

- 597 Piece of paper taken from "an AF General's Notebook" [w]
given to Col PEEBLES by LtCol Carl Lovell.
Subj: SINGLE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT & "What the AF thinks of III MAF"
- ~~598 CG FMAW 091350Z JAN69 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~
- ~~599 CG FMAW 101210Z JAN69 (C) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 600 CG III MAF 100732Z JAN69 (S) MCEO *gp-4*
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE TO BUSE INFO QUILTER FROM CUSHMAN
REVIEW OF PROPOSED MACV DIR 95-4 PRIOR TO FORWARDING TO MACV
- 601 CG FMFPAC 110035Z JAN69 (S) MCEO *gp-4*
FOR CUSHMAN INFO QUILTER FROM BUSE
RE: PROPOSED MACV DIR 95-4 (CG FMFPAC AGREES W/POSITION
TAKEN IN CONN W/PROPOSED DIR PRIOR TO FORWARDING TO COMUSMACV)
- 602 ADMIN FMFPAC 111908Z JAN69 (S) MCEO *gp-4*
FOR COLONEL PEEBLES FROM COLONEL DEEDS
YEAR END REVIEW OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT
- ~~603 CG FMAW 110850Z JAN69 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~
- ~~604 CG FMAW 121120Z JAN69 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 605 A "THOUGHT PAPER" PREPARED BY GENERAL DOOLEY FURNISHING SOME
THOUGHTS & GUIDELINES ON THE REVISION OF PROPOSED MACV DIR 95-4 (2c)
- 606 CG III MAF 120608Z JAN69 (S) *gp-4*
PROPOSED MACV DIR 95-4 (THIS MSG RESPONDS TO REQ FROM MACV
FOR COMMENTS & RECS ON PROPOSED 95-4)
- 609 CG III MAF 142358Z JAN69 (S) MCEO *gp-4*
COL PEEBLES TO COL DEEDS ----- WE'VE REVIEWED YOUR YEAR-END REVIEW
OF SINGLEMANAGEMENT-----RECOMMEND SOME MINOR CHANGES-----
- 611 CG III MAF 151512Z JAN69 (S) MCEO *gp-4*
FOR BUSE FROM DOOLEY "COMNAVFORV LENDS SUPPORT OUR NON-
COJNCURRENCE IN CURRENT SINGLE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT"
- 614 CMC 181717Z JAN69 (S) MCEO *gp-4*
FMAW SPECIAL REPORT " DECREASE REPORTING FREQUENCY TO ONE A WEEK"
- 620 ADMIN FMFPAC 222217Z JAN69 (S) MCEO *gp-4*
FIXED WING STRIKE REPORT -- PAC TO WING REDUCING RPT TO WKLY

~~585~~ ~~CG FMAW 012300Z JAN69 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

586 CG III MAF 020658Z JAN69 (S)
 III MAF TAC AIR REQMTS FOR PD 7-13JAN69 *gp-4*

587 GEN HISE MEMO FOR THE RECORD dTD 28Dec68 *(S) no gp*
 AIR INTERDICTION OF ASHAU VALLEY

~~588~~ ~~CG FMAW 021926Z JAN69 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~589~~ ~~CG FMAW 031305Z JAN69 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~590~~ ~~CG FMAW 041306Z JAN69 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~591~~ ~~CG FMAW 050922Z JAN69 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

592 CG III MAF 050348Z JAN69 (S) *gp-4*
 HELICOPTER AVAILABILITY

~~593~~ ~~CG FMAW 061210Z JAN69 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

594 CG III MAF 070508Z JAN69 (S) MCEO *gp-4*
 COMMENT ON MACV DIR 95-4
 FOR BUSE INFO QUILTER FROM CUSHMAN

~~595~~ ~~CG FMAW 071124Z JAN69 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~596~~ ~~CG FMAW 080745Z JAN69 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

SECRET

PP RHMMAFA RUMLMHA

JE RUHFMA2995 0222217

ZNY SSSSS

P 222217Z JAN 69

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

INFO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FIXED WING STRIKE REPORT (U)

A. ADMINO FIRST MAW 141431Z/JAN69 (C)

B. CMC 131717ZJAN69 (S) (MCEC)

1. (S) REF A RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN REPORTING PROCEDURES IF NEED FOR SUBJECT REPORT EXISTS. BY REF B, CMC REAFFIRMED REQUIREMENT AND REQUESTED DATA COLLECTION EFFORT BE CONTINUED.

2. (S) ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST CG FIRST MAW COMPILE SUBJECT REPORT, INCLUDING FIRST AND THIRD MAR DIV INPUTS, ON PRESENT DAILY BASIS AND SUBMIT REPORT WEEKLY TO COVER PERIOD 0021H TUESDAY THRU 2400H MONDAY. SUBMIT WEEKLY LETTER REPORT TO THIS H3 WITH COPY TO CMC (ATTN AAM).

GP-4

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SECRET

PAC-T-III NAF
 -I-FIRST NAW
 RR RUHNFMA RHMMAFA RUMLMHA.
 (S)

E RUEHMOA 6285 0181749
 ZNY 55555
 R 182117Z JAN 69
 FM CMC

TO RUHNFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RHMMAFA/CG III NAF
 RUMLMHA/CG FIRST NAW
 BT

SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FMAW SPECIAL REPORT (U)

1. (S) THE INFOR CONTAINED IN THE SUBJECT REPORT PROVIDES THE DATA BASE FOR EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING CONTROL SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH THE TIME SENSITIVITY OF THE REPORT HAS DECREASED THE VALUE OF THE DATA BASE HAS NOT. THE OUTCOME OF PROBABLE FUTURE CONFRONTATIONS IN OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF AIR ASSETS MAY WELL BE DETERMINED BY THE QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT.
2. (U) IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE DATA COLLECTION EFFORT BE CONTINUED.
3. (U) IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE SUBMISSION FREQUENCY OF THE REPORT BE DECREASED TO ONE A WEEK AND THAT THE WEEKLY REPORT BE SUBMITTED BY LETTER. THE TIME BASE OF 24 HOURS SHOULD

PAGE TWO RUEBH0A6285 SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 REMAIN UNCHANGED.

4. (U) THE DATA COLLECTION EFFORTS OF THE FMFPAC (OAS) SECTION IN THE AIR CONTROL AGENCIES OF FMAW HAS DISTINCT APPLICATION TO THIS MATTER. REQUEST INFORMATION ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE PROJECT BE FORWARDED ATTN: CMC (AAM).

