

~~491. CG FMAW 231520Z OCT 68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~492. CG FMAW 231525Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~493. CG FMAW 241515Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~494. CG FMAW 251546Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~495. CG FMAW 261415Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~496. CG FMAW 271401Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~497. CG FMAW 280950Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~CG FMAW 291325 Nov 68 (Routine Input) Filed Tab~~

~~498. CG FMAW 301300Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

540

~~499. CG FMAW 311630Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~479. CG FMAW 130955Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

480. CG III MAF 131122Z OCT68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Montly report-evaluation of Single management of
Tactical Air

481. CG III MAF 140300Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Quotes msgs not passed to PAC previously

~~482. CG FMAW 141020Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~483. CG FMAW 151405Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~484. CG FMAW 161416Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~485. CG FMAW 171421Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~486. CG FMAW 181145Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

487. ADMINO FMFPAC 172042Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Fontana provides request substantiating information
regarding USMC Air support to U. S. Army Bns in ICTZ

~~488. CG FMAW 181015Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~489. CG FMAW 200850Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~490. CG FMAW 211105Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~466. CG FMAW 051315Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

467. CG III MAF 061358Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Comments on applicable portions of MACV analyses

~~468. CG FMAW 061010Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~469. CG FMAW 071655Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~470. CG FMAW 081810Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~471. CG FMAW 091120Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

472. CG FMFPAC 092035Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: CG FMFPAC comments on COMUSMAC V'S JUL & AUG
EVAL MSGS

~~473. CG FMAW 101455Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

474. COMUSMACV 110703Z OCT68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Evaluation of Single management Strike Support
Procedures

~~475. CG FMAW 111440Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~476. CG FMAW 121200Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

477. CG III MAF 121334Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Substantiating info regarding Marine air support
to Army battalions in I CTZ.

478. COMUSMACV 121746Z OCT68 (S) *gp-3*

Subj: Allocation of TACAIR

460. CMC 021244Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-3*

Subj: Request substantiating information on deficiency
of sorties per day.

~~461. CG FMAW 021545Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

~~462. CG FMAW 040130Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

463. COMUSMACV 040140Z OCT68 (S) *gp-4*

Subj: Requirement for additional preplanned TAC AIR Sorties

464. CG FMFPAC 040312Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

Subj: Modification of Air Support System

~~465. CG FMAW 041300Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~Subj: Routine Input~~

SECRET

PP RHMAFA RUEBHOA
 DE RUHFMA 2234 291204Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 172042Z OCT 68
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN, INFO LTGEN
 CUSHMAN FROM MGEN FONTANA. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)

A. CMC 021244Z/OCT68 (S)

1. (U) REF A REQUESTED SUBSTANTIATING INFORMATION REGARDING USMC AIR SUPPORT TO U. S. ARMY BATTALIONS IN I CTZ. STATISTICS UTILIZED IN FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE BASED ON DATA OBTAINED FROM HORN DASC BY CG, III MAF.
2. (S) DURING JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST, THE U. S. ARMY WAS OPERATING WITH 31 MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN I CTZ. AT THE PROGRAMMED RATE OF FIVE SORTIES PER U. S. ARMY MANEUVER BATTALION PER DAY, THE USAF SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE U. S. ARMY 4,650 SORTIES PER MONTH.
3. TABLE I SHOWS THE NUMBER OF SORTIES PROVIDED TO I CTZ BY USAF DURING JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST.

PAGE 2 RUHFMA2234 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

TABLE I

	(USAF AIR SUPPORT IN I CTZ)			
	USA	USMC	OTHERS	TOTAL
JUNE	2190	698	997	3885
JULY	1962	511	859	3332
AUGUST	2408	514	884	3806

4. (S) TABLE II REFLECTS THE SORTIES PROVIDED TO U. S. ARMY BATTALIONS BY BOTH THE USAF AND THE USMC DURING THE JUNE-AUGUST PERIOD.

TABLE II

	(AIR SUPPORT FOR U. S. ARMY IN I CTZ)			
	USAF	USMC	TOTAL	SORT/BN/DAY
JUNE	2190	843	3033	3.26
JULY	1962	933	2895	3.01
AUGUST	2408	1296	3704	3.85

5. (S) DURING THE THREE MONTH PERIOD, U. S. ARMY BATTALIONS RECEIVED AN AVERAGE OF 104 SORTIES PER DAY OR 67 PCT OF THE PROGRAMMED 155 SORTIES PER DAY. THIS EQUATES TO AN AVERAGE OF 3.35 SORTIES PER U. S. ARMY BATTALION PER DAY DURING JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST IN LIEU

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUNHFMA2234 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
OF THE PROGRAMMED FIVE SORTIES PER U. S. ARMY BATTALION
PER DAY.

6. (S) TABLE III INDICATES THE NUMBER OF SORTIES U. S.
ARMY BATTALIONS RECEIVED FROM THE USMC AS COMPARED TO
THE SORTIES THE USMC BATTALIONS RECEIVED FROM THE USAF.
THE NET DIFFERENCE REPRESENTS THE ADDITIONAL USMC AIR
SUPPORT PROVIDED THE U. S. ARMY BATTALIONS COMPARED TO
THAT WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY THE USMC BATTALIONS FROM
THE USAF.

	TABLE III		
	USMC TO US ARMY	USAF TO USMC	NET DIFFERENCE
JUNE	843	698	145
JULY	933	511	422
AUGUST	1296	514	782

7. (S) THIS NET DIFFERENCE WOULD HAVE PROVIDED EACH
USMC BATTALION 6.0 ADDITIONAL SORTIES IN JUNE, 17.6 IN JULY,
AND 32.6 IN AUGUST. THIS EQUATES TO .20 SORTIES PER USMC
BATTALION PER DAY IN JUNE, .57 IN JULY, AND 1.05 IN AUGUST.

PAGE 4 RUNHFMA2234 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

8. (S) THE TREND TOWARD INCREASING UTILIZATION OF USMC
AIR TO SUPPORT U. S. ARMY BATTALIONS IS SIGNIFICANT AND IS
CONTINUING. AVAILABLE DATA REVEALS THAT DURING SEPTEMBER,
A NET DIFFERENCE OF 741 ADDITIONAL USMC SORTIES
EXISTED. THIS EQUATES TO 1.18 SORTIES PER DAY WHICH
COULD HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO EACH MARINE BATTALION,
BASED ON THE 21 USMC BATTALIONS NOW IN I CTZ.

9. (S) IN SUMMARY, THE USMC SORTIES PROVIDED THE U. S.
ARMY (WHICH ARE REFLECTED IN THE PRECEDING STATISTICS
AS THE NET DIFFERENCE) RESULTED IN A DAILY SORTIES PROVIDED
RATE OF 3.26, 3.01, AND 3.85 PER BATTALION PER DAY
DURING THE MONTHS OF JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST, 1968.
RESPECTIVELY. HAD THESE USMC SORTIES NOT BEEN PROVIDED,
THE DAILY SORTIES PROVIDED PER ARMY BATTALION PER DAY
WOULD HAVE BEEN ONLY 3.10, 2.60, AND 3.04, FOR THE
SAME MONTHS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

FOR HAS BEEN SENT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PP RUHKN
DE RHMAFA 1743 2889300
ZNY SSSSS
P 140300Z OCT 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHKN/CG FMFPAC
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION I OF II
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN
REF: MY 131122Z OCT 68 (S) (EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO)
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REF, FOL MSGS ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR
INFORMATION: QUOTE

P 080812Z OCT 68
FM CG III MAF
INFO CMC
OP 291442Z JUL 68
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
CINCPAC
INFO CG FIRST MAW

BT
SECRET

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 1743 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
SUBJ: EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR PERIOD 270600H JUN 68
TO 260600H JULY 1968 (U)

REF (A) COMUSMACV 19546 DTG 971036Z JULY 1968 (NOTAL)
(B) COMUSMACV LTR MACCOC 2 OF 15 JULY 1968 (S)
(C) CG, III MAF 300636Z JUNE 1968 (NOTAL)

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (A) SUBJECT EVALUATION IS SUBMITTED,
INCLUDING COMMENTS AND STATUS OF ACTIONS ON THE AREAS OF INTEREST
LISTED IN REFERENCE (B).

2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN REFERENCE (C) ARE STILL CON-
SIDERED VALID ALTHOUGH ONLY ONE OF NINE RECOMMENDATIONS, ELIMINATION
OF IP FROM WEEKLY FRAG, HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
(SM) PROCEDURES, MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CONTINUES TO BE
IMPROVEMENT OVER ORIGINAL SYSTEM. INCREASED FAMILIARITY WITH
SYSTEM HAS RESULTED IN MORE EFFICIENT OPERATIONS. SOME ADDITIONAL
AREAS HAVE BEEN NOTED WHERE MINOR PROCEDURAL CHANGES WOULD PRO-
DUCE INCREASED RESPONSIVENESS TO CHANGING NEEDS OF GROUND COMMANDERS.

3. COMMENTS AND STATUS OF ACTION ON AREAS OF INTEREST LISTED
IN REFERENCE (B) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THIS HQ HAS NO BASIS ON WHICH TO CORROBORATE I DASC
LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS. US PORTION OF I DASC IS BEING MOVED

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111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMAFA 1743 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
TO III MAF HQ. THIS WILL FURTHER IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS TO
III MAF TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS. DEPUTY DIRECTOR I DASC
ALSO SERVES AS III MAF LIAISON OFFICER.

B. DIFFERENCES IN 7TH AF STATISTICS OF SORTIES FRAGGED,
FLOWN, AND REPORTED ARE NOT KNOWN TO THIS HQ. ALL SORTIES
FRAGGED, FLOWN AND REPORTED HAVE BEEN WITHIN 7TH AF TACTICAL
AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. SPECIFIC DISCREPANCIES IN STATISTICS HAVE
NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THIS COMMAND. I DASC MAINTAINS RECORD
OF ALL SORTIES BY TYPE FLOWN IN ICTZ. HQ III MAF IS PROVIDED
WEEKLY SUMMARY OF STATISTICS WHICH IN FACT ARE IDENTICAL TO
THOSE REPORTED TO 7TH AF TACC BY I DASC. ONLY STATISTICS ORI-
GINATING AT THIS HQ CONCERNING SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARE THOSE
REFLECTING AIR SUPPORT REQUEST AND SORTIES ALLOCATION TO III
MAF UNITS.

C. AIR SUPPORT IS REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDERS BASED
ON THEIR ESTIMATE OF SORTIES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS,
III MAF SUB-ALLOCATIONS ARE IN TURN BASED ON THESE REQUESTS.
IN ADDITION CG III MAF ASSIGNS PRIORITIES BASED ON OVERALL
EVALUATION OF ENEMY SITUATION AND OPERATIONS IN ICTZ. EX-
AMINATION OF REQUESTS SUBMITTED TO THIS HQ REVEALS ARMY AND

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 1743 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
FWMAF'S ARE IN FACT ALLOCATED A HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF REQUESTED
SORTIES THAN MARINE UNITS. SINCE 1 JULY, 2ND ROKMC BDE HAS
BEEN ALLOCATED 94 PCT. OF SORTIES REQUESTED, ARMY UNITS 66 PCT. AND
MARINES UNITS 60 PCT. ARVN UNITS DO NOT REQUEST PREPLANNED SORTIES
FROM III MAF, ARVN IMMEDIATE REQUESTS THROUGH TACS HAVE ALWAYS
BEEN HONORED. A WEEKLY AIR SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE HAS
INITIATED BY THIS HQS 18 JULY WITH ALL MAJOR SUBORDINATE
COMMANDERS REPRESENTED IN ORDER TO ASSURE ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR
AIR SUPPORT ARE FULLY KNOWN AND FAIRLY CONSIDERED. PCV
SUBALLOCATES TO UNITS UNDER PCV OPCON.

