

DECLASSIFIED

580 COMUSMACV 281603Z DEC68 (S) *gp -4*
III MAF TAC AIR REQUIREMENTS f/31Dec-6Jan69

581 CG FMFPAC 312131Z DEC68 (S) MCEO *gp -4*
FOR CUSHMAN INFO QUILTER FROM BUSE
SINGLE MANAGEMENT/AIR CONTROL

~~582 CG FMAW 290900Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~583 CG FMAW 301755Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~584 CG FMAW 310816Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~562 CG FMAW 161840Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~563 CG FMAW 171330Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~564 CG FMAW 181445Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~565 CG FMAW 191306Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~566 CG FMAW 201500Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~567 CG FMAW 211410Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~568 CG FMAW 221700Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~569 CG FMAW 231350Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~570 CG FMAW 241325Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~571 CG FMAW 250900Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~572 CG FMAW 261415Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

573 CG III MAF 260148Z DEC68 (S) MCEO *Sp-4*
OPCON OF III MAF AVN RESOURCES IN ICTZ

~~574 CG FMAW 271215Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

575 CG III MAF 220608Z DEC68 (S) *Sp-4*
AERIAL INTERDICTION IN A SHAU VALLEY

576 COMUSMACV 280029Z DEC68 (S) *Sp-4*
AERIAL INTERDICTION IN A SHAU VALLEY

~~577 CG FMAW 281405Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

578 CG III MAF 281020Z (S) *Sp-4*
III MAF AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS (U)

579 CG III MAF 262320Z DEC68 (S) *Sp-4*
III MAF TAC AIR REQMTS f/31Dec-6Jan69

544 COMUSMACV 010757Z DEC68 (S) *gp-4*
ALLOCATION OF TAC AIR

~~545 CG FMAW 021250Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

546 HORN DASC DANANG RVN 030350Z (S) *gp-4*
CHECK IN AND TGT ASSGT OF TAC AIR IN I CORPS

~~547 CG FMAW 031300Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

548 CG III MAF 040600Z DEC68 (S) *gp-4*
SICTZ WINTER CAMPAIGN--TAC AIR REQMTS

~~549 CG FMAW 050055Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~550 CG FMAW 051430Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~551 CG FMAW 061315Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~552 CG FMAW 071710Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~553 CG FMAW 081500Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~554 CG FMAW 091416Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

555 CG III MAF 100930Z DEC68 (S) *gp-4*
TAC AIR STRIKES IN LIEU OF ARC LIGHT (U)

~~556 CG FMAW 101300Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~557 CG FMAW 111730Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~558 CG FMAW 121433Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~559 CG FMAW 131715Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~560 CG FMAW 150010Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

561 CG FMAW 151810Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE
FOR

RR RHMAFA RUMLMHA
DE RUHMFMA3497 3662131
ZNY SSSSS
R 312131Z DEC 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW
BT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN INFO MGEN QUILTER
FROM LT GEN BUSE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CG III MAF 260148Z/DEC68 (S) MCEO

B. CG FMFPAC 040312Z/OCT68 (S) MCEO

1. (S) I BELIEVE THAT THE TIME MAY NOW BE PROPITIOUS TO
RECOMMEND AGAIN THAT MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE
ASSETS BE RETURNED TO YOUR CONTROL AS PROPOSED IN REF A.
ON THE OTHER HAND, ASSUMING YOUR PROPOSAL IS
APPROVED AND A MAJOR THRUST BY THE ENEMY OF THE
MAGNITUDE OF THE TET OFFENSIVE DICTATES A REVERSION
TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT, THEN THE AIR FORCE MAY
GAIN LONG YARDAGE TOWARD THEIR AVOWED GOAL OF
ALWAYS CONTROLLING ALL AIR. MY INCLINATION IS TO SUPPORT
FULLY YOUR PROPOSAL, SUBJECT TO THE COMMENTS BELOW,
WITH FULL CONFIDENCE THAT OUR REINSTITUTED MARINE

PAGE 2 RUHMFMA3497 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
SYSTEM COULD MANAGE THE AIR EFFORT IN I CTZ REGARDLESS
OF THE INTENSITY OF COMBAT. I WOULD ADD ONLY ONE
MORE RESERVATION AND THAT RELATES TO OUR PRE-SINGLE
MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES. AS STATED IN REF B, IT MAY
BE NECESSARY TO STREAMLINE THESE PROCEDURES TO AVOID
ANY SEMBLANCE OF THE PREMATURE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SINGLE MANAGEMENT.

2. (S) THE DIMINISHING AIR FORCE EFFORT IN I CTZ,
PARTICULARLY DURING NOVEMBER, PROVIDES SOUND JUSTIFI-
CATION TO REQUEST A RETURN TO YOUR CONTROL OF AIR
OPERATIONS IN I CTZ. HOWEVER, FROM OUR DISTANT OVERVIEW,
THE STATISTICS IN REF A APPEAR TO HAVE SOME OMISSIONS
WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO REVIEW. ACCORDING TO THE 7TH AF
OPREP FIVE REPORTS FOR NOVEMBER, THE AIR FORCE PROVIDED
658 ATTACK SORTIES IN I CTZ DURING THE MONTH VIS-A-VIS
THE 382 SHOWN IN YOUR MESSAGE. ADDITIONALLY, OF THOSE
NAVY SORTIES MADE AVAILABLE TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE BY THE
US 7TH FLEET, 654 WERE FRAGGED INTO I CTZ. THUS, TO
COUNTER YOUR STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, THE 7TH AF COULD
AVER THAT THEY ACTUALLY PROVIDED SOME 1300 SORTIES TO

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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SECRET

EXCLUSIVE
FOR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PAGE 3 RUHMFMA3497 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
I CTZ.

3. (S) BEFORE CITING YOUR HIGH SORTIE RATE AS AN
INEFFICIENCY OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, IT MIGHT BE PRUDENT
TO COMPUTE COMPARATIVE SORTIE RATES FOR 1967 AND 1968
TO DETERMINE

HOWEVER PRECISELY WHAT EFFECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT
HAS IN FACT HAD ON SORTIE RATES.