GP-4

BT

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CONFIDENTIAL/OUT

FILE:DH

		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 15 JAN 69
		SERIAL# 151512Z JAN 69	COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
		EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT	
S/S	COPY 1-2-3 OF 3 COPIES MAT AND TAPE		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT
SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

#611

SECRET

PP RUHFMA
 DE RHMAFA 1864 0151512
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 151512Z JAN 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R
 LT GEN BUSE FROM BGEN DOOLEY

COMUSSEASIA OPLAN NO 1-69 (GWP) (U)

A. CG III MAF 101430Z JAN 69 (PASEP)

B. COMNAVFORV 122359 JAN 69 (PASEP)

1. (S) PAR 3E (2) OF SUBJECT DOCUMENT DETAILS ONE OF THE MISSIONS
 OF THE COMMANDER, US AIR FORCES, SEASIA, AS FOLLOWS:

A. "ACT FOR COMUSSEASIA AS THE SINGLE MANAGER FOR OPERATIONAL
 DIRECTION AND COORDINATION OF ALL US LAND-BASED TACTICAL STRIKE
 AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS AND OTHER AIR ASSETS AS MAY BE DIRECTED."

2. (U) REF A SETS FORTH OUR PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON SUBJECT
 DRAFT PLAN. GEN CUSHMAN SIGHTED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

3. (U) REF B, THOUGH UNSOLICITED BY US, PROVIDES WELCOME
 SUPPORT FOR OUR NON-CONCURRENCE.

4. (U) FOREGOING IS FURNISHED FOR INFO NOW SINCE SUBJECT
 PLAN ULTIMATELY WILL BE REVIEWED AT CINCPAC.

5. (U) WE WILL REPORT ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS ON THE SUBJECT

GP-4

BT

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OO RUHFMA
 DE RHMAFAI765 0142358
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 142358Z JAN 69
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
 TO RUHFMA/FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SPECAT
 WIRENOTE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR COL DEEDS, DIRECTOR,
 FCC FROM COL PEEBLES, III MAF G-3 AIR
 REF: ADMIN FMFPAC 111908Z JAN 69 (S)

1. (S) REF A, THE YEAR-END SUMMARY OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 HAS BEEN REVIEWED. THE STATISTICIANS AT FIRST MAW AND I
 AGREE THAT IT IS ACCURATE AND SUPPORTS THE VIEWS OF THE
 COMMANDING GENERAL. HOWEVER, A FEW MINOR CHANGES ARE
 SUGGESTED:

A. WE HAVE NEVER ADMITTED NOR DOES 7TH AF CLAIM TO
 HAVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER OUR RESOURCES. THE AF USES
 THE TERM OPERATIONAL DIRECTION FOR WHICH NO APPROVED
 DEFINITION EXISTS. THEREFORE, SUGGEST THE SENTENCES WHICH
 REFER TO OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF OUR ASSETS BY 7TH AF BE
 CHANGED. WORDS TO THE EFFECT THAT III MAF FIXED WING
 STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND ASSOCIATED AIR CONTROL

PAGE TWO RHMAFAI765 S E C R E T
 ASSETS ARE TASKED BY CG 7TH AF WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE.
 B. IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH, DELETE THE PHRASE "VITIATING
 THE CONCEPT AND GOAL OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT", AND SUBSTITUTE
 "DEPRIVING COMUSMACV OF CONTROL OF THE TOTAL AIR EFFORT".
 2. (U) THE PAPER LOOKS GOOD. I HOPE THESE COMMENTS HAVE BEEN
 OF SOME BENEFIT.

GP-4

BT

1765

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SECRET

PP RUSVDE
DE RUSVDB 1414 0120608
ZNY SSSSS

P 120608Z JAN 69 ZFF-1

~~FM CG III MAF DNG RVN~~

TO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV

BT

S E C R E T

PROPOSED MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4

A. MACJ3-072 OF 25 DECEMBER 1968

1. (S) THE REFERENCED LETTER FORWARDED A PROPOSED DRAFT OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 TO THIS COMMAND FOR REVIEW AND COMMENT. IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE PROVIDED.

A. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 DATED 28 JUNE 1966 CONTAINS BASIC AGREEMENTS FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION OF U.S. MILITARY AIR OPERATIONS IN RVN. THESE AGREEMENTS ARE IN CONSONANCE WITH UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES (UNAAF) AND OTHER BASIC AGREEMENTS BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. THE REVISED DRAFT, 95-4, CONTRAVENES A BASIC PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH 30213.B, UNAAF RELATING TO THE PRINCIPLE OF "PRESERVING THE UNI-SERVICE INTEGRITY OF FORCES." APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED DRAFT WOULD ENDORSE PERMANENT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE ORGANIC, INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE

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HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG-S/S

REL-CG

DIST-A-

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA1414 **S E C R E T**

MARINE/AIR GROUND TEAM.

B. THE PRESENT 95-4 CONTAINS THE BASIC PROVISION THAT, DURING A MAJOR EMERGENCY OR DISASTER, COMUSMACV MAY DIRECT COMMANDER, 7TH AIR FORCE, TO ASSUME OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER CERTAIN U.S. AIR RESOURCES. I CONCUR AND SUPPORT THE TRANSFER OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL UNDER SUCH SITUATIONS. HOWEVER, THE PROPOSED REVISION OF 95-4, IF PUBLISHED, WOULD FORMALIZE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE CORPS RESOURCES BY DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR DURING NORMAL SITUATIONS AND WOULD, IN EFFECT, MAKE SUCH OPERATIONAL CONTROL PERMANENT IN NATURE. WHILE THE PROPOSED REVISION REFERS TO THIS AUTHORITY AS "OPERATIONAL DIRECTION", I CANNOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN "OPERATIONAL CONTROL", AS DEFINED IN UNAAF, AND "OPERATIONAL DIRECTION", AS DEFINED IN THE PROPOSED REVISION.

C. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, IN ANNOUNCING APPROVAL OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT OF 15 MAY 1968, STATED: "I AM IN AGREEMENT WITH THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF."

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PAGE THREE RHMAFAI414 S E C R E T
THAT THE UNIFIED COMBAT COMMANDER ON THE SCENE SHOULD
BE PRESUMED TO BE THE BEST JUDGE OF HOW THE COMBAT
FORCES ASSIGNED TO HIM ARE TO BE ORGANIZED, COMMANDED,
AND EMPLOYED TO MEET THE THREAT FACING HIM.....
...FURTHERMORE I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ASSIGNMENT
OF MARINE AIR UNITS UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF
THE DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR SHOULD CONSTITUTE A
PRECEDENT FOR CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS
UNDER OTHER COMBAT CONDITIONS, OR NEED POSE A THREAT
TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM.
"I NOTE IN APPENDIX D TO (JCSM 237-68 OF 19
APRIL 1968) THE ASSURANCES MADE BY COMUSMACV TO THE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT THE SINGLE-
MANAGER ARRANGEMENT OVER TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN
SOUTH VIETNAM WILL NOT BE CONTINUED BEYOND THAT
NECESSARY TO MEET THE SPECIFIC COMBAT SITUATION FOR
WHICH IT WAS DEvised. ACCORDINGLY, COMUSMACV SHOULD
REVERT TO NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE III MAF
WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS."
I SUBMIT THE THESIS THAT THE SPECIFIC COMBAT SITUATION

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SECRET

PAGE FOUR RHMAFAI1414 S E C R E T
 WHICH PROMPTED THE TEMPORARY CENTRALIZING CONTROL OVER
 AIR ASSETS NO LONGER EXISTS. BUT EVEN GRANTING THAT
 IT DOES EXIST TO SOME EXTENT, IT SEEMS APPARENT THAT,
 AT SOME POINT IN TIME, THE SITUATION WILL CHANGE,
 PERMITTING ORDERLY REVERSION TO NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGE-
 MENTS. IT IS DESIRABLE TO PRESERVE THAT OPTION.

