

~~403. CG FMAW 011215Z SEP68 (S MCFE)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~404. CG FMAW 021225Z SEP68 (S MCFE)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~405. CG FMAW 031215Z SEP68 (S MCFE)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

406. CINCPAC 040118Z SEP68 (S) *gp-3*

Subj: CINCPAC approves present--discontinues
monthly COMUSMACV reporting, except when
significant

~~407. CG FMAW 041210Z SEP68 (S MCFE)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

408. CG III MAF 041510Z SEP68 (C) *gp 4*

Subj: I DASC, ... orn

447. CMC 261535Z SEP68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 PROPOSED ANSWER TO CM-3651-68

~~448. CG FMAW 261535Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~449. CG FMAW 271620Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

450. CG III MAF 280750Z SEP68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Requested TOTs

451. CMC 281233Z SEP68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

CONTINUING REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION OF EVENTS

~~452. CG FMAW 261740Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

453. CG FMFPAC 282009Z SEP68 (S MCEO) *gp-3*

Subj: Comments on proposed answer to CM=3651-68

454. CG III MAF 290040Z SEP68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Comments on CM-3651-68

455. CG III MAF 280750Z SEP68 (S) *gp-4*

TOT Changes

~~456. CG FMAW 291430Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~457. CG FMAW 301510Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~458. CG FMAW 011730Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

459. CMC 012038Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-3*

Subj: Reply to the Ahairman, JCS

~~434. CG FMAW 191300Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~435. CG FMAW 190132Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~436. CG FMAW 201317Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~437. CG FMAW 211725Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~438. CG FMAW 221550Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~439. CG FMAW 231544Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

440. CG III MAF 240812Z SEP68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Evaluation of Single Management Strike Support Procedures

441. COMUSMACV 071218Z AUG68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: COMUSMACV Evaluation Report for period 270600h Jun to 260600H Jul68.

442. COMUSMAC V 130350Z SEP68 (S) *gp-4*

COMUSMACV Evaluation report for period 270600H Jul to 260600H Aug68

~~443. CG FMAW 241540Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

444. COMUSMACV 250335Z SEP68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Request comment on areas of continuing interest.

~~445. CG FMAW 250930Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

446. CMC 260142Z SEP68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: CM=3651-68 of 16 Sep68; reply thereto

422. 7AF 120800Z SEP68 (U)

Subj: Danang/Chu Lai Complex recoveries

~~423. CG FMAN 121225Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

424. COMUSMACV 130410Z SEP68 (S) gp-4

Subj: III MAF Evaluation of Single Management/Strike Support Procedures; requests specific comments on possible inadequacy in MACV directives 95-13 and 95-4

~~425. CG FMAN 131152Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~426. CG FMAN 141200Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

427. COMUSMACV 151116Z SEP68 (S) gp-4

Subj: Disapproves request for 30-day interlude in single management system

~~428. CG FMAN 151515Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

429. CG III MAF 160132Z SEP68 (S MCEO) gp-4

Subj: Passes Tab 427 msg to CMC and CGFMFPAC

~~430. CG FMAN 161620Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~431. CG FMAN 170847Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

432. COMUSMACV 181110Z SEP68 (S) gp-4

Subj: Areas of continuing interest to COMUSMACV, as a result of evaluation of Single Mgmt.

433. CG FMAN 190910Z SEP68 (S) gp-4

Subj: Coordination of air and ground supporting fires under COMUSMACV single management of Fighter/attack aircraft.

409. CG FMFPAC 012313Z SEP68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Suggestions for further reclama to COMUSMACV
and CINCPAC

~~410. CG FMAW 051710Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~411. CG FMAW 061725Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~412. CG FMAW 071122Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~413. CG FMAW 081145Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

414. CG III MAF 090300Z SEP68 (S) *gp-3*

Subj: Reclama to COMUSMACV - Proposes 30-Day Plan

415. CG XXIV CORPS 090706Z SEP68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Tactical Air Requirements

~~416. CG FMAW 091045Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

417. CG III MAF 100211Z SEP68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Quotes Tab 414 msg to CMC and CG FMFPAC

~~418. CG FMAW 101105Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

419. CG FMFPAC 110025Z SEP68 (TS MCEO) *gp-3*

Subj: Copy ~~ms~~ of CG III MAF 090300Z SEP furnished to
Elwood for McCain

420. CG II MAF 110432Z SEP68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Tac Air Requirements

~~421. CG FMAW 111255Z SEP68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

SECRET

OO RUHNFMA RUEBHOA
 DE RHMMFA3659 2730050
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 290040Z SEP 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHNFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN BUSE INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM
 LGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT (U)

A. CMC 260142Z SEP 68 (S)
 B. CMC 261535Z SEP 68 (S)

1. PURSUANT TO VERBAL REQUEST THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE MADE
 KEYED TO THE PARAGRAPHS OF REF A. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE
 CONTENTS OF REF B BE REVISED ACCORDINGLY.

2. COMMENTS

PARAGRAPH 3.A: THE PLANNING CYCLE IN ICTZ INCIDENT TO
 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT WAS SHORTER PRIOR TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 THAN THAT CURRENTLY IN EFFECT. THE MARINE SYSTEM REQUIRED
 REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT TO BE SUBMITTED ONLY 12 HOURS PRIOR
 TO THE FIRST TOT, WHEREAS THE PRESENT SYSTEM, AFTER NECESSARY

PAGE TWO RHMMFA3659 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 MODIFICATIONS, NOW REQUIRES REQUESTS 16 HOURS IN ADVANCE
 FOR THE DAILY FRAG AND A MINIMUM OF FIVE DAYS IN ADVANCE
 FOR SPECIFIC REQUESTS VIA THE WEEKLY FRAG. WHILE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT HAS MATERIALLY SHORTENED THE PLANNING CYCLE FOR
 OTHER CORPS AREAS, IT HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED IT IN
 I CORPS. SIMILARLY, THE TIME REQUIRED TO MODIFY SCHEDULED
 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES HAS ALSO INCREASED.

PARAGRAPH 3.B. THE 70/30 SPLIT ESTABLISHED BY THE
 MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS BENEFITED ARMY
 UNITS BUT IS NONE THE LESS INFERIOR TO THE MARINE SYSTEM.
 ALTHOUGH THE SEVENTY PERCENT ALLOCATED BY THE WEEKLY FRAG
 ASSURES GROUND COMMANDERS OF BASIC AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS,
 IT NECESSITATES PLANNING GROUND OPERATIONS AROUND AVAILABLE
 AIR SUPPORT; I.E. THE SYSTEM IS PRODUCER ORIENTED RATHER
 THAN CONSUMER ORIENTED. THE MARINE SYSTEM NOT ONLY ASSURES
 AIR SUPPORT BUT ALSO PROVIDES IT AS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT
 THE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER. THIRTY PERCENT OF MARINE
 SORTIES ARE WITHHELD FROM THE WEEKLY FRAG FOR USE BY
 COMUSMACV IN TACTICAL EMERGENCIES OR TO EXPLOIT TACTICAL
 ADVANTAGES OUTSIDE I CORPS. TO DATE NO SUCH OCCASION HAS

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA3659 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
ARRISEN AND ONLY FOUR MARINE STRIKE SORTIES HAVE BEEN FLOWN
IN OTHER CORPS AREAS SINCE THE INCEPTION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT.

PARAGRAPH 3.D. CINCPAC GRANTED III MAF AUTHORITY TO
SCRAMBLE MARINE AIRCRAFT FOR MISSIONS IN ICTZ. IT HAS BEEN
NECESSARY TO EXERCISE THIS SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY DAILY IN ORDER
TO COMPENSATE FOR DEFICIENCIES IN PLANNING, COMMUNICATIONS,
AND FLEXIBILITY OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. THE
MAJORITY OF SCRAMBLES SINCE 5 AUGUST 1968 HAVE EMPLOYED
THE AIRBORNE ALERT SYSTEM WHICH WAS INSTITUTED TO IMPROVE
RESPONSIVENESS OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT. MARINE SCRAMBLES
HAVE INCREASED APPROXIMATELY 133 PERCENT SINCE THE SINGLE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS IMPOSED. IT IS APPARENT THAT
MARINE FORCES WOULD HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED UNDER
SINGLE MANAGEMENT WITHOUT THE ADDITIONAL SORTIES PROVIDED
BY THIS LARGE NUMBER OF SCRAMBLES.

PARAGRAPH 3.E.: LONG ESTABLISHED MARINE CORPS AIR
CONTROL PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN RECOMMENDED TO COMUSMACV AND
ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED TO THE BENEFIT OF ARMY FORCES.
HOWEVER, THE INVOLVED COMMUNICATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DELAYS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PRESENT SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA3659 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
CAUSE IT TO BE CONSIDERABLY INFERIOR TO THAT POSSIBLE WITH III MAF
MISSION DIRECTION.

PARAGRAPH 4.: THE DECREASE OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT
SORTIES ALLOCATED TO MARINE FORCES HAS RESULTED IN A
REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF MSQ-77/TPQ-10 MISSIONS FLOWN
BY THE 1ST MAW HAS DIMINISHED
TO THIRTY-FIVE PERCENT OF WHAT WAS FLOWN PREVIOUSLY. THE
USE OF THESE RADAR BOMBING SYSTEMS IS FAR LESS THAN THEIR
CAPABILITIES AS WELL AS THAT WHICH IS REQUIRED BY GROUND
FORCES TO CONTINUE PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY AROUND THE CLOCK
IN ALL WEATHER CONDITIONS. FURTHER, THE INEFFICIENT
COORDINATION OF AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES CONTINUES TO
REDUCE THE EFFICIENTLY OF THESE FIRES DESPITE THE RECENT
ATTENTION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT. THE PRESENT SYSTEM REMAINS
UNSATISFACTORY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT HAVE
BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE. THE COORDINA-
TION OF AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES SHOULD BE PATTERNED
AFTER PROVEN MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE THEREBY PROVIDING
ACCEPTABLE CONTROLS AND A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN
EFFECTIVENESS OF ALL SUPPORTING FIRES.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMMAF3659 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

PARAGRAPH 6: SINCE THE INCEPTION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT THE MARINE AIR/GROUND SYSTEM HAS CONTINUED TO FUNCTION BUT ONLY AT A CONSIDERABLY REDUCED CAPABILITY. PRIOR TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT THE 1ST MAW CONSISTENTLY EXCEEDED THE PLANNED RATE OF 6.7 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PER MARINE MANEUVER BATTALION PER DAY. FOR EXAMPLE, FROM MAY 67 TO MAY 68 MARINE AIR AVERAGED 9.4 SORTIES PER MARINE MANEUVER BATTALION PER DAY. THIS FIGURE WAS REDUCED TO 5.4 AND 6.1 IN JULY AND AUGUST RESPECTIVELY. IN CONTRAST, AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO ARMY BATTALIONS HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN BELOW THE EXPECTED FIVE SORTIES PER DAY AND IN I CORPS IS CURRENTLY AVERAGING ONLY SIXTY PERCENT OF THE NUMBER PROGRAMMED BY JCS. MARINE AIR HAS BEEN REQUIRED TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS DEFICIENTLY TO THE DETRIMENT OF MARINE BATTALIONS. FURTHERMORE, THE TOTAL SORTIES ALLOCATED TO III MAF CONTINUE TO DECREASE--LAST WEEK IT WAS 47 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN AND THIS WEEK IT HAS DECREASED TO 42 PERCENT. THE ASSIGNMENT OF A BLOC OF MARINE SORTIES TO CG, III MAF, FOR USE IN I CORPS WOULD ELIMINATE THE CURRENT SYSTEM, WHICH APPROACHES DOUBLE MANAGEMENT, BY ELIMINATING THE UNNECESSARY MANIPULA-

PAGE SIX RHMMAF3659 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
TIONS OF MARINE SORTIES BY COMUSMACV AND 7TH AIR FORCE. COMUSMACV HAS ALWAYS POSSESSED THE AUTHORITY OF OVERALL DIRECTION OF THE AIR EFFORT INCLUDING EMERGENCY PRE-EMPTION AUTHORITY. ASSIGNMENT OF MARINE SORTIES AS A BLOC TO CG, III MAF, WOULD PERMIT EMPLOYMENT OF THE FULL CAPABILITIES AND RESPONSIVENESS OF ORGANIC MARINE AIR ASSETS ACHIEVING DIVIDENDS OF INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS. THIS ASSIGNMENT WOULD IN NO WAY ELIMINATE OR REDUCE THE IMPROVEMENTS AND BENEFITS IN THE ARMY/AIR FORCE SYSTEM BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE SEVERAL MODIFICATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM.

PARAGRAPH 8: SINGLE MANAGEMENT WAS TO MEET THE URGENCY OF AN EMERGENCY SITUATION IN I CORPS. THIS EMERGENCY COMBAT SITUATION HAS CEASED TO EXIST. FURTHER, IT APPEARS THAT THE INVOCATION OF THIS SYSTEM VIOLATED THE PROVISIONS OF JCS PUBLICATION 2; SPECIFICALLY, PARAGRAPHS 30301B, 30213, AND 30225. HOWEVER, WHETHER TO ADDRESS THIS MATTER IN THE RESPONSE TO THE CHAIRMAN'S MEMORANDUM IS MORE PROPERLY A DECISION OF CMC.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

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SECRET

PP RUEBHOA RHMAFA
 DE RUHFMA 4100 272200Z
 ZNY SSSS
 P 28200SZ SEP 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE FOR**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN
 CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER
 DURING WORKING HOURS.

A. CMC 261535Z/SEP68 (S)

1. IN REFERENCE A YOU ASKED FOR MY COMMENTS ON YOUR
 PROPOSED ANSWER TO O-3651-68. I CONSIDER YOUR
 REMARKS TO BE PARTICULARLY COGENT AND OFFER ONLY THE
 FOLLOWING EDITORIAL SUGGESTIONS.
2. IN VIEW OF PAST EXCHANGES, I WOULD VIEW IT PROPITIOUS
 TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS, IN FACT,
 IMPROVED. I THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT PARAGRAPH 2 BE
 REWORDED IN THE FOLLOWING VEIN. QUOTE: I CONCUR
 THAT IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, BUT VIEWED IN PROPER
 PRESPECTIVE, THESE IMPROVEMENTS HAVE RESULTED ONLY IN

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 4100 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 MORE RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT FOR ARMY UNITS WHILE, AS THE
 CHAIRMAN POINTS OUT IN HIS MEMORANDUM, "...THE MECHANICS
 OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ARE STILL NOT SUCH AS
 TO PROVIDE THE MARINES WITH RESPONSIVENESS TO WHICH
 THEY ARE ACCUSTOMED...". THESE IMPROVEMENTS HAVE
 OCCURRED PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF THE DECENTRALIZATION
 OF THE HIGHLY CENTRALIZED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
 AS IT WAS INITIALLY IMPLEMENTED. BUT THEIR GENESIS
 SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED FOR WHAT IT IS---AN EVOLUTIONARY
 ALTERATION IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT TOWARDS
 THE DECENTRALIZED MARINE CORPS TACTICAL AIR CONTROL
 SYSTEM. EACH IMPROVEMENT IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 SYSTEM HAS SIMPLY BEEN AN ADOPTION OF SOME FEATURE
 OF THE ORIGINAL MARINE SYSTEM IN WHOLE OR IN PART.
 THESE IMPROVEMENTS MERELY DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
 ORIGINAL SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS FUNDAMENTALLY
 DEFECTIVE. IN REALITY, SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS BEEN A
 CONTINUATION OF THE ARMY-AIR FORCE JOINT-AIR-GOURND
 OPERATIONS SYSTEM, PARTICULARLY IN II, III, AND IV CORPS,
 WHERE AIR SUPPORT HAS BEEN A UNILATERAL AIR FORCE EFFORT.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHMFMA 4100 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 THEREFORE, THE ENDORSEMENT OF MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT BY
 THE COMMANDERS IN THESE AREAS REFERS NOT TO SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT, PER SE, BUT TO IMPROVEMENTS IN THE JOINT
 AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM. UNQUOTE.

3. IN THE OPENING PHRASE OF YOUR PARAGRAPH 3, THE
 REFERENCE TO INCREASED AIR SUPPORT FOR THE ARMY LENDS
 ITSELF TO A QUANTITATIVE REBUTTAL BY THE CHAIRMAN,
 WHICH CONCEIVABLY MIGHT DISPROVE WHAT YOU SAY. IT
 MIGHT BE WELL TO DELETE ENTIRELY THE WORDS "WHILE
 RESULTING IN INCREASED AIR SUPPORT FOR ARMY COMBAT

FORCES". ALSO, IN THE LAST SENTENCE, THE WORDS
 "IMMEDIATE RESPONSIVENESS" CONNOTE A TIME RESPONSE
 FACTOR, WHICH AGAIN IS SUBJECT TO QUANTITATIVE
 REBUTTAL SHOWING THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT RESPONSE
 TIMES HAVE BEEN EQUIVALENT TO OR BETTER THAN THOSE
 UNDER THE MARINE CORPS SYSTEM. TO PRECLUDE THIS,
 AND TO BE MORE SPECIFIC, I SUGGEST YOU SUBSTITUTE THE
 WORDS "CLOSE INTEGRATION AND RESPONSIVE SCHEDULING".

4. WHILE I APPRECIATE YOUR DESIRE FOR SUCCINCTNESS,
 IT MAY SERVE THE CAUSE BETTER TO TOUT BOB CUSHMAN'S

PAGE 4 RUHMFMA 4100 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 PROPOSAL IN SOME DETAIL. I SUGGEST SUBSTITUTION OF
 THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH 5:

QUOTE:

5. SEEKING TO PROVIDE FOR MORE EFFICIENT UTILIZATION
 OF THE AIR RESOURCES IN I CTZ, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME
 ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, THE
 CG, III MAF HAS RECOMMENDED TO COMUSMACV
 THAT FOLLOWING THE MACV WEEKLY
 ALLOCATION OF AIR EFFORT, MARINE AIR, EXCEPT THAT
 ALLOCATED BY MACV OUTSIDE OF I CTZ, BE SCHEDULED
 BY III MAF ON A DAILY BASIS TO SATISFY THE DYNAMIC
 AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IN I CTZ. THIS SCHEDULE
 WOULD BE PUBLISHED IN SUFFICIENT TIME EACH DAY TO BE
 REFLECTED IN THE TOTAL AIR SUPPORT PICTURE AT THE
 SAIGON BASED TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT CENTER. THEREAFTER,
 AIRCRAFT CONTROL PROCEDURES WOULD BE IDENTICAL TO
 THOSE NOW IN EFFECT, WITH III MAF'S DIRECT AIR SUPPORT
 CENTER (DASC HORN), AS THE SENIOR AIR CONTROL CENTER
 IN I CTZ, COORDINATING AIR SUPPORT IN I CTZ UNDER THE
 EXISTING FRAMEWORK. THUS, THE STATED OBJECTIVES OF

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA 4100 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT WOULD BE INTACT, THE SYSTEM
 WOULD CAPITALIZE ON THE AIR MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES
 UNIQUE TO III MAF, AND THE RELIABILITY AND RESPONSIVE-
 NNESS OF THE PRE-SINGLE MANAGEMENT AIR CONTROL
 ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE RESTORED TO BOTH MARINES AND
 ARMY FORCES IN CTZ. WITH THE ONSET OF THE NORTHEAST
 MONSOON, AND THE RESULTANT IMPRACTICABILITY OF FORE-
 CASTING SCHEDULES WEEKLY IN ADVANCE, DAILY SCHEDULING
 BECOMES EVEN MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GROUND FORCES.
 FURTHER, CG, III MAF PROPOSES ONLY THAT THIS ARRANGE-
 MENT BE GIVEN A THIRTY-DAY TRIAL PERIOD TO PARALLEL THAT
 GIVEN TO BOTH THE INITIAL AND MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGE-
 MENT ARRANGEMENTS."

