
29. CG III MAF 121038Z OCT68 *g-4*
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
INFO PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO ABRAMS REQUEST FOR ASAP REPLY
ON PLANNED ACTIVITIES IN NICTZ THROUGH 26OCT

- 15 21. CG III MAF 200120Z OCT68 (S) *Group-4*
CUSHMAN TO YOUNGDALE INFO QUILTER
FRIENDLY ON FRIENDLY FIRES
- ~~16 22. CG III MAF 200350Z OCT68 (C)~~
~~CUSHMAN TO BRINCLE~~
~~ACCEPTED FOR LUNCH WITH GENERAL BUSE~~
- 17 23. CG III MAF 201802Z OCT68 (C) *gp-4*
ANDERSON TO WILLIAMSON
STOPYRA - TRACER ACTION
- 18 24. CG III MAF 210932Z OCT68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS INFO BROWN AND STILWELL
EVALUATION OF OPN THOR
- ~~19 25. CG III MAF 211240Z OCT68 (C)~~
~~FOR NLO~~
~~DEP CG III MAF TO VISIT HONG KONG 22-26 OCT68~~
- ~~20 26. CG III MAF 211330Z OCT68 (C)~~
~~FOR NLO~~
~~REVISED SCHEDULE FOR DCS III MAF~~
- 21 27. CG III MAF 241216Z OCT68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN FOR ABRAMS
TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT IN I CORPS
- ~~22 28. CG III MAF 250614Z OCT68 (C)~~
~~HOFFMAN TO BAGLEY~~
~~NGTS CDA CONFERENCE~~
- 23 29. CG III MAF 250954Z OCT68 (C MCEO) *Group-4*
COMUSMACV ALLOCATION OF CRITICAL ITEM RESOURCES
- 24 30. CG III MAF 261200Z OCT68 (S) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO GOODPASTER
ANALYSIS OF GOODPASTER'S THOUGHTS ON UPCOMING ATTACK
- 25 31. CG III MAF 261524Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO BUSE
MOVEMENT OF 1ST CAV DIV TO III CORPS
- 26 32. CG III MAF 270234Z OCT68 (S) *Group-4*
CUSHMAN TO BUSE, INFO YOUNGDALE, DAIVS, AND QUILTER
AIR CAV CAPABILITIES FOR MARINE DIVISIONS
- 27 33. LGEN CUSHMAN 270750Z OCT68 (C) *Group-4*
CUSHMAN TO ~~ABRAMS~~ STILWELL
EXPANDED ROLE FOR ZONE COORDINATOR, NORTHERN ICTZ
- 28 34. CG III MAF 271536Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *Group-4*
CUSHMAN TO BUSE
PASSES AIR CAV CAPABILITY INPUT MSGS FROM DIVISIONS AND WING

1. 7. CG III MAF 090340Z OCT68 (C) *group-4*
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS
STATISTICS PROVIDED COMUSMACV
2. 8. CG III MAF 090425Z OCT68 (S) *group-4*
ABRAMS WAS HERE
3. 9. CG III MAF 100745Z OCT68 (S) *group-4*
CUSHMAN TO PEERS INFO ABRAMS & GETTYS
USARV AND AMERICAL COORDINATED ACTION AGAINST ELEMENTS
BETWEEN TWO AO'S
- ~~10. CG III MAF 100632Z OCT68 (C)~~
~~SECNAV DOES NOT REQUEST PRESS AT WASH~~
11. CG III MAF 120750Z OCT68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN & BUSE
CBS NEWS CORRESPONDENT'S LETTER ABOUT CIB
12. CG III MAF 120824Z OCT68 (S) *group - not shown*
ANDERSON TO WEBSTER INFO SCHWEITER
KHE SANH MATTING - WHY IS IT BEING REMOVED?
13. CG III MAF 121334Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS
14. CG III MAF 131122Z OCT68 (S) *gp-4*
cushman to buse
MONTHLY REPORT-EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TAC AIR
15. CG III MAF 140300Z OCT68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO BUSE
FORWARDS EVAL MSGS ON SINGLE MGMT NOT READDRESSSED PREVIOUSLY
16. MG ANDERSON III MAF 151435Z OCT68 (S) *gp-4*
ANDERSON TO GETTYS
PASSES PEERS' MSG ON COMBINED OPNS WITH IFFV & AMERICAL DIV
17. CG III MAF 171545Z OCT68 (C) *gp-4*
CUSHMAN TO BUSE
ASSIGNMENT OFF (LTCOL NEW)
- ~~18. MCEN ANDERSON 171725Z OCT68 (U)~~
~~ANDERSON TO WILSON~~
~~RELIEF FOR MCEN ANDERSON~~
19. CG III MAF 180607Z OCT68 (S) *gp-4*
ANDERSON TO SHAEFER AND SCHWEITER
CONTINGENCY PLANNING GROUP TRANSMITTAL OF MSGS ONLY TO LT HANEY
- ~~20. CG III MAF 190451Z OCT68 (U)~~
~~CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS~~
~~ACKS REC ABRAMS 182330Z OCT68 - MPG~~

JLMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET

UN: 002 FILE: 75

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

SECRET

SECRET

DE RHMAFA 0067 2750652
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 010652Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUHMLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG
 RUHVUP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
 RUHMAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN YOUNGDALE, MGEN DAVIS AND MGEN QUILTER
 FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

SUBJ: AIR CAVALRY CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS (U)

1. (S) ON 25 MARCH 1968, IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY FROM GEN WESTMORELAND, I CONCLUDED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ADVANTAGE IN STRUCTURING AN ORGANIZATION SIMILAR TO AN AIR CAV SQUADRON FROM AVAILABLE MAR CORPS HELO ASSETS. MY RATIONALE AT THAT TIME WAS THAT WE CURRENTLY EMPLOY OUR OWN FORCES TO FIND, FIX AND EXPLOIT SITUATIONS UTILIZING RECON, HELICOPTERS AND REACTION FORCES SUPPLEMENTED WITH FIXED WING ATTACK AIRCRAFT.
2. (S) DURING THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS DIVISION COMMANDERS HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITIES TO EMPLOY AIR CAV UNITS AND OBSERVE THEIR OPNS AT FIRST HAND. IN ADDITION, THE FIRST MAW HAS ENGAGED IN A CROSS-

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0067 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR (MCEO)
 TRAINING CYCLE TO ACQUAINT MARINE PILOTS WITH AIR CAV TECHNIQUES.

3. IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, I WOULD LIKE ADDEES TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT OUR RECON AND REACTION STRUCTURE AND COMMENT BY 10 OCT ON THE DESIRABILITY OF INTRODUCING IN OUR MARINE FORCES AN ORGANIZATION SIMILAR TO AN AIR CAV SQUADRON. YOUR COMMENTS SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION OVERALL MARINE CORPS FORCE STRUCTURE RESTRICTIONS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#38

CONFIDENTIAL

CCN #37 FILE 95

[illegible]

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

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EXCLUSIVE FOR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

00 RUHKM
 DE RHMAFA 0372 2771344
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 031344Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CMC
 INFO CG FMFPAC
 CG FIRST MAR DIV
 CG FIRST MAW
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN BUSE, MGEN YOUNGDALE AND
 MGEN QUILTER FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

A. YOUR 020024Z OCT 68 (C)
 B. YOUR 021845Z OCT 68 (C)

PUC FOR FIRST MARDIV AND FIRST MAW.

1. IN REGARD REF A, ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR JOINT CEREMONY
 AT HQ III MAF ON 101130H OCT. ASSUME SECNAV PARTY WILL HAVE PENNANTS
 AND CITATIONS WITH THEM. IF NOT, REQUEST THEY BE AIR MAILED THIS HQ
 SOONEST. IN REGARD REF B, LTGEN LAM AND MGEN TRUONG WILL BE INVITED
 AS DINNER GUESTS AT III MAF 9 OCT.

2. THIS MESSAGE IS DECLASSIFIED ON 12 OCT 68.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-64)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#43

CONFIDENTIAL

CON 043 FILE 95

		FROM CG III MAP		DATE 04 OCT 68	
		SERIAL # 041100Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR			
10/5	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE		
		EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT			
8/8 COPIES 1, 2, 3 OF 3 COPIES					
MAT AND TAPE					

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EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT

P 041100Z OCT 68
FM CG III MAF
TO CONSERVPAC
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM COMBS FROM LTJEN CUSHMAN

A. CONSERVPAC MSG 022329Z OCT 68

1. ENTHUSIASTICALLY CONCUR WITH YOUR PROPOSAL CONCERNING
RECOMMENDATION OF DSM FOR REAR ADMIRAL OSBORN COMNAV SUPPACT
DANANG.

2. REAR ADMIRAL OSBORN'S OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE
WAS INVALUABLE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE
EFFORT IN THE ICTZ. HIS CONTINUOUS RESPONSIVE LEADERSHIP,
DEDICATION OF PURPOSE AND TO DUTY RESULTED IN EXCEPTIONAL
SERVICE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND HAS REFLECTED
GREAT CREDIT UPON HIMSELF AND THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
UNITED STATES.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	WTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#44

SECRET

JMAF FORM 8216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET

SECRET

CCN 047 FILE 95

		FROM CG III MAF		DATE 05 OCT 68	
		SERIAL# 041230Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR			
10/5	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE		
		EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT			
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES MAT AND TAPE				

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SECRET**EXCLUSIVE****FOR****HAS BEEN SENT**

PP RUMLBPA
 DE RHMAFA 0018 2781230
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 041230Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS
 ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 INFO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN STILWELL AND MGEN YOUNGDALE INFO
 GEN GOODPASTER, FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN

SUBJ: SOUTHERN BOUNDARY XXIV CORPS (U)

1. (S) CONVERSATIONS WITH DEP COMUSMACV ON 3 AND 4 OCT HAVE EMPHASIZED
 GEN ABRAMS' DESIRE TO MOVE XXIV CORPS BOUNDARY FARTHER SOUTH, GENERALLY
 ALONG THE PROVINCE BOUNDARY. SUCH ADJUSTMENT WILL FREE ADDITIONAL
 FIRST MARDIV ELEMENTS (PRIMARILY 3/26) FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
 WEST OF DANANG. IN VIEW OF IMPENDING OPNS, I WOULD LIKE THIS CHANGE
 TO OCCUR SOON, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR RECOS WITH RESPECT TO TIMING
 AND PRECISE BOUNDARY TRACE. DIRECT LIAISON IS AUTHORIZED BETWEEN
 XXIV CORPS AND FIRST MARDIV ON SUBJECT.

LT GEN CUSHMAN SENDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#45

JMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET

SECRET

DE RHMAFA 0539 2781704
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 041704Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

FUR**HAS BEEN SENT****SECRET**

FOR MAJOR GENS YOUNGDALE, DAVIS AND QUILTER FROM LIGEN CUSHMAN.
 SEC NAV VISIT (S)

1. (S) WE HAVE WORD THAT SEC NAV MAY RAISE QUESTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:

- A. PROGRAM SIX IMPACT
- B. TACTICAL SUPPORT TRANSPORTS
- C. STING RAY CONCEPT
- D. EFFECTIVENESS OF ARTY/NGF
- E. AIR CONTROL
- F. INTELLIGENCE PROGRESS AND EFFECTIVENESS
- G. AIRCRAFT SHELTER PROGRAM
- H. EMPLOYMENT OF TAC AIRBORNE, IMPORTANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
- I. CAC PROGRAM

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0539 **SECRET**

- J. CONCEPT OF GUNSHIPS VS FIXED WING COLSE AIR SUPPORT.
- K. WESTPAC AVN SUPPLY PROBLEMS
- L. WESTPAC AVN SUPPORT EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
- M. LIGHT HELO REQTS

2. (S) REQUEST YOU BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SUBJECTS WITHIN YOUR PURVIEW.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

* 46

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET #48

INFO CG XXIV CORPS

ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY FOR MG SHAEFER, J-5 MACV, INFO MG SCHWEITER,
C/S XXIV CORPS, FROM MG ANDERSON, C/S III MAF

I. FOLLOWING IS ACCESS LIST ON SPECIAL PLANNING PROJECT:

A. INITIAL ACCESS:

LTC R. E. CUSHMAN, JR., CG III MAF

LTC R. G. STILWELL, CG XXIV CORPS

MG E. E. ANDERSON, C/S III MAF

MG (THEN BG) L. H. SCHWEITER, C/S XXIV CORPS

SGT T. W. MCKINLEY, C/S STENO III MAF

SP- ALLEN ENGLE, CG'S STENO XXIV CORPS

B. INITIAL AUGMENTATION (FULL ACCESS, 27SEP68):

BG W. K. BENNETT, DC/S PLANS III MAF

BG R. L. IRBY, ADC 1ST CAV DIV (AMBL)

COL K. R. BLAND, FORCE ENGR OFF, III MAF

LTC T. OWENS, ASST G-3, III MAF

MAJ J. L. BROWN, ASST PLANS OFF III MAF

COL W. L. GORDON, G-3 XXIV CORPS

COL M. J. PASTA, G-2, XXIV CORPS

COL A. G. RICHTER, G-6 XXIV CORPS

C. SUBSEQUENT AUGMENTATION (LIMITED SELECTIVE ACCESS, AS
REQUIRED):

MG C. J. QUILTER, CG 1ST MAW

MG R. G. DAVIS, CG 3D MARDIV

MG G. I. FORSYTHE, CG 1ST DAV DIV (AMBL)

BG C. HOFFMAN, G-3, III MAF

COL L. NORTON, G-4 III MAF

COL B. E. HORNER, G-6 III MAF

COL F. W. BURDO, FIRE SPT COORD, XXIV CORPS

COL P. HENDERSON, 1TH AF (ALSO, XXIV CORPS)

LTC J. E. PENNY, HQ 1ST MAW

MAJ J. L. BROWN, ASST G-3 XXIV CORPS

2. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL ARE CONSIDERED
 TO BE AUTHORIZED ACCESS ON A SELECTIVE, NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.
 BASED ON PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE, HOWEVER, THIS AUTHORITY
 IS NOT YET REQUIRED TO BE USED TO DATE.

G-2, III MAF
 G-1, III MAF
 G-4, XXIV CORPS
 CLERK TYPIST, III MAF AND/OR XXIV CORPS
 TWO STAFF OFF, 3D MARDIV
 TWO STAFF OFF, 1ST CAV DIV (AMEL)
 ONE STAFF OFF, 1ST MAW

3. BRIEFING OF SOME OF THE PERSONNEL IN PARA 2 MAY BE
 REQUIRED, ON A HIGHLY SELECTIVE AND LIMITED BASIS. ALSO,
 ADDITION OF SOME REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL WILL BE REQUIRED,
 AS KEY PERSONNEL NOW ON LIST ARE REASSIGNED. CHANGES WILL
 BE REPORTED AS THEY OCCUR.

GP-4
 467

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

48(2)

IIIAF FORM 8216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET # 49

CCN: 069, 070, 071, 072, 073

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

SECRET

SECRET

DE RHMAFA 0802 2801338
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 061358Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHNM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUHNAW/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. SECTION 1 OF 5 SECTIONS
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL AIR ASSETS (U).

- 1. CMC 281233Z SEP 68 (S) (EXCLUSIVE MCEO)
- 2. COMUSMACV 071218Z AUG 68 (S)
- 3. COMUSMACV 130350Z SEP 68 (S)
- 4. CG III MAF 291442Z JULY 68 (S)
- 5. CG III MAF 291416Z AUG 68 (S)
- 6. CG III MAF 240812Z SEP 68 (S)

1. (C) REF A REQUESTED FMFPAC COMMENTSON REF B AND C AND OTHER SPECIFIC INFORMATION CONCERNING SINGLE MANAGEMENT. REF B AND C ARE COMUSMACV EVALUATION REPORTS ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR THE MONTHS OF JULY AND AUGUST RESPECTIVELY. REF D AND E ARE III MAF EVALUATION REPORTS ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR THE MONTHS OF JULY AND AUGUST RESPECTIVELY. REF F PROVIDED COMUSMACV WITH III MAF OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING COORDINATION OF AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES.

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0802 **S E C R E T** SPECAT (MCEO)

2. (U) PURSUANT TO REF A, REF D AND E HAVE BEEN READDRESSED TO CMC. REF F HAS ALSO BEEN READDRESSED.

3. (S) COMMENTS ON APPLICABLE PORTIONS OF REF B ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. PARAGRAPH 4.D.8

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: IT APPEARS THAT WITH MINIMAL EFFORT THE MARINE SPHINX REPORT COULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE DATA REQUIRED BY THE SINGLE MANAGER. THIS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MIGHT BE SUPERFLUOUS TO OTHER RECIPIENTS OF THE SPHINX REPORT, BUT IT IS FELT THAT THIS SINGLE REPORT COULD BE MADE INCLUSIVE ENOUGH TO SATISFY ALL REQUIREMENTS WITHOUT ANY DEGRADATION OF THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE REPORT.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: DO NOT CONCUR. THE CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT (CMR) REQUIRED BY THE SINGLE MANAGER IS A COMPLETE DUPLICATION OF THE COMBAT ACTIVITIES REPORT (COACT) WITH A SINGLE MINOR OMISSION WHICH COULD EASILY BE ADDED: AN INDICATION AS TO WHETHER A SORTIE WAS PREPLANNED OR IMMEDIATE. THE SINGLE MANAGER IS CURRENTLY ON DISTRIBUTION FOR COACT AND THERE IS NO REASON WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF THE CMR. THE SPHINX REPORT IS AN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY WHICH PROVIDES BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA) FOR EACH MISSION FLOWN. REPLACING THE CMR WITH THE SPHINX REPORT

PAGE 1 OF 14 PAGES

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA 0802 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)
WOULD RESULT IN THE PRESENT CMR BEING INCLUDED AS A PART OF THE
SPHINX REPORT WITH NO REDUCTION IN WORKLOAD.

B. PARAGRAPH 5.D.8

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THIS IS AN AREA THAT WAS RECOGNIZED IN THE
LAST EVALUATION AS A COMPLEX PROBLEM THAT REQUIRES EXTENSIVE INVESTI-
GATION AND THE MOST THOROUGH STAFFING. WHEN THE TERM SUPPORTING
FIRES IS TAKEN TO INCLUDE MORTAR FIRE AND NAVAL GUNFIRE AS WELL AS
ARTILLERY FIRE, THE MYRIAD COMPLICATIONS BEGIN TO BECOME APPARENT.
AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR WHICH INCREASES THE DIFFICULTIES OF COORDINATION,
IS THE DIVERSITY OF THE FORCES INVOLVED, I.E., MARINE CORPS, ARMY,
NAVY, RVNAF, ROK FORCES, ETC. TO FULLY COORDINATE AND ASSURE SAFE
PASSAGE FOR ALL AIRCRAFT FROM ONE DIVISION'S AO THROUGH ANOTHER
DIVISION'S AO WITHIN ANY GIVEN CTZ REQUIRES THAT ALL TYPES OF
SUPPORTING FIRES BE KNOWN TO A COMMON CONTROL CENTER AT ALL TIMES.
THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE DURING PERIODS WHEN LOW CEILINGS DICTATE
AIRCRAFT STRIKE OPERATIONS BE CONDUCTED BENEATH CLOUD COVER AT LOW
ALTITUDES. THIS IS AN AREA OF VITAL CONCERN TO MACV WHICH WAS NOT
SUFFICIENTLY RESOLVED DURING THIS EVALUATION PERIOD. EFFORTS TO
RESOLVE THE PROBLEM WILL BE ACTIVELY PURSUED. IT IS REITERATED
THAT THIS PROBLEM IS NOT PECULIAR TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT IN ICTZ,

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 0802 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)

BUT RATHER IS A COORDINATION PROBLEM UNDER ANY SYSTEM.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: DO NOT CONCUR. COORDINATION OF
AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES IS NOT A PROBLEM UNDER THE MARINE AIR
CONTROL SYSTEM. THE AMERICAN DIVISION HAS ESTABLISHED A SIMILAR AND
COMPATIBLE SYSTEM. U.S. NAVY, ROKMC, AND ARVN FORCES HAVE DEMONSTRAT-
ED THE ABILITY TO FUNCTION WITHIN THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. ONLY
THE RECENTLY JOINED FIRST CAVALRY DIV (AM) AND 101ST AIRBORNE DIV (AM)
PROFESS LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AND CAPABILITY TO CONFORM TO THE PROVEN
CONCEPTS OF MARINE AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION. SERIOUS
CONCERN BY COMUSMACV IS NOT EVIDENT. REF F. APPLIES.

