

- 31 ~~28~~. CG III MAF 021414Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO MGEN LAVELLE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY - LTCOL MURPHREE
- ~~32 21. CG III MAF 030840Z JUN68 (C)
CUSHMAN TO PALMER
CONGRATULATIONS ON PROMOTION AND ASSIGNMENT~~
- 33 ~~32~~. CG III MAF 040223Z JUN68 (S) *gp-3*
BACKCHANNEL TO KRULAK
CAPTAIN ROBB -- QUOTES INITIAL MSG
- 34 ~~38~~. CG III MAF 040400Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
CONGRATS TO TRUONG FROM CUSHMAN
- ~~35 24. CG III MAF 050830Z JUN68 (C)
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
REQUEST FOR LEAVE IN JULY~~
- 36 ~~35~~. CG III MAF 060732Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN & KRULAK
PASSES ABRAMS' APPROVAL OF LEAVE PLANS
- 37 ~~36~~. CG III MAF 110112Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
ATTACK ON ENEMY ARTY/INSTALLATIONS CAP MUI LAY SECTOR (S)
- 38 ~~37~~. CG III MAF 110156Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS INFO ROSSON
- 39 ~~38~~. RATIONALE FOR MODIFIED POSTURE IN THE KHE SANH AREA
CG III MAF 110500Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS -- EMERGENCY SUPPORT OF CIDG CAMPS

38. CG III MAF 110500Z JUN68 (C)
~~REF CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS~~
 PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT OF CIDG CAMPS
- 40 ~~39.~~ CG III MAF 130900Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS INFO MG KERWIN
 ICTZ CURRENT SITUATION REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING 131500H JUN68
- 41 ~~40.~~ CG III MAF 150036Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS INFO BUSE, ROSSON, BOUKER
 REQUEST VISIT TO SLF AT SUBIC BAY
- 42 ~~41.~~ CG III MAF 151432Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ROSSON & TOLSON INFO ABRAMS
 PHOENIX PROGRAM
- 43 ~~42.~~ CG III MAF 161615Z JUN68 (S) *group - not shown*
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS.
- 44 ~~43.~~ CG III MAF 161628Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ROSSON
 PREPARE FOR ATTACK ON EN ART_/INSTALL CAP MUI LAY SECTOR (S)
- 45 ~~44.~~ CG III MAF 162025Z JUN68 (S) *group - not shown*
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
- 46 ~~45.~~ LGEN CUSHMAN 170044Z JUN68 (S) *group-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG
- 47 ~~46.~~ CG III MAF 170304Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG
- 48 ~~47.~~ CG III MAF 170426Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG
- 49 ~~48.~~ CG III MAF 170817Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG
- 50 ~~49.~~ CG III MAF 170924Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4 52 z.* CG III MAF 171628Z JUN68 *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG
- 51 ~~50.~~ CG III MAF 171222Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4 53 z.* CG III MAF 172036Z JUN68 *gp-4*
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG

NOTE: ALL EXTRA COPIES SCREENED OUT
 AND BURNED ON 5 NOV 1968.

DECLASSIFIED

19. CG III MAF 241250Z JUN68 (TS) *Gp-4*
MAF TO FMFPAC
DEPLOYMENT OF 27TH MARINES

20. CG III MAF 170358Z JUL68 (MCEO) *Gp-4*
TOMPKINS TO CHAPMAN INFO BUSE
ARVN - DUEL BLADE

21. CG III MAF 260752Z JUL68 *Gp-4*
ROSSON TO ABRAMS
PROPOSED OPERATION - ARC LIGHT

22. CG III MAF 290910Z JUL68 *Gp-4*
WHITE BIRCH

DECLASSIFIED

- ~~13 15. CG III MAF 250824Z JUN68 (C)
CUSHMAN TO VAN DYKIN
PLEASED TO CALL ON OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON~~
- ~~14 16. CG III MAF 260130Z JUN68 (C)
CUSHMAN TO WEEDE
RELAY MSG TO MRS WEEDE, PLS~~
- ~~15 17. CG III MAF 260348Z JUN68 (C)
CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN
FLIGHT ITINERARY PLANS~~
- 16 18. CG III MAF 280320Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
CASUALTY REPORTING
- 17 19. CG III MAF 280636Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO GETTYS
SPECIFIC LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL APPLICATION
- 18 20. CG III MAF 290234Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
DASC LOCATION
- 19 21. CG III MAF 290236Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO BUSE INFO CHAPMAN
HYLAND'S MSG ON RESPONSIBILITIES IN ICTZ
- 20 22. CG III MAF 290334Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO BUSE INFO CHAPMAN
PROPOSED MSG TO ABRAMS ON SINGLE MGMT- REQUESTS COMMENTS
- 21 23. CG III MAF 290900Z JUN68 (C) *group-4*
E E ANDERSON TO KERWIN
ALLEGATIONS MADE BY MAJOR MERRIT, USA, SR.ADV. DONG DA TRNG CTR
- 22 24. CG III MAF 300130Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ROSSON
CONGRATS
- ~~23 25. CG III MAF 300132Z JUN68 (C)
CUSHMAN TO SWILWELL
CONGRATS~~
- 24 26. CG III MAF 300502Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO DAVIS
FIREWATCH
- 25 27. CG III MAF 300504Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ROSSON
EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL GUNFIRE (C)
- 26 ✓*
28. CG III MAF 300632Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
PRAIRIE FIRE AVN SUPPORT
- ~~*27*
29. CG III MAF 300730Z JUN68 MCEO
CUSHMAN TO BUSE INFO CHAPMAN
PASSED SOLE MGMT MSG TO ABRAMS~~

~~1. CG III MAF 171628Z JUN68 (S)
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG~~

~~2. CG III MAF 171026Z JUN68 (S)
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG~~

1. CG III MAF 180001Z JUN68 (S) *Group-4*
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG

2. CG III MAF 180256Z JUN68 (S) *Group-4*
CUSHMAN TO DAVIS
PASSES OUR MSG TO ABRAMS ON KHE SANH MODIFIED POSTURE

3. CG III MAF 180425Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG

4. CG III MAF 180815Z JUN68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG

~~5. CG III MAF 190648Z JUN68 (C)
CUSHMAN TO BUCKER INFO CHIEF
CONCURS IN PROPOSED ITINERARY FOR VISIT TO RPT REHAB SUBIC AND
MARCORPS ACTIVITIES, OKE~~

6. CG III MAF 210134Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN & BUSE
RESPONSIBILITIES IN ICTZ

~~7. ADMINO CG III MAF 211350Z JUN68 (U)
CONGRATS TO FIRST WING COMMANDERS~~

~~8. ADM NO CG III MAF 211352Z JUN68 (U)
CONGRATS TO FIRST MARDIV CDRS~~

9. CG III MAF 210614Z JUN68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO DAVIS INFO BUSE & ANDERSON
VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE HELOS (S)

~~10. CG III MAF 211137Z JUN68 (U)
ANDERSON TO THARIN
THARIN'S SON INJURED~~

11. CG III MAF 251320Z JUN68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS INFO ROSSON
REDUCTION OF GROUND MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES (U)

12. CG III MAF 251320Z JUN68 (U) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ROSSON INFO ABRAMS AND DAVIS
TALKING TO THE PRESS - INVESTIGATION OF KHE SANH COMDR STATEMENT

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	30 JUN 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD
	300632Z JUN 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">FOR</div> <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">HAS BEEN SENT</div> <div style="text-align: center; font-style: italic;"> "Cof # 3 & 4 burned 4 Nov 68" </div> <div style="text-align: right; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">26</div>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S				<i>hms</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		301545H		JCF	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT
FOR

PP RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 5330 1820632
ZNY SSSSS
P 300632Z JUN 68
FM CG III MAF LMG
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SGN
BT

SECRET

FOR GENERAL ABRAMS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
PRAIRIE FIRE AVN SPT (U)

A. COMUSMACV 280951Z MAY68

1. REF A TASKS MY COMMAND FOR EIGHT (8) ARMED HELICOPTERS, SIX (6) TROOP CARRIER HELICOPTERS, AND TWO (2) O-1 ACFT.
2. TO MEET THE PRESENT PRAIRIE FIRE SPT, I HAVE LEVIELED FIRST MAW FOR FOUR (4) UH-1E GUNSHIPS AND PROVISIONAL CORPS FOR FOUR (4) GUNSHIPS. THIS REQUIRES OVER 10 PERCENT OF THE MISSION READY GUNSHIPS THAT I HAVE AVAILABLE ON A NORMAL DAY. THIS PERCENTAGE IS BASED ON ALL ARMED HELICOPTERS IN ICTZ EXCEPT THE 39 ROCKET SHIPS IN FIRST AIR CAV DIV.
3. THIS DAILY LOSS IN GUNSHIP SPT SERIOUSLY IMPAIRS FLEXIBILITY. FOR EXAMPLE DURING 7 AND 8 JUNE WHEN III MAF DIVISIONS WERE INVOLVED IN THIRTEEN MAJOR OPERATIONS, AVAILABLE GUNSHIPS FILLED APPROXIMATELY 70 PER CENT OF USMC REQUIREMENTS AND 60 PER CENT

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 5330 SECRET

OF USA REQUIREMENTS. AS A RESULT, AIR MOBILE OPERATIONS, RESUPPLY, AND MEDEVAC MISSIONS WERE CONDUCTED WITHOUT THE VOLUME OF SUPPRESSIVE FIRE NECESSARY TO INSURE THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSIONS IN THE MOST EFFICIENT MANNER.

4. I FULLY REALIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF PRAIRIE FIRE OBJECTIVES; HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT THE BENEFITS RECEIVED THEREFROM DO NOT ALWAYS WARRANT THE AMOUNT OF HELICOPTER SUPPORT WHICH IS DIVERTED FROM CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS.

5. I RECOMMEND THAT THESE REQUIREMENTS BE CLOSELY RE-EXAMINED IN LIGHT OF ANTICIPATED RESULTS AND THAT CONVENTIONAL COMBAT FORCES BE LEVIELED FOR HCPTER SPT ONLY WHEN THE POTENTIAL RETURNS JUSTIFY COMMITMENT OF VITAL ASSETS.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

[REDACTED]

FILE 5 CON 240

CG 111 MAF

30 JUN 68

300504Z JUN 68

1 3

EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL SUNFIRE (C)

S/S COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES
TABLE 4 MAT

CONFIDENTIAL

#25

[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

PP RUMHMB
 DE RUMSAK 53 12 182 35 34
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 330534Z JUN 68
 RM CG III MAF LING
 TO RUMHMB/CG PROV CORPS V CP HOCHVUT H PHU LAI
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

SUBJ: EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL GUNFIRE (C)

1. I HAVE NOTED WITH CONCERN THE HEAVY EXPENDITURE OF NAVAL GUNFIRE IN THE JEB STUART AREA OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS. DURING THIS PERIOD MORE NAVAL GUNFIRE HAS BEEN PLACED IN THE JEB STUART AREA, BY A LARGE MARGIN, THAN ANY OTHER COMPARABLE AREA EXCEPT THE DMZ. OVER 1000 ROUNDS WERE EXPENDED IN THIS AREA ON EACH OF 27 AND 28 JUNE. THIS APPEARS EXCESSIVE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE NEED TO CONSERVE NGF AMMUNITION FOR OPERATION THUR.

2. I WOULD LIKE FOR YOU TO ASSURE THAT NAVAL GUNFIRE IS EMPLOYED ON SUITABLE TARGETS. FOR THE MOST PART THESE SHOULD BE OBSERVED FIRST. NAVAL GUNFIRE IS PARTICULARLY SUITED FOR DESTRUCTION OF HARD TARGETS. IT SHOULD GENERALLY NOT BE EMPLOYED FOR H&I OR GENERAL AREA COVERAGE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ARTILLERY OR ORGANIC INFANTRY WEAPONS. GP-4

BT

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES#25
FLC 2100/5 (1/68)**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 30 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 300502Z JUN 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS FOR HAS BEEN SENT <i>Copy # 3 & 4 burned 4 Nov 68</i> 24 26
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S				<i>[Signature]</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		3014054		<i>[Signature]</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	I				
	G-4	X				
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

SECRET**FOR****HAS BEEN SENT**

PP RUMWP
 DE RUMSAK 5309 182050Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 300502Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMWP/CG THIRD MARL IV LHCE
 BT

S E C R E T
 FOR MGEN DAVIS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 FIREWATCH (U)

A. CG THIRD MARL IV MSG 270112Z JUN 68
 1. SERVICEABLE 10 KW GENERATORS NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE.
 HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY TWELFTH MARINES THAT 7.5 KW
 WILL BE SATISFACTORY. TWO 7.5 GENERATORS FROM FLC AIR-
 LIFTED COMBAT ESSENTIAL AND ARRIVED PLSG-BRAVO AT 291600H
 TWELFTH MARINES ARE ARRANGING FOR TRANSPORT TO FIREWATCH
 SITE.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

#24

CONFIDENTIAL

HAS BEEN SENT

OP RUMDIB
DE RIMSAR 5269 1528130
ZNY 00000
P 300130Z JUN 68
FM CG III MAF DRC
TO CG PROV CORPS V CP HOCHIMINH PHU LAM
BT

EXCLUSIVE

CONFIDENTIAL
SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ROSSON FROM LTGEN COSMAN
AS YOUR TOUR OF DUTY AS COMMANDING GENERAL, PROVISIONAL
CORPS VIETNAM COMES TO A CLOSE, I WANT TO TAKE THIS
OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND MY APPRECIATION AND CONGRATULATIONS
FOR AN OUTSTANDING JOB WELL DONE. THE PROFESSIONALISM,
DEDICATION AND ENTHUSIASM EXHIBITED BY THE OFFICERS AND
MEN OF PROVISIONAL CORPS VIETNAM ARE A FINE REFLECTION
OF YOUR OUTSTANDING QUALITIES AS A FIGHTING GENERAL.
UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP, PROVISIONAL CORPS VIETNAM HAS
DEVELOPED INTO A SUPERB FIGHTING ORGANIZATION. MY BEST
WISHES FOR YOUR CONTINUED SUCCESS. WARM PERSONAL REGARDS.
JP-4
BT

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

#22
FLC 2100/5 (1/68)

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE
ORIGINATOR			CG III MAF		29 JUNE 68
ACTION / COGNIZANCE			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE		
COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION					COPY # 1, 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD
INFORMATION			INITIAL		SUBJECT
SIGNATURE					MAJOR LAVELL MERRIT
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		REMARKS
			IN	OUT	
	CG				
	DCG				
	DCG AIR				
2	C/S				
	D C/S				
	D C/S DM				
1	S/S	30021029			
	G-1				
	G-2				
	G-3				
	G-4				
	G-5				
	G-6				
	ADJ				
	CAP				
	CORDS				
	EMB/TRANS				
	ENGR				
	H&S CO				
	INSP				
	MTO				
	OP ANAL				
	ORD				
	PSY OPS				
	SUPPLY				
	S&C				

*"Cy # 2 burned
+ Nov 68"*

3

CONFIDENTIAL #21

550 HAGV

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLEGATIONS MADE BY MAJOR LAVELL MERRIT, USA, SR. ADV.

DONG DA TRAINING CENTER

DURING VISIT TO DONG DA TRAINING CENTER, IN CONNECTION

WITH REAL ESTATE MATTERS, LTCOL VON ORDE, USMC, AND LT

COL MITCHUM, USN, HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SUBJECT

OFFICER.

