

~~50 18. CG FMAW 011520Z NOV DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~

47. ~~OIC-COMM-GEN-III~~
51 47. CG FMFPAC 020012Z DEC68 (S MCEO) *9p-4*
WIRENOTE FOR COL DALBY FROM COL MCGOUGH
III MAF PROGRAM SIX FORCE STRUCTURE

~~52 48. LGEN STELWELL 030400Z DEC68 (C)
LEAVE TO WASHINGTON~~

53 49. SA 21ST INF DIV ARVN 020830Z DEC68 (SU)
GEN ANDERSON'S VISIT ~~88~~ TO SAIGON AND PRESENTATION OF BSM TO
GEN NGHI

~~54 50. CG FMAW 021250Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~55 51. COMUSMACV 030040Z DEC68 (U)
DEATH OF GEN WILLIAM S. STONE~~

~~55 52. CG FMAW 030700Z DEC68 (S MCEO)~~

~~56 53. CG FMAW 031300Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~56 54. CG 3D MARDIV 040056Z DEC68 (S MCEO)~~

57 55. GEN ABRAMS 040726Z DEC68 (S) *Ap-4*
ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN
TACCICAL SITUATION IN ICTZ

~~58 56. CG FMAW 050055Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~59 57. CG FMAW 051430Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~

60 58. CG FIRST MARDIV 061110Z DEC68 (S) *Ap-4*
YOUNGDALE TO CUSHMAN
OPN MEADE RIVER

~~61 59. CG FMAW 061315Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~

62 60. GEN GOODPASTER 070913Z DEC68 (C) *Ap-4*
COORDINATION OF SLE OPNS WITH IN-COUNTRY FORCES

63 61. GEN ABRAMS 070926Z DEC68 (S) *Ap-4*
WELL DONE ON BALL2 BRIEF

~~64 62. CG FIRST MAF 0709 071710Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~

65 63. CG FMFPAC 072214Z DEC68 (U)
BUSE TO CUSHMAN
R&R FACILITIES

12. CG FMFPAC 072215Z DEC68 (S MCEO) *group-4*
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES IMPROVEMENT AND MOERNIZATION
13. CG THIRD MARDIV 070302Z DEC68 (C) *group-4*
DAVIS TO CUSHMAN
DUEL BLADE SITE A-3
- ~~14. CG FMAN ~~XXXXXXXX~~ 001500Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~~~
- ~~15. USDAO IMCONSUL 000241Z DEC68 (U)
~~FOR TOMPKINS~~~~
- ~~16. CG FMAN 001416Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~~~
17. COMUSMACV 101124Z DEC68 (C) *gp-4*
ABRAMS TO BROWN, MILDREN, ZUMWALT, AND CUSHMAN
JOINT LOGISTIC REVIEW BOARD
- ~~18. CG FMAN 101200Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~~~
- ~~19. IGEN DOSSON 102212Z DEC68 (U)
~~PHOTOS FOR LAM AND TRUONG CONGRATS ON GOOD WORK, ETC ETC~~~~
20. CG FMFPAC 102301Z DEC68 (C) *gp-4*
~~XXXXXX~~ BUSE TO CUSHMAN
PROMOTION QUOTAS TO LCPL
21. NAVWPNSCEN CHINA LAKE 110040Z DEC68 (C) *gp-4*
FOR JOHN HOFFMAN
ROCKEYE DROP
- ~~22. CG FMFPAC 110122Z DEC68 (C)
~~BUSE TO HYLAND, SHINN, BOWEN, BRINCLE, QUILLER AND ADAMS
FY 69 FLYING HOUR PROGRAM~~~~
23. CG XXIV CORPS 110620Z DEC68 (C) *gp-4*
STILWELL TO CUSHMAN
DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY LOC'S
24. 7TH AF 111345Z DEC68 (S) *gp-4*
FOR ALL WING AND BASE COMMANDERS
INTELLIGENCE WARNING
- ~~25. CG FMAN 111730Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~~~
26. CG FMFPAC
112209Z DEC68 (C MCEO) *gp-4*
BUSE TO CUSHMAN
JOINT LOGISTIC REVIEW BOARD

27. CG THIRD MARDIV 120530Z DEC68 (S MCEO) *gp-4*
CHANGES IN ASR FOR 155MM HOW
- ~~28. CG FMAW 121422Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INDIT~~
29. CG FMFPAC 130025Z DEC68 (S) MCEO) *Group-4*
~~XXXXXXXX~~ BUSE TO ~~XXXXXXXX~~ CHAPMAN AND WEBSTER & WILLIAMS INFO CUSHMAN
REALIGNMENT OF III MAF STRUCTURE
- ~~30. CTF 76 130402Z DEC68 (U)
LACY TO CUSHMAN
DEPARTURE MESSAGE AND THANKS~~
- ~~21. CG FMEDAC 130440Z DEC68 (U)
BUSE TO ANDERSON AND DOOLEY
CONGRATS AND WELCOME ABOARD~~
- ~~22. CG FMEDAC 130448Z DEC68 (U)
BUSE TO TOMPKINS
CONGRATS~~
- ~~23. CG FMAW 131715Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INDIT~~
- ~~24. CG FMEDAC 130501Z DEC68 (U)
BUSE TO YOUNGDALE
CONGRATS~~
35. CG XXIV OORBS 140150Z DEC68 (S) *Group-4*
STO:WE:: TP CISJ,AM AMD DAVOS
DUEL BLADE OBSTACLE BELT
- ~~26. CG FMAW 150010Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INDIT~~
- ~~27. USDAO AMCONSUL HONG KONG 150028Z DEC68 (U)
SULLIVAN TO TOMPKINS~~
38. CG FIRST MARDIV 151450Z DEC68 (S) *Group-4*
YOUNGDALE TO CUSHMAN
OPN TAYLOR COMMON
- ~~29. CG FMAW 151810Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INDIT~~
40. CG FORLOGCOMD 161352Z DEC68 (C MCEO) *Group-4*
FEELEY TO ANDERSON
NEGATIVE REPORT ON SPEED
41. CTG SEVEN X NINE POINT FOUR 161520Z DEC68 (C) *gp-4*
VISIT ACTING CG, AMERICAN DIV

~~42. CG FMAW 161040Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~

43. CMC 162214Z DEC68 (C) *Group-4*
NICKERSON TO ANDERSON
MR ALVIN ADAMS

44. CG THIRD MARDIV 170104Z DEC68 (S) *Group-4*
DAVIS TO CUSHMAN AND STILWELL
DUEL BLADE OBSTACLE BELT

~~44 A CG FMAW 170635Z DEC68 (S OEO)~~

~~45. CG FMAW 171330Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~46. CG FMAW 181445Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~

47. GEN ABRAMS 191031Z DEC68 (S) *Group - not shown*
ABRAMS TO STILWELL INFO CUSHMAN AND DAVIS
ARVN DMZ PATROLLING

~~48. CG FMAW 191306Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~

49. CMC 191633Z DEC68 (C) *gp-4*
VAN RYZIN TO CUSHMAN
DSM FOR ANDERSON

~~NY50 CG FMAW 201500Z DEC68 (S MCEO)
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~51. GEN ADAMS 210722Z DEC68 (C)
ADAMS TO CUSHMAN
VISIT TO OKI APPROVED~~

~~52. CG FMAW 211410Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

53. CG FMFPAC 212031Z DEC68 (C) *gp-4*
BUSE TO CUSHMAN
2D ASSIST WING COMMANDER - CMC WILL NOT FILL BILLET UPON
TRANSFER OF INCUMBENT

~~54. CG FMAW 221700Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~55. CG FMAW 231350Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~56. CG FMAW 241325Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~57. CG FMAW 250000Z DEC68 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~CG III F 0215Z DEC68 (C)
 EYES ONLY~~

59 ~~CG THIRD MARDIV 240216Z DEC68 (C) MCEO~~ *gp-4*
 SPEED REQUIREMENTS

60 ~~CG FMW 261415Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
 ROUTINE INDIT

61 ~~CG FMW 232201Z DEC68 (FOI)~~
 MERRY CHRISTMAS

62 ~~CG FMW 271215Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
 ROUTINE INDIT

63 ~~CG FMW 281405Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
 ROUTINE INDIT

64 ~~CG XXIV CORPS 271835Z DEC68 (S) EYES ONLY~~ *Group - not shown*
 DMZ ACTIVITIES 27 DEC (TO ABRAMS INFO DOOLEY FROM STILWELL)

65 ~~COMUSMACV 280931Z DEC68 (S) EYES ONLY~~ *Group - 3*
 MACV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE UPDATE (ABRAMS TO ALL)

66 ~~CINCPAC 281054Z DEC68 (U) FOP~~
 FOP STILWELL INFO ABRAMS & CUSHMAN FROM MCCAIN
 "WELL DONE TO DAVIS & ERIC ADM MCCAIN'S VISIT"

67 ~~CINCPAC 281120Z DEC68 (U) FOP~~
 FOP CUSHMAN INFO ABRAMS FROM MCCAIN
 "WELL DONE TO III MAF" (ADM MCCAIN'S VISIT)

68 ~~COMUSMACV 290417Z DEC68 (C) EYES ONLY~~ *Group - not shown*
 ABRAMS TO CUSHMAN INFO STILWELL
 "I WILL ARRIVE 0945 31 DEC and WANT BRIEFING"

69 ~~HQ USEUCOM WAIHINGEN GERMANY 290805Z DEC68 (U) EYES ONLY~~
 TO ANDERSON FROM BROWN
 PROJECT "WV" ON TRACK

70 ~~CG FMW 290800Z DEC68 (S) MCEO~~
 ROUTINE INDIT

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

XIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CG XXIV CORPS		02 DEC 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
			020550Z DEC 68			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
34	CG					REMARKS B-3 The CB suggests this request get way off to INACV. FOR Concurs strongly. b.
	DCG		1/16			
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	12/2		H	
	G-1					
	G-2	F	HAS copy # 6			
	G-3	A	HAS copy # 5			
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	S&C					

TOP SECRET #31

TOP SECRET

0122 RUMHVP RHMMAF RHMVA
 DE RUMLBPA 0004 337962M
 ZNY TTTTT
 Z 020550Z DEC 68
 FM CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF DNG
 INFO RHMVA/ COMUSMACV SGN
 RUMHVP/ CG 3RD MAF DIV DGM
 BT

TOP SECRET 07087 AVII-CG

SUBJECT: DMZ OPERATIONS (U)

PERSONAL FOR LTG CUSHMAN FROM STILLWELL DM

REF: A. COMUSMACV MSG 220325Z NOV 68 (TS) (NOTAL).

B. CG XXIV CORPS MSG 210355Z DEC 68 (TS).

C. COMUSMACV MSG 111550Z AUG 68 (TS) (NOTAL).

1. (TS) REF A AUTHORIZES PATROLS IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ FOR A 10 DAY PERIOD IN ORDER TO OBTAIN POSITIVE PROOF OF NVA PRESENCE IN THAT AREA.
2. (TS) REF B SUMMARIZES ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ DURING THE LATTER PART OF NOVEMBER, TO INCLUDE ENEMY MOVEMENTS, POSITION CONSTRUCTION AND ABF; AND RECOMMENDS EXTENSION OF PATROLLING AUTHORITY.
3. (TS) THE EVIDENCE ACQUIRED THROUGHOUT NOVEMBER--BY PATROLS AND BY VISUAL SIGHTINGS--MAKES THE ENEMY INTENT TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN THE

PAGE 2 RUMLBPA 0004 TOP SECRET

SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ ABUNDANTLY CLEAR. WHILE INCONTROVERTIBLE PROOF THEREOF IS LACKING, WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE ENEMY WILL BUILD HIS FORCES SOUTH OF THE PHDL TO AT LEAST PRE-NOVEMBER LEVELS AND CONTINUE PATTERN OF ATTEMPTED ENCROACHMENT SOUTH OF THE DMZ. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT MUST BE REALIZED THAT THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ IS A FAR MORE FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE ENEMY THAN WAS THE CASE PRIOR TO 1 NOVEMBER; GIVEN THE CONSTRAINTS ON OUR EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING WEAPONS INTO WHAT WAS FORMERLY A FREE FIRE ZONE, THE DMZ IS A COMPARATIVE SANCTUARY.