2. (S) SINCE THE REVISED DRAFT OF 95-4 WOULD
 CONSTITUTE A PRECEDENT FOR CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF
 AIR RESOURCES UNDER ANY AND ALL COMBAT CONDITIONS,
 AND SINCE IT WOULD MAKE PERMANENT THAT WHICH WAS
 RECOGNIZED BY SECDEF AS TEMPORARY, I CANNOT CONCUR
 IN THE REVISED DRAFT OF 95-4, AS WRITTEN.

3. (S) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I RECOMMEND THE
 FOLLOWING:

A. THE PRESENT MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 BE REWRITTEN
 TO AGREE WITH THE PHILOSOPHY AND ENCOMPASS THE
 RECOMMENDATIONS IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY 092300Z SEP68.
 IN ANY EVENT, ANY REVISION SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE
 WITH ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE AND REFLECT THE GUIDANCE
 PROVIDED BY THE DEPSECDEF. I WILL PROVIDE ANY ASSISTANCE

PAGE FIVE RHMAFAI1414 S E C R E T
 IN THE PREPARATION OF A REVISED DIRECTIVE THAT YOU
 MAY DESIRE AND REQUEST SUCH REPRESENTATION.

GP-4

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SECRET

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091430H

cmc

From: CG III MAF
To: COMUSMACV
SUBJ: PROPOSED MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4
REF: MACJ3-072 of 25 December 1968

1. The referenced letter forwarded a proposed draft of MACV Directive 95-4 to this command for review and comment. In accordance therewith, the following comments are provided:

a. MACV Directive 95-4 dated 28 June 1966 contains basic agreements for command, control, and coordination of U. S. military air operations in RVN. These agreements are in consonance with Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) and other basic agreements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The revised draft, 95-4, contravenes a basic provision of paragraph 30213.b, UNAAF relating to the principle of "preserving the uni-service integrity of forces." Approval of the proposed draft would endorse permanent operational control of the strike and reconnaissance aircraft which are organic, integral parts to the Marine Air/Ground Team.

b. The present 95-4 contains the basic provision that, during a major emergency or disaster, COMUSMACV may direct Commander, 7th Air Force, to assume operational control over certain U. S. air resources. I concur and support the transfer of operational control under such situations. However, the

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proposed revision of 95-4, if published, would formalize operational control of Marine Corps resources by Deputy COMUSMACV for Air during normal situations and would, in effect, make such operational control permanent in nature. While the proposed revision refers to this authority as "operational direction", I cannot differentiate between "operational control", as defined in UNAAF, and "operational direction", as defined in the proposed revision.

c. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in announcing approval of the Single Management concept on 15 May 1968, stated: "I am in agreement with the view expressed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.....that the unified combat commander on the scene should be presumed to be the best judge of how the combat forces assigned to him are to be organized, commanded, and employed to meet the threat facing him.....Furthermore, I do not believe that the assignment of Marine air units under the single management of the Deputy COMUSMACV for Air should constitute a precedent for centralized control of air operations under other combat conditions, or need pose a threat to the integrity of the Marine Air/Ground Team.

"I note. ^{IN APPENDIX D TO CJCSM 237-68 OF 19 APRIL 1968} A. the assurances made by COMUSMACV to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the single-manager arrangement over tactical air operations in South Vietnam will not be continued beyond that necessary to meet the specific

combat situation for which it was devised. Accordingly, COMUSMACV should revert to normal command arrangement for the III MAF when the tactical situation permits."

I submit the thesis that the specific combat situation which prompted the temporary centralizing control over air assets no longer exists. But even granting that it does exist to some extent, it seems apparent that, at some point in time, the situation will change, permitting orderly reversion to normal command arrangements. It is desirable to preserve that option.

2. Since the revised draft of 95-4 would constitute a precedent for centralized control of air resources under any and all combat conditions, and since it would make permanent that which was recognized by SecDef as temporary, I cannot concur in the revised draft of 95-4, as written.

3. In view of the above, I recommend the following:

a. The present MACV Directive 95-4 be rewritten to agree with the philosophy and encompass the recommendations in paragraph 6 of my 090300Z SEP68. In any event, any revision should be in accordance with established doctrine and reflect the guidance provided by the DepSecDef.

CG III MAF DNG

DTG 120608Z

COMUSMACV SGN

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XXX

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4

A. MACJ3-072 OF 25 DECEMBER 1968

1. (S) THE REFERENCED LETTER FORWARDED A PROPOSED DRAFT OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 TO THIS COMMAND FOR REVIEW AND COMMENT. IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE PROVIDED.

A. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 DATED 28 JUNE 1966 CONTAINS BASIC AGREEMENTS FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION OF U.S. MILITARY AIR OPERATIONS IN RVN. THESE AGREEMENTS ARE IN CONSONANCE WITH UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES (UNAAF) AND OTHER BASIC AGREEMENTS BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. THE REVISED DRAFT, 95-4, CONTRAVENES A BASIC PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH 30213.b, UNAAF RELATING TO THE PRINCIPLE OF "PRESERVING THE UNI-SERVICE INTEGRITY OF FORCES." APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED DRAFT WOULD ENDORSE PERMANENT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE ORGANIC, INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE MARINE/AIR GROUND TEAM.

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B. THE PRESENT 95-4 CONTAINS THE BASIC PROVISION THAT, DURING A MAJOR EMERGENCY OR DISASTER, COMUSMACV MAY DIRECT COMMANDER, 7TH AIR FORCE, TO ASSUME OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER CERTAIN U. S. AIR RESOURCES. I CONCUR AND SUPPORT THE TRANSFER OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL UNDER SUCH SITUATIONS. HOWEVER, THE PROPOSED REVISION OF 95-4, IF PUBLISHED, WOULD FORMALIZE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE CORPS RESOURCES BY DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR DURING NORMAL SITUATIONS AND WOULD, IN EFFECT, MAKE SUCH OPERATIONAL CONTROL PERMANENT IN NATURE. WHILE THE PROPOSED REVISION REFERS TO THIS AUTHORITY AS "OPERATIONAL DIRECTION", I CANNOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN "OPERATIONAL CONTROL", AS DEFINED IN UNAAF, AND "OPERATIONAL DIRECTION", AS DEFINED IN THE PROPOSED REVISION.

C. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, IN ANNOUNCING APPROVAL OF THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT OF 15 MAY 1968, STATED: "I AM IN AGREEMENT WITH THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF..... THAT THE UNIFIED COMBAT COMMANDER ON THE SCENE SHOULD BE PRESUMED TO BE THE BEST JUDGE OF HOW THE COMBAT FORCES ASSIGNED TO HIM ARE TO BE ORGANIZED, COMMANDED, AND EMPLOYED TO MEET THE THREAT FACING HIM....."

...FURTHERMORE I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ASSIGNMENT OF MARINE AIR UNITS UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR SHOULD CONSTITUTE A PRECEDENT FOR CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS UNDER OTHER COMBAT CONDITIONS, OR NEED POSE A THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM.

"I NOTE ~~IN~~ IN APPENDIX D TO (JCSM 237-68 OF 19 APRIL 1968) THE ASSURANCES MADE BY COMUSMACV TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT THE SINGLE-MANAGER ARRANGEMENT OVER TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL NOT BE CONTINUED BEYOND THAT NECESSARY TO MEET THE SPECIFIC COMBAT SITUATION FOR WHICH IT WAS ~~DEvised~~ ^{DEvised}. ACCORDINGLY, COMUSMACV SHOULD REVERT TO NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE III MAF WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS."

I SUBMIT THE THESIS THAT THE SPECIFIC COMBAT SITUATION WHICH PROMPTED THE TEMPORARY CENTRALIZING CONTROL OVER AIR ASSETS NO LONGER EXISTS. BUT EVEN GRANTING THAT IT DOES EXIST TO SOME EXTENT, IT SEEMS APPARENT THAT, AT SOME POINT IN TIME, THE SITUATION WILL CHANGE, PERMITTING ORDERLY REVERSION TO NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS. IT IS DESIRABLE TO PRESERVE THAT OPTION.

2. (S) SINCE THE REVISED DRAFT OF 95-4 WOULD CONSTITUTE A PRECEDENT FOR CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF AIR RESOURCES UNDER ANY AND ALL COMBAT CONDITIONS, AND SINCE IT WOULD MAKE PERMANENT THAT WHICH WAS RECOGNIZED BY SECDEF AS TEMPORARY, I CANNOT CONCUR IN THE REVISED DRAFT OF 95-4, AS WRITTEN.

3. (S) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE PRESENT MACV DIRECTIVE ⁹⁵⁻⁴ ~~95-4~~ BE REWRITTEN TO AGREE WITH THE PHILOSOPHY AND ENCOMPASS THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY 090300Z SEP68. IN ANY EVENT, ANY REVISION SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE AND REFLECT THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY THE DEPSECDEF. I WILL PROVIDE ANY ASSISTANCE ~~IN~~ THE PREPARATION OF A REVISED DIRECTIVE THAT YOU MAY DESIRE AND REQUEST SUCH REPRESENTATION.

GP-4

BT

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I would suggest that the response to the 95-4 paper be along the following lines:

First of all, to express an understanding of General ABRAMS' position. Back in November, he made a decision--or whenever that last dispatch came in--that disapproved the recommendation we had in for a thirty-day test period. I have accepted that decision and will do everything I can to support my boss. However, the formalization of 95-4, revised, will put in concrete a form of operation which, when directed by Mr. NITZE, was for a temporary period of time and was to be returned to the original status quo when the situation which dictated it was no longer present--that situation being ~~whatever the case~~ ^{despite or whatever it was}; I don't know what it was. I recognize that General ABRAMS desires to manage all of his resources and to utilize his assets as he sees fit, and I fully support this. However, the administrative actions of putting this in 95-4, revised, means that forevermore, in this theatre, this is the way the assets are going to be operated and is not in consonance with the decision made by Mr. NITZE earlier last year. I would also point out, that any such document, when formally signed, will inevitably lead to revision to JCS Pub-4 and a refutation of roles and missions that are currently invoked in law.

These above thoughts are just offered, from which you can generate--clean up and refine them--an outline, but I think the general tenor is the approach we ought to take.

605

I would suggest that the response to the 95-4 paper be along the following lines:

First of all, to express an understanding of General ABRAMS' position. Back in November, he made a decision--or whenever that last dispatch came in--that disapproved the recommendation we had in for a thirty-day test period. I have accepted that decision and will do everything I can to support my boss. However, the formalization of 95-4, revised, will put in concrete a form of operation which, when directed by Mr. NITZE, was for a temporary period of time and was to be returned to the original status quo when the situation which dictated it was no longer present--that situation being whatever the case; I don't know what it was. I recognize that General ABRAMS desires to manage all of his resources and to utilize his assets as he sees fit, and I fully support this. However, the administrative actions of putting this in 95-4, revised, means that forevermore, in this theatre, this is the way the assets are going to be operated and is not in consonance with the decision made by Mr. NITZE earlier last year. I would also point out, that any such document, when formally signed, will inevitably lead to revision to JCS Pub-4 and a refutation of roles and missions that are currently invoked in law.

These above thoughts are just offered, from which you can generate--clean up and refine them--an outline, but I think the general tenor is the approach we ought to take.

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SECRET

QP RHMMAFA
 DE RUHFMA 1378 0111903
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 111908Z JAN 69
 FM ADMIN FMPPAC
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO
 WIRENOTE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR COLONEL
 PEEBLES, III MAF AIR OFFICER FROM COMONEL DEEDS,
 DIRECTOR, FORCE COMMAND CENTER

1. THE YEAR-END SUMMARY OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT
 QUOTED HEREIN HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR INCLUSION IN
 THE DECEMBER ISSUE OF OUR MONTHLY PUBLICATION,
 OPERATIONS OF US MARINE FORCES VIETNAM. PLEASE,
 REVIEW IT TO INSURE THAT IT IS ACCURATE IN FACT AND
 CONSISTENT WITH THE VIEWS OF CG III MAF. I
 WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR COMMENTS NOT LATER THAN
15 JANUARY, IF POSSIBLE.

2. QUOTE... SINGLE MANAGEMENT: AS RECOUNTED IN
 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS REPORT, THE YEAR 1968
 BROUGHT A RADICAL DISRUPTION TO III MAF'S ORGANIZA-
 TION FOR COMBAT AS COMUSMACV, ON 10 MARCH, ASSIGNED

DIRECTOR
 PAGE 2 RUHFMA1378 SECRET MCEC
 UUI MAF FIXED WING STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND
 ASSOCIATED AIR CONTROL ASSETS TO THE OPERATIONAL
 (CONTROL) OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 7TH AIR FORCE,
 CITING AS HIS REASONS THEREFOR THE INCREASING DEPLOY-
 MENT OF ARMY FORCES INTO I CTZ, THE THEN-IMPENDING
 MAJOR BATTLE IN I CTZ, AND THE NEED TO ACHIEVE A
 MORE FLEXIBLE CAPABILITY FOR POSSIBLE SHIFTS OF AIR
 EFFORT. THIS PROGRAM OF AIR FORCE CONTROL, ENTI-
 TLED THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM, WAS UNABLE TO
 COMMENCE FUNCTIONING UNTIL 22 MARCH AND WAS NOT
 A VIABLE SYSTEM UNTIL 1 APRIL. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER,
 THE THEN-CURRENT III MAF SYSTEM, FOLLOWING FEB-
 RUARY'S RECORD SHATTERING MONTH OF TET-ASSOCIATED
 COMBAT ACTIVITY (8,610 ENEMY KILLED BY III MAF ALONE),
 CONTINUED DURING THE LAST THREE WEEKS OF MARCH TO
 DEMONSTRATE ITS PROVEN EFFICACY THROUGHOUT I CTZ,
 PARTICULARLY IN CONTROLLING AIR FORCE, NAVY, AND
 MARINE AIRCRAFT IN CLOSE SUPPORT OF GROUND MANEU-
 VER UNITS CONCLUDING SUCCESSFULLY THE BATTLE OF
 KHE SANH - - AN ACTION INVOLVING THE LARGEST ENEMY

