

16 ✓ CG III MAF 290720Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*  
 CUSHMAN TO CHAPMAN AND BUSE  
 ARG/SLF "FIELD MARSHAL MSG"

17 ✓ CG III MAF 290820Z NOV68 (S) *gp-4*  
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS  
 MEABE RIVER

~~CG III MAF 290232Z NOV68~~

~~R & R Proc. Center~~

19 ✓ CG III MAF 290830Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*  
 CUSHMAN TO BUSE  
 PROGRAM SIX FORCE STRUCTURE

20 ✓ CG III MAF 290928Z NOV68 (C) *gp-4*  
 CUSHMAN TO BUSE INFO QUILTER  
 REASGN OF OFF, CASE OF LTCOL NEW

~~21 ✓ CG III MAF 300454Z NOV68 (C)  
 CUSHMAN TO LAGY  
 A CEPTS INVITATION TO LUNCH~~

~~22 ✓ CG III MAF 300952Z NOV68 (U)  
 ANDERSON TO SHOOK  
 WEAPON ARRIVED~~

23 ✓ CG III MAF 301338Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *Group-4*  
 CUSHMAN TO BUSE INFO CHAPMAN, WEBSTER, AND WILLIAMS  
 PROGRAM SIX

24 ✓ CG III MAF 301422Z NOV68 (S) *gp-4*  
 GROVES TO BAGLEY  
 LF MASON SKED - SNOOPY EMPLOYMENT

- 1 ~~11.~~ CG III MAF 180956Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *group-4*  
CUSHMAN TO BUSE INFO CHAPMAN  
PROGRAM 6 DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
- ~~12.~~ ~~CG III MAF 181736Z NOV68 (U)~~  
~~BIRTHDAY MSG FOR MAJEN J. C. SMITH~~
- 3 ~~13.~~ CG III MAF 210742Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*  
TOMPKINS TO BUSE  
PASSES OUR MSG TO COMUSMACV TO BUSE ON PROGRAM 6
- 4 ~~14.~~ CG III MAF 221418Z NOV68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*  
TOMPKINS TO BUSE  
NONAPPROPRIATED FUND PROCUREMENT FLIGHTS TO HONG KONG
- 5 ~~15.~~ CG III MAF 230848Z NOV68 (S) *gp-4*  
ANDERSON TO CORCORAN INFO STILWELL  
OPN MEADE RIVER
- 6 ~~16.~~ CG III MAF 231148Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *group-4*  
~~XAK~~ ANDERSON TO BUSE  
PASSES 7AF MSG ON "NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SVN"
- ~~7.~~ ~~CG III MAF 241440Z NOV68 (U)~~  
~~CUSHMAN TO DAGLEY INFO CAPT GAV~~  
~~NCPS DISCUSSION~~
- 8 ~~18.~~ CG III MAF 251334Z NOV68 (C MCEO) *group-4*  
ANDERSON TO WILSON  
EXPLANATION OF FLUKED READDRESSL OF PROGRAM 6 MESSAGE
- 9 ~~19.~~ CG III MAF 251336Z NOV68 (S) *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS  
OPERATION MEADE RIVER
- 10 ~~20.~~ CG III MAF 251338Z NOV68 (S MCEO)  
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION
- ~~11.~~ ~~CG III MAF 270626Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~CUSHMAN TO BUSE~~  
~~QUOTES TO ADG/SIE MESSAGES~~
- ~~12.~~ ~~CG III MAF 271040Z NOV68 (U)~~  
~~TOMPKINS TO COL STEMAN~~  
~~TRANSPORTATION PLANS~~
- ~~13.~~ ~~CG III MAF 280030Z NOV68 (U)~~ ~~CG III MAF 272350Z NOV68 (S MCEO)~~  
~~ANDERSON TO YOUNGDALE~~  
~~OKS PROVIDED GEN ANDERSON~~
- 14 ~~21.~~ CG III MAF 281440Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*  
DUEL BLADE MESSAGE
- 15 ~~22.~~ CG III MAF 290048Z NOV68 (S) *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS  
WINTER CAMPAIGN IN A BA112

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 18 NOV 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 180956Z NOV 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS ORIG/G-3 REL/C/S
4	DCG		10/19		Emb	
1	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			Q	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/18		IL	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE  
FOR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

#

SECRET

**SECRET**

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		SERIAL# 180956Z NOV 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
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		EXCLUSIVE FOR	
11/18	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
11/19	<i>[Signature]</i>	<p><b>EXCLUSIVE FOR</b></p> <p>MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p>	
S/S	COPIES 1, 2, 3 OF 3 COPIES		
	MAT AND TARE		

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

**SECRET** *2*

**SECRET****EXCLUSIVE****FOR****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
HAS BEEN SENT**

OO RUHKN  
DE RHMMAF 2266 3233956  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 180956Z NOV 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUHKN/CG FMFPAC  
INFO RUHKN/CMC  
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN.  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

PROGRAM 6 DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 052239Z NOV68 (S) SPECAT

1. (S) THIS MSG RESPONDS TO REF A. IT ADDRESSES AUTHORIZED  
STRUCTURE BILLETS WHICH III MAF WOULD RECOMMEND NOT BE FILLED  
UNDER CONSTRAINTS OF SECNAV PROPOSAL AND IDENTIFIES THE  
CONCOMITANT IMPACT ON III MAF COMBAT CAPABILITY. IT FURTHER  
PROVIDES RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMENSURATE CHANGES IN FMFPAC  
TENTATIVE REVISED MANNING LEVELS.

2 (S) III MAF ASSUMPTIONS:

A. THE QUOTE CURRENT III MAF STRUCTURE UNQUOTE AS DEFINED  
IN REF A INCLUDES III MAF UNITS NOW IN SVN AND III MAF UNITS

PAGE TWO RHMMAF 2266 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)  
IDENTIFIED IN ALTERNATIVE ONE TO USMC SVN 82.2 PLAN AS UNITS  
REQUIRING USMC SVN PROGRAM SIX SPACE INCREASE OF 5.8K TO CMC  
PROPOSED USMC SVN CEILING OF 82K.

B. USMC MPS END FY69 IS BEST AVAILABLE SOURCE  
DOCUMENT FOR T/O AND AUTH STR OF UNITS IN USMC 89.5  
PLAN.

C. MAJOR ELEMENTS IN CURRENT HQMC APPROVED  
AUGMENT INCLUDE:

EA DIV - 638 DIV BASE SUPPORT  
259 RECON BN AUGMENT

FLC - 406 HQMC AUGMENT

MAW - 228 ORD PERS

3. (S) BASED ON FORE GOING ASSUMPTIONS, III MAF CURRENT  
TOTAL STRUCTURE BILLETS ARE 83,482. THIS TOTAL MAY  
SUBSEQUENTLY REQUIRE FURTHER REFINEMENT. BASED ON  
THIS TOTAL, SHORTFALL IS 5440. THESE FIGURES ARE  
BASIS OF SUBSEQUENT COMPUTATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
IN THIS MSG.

4. (S) THE TOTAL AUTHORIZED STRUCTURE BILLETS IN  
EACH III MAF ADCON GROUP AND THOSE AUTHORIZED STRUC-

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RHMAF 2266 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)  
 PURE BILLETS WHICH III MAF WOULD RECOMMEND NOT BE  
 FILLED UNDER THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE SECNAV PROPOSAL  
 ARE:

ADCON GROUP	TOTAL BILLETS	UNFILLED BILLETS
A. HQ III MAF ADCON	3,557	NONE
B. FIRST MARDIV ADCON	24,792	1,493
C. THIRD MARDIV ADCON	22,192	911
D. FIRST MAW ADCON	16,753	1,212
E. FLC ADCON	9,660	735
F. 9TH MAB GRD ADCON	5,876	1,068
G. 9TH MAB AIR ADCON	652	21
TOTAL III MAF	83,482	5,440

5. (S) THE CONCOMITANT IMPACT ON III MAF COMBAT CAPABILITY WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THE IMPACT OF THE SUMC SVN 82.2 PLAN. THERE WOULD BE THE ADDITIONAL PROBLEM OF CADRING CERTAIN UNITS IN CTY. CADRING, ALTHOUGH UNDESIREABLE, APPEARS TO BE A BETTER SOLUTION THAN ACROSS-THE-BOARD CUTS. IMPACT IS IDENTIFIED FOR AFFECTED UNITS AS FOLLOWS:

A. FIRST AND THIRD MARDIV. IMPACT WOULD BE

PAGE FOUR RHMAF 2266 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)  
 SIGNIFICANT. CADRE STATUS FOR THE FOLLOWING UNITS MIGHT BE NECESSARY: TWO TANK COS, TWO AMTRAC COS, TWO AT COS, HQ BTRY FAG, ARMD AMPHIB CO(-), AND ONE COMM SUPPORT CO. BILLETS WOULD REMAIN UNFILLED FOR A LARGE PORTION OF CMR PLAT. CURRENT BASE SUPPORT AUGMENTATION WOULD BE REDUCED ABOUT 50PERCENT IN EACH DIVISION

B. FIRST MAW. IT APPEARS THAT BILLETS FOR ONE ASRT, ONE MATCU, 121 HELO GUNNERS AND 297 AIRFIELD SECURITY PERSONNEL COULD NOT BE FILLED. CADRING OF WERS MAY BE REQUIRED. CURTAIN OTHER ELEMENTS SUCH AS SNMM, SHOEHORN, AND COACT COULD NOT BE EMPLOYED. DIVERSION OF AIRCREWS AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL TO AIRFIELD SECURITY DUTIES WOULD LOWER THEIR EFFICIENCY THUS DEGRADING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. HELO OPS WOULD BE RESTRICTED SEVERELY OR MADE MORE HAZARDOUS IN VIEW SHORTAGE OF HELO GUNNERS.

C. PRINCIPAL IMPACT ON FLC WOULD BE TO REDUCE FLEXIBILITY OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT OPERATIONS. CADRING ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT IN FLC IN VIEW UNIQUE FUNCTION

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

**SECRET**

#1

**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RHNMAF 2266 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)  
 EACH UNIT. IMPACT ON COMBAT CAPABILITY OF 9TH MAB  
 UNITS SHOULD NOT PROVE DISABLING.

6. (S) THE MAF'S INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES  
 IN FMFPAC TENTATIVE REVISED MANNING LEVELS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

ADCON GROUP	FMFPAC M/L	CHANGE
A. HQ III MAF ADCON	3,361	ADD 196
B. FIRST MARDIV ADCON	24,849	REDUCE 1550
C. THIRD MARDIV ADCON	21,726	ADD 253
D. FIRST MAW ADCON	15,755	REDUCE 214
E. FLC ADCON	8,924	ADD 401
F. 9TH MAB ORD ADCON	3,897	ADD 911
G. 9TH MAB AIR ADCON	638	ADD 1
TOTAL M/L	78,042	TOTAL CHG-0

GP-4  
 BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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**SECRET**

#1



HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

MAF FORM 5210 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 21 NOV 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 210742Z NOV 68		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				H	SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
	DCG					REMARKS
	DCG AIR					ORIG - C/S
	C/S				Q	REL - C/S
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/22		H	<p><b>EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</b></p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p style="text-align: right;">#3</p>
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

#3



**SECRET**

PP RUHKN  
 DE RHMAFA 2695 3261135  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 210742Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 FOR L GEN BUSE FROM M GEN TOMPKINS  
 FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, DISPATCHED TO COMUS TODAY, IS  
 QUOTED FOR INFO:

QUOTE

O 210740Z NOV 68 ZFF-1  
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN  
 TO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV SGN

BT

SECRET

III MAF PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

A. COMUSMACV 3292Z DTG 230100Z NOV 68 (S)

1. (C) THIS HQ GREATLY APPRECIATED THE PAINSTAKING REVIEW OF III MAF'S PROPOSED REALIGNED PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE BY THE MACV STAFF AND THE RESULTING COMUSMACV CONCURRENCE WHICH WAS EXPRESSED TO CINCPAC IN REF A.
2. (U) PURPOSE OF THIS MSG IS TO ADVISE CURRENT STATUS OF FORCE STRUCTURE SITUATION IN III MAF AND REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE AS A MATTER OF HIGH PRIORITY IN RESOLVING SEVERE FORCE STRUCTURE PROBLEM CONFRONTING THIS HQ.
3. (S) THE PROBLEM HAS TWO SEPERATE BUT RELATED ASPECTS. FIRST ASPECT CONCERNS THE URGENT NEED TO DELETE ONE VMFA SQDN FM III MAF'S REALIGNED PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE IN ORDER TO ACCOMODATE IN THE REALIGNED STRUCTURE THE VMA SQDN NOW IN SVN. SECOND ASPECT CONCERNS EQUALLY URGENT NEED FOR EARLY AND ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL FM SVN OF III MAF UNITS WHICH CANNOT BE ACCOMODATED, I. E., INCLUDED IN THE REALIGNED PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE.

PAGE TWO RHMAFA2672 SECRET

A. NEED FOR THE VMA SQUADRON VICE VMFA SQDN ARISES FM THE RECENT REORIENTATION OF AIR EFFORT AS RESULT OF NVN BOMBING HALT AND III MAF'S ESTIMATE OF FOCUS OF AIR EFFORT IN COMING MONTHS.

FM III MAF POINT OF VIEW, AIR EFFORT WILL FOCUS MORE AND MORE TOWARD DIRECT SUPPORT GROUND COMBAT OPS IN ICIZ AND SVN WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. REQUIREMENT FOR GROUND ATTACK CAPABILITY OF VMA SQDN WILL INCREASE AS COMPARED TO REQUIREMENT FOR FIGHTER/ATTACK CAPABILITY OF VMFA SQDN.

B. NEED FOR EARLY AND ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF III MAF UNITS FM SVN ARISES FROM FACT THAT, ALTHOUGH ACTUAL III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE REMAINS SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER THAN EITHER PRESENT PROG SIX STRUCTURE OR PROPOSED PROG SIX REALIGNED STRUCTURE, PERSONNEL MANNING LEVELS HAVE ALREADY BEEN DRSTICALLY REDUCED TO ENSURE ADHERENCE TO PROG SIX CEILING CONSTRAINTS. THUS, ACTUAL III MAF STRUCTURE REMAINS AT ABOUT 83.5 K BILLETS (SPACES) AND CURRENT AND FUTURE MANNING LEVELS CAN MAKE ONLY 78.0 K MARINES AVAILABLE TO MAN THIS LARGE STRUCTURE.

4. (S) III MAF DONCEPT FOR ALLEVIATING PROBLEM AT EARLY DATE AND RESOLVING PROBLEMHCOMPLETELY DURING COMINT MONTHS IN AS FOLLOWS. CONCEPT IS EXPRESSED AS SERIES OF III MAF ACTIONS:

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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# 3

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RHMAFA2672 S E C R E T

A. ACTION NR 1. ADVISE COMUSMACV OF PROBLEM (THIS MSG CONSTITUTES ACTION NR 1)

B. ACTION NR 2. DEVELOP AND SUBMIT ASAP TO COMUSMACV III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE REQUEST 2-68. THIS CHANGE REQUEST WILL PROVIDE FOR DELETION OF ONE VMFA SQDN FM III MAF'S PROPOSED REALIGNED PROG SIX FORCE STRUCTURE, INCLUSION OF THE VMA SQDN NOW IS SVN, AND USE OF RESULTING USMC TRADE-OFF SPACES TO ACCOMMODATE PORTION OF III MAF HIGHEST PRIORITY FORCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE REALIGNED STRUCTURE.

C. ACTION NR 3. INITIATE WITHDRAWAL FM SVN AND REDEPLOYMENT TO OKINAWA AND JAPAN THESE UNITS IAW INDICATED SEQUENCE AND RATE. READ IN FOUR COLUMNS:

UNIT	SEQUENCE	RATE	DESTINATION
(1) VMFA SQDN	1	ASAP AND NLT 15 DEC	JAPAN
(2) H&MS/MABS DET	1	ASAP AND NLT 15 DEC	JAPAN
(3) AT BN (-)	2	NLT 1 JAN	OKINAWA
(4) AT BN (-)	2	NLT 1 JAN	OKINAWA
(5) AMTRACT BN	3	NLT 15 JAN	OKINAWA
(6) ARMD AMPHIB CO (-) 4		NLT 1 FEB	OKINAWA
(7) MED TK CO REIN	5	NLT 15 FEB	OKINAWA

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA2672 S E C R E T

(8) MED TK CO REIN 5 NLT 15 FEB OKINAWA

(9) WERS (MWSG) 6 NLT 1 MARCH JAPAN

5. (S) DEVELOPMENT OF FOREGOING CONCEPT INTO VIABLE PLAN DEPENDS HEAVILY ON OBTAINING AUTHORITY EARLIEST FOR WITHDRAWAL OF VMFA SQDN FM SVN. PLANNING FOR ACTION NR 2 NOW IN ADVANCED STAGE. FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE REQUEST 2-68 CAN BE SUBMITTED TO YOUR HQ NLT 25 NOV FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, HOWEVER, IT WOULD APPEAR DESIRABLE TO FIRST OBTAIN REQUISITE APPROVAL FOR SUBSTITUTION OF VMA SQDN VICE VMFA SQDN IN REALIGNED STRUCTURE AND WITHDRAWAL OF VMFA SQDN AS INDICATED IN CONCEPT.

6. (U) IT IS REQUESTED THAT COMUSMACV ASSIST III MAF AS FEASIBLE IN ALLEVIATING THIS FORCE STRUCTURE PROBLEM AND RESOLVING IT AS INDICATED IN III MAF CONCEPT.

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**





**CONFIDENTIAL**

CG 20000  
NO RHMNAPA 2349 3071485  
NOV 08000  
2 000000 NOV 68  
NO 08 111 MAY  
13 08 111 MAY  
BT

CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
FOR LYON BASE FROM MAJOR TOMPKINS  
NONAPPROPRIATED FUND PROCUREMENT FLIGHTS TO HONG KONG (U)

- 1. COMUSMACV 043085Z NOV 68 (PASEP)
- 2. CG 107 MAY 110513Z NOV 68 (PASEP)
- 3. CINCPAG 150211Z NOV 68 (PASEP)
- 4. CINCPACFLT 200400Z NOV 68
- 5. ADMIRAL CINCPAG 192100Z NOV 68
- 6. COMUSMACV 181528Z NOV 68 (PASEP)

7. REF A REPORTED THAT PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN ENTERING HONG KONG AND BANGKOK IN AN UNAUTHORIZED STATUS VIA OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT AND DECEASED, UNDER ALIAS, THAT PERMISSIVE TRAVEL WILL NOT BE AUTHORIZED FOR TRAVEL TO COUNTRIES OUTSIDE OF VIETNAM. IN RESPONSE, CG 111 MAY BY LETTER DIRECTED CG FIRST MAY TO STOP ANY FLIGHTS IN THIS CATEGORY.