4. (TS) SO LONG AS THE ENEMY PERSISTS IN MAINTAINING, AND PROBABLY INCREASING, HIS PRESENCE IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ, HE CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY OF OUR FORCES. ADDITIONALLY, BY REASON OF THE SUPPORT HE CAN PROVIDE THERETO, HIS PRESENCE SERIOUSLY COMPLICATES OUR TASK OF ELIMINATING ENEMY ELEMENTS IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE DMZ. FINALLY, THE REQUIREMENT IMPOSED UPON US TO MAINTAIN A POSTURE TO COUNTER ENEMY MOVES ACROSS THE SOUTHERN TRACE OF THE DMZ DEGRADES OUR CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PLAN IN THE NORTHER QUANG TRI PROVINCE.
5. (TS) I AM THEREFORE CONVINCED THAT THE CONTINUATION OF PATROLLING WHILE INDISPENSIBLE, IS NOT OF ITSELF SUFFICIENT. WE URGENTLY NEED

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES**TOP SECRET**

#31

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMLEPA 0004 T O P S E C R E T
 AUTHORITY FOR PERIODIC GROUND OPERATIONS INTO THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE
 DMZ TO DESTROY ENEMY PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS LOCATED THERE. I
 THEREFORE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT AUTHORITY BE SOUGHT TO REINSTATE
 PARAGRAPH 5A OF THE PRE-NOVEMBER RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (REF C) WHICH
 READS AS FOLLOWS:

"5. (IS) ~~DL~~ AUTHORITIES AND PROCEDURES:

A. OPERATIONS BY GROUND FORCES MAY BE CONDUCTED IN THE
 DMZ SOUTH OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE
 (PMDL). MACV WILL BE NOTIFIED AS FAR IN ADVANCE OF SUCH
 OPERATIONS AS PRACTICABLE. GROUND FORCES MAY RETURN FIRE
 ACROSS THE PMDL BUT WILL NOT ADVANCE NORTH OF THE PMDL. "

GP-1
 BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

SECRET

OO RHMMAFA
 DE RUHHFMA 0029 3370012
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 020012Z DEC 68
 FM ADMINO FMFPAC
 TO R HMMAFA/CG III MAF

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

BT
 S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY WIRE NOTE
 FOR COL DALBY, DEP G-3, III MAF
 FROM COL MC GOUGH, DEP G-3, FMFPAC
 III MAF PROGRAM SIX FORCE STRUCTURE (U)
 A. CG III MAF 011710Z/DEC 68 (SPECAT) (S)
 B. CG III MAF 131000Z/OCT 68 (S)

1. REF A HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND IS GENERALLY CON-
 CURRED IN SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTED CHANGES:

A. REF A PROPOSES PLACING SIX TANK CO'S IN
 A CADRE STATUS WHILE ALL THAT IS REQUIRED IS TO
 PROVIDE SPACES FOR CADRE PERSONNEL FOR TWO TANK
 CO'S, ONE EACH TANK BN. (REF B REFERS: FRN K016A
 PROVIDES 549 SPACES WHICH ARE ADEQUATE TO STAFF
 K016A, K016B AND K016C. TOTAL SPACES WERE LUMPED
 UNDER K016A FOR EASE OF REFERENCE. SAME APPLIES
 TO K017A, B AND C.) RECOMMEND THAT THE REQUIRED

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA 0029 S E C R E T FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SPACES BE PROVIDED BY INCREASING FRN'S K017A00 AND
 K017B00 TWENTY-FOUR SPACES EACH. THIS WILL ALLOW
 SPACE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR EACH TANK BN TO BE SHOWN
 BY ONLY ONE FRN. THIS CHANGE WOULD RESULT IN A
 DECREASE OF NINETY-SIX IN THE SPACES LISTED. REF A REQUIRED
 TO ACCOMMODATE CADRING AND RETENTION OF UNITS IN THE
 III MAF STRUCTURE THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN PROPOSED
 FOR DELETION BY REF B.

B. REF A PROPOSES THAT FRN M01200 AUTHORIZE
 TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE SPACES FOR A VMA SQDN. RE-
 COMMEND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY SPACES BE AUTHORIZED IN
 CONSONANCE WITH THE AUTHORIZATION FOR OTHER VMA
 SQDNS UNDER THE REALIGNMENT PROPOSAL.

C. IT IS NOTED THAT WHILE THE REALIGNMENT
 PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN REF B PROPOSED SIGNIFICANT
 STRENGTH REDUCTIONS FOR FRNS K01500 (COMM BN FVF)
 AND K05500 (MWSG) TO ACCOMMODATE DELETION OF A COMM
 SUPPORT CO AND THE VERS RESPECTIVELY, NO SPACES
 WERE PROVIDED FOR CADRES FOR THESE UNITS IN REF A. IF
 YOUR INTENTION IS TO RETAIN THESE UNITS IN THE STRUCTURE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

SECRET

#51

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMKEMA 0029 SECRET FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 AT A REDUCED STRENGTH IN LIEU OF A CADRE STATUS,
 THEN THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN REF A IS SATISFACTORY.
 HOWEVER, THOSE SKILLS BEING REDUCED IN COMB AND
 MSG SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED TO FACILITATE DEVELOP-
 MENT OF RESPONSIVE MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS.

D. THE PROPOSED COMPENSATORY ADJUSTMENTS IN
 PAR 3C OF REF A SHOULD BE MODIFIED IN CONSONANCE
 WITH ANY CHANGES YOU NEED TO MAKE IN PAR 3A OF REF A.
 2. FOR USE IN DEVELOPING MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS, WE
 NEED THE PROPOSED CADRE COMPOSITION FOR H&S BTRY
 AND ONE MISSILE BTRY OF THE LAAM BN (FRN 25302) IN
 ADDITION TO CADRE COMPOSITIONS PRESENTLY SHOWN IN YOUR
 PROPOSED MSG. ALSO, REQUEST GRADE AND MOS SUMMARY
 OF SPACES PROPOSED FOR DELETION FROM FORLOGCMD
 (FRN K03302) BE PROVIDED.

3. FROM ALL INDICATIONS IT APPEARS THAT OUR
 PROGRAM SIX PLANNING IS BACK ON TRACK.

GP-4

BT

0029

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET
#51

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE		FROM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV	DATE 04 DEC 68
		SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 040726	COPY# 123 OF 4 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				lb	REMARKS B-3, C-2 Action D, III MAF 081250Z Dec 68
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			Q	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	E	1214		IF	
	G-1					
	G-2	Has copy	042130H		Y	
	G-3	Has copy	042130H		Y	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HQS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

3
SECRET #57

O 0407Z SZ ZYH ZFF-1

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

SECRET MAC 16621 EO

SUBJECT: TACTICAL SITUATION IN I CTZ (U)

REF: A. COMUSMACV MSG 16332 DTG 200910Z NOV 68 (S)

B. CG, III MAF MSG DTG 293248Z NOV 68 (S)

C. COMUSMACV MSG 32675 DTG 290653Z NOV 68 (S)

1. (U) YOUR PROPOSED MISSION STATEMENT CONTAINED IN REF B IS IN CONSONANCE WITH PREVIOUS GUIDANCE AND IS APPROVED.
2. (S) FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FURNISHED:
 - A. ADDITIONAL SOG ASSETS ARE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE BORDER SCREEN; HOWEVER, PRIORITY OF SOG OPERATIONS WILL REMAIN WITH OUT-OF-COUNTRY MISSIONS. III MAF WILL FURNISH AVIATION SUPPORT FOR THE INCREASE IN SOG ACTIVITIES.
 - B. BY REF C, MACV HAS FORWARDED TO CINCPAC A REQUEST FOR AN INITIAL ALLOCATION OF TEN COMBAT TRAP WEAPONS.
 - C. PROJECT DELTA IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED IN A THIRTY-DAY OPERATION IN III CTZ AND WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER MISSION UNTIL LATE DEC 68.

REQUEST THAT YOUR SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR PROJECT DELTA BE DETERMINED AND THAT THIS INFORMATION BE FURNISHED TO MACV ASAP. JGS HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO SCHEDULE DELTA FORCE INTO I CTZ ASAP AFTER COMPLETION OF CURRENT MISSIONS IN III CTZ.

GP-4.

SSO NOTE:

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

230

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

SIAMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MARDIV		DATE 06 DEC 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 061110Z DEC 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR Q-3 Done ASAP to Gen Alamo with latest statistics
	DCG					
2	DCG AIR					
	C/S	F				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	12/6		EMH	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3				Copy to 06 2120H VU	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #60

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE****FOR**

00 RHMMAFA
 DE RUMHLA 70704 3411005
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 061005Z DEC 68
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MGEN YOUNGDALE
 OPN MEADE RIVER (U)

1. (S) THE COMBINED USMC, ROKMC, ARVN, RF/PF, CORDS SPECIAL PACIFI-
 CATION OFFENSIVE OPN MEADE RIVER IS NEARING THE CONCLUSION OF ITS
 FINAL PHASE.

2. (S) THE FINAL SQUEEZE OF THE CORDON WAS COMPLETED BY 3/5 MOVING
 DELIBERATELY FROM THE S AND PROBING AND SEARCHING EVERY POSSIBLE
 HIDING PLACE. POCKETS OF RESISTANCE WERE LOCATED AND SURROUNDED,
 THEN ELIMINATED. THE MAIN EN STRONGHOLD WAS ISOLATED IN THE HORSE-
 SHOE AREA (VIC BT014587) POUNDED BY ARTY AND AIR AND THEN ASSAULTED
 BY ELEMENTS OF 3/26. HONEYCOMBED BY A SOPHISTICATED COMPLEX OF
 CONCRETE AND BRICK BUNKERS AND TUNNELS THIS AREA ALONE HAS ALREADY
 YIELDED APRX 70 KIA AND 15 POW. SINCE THE MAJORITY OF THESE BUNKERS
 WERE DESTROYED OR CAVED IN BY THE EXTREMELY ACCURATE 8 IN PRECISION
 DESTRUCTION FIRES CONSIDERABLE DIGGING AND SEARCHING REMAINS AND THE
 FINAL COUNT IS EXPECTED TO BE STILL HIGHER.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 0704 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

3. (S) FORCES COMMITTED HAVE BEEN RED WITH THE REL OF BLI 2/7 AND
 3/5.

4. (S) AS OF 061500H NOV68 MAR FOR HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR 122 VC AND
 352 NVA KIA. 64 VC AND 18 NVA HAVE BEEN CPTR IN ADDITION TO 56 IWC
 AND 6 CSWC. ROKMC HAVE RPT 2 VC KIA AND 2 IWC. ARVN FOR HAVE TO
 DATE KILLED 25 VC AND 21 NVA AND CPTR 12 POW AND 8 IWC. THE JOINT
 INTERROGATION CENTER WHEN OFFICIALLY CLOSED HAD INTERROGATED 2663
 DETAINEES SEGREGATING 71 VCI. FOLLOWING INTERROGATION
 700 OF THE CIVILIANS VOLUNTARILY MOVED FROM THE CONTESTED AREA INTO
 FRIENDLY VILLAGES ALONG HIGHWAY ONE.

5. (S) IN SUMMARY OPN MEADE RIVER HAS PROVEN ITSELF A DOUBLE EDGED
 SWORD, THROUGHOUT THE AO, SLICING OUT THE VCI FROM THE MORE
 POPULATED E PORTION WHILE CUTTING TO PIECES THE ORGANIZED VC AND
 NVA UNITS IN THE W. COMBINED WITH AN INTEGRATED SERIES OF JOINT
 CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES THESE RESULTS SHOULD SIG THE END OF THE
 ENEMYS STRANGLE HOLD ON THE DODGE CITY AREA.

GP-4

BT

SECRET
#60

SECRET

CGN 049 FIEE 95

		FROM CG FIRST MARDIV	DATE 06 DEC 68
		SERIAL# 061005Z DEC 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT	EXCLUSIVE FOR
6/17/68	<i>[Signature]</i>		
12/6	<i>[Signature]</i>		
			EXCLUSIVE FOR
TOR	061110H DEC 68		
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		
	MAT AND TAPE		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

#60

NRNVZGZCDA5890DA2670
OO YMLKQ
DE YSHKOD 50 3420932
O 070931Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1
FM GEN GOODPASTER DEPUTY COMUSMACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

815

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 16766 EYES ONLY
SUBJ: COORDINATION OF SLF OPNS WITH IN-COUNTRY FORCES (U)
REF: A. CG, III MAF 010356Z DEC 68 (S)
B. CG, III MAF 170712Z NOV 68 (S)

INT. SEC. NH	
DEPT. SINE	ub
ATIONS	
CG OPNS	
MAF	
ST DIV	
RD DIV	
ST MAF	
PRU	

I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS IN REF A WHICH I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH CORDS. IT APPEARS THAT YOUR CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE SLF IN THE APC REF B HAS CONSIDERABLE MERIT AS WAS BORNE-OUT IN THE RECENT SUCCESS OF OPN MEADE RIVER. I AM PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING A FULL CORDON, AND DOING IT SWIFTLY, AS WAS DONE IN MEADE RIVER, WITH THE VALUABLE RESULTS WITH LIMITED FRIENDLY CASUALTIES, AND OF TAKING ALL THE TIME REQUIRED TO DO A DELIBERATE, COMPLETE JOB. WE ARE ALL LOOKING FORWARD TO CONTINUED SUCCESS IN THESE EFFORTS.
GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
150

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#62

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV		DATE 07 DEC 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 070926		COPY# 123 OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				X	REMARKS For CG - Review for our side. Recommend passing to 1st Div + Comertal, plus our staff. Keepy G. ! Pass to 1st Div + Comertal G. L 9
4	DCG					
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SECRET #63

0 070926Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 16764 EYES ONLY

THE BRIEFING PRESENTED TO ME AT YOUR HEADQUARTERS,
6 DECEMBER, REPRESENTED, IN MY JUDGEMENT, WORK OF
THE HIGHEST PROFESSIONAL QUALITY. I COMMEND YOU AND THE
COMMANDERS AND STAFF PARTICIPATING.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER
DURING DUTY HOURS
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#63

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM 081010H		DATE 08 20 68	
			SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE 081010H		COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #65

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 08 DEC 68	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 072214Z DEC 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
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			IN	OUT		FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN	
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SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

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PP RHMMAFA
 DE RUHHRMA0767 3422214
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 072214Z DEC 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O
 FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM LT GEN BUSE
 TRANSIENT FACILITY AND R&R PROCESSING CENTER
 A. CG, III MAF 060134Z/DEC68
 B. CG, FLC 061254Z/NOV68
 C. CG, FMFPAC 152336Z/NOV68
 D. THIRD FSR 190141Z/NOV68 (NOTAL)
 E. CG, FLC 232232Z/NOV68
 F. ADMINO FMFPAC 020202Z/DEC68
 G. CG, FLC 281332Z/NOV68
 H. ADMINO FMFPAC 050223Z/DEC68

1. I UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN EXPRESSED IN REF A OVER PROCUREMENT OF FURNITURE FOR THE TRANSIENT AND R AND R CENTER, AND I TOO DESIRE TO HAVE THE NEW FACILITY IN OPERATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, I AM RELUCTANT TO APPROVE PROCUREMENT OF ITEMS FROM CONUS OR COMMERCIAL SOURCES AT A COST OF APPROX

PAGE 2 RUHHRMA0767 UNCLAS E F T O

\$14,300.00 WHEN LARGE QUANTITIES OF THE ITEMS OR ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTES ARE AVAILABLE FROM EXCESS STOCKS IN WESTPAC.
 2. REF B WAS THE CG, FLC REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ALLOWANCES FOR 520 DOUBLE TIER WALL LOCKERS. REF C WAS MY APPROVAL OF THE INCREASED ALLOWANCE AND A REQUEST FOR THIRD FSR TO SCREEN EXCESSES AVAILABLE. REF C ALSO REQUESTED CG, FLC TO REQUISITION EXCESS WALL LOCKERS REPORTED AVAILABLE BY 3D FSR. THIRD FSR REPORTED IN REF D THAT 8,000 STANDARD WALL LOCKERS WERE AVAILABLE FROM EXCESS STOCKS. REF E ADVISED THAT THE 8,000 LOCKERS AVAILABLE FROM EXCESSES WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE DUE TO SPACE LIMITATIONS. REF F WAS MY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE CG, FLC DETERMINATION THAT THE EXCESS LOCKERS IN WESTPAC WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE, AND DIRECTION TO THIRD FSR TO WITHHOLD PROCUREMENT ACTION PENDING ADVICE FROM MY HEADQUARTERS. I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THE CG, FLC ANSWER TO REF F.
 3. REF G IS YOUR REQUEST FOR ALLOWANCES FOR FURNITURE FOR THE NEW FACILITY AND FOR AUTHORITY TO PROCURE THE ITEMS FROM COMMERCIAL SOURCES IN WESTPAC. REF H APPROVED THE REQUESTED ALLOWANCES, BUT DIRECTED THIRD FSR TO PROVIDE THE ITEMS OR SUITABLE SUBSTITUTES FROM EXCESSES ALREADY IN WESTPAC. REF H

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES
 PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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PAGE 3 R UHHMA0767 UNCLAS E F I O

ALSO APPROVED NEW PROCUREMENT OF ANY ITEMS NOT AVAILABLE FROM EXCESS STOCKS.