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

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111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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PAGE 3 RUHHFMA1378 S E C R E T M C E O
 FORCE CONCENTRATION OF THE WAJ. AS THE SINGLE
 MANAGER SYSTEM THEN BEGAN TO ATTAIN AN OPERATION-
 AL CAPABILITY IN I CTZ, THE III MAF AIR CONTROL ELE-
 MENT AT KHE SANH CONTINUED TO SUPPORT A MAJOR PART
 OF OPERATION PEGASUS, IN WHICH THE 26TH MARINES
 ATTACKED FROM THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE, JOINING
 THE 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) AND THE 1ST
 MARINE REGIMENT IN AN ASSAULT TO DRIVE THE ENEMY
 FROM WESTERN QUANG TRI.

AS THE III MAF AIR CONTROL SYSTEM, WHICH
 THROUGH THREE YEARS OF VIETNAM COMBAT HAD BEEN
 COORDINATED WITH, AND INTEGRATED INTO, THE 7TH
 AIR FORCE SYSTEM THEN IN EFFECT, BECAME A PART OF
 THE ARMY-AIR FORCE JOINT AIR GROUND OPERATIONS
 SYSTEM (FOJING THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM), A
 FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE IN AIR CONTROL PHILOSOPHY
 BECAME EVIDENT: THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM WAS
 PRIMARILY A PRODUCER ORIENTED EFFORT, WHILE THE
 III MAF SYSTEM WAS A CONSUMER ORIENTED ONE. THIS
 CONSUMER ORIENTATION WAS CENTRAL TO THE PROVEN

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA1378 S E C R E T M C E O
 COMBAT SUCCESS OF THE III MAF SYSTEM AND UNDERLAY
 ITS COMPLETE RESPONSIVENESS TO THE DESIRES OF THE
 SUPPORTED GROUND COMMANDER. ALTHOUGH THE SINGLE
 MANAGER PROCEDURE OF AIR CONTROLLERS DIVERTING
 SCHEDULED AIR SUPPORT WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE
 GROUND CHAIN OF AUTHORITY CERTAINLY WAS FOREIGN
 TO THE MARINE CONCEPT OF DIRECTING AIR SUPPORT, THE
 DIFFERENCE IN AIR CONTROL PHILOSOPHY PRINCIPALLY
 AFFECTED THE PREPLANNED AIR REQUEST PROCEDURES.
 THE III MAF SYSTEM FOR PREPLANNED REQUESTS WAS
 KEYED TO THE GROUND COMMANDER'S SCHEDULE FOR
 PLANNING HIS DAILY OPERATIONS, AND THE GROUND
 COMMANDER THUS TRANSMITTED HIS REQUIREMENTS FOR
 PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT AS LATE AS THE EVENING
 PRECEDING HIS OPERATION. UNDER SINGLE MANAGEMENT,
 HE NOW WAS REQUIRED TO SUBMIT HIS REQUEST FOR PRE-
 PLANNED AIR SUPPORT TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE, OFTEN
 BEFORE A GROUND OPERATION WAS PLANNED OR EVEN
 CONTEMPLATED. WHILE THIS SINGLE MANAGEMENT PRO-
 CEDURE PROVIDED FOR CONVENIENT AND ORDERLY SCHED-

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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PAGE 5 RUHHFMA1378 S E C R E T MCEC
 UING OF AIRCRAFT, IT WAS AT THE EXPENSE OF RESPON-
 SIVENESS TO THE GROUND COMMANDER'S TACTICAL RE-
 QUIREMENTS. BY END-APRIL, THE DEROGATION IN RE-
 SPONSIVENESS HAD BECOME A MATTER OF ALARM TO THE
 COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF WHO, FROM THE OUTSET,
 HAD OPPOSED STRONGLY THE IMPOSITION OF THE NEW AIR
 CONTROL PROCEDURES. KNOWING THAT THE LOSS OF OP-
 ERATIONAL (CONTROL) OF HIS ORGANIC FIXED WING AVIA-
 TION WOULD DEGRADE SERIOUSLY HIS COMBAT EFFECTIVE-
 NESS; HE WAS CONVINCED TOO THAT THE STATED PERFOR-
 MANCE GOALS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT WAS INHERENT
 IN THE PRE-SINGLE MANAGER ARRANGEMENT, AND THE
 CHANGE THEREFORE WAS UNNECESSARY. WITH HIS INITIAL
 ANALYSIS THUS CONFIRMED BY THE DEMONSTRATED WEAK-
 NESS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT AND THE RESULTANT DI-
 MINUTION IN TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT TO MARINE GROUND
 COMMANDERS, THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MAF RE-
 QUESTED THAT HIS FIXED WING AVIATION ASSETS BE RE-
 STORED TO HIS OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

REJECTING THE III MAF PETITION, COMUSMACV

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA1378 S E C R E T MCEC
 RESPONDED TO SINGLE MANAGEMENT'S FAILURE WITH A
 MODIFIED ARRANGEMENT WHICH DIVIDED PREPLANNED
 SORTIE ALLOCATIONS INTO TWO GROUPS: SEVENTY PER-
 CENT OF THE SORTIES WOULD BE ALLOCATED ON A WEEKLY
 SCHEDULE, WHILE THE REMAINDER WOULD BE ALLOCATED
 ON A DAILY BASIS. THE WEEKLY SCHEDULE WAS INTENDED
 TO PROVIDE EACH GROUND COMMANDER WITH SORTIES
 THAT HE COULD USE IN ANY MANNER HE CONSIDERED
 WOULD SUPPORT HIS TACTICAL PLANS MOST EFFECTIVELY,
 AND THE DAILY SCHEDULE WOULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL
 SORTIES WITH WHICH TO RESPOND TO THE EVER-CHANGING
 GROUND COMBAT SITUATION. THIS MODIFIED ARRANGE-
 MENT WAS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE INITIAL SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES. THE WEEKLY SCHEDULE,
 WHILE NOT PROVIDING THE RESPONSIVENESS OF III MAF'S
 PRE-SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM, NEVERTHELESS PROVIDED
 ALL GROUND COMMANDERS WITH A GUARANTEE OF AIR
 SUPPORT AND A DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THAT SUP-
 PORT PREVIOUSLY NOT EXISTENT IN THE SINGLE MANAGER SYS-
 TEM.

