

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV		DATE 15 AUGUST 1968	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 142314Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I			lo	SECRET MAC 10984 EYES ONLY
	DCG					REMARKS  Sic Routed copy to G-2 151015H Aug 68 VA JH  note: G-2 is preparing action for CG's signature - VA J.H. Fair  " #2 "3 burned 5 Nov 68 "
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I		8/15	DM	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		151000H Aug		JH	
	G-1					
	G-2	ACT				
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

#53

0 142314Z ZYH ZFF-3  
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
 LTG PEERS CG I FFV  
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS  
 MG KERWIN CG II FFV  
 INFO LTG STILWELL CG PCV  
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 10984 EYES ONLY

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING IS AN ASSESSMENT MADE BY LTG STILWELL ON THE DETERIORATING QUALITY OF THE NVA. QUOTE: DURING MY BRIEFING, I CITED THE DETERIORATING QUALITY OF THE NVA SOLDIERY, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES (OUR AREA OF OPERATIONS). YOU ASKED ME TO PROVIDE YOU, INFORMALLY, SOME ELABORATION OF THIS TREND. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE ADDRESSED TO THAT END.

1. INDICATORS OF QUALITATIVE DETERIORATION.

A. WE ARE CAPTURING PROPORTIONALLY MORE PRISONERS AND WEAPONS PER ENGAGEMENT. THE FOLLOWING RESULTS, IN THE PCV AREA, ARE SIGNIFICANT:

	PWS	WEAPONS (EXCLUSIVE OF CACHES)
MARCH	60	355
APRIL	71	1350
MAY	298	3279
JUNE	250	1100
JULY	150	600

YOU WILL RECALL THAT JUNE WAS MARKED BY A DECLINE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY AND WITHDRAWAL FROM CONTACT, TRENDS EVEN MORE PRONOUNCED IN JULY. THESE TWO MONTHLY TOTALS ARE THEREFORE PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY.

B. EVEN WHEN HE HAS THE OPPORTUNITY (SUCH AS AFTER A NIGHT ATTACK ON OUR PERIMETERS), THE NVA IS NOT POLICING THE BATTLEFIELD WITH FORMER THOROUGHNESS. HE IS NOT REMOVING HIS DEAD; AND ON OCCASION LEAVES HIS WOUNDED. MORE PERTINENTLY (BECAUSE THIS IS THE EASIER TASK), WE ARE FINDING ALMOST AS MANY WEAPONS AS ENEMY DEAD AFTER A REPULSED ENEMY ATTACK AFTER SWEEPING HIS POSITIONS.

C. TRAINING OF REPLACEMENTS IS LESS EXTENSIVE THAN PREVIOUSLY WHERE 6 - 8 MONTHS WAS ONCE THE NORM, RECENT PWS INDICATE TRAINING FOR AS SHORT AS ONE MONTH AND RARELY MORE THAN THREE. EXCEPTIONS ARE FOUND IN SAPPER AND OTHER SPECIALIZED UNITS, WHERE EXTENSIVE, HIGH QUALITY TRAINING CONTINUES TO BE THE RULE. OVERALL, HOWEVER, THE MOST ADVERSE IMPACT OF THE FORESHORTENED TRAINING PERIODS

(CONCEPTING A SUPER SATURATED TRAINING BASE) IS ON POLITICAL  
 EDUCATION. THE SINE QUO NON OF THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM. #230

D. THE HEAVY ATTRITION WITHIN THE NVA OFFICER CORPS HAS CREATED A SPECIAL REPLACEMENT PROBLEM. QUALITY HAS HAD TO BE SACRIFICED FOR QUANTITY. NUMEROUS PWS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEIR LEADERS HAD LITTLE OR NO COMBAT EXPERIENCE. ALL OTHER INDICATORS MAY BE ATTRIBUTED TO THIS IRREVERSIBLE TREND.

E. THE ENEMY IS COMMITTING MORE TACTICAL ERRORS. WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL INSTANCES OF NVA AND VC TROOPS MOVING IN THE OPEN DURING DAYLIGHT. RECENTLY, A WELL-EQUIPPED NVA PLATOON APPROACHED A MARINE POSITION IN CLOSE FORMATION ACROSS OPEN TERRAIN. ON THREE SEPARATE OCCASIONS, THE ENEMY FOLLOWED IDENTICAL TACTICS IN ATTEMPTING TO OVER RUN A MARINE POSITION; AND WAS THRICE REPULSED WITH HIGH LOSS EACH TIME. THREE WEEKS AGO, THE ENEMY BROKE IN FRONT OF THE 2D ARVN REGIMENT, BEGAN A PRECIPITATE WITHDRAWAL IN DAYLIGHT AND WAS MOWED DOWN.

F. MORALE IS DECLINING. INTERROGATIONS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND PERSONAL DIARIES HIGHLIGHT HOMESICKNESS, OBSESSIVE FEAR OF ALLIED FIREPOWER, HUNGER, ILLNESS. THERE ARE NUMEROUS REFERENCES TO THE LIKELIHOOD THAT HOME WILL EVER AGAIN BE SEEN. DOCUMENTS ALSO REFER TO DEFECTORS AND TRAITORS; AND THE CORRESPONDING NEED FOR INTENSIFICATION OF POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION TO PREVENT THESE LOSSES.

2. IN SUMMARY, AS SEEN FROM THE LIMITED VANTAGE OF THIS SMALL AREA, THE NVA APPEAR TO BE PROGRESSIVELY LESS WELL DISCIPLINED, TRAINED, MOTIVATED AND LED. UNQUOTE

2. (S) I RECOGNIZE THAT THE SITUATION DIFFERS BETWEEN YOUR VARIOUS AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITIES AND AN ASSESSMENT IN ONE AREA DOES NOT NECESSARILY APPLY IN ANOTHER. FOR THAT REASON I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE CONDITIONS CONCERNING THE QUALITY OF ENEMY TROOPS THAT EXIST IN YOUR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

#53(2)

750

NNNN

SECRET

#53(2)

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM	CNO
CG	3	I			<i>lp</i>	SERIAL 141424Z AUG 68	COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG						SUBJECT FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN	
DCG AIR						REMARKS	
C/S	2	I		6/15	<i>DM</i>	<p><b>FOR</b></p> <p><i>"# 3 &amp; 4 burned 5 Nov 68"</i></p> <p>LEGEND                      A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE                      C-COMMENTS                      I- INFORMATION</p>	
DC/S							
DC/S DM							
DC/S AIR							
G-1							
G-2							
G-3							
G-4							
CEO							
S/S	1		15 073040		<i>for</i>		
S/C							

47

RR RUYPSYD  
DE RHYEAWP 508 2271424  
ZNR UUUUU ZYO RUYE  
R 141424Z AUG 68  
FM CNO  
TO RUYPSYD/THIRD MAF  
UNCLAS

FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM ADMIRAL MOORER

I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE TRADITIONAL WARM MARINE HOSPITALITY WHICH YOU AND YOUR STAFF AFFORDED MY PARTY. YOUR PERSONAL TIME AND EFFORT IN UP-DATING ME ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN I CORPS WILL BE MOST HELPFUL TO ME IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. MANY THANKS AND WARM REGARDS  
TOM MOORER

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 13 AUGUST 1968	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 130251Z		1, 2 COPY# OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT PLANNED OPN INTO DMZ (TS)
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DGG AIR					
✓	C/S	5		8/13	BM	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		13/2404		2	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	S&C					

24

TOP SECRET

Z 13025 IZ ZYM  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO SSO MACV  
 INFO SSO PCV  
 CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FROM LGEN CUSHMAN TO GEN ABRAMS INFO  
 LTGEN STILWELL AND GEN DAVIS  
 PLANNED OPN INTO DMZ (TS)

A. CG PCV 1169/121500Z AUG 63 (TS) EYES ONLY TO LGEN  
 CUSHMAN INFO GEN ABRAMS

1. CONCUR WITH PROPOSAL FOR CAVALRY RAID BY 2D ARVN PCT  
 AS OUTLINED REF A INTO EXTREME EASTERN SECTION OF DMZ.

2. STRONGLY RECOMMEND APPROVAL OF US SUPPORT AS FOLLOWS.

A. MAXIMUM AIR AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT BY US FORCES.

B. SUPPORT BY PLATOON OF TANKS

C. US ADVISORS ASSIGNED TO PARTICIPATING ARVN UNITS  
 BE ALLOWED TO ACCOMPANY THEIR UNITS IN AREA SOUTH OF  
 PVDL.

GP-4

139

NNNN

TOP SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	3	I			lp	CG FMFPAC
DCG						SERIAL 131922Z AUG 68 COPY # 2 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT CHANGE OF COMMAND
C/S	2-I		8/14		DK	REMARKS For CG. I do not consider that a similar message from CG III MAC is called for unless CG <u>decides</u> . <b>FOR</b> via J.H. Jan  NO  lp. m
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S	1		14 0730/6		jm	LEGEND
S/C						A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE
						C - COMMENTS
						I - INFORMATION

PTIEZYUW RUHHFMA2237 2261922-EEEE--RUMUGRA.

ZNY EEEEE

P 131922Z AUG 68

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV (R014)

RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB

INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

CHANGE OF COMMAND

1. FOR BGEN CHIP: AS YOUR RELINQUISH COMMAND OF THE 9TH MAB, YOU MAY BE JUSTLY PROUD OF THE EXCELLENT SERVICE YOU HAVE RENDERED YOUR CORPS, YOUR COUNTRY, AND THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD DURING THESE PAST SIX AND A HALF MONTHS. THE OUTSTANDING MANNER IN WHICH YOUR COMMAND HAS PERFORMED DURING COMBAT OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM, WHILE PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR OTHER FAR EAST COMMITMENTS, IS HIGHLY INDICATIVE OF YOUR FIRM DEDICATION AND SUPERIOR LEADERSHIP. GOOD LUCK ON YOUR ASSIGNMENT AS ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER, THIRD MARDIV, AND SINCERE BEST WISHES FOR FUTURE SUCCESS.

2. FOR BGEN WILLIAMS: CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND OF THE 9TH MAB. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE ACHIEVEMENTS

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA2237 UNCLAS E F T O  
OF YOUR CHALLENGING COMMAND DURING THE MONTHS AHEAD WILL BE MARKED BY THE EXCELLENT LEADERSHIP WHICH HAS CHARACTERIZED YOUR PAST ASSIGNMENTS. SINCERE BEST WISHES. LTGEN BUSE.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#50



O 131024Z ZYH ZFF-3  
FM MG CORCORAN COFS MACV  
TO VADM BRINGLE COMSEVENTHFLT  
INFO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
LTG STILWELL CG PCV  
VADM COUSIN CTF 77  
ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 10928 EYES ONLY  
SUBJ: ITINERARY FOR MG SEIGNIOUS  
REF: YOUR 130226Z AUG 68

1. THE ALTERNATIVE YOU SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF REFERENCE TO HAVE MG SEIGNIOUS RON ABOARD CONSTELLATION IS VERY SATISFACTORY IN VIEW OF DESIRE TO SPEND FULL DAY IN I CORPS AREA. WE WILL COORDINATE THE EXACT TIME OF DEPARTURE FROM DANANG WITH YOUR SAIGON LIAISON OFFICE.
2. BEST REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

120

NNNN

SECRET

#48

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM	COMSEVENTHFLT
CG						SERIAL	
DCG						120946Z AUG 68	COPY# OF COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT	FOR BGEN CHIP
C/S						REMARKS	
DC/S						<p>Copy # 2 to BGen Chip #10</p> <p>#4/ Burned 5/06/68</p> <p>FOR</p>	
DC/S DM							
DC/S AIR							
G-1							
G-2							
G-3							
G-4							
CEO							
S/S						LEGEND	
S/C						A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE	
						C- COMMENTS	
						I- INFORMATION	

#46



RR RUYPSYD  
 DE RUHGUKL 0789 2250946  
 ZNR UUUUU ZYO RUHGCS  
 R 120946Z AUG 68  
 FM COMSEVENTHFLT  
 TO RUYJSYB/CTF SEVEF NINE  
 INFO RULCSYG/CMC  
 RUYHSA/C FMFPAC  
 RUYPSYD/CG III MAF  
 RUYVWDB/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 BT

FOR

UNCLAS

FOR BCEN CHIP

1. I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO WISH YOU CONTINUED SUCCESS IN YOUR IMPORTANT AND CHALLENGING ASSIGNMENT AS ADC THIRD MARDIV. I AM CERTAIN THAT YOUR ENTHUSIASM AND PROFESSIONAL ABILITY WILL MAKE YOU AS GREAT AN ASSET THERE AS YOU HAVE BEEN IN THE SEVENTH FLEET.
2. YOUR SKILL AND INSPIRATIONAL LEADERSHIP, SO ABLY DISPLAYED IN THE PLANNING, TRAINING AND EXECUTION OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS ENGAGED IN BY ELEMENTS OF 9TH MAB, AIDED IMMEASURABLY IN THE ATTAINMENT OF OUR COMMON GOAL IN SEASIA. I APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR COMSEVENTHFLT NAVY/MARINE TEAM

PAGE TWO RUHGUKL 0789 UNCLAS  
 AND LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER ASSOCIATION WITH YOU IN OUR COMMON ENDEAVORS.

