

~~1 CG FMAW 150045Z JAN69 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~2 COMSEVENTHFLT 151136Z JAN69 (C) FOR
FOR DEBENS INFO WILLIAMS STILWELL & GETTYS FROM BRINGLE
ITINERARY & VISITING FLAGSHIPS~~

~~3 COMSEVENTHFLT 153104Z JAN69 (C) FOR
FOR BONNER FROM BRINGLE
REQUESTED TO HAVE YOU FOR LUNCH ON 17 JAN~~

~~4 COMUSMAGTHAI 161131Z JAN69 UNCLAS FOR
FOR BENNETT FROM MR HUMPHREY
"I WILL BE PLEASED TO ASSIST IN PERSONNEL RESPONSE PROGRAM"
"INVITE ME AND MY MAGTHAI MONITOR ACAP AFTER 4 FEB 69"~~

~~5 CG FMAW 161415Z JAN69 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

6 COMUSMACV 171019Z JAN69 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-4*
ABRAMS TO ALL MAJOR UNIT COMMANDERS
PARIS PEACE TALKS BEGIN 181730H JAN69. ENEMY PLANS STAGE ATTACKS
TO INFLUENCE. PRE-EMPT ENEMY, DESTROY HIM.

7 COMNAVFORV 170649Z JAN69 (C) FOR *gp-4*
FOR CUSHMAN & STILWELL FROM ZUMWALT
RELIEF OF CTF CLEARWATER

~~8 ADMIN FMAW 171415Z JAN69 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

9 CG FMFPac 182026Z JAN69 (S) MCEO *Group-4*
FOR YOUNGDALE INFOR CHAPMAN FROM BUSE
REALIGNMENT OF SEASIA FORCE STRUCTURE

10 CMC 181717Z JAN69 (S) MCEO *Group-4*
FMAW SPECIAL REPORT

~~11 *ADMIN 0* CG FMAW 181618Z JAN69 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

12 COL ROBERTS ATNG J-2 (S) EYES ONLY 190451Z JAN69 *gp-3*
ENEMY PREPOSITIONING OF CLASS I IN ICTZ "CACHES OF RICE"

~~13 COMSEVENTHFLT 190612Z JAN69 (C) FOR
FOR BCEN DOOLEY FROM COL CODISPOTI
"ADM BRINGLE WOULD LIKE TO ATTEND THE 20 JAN MORNING BRIEF"~~

~~14 ADMINO FMAW 191490Z JAN69 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~15 COMSEVENTHFLT 200526Z JAN69 (C) FOR
FOR STILWELL FROM BRINGLE. "LIKE TO HAVE YOU FOR LUNCH ON 22 JAN--
EXTEND INVITE TO I AM TOO" (GEN BUCE ARRIVES 1145 22 JAN)~~

16 COMUSMACV 200913Z JAN69 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-4*
FOR STILWELL FROM ABRAMS
"WILL VISIT I CORPS TOMORROW, 21 JANUARY) LIKE HAVE UPDATE BRIEF"

~~17 ADMINO FMAW 201600Z JAN69 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~18 ADMINO FMAW 211215Z JAN69 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

~~19 BGEN CLAY AG-65, J-1 MACV to BGEN DOOLEY (S) EYES ONLY
GENERAL WICKHAM REQ THAT MESSAGE BE PASSED GLORIA AND
JIMMY STEWART. HEARTFELT SYMPATHY FOR DEATH OF THEIR
BROTHER EDGAR~~

~~20 CG FMAW 221345Z JAN69 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

21 ADMIN FMFPAC 222217Z JAN69 (S) MCEO *gp-4*
FIXED WING STRIKE REPORT (REDUCES FREQUENCY OF REPORTS TO WKLY)

22 BGEN BOLLING C/S XXIV CORPS 230712Z JAN69 (S) EYES ONLY *Group - not shown*
SUBJ UNK: ALL COPIES PROVIDED TO LTGEN STILWELL

~~23 CG FMAW 231255Z JAN69 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

24 CG XXIV CORPS 231655Z JAN69 (C) FOR EYES ONLY *Group-4*
FOR DRAKE FROM STILWELL "UFO SIGHTINGS"

25 CMC 232017Z JAN69 (C) FOR *Group-4*
FOR DOOLEY FROM BARRETT "COVINGTON CASE"

26 CTF SEVEN NINE 232356Z JAN69 (C) FOR *Group-4*
FOR GETTYS INFO COOKSEY FROM WILLIAMS
THANKS FOR YOUR CT AND C SUPPORT

~~27 CG FMAW 241140Z JAN69 (S) MCEO
ROUTINE INPUT~~

28 COMNAVFORV 241150Z JAN69 (S) EYES ONLY *Group-2*
FOR CUSHMAN, STILWELL & DAVIS FROM ZUMWALT
NAVAL SAPPER ACTIVITY (U)

~~29 CMC 241715Z JAN69 (U) FOR
ITINERARY FOR GEN CUSHMAN~~

- ~~30~~ ~~SSO XXIV CORPS 251144Z JAN69 (U) EYES ONLY~~
~~READD OF MSG FROM TOWNSEND TO STILLWELL~~
~~CORRECTIONS TO MACV 240225Z JAN69 (C) #14 #12 & 13, #0&10)~~
- ~~31~~ ~~CG FMAW 251210Z JAN69 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 32 - CG FMFPAC 252025Z JAN69 (C) FOR *gp-4*
 CONCUR IN ASSGTS OF DWYER & JASKILKA (III MAF msg 250710Z JAN69)
- 33 CG FMFPAC 252232Z JAN69 (S) LIMDIS *gp-4*
 LIMDIS -- PURPLE DRAGON -- OPERATIONS SECURITY EXAMINATION
 OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN SVN (U)
- 34 ✓ MG GETTYS CG AMER DIV 260643Z JAN69 (C) EYES ONLY *Group-not shown*
 GETTYS TO STILLWELL
 "ALLEGED NON-SUPPORT OF 2D ARVN DIV REQ FOR HELICOPTERS"
- ~~35~~ ~~CG FMAW 261120Z JAN69 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- ~~36~~ ~~CG FMAW 271505Z JAN69 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~
- 37 ✓ MG CORCORAN C/S MACV 240225Z JAN69 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-3*
 CORCORAN TO ALL "FOLLOWING MSG RECEIVED AT MACV"
 SUBJ: SITUATION IN VIETNAM (HOFFMAN & PUCKETT WENT TO MACV)
- 38 ✓ BG BOLLING C/S XXIV CORPS 260417Z JAN69 (S) EYES ONLY *Group-4*
 BOLLING TO DOOLEY
 SUBJ: SITUATION IN VIETNAM (SOME AMPLIFYING INSTRUCTIONS)
- ~~39~~ ~~BG BOLLING C/S XXIV CORPS 280650Z JAN69 (S)~~
~~EYES ONLY (LTGEN STILLWELL HAS ALL COPIES)~~
- 40 ✓ ADMIN COMSEVENTHFLT 270734Z JAN69 (S) NOFORN *gp-3* LIMDIS PURPLE DRAGON
 OPERATIONS SECURITY EXAMINATION OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT
 OPERATIONS IN SVN (U)
- 41 ✓ ADMIN CINCPACFLT 280228Z JAN69 (C) FOR *Group-4*
 FOR ZUMWALT INFO BUSE, CUSHMAN, BONNER, COMBS & JOHNSON FROM
 BAUMBERGER
 ICTZ POWER REPROGRAMMING
- ~~42~~ ~~CG 3D MARDIV 290221Z JAN69 (S) MCEO~~
~~SUBJ: SUBMISSION OF WEEKLY REPORT~~
- 43 ✓ COMNAVSUPPACT 280648Z JAN69 (C) FOR *Group-4*
 FOR ZUMWALT INFO COMBS & YOUNGDALE FROM BONNER
 STEVEDORING CONTRACT AT NSA DANANG (U)
- ~~44~~ ~~CG FMAW 281220Z JAN69 (S) MCEO~~
~~ROUTINE INPUT~~

45. COMNAVFORV 291442Z JAN69 (C) FOR *Group 4*
 FOR BAUMBERGER INFO BUSE, CUSHMAN, BONNER, JOHNSON & COMBS
 FROM ZUMWALT
 "ICTZ POWER REPROGRAMMING"
- ~~46. CTC 70 8 301018Z JAN69 (C) FOR
 FOR CUSHMAN, YOUNGDALE AND HOFFMAN FROM BAGLEY
 INVITE TO LUNCH ON 2-3 FEB 69~~
47. SSO XXIV CORPS 301114Z JAN69 (S) EYES ONLY *Op-4*
 XXIV CORPS PASSING MACV MESSAGE TO GEN. STILLWELL
 "MACV 300909 "I'M VISITING YOUR AREA 5 FEB 69
 WANT TO VISIT AMERICAL BRIGADES, 2D ARVN Div etc etc..."
- ~~48. SSO XXIV CORPS 010152Z FEB69 (U) EYES ONLY
 PASS TO DOOLEY DEP STILLWELL
 PASSING GEN ABRAMS 211024Z JAN69 ("ATTORNEY IN CONNECTION")
 WORK ON REPORT 'SITUATION
 IN VIETNAM")~~
- ~~49. SSO XXIV CORPS 012307Z FEB 69 (C) EYES ONLY
 PASS TO STILLWELL FROM TOWNSEND
 "MC TOWNSEND 53 MACV TO LTC STILLWELL 011604Z FEB69 (C)"
 SUBJ: COMPLIANCE WITH REQUEST~~
- 50 GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV 030147Z FEB69 (S) EYES ONLY *Op-4*
 ABRAMS TO ALL "TET CEASEFIRE" (U)

DECLASSIFIED

1. ✓ COMNAVFORV 250048Z JAN69 (TS) LIMDIS EXCLUSIVE *GP-4*
PERSONAL FOR CUSHMAN FRM ZUMWALT
"POSSIBLE ENEMY USE OF UNDERWATER COMMUNICATIONS CABLES (TSL)

~~2. ✓ COL CRYSTAUGH, MACCS 00 210355Z (JAN69) (TS) EYES ONLY
PRAIRIE FIRE INCIDENTS IN VICINITY OF BASE AREA 611 (CONCLD)~~

3. ✓ GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV 310850Z JAN69 (TS) EYES ONLY *GP-3*
ABRAMS TO BROWN, MILDREN, CUSHMAN, PEERS, KERWIN, ZUMWALT,
ECHARDT, AARON INFO STILWELL
"US TROOP REDUCTION"

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 521S (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV		DATE 17 JAN 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 171019Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET MAC 760 EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG	GEN	STILWELL	HAS	SEEN	REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SEC WITHIN 2 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION DESIRED WITHIN ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
3	DCG	I	18 Jan			
	DCG AIR					No action Rec'd 172215H
2	C/S	I	HAS	SEEN		
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	1/17		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

SECRET

5 No

#6

O 171019Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON
 TO GEN BROWN CDR 7AF SAIGON
 LTG MILDREN DCG USARV LONG BINH
 LTG STILLWELL CG III MAF DANANG
 LTG PEERS CG I FFV NHA TRANG
 LTG KERWIN CG II FFV LONG BINH
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CTZ CAN THO
 INFO GEN NAZARRO CINCPAC HONOLULU
 GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 760 EYES ONLY

1. (S) THE PARIS PEACE TALKS ARE SCHEDULED FOR RESUMPTION AT 1730 HOURS, SAIGON TIME, 18 JANUARY ~~0900~~
2. (S) THERE HAVE BEEN CONSTANT INDICATIONS FROM THE ENEMY THAT HE PLANS TO STAGE ATTACKS AT SUCH TIMES AS HE CAN BEST INFLUENCE THE PARIS TALKS.
3. (S) REQUEST THAT EACH ADDRESSEE TAKE SUCH ACTION AS IS NECESSARY TO PRE-EMPT THE ENEMY AND DESTROY HIM COMPLETELY.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

200

SECRET

NNNN

#6

CONFIDENTIAL

21006934
LETCZYUW RUMUGKD7650 0170649-CCCC--RHMMAFA.
ZNY CCCCC
0 170649Z JAN 69
FM COMNAVFORV
TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
RUMLBPN/CG XXIV CORPS
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FOR LTG CUSHMAN AND LTG STILWELL FROM VADM ZUMWALT
CTF CLEARWATER (U)

1. THE CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL IS IN PROCESS OF SELECTING
PERMANENT CG RELIEF AS CTF CLEARWATER FOR ASSIGNMENT ON ONE
YEAR TOUR BASIS. NOMINEE EXPECTED TO BE AVAIL
ABT 1 JUN 69.

2. PRESENT INCUMBENT CDR SAYRE A. SWARZTRAUBER
IS SCHEDULED DEPART RVN IN FEB. IN THE INTERIM
I HAVE SELECTED CAPT FREDERICK F. JEWETT II,
USNA #47, HIGHLY MOTIVATED OFFICER WHO EXTENDED HIS
TOUR IN COUNTRY TO BECOME CTF CLEARWATER. I ANTICIPATE
HE WILL RELIEVE CDR SWARZTRAUBER ABT 4 FEB.

