





**CONFIDENTIAL**

RR R HMMNFA  
 DE RUHMFMA 3354 3652039  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 R 30223Z DEC 68  
 FM CG FMFPA C  
 TO RHMMNFA/CG IIR MAF  
 FT  
 C O N F I D E N T I A L. SPECIALLY EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN

CUSHMAN FR OM LT GEN BUSE, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 RECOMMENDATION FOR BRONZE STAR MEDAL, CASE OF CAPT T. C. SULLIVAN 082553/0302/0130 USMC  
 1. REVIEW OF THE AWARD RECOMMENDATION FOR CAPT T. C. SULLIVAN REVEALS THAT THE CASE WAS ORIGINALLY SCREENED BY A BOARD OF SIX EXPERIENCED AWARDS REVIEWING OFFICERS AND THAT THE DECISION TO DOWNGRADE THE AWARD FROM A BRONZE STAR MEDAL TO THAT OF A NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL WAS UNANIMOUS.  
 2. I HAVE PERSONALLY STUDIED THE RECOMMENDATION IN DETAIL AND HAVE COMPARED CAPT SULLIVAN'S SERVICE TO INDIVIDUAL MERITORIOUS SERVICE THAT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO WARRANT A BRONZE STAR MEDAL IN OTHER CASES. OBVIOUSLY CAPT SULLIVAN PERFORMED HIS DUTIES WITH

PAGE TWO R UHMFMA 3354 C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE HMMN EXPERTISE AND WAS EXTREMELY CONSCIENTIOUS; HOWEVER, I CONCUR WITH THE AWARD BOARD'S DECISION THAT, IN THIS CASE, THE DEGREE OF MERITORIOUS SERVICE PERFORMED DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR A MERITORIOUS AWARD AT THE BRONZE STAR LEVEL. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 FT

3354  
 (11 WAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66))

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									44

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

CCM:241 FILE: DH IIMAF FORM 6216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CINCPAC		DATE 31 DEC 68
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 3 2211Z DEC 68		COPY#   OF 3 COPIES RECD
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN OUT		INITIAL
	CG				
	DCG				
	DCG AIR				
2	C/S	B			J
	D C/S				
	D C/S DM				
1	S/S	B	12/31		h
	G-1				
	G-2				
	G-3	A	HAS COPY #3		
	G-4				
	G-5				
	G-6				
	ADJ				
	CAP				
	CORDS				
	EMB/TRANS				
	ENGR				
	H&S CO				
	INSP				
	MTO				
	OP ANAL				
	ORD				
	PSY OPS				
	SUPPLY				
	S&C				
REMARKS <b>LIMDIS</b>					

SECRET #5



WITHDRAWN MATERIALS  
"OUT CARD"

DESCRIPTION of WITHDRAWN MATERIALS:

Collection Title: III MAF Incoming Msgs 30 Dec 68-15 Jan 69

PC Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Location: Folder, Drawer ~~III~~ M 4

Box Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Folder Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Photo Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Description of Item: Referral 1 DTG 302211Z Dec 68

THESE MATERIALS HAVE BEEN SIGNED OUT TO:

Name/Rank: \_\_\_\_\_

Unit: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Phone Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: \_\_\_\_\_



HEADQUARTERS  
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

CCN:001 FILE:DH II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 01 JAN 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 312131Z DEC 68		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	I				REMARKS <b>EXCLUSIVE</b> <b>FOR</b> MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
3	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR	I				
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	1/1			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

From: Chief of Staff

To: CG -

11/1/69  
*[Signature]*  
 You said is visiting me on 2 Jan after embus conference to discuss single management. I will give you a definite answer after that meeting.

*[Signature]*  
 G. E. DOOLEY

Related MSG -  
 II MAF - 260148Z Dec 68  
 PAC - 040312Z Oct 68

G-3 has copy  
**SECRET**



SECRET

EXCLUSIVE  
FOR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

RR RHMMAFA RUMLMHA  
 DE RUHFMA3497 3662131  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 R 312131Z DEC 68  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW  
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN INFO MGEN QUILLER  
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CG III MAF 260148Z/DEC68 (S) MCEO

B. CG FMFPAC 040312Z/OCT68 (S) MCEO

1. (S) I BELIEVE THAT THE TIME MAY NOW BE PROPITIOUS TO  
 RECOMMEND AGAIN THAT MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE  
 ASSETS BE RETURNED TO YOUR CONTROL AS PROPOSED IN REF A.  
 ON THE OTHER HAND, ASSUMING YOUR PROPOSAL IS  
 APPROVED AND A MAJOR THRUST BY THE ENEMY OF THE  
 MAGNITUDE OF THE TET OFFENSIVE DICTATES A REVERSION  
 TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT, THEN THE AIR FORCE MAY  
 GAIN LONG YARDAGE TOWARD THEIR AVOWED GOAL OF  
 ALWAYS CONTROLLING ALL AIR. MY INCLINATION IS TO SUPPORT  
 FULLY YOUR PROPOSAL, SUBJECT TO THE COMMENTS BELOW,  
 WITH FULL CONFIDENCE THAT OUR REINSTITUTED MARINE

PAGE 2 RUHFMA3497 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 SYSTEM COULD MANAGE THE AIR EFFORT IN I CTZ REGARDLESS  
 OF THE INTENSITY OF COMBAT. I WOULD ADD ONLY ONE  
 MORE RESERVATION AND THAT RELATES TO OUR PRE-SINGLE  
 MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES. AS STATED IN REF B, IT MAY  
 BE NECESSARY TO STREAMLINE THESE PROCEDURES TO AVOID  
 ANY SEMBLANCE OF THE PREMATURE IMPLEMENTATION OF  
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT.

