

- 1 ~~26.~~ CG FMAW 040130Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
ROUTINE INPUT
- 2 ~~27.~~ COMSEVENTHFLT 040204Z OCT68 (C) *group-4*
BRINGLE TO CUSHMAN
ACCEPT FOR LUNCH
- 3 ~~28.~~ CG FMFPAC 040312Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
BUSE FOR CUSHMAN
MODIFICATION OF AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM
- 4 ~~29.~~ COMNAVFORV 040912Z OCT68 (C) *gp-4*
ZUMWALT FOR CUSHMAN
CONCURS IN AWD OF DSM TO ADM OSBORN
- 5 ~~30.~~ GEN ABRAMS 0411146Z OCT68 (S) *group-not shown*
ABRAMS TO ALL
PACIFICATION COUNTEROFFENSIVE - JT MEETING WITH GVN OCT 1
- 6 ~~31.~~ CG FMAW 041300Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
ROUTINE INPUT
- 7 ~~32.~~ CMC 041316Z OCT68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*
CHAPMAN TO BUSE AND DUCHMAN
GRANT STORY ON MARINES AT DMZ
- 8 ~~33.~~ CMC 041720Z OCT68 (U)
CMC TO SIMPSON
ORDERS SIMPSON TO 1ST MARDIV
- 9 ~~34.~~ CG FMFPAC 042311Z OCT68 (C MCEO) *group-4*
BUSE TO QUILTER INFO CUSHMAN
RETROGRADE OF ACFT FROM RVN
- 10 ~~35.~~ CMC 042337Z OCT68 (C) *gp-4*
WALT TO CUSHMAN INFO BUSE, YOUNGDALE, & QUILTER
SECNAV PARTY HAVE STREAMERS & CITATIONS
- 11 ~~36.~~ CG FMFPAC 050119Z OCT68 (C) *gp-4*
BUSE TO MCLAUGHLIN INFO CUSHMAN
INTENT TO VISIT SAIGON 23 OCT.
- 12 ~~37.~~ CG FMAW 051315Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
ROUTINE INPUT
- 13 ~~38.~~ CG FMFPAC 052124Z OCT68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*
FOR CHAPMAN INFO CUSHMAN FROM BUSE
NEW REPUBLIC ARTICLE BY ZALIN GRANT

- 14 39. CG THIRD MARDIV 060230Z OCT68 (S) *Group-4*
DAVIS TO CUSHMAN I FO QUILTER AND YOUNGDALE
AIR CAV CAPABILITIES FOR MARINE DIVISIONS
- 15 40. COMSEVENTHFLT 060650Z OCT68 (C) *gp-4*
BRINGLE TO CUSHMAN INFO LACY
ACCEPT FOR LUNCH
- 16 41. CG XXIV CORPS 070910Z OCT68 (S) *gp-4*
STILWELL FOR CUSHMAN
RETENTION OF 3/5TH ARMORED CAV SQUADRON
- 17 42. SSO 25TH INF DIV 071030Z OCT68 (U)
WILLIAMSON TO ANDERSON
STOPYRA
- 18 43. GEN ABRAMS 071141Z OCT68 (S) *Group - not shown*
ABRAMS TO ALL
POSSIBLE POLITICAL UPRISING 9OCT
- 19 44. CG FMAW 071655Z OCT68 (S) MCEO *Group-4*
ROUTINE INPUT
- 20 45. CG FMAW 061810Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *Group-4*
ROUTINE INPUT
- 21 46. CMC 072054Z OCT68 (U)
SIMPSON ORDERS
- ~~22 47. CG MARCORB CAMPEN 072320Z OCT68 (U)
LIND'S RESERVATION CONFIRMED~~
- 23 48. CG FMFPAC 080222Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *Group-4*
BUSE ~~FROM~~ FOR CUSHMAN
COMMANDO HUNT
- 24 49. SSO 25TH INF DIV 080530Z OCT68 (C) *gp-4*
STOPYRA
- 25 50. CG FMAW 081810Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *Group-4*
ROUTINE INPUT
- 26 1. COMUSMACV 080136Z OCT68 (C) *gp-4*
PACIFICATION IN SVN FOR AUG68
- ~~27 2. CG FMFPAC 082045Z OCT68 (S MCEO)
WILSON FOR ANDERSON
TRANSFER OF MSGT MITCHELL~~
- 28 3. CG FMFPAC 090037Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *Group-4*
BUSE TO MCCUTCHEON, INFO CUSHMAN & QUILTER
SEA INTERFACE OF TAC DATA SYSTEMS
- 29 4. CG FMAW 091120Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
ROUTINE INPUT

- 30 5. CG FMFPAC 092035Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 BUSE TO CHAPMAN INFO CUSHMAN
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TAC AIR ASSETS
- 31 6. CG FIRST MARDIV 100740Z OCT68 (S) *group-4*
 YOUNGDALE FOR CUSHMAN INFO QUILTER & DAVIS
 AIR CAV CAPABILITIES FORMAR DIVISIONS
- 32 7. CG FMAW 101455Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 ROUTINE INPUT
- 33 8. CG FMAW 111440Z OCT68 (S) *group-4*
 ROUTINE INPUT
- 34 9. CMC 111746Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 CHAPMAN TO BUSE INFO CUSHMAN
 SUBMISSION OF PROGRAM 6 PROPOSED FORCE REDUCTIONS IN RVN
- 35 10. SEC IGNATIUS 120400Z OCT68 (C) *gp-4*
 FOR CUSHMAN
 THANKS FOR VISIT
- 36 11. SECNAV 120405Z OCT68 (C) *group-4*
 FOR SECSTATE
 REASSIGNMENT OF CPL MARK HAUGERUD
- 37 12. CG FMAW 121000Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 QUILTER TO CUSHMAN INFO YOUNGDALE AND DAVIS
 AIR CAV CAPABILITY FOR MAR DIVISIONS
- 38 13. CG FMAW 121200Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 ROUTINE INPUT
- 39 14. CG FMFPAC 122245Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 ROK MC COMBAT SUPPORT
- 40 15. MG TOWNSEND ACOF J-3 130452Z OCT68 (SU)
 OPERATIONAL NICKNAMES
- 41 16. CG FMAW 130955Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 ROUTINE INPUT
- 42 17. COMNAVSUPPACT 14OCT68 (C) *gp-4*
 OSBORN TO CUSHMAN, ZUMWALT, AND COMBS
 SERIOUS SITUATION REPORT
- 43 18. COMUSMACV 140656Z OCT68 (S) *group-4*
 ITENERARY FOR SAIGON VISIT 23OCT68
- 44 19. CG FMAW 141020Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
 ROUTINE INPUT
- 45 20. LTG PEERS, 151102Z OCT68 (S) *gp-4*
 PEERS TO CUSHMAN
 JOINT OPERATION WITH AMERICAL DIV

- 46 21. CG FMAW 151405Z OCT68 (S MCEOP *group-4*)
ROUTINE INPUT
- 47 22. LTG STILWELL 160045Z OCT68 (S) *group - not shown*
STILWELL TO CUSHMAN INFO ANDERSON
THOR
- 48 23. CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT 160115Z OCT68 (C) *gp-4*
FOR HOFFMAN FROM BAGLEY
NGFS GDA CONVERENCE
- 49 24. COMNAVFORV 160911Z OCT68 (C) *gp-4*
ZUMWALT TO CLEARLY, HYLAND, CUSHMAN, AND COMBS
RACIAL TENSIONS, DANANG AREA
- ~~50 25. MG STONE CG 4TH INF DIV 161003Z OCT68 (U)
COUSIN ABSENT FROM 3D DIVISION~~
- 51 26. CG FMAW 161416Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
ROUTINE INPUT
- 52 27. CG 18TH ENGR BDE 150600Z OCT68 (U)
ELDERTO CUSHMAN
SECURITY IN HAI VAN PASS
- 53 28. COMSERVPAC 161944Z OCT68 (C) *group-4*
DRAIN TO OSBORN INFO BAUMBERGER, ZUMWALT, AND CUSHMAN
RACIAL TENSIONS, DANANG AREA
- 54 29. CG FMAW 170250Z OCT68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*
INTERIM REPORT NUMBER 2 ON GAO VISIT TO 1ST LAM BN
- 55 30. COMNAVFORV 170330Z OCT68 (S) *gp-4*
OSBORN TO ZUMWALT INFO HYLAND, CLEARLY, AND CUSHMAN; COMBS
RACIAL SITREP 171200H OCT68
- 56 31. COMNAVFORV 170714Z OCT68 (C) *group-4*
ZUMWALT FOR CLAREY AND HYLAND, INFO CUSHMAN, COMBS AND OSBORN
RACIAL TENSIONS, DANANG AREA
- 57 32. CG FMAW 171401Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
ROUTINE INPUT
- 58 33. ADMINO FMFPAC 172042Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
FONTANA FOR CHAPMAN, INFO GEN CUSHMAN
OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS
- 59 34. GEN ABRAMS 180152Z OCT68 (C) *group - not shown*
ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN, MILDREN, BROWN, AND ZUMWALT
SERIOUS INCIDENTS
- 60 35. CG FMAW 181145Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
ROUTINE INPUT
- 61 36. CMC 181441Z OCT68 (S) MCEB *group-4*
SUPPORT AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CG FIRST MAW		1 OCT 68	
			SERIAL N / CONTROL DATE		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
			301510Z SEP 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	10/1				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

SECRET #47

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAV 0178 2741530
 ZNY SSSSS

O P 301510Z SEP 68

FM CG FIRST MAW

TO RUEBHOA/CMC

RUMKM/CG FMFPAC

RUMSAK/CG III MAF

INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FOR FMFPAC F-040

FOR CMC CODE AA-1

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS

A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001-2400H 29 SEP 68

B. (1) 147

(2) 23

(3) 22

(4) 0

C. (1) 133

(2) 72

(3) 60

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0178 S E C R E T SPECAT

(4) 41

(5) 94

(6) 44

(7) 36

D. (1) 49

(2) 16

(3) 11

(4) 4

E. (1) 73

(2) 7

(3) 0

(4) 0

F. (1) 30

(2) 30

(3) 12

(4) 18

G. (1) 6

(2) 19

(3) 5

(4) 0

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0178 S E C R E T SPECAT

H. (1) 26

(2) 4

(3) 0

(4) 0

I. (1) 31

(2) (A) 74

(B) 4

(C) 4

(D) 0

J. (1) 1

(2) 62

(3) 118

(4) 2

(5) 0

(6) 0

K. (1) 0

(2) 0

(3) 0

(4) 21

L. (1) 0

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0178 S E C R E T SPECAT

(2) 0

(3) 5

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 4

M. (1) L (7) 4 SORTIES DIVERTED TADC

2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW

A. (1) (A) 75

(B) 74

(2) 20

(3) 50

B. (1) 194

(2) 25

(3) 0

C. (1) (A) 89 (B) 40

(2) (A) 0 (B) 36

(3) (A) 0 (B) 0

D. (1) 18

(2) 2

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

#47

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0178 S E C R E T SPECAT

(3) 0
 E. (1) 14
 (2) 6
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 F. (1) 0
 (2) 50
 (3) 0
 J. (1) 37
 (2) 5
 (3) 6
 (4) 2
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 H. (1) 48
 (2) 0

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0178 S E C R E T SPECAT

(3) 3
 I. (1) 12
 (2) 39
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 J. (1) (A) 41 (B) 38
 (2) (A) 29 (B) 11
 (3) (A) 2 (B) 0
 (4) (A) 3 (B) 0
 (5) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (6) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (7) (A) 0 (B) 25

K. (1) A (3) INCLUDES 34 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES

I (1) 11 USMC TO USA, TGT PRIORITY

1 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRIORITY

I (2) 8 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRIORITY

8 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALFUNCTION

90 USMC TO USMC, WX

4 USMC TO USMC, ASRT DOWN

4 USMC TO USMC, NEG CONTROL - 2 USMC TO ARVN, TGT PRIORITY GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

SECRET

47

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			COMSEVENTHFLT		2 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE			
			3006507 SEP 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN AND MAJGEN QUILTER
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				10	REMARKS FOR
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	F			Q	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F			H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RUYGSAF2353 2740650-CCCC--RUYPST.
ZNY CCCCC YYO RUYGSHH
P 30065 02 SEP 68
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO RUYPST/CG III MAF
RUYPST/CG FIRST MAW
BT

COMM NOTE: THIS MSG REC'D
GARBLED...HAS BEEN SVC'D...

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR LTJEN CUSHMAN AND MAJGEN QUILTER FROM BRINGLE

1. I WERE PRIVILEGED IF EITHER OR BOTH OF YOU WOULD HAVE LUNCH WITH ME ABOARD MY FLAGSHIP AT 1200H SUNDAY 6 OCT.
 2. ADDITIONALLY, I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF AN INVITATION COULD ALSO BE EXTENDED ON MY BEHALF TO LTJEN LAM FOR LUNCH WITH ME ON THE SAME DATE.
 3. BEST RE GACFSM
- GP-4

DIAL
2304

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENCR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#48

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 6216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 2 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 011050Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				ll	REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY <i>CG - Agree completely with 1st sub portion</i> <i>Shopy</i> <i>9.</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			g	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/2		h	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #49

SECRET

PP RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAV 0105 2760005
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 011050Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN MCCUTCHEON INFO LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM MGEN QUILTER MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SUBJ: SEA INTERFACE OF TACTICAL DATA SYSTEMS

A. FIRST MAW MSG 300835Z SEP 68

1. (C) LOCAL AF REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE CMDR SCOTT, THE TF-77 LIAISON OFFICER AT PANAMA, INTO SUPPORTING THE AF PROPOSAL TO PROCEED WITH A ONE-WAY DATA LINK VICE THE TWO-WAY LINK. CMDR SCOTT ARRANGED FOR A MEETING ON THE CONSTELLATION TO REQUEST GUIDANCE ON THE SUBJECT AND ASKED THAT COL FRIS ACCOMPANY HIM. THE MATTER WAS DISCUSSED ON THE CONSTELLATION ON 23 SEPTEMBER WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF TF-77, CAPT BECKER AND THE CIC OFFICER CMDR CAMPBELL PLUS OTHER STAFF OFFICERS.
2. (S) CMDR CAMPBELL RECENTLY WROTE A POINT PAPER FOR ADM COUSINS WHICH

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0105 S E C R E T MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR
 COVERED THE FOLLOWING:

- A. SINCE THERE SEEMS TO BE NO OPERATIONAL GAIN THAT CAN RESULT FROM THE INTERFACE, THAT THE ENTIRE PROJECT BE DROPPED AND THAT THE FUNDS AND EFFORT BE DIVERTED TO A MORE GAINFUL AREA.
- B. IF THE PROJECT IS TO BE CONTINUED THAT THE PERSONAL IDENTITY EQUAL TRACK NUMBER CONCEPT BE ELIMINATED BECAUSE IT DEGRADES THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF NIDS TO AN UNACCEPTABLE DEGREE.
- C. IF IT IS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE THE EFFORT, THAT IT BE REDUCED IN SCOPE TO A ONE-WAY LINK AND THAT THE ONE-WAY LINK BE ACCOMPLISHED ON SITE AT MACS-4 AND AF SITE ON MONKEY MOUNTAIN. HE FEELS THAT TF-77 CANNOT OBJECT TO A ONE-WAY LINK BECAUSE IT CAN BE DONE WITH NO EFFORT ON THEIR PART AND THEY CAN BE ACCUSED OF BEING OBSTRUCTIONIST AND UNCOOPERATIVE. HIS REASONING FOR DOING ALL THE WORK ON SITE IS: CONTINUANCE OF THE CONUS TEST FORCE AS AN ENTITY PROVIDES THE GREATEST THREAT TO FUTURE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TACTICAL DATA SYSTEMS AND IT SHOULD, THEREFORE, BY ABOLISHED ASAP.
3. (S) COL FRIS SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF NAVAL AIRCRAFT WOULD BE PURSUED BY 7TH AF AS SOON AS THE INTERFACE WAS EFFECTED, WITHOUT REGARD TO DEGREE IT WAS EFFECTIVE. THE AF COULD THEN USE THE ARGUMENT THAT THEY NOW HAVE ALL THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0105 S E C R E T MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR THEM IN THE TONKIN GULF, NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM; THAT THE NAVY HAS ONLY THE LIMITED INFORMATION IN THE TONKIN GULF AND PART OF NORTH VIETNAM; AND THEY, THE 7TH AF, SHOULD THEREFORE MANAGE ALL ASSETS. CAPT BECKER STATED THAT THEY HAD AN AGREEMENT WITH THE 7TH AF THAT WOULD PRECLUDE THEM FROM WINNING THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARGUMENT. COL FRIS POINTED OUT THAT WE ALSO HAD AGREEMENTS WITH THE 7TH AF PRIOR TO THEIR TAKING OPCON OF OUR AIRCRAFT, AND THAT THEY DON'T LET ANYTHING STAND IN THEIR WAY IN ATTAINING THEIR GOAL WHICH IS OPCON OF ALL AIR ASSETS.

4. (S) MUCH DISCUSSION WAS CONTINUED ALONG THE ABOVE LINES. CAPT BECKER ALSO STATED THAT, DURING A RECENT MEETING WITH ADM MCCAIN WHILE HE WAS ABOARD THE CONSTELLATION, UNANIMOUS NAVY AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO RECOMMEND PURSUING THE ONE-WAY LINK.

5. (C) COL FRIS STATED THAT HE THOUGHT THE MARINE CORPS WOULD OBJECT TO THE NAVY PROPOSAL TO WORK OUT THE ONE-WAY LINK ON SITE BECAUSE IT WOULD COMMIT US TO AN EXTENSIVE TEST PROGRAM WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH AND POSSIBLY DEPRIVE US OF OUR PRESENT CONTROL CAPABILITY FOR FIRST MAW AIRCRAFT.

6. (S) ADM COUSINS REQUESTED THAT NEITHER CMDR SCOTT NOR THE FIRST MAW MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS WITH THE AF LOCALLY. WE GAVE OUR ASSURANCE THAT HIS REQUEST WOULD BE HONORED.

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0105 S E C R E T MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR

7. (C) REF A OUTLINES OUR POSITION ON THE TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY OF THE ONE-WAY DATA LINK. INCLUDED ARE OUR COMMENTS ON THE ADDITIONAL READOUT REQUIREMENT FOR THE SUBJECT INTERFACE WHICH WAS ALLUDED TO IN THE CINCPAC POSITION ON THE STATUS OF THE INTERFACE TESTING.

8. (U) IF A ONE-WAY LINK IS PURSUED IN THE FUTURE, I RECOMMEND AT THIS TIME THAT IT BE COMPLETELY CHECKED OUT TECHNICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY

BEFORE BEING SENT OUT HEREFOR IMPLEMENTATION. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET
49

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CG AMERICAL DIV		2 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 of 6 COPIES RECD	
			011539Z OCT 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS FOR 020230H5 Advance Routed 020130H Syp I Contacted COC - Watch Officer indicated Americal had called re this requesting it be delivered to Cb if immediately if still awake or first thing in A.M. Routed to Command Duty Officer (Col Jones) indicated S/S determine disposition to be routed first thing in A.M. V. Ray jr OG - Perhaps this one will have to be observed w/ for Law. As for our getting another brigade that's useful thinking. V. Ray jr
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		020230H5			
	G-1					
	G-2	INFD				
	G-3	ACT				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

SECRET #50

SECRET

DE UUMSEAD 0936S 2751540
 ZNY SSSSS
 Z 011539Z OCT 68
 FM CG/AMERICAL DIV
 TO CG/III MAF
 BT

FOR

S E C R E T ATTN: MG GETTYS TO LT. GEN CUSHMAN
 SUBJ: RELIEF OF HAU DUC OUTPOST

I HAVE TALKED TO THE QUANG TIN PROVINCE CHIEF AND HIS AMERICAN ADVISOR CONCERNING THE CRITICAL SITUATION AT THE HAU DUC RF/PF CAMP. THEY HAVE ADVISED ME THAT IT IS AN ABSOLUTE POLITICAL REQUIREMENT THAT THE HAU DUC POST BE HELD. S. ADVISED THEM THAT IT IS WITHIN OUR CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE OUTPOST SUPPLIED BY AIR UNDER MONSOON CONDITIONS.

HOWEVER, BASED ON ENEMY INFORMATION AND OUR ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE HAU DUC WITH A BATTALION-SIZED FORCE, IT IS APPARENT THAT A MUCH LARGER FORCE WILL BE REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELIEF OF THE POST AND TO CLEAR THE SURROUNDING AREA.

I AM PERSONNALLY CONVINCED THAT HAU DUC HAS NO MILITARY VALUE. HOWEVER, IF IT IS DEEMED ESSENTIAL THAT HAU DUC BE RETAINED I AM CONVINCED,

BASED ON MY EXPERIENCE WITH A SINGLE BATTALION FORCE, THAT THE CONTROL OF THE HAU DUC AREA WILL REQUIRE A BRIGADE-SIZED FORCE.

I CAN PROVIDE THIS FORCE FROM WITHIN MY OWN RESOURCES. HOWEVER THIS WOULD DANGEROUSLY WEAKEN THE DEFENSE OF THE VITAL CHU LAI BASE AREA AND WOULD REDUCE MY CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO CURRENT ENEMY THREATS IN THE QUANG NGAI AREA OR THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO DANANG THROUGH THE QUE SON VALLEY.

IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, I SEE NO PURPOSE IN CONTINUED AMERICAL OPERATIONS IN THE HAU DUC AREA AT OUR PRESENT STRENGTH. IF POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY OVERRIDES MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS I AM PREPARED TO OPERATE IN THE HAU DUC AREA ATTENDENT WITH THE RISKS TO OTHER AREAS MENTIONED ABOVE.

MY CONSIDERED OPINION IS THAT OPERATIONS IN THE HAU DUC AREA ARE NOT OF SUCH VALUE THAT OTHER AREAS SHOULD BE JEOPARDIZED.

IF IT IS DECIDED THAT HAU DUC IS OF SUFFICIENT MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE TO BE SECURED, IT IS REQUESTED THAT AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE-SIZED FORCE BE ASSIGNED THE AMERICAL DIVISION TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK AND SATISFY EXISTING MISSION REQUIREMENTS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

50

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 8216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG FIRST MAW	02 OCT 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY#
	011730Z OCT 68	1 OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	10/2			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #57

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA
 DE RUISAV 0146 2751745
 ZNY S/SSS
 O P 011730Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKN/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

BT

SECRET SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

FOR FMFPAC F-048

FOR CMC CODE AA-1

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS

A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001-2400H 30 SEP 68

B. (1) 144

(2) 22

(3) 8

(4) 0

C. (1) 93

(2) 69

(3) 64

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0146 SECRET SPECAT

(4) 41

(5) 84

(6) 44

(7) 33

D. (1) 36

(2) 18

(3) 9

(4) 14

E. (1) 63

(2) 14

(3) 0

(4) 0

F. (1) 24

(2) 24

(3) 16

(4) 8

G. (1) 24

(2) 0

(3) 0

(4) 0

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

#51

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0146 S E C R E T SPECAT

H. (1) 24

(2) 0

(3) 0

(4) 0

I. (1) 27

(2) (A) 59

(B) 8

(C) 6

(D) 0

J. (1) 1

(2) 66

(3) 98

(4) 5

(5) 0

(6) 0

K. (1) 5

(2) 0

(3) 0

(4) 23

L. (1) 0

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0146 S E C R E T SPECAT

(2) 4

(3) 0

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 0

2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW

A. (1) (A) 78

(B) 72

(2) 30

(3) 32

B. (1) 181

(2) 31

(3) 0

C. (1) (A) 89 (B) 40

(2) (A) 0 (B) 36

(3) (A) 0 (B) 0

D. (1) 8

(2) 22

(3) 0

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

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SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0146 S E C R E T SPECAT

E. (1) 18
 (2) 12
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 F. (1) 0
 (2) 32
 (3) 0
 G. (1) 15
 (2) 5
 (3) 10
 (4) 2
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 H. (1) 56
 (2) 10
 (3) 0

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0146 S E C R E T SPECAT

I. (1) 12
 (2) 54
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 J. (1) (A) 58 (B) 41
 (2) (A) 17 (B) 0
 (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (4) (A) 3 (B) 0
 (5) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (6) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (7) (A) 0 (B) 31
 K. (1) A (3) INCLUDES 10 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES.
 I (1) 4 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRIORITY
 8 USMC TO USMC, WX
 I (2) 14 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRIORITY
 2 USA TO USA, TGT PRIORITY
 8 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALFUNCTION
 19 USMC TO USMC, WX 5 USMC TO USMC, NEG TGT
 2 USMC TO USMC, ASRT DOWN 1 USMC TO USMC, NEG CONTROL
 2 USA TO USMC, ASRT DOWN 1 USA TO USMC, NEG CONTROL
 BT

GP-4

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

COPY 13 OF 13 COPIES

SECRET

#51

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

J1MAF FORM 8216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CMC		2 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
			012038Z OCT 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					<p>EXCLUSIVE FOR</p> <p>REMARKS: G-2 will clear the date in front of EXCLUSIVE FOR</p> <p>EXCLUSIVE FOR</p> <p>FOR</p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p>
4	DCG		10/3			
5	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	F				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	10/2			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #52

SECRET

VV PAC463VVCMC606
 PP RUHKFMA RHMAFA
 DE RUEBHOA3439 2752002
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC-I-MAF
 P 012038Z OCT 68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHKFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
 SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM GEN CHAPMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)
 A. CMC 260142Z SEP 68

1. THE FOLLOWING CONSTITUTES MY REPLY TO THE CHAIRMAN,
 JCS MEMO CONTAINED IN REFEREKKE A:

QUOTE: "MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 SUBJ: MODIFICATION OF AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM (U)
 REF: (A) CM-3651-68 OF 16SEP68 WHICH REPORTED THE CURRENT
 STATUS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT FOR
 AIR SUPPORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO THE DEPUTY
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND MADE A RECOMMENDATION
 PERTAINING THERETO.
 (B) DEP SEC DEF MEMO OF 15MAY68 WHICH CONTAINED HIS

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA3739 S E C R E T SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND
 LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN M C E O
 REVIEW OF THE POSITIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
 STAFF ON THE ISSUE OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF
 III MAF AVIATION ASSETS.

1. I HAVE REVIEWED REFERENCE (A) AND CANNOT CONCUR WHOLLY
 WITH THE EVALUATION THEREIN NOR WITH THE RECOMMENDATION
 WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE INJUNCTION OF THE DEPUTY
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MADE IN REFERENCE (B), THAT THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE "CONTINUED BEYOND THAT
 NECESSARY TO MEET THE SPECIFIC COMBAT SITUATION FOR WHICH
 IT WAS DEvised".

2. I CONCUR THAT IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, BUT VIEWED IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE, THESE
 IMPROVEMENTS HAVE RESULTED ONLY IN MORE RESPONSIVE AIR
 SUPPORT FOR ARMY UNITS WHILE, AS POINTED OUT IN REFERENCE
 (A), "...THE MECHANICS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ARE
 STILL NOT SUCH AS TO PROVIDE THE MARINES WITH THE RESPONSIVENESS
 TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCUSTOMED..." THESE IMPROVEMENTS HAVE
 OCCURRED PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF THE DECENTRALIZATION OF
 THE HIGHLY CENTRALIZED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AS IT WAS
 INITIALLY IMPLEMENTED. BUT THEIR GENESIS SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RUEBHOA3739 S E C R E T SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND
LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN M C E O

FOR WHAT IT IS --- AND EVOLUTIONARY ALTERATION IN THE SINGLE
MANAGEMENT CONCEPT TOWARDS THE DECENTRALIZED MARINE CORPS
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. IMPROVEMENT IN THE SINGLE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS LARGELY BEEN ADOPTIONS OF FEATURES OF
THE ORIGINAL MARINE SYSTEM IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THESE IM-
PROVEMENTS MERELY DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ORIGINAL SINGLE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS FUNDAMENTALLY DEFECTIVE. IN REALITY,
SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS BEEN A CONTINUATION OF THE ARMY/AIR
FORCE JOINT AIR GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM, PARTICULARLY IN
II, III, AND IV CORPS, WHERE AIR SUPPORT HAS BEEN A UNILATERAL
AIR FORCE EFFORT. THEREFORE, THE ENDORSEMENT OF MODIFIED
SINGLE MANAGEMENT BY THE COMMANDERS IN THESE AREAS REFERS
NOT TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT, PER SE, BUT TO IMPROVEMENTS IN THE
JOINT AIR GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM.

3. THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AS INITIALLY IMPLEMENTED, OVER
STRONG MARINE PROTESTS, IMPOSED A SEVERE DEGRADATION ON MARINE
AIR SUPPORT RESPONSIVENESS. IT WAS POINTED OUT AT THE TIME
THAT MARINE GROUND UNITS HAVE FAR FEWER HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS AND
LESS ARTILLERY THAN ARMY UNITS, AND THUS MUST RELY PRIMARILY ON
THE CLOSE INTEGRATION AND RESPONSIVE SCHEDULING OF THEIR ORGANIC

too strong

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA3739 S E C R E T SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN M C E O

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ASSETS. ANY STATISTICS CITING COMPARISON OF
NUMBERS OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PROVIDED MARINE VIS-A-VIS
ARMY BATTALIONS MUST CONSIDER THE DIFFERENTIAL IN ORGANIC SUPPORT
MEANS.

4. THAT THIS SEVERE DEGRADATION OF THE INITIAL PERIOD WAS NOT
NECESSARY AND THAT THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AS ORIGINALLY
IMPLEMENTED WAS UNWORKABLE WAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED BY THE
RADICAL REVISION EFFECTED ON 30 MAY. THE EFFECT OF THIS REVISION,
AS INDICATED ABOVE, WAS TO DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM TOWARDS THE
CONCEPT OF THE MARINE SYSTEM TO A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE. THE
REMAINING DEGRADATION, WHICH ALL COMMANDERS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED,
IS LIKEWISE UNNECESSARY AND SHOULD NOT BE CONTINUED. HOW
"EQUITABILITY" AND THE "BROADENED RESPONSIBILITIES" OF CG,
III MAF JUSTIFY FURNISHING LESS THAN THE MAXIMUM RESPONSIVENESS
IN AIR SUPPORT TO ARMY AND MARINE TROOPS IN I CTZ IS NOT UNDER-
STOOD, AND CANNOT BE CONCURRED IN.

5. SEEKING TO PROVIDE FOR MORE EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF THE
AIR RESOURCES IN I CTZ, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ENHANCING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, CG, III MAF HAS RECOMMENDED
TO COMUSMACV THAT, FOLLOWING THE MACV WEEKLY ALLOCATION OF AIR

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUEBHOA3739 S E C R E T SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN M C E O
 EFFORT, MARINE AIR, EXCEPT THAT ALLOCATED BY MACV OUTSIDE OF I CTZ, BE SCHEDULED BY III MAF ON A DAILY BASIS TO SATISFY THE DYNAMIC AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF ALL III MAF GROUND COMMANDERS, ARMY AND MARINES. THIS SCHEDULE WOULD BE PUBLISHED IN SUFFICIENT TIME EACH DAY TO BE REFLECTED IN THE TOTAL AIR SUPPORT PICTURE AT THE SAIGON BASED TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT CENTER. THEREAFTER, AIRCRAFT CONTROL PROCEDURES WOULD BE IDENTICAL TO THOSE NOW IN EFFECT, WITH III MAF'S SUPPORTING DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER (DASC HORN), AS THE SENIOR AIR CONTROL CENTER IN I CTZ, COORDINATING AIR SUPPORT IN I CTZ UNDER THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK.

6. UNDER THE ARRANGEMENTS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 5, COMUSMACV STILL WOULD HAVE MEANS FOR INFLUENCING ACTION THROUGHOUT SVN BY INCREASING/DECREASING AIR FORCE AND MARINE CORPS SORTIES PROVIDED TO III MAF AS WELL AS RETAINING OVERALL DIRECTION AND CONTROL MEANS TO CONCENTRATE ALL AIR SUPPORT WHEN AND WHERE NEEDED TO MEET EMERGENVES. THUS, THE STATED OBJECTIVES OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT WOULD BE INTACT; THE SYSTEM WOULD CAPITALIZE ON THE AIR MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES UNIQUE TO III MAF; AND, THE RELIABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE PRE-SINGLE MANAGEMENT AIR CONTROL

no such animal

PAGE SIX RUEBHOA3739 S E C R E T SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN M C E O
 ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE OPERATING FOR BOTH MARINE AND ARMY FORCES IN I CTZ.

7. WITH THE ONSET OF THE NORTHEAST MONSOON, AND THE RESULTANT IMPRACTICABILITY OF FORECASTING SCHEDULES WEEKLY IN ADVANCE, DAILY SCHEDULING BECOMES EVE MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GROUND FORCES. FURTHER, CG, III MAF PROPOSES ONLY THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT BE GIVEN A THIRTY-DAY TRIAL PERIOD TO PARALLEL THAT GIVEN TO BOTH THE INITIAL AND MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS.

8. ACCORDINGLY, I RECOMMEND:

A. THAT, IN AN EFFORT TO GAIN THE COMPLETE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE MARINE SYSTEM, A THIRTY-DAY TEST BE MADE OF THE CG, III MAF PROPOSES SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE.

B. THAT THE MONTHLY EVALUATIONS BE CONTINUED TO APPRAISE THE RECOMMENDED TEST AS WELL AS OTHER FUTURE MODIFICATIONS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

C. THAT THE INJUCTION OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MADE BY REFERENCE (B), AS TO THE RESUMPTION OF NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE III MAF, BE EXECUTED AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE.

BT

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS
SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
GEN CHAPMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

9. IT IS REQUESTED THJT THE CHAIRMAN CONVEY THESE VIEWS
TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HIS CONSIDERATION
IN RELATION TO THE RECOMMENDATION OF REFERENCE (A).
UNQUOTE.

2. I WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASD WITH YOUR EXTREMELY HELPFUL
EDITORIALS, AND BOB'S SUPPORTING RATIONALE.

3. ONE OTHER IMPROTAMT POINT - I BELIEVE WE MUST BE
FULLY PREPARED FOR ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSAL, THUS
AVOIDING ANY SEMBLANCE OF THE PREMATURE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SINGLE MANAGEMENT, AND ENSURING A SUCCESSFUL THIRTY
DAY TEST. WARM REGARDS

GP-3

BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

#52

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CMC		2 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
			020024Z OCT 68		1 / 3	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS CG - Do prefer that EXCLUSIVE this ceremony be held on neutral ground or at one of the two commands concerned? FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY [Signature] Believe we should hold it here, as we did for 3d Mar Div during HHH visit. Mike [Signature]
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
4	D C/S		Has	Seen		
1	D C/S DM					
	S/S	I	10/2			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

VV PAC473
 VVCMC611
 PP RUHFMFA RHMAFA RUMLMHA RUMHLA
 DE RUEBHCA3665 2752202
 ZNY CCCCC
 CG FMFPAC -I- CG III MAF
 CG III MAF -I- CG 1ST MAW
 CG III MAF -I- CG 1ST MARDIV
 P 020024Z OCT 68
 FM CMC
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUHFMFA/CG FMFPAC
 RUMLMHA/CG 1ST MAW
 RUMHLA/CG 1ST MARDIV
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE M C E O
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE, LTGEN CUSHMAN, MGEN YOUNGDALE
 AND MGEN QUILTER FROM GENERAL CHAPMAN
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PUC FOR 1ST MARDIV AND 1ST MAW
 1. THE PRESIDENT HAS TODAY APPROVED THE PUC FOR THE 1ST MAW
 AND THE 1ST MARDIV FOR PERIODS 11MAY 1965 TO 15 SEP 1967 AND
 29 MARCH 1966 TO 15 SEP 1967 RESPECTIVELY. SECNAV WOULD BE
 PLEASED TO PRESENT THESE AWARDS DURING HIS FORTHCOMING
 VISIT TO SEA AND IT WOULD APPEAR FROM HIS CURRENT SCHEDULE
 THAT 10 OCTOBER IS THE MOST APPROPRIATE AND CONVENIENT DATE.
 REQUEST YOU MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR JOINT
 CEREMONY ON THAT DATE AND ADVISE.

PAGE TWO RUEBHCA3665 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE M C E O
 2. PRESS RELEASE BY THE WHITE HOUSE SCHEDULED FOR 1130 LOCAL
 9 OCTOBER. PLEASE DO NOT MAKE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THESE
 AWARDS THERE PRIOR TO THAT TIME.
 3. THIS MESSAGE IS DECLASSIFIED ON 11 OCTOBER 1968.

CP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

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HEADQUARTERS
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 2 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 020120Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR REMARKS
			IN	OUT		
2	CG				b	EXCLUSIVE FOR
4	DCG		10/3		Ruled	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/2		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
5	G-3	A	Has Copy			
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

#18
#19
SECRET #54

SECRET

VV PAC 46800 RUHHFMA RHMAFA
 DE RUEBHOA 3723 2752253
 ZNY SSSSS
 CG FMFPAC -T- CG III MAF
 O 020120Z OCT 68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN GUSE AND LIGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM GENERAL CHAPMAN

MARINE CORPS STRENGTH AND STRUCTURE

THE FOLLOWING IMPACT ASSESSMENT, RE: MARINE CORPS SEA FORCES
 WAS SUBMITTED TO DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AS PART OF THE
 MEMO TO HIM, SUBJ: MARINE CORPS STRENGTH AND STRUCTURE, COPY
 AIRMAILED YOUR HEADQUARTERS 30 SEP 1968. QUOTE

"1. GENERAL

A. THE FORCE REDUCTIONS BEING CONSIDERED IN VIETNAM
 ARE IDENTIFIED IN THE ATTACHED TAB. THESE REDUCTIONS WILL
 EQUATE TO A LOSS OF TACTICAL OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO III MAF
 AND COMUSMACV AND THE DILUTION OF III MAF'S CAPABILITY TO
 ACCOMPLISH ITS ASSIGNED MISSIONS.

B. IN REVIEWING THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS AND THE
 FORCE ALIGNMENTS WHICH IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR III MAF

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA 3723 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 TO ACCOMPLISH IN ORDER TO REMAIN WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS
 OF PROGRAM 6 THREE FACTORS ARE SIGNIFICANT:

(1) PROGRAM 6 DOES NOT, IN ALL CASES, AUTHORIZE
 SPACES THAT WILL ACCOMMODATE APPROVED MARINE T/O
 STRENGTHS FOR UNITS AUTHORIZED IN THE OSD APPROVED
 TROOP LIST.

(2) PROGRAM 6 DOES NOT AUTHORIZE SPACES TO
 ACCOMMODATE MARINE CORPS APPROVED AUGMENTATIONS TO ITS
 STANDARD T/OS WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO SATISFY SUPPORT
 FUNCTIONS PECULIAR TO SUSTAINED LAND COMBAT.

(3) MARINE CORPS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL
 PROGRAM 6 SPACES TO SATISFY VALID REQUIREMENTS THROUGH
 BOTH UNIFIED AND SERVICE CHANNELS HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL.