3. CAPT JEWETT HAS BEEN SERVING SINCE MAR 68 AS
OFFICER IN SPECIAL PLANS DIVISION MACV HQ STAFF

Self explanatory

PAGE 2 RUMUGKD7650 C O N F I D E N T I A L.
HE IS A WEAPONS SUBSPECIALIST IN UNDERWATER
OROMANCE WITH MS DEGREE IN ELECTRICAL ENG FROM
USN PG SCOL; PARTICULARLY DESIRABLE CONSIDERING
THE CONSANT MINE THREAT FACED BY CLEARWATER BOATS.
DURING KOREAN WAR HE PARTICIPATED IN COMBAT INSHORE
OPS INVOLVING LSMR SHORE BOMBARDMENT. CAPT JEWETT
HAS PROVEN RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT BY VIRTUE
OF SUCCESSFUL COMMAND AT SEA OF AN OCEAN GOING
MINESWEEPER AND A DESTROYER. HE HAS AN ESTABLISHED
FINE REPUTATION OF COMPETENCE AND LEADERSHIP. I AM
SURE YOU WILL BE PLEASED WITH CAPT JEWETT AS THE
INTERIM CTF CLEARWATER.

WARM REGARDS.

GP:4
III MAF 7100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CC	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURC.								#7	

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FMFPAC		DATE 18 JAN 69		
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 182026Z JAN 69		COPY# OF COPIES RECD		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	EXCLUSIVE FOR
			IN	OUT			
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR <i>Cy # 3 to C-3</i> <i>[Signature]</i> MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY <i>Cy 2 to PROGRAM SIX</i> <i>file</i> <i>Cy # 3 to C-3</i> <i>[Signature]</i> <i>Returned 1 Feb 69</i> SECRET #9	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
	C/S						
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
	S/S						
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

ZIMAF FORM E216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE		FROM CG FMFPAC	DATE 18 JAN 69
		SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 182026Z JAN 69	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I HAS SEA				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I 1119			H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #9

SECRET

PP RUEBHOA RHMMAFA
 DE RUHHFMA 2578 0182026
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 182026Z JAN 69
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN YOUNGDALE, INFO
 GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES
 ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

REALIGNMENT OF SEASIA FORCE STRUCTURE (U)

A. CMC 150050Z/JAN69 (S) SPECAT

B. CG FMFPAC 130025Z/DEC68 (S) SPECAT

C. CMC LTR A01E-5A-JML OF 30 OCT 68 (S) NOTAL-NH

1. (S) REF A PROVIDES CMC DECISION ON ADJUSTMENTS IN
 PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS AND MANNING LEVELS, INCLUDING
 CADRE OF UNITS, TO ENSURE ADHERENCE TO PROGRAM SIX
 CEILINGS. THIS DECISION, WHILE IN CONSONANCE WITH
 THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY REF B, REFLECTS ADDITIONAL
 CHANGES IN SPACE ALLOCATIONS DEVELOPED DURING PREPAR-
 ATION OF HQMC 3D AND 4TH QTR FY69 MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS.
 FURTHER, IT REQUESTS THAT CG III MAF BE ADVISED TO

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA2578 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC
 INITIATE SUCH ACTION ON EFFECTING APPROVED CADRES/
 MANNING LEVEL REDUCTIONS AS DEEMED PRACTICABLE AND TO
 NOTIFY MACV OF THE UNITS CONCERNED.

2. (S) FMFPAC WESTPAC MANNING LEVELS WILL NOT BE REVISED
 UNTIL RECEIPT OF HQMC 3D AND 4TH QTR FY69 MANPOWER
 ALLOCATIONS. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT IT WOULD BE
BENEFICIAL FOR III MAF TO INITIATE ACTION NOW TO ADJUST
ITS PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS AND MANNING LEVELS IN AC-
CORDANCE WITH REF A, SINCE THIS COULD EASE THE IMPACT
OF EMERGENCY REDUCTIONS IN WESTPAC MANNING LEVELS
DIRECTED BY REF C.

3. (C) SINCE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REF A DOES
 NOT PROVIDE THE COMPLETE REALIGNED PROGRAM SIX FORCE
 STRUCTURE LISTING REQUIRED TO ALLOW PREPARATION OF A
 DETAILED FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE REQUEST, NOTIFYING
 MACV OF THE UNITS INVOLVED IN THE DECISIONS CONTAINED
 IN REF A DOES NOT APPEAR PRACTICABLE AT THIS TIME.

4. (S) GUIDANCE IN CONNECTION WITH EQUIPMENT ITEMS OF
 UNITS DESIGNATED FOR CADRE STATUS BY REF A WILL BE
 PROVIDED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA2578 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC

5. (S) ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST CG III MAF TAKE REF A FOR SUCH ACTION
 NOW AS DEEMED PRACTICABLE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SECRET
#9

SECRET

PAC-I-III MAF
 -I-FIRST MAF
 RR RUHHFMA RHMMAFA RUMLMHA.

⑤
 E RUEBHOA 6285 0181749
 ZNY SSSSS
 R 181717Z JAN 69
 FM CMC

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAF

BT
 S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FMAW SPECIAL REPORT (U)

1. (S) THE INFOR CONTAINED IN THE SUBJECT REPORT PROVIDES THE DATA BASE FOR EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING CONTROL SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH THE TIME SENSITIVITY OF THE REPORT HAS DECREASED THE VALUE OF THE DATA BASE HAS NOT. THE OUTCOME OF PROBABLE FUTURE CONFRONTATIONS IN OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF AIR ASSETS MAY WELL BE DETERMINED BY THE QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF SINGLE MANAGEMENT.
2. (U) IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE DATA COLLECTION EFFORT BE CONTINUED.
3. (U) IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE SUBMISSION FREQUENCY BE THE REPORT BE DECREASED TO ONE A WEEK AND THAT THE WEEKLY REPORT BE SUBMITTED BY LETTER. THE TIME BASE OF 24 HOURS SHOULD

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA6285 S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 REMAIN UNCHANGED.

4. (U) THE DATA COLLECTION EFFORTS OF THE FMFPAC (OA) SECTION IN THE AIR CONTROL AGENCIES OF FMAW HAS DISTINCT APPLICATION TO THIS MATTER. REQUEST INFORMATION ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE PROJECT BE FORWARDED ATTN: CMC (AAM).

GP-4

BT

6285

*Requests continuing collection
 of single management data.*

SECRET

#10

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM COL ROBERTS AING J-2		DATE 19 JAN 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 190451		1, 2, 3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT secret mac 851 eyes only
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I	HAS	See		REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I	HAS	See		
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	1/19		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

SECRET

3 190451Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM COL ROB RIS ATNG J-2 MACV SAIGON
TO LTG STILWELL ATNG CG III MAF
INFO COL CANTON G-2 III MAF
ZEM

SECRET

SECRET MAC 851 EYES ONLY
SUBJECT: ENEMY PREPOSITIONING OF CLASS I IN I CTZ.
REFERENCE PHB 0088

Self-explanatory

1. I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS REGARDING THE RICE CACHES RECENTLY LOCATED IN I CTZ. I AGREE THAT THE RICE CACHE LOCATED IN NW QUANG TRI PROV ON 6 JUN WAS PROBABLY STAGED THROUGH THE DMZ; HOWEVER, THE AMOUNT OF RICE INVOLVED DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT. WE ESTIMATE THAT THE 4 TONS ISSUED BETWEEN 3 AND 30 DEC WOULD FEED ONLY 300 MEN FOR THAT PERIOD. PHOTOGRAPHY OF 11 JAN SUGGESTS THAT THE RICE MAY HAVE COME FROM A TRANSSHIPMENT POINT ON THE DAI GIANG RIVER (XD 865 522) IN NN. THIS PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALED THAT 7 STACKS OF BAGGED SUPPLIES WERE LOCATED AT ANOTHER TRANSSHIPMENT POINT (XD 749 895) AT THE SOUTHERN END OF THE MOTORABLE PORTION OF ROUTE 103. PERSONNEL CARRYING BAGS WERE NOTED LEAVING THIS POINT APPARENTLY TRAVELING ALONG ROUTE 1032, WHICH IS A TRAIL EXTENDING INTO THE EXTREME WESTERN DMZ. A HOI CHANH WHO RALLIED ON 3 JAN, 13 KM WEST OF UHE SANH, STATED THAT THE U-2 BN, 246TH REGT, IS LOCATED 28 KM WEST OF KHE SANH AT BAN BUK HAMLZI, LAOS. THE RALLIER STATED THAT HE BELONGED TO THE BN'S REAR SERVICES ELEMENT WHICH HAD CARRIED 3 TONS OF RICE FROM BAN HUK TO SVN SINCE HE HAD BEEN IN THE UNIT. HIS STATEMENTS, ALONG WITH THE CAPTURED RECORDS OF RICE ISSUED TO THE 2ND BN, 246TH REGT, INDICATE THAT THE 2ND BN IS WORKING WITH OTHER U/I REAR SERVICES ELEMENTS TO STORE RICE IN WESTERN QUANG TRI PROV. THIS MAYBE IN ANTICIPATION OF AN EVENTUAL RETURN OF MAJOR COMBAT UNITS TO THE AREA. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT A MAJOR FORCE BUILDUP IS IMMINENT.

2. THE CACHE DISCOVERED EAST OF HUE PROBABLY BELONGS TO ELEMENTS OF THE 5TH REGT. YOU MAY RECALL THAT A PW (LT HOANG BA) CAPTURED ON 4 JUN, 15 KM WSW OF HUE, STATED THAT THE 5TH REGT CONTINUES TO HAVE A SEVERE RICE SHORTAGE AND THAT THE PROCUREMENT OF FOOD IS CURRENTLY THE PRIMARY OCCUPATION OF REGT ELEMENTS. IN VIEW OF THESE UNOWN FOOD PROBLEMS, I FEEL THAT DESPITE SOME REPORTS OF FORTHCOMING ATKS AGAINST HUE, THE ENEMY HAS LITTLE CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT MORE THAN HARASSMENT AT THIS TIME. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT HE IS RECONSTRUCTING HIS LOGISTICS LINES PROBABLY IN HOPES OF SUPPORTING ADDITIONAL TROOPS IN WTTM. HOWEVER, UNTIL HE ACCOMPLISHES THIS, HE WILL BE UNABLE TO MOUNT A SERIOUS OFFENSIVE. #12(1)

3. THE LARGE ACCUMULATION OF RICE FOUND BY THE ROY MARINES IN EASTERN QUANG NAM IS INDEED REMARKABLE. THE VULNERABILITY OF THE CACHE IN THE AREA IN WHICH IT WAS FOUND SUGGESTS THAT THE EN INTENDED TO MOVE IT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. I SUGGEST 2 POSSIBLE USES FOR THE RICE. FIRST, THE U650 AND K800 UNITS OF THE QUANG NAM PROV COMMITTEE WHICH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR PURCHASE AND DISTRIBUTION OF FOODSTUFFS FOR FRONT 4 FORCES MAY HAVE BEEN PREPARING FOR OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY IN THE LOWLANDS. SECONDLY, ELMS OF THE 220TH REGT ARE CHARGED WITH THE PURCHASE AND TRANSFER OF FOOD FROM THE QUANG NAM LOWLANDS BACK TO THE REGT AREA IN THE VIC OF BA 112. THE RICE PROBLEMS WHICH OPN TAYLOR COMMON IS CREATING FOR MR-5 UNITS LOCATED IN THE MOUNTAINS, MAY HAVE PROMPTED A CALL FOR RICE FROM THE LOWLANDS. THIS COULD ACCOUNT FOR THE APPARENT READING OF LARGE QUANTITIES OF RICE FOR MOVEMENT. IN EITHER CASE, LOSS OF THE CACHE TOGETHER WITH PERSONNEL LOSSES SUFFERED BY THE 36TH AND 38TH REGTS, AS WELL AS THE 21ST REGT, 2ND NA DIV, HAVE GREATLY REDUCED THE LIKELIHOOD OF MAJOR OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE FRONT 4 AREA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

4. WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

#12(2)

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

900

SECRET

NNNN

12(2)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV		DATE 20 JAN 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 200913		COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D 1,2,3,	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	1				REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	1				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	1	1/20			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

st
SECRET

#16

O 200945Z ZYH ZFF-4
DE YSHKOD 25 0200914
O 200913Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON
TO LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS DANANG
ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 896 EYES ONLY

I PLAN TO VISIT I CORPS TOMORROW, 21 JANUARY. WOULD
LIKE TO SEE YOU AND GENERAL LAM. I WOULD LIKE TO VISIT
THE FOLLOWING UNITS AND RECEIVE UP DATE BRIEFING AND
PLANS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS:

101ST ABN DIV

2D ARVN REGT

3D MARINE DIV

III MAF

AMERICAL DIVISION

PLAN TO ARRIVE PHU BAI AT 0940.

DEPART FROM CHU LAI.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

100

NNNN

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM ADMIN FMFPAC		DATE 23 JAN 69	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 222217Z JAN 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		FIXED WING STRIKE REPORT (U)	
	CG					REMARKS	
3	DCG	I	23	Jan			
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	I					
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
1	S/S	I	23	1		MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY	
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3					A HAS COPY #3	
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	HQS CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

SECRET

21

SECRET

Implement existing collection of single management data.