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PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWC
 H DESPITE THIS INITIAL MODIFICATION AND OTHER
 III MAF-INSPIRED IMPROVEMENTS TO THE ARMY-AIR FORCE
 JOINT AIR GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM PROCEDURES OF
 SINGLE MANAGEMENT, AND NOTWITHSTANDING THAT,
 WITHIN ITS LIMITATIONS, ITS PERFORMANCE HAD IMPROVED
 MEASURABLY, SINGLE MANAGEMENT CONTINUED TO BE A
 PRODUCER ORIENTED EFFORT AND, FOR MARINE PURPOSES,
 REMAINED LESS EFFECTIVE THAN THE SYSTEM IT RE-
 PLACED. YEAR-END STATISTICS REVEALED THE QUANTI-
 FIABLE EFFECTS OF THIS UNWIELDY SYSTEM ON MARINE
 OPERATIONS IN I CTZ. TO THE MARINE GROUND COMMAN-
 DER, AIR SUPPORT ALWAYS HAS BEEN BUT ANOTHER IN
 HIS ARSENAL OF ORGANIC WEAPONS. PRIOR TO SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT, HE ROUTINELY PRE-PLANNED HIS SUP-
 PORTING AIR TO COMPLEMENT HIS GROUND MANEUVER

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA1379 SECRET MCEO
 FOR THE ENSUING DAY, AND DURING THREE YEARS OF
 COMBAT OPERATIONS, 88 PERCENT OF THE AIR SUPPORT
 RECEIVED BY MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS IN SVN WAS
 SO PLANNED. IN THE MONTHS FOLLOWING THE IMPOSITION
 OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT, THIS PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT
 DECLINED TO ONLY 42 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SORTIES
 RECEIVED BY MARINE GROUND COMMANDERS, AND IN DE-
 CEMBER, IT DIMINISHED FURTHER TO LESS THAN 30 PER-
 CENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE DECLINE IN PREPLANNED
 SORTIES ACTUALLY FLOWN BY III MAF FIXED WING AIR-
 CRAFT (FROM 90 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL TO 58 PERCENT),
 WHILE DRASTIC, WAS NOT AS MARKED AS THE DECLINE
 IN PREPLANNED SUPPORT PROVIDED TO MARINE GROUND
 FORCES. THIS APPARENT DICHOTOMY WAS A PRODUCT OF
 THE SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN MARINE AIR DIVERTED TO
 SUPPORT OTHER THAN MARINE GROUND UNITS, WHICH
 DOUBLED FROM A PREVIOUS AVERAGE OF 21 PERCENT TO
 A SINGLE MANAGER AVERAGE OF 42 PERCENT, AND IN
 NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, TO OVER 50 PERCENT. TO
 OFFSET THE NONRESPONSIVENESS OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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PAGE 3 RUHHFMA1379 S E C R E T MCEC
 PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT, III MAF RELIED HEAVILY ON
 IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT AND EXTRA OR ADD-ON SORTIES.
 IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT, WHICH PREVIOUSLY HAD AVER-
 AGED 10 PERCENT OF THE AIR SUPPORT EFFORT, INCREASED
 TO A 1968 AVERAGE OF (25) PERCENT. AT THE SAME ^{OK} ^{17.9}
 TIME, III MAF FOUND IT NECESSARY TO RECORT TO THE
 EXTRA OR ADD-ON SORTIES (17 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ^{OK}
 AIR SUPPORT SORTIES) TO COMPENSATE FOR THE INCOM-
 PATIBILITY BETWEEN THE WEEKLY SCHEDULING AND THE
 497th COMMANDER'S TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS.

AS THESE INDICES OF INEFFICIENCY ACCUMULATED
 DURING SUCCESSIVE SYSTEM EVALUATIONS, THE COM-
 MANDING GENERAL, III MAF CONTINUED TO RECOMMEND
 A SYSTEM MODIFICATION TO RESTORE OPERATIONAL CON-
 TROL OF HIS FIXED WING RESOURCES. THE ESSENCE OF
 THE III MAF PROPOSAL WAS A PROCEDURAL MODIFICATION
 WHICH WOULD RESTORE PRE-SINGLE MANAGEMENT AIR
 SUPPORT RESPONSIVENESS TO FORCES IN I CTZ AND ATTAIN
 MORE EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF AIR IN I CTZ WITHOUT
 IN ANY WAY VIOLATING THE CONCEPT AND GOAL OF SINGLE

depriving COMUSMACV of the overall control and

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA1379 S E C R E T MCEC
 MANAGEMENT, AS OUTLINED BY THE COMMANDING GEN-
 ERAL, III MAF, FOLLOWING COMUSMACV'S WEEKLY ALLO-
 CATION OF AIR EFFORT, MARINE AIR, LESS THAT ALLO-
 CATED BY MACV FOR EMPLOYMENT OUTSIDE OF I CTZ,
 WOULD BE SCHEDULED ON A DAILY BASIS BY III MAF TO
 SUPPORT ALL III MAF FORCES. THE III MAF DAILY SCHED-
 ULE WOULD BE PUBLISHED CONCURRENTLY WITH THE AIR
 FORCE DAILY SCHEDULE THEREBY KEEPING SAIGON APPRISED,
 ON A TIMELY BASIS, OF THE AIR PLAN IN I CTZ. NO OTHER
 CHANGES IN SINGLE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES WERE
 ENVISIONED. WITH THE DIMINISHING COMBAT INTENSITY
 AND THE REDUCTION IN ARMY FORCES IN I CTZ AT YEAR'S
 END, MARINES IN I CTZ WERE HOPEFUL FOR AN OPPOR-
 TUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THIS PROCEDURAL MODIFICA-
 TION. UNQUOTE WARM REGARDS.

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PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

ZIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-69)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FM FPAG		DATE 11 JAN 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 110035Z JAN 69		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
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	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
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	EMB/TRANS					
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	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

601

SECRET

PP RHMAFA
 DE RUHFMA 1222 0110035
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 110035Z JAN 69
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

S E C R E T

SPECAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN, INFO MGEN
 QUILTER FROM LT GEN BUSE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 REVISION OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4

A. CG III MAF 100732Z/JAN69(S)

1. CONSIDER THE APPROACH TAKEN IN REF A, VIS-A-VIS A
 LINE BY LINE REVIEW, TO BE SOUND. I AM ALSO IN COMPLETE
 AGREEMENT WITH YOUR PROPOSED COMMENTS ADDRESSING
 THE REVISED DRAFT, 95-4 AND BELIEVE YOU HAVE STATED OUR
 CASE EXTREMELY WELL.