D. LULLS IN COMBAT ACTIVITY AND REDUCTION OF ENEMY THREAT
MAY RESULT IN FEWER SORTIES REQUIRED. HOWEVER, AS MANEUVER
BATTALIONS ON OFFENSIVE CONTINUE TO SEEK LOCATION OF ENEMY
UNITS, INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR LZ CONSTRUCTION, PREP AND HELO
ESCORT TEND TO OFFSET REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF TROOPS IN
CONTACT. CONSEQUENTLY GROUND COMMANDERS REQUEST FOR TACAIR
HAVE NOT LESSENED. INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE AT THIS HQ IN-
DICATES AN INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY PARTICULARLY IN QUANG
NAM PROVINCE. PRESENT ALLOCATION OF PREPLANNED SORTIES IS
NOT CONSIDERED ADEQUATE.

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SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFA 1743 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
 E. PROCEDURES TOO ASSURE FULL UTILIZATION OF WEEKLY FRAG
 ARE IN STRICT ACCORD WITH SM SYSTEM.

F. MARINE STRIKE AIRCRAFT TIO WITH CRC AND CRP AS DIRECTED
 BY FRAG.

G. SUB ALLOCATION OF WEEKLY FRAG BY THIS HQ DOES NOT
 INCLUDE ALL SORTIES ALLOCATED TO III MAF. THIS HQ AND HQ
 PCV RETAIN SORTIES FOR LOC INTERDICTION AND TO WEIGH EFFORT
 AS REQUIRED. SORTIES ARE ALSO SHIFTED BETWEEN DIVISIONS WHEN
 REQUIRED. IT MUST BE NOTED HOWEVER THAT PRINCIPLE OF SUB-
 ALLOCATING FIXED NUMBER OF SORTIES ON WEEKLY BASIS IS IN
 ACCORD WITH MODIFIED SYSTEM OBJECTIVE OF GUARANTEEING BASIC
 LEVEL OF SUPPORT.

H. SEE SUB PARA 3G ABOVE.

I. REPRESENTATIVES OF 7TH AF HAVE INDICATED INFORMALLY
 THAT PREVIOUSLY EXISTING III MAF REPORTS COULD BE UTILIZED TO
 MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT. NO REDUC-
 TION IN THIS REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED TO DATE.

J. III MAF HAS MADE CLEAR ITS VIEW THAT SUPPORTING FIRES
 SHOULD BE FULLY AND CENTRALLY COORDINATED WITH PROMPT FREE
 FLOW OF INFORMATION TO COMBINE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS WITH

PAGE SIX RHMMAFA 1743 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
 SAFETY. INFORMALLY, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS IS BEING
 SERIOUSLY STUDIED BY THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE BUT NO CONCRETE
 PROPOSAL IS KNOWN. AMERICAN DIVISION PROCEDURES ARE INDENTI-
 CAL TO MARINE CORPS.

4. DIFFICULTY HAS BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN OBTAINING PROMPT AERIAL
 PHOTOGRAPHY. FOR EXAMPLE, PHOTOGRAPHS OF NEWLY PREPARED
 HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE ARE NEEDED WITHIN SIX HOURS TO DETERMINE
 WHAT OBSTACLES STILL EXIST AND TO BRIEF PILOTS WHO MUST
 LAND BEFORE OBSTACLES CAN BE CLEARED. ALTHOUGH SYMPATHETIC
 UNDERSTANDING IS FOUND AT ALL LEVELS, NORMAL REQUEST CHAIN IS
 TOO LONG TO MEET TIGHT DEADLINE FOR DELIVERY. BELIEVE THE
 ANSWER IS TO USE IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS FOR PHOTO
 SORTIES WITH III MAF/IDASC HAVING SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY AND AIR
 DELIVERY OF PRINTS TO REQUESTING UNIT.

5. ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH SM IS NOT MEETING NEEDS OF GROUND
 UNITS IS NUMBER OF TPQ-10 (CSS) SORTIES FRAGGED. PRIOR
 TO 20 MARCH, FIRST MAW WAS PROVIDING APPROXIMATELY 94 TPQ-10
 (CSS) SORTIES ON DAILY BASIS: 42 FOR 1 ST MARDIV AND 52 FOR
 3RD MARDIV. SINCE SM, 1ST MARDIV HAS REQUESTED 37 TPQ-10 (BSS)
 SORTIES AND BEEN ALLOCATED AVERAGE OF 9 PER DYY WHILE 3RD
 BT

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SECRET

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SECRET

PP RUMKM
 DE RHMMAFA 1744 2886300
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 140300Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF II
 MARDIV REQUESTED 53 AND ALLOCATED 18 PER DAY. MARINE GROUND
 COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN REQUESTING ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER AS BE-
 FORE BUT HAVE ONLY BEEN ALLOCATED 24 PERCENT OF NUMBER RECEIVED
 PRIOR TO SM. TPQ-10 (CSS) OFFERS ACCURATE MEANS OF
 HITTING TARGETS WHICH CANNOT BE LOCATED BY AIRBORNE FAC FOR VISUAL
 ATTACK AND IN ADDITION CAN BRING WEIGHT OF AIR ATTACK ON ENEMY
 WHEN HE LEAST EXPECTS IT. ITS EFFECTIVE USE OVER A 24 HOUR
 PERIOD IS ESSENTIAL TO BOTH MARINE AND ARMY UNITS AND SHOULD
 BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED.

6. IN SUMMARY, SM SYSTEM SAW ONLY MINOR CHANGES DURING PAST
 MONTH. CHANGES RECOMMENDED LAST MONTH IN REFERENCE (C) ARE
 STILL APPLICABLE AND WOULD IMPROVE SYSTEM. IN PARTICULAR,
 RETURN TO THIS HQ SCHEDULING AUTHORITY FOR IN-COUNTRY 1ST
 MAW SORTIES TO BE USED AS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF ALL UNITS

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 1744 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
 IN ICTZ WOULD INCREASE FLEXIBILITY AND ENHANCE RESPON-
 SIVENESS TO NEEDS OF ALL III MAF GROUND COMMANDERS. COMUSMACV
 HAS MEANS FOR INFLUENCING ACTION THROUGHOUT RVN BY INCREASING
 /DECREASING AIR FORCE SORTIES PROVIDED TO III MAF.

7. IN ADDITION, FOLLOWING NEW CHANGES ARE RECOMMENDED:
 A. ESTABLISH PROCEDURE SO THAT CHANGES TO PRE-PLANNED FRAG
 CAN BE MADE THROUGH IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST CHANNELS.
 B. PROVIDE FOR RAPID RESPONSE IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE
 THROUGH USE OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS AND
 DELIVERY OF PRINTS BY AIR AS REQUIRED TO MEET STATED DEADLINES.
 C. INCREASE USE OF CSS TO KEEP ENEMY UNDER ATTACK ON 24
 HOUR A DAY BASIS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE
 QUOTE
 R 110703Z OCT 68
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CG III MAF
 INFO CINCPAC

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMAFA 1744 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
BT

S E C R E T 30171

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT STRIKE SUPPORT PROCEDURES (U)

REF: A. CG III MAF MSG 240812Z SEP 68. (S). SUBJ AS ABOVE (NOTAL)

B. DISCUSSIONS WITH BG HOFFMAN, G-3, III MAF, DURING QP OCT
68 VISIT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF MACV

1. (S) THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS CAREFULLY REVIEWED YOUR RECOMMEN-
DATION OUTLINED IN REF A TO COMBINE MACV DIR 95-13 AND 525-4 INTO
ONE DIRECTIVE AND EXPAND IT TO AN AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDIN-
ATION SYSTEM, AND DISCUSSED IT WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AS SET
FORTH IN REFERENCE B. THE PARAGRAPHS WHICH FOLLOW CONFIRM THE
UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN REFERENCE B.

2. (S) MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 WAS WRITTEN PRIMARILY TO PROTECT
AIRCRAFT FROM ARTILLERY FIRE WHILE OVER OR NEAR AIRFIELDS AND ON
POINT TO POINT FLIGHTS, ALTHOUGH IN ITS PUBLISHED FORM IT BENEFITS
ALL AIR CRAFT BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ARTILLERY WARNING CONTROL
CENTERS THROUGHOUT RVN. IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO SERVE AS A VEHICLE
FOR CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES/TACTICAL AIR IN
THE BATTLE AREA. THE RVNAF, JGS HAS A SIMILAR DIRECTIVE FOR THEIR
FORCES WHICH SERVES THE SAME PURPOSE.

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 1744 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

3. (C) MACV DIR 525-4, COMBAT OPERATIONS ARTILLERY COORDINATION
FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE, WAS WRITTEN FOR SPECIAL ONE-OF-A-
KIND SITUATION. IT DOES NOT APPEAR FEASIBLE OR DESIRABLE TO
COMBINE IT WITH ANY OTHER DIRECTIVE.

4. (S) INSTRUCTIONS FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS FOR CONTROL AND COOR-
DINATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES/TACTICAL AIR IN THE BATTLE AREA ARE
AVAILABLE IN THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIVES: MACV DIR 95-11, AVIATION
JOINT AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM; MACV DIR 525-12, COMBAT OPERA-
TIONS, COMBAT SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER; AND MACV DIR 95-4. US
AIR OPERATIONS IN RVN. MACV DIR 525-12 ESTABLISHED POLICY AND
PROCEDURES FOR INSURING EFFECTIVE AND COORDINATED USE OF ALL
AVAILABLE COMBAT SUPPORT THROUGH A STANDARDIZED COMBINED COMBAT
SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER. IT IS BELIEVED THAT MACV DIR 525-1
PROVIDES SUFFICIENT GUIDANCE TO ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVES SET
FORTH IN REFERENCE MESSAGE.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

WARM RE GARDS.

GP-4

BT

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SECRET

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SECRET

PP RUHKM
 DE RHMAFA1688 2871123
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 131122Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN BUSE FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 FOR MARINE CORPS CORPS EYES ONLY,
 MONTHLY REPORT-EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL
 AIR (U)

A. CG III MAF 240812Z SEP 68 (S)

B. CG III MAF 291614Z SEP 68 (S)

C. CG III MAF 291442Z JUL 68 (S)

D. TELCON C/S FMFPAC WITH C/S III MAF 12OCT68

1. REFS A, B, AND C READDRESSSED AND TRANSMITTED TO CMC ON
 30OCT68. IT HAS BEEN THE POLICY OF THIS COMMAND TO READDRESS
 ALL SINGLE MANAGEMENT MESSAGES TO CG FMFPAC AFTER DISPATCH
 TO COMUSMACV. AS A RESULT OF REF D, A REVIEW WAS CONDUCTED TO
 ASCERTAIN WHY REFS A, B, AND C NOT READDRESSSED. INVESTIGATION
 REVEALED MESSAGES WERE NOT READDRESSSED TO CG FMFPAC, IN
 ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED POLICY, DUE TO COMMUNICATION

PAGE TWO RHMAFA1688 **S E C R E T** SPECAT MCEO
 ERROR. ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.
 2. REF D DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER WE READDRESSSED REF C.
 ACCORDINGLY, REF C IS READDRESSSED AS WELL AS REPLY
 (COMUSMACV 110703Z OCT68-5) TO REF A. REGRET ANY
 INCONVENIENCE.
 WARN RE GARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

480

SECRET

R 006060
RHSZYUN RHMSMVA2267 2861809-SSSS--RHMAFA.
ZNY SSSSS
R 121746Z OCT 68

FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMUFKA/CDR 7AF SAIGON
RHMAFA/CG III MAF DA NANG
RUMVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
RUMUFGA/CG II FFORCEV BIEN HOA
RUMUJLB/SA I CTZ CAN THO
INFO RUMLDNA/DSA I CTZ DA NANG
RUMLPKA/DSA II CTZ PLEKU
RUMUBHA/DSA III CTZ BIEN HOA
RUMUGKD/COMNAVFORV SAIGON
RHMAVA/EP CG USARV LONG BINH

ACT G-3
DIST A

BT
SECRET 30368

SUBJ: ALLOCATION OF TACAIR (U)

1. (S) EFFECTIVE AS OF 150600H OCT 68, FOR ONE WEEK, THE DIVISION OF TACAIR BETWEEN THE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT EFFORT IN COUNTRY AND THE INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN IN THE EXTENDED BATTLE AREA WILL BE 55 PERCENT AND 45 PERCENT, RESPECTIVELY, OF TOTAL AVAILABLE ASSETS. THIS ALLOCATION WILL BE REVIEWED AND ADJUSTED

PAGE 2 RHMSMVA 2267 SECRET
AS APPROPRIATE FOR SUCCEEDING WEEKS.

