

357. CG PCV 2611450Z JUL68 (U)

Subj: No comments or recommendations for this reporting period

358. CG FIRST MARDIV 270840Z JUL68 (C) gp-4

Subj: Comments and recommendations

~~359. CG FMAN 271131Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~360. CG FMAN 280811Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

361. CG III MAF 291142Z JUL68 (S) gp-4

Subj: Evaluation of Single Management for Period  
270600H JUN to 260600H JUL68

~~362. CG FMAN 311035Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~344. CG FMAW 181345Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

345. CG III MAF 201318Z JUL68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Results of Conference on RELOCATION OF I DASC

346. COMUSMACV 211023Z JUL68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Status of COMM for New I DASC

347. COMUSMACV 211107Z JUL68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: COMUSMACV to CINCPAC - Provides Additional Information re mechanics of frag change requests

348. COMUSMACV 220843Z JUL68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Requirements for COMM for I DASC

349. 7AF TSN AB 200130Z JUL68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Rework of 7AF Msg 160750 and CG III MAF 172350Z JUL

~~350. CG FMAW 220950Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

351. 7AF TACC 230430Z JUL68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: HORN DASC

~~352. CG FMAW 231020Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~353. CG FMAW 241159Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~354. CG FMAW 251305Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

355. CG III MAF 260910Z JUL68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: HORN DASC

356. 7AF TACC 261317Z JUL68 (C) *gp-4*

Subj: I DASC Operations

334. CG III MAF 161420Z JUL68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Location of I DASC  
(Passes referenced msgs)

335. CG III MAF 162240H JUL68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Location of I DASC  
(FoneCon to FMFPAC COC)

~~336. CG FMAN 171044Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

337. CG III MAF 172350Z JUL68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Requested information in response to  
COMUSMACV 150040Z JUL68 (Tab 331)

338. COMUSMACV 180707Z JUL68 (U)

Subj: To 7th AF to "provide this Hq with Compatible  
Statistical Data" coordinating with III MAF

339. 7AF 200130Z JUL68 (S) *Group-4*

Subj: 7AF Info in response to COMUSMACV 180707Z JUL68  
(Tab 338)

~~340. CG FMAN 201040Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~341. CG FMAN 201132Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~342. CG FMAN 210816Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

343. COMUSMACV 211107Z JUL68 (S) *(gp-4)*

Subj: COMUSMACV response to CINCPAC 140017Z JUL68  
(Tab 328)

~~310. CG FMAW 020655Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

311. CG FMFPAC 030211Z JUL68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Disapproves termination of Wing Daily

~~312. CG FMAW 031206Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

313. CG III MAF 0411140Z JUL68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Pers Aug for Single Mgmt Ströke and Recn Assets

~~314. CG FMAW 041610Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~315. CG FMAW 051530Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~316. CG FMAW 061100Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~317. CG FMAW 070810Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~318. CG FMAW 081116Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~319. CG FMAW 100450Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~320. CG FMAW 101130Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

323. COMUSMACV 061130Z JUL68 (S) *gp-3*

Subj: Evaluation of Single Management

324. CG III MAF 100302Z JUL68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Sortie Rate of 1st MAW Aircraft

~~325. CG FMAW 111550Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~326. CG FMAW 121620Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~327. CG FMAW 131246Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

328. CINCPAC 140017Z JUL68 (S) *gp-3*

Subj: Sortie Flexibility in Pre-planned frags

329. COMUSMACV 140026Z JUL68 (S) *group 4*

Subj: Relocation of I DASC

~~330. CG FMAW 141230Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

331. COMUSMACV 150040Z JUL68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Additional info re mechanics of preplanned frag

~~332. CG FMAW 150915Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~333. CG FMAW 161315Z JUL68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

**SECRET**

*Readdressed to CMC  
PTG 0808Z Oct 68*

*Quoted to FMC PAC DTG 140300Z Oct  
MCEO*

*361*

OTTSZYUW RUMUGRA325° 2111442-SSSS--RUHHQA RUMHAW RUMUHFA.  
ZNY SSSSS

O P 291442Z JUL 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN

RUHHQA/CINCPAC

INFO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF DNG

BT

SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR PERIOD 270500H JUN TO  
260600H JULY 1968 (U)

REF: (A) COMUSMACV 19546 DTG 071036Z JULY 1968 (NOTAL)

(B) COMUSMACV LTR MACCOC 2 OF 15 JULY 1968 (S)

(C) CG, III MAF 300636Z JUNE 1968 (NOTAL)

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (A) SUBJECT EVALUATION IS SUBMITTED, INCLUDING COMMENTS AND STATUS OF ACTIONS ON THE AREAS OF INTEREST LISTED IN REFERENCE (B).
2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN REFERENCE (C) ARE STILL CONSIDERED VALID ALTHOUGH ONLY ONE OF NINE RECOMMENDATIONS, ELIMINATION OF IP FROM WEEKLY FRAG, HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT (SM) PROCEDURES. MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CONTINUES TO BE IMPROVEMENT OVER ORIGINAL SYSTEM. INCREASED FAMILIARITY WITH

HAS BEEN SENT  
ORIG BY G-3  
CONCURRED BY G-3  
REL BY G-3

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA325R SECRET

SYSTEM HAS RESULTED IN MORE EFFICIENT OPERATIONS. SOME ADDITIONAL AREAS HAVE BEEN NOTED WHERE MINOR PROCEDURAL CHANGES WOULD PRODUCE INCREASED RESPONSIVENESS TO CHANGING NEEDS OF GROUND COMMANDERS.

3. COMMENTS AND STATUS OF ACTION ON AREAS OF INTEREST LISTED IN REFERENCE (B) ARE AS FOLLOWS:
  - A. THIS HQ HAS NO BASIS ON WHICH TO CORROBORATE I DASC LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS. US PORTION OF I DASC IS BEING MOVED TO III MAF HQ. THIS WILL FURTHER IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS TO III MAF TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS. DEPUTY DIRECTOR I DASC ALSO SERVES AS III MAF LIAISON OFFICER.
  - B. DIFFERENCES IN 7TH AF STATISTICS OF SORTIES FRAGGED, FLOWN, AND REPORTED ARE NOT KNOWN TO THIS HQ. ALL SORTIES FRAGGED, FLOWN AND REPORTED HAVE BEEN WITHIN 7TH AF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. SPECIFIC DISCREPANCIES IN STATISTICS HAVE NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THIS COMMAND. I DASC MAINTAINS RECORD OF ALL SORTIES BY TYPE FLOWN IN ICIZ. HQ III MAF IS PROVIDED WEEKLY SUMMARY OF STATISTICS WHICH IN FACT ARE IDENTICAL TO THOSE REPORTED TO 7TH AF TACC BY I DASC. ONLY STATISTICS ORIGINATING AT THIS HQ CONCERNING SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARE THOSE REFLECTING AIR SUPPORT REQUEST AND SORTIES ALLOCATION TO III

*Air Control*  
**SECRET**  
# 361

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMUGRA3257 S E C R E T  
MAF UNITS.

C. AIR SUPPORT IS REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDERS BASED ON THEIR ESTIMATE OF SORTIES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS. III MAF SUB-ALLOCATIONS ARE IN TURN BASED ON THESE REQUESTS. IN ADDITION CG III MAF ASSIGNS PRIORITIES BASED ON OVERALL EVALUATION OF ENEMY SITUATION AND OPERATIONS IN ICTZ. EXAMINATION OF REQUESTS SUBMITTED TO THIS HQ REVEALS ARMY AND FWMAF'S ARE IN FACT ALLOCATED A HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF REQUESTED SORTIES THAN MARINE UNITS. SINCE 1 JULY, 2ND ROKMC PDE HAS BEEN ALLOCATED 94 PCT OF SORTIES REQUESTED, ARMY UNITS 66 PCT AND MARINE UNITS 60 PCT. ARVN UNITS DO NOT REQUEST PREPLANNED SORTIES FROM III MAF. ARVN IMMEDIATE REQUESTS THROUGH TACS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN HONORED. A WEEKLY AIR SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE WAS INITIATED BY THIS HQS 18 JULY WITH ALL MAJOR SUPERORDINATE COMMANDERS REPRESENTED IN ORDER TO ASSURE ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR SUPPORT ARE FULLY KNOWN AND FAIRLY CONSIDERED. PCV SUBALLOCATES TO UNITS UNDER PCV OPCON.

D. LULLS IN COMBAT ACTIVITY AND REDUCTION OF ENEMY THREAT MAY RESULT IN FEWER SORTIES REQUIRED. HOWEVER, AS MANEUVER BATTALIONS ON OFFENSIVE CONTINUE TO SEEK LOCATION OF ENEMY

PAGE FOUR RUMUGRA3258 S E C R E T  
UNITS, INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR LZ CONSTRUCTION, PREP AND HELO ESCORT TEND TO OFFSET REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF TROOPS IN CONTACT. CONSEQUENTLY GROUND COMMANDERS REQUEST FOR TACIAR HAVE NOT LESSEMED. INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE AT THIS HQ INDICATES AN INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY PARTICULARLY IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE. PRESENT ALLOCATION OF PREPLANNED SORTIES IS NOT CONSIDERED ADEQUATE.

E. PROCEDURES TO ASSURE FULL UTILIZATION OF WEEKLY FRAG ARE IN STRICT ACCORD WITH SM SYSTEM.

F. MARINE STRIKE AIRCRAFT RIO WITH CRC AND CRP AS DIRECTED BY FRAG.

G. SUB ALLOCATION OF WEEKLY FRAG BY THIS HQ DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL SORTIES ALLOCATED TO III MAF. THIS HQ AND HQ PCV RETAIN SORTIES FOR LOC INTERDICTION AND TO WEIGHT EFFORT AS REQUIRED. SORTIES ARE ALSO SHIFTED BETWEEN DIVISIONS WHEN REQUIRED. IT MUST BE NOTED HOWEVER THAT PRINCIPLE OF SUB-ALLOCATING FIXED NUMBER OF SORTIES ON WEEKLY BASIS IS IN ACCORD WITH MODIFIED SYSTEM OBJECTIVE OF GUARANTEEING BASIC LEVEL OF SUPPORT.

H. SEE SUB PARA 3G ABOVE.

**SECRET**

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**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RUMUGRA 3258 S E C R E T

I. REPRESENTATIVES OF 7TH AF HAVE INDICATED INFORMALLY THAT PREVIOUSLY EXISTING III MAF REPORTS COULD BE UTILIZED TO MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT. NO REDUCTION IN THIS REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED TO DATE.

J. III MAF HAS MADE CLEAR ITS VIEW THAT SUPPORTING FIRES SHOULD BE FULLY AND CENTRALLY COORDINATED WITH PROMPT FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION TO COMBINE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS WITH SAFETY. INFORMALLY, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS IS BEING SERIOUSLY STUDIED BY THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE BUT NO CONCRETE PROPOSAL IS KNOWN. AMERICAN DIVISION PROCEDURES ARE IDENTICAL TO MARINE CORPS.

4. DIFFICULTY HAS BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN OBTAINING PROMPT AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY. FOR EXAMPLE, PHOTOGRAPHS OF NEWLY PREPARED HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE ARE NEEDED WITHIN SIX HOURS TO DETERMINE WHAT OBSTACLES STILL EXIST AND TO BRIEF PILOTS WHO MUST LAND BEFORE OBSTACLES CAN BE CLEARED. ALTHOUGH SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING IS FOUND AT ALL LEVELS, NORMAL REQUEST CHAIN IS TOO LONG TO MEET TIGHT DEADLINE FOR DELIVERY. BELIEVE THE ANSWER IS TO USE IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS FOR PHOTO SORTIES WITH III MAF/I DASC HAVING SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY AND AIR DELIVERY OF

PAGE SIX RUMUGRA 3258 S E C R E T

PRINTS TO REQUESTING UNIT.

5. ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH SM IS NOT MEETING NEEDS OF GROUND UNITS IS NUMBER OF TPC-10 (CSS) SORTIES FRAGGED. PRIOR TO 22 MARCH, FIRST MAW WAS PROVIDING APPROXIMATELY 94 TPC-10 (CSS) SORTIES ON DAILY BASIS; 42 FOR 1ST MARDIV AND 52 FOR 3RD MARDIV. SINCE SM, 1ST MARDIV HAS REQUESTED 37 TPC-10 (CSS) SORTIES AND BEEN ALLOCATED AVERAGE OF 9 PER DAY WHILE 3RD MARDIV REQUESTED 53 AND ALLOCATED 13 PER DAY. MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN REQUESTING ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER AS BEFORE BUT HAVE ONLY BEEN ALLOCATED 24 PERCENT OF NUMBER RECEIVED PRIOR TO SM. TPC-10 (CSS) OFFERS ACCURATE MEANS OF HITTING TARGETS WHICH CANNOT BE LOCATED BY AIRBORNE FAC FOR VISUAL ATTACK AND IN ADDITION CAN BRING WEIGHT OF AIR ATTACK ON ENEMY WHEN HE LEAST EXPECTS IT. ITS EFFECTIVE USE OVER A 24 HOUR PERIOD IS ESSENTIAL TO BOTH MA

INE AND ARMY UNITS AND SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED.

6. IN SUMMARY, SM SYSTEM SAW ONLY MINOR CHANGES DURING PAST MONTH. CHANGES RECOMMENDED LAST MONTH IN REFERENCE (C) ARE STILL APPLICABLE AND WOULD IMPROVE SYSTEM. IN PARTICULAR, RETURN TO THIS HQ SCHEDULING AUTHORITY FOR IN-COUNTRY 1ST BT

**SECRET**

#361

**SECRET**

OTTSZYUW RUMU GR43259 2111442-SSSS--RUHHQA RUMHAW RUMUHFA.  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 OP 291442Z JUL 68  
 FM CG III MAF DNG  
 TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN  
 RUHHQA/CINCPAC  
 INFO RUMHAW CG FIRST MAW DNG  
 BT

**S E C R E T** FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
 MAW SORTIES TO BE USED AS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF ALL UNITS  
 IN ICTZ WOULD INCREASE FLEXIBILITY AND ENHANCE RESPON-  
 SIVENESS TO NEEDS OF ALL III MAF GROUND COMMANDERS. COMUSMACV  
 HAS MEANS FOR INFLUENCING ACTION THROUGHOUT RVN BY INCREASING  
 DECREASING AIR FORCE SORTIES PROVIDED TO III MAF.

7. IN ADDITION, FOLLOWING NEW CHANGES ARE RECOMMENDED:

- A. ESTABLISH PROCEDURE SO THAT CHANGES TO PRE-PLANNED FRAG  
 CAN BE MADE THROUGH IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST CHANNELS.
- B. PROVIDE FOR RAPID RESPONSE IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE  
 THROUGH USE OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS AND  
 DELIVERY OF PRINTS BY AIR AS REQUIRED TO MEET STATED DEADLINES.
- C. INCREASE USE OF CSS TO KEEP ENEMY UNDER ATTACK ON 24  
 HOUR A DAY BASIS.

GP-4  
 BT

**SECRET**

#361

SECRET

Readdressal to CMC

PTISZYUN RHMMAFA1078 1200 1968  
RNY 33333  
1 200812Z JUL 68

FM CG III MAF DNG  
INFO RUEBROA/CMC  
O P 291442Z JUL 68  
FM CG III MAF DNG  
TO COMUSMACV SGN  
CINCPAC  
INFO CG FIRST MAG DNG

HAS BEEN SENT  
ORIG G-3  
REL G-3.

BT

SECRET SECTION

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR WEEKLY REPORTS  
TO 260600H JULY 1968 (U)

REF (A) COMUSMACV LTR 1916 20081006Z JULY 1968 (U)

(B) COMUSMACV LTR 1916 20081006Z JULY 1968 (S)

(C) CG, III MAF 300606Z JULY 1968 (NOTAL)

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (A) SUBJECT EVALUATION IS BEING  
INCLUDING COMMENTS AND STATUS OF ACTIONS ON THE AREAS OF INTEREST  
LISTED IN REFERENCE (B).

2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN REFERENCE (B) ARE CONSIDERED  
SIDERED VALID ALTHOUGH ONLY ONE OF NINE RECOMMENDATIONS WERE

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA1078 SECRET

OF IP FROM WEEKLY FPAG HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN THE 25TH AF TACTICAL  
(SM) PROCEDURES. MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS RESULTED  
IMPROVEMENT OVER ORIGINAL SYSTEM. INCREASED FAMILIARITY WITH  
SYSTEM HAS RESULTED IN MORE EFFICIENT OPERATIONS. FEW DEFICIENCY  
AREAS HAVE BEEN NOTED WHERE MINOR PROCEDURAL CHANGES WOULD PRODUCE  
INCREASED RESPONSIVENESS TO CHANGING NEEDS OF 25TH AF.

3. COMMENTS AND STATUS OF ACTION ON AREAS OF INTEREST LISTED  
IN REFERENCE (B) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THIS HQ HAS NO BASIS ON WHICH TO CORROBORATE LOCAL  
LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS. US PORTION OF I DASC IS UNDER CONTROL  
TO III MAF HQ. THIS WILL FURTHER IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS TO  
III MAF TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS. DEPUTY DIRECTOR I DASC  
ALSO SERVES AS III MAF LIAISON OFFICER.

B. DIFFERENCES IN 7TH AF STATISTICS OF SORTIES FRAGGED,  
FLOWN, AND REPORTED ARE NOT KNOWN TO THIS HQ. ALL SORTIES  
FRAGGED, FLOWN AND REPORTED HAVE BEEN WITHIN 7TH AF TACTICAL  
AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. SPECIFIC DISCREPANCIES IN STATISTICS HAVE  
NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THIS COMMAND. I DASC MAINTAINS RECORD  
OF ALL SORTIES BY TYPE FLOWN IN ICTZ. HQ III MAF IS PROVIDED  
WEEKLY SUMMARY OF STATISTICS WHICH IN FACT ARE IDENTICAL TO

SECRET

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**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RHMAFAI078 S E C R E T  
 THOSE REPORTED TO 7TH AF TACC BY I DASC. ONLY STATISTICS ORIGINATING AT THIS HQ CONCERNING SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARE THOSE REFLECTING AIR SUPPORT REQUEST AND SORTIES ALLOCATION TO III MAF UNITS.

C. AIR SUPPORT IS REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDERS BASED ON THEIR ESTIMATE OF SORTIES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS. III MAF SUB-ALLOCATIONS ARE IN TURN BASED ON THESE REQUESTS. IN ADDITION CG III MAF ASSIGNS PRIORITIES BASED ON OVERALL EVALUATION OF ENEMY SITUATION AND OPERATIONS IN ICTZ. EXAMINATION OF REQUESTS SUBMITTED TO THIS HQ REVEALS ARMY AND PWMAF'S ARE IN FACT ALLOCATED A HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF REQUESTED SORTIES THAN MARINE UNITS. SINCE 1 JULY, 2ND ROKMC BDE HAS BEEN ALLOCATED 94PCT OF SORTIES REQUESTED, ARMY UNITS 66PCT AND MARINE UNITS 60 PCT. ARVN UNITS DO NOT REQUEST PREPLANNED SORTIES FROM III MAF. ARVN IMMEDIATE REQUESTS THROUGH TACS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN HONORED. A WEEKLY AIR SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE WAS INITIATED BY THIS HQS 18 JULY WITH ALL MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS REPRESENTED IN ORDER TO ASSURE ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR SUPPORT ARE FULLY KNOWN AND FULLY CONSIDERED. PCV SUBALLOCATES TO UNITS UNDER PCV OPCON.