4. (S) THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN AIRBORNE ALERT AS A REMEDY
FOR DELAYED RESPONSIVENESS UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT
APPEARS TO BE A RATHER TENUOUS CHALLENGE UNLESS
SUBSTANTIATING SIQWYS AVAILABLE WHICH SHOWS AN
UNACCEPTABLE DELAY IN RESPONSE TIME. BY AND LARGE, AS
UNDERSTOOD HERE, IMMEDIATE REQUESTS ARE PROCESSED
THROUGH THE MARINE SYSTEM AND EVEN WHEN PROCESSED
THROUGH AIR FORCE DASC'S, RESPONSE TIME IS NOT EXCESSIVE.
A GAIN, YOU ARE CLOSER TO THE ACTUAL SITUATION, AND I
WISH ONLY TO POINT UP THAT A GENERALITY ON A MATTER OF
THIS IMPORT COULD BE SELF DEFEATING IF IT LACKS A SOUND
FOUNDATION.

5. (S) WHILE THE AMOUNT OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED
TO MARINE GROUND UNITS MAY HAVE DECLINED SOMEWHAT

PAGE 4 RUHMFMA3497 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
SINCE THE IMPOSITION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, IT IS
QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN ANY DIMINUTION IN
QUALITY AS STATED IN PAR 2 OF YOUR PROPOSED MESSAGE.

6. (S) RECOGNIZING THAT ANY STATISTICAL COMPARISON
NECESSARY TO MAKE A TELLING POINT NEED BE BASED ON
COMMON SOURCE FIGURES, A COMPARISON
OF PERFORMANCE DURING 1968 WITH 1967, BASED ON
RECORDS AVAILABLE HERE, REVEALS STATISTICS WHICH ARE NOT
ENTIRELY COMPATIBLE WITH REF A. FOR YOUR EXAMINATION
THEY ARE PROVIDED AS FOLLOWS:

	TOTAL USMC ATTACK SORTIES IN I CTZ	MARINE SHARE	USA SHARE	ARVN SHARE
1967	51,864	48,835	1,107	1,242
1968 (THRU NOVEMBER)	59,954	50,292	7,600	479
	ROK SHARE	USSF SHARE		
	681	79		
	1,132	451		

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SECRET

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SECRET**EXCLUSIVE
FOR****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PAGE 5 RUHFMA3497 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 BASED ON AN AVERAGE OF 20 MANEUVER BATTALIONS DURING
 1967, MARINE BATTALIONS WOULD HAVE RECEIVED AN AVERAGE
 OF 203 SORTIES PER MONTH. WITH AN AVERAGE OF 23
 BATTALIONS AVAILABLE DURING 1968, SORTIES DROP TO 198 PER
 MONTH.

7. (S) IN SUM, I BELIEVE THE RATIONALE SET FORTH IN YOUR
 PROPOSED MESSAGE TO BE SOUND, AND URGE ONLY THAT ANY
 STATISTICS USED TO PROVE YOUR POINTS BE CAPABLE OF WITH-
 STANDING CLOSE SCRUTINY BY BOTH COMUSMACV AND 7TH AF.
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3497

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#581

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602

28 December 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Air Interdiction of Ashau Valley

1. At 1000, on 27 December 1968 the 7thAF presented an information briefing to COMUSMACV on the progress of air interdiction in Ashau. BGen George MC LAUGHLIN 7thAF made the presentation. Points were: In May 1968 the Ashau was designated a Free Strike Zone. In early December 1968 the Air Force increased effort into the Ashau and on 9 December 1968 turned the management of the effort over to the Horn DASC. On 15 December - BLU - 52 with CS agent were dropped on choke points at the North end of the valley. Recent efforts have resulted in choke points of the North and South ends of the valley being closed intermittently. The Air Force is scheduling daily FAC coverage, employing about 20 sorties during daylight hours and 12 to 18 sorties per night. Ordnance will include Gravel and other anti-personnel mines. The Air Force pitch concluded by saying the present weight of effort is adequate but that any additional weight of effort can be called up as necessary. General George BROWN opposed any diversion of sorties from Laos to the Ashau or the III MAF request of a named operation. He also resisted the suggestion made in the III MAF message that the responsible ground commanders judge the adequacy of the effort.

2. General ABRAMS responded to the briefing by the following: Nothing should be dedicated to the Ashau but the Ashau is critical to us. The daily effort should be adjusted every day based on weather and aircraft availability. General CUSHMAN is correct in calling attention to the Ashau and the ground commanders should continue to watch Ashau - Ashau is a part of our major effort - both for now and for future operations. General CUSHMAN has flexibility in interdicting Ashau by use of Horn DASC. Horn DASC is III MAF's agent - (General George BROWN spoke in agreement on this point). General ABRAMS concluded by saying the subject of Ashau deserves mention at his Saturday Air Planning Conference. He directed MGen TOWNSEND to reply to III MAF's message - saying the subject has been reviewed and the effort will continue as it has.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD (CONT.)

Further, Horn DASC gives III MAF the flexibility necessary to deal with the Ashau. The meeting adjourned at 1040.

The Senior Officers present were:

- General ABRAMS
- General BROWN ^R
- Major General COCHRAN - C/S
- Major General PETERSON - J-2
- Major General TOWNSEND - J-3
- Brigadier General Jack McLAUGHLIN
- Brigadier General HISE

H. W. Hise

H. W. HISE
BGen USMC
AWC

Noted

CGZ

Noted

CGZ

Noted

CWH

Noted

CGZ

Noted

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Handwritten signature and scribbles, possibly including the name "Gung".

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PT003793
PITSZYUW RHMSMVA6164 3631725-SSSS--RHMAF.

ZNY SSSSS
P 281603Z DEC 68

ACT G-3
DIST A

FM COMUSMACV
TO RHMAF/CG III MAF DA NANG
INFO ZEN/ CDR 7AF TSN
BT

SECRET 44938

SUBJ: III MAF TAC AIR REQUIREMENTS FOR PERIOD 31 DEC 68 THRU
6 JAN 69 (U)

REF: CG III MAF DTG 262320Z DEC 68 (S)

1. (S) THE SORTIE ALLOCATION TO III MAF ON WEEKLY FRAG FOR
310600H DEC 68 TO 070600H JAN 69 WILL BE 22 CSS AND 36 FAC
SORTIES PER DAY.