PP RHMMAFA RUMLMHA

JE RUHHFMA2995 0222217

ZNY SSSSS

P 222217Z JAN 69

~~FM ADMIN DIRECTOR~~

TO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

~~INFO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF~~

BT

~~SECRET FOR THE GORP'S EYES ONLY~~

~~REF A RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN REPORTING PROCEDURES~~

A. ADMINO FIRST MAW 141431Z/JAN69 (C)

B. CMC 131717Z/JAN69 (S) (MCEC)

1. (S) REF A RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN REPORTING PROCEDURES IF NEED FOR SUBJECT REPORT EXISTS. BY REF B, CMC REAFFIRMED REQUIREMENT AND REQUESTED DATA COLLECTION EFFORT BE CONTINUED.

2. (S) ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST CG FIRST MAW COMPILE SUBJECT REPORT, INCLUDING FIRST AND THIRD MAR DIV INPUTS, ON PRESENT DAILY BASIS AND SUBMIT REPORT WEEKLY TO COVER PERIOD 0021H TUESDAY THRU 2400H MONDAY. SUBMIT WEEKLY LETTER REPORT TO THIS HQ WITH COPY TO CMC (ATTN AAM).

GP-4

BT

2995

SECRET #21

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM HQ BOLLING C/S NETV COMB		DATE 23 Jan 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 210712		COPY# OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT Secret sub 0132 USES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					

*All copies given
to Gen Schwab
23 Jan 69*

22

SECRET

#22

0 230712Z 275 EFF-1

FM BG ROLLING CHIEF OF STAFF XXIV CORPS
TO LTC STILWELL ACTING CG III MAF
ZEN

S E C R E T PNB 0132 EYES ONLY

1. ON THE BASIS OF YOUR CONVERSATION AT THE 101ST CP TODAY, GENERAL ZAIS HAS DECIDED TO MOVE TOMORROW (24 JAN) WITH CONNY'S BRIGADE AND THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH HOFFLING'S BRIGADE. COORDINATION WITH 1ST ARVN UNITS DESTINED TO WORK WITH CONNY IS NOW UNDERWAY.
2. GENERAL ZAIS APPEARS TO BE QUITE DISAPPOINTED AT THE APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDING WITH REGARD TO YOUR OVERALL PLAN OF ACTION, AND HE ASKED ME TO INFORM YOU THAT THE EFFORT TO MOVE INTO THE CANOPY WILL BE RAPID AND AGGRESSIVE.
3. ADDITIONAL ITEM. GENERAL PIXTON INFORMS ME THAT THE ANLIGHT THREATENING THE WIRE LINE WILL BE MOVED 1 KILOMETER TO THE WEST.

SSO NOTE: IF GENERAL STILWELL IS NOT PRESENTLY AT HQ III MAF,
DELIVER MSG TO HIM IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS RETURN

160

SECRET

NNNN

#22

Z 221052Z ZFF-1 ZFF-A
 FM LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 TO MG DRAKE DCG XXIV CORPS PHZ
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: SIGHTINGS OF UFO'S

1. IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS WE HAVE HAD A SPATE OF UFO SIGHTINGS WHICH, BY REASON OF ESTIMATED LOCATION, HAVE BEEN PROCESSED THROUGH THE DMZ SIGHTING/INCIDENT REPORTING CHANNEL, AS A SPECIFIC, I REFER YOU TO XXIV CORPS TOC FLASH MESSAGE DTG 221544Z.
2. IN EACH INSTANCE, THE DETECTION MEANS WAS EITHER HOO OR HUMAN EYE, NEITHER OF WHICH HAS RANGE FINDING CAPABILITY WHEN VIEWING LIGHT SOURCE AT NIGHT. THEREFORE THE REPORTED GRID COORDINATES ARE HIGHLY SUSPECT. THEREFORE, ALSO, THE ALTITUDE OF THE UFO AND SPEED ARE EQUALLY SUSPECT. YET ALL THREE (LOCATION, ALTITUDE AND SPEED) ARE REPORTED AS KNOWN.
3. I WISH YOU WOULD SUPERINTEND THE ISSUANCE OF INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL CONCERNED THAT REPORTS OF UFO SIGHTINGS WILL INCLUDE ESTIMATED RANGE (OR GRID COORDINATES) ONLY WHEN SURVEILLANCE INSTRUMENT WAS A RADAR. OTHERWISE, I DESIRE A RETURN (HOW SHORT IS OUR INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY) TO THAT PRESCRIBED AND FOLLOWED LAST SUMMER, I.E., (A) TIME OF SIGHTING; (B) BEARING FROM OBSERVATION POINT; AND (C) DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT. THE ONLY DEPARTURE FROM THIS WOULD BE WHEN WE GET A SIMULTANEOUS FIX ON A SINGLE UFO BY TWO OR MORE OP'S.
4. PLEASE EXPEDITE

GP-4

SSO: DELIVER 0715 HOURS, 20 JAN 69
 155

GANN

CONFIDENTIAL

#24

CONFIDENTIAL

OO RHHHMA RHMMAFA
DE RUEBHOA7756 0232006
ZNY CCCCC
O 232017Z JAN 69
FM CMC
TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
INFO RHHHMA/CG FMFFAC
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJ: COVINGTON CASE (C)

PERSONAL FOR BGEN. DOOLEY FROM COL. BARRETT (CODE AC)
1. (C) IN OUR PHONE CONVERSATION OF 222100H YOU INDICATED YOU HAD THE ANSWERS TO CHIEF NAV PERS 161740Z PREPARED, BUT HAD NOT TRANSMITTED THEM IN VIEW OF THE CANCELLATION MESSAGE LATER RECEIVED.
2. (C) IN SEEKING TO WRAP UP THE ENTIRE MATTER, WE BELIEVE WE NEED THE PRECISE COORDINATES OF THE INITIAL 8-12 JANUARY SEARCH, PARTICULARLY THE OVERLAND PORTION.
3. (C) WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU CAN PROVIDE THE ANSWER TO QUESTION ONE J REPEAT ONE J OF CHIEF NAV PERS 161740Z ASAP VIA DEDICATED CIRCUIT.
WARM REGARDS,

GP-4

III MAF 2100 (REV. 11-66)

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CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. D.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#25

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CTF SEVEN NINE		DATE 23 JAN 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 232356Z JAN 69		COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT FOR
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS FOR <i>Cy # 4 given to C-3 on PR: 261115H Jan 69 R. S. Jenkins</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTD					

*Cy # 4 given to C-3
on PR: 261115H Jan 69
R. S. Jenkins*

26

CONFIDENTIAL #26

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RUMFWDB6824 023235G-0000--RMMMAFA.
 ZNY 00000 ZYO RUYS
 P 23235GZ JAN 69
 FM CTF SEVEN NINE
 TO RUMHIA/CG AMERICAL DIV
 INFO RUMNIC/CTF COOKSEY BAYONET
 RMMMAFA/CG III MAF
 R UHGSAP/COM SEVENT HFLT
 BT

FOR

R O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FOR MGEN GETTYS, INFO BGEN COOKSEY, BRON WILLIAMS
 STAND C SUPPORT (U)

1. (C) GREATLY APPRECIATE TREMENDOUS ASSIST GIVEN ME THROUGH DAILY PROVISION OF HUEQ FOR C AND 'C EMPLOYMENT. THIS SUPPORT ENABLED ME TO STAY FULLY ABREAST OF SITUATION BOTH AFLOAT AND ABSHORE WITHOUT DRAWDOWN ON OUR HARD-PRESSED "WORKING BIRDS".
2. (C) PLEASE CONVEY MY APPRECIATION AS WELL TO THE HIGHLY COMPETENT AIR CREWS WHO PROVIDED THE SERVICE, IN EVERY RESPECT THEY WERE OUTSTANDING, AND ADAPTED TO THE "FEET WET" ENVIRONMENT LIKE THE REAL PROS THEY ARE.
3. (U) MANY THANKS AND WARMEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

III MAF 21007 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#26

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5215 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM COMNAVFORV		DATE 24 JANUARY 1969	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL 241150Z	DATE 1,2,3	COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT NAVAL SAPPER ACTIVITY
			IN	OUT		
4	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION / DISPO- SITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
3	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	1/25		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

SECRET

#28

P 241150Z ZFF-1 ZFF-4 PLS

FM COMNAVFORV

TO CG, III MAF/SA I CTZ

CG, XXIV CORPS

CG, III MAR DIV

ZEM

S E C R E T NOFORN

NAVAL SAPPER ACTIVITY (U)

A. CTF CLEARWATER 230200Z JAN 69

B. COMUSMACV (CMIC) IR 6 029 0085 69

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN, LTGEN STILWELL, MGEN DAVIS
FROM VADM ZUMWALT

Self-explanatory

1. (S) THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION GAINED FROM THE INTERROGATION OF THE SWIMMER CAPTURED 17 JAN ON THE CUA VIET IS THAT A COASTAL INFILTRATION ROUTE IS BEING USED BY THE ENEMY TO BRING NAVAL SAPPERS INTO THE CUA VIET AREA. REF A, AN AGENT REPORT ON THE K-6 NAVALSAPPER TEAM, FURTHER CONFIRMS THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SAPPER INFILTRATION ROUTE. THE BOMBING PASUE AND ASSOCIATED FIRE RESTRICTIONS IN THE DMZ HAVE FACILITATED INFILTRATION OF THIS TYPE.

2. (S) REINTRODUCTION OF THE SOVIET-MADE AMD-1000 MAGNETIC-ACOUSTIC WATERMINE ON THE CUA VIET BY THE 126TH NAVAL SAPPER REGT HAS NO DOUBT BEEN ABETTED BY THE IMPOSITION OF FIRE RESTRICTIONS IN THE DMZ.

3. (C) INTERROGATION OF THE PRISONER HAS ALSO PRODUCED INFORMATION ASCRIBING A WATER ENGINEERING CAPABILITY TO THE NVA 138TH REGT, ELEMENTS OF WHICH ARE PRESENTLY LOCATED VIC GIO LINH (YD 215 734). REF B PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT THIS REGT HAD ONE ENGINEERING PLT, BUT PREVIOUSLY OUR OOB CREDITED THE 138TH WITH NO WATER SAPPER TRAINED PERSONNEL.

GP-2

215

NNNN

SECRET

NOFORN

#28

CONFIDENTIAL

MAF -T- FIRST MARDIV

PP RUEBNOA NIMMAFA RUMILA
DE RUHHFA 3369 0022025
ZNY CCCCC
P 252025Z JAN 69
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RHMNAPA/CG III MAF
INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
RUMILA/CG FIRST MARDIV
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN
YOUNGDALE, INFO MAJGENS JONES AND SIMPSON FROM
LTCEN BUSE, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
A. C G III MAF 250710Z/JAN69 (C)
1. CONCUR WITH REF A, WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#32	

SECRET

CCN 155 FILE SJ

		FROM CG FNFA O	DATE 26 JAN 69
		SERIAL# 252232Z JAN 69	COPY# 4 OF 6 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT PURPLE DRAGON	
1/26	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
		NO FORN LIMITS	
	TOP 260136Z JAN 69		
D/CS PLANS	COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES		
G-3	COPY 3 OF 6 COPIES		
S/S	COPIES 4,5 OF 6 COPIES		
	COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

SECRET

33

SECRET/NOFORN

P 003847
 P TSYUW RUHFMA3406 0252232-SSSS--RHMAFA.
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 252232Z JAN 69
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 UABOL/CG NINTH MAB

BT

S E C R E T

SECRET NOFORN LIMDIS PURPLE DRAGON
 OPERATIONS SECURITY EXAMINATION OF NAVAL GUNFIRE
 SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN SVN (U)

A. CINCPACFLT 010228Z/JAN 69 (S)

B. CINCPAC LTR SER 550 000100-68 OF 4 DEC 68

C. ADMIN FMFPAC 0202127Z/JAN 69 (S) (PASEP)

1. (S) REF A REQUESTED REVIEW OF THAT PORTION OF
 REF B WHICH DEALS WITH NAVAL GUNFIRE (NGF) SUPPORT.
 REF C PROVIDED COMMENTS ON OPERATIONS SECURITY
 (OP SEC) REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURE CALL SIGNS.

2. (S) A REVIEW HAS BEEN CONDUCTED. THE BELOW
 COMMENTS ADDRESS PROBLEMS STATED IN REF B UNDER NGF
 FINDINGS.

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 3406 S E C R E T

A. AIR SPOT AIRCRAFT IN THE TARGET AREA. THE
 TIME AIRCRAFT STAY IN THE TARGET AREA CAN BE REDUCED
 BY:

(1) INSURING THAT SPOTTERS ARE PROPERLY BRIEFED PRIOR TO TAKE OFF.

(2) REQUIRING SPOTTERS TO RENDEZVOUS AND ORBIT TO SEAWARD OF THE TARGET AREA UNTIL FIRING CAN BEGIN.

B. DUPLICATION OF NGF MESSAGES ON SECURE AND
 UNSECURE VOICE CIRCUITS. EQUIPMENT FOR EXPANDED
 SECURE VOICE CAPABILITIES IS PROGRAMMED FOR U.S.
 FORCES. WHEN AVAILABLE, ITS USE WILL REDUCE THIS
 PROBLEM.