2. I CONCUR IN SUBMISSION OF YOUR PROPOSED COMMENTS TO
 COMUSMACV. WARM RE GARDS.

GP-4

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SECRET

#601

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE
FOR****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY****HAS BEEN SENT**

OO RUHMFMA RUMLMHA
 DE RHMMAFA 1155 0100732
 NY SSSSS
 100732Z JAN 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW DNG RVN

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE INFO MGEN QUILTER FROM
 LT GEN CUSHMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SUBJ: REVIEW OF MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4

REF: A. MY 070508Z JAN 69

1. (S) AS STATED IN REFERENCE A THE PROPOSED REVISION TO MACV DIRECTIVE
 95-4 WOULD MAKE SINGLE MANAGEMENT A PERMANENT FIXTURE. RATHER THAN
 LINE-BY-LINE REVIEW OF THE DOCUMENT I PROPOSE TO OBJECT IN
 PRINCIPLE AND ATTACK THE CONCEPT UNDER WHICH WE ARE NOW FORCED TO
 OPERATE. SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE I INTEND TO SUBMIT THE
 FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO COMUSMACV.

NOTE. 1. THE REFERENCED LETTER FORWARDED A PROPOSED DRAFT OF
 MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 TO THIS COMMAND FOR REVIEW AND COMMENT. IN
 ACCORDANCE THEREWITH, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE PROVIDED: A.
 MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 DATED 28 JUNE 1966 CONTAINS BASIC AGREEMENTS
 FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION OF U.S. MILITARY AIR

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 1155 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 OPERATIONS IN RVN. THESE AGREEMENTS ARE IN CONSONANCE WITH
 UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES (UNAAF) AND OTHER BASIC AGREEMENTS
 BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. THE REVISED DRAFT, 95-4 CONTRA-
 VENES A BASIC PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH 30213.B, UNAAF RELATING TO
 THE PRINCIPLE OF "PRESERVING THE UNI-SERVICE INTEGRITY OF
 FORCES." APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED DRAFT WOULD ENDORSE PERMANENT
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT
 WHICH ARE ORGANIC, INTEGRAL PARTS TO THE MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM.
 B. THE PRESENT 95-4 CONTAINS THE BASIC PROVISION THAT, DURING
 A MAJOR EMERGENCY OR DISASTER, COMUSMACV MAY DIRECT COMMANDER,
 7TH AIR FORCE, TO ASSUME OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER CERTAIN U.S.
 AIR RESOURCES. I CONCUR AND SUPPORT THE TRANSFER OF OPERATIONAL
 CONTROL UNDER SUCH SITUATIONS. HOWEVER, THE PROPOSED REVISION
 OF 95-4, IF PUBLISHED, WOULD FORMALIZE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF
 MARINE CORPS RESOURCES BY DEPUTY COMUSMACV FOR AIR DURING NORMAL
 SITUATIONS AND WOULD, IN EFFECT, MAKE SUCH OPERATIONAL CONTROL
 PERMANENT IN NATURE. WHILE THE PROPOSED REVISION REFERS TO THIS
 AUTHORITY AS "OPERATIONAL DIRECTION", I CANNOT DIFFERENTIATE
 BETWEEN "OPERATIONAL CONTROL", AS DEFINED IN UNAAF, AND "OPER-
 TIONAL DIRECTION", AS DEFINED IN THE PROPOSED REVISION. C. THE

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EXCLUSIVE**FOR****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

PAGE THREE RHMAFA 1155 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, IN ANNOUNCING APPROVAL OF THE SINGLE
 MANAGEMENT CONCEPT ON 15 MAY 1968, STATED: "I AM IN AGREEMENT
 WITH THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 THAT THE UNIFIED COMBAT COMMANDER ON THE SCENE SHOULD BE PRESUMED
 TO BE THE BEST JUDGE OF HOW THE COMBAT FORCES ASSIGNED TO HIM
 ARE TO ORGANIZED, COMMANDED, AND EMPLOYED TO MEET THE THREAT
 FACING HIM...FURTHERMORE, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ASSIGNMENT
 OF MARINE AIR UNITS UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPUTY
 COMUSMACV FOR AIR SHOULD CONSTITUTE A PRECEDENT FOR CENTRALIZED
 CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS UNDER OTHER COMBAT CONDITIONS, OR
 NEED POSE A THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE MARINE AIR/GROUND
 TEAM. I NOTE IN APPENDIX D TO (JCSM-237-68 OF 19 APRIL 1968)
 THE ASSURANCES MADE BY COMUSMACV TO THE
 CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT THE SINGLE-MANAGER
 ARRANGEMENT OVER TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL
 NOT BE CONTINUED BEYOND THAT NECESSARY TO MEET THE SPECIFIC
 COMBAT SITUATION FOR WHICH IT WAS DEvised. ACCORDINGLY,
 COMUSMACV SHOULD REVERT TO NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENT FOR THE
 III MAF WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS." I SUBMIT THE
 THESIS THAT THE SPECIFIC COMBAT SITUATION WHICH PROMPTED THE

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 1155 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 TEMPORARY CENTRALIZING CONTROL OVER AIR ASSETS NO LONGER EXISTS.
 BUT EVEN GRANTING THAT IT DOES EXIST TO SOME EXTENT, IT SEEMS
 APPARENT THAT, AT SOME POINT IN TIME, THE SITUATION WILL CHANGE,
 PERMITTING ORDERLY REVERSION TO NORMAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS. IT
 IS DESIRABLE TO PRESERVE THAT OPTION. 2. SINCE THE REVISED
 DRAFT OF 95-4 WOULD CONSTITUTE A PRECEDENT FOR CENTRALIZED CON-
 TROL OF AIR RESOURCES UNDER ANY AND ALL COMBAT CONDITIONS, AND
 SINCE IT WOULD MAKE PERMANENT THAT WHICH WAS RECOGNIZED BY
 SECDEF AS TEMPORARY, I CANNOT CONCUR IN THE REVISED DRAFT OF
 95-4, AS WRITTEN. 3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I RECOMMEND THE
 FOLLOWING: A. THE PRESENT MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 BE REWRITTEN
 TO AGREE WITH THE PHILOSOPHY AND ENCOMPASS THE RECOMMENDATIONS
 IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY 090300Z SEP 68. IN ANY EVENT, ANY REVISION
 SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE AND REFLECT
 THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY THE DEPSECDEF. I WILL PROVIDE ANY
 ASSISTANCE IN THE PREPARATION OF A REVISED DIRECTIVE THAT YOU
 MAY DESIRE AND REQUEST SUCH REPRESENTATION UNQUOTE.
 2. (S) I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONCURRENCE/COMMENTS AS SOON AS
 POSSIBLE. MACV HAS ASKED FOR MY COMMENTS BY 15 JANUARY;
 HOWEVER, I AM SURE WE CAN GET AN EXTENSION, IF REQUIRED.

PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 1155 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 3. (S) GEN CHAPMAN ARRIVED YESTERDAY. I HAVE DISCUSSED THESE
 COMMENTS WITH HIM. WARM REGARDS. **PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**

GP-4

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111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

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600

MEMORANDUM

FROM: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

FOR: C/S

Howard D

Interesting.