8. REF B REQUESTED ELABORATE AREA CLEARANCE FOR A BI-MONTHLY FLIGHT

PAGE TWO RHMNAPA 2349 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE WORD TO HONG KONG FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING NON-APPROPRIATED FUND PURCHASES. THESE FLIGHTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE PAST AND WE HAD VERBAL CONCURRENCE FROM MACV J-4 IN OUR REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE. THE FLIGHTS NORMALLY LEAVE DANANG ON EACH MONTH'S FIRST AND THIRD TUESDAY AND HONG KONG AROUND NOON ON THURSDAY. ADMITTEDLY, IN THE PAST A FEW PERSONNEL HAVE MADE THESE FLIGHTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF RECREATION AND PERSONAL SHOPPING. AS STATED IN REF B, IT IS OUR INTENTION TO ELIMINATE THIS CATEGORY PERSONNEL ON FUTURE FLIGHTS.

9. THE PURCHASES MADE ON THE SUBJECT FLIGHTS HAVE BEEN HIGHLY BENEFICIAL TO OUR VARIOUS NONAPPROPRIATED FUND ACTIVITIES. PROCUREMENT HAS BEEN EITHER UNDER THE BUY-U.S.-HERE PROGRAM OF THE AIR FORCE OR THROUGH THE NAVY PURCHASING ACTIVITY CHINA FLEET CLUB OR WITH ITS APPROVAL. MUCH OF THE PROCUREMENT IS OF AMERICAN-PRODUCED ITEMS. THE TOTAL GOLD FLOW RESULTING FROM THESE FLIGHTS IS INEFFECTIVE WHEN COMPARED WITH WHAT IS SPENT EVERY TIME A SHIP GOES TO HONG KONG AFTER BEING RELIEVED FROM YANKEE STATION.

10. REF C APPROVED THE REQUEST CONTAINED IN REF B ON A CONTINUING BASIS UNTIL NOVEMBER 1969.

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-64)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB	INGR.	FD. SERV.	INT. COMDT.	INSP	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

#4

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE RUMKAPA 2849 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE INFO  
6. REF D IS GENCAPAC'S RECOMMENDATION THAT BLANKET CLEARANCE  
NOT BE GRANTED AND THAT PURPOSE OF THE FLIGHTS DID NOT APPEAR  
JUSTIFIABLE.

7. BY REF E GENCAPAC DIRECTED THAT THE AUTHORITY FOR THE SUBJECT  
FLIGHTS PREVIOUSLY GRANTED IN REF C BE HELD IN ABEYANCE.

8. IN REF F COMUSMACV MODIFIED REF A TO THE EXTENT THAT  
PERMISSIVE TAD COULD BE AUTHORIZED FOR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF RVN.  
THUS PERSONNEL COULD TRAVEL TO HONG KONG OR PERMISSIVE TAD FOR  
SUCH THINGS AS NONAPPROPRIATED FUND PROCUREMENT.

9. WE ARE SOMEWHAT CONFUSED AT THIS POINT AS TO WHY GENCAPAC  
IS COMING INTO THE DISCUSSION AFTER THE FACT, CONNAUGHTON  
HAS STATED ORALLY HE HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO THE FLIGHTS, AS  
HAS COMUSMACV. REF B INDICATES THAT ON 13 NOVEMBER GENCAPAC  
SAW NOTHING WRONG WITH THE FLIGHTS. IT IS REQUESTED YOU  
COORDINATE WITH GENCAPAC AND GENCAPAC ON OUR BEHALF IN ORDER  
TO HAVE THE FLIGHTS COMMENCE. IF THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE ON THE  
FLIGHTS IS AT ISSUE, THIS CAN BE REDUCED. THIRTY-SEVEN WAS CHOSEN  
BECAUSE THIS WAS THE NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE AIRCRAFT. THE  
FREQUENCY OF FLIGHTS COULD BE REDUCED, BUT THIS IS NOT  
DESIRABLE SINCE EACH FLIGHT NORMALLY PICKS UP THE SUPPLIES AND

PAGE FOUR RUMKAPA 2849 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE INFO  
EQUIPMENT ORDERED ON THE PRECEDING FLIGHT AND THE VOLUME IS  
USUALLY GREATER THAN ONE KC-130 LOAD. FINALLY ABOVE ALL WE  
NEED AUTHORIZATION FOR THE NEXT TWO FLIGHTS TO GO, INASMUCH AS  
THESE WILL PICK UP SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT FOR CHRISTMAS PROJECTS  
FOR BOTH CIVIC ACTION AND TROOP MORALE PROJECTS.

10. WARM REGARDS

CP-8  
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-64)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. D.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#4





**SECRET**

OO RUMLBPA  
 DE RHMMAFA 2943 3280550  
 RNY SSSSS  
 O 230848Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV  
 INFO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PHB  
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 FOR MGEN CORCORAN INFO L GEN STILLWELL FROM MGEN ANDERSON  
 OPN MEADE RIVER

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS BELIEVED TO BE OF INTEREST TO GENERAL ABRAMS:

A. THE COMBINED USMC, ROKMC, ARVN, RF/PF, CORDS SPECIAL PACIFICATION OFFENSIVE OPN MEADE RIVER HAS CONCLUDED THE INITIAL PHASE WITH IMPRESSIVE RESULTS.

B. THE ESSENTIAL MANEUVER OF OVER SIX BNS OF MARINES AND TWO ROKMC COMPANIES TOTALING OVER FIVE THOUSAND PERS INTO A CORDON OF AN AREA APPROX THREE BY SIX MILES WAS EXECUTED WITH PRECISION AND APPEARS TO HAVE ACHIEVED THE ALL IMPORTANT SURPRISE. WE ARE SATISFIED THAT WE HAVE ESTABLISHED THE COMPLETE INTEGRITY OF THE CORDON.

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 2943 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

C. THE RELOCATION OF APPROX THREE THOUSAND CIVILIANS TO A RELOCATION CENTER IN THE VIC OF THE 1/1 CP IS IN PROGRESS UNDER THE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF PROVINCE CORDS. A JOINT INTERROGATION CENTER UTILIZING USMC/ARVN AND SPL POLICE IS OPERATING EFFECTIVELY. AS OF 22NOV A TOTAL OF 2086 CIV HAD BEEN RELOCATED WITHOUT INCIDENT. INITIAL RESULTS OF THE DETAILED INTERROGATION OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION HAS RESULTED IN 12 VCI POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED. A FULL PROGRAM OF JOINT CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES IS UNDER WAY IN THE LARGE TENT CITY RELOCATION CENTER.

D. AS OF 22NOV, 102 VC/NVA HAVE BEEN KILLED. NIGHTLY PROBES AGAINST THE CORDON INDICATE SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF ENEMY TRAPPED WITHIN. ARVN CONTINUE TO WORK THE HAMLETS WITH NPFF EXTRACTING THE CIVILIAN POPULACE. ONCE THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, THE USMC ELEMENTS STAND READY TO EFFECT A SQUEEZE OF THE CORDON IN PREPARATION FOR THE ULTIMATE ASSAULT IN THE DODGE CITY AREA.

E. IN SUMMARY WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THIS MAJOR OPN HAS EVERY PROMISE OF ELIMINATING THE VCI IN THE AREA WHILE CONCURRENTLY DESTROYING WHAT APPEARS TO BE A SIGNIFICANT

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA 2943 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FORCE OF VC/NVA TRAPPED IN THE CORDON.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

#5

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 23 NOV 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 231148Z NOV 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ORIG - S/S REL - S/S  <b>EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY</b>  HAS BEEN SENT  <i># 26 3 Burned 27 Nov 68</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			Q	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/24		↓	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #6



**SECRET**

PP RUNKM  
 DE RHMMAF 2961 3281150  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 231148Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC

BT

**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 FOR L GEN BUSE FROM MGEN ANDERSON

1. FOL 7AF MSG QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

O 141050Z NOV 68  
 FM 7AF TAN SON NHUT AB RVN  
 TO RUYGMID/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO  
 INFO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV  
 RUSVDF/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUNKB/CINCPAC FLT  
 RUNKA/CINCPAC  
 RUSVDB/III MAF  
 RUYGSAF/CONSEVENTHFLT

BT

**S E C R E T**

SUBJECT: NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SU)  
 REFERENCE: CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO MSG OP 121326Z NOV 68  
 ZFF-1.

1. SEVENTH AIR FORCE WELCOMES THE ADDITION AIR STRIKES  
 SCHEDULED FOR SVN IN REFERENCED MESSAGE. REPRESENTATIVES  
 THIS HEADQUARTERS AND III MAF DASC VISITED THE CTG ON  
 13-14 NOVEMBER TO DISCUSS IN-COUNTRY OPERATING PROCEDURES  
 AND REVIEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

2. COMUSMACV EACH SATURDAY DETERMINES THE LEVEL OF

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

#6

**SECRET**

PAGE 2 2568E S E C R E T

AIR EFFORT TO BE APPLIED TO THE RESPECTIVE CORPS TACTICAL ZONES FOR THE COMING WEEK. SEVENTH AIR FORCE IS RESPONSIBLE TO MACV FOR MAINTAINING THE DIRECTED SORTIE ALLOCATIONS. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESENT DIRECTED DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT IT BE NECESSARY TO SHIFT MARINE STRIKES PRESENTLY GOING INTO I CORPS TO OTHER CORPS TACTICAL ZONES. THE NUMBER WILL DEPEND ON NUMBERS OF NAVAL AIRCRAFT STRIKING TARGETS IN I CORPS. THE TACC AND TASE ARE PRESENTLY DEVELOPING A PLAN FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MARINE SORTIES WHICH WILL BE REFLECTED IN THE FORTHCOMING WEEKLY FRAG.

3. TO PERMIT COM TAF TO DISCHARGE HIS ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR NAVAL AIRCRAFT ENTERING SVN TO CONTACT WATERBOY (CORP) FOR HAND OFF TO APPROPRIATE TAC AIR CONTROL AGENCY--VICE SQUAD WHEN WORKING IN SUPPORT OF III MAF.

4. DETAILED AND SPECIFIC OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS FOR NAVAL AIR ACTIVITY IN SVN BY ELEMENTS OF CTF 77 WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

WARMS REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

#6

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 25 NOV 68	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 251334Z NOV 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN WILSON	
	CG					REMARKS	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR					ORIG - C/S REL - C/S	
2	C/S	I					
	D C/S					EXCLUSIVE  FOR  MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  HAS BEEN SENT	
	D C/S DM						
1	S/S	I	11/26		I	CONFIDENTIAL	
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						



**CONFIDENTIAL**

FM RUMBN  
DE RHMMAFA 330103Z

ZNY 00000  
P 251834Z NOV 68  
FM CG 112301F  
TO CG FMPPAC  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
FOR BUEN WILSON FROM HGEN ANDERSON

1. HAVE LOOKED INTO THE MATTER, WITH RESPECT TO THE  
210740Z NOV 68 MESSAGE YOU MENTIONED TO ME OVER THE PHONE  
YESTERDAY. I PERSONALLY RELEASED THIS MESSAGE ON THE 21ST TO  
COMUSMACV, WITH NO INFO ADDEES. I ALSO TRANSMITTED THIS  
MESSAGE SEPARATELY TO YOU BY OUR 210742Z NOV 68 (EXCLUSIVE-  
MCEO), AND YOU CAN NOTE IN THE QUOTE OF THIS MESSAGE TO YOU  
THAT THERE WERE NO INFO ADDEES ON THE MESSAGE ORIGINALLY  
DESPATCHED TO COMUSMACV. WHEN YOU INDICATED THAT THE SAME  
MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED AGAIN BY YOU, WITH ALL THESE ADDITIONAL  
INFO ADDEES, YOU DIDN'T MENTION THAT IT WAS A READDRESSAL,  
AND, OF COURSE, THAT CONFUSED ME, SINCE I KNEW THAT WHEN I  
ORIGINALLY RELEASED THE MESSAGE, THERE WERE NO INFO ADDEES.  
ACTUALLY, THE MESSAGE THAT YOU SPOKE TO ME ABOUT WAS OUR  
230502Z NOV 68, WHICH READDRESSED OUR 210740Z NOV 68. I DID

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 3180 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO  
NOT SEE THIS READDRESSAL PRIOR TO RELEASE. IT WAS PREPARED  
FOR RELEASE BY LIAUTENANT COLONEL CROWLEY, OUR FORCE  
STRUCTURE MAN IN THE G-3 SECTION, AT THE REQUEST OF COLONEL  
MCCRIEIGHT, THE ACTION OFFICER FOR OUR FORCE STRUCTURE IN  
THE FORCE REQUIREMENTS DIVISION, MACV. COLONEL MCCRIEIGHT  
INDICATED TO LT COL CROWLEY THAT OUR 210740Z WAS RECEIVED  
BADLY GARBLED AT MACV AND, IN THE INTEREST OF SAVING  
TIME, REQUESTED LT COL CROWLEY TO SEND IT DIRECTLY TO THE  
ADDRESSEES LISTED IN OUR 230502Z. THIS MESSAGE WAS  
RELEASED BY THE ACTING G-3, COL DALBY. HAD OUR ACTION  
OFFICER INDICATED IN OUR 230502Z THAT HE HAD BEEN REQUESTED  
BY MACV TO FORWARD THIS MESSAGE ON TO THE LISTED ADDEES,  
I'M SURE IT MIGHT HAVE HELPED TO EXPLAIN THINGS BACK AT  
YOUR HEADQUARTERS.

2. ALL THE INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED WITH THIS MATTER HAVE  
BEEN PROPERLY INSTRUCTED AS TO HOW TO HANDLE MATTERS  
LIKE THIS IN THE FUTURE.  
3. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#?

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 25 NOV 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 251336Z NOV 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS
4	DCG		11/28		RLH	
1	DCG AIR					ORIG - G-3
2	C/S	I			Q	REL - C/S
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	11/26		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE  
FOR  
HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET #9



**SECRET**

O 251336Z NOV 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
BT

SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE  
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM L GEN CUSHMAN  
OPN MEADE RIVER (L)

1. (S) THE COMBINED USMC, ROKMC, ARVN, RF/PF, CORDS SPECIAL PACIFICATION OFFENSIVE OPN MEADE RIVER CONTINUES WITH INCREASING EVIDENCE OF HIGHLY REWARDING RESULTS.
2. (S) FOLLOWING THE PLANNED PATTERN OF OPN MEADE RIVER, BLT 2/7 IS ADVANCING FROM THE WEST TO TIGHTEN THE CORDON AT POSITIONS ALONG THE RAILROAD TRACK, MOVING DELIBERATELY AND UTILIZING STEEL PROBES WITH WHICH ALL INFANTRY ELEMENTS IN THE OPN ARE EQUIPPED, BLT 2/7 CONTINUES TO SEARCH EVERY INCH OF GROUND COVERED. ALL MEANS AVAILABLE ARE BEING EMPLOYED TO INSURE THAT NO HIDING PLACE OR CACHE IS OVER LOOKED.
3. (S) THE PRESENCE OF SIGNIFICANT NVA/VC ELEMENTS TRAPPED WITHIN THE CORDON IS ATTESTED TO BY THE DETERMINED RESISTANCE ENCOUNTERED BY BLT 2/7 IN THEIR ADVANCE TO THE RAILROAD TRACKS. AS THE CORDON CONTINUES TO TIGHTEN THIS RESISTANCE CAN BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE, PROBES HAVE BEEN

PAGE TWO RUSVDB 3481 SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE

REPLUSED IN MANY AREA AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE CORDON HAS BEEN MAINTAINED BY DETERMINED AND HIGHLY DISCIPLINED FORCES.

4. (S) THE JOINT INTERROGATION CENTER IS OPERATING CONTINUOUSLY. TO DATE 2086 CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN RELOCATED. 867 PERSONS HAVE BEEN PROCESSED RESULTING IN THE SEGRATION OF 29 VCI AND 2 CIVILIAN DEPENDENTS. JOINT CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES ARE UNDERWAY IN A WELL INTERGRATED SERIES OF PRO-

GRAMS AMONG THE CIVILIANS IN THE LARGER TENT CITY RELOCATION CENTER.

5. (S) AS OF 251800H NOV 68 46 VC AND 120 NVA HAVE BEEN KILLED AND 1 NVA PW AND 29 VC PW CAPTURED. THE NFFF HAS COMPLETED EXTRACTION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULACE. THE ARVN CONTINUE TO SEARCH THE HAMLETS. USMC ELEMENTS STAND READY TO BEGIN THE SQUEEZE OF THE CORDON AND THE ULTIMATE ASSUALT TO ELIMINATE THE FINAL VESTIGES OF VC/NVA ACTIVITY IN THE DODGE CITY AREA.
6. (S) IN SUMMARY I AM OF THE OPINION THAT OPN MEADE RIVER IS PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY AND HAS ALREADY PROVED ITS IMPORTANCE AS WELL AS PROVIDING INCREASING INDICATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT FINAL RESULTS.

GP-4  
BT

**SECRET**

#9





**SECRET**

PP RUMKM  
 DE RHMMAFA 3182 1301539  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 251338Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 BT

S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION (U)  
 A. CG FMFPAC 182021Z NOV 68 (S)  
 B. CG III MAF 131446Z NOV 68 (U)  
 1. (U) REF A AND B REFER.  
 2. (S) BASED ON REVIEW CONDUCTED IAW PARA 3A OF REF A, THE PRESENT EXPENDITURE RATE OF 58.5 RDS/TUBE/DAY (RTD) FOR 105MM HE AND 28.0 R/T/D FOR 155MM HOWITZER HE WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS AT CURRENT AND ANTICIPATED FUTURE LEVELS. PRESENT EXPENDITURE RATE IS ADEQUATE BASED ON FOLLOWING RATIONALE:  
 A. THE PRESENT ALLOWANCE HAS PROVEN TO BE ADQUATE BASED ON ACTUAL EXPERIENCE OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS WITH THE LEVEL OF OPERATIONS REMAINING FAIRLY CONSTANT.  
 B. RECENT DECREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY DOES NOT NECESSARILY PERMIT A CORRESPONDING DECREASE IN AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE RATES. SUPPORTING PATROLS, FIRING ACQUIRED TARGETS, INTERDICTION FIRES,

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 3182 S E C R E T MCEO  
 AND COUNTER MORTAR/ROCKET FIRE REMAIN VALID REQUIREMENTS.

C. PROJECTED OPERATIONS REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY THE SAME ASR AS PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED.