C. ALL CODES AND AUTHENTICATORS ARE AVAILABLE
 THROUGH THE REGISTERED PUBLICATIONS SYSTEM (RPS).
 APPROPRIATE CODES AND AUTHENTICATORS ARE HELD IN
 SUITABLE QUANTITIES BY MARINE INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY
 BATTALIONS. A SEPARATE RPS ACCOUNT HAS BEEN ESTAB-
 LISHED FOR ANGLICO AND FOUR DISTRIBUTION POINTS HAVE
 BEEN DESIGNATED IN RVN TO SUPPORT ANGLICO TEAMS.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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4 OF 6 #33

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PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 3406 S E C R E T

COMPATIBLE CODES AND AUTHENTICATORS ARE THUS AVAILABLE TO FORCES WHICH ARE AUTHORIZED THEIR USE. PLANS AND ORDERS FOR NGF SUPPORT MUST REITERATE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE USE OF CODES AND AUTHENTICATORS.

D. SAVAPLANE. TRANSMISSION OF FLIGHT SAFETY INFORMATION IS A MATTER OF OPERATIONAL NECESSITY. HOWEVER, UNDUE DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY INFORMATION CAN BE REDUCED BY STRICT OBSERVANCE OF GUIDANCE PROHIBITING RELEASE OF THE SAVAPLANE MORE THAN THIRTY MINUTES PRIOR TO FIRING.

E. AUTHENTICATORS. THE COMMENT CONCERNING CODES IN PAR 2C PERTAINS TO AUTHENTICATORS ALSO.

F. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT. NO COMMENT.

G. PERENNIAL CALL SIGNS AND FREQUENCIES. REF C CONTAINS EXTENSIVE COMMENTS WHICH APPLY TO NGF SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

H. DELAYS IN FIRING NON-SCHEDULED MISSIONS. NO COMMENT.

I. H AND I MISSIONS. TRANSMISSION OF THESE PRE-PLANNED MISSIONS BY UNSECURE MEANS IS NOT WARRANTED.

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 3406 S E C R E T

J. MARKET TIME SHIPS. THE COMMENT PERTAINING TO CODES IN PARP2C APPLIES IN THIS CASE ALSO.

K. USS NEW JERSEY. NO COMMENT.

L. NESTOR EQUIPMENT. NO COMMENT.

M. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL. NO COMMENT.

3. (C) IT IS CONCLUDED THAT NGF SUPPORT OPERATIONS CAN BE MADE MORE SECURE WHEN:

A. EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON METICULOUS PRIOR PLANNING AND COORDINATION BY SUPPORTING AND SUPPORTED COMMANDS.

B. DETAILED SOP'S AND FRAG ORDERS ARE USED AS A MEANS TO MINIMIZE THE NEED FOR ORAL COMMUNICATION IN THE TARGET AREA.

C. THE AVAILABILITY OF CODES AND AUTHENTICATORS IS RECOGNIZED AND APPROPRIATE COMMANDERS INSIST UPON THEIR USE.

D. USE OF AVAILABLE SECURE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS IS MAXIMIZED.

GP-4

BY
#3406

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET/NOFORN

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O 260643Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM MG GETTYS CG AMERICAL DIV
TO LTG STILLWELL CG III MAF
ZEM

*Putting out a
brush fire.*

C O N F I D E N T I A L A C D 0097 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: ALLEGED NON SUPPORT OF 2D ARVN DIV REQUEST FOR~~BY~~ HELICOPTERS

I HAVE INVESTIGATED THE ALLEGED KNON SUPPORT OF THE 2D ARVN DIV REQUEST FOR HELICOPTERS TO CA INTO BASE AREA 121 BETWEEN 25-27 JAN 69.

1. ON 23 JANUARY 1969, MAJOR VARNER,, THE TOC ADVISOR IN G3 ADVISORY SECTION, 2D ARVN DIVISION, QUANG NGAI, CALLED MAJOR CRAVER, G3 OPERATIONS, AMERICAL DIVISION DESIRING TO KNOW THE STATUS OF OUR HELICOPTER ACTIVITIESS. MAJOR VARNER INDICATED THAT 2D ARVN WAS CONSIDERING AN OPERATION IN BASE AREA 127 BETWEEN 25--27 JANUARY AND WOULD LIKE TO COMBAT ASSAULT ELEMENTS INTO THE AREA. VARNER FURTHER STATED THAT HE KNEW AMERICAL HELICOPTER REQUIREMENTS WERE CRITICALL BECAUSE OF THE SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS WE WERE CONDUCTING AT THE TIME. MAJOR CRAVER INFORMMED HIM THAT OUR HELICOPTER ASSETS WERE CRITICAL DURING THE PERIOD CONCERNED. THE CALL FROM MAJOR VARNER WAS AN INQUIRY AND NOT IN THE NATURE OF A FORMAL REQUEST.

2. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN LTC LAWRENCE, G3, AMERICAL DIVISION, AND MAJOR SHROCK, G3" ADVISOR, 2D ARVN DIVISION, REVEALED THAT MAJOR SHROCK MADE A FORMAL REQUEST FOR HELICOPTER SUPPORT TO I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP. THIS IS, IN FACT, THE NORMAL CHANNEL FOR REQUESTS FOR HELICOPTER SUPPORT OF 2D ARVN DIVISIONN OPERATIONS. THE 282D AMC AND VNAF WERE TASKED TO PROVIDE AIRLIFT FOR THE OPERATION.

3. ON 24 JANUARY 1969, MAJOR VARNER AGAIN CALLED MAJOR CRAVER INDICATING THAT UH-1 AND H-34 SUPPORT FOR THE CA HAD BEEN OBTAINED FROM I CORPSS ASSETS. HE FURTHER ASKED THAT IF , AFTER THE CA, 2D ARVN ELEMENTS MADE CONTACT AND WERE IN CRITICAL NEED OF REINFORCEMENT OR EXTRACTION , WOULD AMERICAL PROVIDE AIR SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.. MAJOR CRAVER INDICATED THAT WE HAD ALWAYS PROVIDED THIS SUPPORT WHEN THE SITUATION WAS CRITICAL, AND WE COULD DO SO AGAIN.

4. ON 25 JANUARY 1969, LTC LAWRENCE G3, AMERICAL DIVISION, WAS DISCUSSING THE PROPOSED 2D ARVN OPERATION TO BE INITIATED ON 27 JANUARY WITH MAJOR SHROCK, G3 ADVISOR FOR 2D ARVN DIVISION. MAJOR SHROCK INDICATED THAT HE HAD UH-1 AND H-34 SUPPORT FROM I CORPS FOR THE INITIAL CA BUT THAT IF THEY COULD GET ADDITIONAL CH-47 SUPPORT THEY COULD COMPLETE THEIR AIR MOVES IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION MORE EXPEDITIOUSLY. LTC LAWRENCE OFFERED TWO CH-47S FROM AMERICAL DIVISION TO ACCELERATE THE MOVE. MAJOR SHROCK ACCEPTED AND THE SUPPORT IS SCHEDULED FOR 27 JANUARY 1969.

5. THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE 2 D ARVN DIV AND THE AMERICAL DIV HAS BEEN EXEMPLLARY AND I HAVE THRU MY CHIEF OF STAFF REAFFIRMED THE AMERICAL DIVISION'S INTENTION OF FURTHERING THAT COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE TO THE SENIOR ADVISOR 2D ARVN DIV, COL HUTTER, AND DEP SENIOR ADVVISOR I CORPS, COL RENWANZ. AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY I SHALL PERSONALLY INFORM GEN TOAN.
WARM REGARDS

SSG NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS 26 JANUARY 1969

37

600

2. ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO FURNISH PROPOSED ANSWERS TO THOSE QUESTIONS WHICH ARE IN THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. IN ADDITION, PROPOSED ANSWERS TO ANY OTHER QUESTIONS THAT ADDRESSEES DESIRE TO FURNISH WILL BE WELCOME.
3. THE SOURCE OF THE OVERALL REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE CLOSELY HELD BY ADDRESSEES. HOWEVER, INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS, PROPERLY CLASSIFIED, WILL BE DISTRIBUTED ON A RESTRICTED BASIS TO ACTION OFFICERS AND COMMANDERS SO THAT THE BEST AND MOST COMPLETE ANSWERS CAN BE FURNISHED.
4. ATTENTION ISS INVITED TO PARAGRAPH 25 OF THE QUOTED MESSAGE. EMPLOYMENT OF GROUND NAVAL AND AIR FORCES HAS CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY DURING THE PAST YEAR AND PARTICULARLY SINCE THE START OF THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM ON 1 NOVEMBER. A COMPLETE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION COVERING CONCEPTIONAL CHANGES IN DEPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF UNITS IS NECESSARY.
5. YOUR RESPONSES ARE REQUESTED BY NOT LATER THAN 0800 HOURS, 27 JAN 69. ANSWERS MAY BE SUBMITTED, VIA THIS CHANNEL, AS EACH IS COMPLETED, OR IN A MACV TOTAL PPACKAGE. J3 HAS STAFF RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREPARING THE RESPONSE.
6. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, PLEASE BLOCK YOUR SCHEDULE FOR A COMMANDERS CONFERENCE AT HQMACV AT 1500 HOURS, 28 JANUARY, TO REVIEW THE PROPOSED RESPONSE TO JCS.
7. PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE BY THIS MEANS.
- GP-3

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT

S32

Staff
Cps.

97(8)

0 240225Z ZYH ZFF-1
 FM MG CORCORAN C/S MACV
 TO YSHKQLC/LTG STILWELL ATNG CG III MAF
 LTG STILWELL ATNG CG III MAF
 LTG PEERS CG I FFORCEV
 LTG KERWIN CG II FFORCEV
 LTG MILDREN DCG USARV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 MG BAKER ATNC CG 7TH AF
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV
 ZEM

SECRET

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF FOUR MACC 1063 EYES ONLY

F. US OPERATIONS

25. HOW DO MILITARY DEPLOYMENT AND TACTICS TODAY DIFFER FROM THOSE OF 6-12 MONTHS AGO? WHAT ARE REASONS FOR CHANGES, AND WHAT HAS THIS IMPACT BEEN? 93/92

26. IN WHAT DIFFERENT WAYS (INCLUDING INNOVATIONS IN ORGANIZATION) MIGHT US FORCES LEVEL BE REDUCED TO VARIOUS LEVELS, WHILE MINIMIZING IMPACT ON COMBAT CAPABILITY? 93/92

27. WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE ON THE SCALE OF EFFECT OF B-52 ATTACKS IN PRODUCING VC/NVA CASUALTIES? IN DISRUPTING VC/NVA OPERATIONS? HOW VALID ARE ESTIMATES OF OVERALL EFFECT?

28. WHAT EFFECT IS THE LOATION INTERDICTION BOMBING HAVING:

A. IN REDUCING THE CAPACITY OF THE ENEMY LLOGISTIC SYSTEM?

B. IN DESTROYING MATERIEL IN TRANSIT?

29. WITH REGARD TO THE BOOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM:

A. WHAT EVIDENCE WAS THERE ON SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRINCIPAL STRAINS IMPOSED ON THE DRV (E.G., IN ECONOMIC DISRUPTION, EXTRA MANPOWER DEMANDS, TRANSPORTATION BLOCKAGES, POPULATION MORALE)?

B. WHAT WAS THE LEVEL OF LOGISTICAL THROUGHPUT THROUGH THE SOUTHERN PROVINCE OF NVN JUST PRIOR TO THE NOVEMBER BOMBING HALT? TO WHAT EXTENT DID THIS LEVEL REFLECT THE RESULTS OF THE US BOMBINGG CAMPAIGN?

C. TO WHAT EXTENT DID CHINESEE AND SOVIET AID BELIEVE PRESSURE ON HANOI?

D. WHAT ARE CURRENT VIEWS ON THE PROPORTION OF WAR-ESSENTIAL IMPORTS THAT COULD COME INTOO NVN OVER THE RAIL OR ROAD LINES FROM CHINA, EVVEN IF ALL IMPORTS BY SEA WERE DENIED AND A STRONG EFFORT EVEN MADE TO INTER-DICT GROUND TRANSPORT? WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE?

E. WHAT ACTION HAS THE DRV TAKEN TO REDUCE THE VULNERABILITY AND IMPORTANCE OF HANOI AS A POPULATION AND ECONOMIC CENTER (E.G., THROUGH POPULATION EVACUA-TION AND ECONOMIC DISPERSALLB

GP-3

UNQUOTE

37(7)

B. PATTERNS OF EXISTENT POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS WITHIN GVN/RVNAF AND OUTSIDE IT -- REFLECTING FAMILY TIES, CORRUPTION, OFFICERS' CLASS, SECRET ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTIES, RELIGIOUS AND REGIONAL BACKGROUND -- AS THESE BEAR UPON BEHAVIOR WITH RESPECT TO THE WAR, THE NLF, REFORM AND BROADENING OF THE GVN, AND RESPONSES TO US INFLUENCE AND INTERVENTION.

23. WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE ON THE PROSPECTS -- AND ON WHAT CHANGES IN CONDITIONS AND US POLICIES WOULD INCREASE OR DECREASE THEM -- FOR CHANGES IN THE GVN TOWARD: (A) BROADENING OF THE GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE PARTICIPATION OF ALL SIGNIFICANT NON-COMMUNIST REGIONAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPINGS (AT PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVELS, AS WELL AS CABINET); (B) STRONGER EMPHASIS, IN SELECTION AND PROMOTION OF OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS, ON COMPETENCE AND PERFORMANCE (AS IN THE COMMUNIST VIETNAMESE SYSTEM) AS DISTINCT FROM CONSIDERATIONS OF FAMILY, CORRUPTION, AND SOCIAL (E.G., EDUCATIONAL) BACKGROUND; AND (C) POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF NON-COMMUNIST SYMPATHIES AND ENERGIES IN SUPPORT OF THE GVN, AS EVIDENCED, E.G., BY REDUCED DESERTION, BY WILLING ALIGNMENT OF RELIGIOUS, PROVINCIAL AND OTHER LEADERS WITH THE GVN, BY WIDE COOPERATION WITH ANTI-CORRUPTION AND PRO-EFFICIENCY DRIVES.

24. HOW CRITICAL, IN VARIOUS VIEWS, IS EACH OF THE CHANGES IN QUESTION 23 ABOVE TO PROSPECTS OF ATTAINING-- AT CURRENT, REDUCED OR INCREASED LEVELS OF US MILITARY EFFORT -- EITHER "VICTORY," OR A STRONG NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL ROLE AFTER A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT OF HOSTILITIES? WHAT ARE VIEWS OF THE RISKS ATTENDANT TO MAKING THESE CHANGES, OR ATTEMPTING THEM; AND, TO THE EXTENT THAT US INFLUENCE IS REQUIRED, ON US PRACTICAL ABILITY TO MOVE PRUDENTLY AND EFFECT SELVY IN THIS DIRECTION: WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE?

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT
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37(6)

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 LTG STILWELL ATNG CG III MAF
 LTG PEERS CG I FFORCEV
 LTG KERWIN CG II FFORCEV
 LTG MILDREN DCG USARV
 MG ECKHARDT SAA IV CORPS
 MG BAKER ATNC CG 7TH AF
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV
 ZEM

SECRET

S E C R E T SECTION THREE OF FOUR MAC 1063 EYES ONLY

18. WHAT NUMBER OR VERIFIED NUMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL APPARATUS (I.E., PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY MEMBERS, THE HARD-CORE "INFRASTRUCTURE") HAVE BEEN ARRESTED OR KILLED IN THE PAST YEAR? HOW MANY OF THESE WERE CADRE OF HIGHER THAN VILLAGE LEVEL? WHAT PROPORTION DO THESE REPRESENT OF TOTAL PRP MEMBERSHIP, AND HOW MUCH -- AND HOW LONG -- HAD THE APPARATUS BEEN DISRUPTED?

19. WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR BELIEVING THAT CURRENT AND FUTURE EFFORTS AT "ROOTING OUT" HARD-CORE INFRASTRUCTURE WILL BE -- OR WILL NOT BE --- MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN PAST EFFORTS? FOR EXAMPLE, FOR BELIEVING THAT COLLABORATION AMONG THE NUMEROUS VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WILL BE MARKEDLY MORE THOROUGH THAN IN THE PAST? WHAT ARE THE SIDE-EFFECTS, E.G., ON VIETNAMESE OPINION, OF ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE CAMPAIGNS SUCH AS THE CURRENT "ACCELERATED EFFORT," ALONG WITH THEIR LASTING EFFECT ON HARD-CORE APPARATUS?

20. HOW ADEQUATE IS OUR INFORMATION ON THE OVERALL SCALE AND INCIDENCE OF DAMAGE TO CIVILIANS BY AIR AND ARTILLERY AND LOOTING AND MISBEHAVIOR BY RVNAF?

21. TO WHAT EXTENT DO RECENT CHANGES IN COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATION AFFECTING THE COUNTRY-SIDE REPRESENT MOVES TO IMPROVE COMPETENCE, AS DISTINCT FROM REPLACEMENT OF ONE CLIQUE BY ANOTHER? WHAT IS THE BASIS OF JUDGMENT? WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE RECENT REMOVAL OF MINORITY-GROUP PROVINCE AND DISTRICT OFFICIALS (HOA HAO, CCAO DAI, MONTAGNARD) IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS?

E. POLITICS

22. HOW ADEQUATE IS OUR INFORMATION, AND WHAT IS IT BASED UPON, CONCERNING:

A. ATTITUDES OF VIETNAMESE ELITES NOT NOW CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH THE GVN (E.G., RELIGIOUS LEADERS, PROFESSORS, YOUTH LEADERS, PROFESSIONALS, UNION LEADERS, VILLAGE NOTABLES) TOWARDS: PARTICIPATION -- IF OFFERED -- IN THE GVN; THE CURRENT LEGITIMACY AND ACCEPTABILITY OF THE GVN; LIKewise (GIVEN "PEACE") FOR THE NLF OR VARIOUS "NEUTRALIST" COALITIONS; TOWARDS US INTENT, AS THEY INTERPRET IT (E.G., US PLANS FOR ENDING THE WAR, PERCEIVED US ALIGNMENTS WITH PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS AND FORCES WITHIN VIETNAM, US CONCERN FOR VARIOUS VIETNAMESE INTERESTS).

37(5)

F. WHAT SUCCESS ARE THE RF AND PF HAVING IN PROVIDING LOCAL SECURITY AND REDUCING VC CONTROL AND INFLUENCE IN RURAL POPULATIONS?

12.. TO WHAT EXTENT COULD RVNAF -- AS IT IS NOW -- HANDLE THE VC (MAIN FORCE, LOCAL FORCES, GUERRILLAS), WITH OR WITHOUT US COMBAT SUPPORT TO FILL RVNAF DEFICIENCIES, IF ALL NVA UNITS WERE WITHDRAWN:

A. IF VC STILL HAD NORTHERN FILLERS.

B. IF ALL NORTHERNERS (BUT NOT REGROUPEES) WERE WITHDRAWN?

13. TO WHAT EXTENT COULD RVNAF -- AS IT IS NOW --- ALSO HANDLE A SIZEABLE LEVEL OF NVA FORCES:

A. WITH US AIR AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT.

B. WITH ABOVE AND ALSO US GROUND FORCES IN RESERVE.

C. WITHOUT US DIRECT SUPPORT, BUT WITH INCREASED RVNAF ARTILLERY AND AIR CAPACITY?

14. WHAT, IN VARIOUS VIEWS, ARE THE REQUIRED CHANGES -- IN RVNAF COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND INCENTIVES, IN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, IN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN US MODES OF INFLUENCE -- FOR MAKING RVNAF ADEQUATE TO THE TASKS CITED IN QUESTIONS 9 AND 10 ABOVE? HOW LONG WOULD THIS TAKE? WHAT ARE THE PRACTICAL OBSTACLES TO THESE CHANGES, AND WHAT NEW US MOVES WOULD BE NEEDED TO OVERCOME THESE?

D. PACIFICATION

15. HOW MUCH, AND WHERE, HAS THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE BETWEEN THE VC AND NLF ACTUALLY CHANGED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE OVER TIME, CONTRASTING THE PRESENT TO SUCH BENCHMARKS AS END-61, END-63, END-65, END-67? WHAT ARE THE BEST INDICATORS OF SUCH CHANGE, OR LACK OF IT? WHAT FACTORS HAVE BEEN MAINLY RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH CHANGE AS HAS OCCURRED? WHY HAS THERE NOT BEEN MORE?

16. WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR EXPECTING MORE CHANGE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE IN THE NEXT TWO YEARS THAN IN PAST INTERVALS? WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR NOT EXPECTING MORE? WHAT CHANGES IN RVNAF, GVN, US, AND VC PRACTICES AND ADAPTIVENESS WOULD BE NEEDED TO INCREASE FAVORABLE CHANGE IN SECURITY AND CONTROL? HOW LIKELY ARE SUCH CHANGES, INDIVIDUALLY AND TOGETHER; WHAT ARE THE OBSTACLES?

17. WHAT PROPORTION OF THE RURAL POPULATION MUST BE REGARDED AS "SUBJECT TO SIGNIFICANT VC PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE"? (HOW SHOULD HAMLETS RATED AS "C" IN THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM -- THE LARGEST CATEGORY -- BE REGARDED IN THIS RESPECT?) IN PARTICULAR, WHAT PROPORTION IN THE PROVINCES SURROUNDING SAIGON? HOW MUCH HAS THIS CHANGED?

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT
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37(4)

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 FM MG CORCORAN C/S MACV
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 LTG STILWELL ATNG CG III MAF
 LTG PEERS CG I FFORCEV
 LTG KERWIN CG II FFORCEV
 LTG MILDREN DCG USARV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 MG BAKER ATNC CG 7TH AF
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV
 ZEM

SECRET

S E C R E T SECTION TWO OF FOUR MAC 1063 EYES ONLY

8. WHAT CONTROVERSIES PERSIST ON THE ESTIMATE OF VC ORDER OF BATTLE; IN PARTICULAR, ON THE VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF GUERRILLA FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE? ON VC RECRUITING, AND MANPOWER POOL? WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE FOR DIFFERENT ESTIMATES, AND WHAT IS THE OVERALL ADEQUACY OF EVIDENCE? g²

9. WHAT ARE NVA/VC CAPABILITIES FOR LAUNCHING A LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE, WITH "DRAMATIC" RESULTS (EVEN IF TAKING HIGH CASUALTIES AND WITHOUT HOLDING OBJECTIVES LONG), IN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS? (E.G., AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST ONE OR MORE CITIES, OR AGAINST MOST NEWLY "PACIFIED" HAMLETS.) HOW ADEQUATE IS THE EVIDENCE? g

10. WHAT ARE THE MAIN CHANNELS FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR THE NVA/VC FORCES IN SVN, (E. G., CAMBODIA AND/OR THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE?) WHAT PORTION OF THESE SUPPLIES COME IN THROUGH SIHANOUKVILLE?

C. RVNAF

11. WHAT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION EXIST CONCERNING EXTENT OF RVNAF IMPROVEMENT, AND WHAT IS EVIDENCE UNDERLYING DIFFERENT VIEWS? (E.G., COMPARE RECENT CIA MEMO WITH MACV VIEWS.) FOR EXAMPLE:

A. WHICH IS THE LEVEL OF EFFECTIVE, MOBILE, OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS? WHAT RESULTS ARE THEY ACHIEVING?

B. WHAT IS THE ACTUAL LEVEL OF "GENUINE" SMALL-UNIT ACTIONS AND NIGHT ACTION IN ARVN, RF AND PF: I.E., ACTIONS THAT WOULD TYPICALLY BE CLASSIFIED AS SUCH WITHIN THE US ARMY, AND IN PARTICULAR, OFFENSIVE AMBUSHES AND PATROLS? HOW MUCH HAS THIS CHANGED?

C. HOW MUCH HAS THE OFFICER SELECTION AND PROMOTION SYSTEM, AND THE QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP, ACTUALLY CHANGED OVER THE YEARS (AS DISTINCT FROM CHANGES IN PAPER "PROGRAMS")? HOW MANY JUNIOR OFFICERS HOLD COMMISSIONS (IN PARTICULAR, BATTLEFIELD COMMISSIONS FROM NCO RANK) DESPITE LACK OF A HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA?

D. WHAT KNOWN DISCIPLINARY ACTION HAS RESULTED FROM ARVN LOOTING OF CIVILIANS IN THE PAST YEAR (FOR EXAMPLE THE WIDESPREAD LOOTING THAT TOOK PLACE LAST SPRING)?

E. TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE PAST "ANTI-DESERTION" DECREES AND EFFORTS LESSENED THE RATE OF DESERTION; WHY HAS THE RATE RECENTLY BEEN INCREASING TO NEW HIGHS?

37(3)

3. HOW SOUNDLY-BASED IS THE COMMON BELIEF THAT HANOI IS UNDER ACTIVE PRESSURE WITH RESPECT TO THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS FROM MOSCOW (FOR) AND PEKING (AGAINST)? IS IT CLEAR THAT EITHER MOSCOW OR PEKING BELIEVE THEY HAVE, OR ARE WILLING TO USE, SIGNIFICANT LEVERAGE ON HANOI'S POLICIES? WHAT IS THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE, OTHER THAN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS? *No*

4. HOW SOUND IS OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STABLE "MOSCOW" AND "PEKING" FACTIONS WITHIN THE HANOI LEADERSHIP, AS DISTINCT, FOR EXAMPLE, FROM SHIFTING FACTIONS, ALL OF WHOM RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO BALANCE OFF BOTH ALLIES? HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW, IN GENERAL, OF INTRAPARTY DISPUTES AND PERSONALITIES WITHIN HANOI? *From*

B. NVA/VC

5. WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING VARIOUS HYPOTHESES, AND THE OVERALL ADEQUACY OF EVIDENCE, RELATING TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. WHY DID NVA UNITS LEAVE SOUTH VIETNAM LAST SUMMER AND FALL?

