

~~531. CG FMAW 221615Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

532. 7AF 230230Z NOV68 (S) *gp-4*

AIR MUNITION STATUS

~~533. CG FMAW 231247Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~534. CG FMAW 241400Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~535. CG FMAW 251042Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~536. CG FMAW 261515Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~537. CG FMAW 271440Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~538. CG FMAW 281445Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~539. CG FMAW 290830Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~540. CG FMAW 291325Z OCT68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~541. CG FMAW 301105Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

542. CG III MAF 010240Z DEC68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

MARINE CORPS AIR GROUND TEAM

~~543. CG FMAW 011520Z DEC68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~17. CG FMAW 131550Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

518. CG FMFPAC 132232Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

RELOCATION OF AVIATION UNITS

519. 7AF TSN AB RVN 141050Z NOV68 (S) *gp-4*

NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

~~520. CG FMAW 141320Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

521. CG FMAW 151015Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

FIRST MAW FORWARD HEADQUARTERS

522. 7AF 1501100Z NOV68 (S) *gp-4*

NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SVN

523. CG III MAF 151124Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

PROPOSED CMCM ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT (S)

~~524. CG FMAW 151150Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~525. CG FMAW 161210Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~526. CG FMAW 171205Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~527. CG FMAW 181410Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~528. CG FMAW 191205Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~529. CG FMAW 200920Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~530. CG FMAW 211900Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~504. CG FMAW 051220Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~505. CG FMAW 061510Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

506. CG FMFPAC 062346Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

LOCATION OF AVIATION UNITS

~~507. CG FMAW 071900Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~508. CG FMAW 081520Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

509. CG III MAF 090940Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

LOCATION OF AVN UNITS

~~510. CG FMAW 091105Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

511. CG III MAF 100326Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION RESOURCES IN ICTZ
RECOMMENDS REQUEST TO COMUSMACV FOR III MAF TO REGAIN
OPNL DIRECTION OF III MAF AVN RESOURCES

~~512. CG FMAW 101415Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~513. CG FMAW 111450Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~514. CG FMAW 120915Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

515. CG FMFPAC 122144Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*

ANSWERS III MAF 100326Z NOV68 (TAB 511)

516. 7AF TSN AB RVN 130920Z NOV68 (S) *gp-4*

TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS, RVN

DECLASSIFIED

~~500. CG FMAW 011855Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~501. CG FMAW 021235Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

502. CG THIRD MARDIV 040040Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *gp 7*

MARINE CORPS AIR GROUND TEAM

~~503. CG FMAW 041320Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~

~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNNNZCZCSVA192ZVA 318VV SX6064VV VTA299
 OO RUSVDB
 DE RUSVT 897 3280435
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 230230Z NOV 68
 FM 7AF TACC TSN RVN
 TO RUSVTO/3 TFW BIEN HOA
 RUSVTB/12 TFW CAM RANH BAY
 RUSVTH/31 TFW TUY HOA
 RUSVTA/35 TFW PHAN RANG
 RUSVTK/37 TFW PHU CAT
 RUSVTF/366 TFW DANANG
 RUSVTP/I DASC DANANG
 RUSVTE/II DASC PLEIKU
 RUSVTN/III DASC BIEN HOA
 RUSVTLA/IV DASC CAN THO
 RUSVTD/DASC ALPHA NHA TRANG
 RUSVTI/DASC VICTOR HUE PHU BAI
 RUSVTP/HORN DASC DANANG
 RUSVDB/III MAF DANANG
 RUMLDNA/I CORPS DANANG
 RUMLPKA/II CORPS PLEIKU
 RUMUBHA/III CORPS BIEN HOA
 RUMUJLA/IV CORPS CAN THO

ACT G-3
 DIST A

PAGE 2 RUSVT 897 S E C R E T
 RUMLBPN/XXIV CORPS HUE PHU BAI
 RUMNVE/I FFV NHA TRANG
 RUMUFQA/II FFV LONG BINH
 RUSVTO/504 IAS GP BIEN HOA
 BT

S E C R E T/TACPS

SUBJECT: AIRMUNITION STATUS (U)
 FOR ALO'S, FAC'S AND G-3 IR'S.

1. (S) THIS MESSAGE INFORMS INTEREST AGENCIES OF THE AIRMUNITIONS STATUS AS OF 20 NOVEMBER 68. IN ADDITION TO THE ALLOCATIONS CHANGED BY THE 7AF AIRMUNITIONS ALLOCATION BOARD BECAUSE OF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, IT INCLUDES ALLOCATION CHANGES CAUSED BY CINCPAC'S CHANGE TO 7AF'S NOVEMBER ALLOCATIONS. BESIDES THE ALLOCATION CHANGES, CINCPAC AUTHORIZED A 15 DAY STOCK LEVEL FOR CBU-24/29/49. ALTHOUGH ALLOCATIONS OF CBU-24/29/49 DID NOT CHANGE, OVER EXPENDITURES, TO THE EXTENT THAT ON-HAND STOCKS WILL ALLOW, ARE PERMISSIBLE. THE NUMBERS OF CBU-24/29/49, REMAINING TO BE EXTENDED ARE BASED UPON STOCKS ON-HAND. ONCE THE DESIRED STOCK LEVEL IS ACHIEVED, OVER EXPENDITURES MUST BE CONTROLLED BECAUSE RESUPPLY IS BASED UPON THE ALLOCATION.