2. (S) CONCOMITANT ADJUSTMENT OF INTER-CTZ CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IS AS FOLLOWS:

I CTZ	20 PER CENT
II CTZ	8 PER CENT
III CTZ	17 PER CENT
IV CTZ	9 PER CENT
TOTAL	55 PER CENT

GP-3
BT

*copy to
single management
file*

SECRET
478

SECRET

00 RUHKM
 DE RHMAFA1594 2861335
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 121334Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 BT

SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)

A. CMC 021244Z OCT 68 (S) (EXCLUSIVE MCEO)
 B. CMC 260142Z SEP 68 (S) (EXCLUSIVE MCEO)

1. (U) REF A REQUESTED SUBSTANTIATING INFO REGARDING MARINE AIR SUPPORT TO ARMY BNS IN I CORPS. STATISTICS INDICATED IN FOLLOWING PARAS ARE BASED ON DATA OBTAINED FROM HORN DASC UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.

2. (S) DURING JUN, JUL, AND AUG THE ARMY WAS OPERATING WITH 31 MANEUVER BNS IN I CORPS. AT THE PROGRAMMED RATE OF 5 SORTIES PER ARMY MANEUVER BN PER DAY 7AF SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED ARMY BNS 155 SORTIES PER DAY. TABLE I SHOWS THE SORTIES PROVIDED TO I CORPS BY USAF FOR SERVICE INDICATED AND INDICATES THAT ONLY 71 SORTIES PER DAY OR 46 PCT OF THOSE PROGRAMMED WERE ACTUALLY PROVIDED TO THE ARMY.

TABLE I

PAGE TWO RHMAFA1594 SECRET SPECAT MCEO

	USA	USMC	OTHER	TOTAL
JUNE	2190	698	997	3885
JULY	1962	511	859	3332
AUGUST	2408	514	884	3806

3. (S) TABLE II SHOWS THE SORTIES PROVIDED TO ARMY FORCES BY USAF AND USMC. IT INDICATES THAT FIRST MAW FURNISHED THE ARMY 33 SORTIES PER DAY OR 21 PCT OF THOSE PROGRAMMED TO BE PROVIDED BY USAF.

TABLE II

	USAF	USMC	TOTAL	SORT/BN/DAY
JUNE	2190	843	3033	3.26
JULY	1962	933	2895	3.01
AUGUST	2408	1296	3704	3.85

4. (S) THEREFORE THE ARMY RECEIVED DURING THE THREE MONTH PERIOD 104 SORTIES PER DAY OR 67 PCT OF THEIR PROGRAMMED 155 SORTIES PER DAY. THIS REDUCES TO 3.35 SORTIES PER BATTALION PER DAY IN LIEU OF THE PROGRAMMED 5 SORTIES PER BATTALION PER DAY.

5. (S) THE NET LOSS OF SORTIES, I.E., MARINE SORTIES TO ARMY MINUS AIR FORCE SORTIES TO MARINE FORCES, ALONG WITH THE NUMBER OF MARINE MANEUVER BNS AND THE AVERAGE NET LOSS PER MARINE MANEUVER BN PER DAY IS SHOWN IN TABLE III FOR MAY THROUGH SEP.

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TABLE III

	SORTIES	MANEUVER BNS	SORT/BN/DAY
MAY	1091	24	1.47
JUN	145	24	0.20
JUL	422	24	0.57
AUG	782	24	1.05
SEP	741	21	1.19

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P3003324
 RFLBYUN RHMSMVA1990 2850940-5555--RHMAFA.
 240 55555
 1110703Z OCT 68
 FM HQ RVNAF SAIGON
 TO RMAFA/CO III MAF DANANG
 INFO RUMHQA/CINCPAC

ACT G-3
 DIST A

BT

SECRET 30171

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT STRIKE SUPPORT PROCEDURES (U)

REF: A. CG III MAF MSG 240812Z SEP 68(S), SUBJ AS ABOVE KNOTAL)

B. DISCUSSIONS WITH BG HOFFMAN, G-3, III MAF, DURING QP OCT 68 VISIT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF MACV

1. (S) THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS CAREFULLY REVIEWED YOUR RECOMMENDATION OUTLINED IN REF A TO COMBINE MACV DIR 95-13 AND 525-4 INTO ONE DIRECTIVE AND EXPAND IT TO AN AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM, AND DISCUSSED IT WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCE B. THE PARAGRAPHS WHICH FOLLOW CONFIRM THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN REFERENCE B.

2. (S) MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 WAS WRITTEN PRIMARILY TO PROTECT AIRCRAFT FROM ARTILLERY FIRE WHILE OVER OR NEAR AIRFIELDS AND ON POINT TO POINT FLIGHTS, ALTHOUGH IN ITS PUBLISHED FORM IT BENEFITS ALL AIR CRAFT BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ARTILLERY WARNING CONTROL

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CENTERS THROUGHOUT RVN. IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO SERVE AS A VEHICLE FOR CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES/TACTICAL AIR IN THE BATTLE AREA. THE RVNAF JGS HAS A SIMILAR DIRECTIVE FOR THEIR FORCES WHICH SERVES THE SAME PURPOSE.

3. (C) MACV DIR 525-4, COMBAT OPERATIONS ARTILLERY COORDINATION FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE, WAS WRITTEN FOR A SPECIAL ONE-OF-A-KIND SITUATION. IT DOES NOT APPEAR FEASIBLE OR DESIRABLE TO COMBINE IT WITH ANY OTHER DIRECTIVE.

4. (S) INSTRUCTIONS FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS FOR CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES/TACTICAL AIR IN THE BATTLE AREA ARE AVAILABLE IN THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIVES: MACV DIR 95-11, AVIATION JOINT AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM; MACV DIR 525-12, COMBAT OPERATIONS, COMBAT SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER; AND MACV DIR 95-4, US AIR OPERATIONS IN RVN. MACV DIR 525-12 ESTABLISHED POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR INSURING EFFECTIVE AND COORDINATED USE OF ALL AVAILABLE COMBAT SUPPORT THROUGH A STANDARDIZED COMBINED COMBAT SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER. IT IS BELIEVED THAT MACV DIR 525-1 PROVIDES SUFFICIENT GUIDANCE TO ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN REFERENCE MESSAGE.

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BT

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SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

FOR

PP RUEBHOA RHMAFA
DE RUHFMA 1207 2832035
ZNY SSSSS

P 092035Z OCT 68

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUEBHOA/CMC

INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN. CHAPMAN, INFO
LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM LT GEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL AIR ASSETS (U)

A. CMC 281233Z/SEP68 (S)

B. CG III MAF 061358Z/OCT68 (S) (PASEP)

1. (S) REFERENCE A REQUESTED COMMENTS ON COMUSMACV'S
JULY AND AUGUST EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT
OPERATIONS AND, IN ADDITION, REQUESTED CG III MAF'S
INPUTS TO COMUSMACV FOR HIS EVALUATION DURING THESE
PERIODS BE PROVIDED.

2. (S) BOB HAS READDRESSSED HIS JULY AND AUGUST INPUTS
TO YOU AS REQUESTED. REFERENCE B IS HIS VERY THOROUGH
RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST AND I AM PASSING IT TO YOU

PAGE TWO RUHFMA 1207 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
SEPARATELY. I CONCUR FULLY WITH HIS COMMENTS.

3. (S) THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS, PROVIDED TO REINFORCE
HIS VIEWS, ARE KEYED TO THE PARAGRAPHS OF REFERENCE B.

A. SUBPARAGRAPH 3A(2): CONCUR WITH USING THE
MODIFIED COMBAT ACTIVITIES REPORT (COACT) TO PROVIDE
REQUIRED DATA TO THE SINGLE MANAGER. HOWEVER, A MORE
EXPEDIENT METHOD OF DELIVERING THE COACT REPORT TO
MACV MUST BE DEVELOPED TO NEGATE HIS OBJECTION TO THE
5-7 DAY DELAY CURRENTLY BEING ENCOUNTERED.

B. SUBPARAGRAPH 3B(2): THE COORDINATION OF AIR/
GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES IS NOT A PROBLEM UNDER OUR
MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. THE ARTILLERY WARNING
SYSTEM INITIATED BY MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 OF 24 FEB 68 IS,
IN FACT, MERELY AN ADVISORY SYSTEM RATHER THAN A CO-
ORDINATING SYSTEM. PERHAPS MACV WOULD BE MORE
RECEPTIVE TO OUR PROPOSAL IF THE FIRST CAVALRY AND 101ST
AIRBORNE DIVISION FOLLOWED THE LEAD OF THE AMERICAN
DIVISION AND ESTABLISHED AN AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING
FIRES COORDINATION SYSTEM COMPATIBLE WITH OURS. A
UNITED FRONT IN ICTZ WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO IGNORE.

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C. SUBPARAGRAPH 3F(2): AVAILABLE DATA SUBSTANTIATES THAT FMAW AIR SUPPORT FOR U. S. ARMY MANEUVER BATTALIONS HAS BEEN REQUIRED DUE TO THE SHORTFALL OF AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE USAF. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS WHO HAVE BEEN HURT THE MOST BY THIS, BUT RATHER THE FMAW WHICH HAS HAD TO MAINTAIN THE HIGH SORTIE RATE TO RECTIFY THIS IMBALANCE OF AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED. DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS, OVER ONE-THIRD OF THE TOTAL FMAW EFFORT HAS BEEN IN SUPPORT OF UNITS OTHER THAN MARINES. MARINES CONTINUE TO RECEIVE MORE THAN THEIR PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF AIR SUPPORT BASED ON THE JCS PLANNING FACTOR OF 6.67 AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PER MARINE BATTALIONS DAILY. FOR EXAMPLE, IN AUGUST MARINE BATTALIONS RECEIVED AN AVERAGE OF 7.8 SORTIES PER DAY. THEREFORE, I BELIEVE WE STAND TO GAIN THE MOST BY ADDRESSING THE CONTINUAL SURGING REQUIRED OF FMAW. THE RESULTANT HIGH SORTIE RATE OFFERS A BETTER REASON FOR REDUCING AIR SUPPORT TO UNITS OTHER THAN MARINES THAN DOES THE INEQUITY OF AIR SUPPORT RECEIVED BY OUR

PAGE FOUR RUHFMA 1207 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
GROUND COMMANDERS.