5. SHOULD YOU DESIRE TO ADDRESS FURTHER THE EQUIT-
 ABILITY OF SORTIES PER BATTALION IN COMPARISON WITH
 OTHER CORPS, IT IS SIGNIFICANT TO NOTE THAT ACCORDING
 TO MACV, CONFIRMED ENEMY COMBAT STRENGTH IN SVN AS
 OF 18 AUGUST WAS 120,796 OF WHOM 47,325 (40 PERCENT)
 WERE IN I CTZ. ADDITIONALLY AS OF 21 SEPTEMBER,

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA 4100 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 CONFIRMED ENEMY KIA'S DURING 1968 TOTALED 148,732, OF
 WHICH 66,851 (APPROXIMATELY 45 PERCENT) WERE KILLED IN
 I CTZ.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

SECRET

#453

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 29 SEP 68	
			SERIAL N/CONTROL DATE 281233Z SEP 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				lp	REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY Get Copy to D/G Clin to-day. Also copy to G-3 Cdr (Coordinate reply ASAP) G.
4	DCG					
I	DCG AIR	I	Has copy	29 Sep 68	lp	
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
I	S/S	I	9/29		lp	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3 (Air)		Has copy	29 Sep 68		
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

SECRET

PTISZYUW RHMAFA3582 2720750-SSSS--RHSMVA RUMUFKA RUMLMHA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 280750Z SEP 68 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RHSMVA/COMUSMACV SAIGON

INFO RUMUFKA/SEVENTH AF TSN AB RVN

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW DNG

BT

HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG G-3

REL C/S

SECRET

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)

REF: A. COMUSMACV 181140Z SEP 68 (S) (PASEP)

B. COMUSMACV 250335Z SEP 68 (S) (PASEP)

C. CG III MAF 172350Z JUL 68 (S) (NOTAL)

1. (S) REF A AS MODIFIED BY REF B REQUESTED COMMENTS PERTAINING TO CHANGES TO FRAGGED TOT'S AND AVAILABILITY OF AIR MUNITIONS. REF C OUTLINES PROCEDURES CURRENTLY UTILIZED WITHIN III MAF TO EFFECT CHANGES TO DAILY/WEEKLY FRAG.

2. (S) DURING PRECEDING TWO MONTH PERIOD TOTAL OF 257 REQUESTS FOR TOT CHANGES WERE PROCESSED BY III MAF TACTICAL AIR REQUEST CENTER (TARC). 81 PERCENT (209) OF REQUESTED CHANGES WERE APPROVED. REASONS FOR DIS-APPROVAL:

A. TOT CHANGE OF FIFTEEN MINUTES OR LESS.

B. A/C TURNAROUND TIME PRECLUDED MEETING SCHEDULE.

PAGE TWO RHMAFA3582 **SECRET**

3. (S) DURING SAME PERIOD TOTAL OF 371 REQUESTS FOR ORDNANCE CHANGES WERE PROCESSED BY III MAF TARC. 84 PERCENT (311) OF REQUESTED CHANGES WERE APPROVED. REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL:

A. NON-AVAILABILITY OF ORDNANCE; TEMPORARY DEPLETION OF STOCKS.

B. ORDNANCE REQUESTED NOT CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE FOR EFFECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSION.

4. (S) ONLY MISSIONS REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDERS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN READILY AVAILABLE DURING PERIOD HAVE BEEN BANISH BEACH. NO INDICATION OF ATTEMPTS TO SUBSTITUTE ANOTHER TYPE OF ORDNANCE (NAPALM) FOR BANISH BEACH HAS BEEN NOTED.

GP-4

BT

*Air Control
File***SECRET**

SECRET

PP RUHFMA
 DE RUEBHOA 2463 2721255
 Z NY SSSSS
 PAC-T-III MAF
 P 281233Z SEP68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RHMMFA/CG III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE FOR**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

**SECRET SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM CEN CHAMPMAN-MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)**

1. IN ORDER TO CONDUCT OUR EVALUATIONS HERE ON THE SUBJECT AS WELL AS TO DEVELOP POSITIONS AND SUPPORTING RATIONALE, WE HAVE A CONTINUING REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION AS EVENTS OCCUR AND DATA IS ACCUMULATED.
2. I RECOGNIZE ALSO THAT YOU MUST BE KEPT ABREAST OF DEVELOPMENTS HERE AND WILL ENSURE YOUR PROMPT RECEIPT OF THESE AS PRACTICABLE. YOURS AND BOB'S TIMELY AND HIGHLY USEFUL COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PAST REFLECT THE VITAL COORDINATION WE MUST CONTINUE IF WE ARE TO BRING ABOUT A SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION. I KNOW YOU ARE WELL AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF EACH OF US STAYING ABREAST OF ACTIONS TAKEN ON THIS MATTER, AND EXCHANGING VIEWS ON THOSE TAKEN AT MACV

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA2463 **SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE**
 AND CINCPAC, AND THOSE I PROPOSE TO TAKE HERE.

3. ALONG THESE LINES, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE THE III MAF INPUTS (ACTUAL SUBMISSION) TO COMUSVACV'S JULY AND AUGUST EVALUATION. ALSO, YOUR COMMENTS ON THE COMUSMACV EVALUATIONS FOR THESE PERIODS WOULD BE VERY USEFUL.

4. ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC INFORMATION THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. PROGRAMMED (PRESENT) USMC AND USAF IN-COUNTRY SORTIE RATES.

B. WHO AT THE SAIGON LEVEL ACTUALLY MAKES THE DETERMINATION OF THE SPLIT BETWEEN IN-COUNTRY AND OUT-OF-COUNTRY SORTIES BOTH IN AND OUTSIDE OF THE MACV AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY?

C. WHAT WAS THE RESULT OF THE EVALUATION OF III MAF'S AIRBORNE ALERT REQUESTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC?

D. DOES THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC RESPOND TO ORDERS FROM CG, III MAF?

E. DO HORN DASC AND VICTOR DASC CONTACT AIRBORNE

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III MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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PAGE THREE RUEBHOA2463 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 STRIKE AND RECON AIRCRAFT AND DIVERT OR OTHERWISE CONTROL
 OR DIRECT THEM?

F. NUMBER OF MARINE DASC'S CURRENTLY OPERATING AND
 THEIR LOCATION.

G. CAUSE OF ALLEGED DRY-UP OF FMAW HOT PAD AND
 CANCELLED SORTIES. (REPORTED BY 7HAF)

H. SPECIFICS OF FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION PROBLEMS
 IN I CTZ UNDER SMS?

I. FACTS CONCERNING THE-WEEKLY I CTZ AIR SUPPORT
 PLANNING CONFERENCE.

J. HAVE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITIES INCREASED
 SINCE SINGLE MANAGEMENT?

K. HAS CONTROL OF AIR TRAFFIC BEEN FACILITATED SINCE
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT? IF SO, HOW?

L. YOUR VIEWS ON COMUSMACV'S CLAIM THAT FRAGGING OF
 IN-COUNTRY MARINE SORTIES BY CG, III MAF WOULD CONSTITUTE
 "DOUBLE MANAGEMENT".

M. AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF SORTIES THAT ARMY BATTALIONS
 IN I CTZ HAVE RECEIVED DURING MONTHS OF MAY, JUNE, JULY, AND
 AUGUST, AND FROM WHAT SOURCE.

5. WARM REGARDS.

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PTISZYUW RHMAFA3582 2720750-SSSS--RHMSMVA RUMUFKA RUMLMHA.
ZNY SSSSS

P 280750Z SEP 68 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV SAIGON

INFO RUMUFKA/SEVENTH AF TSN AB RVN

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAF DNG

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)

REF: A. COMUSMACV 181140Z SEP 68 (S) (PASEP)

B. COMUSMACV 250335Z SEP 68 (S) (PASEP)

C. CG III MAF 172350Z JUL 68 (S) (NOTAL)

1. (S) REF A AS MODIFIED BY REF B REQUESTED COMMENTS PERTAINING TO CHANGES TO FRAGGED TOT'S AND AVAILABILITY OF AIR MUNITIONS. REF C OUTLINES PROCEDURES CURRENTLY UTILIZED WITHIN III MAF TO EFFECT CHANGES TO DAILY/WEEKLY FRAG.

2. (S) DURING PRECEDING TWO MONTH PERIOD TOTAL OF 257 REQUESTS FOR TOT CHANGES WERE PROCESSED BY III MAF TACTICAL AIR REQUEST CENTER (TARC). 81 PERCENT (209) OF REQUESTED CHANGES WERE APPROVED. REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL:

A. TOT CHANGE OF FIFTEEN MINUTES OR LESS.

B. A/C TURNAROUND TIME PRECLUDED MEETING SCHEDULE.

PAGE TWO RHMAFA3582 **S E C R E T**

3. (S) DURING SAME PERIOD TOTAL OF 371 REQUESTS FOR ORDNANCE CHANGES WERE PROCESSED BY III MAF TARC. 84 PERCENT (311) OF REQUESTED CHANGES WERE APPROVED. REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL:

A. NON-AVAILABILITY OF ORDNANCE; TEMPORARY DEPLETION OF STOCKS.

B. ORDNANCE REQUESTED NOT CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE FOR EFFECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSION.

4. (S) ONLY MISSIONS REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDERS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN READILY AVAILABLE DURING PERIOD HAVE BEEN BANISH BEACH. NO INDICATION OF ATTEMPTS TO SUBSTITUTE ANOTHER TYPE OF ORDNANCE (NAPALM) FOR BANISH BEACH HAS BEEN NOTED.

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HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG G-3

REL C/S

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SECRET**EXCLUSIVE
FOR****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

VV PAC381
 PP RUHFMA
 DE RUEBHOA1167 2701537
 Z NY SSSS
 PAC T RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 P 261535Z SEP68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T S P E C I A L , EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN
 CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN- MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CMC 260142Z

1. QUOTED BELOW IS A PROPOSED ANSWER TO CM-3651-68
 (CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A)

2. IT IS PURPOSELY SUCCINCT AND DESIGNED TO FORESTALL
 APPROVAL OF CM-3651-68 BY DEPSECDEF

3. I PLAN TO FOLLOW THE FINAL VERSION OF THIS ANSWER
 WITH A CMC WHICH WILL REITERATE AND UPDATE THE COMPLETE
 STORY IN DETAIL

4. YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE PROPOSED
 ANSWER ARE REQUESTED NLI291600Z

5. PROPOSED ANSWER FOLLOWS: QUOTE:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 SUBJ: MODIFICATION OF AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM(U)

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA1167 S E C R E T S P E C I A L , EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND
 LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN M C E O

REF: (A) CM-3651-68 OF 16SEP68 WHICH REPORTED THE CURRENT
 STATUS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT FOR
 AIR SUPPORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO THE DEPUTY
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND MADE A RECOMMENDATION
 PERTAINING THERETO

(B) DEPSECDEF MEMO OF 15MAY68 WHICH CONATAINED HIS
 REVIEW OF THE POSITIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
 STAFF ON THE ISSUE OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF
 III MAF AVIATION ASSETS.

1. I HAVE REVIEWED REFERENCE (A) AND CANNOT CONCUR WHOLLY
 WITH THE EVALUATION THEREIN NOR WITH THE RECOMMENDATION
 WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE INJUNCTION OF THE DEPUTY
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MADE IN REFERENCE (B), THAT THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE "CONTINUED BEYOND THAT
 NECESSARY TO MEET THE SPECIFIC COMBAT SITUATION FOR WHICH
 IT WAS DEVISED."

2. I CONCUR THAT SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN
 THE AIR SUPPORT RECEIVED BY ARMY UNITS THROUGHOUT SVN. THESE
 HAVE OCCURRED PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF THE DECENTRALIZATION OF
 THE HIGHLY CENTRALIZED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AS IT WAS
 INITIALLY IMPLEMENTED. BUT THEIR GENESIS SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED

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PAGE THREE RUEBHOA1167 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN CHAPMAN M C E O FOR WHAT IT IS---AN EVOLUTIONARY ALTERATION IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT TOWARDS THE DECENTRALIZED MARINE CORPS TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. EACH IMPROVEMENT IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS SIMPLY BEEN AN ADOPTION OF SOME FEATURE OF THE ORIGINAL MARINE SYSTEM IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THESE "IMPROVEMENTS" MERELY DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ORIGINAL SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS FUNDAMENTALLY DEFECTIVE.

3. WHILE RESULTING IN INCREASED AIR SUPPORT FOR ARMY COMBAT FORCES, THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AS INITIALLY IMPLEMENTED, OVER STRONG MARINE PRIORITIES, IMPOSED A SEVERE DEGRADATION OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT RESPONSIVENESS. IT WAS POINTED OUT AT THAT TIME THAT MARINE GROUND UNITS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY FEWER HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS AND LESS ARTILLERY THAN ARMY UNITS, AND THUS MUST RELY PRIMARILY ON THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSIVENESS OF THEIR ORGANIC CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ASSETS.

4. THAT THIS SEVERE DEGRADATION OF THE INITIAL PERIOD WAS NOT NECESSARY AND THAT THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AS ORIGINALLY IMPLEMENTED WAS UNWORKABLE WAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED BY THE RADICAL REVISION EFFECTED ON 30MAY. THE EFFECT OF THIS REVISION, AS INDICATED ABOVE, WAS TO DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM TOWARDS THE

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA1167 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN CHAPMAN M C E O CONCEPT OF THE MARINE SYSTEM TO A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE. THE REMAINING DEGRADATION, WHICH ALL COMMANDERS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED, IS LIKEWISE UNNECESSARY AND SHOULD NOT BE CONTINUED. HOW "EQUITABILITY" AND THE "BROADENED RESPONSIBILITIES" OF CG, III MAF JUSTIFY FURNISHING LESS THAN THE MAXIMUM RESPONSIVENESS IN AIR SUPPORT TO ARMY AND MARINE TROOPS IN I CTZ IS NOT UNDERSTOOD, AND CANNOT BE CONCURRED IN.

5. CG, III MAF HAS RECOMMENDED TO COMUSMACV MEANS BY WHICH RESPONSIVENESS CAN BE IMPROVED FURTHER WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. IN PARTICULAR, RETURN OF SCHEDULING AUTHORITY TO CG, III MAF FOR IN-COUNTRY 1ST MARINE AIR WING SORTIES ALLOCATED FOR SUPPORT OF ALL UNITS IN I CTZ WOULD INCREASE FLEXIBILITY AND ENHANCE RESPONSIVENESS TO NEEDS OF ALL III MAF GROUND COMMANDERS, ARMY AND MARINES. COMUSMACV WOULD HAVE MEANS FOR INFLUENCING ACTION THROUGHOUT SVN BY INCREASING/DECREASING AIR FORCE AND MARINE CORPS SORTIES PROVIDED TO III MAF AS WELL AS RETAINING OVERALL DIRECTION AND CONTROL MEANS TO CONCENTRATE ALL AIR SUPPORT WHEN AND WHERE NEEDED TO MEET EMERGENCIES. THIS IS A REASONABLE PROPOSAL WITH A HIGH PROBABILITY THAT ITS TEST

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PAGE FIVE RUEBHOA1167 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN M C E O
WOULD RESULT IN FURTHER MAJOR REVISIONS TO THE SINGLE MAN-
AGEMENT CONCEPT INVOLVING BENEFITS TO ALL CORPS AREAS.

6. ACCORDINGLY, I RECOMMEND:

A. THAT, IN AN EFFORT TO REGAIN THE COMPLETE RESPONSIVE-
NESS OF THE MARINE SYSTEM, A THIRTY-DAY TEST BE MADE OF THE CG,
III MAF PROPOSAL AS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE.

B. THAT THE MONTHLY EVALUATIONS BE CONTINUED TO APPRAISE
THE RECOMMENDED TEST AS WELL AS OTHER FUTURE MODIFICATIONS
DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

C. THAT THE INJECTION OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
MADE BY REFERENCE (B) AS TO THE RESUMPTION OF NORMAL COMMAND
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE III MAF BE ENJOINED AT THE EARLIEST
PRACTICABLE DATE.

6. IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE CHAIRMAN CONVEY THESE VIEWS
TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HIS CONSIDERATION
IN RELATION TO THE RECOMMENDATION OF REFERENCE (A) UNQUOTE. ✓

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DE RUEBHOA0976 2692246

ZNY SSSSS

PAC -T- III MAF

P 260142Z SEP 68

FM CMC

TO RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RHMMFAFA/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET SPEC AT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN GUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CM -3651-68 OF 16 SEP 68

1. I AM HAVING A REPLY TO REF A DRAFTED WHICH ON COMPLETION WILL BE FORWARDED FOR YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

2. REFERENCE A FOLLOWS: QUOTE

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: MODIFICATION OF AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM(U)

1. (U) REFERENCE IS MADE TO:

A. MEMORANDUM FROM THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DATED

15 MAY 1968, SUBJECT: "OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)."

B. CM-3338-68, DATED 22 MAY 1968, SUBJECT: "MODIFICATION OF AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM (U)".

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA0976 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

2. (S) REFERENCE LA DIRECTED THAT I KEEP YOU INFORMED OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT FOR AIR SUPPORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. REFERENCE 1B APPRISED YOU OF MODIFICATIONS MADE TO THE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO BE PLACED IN EFFECT ON 30 MAY 1968. THE 30-DAY TRIAL PERIOD AND SUBSEQUENT EVALUATION HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. THE MACV EVALUATION INCLUDED VISITS TO ALL FOUR CORPS TACTICAL ZONES TO RECEIVE FIRST HAND INFORMATION.