4. THE PROBLEM OF THE LARGE QUANTITY OF EXCESS STOCKS IN WESTPAC AND THE UTILIZATION AND ULTIMATE DISPOSAL OF THEM IS A MATTER OF UTMOST CONCERN AT WASHINGTON LEVELS. CONSEQUENTLY, CLOSE SCRUTINY OF THE UTILIZATION OF EXCESSES AND PROCUREMENT OF MATERIAL IS BEING MADE BY DOD AND JCS AS WELL AS EXTERNAL REVIEW AGENCIES. THE MARINE CORPS CAN EXPECT SEVERE CRITICISM IN ANY INSTANCE WHERE NEW PROCUREMENT IS MADE WHEN THE MATERIAL OR USABLE SUBSTITUTES ARE AVAILABLE FROM EXISTING EXCESS STOCKS.

5. IN SHORT, I AM IN ACCORD WITH YOUR DESIRE FOR THE MOST ATTRACTIVE TRANSIENT AND R&R FACILITY POSSIBLE, BUT I DO NOT FEEL JUSTIFIED IN PROCURING MATERIAL FROM SOURCES OUTSIDE WESTPAC WHEN THE MATERIAL OR FUNCTIONAL SUBSTITUTES ARE AVAILABLE FROM EXCESS STOCKS.

6 I WILL DISCUSS THE UTILIZATION OF EXCESSES FURTHER WITH YOU DURING MY NEXT VISIT. WARM REGARDS.

PT

#767

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

#65

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAG		DATE 08 DEC 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 072215Z DEC 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				sp	REMARKS <i>Agree with CG - Agree with Marine Corps eyes only</i> <i>V. Keyser</i> 7
	DCG					
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	ADJ					
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12
SECRET

SECRET

RR RUEBHOA RHMMAFA
 DE RUHFMMA 0768 3422215
 ZNY SSSSS
 R 072215Z DEC 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION
 (U)

A. CMC 071300/NOV68 (S) (MCEO) (NOTAL)

1. (S) REF A PROVIDED INFORMATION ON PLANNED INCREASES IN ARTILLERY CAPABILITIES TO BE EFFECTED DURING PHASE I OF THE RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PLAN; REQUESTED JUSTIFICATION/RATIONALE FOR MAINTAINING OR CHANGING CURRENT 105MM HE AND 155MM HOWITZER HE AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE RATES, AND FURTHER REQUESTED COMMENTS CONCERNING AN INCREASE OF ARTILLERY WEAPONS IN RVN WITH NO INCREASE IN THE TOTAL QUANTITY OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION FOR CONSUMPTION.
2. (S) THE ADEQUACY OF CURRENT AUTHORIZED EXPENDITURE RATES FOR 105MM HE AND 155MM HOWITZER HE AMMUNITION HAS BEEN REVIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE III MAF LEVEL OF OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD

PAGE TWO RUHFMMA 0768 SECRET MCEO
 SEP-NOV 68, AND CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE ANTICIPATED FUTURE LEVEL OF OPERATIONS IN THE ICTZ. CONSIDERATION HAS ALSO BEEN GIVEN TO THE EFFECT OF THE COMUSMACV 5X5 AMMO SAVINGS PLAN ON RECENT MUNITION EXPENDITURES.

3. (S) FLC AVERAGE MONTHLY ISSUES FOR THE PERIOD SEP-NOV 68 HAVE EQUATED TO 53.4 RDS/WPN/DAY FOR 105MM HE, AND 25.2 RDS/WPN/DAY FOR 155MM HOWITZER HE. THESE RATES REFLECT A DECREASE IN USAGE FROM THE PREVIOUS THREE-MONTH PERIOD, WHICH IS CONSIDERED THE RESULT OF THE DECREASE IN LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY AND, TO SOME EXTENT, THE EFFECT OF THE COMUSMACV 5X5 AMMO SAVINGS PLAN. THE LEVEL OF OPERATIONS WITHIN III MAF DURING SEP-NOV 68 HAS REMAINED FAIRLY CONSTANT AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THIS LEVEL WILL BE MAINTAINED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. BASED ON THIS PREMISE, SOME REDUCTION IN THE CURRENT AUTHORIZED EXPENDITURE RATES OF 62.0 RDS/WPN/DAY FOR 105MM HE AND 30.0 RDS/WPN/DAY FOR 155MM HOWITZER HE IS CONSIDERED FEASIBLE AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, A REDUCTION TO THE ACTUAL ISSUE RATES FOR THE PAST THREE MONTHS IS NOT CONSIDERED ADVISABLE, SINCE SUCH A REDUCTION WOULD ELIMINATE ANY RESERVE IN THE EVENT OF AN UNEXPECTED INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY. THE ASR'S ESTABLISHED BY CG III MAF IN CONJUNCTION

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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PAGE THREE RUHHFMA 0768 S E C R E T M C E O
 WITH THE COMUSMACV 5X5 PLAN ARE CONSIDERED TO REPRESENT A MORE
 REALISTIC REQUIREMENT. ACCORDINGLY, A REDUCTION IN AUTHORIZED
 EXPENDITURE RATES TO 58.5 RDS/WPN/DAY FOR 105MM HE AND 28.0 RDS/
 WPN/DAY FOR 155MM HOWITZER HE IS ACCEPTABLE AT THIS TIME.

A. (S) COMMENTS OF THIS HQ CONCERNING AN INCREASE OF ARTILLERY
 WEAPONS IN RVN, WITH NO ATTENDANT INCREASE IN THE TOTAL QUANTITY
 OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION FOR CONSUMPTION, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE ACCEPTABLE REDUCED EXPENDITURE RATES CITED IN PARA 3
 ABOVE ARE CONSIDERED MERELY AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF EXPRESSING
 THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE FIRING OF 262,440 RDS OF 105MM HOWITZER
 HE AND 60,480 RDS OF 155MM HOWITZER HE AMMUNITION PER MONTH
 IN SUPPORT OF PROJECTED USMC/ROKMC OPERATIONS IN THE ICTZ.

B. FROM AN ARTILLERY SUPPORT VIEWPOINT, AND WITHIN REASONABLE
 LIMITS, THE ABOVE MONTHLY AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS CAN BE
 CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT OF THE EXACT NUMBER OF ARTILLERY WEA-
 PONS ON HAND, AND TO BE VARIABLE ONLY AS A RESULT OF CHANGES
 IN ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING:

- (1) THE NUMBER OF TACTICAL UNITS/INSTALLATIONS REQUIRING
 ARTILLERY SUPPORT.
- (2) THE LEVEL/NATURE OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

PAGE FOUR 0768 S E C R E T M C E O

(3) THE NUMBER AND/OR SIZE OF THE TACTICAL AREA (S) OF
 OPERATIONS REQUIRING ARTILLERY SUPPORT.

C. ACCORDINGLY, BASED UPON THE PREMISE THAT NO CHANGE IN THE
 FACTORS LISTED IN PARA 4B ABOVE WILL OCCUR IN THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE,
 IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY RVNAF ARTILLERY WEA-
 PONS INTO THE ICTZ WILL MERELY RESULT IN A GREATER NUMBER OF
 WEAPONS FIRING APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TOTAL NUMBER OF ROUNDS
 PER MONTH BUT AT SOME REDUCED NUMBER OF RDS/TUBE/DAY.

GP-4

BT

0768

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

#12

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PP RHMMAFA
 IE RUMHVP 06120 342 03 02
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 0703 02Z DEC 68 ZFD
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM MAJGEN DAVIS
 DUEL BLADE SITE A-3

A. CG, III MAF MSG CITE 031 DTG 26074Z NOV 68

1. IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE DIRECTIVE CONTAINED IN PARA
 3 OF REFERENCE BE REVIEWED.

2. DURING DECEMBER 1967 AN AP MINEFIELD WAS INSTALLED AT
 DUEL BLADE SITE A-3. THIS MINEFIELD, CONTAINING ABOUT 23,000
 KNOWN MPNES, ENCIRCLES THE SITE EXCEPT FOR PATROL LANES AND
 AN ENTRANCE ROAD. ALL MINES ARE OF THE AP VARIETY WITH A 2:1
 RATIO BETWEEN M-14 AND M-16 MINES. THE M-14 MINE IS A SMALL
 PLASTIC BLAST WIRE THAT IS ACTIVATED WHEN 25-30 POUNDS PRESSURE
 IS EXERTED ON ITS PRESSURE PLATE. BECAUSE OF ITS SMALL SIZE
 AND NON METALLIC SHELL THIS MINE IS VERY DIFFICULT TO DETECT.
 M-14 MINES AT A-3 ARE NOT BOOBY TRAPPED. THE M-16 IS A
 BOUNDING, FRAGMENTATION MINE AND FUNCTIONS WITH LIGHT GROUND
 PRESSURE, 8-20 POUNDS, AS WELL AS A TRIP WIRE PILL OF 3 TO 10

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 06120 C O N F I D E N T I A L

POUNDS. THE MINE IS SIMILAR IN LETHAL EFFECT TO THAT OF A 60MM
 MORTAR AND IS THUS DANGEROUS TO EQUIPMENT AS WELL AS PERSONNEL.
 ABOUT 1/3 OF THE M-16 MINES ARE RIGGED WITH A TRIP WIRE. NONE
 KNOWN ARE BOOBY TRAPPED. SUBSEQUENT TO INSTALLATION OF THE
 MINEFIELD THE AREA HAS BECOME HEAVILY OVERGROWN WITH VEGETATIVE
 COVER ALMOST COMPLETELY OBLITERATING THE MINEFIELD'S LOCATION.
 THE FRIENDLY SIDE OF THE MINEFIELD, INCLUDING SAFE LANES, IS
 MARKED IN A STANDARD MANNER.

3. THE AP MINEFIELD IS ENPLACED IN SUCH A MANNER TO MAKE
 REMOVAL BY ENEMY FORCES DIFFICULT. HOWEVER EXPERIENCE HAS
 SHOWN THAT UNLESS SUCH A FIELD IS COVERED BY FIRE, THE ENEMY
 IS CAPABLE OF BREACHING SAME AND IF HE IS WILLING TO SUSTAIN
 PERSONNEL LOSSES, HE HAS THE CAPABILITY OF REMOVING THE ENTIRE
 FIELD. IN THE CASE OF THE MINEFIELD AT A-3 SEVERAL FACTORS
 INHIBIT REMOVAL OF MINES FROM THE FIELD:

A. THE M-14 MINE IS BURIED, SMALL, AND HARD TO DETECT BY
 PROBE OR ELECTRONIC MEANS.

B. THE M-16 MINE IS BURIED WITH ONLY PRONGS PROTRUDING
 FROM THE SOIL. 1/3 OF THE CLUSTERS IN THE FIRST FOUR ROWS
 HAVE THE M-16 MINE FIXED WITH A TRIP WIRE.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SJRG.									#13

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PAGE THREE RUMHVP 0612D C O N F I D E N T I A L

C. THE AREA IS ALMOST COMPLETELY OVERGROWN WITH GRASS, BRUSH AND REEDS VARYING IN HEIGHT FROM 8" TO 6".

D. PREVIOUS SHELLING OF THE AREA HAS UNDOUBTEDLY SENSITIZED MANY MINES, SPECIFICALLY THE M-16.

E. DAILY ALLIED AERIAL OBSERVATION PRECLUDES ENEMY REMOVAL DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS MAKING NIGHT REMOVAL NECESSARY, AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TASK UNDER EVEN THE MOST FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.

F. EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM REMOVAL OF NUMEROUS AP MINEFIELDS SHOWS CASUALTIES TO BE HIGH EVEN WHEN ACCURATE MINEFIELD RECORDS ARE AVAILABLE AND WHERE VEGETATION IS NOT AN ADDITIONAL HAZARD. UNDER THE ADVERSE CONDITIONS AT A-3 IE: LACK OF MINEFIELD LAYOUT, HIGH VEGETATION, SENSITIZATION FROM ARTILLERY AND A NECESSITY TO WORK IN DARKNESS; THE ENEMY WOULD PROBABLY LOSE A MAN FOR EVERY 3 OR 4 MINES THEY OBTAINED, A GOOD EXCHANGE. IN ADDITION THE ENEMY CURRENTLY HAS A READY SOURCE OF SUPPLY FROM ITS SUPPORTING NATIONS AS WELL AS HOME MADE MINES UTILIZING AN AMPLE SUPPLY OF DUDS AND DISCARDED AMMUNITION. HE HAS LITTLE REASON TO TAKE THE DIFFICULT COURSE OF RESUPPLY THROUGH MINEFIELD CLEARANCE.