THE SERIOUS NATURE OF VARIOUS ALLEGATIONS MADE BY

MAJOR MERRIT, DURING THE COURSE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS,

IS SUCH THAT AN OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION BY MACV

IS WARRANTED.

IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED

SWIFTLY AND THIS COMMAND AND PCV WILL PROVIDE ANY

NECESSARY ASSISTANCE.

A

*Referenced
msg*

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FOR

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 29 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 290334Z JUN 68		COPY# OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY Copy #2 to DC6 Air 30 Jun 68 <i>whyts</i> Copy #3 to Air Control 30 Jun 68 <i>ym</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

#20

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVEOO RUMKM RUEBHOA
DE RUMSAK 5118 181033A

ZNY SSSSS

PAC - CMC

O 290834Z JUN 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUEBHOA/CMC

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE, INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM
LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION 1 OF 2

REF: A. CG FMFPAC MSG 200035Z JUN68

B. CG FMFPAC MSG 222262Z JUN68

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE PROPOSED MESSAGE TO GEN ABRAMS
OUTLINING MY VIEWS ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOLLOWING THE JUNE
TRIAL PERIOD: QUOTE

FROM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV SAIGON

BT

SECRET

III MAF EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT/STRIKE SUPPORT PROCEDURES (C)

A. COMUSMACV LTR MACJOO OF 2MARG8 (S)

B. COMUSMACV 14578 MSG 211145Z MAY68 (S)

C. COMUSMACV 16352 MSG 071135Z JUN68 (C)

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 5118 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

D. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4, 28 JUNE 1966 (C)

1. (C) OBJECTIVE OF REF A WAS TO ACHIEVE INCREASED EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, PRINCIPALLY BY PROVIDING:A. GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF TOTAL STRIKE
RESOURCES AVAILABLE.B. IMPROVING RESPONSIVENESS TO THE AIR SUPPORT REQUIRE-
MENTS OF GROUND TACTICAL COMMANDERS.C. SIMPLIFICATION OF PROCEDURES AND REDUCTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN.2. (U) REF C DIRECTED A 30-DAY EVALUATION OF THE MODIFIED
PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE FOMULGATED BY REF B, IN ORDER TO
ASSESS PROGRESS OF THE SYSTEM AND TO IDENTIFY NECESSARY
PROCEDURAL CHANGES. COVERAGE OF THE FOLLOWING WAS REQUESTED
AND WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THE ORDER LISTED:

A. FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM.

B. EVALUATION.

C. CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS AND APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS.

3. FUNCTIONING OF THE SYSTEM.

A. THE LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE WORK
LOAD PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF REF APAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUNSAK 5118 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOB
 HAVE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE INSTITUTION OF THE
 PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN REF B. HOWEVER, BOTH FACTORS CAN BE
 IMPROVED WITH RELATIVELY MINOR MODIFICATIONS. IN ADDITION,
 FULLY ADEQUATE PROCEDURES ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR ARTILLERY
 COORDINATION WITH AIR OR AIRCRAFT DIVERSION AROUND DANGER
 AREA.

4. EVALUATION OF THE SYSTEM.

A. ADMINISTRATION - UNDER REF B THE ADMINISTRATIVE
 WORK LOAD WAS LESSEMED BY REDUCTION IN THE LENGTH AND COMPLEXITY
 OF FRAGS AND REQUEST DATA; HOWEVER, THE BURDEN IS STILL
 EXCESSIVE. THIS IS DUE TO THE CURRENT DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG
 PROCEDURES AND DETAILED SCHEDULING THROUGH THE TACC. IT IS
 NOTED THAT DURING THE TEST PERIOD, THE SORTIES ASSIGNED 1ST MAF
 BY THE DAILY FRAG WERE ESSENTIALLY AS UNVARYING AS THOSE IN THE
 WEEKLY FRAG. FURTHER, BASED UPON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THIS
 HEADQUARTERS, THERE WERE NO DIVERTS FROM I CORPS DAILY SORTIES
 TO OTHER CORPS AREAS. CONSEQUENTLY, INASMUCH AS COMUSMACV HAS
 FREEMPTION AUTHORITY OVER ALL SORTIES AND THE CENTRAL CONTROL
 AGENCY (7TH AF TACC) IS FULLY INFORMED OF SORTIE STATUS AND
 CAPABILITIES, THE DAILY FRAG PROCEDURES APPEAR TO BE AN UNNECESSARY

PAGE 4 RUNSAK 5118 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOB
 COMPLEXITY IN ICIZ.

B. (C) EFFICIENCY - THE PROVISIONS OF REF B BROUGHT
 IMPROVED EFFICIENCY IN SORTIE ALLOCATION, BUT OPTIMUM USE OF
 SORTIES WAS NOT REALIZED. THIS IS EVIDENCED IN I CORPS BY THE
 HIGH NUMBER OF SCRAMBLE AND ADD-ON SORTIES TO MEET THE DAILY
 NEEDS OF GROUND COMMANDERS, RESULTING IN THE 1ST MAF BEING
 FORCED TO CONTINUALLY EXCEED PLANNED LEVELS OF SORTIE PRODUCTION.
 OUR ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE PREPLANNED SORTIE LEVEL DOES
 NOT PROVIDE THE GROUND COMMANDER IN I CORPS WITH THE NUMBER
 OF SORTIES HE DESIRES, AND THE SORTIES AVAILABLE ON THE PREPLANNED
 FRAG ARE NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE TO THE GROUND COMMANDER IN SUFFI-
 CIENT NUMBERS AT THE CRITICAL TIMES NEEDED TO INFLUENCE THE
 TACTICAL SITUATION. THEREFORE, ADDITIONAL SORTIES IN THE FORM
 OF SCRAMBLES ARE REQUIRED. OF COURSE, SCHEDULES FOR SORTIE
 PRODUCTION, WHEN APPROACHED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MAXIMUM
 EFFICIENCY ON THE PART OF AIR UNITS, RARELY COINCIDE WITH THE
 TOTS REQUIRED BY THE GROUND SCHEMES OF MANEUVER. BASE LOCATIONS
 AND AIRCRAFT RADIUS OF ACTION STRONGLY INFLUENCE ORDNANCE
 LOADS, A/C TURN AROUNDS, AND TIME ON TARGETS. ADJUSTMENTS AND
 COORDINATIONS BETWEEN THESE REQUIREMENTS CAN BEST BE MADE

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

20

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUNSAK 5118 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEQ
 LOCALLY, THUS ENSURING GREATER SORTIE EFFECTIVENESS AND
 PRODUCTION.

C. (C) CONCENTRATION OF AIR EFFORT - THE DAILY PRE-
 PLANNED FRAG WAS INSTITUTE, INTER ALIA, TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY
 TO CONCENTRATE THE AIR EFFORT AS DICTATED BY THE ENEMY THREAT.
 DURING THE TEST PERIOD, WHICH ENDED 270600H JUN, THIS EMERGENCY
 MASSING AND DIVERSION OF AIR EFFORT FROM I CORPS WAS NOT EN-
 PLOYED, EXCEPT FOR A REDUCTION IN TAC AIR AVAILABLE TO I CORPS
 TO 25 PERCENT OF TOTAL IN-COUNTRY TAC AIR SORTIES COMMENCING
 260600H FOR THE REMAINDER OF THAT MONTH. THE CHANGE IN THE WEIGHT
 OF THE AIR EFFORT WAS DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO INCREASE THE OUT-OF-
 COUNTRY SORTIES TO 35 PERCENT OF TOTAL STRIKES AVAILABLE (SEE MACV
 MSG 230757Z JUNE). ALSO, THE DAILY PREPLANNED MISSION CHANGED LITTLE
 FROM DAY TO DAY. RATHER THAN CONTINUING THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN
 AND COMPLEXITY OF THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG, MARINE SORTIES IN
 I CORPS COULD BE MORE EFFICIENTLY EMPLOYED BY ALLOCATION OF A
 BLOCK OF MARINE SORTIES TO BE SCHEDULED IN I CORPS.

D. (C) PRODUCTION OF SORTIES: DURING THE TEST PERIOD MARINE
 FIXED WING AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, BASED OR POSSESSED AIR-
 CRAFT IN COUNTRY AGAINST A 1.2 SORTIE RATE, WERE PROGRAMMED AT 220

PAGE 6 RUNSAK 5118 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEQ
 SORTIES PER DAY. OF THIS NUMBER, 16 WERE ROUTINELY EMPLOYED
 IN NIGHT INTERDICTION MISSIONS OUT OF COUNTRY; 46 SORTIES WERE
 EMPLOYED AS SCRAMBLES TO MEET EMERGENCY NEEDS OF ALL FORCES
 IN I CORPS; 18 WERE DESIGNATED FOR HELICOPTER ESCORT, AND
 143 SORTIES WERE SCHEDULED BY THE COMUSMACV DEPUTY COMMANDER
 FOR AIR OPERATIONS THROUGH THE TACC AT SAIGON. OF THE 143
 SORTIES, 79 PERCENT OR 111, WERE SCHEDULED BY THE WEEKLY FRAG AT
 SET TIMES AND WITH STANDARD ORDNANCE LOADS; THE REMAINING 32
 WERE SCHEDULED DAILY, BASED ON INDIVIDUAL TARGETS REQUESTED
 THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. THE 1ST MAW, TO MEET THE NEEDS
 OF FORCES IN I CORPS, ALSO AVERAGED AN ADDITIONAL 18 SORTIES
 PER DAY, EMPLOYED BY SCRAMBLE AND ADD-ON MISSIONS (FOR A
 DAILY AVERAGE OF 243 ATTACK SORTIES).

2. SUMMARY/RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. (C) SUMMARY:

THE MODIFIED SYSTEM IS AN IMPROVEMENT, A STEP
 FORWARD FROM THE CUMBERSOME SYSTEM IMPLEMENTED ON 20 MARCH.
 AIR FORCE SORTIES HAVE IMPROVED GREATLY UNDER THE SYSTEM IN FACT,
 A 94 PERCENT INCREASE IN AIR FORCE SORTIES HAS BEEN REALIZED DURING
 THE TEST PERIOD, WHICH IS COMMENDABLE. STILL, THE SYSTEM
 IS

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

20

SECRET

OO RUMKM RUEBHQA
 DE RUMSAK 5136 161334
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC -T- CMC
 O 290334Z JUN 68
 FM CG IIX MAF ENG
 TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHQA/CMC
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN DUSE, INFO GEN CHAIRMAN FROM
 LTGEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF 2
 CONTINUES TO HARBOR DEFICIENCIES. THE WEEKLY AND DAILY FRAG,
 WHILE IMPROVING THE SYSTEM OF THE ORIGINAL SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 DIRECTIVE, HAS REQUIRED AN INORDINATELY HIGH NUMBER OF SCRAMBLES AND
 ADD-ON SORTIES BY MARINE AIRCRAFT IN I CORPS. CONSEQUENTLY THE
 1ST MAW HAS BEEN FORCED TO CONTINUALLY EXCEED PLANNED LEVELS OF
 SORTIE PRODUCTION. AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE PRESENT
 SYSTEM INDICATES THAT THE PREPLANNED SORTIE LEVEL DOES NOT
 PROVIDE THE GROUND COMMANDER WITH ALL THE SORTIES HE REQUIRES.
 FURTHERMORE, TIMES ASSIGNED A WEEK IN ADVANCE DO NOT PERMIT
 SURGE AIR EFFORTS IN RESPONSE TO THE CHANGING TACTICAL
 SITUATIONS FACING THE GROUND COMMANDER, THEREBY REQUIRING
 INCREASED SCRAMBLES. THE LENGTH OF THE AIR REQUEST CHAIN AND
 THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN IMPOSED BY THE DAILY PREPLANNED FRAG

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 5136 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGED
 ARE STILL EXCESSIVE. THE DAILY PREPLANNED MISSIONS ALSO
 APPEAR MORE SUITABLE FOR WEEKLY FRAGGING SINCE THEY HAVE CHANGED
 LITTLE FROM DAY TO DAY.

B. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE TO ACCOMMODATE
 THE NEED FOR COMUSMACV TO DISTRIBUTE THE WEIGHT OF AIR EFFORT
 IN SUPPORT OF HIS TACTICAL PLANS AND TO MEET EMERGENCY AND
 CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS THROUGHOUT RVN:

(1) THAT THE PRESENT INTEGRATED AIR CONTROL SYSTEM
 BE RETAINED, BUT IMPROVED BY PROVIDING FOR FULL COORDINATION OF
 SURFACE SUPPORTING ARMS WITH TACTICAL AIR.

(2) THAT THE NUMBER OF MARINE STRIKE SORTIES SET
 ASIDE BY COMUSMACV FOR OUT-OF-COUNTRY AIR EFFORT (CURRENTLY
 16 SORTIES PER DAY) BE FRAGGED BY THE TACC CONSISTENT WITH
 OVERALL INTERDICTION PLANS.

(3) THAT ALL OTHER MARINE STRIKE SORTIES (CURRENTLY
 269 INCLUDING 111 WEEKLY AND 38 DAILY PREPLANNED SORTIES AS
 WELL AS THE 48 SCRAMBLES AND 13 HELO ESCORT MISSIONS) BE ASSIGNED
 TO CG IIX MAF AS A WEEKLY SORTIE BLOCK. TIMES ON TARGET AND
 ORDNANCE LOADS TO BE DETERMINED BY CG IIX MAF BASED ON THE

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 5136 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
TACTICAL NEEDS OF MARINE AND ARMY DIVISIONS.

(4) THAT, AS NECESSARY, EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS
ARISING OUTSIDE I CORPS BE MET BY COMUSMACV PREEMPTION OF
SORTIES SCHEDULED IN I CORPS IAW REF D.

(5) THAT III MAF (THROUGH I LASC) INFORM COMUSMACV
BY DIRECT LINE TO TACC OF ALL MARINE SORTIES SCHEDULED IN
I CORPS AND BY COPY OF THE 1ST MAW FRAG. REAL TIME REPORTS
WILL BE MADE TO AIR FORCE CRC, (PANAMA AND TACC), AS SORTIES
ARE FLOWN.

(6) THAT IN RECOGNITION OF AIR FORCE BASE
LOCATION AND LOADINGS, PREPLANNED AIR FORCE SORTIES, TOTS, AND
ORDNANCE LOADS BE ADJUSTED THROUGH REQUESTS AND COORDINATION
BETWEEN III MAF, COMUSMACV TASE AND TACC. AIR FORCE SORTIES
SUPPORTING FORCES IN I CORPS CONTINUE AS CURRENTLY DIRECTED BY
COMUSMACV AND SCHEDULED BY TACC.

(7) THAT THE INITIAL POINT (IP) BE ELIMINATED
FROM THE WEEKLY FRAG. THE CORRECT IP IS CONTINGENT UPON
ASSIGNMENT OF A SPECIFIC III MAF SUBORDINATE TO BE SUPPORTED.
UNTIL THE WEEKLY FRAG IS RECEIVED BY III MAF AND SUBALLOCATED
TO ITS SUBORDINATES, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE A CORRECT

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 5136 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
IP. I DASC AND DASC VICTOR ARE PASSING NIGHTLY TO 7TH AF
AND FMAW THE CORRECT IP FOR EACH MISSION ON THE WEEKLY AND
DAILY FRAG.