ADDITIONALLY, EVALUATION REPORTS FROM CG III MAF, COMMANDER 7TH AF, CG I FFV, CG III FFV AND SENIOR ADVISOR TO COMMANDER IV CORPS WERE RECEIVED 30 MAY -27 JUNE 1968 AND SUBSEQUENTLY, CAREFUL AND SYSTEMATIC CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS AND COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF. COMUSMACV HAS MADE, AND CONTINUES TO MAKE, CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS TO ALLAY THEIR CONCERNS AND, WHERE CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT AND OVERALL FORCE EFFECTIVENESS, TO MEET THEIR DESIRES.

3. (S) NUMEROUS IMPROVEMENTS IN THE RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM HAVE BEEN MADE. THE MORE IMPORTANT OF THESE IMPROVEMENTS INCLUDE:

A. INSTITUTION OF A WEEKLY AIR SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE, WHICH HAS IMPROVED PLANNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TACTICAL AIR ASSETS AND HAS FACILITATED COMPRESSION OF THE PLANNING CYCLE IN I CTZ TO BE COMPARABLE WITH CYCLES OF OTHER MAJOR GROUND COMMANDERS.

B. ALLOCATION OF 70 PERCENT OF THE PREPLANNED SORTIES ON A WEEKLY BASIS, RETAINING 30 PERCENT FOR ALLOCATE DAILY. THIS PROCEDURE ENABLES COMMANDERS TO PLAN GROUND OPERATIONS CONFIDENT THAT FUNDAMENTAL AIR SUPPORT OF THOSE OPERATION WILL BE AVAILABLE WHILE PERMITTING DAILY CHANGES OF PREPLANNED SORTIES BY MAJOR COMMANDERS

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PAGE THREE RUEBHOA0767 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
TO MEET CHANGING NEEDS. THIS FLEXIBILITY IS FURTHER ENHANCED BY IMMEDIATE SORTIES TO RESPOND TO TACTICAL EMERGENCIES OR TO EXPLOIT TACTICAL ADVANTAGES.

C. THE PRINCIPAL DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER IN I CTZ HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE III MAF COMPOUND TO ASSURE IMMEDIATE RESPONSIVENESS TO CG, III MAF.

D. IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE SUPPORT IN I CTZ, THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM PROVIDES CG, III MAF THE OPTION OF SCRAMBLING MARINE OF AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT FROM LESS URGENT MISSIONS TO RESPOND MORE QUICKLY TO TACTICAL EMERGENCIES. THE DECISION TO SCRAMBLE, OR TO DIVERT AIRCRAFT FOR MORE RAPID RESPONSE, RESIDES WITH THE CT, III MAF.

3. EXPEDITED PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED TO FACILITATE THE CHANGING OF TOTS AND ORDNANCE LOADS BETTER TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF GROUND COMMANDERS WITH PREPLANNED MISSIONS.

4. (S) OTHER BENEFITS HAVE ACCRUED FROM INSTITUTION OF THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM. PRINCIPAL AMONG THESE IN THE INCREASED UNDERSTANDING AT ALL LEVELS OF THE SYSTEMS FOR INITIATING, PROCESSING AND FULFILLING REQUESTS FOR TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT OF GROUND-DIRECTED BLIND BOMBING, AND MSQ-77 AND TPQ-10 RESOURCES FOR GROUND-DIRECTED BLIND BOMBING, AND IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS IN THE USE OF AIRCRAFT BASED IN THAILAND FOR AIR SUPPORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAVE RESULTED.

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA0767 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
FURTHER, REFINED AIR ORDNANCE REQUIREMENTS, ENHANCED CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT, IMPROVEMENTS IN AIR SPACE COORDINATION TO ASSURE SAFE PASSAGE THROUGH ARTILLERY FIRE ZONES, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES TO EXPEDITE RECEIPT OF RECONNAISSANCE HAVE COME OUT OF THE STUDY AND MODIFICATIONS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

5. (C) SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, COMUSMACV HAS TAKEN CARE THAT THE MARINE STRUCTURE AND SYSTEM FOR AIR/GROUND SUPPORT SHOULD NOT BE VITIATED. THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD, THE FULL MARINE AIR/GROUND SYSTEM HAS CONTINUED TO FUNCTION. I HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE ITS CAPABILITY HAS BEEN IMPAIRED.

6. (S) THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF, HAS CONSISTENTLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE SORTIE DIRECTION OF MARINE AIRCRAFT, LESS OUT-COUNTRY EFFORT, BE ASSIGNED TO HIM. HE IS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE

RESPONSIVENESS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AS COMPARED TO THE MARINE SYSTEM AND HAS RECOMMENDED THAT A BLOC OF MARINE SORTIES BE ALLOCATED FOR FRAGGING IN I CTZ BY III MAF. COMUSMACV HAS OPPOSED THIS RECOMMENDATION ON THE BASIS THAT IT WOULD BE "DOUBLE MANAGEMENT" AND WOULD NOT FULFILL THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. I CONCUR IN COMUSMACV'S VIEW. I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE HAS CONTINUED TO RECEIVE THE MAJORITY OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SORTIES FLOWN IN SOUTH VIETNAM SINCE 21 MARCH 1968. CG, III MAF HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EMPLOYMENT AND ALLOCATION OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT OF THREE US ARMY DIVISIONS AS WELL AS TWO MARINE

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PAGE FIVE RUEBHQA0767 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 DIVISIONS, AND OTHER UNITS, IN I CTZ. DURING THE 30 MAY-
 26 JUNE 1968 EVALUATION PERIOD, MARINE BATTALIONS RECEIVED AN AVER-
 AGE OF 6.65 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PER BATTALION PER DAY WHILE
 US ARMY BATTALIONS RECEIVED 3.23 SORTIES PER DAY AGAINST A COUNTRY
 -WIDE DAILY AVERAGE OF 2.14 SORTIES PER BATTALION. SINCE
 THAT TIME THESE AVERAGES HAVE VARIED ONLY SLIGHTLY. ALTHOUGH THE
 MECHANICS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ARE STILL NOT SUCH AS TO
 PROVIDE THE MARINES WITH RESPONSIVENESS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCUS-
 TOMED IN THEIR ORGANIC CONTROL SYSTEM, I CONSIDER THAT AIR SUPPORT
 OF MARINE FORCES HAS BEEN EQUITABLE
 CONSISTENT WITH THE BROADENED RESPONSIBILITIES OF CG, III MAF.
 7. (S) COMUSMACV CONSIDERS THAT THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
 CONTINUES TO MEET THE OBJECTIVE FOR WHICH IT HAS ESTABLISHED. BOTH
 COMUSMACV AND CI WPAC CONSIDER THE SYSTEM HAS IMPROVED CONSIDER-
 ABLE SINCE ITS INSTITUTION AND PROVIDES TO COMUSMACV THE CONTROL OF
 ASSETS REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT HIS MISSION. CINCPAC CONCLUDES THE
 SYSTEM IS PROVIDING FOR THE BEST OVERALL USE OF TACTICAL AIR IN COM-
 USMACV'S ASSIGNED AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.
 8." (U) I CONCUR IN THE EVALUATION OF COMUSMACV AND CINCPAC. THEY
 AND I WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR ITS PROGRESS CAREFULLY WITH THE VIEW OF

PAGE SIX RUEBHQA0767 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 ENHANCING THE OVER ALL EFFECTIVENESS OF TACTICAL AIR ASSETS IN SOUTH
 VIETNAM. UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THERE, I RECOMMEND THAT
 COMUSMACV BE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE THE SINGLE MANAGENT
 SYSTEM UNTIL HE CONSIDERS ITS DISCONTINUANCE APPROPRIATE.
 EARLE G. WHEELER, CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF." UNQUOTE
 GP-4
 BT

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ZNY SSSSS
R 250311Z SEP 68

ACT G- 3
INFO G- 2
COPY TO ADJ S/ S G-6

FM COMUSMACV
TO ZEN/COR 7AF SAIGON
RHMMAFA/CG III MAF DA NANG
INFO RUMHNOA/CINCPAC
DX

SECRET 20557
SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)

REF: A. JCS 0307 DTG 202253Z MAY 68 (S) (NOTAL)
B. COMUSMACV DTG 181140Z SEP 68 (S) (NOTAL)
C. JSC 09207 DTG 161955Z SEP 68 (S) (NOTAL)

1. (S) REF A REQUIRED COMUSMACV, IN CONJUNCTION WITH CG, III MAF AND COR, 7AF TO EVALUATE MONTHLY THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT IN I CTZ. REF B REQUIRES COR, 7AF AND CG, III MAF REPORT ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1968.
2. (S) REF C RESCINDS THE REQUIREMENT FOR A MONTHLY COMUSMACV EVALUATION REPORT ON THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT IN I CTZ.
3. (U) WHILE A FULL EVALUATION REPORT FOR SINGLE MANAGEMENT IS NO LONGER REQUIRED, REQUEST YOUR COMMENT ON THE TWO AREAS OF CONTINUING INTEREST REF B. GP4

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S E C R E T

JH
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Single Management File
III MAF
190222Z
Sept 68

PTG 19544
OT 27007 RHMSMVA 2250 2570410-SSCS--RHMMAFA.
FM COMUSMACV
TO RHHHGA/CTHPAC
INFO RHHHGA/CSJCS
ZNAFCOM 7AF SAIGON
RHMMAFA/CG III MAF DA NANG

ACT G-3
INFO G-2
COPY TO ADJ S/S G-6

S E C R E T 27007 SECTION I OF II
SUBJECT: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)
REF A. JCS DTG 202253Z MAY 68 (S)
REF B. COMUSMACV 22964 DTG 071218Z AUG 68 (S)
REF C. CG III MAF 291416Z AUG 68 (S) (NOTAL)

1. (S) REF A ESTABLISHED REQUIREMENT FOR A MONTHLY COMUSMACV EVALUATION REPORT ON PROGRESS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN I CORPS. REF B IS COMUSMACV EVALUATION REPORT FOR JULY. REF C IS III MAF EVALUATION REPORT FOR AUGUST 1968. THIS MESSAGE IS COMUSMACV EVALUATION REPORT FOR PERIOD 270600H JULY TO 280600H AUG 68.
2. (S) THIS REPORT IS IN THREE PARTS, AS FOLLOWS:
PART I - COMUSMACV AREAS OF CONTINUED ATTENTION AND STATUS OF

PAGE 2 RHMSMVA 2250 S E C R E T
ACTION AS INDICATED IN REF B.

PART II - MACV ANALYSIS OF REF C.
PART III - IMPROVEMENTS AND INNOVATIONS IN SINGLE MANAGEMENT DURING THIS PERIOD.

PART I OF III PARTS, AREAS OF CONTINUED ATTENTION AND STATUS OF ACTIONS:

1. (S) DURING THE COURSE OF EVALUATION OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR THE PERIOD 270600H JULY 68, THE MACV EVALUATION GROUP IDENTIFIED FIVE AREAS OF CONTINUING INTEREST. THREE PROBLEM AREAS ARE LISTED BELOW WITH COMMENTS PERTAINING TO THEIR CURRENT STATUS.

4. (S) 1. PROBLEM AREA: FLIGHT SAFETY ASSURANCE IN RELATION TO BARRAGE SUPPORTING FIRES.
STATUS OF ACTION: PARA 260, REF B, APPLIES. PROCEDURES FOR FLIGHT SAFETY AND COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY FIRES ARE OUTLINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 00001-68 FEB 68. ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM (AWS) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DIRECTIVE IS ON AN INCREMENTAL OR ADDITIVE BASIS AND IS TO BE EFFECTED IN A MANNER WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE TACTICAL MISSION. EFFECTIVE 1 AUGUST 1968, THE OBJECTIVE IMPLEMENTED THE PROCEDURE FOR ALL

13 MA 2100/7 (3/68)

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PAGE 3 2250 SECRET
ATTENTION: FIRE WITHIN ENROUTE AREAS TO BE REPORTED TO THE NEAREST
CONTROL AND REPORTING CENTER (CRC) WHEN THE MAXIMUM ORDINATE OF
SIDE IS 3,100 FEET OR HIGHER. PRIOR TO 11 AUGUST 1968, IF
MAXIMUM ORDINATE REPORTING ALTITUDE WAS 7,000 FEET AGL, THE
DIRECTIVE REQUIRES THAT AT THE TIME A COMMUNICATION AND DISSEMINATION
CAPABILITY EXISTS OR CAN BE DEVELOPED, THE MAXIMUM REPORTING
ALTITUDE SHOULD BE PROGRESSIVELY REDUCED TO ACHIEVE THE END STATE
OF 3,100 FEET AGL. THIS DIRECTIVE IS PRESENTLY UNDER REVIEW
IN THOSE AREAS THAT ADEQUATE PROCEDURES ARE ESTABLISHED FOR FLIGHT
SAFETY.

PROBLEM AREA: INFLEXIBILITY OF CHANGING SCHEDULED
REQUESTS OF GROUND COMMANDERS.
1ST MAW COMMENT: DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT,
REQUESTS FOR TOT CHANGES TOTALLED 117, OF WHICH 22 PERCENT
WERE DISAPPROVED AND 81.2 PERCENT APPROVED.
2ND MAW COMMENT: THE PRESENT SYSTEM, IF UNDERSTOOD AND
RESPONSIVE TO VALID TOT CHANGE REQUESTS, THE EFFICIENCY
OF THE SYSTEM IS INDICATED BY THE FACT THAT 95 PERCENT OF
ALL REQUESTS (ALL PASSED TO TACC) REQUESTED IN 1 CTZ DURING THE
PERIOD WERE APPROVED. THROUGHOUT SVN 209 CHANGE REQUEST

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TACC FOR RESOLUTION OF WHICH: 192 92PDT

COMMENT: IT APPEARS THAT INCREASING FAMILIARITY WITH THE
SYSTEM IS RESULTING IN BETTER RESPONSIVENESS TO GROUND
COMMANDER REQUIREMENTS. THIS IS AN ITEM OF CONTINUING INTEREST
IN THE PROBLEM AREA. THE AVAILABILITY OF TACC SERVICES BEING
SUFFICIENT TO MEET USUAL VALID REQUESTS.

DURING THE SAME PERIOD (REF C) AMOUNTED TO 240 OF WHICH 32 OF 12
AND 87.2 PERCENT APPROVED. THESE REQUESTS WERE
REJECTED FOR REASONS OTHER THAN LACK OF SPECIFIED
DISAPPROVAL BY LEADER WITH 1ST MAW. REQUESTS FOR
WAS PROVIDED TO FULFILL GROUND COMMANDER REQUIREMENTS
SUPPORT ORNANCE WAS NOT AVAILABLE FROM ALL PARTIES
AVAILABLE AT 1ST MAW AND 2ND MAW INTERCHANGING PARTIES.

TACC COMMENT: THE STATED REQUIREMENTS ON WHICH MAXIMUM
ORDINATE ARE BASED AND REVISED PERIODICALLY TO REFLECT
NEW DEMANDS DURING THE PERIOD 270600H JULY 1968.

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OR 83 PERCENT OF THE ORDINATE

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OF THE 17 PERCENT REMAINING, 12 PERCENT WERE MINOR ORDNANCE SUBSTITUTIONS.

D. MACV COMMENT: THIS IS AN ITEM OF CONTINUING INTEREST. ALTHOUGH THE BULK OF REQUESTS FOR MUNITIONS WAS MET SATISFACTORILY, IMPROVEMENT POSSIBILITIES REMAIN.

7. (S) A. PROBLEM AREA: MODIFICATION OF ESTABLISHED PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE PROCEDURES TO SATISFY THE DEMAND FOR RAPID RESPONSE.

B. STATUS OF ACTION: PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY ARE PRESCRIBED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-11, JOINT AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM, WHICH IS PRESENTLY UNDERGOING REVISION. THE INTERIM PROCEDURE ADOPTED ON 3 JULY, AND REPORTED LAST MONTH, CONTINUES IN EFFECT. 7AF HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO REEVALUATE THE FEASIBILITY OF RELOCATING CERTAIN RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO REQUESTERS. PARA 28, REF B, APPLIES.

8. (S) A. PROBLEM AREA: REVISION OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-11 TO PERMIT CHANGES TO PREPLANNED FRAG THROUGH THE IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST NET.

B. STATUS OF ACTION: THE PROPOSED REVISION OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-11 JOINT AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM, INCLUDES A PROCEDURE

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FOR CHANGING THE PREPLANNED FRAG THROUGH THE IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST NET. THIS PROCEDURE IS CURRENTLY IN USE. PARA 30C, REF B, APPLIES. PART II OF III PARTS. MACV ANALYSIS OF REF C.

9. (S) IN PARA 2, REF C, CG III MAF REITERATES HIS DESIRE TO HAVE SORTIE DIRECTION OF MARINE AIRCRAFT, LESS OUT-COUNTRY EFFORT, ASSIGNED TO HIM. HE SUPPORTS THIS RECOMMENDATION WITH A SERIES OF ADVANTAGES HE ESTIMATES WILL ACCRUE AS A RESULT OF III MAF MISSION DIRECTION. ADOPTION OF HIS RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD ELIMINATE SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND REINSTITUTE THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM WHICH WAS INADEQUATE TO THE NEEDS OF COMUSMACV. AS LONG AS IT IS NECESSARY TO COMMIT U. S. ARMY DIVISIONS IN THE I CTZ WITH MARINE DIVISIONS, AND IT IS NECESSARY TO AUGMENT MARINE AIR ASSETS TO SUPPORT THE TOTAL FORCE, SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR IS DESIRABLE. PARA 30A, REF B, APPLIES.

REF B, APPLIES.

10. (S) A. PARA 4, REF C, RECOMMEND INCREASING USE OF MSG/TPQ SORTIES TO KEEP FULMY UNDER ATTACK ON 24 HOUR A DAY BASIS.

B. MACV COMMENT. PARAS 20 AND 30C, REF B, APPLY.

11. (S) A. PARA 4, REF C, RECOMMEND THAT CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT (CMR) BE REPLACED BY COAST REPORT, MARINE SPHINX REPORT AND I DASC DIVERSITY INFORMATION.

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TO: DIRHQDA CINCPAC
INFO: RUEAFA/CIC
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REF 7AF COMMENT: THE SPHINX REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION ON THOSE MISSIONS WITH A SPECIFIC BDA. NO OTHER MISSIONS ARE REPORTED IN THE COMBAT AND ACTIVITIES REPORT (COACT). ALTHOUGH CONTAINING COMPLETE INFORMATION, IS NORMALLY RECEIVED 5 TO 7 DAYS AFTER A MISSION IS FLOWN. ANY COMBINATION OF THESE TWO COULD NEVER PROVIDE THE TIMELY INFORMATION REQUIRED ON EACH DAYS ACTIVITY. MARINE MISSIONS FRAGMENTED AND FLOWN UNDER SINGLE MANAGER CONCEPT ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE DATA SYSTEM. THE CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT (CMD) AND OPERATIONAL REPORT ARE THE REPORTING DOCUMENTS USED TO PROVIDE TIMELY INPUT OF MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OPERATIONAL DATA REQUIRED FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE TOTAL FORCE AVAILABLE. COACT IS HISTORICAL IN NATURE AND SPHINX IS NOT COMPLETE. ACCORDINGLY, THEY ARE NOT

PAGE 2 PANSOVA 2261 S E C R E T

SUFFICIENTLY RESPONSIVE FOR DAILY MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.