D. SUBPARAGRAPH 3K(2): CONCUR THAT ADDITIONAL RADAR CONTROLLED MISSIONS (COMBAT SKY SPOT) ARE DESIRABLE AS LONG AS FMAW IS NOT TASKED TO MAKE UP THE SHORTFALL OF THE USAF, AND THE PRESENT BALANCE OF AVAILABLE DAY SORTIES IS NOT JEOPARDIZED.

E. SUBPARAGRAPH 4F(1): RELATES THAT COMUSMACV STATED THE PREVIOUS MARINE SYSTEM WAS INADEQUATE TO MEET HIS NEEDS AND THAT WHEN IT BECAME NECESSARY TO AUGMENT MARINE AIR ASSETS TO SUPPORT THE ARMY DIVISIONS IN ICTZ, SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR WAS DESIRABLE. BOB DOES NOT CONCUR, AND I AGREE. THE RETRUN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO CG III MAF WOULD BENEFIT ICTZ BY SHORTENING THE REQUEST CHAIN, THEREBY PERMITTING A MORE FLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM. HOWEVER, TO ENSURE A RECEPTIVE HEARING, A MORE PALATABLE APPROACH WOULD BE TO STRESS THE ADVANTAGES ACCRUING OVERALL TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT BY ADOPTION OF MISSION DIRECTION BY CG III MAF.

F. SUBPARAGRAPH 4K(2): CONCUR THAT THE MONTHLY

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PAGE FIVE RUHFMA 1207 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
EVALUATION MUST CONTINUE, SINCE IT IS BY THIS MEDIUM
THAT THE SHORICOMINGS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT CAN BE
BEST ILLUMINATED. THE EVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENTS WHICH
RESULT PROVIDE US THE MOST PROMISING VEHICLE TO RETURN
THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF WHERE
IT RIGHTFULLY BELONGS. WARMEST REGARDS.

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SECRET

DE RHMAFA 0802 2801358

ZNY SSSSS

061358Z OCT 68

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMHAN/CG FIRST MAW

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 1 OF 5 SECTIONS
SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL AIR ASSETS (U).

1. CMC 281233Z SEP 68 (S) (EXCLUSIVE MCEO)

2. COMUSMACV 071218Z AUG 68 (S)

3. COMUSMACV 130350Z SEP 68 (S)

4. CG III MAF 291442Z JULY 68 (S)

5. CG III MAF 291416Z AUG 68 (S)

6. CG III MAF 240812Z SEP 68 (S)

1. (C) REF A REQUESTED FMFPAC COMMENTSON REF B AND C AND OTHER SPECIFIC INFORMATION CONCERNING SINGLE MANAGEMENT. REF B AND C ARE COMUSMACV EVALUATION REPORTS ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR THE MONTHS OF JULY AND AUGUST RESPECTIVELY. REF D AND E ARE III MAF EVALUATION REPORTS ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR THE MONTHS OF JULY AND AUGUST RESPECTIVELY. REF F PROVIDED COMUSMACV WITH III MAF OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING COORDINATION OF AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES.

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0802 **S E C R E T** SPECAT (MCEO)

2. (U) PURSUANT TO REF A, REF D AND E HAVE BEEN READDRESSED TO CMC. REF F HAS ALSO BEEN READDRESSED.

3. (S) COMMENTS ON APPLICABLE PORTIONS OF REF B ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. PARAGRAPH 4.D.8:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: IT APPEARS THAT WITH MINIMAL EFFORT THE MARINE SPHINX REPORT COULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE DATA REQUIRED BY THE SINGLE MANAGER. THIS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MIGHT BE SUPERFLUOUS TO OTHER RECIPIENTS OF THE SPHINX REPORT, BUT IT IS FELT THAT THIS SINGLE REPORT COULD BE MADE INCLUSIVE ENOUGH TO SATISFY ALL REQUIREMENTS WITHOUT ANY DEGRADATION OF THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE REPORT.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: DO NOT CONCUR. THE CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT (CMR) REQUIRED BY THE SINGLE MANAGER IS A COMPLETE DUPLICATION OF THE COMBAT ACTIVITIES REPORT (COACT) WITH A SINGLE MINOR OMISSION WHICH COULD EASILY BE ADDED: AN INDICATION AS TO WHETHER A SORTIE WAS PREPLANNED OR IMMEDIATE. THE SINGLE MANAGER IS CURRENTLY ON DISTRIBUTION FOR COACT AND THERE IS NO REASON WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF THE CMR. THE SPHINX REPORT IS AN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY WHICH PROVIDES BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA) FOR EACH MISSION FLOWN. REPLACING THE CMR WITH THE SPHINX REPORT

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PAGE THREE RHMMAFA 0802 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)
 WOULD RESULT IN THE PRESENT CMR BEING INCLUDED AS A PART OF THE
 SPHINX REPORT WITH NO REDUCTION IN WORKLOAD.

B. PARAGRAPH 5.D.:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THIS IS AN AREA THAT WAS RECOGNIZED IN THE
 LAST EVALUATION AS A COMPLEX PROBLEM THAT REQUIRES EXTENSIVE INVESTI-
 GATION AND THE MOST THOROUGH STAFFING. WHEN THE TERM SUPPORTING
 FIRES IS TAKEN TO INCLUDE MORTAR FIRE AND NAVAL GUNFIRE AS WELL AS
 ARTILLERY FIRE, THE MYRIAD COMPLICATIONS BEGIN TO BECOME APPARENT.
 AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR WHICH INCREASES THE DIFFICULTIES OF COORDINATION,
 IS THE DIVERSITY OF THE FORCES INVOLVED, I.E., MARINE CORPS, ARMY,
 NAVY, RVNAF, ROK FORCES, ETC. TO FULLY COORDINATE AND ASSURE SAFE
 PASSAGE FOR ALL AIRCRAFT FROM ONE DIVISION'S AO THROUGH ANOTHER
 DIVISION'S AO WITHIN ANY GIVEN CTZ REQUIRES THAT ALL TYPES OF
 SUPPORTING FIRES BE KNOWN TO A COMMON CONTROL CENTER AT ALL TIMES.
 THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE DURING PERIODS WHEN LOW CEILINGS DICTATE
 AIRCRAFT STRIKE OPERATIONS BE CONDUCTED BENEATH CLOUD COVER AT LOW
 ALTITUDES. THIS IS AN AREA OF VITAL CONCERN TO MACV WHICH WAS NOT
 SUFFICIENTLY RESOLVED DURING THIS EVALUATION PERIOD. EFFORTS TO
 RESOLVE THE PROBLEM WILL BE ACTIVELY PURSUED. IT IS REITERATED
 THAT THIS PROBLEM IS NOT PECULIAR TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT IN ICTZ.

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA 0802 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)

BUT RATHER IS A COORDINATION PROBLEM UNDER ANY SYSTEM.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: DO NOT CONCUR. COORDINATION OF
 AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES IS NOT A PROBLEM UNDER THE MARINE AIR
 CONTROL SYSTEM. THE AMERICAN DIVISION HAS ESTABLISHED A SIMILAR AND
 COMPATIBLE SYSTEM. U.S. NAVY, ROKMC, AND ARVN FORCES HAVE DEMONSTRAT-
 ED THE ABILITY TO FUNCTION WITHIN THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. ONLY
 THE RECENTLY JOINED FIRST CAVALRY DIV (AM) AND 101ST AIRBORNE DIV (AM)
 PROFESS LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AND CAPABILITY TO CONFORM TO THE PROVEN
 CONCEPTS OF MARINE AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION. SERIOUS
 CONCERN BY COMUSMACV IS NOT EVIDENT. REF F. APPLIES.

C. PARAGRAPH 6.D.:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: MACV'S CONTINUED ATTENTION TO THIS PROBLEM
 IS PRODUCING RESULTS TOWARD A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE MATTER.
 THIS IS ONE OF THE AREAS IN WHICH KNOWLEDGE AND FAMILIARITY
 WITH THE SYSTEM WILL RESULT IN SMOOTHER FUNCTIONING. BETTER UNDER-
 STANDING OF THIS INHERENT FLEXIBILITY WAS MORE APPARENT DURING THIS
 EVALUATION PERIOD.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY III MAF TO
 ASSURE FULL UTILIZATION OF THE WEEKLY FRAG ARE IN STRICT ACCORDANCE
 WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. COMUSMACV CONCERN HERE IS VAGUE.

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 HOWEVER, EXPERIENCE HAS INDICATED THAT LEAD TIME NECESSARY TO CHANGE MISSIONS, TOT'S AND ORDANCE UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARE IN EXCESS OF THAT REQUIRED BY THE MARINE SYSTEM.

D. PARAGRAPH 8C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THE MOVE OF THE US FMAF PORTION OF I DASC TO III MAF HQ, WHICH SHOULD BE COMPLETED ON OR ABOUT 10 AUGUST 1968, IS EXPECTED TO ASSURE COMPLETE TACAIR RESPONSIVENESS TO III MAF TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: NO LONGER A CONCERN AS HORN DASC IS NOW IN FULL OPERATION LOCATED WITHIN THE III MAF COMPOUND WITH AN ADEQUATE AUGMENTATION OF MARINE PERSONNEL.

E. PARAGRAPH 9C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THIS PROBLEM NOW APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF THE DIFFERENCES WERE THE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF TERMS AND A DIFFERENCE IN REPORTING PERIODS. THE SPOTLIGHTING OF THESE PROBLEM AREAS BY COMUSMACV COUPLED WITH COORDINATION BETWEEN 7AF AND III MAF, AND INDOCTRINATION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL APPEAR TO REDUCED THE REPORTING DIFFERENCES TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: NO LONGER A CONCERN AS 7TH AF PERSONNEL

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 0802 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEQ)
 HAVE BEEN INDOCTRINATED IN THE PROCEDURES AND FORMAT OF SINGLE MANAGER REPORTING.

F. PARAGRAPH 10C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THE INSTITUTION OF A WEEKLY AIR SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE IS APPROPRIATE, AND IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THIS HAS RESULTED IN BETTER PLANNING OF DISTRIBUTION OF TACAIR ASSETS.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: ACCORDING TO JCS PLANNING FACTORS THE U.S. AIR FORCE WAS INITIALLY PROGRAMMED TO PROVIDE AN AVERAGE OF 145 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PER DAY FOR THE SUPPORT OF ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ. WITH THE RECENT ARRIVAL OF ADDITIONAL ARMY MANEUVER BATTALIONS THIS FIGURE HAS INCREASED TO 170 SORTIES PER DAY. USING THESE SAME PLANNING FACTORS DURING JULY, SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED 155 SORTIES A DAY FOR ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ.

ACTUALLY PROVIDED ONLY AN AVERAGE OF 109 SORTIES PER DAY. HENCE, I CORPS BATTALIONS WERE DEPRIVED OF 46 SORTIES PER DAY. THE FAILURE OF THE AIR FORCE TO PRODUCE THIS NUMBER OF SORTIES FOR ICTZ HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY GROSS SINCE THE INCEPTION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND HAS BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE DEVERSION OF MARINE AIR FROM THE SUPPORT OF MARINE UNITS. IN JULY, MARINE AIR AVERAGED 30 SORTIES PER DAY IN SUPPORT OF U.S. ARMY UNITS. ROMC RECEIVED AN AVERAGE OF 2 SORTIES PER DAY WHICH WAS ESSENTIALLY ALL THAT WAS REQUESTED. IF U.S. ARMY MANEUVER
 BT

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SECRET

DE RHMAFA 0803 2801358
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 061358Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG
 BT

SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY TWO OF FIVE
 BATTALIONS ARE TO BE SUPPORTED BY AN AVERAGE OF 5 SORTIES PER DAY,
 IT IS MANDATORY THAT THE AIR FORCE CONFORM TO SORTIE PRODUCTION
 QUOTAS.