2. (U) SORTIE ALLOCATION FOR DAILY FRAG WILL VARY IN ACCORDANCE
WITH COMMANDER'S REQUEST AND GUIDANCE FROM COMUSMACV.

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111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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ZITTSZYUW RHMMFA3451 361232C-SSSS--RHMSMVA RHMTSNA.

ZNY SSSSS

Z 262320Z DEC 68 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF DNG RVN

TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV SGN RVN

INFO RHMTSNA/SEVENTH AF TACC TSN AB RVN

BT

SECRET

ATTN: TASE

SUBJ: III MAF TAC AIR REQUIREMENTS FOR PERIOD 31 DEC 68 THRU 31 JAN 69

BT

1. (S) PREPLANNED TAC AIR SORTIES REQUIRED DAILY TO SUPPORT COMBAT OPERATIONS DURING SUBJECT PERIOD ARE: 279

2. (S) REQUEST PREPLANNED SORTIES BE ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS:

A. CAS: 110 CSS: 85 TOTAL: 195

B. DAILY CAS: 84

C. TOTAL: 279

BP-4

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REF (A)

26

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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PTTSZYUN RHMMFA3637 363102Z-SSSS--RUKHFMA RUMLMHA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 28102Z DEC 68FM CG III MAF DNG RVNTO RUKHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW DNG RVN

BT

SECRET

SUBJECT: III MAF AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS (U)

REF: A. CMC 22162Z NOV 68 (S)

B. CG FMFPAC 282532Z NOV 68 (S)

C. CG FIRST MAW 151225Z DEC 68 (S)

D. CG FMFPAC 21233Z DEC 68 (S)

E. CMC 281331Z DEC 68 (S)

1. (S) REFERENCE A COMMENTED ON RELIEF FOR III MAF AIRCRAFT DEFICIENCIES AND OFFERED SEVERAL PROPOSALS FOR PARTIALLY ALLEVIATING CURRENT AND PROJECTED DEFICITS. REFERENCE B REQUESTED SPECIFIC INFORMATION RELATIVE TO PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A. REFERENCE C SUBMITTED SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO OFFSET CRITICAL SHORTAGES OF LIGHT HELICOPTER ASSETS. REFERENCE D REQUESTED COMMENTS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONNEL AVAILABILITY AND COMPENSATORY PROGRAM & TRADE-OFF SPACES CONCERNING NOT ONLY UH-34 RETENTION BUT ALL PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN

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REFERENCE B.

2. (S) FOLLOWING SUBMITTED IN REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 2, REFERENCE B:

A. RETENTION OF 13 U-1C/G:

(1) RETENTION OF U-1C/G AIRCRAFT PAST JANUARY 1969 IS DESIRED

(2) SINCE RETENTION IS DESIRED:

(A) MATERIAL CONDITION OF AIRCRAFT IS GOOD. NO FLT HR CUT OFF IS IN EFFECT. NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL WESTPAC EXTENSIONS IS INDEFINITE.

(B) SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR THE U-1C/G IS MARGINAL. RETENTION OF THIS AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY ADDITIONAL SYSTEM SPARE PARTS PROCUREMENT ACTION INITIATED AT THE ICP (AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE) LEVEL. MINIMUM AVAILABILITY HAS BEEN MAINTAINED ONLY AS A RESULT OF IN-COUNTRY CROSS-SERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT OBTAINED FROM LOCAL ARMY SOURCES. CRITICAL HIGH-USAGE ITEMS CONTRIBUTING TO MORS CONDITIONS DURING RECENT MONTHS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) TAIL-WHEEL ASSEMBLY

(2) MAGNETO

(3) WIND SHIELD

SECRET

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(4) PROPELLER

(5) CARBURETOR

(6) SPARK PLUGS

(C) ALL AIRCRAFT TO BE RETAINED IN VMO-6.

(D) TEN ADDITIONAL NA'S MOS 9912 AND TWENTY ADDITION-

AL ENLISTED MOS 6331 FOR VMO-6 (FRN K03900) REQUIRED AS FOLLOWS:

MOS	05/E6	24/E5	23/E4	LT/E3	WO/E1-2	TOTAL
9912		1	3	6		10
6331	1	2	5	6	6	20

RECOMMENDED PROGRAM 6 ADJUSTMENTS ARE ADDRESSED IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW.

B. INCREASED UTILIZATION OF OV-10A:

(1) IN VIEW REF E INCREASED UTILIZATION OF OV-10A IS NOT RECOMMENDED; THEREFORE, NO PROGRAM 6 ADJUSTMENTS ARE IDENTIFIED.

(2) INCREASED LOGISTIC SUPPORT IS REQUIRED UNDER PRESENT UTILIZATION AS FOLLOWS:

(A) INCREASE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PACKAGE BY 40 PERCENT.

(B) FOLLOWING ITEMS CURRENTLY IN SHORT SUPPLY:

(1) BRAKE ASSEMBLY, FSN NO BH1630-879-2097-AV7X

(2) STARTER, FSN NO RH2925-997-3173-AV7X

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(3) PROP GOVERNOR, FSN NO RH1612-217-2394-AV7X

(4) ARM ASSEMBLY, FSN NO RH1560-824-6527-AF7X

(5) VGI, FSN NO RH6610-754-6627-AH7X

C. MAINTENANCE OF A-72 LIGHT HELICOPTER FORCE STRUCTURE, FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS SUBMITTED:

(1) HU-34 TO BE RETAINED IN H&MS-16 AND H&MS-36.