(A) IN SEPTEMBER 1967 THE JCS IDENTIFIED TO
 OSD A REQUIREMENT FOR OVER 6000 DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM SPACES
 FOR MARINE CORPS FORCES IN SVN.

(B) DURING THIS SAME PERIOD OF TIME, WHICH
 WITNESSED A GROWTH IN THE PROGRAM CEILING FOR SVN OF
 57,308, THE MARINE CORPS CEILING HAS INCREASED ONLY
 1,462. THIS MINOR INCREASE HAS BEEN LIMITED ALMOST

PAGE 1 OF 8 PAGES

SECRET

#54

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUEBHOA3723 S E C R E T SPEAT EXCLUSIVE
ENTIRELY TO ADDITIONAL UNITS OR CAPABILITIES.

2. SPECIFIC.

A. WITHDRAWAL OF TWO AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR COMPAINES

(REIN):

- (1) A REDUCTION IN ESSENTIAL ARMOR PROTECTION CURRENTLY EMPLOYED IN THE AREA OF THE DMZ.
- (2) A REDUCITION IN CAPABILITY TO MOVE PERSONNEL,

SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT OVERLAND DURING THE MONSOON SEASON. BECASUE OF TERRAIN AND CLIMATIC CONDITIONS THIS REDUCTION CANNOT BE OFFSET BY THE REMAINING MEANS OF MOBILITY, I.E., HELICOPTERS AND TRUCKS.

(3) FURTHER REDUCTION OF THE IN-COUNTRY AMTRAC CAPABILITY WILL OCCUR IN THE EVENT OF REQUIREMENTS TO WITHDRAW LVTS FOR SUPPORT OF SF OPERATIONS.

(4) REDUCES BY 40PERCENT THE AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR CAPABILITY IN WESTPAC THUS LEAVING AVAILABLE SUFFICIENT LIFT FOR THE ASSUALT ELEMENTS OF ONLY ONE OF THE TWO DIVISIONS. IT IS APPARENT THAT THE NVA WOULD BECOME QUICKLY COGNIZANT OF THE FACT THAT A CONSIDERABLE DRAW-DOWN IN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CAPABILITY HAD TRANSPIRED AND

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA3723 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
THEY COULD IN TRUN DEVOTE INCREASED EFFORTS TO AIR DEFENSE (INCLUDING ANTI-HELICOPTER) WITH A COMMENSURATE DECREASE IN THEIR COASTAL DEFENSE EFFORT. EQUALLY IMPROTANT, FUTURE ATTEMPTS TO UTILIZE AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATIONS, FEINTS, ETC., MAY BE FORECAST TO MEET WITH LIMITED SUCCESS.

B. REDEPLOYMENT OF MATCU:

(1) ELIMINATES 25PERCENT OF THE CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE IFR TRAFFIC CONTROL WHEN MOST URGENTLY NEEDED DURING THE WET MONSOON. THE BASELINE FORCE STRUCTURE AUTHORIZES SIX MATCU'S TO SUPPORT THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT GROUPS PRESENTLY IN SVN. THE PRESENT FOUR MATCU'S ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THIS CAPBILITY ON A CONTINUING BASIS AT FOUR PRIMARY AIRFIELDS (CHU LAI, MARBLE MOUNTAIN, PHU BAI,

AND QUANG TRI) AND SUPPORT TWO LANDING ZONES (DONG HA AND VANDERGRIFT) BY TEMPORARY DRAWDOWN FROM TWO PRIMARY AIRFIELDS.

(2) DENIES AN IFR CAPABILITY AT ONE OF THE PRIMARY AIRFIELDS AND REDUCES THE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THE LANDING ZONES.

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PAGE FIVE RUEBHOA3723 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

(3) A REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH HIGHER WEATHER MINIMUMS FOR LAUNCH AND RECOVERY THEREBY REDUCING THE ALREADY LIMITED RESTRICTED HELICOPTER SUPPORT DURING PERIODS OF BAD WEATHER.

(4) A DECREASE IN OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY AND HELICOPTER RESPONSIVENESS AT A TIME WHEN INCREASED DEMANDS FOR LOGISTIC LIFT WILL OCCUR DUE TO THE CONCURRENT REDUCTION IN AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR ASSETS.

(5) A DEGRADATION IN CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT ARMY UNITS IN I CTZ.

C. REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE MARINE ATTACK SQUADRON:

(1) A REDUCTION IN III MAF'S CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SORTIE RATE AND ORDNANCE TONNAGE CAPABILITIES.

(2) A REDUCED CAPABILITY OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT, E.G., SHRIKE, BULLPUP, WALLEYE, GCBS, AND CW.

(3) REDUCTIONS IN THE CAS AND ALL WEATHER BOMBING CAPABILITY WHICH WILL ENGAGE THE ENEMY'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ABILITY TO ACHIEVE TACTICAL SURPRISE AND SUCCESS.

PAGE SIX RUEBHOA3723 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

(4) A DEGRADATION IN CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT ARMY UNITS IN I CTZ.

D. REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE AIR SUPPORT RADAR TEAM:

(1) A REDUCTION OF ALL WEATHER BOMBING CAPABILITY DURING INCLEMENT WEATHER, DARKNESS, AND PERIODS OF REDUCED VISIBILITY WHEN OTHER MEANS OF FIRE SUPPORT ARE RESTRICTED BECAUSE OF REDUCED MOBILITY AND VISUAL OBSERVATION.

E. REDEPLOYMENT OF TWO ANTI-TANK AND TWO TANK COMPANIES.

(1) THE LOSS OF TOTAL AT BATTALION ASSETS.

(2) A REDUCTION IN DIRECT ASSAULT FIRES AVAILABLE TO REINFORCE INFANTRY UNITS. THESE ARE PARTICULARLY DESIRABLE IN THE EVENT OF COMBAT IN BUILT-UP AREAS.

(3) A REDUCTION IN ANTI-TANK CAPABILITY IN THE AREA OF HIGHEST ENEMY ARMOR THREAT. IN THE VICINITY OF THE DMZ, THE ENEMY ENJOYS THE ADVANTAGE OF A RELATIVE SANCTUARY TO MASS HIS FORCES, INCLUDING ARMOR. HE COULD IF HE CHOSE TO, EMPLOY ARMOR IN AT LEAST BATTALION STRENGTH. REDUCTION OF III MAF'S ARMOR CAPABILITY IN
BT

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VV PAC 469
 OO RUHFMA RHMAFA
 DE RUEBHOA 3725 2752253
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 CG FMFPAC -T- CG IIIMAF
 O 02 012 02 OCT 68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM GENERAL CHAPMAN SECTION TWO OF THREE SECTIONS
 THE FACE OF THIS THREAT ACCEPTS AN APPRECIABLE RISK.

F. REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE ARMORED AMPHIBIAN COMPANY
 (LESS ONE PLATOON):

- (1) THE LOSS OF TWO THIRDS OF THE CURRENT
 ARMORED AMPHIBIAN CAPABILITY WITHIN III MAF.
- (2) A REDUCTION IN ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT
 AVAILABLE TO III MAF. MAY REQUIRE REPLACEMENT BY
 CONVENTIONAL 105MM HOWITZER UNITS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE
 III MAF WITH ADEQUATE FIRE SUPPORT. THE IMPACT OF
 THE REDUCTION IN ARMORED AMPHIBIAN ASSETS IS COMPOUNDED
 DUE TO THEIR EFFECTIVE MOBILITY DURING THE MONSOON
 SEASON.
- (3) A REDUCTION OF III MAF'S CAPABILITY TO

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA 3725 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE
 FOR THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY
 THE ARMORED AMPHIBIAN TO REDUCE ENEMY FIRES AND
 FORTIFICATIONS IN THE BEACH ASSAULT.

G. REDEPLOYMENT OF THE WING EQUIPMENT REPAIR
 SQUADRON, MINE WING SUPPORT GROUP:

- (1) THE ELIMINATION OF 1ST MAW CAPABILITY TO
 PERFORM FOURTH ECHELON MAINTENANCE OF MOTOR TRANSPORT,
 ENGINEER AND OTHER EQUIPMENT.

H. REDUCTION IN THE MANNING OF TWO DIVISION
 RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION:

- (1) THE ELIMINATION OF ESSENTIAL AUGMENTATION
 PROVIDED PREVIOUSLY TO BOTH RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS
 THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL FROM THE AT COMPANIES
 CADRED IN 1967. THE AUGMENTATION WAS DIRECTED BY A
 FACT-OF-LIFE COMBAT REQUIREMENT WHICH HAS NOT DECREASED,
 AND, IN FACT HAS INCREASED.
- (2) A REQUIREMENT TO DIVERT THE RESOURCES OF
 INFANTRY UNITS TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECONNAISSANCE FUNCTION.
- (3) A DIMINUTION OF THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF

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PAGE THREE RUEBHOA3725 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
THE RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT.

(4) AN INCREASED OPPORTUNITY FOR THE ENEMY TO
MOVE WITH FREEDOM AND TO GAIN TACTICAL SURPRISE AND
SUCCESS.

I. REDUCTION IN DIVISION BASE SUPPORT PERSONNEL C.

(1) THE REDUCTION WITH IN EACH MARINE DIVISION
OF OVER 50PERCENT OF THE ESSENTIAL AUGMENTATION REQUIRED TO
PERFORM NECESSARY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS PECULIAR TO SUSTAINED
COMBAT IN SVN. THESE INCLUDE: POSTAL, BASE SECURITY,
FIREFIGHTING, SALVAGE, POST EXCHANGE, AND RECREATIONAL
SERVICES WHICH THE MARINE DIVISION IS NOT ORGANIZED OF
STAFFED TO PROVIDE TO THE DEGREE REQUIRED IN SVN.

THESE FUNCTIONS ARE PROVIDED BY BASE SUPPORT ORGANIZA-
TIONS IN PEACETIME AND HAVE NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED
IN THE SAME DEGREE BY MARINE UNITS COMMITTED TO COMBAT.

(2) PERSONNEL TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS WILL
BE WITHDRAWN FROM COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS WHICH
ARE ALREADY OVEREXTENDED. THIS WILL RESULT IN REDUCED
COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS WITHIN THE UNITS PROVIDING THE
PERSONNEL.

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA3725 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

J. REDUCTION IN HELICOPTER DOOR GUNNERS:

(1) A REQUIREMENT TO "TWO - HAT" HARD SKILL
AVIATION PERSONNEL, E.G., ORDNANCE TECHNICIANS AND
MECHANICS, TO PERFORM THE DOOR GUNNER FUNCTION.

(2) A REDUCED MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY AS A NATURAL
OUTGROWTH OF THE DIMINISHED EFFECTIVENESS OF PERSONNEL
WHICH WILL ACCRUE AS A RESULT OF THE EXCESSIVE HOURS
THESE PERSONNEL MUST DEVOTE TO EACH FUNCTION. THE
AVERAGE NORM (NOT OPERATIONALLY READY DUE TO MAINTENANCE)
RATE FOR 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING HELICOPTERS
FOR THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD MARCH-AUGUST, 1968 WAS 26.3PERCENT.
THE REQUIREMENT TO UTILIZE AVIATION TECHNICIANS AS
HELICOPTER DOOR GUNNERS, THEREBY MAKING THEM UNAVAILABLE
FOR MAINTENANCE FUNCTION, WILL INCREASE THE NORM RATE
PROPORTIONATELY WITH A RESULTANT REDUCTION IN TOTAL LIFT
CAPABILITY.

K. DEDUCTION IN STRENGTH OF AIRFIELD SECURITY
FORCES:

(1) A REQUIREMENT TO ASSIGN HARD SKILL,
CRITICAL AVIATION TECHNICIANS TO THE SECURITY FORCE

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PAGE FIVE RUEBHOA3725 S E C R E T SEPCAT EXCLUSIVE AS AN ADDITIONAL DUTY. THIS PLACES AN ADDED REQUIREMENT ON INDIVIDUALS WHO ALREADY WORK EXCEPTIONALLY LONG HOURS ON A CONTINUING BASIS AND RESULTS IN REDUCED ALERTNESS AND EFFICIENCY.

(2) A REDUCED MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF NONAVAILABILITY OF TECHNICIANS WHEN ACTUALLY PERFORMING A SECURITY TASK AND REDUCED EFFECTIVENESS WHEN AVAILABLE. A PROPORTIONATE INCREASE IN THE NORM RATE WITH RESULTANT REDUCTION IN TOTAL AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY, BASED ON THE SAME RATIONALE PRESENTED IN PARAGRAPH J ABOVE, WILL ENSUE.

(3) A DRAWDOWN ON PERSONNEL ASSETS OF INFANTRY UNITS TO ASSIST IN THE SECURITY TASKS, WITH A RESULTANT REDUCTION IN THE OVERALL COMBAT CAPABILITY OF III MAF.

1. REDUCTION IN STRENGTHS OF LOGISTIC ELEMENTS:

(1) THE DILUTION OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT THROUGHOUT III MAF. HBE CURRENT RATION OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TO COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS IN III MAF IS APPROXIMATELY 1:6.5. THIS IS THE MOST AUSTERE OF ANY OF THE SERVICES IN SVN. THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS WILL SIGNIFI-

PAGE SIX RUEBHOA3725 S E C R E T SEPCAT EXCLUSIVE CANTLY COMPOUND THIS REALITONSHIP. THE NET RESULT WILL BE DECREASED LOGISTIC RESPONSIVENESS AND FLEXIBILITY IN RELATION TO THE REQUIREMENT TO SUPPORT WIDELY DISPERSED MAJOR LOGISTIC BASES AT DANANG, PHU BAI, DONG HA-QUANG TRI AND TO PROVIDE TASK ORGANIZED LOGISTIC SUPPORT ELEMENTS TO SIMULTANEOUSLY SUSTAIN NUMEROUS GEOGRAPHICALLY SEPARATED BATTALION AND REGIMENTAL SIZED COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS WILL BE COMPOUNDED BY THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE FLC TO ABSORB CERTAIN OF THE FUNCTIONS PREVIOUSLY PERFORMED BY THE MWSG (WERS). IT WILL ALSO RESULT IN THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSPORTATION FOR THE MOVEMENT OF EQUIPMENT TO AND FROM OKINAWA FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF 3D AND 4TH ECHELON MAINTENANCE. A CONCURRENT REDUCTION OF 3D FSR IN OKINAWA WILL FURTHER AGGRAVATE THE PROBLEM AT DEPOT LEVEL.

(2) THE REDUCTION IN LAUNDRY SERVICES, FIRE PROTECTION, AERIAL DELIVERY, MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIDS, MECHANICAL PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING, ETC.

3. MANPOWER CONSIDERATIONS.

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 VVCM C6033EEE 610
 OO RUHFMA RHMAFA
 DE RUEBHOA3740 2752253
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 CG FMFPAC -T - CG III MAF
 O 020120Z OCT 68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM GENERAL CHAPMAN FINAL SECTION OF THREE SECTIONS

A. THE FOREGOING ASSESSMENT IS FOCUSED UPON THE
 IMPACT ON SEA STRUCTURE ACCRUING FROM THE POSSIBLE
 REDUCTION OF 5,800 STRUCTURE SPACES. THE REQUIREMENT
 FOR THESE STRUCTURE SPACES DERIVES FROM RECOGNITION OF
 THE FACT THAT CAREFULLY VALIDATED MARINE CORPS T/O'S
 REFLECT MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT BUT
 SUPPORT A SUSTAINED LAND CAMPAIGN.

B. MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS SUPPORTING THESE STRUCTURE
 SPACES HAS RESULTED FROM TWO PRINCIPAL SOURCES. FIRST N
 OSD HAS APPROVED IN PRINCIPAL VARIOUS CHANGES IN OVERALL
 MARINE CORPS FORCES WHICH INCREASED SEA MANPOWER REQUIRE-
 MENTS AND AUTHORIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE TRANSITION OF A-4

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA3740 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 SQUADRONS TO A-6 AIRCRAFT. SECOND, THE MARINE CORPS HAS
 IDENTIFIED OTHER MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS ESSENTIAL TO THE
 EFFECTIVENESS OF SEA FORCES. THESE CONSIST OF VITAL,

ACT-OFF-LIFE REQUIREMENTS SUCH AS AIRFIELD SECURITY AND
 HELICOPTER DOOR GUNNERS, FOR WHICH MANPOWER WAS AUTHORIZED
 TO SEA BY DRAWING UPON CONUS RESOURCES. TIMELY RESPONSE
 TO THE URGENT REQUIREMENT TO PLACE THESE ADDITIONAL
 FORCES IN SEA, LED THE MARINE CORPS TO DEPLOY THE NECES-
 SARY MANPOWER IN ANTICIPATION OF COMMENSURATE INCREASES
 IN DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES PROGRAM CEILINGS. THE MARINE
 CORPS SEA MANNING OBJECTIVE ABOVE THE DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM
 CEILING (4,100) DERIVES FROM THESE MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS M
 MARINE CORPS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT
 PROGRAM CEILING SPACES TO SUPPORT THE SEA MANNING AUTHO-
 RIZATIONS HAVE BEEN ENERAL LY UNSUCCESSFUL.

C. THE DEPLOYMENT OF RLI-27, INITIALLY PLANNED FOR
 90 DAYS AND SUBSEQUENTLY EXTENDED TO MORE THAT TWICE
 THAT PERIOD, CREATED A SURGE IN OVERSEAS MANNING REQUIRE-
 MENTS EXCEEDING THE IMMEDIATELY DEPLOYABLE MANPOWER
 RESOURCES OF THE MARINE CORPS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE MARINE

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PAGE THREE RUEBNOA EURP S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 CORPS SEA ACTUAL STRENGTH IS BELOW THE PRESCRIBED
 MANNING LEVEL. SUPERFICIALLY, THIS FACT WOULD SEEM TO
 LESSEN THE IMPACT OF KNIT WITHDRAWALS REQUIRED TO REDUCE
 THE FORCE STRUCTURE TO THE CURRENTLY APPROVED CEILING.
 HOWEVER, THE FACT IS THAT ALL OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS
 INHERENT IN THE TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE ARE BEING PERFORMED
 AT THIS TIME, ALBEIT AT MARGINAL LEVELS OF EFFECTIVENESS
 IN SOME CASES. THEREFORE, THE APPRAISAL OF IMPACT ON
 THE CAPABILITY OF THE MARINE CORPS SEA FORCES REMAINS
 UNCHANGED IN THE CONTEXT OF ACTUAL MANNING SINCE NOT
 ONLY MANPOWER BUT ALSO FUNCTIONS AND EQUIPMENT ARE DELETED
 FROM THE FORCE BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS FROM SEA."
 UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

SECRET

#54

HEADQUARTERS
II MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 2 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 020121Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY I don't like alt. #2 !!! b.
4	DCG		10/15			
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	E				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/2		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
5	G-3	A	10/5		curt	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
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 Z NY SSSSS
 CG FMFPAC -T- CG III MAF
 O 020121Z OCT 68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 GEN CHAPMAN, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DUPTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON MARINE
 CORPS STRENGTH AND STRUCTURE AIRMAILED YOUR HEADQUARTERS
 30SEP68. FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM THAT MEMO.

1. (S) YOUR MEMORANDUM OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1968 REQUESTED A DETAILED
 MARINE CORPS TROOP LIST AND PLAN FOR ATTAINING 89,500 TO / TD
 STRUCTURE SPACES FOR SEA FORCES. YOU ALSO REQUESTED A LISTING
 OF FORCES TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM SEA AND RECOMMENDED FOR RETENTION
 IN THE NON-SEA STRUCTURE OF THE MARINE CORPS, TOGETHER WITH
 SUPPORTING RATIONALE.

2. (S) A SUMMARIZED TROOP LIST OF MARINE CORPS SEA FORCES WAS
 PREPARED IN LAND FORCES MANPOWER SUMMARY FORMAT.
 THIS TROOP LIST AGGREGATES 89,503 STRUCTURE SPACES, INCLUDING
 A MINIMAL TEMPORARY DUTY ACCOUNT FOR SVN. FOR YOUR INFORMATION

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA3724 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE M C E O
 THE SUMMARIZED TROOP LIST COMPARES THE STRUCTURE SPACES WITHIN THIS
 TOTAL TO THE SEA DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES PROGRAM CEILINGS
 FOR EACH COUNTRY.

3. (S) CONSISTENT WITH YOUR REQUEST N MARINE CORPS UNITS NECESSARILY
 WITHDRAWN FROM SEA IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE STIPULATED
 FORCE LEVEL OF 89,500 STRUCTURE SPACES AND WHICH ARE RECOMMENDED
 FOR RETENTION IN NON-SEA FORCES WERE

IDENTIFIED. THESE UNITS AGGREGATE 3, YPR NON-SEA STRUCTURE SPACES
 REQUIRING A COMMENSURATE INCREASE IN FY69 END STRENGTH.
 SUPPORTING RATIONALE AND A BREF EXPLANATION REGARDING THE
 ADDITION OF EACH UNIT TO THE NON-SEA FORCES IS INCLUDED.
 THE DETAILED MARINE CORPS TROOP LIST REFLECTS THE DELETION FROM
 SEA OF A REQUIREMENT FOR SOME 5,800 SEA STRUCTURE SPACES
 WHICH THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS CONSIDERS NECESSARY
 TO THE EFFECTIVE PROSECUTION OF THE MARINE CORPS MISSION IN

SEA. THE DELETION OF THESE SPACE WILL RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT
 REDUCTION IN THE OVERALL CAPABILITY OF MARINE CORPS FORCES COM-
 MITTED TO COMBAT IN SOUTH VIETNAM, NOTABLY IN THE AREAS OF AMPHIB-
 IOUS ASSAULT, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND ALL-
 WEATHER BOMBING, TANK AND ANTI-TANK OPERATIONS, LOGISTIC SUPPORT

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

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PAGE THREE RUEBHOA3724 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE M C E O AND MOBILITY, MAINTENANCE AND SERVICE, AND A VARIETY OF AUGMENTATION REQUIREMENTS. TO SOME EXTENT, THE SUPPORT OF ARMY FORCES IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE WILL ALSO BE REDUCED.

FULL RECOGNITION OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THESE REDUCTIONS, DICTATES THAT ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION BE CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO RETAIN THE BALANCED FORCE CAPABILITY OF MARINE CORPS SEA FORCES. THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES ARE PRESENTED:
ALTERNATIVE NR 1

1. AUTHORIZE 95,300 MARINE CORPS SEKISTRUCTURE SPACES FOR FY69 AND FY70.

*/ CONCURRENTLY INCREASE THE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES PROGRAM CEILINGS BY 5,500 IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 200 IN OKINAWA AND 100 IN JAPAN, ACCOMMODATING THE PRESENT DISPOSITION OF MARINE CORPS SEA FORCE STRUCTURE.

3. APPROVE A FORCE STRUCTURE MANPOWER ALLOWANCE INCREASE OF 4,100 FOR FY69.

4. APPROVE A FORCE STRUCTURE MANPOWER ALLOWANCE INCREASE OF 5,800 FOR FY70.

APPROVAL OF THIS ALTERNATIVE WILL PERMIT RETENTION IN SEA OF A BALANCED MARINE COMBAT FORCE. MOREOVER, THESE FORCES WILL BE

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA3724 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE M C E O IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE IN THE COMBAT THEATRE CAPABLE OF INSTANT RESPONSE TO THE FULL SPECTRUM OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

HOWEVER, IF IT IS DECIDED THAT MARINE CORPS FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM SVN, IT APPEARS PRUDENT TO FULLY EXPLIIT THE THREAT POSED TO THE ENEMY BY MAINTAINING THE AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY OF MARINE CORPS FORCES IN A FORWARD POSTURE.

THIS POSTURE CAN BE READILY OBTAINED BY THE RELOCATION OF TWO BATTALION LANDING TEAMS AND ONE AVIATION ATTACK SQUADRON TO OKINAWA AND JAPAN, RESPECTIVELY. ALTHOUGH ACCOUNTABLE TO THE OKINAWA AND JAPAN CEILINGS, THESE UNITS WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN SVN IN A SPECIAL LANDING FORCE CAPACITY.

IN ADDITION OF THIS CAPABILITY TO QUICKLY REINFORCE SVN FORCES, SUCH ACTION HAS THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF PROVIDING FOR RECONSTITUTION OF THE PACOM RESERVE IN OKINAWA AND JAPAN. THE ALTERNATIVE BELOW WILL PROVIDE THIS POSTURE.

ALTERNATIVE NR 2

1. AUTHORIZE 95,300 MARINE CORPS SEA STRUCTURE SPACES FOR FY69 AND FY70.

2. CONCURRENTLY INCREASE THE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES PROGRAM CEILINGS BY 2,100 IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 3,400 IN OKINAWA AND

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PAGE FIVE RUEBHOA3724 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE M C E O
300 IN JAPAN TO ACCOMMODATE TWO BATTALION LANDING TEAMS IN
OKINAWA AND ONE MARINE ATTACK SQUADRON IN JAPAN WHILE MAIN-
TAINING THE PRESENT DISPOSITION OF REMAINING MARINE CORPS
SEA FORCE STRUCTURE.

3. APPROVE A FORCE STRUCTURE MANPOWER ALLOWANCE OF 4,100
FOR FY69.

4. APPROVE A FORCE STRUCTURE MANPOWER ALLOWANCE OF 5,800
FOR FY70.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

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SECRET

#55

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 03 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 021545Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/3		V	
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	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
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	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

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SECRET

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 DE RUMSAV 0158 2761915
 ZNY SSSSS
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 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR FMFPAC F-059
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1

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PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0158 S E C R E T SPECAT

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G. (1) 19

(2) 4

(3) 2

(4) 0

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

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PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0158 S E C R E T SPECAT

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 (2) 95
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PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0158 S E C R E T SPECAT

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PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**
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PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0158 S E C R E T SPECAT

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 (4) (A) 3 (B) 0
 (5) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (6) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (7) (A) 0 (B) 36
 K. (1) (1) A (3) INCLUDES 34 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES
 I (1) 10 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI
 7 USMC TO USMC, WX
 I (2) 5 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI
 1 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALFUNCTION
 8 USMC TO USMC, WX
 2 USA TO USMC, WX
 2 USMC TO USMC, NEG TGT 4 USMC TO USA, NEG CONTROL GP-4
 BT

PAGE 5 OF 3 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

SECRET

#56

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CMG		03 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
			021244Z OCT 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY <i>CG - Apples & oranges are mixed - we will straighten out.</i> <i>J. Henry</i>
4	DCG		15/3		<i>RP</i>	
2	DCG AIR				<i>RP</i>	
	C/S	<i>I copy to</i>			<i>RP</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	<i>I 10/3</i>			<i>N</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

#57

SECRET

PP RUHFMA
 RHMMAFA
 DE RUEBHOA3794 2761323
 Z NY SSSSS
 P 021244Z OCT 68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO/CG, III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE FOR
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT, FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 GEN CHAPMAN-MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)

A. CG III MAF 290040Z SEP 68
 B. CMC 260142Z SEP 68

1. PARAGRAPH 6 OF REF A STATES "...AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO ARMY
 BATTALIONS HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN BELOW THE EXPECTED FIVE SORTIES
 PER DAY AND IN I COPRS IS CURRENTLY AVERAGING ONLY SIXTY PERCENT
 OF THE NUMBER PROGRAMMED BY THE JCS. MARINE AIR HAS BEEN
 REQUIRED TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS DEFICIENCY TO THE DETRIMENT OF
 MARINE BATTALIONS..."

2. THE CHAIRMAN, JCS AS QUOTED IN REF B, HAS INDICATED THAT

ARMY FORCES IN I CTZ HAVE BEEN RECEIVING 3.03 SORTIES PER DAY,
 WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH ABOVE STATEMENT (5X60PER CENT EQUALS 3).
 THEREFORE IT IS UNCLER AS TO HOW MARINE AIR HAS COMPENSATED

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA3794 SECRET SPECAT, FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR THE DEFICIENCY IS THE SORTIES PER ARMY BATTALION HAVE
 REMAINED AT THREE.

3. REQUEST SUBSTANTIATING INFORMATION. WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

BT

SECRET

#57

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 6216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 03 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 021758Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				lc	<p>REMARKS</p> <p>CG - Will pass this</p> <p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>info as appropriate to</p> <p>FOR</p> <p>our staff and commands</p> <p>concerned. There appears</p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>to be several requirements</p> <p>for ensuring of data and</p> <p>portion papers for your</p> <p>info and use prior</p> <p>to Sec Nav's visit</p> <p>V. Rojny</p> <p>Q-3 Inc labeled items</p> <p>as Division (D) or Wing (W)</p> <p>Please comply with above</p> <p>SECRET</p>
4	DCG	Separate Copy Routed			-#2	
5	DCG AIR		1.	2		
2	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I 1013			H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	A				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

RHMMFA RUHFMA
 DE RUEBHOA3934 2761735
 ZNY SSSSS
 CG FMFPAC -I -
 CG III MAF
 R 021758Z OCT 68
 FM CMC
 TO RHMMFA/CG III MAF
 RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 BT

EXCLUSIVE FOR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T

SPECAT M C E O

SPECAT FOR LTGEN CUUSHMAN AND LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN VAN RYZIN
 EFFECTIVENESS OF FIELD ARTY FIRES

A. SECNAV MSG 071744Z SEP68

1. REF (A) CONTAINS ITINERARY FOR SECNAV VISIT TO PACOM AREA.
2. SECNAV IS AWARE OF CERTAIN ASST SECDEF (SYSTEMS ANALYSIS) STUDIES DEALING WITH RATIOS OF H&I TYPE ARTY FIRES TO OBSERVED FIRES, AND THEIR THEORETICAL COST EFFECTIVENESS IMPACT.
3. SECNAV HAS COPY OF DRAFT SUIDY PROVIDED HIM BY SECARMY WHICH ORIGINATED IN IFFV (INFORMALLY IDENTIFIED AS KALERGIS STUDY, NAME DERIVED FROM BGEN KALERGIS, ARTY OFFICER, IFFV) WHICH CONTAINS ANALYSIS OF FIELD ARTY FIRES BY CATEGROY. I.E., CONFIRMED, COUNTERBATTERY, PERPARATION, TRAINING, REGISTRATION, MARKING, ECT., IN PURPORTED EFFORT TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF FIRE.

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA3934 S E C R E T SPECAT M C E O

4. THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE INTEREST HERE IN AMMO COSTS. THIS CONSTITUTES SIGNFICANT SUM, AND AMOUNT OF UNOBSERVED FIRES COMPARED TO OBSERVED FIRE MISSIONS IS PERIODICALLY IN QUESTION.

5. SECNAV'S INTEREST STEMS BASICALLY FROM THIS POINT, AND LED HIM TO ASK FOR THE STUDY REFERRED TO IN PAR 3 ABOVE. YOU CAN EXPECT HIM TO BRING THIS MATTER UP IN HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT.

6. IN ADDITION TO INFO PREVIOUSLY PORVIDED ON SECNAV VISIT, WE HAVE WORD THAT HE MAY REASE QUESTIONS IN FOLLOWING SUBJECT AREAS:

- M*A. PROGRAM SIX IMPACTS *o/w*
- A*B. TACTICAL SUPPORT TRANSPORTS *w*
- O*C. STING RAY CONCEPT *o*
- O*D. EFFECTIVENESS OF ARY/NGF *o*
- A*E. AIR CONTROL *w*
- F. INTELLIGENCE PROGRESS AND EFFECTIVENESS *ou (6-2)*
- A*G. AIRCRAFT SHELTER PROGRAM *w*
- A*H. EMPLOYMENT OF TAC AIRBORNE. IMPORTANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS *w*
- C*I. CAC PROGRAM *III 197 + o*
- A*J. CONCEPT OF GUBSHIPS VS FIXED WING COLSE AIR SUPPORT. *o/w*
- A*K. POST VIETNAM POSUTURE *o/w p*
- A*L. WESTPAC AVN SUPPLY PROBLEMS *w*
- A*M. WESTPAC AVN SUPPORT EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS *w*
- A*N. LIGHT HELO REGTS *o + o*
- A*O. BELLOWS FILED *not applicable*

" POINT PAPERS PROVIDED BY HQMC TO SECHAV, COPIES TO BE PROVIDED YOUR COMMANDS,
 WARM REGARDS GP-4

BT 111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

#58

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 1216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 03 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 022233Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				lp	EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY <i>OK - BT needed no preparing info for the request. J. Keith's copy</i> <i>OK</i>
	DCG					
4	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/3			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #59

SECRET

CCN 029 FILE 95

		FROM CMC	DATE 03 OCT 68
		SERIAL # 022233Z OCT 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT	
030905H	<i>[Signature]</i>	EXCLUSIVE FOR	
	<i>to</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
	<i>Twitter</i>	EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY	
S/S COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES MAT AND TAPE			

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE**

R 022233Z OCT 68

FM CMC
 TO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW
 INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RHMMAFA/CG III MAF

FOR**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

BT

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN QUILTER, INFO LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN MC CUTCHEON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SEA INTERFACE OF TACTICAL DATA SYSTEMS (U)
 A. CG FIRST MAW 011050Z OCT 68

1. (U) THIS HQ HAS BEEN FIRMLY AND PUBLICLY OPPOSED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF ONE WAY DATA LINK SINCE TEST NINE OF JOINT CONUS TEST.

2. (S) FOR YOUR INFO OUR CURRENT UNOFFICIAL POSITION ON THE POINTS RAISED IN REF A IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. CANCELLATION OF INTERFACE PROJECT: MARCORPS NEUTRAL. WILL SUPPORT CINCPAC DECISION UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED BY YOU FOLKS IN PAC AREA.

B. IN EQUAL PI: MARCORPS WILL SUPPORT CONTINUATION OF THIS

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA4209 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN QUILTER INFO LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN MC CUTCHEON M C E O CONCEPT UNLESS REQUIREMENT IS WITHDRAWN BY CINCPAC. MACS-3, FCPCPAC, JOINT CONUS TEST FORCE (LESS AIR FORCE) RECOMMEND DELETION OF THIS CONCEPT. REQ FOR DECISION WILL BE SENT TO CINCPAC BY EXEC COMMITTEE ON RECEIPT OF TEST FORCE REPORT ON CINCPAC EVALUATION.

C. ONE WAY DATA LINK: MARCORPS WILL RESIST ONE WAY LINK UNLESS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED BY CINCPAC. MARCORPS WILL RECOMMEND AGAINST IMPLEMENTATION ONE WAY LINK W/O COMPLETE CHECKOUT IN CONUS FIRST, EVEN IF CINCPAC REQUESTS IT.

3. (C) I RECOMMEND THAT YOUR PREPARE AS STRONG A CASE AS POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT YOUR VIEWS AT MACV/7TH AIR FORCE LEVEL AND PROVIDE AMMO TO FMFPAC AND TO US TO CARRY ON THE BATTLE IN HAWAIIAN AND WASHINGTON ARENAS. OBVIOUSLY THREAT TO NAVY CONTROL OF THEIR AIR IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO USE BUT TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ARGUMENTS WOULD BE USEFUL TO ALL. AMPLIFICATION OF IMPACT OF IN-COUNTRY TEST ON CONTROL CAPABILITY OF FIRST MAW AIRCRAFT IS NECESSARY.

4. (S) WE HAVE ENDEAVORED TO ALERT AND EDUCATE NAVY ON DANGERS OF ONE WAY LINK BUT GENERAL REACTION OF CNO PARALLELS THE INFO IN YOUR MSG.

PAGE THREE RUEBHOA4209 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN QUILTER INFO LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN MCCUTCHEON M C E O

5. (S) REQ ANY INFO ON STATUS OF SEEK VIEW AND SEEK DATA PROGRAMS WHICH WOULD ADD TO OUR POSITION.

GP-4

BT 11 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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SECRET

#59

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM COMSERVPAC		DATE 3 OCT 68	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 022329Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
7	CG				lp	REMARKS CG - Will prepare @ may for your concurrence	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR					EXCLUSIVE	
2	C/S	I			o		
	D C/S					FOR	
	D C/S DM						
1	S/S	I	10/3		H	Concur. OIC	
4	G-1	A	10/4	10/4			
	G-2					G-1 Prepare Land Army msg of concurrence today	
	G-3						
	G-4					9.	
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

R 022329Z OCT 68
 FM CONSERVPAC
 TO COMNAVFORV
 CG III MAF
 INFO CINCPACFLT
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 FOR VADM ZUMWALT AND LT GEN CUSHMAN INFO VADM BAUMBERGER FROM
 RADM COMBS

1. (C) AS YOU KNOW, REAR ADMIRAL OSBORN, COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG
 IS DUE TO BE RELIEVED BY RADM BONNER IN DECEMBER. IN KEEPING WITH HIS
 EXCEPTIONALLY MERITORIOUS PERFORMANCE DURING THIS MOST DEMANDING
 YEAR, WITH FORCES SUPPORTED IN ICTZ AND LOGISTIC FUNCTIONS BOTH
 HAVING EXPANDED MARKEDLY, I PROPOSE TO RECOMMEND RADM OSBORN FOR A
 DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL. THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH SAME
 AWARD HAVING BEEN APPROVED FOR BOTH HIS PREDECESSORS, RADM WESCHLER
 AND RADM LACY.

2. (U) WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONCURRENCE OR COMMENT CONCERNING PRO-
 POSAL ABOVE.

WARM RE GARDS.
 GP-4

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#60

O 040025Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM
C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 13391 EYES ONLY
YOUR REQUEST TO VISIT HONG KONG IS APPROVED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

030

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

ZIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG FIRST MAW	4 OCT 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
	040130Z OCT 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">FOR</div> MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			Q	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	70/H	I		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA RUHKM JUMSAK
 DE RUMSAV 0042 2770230
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 040130Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIJST MARDI
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR CMC CODE (AA-1)
 FOR FMFPAC (F-007)

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
 A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001-2400H 2 OCT 68
 B. (1) 178
 (2) 20
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 C. (1) 82
 (2) 69

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0042 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

- (3) 72
 (4) 36
 (5) 120
 (6) 58
 (7) 36
 D. (1) 53
 (2) 19
 (3) 15
 (4) 7
 E. (1) 86
 (2) 8
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 F. (1) 64
 (2) 64
 (3) 8
 (4) 56
 G. (1) 24
 (2) 24
 (3) 10

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#1

SECRET

PAGE THREE JUMSAV 0042 S E K J I T SPECAT MCEO

(4) 6
 H. (1) 60
 (2) 0
 (3) 1
 (4) 0
 I. (1) 1
 (2) (A) 36
 (B) 4
 (C) 0
 (D) 0
 J. (1) 0
 (2) 119
 (3) 51
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 6
 K. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 1
 (4) 14

PAGE FOUR JUMSAV 0042 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO.

L. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 1
 (4) 1
 (5) 4
 (6) 0
 (7) 18
 L. (1) L (7) 4 DI TADC
 10 DI, NEG TGT
 4 DIV, NEG KONTROL
 2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW
 A. (1) (A) 90
 (B) 73
 (2) 30
 (3) 63
 B. (1) 183
 (2) 73
 (3) 0
 C. (1) (A) 94 (B) 40
 (2) (A) 0 (B) 36

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

SECRET

#1

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0042 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO.