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#532

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUSVT 897 S E C R E T

2. (S) IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE, THE FIRST NUMBER IS THE ALLOCATION, THE SECOND NUMBER IS THE EXPENDITURE THROUGH 20 NOVEMBER, AND THE NUMBER IN PARENTHESIS IS THE DAILY AVERAGE EXPENDITURE WHICH WOULD EXPEND THE NOVEMBER ALLOCATION. THE FOURTH NUMBER FOR CBU-24 AND CBU-29/49 IS THE ON-HAND QUANTITY AS OF 20 NOVEMBER, AND THE NUMBER IN PARENTHESIS FOR THESE MUNITIONS IS THE PERMISSIBLE DAILY AVERAGE EXPENDITURE. THIS PERMISSIBLE DAILY AVERAGE EXPENDITURE WILL CHANGE WITH ANY REDISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS. NOTE: PLEIKU IS NOT LISTED, SINCE ALL PREPLANNED SORTIES FROM PLEIKU ARE OUT-COUNTRY.

A. AIRMUNITION STATUS:

	BNH	CRB	PRG	TYH	PHC	DNG
MK-81	320 10 (31)					
MK-82	5500 4170 (133)	4500 2048 (245)	4500 3031 (14)	5000 2997 (200)	4000 2818 (118)	5000 2348 (345)
M-117	2000 1474 (53)	3300 2049 (125)	5100 2826 (227)	4400 3061 (134)	3100 1231 (187)	3600 2733 (87)

PAGE 4 RUSVT 897 S E C R E T

MK-84						136 132 (0.4)
ELU-27	1994 1503 (49)	1326 516 (81)	4071 2364 (121)	2155 383 (127)	949 608 (34)	780 288 (41)
ELU-32	1400 335 (105)					
CBU-12	30 34 (0)	40 0 (4)	20 0 (2)	20 0 (2)	20 4 (1.6)	20 8 (1.2)
CBU-22	50 OP (5)					50 0 (5)
VOCBU-19	BNH 150 24 (13)	CRB	PRG	TYH	PHC	DNG
CBU-24	54	240	105	201	86	573

SECRET

#532

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUSVT 897 S E C R E T

	104	214	55	26	109	461
	(6)	(55)	(15)	(25)	(3)	(34)
	58	665	199	349	76	633
CBU-25	200					
	61					
	(14)					
CBU-29/49	10	20	10	10	20	
	19	3	1	5	10	5
	(0.8)	(2.4)	(3.1)	(2.6)	(0.3)	(5.5)
	13	34	36	31	8	69
B.U-52	100	250				
	NOT	16				
	AVAIL	(23)				
CBU-34			23	80	100	
				0	48	122
			(2)	(3)	(0)	
RKTS	4000	6000	4000	3000	2000	24000
	2041	1674	1763	2033	1064	9411
	(196)	(433)	(224)	(97)	(94)	(1459)
MICHAUT KITS		600				1700
		112				195
		(49)				(151)
GP-4						
BT						

SECRET

532

SECRET

PP RUMDM RUSVDF
 DE RHMAF 1883 3201124
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 151124Z NOV 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMKM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUSVDF/CG FIRST MAF
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE, INFO MAJGEN QUILTER FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
 PROPOSED CMCM ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT (S)

A. YOUR NOTE OF 5NOV68

1. AS YOU REQUESTED IN REF A, I HAVE STUDIED THE TWO PROPOSED CMCM'S THAT THE COMMANDANT IS CONSIDERING TABLING WITH THE JCS FOR RECORD PURPOSES.
2. I PREFER THE MORE TO THE POINT BRIEF VERSION OF THE CMCM, WITH ATTACHMENTS TO LAY OUT THE DETAIL. THIS IS A BETTER MODE OF PRESENTATION IN THAT THE BASIC ISSUE IS SET OUT QUITE CLEARLY AT THE ONSET AND BACKED UP IN THE DETAIL REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OUR CASE.
3. THE STATISTICAL MATERIAL AND CHRONOLOGY PRESENTED

PAGE TWO RHMAF 1883 S E C R E T SPECAT (MCEO)
 IN BOTH VERSIONS ARE ACCURATE AND SUPPORTABLE BY RECORDS ON FILE AT FIRST MAF HEADQUARTERS. THE RATIONAL AND ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING OUR CASE APPEAR TO BE SOUND.

4. I WISH TO NOTE THAT SINCE 6NOV68 THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY 26 USAF SORTIES FRAGGED INTO ICTZ, WHILE 137 ADD-ON OR IMMEDIATE SORTIES HAVE BEEN ACTUALLY FLOWN. THIS INDICATES THE SMALL AMOUNT OF USAF AIR NOW BEING EMPLOYED IN ICTZ. IT AMOUNTS TO LESS THAN 4 FRAGGED SORTIES PER DAY WITH A TOTAL FLOWN OF LESS THAN 18 SORTIES PER DAY COUNTING ALL DIVERTS AND SCRAMBLES. IN COMPARISON, THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF SORTIES FLOWN BY THE FIRST MAF IN ICTZ DURING THE SAME PERIOD IS 176 PER DAY.