G. PARAGRAPH 11C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: UPON COMUSMACV'S IDENTIFICATION OF THE
 SPECIFIC PROBLEM AND NOTIFICATION TO CG, III MAF, AND CDR, 7AF,
 THIS PROBLEM WAS RESOLVED. ALL MARINE STRIKE AIRCRAFT REPORTEDLY
 NOW CHECK IN WITH EITHER A CRC OR CRP. THIS WAS PRIMARILY A PROBLEM
 OF FAMILIARIZATION AND STANDARDIZATION.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: DO NOT CONCUR. DESPITE THE FACT THE THE
 FIRST MAW TAOC (VICE SQUAD) POSSESSES FAR SUPERIOR EQUIPMENT
 THAN THE AIR FORCE CRC (PANAMA) AND CONSISTENTLY OUTPERFORMS THE
 LATER IT HAS BEEN DENIED A MAJOR AREA AIR CONTROL ROLE. MARINE
 FLIGHTS UTILIZE VICE SQUAD WHICH IN TURN RELAYS CHECK-IN INFORMATION

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0803 SECRET (MCEO)
 TO PANAMA. THIS SYSTEM IS SATISFACTORY TO AIR FORCE INTEREST. AIE
 FORCE FLIGHTS UTILIZE PANAMA.

H. PARAGRAPH 12C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THE SITUATION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN
 IMPROVED BY III MAF ADOPTION OF A PROCEDURE SIMILAR TO THAT
 EMPLOYED BY COMUSMACV (TASE).

(2) III MAF COMMENT: NO LONGER A CONCERN. MAJOR GROUND
 COMMANDERS MUST POSSESS THE AUTHORITY TO DIRECT THE EMPLOYMENT OF
 SORTIES REPORTING TO THEIR SUPPORTING DADC'S ON TARGETS WITHIN
 THEIR TAOR'S WHICH IN THEIR OPINION ARE THE MOST CRITICAL TO THE
 GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER.

I. PARAGRAPH 13C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THIS SITUATION IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
 PRECEDING ONE AND APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY THE PROCEDURE
 CURRENTLY IN USE BY III MAF.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: NO LONGER A CONCERN. REMARKS IN
 PARAGRAPH H. ABOVE APPLY.

J. PARAGRAPH 14C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: COMUSMACV CONCURS WITH CG, III MAF,
 THAT THE CHANGE IN NATURE OF FRIENDLY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, HAS NOT

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PAGE THREE RHMMAFA 0803 S E C R E T (MCEO)
 DECREASED THE REQUIREMENT FOR TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT, BUT HAS ONLY CHANGED THE SPECIFICS OF THE REQUIREMENT. WHILE THE EMPHASIS ON INCREASED AIER SUPPORT IN ICTZ IS APPRECIATED, THIS NEED MUST BE BALANCED AGAINST THE NEEDS OF ALL OTHER MAJOR GROUND COMMANDERS TO MAKE AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF AIR ASSETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MACV PRIORITIES AND THREAT REQUIREMENTS. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE FACT THAT ICTZ RECEIVES A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF THE TACAIR SUPPORT AVAILABLE.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: THAT THE PREPLANNED ALLOCATION OF SORTIES IN ICTZ IS INADEQUATE IS AMPLY EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT DURING THIS PERIOD U.S. ARMY MANEUVER BATTALIONS RECEIVED LESS THAN THEIR PROGRAMMED 5 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PER BATTALION PER DAY. SORTIE ALLOCATION TO ICTZ MUST BE CAREFULLY MONITORED TO PRECLUDE FURTHER DRAW DOWN ON MARINE SORTIES AT THE EXPENSE OF MARINE MANEUVER BATTALIONS.

K. PARAGRAPH 29B:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT, CG, III MAF DETERMINES THE PROPORTION OF CSS TO FAC MISSIONS TO BE FLOWN WITHIN TACAIR ASSETS PROVIDED. DURING THIS REPORT PERIOD III MAF RECEIVED A TOTAL DAILY AVERAGE OF 225 SORTIES OF WHICH 35 WERE REQUESTED

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 AND EXECUTED AS CSS (21 FOR USMC UNITS, 12 FOR USA UNITS AND 2 FOR ROK UNITS). AN INCREASED REQUIREMENT FROM 21 TO 90 CSS FOR MARINE UNITS IS WELL WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF TPQ/MSQ-77 RADARS AND THE AIR ASSETS PROVIDED. HAD III MAF CHOSEN TO ESTABLISH THIS REQUIREMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN FULFILLED. HOWEVER, ANY INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF FAC SORTIES AVAILABLE TO III MAF.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: COMBAT SKY SPOT (CSS) MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF MARINE FORCES HAD BEEN REDUCED TO 24 PERCENT OF WHAT WAS RECEIVED PRIOR TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT. CG, III MAF COULD HAVE REQUESTED ADDITIONAL CSS SORTIES FROM THE DAILY I CORPS ALLOCATION OF AIR SUPPORT BUT WOULD HAVE THEREBY DIMINISHED THE AVAILABLE NUMBER OF VISUALLY CONTROLLED DAY TIME MISSIONS. THIS WAS NOT CONSIDERED PRUDENT DUE TO THE SHORTAGE OF PREPLANNED SORTIES ALLOCATED TO I CORPS. AVAILABLE DAY SORTIES ARE CRITICALLY NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER. AN ADDITIONAL ALLOCATION OF SORTIES IS NEEDED TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF TPQ CONTROLLED NIGHT INTERDICTION MISSIONS.

4. (S) COMMENTS ON APPLICABLE PORTIONS OF REF C ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. PARAGRAPH 4.8:

(1) MACV COMMENT: PROCEDURES FOR FLIGHT SAFETY AND

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PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 0803 S E C R E T (MCEO)
 COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY FIRES ARE OUTLINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13, 24 FEBRUARY 1968, ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DIRECTIVE IS ON AN INCREMENTAL OF ADDITIVE BASIS AND IS TO BE EFFECTED IN A MANNER WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE TACTICAL MISSION. EFFECTIVE 1 AUGUST 1968 THE DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTED THE PROCEDURE FOR ALL ARTILLERY FIRE WITHIN ENROUTE AREAS TO BE REPORTED TO THE NEAREST CONTROL AND REPORTING CENTER (CRC) WHEN THE MAXIMUM ORDINATE FO FIRE IS 5,000 FEET OF HIGHER AGL. PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST 1968 THE MAXIMUM ORDINATE REPORTING ALTITUDE WAS 7,000 FEET AGL. THE DIRECTIVE REQUIRES THAT AT THE TIME A COMMUNICATION AND DISSEMINATING CAPABILITY EXISTS OR CAN BE DEVELOPED, THE REPORTING ALTITUDE SHOULD BE PROGRESSIVELY REDUCED TO ACHIEVE THE END OBJECTIVE OF 3,000 FEET AGL. THIS DIRECTIVE IS PRESENTLY UNDER REVIEW TO ENSURE THAT ADEQUATE PROCEDURES ARE ESTABLISHED FOR FLIGHT SAFETY.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: THE ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM ESTABLISHED BY MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 WAS ORGANIZED AS AN ADVISORY SERVICE ONLY AND THEREFORE LACKS BOTH THE CAPABILITY AND AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE AIR/ GROUND SUPPORT IN FIRES. SINCE SINGLE MANAGEMENT THE APPLICATION OF

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 0803 S E C R E T (MCEO)
 AIR AND GROUND SUPPORT IN FIRES HAS BEEN GREATLY INHIBITED BY THE LACK OF COORDINATING AGENCIES RESULTING IN SERIOUS INEFFICIENCIES. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MARINE TYPE AIR SUPPORT CONTROL SYSTEM HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY RECOMMENDED. THE ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM IS INADEQUATE EVEN AS AN ADVISORY SERVICE BECAUSE OF THE MYRIAD AGENCIES AND AGENCIES WHICH MUST BE UTILIZED TO TRAVERSE EVEN A LIMITED DISTANCE.

B. PARAGRAPH 5.:

(1) MACV COMMENT: IT APPEARS THAT INCREASING FAMILIARITY WITH THE SYSTEM IS RESULTING IN BETTER RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GROUND COMMANDERS REQUIREMENTS. THIS IS AN ITEM OF CONTINUING INTEREST.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: WHEN COMPARED TO WHAT COULD BE AVAILABLE UNDER A MARINE TYPE AIR SUPPORT CONTROL SYSTEM, THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IS REFUTABLY INFLEXIBLE AND UNRESPONSIVE. ALTHOUGH SINGLE MANAGEMENT IS FUNCTIONING IN ITS PRESENT FORM, IT IS FAR FROM OPTIMUM. THE LENGTHY CHAIN OF REQUEST FOR AIR SUPPORT ESTABLISHED BY SINGLE MANAGEMENT CAN NEVER EXPECTED TO PRODUCE THE FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS WHICH COULD BE REALIZED BY THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF.

C. PARAGRAPH 6.:

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S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY . SECTION 3 OF 5 SECTIONS
 (1) MACV COMMENT: THIS IS AN ITEM OF CONTINUING INTEREST.
 ALTHOUGH THE BULK OF REQUESTS FOR MUNITIONS WAS MET SATISFACTORILY,
 IMPROVEMENT POSSIBILITIES REMAIN.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: ALTHOUGH REQUESTS FOR SPECIFIC ORDNANCE
 HAVE BEEN HONORED SINCE THE DESIRED ORDNANCE IS USUALLY AVAILABLE FROM
 ONE OF THE MANY SOURCES, THE TIME REQUIRED TO LOCATE SPECIFIC ORDNANCE
 REMAINS EXCESSIVE AS DOES THE TIME REQUIRED TO EFFECT CHANGES IN
 PREPLANNED ORDNANCE. THE REMARKS OF PARAGRAPH B ABOVE APPLY.

D. PARAGRAPH 7.:

(1) MACV COMMENT: PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING AERIAL PHOTO-
 GRAPHY ARE PRESCRIBED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-11, JOINT AIR/GROUND
 OPERATIONS SYSTEM, WHICH IS PRESENTLY UNDERGOING REVISION. THE
 INTERIM PROCEDURE ADOPTED ON 3 JULY, AND REPORTED LAST MONTH,
 CONTINUES IN EFFECT, 7AF HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO REEVALUATE THE

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0804 **S E C R E T** SPECAT. (MCEO)
 FEASIBILITY OF RELOCATING CERTAIN RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS TO BE MORE
 RESPONSIVE TO REQUESTERS.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE UNDER SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT HAS SUFFERED SIMILAR PENALTIES IN FLEXIBILITY AND
 RESPONSIVENESS AS HAS BEEN EXPERIENCED IN TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT, TO
 BE OF BENEFIT TO THE GROUND COMMANDERS, PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE MUST BE
 HIGHLY RESPONSIVE PRODUCING DESIRED RESULTS IN A MINIMUM TIME FRAME.
 I CORPS REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE COULD BE
 SATISFIED BY THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE PHOTO
 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT TO III MAF. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT
 COMUSMACVZJS PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS WILL ALTER THE CURRENT UNDESIRABLE
 SITUATION.

E. PARAGRAPH 8.:

(1) MACV COMMENT: THE PROPOSED REVISION OF MACV DIRECTIVE
 95-11 JOINT AIR/GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM, INCLUDES A PROCEDURE FOR
 CHANGING THE PREPLANNED FRAG THROUGH THE IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST NET.
 THIS PROCEDURE IS CURRENTLY IN USE.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: NO LONGER A CONCERN.