(2) TO SUPPORT UH-34'S FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR H&MS-16 (TOTAL OF 57) (FRN K07600) AND FOR H&MS-36 (TOTAL OF 58) (FRN K27700):

MOS	E7	05/E6	24/E5	23/E4	LT/E3	WO/E1-2	TOTAL
7561			4	3	15		27
3041					1	1	2
3071				1		1	2
6212		2	1	9	2		14
6242			1	1	2		4
6331		1	1	2	1		5
6332	2	3	5	3	12	10	41
6339	2						2
6341		1	1	4	3	1	10
6351				1	1		2

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7113 1 1 2 2 6
 RECOMMENDED PROGRAM 6 ADJUSTMENTS ARE ADDRESSED IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW.

D. INCREASED TA-4F AIRCRAFT:
 WITH AN INCREASE IN TA-4F AIRCRAFT ASSETS, THE FOLLOWING INCREASE
 IN PERSONNEL (TOTAL OF 45) WOULD BE REQUIRED AS ADDITIONS TO
 H/MS-11 (FRN K25720):

MOS	04/E5	23/E4	LT/E3	WO/E 1-2	TOTAL
7501	2	5	12		17
3071				1	1
6213		1	2		3
6243			1	2	3
6316	1	1	2	4	8
6341			1	2	3
6351			1	2	3
6511		1	1	2	4
7113			1	2	3

PROGRAM 6 ADJUSTMENTS ARE ADDRESSED IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW.
 3. (S) A TOTAL OF 192 SPACES ARE REQUIRED TO ACCOMMODATE THE
 ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL RECOMMENDED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE. PROGRAM
 6 TRADE-OFF SPACES ARE RECOMMENDED AS FOLLOWS:

MOS	E4	E3	E 1-2	TOTAL

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8151 68 50 72 192
 THESE SPACES ARE TO BE DELETED FROM THE FOLLOWING FRN'S:
 K06000 (20), K26102 (20), K26202 (20), K27300 (65), AND K27902
 (65).

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P2003401
PBTZYUW RHMSMVA6041 3630035-SSSS--RHMAF.
ZNY SSSSS
P R 280029Z DEC 68

FM COMUSMACV
TO RHMAF/CG XII MAF DA NANG
INFO RUSVB/CDR 7AF SAIGON
BIALBPN/CG XXIV CORPS PHU BAI
BIALBPE/CG 101ST ABN DIV CAMP EAGLE
SUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAH DA NANG
BUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DA NANG

ACT G-3
DIST A

SECRET 44819
SUBJ: AERIAL INTERDICTION IN A SHAU VALLEY (U)

REF: CG III MAF DTG 220608Z DEC 68 (S)

1. (S) REFERENCE RECOMMENDED A CONCENTRATED AERIAL INTERDICTION OPERATION IN A SHAU VALLEY.
2. (S) THE III MAF PROPOSAL HAS BEEN REVIEWED AT 7TH AF, AT MACV, AND RESULTS PRESENTED TO COMUSMACV. THE ROAD NETWORK IN THE A SHAU VALLEY IS CONSIDERED AS AN EXTENSIVE OF THE LAOTIAN INTERDICTION PROGRAM.
3. (S) COMUSMACV DESIRES TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS AS AT PRESENT, REVIEWING THE A SHAU SITUATION DAILY, AND SHIFTING WEIGHT OF

PAGE 2 RHMSMVA6041 SECRET
STRIKES AS DETERMINED AFTER DAILY REVIEWM THE DELEGATION TO HORN
DASC OF CONTROL OF STRIKES IN THE A SHAU IS TO BE CONTINUED SO THAT
CG III MAF MAY HAVE A CONSTANT INPUT INTO THESE OPERATION AND BE
KEPT ABREAST THEREOF

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OTTSZYUW RHMMAFA2923 3570608-SSSS--RHMSMVA RUMLEPA RHMTSNA
 RUMLEPE RUMLMMA RUMHLA.
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 220608Z DEC 68 ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
 TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV SGN RVN
 INFO RUMLEPA/CG XXIV CORPS PHE RVN
 RHMTSNA/CMDR SEVENTH AF SGN RVN
 RUMLEPE/ONE ZERO ONE AEN DIV CAMP EAGLE RVN
 RUMLMMA/CG FIRST MAW DNG RVN
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG RVN
 BT

HAS BEEN SENT
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 CONC G-2
 REL C/S

SECRET

SUBJ: AERIAL INTERDICTION IN A SHAU VALLEY (U)

REF: (A) CG XXIV CORPS 27297 DTG 131235Z DEC 68 (PASEP) (S)

(E) CG XXIV CORPS 27322 DTG 151452Z DEC 68 (PASEP) (S)

1. (S) RECENT REPORTS FROM PRISONERS CAPTURED IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE AND THE CONTENTS OF REF (A) INDICATE IMMEDIATE NEED TO CONCENTRATE AN AGGRESSIVE INTERDICTION EFFORT IN A SHAU VALLEY, SSZ VICTOR.
2. (S) EFFORTS TO DATE HAVE BEEN WORTHWHILE BUT INSUFFICIENT TO PREVENT THE ENEMY FROM RESUPPLYING HIS FORCES BY WAY OF A SHAU OR TO CURE THE DEFICIENCIES LISTED IN REF (A), SPECIFICALLY TO STOP ENEMY VEHICULAR MOVEMENT, PREVENT ROAD RECONSTRUCTION, MAINTAIN VISUAL OB-

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA2923 SECRET

SERVATION AND DECREASE THE FLOW OF ENEMY SUPPLIES AND MANPOWER INTO I CORPS.

3. (S) THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED TO REDUCE ADEQUATELY THE INGRESS OF ENEMY SUPPLIES AND MATERIAL INTO I CORPS AND TO MAINTAIN CONSTANT PRESSURE IN A SHAU VALLEY.

A. COMMENCING ASAP, ESTABLISH A NAMED INTERDICTION OPERATION TO FUNCTION 24 HOURS A DAY WITH THE SPECIFIC GOALS TO BE ACHIEVED AS CITED IN REF A AND B.