B. DID THE PREDICTED "THIRD-WAVE OFFENSIVE" BY THE NVA/VC ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE? IF SO, WHY DID IT NOT ACHIEVE GREATER SUCCESS?

C. WHY ARE VC GUERRILLAS AND LOCAL FORCES NOW RELATIVELY DORMANT?

(AMONG THE HYPOTHESES: 1) RESPONSE TO VC/NVA BATTLE LOSSES, FORCING WITHDRAWAL OR PASSIVITY; 2) TO PUT DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON US TO MOVE TO SUBSTANTIVE TALKS IN PARIS; 3) TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS; AND/OR 4) PRESSURE OF US AND ALLIED OPERATIONS.)

6. WHAT RATE OF NVA/VC ATTRITION WOULD OUTFIT THEIR ABILITY TO REPLENISH BY INFILTRATION AND RECRUITMENT, AS CURRENTLY CALCULATED? DO PRESENT OPERATIONS ACHIEVE THIS? IF NOT, WHAT FORCE LEVELS AND OTHER CONDITIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY? IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT CONTINUING HEAVY LOSSES?

7. TO WHAT RELATIVE EXTENT DO THE US/RVNAF AND THE NVA/VC SHARE IN THE CONTROL AND THE RATE OF VC/NVA ATTRITION; I.E., TO WHAT EXTENT, IN TERMS OF OUR TACTICAL EXPERIENCE, CAN HEAVY LOSSES PERSISTENTLY BE IMPOSED ON VC/NVA FORCES, DESPITE THEIR POSSIBLE INTENTION TO LIMIT CASUALTIES BY AVOIDING CONTACT?

(AMONG THE HYPOTHESES:

A. CONTACT IS PREDOMINANTLY AT VC TACTICAL INITIATIVE, AND WE CANNOT REVERSE THIS; VC NEED SUFFER HIGH CASUALTIES ONLY SO LONG AS THEY ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT THEM, IN SEEKING CONTACT; OR

B. CURRENT VC/NVA LOSS RATES CAN BE MAINTAINED BY PRESENT FORCES -- AS INCREASED PERCENT BY Y ADDITIONAL FORCES -- WHATEVER THE DRV/VC CHOOSE TO DO, SHORT OF FURTHER MAJOR WITHDRAWAL.)

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT
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37(2)

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FM MG CORCORAN C/S MACV
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LTG KERWIN CG II FFORCEV
LTG MILDREN DCG USARV
MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
MG BAKER ATNG CG 7TH AF
VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV
ZEM

from whom? JCS?
SECRET
29 questions to put for JCS

SECRET SECTION ONE OF FOUR MAC 1063 EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY COMUSMACV:

QUOTE

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN VIETNAM (U)

1. IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP AN AGREED EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM AS A BASIS FOR MAKING POLICY DECISIONS, THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED THAT THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, DEFENSE, AND THE DIRECTOR, CIA, THE AMBASSADOR IN SAIGON, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND MACV EACH PREPARE A SEPARATE RESPONSE TO THREE QUESTIONS BELOW. THE ANSWERS SHOULD INCLUDE A DISCUSSION OF UNCERTAINTIES AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF EXISTING DATA.

2. IN VIEW OF THE SHORT SUSPENSE IMPOSED ON THIS REQUIREMENT, REQUEST MACV RESPONSE BE FORWARDED DIRECTLY TO JCS VIA THIS CHANNEL TO BE RECEIVED NLT 30 JANUARY 1969. REQUEST CINCPAC COMMENTS ON AND/OR ADDITIONS TO MACV RESPONSE BE FORWARDED ASAP AFTER RECEIPT OF MACV RESPONSE.

3. NIE MENTIONED IN PARA 2 OF QUESTIONS IN NIE 50-68, DATED 14 NOV 68, SUBJECT: "SOUTHEAST ASIA, AFTER VIETNAM." VIETNAM QUESTIONS

A. ENVIRONMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS

1. WHY IS THE DRV IN PARIS? WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE? (AMONG THE HYPOTHESES:

A. OUT OF WEAKNESS, TO ACCEPT A FACE-SAVING FORMULA FOR DEFEAT.

B. TO NEGOTIATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF US (AND NVA) FORCES, AND/OR A COMPROMISE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, GIVING A CHANCE FOR NLF VICTORY IN THE SOUTH.

C. TO GIVE THE US A FACE-SAVING WAY TO WITHDRAW.

D. TO UNDERMINE THE GVN AND US/GVN RELATIONS, AND TO RELIEVE US MILITARY PRESSURE IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM.

E. OUT OF DESIRE TO END THE LOSSES AND COSTS OF WAR ON THE BEST TERMS ATTAINABLE.)

2. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE, AND HOW ADEQUATE IS IT, UNDERLYING COMPETING VIEWS (AS IN THE MOST RECENT NIE ON THIS SUBJECT, WITH ITS DISSENTING FOOTNOTES) OF THE IMPACT OF VARIOUS OUTCOMES IN VIETNAM WITHIN SOUTHEAST ASIA?

all ideas are as good as any

(M)

7 72

#37(1)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5215 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM MG CORCORAN C/S MACV		DATE 24 JAN 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 240225	1, 2, 3 COPY#	3 OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					SECRET MAC 1063 EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
2	C/S	I				
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SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			COMNAVFORV		25 JAN 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL	DATE	COPY#	
			250048Z	JAN 68	1 OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4... THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
	DCG	I	Has	seen		
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I	Has	seen		
	DC/S					
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	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
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	MTD					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
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EXCLUSIVE
FOR
"LIMDIS"

TOP SECRET ²³

TOP SECRET

002863
RUMUGKD1721 020048-TTTT--RHMMAFA.
NY TTTT
E 250048Z JAN 69
FM COMNAVFORV
TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF

Self-explanatory

TOP SECRET LINDIS
PERSONAL FOR LGEN CUSHMAN FROM VADM ZUMWALT
POSSIBLE ENEMY USE OF UNDERWATER COMMUNICATIONS CABLES (TSL)
1. (TSL) IT WAS DISCLOSED TO ME BY DR. McMILLAN, SCIENCE ADVISOR TO COMUSMACV THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ENEMY IS COMMUNICATING VIA UNDERWATER CABLE WITH CONNECTIONS LOCATED IN ANOY, HAIPHONG, HUE, DANANG, AND VONG TAU. FOUR CABLES PROVIDING THE CONNECTIONS FROM DANANG ARE THOUGHT TO CROSS THE SHORELINE UNDERGROUND AT COORDINATES BT 06007875/3.
2. (TSL) IT IS PROPOSED TO ME THAT THE CABLES SHOULD BE LOCATED COVERTLY AND WE SHOULD TAP IN ON THEM.
3. (TSL) I AM PREPARED TO CONDUCT OR ASSIST IN THE CONDUCT OF COVERT OPERATIONS INDICATED ABOVE. PRELIMINARY CONCEPT ENVISIONS THE SUBTERFUGE OF A SIMULATED AIR CRASH AT NIGHT APPROX ONE KM TO SEAWARD OF THE ABOVE POSITION.

PAGE 2 RUMUGKD1721 TOP SECRET LINDIS
THE FOLLOWING MORNING, A MINESWEEPER AND BOAT WITH DIVERS WILL COMMENCE QUOTE SEARCH UNQUOTE. THE LINE OF SEARCH TO BE ALONG THE THIRTY FOOT CURVE IN AN EFFORT TO LOCATE ANY POSSIBLE CABLES. IF THIS FAILS, A SECOND SEARCH ALONG THE FORTY FOOT CURVE WILL FOLLOW. ANY CABLES LOCATED IN THIS MANNER WILL BE BUOYED BELOW THE SURFACE FOR SUBSEQUENT TAP IN. INTEND TO SEND DIVING TEAM TO DANANG ON 31 JAN AND, WEATHER PERMITTING, PROCEED WITH SIMULATED CRASH ON ONE OR TWO FEBRUARY.
4. (U) YOUR COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED.

GP-4
BT
#1721

C 260417Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1
 FM BG BOLLING C/S XXIV CORPS
 TO BG DOOLEY C/S III MAF
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L PHB 0153 EYES ONLY

1. MACV MESSAGE BELOW RETRANSMITTED TO YOU FOR INFORMATION AND APPROPRIATE ACTION. HAAVE NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS MESSAGE WITH GENERAL STILWELL FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING A NAME OF REPRESENTATIVE REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF QUOTED MESSAGE.

2. I AM ASSUMING THAT YOUR HEADQUARTERS WILL COMPLY WITH PARA 5 OF QUOTED MESSAGE. WILL CONTACT YOU BY PHONE WHEN I HAVE GUIDANCE FROM GENERAL STILWELL.

3. QUOTE

O 260233Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM MG CORCORAN

TG LTG STILWELL CG XXIIIV CORPS

LTG PEERS CG I FFV

LTG KERWIN CG II FFV

LTG MILDREN DCG USARV

MG ECKHARDT IV CORPS

VADM ZUMWALT COMUSNAVFORV

MG BAKER A/CG 7AF

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 1155 EYES ONLY

REF : MY SECRET MAC 1063, DTG 240225Z JAN 69, PERTAINING TO JCS MESSAGE, SUBJECT: SITUATION IN VIETNAM (U).

1. (C) IN ADDITION TO SUBMISSION REQUIRED BY REFERENCED MESSAGE, REQUEST ONE OR MORE REPRESENTATIVES FROM YOUR COMMAND ARRIVE THIS HEADQUARTERS MORNING 27 JAN 69 TO DISCUSS YOUR RESPONSE WITH MACV STAFF. ALTHOUGH MEETING IS SCHEDULED FROM 1230 TO 1800, REPRESENTATIVES ARE TO ARRIVE EARLY AM FOR ADVANCE READING OF PROPOSED POSITION STATEMENTS. PURPOSE OF MEETING IS TO MODIFY, AS APPROPRIATE, DRAFT PREPARED BY STAFF TO INCORPORATE YOUR VIEWS PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO COMUSMACV.

2. (U) REQUEST THE NAME OF YOUR REPRESENTATIVES BE FURNISHED TELEPHONICALLY TO LTC MARKS, MACV 2891/4589 BY 261800H JAN 69.

3. (U) YOUR REPRESENTATIVES ARE TO REPORT TO THE MACV COMMAND CENTER, B CORRIDOR, 1ST FLOOR, ROOM 1B34 UPON ARRIVAL.

4. (C) THE COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE, TENTATIVELY PLANNED FOR 281500H JANUARY, IS CANCELLED.

5. (U) PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE BY THIS MEANS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

SIO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.

GEN BOLLING EXPECTS GEN DOOLEY TO SEND BACK CHANNEL TO MG CORCORAN ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF QUOTED MSG

365

More ~ 29 questions effort

Don

Don 9

SECRET/NOFORN

R 270734Z JAN 69
 FM ADMIN COMSEVENTHFLT
 TO RUYHSYB/CINCPACFLT
 INFO RUYVSYD/COMNAVFORV
 RUYHSA/C G FMFPAC
 RUKRSYH/COMPHIBPAC
 RUKRSYB/COMCRUDESPAC
 RUYPWDB/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUYPZFF/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUYPSYD/C G III MAF
 RUYVUIN/CT G SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 BT

S E C R E T NOFORN LIMDIS PURPLE DRAGON
 OPERATIONS SECURITY EXAMINATION OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
 IN SVN (U)

A. CINCPAC LTR SER SSO-200100-68 OF 4 DEC 68

B. CINCPACFLT 010228Z A 69

1. REF A CONTAINED THE FINDINGS OF AN OPSEC SURVEY OF NGFS OPS

PAGE TWO RUKGSAF2644 S E C R E T NOFORN LIMDIS
 IN SVN. RF B REQUESTED A REVIEW OF REF A TO DETERMINE AREAS WHICH
 MAY LEND THEMSELVES TO POSSIBLE OPSEC CORRECTIONS OR IMPROVEMENT
 OF NGFS PROCEDURES AND INVITED COMMENTS ON PROPOSED, PLANNED OR
 IMPLEMENTED CHANGES.

2. A GENERAL ADDRESS OF OPSEC DEMANDS THAT OUR TACTICS BE REVIEWED
 IN TERMS OF EFFECTIVENESS. IT IS NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE TO CHANGE
 OUR TACTICS BY THEY SHOULD BE CONTINUALLY OBSERVED, EVALUATED AND
 WEIGHED AGAINST THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES WHICH MAY OCCUR. IT IS
 IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE OUR TACTICS EVALUATED BY OUTSIDE ELEMENTS

FOR OPSEC. HOWEVER, THE EXECUTION OF A CHANGE MUST STILL REST WITH
 THE TACTICAL COMMANDER WHO SHOULD CONSIDER OPSEC AS PART OF THE
 OVERALL TACTICAL SITUATION.