BEST REGARDS.

VADM WM F. BRINGLE, USN.

BT

COPY 3 OF 6 COPIES

#46



R 120803Z ZYH ZFF-3  
 FM MG CORCORAN COFS USMACV  
 GEN BROWN CG 7TH AF  
 ADM BRINGLE CMDR 7TH FLT  
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
 LTG PEERS CG I FFORCEV  
 LTG SILLWELL CG PROVCORPSV  
 MG KERWIN CG II FFORCEV  
 MG ECHARDT SA IV CORPS  
 YSHKOLC/ COL AARON 5TH SFC  
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 10870 EYES ONLY

1. (S) MG GEORGE M. SEIGNIOUS, U.S. MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE AT THE PARIS TALKS WILL VISIT SVN DURING THE PERIOD 16-20 AUGUST 1968. THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT IS TO GATHER FACTUAL INFORMATION ON THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA PARTICULARLY AS IT AFFECTS THE UNITED STATES POSITION AT THE PARIS TALKS. WHILE HIS INTERESTS INCLUDE THE FULL SPECTRUM OF ACTIVITIES CAPABILITIES AND PLANS OF BOTH FRIENDLY AND ENEMY FORCES, SPECIFIC EVIDENCE WILL BE SOUGHT TO REFUTE COMMUNIST ASSERTIONS OF ESCALATION ON OUR PART AND DE-ESCALATION ON THEIR PART. THUS, THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS VISIT AND NECESSITY FOR ALL COMMANDS CONCERNED TO PROVIDE FULL AND ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS CANNOT BE OVER-EMPHASIZED.

2. (S) FOR YOUR PLANNING PURPOSES THE ITINERARY FOR MG SEIGNIOUS FOLLOWS:

DATE/TIME      EVENTS

FRIDAY, 16 AUGUST 1968

- 1350	ARRIVE TAN SON NHUT, BASE OPERATIONS
1350-1400	EN ROUTE HEADQUARTERS, MACV
1400-1500	CALL ON COMUS AND DEPCOMUS
1500-1830	BRIEFINGS BY MACV J2, J3 AND MACMA

#45(a)

#45(a)

SATURDAY, 17 AUGUST 1968

0730-0835 EN ROUTE DANANG, BASE OPERATIONS  
 0835-1800 ITINERARY AS ARRANGED BY CG, III MAF,  
 TO INCLUDE VISIT TO PCV. RON.

SUNDAY, 18 AUGUST 1968

0730-815 EN ROUTE NHA TRANG (I FFV HOT SPOT)  
 0815-1300 ITINERARY AS ARRANGED BY CG, IFFV, TO  
 INCLUDE VISIT TO AND BRIEFING BY 5LK  
 SFG AND LUNCH  
 1300-1335 EN ROUTE BIEN HOA (WEST RAMP)  
 1335-1830 ITINERARY AS ARRANGED BY CG, II FFV,  
 TO INCLUDE VISIT TO AND BRIEFING BY  
 CMAC  
 1830- DEPART FOR QUARTERS

MONDAY, 19 AUGUST 1968

0800-0930 MACV JB BRIEFING  
 0930-0940 EN ROUTE U. S. EMBASSY  
 0940-1000 CALL ON AMBASSADOR BUNKER  
 1000-1400 MISSION COUNCIL MEETING AND LUNCH WITH  
 THE AMBASSADOR  
 1400-1420 EN ROUTE TAN SON NHUT, BASE OPERATIONS  
 1420-1430 EN ROUTE CAN THO  
 1430-1730 ITINERARY AS ARRANGED BY SA, IV CORPS  
 1730-1800 EN ROUTE TAN SON NHUT, BASE OPERATIONS

TUESDAY, 20 AUGUST 1968

0800-1000 BRIEFINGS BY 7TH AIR FORCE AT HQ, MACV  
 1000-1100 BRIEFINGS BY 7TH FLEET AT HQ, MACV  
 1100-1200 EXIT DISCUSSION COMUSMACV  
 1200-1330 LUNCH  
 1330-1350 EN ROUTE TAN SON NHUT, CIVILIAN  
 TERMINAL  
 130-1420 OUT PROCESSING  
 1420- DEPART RVN

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

550

#45(2)

NNNN

SECRET

45(2)



O 110959Z ZYH ZFF-1  
 FM MG GETTYS CG AMERICAL DIVISION  
 TO LG CUSHMEN CG III MAF  
 INFO MG YOUNGDALE CG 1ST MAR DIV  
 ZEM

S E C R E T ACD 901 EYES ONLY

1. REFERENCE TOP SECRET BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM CG, III MAF  
 DTG 100835Z.

2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN MESSAGE REFERENCED  
 ABOVE, THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN:

A. I HAVE ESTABLISHED COMMAND LIAISON WITH CG, 1ST MAR DIV  
 TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN HOI AN AND GO NOI AREAS.

B. APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF MY STAFF WILL VISIT COUNTERPARTS  
 AT 1ST MAR DIV ON 12 AUGUST.

C. THE BATTALION COMMANDER AND THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER, IF  
 TWO BATTALIONS ARE COMMITTED, WILL CONTACT REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS OF  
 1ST MAR DIV ON 12 AUGUST TO DISCUSS FUTURE OPERATIONS.

D. AN AERIAL RECON PLAN OF THE HOI AN AND GO NOI AREAS IS  
 BEING DEVELOPED.

E. I PLAN TO VISIT HOI AN AND 2D ROK MAR BDE ON 12 AUGUST.

F. MY G3 WILL VISIT YOURS ON 12 AUGUST TO DISCUSS DETAILS  
 OF THESE ACTIVITIES.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

160

SECRET

#43



HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CG FIRST MAW		10 AUG 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# / OF 4 COPIES RECD	
			1009348 AUG 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I				SPECAT REPORT (U)
	DCG					REMARKS  MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY Recommended rating 5 G-3 VR JCR  CG. Good point, but will need a one-time "gap filler" report on change-over.  JCR Jh. JCR  +2
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I		8/10	JCR	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		11/20/68		JCR	
	G-1					
	G-2					
4	G-3	I		8/11	JCR	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL**

*W*

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PP RUEBHOA RUMSAK RUEBHOA  
DE RUMSAV 070W 2231300  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 100934Z AUG 68  
FM CG FIRST MAW  
TO RUEBHOA/CMC  
INFO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
RUMSAK/CG III MAF  
RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV  
RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
FOR CMC CODE AA-1  
FOR FMFPAC (F-029)  
SPECAT REPORT (U)

1. AT PRESENT THE SPECAT REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED DAILY TO ENCOMPASS THE PERIOD 1901-1900H (1101-1100Z). TO ALLOW FOR REPORTING CONTINUITY AND PROVIDED CONFORMITY WITH OTHER LIKE STATISTICAL RPTS, REQ AUTH TO COMMENCE SPECAT RPT REFLECTION PERIOD 0001-2400H (1601-1600Z) DAILY. THIS ACTION WILL ALLOW THIS HDQTRS TO COMPARE DATA REPORTED WITH OTHER RPTS.
2. REQ ADVISE. GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SJRG.									#42

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM ADM ABRAMS COMUSMACV		DATE 10 AUG 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 101113	1, 2, 3, 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECD		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					<p>REMARKS</p> <p>Copy #2 to DC/S 5 Sep 68 In 9 Sep 68</p> <p>Copy 1 to Dets 9/5</p> <p>Copy 1 to Inspector 5 Sep 68 PM JJA In 75, 65 PM</p> <p>#1</p> <p>5</p> <p>1</p> <p>Copy #2 to Insp 29 Sep 68 PM Harrill JR</p> <p>Copy #2 to G-3</p> <p>112155 Aug 68.</p> <p>12 Aug 68 g/l</p> <p>#3 Burned 12 Aug 68</p> <p>#1 to Annex Casualties File 12 Aug 68</p>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS, COMUSMACV		DATE 10 AUG 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 101143		COPY# OF COPIES RECD 1, 2, 3, 4	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I			le	REMARKS  CG Recommend this be relayed via a personal to CG 1st Mar Div, CG 1st MAW, CG Americal Div, and CG, FLC. a few personal comments can be added.  Info should be conveyed by other means to COs of the CAGs.  Upon approval, will take the required action.  Yes ↑ J. G. Fair  I asked E. E. to have a msg prepared, just a day ago. Maybe it is around - but we need action pronto.  le.
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
2	D C/S	C		110805	Jm	
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		1021104		Jm	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

X O 101143Z ZYH ZFF-1  
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
 TO GEN BROWN CDR 7AF  
 LTG MILDREN DCG USARV  
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
 LTG PEERS CG I FFORCEV  
 LTG STILWELL CG PCV  
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS  
 MG KERWIN CG II FORCEV  
 RADM VETH COMNAVFORV  
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 10826 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES

1. WE ARE HAVING TOO MANY INCIDENTS RESULTING IN CASUALTIES TO OUR OWN TROOPS AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THESE MAY BE RELATED TO ENEMY INITIATED ACTION, THE MAJORITY ARE CAUSED BY CARELESSNESS AND A LACK OF PROFESSIONALISM IN HANDLING OUR WEAPONS SYSTEMS. I DESIRE EACH ADDRESSEE TO GIVE THIS SERIOUS SITUATION HIS IMMEDIATE PERSONAL ATTENTION AND INITIATE MEASURES TO STOP THIS USELESS KILLING OF OUR OWN PEOPLE. I WANT RAPID AND COMPLETE INVESTIGATIONS, JOINT WHERE INDICATED, TO BE FORWARDED TO MACV ASAP. INTERIM REPORTS ARE DESIRED. IN CASES INVOLVING SOUTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS, RAPID ASSISTANCE WILL BE PROVIDED TO INCLUDE CONTACTS WITH APPROPRIATE LOCAL OFFICIALS.
2. IN YOUR ADVISORY CAPACITIES, WHERE APPROPRIATE, ENSURE THAT ALLIED FORCES KNOW AND APPLY PROPER PROCEDURES IN THEIR CONDUCT AND DIRECTION OF FIRE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
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250

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	3				lp	CG FMFPAC
DCG	4		8/8		Rued	SERIAL 090355Z AUG 68
DCG AIR	5					COPY #2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
C/S	2					SUBJECT NAVY ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL
DC/S						REMARKS
DC/S DM						<p>In CG - further "flipped" - FLC            An <b>FOR</b> MAA            are ignored. Will            pass. V. Keagy</p> <p>OK</p> <p>lp.</p> <p>Sir            Have released address 8/10            VA            JCS</p>
DC/S AIR						
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LEGEND  
 A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE  
 C-COMMENTS  
 I- INFORMATION