C. PARAGRAPH 6.D.8

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: MACV'S CONTINUED ATTENTION TO THIS PROBLEM
IS PRODUCING RESULTS TOWARD A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE MATTER.
THIS IS ONE OF THE AREAS IN WHICH KNOWLEDGE AND FAMILIARITY
WITH THE SYSTEM WILL RESULT IN SMOOTHER FUNCTIONING. BETTER UNDER-
STANDING OF THIS INHERENT FLEXIBILITY WAS MORE APPARENT DURING THIS
EVALUATION PERIOD.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY III MAF TO
ASSURE FULL UTILIZATION OF THE WEEKLY FRAG ARE IN STRICT ACCORDANCE
WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. COMUSMACV CONCERN HERE IS VAGUE.

PAGE 2 OF 14 PAGES

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#49

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 0802 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)
HOWEVER, EXPERIENCE HAS INDICATED THAT LEAD TIME NECESSARY TO CHANGE MISSIONS, TOT'S AND ORDANCE UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARE IN EXCESS OF THAT REQUIRED BY THE MARINE SYSTEM.

D. PARAGRAPH 8C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THE MOVE OF THE US FVMAF PORTION OF I DASC TO III MAF HQ, WHICH SHOULD BE COMPLETED ON OR ABOUT 10 AUGUST 1968, IS EXPECTED TO ASSURE COMPLETE TACAIR RESPONSIVENESS TO III MAF TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: NO LONGER A CONCERN AS HORN DASC IS NOW IN FULL OPERATION LOCATED WITHIN THE III MAF COMPOUND WITH AN ADEQUATE AUGMENTATION OF MARINE PERSONNEL.

E. PARAGRAPH 9C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THIS PROBLEM NOW APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF THE DIFFERENCES WERE THE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF TERMS AND A DIFFERENCE IN REPORTING PERIODS. THE SPOTLIGHTING OF THESE PROBLEM AREAS BY COMUSMACV COUPLED WITH COORDINATION BETWEEN 7AF AND III MAF, AND INDOCTRINATION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL APPEAR TO REDUCED THE REPORTING DIFFERENCES TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: NO LONGER A CONCERN AS 7TH AF PERSONNEL

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 0802 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)
HAVE BEEN INDOCTRINATED IN THE PROCEDURES AND FORMAT OF SINGLE MANAGER REPORTING.

F. PARAGRAPH 10C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THE INSTITUTION OF A WEEKLY AIR SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE IS APPROPRIATE, AND IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THIS HAS RESULTED IN BETTER PLANNING OF DISTRIBUTION OF TACAIR ASSETS.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: ACCORDING TO JCS PLANNING FACTORS THE U.S. AIR FORCE WAS INITIALLY PROGRAMMED TO PROVIDE AN AVERAGE OF 145 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PER DAY FOR THE SUPPORT OF ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ. WITH THE RECENT ARRIVAL OF ADDITIONAL ARMY MANEUVER BATTALIONS THIS FIGURE HAS INCREASED TO 170 SORTIES PER DAY. USING THESE SAME PLANNING FACTORS DURING JULY, SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED 155 SORTIES A DAY FOR ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ. ACTUALLY PROVIDED ONLY AN AVERAGE OF 109 SORTIES PER DAY. HENCE, I CORPS BATTALIONS WERE DEPRIVED OF 46 SORTIES PER DAY. THE FAILURE OF THE AIR FORCE TO PRODUCE THIS NUMBER OF SORTIES FOR ICTZ HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY GROSS SINCE THE INCEPTION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND HAS BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE DEVERSION OF MARINE AIR FROM THE SUPPORT OF MARINE UNITS. IN JULY, MARINE AIR AVERAGED 30 SORTIES PER DAY IN SUPPORT OF U.S. ARMY UNITS. ROKMC RECEIVED AN AVERAGE OF 2 SORTIES PER DAY WHICH WAS ESSENTIALLY ALL THAT WAS REQUESTED. IF U.S. ARMY MANEUVER
BT

PAGE 3 OF 14 PAGES

SECRET

49

SECRET

DE RHMAFA 0803 2801358
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 061358Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUHNM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW DNG
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY TWO OF FIVE
 BATTALIONS ARE TO BE SUPPORTED BY AN AVERAGE OF 5 SORTIES PER DAY,
 IT IS MANDATORY THAT THE AIR FORCE CONFORM TO SORTIE PRODUCTION
 QUOTAS.

G. PARAGRAPH 11C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: UPON COMUSMACV'S IDENTIFICATION OF THE
 SPECIFIC PROBLEM AND NOTIFICATION TO CG, III MAF, AND CDR, 7AF,
 THIS PROBLEM WAS RESOLVED. ALL MARINE STRIKE AIRCRAFT REPORTEDLY
 NOW CHECK IN WITH EITHER A CRC OR CRP. THIS WAS PRIMARILY A PROBLEM
 OF FAMILIARIZATION AND STANDARDIZATION.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: DO NOT CONCUR. DESPITE THE FACT THE THE
 FIRST MAW TAOC (VICE SQUAD) POSSESSES FAR SUPERIOR EQUIPMENT
 THAN THE AIR FORCE CRC (PANAMA) AND CONSISTENTLY OUTPERFORMS THE
 LATER IT HAS BEEN DENIED A MAJOR AREA AIR CONTROL ROLE. MARINE
 FLIGHTS UTILIZE VICE SQUAD WHICH IN TURN RELAYS CHECK-IN INFORMATION

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 TO PANAMA. THIS SYSTEM IS SATISFACTORY TO AIR FORCE INTEREST. AIE
 FORCE FLIGHTS UTILIZE PANAMA.

H. PARAGRAPH 12C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THE SITUATION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN
 IMPROVED BY III MAF ADOPTION OF A PROCEDURE SIMILAR TO THAT
 EMPLOYED BY COMUSMACV (TASE).

(2) III MAF COMMENT: NO LONGER A CONCERN. MAJOR GROUND
 COMMANDERS MUST POSSESS THE AUTHORITY TO DIRECT THE EMPLOYMENT OF
 SORTIES REPORTING TO THEIR SUPPORTING DADC'S ON TARGETS WITHIN
 THEIR TAOR'S WHICH IN THEIR OPINION ARE THE MOST CRITICAL TO THE
 GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER.

I. PARAGRAPH 13C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: THIS SITUATION IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
 PRECEDING ONE AND APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY THE PROCEDURE
 CURRENTLY IN USE BY III MAF.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: NO LONGER A CONCERN. REMARKS IN
 PARAGRAPH H. ABOVE APPLY.

J. PARAGRAPH 14C:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: COMUSMACV CONCURS WITH CG, III MAF,
 THAT THE CHANGE IN NATURE OF FRIENDLY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, HAS NOT

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 DECREASED THE REQUIREMENT FOR TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT, BUT HAS ONLY CHANGED THE SPECIFICS OF THE REQUIREMENT. WHILE THE EMPHASIS ON INCREASED AIER SUPPORT IN ICTZ IS APPRECIATED, THES NEED MUST BE BALANCED AGAINST THE NEEDS OF ALL OTHER MAJOR GROUND COMMANDERS TO MAKE AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUION OF AIR ASSERS IN ACCORDANCW WITH MACV PRIORITIES AND THREAT REQUIREMENTS. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE CONTINUE TO SPPORT THE FACT THAT ICTZ RECEIVES A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF THE TACAIR SUPPORT AVAILABLE.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: THAT THE PREPLANNED ALLOCATION OF SORTIES IN ICTZ IS INADEQUATE IS AMPLY EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT DURING THIS PERIOD U.S. ARMY MANEUVER BATTALIONS RECEIVED LESS THAN THEIR PROGRAMMED 5 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SORTIES PER BATTALION PER DAY. SORTIE ALLOCATION TO ICTX MUST BE CAREFULLY MONITORED TO PRECLUDE FURTHER DRAW COWN ON MARINE SORTIES AT THE EXPENSE OF MARINE MANEUVER BATTALIONS.

K. PARAGRAPH 29B:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT, CG, III MAF DETERMINES THE PROPORTION OF CSS TO FAC MISSIONS TO BE FLOWN WITHIN TACAIR ASSETS PROVIDED. DURING THIS REPORT PERIOD III MAF RECEIVED A TOTAL DAILY AVERAGE OF 225 SORTIES OF WHICH 35 WERE REQUESTED

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 AND EXECUTED AS CSS (21 FOR USMC UNITS, 12 FOR USA UNITS AND 2 FOR ROK UNITS). AN INCREASED REQUIREMENT FROM 21 TO 90 CSS FOR MARINE UNITS IS WELL WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF TPQ/MSQ-77 RADARS AND THE AIR ASSETS PROVIDED. HAD III MAF CHOSEN TO ESTABLISH THIS REQUIREMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN FULFILLED. HOWEVER, ANY INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF FAC SORTIES AVAILABLE TO III MAF.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: COMBAT SKY SPOT (CSS) MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF MARINE FORCES HAD BEEN REDUCED TO 24 PERCENT OF WHAT WAS RECEIVED PRIOR TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT. CG, III MAF COULD HAVE REQUESTED ADDITIONAL CSS SORTIES FROM THE DAILY I CORPS ALLOCATION OF AIR SUPPORT BUT WOULD HAVE THEREBY DIMINISHED THE AVAILAVLE NUMBER OF VISUALLY CONTROLLED DAY TIME MISSIONS. THIS WAS NOT CONSIDERED PRUDENT DUE TO THE SHORTAGE OF PREPLANNED SORTIES ALLOCATED TO I CORPS. AVAILABLE DAY SORTIES ARE CRITICALLY NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER. AN ADDITIONAL ALLOCATION OF SORTIES IS NEEDED TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF TPQ CONTROLIED NIGHT INTERDICTION MISSIONS.

4. (S) COMMENTS ON APPLICABLE PORTIONS OF REF C ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. PARAGRAPH 4.8

(1) MACV COMMENT: PROCEDURES FOR FLIGHT SAFETY AND

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 COORDINATION OF ARTILLERY FIRES ARE OUTLINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13, 24 FEBRUARY 1968, ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DIRECTIVE IS ON AN INCREMENTAL OF ADDITIVE BASIS AND IS TO BE EFFECTED IN A MANNER WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE TACTICAL MISSION. EFFECTIVE 1 AUGUST 1968 THE DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTED THE PROCEDURE FOR ALL ARTILLERY FIRE WITHIN ENROUTE AREAS TO BE REPORTED TO THE NEAREST CONTROL AND REPORTING CENTER (CRC) WHEN THE MAXIMUM ORDINATE TO FIRE IS 5,000 FEET OF HIGHER AGL. PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST 1968 THE MAXIMUM ORDINATE REPORTING ALTITUDE WAS 7,000 FEET AGL. THE DIRECTIVE REQUIRES THAT AT THE TIME A COMMUNICATION AND DISSEMINATING CAPABILITY EXISTS OR CAN BE DEVELOPED, THE REPORTING ALTITUDE SHOULD BE PROGRESSIVELY REDUCED TO ACHIEVE THE END OBJECTIVE OF 3,000 FEET AGL. THIS DIRECTIVE IS PRESENTLY UNDER REVIEW TO ENSURE THAT ADEQUATE PROCEDURES ARE ESTABLISHED FOR FLIGHT SAFETY.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: THE ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM ESTABLISHED BY MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 WAS ORGANIZED AS AN ADVISORY SERVICE ONLY AND THEREFORE LACKS BOTH THE CAPABILITY AND AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE AIR/ GROUND SUPPORT IN FIRES. SINCE SINGLE MANAGEMENT THE APPLICATION OF

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 AIR AND GROUND SUPPORT IN FIRES HAS BEEN GREATLY INHIBITED BY THE LACK OF COORDINATING AGENCIES RESULTING IN SERIOUS INEFFICIENCIES. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MARINE TYPE AIR SUPPORT CONTROL SYSTEM HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY RECOMMENDED. THE ARTILLERY WARNING SYSTEM IS INADEQUATE EVEN AS AN ADVISORY SERVICE BECAUSE OF THE MYRIAD AGENCIES AND AGENCIES WHICH MUST BE UTILIZED TO TRAVERSE EVEN A LIMITED DISTANCE.

B. PARAGRAPH 5.:

(1) MACV COMMENT: IT APPEARS THAT INCREASING FAMILIARITY WITH THE SYSTEM IS RESULTING IN BETTER RESPONSIVENESS TO THE GROUND COMMANDERS REQUIREMENTS. THIS IS AN ITEM OF CONTINUING INTEREST.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: WHEN COMPARED TO WHAT COULD BE AVAILABLE UNDER A MARINE TYPE AIR SUPPORT CONTROL SYSTEM, THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IS REFUTABLY INFLEXIBLE AND UNRESPONSIVE. ALTHOUGH SINGLE MANAGEMENT IS FUNCTIONING IN ITS PRESENT FORM, IT IS FAR FROM OPTIMUM. THE LENGTHY CHAIN OF REQUEST FOR AIR SUPPORT ESTABLISHED BY SINGLE MANAGEMENT CAN NEVER EXPECTED TO PRODUCE THE FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS WHICH COULD BE REALIZED BY THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF.

C. PARAGRAPH 6.:

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S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION 3 OF 5 SECTIONS

(1) MACV COMMENT: THIS IS AN ITEM OF CONTINUING INTEREST. ALTHOUGH THE BULK OF REQUESTS FOR MUNITIONS WAS MET SATISFACTORILY, IMPROVEMENT POSSIBILITIES REMAIN.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: ALTHOUGH REQUESTS FOR SPECIFIC ORDNANCE HAVE BEEN HONORED SINCE THE DESIRED ORDNANCE IS USUALLY AVAILABLE FROM ONE OF THE MANY SOURCES, THE TIME REQUIRED TO LOCATE SPECIFIC ORDNANCE REMAINS EXCESSIVE AS DOES THE TIME REQUIRED TO EFFECT CHANGES IN PREPLANNED ORDNANCE. THE REMARKS OF PARAGRAPH B ABOVE APPLY.

D. PARAGRAPH 7.:

(1) MACV COMMENT: PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY ARE PRESCRIBED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-11, JOINT AIR/GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM, WHICH IS PRESENTLY UNDERGOING REVISION. THE INTERIM PROCEDURE ADOPTED ON 3 JULY, AND REPORTED LAST MONTH, CONTINUES IN EFFECT, 7AF HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO REEVALUATE THE

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FEASIBILITY OF RELOCATING CERTAIN RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO REQUESTERS.

(2) III MAF COMMENTS: PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS SUFFERED SIMILAR PENALTIES IN FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS AS HAS BEEN EXPERIENCED IN TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT, TO BE OF BENEFIT TO THE GROUND COMMANDERS, PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE MUST BE HIGHLY RESPONSIVE PRODUCING DESIRED RESULTS IN A MINIMUM TIME FRAME. I CORPS REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE COULD BE SATISFIED BY THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT TO III MAF. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT COMUSMACVZJS PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS WILL ALTER THE CURRENT UNDESIRABLE SITUATION.

E. PARAGRAPH 8.:

(1) MACV COMMENT: THE PROPOSED REVISION OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-11 JOINT AIR/GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM, INCLUDES A PROCEDURE FOR CHANGING THE PREPLANNED FRAG THROUGH THE IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST NET. THIS PROCEDURE IS CURRENTLY IN USE.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: NO LONGER A CONCERN.

F. PARAGRAPH 9.:

(1) MACV ANALYSIS: CG III MAF REITERATES HIS DESIRE TO

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 HAVE SORTIE DIRECTION OF MARINE AIRCRAFT, LESS OUT-COUNTRY EFFORT, ASSIGNED TO HIM. HE SUPPORTS THIS RECOMMENDATION WITH A SERIES OF ADVANTAGES HE ESTIMATES WILL ACCRUE AS A RESULT OF III MAF MISSION DIRECTION. ADOPTION OF HIS RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD ELIMINATE SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND REINSTITUTE THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM WHICH WAS INADEQUATE TO THE NEEDS OF COMUSMACV. AS LONG AS IT IS NECESSARY TO COMMIT U.S. ARMY DIVISIONS IN THE ICTZ WITH MARINE DIVISIONS, AND IT IS NECESSARY TO AUGMENT MARINE AIR ASSETS TO SUPPORT THE TOTAL FORCE, SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF AIR IS DESIRABLE.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: DO NOT CONCUR. THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR ASSETS TO III MAF COULD EASILY BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PRESENT SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. CURRENTLY, MARINE SORTIES ARE TAKEN FROM III MAF ON A DAILY/WEEKLY BASIS BY COMUSMACV AND ARE CONSISTENTLY RETURNED FOR USE IN ICTZ. SINCE THE INCEPTION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT THERE HAS BEEN ONLY ONE OCCASION WHEN 1ST MAW DELIVERED AIR SUPPORT TO ANOTHER CORPS AREA. THIS CONSISTED OF ONLY 4 SORTIES. WITH THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF, COMUSMACV WOULD RETAIN OVERALL CONTROL OF THE AIR EFFORT AS WELL AS PREEMPTION AUTHORITY IN THE EVENT OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. THE NET EFFECT OF RETURN OF

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 MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF WOULD BE THE SHORTENING OF THE REQUEST CHAIN THEREBY PERMITTING A MORE FLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM.

G. PARAGRAPH 10: PARAGRAPH 3.K. ABOVE APPLIES.

H. PARAGRAPH 11C:

(1) MACV COMMENT: IT APPEARS THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM REPORTING REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO THE MINIMUM NECESSARY FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: THE CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT (CMR) IS REDUNDANT. IT COULD AND SHOULD BE ELIMINATED. THE FIRST MAW IS NEITHER EQUIPPED NOR STAFFED TO CONFORM TO AIR FORCE COMBAT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND TIME FRAMES. A REASONABLE DELAY IN THE SUBMISSION OF FIRST MAW REPORTS MUST BE ACCEPTED. THE REMARKS OF PARAGRAPH 3.A. ABOVE APPLY.

I. PARAGRAPH 12C:

(1) MACV COMMENT: HORN DASC HAS SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY OVER ALERT SORTIES OF AIR UNITS LOCATED IN ICTZ, AND IS RESPONSIVE TO CG, III MAF REQUIREMENTS. THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOES NOT PRECLUDE ADOPTION OF THE AIRBORNE ALERT PROCEDURE.

(2) III MAF COMMENT:

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(A) THE FIRST MAW AIRBORNE ALERT, OR CAP, HAS BEEN AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS IN PROVIDING GROUND FORCES IN ICTZ WITH VASTLY MORE RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT. DURING AUGUST 1,063 CAP MISSIONS WERE FLOWN WITH AN AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME OF 15.4 MINUTES. THIS RESPONSE TIME IS MEASURED FROM RECEIPT OF REQUEST AT DASC TO FIRST BOMB ON TARGET.

(B) CONTRARY TO THE 7TH AF ALLEGATION WITH RESPECT TO THIS PARA, THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AN INFORMAL BRIEFING ON THE RESULTS OF THE MARINE CAP SYSTEM. MARINE CAP'S AND HOT PADS HAVE RARELY GONE DRY AS ALLEGED AND THEN ONLY FOR SHORT DURATION AS THE RESULT OF HEAVY SURGE DEMANDS FOR AIR SUPPORT.

J. PARAGRAPH 13.8

(1) MACV COMMENT: MACV EVALUATION FOR THIS PERIOD INDICATES THE FOLLOWING IMPROVEMENTS OR INNOVATIONS:

(A) HORN DASC BECAME OPERATIONAL ON 10 AUGUST 1968. IT IS THE SENIOR FWF DASC IN ICTZ AND WAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN III MAF COMPOUND TO PROVIDE BETTER RESPONSE TO III MAF.