THE REDUCTION IN AIR FORCE SORTIES IN ICTZ IS A RESULT OF A COMUSMACV DECISION TO WEIGHT THE EFFORT IN LAOS AND III CORPS. HOWEVER, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE PREPONDERANCE OF TAC AIR IN MY AREA IS FLOWN BY THE 1ST MAF. THIS MIGHT STRENGTHEN OUR ARGUMENT FOR DIRECT MANAGEMENT.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#523

SECRET

00 RUSVDB
 E RUSVB 2662E 3201150
 SSSSS NZO Z JPCCO
 P 150100Z NOV 68XV
 M 7AF TSN
 TO RUYGMIB/CTF SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO
 INFO RUYGSAF/COMSEVENTHFLT
 HKA/CONCRAC
 USVDE/COMUSMACV
 SUDBA/II MAF
 USVDF/II MAF

COG G-3

DIST A

T B

S E C R E T

BUECS: NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SVN (U)

1. COMUSMACV HAS APPROVED CERTAIN OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES TO INSURE COORDINATION OF TACTICAL AIR STRIKES IN SVN. IN ORDER THAT NAVAL AIR ASSETS CAN BE PROPERLY INTEGRATED INTO THE TOTAL AIR EFFORT IN SVN, THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES MUST APPLY:

A. ALTHOUGH NAVY FORCES REMAIN UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE 7TH FLEET, NAVAL AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN-COUNTRY MUST OPERATE WITHIN THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM (TACS).

PAGE 2 RUSVB 2662E **S E C R E T**

B. CTF-77 WILL FURNISH 7TH AF TACC THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO ARRIVE NOT LATER THAN 0600H EACH FRIDAY:

(1) THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PREPLANNED SORTIES THAT CAN BE GUARANTEED ON A DAILY BASIS FOR THE WEEK STARTING THE FOLLOWING TUESDAY.

(2) COMBAT RADIUS OK EACH SORTIE AND ORDNANCE LOAD.

(3) NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IN EACH FLIGHT AND FLIGHT CALL SIGN.

(4) LAUNCH AND RECOVERY TIME OF EACH SORTIE

(5) AVAILABLE FUPES.

C. THE SORTIES FURNISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 2B ABOVE WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE WEEKLY FRAG DISSEMINATED BY THE TACC BY 1800H EACH SUNDAY.

D. SORTIES FORECAST TO BE AVAILABLE IN ADDITION TO THE WEEKLY FRAG COMMITMENT MAY BE SUBMITTED TO TACC BY PVPH DAILY FOR INCORPORATION IN THE FOLLOWING DAY'S SCHEDULE. THESE SORTIES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN A FRAG DISSEMINATED BY 2000H EACH DAY.

E. INSOFAR AS COMBAT RADIUS AND AVAILABLE TARGETS WILL PERMIT, CTF-77 WEEKLY PRE-PLANNED STRIKES WILL BE FRAGGED INTO I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. WEATHER DIVERTU FROM LAOS WILL NORMALLY BE UTILIZED IN I CTZ WITH CSS DELIVERIES.

PAGE 3 RUSVB 2662E **S E C R E T**

1. IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE A SHORT ROUND, INITIALLY FRAGS WILL NOT PUT NAVAL AIR STRIKES ON TARGETU IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO FRIENDLY GROUND FORCES. AS SOON AS EXPERIENCE CAN BE GAINED IN DELIVERING ORDNANCE IN SUPPORT OF THE GROUND FORCES THIS LIMITATION WILL BE REMOVED.

GP-4

BT

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

COPY _____ OF _____ COPIES

SECRET

522

Air Control

SECRET

RF RUSVDB
DE RUSVDF 0110 3201015
ZNY SSSSS
P 151015Z NOV 68
FM CG FIRST MAW
TO RUSVDB/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE FOR

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM WGEN QUILTER
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FIRST MAW FORWARD HQS (U)

A. CG FIRST MAW 202340Z JUN 68 (U)

B. CG THIRD MARDIV 300040Z NOV 68 (S)

1. (S) I CERTAINLY AGREE THAT THE EARLIEST RETURN TO OUR MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM POSITION IS IN OUR BEST INTERESTS. IN ADDITION, ANY MEANS OF DILUTED SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF OUR RESOURCES SHOULD BE EXPLORED. HOWEVER, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FORWARD HEADQUARTERS OF THE FIRST MAW IS NOT DEEMED FEASIBLE. AT THIS POINT IN TIME I DOUBT THAT A FORWARD WING HEADQUARTERS WOULD ACCOMPLISH EITHER OF THE ABOVE GOALS IN A COMPLETELY SATISFACTORY WAY.
2. (C) FIRST OF ALL, PERSONNEL ASSETS WILL NOT PERMIT THE CREATION OF AN ADEQUATE STAFF IN SUPPORT OF A PERMANENT RESIDENT SENIOR MARINE CORPS AVIATOR IN THE THIRD MARDIV AO. PERSONNEL CEILING RESTRAINTS UNDER PROGRAM S APPLY.