(8) THAT, IN THE CASE OF I CORPS, CONSIDERATION
BE GIVEN TO ADOPTION OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE COACT,
MARINE SPINX REPORT, AND INFORMATION ON DIVERTS FROM I DASC
TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS ON MARINE AIR FOR THE CONSOLIDATED
MISSION REPORT.

(9) THAT THE COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE OF 7 MARCH (REF A)
BE REVISED TO INCORPORATE THE ABOVE REFINEMENTS TO THE SINGLE
MANAGER TACTICAL AIR CONCEPT.

GP-4 UNQUOTE

2. YOUR VIEWS ON THIS PROPOSED MESSAGE ARE SOLICITED
EARLIEST, AS MY REPLY MUST BE TO COMUSMACV BY 010700H JUL 68.
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

20

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

OO RUMKY RUEBHOA
DE RUMSAK 4446 1811327
ZNY SSSSS
PAC -I- CMC
BT

SECRET SVC SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
ZUI RUMSAK 5118 1813534 292554Z JUN 68 SECTION 1 OF 2
DE PAGE 5 LN 10 AA COMMENCING AD FOR TO READ 260522H JUNE 68
BT

SECRET

#20

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FOR

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 29 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 290236Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY "Cg #2003 burned 4 Nov 68"
3	DCG				Ruel	
4	DCG AIR					
7	C/S					
	D C/S			7/7		
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		291600		Jen	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #79

SECRET

PP RUKM RUEBHOA
 DE RUNSAK 5114 1819236
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC -T- CMC
 P 290236Z JUN 68
 RM CG III MAF
 TO RUKM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN EUSE INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM
 LTGEN CUSHMAN. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. MARINE CORPS
 EYES ONLY.

1. IN REFERENCE TO VETH'S MESSAGE TO JOHNNY HYLAND, MY VIEWS AND
 INTENTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. MY POSITION ON THE MATTER OF TRANSPLACEMENT OF MAJOR
 FORCES WITHIN ICIZ AND/OR CHANGE IN MACV-III MAF-PCV COMMAND
 RELATIONS AT THIS TIME OR IN THE NEAR FUTURE IS THAT IT IS NOT
 ADVISABLE.

B. THE WORKING PAPER DISTRIBUTED AT THE 25 JUNE MEETING AS
 A GUIDE DOES NOT REPRESENT OFFICIAL MACV POSITION THOUGH IT MUST
 BE RECOGNIZED AS PROBABLY REFLECTING A STRONG SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
 WITHIN THE MACV STAFF. THAT THOUGHT IS MANIFESTED IN THE STATEMENT
 OF THE PROBLEM IN THE WORKING PAPER THUSLY: QUOTE. INVESTIGATE THE
 FEASIBILITY, DESIRABILITY AND TIMING OF A REASSIGNMENT OF SEPARATE

PAGE 2 RUNSAK 5114 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN ICIZ AS FOLLOWS: (A) PROVISIONAL CORPS
 VIETNAM NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES OF ICIZ (OPERATE IN THE SAME MANNER
 AS A FIELD FORCE). (B) III MAF SOUTHERN THREE PROVINCES OF ICIZ.
 UNQUOTE. OTHER SIGNIFICANT REVELATIONS IN THE WORKING PAPER INCLUDE
 PROPOSITION THAT TRANSPLACEMENTS OF MAJOR UNITS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED
 PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF THE NE MONSOON SEASON. IT IS MY VIEW THAT
 SUCH A REASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES COUPLED WITH THE ACCOMPLISH-
 MENT OF UNI-SERVICE ALIGNMENT OF FORCES PRIOR TO THE MONSOON SEASON
 IS IMPRACTICAL AS WELL AS INADVISABLE.

C. IT IS MY INTENTION TO PROVIDE REPRESENTATIVES TO PART-
 ICIPATE IN THE PREPARATION OF THE STUDY. THEIR PURPOSE WILL BE
 TO REFLECT MY VIEWS AND TO INSURE THAT OBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS ARE
 APPLIED TO THE IMPACT OF ADOPTING THE PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION OR
 ANY OTHER ALTERNATIVES THAT MAY COME UNDER CONSIDERATION.

D. GEN ROSSON CONTINUES TO SHARE MY VIEWS THAT CURRENT
 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND PROJECTED TROOP DISPOSITIONS SHOULD NOT
 BE DISTURBED AT THIS CRUCIAL PERIOD OF THE CONFLICT.

E. THOUGH THERE ARE SOME DISTINCT ADVANTAGES TO BE REALIZED
 IN REALIGNMENT OF THE MARINE FORCES INCLUDING GROUND, AVIATION
 AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT UNITS, IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO ATTEMPT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#19

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 5 114 SE C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO
 ACHIEVEMENT PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER. IT WOULD BE ALSO POOR JUDGEMENT
 TO MAKE MAJOR TRANSPLACEMENTS DURING THE MONSOONS. HOWEVER, IF
 COMUSMACV DECIDES TO TRANSPLACE THE 35 MARB IV AND THE AMERICAL,
 MY POSITION WILL BE THAT THE EARLIEST PRACTICAL TIME TO
 CONSIDER CHANGES OF THIS NATURE IS LATE SPRING 1969. THERE ARE
 ALSO DIFFICULT PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED IN THE AREAS OF CORDS
 FUNCTIONS, ADVISORY GROUP OPERATIONS, RELATIONS WITH GEN LAN, AND
 LOGISTICS. I HAVE NOT YET SEEN ANY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#19

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 5113 151234
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 290234Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 I DASC LOCATION (U)

- A. 7H AF 141245Z MAR 68
- B. COMUSMACV 0775G LTG 190154Z MAR 68
- C. 366 CMBISPTIGRF DNG 160022Z APR 68
- D. CG III MAF 240220Z MAY 68
- E. COMUSMACV 15079 LTG 260207Z MAY 68
- F. ADMINS III MAF 280704Z MAY 68
- G. CG III MAF 150544Z JUN 68

1. REFERENCES (A), (B) AND (C) ALL CONCUR THAT THE FINAL AND MOST DESIRABLE LOCATION FOR I DASC IS AT ACHANG MY COC. REF (D) ADVISED OF THE AVAILABILITY OF SPACE WITHIN MY HEADQUARTERS FOR I DASC AND EXPRESSED MY DESIRE FOR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT. REF (E) STATED THAT ALL

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 5113 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR AGENCIES AND SERVICES WERE READY TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE AND EQUIPMENT AND REQUESTED A FIRM DATE FOR RELOCATION FROM I CORPS HEADQUARTERS. I RESPONDED ON 28 MAY (SEE REF F) OUTLINING IN DETAIL MY REQUIREMENTS AND ON 15 JUNE, IN REF (G), I REQUESTED TO BE ADVISED AS TO THE CURRENT STATUS OF MY REQUEST COM ACHANG IN REF (F).

2. THE PHYSICAL FACILITIES ARE BEING MOVED AT THE PRESENT TIME, BUT UNTIL I RECEIVE THE REQUESTED ASSISTANCE I WILL BE UNABLE TO MOVE FURTHER FORWARD ON THE RELOCATION OF I DASC AT III MAF HEADQUARTERS.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

#18

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	28 JUN 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD
	280636Z JUN 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SPECIFIC LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL APPLICATION (U)
			IN	OUT		
7	CG					REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT FOR <i>Copies 3 & 4 burned 4 Nov 68</i>
	DCG			4/9	Power	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		281500	June	ICT	
	G-1					
	G-2	X				
	G-3	SI				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HAS BEEN SENT

PP RUMHIC
 DE RUMSAK 5332 1802636
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 280636Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF LMG
 TO RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI
 BT

FOR

CONFIDENTIAL
 FOR MGEN GETTYS FROM LGTN CUSHMAN
 SPECIFIC LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL APPLICATION (U)
 A. CG III MAF 190158Z JUN 68 (III MAF SICR 54-68)
 1. I AM SURE THAT WE SHARE THE FEELING THAT WE ARE NOT SATISFIED
 WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE OF THE 3D NVA DIVISION, ITS DISPOSITION AND
 ITS INTENTIONS. (REF A PERTAINS) BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULAR
 VANTAGE OFFERED BY THE CILG CAMPS, SPECIFICALLY, IN THIS CASE,
 GIA VUC, BA TO, MINH LONG, HA THANH AND TRA BONG, I HAVE TASKED
 CO C 5TH SFGA, TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ACQUIRE
 INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE 3D NVA DIVISION ELEMENTS IN QUANG NGAI.
 2. IN THIS SAME CONNECTION, I SHOULD LIKE YOU TO LOOK INTO THE
 POSSIBILITY OF TARGETING YOUR LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL
 ASSETS AGAINST SUSPECTED AREAS OF 3D NVA DIVISION OCCUPATION FOR
 THE PURPOSE OF ACQUIRING SUBSTANTIAL COLLATERAL INFORMATION
 REGARDING THE DIVISION, WITH THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF DETERMIN-

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 5332 CONFIDENTIAL
 ING THE LOCATION OF SOUND TARGETS FOR B-52 OR TACTICAL AIR
 STRIKES. TACTICAL AIR STRIKES SHOULD BE PROGRAMMED BY YOU ON
 SUITABLE TARGETS THAT MAY BE DEVELOPED BY THE RECONNAISSANCE
 EFFORT. B-52 STRIKES SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR THOSE CASE WHERE
 A MAJOR TARGET IS INDICATED AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM THIS
 HEADQUARTERS.

GP-4
 BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES#17
FLC 2100/5 (1/68)**CONFIDENTIAL**

TOP SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

PP RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 5912 182032Z
ZNY SSSSS

P 23032Z JUN 68
FM CG III MAF DNG
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SGN
BT

EXCLUSIVE

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN AERAMS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
4. COMUSMACV 8315 LTG 230757Z JUN68

1. PARAGRAPH 2. A. OF REFERENCE (A) CONTAINS FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CASUALTY FIGURES WHICH DIFFER BY A WIDE MARGIN FROM THOSE WHICH I HOLD FOR ICTZ FOR THE PERIOD OF COVERAGE SPECIFIED. THE FIGURES SHOWN IN REF (A) ARE 47 FRIENDLY AND 557 ENEMY KIA DURING THE PERIOD 140001H AND 232400H. MY RECORDS INDICATE THAT THERE WERE 170 FRIENDLY KIA (INCLUDING US, ARVN, AND ROKMC) AND 1359 ENEMY (TOTAL KILLS BY US FORCES, ARVN, ROKMC, AND CILG). WHILE I REALIZE THAT CASUALTY FIGURES WILL VARY SOMEWHAT DEPENDING ON WHETHER THEY ARE RAW FIGURES FROM SIX HOUR SITREPS OR REFINED FIGURES FROM LATER UPDATES, I DO NOT BELIEVE THEY SHOULD DIFFER TO THE EXTENT INDICATED ABOVE. THE COMMANDER'S DAILY SUMMARY WHICH I SUBMIT TO YOU EACH DAY CONTAINS UP TO DATE CASUALTY FIGURES WHICH CHANGE VERY LITTLE ON FURTHER REFINEMENT AND APPEARS TO BE THE BEST SOURCE FOR CASUALTY FIGURES. WARM REGARDS. GP-4
BT

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 25 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 251320		COPY# 1,2 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CB					REMARKS COPY 2 burned 4 Nov 68
2	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
	S/S	2607301			Jca	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #12

0 251320Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO SSO PCV
INFO SSO MACV
CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEM

SECRET
DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO LGEN ROSSON AND MGEN DAVIS
DELIVER FIRST DUTY HOUR TO GEN ABRAMS
FOR LGEN ROSSON INFO GEN ABRAMS AND MGEN DAVIS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
REFERENCE A. COMSUMACV 251012Z JUN68 (NOTAL)
1. PLEASE TAKE REF A FOR ACTION. I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE
RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION REQUESTED IN PARA 4 OF REF A
NLT 1800, 26 JUNE.

GP-4
102

NNNN

#12

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 25 JUN 68
		SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 251320Z JUN 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT REDUCTION OF GROUND MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES (U)
			IN	OUT		
	CG					<p>REMARKS</p> <p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><i>"Copies 2 + 3 burned 4 Nov 68"</i></p> <p><i>11</i></p>
<i>2</i>	DCG				<i>Released copy</i>	
	DCG AIR				<i>copy</i>	
<i>1</i>	C/S				<i>a</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		<i>27070010</i>		<i>scr</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE****HAS BEEN SENT**

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 35 16 1771320
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 25 1322Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SGN
 INFO RUMMA/CG PCV CP HOCHMUTH
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO
 LGEN ROSSON FROM LGEN CUSIMAN
 REDUCTION OF GROUND MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES (U)
 A. COMUSMACV MAC 8148 222429Z JUN 68
 1. CONCUR WITH PLAN OF REF A FOR REDUCTIONS OF GROUND MUNITIONS
 EXPENDITURES OF HIGH DOLLAR VALUE. PLANNED SAVINGS OF FIVE
 PERCENT WITH POTENTIAL SAVINGS OF TEN PERCENT CONSIDERED
 REASONABLE GOAL.
 2. ACTUAL SAVINGS OVER ANY TIME PERIOD WILL VARY SIGNIFICANTLY
 WITH TACTICAL SITUATION. THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT PLAN INCLUDE
 PROCEDURES FOR MAKING ENTIRE TEN PERCENT AVAILABLE TO CORPS
 COMMANDERS ON SHORT NOTICE SHOULD TACTICAL SITUATION REQUIRE.
 CP-A
 BT

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 8210 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COORDINATOR C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 24 JUN 68	
			SERIAL/CONTROL DATE 241250Z JUN 68		COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
3 4 5	CG					REMARKS FLASH MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
C/S						
D C/S						
D C/S DM						
1	S/S			242230H		
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	S&C					

TOP SECRET #19

TOP SECRET

FLASH

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

ZZ RUHKM
 DE RUMSAK 3350 176125 Z
 ZNY TTTTT
 Z 241250Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF LING
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 BT

TOP SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DEPLOYMENT OF 27TH MAR FROM VIETNAM (IS)

1. MACV HAS INQUIRED INFORMALLY AS TO WHEN 27TH MARINES CAN BE RELEASED FOR DEPLOYMENT FROM VIETNAM. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN POSED BY CINCPAC AND THAT AN ANSWER IS REQUIRED NLT 25 JUNE OUR TIME. ASSUMPTION IS MADE BY MACV THAT 1ST BDE 5TH MECH DIV WILL BE IN PLACE IN VIETNAM BY 1 AUG.

2. FOLLOWING FACTORS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED:

A. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE IT WILL TAKE THREE OR FOUR WEEKS FOR 1ST BDE, 5TH MECH TO SHAKE DOWN AND BE EFFECTIVE AS A COMBAT FORCE.

B. IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR 27TH MARINES TO BE RELIEVED IN PLACE BY ANOTHER UNIT. PREFERRED UNIT WOULD BE 1ST MARINES. 1ST MARINES COULD BE MOVED FROM NORTHERN QUANG TRI TO LANANG AREA IN A TEN DAY PERIOD.

3. OUR ESTIMATE IS AS FOLLOWS:

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 3350 TOP SECRET MCEO

1-20 AUG - 1/5 MECH SHAKES DOWN.