B. THE ADEQUACY OF STEPS TAKEN UNDER THE NAMED INTERDICTION PROGRAM SHOULD BE MEASURED BY THE GROUND COMMANDERS CONCERNED, BASED PRIMARILY ON THE SCALE AND TEMPO OF ENEMY ACTION SUPPORTED THROUGH THE A SHAU AND SUPPLEMENTED BY PRISONER REPORTS, LONG RANGE PATROLS, VISUAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC OBSERVATION AND OTHER MEANS TO DETECT ENEMY MOVEMENT SUCH AS SLAR, IR AND SENSOR READ OUTS. CG XXIV CORPS WILL MONITOR EFFECTIVENESS FOR HIS TAOR USING THE ABOVE CRITERIA AND MEANS OF DETECTION. FIRST MARDIV WILL SIMILARLY MONITOR THE PROGRAM AS OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE HAI VAN PASS ARE AFFECTED.

C. TO ADEQUATELY CLOSE ROUTES, PREVENT VEHICULAR MOVEMENT AND MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE IN A SHAU THIS HEADQUARTERS ESTIMATES THAT AT THIS TIME A MINIMUM OF 16 NIGHT/ALL WEATHER

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA2923 S E C R E T

AND 24 DAYLIGHT ATTACK/VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE SORTIES PER DAY ARE REQUIRED. EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CLOSING ROUTES AT SPECIFIED CHOKER POINTS, INTERDICTING VEHICULAR MOVEMENT AND DESTRUCTION OF PRIORITY TARGETS LISTED IN REFS (A) AND (E).

4. (S) INTERDICTION SORTIES TO BE EMPLOYED IN A SHAU AREA REQUIRED IN ADDITION TO SORTIES PRESENTLY ALLOCATED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF I CORPS FORCES: THEREFORE, AN ADJUSTMENT TO INCREASE OVERALL SORTIE ALLOCATION TO ICTZ WILL BE NECESSARY TO EXECUTE THIS PROGRAM.

5. (S) IT IS REQUESTED THAT THIS SPECIFIC AIR INTERDICTION OPERATION IN A SHAU VALLEY BE INITIATED, AND FURTHER, THE IF FEASIBLE, THIS HDGTRS BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW AND COMMENT ON PLANS FOR THE OPERATION PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION.

CP-4

BT

2923

SECRET

#575

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	GG III MAF	26 DEC 68
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY# / OF / COPIES RECD
	260148Z DEC 68	1 / 3

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ORIG/ O/S REL/ CG EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT #573  SECRET #573
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	2	12/26		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

REF A

SECRET

PP RUHMM RUMLMHA
 DE RHMMFAFA 3338 3610148
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 260148Z DEC 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHMM/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMLMHA/CG FMAW
 BT

S E C R E T S P E C A T

EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE INFO MAJ GEN QUILTER FROM
 LT GEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

OPCON OF III MAF AVIATION RESOURCES IN ICTZ (U)

A. CG III MAF 090300Z SEP68 (S)

1. FOLLOWING DINNER FOR ADMIRAL MCCAIN LAST EVENING, HE
 ASKED FOR A PRIVATE DISCUSSION ON SEVERAL MATTERS, INCLUDING
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT. I POINTED OUT SEVERAL OF THE SHORT-
 COMINGS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM AND INDICATED THAT I INTENDED
 PRESENTING YOU WITH A PROPOSED MSG TO COMUSMACV WHICH WOULD AGAIN
 REQUEST A THIRTY-DAY TRIAL PERIOD OF OUR SYSTEM. WITHOUT
 ENDORSING THIS APPROACH, ADMIRAL MCCAIN APPEARED SYMPATHETIC
 TO OUR VIEWPOINT. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, THE
 FOLLOWING IS A REWORK OF MY SPECAT 100326Z NOV 68. REQUEST
 YOUR COMMENTS AS TO CONTENT OF MSG AND PROPRIETY OF DIS-

PAGE TWO RHMMFAFA 3338 **S E C R E T S P E C A T**
 PATCHING AT THIS TIME.

2. TEXT: QUOTE

1. PRESENT CONDITIONS IN I CORPS ARE RADICALLY
 DIFFERENT FROM THOSE THAT LED TO THE IMPOSITION OF
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT. CHANGES ARE:

A. THE CESSATION OF AIR COMBAT OPERATIONS OVER
 NVN AND THE INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF NAVY AND AIR
 FORCE SORTIES TO SUPPORT LAOTIAN AND IN-COUNTRY
 OPERATIONS.

B. THE DECREASE OF FORCES IN I CORPS WITH THE MOVE-
 MENT OF THE 1ST CAV DIVISION (AM).

C. THE GRATLY DECREASED TEMPO OF OPERATIONS IN
 NORTHERN I CORPS BROUGHT BY THE REDUCTION OF ENEMY
 INITIATED LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL
 OF SOME MAIN FORCE NVA UNITS.

D. THE LOW PROPORTION OF AIR FORCE SORTIES FLOWN
 IN I CORPS DURING NOVEMBER AS SHOWN BY THE FOLLOWING
 TABLE:

SERVICE	FIGHTER/ATTACK SORTIES	FOR NOVEMBER 1968		
	SORTIES	SORTIES	SORTIES	PROVIDED

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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PAGE THREE RHMMAFA 3338 S E C R E T SPECAT

SUPPORTED	REQ	FRAGGED	USMC	USAF
USMC	4356	1678	3054	110
USA	2925	1516	1496	272
ROK	90	90	187	0
ARVN	----	153	78	0
USN (BARCAP)	----	----	91	---
USAF (ESCORT)	----	----	25	---
USAF	----	----	881	---

2. WHILE THE AMOUNT OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT TO MARINE GROUND FORCES HAS DECLINED UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT ITS FULL IMPACT ON THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF MARINE ORGANIC TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT CAN BEST BE SEEN BY CONTRASTING RECENT AIR OPERATIONS IN I CORPS WITH THE YEAR PRIOR TO THE IMPOSITION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT. DURING THE PERIOD FROM MARCH 1967 TO MARCH 1968 MARINE AIR IN I CORPS FLEW AN AVERAGE OF 248 PREPLANNED SORTIES PER MARINE MANEUVER BN PER MONTH. RECENTLY IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1968, MARINE AIRCRAFT WERE FRAGGED FOR ONLY 78 PREPLANNED SORTIES PER BN PER MONTH, OR ONLY 31 PERCENT OF THE

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA 3338 S E C R E T SPECAT

PREPLANNED SORTIES PROVIDED TO MARINE FORCES PRIOR TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT. FURTHER, SINGLE MANAGEMENT FRAGGED ONLY 43 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SORTIES MARINE UNITS REQUESTED IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER. THIS DRASTICALLY REDUCED LEVEL OF ORGANIC MARINE FIRE SUPPORT DISRUPTS THE COMBAT BALANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM. IN ADDITION, SCHEDULING OF THE SORTIE EFFORT OF MARINE FORCES BY SINGLE MANAGEMENT PRODUCES INEFFICIENCY BY:

A. FORCING MARINE AIR TO OVERFLY THE PLANNED SORTIE RATE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO MARINE UNITS.