4. DESTRUCTION OF THE FIELD COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE LVTE-1 LINE CHARGE WHICH CONTAINS IN EXCESS OF 1700 POUNDS OF EXPLOSIVE.

PAGE FOUR RUMHVP 0612D C O N F I D E N T I A L

A VERY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE IS THAT AT LEAST 93 SUCH CHARGES, IF ACCURATELY LAID, WILL BE REQUIRED TO DEMOLISH THE FIELD. A LIBERAL ESTIMATE PLACES THE REQUIREMENT AS HIGH AS 200 CHARGES 12 SUCH CHARGES ARE CURRENTLY AVAILABLE TO THE DIVISION WITH ABOUT 100 ADDITIONAL AVAILABLE IN THE DANANG AREA. EVEN IF THIS TREMENDOUS EXPENDITURES OF MUNITIONS WERE MADE NO ONE COULD GUARANTEE COMPLETE REMOVAL OF THE FIELD WITHOUT A SWEEP.

5. AP, PRESSURE ACTIVATED MINES ARE NOT OVERLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO SYMPATHETIC DETONATION THUS, IN MOST INSTANCES EITHER DEMOLITIONS OR ARTILLERY FIRE REQUIRE A DIRECT HIT OR VERY NEAR MISS TO BE EFFECTIVE. PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THE USE OF ARTILLERY NORMALLY UNCOVERS MINES MAKING DISCOVERY AND ENEMY REMOVAL EASIER. IN ADDITION ARTILLERY COULD BE EXPECTED TO CUT MANY TRIP WIRES, AGAIN MAKING REMOVAL EASIER.

6. IF AVAILABLE AN LVTE-1 COULD BE USED TO EXCAVATE THE MINES AS LONG AS THE EARTH IS SOFT OR SANDY. THE LVTE-1 HAS SHOWN VERY LIMITED SUCCESS IN MINE EXCAVATION/REMOVAL. IN HARD EARTH, EXCAVATION WILL NOT, IN MANY INSTANCES, EXPLODE THE MINES BUT WILL ROLL THEM UP IN AN EARTH BERM FACILITATING ENEMY COLLECTION. THE ENEMY COULD SAFELY FOLLOW THE PLOWED AREAS AND, AFTER A HEAVY RAIN, RETRIEVE

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#13	

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PAGE FIVE RUMHVP 06120 C O N F I D E N T I A L
UNCOVERED MINES.

7. THE USE OF TANKS IS POSSIBLE. THE M-14 MINE WOULD NOT HARM THE TANK BUT THE M-16 HAS THE CAPACITY TO BREAK A TRACK.

8. THE ADVANTAGES OF LEAVING THE FIELD INTACT ARE AS FOLLOWS:
A. RESTRICTION OF USE BY THE ENEMY OF AN AREA HE COULD OTHERWISE USE.

B. DAILY SURVEILLANCE OF THE AREA, BY AIR OR GROUND, COULD WELL DISCLOSE ENEMY ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE MINES. IN SUCH AN AREA PROMPT REACTION COULD WELL RESULT IN ENEMY CASUALTIES IN EACH INSTANCE.

C. ENEMY ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE MINES AT NIGHT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY RESULT IN CASUALTIES FAVORABLE TO THE ALLIES.

D. IN EVENT THE ENEMY MADE PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE MINES, SUCH AN ATTRACTION COULD WELL BE USED TO OUR ADVANTAGE THROUGH AMBUSH, PATROL ACTION, TOT'S ETC.

E. THERE WOULD NOT BE THE NEEDLESS WASTAGE OF EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL THAT REMOVAL OR DESTRUCTION WOULD REQUIRE. EYIT WOULD THEREFORE APPEAR THAT SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES ARE AVAILABLE IE:

A. ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE MINEFIELD. THIS DESTRUCTION CAN BE

PAGE SIX RUMHVP 06120 C O N F I D E N T I A L

ACHIEVED BY DEMOLITION, ARTILLERY AND USE OF LVTE-1 (AT SUCH TIME AS ONE IS AVAILABLE) AND COMPLETED BY A MINE SWEEP.

B. CONDUCT A "SHOW OF FORCE" THROUGH LIMITED DEMOLITION AND ARTILLERY FIRE AND THUS SATISFY A POSSIBLE POLITICAL REQUIREMENT, RECOGNIZING IN ADVANCE THE INADEQUACY OF THE EFFORT.

C. EXPEND AN EXORBITANT AMOUNT OF LINE CHARGES, FOLLOWED BY LVTE-1 (WHEN AVAILABLE) EXCAVATION, RECOGNIZING THE INHERENT PROBLEM OF TURNING UP MINES FOR THE ENEMY.

D. LEAVE THE FIELD AS IS AND KEEP IT UNDER SURVEILLANCE.

10. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE MINEFIELD BE LEFT INTACT AND THAT IT BE KEPT UNDER SURVEILLANCE.

GP-4

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06120

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#13

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 8200REV 3-68

OPERATION CODE			FROM COMUSMACV XXXXXXXXXX		DATE 11 DEC 68	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 1011217 DEC 68		COPY# 2 of 6 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
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3	CG	I			la	REMARKS FOR
5	DCG			12/11	Rues	
	DCG AIR					
4	C/S	I			Q	
2	D C/S	I	12/11	12/11	mm	
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	ENGR					
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	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

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PP RUSVDB
DE RUSVDE 9003 3451200
ZNY CCCCC
P 101124Z DEC 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO ZEN/CDR -TH AF
ZEN/CG USARV
ZEN/COMNAVFORV
RUSVDB/CG III MAF
BT

FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT 41147
SUBJ: JOINT LOGISTIC REVIEW BOARD (U)
SPECAT FOR GEN BROWN, LGEN MILDREN, VADM ZUMWALT, LTGEN CUSHMAN
FROM GEN ABRAMS

1. (C) INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT RECOMMENDATION HAS BEEN MADE BY THE DEPUTY SECDEF THAT A JOINT LOGISTIC REVIEW BOARD HEADED BY A 4 STAR OFFICER CONDUCT A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THE LOGISTIC EFFORT RELATED TO THE WAR IN WOUTHEAST ASIA AND ITS RESULTANT WORLDWIDE IMPACT.
2. (C) JCS AGREE IN PRINCIPLE THAT A REVIEW OF LOGISTIC LESSONS LEARNED IN SUPPORTING COMBAT FORCES IN SEA WOULD BE WORTHWHILE. JCS HAVE CONCURRED WITH ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT LOGISTICS REVIEW GROUP TO "REVIEW THE VIETNAM WAR FROM THE POINT OF

PAGE 2 RUSVDE 9003 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT
VIEW OF LOGISTIC READINESS AND SUPPORT...REVIEW THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS SUPPORT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF COMBAT OPERATIONS AND ASSESS THE ABILITY TO MEET CHANGING SITUATIONS AND EMERGENCIES, THE EFFECT ON WORLDWIDE READINESS, AND THE EFFICIENCY OF SUPPORT IN LIGHT OF THE RELATED SITUATION, POLICIES, AND CONTROLS AS THEY DEVELOPED". JCS RECOMMENDED THAT THIS GROUP SUBMIT FINAL REPORT TO THEM BY 31 DECEMBER 1969 AND THEN BE DISSOLVED.

3. (C) THE CURRENT OSD PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, REFLECTS A BROADER SCOPE FOR THIS STUDY; ALSO, THE BOARD WOULD REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE SECDEF AND CJCS, AND WOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONCLUDE ITS WORK BY END DECEMBER 1969. THE REVISED TERMS OF REFERENCE PRESCRIBE: " THE JLRB WILL REVIEW WORLDWIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE US GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES DURING THE 'VIETNAM ERA' (AUGUST 1, 1965 TO DATE) TO IDENTIFY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF 'LOGISTIC SYSTEMS' (I.E., POLICIES, PROCEDURES, ORGANIZATION, MANPOWER, AND CONTROLS) IN ORDER TO MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES THAT WILL IMPROVE THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE SYSTEMS. THE BOARD WILL GIVE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE EFFECTIVENESS AND ECONOMY OF CURRENT AND PLANNED LOGISTIC SYSTEMS UNDER COMBAT AND THE QUICK REACTION CAPABILITIES OF THESE SYSTEMS.

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENR.	FD. SERV.	HC. COMD	INS.	REGAS	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#17

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 RUSVDE 9003 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT
 CHANGING SITUATIONS AND EMERGENCIES. THE BOARD WILL EXAMINE THE
 LOGISTIC POSTURE AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE BUILD-UP, AND THE
 FACTORS THAT AFFECTED (1) THE RESPONSIVENESS OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT
 TO COMBAT FORCES IN VIETNAM, AND (2) THE ADEQUACY OF WORLDWIDE
 READINESS. THE BOARD WILL IDENTIFY LOGISTIC LESSONS LEARNED,
 INCLUDING THOSE OF A PLANNING NATURE, WHICH MAY HAVE A SIGNIFICANT
 EFFECT ON READINESS FOR AND SUPPORT OF FUTURE COMBAT OPERATIONS,
 PARTICULARLY THOSE OF A JOINT NATURE."

A. (U) REQUEST YOUR VIEWS ON OSD PROPOSAL BY 1200, 13 DEC.
 COMMENTS DESIRED ON FEASIBILITY, DESIRABILITY, MAJOR PROBLEMS
 FORESEEN, AND ANY OTHER SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS.

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OP-4 MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMB.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.	PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES								
											#17	

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG FMFPAG		DATE 11 DEC 68	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 102301Z DEC 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR	REMARKS
			IN	OUT			
	CG						
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	I			a	EXCLUSIVE FOR	
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
1	S/S	I	12/11		12		
	G-1		Copy at 11/2/25H				
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	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

#2 burned 13 Dec 68

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PP RHMMAFA
 DE RUHFMA 1127 3452301
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 102301Z DEC 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
 FROM LTGEN BUSE

- PROMOTION QUOTAS TO LCPL (U)
 A. CG III MAF 131426Z/NOV68 (U)
 B. CG III MAF 141000Z/NOV68 (U)
 C. CG FMFPAC 200409Z/NOV68 (U)
 D. CG III MAF 070030Z/DEC (C)

1. REF A, AS MODIFIED BY REF B REQUESTED ADDITIONAL PROMOTION QUOTAS FOR LCPL. REF C DISAPPROVED THE REQUEST BUT STATED THAT A MODEST INCREASE WOULD BE PROVIDED. REF D INVITED MY ATTENTION TO THE SITUATION IN WHICH OUTSTANDING MARINES ARE BEING RETURNED TO CONUS IN THE SAME RANK IN WHICH THEY DEPARTED.
2. I AM PERSONALLY AWARE OF THE SITUATION DESCRIBED IN REFS A THROUGH D. YOUR PROPOSAL THAT PROMOTIONS NOT BE COMPUTED AGAINST THE AUTHORIZED T/O ON-BOARD

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 1127 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR STRENGTH IN GRADE IS A DECISION FOR CMC WHICH I SHALL PASS ON. I HOLD OUT LITTLE HOPE OF APPROVAL, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE CURRENT PROCEDURE IS ALREADY AN OVER-PROMOTION AUTHORITY OF UP TO 125 PERCENT AND ANY FURTHER INCREASE WOULD CAUSE AN IMBALANCE THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE MARINE CORPS.

3. AN EXPLANATION OF THE PROMOTION QUOTAS FOLLOWS:
 - A. PAR. 3. OF REF D STATES THAT ONLY A FEW OF THE INFANTRY PFC'S ASSIGNED TO HQ, III MAF ARE PROMOTED TO LCPL BEFORE ROTATION. THERE IS NO RESTRICTION ON PROMOTION BY OCC FLD, I.E., PROMOTION QUOTAS MAY BE USED FOR ANY OCC FLD.
 - B. BOTH DIVISIONS AS WELL AS FLC REQUEST ADDITIONAL PROMOTION QUOTAS EACH MONTH, BUT THERE ARE NONE AVAILABLE. BECAUSE YOUR HQ AND CAMP BUTLER ARE SO FAR OVER STRENGTH IN THE LCPL GRADE, BOTH DIVISIONS COULD NOT BE GIVEN THEIR TRUE PERCENTAGE OF PROMOTION AUTHORITY. IF EACH DIVISION COULD COMPUTE THEIR OWN PROMOTION AUTHORITY INSTEAD OF TAKING THEIR SHARE OF THE TOTAL MCC 159 COMPUTATION, THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED TO PROMOTE 342 MORE LCPL IN THE 1ST DIV AND 372 MORE LCPL IN THE 3D DIV DURING DECEMBER. THE QUOTA FOR

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES								#20

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PAGE 3 RUMHMA 1127 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR HQ, III MAF SHOULD HAVE BEEN 7, HOWEVER, AN ADDITIONAL 14 QUOTAS WERE GRANTED IN RESPONSE TO REFS A AND B.

C. AT THE TIME OF COMPUTATION OF THE DECEMBER QUOTAS, HQ, III MAF WAS AT 135 PERCENT (209 OVER) OF M/L IN THE GRADE OF LCPL, AND CAMP BUTLER WAS AT 206 PERCENT, WHEREAS THE 1ST AND 3D DIVS WERE AT 110 AND 106 PERCENT RESPECTIVELY. CAMP BUTLER'S AVERAGE IS DUE TO CASUALTIES ON THEIR ROLLS. ALL OTHER COMMANDS WITHIN MCC 159 WERE UNDER THE 125 PERCENT.