20 AUG - 1SEP - 1ST MAR DEPLOYS TO LANANG AS FOLLOWS: ONE BN BY 24 AUG, NEXT BN BY 27 AUG, LAST BN BY 30 AUG. 1ST MAR RELIEVES 27TH MAR BY 5 SEPT. 27TH MAR READY FOR AIRLIFT BY 10 SEP OR FOR SEALIFT BY 15 SEP.

4. REQUEST ANY GUIDANCE WHICH YOU MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE FOR RESPONDING TO MACV QUERY.

GP-4
 BT

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		21 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
			210614Z JUN 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT <i>3 Copies 2 & 3 burned 4/17/68</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S				<i>a</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		<i>220820H</i>		<i>VCK</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3				<i>Pto</i>	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #9

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT

OO RUMK4
 DE RUMSAK 2827 1730614
 ZNY SSSSS
 0210614Z JUN-68
 FM CG III MAF

→ TO RUMKVP/CG THIRD MARB IV
 INFO RUMKIM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAV/CG FIRST MAF
 RUMKVA/CG FIRST MARB IV
 BT

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN DAVIS INFO LOEN BUSE, MGEN ANDERSON,
 AND MGEN ROBERTSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE HELIOS (S)

1. UNDERSTAND YOUR PROBLEM AND APPRECIATE YOUR DESIRE FOR
 INCREASED AND MORE EFFECTIVE VR IN YOUR DIVISION AO. I'M SURE THAT
 YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THIS PROBLEM IS NOT PECULIAR TO YOUR AREA BUT
 OBTAINS THROUGHOUT ICIZ.
2. I FAVOR OBTAINING THE MOST EFFECTIVE AIRFRAME FOR THIS
 MISSION WHETHER IT BE THE OH-6, ANOTHER HELIO OR PERHAPS A
 FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, TO OBTAIN A DOZEN OR SO OH-6'S FOR
 YOUR AO, AS YOU RECOMMENDED, NOT ONLY AFFECTS THE AIRCRAFT
 STRUCTURE OF THE 1ST MAF BUT PERSONNEL SPACES AS WELL, BOTH
 AVIATOR AND GROUND.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2827 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCOO

3. INASMUCH AS THIS IS A III MAF OPERATIONAL PROBLEM, I
 INTEND TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM YOUR
 COMMAND, 1ST MAF, 1ST MARB IV, AND MY STAFF TO DISCUSS THIS
 ENTIRE MATTER. FOLLOWING THIS, I'LL MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOM-
 MENDATIONS TO CG FMFPAC.

GP-4

BT

SECRET
 # 7

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 21 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 210134Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT RESPONSIBILITIES IN CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (U)
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT "Copies 2 & 3 burned 4 Nov 68"
2	DCG					
3	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		21/3/68			
	G-1					
	G-2					
2	G-3	X				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #6

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

VP RUMM RUEBHQA
 DT RUMSAK 2792 1730134
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC 21- CMC
 P 210134Z JUN 68
 RM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUEBHQA/CMC
 RUMM/CS DMFAC
 IR

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LOEN BUSE FROM
 LOEN BUSMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 RESPONSIBILITIES IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (CZ)
 1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE DTG 182536Z JUNE 68 FROM COMUSMACV TO
 COMNAVFORV, CG USARV, CG PCV, CG III MAF AND OR TTH AS IS QUOTED
 FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:

1. (S) RESPONSIBILITY IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (CZ)
 2. (S) A STUDY IS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY WITHIN THIS HEADQUARTERS
 TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF REASSIGNING
 RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN ICZ.

3. (S) AREAS UNDER EXAMINATION INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO
 THE FOLLOWING:

- A. OPERATIONS.
- B. LOGISTICS.

1. (S) 2 RUMSAK 2792 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO.

- C. COMMUNICATIONS.
- D. CAPABILITY OF FORCES.
- E. COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS.
- F. TERRAIN.

4. (S) IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT ALL ADDRESSEES WILL DESIRE TO
 PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. REQUEST THAT ADDRESSEES PROVIDE A
 REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND A PRELIMINARY MEETING AT THIS HEAD-
 QUARTERS (ROOM 2100) AT 0800 HOURS, 25 JUNE 68. FURTHER REQUEST
 THAT THE NAMES OF SUCH REPRESENTATIVES BE PROVIDED TO THIS
 HEADQUARTERS, TELEPHONE MACV 2186 OR 3964, NLT 21 JUNE 68.

UNQUOTE

5. (S) HAVE ALSO BEEN PROVIDED, BY THE III MAF LIAISON OFFICER
 CG MACV, A COPY OF A MEMORANDUM FROM THE MACV CHIEF OF STAFF,
 GEN HERRIN, TO THE MACV J-3 ON THE SAME SUBJECT. THIS
 MEMORANDUM IS QUOTED AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE:

1. THE SITUATION PERMITTING, THERE MAY COME A TIME WHEN WE WILL
 WANT TO SPECIFICALLY ASSIGN A PART OF WHAT IS NOW ICZ TO THE
 1ST AND ANOTHER PART TO III MAF.

2. J-3 IS TASKED TO STUDY THE FEASIBILITY, DESIRABILITY AND

SECRET

#6

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 2792 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
TIMING OF SUCH A MOVE. THIS STUDY SHOULD CONSIDER OPERATIONS,
LOGISTICS, COMMUNICATIONS, TERRAIN, CAPABILITY OF FORCES,
COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AND OTHERS.

3. ONE APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM SHOULD CONSIDER ASSIGNING III
MAF THE SOUTHERN PART OF ICTZ AND PROVISIONAL CORPS, VIETNAM
THE NORTHERN PART OF ICTZ.

4. THE MEMBERS OF THE STUDY GROUP SHOULD INCLUDE MACV, NAVFORV,
USARV, PCV, III MAF AND SUCH OTHER AGENCIES AS CONSIDERED
NECESSARY.

5. REPORT ECD (ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE) BY 22 JUNE.

UNQUOTE

3. THE MEMORANDUM QUOTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 INDICATES THE MAIN
THRUST OF THIS STUDY, WHICH WOULD BE A REORIENTATION OF U.S.
FORCES IN ICTZ WITH ARMY UNITS ASSIGNED TO THE NORTHERN PORTION
AND MARINE UNITS, UNDER III MAF, TO THE SOUTHERN PORTION. I AM
SURE THAT THE ARMY HAS IN MIND THE CREATION OF ANOTHER FIELD
FORCE REPORTING DIRECTLY TO COMUSMACV IF SUCH A READJUSTMENT OF
FORCES IN ICTZ SHOULD COME ABOUT.

4. IN A STUDY, TITLED "MILITARY POSTURE, NORTHERN I CORPS,
1 SEP 1968", PREPARED AT THE DIRECTION OF COMUSMACV, AND SUBMITTED

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 2792 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
ON 31 MARCH 1968, I DISCUSSED THE DESIRABILITY, FROM THE STAND-
POINT OF LONG RANGE FORCE DEPLOYMENT PLANNING, OF HAVING THE
TWO MARINE DIVISIONS OF III MAF OPERATING IN CONTIGUOUS AREAS
WHICH INCLUDE DEEP WATER PORT FACILITIES AND EXISTING MAJOR
MARINE LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS.

5. MAJOR ADVANTAGES OF CONTIGUOUS LOCATION ARE:

A. THERE WOULD BE LESS FRAGMENTATION AND LESS DUPLICATION
OF EFFORT BY COMBAT AND SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS AND FACILITIES
WHICH PROVIDE COMMON SUPPORT TO BOTH MARINE DIVISIONS AND THE
MAV. THIS SUPPORT, PROVIDED BY UNITS AT THE III MAF LEVEL,
COULD BE DECIDEDLY MORE EFFICIENT AND ECONOMICAL IF APPLIED IN
CONTIGUOUS AREAS OF OPERATION. SOME OF THE SAME ADVANTAGES
WOULD ACCURE TO AFFECTED ARMY UNITS THROUGH CLOSER GEOGRAPHICAL
ASSOCIATION.

B. FOR CONTINGENCY CONSIDERATIONS, LOCATION OF BOTH DIVISIONS
NEAR A DEEP WATER FORT WOULD FACILITATE COMBAT LOADOUT OF ONE OR
BOTH OF THE DIVISIONS FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN A TIME FRAME
ACCEPTABLE TO MEET EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS.

C. LOCATION OF BOTH MARINE DIVISIONS IN THE GEOGRAPHICAL
AREA OF THE MARINE AIR WING WOULD STRENGTHEN OUR CASE FOR

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

4

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMSAK 2792 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
REGAINING FULL CONTROL OF MARINE AIR WING ASSETS AND RETURN TO THE
MARINE AIR/GROUND TASK FORCE CONCEPT. THIS ARGUMENT IS LESS FORCEFUL
IF THE PRESENT CMC MEMO BEFORE THE JCS RE SINGLE MANAGEMENT IS
ACCEPTED.

D. THE LOCATION OF MARINE FORCES IN CONTIGUOUS AREAS AND
IN THE VICINITY OF A DEEP WATER PORT WOULD, AT THE CESSATION OF
HOSTILITIES, FACILITATE THE EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCES FROM
VIETNAM.

E. CG III MAF, WITH STAFF AND FACILITIES AVAILABLE, COULD
DO A MORE COMPLETE JOB OF MANAGING THE AFFAIRS OF TWO MARINE
DIVISIONS, ONE AIR WING, AND SUPPORT FORCES THAN HE CAN THE
MULTIPLICITY OF FORCES AND FUNCTIONS NOW ASSIGNED.

G. DISADVANTAGES OF A MOVE AS DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ARE:

A. LOSS OF PRESTIGE FOR CG III MAF AND POSSIBLE REDUCED
IMPORTANCE OF MARINE CORPS PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAMESE
CONFLICT. THE PUBLIC INFORMATION PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED THERE-
WITH WOULD NOT BE FAVORABLE TO THE MARINE CORPS.

B. REMOVAL OF MARINES FROM THE WIDELY PUBLICIZED POINTS
OF CONFLICT ALONG THE DMZ AND IN THE KHE SANH AREA.

C. SEPARATION OF U. S. FORCES IN ICTZ INTO TWO ENTITIES, EACH

PAGE 6 RUMSAK 2792 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
REPORTING TO COMUSMACV PRESENTS PROBLEMS TO CG I CORPS, LGEN LAN.
HE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DEAL WITH TWO U. S. COMMANDERS IN HIS CORPS
AREA. THERE WOULD BE OTHER FUNCTIONS NOW HANDLED ON A CORPS BASIS
(SUCH AS CORDS) WHICH WOULD BE AFFECTED TO SOME DEGREE. PRESTIGE OF
III MAF WOULD SUFFER IN THIS AREA AS WELL.

7. LGEN ROSSON HAS INDICATED UNOFFICIALLY THAT HE WILL GO ALONG
WITH WHATEVER III MAF RECOMMENDS ON THE MATTER OF DISPOSITION OF
FORCES IN ICTZ. HE CONTENDS THAT CURRENT DISPOSITIONS ARE WORKING
SATISFACTORILY AND SEES NOTHING WRONG WITH PRESENT COMMAND
ARRANGEMENTS. MACV HAS INVITED HIM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
DISCUSSIONS IN SAIGON AND LGEN ROSSON FEELS THAT HE SHOULD, ALONG
WITH CG III MAF, PRESENT A UNITED FRONT.

8. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO GIVE ME ON
THIS MATTER. PERSONALLY I NOW BELIEVE THE STATUS QUO (EXCEPT
FOR AIR CONTROL) IS TO BE PREFERRED. THE PROBLEMS OF MANAGING THE
CORDS, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION, AND THE ADVERSE PUBLICITY ARE
OVERRIDING IN MY OPINION.

WARM REGARDS,

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

6

Z 180815Z ZYH
FM CG, III MAF
TO SSO MACV
INFO SSO PCV
ZEM

S E C R E T (EYES ONLY)
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN INFO LGEN ROSSON
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG PERIOD ENDING 181600H JUN 68
NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS REPORT
SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
GP-4
060

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

184

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

TIMEFORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 18 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 180425Z JUNE 68		COPY# 1, 2 & 3 / OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SIG EVENTS LOG
			IN	OUT		
2	CG			6/19	<i>[Signature]</i>	REMARKS
3	DCG			6/19	<i>[Signature]</i>	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S			6/18	<i>[Signature]</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	181502			<i>[Signature]</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

*Copies 2 & 3 burned
4 Nov 68*

[Handwritten mark]

SECRET #3

Z 180425Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO SSO MACV
INFO SSO PCV (FOR LGEN ROSSON)
ZEM
S E C R E T (EYES ONLY)
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG PERIOD ENDING 181200H JUN 68
NO CHANGE SINCE LAST REPORT.
GP-4
060

Op to Gen Rosson

~~NNNN~~ HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 18 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 180256Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE HAS BEEN SENT <i>"Copies 2, 3 burned 4 Nov 68"</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		6/18		<i>Q</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	181220	6/18		<i>DWN</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #2

SECRET

OO RUMHVP
 DE RUMSAK 2365 1700256
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 18025Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

EXCLUSIVE**HAS BEEN SENT**

SECRET
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN DAVIS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION: QUOTE
 P 11015Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SGN
 INFO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS CAMP HOCHMUNH
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LTGEN ROSSON
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 RATIONALE FOR MODIFIED POSTURE IN THE KHE SANH AREA
 1. THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED AS A PROPOSED RATIONALE UNDERLYING
 THE FORTHCOMING ADJUSTMENTS IN THE KHE SANH AREA. IT IS CONSIDERED
 THAT THIS RATIONALE MAY BE USEFUL IN ANY REQUIRED COMMUNICATION
 WITH HIGHER AUTHORITY ON THE SUBJECT:

A. SINCE TERMINATION OF OPERATION PEGASUS ON 15 APRIL 1968,

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2365 **SECRET** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 ELEMENTS OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AND AT TIMES ELEMENTS OF
 THE 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION HAVE CONDUCTED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
 AGAINST THE NVA 304TH DIVISION GENERALLY TO THE WEST AND SOUTH
 OF THE SANH COMBAT BASE IN STRENGTHS RANGING FROM FOUR TO SEVEN
 MANEUVER BATTALIONS. DURING THIS TWO-MONTH PERIOD ROUTE 9
 FROM CALU TO THE SANH COMBAT BASE HAS BEEN MAINTAINED AS THE
 PRINCIPAL ARTERY FOR SUPPLY OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE AREA.
 THUS VIRTUALLY ELIMINATING NEED FOR THE AIRFIELD AT THE SANH
 COMBAT BASE.

B. SECURITY OF ROUTE 9 FROM CALU TO THE SANH COMBAT
 BASE HAS BEEN AN EXPENSIVE UNDERTAKING IN THAT BETWEEN ONE AND
 TWO BATTALIONS HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO PROTECT THE NUMEROUS
 BRIDGES AND BY-PASSES AND TO CONTROL THE HIGH GROUND PARALLELING
 THE ROAD. CONSIDERABLE ENGINEER MAINTENANCE EFFORT HAS
 BEEN REQUIRED AS WELL. ALTHOUGH EXISTING COMMUNICATIONS AND
 SUPPLY FACILITIES AT THE SANH COMBAT BASE HAVE BEEN UTILIZED AS
 A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE, UTILIZATION OF THE BASE IS DIMINISHING
 BY VIRTUE OF GREATER RELIANCE ON BATTALION AND COMPANY FIRE
 BASES IN THE SURROUNDING AREA. IN THAT THE LATTER BASES ARE
 SUPPLIED BY HELICOPTER FROM THE SANH COMBAT BASE, IT IS BECOMING

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 2365 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR APPARENT THAT BY EFFECTING SUCH SUPPLY FROM THE VICINITY OF CA LU CONSIDERABLE SAVINGS IN TROOPS COMMITTED TO ROUTE 9 SECURITY AND MAINTENANCE COULD BE ACHIEVED.