(3) (A) 0 (B) 0

D. (1) 18

(2) 12

(3) 0

E. (1) 26

(2) 4

(3) 0

(4) 1

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 0

F. (1) 0

(2) 63

(3) 0

G. (1) 47

(2) 8

(3) 6

(4) 2

(5) 0

(6) 0

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0042 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(7) 0

H. (1) 21

(2) 2

(3) 2

I. (1) 4

(2) 21

(3) 0

J(4) (1) (A) 74 (B) 37

(2) (A) 13 (B) 0

(3) (A) 0 (B) 0

(4) (A) 3 (B) 0

(5) (A) 0 (B) 0

(6) (A) 0 (B) 0

(7) (A) 0 (B) 36

K. (1) - (3) INCLUDES 36 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES

I (1) 4 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI

(2) I (2) 8 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI 1 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALFUNCTION

6 USMC TO USMC, ASRT DOWN

4 USMC TO USMC, NEG TGT

2 USMC TO USMC, NEG CONTROL

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#1

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PI001151
PITCZYUW RUHGSAF0399 2780204-CCCC--RHMAFA.
ZNY CCCCC ZYO RUHGSHH
P 040204Z OCT 68
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF DNG

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM BRINGLE

1. I AM DELIGHTED TO ACCEPT FOR MYSELF, MY COS, AND MY FLAG CAPTAIN THE KIND INVITATION TO LUNCH AT YOUR QUARTERS AT 1200 ON 6 OCT. WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AND GENERALS LAM AND QUILTER AT THAT TIME.
2. BEST REGARDS,

GP-4
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#2

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 4 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 040312Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					<p>EXCLUSIVE FOR</p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p><i>Request copy for 1st MAW Hise</i></p>
2	DCG					
2	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/4			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

EXCLUSIVE FOR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

Request copy for 1st MAW Hise

28

SECRET #3

SECRET

PP RHMAFA
 DE RUHFMA 0484 2780312
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 040312Z OCT 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN BUSE.
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

MODIFICATION OF AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM (S)

A. CMC 012038Z/OCT68 (S)

1. THE COMMANDANT'S EXHORTATION IN REF A THAT,
 QUOTE: WE MUST BE FULLY PREPARED FOR ACCEPTANCE
 OF OUR PROPOSAL, THUS AVOIDING ANY SEMBLANCE OF
 THE PREMATURE IMPLEMENTATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT,
 AND ENSURING A SUCCESSFUL THIRTY DAY TEST. UNQUOTE,
 FOCUSES CLEARLY ON THE NEED FOR A CAREFUL EVALUATION
 OF OUR PRE-SINGLE MANAGEMENT AIR REQUEST AND FRAG
 PROCEDURES TO INSURE THAT WE INDEED WILL BE
 PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE THE EFFICACY OF OUR
 SYSTEM. THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY
 WILL MIGHT DECIDE NOT ONLY THE IMMEDIATE BUT THE POST
 VIETNAM AIR CONTROL DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS.

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 0484 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

2. JUST AS SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROVED UNWIELDLY, THE
 MECHANICS OF OUR OWN SYSTEM, DESIGNED PRIMARILY FOR
 DIVISION-WING SIZE OPERATIONS, MAY NOT BE ENTIRELY
 ADEQUATE FOR YOUR PRESENT FORCE OF SOME FIFTY MANEUVER
 BATTALIONS. THUS, SOME STREAMLINING OF OUR PRE-SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES MAY BE NECESSARY TO INSURE THAT
 OUR SYSTEM IS MORE RESPONSIVE, LESS OF AN ADMIN-
 ISTRATIVE BURDEN, AND THE MOST EFFICIENT WAY TO ALLOCATE
 SORTIES, WHILE I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOUR OWN EXPERTS
 ARE ON TOP OF THIS AND ARE PREPARING PLANS AND DEVISING THE
 SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURES NECESSARY FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION
 RED MY STAFF IS PREPARED TO
 RENDER WHATEVER ASSISTANCE YOU MAY DESIRE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#3

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM COMNAVFORV		DATE 05 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 040912Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG				lp	REMARKS EXCLUSIVE <i>AG - they can get them through quickly.</i> FOR <i>Regg</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/5			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM COMBS INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN
AND VADM BAUMBERGER FROM VADM ZUMWALT FROM COMNAVFORV TO
COMSERVPAC INFO CINCPACFLT CG III MAF

TDIG 040912Z OCT 68

A. YOUR 022329Z OCT 68

1. (C) HARTILY CONCUR AND ENDORSE YOUR
PROPOSAL REF A. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE JOB AND THE HIGH DEGREE
OF PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE BY RADM OSBORN ARE EVIDENT THROUGHOUT
I CORPS. RADM OSBORN HAS BEEN THE MAN AT NAVSUPACT DNG
AND THE PRESENTATION OF THE DSM ON HIS DEPARTURE WOULD RECOGNIZE
THE EXCEPTIONAL CONTRIBUTION THIS OUTSTANDING OFFICER HAS MADE TO
OUR OVERALL EFFORT IN VIETNAM. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									#4

O 041146Z ZYH ZFF-1
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LTG PEERS CG I FFORCEV
 LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 LTG KERWIN CG II FFORCEV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 13432 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF THREE

1. US EMBASSY, SAIGON, SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO
 SEC STATE. IT IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR "EYES ONLY".

QUOTE

SUBJ: PACIFICATION COUNTEROFFENSIVE - JOINT MEETING WITH
 GVN OCT 1

1. SUMMARY. JOINT MEETING OCT 1 WAS HELD ON VIETNAMESE
 INITIATIVE TO DISCUSS THEIR PLANNING CONCEPT FOR 1969 "PACIFICA-
 TION AND DEVELOPMENT" CAMPAIGN. SINCE WE HAD JUST PREPARED
 PROPOSALS OF OUR OWN FOR A SHORTER-TERM PACIFICATION COUNTER-
 OFFENSIVE; INVOLVING LESS AMBITIOUS GOALS BUT EARLIER INCEPTION
 OF THE CAMPAIGN, THE MEETING CENTERED ON HOW THE TWO CONCEPTS
 CAN BE RECONCILED. IT WAS A GOOD MEETING, AND WE BELIEVE THERE
 ARE PROSPECTS FOR MARRYING UP THE TWO CAMPAIGNS, SO THAT THERE
 WOULD BE A THREE-MONTH CRASH PROGRAM LAUNCHED WITHIN PERHAPS
 A MONTH, AS CURTAIN-RAISER FOR THE YEAR-LONG 1969 CAMPAIGN THAT
 THIEU AND HIS ADVISERS HAVE IN MIND.

2. MANY PROBLEMS REMAIN TO BE WORKED OUT, NOTABLY HOW TO
 EXPAND RD CADRES AND MOVE MORE RF/PF FROM SECURE TO
 CONTESTED AREAS; BUT THE BASIC CONCEPT SEEMS AGREED AND IT
 IS SOUND. IT IS TO CONSOLIDATE GVN CONTROL OVER THE SECURE
 (A, B AND C) HAMLETS AND CONCENTRATE DURING THE PERIOD AHEAD
 ON SHORT-TERM EFFORTS TO MOVE "CONTESTED" HAMLETS FROM THE D
 OR E CATEGORIES TO THE C CATEGORY, I.E., TO EXTEND GOVERNMENT
 CONTROL TO AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF THE CONTESTED AREA. THE VC
 CONTROLLED AREAS WOULD BE LEFT ASIDE FOR "SPECIAL PLANS," INCLUD-
 ING MILITARY SWEEPS AND PERIODIC CIVIC ACTION. THE OBJECT OF THE
 PLAN IS TO GIVE THE GVN THE BEST POSSIBLE CHANCE TO COMPETE WITH
 THE COMMUNISTS IN AREAS WITH 83 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION WHEN
 THE CONTEST MOVES TO THE POLITICAL PLANE. END SUMMARY.

3. MEETING WAS CHAIRED BY THIEU. ON GVN SIDE WERE MINISTER
 OF INTERIOR KHIEM, MINISTER OF DEFENSE VY, CHIEF OF JGS VIEN,
 AND GENERALS LAC (RD MINISTRY), LA (RF/PF) AND QUANG (SPECIAL
 ADVISER TO THIEU). ON OUR SIDE, IN ADDITION TO MYSELF, WERE BERGER,
 GOODPASTER, KOMER, HERZ AND COLBY.

#5 (1)

4. PRESIDENT THIEU OPENED BY SAYING THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS OVERALL PACIFICATION PLANNING FOR 1969. HE SAID HE WILL SHORTLY ISSUE A CALL TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR A NATIONAL PLAN FOR "PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT." PACIFICATION WOULD INCLUDE SECURITY OPERATIONS, AND DEVELOPMENT WOULD INCLUDE BOTH RURAL AND URBAN AREAS. TAKING OUR VPAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM AS A BASE, THIEU OUTLINED A PLAN TO ACHIEVE FULL SECURITY AND A FULL ADMINISTRATIVE AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN A, B, AND C HAMLETS; ESTABLISH SECURITY PLUS SOME DEGREE OF GVN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION THROUGH ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL EFFORT IN D AND E HAMLETS. AND A PROCEDURE OF "VISITATION" BY MILITARY FORCES PLUS CIVIC ACTION IN THE VC HAMLETS. THIS PLAN WOULD ACHIEVE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION AND AUTHORITY OVER 33 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION AND 73 PERCENTS OF THE HAMLET. IT WOULD MEET ANY VC POLITICAL THREAT BASED ON THEIR PRESENCE IN VC AND CONTESTED (D AND E) HAMLETS AND WOULD REDUCE THE INFLUENCE OF THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE WHICH EXISTS EVEN IN THE RELATIVELY SECURE (A, B, C) HAMLETS. HE HOPED THAT THIS 1969 PLAN MIGHT BE STARTED BY DECEMBER AFTER CORPS LEVEL SEMINARS TO EXPLAIN IT IN EARLY NOVEMBER. ITS OVERALL THRUST WOULD BE CONSOLIDATION OF THE PRESENTLY RELATIVELY SECURE AREAS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE CONTESTED AREAS.

5. I OFFERED THE PRELIMINARY COMMENT THAT A POLITICAL COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN THE CONTESTED AREAS WAS PARTICULARLY TIMELY IN VIEW OF THE CONCERTED COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO SET UP "LIBERATION COMMITTEES" IN THE COUNTRYSIDE IN PREPARATION FOR THE POST-HOSTILITIES PERIOD. I STRESSED THE NEED FOR CONCERTED EFFORTS ON OUR SIDE, TO INCLUDE ATTACK ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE AND BUILDING UP OF LOCAL SELF DEFENSE FORCES. WE WERE HEARTENED BY THE RECENT BEGINNINGS OF THOSE TWO EFFORTS ESPECIALLY, BUT WE WONDERED IF SOME OF THE INITIATIVES THAT THIEU HAD IN MIND COULD NOT BE STARTED EARLIER THAN THE BEGINNING OF NEXT YEAR. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE NOW. IT IS IMPERATIVE TO MOVE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
V PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

#5(2)

373

SECRET

#5(2)

O 041146Z NOV 68
 FM GENERAL ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LTG PEEB'S CG I FFORCIV
 LTG STILLWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 LTG KERWIN CG II FFORCEV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 ZEM

SECRET MAC 13432 EYES ONLY SECTION TWO OF THREE

6. KOMER ELABORATED BY COMMENTING THAT THE BASIC CONCEPT OF THE "PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT", WHILE AMBITIOUS, IS NOT UNREALISTIC. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SEIZE THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY INITIATIVE. TO BE SUCCESSFUL, PACIFICATION MUST GO HAND IN HAND WITH AN OVERALL MILITARY OFFENSIVE AND A STEPPED-UP "PHOENIX" PROGRAM. WITH RESPECT TO TIMING, THERE WERE TWO POSSIBLE APPROACHES, EITHER AS THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID TO GEAR UP FOR A YEAR-LONG CAMPAIGN STARTING IN DECEMBER, OR TO START THE FULL CAMPAIGN AROUND TET 1969 BUT TO PRECEDE IT WITH A THREE-MONTH PRELIMINARY EFFORT FROM NOVEMBER 1 TO TET. IF THE GVN DECIDED AGAINST THE TWO-PHASE APPROACH, WE HOPED INCEPTION OF THE 1969 CAMPAIGN COULD BE MOVED UP TO, SAY, NOV. 1. IF WE COULD SEIZE THE STRATEGIC INITIATIVE NOW WHEN THE ENEMY IS CLEARLY IN A MOST VULNERABLE CONDITION, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO SHOW SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS BY TET AND COULD THEN GATHER REAL MOMENTUM FOR THE REST OF THE CAMPAIGN WHICH COULD EVEN TURN OUT TO BE A "VICTORY" CAMPAIGN AS IT UNFOLDED.

7. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM THIEU, KOMER FAVORED ASSIGNING AN ARBITRARY GOAL OF 1,000 CONTESTED HAMLETS FOR THE THREE-MONTH PRELIMINARY PERIOD. DIVIDED INTO THREE ONE-MONTH BITES, AND WITH QUOTAS FOR EVERY CORPS AREA AND PROVINCE, THIS WAS NOT UNREALISTIC: IT WORKED DOWN ONLY TO A BIT MORE THAN ONE HAMLET PER DISTRICT PER MONTH. THE PROBLEM, OF COURSE, IS GETTING THE NECESSARY CADRE AND SECURITY FORCES INTO THOSE HAMLETS, AND TO HAVE GOOD COORDINATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND PACIFICATION ASPECTS INCLUDING PHOENIX, CHIEU NOI AND LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES.

8. THIEN SAID HE FORESAW NO PROBLEMS IN LAUNCHING THIS PRELIMINARY PHASE WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS. PHUNG HOANG, CHIEU HOI OR INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS. HE DID, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT THERE MIGHT BE A PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE NUMBERS OF POPULAR FORCES AND RD CADRE FOR SUCH A LARGE NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL HAMLETS, WITHOUT PULLING TOO MANY FROM CURRENT A, B, C HAMLETS. GENERAL VIEN COUNTED OFF THE NUMBER OF ARVN BATTALIONS, RF COMPANIES AND PF PLATOONS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF RD AND SAID THAT THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH FORCES. AMBASSADOR KOMER QUESTIONED, HOWEVER, WHETHER MORE COULD NOT BE REDEPLOYED WHO WERE NOT CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO RD SUPPORT, AND POINTED OUT THAT IF MORE THAN THESE WERE NOT AVAILABLE THEN THE 1969 PLAN WOULD NOT WORK EITHER. SINCE IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE MANY MORE RESOURCES IN THE SHORT TERM, THE SOLUTION OBVIOUSLY IS TO REALLOCATE WHAT IS PRESENTLY AVAILABLE. HE POINTED OUT THAT REDEPLOYMENT INVOLVES SOME RISKS, BUT RISKS WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN IF THE CAMPAIGN IS TO GET OFF THE GROUND. THE MATTER WAS LEFT THAT GENERAL VIEN WOULD CONSULT WITH THE CORPS COMMANDERS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND SUBMIT A FEASIBILITY STUDY TO THE PRESIDENT BY OCTOBER 10.

9. GENERAL GOODPASTER REMARKED THERE ARE MANY SIGNS THAT A FAVORABLE SITUATION IS EMERGING, AND IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE IN A PHASE OF EXPANDING STRENGTH. THERE IS MUCH EVIDENCE OF IMPROVED ARVN AND RF PERFORMANCE IN ALMOST ALL RESPECTS. GOODPASTER ENDORSED THE IDEA OF CONSULTING THE CORPS COMMANDERS, TO WHOM MIGHT BE ADDED OUR FIELD FORCE COMMANDERS AND SENIOR ADVISERS. THEY ARE IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO STUDY THE PROBLEM IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS. FIVE POINTS NEED TO BE MADE: FIRST, THE VC MUST NOT BE LEFT UNDISTURBED IN THE AREAS THEY CONTROL. SECOND, WE MUST MAINTAIN OUR SUPERIORITY OVER VC MAIN FORCE AND LOCAL FORCE UNITS, SO THE ENEMY CANNOT MOVE TOWARD THE TARGETS HE RELY WANTS TO HIT, THE CITIES. MOBILE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC MUST THUS BE PART OF THE PLAN. THIRD, THE TEMPO AND SCOPE OF PACIFICATION MAY HAVE TO DIFFER BETWEEN CORPS AREAS, AND THE OVERALL GOALS MAY HAVE TO BE APPLIED WITH SOME FLEXIBILITY. FOURTH, ALL NEEDED RESOURCES NEED NOT BE SHIFTED AT ONE TIME. IT COULD BE DONE IN PHASES. FINALLY, WE MUST MAINTAIN MOMENTUM. WE HAVE A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION WITHOUT LOSING WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN SECURED.

SSC NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

5(4)

759

SECRET

#5(4)

O 241146Z ZYH ZFF-1
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LTC PEERS CG I FFORCEV
 LTC STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 LTC KERWIN CG II FFORCEV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 13452 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF THREE
 12. THIEU THEN RECAPITULATED HIS CONCEPT OF THE 1969 CAMPAIGN. IN THE A, B, C AREAS HE BELIEVED THAT THE RF WOULD REMAIN AS SUPPORT FORCES, WITH PF AND PEOPLES SELF DEFENSE IN EACH HAMLET AND A PROGRAM TO PERFECT ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE HAMLETS. IN D AND E AREAS THE REGULAR FORCES SHOULD BE THE MAIN MILITARY SUPPORT WHILE THE RF WORKS TO CREATE PF UNITS IN THE HAMLETS AND THE RD CADRE SETS UP LIMITED POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION AND CONDUCTS A LIMITED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM; NO PEOPLES SELF DEFENSE GROUPS ARE DEVELOPED. IN THE VC AREAS, HE CONTEMPLATED "MOBILE" OPERATIONS, INVOLVING SEARCH AND DESTROY ON THE MILITARY SIDE, PLUS VISITATION OF HAMLETS, ACCOMPANIED BY SOME CIVIC ACTION, BUT NO EFFORT TO ESTABLISH GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION OR CONDUCT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

11. EVERYONE AGREED THAT THE PRESENTLY AVAILABLE NUMBER OF RD CADRE WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD CAMPAIGN IN THE CONTESTED HAMLETS, SO THAT THE CURRENT 700 TEAMS SHOULD BE DOUBLED BY SPLITTING THEM IN HALF. SOME COULD ALSO BE PULLED OUT OF CURRENT ABC LOCATIONS. SINCE THE TEAMS WILL BE EXPECTED TO DO LESS THAN THEY ARE NOW DOING. SPECIFICALLY, DROPPING THEIR DEFENSE ROLE, WE COULD AFFORD SMALLER ONES. IF ENEMY STRENGTH IS DECLINING AS WE SEIZE THE MILITARY INITIATIVE, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO THIN OUT AND EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY IN ORDER TO HAVE FULL COVERAGE EVEN THOUGH WITH SMALLER UNITS.

12. GENERAL LAC OBSERVED THAT BREAKING DOWN THE RD CADRES INTO SMALLER UNITS IS FEASIBLE PROVIDED THEY ARE USED WHERE THERE IS MILITARY SUPPORT, AND THIS WILL REQUIRE A FEW WEEKS TO WORK OUT NEW CONCEPTS AND SOME RETRAINING. AT THIS POINT I STRESSED THAT WE SHOULD NOT REALLY EXPECT TO FIELD 1,000 NEW RD TEAMS (OR PF PLATOONS) BY NOVEMBER 1. IF THIS IS A PHASED PLAN, EVERYTHING DOES NOT HAVE TO BE STARTED AT THE SAME TIME. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO HAVE A PLAN AND TO START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PRESIDENT THIEU COMMENTED THAT THE RD CADRE MUST BE USED AS CADRE, NOT AS A SORT OF SOLDIER OR POPULAR FORCES MEMBER. THEY ARE ARMED FOR THEIR SELF DEFENSE, BUT THE MISSION OF DEFENSE IS THAT OF THE REGULAR REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES. HE THEREFORE AGREED ON THE DIVISION OF THE TEAMS INTO TWO, AND TOLD GENERAL LAC TO HAVE THE RETRAINING AND RELOCATION DONE WITHIN ONE MONTH.

13. PRESIDENT THIEU THEN RECAPITULATED HIS THOUGHTS FOR 1969. HE WILL SOON ISSUE A PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE AND CALL FOR A DETAILED PLAN FROM THE RVN WHICH WILL SEEK TO RAISE ALL D AND E HAMLETS TO C THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. HE IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING PROBLEM AREAS WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE MET:

A. THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES (PF, PP AND PEOPLES SELF DEFENSE), DEVELOPMENT OF PROPER OPERATIONAL BASES OR OUTPOSTS, ARTILLERY SUPPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS.

E. WITH RESPECT TO THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE, THE STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE POLICE.

C. LOCAL ADMINISTRATION MUST BE REINFORCED IN QUANTITY AND QUALITY, IMPROVING VILLAGE AND HAMLET ADMINISTRATION EITHER BY SENDING CADRE FROM THE PROVINCE LEVEL TO CONDUCT THE ADMINISTRATION OR TO TRAIN LOCALS TO DO IT. HE CITED AS AN EXAMPLE THE INFORMATION CADRE OF THE VILLAGE WHO MUST BE TRAINED TO DO HIS WORK EFFECTIVELY.

D. THE ADEQUACY OF THE RD CADRE TO CARRY ON THEIR ROLE IN BOTH THE SECURE AND CONTESTED AREAS.

14. THIEU CONCLUDED THIS PORTION OF THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD SOON ISSUE A CALL FOR A NATIONAL PLAN FOR 1969 AND THAT HE WISHED A COUNTEROFFENSIVE TO BEGIN ON THE 1ST OF NOVEMBER. CONTINGENT ON A FEASIBILITY STUDY BY 12 OCTOBER BY GENERAL VIEN AS TO THE FORCES AVAILABLE. I SUGGESTED TO THIEU THAT WE HAVE ANOTHER MEETING IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS TO CHECK ON PROGRESS, AND WE AGREED THIS WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA.

15. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE TASKED WITH COORDINATION OF THE EFFORT. THIEU DID NOT FEEL, DESPITE OUR SUGGESTIONS, THAT COORDINATION COULD BE LODGED IN THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE OR WITH A SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT. HE FELT THAT THIS IS A JOB FOR THE PRIME MINISTER WHO COORDINATES THE WORK OF SEVERAL MINISTRIES. I GAINED THE IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, THAT SINCE THE NEW PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN IS VERY CLOSE TO THIEU'S HEART, HE WILL WATCH PERSONALLY OVER THE EFFORT OF MORE DETAILED PLANNING THAT IS TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

#5(6)

2/4

#5(6)

O 050940Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM MG TOWNSEND MACJ3
 TO MG ANDERSON C/S III MAF
 INFO BG SCHWEITER C/S XXIV CORPS
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T MAC 13465 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: MACV PLANNING GROUP

1. (TO) A MACV STAFF PLANNING GROUP HAS BEEN ORGANIZED TO PARALLEL THE III MAF/XXIV CORPS PLANNING GROUP AND WILL FUNCTION UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE MACJ3.

2. (S) THE PLANNING GROUP MEMBERS AND THE STAFF PRINCIPALS HAVE BEEN BRIEFED ON THE PROBLEM, THE STATUS OF PLANNING BY III MAF/XXIV CORPS, AND ON THE CONCEPT FOR TASK FORCE OMEGA.

3. (S) THE NAMES, AGENCY, AND PHONE NUMBER OF MACV STAFF PLANNING GROUP MEMBERS OF COMPONENT POINTS OF CONTACT FOLLOW:

J2-	LTC A. SMITH	MACV 3161
J3-	COL E. H. DAVIS	MACV 3156
JA-	COL W. R. LOBELL	MACV 2862
J5-	COL D. F. BLETZ	MACV 3074
J6-	LTC C. B. MODISSETT	MACV 2835
MACJ3-	LTC R. W. JOHNSON	TIGER 3374
NAVFORV-	CAPT J. D. EATON	MACV 3266
USARV-	COL R. C. BAINVILLE	LB 4242
7TH AF-	LTC R. D. GOS	TSN 2588
	LTC J. E. WOLTER	TSN 3626

INFO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

05

NNNN

TOP SECRET

#14

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 5 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 041300Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
2	DCG AIR	I				
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	146			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #6

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAV 0114 278100
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 041300Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDI
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION ONE OF TWO
 FOR FMFPAC F-032
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
 A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001-2400H 3 OCT 68.
 B. (1) 165
 (2) 18
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 C. (1) 102
 (2) 73
 (3) 74

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0114 S E C R E T SPECAT

- (4) 38
 (5) 91
 (6) 57
 (7) 30
 D. (1) 42
 (2) 24
 (3) 18
 (4) 3
 E. (1) 66
 (2) 21
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 F. (1) 61
 (2) 61
 (3) 6
 (4) 55
 G. (1) 57
 (2) 2
 (3) 2
 (4) 0

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET
#6

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0114 S E C J E T SPECAT

H. (1) 61
 (2) 1
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 I. (1) 16
 (2) (A) 30
 (B) 5
 (C) 0
 (D) 0
 J. (1) 0
 (2) 117
 (3) 64
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 K. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 12
 (4) 13
 L. (1) 0

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0114 S E C R E T SPECAT

(2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 2
 M. (1) L (7) 2 SORTIES NEG TGT
 I (2) A 2 ADDITIONAL SORTIES NOT PROVIDED
 K3 12 DIVERTED TO ROKMC BY TADC
 2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW
 A. (1) (A) 90
 (B) 74
 (2) 24
 (3) 73
 B. (1) 193
 (2) 68
 (3) 0
 C. (1) (A) 94 (B) 42
 (2) (A) 1 (B) 36
 (3) (A) 1 (B) 0

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

#6

SECRET

PAGE FIE RUMSAV 0114 S E K R E T SPECAT

D. (1) 12

(2) 12

(3) 0

E. (1) 18

(2) 2

(3) 4

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 0

F. (1) 0

(2) 73

(3) 0

G. (1) 57

(2) 8

(3) 4

(4) 4

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 0

PAGE SIX JUMSAV 0114 S E C R E T SPECAT

H. (1) 9

(2) 29

(3) 0

I. (1) 10

(2) 28

(3) 0

(4) 0

J. (1) (A) 72 (B) 38

(2) (A) 11 (B) 0

(3) (A) 1 (B) 0

(4) (A) 7 (B) 0

(5) (A) 0 (B) 0

(6) (A) 0 (B) 0

(7) (A) 0 (B) 36

K. (1) A (3) INCLUDES 38 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES

I (1) 4 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRIORITY

6 USMC TO USMC, WX

I (2) 2 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRIORITY

1 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALFUNCTION

4 USMC TO USMC, WX

BT

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

#6

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAV 0125 2771500
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 041300Z OCT 68
 FM KG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG IUI MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E K R E T SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

2 USA TO USMC, WX
 8 USMC TO USMC, ASRT DOWN
 2 USA TO USMC, ASRT DOWN
 3 USMC TO USMC, NEG IGT
 2 USMC TO USMC, NEG CONTROL
 2 USMC TO USA, NEG CONTROL
 2 USMC TO ROKMC, IGT PRIORITY

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET
#6

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM XXXXXXXXXXXX GMC	DATE 05 OCT 68		
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 041316Z OCT 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY CG - Here are go again. I have Paul M. work with our 3 and 3d Mar Div re response to final sentence. [Signature] [Signature]
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I 1015				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

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CGM OLS FILE 95

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		SERIAL # 041316Z OCT 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT	
1015	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
6 Oct	<i>[Signature]</i>	EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY	
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PP RUHHFMA RHMMAFA
BE RUEBHOA5 036 2781515
Z NY CCCCC
PAC -T -MAF
P 041316Z OCT 68
FM CMC
TO RUHHFMA /CG FMFPAC
RHMMAFA /CG III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. ZALIN GRANT, SEASIA CORRESPONDENT FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC, HAS A STORY IN THE 5 OCTOBER ISSUE OF THAT MAGAZINE IN WHICH HE CHARGES MARINES WITH A "DULL, CLUMSY AND UNIMAGINATIVE"

PERFORMANCE IN VIETNAM, AND WITH "STUMBLING ABOUT THE DMZ LIKE A SLOW-WITTED FOOTBALL TACKLE." GRANT WRITES THAT MARINES "SEEMED HUNG-UP ON BLOOD-AND-GUTS MANEUVERS LIFTED FROM WORLD WAR TWO AND KOREAN MANUALS. FOR INSTANCE, "GRANT STATES, " IN A TYPICAL BATTLE FOR SEVERAL HILLS AROUND KHE SANH, THE MARINES MADE REPEATED FRONTAL ASSAULTS GUADALCANAL-STYLE ON NORTH VIETNAMESE BUNKERS. "

2. "MANY YOUNG AMERICANS DIED NEEDLESSLY," THE GRANT STORY CONTINUES. "OTHER U.S. UNITS HAD LONG LEARNED TO STAY AWAY FROM BLOODY FRONTAL ASSAULTS, LETTING MASSIVE AIRSTRIKES

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA5... C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECATE MCEO AND ARTILLERY DO THE DIRTY WORK INSTEAD."

3. COMPLETE STORY APPEARS IN WHITE PAGES OF EARLY BIRD AIRMAILED TODAY, AND ADDITIONAL COPIES ALSO ARE BEING AIRMAILED TO YOU.

4. WHILE I DO NOT PROPOSE TO DIGNIFY THE NEW REPUBLIC OR GRANT WITH ANY OFFICIAL APPROACH TO THEM, IT IS LIKELY THAT HIS HEADQUARTERS WILL BE REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO CORRESPONDENCE -- SOME OF IT CONGRESSIONAL -- WHICH THIS ARTICLE WILL GENERATE. TO THAT END, I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR THOUGHTS AND COMMENTS WHICH WILL BE USEFUL IN REFUTING THIS ARTICLE -- PARTICULARLY THE ALLEGATIONS THAT ANY YOUNG AMERICANS DIED NEEDLESSLY.

GP-4

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SLP.	SURG.									#7

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

IIIMAF FORM 8213 (REV 3-60)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COORDINANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CMC	05 OCT 68
SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES REC'D
041720Z OCT 68		

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CC				lp	REMARKS FOR
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			o	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I 1015			h	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	SAC					

23



#8

RITUZYUW RUEBHOA5151 2781713-UUUU--RHMAFA.

ZNR UUUUU

R BPRQUWPZ OCT 68

FMCMC

TO RUCLNRA/CG MARCRUITDEP PARRIS ISC

INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RHMAFA/CG III MAF

RUHHQA/CINCPAC

RUHBBRA/CINCPACFLT

RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV

RA BQL/CG NINTH MARAMPHIB BDE

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUABQL/CAMP BUTLER OKINAWA

RUWMMMDA/MARBKS NAUSTIA SFRAN

RUEDNWA/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUCLBEA/COMSIX

BT

UNCLAS

FOR MAJGEN O R SIMPSON 05422/9903 USMC. ON 15NOV68 STAND DET PRESENT
STA AND PRO MARCORB CAMPEN FOR TEM PRD ABI ONE DAY CONN BRIEFING.
COMPL PROREP BY 12 DEC 68 CG FMFPAC FOR TEM PRD ABI ONE DAY AT THAT
PLACE AND FOR SUCH PRDS AS REQR AT SUCH OTHER PLACES AS HE MAY DESIG
CONN ABOVE MATTER. COMPL FURTHER PRO SUCH PLACE AS FIRST MARDIV

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA5151 UNCLAS

MAY BE LOC FOR DU AS CG THAT DIV (MCC 159) AS RELFOR MAJGEN R M TOMP-
KINS 05269/9903 USMC. UPON ASSUMPTION IOMD RPT BY MSG CG FMFPAC.

JTR PAR M7005, MCO 4650.30A AND 1300.8H APPL. AUTH DELAY

UNTIL NLT 12DEC68 IN RPT FMFPAC SUCH DEL

LESS PRO AND TVL TIME CHG AS LV. TRAVCHAR IAW MCO 7301.57

PAR 4D(1).

BT

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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			SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE 042311Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN QUILTER
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY <i>Re HP2. Has been done. Previous shipment was done successfully. Currently it is prepared for shipment w/ much closer scrutiny in effect.</i> <u>CR</u> 34
	DCG					
1	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	#				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	1015		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

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PP RHMAFA RUMMHA
 DE RUHFMA 0581 2782311
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 042311Z OCT 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMMHA/CG FIRST MAW
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN QUILTER FROM
 LTGEN BUSE M INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER
 DURING WORKING HOURS.
 RETROGRADE OF ACFT FROM RVN (U)

1. I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT AN ARMED HAND GRENADE WAS DISCOVERED
 IN CH-53A BUNO 152411 WHILE UNDERGOING REWORK AT
 NORIS. THE AIRCRAFT WAS INDUCTED ON 22 AUG 68. THE GRENADE
 WAS FOUND UNDER THE FLOOR BOARDS. FURTHER, I WAS ADVISED THAT
 IT IS NOT UNUSUAL TO FIND SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN INDUCTED
 AIRCRAFT RECEIVED FROM RVN.

2. PLEASE INSURE THAT A POSITIVE PROGRAM IS DEVELOPED TO CLOSER
 INSPECT RETROGRADE AIRCRAFT TO PREVENT RECURRENCE AND AVOID
 ANY POSSIBLE SERIOUS INCIDENTS.

GP-4
 BT

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 042337Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN CUSHMAN
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					EXCLUSIVE FOR
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I 10/5			H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

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VV CMC621
 PP RUHHFMA RHMMFA RUMHLA RUMLMHA
 DE RUEBHOA5508 2782 133
 ZNY CCCCC
 PAC-T-MAF
 MAF-T-1ST MARDIV
 1ST MAW
 P 042337Z OCT 68
 FM CMC
 TO RHMMFA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMLMHA/CG 1ST MAW
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN CUSHMAN, INFO LTGEN BUSE, MGEN YOUNGDALE
 AND MGEN QUILTER FROM LTGEN WALT
 PUC FOR 1STMARDIV AND 1STMAW

- A. YOUR 031344Z OCT 68 (C)
 1. IN REGARDS TO REF A SECNAV PARTY HAVE STREAMERS AND CITATIONS
 IN POSSESSION.
 2. THIS MSG IS DECLAS ON 11OCT68.

GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#10

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PI001900
 PRTZYUW RUHFMA0610 2790119-5555--RHMAFA.
 ZNY 55555
 P R 050119Z OCT 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BX

S E C R E T

FOR BOEN MC LAUGHLIN USMC CHIEF COC
 USMACV, INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN BUSE
 1. INTEND TO VISIT SAIGON ON 23 OCT, ARRIVING TAN SON
 NHUT VIA Y-39 FROM DANANG, ETA 0900 LOCAL.
 2. DESIRE TO CALL ON GEN ABRAMS, GEN GOODPASTER, GEN
 BROWN, AND ADM ZUMWALT, IF SCHEDULE PERMITS, AND
 POLITICALLY DESIRABLE, WOULD ALSO LIKE TO PAY CALL ON
 COMMANDANT, VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS.
 3. DESIRE TO DEPART SAIGON AT 231200 LOCAL VIA MARINE
 KC-130.
 4. PLEASE SEND DETAILED ITINERARY OF SAIGON VISIT WHEN
 FIRM.

GP-4
 BX

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								# 11	

SECRET

00 RUEBKOA
 DE RUMSAV 0126 2791319
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 051315Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAF
 TO RUEBKOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

BT
 S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR FMFPAC F-040
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1
 1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
 A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001-2400H 04 OCT 68
 B. (1) 164
 (2) 29
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 C. (1) 113
 (2) 73
 (3) 74

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0126 S E C R E T SPECAT

(4) 51
 (5) 158
 (6) 72
 (7) 42
 D. (1) 65
 (2) 38
 (3) 5
 (4) 6
 E. (1) 94
 (2) 20
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 F. (1) 51
 (2) 51
 (3) 0
 (4) 51
 G. (1) 39
 (2) 2
 (3) 4
 (4) 6

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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SECRET

#12

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0126 S E C R E T SPECAT

H. (1) 49

(2) 2

(3) 0

(4) 0

I. (1) 5

(2) (A) 22

(B) 6

(C) 0

(D) 0

J. (1) 0

(2) 112

(3) 51

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 6

K. (1) 3

(2) 0

(3) 0

(4) 8

L. (1) 0

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0126 S E C R E T SPECAT

(2) 0

(3) 0

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 14

M. (1) L (7) 4 SORT NEG TGT

2 BINGO FUEL

8 CRT DIV BY DASC/TADC

2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW

A. (1) (A) 86

(B) 72

(2) 38

(3) 62

B. (1) 219

(2) 39

(3) 0

C. (1) (A) 94 (B) 42

(2) (A) 0 (B) 36

(3) (A) 0 (B) 0

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

#12

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0126 S E C R E T SPECAT

- D. (1) 28
 (2) 10
 (3) 0
 E. (1) 28
 (2) 10
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 F. (1) 0
 (2) 62
 (3) 0
 G. (1) 46
 (2) 4
 (3) 6
 (4) 6
 (5) 1
 (6) 0
 (7) 0

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0126 S E C R E T SPECAT

- H. (1) 7
 (2) 2
 (3) 0
 I. (1) 0
 (2) 9
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 J. (1) (A) 70 (B) 36
 (2) (A) 13 (B) 0
 (3) (A) 0 (B) 1
 (4) (A) 3 (B) 0
 (5) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (6) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (7) (A) 0 (B) 36
 K. (1) A (3) INCLUDES 40 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES
 I (2) 4 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI
 5 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALF

GP-4
BTPAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#12

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PP RUEPHOA RHMMAFA
DE RUHFMA 0757 2792 124
ZNY CCCCC
P 052124Z OCT 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
INFO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN
FROM LTGEN BUSE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
NEW REPUBLIC ARTICLE BY ZALIN GRANT (U)

A. CMC 041316Z /OCT 68 (C)

1. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED IN RE-
SPONSE TO REF A.

2. GENERAL COMMENTS: RECORDS OF THIS HEADQUARTERS,
BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY CIE, III MAF, INDICATE
THAT GRANT MADE ONLY TWO VISITS TO THE
DMZ AREA DURING 1968: KHE SANH ON 16 APRIL AND CON
THIEN ON 15 SEPTEMBER. IT WOULD APPEAR, THEREFORE,
THAT GRANT'S COMMENTS PERTAINING TO MARINE OPERATIONS
IN THE "HILLS AROUND KHE SANH" AND OTHER
OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ AREA ARE BASED PRIMARILY ON

PAGE TWO RUHFMA 0757 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
HIS VISITS TO I CTZ DURING THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1967. ?

3. SPECIFIC COMMENTS:

ALLEGATION: "DULL, CLUMSY AND UNIMAGINATIVE PERFORMANCE
IN VIETNAM."