3. (S) IN RESPONSE TO PARA 3C OF REF (A), THIS HQ CONSIDERS IT FEASIBLE TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF ARTILLERY WEAPONS WITHOUT A COMMENSURATE INCREASE IN AMMUNITION SUPPORT. THIS IS PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT, UNDER THE RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, ADDITIONAL ARVN ARTILLERY UNITS WILL BE POSITIONED WITHIN ICITZ TO SUPPORT ARVN UNITS. SUCH AN INCREASE IN ARVN ASSETS WOULD ALLOW MARINE CORPS UNITS TO REMAIN ON THE SAME OR PERHAPS SLIGHTLY LOWER LEVEL OF EXPENDITURES BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ARVN UNITS WILL NOT DRAW FROM MARINE CORPS AMMUNITION ASSETS.

4. (S) AS DIRECTED BY PARA 3.E OF REF (A), A PERIODIC REVIEW OF 105MM AND 155MM HOWITZER HE MUNITION REQUIREMENTS WILL BE CONDUCTED AND WILL ADVISE ANY NECESSARY REVISIONS.

GP-4  
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**SECRET**  
+10

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

J1MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 28 NOV 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 281440Z NOV 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ORIG - G-3
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					REL - C/S
2	C/S	I			Q	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/29		H	MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  HAS BEEN SENT
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #14



**SECRET**

PP RUEBHOA RUMKN RUMLNHA  
 DE RHMMAFA 3596 333144Z  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 261440Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC  
 INFO RUMKN/CG FMFPAC  
 RUMLNHA/CG FIRST MAW  
 BT

**S E C R E T** MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

THIS IS A DUEL BLADE MESSAGE

SENSOR PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS (U)

- A. CG FMFPAC 232049Z NOV 68 (S)
- B. CG 1ST MAW 221517Z NOV 68 (S) NOTAL
- C. CMC 181441Z OCT 68 (S)
- D. ADMENO, FMFPAC 250134Z OCT 68 (S)
- E. CMC 161649Z NOV 68 (S)
- F. CMC 181850Z NOV 68 (S)
- G. CMC 201859Z NOV 68 (S)

- 1. (S) REF A REQUESTS REEVALUATION OF REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN REF B TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE RATIONALE AND PARAMETERS DEVELOPED IN REFS C THROUGH G.
- 2. (S) THE RATIONALE OF REF C IS CONCURRED IN WITH REGARD TO

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 3596 **S E C R E T** MCEO

PRESENT NON-AVAILABILITY OF PROVEN LORAN TYPE NAVIGATION EQUIP AND PREFERENCE FOR A SYSTEM INDEPENDENT OF GROUND STATIONS. SCNS EQUIPPED CH-46 MAY PROVIDE ACCEPTABLE PRECISION FOR SENSOR SEEDING IN A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT WHEN COUPLED WITH PHOTO INTERPRETATION TO PLOT EXACT LOCATIONS. A REQUIREMENT STILL EXISTS FOR TACTICAL JET NAVIGATION EQUIP BUT MAY NOT BE CRITICAL TO SUCCESS OF FORESEEABLE SENSOR SEEDING EFFORTS IF THE A-G RAB/FAC BEACON MEETS EXPECTATIONS AFTER NAVAIRSYS COM CLEARANCE FOR SENSOR DELIVERY.

- 3. (S) A-4/F-4 PARTICIPATION IS NOT FORSEEN IN THE NEAR FUTURE LACKING PRECISION NAVIGATION CAPABILITY THEREFORE THIS POINT ADDRESSED IN REF F IS NON-CRITICAL TO III MAF CURRENT PLANNING.
- 4. (S) STRONG ARM DELIVERY OF SENSORS FROM HELICOPTERS WITH PHOTO VERIFICATION OF LOCATION WAS DEMONSTRATED DURING PHASE I OF OPERATION DUCK BLIND WITH ENCOURAGING BUT INCONCLUSIVE RESULTS. PILOT INITIATED BOMB RACK DELIVERY IS THOUGHT TO BE INHERENTLY MORE PRECISE AND SHOULD BE EXPLORED. REF F SUGGESTS THAT THE UH-1/AH-1 HTW RACK MAY FILL THIS NEED AND THIS IS ACKNOWLEDGED. HOWEVER THE EXISTING IMBALANCE OF UH-1/AH-1 REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES DOES NOT ENCOURAGE PLANNING NEW OR ADDITIONAL MISSIONS

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

**SECRET**

#14

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA 3596 S E C R E T MCEO  
 FOR THIS TYPE ACFT, INITIAL EFFORTS WILL MORE THAN LIKELY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY CH-46 UNLESS HML/VMO RESOURCES ARE INCREASED.  
 5. (S) OV-10A MAY BE BEST AVAILABLE SYSTEM FOR DELIVERY IN SEMI-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT. THIS AIRCRAFT ROUTINELY FLYS VISUAL RECON FLIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE AREA OF OPERATIONS AND THEREFORE WOULD ATTRACT LITTLE ATTENTION IN A QUASI-COVERT SENSOR SEEDING ROLE. PILOT AND AO CAN PLAN AND REHERSE ACTUAL SEEDING MISSION DURING THE COURSE OF ROUTING VR FLIGHTS. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION MUST INCLUDE RADAR ALTIMETER FOR POSITIVE HEIGHT ABOVE THE GROUND INFO AND SHOULD INCLUDE CAMERA INSTALLATION FOR PHOTO VERIFICATION OF SENSOR IMPACT SPOT.

A. STRONGLY RECOMMEND AN IMMEDIATE PRIORITY EVALUATION OF OV-10 IN THIS ROLE AND DETERMINATION OF BALLISTIC VALUES AND DELIVERY TECHNIQUES.

6. (S) FMAW REQUIREMENTS STATED IN REF B ARE FOR ANTICIPATED SUPPORT OF USMC UNITS ONLY AND REMAIN UNCHANGED.

7. (S) CRITICAL SHORTAGE OF KEY STAFF OFFICERS WITH SENSOR EMPLOYMENT, DELIVERY, AND READOUT ORIENTATION TRAINING TOGETHER WITH LACK OF CLEARLY DEFINED MARINE CORPS OBJECTIVES, POLICY, AND RESOURCES, PRESENTS PLANNING PROBLEMS.

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA 3596 S E C R E T MCEO  
 ORIENTATION TRAINING FOR SELECTED OFFICERS AT ALL ECHELONS OF PLANNING COUPLED WITH A CONFERENCE OF PARTICIPANTS FROM ALL LEVELS, DIVISION/WING TO CMC, IS ESSENTIAL TO MEANINGFUL PLANNING AND ON TRACK PROGRESS IN THIS NEW AND PROMISING FIELD.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

#14

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	290048Z NOV 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD
	290048Z	1, 2, 3 /

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	SUBJECT
	CG					REMARKS
3	DCG			11/29	Emel	
	DCG AIR					291200H - GEN ABRAMS REC RECEIPT.
2	C/S	I			Q	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/29		12	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #15

P 290048Z ZFFI  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV

SECRET

ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
LGEN CUSHMAN SENDS FOR GEN ABRAMS  
SOUTHERN ICTZ WINTER CAMPAIGN (U)

- A. YR 16032 DTG 20091Z NOV 68
- B. MY 211322Z OCT 68
- C. MY 23140Z NOV 68
- D. MY 170712Z NOV 68

1. (S) THIS RESPONDS TO REF A WHICH REQUESTS MY COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING AN ACCELERATED SOUTHERN ICTZ WINTER CAMPAIGN AGAINST BASE AREA 112 AND THE 2ND AND 3RD NVA DIVISIONS. AT THE OUTSET LET ME SAY I CONCUR IN THE APPROACH YOU SUGGEST. IN ACTUALITY IT REPRESENTS AN ACCELERATION OF WHAT WE ARE NOW DOING. THE FOLLOWING REMARKS COVER MY VIEWS ON SOME OF THE MORE DETAILED ASPECTS OF SUCH A CAMPAIGN AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON CERTAIN MINOR CHANGES TO THE MISSION.

A. (S) COMMENTS

(1) MISSION AS RELATED TO CURRENT OPERATIONS. THE MISSION, AS I VIEW IT, AMOUNTS TO A CAMPAIGN OF SEVERAL MONTHS DURATION. IT IS NOT AN ENTIRELY NEW MISSION TO III MAF, HOWEVER, SINCE WE HAVE BEEN IN ACTION AGAINST 2D AND 3D NVA DIVISIONS FOR SOME TIME NOW, AND AS REFLECTED IN REF B, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN BA 112 BY NOW BUT FOR THE APPEARANCE OF A LUCRATIVE TARGET NEAR DIEN BAN WHICH PROMISED NOT ONLY TO HURT THE NVA, BUT TO BOOST THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM IN QUANG NAM. WE THEREFORE PUT ASIDE TEMPORARILY THE BA 112 OPERATION IN ORDER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SITUATION AT DIEN BAN. WHEN THAT HAS BEEN DONE, PROBABLY IN EARLY DECEMBER, WE WILL PICK UP THE BA 112 OPERATION WHERE WE LEFT OFF. IN THE SOUTH, AMERICAL DIVISION HAS BEEN IN OPERATIONS AIMED PRIMARILY AT THE DESTRUCTION OF 3D NVA DIVISION, SLOWED TEMPORARILY NOW BECAUSE OF WEATHER.

(2) WEATHER AND TERRAIN.

(A) THE UPCOMING SEASONAL WEATHER PICTURE INDICATES THAT SEVERE RESTRICTIONS ON TACTICAL FREEDOM AND COURSES OF ACTION WILL OBTAIN DURING DEC, IN SICTZ, FOG INCREASES AND PERSISTS ALONG THE NUMEROUS STEEPWALLED VALLEYS. MEAN CLOUD COVERAGE IS 92 PER CENT. RAINFALL VARIES FROM 10-20 INCHES, BECOMING HEAVIER IN THE MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS. THIS WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INHIBIT TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN AND NEAR BA 112 WHERE CLOUD CEILINGS PREVAIL AT 2000 FT AND LOWER, ENVELOPING THE 3000 FT RIDGELINES.

Page

ACCORDINGLY, COMBAT ASSAULTS, OBSERVATION, AIR SUPPORT AND HELO RESUPPLY WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT AND SOMETIMES PROHIBITED. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, WHEN THESE MONSOON EFFECTS HAD NOT FULLY MATERIALIZED, 62 SEPARATE RECON PATROLS OF 1ST MARDIV COULD NOT BE INSERTED IN THE HIGHLANDS WEST OF DANANG BECAUSE OF LOW CLOUDS AND REDUCED VISIBILITY. TO PARTIALLY OFFSET THE EFFECT OF THE WEATHER WE WILL TAKE MEASURES SUCH AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FORWARD SUPPLY POINTS, UPGRADING AND EXPANDING EXISTING FACILITIES AT AN HOA; PRESTAGING SUPPLIES DURING BREAKS IN WEATHER, KEEPING A NUMBER OF HELOS AT FORWARD POINTS, ETC. IN SHORT, WE WILL TAKE EVERY STEP WE CAN TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF THE WEATHER, BUT WE RECOGNIZE THAT OFTEN WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MOVE AS RAPIDLY AS WE WOULD LIKE.

(3) THE SOUTHERN ICTZ WINTER CAMPAIGN WILL HAVE A BEARING ON THE CONTINUING MISSIONS OF DEFENSE OF POPULATED AREAS AND THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION OFFENSIVE.

(A) CITIES. TO EMBARK ON MULTIBATTALION OPERATIONS TO THE WEST OBVIOUSLY MEANS OUR TROOP DENSITY IN THE EAST WILL BE CONSIDERABLY THINNED. AS A RESULT, THE CITIES WILL BE MORE VULNERABLE DURING THIS PERIOD.

(B) APC. FOR THE REASON MENTIONED ABOVE, FEWER US AND ARVN OPERATIONS CAN BE CONDUCTED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE APC DURING THIS CAMPAIGN. THE SLF WILL BE EMPLOYED TO BUOY THIS CAMPAIGN, AS OUTLINED IN REF D.

(4) ADDITIONAL SUPPORT. YOUR OFFER OF ADDITIONAL SUPPORT IN WAY OF THE TAC AIR AND ARC LIGHTS IS PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. I INTEND TO RELY HEAVILY ON THIS SUPPORT TO COMENSATE IN PART FOR THE LACK OF ADDITIONAL FORCES WHICH WOULD NORMALLY BE REQUIRED FOR A MISSION OF THIS MAGNITUDE. WE WILL ALSO REQUEST MAXIMUM SOG SUPPORT TO ASSIST IN THE LATER SCREENING MISSION.

GP-4  
900

#15(2)  
SECRET

P 290048Z ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

LOEN CUSHMAN SENDS FOR GEN ABRAMS

SOUTHERN ICTZ WINTER CAMPAIGN (U)

A. YR 16032 DTG 290910Z NOV 68

B. MY 211322Z OCT 68

C. MY 231400Z NOV 68

D. MY 170712Z NOV 68

(5) A COMBAT TRAP WEAPONS. ALLOCATION OF COMBAT TRAP RESOURCES AS REQUESTED IN REF C WILL GREATLY CONTRIBUTE TO OUR ABILITY TO ESTABLISH FIRE BASES IN THE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS. I FURTHER RECOGNIZE THAT WHEN R&D ITEMS ARE INVOLVED, THERE ARE FREQUENTLY DELAYS. I BELIEVE THESE ITEMS ARE IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY ADDITIONAL EFFORT TO PREVENT SUCH DELAYS.

2. (S) MISSION STATEMENT.

A. I BELIEVE THE INTENT OF YOUR PROPOSED MISSION TO III MAF IS CLEAR, BUT TO BE DOUBLY CERTAIN, THIS IS HOW I INTERPRET SOME OF THE WORDING:

(1) "CURRENTLY ASSIGNED FORCES". I BELIEVE THIS MEANS MANEUVER BATTALIONS, ARTILLERY AND HELICOPTER SUPPORT, BUT DOES NOT RULE OUT ADDITIONAL TAC AIR, SOG, PROJECT DELTA, ETC.

(2) "INITIATE OPERATIONS." I BELIEVE WHAT IS INTENDED IS FOR GROUND OPERATIONS TO PENETRATE BA 112, SINCE OTHER OPERATIONS IN LINE WITH REF A ARE ALREADY IN PROGRESS.

(3) "ELIMINATE BASE AREA 112." I BELIEVE WHAT IS INTENDED IS TO CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, SUPPLIES AND FACILITIES AND RENDER THE PRESENT FACILITIES UNUSABLE, IN SHORT, NEUTRALIZE BA 112.

(4) "DESTROY 2D AND 3D NVA DIVISION". I INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN TO DESTROY ALL HIS MAJOR UNITS IN ICTZ OR SO FRACTURE THEM THAT THE DIVISIONS AS SUCH ARE NO LONGER COMBAT EFFECTIVE ENTITIES.

SECRET

(5) "PREVENT ENEMY ESCAPE INTO LAOS." TO ACCOMPLISH THIS EN TOTO WOULD REQUIRE MANY MORE FORCES THAN WE POSSESS. I INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN TO PREVENT HIS MAJOR UNITS FROM WITHDRAWING INTO LAOS.

(6) "ESTABLISH A RECON SCREEN ALONG THE LAOTIAN/VN BORDER IN SOUTHERN I CORPS." THIS TOO, IS TOO GREAT A TASK FOR THE FORCES AVAILABLE. I INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN TO PLACE RECON/SURVEILLANCE OVER MAJOR ROUTES OF APPROACH FROM LAOS TO WARN OF REINFORCEMENT OR CONTINUED INFILTRATION INTO SVN.

B. RECOMMENDATION. THAT MISSION PARAGRAPH READ AS FOLLOWS:

"CG III MAF, USING CURRENTLY ASSIGNED MANEUVER FORCES COMMENCES GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, BUT NOT LATER THAN 15 DEC 68 TO NEUTRALIZE BASE AREA 112 AND DESTROY ELEMENTS OF 2D AND 3D NVA DIVISION IN ZONE; PREVENT MAJOR ENEMY UNITS FROM ESCAPING INTO LAOS, AND ESTABLISH RECON AND SURVEILLANCE ALONG MAJOR ROUTES OF APPROACH TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENT/RESUPPLY OF EN FORCES."

3. (S) IN THE INTEREST OF GETTING ON WITH THIS OPERATION, WE ARE GOING AHEAD WITH PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AN ACCELERATED CAMPAIGN IN ADVANCE OF FINAL APPROVAL. THIS WILL BE IN A FRAG ORDER TO BE ISSUED SHORTLY.

GP-4

900

#15(4)

NNNN

SECRET





**SECRET****EXCLUSIVE  
FOR****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

00 RUMKM  
DE RHMAF 3663 3340720  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 200720Z NOV 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CMC  
CG FMFPAC  
BT

**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LT GEN BUSE FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN  
FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

REF: A. CMC 280231Z NOV 68  
B. COMNAVFORV 230642Z NOV 68 (NOTAL)  
C. COMUSMACV 260948Z NOV 68

1. IN ICTZ THE CURRENT METHOD OF SLF/ARG OPERATION IS REPEATED AND FREQUENT LANDINGS IN SUPPORT OF THE APC (ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN). THERE WAS AN INTERRUPTION CAUSED BY SOME SHIPS BEING USED TO MOVE THE 1ST CAV DIV (AM) AND SOME SHIPS GOING TO SUBIC FOR UPKEEP, BUT WE ARE BACK IN THE GAME AGAIN NOW.
2. I HAVE SIX (6) ENEMY REGIMENTS IN DANANG AREA ALONE AND ABOUT SEVEN (7) ENEMY DIV EQUIVALENTS IN I CORPS, AS YOU KNOW. ON THE OTHER HAND, PHU QUOC ISLAND HAS 250-300

PAGE TWO RHMAF 3663 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)  
VC ON IT, BUT ALSO HAS 3,000 FRIENDLY FORCES (RF/PF). IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT WE ARE BACK IN THE AMPHIBIOUS ROLE AGAIN, I SIMPLY CANNOT SEE ANY RATIONALE FOR TAKING A SORELY NEEDED SLF/ARG FROM THIS AREA TO MOVE AGAINST THE PIDDLING TARGET OF PHU QUOC REQUESTED BY REF B, <sup>AND</sup> SO RECOMMENDED TO COMUSMACV. BY REF C COMUSMACV CONCURRED IN THE REQUIREMENT FOR BOTH ARG'S/SLF'S IN ICTZ FOR PRESENT AND NEAR FUTURE.