C. EXPERIENCE GAINED DURING OPERATIONS IN THE KHE SANH AREA OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS INDICATES THAT THE ENEMY IS CONFRONTING US WITH LIGHT FORCES AND WITH STAND-OFF MORTAR AND ARTILLERY FIRES. IN RESPONSE TO OUR FREQUENT EFFORTS TO FIX AND ENGAGE LARGE FORMATIONS, HE HAS RESORTED TO EVASION TACTICS FOR THE MOST PART.

D. IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING IT IS CONSIDERED HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO ADJUST OUR MODUS OPERANDI IN THE KHE SANH AREA TO ACHIEVE GREATER OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY, ECONOMIZE ON FORCES AND DEAL MOST EFFECTIVELY WITH THE ENEMY PATTERN OF ACTIVITY. ACCORDINGLY, IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO:

(1) OPERATE IN THE KHE SANH AREA FROM SEVERAL RANDOMLY POSITIONED AND FREQUENTLY MOVED FIRE BASES SUPPLIED BY HELICOPTER FROM THE VICINITY OF CA LU. THE FIRE BASES WILL BE SO LOCATED AS TO FACILITATE OPERATIONS THEREFROM TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES. LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS AND AERIAL OBSERVERS WILL COMPLEMENT THE FORCES OPERATING FROM THE

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 2365 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR FIRE BASES. ARTILLERY AND TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT WILL CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE, AS WILL B-52 STRIKES.

(2) REINFORCE BY HELICOPTER FORCES OPERATING FROM THE FIRE BASES WHEN THEY ENCOUNTER SIZEABLE ENEMY FORMATIONS.

(3) DISCONTINUE USE OF THE KHE SANH BASE AS A PRINCIPAL COMBAT AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT BASE.

(4) TERMINATE USE OF RTE 9 BETWEEN CA LU AND KSCB, RECOVERING THE TACTICAL BRIDGING FOR USE ELSEWHERE.

(5) EMPLOY THE SEVERAL BATTALIONS SAVED AS A RESULT OF THE FOREGOING ADJUSTMENTS TO CONDUCT STRONG OFFENSIVE THRUSTS ELSEWHERE IN ICFZ. CONDUCT OF THESE OPERATIONS HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO DATE BECAUSE OF HEAVY DEMANDS ON REMAINING FORCES.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#2

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET


IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 18 JUN 68	
			SERIALS/CONTROL DATE 1800012 JUNE 68	1, 2 & 3 /	COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SIG EVENTS LOG
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/19			REMARKS
3	DCB		6/17		Blumen	
4	DCB AIR		6/18	70	OH	
	C/S		6/18			
	D C/S		6/18			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	180915			TUM	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

"Copies 2 & 3
burned
7 Nov 68"

3

SECRET



Z 172036Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO SSO MACV
 ZEM

S E C R E T

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN (EYES ONLY)

1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG PERIOD 180400 JUN 68

2328H - 1 HELO OBS LANDING VIC YD 1176. VISUAL OBSERVATION
 FROM CON THIEN.

0012 - 2 HELO'S OBS VIC YD 1978 GOING N. VISUAL CITE BY (ac)
 ARVN.

0012H - 1 HELO OBS VIC YD 2079 GOING E. VISUAL CITE BY ARVN.

0030H - 1 HELO OBS VIC YD 1876 GOING NE. RADAR CITE FROM
 A-2.

0104H - 1 HELO OBS VIC YD 2764 VISUAL CITE
 BY DONG HA COMBAT BASE.

0240H - 5 HELO'S AND 1 F/W ESCORT OBS VIC YD 1170. VISUAL
 CITE BY 9 MAR OP AT CON THIEN.

0300H - 2 JETS OBS VIC YD 2674 MOVING ALONG DMZ VISUAL
 CITE FROM A-1.

0320H - 1 HELO OBS VIC YD 0969 FIRING FAR AT GROUND
 AND RECEIVING RETURN FIRE FROM GROUND. VISUAL CITE BY
 9TH MAR OP AT CON THIEN.

NO FRIENDLY TROOPS IN AREA. BELIEVED TO BE EN
 FIRING ON EN.

GP-4

300

Z 171628Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO SSO MACV
ZEM

S E C R E T

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN (EYES ONLY)

1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG PERIOD ENDING 172400H JUN 68
2025H 2 HELO'S OBS VIC YD2088 BY NAVAL GUN FOWARD RADAR UNIT.
2028H 5 HELO'S OBS VIC YD2582 BY ARVN AT GIO
LINH. (VISUAL OBS).

2050H REFER 2028H ENTRY NOW 10 HELO'S MOVING WEST BY ARVN
AT GIO LINH (VISUAL OBS).

2110H REFER 2050H ENTRY. ARVN AT GIO LINH OBS 2 JETS
ESCORTING THE 10 HELOS. ALSO ARVN REPORTED 2 HELO'S OBS
OVER TIGER ISLAND.

2217H 1 HELO OBS VIC YD 2578 HEADED N. THIS WAS A VISUAL
SPOT BY ARVN.

2141H 2 HELO'S OBS VIC YD2664. VISUAL SIGHTING BY PATROL
BOAT ON CUA VIET.

2145H 3 HELO'S OBS. VIC YD2876. VISUAL SIGHTING BY FO AT A-1.

2215H 1 JET OBS VIC YD2575. VISUAL SIGHTING BY FO AT A-1
2. ABOVE SIGHTINGS WERE REPORTED TO 7TH AIR FORCE COMBAT
REPORTING CENTERS (WATERBOY AND PANAMA) WITHIN APPROX 2 MIN
AFTER RECEIPT. ACCORDING TO 7AF TACC TSN AB

RVN 170750Z JUN 68 MSG I AM PROHIBITED FROM RE-
ACTING TO THESE SIGHTINGS. SO FAR AS I HAVE BEEN
ABLE TO DETERMINE, NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY 7TH
AIR FORCE TO INTERCEPT THESE UNIDENTIFIED SIGHTINGS.
REQUEST NECESSARY ACTION BE TAKEN ASAP.

GP-4

SSO NOTE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

300

#52

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JMNAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG TTY MAIL SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 171222		DATE 17 JUNE 68 1,2,3, of 4 COPIES OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/18			REMARKS LOG 172000H
3	DCG		6/18		True	
4	DCG AIR		20			
	C/S		6/18			
	D C/S		6/20			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	180600H				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					
Joe Stewart					4	

SECRET #57

Z 171222Z ZYH ZFF-#
FM CG III MAF
TO SSO MACV
ZEM
S E C R E T EYES ONLY
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG PERIOD ENDING 172000H JUN 68
NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS REPORT
SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
GP-4
Ø6Ø

O 170924Z ZYH
 FM CG, III MAF
 TO SSO MACV
 ZEM

SECRET (EYES ONLY)
 FOR GENERAL ABRAMS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

A. YR 170442ZJUN68

B. MY 170352ZJUN68 (BY OTHER MEANS)

1. THE REPORTED ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY 15 - 17 JUNE IN THE DMZ - TIGER ISLAND AREA IS OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO ME. I AGREE WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT ENEMY HELICOPTERS IN SOME NUMBERS AS YET UNDETERMINED FOR A PURPOSE NOT YET KNOWN HAVE BEEN OPERATING NORTH AND TO SEAWARD OF OUR DMZ POSITIONS. I AM SKEPTICAL AT THIS POINT CONCERNING REPORTS OF ENEMY JET ACTIVITY IN THAT AREA.

2. I HAVE ENCOUNTERED AND CONTINUE TO ENCOUNTER EXTREME DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING CLEAR REPORTS ON THIS SERIES OF EVENTS. THE ONLY FORCES INVOLVED THAT ARE UNDER MY COMMAND ARE GROUND ELEMENTS OF 3RD MAR DIV WHO HAVE REPORTED ON CERTAIN VISUAL SIGHTINGS WHICH I HAVE IMMEDIATELY RELAYED TO YOUR HQ. U.S. ELEMENTS MOST DIRECTLY INVOLVED HAVE BEEN AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, NEITHER UNDER MY OPCON. THEY HAVE IN MOST INSTANCES DURING THE PAST 40 HOURS, BUT NOT ALL, INFO'ED MY HQ ON THEIR REPORTS. NEVERTHELESS, MY EFFORTS TO THIS HOUR TO CONSTRUCT A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY IN QUESTION HAVE BEEN SEVERELY HANDICAPPED. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THIS MORNING I ASKED YOUR HQTRS (REF B) FOR A CONFERENCE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, PREFERABLY AT THIS HQ AND CHAIRED AS YOU DIRECT, TO REVIEW PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATION/CONTROL OF OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE ON ENEMY AIR OPERATIONS AFFECTING ICTZ. IN THE MEANTIME I AM CONTINUING MY EFFORTS BY LIAISON WITH AIR AND NAVAL ELEMENTS CONCERNED TO CLARIFY AND EVALUATE THE REPORTS WE NOW HAVE.

REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

GP-4

350

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

NNNN

#50

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	17 JUNE 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	1, 2 & 3
	170817Z JUNE 68	COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		6/17		[Signature]	
	D C/S		6/17		[Signature]	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		1720506/15		[Signature]	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HQS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

SECRET #49

Z 170817Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO SSO MACV
ZEM
SECRET
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM (GEN CUSHMAN (EYES ONLY)
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG PERIOD ENDING 171600Z JUN 68
NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS REPORT.
GP-4
SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
BTB

NNNN

#49

#49

Z 170405Z ZNY
FM CG III MAF
TO SSO MACV
ZEM

S E C R E T
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN (EYES ONLY)
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG PERIOD ENDING 171200H JUN68
170833H-170930 RADAR SIGHTINGS RPTD BETWEEN SONG BEN
HAI AND TIGRE ISLAND. TWO F-102 SCRAMBLED. NO CONTACT
MADE.
GP-4
075

SECRET

NRHL

HAS BEEN SENT
#48
SENT

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

TIMEFORM 5218 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAP		DATE 17 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 170306Z JUNE 68	2, 2, & 3 COPIES OF 4 COPIES RECD		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT UPDATE OF SIGNIF. EVENTS LOG
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/17		6	REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		6/17		Q	
	D C/S		12/17		OK	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	171400			DUN	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

SECRET

FOR GEN CERRANS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN EYES ONLY

MONTH OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG PERIOD ENDING 170400H
00 00

DELETE 0150H ENTRY AND SUBSTITUTE FOLLOWING:

PANAMA REPORTS 3 HELOS DESTROYED CONFIRMED. DASC-V

REPORTS LOCATIONS OF 3 AS FOLLOWS:

MISSION 3 HELO YD 1384-- DESTROYED BY USAF ON-GROUND.

MISSION 1 HELO YD 2673-- DESTROYED BY USAF IN AIR.

MISSION 1 HELO YD 1787-- DESTROYED BY USAF IN AIR.

TWO HELOS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED DESTROYED BY ARTY CANNOT BE

CONFIRMED. ARTY FIRE MISSION AT YD 085700 RESULTED IN

SECONDARY EXPLOSION AT 182513H. TWO HELOS WERE REPORTED

IN AREA JUST PRIOR TO EXPLOSION. (DASC-V)

00-4

000 NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

00

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

#47

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			7-STATE/CONTINENT SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 170000Z JUNE 68		19 JUNE 68	
			1, 2, 3 COPY# OF		COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
11	CG		6/17		lp	REMARKS
2	DCG		6/17		AD	
4	DCG AIR		6/17		AD	
11	C/S		6/17		AD	
	D C/S		4/18		AD	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	171000			AD	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

#46
SECRET

Z 170044Z ZYM
FM CG III MAF
TO SSO MACV
ZEM
S E C R E T
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM L GEN CUSHMAN
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG PERIOD ENDING 170500H JUN 68
NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS REPORT
GP-4
060

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

#46

#46

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 16 JUNE 68	
			SERIALS/CONTROL DATE 162025 1	COPY# 1, 2, 3, OF 4 COPIES REC'D		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
			IN	OUT		
✓	CG		4/17		4	REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		5/17		Q	
	D C/S		4/17		W	
	D C/S DM	170720			SW	
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

SECRET

45

Z 162025Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO SSO MACV
 ZEM

S E C R E T

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG PERIOD ENDING 170400H JUN 68

0015H VIC YD 240821 - 9 HELOS ON GROUND, 10 HELOS
 SHUTTLING N&S IN SAME AREA. GUNFIGHTERS DROPPED
 6-MK 82'S. 3 OBJECTS OBS. BURNING ON GROUND. CONFIRMED
 BY AERIAL TANKER. RECON WILL CHECK AREA. SPOTTER AT
 DASC RPTS THAT NUMBER OF HELO'S DIMISHING AND MOVING
 EASTWARD. (PANAMA)

0025H VIC YD 240821 - GUNFIGHTER 03 FIRED MISSILE AND
 REC'D ABN DETONATION. TANKER CONFIRMS 1 A/C HIT IN AIR.
 RINGNECK ON STATION AND WILL REPLACE GUNFIGHTER. (PANAMA)
 CUMULATIVE TOTAL AS OF 0130H: WATERBOY RPTS 6 HELO'S DESTROYED
 CONFIRMED. 3 HELO'S YD 267875 DESTROYED BY USAF ON GROUND. 2
 HELO'S YD 085793 - DESTROYED BY ARTY IN AIR AND
 CONFIRMED BY USAF AIR.

1 HELO YD 160865 - SHOT DOWN BY USAF (PANAMA).
 0310H WATERBOY RPTS GUNFIGHTER 6 FIRED ON TARGET
 (SUSPECTED HELO'S) VIC YE 2400. TWO
 EXPLOSIONS WERE OBSERVED ABOVE WATER BY
 GUNFIGHTER 6 AND GUNFIGHTER 5. (PANAMA)
 0330H WATERBOY RPTS THERE ARE APX 6 CONTACT NOTH
 OF TIGER ISLAND. UNK TYPE A/C AT THIS TIME.
 (PANAMA)

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
 250

In water

#45

#45

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	16 JUN 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT: ATTACK ON ENEMY ARTY/INFANTRY CAP MUI LAY SECTOR (GMLS) (S)
			IN	OUT		

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL
2	CG		6/17		le
3	DCG		6/17		Quint
4	DCG AIR		6/17		HA
	C/S		6/17		ML
	D C/S		6/18		
	D C/S DM				
	S/S	170700			WIN
	G-1				
	G-2				
	G-3				
	G-4				
	G-5				
	G-6				
	ADJ				
	CAP				
	CORDS				
	EMB/TRANS				
	ENGR				
	H&S CO				
	INSP				
	MTO				
	OP ANAL				
	ORD				
	PSY OPS				
	SUPPLY				
	S&C				

REMARKS

HAS BEEN SENT

FOR

#5

SECRET #74

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

FOR

PP RUMHMB
 DE RUMSAK 2188 1681628
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 161628Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO CG PCV CP KOCHMUTH
 BT

S E C R E T

FOR LTGEN ROSSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

ATTACK ON ENEMY ARTY/INSTALLATIONS CAP MUI LAY SECTOR (CMLS) (S)
 1. AS YOU KNOW FROM MY 112112Z JUN68 MSG, UPON APPROVAL OF THE
 PROPOSAL ON CMLS BY COMUSMACV, I WILL DESIGNATE YOU AS MY
 AGENT TO PLAN AND CONTROL PHASES II, III, AND IV OF THE OPERATION.