B. PRODUCING A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL EFFORT IN THE EMERGENCY OF UNPLANNED CATEGORY: FOR EXAMPLE, DURING THE YEAR PRIOR TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT MARINES FLEW FOR MARINES 88 PERCENT PREPLANNED AND 12 PERCENT UNPLANNED SORTIES, WHILE IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1968 THE CORRESPONDING PERCENTAGES WERE PREPLANNED 49 PERCENT AND UNPLANNED 51 PERCENT.

C. REDUCING RESPONSIVENESS BY INCREASED DELAY BETWEEN THE REQUEST AND PROVISION OF SUPPORT IN THE

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

13

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PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 3338 S E C R E T SPECAT
 NORMAL SYSTEM, THEREBY FORCING THE EMPLOYMENT OF
 AIRBORNE ALERT AIRCRAFT TO COMPENSATE FOR THE DELAY.
 D. DECREASING THE FLEXIBILITY AND AMOUNT OF PRE-
 PLANNED AIR AVAILABLE TO THE GROUND UNITS.
 3. THE CESSATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES
 IN I CORPS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY AFFECT THE REMAIN-
 ING CORPS AREAS. MARINE AIR CONTROL PROCEDURES
 INCORPORATED IN THE JAGOS AS A RESULT OF SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT COULD BE RETAINED FOR ARMY UNITS.
 REFERENCE (A) RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES THAT WOULD
 ALLOW THE BENEFITS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT TO CONTINUE
 FOR ARMY UNITS WHILE REMOVING THE FEATURES THAT
 DEGRADE THE OPTIMUM USE OF ORGANIC MARINE AIR ASSETS
 TO SUPPORT ALL GROUND FORCES IN I CORPS. NEITHER
 WOULD DISCONTINUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT IN
 I CORPS NECESSARILY REDUCE THE OVERALL ALLOCATION
 AND CONTROL OF AIR ASSETS BY COMUSMACV. THIS CONTROL
 COULD BE CONTINUED EITHER UNDER THE RECOMMENDATIONS
 OF REFERENCE (A) OR UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
 MACVO - 95-4.

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 3338 S E C R E T SPECAT
 4. IN VIEW OF CHANGED CONDITIONS AND THE CONTINUING
 COST IN EFFICIENCY AND RESPONSIVENESS IMPOSED ON
 ORGANIC MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIR ASSETS,
 IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT SINGLE MANAGEMENT BE TEMPORARILY
 DISCONTINUED IN I CORPS AND THAT A THIRTY-DAY TRIAL
 PERIOD BE INSTITUTED FOR THE SYSTEM III MAF PREVIOUSLY
 RECOMMENDED IN REF (A). THE RESULTS OF THIS TRIAL
 PERIOD WOULD FORM THE BASIS OF A RECOMMENDATION FOR
 FURTHER MODIFICATIONS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM OR
 PERMANENT DISCONTINUANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPSECDEF
 MEMO OF 15MAY68.
 UNQUOTE
 3. WARM REGARDS.
 GP-4
 BT
 3338

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

SECRET

PIT SZ YW RHMMAFA 1347 345 293 2-5355--RUSVDE RMT SNA.
ZNY 55555

P 120530Z DEC 68 ZIF-1
FM CG 111 MAF DRG RVN
TO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV GEN RVN
INFO RMT SNA/SEVENTH AF TSN AB RVN
BT

HAS BEEN SENT
ORIG G-3
REL 103
DIST A

SECRET

SUBJ: TAC AIR STRIKES IN LIEU OF ARC LIGHT (U)

1. (S) TARGETS NOMINATED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS FOR ARC LIGHT STRIKES ARE SOMETIMES NOT APPROVED BECAUSE TARGETS NOMINATED IN OTHER CORPS AREAS ARE ADJUDGED TO HAVE HIGHER PRIORITY. SUCH TARGETS HOWEVER REMAIN AS AREAS OF CONCERN/INTEREST TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AND MAY BE DESERVING OF CONCENTRATED TACTICAL AIR STRIKES IF ARC LIGHT STRIKES CANNOT BE ALLCATED. PRESENTLY, SINCE THE REQUEST PROCEDURES FOR A CONCENTRATED TACTICAL AIR STRIKE CANNOT BE INITIATED UNTIL AFTER A DECISION IS MADE ON THE ARC LIGHT REQUEST, A NEW NOMINATION AND REJUSTIFICATION BY THE NOMINATING HEADQUARTERS IS REQUIRED.

2. (S) THE LEAD TIME RESULTING FROM INDEPENDENT PROCESSING OF A SEPARATE REQUEST FOR A CONCENTRATED TACTICAL AIR STRIKE WOULD BE GREATLY REDUCED IF PROCEDURES COULD BE ESTABLISHED WHEREBY SUCH REQUESTS ARE PROCESSED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ARC LIGHT NOMINATION WHEN REQUESTED BY THIS

P 120530Z DEC 68 RHMMAFA 1347 SECRET

HEADQUARTERS. IN THE EVENT THE PRIORITY OF THE NOMINATED TARGET DID NOT WARRANT AN ARC LIGHT STRIKE, COMUSMACV COULD THEN ALLCATE A CONCENTRATED TACTICAL AIR STRIKE COMMENSURATE WITH AVAILABILITY OF TACTICAL AIR ASSETS.