COMMENT: MARINE OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM HAVE BEEN FAR
FROM DULL, CLUMSY OR UNIMAGINATIVE; RATHER, THEY
HAVE BEEN BOLDLY CONCEIVED AND SKILLFULLY EXECUTED.
THE RECORD SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. MARINE

EFFORTS HAVE INCLUDED SUCH SUCCESSFUL INNOVATIONS
AS THE COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM, KIT CARSON SCOUTS,
GOLDEN FLEECE OPERATIONS, STING
RAY OPERATIONS, AND MEDCAP/DENTCAP PROGRAMS.

MANY OF THESE HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY OTHER SERVICES.
ALLEGATION C "STUMBLING AROUND THE DMZ LIKE A SLOW-
WITTED FOOTBALL TACKLE."

COMMENT: AUTHORITY FOR U. S. FORCES TO ENTER THE
DMZ AREA SOUTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER WAS GRANTED
IN MID-MAY 1967. IN THE ENSUING 2-1/2 MONTHS ALONE,
EIGHT BATTALION OR LARGER SIZE OPERATIONS WERE
DIRECTED AGAINST ENEMY FORCES IN THE DMZ AREA.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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PAGE THREE C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 FINDING, FIXING AND DESTROYING THE ENEMY (OPNS
 BEAU CHARGER, HICKORY I AND II, CROCKET, BUFFALO,
 BEAU CHAIN, BEACON GUIDE AND KINGFISHER). THESE
 RESULTED IN MORE THAN 2700 CONFIRMED ENEMY KIA AT
 A LOSS OF LESS THAN 400 USMC KIA, A RATIO OF APPROXIMATELY 7:1.
 ALLEGATION: "IN A TYPICAL BATTLE FOR SEVERAL HILLS
 AROUND KHE SANH, THE MARINES MADE REPEATED FRONTAL
 ASSAULTS GUADALCANAL-STYLE ON NORTH VIETNAMESE
 BUNKERS. MANY YOUNG AMERICANS DIED NEEDLESSLY.
 OTHER U. S. UNITS HAD LONG LEARNED TO STAY AWAY
 FROM BLOODY FRONTAL ASSAULTS, LETTING MASSIVE
 AIRSTRIKES AND ARTILLERY DO THE DIRTY WORK INSTEAD."
 COMMENT: ASSAULT TECHNIQUES, PARTICULARLY THOSE
 EMPLOYED AGAINST HEAVILY FORTIFIED POSITIONS SUCH
 AS THOSE OF HILLS 861, 881N AND 881S, ARE DICTATED IN
 LARGE MEASURE BY THE TERRAIN AND THE ENEMY SITUATION.
 A. THE MARINE CORPS HAS TRADITIONALLY MADE MAXIMUM
 USE OF ALL AVAILABLE SUPPORTING ARMS TO BACK
 UP THE MARINE RIFLEMAN. SUPPORTING ARMS, BY THEMSELVES,

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA0757 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 DO NOT WIN BATTLES; IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, IT
 IS THE MAN ON THE GROUND WITH THE RIFLE WHO MUST
 CLOSE WITH THE ENEMY TO DEFEAT HIM.
 E. THE MARINE AND CIVILIAN PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE,
 STILL AND MOTION PICTURE, FULLY DOCUMENT THE EXTENT
 TO WHICH SUPPORTING ARMS WERE EMPLOYED IN
 THE BATTLES FOR THE HILLS AROUND KHE SANH.
 C. ADDRESSING THE AVIATION ASPECTS OF SUPPORTING
 ARMS, DURING THE OPERATION AROUND KHE SANH AND
 ITS ENVIRONS DURING THE PERIOD 24 APRIL TO 4 MAY 1967,
 MARINE AVIATORS FLEW 1004 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES,
 EXPENDED 1502 TONS OF ORDNANCE, AND ACCOUNTED FOR
 112 CONFIRMED ENEMY KIA AND 328 BUNKERS DESTROYED.
 ON 1 MAY 1967 ALONE, FIRST MAW AIRCRAFT FLEW 107
 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND 45 DIRECT AIR SUPPORT SORTIES
 IN SUPPORT OF 3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES--THE HIGHEST
 NUMBER OF SORTIES FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF ONE BATTALION
 IN A SINGLE DAY IN I CTZ SINCE OPERATIONS STARLIGHT IN AUGUST 1965.
 D. DURING THE PERIOD 24 APRIL - 6 MAY 1967, MARINE
 ARTILLERY FIRED 1,644 MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF MARINE

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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PAGE FIVE RUHHKWU C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO OPERATIONS AROUND KHE SANH, AN AVERAGE OF MORE THAN 136 MISSIONS PER DAY.

E. DURING THE SAME PERIOD, MARINES ACCOUNTED FOR 661 CONFIRMED ENEMY KIA AND AN ADDITIONAL 673 ENEMY PROBABLY KIA, COMPARED WITH MARINE LOSSES OF 131 KIA AND 393 WOUNDED. THIS IS BETTER THAN A 5:1 RATIO OF CONFIRMED KIA OR A 10:1 RATIO OF CONFIRMED/PROBABLE KIA.

F. DURING THE FOLLOW-UP ACTION BETWEEN 6 AND 12 MAY 1967, MARINE ARTILLERY FIRED AN ADDITIONAL 2,760 MISSIONS AND SWEEPS UNCOVERED 940 ADDITIONAL CONFIRMED ENEMY KIA.

G. OPERATION NIAGRA, DURING THE OPERATIONS IN THE KHE SANH AREA FROM 20 JANUARY TO 31 MARCH, WAS CHARACTERIZED BY HEAVY EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING ARMS. APPROXIMATELY 103,600 TONS OF ORDNANCE WAS DELIVERED BY 24,449 FIXED WING SORTIES, INCLUDING USMC, USAF AND USN AIRCRAFT. IN ADDITION, MORE THAN 102,600 ARTILLERY ROUNDS WERE FIRED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION NIAGRA.

4. IT IS A TIME-TESTED TECHNIQUE OF SMALL ACALIBER

PAGE SIX RUHHFMA0757 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO REPORTERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO LACK THE ABILITY TO PUT FACTUAL MATTER INTO INTERESTING FORM, TO SENSATIONALIZE THEIR STORIES WITH UNQUALIFIED CONJECTURES, BROAD GENERALITIES, AND HALF-TRUTHS.

MR. GRANT IS THIS KIND OF REPORTER. BOTH HE AND THE PUBLICATION HE REPRESENTS OPERATE ON THE FRINGE OF JOURNALISTIC LICENSE AND RESPECTABILITY. IN VIETNAM, NEITHER THE PUBLIC NOR THE REPORTER IS PROTECTED BY CENSORSHIP WHICH SCREENS OUT DISTORTED VIEWS OR VICIOUS ATTACKS BY IRRESPONSIBLE CORRESPONDENTS. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IS TASKED WITH SEPARATING THE GRAIN FROM THE CHAFF--A NOT-TO-DIFFICULT TASK WHEN AIDED BY THE MIND OF INTELLIGENT REASONING AND THE FACTS. GP #

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#13

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

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			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 060230Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				10	EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN CUSHMAN
	DCG					REMARKS
4	DCG AIR				10	<p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>FOR</p> <p><i>CB - mostly generalities. We will await the two reports.</i></p> <p><i>R. Resny</i></p> <p><i>50</i></p>
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	10/6			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

#14 6

SECRET

OO RHMMAFA
 DE RUMHVP 0675 2800230
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 060230Z OCT 68
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMNLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN CUSHMAN; INFO MGEN QUILTER
 AND MGEN YOUNGDALE FM MGEN DAVIS
 AIRCAV CAPABILITIES FOR MARINE DIVISIONS
 A. CG III MAF 010650Z OCT68 (SECRET SPECAT)
 1. I CONSIDER A CAPABILITY EQUIVALENT TO AN AIR CAVALRY TROOP THE
 MOST URGENT, COMBAT ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT NOW LACKING FOR PROPER
 SUPPORT OF THIS DIVISION. I PERSONALLY, AND MY ENTIRE STAFF,
 ARE CONVINCED THAT THE LACK OF SUCH A CAPABILITY HAS RESULTED AND
 IS CONTINUING TO RESULT IN GREATER PERSONNEL AND HELICOPTER LOSSES
 THAN NECESSARY WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SERIOUSLY INHIBITING OUR
 CAPABILITY TO FIND, FIX AND DESTROY THE ENEMY.
 A. OUR FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS, OF COURSE, THE UTTER INADEQUACY
 IN NUMBERS, TYPES AND MODERNITY OF THE LIGHT HELICOPTER/VISUAL
 RECCE ASSETS AVAILABLE TO FMAW FOR SUPPORT OF THE MARINE DIVISION.

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 0675 **S E C R E T** SPECAT
 B. DELIBERATLY PLANNED, LOW ALTITUDE HELICOPTER RECONNAISSANCE
 CAN, BETTER THAN ANY OTHER MEANS, DETECT ENEMY ACTIVITY IN AND NEAR
 HLZ'S AND THE APPROACHES THERETO. A TROOP OF THE AIRCAV HAS BEEN
 MOST SUCCESSFULLY EMPLOYED IN THIS ROLE SEVERAL TIMES IN SUPPORT
 OF 3D MARDIV. NO AIRCAV HELICOPTER HAS BEEN LOST DURING THESE
 OPERATIONS. NO MARINE HELICOPTER HAS YET BEEN LOST ENEMY ACTION
 IN A ZONE THOROUGHLY RECONNOITERED AT LOW ALTITUDE BY AN AIRCAV
 TROOP. THE KEY FACTOR APPEARS TO BE AN ADEQUATE DENSITY OF MODERN
 ARMED AND OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS OVER THE AREA TO BE RECONNOITERED.
 C. THERE ARE A VARIETY OF OTHER RECONNAISSANCE TASKS WHICH ARE
 ALSO BEST ACCOMPLISHED BY LOW ALTITUDE HELO RECCE, A TECHNIQUE
 WHICH SELECTIVELY UTILIZED, IS COMPLEMENTARY TO THE RECCE TECHNIQUES
 CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BY THE MARINE CORPS.
 D. IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THIS DIVISIONS AO, HELO SEARCH AND
 ATTACK AGAINST FLEETING PERSONNEL TARGETS IS THE METHOD OF CHOICE
 FOR INFLECTING ATTRITION ON THE ENEMY'S FORCES.
 F. IN THE AIRCAV TROOP, THE CLOSE MARRIAGE OF LIMITED
 GROUND RECCE/COMBAT CAPABILITIES WITH HELICOPTER RECCE/ATTACK
 CAPABILITIES OFFERS A FASTER REACTION TIME, REDUCED COORDINATION
 DIFFICULTIES AND BETTER INTEGRATION OF THE ELEMENTS INVOLVED THAN

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#14

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHVP 0675 S E C R E T SPECAT

CAN BE ACHIEVED WITH OUR PRESENT SPARROW HAWK CONCEPT.

2. ACHIEVEMENT OF AN EQUIVALENT (AND IN FACT SUPERIOR) AIR CAVALRY TYPE CAPABILITY REPRESENTS NOTHING MORE THAN AN EXTENSION OF THE OFTEN STATED MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE OF MAXIMUM INTEGRATION AND OPTIMUM UTILIZATION OF AIR AND GROUND RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE COMMON GOALS. THE GROUND ELEMENT CAN BE PROVIDED FROM EXISTING RECON RESOURCES OF THE DIVISION. AIR ASSETS WILL REQUIRE NEW EQUIPMENT WHICH IS URGENTLY NEEDED IN ANY EVENT.

A. AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE I SUGGEST CONSIDERATION OF A LIGHT HELO/OBSERVATION GROUP IN SUPPORT OF EACH MARDIV WITH THREE SQUADRONS EQUIPED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) VMO O-1 AND OV10

(2) HMAO AH-1 AND OH6/OH 58 (LOH)

(3) HML UH-1H OR UH1E (TUG CONVERSION) — *new U.S. Army, actually com- tractor version*

B. THE AIR CAVALRY CAPABILITY WOULD BE TASK ORGANIZED BY PASSING OPCON OF GROUND RECON ASSETS AS REQUIRED TO THE LIGHT HELO GROUP COMMANDER WHO WOULD HAVE OVERALL CONTROL OF THIS EFFORT.

3. MY DIVISION'S EXPERIENCES INDICATE QUITE CLEARLY THAT WE MUST HAVE LOH AND UH-1H TYPE HELICOPTERS. THE OTHER AIRCRAFT TYPES ARE EITHER ON HAND OR ON THE WAY IN AT LEAST MINIMALLY ADEQUATE

PAGE FOUR RUMHVP 0675 S E C R E T SPECAT NUMBERS.

4. CONCERNING COST AND FORCE LEVEL IMPLICATIONS:

A. THE LOH IS EXTREMELY CHEAP TO BUY AND MAINTAIN. THIS DIVISION'S ENTIRE REQUIREMENT WOULD COST LESS THAN ONE CH-53.

*requires 16 X
the pilots*

B. THE CURRENT UH-1E CANNOT SAFELY PERFORM THE HML MISSION IN THIS AO. IT HAS TO BE REPLACED. THE PRICE OF THE UH1H IS MODERATE. IT'S AVAILABILITY WILL REDUCE DEMANDS ON AND LOSSES TO THE CH-46 WHICH MAY WELL MAKE IT A SELF FUNDING PROPOSITION.

C. FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE THE ONLY UNPROGRAMMED ADDITIONAL PILOT REQUIREMENT WOULD BE FOR THE LOH. IT WOULD SEEM THAT A DRAW DOWN FROM SQUADRONS EXPERIENCING MAINTAINANCE DIFFICULTIES COULD OVERFILL THE REQUIREMENT.

5. FOR THE LONGER TERM THERE ARE A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO WHATEVER PARTICULAR FORCE LEVEL OR FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS ARE APPLIED; HOWEVER, THE CONTRAL POINT REMAINS THAT WE MUST HAVE A MODERN LIGHT HELICOPTER MIX AND THE CAPABILITIES (INCLUDING AIRCAV TYPE OPERATIONS) SUCH A FORCE PROVIDES.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

#14

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM COMSEVENTHFLT		DATE 6 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 060650Z OCT 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS For CG - you won't live it down - PA, U. Kopy G
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		7	10/6	H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RUMGSAF0650 2800650-CCCC--RHMAFA.
 ZNY CCCCC ZYO RUMGSNH
 P 060650Z OCT 68
 FM COMSEVENTHFLT
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMFWDB/CTF SEVEN SIX
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 FOR LTJEN CUSHMAN INFO RADN LACY FROM VADM BRINGLE
 A. YOUR 050358Z OCT 68

1. I ACCEPT WITH PLEASURE YOUR KIND INVITATION TO WITNESS THE SECNAV PRESENTATION CEREMONY AT III MAF HQTRS, BUT DUE PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS I REGRET THAT I CANNOT REMAIN FOR THE LUNCHEON.
2. INTEND ARRIVE III MAF HELIPORT IN C7F HELO ABOUT 10115H AND DEPART IN CTF 76 HELO AFTER THE PUC CEREMONY.
3. THANKS AGAIN FOR THE ENJOYABLE LUNCHEON TODAY. IF YOU NEED THE QUOTE PENNSYLVANIA UNQUOTE LET ME KNOW.
4. BEST RE CARDS.

GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#15

HEADQUARTERS
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CG XXIV CORPS		07 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
			070910Z OCT 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT RETENTION OF 3/5TH ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON (S)
			IN	OUT		
7	CG				lp	REMARKS For CG - should await the fall out of the Gen A. FOR [Signature]
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			a	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/8		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #16

SECRET

PR003086

PFTSZYUW RUMLBPA0683 2811345-5555--RHMMAFA.

DE RUMLBPA 2867 2810920

ZNY 55555

P R 070910Z OCT 68

FM CG XX IV CORPS PHB

TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF DNG

INFO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV SGN

RHMAAVA/DEP CG USARV LBN

BR

S E C R E T AVII-CG 06142

PERSONAL FOR :LTG CUSHMAN

FROM :LTB STILWELL

SUBJ:RETENTION OF 3/5TH ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON(S)

REF:A.COMUSMACV MSG DTG221042Z SEP 68(S)

B.COMUSMACV MS 6 DTG251221Z SEP 68(S)

C.CG III MAF MSG DTG030852Z OCT 68(S)

D.COMUSMACV MSG DTG071140Z SEP 68(S)

E.CG XXIV CORPS LTR DTG27SEP 68(S)SUBJ:DRY WEATHER

CAMPAIGN(U)

F.CG III MAF MSG DTG041230Z OCT 68(S)

1.(S)A.REFERENCES A AND B DIRECT XXIV CORPS TO DEPLOY 3/5TH ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON TO III CTZ ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 1968.

B.REFERENCES C DIRECTS THE BACKLOADING OF SLF ALPHA(2ND BN,26TH

PAGE TWO RUMLBPA 2867S E C R E T

MARINES)ON 19OCTOBER 1968.

C.REFERENCE D ANNOUNCES A PLAN WHICH WOULD REQUIRE DEPLOYMENT OF A REINFORCED AIR MOBILE BRIGADE FROM XXIV CORPS FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE MONTHS DURING THE NORTHEAST MONSOON SEASON.REFERENCE E OUTLINES THE IMPACT OF THIS PLAN ON XXIV CORPS.

D.REFERENCE F ANNOUNCES THE DESIRES OF HIGHER AUTHORITY TO EXTEND THE XXIV CORPS SOUTHERN BOUNDARY AT AN EARLY DATE TO RELEASE ADDITIONAL FORCES TO THE 1ST MARINES DIVISION.

2.(S)THE LOSS OF TWO BATTALIONS SIZED MANUEVER ELEMENTS AS DIRECTED IN REFERENCES B AND C WILL OCCUR AT A JUNCTURE THAT IS CRITICAL TO THE COMBINED US AND GVN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN I CTZ.THESE LOSSES WILL FURTHER EXACEATE THE IMPACT OF THE IMPACT OF THE PROJECTED LOSS OF A REINFORCED AIR MOBILE BRIGADE TO THE IV CTZ DURING THE NORTHSAST MOONSOON SEASON.AS POINTED OUT IN REFERENCE E THE LOSS OF SUBSTANTIAL FORCES WOULD IMPAIR THE MOMENTUM OF THE ATTACK AGAINST NVA FORMATIONS AND THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE AT A MOST CRITICAL JUNCTURE.IT WOULD DETER THE MOUNTING CONFIDENCE OF THE ARVN REGIMENTS AND TERRITORIAL FORCES,AND IT WOULD SLOW THE PACE OF PACCIFICATION IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES.

3.(S)THE EXTENSION OF THE XXIV CORPS SOUTHERN BOUNDARY AS DIRECTED

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET
#16

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMLBPA 2867 S E C R E T

IN REFERENCE F WILL REQUIRE THE REALIGNMENT OF RESIDUAL FORCES AVAILABLE TO XXIV CORPS TO ASSUME THE MISSIONS OF THE USMC BATTALION PRESENTLY OPERATING IN THE AREA BETWEEN PHU LOC AND HAI VAN PASS. IT REPRESENTS FURTHER DRAWDOWN ON THE MANEUVER FORCES AVAILABLE TO XXIV CORPS FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, INCLUDING THIS AO EXTENSION, XXIV CORPS STANDS TO LOSE THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE MANEUVER BATTALIONS DURING THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, PLUS THE PROJECTED LOSS OF AN ADDITIONAL REINFORCED AIR MOBILE BRIGADE DURING THE NORTHEAST MONSOON SEASON.

4. (S) UNLESS THIS SERIOUS DEGRADATION OF THE MANEUVER ELEMENTS OF XXIV CORPS IS ARRESTED, THE ABILITY TO EXPLOIT THE MOMENTUM OF THE CONSIDERABLE, BUT FAR FROM DECISIVE, SUCCESSSES THAT THE XXIV CORPS AND ALLIED ARVN AND TERRITORIAL FORCES HAVE ENJOYED WILL BE SEVERELY CURTAILED.

5. (S) THE MOBILITY AND FIRE POWER INHERENT IN A ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON MAKE SUCH A FORCE PARTICULARLY WELL-SUITED TO OPERATIONS IN THE COASTAL PLAINS ASTRIDE HIGHWAY QL1. RETENTION OF THE 3/5TH ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON IN THE XXIV CORPS AO WOULD COMPENSATE TO SOME DEGREE FOR THE OTHER DIRECTED AND PROJECTED LOSSES DESCRIBED ABOVE. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS STRONGLY REQUESTED THAT YOU TAKE ACTION TO SECURE REVERSAL OF THE DECISION TO REDEPLOY THE 3/5TH ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON TO III CTZ.

GP-4

BX

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

#16

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM SSO 25TH INF DIV	DATE 08 OCT 68	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 071030	COPY# 1, 2, 3, 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS S/S Rec 090730H oct 68 S/S Perhaps we should send msg explaining in general terms what happened Done 20802 BC 08/68
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	F HAS				
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
1	S/S	F	10/9		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
3	G-6	A	10/10	10/15	301	
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #17

THIS CORRESPONDENCE WILL BE ASSIGNED A FILE NUMBER AS LISTED BELOW.

FILE NUMBER _____

ACTION SECTION WILL COMPLETE	
ACTION COMPLETED ON:	
RETAINED BY _____ SECTION	
DATE	SIGNATURE AND RANK

EX-103

1953

1953

P 071034Z ZFF-4
FM SSO 25TH INF DIV
TO CG III MAF

ZFF

UNCLAS E F T O CHH 1090 EYES ONLY
MG WILLIAMSON SENDS FOR MG ANDERSON

1. RECEIVED YOUR EYES ONLY THIS AFTERNOON. THIS WAS THE FIRST NOTICE I HAVE HAD OF THE SITUATION.
2. MY CHIEF OF STAFF IS CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING THE ENTIRE MATTER. WILL FORWARD DETAILS ASAP.

WARM REGARDS

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
091

NNNN

Copy 1 of 3 copies

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV		DATE 17 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 071141		COPIES 2, 3 OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	072035	OUT		
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #18

O 071141Z SEP 68-1
 FM GEN ALANUS COMUSMACV DA-SCM
 TO GEN BROWN 7TH AF
 LTC MILBURN DEP CG USARV
 VADM EUNWALT COMNAVFORV
 LTC CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LTC PETERS CG I FFORCEV
 LTC STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 LTC KENWIN CG II FFORCEV
 CG ECKHARDT SA IV CTZ
 ZEM

SEC STATE NOFORN MAC 13558 EYES ONLY
 (G/NF) I HAVE RECEIVED CERTAIN INFORMATION TODAY, AS YET
 UNCONFIRMED, INDICATING THAT ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS
 MAY BE ORGANIZED FOR 9 OCT. THESE DEMONSTRATIONS
 ARE REPORTEDLY PLANNED FOR SAIGON, BIEN HOA, NHA TRANG
 AND DANANG, AND ARE CONNECTED WITH COMP RUMORS. THE
 BASIS FOR THE DEMONSTRATIONS IS SAID TO BE DISSATISFACTION
 WITH SAIGON'S ROLE IN THE PARIS TALKS. DISSOLUTION OF THE
 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND SUPPORT FOR KY ARE ALSO ALLEGED
 AIMS OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS. THE FOREGOING IS BEING PROVIDED
SOLELY FOR YOUR INFORMATION. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS WILL
BE PROVIDED AS THEY BECOME KNOWN. I WOULD APPRECIATE
ANY INFORMATION YOU MAY PICK UP ON THIS SUBJECT.

SSC NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
 175

SECRET

OO RUHKM
 DE RUMSAV 0182 2811700
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 071655Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1
 FOR FMFPAC (F-050)

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
 A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001-2400H 06 OCT 68
 B. (1) 173
 (2) 43
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 C. (1) 130
 (2) 81

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0182 **S E C R E T** SPECAT MCEO

(3) 74
 (4) 47
 (5) 103
 (6) 50
 (7) 45
 D. (1) 40
 (2) 29
 (3) 13
 (4) 13
 E. (1) 83
 (2) 12
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 F. (1) 73
 (2) 73
 (3) 16
 (4) 57
 G. (1) 38
 (2) 31
 (3) 2

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#19

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0182 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(4) 2
 H. (1) 73
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 I. (1) 23
 (2) (A) 37
 (B) 11
 (C) 0
 (D) 0
 J. (1) 0
 (2) 168
 (3) 38
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 K. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 7
 (4) 19

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0182 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

L. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 10
 M. (1) K(3) 6 SORT DIV, ASRT DOWN
 L(7) 6 SORT DIV BY TADC
 (4) SORT DIV, NEG TGT
 2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW
 A. (1) (A) 84
 (B) 76
 (2) 28
 (3) 64
 B. (1) 209
 (2) 43
 (3) 0
 C. (1) (A) 94 (B) 40
 (2) (A) 0 (B) 36

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#19

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0182 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(3) (A) 0 (B) 0

D. (1) 22

(2) 6

(3) 0

E. (1) 26

(2) 2

(3) 0

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 0

F. (1) 0

(2) 64

(3) 0

G. (1) 60

(2) 2

(3) 0

G. (1) 60

(2) 2

(3) 2

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0182 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(7) 0

H. (1) 13

(2) 0

(3) 5

I. (1) 3

(2) 15

(3) 0

(4) 0

J. (1) (A) 68 (B) 40

(2) (A) 13 (B) 0

(3) (A) 0 (B) 0

(4) (A) 3 (B) 0

(5) (A) 0 (B) 0

(6) (A) 0 (B) 0

(7) (A) 0 (B) 36

K. (1) A(3) INCLUDES 33 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES

I(1) 3 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI I(2) 5 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI

2 USMC TO ROKMC, TGT PRI 2 ROKMC TO USMC, TGT PRI

3 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALF 1 USMC TO USMC, ASRT DOWN

2 USMC TO USMC, NEG TGT

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#19

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 07 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 01810Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/8		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #20

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA RUHKM RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAV 0157 2802130
 ZNY SSSSS

O P 061810Z OCT 68

FM CG FIRST MAW

TO RUEBHOA/CMC

RUHKM/CG FMFPAC

RUMSAK/CG III MAF

INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FOR FMFPAC (F-038)

FOR CMC CODE AA-1

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS

A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001 - 2400H 05 OCT 68

B. (1) 154

(2) 8

(3) 0

(4) 0

C. (1) 116

(2) 80

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0157 **S E C R E T** SPECAT MCEO

(3) 76

(4) 49

(5) 85

(6) 55

(7) 38

D. (1) 55

(2) 25

(3) 4

(4) 9

D. (1) 34

(2) 7

(3) 2

(4) 0

F. (1) 48

(2) 48

(3) 14

(4) 34

G. (1) 6

(2) 32

(3) 10

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#20

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0157 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(4) 0
 H. (1) 44
 (2) 4
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 I. (1) 6
 (2) (A) 21
 (B) 0
 (C) 0
 (D) 0
 J. (1) 0
 (2) 119
 (3) 41
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 K. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 32

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0157 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

L. (1) 0
 (2) 2
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW
 A. (1) (A) 94
 (B) 74
 (2) 8
 (3) 51
 B. (1) 188
 (2) 39
 (3) 0
 C. (1) (A) 94 (B) 40
 (2) (A) 0 (B) 36
 (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
 D. (1) 6
 (2) 2

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0157 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(3) 0
 E. (1) 6
 (2) 2
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 F. (1) 0
 (2) 51
 (3) 0
 G. (1) 47
 (2) 4
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 H. (1) 15
 (2) 2

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0157 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(3) 0
 I. (1) 2
 (2) 15
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 J. (1) (A) 80 (B) 38
 (2) (A) 11 (B) 0
 (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (4) (A) 3 (B) 0
 (5) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (6) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (7) (A) 0 (B) 36
 K. (1) A(3) INCLUDES 41 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES
 I(1) 2 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI
 I(2) 3 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI
 5 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALF
 2 USMC TO USMC, NEG TGT
 2 USA TO USMC NEG TGT
 1 USMC TO USMC WX
 2 USMC TO USMC, RESCAP GP-4
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

20

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

FORM 8010 (REV 5-61)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COMPLIANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION O-ORIGINATOR			FROM CMC		DATE 08 OCT 68	
			SERIAL/CONTROL DATE 072054Z OCT 68		COPY NO 2 of 6 COPIES REQ.	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	REMARKS
			IN	OUT		
	CG					FOR
	DCS					
	DCC AIR					
2	C/S	I			Q	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	10/8		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	SAC					

#21

P1003355
 RZTUZYUW RUEBHOA6240 2811943-UUUU--RHMMFAFA
 ZNR UUUUU
 R 072054Z OCT 68
 FM CMC
 TO RUCLNRA/CG MCRD PARRIS ISC
 INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUHMLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RHMMFAFA/CG III MAF
 RUHHHQ/CG CINCPAC
 RUHHBRA/CG CINCPACFLT
 RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV
 RUABOL/CG NINTH MAB
 RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUABOL/CAMP BUTLER OKINAWA
 RUWMDA/MARBKS NAVSTA SFRAN
 RUEDNWA/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUECLBEA/COMSIX

FOR

BT

UNCLAS

FOR MAJGEN O R SIMPSON 05422/9903 USMC. PCSO CNTN MY 041720Z OCT
 68 MOD IN THAT UPON COMPL TEM AT FMFPAC FURTHER PRO SUCH PALCE AS
 FIRST MARDIV MAY BE LOC FOR DU AS CG THAT DIV (MCC 159) AS RELFOR
 MAJGEN C A YOUNDALE 05454/9903 USMC.

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#21

HEADQUARTERS
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 8216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE		FROM CG FMEPAC	DATE 08 OCT 68
		SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 080222Z OCT 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	EXCLUSIVE FOR
			IN	OUT			
3	CG				lo	REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY Reg copy for C6 1st MAF in conn. with our review of same plan. By C82. 4/6	
	DCG						
4	DCG AIR				lo		
2	G/S	I					
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
1	S/S	I	10/8		H		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

SECRET

SECRET

		FROM CG FMFPAC	DATE 08 OCT 68
		SERIAL # 080222Z OCT 68	COPY# <i>1</i> OF <i>3</i> COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT	
		EXCLUSIVE FOR	
8 OCT 68	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
	<i>[Signature]</i>	EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY	
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		
	MAT AND TAPE		

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EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT
SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

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SECRET**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**PP RHMAFA
DE RUHFMA 0947 2820222
ZNY SSSSS

P 080222Z OCT 68

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF

BT
SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN
BUSE/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
COMMANDO HUNT (U)**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

1. (S) THIS IS TO APPRISE YOU OF A SEVENTH AF PLAN CALLED COMMANDO HUNT WHICH IS AIMED AT INTENSIFIED TRUCK-KILL OPERATIONS IN THE LAOTIAN AREA DURING THE FORTHCOMING NORTHEAST MONSOON. I HAVE ALSO INCLUDED GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY THE COMMANDANT RELATIVE TO COMMANDO HUNT. THE PLAN REQUIRES APPROXIMATELY 62 PER CENT OF AIR EFFORT DEVOTED TO OUT-OF-COUNTRY DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS ARE:

- A. INCREASED ASSIGNMENT OF SENSOR DEVICES.
- B. EXPEDITED AND INCREASED ALLOWANCES OF SPECIAL MUNITIONS SUCH AS CBU'S, MINES (PERSONNEL AND VEHICULAR), AND CS.

This is a laugh. I had this plan sent to 7th Air and they received it on 26 Sept. W. King

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 0974 SECRET MC SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

C. RELAXED LAOTIAN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WHICH, AS YET, HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED. ONE OF THE PROPOSED RULES WOULD PERMIT THE ATTACK OF TARGETS IN A NON-PERMISSIVE AREA WITHOUT A FAC(A).

2. (S) ALTHOUGH THE PLAN HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED BY JCS AND THE SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF COMMANDO HUNT ON YOUR OPERATIONS ARE NOT KNOWN, THE FOLLOWING IS ANTICIPATED:

A. INCREASED DAILY OUT-OF-COUNTRY FRAG OF 62 USMC SORTIES FOR A TOTAL OF 103 USMC SORTIES OUT-OF-COUNTRY DAILY.

B. LOSS OF ASSIGNED SENSOR FREQUENCIES. 7TH AF HAS SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT OF 4 OF THE 6 MARINE SENSOR FREQUENCIES USED IN SUPPORT OF DUCK BLIND. THIS WOULD TAKE 108 OF 162 CURRENTLY AVAILABLE CHANNELS.

D. INCREASED DIFFICULTY IN PROCURING CBU MUNITIONS FOR IN-COUNTRY USE.

3. WHILE IT IS NOT CONSIDERED DESIRABLE TO USE MARINE A4 AND F4 AIRCRAFT FOR COMMANDO HUNT, OUR A6 IS WELL SUITED PROVIDING:

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

#23

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHFMA 0974 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

A. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR A/C OPERATIONS IN LAOS ARE CHANGED TO PERMIT A6 FLIGHT CREWS TO CONTROL ORDNANCE DELIVERY VICE FAC(A).

B. THERE IS COMMENSURATE REDUCTION IN USE OF MARINE A 6 AIRCRAFT IN ROUTE PACKAGE ONE PRIOR TO VMA (AW)-225 ARRIVING IN-COUNTRY.

C. 7TH AF WILL TRANSFER ADEQUATE CBU MUNITIONS TO CG 1ST MAW TO OFFSET ANY INCREASED USAGE OF CBU DURING COMMANDO HUNT.

D. MARINE A6 COMMITMENT TO COMMANDO HUNT IS REVIEWED AT CINCPAC ABOUT 15 NOV 68 AFTER MORE COMBAT DATA IS AVAILABLE ON USE OF GROUND BEACON FOR A 6 ALL-WEATHER CAS.

GP-4

BT

NNNN

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

#23

P 080530Z 27FF-4

FM SSO 25TH INF DIV

TO CG III MAF

ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL ONLY 1104 EYES ONLY

MG WILLIAMSON CG 25TH INF DIV SENDS FOR MG ANDERSON C/S III MAF

SUBJECT: DEATH OF SP/4 THOMAS J. STOPYRA

REF: YOUR P 070335Z OCT 68

1. I HAVE MADE AN EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH, NO RECORD CAN BE FOUND OF YOUR MESSAGES OF 7 AND 13 SEP 68. TRACER ACTION HAS BEEN INITIATED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS. REQUEST THAT YOU DO THE SAME.
2. ON 261755 AUG 68, CG HEADQV NOTIFIED THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OF SP/4 THOMAS J. STOPYRA'S DEATH INCLUDING CAUSE OF DEATH AS MISSILE (CSW), HEAD, SELF-INFLICTED. SP/4 STOPYRA'S COMPANY COMMANDER WROTE A LETTER TO SP/4 STOPYRA'S MOTHER EXPLAINING THAT SP/4 STOPYRA TOOK HIS OWN LIFE FOR REASONS UNKNOWN TO EVEN HIS CLOSEST FRIENDS.
3. IF CPL HOLLOWAY HAS INFORMATION OR LEADS THAT COULD ASSIST IN EXPLAINING SP/4 STOPYRA'S DECISION TO TAKE HIS OWN LIFE, PLEASE FURNISH THIS INFORMATION TO ME TO ASSIST ME IN VIEW OF MY INTEREST IN THIS MATTER.
4. INVESTIGATION BY THE CID AFFIRMED THAT SP/4 STOPYRA'S DEATH WAS CAUSED BY SELF-INFLICTED GUN SHOT WOUNDS.
5. I REGRET THE NON-RECEIPT OF YOUR ORIGINAL MESSAGES. IF I CAN BE OF FURTHER ASSISTANCE, DO NOT HESITATE TO CONTACT ME.

SP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

SSO

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OO RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAV 0124 2821900
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 081810Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1
 FOR FMFPAC (F-035)

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
 A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001-2400H 07 OCT 68
 B. (1) 169
 (2) 35
 (3) 3
 (4) 0
 C. (1) 84
 (2) 81
 (3) 74

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0124 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEC

- (4) 54
 (5) 95
 (6) 50
 (7) 48
 D. (1) 54
 (2) 29
 (3) 15
 (4) 0
 E. (1) 92
 (2) 6
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 F. (1) 76
 (2) 76
 (3) 15
 (4) 61
 G. (1) 74
 (2) 2
 (3) 0
 (4) 0

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET
 #35

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUNSAV 0124 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

- H. (1) 74
- (2) 2
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- I. (1) 9
- (2) (A) 26
- (B) 7
- (C) 0
- (D) 0
- J. (1) 0
- (2) 172
- (3) 33
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- K. (1) 0
- (2) 0
- (3) 11
- (4) 19
- L. (1) 0

PAGE FOUR RUNSAV 0124 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- (7) 2
- M. (1) K(3) 11 DIVERTED BY TADC FOR ASRT DOWN
L(7) 2 SORTIES, NEGATIVE CONTROLLER
- 2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW
- A. (1) (A) 88
(B) 73
- (2) 20
- (3) 77
- B. (1) 203
- (2) 55
- (3) 0
- C. (1) (A) 94 (B) 40
- (2) (A) 0 (B) 36
- (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
- D. (1) 8

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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#25

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0124 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(2) 12
 (3) 0
 E. (1) 14
 (2) 6
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 F. (1) 0
 (2) 77
 (3) 0
 G. (1) 67
 (2) 8
 (3) 0
 (4) 2
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 H. (1) 30

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0124 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(2) 2
 (3) 0
 I. (1) 8
 (2) 24
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 J. (1) (A) 72 (B) 37
 (2) (A) 13 (B) 0
 (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (4) (A) 3 (B) 0
 (5) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (6) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (7) (A) 0 (B) 36

K. (1) A (3) INCLUDES 34 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES
 1 (1) 6 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRIORITY
 2 USMC TO USMC, ASRT DOWN
 1 (2) 10 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRIORITY
 2 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALFUNCTION
 2 USMC TO USMC, ASRT DOWN
 2 USA TO USA, NEG TGT
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

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SECRET

OO RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAV 0128 282100
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 081810Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO
 2 USMC TO USMC, NEGATIVE CONTROLLER
 6 USMC TO SUMC, NEGATIVE COMMUNICATION

GP-4

BT

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MACV JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVE FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER			LOCAL DISTRIBUTION			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL							C/S	SJS	HIST	
TYPE MSG		BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		J1	J2	C11B		
			X			X 4	X 8			
TYPE TRANSMISSION			TO		INFO	J3	J4			
ELECTRICAL						X 1	X 3			
AIR MAIL						J5	J6			
COURIER			X	X		X 1	X 2			
PRECEDENCE							ACTIV			
ACTION TO: COURIER							NAG			
INFO: COURIER							AFGP			
<p style="text-align: center;">11043</p> <p style="text-align: right;">B</p> <p style="text-align: center;">DTG 080136Z Oct 68</p> <p>FROM: COMUSMACV</p> <p>TO: CINCPAC 10</p> <p>INFO: CJCS 10</p> <p>DOD 10</p> <p>STATE/AID 10</p> <p>CIA 10</p> <p>CINCUSARPAC 2</p> <p>CINCPACAF 2</p> <p>CINCPACFLT 2</p> <p>CGFMFPAC 2</p> <p>CG, I FFORCEV/SA II CTZ 2</p> <p>CG, II FFORCEV/SA III CTZ 2</p> <p><u>CG, III MAF/SA I CTZ 2</u></p> <p>SA, IV CTZ 2</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL 29797 FOR ADM McCAIN,</p> <p>INFO GEN WHEELER, GEN HAINES, GEN NAZZARO, ADM HYLAND, LTG BUSE,</p> <p>LTG PEERS, LTG KERWIN, LTG CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT</p> <p>Subject: Pacification in South Vietnam during August 1968 (U)</p> <p>(U) This is the eighth in the 1968 series of monthly assessments of pacification.</p>							AG			
							X 5			
							AMEMB			
							X 4			
							CBPAC			
							SJA			
							CH			
							SOG			
							COC			
							SURG			
							X 2			
							X 3			
							COMB STUDIES			
							TMA			
							X 3			
COMPT										
TNG										
X 2										
X 1										
DOD_SPEC										
USAID										
REP										
X 6										
FMMAO										
USARV										
X 6										
HC										
1FFV LNO										
X 1										
IG										
11 FFV LNO										
X 2										
X 3										
JRATA										
111 MAFLNO										
X 1										
JUSPAO										
5TH SF LNO										
X 2										
MACDC										
7TH AF										
MACON										
MACCORDS										
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PHOENIX										
1										
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DRAFT							R		SIGNATURE	
TYPED NAME TITLE PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL							L		<i>Charles A. Corcoran</i>	
MR. PHILLIP LANEY Reports Officer MACCORDS-OAD/R MACV 3556							E			
A							S		TYPED NAME AND TITLE	
F							E		CHARLES A. CORCORAN, MG	
T							R		USA, Chief of Staff	
E							R			
R										
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(MACV - RM)										

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1. (C) SUMMARY: During August territorial security in South Vietnam continued the steady improvement underway since the termination of the Tet offensive. In spite of a series of enemy attacks launched in each Corps area, the population in relatively secure hamlets rose to 65.8 of the total GVN population. This is only 1.4 percent less than the end-January level. Other pacification indexes also were favorable. RF and PF operations increased in number as well in effectiveness as shown by large increases in the number of enemy KIA and weapons captured. The increased effectiveness of territorial forces is partially attributable to the progress in weapons upgrading. The PHOENIX program accounted for 1,117 VC infrastructure killed, captured, or rallied during August for a total 8,486 for the year. August was designated as Self-Defense Month by the GVN and received much high level emphasis. The number of Self-Defense groups doubled. Large numbers of weapons have been allocated to provinces and cities but few of these are in the hands of self-defenders. One thousand four hundred and fifty-one returnees rallied under the Chieu Hoi program.