PAGE TWO RUSVDF 0110 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

3. (C) SECONDLY, THE REQUIRED COMMUNICATION ASSETS FOR ADEQUATE DIRECTION AND CONTROL ARE NON-EXISTENT.
4. (C) PRIMARILY, THE SINGLE FACTOR THAT NEGATES AN ADDITIONAL HEADQUARTERS STAFF, IS THE FRACTIONALIZING OF WING ASSETS, CAPABILITIES AND CONTROL MUCH OF WHICH IS ALREADY STRETCHED THIN AND SOME OF WHICH IS DONE NOW AT THE EXPENSE OF SQUADRON ASSETS. THIS WOULD BE A BURDEN TO A WING THAT CURRENTLY SUPPORTS BOTH MARINE DIVISIONS AND FREE WORLD FORCES THROUGHOUT I CORPS.
5. (S) IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE MOVEMENT OF MAG-36 TO QUANG TRI IN THE FUTURE WILL AFFORD THE THIRD MARDIV WITH QUICK REACTION HELICOPTER SUPPORT, WHILE FIXED WING AIR WILL REMAIN RESPONSIVE THROUGH OUR NORMAL CONTROL SYSTEM.
6. (C) REF A ESTABLISHED A FIRST MAW AUX HEADQUARTERS AT QUANG TRI IN JUNGLE WITH ONE OF THE AWC'S MAINTAINING THAT POSITION. WHILE THE AUX HEADQUARTERS HAS NOT HAD THE COMMUNICATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES ENVISIONED IN REF B, THE TASKS PERFORMED BY THAT HEADQUARTERS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN REFINING PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES TO INSURE EFFICIENT AND RESPONSIVE AIR SUPPORT TO THE THIRD MARDIV WITHIN AIR RESOURCES ALLOCATED. THE AWC HAS BEEN TASKED TO PERFORM SIMILAR FUNCTION WITHIN FIRST MARDIV AREA AND HENCEFORTH

PAGE THREE RUSVDF 0110 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
WILL DIVIDE HIS TIME BETWEEN THE TWO DIVISIONS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#521

SECRET

V VBF813
 JO RUSVDB
 DE RUSVE 2568E 3191115
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCC
 O 141050Z NOV 68K
 FM 7AF TAN SON NHUT AB RVN
 TO RUYEMIB/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO.
 INFO RUSVDE/CCMUSMACV
 RUSVDF/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMKB/CINCPAC FLT
 RUMKA/CINCPAC
 RUSVDB/III MAF
 RUMGSAP/COMSEVENTHFLT
 BT

COG 03
 DIST A

S E C R E T C
 SUBJECT: NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM (U).
 REFERENCE: CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO-MSG; OP 121326Z NOV 68
 ZFF-1.

1. COM SEVENTH AIR FORCE WELCOMES THE ADDITION AIR STRIKES
 SCHEDULED FOR SVN IN REFERENCED MESSAGE. REPRESENTATIVES
 THIS HEADQUARTERS AND III MAF DASC VISITED THE CTG ON
 13-14 NOVEMBER TO DISCUSS IN-COUNTRY OPERATING PROCEDURES
 AND REVIEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.
 2. COMUSMACV EACH SATURDAY DETERMINES THE LEVEL OF

PAGE 2 2568E S E C R E T
 AIR EFFORT TO BE APPLIED TO THE RESPECTIVE CORPS TACTICAL ZONES
 FOR THE COMING WEEK. SEVENTH AIR FORCE IS RESPONSIBLE TO MACV
 FOR MAINTAINING THE DIRECTED SORTIE ALLOCATIONS. IN ORDER TO
 COMPLY WITH THE PRESENT DIRECTED DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT IT
 BE NECESSARY TO SHIFT MARINE STRIKES PRESENTLY GOING INTO
 I CORPS TO OTHER CORPS TACTICAL ZONES. THE NUMBER WILL DEPEND
 ON NUMBERS OF NAVAL AIRCRAFT STRIKING TARGETS IN I CORPS. THE
 TACC AND TASE ARE PRESENTLY DEVELOPING A PLAN FOR THE DISTRIBUTION
 OF MARINE SORTIES WHICH WILL BE REFLECTED IN THE FORTHCOMING
 WEEKLY FRAG.

3. TO PERMIT COM 7AF TO DISCHARGE HIS ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITIES BY
 IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR NAVAL AIRCRAFT ENTERING SVN TO
 CONTACT WATERBOY (CRP) FOR HAND OFF TO APPROPRIATE TAC AIR
 CONTROL AGENCY--VICESQUAD WHEN WORKING IN SUPPORT OF III
 MAF.