REF 7AF COMMENT: PARA 4, REF B, APPLIES. IT APPEARS THAT SINGLE MANAGER REPORTING REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO THE MINIMUM NECESSARY FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT.

REF 12. (b) & PARA 5, REF C. 1ST MAW HAS INSTITUTED AN AIRBORNE ALERT WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASES RESPONSE TIME FOR IMMEDIATE SORTIES.

REF 7AF COMMENT: (1) THE 1ST MAW INSTITUTED AN EXPERIMENTAL AIRBORNE ALERT POSTED BY 1 COOPG ON 5 AUGUST 1968. A FIGHTER SCHEDULED FOR "AIR CAP" REMAINS ON THE ALERT FOR UP TO 30 MINUTES. IF NOT SCRAMBLE, HE THEN TAKES OFF AND MAINTAINS A COMBAT AIR PATROL OVER PHU BAI TACAN. IF NO IMMEDIATE REQUEST IS RECEIVED, HE REFUELS (APPROXIMATELY 45 MINUTES AFTER TAKEOFF) AND IS DIRECTED TO A LESS LUCRATIVE TARGET E.G. SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITION.
(2) THIS SYSTEM PROVIDES EXCELLENT RESPONSE TIME (VEHICLE (HLW) 14.9 MINUTES) FROM REQUEST TO FIRST BOMBS ON TARGETS. 464 BOMBS WERE DIVERTED FROM CAP TO IMMEDIATE TARGETS SUCH AS ENEMY CONTACT OR ACTIVE ARTILLERY. THE REMAINING 284 WERE COMMITTED TO AIRBORNE TARGETS SUCH AS ASSEMBLY AREAS AND INFILTRATION POINTS.

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(5) AIR FORCE EXPERIENCE HAS INDICATED THAT CAP IS EXPENSIVE IN TERMS OF MAINTENANCE HOURS AND UNPRODUCTIVE MISSIONS, AND THAT THIS COST MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST IMPROVED RESPONSE TIME. IN THIS CONNECTION, ON 17 AUGUST 1968 THE HORN DASC DIRECTOR REQUESTED BY LETTER TO THE G-3, 1ST MAW THAT, AT HIS EARLIEST CONVENIENCE, HE PROVIDE THE DASC DIRECTOR AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR CAP WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE COMPARISON OF FLYING HOURS OF AIRCRAFT DIRECTED FROM THE AIR CAP AS OPPOSED TO ALERT.

(1) NO STATISTICS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO DATE. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN MISSION CANCELLATIONS DUE TO LACK OF AIRCRAFT AND MARINE ALERT PADS HAVE GONE DRY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. C. MACV COMMENT: HORN DASC HAS SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY OVER ALERT SORTIES OF AIR UNITS LOCATED IN I CTZ, AND IS RESPONSIVE TO CG III MAF REQUIREMENTS. THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOES NOT PRECLUDE ADOPTION OF THE AIRBORNE ALERT PROCEDURE. PART III OF III PARTS. IMPROVEMENTS AND INNOVATIONS IN SINGLE MANAGEMENT DURING THIS REPORT PERIOD.

13. (5) MACV EVALUATION FOR THIS PERIOD

INDICATES THE FOLLOWING IMPROVEMENTS OR INNOVATIONS:

A. HORN DASC BECAME OPERATIONAL ON 10 AUGUST 1968. IT IS THE

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SENIOR FWF DASC IN I CTZ AND WAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN III MAF COMPOUND TO PROVIDE BETTER RESPONSE TO III MAF.

B. CG III MAF INITIATED AN EXPERIMENTAL AIRBORNE ALERT POSTURE IN I CTZ ON 5 AUGUST 1968.

C. AIR SUPPORT MEASURED IN SORTIES PER BATTALION PER DAY INCREASE FOR BOTH MARINE AND ARMY FORCES FROM 5.4 TO 6.1 AND 3.1 TO 3.5 RESPECTIVELY.

D. INCREASED FAMILIARITY WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS RESULTED IN MORE RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT TO GROUND COMMANDERS THROUGHOUT VIETNAM.

E. RESPONSIVENESS TO REQUESTS FOR TOT CHANGES HAS IMPROVED.

14. (2) THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF AIR CONTINUES TO MEET THE OBJECTIVE FOR WHICH IT WAS ESTABLISHED. IT APPEARS THAT LITTLE THAT IS NEW IS COMING FROM THESE MONTHLY REPORTS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THEY HAVE SERVED THEIR PURPOSE, AND THEREFORE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A REPORT BE GENERATED ONLY WHEN SIGNIFICANT CHANGES OR DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR.

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III MAF

PRECEDENCE

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CLASS: PRIORITY

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FROM: COMUSMACV
TO: CINCPAC
INFO: CJCS

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Subj: Single Management (U)

Ref: A. JCS 202253Z May 68 (S)

B. COMUSMACV 061130Z Jul 68 (S)

C. OG III MAF 291442Z JUL 68 (S)

1. (S) Ref A established requirement for a monthly COMUSMACV Evaluation Report on progress of the Single Management System in II Corps. Ref B is COMUSMACV Report for the month of June. Ref C is III MAF Evaluation Report to COMUSMACV for the month of July.

This message is COMUSMACV Evaluation Report for the period 270600H Jun to 260600H Jul 68.

2. (S) This report is in six parts, as follows:

Part I - COMUSMACV areas of concern addressed to both CDR 7AF and CC, III MAF subsequent to June evaluation.

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TYPED NAME, TITLE, PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL
WILLIAM R. SMITH
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Air P&O Div/ 2072

SIGNATURE
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
TYPED NAME AND TITLE
CHARLES A. CORCORAN
MG, USA, Chief of Staff

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Part II - COMUSMACV areas of concern addressed specifically to CG, III MAF.

Part III - COMUSMACV areas of concern addressed specifically to GDR, 7 AF.

Part IV - MACV analysis of CG, III MAF, comments contained in para 4, 5, and 6 of Ref G.

Part V - Overall MACV analysis of changes made, improvement actions.

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taken and areas requiring further attention.

Part VI - Comparison figures of TACAIR Strike Support of III MAF/POV prior to Single Management and subsequent to 20 March implementation.

Part I of VI: COMUSMACV areas of concern to both III MAF and 7AF.

3. (S) During the course of the evaluation of the Single Management System for the period 20 May - 27 June 1968 the MACV Evaluation Group identified three areas of concern applicable to both III MAF and 7AF. These three areas are listed below with comments pertaining thereto as submitted by III MAF and 7AF in July Reports.

Following these comments is a MACV analysis.

4. (S) A. Area of concern: Layering of reports, unnecessary reports.

B. III MAF comment: Representatives of 7AF have indicated informally that previously existing III MAF Reports could be utilized to meet requirements for consolidated mission report. No reduction in this requirement has been received to date.

C. 7AF comment: It is believed this area of concern refers to the Combat Mission Report (CMR). There is a great deal of similarity between the Marine Sphinx Report and USAF OPREP-4 Report, but the Sphinx Report does not contain sufficient information to provide a data base necessary for complete recording of in-country air operations. As the COMUSMACV Deputy for Air Operations is charged with the management of all tactical air assets in SVN, it is logical that the capability to retrieve specific mission data for all tactical missions be available. To accomplish this, 7AF considers the expansion of Sphinx Report a realistic requirement.

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D. MACV Analysis: It appears that with minimal effort the Martin Sphinx Report could be expanded to include data required by the Single Manager. This additional information might be superfluous to other recipients of the Sphinx Report, but it is felt that this single report could be made inclusive enough to satisfy all requirements without any degradation of the basic purpose of the report.

5. (S) A. Area of concern: Coordination among 7AF, USARV and III MAF, of supporting fires.

B. III MAF Comment: III MAF has made clear its view that supporting fires should be fully and centrally coordinated with prompt free flow of information to combine maximum effectiveness with safety. Informally, it is understood that this is being seriously studied by the Army and Air Force but no concrete proposal is known. Americal Division procedures are identical to Marine Corps.

C. 7AF Comment: This headquarters would appreciate an early resolution to this problem as not only does it hamper mission accomplishment, but it is a definite hazard to flight safety.

D. MACV Analysis: This is an area that was recognized in the last evaluation as a complex problem that requires extensive investigation and the most thorough staffing. When the term supporting fires is taken to include mortar fire and naval gunfire as well as artillery, the operational complications begin to become apparent. An additional factor which increases the difficulties of coordination is the diversity of the forces involved, i.e., Marine Corps, Army, Navy, RVNAF, ROK forces, etc. To fully coordinate and assure safe passage for all aircraft from one division's AO through another

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division's AO within any given GTZ requires that all types of supporting fires be known to a common control center at all times. This is particularly true during periods when low ceilings dictate aircraft strike operations be conducted beneath cloud cover at low altitudes. This is an area of vital concern to MACV which was not sufficiently resolved during this evaluation period. Efforts to resolve the problem will be actively pursued. It is reiterated that this problem is not peculiar to Single Management in I GTZ, but rather is a coordination problem under any system.

6. (S) A. Area of concern: Procedures to assure full utilization of the flexibility inherent in the weekly frag to change missions, TOT's and ordnance.

B. III MAF Comment: Procedures to assure full utilization of weekly frag are in strict accord with SM System.

C. 7AF Comments: Seventh Air Force is not aware that a problem area exists here. Many of the frag change requests generated at the ground echelons never reach 7AF because they are disapproved by one of the intermediate echelons prior to being presented to 7AF through TASE. The coordination is very simple. The new system calls for changes, that are known prior to the submission of requests for the daily frag, to be submitted at the same time and through the same channels as the daily requests. Changes that are required on short notice are handled the same as immediate requests and are honored whenever possible from the alert forces or through direct.

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(S) A. Area of concern: Resolution with 7AF of the differences in the statistics of sorties fraged, sorties flown and sorties reported.

B. III MAF. Differences in 7AF statistics of sorties fraged, flown, and reported are not known to this Hq. All sorties fraged, flown, and reported have been within 7AF Tactical Air Control System. Specific discrepancies in statistics have not been reported to this command. I DASC maintains record of all sorties by type flown in I CTZ. Hq III MAF is provided weekly summary of statistics which in fact are identical to those reported to 7AF TAGC by I DASC. Only statistics originating at this Hq concerning single management are those reflecting air support request and sorties allocation to III MAF units.

C. MACV analysis: This problem now appears to have been resolved. The principal causes of the differences were the different interpretations of terms and a difference in reporting periods. The spotlighting of these problem areas by COMUSMACV coupled with coordination between 7AF and III MAF, and indoctrination and training of personnel appear to have reduced the reporting differences to an acceptable level.

10. (S) A. Area of concern: The relative significance of the fact that the number of sorties/maneuver battalion/day in support of Marine units is in excess of the planning factor (6.67); the figure for the Army units in I Corps is less than the planning factor (5.0). The rate for FWMAF and ARVN is extremely low.

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D. MACV Analysis: MACV's continued attention to this problem is producing results toward a satisfactory resolution of the matter. This is one of the areas in which knowledge and familiarity with the system will result in smoother functioning. Better understanding of this inherent flexibility was more apparent during this evaluation period.

Part II of VI: COMUSMACV areas of concern addressed to III MAF.

7. (S) During the course of the evaluation of the Single Management System for the period 30 May to 27 June, the MACV Evaluation Group identified several areas of interest which merited followup action by CG, III MAF. This portion of this report categorically compares or contrasts the questions posed to CG, III MAF, by COMUSMACV and the replies to these questions received from CG, III MAF in Ref. C. Each question and reply is followed by a MACV analysis statement.

8.0 (S) A. Area of concern: No III MAF representation in I DASC to assure complete responsiveness to CG, III MAF, tactical requirements.

B. III MAF: This Hq has no basis on which to corroborate I DASC lack of responsiveness. US portion of I DASC is being moved to III MAF Hq. This will further improve responsiveness to III MAF tactical requirements. Deputy Director I DASC also serves as III MAF Liaison Officer.

C. MACV Analysis: The move of the US FWMAP portion of I DASC to III MAF Hq, which should be completed on or about 15 August 1968, is expected to assure complete PACAFR responsiveness to III MAF tactical requirements.

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B. III MAF: Air support is requested by ground commanders based on their estimate of sorties required to support operations. III MAF sub-allocations are in turn based on these requests. In addition CG, III MAF assigns priorities based on overall evaluation of enemy situation and operations in I GTZ. Examination of requests submitted to this Hq reveals Army and FWMAF's are in fact allocated a higher percentage of requested sorties than Marine units. Since 1 July, 2nd ROKMC BDE has been allocated 94 percent of sorties requested, Army units 66 percent, and Marine units 60 percent. ARVN units do not request preplanned sorties from III MAF. ARVN immediate requests through TACS have always been honored. A weekly air support planning conference was initiated by this Hqs 18 July with all major subordinate commanders represented in order to assure all requirements for air support are fully known and fairly considered. PCV suballocates to units under PCV OPCON.

C. MACV Analysis: The institution of a weekly air support planning conference is appropriate, and it is considered that this has resulted in better planning of distribution of TACAIR assets.

11. (S) A. Area of concern: Marine strike aircraft not checking into the traffic control net (CRC) working completely within the Marine DASC system.

B. III MAF: Marine strike aircraft RIO with CRC and CFP as directed by frag.

C. MACV Analysis: Upon COMUSMACV's identification of the specific problem and notification to CG, III MAF, and GDR, 7AF, this problem was resolved. All Marine strike aircraft reportedly now

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work in with either a (RC or GRP. This was primarily a problem of familiarization and standardization.

12. (S) A. Area of concern: Possible limitation of weekly frag flexibility by complete sub-allocation.

B. III MAF: Sub-allocation of weekly frag by this Hq does not include all sorties allocated to III MAF. This Hq and Hq PCV retain sorties for LOC interdiction and to weight effort as required. Sorties are also shifted between divisions when required. It must be noted however that principle of sub-allocating fixed number of sorties on weekly basis is in accord with modified system objective of guaranteeing basic level of support.

C. MACV Analysis: The situation appears to have been improved by III MAF adoption of a procedure similar to that employed by COMUSMACV (TASE).

13. (S) A. Area of concern: Full exploitation of the capability within the weekly frag in shifting TACAIR resources between divisions.

B. III MAF. Sub-allocation of weekly frag by this Hq does not include all sorties allocated to III MAF. This Hq and Hq PCV retain sorties for LOC interdiction and to weight effort as required. Sorties are also shifted between divisions when required. It must be noted however that principle of sub-allocating fixed number of sorties on weekly basis is in accord with modified system objective of guaranteeing basic level of support.

C. MACV Analysis: This situation is associated with the preceding one and appears to have been resolved by the procedure currently in use by III MAF.

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14. (S) A. Area of concern: The possible effect of the recent reduction in combat activity in I Corps on strike sortie requirements.

B. III MAF: Lulls in combat activity and reduction of enemy threat may result in fewer sorties required. However, as maneuver battalions on offensive continue to seek location of enemy units, increased requirements for LZ construction, Prep and Helo escort tend to offset requirements for support of troops in contact. Consequently ground commander's requests for TACAIR have not lessened. Intelligence available at this Hq indicates an increase in enemy activity particularly in Quang Nam Province. Present allocation of preplanned sorties is not considered adequate.

C. MACV Analysis: COMUSMACV concurs with CG, III MAF, that the change in nature of friendly offensive operations, has not decreased the requirement for tactical air support, but has only changed the specifics of the requirement. While the emphasis on increased air support in I CTZ is appreciated, this need must be balanced against the needs of all other major ground commanders to make an equitable distribution of air assets in accordance with MACV priorities and threat requirements. Statistical evidence continues to support the fact that I CTZ receives a substantial proportion of the TACAIR support available.

Part III of VI: COMUSMACV areas of concern addressed to 7AF.

15. (S) During the course of the evaluation of the Single Management System for the period 30 May to 27 Jun 1968 the MACV Evaluation Group identified several areas of concern which warranted follow up action by 7AF. These areas are discussed below:

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(S) A. Area of concern: Inflexibility in scheduled TOT's, ordnance loads, mission change, surging, loiter time.

B. 7AF:

(1) The number of actual requests for changes to scheduled TOT's, ordnance loads and preplanned sorties received at 7AF can be measured. However, these changes will be consistently at variance with those change requests identified by the various ground force units. The major ground force command receives, from their subordinate units, requests for changes to preplanned missions. Upon receipt, some are refused, for a variety of reasons, by the senior ground commander. Those approved are in turn passed to MACV TASE for the DASC, dependent upon which portion of the frag is affected. TASE review the request prior to submission to TACC. This review process results in refusals. Therefore, 7AF TACC does not receive the number of requests for frag changes as are submitted as the TASE is designed to review the requests for validity and compatibility at the intermediate levels. Upon receipt of the request at the 7AF TACC, there are occasions when TOT's cannot be changed because of the incompatibility of turn around times, which, if approved, would preclude meeting other sortie commitments. Seventh AF is cognizant of the requirement to fulfill the ordnance commitments of the force commanders and endeavors to honor as far as possible. Some of the most common reasons for disappointing requests are as follows:

Load incompatibility with aircraft capability; for

example, 1000 pound bombs for an F-100.

Incompatibility of fusing with bomb configuration.

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M-1 extenders or delayed fuses with high drag bombs.

(C) Shortage of munitions, particularly M-1 extenders and napalm.

(D) Requirement to remain within the monthly munitions allocation.

(2) The above discussion addressed itself to the allegation of inflexibility in scheduled TOT's, ordnance and mission changes; but did not cover the flexibility of surging or loiter time.

Seventh Air Force takes strong exception that the forces are incapable of surging or that this fact has ever been demonstrated. At no time during the evaluation period has a surge been required or requested.

(3) The question of inflexibility of loiter times is not understood. Jet aircraft certainly have less on station time than the older propeller driven aircraft, but the real question to be answered is: Can the ground commander's requirements for air cover for a specific time be met? The fact that a particular aircraft has a time on target limitation is unimportant if sufficient air assets are available to keep continuous air over the area in question for the desired length of time. All our major tactical bases in South Vietnam maintain aircraft on an alert posture which can and are rapidly employed to fill any gaps that may develop.

C. MACV Analysis:

(1) Significant progress has been made. The requirement for flexibility is recognized and accepted by 7AF and the system continues to improve in responsiveness. Changes are being made to

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the scheduled TOT's at the request of the user, consistent with capabilities. This is a matter of continuing interest to MACV.