PT007435  
 RTTEZYUW RUHHFMA1497 2220355-EEEE--RUMUGRA.  
 ZNY EEEEE  
 R 090355Z AUG 68  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV (W007)  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB  
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF  
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O FOR MGEN YOUNGDALE, MGEN DAVIS  
 AND BGEN CHIP, INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN BUSE  
 A. SECNAVNOTE 1650 OF 17JUL67

1. REFERENCE A REDESIGNATED THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
 COMMENDATION FOR ACHIEVEMENT AS THE NAVY ACHIEVEMENT  
 MEDAL. THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY APPROVED THE REDESIG-  
 NATION PRIMARILY TO AFFORD INCREASED RECOGNITION OF  
 SUSTAINED OR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A SUPERLATIVE  
 NATURE BY INDIVIDUALS WHOSE DEDICATED COMPETENT WORK  
 ENABLED SUCCESSFUL MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.  
 2. SINCE RECEIVING AUTHORITY TO AWARD THE NAVY ACHIEVE-  
 MENT MEDAL DURING AUGUST 1967, THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS  
 RECEIVED 840 RECOMMENDATIONS, THE MAJORITY OF WHICH

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA1497 UNCLAS E F T O  
 HAVE BEEN ORIGINATED BY UNITS EXTERNAL TO THE MARINE  
 DIVISIONS. I RECOGNIZE THAT UNITS OCCUPYING FIXED  
 INSTALLATIONS ARE IN A BETTER POSITION TO ORIGINATE AWARD  
 RECOMMENDATIONS AS COMPARED TO THE INFANTRY BATTALIONS  
 WHO SELDOM HAVE ADEQUATE OFFICE FACILITIES READILY  
 ACCESSIBLE. HOWEVER, WE MUST PROVIDE A COMPARABLE  
 SPREAD OF AWARDS AMONG THE INFANTRY. THE JUNIOR  
 OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN SERVING IN THE RIFLE COMPANIES  
 THROUGHOUT THE DIVISION SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED FOR THE  
 HAZARDS TO WHICH THEY ARE EXPOSED AND FOR SERVICES  
 WHICH WARRANT MORE TANGIBLE RECONGNITION THAN IS  
 POSSIBLE BY A FITNESS REPORT OR CONDUCT AND PROFICIENCY  
 EVALUATION. THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE CONTRIBUTING SIGNI-  
 FICANTLY TO THE TOTAL WAR EFFORT IN I CORPS, AND SHOULD  
 RETURN TO CONUS WITH SOMETHING TO SHOW FOR THEIR  
 EXPERIENCES BESIDES THE PURPLE HEART AND CAMPAIGN/  
 SERVICE RIBBONS.  
 3. PLEASE GIVE THIS MATTER YOUR COMMAND ATTENTION TO  
 ENSURE THAT AN INDIVIDUAL'S SUSTAINED PERFORMANCE WHICH  
 HAS EXCEEDED THAT NORMALLY EXPECTED OF A PERSON OF HIS

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA1497 UNCLAS E F T O  
 RANK AND POSITION IS RECOGNIZED.  
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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM COMUSMACV		DATE 09 AUG 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 060050Z AUG 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT PACIFICATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM DURING JANUARY - JUNE 68 (U)
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				le	REMARKS
4	DCG					
5	DCG AIR					
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ELECTRICAL				J5	J6	
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COURIER		X	X	ACTIV	NAG	
PRECEDENCE				AFGP	NAVFORV	
ACTION TO: <b>COURIER</b>		<b>DTG 060050Z AUG 68</b>		AG	OICC	
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 TO: CINCPAC 2  
 INFO: CJCS 2  
 DOD 2  
 STATE/AID 2  
 CIA 2  
 CG, I FFORCEV/SA II CTZ 2  
 CG, II FFORCEV/SA III CTZ 2  
 CG, III MAF/SA I CTZ 20  
 SA, IV CTZ 2

B

AMEMB	PM
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CBPAC	SJA
CH	SOG
COC	SURG
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	X 3
COMPT	TNG
X 2	X 1
DOD SPEC REP	USAID
	X 2
FMAO	USARV
	X 6
HC	1FFV LNO
	X 1
IG	11 FFV LNO
X 2	X 3
JRATA	111 MAF LNO
	X 1
JUSPAO	5TH SF LNO
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MACDC	7TH AF
MACON	MACCORDS A 80
MACPD	MACJOIR 3
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McCain, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTC PEERS, LTC KERWIN, LTC CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT

Subj: Pacification in South Vietnam during January - June 1968 (U)

(U) This is the sixth in the 1968 series of monthly assessments of pacification, and the first (January-June) 1968 semiannual assessment.

I. (CNF) SUMMARY: COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

A. The first half of 1968 was, for pacification in South Vietnam,

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MR. JOHN HAYES Reports Officer MACCORDS-QAD/R MACV 3556			<i>Charles A. Corcoran</i>
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		TYPED NAME AND TITLE	
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a period of unprecedented turbulence. As a result of the VC Tet offensive pacification suffered a sharp setback, though found subsequently not to have been so extensive or so damaging in detail as was first feared. The drop in relatively secure population from 67.2% in January to 59.8 in February cancelled all the population gains of 1967. Hamlet Evaluation System returns reflected a subsequent constant, gradual upward trend in March (61.0), April (61.9), May (62.1) and June (63.3).

B. Territorial Security Forces have increased in size and a multi-faceted program is in process to increase their effectiveness through improving their weaponry, additional advisory effort, improvements in equipment and training, etc. By end-June Regional and Popular Forces numbered 358,000, and have already begun to display new operational vigor.

C. The attack on the VC infrastructure was assisted by the degree to which the infrastructure surfaced during the Tet attacks. An intensive advisory effort also augmented the number of infrastructure personalities killed, captured, or defected. The major drawback, a lack of clear understanding and direction of this program on the Vietnamese side, was finally unlocked on 1 July with the signing of a presidential decree establishing Phung Hoang as a major government program.

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D. Considerable pacification effort during the first half-year was given over to recovery from the Tet attacks. Primary attention went to care for and reestablishment of the nearly 900,000 suffering people left in the backwash of the violent fighting and to reviving the nation's disrupted economy.

1. In the wake of the offensive, President Thieu, in response to US initiatives, created a high-level GVN task force, with US participation, to direct and coordinate the activities of GVN and US agencies in speeding civil recovery. Ministries were brought together to react quickly on basic recovery problems. The effort proved effective in getting "Project Recovery" under way. Some 797,000 persons were given temporary relief and returned to their homes or received commodities to help them build new ones.

2. The rural economy is practically back to pre-Tet conditions in I, II, and III Corps. Curfews have been eased, major LOCs are reopened, and commerce is approaching pre-Tet levels. This has brought a decline in prices from the February inflationary peak to only slightly above pre-Tet levels. In IV Corps, where the VC have been making a determined effort to discourage movement of commodities to and from the Delta, the rural economy has not fully recovered.

E. Involvement of the population through RD remained a key objective of the pacification program. The RD Program suffered to a lesser degree than initially expected from the Tet offensive,

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except in its developmental aspects as funds, commodities and leadership attention were diverted to Recovery and refugee relief. On the other side of the coin, as a result of the Tet offensive increasing numbers of civilians and civic organizations in urban areas appealed to the GVN for arms to defend themselves, their families, and their property from VC attack. At end-June, the population was in effect ahead of the Government in terms of its willingness to participate actively in Self-Defense, but the government seemed finally to be pulling together a program to exploit and support this popular attitude.

F. In sum, the outlook for pacification is favorable, barring a sharp drop in SVN morale or new attacks of the Tet magnitude. Lagging administrative reform, defensive-mindedness, and the need to share pacification assets between city and countryside, are persistent problems. Yet the possibility of about 70% relatively secure population by the year's end is good. RF/PF expansion and improvement will continue to pay off. The attack on the VC infrastructure and the Chieu Hoi rate should both accelerate, and refugee and recovery burdens should decline, though solid gains will be slow to materialize.

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II. PACIFICATION TRENDS

A. Analysis of HES:

1. The table below contains Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) pacification status and trends for the first five months of CY68.

PERCENT SVN TOTAL POPULATION  
(Security & Development)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun
GVN	67.2	59.8	61.0	61.9	62.1	63.3
Contested	16.3	22.0	20.7	20.2	20.3	19.4
VC	16.4	18.2	18.3	17.9	17.6	17.3

2. The Tet aftereffect was a substantial loss of population (7.4%) in the GVN category and corresponding increases in contested and VC population. The March and April data indicated a recovery, but in May the rise in GVN and contested population slowed, due mainly to the VC mini-Tet attacks in the heavily populated areas around Saigon. The rate of pacification progress in II Corps slowed also. In IV Corps, GVN controlled population has increased steadily. In June, the nationwide rate of increase in relatively secure population again rose to the March-April level.

3. 58.5% of all ABC-rated hamlet population is susceptible to regression as the result of potential VC infrastructure activity. 72% of III Corps ABC hamlet population is in this category. Over one third (36%) of the total ABC hamlet population have marginal security ratings. Marginal security is defined as ratings of D and E for VC military activities and friendly security capabilities.

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B. The Military Setting:

1. By the end of April, territorial security had been reestablished in much previously lost ground. Although I CTZ still faced the threat of major engagements with enemy main force units, the remainder of the country was well on the way toward regaining the ground lost during the first two months of the year.

2. I CTZ: By the end of March, most of the Tet territorial losses had been regained. There were - and still are - physical damages which cannot be repaired overnight, especially in Hue. But civil life has fully resumed its pre-Tet pace. Of foremost importance has been the attempt to reestablish security in the cities and to open the main LOCs. Security has been sufficiently restored to foster the resumption of pre-Tet economic life throughout the Corps area. Partly due to the massive infusion of foodstuffs and building materials, critical supply shortages have not occurred and prices have remained stable.

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3. II CTZ:

a. Pacification and revolutionary development ground to a virtual halt in the midst of the first offensive but in general, RD assets in the countryside were left relatively untouched. The exceptions were in Ninh Thuan (although Phan Rang was not attacked at all) and Binh Dinh (where the priority districts of Tuy Phuoc and An Nhon suffered marked setbacks).

b. When major allied forces were deployed to evict enemy forces entrenched in major population centers, deterioration of security in the rural areas was inevitable. Although many of these units have returned to their original positions, a significant number still remain behind to guard provincial and district capitals. In April and May, the enemy situation in II Corps was characterized by the introduction of new enemy forces in western Kontum, continued development of the staging area west of Poley Kleng, an increase in attacks by fire, interdiction of LOC and attempts to disrupt RD efforts. By mid-June the enemy main force units had largely withdrawn from the area once again.

c. In general, despite the slackening pace of enemy effort in II Corps, recovery of pacification momentum has been slow.

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4. III CTZ:

a. In certain areas of III Corps - Phuoc Long, Binh Long, and Hau Nghia, for example - the situation during the Spring was very discouraging. In Hau Nghia, the VC openly proselytized 15 to 18 year-olds, with an announced goal of 2,000 recruits. In Binh Long, confirmed reports revealed the operations of VC training cadre at work. Phuoc Long presented a unique situation as an entire province used as a staging area by the VC. In these provinces, only the provincial capitals and the district towns were marginally secure, and the situation was subject to further deterioration.

b. Other areas were more encouraging. Long An, Gia Dinh, Tay Ninh, Phuoc Try and Binh Duong received heavy attention from the VC, but tactical VC successes were not achieved. In all of these provinces, the presence of US and/or GVN military forces was substantial and offered a deterrent to the free movement of enemy forces, even though the enemy retained the capability for selective terrorism.

c. The much-heralded second phase of the VC/NVA winter-spring offensive began in the early days of May. In many respects the enemy operations repeated those of the Tet campaign, supported by indiscriminate rocket-mortar attacks on Saigon and other population targets. In contrast to other months, the enemy concentrated on the RD cadre teams during May, hitting hard with 45 attacks which resulted in 51 RD personnel KIA and 87 WIA.