4. DETAILED AND SPECIFIC OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS FOR NAVAL AIR
 ACTIVITY IN SVN BY ELEMENTS OF CTG 77 WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF
 A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

OP-4

Air Control

SECRET

#519

SECRET

PP RUEBHQA RHMAFA
 DE RUHFMA 1779 318223Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 P R 132232Z NOV 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHQA/CMC
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN
 HUSE. NFO LTGEN CUSHMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

RELOCATION OF AVIATION UNITS (U)

1. (S) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SEASIA INDICATE THAT IT WOULD BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO EFFECT AN EARLY TRANSFER OF A VMFA SQUADRON FROM SVN TO JAPAN.
2. (S) THE BOMBING HALT AND MOVEMENT OF THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV (AM) TO III CORPS HAS DECREASED I CTZ TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. FURTHER, COMUSMACV HAS CONCURRED IN THE REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE VMA SQUADRON FROM SVN, AS PROPOSED IN CONNECTION WITH REALIGNMENT OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE WITHIN PROGRAM 6 CONSTRAINTS.
3. (S) I FEEL THAT THE EARLY TRANSFER OF A SQUADRON FROM SVN WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IN SEVERAL RESPECTS. HOWEVER

PAGE TWO RUHFMA 1779 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC
 THE MOVEMENT OF A VMFA VICE A VMA, IN WHICH BOTH BOB
 CUSHMAN AND CHICK QUILTER CONCUR, WOULD PROVIDE
 ABOUT 125 ADDITIONAL SPACES FOR III MAF'S USE, AND WOULD
 FACILITATE OPTIMUM POSITIONING OF 1ST MAF FIXED WING
 UNITS AND ENHANCE OUR PRESENT AND POST HOSTILITY
 POSTURES BY POSITIONING TWO VMFA SQUADRONS AT IWAKUNI.
 CONCOMITANTLY, T-DAY PLANNING AND EXECUTION REQUIRE-
 MENTS WOULD BE REDUCED. FURTHER, SINCE MCAS IWAKUNI
 IS PRESENTLY UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY, OUR POSITION WOULD
 BE IMPROVED BY THE INCREASED USAGE THAT WOULD RESULT.

4. (S) IN CONSIDERATION OF THE MANY ADVANTAGES TO BE
 GAINED BY AN EARLY TRANSFER OF A VMFA (VMFA-115) TO MAC-15, I
 BELIEVE THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS RESULT COULD BE OBTAINED
 BY THE INITIATION OF APPROPRIATE ACTION AT YOUR LEVEL.
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

* 518

SECRET

DE RUSVB 147D 3180931
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO
 O 130920Z NOV 68
 FM 7AF TSN AB RVN
 TO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV
 INFO RUSVDB/3MAF
 RUYGSAF/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUSVDB/HORN DASC DANANG AB RVN

COG G-3
 DIST A DASC

BT

SECRET/DO NOV 68.

SUBJECT: TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS, RVN (J).

REFERENCES: A. COMSEVENTHFLT, MSC 080542Z NOV 68.
 B. CTG 76.5, 090022Z, NOV 68.
 C. COMSEVENTHFLT, MSC 081448Z NOV 68.
 D. CTG 76.5, 081201Z NOV 68.

1. MESSAGE A IS INITIATING DIRECTIVE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION, CODE NAME, DARING ENDEAVOR WITH TENTATIVE D-DAY 10 NOVEMBER 1968. IN THE MESSAGE COMUSMACV WAS TASKED TO PROVIDE CAS FOR THE OPERATION. 7TH AIR FORCE ATTEMPTED COORDINATION WITH APPROPRIATE OFFICES AT MACV, WHICH INCLUDED MACV-TASE, BUT COULD NOT OBTAIN ANY INFORMATION REGARDING AIR SUPPORT FOR SUBJECT OPERATION. AT APPROXIMATELY 1500 HOURS, 9 NOV 68, HORN DASC WAS CONTACTED.

PAGE 2 RUSVB 147D SECRET

WITH REFERENCE TO AIR SUPPORT FOR DARING ENDEAVOR. THEY WERE UNABLE TO SUPPLY ANY INFORMATION, HOWEVER, SUBSEQUENTLY, 3 MAFF INFORMED HORN DASC THAT AIR SUPPORT WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE SE MAW WITH SORTIES ADDED ON TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE DAILY FRAG.

2. MESSAGE B IS REQUEST FOR NOTAM ISSUE RESTRICTING AIRSPACE IN THE AREA OF OPERATION DARING ENDEAVOR. THE AIRSPACE REQUESTED IN THE MESSAGE WOULD SERIOUSLY RESTRICT NORMAL AIR OPERATIONS AT DANANG AIR BASE. COORDINATION WITH 7TH AIR FORCE TO IDENTIFY RESTRICTED AIR SPACE FOR SUBJECT OPERATION WAS NOT COMPLETED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MESSAGE B REQUESTING NOTAM ISSUE, WHICH WAS RECEIVED AT 1130H ON 9 NOV 68 AND MESSAGE D REQUESTING DISCONTINUANCE OF DANANG TACAN NUMBER THREE. MESSAGE C OUTLINED THE DARING ENDEAVOR AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA AND THE ASSOCIATED AIRSPACE CONTROL AREA.