We should hold closely.

V Resp'y

for 209 / ~~has seen~~
~~CG~~ *to.*

|||||
o o o

BULL SHIT

#597

MEMO ROUTING		Never Use for Disapprovals, Concurrency or Similar Actions		AC
1 TO	Col. Bob Peebles	INITIALS	CIRCULATE	
		DATE	COORDINATION	
2	G-3 AIR, III MAF	FILE		
		INFORMATION	X	
3		NOTE AND RETURN		
		PER CONVERSATION		
4		SEE ME		
		SIGNATURE		
REMARKS				
<p style="text-align: center;">NO DEFEC</p> <p>Here is an interesting piece of paper - purloined from an AF General's note-book. Thought perhaps you and Gen. Cushman might like to see what the AF thinks of III MAF</p>				
FROM		DATE		
Lt Col Carl Lovell		1/4/69		
		PHONE		

DD FORM 95 1 OCT 60 Replaces DD Form 94, 1 Feb 60, and DD Form 95, 1 Feb 60, which will be used until exhausted. * GPO : 1968 O - 295-658

#597

~~SECRET~~ WORKING PAPER

SUBJECT: Single Management of Air Strike and Reconnaissance Assets in SVN

14 Dec 68
Spencer

BACKGROUND: Between early CY 1967 and the middle of CY 1968 the level of conflict in I Corps Tactical Zone increased markedly. U.S. Forces in the area increased from 21 Marine Maneuver Battalions in April '67 to 59 Maneuver Battalions in April '68 which 31 were US Army. The First Marine Air Wing was not able to support this force without a large number of USAF sorties. Special operations such as Neutralize and Niagara called for massive applications of tri-service airpower in a relatively small geographical area, and the day to day operations required a degree of coordination not feasible under two separate tactical air control systems. On 8 March 68, therefore, COMUSMACV designated Commander 7th Air Force, in his role of Deputy Commander for Air Operations for COMUSMACV, as the Single Manager for control of tactical air resources. The Single Management system became fully operational on 1 April 1968.

DISCUSSIONS: CG III MAF has steadfastly opposed Single Management. His initial objections included alleged lack of responsiveness to the ground commander and burdensome administrative procedures. In order to increase the responsiveness of the system and reduce administrative procedures, a modified preplan system was introduced in May 1968. This system simplified the frag, allocated a major portion of the preplan sorties to ground commanders on a weekly basis, and shortened the request cycle for daily preplan missions.

On 15 May the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a decision memo approving Single Management for "the duration of the specific combat situation for which it was devised." JCS directed that COMUSMACV, in conjunction with III MAF and 7AF, perform a monthly evaluation of the system and report to CINCPAC and JCS. This report provided a convenient forum for III MAF to reiterate his objections to the system. The monthly reports became repetitive and in September JCS rescinded the reporting requirement. Since that time III MAF has initiated numerous proposals on a variety of unrelated subjects, all of which have the objective of terminating or reducing the effect of the Single Management System. These proposals included:

- 14*
- a. Movement of the Forward Bomb Line some 10 miles North of the DMZ.
 - b. Future Thor-type operations in which the ground commander controls artillery and air in portions of Tallyho.
 - c. Revision of a MACV artillery warning directive in such a way as to convert artillery warning centers to control centers with coordination and control responsibility for tactical areas as well as artillery.

These proposals are being rebutted on a case by case basis. The Single Management System is working exceptionally well, and minor modifications are constantly being implemented to improve it.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That the Air Force continue to oppose any efforts to terminate or emasculate the Single Management System.

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PP RUHFMA RUMLMHA
 DE RHMAFA 0749 0070508
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 070508Z JAN 69
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW DNG RVN
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE INFO MGEN GUILTER
 FROM LT GEN CUSHMAN FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. CG FMFPAC MSG 312131Z DEC 68 MCEO

B. CG III MAF MSG 260148Z DEC 68 MCEO

1. (S) SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH RECEIPT OF REF A MY HQS WAS TASKED TO
 COMMENT ON A REVISED MACV DIR 95-4. THE REVISED DRAFT, IF PUBLISHED,
 WOULD SET SINGLE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS
 IN CONCRETE.

2. (S) THEREFORE, I WILL TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION ON MY PROPOSAL OF
 REF B BUT PLAN TO GO ON RECORD WITH COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT OF 95-4.

3. (S) I WILL FORWARD COPIES OF THE DRAFT OF THE MACV DIRECTIVE TO
 YOUR HQS AND SUGGEST A COPY BE FORWARDED TO HQ MC TO KEEP THEM ABREAST
 OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0749

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PTT SZ YUW RHMAFA 25 03 203 0348-SSSS--RUHGSAP RUMLMHA RUYJSYB
RUYPWQU RUYVFO. HAS BEEN SENT
ZNY SSSSS ORIG G-3
P 03 0348Z JAN 69 REL C/S
FM CG III MAF DNG RVN DIST A

TO RUHGSAP/COM SEVENTH FLT
INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW DNG RVN
RUYJSYB/CTF SEVEN NINE
RUYVFO/CTF SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
RUYPWQU/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: HELICOPTER AVAILABILITY (U)

1. (S) THE DAILY HELICOPTER AVAILABILITY WITHIN THE FIRST MAW HAS DECLINED IN RECENT WEEKS. THIS REDUCED AVAILABILITY HAS HAMPERED THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS' ABILITY TO CONDUCT DAT-TO-DAY OPERATIONS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE NEED TO INSURE THE MOST EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE USE OF ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES, BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL.
2. (S) TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL HELICOPTER SUPPORT TO III MAF COMMANDS, THE FIRST MAW WOULD BENEFIT FROM A GREATER DAILY CONTRIBUTION OF HELICOPTERS FROM SLF'S DURING PERIODS WHEN OPERATIONS ARE NOT BEING CONDUCTED WITH BLT'S.
3. (U) WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ASSISTANCE YOU CAN PROVIDE IN THIS

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 25 03 SECRET

CONNECTION.

GP-4

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SECRET

OTTSZYUW RHMAFAC165 0020658-SSSS--RHMSMVA RUSQSNA.

ZNY SSSSS

~~Q 420658Z JAN 69 ZEE-1~~

~~FM CG III MAF DNG RVN~~

~~TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV~~

INFO RUSQSNA/SEVENTH AF TACC TSN AB RVN

BT

S E C R E T

ATTN: TASE

~~SUBJ: III MAF TAC AIR REQUIREMENTS FOR PERIOD 7 JAN THRU 13 JAN 69 (U)~~

1. (S) PREPLANNED TAC AIR SORTIES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT COMBAT OPERATIONS DURING SUBJ PERIOD ARE: 283

2. (S) REQUEST PREPLANNED SORTIES BE ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS:

A. CAS: 116 CSS: 85 TOTAL: 201

B. DAILY CAS: 82

C. TOTAL 283

GP-4

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0165

HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG-G-3-

REL-G-3-

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