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5. IV CTZ:

a. Territorial security increased during the spring with the arrival in March of the new Corps Commander, Major General Thang. GVN forces took the offensive and began regaining the losses suffered during the Tet offensive. Particular emphasis was directed toward the major LOCs: Highway 4, the Mang Thit-Nicholai Canal, and Cho Gao Canal. RF/PF units largely returned to their territorial security missions. ARVN emphasis was directed towards offensive activities.

b. The VC concentration during April on LOCs and outpost harassment throughout the corps--though largely unsuccessful--seems to reinforce the theory that this was a period of VC consolidation. The expected attacks against urban areas did not materialize in April, but apprehension about them did force a greater measure of concentration in defense of cities.

c. In May and June the overall security situation in the Corps area continued to improve. Only Chau Phu in Chau Doc province was seriously affected by the May offensive. GVN military operations remained at a high level, preventing the VC from gaining the initiative in most provinces. Most provinces continue to experience low-level harassment by small VC elements, with particular focus on LOC and RD areas.

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C. Status of LOCs:

1. Status of Roads: \*

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>
Green %	42.5	37.6	46.1	48.2	46.3	52.9
Amber %	53.1	53.9	46.1	45.4	49.5	44.2
Red %	4.4	8.5	7.8	6.4	4.2	2.9

The above reflects the roads designated as military essential by MACV. The percentages are based on 3759 Km.

2. Status of Waterways in III & IV CTZ: \*

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>
Green %	27.9	9.8	15.1	35.2	45.5	71.9
Amber %	65.3	83.1	77.5	56.8	53.2	26.9
Red %	6.8	7.1	7.4	8.0	1.3	1.2

The above reflects the waterways designated as military essential by MACV. The percentages are based on 1504 Km.

\* Status green indicates LOC open during daylight, amber open with military escort, and red closed.

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III. TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES

A. RF/PF analysis based on the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) -- Progress and problems:

1. During the period 31 January to 30 June the Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF) were quite rapidly expanded. Total personnel strengths at the end of June were 197,714 RF and 164,284 PF, or in terms of field units, 1050 RF companies and 4560 PF platoons. Sample operational results for May are as follows:

	RF	PF
Total Operations	38,129	68,539
With Contact (%)	1,366 (3.6)	1,626 (2.4)
Night Operations (% Tot.)	28,662 (75.2)	56,018 (81.6)
With Contact (%)	477 (1.6)	968 (1.7)

a. Primary mission assignments have remained relatively static since January, with 25% of RF units and 64% of the PF platoons now providing security for hamlets and villages.

b. TFES RF tactical unit personnel strengths assigned at the end of May and the change from January were: Officer 66% (-1%), NCO 77% (-2%) and enlisted 95% (+8%). PF platoon personnel strengths assigned were: NCO 65% (-4%) and enlisted 100% (0).

c. The major deficiencies in RF/PF forces and percent

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of units affected, according to TPES, were:

- (1) Resupply slow or undependable, 56% of RF and 62% of PF.
- (2) Insufficient in-place training, 91% of RF and 93% of PF.
- (3) Insufficient operational radios, 78% of RF and 63% of PF.
- (4) Firepower inferior to enemy's, 39% of RF and 55% of PF.

d. RD/PF deficiencies have not been corrected to any great extent. RF and PF units reporting inferior firepower have increased 10% since January.

e. The importance of RF/PF to territorial security is shown by the fact that two-thirds of the hamlets that experienced pacification regression during Tet had no assigned RF or PF units.

2. Issue of additional M2 carbines and BAR's as an immediate measure, pending issue of M16 rifles, proceeded rapidly during April, May, and June. Current plans are to issue M16 rifles to all RF/PF with priority by geographical area. Initial issues to RF/PF began 30 June 1968. RF/PF units are still critically short of M79 grenade launchers. As of 30 June, 18% of the authorized M79s were on hand. Full issue of M16 rifles and M79 grenade launchers to combat units will be completed by the last half of FY 70.

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B. Battalions in Direct Support of Revolutionary Development (DSRD): ARVN battalions in direct support of revolutionary development have fluctuated in the past six months from a high in January of 51 to a low in February of 31. The number of DSRD battalions are given in the chart below:

<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>
51	31	46	41	43	40

C. National Police (Except National Police Field Forces):

1. Even though there were shortfalls in terms of attaining specific goals, National Police capability has definitely increased since 1 January 1968. Their successful performance during the latest VC/NVA offensive earned them more respect from the population, as evidenced by a greater number of people providing information to the police.

2. The recruitment program for the past six months has survived the two VC offensives and remained on schedule. NP force strength on 1 January 1968 was 70,291; the end-June goal of 78,500 was slightly surpassed with a total force strength of 79,729. The recently enacted mobilization law will seriously restrict future NP recruitment as it limits men eligible for NP service to those 25 years of age or older, with only 50% of recruits allowed from the 25-33 age bracket.

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
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3. National Police and NPFF Strengths:

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4. In January there were approximately 20,000 NP serving at district level and below. However, as a result of the Tet offensive, the majority of NP were pulled into the province capitals. Advisory efforts are continuing toward returning the police to the rural areas. The end-of-year goal to assign 30% of the Marine Police to the Delta is on schedule.

5. The Resource Control Program calls for relocating certain fixed check-points from secure areas to the fringe areas of contested or VC-dominated zones, eliminating 40% of the static check-points and increasing the operation of mobile checkpoints by 50%. The goal for the period was not achieved. Although sufficient manpower has been allocated and trained for this program, the need for additional vehicles to implement and/or replace the static check-points continued to be a problem. Mobile checkpoints increased by 50% in I Corps during May.

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6. The program to expand prison facilities calls for construction of a total of 9,500 spaces (5,000 temporary) by end-CY 68. Two thousand spaces of a planned 5,000-space temporary tent prison camp were recently completed at the National Correction Center, Con Son Island. Construction of 4,000 permanent spaces on Con Son Island will begin in July 1968.

7. The police detention expansion program calls for the construction of 8,500 new detention spaces by end-CY-68. Construction at the An Tuc Detention Facility in II Corps is nearing completion; however, only 500 spaces are ready for occupancy out of a total of 1,200 spaces.

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## IV. (CNF) ATTACK ON THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE

A. Phoenix/Phung Hoang:

1. Since the beginning of the year, the CVN has shown a new spirit of resolution in pressing the attack on the VC infrastructure (VCI). Yet, until recently, the effectiveness of the Phung Hoang program depended largely on the interest of local officials and the ability of US Phoenix coordinators. Only in II Corps was a concerted effort made at regional level to give proper CVN support and impetus to the program.

2. During the Tet offensive DIOCCs were in many areas the primary sources of intelligence information. This fact, together with the inadequacy of local efforts by CVN officials to neutralize VCI abetting the attacks, focused new attention on Phoenix/Phung Hoang. Nonetheless, it was not until 1 July that persistent US efforts culminated in the signing by President Thieu of a Phung Hoang decree directing coordinated employment of military and police resources against the VC infrastructure.

3. Some significant local measures antedated publication of the presidential decree:

a. The I CTZ commander formed a combined Phoenix/Phung Hoang working group for planning and coordination and a Corps Phoenix/Phung Hoang Committee to direct anti-infrastructure operations.

b. The II CTZ Phung Hoang Committee activated new DIOCCs, such as these in Phu Bon and Ninh Thuan, even though US advisors were not available.

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c. The IV CTZ Commander established a Regional Intelligence Coordinating Center, ordered that each District Chief activate a DIOCC, and published instructions for proper civil-military inter-agency coordination in pursuit of Phung Hoang objectives.

4. The III CTZ Commander has been reluctant to employ military forces in support of Phung Hoang. Still, the obvious need for an energetic program has prompted instances of strong local action. For instance, in Gia Dinh, the rate of infrastructure neutralizations has quadrupled in May and June over its previous level.

5. A large and viable Phoenix/Phung Hoang organizational and data base existed when the presidential decree was finally signed. By 30 June, there were 189 District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCC) and 32 Provincial Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (PIOCC). City Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (CIOCC) exist in Danang, Cam Ranh, and Vung Tau. A Phoenix/Phung Hoang element has been incorporated into the new Capital Military District (Saigon and environs) structure, established during June.

6. Phoenix/Phung Hoang has accounted for 6078 identified VC infrastructure personalities killed, captured, or rallied in the last six months. It is noteworthy that district- and province-level infrastructure killed or captured are steadily rising. Data

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
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for the first six months of 1968 are as follows:

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TABLE  
Neutralization of the Infrastructure



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B. National Police Field Forces (NPF): An increasing number of successes have resulted from the NPF anti-infrastructure effort, and only six companies remain unsatisfactorily employed (compared to 13 companies employed out of concept at the start of 1968). In keeping with the trend to train and equip existing personnel properly, to emphasize quality instead of quantity, NPF strength goals have been recently revised; the previous end-68 goal of 22,500 is now 18,000.

C. Chieu Hoi:

1. The removal of 15 ineffective province Chieu Hoi Service Chiefs has been instrumental in eliminating complacency and in re-energizing the program. Particularly significant during this period has been the defection of two high-level VC officers. On 4 June the largest single unit defection occurred when some 140-odd members of the VC Quyet Thang Regiment turned themselves in to the VN Marine Corps on the northern fringe of Saigon.

2. In view of the intensity and duration of enemy operational activity which has been experienced since Tet, depressed program activity is not surprising. The curve below depicts returnee experience by month thus far in 1968.

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
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Chieu Hoi Returnees (Thousands)



3. Although the total number of returnees to date is about one-third of last year's figure for the same period, there is a distinct rise in rank of ralliers. An analysis of results over recent months discloses that approximately 2½ times the number of NCO-level and higher Hoi Chanh have rallied than was the case previously. Also of note are several instances in I CTZ and in III CTZ of defections by large groups of ralliers from a single unit.

4. During the past six months, US and ARVN units have begun to employ Armed Propaganda Teams (APTs) for propaganda purposes in conjunction with military operations.

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
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
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The following chart depicts month-end APT strengths for the first half-year:



5. Given command emphasis, the Kit Carson Scout program has become more formalized and nearly all US tactical forces employ Kit Carson Scout elements. The number of Hoi-Chanh enrolled in the program totaled 749 at end-June compared with 244 at end-1967:



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## V. (C/NF) POPULAR INVOLVEMENT

## A. Recovery:

## 1. General:

a. In the wake of the Tet offensive, President Thieu, in response to US initiatives, created a high-level GVN task force, the Central Recovery Committee, with US participation, to direct and coordinate the activities of GVN and US agencies in speeding civil recovery. Vice President Ky headed the group initially, with Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS as the senior US representative. Each CTZ Commander and his US counterpart created similar task forces. The effort proved effective in getting "Project Recovery" under way.

b. GVN reaction to and performance during and after the Tet offensive was varied. At the national level, performance has been good, although on occasion GVN representatives were slow to start and uneven in pace once moving. On the whole, there has been much greater cooperation among the Ministries and agencies of GVN.