F. PARAGRAPH 9.:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: CG III MAF REITERATES HIS DESIRE TO

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 HAVE SORTIE DIRECTION OF MARINE AIRCRAFT, LESS OUT-COUNTRY EFFORT,
 ASSIGNED TO HIM. HE SUPPORTS THIS RECOMMENDATION WITH A SERIES OF
 ADVANTAGES HE ESTIMATES WILL ACORUE AS A RESULT OF III MAF MISSION
 DIRECTION. ADOPTION OF HIS RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD ELIMINATE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT AND REINSTITUTE THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM WHICH WAS INADEQUATE
 TO THE NEEDS OF COMUSMACV. AS LONG AS IT IS NECESSARY TO COMMIT U.S.
 ARMY DIVISIONS IN THE ICTZ WITH MARINE DIVISIONS, AND IT IS NECESSARY
 TO AUGMENT MARINE AIR ASSETS TO SUPPORT THE TOTAL FORCE, SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT OF AIR IS DESIRABLE.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: DO NOT CONCUR. THE RETURN OF MISSION
 DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR ASSETS TO III MAF COULD EASILY BE ACCOMPLISHED
 WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PRESENT SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.
 CURRENTLY, MARINE SORTIES ARE TAKEN FROM III MAF ON A DAILY/WEEKLY
 BASIS BY COMUSMACV AND ARE CONSISTENTLY RETURNED FOR USE IN ICTZ.
 SINCE THE INCEPTION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT THERE HAS BEEN ONLY ONE
 OCCASION WHEN 1ST MAW DELIVERED AIR SUPPORT TO ANOTHER CORPS AREA.
 THIS CONSISTED OF ONLY 4 SORTIES. WITH THE RETURN OF
 MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF, COMUSMACV WOULD RETAIN
 OVERALL CONTROL OF THE AIR EFFORT AS WELL AS PREEMPTION AUTHORITY
 IN THE EVENT OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. THE NET EFFECT OF RETURN OF

PAGE FOUR RHMMFA 0804 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)
 MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF WOULD BE THE SHORTENING
 OF THE REQUEST CHAIN THEREBY PERMITTING A MORE FLEXIBLE AND
 RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM.

G. PARAGRAPH 10: PARAGRAPH 3.K. ABOVE APPLIES.

H. PARAGRAPH 11C:

(1) MACV COMMENT: IT APPEARS THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO THE MINIMUM NECESSARY
 FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: THE CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT (CMR)
 IS REDUNDANT. IT COULD AND SHOULD BE ELIMINATED. THE FIRST MAW IS
 NEITHER EQUIPPED NOR STAFFED TO CONFORM TO AIR FORCE COMBAT REPORTING
 REQUIREMENTS AND TIME FRAMES. A REASONABLE DELAY IN THE SUBMISSION OF
 FIRST MAW REPORTS MUST BE ACCEPTED. THE REMARKS OF PARAGRAPH 3.A.
 ABOVE APPLY.

I. PARAGRAPH 12C:

(1) MACV COMMENT: HORN DASC HAS SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY OVER
 ALERT SORTIES OF AIR UNITS LOCATED IN ICTZ, AND IS RESPONSIVE TO
 CG, III MAF REQUIREMENTS. THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOES NOT
 PRECLUDE ADOPTION OF THE AIRBORNE ALERT PROCEDURE.

(2) III MAF COMMENT:

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(A) THE FIRST MAW AIRBORNE ALERT, OR CAP, HAS BEEN AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS IN PROVIDING GROUND FORCES IN ICTZ WITH VASTLY MORE RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT. DURING AUGUST 1, 063 CAP MISSIONS WERE FLOWN WITH AN AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME OF 15.4 MINUTES. THIS RESPONSE TIME IS MEASURED FROM RECEIPT OF REQUEST AT DASC TO FIRST BOMB ON TARGET.

(B) CONTRARY TO THE 7TH AF ALLEGATION WITH RESPECT TO THIS PARA, THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AN INFORMAL BRIEFING ON THE RESULTS OF THE MARINE CAP SYSTEM. MARINE CAP'S AND HOT PADS HAVE RARELY GONE DRY AS ALLEGED AND THEN ONLY FOR SHORT DURATION AS THE RESULT OF HEAVY SURGE DEMANDS FOR AIR SUPPORT.

J. PARAGRAPH 13.:

(1) MACV COMMENT: MACV EVALUATION FOR THIS PERIOD INDICATES THE FOLLOWING IMPROVEMENTS OR INNOVATIONS:

(A) HORN DASC BECAME OPERATIONAL ON 10 AUGUST 1968. IT IS THE SENIOR FWF DASC IN ICTZ AND WAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN III MAF COMPOUND TO PROVIDE BETTER RESPONSE TO III MAF.

(B) CG, III MAF INITIATED AN EXPERIMENTAL AIRBORNE ALERT POSTURE IN ICTZ ON 9 AUGUST 1968.

(C) AIR SUPPORT MEASURED IN SORTIES PER BATTALION PER

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DAY INCREASED FOR BOTH MARINE AND ARMY FORCES FROM 5.4 TO 6.1 AND 3.1 TO 3.5 RESPECTIVELY.

(D) INCREASED FAMILIARITY WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS RESULTED IN MORE RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT TO GROUND COMMANDERS THROUGHOUT VIETNAM.

(E) RESPONSIVENESS TO REQUESTS FOR TOT CHANGES HAS IMPROVED.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: CONCUR.

K. PARAGRAPH 14.:

(1) MACV COMMENT: THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF AIR CONTINUES TO MEET THE OBJECTIVE FOR WHICH IT WAS ESTABLISHED. IT APPEARS THAT LITTLE THAT IS NEW IS COMING FROM THESE MONTHLY REPORTS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THEY HAVE SERVED THEIR PURPOSE, AND THEREFORE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A REPORT BE RENDERED ONLY WHEN SIGNIFICANT CHANGES OR DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: DO NOT CONCUR. THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS ESTABLISHED FOR THE EXPRESSED PURPOSE OF PROVIDING GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF TOTAL AIR STRIKE RESOURCES, IMPROVING THE RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF GROUND FORCE COMMANDERS, AND OF SIMPLIFYING PROCEDURES AND REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS. U.S. ARMY FORCES ARE RECEIVING

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S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 4 OF 5 SECTIONS IMPROVED SUPPORT; HOWEVER, SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS THUS FAR REDUCED THE FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT, AND HAS CREATED A COMPLICATED SYSTEM REplete WITH ADMINISTRATIVE HINDERANCES.

5. (S) ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUESTED BY PARAGRAPH 4. OF REF A IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. PARAGRAPH 4.A: PROGRAMMED (PRESENT) USMC AND USAF IN-COUNTRY SORTIES RATES.

(1) ALL MARINE AIRCRAFT ARE PROGRAMMED FOR 1.2 SORTIES RATE. USAF F-100 AND F-4 AIRCRAFT ARE PROGRAMMED FOR A1.2 AND A-37 AIRCRAFT FOR A 2.0 SORTIE RATE. (7TH AF 30 MAY-26 JUNE EVALUATION)

(2) IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ABOVE, USMC AND ROKMC MANEUVER BATTALIONS ARE PROGRAMMED FOR 200 SORTIES PER MONTH AND USA BATTALIONS FOR 150 SORTIES PER MONTH. USMC AND ROKMC

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0805 **S E C R E T** SPECAT (NCEO) BATTALIONS ARE INCREASED BY A FACTOR OF 1/3 DUE TO BATTALION COMPOSITION, REDUCED ORGANIC ARTILLERY SUPPORT AND LACK OF ARMED HELICOPTER SUPPORT. (APPENDIX C, CINCPAC LTR 3010, SER: 00438 OF 20 OCT 66)

B. PARAGRAPH 4.B: WHO AT THE SAIGON LEVEL ACTUALLY MAKES THE DETERMINATION OF THE SPLIT BETWEEN IN-COUNTRY AND OUT-OF-COUNTRY SORTIES BOTH IN AND OUTSIDE OF THE MACV AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY?

(1) THE PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY COMUSMACV AND COMMANDER 7TH AF TO ESTABLISH THE IN-COUNTRY/OUT-OF-COUNTRY SPLIT OF AIR EFFORT AND THE PERCENTAGE BREAKOUT BY CORPS HAS EXPLAINED IN 7TH AF JULY EVALUATION AS FOLLOWS:

(A) ON EACH FRIDAY PRIOR TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE INDICATION BRANCH (CIIB) MEETING THE 7TH AF AIR STAFF CONSOLIDATES INTELLIGENCE AND AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION. BASED ON THE PREVIOUS WEEK'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND ACTUAL SORTIES FLOWN A PREVIEW OF THE EXPECTED AIR ACTIVITY IS DETERMINED. EVALUATION OF THE ABOVE RESULTS IN A RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION OF AIR FOR IN-COUNTRY, OUT-OF-COUNTRY AND INDIVIDUAL CORPS AREA USAGE.

(B) AT THE SATURDAY MORNING CIIB MEETING THIS DATA IS PROVIDED TO COMUSMACV BY COMMANDER 7TH AF FOR HIS APPROVAL/CHANGE.

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 (C) THE EVALUATION STATES THAT QUOTE: ALTHOUGH THE SYSTEM HAS ONLY BEEN IN EFFECT A FEW WEEKS IT APPEARS TO BE WORKING IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER. IT DOES GUARANTEE A THOROUGH REVIEW AT MAJOR COMMAND STAFF LEVEL AND BY THE TWO MAJOR COMMANDERS CONCERNED UNQUOTE.

(2) FIRST MAW LIAISON OFFICERS TO 7TH AF INDICATE THAT GENERALS ABRAMS DOES IN FACT MAKE THE FINAL DECISION.
 C. PARAGRAPH 4.C: WHAT WAS THE RESULT OF THE EVALUATION OF III MAF'S AIRBORNE ALERT REQUESTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC?
 (1) THE FOLLOWING DATA WAS PRESENTED AS AN EVALUATION OF III MAF'S AIRBORNE ALERT.

	WITHOUT ALERT	WITH ALERT
	5 JUL-4 AUG	5 AUG-4 SEP
SCRAMBLES	1542	1119
ALERTS	0	1063
OTHER ADD-ONS	795	719
TOTAL	2337	7613

(2) FOR ALL SORTIE CLASSES OTHER THAN PREPLANS, THERE WAS AN INCREASE OF 24 PERCENT AND AN OVERALL INCREASE OF 6 PERCENT.

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 THIS, HOWEVER, DOES NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE INCREASED GROUND ACTIVITY DURING THIS PERIOD NOR IS IT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF AIR FORCE SCRAMBLES OR DIVERTS WHICH WERE NOT REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF HAVING ALERT AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE.

(3) DURING THE WEEK OF 16-22 AUGUST, 294 ALERT SORTIES WERE SCHEDULED. OF THIS NUMBER 38 WERE CANCELLED MAINLY BECAUSE PREVIOUS FLIGHTS HAD REFUELED AND REMAINED ON STATION, 148 WERE UTILIZED FOR TARGETS ANTICIPATED PRIOR TO SCHEDULING, AND 54 WERE DEVERTED TO SECONDARY TARGETS. OTHER CANCELLATIONS WERE THE RESULT OF WEATHER OR AIRCRAFT MALFUNCTION RESULTING IN GROUND ABORT. A FULL 79 PERCENT OF THE AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES WERE UTILIZED ON MISSIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE REQUIRED SCRAMBLES OR PREPLANNED SORTIES AND RESULTED IN VASTLY IMPROVED RESPONSIVENESS. RESPONSE TIME FOR CAP AIRCRAFT AVERAGES 15.4 MINUTES WHEREAS THE NORMAL RESPONSE TIME FOR SCRAMBLES AVERAGES 41.3 MINUTES OR 268 PERCENT OF CAP RESPONSE TIME.