3. (S) TARGETS PARTICULARLY SUITABLE AS ALTERNATIVES TO ARC LIGHT STRIKES ARE THOSE FOR WHICH THE STRIKE OBJECTIVES ARE SUPPORT OR SPOILING AND FOR WHICH INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THE PRESENCE OF MAJOR TROOP CONCENTRATIONS OR MILITARY HEADQUARTERS OF A TRANSITORY NATURE. TIMELY REACTION IS A MAJOR FACTOR FOR TARGETS OF THIS NATURE AND AUTOMATIC CONSIDERATION AT MACV LEVEL WOULD PERMIT AN EARLIER RESPONSE. IF AN ALTERNATIVE CONCENTRATED TACTICAL AIR STRIKE IS DESIRED, THE NOMINATING HEADQUARTERS COULD SO INDICATE AND AT WHAT POINT IN TIME THE STRIKE SHOULD BE PROGRAMED.

4. (S) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE THE FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED FOR CONSIDERATION:

A. PROVIDE, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF TACTICAL AIR ALLCATION, FOR MULTI-PLANE STRIKES ON A STANDBY STATUS.

B. PROVIDE REACTION WITHIN TIME FRAME OF 6-8 HOURS BASED ON TURN-AROUND TIME OF TACTICAL AIR.

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA 1347 SECRET

C. TACC AUTOMATICALLY EXECUTE STRIKE WHEN ARC LIGHT STRIKES NOT AVAILABLE AND WHEN REQUESTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

D. PROVIDE FOR AIR STRIKES TO BE FAC CONTROLLED OR CSS.

5. (S) PROCEDURES ALONG THE LINES MENTIONED ABOVE COULD REDUCE THE LEAD TIME REQUIRED FOR THIS PROCESSING OF LARGE SCALE TACTICAL AIR STRIKES AND PROVIDE A TIMELY ALTERNATIVE TO ARC LIGHT STRIKES. IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT THE FOREGOING BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT DEGRADING THE NORMAL TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT

GP-4

BT

SECRET
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SECRET

PTTSZYU RHMMAFA0450 3397600-5555--RUSVDE RHMSTNA RUMHLA
RUMNIC RUMLMA.

ZNY 55555

P 040600Z DEC 68 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV SGN

INFO RHMSTNA/SEVENTH AF TSN AB RVN

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG

RUMNIC/CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI

RUMLMA/CG FIRST MAU

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: SICTZ WINTER CAMPAIGN, TMC AIR REQUIREMENTS (U)

REF: (A) COMUSMACV 16032, 200910Z NOV 68 (S) (COM)

(B) CG III MAF 290248Z NOV 68 (S) (COM)

1. (S) REFERENCE (A) STATED THAT ADDITIONAL TMC AIR AND ARC LIGHT SUPPORT WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR SUBJECT OPERATION.

2. (S) REFERENCE (B) INDICATED III MAF INTENTION TO RELY HEAVILY ON AIR SUPPORT TO COMPENSATE IN PART FOR LACK OF ADDITIONAL GROUND FORCES.

3. (S) PRESENT PLANNING ENVISIONS INTENSIVE LZ PREPARATION, HELICOPTER TROOP LIFT AND RESUPPLY ESCORT, AND A WIDE RANGING RECON EFFORT. TACTICAL AIR WILL BE RELIED UPON TO SUPPLEMENT AND, AT EXTENDED RANGES,

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 0450 **S E C R E T**

TO SUPPLANT/ARTILLERY IN SUPPORT OF GROUND UNITS. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE REQUIRED SUPPORT, AS WELL AS NORMAL SUPPORT FOR ALL FORCES IN ICTZ, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL DAILY SORTIES ARE REQUESTED BEGINNING 16 DEC 68: 75 CAS, 15 CSS.

4. (S) FOR THE PAST WEEK AN AVERAGE OF 88 CAS AND CSS SORTIES HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED DAILY TO III MAF. ASSUMING PRE-PLANNED SORTIE ALLOCATION WILL REMAIN THE SAME, THE REQUESTED ADDITIONAL ALLOCATION WILL PROVIDE TOTAL OF 137 CAS AND 41 CSS DAILY. THIS IS CONSIDERED MINIMUM REQUIREMENT TO SUPPORT PLANNED OPERATIONS.

5. (C) TIMELY REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL ARC LIGHTS WILL BE SUBMITTED AS SUITABLE TARGETS ARE IDENTIFIED.

GP-4

BT
0450

HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG C-3

REL C/S

DIST A

SECRET

548

SECRET

O P 932350Z DEC 68
 FM HORN DASC DANANG RVN
 TO TAF IACC TSN AB RVN
 7AF TADC TSN AB RVN
 INFO: CG III MAF DDNANG RVN (ZEN)
 CG 1ST MAW DANANG RVN (ZEN)
 DET 1, 622TH TCS (WATERBOY) DONG HA RVN
 622TH TCS (PANAMA) DANANG AB RVN

RECEIVED BY MAIL

COG G-3
 DIST A

S E C R E T/HORN DASC DEC 68. SUBJ: CHECK-IN AND TARGET ASSIGNMENT
 OF NAVAL TACTICAL AIR IN I CORPS. (MY MSG 050540 NOV 68. (S)).

1. PRESENTLY, NAVAL AIRCRAFT ARE ENTERING I CORPS FOR ORDNANCE EX-
 PENDITURE VIA ONE OF TWO METHODS A, AND/OR B, BELOW:

A. WHEN THE DECISION IS MADE TO DIVERT FROM OUT OF COUNTRY INTO
 I CORPS, THE AVCCC CONTACTS BLUE CHIP, WHO CONTACTS AGATE, AND CON-
 TACTS HORN DASC FOR TARGET AVAILABILITY AND TARGET ASSIGNMENT. WHEN
 TARGET ASSIGNMENT IS DETERMINED THIS COMMUNICATION CHANNEL IS REVER-
 SED WITH THE NECESSARY COMMAND-CONTROL INFORMATION FOR THE FIGHTERS.