(2) Mission Change. Mission specifics are no longer part of the frag order. Specifics are prebriefed or passed to pilots in flight by the DASC or FAC.

(3) Surging. MACV concurs that the 7AF system is capable of necessary surge action when the situation so dictates.

(4) Loiter Time. The capability to loiter is being maximized by scheduling from nearby bases and the scramble of aircraft on alert posture to fill any continuing target coverage requirements.

17. (S) A. Area of Concern: IP and rendezvous point problems.

B. 7AF: There was an initial problem caused by lack of understanding of the system when it was first put into effect.

III MAF requested three changes to the reporting points in I Corps for Marine air, all of which have been accommodated. Since personnel have become familiar with the system, no further problems have been reported to 7AF.

C. MACV Analysis: This problem has been resolved by mutual agreement and understanding of both III MAF and 7AF and resolution of previously conflicting points of view.

18. (S) A. Area of Concern: Fragging out-of-country Marine strike sorties consistent with overall interdiction plan.

B. 7AF: COMUSMACV, in conjunction with his Deputy for Air, decides each Saturday just what percentage of the total air assets are to be applied to the out-of-country air effort. Because more

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Sorties have been allocated to the out-of-country effort than can be generated by out-of-country units, it is necessary to employ some of the in-country assets. The base locations and the type aircraft assigned dictate, to a large extent, which aircraft will be used. The northern bases are naturally more practical and, for example, most of the Da Nang effort is devoted to out-country operations. Presently 41 Marine sorties are being fraged out-of-country. This figure constitutes about 20 percent of the total number of sorties III MAF states can be supported. These 41 sorties are flown from either Da Nang or Chu Lai, both of which offer a logical choice for use in the out-of-country air effort. When the decision is made by COMUSMACV to reduce the number of sorties going out-of-country, the Marine sorties supporting this operation will be subsequently reduced.

C. MACV Analysis: Marine strike and RECCE assets are appropriately managed within the total air assets system. Marine strike sorties flown out-of-country are consistent with the overall interdiction plan and this therefore, is not considered to be a problem area at this time.

19. (S) A. Area of Concern: Alert pad ordnance mix.

B. 7AP: Aircraft on alert are intentionally configured with mixed loads so they can be responsive to a variety of situations.

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G. MACV Analysis: Concur in principle. Planning of alert pad ordnance mix must be constantly reviewed in the light of the ordnance mix requested by the ground commanders. Continuing attention must be focused to assure maximum response capacity.

20. (S) A. Area of Concern: Saturation of Panama CRC.

B. 7AF: On certain occasions, the Panama CRC has become saturated. In consideration of the vast amount of air traffic flowing into the I Corps area, with traffic peaks caused by special combat operations and adverse weather, this is not an unexpected situation. However, this was true before Single Management and was recognized over one year ago. The PACAF OPLAN 151-67 calls for an increase of four more air traffic control positions to be manned by trained controllers. The personnel (36 Controllers) are in place and are being utilized on the

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only two positions presently available. This scheduled increase in Panama's capability will not completely solve the problem but the traffic will be handled more efficiently than in the past. In addition, the US Army VR flight following system will be collocated with the air traffic control facility to insure closer coordination. The entire project has a priority of 1-9 and the building to house the joint operation will be finished about 1 Sep 68. In addition, continuous efforts are being made to more efficiently integrate the available CRC with the CRPs in the area.

C. MACV Analysis: This problem is receiving appropriate attention from CDR, 7 AF. The situation continues to improve.

21. (S) A. Areal of Concern: CRC and CRP familiarity with current frag procedures and control requirements.

B. 7 AF: The system experienced some growing pains and minor revisions have been made to smooth out the operations. Seventh Air Force is not aware of a problem in this area at this time.

C. MACV Analysis: Concur. This problem appears to have been resolved by increased familiarity with the system on the part of operating personnel.

22. (S) A. Area of Concern: Relocation of I DASC.

B. 7 AF: I DASC will not be relocated, rather a new DASC is being activated. The collocation of the new DASC within CG, III MAF's Headquarters is consistent with basic principles of the Joint Air Ground Operations System (JAGOS) and should do much to

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enhance the coordination of both the principals and working level personnel involved. The only disadvantage foreseen is the decentralization of a degree of control between the three DASCs within the I Corps Tactical Zone. However, this should be overcome to a significant extent by the continuing subordination of DASC Victor to Horn DASC and the assignment of the USAF Horn DASC Director as the senior Free World Force DASC Director in the area.

C. MACV Analysis: The CG, I ARVN Corps declined to authorize the movement of the RVNAF portion of I DASC, and consequently I DASC will remain in its present location, less the USAF/FWMAF portion thereof. Horn DASC, collocated with III MAF, is expected to provide the responsiveness desired by CG, III MAF, without a degradation of coordination between RVNAF I DASC and Horn DASC. The coordination required will be a responsibility of the Director of Horn DASC who retains his advisory functions with I DASC.

23. (S) A. Area of Concern: Ordnance stockage levels.

B. 7 AF: 7 AF does not have an unlimited supply of all types of munitions and the expenditures of each type has to be closely monitored to insure that the strategic reserves are not depleted because of over expenditures. The addition of the four F-100 squadrons into S&A has caused a strain on the existing ordnance stockpiles, but scheduled shipment should supply relief by Aug 68. To insure that all ALCs and PACs are cognizant of those

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munitions limited by the stockpile, a bi-monthly report is furnished each DASC. This affords the ALO the opportunity of knowing which munitions are in short supply and enables him to advise the ground commanders of suitable substitutes.

C. MACV Analysis: The real problem here is the degree to which users' valid requirements for ordnance are being met. The ultimate objective is the adjustment of authorized stockage and expenditure levels to the end that proper types and quantities of ordnance are available to meet the users needs. Variety of stockage should continually adjust to the requestors demand. Appropriate records of the requirements should be reflected in adjusted stockage levels of desired ordnance.

24. (S) A. Area of Concern: Coordination with ground forces on fragging of under-expended ordnance in substitution.

B. 7 AF: Although TACC attempts to frag the ordnance requested by the user, there are times when the requested munition is impractical or a poor choice. For example, 750 lb bombs for convoy cover. When this occurs, substitutions are made and the requestor is advised through TASE. Further, since a bi-monthly stock level of munitions is furnished to the DASCs, coordination and preplanning by the ground units with TOC personnel should enhance proper selection of ordnance.

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C. MACV Analysis: 7 AF provides appropriate expertise in the proper selection of ordnance for a given targets. The real problem here, to be given further consideration, is to ensure that the fragging of under-expended ordnance in substitution is compatible with the request and consistent with the tactical situation.

25. (S) A. Area of Concern: Deficiencies in out-country air utilization in-country.

B. 7 AF: This problem has been recognized by 7 AF. The environment that the out of country forces have been dealing with is entirely foreign to in-country close air support operations. Many staff visits have been made to the out-country units to brief the crews on the proper procedures and techniques to be used for in-country operations; out-country crews have flown on scheduled FAC sorties and TACC has conducted conferences for DCOs on problems associated with in-country operations. The 7 AF staff will continue to strive for improved operations in all areas.

C. MACV Analysis: 7 AF recognizes this problem and appropriate action is being taken to correct deficiencies.

26. (S) A. Area of Concern: Shortage of FACs and FAC Aircraft.

B. 7 AF: There is presently a shortage of FACs and FAC aircraft as a result of heavy combat losses and the introduction of new ground units. The ever increasing new requirements (such as the CMD night rocket patrol) for this limited resource aids in compounding the problem. The overall shortage is further amplified by the extremely limited number of FACs and FAC

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aircraft furnished by the USMC. The SEA requirement for 325 USAF FACs, as requested by 7th AF, has been justified and manning toward this figure has begun with a total of 711 (vs 600 as of 1 Jul 68) scheduled into the system. A similar requirement for 442 FAC aircraft has been justified. Sixteen additional O-1 aircraft are scheduled to arrive in Aug 68, the OV-10 is being introduced into the theater in the same month and a new O-2A buy will provide more deliveries in Jan 69. Thus the problem has been faced by the USAF and the ultimate solution is dependent upon production capabilities. In the meantime USMC FAC and FAC aircraft added to the system would certainly help alleviate the present problem.

C. MACV Analysis: This problem is receiving continuing attention from CDR, 7 AF. The increase of 111 FACs in the past 30 day period, coupled with the scheduled arrival of new and additional aircraft indicates that the problem will be resolved.

27. (S) A. Area of Concern: Arc Light preemption of Skyspot radar availability.

B. 7 AF: This problem has been addressed at 7 AF and the procedures have been refined to reduce the amount of time blocked for Arc Light missions. Previously, two and sometimes three radar sites were blocked for periods of over 1 1/2 hours for each Arc Light mission. This procedure has been changed as follows: Time

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is blocked for a period from one hour prior to the last scheduled release through the last actual release. If the mission has a second run capability, only one site is blocked; if no second run capability exists, a back up site is also blocked for the same period. There are limited MSQ-77 resources and MACV determines the Arc Lights required, thus utilizing the MSQ-77 for these higher priority missions. When an Arc Light strike does preempt fighter strikes, every effort is made to slip the fighters. This frequently cannot be accomplished because the aircraft are scheduled for a later mission and cannot meet the turn around times if slipped.

C. MACV Analysis: Because of their larger bomb loads and longer flight time Arc Light missions must be given priority over fighter strikes for the use of MSQ-77 radar. The problem of radar conflict becomes acute only when intense Arc Light programs are run in one area. The refined procedures by 7 AF have reduced Arc Light radar preemption time by approximately 50% and should greatly reduce the problem of radar conflict.

Part IV of VI: MACV analysis of CG, II MAF comments contained in paragraphs 4,5, and 6 of reference C.

26. (3) A. Para 4, Ref C: Difficulty has been encountered in obtaining prompt aerial photography. For example, photographs of newly prepared helicopter landing zone are needed within six hours to determine what obstacles still exist and to brief pilots

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who must land before obstacles can be cleared. Although sympathetic understanding is found at all levels, normal request chain is too long to meet tight deadline for delivery. Believe the answer is to use immediate air support request channels for photo sorties with III MAF/I DASC having scramble authority and air delivery of prints to requesting unit.

B. MACV Analysis: Concur in principle that timely delivery of reconnaissance photographs is a problem. However, it is not primarily caused by the length of the request chain, but rather by the location of limited photographic processing and aerial delivery means. A study of this problem will be conducted to determine the most practical solution. As an interim measure starting 3 July 68 the following procedure was adopted: III MAF requests for rapid response aerial photography are passed to J2 TASE by telephone, accompanied by a recommendation to use 1st MAW assets to accomplish the mission. J2 TASE obtains the concurrence of the 7 AF Recce Duty Officer and passes this authorization to the requestor to task the 1st MAW direct.

29. (S) A. Para 5, Ref C: Another area in which SM is not meeting needs of ground units is number of TPQ-10 (CSS) sorties fraged. Prior to 20 March, First MAW was providing approximately 94 TPQ-10 (CSS) sorties on daily basis: 42 for 1st MARDIV and 52 for 3rd MARDIV. Since SM, 1st MARDIV has requested 37 TPQ-10 (CSS) sorties and been allocated average of 9 per day while 3rd MARDIV

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requested 53 and allocated 13 per day. Marine ground commanders have been requesting about the same number as before but have only been allocated 24 percent of number received prior to SM. TPQ-10 (CSS) offers accurate means of hitting targets which cannot be located by airborne FAC for visual attack and in addition can bring weight of air attack on enemy when he least expects it. Its effective use over a 24 hour period is essential to both Marine and Army units and should be substantially increased.

B. MACV Analysis: Under Single Management, CG, III MAF, determines the proportion of CSS to FAC missions to be flown within TACAIR assets provided. During this report period III MAF received a total daily average of 225 sorties of which 35 were requested and executed as CSS (21 for USMC units, 12 for USA units and 2 for ROK units). An increased requirement from 21 to 90 CSS for Marine units is well within the capabilities of TPQ/MSQ-77 radars and the air assets provided. Had III MAF chosen to establish this requirement it would have been fulfilled. However, any increase in the number of CSS sorties would result in a like reduction in the number of FAC sorties available to III MAF.

30. (S) A. Para 6, Ref C: In summary, SM system saw only minor changes during past month. Changes recommended last month in reference C (CG, III MAF 300636Z Jun 68) are still applicable and would improve system. In particular, return to this HQ scheduling authority for in-country 1st MAW sorties to be used as

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required in support of all units in I GTZ would increase flexibility and enhance responsiveness to needs of all III MAF ground commanders. COMUSMACV has means for influencing action throughout RVN by increasing/decreasing Air Force sorties provided to III MAF. * * * * *

B. MACV Analysis: MACV concurred in 5 of the 9 recommendations made in the III MAF Evaluation Report 300636Z Jun 68. Four of these have been implemented and are currently being followed under Single Management. Action on the implementation of the fifth recommendation i.e., the full coordination of surface supporting arms with tactical air, has not been completed. MACV views on III MAF recommendations not concurred in are stated in Ref B.

C. (1) III MAF recommendation: Para 6A, Ref C. "Establish procedure so that changes to preplanned frag can be made through Immediate Air Request Channels."

(2) MACV Analysis: Concur. The procedure following is planned for incorporation in the revision of MACV Directive 95-4: Changes to the weekly frag that are known a sufficient time in advance should be forwarded to TASE along with requests for daily frag resources. Such changes are considered as preplanned and can most easily be processed in the preplanned channel. All other changes to approved frag (both daily and weekly) should be passed from the major ground commands to their supporting DASC.

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The internal procedure for processing these late changes is left to the discretion of the major ground commander. He may use either immediate or preplanned channels depending upon requirements for coordination and availability of time to process the changes.

D. (1) III MAF recommendation: Para 6B, Ref C: "Provide for rapid response imagery reconnaissance through use of immediate air support request channels and delivery of prints by air as required to meet stated deadlines."

(2) MACV Analysis: Concur in principle that a requirement exists for rapid response imagery. Increased attention is being focused on this subject.

E. (1) III MAF recommendation: Para 6C, Ref C: "Increase use of CSS to keep enemy under attack on 24 hour a day basis."

(2) MACV Analysis: The number of CSS sorties used by the ground commander is within his option in managing his total allocation of TACAIR. If he chooses to increase CSS sorties it can be done at the expense of reducing the number of FAC sorties available to him.

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Part V of VI: Overall MACV analysis of changes made, improvement, action taken, and areas requiring further attention.

31. (S)A. MACV assessment of the analysis data above indicates that progress continues to be made in mutual understanding of problems involved, and in making the mechanics of the system more responsive and more effective. Since the establishment of Single Management, there has been more interest, analysis, judgement and decision action in the allocation and utilization of TACAIR resources than ever before, at all action levels, within ground elements and within air echelons as well. Despite the differences of opinion, and temporary misunderstandings which have existed, the overall result has been better TACAIR support when and where it is needed throughout MACV areas of responsibility (including Route Package I and Laos). The system provides decision options at all management levels, from COMUSMACV on down, to assure that the TACAIR resources support the critical combat plans and operations. The weekly COMUSMACV assessment and subsequent direction of TACAIR allocation percentages assures the application of TACAIR emphasis where the theater situation dictates. This is reflected in TASE allocations and in 7AF weekly and daily frag orders. Field force commanders can exercise options in the sub-allocation of weekly and daily frag commitments. Air wings are more responsive to validated change requirements; DASCs are more knowledgeable and responsive to field force and ground unit individualized requirements; division, brigade and battalion G3 and S3 staff personnel

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continually improving their proficiency in exploiting the optional advantages built into the system. ALOs and FACs possess a better understanding than ever before of the mechanics of the TACAIR support system as it relates to their functions at the operational level. The TACS is doing a better, more responsive job than ever before, from both a control and safety standpoint. The TASE workload is more manageable and TASE reaction to field force requirements is more realistic. Example Lancaster II: (16-26 July phase). A late and out-of-normal channel request for TACAIR support was treated as an emergency situation and 90 sorties were provided specifically for initiation of this 3d Mar Div operation. 7AF provided 40 sorties by diversion from Route Package I and Laos, 10 CSS sorties by surging, and 40 sorties from the regular daily frag. The total III MAF daily frag allocation for that date represented 84 per cent of the daily frag compared to an average of 40 to 50 per cent. For succeeding days of operation, lack of significant contact permitted a gradual reduction of TACAIR daily frag preplanned support, i.e., 71 per cent the second day, 56 per cent the third day, and thereafter to the termination of this phase of the operation no more than the usual average of 40 to 50 per cent. The TASE was responsive to the need, allocated appropriate support for initiation of the operation, including air diverted from out-of-country tasks, and through monitoring of the daily tactical situation acquired the information necessary to make a realistic reapportionment of air support for succeeding days in which contact

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was light. This enabled continued support of major ground commands in other corps tactical zones which they would have been deprived of on the daily frag in order to provide the level of support initially estimated to be appropriate for this phase of Lancaster II. This is a good example of the value of the current system of management, under which each major ground commander has a firm basis (i.e., the weekly frag) on which to plan support of his operations, with the capability to acquire a significant increased support in relation to other major ground commanders, for daily frag resources to support an increased tempo of operations. Another fine example of the value of single management is displayed in the cooperation between 7AF and III MAF in solving the problem of radar dead space in I CTZ. The MSQ-77 site at ~~the Phu Beit (Milky)~~ had continually encountered masking problems in certain of the mountainous areas to the south of Da Nang. Complete coverage of this area could not be obtained from the MSQ-77 site at Pleiku (Bongo) for the same reason. To improve the combat sky spot capability in this area, through joint Marine/Air Force negotiations, the TPQ-10 Marine ASRAT was relocated from Khe Sanh to Chu Lai. This significantly increased the Tactical Air Strike capability employing Combat Sky Spot techniques in I CTZ.

B. Improvements in Single Management during this report period:

(1) Increased familiarity by tactical air control and management personnel has improved the operational efficiency of Single Management. (Para 2 Ref C, and Para 9 C, 17 and 21 this report)

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- (2) The use of Weekly Air Support Planning Conferences by ground commanders has resulted in a more effective utilization of TACAIR assets. (Para 10)
- (3) Revised procedures by 7 AF for conducting ARC Light Missions has greatly reduced the intensity of competition for use of radar. (Para 27)
- (4) The establishment of Horn DASC within the III MAF compound will improve responsiveness of the supporting DASC to the desires of CG, III MAF. Horn DASC will become the Senior FWF DASC in CTZ and should be operational around 10 Aug 68. (Para 8 and 22)
- (5) Improved CSS Radar coverage in I CTZ through the joint Marine/Air Force coordination and relocation of TPQ-10 radar. (Para 31 A)
- (6) Increased responsiveness of TACAIR to ground commanders requirements. (Para 12, 13, 16C and 31A)
- (7) Improved coordination and control of Marine and Air Force aircraft employed in I CTZ. (Para 11 and 20)
- (8) Improved effectiveness of out country Interdiction Program through the coordination and integration of Marine and Air Force strike assets. (Para 18)
- (9) Improved effectiveness in the use of out-country based aircraft in-country. (Para 25)
- (10) Increased FAC capability. (Para 26)
- C. Areas for continued attention and action:
- (1) Flight safety assurance in relation to ground supporting

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fires. (Para 5)

(2) The degree to which valid requests for TOT changes are met.