4. I WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE YOU SOME ADDITIONAL PROMOTION QUOTAS EACH MONTH AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER COMMANDS, HOWEVER, AS STATED IN REF C, IT WILL BE MODEST. MEANWHILE I SUGGEST YOU TAKE A LOOK AT THE DISTRIBUTION OF QUOTAS WITHIN M&S CO, SU NR 1, 1ST RADIO BN AND THE CAGS. ALSO, A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF LCPL'S REQUESTED EACH MONTH FROM THE DIVISIONS FOR THE CAGS WOULD PERMIT MORE PROMOTIONS.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1127

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-64)

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BTTCZYUH RUMJATA0348 3460040-CCCC--RHMAFA.
ZNY CCCCC

R 110040Z DEC 68

FM NAVFPCSCEN CHINA LAKE

TO RHMAFA/COMMANDING GENERAL III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

BT

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HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE COMPANY, III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (R&D)

FOR JOHN HOFFMAN

ROCKEYE DROP (U)

1. (C) REQUEST INFORMATION CONCERNING ROCKEYE II DROP INTO JUNGLE CANOPY.

2. (C) ALSO REQUEST FORWARD ASAP DATA SHEETS ON FOUR ROCKEYE II DROPS BY MAG 11; DATA ON THESE COMPILED BY 1ST MAW, G-3 (MAJOR LORING/MAJOR JOHNSON). FORWARD DATA SHEETS AND FILM OF CANOPY DROP WHEN AVAILABLE, TO NWC, ATTN: IRV KOFF, CODE 4031.

GP-4

BT

NO348

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#21	

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG XXIV CORPS		DATE 12 DEC 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 110620Z DEC 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT PERSONAL FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				6	<p>REMARKS</p> <p>for CG- would be a good item to discuss with Gen Jan at a meeting FOR trying to have FEO work in accordance with I Corps Eng Advisor and I Corps Eng.</p> <p>Copy</p> <p>FEO Copy</p> <p>Gen Jan concurs. We'll work thru Prov. Chiefs + PSA's in coord/coop with Buys - then III MAF will put together.</p> <p>la</p>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			2	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	12		2	
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	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

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PTTCZYVW RUMMLBPA0921 3470602-CCCC--RHMMAFA
ZNY CCCC
P 110620Z DC 68 ZDK
MM CG, XXIV CORPS, VOB
TO CG, III MAF, DNG
PERSONAL FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM LT GEN STILWELL
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L AVII-CE07244
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY LOC'S
REFERENCE: III MAF COMMANDERS CONFERENCE BRIEFINON SUBJECT: DEVELOP-
MENT OF SECONDARY LOC'S, 5 DECEMBER 1968.

1. (C) THE REMARKABLE SUCCESS OF THE 101ST ARVN ENGINEERING RECONSTRUCT-
ING A VILLAGE TO MARKET ROAD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE GIA DANG PROJECT
HAS CLEARLY DEMONST-
ATED A LATENT ARVN ENGINEERING CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT
PART THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAING AND TO ASSIST IN THE EKONOM-
IC DEVELOPMENT M SOUTH VIETNAM WITH MINIMUM US TECHNICAL ADVISE AND
SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT, NOT ORGANICALLY AVAILABLE TO THE ARVN UNIT, THE
CAPABILITIES OF THE BATTALION WERE ENHANCED MANY FOLD INDICATING THAT A
JUDICIOUS COMBINATION OF US AND ARVN RESOURCES CAN YIELD BENEFITS BE-
YOND THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THE TWO FORCES ACTING ALONE.
2. (C) OPENING OF THIS ROAD HAS BEEN ENTHUSIASTICALLY GREETED BY THE
LOCAL POPULATION AND THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT IT WILL HAVE A PER-
MANENT IMPACT ON THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNITY.

PAGE TWO RUMMLBPA 6914 C O N F I D E N T I A L
MOREOVER, SINCE THE MERITS OF THE ROAD ARE UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED, VC
ATTEMPTED DESTRUCTION OR MINING OF THE ROAD WOULD BE PRIMA FACIE EVI-
DENCE THAT THE VC ARE THE REAL ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE.

3. (C) ASIDE FROM THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PLUSES TO BE
DERIVED FROM PROJECTS OF THIS NATURE THERE ARE ANCILLARY BENEFITS
STEMMING FROM ON THE JOB TRAINING RECIVED BY ARVN ENGINEER FORCES AND
DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNICAL SKILLS AMONG THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WHICH WILL

- BE USEFUL FOR POST WAR REHABILITATION EFFORTS.
4. (C) AT THE PRESENT TIME US ENGINEER EFFORT IS LOGICALLY DEVOTED TO
DIRECT SUPPORT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND TO MAJOR ENGINEERING PROJECTS
(SUCH AS THE RESTORATION OF PRIMARY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS). NONE-THE-
LESS FROM TIME TO TIME CERTAIN RESIDUAL ASSETS CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO
USE AND ASSIST ARVN ENGINEER FORCES. IN THIS EVENT THEIR CAPA-
BILITY TO SUPPORT GVN PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS WILL BE ENHANCED MANY FOLD.
THE POTENTIAL GAIN TO BE ACHIEVED IS SO GREAT AS TO WARRANT DEVELOP-
MENT OF A PROGRAM TO EXPLOIT THIS CAPABILITY AND FOR ITS EXTENSION INTO THE
POST HOSTILITIES PERIOD.
5. (C) ACCORDINGLY, I RECOMMEND THAT:
 - A. ARVN BE ENCOURAGED TO DEVELOP AND PURSUE A LOC REHABILITATION
PROGRAM FOR SECONDARY ROADS.

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-64)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES								#23

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PAGE THREE RUMLEPA 6914 C O N F I D E N T I A L
B. FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE ENGINEER FORCES PROVIDE SPE-
CIALIZED EQUIPMENT AND TECHNICAL ADVISE AND ASSISTANCE TO ARVN ENGINEER
FORCES FOR VIETNAMESE PUBLIC WORKS ACTIVITIES ~~AND~~ SUCH PROJECTS ARE
NOT IN COMPETITION WITH HIGHER PRIORITY MILITARY CONSTRUCTION EFFORTS.

SP-4

BT

6914

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMBL	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	WTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#23

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CCN 094 FILE 95

		FROM 7TH AF	DATE 11 DEC 68
		SERIAL# 111345Z DEC 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
		EXCLUSIVE FOR	
TOR	111345Z DEC 68		
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	MAT AND TAPE		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

#24

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ZCZCVA637ZVA 336VBF910
ZZ RUSVDB
 DE RUSVB 1298 3461350
 ZNY SSSSS ZOK JPCCO
 Z 111345Z DEC 68
 FM 7AF TSN AB RVN
 TO AIG 762
 AIG 7946
 AIG 7936
 AIG 7935
 EXEMPT ICE GP TSN AB RVN
 I WEA GP TSN AB RVN
 1964 COMM GP TSN AB RVN
 505 TAC CON GP TSN AB RVN
 6250 SPT SQ TSN AB RVN
 BT

S E C R E T/DI

EXCLUSIVE FOR ALL WING AND BASE COMMANDERS, TACC, DASC
 SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE WARNING (U) THIS IS PRECAUTIONARY MESSAGE.
 EVIDENCE INDICATES THE ENEMY IS MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR OFFENSIVE
 ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE CHIEF ENEMY ACTION WILL BE IN
 III CORPS AND NORTHERN IV CORPS WITH ENEMY IN OTHER CORPS LENDING
 SUPPORT TO TIE DOWN ALLIED FORCES. ATTACKS BY FIRE AGAINST US
 AIR BASES CAN BE EXPECTED DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS. THIS COULD

PAGE 2 RUSVB 1298 S E C R E T
 BE ACCOMPANIED BY SAPPER ACTION. ATTACKS MAY START AS EARLY IN DEC
 AS THE 12TH. THE HIGH POINT OF THE ATTACKS WILL LIKELY BE SUBSE-
 QUENT TO THE 15TH. IN EASTERN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, CENTRAL AND
 NORTHWESTERN III CORPS, AND NORTHERN IV CORPS, THESE ATTACKS COULD
 INCLUDE GROUND PROBES.

GP-4

BT

1298

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#24

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 12 DEC 68	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 112209Z DEC 68		COPY# <i>1 of 3</i> COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN	
<i>7</i>	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY <i>" # 3 burned 12 Dec 68 "</i>	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
<i>2</i>	C/S	<i>I</i>			<i>a</i>		
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
<i>1</i>	S/S	<i>I</i>	<i>12/12</i>		<i>id</i>		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
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	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

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OO R HMMAFA
 DE RUHHRMA 1245 3462209
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 112209Z DEC 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMMFAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
 JOINT LOGISTIC REVIEW BOARD (U)

A. CG III MAF 110932Z DEC 68(C) (MCEO)

1. (C) IT IS UNDERSTOOD FROM HQMC THAT THE OSD STUDY
 ADDRESSED IN REF A IS AN ARMY INITIATED PROPOSAL. ALL OTHER
 SERVICES ARE OPPOSED TO IT.

2. (C) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, SUGGEST REPLY ALONG THE
 FOLLOWING LINE:

"ORGANIZATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT
 FOR MARINE CORPS UNITS IN PACOM IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
 CG FMFPAC; THEREFORE, IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO PROVIDE
 COMMENTS ON THIS MATTER". WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

124 5

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#26

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG THIRD MARDIV		DATE 12 DEC 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 120530Z DEC 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SPEC MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
7	CG					REMARKS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY 700 - Comment these 9. For @ 6 - July 3 provides rationale on present ASL's for 105 & 155 How ammo. As soon as 1st Div Reg. arrives we will have to determine what increase in 155 How ASL can be supported. Respy 9.
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	12/12			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
7	OP ANAL					
	ORD	A	12/13	12/13	W	
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

SECRET

LL P RHMMAFA
 DE RUMNY 1.0 3470330
 ZNB SSSSS
 P 120530Z DEC 68
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 INFO ZEN/TWELFTH MAR

S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION
 (U)

A. CG III MAF 151434Z NOV 68

1. (U) PARA 3 OF FF (A) REFERS

2. (S) RECOMMEND INCREASE OF ASR FOR 155MM HOW FROM 28
 RDS/TUBE/DAY TO 38 RDS/TUBE/DAY. 155MM HOWITZER IS NOW
 EMPLOYED FOR DESTROYING BUNKERS AND FOR CUTTING THROUGH THE
 HEAVY DOUBLE AND TRIPLE CANOPY OF THE RAIN FOREST IN THE
 WESTERN AND SOUTHERN PORTIONS OF THIRD MARDIV AD. THE HEAVIER
 WEIGHT AND GREATER EXPLOSIVE POWER OF THE 155MM PROJECTILE IS
 REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS OF ARTILLERY
 IN THAT TYPE OF TERRAIN.

3. (S) RECOMMEND ASR FOR 105MM HOW REMAIN AT 58.5 RDS/TUBE /
 DAY.

CP-A

BT

1210

SECRET
#27

~~SECRET~~

O 121705Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS PHB
TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN
LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DNG
INFO MG DAVIS CG 3D MAR DIV DGH
ZEM

T O P I S E C R E T PHB 1907 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: ARVN DMZ PATROLLING

REF: PHB 1823, DTG 281728Z NOV.

1. WE CAN EXPECT VERY LITTLE PATROLLING BY ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST ARVN INTO THEIR SECTOR OF DMZ. TRUONG REASONS THAT, WITH SURPRISE LONG SINCE LOST, THE OPEN TERRAIN TO HIS FRONT IS INHOSPITABLE TO GROUND RECCO EFFORT. ONLY THE APPEARANCE OF INDICATORS THAT NVA IS LEAVING THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ (A DEVELOPMENT

HE CONSIDERS HIGHLY UNLIKELY) WILL SPUR HIM TO PATROLLING ON A REGULAR BASIS.

2. MEANWHILE, THERE HAS BEEN A REALIGNMENT OF 2D REGIMENT UNITS. MAJOR DUNG (CO, 11TH ARMD CAV SQUADRON) NOW COMMANDS THE TWO BATTALIONS (1ST AND 4TH) FRONTING THE DMZ PLUS ONE M-113 TROOP. DUNG IS DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO COL GIAI. DUNG'S MISSIONS ARE TO KEEP AREA IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF DMZ CLEAR OF ENEMY, TO PREVENT INFILTRATION AND TO EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES. GIAI, WITH BALANCE OF FORCES, WILL CONCENTRATE ON PACIFICATION RELATED, AS WELL AS MOBILE, OPERATIONS ELSEWHERE IN ZONE.

3. TRUONG HAS ISSUED GIAI AND DUNG TWO SIGNIFICANT INSTRUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ENTRY INTO SOUTHERN DMZ:

A. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL AN ARVN SOLDIER BE TAKEN PRISONER BY THE ENEMY.

B. ENTER ONLY WHEN CLEAR OPPORTUNITY PERCEIVED TO KILL OR CAPTURE ENEMY.

C. QUICK THRUST, PURSUANT TO B, WILL BE IN 50 RPT 50 MAN STRENGTH.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

4. TRUONG WAS FORTHRIGHT IN REPORTING FOREGOING. I TOLD HIM MY INSTRUCTIONS LIMITING PATROLS TO SQUAD SIZE REMAINED IN FORCE; AND ASKED HIM IF HE HAD RECEIVED AUTHORITY FOR THIS SHIFT. HE SAID THIS WAS HIS OWN DETERMINATION BUT WAS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH HIS ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS WHICH AUTHORIZED PATROLLING WITHOUT FURTHER SPECIFICATION, THAT ONLY WORD ON SQUAD SIZED PATROLS WITH PLATOON BACK-UP HAD COME FROM ME. IT

LD TRUONG THAT THIS DISCLOSURE PRESENTED US-SIDE WITH REAL PROBLEM SINCE IT UNDERSTOOD WE WERE COMPLETELY IN STEP. TRUONG SAID THERE WOULD BE NO PATROLLING FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL DAYS AND THE WE WOULD HAVE AMPLE ADVANCE NOTICE OF NEXT FORAY.

5. IN THIS CONNECTION, YOU WILL RECALL MY REPORT (REF A) ON SECOND PRISONER SNATCH BY DIV RECON WHERE THE TWO PATROLS O

PERATED ESSENTIALLY AS ONE COMBINED FORCE. I NOW SUSPICION THAT THE AMBUSH ALONG HIGHWAY 1 WHICH PRODUCED FIRST PRISONER WAS SET BY A FORCE LARGER THAN A SQUAD.