## 2. Refugee Care and Resettlement:

a. As a result of the VC Tet offensive, 12,500 civilians were killed and 22,000 were wounded throughout the country. A total of 31,481 houses were damaged up to 50% and 127,334 were damaged more than 50% or destroyed. Comparable figures for the 5-12 May period are: less than 600 civilians killed and less than 5,700 wounded. Twenty thousand one hundred fifty-six houses were damaged more than 50%. The peak number of evacuees cared for by GVN in the wake of the Tet attacks was 892,454; at end-June only 169,984 of these so-called Tet evacuees remain under GVN

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
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care. As a result of mini-Tet, an additional 179,164 evacuees were generated, 123,760 of whom were in Saigon, and 51,419 in Gia Dinh. The following table depicts the refugee and evacuee situation during the first 6 months of 1968:

REFUGEES & EVACUEES  
(Thousands)



b. Two programs deal with refugee reestablishment:

(1) Self-help housing is under construction

throughout the country with GVN assistance in the form of cement, roofing, and fund grants. Nearly all commodities were distributed from Saigon to the provinces by 1 May. To date, cash relief and resettlement allowances have been distributed to about 100,000 families (the "Tet" requirement is 120,000 families), about 83 percent of the total estimated amount required. Sixty-two percent of the cement

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requirement and 76 percent of the roofing requirement have been distributed to about 77,000 families for resettlement.

(2) There are currently 6,000 family apartment units planned in four areas of District Five in Saigon. Four thousand are being constructed by the GVN on three sites, with completion scheduled for December 1968. Two thousand family units will be constructed by USAID on one site, with completion scheduled for February 1969. After the mini-Tet attacks, MACV initiatives led to creation of an ARVN/US engineer task force to clear rubble, lay out housing sites and assist in erection of housing for most of the new refugees in Districts Six and Eight of Saigon, and the Tan Binh District of Gia Dinh where the heavy damage occurred. Clearing is complete in Districts Six and Eight. Thirty units (200 units allocated) of prefabricated housing have been completed in District Eight. Seabees in Gia Dinh Province have completed 105 units of 800 units allocated.

c. Regular refugees also showed a substantial rise during the first 6 months of 1968, increasing from 793,944 at end-December 1967 to 1,092,493 on 30 June. The regular refugee program was hindered during the early months of the year, but the end of June found most provinces in a pre-Tet position with refugees receiving allowances as prescribed in regulations.

d. The total cost of Recovery is estimated at four to five billion piasters in addition to PL 480 commodities, cement and roofing, and miscellaneous supplies provided

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the CVN from US sources. To date 3.2 billion piasters have been made available from all sources, including 510 million piasters donated by private organizations and individuals (in addition to the 714 million allocated to them by the CRC, the province chiefs and mayors also have available a total of 1,033.5 million piasters from the Minister of Health, Welfare and Refugees for refugee relief and resettlement.

3. Economic Revival:

a. The economic picture in Vietnam changed radically during the first half-year. On 12 February, a check showed the retail price index 58 percent above 27 January. This peak was followed, however, by an almost uninterrupted decline over the next seven weeks as supply conditions in Saigon were gradually restored. By 18 March, the index approximated the 27 January level. Then the VC May offensive and the subsequent rocketing of Saigon resulted in a second set-back to the gradually recovering economy. Thus at mid-year the Vietnamese economy still presents a picture of sluggishness. New investment activity is limited and disinvestments and some capital flight has taken place. The main problem is to help the private sector to recover and keep going despite the risks and uncertainties of war. To help, the Lower House passed the war risk insurance bill and began consideration

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of the Industrial Reconstruction Loan Fund.

b. Agricultural Revival: The volume of rice stored in the Delta is high and prices are extremely low in the Bassac River area and south. However, there is no indication that the farmers plan a reduction in area planted. IR-8 rice extension is going well. The planting goal of 44,000 hectares for 1968 will probably be exceeded. In Central Vietnam, a period of drought did not prevent an IR-8 yield of two and one half times the yield of regular rice.

B. Revolutionary Development People's Groups (RDPG) and Urban Self-Defense Groups:

1. a. During the Tet offensive, and immediately thereafter, increasing numbers of civilians and civic organizations in urban areas appealed to the GVN for arms to defend themselves, their families, and their property from VC attack. During the brief period when the Vice President had charge of the program a directive was issued to all province chiefs and city mayors authorizing them to develop programs. This resulted almost immediately in the initiation of a wide variety of programs in urban areas, limited in effectiveness by the very small number of weapons released. At the national level all of these efforts were allowed to go un-directed and uncoordinated. The only significant project involved two weeks of training for about 2,000 cadre for assignment in Saigon neighborhoods to organize the people for self-defense to include the mobilization of the people into self-help projects and participation

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in neighborhood self-defense groups. This project was to serve as a model for adaption in other cities, but died on the vine.

b. 'It was roughly estimated by the GVN that the total number of people involved in urban civil defense activities of one kind or another as of the date of the Mobilization Law was about 176,000.

c. Revolutionary Defense People's Groups (RDPG): For over a year, RD cadre have had the task of organizing and training self-defense groups in RD hamlets. Province chiefs have failed in most cases to provide weapons needed to complete the program. A rough estimate is that as of the date of the Mobilization Law, only about 6,000 arms have been provided to about 23,000 people organized and trained to use them.

2. Summary of General Mobilization Decree: Under this general Mobilization Decree, males 18 to 38 are eligible for service in RVNAF and those 16-17 and 39-50 for service in Civil Self-Defense organizations. All males and females not serving in RVNAF or Civil Defense units are subject to serve in local Popular Groups. Police and RD Cadre over 33 and younger persons in those categories who have completed their required military services and Police Field Force and RD Cadre from ages 21 to 24 serving in hamlets and villages prior to the date of the decree are exempt. Other exemptions include elected officials during term of office, selected technicians and school teachers, public health and educational cadre in rural areas, outstanding students, clergymen, Montagnards, Kit Carson Scouts and persons who are sole support of disabled parents or many

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dependents, e.g., persons over 23 who are sole support of six or more children under 18.

C. Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) and Truong Son RD (ISRD)

1. During the first six months of 1968, the Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) program experienced a number of serious strains, and still faces substantial obstacles to any early achievement of 1968 pacification goals. Statistically the program has shown some gains, with an increase in the number of RD groups from 555 to 669 and a corresponding increase in field strength from 29,120 to 35,626. An additional 9,912 cadre are in training at the National Training Center.

CADRE STRENGTH

CORPS	RD Cadre		Truong Son (Highlander) Cadre	
	Teams	Strength	Teams	Strength
I	157	9,183	10	654
II	181	9,607	85	4,976
III	102	5,683	13	714
IV	229	11,153	0	0
Subtotal	669	35,626	108	6,344
In Training		9,912		667
TOTAL		45,538		7,011

2. The VC/NVA continue to maintain pressure on RD Groups in the countryside as evidenced by the increase in the number of VC

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
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incidents involving RD Groups: 1,015 during the first six months of 1968 with 516 killed in action (KIA), as compared to 803 during the last six months of 1967 with 378 KIA.

VC Incidents Against RDC/TSRD



Higher casualties plus high desertion rates have frustrated the battle to cut back on attrition, which remains at approximately 31%.

D. Revised RD Plans:

1. The Tet offensive brought changes to the tactical and psychological situation and a reevaluation of these plans.
2. MORD has also recently revised the objectives for the RDC groups. Formerly there were several different kinds of hamlet, with the cadre undertaking different work in each. The principal type was the Ap Doi Moi in which the cadre attempted to achieve 11 criteria of a "New Life Hamlet" - these being divided into 98 specific tasks. Now there is only one kind of hamlet. It is still an Ap Doi Moi, but the cadre attempt in 28 specific tasks to restore security, identify and eliminate VC infrastructure, and to establish a functioning hamlet self-defense system. Nine key developmental tasks are also included as secondary objectives.

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E. Ethnic Minorities Affairs:

1. The most significant trend on the positive side of the ledger for the first six months of 1968 has been the steady assumption of control by Montagnards of the Ministry for Development of Ethnic Minorities. There has been a marked rise in the self-confidence and morale of various key members of MDEM and an increase in their assertiveness with other GVN agencies. This represents significant progress, considering that there are but seven Montagnards in the RVN known to hold a second baccalaureate degree.

2. On the negative side, the MDEM program for construction of boarding facilities, guest houses and technical schools has not really got off the ground, as represented by these figures:

	<u>Authorized Projects</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Under Construction</u>	<u>Not Yet Started</u>
1966 Program	14	4	7	3
1967 Program	29	1	2	26
1968 Program	$\frac{15}{58}$	$\frac{-}{5}$	$\frac{-}{9}$	$\frac{15}{44}$

This is a serious failure in that these projects represent the GVN's good faith in assisting Montagnard development, and they are the inducement in obtaining Montagnard resources in pacifying the highlands. The failure lies with the cumbersome procedures of the Ministry of Public Works.

F. New Life Development (NLD):

1. General: February and March were months of very little progress in the major NLD program areas as Recovery activi-

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ties dominated the attention of most provincial officials. Only in April and May was attention refocused on regular MORD programs. In many provinces, officials from the different technical service offices have worked together on Recovery Committees and developed cooperative attitudes which CORDS personnel have long tried to foster. Counter-balancing this trend, however, is the shortage of USAID commodities because of their use in recovery. In spite of this obstacle almost all NLD programs have begun to move ahead in the last two months. In general, the prognosis is that 1968 goals will be met.

2. MORD Budget Expenditures: The four Corps' rates of MORD funds spent through the end of May continue to reflect their respective rural security situations.

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
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TOTAL MORD BUDGET EXPENDITURES BY CORPS

PERCENT OF ANNUAL BUDGET

(JANUARY - MAY)



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
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MONTHLY MORD BUDGET EXPENDITURES BY CORPS  
(Percent of 1968 Budget)



	J	F	M	A	M
I	1.7	1.6	2.0	2.3	6.2
II	0.7	1.7	1.7	7.1	5.2
III	2.1	0.8	4.5	6.3	5.8
IV	0.9	0.8	0.9	2.8	3.2

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
3. Hamlet Schools:

a. Following a slow start due to the Tet offensive, the Rural Elementary Classroom Construction Program showed reasonable progress. At End-June, 599 classrooms were under construction and 160 completed.

b. The year's programmed objective of 2,734 rooms has been reduced to 2,540. The reduction was made in I and IV CTZs. II and III CTZs objectives remained as originally planned.

Hamlet Schools

Classroom Construction and Teacher Training



▨ Classrooms

▭ Teachers Trained

\* 30 June

\*\* Projected

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
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4. Self-Help: After a serious setback at Tet, which reduced Self-Help program goals from 25,000 to 16,500 projects for the year, the Self-Help Program has slowly picked up momentum. Current indicators are that program goals will be met.

5. Provincial Roads and Bridges: The MORD Roads and Bridges program for 1968 got off to a poor start, and it appears the situation will get worse before it will get better. The three main reasons for poor performance of this program, in the order of their importance are: inadequate security, loss of manpower due to mobilization (ten Provincial Public Works Chiefs will be mobilized during the next six months) and the high prices of building material.

Roads and Bridges  
Percent of Goal



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OFFICE SYMBOL  
MACCORDS-CAD/R

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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6. Military Support of Pacification (AIK):

a. The Military Support of Pacification Assistance in Kind (AIK) budget available to CORDS totals 1,500,000,000 \$VN for CY 1968. The program has proven successful since its inception in September 1967.

b. CY 68 expenditures and obligations through 31 May are as follows:

Refugee	16,560,323
Chieu Hoi	5,633,662
Detainee	176,909,518
Attack on VC Infrastructure	35,348,417
Psyops	19,224,905
Health	20,149,093
Education	29,710,785
Agriculture	6,694,478
Public Works	49,400,891
Village/Hamlet Administration	<u>16,934,441</u>

Total 376,506,518

c. Expenditures in the first six months of this year are slightly below the authorized limits due to the fund being a relatively new pacification tool; the Tet offensive, which required the postponement of priorities for a thirty day period; a shortage of locally available commodities in many remote areas; and the general lack of security. However, Province Senior Advisors say their pacification effort has been accelerated by this input of financial support.

7. Civic Action: During the period January through June pacification programs were supplemented by US military civic action projects with a reported 1,725,700 man-hours, materials valued at 188,188,700 piasters from military resources and 31,028,900 piasters

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in voluntary donations by military personnel. Approximately 42.9% of the total man-hours and 55% of the total value of materials contributed directly assisted refugees.