D. PARAGRAPH 4.D: DOES THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC RESPOND TO ORDERS FROM CG, III MAF?

(1) THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC DOES RESPOND TO ORDERS FROM CG, III MAF.

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E. PARAGRAPH 4.E.: DO HORN DASC AND VICTOR DASC CONTACT AIRBORNE STRIKE AND RECON AIRCRAFT AND DIVERT OR OTHERWISE CONTROL OR DIRECT THEM?

(1) HORN DASC AND VICTOR DASC DO NOT HAVE THE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY FOR DIRECT CONTACT WITH AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT. THEY DO, HOWEVER, CONTROL AND DIVERT AIRCRAFT THROUGH THE MARINE TAOC (VICE SQUAD) AND AIR FORCE CRC (PANAMA).

F. PARAGRAPH 4.F.: NUMBER OF MARINE DASC'S CURRENTLY OPERATING AND THEIR LOCATION.

(1) THERE ARE THREE MARINE DASC'S. THESE ARE LOCATED AT DANANG, DONG HA AND VANDER GRIFT.

G. PARAGRAPH 4.G.: CAUSE OF ALLEGED DRY-UP OF FMAW HOT PAD AND CANCELLED SORTIES. (REPORTED BY 7TH AF)

(1) THE IMPLICATION IN THE 7TH AF AUGUST EVALUATION THAT MARINE ALERT PADS HAVE GONE DRY AS A RESULT OF THE AIRBORNE ALERT IS TOTALLY ERRONEOUS. AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES ARE NOT FLOWN BY THE SQUADRONS MAINTAINING THE GROUND ALERT. THE GROUND ALERT SYSTEM REMAINS THE SAME WITH ONE A-4 AND ONE F-4 SQUADRON ON ALERT. AIR CAPS WERE OCCASIONALLY DRY FOR SHORT DURATIONS DURING HEAVY DEMAND FOR AIR SUPPORT.

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(2) THE MARINE ALERT PAD HAS GONE DRY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS FOR SHORT PERIODS AS A RESULT OF INTENSE GROUND ACTIVITY. AS AN EXAMPLE ON 24 SEP IN A ONE HOUR AND 50 MINUTE PERIOD, 7 FLIGHTS (14 SORTIES) FROM THE ALERT PAD AND 2 AIRBORNE ALERT FLIGHTS (4 SORTIES) WERE UTILIZED ON IMMEDIATE MISSIONS FOR TROOPS IN CONTACT. ONE OF THESE FLIGHTS CONSISTING OF 4 SORTIES, WAS UTILIZED IN II CORPS SINCE THE AIR FORCE ALERT PAD WAS ALSO DRY AS INDICATED BY HORN DASC.

(3) DURING THE PERIOD OF 5 AUG-5 SEP, MARINE AIR AVERAGED LESS THAN SIX CANCELLATIONS PER DAY AS A RESULT OF HEAVY DEMANDS FOR AIR SUPPORT DURING CRITICAL PERIODS. DURING THIS PERIOD MARINE AIR AVERAGED 245 STRIKE SORTIES DAILY.

H. PARAGRAPH 4.H.: SPECIFICS OF FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION PROBLEMS IN ICTZ UNDER SMS?

(1) THE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION PROBLEMS BEING EXPERIENCED IN ICTZ UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARE THE DIRECT RESULT OF INHERENT DEFICIENCIES IN THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM FOR CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM HAS BEEN RETAINED INTACT, ITS FULL CAPABILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN EXPLOITED BY THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM. THE MARINE SYSTEM OWES ITS PROVEN SUCCESS TO THE COLOCATION OF AIR AND GROUND

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S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF 5 SECTIONS
 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION AGENCIES AT EACH LEVEL OF COMMAND DOWN
 TO THE BATTALION LEVEL WITH THE MEANS, UNDERSTANDING, AND EXPRESSED
 RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTROL AND COORDINATE AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES.
 THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM IS ORGANIZED, EQUIPPED AND TASKED PRIMARILY
 FOR THE CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AND THEREFORE LACKS ABILITY AND MEANS
 TO COORDINATE AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES. THIS LACK OF COORDINATION
 HAS RESULTED IN GROSS INEFFICIENCIES IN THE APPLICATION OF FIRE SUPPORT
 IN ICTZ. ARTILLERY FIRES ARE OF NECESSITY SECURED OVER VAST AREAS
 TO PERMIT DELIVERY OF AIR SUPPORT. OR REQUEST FOR AIR SUPPORT IS
 DENIED. WITH A MEANS TO COORDINATE AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES,
 ARTILLERY FIRES COULD BE SHIFTED, NOT SECURED, DURING AIR STRIKES
 THEREBY MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY AND PROVIDING FLAK
 SUPPRESSION FOR ATTACKING AIRCRAFT. IT IS EMPHISIZED THAT THE CURRENT
 PROBLEM IS ONE OF COORDINATION AND NOT CONTROL. AN EXTENSION OF

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THE MARINE TYPE AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM
 THROUGHOUT ICTZ WOULD EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE EXISTING PROBLEMS.

I. PARAGRAPH 4.I.: FACTS CONCERNING THE WEEKLY ICTZ AIR
 SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE.

(1) RESULTS OF THE BI-MONTHLY TACAIR PLANNING CONFERENCE HAS
 PROVEN AND EXCELLENT MEANS OF EDUCATION (TPQ-10, ORDANCE CAPABILITIES
 LIMITATIONS, ETC.) AND A MEDIUM FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN
 AIR AND GROUND UNITS LOCATED IN ICTZ ON CURRENT AND PROPOSED OPERATIONS,
 AND CRITIQUES OF PAST OPERATIONS, THE CONFERENCE IS PRESIDED OVER
 BY III MAF DEPUTY CG FOR AIR WITH THE FOLLOWING IN ATTENDANCE: FIRST
 MAW G-2/G-3, III MAF G-3 AIR, XXIV CORPS G-3 AIR, DIRECTOR HORN DASC,
 FIRST AND THIRD MARDIV AIR OFFICERS, AND 2ND ROKMC BRIGADE AIR OFFICERS,
 ALO'S OF FIRST CAV (AM), 101ST ABN (AM) AND AMERICAL DIV, CO 16TH
 CAG AND I CORPS ADV GP G-3 AIR.

J. PARAGRAPH 4.J.: HAVE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITIES IN-
 CREASED SINCE SINGLE MANAGEMENT?

(1) TACTICAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITIES HAVE BEEN
 VIRTUALLY UNCHANGED BY SINGLE MANAGEMENT. CONTROL IS PROVIDED
 BY THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SQUADRON OR MARINE AIR SUPPORT SQUADRONS
 AS REQUIRED BY THE ASSIGNED MISSION. AIR FORCE FLIGHTS UTILIZED AIR

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FORCE COMBAT REPORTING CENTERS (CRC) AND COMBAT REPORTING POINTS (CRP).

K. PARAGRAPH 4.K: HAS CONTROL OF AIR TRAFFIC BEEN FACILITATED SINCE SINGLE MANAGEMENT? IF SO HOW?

(1) TACTICAL CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT HAS REMAINED UNCHANGED UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT AS NOTED UNDER PARAGRAPH J.

L. PARAGRAPH 4.L.: YOUR VIEWS ON COMUSMACV'S CLAIM THAT FRAGGING OF IN-COUNTRY MARINE SORTIES BY CG, III MAF WOULD CONSTITUTE "DOUBLE MANAGEMENT".

(1) THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT TO III MAF WOULD CERTAINLY NOT AMOUNT TO DOUBLE MANAGEMENT. SUCH RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT THEREBY PRESERVING COMUSMACV'S OVERALL CONTROL OF THE AIR EFFORT AND PREEMPTION AUTHORITY OVER MARINE SORTIES IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. THE CURRENT PAPER DRILL OF OFFERING MARINE SORTIES TO COMUSMACV ONLY TO HAVE THEM RETURNED FOR USE IN I CORPS INHIBITS THE FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM. LARGE DIVIDENDS IN IMPROVED EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN THE APPLICATION OF "AIR POWER" COULD BE REALIZED BY THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF. SUCH RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION

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WOULD IN NO WAY DEROGATE THE IMPROVEMENTS RECENTLY MADE IN THE ARMY/AIR FORCE SYSTEM AS A RESULT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT. IN FACT CLOSER EXPOSURE TO THE MARINE SYSTEM COULD BE EXPECTED TO RESULT IN EVEN FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS.

M. PARAGRAPH 4.M.: AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF SORTIES THAT ARMY BATTALIONS IN ICTZ HAVE RECEIVED DURING MONTHS OF MAY, JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST, AND FROM WHAT SOURCE?

(1) THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS WITH REGARD TO THE NUMBER OF SORTIES PROVIDED TO ARMY BATTALIONS IN ICTZ WERE PROVIDED BY HORN DASC.

MONTH	USAF	USMC
APR	2035	1838
MAY	2710	1589
JUN	2190	843
JUL	1962	933
AUG	2408	1296
SEP	1741	1173

(2) DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD FROM APR. THROUGH SEP. THE 1ST MAW HAS FLOWN AN AVERAGE OF 42 SORTIES PER-DAY FOR ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ. THE SORTIES FLOWN BY THE USMC IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY IN ICTZ IS

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APPROXIMATELY 37 PERCENT OF ALL SORTIES FLOWN IN THEIR SUPPORT.

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S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM LTGEN BUSE.
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

MODIFICATION OF AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM (S)

A. CMC 012038Z/OCT68 (S)

1. THE COMMANDANT'S EXHORTATION IN REF A THAT,
 QUOTE: WE MUST BE FULLY PREPARED FOR ACCEPTANCE
 OF OUR PROPOSAL, THUS AVOIDING ANY SEMBLANCE OF
 THE PREMATURE IMPLEMENTATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT,
 AND ENSURING A SUCCESSFUL THIRTY DAY TEST. UNQUOTE,
 FOCUSES CLEARLY ON THE NEED FOR A CAREFUL EVALUATION
 OF OUR PRE-SINGLE MANAGEMENT AIR REQUEST AND FRAG
 PROCEDURES TO INSURE THAT WE INDEED WILL BE
 PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE THE EFFICACY OF OUR
 SYSTEM. THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY
 WILL MIGHT DECIDE NOT ONLY THE IMMEDIATE BUT THE POST
 VIETNAM AIR CONTROL DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS.

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 0484 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 2. JUST AS SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROVED UNWIELDLY, THE
 MECHANICS OF OUR OWN SYSTEM, DESIGNED PRIMARILY FOR
 DIVISION-WING SIZE OPERATIONS, MAY NOT BE ENTIRELY
 ADEQUATE FOR YOUR PRESENT FORCE OF SOME FIFTY MANEUVER
 BATTALIONS. THUS, SOME STREAMLINING OF OUR PRE-SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES MAY BE NECESSARY TO INSURE THAT
 OUR SYSTEM IS MORE RESPONSIVE, LESS OF AN ADMIN-
 ISTRATIVE BURDEN, AND THE MOST EFFICIENT WAY TO ALLOCATE
 SORTIES, WHILE I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOUR OWN EXPERTS
 ARE ON TOP OF THIS AND ARE PREPARING PLANS AND DEVISING THE
 SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURES NECESSARY FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION
 RED MY STAFF IS PREPARED TO
 RENDER WHATEVER ASSISTANCE YOU MAY DESIRE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

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SECRET

OTT SZ YUW RHMSMVA0452 2780145-SSSS--RHMAFA.