WHEN LARGE SCALE SURFACE OPERATIONS SUCH AS DARING ENDEAVOR ARE PLANNED WHICH REQUIRE AIR SUPPORT AND/OR AIR SPACE RESTRICTIONS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE INITIATING SERVICE COORDINATE WITH 7TH AIR FORCE AT THE EARLIEST DATE POSSIBLE FOR PLANNING ACTION.

(P-4)

BT

SECRET

#516

SECRET

PP RHMMAF A
 DE RUHHFMA 1624 3172144
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 122144Z NOV 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMMAF A/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM
 LT GEN BUSE.

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

AIR CONTROL (U)

FM CG III MAF 192326Z/NOV68 (S)

1. I CONCUR FULLY WITH THE GOAL YOU HAVE IN MIND
 AS EVIDENCED BY YOUR PROPOSAL IN REF A. CONCUR
 ALSO THAT RECENT EVENTS AND CHANGED CONDITIONS IN I
 CTZ WARRANT A RENEWED EFFORT TO RETURN CONTROL OF
 MARINE AIR TO III MAF, WHERE IT BELONGS. IN THIS
 REGARD, TIMING WILL BE OF THE ESSENCE. PREVIOUS
 PRESENTATIONS OF OUR CASE IN SAIGON HAVE FAILED TO
 ELICIT ANY ACTION AND I BELIEVE IT MAY BE ILLUSORY
 TO ANTICIPATE ANY AT THIS
 MOMENT. IN FACT, ANY IMMEDIATE MOVE MIGHT PROVE
 COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE BY ALERTING 7TH AIR FORCE TO THE

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA 1624 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 RECENT DOWNWARD TREND OF AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO I CTZ
 BEFORE SUFFICIENT TIME HAS ELAPSED TO ENABLE US TO
 PRESENT A STRONG, DOCUMENTED CASE.

2. THE MOVEMENT SOUTH OF THE 1ST CAV DIV (AM)
 CERTAINLY REDUCES THE ARMY TROOP DENSITY IN I CORPS.
 HOWEVER, THE MOVE SOUTH COULD BE USED AGAINST US.
 THE AIR FORCE COULD REITERATE THE OLD MACV PLATITUDE
 OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AIR EFFORT TO BE APPLIED
 IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER IN FURTHERANCE OF THE
 MACV MISSION AND, USING DEVELOPING 1ST CAV REQUIRE-
 MENTS IN III CORPS, JUSTIFY DECREASED AIR FORCE
 SORTIES ALLOCATED TO III MAF.

3. IN SHORT, I AGREE THAT THE RECENT TURN OF EVENTS
 IN I CTZ MAY IN TIME PROVIDE FOR AN ACCEPTABLE SO-
 LUTION TO THE AIR CONTROL PROBLEM. YET, I'M RELUC-
 TANT NOW TO TIP OUR HAND, AND I FEEL THAT WE NEED
 TO WATCH THESE NEW DEVELOPMENTS CAREFULLY, CHARTING
 THE FACTUAL DATA TO BACK OUR CASE IN DETAIL, AND AT
 TO PROPITIOUS MOMENT, SUBMIT OUR PROPOSAL TO MACV.
 WARM RE GARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

#515

SECRET

PRIORITY

SECRET/ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY1229
PRIORITYFROM: CG III MAF
TO: CG FMFPAC
INFO: CG FIRST MAW

10 0326 2 Nov 68

SECRET SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO MAJGEN QUILTER FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN,
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION RESOURCES IN ICTZ(U)

1. (U) I BELIEVE THAT RECENT CHANGES WARRANT A REQUEST TO COMUSMACV FOR III MAF TO REGAIN OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF ALL MARINE AVIATION RESOURCES IN ICTZ.
2. (U) WITH THIS GOAL IN MIND, PROVIDING OF COURSE THAT YOU CONCUR, THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PROPOSED MESSAGE TO COMUSMACV INFO CINCPAC THAT MAY GAIN SOME RESULT OR AT LEAST KEEP THE FIRE BURNING.
3. (S) TEXT: RECENT EVENTS AND CHANGED CONDITIONS WARRANT REEVALUATION OF REQUIREMENT TO CONTINUE THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. IN ICTZ THESE ARE:
 - A. THE CESSATION OF AIR COMBAT OPERATIONS OVER NVN.
 - B. THE MOVEMENT SOUTH OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AM).
 - C. THE REDUCED TEMPO OF ENEMY INITIATED LARGE SCALE ACTION AND WITHDRAWAL OF SOME NVA MAIN FORCE UNITS.
 - D. THE DECLINE OF USAF TACTICAL AIR IN SUPPORT OF UNITS IN ICTZ IN RECENT DAYS; E.G., ON 5NOV NO USAF SORTIES WERE PREPLANNED TO SUPPORT ICTZ OPERATIONS ALTHOUGH 25 ADDONS AND IMMEDIATES WERE FLOWN. THE FIRST MAW FLEW 202 SORTIES IN ICTZ. NO USAF PREPLANNED SORTIES ARE SCHEDULED FOR 6NOV. FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES NUMBERS OF USAF/USMC SORTIES FLOWN IN ICTZ IN SUPPORT OF USA AND OTHER UNITS THE PAST TWO WEEKS ARE LISTED.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET
#511