F. Psychological Operations (Psyops): There was extensive damage to communications media (both property and equipment) resulting from the Tet offensive. Yet even the most confirmed pessimist had to be gratified at the surprising tempo of recovery of some of the institutions involved. In some cases radio stations were again on the air only hours after their transmitters had been silenced. As one might expect, recovery from material losses progressed at a satisfactory rate and there were some additions to or improvement of installations which remained intact during Tet. During this reporting period aid to the Vietnamese Information Service has been massive. Loss of offices, vehicles, equipment - and morale - was extensive. Ironically however, no sooner had most losses been made up when the new draft law was promulgated resulting in great inroads on VLS staffing patterns and a resultant loss of momentum in many areas.

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## VI. (CNF) GVN LEADERSHIP

A. Perhaps the most serious - and telling - flaw in the GVN/ allied effort has been the conspicuous shortage of good Vietnamese leadership (both civil and military) at all levels of command. The problems of GVN leadership center around charges of corruption and incompetence. The anti-corruption program is an integral part of the pacification guidelines of 1968. While the program emphasizes measures to be taken to combat various areas of corruption, and systems within which corrupt practices exist, its main stress is on the selection of best possible leaders. Prime Minister Huong has stated to the press that he sees corruption as the major problem facing the government.

B. A partial list of 44 Province and District level officials covering the period January through June 1968 has been analyzed below. No officials from Corps, large cities or the Capital appear on the list; however, a few below District level indicate the broad scope of the GVN Anti-Corruption Campaign. Nineteen officials reported as relieved for cause from IV Corps is the highest number for any Corps area. Of the 44 officials relieved countrywide, 17 were engaged or suspected to be engaged in corrupt practices. Sixteen Province Chiefs (PC) and 28 District Chiefs (DC) are on the list.

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C. A Corps Breakdown:

<u>Corps</u>	<u>Province Chief</u>	<u>District Chief</u>	<u>Total</u>
I	1	7	8
II	5	2	7
III	2	8	10
IV	8	11	19
	16	28	44

D. Reasons for Removal:

Corrupt/Inefficient	12	5	17
Reassigned	1	6	7
Died	1	3	4
Poor Health	1	0	1
Discharge	0	1	1
Unknown	1	13	14
	16	28	44

E. GVN Effectiveness: Returns from a special survey of hamlet administrations as of 30 June provided, among other things, the number and effectiveness of hamlet governments in 7398 hamlets rated:

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>RVN</u>
Hamlets Rated	1130	2078	1382	2808	7398
Effective Administrations (%)	966(85)	1692(81)	1093(79)	2246(80)	5997(81)
Administrations with high Performance (%)	776(69)	1342(65)	911(66)	1680(60)	4709(64)
Administrations with satisfactory Performance (%)	190(17)	350(17)	182(13)	566(20)	1288(17)
Administrations with Low Performance (%)	167(15)	386(19)	289(21)	553(20)	1395(19)

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## VII. (CNF) PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

A. Pacification, in the first half of 1968, was undeniably set back by the VC Tet offensive, though not to the extent initially believed and publicized. The defensive psychology engendered by the shock of these attacks severely weakened a number of pacification programs. As a result, GVN attention turned inward to the population centers and away from the countryside. The VC failed to fully exploit this situation.

B. Pacification is still, compared to the military effort, a relatively modest undertaking in terms of money and manpower. It is adversely influenced by weak and fragmented GVN leadership, particularly at the important village and hamlet level. The mobilization problem, which entails induction of large numbers of provincial technical service chiefs and cadres, intensifies the leadership shortage. Territorial security has been impaired by the necessity to focus attention on the towns as well as the countryside, and by the defensive-mindedness still influencing GVN civil and military leaders.

C. On the plus side, the new GVN cabinet and a maturing parliament are working harder than ever before. Key leadership is improving under the influence of the government's first real sustained and serious campaign to root out the weak, the ineffectual, and the self-seekers. Phoenix/Phung Hoang should accelerate as the presidential decree of 1 July is followed on with GVN field guidance and a coordinated anti-VCI effort is mounted. An increase in the Chieu Hoi returnee rate can be

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anticipated. Hopefully, the urban recovery burden will continue to decline.

D. On balance, the outlook is favorable for a continued gradual increase in pacification momentum, with a good possibility of achieving about 70% "relatively secure" population by end-1968.

GP-4

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	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG	3				ly	CG EMF PAE
DCG	4		8/18		Rhet	SERIAL 082042Z AUG 68 COPY #2 OF 4 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR	2				dlw	SUBJECT MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMENDATION
C/S	2				Q	REMARKS
DC/S						<p><del>CG will get out</del></p> <p><del>They</del> All CG's are on Dist List. Do not believe further action is required <b>FOR</b> our part</p> <p>OK Except we might think of 52 Comm &amp; 2 MP Bns - FHC may not think of them!</p> <p>G-1 be that b. They b.</p> <p>LEGEND                      A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE                      C- COMMENTS                      I- INFORMATION</p> <p>copy to G-1</p>
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1		Act			Copy	
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
S/S	I		09 07/15/4		JR	
S/C						

PY007272  
 RYTEZYUW RUHFM1408 2212042-EEEE--RUMUGRA.  
 ZNY EEEEE  
 R 082042Z AUG 68  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF  
 RUMHLA/FIRST MARDIV (W008)  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV (R007)  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW (P015)  
 RUMLMPA/CG FLC (B009)  
 RUMBQL/CG NINTH MAB  
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O. FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, MGENS' YOUNGDALE,  
 DAVIS AND QUILTER AND BGENS' OLSON AND CHIP FROM  
 LTGEN BUSE  
 A. SECNAVNOTE 1650 OF 17 JULY 1967  
 B. FMFPAC P1650:1B  
 1. REFERENCE A ESTABLISHED THE MERITORIOUS UNIT COM-  
 MENDATION AS A THIRD UNIT AWARD WITH PRECEDENCE IM-  
 MEDIATELY BELOW THE NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION, AND PRE-  
 CISES ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA AND PERTINENT ADMINISTRA-  
 TIVE PROCESSING PROCEDURES. REFERENCE B CONTAINS  
 ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THIS NAVY AND

PAGE 2 RUHFM1408 UNCLAS E F T O  
 MARINE CORPS UNIT AWARD.  
 2. A REVIEW OF RECORDS HERE REVEALS THAT ONLY FOUR  
 MUC RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE BEEN ORIGINATED BY IN-COUNTRY  
 COMMANDS SINCE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AWARD. THE MUC  
 AFFORDS AN OPPORTUNITY, HERETOFORE NOT AVAILABLE TO  
 YOU, TO RECOGNIZE UNITS THAT HAVE DISPLAYED OUTSTAND-  
 ING DEVOTION AND SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE OF EXCEPTIONAL-  
 LY DIFFICULTY TASKS, BUT NOT SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE  
 AWARD OF THE NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION. TO JUSTIFY AWARD  
 OF THE MUC, THE SERVICE PERFORMED AS A UNIT MUST BE  
 OF A CHARACTER COMPARABLE TO THAT WHICH WOULD MERIT  
 THE AWARD OF A BRONZE STAR MEDAL TO AN INDIVIDUAL.  
 3. PLEASE GIVE THIS MATTER YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION  
 TO ENSURE THAT UNITS WHOSE PERFORMANCE HAS SET THEM  
 APART AND ABOVE OTHER UNITS WITH SIMILAR MISSIONS ARE  
 APPROPRIATELY RECOGNIZED.  
 BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#36

	ROUTE	ACTION	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	FROM
CG						CG USARV LONG BINH
DCG						SERIAL 081110Z AUG 68 COPY # 2 OF 6 COPIES RECEIVED
DCG AIR						SUBJECT TRAVEL ITINERARY FOR BG CH CHARLES W. RYDER, JR.
C/S	2				9	REMARKS Should be passed to American Dir. Done W. J. J. <b>FOR</b>
DC/S						
DC/S DM						
DC/S AIR						
G-1						
G-2						
G-3						
G-4						
CEO						
PROT		COG			Copy	
S/S	1		090745H any		JW	LEGEND A- ACTION /COGNIZANCE C-COMMENTS I- INFORMATION
S/C						

#34

PT007099  
 RTTEZYI/W RUMUGDA0380 2210000-EEEE--RUMUGRA.

ZNY EEEEE

DE RUMUGDA 6315 2211121

ZNY EEEEE

R 081110Z AUG 68

FM CG USARV LONG BINH VIETNAM

TO RUMNVF/CG IFFORCEV

ZEN/CG IFFORCEV

RUMSVS/CG PROV CORPS VIETNAM

RUMLBPA/CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV

RUMLPKW/CG 4TH INF DIV

RUMSUL/CG 9TH INF DIV

RUMLBPA/CG 101ST AIR CAV DIV

RUMNGR/CO 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

INFO RUHNRGA/CINCUSARPAC

ZEN/COMUSMACV

RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

BT

UNCLAS E F T O FOUO 63884. AVHGA-PP

CINCUSARPAC FOR BG RYDER, ACOFS, G1

SUBJ: TRAVEL ITINERARY FOR BG CHARLES W. RYDER, JR.

REF: A. USARV PAC MSG GPPE-XO 32307 DTG 022148Z AUG 65

(NOTAL).

B. USARV MSG AVHCS-P 63630, DTG 070653Z AUG 68.

FOR

PAGE 2 RUMUGDA 6315 UNCLAS E F T O FOUO

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE B, BG RYDER, G1, USARPAC  
 WILL ACCOMPANY CINCUSARPAC IN RVN DURING PERIOD 24-27 AUG 68.

2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE A, WHEN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN  
 CINCUSARPAC AND COMMANDERS ARE HELD, BG RYDER WOULD LIKE TO  
 MEET SEPARATELY WITH APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL OFFICERS.

3. PROTECTIVE MARKINGS TO BE REMOVED 28 AUGUST 1968

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#34

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CG FIRST MARDIV		8 AUG 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
			0810417 AUG 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS G-4 For inclusion in eventual copy to Gen Abrams, FOR 9
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		08/03/68	Handy	gn	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4	ACT			copy	
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

"#3" 4 burned  
5 Nov 68"

SECRET #23

**SECRET**

AZMVV LAF 522  
 DE RUMHLA 1021 2211041  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 081741Z AUG 68  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV (REIN)  
 TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF  
 BT

**FOR****S E C R E T**

PERSONAL FROM MAJGEN YOUNGDALE TO LT GEN CUSHMAN  
 A. TELECON LT COL MALLARD (ASST G-4 III MAF) AND COL WILSON (G-4)  
 FIRST MARDIV 081015H AUG 68

B. CG III MAF 010200Z AUG 68

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO REF A:  
 A. IN RESPONSE TO REF B, A DIVISION MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE  
 ADVISORY TEAM WAS ORGANIZED ON AN AD HOC BASIS. TEAM WILL VISIT  
 EACH COMMAND WITHIN FIRST MARDIV WITH PRIORITY TO DIVISION UNITS  
 IN C2 EQUIPMENT AND C2 SUPPLY. TEAM USES INFORMAL APPROACH, EM-  
 PHASIZING NEED TO HAVE EQUIPMENT READY FOR COMING MONSOON AND  
 READINESS FOR SUSTAINED COMBAT, PASSES HELPFUL HINTS ON MAINTEN-  
 ANCE, ANSWERS QUESTIONS, GATHERS UNIT PROBLEMS, AND REPORTS FIND-  
 INGS TO G-4 WHO COORDINATES SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS.  
 B. IN ADDITION, SPECIAL EMPHASIS IS BEING DIRECTED TOWARD  
 DEADLINED EQUIPMENT AND WHAT ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN TO REMOVE

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1021 **S E C R E T**  
 EQUIPMENT FROM DEADLINE.

C. ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN SUBPARAS A AND B IN ADDITION TO  
 NORMAL ACTIONS OF SPECIAL STAFF ASSISTANCE, INSPECTIONS, AND USE  
 OF MOBILE CONTACT TEAMS PROVIDED BY FLC WILL MAINTAIN THE HIGHEST  
 POSSIBLE STATE OF READINESS FOR THE DIVISION.  
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

# 33

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM <b>LTC STILWELL</b>		DATE <b>04 AUG 68</b>	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE <b>041415</b>		COPY# <b>1,2,3, 4</b> OF <b>4</b> COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS  Expedited Construction in NICTZ  Copy #2 to C-4 5 Aug 68 O A Chetani  COPY #3, w/note, to Cdr, 3rd NCB 6 Aug 68 VNC W. K. [Signature]
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

UNCLASSIFIED #26

THIS CORRESPONDENCE WILL BE ASSIGNED A FILE NUMBER AS LISTED BELOW.

FILE NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

ACTION SECTION WILL COMPLETE	
ACTION COMPLETED ON: _____	
RETAINED BY _____ SECTION	
DATE _____	SIGNATURE AND RANK _____

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM LTG STILWELL		DATE 04 AUG 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 041415		COPY# 1, 2, 3, 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG					EXPEDITED CONSTRUCTION IN NICTZ  REMARKS CG - Dir requesting G-4 and Seabee Comments. Hogg
3	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
1	S/S		0507KEN			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
✓	G-4	C				
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
✓	Seabee	C				

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED 4 29

THIS CORRESPONDENCE WILL BE ASSIGNED A FILE NUMBER AS LISTED BELOW.

FILE NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

ACTION SECTION WILL COMPLETE	
ACTION COMPLETED ON:	
RETAINED BY _____ SECTION	
DATE _____	SIGNATURE AND RANK _____

O 041413Z IYH ZFF-1  
FM LTG STILWELL  
TO LTG CUSHMAN  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O PHB 1127 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: EXPEDITED CONSTRUCTION IN NICTZ

1. THE ABOVE SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED DURING MEETING AT YOUR HEAD-  
QUARTERS ON 2 AUG 1968. ATTENDANCE INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES FROM  
PCV AND ITS THREE DIVISIONS.

2. THE CONFEREES, INCLUDING MG DAVIS, 3D MAR DIV, AGREED THAT  
TJOOPS OTHER THAN ENGINEERS COULD BE USED ON A SELF-HELP BASIS IN  
ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH VITAL WORK PRIOR TO THE MONSOONS. FURTHER,  
IT WAS DEEMED DESIRABLE TO FREE ENGINEER TROOPS FROM SECURITY  
MISSIONS WHEN SUCH MISSIONS DETRACTED FROM THEIR WORK ON VITAL  
PROJECTS AND TO PROVIDE SECURITY FORCES TO PROTECT ENGINEER WORK SITES  
AND TO PERMIT 2-SHIFT OPERATIONS AT CRITICAL LOCATIONS.

3. I CONKUR WITH THE PRINCIPLES GIVEN IN PARA 2 ABOVE CONTINGENT,  
OF COURSE, UPON THE EXISTING TACTICAL SITUATION.

4. I UNDERSTAND THAT ADDITIONAL EFFORT WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE  
TO THE MOBS UN NICTZ BY MOVING ABOUT 250 MEN FROM SOUTHERN MOBS.  
FURTHER, IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT A REVIEW OF CURRENT AND PLANNED  
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN SICTZ IS UNDERWAY TO DETERMINE WHICH  
PROJECTS, IF ANY, CAN BE CURTAILED OR DEFERRED IN ORDER TO  
FURTHER REINFORKE. I TRUST THAT THIS EVALUATION WILL RELEASE ADDITIONAL  
MEN AND EQUIPMENT FOR EARLY MOVEMENT INTO NICTZ.

5. AN ADDITIONAL WAY IN WHICH TO ADD TO THE OVERALL CONSTRUCTION  
ACAPABILITY IN NICTZ WOULD BE TO AUTHORIZE FUNDS PERMITTING THE HIRE  
OF ADDITIONAL VN CIVILIANS FOR USE BY MOBS. THE EXPENDITURE OF SUCH  
FUNDS WOULD SEEM TO BE COMPLETELY JUSTIFIED IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT  
SITUATION AND I STRONGLY URGE THAT THIS POSSIBILITY BE EXAMINED.  
AS YOU KNOW, USE OF CIVILIAN SKILLS HAS EFFECTIVELY AUGMENTED  
MILITARY ENGINEERS CAPABILITIES ELSEWHERE IN SVN.

6. INITIATION OF THE SEVERAL ACTIONS OUTLINED ABOVE WILL  
GREATLY ACCELERATE OUR PREPARATIONS TO BE ABOVE THE MUD BEFORE THE  
RAINS.

WARM REGARDS

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.  
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

400

UNCLASSIFIED  
"EFTO"

#29



HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG PCV PHB		DATE 04 AUG 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 040712Z AUG 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					MANAGEMENT OF VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE IN NICTZ(C)  REMARKS G-2 and G-3 are working on this one. <b>FOR</b> <i>[Signature]</i>
4	DCG		8/5		<i>[Signature]</i>	
5	DCG AIR				<i>[Signature]</i>	
2	C/S				<i>[Signature]</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		041830Z		<i>[Signature]</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2	COG copy				
	G-3	INFO copy				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

GRRRAA 832.....832  
 OO RUMUGRA  
 DE RUMHMA 332 2170725  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 040712Z AUG 68  
 FM CG PCV PHB  
 TO CG III MAF DNG  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L AVII-GB 04897  
 FOR: LTG CUSHMAN FROM: LTG STILWELL  
 SUBJ: MANAGEMENT OF VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE IN NICTZ (C)  
 REF: A. MACV DIRECTIVE 381-1, DTD 10 AUG 66.  
 B. III MAF LOI (SER 0152467), 26 MAY 67.  
 C. I CORPS COORDINATION INSTRUCTION 03310.1, 13 SEP 67.  
 D. COMUSMACV 21765/280046Z JUL 68.

1. (C) REF A, AND THE III MAF INSTRUCTION (REFS B AND C) WHICH IMPLEMENTED IT IN I CTZ, WERE VERY PERTINENT TO THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT A YEAR AGO OR MORE. IN THAT EARLIER TIME FRAME, THERE WAS LESS THAN ONE AMERICAN DIVISION NORTH OF THE HAI VAN PASS, THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION HAD A DISCRETE OPERATING AREA, AND THE 2-1S OF THE 220TH RAC WERE THE ONLY VR ASSETS AVAILABLE TO THE SECTORS/ SUBSECTORS. IT WAS THEREFORE APPROPRIATE FOR THE AREA VR PROGRAM TO BE RUN BY THE ADVISORY GROUP.
2. (C) THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS.

PAGE TWO RUMHMA 332 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 PCV HAS COME INTO BEING, WITH AREA RESPONSIBILITIES NEARLY COEXTENSIVE WITH THE NVASAC. THERE ARE NOW THREE US DIVISIONS IN THE NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES, ONE (1ST ACD) WITH FORMIDABLE ORGANIC VR CAPABILITIES AND TWO WITH SUBSTANTIAL, PERMANENTLY ATTACHED, P-2 FAC ASSETS. THE THREE DIVISION AO'S SPAN PRACTICALLY THE ENTIRETY OF THE NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES. MOREOVER, THE OPERATIONS OF THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION AND THOSE OF THE US DIVISIONS ARE, BY DESIGN, SO INTERTWINED THAT THE VR NEEDS OF THE ARVN CAN ONLY RARELY BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY. FINALLY, AND AGAIN AS A RESULT OF CONTINUOUS, CLOSELY INTEGRATED JOINT OPERATIONS BETWEEN US AND VIETNAMESE DISTRICT FORCES, SECTOR AND SUBSECTOR VR REQUIREMENTS ARE LARGELY MET BY US DIVISIONAL ASSETS.

3. (C) STUDY OF THE VR QUESTION AND PCV RECONNAISSANCE REQUIREMENTS/ASSETS HAS LED ME TO THREE CONCLUSIONS.
  - A. REF A HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS, AT LEAST AS CONCERNS NICTZ, AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVISED.
  - B. TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM UTILIZATION/INTEGRATION OF ALL AVAILABLE VR MEANS, WE MUST APPLY FAR MORE PLANNING/MANAGEMENT EFFORT AND TALENT THAN HAS HERETOFORE BEEN THE CASE. THIS POINT IS UNDERSCORED BY MACV'S RECENT REJECTION OF III MAF'S REQUEST

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURC.								#27

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*SP.*

PAGE THREE RUMHMA 332 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FOR ADDITIONAL O-1 AIRCRAFT. IT IS DRIVEN HOME BY REFERENCE D,  
EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR QUANTUM IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RECORDS OF  
FINDING AND FIXING THE ENEMY.

C. THE SENIOR HEADQUARTERS IN THESE TWO PROVINCES IS CLEARLY  
THE AGENCY WHICH CAN BEST PLAN AND MANAGE A COMPREHENSIVE, FULLY  
RESPONSIVE VR PROGRAM.

4. (U) AS TO THE FIRST CONCLUSION, I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST THAT A  
III MAF STUDY MAY BE IN ORDER.

5. (C) AS TO THE OTHER CONCLUSIONS, AND IN THE CONTEXT OF REF D,  
I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE 220TH RAC PASS IMMEDIATELY TO PCV  
OPCON; AND THAT PCV BE CONCURRENTLY CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY  
FOR VR IN THE NICTZ TO INCLUDE TF X-RAY AO. AS A LESS DESIREABLE  
ALTERNATIVE, IF IT IS DESIRED TO KEEP VR OF THE TFX-RAY AREA  
UNDER THE WISIS OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION, I RECOMMEND THAT THE  
220TH RAC TRANSFER TO THE 21ST RAC THE NUMBER OF O-1'S NORMALLY  
ALLOCATED TO TF X-RAY PRIOR TO PASSING TO PCV OPCON; AND THAT MY  
TASKING BE DELIMITED ACCORDINGLY.

GP-4  
BT

**PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**  
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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#27



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ACTION SECTION WILL COMPLETE	
ACTION COMPLETED ON: _____	
RETAINED BY _____ SECTION	
DATE _____	SIGNATURE AND RANK _____

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM <b>OWN ABRAMS COMUSMACV</b>		DATE <b>03 JULY 68</b>	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE <b>021332</b>		COPY# <b>2.05</b> COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
<b>3</b>	CG				<b>ll</b>	REMARKS <i>PCV Answered 12230 2 Aug. V. Hoop. G.</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
<b>4</b>	C/S				<b>W</b>	
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
<b>1</b>	S/S	<b>0222154</b>			<b>Jm</b>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #26

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FILE NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

ACTION SECTION WILL COMPLETE	
ACTION COMPLETED ON:	
RETAINED BY _____ SECTION	
DATE	SIGNATURE AND RANK

O 021332Z ZYH ZFF-1  
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
ZEM  
UNCLAS E F T O FOUO MAC 10441 EYES ONLY  
REF YOUR 020415Z  
PARAGRAPH 7 IS APPROVED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY  
260

DECLASSIFIED  
"EFTO"

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CG AMERICAL DIV		02 AUG 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
			021045Z AUG 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					OPERATIONAL PLANNING (U)  REMARKS CG- have requested G-2 and G-3 to provide comments by 0900 to monow. I agree FOR On 22 Aug 68 } 2255H notified Col Eech G-2 } VR I tend to agree. le.  "#3 & 4 burned 5 Nov 68
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		072030			
	G-1					
	G-2	INFO COPY				
	G-3	COG COPY				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

**SECRET**

0  
 OO HUMSEA  
 DE HUMSEAD 0001 2191050  
 TRV 80000  
 01021045Z JULY 68  
 FM CG AMERICAL DIV CHL  
 TO CG 111 MAF DNG  
 NG GETTYS SENDS TO LYG CUSHMAN  
 BT

SECRET AVDF-CG

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL PLANNING (U).