ZNY SSSSS

O 040140Z OCT 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO CG III MAF DANANG

BT

SECRET 29345

SUBJ: REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL PREPLANNED TAC AIR SORTIES (U)

REF: CG, III MAF DIG 011414Z OCT 68 (S)

1. (U) RECEIPT OF REFERENCE ACKNOWLEDGED.
2. (S) EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO SATISFY YOUR STATED REQUIREMENT FOR SUPPORT OF OPERATION SCOTLAND/NANKING.

GP-4

BT

ACT. G-3
INFO. G-2
COPY TO ADJ S/SG -6#463
SECRET

SECRET

CCN 026 FILE 95

		FROM CMC	DATE 03 OCT 68
		SERIAL # 021244Z OCT 68	COPY# 3 OF 3 COPIES REQ
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT	
		EXCLUSIVE FOR	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
		EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY	
	MAT AND TAPE		
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

#460

SECRET

PP RUHMFMA
 RHMMFA
 DE RUEBHOA3794 2761323
 Z NY SSSSS
 P 021244Z OCT 68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO/CG, III MAF
 BT

EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT, FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 GEN CHAPMAN=MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)

- A. CG III MAF 290040Z SEP 68
- B. CMC 260142Z SEP 68

1. PARAGRAPH 6 OF REF A STATES "...AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO ARMY BATTALIONS HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN BELOW THE EXPECTED FIVE SORTIES PER DAY AND IN I CORPS IS CURRENTLY AVERAGING ONLY SIXTY PERCENT OF THE NUMBER PROGRAMMED BY THE JCS. MARINE AIR HAS BEEN REQUIRED TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS DEFICIENCY TO THE DETRIMENT OF MARINE BATTALIONS..."

2. THE CHAIRMAN, JCS AS QUOTED IN REF B, HAS INDICATED THAT

ARMY FORCES IN I CTZ HAVE BEEN RECEIVING 3.03 SORTIES PER DAY, WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH ABOVE STATEMENT (5X60PER CENT EQUALS 3). THEREFORE IT IS UNCLEAR AS TO HOW MARINE AIR HAS COMPENSATED

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA3794 SECRET SPECAT, FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR THE DEFICIENCY IS THE SORTIES PER ARMY BATTALION HAVE REMAINED AT THREE.

3. REQUEST SUBSTANTIATING INFORMATION. WARM REGARDS.

GP-3
 BT

SECRET

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SECRET

VV PAC463VVCMC606
 PP RUHMFMA RHMAFA
 DE RUEBHOA3439 2752002
 Z NY SSSSS
 PAC-T-MAF
 P 012038Z OCT 68
 FM CMC
 TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
 SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM GEN CHAPMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)
 A. CMC 260142Z SEP 68

1. THE FOLLOWING CONSTITUTES MY REPLY TO THE CHAIRMAN,
 JCS MEMO CONTAINED IN REFEREKKE A:

QUOTE: "MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 SUBJ: MODIFICATION OF AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM (U)
 REF: (A) CM-3651-68 OF 16SEP68 WHICH REPORTED THE CURRENT
 STATUS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT FOR
 AIR SUPPORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO THE DEPUTY
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND MADE A RECOMMENDATION
 PERTAINING THERETO.
 (B) DEP SEC DEF MEMO OF 15MAY68 WHICH CONTAINED HIS

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA3739 **S E C R E T** SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND
 LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN M C E O
 REVIEW OF THE POSITIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
 STAFF ON THE ISSUE OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF
 III MAF AVIATION ASSETS.

1. I HAVE REVIEWED REFERENCE (A) AND CANNOT CONCUR WHOLLY
 WITH THE EVALUATION THEREIN NOR WITH THE RECOMMENDATION
 WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE INJUNCTION OF THE DEPUTY
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MADE IN REFERENCE (B), THAT THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE "CONTINUED BEYOND THAT
 NECESSARY TO MEET THE SPECIFIC COMBAT SITUATION FOR WHICH
 IT WAS DEvised".

2. I CONCUR THAT IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, BUT VIEWED IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE, THESE
 IMPROVEMENTS HAVE RESULTED ONLY IN MORE RESPONSIVE AIR
 SUPPORT FOR ARMY UNITS WHILE, AS POINTED OUT IN REFERENCE
 (A), "...THE MECHANICS OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ARE
 STILL NOT SUCH AS TO PROVIDE THE MARINES WITH THE RESPONSIVENESS
 TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCUSTOMED..." THESE IMPROVEMENTS HAVE
 OCCURRED PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF THE DECENTRALIZATION OF
 THE HIGHLY CENTRALIZED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AS IT WAS
 INITIALLY IMPLEMENTED. BUT THEIR GENESIS SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED

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PAGE THREE RUEBHOA3739 S E C R E T SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN M C E O
 FOR WHAT IT IS --- AND EVOLUTIONARY ALTERATION IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT TOWARDS THE DECENTRALIZED MARINE CORPS TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. IMPROVEMENT IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS LARGELY BEEN ADOPTIONS OF FEATURES OF THE ORIGINAL MARINE SYSTEM IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THESE IMPROVEMENTS MERELY DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ORIGINAL SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS FUNDAMENTALLY DEFECTIVE. IN REALITY, SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS BEEN A CONTINUATION OF THE ARMY/AIR FORCE JOINT AIR GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM, PARTICULARLY IN II, III, AND IV CORPS, WHERE AIR SUPPORT HAS BEEN A UNILATERAL AIR FORCE EFFORT. THEREFORE, THE ENDORSEMENT OF MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT BY THE COMMANDERS IN THESE AREAS REFERS NOT TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT, PER SE, BUT TO IMPROVEMENTS IN THE JOINT AIR GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM.

3. THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AS INITIALLY IMPLEMENTED, OVER STRONG MARINE PROTESTS, IMPOSED A SEVERE DEGRADATION ON MARINE AIR SUPPORT RESPONSIVENESS. IT WAS POINTED OUT AT THE TIME THAT MARINE GROUND UNITS HAVE FAR FEWER HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS AND LESS ARTILLERY THAN ARMY UNITS, AND THUS MUST RELY PRIMARILY ON THE CLOSE INTEGRATION AND RESPONSIVE SCHEDULING OF THEIR ORGANIC

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA3739 S E C R E T SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN M C E O
 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ASSETS. ANY STATISTICS CITING COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PROVIDED MARINE VIS-A-VIS ARMY BATTALIONS MUST CONSIDER THE DIFFERENTIAL IN ORGANIC SUPPORT MEANS.

4. THAT THIS SEVERE DEGRADATION OF THE INITIAL PERIOD WAS NOT NECESSARY AND THAT THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AS ORIGINALLY IMPLEMENTED WAS UNWORKABLE WAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED BY THE RADICAL REVISION EFFECTED ON 30 MAY. THE EFFECT OF THIS REVISION, AS INDICATED ABOVE, WAS TO DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM TOWARDS THE CONCEPT OF THE MARINE SYSTEM TO A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE. THE REMAINING DEGRADATION, WHICH ALL COMMANDERS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED, IS LIKEWISE UNNECESSARY AND SHOULD NOT BE CONTINUED. HOW "EQUITABILITY" AND THE "BROADENED RESPONSIBILITIES" OF CG, III MAF JUSTIFY FURNISHING LESS THAN THE MAXIMUM RESPONSIVENESS IN AIR SUPPORT TO ARMY AND MARINE TROOPS IN I CTZ IS NOT UNDERSTOOD, AND CANNOT BE CONCURRED IN.

5. SEEKING TO PROVIDE FOR MORE EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF THE AIR RESOURCES IN I CTZ, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, CG, III MAF HAS RECOMMENDED TO COMUSMACV THAT, FOLLOWING THE MACV WEEKLY ALLOCATION OF AIR

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PAGE FIVE RUEBHOA3739 S E C R E T - SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN M C E O
 EFFORT, MARINE AIR, EXCEPT THAT ALLOCATED BY MACV OUTSIDE OF I CTZ, BE SCHEDULED BY III MAF ON A DAILY BASIS TO SATISFY THE DYNAMIC AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF ALL III MAF GROUND COMMANDERS, ARMY AND MARINES. THIS SCHEDULE WOULD BE PUBLISHED IN SUFFICIENT TIME EACH DAY TO BE REFLECTED IN THE TOTAL AIR SUPPORT PICTURE AT THE SAIGON BASED TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT CENTER. THEREAFTER, AIRCRAFT CONTROL PROCEDURES WOULD BE IDENTICAL TO THOSE NOW IN EFFECT, WITH III MAF'S SUPPORTING DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER (DASC HORN), AS THE SENIOR AIR CONTROL CENTER IN I CTZ, COORDINATING AIR SUPPORT IN I CTZ UNDER THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK.

6. UNDER THE ARRANGEMENTS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 5, COMUSMACV STILL WOULD HAVE MEANS FOR INFLUENCING ACTION THROUGHOUT SVN BY INCREASING/DECREASING AIR FORCE AND MARINE CORPS SORTIES PROVIDED TO III MAF AS WELL AS RETAINING OVERALL DIRECTION AND CONTROL MEANS TO CONCENTRATE ALL AIR SUPPORT WHEN AND WHERE NEEDED TO MEET EMERGENVES. THUS, THE STATED OBJECTIVES OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT WOULD BE INTACT; THE SYSTEM WOULD CAPITALIZE ON THE AIR MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES UNIQUE TO III MAF; AND, THE RELIABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE PRE-SINGLE MANAGEMENT AIR CONTROL

PAGE SIX RUEBHOA3739 S E C R E T SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM GEN CHAPMAN M C E O
 ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE OPERATING FOR BOTH MARINE AND ARMY FORCES IN I CTZ.

7. WITH THE ONSET OF THE NORTHEAST MONSOON, AND THE RESULTANT IMPRACTICABILITY OF FORECASTING SCHEDULES WEEKLY IN ADVANCE, DAILY SCHEDULING BECOMES EVE MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GROUND FORCES. FURTHER, CG, III MAF PROPOSES ONLY THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT BE GIVEN A THIRTY-DAY TRIAL PERIOD TO PARALLEL THAT GIVEN TO BOTH THE INITIAL AND MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS.

8. ACCORDINGLY, I RECOMMEND:

A. THAT, IN AN EFFORT TO GAIN THE COMPLETE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE MARINE SYSTEM, A THIRTY-DAY TEST BE MADE OF THE CG, III MAF PROPOSES SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE.

B. THAT THE MONTHLY EVALUATIONS BE CONTINUED TO APPRAISE THE RECOMMENDED TEST AS WELL AS OTHER FUTURE MODIFICATIONS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

C. THAT THE INJUNCTION OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MADE BY REFERENCE (B), AS TO THE RESUMPTION OF NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE III MAF, BE EXECUTED AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE.

BT

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SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS
SPECAT, EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
GEN CHAPMAN - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
9. IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE CHAIRMAN CONVEY THESE VIEWS
TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HIS CONSIDERATION
IN RELATION TO THE RECOMMENDATION OF REFERENCE (A).
UNQUOTE.
2. I WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH YOUR EXTREMELY HELPFUL
EDITORIALS, AND BOB'S SUPPORTING RATIONALE.
3. ONE OTHER IMPROTANT POINT - I BELIEVE WE MUST BE
FULLY PREPARED FOR APPEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSAL, THUS
AVOIDING ANY SEMBLANCE OF THE PREMATURE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SINGLE MANAGEMENT, AND ENSURING A SUCCESSFUL THIRTY
DAY TEST. WARM REGARDS
GP-3
BT

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