3. WHAT HAS REALLY HAPPENED IS AN ATTACK OF "KELLY TURNERITIS", PRINCIPAL SYMPTOM OF WHICH IS A BURNING DESIRE TO PLAY FIELD MARSHAL.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT

**SECRET**

#16

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

J1MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	29 NOV 68
	SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE	COPY# / OF / COPIES RECD
	290820Z NOV 68	1 / 3

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS  REMARKS ORIG - G-3 REL - C/S
4	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/30			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE  
FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

27

SECRET



**SECRET**

O 290820Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV SGN  
 BT

**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
 OPN MEADE RIVER (U)

1. (S) OPN MEADE RIVER WITH COMBINED USMC, ROKMC, ARVN, RF/PF, AND CORDS PARTICIPATION AS AN OFFENSIVE IN THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN IS ADVANCING THROUGH ITS THIRD PHASE.
2. (S) BLT 2/7 HAS COMPLETED ITS MOVE TO THE RAILROAD TRACK WHERE IT NOW HOLDS THE WESTERN FLANK OF THE CORDON. BLT 2/26 AND 2ND BN 5TH MARINES ARE PRESENTLY ADVANCING FROM THE EAST TO SQUEEZE THE CORDON TO THE SUOI CO CA. MOVING WITH THE SAME DELIBERATION WHICH CHARACTERIZED BLT 2/7 IN THEIR SUCCESSFUL ADVANCE, 2/26 AND 2/5 ARE PROBING AND SEARCHING POSSIBLE HIDING PLACES.
3. (S) THE JOINT INTERROGATION CENTER CONTINUES ITS EXTENSIVE AROUND THE CLOCK OPERATION. TO DATE 2636 CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN RELOCATED. 1369 PERSONS HAVE BEEN PROCESSED RESULTING IN THE SEGREGATION OF 54 VCI. JOINT CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES CONTINUE IN THE RELOCATION CENTER.
4. (S) AS OF 282400H NOV 68 MARINE FORCES HAVE ACCOUNTED

PAGE TWO RUSVDB 3688 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 FOR 71 VC ABD 169 NVA KIA, 43 VC AND 2 NVA HAVE BEEN CAPTURED  
 IN ADDITION TO 16 IWC AND 4 CSWC. ROKMC UNITS HAVE REPORTED  
 2 VC KIA AND 2 IWC. ARVN FORCES WORKING WITHIN THE CORDON  
 HAVE TO DATE KILLED 14 VC AND 20 NVA AND CAPTURED 6 IWC.

5. (S) IN SUMMARY THE CASUALTIES WE HAVE ALREADY INFLICTED  
 AS WELL AS INDICATIONS AS TO EVENTUAL RESULTS SHOW THAT  
 OPN MEADE RIVER WILL SURPASS PREVIOUS EXPECTATIONS AND  
 PROVE TO BE A HEAVY BLOW TO ENEMY FORCES.

GP-4  
 BT

**SECRET**

#17



HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 29 NOV 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 290830Z NOV 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
4	DCG		11/30		RMS	REMARKS
	DCG AIR					ORIG - G-3
2	C/S	I				REL - C/S
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/30		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE  
FOR  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
HAS BEEN SENT

29-42

SECRET



**SECRET**

OO RUHKM  
 DE RHMAFA 3689 3340832  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 290830Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC HAW

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 FOR LT GEN BUSE FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN  
 DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS  
 III MAF PROGRAM SIX FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

A. CG III MAF 290656Z NOV 68

B. CG FMFPAC 272136Z NOV 68

1. (S) REF A RESPONDS TO REF B WHICH POINTS OUT THAT EARLY SUBMISSION OF ACTIONS NR 2 AND 3 IS DESIRABLE.
2. (S) ACTION 2, WHICH RELATES TO III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE REQUEST 2-68 IS INITIATED IN REF A. ACTION 3, HOWEVER, REQUIRES APPROVAL BEFORE ACTUAL TROOP MOVEMENT CAN BEGIN. THAT APPROVAL IS REQUESTED IN REF A.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

#19





**CONFIDENTIAL**

PP RUHKM RUMLMHA  
 DE RHMMFAFA 3692 3340930  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P R 290928Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAN  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 FOR L GEN BUSE, INFO MGEN QUILTER FROM L GEN CUSHMAN  
 REASON OF OFF, CASE OF LT. COL. (COL SEL) N.C. NEW 049308/7501

- A. CG FMFPAC 042216Z NOV 68
- B. CG FMFPAC 061939Z NOV 68
- C. CMC 020041Z NOV 68

1. (C) REFS A AND B REFER. THE DEACTIVATION OF PROV MAG 39 IS STILL SOME TIME AWAY. IN THE MEANTIME, CHICK QUILTER HAS PROPOSED THAT THE SNO BE ASSIGNED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF MAG TWELVE.

2. (U) IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE SNO HAS NOT BEEN IN A TACTICAL AVIATION ASSIGNMENT SINCE 1955, I FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE OFFICER AND THE MARINE CORPS TO ALLOW HIM TO REMAIN IN THE WING, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF REF C WHICH INDICATED THAT LT COL NEW SHOULD SPEND AT LEAST SIX MONTHS OF HIS TOUR IN AN AVIATION ASSIGNMENT.

PAGE TWO RHMMFAFA 3692 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 3. (U) ACCORDINGLY, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE REASON DIRECTED BY REFS A AND B BE CANCELLED.

WARM REGARDS  
 CP-4  
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#20



HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 30 NOV 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 301338Z NOV 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I				EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
4	DCG	I	12/1		Rues	REMARKS
	DCG AIR					ORIG - G-3
2	C/S	I			Q	REL -> C/S
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	12/1		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE  
FOR  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET



**SECRET**

PP RUHKM RUEBHOA  
 DE RHMMAFA 3859 3351545  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 301338Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC  
 INFO RUEBHOA/CNC  
 ZEN/CG FMFPAC (FWD)  
 ZEN/CG NINTH MAB  
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 FOR LT GEN BUSE, INFO GEN CHAPMAN, BGEN WEBSTER, AND BGEN WILLIAMS  
 FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
 III MAF PROGRAM SIX FORCE STRUCTURE (U)  
 A. CG FMFPAC 252202Z NOV 68 SPECAT  
 B. CG III MAF 131000Z OCT 68  
 1. (U) THIS MESSAGE IS IN REPLY TO REF A.  
 FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS RESPOND TO YOUR REQUEST IN  
 PARA 4A OF REF A. RESPONSE TO PARA 4B OF REF B FOLLOWS  
 BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.  
 2. (S) RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE REALIGNMENT  
 PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN REF (B) ARE PROVIDED AS  
 FOLLOWS:

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 3859 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

IDENTITY OF FRN	III MAF UNIT	REALIGNED PROG SIX AUTH STR	RECOM- MENDED CHANGE	NEW PROG SIX AUTH STR
K002 T00	AT BN	0	INCR 381	381
K002 V00	RECON BN	582	INCR 148	730
K003 T00	AT BN	0	INCR 381	381
K003 V00	RECON BN	582	INCR 148	730
K015 00	COMM BN	586	INCR 159	745
	(FMF)			
K016 A00	TK BN	549	INCR 127	676
K017 A00	TK BN	549	INCR 127	676
K019 00	AMTRAC BN	0	INCR 713	713
K026 00	HQ BTRY	0	INCR 144	144
	FAG			
K026 B00	CM RADAR	47	INCR 78	125
	PLI			
K027 00	ARMED	42	INCR 203	245
	AMPHIB CO			
K033 00	FOR LOG	6344	DECR6344	0
	CMD			

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

**SECRET**  
#23

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE	RHMMAFA 3859	S E C R E T	SPECAT	EXCLUSIVE	MCEO
NONE	FSR (-NOP)	0	INCR	4125	4125
NONE	SVC BN,	0	INCR	1089	1089
	MAR DIV				
NONE	SVC BN,	0	INCR	1089	1089
	MAR DIV				
K049 00	ICTZ ADV	129	DECR	129	0
	SECURITY				
K052 B00	AIR SPT	0	INCR	23	23
	RADAR TM				
K055 00	MWSG	605	INCR	221	826
K105 00	MATCU	0	INCR	68	68
K200 00	9 MAB	6423	DECR	6423	0
	INSVN				
NONE	HQ CO	0	INCR	218	218
	INF REGT				
NONE	INF BN	0	INCR	1193	1193
NONE	INF BN	0	INCR	1193	1193
NONE	INF BN	0	INCR	1193	1193
NONE	D/S ARTY	0	INCR	803	803
	BN REIN				

PAGE FOUR	RHMMAFA 3859	S E C R E T	SPECAT	EXCLUSIVE	MCEO
NONE	DETS, SEP BNS	0	INCR	528	528
	MARDIV				
NONE	DETS, FORTIRPS	0	INCR	543	543
NONE	HMM/CH-46	0	INCR	270	270
NONE	HMM/CH-46	0	INCR	270	270
M01200	VMA SQDN	0	INCR	260	260

3. (S) IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THE NEW PROGRAM 6 AUTHORIZED STRENGTH FOR THE TWO RECON BNS IS CONSIDERABLY IN EXCESS OF I/O STRENGTH FOR THOSE UNITS. THIS RESULTS FROM AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT AND PROJECTED RVN TACTICAL MILIEU WITH ITS CONTINUING DEMANDS FOR EXTENSIVE RECON.

4. (S) THE CAP HAS BEEN RETAINED WITHOUT CHANGE IN THE NEW PROGRAM 6 AUTHORIZED STRENGTH IN RECOGNITION OF ITS CONTINUING VALUE TO III MAF OPERATIONS AND ITS UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TO THE PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN.

GP-4  
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**SECRET**  
#23

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 30 NOV 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 301422Z NOV 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS  ORIG - G-3  REL - G-3  <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">FOR</div>  HAS BEEN SENT
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	F				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	12/1		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #24

**SECRET**

FTI SZ YUW RHMAFA3857 3351422-SSSS--RUYPEL S RUYPESAA.  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 301422Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF DNG  
 TO RUYPEL S/CTG SEVEN ZERO FT EIGHT  
 INFO RUYPSAA/USS L F MASON  
 BT

S E C R E T

SNOOPY EMPLOYMENT (U)  
 FOR RADM BAGLEY FROM GROVES

1. (S) L. F. MASON SKED SUPPORT AMERICAL DIVISION AT FT ELKE 1-2 DEC VIC BATANGAN PENINSULA. LCDR CAMPELL, III MAF NGL0, WILL CALL NGL0 AMERICAL DIV EARLY TOMORROW AND RECOMMEND USE OF SNOOPY IN THE ABOVE AREA. HE WILL RECOMMEND THAT NGL0 VISIT MASON TO COORDINATE OPERATIONS.
2. (S) LCDR ADAMS AT III MARDIV ANXIOUS TO USE SNOOPY IN SURVEILLANCE ROLE SOUTH OF BEN HAI RIVER. AO'S CONDUCTING RECCE IN THIS AREA NOW. FORSEE NO PROBLEM WITH CLEARANCE. HE ALSO INDICATED THEY COULD KEEP MASON FULLY OCCUPIED 3-10 DEC IF MADE AVAILABLE.
3. (C) HAVE ARRANGED FOR LCDR CAMPELL TO VISIT CANBERRA 1 DEC AND DISCUSS SHIP SCHEDULING PROBLEMS AND IMPACT OF KEEPING SNOOPY SHIP IN NORTHERN I CORPS CONTINUALLY. WILL ATTEMPT TO HAVE SOMEONE

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 3857 S E C R E T

FROM G-6 ACCOMPANY LCDR CAMPBELL TO DISCUSS MEANS OF OBTAINING  
 SECURE VOICE WITH DANANG AREA.

4. (C) IN VIEW ABOVE RECOMMEND HOLDING SNOOPY MSG TO MACV UNTIL YOU HAVE TALKED WITH LCDR CAMPBELL.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**  
#24

- ~~29 35. CG III MAF 291312Z OCT68 (C)  
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS INFO STILWELL  
IN COMPLETE ACCORD WITH BELIEF OF COMMANDER FOR MISUSE OF  
HELICOPTERS (DEER HUNTING)~~
- ~~30 36. CG III MAF 300324Z OCT68 (C)  
ACROSS FOR COLBY  
LUNCH~~
- ~~31 37. CG III MAF 300858Z OCT68 (U)  
ANDERSON TO ~~EMMY~~ SHOOK  
PLANS FOR ARRIVING RVN AND ANDERSON'S LEAVE PLANS~~
- 32 38. CG III MAF 010410Z NOV68 (S) *Group-4*  
CUSHMAN TO YOUNGDALE, QUILTER, AND FEELEY  
PASSE GEN ABRAMS 010211Z NOV68 - PUBLIC RELATIONS GUIDANCE ON  
CESSATION
- ~~33 39. CG III MAF 010754Z NOV68 (U)  
INFORMS CMC OF GEN CARNEY'S ARRIVAL~~
- 34 40. CG III MAF 010925Z <sup>NOV</sup>~~OCT~~68 (S) *gp-4*  
ANDERSON TO CORCORAN AND SCHWEITER  
DEFINITE TRACE OF SOUTHERN DMZ AND PMDL - RESTRICTIONS ON  
ATTACKING INTO OR ACROSS THE DMZ
- ~~35 41. CG III MAF 040826Z NOV68 (C MCEO)  
TOMPKINS TO WHEELER  
MOVE TO CAMP LENTINE~~
- ~~35 A~~  
36 42. CG III MAF 040946Z NOV68 (C MCEO) *gp-4* ~~CG III MAF 040834Z NOV68 (C CEO)~~  
LCOL BAKER TO BGEN AXTELL info CG III MAF  
M151A1 Truck allocation
- ~~36 A~~  
37 43. CG III MAF 071628Z NOV68 (U) ~~gp-4~~ ~~CG III MAF 061304Z NOV68 (S-MCEO)~~  
CUSHMAN TO BUSE  
TRANSIENT FACILITY AND R&R PROCESSING CENTER
- 38 44. CG III MAF 090940Z NOV68 (SMCEO) *gp-4*  
LOCATION OF AVN UNITS
- 39 45. CG III MAF 100326Z NOV68 (SMCEO) *Group-4*  
FO/BUSE INFO QUILTER FR/CUSHMAN  
SINGLE MANAGEMENT
- 40 46. CG III MAF 101435Z NOV68 *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN TO STILWELL  
FLAG ON THE BEN HAI
- 41 47. CG III MAF 110310Z NOV68 *Group-4*  
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS INFO STILWELL  
W&W GVN NON MILITARY ACTIVITY IN DMZ

- 42 48. CG III MAF 090526Z NOV68 S(FOR) *group-4*  
PROGRAM SIX
- 43 49. CG III MAF 120144Z NOV68 (C-MCEO) *gp-4*  
F/GEN CHAPMAN & LGEN BUSE FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
QUOTE OF DRAKE'S MEMO REGARDING STEADMAN
- ~~44 50. CG III MAF 120008Z NOV68 (U-FOR)  
PERSONAL FOR SULLIVAN FROM TOMPKINS~~
- 45 51. CG III MAF 121116Z NOV68 (S-FOR) *gp-4*  
ACCELERATED TURNOVER OF NAVY OPS TO VNN
- 46 52. CG III MAF 111420Z NOV68 (S) *gp-1*  
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS INFO STILWELL AND DAVIS  
VIEWS ON AUTHORITY TO MOVE TROOPS INTO SOUTHERN DMZ
- 47 53. CG III MAF 131434Z NOV68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*  
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION
- ~~48 54. CG III MAF 131438Z NOV68 (S MCEO GEO)  
ALL COPIES SEALED ENVELOPE~~
- 49 55. CG III MAF 150133Z NOV68 (C) *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS  
REPAIR OF ROAD FROM GIO LINH TO BIEN HAI BRIDGE
- 50 56. CG III MAF 150240Z NOV68 (C) *gp-4*  
CUSHMAN TO STILWELL, YOUNGDALE, GETTYS, ZAIS, DAVIS, AND CROSS  
GUIDANCE ON CONTINUED OPERATIONS IN NICTZ
- ~~51 57. CG III MAF 150510Z NOV68 (U)  
TOMPKINS TO SULLIVAN  
AMCONSUL GO NCUR~~
- 52 58. CG III MAF 151124Z NOV68 (S MCEO) *group-4*  
CUSHMAN TO BUSE, INFO QUILTER  
PROPOSED CMCM ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT
- 53 59. ADMINO III MAF 160350Z NOV68 (S) *gp-4*  
TOMPKINS TO STILWELL INFO ABRAMS  
INSTRUCTS STILWELL TO REPLY DIRECT TO MACV ON TRUCKS IN DMZ MSG  
FROM ABRAMS
- 54 60. ADMINO III MAF 160919Z NOV68 (S) *gp-4*  
ANDERSON TO ABRAMS INFO STILWELL  
MEETING WITH LAM ON MANNED POST SOUTH SIDE OF DONG HOI BRIDGE

DECLASSIFIED

30. CG III MAF 011018Z NOV68 *gp-4*  
 CUSHMAN TO STILWELL, QUILTER, AND COL TYRELL, INFO DAVIS  
 GUIDANCE ON HALT IN BOMBING AS IT CONCERNS AIR
31. CG III MAF 051448Z NOV68 (TS) *gp-4*  
 CUSHMAN TO STILWELL, QUILTER, COL TYRELL INFO DAVIS  
 CHANGE IN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
32. CG III MAF 060046Z NOV68 *gp-4*  
~~CUSHMAN TO STILWELL, QUILTER, COL TYRELL, INFO DAVIS~~  
 PASSES MSG UNDER TAB 31 TO ABRAMS  
 CHANGES IN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
33. CG III MAF 071146Z NOV68 *gp-4*  
 CUSHMAN TO ABRAMS  
 PASSES MSG UNDER TAB 30 TO ABRAMS
34. CG III MAF 211335Z NOV68 *gp-3*  
 SPECIAL PATROLS IN DMZ
35. MG ANDERSON 211445Z NOV68 *gp-3*  
 SPECIAL PATROLS IN DMZ
36. CG III MAF 231150z NOV68 (TS MCEO) *gp-1*  
 ANDERSON TO BUSE  
 PASSES SPECIFIC SPECIAL PATROLS MSGS TO FMFPAC

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 01 NOV 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 0110187 NOV 68		COPY# 1 OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR
3	DCG		11/2		Rues	<p>REMARKS</p> <p><b>EXCLUSIVE</b></p> <p><b>FOR</b></p> <p><b>HAS BEEN SENT</b></p>
4	DCG AIR				PQ	
2	C/S	F				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	11/2		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	SBC					

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE  
FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

\*\*\*\*\* ZZ RUMLEPA RUMSAV RUMJINI RUMHVP  
DE RHMMAFA0084 3061019

NY TTTT  
C 011018Z NOV 68  
FM CG III MAF DNG  
TO RUMLEPA/CG XXZ/ CORPS PMS  
RUMMA/CG FIRST RM  
RUMLEH/GO 16TH ALMY AVN SRF DNG  
INFO RUMMA/CG 1STND NARDIV 0084 RA

1. THIS IS A T O P S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE  
FOR THE USE OF THE HEADQUARTERS AND JOINT HEADQUARTERS,  
COMBAT COMMAND III, FROM THE COMMAN  
DANT'S OPERATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST NVA AND RELATED MATTERS.  
2. REF B DATES NOV 68  
3. REF C DATES NOV 68 (PAGES) SIDE 0505V  
4. REF D DATES NOV 68 (PAGES) SIDE 020V  
5. REF E DATES NOV 68 (PAGES) SIDE 020V  
6. REF F DATES NOV 68 (PAGES) SIDE 020V  
7. REF G ANNOUNCES THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ALL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST  
THE 70 REGTS OF THE 3RD, AND WITHIN THE CLAIMED 12ND TERRITORIAL DIVISION

8. THIS MESSAGE RUMMAFA0084 T O P S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE  
FOR THE SERVICES, ARTILLERY, FIRE AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENT AS WELL AS OTHER  
TYPE OF MISSILES EXPENDED INTO THIS AREA WILL BE TERMINATED.  
9. THIS REGULATION APPLIES TO ALL TERRITORY NORTH OF THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY  
OF THE DMZ. IT DOES NOT APPLY WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM BELOW THE SOUTHERN  
BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ.  
10. REFS D AND E PROVIDE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT THAT APPLY FOLLOWING THE  
CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NVA. THESE RULES MUST  
BE OBEYED TO THE LETTER, WHERE RULES ARE DEEMED NECESSARY OR INFORMATION  
MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE TO THIS HEADQUARTERS WITHOUT DELAY.  
11. ALTHOUGH EVERY COMMANDER RETAINS INHERENTLY THE RIGHT AND  
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SELF DEFENSE OF HIS FORCES, OTHER TYPES OF  
RESPONSE ARE LIMITED TO DESIGNATED LEVELS OF COMMAND AUTHORITY. IN  
THIS REGARD, PARAS 1D, E AND F OF REF C STATE THAT QUOTE COMMANDERS  
CONCERNED UNQUOTE WILL TAKE ACTIONS REQUIRED AND REPORT SITUATION  
THROUGH COMMAND CHANNELS TO COMUSMACV WITH REQUEST FOR FURTHER  
GUIDANCE. COMMENCING AT 010000H NOVEMBER 1968, AND UNTIL SUBSEQUENTLY  
MODIFIED, THE "COMMANDER CONCERNED" IS DESIGNATED AS CG THIRD MARDIV.  
12. REF D OUTLINES THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION OF THE BOMBING  
IN LAOS.  
13. REFS E, F, AND G PROVIDE THE NECESSARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA0084 T O P S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE  
CONCERNING PRESS OR PUBLIC INQUIRIES ON THIS SUBJECT.  
7. REQUEST IMMEDIATE ACK OF RECEIPT.