(B) CG, III MAF INITIATED AN EXPERIMENTAL AIRBORNE ALERT POSTURE IN ICTZ ON 5 AUGUST 1968.

(C) AIR SUPPORT MEASURED IN SORTIES PER BATTALION PER

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DAY INCREASED FOR BOTH MARINE AND ARMY FORCES FROM 5.4 TO 6.1 AND 3.1 TO 3.5 RESPECTIVELY.

(D) INCREASED FAMILIARITY WITH THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS RESULTED IN MORE RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT TO GROUND COMMANDERS THROUGHOUT VIETNAM.

(E) RESPONSIVENESS TO REQUESTS FOR TOT CHANGES HAS IMPROVED.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: CONCUR.

K. PARAGRAPH 14.8

(1) MACV COMMENT: THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF AIR CONTINUES TO MEET THE OBJECTIVE FOR WHICH IT WAS ESTABLISHED. IT APPEARS THAT LITTLE THAT IS NEW IS COMING FROM THESE MONTHLY REPORTS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THEY HAVE SERVED THEIR PURPOSE, AND THEREFORE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A REPORT BE RENDERED ONLY WHEN SIGNIFICANT CHANGES OR DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR.

(2) III MAF COMMENT: DO NOT CONCUR. THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS ESTABLISHED FOR THE EXPRESSED PURPOSE OF PROVIDING GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF TOTAL AIR STRIKE RESOURCES, IMPROVING THE RESPONSIVENESS OF AIR SUPPORT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF GROUND FORCE COMMANDERS, AND OF SIMPLIFYING PROCEDURES AND REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS. U.S. ARMY FORCES ARE RECEIVING

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S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION 4 OF 5 SECTIONS
 IMPROVED SUPPORT; HOWEVER, SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS THUS FAR REDUCED
 THE FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT, AND HAS
 CREATED A COMPLICATED SYSTEM REplete WITH ADMINISTRATIVE HINDER-
 ANCES.

5. (S) ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUESTED BY PARAGRAPH 4.
 OF REF A IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. PARAGRAPH 4.A: PROGRAMMED (PRESENT) USMC AND USAF IN-
 COUNTRY SORTIES RATES.

(1) ALL MARINE AIRCRAFT ARE PROGRAMMED FOR 1.2 SORTIES RATE.
 USAF F-100 AND F-4 AIRCRAFT ARE PROGRAMMED FOR 1.2 AND A-37
 AIRCRAFT FOR A 2.0 SORTIE RATE. (7TH AF 30 MAY-26 JUNE EVALUATION)

(2) IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ABOVE, USMC AND ROKMC
 MANEUVER BATTALIONS ARE PROGRAMMED FOR 200 SORTIES PER MONTH
 AND USA BATTALIONS FOR 150 SORTIES PER MONTH. USMC AND ROKMC

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 BATTALIONS ARE INCREASED BY A FACTOR OF 1/3 DUE TO BATTALION
 COMPOSITION, REDUCED ORGANIC ARTILLERY SUPPORT AND LACK OF
 ARMED HELICOPTER SUPPORT. (APPENDIX C, CINCPAC LTR 3010, SER:
 00438 OF 20 OCT 66)

B. PARAGRAPH 4.B: WHO AT THE SAIGON LEVEL ACTUALLY MAKES
 THE DETERMINATION OF THE SPLIT BETWEEN IN-COUNTRY AND OUT-OF-
 COUNTRY SORTIES BOTH IN AND OUTSIDE OF THE MACV AREA OF RESPONSIB-
 ILITY?

(1) THE PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY COMUSMACV AND COMMANDER
 7TH AF TO ESTABLISH THE IN-COUNTRY/OUT-OF-COUNTRY SPLIT OF AIR
 EFFORT AND THE PERCENTAGE BREAKOUT BY CORPS WAS EXPLAINED IN 7TH
 AF JULY EVALUATION AS FOLLOWS:

(A) ON EACH FRIDAY PRIOR TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
 INDICATION BRANCH (CIIB) MEETING THE 7TH AF AIR STAFF CONSOLIDATES
 INTELLIGENCE AND AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION. BASED ON THE
 PREVIOUS WEEK'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND ACTUAL SORTIES FLOWN A PREVIEW
 OF THE EXPECTED AIR ACTIVITY IS DETERMINED. EVALUATION OF THE
 ABOVE RESULTS IN A RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION OF AIR FOR IN-COUNTRY,
 OUT-OF-COUNTRY AND INDIVIDUAL CORPS AREA USAGE.

(B) AT THE SATURDAY MORNING CIIB MEETING THIS DATA IS
 PROVIDED TO COMUSMACV BY COMMANDER 7TH AF FOR HIS APPROVAL/CHANGE.

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 (C) THE EVALUATION STATES THAT QUOTE: ALTHOUGH THE SYSTEM HAS ONLY BEEN IN EFFECT A FEW WEEKS IT APPEARS TO BE WORKING IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER. IT DOES GUARANTEE A THOROUGH REVIEW AT MAJOR COMMAND STAFF LEVEL AND BY THE TWO MAJOR COMMANDERS CONCERNED UNQUOTE.

(2) FIRST MAW LIAISON OFFICERS TO 7TH AF INDICATE THAT GENERALS ABRAMS DOES IN FACT MAKE THE FINAL DECISION.
 C. PARAGRAPH 4.C: WHAT WAS THE RESULT OF THE EVALUATION OF III MAF'S AIRBORNE ALERT REQUESTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC?
 (1) THE FOLLOWING DATA WAS PRESENTED AS AN EVALUATION OF III MAF'S AIRBORNE ALERT.

	WITHOUT ALERT	WITH ALERT
	5 JUL-4 AUG	5 AUG-4 SEP
SCRAMBLES	1542	1119
ALERTS	0	1063
OTHER ADD-ONS	795	719
TOTAL	2337	7613

(2) FOR ALL SORTIE CLASSES OTHER THAN PREPLANS, THERE WAS AN INCREASE OF 24 PERCENT AND AN OVERALL INCREASE OF 6 PERCENT.

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 THIS, HOWEVER, DOES NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE INCREASED GROUND ACTIVITY DURING THIS PERIOD NOR IS IT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF AIR FORCE SCRAMBLES OR DIVERTS WHICH WERE NOT REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF HAVING ALERT AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE.

(3) DURING THE WEEK OF 16-22 AUGUST, 294 ALERT SORTIES WERE SCHEDULED. OF THIS NUMBER 38 WERE CANCELLED MAINLY BECAUSE PREVIOUS FLIGHTS HAD REFUELED AND REMAINED ON STATION, 148 WERE UTILIZED FOR TARGETS ANTICIPATED PRIOR TO SCHEDULING, AND 54 WERE DEVERTED TO SECONDARY TARGETS. OTHER CANCELLATIONS WERE THE RESULT OF WEATHER OR AIRCRAFT MALFUNCTION RESULTING IN GROUND ABORT. A FULL 79 PERCENT OF THE AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES WERE UTILIZED ON MISSIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE REQUIRED SCRAMBLES OR PREPLANNED SORTIES AND RESULTED IN VASTLY IMPROVED RESPONSIVENESS. RESPONSE TIME FOR CAP AIRCRAFT AVERAGES 15.4 MINUTES WHEREAS THE NORMAL RESPONSE TIME FOR SCRAMBLES AVERAGES 41.3 MINUTES OR 268 PERCENT OF CAP RESPONSE TIME.

D. PARAGRAPH 4.D: DOES THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC RESPOND TO ORDERS FROM CG, III MAF?

(1) THE DIRECTOR OF HORN DASC DOES RESPOND TO ORDERS FROM CG, III MAF.

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E. PARAGRAPH 4.E.: DO HORN DASC AND VICTOR DASC CONTACT AIRBORNE STRIKE AND RECON AIRCRAFT AND DIVERT OR OTHERWISE CONTROL OR DIRECT THEM?

(1) HORN DASC AND VICTOR DASC DO NOT HAVE THE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY FOR DIRECT CONTACT WITH AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT. THEY DO, HOWEVER, CONTROL AND DIVERT AIRCRAFT THROUGH THE MARINE TAOC (VICE SQUAD) AND AIR FORCE CRC (PANAMA).

F. PARAGRAPH 4.F.: NUMBER OF MARINE DASC'S CURRENTLY OPERATING AND THEIR LOCATION.

(1) THERE ARE THREE MARINE DASC'S. THESE ARE LOCATED AT DANANG, DONG HA AND VANDERGRIFT.

G. PARAGRAPH 4.G.: CAUSE OF ALLEGED DRY-UP OF FMAW HOT PAD AND CANCELLED SORTIES. (REPORTED BY 7TH AF)

(1) THE IMPLICATION IN THE 7TH AF AUGUST EVALUATION THAT MARINE ALERT PADS HAVE GONE DRY AS A RESULT OF THE AIRBORNE ALERT IS TOTALLY ERRONEOUS. AIRBORNE ALERT SORTIES ARE NOT FLOWN BY THE SQUADRONS MAINTAINING THE GROUND ALERT. THE GROUND ALERT SYSTEM REMAINS THE SAME WITH ONE A-4 AND ONE F-4 SQUADRON ON ALERT. AIR CAPS WERE OCCASIONALLY DRY FOR SHORT DURATIONS DURING HEAVY DEMAND FOR AIR SUPPORT.

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(2) THE MARINE ALERT PAD HAS GONE DRY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS FOR SHORT PERIODS AS A RESULT OF INTENSE GROUND ACTIVITY. AS AN EXAMPLE ON 24 SEP IN A ONE HOUR AND 50 MINUTE PERIOD, 7 FLIGHTS (14 SORTIES) FROM THE ALERT PAD AND 2 AIRBORNE ALERT FLIGHTS (4 SORTIES) WERE UTILIZED ON IMMEDIATE MISSIONS FOR TROOPS IN CONTACT. ONE OF THESE FLIGHTS CONSISTING OF 4 SORTIES, WAS UTILIZED IN II CORPS SINCE THE AIR FORCE ALERT PAD WAS ALSO DRY AS INDICATED BY HORN DASC.

(3) DURING THE PERIOD OF 5 AUG-5 SEP, MARINE AIR AVERAGED LESS THAN SIX CANCELLATIONS PER DAY AS A RESULT OF HEAVY DEMANDS FOR AIR SUPPORT DURING CRITICAL PERIODS. DURING THIS PERIOD MARINE AIR AVERAGED 245 STRIKE SORTIES DAILY.

H. PARAGRAPH 4.H.: SPECIFICS OF FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION PROBLEMS IN ICTZ UNDER SMS?

(1) THE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION PROBLEMS BEING EXPERIENCED IN ICTZ UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARE THE DIRECT RESULT OF INHERENT DEFICIENCIES IN THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM FOR CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM HAS BEEN RETAINED INTACT, ITS FULL CAPABILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN EXPLOITED BY THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM. THE MARINE SYSTEM OWES ITS PROVEN SUCCESS TO THE COLOCATION OF AIR AND GROUND

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S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF 5 SECTIONS
 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION AGENCIES AT EACH LEVEL OF COMMAND DOWN
 TO THE BATTALION LEVEL WITH THE MEANS, UNDERSTANDING, AND EXPRESSED
 RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTROL AND COORDINATE AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES.
 THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM IS ORGANIZED, EQUIPPED AND TASKED PRIMARILY
 FOR THE CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AND THEREFORE LACKS ABILITY AND MEANS
 TO COORDINATE AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES. THIS LACK OF COORDINATION
 HAS RESULTED IN GROSS INEFFICIENCIES IN THE APPLICATION OF FIRE SUPPORT
 IN ICTZ. ARTILLERY FIRES ARE OF NECESSITY SECURED OVER VAST AREAS
 TO PERMIT DELIVERY OF AIR SUPPORT OR REQUEST FOR AIR SUPPORT IS
 DENIED. WITH A MEANS TO COORDINATE AIR/GROUND SUPPORTING FIRES,
 ARTILLERY FIRES COULD BE SHIFTED, NOT SECURED, DURING AIR STRIKES
 THEREBY MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY AND PROVIDING FLAK
 SUPPRESSION FOR ATTACKING AIRCRAFT. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THE CURRENT
 PROBLEM IS ONE OF COORDINATION AND NOT CONTROL. AN EXTENSION OF

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THE MARINE TYPE AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM
 THROUGHOUT ICTZ WOULD EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE EXISTING PROBLEMS.

I. PARAGRAPH 4.I.: FACTS CONCERNING THE WEEKLY ICTZ AIR
 SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE.

(1) RESULTS OF THE BI-MONTHLY IACAIR PLANNING CONFERENCE HAS
 PROVEN AND EXCELLENT MEANS OF EDUCATION (TPQ-10, ORDNANCE CAPABILITIES
 LIMITATIONS, ETC.) AND A MEDIUM FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN
 AIR AND GROUND UNITS LOCATED IN ICTZ ON CURRENT AND PROPOSED OPERATIONS,
 AND CRITIQUES OF PAST OPERATIONS, THE CONFERENCE IS PRESIDED OVER
 BY III MAF DEPUTY CG FOR AIR WITH THE FOLLOWING IN ATTENDANCE: FIRST
 MAW G-2/G-3, III MAF G-3 AIR, XXIV CORPS G-3 AIR, DIRECTOR HORN DASC,
 FIRST AND THIRD MARDIV AIR OFFICERS, AND 2ND ROKMC BRIGADE AIR OFFICERS,
 ALO'S OF FIRST CAV (AM), 101ST ABN (AM) AND AMERICAL DIV, CO 16TH
 CAG AND I CORPS ADV GP G-3 AIR.

J. PARAGRAPH 4.J.: HAVE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITIES IN-
 CREASED SINCE SINGLE MANAGEMENT?

(1) TACTICAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITIES HAVE BEEN
 VIRTUALLY UNCHANGED BY SINGLE MANAGEMENT. CONTROL IS PROVIDED
 BY THE MARINE AIR CONTROL SQUADRON OR MARINE AIR SUPPORT SQUADRONS
 AS REQUIRED BY THE ASSIGNED MISSION. AIR FORCE FLIGHTS UTILIZED AIR

PAGE 13 OF 14 PAGES

SECRET

#49

SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMAFA 0806 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)
FORCE COMBAT REPORTING CENTERS (CRC) AND COMBAT REPORTING POINTS (CRP).

K. PARAGRAPH 4.K: HAS CONTROL OF AIR TRAFFIC BEEN FACILITATED SINCE SINGLE MANAGEMENT? IF SO HOW?

(1) TACTICAL CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT HAS REMAINED UNCHANGED UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT AS NOTED UNDER PARAGRAPH J.

L. PARAGRAPH 4.L: YOUR VIEWS ON COMUSMACV'S CLAIM THAT FRAGGING OF IN-COUNTRY MARINE SORTIES BY CG, III MAF WOULD CONSTITUTE "DOUBLE MANAGEMENT".

(1) THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT TO III MAF WOULD CERTAINLY NOT AMOUNT TO DOUBLE MANAGEMENT. SUCH RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT THEREBY PRESERVING COMUSMACV'S OVERALL CONTROL OF THE AIR EFFORT AND PREEMPTION AUTHORITY OVER MARINE SORTIES IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. THE CURRENT PAPER DRILL OF OFFERING MARINE SORTIES TO COMUSMACV ONLY TO HAVE THEM RETURNED FOR USE IN I CORPS INHIBITS THE FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM. LARGE DIVIDENDS IN IMPROVED EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN THE APPLICATION OF "AIR POWER" COULD BE REALIZED BY THE RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION OF MARINE AIR TO III MAF. SUCH RETURN OF MISSION DIRECTION

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 0806 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)

WOULD IN NO WAY DEROGATE THE IMPROVEMENTS RECENTLY MADE IN THE ARMY/AIR FORCE SYSTEM AS A RESULT OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT. IN FACT CLOSER EXPOSURE TO THE MARINE SYSTEM COULD BE EXPECTED TO RESULT IN EVEN FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS.

M. PARAGRAPH 4.M: AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF SORTIES THAT ARMY BATTALIONS IN ICTZ HAVE RECEIVED DURING MONTHS OF MAY, JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST, AND FROM WHAT SOURCE?

(1) THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS WITH REGARD TO THE NUMBER OF SORTIES PROVIDED TO ARMY BATTALIONS IN ICTZ WERE PROVIDED BY HORN DASC.

MONTH	USAF	USMC
APR	2035	1838
MAY	2710	1589
JUN	2190	843
JUL	1962	933
AUG	2408	1296
SEP	1741	1173

(2) DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD FROM APR. THROUGH SEP. THE 1ST MAW HAS FLOWN AN AVERAGE OF 42 SORTIES PER-DAY FOR ARMY UNITS IN ICTZ. THE SORTIES FLOWN BY THE USMC IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY IN ICTZ IS

PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 0806 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)

APPROXIMATELY 37 PERCENT OF ALL SORTIES FLOWN IN THEIR SUPPORT.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 14 OF 14 PAGES

SECRET

#49

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

CONFIDENTIAL

P 070335Z

FM CG III MAF

TO SSO 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY FOR MGEN WILLIAMSON, FROM MGEN E. E. ANDERSON,

C/S IIF MAF

1. ON 7SEP I SENT AN EXCLUSIVE PERSONAL (CG III MAF 070800Z SEP 68) TO YOUR CHIEF OF STAFF, AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE

1. TODAY, ONE MY CLERKS, CORPORAL HOLLOWAY, RECEIVED A LETTER FROM HOME ENCLOSING A CLIPPING ANNOUNCING THE DEATH OF SP/4 THOMAS J. STOPYRA, USA, A MEMBER OF D COMPANY, 65TH ENGINEERING BATTALION, 25 INFANTRY DIVISION, SP/4 STOPYRA AND CPL HOLLOWAY HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY CLOSE FRIENDS SINCE THE DEATH OF BOTH OF THEIR FATHERS AND WERE NEIGHBORS IN WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS. THE LETTER AND CLIPPING THAT CPL HOLLOWAY RECEIVED FROM HIS MOTHER HAS UPSET HIM CONSIDERABLY, AND HE STATED TO ME THAT THE MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO THE MOTHER OF SP/4 STOPYRA INDICATED THAT HER SON'S DEATH WAS PROBABLY THE RESULT OF SELF-INFLICTED WOUNDS. I EXPLAINED TO CPL HOLLOWAY THE NECESSITY FOR A COMPLETE INVESTIGATION AS TO THE CAUSE OF DEATH WHEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT CLEAR-CUT. THIS MIGHT WELL BE THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO SP/4 STOPYRA.

2. IF IT IS POSSIBLE, WITHIN THE TERMS OF YOUR ARMY REGULATIONS, TO INDICATE SOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT I MIGHT PASS ON TO CPL HOLLOWAY TO EASE HIS MIND, I WOULD CONSIDER IT A PERSONAL FAVOR.

WARM REGARDS.

UNQUOTE

2. NOT RECEIVING ANY INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO THE 7SEP MESSAGE, ON 13SEP I SENT YOUR CHIEF OF STAFF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE (CG III MAF 130946Z SEP68): QUOTE

SUBJ: SP/4 THOMAS J. STOPYRA, USA

A. MY 070800Z SEP68 (C)

1. FULLY APPRECIATE THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH GATHERING FULLY CREDIBLE INFORMATION ON INCIDENTS SUCH AS THE ONE MENTIONED IN MY PERSONAL OF 7SEP (REF A), CONCERNING THE DEATH OF SP/4 THOMAS J. STOPYRA, USA. I DO WONDER, HOWEVER, IF THERE MIGHT NOT BE SOME PRELIMINARY INFORMATION I COULD PASS ON TO CPL HOLLOWAY TO KEEP HIM ABREAST OF YOUR ACTIONS AND TO ALLAY, IN SOME WAY, HIS GROWING APPREHENSIONS CONCERNING SP/4 STOPYRA'S CAUSE OF DEATH.

2. AGAIN, AND IF IT IS AT ALL POSSIBLE, ANY INTERIM INFORMATION WHATSOEVER WOULD BE SINCERELY APPRECIATED.

WARM REGARDS.