PAGE FOUR RHMAFAI078 S E C R E T  
 D. LEVELS IN COMBAT ACTIVITY AND REDUCTION OF ENEMY THREAT MAY RESULT IN FEWER SORTIES REQUIRED. HOWEVER, AS MANEUVER BATTALIONS ON OFFENSIVE CONTINUE TO SEEK LOCATION OF ENEMY UNITS, INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR LZ CONSTRUCTION, PREP AND HELO ESCORT TEND TO OFFSET REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF TROOPS IN CONTACT. CONSEQUENTLY GROUND COMMANDERS REQUEST FOR TACIAR HAVE NOT LESSENED. INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE AT THIS HQ INDICATES AND INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY PARTICULARLY IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE. PRESENT ALLOCATION OF PREPLANNED SORTIES IS NOT CONSIDERED ADEQUATE.

E. PROCEDURES TO ASSURE FULL UTILIZATION OF WEEKLY FRAG ARE IN STRICT ACCORD WITH SM SYSTEM.

F. MARINE STRIKE AIRCRAFT RIO WITH CRC AND CRP AS DIRECTED BY FRAG.

G. SUB ALLOCATION OF WEEKLY FRAG BY THIS HQ DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL SORTIES ALLOCATED TO III MAF. THIS HQ AND HQ PCV RETAIN SORTIES FOR LOC INTERDICTION AND TO WEIGH EFFORT AS REQUIRED. SORTIES ARE ALSO SHIFTED BETWEEN DIVISIONS WHEN REQUIRED. IT MUST BE NOTED HOWEVER THAT PRINCIPLE OF SUB-ALLOCATING FIXED NUMBER OF SORTIES ON WEEKLY BASIS IS IN

**SECRET**

# 361

**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RHMAFAI078 S E C R E T  
 ACCORD WITH MODIFIED SYSTEM OBJECTIVE OF GUARANTEEING BASIC  
 LEVEL OF SUPPORT.

H. SEE SUB PARA 3 G ABOVE.

I. REPRESENTATIVES OF 7TH AF HAVE INDICATED INFORMALLY  
 THAT PREVIOUSLY EXISTING III MAF REPORTS COULD BE UTILIZED TO  
 MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT. NO REDUC-  
 TION IN THIS REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED TO DATE.

J. III MAF HAS MADE CLEAR ITS VIEW THAT SUPPORTING FIRES  
 SHOULD BE FULLY AND CENTRALLY COORDINATED WITH PROMPT FREE  
 FLOW OF INFORMATION TO COMBINE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS WITH  
 SAFETY. INFORMALLY, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS IS BEING  
 SERIOUSLY STUDIED BY THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE BUT NO CONCRETE  
 PROPOSAL IS KNOWN. AMERICAL DIVISION PROCEDURES ARE IDENTI-  
 CAL TO MARINE CORPS.

4. DIFFICULTY HAS BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN OBTAINING PROMPT AERIAL  
 PHOTOGRAPHY. FOR EXAMPLE, PHOTOGRAPHS OF NEWLY PREPARED  
 HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE ARE NEEDED WITHING SIX HOURS TO DETERMINE  
 WHAT OBSTACLES STILL EXIST AND TO BRIEF PILOTS WHO MUST  
 LAND BEFORE OBSTACLES CAN BE CLEARED. ALTHOUGH SYMPATHETIC  
 UNDERSTANDING IS FOUND AT ALL LEVELS, NORMAL REQUEST CHAIN IS

PAGE SIX RHMAFAI078 S E C R E T

TOO LONG TO MEET TIGHT DEADLINE FOR DELIVERY. BELIEVE THE  
 ANSWER IS TO USE IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS FOR PHOTO  
 SORTIES WITH III MAF/I DASC HAVING SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY AND AIR  
 DELIVERY OF PRINTS TO REQUIESING UNIT.

5. ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH SM IS NOT MEETING NEEDS OF GROUND  
 UNITS IS NUMBER OF TPQ-10 (CSS) SORTIES FRAGGED. PRIOR  
 TO 20 MARCH, FIRST MAW WAS PROVIDING APPROXIMATELY 94 TPQ-10  
 (CSS) SORTIES ON DAILY BASIS: 42 FOR 1ST MARDIV AND 52 FOR  
 3RD MARDIV. SINCE SM, 1ST MARDIV HAS REQUESTED 37 TPQ-10 (CSS)  
 SORTIES AND BEEN ALLOCATED AVERAGE OF 9 PER DYY WHILE 3RD  
 MARDIV REQUESTED 53 AND ALLOCATED 13 PER DAY. MARINE GROUND  
 COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN REQUESTING ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER AS BE-  
 FORE BUT HAVE ONLY BEEN ALLOCATED 24 PERCENT OF NUMBER RECEIVED  
 PRIOR TO SM. TPQ-10 (CSS) OFFERS ACCURATE MEANS OF  
 HITTING TARGETS WHICH CANNOT BE LOCATED BY AIRBORNE FAC FOR VISUAL  
 ATTACK AND IN ADDITION CAN BRING WEIGHT OF AIR ATTACK ON ENEMY  
 WHEN HE LEASE EXPECTS IT. ITS EFFECTIVE USE OVER A 24 HOUR  
 PERIOD IS ESSENTIAL TO BOTH MARINE AND ARMY UNITS AND SHOULD  
 BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED.

6. IN SUMMARY, SM SYSTEM SAW ONLY MINOR CHANGES DURING PAST  
 BT

**SECRET**

#361

**SECRET**

NNNNPTTSZYUW RHMAFA1093 2820812-SSSS--RUEBHOA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 080812Z OCT 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

INFO RUEBHOA/CMC

O P 291442Z JUL 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO COMUSMACV SQ

CINCPAC

INFO CG FIRST MAF DNG

BT

SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
 MONTH. CHANGES RECOMMENDED LAST MONTH IN REFERENCE (C) ARE  
 STILL APPLICABLE AND WOULD IMPROVE SYSTEM. IN PARTICULAR,  
 RETURN TO THIS HQ SCHEDULING AUTHORITY FOR IN-COUNTRY 1ST  
 MAF SORTIES TO BE USED AS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF ALL UNITS  
 IN ICTZ WOULD INCREASE FLEXIBILITY AND ENHANCE RESPON-  
 SIVENESS TO NEEDS OF ALL III MAF GROUND COMMANDERS. COMUSMACV  
 HAS MEANS FOR INFLUENCING ACTION THROUGHOUT RVN BY INCREASING  
 /DECREASING AIR FORCE SORTIES PROVIDED TO III MAF.  
 7. IN ADDITION, FOLLOWING NEW CHANGES ARE RECOMMENDED:  
 A. ESTABLISH PROCEDURE SO THAT CHANGES TO PRE-PLANNED FRAG

PAGE TWO RHMAFA1093 SECRET

CAN BE MADE THROUGH IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST CHANNELS.

B. PROVIDE FOR RAPID RESPONSE IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE

THROUGH USE OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS AND

DELIVERY OF PRINTS BY AIR AS REQUIRED TO MEET STATED DEADLINES.

C. INCREASE USE OF CSS TO KEEP ENEMY UNDER ATTACK ON 24

HOUR A DAY BASIS.

3-4

BT

**SECRET**

#361

SECRET

Star

PYTSZYUW RHMMAF1076  
FM CG III MAF DNG  
INFO RUEBHOA/CMC  
O P 291442Z JUL 68  
TO COMUSMACV SON  
CINCPAC  
INFO CG PYTSY  
BT

RAS 3800  
ORIG G-3  
DEL G-3

S E C R E T  
SUBJ: EVALUATION OF  
TO 200600N JULY 1968  
REF (A) COMUSMACV  
(B) COMUSMACV LTR  
(C) CG, III MAF 200600N JULY 1968 (NOTALS)

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (A) SUBJECT EVALUATION IS INCLUDING COMMENTS AND STATUS OF ACTIONS ON AREAS LISTED IN REFERENCE (B).
2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN REFERENCE (A) ARE CONSIDERED VALID ALTHOUGH ONLY ONE OF NINE RECOMMENDATIONS

PAGE TWO RHMMAF1076 S E C R E T

OF IT FROM WEEKLY FRAG HAS BEEN ADOPTED ON THE BASIS OF (SM) PROCEDURES. MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS RESULTED IN MORE EFFICIENT OPERATIONS. AREAS HAVE BEEN NOTED WHERE MINOR PROCEDURAL CHANGES WOULD INCREASE RESPONSIVENESS TO CHANGING NEEDS.

3. COMMENTS AND STATUS OF ACTION ON AREAS OF INTEREST IN REFERENCE (B) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THIS HQ HAS NO BASIS ON WHICH TO CORROBORATE LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS. AS PORTION OF I DASC IS MAINTAINED TO III MAF HQ, THIS WILL FURTHER IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS TO III MAF TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS. DEPUTY DIRECTOR ALSO SERVES AS III MAF LIAISON OFFICER.

B. DIFFERENCES IN 7TH AF STATISTICS OF SORTIES FLOWN, FLOWN AND REPORTED ARE NOT KNOWN TO THIS HQ. ALL SORTIES FLOWN, FLOWN AND REPORTED HAVE BEEN WITHIN 7TH AF EASTERN AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. SPECIFIC DISCREPANCIES IN STATISTICS NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THIS COMMAND. I DASC MAINTAINS RECORD OF ALL SORTIES BY TYPE FLOWN IN ICTZ. HQ III MAF IS PROVIDED WEEKLY SUMMARY OF STATISTICS WHICH IN FACT ARE IDENTICAL

*Readdressal*

SECRET

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PAGE THREE RHMAFAI078 S E C R E T  
 THOSE REPORTED TO 7TH AF TACC BY I DASC. ONLY STATISTICS ORIGINATING AT THIS HQ CONCERNING SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARE THOSE REFLECTING AIR SUPPORT REQUEST AND SORTIES ALLOCATION TO III MAF UNITS.

C. AIR SUPPORT IS REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDERS BASED ON THEIR ESTIMATE OF SORTIES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS. III MAF SUB-ALLOCATIONS ARE IN TURN BASED ON THESE REQUESTS. IN ADDITION CG III MAF ASSIGNS PRIORITIES BASED ON OVERALL EVALUATION OF ENEMY SITUATION AND OPERATIONS IN ICTZ. EXAMINATION OF REQUESTS SUBMITTED TO THIS HQ REVEALS ARMY AND FMMAF'S ARE IN FACT ALLOCATED A HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF REQUESTED SORTIES THAN MARINE UNITS. SINCE 1 JULY, 2ND ROKMC BDE HAS BEEN ALLOCATED 94PCT OF SORTIES REQUESTED, ARMY UNITS 66PCT AND MARINE UNITS 60 PCT. ARVN UNITS DO NOT REQUEST PREPLANNED SORTIES FROM III MAF. ARVN IMMEDIATE REQUESTS THROUGH TACS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN HONORED. A WEEKLY AIR SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE WAS INITIATED BY THIS HQS 18 JULY WITH ALL MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS REPRESENTED IN ORDER TO ASSURE ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR SUPPORT ARE FULLY KNOWN AND FULLY CONSIDERED. PCV SUBALLOCATES TO UNITS UNDER PCV OPCON.

PAGE FOUR RHMAFAI078 S E C R E T  
 D. LEVELS IN COMBAT ACTIVITY AND REDUCTION OF ENEMY THREAT MAY RESULT IN FEWER SORTIES REQUIRED. HOWEVER, AS MANEUVER BATTALIONS ON OFFENSIVE CONTINUE TO SEEK LOCATION OF ENEMY UNITS, INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR LZ CONSTRUCTION, PREP AND HELO ESCORT TEND TO OFFSET REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF TROOPS IN CONTACT. CONSEQUENTLY GROUND COMMANDERS REQUEST FOR TACIAR HAVE NOT LESSENED. INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE AT THIS HQ INDICATES AND INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY PARTICULARLY IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE. PRESENT ALLOCATION OF PREPLANNED SORTIES IS NOT CONSIDERED ADEQUATE.

E. PROCEDURES TOO ASSURE FULL UTILIZATION OF WEEKLY FRAG ARE IN STRICT ACCORD WITH SM SYSTEM.  
 F. MARINE STRIKE AIRCRAFT RIO WITH CRC AND CRP AS DIRECTED BY FRAG.

G. SUB ALLOCATION OF WEEKLY FRAG BY THIS HQ DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL SORTIES ALLOCATED TO III MAF. THIS HQ AND HQ PCV RETAIN SORTIES FOR LOC INTERDICTION AND TO WEIGH EFFORT AS REQUIRED. SORTIES ARE ALSO SHIFTED BETWEEN DIVISIONS WHEN REQUIRED. IT MUST BE NOTED HOWEVER THAT PRINCIPLE OF SUB-ALLOCATING FIXED NUMBER OF SORTIES ON WEEKLY BASIS IS IN

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**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RHMAFAI078 S E C R E T  
 ACCORD WITH MODIFIED SYSTEM OBJECTIVE OF GUARANTEEING BASIC  
 LEVEL OF SUPPORT.

H. SEE SUB PARA 3 G ABOVE.

I. REPRESENTATIVES OF 7TH AF HAVE INDICATED INFORMALLY  
 THAT PREVIOUSLY EXISTING III MAF REPORTS COULD BE UTILIZED TO  
 MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT. NO REDUC-  
 TION IN THIS REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED TO DATE.

J. III MAF HAS MADE CLEAR ITS VIEW THAT SUPPORTING FIRES  
 SHOULD BE FULLY AND CENTRALLY COORDINATED WITH PROMPT FREE  
 FLOW OF INFORMATION TO COMBINE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS WITH  
 SAFETY. INFORMALLY, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS IS BEING  
 SERIOUSLY STUDIED BY THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE BUT NO CONCRETE  
 PROPOSAL IS KNOWN. AMERICAN DIVISION PROCEDURES ARE IDENTI-  
 CAL TO MARINE CORPS.

4. DIFFICULTY HAS BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN OBTAINING PROMPT AERIAL  
 PHOTOGRAPHY. FOR EXAMPLE, PHOTOGRAPHS OF NEWLY PREPARED  
 HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE ARE NEEDED WITHIN SIX HOURS TO DETERMINE  
 WHAT OBSTACLES STILL EXIST AND TO BRIEF PILOTS WHO MUST  
 LAND BEFORE OBSTACLES CAN BE CLEARED. ALTHOUGH SYMPATHETIC  
 UNDERSTANDING IS FOUND AT ALL LEVELS, NORMAL REQUEST CHAIN IS

PAGE SIX RHMAFAI078 S E C R E T

TOO LONG TO MEET TIGHT DEADLINE FOR DELIVERY. BELIEVE THE  
 ANSWER IS TO USE IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS FOR PHOTO  
 SORTIES WITH III MAF/I DASC HAVING SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY AND AIR  
 DELIVERY OF PRINTS TO REQUIESING UNIT.

5. ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH SM IS NOT MEETING NEEDS OF GROUND  
 UNITS IS NUMBER OF TPQ-10 (CSS) SORTIES FRAGGED. PRIOR  
 TO 20 MARCH, FIRST MAW WAS PROVIDING APPROXIMATELY 94 TPQ-10  
 (CSS) SORTIES ON DAILY BASIS: 42 FOR 1ST MARDIV AND 52 FOR  
 3RD MARDIV. SINCE SM, 1ST MARDIV HAS REQUESTED 37 TPQ-10 (CSS)  
 SORTIES AND BEEN ALLOCATED AVERAGE OF 9 PER DAY WHILE 3RD  
 MARDIV REQUESTED 53 AND ALLOCATED 13 PER DAY. MARINE GROUND  
 COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN REQUESTING ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER AS BE-  
 FORE BUT HAVE ONLY BEEN ALLOCATED 24 PERCENT OF NUMBER RECEIVED  
 PRIOR TO SM. TPQ-10 (CSS) OFFERS ACCURATE MEANS OF  
 HITTING TARGETS WHICH CANNOT BE LOCATED BY AIRBORNE FAC FOR VISUAL  
 ATTACK AND IN ADDITION CAN BRING WEIGHT OF AIR ATTACK ON ENEMY  
 WHEN HE LEASE EXPECTS IT. ITS EFFECTIVE USE OVER A 24 HOUR  
 PERIOD IS ESSENTIAL TO BOTH MARINE AND ARMY UNITS AND SHOULD  
 BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED.

6. IN SUMMARY, SM SYSTEM SAW ONLY MINOR CHANGES DURING PAST  
 BT

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# 361

**SECRET**

NNNNPTTSZYUW RHMMFAI093 2820812-SSSS--RUEBHOA.  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 080812Z OCT 68  
 FM CG III MAF DNG  
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC  
 O P 291442Z JUL 68  
 FM CG III MAF DNG  
 TO COMUSMACV SGN  
 CINCPAC  
 INFO CG FIRST MAW DNG  
 BT

~~SECRET~~  
 SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
 MONTH. CHANGES RECOMMENDED LAST MONTH IN REFERENCE (C) ARE  
 STILL APPLICABLE AND WOULD IMPROVE SYSTEM. IN PARTICULAR,  
 RETURN TO THIS HQ SCHEDULING AUTHORITY FOR IN-COUNTRY 1ST  
 MAW SORTIES TO BE USED AS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF ALL UNITS  
 IN ICTZ WOULD INCREASE FLEXIBILITY AND ENHANCE RESPON-  
 SIVENESS TO NEEDS OF ALL III MAF GROUND COMMANDERS. COMUSMACV  
 HAS MEANS FOR INFLUENCING ACTION THROUGHOUT RVN BY INCREASING  
 /DECREASING AIR FORCE SORTIES PROVIDED TO III MAF.  
 7. IN ADDITION, FOLLOWING NEW CHANGES ARE RECOMMENDED:  
 A. ESTABLISH PROCEDURE SO THAT CHANGES TO PRE-PLANNED FRAG

PAGE TWO RHMMFAI093 S E C R E T  
 CAN BE MADE THROUGH IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST CHANNELS.  
 B. PROVIDE FOR RAPID RESPONSE IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE  
 THROUGH USE OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS AND  
 DELIVERY OF PRINTS BY AIR AS REQUIRED TO MEET STATED DEADLINES.  
 C. INCREASE USE OF CSS TO KEEP ENEMY UNDER ATTACK ON 24  
 HOUR A DAY BASIS.