2. I AM CONFIDENT THIS PROPOSAL WILL BE APPROVED, SO I
 ENCOURAGE YOU TO PROCEED WITH THE REQUIRED PLANNING. ANYTHING
 THAT CAN BE DONE NOW WILL PUT US AHEAD WHEN THE REQUIRED
 INITIATING DIRECTIVES ARE PUBLISHED.

3. IN ADDITION TO PLANNING THE MOVEMENT OF ARTILLERY AND
 ANCILLARY GROUND PROTECTION THEREFOR, I FEEL THE MATTER OF
 AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE DESERVES IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

A. AERIAL PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE CURRENTLY PROGRAMMED UNDER
 THE BLUE TREE AND MACV IN-COUNTRY RECCE PLANS PROVIDE FOR
 COMPLETE COVERAGE OF THE OBJECT AREA. YOU SHOULD REQUEST THAT

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2188 S E C R E T

THESE OBJECTIVES BE FLOWN AT SUCH FREQUENCY AS DEEMED NECESSARY
 TO PROVIDE THE REQUIRED PRE-D-DAY PHOTO COVERAGE.

B. REQUIREMENTS MAY ARISE FOR SPECIAL COVERAGE (E.G., LOW
 ALTITUDE, FORWARD FIRING) OF SELECTED AREAS. SUCH REQUIREMENTS
 SHOULD BE SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL REQUEST PROCEDURES.

C. REQUIREMENTS FOR PRINTS, DIAPOSITIVES AND DUPLICATE
 NEGATIVES SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO III MAF FOR INCLUSION WITH
 REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS HQ.

4. INITIALLY THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL COORDINATE THE TARGET LIST FOR
 PHASE I OPERATIONS WITH 7TH AF. WE ALREADY HAVE YOUR INPUT BUT
 WILL NEED LAST MINUTE UPDATE WHEN WE GET THE GREEN LIGHT.

GP-4

I

SECRET
#44

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

31MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 16 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 161615	1,2,3, of 4 COPIES OF COPIES REC'D		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
			IN	OUT		
✓	CG		6/13			REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		6/17			
	D C/S		6/17			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	170720			JAN	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

42
#43
SECRET

Z 161615Z ZYH

FM CG III MAF

TO SSO MACV

ZEM

S E C R E T

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

1. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LOG PERIOD ENDING 162400H JUN 68:
1950H UNIDENTIFIED HELO OBS BY 3/12 FROM TOWER ALONG CUA
VIET VOC YD2086. (PCV)

2055H DASC V CONFIRMED BY WATER BOY CRC RADAR 10 ADDITIONAL
HELO'S AT YD2086. COMPARABLE SIZE TO CH-34. A/C SCRAMBLED
BY 7AF AT 2055H. (PCV)

2110H HELO COUNT UPDATED TO 24 VICE 10. (PCV)

2125H F-4'S ATTACKING EN HELO'S (PANAMA)

2147TH SHIPS OFF SHORE HAVE REPORTED VISUAL SIGHTINGS (LIGHTS).
WATERBOY (CRC RADAR DONG HA) REPORTS UNKNOWN BOGIES VICINITY
OF BEN HAI (DONG HA DASC)

2150H PANAMA REPORTS EVERYTHING CLEAR. F-4'S WILL MAKE 1
MORE SWEEP. NO CONTACT INITIAL PASS. (PANAMA)

2225H 8 HELO'S WERE OBS VIC YD176798. 3 WERE ON GROUND 5
IN AIR. 2 ADDITIONAL HELO'S VIC YD240821. GUNFIGHTER 05
FIRED 2 MISSILES AT 2216H DESTROYING 2 HELOS'S. DESTRUCTION
CONFIRMED BY NGF SPOTTER AT A-1 SITE. (PANAMA)

2320H. PPS-6 HAS PICKED UP TARGETS IN GENERAL AREA
OF SIGHTINGS. (3D MARDIV)

2300-2320H CON THIEN REPORTED VISUAL SIGHTING
LARGE GROUP HELO'S ON GROUND

SOUTH OF BEN HAI AND NORTH CON THIEN - TAKEN
UNDER FIRE BY ARTILLERY. (DONG HA DASC)

2. HAVE ISSUED WARNING ORDER TO MOVE ONE ASSAULT BATTERY
OF HAWK FROM CHU LAI TO DONG HA ON 17 JUNE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
305

443

443

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 15 JUN 68	
			SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE 151432Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/17		lb	PHOENIX PROGRAM (C) REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT EXCLUSIVE
2	DCG		6/17		(Buel)	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		6/16		(A)	
	D C/S		6/17			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	160805H			TCR 7211	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

44

CONFIDENTIAL #42

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 2853 167143Z
ZNY CCCCC
P 15 1432Z JUN 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMMB/CG PROV COR PSV PHE
RUMMB/CG FIRST AIRCAV DIV
INFO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
BT

HAS BEEN SENT

EXCLUSIVE

CONFIDENTIAL
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN ROSSON AND MGEN TOLSON INFO GEN AERAMS
FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
PHOENIX PROGRAM (C)

1. ONE OF THE MORE IMPORTANT PROGRAMS IN OUR PACIFICATION ARSENAL IS THE PHOENIX PROGRAM. THIS PROGRAM IS SUPPORTED BY COMUSMACV, AND I SUPPORT IT.
2. THERE HAVE BEEN RECURRING REPORTS OF INSTANCES WITHIN THE TACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION IN WHICH THE LOCAL COMMANDER HAS MATERIALLY INTERFERED WITH THE ORDERLY OPERATION OF THE PHOENIX PROGRAM BY TAKING CUSTODY OF DETAINEES ACTUALLY APPREHENDED BY VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES IN PURSUING THIS PROGRAM. THIS MAY WELL HAVE OCCURRED BECAUSE OF SOME MIS-

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-68)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#42

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 2053 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TACTICAL COM-
MANDERS FOR DETAINEES, OR IT MAY BE BECAUSE THE UNIT IS
PLAYING THE NUMBERS GAME. NEVERTHELESS, THE IMPACT ON THE
PHOENIX PROGRAM IS DAMAGING.

3. IT IS REQUESTED THAT SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS BE MADE FULLY
AWARE OF THE PHOENIX PROGRAM, AND THAT THIS IS A U.S.-INITIATED
AND SUPPORTED PROGRAM. THEY SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WHEN THEY
OPERATE IN CONJUNCTION WITH VIETNAMESE FORCES, THIS ALONE DOES
NOT IMPOSE UPON THEM A SUPERIOR RIGHT OR RESPONSIBILITY WITH
RESPECT TO DETAINEES VIS-A-VIS THE PARTICIPATING VIETNAMESE
FORCES. DETAINEES ACTUALLY APPREHENDED BY VIETNAMESE
AUTHORITIES DURING THE COURSE OF A JOINT OPERATION, REGARDLESS
OF THE DEGREE OF U. S. PARTICIPATION, SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED
FROM THE CUSTODY OF THE VIETNAMESE FOR UNILATERAL U.S. MILITARY
PROCESSING. FURTHERMORE, DETAINEES OF U. S. FORCES SHOULD BE
MADE AVAILABLE, ROUTINELY, TO PROPER AUTHORITIES FOR PHOENIX
SCREENING AND DEBRIEF, REGARDLESS OF THE CLASSIFICATION WHICH
IS PLACED ON THEM BY U. S. AUTHORITIES. THIS IN NO WAY
CONTRAVENES U. S. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF
U. S. DETAINEES, BUT IT SEEKS TO AVOID THE MISAPPLICATION OF

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 2053 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
THIS RESPONSIBILITY.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#42

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUSIVE

HAS BEEN SENT

OO RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 1551 1670036
ZNY CCCCC
O 150036Z JUN 68
FM CG III MAF DFG
TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SGN
INFO RUMKIM/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V RVN
RUABGL/CG FMFPAC (FWL) OKI
RUABGL/CG 9TH MAB OKI

BT
CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS
INFO LGEN BUSE, LGEN ROSSON, MGEN BOKER, AND BGEN CHIP
FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
REQUEST PERMISSION TO OBSERVE REHAB OF SLF AT SUBIC BAY
ON 21 JUN 68 AND VISIT 3D FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT ON 22 AND
23 JUN 68 TO OBSERVE LOGISTIC PROGRAMS IN SUPPORT OF MARINE
ELEMENTS OF III MAF. RETURN TO DANANG ON 24 JUNE.
WARM REGARDS.

SP-4
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								# 41	

CONFIDENTIAL

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG III MAP SERIAL 130900
DCG						1,2,3, of 4 COPY # / OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT ICTZ CURRENT SITUATION
C/S	1.		6/14		<i>[Signature]</i>	REMARKS
DC/S				4/14	<i>[Signature]</i>	
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S		140735			<i>[Signature]</i>	
S/C						

LEGEND
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE
 C-COMMENTS
 I- INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

O 130900Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO SSO IV CORPS
INFO SSO MACV

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION ONE OF TWO
LTG CUSHMAN SENDS FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO MG KERWIN EYES ONLY
ICTZ CURRENT SITUATION REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING 131500H JUN 68

1. SIGNIFICANT ENEMY DEVELOPMENTS:

A. DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD, ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY CONT'D AT A LOW LEVEL. THE ENEMY CONDUCTED SMALL ATKS BY FIRE ON FRIENDLY POS ALONG THE DMZ INCLUDING: KSCB, COMPANIES C AND D, 1/9 MARINES VIC CAMP CARROLL, COMPANY B, 1/1 ON HILL 661, COMPANY D, 1/1 MARINES ON HILL 689, VIC LZ EAGLE AND 1/12 MARINES AT LZ ROBIN. ELSEWHERE, ELEM OF 3/26 MARINES REC'D A 20-30 RD MORT ATK AT 130900H, 11 KM NE OF THUONG DUC.

B. LIGHT SCATTERED CONTACTS OCCURRED THROUGHOUT I CORPS AS FRIENDLY FORCES CONT'D TO UNCOVER LARGE EN CACHES OF WPNS, AMMO AND FOOD. FOUR RICE CACHES WERE UNCOVERED BY FRIENDLY UNITS IN OPN NEVADA EAGLE, NETTING 55,500 LBS OF RICE. COMPANY C, 1/502ND ABN FND A RICE CACHE YESTERDAY, 3 KM NE OF QUANG DIEN (YD711358) TOTALING 19 TONS OF RICE. COMPANY B, 2/17TH CAV CAPT 6 TONS OF RICE, 6 KM ENE OF PHU BAI. COMPANY C, 1/501ST ABN CAPT 2400 LBS OF RICE, 5 KM NW OF HUE WHILE COMPANY B, 2/501ST ABN CAPTURED 3100 LBS OF RICE 10 KM EAST OF PHU BAI (YD997167). THE MOST SIGNIFICANT WPSN CACHE OF THE REPORTING PERIOD WAS DISCOVERED BY COMPANY I, 3/26 MARINES, 11 KM NE OF THUONG DUC (ZC211624). BESIDES VARIOUS ARTY PLOTTING BOARDS, MAPS AND FIRE CONTROL GEAR, THE CACHE CONTAINED 11X122MM RKT WARHEADS, 200 75MM RR RDS, 264/82MM MORT RDS, 186 RPG RDS, 2 BOXES OF .50 CAL AMMO, 96,250X7.62MM AMO, 9X122MM RKT MORTORS, 5 1/WPNS, 5X7.62 HVY MG'S, ONE HVY CHICOM MG, ONE LIGHT MG AND MSC SPARE WPNS PARTS, YESTERDAY, 12 KM SE OF TIEN PHUCC (BT207067) COMPANY C, 1/45TH INF REC'D 30X60MM MORT RDS AND CS GAS. THE VC LATER EMPLOYED A FLAME THROWER, BUT THE FLAME THROWER WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CAPT.

C. ELSEWHERE IN I CORPS, 2/3 ARVN, ASSISTED BY ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST ACD, 4.9 KM SE OF LE MEREDITH (YD499169), MADE CONTACT WITH AN EST EN BN, RESULTING IN 8 NVA KIA, OF WHOM TWO WERE OFFICERS OF THE 803RD REGT.

2. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS:

1. BATTALION QUARTERS AT PHU BAI
AND TWO ARVN REGT ALONG THE DMZ

(1) 3&D MARDIV: LIGHT ENEMY GROUND CONTACT WAS REPORTED IN OPNS SCOTLAND II WITH NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY GROUND CONTACT REPORTED IN OPNS LANCASTER II, KENTUCKY OR NAPOLEON/SALINE. YESTERDAY MORNING IN OPN SCOTLAND II, A PATROL FROM COMPANY K, 3/4 MARINES MADE CONTACT WITH AN EST 15-20 NVA (XD881285), 3 KM WEST OF LZ TORCH; WITH SPT OF GUNSHIPS, THE PATROL WAS ABLE TO BREAK CONTACT 2.5 HOURS LATER, RESULTING IN 6 USMC KIA (2 FORMER MIA'S FND) 9 WIA (8 EVAC) AND ONE NVA KIA WITH ONE IVC. ELSEWHERE IN SCOTLAND II, THERE WAS ONE USMC KIA WITH 3 WIA (1 EVAC) BY INCOMING AT LZ ROBIN (XD918335) AND HILL 689 (XD803488). CUM CAS REPORTED BY 3D MARDIV DURING THE PERIOD WERE 7 USMC KIA, 15 WIA (12 EVAC) AND ONE NVA KIA WITH ONE WPN CAPT.

(2) LAM SON 228: THE 2D ARVN REGT CORDON AND SEARCH OPN SE OF GIO LINH TERM AT 120900H. CUM CAS WERE 25 ARVN KIA, 83 WIA AND 219 NVA KIA WITH 2 PW'S, 46 IVC AND 3 CSWC. LAM SON 224/DMZ, A RICE DENIAL OPN WAS RECOMMENCED AT 120900H.

B. SOUTHERN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES:

(1) THE 1ST ACD, IN OPN JEB STUART III CONT'D TO INCREASE THE TEMPO OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS IN BASE AREAS 101 AND 114, AND RICE DENIAL OPNS IN CONJUNCTION WITH LOCAR ARVN FORCES ALONG THE COASTAL PLAINS, WITH LIGHT CONTACT RESULTING IN 3 US KIA, 17 WIA (EVAC) AND 10 EN KIA WITH 2 PW'S AND 7 WPN'S CAPT. THE 3RD ARVN REGT IN LAM SON 225/PHASE II CONT'D TO MEET INCREASING RESISTANCE AS 2/3 ARVN, ASSISTED BY ELEM OF 1ST ACD AND SPT'D BY ARA, ARTY, TAS AND ORG WPN'S, ENGAGED ELEM OF AN EST ENEMY BN, RESULTING IN ONE ARVN KIA, 2 WIA AND 8 NVA KIA WITH 4 IVC AND ONE CSWC.