SECRET

PRIORITY

SECRET / SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PRIORITY

USAF SORTIES (ICTZ)

USMC SORTIES (ICTZ)

	SUPPORT TO						
	USA/OTHER	USMC	TOTAL		USA	USMC/OTHER	TOTAL
OCT 21	12	2	14	OCT 21	47	54	101
22	38	12	50	22	42	131	173
23	44	2	46	23	46	123	169
24	53	12	65	24	40	135	175
25	59	10	69	25	57	110	167
26	34	11	45	26	38	131	169
27	29	10	39	27	65	106	170
28	34	11	45	28	43	112	155
29	19	0	19	29	46	77	123
30	26	16	42	30	48	90	138
31	19	6	25	31	31	109	140
NOV 1	28	14	42	NOV 1	52	95	147
2	35	2	37	2	52	124	176
3	36	16	52	3	48	133	181
4	32	7	39	4	51	148	199
5	19	6	25	5	61	141	202
TOTAL	517	137	654	TOTAL	767	1818	2585

IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE CONDITIONS THAT LED TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT NO LONGER EXIST AS DISCUSSED ABOVE.

RETURN TO THE PROVISIONS OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 IS REQUESTED.
END OF TEXT

4. (U) I DON'T HOLD A GREAT DEAL OF HOPE THAT THIS WILL CHANGE SINGLE MANAGEMENT BUT IT WILL KEEP US ON RECORD AND DOCUMENT THE DRASTIC REDUCTION IN AIR FORCE AIR SUPPORT IN ICTZ. WARM REGARDS.
GP-4
BT

Prepared by CG FMAW

Released by CG, III MAF

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

FOR

MARINE CODED EYES ONLY

OO RUHAM
 DE RHMM,F 1152 3140940
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 090940Z NOV 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

SUBJ: LOCATION OF AVN UNITS (U)

REF: A. FMFPAC 062346Z NOV 68 (S)

1. (S) IN VIEW OF T-DAY PLANNING NOW UNDERWAY I CONCUR WITH THE
 RELOCATION OF VMFA 115 VICE VMA 311 TO MAG 15. IN ADDITION,
 THE 125 SPACES WE WOULD ACCRUE IN-COUNTRY IS A BONUS WE CANNOT
 IGNORE.

2. (S) THE REQUIREMENT FOR TAC AIR SUPPORT HAS DECREASED SOME-
 WHAT SINCE THE BOMBING HALT, HOWEVER, THE TOTAL EFFECT CANNOT
 BE MEASURED AT THIS TIME. RECENTLY MACV HAS SHIFTED THE
 EMPHASIS OUT-OF-COUNTRY AND TO III CORPS. THEREFORE,
 I WOULD NOT OBJECT TO MOVING VMFA 115 AT AN EARLY DATE
 IF IT CAN BE ARRANGED. CHICK QUILTER CONCURS.

GP-4

BT

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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SECRET

#509

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE
FOR****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PP RHMAFA RUMLMHA
 DE RUHMFMA 0915 511234G
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 062346Z NO' 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMAFA/CA III MAF
 INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW (P054)
 BT

S E C R E T S E C A T EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN INFO MAJGEN QUILTER
 FROM LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING
 HOURS

LOCATION OF AVIATION UNITS (U)

A. CG FIRST MAW 301050Z/OCT 68 (S)

1. (S) CHICK QUILTER'S RECOMMENDATION TO CONSIDER
 MOVEMENT OF VMFA-115 TO MAG-15 CONTAINED IN REF A
 MERITS SPECIAL ATTENTION AT THIS TIME. CURRENT
 EVENTS INDICATE THAT WE SHOULD AVAIL OURSELVES
 OF OPPORTUNITIES WHICH PLACE US IN THE BEST POSSIBLE
 POSITION TO FACILITATE ATTAINMENT OF OUR DESIRED POST
 SVN POSTURE. ALSO, MOVEMENT OF VMFA INSTEAD
 OF A VMA WOULD PROVIDE ABOUT 125 ADDITIONAL SPACES FOR
 USE IN-COUNTRY. THIS POINT IS SIGNIFICANT.
2. (S) FURTHER, WITH THE 1ST CAV DIV (AM) DEPLOYING TO III

PAGE 2 RUHMFMA 0915 **S E C R E T S E C A T** EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 CORPS, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PRESENT BOMBING
 HALT, IT MIGHT BE OPPORTUNE TO
 MOVE A VMFA TO IWAKUNI VICE A VMA AS SOON AS IT COULD BE
 ARRANGED. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS. WARM REGARDS.
 GP-4
 BT