3  
 P-4  
 BT

**SECRET**

#561

**CONFIDENTIAL**

NNNNVV LAF634  
DE RUMWLA 3982 2993843  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 270447Z JUL 68  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO RUMUSRA/CG III MAF  
BT

ACT G- 3  
INFO G-2  
COPY TO ADJ S/S G-6  
OAS

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT  
REF: A. CG III MAF 38133AZ JUL 68

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARE SUBMITTED ON SUBJECT SYSTEM BASED ON EVALUATION DURING PERIOD 271610H JUNE 10 1968 TO 270600H JULY.

- A. AIR REQUEST PROCEDURES:
  - (1) MECHANICS FOR AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS WERE SATISFACTORY DURING PERIOD.
  - (2) PROCEDURE OF NOT ACCEPTING REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL TPQ (CSS) MISSIONS ON DAILY BASIS AT TARC AND TASE IS UNSPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS.
  - (3) AIR SUPPORT REQUEST SUBMISSION CUTOFF TIME AND MISSION CHANGE CUT-OFF TIME CONTRIBUTE TO A DEGREE OF INFLEXIBILITY IN THE PREPLANNED SYSTEM.
- B. AIR SUPPORT ALLOCATION:

PAGE TWO RUMWLA3982 **C O N F I D E N T I A L**

- (1) WEEKLY/DAILY FRAG SYSTEM PROVIDES 54 PCT OF DIVISION AIR SUPPORT UTILIZED. REMAINING SORTIES RECEIVED FROM "ALERT/DIVERT" SYSTEM.
  - (2) TPQ (CSS) ALLOCATION REMAINS INSUFFICIENT TO MEET MINIMUM REQUIREMENT.
  - C. CONTINUING ACTIVE AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT RECEIVED FROM "IMMEDIATE" SYSTEM IS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN RECEIVING TIMELY CLOSE AIR SUPPORT.
2. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:
- A. A GREATER NUMBER OF TPQ(CSS) SORTIES BE ALLOCATED TO THIS DIVISION ON THE WEEKLY FRAG.
  - B. THE TARC/TASE ACCEPT AND PROCESS DAILY REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL TPQ (CSS) SORTIES.
  - C. MISSION CUT-OFF TIMES BE RE-EXAMINED WITH A VIEW OF REDUCING THE TIMES INVOLVED.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHIEF	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	ATO	POST	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURC.									

*Air Control*

#358

00 013: 313...313...313...313...

CG RUMUGRA  
DE WENNA 331 2081500  
ZNY 00000  
O 001002 JUL 68  
FM CG PCV PHB  
TO RUMUGRA/ CG III MAF DNG  
INFO ZEN/CG 1ST ACD CES  
ZNY/CG 101ST ACD GLE  
ZEN/CG 30 MAR DIV DGH  
BT

ACT G-3  
COPY TO G-6 ADJ S/S

UNCLAS AVII-GCAV 24739  
SUBJ: EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT ((U))  
REF: MSG CG III MAF 081334Z JUL 68 (U), SUBJECT AS ABOVE.  
((U)) THIS HQ HAS NO COMMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THIS REPORTING  
PERIOD.  
BT

*Air Control*

#357

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ZVA 414 ARA963  
 PP RUMSAK  
 DE RUMSAR 989 2081317  
 ZNY CCCC  
 261317Z JUL 68

COG G-3  
 INFO G-2 G-4  
 COPY TO G-6 ADJ S/S

FM 7AF TACC ISN AB RVN  
 TO RUMSAK/HQ III MAF DANANG AB RVN  
 RUMHVH/ADVISORY TEAM ONE DANANG AB RVN  
 RUMSAGP/I DASC DANANG AB RVN

BT  
 C O N F I D E N T I A L / T A C W F P  
 SUBJECT: I DASC OPERATIONS (U)  
 FOR: SENIOR ADVISOR I CORPS AT HQ III MAF; DEPUTY SENIOR ADVISOR  
 I CORPS AT ADVISORY TEAM ONE; DEPUTY DIRECTOR AT I DASC.  
 1. (C) MOVEMENT OF SOME PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT FROM I DASC TO  
 III MAF COMPOUND WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH PRESENT OPERATIONS OR  
 ADVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES OF I DASC.  
 2. (C) FULL SUPPORT OF CG I CORPS AND ALL REQUIRED SUPPORT AND  
 ADVISORY FUNCTIONS FOR THE ARVN ALO/FAC SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE  
 UNCHANGED.

GP-4  
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	REG
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	MO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

*Handwritten signature and initials*

#356

SECRET

PTTSZYUW RUMUGRA3245 2080910-SSSS--RUMHVH RUMUFKA RUMUKFA.  
ZNY SSSSS

P 26091Z JUL 68 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF DNG RVN

TO RUMUKFA/COMUSMACV SGN RVN

INFO RUMUFKA/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN AB RVN

RUMHVH/I DASC DNG RVN

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: HORN DASC (U)

REF: A. COMUSMACV 21159 DTG 220843Z JUL 68 (NOTAL)

B. 7AF MSG DTG 171355Z JUL 68 (NOTAL)

1. REF A REQUESTS CONSTRUCTION PLANNING TO ACHIEVE THE REQUIRED DEGREE OF HARDNESS IAW REF B. REF B NOT WELD THIS HQ.
2. WALLS OF ORIGINAL PORTION OF BLDG ARE TWO FT EIGHT IN THICK REINFORCED CONCRETE TO HEIGHT OF SIX FT TEN IN. THAT SECTION OF CONCRETE WALL, SOUTHSIDE BORDERING ALONG PERIMETER FENCE, IS EXTENDED UPWARD THREE AND HALF FT TO ROOF WITH HALF IN PLYWOOD SHELL CONTAINING SANDBAG FILL. NEW 29 FT X 42 FT ADDITION (COMM CENTER) IS EIGHT IN THICK REINFORCED CONCRETE AND EXTENDS TO THE ROOF (APPROX TEN FT) FOOTING IS CONCRETE SLAB AND ROOF IS CONVENTIONAL ASBESTOS/CORRUGATED METAL WITH INNER HALF IN PLYWOOD CEILING.

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA3245 SECRET

GP-4

BT

HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG G-3

CON G-3 AIR FEO

KEL C/S

*6*  
*DASC*  
*Folder*

SECRET

# 353

**SECRET**

NNNNZ CZ CSAA154ZVA 361 ARA372  
 OO RUMSAK  
 DE RUMSAR 861 20:0453  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O-23343Z JUL-68  
 FM 7AF TACC TAN SON NHUT AB RVN  
 TO RUMSAK/CG UNBAGMAF DA NANG AB RVN  
 RUMSARH/CG PCV PHU BAI RVN  
 RUMSAV/CG I MAU DA NANG AB RVN  
 RUMSAGP/I DASC DA NANG AB RVN  
 RUMSARH/DASC VICTOR PHU BAI RVN  
 INFO ZEN/COMUSMACV  
 RUHEAE/CINCPACAF  
 RUMSAR3/STAC FTR UG BIEN HOA AB RVN  
 RUMSAH/12 TAC FTR UG CAM RANH BAY AB RVN  
 RUMSAB/14 AIR COMDO UG NHA TRANG AB RVN  
 RUMSARE/31 TAC FTR UG TUY HOA AB RVN  
 RUMSAP/35 TAC FTR UG PHAN RANG AB RVN  
 RUMSARA/37 TAC FTR UG PHU CAT AB RVN  
 RUMSAGP/356 TAC FTR UG DA NANG AB RVN  
 RUMSAE/633SP OPNS UG FLEIKU AB RVN  
 RUMSAR3/504 TAC AIR SPT GP BIEN HOA AB RVN  
 RUMSAE/II DASC FLEIKU AB RVN  
 RUMSARF/III DASC BIEN HOA AB RVN

ACT G-3  
 INFO G-2 OAS  
 COPY TO ADJ S/S G-6

PAGE 2 RUMSAR 861 S E C R E T  
 RUMSAUA/IV DASC CAN THO AB RVN  
 RUMSAB/DASC ALPHA NHA TRANG AB RVN  
 RUMBOF/ABCCC UDORN RTAFB THAI  
 RUMSAGD/WATERBOY DONG HA RVN  
 RUMSAGS/PANAMA MONKEY MOUNTAIN RVN  
 RUMSAV/VICE SQUAD MONKEY MOUNTAIN RVN  
 RUMSAE/PEACOCK FLEIKU AB RVN  
 BT

*TY DASC  
 [Signature]*

S E C R E T /TACD/JUL 68

SUBJECT: HORN DASC (U)

1. (C) A NEW DASC IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE III MAF COMPOUND, CAMP HORN, AT DA NANG. THE NEW DASC IS TO BE TITLED HORN DASC AND IT IS EXPECTED TO BE IN OPERATION BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THE TENTH OF AUGUST.
2. (S) HORN DASC IS TO BE RESPONSIVE TO CG III MAF AND IS TO OPERATE ALL F4F STRIKE, RECONNAISSANCE AND SUPPORT AIRCRAFT (LESS HELICOPTERS AND AIRLIFT) THAT SUPPORT F4F OPERATING WITHIN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. VICTOR DASC AND I DASC WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE.

**SECRET**  
 #351

**SECRET**

PAGE 3 RUMSAR 861 S E C R E T  
VICTOR DASC WILL BE SUBORDINATE TO HORN DASC, WITH THE  
SAME RELATIONSHIP PREVIOUSLY HELD WITH I DASC. I DASC  
IS TO BE RESPONSIVE TO I CORPS AND IS TO OPERATE ALL AIR  
IN SUPPORT OF ARVN FORCES WITHIN THE I CORPS TACTICAL  
ZONE. A COORDINATION RELATIONSHIP WILL BE ESTABLISHED  
BETWEEN HORN DASC AND I DASC, SIMILAR TO THAT IN BEING  
FOR DASC ALPHA AND II DASC.

3. (C) NOTIFICATION OF THE ACTUAL DATE HORN DASC  
STARTS OPERATING WILL BE PASSED ONCE I IS FIRM.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

# 351

**SECRET**

DE RUMU GRA 2891 2050646  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 0 230646Z JUL 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 INFO RUMHAW CG FIRST MAW DNG  
 0 220130Z JUL 68  
 FM 7AF TSN AB RVN  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 INFO CG III MAF DNG AB RVN  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG S/S  
 REL DC/S

**S E C R E T** /TACD/JUL 68. SECTION 1 OF 2.  
 SUBJECT: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)  
 REF: COMUSMACV MSG 180707Z JUL 68.

1. (U) IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCE A MEETING WAS HELD AT DA NANG ON 19 JULY BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF 7AF AND III MAF. IN ANALYZING THE STATISTICAL DATA IT IS THE OPINION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE DIFFERENCES ARE EXPLAINABLE. WITHIN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS A REWORK OF 7AF MESSAGE DTG 160750 AND CG III MAF MSG DTG 172350Z HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED TO SET FORTH THE RATIONALE FOR THE DIFFERENCES. THE STATISTICAL DATA CONTAINED IN THE REWORK OF BOTH MESSAGES HAS BEEN AGREED UPON BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF 7AF AND III MAF. THE FINAL PARAGRAPH CONTAINS A JOINT SUMMARY OF REPRESENTATIVES FINDINGS.

PAGE TWO RUMU GRA2891 **S E C R E T**

2. (S) 7AF REWRITE.  
 A. THE NUMBER OF ACTUAL CHANGES TO PREPLANNED SORTIES DURING THE EVALUATION PERIOD RECEIVED AT THE 7AF TACC CAN BE MEASURED. HOWEVER, THEY WILL BE CONSISTENTLY AT VARIANCE WITH THE CHANGES IDENTIFIED BY III MAF. G-3, III MAF RECEIVES FROM THEIR SUBORDINATE UNITS CHANGES TO PREPLANNED MISSIONS. UPON RECEIPT THEY ARE REVIEWED AND SOME ARE REFUSED FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS SUCH AS INCOMPATIBLE ORDNANCE REQUESTS AND INCOMPATIBLE TURN AROUND TIMES. IN TURN THE APPROVED G-3 AIR, III MAF REQUESTS ARE PASSED TO MACV TASE OR I DASC, DEPENDENT UPON WHICH PORTION OF THE FRAG IS AFFECTED. BOTH TASE AND I DASC REVIEW THE REQUESTED CHANGES PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO 7AF TACC. THE REVIEW AT THIS LEVEL NORMALLY RESULTS IN SOME REFUSAL. THEREFORE, 7AF TACC DOES NOT RECEIVE A LIKE NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR FRAG CHANGES AS DOES III MAF, AS THE INTENTION OF THE SYSTEM IS TO REVIEW THE REQUESTS FOR VALIDITY AND COMPATIBILITY AT THE MAJOR LEVELS, E. G., G-3 AIR,

*Air Control File*

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**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMUGRA2891 S E C R E T  
 III MAF, MACV TASE, I DASC AND FINALLY 7AF TACC.  
 B. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF REQUESTS RECEIVED  
 PER DAY FROM I DASC BY 7AF TACC DURING THE MONTH  
 OF JUNE FOR ORDNANCE CHANGES WAS APPROXIMATELY  
 FOUR AND ONE HALF PER DAY, FOR A TOTAL OF 135.  
 OF THIS NUMBER 49 REQUESTS WERE DISAPPROVED BE-  
 CAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:  
 (1) LOAD INCOMPATIBLE WITH AIRCRAFT LOAD  
 CONFIGURATION FOR EXAMPLE, 2000 LB BOMBS FOR AN  
 F-105 OR M-1 FUZE EXTENDERS ON M-117 FOR F-4 AIRCRAFT.  
 (2) INCOMPATIBILITY OF FUSING WITH BOMB  
 CONFIGURATION, I. E., M-1 EXTENDERS AND MD BOMBS OR  
 DELAYED FUSES ON HE BOMBS.  
 (3) SHORTAGE OF MUNITIONS, PARTICULARLY M-1  
 EXTENDERS AND NAPALM.  
 (4) MANAGEMENT OF MUNITIONS TO REMAIN WITHIN  
 THE MONTHLY MUNITION ALLOCATION.  
 C. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR TOT AND/OR  
 TOIP CHANGES RECEIVED AT 7AF TACC WAS APPROXIMATELY  
 TWO PER DAY FOR A TOTAL OF 58 FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE.

PAGE FOUR RUMUGRA2891 S E C R E T  
 OF THIS NUMBER APPROXIMATELY 25 WERE DISAPPROVED  
 BECAUSE THE AIRCRAFT TURN AROUND CAPABILITY WAS  
 EXCEEDED.  
 D. RESPONSE TIME MEASURED BY 7AF IS NOT BELIEVED  
 PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE AS THE ONLY TIME THAT CAN BE  
 MEASURED BY 7AF IS FROM THE MOMENT A REQUEST IS  
 RECEIVED BY I DASC FROM G-3 AIR, III MAF OR BY THE  
 TCC FROM EITHER I DASC OR M CVT. THE TIME INVOLVING THE REQUEST TO  
 7AF TCC FROM EITHER OF THESE TWO AGENCIES IS NEGLIGIBLE,  
 AS IN ON CE ALL IT INVOLVES IS A PHONE CALL IN THE LATTER  
 CASE (MACV TASE) IT MEANS WALKING ACROSS THE HALL,  
 AS TASE AND TCC ARE PHYSICALLY COLLOCATED ON THE  
 SAME FLOOR IN HQ 7AF. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE TIME  
 CONSIDERABLY DEPENDENT UPON THE MAGNITUDE OF THE  
 REQUESTED CHANGE, PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT TO ORD-  
 NANCE. IF NUMEROUS BASES ARE INVOLVED IT WILL DIFFER  
 SHARPLY THAN IF ONLY ONE TOT AT ONE BASE IS INVOLVED.  
 SIMILARLY, TIME WILL VARY IF A MINOR CHANGE IN ORD-

**SECRET**

# 349

**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RUMUGRA2891 S E C R E T  
 NANCE IS REQUESTED AS OPPOSED TO THE DOWN AND UP  
 LOADING'S OF A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT ORDNANCE RE-  
 QUIRING COMPLICATED FUZING ON NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT.  
 NO ATTEMPT HAS BEEN MADE BY 7AF TO MEASURE IN  
 FINITE TERMS THE TIME INVOLVED FROM RECEIPT OF  
 CHANGE REQUESTS THROUGH APPROVAL TO ACTUAL  
 EXECUTION. DATA AVAILABLE INDICATES THAT ONCE  
 APPROVED BY 7AF TACC THE CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE  
 AS REQUESTED. THIS BEING CONSISTENT WITH THE FACT  
 THAT TACC WOULD NOT NORMALLY APPROVE CHANGES,  
 UNLESS IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THE CHANGES COULD BE  
 EFFECTED.

3. (S) III MAF REWRITE:

A. DURING JUNE EVALUATION OF MODIFIED SINGLE  
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) TOTAL OF 9,254 SORTIES  
 WERE FLOWN IN I CTZ. SOME 5,967 OF THESE WERE PRE-  
 PLANNED SORTIES, HOWEVER 7310 SORTIES WERE FRAGGED  
 345 CHANGES REQUESTED TO THE PREPLANNED FRAG.  
 THE AVERAGE TIME REQUESTS WERE RECEIVED AT III MAF

PAGE SIX RUMUGRA2891 S E C R E T

TARC PRIOR TO TOT'S ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) ORDNANCE: 220 AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 7  
 HRS PRIOR TO TOT.

(2) TOT: 95, AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 8 HRS  
 PRIOR TO TOT.

(3) TPQ: 39, AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 8 HRS  
 PRIOR TO ORIGINAL TOT.

(4) 34 ORDNANCE CHANGES REQUESTED AND 5  
 TOT CHANGES REQUESTED WERE DISAPPROVED BY III MAF.  
 ALL OTHERS WERE SUBMITTED TO I DASC AND MACV TASE.

B. OF THE TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN DURING THE PERIOD  
 3,287 CONSISTED OF SCRAMBLES, DIVERTS INTO I CTZ AND  
 REPRESENTS APPROX 35 PERCENT OF EFFORT.