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
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2. (C) PACIFICATION STATUS:

a. ANALYSIS OF HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM TRENDS:

(1) HES reports for August show further improvement in the security situation. Population in relatively secure hamlets (HES ratings of A, B, and C) increased by 159,000 during the month. This represents a net advance of 0.9 percent to 65.8 percent of the population (urban and rural) living under conditions of relative security. This level is 1.4 percent below the high of 67.2 percent on 31 January, just before the Tet offensive. Population in contested hamlets (rated D and E) declined 0.8 percent in August to 17.4 percent and that in Viet Cong controlled hamlets declined 0.1 percent to 16.8 percent. (31 January figures were 16.3 and 16.4 percent respectively.)

FIGURE I
TRENDS IN POPULATION CONTROL (PERCENT)
(Security and Development)



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(2) Results in the rural areas show the same trend. Relatively secure rural population increased 0.7 percent in August to 50.1 percent (compared to 52.8 percent on January 31) of the countrywide population. Contested rural population declined 0.6 percent to 23.8 percent and the VC controlled rural population decreased 0.1 percent to 26.1 percent.

(3) Three hundred sixty-one hamlets progressed to a higher security status while 232 regressed. Tables showing current population control data and hamlet movement are given in Paragraph 11, Statistical Annex.

b. THE CLIMATE FOR PACIFICATION:

(1) During August, a series of coordinated attacks within each Corps area ended the lull in enemy activity.

These attacks started on the night of 17 August in Tay Ninh Province in III CTZ. On the 21st the scene shifted to the Delta where several province and district towns were attacked simultaneously. On August 23rd, enemy action increased in I CTZ with attacks against Danang and several other cities. The enemy offensive in II CTZ also began on the 23rd with attacks on Duc Lap in Quang Duc Province.

(2) I CTZ: A series of coordinated ground attacks and attacks by fire in all five provinces, with Danang as the main target, began on August 23rd. There was heavy ground fighting and a small enemy sapper force made a limited penetration of the city. US and ARVN units reacted quickly to these attacks

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inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy and preventing large scale penetrations of Danang. In Quang Nam there were numerous attacks against ARVN installations, CAP units, refugee camps and district towns. While these attacks were successfully repulsed, tenuous security greatly hinders pacification progress in the Quang Nam RD areas and in the operational area of the ROK Marine Brigade where the enemy has been concentrating his efforts.

(3) II CTZ: Beginning on the 23rd, the Duc Lap CIDG camp in Quang Duc received a series of massive ground attacks considered to be a prelude to an offensive against Ban Me Thuot in Darlac Province. In the coastal provinces enemy activity has remained at a comparatively low level.

(4) III CTZ: On the night of 17 August, multi-regimental attacks were launched throughout Tay Ninh Province. In Binh Long elements of the 7th NVA Division launched a two-battalion attack against the Loc Ninh Special Forces and Subsector compounds on 18 August. The enemy initiated three attacks in Hau Nghia using one or more battalions.

(5) IV CTZ: While anticipated ground attacks on Can Tho did not materialize, continued presence of enemy main-force units near 67-68 RD campaign areas around Can Tho proved detrimental to pacification programs. In Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, Dinh Tuong, and Kien Giang VC activity increased but at a high cost to the enemy.

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3. (C) TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES:

a. The Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) is the system by which provincial RF and PF advisors report on the performance and readiness of the tactical units (excluding headquarters and administrative elements). August TFES reports show:

(1) RF small unit operations increased by 8000 (16%) over July. Contacts increased by 300 (22%). Operations-to-contact ratio was 34 to 1. Enemy KIA and enemy weapons captured by the RF doubled in August to totals of 2155 KIA and 1115 weapons respectively. RF losses were reported as 485 KIA (up 54%) and 145 weapons. RF personnel assigned to tactical units increased by 6900 (5%) over July. Percent authorized personnel assigned:

Officers	70%	Up 3% from July
NCO	77%	Up 1% from July
Enlisted	104%	Up 3% from July

(2) PF small unit operations increased by 7600 (9%) over July. Contacts increased by 330 (26%). Operations-to-contact ratio was 55 to 1. Enemy KIA by the PF increased by 46% to 1500. Enemy weapons captured by the PF decreased 9% to 640. PF losses were reported as 453 KIA (up 40%) and 232 weapons. PF personnel assigned to platoons increased 3100 (2%) over July. Percent authorized personnel assigned:

Platoon Leaders	95%	Up 5% from July
Squad Leaders	69%	Up 4% from July
Enlisted	100%	No change

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b. TERRITORIAL FORCES STRENGTH: During August, 29 RF Companies and 79 PF Platoons were activated, raising the total to 1,134 RF companies and 4,698 PF platoons. This program is on schedule. Table I shows the current strength of RF, PF and paramilitary forces.

TABLE I
PACIFICATION ASSETS

	<u>End July</u>	<u>August Losses</u>	<u>Net Gain</u>	<u>End August</u>
RF	208,588	5,865	5,824	214,412
PF	167,411	6,759	4,557	171,968
National Police	80,434	233	299	80,733
RD/TSRD	53,860	951	-931	52,929*
APT	3,465	0	5	3,470
Kit Carson Scouts	899	1	43	942

* 2,408 cadre who completed training late in August have not all been assigned to permanent groups. Therefore, some are not yet reflected in strength reports.

c. REGIONAL FORCES (RF) AND POPULAR FORCES (PF) IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS:

(1) Weapons Upgrading: As a result of M16 rifle issues to RF and PF units, and a subsequent reduction in M2 carbine authorization, a 100% fill of RF and PF M2 carbine requirements was achieved in August 1968. With the continuation of the BAR redistribution program and receipt of 2,639 BAR's during August,

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a 71% fill of current requirements has been issued to province administration and direct support logistic companies. Complete fill is expected by February 1969 due to the reduction in BAR authorization as a result of M16 rifle issues to RF and PF. Current shortages of M79 grenade launchers are being alleviated by the addition of a second US producer. RF and PF units currently have 24.5% of their M79 requirement (3,878 on hand vs. 15,837 authorized). It is planned to complete issues of these weapons in February 1969. Final issue of M16's to RF and PF in the Capital Military District was completed in August. M16 distribution within IV CTZ began with a token issue to RF and PF Training Centers. To date 14,075 M16's have been issued.

(2) Organizational Improvements: Seventy-nine of the 177 RF company-group headquarters programmed for activation have been activated to date and the remaining 98 will be activated by end-December. One hundred fifteen subsector headquarters have implemented the new Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs) planned for completion by end-June 1969. All sector headquarters and administrative and direct support logistic (A&DSL) companies have been converted to new TOEs.

(3) Advisors: During August, 20 additional Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs) were deployed. Two hundred thirty-two of the programmed 353 teams are now in the field. The program to increase the number of A&DSL Company advisors from 3 to 9 has been completed in 41 provinces. A marked improvement

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has been noted in the RF and PF logistics support field since the A&DSL advisor increases. All provinces now have engineer advisors as well as personnel and administration advisors.

(4) Leadership Improvement: Actions designed to improve leadership in RF and PF include acceleration of promotions, development of special promotion criteria for aspirants, more equitable assignment of OCS and NCO Academy graduates, establishment of mandatory school quotas, and use of the Territorial Forces Evaluation System leadership model to evaluate unit leadership. MACV is taking steps to identify and eliminate ineffective and/or corrupt leaders through advisory and JGS channels. Ineffective leadership at Province and District as well as RF and PF units has been included. MACV is currently stressing enforcement of Decree Law 20, which provides for the prompt removal of ineffective or corrupt leaders. In II CTZ a program to hold RF and PF leadership refresher courses is now being studied.

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d. NATIONAL POLICE:

(1) National Police (NP) continue to provide major support to pacification. Since the Tet offensive most NP have been on 24 hour alert status performing civil duties during the day and maintaining a military posture at night. The morale and the efficiency of the police have remained high in spite of this dual function.

(2) The program to reach a year-end force level of 86,000 is in jeopardy because recruitment has been seriously restricted by the Mobilization Law; also, no GVN funds are available for recruitment and approximately 1,000 trained policemen have not received any salary since being recruited. The end-year strength goal may not be realized unless these problems are resolved. Current strength and deployment of National Police is given in Paragraph 11, Section c.

(3) The majority of NP continue to maintain a defensive posture guarding urban areas. Main-force enemy units must be cleared from the countryside before the program to increase the number of NP in rural areas can regain its momentum. The progressive development of PHUNG HOANG, which requires deployment of NP to district and village levels, should have a marked

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effect on the extension of the police presence in rural areas.

(4) Emphasis on Marine Police in the Delta continues. Sufficient personnel are being assigned and trained. Boats and communications equipment are operational and 36 additional boats were received during August. The first NP Marine Police Base was commissioned at My Tho and work is progressing on obtaining additional bases.

(5) Expansion of Correction and Detention Facilities:

Construction has commenced on the new Con Son Island facility which, when completed, will house 4,000 prisoners. Most of the other centers have been reinforced with barrier materials and perimeter walls have been repaired. Of the 25 permanent detention facilities being constructed adjacent to Provincial Interrogation Centers (PICs), nine have been completed, which reflects an increase of 1,000 new confinement spaces.

4. (C) ATTACK ON THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE (VCI):

a. PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG:

(1) PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG has accounted for 8,486 VCI killed, captured or rallied in 1968. Of the 1,117 VCI eliminated in August, 5 were regional-level personalities, the highest monthly total to date. The VC region is an echelon of command roughly equivalent to the GVN Corps. Twenty-eight province

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level, 100 district level and 984 hamlet and village level VCI were also eliminated. VCI eliminations are tabulated in Table II.

TABLE II

ATTACK ON VC INFRASTRUCTURE

<u>Corps</u>	<u>KILLED</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>	<u>RALLIED</u>	<u>AUG. TOTAL</u>	<u>1968 TOTALS</u>
I	29	177	52	258	2,207
II	25	85	15	125	2,355
III	22	335*	26	383	1,906
IV	69	110	86	265	1,818
Capitol Military District	<u>7</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>200</u>
	152	780*	185	1,117	8,486

* Includes 108 VCI actually captured in earlier months but not reported.

(2) Activities in I CTZ emphasized the operational aspects of the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG program. An integrated corps-wide, military/civil psyops campaign directed against the VCI political organization was launched on 26 August. The program got under way with a concerted radio, TV, poster and leaflet campaign to publicize objectives and identify the "Top 15" most wanted VCI in each of the provinces. A Combined Psychological Operations Order was promulgated jointly by CG, III MAF and CG, I CTZ, indicating that PHUNG HOANG continues to get top level support in I Corps.

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(3) In II CTZ, the PHUNG HOANG decree and SOP have generated, at least on the surface, an improving atmosphere of cooperation and cohesiveness on the part of concerned GVN agencies. On 24 August, the CG, II CTZ, ordered all province chiefs and mayors to actively support the PHUNG HOANG program. One part of the order, especially forceful, stated that a II CTZ inspection team was to visit each province and district and that Province Chiefs would be held directly responsible for any shortcomings in the program.

(4) Following is the breakout by Corps of established District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC):

	<u>ACTIVATED</u>	<u>W/ADVISORS</u>	<u>PROGRAMMED</u> <u>31 Dec 68</u>
I Corps	26	24	29
II Corps	44	42	52
III Corps	42	42	45
IV Corps	80	45	68
CMD/Gia Dinh	6	6	6
Saigon/NP Precincts	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	207	168	200

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b. NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE (NPPF): Of the 68 NPPF companies, only four continue to be misused. The remainder are operating substantially within concept. Although the activities of many companies have increased, the results obtained were minimal and not commensurate with risks involved. An analysis of the operations indicated that poor intelligence and targeting by the Special Police was the main reason poor results were obtained. Current strength of the NPPF is 12,079 with a year-end goal of 18,000 in 89 companies (See Paragraph 11, Section c. for deployment by Corps).

5. (U) PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE PROGRAM:

a. August was designated as Self-Defense Month in an effort to capitalize on the people's fear of a third VC offensive and motivate them to voluntarily bear arms to protect their families and property. Top GVN leaders displayed their interest and enlisted popular support at 34 ceremonies kicking off local programs with the issuance of weapons for self-defense groups. Talks by key GVN officials over radio and TV underscored top-level interest in the program. During the month the number of members of Self-Defense groups rose to 421,706 from 200,370 at end-July. Self-Defense groups give an increasingly good account of themselves in action. Examples: during enemy attacks in I CTZ self-defense members killed 70 enemy and wounded 70 others in 10 separate engagements; self-defense groups gave the first warning of the enemy attacks on Tay Ninh; and in Danang they contributed to the

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defense of the city during the 23 August attacks.

b. During the month Minister of Interior Khiem requested weapons for People's Self-Defense groups based on an original plan of 2,000 weapons for each province and autonomous city, and 10,000 for Saigon. This would establish the national total at approximately 110,000 weapons. However, new priorities that stress urban defense have been developed, resulting in more than the 2,000 maximum being allocated to large cities and more than 10,000 being allocated to Saigon. MOI still plans to stay within the 110,000 total planned. Because of the rapid growth of the program, weapons allotments may have to be increased, depending on their availability and the speed with which self-defense members can be trained.

c. Of the 600,000 programmed participants, about 100,000 will not carry weapons. They will be involved in first aid (girls), firefighting, ammunition supply, and communications. The Ministry applies a formula of one weapon (on a rotational basis) for every three arms-bearing members; of the 500,000 members able to bear arms, there is a long-run program requirement for 167,000 weapons. At present, about 134,000 members have received training and close to 40,000 self-defense members (both rural and urban) have been armed. These figures reflect an increase of 20,000 civilians armed during August and a large increase in total membership. The armed members take their places around their guard positions every night and serve as a warning and defensive force in the

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cities and hamlets in case of VC infiltration past the main ARVN, US and RF and PF forces. They coordinate with local police and reaction forces in their areas.

d. In spite of the wide publicity given the program and the significant number of weapons allocated to provinces and cities, the distribution of these weapons to self-defense forces by some Province Chiefs and Mayors has been very slow. For example, in Saigon, a high priority target of the program, only 354 were distributed to self-defense forces during August.

TABLE III
SELF-DEFENSE FORCES (As of end-August)

	<u>Members</u>	<u>Trained</u>	<u>Armed</u>
Rural	94,032	35,150	10,112
Urban	271,248	66,963	15,381
Industrial*	<u>56,426</u>	<u>31,896</u>	<u>13,665</u>
Total	421,706	134,009	39,158

*Industrial and civil-servant self-defense groups (composed of union members, civil servants, students) guard government installations and perform defense functions in city hamlets.

6. (U) REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT:

a. The number of RD Cadre groups increased by 14 in August to 704. TSRD remained constant with 108 groups. The average strength of the RD groups is 52, and of TSRD groups, 60. (See Table IV)

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TABLE IV

CADRE STRENGTH

Corps	RD Cadre		Truong Son (Highlanders) Cadre	
	Groups	Strength	Groups	Strength
I CTZ	162	9,517	10	642
II CTZ	186	9,942	85	5,263
III CTZ	109	6,217	13	738
IV CTZ	247	12,014	0	0
Subtotal	704	37,690	108	6,643
In Training		7,931*		665
Total		45,621		7,308

* 2,408 students who returned to their provinces on 21 August have not all been assigned to permanent groups. Therefore, some do not appear on 31 August strength reports.

b. During August many groups reported that they had finished their assigned tasks and were ready to move on. The wisdom of this move into second-phase 1968 hamlets is being debated in some provinces, where both Americans and Vietnamese feel that the progress made has been mostly "paper progress", and that there is a genuine need for the groups to remain longer in their present hamlets. The fact that August saw the highest number of VC incidents directed against the RD and TSRD Groups - 227 - reinforces that viewpoint. Eighty-four cadres were KIA, 250 WIA, and three MIA. The Cadre groups were responsible for killing 140 VC and capturing five. (See Figure II).

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
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FIGURE II

VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC/TSRD



c. During the month there was steady progress in the Self-Help Program. Only three provinces indicated unsatisfactory progress because of security conditions. Progress over the past three months indicates that Self-Help program goals will be accomplished by the end of the year.

d. Fifteen Seabee teams, consisting of 13 men each, are deployed in priority provinces in II, III and IV Corps. In August they worked on a total of 131 projects including provincial maintenance shops, a high school, market places, refugee housing, dispensaries and elementary classrooms. Based on the success of these teams and their popularity with the rural people, 15 more have been programmed for 1969, provided that spaces can be made available.

7. (C) CHIEU HOI:

a. August's total of 1,451 returnees (for 4 reporting weeks) is on the same general level as the July total (for 5 reporting weeks) and is well above other months of the year. In view of

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
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the increased enemy activity during August, including 7 attacks on Chieu Hoi centers in the last week of August alone, the rate is considered favorable and is a continuation of the steady progress since April.

FIGURE III

CHIEU HOI RETURNEES



b. The number of Ministry-approved Armed Propaganda Team (APT) cadre increased from 3465 to 3470; this small increase is due to the slow functioning of ministerial agencies. Actually well over 300 new recruits are still awaiting confirmation of their appointment orders. The effort to secure US noncommissioned advisors for APTs is moving forward with action underway to secure 27 authorized spaces at province level. Meanwhile Region III has taken the step of appointing an officer or NCO in each province to be APT advisor either on a full-time or additional duty status.

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c. A moderate increase of 43 newly-hired Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) during the month brings the total number of Scouts to 942. All new scouts are given training before they are officially accepted for employment; there are 52 new scouts in training in I CTZ which have yet to be counted as officially hired. The scouts continue to perform with their usual degree of efficiency, resulting in an increased confidence in the program by US tactical commanders. Informal reports received from units indicate a desire to employ scouts in excess of established allocation; plans call for an expansion of the program to an overall total of 2500 scouts for CY 69.

8. (U) REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT:

a. Statistics regarding current number of Tet Evacuees and Regular Refugees are given in Table V. Total number of Tet Evacuees remaining to be reestablished as of 31 August was 31,808 as compared with 87,701 reported on 31 July. Of 49 Cities and Provinces reporting, forty have completed their Tet recovery programs. The total number of Regular Refugees increased during the month of August by 57,533 persons. This increase occurred primarily in II CTZ with 23,112 persons reported and III CTZ with 19,786 reported.

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TABLE V
REFUGEES AND TET EVACUEES
(AS OF 31 AUGUST)

	Tet Evacuees		Regular Refugees
	Peak Number	Current	
I CTZ	166,533	2,017	653,492
II CTZ	165,897	-0-	340,413
III CTZ	186,619	23,790	70,348
IV CTZ	222,107	3,200	116,238
Saigon	150,060	-0-	-0-
Mini-Tet*	<u>179,164</u>	<u>2,801</u>	<u>-0-</u>
National Totals	1,070,380	31,808	1,180,491

*Evacuees in Saigon and near-by urban areas caused by post-Tet attacks.

b. The rate of reestablishment of refugees declined during the month as compared with July with a total of 11,867 persons included in this category. Of these, 6,725 were resettled and 5,142 were able to return to their former homes. III CTZ accounted for over 50% of the total reestablished (6,870) followed by IV CTZ with 3,265 (See Table VI). Since 1 January a total of 108,397 refugees, assisted by the GVN, resettled in sites other than their original homes. Some of the major resettlement sites now underway or in the planning stage are as follows:

I CTZ - Cua Valley (Quang Tri Province)	1000 families
II CTZ - Cam Ranh Bay Area	1000 families
II CTZ - Catecka (Pleiku Province)	400 families
II CTZ - Edap Enang (Pleiku Province)	1200 families
III CTZ - Gia Dinh Province	300 families
IV CTZ - Soc Son (Kien Giang Province)	900 families

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TABLE VI
REFUGEES RESETTLED OR RETURNED TO ORIGINAL VILLAGES
(Tet Evacuees are not included)

	<u>Jan. through July</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>Total</u>
I CTZ	45,532	11	45,543
II CTZ	49,094	1,721	50,815
III CTZ	47,478	6,870	54,348
IV CTZ	<u>9,907</u>	<u>3,265</u>	<u>13,172</u>
National Totals	152,011	11,867	163,878

c. During the month refugee sites were the target of enemy harassment and attacks in 23 reported incidents, in contrast to 10 occurring during July. All except one of these attacks occurred in I CTZ.

d. Project Recovery activities are now moving at a rapid rate in Hue, where almost every home was damaged to some extent during the Tet offensive. By the end of July, MHSWR had distributed 202,000 sheets of roofing and 74,000 bags of cement in the massive rehabilitation effort. Stores and other businesses are being rebuilt, the Citadel is undergoing repairs, parks have been thoroughly cleaned, and grass planted on both sides of the Perfume River. Although major buildings at the University are being renovated, funding difficulties make it doubtful that

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classes will resume by October. Security is vastly improved, and Hue citizens who were at first dubious about their own safety now show confidence in the GVN's ability to withstand enemy attacks. The reopening of the Nguyen Hoang Bridge July 28 at a ceremony attended by Prime Minister Huong and Ambassador Bunker symbolized the progress made in rehabilitating the city.

9. (C) LOCAL GOVERNMENT:

a. The GVN has begun to move more actively against corruption with the National Assembly and the press joining in enthusiastically. Recent measures include setting up a system of provincial committees to establish procedures to make corruption more difficult and the issuance of a decree which requires that all civil servants and their close relatives declare their property holdings. During August, 24 district chiefs were replaced; the total removed since Tet now stands at 68. The total number of corrupt and/or inefficient provincial officials relieved since 1 February is shown in Table VII.

TABLE VII
OFFICIALS REMOVED SINCE 1 FEBRUARY 1968

Corps	Province Chiefs	Deputy P.C.'s	District Chiefs	Mayors
I CTZ	1	1	9	0
II CTZ	4	1	18	0
III CTZ	2	1	24	1
IV CTZ	9	0	17	0
Total	16	3	68	1

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b. Plans being developed for the 1969 Pacification Program emphasize the strengthening of local government and village development. Emphasis will be shifted from hamlet to village, the key echelon of local government. The Ministry of Interior is now placing a great deal of emphasis on the strengthening of village administrations and has requested a full-time training advisor and a local taxation advisor to help in formulating specialized training programs in local taxation and security. At the cabinet meeting of 28 August, the Prime Minister underlined the emphasis on strengthening local government and village development in a "two-phased program emphasizing security and development" as part of the pacification guidelines for 1969. Special programs have been recently developed in several provinces throughout the country to build up the village as the basic unit of local government. Agreement has been reached to deploy RD Cadre by village, under village administrative control, and progressively to return PF to their villages of origin for local defense.

c. As part of the program to improve territorial security and provide additional support to local government the existing village/hamlet radio system (VHRS) is being expanded by more than 15,000 radios to a total of 27,000 radios. This system is operated by the Combined Telecommunications Directorate with support from Public Safety Division of MACCORDS. The VHRS has

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primarily provided administrative communications between province, district, village and hamlets. RF and PF units that provide territorial security have not heretofore had direct communication with hamlet and village chiefs. Additional radios will be issued to these units as well as to those ARVN battalions in direct support of RD, to Mobile Advisory Teams and, as needed, to other US units. Also included in the distribution will be those New Life Hamlets developed since the initial distribution. The first increment of the new issues will be to hamlets and territorial security units in the immediate vicinity of major cities.

d. A Saigon Civil Assistance Group (SCAG) has been formed to apply single management to U.S. assistance in the capital city. Priority programs of SCAG include: providing guidance for the self-defense program; unification of self-help and civic action programs under an orderly and responsive administrative structure; identification of unregistered refugees and development of a responsive relief capability; and support for local community development programs, especially in the field of housing. In addition, SCAG will direct its efforts toward improvement of administrative efficiency and responsiveness and continue work on such critical problem areas as garbage collection, bus service and other public services unique to urban areas.

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e. On 5 August, the Ministry of Information distributed a decree emphasizing the necessity for Province and District Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) elements to guide and assist village and hamlet information cadre. The decree criticized weak information programs in villages and hamlets, and pointed out that they do not meet the needs of a fast-changing political situation, nor are they effectively combating ever-present enemy propaganda. This decree, intended to mobilize the information effort at village and hamlet level, constitutes a noteworthy Ministry initiative stressing the importance of a grass-roots information program and the integration of VIS into the pacification effort.

f. During the month, directives were issued on US support of locally-organized cultural-drama teams. AIK funding will permit support of up to 30 teams at province level during the remainder of the year, and will help fill the vacuum created by mobilization of the nationally-organized teams.

g. Hue radio station resumed full-power operation at 10KW output, on 22 August. The total radio and TV broadcasting activity in the northern provinces now exceeds that of the pre-Tet period.

10. (U) POPULAR ATTITUDES: The Tet offensive generated among Vietnamese a widespread apprehension

concerning GVN/Allied

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE SYMBOL

MACCOPRS-QAD/R

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MACV FORM 29751 (MAY 66)
(MACAG - AM)

CONFIDENTIALMACV JOINT MESSAGE FORM
CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

ability to cope with an effective enemy. A new and encouraging psychological trend, however, seems to be emerging. Recent attitude research strongly indicates that public attitudes and opinions are moving measurably in favor of the GVN and against the enemy. Support for the GVN appears to be at a higher level than before Tet, and fence sitting appears to be on the wane.

11. (C) STATISTICAL ANNEX:

a. Table VIII reflects status of population control by Corps as of end-January 1967, end-March (the month best reflecting the impact of the Tet offensive), and end-August 1968.

TABLE VIII

POPULATION CONTROL (Thousands)
(Security and Development)

	<u>31 Dec 67</u>		<u>31 Mar 68</u>		<u>31 Aug 68</u>	
	<u>GVN CONTROLLED</u>					
I CTZ	1,853.5	56.6%	1,591.6	49.1%	1,695.5	52.7%
II CTZ	2,130.2	74.8%	1,996.4	70.1%	2,182.7	74.9%
III CTZ	4,326.3	81.5%	3,936.1	75.0%	4,373.6	80.8%
IV CTZ	3,204.8	55.6%	2,947.1	50.6%	3,216.1	54.6%
RVN	11,514.8	66.9%	10,471.1	61.0%	11,468.9	65.8%
	<u>CONTESTED</u>					
I CTZ	625.3	19.1%	785.2	24.2%	752.2	23.4%
II CTZ	491.4	17.2%	600.0	21.1%	472.8	16.2%
III CTZ	707.1	13.3%	1,022.7	19.5%	753.7	13.9%
IV CTZ	1,008.6	17.5%	1,145.3	19.7%	1,057.8	17.9%
RVN	2,832.4	16.5%	3,553.2	20.7%	3,036.6	17.4%

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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OFFICE SYMBOL

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MACV JOINT MESSAGEFORM
CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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VC CONTROLLED

	<u>31 Dec 67</u>		<u>31 Mar 68</u>		<u>31 Aug 68</u>	
I CTZ	793.9	24.3%	867.4	26.7%	769.7	23.9%
II CTZ	228.2	8.0%	253.2	8.9%	258.1	8.9%
III CTZ	283.2	5.3%	286.3	5.5%	284.1	5.3%
IV CTZ	1,555.8	27.0%	1,729.8	29.7%	1,622.7	27.5%
RVN	2,861.1	16.6%	3,136.7	18.3%	2,934.6	16.8%

b. Table IX shows the shift of hamlets between the various HES categories. The categories are based on security and development factors. The base line "Total Moved" shows the number of hamlets that shifted during July. Reading up or down within a column, progression or regression is shown in terms of hamlets and percentage of the "Total Moved" base line figure. Of the 593 hamlets that shifted, 361 progressed (60.8%) while 232 regressed (39.2%).

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MACV FORM 297-1 (Mar 66)
(MACAG - AM)

CONFIDENTIAL

MACV JOINT MESSAGE FORM
CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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TABLE IX
MONTHLY HAMLET MOVEMENT
FROM 31 JULY TO 31 AUGUST 68

UP	A	B		C		D		E		VC	
	3(4.9)	123(52.6)	3(1.3)	176(30.6)	3(6.9)	27(62.8)	20(76.9)	6(23.1)			
DOWN	B		D		E		VC				
	11(100.0)	56(91.8)	2(3.3)	107(45.8)	2(0.8)	22(10.4)	2(0.8)	17(7.7)	13(30.3)		
NO CHANGE	A	B	C	D	E	VC					
	202	1361	3014	2038	390	3904					

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE SYMBOL
MACCORDS-QAD/R

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CONFIDENTIAL

#26

MACV JOINT MESSAGEFORM
CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

c.

TABLE X
STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF NATIONAL POLICE
(AS OF 31 AUGUST 1968)

	<u>Special Police</u>	<u>NPFF</u>	<u>Marine Police</u>	<u>Other Police</u>	<u>Totals</u>
DGNP*	1,975	3,185		7,153	12,313
SMPD**	1,626			14,576	16,202
I Corps	2,124	2,430		5,944	10,498
II Corps	2,434	1,590	20	7,339	11,383
III Corps	1,759	1,959	487	9,816	14,021
IV Corps	3,037	2,915	795	9,379	16,126
In Training				190	190
Totals	12,955	12,079	1,302	54,397	80,733

* Director General of National Police figures include the following:

1) NPFF Headquarters staff, 2) Reserve NPFF Battalions, 3) All training facilities' staff, 4) Con Son Island Police and 5) All national services and administration staff.

** Saigon Municipal Police Directorate.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE SYMBOL

MACCORDS-OAD/R

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(MACAG - AM)

HEADQUARTERS
II MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAG		DATE 09 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 090037Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY <i>D/C Air - Please note CG's arrangements</i> <i>[Signature]</i>
	DCG					
4	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	F				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	10/9		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

#28

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

R 090037Z OCT 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
INFO RHMMFA/CG III MAF
RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW
BT

FOR

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN MCCUTCHEON, INFO
LTGEN CUSHMAN AND MGEN QUILTER FROM LTGEN BUSE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SEA INTERFACE OF TACTICAL DATA SYSTEMS (U)

A. CINCPAC 03000Z/OCT 68 (S) (PASEP)

B. CINCPAC 112350Z/SEP 68 (S)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED TO KEEP YOU ABREAST OF DEVELOPMENTS HERE IN HAWAII, AND TO ALERT YOU TO POSSIBLE FUTURE HAPPENINGS ON THE SEA INTERFACE MATTER.
2. (S) REF A REAFFIRMED CINCPAC'S ORIGINAL POSITION, CONTAINED IN REF B, WHICH SPECIFIED THAT CERTAIN DEFICIENCIES, WITNESSED DURING THE CONUS INTERFACE TESTING, BE CORRECTED PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF THE SEA INTERFACE.

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA 1089 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
ALSO, THE CINCPAC SEA INTERFACE EVALUATION TEAM CONTINUES TO RECOMMEND THAT THE TWO WAY DATA FLOW BE REQUIRED. HOWEVER, THE CINCPACAF AND CINCPACFLT MEMBERS ARE URGING THAT A ONE WAY DATA FLOW BE ADOPTED FOR THE DIFFERENT REASONS OUTLINED BELOW:

A. CINCPACAF CLAIMS THAT THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT IN SEA DICTATES EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF INTERFACE AND THAT DEPLOYMENT SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED, AWAITING RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH DEVELOPING A FUNCTIONAL TWO WAY DATA FLOW.

B. THE CINCPACFLT POSITION IS THAT A ONE WAY DATA FLOW IS PREFERRED FOR TWO REASONS: FIRST, NO REAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR A COMBAT LIGHTNING DATA FLOW TO MIDS BECAUSE THE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE NOW FROM THE MIDS; AND, SECOND, A ONE WAY DATA FLOW WOULD PERMIT AN ORDERLY PROGRESSION OF EFFORT TO INCLUDE ATTAINMENT OF OPERATOR PROFICIENCY IN THE ONE WAY DATA FLOW, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION OF TWO WAY DATA FLOW. THE NAVY'S RATIONALE IN THIS REGARD IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, INFORMAL DISCUSSION AT THE STAFF OFFICER LEVEL SUGGESTS

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RUHNFMA 1089 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
THAT THE CINCPACFLT POSITION IS INFLUENCED TO A LARGE
DEGREE BY THE FLEET COMPUTER PROGRAMMING CENTER (FCPC)
EFFORT IN THE AREA OF SOFTWARE CHANGES. A ONE WAY DATA
FLOW WILL PERMIT FCPC TO RESUME USE OF PREVIOUSLY USED
SOFTWARE.

3. (S) THE POSITIONS OF CINCPACAF AND CINCPACFLT, IF
CONTINUED, MAY MAKE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR
CINCPAC TO MAINTAIN HIS OBJECTION TO IMPLEMENTING ONE
WAY INTERFACE. I WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT STRONGLY A
FULLY FUNCTIONAL SEA INTERFACE, INCLUDING TWO WAY DATA
FLOW, PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT SINCE ONE WAY DATA FLOW
WOULD RESULT IN THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM BEING THE ONLY AIR
CONTROL SYSTEM IN SEA WITH ACCESS TO ALL AIR SITUATION
DATA. THIS WOULD PRESENT EXCELLENT JUSTIFICATION FOR
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SINGLE MANAGER FOR ALL AIR CONTROL /
DEFENSE IN SEA. WARM REGARDS.

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BT

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SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 9 OCT 68
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 091120Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			B	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	2	10/11		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HQS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

SECRET

00 RUEBHOA RUHKM RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAV 0144 2831140
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 091120Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T - SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO
 FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1
 FOR FMFPAC (F-031)

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
 A. PERIOD COVERED FROM 0001-2400H 8 OCTOBER 1968.
 B. (1) 156
 (2) 24
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 C. (1) 114
 (2) 73

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0144 **S E C R E T** SPECAT MCEO

- (3) 66
 (4) 50
 (5) 83
 (6) 50
 (7) 44
 D. (1) 57
 (2) 26
 (3) 9
 (4) 2
 E. (1) 88
 (2) 6
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 F. (1) 66
 (2) 66
 (3) 10
 (4) 56
 G. (1) 20
 (2) 38
 (3) 8

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0144 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(4) 0
 H. (1) 66
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 I. (1) 0
 (2) (A) 18
 (B) 2
 (C) 0
 (D) 0
 J. (1) 0
 (2) 157
 (3) 19
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 K. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 14
 (4) 8

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0144 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

L. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 4
 M. (1) K(3) - ALL 14 SCHEDULED TPQ SORTIES DIVERTED
 DUE BOTH ASRTS DOWN.
 L(7) - 2 SORTIES, NEG CONTROL
 2 SORTIES, BINGO FUEL
 2. DATA PROVIDED BY FIRST MAW
 A. (1) (A) 85
 (B) 68
 (2) 38
 (3) 50
 B. (1) 188
 (2) 53
 (3) 0
 C. (1) (A) 94 (B) 40

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PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0144 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO.

(2) (W) 0 (B) 36

(3) (A) 0 (B) 0

D. (1) 6

(2) 32

(3) 0

E. (1) 36

(2) 2

(3) 0

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 0

F. (1) 0

(2) 50

(3) 0

G. (1) 41

(2) 7

(3) 0

(4) 2

(5) 0

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0144 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(6) 0

(7) 0

H. (1) 15

(2) 0

(3) 3

I. (1) 3

(2) 15

(3) 0

(4) 0

J. (1) (A) 76 (B) 32

(2) (A) 6 (B) 0

(3) (A) 0 (B) 0

(4) (A) 3 (B) 0

(5) (A) 0 (B) 0

(6) (A) 0 (B) 0

(7) (A) 0 (B) 36

K. (1) A (3) - INCLUDES 34 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES

I (1) - 2 USA TO USMC, TGT PRI

1 USMC TO USA, TGT PRI

I (2) - 3 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI

BT

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SECRET

OO RUEBHOA RUHKM RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAV 0147 2831140
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 091120Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION TWO OF TWO.

2 USA TO USMC, TGT PRI
 4 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALFUNCTION
 4 USMC TO USMC, WX
 2 USMC TO USMC, ASRT DOWN

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BT

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 10 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 092035Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY Req. copy for G6 1st MAW for continuity of background on this subj. Ry Cg2
4	DCG			10/14		
4	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	F				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	10/10	—		IF	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

#30

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE
FOR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PP RUEBHOA RHMAFA
DE RUHFMA 1207 2832035
ZNY SSSSS
P 092035Z OCT 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN. CHAPMAN, INFO
LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM LT GEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY

SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL AIR ASSETS (U)

A. CMC 281233Z/SEP68 (S)

B. CG III MAF 061358Z/OCT68 (S) (PASEP)

1. (S) REFERENCE A REQUESTED COMMENTS ON COMUSMACV'S
JULY AND AUGUST EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT
OPERATIONS AND, IN ADDITION, REQUESTED CG III MAF'S
INPUTS TO COMUSMACV FOR HIS EVALUATION DURING THESE
PERIODS BE PROVIDED.