BT-4  
BT

111 MAF 2100/4

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TOP SECRET

#39







**SECRET**

ZNY 58555  
 Z 010412Z NOV 68  
 FM 5G 222 NAF  
 TO RUMZLA/CG FIRST MAWDEV DNG  
 RUMNAV/CG FIRST MAW DNG  
 RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CLI  
 RUMZMPA/CG FORLOGRD DNG  
 BT

S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE  
 FOR MGEN YOUNGDALE, MGEN QUILTER, AND  
 BGEN PEILEY FROM LGEN CUSHMAN  
 FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

1. THE FOL MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE ACTION:  
 QUOTE

\*\*\*\*\* ZZ HUMSG  
 DE UMS 2626V 3050212  
 ZNY 58555

Z 010211Z NOV 68 ZFF-6  
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
 TO HUMSH/ GEN BROWN COM 7TH AF  
 HUMSQ/LT GEN CUSHMAN III NAF  
 HUMSK/LT GEN STILWELL XXIV CORPS  
 HUMSA/MG STONE I FFV  
 HUMSB/LT GEN KERWIN II FFV  
 HUMSD/MG ECKHARDT S/A IV CIZ  
 HUMSE/ LT GEN MILDREN DCG USARV  
 HUMSF/VADM ZUMWALT COMUSNAVFORV  
 INFO ZEN/ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC  
 ZEN/GEN WHEELER CJCS  
 BT

S E C R E T

MAC 2626V EO

SUBJECT: PUBLIC RELATIONS GUIDANCE ON CESSATION OF ALL  
 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

1. PRESIDENT JOHNSON ANNOUNCED AT 0900 (H) HOURS  
 ON 1 NOV 1968 THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CEASE ALL OFFENSIVE  
 OPERATION AGAINST THE TERRITORY OF NORTH VIETNAM AS OF 2100 H, 1 NOV.  
 EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL COMMANDERS WILL ENSURE THAT ALL  
 US MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OF THEIR COMMANDS WILL  
 REFRAIN FROM ANY COMMENT WHATSOEVER ON THIS MATTER TO  
 THE PRESS OR TO THE PUBLIC. THIS INSTRUCTION WILL BE  
 PASSED TO ALL PERSONNEL WITHOUT DELAY.
2. COMMANDERS AND INFORMATION OFFICERS, IF QUERIED  
 ABOUT THE EFFECT IN SOUTH VIETNAM OF THE CESSATION OF  
 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST NVN WILL REPLY THAT:  
 "THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. OUR  
 OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL CONTINUE ON THE PRESENT  
 BASIS". IF QUERIED AS TO THE EXTENT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION  
 THE REPLY WILL BE: I HAVE NOTHING TO ADD TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT."
3. REQUEST IMMEDIATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT OF  
 THIS MESSAGE.

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE

2. REQUEST IMMEDIATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT OF  
 THIS MESSAGE TO DANANG 3212.

GP-4

BT

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

#32



HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 01 NOV 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 010925Z	1,2,3	COPY# / OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET EYESONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/1		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #34

Z 010925Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 INFO CG XXIV CORPS  
 ZEM

**SECRET**

SECRET EYES ONLY

MGEN ANDERSON, C/S III MAF, SENDS FOR MGEN CORCORAN,  
 C/S MACV, INFO MGEN SCHWEITER, C/S XXIV CORPS

A. C/S XXIV CORPS 010925Z NOV68

B. COMUSMACV MSG DTG 010228Z NOV68

1. CONCUR IN REQUEST CONTAINED IN PARA (1) OF REF A.  
 THIS HEADQUARTERS HOLDS AMS MAPS OF NICTZ WHICH OUTLINE  
 TO NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN TRACE OF THE DMZ AND THE PNDL AS  
 WELL. NO OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTATION IS AVAILABLE.  
 REQUEST YOU PROVIDE ANSWER DIRECT TO XXIV CORPS; INFO  
 III MAF.

2. CONSIDER REF B RESPONDS TO QUERY CONTAINED IN PARA  
 (2) OF REF A.

GP-4

130

**SECRET**

NNNN





**CONFIDENTIAL**

PP RUMC  
DE RHMMAFA 0430 303094 **MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

ZNY 0000  
P 040940 NOV 53  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMK/CMC  
BT

**HAS BEEN SENT**

C O N F I D E N T I A L S P E C I A L M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y  
FOR BGEN AXTELL, AC/S G-4 HQMC CODE 004 FROM LTCOL BAKER HQ DTGR  
G-4 HQMC

- M 15 M 1 TRUCK ALLOCATION
- A. CG III MAF 241802Z OCT 53
- B. CG III MAF 250954Z OCT 53
- C. CMC 251347Z SEP 53

1. REF A. PROVIDED NOTIFICATION OF NON-CONCURRENCE WITH MACVDAC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JSAC TO PROVIDE 75 SUBJ VEHICLES. REF B ADVISES THAT INFO CONTAINED IN REF C COULD NOT BE CORRELATED WITH CURRENT III MAF ALLOWANCE FIGURES.

2. III MAF IN PROCESS OF VALIDATING SUBJ VEHICLE ALLOWANCE WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED FOR NEXT MACVDAC REVIEW. COPIES TO BE FURNISHED CMC AND FMFPAC FOR INFO PRIOR TO MACVDAC MEETING. EVERY ATTEMPT BEING MADE BY III MAF TO PREVENT LOSS OF SUBJ VEHICLE THROUGH

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 0430 C O N F I D E N T I A L S P E C I A L  
REDISTRIBUTION. REQUEST DETAILED BREAKDOWN ANALYSIS OF REF C  
LINE NR. 60333 1/2 (QTY 2995), MAINTENANCE FLOAT (QTY 146), PIPE  
LINE (QTY 854), TOTAL QTY 3995 EARLIEST TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE  
IN UPDATING ALLOWANCE.

3. NEW SUBJ: PLANNED ITINERARY REMAINING TRIP AS FOLLOWS:  
9-6 NOV OKINAWA/3D PER; 7-9 NOV TRAV/FMFPAC; 10-11 NOV  
DELAY ENROJIE/LA; 12 NOV TRAV/WASHDC.  
GP-4  
BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-64)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#36

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

ZIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 05 NOV 68	
			SERIAL NO / CONTROL DATE 051448Z NOV 68		COPY 1 / OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS  <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  <b>FOR</b> <i>4/5 This may make the passed to MACV HAS BEEN SENT</i> <i>G.</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/6		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	SGC					

TOP SECRET

# 31



TOP SECRET

\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUMLBPA RUSVDF RUMKVP  
 DE RHMNAFA 0668 3101449  
 ZNY TTTTT  
 Z 051448Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF DNG  
 TO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PHB  
 RUSVDF/CG FIRST MAW  
 ZEN/CO 16TH ARMY AVN GRP DNG  
 INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA  
 BT

I O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
 FOR LTGEN STILWELL, MAJGEN QUILTER AND COL TYRELL INFO  
 MAJGEN DAVIS FROM GEN CUSHMAN  
 CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST NVA AND RELATED  
 MATTERS.

A. CG III MAF 011018Z NOV 68 (TS SPECAT)

1. (TS) CHANGE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4 REF A TO READ:  
 QUOTE EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT AND UNTIL SUBSEQUENTLY MODIFIED  
 THE "COMMANDER CONCERNED" IS DESIGNATED AS CG XXIV CORPS.  
 CG XXIV CORPS IS AUTHORIZED TO DELEGATE TO SUBORDINATE  
 COMMANDERS THE AUTHORITY TO RESPOND TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED  
 ENEMY HOSTILE ACTIONS FROM NORTH OF THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF  
 THE DMZ AS DESCRIBED IN PARAS ID, E AND F OR REF C UNQUOTE.

2. (U) REQUEST IMMEDIATE ACK OF RECEIPT, ALL ADDEES.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES

TOP SECRET

#31



TOP SECRET

CCN 071 FILE 95

DATE	SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	
		SERIAL 060046Z NOV 68	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECEIVED
		SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
		<b>EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT</b>	
		S/S COPIES 1, 2, 3 OF 3 COPIES	
		MAT AND TAPE	

# RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT  
SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

#32

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE  
FOR

O 060046Z NOV 68

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN

1. FOL MSG PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION: QUOTE

Z 051448Z NOV 68

FM CG III MAF

TO CG XXIV CORPS

CG FIRST MAW

CG 16TH ARMY AVN GP

INFO CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN STYLWELL, MAJ GEN QUILTER AND COL TYRELL

INFO MAJ GEN DAVIS FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN

CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST NVA AND RELATED MATTERS.

A. CG III MAF 011018Z NOV 68 (IS SPECAT)

1. (IS) CHANGE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4 REF A TO READ:  
QUOTE EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT AND UNTIL SUBSEQUENTLY MODIFIED

THE "COMMANDER CONCERNED" IS DESIGNATED AS CG XXIV

CORPS. CG XXIV CORPS IS AUTHORIZED TO DELEGATE TO SUBORDINATE

COMMANDERS THE AUTHORITY TO RESPOND TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED

ENEMY HOSTILE ACTIONS FROM NORTH OF THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF

THE DMZ AS DESCRIBED IN PARAS 1D, AND E AND F OR REF C UNQUOTE.

2. (U) REQUEST IMMEDIATE ACK OF RECEIPT, ALL ADDRES.

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

HAS BEEN SENT

III MAF 2100/4

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TOP SECRET

#32

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

FORM 610 (REV 5-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		07 NOV 68	
			SERIAL/CONTROL DATE		COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
			071146Z NOV 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					<b>EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT</b>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F 1118			B	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	QBC					
REMARKS						
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS						

TOP SECRET #33



**TOP SECRET**

011018Z NOV 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN  
1. FOR MSG QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

Z 011018Z NOV 68  
FM CG III MAF DNG  
TO RUMLRMA/CG XXIV CORPS PHB  
RUMSAU/CG FIRST MAW  
RUMLJHN/CG 16TH ARMY AVN GRP DNG  
INFO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DONG HA

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR LT GEN STILLWELL, MAJ GEN GULFERT AND COL TYWELL,  
INFO MAJ GEN DAVIS, FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN  
SUBJ: CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST NVN AND RELATED MATTERS.

- A. JCS 010100Z NOV 68
  - B. JCS 010108Z NOV 68
  - C. MACV 010208Z NOV 68 (PASEP) CITE 0625V
  - D. MACV 010419Z NOV 68 (PASEP) CITE 628V
  - E. MACV 010158Z NOV 68 CITE 14710
  - F. MACV 010211Z NOV 68 (PASEP) CITE 0626V
  - G. MACV 010215Z NOV 68 (PASEP) CITE 0627V
1. REF A ANNOUNCES THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ALL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST NVN TO INCLUDE THE DMZ, AND WITHIN THE CLAIMED 12NM TERRITORIAL WATERS.

PAGE TWO RHMMAFAD084 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
ALL AIR STRIKES, ARTILLERY, FIRE AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENT AS WELL AS OTHER FIRE OR MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES INTO THIS AREA WILL BE TERMINATED.  
2. THIS CESSATION APPLIES TO ALL TERRITORY NORTH OF THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ. IT DOES NOT APPLY WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM BELOW THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ.  
3. REFS B AND C PROVIDE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT THAT APPLY FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NVN. THESE RULES MUST BE OBEYED TO THE LETTER. WHERE RULES ARE DEEMED UNCLEAR OR INCONSISTENT MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE TO THIS HEADQUARTERS WITHOUT DELAY.  
4. ALTHOUGH EVERY COMMANDER RETAINS INHERENTLY THE RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SELF DEFENSE OF HIS FORCES, OTHER TYPES OF RESPONSE ARE LIMITED TO DESIGNATED LEVELS OF COMMAND AUTHORITY. IN THIS REGARD, PARAS 1D, E AND F OF REF C STATE THAT QUOTE COMMANDERS CONCERNED UNQUOTE WILL TAKE ACTIONS REQUIRED AND REPORT SITUATION THROUGH COMMAND CHANNELS TO COMUSMACV WITH REQUEST FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE. COMMENCING AT 012100H NOVEMBER 1968, AND UNTIL SUBSEQUENTLY MODIFIED, THE "COMMANDER CONCERNED" IS DESIGNATED AS CG THIRD MARDIV.  
5. REF D OUTLINES THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUATION OF THE BOMBING IN LAOS.  
6. REFS E, F, AND G PROVIDE THE NECESSARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

**PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES**COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**TOP SECRET**

III MAF 2100/4

#33

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PAGE THREE RHMMAF0084 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
CONCERNING PRESS OR PUBLIC INQUIRIES ON THIS SUBJECT.

7. REQUEST IMMEDIATE ACK OF RECEIPT.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

2. REQUEST IMMEDIATE ACK OF RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 07 NOV 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 071628Z NOV 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT FOR LGEN BUSE
			IN	OUT		
4	CG				U	REMARKS  <b>FOR</b>  <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b>  <i>"#4 burned 27 Nov 68"</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			Q	
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/8		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4	COPY #5 TO (CO) NORTON				
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #37

PP RUHMM  
 DE RHMMAF 0914 0121630  
 ZNY EEEEE  
 P 071028Z NOV 68  
 FM CG 121 MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 RF

U N C L A S E F T O  
 FOR LEGN BUDE FROM LEGN CUSHMAN  
 TRANSIENT FACILITY AND R&R PROCESSING CENTER  
 A. YR 042228Z NOV 68

1. I SHARE YOUR CONCERN OVER THE PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY  
 CONDITIONS IN THE DANANG TRANSIENT FACILITY AND R&R PROCESSING  
 CENTER. AS YOU NO DOUBT NOTED IN THE FORCE INSPECTORS REPORT,  
 THESE CONDITIONS PRIMARILY RESULT FROM DEFICIENCIES IN THE  
 FACILITIES AND ADMINISTRATION AREAS.  
 2. I WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH A DETAILED REPORT ON IDEOG68 ON OUR  
 CORRECTION OF THESE DEFICIENCIES. IN THE INTERIM, IN ORDER THAT  
 YOU HAVE AVAILABLE THE MOST CURRENT INFO, THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED.  
 A. ON 29SEP68 I APPROVED ACTIONS WHICH IDENTIFIED NEW CONST AT  
 THE FREEDOM HILL COMPLEX FOR A COMBINED TRANSIENT FACILITY AND R&R  
 CENTER AS A MATTER OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. SITE PREPARATION  
 COMMENCED IMMEDIATELY AND WAS COMPLETED INOV68 DESPITE THE

PAGE TWO RHMMAF 0914 U N C L A S E F T O  
 HEAVY RAINFALL DURING THE MONTH OF OCT. SPECIFIC CONST PROJECTS  
 SUBSEQUENTLY INITIATED AND ESTIMATED DATES OF COMPLETION FOLLOWS:

(1) R&R PROCESSING CENTER - JAN 69.  
 (2) EIGHT 130 MAN BARRACKS - JAN 69.  
 (3) TRANSIENT TERMINAL - FEB 69.  
 (4) MESSHALL - APR 69.  
 (5) IMPROVED WATER DIST FACILITIES WHICH PROVIDE WATER TO  
 R&R CENTER, FREEDOM HILL ON 24 HOUR BASIS OPERATIONAL ON 2NOV68.  
 B. ADMIN PROCEDURES/ACTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN INITIATED ARE AS  
 FOLLOWS:

(1) PLANNING UNDERWAY TO CONSOLIDATE ALL ACTIVITIES OF THE  
 TRANSIENT FACILITY AND R&R CENTER IN THE FREEDOM HILL COMPLEX  
 AFTER COMPLETION OF THE NEW FACILITIES. TENTATIVE CONCEPT IS  
 THAT COMBINED CENTER WILL BE UNDER THE IMMEDIATE DIRECTION OF  
 CG FLC. COMBINED T/O HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND IS BEING STAFFED.  
 (2) TWO ADDITIONAL BARRACKS IN THE TRANSIENT CENTER AREA  
 AT THE AIRFIELD HAVE BEEN PROCURED ON TEMPORARY LOAN WITH A  
 RESULTANT DECREASE IN OCCUPANCY LOADING AT THE FREEDOM HILL R&R  
 CENTER.  
 (3) ALL BUNKS HAVE BEEN EQUIPPED WITH APPROPRIATE BEDDING.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#37

PAGE THREE RHMMAF 0914 U N C L A S S E F T O

(4) PRESENT ADMIN SPACES HAVE BEEN REORGANIZED FOR MAXIMUM PROCESSING EFFICIENCY.