C. CHANGES TO WEEKLY FRAG ARE RELATIVELY EASY  
 AND THE MODIFIED SMS IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE  
 MODIFY FRAGS ARE MORE COMPLEX AND TIME CONSUMING  
 THAN THOSE THAT WERE IN EFFECT FOR MARINE UNITS  
 PRIOR TO 21 MARCH 68. PRIOR TO SMS, MARINE DIVISIONS

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

#349

**SECRET**

DE RUMUGRA 2929 2050646  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 0233646Z JUL 68  
 FM CG III MAF DNG  
 INFO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG  
 02-3130Z JUL 68  
 FM 7AF TSN AB RVN  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 INFO CG III MAF DNG AB RVN  
 BT

**S E C R E T /TACD/JUL 68. FINAL SECTION OF TWO**  
**SUBJECT: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)**  
 WENT DIRECT TO FMAW TADC TO REQUEST CHANGES TO  
 PREPLANNED FRAG USING IMMEDIATE REQUEST CHANNEL.  
 CURRENT SYSTEM REQUIRES DIVISIONS TO FOLLOW THE AIR  
 SUPPORT REQUEST CHAIN TO III MAF. III MAF THEN PRO-  
 CEEDS AS FOLLOWS:  
 (1) AIR FORCE MISSIONS: III MAF NOTIFIES I DASC  
 WHO IN TURN REQUEST CHANGE FROM STRIKE PLANS (TACC).  
 STRIKE PLANS THEN NOTIFIES USAF TFW'S.  
 (2) MARINE MISSIONS: III MAF GOES DIRECT TO FMAW  
 TADC AND IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIES I DASC. FMAW THEN

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA2929 **S E C R E T**  
 NOTIFIES MA GS. (DIVISIONS SUBORDINATE TO PCV HAVE AN  
 ADDED LINK SINCE REQUESTED CHANGES GO THROUGH PCV  
 D. THE SMS WOULD BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO GROUND  
 COMMANDERS NEEDS AND MISSION DIRECTION WOULD BE  
 MORE EFFICIENT AND FLEXIBLE IF A BLOCK OF SORTIES  
 WERE ALLOCATED TO III MAF FOR SCHEDULING WITHIN  
 FRAMEWORK OF SS, AND A MORE DIRECT REQUEST SYSTEM  
 FOR CHANGES IMPLEMENTED.  
 E. THE WEEKLY FRAG CONSISTED OF APPROXIMATELY  
 73 PERCENT OF PREPLANNED SORTIED DURING JUNE. SINCE  
 THAT TIME THERE HAS BEEN A DECLINE IN PREPLANNED  
 ALLOCATIONS DUE TO OUT-OF-COUNTRY OPERATIONS.  
 CONSEQUENTLY, TOTAL SORTIES AVAILABLE AND PER-  
 CENTAGE OF PREPLANS DECLINED. GROUND COMMANDERS  
 CONTINUE TO REQUEST IMMEDIATE SORTIES TO COMPENSATE  
 FOR DECREASED PREPLANNED ALLOCATIONS. THIS SUPPORTS  
 CONTENTION THAT LARGER RATIO OF PREPLANS IS  
 NECESSARY.  
 F. THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN CG III MAF

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**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMU GRA2929 S E C R E T  
7AF THAT THE DATA PRESENTED BY EACH OF REQUESTED  
CHANGES CAN NEVER BE THE SAME BECAUSE OF THE  
REVIEW SYSTEM INVOLVED. IN RESPECT TO RESPONSE TIMES  
IT IS MOST DIFFICULT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION IN FINITE  
TERMS, UNLESS THE QUESTION IS DEFINED IN TERMS OF  
GROSS TIMES FROM INITIATION AT THE LOWEST LEVEL TO  
EXECUTION OR IN NET TIME FROM APPROVAL AT III MAF OR  
TACC TO EXECUTION. IN EITHER EVENT ONCE APPROVAL  
IS MADE BY TACC, THE FINAL APPROVING AUTHORITY, THE  
CHANGE IS MADE.

P-4

BT

**SECRET**

# 349

SECRET

6

SECRET

PT009063  
PTTSZYUW RUMUFA3946 2040920-SSSS--RUMUGRA.  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 220843Z JUL 68  
FM COMUSMACV  
TO ZEN/CDR 7AF  
RUMUGRA/CG III MAF  
BT

ACT G-3  
INFO G-6  
COPY TO ADJ S/S G-2

SECRET 21159  
SUBJ: III MAF DASC (U)  
REF: A. 7AF MSG DTG 171355Z JUL 68 (S) (NOTAL)  
B. CG III MAF MSG DTG 201318Z JUL 68 (S)

1. (S) CG III MAF (REF B) HAS REPORTED THAT A MEETING AT HQ I CORPS RESULTED IN AGREEMENT TO MOVE MAIN DASC TO III MAF HQ COMPOUND; HOWEVER, VNAF INSTALLATION WILL REMAIN AT HQ I CORPS. THIS WILL REQUIRE COMMUNICATIONS FOR AIR SUPPORT PURPOSES BETWEEN THE TWO CENTERS.
2. (S) FOR CG III MAF, CDR, 7AF (REF A) HAS EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR A HARDENED FACILITY AT THE III MAF SITE. REQUEST YOU ADVISE THIS HQ, INFO CDR 7AF, AS TO CONSTRUCTION PLANNING TO ACHIEVE THE REQUIRED DEGREE OF HARDNESS.

GP-4  
BT

*I Don't  
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SECRET

#348

**SECRET**

6

OTISZYUW RUMUGRA2879 205065Z-SSSS--RUMHAW.

ZNY SSSSS

O 230650Z JUL 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

INFO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF DNG

O P 211107Z JUL 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO CINCPAC

INFO CDR 7AF

CG III MAF

BT

S E C R E T 2111Z SECTION I OF II

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)

REF: A. CINCPAC 140017Z JULY 68

B. COMUSMACV 182706Z JULY 68 (NOTAL)

1. REF A TASKED THIS HQ TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE MECHANICS OF FRAG CHANGE REQUESTS. REF ALSO REQUESTED CG, III MAF COMMENTS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FRAG CHANGE PROCEDURES. STATISTICAL INPUTS FROM CDR, 7AF AND CG, III MAF WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY COMPATIBLE TO FORWARD IN REPLY TO REF A. CDR 7AF WAS TASKED BY THIS HQ. IN COORDINATION WITH CG, III MAF, TO PROVIDE THIS HQ WITH COMPATIBLE STATISTICAL DATA FOR THIS PURPOSE.

HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG S/S

REL DC/S

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA 2879 S E C R E T

REF B PROVIDED AN INTERIM REPLY TO YOUR HQ CONCERNING THIS PURPOSE.

2. CDR, 7AF REPLY TO THIS HQ IS QUOTED: QUOTE:

1. (U) IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCE A (COMUSMACV 180706Z JUL)

MEETING WAS HELD AT DANANG ON 19 JULY BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF 7AF AND III MAF. IN ANALYZING THE STATISTICAL DATA IT IS THE OPINION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE DIFFERENCES ARE EXPLAINABLE. WITHIN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS A REWORK OF 7AF MESSAGE DTG 160750Z JUL AND CG III MAF MSG DTG 172350Z JUL HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED TO SET FORTH THE RATIONALE FOR THE DIFFERENCES. THE STATISTICAL DATA CONTAINED IN THE REWORK OF BOTH MESSAGES HAS BEEN AGREED UPON BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF 7AF AND III MAF. THE FINAL PARAGRAPH CONTAINS A JOINT SUMMARY OF REPRESENTATIVES FINDINGS.

2. (S) 7AF REWRITE.

A. THE NUMBER OF ACTUAL CHANGES TO PREPLANNED SORTIES DURING THE EVALUATION PERIOD RECEIVED AT THE 7AF TACC CAN BE MEASURED. HOWEVER, THEY WILL BE CONSISTENTLY AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE CHANGES IDENTIFIED BY III MAF. G-3, III MAF RECEIVES FROM THEIR SUBORDINATE UNITS CHANGES TO PREPLANNED MISSIONS UPON RECEIPT THEY ARE REVIEWED AND SOME ARE REFUSED FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS SUCH AS INCOMPATIBLE ORDNANCE REQUESTS AND INCOMPATIBLE TURN AROUND TIMES.

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**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMUGRA 2879 S E C R E T

IN TURN THE APPROVED G-3 AIR, III MAF REQUESTS ARE PASSED TO MACV TASE OR I DASC, DEPENDENT UPON WHICH PORTION OF THE FRAG IS AFFECTED. BOTH TASE AND I DASC REVIEW THE REQUESTED CHANGES. PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO 7AF TACC, THE REVIEW AT THIS LEVEL NORMALLY RESULTS IN SOME REFUSALS. THEREFORE, 7AF TACC DOES NOT RECEIVE A LIKE NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR FRAG CHANGES AS DOES III MAF. AS THE INTENTION OF THE SYSTEM IS TO REVIEW THE REQUESTS FOR VALIDITY AND COMPATIBILITY AT THE MAJOR LEVELS, E.G. G-3 AIR, III MAF, MACV TASE, I DASC AND FINALLY 7AF TACC.

B. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF REQUESTS RECEIVED PER DAY FROM I DASC BY 7AF TACC DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE FOR ORDNANCE CHANGES WAS APPROXIMATELY FOUR AND ONE HALF PER DAY, FOR A TOTAL OF 135. OF THIS NUMBER 40 REQUESTS WERE DISAPPROVED BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

- (1) LOAD INCOMPATIBLE WITH AIRCRAFT LOAD CONFIGURATION, FOR EXAMPLE, 2000 LB BOMBS FOR AN F-105 OR M-1 FUZE EXTENDERS ON M-117 FOR F-4 AIRCRAFT.
- (2) INCOMPATIBILITY OF FUSING WITH BOMB CONFIGURATION. I.E., M-1 EXTENDERS AND HD BOMBS OR DELAYED FUSES ON HD BOMBS.
- (3) SHORTAGE OF MUNITIONS. PARTICULAR M-1 EXTENDERS

PAGE FOUR RUMUGRA 2879 S E C R E T

AND NAPALM.

- (4) MANGEMENT OF MUNITIONS TO REMAIN WITHIN THE MONTHLY MUNITION ALLOCATION.

C. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR TOT AND/OR TOIP CHANGES RECEIVED AT 7AF TACC WAS APPROXIMATELY TWO PZR DAY FOR A TOTAL OF 57 FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE. OF THIS NUMBER APPROXIMATELY 29 WERE DISAPPROVED BECAUSE THE AIRCRAFT TURN AROUND CAPABILITY WAS EXCEEDED.

D. RESPONSE TIME MEASURED BY 7AF IS NOT BELIEVED PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE AS THE ONLY TIME THAT CAN BE MEASURED BY 7AF IS FROM THE MOMENT A REQUEST IS RECEIVED BY I DASC FROM G-3 AIR, III MAF OR BY THE TACC FROM EITHER I DASC OR MACV TASE. THE TIME INVOLVED IN PASSING THE REQUEST TO 7AF TACC FROM EITHER OF THESE TWO AGENCIES IS NEGLIGIBLE. AS IN ONE CASE ALL IT INVOLVES IS A PHONE CALL AND IN THE LATTERN CASE (MACV TASE) IT MEANS WALKING ACROSS THE HALL. AS TASE AND TACC ARE PHYSICALLY COLLOCATED ON THE SAME FLOOR IN HQ 7AF. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE TIME FOR THE UNIT TO ACTUALLY EFFECT A CHANGE WILL VARY CONSIDERABLY DEPENDENT UPON THE MAGNITUDE OF THE REQUESTED CHANGE, PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT TO ORDNANCE. IF NUMEROUS BASES ARE INVOLVED IT WILL DIFFER SHARPLY

**SECRET**

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**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RUMUGRA 2879 S E C R E T  
 THAN IF ONLY ONE TOT AT ONE BASE IS INVOLVED. SIMILARLY, TIME WILL VARY IF A MINOR CHANGE IN ORDNANCE ID REQUESTED AS OPPOSED TO THE DOWN AND UP LOADING OF A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT ORDNANCE REQUIRING COMPLICATED FUZING ON NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT. NO ATTEMPT HAS BEEN MADE BY 7AF TO MEASURE IN FINITE TERMS THE TIME INVOLVED FROM RECEIPT OF CHANGE REQUESTS THROUGH APPROVAL TO ACTUAL EXECUTION. DATA AVAILABLE INDICATES THAT ONCE APPROVED BY 7AF TACC THE CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE AS REQUESTED. THIS BEING CONSISTENT WITH THE FACT THAT TACC WOULD NOT NORMALLY APPROVE CHANGES, UNLESS IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THE CHANGES COULD BE EFFECTED.

3. (S) III MAF REWRITE:

A. DURING JUNE EVALUATION OF MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) A TOTAL OF 9,254 SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN ICTZ. SOME 5,967 OF THESE WERE PREPLANNED SORTIES, HOWEVER 7310 SORTIES WERE FRAGGED ON THE PREPLANNED WKLY/DAILY FRAGS. THERE WERE 345 CHANGES REQUESTED TO THE PREPLANNED FRAG. THE AVERAGE TIME REQUESTS WERE RECEIVED AT III MAF TARC PRIOR TO TOTs ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) ORDNANCE: 220 AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 7 HRS PRIOR TO TOT.

PAGE SIX RUMUGRA 2879 S E C R E T

(2) TOT: 95, AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 3 HOURS PRIOR TO TOT.

(3) TPQ: EP, AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 3 HRS PRIOR TO ORIGINAL TOT.

(4) 34 ORDNANCE CHANGES REQUESTED AND 4 TOT CHANGES REQUESTED WERE DISAPPROVED BY III MAF. ALL OTHERS WERE SUBMITTED TO I DASC AND MACV IASE.

B. OF THE TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN DURING THE PERIOD 3,237 CONSISTED OF SCRAMBLES, DIVERTS INTO ICTZ AND ADD ONS TO MEET GROJND COMMANDERS NEEDS. THIS REPRESENTS APPROX 35 PERCENT OF EFFORT.

C. CHANGES TO WEEKLY FRAG ARE RELATIVELY EASY AND THE MODIFIED SMS IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT. HOWEVER, PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO MODIFY FRAGS ARE MORE COMPLEX AND TIME CONSUMING THAN THOSE THAT WERE IN EFFECT FOR MARINE UNITS PRIOR TO 21 MARCH 68. PRIOR TO SMS, MARINE DIVISIONS WENT DIRECT TO FMAW TADC TO REQUEST CHANGES TO PREPLANNED FRAG USING IMMEDIATE REQUEST CHANNEL. CURRENT SYSTEM REQUIRES DIVISIONS TO FOLLOW THE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHAIN TO III MAF. III MAF THEN PROCEEDS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) AIR FORCE MISSIONS: III MAF NOTIFIES I DASC WHO IN TURN REQUESTS CHANGE FROM STRIKE PLANS (TACC). STRIKE PLANS THEN  
 BT

**SECRET**

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**SECRET**

OTTSZYUW RUMUGRA2916 2050650-SSSS--RUMHAW.

ZNY SSSSS

O 230650Z JUL 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

INFO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG

O P 211107Z JUL 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO CINCPAC

INFO CDR 7AF

CG III MAF

BT

**S E C R E T** 21110 FINAL SECTION OF II

NOTIFIES USAF TFW'S.

(2) MARINE MISSIONS: III MAF GOES DIRECT TO FMAW TADC AND IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIES I DASC. FMAW THEN NOTIFIES MAGS. (DIVISIONS SUBORDINATE TO PCV HAVE AN ADDED LINK SINCE REQUESTED CHANGES GO THROUGH PCV HQ).

D. THE SMS WOULD BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO GROUND COMMANDERS NEEDS AND MISSION DIRECTION WOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT AND FLEXIBLE IF A BLOCK OF SORTIES WERE ALLOCATED TO III MAF FOR SCHEDULING WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF SMS, AND A MORE DIRECT REQUEST SYSTEM FOR CHANGES IMPLEMENTED.

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA 2916 **S E C R E T**

E. THE WEEKLY FRAG CONSISTED OF APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT OF PREPLANNED SORTIES DURING JUNE, SINCE THAT TIME THERE HAS BEEN A DECLINE IN PREPLANNED ALLOCATIONS DUE TO OUT-OF-ACOUNTRY OPERATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, TOTAL SORTIES AVAILABLE AND PERCENTAGE OF PREPLANS DECLINED. GROUND COMMANDERS CONTINUE TO REQUEST IMMEDIATE SORTIES TO COMPENSATE FOR DECREASED PREPLANNED ALLOCATIONS.

THIS SUPPORTS CONTENTION THAT LARGER RATIO OF PREPLANS IS NECESSARY.

F. THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN CG III MAF 300636

JUN 68 (NOTAL) PARA 6B (2) AND (3) ARE CONSIDERED VALID.

4. (S) IN SUMMARY IT IS RECOGNIZED BY BOTH III MAF AND 7AF THAT THE DATA PRESENTED BY EACH ON REQUESTED CHANGES CAN NEVER BE THE SAME BECAUSE OF THE REVIEW SYSTEM INVOLVED. IN RESPECT TO RESPONSE TIMES IT IS MOST DIFFICULT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION IN FINITE TERMS, UNLESS THE QUESTION IS DEFINED IN TERMS OF GROSS TIMES FROM INITIATION AT THE LOWEST LEVEL TO EXECUTION OR IN NET TIME FROM APPROVAL AT III MAF OR TACC TO EXECUTION. IN EITHER EVENT ONCE APPROVAL IS MADE BY TACC, THE FINAL APPROVING AUTHORITY, THE CHANGE IS MADE.

END OF QUOTE.

3. IT IS APPARENT FROM THE 7AF AND III MAF RESPONSES THAT THE

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**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMUGRA 2916 S E C R E T  
PROBLEM, AS APPROACHED FROM TWO LEVELS OF CONTROL, RESULTED IN TWO  
SETS OF STATISTICS. IN PROPERLY EXERCISING JUDGEMENT AT ITS LEVEL,  
CERTAIN REQUESTS FOR CHANGES WERE DENIED AT III MAF LEVEL, THEREBY  
RESULTING IN A LESSER NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR CHANGES ARRIVING AT  
7AF TACC. THE RESPONSE TIMES, AS CITED IN III MAF COMMENTS,  
REFLECT TIMES OF REQUESTS IN ADVANCE OF TOT'S RATHER THAN A  
MEASURE OF MINIMUM RESPONSE TIMES IN WHICH CHANGES MAY BE  
EFFECTED. THE REFUSALS OF CHANGE REQUESTS AT BOTH HEADQUARTERS  
ARE JUSTIFIABLE FOR THE REASONS GIVEN.

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**SECRET**

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*copy given to G-3  
G-4 informed & will  
get copy*

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PT008900

PTTSZYIN RUMUHFA3800 2031245-SSSS--RUMUGRA.

ZNY SSSSS

ACT G-6

P 211023Z JUL 68

COPY TO ADJ S/S G-2

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DNG

RUMUFKA/CDR 7AF TSN

BT

SECRET 21103

SUBJ: STATUS OF COMM FOR NEW I DASC SITE (U)

REF: CG III MAF DTG 201318Z (S)

1. (S) GENERAL: REF STATES I CORPS (VNAF) WILL RETAIN DASC FACILITY PRESENT LOCATION, U.S. PORTION WILL MOVE TO NEW LOCATION III MAF COMPOUND, BASED ON THIS INFORMATION, REQUEST COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS BE FINALIZED AND INSTALLATION PROCEED WITHOUT DELAY.