2. (S) THE DIMINISHING AIR FORCE EFFORT IN I CTZ,  
 PARTICULARLY DURING NOVEMBER, PROVIDES SOUND JUSTIFI-  
 CATION TO REQUEST A RETURN TO YOUR CONTROL OF AIR  
 OPERATIONS IN I CTZ. HOWEVER, FROM OUR DISTANT OVERVIEW,  
 THE STATISTICS IN REF A APPEAR TO HAVE SOME OMISSIONS  
 WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO REVIEW. ACCORDING TO THE 7TH AF  
 OPREP FIVE REPORTS FOR NOVEMBER, THE AIR FORCE PROVIDED  
 658 ATTACK SORTIES IN I CTZ DURING THE MONTH VIS-A-VIS  
 THE 382 SHOWN IN YOUR MESSAGE. ADDITIONALLY, OF THOSE  
 NAVY SORTIES MADE AVAILABLE TO THE 7TH AIR FORCE BY THE  
 US 7TH FLEET, 694 WERE FRAGGED INTO I CTZ. THUS, TO  
 COUNTER YOUR STATISTICAL PRESENTATION, THE 7TH AF COULD  
 AVER THAT THEY ACTUALLY PROVIDED SOME 1320 SORTIES TO

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SECRET

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**SECRET**

**EXCLUSIVE**

**FC**

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PAGE 3 RUHMFMA3497 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO I CTZ.

3. (S) BEFORE CITING YOUR HIGH SORTIE RATE AS AN INEFFICIENCY OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, IT MIGHT BE PRUDENT TO COMPUTE COMPARATIVE SORTIE RATES FOR 1967 AND 1968 TO DETERMINE

HOWE PRECISELY WHAT EFFECT SINGLE MANAGEMENT HAS IN FACT HAD ON SORTIE RATES.

4. (S) THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN AIRBORNE ALERT AS A REMEDY FOR DELAYED RESPONSIVENESS UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT APPEARS TO BE A RATHER TENUOUS CHALLENGE UNLESS SUBSTANTIATING SLOWYS AVAILABLE WHICH SHOWS AN UNACCEPTABLE DELAY IN RESPONSE TIME. BY AND LARGE, AS UNDERSTOOD HERE, IMMEDIATE REQUESTS ARE PROCESSED THROUGH THE MARINE SYSTEM AND EVEN WHEN PROCESSED THROUGH AIR FORCE DASC'S, RESPONSE TIME IS NOT EXCESSIVE. A GAIN, YOU ARE CLOSER TO THE ACTUAL SITUATION, AND I WISH ONLY TO POINT UP THAT A GENERALITY ON A MATTER OF THIS IMPORT COULD BE SELF DEFEATING IF IT LACKS A SOUND FOUNDATION.

5. (S) WHILE THE AMOUNT OF MARINE AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED TO MARINE GROUND UNITS MAY HAVE DECLINED SOMEWHAT

PAGE 4 RUHMFMA3497 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO SINCE THE IMPOSITION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN ANY DIMINUTION IN QUALITY AS STATED IN PAR 2 OF YOUR PROPOSED MESSAGE.

6. (S) RECOGNIZING THAT ANY STATISTICAL COMPARISON NECESSARY TO MAKE A TELLING POINT NEED BE BASED ON COMMON SOURCE FIGURES, A COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE DURING 1968 WITH 1967, BASED ON RECORDS AVAILABLE HERE, REVEALS STATISTICS WHICH ARE NOT ENTIRELY COMPATIBLE WITH REF A. FOR YOUR EXAMINATION THEY ARE PROVIDED AS FOLLOWS:

	TOTAL USMC	MARINE	USA	ARVN
	ATTACK SORTIES	SHARE	SHARE	SHARE
	IN I CTZ			
1967	51,864	48,835	1,107	1,242
1968 (THRU NOVEMBER)	59,954	50,292	7,600	479
	ROK	USSF		
	SHARE	SHARE		
	601	79		
	1,132	451		

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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**SECRET**

**EXCLUSIVE  
FOR**

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PAGE 5 RUHFMNA3497 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
BASED ON AN AVERAGE OF 20 MANEUVER BATTALIONS DURING  
1967, MARINE BATTALIONS WOULD HAVE RECEIVED AN AVERAGE  
OF 203 SORTIES PER MONTH. WITH AN AVERAGE OF 25  
BATTALIONS AVAILABLE DURING 1968, SORTIES DROP TO 198 PER  
MONTH.

7. (S) IN SUM, I BELIEVE THE RATIONALE SET FORTH IN YOUR  
PROPOSED MESSAGE TO BE SOUND, AND URGE ONLY THAT ANY  
STATISTICS USED TO PROVE YOUR POINTS BE CAPABLE OF WITH-  
STANDING CLOSE SCRUTINY BY BOTH COMUSMACV AND 7TH AF.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3497

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**SECRET**  
#9