(5) PERSONNEL RETURNING FROM R&R ARE NOW TRANSPORTED TO TRANSIENT FACILITY AT AIRFIELD WHERE ORDERS ARE ENDORSED AND ONWARD TRANSPORTATION ARRANGED.

(6) ADDITIONAL DIRECTIONAL AND INSTRUCTION SIGNS HAVE BEEN ERECTED AT THE R&R CENTER TO FACILITATE DISSEMINATION OF INFO. 3. BE ASSURED THAT THIS MATTER HAS MY PERSONAL ATTENTION.

BEST RE CARDS.

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#37



HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE Amphibious Force

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 09 NOV 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 090940Z NOV 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS Rel - CG  EXCLUSIVE  FOR  HAS BEEN SENT
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S	HAS SEEN				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/10		D	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET



**SECRET****EXCLUSIVE****FOR****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

00 RUHAM  
 DE RHMM,F 1152 3140940  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 090940Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHMM/CG FMFPAC

HAS BEEN SENT

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTJEN BUSE FROM LTJEN CUSHMAN  
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

SUBJ: LOCATION OF AVN UNITS (U)

REF: A. FMFPAC 062346Z NOV 68 (S)

1. (S) IN VIEW OF T-DAY PLANNING NOW UNDERWAY I CONCUR WITH THE  
 RELOCATION OF VMFA 115 VICE VMA 311 TO MAG 15. IN ADDITION,  
 THE 125 SPACES WE WOULD ACCRUE IN-COUNTRY IS A BONUS WE CANNOT  
 IGNORE.

2. (S) THE REQUIREMENT FOR TAC AIR SUPPORT HAS DECREASED SOME-  
 WHAT SINCE THE BOMBING HALT, HOWEVER, THE TOTAL EFFECT CANNOT  
 BE MEASURED AT THIS TIME. RECENTLY MACV HAS SHIFTED THE  
 EMPHASIS OUT-OF-COUNTRY AND TO III CORPS. THEREFORE,  
 I WOULD NOT OBJECT TO MOVING VMFA 115 AT AN EARLY DATE  
 IF IT CAN BE ARRANGED. CHICK QUILTER CONCURS.

GP-4

BT

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

# 38

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 NOV 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 100326Z NOV 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS
	DCG			11/12	Rues	
	DCG AIR					
3	C/S					
2	D C/S	I HAS BEEN				EXCLUSIVE
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/10		12	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	I HAS COPY				FOR
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SEND

SECRET

**SECRET**

CCN 113 FILE 95

		FROM CG 111 MAF	DATE 10 NOV 68
		SERIAL # 100326Z NOV 68	COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
11/10	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
		<b>EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT</b>	
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		
	MAT AND TAPE		

### RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PRIORITY

SECRET/ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY1229  
PRIORITYFROM: CG III MAF  
TO: CG FMFPAC  
INFO: CG FIRST MAW10 0326 Z NOV  
68

SECRET SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO MAJGEN QUILTER FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN,  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
OPCOM OF III MAF AVIATION RESOURCES IN ICTZ(U)

1. (U) I BELIEVE THAT RECENT CHANGES WARRANT A REQUEST TO COMUSMACV FOR III MAF TO REGAIN OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF ALL MARINE AVIATION RESOURCES IN ICTZ.
2. (U) WITH THIS GOAL IN MIND, PROVIDING OF COURSE THAT YOU CONCUR, THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PROPOSED MESSAGE TO COMUSMACV INFO CINCPAC THAT MAY GAIN SOME RESULT OR AT LEAST KEEP THE FIRE BURNING.
3. (S) TEXT: RECENT EVENTS AND CHANGED CONDITIONS WARRANT REEVALUATION OF REQUIREMENT TO CONTINUE THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. IN ICTZ THESE ARE:
  - A. THE CESSATION OF AIR COMBAT OPERATIONS OVER NVN.
  - B. THE MOVEMENT SOUTH OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AM).
  - C. THE REDUCED TEMPO OF ENEMY INITIATED LARGE SCALE ACTION AND WITHDRAWAL OF SOME NVA MAIN FORCE UNITS.
  - D. THE DECLINE OF USAF TACTICAL AIR IN SUPPORT OF UNITS IN ICTZ IN RECENT DAYS; E.G., ON 5NOV NO USAF SORTIES WERE PREPLANNED TO SUPPORT ICTZ OPERATIONS ALTHOUGH 25 ADDONS AND IMMEDIATES WERE FLOWN. THE FIRST MAW FLEW 202 SORTIES IN ICTZ. NO USAF PREPLANNED SORTIES ARE SCHEDULED FOR 6NOV. FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES NUMBERS OF USAF/USMC SORTIES FLOWN IN ICTZ IN SUPPORT OF USA AND OTHER UNITS THE PAST TWO WEEKS ARE LISTED.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

**SECRET**

#39

**SECRET**

PRIORITY

SECRET / SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PRIORITY

USAF SORTIES (ICTZ)

USMC SORTIES (ICTZ)

	SUPPORT TO						
	USA/OTHER	USMC	TOTAL		USA	USMC/OTHER	TOTAL
OCT 21	12	2	14	OCT 21	47	54	101
22	38	12	50	22	42	131	173
23	44	2	46	23	46	123	169
24	53	12	65	24	40	135	175
25	59	10	69	25	57	110	167
26	34	11	45	26	38	131	169
27	29	10	39	27	65	106	170
28	34	11	45	28	43	112	155
29	19	0	19	29	46	77	123
30	26	16	42	30	48	90	138
31	19	6	25	31	31	109	140
NOV 1	28	14	42	NOV 1	52	95	147
2	35	2	37	2	52	124	176
3	36	16	52	3	48	133	181
4	32	7	39	4	51	148	199
5	19	6	25	5	61	141	202
TOTAL	517	137	654	TOTAL	767	1818	2585

IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE CONDITIONS THAT LED TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT NO LONGER EXIST AS DISCUSSED ABOVE.

RETURN TO THE PROVISIONS OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 IS REQUESTED.  
END OF TEXT

4. (U) I DON'T HOLD A GREAT DEAL OF HOPE THAT THIS WILL CHANGE SINGLE MANAGEMENT BUT IT WILL KEEP US ON RECORD AND DOCUMENT THE DRASTIC REDUCTION IN AIR FORCE AIR SUPPORT IN ICTZ. WARM REGARDS.  
GP-4  
BT

Prepared by CG FMAW

Released by CG III MAF

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	10 NOV 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# OF COPIES RECD
	101435Z	1,2,3 OF 4

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I			<i>[Signature]</i>	REMARKS
	DCG			<i>11/2</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
2	D C/S	I			<i>[Signature]</i>	
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	<i>11/11</i>		<i>[Signature]</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

*[Handwritten mark]*

SECRET #70

O 101435Z ZYH  
 FM LTGEN CUSHMAN CG III MAF  
 TO LTGEN STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS  
 ZEM

SECRET

SECRET

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV TO LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 CG III MAF IS QUOTED FOR YOUR ACTION:

QUOTE SECRET MAC 15089 EYES ONLY DTG 100659Z PASEP.

WITH REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS MESSAGE STATING THAT NORTH VIETNAM  
 HAD POSITIONED THEIR FLAG IN THE VICINITY OF THE NORTH BANK OF  
 THE BEN HAI HALF OF THE DMZ, I NEED CONFIRMATION THAT THIS IS A FACT  
 AND HAS BEEN VERIFIED BY COMPETENT AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES. UNQUOTE.  
 REQUEST YOU RESPOND DIRECTLY TO COMUSMACV, INFO THIS HQ.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
 GP-4  
 250

HAS BEEN SENT  
 SECRET

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 0216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	11 NOV 68
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD
	110310Z NOV 68	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ORIG-G-3 REL-CG  FOR  HAS BEEN SENT
	DCG		11/12		Russ	
	DCG AIR					
3	C/S	I			QJ	
2	D C/S	I				
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/11		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

47

SECRET #41

**SECRET****OR**

OO RUSVDE  
 DE RUSVDB 1332 3170310  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 110310Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV  
 INFO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS  
 BT

**HAS BEEN SENT**

S E C R E T

FOR GENERAL ABRAMS INFO LTGEN STILWELL FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 PLANNED GVN NON-MILITARY ACTIVITY IN DMZ

A. CG XXIV CORPS 091739Z

1. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE PROJECT DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE A IS  
 OF SUCH IMPORTANCE AND HAS SUCH POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUS  
 COMPLICATIONS THAT IT DESERVES THE MOST THOUGHTFUL TREATMENT.  
 THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS GVN ENDEAVOR MIGHT UPSET THE SOME-  
 WHAT DELICATE ARRANGEMENTS NEAR THE DMZ CAUSES ME TO SUGGEST  
 THAT THE SUBJECT BE CAREFULLY EXPLORED AT THE SAIGON LEVEL.  
 IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT FRIENDLY POSITIONS NEAR THE DMZ  
 RECEIVED 235 MORTAR ROUNDS ON 9 NOVEMBER, AN INDICATION THAT  
 EFFORTS TO REPAIR THE ROAD AND ESTABLISH A POLICE POST MIGHT  
 BE CHALLENGED. ON THE OTHER HAND, GEN STILWELL HAS CONFIRMED  
 THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAS MOVED TO THEIR END OF THE BRIDGE.

PAGE TWO RUSVDB 1332 S E C R E T

THEREFORE, GVN WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO ANSWER IN KIND FOR  
 PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS EVEN THOUGH MILITARILY THE PROJECT  
 WOULD NOT BE OF ANY NOTICEABLE BENEFIT.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

#41





**SECRET** 68

TO RUMKMG/CG FMFPAC  
INFO RUMKMG/CMJ  
BT

**S E C R E T**  
FOR COMC

**FOR**

PROGRAM 6 REDUCTION IMPACT (U)

- A. ACNC VERBAL REQ OF 29OCT68
- B. ADMINO FMFPAC 260045Z OCT 68
- 1. THIS RPT SUB IAW REF 4.

2. (C) REF B DIR ACT TO REDUCE IN-COUNTRY MARINE STR TO PROGRAM 6 LEVELS BY 31OCT68.

3. (S) TOTAL LOSSES OF PERS BY MAJ COMDS OF III MAF BETWEEN 1OCT68 AND 1NOV68 ARE AS FOL:

	FIRST MARDIV	THIRD MARDIV	FIRST MAW	FORLOGCOMD
N/L	25,849	22,418	15,379	9,805
1OCT68 O/B	26,772	22,847	15,133	9,731
1NOV O/B	25,508	22,175	15,923	9,090
DIFFERENCE O/B	-934	-672	-210	-641
DIFFERENCE N/L	-332	-243	-544	-715

PAGE TWO RUMKMG 1122 **S E C R E T**

4. (S) ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THIS STR RED UPON THIS COMD IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. A MAJ EFFECT HAS BEEN FELT IN KEY OFF BIL IN BOTH DIV. JR, INEXPERIENCED OFF. ARE FILLING CO CMDR BIL, ARTY BTRY CMDR BIL, AND KEY STAFF BIL IN BN, REGT, DIV HQS. INASMUCH AS FIRST LT'S ARE FILLING CAPT BIL, THIS SHORTAGE COMPOUNDS THE IMPACT OF SHORTAGE OF CAPT AND REQUIRES THAT SNCO'S FILL BIL NORMALLY FILLED BY LT'S.

B. FORLOGCOMD HAS BEEN REQUIRED TO REDUCE PLSG ALPHA TO CADRE STATUS. AS LONG AS PRESENT TACTICAL SITUATION AND ASSIGNED MISSION DOES NOT CHANGE, THIS SITUATION CAN BE TOLERATED. FIFTH COMM BN HAS BEEN ADVERSELY EFF TO THE EXTENT THAT ALTHOUGH NO COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN LOST, A LESSER DEGREE OF RESPONSIVENESS CAN BE EXPECTED.

C. THE WEEKLY AVG EFF RIFLE CO STR OF THE FIRST AND THIRD MARDIV RPT AS OF 5 OCT AND 8 NOV ARE AS LISTED BELOW FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES. PROVE ONE FOR ONE REPL IS MAINTAINED, IT IS EXPECTED THAT EFF RIFLE CO STR WILL REMAIN AT OR ABT THE 8 NOV 68 LEVEL.

FIRST MARDIV	THIRD MARDIV
--------------	--------------

PAGE THREE RUMKMG 1122 **S E C R E T**

5OCT68

OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
O/M 4.7	203	5.2	211
EFF 4.2	179	4.8	192
CO'S INVOLVED 40		CO'S INVOLVED 36	

8NOV			
O/M 4.8	196	5.1	206
EFF 4.9	178	5.0	196

BT

**SECRET**  
#42





**CONFIDENTIAL**

FM RUMDIAF 1460 510000  
OS RUMDIAF 1460 510000  
ZNY 08:00  
R 180100Z NOV 68  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUEBROA/ONS  
RUMDIAF G FMSPAC  
BT

0 0 0 1 7 0 2 0 7 2 A L SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
FOR GEN CHATELAIN AND L GEN DUSE  
FROM L GEN CUSHMAN (MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY)

1. I HAVE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MEMO FOR THE RECORD  
FROM CLIFF BRAKE AND FORWARD IT FOR YOUR INFO.  
I HAD OTHER COMMITMENTS WHICH PREVENTED ME MEETING  
MR STEADMAN SO CANNOT SEND ANY PERSONAL JUDGMENT ON  
THE MATTER.

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD, PERSONAL FOR L GEN  
CUSHMAN FROM MAJ GEN BRAKE. SUBJECT: CONVERSATION  
WITH MR. R. G. STEADMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE (ASAP).

1. MR STEADMAN AND PARTY VISITED XXIV CORPS 2-4 NOV,  
SPENDING SATURDAY NIGHT AT XXIV CORPS. FOLLOWING DINNER  
L GEN STEWELL INVITED MR. STEADMAN AND A FEW OTHERS

2. FROM THE RUMDIAF 1460 SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR WOOD  
30 HIS QUARTERS. INCLUDED IN THE GROUP WERE MAJ GEN SOMMEYER  
C/MC XXIV CORPS AND CAPT G. M. KAISER, USM AND COL BRUNSON USA  
BOTH MEMBERS OF MR STEADMAN'S PARTY, PLUS MYSELF.

3. MR STEADMAN WAS DOMINATING THE CONVERSATION WITH A  
DISCUSSION OF DOD'S NEED FOR BETTER STATISTICAL DATA  
SO AS TO QUANTIFY AND HENCE BETTER EVALUATE TACTICAL  
OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM. AT ONE POINT IN THE CONVERSATION,  
FOR NO APPARENT REASON THAT I COULD RECALL, MR STEADMAN  
TURNED TO ME AND SAID TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ONLY  
THING THAT IS KEEPING DOD FROM TRANSFERRING THE MARINE  
CORPS TO THE ARMY IS THE CONGRESS. HE THEN WENT ON  
TO THE EFFECT THAT THE MARINES WERE REALLY NO DIFFERENT  
FROM THE ARMY AND THAT WAS WHERE THEY BELONGED. HE  
REPEATED AGAIN THAT IF IT WEREN'T FOR CONGRESS THE  
MARINES WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE ARMY TOMORROW.  
MY REPLY TO THIS WAS THAT WHILE I WAS SURE THAT THE  
ARMY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE ASSETS REPRESENTED BY THE  
MARINE CORPS, I DOUBTED IF THE ARMY WANTED THE MARINE  
CORPS PER SE AND I WAS POSITIVE THAT THE MARINE CORPS  
HAD NO DESIRE OR INTENTION TO BECOME A DUPLICATIVE

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FILE SERV.	HQ. COMM.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

#43

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE RUMMATA 1469 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO  
 ELEMENT OF AND WITHIN THE US ARMY. I THEN WENT ON WITH  
 A DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLE AND MISSION OF THE MARINE CORPS,  
 ITS PART AS AN INTEGRAL ENTITY WITHIN THE US FLEET  
 STRUCTURE, AND SOME PHILOSOPHY ON SEA POWER.  
 5. AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE DISCUSSION MR STEADMAN  
 MADE A SERIOUS ALLEGATION AS TO THE QUALITY OF THE  
 PRESENT DAY OFFICER CORPS IN THE MARINE CORPS, CHARGING  
 THAT WE WERE STILL LIVING AND THINKING IN TERMS  
 OF THE MASSIVE HEAD-ON ASSAULT TYPE TACTICS WHICH  
 CHARACTERIZED MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN  
 WW II. HE CHARGED IN EFFECT THAT THE TROUBLE WITH  
 MARINE CORPS OFFICER LEADERSHIP TODAY IS THAT IT IS  
 TOO RIGID IN ITS THINKING, STUBBORNLY CLINGING TO THE  
 PAST AND NOT KEEPING UP ON MODERN DAY TRENDS IN  
 TACTICS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ONLY REASON THE  
 MARINE CORPS HAS ENJOYED ANY SUCCESS IN VIETNAM  
 IS BECAUSE OF ITS ELITE BODY OF ENLISTED MEN. HE SAID  
 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE MARINE CORPS WAS LIVING OFF  
 THE FAT OF ITS ELITE ENLISTED TROOPS IMPLYING THAT  
 THEY WOULD BE BETTER OFF IN THE ARMY. MY REPLY TO

PAGE FOUR RUMMATA 1469 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO  
 THIS WAS THAT WITH REGARD TO THE ELITE TROOPS, WE  
 WORKED THAT MAGIC AT PARRIS ISLAND AND SAN DIEGO --  
 BUT THAT I COULD NOT AGREE WITH HIS COMMENTS ABOUT THE  
 PRESENT DAY MARINE OFFICERS CORPS. I AGREED THAT IN  
 SOME INDIVIDUAL CASES YOU MIGHT FIND SOME OFFICERS  
 WHO WERE SLOW TO REACT TO CHANGING TIMES BUT THAT I  
 DOUBTED VERY STRONGLY THE VALIDITY OF HIS CLAIM THAT  
 IT APPLIED TO THE GROUP AS A WHOLE. I ADMITTED THAT  
 WE WERE A DOGGED AND DETERMINED GROUP AND TOOK OUR  
 RESPONSIBILITIES VERY SERIOUSLY, POINTING OUT TO HIM  
 THAT THIS DETERMINATION OF PURPOSE ON THE PART OF  
 MARINE CORPS SENIOR LEADERSHIP LED TO THE MARINE CORPS  
 BEING THE ONLY SERVICE THAT HAS BEEN ABLE TO MEET EVERY  
 COMMITMENT PLACED UPON IT SINCE THE INITIAL INTRODUCTION  
 OF US COMBAT FORCES INTO VIETNAM -- DELIVERING WITHOUT  
 FAIL WHAT WAS WANTED WHEN IT WAS WANTED.  
 6. AT ANOTHER POINT MR STEADMAN ASKED ME WHY DON'T  
 THE MARINES GIVE UP THEIR FIGHTERS AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT  
 AND GO TO ALL HELICOPTERS LIKE THE ARMY. HE SAID  
 THAT THE NAVY COULD PROVIDE ALL THE FIGHTER AND ATTACK