(2) THE 101ST ABN DIV CONT'D RECON IN FORCE OPNS IN NEVADA EAGLE ALONG ROUTE 547/547A AND AREAS IN THE VIC OF HUE/PHU BAI. SCATTERED CONTACTS RESULTED IN 2 USA KIA (EVAC) AND 4 EN KIA WITH 2 PW'S AND ONE WPN CAPT.

C. SOUTHERN IGIZ:

(1) 1ST MARDIV: IN OPN MAMELUKE THRUST, A DELAYED REPORT INDICATED THAT AN UNK SUZE ENEMY FORCE ATTACKED 3/5 MARINES DEF POS (A19851), 5 KM NE OF AN HOA ON 11 JUN, EMPLOYING SA/AV AND 82MM MORT FIRE, RESULTING IN 4 USMC KIA AND 16 WIA (EVAC). THE MARINES RETURNED FIRE WITH SA/AV, ARTY AND TAS, RESULTING IN 4 NVA KIA WITH 5 AK-47, ONE AK-44, ONE RUSSIAN MG, 5 B-40 RKTS AND ASSORTED PERS GEAR CAPT. YESTERDAY, ELEM OF 3/26 MARINES FND ADDED HARBOR SITE FACILITIES (Z0211624), 11 KM NE OF THONG BOC, CONTAINING ARTY FIRE CONTROL EQUIP, 5 I/WPN'S, 7 CS/WPN'S AND ASSORTED AMMO, INCLUDING 16X140MM RKTS, OVER 400 RPS AND 800 MORT RPS AND OVER 96,000 RPS OF 20 CALIB. 14 WPN'S WERE KIA (EVAC) BY THE ENEMY.

O 130900Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO SSI IV CORPS
 INFO SSO MACV
 ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 LTG CUSHMAN SENDS FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO RE KERWIN EYES ONLY
 ELSEWHERE IN MAMELUKE THRUST, SCATTERED
 INCIDENTS RESULTED IN 2 USMC KIA, 18 WIA (9 EVAC)
 AND 3 ENEMY KIA. IN THE DANANG/PHU BAI TAORS, SCAT-
 TERED CONTACTS RESULTED IN 4 USMC KIA, 12 WIA (3 EVAC)
 AND 8 ENEMY KIA WITH 5 I/C. THE US NAVY FOREIGN
 CLAIMS OFFICE IN DANANG WAS DAMAGED BY AN EXPLOSION
 AT 131205H, RESULTING IN 8 PERSONS WIA (EVAC).
 THE EXPLOSIVE WAS 50LBS OF C4 IN A SUITCASE.
 ELSEWHERE, 8 USMC WERE WIA (EVAC) BY ENEMY
 INCOMING AND DET SURPRISE EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. NO SIG-
 NIFICANT ENEMY CONTACTS WERE REPORTED IN OPNS ALLEN
 BROOK, HOUSTON OR SWIFT SABER. CUM CAS REPORTED BY
 THE 1ST MARDIV WERE 8 USMC KIA, 73 WIA (65EVAC) AND
 15 ENEMY KIA WITH ONE PW AND 24 WPNS CAPT.

(2) 2D ROK MARINE BRIGADE: REPORTED 18 VC
 KIA WITH 2 VC PW'S AND ONE IWC IN 3 CONTACTS WEST OF
 HOI AN.

(3) AMERICAN: ALL UNITS CONT'D CBT OPNS IN
 DIV AO HIGH LIGHT CONTACT REPORTED. IN OPN BURLINGTON
 TRAIL (BT207067), 12 KM SE OF TIEN PHOUC, COMPANY C,
 1/46TH INF REC'D A MORT ATK FOLLOWED BY AN ASSAULT BY
 VC EMPLOYING A FLAME THROWER. DURING THE ATK THE
 FLAME THROWER WAS CAPTURED. A MEDEVAC HELO WAS DOWNED
 BY MORT FRAGMENTS. REPORTS THUS FAR INDICATE 2 USA
 KIA, 21 WIA (9 EVAC), ONE NVA KIA, AND ONE IWC. AT
 130750H, AN/O-2 A/C ON A FAC MISSION FOR THE 2D ARVN
 DIV AND A UH-1H HELO ON A C&C MSN FOR THE 4/3RD
 INFANTRY COLLIDED IN MID AIR (BS727808), 11 KM NE OF
 QUANG NGAI CITY, RESULTING IN THE FAC AND ALL 7 PER-
 SONS ABOARD THE UH-1H, (INCLUDING THE BN CO, S-2 AND
 ARTY LHO) KIA. CUM CAS REPORTED DURING THE PERIOD
 WERE 12 US KIA, 36 WIA (23 EVAC) WITH 21 VC AND ONE
 NVA KIA WITH 6 WPNS CAPT.

D. COMBAT OPNS THROUGHOUT ICYZ RESULTED
 IN 102 EN KIA, 7 PW'S AND 60 WPNS CAPT; ARVN FORCES
 ACCOUNTED FOR 14 EN KIA AND 18 WPNS CAPT; ARVN LOSSES
 WERE 4 KIA AND 9 WIA. US AND ARVN REPORTED A TOTAL

A. YESTERDAY 381 SORTIES WERE FLOWN THROUGHOUT THE DMZ IN SPT OF CRT OPN. MARINE AIRCRAFT FLEW 281 SORTIES, INCLUDING 26 IN SPT OF NVA UNITS IN THE DMZ AREA.

B. PCV WAS SPTD BY 287 SORTIES, INCLUDING 187 IN SPT OF THE 3RD MARDIV, 52 IN SPT OF 1ST ACD, 36 IN SPT OF THE 101ST ABN DIV AND ANOTHER 12 IN ASHAU VALLEY. ELSEWHERE IN ICTZ, THE 1ST MARDIV WAS SPTD WITH 113 SORTIES, AMERICAL DIV WITH 28 AND THE 28 ROK MAR BDE WITH 5; ARVN UNITS WERE SPTD WITH 34 SORTIES, INCLUDING 17 FLOWN BY THE USAF, WHILE SPECIAL OPNS UNDER III MAF WERE SPTD WITH 2 SORTIES.

C. SIGNIFICANT BDA INCLUDED 62 STRUCTURES DEST, 41 STRUCTURES DAM, 12 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, 42 BUNKERS DESTROYED OR DAMAGED, 9 SAMPANS DESTROYED OR DAMAGED AND 4 KBA. 18 B-52'S FLEW 3 STRIKES DELIVERING 458 TONS OF ORDNANCE IN SPT OF III MAF ON ENEMY COMPLEXES IN THE DMZ AREA NORTH OF DONG HA.

4. TRENDS/COMMANDERS COMMENTS:

A. NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN TRENDS WERE NOTED AS US AND ARVN FORCES CONT'D TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE AGAINST THE ENEMY AND TO UNCOVER LARGE ENEMY CACHES OF PNS, AMMUNITION AND FOOD.

B. ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT THE ICTZ REMAINS AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL. ELEM OF THE RECENTLY IDENTIFIED 102ND REGT, 308TH NVA DIV, CONTINUE TO HARASS, PROBE AND ATK BY FIRE THE MARINE ELEM OPERATING S OF KHE SANH. PW'S CAPT RECENTLY IN THE SAME OPERATIONAL AREA HAVE IDENTIFIED THEIR UNIT AS THE 83RD ENGINEER REGT. THE MSN OF THIS REGT IS REPORTED TO BE THE CONSTRUCTION OF A ROAD FROM THE XE PON RIVER, QUANG TRI PROVINCE, TO HUE. SINCE THIS REGT HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY CARRIED IN NVA COB, IT IS ASSUMED IT IS A NEWLY ORGANIZED ENTITY, ASSIGNED THE MISSION OF ROAD CONSTRUCTION.

C. BDA ON 2 ARC LIGHT TARGETS, APPROX NINE KM NE OF CON THIEU IN THE DMZ, REVEALED AN EST 325 M OF TRENCH EST, 11 BUNKERS DEST AND 7 ROAD CUTS (6 OF THE BEN HAI), AND 30 BUNKERS DEST, 288 M OF TRENCH DEST, ONE TUNNEL COLLAPSED, A RAILROAD DIKE CUT IN 10 PLACES AND 2 KIA (C) (S OF THE BEN HAI).

D. IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, THE EN CONTINUES TO AVOID CONTACT, AND IS PROBABLY MOVING INTO BASE AREAS IN THE MTS TO REFIT, RETRAIN AND RECEIVE REPLACEMENTS.

E. IN EASTERN QUANG BINH PROVINCE, THE 1ST VC REGT AND 3D NVA REGT OF THE 28 NVA DIV CONTINUE TO PREPARE FOR AN EXPECTED 2ND ATK IN THE TIEP PROVINCE AREA AND ONE LIA AREA.

SEE NOTES RECENT BDA IN DMZ AREA TO THE WEST OF THE DMZ.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK1370 1630500
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 110500Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SGN
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT OF CIDG CAMPS

- 1. YOUR MAC 7462, SUBJECT ABOVE LTG 061125Z JUN 68 (BOM)
- 2. WE HAVE BEEN STUDYING THE ENTIRE PICTURE OF CIDG CAMPS IN ICTZ WITH A VIEW TOWARD ASSESSING THEIR CURRENT VALUE AND VULNERABILITY AND THEIR POTENTIAL IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHANGED CONDITIONS IN THIS CTZ NOW AS OPPOSED TO WHEN THE CIDG CAMPS WERE FIRST EMPLACED.
- 3. I WILL REVIEW IN DETAIL THE THREE ACTIONS YOU MENTIONED IN ADDITION TO THE ENTIRE CIDG EFFORT PRESENT AND FUTURE IN ICTZ. I RECOGNIZE THAT IF WE PLAN TO STAY IN THESE CAMPS, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO COPE WITH A VARIETY OF CONTINGENCIES.

GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#39

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 11 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 110156Z JUN 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
			IN	OUT		
2	CG		6/11			REMARKS EXCLUSIVE HAS BEEN SENT
3	DCG		6/11			
11	DCG AIR		6/11			
	C/S		6/11			
	D C/S		6/11			
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	11/520			BNW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					
			6/13		4	

SECRET

SECRET

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 1348 1630156
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 11015Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF LNG
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SGN
 INFO RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS CAMP HOCHMUTH

EXCLUSIVE**HAS BEEN SENT**

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LTGEN ROSSON
 FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 RATIONALE FOR MODIFIED POSTURE IN THE KHE SANH AREA
 1. THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED AS A PROPOSED RATIONALE UNDERLYING
 THE FORTHCOMING ADJUSTMENTS IN THE KHE SANH AREA. IT IS CONSIDERED
 THAT THIS RATIONALE MAY BE USEFUL IN ANY REQUIRED COMMUNICATION
 WITH HIGHER AUTHORITY ON THE SUBJECT:

A. SINCE TERMINATION OF OPERATION PEGASUS ON 15 APRIL 1968,
 ELEMENTS OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AND AT TIMES ELEMENTS OF
 THE 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION HAVE CONDUCTED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
 AGAINST THE NVA 304TH DIVISION GENERALLY TO THE WEST AND SOUTH
 OF KHE SANH COMBAT BASE IN STRENGTHS RANGING FROM FOUR TO SEVEN
 MANEUVER BATTALIONS. DURING THIS TWO-MONTH PERIOD ROUTE 9
 FROM CALU TO KHE SANH COMBAT BASE HAS BEEN MAINTAINED AS THE
 PRINCIPAL ARTERY FOR SUPPLY OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE AREA,

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1348 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 THUS VIRTUALLY ELIMINATING NEED FOR THE AIRFIELD AT KHE SANH
 COMBAT BASE.

B. SECURITY OF ROUTE 9 FROM CALU TO KHE SANH COMBAT
 BASE HAS BEEN AN EXPENSIVE UNDERTAKING IN THAT BETWEEN ONE AND
 TWO BATTALIONS HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO PROTECT THE NUMEROUS
 BRIDGES AND BY-PASSES AND TO CONTROL THE HIGH GROUND PARALLELING
 THE ROAD. CONSIDERABLE ENGINEER MAINTENANCE EFFORT HAS
 BEEN REQUIRED AS WELL. ALTHOUGH EXISTING COMMUNICATIONS AND
 SUPPLY FACILITIES AT KHE SANH COMBAT BASE HAVE BEEN UTILIZED AS
 A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE, UTILIZATION OF THE BASE IS DIMINISHING
 BY VIRTUE OF GREATER RELIANCE ON BATTALION AND COMPANY FIRE
 BASES IN THE SURROUNDING AREA. IN THAT THE LATTER BASES ARE
 SUPPLIED BY HELICOPTER FROM KHE SANH COMBAT BASE, IT IS BECOMING
 APPARENT THAT BY EFFECTING SUCH SUPPLY FROM THE VICINITY OF
 CALU CONSIDERABLE SAVINGS IN TROOPS COMMITTED TO ROUTE 9
 SECURITY AND MAINTENANCE COULD BE ACHIEVED.

C. EXPERIENCE GAINED DURING OPERATIONS IN THE KHE SANH
 AREA OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS INDICATES THAT THE ENEMY IS
 CONFRONTING US WITH LIGHT FORCES AND WITH STAND-OFF MORTAR AND
 ARTILLERY FIRES. IN RESPONSE TO OUR FREQUENT EFFORTS TO FIX

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**
#38

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1348 S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R
AND ENGAGE LARGE FORMATIONS, HE HAS RESORTED TO EVASION TACTICS
FOR THE MOST PART.

D. IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING IT IS CONSIDERED HIGHLY
DESIRABLE TO ADJUST OUR MOD US OPERAND I IN THE KHE SANH AREA TO
ACHIEVE GREATER OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY, ECONOMIZE ON FORCES
AND DEAL MOST EFFECTIVELY WITH THE ENEMY PATTERN OF ACTIVITY.
ACCORDINGLY, IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO:

(1) OPERATE IN THE KHE SANH AREA FROM SEVERAL RANDOMLY
POSITIONED AND FREQUENTLY MOVED FIRE BASES SUPPLIED BY
HELICOPTER FROM THE VICINITY OF CA LU. THE FIRE BASES WILL BE
SO LOCATED AS TO FACILITATE OPERATIONS THEREFROM TO LOCATE AND
DESTROY ENEMY FORCES. LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS AND
AERIAL OBSERVERS WILL COMPLEMENT THE FORCES OPERATING FROM THE
FIRE BASES. ARTILLERY AND TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT WILL CONTINUE
TO BE AVAILABLE, AS WILL B-52 STRIKES.

(2) REINFORCE BY HELICOPTER FORCES OPERATING FROM THE
FIRE BASES WHEN THEY ENCOUNTER SIZEABLE ENEMY FORMATIONS.

(3) DISCONTINUE USE OF THE KHE SANH BASE AS A PRINCIPAL
COMBAT AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT BASE.

(4) TERMINATE USE OF RTE 9 BETWEEN CA LU AND KSCB,

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1348 S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R
RECOVERING THE TACTICAL BRIDGING FOR USE ELSEWHERE.