6. I KNOW TRUONG WELL ENOUGH TO DOUBT MY ABILITY PERSUADE HIM ABIDE BY OUR GROUND RULES, IN ABSENCE OF JGS/IKCTZ INSTRUCTIONS. K CONVERSELY, GIVEN ATTITUDE EXPRESSED IN PARA 1, PRO FORMA JGS INSTRUCTIONS ON SIZE LIMITATIONS WILL LIKELY TRANSLATE INTO NO PATROLS AT ALL. MILITARILY, TRUONG'S POSITION IS SOUND BY OTHER IMPLICATIONS ARE WELL RECOGNIZED. PENDING FURTHER GUIDANCE, I WILL DO BEST TO INSURE NO ARVN FORCES ENTER DMZ.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER OPENING BUSINESS 13 DECEMBER
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

500

#32-#2

NNNN

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION BRIEF
5000/3 (6.67)

SUBJECT:

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Improvement and Modernization

DATE:

13 Dec 1968

1. PROBLEM:

To provide comments on Third Marine Division's Recommended increase of ASR for 155mm Howitzer ammunition.

2. FACTS:

- a. Third Marine Division message is in response to paragraph 3 of TAB 1.
- b. First Marine Division will reply to paragraph 3 of TAB 1 at which time any proposed changes in ASR will be recommended to FMFPAC in accordance with paragraph 3e of TAB 2.

3. DISCUSSION:

- a. Basic rationale provided on TAB 3 remains valid. Those savings indicated in paragraph 3b(3) of TAB 3 provided for increased allocations on an as required basis.
- b. Divisions have been instructed to request any increase in allocations of ammunition needed to meet operational requirements. On only one occasion has an increase in 155mm Howitzer ammunition been requested. This request was to support operation Taylor Common and was approved as shown on TAB 4.
- c. The present ammunition allocations and stockage levels for III MAF are adequate to support current ammunition requirements and allows for judicious increased allowances on an as required basis.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

That present ASR of 28 R/T/D for 155mm Howitzer ammunition remains satisfactory.

5. DELAYED OR LATE CORRESPONDENCE:

ACTION OFFICER

SIGNATURE <i>J. Leon</i>	TYPED NAME C. W. RETNKE, Captain	BILLET Tracked Vehicle Officer
SECTION HEAD		DATE 13 Dec 68

#27

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 13 DEC 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 130025Z DEC 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I				REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	12/13		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

#29

SECRET

PP RUEBHOA RUMSAK
 DE RUHKM 1333 3480025
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 130025Z DEC 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 ZEN/CG NINTH MAB
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR GEN
 CHAPMAN INFO LT GEN CUSHMAN, BGEN WEBSTER AND
 BGEN WILLIAMS FROM LT GEN BUSE. DELIVER DURING NORMAL
 WORKING HOURS.

REALIGNMENT OF III MAF STRUCTURE (U)

- A. CMC 231831Z/NOV68 (S) (SPECAT) (NOTAL)
- B. CG III MAF 021420Z/DEC68 (S) (SPECAT)
- C. CG III MAF 131000Z/OCT68 (S) (NOTAL)
- D. CG III MAF 100300Z/DEC68 (S) (SPECAT)

1. (S) REF A ADVISED OF DEPSECDEF DECISION THAT NO
 ADDITIONAL SEASIA PROGRAM SIX SPACES WOULD BE
 AUTHORIZED AND NO UNITS WOULD BE REDEPLOYED FROM SVN
 AT THIS TIME. FURTHER, IT REQUESTED THAT A PLAN

PAGE 2 RUHKM 1333 **S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 BE SUBMITTED TO BEST MEET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
 WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF PROGRAM SIX CEILINGS AND
 THE DEPSECDEF DECISION.

2. (S) BY REF B, CG III MAF SUBMITTED A REALIGNMENT
 PROPOSAL WITHIN THE PARAMETERS ESTABLISHED BY REF A,
 WHICH PROVIDED FOR PLACING CERTAIN UNITS IN CADRE
 STATUS, RETAINING CERTAIN UNITS AT T/O STRENGTH THAT
 HAD BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR DELETION IN THE REALIGNMENT
 OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE PROPOSED BY REF C, AND
 REDUCING SPACES AUTHORIZED THE FORCE LOGISTICS
 COMMAND AND REMAINING LAAM BN TO ACCOMMODATE THE
 REALIGNMENT.

3. (S) BY REF D, CG III MAF MODIFIED THE REALIGNMENT
 PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN REF B TO AVOID PLACING PORTIONS
 OF THE REMAINING LAAM BN IN A CADRE STATUS AND TO
 PROVIDE SPACES TO ACCOMMODATE RETENTION OF WERS (MWSG),
 WHICH WAS PROPOSED FOR REDEPLOYMENT TO OKINAWA BY REF
 C.

4. (S) THE REALIGNMENT OF III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE
 PROPOSED IN REF B, AS MODIFIED BY REF D, IS CONCURRED

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#29

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUKKM 1333 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 IN WITH THE MINOR EXCEPTION THAT REDUCTION OF SPACES
 FOR HQ BNS/MAR DIVS (FRNS K002A00 AND K003A00) IS
 APPROVED AT 33 FOR EACH AND THE REDUCTION OF SPACES
 FOR FLC (FRN003300) IS DECREASED TO 164. A RE-
 CAPITULATION OF THIS PLAN FOR REALIGNMENT OF THE
 III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A
 FOLLOWS (NOTE: CHANGES INDICATED REFER TO THE
 REALIGNMENT PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY REF C):

FRN NO	UNIT	NEW STR	CHANGE	REMARKS
K002A00	HQ BN/MAR DIV	1283	- 33	NOTE NR 1
K002B00	HQ CO/INF REGT	251	- 13	NOTE NR 1
K002F00	HQ CO/INF REGT	251	- 13	NOTE NR 1
K002J00	HQ CO/INF REGT	251	- 13	NOTE NR 1
K002N00	HQBTRY/ARTY REGT	278	- 16	NOTE NR 1
K002T00	AT BN	19	PLUS 19	NOTE NR 2
K003A00	HQ BN/MAR DIV	128	- 33	NOTE NR 1
K003B00	HQ CO/INF REGT	251	- 13	NOTE NR 1
K003F00	HQ CO/INF REGT	251	- 13	NOTE NR 1
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PAGE 4 RUKKM 1333 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

K003T00	AT BN	19	PLUS 19	NOTE NR 2
K016A00	TK BN	573	PLUS 24	NOTE NR 2
K017A00	TK BN	573	PLUS 24	NOTE NR 2
K019 00	AMTRAC BN	137	PLUS 137	NOTE NR 2
K022A00	MP BN	600	- 50	NOTE NR 3
K023 00	MP BN	600	- 50	NOTE NR 3
K026 00	HQ BTRY FAG	21	PLUS 21	NOTE NR 2
K033 00	FLC	6180	- 164	NOTE NR 3
K052 00	MAC G	886	- 64	NOTE NR 4
K055 00	MWSG	826	PLUS 221	NOTE NR 5
K060 00	MABS VF/VA	483	- 9	NOTE NR 6
K061 00	MABS VF/VA	483	- 9	NOTE NR 6
K062 00	MABS VF/VA	483	- 9	NOTE NR 6
K076 00	H/MS MAG VH	314	- 19	NOTE NR 6
K077 00	H/MS MAG VH	314	- 19	NOTE NR 6
K078 00	MABS MAG VH	561	- 78	NOTE NR 6
K079 00	MABS MAG VH	561	- 78	NOTE NR 6
M012 00	VMA SQDN	260	PLUS 260	NOTE NR 5

NOTES: NR 1 - REDUCTION IN DIVISION AUGMENTATION
 NR 2 - CADRE TO MAINTAIN FLAG AND EQUIPMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#29

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SSO NOTE: DELIVER OPENING BUSINESS 13 DECEMBER
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

500

52-#2

NNNN

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION BRIEF
5000/3 (6.67)

SUBJECT:

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Improvement and Modernization

DATE:

13 Dec 1968

1. PROBLEM:

To provide comments on Third Marine Division's Recommended increase of ASR for 155mm Howitzer ammunition.

2. FACTS:

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4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

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ACTION OFFICER

SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>	TYPED NAME C. W. REINKE, Captain	BILLET Tracked Vehicle Officer
SECTION HEAD <i>[Signature]</i>		DATE 13 Dec 68

#27

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM 31 712/00		DATE 13 DEC 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 4 00000 000 000		COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY #3 to Proc 6 File 13 Dec 68 ec 68 ins
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP AN					
	ORD					
	PSY O					
	SUPPL					
	S&C					

29

SECRET #29

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

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IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

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			IN	OUT		EXCLUSIVE FOR INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN	
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	DCG						
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	D C/S						
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1	S/S	I	12/13		H		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
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	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

SECRET #29

SECRET

PP RUEBHOA RUMSAK
 DE RUHKM 1333 3480025
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 130025Z DEC 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RUMSAK/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 ZEN/CG NINTH MAB
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR GEN
 CHAPMAN INFO LT GEN CUSHMAN, BGEN WEBSTER AND
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REALIGNMENT OF III MAF STRUCTURE (U)

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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#29

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUKM 1333 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
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 FOR FLC (FRN003300) IS DECREASED TO 164. A RE-
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K002J00	HQ CO/INF REGT	251	- 13	NOTE NR 1
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K003J00	HQ CO/INF REGT	251	- 13	NOTE NR 1
K003N00	HQBTRY/ARTYREGT	278	- 16	NOTE NR 1

PAGE 4 RUKM 1333 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

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K023 00	MP BN	600	- 50	NOTE NR 3
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K033 00	FLC	6180	- 164	NOTE NR 3
K052 00	MACG	886	- 64	NOTE NR 4
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K062 00	MABS VF/VA	483	- 9	NOTE NR 6
K076 00	H/MS MAG VH	314	- 19	NOTE NR 6
K077 00	H/MS MAG VH	314	- 19	NOTE NR 6
K078 00	MABS MAG VH	561	- 78	NOTE NR 6
K079 00	MABS MAG VH	561	- 78	NOTE NR 6
M012 00	VMA SQDN	260	PLUS 260	NOTE NR 5

NOTES: NR 1 - REDUCTION IN DIVISION AUGMENTATION
 NR 2 - CADRE TO MAINTAIN FLAG AND EQUIPMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

#29

SECRET

- PAGE 5 RUHKM S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 FOR UNIT PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED FOR
 DELETION FROM III MAF STRUCTURE
- NR 3 - REDUCTION OF SPACES AUTHORIZED UNIT NOT
 IN PERMANENT MARINE CORPS STRUCTURE
 - NR 4 - REDUCTION OF SPACES AUTHORIZED UNIT
 INCLUDED IN PERMANENT MARINE CORPS
 STRUCTURE
 - NR 5 - PROVIDES SPACES TO RETAIN AT T/O STRENGTH
 UNITS PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED FOR DELETION
 FROM III MAF STRUCTURE
 - NR 6 - REDUCTION IN WING AUGMENTATION
5. (U) GRADE AND MOS SUMMARIES OF PROPOSED REDUCTIONS,
 EXCEPT FOR REDUCTIONS IN DIVISION AND WING AUGMENTATION,
 ARE CONTAINED IN REFS A AND C. FMFPAC G-1 MANPOWER
 REPS CURRENTLY AT HQMC IN CONNECTION WITH PREPARATION
 OF REVISED 3D AND 4TH QUARTER FISCCAL YEAR 1969
 MANPOWER ALLOCATION ARE AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE GRADE
 AND MOS SUMMARIES FOR PROPOSED REDUCTIONS IN DIVISION
 AND WING AUGMENTATIONS.
6. (S) UNDER THE ESTABLISHED PARAMETERS, THIS PROPOSAL

PAGE 6 RUHKM 1333 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 ATTAINS A REASONABLE BALANCE BETWEEN OPERATIONAL
 REQUIREMENTS AND THE REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT THE
 VALIDITY OF MARINE CORPS T/O'S. WHILE IT IS CLEARLY
 UNDERSTOOD THAT THESE PARAMETERS ARE NOT OF
 MARINE CORPS CHOOSING, EVERY EFFORT TO EASE PROGRAM
 6 CONSTRAINTS WILL BE APPRECIATED IN THE FUTURE, AS
 ARE THOSE EFFORTS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE IN THE
 PAST. WARM RE GARDS.

GP-4

BT

1333

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

#29

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 6216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG XXIV CORPS		DATE 14 DEC 68	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 140150Z DEC 68		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	FOR
			IN	OUT			
3	CG					REMARKS CG - Lacks rather reasonable	FOR
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	I			A		
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
1	S/S	I	12/14		A		
	G-1						
	G-2	I	16 Dec		A		
	G-3			12/16	curd		
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	SBC						
	Plans	A	15/12/68	15 Dec	B		

Concern.

Plans - Fractions

9.

Comp

SECRET

SECRET

P:004487
 PITSZYUH RUMLBPA7090 3490245-SSSS--RHMAFA.
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 140150Z DEC 68 ZDK
 FM CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 TO RUMHVP/CG 3D MAR DIV DGH
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF DNG
 BT

S E C R E T
 PERSONAL FOR GENERALS CUSHMAN AND DAVIS FROM
 STILWELL

S E C R E T AVII-CG 07292

THIS IS A DUEL BLADE MSG

SUBJ: DUEL BLADE OBSTACLE BELT

REF: CG III MAF MSG, DTG 111448Z DEC 68

1. (S) GEN TRUONG AND I HAD A LONG CONVERSATION TODAY ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF REF MSG; AND GENERALS LAM AND TRUONG HAD AN EARLIER CONVERSATION YESTERDAY.
2. (S) GEN TRUONG, WHO HAS BEEN WAXING HOT AND COLD ON EARLY EMPLACEMENT OF AN OBSTACLE BELT HAS FINALLY CONCLUDED THAT, UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SHOULD ADHERE TO THE CONCEPT OF MOBILE WARFARE. I THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE THE BASIS FOR AN AGREED US/ARVN POSITION WHICH WOULD NOT BE AN ALTERNATIVE BUT RATHER AN ADDENDUM TO THE REVISED DUEL BLADE II CONCEPT. THE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE POINT OF THE POSITION PAPER WOULD

PAGE 2 RUMLBPA 7090 S E C R E T

BE THAT THE MATERIALS CURRENTLY STOCKPILED FOR THE ORIGINAL TRACE MAY WELL BE NEEDED AT SOME FUTURE DATE (AND MOST PROBABLY TO ESTABLISH FRONTIER CONTROL IN A POST-HOSTILITIES PERIOD) AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE MAINTAINED INTACT FOR EVENTUAL UTILIZATION.