UNQUOTE

3. FULLY UNDERSTAND THE POSSIBLE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH A DEATH OF THIS SORT, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD APPRECIATE A REPLY TO MY MESSAGES, EVEN IF IT'S ONLY AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT AND AN INDICATION THAT NO INFORMATION CAN BE PASSED AT THIS TIME.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

483

#50

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

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PP RUHMFMA RUMLMPA
 DE RHMAFA0859 2810515
 ZNY CCCCC
 P R 070514Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC HAWAII
 INFO RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOND DNG
 BT

FOR
HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L F O R
 FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO BEEN OLSON FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 DISPOSITION OF SUSPENDED AMMUNITION (U)

A. CMC 030052Z OCT 68

1. (C) I AM CONCERNED OVER THE QUANTITIES OF SUSPENDED AMMUNITION THAT ARE ACCUMULATING IN THE ASP'S. THIS AMMUNITION IS OCCUPYING VALUABLE STORAGE SPACE IN ASP'S THAT ARE RAPIDLY REACHING THEIR MAXIMUM CAPACITY. AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER, 8,382.5 S/T OF SUSPENDED AMMUNITION WERE ON HAND. ACTION TAKEN BY REFERENCE A WILL REDUCE THIS QUANTITY BY 4,870.1 S/T. HOWEVER, THE 3,512.4 S/T REMAINING IS STILL CONSIDERED EXCESSIVE.

2. (C) WITH THE FORTHCOMING MONSOON SEASON, IT IS CONSIDERED IMPERATIVE THAT ALL SUSPENDED ASSETS BE DISPOSED OF AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THIS WILL PREVENT DETERIORATION OF PACKAGING AND AMMUNITION BY THE ELEMENTS AND WILL ALSO FREE VALUABLE

PAGE TWO RHMAFA0859 **C O N F I D E N T I A L F O R**
 STORAGE SPACE. THEREFORE IT IS REQUESTED THAT AUTHORITY BE GRANTED TO SHIP ALL ASSETS OF SUSPENDED AMMUNITION, LESS 81MM MORTAR AMMUNITION PROGRAMMED FOR REWORK, TO SASEBO OR OTHER DESIGNATED WESTPAC DEPOTS.

3. (U) BY SEPARATE MESSAGE WE WILL TRANSMIT A SPECIAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF SUSPENDED AMMUNITION IN III MAF ASP'S.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#51

IIIAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

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O 0090340Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF

TO SSO MACV

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L EYES ONLY

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. DURING YOUR VISIT YESTERDAY, YOU REQUESTED A STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF VARIOUS DATA DISCUSSED DURING OUR CONFERENCE. THIS DATA RELATES TO ICTZ FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CASUALTIES, PW'S, AND IWC/CSWC DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER. YOU ALSO REQUESTED A LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT ITEMS OF MATERIEL AND FOOD CAPTURED AND/OR DISCOVERED I CACHES DURING SEPTEMBER. THE FOLLOWING STATISTICAL REPORT IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

A. LATEST REFINED INFO RE FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CASUALTIES, PW'S AND INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS/CREW SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER:

UNIT/MTH	FRIENDLY			ENEMY			
	KIA	WIA(E)		KIA	PW	IWC	CSWC
1ST MARDIV							
AUG	139	124	(NOTE 1)	1398	53	250	22
SEP	133	499	(NOTE 1)	1186	87	229	18
3RD MARDIV (INCL 1/5 MECH)							
AUG	96	340		496	4	205	31
SEP	140	371		1206	18	665	53
AMERICAL							
AUG	65	190		1384	11	209	20
SEP	88	360		1294	17	199	59
1ST CAV (AM)							
AUG	32	408		485	51	212	39
SEP	7	111		207	15	187	2
101ST ABN (AM)							
AUG	48	395		583	45	785	67
SEP	12	144		268	148	244	7
ARVN							
AUG	346	979		2369	478	830	139
SEP	299	952		2174	525	790	154
ROKMC							
AUG	14	80		104	15	24	2
SEP	5	32		127	2	52	2
CIDG							
AUG	39	86		135	7	51	10
SEP	103	389		271	7	75	5

AUG/SEP TOTALS:

FRIENDLY		ENEMY	
KIA	1566	KIA	13,687
WIA(E)	5460	PW	1,483
		IWC	4,987
		CSWC	630

NOTE 1: MANY OF THESE CASUALTIES ARE THE RESULT OF THE EXTENSIVE MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS IN THE DANANG TAOR.

B. SIGNIFICANT ITEMS OF ENEMY MATERIEL CAPTURED,
DESTROYED, OR FOUND IN CACHES THROUGHOUT ICTZ DURING
SEPTEMBER.

(1) WEAPONS	TOTAL	
(A) INDIVIDUAL	2,449	
(B) CREW SERVED, LIGHT	204	
(C) 12.7MM HMG	7	
(D) 60MM MORTAR	28	
(E) 82MM MORTAR	9	
(F) RPG 2/7	40	
(G) 57MM RR	2	
(H) 75MM RR	2	
(I) 122MM RKT LAUNCHER	10	
(J) 105MM HOWITZER	1	
(K) FLAMETHROWERS	11	
(2) AMMUNITION	TOTAL	
(A) SMALL ARMS, RDS	1,258,984	
(B) 12.7MM, RDS	65,540	
(C) 23MM, RDS	270	
(D) 50 CAL, RDS	353,128	
(E) 75MM, RDS	1,057	
(F) 60MM MORTAR, RDS	6,782	
(G) 81MM MORTAR, RDS	845	
(H) 82MM MORTAR, RDS	21,683	
(I) RPG 2/7 RDS	5,597	
(J) 107MM RKT RDS	91	
(K) 122MM RKT RDS	184	
(L) 140MM RKT RDS	35	
(M) 105MM HOW RDS	78	
(N) 155MM HOW RDS	70	
(3) EXPLOSIVES	TOTAL	
(A) MINE (AT, AP, UNK)	3,482	
(B) CLAYMORE	2,234	
(C) BANGALORE TORPEDO	531	
(D) GRENADES	16,202	
(E) EXPLOSIVES (COMP "B", TNT, DYNAMITE) LBS	27,996	
(F) FUZES (ASST'D)	593	
(4) EQUIPMENT	TOTAL	
(A) RADIOS	11	
(B) COMM WIRE, MILES	31.6	
(C) TRUCK ENGINES	7	
(D) TRUCKS	3	
(5) MEDICAL SUPPLIES		
(A) ASSORTED BOTTLES (SULFA, MORPHINE, PENICILLIN, ETC.)	930	
(B) ASSORTED VIALS (VITAMINS, ATROPHINE, QUININE, ETC.)	531	

= 1(2)

C. THE FOLLOWING RICE AND FOOD CACHES HAVE BEEN UNCOVERED IN ICTZ DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER.

(1) RICE

AUGUST	275 TONS
SEPTEMBER	300 TONS

(2) FOOD, OTHER

AUGUST	17 1/2 TONS
SEPTEMBER	17 TONS

2. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE ENEMY CANNOT LONG SUSTAIN LOSSES OF THIS MAGNITUDE WITHOUT ADVERSELY AFFECTING HIS OVERALL COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. I WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP YOU INFORMED OF LARGE CACHES UNCOVERED IN ICTZ.
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

720

HAS BEEN SENT

#1(3)

IIIAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET #2

JLNAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET #2

O 090425Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO SSO XXIV CORPS
 CG FIRST MARDIV
 CG 3D MARDIV
 SSO 1ST CAV DIV (AMBL)
 SSO 101ST AIR CAV DIV
 ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LGEN STILWELL, MGEN YOUNGDALE, MGEN DAVIS, MGEN FORSYTHE, AND MGEN ZAIS, FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 SUBJ: VISIT BY COMUSMACV

1. GEN ABRAMS VISITED III MAF HQ ON 8 OCT. FOLLOWING AN INTELL UPDATE BRIEFING AND AN OPERATIONAL SUMMARY OF THE THUONG DUC SITUATION, THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION ENSUED:
 A. DANANG TAOR. GENERAL ABRAMS REQUESTED CONSIDERATION OF THE MOVEMENT OF ONE REGIMENT FROM THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION INTO THE DANANG TAOR, IN ADDITION TO THE ALREADY DIRECTED MOVEMENT OF 3/26 FROM NORTH OF THE HAI VAN PASS INTO THE DANANG TAOR. IT WAS HIS OPINION THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THESE FORCES, TOGETHER WITH APPROPRIATE CHANGES IN BOUNDARY, WOULD PERMIT THE CONTINUED DEFENSE OF THE DANANG COMPLEX AND FREE THE NECESSARY FORCES TO MOVE DEEPER INTO THE DANANG TAOR AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES OPERATING THEREIN. GENERAL ABRAMS REQUESTED THAT WE BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THIS MOVE ON 10 OCT, WHEN HE RETURNS TO THIS HQ FOR A SPECIAL BRIEFING.

B. IV CORPS DRY-WEATHER CAMPAIGN. GEN ABRAMS STATED THAT WE CAN REALIZE POSITIVE GAINS BY INCREASING PRESSURE ON THE VC IN IV CORPS AND, THEREFORE, MACV SHOULD PROSECUTE THE DRY-WEATHER CAMPAIGN PLANNED FOR THAT AREA, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT IN ADDITION TO CONSIDERATION OF A POSSIBLE MOVE OF AN AIR MOBILE BRIGADE FROM III MAF, EXAMINATION OF THE EXISTING THREAT NOW PRESENT IN II CORPS AREA MIGHT REVEAL THAT THE 173D BRIGADE COULD BE THE ONE THAT SHOULD DEPLOY TO IV CORPS.

C. 3D/5TH ARMD CAV SQDN. GEN CUSHMAN THEN DISCUSSED THE POSSIBLE MOVE OF AN AIRMOBILE BRIGADE FROM I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE TO IV CTZ AND THE ATTENDANT LOSS OF THE 3D/5TH. HE OUTLINED HIS REASONS FOR RETAINING THE 3D/5TH, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE PERSONNEL OF THE 1ST/18TH WERE NOT DEPLOYING FROM THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, GEN ABRAMS INDICATED THAT THE ARMOR THREAT THAT ONCE EXISTED IN NORTHERN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE IS NO LONGER OF ANY GREAT MAGNITUDE, AND IN ADDITION, THE 1ST BRIGADE OF THE 5TH MECH, NOW LOCATED IN THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AREA, PROVIDES SUFFICIENT ARMOR IN NORTHERN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. ACCORDINGLY, IT WAS HIS OPINION

THAT THE 3D/5TH COULD SAFELY DEPLOY TO III CORPS WITHOUT LEAVING

#2(1)

D. ENEMY LOGISTIC SYSTEM. GEN ABRAMS REPORTED THAT THE ENEMY LOGISTIC SYSTEM HAS BEEN DISRUPTED SUBSTANTIALLY AND MUST BE REESTABLISHED PRIOR TO THE INITIATION OF ANY FUTURE MAJOR OFFENSIVE. THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THIS SYSTEM WILL BE A PRIME INDICATOR THAT FUTURE ENEMY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ARE INTENDED, AND COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED OVERNIGHT.

E. INPUT FROM NVN INTO SVN. THE SIGNIFICANT STATISTICS MENTIONED IN THIS AREA WERE:

(1) CACHES DISCOVERED IN 1968 WERE 7 TO 16 TIMES GREATER IN QUANTITY THAN THOSE UNCOVERED IN 1967.

(2) BY THE END OF 1968, INFILTRATION INTO SVN DURING 1968 WILL EXCEED THE TOTAL INFILTRATION FOR ALL PREVIOUS FOUR YEARS OF THE WAR, DESPITE RECENT REDUCTION IN INFILTRATION GROUPS.

(3) DURING RECENT WEEKS, THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED DECREASE IN ENEMY TRUCK TRAFFIC IN LAOS.

F. RELOCATION OF ENEMY UNITS IN NORTH. HE DISCUSSED AND SOLICITED VIEWS CONCERNING THE GRADUAL NORTHWARD RELOCATION OF ENEMY FORCES IN THE DMZ AND THE RECENT CONVERGENCE OF MRTH HEADQUARTERS AND CERTAIN REGIMENTS INTO LAOS WEST OF KHE SANH. NO DEFINATE CONCLUSIONS WERE REACHED.

G. STATISTICAL REPORT. HE REQUESTED THAT A STATISTICAL REPORT OF ENEMY WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND RICE CAPTURED BY ICTZ UNITS DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1968 BE PROVIDED COMUSMACV NLT 1300, 9 OCTOBER. CONFIRMED ENEMY KIA'S AND PW'S ARE ALSO TO BE INCLUDED.

GP-4

720

#2(2)

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

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JLMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET #5

P 100745Z

FM CG III MAF

TO SSO IFFV

INFO COMUSMACV

SSO AMERICAL DIV

ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY

FOR LGEN PEERS INFO GEN ABRAMS AND MGEN GETTYS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

1. DURING COMUSMACV VISIT TODAY, HE DIRECTED THAT YOUR FORCES AND MINE TAKE COORDINATED ACTION AGAINST ENEMY ELEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO.

2. HE THEREUPON AUTHORIZED DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN THE AMERICAL DIVISION AND THE 173D BRIGADE FOR THIS PURPOSE.

I SUGGEST THEY DRAW UP A MUTUAL PLAN AND SUBMIT IT FOR APPROVAL TO US AND WE CAN THEN EXECUTE.

WARM REGARDS AND GOOD HUNTING.

GP-4

SSO NOTE; DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

120

NO
NNNN

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Z 121038Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM CG III MAF DNG
TO COMUSMACV SGN
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN EYES ONLY

1. THIS RESPONDS IN PART TO COMUSMACV 120351Z OCT MAC 13782.
CG XXIV CORPS 120820Z OCT PASSED SEPARATELY CONTAINS REMAINDER
OF DESIRED INFO.
 2. FOLLOWING IS PRESENT NGF SHIP PROJECTION FOR REGION OFF-SHORE
DMZ AND NORTH UNTIL 26 OCTOBER 1968.
 - A. IN VICINITY OF DMZ. TWO SHIPS, DESTROYER OR CRUISER,
ENTIRE PERIOD EXCEPT 21 TO 23 OCT ONE SHIP ONLY. ON 17 OCT
3 SHIPS.
 - B. NORTH OF DMZ. SEA DRAGON. UNDERSTAND NEW JERSEY AND 3
DESTROYERS ON STATION THROUGH 20 OCT. ONE CRUISER AND 3 DESTROYERS
AFTER 20 OCT.
 3. AS YET NO FIRM FIRING OR TARGET SCHEDULE FOR NGF SHIPS.
MISSIONS WILL BE AS ASSIGNED.
- GP-4
SSO: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
200

NNNN HAS BEEN SENT

11 OCT 1968

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JO RUMK
DE RHMMFAI565 2860751

ZNY CCCCC

R 120750Z OCT 68

FM CG III MAF

TO CMC

CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
SPECAT FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LGEN BUSE FROM
LGEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FOLLOWING LETTER, DATED 2 OCTOBER, WAS RECEIVED FROM
MR. DON WEBSTER, A CBS NEWS CORRESPONDENT IN SAIGON. IT
IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION: QUOTE

DEAR GENERAL CUSHMAN:

I DO NOT HAVE OCCASION TO WRITE LETTERS TO THE MILITARY IN
VIETNAM VERY OFTEN, WHICH I HOPE SERVES TO PLACE EMPHASIS ON
CORRESPONDENCE WHEN I DO WRITE.

I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW, IF YOU DID NOT ALREADY, THAT
AS FAR AS I CAN TELL IT IS THE UNANIMOUS OPINION OF THE
PRESS CORPS WORKING IN VIETNAM THAT THE WORKING CONDITIONS
AND THE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS AT THE DANANG PRESS CENTER
HAVE IMPROVED A HUNDRED PER CENT RECENTLY, SINCE COLONEL

PAGE TWO RHMMFAI565 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT MCEO
PAUL MORIARTY TOOK OVER HIS COMMAND THERE.

THE WHOLE ATTITUDE AT THE PRESS CENTER SEEMS TO HAVE
CHANGED. THE PERSONNEL THERE SEEM ANXIOUS AND SOMETIMES
EVEN EAGER TO ASSIST THE PRESS IN COVERING THE NEWS OF
I CORPS. WE ARE ABLE TO GET TO AND COVER STORIES AS NEVER
BEFORE. AND ALTHOUGH IT IS PROBABLY TOO EARLY TO SEE THIS
CLEARLY, I THINK IN TIME IT WILL BE APPARENT THAT THE NEWS
COVERAGE TOO IS IMPROVING BECAUSE OF THIS NEW MUTUAL SPIRIT
OF COOPERATION. NEW COVERAGE IS BECOMING GREATER, MORE
THOROUGH AND MORE ACCURATE AS A RESULT OF COOPERATION AT THE
PRESS CENTER AND OF BEING ABLE TO GET OUT INTO THE FIELD
AND "SEE FOR YOURSELF."

OF THE MEN ON COL. MORIARTY'S STAFF, THERE IS ONE I
ESPECIALLY WANTED TO MENTION. THE NEW OPERATIONS OFFICER,
MAJOR JOSEPH MARTIN, IS DOING A TRULY OUTSTANDING JOB.
ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS HE HAS DONE EVERYTHING THAT COULD POSSIBLY
BE EXPECTED OF HIM, AND EVEN MORE, TO ASSIST US. ON ONE
OF THESE OCCASIONS INVOLVING MYSELF HE WAS STILL HARD AT WORK
AT 2 A.M. TO HELP ME WITH A PROJECT. AND I HAVE FOUND HIM
EQUALLY HELPFUL IN ASSISTANCE IN COVERING ANY NEWS STORIES

Joel *AN* PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DEPT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#5

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE RHMMFA1565 CO N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT MCEO
 WITHIN YOUR TAOR--HE DOES NOT HOLD A PAROCHIAL VIEW OF ONLY
 ASSISTING ON STORIES RELATING TO THE MARINE CORPS.

I KNOW SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES IN THE PRESS HAVE NOT
 HESITATED IN THE PAST TO REGISTER COMPLAINTS WHEN THEY
 FELT THEM WARRANTED. I WANTED TO MAKE SURE THAT GOOD
 WORK ALSO DOES NOT GO UNNOTICED.

UNQUOTE
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#5

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O 120824Z OCT 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
INFO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS
BT

SECRET SPECAT
EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN WEBSTER, INFO MGEN SCHWEITER,
FROM MGEN ANDERSON FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY
A. XXIV CORPS 101530Z OCT 68
B. CG III MAF 120752Z JUN 68
C. TELCON AC/S, G-4 III MAF AND C/S 3D MARDIV OF 11OCT
REF A REPORTED SEABEES REMOVING MATTING FROM KHE SANH
AIRFIELD UNDER PROTECTION OF 3/4. REF B DIRECTS AIRFIELD
MATTING TO REMAIN IN PLACE. REF C DIRECTED REMOVAL OF MATTING
BE CEASED. REQUEST AUTHORITY FOR AND EXTENT OF REMOVAL BE
PROVIDED THIS HQTRS ASAP.
BT

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 8216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET #7

JIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET

CCN: 124 FILE: 9

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00 RUH KM
 DE RHMMFAI594 2861335
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 121334Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION ASSETS (U)

A. CMC 021244Z OCT 68 (S) (EXCLUSIVE MCEO)

B. CMC 260142Z SEP 68 (S) (EXCLUSIVE MCEO)

1. (U) REF A REQUESTED SUBSTANTIATING INFO REGARDING MARINE AIR SUPPORT TO ARMY BNS IN I CORPS. STATISTICS INDICATED IN FOLLOWING PARAS ARE BASED ON DATA OBTAINED FROM HORN DASC UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.

2. (S) DURING JUN, JUL, AND AUG THE ARMY WAS OPERATING WITH 31 MANEUVER BNS IN I CORPS. AT THE PROGRAMMED RATE OF 5 SORTIES PER ARMY MANEUVER BN PER DAY 7AF SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED ARMY BNS 155 SORTIES PER DAY. TABLE I SHOWS THE SORTIES PROVIDED TO I CORPS BY USAF FOR SERVICE INDICATED AND INDICATES THAT ONLY 71 SORTIES PER DAY OR 46 PCT OF THOSE PROGRAMMED WERE ACTUALLY PROVIDED TO THE ARMY.