2. (S) FOR III MAF: REQUEST CONFIRMATION VIA ELECTRICAL MEANS, INFO 7AF, NLT 23 JUL THAT BUILDING AT NEW SITE IS READY TO ACCEPT COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT ( TO INCLUDE CONSOLE MOUNTED EQUIPMENT) THAT ADEQUATE POWER IS AVAILABLE AND THAT AIR CONDITIONING PROBLEM HAS BEEN RESOLVED. PROBLEM AREAS, IF ANY, WILL ADDRESS SPECIFICALLY AND INCLUDE ACTIONS BEING TAKEN TO RESOLVE.

PAGE 2 RUMUHFA 3800 SECRET

3. (S) FOR 7AF: REQUEST CONFIRMATION VIA ELECTRICAL MEANS, INFO III MAF, NLT 24 JULY THAT ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT IS ON HAND TO MAKE INSTALLATION AND THAT PERSONNEL ARE AVAILABLE TO COMPLETE TASK EXPEDITIOUSLY. PROBLEM AREAS, IF ANY, WILL BE ADDRESSED SPECIFICALLY, AND INCLUDE ACTIONS BEING TAKEN TO RESOLVE. FURTHER REQUEST ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE OF COMMUNICATION INSTALLATION.

GP-4

BT

*I DASC folder*

**SECRET**

#346

SECRET

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OTT SZ YUW RUMUGRA2602 2021318-SSSS--RUMHAW RUMHMA RUMKVN  
RUMUFKA RUMUHFA. HAS BEEN SENT

ZNY SSSSS

O 201318Z JUL 68 ZFF-1

ORIG G-3

FM CG III MAF DNG

REL C/S

TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN

INFO RUMUFKA/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN AB RVN

RUMKVN/CG I CORPS DNG

RUMHMA/CG PROV CORPS V PHB

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUMKVN/I DASC DNG

RUMHMA/DASC VICTOR PHB

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: RELOCATION OF I DASC (S)

1. A CONFERENCE AT I CORPS HQS WAS HELD AT 1000H 19 JULY 68 TO DISCUSS RELOCATION OF I DASC. CONFEREES REPRESENTING I CORPS, 7TH AF, III MAF, FMAW, VNAF TACC AND I DASC WERE PRESENT. C/S I CORPS REPRESENTED CG I CORPS.
2. RESULT OF CONFERENCE FOLLOWS:
  - A. CG I CORPS CONCURS WITH US PART OF I DASC RELOCATING TO III MAF COMPOUND.
  - B. I CORPS RETAINS DASC FACILITY AT PRESENT LOCATION AND

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA2602 SECRET

DESIGNATION REMAINS I DASC.

C. RECOMMEND NEW DASC AT CAMP HORN BE DESIGNATED (HORN DASC) IT WILL BE SENIOR DASC IN ICTZ SERVING ALL FMAW'S AND DIRECTLY RESPONSIVE TO CG III MAF.

D. TIME FOR RELOCATION TO CAMP HORN ASAP BUT NOT 1 AUG 68.

E. SELECTED USAF ADVISORY PERSONNEL REMAIN WITH I DASC AND COVERED DIRECT CIRCUITS BETWEEN DASC'S WILL FACILITATE LIAISON AND COORDINATION.

GP-4

BT

I DASC folder

SECRET

SECRET

P100885  
OITSZYUW NUMBER 52  
ZNY 5550  
O P 21110 Z  
FM COMUSMACV  
TO RUHHUGA/CIN  
INFO ZEN/CDR 7AF  
RUHUGRA/CG III MAF

COG G-3

INFO G-2

COPY TO A/W S/S G-6

BT

SECRET  
SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT  
REF: A/ COMUSMACV  
SI COMUSMACV 180706Z JULY 68

1. REF A TASKED THIS HQ TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE MECHANISMS OF FRAG CHANGE REQUESTS. REF ALSO REQUESTED CG III MAF COMMENTS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FRAG CHANGE PROCEDURES. STATISTICAL INPUTS FROM CDR 7AF AND CG III MAF WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY COMPATIBLE TO FORWARD IN REPLY TO REF A. CDR 7AF HAS TAKEN BY THIS HQ IN COORDINATION WITH CG III MAF TO PROVIDE THIS HQ WITH COMPATIBLE STATISTICAL DATA FOR THIS PURPOSE. REF B PROVIDED AN INTERIM REPLY TO YOUR HQ CONCERNING THIS MATTER. CDR 7AF REPLY TO THIS HQ IS QUOTED: QUOTE:

1. CG III MAF RESPONSE TO REFERENCE A COMUSMACV 180706Z JULY 68:

PAGE 2  
MEETING WAS HELD AT DA NANG ON 19 JULY BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF 7AF AND III MAF. IN ANALYZING THE STATISTICAL DATA BY THE OPINION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE DIFFERENCES ARE EXPLAINABLE. WITHIN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH A PARAGRAPH OF 7AF MESSAGE 180750Z JULY AND CG III MAF 180750Z JULY HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED TO SET FORTH THE RATIONALE FOR THE DIFFERENCES. THE STATISTICAL DATA CONTAINED IN THE PARAGRAPH OF BOTH MESSAGES HAS BEEN AGREED UPON BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF 7AF AND III MAF. THE FINAL PARAGRAPH CONTAINS A JOINT SUMMARY OF REPRESENTATIVE FINDINGS.

2. (S) 7AF REWRITE:

AS THE NUMBER OF ACTUAL CHANGES TO PREPLANNED SORTIES DURING THE EVALUATED PERIOD RECEIVED AT THE 7AF TAC CAN BE MEASURED HOWEVER, THEY WILL BE CONSISTENTLY AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE CHANGES IDENTIFIED BY III MAF. G-3 III MAF RECEIVES FROM THEIR SUPERORDINATE UNITS CHANGES TO PREPLANNED MISSIONS UPON RECEIPT THEY ARE REVIEWED AND SOME ARE REFUSED FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS SUCH AS INCOMPATIBLE ORDNANCE REQUESTS AND INCOMPATIBLE TURN AROUND TIMES. IN TURN THE APPROVED G-3 AIR III MAF REQUESTS ARE PASSED TO MACV TAC OR I DASS DEPENDING UPON WHETHER FOR ION OF THE FRAG IS AFFECTED BOTH TAC AND I DASS LEVEL. THE REQUESTED CHANGES

Air Control  
SECRET  
# 343

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMUHFA 3792 S E C R E T

PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO 7AF TACC, THE REVIEW AT THIS LEVEL NORMALLY RESULTS IN SOME REFUSALS. THEREFORE, 7AF TACC DOES NOT RECEIVE A LIKE NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR FRAG CHANGES AS DOES III MAF, AS THE INTENTION OF THE SYSTEM IS TO REVIEW THE REQUESTS FOR VALIDITY AND COMPATIBILITY AT THE MAJOR LEVELS, E. G., G-3 AIR, III MAF, MACV TASE, I DASC AND FINALLY 7AF TACC.

B. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF REQUESTS RECEIVED PER DAY FROM I DASC BY 7AF TACC DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE FOR ORDNANCE CHANGES WAS APPROXIMATELY FOUR AND ONE HALF PER DAY, FOR A TOTAL OF 135. OF THIS NUMBER 40 REQUESTS WERE DISAPPROVED BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

(1) LOAD INCOMPATIBLE WITH AIRCRAFT LOAD CONFIGURATION: FOR EXAMPLE, 2000 LB BOMBS FOR AN F-100 OR M-1 FUZE EXTENDERS ON M-117 FOR F-4 AIRCRAFT.

(2) INCOMPATIBILITY OF FUSING WITH BOMB CONFIGURATION: E. G., M-1 EXTENDERS AND HD BOMBS OR DELAYED FUSES ON HD BOMBS.

(3) SHORTAGE OF MUNITIONS, PARTICULARLY M-1 EXTENDERS AND NAPALM.

(4) MANAGEMENT OF MUNITIONS TO REMAIN WITHIN THE MONTHLY MUNITION ALLOCATION.

PAGE 4 RUMUHFA 3792 S E C R E T

C. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR TOT AND/ OR TOIP CHANGES RECEIVED AT 7AF TACC WAS APPROXIMATELY TWO PER DAY FOR A TOTAL OF 57 FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE. OF THIS NUMBER APPROXIMATELY 25 WERE DISAPPROVED BECAUSE THE AIRCRAFT TURN AROUND CAPABILITY WAS EXCEEDED.

D. RESPONSE TIME MEASURED BY 7AF IS NOT BELIEVED PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE AS THE ONLY TIME THAT CAN BE MEASURED BY 7AF IS FROM THE MOMENT A REQUEST IS RECEIVED BY I DASC FROM G-3 AIR, III MAF OR BY THE TACC FROM EITHER I DASC OR MACV TASE. THE TIME INVOLVED IN PASSING THE REQUEST TO 7AF TACC FROM EITHER OF THESE TWO AGENCIES IS NEGLIGIBLE, AS IN ONE CASE ALL IT INVOLVES IS A PHONE CALL AND IN THE LATTER CASE (MACV TASE) IT MEANS WALKING ACROSS THE HALL, AS TASE AND TACC ARE PHYSICALLY COLLOCATED ON THE SAME FLOOR IN HQ 7AF. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE TIME FOR THE UNIT TO ACTUALLY EFFECT A CHANGE WILL VARY CONSIDERABLY DEPENDENT UPON THE MAGNITUDE OF THE REQUESTED CHANGE, PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT TO ORDNANCE. IF NUMEROUS BASES ARE INVOLVED IT WILL DIFFER SHARPLY THAN IF ONLY ONE TOT AT ONE BASE IS INVOLVED. SIMILARLY, TIME WILL VARY IF A MINOR CHANGE IN ORDNANCE IS REQUESTED AS OPPOSED TO THE DOWN AND UP LOADING OF A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT ORDNANCE REQUIRING

PAGE 5 RUMUHFA 3792 S E C R E T

COMPLICATED FUZING ON NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT. NO ATTEMPT HAS BEEN

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SECRET

# 343

**SECRET**

S E C R E T  
\*\*\*\*\*

MADE BY 7AF TO MEASURE IN FINITE TERMS THE TIME INVOLVED FROM RECEIPT OF CHANGE REQUESTS THROUGH APPROVAL TO ACTUAL EXECUTION. DATA AVAILABLE INDICATES THAT ONCE APPROVED BY 7AF TACC THE CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE AS REQUESTED, THIS BEING CONSISTENT WITH THE FACT THAT TACC WOULD NOT NORMALLY APPROVE CHANGES, UNLESS IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THE CHANGES COULD BE EFFECTED.

3. (S) III MAF REWRITE:

A. DURING JUNE EVALUATION OF MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) A TOTAL OF 9,254 SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN I CTZ. SOME 5,967 OF THESE WERE PREPLANNED SORTIES, HOWEVER 7310 SORTIES WERE FRAGGED ON THE PREPLANNED WKLY/DAILY FRAGS. THERE WERE 345 CHANGES REQUESTED TO THE PREPLANNED FRAG. THE AVERAGE TIME REQUESTS WERE RECEIVED AT III MAF TARC PRIOR TO TOTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) ORDNANCE: 220 AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 7 HRS PRIOR TO TOT.

(2) TOT: 95, AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 8 HOURS PRIOR TO TOT.

(3) TPO: EP: AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 8 HRS PRIOR TO ORIGINAL TOT.

PAGE 6 RUMUMFA 3792 S E C R E T

(4) 34 ORDNANCE CHANGES REQUESTED AND 4 TOT CHANGES REQUESTED WERE DISAPPROVED BY III MAF. ALL OTHERS WERE SUBMITTED TO I DASC AND MACV TASE.

B. OF THE TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN DURING THE PERIOD 3,287 CONSISTED OF SCRAMBLES, DIVERTS INTO ICTZ AND ADD ONS TO MEET GROUND COMMANDERS NEEDS. THIS REPRESENTS APPROX 35 PERCENT OF EFFORT.

C. CHANGES TO WEEKLY FRAG ARE RELATIVELY EASY AND THE MODIFIED SMS IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT, HOWEVER, PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO MODIFY FRAGS ARE MORE COMPLEX AND TIME CONSUMING THAN THOSE THAT WERE IN EFFECT FOR MARINE UNITS PRIOR TO 21 MARCH 68. PRIOR TO SMS, MARINE DIVISIONS WENT DIRECT TO FMA, TADC TO REQUEST CHANGES TO PREPLANNED FRAG USING IMMEDIATE REQUEST CHANNEL. CURRENT SYSTEM REQUIRES DIVISIONS TO FOLLOW THE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHAIN TO III MAF. III MAF THEN PROCEEDS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) AIR FORCE MISSIONS: III MAF NOTIFIES I DASC WHO IN TURN REQUESTS CHANGE FROM STRIKE PLANS (TACC). STRIKE PLANS THEN NOTIFIES USAF TFW'S.

(2) MARINE MISSIONS: III MAF GOES DIRECT TO FMA, TADC AND IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIES I DASC. FMA, THEN NOTIFIES MAGS.  
BT

**SECRET**  
# 343

**SECRET**

010210W RUMUHFA3793 2031100-SSSS-RUMUGRA.

ZNY SSSSS

O P 211107Z JUL 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMHHQA/CINCPAC

INFO ZEN/CDR 7AF

RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

BT

COG G-3

INFO G-2

COPY TO ADJ S/S G-6

**S E C R E T** 21110 FINAL SECTION OF II  
(DIVISIONS SUBORDINATE TO PCV HAVE AN ADDED LINK SINCE REQUESTED CHANGES GO THROUGH PCV HQ).

D. THE SMS WOULD BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO GROUND COMMANDERS NEEDS AND MISSION DIRECTION WOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT AND FLEXIBLE IF A BLOCK OF SORTIES WERE ALLOCATED TO III MAF FOR COMBINATION WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF SMS. A MORE COMPLEX SYSTEM FOR CHANGES APPLIED.

E. THE WEAKEST FRAG CONSIDERED IS APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT OF PREPLANNED SORTIES DURING JUNE, SINCE THAT TIME THERE HAS BEEN A DECLINE IN PREPLANNED ALLOCATIONS DUE TO OUT-OF-COUNTRY OPERATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, TOTAL SORTIES AVAILABLE AND PERCENTAGE OF PREPLANS DECLINED. GROUND COMMANDERS CONTINUE TO REQUEST IMMEDIATE SORTIES TO COMPENSATE FOR DECREASED PREPLANNED ALLOCATIONS.

PAGE 2 RUMUHFA 3793 **S E C R E T**

THIS SUPPORTS CONTENTION THAT LARGER RATIO OF PREPLANS IS NECESSARY.

F. THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN CG III MAF 300636

JUN 68 (NOTAL) PARA 6B (2) AND (3) ARE CONSIDERED VALID.

G. (5) IN SUMMARY IT IS RECOGNIZED BY BOTH III MAF AND 7AF

THAT THE DATA PRESENTED BY EACH ON REQUESTED CHANGES CAN NEVER

BE THE SAME BECAUSE OF THE REVIEW SYSTEM INVOLVED. IN RESPECT

TO RESPONSE TIMES IT IS MOST DIFFICULT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION IN

FINITE TERMS, UNLESS THE QUESTION IS DEFINED IN TERMS OF GROSS

TIMES FROM INITIATION AT THE LOWEST LEVEL TO EXECUTION OR IN NET

TIME FROM APPROVAL AT III MAF OR TACC TO EXECUTION. IN EITHER

EVENT ONCE APPROVAL IS MADE BY TACC, THE FINAL APPROVING AUTHORITY,

THE CHANGE IS MADE.

END OF QUOTE.

H. IT IS APPARENT FROM THE 7AF AND III MAF RESPONSES THAT THE

PROBLEM, AS APPROACHED FROM TWO LEVELS OF CONTROL, RESULTED IN TWO

SETS OF STATISTICS. IN PROPERLY EXERCISING JUDGMENT AT ITS LEVEL,

CERTAIN REQUESTS FOR CHANGES WERE DENIED AT III MAF LEVEL, THEREBY

RESULTING IN A LESSER NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR CHANGES ARRIVING AT

7AF TACC. THE RESPONSE TIMES, AS CITED IN III MAF COMMENTS,

REFLECT TIMES OF REQUESTS IN ADVANCE OF TOT'S RATHER THAN A

PAGE 3 RUMUHFA 3793 **S E C R E T**

MEASURE OF MINIMUM RESPONSE TIMES IN WHICH CHANGES MAY BE

EFFECTED. THE REFUSALS OF CHANGE REQUESTS AT BOTH HEADQUARTERS

ARE JUSTIFIABLE FOR THE REASONS GIVEN. GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

# 343

SECRET

MSG AS REC'D, WILL SVC ON REQUEST

KVAOTISZYU RUMACNU1778 2020000-SSSS--RUMUGFA.  
ZNY SSSSS ZFH-1 RUMSA

VVVV ALF118  
OO RUMSAK  
DE RUMSAL 2370 2020206  
ZNY SSSSS ZOK JFCCO  
O 200130Z JUL 68  
FM 7AF TSN AB RVN  
TO ZEN/COMUSMACV  
INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF DA NANG AB RVN  
BT

COG G-3  
INFO E-2 OAS  
COPY TO S/S ADJ G-6

6

SECRET/TACD/JUL 68. SECTION 1 OF 2.  
SUBJECT: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)  
REF: COMUSMACV MSG 180707Z JUL 68.

1. (U) IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCE A MEETING WAS HELD AT DA NANG ON 19 JULY BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF 7AF AND III MAF. IN ANALYZING THE STATISTICAL DATA IT IS THE OPINION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE DIFFERENCES ARE EXPLAINABLE. WITHIN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS A REWORK OF 7AF MESSAGE DTG 160750 AND CG III MAF MSG DTG 172352Z HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED TO SET FORTH THE RATIONALE FOR THE DIFFERENCES. THE STATISTICAL DATA CONTAINED IN THE REWORK OF BOTH MESSAGES HAS BEEN AGREED UPON BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF 7AF AND III MAF. THE FINAL PARAGRAPH CONTAINS A JOINT SUMMARY OF REPRESENTATIVES FINDINGS.

MUST SVC

PAGE 2 RUMSAL 2370 SECRET  
2. (S) 7AF REWRITE.

A. THE NUMBER OF ACTUAL CHANGES TO PREPLANNED SORTIES DURING THE EVALUATION PERIOD RECEIVED AT THE 7AF TACC CAN BE MEASURED. HOWEVER, THEY WILL BE CONSISTENTLY AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE CHANGES IDENTIFIED BY III MAF. G-3, III MAF RECEIVES FROM THEIR SUBORDINATE UNITS CHANGES TO PREPLANNED MISSIONS. UPON RECEIPT THEY ARE REVIEWED AND SOME ARE REFUSED FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS SUCH AS INCOMPATIBLE ORDNANCE REQUESTS AND INCOMPATIBLE TURN AROUND TIMES. IN TURN THE APPROVED G-3 AIR, III MAF REQUESTS ARE PASSED TO MACV TASE OR I DASC, DEPENDENT UPON WHICH PORTION OF THE FRAG IS AFFECTED. BOTH TASE AND I DASC REVIEW THE REQUESTED CHANGES PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO 7AF TACC. THE REVIEW AT THIS LEVEL NORMALLY RESULTS IN SOME REFUSAL. THEREFORE, 7AF TACC DOES NOT RECEIVE A LIKE NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR FRAG CHANGES AS DOES III MAF, AS THE INTENTION OF THE SYSTEM IS TO REVIEW THE REQUESTS FOR VALIDITY AND COMPATIBILITY AT THE MAJOR LEVELS, E.G., G-3 AIR,

Air Control Folder

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 4 RUMSAL 237D S E C R E T  
 III MAF, MACV TASE, I DASC AND FINALLY 7AF TACC.

B. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF REQUESTS RECEIVED PER DAY FROM I DASC BY 7AF TACC DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE FOR ORDNANCE CHANGES WAS APPROXIMATELY FOUR AND ONE HALF PER DAY, FOR A TOTAL OF 135. OF THIS NUMBER 40 REQUESTS WERE DISAPPROVED BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

(1) LOAD INCOMPATIBLE WITH AIRCRAFT LOAD CONFIGURATION FOR EXAMPLE, 2000 LB BOMBS FOR AN F-100 OR M-1 FUZE EXTENDERS ON M-117, FOR F-4 AIRCRAFT.

(2) INCOMPATIBILITY OF FUSING WITH BOMB CONFIGURATION, I.E., M-1 EXTENDERS AND HD BOMBS OR DELAYED FUSES ON HD BOMBS.

(3) SHORTAGE OF MUNITIONS, PARTICULARLY M-1 EXTENDERS AND NAPALM.

(4) MANAGEMENT OF MUNITIONS TO REMAIN WITHIN THE MONTHLY MUNITION ALLOCATION.

C. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR TOT AND/OR TOIP CHANGES RECEIVED AT 7AF TACC WAS APPROXIMATELY TWO PER DAY FOR A TOT

L OF 58 FOR THE MONTH ON JUNE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 4 RUMSAL 237D S E C R E T  
OF THIS NUMBER APPROXIMATELY 25 WERE DISAPPROVED  
BECAUSE THE AIRCRAFT TURN AROUND CAPABILITY WAS  
EXCEEDED.

D. RESPONSE TIME MEASURED BY 7AF IS NOT BELIEVED  
PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE AS THE ONLY TIME THAT CAN BE  
MEASURED BY 7AF IS FROM THE MOMENT A REQUEST IS  
RECEIVED BY I DASC FROM G-3 AIR, III MAF OR BY THE  
IA.

CC FROM EITHER I DASC OR M

CV T

. TH TIME

INVOLV  
IN P

ING TH REQUEST TO 7AF T

CC FROM

ITHER OF THESE TWO AGENCIES IS NEGLIGIBLE, AS IN ON  
C

E ALL IT INVOLVES IS A PHON C

LL

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IN THE LATTER  
CASE (MACV TASE) IT MEANS WALKING ACROSS THE HALL,  
AS TASE AND T

CC ARE PHYSICALLY COLLOCATED ON THE  
SAME FLOOR IN HQ 7AF. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE TIME  
FOR THE UNIT TO ACTUALLY EFFECT A CHANGE WILL VARY  
CONSIDERABLY DEPENDENT UPON THE MAGNITUDE OF THE  
REQUESTED CHANGE, PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT TO ORD-  
NANCE. IF NUMEROUS BASES ARE INVOLVED IT WILL DIFFER  
SHARPLY THAN IF ONLY ONE TOT AT ONE BASE IS INVOLVED.  
SIMILARLY, TIME WILL VARY IF A MINOR CHANGE IN ORD-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMSAL 237D S E C R E T  
 NANCE IS REQUESTED AS OPPOSED TO THE DOWN AND UP  
 LOADING OF A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT ORDNANCE RE-  
 QUIRING COMPLICATED FUZING ON NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT.  
 NO ATTEMPT HAS BEEN MADE BY 7AF TO MEASURE IN  
 REFERENCE TERMS THE TIME INVOLVED FROM RECEIPT OF  
 CHANGE REQUESTS THROUGH APPROVAL TO ACTUAL  
 EXECUTION. DATA AVAILABLE INDICATES THAT ONCE  
 APPROVED BY 7AF TACC THE CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE  
 AS REQUESTED. THIS BEING CONSISTENT WITH THE FACT  
 THAT TACC WOULD NOT NORMALLY APPROVE CHANGES,  
 UNLESS IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THE CHANGES COULD BE  
 EFFECTED.

3. (S) III MAF REWRITE:

A. DURING JUNE EVALUATION OF MODIFIED SINGLE  
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) A TOTAL OF 9,254 SORTIES  
 WERE FLOWN IN I CTZ. SOME 5,967 OF THESE WERE PRE-  
 PLANNED SORTIES, HOWEVER 7310 SORTIES WERE FRAGGED  
 ON THE PREPLANNED WKLY/DAILY FRAGS. THERE WERE  
 345 CHANGES REQUESTED TO THE PREPLANNED FRAG.  
 THE AVERAGE TIME REQUESTS WERE RECEIVED AT III MAF

PAGE 6 RUMSAL 237D S E C R E T

TARC PRIOR TO TOTs ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) ORDNANCE: 220 AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 7  
 HRS PRIOR TO TOT.

(2) TOT: 95, AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 8 HRS  
 PRIOR TO TOT.

(3) TPQ: 30, AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 8 HRS  
 PRIOR TO ORIGINAL TOT.

(4) 34 ORDNANCE CHANGES REQUESTED AND 5  
 TOT CHANGES REQUESTED WERE DISAPPROVED BY III MAF.  
 ALL OTHERS WERE SUBMITTED TO I DASC AND MACV TASE.

B. OF THE TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN DURING THE PERIOD  
 3,287 CONSISTED OF SCRAMBLES, DIVERTS INTO I CTZ AND  
 ADD ONS TO MEET GROUND COMMERS NEEDS, THIS  
 REPRESENTS APPROX 35 PERCENT OF EFFORT.

C. CHANGES TO WEEKLY FRAG ARE RELATIVELY EASY  
 AND THE MODIFIED SMS IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE  
 ORIGINAL CONCEPT. HOWEVER, PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO  
 MODIFY FRAGS ARE MORE COMPLEX AND TIME CONSUMING  
 THAN THOSE THAT WERE IN EFFECT FOR MARINE UNITS  
 PRIOR TO 21 MARCH 68. PRIOR TO SMS, MARINE DIVISIONS

CP-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET

6

OO RUMSAK  
 DE RUMSAL 2320 222206  
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCO  
 O 22213Z JUL 68  
 FM 7AF TSN AB RVN  
 TO ZEN/COMUSMACV

GOG C-3  
 INFO OASG-2  
 COPY TO ADJ. S/ S C-6

INFO RUMSAK/OG III MAF DA NANG AB RVN

BT

SECRET/TACD/JUL 68. FINAL SECTION OF 2.

SUBJECT: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)

WENT DIRECT TO FMAN TADC TO REQUEST CHANGES TO  
 PREPLANNED FRAG USING IMMEDIATE REQUEST CHANNEL.

CURRENT SYSTEM REQUIRES DIVISIONS TO FOLLOW THE AIR  
 SUPPORT REQUEST CHAIN TO III MAF. III MAF THEN PRO-  
 CEEDS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) AIR FORCE MISSIONS: III MAF NOTIFIES I DASC  
 WHO IN TURN REQUESTS CHANGE FROM STRIKE PLANS (TACC).  
 STRIKE PLANS THEN NOTIFIES USAF TFW'S.

(2) MARINE MISSIONS: III MAF GOES DIRECT TO FMAN  
 TADC AND IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIES I DASC. FMAN THEN  
 NOTIFIES MAGS. DIVISIONS SUBORDINATE TO PCV HAVE AN  
 ADDED LINK SINCE REQUESTED CHANGES GO THROUGH PCV  
 HQ).

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 RUMSAL 2380 S E C R E T

D. THE SMS WOULD BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO GROUND COMMANDERS NEEDS AND MISSION DIRECTION WOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT AND FLEXIBLE IF A BLOCK OF SORTIES WERE ALLOCATED TO III MAF FOR SCHEDULING WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF SMS, AND A MORE DIRECT REQUEST SYSTEM FOR CHARGES IMPLEMENTED.

E. THE WEEKLY FRAG CONSISTED OF APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT OF PREPLANNED SORTIES DURING JUNE. SINCE THAT TIME THERE HAS BEEN A DECLINE IN PREPLANNED ALLOCATIONS DUE TO OUT-OF-COUNTRY OPERATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, TOTAL SORTIES AVAILABLE AND PERCENTAGE OF PREPLANS DECLINED. GROUND COMMANDERS CONTINUE TO REQUEST IMMEDIATE SORTIES TO COMPENSATE FOR DECREASED PREPLANNED ALLOCATIONS. THIS SUPPORTS CONTENTION THAT LARGER RATIO OF PREPLANS IS NECESSARY.

F. THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN CG III MAF 300636 JUN 68 (NOTAL) PARA 6 B (2) AND (3) ARE CONSIDERED VALID.

4. (S) IN SUMMARY IT IS RECOGNIZED BY BOTH III MAF AND

PAGE 3 RUMSAL 2380 S E C R E T

7AF THAT THE DATA PRESENTED BY EACH ON REQUESTED CHANGES CAN NEVER BE THE SAME BECAUSE OF THE REVIEW SYSTEM INVOLVED. IN RESPECT TO RESPONSE TIMES IT IS MOST DIFFICULT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION IN FINITE TERMS, UNLESS THE QUESTION IS DEFINED IN TERMS OF GROSS TIMES FROM INITIATION AT THE LOWEST LEVEL TO EXECUTION OR IN NET TIME FROM APPROVAL AT III MAF OR TACC TO EXECUTION. IN EITHER EVENT, ONCE APPROVAL IS MADE BY TACC, THE FINAL APPROVING AUTHORITY, THE CHANGE IS MADE.

GP-4

BT

SECRET



OPNS	
PLANS	
	<i>C</i>

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* UNCLASSIFIED E F T O \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

PT007106  
OYTEZYUW RUMUHFA3130 2000715-EEEE--RUMUGRA.  
ZNY EEEEE  
O 180707Z JUL 68  
FM COMUSMACV  
TO RUMUFKA/CDR 7TH AF SAIGON  
INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DA NANG  
BT

UNCLAS E F T O 20759  
SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)  
REF: A. CINCPAC 140017Z JULY 68  
B. MACV 150040Z JULY 68  
C. 7AF 160750Z JULY 68  
D. CG, III MAF 172350Z JULY 68 (PASEP)

COG G-3  
INFO G-1 *CAF*  
COPY TO ADJ S/S G-2

1. REF B REQUESTED INPUTS FROM CDR, 7AF AND CG, III MAF TO REPLY TO REF A.
2. REF C AND REF D PROVIDED FIELD INPUTS. HOWEVER, STATISTICAL DATA IN THESE MESSAGES ARE AT WIDE VARIANCE, AND DIFFERENCES MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE FORWARDING TO CINCPAC.
3. REQUEST YOU TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION IN COORDINATION WITH CG, III MAF TO PROVIDE THIS HQ WITH COMPATIBLE STATISTICAL DATA TO BE FORWARDED IN REPLY TO REF A.
4. CINCPAC SUSPENSE FOR REF A WAS 17 JULY. REQUEST PROMPT ACTION

PAGE 2 RUMUHFA 3130 UNCLAS E F T O  
ON PARA 3: THIS MESSAGE  
BT

*18*

*07*

*07*

*#338*

**SECRET**

ZNY SSSSS  
 O 172350Z JUL 68 ZFF-D  
 FM CG III MAF DNG  
 TO RUMUNFA/COMUSMACV SGN  
 INFO RUMHAM/CG FIRST MAW DNG  
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT  
 ORIG BY G-3  
 CONCURRED BY G-3  
 REL BY CG

**SECRET****(SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U))**

- A. COMUSMACV 152043Z JUL 68 (NOTAL)  
 B. CG III MAF 320636Z JUN 68 (NOTAL)
1. INRESPONSE TO REF A THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED.
  2. DURING JUNE EVALUATION OF MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) A TOTAL OF 9,254 SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN ICTZ. SOME 5,967 OF THESE WERE PREPLANNED SORTIES, HOWEVER 7310 SORTIES WERE FRAGGED ON THE PRE-PLANNED WKLY/DAILY FRAGS. THERE WERE 371 CHANGES REQUESTED TO THE PRE-PLANNED FRAG. CHANGES WERE OF THREE TYPES AS FOLLOWS:
    - A. ORDANCE: 244, AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 7 HRS PRIOR TO TOT.
    - B. TOT: 97, AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 3 HRS PRIOR TO TOT.
    - C. IP: 30, AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 3 HRS PRIOR TO ORIGINAL TOT.
  3. OF THE TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN DURING THE PERIOD 3,267 CONSISTED OF SCRAMBLES, DIVERTS INTO ICTZ AND ADD ONS TO MEET GROUND COMMANDERS,

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA 2244 **SECRET**

NEEDS THIS REPRESENTS APPROX 35 PERCENT OF EFFORT.

4. CHANGES TO WEEKLY FRAG ARE RELATIVELY EASY AND THE MODIFIED SMS IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT. HOWEVER, PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO MODIFY FRAGS ARE MORE COMPLEX AND TIME CONSUMING THAN THOSE THAT WERE IN EFFECT FOR MARINE UNITS PRIOR TO 21 MAR 68. PRIOR TO SMS, MARINE DIVISIONS WENT DIRECT TO FMAW TADC TO REQUEST CHANGES TO PREPLANNED FRAG USING IMMEDIATE REQUEST CHANNEL. CURRENT SYSTEM REQUIRES DIVISIONS TO FOLLOW THE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHAIN TO III MAF. III MAF THEN PROCEEDS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. AIR FORCE MISSIONS: III MAF NOTIFIES I DASC WHO IN TURN REQUESTS CHANGE FROM STRIKE PLANS (TACC). STRIKE PLANS THEN NOTIFIES USAF IFW'S.
- B. MARINE MISSIONS: III MAF GOES DIRECT TO FMAW TADC AND IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIES I DASC. FMAW THEN NOTIFIES MAGS. (DIVISIONS SUBORDINATE TO PCV HAVE AN ADDED LINK SINCE REQUESTED CHANGES GO THROUGH PCV HQ).

5. THE SMS WOULD BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO GROUND COMMANDERS NEEDS AND MISSION DIRECTION WOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT AND FLEXIBLE IF A BLOCK OF SORTIES WERE ALLOCATED TO III MAF FOR SCHEDULING WITHIN FRAME

*Air Control File*  
**SECRET**  
 #337

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMUSRA 2244 S E C R E T  
WORK OF SMS, AND A MORE DIRECT REQUEST SYSTEM FOR CHANGES IMPLEMENTED.  
6. THE WEEKLY FRAG CONSISTED OF APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT OF  
PREPLANNED SORTIES DURING JUNE. SINCE THAT TIME THERE HAS BEEN  
A DECLINE IN PREPLANNED ALLOCATIONS DUE TO OUT-OF-COUNTRY  
OPZRATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, TOTAL SORTIES AVAILABLE AND PER-  
CENTAGE OF PREPLANS DECLINED. GROUND COMMANDERS CONTINUE TO  
REQUEST IMMEDIATE SORTIES TO COMPENSATE FOR DECREASED PRE-  
PLANNED ALLOCATIONS. THIS SUPPORTS CONTENTION THAT LARGER  
RATIO OF PREPLANS IS NECESSARY.  
7. THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN REF B PARA 6 B (2) AND  
(3) ARE CONSIDERED VALID.

GP-4  
BT

**SECRET**  
#337

*Oil by 20 Pent  
Pac COC etc*

\* BLACK BORDER FOR UNCLASSIFIED

\* RED BORDER FOR CLASSIFIED AND EFTO

DATE - TIME - GROUP

**Z**

*Passed to  
FMF Pac COC  
162240H Jul*

From: CG III MAF *COC*  
To: CG FMFPAC *COC*

**PRECEDENCE**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (XX)	IMMEDIATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (INFO)
<input type="checkbox"/>	PRIORITY	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	ROUTINE	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	DEFERRED	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	AIRMAIL	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	MAIL	<input type="checkbox"/>

Drafted: 5/twm

Concurred:

Released:

Info:

**SECRET**

**STAMP IF CLASSIFIED**  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
**SECRET**

**NOTE \***

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN BUSE FROM MGEN TOMPKINS FOR MARINE  
CORPS EYES ONLY

IN RESPONSE TO FMFPAC'S 160600H JULY COC MSG. REGARDING

PARA 5 OF COMUSMACV 130637Z JUL68. (ALL MSGS REFERENCED BELOW  
PASEP BY CG III MAF 161420 Z JUL68)

1. IN ALL PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS LEADING UP TO SINGLE  
MANAGEMENT BETWEEN COMUSMACV, 7TH AF, AND III MAF, IT WAS  
CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT THE COMBINED DASC (I DASC) WAS TO BE  
PRIMARY DASC IN SUPPORT OF III MAF.

DATE - TIME - GROUP

**Z**

*AC*

# 335

2. IT WAS REALIZED BY ALL CONCERNED THAT FACILITIES IN-BEING  
AT I DASC WERE NOT CAPABLE OF HANDLING THE VOLUME OF TRAFFIC  
NOR ADEQUATELY MANNED TO SUPPORT III MAF.

3. PROPOSAL WAS MADE BY CG FIRST MAW TO BUILD ON EXISTING  
FACILITIES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR AN ADEQUATE III MAF DASC  
IN THE SHORT TIME REQUIRED BY THE SUDDEN IMPOSITION OF SINGLE  
MANAGEMENT. CG III MAF CONCURRED AND PROPOSAL WAS TO PROCEED  
IN THREE PHASES. (SEE III MAF MSG 130528Z MAR68) ~~(PAGE BY~~

~~PHASE I~~ PHASE I, 13MAR TO 1APR--USE I DASC AND TADC. PHASE

II, 1APR TO 1JUN--INCORPORATE U.S. PORTION OF I DASC INTO

G-3 BLDG AT FMAW, AND DURING THIS PHASE A HARDENED SITE FOR

III MAF DASC WAS TO BE COMPLETED. PHASE III, APPROX 1JUN,

MOVE DASC INTO HARDENED SITE.

4. I DASC WAS TO BE DESIGNATED III MAF DASC AND LOCATED AT  
 FMAW TADC LOCATION. GEN WESTMORELAND AGREED ON 17MAR TO  
 CO-LOCATE DASC WITH FMAW TADC (SEE III MAF MSG 180724Z MAR68);  
~~(PASTE BY MCRG)~~ *in interview* HOWEVER; ON 14MAR68 GEN MOMYER STATED IN  
 HIS MSG 141245Z ~~(PASTE BY MCRG)~~ THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE  
 TO MOVE I DASC IMMEDIATELY, BUT THAT THE ULTIMATE LOCATION  
 OF THE DASC SHOULD BE ADJACENT TO III MAF COC SO THAT SIDE-BY-  
 SIDE WORKING RELATIONSHIP OF ALL AIR AND GROUND ELEMENTS WOULD  
 BE PROVIDED. HE ALSO STATED THAT IT WAS GEN WESTMORELAND'S  
 DESIRE THAT THIS BE DONE.