3. (S) THE POSITION PAPER WOULD BE DEVELOPED ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A. ALTHOUGH THE EMPLACEMENT OF THE OBSTACLE BELT WOULD ASSIST IN CONTROLLING FURTHER ENEMY MOVEMENT ACROSS THE DMZ, FROM A-4 TO THE SEA, CERTAIN FACTORS NOW ARGUE AGAINST IT. THE ENGINEER EFFORT REQUIRED FOR INSTALLATION WOULD COMPETE WITH HIGHER PRIORITY DEMANDS, MANY OF THEM RELATED TO ACCELERATED PACIFICATION. THE SAME APPLIES TO THE INFANTRY TROOPS REQUIRED FOR THE MANNING OF THE COMPLETED OBSTACLE BELT.

B. IT IS THUS CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD CAPITALIZE ON CURRENT EFFORTS TO FORCE THE ENEMY TO RESPECT THE DMZ AND ON THE AVAILABILITY OF US-PROVIDED SENSORS BY MAINTAINING A MOBILE POSTURE IN THE VICINITY OF THE DMZ.

C. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT AN OBSTACLE BELT, REPRESENTING SOME MODIFICATION OF ORIGINAL DESIGN, WILL NOT BE NEEDED IN THE FUTURE, STRETCHING FROM THE SEA AS FAR WEST AS PRACTICABLE. IT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
 2 to 6

SECRET

#35

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMLBPA 7090 S E C R E T

IS HIGHLY LIKELY THAT THE RVN WILL BE CALLED UPON TO POLICE, WITH ITS OWN RESOURCES, THE DMZ SUBSEQUENT TO THE TERMINATION OF ACTIVE COMBAT. AS IN THE CASE OF KOREA, A BARRIER WILL FACILITATE THIS TASK. WHILE THE PLACEMENT OF SUCH A BARRIER WOULD IDEALLY FOLLOW THE SOUTHERN BANK OF THE BEN HAI, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THE SOUTHERN TRACE OF THE DMZ, A NUMBER OF FACTORS RENDER THIS INFEASIBLE. ASSUMING (AS DOES CG, 1ST ARVN DIVISION) THAT CIVILIAN POPULACE WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO RETURN TO THE FORWARD AREAS, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIER ALONG THE PRESENT CLEARED TRACE FROM A-4 TO A-2 IS THE BEST SOLUTION MILITARILY. THE ONE ENVISAGED MODIFICATION IS TO RUN THE BARRIER ENE FROM A-2 TO COINCIDE WITH THE EASTERMOST SEGMENT OF THE DMZ.

D. WITH THE FOREGOING IN MIND, THE MATERIALS STOCKPILE AT DONG HA AND DA NANG FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ORIGINAL OBSTACLE BELT SHOULD BE MAINTAINED INTACT FOR EENTUAL TURNOVER TO VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES. THERE ARE TWO CAVEATS TO THIS: FIRST, ROTATION OF STOCKS IS OBVIOUSLY DESIRABLE AND SECOND, ISSUES SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO MAINTAIN, STRENGTHEN OR AUGMENT THE STRONG POINTS WHICH ARE INTEGRAL TO THE CONCEPT OF MOBILE WARFARE.

PAGE 4 RUMLBPA 7090 S E C R E T

4. (U) YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS APPROACH ARE REQUESTED.

GP-4

BE

#7090

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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SECRET
#35

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 0216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE		
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CG FIRST MARDIV		16 DEC 68		
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY#		
			151450Z DEC 68		1 OF 3 COPIES RECD		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	EXCLUSIVE FOR
			IN	OUT			
3	CG					REMARKS For CG - Recommend pending msg in substance from you to JCS Debrand FOR Test Q-3 Prepare msg Done 17 Dec 68	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	J					
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
1	S/S	F	12/16				
	G-1						
	G-2						
4	G-3	A			Has Copy 160900H		
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	SBC						

SECRET

SECRET

OCN 135 FILE 95

		FROM CG FIRST MARDIV	DATE 16 DEC 68
		SERIAL # 151450Z DEC 68	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT	
		EXCLUSIVE FOR	
12/16	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
		EXCLUSIVE FOR	
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		
	MAT AND TAPE		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT
SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

#38

SECRET

DE RUMHLA 2020 301450
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 151450Z DEC 68
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET

DECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FR MGEN YOUNGDALE
 OPN TAYLOR COMMON(U)

A. CG III MAF 211322Z OCT 68
 B. CG III MAF 290752Z NOV 68

1. (S) REF A INITIAED PLANNING FOR THE CONDUCT OF MULTI-BN OFFENSIVE OPNS IN BA 112 AND REF B DIRECTED THE PENETRATION OF BA 112 NO LATER THAN 15DEC68 WITH A MINIMUM OF FOUR BATTALIONS.
2. (S) ON 7DEC68 OPN TAYLOR COMMON A THREE PHASED OPN COMMENCED TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, CACHES AND INSTALLATIONS, AND PREPARE A COMPLEX OF FIRE SUPPORT BASES (FSB) TO SUPPORT EXTENDED OPERATIONS ALONG AVENUES OF APPROACH FROM THE LOATION BORDER.
3. (S) PHASE ONE CONDUCTED IN THE AN HOA/ARIZONA AREA IN COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH THE 1ST ARVN RANGER GROUP HAS MET WITH SATISFYING RESULTS. TO DATE FRIENDLY FORCES HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR 218 EN KIA, 5 PW, 13 CIV DEF, 39 IWC AND 4CSWC WHILE KEEPING FRIENDLY CASUALTIES

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2020 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 TO A MINIMUM.

4. (S) PHASE TWO THE INITIAL PENERATION OF BA 112 IS PROCEEDING ON SCHEDULE DESPITE THE ADVERSITIES OF TERRAIN AND WEATHER. FOUR FSB HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH MARINE UNITS IN POSITION COMPLETING DEVELOPMENT AND CONDUCTING RIF OPERATIONS. FSB MARNE (AT 848425) A MOBILE FSB CONTAINS M/3/5 AND 4 155MM SP. FSB PIKE (ZC192452) CONTAINS 2/5 AND 2 155MM TOWED. FSB LANCE (AT 792408) HAS 3/5 (-) WITH 4 105MM AND 4 155MM TOWED. FSB SPEAR (ZC187401) HOLDS 1/3 (-) WITH REMAINING ELEMENTS SCHEDULED FOR INSERTION ON 16DEC68. IN ADDITION 1ST FORCE RECON CO IS CONDUCTING DEEP RECON INSERTS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS.

5. (S) IN SUMMARY OPN TAYLOR COMMON IS ON SCHEDULE, PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY AND GIVES EVERY INDICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ULTIMATE RESULTS.

GP-4

BT

2020

SECRET

438

CONFIDENTIAL

ZCZC FLF977PTTEZYUW RUMLMFA2085 3511352-CCCC--RHMNAFA.
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 161352Z DEC 68
 FM CG FORLOGCOND
 TO RHMNAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR
 MGEN ANDERSON FROM BGEN FEELEY.
 A. CG III MAF 140014Z/DEC 68
 1. A NEGATIVE REPORT IS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO REF A.
 THERE ARE THINGS NEEDED IN THE LOGISTIC FIELD, SUCH AS
 A LESS COMPLEX ROUGH TERRAIN FORKLIFT, AND A FAMILY OF
 RUGGED GENERATORS WITH PARTS COMMONALITY, BUT NONE OF
 THESE FIT PROPERLY INTO THE SPEED CONCEPT, AS THEY HAVE
 BEEN ADDRESSED PREVIOUSLY VIA OTHER PROGRAMS AND ARE
 NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO SHORT TERM ACTION. FEELEY.
 G-4
 BZE 85

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									#40

CONFIDENTIAL

NNMNVZ CZ CYP A 896
 VZ CZ CO BA 928
 QIT CZ YUM RUYPGKX0100 35 11520-CCCC-RUYPSYD.
 Z NY CCCCC ZYO RUMFSHH
 O 161520Z DEC 68
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 TO RUMHIAZ/CG AMERICAL DIVISION
 INFO ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 RUYPSYD/CG III MAF
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL
 VISIT ACTING CG, AMERICAL DIV AND DIRECTOR CGC, COMUSMACV
 A. YR 150920Z DEC 68 (C)

- PERSONAL TO GEN COOKSEY FROM COL MCMAHON
1. REF A UNFORTUNATELY NOT RECEIVED UNTIL 16222Z DEC. COMMUNICATION SITUATION SUCH PRIORITY MSG APPARENTLY STATUS OF ROUTINE.
 2. RECEIVED REQUEST AN OVER VOICE FOR OKI FLIGHT DECK REQ WHICH WAS PASSED, WAITED FOR BIRD TO ARRIVE HOWEVER WAS AMERICAL LNO.
 3. IF YR SCHEDULE AND GEN MCLAUGHLINS STILL PERMITS VISIT REQUEST ADVISE

BT
 OVER ORESTES COVERED TELETYPE THROUGH III MAF CGC.
 4. LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT. VERY RESPECTFULLY COL MCMAHON
 SENDS.

GP-4
 BT
 0100

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 41

CONFIDENTIAL

ER R R UHMMVA
DE RLBHOA3 724 35 12 68 9
ZNY CCCCC
PAC-T-MAF
R 122142Z DEC 68
FM OIC

T O R HMMAFA/CG III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN ANDERSON
FR OM L GEN WICKERSON

A. YR 05054 @
HAVE RECD INFO CONT IN REF A RE : ALVIN ADAMS JR. MANY
THANKS AND WARM REGARDS.
GP-4

BT
3724

UI MAP-2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CONFIDENTIAL

CC	AFC	ES	OC/S	B-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#43

SECRET**FOR**

OO RHMMAFA
 DE RUMHVP 1805D 3520104
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 170104Z DEC 68
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 OM RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS
 INFO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

S E C R E T

PERSONAL FOR GENERALS CUSHMAN AND STILLWELL FROM DAVIS
 THIS IS A DUEL BLADE MESSENGER
 DUEL BLADE OBSTACLE BELT (S)

A. CG XXIV CORPS MSG 140150Z DEC 68 (S)

B. CG III MAF MSG 111448Z DEC 68 (S)

COM (U) CONCUR WITH POSITION AS STATED IN REFERENCE A.

2. (S) UNODIR, THIS HDQTRS, IN COOPERATION AND COORDINATION
 WITH 1ST ARVN DIV, WILL INITIATE THE STUDY REQUIRED BSP
 REFERENCE B. STUDY AND RESULTANT POSITION PAPER WILL PRODUCE
 DETAILS IN CONSONANCE WITH, AND SUPPORT OF, THE SUBSTANCE OF
 REFERENCE A.

3. (U) IN THIS REGARD, INITIAL LIAISON WITH 1ST ARVN DIVISION
 HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

GP-4

BT

1805D

SECRET

44

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV		DATE 19 DEC 68	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 191031		COPY# 1, 2, 3, 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		ARVN DMZ PATROLLING	
7	CG					REMARKS	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	F					
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
1	S/S	F	12/19				
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

SECRET #47

O 191031Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM GEN [REDACTED]

TO LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS

INFO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF

MG DAVIS CG 3RD MAR DIV

ZEM

SECRET MAC 17354 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: ARVN DMZ PATROLLING

1. REFERENCES: A. PMS 1907 - DTG 121705Z DEC 68.

B. PMS 1323 - DTG 281726Z NOV 68.

2. THE QUESTION OF ARVN OBSERVANCE OF SA-2 PATROL RULES AS US HAS BEEN TAKEN UP WITH JCS. A FORMAL REQUEST FOR JCS TO ISSUE SUCH INSTRUCTIONS WAS TRANSMITTED 18 DEC 68 FROM C/S MACV TO C/S JCS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT JCS WILL ISSUE SUCH INSTRUCTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. YOU WILL BE INFORMED AS SOON AS JCS ACTION IS TAKEN.

3. IN THE INTERIM YOU MAY SUPPORT ARVN PATROLS UP TO THE LIMIT SET BY US HIGHER AUTHORITY; E.G., IF ARVN REQUESTS TO SEND A 24 MAN PATROL, INFORM HIM THAT YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE THAT YOU CAN SUPPORT ONLY A SQUAD SIZE FORCE WITH A PLATOON SIZE BACK-UP, NO MORE.