B. IN THE PROCESS OF DIVERTING BY THE AVCCC, THE NAVAL AIRCRAFT
 OFTEN CHECK-IN DIRECTLY WITH THE CRC/CRP (WATERBOY, PANAMA OR VICE
 SQUAD). THE CRC/CRP THEN REQUESTS TARGET ASSIGNMENT AND COMMAND
 CONTROL INFORMATION FROM HORN DASC OR DASC-V.

2. RECOMMEND, FOR SIMPLICITY, STANDARDIZATION AND TIMELY RESPONSE
 THAT EXAMPLE B, ABOVE BE IMPLEMENTED AS THE PROPER PROCEDURE.

3. IF THE RECOMMENDED PROCEDURE IS APPROVED HORN DASC AND DASC-V
 WILL NOTIFY THE TACC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE MISSION BRIEFS ON THE
 NAVAL AIRCRAFT. IN THE MEANTIME, THE AVCCC WILL HAVE NOTIFIED BLUE
 CHIP OF THE DIVERT IN PROGRESS.

GP-4
 BT

AC
 SECRET
 #546

SECRET

SECRET

PI005009
PLISZYDN RHMSMVA0062 3360805-SSSS--RHMAF.

ZNY SSSSS
P 010757Z DEC 68

FM COMUSMACV ACT G-3
TO RUSVB/CDR 7AF SAIGON DIST A

RHMAF/CG III MAF DANANG
RUMNVE/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
RHMAA/CG II FFORCEV BIEN HOA
RUMUJLB/SA IV CTZ CAN THO
INFO RUMLDNA/DSA I CTZ DANANG
RUMLPKA/DSA II CTZ PLEIKU
RUMUBHA/DSA III CTZ BIEN HOA
RUMUGKD/COMNAVFORV SAIGON
RHMAA/DEP CG USARV LONG BINH

BT
SECRET 39088
SUBJ: ALLOCATION OF TAC AIR (U)
REF: COMUSMACV DTG 250741Z NOV 68 (S)
1. (S) THE DIVISION OF TAC AIR BETWEEN THE IN AND OUT-COUNTRY EFFORTS CONTINUES AT 55 PERCENT AND 45 PERCENT, RESPECTIVELY, AS ANNOUNCED IN REFERENCE.
2. (S) THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE INTER-CTZ ALLOCATION, GP-4
BT

X-2

SECRET
544

SECRET

RR RHHWUP RHHLMHA
 RR RHHNAF 0011 3360240
 ZNY SSSSS
 R 010240Z DEC 68
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RHHWUP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 INFO RHHLMHA/CG FIRST MAS
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT
 EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN DAVIS, INFO MGEN QUILLER, FROM
 LTJEM CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 INFO: A. CG THIRD MARDIV 040040Z NOV 68 (S) SPECAT EXCL. MCEO
 INFO: MARINE CORPS AIR GROUND TEAM (U)

1. (S) WE ALL AGREE THAT WE MUST RETURN TO OUR AIR-GROUND TEAM POSTURE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. I THINK WE HAVE PRESENTED MACV WITH EVERY LOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR RETURN OF OUR AIR ASSETS AND THAT THE CONDITIONS UPON WHICH SINGLE MANAGEMENT MAY HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIED NO LONGER EXIST. HOWEVER, THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT COMUSMACV WILL NEVER RELINQUISH PRESENT CONTROL UNLESS OUTSIDE PRESSURE IS APPLIED. TO THAT END GENERAL CHAPMAN IS CONSIDERING TABLING A WELL-DOCUMENTED POSITION PAPER WITH JCS. IN MY JUDGMENT THIS IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOLUTION NOW, I.E., HAVE PRESSURE EXTENDED BACK THROUGH CINCPAC. THE CONSTANT PRESSURE WE APPLY AT OUR LEVEL TO MACV IS APPARENTLY A SOURCE OF IRRITATION AND

PAGE TWO RHHNAF 0011 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
 NOTHING MORE.

2. (S) IT IS NOT DEEMED FEASIBLE TO ESTABLISH A FORWARD WING HEADQUARTERS IN THIRD MARINE DIVISION AO NOW FOR SEVERAL REASONS:

- (1) PRESENT PERSONNEL ASSETS WILL NOT PERMIT THE CREATION OF AN ADEQUATE STAFF.
- (2) THE REQUIRED COMMUNICATION ASSETS FOR ADEQUATE DIRECTION AND CONTROL ARE NON-EXISTENT.
- (3) STRINGENT PROGRAM 6 CEILINGS WILL NOT PERMIT ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL OR FACILITIES.

IN SHORT, WE NEED PEOPLE AND EQUIPMENT AND PRESENT WING ASSETS ARE STREACHED THIN. ANY FURTHER FRACTIONALIZING WOULD BE TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

3. (S) THE FIRST MARINE AIR WING AUX HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHED IN JUNE AT QUANG TRI HAS NOT HAD THE COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES WHICH YOU ENVISION. NEVERTHELESS, THE TASKS PERFORMED BY THAT HEADQUARTERS HAVE IMPROVED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES TO INSURE MORE RESPONSIVE SUPPORT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS. THE AWC HAS BEEN TASKED WITH PERFORMING A SIMILAR FUNCTION WITHIN THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION AND HENCEFORTH HE WILL DIVIDE HIS TIME BETWEEN THE TWO DIVISIONS.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#542

SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAF 0011 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (MCEO)
 4. (S) MY ENTIRE STAFF IS CONSTANTLY WORKING AT MEANS TO PRO-
 VIDE MORE RESPONSIVE SUPPORT TO BOTH DIVISIONS. THE PROPOSED
 MOVE OF HAG-36 TO QUANG TRI WOULD PROVIDE YOU WITH IMPROVED RE-
 ACTION HELO SUPPORT. FIXED WING TAC AIR WILL REMAIN RESPON-
 SIVE THROUGH THE NORMAL CONTROL SYSTEM.
 5. (U) THIS IS RESPONSE TO REF A.

GP-4

BT

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111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

SECRET

#542