TABLE I

PAGE TWO RHMMFAI594 **S E C R E T** SPECAT MCEO

	USA	USMC	OTHER	TOTAL
JUNE	2190	698	997	3885
JULY	1962	511	859	3332
AUGUST	2408	514	884	3806

3. (S) TABLE II SHOWS THE SORTIES PROVIDED TO ARMY FORCES BY USAF AND USMC. IT INDICATES THAT FIRST MAW FURNISHED THE ARMY 33 SORTIES PER DAY OR 21 PCT OF THOSE PROGRAMMED TO BE PROVIDED BY USAF.

	USAF	USMC	TOTAL	SORT/BN/DAY
JUNE	2190	843	3033	3.26
JULY	1962	933	2895	3.01
AUGUST	2408	1296	3704	3.85

4. (S) THEREFORE THE ARMY RECEIVED DURING THE THREE MONTH PERIOD 104 SORTIES PER DAY OR 67 PCT OF THEIR PROGRAMMED 155 SORTIES PER DAY. THIS REDUCES TO 3.35 SORTIES PER BATTALION PER DAY IN LIEU OF THE PROGRAMMED 5 SORTIES PER BATTALION PER DAY.

5. (S) THE NET LOSS OF SORTIES, I.E., MARINE SORTIES TO ARMY MINUS AIR FORCE SORTIES TO MARINE FORCES, ALONG WITH THE NUMBER OF MARINE MANEUVER BNS AND THE AVERAGE NET LOSS PER MARINE MANEUVER BN PER DAY IS SHOWN IN TABLE III FOR MAY THROUGH SEP.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA1594 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

TABLE III

	SORTIES	MANEUVER	BNS	SORT/BN/DAY
MAY	1091	24		1.47
JUN	145	24		0.20
JUL	422	24		0.57
AUG	782	24		1.05
SEP	741	21		1.19

GP-4
BTPAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

#7

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CCN: 132 FILE: 9

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PP RUHKM
 DE RHMAFA1688 2871123
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 131122Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN BUSE FROM LGEN CUSHMAN
 FOR MARINE CORPS CORPS EYES ONLY,
 MONTHLY REPORT-EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL
 AIR (U)

A. CG III MAF 240812Z SEP 68 (S)
 B. CG III MAF 291614Z SEP 68 (S)
 C. CG III MAF 291442Z JUL 68 (S)
 D. TELCON C/S FMFPAC WITH C/S III MAF 12OCT68
 1. REFS A, B, AND C READDRESSSED AND TRANSMITTED TO CMC ON
 8OCT68. IT HAS BEEN THE POLICY OF THIS COMMAND TO READDRESS
 ALL SINGLE MANAGEMENT MESSAGES TO CG FMFPAC AFTER DISPATCH
 TO COMUSMACV. AS A RESULT OF REF D, A REVIEW WAS CONDUCTED TO
 ASCERTAIN WHY REFS A, B, AND C NOT READDRESSSED. INVESTIGATION
 REVEALED MESSAGES WERE NOT READDRESSSED TO CG FMFPAC, IN
 ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED POLICY, DUE TO COMMUNICATION

PAGE TWO RHMAFA1688 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO
 ERROR. ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.
 2. REF D DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER WE READDRESSSED REF C.
 ACCORDINGLY, REF C IS READDRESSSED AS WELL AS REPLY
 (COMUSMACV 110703Z OCT68-S) TO REF A. REGRET ANY
 INCONVENIENCE.

WARN REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET
#8

JLMAF FORM 8216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET #9

SECRET

CON 137 & 138 FILE 95

		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 14 OCT 68
	SERIAL# 40300Z OCT 68	COPY# 1 OF 3	COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
10/14	[Signature]	DATE	SIGNATURE
		EXCLUSIVE	
		FOR	
		MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY	
		HAS BEEN SENT	
s/s	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES MAT AND TAPE		

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SECRET**EXCLUSIVE****FOR** HAS BEEN SENT**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PP RUHMM
 DE RHMMFA 1743 2880300
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 140300Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHMM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION I OF II
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN
 REF: MY 131122Z OCT 68 (S) (EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO)
 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REF, FOL MSGS ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR
 INFORMATION: QUOTE

P 080812Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 INFO CMC
 OP 291442Z JUL 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 CINCPAC
 INFO CG FIRST MAW
 BT

S E C R E T

PAGE TWO RHMMFA 1743 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
 SUBJ: EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR PERIOD 270600H JUN 68
 TO 260600H JULY 1968 (U)

REF (A) COMUSMACV 19546 DTG 971036Z JULY 1968 (NOTAL)

(B) COMUSMACV LTR MACCOC 2 OF 15 JULY 1968 (S)

(C) CG, III MAF 300636Z JUNE 1968 (NOTAL)

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (A) SUBJECT EVALUATION IS SUBMITTED,
 INCLUDING COMMENTS AND STATUS OF ACTIONS ON THE AREAS OF INTEREST
 LISTED IN REFERENCE (B).

2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN REFERENCE (C) ARE STILL CON-
 sidered valid although only one of nine recommendations, elimination
 of IP from WEEKLY FRAG, HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 (SM) PROCEDURES. MODIFIED SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CONTINUES TO BE
 IMPROVEMENT OVER ORIGINAL SYSTEM. INCREASED FAMILIARITY WITH
 SYSTEM HAS RESULTED IN MORE EFFICIENT OPERATIONS. SOME ADDITIONAL
 AREAS HAVE BEEN NOTED WHERE MINOR PROCEDURAL CHANGES WOULD PRO-
 DUCE INCREASED RESPONSIVENESS TO CHANGING NEEDS OF GROUND COMMANDERS.

3. COMMENTS AND STATUS OF ACTION ON AREAS OF INTEREST LISTED
 IN REFERENCE (B) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THIS HQ HAS NO BASIS ON WHICH TO CORROBORATE I DASC
 LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS. US PORTION OF I DASC IS BEING MOVED

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES**SECRET**

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA 1743 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
TO III MAF HQ. THIS WILL FURTHER IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS TO
III MAF TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS. DEPUTY DIRECTOR I DASC
ALSO SERVES AS III MAF LIAISON OFFICER.

B. DIFFERENCES IN 7TH AF STATISTICS OF SORTIES FRAGGED,
FLOWN, AND REPORTED ARE NOT KNOWN TO THIS HQ. ALL SORTIES
FRAGGED, FLOWN AND REPORTED HAVE BEEN WITHIN 7TH AF TACTICAL
AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. SPECIFIC DISCREPANCIES IN STATISTICS HAVE
NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THIS COMMAND. I DASC MAINTAINS RECORD
OF ALL SORTIES BY TYPE FLOWN IN ICTZ. HQ III MAF IS PROVIDED
WEEKLY SUMMARY OF STATISTICS WHICH IN FACT ARE IDENTICAL TO
THOSE REPORTED TO 7TH AF TACC BY I DASC. ONLY STATISTICS ORI-
GINATING AT THIS HQ CONCERNING SINGLE MANAGEMENT ARE THOSE
REFLECTING AIR SUPPORT REQUEST AND SORTIES ALLOCATION TO III
MAF UNITS.

C. AIR SUPPORT IS REQUESTED BY GROUND COMMANDERS BASED
ON THEIR ESTIMATE OF SORTIES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS,
III MAF SUB-ALLOCATIONS ARE IN TURN BASED ON THESE REQUESTS.
IN ADDITION CG III MAF ASSIGNS PRIORITIES BASED ON OVERALL
EVALUATION OF ENEMY SITUATION AND OPERATIONS IN ICTZ. EX-
AMINATION OF REQUESTS SUBMITTED TO THIS HQ REVEALS ARMY AND

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 1743 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
FWMAF'S ARE IN FACT ALLOCATED A HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF REQUESTED
SORTIES THAN MARINE UNITS. SINCE 1 JULY, 2ND ROKMC BDE HAS
BEEN ALLOCATED 94 PCT. OF SORTIES REQUESTED, ARMY UNITS 66 PCT. AND
MARINES UNITS 60 PCT. ARVN UNITS DO NOT REQUEST PREPLANNED SORTIES
FROM III MAF, ARVN IMMEDIATE REQUESTS THROUGH TACS HAVE ALWAYS
BEEN HONORED. A WEEKLY AIR SUPPORT PLANNING CONFERENCE HAS
INITIATED BY THIS HQS 18 JULY WITH ALL MAJOR SUBORDINATE
COMMANDERS REPRESENTED IN ORDER TO ASSURE ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR
AIR SUPPORT ARE FULLY KNOWN AND FAIRLY CONSIDERED. PCV
SUBALLOCATES TO UNITS UNDER PCV OPCON.

D. LULLS IN COMBAT ACTIVITY AND REDUCTION OF ENEMY THREAT
MAY RESULT IN FEWER SORTIES REQUIRED. HOWEVER, AS MANEUVER
BATTALIONS ON OFFENSIVE CONTINUE TO SEEK LOCATION OF ENEMY
UNITS, INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR LZ CONSTRUCTION, PREP AND HELO
ESCORT TEND TO OFFSET REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF TROOPS IN
CONTACT. CONSEQUENTLY GROUND COMMANDERS REQUEST FOR TACAIR
HAVE NOT LESSENERED. INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE AT THIS HQ IN-
DICATIONS AND INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY PARTICULARLY IN QUANG
NAM PROVINCE. PRESENT ALLOCATION OF PREPLANNED SORTIES IS
NOT CONSIDERED ADEQUATE.

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

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PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 1743 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
 E. PROCEDURES TOO ASSURE FULL UTILIZATION OF WEEKLY FRAG
 ARE IN STRICT ACCORD WITH SM SYSTEM.

F. MARINE STRIKE AIRCRAFT TIO WITH CRC AND CRP AS DIRECTED
 BY FRAG.

G. SUB ALLOCATION OF WEEKLY FRAG BY THIS HQ DOES NOT
 INCLUDE ALL SORTIES ALLOCATED TO III MAF. THIS HQ AND HQ
 PCV RETAIN SORTIES FOR LOC INTERDICTION AND TO WEIGH EFFORT
 AS REQUIRED. SORTIES ARE ALSO SHIFTED BETWEEN DIVISIONS WHEN
 REQUIRED. IT MUST BE NOTED HOWEVER THAT PRINCIPLE OF SUB-
 ALLOCATING FIXED NUMBER OF SORTIES ON WEEKLY BASIS IS IN
 ACCORD WITH MODIFIED SYSTEM OBJECTIVE OF GUARANTEEING BASIC
 LEVEL OF SUPPORT.

H. SEE SUB PARA 3 G ABOVE.

I. REPRESENTATIVES OF 7TH AF HAVE INDICATED INFORMALLY
 THAT PREVIOUSLY EXISTING III MAF REPORTS COULD BE UTILIZED TO
 MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT. NO REDUC-
 TION IN THIS REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED TO DATE.

J. III MAF HAS MADE CLEAR ITS VIEW THAT SUPPORTING FIRES
 SHOULD BE FULLY AND CENTRALLY COORDINATED WITH PROMPT FREE
 FLOW OF INFORMATION TO COMBINE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS WITH

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 1743 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
 SAFETY. INFORMALLY, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS IS BEING
 SERIOUSLY STUDIED BY THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE BUT NO CONCRETE
 PROPOSAL IS KNOWN. AMERICAL DIVISION PROCEDURES ARE INDENTI-
 CAL TO MARINE CORPS.

4. DIFFICULTY HAS BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN OBTAINING PROMPT AERIAL
 PHOTOGRAPHY. FOR EXAMPLE, PHOTOGRAPHS OF NEWLY PREPARED
 HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE ARE NEEDED WITHIN SIX HOURS TO DETERMINE
 WHAT OBSTACLES STILL EXIST AND TO BRIEF PILOTS WHO MUST
 LAND BEFORE OBSTACLES CAN BE CLEARED. ALTHOUGH SYMPATHETIC
 UNDERSTANDING IS FOUND AT ALL LEVELS, NORMAL REQUEST CHAIN IS
 TOO LONG TO MEET TIGHT DEADLINE FOR DELIVERY. BELIEVE THE
 ANSWER IS TO USE IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS FOR PHOTO
 SORTIES WITH III MAF/IDASC. HAVING SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY AND AIR
 DELIVERY OF PRINTS TO REQUESTING UNIT.

5. ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH SM IS NOT MEETING NEEDS OF GROUND
 UNITS IS NUMBER OF TPQ-10 (CSS) SORTIES FRAGGED. PRIOR
 TO 20 MARCH, FIRST MAF WAS PROVIDING APPROXIMATELY 94 TPQ-10
 (CSS) SORTIES ON DAILY BASIS: 42 FOR 1 ST MARDIV AND 52 FOR
 3RD MARDIV. SINCE SM, 1ST MARDIV HAS REQUESTED 37 TPQ-10 (BSS)
 SORTIES AND BEEN ALLOCATED AVERAGE OF 9 PER DYY WHILE 3RD
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#9

SECRET

PP RUHKM
 DE RHMAFA 1744 2880300
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 140300Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF II
 MARDIV REQUESTED 53 AND ALLOCATED 18 PER DAY. MARINE GROUND
 COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN REQUESTING ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER AS BE-
 FORE BUT HAVE ONLY BEEN ALLOCATED 24 PERCENT OF NUMBER RECEIVED
 PRIOR TO SM. TPQ-10 (CSS) OFFERS ACCURATE MEANS OF
 HITTING TARGETS WHICH CANNOT BE LOCATED BY AIRBORNE FAC FOR VISUAL
 ATTACK AND IN ADDITION CAN BRING WEIGHT OF AIR ATTACK ON ENEMY
 WHEN HE LEAST EXPECTS IT. ITS EFFECTIVE USE OVER A 24 HOUR
 PERIOD IS ESSENTIAL TO BOTH MARINE AND ARMY UNITS AND SHOULD
 BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED.

6. IN SUMMARY, SM SYSTEM SAW ONLY MINOR CHANGES DURING PAST
 MONTH. CHANGES RECOMMENDED LAST MONTH IN REFERENCE (C) ARE
 STILL APPLICABLE AND WOULD IMPROVE SYSTEM. IN PARTICULAR,
 RETURN TO THIS HQ SCHEDULING AUTHORITY FOR IN-COUNTRY 1ST
 MAW SORTIES TO BE USED AS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF ALL UNITS

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 1744 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
 IN ICTZ WOULD INCREASE FLEXIBILITY AND ENHANCE RESPON-
 SIVENESS TO NEEDS OF ALL III MAF GROUND COMMANDERS. COMUSMACV
 HAS MEANS FOR INFLUENCING ACTION THROUGHOUT RVN BY INCREASING
 /DECREASING AIR FORCE SORTIES PROVIDED TO III MAF.

7. IN ADDITION, FOLLOWING NEW CHANGES ARE RECOMMENDED:

- A. ESTABLISH PROCEDURE SO THAT CHANGES TO PRE-PLANNED FRAG
 CAN BE MADE THROUGH IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST CHANNELS.
- B. PROVIDE FOR RAPID RESPONSE IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE
 THROUGH USE OF IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS AND
 DELIVERY OF PRINTS BY AIR AS REQUIRED TO MEET STATED DEADLINES.
- C. INCREASE USE OF CSS TO KEEP ENEMY UNDER ATTACK ON 24
 HOUR A DAY BASIS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

QUOTE

R 110703Z OCT 68

FM COMUSMACV
 TO CG III MAF
 INFO CINCPAC

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#9

SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMNAFA 1744 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
BT

S E C R E T 30171

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT STRIKE SUPPORT PROCEDURES (U)

REF: A. CG III MAF MSG 240812Z SEP 68 (S). SUBJ AS ABOVE (NOTAL)

B. DISCUSSIONS WITH BG HOFFMAN, G-3, III MAF, DURING QP OCT 68 VISIT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF MACV

1. (S) THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS CAREFULLY REVIEWED YOUR RECOMMENDATION OUTLINED IN REF A TO COMBINE MACV DIR 95-13 AND 525-4 INTO ONE DIRECTIVE AND EXPAND IT TO AN AIR/GROUND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION SYSTEM, AND DISCUSSED IT WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCE B. THE PARAGRAPHS WHICH FOLLOW CONFIRM THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN REFERENCE B.

2. (S) MACV DIRECTIVE 95-13 WAS WRITTEN PRIMARILY TO PROTECT AIRCRAFT FROM ARTILLERY FIRE WHILE OVER OR NEAR AIRFIELDS AND ON POINT TO POINT FLIGHTS, ALTHOUGH IN ITS PUBLISHED FORM IT BENEFITS ALL AIR CRAFT BY THE ESTABLISHMENT TO ARTILLERY WARNING CONTROL CENTERS THROUGHOUT RVN. IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO SERVE AS A VEHICLE FOR CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES/TACTICAL AIR IN THE BATTLE AREA. THE RVNAF, JGS HAS A SIMILAR DIRECTIVE FOR THEIR FORCES WHICH SERVES THE SAME PURPOSE.

PAGE FOUR RHMNAFA 1744 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

3. (C) MACV DIR 525-4, COMBAT OPERATIONS ARTILLERY COORDINATION FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE, WAS WRITTEN FOR SPECIAL ONE-OF-A-KIND SITUATION. IT DOES NOT APPEAR FEASIBLE OR DESIRABLE TO COMBINE IT WITH ANY OTHER DIRECTIVE.

4. (S) INSTRUCTIONS FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS FOR CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES/TACTICAL AIR IN THE BATTLE AREA ARE AVAILABLE IN THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIVES: MACV DIR 95-11, AVIATION JOINT AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM; MACV DIR 525-12, COMBAT OPERATIONS, COMBAT SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER; AND MACV DIR 95-4. US AIR OPERATIONS IN RVN. MACV DIR 525-12 ESTABLISHED POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR INSURING EFFECTIVE AND COORDINATED USE OF ALL AVAILABLE COMBAT SUPPORT THROUGH A STANDARDIZED COMBINED COMBAT SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER, IT IS BELIEVED THAT MACV DIR 525-1 PROVIDES SUFFICIENT GUIDANCE TO ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN REFERENCE MESSAGE.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

SECRET

#9

ILMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET #10

0 151405Z ZYH
 FM MTG ANDERSON, III MAF
 TO MG GELLYS, CG 4NDIV
 0 151122Z ZTR ZPT-1
 FM LTC JELERS, CG IFFV
 TO LTC CASHMAN, CG III MAF
 INFO CG 4NDIV, CG 111 MAF
 ZLW

S E C R E T EAT 1715 EYES ONLY

1. (S) SINCE RECEIVING YOUR MESSAGE (100745Z OCT 68) CONCERNING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VA DIV, THE CG, IITH BDE AMERICAL DIV, A-S COORDINATED WITH AND PRESENTED A PLAN TO THE CG, 173D ABN BDE. THIS PLAN, HOWEVER, ENVISIONS OPERATIONS CONSIDERABLY FARTHER FROM THE 173D ABN BDE'S HQ THAN YOUR MESSAGE IMPLIED. WE HAVE STUDIED THE PLAN TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF DEPLOYING FORCES TO OPERATE IN I CTZ.

2. (S) TWO BATTALIONS (1/503 AND 2/503) OF THE 173D ABN BDE ARE CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN THE HIGH GROUND AROUND THE HIGHEST PRIORITY AREA AND MOST DENSELY POPULATED REGION IN II CTZ - THE BONG SON PLAIN OF BINH DINH PROVINCE. THE CRITICALITY OF THIS AREA, PARTICULARLY DURING THE RICE HARVESTING SEASON, PRECLUDES COMMITMENT OF EITHER OF THESE BATTALIONS IN I CTZ. THE 1ST BN, 69TH ARMOR WILL MOVE TO THE HIGHLANDS ON 19 OCT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF BETTER TRAFFICABILITY IN THAT AREA DURING THE NORTHEAST MO SOON. THE ONLY OTHER US BATTALION IN BINH DINH PROVINCE, THE 1/56TH MECH, IS FULLY COMMITTED TO S AND C OPERATIONS IN THE AN KHE AREA AND SECURITY OF HIGHWAY 19. FROM THIS IT CAN BE SEEN THAT A BRIGADE OF THREE BATTALIONS IS BEING STRETCHED TO COVER AN AREA FORMERLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 1ST CAV DIV. WE ARE ALSO SPREAD THIN IN THE HIGHLANDS, MAKING FURTHER DRAWDOWN OF FORCES THERE IMPRUDENT.