(Para 16)

(3) The availability of air munitions by types and quantities sufficient to meet users' valid requirements. (Para 23)

(4) Modification of established photo reconnaissance procedures to satisfy demand for rapid response. (Para 28)

(5) Revision of MACV Directive 95-4 to enable changes to pre-planned frag through the Immediate Air Request Net. (Para 30C (2))

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Part VI of VI: Comparison figures of TACAIR Strike support of III
MAF/PCV prior to Single Management and subsequent to 20 March
implementation.

Before SM	1st MAW	USAF	TOTAL
Jan 68	5330	1188	6518
Feb 68	5161	1270	6431
After SM			
May 68	7040	3625	10,665
June 68	5687	3809	9,496
July 68	5034	3325	8,359
(THOR) July	630	861	1,991 (Includes 500 Navy)

32. (S) In examination of these statistical comparisons it must
be recognized that there are several factors which influence this
escalation such as:

Monsoon seasonal effects

Additional strike assets available

COMUSMACV weight of emphasis

However, these statistics demonstrate the fact that there has been
no diminution of tactical air strike emphasis in I CTZ since the
advent of Single Management, in relation to the number of Friendly
Maneuver Battalions supported.

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FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV SGN

INFO RUMUFKA/CDR SEVENTH AF TSN

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SUBJ: EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT STRIKE SUPPORT PROCEDURES (U)

REF: A. COMUSMACV 130410Z SEP 68 (S)

B. CG III MAF 300636Z JUN 68 (S)

C. CG III MAF 291442Z JUL 68 (S)

D. COMUSMACV LTR MACCCC 2 OF 15 JUL 68 (S)

E. CG III MAF 180624Z JUL 68 (S)

F. MACV DIR 525-4

G. FMFM 7-1 (FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION)

H. FMFM 7-3 (AIR SUPPORT)

1. (S) REF A SOLICITED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROCEDURAL CHANGES TO MACV DIRECTIVES 95-4 AND 95-13 WHERE DIFFICULTIES IN SUPPORTING ARMS/TACTICAL AIR COORDINATION WERE BEING EXPERIENCED. REF B INDICATED COORDINATION DEFICIENCIES EXISTED IN ICTZ. REF C ANSWERED A SPECIFIC QUESTION

HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG G-3

CONCURR ARTY WING G-3 (OPNS) G-3

REL C/S

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA3028 SECRET

CONTAINED IN REF D PERTAINING TO FIRE SUPPORT/TACTICAL AIR COORDINATION. REF E ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES W/IN ICTZ FOR FIRE SUPPORT/TACTICAL AIR COORDINATION. REF F ESTABLISHES ARTILLERY COORDINATION FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE. REF G AND H DESCRIBE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AN AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM.
2. (U) MACV DIRECTIVES 95-4 AND 95-13 HAVE BEEN REVIEWED. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 HAS NO DIRECT BEARING ON SUBJECT AND IS CONSIDERED ADEQUATE WITHOUT REVISION.

3. (S) MACV DIRECTIVES 95-13 AND 525-4 SET FORTH AVIATION ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM AND ARTILLERY COORDINATION FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE. THESE DIRECTIVES SHOULD BE COMBAINED IN ONE DIRECTIVE. RELIANCE UPON BDE TACP'S AS CONTROLLING AGENCIES POSES PROBLEMS FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT IN THAT AIRCRAFT PASS FROM ONE CONTROLLING AGENCY AREA TO ANOTHER IN SHORT PERIODS OF TIME. COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES AND EXTENSIVE FREQUENCY CHANGES LEAD TO DEGRADATION OF THE MISSION BY EXCESSIVE LOITER TIME. WHERE TARGET LIES ON BRIGADE/DIVISION BOUNDARIES, COORDINATION WITH EACH MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED TO ENSURE SAFETY PRIOR TO CONDUCTING MISSION ADDING TO UNPRODUCTIVE LOITER TIME.

4. (S) IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT CONCEPT OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 BE EXTENDED FROM AN ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM TO AN AIR/GROUND

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA3028 S E C R E T
 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS THE
 FOLLOWING CHANGES TO 95-13 ARE SUGGESTED:

A. EXPAND FUNCTIONS OF ARTILLERY WARNING CONTROL CENTERS
 (AWCC) TO INCLUDE TACTICAL AIR/RECONNAISSANCE COORDINATION
 AT EACH COMMAND LEVEL FROM BATTALION THROUGH CORPS.

B. CHANGE NAME OF AWCC TO A TITLE MORE DESCRIPTIVE OF
 ITS EXPANDED FUNCTION.

C. COMBINE CONTENTS OF MACV DIRECTIVES 95-13 AND 525-4.

5. (S) THIS SYSTEM WOULD MAXIMIZE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE
 EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING ARMS, BOTH AIR AND GROUND. ABRUPT
 SILENCING OF GROUND FIRES TO ACCOMMODATE AIR SUPPORT/RECON-
 NAISSANCE OFTEN SERVES TO DETRIMENT OF BOTH AIR AND GROUND
 UNITS. WITH FACILITIES FOR CLOSE COORDINATION, GROUND FIRES
 CAN BE SHIFTED, NOT SECURED, DURING AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS
 THEREBY CONTINUING PRESSURE ON ENEMY AND PROVIDING FLAK
 SUPPRESSION FOR ATTACKING AIRCRAFT. DEGREE OF CONTROL AND
 COORDINATION NECESSARY TO HARMONIZE AIR AND GROUND SUPPORTING
 FIRES IS ONLY AVAILABLE THROUGH A CENTRALLY CONTROLLED, COL-
 LOCATED SYSTEM WITH COMPETENT AIR REPRESENTATION PARALLELING
 GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM AT EACH COMMAND LEVEL.

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA3028 S E C R E T
 6. (U) WHEN CONSIDERING EXPANSION OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13
 ATTENTION IS INVITED TO REFS G AND H WHICH CONTAIN SPECIFIC
 DETAILS AND PARTICULARS OF AN ESTABLISHED AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT
 COORDINATION SYSTEM.

GP-4
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PTTSZYUW RHMAFAI077 2820810-SSSS--RUEBHOA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 080810Z OCT 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

INFO RUEBHOA/CMC

P 240812Z SEP 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO COMUSMACV SGN

INFO CDR SEVENTH AF TSM

CG FIRST MAW DNG

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT STRIKE SUPPORT PROCEDURES (1)

REF: A. COMUSMACV 130410Z SEP 68 (S)

B. CG III MAF 300636Z JUN 68 (S)

C. CG III MAF 291442Z JUL 68 (S)

D. COMUSMACV LTR MACCOC 2 OF 15 JUL 68 (S)

E. CG III MAF 180624Z JUL 68 (S)

F. MACV DIR 525-4

G. FMFM 7-1 (FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION)

H. FMFM 7-3 (AIR SUPPORT)

I. (S) REF A SOLICITED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROCEDURAL CHANGES.

HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG G-3

REL G-3

PAGE TWO RHMAFAI077 **S E C R E T**

DIRECTIVES 95-4 AND 95-13 WHERE DIFFICULTIES IN SUPPORTING ARTILLERY/TACTICAL AIR COORDINATION WERE BEING EXPERIENCED. REF B INDICATED COORDINATION DEFICIENCIES EXISTED IN ICTZ. REF C ANSWERED A SPECIFIC QUESTION CONTAINED IN REF D PERTAINING TO FIRE SUPPORT/TACTICAL AIR COORDINATION. REF E ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES W/IN ICTZ FOR FIRE SUPPORT/TACTICAL AIR COORDINATION. REF F ESTABLISHES ARTILLERY COORDINATION FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE. REF G AND H DESCRIBE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AN AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM.

2. (U) MACV DIRECTIVES 95-4 AND 95-13 HAVE BEEN REVIEWED. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 HAS NO DIRECT BEARING ON SUBJECT AND IS CONSIDERED ADEQUATE WITHOUT REVISION.

3. (S) MACV DIRECTIVES 95-13 AND 524-4 SET FORTH AVIATION ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM AND ARTILLERY COORDINATION FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE. THESE DIRECTIVES SHOULD BE COMBINED IN ONE DIRECTIVE. RELIANCE UPON EDE TACP'S AS CONTROLLING AGENCIES POSES PROBLEMS FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT IN THAT AIRCRAFT PASS FROM ONE CONTROLLING AGENCY AREA TO ANOTHER IN SHORT PERIODS OF TIME. COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES AND EXTENSIVE FREQUENCY CHANGES LEAD TO DEGRADATION OF THE MISSION BY EXCESSIVE LOITER TIME. WHERE TARGET LIES ON BRIGADE/DIVISION BOUNDARIES, COORDINATION WITH EACH MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED TO ENSURE SAFETY PRIOR TO CONDUCT-

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA1077 S E C R E T

ING MISSION ADDING TO UNPRODUCTIVE LOITER TIME.

4. (S) IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT CONCEPT OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 BE EXTENDED FROM AN ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM TO AN AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS THE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO 95-13 ARE SUGGESTED:

A. EXPAND FUNCTIONS OF ARTILLERY WARNING CONTROL CENTERS (AWCC) TO INCLUDE TACTICAL AIR/RECONNAISSANCE COORDINATION AT EACH COMMAND LEVEL FROM BATTALION THROUGH CORPS.

B. CHANGE NAME OF AWCC TO A TITLE MORE DESCRIPTIVE OF ITS EXPANDED FUNCTION.

C. COMBINE CONTENTS OF MACV DIRECTIVES 95-13 AND 525-4.

5. (S) THIS SYSTEM WOULD MAXIMIZE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING ARMS, BOTH AIR AND GROUND. ABRUPT SILENCING OF GROUND FIRES TO ACCOMMODATE AIR SUPPORT/RECONNAISSANCE OFTEN SERVES TO DETRIMENT OF BOTH AIR AND GROUND UNITS. WITH FACILITIES FOR CLOSE COORDINATION, GROUND FIRES CAN BE SHIFTED, NOT SECURED, DURING AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS THEREBY CONTINUING PRESSURE ON ENEMY AND PROVIDING FLAK SUPPRESSION FOR ATTACKING AIRCRAFT. DEGREE OF CONTROL AND COORDINATION NECESSARY TO HARMONIZE AIR AND GROUND SUPPORTING

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA1077 S E C R E T

FIRES IS ONLY AVAILABLE THROUGH A CENTRALLY CONTROLLED, COLLOCATED SYSTEM WITH COMPETENT AIR REPRESENTATION PARALLELING GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM AT EACH COMMAND LEVEL.

6. (U) WHEN CONSIDERATING EXPANSION OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 ATTENTION IS INVITED TO REFS G AND H WHICH CONTAIN SPECIFIC DETAILS AND PARTICULARS OF AN ESTABLISHED AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM.

CP-4

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DE RUMHAW 0077 2631005
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 190910Z SEP 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

ACT G-3
 INFO G-2
 COPY TO ADJ S/S G-6

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COORDINATION OF AIR AND GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF FIGHTER/ATTACK AIRCRAFT (U)

- A. COMUSMACV 130410Z SEP 68 (S)
 B. CG III MAF 141400Z SEP 68 (S)
 C. FMFM 7-1 (FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION)
 D. FMFM 7-3 (AIR SUPPORT)

1. (C) REF A REQUESTED SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FROM IZC AS TO HOW MACV DIRECTIVES 95-4 AND 95-13 SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO FACILITATE SUPPORTING ARMS/TACTICAL AIR COORDINATION DIFFICULTIES BEING EXPERIENCED IN IOTZ. REF B REQUESTED BEST MAW COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON REF A. REF C PROVIDES DETAILS ON FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION. SECTION III OF REF D DESCRIBES THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF AN AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM.
 2. (U) MACV DIRECTIVES 95-4 AND 95-13 HAVE BEEN REVIEWED. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 HAS NO BEARING ON THE SUBJ MATTER AND IS CONSIDERED

PAGE TWO RUMHAW 0077 SECRET
 ADEQUATE WITHOUT REVISION.

3. (C) MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 SETS FORTH AN AVIATION ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM. WHEREAS THIS SYSTEM OFFERS A MEANS OF PROVIDING ARTILLERY WARNING TO PASSING AIRCRAFT IT CONTRIBUTES LITTLE TO THE COORDINATION OF AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES. TO MAXIMIZE THE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING ARMS, SUPPORTING FIRES, BOTH AIR AND GROUND, MUST BE BLENDED INTO PERFECT CONCERT. THE ABRUPT SILENCING OF GROUND FIRES TO ACCOMMODATE AIR SUPPORT OFTEN SERVES TO THE DETRIMENT OF BOTH AIR AND GROUND UNITS. WITH FACILITIES FOR CLOSE COORDINATION, GROUND FIRES CAN BE SHIFTED, NOT SECURED, DURING AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS THEREBY CONTINUING PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY AND PROVIDING FLACK SUPPRESSION FOR ATTACKING AIRCRAFT. THE DEGREE OF CONTROL AND COORDINATION NECESSARY TO HARMONIZE AIR AND GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES IS ONLY AVAILABLE THROUGH A CENTRALLY CONTROLLED, CO-LOCATED SYSTEM WITH COMPETENT AIR REPRESENTATION PARALLELING THE GROUND FIRE SUPPORT

CONTROL COORDINATION SYSTEM AT EACH COMMAND LEVEL FROM BATTALION THROUGH CORPS.

4. (S) ACCORDINGLY, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE CONCEPT OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 BE EXTENDED FROM AN ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM TO AN AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM TO ACCOMPLISH THIS

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PAGE THREE RUMHAW 0077 S E C R E T

THE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO 95-13 ARE SUGGESTED :

- A. EXPAND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ARTILLERY WARNING CENTER (AWCC) TO INCLUDE CONTROL OF AIR SUPPORT WITHIN THE TAOR.
- B. PROVIDE FOR THE AWCC TO INCLUDE AN APPROPRIATE AIR CONTROL ELEMENT CO-LOCATED WITH EACH GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER (GFSCC) DOWN TO BATTALION LEVEL. THE AIR CONTROL ELEMENT MUST BE ORGANIZED TO EFFECT RAPID AND FULL COORDINATION WITH SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT AND MUST HAVE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABLE OF ASSURING POSITIVE CONTROL OF AIR SUPPORT.
- C. CHANGE THE NAME OF THE AWCC TO SOMETHING MORE DESCRIPTIVE OF ITS EXPANDED FUNCTION.
5. (U) WHEN CONSIDERING THE EXPANSION OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13, ATTENTION IS INVITED TO REFS C AND D WHICH CONTAIN DETAILS AND PARTICULARS OF AN ESTABLISHED AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM.

GP-4

BT

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SECRET

PROO 37
RHSZVHJ RHMSVA 3272 2621430-SSSS--RHMAFA:

ZNY SSSSS
P 18140Z SEP 68
FM COMUSMACV

ACT G-3

INFO G-2 G-4

COPY TO ADJ S/S G-6

TO ZEN/CDR 7TH AF TSN
RHMAFA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ OA NANG
RUMVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ NHA TRANG
RUMVCA/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ LONG BINH
RUMLLA/SA IV CTZ CAN THO

FEO

BT

SECRET 2763

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)

REF: A. COMUSMACV 27007 DTG 130350Z SEP 68 (S) (NOTAL)

B. JCS 2497 DTG 202253Z MAY 68 (S) (NOTAL)

THIS MESSAGE IS IN THREE PARTS

PART ONE FOR ALL

1. (S) EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR FOR THE PERIOD 270600H JUL TO 260600H AUG. REF A, IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING TWO AREAS OF CONTINUING COMUSMACV INTEREST:
 - A. THE DEGREE TO WHICH CHANGES TO FRAGGED TOT'S ARE MADE IN RESPONSE TO USER REQUESTS.
 - B. THE AVAILABILITY OF AIR MUNITIONS BY TYPE AND QUANTITIES

PAGE 2 RHMSVA 3272 SECRET

TO MEET USERS' REQUIREMENTS.

2. (U) ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES PROVIDE THAT REQUESTS FOR CHANGES TO WEEKLY FRAGGED TOT'S OR ORDONANCE ARE TO BE FORWARDED BY MAJOR GROUND COMMANDERS TO MACV TASE ALONG WITH THE DAILY REQUEST FOR RESOURCES, OR PRIOR TO THE PUBLICATION OF THE DAILY FRAG. REQUESTS FOR CHANGES TO FRAGGED TOT'S OR ORDONANCE THAT COULD NOT BE ANTICIPATED EARLY ENOUGH TO COMPLY WITH THE FOREGOING PROCEDURE ARE TO BE PASSED FROM MAJOR GROUND COMMANDERS TO THE SUPPORTING DAS; OVER THE IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST NET.

3. (S) IN SOME CASES COMMANDERS MAY BE REQUESTING AIR MUNITIONS KNOWN TO BE AVAILABLE IN THE INVENTORY RATHER THAN THOSE TYPES ACTUALLY DESIRED. A POSSIBLE RESULT OF THIS SYSTEM COULD BE A PERPETUATION OF SHORTAGES OF CERTAIN TYPES OF AIR MUNITIONS FOR WHICH THERE IS ACTUALLY A HIGH DEMAND. ACTION MAY BE REQUIRED TO ADJUST AIR MUNITION STORAGE TO ENSURE ADEQUATE QUANTITIES OF AIR MUNITIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO SATISFY USER DESIRES MORE CLOSELY.

PART TWO FOR CG, I FFORCEV, CG, II FFORCEV AND SA, IV CTZ.

4. (U) REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS RELATIVE TO THE ABOVE TWO AREAS OF CONTINUING INTEREST NLT 290600H SEP 68.

PART THREE FOR CG, III MAF AND CDR, 7AF

PAGE 3 RHMSVA 3272 SECRET

5. (U) REQUEST CG, III MAF COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE TWO AREAS OF CONTINUING INTEREST BE INCLUDED IN SEPTEMBER SINGLE MANAGEMENT REPORT REQUIRED BY REF B NLT 290600H SEP 68.

6. (U) REQUEST CDR, 7AF SEPTEMBER SINGLE MANAGEMENT REPORT REQUIRED BY REF B NLT 030600H OCT 68. PERTINENT PORTIONS OF CG, III MAF SEPTEMBER SINGLE MANAGEMENT REPORT AND COMMENTS FROM MAJOR COMMANDERS WILL BE FURNISHED CDR, 7AF FOR APPROPRIATE COMMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN REQUIRED REPORT.