REFERENCE: BRIEFING ON PLAN TO CONTINUE POCAHONTAS FOREST PRESENTED TO CG, 111 MAF AT HQS, PCV ON 29 JULY 68.

1. (S) PLANS PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED INDICATED AN OPERATION WHICH WOULD EXPLOIT ENEMY SITUATION IN TIEN PHUOC RICE BOWL. RECENT INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT ENEMY HAS SHIFTED SOUTH AND EAST. THIS INFORMATION IS A RESULT OF AMERICAL DIVISION INTENSIFIED RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT WHICH IS KEEPING WITH MSG (S) 111 MAF, DTG 011800Z AUG 68. SUBJ: PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLAN FOR 10TZ (U). THE MOVEMENT SOUTH AND EAST OF THE 2 D NVA DIV PRESENTS THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ENEMY ENTERING THE APPROACHES INTO BASE AREA 117 OR USING THE TRA BONG VALLEY APPROACH. EITHER APPROACH PERMITS THE ENEMY TO POSITION HIS FORCES IN A POSTURE TO THREATEN THE COASTAL AREA. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THE 2D NVA DIV WILL MANEUVER AROUND THE FLANKS OF AMERICAL DIV AND LAUNCH

**FOR**

PAGE 2 HUMSEAD 0001 SECRET

ATTACKS AGAINST THE PRIMARY TARGETS OF TAM KY, CHU LAI AND QUANG NGAI AREAS. FURTHER, A LOCAL THREAT HAS RECENTLY DEVELOPED IN THE TAM KY, CHU LAI AND QUANG NGAI AREAS AS EVIDENCED BY TWO MAJOR ATTACKS:

2. G. ATTACK AGAINST SON TRA ON 28 JUN 68 (BS621016) AND AN ATTACK AGAINST CAP TEAM 1-5-5 ON 2 AUG 68 (BS663985).

2. (S) SUBJECT TO YOUR APPROVAL I FEEL IT WERE ADVISABLE TO REINFORCE THE CHU LAI AREA AND PLACE MY FORCES IN A BETTER POSTURE TO COVER THE APPROACHES TO TAM KY AND QUANG NGAI AS WELL AS TO REACT TO ATTACKS AGAINST TAM KY AND QUANG NGAI. THE PROPOSED REALIGNMENT WILL LEAVE AMERICAL DIVISION IN A STRONG POSTURE TO BLOCK ENEMY INGRESS RTES TO DA NANG THROUGH QUE SON VALLEY AND ALLOW INTENSIFIED RECONNAISSANCE EFFORTS TO CONTINUE ALONG APPROACH TO DANANG TAOR.

3. (S) RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT AS OUTLINED IN MSG (S), HQS 111 MAF, DTG 011350Z AUG 68. SUBJ: PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLAN FOR 10TZ (U) WILL CONTINUE.

GP-4  
 BT

*Latest rept's seem to indicate a very small force attacked Bang Tra, that the damage was "major"*

**SECRET**

#24



**SECRET**

TOTTSZYUW RUMHCTA0110 2160000 RUMU-SSSS--RUMUGRA.  
 OTTSZYUW RUMHCTA0110 2160000-SSSS-- RUMUGRA.

ZNY SSSSS

DE RUMHIA 171 2151430

ZNY SSSSS

O 021345Z UG 68

FM AMERICAL DIV CHL

TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF DNG

INFO RUMHIA /CO 11TH INF BDE (LT), DPO

RUMHIA/CO 196TH INF BDE (LT), LZ BALDY

RUMHIA/CO 198TH INF BDE (LT), LZ BAYONET

RUMHIA/CO 1ST SQDN 1ST CAV HAWK HILL

RUMHVH/SA 2D ARVN DIV QNG

RUMHVH/SA QUANG NGAI PROVINCE QNG

RUMHVH/SA QUANG TIN PROVINCE TKY

RUMHVH/SA QUANG NAM PROVINCE NAM

BT

MG GETTYS SENDS TO LTG CUSHMAN

S E CR ET AVDF-CC 143

SUBJECT OPERATIONAL PLANNING (U)

REFERENCE BRIEFING ON PLAN TO CONTINUE POCAHONTAS FOREST

PRESENTED TO CG III MAF AT HQS PCV ON 29 JULY 68

1: (S) PLANS PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED INDICATED AN OPERATION WHICH  
 WOULD EXPLOIT ENEMY SITUATION IN TIEN PRUOC RICE BOWL RECENT  
 INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT ENEMY HAS SHIFTED SOUTH AND EAST

**FOR**

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

**SECRET**

W# 24

**SECRET**

PAGE 2 RUMHIA 171 S E C R E T

THIS INFORMATION IS A RESULT OF AMERICAL DIVISION INTENSIFIED RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT WHICH IS KEEPING WITH MSG (S) III MAF DTG 011350Z AUG 68, SUBJ: PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLAN FOR ICTZ (U) THE MOVEMENT SOUTH AND EAST OF THE 2D NVA DIV PRESENTS THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ENEMY ENTERING THE APPROACHES INTO BASE AREA 117 OR USING THE TRA BONG VALLEY APPROACH EITHER APPROACH PERMITS THE ENEMY TO POSITION HIS FORCES IN A POSTURE TO THREATEN THE COASTAL AREA THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE 2N NVA DIV WILL MANEUVER AROUND THE FLANKS OF AMERICAL DIV AND LAUNCH ATTACKS AGAINST THE PRIMARY TARGETS OF TAM KY CHU LAI AND QUANG NGAI AREAS FURTHER A LOCAL THREAT HAS RECENTLY DEVELOPED IN THE TAM KY CHU LAI AND QUANG NGAI AREAS AS EVIDENCED BY TWO MAJOR ATTACKS E G ATTACK AGAINST SON TRA ON 28 JUN 68 (BS621016) AND AN ATTACK AGAINST CAP TEAM 1-3-3 ON 2 AUG 68 (BS663985)

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PAGE 3 RUMHIA 171 S E C R E T

3. (S) RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT AS OUTLINED MSG (S) HQS III MAF DTG 011350Z AUG 68, SUBJ: PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLAN FOR ICTZ (U) WILL CONTINUE  
GP-4  
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**SECRET**

w/#24



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**FOR**

DE RUMHVP 1062D 2141202  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 011202Z AUG 68  
FM CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF  
BT

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS QUANG TRI COMBAT BASE  
PERSONAL FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN DAVIS

1. I THINK I SHOULD BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION THAT ANOTHER MONTH HAS PASSED WITH NO SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS APPARENT AT QUANG TRI. SEABEE BN ARE NOT FULLY COMMITTED AND ARE STILL WAITING FOR A SIGNAL TO START WORKING. I AM UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE SOURCE OF THE SLIPPAGE AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ASSISTANCE IN CUTTING THE RED TAPE. WARM RE GARDS.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#22



**SECRET**

POTSZYUW RUABCMA3369 2140000-SSSS--RUMUGRA.  
 DE RUABQL 029A 2140745  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 010745Z AUG 68  
 FM CG NINTH MAB  
 TO RUMKVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 INFO RUMUGRA/CG III MAF  
 BT

**FOR****SECRET**

PERSONAL FOR MAJ GEN DAVIS FROM BGEN CHIEF INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 PRACTICE LANDINGS FOR BLT 2/26

AS CG THIRD MARDIV 311330Z JUL68.

1. DATE OF 31 AUGUST GIVEN IN REF A FOR ACCELERATED AMPHIB TRAINING OF BLT 2/26 CONFLICTS WITH PLANNED REHAB CYCLE.
2. ASSUMING THAT SUCH TRAINING WOULD BE DESIRED DURING MID-AUGUST, I WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH CTF-76 AND COMSEVENTH FLT DURING THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE. I WILL PROVIDE RESULTS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS UPON MY RETURN. WILL ALSO HAVE MY STAFF DISCUS THIS WITH COL AL THOMAS ON HIS WAY THROUGH OKI. VERY RESPECTFULLY.

CP-4

BT

**SECRET**

#20





**SECRET**

T  
 PP RUMUGRA RUEBHOA  
 DE RUHKFMA 0035 2140053  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 010053Z AUG 68  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO ZEN/CG FMFPAC (FWD)  
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC  
 RUMUGRA/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET MCEO SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN, INFO LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALT AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL CUSHMAN FROM LIEUTENANT GENERAL BUSE. CG FMFPAC (FWD) NOT ADDEE, DELIVER TO GENERAL CHAPMAN ONLY.

1. MY 29-30 JULY VISIT WITH III MAF COMMANDS WAS PRINCIPALLY DEVOTED TO PROBLEMS OF MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND UTILIZATION. BRIEFINGS AT THE WING AND THE DIVISIONS WERE ORIENTED ACCORDINGLY. MY PRINCIPAL IMPRESSIONS ARE:

A. THAT INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT ACTIONS ARE NOW IN PROGRESS TO IMPROVE FOXHOLE, FLIGHTLINE AND COCKPIT STRENGTHS.

B. THE CURRENT ENEMY THREAT IN ICTZ PRESENTS THE SINGLE MOST COMPELLING REASON FOR INITIATING A KICKER AT THIS TIME.

PAGE 2 RUHKFMA 0035 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

C. WE MUST INSTITUTE SERIOUS MEASURES TO AVOID PERPETUATING THE SUMMER 68 FIELD GRADE HUMP INTO FUTURE YEARS.

2. PREPARING RL1-27 FOR REDEPLOYMENT PRESENTS A COMPLICATED MIXTURE OF TACTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS. THE PROBLEM IS TO DEVELOP A PLAN THAT WILL BEGIN CONFIGURING THE REGIMENT FOR RETRACTION WHILE RETAINING TACTICAL INTEGRITY UNTIL RELIEVED. BECAUSE THE OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FEATURES CUT ACROSS ALL IN-COUNTRY COMMANDS, I HAVE ASKED III MAF TO COORDINATE AND COMMENCE PLANNING THE MIXMASTER AND PROGRAM 6 ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES FOR THIS EVOLUTION. THE ACTUAL EXECUTION SCHEDULE IS LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE MAF AND DIVISION COMMANDERS, BUT THE INTENTION IS TO START MOVING SOME PERSONNEL NOW, AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS, WITH A TARGET DATE TO BE PREPARED TO MAKE FINAL REASSIGNMENTS DURING THE PERIOD 5-10 SEPTEMBER.

3. OPERATIONALLY I FOUND THE 1ST MARDIN SORTING

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

**SECRET**

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**SECRET**

PAGE 3 RUHFMA 0035 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
OUT THE DETAILS OF THE K/3/7 ENGAGEMENT. THE  
REST OF THEIR AO WAS QUIET. A BRIEFING BY CARL  
HOFFMAN AT HIS LZ STUD COMMAND POST WAS THE  
OPERATIONS HIGHLIGHT OF THE VISIT WITH 3D MARDIV.  
TASK FORCE HOTEL IS JUSTIFIABLE PROUD OF THE JOB  
DONE IN CLOSING OUT THE KSCB. THEY ARE NOW  
OPERATING AGGRESSIVELY AND WITH CONSIDERABLE  
SUCCESS IN AREAS THAT WE HAVE LONG WANTED TO GET  
INTO BETWEEN ROUTE NINE AND THE DMZ. THEY ARE  
PLANNING OPERATION SCOTLAND II EAST WHICH WILL BE  
PRIMARILY A NEW SWEEP OF THE BA LONG. FIRE BASES  
ARE NOW GOING IN ON THE SHOULDERS OF THE VALLEY  
TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION.

4. IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE THAT III MAF READINESS AND  
THE ENEMY THREAT ARE BOTH HIGH AND IT LOOKS LIKE  
A PLAYOFF IS SHAPING UP. THE RAPID RESPONSE TO  
THE KICKER RECOMMENDATION IS APPRECIATED, BOTH  
HERE AND IN WESTPAC.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**SECRET**

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