3. (S) THE 4/503 ABN BN WAS RELEASED FROM THE DUC LAP AREA ON 15 OCT TO INITIATE A 7-10 DAY SEARCH OF THE HUB (CQ 2255) AREA IN PHU YEN PROVINCE WHERE THE ENEMY HAS RECENTLY BEEN BUILDING UP. AFTER THAT IT IS PLANNED TO DEPLOY THE 4/503 INTO THE SONG CON RIVER VALLEY NORTH OF VINH THANH CIDG CAMP. HOWEVER, IF THE SITUATION REQUIRES, THEY COULD BE DIVERTED TO QUANG NGAI PROVINCE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OPERATION WITH III MAF FORCES.

4. (S) GENERAL ALLEN WILL FOLLOW THE PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION CLOSELY. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE, CONTINGENT ON THE ENEMY SITUATION IN II CTZ AND QUANG NGAI, TO MAKE THE 4/503D AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE UPON COMPLETION OF THEIR OPERATION IN PHU YEN PROVINCE.

BT-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
 DDD

#10

NNNN

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

IIIAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CCN: 184 FILE: 9

[illegible]

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RUHKM
 DE RHMAFA2134 2911547
 P 171545Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
 TO CG FMFPAC HAW
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN BUSE FROM L GEN CUSHMAN
 ASSIGNMENT OF OFF (U)

A. CG III MAF 170046Z SEP 68
 B. CG FMFPAC 200246Z SEP 68

1. LTCOL N. C. NEW REPORTED FOR DUTY WITH FIRST MAW ON 40CT68. STILL DESIRE TO HAVE HIM ASSIGNED TO OUR STAFF FOR THE REASONS DISCUSSED IN REF A.
 2. REF B SUGGESTED THAT WE CONSIDER MAKING THE C/S TF HOTEL A GROUND OFFICER. THE CG 3D MARDIV, HOWEVER, DESIRES C/S REMAIN AN NA COLONEL. STUDY BEING CONDUCTED BY 1ST MAW, AS DIRECTED BY THIS HQTRS, TO CONSIDER DISPLACEMENT OF ELEMENTS OF MAG-36 AT PHU BAI TO BOTH QUANG TRI AND MMAF. ELEMENTS OF MAG-36 MOVING TO MMAF WOULD DISPLACE ELEMENTS OF ARMY'S 16TH AVIATION GROUP NOW LOCATED MMAF TO PHU BAI. MAG-36 COMMAND GROUP WOULD MOVE TO QUANG TRI. WITH TF X-RAY DISSOLVED AND

PAGE TWO RHMAFA2134 C O N F I D E N T I A L: SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 THE FIRST DIVISION MARINES MOVED SOUTH OF HAI VAN PASS, THERE IS NO LONGER A REQUIREMENT FOR TWO HELICOPTER GROUP HQTRS BOTH AT QUANG TRI AND PHU BAI. THE DISSOLUTION OF PROV MAG-39 HQ WOULD ELIMINATE THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE COLONEL AUGMENTATION FOR PROV MAG-39 CO.

3. CURRENT PROJECTIONS OF COLONELS FOR THE WING SHOW 21 ON BOARD AT THE END OF OCTOBER, 20 NOVEMBER, 21 IN DECEMBER, AND 23 IN JANUARY. IF LTCOL NEW NOT ORDERED TO III MAF FOR ASSIGNMENT AS MY DEPUTY G-2, WILL CONTINUE WITH BOTH AC/S G-2 AND G-2 AND DEP G-2 AS GROUND OFFICERS. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS REQUESTED THAT COL NEW BE TRANSFERRED TO HQ, III MAF, FOR DUTY.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#11

ZIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET #13

SECRET

CCN 211 FILE 95

		FROM CG III MAF		DATE 20 OCT 68	
		SERIAL# 200120Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR			
10/20	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE		
		<div style="text-align: center;"> <h1>EXCLUSIVE</h1> <h1>FOR</h1> <h2>HAS BEEN SENT</h2> </div>			
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES				
	MAT, TAPE AND HARD COPY				

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SECRET

JINAF FORM E216 (REV 3-60)

SECRET *#15*

SECRET

CCN 211 FILE 95

		FROM CG III MAF		DATE 20 OCT 68	
		SERIAL # 200120Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR			
10/20	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE		
		<div style="text-align: center;"> <h1>EXCLUSIVE</h1> <h1>FOR</h1> <h2>HAS BEEN SENT</h2> </div>			
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FOR**

OO RUMHLA RUMHAW
DE RHMAFA 2362 2940120
ZNY SSSSS
O 200120Z OCT 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
INFO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN YOUNGDALE INFO MGEN QUILTER FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN

1. I AM DEEPLY DISTURBED TO NOTE 93 MARINES, ARVN SOLDIERS AND VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED BY 1ST MARINE DIVISION MORTAR AND ARTILLERY FIRE THUS FAR DURING OCTOBER. THE TRAGEDY OF THESE LOSSES IS SHARPENED BY THE FACT THAT THEY NEED NEVER HAVE HAPPENED. THE EVER-PRESENT THREAT OF FRIENDLY-ON-FRIENDLY FIRE IS WELL KNOWN AND RECOGNIZED, AS ARE THE TECHNIQUES OF PREVENTING SUCH TRAGIC MISTAKES.

2. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES REPORTS OF 1ST MARINE DIVISION FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENTS IN OCTOBER:

A. ON 9 OCT 0830H 4.2 MORTARS OF W/3/11, FIRING IN SUPPORT OF 1/51 ARMOR HAD 2 ROUNDS IMPACT SHORT KILLING 4 ARVN AND WOUNDING 28. ARVN FORCES REPORTED 1 EARLIER SHORT ROUND AT THE SAME LOCATION WHICH WOUNDED 1 ARVN.

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 2362 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

B. ON 12 OCTOBER K/4/11 FIRING IN SUPPORT OF THE 51ST ARVN REGT, HAD THREE ROUNDS IMPACT LONG, KILLING TWO ARVN AND WOUNDING THREE OTHERS.

C. ON 15 OCT AT 0730H, K/4/11 HAD 8 ROUNDS IMPACT IN A VILLAGE KILLING 8 CIVILIANS WOUNDING 21 OTHERS SERIOUSLY ENOUGH FOR EVAC, AND 21 WOUNDED MINOR.

3. IN ADDITION, ON 8 OCTOBER AT 1030 A 1ST MAF GUNSHIP FROM HML 167 FIRED ROCKETS INTO ELEMENTS OF 2ND BN 7TH MAR, WOUNDING 8 MARINES. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS MATTER HAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED WHETHER THE FAULT LAY WITH PERSONNEL OF 1 ST MAF, 1ST MARDIV OR BOTH. IN EITHER CASE, MARINES WERE AGAIN WOUNDED NEEDLESSLY BY OTHER MARINES. I INTEND PERSONALLY TO REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION.

4. I DESIRE THAT YOU TAKE IMMEDIATE AND DECISIVE ACTION TO CURTAIL THIS TREND IN THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#15

DECLASSIFIED

P 201802Z

FM CG III MAF

TO CG 25TH INF DIVISION

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY FOR MGEN WILLIAMSON FROM MGEN ANDERSON

REF: MY 070335Z OCT 68

1. TRACER ACTION INITIATED ON TWO SPECAT MESSAGES RE SP/4 STOPYRA INDICATES NONDELIVERY RESULT OF NONAVAILABILITY OF CIRCUITS FOR ON-LINE TRANSMISSION OF SPECAT TRAFFIC TO YOUR COMMAND AND SUBSEQUENT IMPROPER HANDLING OF RESULTANT SERVICE REQUESTS. NO FURTHER TRACER ACTION NECESSARY.
2. SINCERELY APPRECIATE YOUR PROMPT AND INFORMATIVE REPLY TO THE REF.

WARM REGARDS.

GP 4

120

NNNN

IMA Form 5216 (REV 3-68)

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CCN 238 & 239 FILE 95

		FROM CG III MAF		DATE 22 OCT 68	
		SERIAL# 210932Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
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		EXCLUSIVE FOR			
		DATE	SIGNATURE		
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FOR****HAS BEEN SENT**

P 212532Z OCT 68
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
INFO CDR SEVENTH AF
CG XXIV CORPS
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO GEN BROWN AND LTGEN STILWELL FROM
LTGEN CUSHMAN
EVALUATION OF THOR (U)

A. 7TH AF SSO 221400Z SEP 68 (S)
B. COMUSMACV 39443 DTG 131048Z OCT68 (S)
C. CG XXIV CORPS LTR AVII-ATC OF 16AUG68, SUBJ: COMBAT AFTER ACTION
REPORT (RCS: MACJ 3-37) (K-1) (U) W/III MAF 1ST END
D. LTG STILWELL CT XXIV CORPS PHB 1561 DTG 160045Z OCT68 (NOTAL)

1. (S) REFERENCE A IS A 7TH AF MESSAGE DESCRIBING ITS PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE
EFFORTS IN THE AREA IMMEDIATELY NORTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER. THAT MESSAGE
POINTS OUT THAT AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY FAILED TO LOCATE MANY OF THE ENEMY
ARTILLERY AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT POSITIONS WHICH WERE DESTROYED IN THAT AREA
DURING OPERATION THOR. BASED ON THIS, THE MESSAGE CONCLUDES THAT THOR
TYPE OPERATIONS ARE NOT A COST-EFFECTIVE METHOD OF NEUTRALIZING ENEMY
ARTILLERY. REFERENCE B DESCRIBES A CONFERENCE WHERE THE SAME 7TH AF
INTELLIGENCE WAS USED TO DISPUTE TARGET INTELLIGENCE PRESENTED BY XXIV
CORPS.

2. (S) I AM CONCERNED THAT AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY, APPARENTLY OF MARGINAL
EFFECTIVENESS IN THIS CASE, IS USED AS A SINGLE INTELLIGENCE SOURCE
UPON

WHICH BROAD COST EFFECTIVENESS CONCLUSIONS ARE DRAWN, AND I AM CONCERNED
THAT THE CONCLUSIONS THEMSELVES IN REF A TEND TO DISCREDIT THE HIGHLY
EFFECTIVE COUNTER BATTERY TECHNIQUES OF MASSING A VARIETY OF SUPPORTING
ARMS IN BRIEF INTENSIVE ATTACKS. IT IS SIGNIFICANT TO NOTE THAT THE UNIT
MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE GUNS NORTH OF THE BEN HAI ASSESSED THOR
AS THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF ITS TYPE YET CONDUCTED.

SEE REFERENCE C. THE INHERENT WEAKNESS IN USE OF AERIAL
PHOTOGRAPHY AS A SOLE INTELLIGENCE SOURCE IS APPARENT IN THE
STATEMENT IN REF A REGARDING NUMBER OF ARTILLERY PIECES
DESTROYED DURING THOR. REF A STATES THAT EXTENSIVE POST STRIKE
PHOTOGRAPHY CONFIRMED THAT ONLY TWO GUNS WERE DESTROYED.
YET CG XXIV CORPS IN REF C REPORTS THAT HAND-HELD CAMERA
PHOTOGRAPHY AND OBSERVERS IN C-1 AIRCRAFT CONFIRMED THAT 16
GUNS WERE DESTROYED BY 8 INCH MOWITZER FIRES USING OBSERVED
FIRE PRECISION DESTRUCTION TECHNIQUES.

3. (S) RELIANCE ON AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AS A SINGLE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCE INVITES A NUMBER OF PITFALLS. FOR EXAMPLE, NVA
ARTILLERY AND OTHER TARGETS WHICH HAVE ESCAPED DETECTION BY
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY WERE DETECTED AND ENGAGED BY AERIAL OBSERVERS.
IN REF D. CG XXIV CORPS REPORTED THAT, OF THE 89 ARTILLERY WEAPONS

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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DESTROYED DURING THE PERIOD 10 JULY TO 15 OCTOBER 68, SIXTY-FOUR WERE DESTROYED BY ARTILLERY AND NOT PRECISION DESTRUCTION TECHNIQUES AND TWENTY-FIVE WERE DESTROYED BY TAC AIR, THE TARGETS DESTROYED BY TAC AIR WERE IDENTIFIED TO THE PILOTS BY ARMY OR MARINE AERIAL OBSERVERS AND WERE NOT FOUND AS A RESULT OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY.

4. (S) AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY IS BUT ONE OF MANY INTELLIGENCE SOURCES GROUND COMMANDERS USE IN ASSESSING THE ENEMY SITUATION AND ESTABLISHING MEANINGFUL OBJECTIVES. THESE SOURCES INCLUDE, IN ADDITION TO AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY, SENSORS, URS, RADAR, SLAR, FIREWATCH, PRISONERS, PATROLS, AGENTS, RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE AND AERIAL OBSERVERS. LESS THAN 10 PERCENT OF TARGETS NORTH OF THE DMZ ARE OBTAINED THROUGH AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY.

5. IN ASSESSING THE DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY DURING OPERATION THOR WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT A VARIETY OF INDICATORS, COMPENSATING TO SOME EXTENT FOR THE SHORTCOMINGS OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AS A SINGLE INTELLIGENCE SOURCE. THESE INDICATORS FOLLOW:

A. (S) SINCE THOR, THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAJOR MATERIAL LOSSES DUE TO EN ARTY AND, UNTIL LAST MONTH, PERSONNEL CASUALTIES FROM ARTY HAVE BEEN SHARPLY REDUCED. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES FROM ENEMY ARTY IN 3D MARDIV AO BEFORE AND AFTER THOR FOLLOW:

MONTH	KIA	WIA
MAY	41	265
JUNE	26	182
JULY	5	62
AUGUST	0	47
SEPTEMBER	14	28

B. (S) FURTHER EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THOR IS APPARENT BY COMPARISON OF INCOMING ARTY ROUNDS FROM THOR AREA DURING PERIOD 1 MAY- 30 SEP: MAY - 1394, JUN - 726, JUL - 494, AUG - 334 SEP - 96. HIDDEN IN THESE STATISTICS IS A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN ENEMY EMPLOYMENT OF ARTY. DURING THE PERIOD 1 MAY- 2 JUL, INCOMING ARTY WAS EXPERIENCED BY 3D MARDIV 62 DAYS OF THE 63 DAY PERIOD. DURING THE REMAINDER OF JUL, AUG AND SEP, 3D MARDIV HAS BEEN FREE OF INCOMING ARTY 38 DAYS OF THE 90 DAY PERIOD. THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR IN THIS MAJOR SUCCESS IS ATTRIBUTED TO PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT SUBSEQUENT TO THOR WHICH ALLOWS AO'S IN O-1 ARMY AND MARINE ACFT TO FLY NORTH OF DMZ ON A DAILY BASIS.

V

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

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6. (C) THOR REDUCED THE HOSTILE SHORE BATTERY THREAT TO NCF SUPPORT SHIPS. BEFORE THOR, NCF SHIPS SELDOM CLOSED TO WITHIN 12 KM OF BEACH WITHOUT BEING ENGAGED BY HOSTILE BTRY FIRE. SINCE THOR, SHIPS HAVE CLOSED TO 5 KM WITHOUT BEING ENGAGED. THUS NCF RANGES ARE MORE DEEPLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

6. (S) THE PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT CREATED BY THOR FOR AO'S IN ARMY AND MARINE O-1 AIRCRAFT NORTH OF DMZ HAS CONTRIBUTED DIRECTLY TO DESTRUCTION OF 64 ENEMY ARTY WEAPONS BY PRECISION DESTRUCTION FIRE OF 2" HOW AND NCF IN SUPPORT OF 3D MAR DIV SINCE 16 JUL 65. THIS PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT DID NOT EXIST PRIOR TO THOR AND IS ESSENTIAL TO INSURE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF OPERATIONS IN AND ALONG THE DMZ.

6. (C) I DO NOT HAVE THE FACILITIES TO MAKE A PRECISE DETERMINATION OF THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THOR, BUT I AM CERTAIN THAT OUR TROOPS IN QUANG TRI WHO SAW THE SHARP DECREASE IN INCOMING FIRE FROM THE THOR ZONE AFTER THE OPERATION CONSIDER THE EFFORT WELL WORTHWHILE.

7. (S) I FEEL THAT THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THOR IS WELL SUBSTANTIATED AND DOCUMENTED. THE "LITTLE THOR" OPNS PROPOSED BY CG XXIV CORPS, AND CONCURRED IN BY THIS HEADQUARTERS, WERE DESIGNED TO BE CONDUCTED, AS DICTATED BY THE SITUATION, IN THE SHORTEST TIME POSSIBLE, TO KEEP THE NVA OFF BALANCE AND TO MAINTAIN THE ARTILLERY SUPERIORITY AND PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR AO'S GAINED DURING AND AFTER THOR. THE PRINCIPAL AND MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS AVAILABLE FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THIS MISSION IS A COMBINED ARMS (ARTY, NCF, TAC AIR, AND B-52) ATTACK. ACCORDINGLY, AND PURSUANT REF B, REQUEST AUTHORIZATION TO PLAN AND CONDUCT FUTURE THOR TYPE OPNS UNDER THE GROUND COMMANDERS CONTROL AND, IF NECESSARY, USING ONLY HIS AVAILABLE RESOURCES.

GP-4

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#18

CONFIDENTIAL**FOR**

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 2902 2901216
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 141216Z OCT 68 ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMSAW/COMUSMACV
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTJEN CUSHMAN
 TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT IN I CORPS (U)
 A. COMUSMACV 31126/191113Z OCT 68 (C)
 1. (C) I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT USARV HAS REQUESTED THE
 RETURN OF SEVEN LCU'S FROM I CORPS. THIS IS ALL OF THE
 ARMY LCU'S IN I CORPS. I AM STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THIS
 PROPOSAL. LCU'S ARE A VITAL PART OF THE TRANSPORTATION
 SYSTEM IN I CORPS AND DURING THIS MONSOON SEASON THERE
 IS A NEED FOR MORE LCU'S RATHER THAN A REDUCTION. AS YOU
 KNOW, FOLLOWING PERIODS OF HIGH SURF CONDITIONS AND/OR HEAVY
 RAINS, THE PORTS OF TAN MY AND CUA VIET ARE FREQUENTLY CLOSED
 TO LST'S BY SILTING. AFTER TYPHOON BESS, TAN MY WAS CLOSED FOR
 APPROX THIRTY DAYS AND CUA VIET HAS JUST REOPENED FOLLOWING
 THE RECENT HEAVY RAINS. THE RESULTANT LOSS OF VITAL LST CARGO
 CAPACITY COMES AT A TIME WHEN THE OVERALL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 2902 **C O N F I D E N T I A L**
 SHOULD BE SURGING TO THE MAXIMUM TO REDUCE CARGO BACKLOG AND
 IMPROVE STOCK LEVEL POSITIONS.
 2. (C) THE NUMBER OF LCU/YFC ASSETS IN I CORPS (57) IS NOT
 SUFFICIENT TO OFF-SET LOSS OF LST CAPACITY DURING THESE
 SURGE PERIODS. THEREFORE REDUCTION IN CARGO BACKLOG PROCEEDS
 AT A LESS THAN SATISFACTORY PACE. BASED ON EXPERIENCE TO
 DATE, I CONSIDER THAT AS MANY AS TEN ADDITIONAL LCU'S WITH
 CREWS COULD BE PROFITABLY EMPLOYED IN I CORPS FOR THE REMAINDER
 OF THE MONSSON SEASON.