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO	
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	ENGR.	ENGR.	ENGR.	ENGR.	ENGR.	ENGR.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#43	

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFA 1469 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOO  
 SUPPORT WE NEEDED. I REPLIED WITH A BRIEF EXPLANATION  
 OF THE ROLE OF THE NAVY AND MARINE AIR, POINTING OUT  
 IN PARTICULAR THAT THE OVA'S COULD NOT BE TIED DOWN  
 TO PROVIDE CONTINUING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO THE LANDING  
 FORCE AND HENCE THE NEED FOR OUR SATO SYSTEM ETC SO AS  
 TO GET FIXED WING ESTABLISHED ASHORE AS SOON AS  
 POSSIBLE. HIS REPLY TO THIS WAS AN OFF-HAND REMARK  
 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE AIR FORCE COULD OFF STEEL  
 BATTING JUST AS EASILY AS THE MARINES.  
 5. ALL THE FOREGOING WAS CONDUCTED IN A FRIENDLY  
 ATMOSPHERE WITH MR STEADMAN CONCLUDING BY SAYING THAT  
 SINCE HE HAD BEEN RAISED IN HAWAII DURING WW II HE  
 HAD ALWAYS BEEN A GREAT ADMIRER OF THE MARINES. HE  
 ALSO SAID TO THE EFFECT THAT ALL OF THIS WAS JUST  
 FRIENDLY AFTER DINNER TALK AND HOPED THAT I DIDN'T  
 TAKE HIM TOO SERIOUSLY.  
 6. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT MR STEADMAN IS SOMEWHAT  
 SUPERCILIOUS AND IS NOT A VERY PROFOUND THINKER. ALSO  
 IT SEEMS RATHER OBVIOUS THAT HE HAS BEEN THROUGHLY  
 WORREED UPON BY THOSE WHO DO NOT HAVE THE BEST INTERESTS

PAGE SIX RHMMAFA 1469 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOO  
 OF THE MARINE CORPS AT HEART. UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.  
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-56)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COM. & INE	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO	
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#43

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES



**SECRET****FOR**

PTT SZ YUW RHMMAFA 15 18 3171116-SSSS--RUMUGKD RUMHBRA RUMUFGA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 121116Z NOV 68

FM CG III MAF DNG RVN

TO RUMUGKD/COMNAVFORV SGN RVN

INFO RUMHBRA/CINCPACFLT PRL HARBOR USA

RUMUFGA/COMNAVSUPPACT DNG RVN

BT

**S E C R E T**FOR VADM ZUKWALT INFO VADM BAUMBURGER AND RADM OSBORN FM LGEN CUSHMAN  
MILCON SUPPORT OF ACCELERATED TURNORV NAVY OPERATION TO VNN (U)

A. YOUR 08218Z NOV 68

B. COMNAVFORV REP DNG LTR 11013 SER: 88/1071 OF 6 NOV 68 (NOTAL)

1. (U) REF A ADVISED OF NEED TO WITHDRAW 12.1 MIL FROM FY69 ICTZ KCON  
PROGRAM TO SUPPORT SUBJECT TURNORV.2. (S) AS I'M SURE YOU REALIZE, THIS WILL IMPACT HEAVILY ON THE 45.2  
MIL PROGRAM SUBMITTED BY REF B. TO EFFECTIVELY REALIGN THE PRO-  
GRAM I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL YOU  
MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ON WHAT NAVY OPERATIONS WILL BE TURNED OVER,  
WHERE, AND WHEN. ARE THERE PLANS FOR RELINQUISHING ANY PORTION  
OF THE TAN MY OR DANANG NAVY CPS? IF SO IT COULD HAVE RAM-  
IFICATION ON OUR CENTRALIZED POWER PROGRAM WHICH MUST TAKE 18PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 15 18 **S E C R E T**OF THE 12.9 MIL ICTZ INITIAL RELEASE DUE TO THE LONG LEAD TIME  
REQUIRED TO OBTAIN THE GENERATORS.3. (U) WE ALSO NEED TO KNOW THE SCOPE OF CONSTRUCTION ANTICIPATED IN  
ICTZ AS WELL AS THE LOCATION AND REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE. THIS  
WILL PERMIT DETERMINING THE NEED TO RELOCATE ENGINEER UNITS AND  
THE EFFECT ON OTHER MAJOR PROJECTS SUCH AS QL-1 UPGRADING,  
PHU PAI AIRFIELD IMPROVEMENTS, AND HARD SHELTER COVERS FOR AIRCRAFT.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**  
#45



Z 111420Z ZYH ZFF-3  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 INFO CG XXIV CORPS  
 CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ZEM

S E C R E T FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LGEN STILWELL AND NGEN  
 DAVIS FROM LGEN CUSHMAN

1. THIS IS IN ANSWER TO YOUR 110928Z NOV 68 ASKING MY VIEWS ON  
 AUTHORITY TO MOVE TROOPS INTO THE SOUTHERN DMZ IF THE  
 SITUATION REQUIRES IT. MY 110643Z NOV 68 EXPRESSED MY SUPPORT OF  
 3D MARDIV ENTERING THE SOUTHERN DMZ BEFORE THE SITUATION  
 THERE DETERIORATES FURTHER. I WANT TO REAFFIRM  
 THAT POSITION NOW. I CONSIDER AUTHORITY TO MOVE TROOPS INTO  
 SOUTHERN HALF OF DMZ WOULD GREATLY IMPROVE OUR RESPONSE  
 CAPABILITY. RESPONSE BY FIRE ALONE IS NOT DECISIVE ENOUGH COMPARED  
 TO INFANTRY ACTION TO DESTROY THE ENEMY IN THE SOUTHERN DMZ.  
 2. WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE ENEMY TO EXPLOIT OUR PRESENT  
 SITUATION BY BUILDING UP SUPPLIES AND COMBAT POWER WITHIN THE  
 DMZ OF SOUTH VIETNAM. WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN EVIDENCE THAT HE  
 INTENDS TO DO THIS. HIS ATTACKS BY FIRE OVER THE PAST SEVERAL  
 DAYS FROM POSITIONS INSIDE THE SOUTHERN DMZ MAKE THIS CRYSTAL  
 CLEAR. IN MY OPINION THE MOST DECISIVE AND EFFICIENT WAY  
 TO DO THIS IS TO CHASE HIM OUT BY INFANTRY ACTION. I DO NOT  
 BELIEVE HE WILL GET THE MESSAGE OTHERWISE.

CP-1

SSO NOTE; DELIVER IMMEDIATELY  
 250

SECRET

NNNN

COPIES BEEN SENT

#46







**CONFIDENTIAL**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PP RUMHLA RUMKVP  
 TE RHMNAF 1634 3181434  
 2NY CCCCC  
 P 131434Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARIDV  
 RUMKVP/CG THIRD MARIDV  
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 102221Z NOV 68 (MARCOR EYES ONLY) (PASEP)

1. (U) REF A REFERS.
2. (U) PROVIDE INFO REQUESTED PARAS 3A, 3B, AND 3C OF REF A TO REACH THIS HQ MLT 20NOV68. INFO WILL BE CONSOLIDATED AT THIS HQ FOR SUBMISSION TO CG FMFPAC.
3. (C) PER INSTRUCTIONS IN PARA 3E, REPORT TO THIS HQ BY 15TH OF EACH MONTH ANY REVISIONS TO EXPENDITURE RATES OF 125MM AND 155MM HOW FE. FIRST REPORT DUE THIS HQ 15DEC68. NEGATIVE RPTS REQUIRED.

GP-4  
 BT

FORM 2100-1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#47



P 150133Z  
FM CG III MAF DNG  
TO COMUSMACV SGN  
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN

1. IN DISCUSSIONS TODAY WITH GENERAL LAN, HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO MOVE CIVILIAN ENGINEERS OUT ON HIGHWAY ONE TO REPAIR THE ROAD FROM GIOLINH TO THE BIEN HAI BRIDGE.
2. HIS PLAN WAS TO PROCEED SLOWLY AND CAUTIOUSLY. AT THE FIRST SIGN OF TROUBLE THEY WERE TO PULL BACK TO SAFETY. IF THEY SUCCEED IN REPAIRING THE ROAD, IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE WITH THE TACIT APPROVAL OF THE ENEMY IN NOT MOLESTING THE CIVILIAN ENGINEERS. GENERAL LAN WOULD THEN FEEL FREE TO STATION POLICEMEN AT THE BRIDGE.
3. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT I COULD NOT COME TO HIS ASSISTANCE AND THAT BY HIS INSTRUCTIONS HE COULD NOT SEND TROOPS IN TO HELP THE ENGINEERS EITHER. HE AGREED AND SAID THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS WOULD BE TO SEAT A HASTY RETREAT IF FIRED UPON. I FINISHED BY RECOMMENDING AGAINST IT, BUT I COULD SEE I HAD NOT CHANGED HIS MIND.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

205

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

# 49

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

PP RUMLBPA RUMHLA RUMHIC RUMLBPE RUMKVP  
 DE RHMMAF 1813 3200245  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 150240Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PHU BAI  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG  
 RUMHIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI  
 ZEN/DEPCORDS III MAF DNG  
 RUMLBPE/CG 121ST ABN  
 RUMKVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR  
 FOR LT GEN STILWELL, MGEN YOUNGDALE, MGEN GETTYS, MGEN ZAIS,  
 MGEN DAVIS AND MR CROSS FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN

1. DURING THIS PHASE OF THE WAR UPON WHICH WE HAVE  
 ENTERED, THERE ARE TWO POINTS THAT I WOULD LIKE TO  
 MAKE.

A. WE MUST NOT ONLY CONTINUE THE TACTICS OF CORDON  
 AND SEARCH, BUT MUST STEP UP THE PACE WHEREVER POSSIBLE.  
 WHILE WE HAVE TO CONTINUE TO SEARCH OUT THE MAIN FORCE  
 UNITS, WE HAVE MANY REGULAR U. S. AND ARVN FORCES AVAILABLE  
 IN THE LOWLANDS WHO CAN CONDUCT FREQUENT SMALL CORDON AND

PAGE TWO RHMMAF 1813 C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR  
 SEARCH OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE TERRITORIAL FORCES,  
 THE PRU'S, AND OTHER PROVINCE ELEMENTS. CONTINUOUS LIAISON  
 SHOULD BE MAINTAINED WITH PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS.

B. THE GENERAL LULL IN ENEMY ACTIVITY MUST NOT BE  
 PERMITTED TO PRODUCE A LET UP IN THE AGGRESSIVE SPIRIT  
 OR IN THE VIGILANCE OF OUR TROOPS. THE ENEMY STILL HAS  
 THE CAPABILITY OF CAUSING DAMAGE AND CASUALTIES. THIS  
 CAN BE MAGNIFIED MANY TIMES IF THEY ARE PERMITTED TO  
 SURPRISE ANY OF OUR UNITS.

2. I WANT TO CONGRATULATE THE COMMANDERS FOR THE OUTSTANDING  
 START WHICH THEY HAVE MADE ON THIS NEW CAMPAIGN. THIS  
 MESSAGE IS MERELY TO POINT UP THE EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF  
 THE TASK BEFORE US AND TO URGE CONTINUED FINE WORK.  
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-64)

COPY 2 OF 7 COPIES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	F.D. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									450

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 151124Z NOV 68	15 NOV 68 COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ORIG- G-3 REL- CG
3	DCG			11/16	Rme	
4	DCG AIR				P. W.	
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/16		12	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

EXCLUSIVE  
FOR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

f

SECRET

**SECRET**

CCN 155 FILE 95

		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 15 NOV 68
		SERIAL# 151124Z NOV 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT PROPOSED CMCM ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT (S)	
11/16	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
11/16	<i>[Signature]</i>	<b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  <b>FOR</b>  MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b>	
	<i>[Signature]</i>		
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		
	MAT AND TAPE		

### RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

**SECRET**

#52

**SECRET**

PP RUHDM RUSVDF  
 DE RHMAF 1883 3201124  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 151124Z NOV 68  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHDM/CG FMFPAC  
 INFO RUSVDF/CG FIRST MAW  
 BT

**S E C R E T** SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE, INFO MAJGEN QUILTER FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN  
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
 PROPOSED CMCM ON SINGLE MANAGEMENT (S)

A. YOUR NOTE OF 5NOV68

1. AS YOU REQUESTED IN REF A, I HAVE STUDIED THE TWO PROPOSED  
 CMCM'S THAT THE COMMANDANT IS CONSIDERING TABLING  
 WITH THE JCS FOR RECORD PURPOSES.

2. I PREFER THE MORE TO THE POINT BRIEF VERSION  
 OF THE CMCM, WITH ATTACHMENTS TO LAY OUT THE  
 DETAIL. THIS IS A BETTER MODE OF PRESENTATION  
 IN THAT THE BASIC ISSUE IS SET OUT QUITE CLEARLY  
 AT THE ONSET AND BACKED UP IN THE DETAIL REQUIRED  
 TO SUPPORT OUR CASE.

3. THE STATISTICAL MATERIAL AND CHRONOLOGY PRESENTED

PAGE TWO RHMAF 1883 **S E C R E T** SPECAT (MCEO)  
 IN BOTH VERSIONS ARE ACCURATE AND SUPPORTABLE BY  
 RECORDS ON FILE AT FIRST MAW HEADQUARTERS. THE  
 RATIONAL AND ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING OUR CASE APPEAR  
 TO BE SOUND.

4. I WISH TO NOTE THAT SINCE 5NOV68 THERE HAVE BEEN  
 ONLY 26 USAF SORTIES FRAGGED INTO ICTZ, WHILE 137  
 ADD-ON OR IMMEDIATE SORTIES HAVE BEEN ACTUALLY FLOWN.  
 THIS INDICATES THE SMALL AMOUNT OF USAF AIR NOW  
 BEING EMPLOYED IN ICTZ. IT AMOUNTS TO LESS THAN 4  
 FRAGGED SORTIES PER DAY WITH A TOTAL FLOWN OF LESS  
 THAN 18 SORTIES PER DAY COUNTING ALL DIVERTS AND SCRAMBLES.  
 IN COMPARISON, THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF  
 SORTIES FLOWN BY THE FIRST MAW IN ICTZ DURING THE  
 SAME PERIOD IS 176 PER DAY.

THE REDUCTION IN AIR FORCE SORTIES IN ICTZ IS A RESULT OF A  
 COMUSMACV DECISION TO WEIGHT THE EFFORT IN LAOS AND III CORPS.  
 HOWEVER, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE PREPONDERANCE OF TAC AIR  
 IN MY AREA IS FLOWN BY THE 1ST MAW. THIS MIGHT STRENGTHEN OUR  
 ARGUMENT FOR DIRECT MANAGEMENT.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

#52



HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM ADMINSO III MAF		DATE 16 NOV 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 160350Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
4	CG					REMARKS
4	DCG		11/17		Rues	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			@	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/16		W	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

SECRET

Z 160350Z ZYH  
 FM ADMINO III MAF  
 TO CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM  
 INFO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY  
 FOR LGEN STILWELL INFO GEN ABRAMS FROM MGEN TOMPKINS  
 1. FOL MSG QUOTED FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE ACTION: QUOTE

160034Z NOV68

FM GEN ABRAMS

TO LGEN CUSHMAN

SECRET MAC 15854 EYES ONLY

OPREP THIS MORNING CARRIED REPORT OF FIVE ENEMY  
 TRUCKS ATTACKED AND DESTROYED YESTERDAY IN SOUTHERN  
 DMZ.

I WOULD LIKE THOROUGH VERIFICATION OF THIS AND FULL  
 DETAILED REPORT ASAP.

IF FULL REPORT NOT COMPLETE, LET ME HAVE AN INTERIM  
 REPORT TO REACH ME BY 1700 TODAY.

UNQUOTE

2. REQUEST YOU REPLY TO ABOVE DIRECT TO MACV, INFO THIS  
 HQTRS.

GP-4

087

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET



HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM ADMINO III MAF		DATE 16 NOV 68	
			SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE 160919		1,2,3, 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					EYES ONLY
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	11/17		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

FD

SECRET

O 162919Z ZYH  
FM ADMINO III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
INFO CG XXIV CORPS  
ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY

MSGEN ANDERSON, C/S III MAF, SENDS FOR GEN ABRAMS, INFO  
LGEN STILWELL

1. DURING THE REGULAR DAILY MEETING WITH GEN LAM, LGEN  
STILWELL VOICED CONCERN OVER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MANNED  
POST ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE DONG HOI BRIDGE IN VIEW OF  
ENEMY ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN DMZ. GEN LAM RESPONDED BY  
STATING THAT HE NO LONGER PLANNED TO ESTABLISH THIS POST,  
DUE TO CHANGING CONDITIONS. HOWEVER, HE STATED THAT PLANS ARE  
BEING DEVELOPED SO THAT IF THE SITUATION CHANGES AND SHOULD  
THE NVA REMAIN IN THE NORTHERN DMZ, CONSIDERATION MIGHT AGAIN  
BE GIVEN TO ESTABLISHING SUCH A POST IF THE NVA MAINTAIN A  
SIMILAR ONE ON THE NORTHERN SIDE OF THE BRIDGE.