2. (S) BOB HAS READDRESSSED HIS JULY AND AUGUST INPUTS
TO YOU AS REQUESTED. REFERENCE B IS HIS VERY THOROUGH
RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST AND I AM PASSING IT TO YOU

PAGE TWO RUHFMA 1207 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
SEPARATELY. I CONCUR FULLY WITH HIS COMMENTS.

3. (S) THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS, PROVIDED TO REINFORCE
HIS VIEWS, ARE KEYED TO THE PARAGRAPHS OF REFERENCE B.

A. SUBPARAGRAPH 3A(2): CONCUR WITH USING THE
MODIFIED COMBAT ACTIVITIES REPORT (COACT) TO PROVIDE
REQUIRED DATA TO THE SINGLE MANAGER. HOWEVER, A MORE
EXPEDIENT METHOD OF DELIVERING THE COACT REPORT TO
MACV MUST BE DEVELOPED TO NEGATE HIS OBJECTION TO THE
5-7 DAY DELAY CURRENTLY BEING ENCOUNTERED.

B. SUBPARAGRAPH 3B(2): THE COORDINATION OF AIR/
GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES IS NOT A PROBLEM UNDER OUR
MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. THE ARTILLERY WARNING
SYSTEM INITIATED BY MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 OF 24FEB68 IS,
IN FACT, MERELY AN ADVISORY SYSTEM RATHER THAN A CO-
ORDINATING SYSTEM. PERHAPS MACV WOULD BE MORE
RECEPTIVE TO OUR PROPOSAL IF THE FIRST CAVALRY AND 101ST
AIRBORNE DIVISION FOLLOWED THE LEAD OF THE AMERICAN
DIVISION AND ESTABLISHED AN AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING
FIRES COORDINATION SYSTEM COMPATIBLE WITH OURS. A
UNITED FRONT IN ICTZ WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO IGNORE.

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PAGE THREE RUHHFMA 1207 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

C. SUBPARAGRAPH 3F(2): AVAILABLE DATA SUBSTANTIATES THAT FMAW AIR SUPPORT FOR U. S. ARMY MANEUVER BATTALIONS HAS BEEN REQUIRED DUE TO THE SHORTFALL OF AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE USAF. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS WHO HAVE BEEN HURT THE MOST BY THIS, BUT RATHER THE FMAW WHICH HAS HAD TO MAINTAIN THE HIGH SORTIE RATE TO RECTIFY THIS IMBALANCE OF AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED. DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS, OVER ONE-THIRD OF THE TOTAL FMAW EFFORT HAS BEEN IN SUPPORT OF UNITS OTHER THAN MARINES. MARINES CONTINUE TO RECEIVE MORE THAN THEIR PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF AIR SUPPORT BASED ON THE JCS PLANNING FACTOR OF 6.67 AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PER MARINE BATTALIONS DAILY. FOR EXAMPLE, IN AUGUST MARINE BATTALIONS RECEIVED AN AVERAGE OF 7.8 SORTIES PER DAY. THEREFORE, I BELIEVE WE STAND TO GAIN THE MOST BY ADDRESSING THE CONTINUAL SURGING REQUIRED OF FMAW. THE RESULTANT HIGH SORTIE RATE OFFERS A BETTER REASON FOR REDUCING AIR SUPPORT TO UNITS OTHER THAN MARINES THAN DOES THE INEQUITY OF AIR SUPPORT RECEIVED BY OUR

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA 1207 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
GROUND COMMANDERS.

D. SUBPARAGRAPH 3K(2): CONCUR THAT ADDITIONAL RADAR CONTROLLED MISSIONS (COMBAT SKY SPOT) ARE DESIRABLE AS LONG AS FMAW IS NOT TASKED TO MAKE UP THE SHORTFALL OF THE USAF, AND THE PRESENT BALANCE OF AVAILABLE DAY SORTIES IS NOT JEOPARDIZED.

E. SUBPARAGRAPH 4F(1): RELATES THAT COMUSMACV STATED THE PREVIOUS MARINE SYSTEM WAS INADEQUATE TO MEET HIS NEEDS AND THAT WHEN IT BECAME NECESSARY TO AUGMENT MARINE AIR ASSETS TO SUPPORT THE ARMY DIVISIONS IN ICTZ, SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR WAS DESIRABLE. BOB DOES NOT CONCUR, AND I AGREE. THE RETRUN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO CG III MAF WOULD BENEFIT ICTZ BY SHORTENING THE REQUEST CHAIN, THEREBY PERMITTING A MORE FLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM. HOWEVER, TO ENSURE A RECEPTIVE HEARING, A MORE PALATABLE APPROACH WOULD BE TO STRESS THE ADVANTAGES ACCRUING OVERALL TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT BY ADOPTION OF MISSION DIRECTION BY CG III MAF.

F. SUBPARAGRAPH 4K(2): CONCUR THAT THE MONTHLY

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COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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PAGE FIVE RUHFMA 1207 S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
EVALUATION MUST CONTINUE, SINCE IT IS BY THIS MEDIUM
THAT THE SHORTCOMINGS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT CAN BE
BEST ILLUMINATED. THE EVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENTS WHICH
RESULT PROVIDE US THE MOST PROMISING VEHICLE TO RETURN
THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF WHERE
IT RIGHTFULLY BELONGS. WARMEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#50

MEMORANDUM

10-13068

FROM: DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF

FOR: CG

VIA C/S

1. We should get away utterly from the term "Air Cav Capabilities for Hel Divs" - We wrote the basic doctrine years ago.
2. All this boils down to is giving Opcon of a package of helicopters (transport and guns) to the Div Cdr.
3. We have agonized over this "Concept" for months - needlessly. Why, I do not understand. If you want to solve this Gordian Knot, simply give the Div Cdr a bag of helicopters for a stated period.

VR. Touchin

31

SECRET

OO RUMSAK
 DE RUMHLA 1548 2840740
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 100740Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN: INFO MGEN QUILTER AND
 MGEN DAVIS FROM MGEN YOUNGDALE

AIRCAV CAPABILITIES FOR MAR DIVISIONS (U)

A. CG III MAF 010652Z OCT 68 (SECRET SPECAT)

1. (C) IN ARRIVING AT MY OPINION ON SUBJECT I HAVE CONSIDERED THE
 FOLLOWING FACETS OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
 AS A FRAME OF REFERENCE:

A. LARGE SUBORDINATE UNIT AO'S EXTENDING OUT FROM A GENERALLY
 FLAT PIEDMONT TO A RUGGED CANOPY MOUNTAINOUS REGION WITH NUMEROUS
 VALLEY APPROACHES INTO THE DANANG PLAINS.

B. AN ENEMY WHO USES THE CANOPY CONCEALMENT FROM WHICH TO
 SUSTAIN INFILTRATION OF SMALL UNITS FOR FLEETING HARRASSING GROUND/
 MORTAR/ROCKET ATKS AND AVOIDANCE OF MASS EXCEPT AT HIS CHOOSING
 FOR DELIBERATE COORDINATED GROUND ATKS SUCH AS TET OR THE ABORTIVE

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 1548 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 AUGUST OFFENSIVE.

C. A DIVISION CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO DENY EN
 PENETRATION OF A CLOSE IN BELT OF SATURATION COUNTER INFILTRATION/
 ROCKET PATROLS WHILE CONCURRENTLY CONDUCTING WIDE RANGING OFFENSIVE
 OPERATIONS IN THE DEEP APPROACHES TO FIND, FIX AND DESTROY HIM.
 THE CONCEPT PLACES A PREMIUM ON THE ABILITY TO FIND AND THEN
 RAPIDLY REACT WITH FIRE AND MANEUVER OVER GREAT DISTANCES TO FIX
 AND DESTROY THE ENEMY. HELICOPTERS ARE AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT TO
 THE SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF THE CONCEPT.

D. AN INADEQUATE AVAILABILITY OF HELICOPTERS AS TO NUMBER AND
 TYPE TO EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

E. LIMITED MANEUVER FORCES WITH WHICH TO EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT
 THE CONCEPT.

2. (C) DURING THE PERIOD 1-17 AUGUST 68 1ST MARDIV EXERCISED OPCON
 OF AN AIR CAV TROOP WHICH WAS EMPLOYED PRINCIPALLY IN THE AN HOA
 BASIN/ARIZONA AREA BY THE 5TH MARINES. THIS HELO SEARCH AND ATTACK
 PACKAGE WITH ITS ORGANIC INFANTRY/RECON PLATOON AND GUNSHIPS WAS
 MOST SUCCESSFULLY EMPLOYED. SPECIFIC TACTICAL ADVANTAGES IN THIS
 EMPLOYMENT WERE:

A. IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY/RESPONSIVENESS TO THE INFANTRY

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#51

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMHLA 1548 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
REGIMENTAL COMMANDER.

B. ORGANIC AIRBORNE HUNTER/KILLER CAPABILITY OF THE AIR CAV TROOP WHICH PERMITTED TARGET ACQUISITION AND IMMEDIATE REACTION. THIS INCLUDED HELO OBS AND GUNSHIPS FLYING LOW OVER FLAT PIEDMONT IN A FIND AND DESTROY ROLE, AND UH-1E TROOP CARRIERS COMBINED WITH OBS AND GUNSHIPS IN A FIND, FIX AND DESTROY ROLE UTILIZING THE HIGHLY TRAINED INFANTRY RECONNAISSANCE UNIT IN HELO INSERTED LIMITED GROUND ASSAULTS SUPPORTED BY GUNSHIPS TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY SMALL GROUPS OF VC/NVA OVER A WIDE AREA. ON 1 AUG BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0700-1400 EMPLOYING THESE TACTICS ALFA TROOP 1/9 ACD OBTAINED 79 VC/NVA KIA.

C. SIMPLIFIED COMMAND AND CONTROL ARISING FROM THE MARRIAGE OF INFANTRY RECON AND HELO OBSERVATION, ASSAULT TROOP CARRIER AND GUNSHIPS INTO AN ORGANIC SPECIALLY TRAINED TEAM REQUIRING LITTLE OR NO ADVANCE PLANNING OR COORDINATION TO BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED.

3. (S) IN VIEW OF FOREGOING I AM OF OPINION THAT INTRODUCTION OF A CAPABILITY SIMILAR TO THE AIR CAV CONCEPT INTO OUR MARINE FORCES IS DESIREABLE. TO ACHIEVE THIS CAPABILITY WILL REQUIRE A STUDY IN DEPTH OF THE CURRENT HELO MIX TO OBTAIN THE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE LIGHT OBS/ASSAULT/GUNSHIP ASSETS REQUIRED. I SEE LITTLE OR NO

AGE 4 RUMHLA 1548 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
PROBLEM IN RESOLVING THE APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH OR COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENT FOR SUCH AN ORGANIZATION AS PART OF OUR AIR GROUND CONCEPT. TO DO SO WITHIN EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE LIMITATIONS WILL BE DIFFICULT BUT NECESSARY.

4. (S) IN SUMMARY IT IS MY VIEW THAT:

A. WE ARE OPERATING OVER DISTANCES AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS WHICH REQUIRE MAXIMUM AIR MOBILITY IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE INFANTRY STRENGTH AT THE PROPER PLACE AND TIME.

B. THE ENEMY EMPLOYS A TACTIC OF INFILTRATION/HARRASSEMENT WHICH EXPLOITS THE THIN DISTRIBUTION OF OUR FORCES AND MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO INTERDICT HIM.

C. THE HELICOPTER AFFORDS US THE BEST MEANS TO COMPENSATE FOR OUR DISPERSION AND THE ONLY MEANS TO CONCENTRATE OUR MANEUVER ELEMENTS RAPIDLY AGAINST A FLEETING ENEMY.

D. TECHNIQUES OF EMPLOYMENT COMBINED WITH LIMITED AVAILABILITY AND TYPES OF HELICOPTERS ARE NOW DENYING US THE RESPONSIVENESS REQUIRED TO EFFECTIVELY COUNTER THE PROBLEMS OF DISTANCE AND ENEMY TACTIC.

E. THE AIR CAV ORGANIZATION AND CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT IS A LOGICAL, DESIREABLE AND ATTAINABLE SOLUTION TO SOME OF THE OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION.

5. (S) I RECOMMEND THAT ON A TRIAL BASIS IN ORDER TO VALIDATE OUR LIMITED EXPERIENCE AND OPINIONS 1ST MAW IN COORDINATION WITH 1ST

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#31

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMHLA 1548 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
AND 3D MARDIV ESTABLISH A HELO/RECON/ASSAULT TEAM AND PASS IT TO
THE OPCON OF EACH DIV FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF COMBAT EMPLOYMENT
I RECOGNIZE THAT THIS MAY BE DIFFICULT UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF OUR
LIMITED HELO ASSETS HOWEVER SUCH AN APPROACH IN MY JUDGMENT WOULD
BE WORTH SOME SACRFICE.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

31

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 11 OCT 68	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 101455Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS	
	CG					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	I			Q		
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
1	S/S	I	10/11		H		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

SECRET

32

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA RUHKM RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAV 0147 284 1835
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 101455Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT MARCOR EYES ONLY
 FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1
 FOR FMFPAC (F-040)

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
 A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001-2400H 90 OCT 68
 B. (1) 159
 (2) 32
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 C. (1) 111
 (2) 71

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0147 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

- (3) 66
 (4) 40
 (5) 68
 (6) 46
 (7) 36
 D. (1) 48
 (2) 19
 (3) 14
 (4) 1
 E. (1) 72
 (2) 6
 (3) 0
 (4) 4
 F. (1) 87
 (2) 87
 (3) 17
 (4) 70
 G. (1) 81
 (2) 2
 (3) 4

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

32

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0147 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(4) 0
 H. (1) 87
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 I. (1) 0
 (2) (A) 20
 (B) 2
 (C) 0
 (D) 0
 J. (1) 6
 (2) 145
 (3) 27
 (4) 3
 (5) 0
 (6) 8
 K. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 13
 (4) 11

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0147 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO.

L. (1) 0
 (2) 2
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 M. (1) K(3) 13 DIV BY TADC, ASRT DOWN
 2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW
 A. (1) (A) 88
 (B) 71
 (2) 48
 (3) 43
 B. (1) 201
 (2) 49
 (3) 0
 C. (1) (A) 89 (B) 40
 (2) (A) 0 (B) 36
 (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
 D. (1) 6

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#32

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0147 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(2) 42
 (3) 0
 E. (1) 44
 (2) 4
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 F. (1) 0
 (2) 43
 (3) 0
 G. (1) 39
 (2) 0
 (3) 2
 (4) 2
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 H. (1) 17

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0147 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(2) 0
 (3) 0
 I. (1) 0
 (2) 17
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 J. (1) (A) 75 (B) 35
 (2) (A) 10 (B) 0
 (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (4) (A) 3 (B) 0
 (5) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (6) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (7) (A) 0 (B) 36
 K. (1) A (3) INCLUDES 33 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES
 I (2) 2 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI
 2 USMC TO USMC, ACFT HAL F
 6 USMC TO USMC, ASRT DOWN
 3 USA TO USMC, ASRT DOWN
 2 USMC TO USMC NEG. TGT
 2 USMC TO USMC, NEG. CONTROL
 BT

GP-4

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#32

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA RUHKM RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAV 0135 285 1523
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 11144Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO. SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
 FOR MARINE COPRS EYES ONLY
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1 FOR FMFPAC F-043

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
 A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001-2400H 10 OCT 68
 B. (1) 179
 (2) 16
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 C. (1) 111
 (2) 76
 (3) 68

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0135 **S E C R E T** SPECAT MCEO.

- (4) 44
 (5) 110
 (6) 63
 (7) 40
 D. (1) 66
 (2) 19
 (3) 9
 (4) 9
 E. (1) 97
 (2) 6
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 F. (1) 60
 (2) 60
 (3) 6
 (4) 54
 G. (1) 16
 (2) 30
 (3) 10
 (4) 4

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0135 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

H. (1) 48

(2) 8

(3) 0

(4) 0

I. (1) 32

(2) (A) 32

(B) 0

(C) 0

(D) 0

J. (1) 0

(2) 140

(3) 47

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

K. (1) 0

(2) 0

(3) 0

(4) 9

L. (1) 0

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0135 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(2) 0

(3) 0

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 8

M. (1) L (7) 2 SORT NO CONT
2 SORT DIV BY VICE SQUAD
4 SORT DIV BY TADC

2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW

A. (1) (A) 86

(B) 72

(2) 40

(3) 48

B. (1) 201

(2) 45

(3) 0

C. (1) (A) 89 (B) 40

(2) (A) 0 (B) 36

(3) (A) 0 (B) 0

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

#53

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0135 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

D. (1) 22

(2) 18

(3) 0

E. (1) 36

(2) 4

(3) 0

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 0

F. (1) 0

(2) 48

(3) 0

G. (1) 38

(2) 4

(3) 6

(4) 0

(5) 0

(6) 0

(7) 0

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0135 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

H. (1) 26

(2) 2

(3) 4

I. (1) 2

(2) 30

(3) 0

(4) 0

J. (1) (A) 60 (B) 36

(2) (A) 23 (B) 0

(3) (A) 0 (B) 0

(4) (A) 3 (B) 0

(5) (A) 0 (B) 0

(6) (A) 0 (B) 0

(7) (A) 0 (B) 36

K. (1) A (3) INCLUDES 40 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES

I (1) 2 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALF

I (2) 4 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI

2 USA TO USA, TGT PRI

2 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALF

2 USMC TO USMC, WX

BT

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

33

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA RUHKM RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAV 0142 285 1523
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 111440Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

SECRET SPECAT MCEO FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS

2 USMC TO USMC, ASRT DOWN
 9 USMC TO USA, ASRT DOWN
 4 USMC TO USMC, NEG TGT
 1 USMC TO USA, NEG TGT
 4 USMC TO USMC, NEG CONTROL

GP-4

BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

#33

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 6216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 12 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 111746Z OCT 68		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/12		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
4	G-3	A	Copy to 63 12 Oct 68			
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #34

SECRET

RR RUHHFMA RHMAFA
 DE RUEBHOA 8271 2851743
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC -I- III MAF
 R 11174Z OCT 68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE FROM GEN CHAPMAN
 INFO LT GEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING
 WORKING HOURS)

SUBMISSION OF PROGRAM 6 PROPOSED FORCE REDUCTIONS IN RVN
 BY CG, III MAF TO COMUSMACV (S)

A. SECNAV MEMO OF 2 OCTOBER 1968 TO SECDEF

B. CMC SPECAT 020121Z OCT 68

1. (S) REF A FORWARDED TO SECDEF A DETAILED TROOP LIST AND
 PLAN FOR ATTAINING 89,500 T/O STRUCTURE SPACES FOR SEA
 FORCES. PAR 2 PAGE 4 OF REF A IS QUOTED IN PART AS FOLLOWS:
 QUOTE. THE PLAN REQUESTED BY YOUR MEMORANDUM OF 18
 SEPTEMBER 1968 AND THE SVN PORTION OF ALTERNATIVE ONE
 PRESENTED IN THIS MEMORANDUM WILL BE SUBMITTED BY CG, III
 MAF TO COMUSMACV FOR REVIEW AND SUBMISSION THROUGH APPROPRIATE
 CHANNELS. UNQUOTE.

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA IWUQ SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE FROM
 GEN CHAPMAN INFO LT GEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING
 WORKING HOURS)

2. (S) REF B INCLUDED PARAMETERS OF ALTERNATIVE ONE. ADDITIONAL
 REQUIRED DETAILS FOR ALTERNATIVE ONE HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY
 YOUR STAFF IN LIAISON WITH HQMC REPS CURRENTLY IN WESTPAC.
 DESIRE CG, III MAF FULFILL SECNAV COMMITMENT STATED ABOVE
 BY SUBMITTING TO MACV HIS PROPOSED SVN REQUIREMENTS IN EXCESS
 OF CURRENT CEILING UNDER ALTERNATIVE ONE. THESE REQUIREMENTS
 SHOULD BE SUBMITTED CONCURRENT WITH HIS PROPOSED FORCE
 REDUCTIONS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

34

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM LTG STILWELL CG XXIV COR		DATE 12 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 120820Z		COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TOP SECRET EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DGG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		12/1800H		2	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	COG			COPY	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	SSC					

TOP SECRET

#16

15 OCT 1967
TO LTJG BUSHAW 100 111 100 100
INFO COMA WARS OF US NAVY SEN
ZEM

TOP SECRET PH 1547 EYES ONLY

(TS) FOLLOWING RESPONDS TO YOUR MESSAGE, CITE WAO 10701 (TO)

A. PART I: US AND ARVN TROOP ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTHERN DMZ NOW GOING ON AND PLANNED THRU 26 OCT 67.

(1) CURRENTLY ELEMENTS OF 3D MAR REGT OF 3D MAR DIV ARE CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN PORTION OF DMZ AS FOLLOWS:

(A) 1ST BATTAL MAR AND 2D BATTAL MAR ARE LOCATED VICINITY OF COORD XD 004574 AND YD 004305, RESPECTIVELY. CURRENTLY, SEARCHING OUT BUNKER COMPLEXES, DESTROYING CACHES AND SEARCHING FOR ENEMY IN AREA. THIS OPERATION IS SCHEDULED TO TERMINATE 15 OCT.

(B) 2D BATTAL MAR LOCATED VIC XD 004550 AND CONDUCTING PATROLLING AND RECONNAISSANCE JUST INSIDE DMZ. ON 11 OCT (WHEN NEW EST ESTABLISHED) UNIT WILL MOVE IN AND SEARCH OUT MAJOR TRAIL CORRIDOR IN SOUTHERN HALF DMZ. WHETHER OPERATION CONTINUES THRU 15 OCT OR IS PHASED OUT EARLIER DEPENDS ON WHAT ENEMY INSTALLATIONS OR FORCES ARE UNCOVERED.

(2) OTHER ELEMENTS OF 3D MAR DIV ARE SOUTH OF DMZ AND CONDUCTING SCREENING AND SECURITY OPERATIONS IN AREA.

(3) 2D REGT, 1ST ARVN DIV LOCATED JUST S OF DMZ, VICINITY STRONG POINTS A-1 (YD 213743) AND A-2 (YD 214735). CONTINUES TO SECURE AREA AND CONDUCT RECON IN ZONE.

(4) WE HAVE TENTATIVE PLANS FOR A SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION INTO SOUTHERN DMZ IN AREA NORTH OF DUEL BLADE PORTION (U-1 THROUGH A-4) PRIOR TO 25 OCT. THIS OPERATION WOULD INVOLVE ELEMENTS OF 1ST BDE/5TH MECH AND 2D REGT, 1ST ARVN DIV.

B. PART II. LISTING OF 2-52 REQUESTS CONTEMPLATED IN AND NORTH OF THE DMZ.

(1) THE FOLLOWING TARGETS HAVE BEEN NOMINATED BY THIS WAO AND ARE CURRENTLY VALID:

TARGET NO.	VALID TIME
(1) QT 5345	FRAGGED FOR 15 OCT
(2) QT 5346	FRAGGED FOR 15 OCT
(3) QT 5308	15 OCT
(4) QT 5309	24 OCT
(5) QT 5310	25 OCT
(6) QT 5311	25 OCT
(7) QT 5312	25 OCT
(8) QT 5313	25 OCT
(9) QT 5314	25 OCT
(10) QT 5315	25 OCT
(11) QT 5316	25 OCT
(12) QT 5317	25 OCT
(13) QT 5318	25 OCT
(14) QT 5319	25 OCT
(15) QT 5320	25 OCT
(16) QT 5321	25 OCT
(17) QT 5322	25 OCT
(18) QT 5323	25 OCT
(19) QT 5324	25 OCT
(20) QT 5325	25 OCT
(21) QT 5326	25 OCT
(22) QT 5327	25 OCT
(23) QT 5328	25 OCT
(24) QT 5329	25 OCT
(25) QT 5330	25 OCT
(26) QT 5331	25 OCT
(27) QT 5332	25 OCT
(28) QT 5333	25 OCT
(29) QT 5334	25 OCT
(30) QT 5335	25 OCT
(31) QT 5336	25 OCT
(32) QT 5337	25 OCT
(33) QT 5338	25 OCT
(34) QT 5339	25 OCT
(35) QT 5340	25 OCT
(36) QT 5341	25 OCT
(37) QT 5342	25 OCT
(38) QT 5343	25 OCT
(39) QT 5344	25 OCT
(40) QT 5345	25 OCT
(41) QT 5346	25 OCT
(42) QT 5347	25 OCT

#16-41

#16

1. COORDINATE THE TARGETS WITH THE ...
2. ...
3. ...

- YD 977029
- YD 157009
- YD 151015
- YD 150030
- YD 100000
- YD 230000
- YD 150000

(C) IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THERE WILL BE A CONTINUING NEED FOR B-50 STRIKES DURING THE PERIOD WITH EMPHASIS ON ARTY AND ANTI AIRCRAFT BNS AND STORAGE AREAS. THE MAJORITY OF THE TARGETS LISTED WITHIN 15 KM OF THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ. APPROXIMATELY 27 PER CENT OF THE LISTED TARGETS FALL WITHIN THE DMZ.

C. PART III: PLANNED NAVAL GUNFIRE IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ

(1) NGFN AVERAGING 150 ROUNDS PER DAY, IS BEING USED DAILY IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ PRINCIPALLY IN COUNTER-ARTILLERY, COUNTERBATTERY AND INTERDICTION PROGRAMS. THIS REQUIREMENT WILL CONTINUE DURING THE PERIOD.

TOP-1

SSC NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

SAG

NNNN

TOP SECRET

*16*2

= 16

O 12035 IZ ZYH ZFF-1
 FM GEN ABRAMS, COMUSMACV
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LTG STILLWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 ZC

T O P S E C R E T MAC 13781 EYES ONLY

I NEED FROM YOU ASAP THIS AFTERNOON THE US AND ARVN
 TROOP ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTHERN DMZ NOW GOING ON AND
 PLANNED THRU 2400 OCTOBER 26. I ALSO NEED A LISTING OF
 P-52 REQUESTS YOU MAY BE CONTEMPLATING IN AND NORTH OF
 THE DMZ FOR THE SAME PERIOD. I ALSO NEED A SIMILAR REPORT
 ON PLANNED NAVAL GUNFIRE IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE
 DMZ.

ES0 NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
 125

TOP SECRET

#15

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

IIIAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV		DATE 12 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 120351Z	1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
						TOP SECRET MAC 13781 EYES ONLY
	<i>fab</i>					REMARKS <i>Rec 121246H.</i>
	DRF					
	DCG AIR					
<i>2</i>	C/S	<i>I</i>			<i>g</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
<i>1</i>	S/S	<i>I</i>	<i>10/12</i>		<i>H</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2	<i>HAS SEEN</i>				
	G-3	<i>HAS COPY</i>				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	S&C					

TOP SECRET

#15

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM SECRETARY IGNATIUS		DATE 12 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 120400Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
7	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					REMARKS
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					EXCLUSIVE
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/12		H	<p>OG - Recommend pass to all units of the MAF of the MAF</p> <p>FOR</p> <p>Yes - please pass to all hands</p> <p>3/5 Please comply</p>
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

P 120400Z OCT 68
 FM SECRETARY IGNATIUS
 TO CG III MAF
 INFO CMC
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM SECRETARY INGNATIUS

1. MY RECENT VISIT TO UNITS OF III MAF WAS A MOST REWARDING EXPERIENCE FOR ME. THE PROFESSIONALISM, DEDICATION AND ENTHUSIASM OF THE OFFICERS AND MEN WHOM I MET WERE OBVIOUS AND IMPRESSIVE. THE RESPONSIBILITIES READILY ASSUMED AND CAPABLY DISCHARGED BY SMALL UNIT LEADERS AND INDIVIDUAL SOLDIARS, SAILORS, MARINES AND AIRMEN ARE A GREAT TRIBUTE TO THE MEN AND THEIR LEADERS.
2. THOUGH BRIEF, MY VISITS AND DISCUSSIONS PROVIDED ME A MUCH BETTER APPRECIATION OF THE COMPLEXITY OF YOUR OPERATIONS AND THE SUPERB MANNER IN WHICH ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF YOUR TEAM ARE CARRYING OUT THESE OPERATIONS. FOR ME THIS SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE IS A SOURCE OF GREAT PRIDE, GRATITUDE AND HUMILITY.
3. CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES FOR CONTINUED OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT. PAUL R. IGNATIUS.

GP-4

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SJRG.									#35

CONFIDENTIAL

P 120405Z OCT 68
 FM SECNAV
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC
 INFO AMEMB SAI GON
 CG III MAF
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY RUSK, AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND LT GEN CUSHMAN.

A. SECSTATE 091743Z NOTAL

1. APPROPRIATE MARINE CORPS COMMANDERS IN VIETNAM HAVE REVIEWED THE CASE OF CORPORAL MARK HAUGERUD, USMC, INCLUDING HIS NEW ASSIGNMENT UPON RETURN TO VIETNAM.

GENERAL CUSHMAN HAS INFORMED ME THAT, BASED UPON THIS REVIEW, CORPORAL HAUGERUD IS BEING ASSIGNED TO THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION, COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY.

2. THE ABOVE ASSIGNMENT MEETS YOUR REQUEST AND THEREFORE IT APPEARS NO ACTION BY ME IS REQUIRED. I WAS SORRY TO LEARN OF CORPORAL HAUGERUDS RECENT WOUNDS AND AM PLEASED HE HAS FULLY RECOVERED.
 PAUL R. IGNATIUS
 GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#36

HEADQUARTERS
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 12 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 121000Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					<p>REMARKS</p> <p>6-3 - take action on file and division</p> <p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>FOR</p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>I want to review all the bedding when I return next week!</p> <p>le,</p>
4	DCG			12/14	le	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I 1013				
	G-1					
	G-2					
5	G-3	A 66.3		14 Oct 68		
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

#37

SECRET

PP RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAV 0124 2861045
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 121000Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN: INFO MAJGEN YOUNGDALE AND MAJGEN
 DAVIS FM MAJGEN QUILTER

AIR CAVALRY CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS (U)

- A. CG III MAF 010652Z OCT 68
- B. CG FIRST MAW 130740Z JUL 68
- C. CG III MAF 221100Z SEP 68
- D. CG III MAF 250038Z MAR 68

1. (C) REF A REQUESTED A RE-EVALUATION OF OUR RECON AND REACTION STRUCTURE AND COMMENTS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF INTRODUCING IN OUR MARINE FORCES AN ORGANIZATION SIMILAR TO AN AIR CAV SQUADRON.
- (2). (S) REF B REPORTED ON FIRST MAW PILOTS GROSS TRAINING EXPERIENCES WITH THE FIRST AIR CAV DIV. IT WAS NOTED THT THE AIR CAV SQUADRON WAS AN ORGANIZATION PLACING IN ONE UNIT DEDICATED FORCES

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0124 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO WHICH PERFORM THE SAME BASIC MISSION AS DO THE MARINE CORPS TASK ORGANIZED SPARROW HAWKS AND BALD EAGLES. THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE NOTED WAS IN THE LARGE NUMBER OF LIGHT OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS AVAILABLE TO THE AIR CAV TROOP. THE READY AVAILABILITY OF LIGHT OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS PERMITTED THEIR WIDESPREAD UTILIZATION IN SEARCHING OUT ENEMY FORCES TO A DEGREE NOT POSSIBLE FOR MARINE CORPS FORCES WITH LIMITED OBSERVATION ASSETS. BASED ON THIS EXPERIENCE IT APPEARS THAT WITH SUFFICIENT OBSERVATION ASSETS THE MARINE CORPS COULD TASK ORGANIZE UNITS ALONG AIR CAV SQUADRON LINES AS REQUIRED WITHOUT DEDICATING FORCES TO IT WHEN NOT NEEDED.

3. (S) THE INADEQUATE QUANTITY OF MARINE AIR OBSERVATION ASSETS IN RVN HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY ADDRESSED WITH REF C THE MOST RECENT STATEMENT OF MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. THE NATURE OF CONFLICT IN RVN REQUIRES SUBSTANTIALLY MORE OBSERVATION ASSETS THAN WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO JUSTIFY SUFFICIENTLY FOR ACQUISITION TO DATE. A FACTOR IN OUR PAST FAILURE TO PROCURE ADEQUATE OBSERVATION ASSETS FOR RVN APPEARS TO BE THE GREAT DISPARITY BETWEEN OUR CURRENT REQUIREMENTS AND THOSE NORMAL TO OUR INHERENT AMPHIBIOUS MISSION. IN THIS REGARD, REF C IS STILL RATHER MODEST IN ITS STATEMENT OF OUR REQUIREMENTS AND DOES NOT PROVIDE ASSETS FOR MORE THAN VERY LIMITED

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0124 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
APPLICATION OF THE AIR CAV SQUADRON CONCEPT.

4. (S) IN SUMMARY, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT :

- A. OUR AMPHIBIOUS ORIENTED FORCE STRUCTURE IS BASICALLY SOUND AND HAS THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY TO TASK ORGANIZE FOR SPECIAL COMBAT OPERATIONS INCLUDING THOSE PERFORMED BY THE AIR CAV SQUADRON.
- B. WE CONTINUE TO BE CRITICALLY SHORT OF AIR OBSERVATION ASSETS.
- C. THE RATIONALE CONTAINED IN REF D IS STILL VALID.

TM KS) IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT :

- A. WE VIGOROUSLY PURSUE THE ACQUISITION OF AIR OBSERVATION ASSETS ADEQUATE FOR EFFICIENT PROSECUTION OF TWOTYPE WARFARE IN WHICH WE ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS PRIOR TO THE NEXT GOOD WEATHER SEASON COMMENCING IN APRIL 1969.
- B. SUCH ASSETS AS ARE NOT NORMALLY REQUIRED FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AND PROCURED AS TEMPORARY FORCE STRUCTURE.
- C. SPARROW HAWK/BALD EAGLE OPERATIONS BE CONTINUED. THEY SHOULD BE EXPANDED AS LUCRATIVE TARGETS ARE DEVELOPED WHEN ADDITIONAL R VR ASSETS BECOME AVAILABLE.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

37

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 13 OCT, 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 121200Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/13			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #32

SECRET

00 RUEBHOA RUHKM RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAV 0152 2851215
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 121200Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR FMF CODE AA-1
 FOR FMFPAC (F-037)

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
 A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001 - 2400H, 11 OCT 68
 B. (1) 139
 (2) 34
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 C. (1) 111
 (2) 71

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0152 **S E C R E T** SPECAT MCEO.

- (3) 68
 (4) 36
 (5) 93
 (6) 56
 (7) 20
 D. (1) 34
 (2) 21
 (3) 6
 (4) 15
 E. (1) 58
 (2) 18
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 F. (1) 40
 (2) 40
 (3) 8
 (4) 32
 G. (1) 36
 (2) 4
 (3) 0

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#38

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0152 S E C R E T . SPECAT MCEO

(4) 0
 H. (1) 40
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 I. (1) 19
 (2) (A) 43
 (B) 14
 (C) 0
 (D) 0
 J. (1) 2
 (2) 69
 (3) 86
 (4) 2
 (5) 0
 (6) 8
 K. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 28

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0152 S E C R E T . SPECAT MCEO

L. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 2
 (6) 0
 (7) 4
 M. (1) L (U) 4 SORT DIV WX
 2. DATA PROVIDED BY ISI MAW
 A. (1) (A) 80
 (B) 71
 (2) 10
 (3) 56
 B. (1) 180
 (2) 37
 KEL P
 C. (1) (A) 89 (B) 40
 (2) (A) 0 (B) 36
 (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
 D. (1) 6

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#38

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0152 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO.

(2) 4
 (3) 0
 E. (1) 10
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 F. (1) 0
 (2) 56
 (3) 0
 G. (1) 52
 (2) 4
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 H. (1) 40

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0152 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO.

(2) 0
 (3) 2
 I. (1) 2
 (2) 40
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 J. (1) (A) 62 (B) 35
 (2) (A) 15 (B) 0
 (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (4) (A) 3 (B) 0
 (5) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (6) (A) 0 (B) 0
 (7) (A) 0 (B) 36
 K. (1) A (1) INCLUDES 29 SORTIES NEG DROP
 A (3) INCLUDES 34 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES
 I (1) 2 USMC TO USMC, WX
 I (2) 2 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALF 19 USMC TO USMC, WX
 2 USA TO USA WX 7 USMC TO USMC, ASRT DOWN
 6 USMC TO USMC, NEG IGT 2 USMC TO USMC, NEG CONTROL
 2 USMC TO USA, ASRT DOWN GP-4
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

38

SECRET

PP RUEBHOA RHMAFA RUMLMPA
 DE RUHFMA 1724 2862245
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 122245Z OCT 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOMD

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

BT
 S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 2D BRIGADE, ROKMC COMBAT SUPPORT (U).
 A. CG, FMFPAC 040418Z /OCT 68 (S)
 B. CG, III MAF 250944Z /SEP 68 (S) NOTAL
 1. (S) REF A ADVISED THAT UNDER CURRENT USMC FORCE LEVEL RE-
 QUIREMENTS THERE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT LVIP5A1 AND M48 TANK ASSETS
 FROM OUT OF COUNTRY TO SUPPORT THE ROKMC REQUIREMENT STATED IN
 REF B, AND THAT PROVIDING THESE VEHICLES TO 2D BRIGADE, ROKMC
 FROM IN-COUNTRY ASSETS IS CONTINGENT UPON RESULTS OF HQMC RE-
 CLAMA TO PROGRAM 6.
 2. (S) FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IN THE EVENT THAT HQMC RECLAMA TO
 PROGRAM 6 IS NOT SUCCESSFUL AND ASSUMING THE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT
 WOULD NOT BE RETURNED TO CONUS, REQUEST THAT A PLAN BE
 DEVELOPED WHICH WILL PROVIDE PROCEDURES FOR TURNING OVER TO THE

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 1724 S E C R E T MCEO
 2D BRIGADE, ROKMC, THE EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO EQUIP ONE LVIP5
 COMPANY, ONE LVTH-6 PLATOON AND ONE M48 TANK COMPANY. REQUEST
 THAT COPY OF PLAN BE PROVIDED THIS HQ NLT 15NOV68. PLANNING
 SHOULD BE BASED ON PREMISE THAT TITLE TO EQUIPMENT WILL BE RE-
 TAINED BY THE USMC, AND EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE WITHDRAWN FROM
 VIETNAM BY THE ROKMC WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THIS HQ AND
 COMUSMACV. PLANNING SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE FOLLOWING CONSIDERA-
 TIONS C

A. EQUIPMENT TO BE TURNED OVER SHOULD INCLUDE, IN ADDITION
 TO THE MAJOR END ITEMS AND ALL OEM, THAT MATERIEL PECULIAR TO
 EACH OF THE COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS
 AND MAINTENANCE, I.E. (COMBAT VEHICLE CREWMAN HELMETS, TOOLS,
 TEST EQUIPMENT, ETC).

B. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS TO TRAIN ROKMC PERSONNEL IN OPERA-
 TIONS AND MAINTENANCE.

C. MAINTENANCE SUPPORT CONCEPT.

D. ADDITIONAL FUNDING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MASF PROGRAM TO
 SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE.

E. NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL USMC LIAISON PERSONNEL REQUIRED ON
 INTERIM AND CONTINUING BASIS TO SUPPORT 2D BRIGADE, ROKMC OPERA-

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHFMA 1724 S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 TIONAL AND MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, AS-
 SUME ADDITIONAL MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, IF REQUIRED, WOULD BE
 PROVIDED FROM WITHIN III MAF RESOURCES.

F. EQUIPPING USMC LVT UNITS REMAINING IN-COUNTRY UNDER PRO-
 GRAM 6 WITH FULL T/E ALLOWANCE OF LVTP5A1 TAKES PRECEDENCE.
 IN-COUNTRY ASSETS OF LVTP5A1 IN EXCESS OF III MAF REQUIREMENTS
 MAY DICTATE THAT PLANNING CONSIDER PROVIDING ONLY A LVTP T
 COMPANY (-).

// 3. (S) THE NATURE OF THIS SUBJECT IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND //
 PRECLUDES ANY DISCUSSION WITH THE ROKMC.

GP ~~44~~
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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THIS CORRESPONDENCE WILL BE ASSIGNED A FILE NUMBER AS LISTED BELOW.

FILE NUMBER _____

ACTION SECTION WILL COMPLETE	
ACTION COMPLETED ON:	
RETAINED BY _____ SECTION	
DATE	SIGNATURE AND RANK

INFO FOR JCS-7
 FROM THE COMBINED ACP/CS J-3
 TO LTG STILLWELL CG XXIV COMPS
 INFO LTG CUEWMAN CG III MAF

221

UNCLAS E F T O MAC 13307 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL NICKNAMES

1. I HAVE HAD THE SUBJECT OF OPERATIONAL NICKNAMES FULLY CHECKED. A CONTACT SHEET IS ENROUTE TO YOU.
2. A WORLD WIDE NICKNAME LISTING IS MAINTAINED BY JCS TO PRECLUDE DUPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL NICKNAMES. A CHECK WITH HEADQUARTERS PACOM INDICATES A REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ADDITIONAL NICKNAMES WOULD BE FAVORABLY CONSIDERED; HOWEVER THEY WILL HAVE TO BE CHECKED AGAINST THE JCS LIST.
3. REQUEST YOU SUBMIT ANY DESIRED NICKNAME OR VNAME TO J-3 ATTN: MACCOCS, CITING PARA 2C, ANNEX A, MACV DIRECTIVE 505-25. WE WILL HAVE THE NAMES CHECKED AND INFORM YOU AS SOON AS REPLY IS RECEIVED.
4. I REALIZE THAT THIS IS NOT EXACTLY WHAT YOU HAD IN MIND, BUT IT'S THE BEST THAT WE CAN DO UNDER CURRENT RESTRAINTS. SEVERAL ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO HAVE THESE LIFTED, BUT THE REQUIREMENT REMAINS FOR CHECKING AGAINST THE JCS LIST.
5. Warm regards.

300 NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

175

AMM

UNCLAS/EF T O

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA RUHKM RUMSAK
 ZNY SSSSS
 DE RUMSAV 0119 2871010
 O P 130955Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO
 FOR FMFPAC (F-23)
 FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
- A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001-2400H 12 OCT 68
 - B. (1) 77
 - (2) 5
 - (3) 0
 - (4) 0
 - C. (1) 90
 - (2) 61

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0119 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

- (3) 68
- (4) 38
- (5) 47
- (6) 44
- (7) 8
- D. (1) 34
- (2) 11
- (3) 7
- (4) 0
- E. (1) 52
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- F. (1) 18
- (2) 18
- (3) 0
- (4) 18
- G. (1) 4
- (2) 12
- (3) 2

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0119 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

(4) 0
 H. (1) 18
 KWL P
 KEL P
 KRL P
 I. (1) 0
 (2) (A) 12
 (B) 0
 (C) 0
 (D) 0
 J. (1) 0
 (2) 20
 (3) 54
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 K. (1) 8
 (2) 0
 (3) 14
 (4) 32

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0119 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO.

L. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 2
 (4) 0
 (5) 6
 (6) 0
 (7) 0
 M. (1) K(3) 14 SRTIES CANX BY WK.
 2. DATA PROVIDED BY IST MAW
 A. (1) (A) 56
 (B) 36
 (2) 22
 (3) 9
 B. (1) 100
 (2) 23
 (3) 0
 C. (1) (A) 89 (B) 40
 (2) (A) 0 (B) 36
 (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
 D. (1) 6

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

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SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0119 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

- (2) 16
- (3) 0
- E. (1) 22
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- (7) 0
- F. (1) 0
- (2) 9
- (3) 0
- G. (1) 8
- (2) 1
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- (7) 0
- H. (1) 20

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0119 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

- (2) 0
- (3) 1
- I. (1) 0
- (2) 21
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- J. (1) (A) 42 (B) 13
- (2) (A) 11 (B) 0
- (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
- (4) (A) 3 (B) 0
- (5) (A) 0 (B) 0
- (6) (A) 0 (B) 0
- (7) (A) 0 (B) 23
- K. (1) A (1) INCLUDES 4 NON-TACTICAL SORTIES
- A (3) INCLUDES 6 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES
- I (2) 6 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI
- 1 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALF
- 14 UNMC TO USMC, WX

GP-4
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET
#41

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

Category (AC)

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM COMNAVSUPPACT		DATE 16 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 14 OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN CUSHMAN REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR
4	DCG		15/18		Ruler	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			Q	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	161100400Z		Y m	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

#7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ZNY CCCCC
 P 174 OCT 68
 FM COMNAVSUPACT DANANG
 TO CG III MAF
 COMNAVFORV
 COMSERVPAC
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN CUSHMAN, VADM ZUMWALT,
 RADM COMBS FROM RADM OSBORN

SUBJ: SERIOUS SITUATION REPORT (C)

A. MY 140302Z OCT 68

1. (C) REFERENCE A, INCIDENT REPORT SUGGESTS AMPLIFICATION INASMUCH AS INCIDENT SURROUNDED BY CONTINUING BUILDUP OF RACIAL TENSIONS. SOURCE OF TENSIONS RUMORED AS BEING ORGANIZED BUT NO PROOF AVAILABLE OF SPECIFIC ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT.

2. (C) CHRONOLOGY OF SPECIFIC RACIALLY INSPIRED INCIDENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. ON THURSDAY 9 OCTOBER 1968, APPROXIMATELY 30 TO 40 NEGROES APPARENTLY REPRESENTING ALL SERVICES AND SEVERAL COMMANDS IN I CORPS MET NEAR THE CAMP TIEN SHA ANNEX OSTENSIBLY TO DISCUSS VARIOUS INCIDENTS

PAGE TWO C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. MEETING BROKE UP WITH MINOR PROBLEMS, HOWEVER THE MEETING CAUSED A NOTICEABLE INCREASE IN RACIAL TENSION IN THE EAST DANANG AREA.

B. THE FOLLOWING MORNING INCIDENT OCCURED AT CHINA BEACH R&R BEACH INVOLVING 9 NEGROES AND 4 WHITES. TWO BEACH SECURITY PATROL WERE DISARMED AND ASSAULTED ATTEMPTING TO DISPERSE PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT THE NINE NEGROES ULTIMATELY PROCEEDED TO THE ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND SOME 2 1/2 MILES DISTANT WHERE THEY WERE DISARMED AND TAKEN INTO CUSTODY BY THE ARMED FORCES POLICE.

C. ON FRIDAY EVENING 10 OCTOBER ANOTHER MEETING OF NEGROES WAS HELD AT CAMP TIEN SHA ANNEX WITH OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY IN ATTENDANCE. THE MEETING DISSOLVED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SJRG.									

#42

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR
 GENERAL TOPICS OF DISCUSSION WERE RACIAL TENSION AND
 DISCRIMINATION IN THE ICTZ. MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY
 APPROXIMATELY 30 TO 40 NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY NEGROES.
 AFTER MEETING ADJOURNED RACIAL TENSIONS CONTINUED TO
 MOUNT.

D. SATURDAY 11 OCTOBER 1968 A SMALL MEETING WAS HELD
 AT CAMP TIEN SHA ANNEX BY NEGROES WITH NO RESULTING
 INCIDENT; HOWEVER RACIAL FEELINGS HERE STILL RUNNING
 HIGH.

E. SUNDAY NIGHT 13 OCTOBER AT APPROXIMATELY 1900
 A LONE NEGRO SAILOR WAS EJECTED FROM THE EM CLUB
 CAMP TIEN SHA FOR DRUNKENNESS AND USE OF ABUSIVE
 LANGUAGE. HE PROCEEDED TO THE FIRE STATION, HIS
 WORK STATION, AND OBTAINED POSSESSION OF A .45 CALIBER
 PISTOL AND FIRED WEAPON WHILE AT THE FIRE STATION.
 TWO SHORE PATROL INVESTIGATING THE SHOOTING WERE DIS-

PAGE FOUR C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR

ARMED AT GUNPOINT BY THE SUBJECT, SUBJECT PROCEEDED
 THROUGH GALLEY AND COMMENCED SHOOTING UP THE GALLEY.
 SUBJECT WAS EVENTUALLY DISARMED AND TAKEN INTO CUSTODY
 BY THE SHORE PATROL AND CAMP TIEN SHA SECURITY
 PERSONNEL.

F. AT APPROXIMATELY 2050 13 OCTOBER 1968 A GROUP OF
 ABOUT 15 NEGROES WERE OBSERVED LEAVING CAMP TIEN SHA
 HEADED IN DIRECTION OF THE CAMP TIEN SHA ANNEX
 WHERE THE PREVIOUS NEGRO MEETINGS HAD BEEN HELD.
 THE GROUP WAS SUBJECTED TO VARIOUS TAUNTS AND
 INSULTS WHILE PROGRESSING THROUGH THE CAMP TIEN SHA
 BARRACKS AREA THEY BECAME RILED BUT DID NOT RESORT
 TO VIOLENCE. NAVY OFFICER ATTEMPTING TO ATTEND THE
 MEETING WITH PURPOSE OF COOLING TEMPER; WAS IN
 COMPANY WITH TWO NEGROES WHEN THEY WERE CALLED FROM
 THE MEETING AREA BY TAUNTING ABUSIVE LANGUAGE AND

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#42

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE FIVE C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR THREATS FROM A SINGLE WHITE SAILOR. UPON CLOSE APPROACH THE SAILOR PULLED A HOME MADE MACE LIKE CHAIN WEAPON FROM HIS POCKET AND SWUNG AT ONE OF THE NEGROES, AT THE SAME TIME ALLEGEDLY STATING I AM GOING TO KILL YOU OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. THE NEGRO SUCCESSFULLY EVADED THE ATTACK AND THE WHITE SAILOR WAS DISARMED AT GUN POINT BY THE OFFICER AND TAKEN INTO CUSTODY.

G. AT APPROXIMATELY 2230 A CTS NEGRO SENTRY WAS DISCOVERED DEAD ON HIS POST IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE GALLEY BY ROVING SECURITY PATROL. DEATH APPEARS TO HAVE RESULTED FROM A .45 CALIBER GUNSHOT WOUND. IT IS OPINED THAT THE WOUND WAS INFLICTED BY A STRAY BULLET FROM THE 1930 SHOOTING INCIDENT IN THE GALLEY. BALLISTIC TESTS ARE TO BE CONDUCTED.

3. (C) TENSIONS CONTINUE TO RUN HIGH AND AM TAKING THE

PAGE SIX C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR FOLLOWING MEASURES TO PROTECT SECURITY OF NSA PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY:

A. DISCONTINUE THE SALE OF ALL ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES IN THE COMMAND.

B. RESTRICT INGRESS AND EGRESS TO CTS AND CTS ANNEX TO NSA PERSONNEL ONLY.

C. RESTRICT INGRESS AND EGRESS TO CHINA BEACH R&R CENTER TO PERSONNEL ON AUTHORIZED IN-COUNTRY R&R ONLY.

4. (C) IF STEPS TAKEN IN ABOVE PARAGRAPH PROVE INADEQUATE I AM PREPARED TO TAKE ADDITIONAL ACTION AS FOLLOWS:

A. COLLECT ALL PERSONAL WEAPONS FROM NSA EAST DANANG PERSONNEL EXCEPT THOSE REQUIRED FOR THE IMMEDIATE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY.

B. NOT PERMIT GATHERINGS FOR ANY PURPOSE EXCEPT THOSE OFFICIALLY AUTHORIZED BY THE COMMAND.

PAGE SEVEN C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR 5. (U) WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	HTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#42

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM COMUSMACV		DATE 14 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 140656Z OCT 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					ITINERARY FOR SAIGON VISIT 23OCT68
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					REMARKS
2	C/S	F				
	D C/S					FOR
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	10/14		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #43

SECRET**FOR**

PP UUMSEA
DE UUMSE 263V 2880657

ZNY SSSSS

PP 140656 OCT . 68

FROM COMUSMACV

TO CG FMFPAC

INFO CG III MAF

S E C R E T FOR LT GEN BUSE , INFO LT GEN
CUSHMAN , FROM BGEN MC LAUGHLIN

SUBJ: ITINERARY FOR SAIGON VISIT 23 OCT 68

1. FIRM ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS:

DATE /TIME	EVENTS	REMARKS
WEDNESDAY , 23 OCTOBER 1968		
- 0900	ARRIVE TIME TAN SON NHUT ,BASE. OPERATION	T-39 (7AF)
0900-0915	EN ROUTE HEADQUARTERS, 7TH AIR FORCE	SEDAN
0915-0935	CALL ON COMANDER, 7TH AIR FORCE	
0935 -0945	EN ROUTE HEADQUARTERS,MACV	SEDAN
0945-1015	CALL ON COMUSMACV	
1015-1045	CALL ON DEPCOMUSMACV	
1045-1135	MEETING WITH DEPCOMUSMACV	
1135-1145	EN ROUTE TAN SON NHUT ,BASE OPERATIONS	VIP OFFICE SEDANN

PAGE TWO UUMSE 263V **S E C R E T**

91145-1200 PLANE-SIDE FAREWELL; BGEN MCLAUGHLIN

1200- FEPART REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

KC-130 (USMC)

2. LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE NEGATES CALL ON COMMANDANT ,VIETNAMESE
MARINE CORPS .WILL HAVE USMC SENIOR ADVISOR AVAILABLE FOR
DISCUSSION AT HQ USMACV.

GP-4

SECRET

43

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 6216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 15 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 141020Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	F			a	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	10/17		u	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

19

SECRET

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAV 0119 2881020
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 141020Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR FMFPAC-033

FOR CMC CODE AA-1

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS

A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001-2400H 13 OCT 68

B. (1) 139

(2) 14

(3) 0

(4) 0

C. (1) 115

(2) 73

(3) 68

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0119 S E C R E T MCEO

(4) 32

(5) 98

(6) 61

(7) 25

D. (1) 35

(2) 23

(3) 25

(4) 3

E. (1) 86

(2) 0

(3) 0

(4) 0

F. (1) 18

(2) 18

(3) 14

(4) 4

G. (1) 18

(2) 0

(3) 0

(4) 0

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#44

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0119 S E C R E T MCEO

- H. (1) 18
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- I. (1) 0
- (2) (A) 45
- (B) 4
- (C) 0
- (D) 0
- J. (1) 1
- (2) 50
- (3) 95
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- K. (1) 0
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- (4) 14
- L. (1) 0

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0119 S E C R E T MCEO

- (2) 0
- (3) 5
- (4) 0
- (5) 2
- (6) 0
- (7) 0
- M. (1) NONE
- 2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1 ST MAW
- A. (1) (A) 81
- (B) 70
- (2) 14
- (3) 25
- B. (1) 134
- (2) 56
- (3) 0
- C. (1) (A) 89 (B) 40
- (2) (A) 0 (B) 36
- (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
- D. (1) 10
- (2) 4

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

44

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0119 S E C R E T MCEO

- (3) 0
- E. (1) 6
- (2) 6
- (3) 2
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- (7) 0
- F. (1) 0
- (2) 25
- (3) 0
- G. (1) 21
- (2) 4
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- (7) 0
- H. (1) 34
- (2) 0

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0119 S E C R E T MCEO

- (3) 4
- I. (1) 6
- (2) 32
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- J. (1) (A) 65 (B) 34
- (2) (A) 13 (B) 0
- (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
- (4) (A) 3 (B) 0
- (5) (A) 0 (B) 0
- (6) (A) 0 (B) 0
- (7) (A) 0 (B) 36
- K. (1) A(3) INCLUDES 6 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES
 - I(1) 4 USMC TO USMC, WX
 - 2 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI
 - I(2) 7 USMC TO USMC, TGT PRI
 - 2 USMC TO USA, TGT PRI
 - 3 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALF
 - 2 USA TO USMC, WX
 - 16 USMC TO USMC, WX
 - 2 USA TO USA, WX

GP-4
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

44

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

31MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM LTG PEERS, CG IFFV		DATE 15 Oct 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 151102		COPY# 123 OF 1 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS Poc 152125H Oct 68 S/S Have this passed to Americal by person from me ↑ 9. DONE 10/15/68 - (DTG 151435Z) MRA SIS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/15		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

O 151102Z ZYH ZFF-1
 FM LTG PEERS, CG IFFV
 TO LTG CUSHMAN, CG III MAF
 INFO GEN ABRAMS, COMUSMACV
 ZEM

S E C R E T NMT 1715 EYES ONLY

1. (S) SINCE RECEIVING YOUR MESSAGE (150745Z OCT 65) CONCERNING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE 3D NVA DIV, THE CG, 11TH BDE AMERICAL DIV, WAS COORDINATED WITH AND PRESENTED A PLAN TO THE CG, 173D ABN BDE. HIS PLAN, HOWEVER, ENVISIONS OPERATIONS CONSIDERABLY FARTHER FROM THE 173D ABN BDE'S AO THAN YOUR MESSAGE IMPLIED. WE HAVE STUDIED THE PLAN TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF DEPLOYING FORCES TO OPERATE IN I-CTZ.

2. (S) TWO BATTALIONS (1/503 AND 2/503) OF THE 173D ABN BDE ARE CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN THE HIGH GROUND AROUND THE HIGHEST PRIORITY AREA AND MOST DENSELY POPULATED REGION IN II CTZ - THE BONG CON PLAIN OF BINH DINH PROVINCE. THE CRITICALITY OF THIS AREA, PARTICULARLY DURING THE RICE HARVESTING SEASON, PRECLUDES COMMITMENT OF EITHER OF THESE BATTALIONS IN I CTZ. THE 1ST BN, 69TH ARMOR WILL MOVE TO THE HIGHLANDS ON 19 OCT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF BETTER TRAFFICABILITY IN THAT AREA DURING THE NORTHEAST MONSOON. THE ONLY OTHER US BATTALION IN BINH DINH PROVINCE, THE 1/50TH REGT, IS FULLY COMMITTED TO B AND C OPERATIONS IN THE AN KHE AREA AND SECURITY OF HIGHWAY 19. FROM THIS IT CAN BE SEEN THAT A BRIGADE OF THREE BATTALIONS IS BEING STRETCHED TO COVER AN AREA FORMERLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 1ST CAV DIV. WE ARE ALSO SPREAD THIN IN THE HIGHLANDS, MAKING FURTHER DRAWDOWN OF FORCES THERE IMPRUDENT.

3. (S) THE 4/503 ABN BN WAS RELEASED FROM THE DUC LAP AREA ON 15 OCT TO INITIATE A 7-10 DAY SEARCH OF THE HUB (CG 0255) AREA IN PHU YEN PROVINCE WHERE THE ENEMY HAS RECENTLY BEEN BUILDING UP. AFTER THAT IT IS PLANNED TO DEPLOY THE 4/503 INTO THE SONG CON RIVER VALLEY NORTH OF VINH THAM CIDS CAMP. HOWEVER, IF THE SITUATION REQUIRES, THEY COULD BE DIVERTED TO QUANG NGAI PROVINCE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OPERATION WITH III MAF FORCES.

4. (S) GENERAL ALLY WILL FOLLOW THE PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION CLOSELY. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE, CONTINGENT ON THE ENEMY SITUATION IN II CTZ AND QUANG NGAI, TO MAKE THE 4/503 AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE UPON COMPLETION OF THEIR OPERATION IN PHU YEN PROVINCE.

OF-4

SGO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
 510

NNNN

SECRET

OO RUEOBHA
 DE RUMSAV 0105 2891405
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 151405Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKN/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR FMFPAC F-025
 FOR CMC (CODE AA-1)

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
- A. PERIOD COVERED FROM 0001-2400H 14 OCT 68.
 - B. (1) 28
 (2) 9
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 - C. (1) 104
 (2) 71
 (3) 68

PAGE TWO RUMSAV 0105 S E C R E T MCEQ

- (4) 36
- (5) 32
- (6) 19
- (7) 0
- D. (1) 15
 (2) 3
 (3) 0
 (4) 1
- E. (1) 19
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
- F. G. & H. ALL ZEROS
- I. (1) 3
 (2) (A) 9
 (B) 9
 (C) 0
 (D) 0
- J. (1) 0
 (2) 0

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET
 #46

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMSAV 0105 SE C R E T M C E O

- (3) 31
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- K. (1) 0
- (2) 0
- (3) 42
- (4) 43
- L. (1) 0
- (2) 0
- (3) 6
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- (7) 0

M. (1) NO CAS MISSIONS DUE TO WX
 2. DATA PROVIDED BY FIRST MAW

- A. (1) (A) 6
- (B) 22
- (2) 0

PAGE FOUR RUMSAV 0105 S E C R E T M C E O

- (3) 8
- B. (1) 25
- (2) 11
- (3) 0
- C. (1) (A) 89 (B) 40
- (2) (A) 0 (B) 36
- (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
- D. (1) 0
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- E. (1) 0
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- (7) 0
- F. (1) 0
- (2) 8
- (3) 0

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET #46

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMSAV 0105 S E C R E T MCEO

- G. (1) 8
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- (7) 0
- H. (1) 7
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- I. (1) 0
- (2) 7
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- J. (1) (A) 3 (B) 11
- (2) (A) 0 (B) 0
- (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
- (4) (A) 3 (B) 0
- (5) (A) 0 (B) 0
- (6) (A) 0 (B) 0

PAGE SIX RUMSAV 0105 S E C R E T MCEO

(7) (A) 0 (B) 11

- K. (1) A(3) INCLUDES 6 AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES
- I(2) 7 USMC TO USMC, WX

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#46

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM LTGEN STILLWELL		DATE 16 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 160045Z	1,2,3 COPIES	OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS CG & Adm Gen Stillwell to guide this to HQ Koozy 9
3	DCG					
3	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/18			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

SECRET



TO THE COUS...
TO THE COUS...
TO THE COUS...

SEE...
REF...
REF...

1. THOUGH I AM NOT SURE WHERE THE -AF DERIVED THE STATISTICS INCLUDED IN REF 150, I AM CONVINCED THAT THEY ARE FURTHER REMOVED FROM THE SITUATION IN THE DMZ AREA THAN THE DISTANCE TO SAIGON TO THE DMZ WOULD INDICATE. TO ARRIVE AT THE CONCLUSIONS STATED IN REFERENCE BASED SOLELY ON AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY IS A FURTHER INDICATION OF THEIR INABILITY TO ACCURATELY ASSESS THE THREAT FROM WITHIN AND NORTH OF THE DMZ.

2. SINCE OPERATION THOR, 1-7 JULY 68, THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS EMPLOYED THE MAJOR PORTION OF ITS HEAVY ARTILLERY AND TARGET ACQUISITION TANKS IN THE DMZ AREA. THIS ACTION HAS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAINING THE ADVANTAGES GAINED DURING THOR AND TO INSURE THAT THE ENEMY ARTILLERY THREAT FROM NORTH OF THE DMZ DID NOT REACH THE UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THOR.

3. SINCE CONCLUSION OF OPERATION THOR, ARMY 1 AIRCRAFT HAVE OVERFLOUN THE THOR AOI DAILY AT LOW ALTITUDE WITHOUT LOSS OF AIRCRAFT OR CASUALTIES. OBSERVERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DETECT AND IMAGE TANK ARTILLERY AND OTHER TARGETS WHICH HAVE ESCAPED DETECTION BY AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY. THE VALUE OF THE AERIAL CASUALTY IS CURRENTLY ESTIMATED BY THE 80 ARTILLERY WEAPONS DESTROYED DURING THE PERIOD 1 JULY TO 1 OCTOBER 68. SIXTY-FOUR OF THESE WEAPONS WERE DESTROYED BY ARTILLERY AND ONE PRECISION DESTRUCTION TECHNIQUES AND TWENTY-FIVE WERE DESTROYED BY TAG AIR. IT IS ALSO INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE TARGETS DESTROYED BY TAG AIR WERE IDENTIFIED TO THE BULLDOGS BY AN ARMY OR MARINE AERIAL OBSERVER AND WERE NOT OR NOT FOUND AS A RESULT OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY PI.

4. ENEMY ARTILLERY FIRING FIGURES AS LISTED IN REFERENCE 150 AT WIDE VARIANCE WITH OFFICIAL FIGURES HELD AT THIS HEADQUARTERS. THE GREATEST NUMBER OF INCOMING ROUNDS THIS YEAR FROM THE THOR AREA WAS 11004 ROUNDS RECEIVED DURING MAY 68. SUBSEQUENT PERIOD FIGURES WERE: JUN 68: 700; JUL 68: 100; AUG 68: 10; SEP 68: 0. A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION IS THAT THE FIGURES OF 3147 AND 2047 FOR INCOMING ARTILLERY ROUNDS QUOTED IN REFERENCE TO DESCRIBE THOR RESULTS REPRESENT TOTAL ROCKET, MORTAR, ARTILLERY AND OTHER FIRING RECEIVED BEFORE AND AFTER THOR FROM ALL SECTORS, RATHER THAN FROM THE THOR AREA ALONE. SUCH A COMPARISON WOULD, OF COURSE, LACK VALIDITY.

5. IN REFERENCE TO OPERATION MINUTALIFE, REFERRED TO IN PAR 4 OF REFERENCED MESSAGE, THE AMOUNT OF BARRAGE EMPLOYED REPRESENTED 1.5 BARRAGES FOR EVERY THREE WEAPONS (MORTAR, MORTAR, ROCKET OR TAG) DESTROYED. NOT MENTIONED IN THE -HE MESSAGE WAS THE 200 MIA AND 14 KIA SUFFERED BY THE 100 BAR DIV IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING OPERATION MINUTALIFE (MIA 60) AS A RESULT OF ENEMY ACTION FROM NORTH OF THE DMZ. THIS COINCIDES WITH THE AFTERMATH OF THE 100 BAR DIV MIA AND KIA IN JULY 68 47 MIA AND 4 KIA IN AUGUST 68.

#47 (1)

#47 (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYQW RUMGBLS5731 2900130-CCCC--RHMMAFA.
 ZNY CCCCC ZYO RUMGSHH
 P 160115Z OCT 68
 FM CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMFSAA/GMU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

NGFS @A CONFERENCE (U)

FOR SEEN HOFFMAN FROM BAGLEY

1. (C) IN ORDER TO ENHANCE NGFS SHIP/SPOTTER TEAM EFFECTIVENESS, PROPOSE A NGFS SPOTTER CONFERENCE AT III MAF HQ 26 OCT OR AS ALTERNATE DATE, 02 NOV.

PROPOSED SUBJECTS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. @A REQUIREMENTS
- B. RESULTS OBTAINED FROM UNOBSERVED NIGHT H AND I MISSIONS
- C. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE IS EFFECT
- D. OTHER MUTUAZ PROBLEMS

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	WTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#48

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM COMNAVFORV		DATE 17 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 160911Z OCT 68		COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
7	CG	HASSEN				EXCLUSIVE FOR
	DCG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			Q	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/17		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

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CONFIDENTIAL

**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

P 160911Z OCT 68
FM COMNAVFORV
TO CNO
CINCPACFLT
INFO COMSERVPAC
CG III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL CLEARY, ADMIRAL HYLAND, INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN
AND READMS COMBS AND OSBORN FROM ZUMWALT
SUBJ: RACIAL TENSIONS, DANANG AREA (C) COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG
14 OCT 68 PASEP

1. (C) IN VIEW POSSIBLE ADVERSE PUBLICITY WHICH MAY ENSUE AS OUTGROWTH
OF SITUATION DESCRIBED IN REF A, I HAVE INFORMED GENERAL
ABRAMS AND HIS PAO OF THE GIST OF THE MESSAGE. IN SUBSEQUENT
PERSONAL TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH RADM OSBORN, FOLLOWING
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OBTAINED WHICH I AM ALSO PASSING ON TO
GENERAL ABRAMS.

A. THAT THE LOCAL SITUATION IN DANANG SEEMS TO BE DAMPENING OUT.

B. THAT BRIGGEN YOUNG, USA, CG DANANG SUPPORT COMMAND, HAS IN
INSTITUTED SIMILAR MEASURES TO KEEP SOLDIERS OUT OF DANANG.

2. (C) MR MOSKOWITZ, DEPUTY ASST SECDEF FOR CIVILRIGHTS
AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT COMNAVFORV AT
170002S²Z (0800 LOCAL).

ALTHOUGH I HAVE NO DIRECT CORRELATION BETWEEN THIS REPORTED RACIAL
TENSION AND CIVIL RIGHTS, PER SE, I EXPECT THAT SOME SUCH
ALLEGATIONS MAY BE MADE IF IT RECEIVES MEDIA COVERAGE.
THEREFORE, I CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT MR. MOSKOWITZ BE ADVISED OF
THE EVENTS THAT HAVE TRANSPIRED, IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN
TO RETAIN HIS CONFIDENCE THAT WE HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED TO CONCEAL
PERTINENT INFORMATION FROM HIM.

3. (U) WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#49

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 6216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 17 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 161416Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	F			has over	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	10/17		B	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

Handwritten initials/signature

SECRET #51

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA
 DE RUMSAV 0147 2901416
 ZNY SSSSS
 O R 161416Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAF
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMSAK/FIRST MARDIV

BT
 S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1
 FOR FMFPAC F-045

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
 A. PERIOD COVERED -FROM 0001-2400H 15 OCT 68
 B. (1) 32
 (2) 16
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 C. (1) 113
 (2) 73
 (3) 54

PAGE TWO RUMLMHA0147 S E C R E T MCEO

- (4) 28
 (5) 27
 (6) 10
 (7) 0
 D. (1) 5
 (2) 1
 (3) 3
 (4) 1
 E. (1) 10
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 F. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 G. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMLMHA0147 S E C R E T MCEO

- H. (1) 0
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- I. (1) 3
- (2) (A) 25
- (B) 13
- (C) 0
- (D) 0
- J. (1) 0
- (2) 16
- (3) 25
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- K. (1) 0
- (2) 0
- (3) 34
- (4) 38
- L. (1) 0

PAGE FOUR RUMLMHA0147 S E C R E T MCEO

- (2) 0
- (3) 7
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- (7) 0
- 2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW
- A. (1) (A) 35
- (B) 12
- (2) 8
- (3) 0
- B. (1) 43
- (2) 12
- (3) 0
- C. (1) (A) 81 (B) 40
- (2) (A) 0 (B) 42
- (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
- D. (1) 8
- (2) 0
- (3) 0

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#51

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMLMHA0147 S E C R E T MCEO

- E. (1) 8
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- (7) 0
- F. (1) 0
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- G. (1) 0
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- (5) 0
- (6) 0
- (7) 0
- H. (1) 10
- (2) 0
- (3) 1

PAGE SIX RUMLMHA0147 S E C R E T MCEO

- I. (1) 0
- (2) 11
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- J. (1) (A) 23 (B) 0
- (2) (A) 9 (B) 0
- (3) (A) 0 (B) 0
- (4) (A) 3 (B) 0
- (5) (A) 0 (B) 0
- (6) (A) 0 (B) 0
- (7) (A) 0 (B) 12
- K. (1) 116 PREPLANNED SORTIES CANX DUE TO WX

GP-4
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET
57

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG 18TH ENGR BDE DBT RVN		DATE 18 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 150600Z OCT 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
7	CG					FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
	DCG					REMARKS FOR
2	DCG AIR	J				
	C/S					
	DC/S					
1	DC/S DM					
	S/S	F 10/18				
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	HQS CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #52

THIS CORRESPONDENCE WILL BE ASSIGNED A FILE NUMBER AS LISTED BELOW.

FILE NUMBER _____

ACTION SECTION WILL COMPLETE	
ACTION COMPLETED ON:	
RETAINED BY _____ SECTION	
DATE	SIGNATURE AND RANK

BM

DE RUMLNHD 2020 2890613

ZNR UUUUU

R 150600Z OCT 68

FM CG 18TH ENGR BDE DBT RVN

TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF DNG RVN

INFO RHMAVA/CG USARV ENGR TROOPS LBN RVN

RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN

ZEN/CO 45TH ENGR GP DNG RVN

BT

UNCLAS AVBC-C 010189 ELDER SENDS TO CUSHMAN ?

SUBJECT: HAI VAN PASS TRAFFIC CONTROL

1. THE UPGRADING OF THE 22 KM OF QL-1 THROUGH THE HAI VAN PASS HAS SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED THE CAPABILITY TO SUPPLY FORCES IN THE NORTHERN I CTZ. THE DAILY VOLUME OF TRAFFIC, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, IS CONTINUALLY GROWING. AT THE SAME TIME, ELEMENTS OF THE 45TH ENGR GP ARE STILL PLACING A LARGE AMOUNT OF EFFORT INTO REPAIRS OF STORM DAMAGE AT VARIOUS POINTS ALONG THIS ROUTE. THIS WORK IS BEING DONE UNDER A SEVERE HANDICAP IMPOSED BY A TOTAL LACK OF TRAFFIC CONTROL WITHIN THE PASS ITSELF. NOT ONLY IS THE PROGRESS OF WBRK HINDERED BUT SAFETY CONDITIONS ARE INTOLERABLE. DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER THE 35TH ENGR BN ALONE EXPERIENCED 9 VEHICLE ACCIDENTS INVOLVING US AND VN VEHICLES. ONE US SOLDIER LOST HIS LIFE IN THESE ACCIDENTS.

PAGE 2 RUMLNHD 2020 UNCLAS

2. IT IS FELT THAT SOME SYSTEM OF TRAFFIC CONTROL WITHIN THE PASS MUST BE INITIATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 45TH ENGR GP HAS BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN DETERMINING THE AGENCY OR HEADQUARTERS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THIS.

3. I REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IN RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM. THE SITUATION HAS REACHED THE POINT WHERE I MUST WEIGH THE CONTINUED USE OF THE 35TH ENGR BN IN THIS PRESENTLY INEFFICIENT AND UNSAFE MANNER AGAINST THE LARGE CONSTRUCTION BACKLOG IN OTHER AREAS

BT

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#52

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM COMSERVPAC	DATE 17 OCT 68	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 161944Z OCT 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN CUSHMAN
	DCG					REMARKS
	DCG AIR					EXCLUSIVE FOR
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	10/18			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

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P 161944Z OCT 68
 FM CONSERVPAC
 TO COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG
 INFO CINCPACFLT
 COMNAVFORV
 CG III MAF
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM OSBORN INFO VADM BAUMBERGER, VADM ZUMWALT
 AND L GEN CUSHMAN FROM CAPT DRAIN
 RACIAL TENSIONS, DANANG AREA (C)

- A. COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG 14 OCT 68 PASEP
- B. COMNAVFORV 160911Z OCT 68

- 1. (U) REF A IS ACKNOWLEDGED. HAVE DISCUSSED CONTENTS WITH DEPUTY CINCPACFLT AND HAVE ALSO ADVISED REAR ADMIRAL COMBS, CURRENTLY ON LEAVE. REF B ALSO RECEIVED AND NOTED.
- 2. (C) APPRECIATE DELICATE NATURE AND POTENTIAL DANGER OF SITUATION AS INDICATED. PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES STATED REF A APPEAR ADQUATE, AT LEAST FOR THE INTERIM. WE WILL BE WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS WITH INTEREST, RECOGNIZING THAT YOU, ON THE SCENE, ARE IN BEST POSITION TO ASSESS SITUATION AND INSTITUTE SECURITY MEASURES WHICH YOU CONSIDER APPROPRIATE. ASSUME ASSISTANCE OF LOCAL NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE HAS BEEN REQUESTED.
- 3. (U) REQUEST KEEP ALCON, INCLUDING CNO AND CINCPACFLT, ADVISED.

WARM RE CARDS
 GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#53

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 17 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 170250Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT INTERIM REPORT NUMBER 2 ON GAO VISIT TO 1ST LAM BN
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	10/17		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

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CONFIDENTIAL

PTICZYUW RUMLMHA 0059 29 10520-CCCC-RUHKM.

ZNY CCCCC

P 170250Z OCT 68

FM CG FIRST MAW

TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF

ZEN/CG FMFPAC FWD

ZEN/CG FLC

ZEN/THIRD FSR

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT MARCOR EYES ONLY
FOR FMFPAC (F-012)

INTERIM REPORT NUMBER 2 ON GAO VISIT TO 1ST LAAM BN
REF:

- A. CG FMFPAC 210807Z SEP 68
- B. CG FMAW 231212Z SEP 68
- C. CG FMAW 291200Z SEP 68
- D. CG FMAW LTR 21/GKR/JHS SER 4400 DTD 10 OCT 68 (W/2ENCL)
- E. OIC FSAO 3 JEM/EFM OVER 29041 DTD 24 SEP 68

1. (U) REFERENCE (A) REQUESTED INTERIM REPORTS ON THE VISIT OF THE GAO TO THE 1ST LAAM BN OF THIS COMMAND. REFERENCE (B), (C) AND (D) HAVE FURNISHED REPORTS OF ALL MEETINGS/DISCUSSIONS WITH GAO REPRESENTATIVES

PAGE TWO RUMLMHA 0059 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT MCEO TO DATE.

2. (C) A DEBRIEFING WAS HELD ON 16 OCTOBER 1968, AT HEADQUARTERS, FMAW WITH MR. LANDICHO AND MR. MOSER, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GAO. THEY ORALLY STATED THAT THEIR GENERAL WRITTEN CONCLUSION WOULD BE: THAT THE MARINE CORPS READINESS OF THE 1ST LAAM BN IS LOW WHEN COMPARED WITH THAT OF LAAM BNS OF THE USA. (THIS COMPARISON BASED ON CRITERIA CONTAINED IN USA AR-220-1).