4. APPROVAL OF ANY ARVN PATROL ACTION CONTRARY TO US RULES IS NOT REPEAT NOT TO BE ACTUAL OR IMPLIED.

330 NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

175

SECRET

2147

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 20 DEC 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 191699Z DEC 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR <i>To C6 - Fantastic!!</i> <i>V. Respy</i> <i>9.</i> <i>Good!</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	12/20		12	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL #49

CONFIDENTIAL

RR R HMMAFA
 DE R LEBHOA 5249 3541640
 ZNY CCCCC
 PAC -J -III MAF
 R 191633Z DEC 68
 FM OMC
 TO RHMMFA/CG III MAF
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM LT GEN VAN RYZIN
 REF A. CG III MAF 18012Z DEC
 1. (U) SECNAV HAS APPROVED AND SIGNED REF A.
 2. (U) ALL PAPERS HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO YOU BY REGISTERED
 AIR MAIL 156837
 WARM REGARDS,
 GP-4
 BT
 524 9

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#49

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAG		DATE 21 DEC 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 212031Z DEC 68		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
5	DCG					
4	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	7	12/22			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					
3A	Gen Boole					

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

*This says that
Gen Hess will
not be replaced
when he goes
home*

RP RHMMA FA
DE RUMHMA 25 15 35 62 03 T
ZNY CCCCC
P 212031Z DEC 68
FM CG III MAF
TO RHMMA FA /CG III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN
FROM LT GEN BUSE, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
2D ASSISTANT WING COMMANDER (U)
A: CG III MAF 191336Z DEC 68 (C) (MCEO)
1. I CONCURRED IN YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED
IN REF A.
2. CMC DOES NOT INTEND TO PROVIDE A REPLACEMENT
UPON TRANSFER OF INCUMBENT. WARM REGARDS.
GP-4

BT
2515

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-68)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									

#50

CONFIDENTIAL

PP JTVPVV PP376
PP RHMAFA
DE RUMHVP 2709D 3590216
ZNY CCCCC
P 240216 DEC 68
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
BT

CONFIDENTIAL. SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR MGEN ANDERSON
FROM MGEN DAVIS

A. CG III MAF P 140614Z DEC 68

1. HAVE IDENTIFIED SEVERAL INITIAL SPEED REQUIREMENTS WHICH WILL BE
SUBMITTED BY MESSAGE IN SPEED FORMAT BY 24 DEC 68. SUBSEQUENT SPEED
REQUIREMENTS WILL BE SUBMITTED AS THEY ARISE.

2. THE SPEED PROGRAM HAS BEEN GIVEN WIDEST DISSEMINATION IN THIRD
MARDIV.

CP-4

BT

2709D

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#59

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 6216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM LTJEN STILLWELL		DATE 28 DEC 68	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 271835Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET EHB 1989 EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS REC 280901H Dec 68 for the eyes of Gen Hoffman <u>Curt</u> Gen Youngdale <u>3-</u> Gen Cushman only J
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	12/28			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #64

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

From: Chief of Staff

To: Lt. Gen. Cushman

1. Gen. Abrams
will discuss
this subject
on the 31st

h/d

MR

D

G. E. DOOLEY

~~SECRET~~

49

AP 81 *****
 CG YMLKQ
 DE YSHKQL 6 3621840
 O 271835Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS AND ACTING CG III MAF
 TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGM
 INFO BG DOOLEY C/S III MAF DNG
 ZEM

SECRET PHB 1989 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: DMZ ACTIVITIES, 27 DEC

REF: A. XXIV CORPS TCG MSG DTD 270817Z DEC 68.

B. XXIV CORPS TCG MSG DTG 271153Z DEC 68.

1. REF MESSAGES, FILED BY MY HEADQUARTERS, ARE IN ERROR IN A NUMBER OF PARTICULARS. MY INTENT HERIN IS TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. SEPARATE FRONT CHANNEL MSG WILL CONFIRM.

2. THE PATROL OF THE 1/2 ARVN, WHICH ENTERED THE DMZ CIRCA 272000H DID NOT REPEAT NOT SIGHT 100 ENEMY SOLDIERS. AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS 28 DECEMBER, THE PATROL OBSERVED SMALL GROUPS OF ENEMY (LARGEST KNOWN SIGHTING WAS FIVE) WHICH TRANSLATED INTO AN EVALUATION OF A PROBABLE ENEMY COMPANY LOCATED TO THE NORTH OF THE PATROL.

3. SENSING AN OPPORTUNITY TO INFLICT CONSIDERABLE VIOLENCE ON THE ENEMY--IT WAS A PERFECT DAY FOR AIR OBSERVATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF TAC AIR--GEN TRUONG AUTHORIZED COL GIAI TO SET AN APC TROOP AND A RIFLE COMPANY IN MOTION; AND IMMEDIATELY SENT ME A RADIO MESSAGE REQUESTING THAT I APPROVE COMMITMENT WITHIN THE DMZ OF THESE REINFORCING ELEMENTS. THE MESSAGE STATED THAT GEN TRUONG WAS PROCEEDING TO DONG HA.

4. I LEFT GEN WOOLNOUGH AND FLEW TO THE 2D ARVN REGT, ARRIVING SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH TRUONG. HAVING ASCERTAINED THAT THE PATROL, WHILE UNDER ENEMY OBSERVATION, WAS NOT SERIOUSLY INVOLVED AND THAT AN EXTRICATION FORCE OF AUTHORIZED SIZE HAD NOT YET BEEN COMMITTED, I TOLD TRUONG THAT HIS CONTEMPLATED ACTION WAS IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE RULES AND THAT IF IMPLEMENTED, NO US AIR, ARTILLERY OR GUNSHIP SUPPORT COULD BE PROVIDED. MY COUNTERPROPOSAL WAS THAT HE MOUNT SOME INFANTRY IN A PLATOON (SEVEN) OF APC'S AND SEND IT FORWARD TO LINK UP WITH PATROL, MEANWHILE POUNDING THE ENEMY WITH ALL AVAILABLE SUPPORTING ARMS (OF WHICH WE HAD PLENTY); THE BALANCE OF THE APC TROOP AND INFANTRY COMPANY TO BE HELD AT THE SOUTHERN TRACE OF THE DMZ AGAINST CONTINGENCIES. AS YOU KNOW, AN ARVN APC TROOP CONTAINS NO INFANTRY SO THE FORCE I SUGGESTED WOULD STILL FALL WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF A REINFORCED PLATOON.

64(1)

5. TRUONG, WHO WAS WITH GEN LAI WHEN HE ISSUED HIS PREPARATORY ORDERS, DOES NOT ACKNOWLEDGE HAVING RECEIVED SPECIFIC RESTRAINING INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE JGS. BOTH TRUONG AND GIAI WERE CLEARLY UNHAPPY WITH MY DEMARCHE BUT ISSUED CERTAIN CHANGE ORDERS AND DECIDED WE SHOULD ALL GO TO A-1 FOR A FIRST-HAND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION. AT ROUGHLY 1615 HOURS, WE FLEW TO A-1 WHERE WE HAD RADIO AND VISUAL CONTACT WITH DEPLOYED FORCES.

6. AN INFANTRY COMPANY WAS DEPLOYED AT THE SOUTHERN TRACE CENTERED ON YD 2576, WITH ELEMENTS MOVING SOUTH AND WEST. TRUONG TOLD ME HE HAD HALTED ADVANCE AFTER OUR CONVERSATION. LEAD ELMS OF COMPANY MAY HAVE PENETRATED DMZ TWO HUNDRED METERS BEFORE RECALL, BUT NO MORE TO WEST. US ADVISOR WITH 3/11 ARVN CAV REPORTED TO SENIOR DIVISION ADVISOR THAT A TOTAL OF EIGHT APC'S HAD CROSSED THE TRACE. PARA 30, REF B, INFERS THAT AN ARVN INFANTRY COMPANY WAS OPERATING SOUTH AND INDEPENDENT OF APC'S. THIS IS INCORRECT; ONLY INFANTRY INVOLVED IN THIS ZONE WERE ELEMENTS (APPROXIMATELY 500) MOUNTED ON APC'S.

7. ON BASIS OF FOREGOING, I PERMITTED SUPPORTING ARMS TO ENGAGE ENEMY IN VICINITY ARVN FORCES IN DMZ. WHILE WE DO NOT HAVE FINAL ASSESSMENT (INITIAL READING IS 16 KBA), OUR MONITORING OF TRANSMISSIONS OF FAC CONTROLLING FIGHTER AND GUNSHIPS LED TO CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS GOOD TURKEY SHOOT OF ENEMY IN OPEN, EMPLOYING GUNS, ROCKETS AND NAPALM.

8. ALTHOUGH THE FORCE COMMITTED TO REINFORCE PATROL WAS A WHOLE OF A BIG PLATOON, IT WAS FAR LESS THAN THE ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATED SIZE AND THE INITIAL SCHEME OF MANEUVER WAS ALSO GREATLY CIRCUMSCRIBED. CONSEQUENTLY, I CONCLUDE THAT TRUONG, HAVING SOUGHT AND GOT OUR REACTION, PLAYED THE GAME PRETTY STRAIGHT. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE IS CHAFING UNDER THE RESTRICTIONS AND THERE MAY WELL BE A REPLAY OF TODAY'S EVENTS. WHENEVER A LUCRATIVE TARGET APPEARS.

9. WE CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE 2D ARVN REGT TO INNOVATE, TO ESTABLISH SPECIALLY SELECTED RECON AND REACTION ELEMENTS AND TO ACCOMPLISH MAXIMUM OF PRE-PLANNING. BUT THERE ARE TWO OBSTACLES: FIRST, 2D REGT IS WITHOUT ITS RECON COMPANY (IT FORMS ONE HALF OF BLACK PANTHER FORCE). SECOND, GOOD AS IT IS, THE 1ST ARVN HAS NOT REACHED STAGE WHERE COMMANDERS HAVE ANY CONFIDENCE IN COMMAND/CONTROL BELOW COMPANY LEVEL--THUS RELUCTANCE TO HAVE PLATOONS OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY.

10. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER DATE LOCAL 25 DEC

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#64(2)

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV		DATE 26 DEC 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 280931Z		COPY# 1, 2, 3 OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	I			4/1	REMARKS
3	DCG	I			4/1	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I	HAS	see 12125		
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	12/29		H	
	G-1					
	G-2		HAS COPY			
	G-3		HAS COPY			
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #15

O 232931Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO GEN BROWN COMMANDER 7TH AF
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNFV
 LTG MILDREN DEP CG USARV
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LTG PEERS CG I FFV
 LTG KERWIN CG II FFV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CTZ
 INFO LTG STILLWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 17634 EYES ONLY

1. I SUGGEST THAT YOU STUDY THE MACV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE UPDATE OF 28 DECEMBER 68, PARTICULARLY THE SUMMARY THERETO DEALING WITH THE ENEMY'S STRATEGIC OPTIONS.
 2. YOU WILL BE KEPT INFORMED OF ENEMY PREPARATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THESE OPTIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, I SHOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU CONSIDER WHAT EACH OF YOU WOULD SUGGEST IF THE ENEMY IMPLEMENTS ONE OR MORE OF THESE OPTIONS. A COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS OUR PLANS WILL BE CONVENED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.
- GP-3

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS. PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 200

*This is the summary we
 sent to you in Okinawa*

NNNN

SECRET

#65

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV		DATE 29 DEC 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 290417Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I	12/29			
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	12/29			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

#68

O 290417Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO GTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
INFO LTG STILLWELL CG XXIV CORPS
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAc 17662 EYES ONLY
WILL ARRIVE DANANG 0945, 31 DECEMBER. WOULD LIKE BRIEFING BY III
MAF AND XXIV CORPS AT III MAF HEADQUARTERS. PLAN TO STAY FOR LUNCH
AND DEPART FOR SAIGON AT 1330. WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY MY ADC, LTC
STEINBERG, PLUS ONE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

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CONFIDENTIAL

#68

P 290200Z ZFF-1
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO CG XXIV CORPS
 INFO CG III MAF
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T

PERSONAL TO LTGEN STILWELL INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN. DAVIS SENDS.
 POSSIBLE IMPENDING NVA OFFENSIVE IN DMZ AND NORTHERN ICTZ AREA
 A. CG THIRD MARDIV 270910Z DEC 68

1. REFERENCE A REFERS. IT IS PROBABLE THAT A SOUTHWARD MOVEMENT OF A LARGE NUMBER OF ENEMY FORCES, POSSIBLY TWO TO FOUR DIVISIONS, IS UNDERWAY. THE FINAL DESTINATION OF THESE FORCES IS AS YET UNDETERMINED; HOWEVER, THEIR ROUTES INDICATE AT LEAST AN IMPENDING TEMPORARY PRESENCE IN THE DMZ OR BORDER AREAS WHICH WOULD EBNSTITUTE A THREAT TO MY FORCES.

2. CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT DIPLOMATIC SITUATION WHICH UNDER MOST CIRCUMSTANCES MAY DENY A RESUMPTION OF OUR BOMBING IN AND NORTH OF THE DMZ IT IS FEASIBLE TO ESTIMATE THAT THIS MOVEMENT IS A PRELUDE TO A SIGNIFICANT ENEMY OFFENSIVE TO BE CONDUCTED IN EARLY JANUARY OR PRIOR TO TET AT THE LATEST IN NORTHERN ICTZ. IN THIS ESTIMATE, THE ENEMY MIGHT HOPE, WHILE EXECUTPTG A LARGE AND WHAT HE BELIEVES TO BE SURPRISE ATTACK, TO:

A. HAVE OUR FORCES AT CONSIDERABLE DISADVANTAGE BY OUR POLICY OF NON-INTERDICTION OF SUPPLY LINES, AND/OR

B. DELIVER A CRIPPLING BOMBARDMENT OF OUR POSITIONS FROM NORTH OF THE DMZ BEFORE APPROPRIATE REACTIONS CAN BE GENERATED.

3. ALTERNATELY, IT IS ALSO FEASIBLE TO ESTIMATE THAT THE ENEMY INTENDS TO INFILTRATE THESE UNITS THROUGH ALL OR PART OF NORTHERN ICTZ FOR POSITIONING PRIOR TO SOME LATER OFFENSIVE BETWEEN 10 JANUARY AND TET.

4. IN ITS PREMISES I RECOMMEND THAT WE CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTION:

A. IMMEDIATELY, GAIN APPROVAL AND COMMENCE SEARCH AND CLEAD OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN DMZ IN ORDER TO DENY STAGING, SUPPLY AND INFILTRATION AREAS,

B. IMMEDIATELY, GAIN APPROVAL AND COMMENCE ARCLIGHT BOMBING IN AND NEAR THE DMZ,

C. SEEK RETURN OF 3D MARINES TO NORTHERN ICTZ,

D. GAIN APPROVAL FOR AIR, ARTILLERY AND NGF ATTACK OF ANY DIVISION SIZE FORCES WHICH THREATEN OUR FORCES BY APPROACHING WITHIN 10 KMS OF THE DMZ

GP-1
 435

TOP SECRET

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