(5) EMPLOY THE SEVERAL BATTALIONS SAVED AS A RESULT OF
THE FOREGOING ADJUSTMENTS TO CONDUCT STRONG OFFENSIVE THRUSTS
ELSEWHERE IN ICTZ. CONDUCT OF THESE OPERATIONS HAS NOT BEEN
POSSIBLE TO DATE BECAUSE OF HEAVY DEMANDS ON REMAINING FORCES.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#38

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

J1MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 11 JUN 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 110112Z JUN 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS FOR HAS BEEN SENT
2	DCG			6/11	R	
3	DCG AIR			6/12	Q	
1	C/S		6/11		Q	
	D C/S			6/13	De	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	11 1520	6/12		Q	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	copy				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					
				6/13	H	

SECRET #37

SECRET**FOR****HAS BEEN SENT**

PP RUMSAL RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 1343 163011Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 110112Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SGN
 INFO RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE TSN
 RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS CAMP HOCHMUTH

BT
 S E C R E T FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM L GEN CUSHMAN, INFO GEN
 MOMEYER AND LT GEN ROSSON
 ATTACK ON ENEMY ARTY/INSTALLATIONS CAP MUI LAY SECTOR (CMLS)
 (S)

1. (S) MY 260028Z MAY68 OUTLINED THE CONTINUING THREAT OF
 THE ENEMY ARTILLERY STRONGHOLD IN CAP MUI LAY SECTOR (CMLS).
 EFFORTS TO REDUCE THIS THREAT HAVE THUS FAR BEEN INEFFECTIVE,
 AND IT IS MY CONVICTION THAT A MAJOR OPERATION IS REQUIRED
 IN ORDER TO DO THE JOB AND DO IT RIGHT. PAST EFFORTS HAVE
 BEEN LIMITED IN SCOPE, HAVE BEEN HASTILY PLANNED AND EXECUTED,
 AND HAVE BEEN INADEQUATE TO REDUCE THE THREAT ON A SUSTAINED
 BASIS. I AM THEREFORE PROPOSING AN OPERATION TO REDUCE EFFECT-
 IVELY THE PRESENT THREAT AND TO KEEP IT NEUTRALIZED IN FOLLOW
 ON OPERATIONS.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 1343 S E C R E T

2. (C) FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISCUSSION THE FOLLOWING
 GEOGRAPHIC DEFINITIONS APPLY.

A. CAP MUI LAY SECTOR (CMLS). THE AREA BOUNDED BY THE
 GULF OF TONKIN, SOUTHERN EDGE OF DMZ, Y000 EASTING AND YL 90
 NORTHING.

B. CAP MUI LAY COASTAL SECTOR (CMLCS). THE AREA BOUNDED
 BY THE GULF OF TONKIN, SOUTHERN EDGE OF DMZ, YL 20 EASTING,
 AND YD 87 NORTHING.

3. (S) I WOULD LIKE TO CONDUCT AN ATTACK OF CMLS INSTALLATIONS
 WITH A CAREFULLY PHASED AND INTEGRATED APPLICATION OF MASSEL
 AIR, ARTILLERY, AND NAVAL GUNFIRE. MY GENERAL CONCEPT IS AS
 FOLLOWS:

A. PHASE I: D-DAY AND D PLUS 1, MASSIVE BOMBARDMENT OF KNOWN
 EN AAA, ARTY, AND SHORE BATTERIES WITHIN CMLS WITH THE OBJECTIVES
 OF CRIPPLING HIS IMMEDIATE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND AND TO UNCOVER
 ADDITIONAL TARGET LOCATIONS BY FAC AND POST STRIKE PHOTO RECON.

(1) THIS PHASE WOULD EMPLOY ALL AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT
 SUPPORT YOU COULD PROVIDE ON MOST PROFITABLE TARGET AREAS WITH
 TAC AIR HITTING DISPERSED TARGET SITES AS ESTABLISHED BY HARL
 INTELLIGENCE.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMSAK 1343 S E C R E T

2) ASSUME 7TH AIR FORCE WOULD CONTROL THIS PHASE ON TARGETS SELECTED BY III MAF/ 7TH AF JOINTLY.

(3) ARTY AND SUPPORTING INFANTRY OCCUPY FORWARD POSITIONS SOUTH OF DMZ NORTH OF DPLUS1. I AM THINKING OF UP TO 14 BTRY'S OF HEAVY ARTY PLUS 2 TO 3 INF BNS TO PROTECT THEM.

B. PHASE II: DPLUS2 AND DPLUS3, AN INTEGRATED ATTACK CONCENTRATED IN THE CMLCS TO SECURE A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR AO/FAC AIRCRAFT AND CLOSE-IN NGF SUPPORT.

(1) THIS PHASE WOULD DELIVER A HEAVY VOLUME OF TAC AIR/ARTY/NGF SUPPORTING FIRES TO EFFECTIVELY DESTROY HOSTILE BATTERIES IN THE COASTAL SECTOR.

(2) III MAF WOULD CONTROL THIS INTEGRATED ATTACK UTILIZING THE CONTROL FACILITIES OF THE LONG HA FSCC/DASC, SUPPORTED BY DASC VICTOR IF REQUIRED.

(3) 7TH AF SUPPORT COULD BE EMPLOYED IN THIS PHASE TO INTERDICT AND ISOLATE CMLS BY ATTACKING CHOKE POINTS WEST AND NORTH OF THE COASTAL SECTOR.

C. PHASE III: DPLUS4 TO DPLUS6, INTEGRATED ATTACKS CONTINUE AT REDUCED VOLUMES OF FIRE TO OPEN ALL CMLS FROM N TO S AND E TO W TO CLOSE SURVEILLANCE BY AO/FAC AND PRECISION DESTRUCTION OF

PAGE 4 RUMSAK 1343 S E C R E T

EN ARTY AND INSTALLATIONS BY OBSERVED FIRES.

(1) III MAF CONTROLS AS IN PHASE II

(2) FRIENDLY ARTILLERY AND SUPPORTING INFANTRY WITHDRAW FROM ADVANCED POSITIONS EVENING DPLUS6.

D. PHASE IV: A CONTINUING PROGRAM OF OBSERVATION/PHOTO RECCE WITH IMMEDIATE ATTACKS ON RE-EMERGENT AAA, ARTILLERY, AND SHORE BATTERY INSTALLATIONS.

4. I BELIEVE THE TIME FRAME FOR D-LAY SHOULD BE EARLY IN JULY, A SPECIFIC DATE BEING CONTINGENT UPON THE RISKS INVOLVED IN EXPOSING A MAXIMUM OF 14 BATTERIES OF HEAVY AND MEDIUM ARTILLERY IN FORWARD POSITIONS. IT WILL TAKE TWO/THREE BATTALIONS OF INFANTRY TO CLEAR AND SECURE ARTILLERY POSITIONS FROM GROUND ATTACK. INITIAL THINKING IS THAT 2 CA AND 6 DL WILL BE REQUIRED FOR NGF SUPPORT. AIR AND FAC REQUIREMENTS ARE UNDER STUDY. REQUIREMENTS FOR 7TH FLEET AIR SUPPORT OF PHASES II AND III ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION.

5. (S) I BELIEVE THAT AFTER THE INITIAL MASSIVE AIR BOMBARDMENT THE SUCCESS OF THIS OPERATION REQUIRES THAT IT BE PLANNED AND EXECUTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A SINGLE GROUND COMMANDER, SUPPORTED AS NECESSARY BY AIR AND NAVAL COMPONENTS.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#37

SECRET

PAGE 3 KUMSAK 1345 S E C R E T

SINCE THE CMLS STRONGHOLD DIRECTLY THREATENS III MAF FORCES, BASES, AND LOC IN NICTZ, I BELIEVE CG III MAF SHOULD BE CHARGED WITH THIS RESPONSIBILITY. IF YOU CONCUR, I PLAN TO DESIGNATE CG PCV MY AGENT TO PLAN AND CONTROL THE OPERATION. THE CONTROL OF PHASES EXECUTION, I ENVISION AS FOLLOWS:

A. III MAF AND 7TH AF WOULD JOINTLY ESTABLISH THE TARGET LIST FOR PHASE I OPERATIONS. THE AERIAL BOMBARDMENT WOULD BE CARRIED OUT UNDER THE CONTROL OF A 7TH AF CAN/C AGENCY.

B. THE COMPLEXITY OF INTEGRATING THE SUPPORTING FIRES OF ALL ARMS IN THE ENGAGEMENT OF TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY DURING PHASE II AND III REQUIRES THE STAFF AND FACILITIES OF THE LONG HA FSCC/DASC WHICH ARE ORGANIC TO III MAF.

C. III MAF HAS A CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE CMLS AND SHOULD HAVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING IT NEUTRALIZED IN PHASE IV.

6. (U) THIS PROPOSAL SUPERSEDES BY 260028Z MAY68 WHICH HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. IF YOU CONCUR IN THIS PROPOSAL AND THE TIME FRAME FOR ITS EXECUTION, I REQUEST THAT INITIATING DIRECTIVES/REQUESTS BE ISSUED AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MAJOR COMMANDS INVOLVED SO THAT DETAILED, COORDINATED PLANNING MAY BE INITIATED BY ALCON. GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#37

CONFIDENTIAL

HAS BEEN SENT

CG RUMKM RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAK 0684 1580732
 ZNY CCCCC
 PAC -I- CMC
 O 060732Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

EXCLUSIVE

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHATMAN AND LGEN
 BUSE FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

1. GEN ABRAMS HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING:

A. MY BEING ORDERED FROM HERE AT SUCH TIME AS TO ENABLE
 ME TO PICK UP MY WIFE ON WEST COAST AND PROCEED TO WASHINGTON,
 D.C., FOR SUCH DUTY AS CMC MAY DIRECT IN CONNECTION WITH
 PRESENTATION TO GEN OFFICER SYMPOSIUM.

B. MY REQUEST TO USMC AUTHORITY FOR THIRTY DAYS LEAVE TO
 COMMENCE UPON COMPLETION OF A. ABOVE. SUCH LEAVE IS HEREBY
 REQUESTED.

2. I ASSUME GOVT AIRCRAFT WILL BE LEAVING EL TORO WITH
 WEST COAST SYMPOSIUM ATTENDEES. REQUEST MY ORDERS PERMIT
 SUFFICIENT TIME FOR ME TO GET TO FENLETON, GET PACKED AND
 MAKE PLANE. I RECOMMEND I LEAVE HERE 5 JULY.
 WARM REGARDS.

PAGE 2 RUMSAK 0684 CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 IMMEDIATE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

GP-4
 BT

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES#36
FLC 2100/5 (1/68)**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL**FOR****HAS BEEN SENT**

RR RUMHVH
 DE RUMUGRA 0418 1560400
 ZNY CCCCC
 R 040400Z JUN 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG 1ST ARVN DIV
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 FOR MGEN TROUNG FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR PROMOTION TO
 MAJOR GENERAL. YOUR LEADERSHIP HAS MADE THE 1ST ARVN
 DIVISION A SUPERB FIGHTING ORGANIZATION. MY VERY BEST
 WISHES FOR YOUR CONTINUED SUCCESS AS THE LEADER OF THE
 1ST ARVN DIVISION IN OUR FIGHT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST
 ENEMY. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#34
 FLC 2100/5 (1/68)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

J1MAF FORM 5216 (REV 5-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CO III MAF		DATE 04 JUNE 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 040223		1,2, & 3 of 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
N	CG		6/5		Le	REMARKS SFGAT EXCLUSIVE
7	DCG			6/5	RM	
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		6/5		QJ	
	D C/S		6/5		PK	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	042025			Dtrud	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

J-2

SECRET 433

O 040223Z ZYH

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

ZEM

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN BUSE FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

A. CMC 031418Z JUN68

1. REPORT REFERRED TO IN REF A RECEIVED FROM MACV AND IS QUOTED AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE

PART I. FOR III MAF.

REPORT RECEIVED TODAY FROM RELIABLE SOURCE WHO IN TURN WAS GIVEN INFO BY TWO SEPARATE SOURCES, INDICATES POSSIBILITY OF A PLAN TO KIDNAP CPT CHARLIES ROBB, PRESIDENT'S SON-IN-LAW, IN DANANG. ONE SOURCE WAS POLISH MEMBER OF ICC. OTHER WAS CHINESE RESIDENT OF SAIGON WHO SAID HE WAS GIVEN INFO BY A VC. SHOULD BE PASSED TO INTERESTED PARTIES. LATER SOURCE HAS PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED RELIABLE INFO. EVALUATED F-6.

PART II. FOR 7 AF. THIS INFO PASSED IN VIEW OF PRESENCE OF SGT NUGENT AT CAM RANH BAY.

UNQUOTE

2. NATURE OF REPORT AND INSTRUCTIONS PASSED ON TO CAPT ROBB CONTAINED IN DONN ROBERTSON'S LATEST "OUR FRIEND" REPORT TO BILL JONES.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

220

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		02 JUN 68	
			SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
			021414Z JUN 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG		6/3		lp	PERFORMANCE OF DUTY
2	DCG			6/3	Rhodes	REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT FOR
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S		6/3		G	
	D C/S			6/3	TR	
	D C/S DM					
	S/S		6/3		BRUN	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #31

SECRET

FOR

RT SYUW RUMUGRA0234 1541414-SSSS--RUEADWT.

ZNY SSSSS

P 021410Z JUN 68

FM CG III MAF

TO RUEADWT/CG DCPG WASH D C

HAS BEEN SENT

BT

SECRET

FOR MAJOR GEN LAVELLE FROM LTJEN CUSHMAN

PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

1. IT IS MY PLEASURE TO REPORT TO YOU THAT DURING THE RECENT VISIT OF LTCOL MURPHREE USMC TO III MAF, HE ENGAGED IN THE FOLLOWING:

A. ON 2 MAY CONDUCTED TEST OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE ASHUA VALLEY THAT CONFIRMED THE FEASIBILITY OF OPERATING A SENSOR SYSTEM IN THAT AREA. ON 9 MAY ORGANIZED AND TRAINED 1ST AZR CAV DIV PERSONNEL, PERSONALLY SUPERVISED THE EMPLACEMENT OF INITIAL SENSORS AND HAD SYSTEM IN OPERATION BY 1930 THAT EVENING. THIS SYSTEM EFFECTIVELY PROVIDED INFORMATION REGARDING ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING THE CRITICAL PHASES OF EXTRACTING THE DIVISION FROM THE VALLEY AND CONTINUES TO FURNISH VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE OF ENEMY ACTIVITY THERE.

B. PERSONALLY SUPERVISED SENSOR EMPLACEMENT NEAR THE JUNCTION OF ROUTE 547 AND 547A, IMPORTANT ROUTES LEADING OUT

PAGE 2 RUMUGRA0234 SECRET
OF ASHUA VALLEY TOWARD HUE.

C. WORKING WITH THIRD MARDIV, INITIATED INSTALLATION OF SENSOR SYSTEMS IN DEFILE AREA NEAR DMZ.

2. ALL THE ABOVE WERE PERFORMED IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT.
3. LTCOL MURPHREE'S PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE IN ALL ASPECTS OF IGLOO WHITE/DUEL BLADE/DUCK BLIND PROJECTS PROVIDED VALUABLE ASSISTANCE AND GUIDANCE TO III MAF TACTICAL UNITS. I WISH TO EXTEND MY PERSONAL THANKS TO YOU BOTH FOR THIS VALUABLE AND TIMELY CONTRIBUTION.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

31