SECRET
#506

SECRET

OO RHMMAFA RUMLMHA
 DE RUMHVP 225 ID 329024Z
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 24204Z NOV 68
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMLYHA/CG FIRST MAW
 ET

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 MGEN DAVIS SENDS FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN INFO MGEN QUILTER
 MARINE CORPS AIR GROUND TEAM

1. THE RECENT CESSATION OF FW MILITARY ACTIVITY IN AND NORTH OF THE DMZ POSES MANY DIFFICULT MILITARY PROBLEMS BUT ALSO, IN MY OPINION, OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE THE FULL MEANING OF THE CONCEPT OF A MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM WHICH HAS BEEN SO SERIOUSLY ERODED BY THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM.

2. THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THIS CESSATION OF ACTIVITY INCLUDE:

- A. GENERATION OF A SURPLUS OF TACAIR IN WESTPAC (NAVY, MARCORPS, AIR FORCE).
- B. DRASTIC RESTRICTIONS ON B-52 SORTIES IN THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AO BECAUSE OF USAF FEAR OF A SAM ENVELOPE RADIATING FROM THE BEN HAI RIVER.
- C. A DEMAND FOR EXPERTISE AND AREA ORIENTATION ON THE PART OF

PAGE 2 RUMHVP 225"222&

" JOXXD **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 PILOTS OPERATING IN THIS AO IN ORDER TO PROVIDE OPTIMUM SUPPORT WHILE AVOIDING OVERFLIGHTS OF THE NVA SANCTUARY IN THE DMZ.

3. I BELIEVE THAT THE FOREGOING DEVELOPMENTS ELIMINATE THE FUNDAMENTAL BASES ON WHICH THE AIR FORCE SOLD THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM IN THE FIRST PLACE SINCE THE FIRST MAW IS PERFECTLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ALL THE TACAIR THAT CAN PROFITABLY BE UTILIZED BY THE MARINE DIVISIONS, AND THE AIR FORCE WILL NO LONGER EMPLOY ITS B-52'S IN MOST OF THIS AO BECAUSE OF FEAR OF SAM'S.

4. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO RID OURSELVES OF THE SINGLE MANAGER, I BELIEVE WE MUST ALSO TAKE STEPS TO PROVIDE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF A COMPLETELY INTEGRATED MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM ON THE SPOT IN BOTH DIVISION AO'S, DESPITE THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL SEPARATION AND THE PRESENCE OF INTERVEING NON-MARINE CORPS ECHELONS. LET ME FRANKLY SAY THAT I BELIEVE THESE STEPS ARE, OF THEMSELVES, BENEFICIAL TO THE PERFORMANCE OF MARINE AIR AND GROUND FORCES QUITE INDEPENDENT OF THE SINGLE MANAGER ISSUE. THE STEPS I PROPOSE ARE:

- A. ESTABLISHMENT OF A FORWARD HEAD QUARTERS OF THE FIRST MAW, UNDER A PERMANENTLY RESIDENT SENIOR MARINE CORPS AVIATOR IN THE 3D MARDIV AO.
- B. DEDICATION TO THE SUPPORT OF THE 3D MARDIV OF THOSE FIXED AND

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET
#502

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMHVP 02510 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 ROTARY WING ASSETS/MISSIONS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE MADE AVAILABLE
 UNDER CURRENT PRACTICES, UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE FORWARD WING HQ,
 WITH III MAF AND FIRST MAW RETAINING AUTHORITY TO DIVERT ASSETS/MISSIONS
 FROM THE SUPPORT OF ONE DIVISION TO THE OTHER IF REQUIRED.

C. MISSION GENERATION FOR SUPPORT OF 3D MARDIV TO BE COMPLETED
 BY COMMUNICATION BETWEEN 3D MARDIV AND THE FORWARD WING HQ.

D. SPECIFIC STEPS TO INSURE ORIENTATION OF PILOTS OPERATING IN
 THE 3D MARDIV AO TO THE UNIQUE OPERATIONAL PECULIARITIES IMPOSED BY
 THE DMZ SANCTUARY.

E. IF WE DO THE FOREGOING, I THINK WE CAN PUT FORWARD A MUCH STRENGTHENED
 CASE THAT WE CAN PROVIDE MORE RESPONSIVE AND TIGHTLY CONTROLLED AIRR
 SUPPORT IN A HIGHLY SENSITIVE ENVIRONMENT THAN IS POSSIBLE WITH THE SINGLE
 MANAGER SYSTEM. IF WE DO NOT TAKE THIS OPPORTUNI

BY I FEAR FURTHER
 EROSION OF OUR AIR GROUND TEAM THROUGH THEATRE WIDE RATIONING OF TACAIR
 SORTIES TO INSURE ADEQUATE EMPLOYMENT OF USAF ASSETS AND , INCREASINGLY
 ONEROUS EXTERNAL CONTROLS ON MARINE AIR SUPPORT OF MARINE GROUND TROOPS.

CP-4
 ET

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#502