5. ON 19 MAR GEN WESTMORELAND'S MSG TO III MAF (COMUSMACV  
 190154Z MAR68) (~~PASTE BY MCRG~~) STATED THAT IN HIS DISCUSSION

ON 17MAR HE WAS APPARENTLY MISUNDERSTOOD AND THAT I DASC

SHOULD BE ADJACENT TO III MAF TOC.

In response to FMFPAC 160600H July GOC msg. Regarding para 5 of COMUSMACV 130637Z.

1. In all preliminary discussions leading up to Single Management between COMUSMACV, 7th AF and III MAF it was crystal clear that the combined DASC (I DASC) was to be primary DASC in support of III MAF.
2. It was realized by all concerned that facilities in-being at I DASC were not capable of handling the volume of traffic nor adequately manned to support III MAF.

3. Proposal was made by CG 1st MAF to build on existing facilities to <sup>provide</sup> an adequate III MAF DASC. CG III MAF concurred and proposal was to proceed in three phases. <sup>in order to provide</sup> <sup>in the short time required by the system imposition of single management</sup> (See III MAF msg - - - - - (PASEP)) Phase I, 13 Mar to 1 Apr - use I DASC & TADC. Phase II, 1 Apr to 1 June - Incorporate U S portion of I DASC into G-3 Bldg at FMAW, and during this phase <sup>a</sup> hardened site <sup>III MAF</sup> for DASC was to be completed. Phase III; approx 1 June; move DASC into hard <sup>and</sup> site.

I-DASC was to be designated III MAF DASC and located at FMAW General WESTMORELAND agreed on 17 March to collocate <sup>DASC</sup> with FMAW TADC; however, on 14 Mar 68 Gen MOMYER msg 141245Z <sup>stated in (PASEP) that</sup> it would not be desirable to move I DASC <sup>immediately</sup> but ultimate location should be <sup>adjacent to</sup> III MAF COC and <sup>so that</sup> by-side working relationship of all air and ground elements would <sup>that the</sup> be provided. <sup>He also stated</sup> ~~that~~ it was Gen WESTMORELAND's desire that this be done.

On 19 Mar Gen WESTMORELAND msg to III MAF 190154Z stated that in discussion on 17 March he was <sup>apparently was</sup> understood and that DASC should be adjacent to III MAF TOC. <sup>is</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

RESUME OF TELEPHONE CALL

DTG 16 0600H July

All persons placing or receiving official telephone calls are requested to complete this form which will be placed in the journal for record purposes.

From: FM F PAC

To: IL MAF COC

Resume of call:

TO: Col Wilkov, G-3 Air *IL not MAF address*

Re: COMUSMACV Moser. 130637Z July  
1. Is the info in para 5 true.

2. If so, when did CG IL MAF make this  
proposal or did he propose collecting  
at 1st MAW TADC

3. Please qualify this para for me  
to reply to George Gibson, HQ MC  
ASAP.

Director Cnd Center sends 0640

ACTION G-3 Lia G-3 AIR

270

D. W. Davis  
(SIGNATURE)

CONFIDENTIAL

Single Management

J. Ch. Stornetta

Ref (E) Cin C PAC 1023 40 2 July (S)

5 Cin C PAC Comment on needs to  
of PAR 5 of 5 pages

5. The relocation of I DASC was initially requested by CG III MAF. The reason was of vital importance to propose and effecting PAC air management within I Corps under the current system. It was concurred in by Cdr 4 AF and approved by COMUSMACV. Prior to single management marine air was managed in large part directly between 1 MAW and Marine Div's. Subsequent to integration of Army units into I Corps organizational structure, CG III MAF is necessarily concerned with distribution of air support to all units, and the III MAF staff must provide the management and supervision of air support necessary allocated by the DASC and the main HQ P

# 385

is considered to be a valuable asset in securing cooperation and understanding between central and Air Support agencies and the field forces being supported.





/////// S E C R E T S P E C I A L M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y M S G F O L L O W S //

**SECRET**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

OO RUHKM  
DE RUMSAK 2091 1981420  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 161420Z JUL 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
BT

S E C R E T S P E C I A L F O R M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y S E C I O F I I  
FOR FMFPAC COC  
FOLLOWING MSGS CITED IN FONECON 16JUL68.

1. P 130528Z MAR 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
INFO CDR SIVENTH AF TSN RVN  
CG FMAW  
BT

S E C R E T

PLAN FOR LOCATION OF SENIOR III MAF DASC

A. MACV DIRECTIVE (MACJOO OF 7 MAR 68

1. IAW REF A, THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF STRIKE AND RECON  
ASSETS CONCEPT IS BEING IMPLEMENTED. IN VIEW OF URGENCY  
TO IMPLEMENT IT IS APPARENT WE MUST BUILD ON EXISTING FACIL-  
ITIES. TO ACCOMPLISH AS SMOOTH A TRANSITION AS POSSIBLE, A

PAGE TWO RUMSAK2091 S E C R E T S P E C I A L F O R M C E O  
THREE PHASED IMPLEMENTATION IS PROPOSED.

PHASE I: PRESENT TO IAPR68. USE EXISTING I DASC AND  
FMAW TADC FACILITIES, IMPROVING THE CROSS-TELL CAPABILITY  
WITH A VIEW TO PROVIDING I DASC WITH REQUIRED INFORMATION  
FOR TRANSMISSION TO SAIGON TACC.

PHASE II: IAPR68-1JUN68. INCORPORATE THE U.S. PORTION  
OF PRESENT I DASC INTO THE G-3 BUILDING AT FMAW, SINCE ITS  
EXPANDING FUNCTION REQUIRES IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY OF MORE  
SPACE AND AN IMPROVED COMMUNICATION SYSTEM. DURING THIS  
PHASE, THE HARDENED SITE TO HOUSE THE SENIOR DASC SHOULD  
BE COMPLETED.

PHASE III: APPROX 1JUN68. RELOCATE THE REMAINDER OF  
I DASC INTO THE NEW HARDENED SITE AND PROCEED WITH OPERATIONS.

3. UPON SEPARATION FROM PRESENT I DASC SITE ON 1 APR DASC  
WILL BE KNOWN AS III MAF DASC. I DASC WILL REMAIN WITH I  
CORPS IN ITS PRESENT LOCATION. NUMBER U. S. PERSONNEL  
REMAINING WITH I DASC WOULD BE MINIMAL.

GP-4

BT

2. P 180724Z MAR 68

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

**SECRET**

# 334

**SECRET**

## MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE THREE RUMSAK2091 S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MCEO  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CDR SIVENTH AF TSN AB RVN  
 INFO COMUSMACV

BT

S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR GEN MOMYER INFO GEN WESTMORELAND  
 FROM LIGEN CUSHMAN  
 LOCATION OF I DASC

1. DURING GEN WESTMORELAND'S VISIT TO I CORPS YESTERDAY,  
 THE PHYSICAL LIMITATION OF THE DASC AT I CORPS HEADQUARTERS  
 BECAME A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION. IN VIEW OF THE NEED FOR  
 ADDED SPACE AND OPERATIVE COMMUNICATIONS TO PROVIDE NECESSARY  
 AIR CONTROL HE AGREED WITH ME THAT CO-LOCATION WITH MY TADC  
 PROVIDED AN ACCEPTABLE AND SPEEDY INTERIM SOLUTION.  
 2. I WOULD APPRECIATE THEREFORE, YOUR EARLY INPUT INTO  
 REMODELING AND COMMUNICATION PLANS TO ACCOMMODATE THIS  
 ADDED INTERIM FACILITY. CONTACT POINT LTCOL OSSERMAN,  
 DANANG 6125. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3. O 141245Z MAR 68

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK2091 S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MCEO  
 FM 7AF TSN AB RVN  
 TO CG III MAF DANANG  
 INFO COMUSMACV

BT

S E C R E T / C / DELIVERY FIRST DUTY HOUR  
 PERSONAL FOR GEN CUSHMAN FROM MOMYER. INFO: GEN  
 WESTMORELAND. I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH GEN WESTMORELAND  
 THE LOCATION OF I DASC. AS YOU KNOW, I DASC HAS BEEN  
 LOCATED WITH I CORPS FOR MORE THAN FOUR YEARS. AS  
 A RESULT, IS HAS BECOME THE RIGHT HAND OF THE ARVN  
 CORPS COMMANDER IN OBTAINING AIR SUPPORT FOR HIS  
 TROOPS. AT THIS TIME IT WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE TO  
 DISTURB THIS RELATIONSHIP AND PERHAPS CREATE THE  
 WRONG IMPRESSION AFTER SO MANY YEARS THAT WE WERE  
 DRAWING AWAY FROM ARVN RATHER THAN MOVING CLOSER  
 TOGETHER. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WHICH DICTATED THE  
 NEED FOR EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM  
 MADE IT NECESSARY TO USE THE EXISTING FACILITIES AT  
 I DASC. AS A CONSEQUENCE, GEN WESTMORELAND HAS MADE  
 THE DECISION TO TEMPORARILY KEEP I DASC IN ITS CURRENT

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

**SECRET**

SECRET

## MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE FIVE RUMSAK2091 S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MCEO  
 LOCATION IN ORDER TO GET THE SYSTEM FULLY IMPLEMENTED  
 AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THE ULTIMATE LOCATION OF I DASC,  
 HOWEVER, SHOULD BE IN YOUR COC. WHEN SO LOCATED IT WOULD  
 PROVIDE A SIDE - BY - SIDE WORKING RELATIONSHIP OF ALL THE  
 AIR AND GROUND ELEMENTS WHICH IS ESSENTIAL FOR GOOD  
 TEAMWORK. IT IS GEN WESTMORELAND'S DESIRE THAT YOUR  
 HARDENED COC SHOULD PROVIDE SPACE FOR THE MOVEMENT  
 OF I DASC AT A LATER DATE. I HAVE ASKED COL FOGLE TO  
 WORK WITH YOUR CHIEF OF STAFF ON SPACE REQUIREMENTS  
 IN THE HARDENED COC. I AM MOST PLEASED WITH THE WAY  
 YOUR PEOPLE AND MINE HAVE GOTTEN ON WITH THE JOB  
 OF GETTING THE NEW SYSTEM GOING.

GP-4

BT

4. O 190154Z MAR 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO CG III MAF DANANG

INFO CMDR SEVENTH AF TAN SON NHUT

BT

S E C R E T 07756 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG CUSHMAN

PAGE SIX RUMSAK2091 S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MCEO  
 FROM GEN WESTMORELAND INFO GEN ABRAMS AND GEN MONYER  
 REF: YOUR SECRET MESSAGE 180724Z MAR 68, SUBJ: LOCATION OF  
 I DASC.

DURING MY VISIT WITH YOU SUNDAY, I DID BRING UP THE SUBJECT OF  
 I DASC. BECAUSE OF THE BRIEFNESS OF THE DISCUSSION, THERE WAS  
 APPARENTLY A MISUNDERSTANDING. I UNDERSTAND THAT I DASC HAS BEEN  
 ESTABLISHED IN THE I CORPS COMPOUND, WITH SPACE HAVING BEEN MADE  
 AVAILABLE BY LTG LAM. HOWEVER, IT WOULD SEEM THAT THIS SHOULD BE  
 AN INTERIM LOCATION PENDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A HARDENED SITE. THE  
 IDEAL LOCATION FOR THE HARDENED SITE WOULD BE ADJACENT TO YOUR TOC.  
 THIS COLLOCATION WILL BRING ABOUT THE GROUND-AIR TEAM THAT IS SO  
 IMPORTANT AND SIMPLIFY COMMUNICATIONS BY FACILITATING COORDINATION  
 AND REDUCING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR EQUIPMENT. THIS ARRANGEMENT  
 WILL GIVE YOU THE MEANS AT YOUR HQ TO CONTROL THE AIR EFFORT IN  
 SUPPORT OF TROOPS UNDER YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE PERMANENT SITE SHOULD BE AT THE IDEAL  
 LOCATION, WHICH LOCATION WOULD BE NEXT TO YOUR TOC. IF AN AREA CAN  
 BE PROVIDED. WE SHOULD NOT ACCEPT A SECOND-BEST ARRANGEMENT  
 UNLESS IT BECOMES ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, AND I'M NOT CONVINCED THAT  
 WE'VE REACHED THAT POINT.

BT

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

**SECRET****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

/////S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY MSG FOLLOWS/////

00 RUHKM  
 DE RUMSAK 2092 1981420  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 161420Z JUL 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SEC II OF II  
 GENERAL ABRAMS INFORMS ME THAT HE HAD A TALK WITH LAM  
 ON THE MATTER AND WILL GIVE YOU THE BENEFIT OF THAT DISCUSSION WHEN  
 HE VISITS YOU THIS WEEK. WE CANNOT ALLOW ANY DRAGGING OF HEELS ON  
 THIS MATTER. I MAKE THIS COMMENT BECAUSE I AM INFORMED THAT CER-  
 TAIN ACTIONS CONCERNING PERSONNEL AND COMMUNICATIONS PRESCRIBED  
 BY MY DIRECTIVE HAVE NOT YET BEEN COMPLIED WITH.  
 GENERAL ABRAMS WILL DISCUSS WITH YOU THE LOCATION OF I DASC IN  
 DETAIL. UPON HIS RETURN, I WILL ASK HIM TO PROVIDE ME A PROGRESS  
 REPORT ON ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PUBLISHED DIRECTIVES.

GP-4  
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 GP-4  
 BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

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**SECRET**



\*\*\*\*\*  
\* **SECRET** \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

PT009235  
OPTS2YUN RUMUFA2514 1970045-SS55--RUMUGRA.  
ZNY SS55

Q P 180002Z JUL 68 )  
FM COMUSMACV  
TO ZEN/CDR 7AF SAIGON  
RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DANANG  
INFO RUMHQA/CINCPAC  
BT

ACT G-3  
INFO G-2  
COPY TO ADJ S/S G-6

*not used as of 2200 17 Jul*

**SECRET** 20389  
SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)  
REF: CINCPAC MSG DTG 140017Z JUL 68 (S) (PASEP)

1. (U) REF MESSAGE, PARA 2, REQUESTS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING MECHANICS OF THE PREPLANNED FRAG SYSTEM.
  2. (S) FOR CDR 7AF: REQUEST YOU PROVIDE THIS HEADQUARTERS NLT 16 JULY, NECESSARY INPUT CONCERNING THAT PART OF PARA 2 OF REFERENCE MSG WHICH REQUIRES DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF FRAG CHANGES.
  3. (U) FOR CG, III MAF: REQUEST YOU PROVIDE III MAF COMMENTS AS REQUESTED IN PARA 2, REF MSG, TO THIS HQ NLT 16 JULY 68. GP=4
- BT

*Anti Control File*

**SECRET**  
# 221

**SECRET**

6

PT004781  
OYTSZYUJ RUMUWAEJY 100000-SSSS-RUMUGRA  
ZNY SSSSS  
C 1 100000 00 00 00 00

FM COMUSMACV  
TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DANANG  
INFO RUMUFKA/CDR 7AF SAIGON  
RUMHVM/O5A I CORPS DANANG

ACT G-6  
COPY TO ADV S/S G-2

BT  
SECRET 20293

SUBJECT: RELOCATION OF I DASC

1. (X) THIS HEADQUARTERS URGENTLY REQUIRES FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING COORDINATION WITH I CORPS ON RELOCATION OF I DASC.
  - A. DOES CG, I CORPS CONCUR WITH RELOCATION OF I DASC TO III MAF COMPOUND?
  - B. IF ANSWER TO 2A ABOVE IS NO, WHAT IS CG, I CORPS PROPOSAL?
  - C. IF AGREEMENT EXISTS BETWEEN CG, III MAF AND CG, I CORPS, HAS IT BEEN COORDINATED WITH CDR 7AF?
2. (U) ABOVE INFORMATION IS REQUIRED SO THAT WORK CAN PROCEED WITH NECESSARY COMMUNICATIONS AT THIS HEADQUARTERS.
3. (U) RESPONSE WITHIN 24 HOURS IS REQUESTED.

GP-4  
BT

*Air Control*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

6

PT005816  
 OTTSZYUW RUMUHFA2706 1980200-SSSS--RUMUGRA.

ZNY SSSSS

O R 160150Z JUL 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DA NANG

P R 140017Z JUL 68

FM CINCPAC

TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV

INFO RUEOJFA/CJCS

BY

**SECRET**

SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)

A. CINCPAC 102340Z JUL 68

B. COMUSMACV 130637Z JUL 68

1. REF A REQUESTED COMUSMACV EXPAND PREVIOUS REMARKS ON SORTIE FLEXIBILITY IN PRE-PLANNED FRAGS THAT WERE MADE IN RESPONSE TO A III MAF INDICATION OF UNSATISFACTORY SORTIE UTILIZATION. REF B IN REPLYING TO REF A ADDRESSED THE MATTER OF FLEXIBILITY IN MODIFYING PREPLANNED FRAGS IN DETAIL. IF IN FACT, THE SYSTEM DOES ALLOW A TIMELY ADJUSTMENT OF PRE-SCHEDULED TOTS IN THE WEEKLY FRAG AS DISCUSSED IN PARA 3A. REF B THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN THE GROUND COMMANDERSJ UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE ASSETS AND SHOULD LARGELY PRECLUDE THE USE OF ADD-ON SORTIES AND SCRAMBLES FOR OTHER THAN ADDED WEIGHT OF EFFORT AND EMERGENCY SITUATIONS.
2. IT IS REQUESTED THAT A BREAK OUT BY NUMBER OF SORTIES AND AVERAGE

ACT G-3

INFO G-2

COPY TO S/S ADJ

G-5

PAGE 2 RUMUHFA 2706 **SECRET**

RESPONSE TIME OF ACTUAL CHANGES TO PRE-PLANNED FRAGS DURING THE JUNE EVALUATION PERIOD BE PROVIDED ALONG WITH III MAF COMMENTS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS PORTION OF THE SYTEM.

9. REPLY REQUESTED BY 17 JULY 1968. GP-3

BY

*Air Contingent  
 File*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

RTT SZ YUW RUMUGRA 1242 192030Z-SSSS--RUMHAW RUMUHFA.