GP-4

175

**SECRET**

AFB/AM



Z 211335Z ZYH  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG XXIV CORPS PHB  
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY

MGEN ANDERSON, C/S III MAF, SENDS FOR LGEN STILWELL  
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT (U)

REF: MAC 16076 EYES ONLY DTG 211056Z NOV68 (TS) (PASEP)

1. REQUEST THAT YOU TAKE REF FOR ACTION.
2. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PASSED AT 2015 BY J-3 MACV INDICATES THAT THE PLAN MUST BE IN MACV BY THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS TOMORROW, 22 NOV. ALTHOUGH THE SECURE COMMUNICATION CHANNEL WAS GARBLED, IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING, IN THE CONVERSATION WITH MGEN TOWNSEND, THAT AUTHORITY HAS BEEN RECEIVED FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF SUCH PATROLS, COMMENCING AT 2400, 23 NOV. HE ALSO STATED THAT THEY ARE WORKING WITH JGS ON AUTHORITY TO BRING IN THE ARVN 1ST DIVISION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-1

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

170

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

FORM 8216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			MG ANDERSON		21 NOV 68	
			SERIALS/CONTROL DATE		1.2.3 OF 4 COPIES RECD	
			211445Z			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG				<i>b</i>	REMARKS
<i>3</i>	DCC					
	DCC AIR					
<i>2</i>	C/S	<i>I</i>			<i>Q</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DIA					
<i>1</i>	S/S	<i>I</i>	<i>11/22</i>		<i>H</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	SBC					

*35*

TOP SECRET

Z 211445Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF  
TO CG XXIV CORPS  
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY

MGEN ANDERSON SENDS FOR LGEN STILWELL

REF: MG TOWNSEND MAC 16078 DTG 211252Z NOV68 (TS)

1. REF AMPLIFIES INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN MY 211335Z  
AND IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND NECESSARY ACTION:

QUOTE

PART I

REFERENCES: A. DTG 211056Z NOV68

B. TELECON, TOWNSEND TO ANDERSON, SECURE  
PHONE, 1950 HOURS, 21SEP68

PART II

EXTRACT FROM JCS MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

"2. (TS) COMUSMACV IS AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT SQUAD SIZE  
PATROLS, WITH PLATOON SIZE BACKUP TO ASSIST EXTRACTION IF  
REQUIRED, INTO THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ AS FAR NORTH  
AS THE PMDL FOR A PERIOD OF TEN DAYS COMMENCING 2400 SAIGON  
TIME 23 NOV68 (1100, 13 NOVEMBER WASHINGTON TIME) AND  
ENDING 2400, SAIGON TIME, 3 DEC 68 (1100, 3 DECEMBER 1968  
WASHINGTON TIME).

"3. (TS) IT MAY BE PREFERABLE TO EMPLOY ARVN FORCE FOR  
THIS PURPOSE OR PERHAPS A MIXTURE OF ARVN AND US. CON-  
SEQUENTLY, AUTHORITY IS GRANTED TO COORDINATE WITH THE JGS  
TO ARRANGE SUCH OPERATION IF PREFERRED.

"4. (TS) THE PURPOSE OF THESE PATROLS IS TO CAPTURE  
PRISONERS AND OBTAIN OTHER POSITIVE PROOF THAT THE NVA  
RATHER THAN THE VC ARE OPERATING IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION  
OF THE DMZ SOUTH OF THE PMDL."

PART III

THIS HEADQUARTERS IS CONTACTING JGS THIS EVENING, 21  
NOVEMBER 1968 RE: COORDINATION AUTHORIZED BY PAR 3 OF JCS  
MESSAGE. DO NOT REPEAT NOT CONTACT ARVN UNTIL YOU ARE  
SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED TO DO SO BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.  
THIS WILL BE SENT TO YOU SOONEST.

PART IV

REQUEST YOUR PLAN REACH THIS HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAN  
1800 HOURS, 22 NOVEMBER 1968. THIS IS A CHANGE REPEAT  
CHANGE FROM PAR 3, REF A.

GP-3

UNQUOTE

2. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT REF B OF THE QUOTED MESSAGE  
REFERS TO 21 SEP 68 (SIC). IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT  
PAR 2 CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING OBVIOUS ERROR: "1100, 13 NOV,  
WASHINGTON TIME" WARM REGARDS

GP-3

350

HAS BEEN  
TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 23 NOV 68	
			SERIAL NO / CONTROL DATE 231150Z NOV 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ORIG - S/S REL - S/S  <b>EXCLUSIVE</b>  <b>FOR</b>  MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  HAS BEEN SENT  TOP SECRET #36
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	11/24			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	SAC					



TOP SECRET

NP RUMKM  
DE RHMNAFA 2962 820125  
ZNY TTTT

P 251150Z NOV 68

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFFAG

BT

T O P S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR L GEN BUSE FROM W TEN ANDERSON  
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE AUTHORITY (S)

1. THE FOLLOWING PERSONALS ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

A. QUOTE

O 211056Z NOV 68

FM GEN ADRIANS COMUSMACV

TO L GEN CUSHMAN CG III MAF

INFO GEN BROWN CDR FM AF

LTC STILWELL XXIV CORPS

YADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV

COL CAVANAUGH SOG

ZEN

T O P S E C R E T MAC 16076 EYES ONLY

SUB: SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE AUTHORITY (S)

1. (TS) AUTHORITY HAS BEEN REQUESTED, BUT NOT YET RECEIVED, FOR MACV TO CONDUCT LIMITED PATROLS INTO THE DMZ, SOUTH OF THE PMDL WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF CAPTURING PRISONERS AND MONITORING ENEMY OPERATIONS. IT IS VISUALIZED THAT THESE PATROLS WOULD WALK, OR BE INSERTED BY HELICOPTER, INTO THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ. PATROLS WOULD BE LIMITED TO SQUAD SIZE WITH A PLATOON SIZE BACK-UP FORCE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST EXTRACTION IF REQUIRED. CONVENTIONAL III MAF FORCES AND/OR SOG ASSETS AS APPROPRIATE WOULD BE USED. INITIALLY A MAXIMUM OF 20 INSERTIONS PER MONTH IS CONTEMPLATED.

2. (TS) REQUEST THAT YOU, IN COORDINATION WITH MACSOG, PREPARE PLANS FOR CONDUCTING SUCH PATROLS INTO THE DMZ, SOUTH OF THE PMDL. DIRECT LIAISON WITH CONTROL CENTER NORTH IS AUTHORIZED IN THE PREPARATION OF PLANS.

3. (S) FURTHER REQUEST THAT YOUR PLAN FOR THE USE OF SUCH PATROLS IN THE SOUTHERN DMZ BE FURNISHED TO ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT LATER THAN 24 NOV 68.

4. (S) THIS IS NOT REPEAT NOT AUTHORITY TO SEND PATROLS INTO THE SOUTHERN DMZ. YOU WILL BE SPECIFICALLY INFORMED WHEN AUTHORITY IS RECEIVED.

GP-1

UNQUOTE

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET

FM 3072

Z 211200Z NOV 63

FM HQ 10TH AFHQ FOR 10TH AFHQ

TO 118 COMBATT, COM 118 AFHQ, 11

118 ANDERSON, COM 118 AFHQ

230

1 OF 5 1 0 R E T R I V E R E F S ONLY

PART I

REFERENCE: 118 COMBATT, NOV 23

AS IN COPY, FORWARD TO ANDERSON, NEGATIVE SIGN, 1000 1000

21 SEP 63.

PART II

CONTACT FROM JOG MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

1. 118 COMBATT IS AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT SQUAD SIZE PATROLS,

WITH PLATOON SIZE BACKUP TO ASSIST EXTRACTION IF REQUIRED, INTO

THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ AS FAR NORTH AS THE DMZ FOR A

PERIOD OF 120 DAYS COMMENCING 2400 SAIGON TIME 23 NOV 63 0100,

11 NOVEMBER WASHINGTON TIME AND ENDING 2400, SAIGON TIME, 3 DEC

63 0100, 3 DECEMBER 1100 WASHINGTON TIME.

2. (118) IS NOT TO EMPLOY ARVN FORCE FOR THIS

PURPOSE OR PERHAPS A NUMBER OF ARVN AND US, CONSEQUENTLY, APPROVAL

IS GRANTED TO COORDINATE WITH 7TH JCS TO ARRANGE SUCH OPERATION IF

PREFERRED.

3. (118) THE PURPOSE OF THESE PATROLS IS TO CAPTURE PRISONERS AND

OTHER POSITIVE PROOF THAT THE NVA RATHER THAN THE VC ARE OPERATING IN

THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

PART III

THIS HEADQUARTERS IS CONTACTING JOG THIS EVENING, 23 NOVEMBER 1963 RE

COORDINATION AUTHORIZED BY PAR 5 OF JOG MESSAGE. DO NOT REPEAT NOT

CONTACT WITH UNLESS YOU ARE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED TO DO SO BY THIS

HEADQUARTERS. THIS WILL BE SENT TO YOU SOONEST.

PART IV

REQUEST YOUR PLAN REACH THIS HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAN 1200 HOURS

22 NOVEMBER 1963. THIS IS A CHANGE REPEAT CHANGE FROM PAR 5,

REFERENCE 118

118-3

UNQUOTE

FM QUOTE

Z 220320Z NOV 63

FM COMBATT

TO RUSVOR/CG III MAF SAIGON

INFO RUSVOR/COM 118 AFHQ SAIGON

RUSVAKO/CS XXIV CORPS PHU THAI

RUSVDA/COMNAVFORV SAIGON

ZEN/CHIEF SOF SAIGON

BT

1 OF 5 1 0 R E T R I V E R E F S ONLY

SUBJ: PATROLS IN SOUTH HALF OF DMZ (S)

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TOP SECRET

REF: A. COMBATACV 015 221524Z NOV 68

B. MAP 16270 DCG 211002Z NOV 68 (PAGES)

1. (TS) REFERENCE A STATES THAT 20 US GROUND FORCES WILL CROSS THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ WITHOUT SPECIFIC ORDERS FROM COMBATACV TO DO SO. REFERENCE B REQUIRES CG, III MAF TO PREPARE PLANS TO CONDUCT LIMITED PATROLS IN THE DMZ UP TO THE PWL.  
 2. (TS) CG, III MAF IS AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT SQUAD-LEVEL PATROLS, WITH PLATOON-SIZED SUPPORT TO ASSIST EXTRACTION OF RE-Captured, INTO THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ AS FAR NORTH AS THE PWL FOR A PERIOD OF 20 DAYS COMMENCING 2300N 23 NOVEMBER

PAR 2 PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO US S E G N I Y LINDIS

1965 AND ENDING 2400N 5 DECEMBER 1968. PATROLS MAY WALK, OR BE INSERTED BY HELICOPTER, INTO THE SOUTHERN DMZ.

3. (TS) CONVENTIONAL III MAF FORCES OR SOG ASSETS WITH COM. IN ADDITION, CGS HAS AUTHORIZED THE USE OF ADVA PATROLS IN THIS OPERATION. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO COORDINATE WITH CG, 3 CORPS TO ARRANGE THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARVN FORCES.

4. (TS) THE PURPOSE OF THESE PATROLS IS TO CAPTURE PRISONERS AND OBTAIN POSITIVE PROOF THAT THE NVA RATHER THAN THE VC ARE OPERATING IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ SOUTH OF THE PWL.

5. (TS) PROVIDE BY 1600 HOURS EACH DAY, TO THE USMC COMMAND CENTER VIA DEDICATED AIRCRAFT, YOUR PATROL PLANS FOR THE FOLLOWING DAY. PROVIDE SPOT REPORTS OF PATROL RESULTS TO THE COMMAND CENTER BY FLASH PRECEDENCE USING DEDICATED AIRCRAFT. REPORT BY THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS, POSITIVE PROOF, IF ANY OF NVA OR VC PRESENCE IN THE SOUTHERN DMZ.

GP-1

UNRUOTE

D. QUOTE

0 221524Z NOV 68

FM LTG STEWELL CG XXIV CORPS PHO

TO GEN ABRAMS COMBATACV SGN

INFO MG TOMPKINS DCG III MAF

AS DAVIS CG 3 MAR DIV

ZMH

T O P S E C R E T THE OTHER EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: INITIAL DMZ PATROLS

1. THE FIRST PATROLS, PURSUANT TO OUR SPECIAL AUTHORITY, WILL BE LAUNCHED BY THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS 23/24 NOVEMBER. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM SURPRISE, GENERAL TPuong HAS REQUESTED--AND I HAVE SO DIRECTED GENERAL DAVIS--THAT US PATROLLING ACTIVITY BE WITHHELD UNTIL DAYLIGHT 25 NOVEMBER.  
 2. THE 801 ARVN DIVISION RECON COMPANY (EXTRACTED FROM THE TROPY AND ASSEMBLED IN THE THIS EVENING) WILL CARRY THE MAIL. TWO SPECIALLY SELECTED GROUPS OF 10 MEN EACH WILL BE OUTFITTED AS

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET

1. SPEND ALL DAY IN PREPARATION AND BE FLOWN TO A-1 (YD270730) TO STAY. THE BOMBS OF THE 1ST BN, 20 AVN REGT WERE ACCOMPANIED BY TWO HELICOPTERS WITH EACH PATROL. SEVEN THEIR MOUNTED TOW BEHIND OF THE TARGET AREA, THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF THE HELICOPTERS WILL BE AS ESCORTS.

2. THE TWO PATROLS AND ONE BTR COMPANY WILL DEPART A-1 CIRCA 2000 HOURS AND PROCEED TOGETHER TO THE VICINITY OF AN NY (YD2675), APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER SHORT OF THE SOUTHERN TRACK, WHERE THE COMPANY WILL ESTABLISH A PATROL SUPPORT BASE. THIS WILL BE THE LAUNCH POINT FOR THE TWO BTR PATROLS. ONE PATROL WILL CROSS THE TRACK AND PROCEED ON THE GENERAL AXIS 292797-245770; THE OTHER ON THE AXIS 279768-260706. PATROLS ARE INSTRUCTED TO OPERATE ONLY AT NIGHT. IF A PRISONER IS CAPTURED THE FIRST NIGHT, THE CAPTURING PATROL WILL RETURN TO THE PATROL BASE AS STEALTHILY AS POSSIBLE. IF UNSUCCESSFUL, PATROL (S) WILL REMAIN THROUGHOUT DAYLIGHT HOURS 24 NOVEMBER AND RETURN ACTIVELY AFTER DARK. MISSION WILL, IN ANY CASE, TERMINATE AT 0600 HOURS 25 NOVEMBER. PATROLS WILL BE ON THEIR OWN EXCEPT IN REAL EMERGENCY WHEN ADVISED TO BREAK RADIO SILENCE. EXTRACTION FORCE, FOR CONTINUED DAYLIGHT EMPLOYMENT, IS FROM INFANTRY PLATOON, 1. TO AVOID SHARP BREAK IN THE PATTERN OF TARGET ENGAGEMENT, LIMIT OF PATROL ADVANCE WILL BE ONE KILOMETER SOUTH OF THE BED NAIL. THIS WILL PERMIT ENGAGEMENT BY FIRE ON ANY ENEMY ACTIVITY DETECTED BY OR NEAR THE SOUTH BANK. CONTROL OF SUCH FIRES WILL VEST IN ARVN 000 AT A-2.

3. ALTHOUGH THE SURPRISE WILL BE LARGELY LOST AS SOON AS OVERT PATROLLING BEGINS ON 25 NOVEMBER, AND THE ENEMY CONSEQUENTLY ALERTED ALL ALONG THE LINE, THE ONLY ARVN PATROLS WILL ALSO BE CLAMORING; TWO ARE TENTATIVELY PROGRAMMED FOR INSERT ASTRIDE HIGHWAY 1 THE NIGHT OF 25/26 NOVEMBER.

4. THERE IS ONE POINT IN WHICH I NEED IMMEDIATE GUIDANCE. IN ORDER TO TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF DARKNESS, THE PLAN OUTLINED ABOVE WILL HAVE THE PATROLS CROSSING THE TRACK SHORTLY AFTER 2200 HOURS TONIGHT. TACTICALLY THIS MAKES GOOD SENSE BUT I CAN SEE TRAPS TO DELAY TO PRECISELY MIDNIGHT IF YOU SO INSTRUCT.

5. WARM REGARDS.

UNQUOTE

6. WARM REGARDS.

BT-1

BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

# TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS  
ROUTING SHEET (5511)  
NAVMC HQ 335a (REV. 7-83)

T8125	OUTGOING SPECAT EXLUS MSG 11MAR-23NOV 1968	MAF3	01	
DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT	FILE NUMBER	ORIGINATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.
C.Y. NO.	C.Y. NO.	MO.	DA.	YR.
			DATE	

ROUTING — Use numbers to show order of routing

**OPERATION CODE**

X - ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET

A - APPROPRIATE ACTION

B - GUIDANCE

C - SIGNATURE

D - COMMENT

E - RECOMMENDATION

F - CONCURRENCE

G - INFORMATION

H - RETURN TO

I - INITIAL

J - DISPOSITION

K - DECISION

L - RETENTION

O - (OTHER)

HQSR-3

**DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS**  
(COMPLETED BY ACTION OR ROUTING OFFICER AS APPROPRIATE)

RETENTION PERIOD ESTABLISHED BY ROUTING OFFICER AS:

\_\_\_\_\_ MONTHS      \_\_\_\_\_ INDEFINITE (Historical Value)

\_\_\_\_\_ UNTIL SUPERSEDED      \_\_\_\_\_ PERMANENTLY (Record Material)

\_\_\_\_\_ UNTIL OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AS DETERMINED ON ANNUAL REVIEW

REQUEST ACTION OFFICER ADVISE RETENTION ABOVE

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER ESTABLISHING DISPOSITION: *William Seg*

15 SEP 1988  
HQSR-3

RTG	OPR CODE	ADDRESSEES	DATE		INIT
			IN	OUT	
		COMMANDANT CMC			
		MILITARY SECY TO CMC			
		ASSISTANT COMMANDANT ACMC			
		MILITARY ASST TO CMC			
		CHIEF OF STAFF CS			
		SECY GEN STAFF			
		DIR SPL PROJ SPD			
		DC/S AYN A			
		DC/S I&L L			
		DC/S MPR M			
		DIR PERS MGT DIV MM			
		DIR MPR P&P DIV MP			
		DIR PERS PROC DIV MR			
		DC/S PP&O P			
		DIR PLANS DIV PL			
		DIR OPNS DIV PO			
		MCCC POC			
		GRD CBT REQBR POG			
		DC/S RD&S RD			
		DC/S RESAFF RES			
		DC/S R&P RP			
		DC/S TRNG T			
		FDMC FD			
		IGMC IG			
		MED OFF MED			
		DIR C4 SYS DIV CC			
		C4 SYS P&P BRANCH CCP			
		DIR OF INTEL INT			
		DIR JAD JA			
		DIR PA PA			
		LEGIS ASST OLA			
		COUNSEL FOR CMC CL			
		DIR MCH&M HD			
		DIR HQSPT HQS			
		DENT OFF DEN			
		CHAPLAIN REL			
		JOINT CONTROL JC			
		CLASSIFIED FILES HQSR-3			
		ANMCC AJCC			
		AHERS AHERS			

**RECORD OF DISCLOSURE**

ALL PERSONS WHO HANDLE THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT, SIGN AND DATE IN NUMERICAL ORDER BELOW.

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME
1		11	
2		12	
3		13	
4		14	
5		15	
6		16	
7		17	
8		18	
9		19	
10		20	

REMARKS: (Entries to be signed and dated. For lengthy comments attach separate page and indicate "Bucktag Comment Attached." Do not assign separate Control Number to Bucktag Comments.)

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*John Paul* Signature Date 1/15/92

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