GP-4
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	WTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#21

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P 252354Z OCT 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUEBHOA/CMS
BT

**HAS BEEN SENT
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. COMUSMACV ALLOCATION OF CRITICAL ITEM RESOURCES (U)

2. CG III MAF 241622Z OCT 68 (C)

3. CG III MAF LTA 48/DEB 4882 SER 2227168 OF 7 OCT 68

4. ADMINO FMFPAC 138448Z OCT 68 (NOTAL) (C)

5. CMC 251547Z SEP 68 (S)

6. FMFPAC 4882.15A DTD 26JUN68

7. COMUSMACV 31521/232450Z OCT 68 (C)

1. (C) REF A PROVIDED III MAF'S FORMAL NON-CONCURRENCE WITH A MACVDAC RECOMMENDATION THAT 75 M151A1'S BE TRANSFERRED IN NOV 1968 FROM MARINE CORPS UNITS IN III MAF TO THE RVNAF. INITIAL IMPRESSION AFTER FIRST MEETING OF MACVDAC ON 22OCT68 IS THAT ONCE THE DATA BASE IS ESTABLISHED ON AN ITEM, WORKING GROUP AND MACVDAC REPS FROM THE COMPONENTS AND III MAF HAVE

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 3216 C O N F I D E N T I A L

LITTLE OR NO INFLUENCE ON EITHER GROUP'S FINAL RECOMMENDATION. IN THE 22OCT MEETING OF THE MACVDAC, III MAF'S REP WAS ABLE TO REVERSE THE WORKING GROUP'S RECOMMENDATION THAT III MAF TRANSFER SIX 12 TON SEMI-TRLS AND FIVE CRANES, TEX M102D, 20 TON EC BY INSERTING INTO THE RECORD UPDID ALLOWANCE/ON-HAND DATA WHICH IN EACH INSTANCE REFLECTED A III MAF ASSET POSITION SOMEWHAT LESS FAVORABLE THAN WAS PRESENTED DURING THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP. IT IS ALSO APPARENT THAT THE QUANTITY OF AN ITEM POSSESSED VS. ALLOWANCE WILL BE THE CONTROLLING FACTOR IN MACVDAC DECISIONS. LITTLE OR NO CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE PRIMARY VS. SUBSTITUTE INVENTORY, AGE, CONDITION, OR MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS.

2. (C) IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN THE CASE OF THE M151A1'S THE DATA PROVIDED MACVDAC ON 22OCT68 AND AS CONTAINED IN REF A IS NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH THAT PROVIDED IN REF B. CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY WAS ENCOUNTERED DURING THE INITIAL DATA ACCUMULATION EFFORTS AMONG III MAF UNITS AND THE PROBLEM HAS ONLY BEEN PARTIALLY SOLVED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FAIRLY EXTENSIVE END ITEM MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY WITHIN III MAF. HOWEVER, ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED TO EXPEDITE THE DEVELOPMENT OF

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. G.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

#23

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA 3010 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 ABLE ALL INCLUSIVE III MAF ALLOWANCE LIST FOR EACH ITEM TO BE
 ADDRESSED BY THE MACVDAC.
 3. (C) REF C REQUESTED THIS HQ REVIEW DATA CONTAINED IN REF D
 WHICH WAS EXTRACTED FROM SUMMARY ITEM READINESS STUDIES PREPARED
 FOR THE FY-70 OSD BUDGET SUBMISSION AND COMMENT ON CERTAIN
 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN III MAF'S INITIAL MACVDAC INPUT AND
 REF D. NO MEANINGFUL CORRELATION CAN BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN
 THE TWO SETS OF DATA. THE ABSENCE OF A COMPARATIVE BASIS CAN
 BEST BE ILLUSTRATED BY THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLE INVOLVING THE
 TRUCK, 1/4 TON, M151A1. REF D CONTAINS AN ALLOWANCE (TE AND
 SPECIAL) OF 2996 AND A MAINTENANCE FLOAT OF 146. A COMPRE-
 HENSIVE REVIEW OF ALL ALLOWANCE LISTS, BOTH TE AND SPECIAL,
 AT THIS HQ INDICATES THE ALLOWANCE TO BE 1987. THE III MAF
 MAINTENANCE FLOAT ESTABLISHED BY REF E IS 75.
 4. (U) PAR 4 OF REF F IDENTIFIES NEW ITEMS ADDED TO THE
 CURRENT CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CCIL) FOR THE NEXT WORKING
 GROUP/MACVDAC PERIODIC REVIEW. IT IS REQUESTED THAT THIS HQ
 BE PROVIDED WITH FMFPAC'S ANALYSIS OF THE TE, SPECIAL
 ALLOWANCE, MAINTENANCE FLOAT, WESTPAC IN-COUNTRY END ITEM
 STOCK LEVEL AND PIPELINE FOR EACH APPLICABLE ITEM IN THE NEW

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 3010 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 LIST. THIS HQ IS EXPEDITING VALIDATION OF THE DATA PROVIDED
 IN REF B WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE NEXT MACVDAC REVIEW
 AND WILL PROVIDE ADDRESSES WITH UPDATE INCLUDING FSN VERIFICATIONS
 FOR EVALUATION ASAP.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

#23

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SECRET

SECRET

PP RUMSAW
 DE RUMSAK 3136 3001200
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 231200Z OCT 68
 FM CG III NAF
 TO RUMSAW/DEPCOMUSMACV
 BT

FOR

S E C R E T

FOR GEN GOODPASTER FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN

1. I HAVE STUDIED THOROUGHLY YOUR EXCELLENT ANALYSIS OF OUR
 UPCOMING ATTACK AGAINST THE FULL SPECTRUM OF ENEMY FORCES AND
 ACTIVITIES.

2. I MIGHT SUGGEST THAT PARAGRAPH 3B AND C ENCOMPASS AN
 ADDITIONAL TASK "TURN THE POPULACE AGAINST THEM", AND THAT
 PARAGRAPH 3E CONTAIN THE ADDITIONAL TASK "DISCOVER THEM".
 WITH RESPECT TO PARAGRAPH 3F, I SUGGEST ANOTHER TASK "CONDUCT
 PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS TO CREATE A CLIMATE HOSTILE
 TO VC/NVA PRESENT". IN PARAGRAPH 3G THERE MIGHT BE ADDED THIS
 TASK "TRAIN AND ORIENT NEW ADMINISTRATORS LOYAL TO GVN FOR THE
 LEADERSHIP TO SPECIFIC HAMLETS". ALSO WITH RESPECT TO THIS
 LATTER PARAGRAPH, WE MIGHT RECRUIT WOMEN AS WELL AS MEN AND
 ATTEMPT TO AT LEAST OBTAIN A COMMITMENT TO THE GVN ON THE
 PART OF THE POPULACE.

PAGE TWO RUMSAK 3136 S E C R E T

3. WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC POINTS OF PARAGRAPH 5, I HAVE
 CHECKED TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT BOTH MY PLAN AND GENERAL LAN'S PLAN
 CONTAIN INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO EACH POINT YOU HAVE MADE.

4. I AM SENDING COPIES OF THIS IMPORTANT PAPER TO MY MAJOR
 COMMANDERS.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#24

JLMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET #25

CCN 281 ELLF 95

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EXCLUSIVE FOR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

00 RUHKN
 DE RHMAFA 3159 3001524
 ZNY SSSSS
 0 201524Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKN/CG FMFPAC
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 MOVEMENT OF FIRST CAV DIV (AM) (S)
 A. COMSEVENTHFLT 260707Z OCT 68 (S/NOTAL)
 1. (S) I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO DEPLOY 1ST CAV DIV (AM)
 FROM ICIZ TO III CTZ ASAP. WILL COMMENCE ON OR ABOUT
 28OCT68 WITH HELP OF ARG SHIPPING. REF A INDICATES ARG
 ALFA SHIPPING WILL COMMENCE MOVE WITH POSSIBLE AUGMENTATION
 BY ARG BRAVO ON 30OCT.
 2. (S) EXPECT SEVERE IMPACT ON FORTH QUARTER PACIFICATION
 DRIVE AS A RESULT. AS SITUATION DEVELOPS, WILL KEEP YOU
 INFORMED.
 WARM REGARDS.
 GP-4
 BT

NNNN

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#25

JLNAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

PP RUMKM RUMMLA RUMHUP RUMSAV
 DE RHMMAFAS195 301024G
 111 38594
 2 101042Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC HAW
 INFO RUMMLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG
 RUMHUP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA
 RUMSAV/CG THREE MAF DNG
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN BUSE, INFO: MGEN YOUNGDALE,
 MGEN DAVIS AND MGEN QUILTER FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

AIR CAV CAPABILITIES FOR MARINE DIVISIONS (S)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 160740Z OCT 68 (PASEP) (S)

B. CG FIRST MAF 121000Z OCT 68 (PASEP) (S)

C. CG THIRD MARDIV 060233Z OCT 68 (PASEP) (S)

D. CG III MAF 021106Z SEPT 68 (S)

E. CG III MAF 250056Z OCT 68 (S)

1. (S) WORKING CLOSELY ALONGSIDE US ARMY CAV UNITS HAS PROVIDED III MAF
 COMMANDERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE AIR CAV OPERATIONS FIRST HAND. SEVERAL
 ASPECTS OF THEIR OPERATIONS HAVE STIMULATED MARINE INTEREST, PARTICULARLY
 THE AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS OF THE AIR CAV TROOP. IN ORDER TO
 DETERMINE IF CERTAIN TECHNIQUES MIGHT BE USEFUL TO US, I ASKED THE

PAGE TWO RHMMAFAS195 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 COMMANDING GENERALS OF THE DIVISIONS AND THE FIRST WING TO GIVE ME
 THEIR VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT. THEIR RESPONSES ARE REFS A, B, AND C WHICH
 GENERALLY REFLECT A CONSENSUS ON THE FOLLOWING:

A. INCREASED HELO RECON IS A VITAL COMBAT NEED.

B. WE NEED MORE LIGHT HELOS TO DO THIS NECESSARY RECON JOB.

C. THERE IS NOTHING FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG WITH OUR TACTICS: THE TWO
 DIVISION COMMANDING GENERALS, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE DEDICATED
 AIR GROUND RECON PACKAGE.

D. WE SHOULD TRY THE AIR GROUND RECON PACKAGE ON A TEST
 BASIS.

2. (S) I AM IN COMPLETE ACCORD WITH THEIR VIEWS THAT INTENSIVE
 AND LONG-RANGING HELICOPTER VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE IS A NEED THAT
 IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL. AND I ALSO AGREE THAT OUR PRESENT
 HELICOPTER INVENTORY IS FAR TOO SMALL AND MADE UP OF MARGINAL
 TYPES FOR THE OBSERVATION PACKAGE. REFS D AND E DOCUMENT THIS VIEW-
 POINT. FURTHER, I CAN BE A VERY SUBSTANTIAL VALUE IN THE CON-
 TRIBUTION BEING MADE BY THE AIR CAV RECON PACKAGE. VIEWED IN
 THAT CONTEXT, THERE IS ONE CONSIDERATION THAT IS PARTICULARLY
 PERTINENT: THE SPECIALLY DEDICATED RECON PACKAGE WORKS WELL
 PROVIDING THERE ARE SUFFICIENT AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#26

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMKATA 3195 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
THE PACKAGE.

3. (S) INCLUDES THE AIR CAV RECON CONCEPT, WE HAVE IN THE PAST
EMPHASIZED U. S. ARMY AVIATION TECHNOLOGY FOR STRAIGHT AND RECON
STRONG ELEVATION AND ENRADITION. IN EACH CASE WE CAME BACK TO THE
SAME BASIC POINT: A HIGHLY RESPONSIVE SYSTEM, WHICH APPEARED ON
THE SURFACE TO BE BASED ON SUPERIOR TECHNIQUES, WAS ACTUALLY
MADE POSSIBLE BY HAVING RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT
AVAILABLE IN A DEDICATED PACKAGE.

4. AND THE PRESENT SMALL NUMBER OF MARINE HELICOPTERS IN IAI
DOES NOT ALLOW SUCH DEDICATED PACKAGES WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE
COMPENSATORY REDUCTIONS IN OTHER ESSENTIAL SUPPORT. IT IS POS-
SIBLE TO PROVIDE THE DIVISIONS, ON AN AVERAGE, WITH TWO HUEY
BUCKE PER DAY AND EIGHT OR NINE HUEY GUNSHIPS. THOSE AIRCRAFT
ARE EMPLOYED BY THE DIVISIONS AS THEY DEEM APPROPRIATE AND THE
PERMITTES FOR THEIR USE ARE SENT BY THE DIVISIONS THEMSELVES.
IF THEY DESIRE TO USE THEM FOR RECONNAISSANCE THEY ARE FREE TO
DO SO, BUT AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER MISSIONS. HOWEVER, IT IS
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HARDLY A DAY PASSES THAT MISSIONS DO NOT GO
UNFILLED FOR SHORTAGE OF HELOS; THAT IS, DAILY, UNITS DO NOT
RECEIVE RESUPPLY, SCHEDULED TROOP LIFTS ARE NOT MADE, OR RECON

PAGE FOUR RUMKATA 3195 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
TEAM INSERTS OR EXTRACTIONS ARE NOT COMPLETED, FOR LACK OF HUEY
GUNSHIPS. THUS, UNLESS WE RECEIVE ADDITIONAL NUMBERS OF SLICKS
AND GUNSHIPS, DEDICATION OF A SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE PACKAGE
WOULD DRAWDOWN ON THE PRESENT DIVISION ALLOCATION TO AN UNAC-
CEPTABLE LEVEL. ESTABLISHMENT OF A RECON PACKAGE ROUGHLY EQUI-
VALENT TO THAT OF THE AIR CAV TROOP, WOULD REQUIRE VIRTUALLY
ALL THE SLICKS AND GUNSHIPS NOW BEING ALLOCATED DAILY TO BOTH
DIVISIONS.

5. (S) ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING THIS IS MY APPRAISAL OF
AIR GROUND RECON PACKAGE: THE TYPE RECONNAISSANCE UNDER CONSID-
ERATION IS ESSENTIAL TO THE COMBAT SITUATION IN RVN, BUT IT CAN-
NOT BE SUPPORTED IN THE MARINE DIVISIONS BY MARINE WING AIRCRAFT
BECAUSE OF SHORTAGES OF LIGHT TRANSPORT AND GUNSHIP HELICOPTERS.
I THEREFORE RECOMMEND:

(1) IMMEDIATE ACTION BE TAKEN TO PROCURE ADDITIONAL HELI-
COPTER ASSETS INDICATED REFS D AND E.

(2) THAT THE AIR CAV CONCEPT FOR MARINE DIVISION BE HELD IN
ABEYANCE UNTIL SUFFICIENT LIGHT TRANSPORT AND GUNSHIPS HELICOPTERS
ARE AVAILABLE.

GP-4

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#26

IIIAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

CONFIDENTIAL

R 270750Z

FM CG III MAF

TO SSO XXIV CORPS

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L - EYES ONLY

LGEN CUSHMAN SENDS FOR LGEN STILWELL

A. YR LTR 90CT68, SUBJ: EXPANDED ROLE FOR ZONE COORDINATOR, NORTHERN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

B. MACV DIRECTIVE 10-12 W/CH

C. FORCE ORDER 5400.1 OF 8JUL67

1. RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN REF A HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED BY ME, AND I HAVE DISCUSSED THEM THOROUGHLY WITH KEY MEMBERS OF MY STAFF. AS A RESULT OF THIS REVIEW, I HAVE FORMULATED THE FOLLOWING OPINIONS:

A. III MAF LETTER OF INSTRUCTION 24-68 (WHICH RESCINDS LOI 18-68, REFERENCED IN YOUR LETTER)--SPECIFICALLY, SUBPARAGRAPHS 3A, B, AND C--CONTAINS DETAILED AND ADEQUATE EMPOWERING INSTRUCTIONS.

B. THERE ARE VARYING CHAINS OF AUTHORITY FOR THE MANY DIFFERENT PROGRAMS ON-GOING IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. IN SOME AREAS, THE CHAIN GOES DIRECTLY FROM THE I CORPS COMMANDER TO THE DIVISION COMMANDER; WHEREAS, IN OTHERS, IT GOES FROM THE I CORPS COMMANDER TO THE PROVINCE CHIEF.

C. IN THE AREA OF RD AND PACIFICATION, THE LINE OF AUTHORITY PASSES FROM THE I CORPS COMMANDER TO THE PROVINCE CHIEF, AND ANY ARVN BATTALIONS ASSISTING IN THE R&D EFFORT ARE TO BE PLACED UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE PROVINCE CHIEF. THIS HAS BEEN THE CONDITION IN THE PAST, AND IN VERY RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL LAM, HE HAS INDICATED TO ME THAT THIS IS THE WAY IT IS TO CONTINUE TO WORK. LIKEWISE, THE PHOENIX (PHUNG HOANG) PROGRAM HAS A CHAIN OF COMMAND DIRECTLY FROM THE I CORPS HEADQUARTERS TO THE PROVINCE CHIEF. THE COORDINATION OF THESE PROGRAMS SHOULD BE RETAINED AT THE CG III MAF LEVEL AS A COUNTERPART FUNCTION OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL, I CORPS.

D. MANY OTHER NON-ARVN-ASSOCIATED OR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PROGRAMS IN THE R&D AND PACIFICATION AREA ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PROVINCE CHIEF, WITH DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS COMING FROM I CORPS HEADQUARTERS.

E. WITH RESPECT TO PACIFICATION, PROGRAMS AND POLICIES ARE ESTABLISHED BY MACV AND JGS, AND ARE MONITORED AND REPORTED ON AT THE CORPS LEVEL. I DO NOT CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE TO INTERPOSE ANOTHER LEVEL OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN THE III MAF CORPS ORGANIZATION AND THE PROVINCE CHIEF/PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR. RATHER I WISH TO HAVE AND ENCOURAGE MUTUAL COORDINATION AND COOPERATION ALONG PRESENT

270750Z

*27(1)

F. LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION 6-68 AND 7-68, WHICH APPLY TO THE OPERATIONS OF THE AMERICAL AND FIRST MARINE DIVISIONS, RESPECTIVELY, CONTAIN ALMOST IDENTICAL EMPOWERING INSTRUCTIONS IN THE R&D AND PACIFICATION AREAS AS ARE CONTAINED IN THE LETTER OF INSTRUCTION FOR YOUR COMMAND. TO DATE, I HAVE HAD NO REACTIONS FROM EITHER THE CG OF THE AMERICAL OR FIRST MARINE DIVISIONS THAT SUGGEST THAT THEY LACK EMPOWERING AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES IN THEIR REGIONS OF THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.

G. IN REF B, MACV OUTLINES THE ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT. REF C IS III MAF'S IMPLEMENTING DIRECTIVE IN THIS AREA. REF C IS BEING REVISED TO INCORPORATE CHANGES EFFECTED BY CHANGE 1 TO REF B.

2. ALTHOUGH THE CORDS ARRANGEMENTS MAY APPEAR TO BE COMPLEX AT TIMES, ALL PARTICIPANTS ARE NOW ON BOARD, UNDERSTAND THE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS AND ARE WELL ACQUAINTED WITH THE PEOPLE WITH WHOM THEY ARE PRESENTLY DEALING. TO MAKE A MAJOR CHANGE FOR TWO OF THE FIVE PROVINCES IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE AT THIS TIME DOES NOT APPEAR NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE, AND IT MIGHT PROVE TO BE MORE DISRUPTIVE THAN HELPFUL.

3. I AM MOST PLEASED WITH THE VERY EFFECTIVE RESULTS YOU HAVE ATTAINED IN ELIMINATING THE VC MILITARY AND POLITICAL APPARATUS IN NICTZ, AND I BELIEVE THAT THIS SUCCESS IS A PERSUASIVE INDICATION THAT THE EXISTING REGULATIONS AND DIRECTIVES ARE NOT STIFLING YOUR ACTIONS, BUT INDEED PROVIDE SUFFICIENT LATITUDE AND EMPOWERING AUTHORITY FOR YOU TO CONDUCT YOUR OPERATIONS IN THIS VITAL AREA MOST EFFICIENTLY. CONSEQUENTLY, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY IS REQUIRED AT THIS TIME. IF, HOWEVER, THERE ARE SPECIFIC INSTANCES IN WHICH YOU DETERMINE THAT EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS ARE NOT ADEQUATE OR THERE IS ANY EXAMPLE OF FOOT-DRAWING, PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO NOTIFY ME SOONEST, SO THAT I MAY TAKE THE NECESSARY CORRECTIVE ACTION. IN MY MIND, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PSA AND U.S. COMMANDERS SHOULD BE ONE OF MUTUAL REPEAT MUTUAL COORDINATION AND LIAISON.