ZNY SSSSS

R 100302Z JUL 68 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAFDNG

TO RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV SGN

INFO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG

BT

SECRET

SORTIE RATE OF 1ST MAW AIRCRAFT (U)

A. 7AF TACC TSN AB RVN MSG 060600Z JUL 68 (S)

B. CG III MAF MSG 300630Z JUN 68 (S)

1. THIS HQ TAKES REF A FOR ACT.

2. REF A QUESTIONS THE AUTHENTICITY OF 1ST MAW OPERATIONAL REPORTS AND REQUESTS CLARIFICATION OF 1ST MAW SORTIE RATE VERSUS POSSESSED AIRCRAFT FOR FUTURE PLANNING. REF B EVALUATES THE REVISED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR THE FOUR WEEK PERIOD FROM 0600H 30 MAY 1968 TO 0600H 07 JUNE 1968 AND PROVIDES RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENT.

3. AN AUDIT OF REPORTS MADE BY THE 1ST MAW TO 7TH AF TACC DURING THIS PERIOD NAMELY OPREP-4S, CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORTS (KCMR), AND COMBAT ACTIVITIES REPORTS (COACT) INDICATES THAT DURING THE FOUR WEEK PERIOD OF EVALUATION THE 1ST MAW FLEW A TOTAL OF 6793 SORTIES OR AN

PAGE TWO RUMUGRA 1242 SECRET

AVERAGE OF 243 SORTIES PER DAY. BASED ON AN AVERAGE IN-COUNTRY INVENTORY OF 190 FIGHTER/ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT THIS IS REPRESENTATIVE OF A 1.28 SORTIE RATE.

4. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, 1.2 SORTIE RATE REMAINS VALID. NOTE THAT AIRCRAFT INVENTORY IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE AND NOW STANDS AT 190 FIXED WING FIGHTER/ATTACK AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. SUCH DIFFERENCE AS MAY EXIST BETWEEN THE PROGRAMMED 1ST MAW SORTIE RATE AND THAT FLOWN IS EXPLAINED BY REF B.

GP-4

BT

HAS BEEN SECT  
ORIG C/S  
REL C/S

**SECRET**  
#334

**SECRET**

MACV JOINT MESSAGEFORM			RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER COC 2			LOCAL DISTRIBUTION				
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>			<i>Planned</i> <i>CONTRACT AIR</i> <i>Control</i> <i>Folder</i> <i>138/74</i> <i>RECEIVED</i>			3/8	SJS	HIST		
TYPE MSO BOOK MULTI SINGLE M						3/1	J2	CIIB	X	19
TYPE TRANSMISSION TO INFO						3/3	J4		X/1	10X
ELECTRICAL X X						3/5	J6			
AIR MAIL						3/7				
COURIER						3/8				
PRECEDENCE			DTG 061130Z Jul 68			AFOP	NAVFORV			
ACTION TO: IMMEDIATE						AG	OICG			
INFO: PRIORITY						AMEMB	PM			
FROM: COMUSMACV			COC ROUTING STAMP			ICA SAM	SJA			
TO: CINCPAC			ACT. INFO. SUSP.			CG	SGS			
INFO: CJCS			COC			CGC	SURO			
SECRET 19472			COC1			COMB	TMA DCPO IWO			
Subj: Evaluation of Single Management 30 May - 27 Jun 68 (U)			COC2 X			COMPT	TNG MACMA			
Ref: A. CJCS 2231 DTG 112248Z Jun 68 (S)			COC3 X			DOD SPEC REP	USAID			
B. CINCPAC 140255Z Jun 68 (S)			COC4			FMMNO	USARV			
C. CJCS 9497 DTG 202253Z May 68 (S)			COC5			HC	IFFV LNO			
D. CJCS 2866 DTG 191952Z Jun 68 (S)			COC6			IG	IIFV LNO			
E. CG III MAF 300636Z Jun 68 (S) (NOTAL)			COC7			MACSA	IIMAF LNO			
1. (S) Ref A requested CINCPAC appraise the Single			COC8			JUSPAO	5TH SF LNO			
Management arrangement in I Corps. Ref B directed COMUSMACV, in			COC Control #: COC00 -			MACDC	7TH AF			
conjunction with CG III MAF and CDR, 7AF to evaluate the progress						MACOI	PROTOCOL			
of the Single Management System for strike and recce assets in I						MACPD				
Corps during the month of June subsequent to implementation of the										
Modified Pre-Planned support procedures 30 May 68. Ref C										
referred to the Deputy SECDEF Memorandum on this subject, and Ref										
D requested comments on the Commandant, Marine Corps proposal be										
included in the evaluation report.										
TYPED NAME, TITLE, PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL			SIGNATURE							
WILLIAM R. SMITH			<i>WT Kerwin</i>							
Colonel USAF			TYPED NAME AND TITLE							
Chief, Air P&O Div			WALTER T. KERWIN, JR							
MACGOC2/2917			MG, USA, Chief of Staff							
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			PAGE NO			NO OF PAGES				
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MACV FORM 297			COPY NO			14				

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2. (S) A MACV Evaluation Team visited all four Corps to discuss this subject first hand with management personnel at all ground levels and all control agencies. In addition, evaluation reports were received from CG III MAF, CDR 7AF, CG I FFV, CG II FFV and SA/IV Corps. This report will address the evaluation of the I Corps arrangement.

3. (S) The evaluation has shown that the system has improved markedly since the implementation of the Modified Pre-planned Support Procedures 30 May. It is responsive to the requirements of this Headquarters, and the 70% weekly, 30% daily frag system has improved tactical air support in I Corps, as well as in the other Corps areas. Planning at all management levels, and the mechanics of execution have steadily improved throughout the evaluation period. An area of conflict remains concerning the management and control of Marine air. The Marine evaluation points toward total management of Marine air at III MAF level, and the 7AF evaluation strongly supports the integrated control of all strike assets at MACV level. The MACV Evaluation indicates that the Modified Pre-planned Support Procedures presently in operation is the most effective system to satisfy MACV, CG III MAF and 7AF objectives.

4. (S) The 70-30 split of the 7AF weekly/daily frag order was a giant step in the positive direction of providing maximum flexibility, responsiveness and continuity within the mechanics of Single Management. It provides executive control at this level, and at the same time delegates, insofar as possible, planning, allocation, and a degree of control of strike support to major

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MACV FORM 309-1 (May 68)  
(MACV - AM)

# 323

**SECRET**MACV JOINT MESSAGE FORM  
CONTINUATION SHEET

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ground units.

5. (S) Reference III MAF Evaluation at Ref E, subparagraphs below are keyed to Ref E:

III MAF comment: 4a. Adequate procedures are not provided for artillery coordination with air or aircraft diversion around danger areas. MACV Evaluation: Artillery clearance and aircraft diversion procedures throughout I Corps have been considerably improved. Army coordination procedures are being oriented toward Marine requirements to assure standardization. Proper radio check-in procedures with ORG, TACP and FAC should provide adequate clearance assurance - The Marine DASC system of clearance is effective and is a definite influence in efforts toward a standardized system. MACV is requiring maximum coordination of effort among III MAF, 7AF and Army to achieve optimum standardization and effectiveness. This is a problem related more to the joint ground environment, rather than to Single Management per se.

III MAF comment: 5a. Administrative burden excessive, daily frag procedures an unnecessary complexity in I CTZ. MACV Evaluation: Administrative burden has been reduced to normal proportions. Granted III MAF Headquarters has a greater workload than before; however, this is considered to be understandable in that now CG III MAF as overall US/FW Commander in I CTZ, must, within his own Headquarters, manage the allocation of air support to

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MACV FORM 287-1 (Mar 66)  
(4046 17)**SECRET**

#323

MACV JOINT MESSAGE FORM  
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Marine, Army, ROK and ARVN units. To exercise the allocation management authority provided, III MAF Headquarters must maintain cognizance of weekly and daily requirements of all forces and provide necessary staffing in the decision making process.

Administrative procedures in the processing of strike requests have been greatly simplified and streamlined by the 70% weekly frag. The time cycle for processing daily requests has compressed to less than 20 hours, which compares favorably with the previous Marine system, and is approximately half the previous figure under Single Management. There has been a recent instance of the essentiality of the 30% daily frag system. During the last week of June, this Headquarters shifted weight of effort within Corps areas for more strike emphasis in III Corps and RF-I (Tally Ho). This command decision was facilitated by the mechanics of the Single Management System. Such changes of emphasis will continue as the tactical situation demands, and the 70-30 system can absorb them with minimum disruption to normal operations.

III MAF comment: 5b. The pre-planned sortie level does not provide the ground commander in I Corps with the number of sorties he desires, and the sorties available on the pre-planned frag are not always available in sufficient numbers at the critical times needed to influence the tactical situation. MACV comment: The ground commander can utilize the weekly pre-planned sorties and the daily pre-planned sorties in any situation. There is flexibility. During the evaluation period, close to 50 per cent of the pre-planned in-country sorties were allocated and flown in I

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Corps.

III MAF comment: 5c. Marine sorties in I Corps could be more efficiently employed by allocation of a block of Marine sorties to be scheduled in I Corps. MACV Evaluation: This would be double management, and particularly within III MAF itself. Integration with country-wide objectives would be negated, and CG III MAF would be operating on a double standard in his responsibilities to Marine and Army, FWMAF, ARVN units. This type of management with the present deployment of troops in I Corps would be unsatisfactory to MACV in that it would not fulfill Single Management objectives, and it would complicate the procedures of allocation and management of air support within I Corps itself.

III MAF recommendation: 6b(1). Improved Joint Air Control System. MACV Evaluation: Agree that further improvement can be achieved.

III MAF recommendation: 6b(2). Fragging of Marine out-country sorties. MACV Evaluation: Fragging of these sorties is being reviewed by MACV with 7AF as to Marine comment.

III MAF recommendation: 6b(3). All other Marine strike sorties to be fragged by CG III MAF. MACV Evaluation: Do not concur. This would negate the stated COMUSMACV objectives in Single Management.

III MAF recommendation: 6b(4). Emergency requirements arising outside I Corps be met by COMUSMACV preemption. MACV Evaluation: This can be accomplished more efficiently within Single Management with less disruption and impact on normal operations.

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III MAF recommendation: 6b(5). III MAF inform COMUSMACV of all Marine sorties scheduled in I Corps. MACV Evaluation: This is a procedure based on the recommendation in 6b(3) with which MACV does not concur. It would not be Single Management, but rather would be providing after the fact information to MACV on III MAF management of air resources.

III MAF recommendation: 6b(6). Pre-planned Air Force sorties, TOTs and ordnance loads be adjusted by coordination between III MAF, TASE and TACC. MACV Evaluation: Concur in principle. The machinery for this is presently in existence, and this Headquarters will assure the most expeditious procedures are utilized. This flexibility exists within the system.

III MAF recommendation: 6b(7). That the initial point (IP) be eliminated from the weekly frag. MACV Evaluation: This has already been accomplished by agreement between III MAF and 7AF.

III MAF recommendation: 6b(8). Simplification of reporting procedures. MACV Evaluation: Concur. 7AF has been requested to examine the reports situation to eliminate unnecessary duplicative information requirements.

III MAF recommendation: 6b(9). Revision of COMUSMACV Directive of 7 March 1968. MACV Evaluation: Directive will be amended as appropriate to reflect changes concurred in by COMUSMACV.

6. (S) The Secretary Nitze Memorandum (Ref C) specifically referred to several areas of concern, as expressed by the Commandant, Marine Corps. These areas of concern actually relate to the situation as it existed immediately subsequent to implementation of

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Single Management in late March and April.

a. Unusual Delays in Planning Cycles. This criticism pertained to the system prior to the 30 May modification. The 70% weekly, 30% daily frag order splitout virtually eliminated this problem. Basic requirements are now fulfilled from the weekly allocation; the time cycle has been greatly reduced for the daily request procedures. TASE requires daily requests submissions prior to 1400 the previous day; the mechanics in the field from Battalion to III MAF level to TASE are accomplished from 0900 to 1400. Most field units expressed satisfaction with the time cycle as it now exists. The 1400 time to TASE was changed from 1600 in mid-June.

b. Delays in Providing Aircraft for Immediate Strikes. This comment pertains to the early days of Single Management before communications procedures had been thoroughly smoothed out. Response to immediate requests is now within normal limits (15 - 30 minutes normally).

c. Use of Diverted Aircraft to Satisfy Immediate Support Requirements. Statistics for June reveal that 1.6% of Marine sorties in I Corps were diverted to missions outside the assigned division, which is considered reasonable. As stated previously, III MAF makes liberal use of add-on sorties and scrambles to satisfy additional air requirements. The divert situation is not considered to be a significant problem.

d. Ordnance Load Mixes and Pre-briefing of Pilots on Immediates. The mix of ordnance on scramble pads is a compromise. 7AF endeavors to configure scramble aircraft for specific types of

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missions, and assures that there is a mix of configurations on the pad. In most cases, the ordnance load required is met within tolerable limits; however, on a given day at a given time dependent on demands for scrambles, a specific requirement may not be met. The system provides the maximum response within the unknown factors associated with scramble planning. 7AF is studying this area of concern toward further optimization of pad ordnance capacity. Pilots on the scramble pad are now provided with adequate briefing on weather, target area and FAC coordination to satisfy mission requirements.

7. (S) Concerning the proposal of the Commandant, Marine Corps contained in CJCS message 191952Z Jun 68 (Ref D). CMC comment: Ground operations must be planned to accommodate the advance schedule of the supporting arm. MACV comment: The weekly frag is designed to accommodate the pre-planned requirements submitted by the major field commands. Ground operations personnel at lower management levels provide their weekly requirements to the major ground commands, who in turn consolidate them and forward to TASE. These known and requested requirements are then the basis for development of the weekly frag. The daily frag supplements the weekly to fulfill those requirements not taken care of in the weekly. As the ground scheme of maneuver changes during the week, requested changes to the weekly frag, the daily frag, and immediates provide sufficient flexibility to absorb the impact on the pre-planned schedule. The weekly frag provides the combat elements an important resource planning factor, and the MACV Evaluation indicates its

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value in this role is recognized.

CMC comment: There are, in fact, two air control systems now functioning in I Corps. MACV comment: There was never an intent to do away with one system in favor of the other. The intent was and is to assure that the systems are blended into a homogeneous effort to provide integrated control of TACAIR in I Corps. In joining the two TACAIR control systems, every effort has been expended to maintain the integrity of the Marine system. PANAMA CRC (USAF) is the senior airspace controlling agency in I Corps - WATERBOY CRP (USAF) and VICE SQUAD CRP (Marine) are subordinate to PANAMA. The Marine DASC's and the USAF/USA TACP's continue to perform their control functions as in the past. In this integrated system, the tactical aircraft contact the appropriate CRP after take-off (also when entering from another control area), and they are provided traffic separation and hand-off information to the appropriate TACP or Marine DASC for FAC controlled strikes. For radar drops, the CRC provides hand over to MSQ-77/TPQ-10 sites. The aircraft then returns to CRC control for radar flight following to base. The integrated Tactical Air Control System is accomplishing its objectives - reduce possibility of mid-air collisions, improve spacing of traffic over target, enhance existing fire support coordination, and provide effective air strike control. An integrated target base complements this basic purpose in the functioning of the TACS.

CMC comment: Return to CG III MAF, for direct support of Marine ground forces in I Corps, operational control of those air

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assets which constitute 70 per cent of his available sorties, the remaining 30 per cent be retained by COMUSMACV for daily allocation.

MACV comment: The TACAIR management system must consider CG III MAF as the overall commander in I Corps, not just as Marine commander. It is considered that in determining necessary weight of TACAIR air effort in support of Army, ROK, ARVN units an integrated management system is essential. This Headquarters must consider Marine strike air and the intensity of engagement in I Corps in determining the necessary Air Force effort which must supplement Marine air. To do this the allocation request input must be on an integrated basis as well. In essence, the CMC proposal could cause CG III MAF to be managing air assets under several frag orders at the same time, and the support of ARVN/FWMAF an indefinite quantity somewhere in between. One of the basic reasons for integration at MACV level is the inescapable necessity for integration of air planning and support within the entire CG III MAF responsibilities. Overall, the CMC proposal appears to require a partial reversion to the former system, and as such it would compromise the basic objectives of Single Management to an unacceptable degree.

8. (S) Improvement actions taken. Throughout this month of operations under the Modified Pre-planned Allocation Procedures, numerous mechanical changes have been made, and certain improvement actions are continuing.

a. TOT flexibility and ordnance flexibility. 7AF is examining their system to assure responsiveness to field commander

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requirements. Broader guidance has been provided the field in assuring responsiveness to TOT change requests and ordnance change requests.

b. IP and/or rendezvous point designations. 7AF frag order specifics have been modified to satisfy field recommendations.

c. Allocation request time cycle. TASE has changed daily submission time from 1600 to 1400. This appears to be the best medium between allowing sufficient ground unit planning time prior to submission, and sufficient time after confirmation of the daily frag to disseminate necessary information to action agencies.

d. Artillery clearance and air control coordination. Action is continuing to assure complete coordination between control agencies throughout I Corps.

e. Coding of target specifics and ordnance loads in the frag order. A new coding system has been devised which satisfies field requirements.

f. Saturation of Panama CRC. 7AF is developing procedures to decentralize traffic management to other CRCs, which in turn will report by exception to Panama.

g. Use of out-country air in-country. Several problems arose during the evaluation period concerning best utilization of out-country F-105s when fragged in-country as to type of attack, ordnance load, delivery procedures, targeting. 7AF is taking internal actions to resolve these problems of adapting out-country air to in-country requirements.

h. Changes in weekly frag. TASE has taken action to

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assure maximum responsiveness in changes to the weekly frag.

Requirements for changes to the weekly frag will be submitted with daily frag requests to insure positive action.

i. Education of the field control and management levels.

The MACV Evaluation Team in field visits determined that in certain instances, management personnel at the battalion and brigade level are not thoroughly familiar with the mechanics of the system. An education program is being implemented.

j. Closer coordination and cross tell between DASC and field force Headquarters, and divisions. As the new system was implemented, it was quickly realized that a closer relationship is necessary between DASC operations and field force planners. 7AF instituted actions to provide maximum coordination and collaboration between these agencies. This has been a healthy development.

k. Move of I DASC. Planning actions are in final stages to move the I DASC facility to the III MAF compound. This will assure CG III MAF the necessary physical association considered desirable for best management.

l. In general, TASE and 7AF TACC have been quick to react to positive constructive recommendations toward improvement in the system management procedures. This type of criticism has been a positive step in the development of an effective system responsive to the needs of all management levels.

9. (S) Evaluation comments received from II, III and IV Corps have been highly in favor of the new pre-planning procedures for reasons of better planning, more responsiveness and flexibility,

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and more control of allocations at ground force levels. The 70% weekly frag provides a stable planning platform for field operations, and the 30% daily frag provides air concentration where it is needed. Better planning is being accomplished at all field force levels, and DASCs, ALOs and FACs are working in closer concert than was possible before.

a. As the situation matures, the tactical situation may periodically dictate a different frag split-out from the 70-30. This will be continually examined and necessary adjustment of percentages made. At this time there has been insufficient experience with the system to identify further refinement of the percentage ratio. An important facet of the system is to maintain as much stability in this ratio as possible, so that field planners can have confidence in the degree of air support available weekly for normal planning purposes.

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