3. (U) THEY GAVE AS THE REASONS FOR THIS:

- A. NON RESPONSIVENESS OF SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT.
- B. INSUFFICIENT USE OF THE ISSA WITH THE USA.

4. (U) IN ADDITION:

A. THEY QUOTED SOME STATISTICS AS TO THE LONG PERIOD OF TIME SOME NORS REQUISITIONS WERE TAKING IN COMING FROM THE ICP AT PHILADELPHIA. THEY MADE A GENERAL STATEMENT THAT PRIORITY 02 REQUISITIONS WERE TAKING 96.8 DAYS TO FILL FROM PHILADELPHIA VS 28.7 DAYS FOR USA PRIORITY 02 REQUISITIONS.

B. ALSO THAT SOME ODD 1000 ITEMS CARRIED AS HAWK PECULIAR ARE ONLY 70 PERCENT OF THE ITEMS LISTED IN THE ESSENTIAL STACKAGE LIST.

C. THEY QUOTED OUR RECENT FSAO TEAM VISIT AS FINDING THIS ACCOUNT IN THE SAME CONDITION AS THEY FOUND IT. (REEE)

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#54

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE RUMLMHA 0059 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT MCEO

- 5. (U) THE NONRESPONSIVENESS OF MAINTENANCE SUPPORT, I.E. TOO LONG FOR REPAIR TO BE EFFECTED, WAS A STATEMENT MADE BY THEM BACKED BY A FOLLOWING STATEMENT THAT THIS SHOULD BE CORRECTED BY THE MAINTENANCE FLOAT NOW BEING ESTABLISHED.
- 6. (U) THE INSUFFICIENT USE OF THE ISSA HAS ALREADY BEEN ADDRESSED BY THIS COMMAND. (ENCLOSURE (2) TO REFERENCE (D)).
- 7. (U) WITH RESPECT TO STATEMENTS MADE IN PARAGRAPH 4, THE FOLLOWING APPLY:
 - A. THE PRIORITY 02 DOCUMENTS THAT WERE CITED DID TAKE AN AVERAGE OF 96.8 DAYS FROM THE TIME OF INTRODUCTION INTO THE SYSTEM UNTIL THE DEMAND WAS SATISFIED.
 - B. THE FACT THAT ONLY 70 PERCENT OF THE HAWK PECULIAR ITEMS ARE ON THE SUPPLY OFFICERS CARDS DO NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT THERE MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT USAGE ON THE REMAINING ITEMS AND HENCE NO REQUIREMENT TO CARRY THEM IN STOCK. THIS IS BEING VERIFIED AND WILL BE COVERED WHEN THE ACTUAL GAO REPORT IS FURNISHED. THIS REPORT WAS PROMISED IN ABOUT ONE WEEK.
 - C. REGARDING THE FSAO REPORT, ALL ITEMS AT FAULT HAVE BEEN OR ARE BEING CORRECTED.
- 8. (U) MR LANDICHO REMARKED THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY RECOMMEND SUPPORT

PAGE FOUR RUMLMHA 0059 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT MCEO

- OF USMC LAAM BN IN COUNTRY BY THE USA. IT WAS POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT:
 - A. ALTHOUGH THE ARMY COULD PROBABLY NOW SUPPORT US, THEY COULD NOT FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT, AND
 - B. WE NEED OUR OWN SUPPORT SYSTEM AS WE ARE SUBJECT TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AT ANY TIME AWAY FROM ESTABLISHED ARMY SUPPORT FACILITIES.
- 9. (U) MR LANDICHO FURTHER STATED THAT THE ARMY LAAM BNS LEFT CONUS WITH DOUBLE ALL AUTHORIZED SUPPLIES ON HAND AND IN SUPPORT HAD TWO FULL BATTERIES AS A MAINTENANCE FLOAT. ALSO THAT THEY ARE JUST NOW GETTING DOWN TO NORMAL AUTHORIZED STOCK LEVELS.
- 10 (U) UPON RECEIPT OF THE GAO REPORT, A DETAILED RESPONSE WILL BE SENT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS.
- 11. (U) IN CONCLUSION, THIS COMMAND FEELS THAT THE READINESS POSTURE OF USMC LAAM PN WAS AND IS AT THE LEVELS THAT HAVE BEEN REPORTED.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#54

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PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL
"MARINE EYES ONLY"

17OCT68

170250Z OCT 68

0059

FROM: CG FIRST MAW

TO: CG FMFPAC

INFO: CG III MAF (MAIL)
CG FMFPAC (FWD) (MAIL)
CG FLC (MAIL)
3RD FSR (MAIL)

F-912

CONFIDENTIAL "MARINE EYES ONLY"

INTERIM REPORT NUMBER 2 ON GAO VISIT TO 1ST LAAM BN

REF:

- A. CG FMFPAC 210807Z SEP 68
- B. CG FMFW 231212Z SEP 68
- C. CG FMFW 291200Z SEP 68
- D. CG FMFW LTR 21/CHR/JHS SER 1100 DTD 10 OCT 68 (W/2ENCL)
- E. OIG HHD FSAO 3 LTR JEM/EFM OVER 39041 DTD 21SEP68

1. (U) REFERENCE (A) REQUESTED INTERIM REPORTS ON THE VISIT OF THE GAO TO THE 1ST LAAM BN OF THIS COMMAND. REFERENCE (B), (C) AND (D) HAVE FURNISHED REPORTS OF ALL MEETINGS/DISCUSSIONS WITH GAO REPRESENTATIVES TO DATE.

2. (U) A DEBRIEFING WAS HELD ON 16 OCTOBER 1968, AT HEADQUARTERS, FMFW WITH MR. LANDICHO AND MR. MOSER, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GAO. THEY ORALLY STATED THAT THEIR GENERAL WRITTEN CONCLUSION WOULD BE:

THAT THE MARINE CORPS READINESS OF THE 1ST LAAM BN IS LOW WHEN COMPARED WITH THAT OF LAAM BNS OF THE USA. (THIS COMPARISON BASED ON CRITERIA CONTAINED IN USA AR-220-1).

- 3. (U) THEY GAVE AS THE REASONS FOR THIS:
 - A. NON RESPONSIVENESS OF SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT.
 - B. INSUFFICIENT USE OF THE ISSA WITH THE USA.

4. (U) IN ADDITION:

A. THEY QUOTED SOME STATISTICS AS TO THE LONG PERIOD OF TIME SOME MORS REQUISITIONS WERE TAKING IN COMING FROM THE ICP AT PHILADELPHIA. THEY MADE A GENERAL STATEMENT THAT PRIORITY O2 REQUISITIONS WERE TAKING 96.8 DAYS TO FILL FROM PHILADELPHIA VS 28.7 DAYS FOR USA PRIORITY O2 REQUISITIONS.

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL
"MARINE EYES ONLY"

PRIORITY

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

Copy 3-6

1st MAF TOP SECRET CONTROL NO.	COPY NO.
A1201-68	3

#54

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL
"MARINE EYES ONLY"

PRIORITY

B. ALSO THAT SOME ODD 1000 ITEMS CARRIED AS HAWK PECULIAR ARE ONLY 70% OF THE ITEMS LISTED IN THE ESSENTIAL STORAGE LIST.

C. THEY QUOTED OUR RECEIPT FSAO TEAM VISIT AS FINDING THIS ACCOUNT IN THE SAME CONDITION AS THEY FOUND IT. (REF E)

5. (U) THE NONRESPONSIVENESS OF MAINTENANCE SUPPORT, I.E. TOO LONG FOR REPAIR TO BE EFFECTED, WAS A STATEMENT MADE BY THEM BACKED BY A FOLLOWING STATEMENT THAT THIS SHOULD BE CORRECTED BY THE MAINTENANCE FLOAT NO.: BEING ESTABLISHED.

6. (U) THE INSUFFICIENT USE OF THE ISSA HAS ALREADY BEEN ADDRESS'D BY THIS COMMAND. (ENCLOSURE (2) TO REFERENCE (D)).

7. (U) WITH RESPECT TO STATEMENTS MADE IN PARAGRAPH 4, THE FOLLOWING APPLY:
A. THE PRIORITY O2 DOCUMENTS THAT WERE CITED DID TAKE AN AVERAGE OF 96.8 DAYS FROM THE TIME OF INTRODUCTION INTO THE SYSTEM UNTIL THE DEMAND WAS SATISFIED.

B. THE FACT THAT ONLY 70% OF THE HAWK PECULIAR ITEMS ARE ON THE SUPPLY OFFICERS CARDS DOB. NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT THERE MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT USAGE ON THE REMAINING ITEMS AND HENCE NO REQUIREMENT TO CARRY THEM IN STOCK. THIS IS BEING VERIFIED AND WILL BE COVERED WHEN THE ACTUAL GAO REPORT IS FURNISHED. THIS REPORT WAS PROMISED IN ABOUT ONE WEEK.

C. REGARDING THE FSAO REPORT, ALL ITEMS AT FAULT HAVE BEEN OR ARE BEING CORRECTED.

8. (U) MR LANDICHO REMARKED THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY RECOMMEND SUPPORT OF USMC LAAM BN IN COUNTRY BY THE USA. IT WAS POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT:

A. ALTHOUGH THE ARMY COULD PROBABLY NOW SUPPORT US, THEY COULD NOT FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT, AND

B. WE NEED OUR OWN SUPPORT SYSTEM AS WE ARE SUBJECT TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AT ANY TIME AWAY FROM ESTABLISHED ARMY SUPPORT FACILITIES.

9. (U) MR LANDICHO FURTHER STATED THAT THE ARMY LAAM BNS LEFT CONUS WITH DOUBLE ALL AUTHORIZED SUPPLIES ON HAND AND IN SUPPORT HAD TWO FULL BATTERIES AS A MAINTENANCE FLOAT. ALSO THAT THEY ARE JUST NOW GETTING DOWN TO NORMAL AUTHORIZED STOCK LEVELS.

10. (U) UPON RECEIPT OF THE GAO REPORT, A DETAILED RESPONSE WILL BE SENT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS.

11. (U) IN CONCLUSION, THIS COMMAND FEELS THAT THE READINESS POSTURE OF USMC LAAM BN WAS AND IS AT THE LEVELS THAT HAVE BEEN REPORTED.

GP-4

DIST: WSO(1)

J. Jaross
J. JAROSS MAJOR
ASST WING SUPO

RELEASED BY *[Signature]*

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL
"MARINE EYES ONLY"

PRIORITY

1ST MAW 2100/3 (9/67)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

#54

HEADQUARTERS
II MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

ZIMAF FORM 6216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM COMNAVFORV		DATE 18 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 170330Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
1	CG				H	REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			H	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/18	10/18	H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #53

SECRET

CCN 190 FILE 95

		FROM COMNAVFORV	DATE 18 OCT 68
		SERIAL# 170330Z OCT 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT	EXCLUSIVE FOR
10/18	<i>[Handwritten Signature]</i>		
		EXCLUSIVE FOR	
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES MAT, TAPE AND HARD COPY		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

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#55

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

P 170330Z OCT 68
 FM COMNAVSUPACT
 TO COMNAVFORV
 INFO CG III MAF
 COMSERVPAC
 CINCPACFLT
 CNO
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM ZUMWALT INFO ADM HYLAND, ADM CLEARY, LIGEN CUSHMAN,
 RADM COMBS FROM RADM OSBORN

SUBJ: RACIAL SITREP 171200H OCT 68 (S)

A. MY 14 OCT 68 (NOTAL)

1. (S) FROM A RACIAL STANDPOINT GENERAL CALM PREVAILS AT NSA DANANG.
2. (S) IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS TO TEMPORARILY DISCONTINUE SALE OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TO RESTRICT INGRESS AND OCCRESS TO NSA PROPERTY, AS PROVIDED IN REF A, HAS REDUCED TENSIONS TO VIRTUALLY ZERO. MONSOON RAIN OF IN EXCESS OF 30 INCHES PAST 72 HOURS HAS CONTINUED TO REDUCING OF PREVIOUS TENSIONS.
3. (S) NO SPECIFIC ACCUSATIONS OF DESCRIMINATION REVEALED IN DISCUSSIONS. REFERENCE IS MADE TO SUCH GENERAL TITLES AS;
 1. LACK OF PROGRESS SINCE 1865, AND
 2. A DESIRE FOR THE SAME EQUALITY UPON RETURN TO CONUS AS ENJOYED IN RVN.
4. (U) WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

BEST RE GARDS.

GP-4

SECRET

#55

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM COMNAVFORV		DATE 17 OCT 68	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 170714Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		EXCLUSIVE FOR INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN	
9	CG				h	REMARKS	
	DCG					EXCLUSIVE FOR	
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	F			q		
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
1	S/S	F	10/17		h		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

P 170714Z OCT 68
 FM COMNAVFORV
 TO CNO
 CINCPACFLT
 INFO COMSERVPAC
 CG THIRD MAF
 COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL CLAREY AND
 ADMIRAL HYLAND, INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN AND RADMS COMBS AND OSBORN
 FROM ZUMWALT

RACIAL TENSIONS, DANANG AREA (C)

1. MEETING WITH MR. MOSKOWITZ WENT WELL. HE AGREED MY EVALUATION THAT
 RADM OSBORN TAKING APPROPRIATE MEASURES. HE HAD EARLIER BEEN MADE
 AWARE OF TENSIONS DANANG AREA BY LTGEN CUSHMAN. ON LEARNING THAT BOTH
 ALLEGED ASSAILANT AND DEAD GUARD WERE NEGRO HIS ASSISTANT, JUDGE
 BENNET, STATED HE BELIEVED THIS WOULD SERVE TO ALLAY RUMORS OF WHITE
 VERSUS BLACK. BENNET ASKED THRUST OF COMPLAINTS OF ALLEGED DIS-
 CRIMINATION DANANG AREA. REPLIED, EVALUATION BY NSA DANANG BASED ON
 MANY INTERVIEWS WAS ESSENTIALLY DISSATISFACTION WITH OPPORTUNITY
 IN STATES AFTER EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EXPERIENCED WHILE IN VIETNAM.
 MR. MOSKOWITZ SEEMED GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH NAVY STORY THROUGHOUT
 VIETNAM BUT WORRIED THAT RACIAL TENSIONS ARE SLOWLY EXACEBATING ALL
 ELEMENTS OF US NATIONAL LIFE.

GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. CONDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#56

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 18 OCT 68
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 171421Z OCT 68		COPY# 3 OF 3 COPIES RECD
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	F				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	10/18		18	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #57

SECRET

OO RUEBHQA
 DE RUMLMHA 0121 2911421
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 171421Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAF
 TO RUEBHQA/CMC
 RUHKN/CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT
 S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1
 FOR FMFPAC F-046

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS
- A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001 - 2400H 16 OCT 68
 - B. (1) 10
 - (2) 16
 - (3) 0
 - (4) 0
 - C. (1) 119
 - (2) 46
 - (3) 41

PAGE TWO RUMLMHA 0121 S E C R E T MCEO

- (4) 28
- (5) 16
- (6) 4
- (7) 4
- D. (1) 6
- (2) 0
- (3) 1
- (4) 1
- E. (1) 8
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- F. (1) 0
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- (4) 0
- G. (1) 0
- (2) 0
- (3) 0
- (4) 0

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

157

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMLMHA0121 S E C R E T MCEO

H.	(1)	0	
	(2)	0	
	(3)	0	
	(4)	0	
I.	(1)	0	
	(2)	(A)	2
		(B)	16
		(C)	0
		(D)	0
J.	(1)	0	
	(2)	0	
	(3)	26	
	(4)	0	
	(5)	0	
	(6)	0	
	(7)	0	
K.	(1)	0	
	(2)	0	
	(3)	36	
	(4)	25	

PAGE FOUR RUMLMHA0121 S E C R E T MCEO

L.	(1)	0	
	(2)	0	
	(3)	0	
	(4)	0	
	(5)	0	
	(6)	0	
	(7)	0	
M.	(1)	K(3)	36 SORTIES CANX BY WX.
2. DATA PROVIDED BY FIRST MAW			
A.	(1)	(A)	16
		(B)	21
	(2)	0	
	(3)	0	
B.	(1)	21	
	(2)	16	
	(3)	0	
C.	(1)	(A)	81 (B) 40
	(2)	(A)	0 (B) 42
	(3)	(A)	0 (B) 0
D.	(1)	0	

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#57

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMLMHA0121 S E C R E T MCEO

(2)	0
(3)	0
E. (1)	0
(2)	0
(3)	0
(4)	0
(5)	0
(6)	0
F. (7)	
F. (1)	0
(2)	0
(3)	0
G. (1)	0
(2)	0
(3)	0
(4)	0
(5)	0
(6)	0
(7)	0
H. (1)	14

PAGE SIX RUMLMHA0121 S E C R E T MCEO

(2)	0
(3)	0
I. (1)	4
(2)	10
(3)	0
(4)	0
J. (1)	(A) 9 (B) 5
(2)	(A) 7 (B) 0
(3)	(A) 0 (B) 0
(4)	(A) 0 (B) 0
(5)	(A) 0 (B) 0
(6)	(A) 0 (B) 0
(7)	(A) 0 (B) 16
K. (1)	126 SORTIES CANX DUE ADVERSE WX THROUGHOUT ICTZ.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#57

TOP SECRET

CCN 197 FILE 95

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM COMUSMACV	
		SERIAL 182335Z OCT 68	COPIES 1 OF 2 COPIES RECEIVED
		SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
		EXCLUSIVE FOR "LIMDIS"	
LTGEN CUSHMAN	COPIES 1,2 OF 2 COPIES		
	MAT AND TAPE		

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SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

TOP SECRET
#16-A

TOP SECRET

OO RUMSAK
 DE RUMSAW 4012U 2922335
 ZNY TITTT
 O 182330Z OCT 68 ZFF-3

FM COMUSMACV SAIGON
 TO RUMAAVA/CG USARV LONG BINH
 RUMSAN/COMNAVFROV SAIGON
 RUMSAL/CDR TTH AF TAN SON NHUT
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF DANANG
 INFO RUMJIR/AMERICAN AMBASSADOR SAIGON
 BT

EXCLUSIVE
 FOR
 "LIMDIS"

TOP SECRET LIMDIS EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG MILDREN,
 VADM ZUMWALT, GEN BROWN, LTCSMANN AND AMB BUNKER FROM GEN ABRAMS.
 1. BE PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT PROVISIONS OF MACV DIRECTIVE 37-10. ONLY
 KEY PERSONNEL ON A "NEED TO KNOW BASIS WILL BE AUTHORIZED ADVANCED
 NOTIFICATION. CRITERIA TO BE USED IS WHETHER INDIVIDUAL REQUIRES
 INFORMATION TO INSURE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION. MAINTAIN
 LIST OF INDIVIDUALS NOTIFIED & PROVIDE LIST TO MACV ATTN: MACCO UPON
 REQUEST. NOTIFY THIS HEADQUARTERS IMMEDIATELY OF ANY SECURITY VIOLATED

IN CONNECTION WITH THIS PROGRAM. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT BY BACKCHANNEL.
 GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

TOP SECRET

546
SA9 190219Z

OO RUMSAW
DE RUMSAK 4318 2930205
ZNR UUUUU
BT
UNCLAS SVC
ZDF 190100 RUMSAW 4012U 2922335/182330Z OCT. 68
BT

NNNN

#16 A

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM ADMINO FMFPAC		DATE 18 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 172042Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY <i>Req. Copy for C6 1st MAW continuity file by CJR</i>
	DCG					
4	DCG AIR					
	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/18			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #58

SECRET

PP RHMMFA RUEBHOA
 DE RUHNFMA 2234 2912042
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 172042Z OCT 68
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RHMMFA/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN, INFO LT GEN
 CUSHMAN FROM MGEN FONTANA. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)

A. CMC 021244Z/OCT68 (S)

1. (U) REF A REQUESTED SUBSTANTIATING INFORMATION REGARDING USMC AIR SUPPORT TO U. S. ARMY BATTALIONS IN I CTZ. STATISTICS UTILIZED IN FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE BASED ON DATA OBTAINED FROM HORN DASC BY CG, III MAF.
2. (S) DURING JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST, THE U. S. ARMY WAS OPERATING WITH 31 MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN I CTZ. AT THE PROGRAMMED RATE OF FIVE SORTIES PER U. S. ARMY MANEUVER BATTALION PER DAY, THE USAF SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE U. S. ARMY 4,650 SORTIES PER MONTH.
3. TABLE I SHOWS THE NUMBER OF SORTIES PROVIDED TO I CTZ BY USAF DURING JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST.

PAGE 2 RUHNFMA2234 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

TABLE I

	(USAF AIR SUPPORT IN I CTZ)			TOTAL
	USA	USMC	OTHERS	
JUNE	2190	698	997	3885
JULY	1962	511	859	3332
AUGUST	2408	514	884	3806

4. (S) TABLE II REFLECTS THE SORTIES PROVIDED TO U. S. ARMY BATTALIONS BY BOTH THE USAF AND THE USMC DURING THE JUNE-AUGUST PERIOD.

TABLE II

	(AIR SUPPORT FOR U. S. ARMY IN I CTZ)			TOTAL SORT/BN/DAY
	USAF	USMC	TOTAL	
JUNE	2190	843	3033	3.26
JULY	1962	933	2895	3.01
AUGUST	2408	1296	3704	3.85

5. (S) DURING THE THREE MONTH PERIOD, U. S. ARMY BATTALIONS RECEIVED AN AVERAGE OF 104 SORTIES PER DAY OR 67 PCT OF THE PROGRAMMED 155 SORTIES PER DAY. THIS EQUATES TO AN AVERAGE OF 3.35 SORTIES PER U. S. ARMY BATTALION PER DAY DURING JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST IN LIEU

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#58

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUKHFMA2234 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
OF THE PROGRAMMED FIVE SORTIES PER U. S. ARMY BATTALION
PER DAY.

6. (S) TABLE III INDICATES THE NUMBER OF SORTIES U. S.
ARMY BATTALIONS RECEIVED FROM THE USMC AS COMPARED TO
THE SORTIES THE USMC BATTALIONS RECEIVED FROM THE USAF.
THE NET DIFFERENCE REPRESENTS THE ADDITIONAL USMC AIR
SUPPORT PROVIDED THE U. S. ARMY BATTALIONS COMPARED TO
THAT WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY THE USMC BATTALIONS FROM
THE USAF.

	TABLE III		
	USMC TO US ARMY	USAF TO USMC	NET DIFFERENCE
JUNE	843	698	145
JULY	933	511	422
AUGUST	1296	514	782

7. (S) THIS NET DIFFERENCE WOULD HAVE PROVIDED EACH
USMC BATTALION 6.0 ADDITIONAL SORTIES IN JUNE, 17.6 IN JULY,
AND 32.6 IN AUGUST. THIS EQUATES TO .20 SORTIES PER USMC
BATTALION PER DAY IN JUNE, .57 IN JULY, AND 1.05 IN AUGUST.

PAGE 4 RUKHFMA2234 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

8. (S) THE TREND TOWARD INCREASING UTILIZATION OF USMC
AIR TO SUPPORT U. S. ARMY BATTALIONS IS SIGNIFICANT AND IS
CONTINUING. AVAILABLE DATA REVEALS THAT DURING SEPTEMBER,
A NET DIFFERENCE OF 741 ADDITIONAL USMC SORTIES
EXISTED. THIS EQUATES TO 1.18 SORTIES PER DAY WHICH
COULD HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO EACH MARINE BATTALION,
BASED ON THE 21 USMC BATTALIONS NOW IN I CTZ.

9. (S) IN SUMMARY, THE USMC SORTIES PROVIDED THE U. S.
ARMY (WHICH ARE REFLECTED IN THE PRECEDING STATISTICS
AS THE NET DIFFERENCE) RESULTED IN A DAILY SORTIES PROVIDED
RATE OF 3.26, 3.01, AND 3.85 PER BATTALION PER DAY
DURING THE MONTHS OF JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST, 1968.
RESPECTIVELY. HAD THESE USMC SORTIES NOT BEEN PROVIDED,
THE DAILY SORTIES PROVIDED PER ARMY BATTALION PER DAY
WOULD HAVE BEEN ONLY 3.10, 2.60, AND 3.04, FOR THE
SAME MONTHS. WARM RE GARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**
#58

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV		DATE 18 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 180152		1, 2, 3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
7	CG					REMARKS Rec 181210H. For CG - you prepared to discuss representation V. Keyes 9 copy #3 of 3 to G-1 11/6/69 <i>[Signature]</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/18			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

34

CONFIDENTIAL

0 130152Z ZYVN ZFF-1
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LTC MILDREN DCG USARPV
 GEN BROWN CO QUATH AF
 VADM ZIMWALT COMNAVFORV
 ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL MAC 14059 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: SERIOUS INCIDENTS

1. SUMMARIZED FOR YOUR INFORMATION ARE RECENT SERIOUS INCIDENTS IN THE I CORPS ZONE INVOLVING RACIAL TENSIONS. THERE WAS NO PROOF AVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF THE REPORT OF ANY ORGANIZED MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, IN THIS REGARD THE INCIDENTS SUGGEST A POSSIBLE BUILD UP OF RACIAL TENSIONS IN THE EAST DANANG AREA.

A. 10 OCT 1968. APPROXIMATELY 30-40 NEGROES APPARENTLY REPRESENTING ALL SERVICES AND SEVERAL COMMANDS IN THE I CORPS MET OSTENSIBLY TO DISCUSS INCIDENTS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN RVN. MEETING ADJOURNED WITH MINOR PROBLEMS. THIS MEETING APPEARED TO INCREASE RACIAL TENSION IN THE AREA.

B. 11 OCT 1968. ANOTHER MEETING OF 30-40 NEGROES WAS HELD. RACIAL TENSION AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE I CORPS ZONE WERE DISCUSSED WITH OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES. THE MEETING DISSOLVED WITHOUT INCIDENT. HOWEVER, RACIAL TENSIONS CONTINUED TO MOUNT AFTER MEETING.

C. 12 OCT 1968. SMALL MEETING WAS HELD WITH NO RESULTING INCIDENT; HOWEVER, RACIAL FEELINGS CONTINUED TO RUN HIGH.

D. 13 OCT 1968. ONE NEGRO SOLDIER, AFTER BEING EJECTED FROM EM CLUB FOR DRUNKNESS AND USE OF ABUSIVE LANGUAGE, OBTAINED .45 CALIBER PISTOL AND FIRED WEAPON SEVERAL TIMES IN CAMP AREA. LATER, A NEGRO SENTRY WAS DISCOVERED DEAD IN THE VICINITY OF WHERE SHOOTING OCCURRED.

AT 2050 HOURS ON 13 OCT 1968 A GROUP OF 15 NEGROES WERE SUBJECTED TO TAUNTS AND INSULTS WHILE GOING TO AREA WHERE PREVIOUS MEETINGS WERE HELD. INCIDENT CULMINATED WITH WHITE SAILOR ATTACKING TWO NEGROES WITH A MACE LIKE WEAPON.

2. IN VIEW OF THE INCIDENTS CITED ABOVE AND THE CONTINUED TENSIONS RESULTING FROM THESE INCIDENTS, I DESIRE THAT A "WATCH COMMITTEE" COMPOSED OF SENIOR SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH SERVICE IN THE DANANG AREA BE FORMED IMMEDIATELY WITH THE MISSION OF MONITORING AND TAKING APPROPRIATE ACTION ON RACIAL TENSIONS AND INCIDENTS. THE "WATCH COMMITTEE" WILL BE UNDER THE OVERALL SUPERVISION OF CG, III MAF.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

450

NNNN

#59

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MAW		DATE 19 OCT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 181145Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/19		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

SECRET

#60

SECRET

OO RUEBHOA
 DE RUMLMHA 0134 2921145
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 181145Z OCT 68
 FM CG FIRST MAW
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 RUHKM /CG FMFPAC
 RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR CMC CODE AA-1
 FOR FMFPAC F-038

1. DATA FROM USMC GROUND UNITS

A. PERIOD COVERED - FROM 0001 - 2400H, 17 OCT 68
 B. (1) 38
 (2) 3
 (3) 40
 (4) 0
 C. (1) 111
 (2) 50
 (3) 41

PAGE TWO RUMLMHA 0134 S E C R E T MCEO

(4) 34
 (5) 37
 (6) 10
 (7) 5
 D. (1) 4
 (2) 1
 (3) 2
 (4) 8
 E. (1) 15
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 F. (1) 4
 (2) 4
 (3) 0
 (4) 4
 G. (1) 2
 (2) 2
 (3) 0
 (4) 0

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#60

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMLMHA Ø134 S E C R E T MCEO

H. (1) 4
 (2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 I. (1) 0
 (2) (A) 21
 (B) 41
 (C) 0
 (D) 0
 J. (1) 0
 (2) 13
 (3) 61
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 K. (1) 0
 (2) 0
 (3) 40
 (4) 20
 L. (1) 0

PAGE FOUR RUMLMHA Ø134 S E C R E T MCEO

(2) 0
 (3) 0
 (4) 0
 (5) 0
 (6) 0
 (7) 7
 M. (1) L(7) 5 SORT NO DROP, REASON UNK
 2 SORT BINGO FUEL
 K(3) 8 SORT ASRT DOWN
 30 CANX WX

2. DATA PROVIDED BY 1ST MAW

A. (1) (A) 30
 (B) 44
 (2) 4
 (3) 4
 B. (1) 59
 (2) 23
 (3) 0
 C. (1) (A) 81 (B) 40
 (2) (A) 0 (B) 42

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET
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SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMLMHA 0134 RUMLMHA S E C R E T MCEO

	(3)	(A)	0	(B)	0
D.	(1)		2		
	(2)		2		
	(3)		0		
E.	(1)		4		
	(2)		0		
	(3)		0		
	(4)		0		
	(5)		0		
	(6)		0		
	(7)		0		
F.	(1)		0		
	(2)		4		
	(3)		0		
G.	(1)		4		
	(2)		0		
	(3)		0		
	(4)		0		
	(5)		0		
	(6)		0		

PAGE SIX RUMLMHA 0134 RUMLMHA S E C R E T MCEO

	(7)		0		
H.	(1)		21		
	(2)		0		
	(3)		0		
I.	(1)		0		
	(2)		21		
	(3)		0		
	(4)		0		
J.	(1)	(A)	12	(B)	14
	(2)	(A)	15	(B)	7
	(3)	(A)	0	(B)	0
	(4)	(A)	3	(B)	0
	(5)	(A)	0	(B)	0
	(6)	(A)	0	(B)	0
	(7)	(A)	0	(B)	23

K. (1) I (2) 1 USMC TO USMC, ACFT MALF 13 USMC TO USMC, WX
 2 USMC TO USA, WX 1 USMC TO USA, ASRT DOWN
 3 USMC TO USA, NEG CONTROL 1 USA TO USA, NEG COMM
 (2) A (1) 89 CNX DUE WX INCLUDES 13 SORT, NEG DROP

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#60

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 19 OCT 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 181441Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/19		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

36
SECRET #61

SECRET

RR RUHHFMA RHMMFA
 DE RUEBHOA 1112 292164Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 R 181441Z OCT 68.
 FM CMC
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RHMMFA/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SUPPORT AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS FOR DUFFEL BAG (U)
 A. COMUSMACV 150115Z SEPT 68 (S)
 B. CG III MAF 110922Z SEPT 68 (S)
 C. CG III MAF 090356Z SEPT 68 (S)
 D. COMUSMACV 120125Z OCT 68 (S)
 1. (S) REF A CONCLUDED THAT DUCKBLIND (NOW DUFFEL BAG (U)
 PHASE I OPERATIONAL RESULTS JUSTIFY CONTINUATION AND EXPANSION
 OF DUCKBLIND PROGRAM. REF B LISTED ACFT EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS (
 INCLUDING LORAN D FOR F-4 AND CH-46) NEC TO CONDUCT DUCKBLIND/
 IGL OO WHITE/ DUEL BLADE OPERATIONS THROUGH THE FIRST HALF OF FY69.
 REF C REQUESTED A DCPG BRIEFING ON FOLLOW-ON LORAN ASSISTED DELIVERY
 SYSTEM. REF D FORWARDED TO DCPG THE REQUIREMENTS OF REF B.
 2. (S) THIS HQTRS RECOGNIZES THE DESIRABILITY OF ATTAINING AN
 ORGANIC MARINE CORPS CAPABILITY FOR DELIVERY/MONITORING DUFFLE

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA 1112 SECRET MCEO
 BAG SENSORS. THE DESIRABILITY OF OBTAINING REQUESTED LORAN D SYSTEMS
 FOR ASSISTING EMPLACEMENT/RETRIEVAL OF SENSORS IS NOT AS CLEAR.
 INFO AVAIL TO THIS HQTRS FROM NAVY, AIR FORCE, AND DCPG SOURCE
 INDICATE THAT LORAN HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT LOCATION ACC-
 URACY, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, HAS BEEN EXTREMELY UNRELIABLE IN THE
 F-4 ACFT. THESE RESULTS ARE NOT UNEXPECTED FROM A SYSTEM WHICH HAS
 TO DATE, BY-PASSED RELIABILITY TESTING.
 3. (S) THE QUESTION OF LORAN USE FOR AIRBORNE NAVIGATION AND WPNS
 DELIVERY WAS ADDRESSED BY THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE- DEFENSE
 SCIENCE BOARD'S SUMMER STUDY PANEL ON TACTICAL ACFT. AN EXCERPT FROM
 THE PANEL'S 19AUG68 REPORT FOLLOWS, QUOTE: THE PANEL WAS VERY
 CONCERNED AT THE EXCESSIVE AMOUNT BEING SPENT AND PLANNED FOR
 INSTALLATION OF ARN-92 IN LARGE QUANTITIES OF ACFT, WITH WHAT APPEARED
 TO BE INSUFFICIENT PREVIOUS TESTING OR EXAMINATION OF LESS COSTLY
 ALTERNATIVES. IT WAS STRONGLY FELT THAT SMALLER, LESS COSTLY LORAN
 RECEIVERS COULD BE AVAIL IN 1-2 YEARS THAT WOULD DECREASE THE
 IMPACT OF LORAN INSTALLATION ON AN ACFT BY FACTORS OF WAY AND WOULD
 NOT NEED VELOCITY AIDING. SUCH SYSTEMS WOULD BE PERFECTLY ADEQUATE
 FOR NAVIGATION AND VISUAL TARGET ACQUISITION AT GREATLY REDUCED
 COST. THE PANEL WAS ALSO UNIMPRESSED WITH PLANS FOR DEVELOPMENT
 OF SYSTEMS INTENDED FOR BLIND
 BOMBING ON LORAN COORDINATES
 (E.G. LAWDS). AS NOTED ON PAGE E-1,

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RUEBHOA1112 S E C R E T MCEO

IT WAS FELT THAT NET WARPAGE AND OTHER PROBLEMS, PLUS THE COST OF THE SYSTEM MADE IT VERY UNATTRACTIVE. END QUOTE. THE PANEL MADE THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION WITH RESPECT TO AIRBORNE LORAN: CEASE COMMITMENT OF ANY MORE FUNDS TO LARGE-SCALE ARN-92 PROCUREMENT AND/OR INSTALLATION PENDING FULL EVALUATION OF ITS OPERATIONAL UTILITY AND COST/EFFECTIVENESS.

4. (S) THE AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND ESTIMATES THE TOTAL COST (INCLUDING PUBLICATION, SUPPORT, SPARES) OF EACH LORAN D AT ~~\$200,000~~ **445** EQUIVALENT SETS OF LORAN D HAVE ALREADY BEEN PROCURED, BUT RELIABILITY TESTING WPM NOT COMMENCE UNTIL INOV68.

5. (S) A TOTAL OF \$1,000,000 IS AVAIL IN NAVY FY69 PAMN FUNDS TO SUPPORT NAVY/MARINE DUFFEL BAG/IGLOO WHITE/DUEL BLADE ACFT EQUIPMENT AND MODIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. THESE FUNDS CAN PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE RADIOS, READOUT EQUIPMENTS, AND SENSOR DELIVERY KITS REQUIRED BY CG III MAF. ALTHOUGH THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT ADDITIONAL DOLLARS CAN BE OBTAINED FROM DCPG, THE PROBABILITY IS MUCH GREATER THAT MARINE CORPS REQUIREMENTS WHICH EXCEED EXISTION FY69 FUNDING CAN BE OBTAINED ONLY BY REPROGRAMMING OTHER MARINE CORPS/NAVY FUNDS.

6. (S) THE MARINE CORPS HOPES TO AVOID DEPENDENCE ON GROUND STATIONS FOR NAVIGATION AND IN KEEPING WITH THESE OBJECTIVES, PLANS TO FIELD 126 CH-46 AND 50 CH-53 SELF CONTAINED NAVIGATION SYSTEMS (SCNS) DURING

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA QQQW S E C R E T MCEO

THE NEXT YEAR. THIS SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE A SELF CONTAINED NAVIGATIONAL CEP OF ONE HALF OF ONE PERCENT OF THE DISTANCE TRAVELED. IT IS REQUESTED THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO USE OF SCNS AND THE A-6A WITH FAC BEACON/TPQ ASSIST TO MEET CG III MAF REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCURATE AIRBORNE DELIVERY/RETRIEVAL OF DUFFLE BAG SENSORS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

#61

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CPL ADRIANE COMBACH SERIALN/CONTROL DATE 280207Z		DATE 28 OCTOBER 68	
			1, 2, 3, 4		COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				lo	REMARKS
4	DCG		10/29		Buel	
5	DCG AIR				ca	
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	10/28		A	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	SAC					

TOP SECRET #17

O 230207Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN AERAMS COMUSMACV
TO GEN CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T MAC 14496 EYES ONLY

I KEENLY REGRET THE NECESSITY OF CANCELING MY TRIP TO I CORPS TODAY FOR REASONS BEYOND MY CONTROL.

I HAVE DIRECTED THE MOVE OF THE 1ST CAV DIV ON THE BASIS OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND MY CONTINUING ASSESMENT OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY TO INCLUDE HIS CAPABILITY TO REENFORCE FROM OUT OF COUNTRY. I BELIEVE THAT A PART OF HIS PROBLEM IN NORTHERN I CORPS IS INADEQUATE LOGISTIC SUPPORT. THIS MAY BE TEMPORARY. THE ABSENCE OF SOME ENEMY UNITS FROM NORTHERN I CORPS MAY ALSO BE TEMPORARY. IN THE MEANTIME HE HAS STEADILY BUILT HIS CAPABILITY IN III CORPS AND THE SANCTUARIES IN CAMBODIA. THUS THE DECISION TO MOVE 1ST CAV NOW. AS I SEE IT I CAN MOVE THE 1ST CAV BACK AS QUICKLY IF CHANGES IN THE SITUATION WARRANT IT.

WHILE IT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE DECISION TO MOVE THE 1ST CAV IT NEVERTHELESS PROVIDES SOME OPPORTUNITY FOR ARVN TO SHOULDER A BIGGER PART OF THE LOAD. I FEEL CERTAIN THAT THE 1ST ARVN DIV WILL DO THAT.

SSO NOTE:
DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

200

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~