4. ALTHOUGH I DO NOT BELIEVE ADDITIONAL EMPOWERING INSTRUCTIONS ARE REQUIRED, I AM OF THE OPINION THAT THE FORMULATION OF A VERY SMALL LIAISON GROUP AT YOUR HEADQUARTERS, FUNCTIONING UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF MY DEP CORDS, WILL GO A LONG WAY TOWARDS REDUCING OR ELIMINATING ANY PROBLEMS THAT MAY ARISE IN THIS VITAL PORTION OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES. I HAVE REQUESTED THE REQUISITE PERSONNEL FOR THIS TASK FROM MACV.

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27(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

JIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

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CCN 293&294&295 FILE 95

		FROM CG III MAF		DATE 28 OCT 68
		SERIAL# 271536Z OCT 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR		
		DATE	SIGNATURE	
		EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT		
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PP RUHMM
DE RHMMFA 3286 3011536
ZNY SSSSS
P 271536Z OCT 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHMM/CG FMFPAC
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION I OF III
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

1. FOL MSGS ARE REFS A, B, C, RESPECTIVELY, IN
MY 270234Z OCT 68: QUOTE
P 100740Z OCT 68

FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
INFO RUMSAK/CG FIRST MAW
RUMSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV
BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN: INFO MGEN QUILTER AND
MGEN DAVIS FROM MGEN YOUNGDALE

AIRCAV CAPABILITIES FOR MAR DIVISIONS (U)

A. CG III MAF 012652Z OCT 68 (SECRET SPECAT)

1. (C) IN ARRIVING AT MY OPINION ON SUBJECT I HAVE CONSIDERED THE

PAGE TWO RHMMFA 3286 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
FOLLOWING FACETS OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
AS A FRAME OF REFERENCE:

A. LARGE SUBORDINATE UNIT AO'S EXTENDING OUT FROM A GENERALLY
FLAT PIEDMONT TO A RUGGED CANOPY MOUNTAINOUS REGION WITH NUMEROUS
VALLEY APPROACHES INTO THE DANANG PLAINS.

B. AN ENEMY WHO USES THE CANOPY CONCEALMENT FROM WHICH TO
SUSTAIN INFILTRATION OF SMALL UNITS FOR FLEETING HARRASSING GROUND/
MORTAR/ROCKET ATKS AND AVOIDANCE OF MASS EXCEPT AT HIS CHOOSING
FOR DELIBERATE COORDINATED GROUND ATKS SUCH AS TET OR THE ABORTIVE
AUGUST OFFENSIVE.

C. A DIVISION CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO DENY EN
PENETRATION OF A CLOSE IN BELT OF SATURATION COUNTER INFILTRATION/
ROCKET PATROLS WHILE CONCURRENTLY CONDUCTING WIDE RANGING OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS IN THE DEEP APPROACHES TO FIND, FIX AND DESTROY HIM.
THE CONCEPT PLACES A PREMIUM ON THE ABILITY TO FIND AND THEN
RAPIDLY REACT WITH FIRE AND MANEUVER OVER GREAT DISTANCES TO FIX
AND DESTROY THE ENEMY. HELICOPTERS ARE AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT TO
THE SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF THE CONCEPT.

D. AN INADEQUATE AVAILABILITY OF HELICOPTERS AS TO NUMBER AND
TYPE TO EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA 3286 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

E. LIMITED MANEUVER FORCES WITH WHICH TO EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT THE CONCEPT.

2. (C) DURING THE PERIOD 1-17 AUGUST 68 1ST MARDIV EXERCISED OPCON OF AN AIR CAV TROOP WHICH WAS EMPLOYED PRINCIPALLY IN THE AN HOA BASIN/ARIZONA AREA BY THE 5TH MARINES. THIS HELO SEARCH AND ATTACK PACKAGE WITH ITS ORGANIC INFANTRY/RECON PLATOON AND GUNSHIPS WAS MOST SUCCESSFULLY EMPLOYED. SPECIFIC TACTICAL ADVANTAGES IN THIS EMPLOYMENT WERE:

A. IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY/RESPONSIVENESS TO THE INFANTRY REGIMENTAL COMMANDER.

7. ORGANIC AIRBORNE HUNTER/KILLER CAPABILITY OF THE AIR CAV TROOP WHICH PERMITTED TARGET ACQUISITION AND IMMEDIATE REACTION. THIS INCLUDED HELO OBS AND GUNSHIPS FLYING LOW OVER FLAT PIEDMONT IN A FIND AND DESTROY ROLE, AND UH-1E TROOP CARRIERS COMBINED WITH OBS AND GUNSHIPS IN A FIND, FIX AND DESTROY ROLE UTILIZING THE HIGHLY TRAINED INFANTRY RECONNAISSANCE UNIT IN HELO INSERTED LIMITED GROUND ASSAULTS SUPPORTED BY GUNSHIPS TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY SMALL GROUPS OF VC/NVA OVER A WIDE AREA. ON 1 AUG BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0700-1400 EMPLOYING THESE TACTICS ALFA TROOP 1/9 ACD OBTAINED 79 VC/NVA KIA.

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 3286 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

C. SIMPLIFIED COMMAND AND CONTROL ARISING FROM THE MARRIAGE OF INFANTRY RECON AND HELO OBSERVATION, ASSAULT TROOP CARRIER AND GUNSHIPS INTO AN ORGANIC SPECIALLY TRAINED TEAM REQUIRING LITTLE OR NO ADVANCE PLANNING OR COORDINATION TO BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED.

3. (S) IN VIEW OF FOREGOING I AM OF OPINION THAT INTRODUCTION OF A CAPABILITY SIMILAR TO THE AIR CAV CONCEPT INTO OUR MARINE FORCES IS DESIREABLE. TO ACHIEVE THIS CAPABILITY WILL REQUIRE A STUDY IN DEPTH OF THE CURRENT HELO MIX TO OBTAIN THE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE LIGHT OBS/ASSAULT/GUNSHIP ASSETS REQUIRED. I SEE LITTLE OR NO PROBLEM IN RESOLVING THE APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH OR COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENT FOR SUCH AN ORGANIZATION AS PART OF OUR AIR GROUND CONCEPT. TO DO SO WITHIN EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE LIMITATIONS WILL BE DIFFICULT BUT NECESSARY.

4. (S) IN SUMMARY IT IS MY VIEW THAT:

A. WE ARE OPERATING OVER DISTANCES AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS WHICH REQUIRE MAXIMUM AIR MOBILITY IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE INFANTRY STRENGTH AT THE PROPER PLACE AND TIME.

B. THE ENEMY EMPLOYS A TACTIC OF INFILTRATION/HARRASSEMENT WHICH EXPLOITS THE THIN DISTRIBUTION OF OUR FORCES AND MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO INTERDICT HIM.

PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES

SECRET

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PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 3286 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

C. THE HELICOPTER AFFORDS US THE BEST MEANS TO COMPENSATE FOR OUR DISPERSION AND THE ONLY MEANS TO CONCENTRATE OUR MANEUVER ELEMENTS RAPIDLY AGAINST A FLEETING ENEMY.

D. TECHNIQUES OF EMPLOYMENT COMBINED WITH LIMITED AVAILABILITY AND TYPES OF HELICOPTERS ARE NOW DENYING US THE RESPONSIVENESS REQUIRED TO EFFECTIVELY COUNTER THE PROBLEMS OF DISTANCE AND ENEMY TACTIC.

E. THE AIR CAV ORGANIZATION AND CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT IS A LOGICAL, DESIREABLE AND ATTAINABLE SOLUTION TO SOME OF THE OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION.

5. (S) I RECOMMEND THAT ON A TRIAL BASIS IN ORDER TO VALIDATE OUR LIMITED EXPERIENCE AND OPINIONS 1ST MAW IN COORDINATION WITH 1ST AND 3D MARDIV ESTABLISH A HELO/RECON/ASSAULT TEAM AND PASS IT TO THE OPCON OF EACH DIV FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF COMBAT EMPLOYMENT. I RECOGNIZE THAT THIS MAY BE DIFFICULT UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF OUR LIMITED HELO ASSETS HOWEVER SUCH AN APPROACH IN MY JUDGMENT WOULD BE WORTH SOME SACRIFICE.

GP-4

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UNQUOTE

QUOTE

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 3286 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

P 121000Z OCT 68

FM CG FIRST MAW

TO RUNSAK/CG III MAF

INFO RUNSAK/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUNSAK/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTJEN CUSHMAN: INFO MAJGEN YOUNGDALE AND MAJGEN
DAVIS FM MAJGEN QUILTER

AIR CAVALRY CAPABILITY FOR MARINE DIVISIONS (U)

A. CG III MAF 010652Z OCT 68

B. CG FIRST MAW 130740Z JUL 68

C. CG III MAF 221106Z SEP 68

D. CG III MAF 250038Z MAR 68

1. (C) REF A REQUESTED A RE-EVALUATION OF OUR RECON AND REACTION STRUCTURE AND COMMENTS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF INTRODUCING IN OUR MARINE FORCES AN ORGANIZATION SIMILAR TO AN AIR CAV SQUADRON.

(2). (S) REF B REPORTED ON FIRST MAW PILOTS GROSS TRAINING EXPERIENCES WITH THE FIRST AIR CAV DIV. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE AIR CAV

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 PP RUHKN
 DE RHMMFA 3287 3011536
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 271536Z OCT 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKN/CG FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION II OF III
 SQUADRON WAS AN ORGANIZATION PLACING IN ONE UNIT DEDICATED FORCES
 WHICH PERFORM THE SAME BASIC MISSION AS DO THE MARINE CORPS TASK
 ORGANIZED SPARROW HAWKS AND BALD EAGLES. THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE
 NOTED WAS IN THE LARGE NUMBER OF LIGHT OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS
 AVAILABLE TO THE AIR CAV TROOP. THE READY AVAILABILITY OF LIGHT
 OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS PERMITTED THEIR WIDESPREAD UTILIZATION IN
 SEARCHING OUT ENEMY FORCES TO A DEGREE NOT POSSIBLE FOR MARINE
 CORPS FORCES WITH LIMITED OBSERVATION ASSETS. BASED ON THIS EX-
 PERIENCE IT APPEARS THAT WITH SUFFICIENT OBSERVATION ASSETS THE
 MARINE CORPS COULD TASK ORGANIZE UNITS ALONG AIR CAV SQUADRON LINES
 AS REQUIRED WITHOUT DEDICATING FORCES TO IT WHEN NOT NEEDED.
 3. (S) THE INADEQUATE QUANTITY OF MARINE AIR OBSERVATION ASSETS
 IN RVN HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY ADDRESSED WITH REF C THE MOST RECENT
 STATEMENT OF MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. THE NATURE OF CONFLICT IN RVN

PAGE TWO RHMMFA 3287 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
 REQUIRES SUBSTANTIALLY MORE OBSERVATION ASSETS THAN WE HAVE BEEN
 ABLE TO JUSTIFY SUFFICIENTLY FOR ACQUISITION TO DATE. A FACTOR IN
 OUR PAST FAILURE TO PROCURE ADEQUATE OBSERVATION ASSETS FOR RVN
 APPEARS TO BE THE GREAT DISPARITY BETWEEN OUR CURRENT REQUIREMENTS
 AND THOSE NORMAL TO OUR INHERENT AMPHIBIOUS MISSION. IN THIS
 REGARD, REF C IS STILL RATHER MODEST IN ITS STATEMENT OF OUR RE-
 QUIREMENTS AND DOES NOT PROVIDE ASSETS FOR MORE THAN VERY LIMITED
 APPLICATION OF THE AIR CAV SQUADRON CONCEPT.

4. (S) IN SUMMARY, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT:

- A. OUR AMPHIBIOUS ORIENTED FORCE STRUCTURE IS BASICALLY SOUND
 AND HAS THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY TO TASK ORGANIZE FOR SPECIAL
 COMBAT OPERATIONS INCLUDING THOSE PERFORMED BY THE AIR CAV SQUADRON.
- B. WE CONTINUE TO BE CRITICALLY SHORT OF AIR OBSERVATION ASSETS.
- C. THE RATIONALE CONTAINED IN REF D IS STILL VALID.

5. (S) IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:

- A. WE VIGOROUSLY PURSUE THE ACQUISITION OF AIR OBSERVATION
 ASSETS ADEQUATE FOR EFFICIENT PROSECUTION OF THE TYPE WARFARE IN
 WHICH WE ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO
 ACCOMPLISH THIS PRIOR TO THE NEXT GOOD WEATHER SEASON COMMENCING IN
 APRIL 1969.

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COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA 3287 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
 1. SUCH ASSETS AS ARE NOT NORMALLY REQUIRED FOR AMPHIBIOUS
 OPERATIONS BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AND PROCURED AS TEMPORARY FORCE
 STRUCTURE.

C. SPARROW HAWK/BALD EAGLE OPERATIONS BE CONTINUED. THEY SHOULD
 BE EXPANDED AS LUCRATIVE TARGETS ARE DEVELOPED WHEN ADDITIONAL
 VR ASSETS BECOME AVAILABLE.

GP 1

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000230Z OCT 68

FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 INFO RMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN CUSHMAN; INFO MGEN QUILTER
 AND MGEN YOUNGDALE FM MGEN DAVIS
 AIRCAV CAPABILITIES FOR MARINE DIVISIONS
 A. CG III MAF 010650Z OCT 68 (SECRET SPECAT)

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 3287 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)

1. I CONSIDER A CAPABILITY EQUIVALENT TO AN AIR CAVALRY TROOP THE
 MOST URGENT, COMBAT ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT NOW LACKING FOR PROPER
 SUPPORT OF THIS DIVISION. I PERSONALLY, AND MY ENTIRE STAFF,
 ARE CONVINCED THAT THE LACK OF SUCH A CAPABILITY HAS RESULTED AND
 IS CONTINUING TO RESULT IN GREATER PERSONNEL AND HELICOPTER LOSSES
 THAN NECESSARY WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SERIOUSLY INHIBITING OUR
 CAPABILITY TO FIND, FIX AND DESTROY THE ENEMY.

A. OUR FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS, OF COURSE, THE UTTER INADEQUACY
 IN NUMBERS, TYPES AND MODERNITY OF THE LIGHT HELICOPTER/VISUAL
 RECCE ASSETS AVAILABLE TO FMAW FOR SUPPORT OF THE MARINE DIVISION.

B. DELIBERATELY PLANNED, LOW ALTITUDE HELICOPTER RECONNAISSANCE
 CAN, BETTER THAN ANY OTHER MEANS, DETECT ENEMY ACTIVITY IN AND NEAR
 HLZ'S AND THE APPROACHES THERETO. A TROOP OF THE AIRCAV HAS BEEN
 MOST SUCCESSFULY EMPLOYED IN THIS ROLE SEVERAL TIMES IN SUPPORT
 OF 3D MARDIV. NO AIRCAV HELICOPTER HAS BEEN LOST DURING THESE
 OPERATIONS. NO MARINE HELICOPTER HAS YET BEEN LOST ENEMY ACTION
 IN A ZONE THOROUGHLY RECONNOITERED AT LOW ALTITUDE BY AN AIRCAV
 TROOP. THE KEY FACTOR APPEARS TO BE AN ADEQUATE DENSITY OF MODERN
 ARMED AND OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS OVER THE AREA TO BE RECONNOITERED.

C. THERE ARE A VARIETY OF OTHER RECONNAISSANCE TASKS WHICH ARE

PAGE 5 OF 7 PAGES

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PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 3287 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
 ALSO BEST ACCOMPLISHED BY LOW ALTITUDE HELO RECCE, A TECHNIQUE WHICH SELECTIVELY UTILIZED, IS COMPLEMENTARY TO THE RECCE TECHNIQUES CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BY THE MARINE CORPS.

D. IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THIS DIVISIONS AO, HELO SEARCH AND ATTACK AGAINST FLEETING PERSONNEL TARGETS IS THE METHOD OF CHOICE FOR INFLECTING ATTRITION ON THE ENEMY'S FORCES.

F. IN THE AIRCAV TROOP, THE CLOSE MARRIAGE OF LIMITED GROUND RECCE/COMBAT CAPABILITIES WITH HELICOPTER RECCE/ATTACK CAPABILITIES OFFERS A FASTER REACTION TIME, REDUCED COORDINATION DIFFICULTIES AND BETTER INTEGRATION OF THE ELEMENTS INVOLVED THAN CAN BE ACHIEVED WITH OUR PRESENT SPARROW HAWK CONCEPT.

2. ACHIEVEMENT OF AN EQUIVALENT (AND IN FACT SUPERIOR) AIR CAVALRY TYPE CAPABILITY REPRESENTS NOTHING MORE THAN AN EXTENSION OF THE OFTEN STATED MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE OF MAXIMUM INTEGRATION AND OPTIMUM UTILIZATION OF AIR AND GROUND RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE COMMON GOALS. THE GROUND ELEMENT CAN BE PROVIDED FROM EXISTING RECON RESOURCES OF THE DIVISION. AIR ASSETS WILL REQUIRE NEW EQUIPMENT WHICH IS URGENTLY NEEDED IN ANY EVENT.

A. AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE I SUGGEST CONSIDERATION OF A LIGHT HELO/OBSERVATION GROUP IN SUPPORT OF EACH MARDIV WITH THREE

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 3287 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
 SQUADRONS EQUIPED AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) VMO O-1 AND OV10
- (2) HMAO AH-1 AND OH6/OH 58 (LOH)
- (3) HML UH-1H OR UH1E (TUG CONVERSION)

B. THE AIR CAVALRY CAPABILITY WOULD BE TASK ORGANIZED BY PASSING OPCON OF GROUND RECON ASSETS AS REQUIRED TO THE LIGHT HELO GROUP COMMANDER WHO WOULD HAVE OVERALL CONTROL OF THIS EFFORT.

3. MY DIVISION'S EXPERIENCES INDICATE QUITE CLEARLY THAT WE MUST HAVE LOH AND UH-1H TYPE HELICOPTERS. THE OTHER AIRCRAFT TYPES ARE EITHER ON HAND OR ON THE WAY IN AT LEAST MINIMALLY ADEQUATE NUMBERS.

4. CONCERNING COST AND FORCE LEVEL IMPLICATIONS:

A. THE LOH IS EXTREMELY CHEAP TO BUY AND MAINTAIN. THIS DIVISION'S ENTIRE REQUIREMENT WOULD COST LESS THAN ONE CH-53.

B. THE CURRENT UH-1E CANNOT SAFELY PERFORM THE HML MISSION IN THIS AO. IT HAS TO BE REPLACED. THE PRICE OF THE UH1H IS MODERATE. IT'S AVAILABILITY WILL REDUCE DEMANDS ON AND LOSSES TO THE CH-46 WHICH MAY WELL MAKE IT A SELF FUNDING PROPOSITION.

C. FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE THE ONLY UNPROGRAMMED ADDITIONAL

BT

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 TO RUHMM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION III OF III
 PILOT REQUIREMENT WOULD BE FOR THE LOW. IT WOULD SEEM THAT A
 DRAW DOWN FROM SQUADRONS EXPERIENCING MAINTAINANCE DIFFICULTIES
 COULD OVERFILL THE REQUIREMENT.

5. FOR THE LONGER TERM THERE ARE A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE APPROACHES
 TO WHATEVER PARTICULAR FORCE LEVEL OR FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
 ARE APPLIES; HOWEVER, THE CONTRAL POINT REMAINS THAT WE MUST HAVE
 A MODERN LIGHT HELICOPTER MIX AND THE CAPABILITIES (INCLUDING
 AIRCAV TYPE OPERATIONS) SUCH A FORCE PROVIDES.

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UNQUOTE

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SECRET