GP-4

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE
FOR
HAS BEEN SENT

PP RUHKM
 DE RHMAFA 1908 2600132
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 160132Z SEP 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKM/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN BUSE FROM
 LTGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOL MSG RECD THIS DATE AND IS QUOTED BELOW FOR YOUR INFO:
 QUOTE

FOR LTG CUSHMAN AND GEN BROWN FROM GEN ABRAMS

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)

REF: CG III MAF 090300Z SEP 68 (NOTAL) (S)

1. (S) YOUR PROPOSAL FOR A THIRTY DAY TRIAL PERIOD OF III MAF
 MISSION DIRECTION OF 1ST MAW IN-COUNTRY STRIKE ASSETS HAS BEEN
 GIVEN CAREFUL APPRAISAL.

2. (S) I FIND THAT IT WOULD HAVE EFFECTS GOING FAR BEYOND THE
 MODIFICATION ITSELF. AN IMMEDIATE EFFECT AT THIS LEVEL WOULD BE TO
 DEPRIVE ME OF A SINGLE MANAGER FOR AIR AND ESTABLISH TWO MANAGERS
 AS CHANNELS FOR DIRECTION OF SEPARATE SEGMENTS OF THE TOTAL AIR

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 1908 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)
 EFFORT. ONE OF THESE WOULD BE CG, III MAF, AND THE OTHER MY
 DEPUTY FOR AIR OPERATIONS. THIS WOULD BE COMPLICATED ARRANGE-
 MENT WHICH WOULD NOT FULFILL MY REQUIREMENTS

3. (S) THIS REQUIREMENT IS FOR A SINGLE COMMANDER TO DIRECT
 THE TOTAL TACTICAL AIR EFFORT, BOTH IN-COUNTRY AND OUT-COUNTRY, IN
 CONSONANCE WITH MY GUIDANCE. THE PROPOSED REVISION IS NOT IN
 ACCORD WITH THIS REQUIREMENT, AND IN CONSEQUENCE IS NOT APPROVED

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

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HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			COMUSMACV		15 SEP 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
			151116Z SEP 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					<p>REMARKS</p> <p>CG - Recommend transmission to CMC & CG FOR Pac</p> <p>FOR</p> <p>Yes</p> <p>9/14/68</p> <p>DONE</p> <p>H2H</p> <p>SIS</p> <p>Reg Copy for CG 1st Lt AW</p> <p>Reg</p> <p>CG2</p> <p>Done!</p> <p>9/17/68</p> <p>RED</p>
4	DCG			9/16	Red	
5	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	9/16		H	
	G-1					
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	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

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PTTSZYUW RHMSMVA2718 2591216-SSSS--RHMAFA.
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 151116Z SEP 68 ZFF-1
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF DA NANG
 INFO ZEN/CDR 7AF TSN
 BT

S E C R E T 27279

FOR LTG CUSHMAN AND GEN BROWN FROM GEN ABRAMS

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)

REF: CG III MAF 090300Z SEP 68 (NOTAL) (S)

1. (S) YOUR PROPOSAL FOR A THIRTY DAY TRIAL PERIOD OF III MAF MISSION DIRECTION OF 1ST MAW IN-COUNTRY STRIKE ASSETS HAS BEEN GIVEN CAREFUL APPRAISAL.

2. (S) I FIND THAT IT WOULD HAVE EFFECTS GOING FAR BEYOND THE MODIFICATION ITSELF. AN IMMEDIATE EFFECT AT THIS LEVEL WOULD BE TO DEPRIVE ME OF A SINGLE MANAGER FOR AIR AND ESTABLISH TWO MANAGERS AS CHANNELS FOR DIRECTION OF SEPARATE SEGMENTS OF THE TOTAL AIR EFFORT. ONE OF THESE WOULD BE CG, III MAF, AND THE OTHER MY DEPUTY FOR AIR OPERATIONS. THIS WOULD BE COMPLICATED ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD NOT FULFILL MY REQUIREMENTS

3. (S) THIS REQUIREMENT IS FOR A SINGLE COMMANDER TO DIRECT

PAGE 2 RHMSMVA 2718 S E C R E T

THE TOTAL TACTICAL AIR EFFORT, BOTH IN-COUNTRY AND OUT-COUNTRY, IN CONSONANCE WITH MY GUIDANCE. THE PROPOSED REVISION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THIS REQUIREMENT, AND IN CONSEQUENCE IS NOT APPROVED.

GP-4

BT

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427

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PT009574
PTYSZVIN RHMSMVA2270 2570630-SSSS--RHMAFA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 130410Z SEP 68

ACT G-3

FM COMUSMACV SAIGON

INFO G-2

TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF DANANG

INFO ZFN/CG USARV LONG BINH

COPY TO ADJ S/S G-6

ZEN/CDR 7AF SAIGON

RIMNMF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG

RIMIFQA/CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH

RIMULLR/SA IV CTZ KAN THO

BT

SECRET 27008

SICRY: III MAF EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT/STRIKE SUPPORT PROCEDURES (U)

REF A: III MAF MSG DTG 300636Z JUN 68; SUBJ AS ABOVE (S)

B: III MAF MSG DTG 291442Z JUL 68; SUBJ AS ABOVE (S)

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE QUOTED FROM ABOVE REFERENCES:

A. PARA 4A REF A: FULLY ADRGUATE PROCEDURES ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR ARTILLERY COORDINATION WITH AIR OR AIRCRAFT DIVERSION AROUND DANGER AREAS.

B. PARA 6A(1) REF A: THE PRESENT JOINT AIR CONTROL SYSTEM BE FURTHER IMPROVED BY PROVIDING FOR FULL COORDINATION OF SURFACE

PAGE 2 RHMSMVA 2270 SECRET

SUPPORTING ARMS WITH TACTICAL AIR.

C. PARA 3J REF B: III MAF HAS MADE CLEAR ITS VIEW THAT SUPPORTING FIRES SHOULD BE FULLY AND CENTRALLY COORDINATED WITH PROMPT FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION TO COMBINE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS WITH SAFETY.

2. (S) TH ABOVE COMMENTS INDICATE POSSIBLE INADEQUACY IN MACV DIRECTIVES 95-13 AND 95-4.

BOTH DIRECTIVES ARE UNDER REVIEW AT THIS HEADQUARTERS.

3. (S) YOUR SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ARE SOLICITED AS TO HOW THE PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN THE CITED DIRECTIVES SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO OVERCOME SUPPORTING ARMS/TACTICAL AIR KOORDINATION DIFFICULTIES BEING EXPERIENCED BY YOUR COMMAND. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS REACH THIS HQS NLT 20 SEP 68. RECOMMENDATIONS OF INFO ADDRESSEES ARE ALSO SOLICITED. GP-4

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Jim Control Suite
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UMUFKA3776 25 6082 0-EEEE--RHMAF.
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 12 08 00Z SEP 68
 FM TAP TAN SON NHUT AB VIETNAM
 TO RHMAF/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMHPB/366TACFTRWG DO DANANG AB VIETNAM
 RUMNAV/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMLONA/MAG ONE SIX C DANANG AB VIETNAM
 RUMLONA/MAGS FOUR C DANANG AB VIETNAM
 RUMHPB/1972COMMSQ CR DANANG AB VIETNAM
 RUMS165/620 TACCONSQ C SON TRA AB VIETNAM
 RUMS165/620 TACCONSQ C SON TRA AB VIETNAM
 RUMS165/620 TACCONSQ C SON TRA AB VIETNAM

ACT G-3
 INFO G-2
 COPY TO ADJ S/S G-6

UNCLAS E F T C DE

SUBJECT: DANANG/CHU LAI COMPLEX RECOVERIES.

REFERENCE: 31 AUG 68 JOINT USAF/USMC MEETING AT PANAMA CRC.

1. IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF EFFICIENT AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT THE PANAMA CRC WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE AN AIR TRAFFIC REGULATION

MANUAL BY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER PERSONNEL.

2. CURRENTLY TWO TACTICAL RADARS ARE EFFECTING GCI/GCA HANDOFFS WITHIN SUBJECT COMPLEX. PANAMA AND VICE SQUAD. COORDINATION REQUIRED TO EFFICIENTLY MANAGE SUCH AN OPERATION IS EXCESSIVE AND

PAGE TWO RUMUFKA3776 UNCLAS E F T O

RESULTS IN MULTIPLE HANDOFFS TO ONE TERMINAL AGENCY, DANANG WAPCON, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICTION AND/OR NEAR MISS/MID AIR.

3. TO RESOLVE THIS SITUATION THE CONFEREES AT REFERENCED MEETING AGREED THAT ONE AGENCY, THE PANAMA CRC, SHOULD SEQUENCE ALL RECOVERIES IN THE DANANG/CHU LAI COMPLEX AND EFFECT SINGLE MANAGERSHIP OF GCI/GCA RECOVERIES WHEN RTB IS IMMINENT.

4. REQUEST THAT ALL USMC AIRCRAFT CONTACT PANAMA CRC FOR RTB IN THE DANANG/CHU LAI COMPLEX IMMEDIATELY TO FACILITATE EXERCISE OF THE PANAMA RECOVERY CAPABILITY AND REFINEMENT OF PROCEDURES. FINALIZATION OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN 1ST MAW, PANAMA CRC, VICE SQUAD CRP, DANANG APPROACH CONTROL AND CHU LAI APPROACH CONTROL SHOULD BE COMPLETED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BT

Air Control (2)

422

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ZNY SSSSS

P 110432Z SEP 68

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMBPA/CG XXIV CORPS CP HOCHMUTH REL C/S

INFO RHNSIVA/COMUSMACV SGN

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: TAC AIR REQUIREMENTS (U)

REF: (A) CG III MAF 120340Z JUL 68 (C) (NOTAL)

(B) CG XXIV CORPS AVII-G CAV 05551 090706Z SEP 68 (S) (PASEP)

1. (S) REF (A) INSTITUTED PROCEDURES WHEREBY FIELD COMMANDERS MIGHT MAKE KNOWN TAC AIR REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT PLANNED OPERATIONS SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE TO PROVIDE LEAD TIME FOR ALLOCATION AND FRAGGING THROUGH SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. REF (B) STATED REQUIREMENT FOR 40 ADDITIONAL CAS SORTIES DAILY TO SUPPORT THREE MULTI BN OPNS IN YOUR AO COMMENCING 11 SEP 68.
2. (S) LATE RECEIPT OF REQUIREMENTS EXPRESSED IN REF (B) PREVENTED COORDINATION WITH MACV TO INSURE SUPPORT THROUGHOUT ENTIRE SCHEDULING/FRAGGING PERIOD. INITIAL MACV ALLOCATION TO III MAF ON DAILY FRAG WAS ADEQUATE TO FULFILL YOUR STATED REQUIREMENT WITHOUT SERIOUS DEGRADATION OF SUPPORT TO OTHER I CORPS UNITS.

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 1239 SECRET

HOWEVER SHOULD DAILY FRAG ALLOCATION FOR III MAF BE DECREASED DURING COMING WEEK THIS LEVEL OF SUPPORT CANNOT BE MAINTAINED AND CORRESPONDING REDUCTION OF PREPLANNED TAC AIR SORTIES MUST BE EXPECTED.

3. (U) IN VIEW OF ABOVE REQUEST YOU MAKE KNOWN PREPLANNED TAC AIR REQUIREMENTS SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE TO ALLOW COMUSMACV TO CONSIDER THESE REQUIREMENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH SUPPORT REQUIRED BY OTHER COMBAT UNITS.
4. (U) REF (B) HAS BEEN READDRESSSED TO COMUSMACV.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

Am. Control File

TOP SECRET

PP RUEBHOA
 DE RUHFMAL400 ->50025
 ZNY TTTT
 P 110025Z SEP 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
**EXCLUSIVE
 FOR**

TOP SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LT GEN CUSHMAN
 FROM LT GEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER
 DURING WAKING HOURS.

A. CG III MAF 100224Z SEPT 68

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT

1. HAVE FURNISHED COPY OF BOB'S EXCELLENT MESSAGE TO ELWOOD WHO WILL ACCOMPANY MCCAIN ON FORTHCOMING TRIP, ARRIVING DANANG SUNDAY, 15 SEPTEMBER.
2. I BELIEVE ABE WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY IN DISAPPROVING BOB'S RECO BUT REGARDLESS OF ABE'S REPLY I SUGGEST BOB INFORM MCCAIN OF FULL CONTENT OF THE REF DURING BRIEF AT III MAF.
3. ALTHOUGH I CONSIDERED FURNISHING COPY TO MCCAIN PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR WESTPAC, I HAVE DECIDED AGAINST IT SINCE I BELIEVE IMPACT WILL BE

PAGE 2 RUHFMAL400 TOP SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 GREATER COMING FROM BOB ON THE SCENE AND WILL
 MAKE TIMELY IMPRESSION FOR MCCAIN'S DISCUSSIONS IN SAIGON.
 WARM REGEZDS.

GP-3

BT

~~SECRET~~

FLASH

Declassified by the Director of
Marine Corps History and Museums
in accordance with the provisions
of CNO ltr Ser 009D323/232095 of
21 Feb 1979

[Handwritten Signature]
Signature Date *8/4/96*

VV NWS 186Z FT SZYLW R UMLBPA 0004 2530730-SSSS--RHMMAFA.

DE RUMLBPA 1294 2530714

ZNY SSSSS

Z O 090706Z SEP 68

FM CG XXIV CORPS PHB

TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAG DNG

INFO RUMSAL/CDR 7TH AF TSN

BT

ACT 0-3

INFO G-2

COPY TO ADJ S/S G-6

SECRET AVII-GCAV 05551

SUBJ: TACTICAL AIR REQUIREMENTS (U)

REF: FONECON FROM G3 AIR, III MAF, TO G3 AIR, XXIV CORPS AT 090800H
SEPT 68

1. (S) BY REF FONECON, THIS HQ WAS ADVISED THAT 25 FAC MISSIONS PER DAY WERE ALLOCATED FOR XXIV CORPS FOR THE PERIOD 10-17 SEPT 68.
2. (S) 3D MAR DIV WILL CONDUCT A JOINT US/ARVN MULTI-BATTALION OPERATION IN THE KHE SANH AREA DURING THE PERIOD 12-19 SEP 68. A SECOND JOINT US/ARVN MULTI-BATTALION OPERATION WILL BE CONDUCTED TO EXPLOIT ARC LIGHT STRIKES IN THE EASTERN DMZ DURING THE PERIOD 12 TO 13 SEP 68.
3. (S) IN ADDITION, 1ST CAV DIV WILL CONDUCT A SEVEN-DAY JOINT US/ARVN MULTI-BATTALION OPERATION TO EXPLOIT ARC LIGHT STRIKES IN EASTERN BA 101 BEGINNING ON 11 SEP 68.
4. (C) DURING THE PERIOD IN QUESTION, THERE WILL BE A TOTAL OF 11 MANEU-
XER BATTALIONS ENGAGED IN MAJOR OPERATIONS IN NICTZ IN ADDITION TO THE

APAGE 2 RUMLBPA 1294 SECRET
CONTINUING OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY OTHER UNITS OF THE CORPS.

5. (C) IN VIEW OF THE MAJOR TACTICAL EFFORTS PLANNED FOR THE WEEK OF
10-17 SEP, REQUEST THAT A MINIMUM OF 40 DAILY ADDITIONAL CAS SORTIES
PER DAY BE ALLOCATED TO XXIV CORPS DURING THAT PERIOD

GP-4
BO

AC

[Handwritten mark]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PP RUHKM
 DE RHMAFA 1071 2450224
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 100224Z SEP 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN BUSE FROM
 LGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. YESTERDAY I SENT THE FOLLOWING MSG TO GEN ABRAMS RE
 THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, AND ITS IS QUOTED BELOW FOR
 YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)

REF: (A) CINCPAC 040118Z SEP 68 (S)

1. I THINK THERE IS NO DOUBT BUT WHAT THE PRESENT MODIFIED
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS PROVIDED YOU MORE EFFECTIVE
 OVERALL CONTROL OF THE USE OF TACTICAL AIR IN ALL OF RVN.
 HOWEVER, IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE SYSTEM IN ICTZ IS NOT AS
 RESPONSIVE AS THE MARINE CORPS SYSTEM IT REPLACED (SEE REF A),
 AND I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM CAN BE MATERIALLY

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 1071 SECRET SPECAT (MCEO)
 IMPROVED IN MY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. WITH THIS THOUGHT IN
 MIND AND IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF CONSTANTLY
 EXAMINING MEANS TO IMPROVE THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
 FORCES UNDER MY OPCON, THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL IS OFFERED FOR
 YOUR CONSIDERATION.

2. IN EACH OF MY EVALUATION REPORTS SINCE THE SYSTEM WAS MODIFIED
 ON 30 MAY I HAVE PROPOSED THAT III MAF SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED MISSION
 DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF IN-COUNTRY MARINE STRIKE SORTIES. I CONSIDER
 THIS PROPOSAL A PROCEDURAL MODIFICATION ONLY WHICH IN NO WAY
 VIOLATES THE CONCEPT AND GOAL OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT BUT ONE THAT
 ENHANCES ITS EFFECTIVENESS, FACILITATES PROCEDURES AND MAKES FOR
 BETTER UTILIZATION OF AIR IN ICTZ.

3. DURING THE PERIOD OF 30 MAY TO 2 SEPT 1968-28,993 ATTACK SORTIES
 HAVE BEEN FLOWN IN I CORPS BY AIR FORCE AND MARINE AIRCRAFT.
 SORTIE CATEGORIES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

TYPE	USAF	USMC	TOTAL	PCT OF TOTAL
PREPLAN FRAGED	9,473	11,980	21,453	83
PREPLAN FLOWN	7,731	9,960	17,691	61
IMMEDIATE DIVERTS	486	573	1,059	5
SCRAMBLES	1,505	3,235	4,740	16

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

~~SECRET~~ RHMMFAF 1071 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCI)
 ADD ONS 1,807 3,696 5,503 18
 TOTALS FLOWN 11,529 17,464 28,993

THE ABOVE FIGURES INDICATE THAT

- A. 61 PCT OF TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN ARE PREPLANNED.
 - B. 34 PCT OF TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN ARE ADD-ONS & SCRAMBLES.
 - C. 40 PCT OF MARINE SORTIES ARE ADD-ONS AND SCRAMBLES.
 - D. 29 PCT OF USAF SORTIES ARE ADD-ONS AND SCRAMBLES.
4. THE CONSISTENTLY HIGH SORTIE RATE FLOWN BY THE FMAW AND THE HIGH PCT OF SCRAMBLES AND ADD-ONS COMPARED TO PREPLANS FLOWN BY BOTH USAF AND MARINE AIRCRAFT POINTS UP EITHER A SHORTAGE OF PREPLANS OR LESS THAN OPTIMUM UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES. SINCE SOME 60 PCT OF THE SORTIES FLOWN IN ICTZ ARE GENERATED BY THE FMAW I CONSIDER IT FEASIBLE TO IMPROVE UTILIZATION OF FMAW ASSETS AND AT THE SAME TIME ENHANCE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR RESOURCES.
5. FOR THESE REASONS IT IS REQUESTED THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO AUTHORIZING ME MISSION DIRECTION OF IN-COUNTRY MARINE STRIKE ASSETS ON A THIRTY DAY TRIAL BASIS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT. FURTHER, THAT AFTER THIRTY DAYS THE TRIAL SYSTEM BE EVALUATED TO DETERMINE ITS

PAGE FOUR RHMMFAF 1071 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)
 EFFECTIVENESS IN ICTZ AND THAT IS BE COMPARED WITH PRESENT SYSTEM.

6. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROPOSAL, SUBSEQUENT TO COMUSMACV'S DETERMINATION OF WEEKLY ALLOCATION OF AIR EFFORT, WILL REQUIRE ONLY FOLLOWING MINOR REVISIONS OF PRESENT SYSTEM:

A. BASED ON COMUSMACV'S ALLOCATION, WEEKLY FRAG FOR AIR FORCE SORTIES TO ALL FOUR CORPS AREAS WOULD BE PUBLISHED. THE NUMBER OF AIR FORCE SORTIES FRAGGED FOR III MAF SUPPORT WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON III MAF'S REQUIREMENT OVER AND ABOVE FMAW CAPABILITY AND COULD BE STANDARDIZED AT MINIMUM FIGURE WITH INCREASES AS NECESSARY.

B. TACC WOULD CONTINUE TO PUBLISH A DAILY FRAG FOR AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED EACH CORPS.

C. ON DAILY BASIS WITHIN ICTZ, MARINE AIR, EXCEPT THAT ALLOCATED BY COMUSMACV OUTSIDE ICTZ WOULD BE FRAGGED DAILY BY III MAF TO SUPPORT ALL III MAF FORCES.

D. THE DAILY III MAF FRAG WOULD BE PUBLISHED CONCURRENTLY WITH PUBLICATION OF 7TH AIR FORCE DAILY FRAG ORDER.

E. TACC, TASE, DASCs AND COGNIZANT TACTICAL UNITS WOULD RECEIVE FRAG. THIS WOULD APPRISE TACC AND TASE, ON A

PAGE FIVE RHMMFAF 1071 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)
 TIMELY BASIS OF AIR PLANS FOR ICTZ.

UNQUOTE
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

#414
III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 09 SEP 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 090300Z SEP 68		COPY# 2 OF 8 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT FOR Reg Cy for CG-1st MAF files for continuity purpose Ry 182
3	DCG		9/10		Amst	
4	DCG AIR				PO	
R	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		09153545p		18 JCR	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	X			COPY	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #414

SECRET

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 0934 2530300
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 090300Z SEP 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV SGN
 BT

S E C R E T

FOR GENERAL ABRAMS FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN

SUBJ: SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)

REF: (A) CINCPAC 040118Z SEP 68 (S)

1. I THINK THERE IS NO DOUBT BUT WHAT THE PRESENT MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS PROVIDED YOU MORE EFFECTIVE OVERALL CONTROL OF THE USE OF TACTICAL AIR IN ALL OF RVN. HOWEVER, IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE SYSTEM IN ICTZ IS NOT AS RESPONSIVE AS THE MARINE CORPS SYSTEM IT REPLACED (SEE REF A), AND I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM CAN BE MATERIALLY IMPROVED IN MY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. WITH THIS THOUGHT IN MIND AND IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF CONSTANTLY EXAMINING MEANS TO IMPROVE THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FORCES UNDER MY OPCON, THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL IS OFFERED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.
2. IN EACH OF MY EVALUATION REPORTS SINCE THE SYSTEM WAS MODIFIED

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 0934 **S E C R E T**

ON 30 MAY I HAVE PROPOSED THAT III MAF SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED MISSION DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF IN-COUNTRY MARINE STRIKE SORTIES. I CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL A PROCEDURAL MODIFICATION ONLY WHICH IN NO WAY VIOLATES THE CONCEPT AND GOAL OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT BUT ONE THAT ENHANCES ITS EFFECTIVENESS, FACILITATES PROCEDURES AND MAKES FOR BETTER UTILIZATION OF AIR IN ICTZ.

3. DURING THE PERIOD OF 30 MAY TO 2 SEPT 1968-28,993 ATTACK SORTIES HAVE BEEN FLOWN IN I CORPS BY AIR FORCE AND MARINE AIRCRAFT. SORTIE CATEGORIES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

TYPE	USAF	USMC	TOTAL	PCT OF TOTAL
PREPLAN FRAGGED	9,473	11,980	21,453	83
PREPLAN FLOWN	7,731	9,960	17,691	61
IMMEDIATE DIVERTS	486	573	1,059	5
SCRAMBLES	1,505	3,235	4,740	16
ADD ONS	1,807	3,696	5,503	18
TOTALS FLOWN	11,529	17,464	28,993	

THE ABOVE FIGURES INDICATE THAT

- A. 61 PCT OF TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN ARE PREPLANNED.
- B. 34 PCT OF TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN ARE ADD-ONS & SCRAMBLES.
- C. 40 PCT OF MARINE SORTIES ARE ADD-ONS AND SCRAMBLES.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAK 0934 S E C R E T

- D. 29 PCT OF USAF SORTIES ARE ADD-ONS AND SCRAMBLES.
4. THE CONSISTENTLY HIGH SORTIE RATE FLOWN BY THE FMAW AND THE HIGH PCT OF SCRAMBLES AND ADD-ONS COMPARED TO PREPLANS FLOWN BY BOTH USAF AND MARINE AIRCRAFT POINTS UP EITHER A SHORTAGE OF PREPLANS OR LESS THAN OPTIMUM UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES. SINCE SOME 60 PCT OF THE SORTIES FLOWN IN ICTZ ARE GENERATED BY THE FMAW I CONSIDER IT FEASIBLE TO IMPROVE UTILIZATION OF FMAW ASSETS AND AT THE SAME TIME ENHANCE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR RESOURCES.
5. FOR THESE REASONS IT IS REQUESTED THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO AUTHORIZING ME MISSION DIRECTION OF IN-COUNTRY MARINE STRIKE ASSETS ON A THIRTY DAY TRIAL BASIS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT. FURTHER, THAT AFTER THIRTY DAYS THE TRIAL SYSTEM BE EVALUATED TO DETERMINE ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN ICTZ AND THAT IS BE COMPARED WITH PRESENT SYSTEM.
6. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROPOSAL, SUBSEQUENT TO COMUSMACV'S DETERMINATION OF WEEKLY ALLOCATION OF AIR EFFORT, WILL REQUIRE ONLY FOLLOWING MINOR REVISIONS OF PRESENT SYSTEM:
- A. BASED ON COMUSMACV'S ALLOCATION, WEEKLY FRAG FOR AIR

PAGE FOUR RUMSAK 0934 S E C R E T

FORCE SORTIES TO ALL FOUR CORPS AREAS WOULD BE PUBLISHED. THE NUMBER OF AIR FORCE SORTIES FRAGGED FOR III MAF SUPPORT WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON III MAF'S REQUIREMENT OVER AND ABOVE FMAW CAPABILITY AND COULD BE STANDARDIZED AT MINIMUM FIGURE WITH INCREASES AS NECESSARY.

B. TACC WOULD CONTINUE TO PUBLISH A DAILY FRAG FOR AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED EACH CORPS.

C. ON DAILY BASIS WITHIN ICTZ, MARINE AIR, EXCEPT THAT ALLOCATED BY COMUSMACV OUTSIDE ICTZ WOULD BE FRAGGED DAILY BY III MAF TO SUPPORT ALL III MAF FORCES.

D. THE DAILY III MAF FRAG WOULD BE PUBLISHED CONCURRENTLY WITH PUBLICATION OF 7TH AIR FORCE DAILY FRAG ORDER.

E. TACC, TASE, DASCs AND COGNIZANT TACTICAL UNITS WOULD RECEIVE FRAG. THIS WOULD APPRISE TACC AND TASE, ON A TIMELY BASIS OF AIR PLANS FOR ICTZ.

GP-3

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

#414

SECRET

PP RHMAFA
 DE RUHFMA 0383 2482313
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 042313Z SEP 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN
 BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING
 HOURS.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)
 1. PRIOR TO MCCAIN'S VISIT TO SAIGON I PROPOSED THAT HE
 DISCUSS WITH ABE THE RETURN, ON A TRIAL BASIS, OF YOUR
 FIXED WING AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS THAT ARE UTILIZED
 IN I CTZ. SINCE HIS RETURN HE HAS INDICATED A RELUCTANCE
 TO DIRECT ABE TO TAKE SUCH ACTION. HE SUGGESTS THAT
 THE PRESENT AIR CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD IN NO
 WAY BE CONSIDERED AS ESTABLISHING A PRECEDENT BUT
 SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF AN EXPEDIENT TO MEET
 THE DEMANDS OF THE EXISTING SITUATION. WHILE THIS IS
 EASILY SAID, HISTORY WILL MOST CERTAINLY LOOK UPON THE
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM NOW IN EFFECT IN RVN AS
 PRECEDENT SETTING AND IT MAY WELL BE DIFFICULT TO

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 0383 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 RE-ESTABLISH OUR MARINE AIR/GROUND CONCEPT ON THE
 FUTURE.

2. I TALKED WITH THE COMMANDANT YESTERDAY AND HE
 SUGGESTS THAT AS AN INITIAL MOVE, A WRITTEN REQUEST FROM
 YOU TO ABE THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO RETURNING
 THOSE MARINE FIXED WING AIR SUPPORT ASSETS
 EMPLOYED IN I CTZ TO YOUR FRAGGING AUTHORITY ON A
 TRIAL BASIS FOR A PERIOD OF THIRTY DAYS. FURTHER, THAT
 AFTER A PERIOD OF THIRTY DAYS, THE REVISED SYSTEM BE
 EVALUATED BY ABE TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR
 SUPPORT IN I CTZ UNDER YOUR DIRECTION VERSUS THAT
 PROVIDED TO I CTZ DURING A SIMILAR PERIOD UNDER THE
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT
 THAT THIS WOULD ENABLE YOU TO EMPLOY YOUR LOCAL AIR
 ASSETS MOST EFFECTIVELY, REDUCE MATERIALLY THE
 ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN IMPOSED BY THE PRESENT SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND CAPITALIZE ON INHERENT MARINE
 CAPABILITIES.

3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

409

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 0383 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
ONLY THE FOLLOWING MINOR REVISIONS TO THE PRESENT
SYSTEM:

A. EACH WEEK, ABE WOULD CONTINUE TO DETERMINE
ALLOCATION OF HIS AIR EFFORT AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION
DEMANDS.

B. BASED ON THIS ALLOCATION, COMMANDER, 7TH AIR
FORCE WOULD CONTINUE TO PUBLISH A WEEKLY FRAG FOR
AIR FORCE SORTIES TO ALL FOUR CORPS AREAS. THE NUMBER
OF AIR FORCE SORTIES FRAGGED INTO I CTZ WOULD BE
DEPENDENT ON YOUR REQUIREMENT OVER AND ABOVE MARINE
CAPABILITY AND COULD BE STANDARDIZED AT A MINIMUM
FIGURE WITH INCREASES AS NECESSARY.

C. COMMANDER, 7TH AIR FORCE WOULD CONTINUE TO
PUBLISH A DAILY FRAG FOR AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO BE PRO-
VIDED TO II, III AND IV CORPS.

D. ON A DAILY BASIS WITHIN I CTZ, MARINE AIR, EXCEPT
AS OTHERWISE ALLOCATED BY COMUSMACV OUTSIDE I CTZ,
WOULD BE FRAGGED DAILY, DIRECTLY BY YOU TO SUPPORT ALL
III MAF FORCES, BOTH ARMY AND MARINE. THE DAILY III
MAF FRAG WOULD BE PUBLISHED CONCURRENTLY WITH

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 0383 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
PUBLICATION OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE DAILY FRAG IN ORDER
THAT THE TACC WOULD BE APPRISED, ON A TIMELY BASIS OF
AIR PLANS FOR I CTZ.

4. THIS PLAN, IF APPROVED, WOULD BE A STEP IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION. IF NOT APPROVED, WRITTEN DOCUMENTATION
AS TO THE REASONS THEREFOR WOULD PROVIDE THE
COMMANDANT WITH AMMUNITION FOR FURTHER ACTION.

5. CHICK QUILTERS DAILY STATISTICAL SUMMARY PROVIDES
INVALUABLE DATA FOR DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE SINGLE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO
INCLUDE SPECIFICS ON TIMING, SCRAMBLES AND SORTIE RATES
IN YOUR AUGUST SUMMARY. WARM REGARDS

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#409

CONFIDENTIAL

DE RHMMAFA 0460 24815 10
ZNY CCCCC
P 04 15 10Z SEP 68
FM CG III MAF DNG
TO RUMUGKA/COMNAVFORV REP DNG
INFO RUMUFGA/COM THIRD NCR
RUMUFGA/COM THIRTY NCR
RUMUFGA/NMCR FIFTY THREE
BT

HAS BEEN SENT
ORIG ENGR
REL FEO

C O N F I D E N T I A L
IDASC, CAMP HORN (U)

1. IDASC RECENTLY COMPLETED BY NMCR 53 HAS NO EMERGENCY BACK UP POWER. 100 KW GEN FROM GEN POOL BEING DELIVERED 5 SEPT 68.
2. REQUEST TASK COM THIRD NCR TO INSTALL AS "ADD ON" ITEM TO ORIGINAL PROJECT. DESIRE CHANGE ORDER INCLUDE MINIMAL SHED TO PROTECT GEN FROM ELEMENTS.
3. EMERG GEN CONSIDERED PRIORITY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT. REQUEST IMMEDIATE EXECUTION.

CP 4
BT

Air Control

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#408

SECRET

PP RUMSAK
 DE RUHKA 0085 2480114
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO
 P R 040118Z SEP 68
 FM CINCPAC
 TO RUEKDA/CJCS
 INFO RUMSAL/CMDR 7AF
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUEFHQA/CSAF
 RUENAAA/CNO

BT

S E C R E T LIMDIS - IVY TREE
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT (U)

- A. CJCS 2231/112248Z JUN 68 NOTAL
- B. COMUSMACV 061130Z JUL 68 NOTAL
- C. CG III MAF 300636Z JUN 68 PASEP
- D. CJCS 2866/191952Z JUN 68 NOTAL
- E. CINCPAC 102340Z JUL 68 NOTAL
- F. COMUSMACV 130637Z JUL 68 NOTAL
- G. CINCPAC 140017Z JUL 68 NOTAL

PAGE 2 RUHKA0085 **S E C R E T** LIMDIS - IVY TREE

H. COMUSMACV 211107Z JUL 68 PASEP

I. COMUSMACV 071218Z AUG 68

1. REF A REQUESTED CINCPAC APPRAISE THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR TACTICAL AIR IN I CORPS. REF B IS THE COMUSMACV REPORT OF THE EVALUATION OF THE SYSTEM DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE SUBSEQUENT TO IMPLEMENTATION OF MODIFIED PREPLANNED SUPPORT PROCEDURES. IN REF B COMUSMACV ADDRESSED THE COMMENTS OF III MAF (REF C) AND CMC THAT WERE FORWARDED BY REF D. REFS F AND H ARE COMUSMACV AMPLIFICATIONS AND EXPANSION OF INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE ORIGINAL REPORT AS REQUESTED BY REFS E AND G. REF I IS COMUSMACV EVALUATION REPORT FOR THE MONTH OF JULY.

2. REVIEW OF ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION FOR THE EVALUATION PERIODS, AS WELL AS PERSONAL DISCUSSION WITH COMUSMACV, CNO, AND CMC, INDICATES THAT THE SYSTEM HAS IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY SINCE ITS INSTITUTION AND PROVIDES TO COMUSMACV THE CONTROL OF ASSETS REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT HIS MISSION. THE INSTITUTION OF THE 70-30 FRAG SPLIT HAS RECEIVED UNANIMOUS ACCEPTANCE IN II, III AND IV CORPS. HOWEVER, CG III MAF IS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE SEVENTY PERCENT WEEKLY FRAG AS COMPARED TO THE MARINE SYSTEM AND HAS RECOMMENDED THAT A BLOCK OF MARINE SORTIES BE ALLOCATED FOR FRAGGING BY III MAF IN I CORPS.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

406

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMKA 005 S E C R E T LIMDIS - IVY TREE
COMUSMACV HAS OPPOSED THE RECOMMENDATION ON THE BASIS THAT THIS PROCEDURE WOULD BE DOUBLE MANAGEMENT AND WOULD NOT FULFILL SINGLE MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES.

3. SIMPLY STATED, THE CURRENT SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IS OPERATING PROCEDURALLY SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE JOINT AIR GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM (JAGOS) AND THE MARINE CORPS TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. TO MAKE THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FUNCTION THERE HAS BEEN A DECENTRALIZATION IN CERTAIN MANAGEMENT AREAS AND THE 70-30 FRAG SPLIT HAS BEEN EVOLVED. THROUGH THIS SYSTEM COMUSMACV MAINTAINS CONTROL OF HIS AIR RESOURCES AND RETAINS THE FLEXIBILITY TO SHIFT THE AIR EFFORT TO SUPPORT THE CHANGING DEMANDS CONFRONTING GROUND COMMANDERS FROM SVN, LAOS AND ROUTE PACKAGE I. THE MECHANICS OF THE SYSTEM ARE STILL NOT SUCH AS TO PROVIDE THE MARINES THE RESPONSIVENESS THAT THEY WERE ACCUSTOMED TO IN THEIR ORGANIC CONTROL SYSTEM.

4. HOWEVER, THE SYSTEM IS PROVIDING FOR THE BEST OVERALL USE OF TACTICAL AIR IN COMUSMACV'S ASSIGNED AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. AS PROCEDURAL MODIFICATIONS ARE SMOOTHED OUT AND IMPLEMENTED FURTHER IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO IMPROVE. I INTEND TO CONTINUE THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND CLOSELY MONITOR.

5. RECOMMEND THAT THE MONTHLY EVALUATION REPORTS

PAGE 4 RUMKA 005 S E C R E T LIMDIS - IVY TREE
FROM COMUSMACV BE DISCONTINUED, BUT THAT A REPORT BE REQUIRED WHENEVER SIGNIFICANT CHANGES ARE MADE.

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