3. A REVIEW OF REF A INDICATES THAT FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF OPSEC
 SHOULD LEAD TO IMPROVEMENT IN THE RESULTS OF NGFS. HOWEVER IMPROVEMENT
 IN OPSEC IS GENERALLY LIMITED BY EITHER THE LACK OF EQUIPMENT OR THE
 NECESSITY TO CONDUCT COORDINATION TO PREVENT MUTUAL INTERFERENCE. IN
 THE LATTER AREA, COORDINATION MUST BE CONDUCTED BY THE NGFS SHIP WITH
 THE APPROPRIATE COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CENTER (CSC) AS WELL AS THE
 MARKET TIME UNITS IN THE VICINITY AND WITH THE NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON
 OFFICER (NGLO). THE NGLO, IN TURN, MUST COORDINATE WITH IN-COUNTRY AIR

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET/NOFORN

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SECRET/NOFORN

PAGE THREE RUMGSAF2644 S E C R E T NOFORN LINDIS
AND GROUND AUTHORITIES DOWN THRU THE VILLAGE CHIEF LEVEL FOR SOME
OPERATIONS.

A. THE INTRODUCTION OF SECURE VHF/FM VOICE WILL IMPROVE OPSEC
BETWEEN THE SHIP AND THE UNIT SUPPORTED. THE USE OF COVERED TELETYPE
CIRCUITS TO COORDINATE AND ADVISE POSITIONS WITH THE CSC'S AND NGLO'S
WHEN THE TIME PERMITS, WILL FURTHER IMPROVE IT. HOWEVER, IN A FAST-
MOVING TACTICAL SITUATION TIME DOES NOT ALWAYS PERMIT THE USE OF
SECURE CIRCUITS THAT ARE, OR WILL BE, AVAILABLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

B. IT IS REALIZED THAT THE RECOMMENDATION FOR THE FURTHER EXPANSION
OF SECURE VOICE MAY NOT BE FULLY JUSTIFIABLE IN VIEW OF THE EXPENSE,
LEAD TIME, AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED, HOWEVER, IT WOULD
BE A STEP FORWARD IN NGFS OPSEC. EVEN IF SECURE COMMUNICATION FACILITIES
WERE AVAILABLE TO ALL FORCES ASSOCIATED WITH NGFS, THE NUMBER OF IN-
COUNTRY AUTHORITIES THAT APPARENTLY "NEED TO KNOW" ARE SO GREAT
THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPROMISE WOULD STILL REMAIN HIGH.

4. FROM THE CONSEC DISCLOSURES WHICH DIRECTLY CONCERN OPSEC, TWO
REQUIREMENTS ARE GERMANE:

A. COVERED RADIO AND TELEPHONE CIRCUITS USED BY SHIPS, AIR-
CRAFT, AND GROUND FORCES INVOLVED IN NGFS
AND RELATED ACTIVITIES IS THE PRACTICAL AND SATISFACTORY FINAL SOLUTION.

PAGE FOUR RUMGSAF2644 S E C R E T NOFORN LINDIS

B. A SINGLE JOINT/COMBINED OPCODE WITH A COMPATIBLE VOCABULARY
RELATED TO NGFS IS NEEDED AS AN INTERIM MEASURE.

5. THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS CONCERNING OPSEC AS ASSOCIATED WITH NGFS ARE
BEING CONDUCTED:

A. CTG 70.8 IS REVIEWING WITH CTF-115 COORDINATION PROCEDURES
BETWEEN MARKET TIME AND NGFS FORCES.

B. THE IMPORTANCE OF OPSEC IS REITERATED PERIODICALLY TO ALL
CONCERNED. IT IS PLANNED TO INCLUDE A SECTION ON OPSEC IN THE NEXT
REVISION ON GUN 13.

C. THE OPSEC PROBLEM IS UNDER CONTINUOUS ANALYSIS WITHIN
SEVENTHFLT.

5. COORDINATIVE PROCEDURES, ESPECIALLY THOSE REQUIRING UNCOVERED
HF VOICE WITH NGLO'S, ARE BEING REVIEWED.

6. THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATIONS SECURITY, IN THE
ENT

IN WHICH OPERATIONS MUST BE CONDUCTED IN SVN, ARE INDEED UNIQUE.
ALTHOUGH IT APPEARS THAT ABSOLUTE SECURITY OF OPERATIONS MAY NOT BE
REALIZED IN THIS ENVIRONMENT, EFFORTS WILL BE CONTINUED TO OPTIMIZE
SECURITY COMMENSURATE WITH VALID TACTICAL AND COORDINATIVE REQUIREMENT.

GP-3

BT

2644

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R 280228Z JAN 69
FM ADMIN CINCPACFLT
TO COMNAVFORV
INFO CG FMFPAC
CG III MAF
COMNAVFORVREP DANANG
OICC RVN
CONSERVPAC
BT

*Reveals opposition
to our 50 megawatt
power pkg request.*

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT
EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM ZUMWALT INFO LTGEN BUSE, LTGEN CUSHMAN,
RADM BONNER, RADM COMBS AND RADM JOHNSON FROM VADM BAUMBERGER
ICTZ POWER REPROGRAMMING

- A. CINCPACFLT 162134Z JAN 69 NOTAL
- B. CINCPACFLT 220338Z JAN 69 NOTAL

1. RADM HOOPER (OP-14B) HAS ADVISED ME THAT, OUR RECENT MESSAGES (REFS A AND B) NOTWITHSTANDING, THE PROSPECTS FOR GAINING APPROVAL FOR ANY OF THE ICTZ POWER PACKAGE APPEAR LIMITED IN THE EXTREME. HE INDICATED FURTHER THAT THE DESIRABILITY OF THE NAVY PUSHING THE ISSUE SEEMS QUESTIONABLE AT THIS TIME AND SUGGESTS THAT WE MAY WISH TO REEVALUATE OUR POSITION, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE 8-10 MONTH GENERATOR PROCUREMENT LEAD TIME THAT WILL ENCOUNTERED.

2. OPPOSITION TO THE POWER PACKAGE IS NOT BASED ON THE TECHNICAL REQMT FOR POWER OR THE ENGINEERING/ECONOMIC VALIDITY OF REPLACING PORTABLE UNITS WITH BASIC POWER, BUT RATHER WITH THE WISDOM OF BUILDING SEMI-PERMANENT FACILITIES IN THE ICTZ AT THIS LATE DATE. IN VIEW OF THIS ATMOSPHERE IN WASHINGTON, I BELIEVE OUR ONLY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS IN THIS ENDEAVOR IS TO IDENTIFY THOSE POWER REQMTS IN THE ICTZ THAT ARE FOR, (A) PROGRAMMED FACILITIES NOT YET COMPLETED AND FOR WHICH THERE WILL BE NO POWER AVAILABLE AND (B) POWER REQMTS THAT WILL RELEASE TACTICAL GENERATORS FOR USE IN A TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST YOU LET ME KNOW FOR EACH OF THE ABOVE CRITERIA THE APPLICABLE POWER REQMTS, LOCATIONS, AND TACTICAL UNITS OR FACILITIES AFFECTED WITH NECESSARY SUPPORTING RATIONAL.

3. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT WE MUST ADDRESS SPECIFIC ACTIONS WHICH WILL BE UNDERTAKEN IF, AS APPEARS LIKELY, THE ENTIRE REPROGRAMMING REQUEST IS TURNED DOWN. IF, IN FACT, NEW FACILITIES WILL NOT BE USEABLE BECAUSE OF LACK OF POWER, I WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING THE SPECIFICS. UNDERSTAND VINCE COMBS PLANNED TO DISCUSS WHOLE MATTER WITH YOU IN SAIGON.

4. TO MAKE A TIMELY REPLY TO RADM HOOPER, REQUEST YOUR INPUT ASAP BUT NOT LATER THAN 29 JAN. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

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P 280648Z JAN 69
FM COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG
TO RUYVSYD/COMNAVFORV
INFO RUYHSYB/COMSERVPAC
RUYPSYD/CG III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2
FOR VADM ZUMWALT

INFO FOR RADM COMBS AND MGEN YOUNGDALE
STEVEDORING CONTRACT AT NSA DANANG(U)

1. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR TELEPHONIC REQUEST, THE FOLLOWING RESUME OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE RENEWAL OF THE STEVEDORING CONTRACT WITH KOREA EXPRESS-KEANGNAM LTD (KEKN) IS PROVIDED.
2. THE PRESENT CONTRACT WITH KEKN IS FOR ABOUT ELEVEN MILLION DOLLARS AND EXPIRES 30 JUN. IT WAS NEGOTIATED LAST YEAR DIRECTLY WITH KEKN. MY STAFF UNDERSTANDS UNOFFICIALLY THAT THE NEGOTIATORS WERE TOLD FROM THE WASHINGTON LEVEL TO RAISE THE TENTATIVELY NEGOTIATED PRICE BY ABOUT TWO MILLION DOLLARS; HOWEVER, I HAVE NO DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCURACY OF THAT PARTICULAR ALLEGATION, NOR DO I SEE ANYTHING NECESSARILY SINISTER OR IMPROPER IF IT

PAGE 2 RUYVSYB6257 C O N F I D E N T I A L
BE TRUE.

3. DIGRESSING FOR A MOMENT, WE HAVE BEEN UNDER EXTREMELY HEAVY PESSURE FROM OSD AND OTHERS TO GO COMPETITIVE IN THE RENEWAL OF OUR CONTRACT WITH PHILCO FORD, WHICH IS ABOUT FOUR TIMES THE SIZE OF THE KEKN CONTRACT. WE HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE VAST COMPLEXITY OF THE WORK PHILCO FORD IS DOING FOR US, PLUS ITS SHEER VOLUME, WOULD MAKE IT EXTREMELY UNWISE, RISKY, DANGEROUS AND EXPENSIVE TO CONSIDER COMPETITIVE BIDDING ON THAT WORK PACKAGE AT THIS TIME.

4. BACK TO KEKN, WE HAVE AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT SITUATION. THE WORK PACKAGE IS WELL DEFINED AND MORE SUITED TO A SWITCH IN CONTRACTORS. ONLY ABOUT TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT OF OUR STEVEDORING EFFORT IS DONE BY KEKN; THE REMAINDER IS BY U.S. MILITARY AND VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES. WE HAVE CONTINGENCY PLANS TO COVER A WORK STOPPAGE BY KEKN FOR ANY CAUSE, AND COULD TOLERATE A NORMAL AMOUNT OF LOST WORK IN THE EVENT OF A CHANGE OF CONTRACTORS. ALL OF THIS IS NATURALLY CONTINGENT ON A FAIRLY STEADY WORK LOAD AS AT PRESENT. IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER MAJOR OFFENSIVE BY THE OTHER SIDE, WE WOULD BE FORCED TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH KEKN. THE PRESENT CONTRACT CONTAINS AN OPTION FOR RENEWAL TO COVER THIS VERY CONTINGENCY. LAST YEAR THE

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PAGE 3 RUYVSYB6257 C O N F I D E N T I A L

TACTICAL SITUATION REQUIRED US TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH KEKN; THIS YEAR SO FAR THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS US TO FOLLOW THE MORE NORMAL COMPETITIVE CONTRACTUAL PROCEDURE. I HAVE NO BASIS WHATSOEVER FOR SEEKING TO GO SINGLE SOURCE.

5. PARENTHETICALLY I WILL AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE FAR SIMPLER FOR ME TO NEGOTIATE EXCLUSIVELY WITH KEKN. THE COMPANY HAS DONE OUTSTANDING WORK FOR WHICH I HAVE LAVISHLY COMMENDED THEM. HOWEVER, THEIR PAY SCALES ADEQUATELY RECOGNIZED THE HAZARDS OF THE WORK BOTH FROM THE AMMUNITIONS HANDLED AND OM ENEMY ACTION. OUR OWN UNOFFICIAL ESTIMATE IS THAT KEKN IS CHARGING ABOUT TWICE THE GOING HOURLY RATE IN EACH CATEGORY OF WORK AND HAZARD.

6. ACCORDINGLY, AND WITH THE VERBAL APPROVAL OF CONSERVPAC, I HAVE ADVERTISED FOR BIDS ON THE RENEWAL OF THIS CONTRACT. KEKN AND ABOUT SEVEN OTHER KOREAN FIRMS ARE ON THE LIST OF THOSE RECEIVING INVITATIONS TO BID. ADDITIONAL FIRMS NOT ON THE LIST MAY SUBMIT BIDS IF THEY SO DESIRE. THE BIDS ARE DUE TWENTY-SIX FEB AND WILL REQUIRE SEVERAL WEEKS TO ANALYZE. I HAVE REQUESTED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM SUPPLY SYS COMD IN THIS TASK AND IN CONDUCTING THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. OBVIOUSLY, MY PRESENT DECISION COULD BE REVERSED AT ANY TIME UP TO THE ACTUAL SIGNING OF A NEW CONTRACT.

PAGE 4 RUYVSYB6257 C O N F I D E N T I A L

7. SO FAR, SO GOOD; EVERYTHING STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS. STARTING WITH MY RECENT VISIT TO SEE YOU IN SAIGON, I HAVE RECEIVED MANY VISITS FROM KOREANS WHO ARE INTERESTED IN OBTAINING A CHANGE IN MY DECISION TO GO COMPZEA. THEY SEEK TO CONVINC ME THAT THE CONTRACT SHOULD BE RENEWED BY DIRECT NEGOTIATION WITH KEKN EXCLUSIVELY. SEVERAL KEKN EXECUTIVES AND MINISTER KIM OF THE KOREAN ECONOMIC COORDINATION MISSION IN SAIGON HAVE STATED THAT KEKN IS PREPARED TO COME DOWN A "SUBSTANTIAL" BUT UNSPECIFIED AMOUNT IN THEIR RATES.

8. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE MATTER OPENLY AND AT EXHAUSTIVE AND REPETITIVE LENGTH WITH THE FOLLOWING, ALL AT THEIR REQUEST:

- A. MINISTER KIM, BOTH IN SAIGON AND DANANG
- B. MR CHO, PRESIDENT OF KEKN
- C. MR KIM, KEKN DANANG MANAGER
- D. BGEN LEE, ROK BRIGADE COMMANDER
- E. SEVERAL LESSER KEKN OFFICIALS.

9. IN ALL CASES, THE CONVERSATIONS HAVE BEEN PLEASANT AND CORDIAL, AND HAVE ALL CLOSED ON A FRIENDLY NOTE. IN FACT, ON MINISTER KIM'S TRIP TO DANANG, I TOOK HIM ON A HARBOR TOUR TO SHOW HIM THE KOREAN AT WORK, AND HAD A DINNER PARTY AT MY QUARTERS IN HIS

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PAGE 5 RUVVSYB6257 C O N F I D E N T I A L
HONOR.

10. THE THRUST OF THE ARGUMENTS ALL OF THE KOREANS HAVE USED IS EXACTLY THE SAME:

A. KEKN HAS DONE A GOOD JOB FOR WHICH I HAVE COMMENDED THEM. THIS IS TRUE, AND I FREELY ACKNOWLEDGE IT WITH EMBELLISHMENTS TO THEM

B. SKEKN HAS LOST SOME PEOPLE THROUGH ROCKET ATTACKS, THIS AGAIN IS TRUE AND FREELY ACKNOWLEDGED; ALSO, THE RATES IN THE CONTRACT ADEQUATELY REFLECT THIS HAZARD.

C. THERE IS SOME OVERALL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE U.S. AND KOREA THAT A SPECIFIED AMOUNT OF CONTRACTS WILL BE AWARDED TO KOREAN FIRMS TO COMPENSATE FOR THE PRESENCE OF ROK COMBAT UNITS IN VIETNAM, AND ALSO AS A PART OF OUR FOREIGN AID PROGRAM. THIS MAY BE SO, BUT OF COURSE I HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY SUCH AGREEMENTS, HAVE NO INSTRUCTIONS WHATSOEVER ALONG THESE LINES, AND HAVE NO JUSTIFICATION IN SEEKING TO AVOID THE NORMAL PROCEDURE OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING.

D. THE ARMY IS ALLEGED TO BE ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATING DIRECTLY WITH KEKN AND/OR OTHER KOREAN FIRMS ELSEWHERE IN VIETNAM UNDER SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES. I WOULD FIND IT PROHIBITIVELY TIME CONSUMING TO ATTEMPT

PAGE 6 RUVVSYB6257 C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO VERIFY THIS ALLEGATION, AND THE INEVITABLE RESULT WOULD BE THAT IT WAS A QUESTION OF JUDGEMENT AS TO WHETHER THE INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCE DID OR DID NOT REQUIRE SINGLE SOURCE NEGOTIATIONS. FURTHERMORE, ANY LAXNESS, IF IT SHOULD EXIST ON THE ARMY'S PART, IS NO REASON FOR LAXNESS ON MINE.

E. KOREA IS A POOR COUNTRY AND NEEDS THE BUSINESS MORE THAN OTHER COUNTRIES. I REGARD THIS AS AN EMOTIONAL PLEA IN WHICH THE KOREANS DO NOT PUT MUCH CREDIBILITY THEMSELVES.

F. I, AS AN INDIVIDUAL COMMANDER WILL LOSE FACE IF I DO NOT TAKE THE POSITIVE STEP OF DIRECTING THE CONTRACT TO THEM. THIS PLOY MAY APPEAR TO THEM TO BE WORTH TRYING BUT IS OBVIOUSLY INVALID.

G. THE U.S. WOULD BE DOING A RISKY THING TO GO COMPETITIVE, AS THE WAR MIGHT TAKE A BAD TURN. THIS IS A POSSIBILITY WE HAVE TO FACE, BUT WE DO HAVE CONTINGENCY PLANS AND A SPRINT CAPABILITY FROM OUR OTHER STEVEDOR, ASSETS, AND WE DO HAVE TO HAVE THE COURAGE OF OUR CONVICTIONS.

H. THERE ARE SEVERAL MORE PERIPHERAL APPROACHES LIKE BROTHERS IN ARMS, DISTRUST OF THE JAPANESE, AND OPENLY EXPRESSING FEARS THAT THE INDIVIDUAL TALKING MAY LOSE HIS JOB IF I DO NOT REVERSE MY DECISION. I EVALUATE ALL OF THESE AS PERFUNCTORY AND NOT VERY

GP-4

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MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.									#43

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CONFIDENTIAL FINAL SECTION OF 2
GENERALLY BELIEVED BY THE INDIVIDUALS.

11. MY APPROACH TO THE DISCUSSIONS IS TO OUT-DO THE KOREANS IN ACKNOWLEDGING THE DILIGENCE OF KEKN AND OUR OTHER KOREAN EMPLOYEES. I SWAP WAR STORIES ABOUT MY EXPERIENCES IN KOREA DURING THE KOREAN WAR, AND POINT OUT THAT A LOT OF U.S. MILITARY MEN HAVE DIED FIGHTING IN KOREA. I ACKNOWLEDGE THE FACT THAT LAST YEAR THE TACTICAL SITUATION DID NOT PERMIT US TO GO COMPETITIVE. I POINT OUT THAT THE ABILITY TO GO TO COMPETITIVE BIDDING IS A MARK OF SOME PROGRESS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR, AND ONE THAT IS TO BE WELCOMED RATHER THAN RESISTED. LIKEWISE THE APPEARANCE OF ADDITIONAL FIRMS AND NATIONALITIES IS A STEP FORWARD.

12. IN RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENT THAT IT ISN'T FAIR FOR THE KOREANS, WHO CAME TO OUR AID WHEN THE GOING WAS ROUGH, NOW HAVE TO SHARE

PAGE 2 RUYVSYB6258 C O N F I D E N T I A L

THE WEALTH WITH THE FAINT HEARTED JOHNNY-COME-LATELIES NOW THAT THE FIGHTING IS LETTING UP, I POINT OUT THAT WHILE THERE MAY BE SOME EMOTIONAL FEELING ON THIS SUBJECT, EACH CONTRACT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN WRITTEN TO GENEROUSLY REFLECT THE TOTAL HAZARDS AND RISKS THAT APPLIED DURING THE TERM OF THAT CONTRACT.

13. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE TIME HAS FORTUNATELY COME WHEN THE U.S. NAVY CAN START TO TAKE THE LEAD IN GOING COMPETITIVE, AND PROPOSE THAT WE HEW TO THIS LINE AS LONG AS THE PRESENT TACTICAL SITUATION PERTAINS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THIS DECISION IS OVERRULED, EITHER ON THE BASIS OF A DIFFERENT EVALUATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, OR THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER WORLD WIDE PROGRAMS, OR EVEN ARBITRARILY, I WOULD FEEL NO EMBARRASSMENT, AND WOULD HAPPILY ENTER INTO SINGLE SOURCE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS LATER CASE, I WOULD EXPECT THAT OUR NEGOTIATORS OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO GET A BETTER PRICE AS A RESULT OF THIS DRILL.

14. TO KEKN OFFICIALS I HAVE POINTED OUT AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND AS A FRIEND THAT KEKN IS ALREADY IN A REFERRED POSITION TO WIN THE CONTRACT IF THEYUT IN A GOOD LOW BID, AND I REASSURED THEM THAT AMPLE CREDIT WILL BE GIVEN THEM FOR THEIR DEMOSTRATED GOOD PERFORMANCE. I ALSO ASSURE THEM THAT WE WILL DISQUALIFY ANY LOW

PAGE 3 RUYVSYB6258 C O N F I D E N T I A L

BIDDER WHO IN FACT DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY AND PRIOR PERFORMANCE RECORD. I ALSO DRAW THEIR ATTENTION TO THE PREDICTABLE TREND TOWARD COMPETITIVE BIDDING, AND URGE THEM TO MAKE THE PLUNGE.

15. FINALLY, I DRAW YOUR ATTENTION AGAIN TO THE OPTION WE HAVE IN THE PRESENT CONTRACT FOR A NEGOTIATED RENEWAL, AS AN INDICATION THAT WE ARE BY NO MEANS IN ANY KIND OF BIND IN GOING EITHER COMPETITIVE OR DIRECTED SOURCE.

16. WARM REGARDS, AND HOPE YOU CAN GIVE US A DAY AND A HALF

FEB SIX TO SEVEN. COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES
 11 MAR 21 007 11 REV. 11-26
 ADM BOWLER SENDS

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P 291442Z JAN 69
FM COMNAVFORV
TO CINCPACFLT
INFO CG FMFPAC
CG III MAF
COMNAVFORV REP DANANG
DEPANAVFACENCOM SEA
COMSERVPAC

*Reelama data
to challenge of
50 megawatt
power pkg*

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT
FOR VADM BAUMBER GER INFO LTGEN BUSE, LTGEN CUSHMAN, RADM BONNER,
RADM JOHNSON, AND RADM COMBS FROM ZUMWALT
ICYZ POWER REPROGRAMMING (U)

- A. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 280228Z JAN 69
- B. COMSERVPAC 252333Z JAN 69 NOTAL

1. (C) REF A REQUESTED REEVALUATIONS MY PROGRAM, AND SPECIFICALLY TO IDENTIFY POWER RQMTS IN ICYZ THAT ARE FOR (A) PROGRAMMED FACILITIES NOT YET COMPLETED AND FOR WHICH NO POWER AVAILABLE; AND (B) POWER RQMTS THAT WILL RELEASE TACTICAL GENERATORS FOR USE IN TACTICAL ENVIRONMENTS FURTHER, INFO WAS REQUESTED ON ACTION WHICH WILL BE UNDERTAKEN IF REPROGRAMMING REQUEST TURNED DOWN.

2. (C) PROGRAMMED FACILITIES NOT YET COMPLETED AND FOR WHICH NO POWER AVAILABLE:

- A. DANANG. TOTAL SEVEN MEGAWATTS (MW) INCLUDES FOLLOWING MAJOR FACILITIES: PUBLIC WORKS SHOPS COMPLEX, CHINA BEACH, TRI-SERVICE AIR TERMINAL FACILITY, GENERATOR OVERHAUL FACILITY, COVERED AND COLD STORAGE, MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY (MAG-16) SHOPS, ADDITIONAL HANGERS, AND OPERATION BUILDING, COMPLETION OF SERVICE CRAFT REPAIR FACILITIES, MAG 11 HANGARS AND SHOPS, FASU HANGERS, VQ-1 FACILITIES, TRANSIENT PROCESSING FACILITY.
- B. CHU LAI. TOTAL THREE MW INCLUDES FOLLOWING MAJOR FACILITIES: MAG-13 SHOPS, VQ-1 OPERATIONS BUILDING AND HANGARS, PHILCO-FORD CIVILIAN CANTONMENT, AMERICAL DIVISION BERTHING.
- C. PHU BAI. TOTAL SIX MW INCLUDES FOLLOWING MAJOR FACILITIES: MAG-36 HANGARS AND SHOPS, FLSG COVERED AND COLD STORAGE, PW MAINTANANCE SHOPS, CANTONMENTS FOR THE 4,000MEN. PHILCO-FORD CANTONMENT, ARMY MEDICAL DEPOT.

D. QUANG TRI, TOTAL NINE MW INCLUDES FOLLOWING MAJOR FACILITIES: MAG-39 HANGARS, SHOPS COMMAND ADMIN FACILITIES, CANTONMENT FOR 18,000 MEN, FLSG COLD STORAGE DEPOT.

3. (C) POWER RQMTS THAT WILL RELEASE TACTICAL GENERATORS FOR USE IN TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT:

- A. ESTIMATED CAPACITIES OF THE UNITS BY AREAS WHICH WILL BE RELEASED BY CENTRAL POWER SYSTEMS: QUANG TRI-4 MW-101ST ABN DIV, 5TH INF DIV, 3RD MARDIV, MAG 39. PHU BAI-4 MW-101ST ABN DIV, FIFTH INF DIV, 3RD MARDIV, XXIV CORPS, MAG 36. CHU LAI-4 MW-AMERICAL DIV, 1ST AVN BGE. DANANG-6 MW-1ST MARDIV.

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4. (C) ACTION TO BE TAKEN IF REPROGRAMMING REQUEST TURNED DOWN.
A. ASSUME 28 MW PACKAGE APPROVED. BY FULL IMPLEMENTATION POWER RATIONING LEAVING CURRENT 26 MW OF POOL UNITS IN OPERATION AT MAJOR BASES, AND HOLDING LOAD GROWTH TO MINIMUM, FOLLOWING WILL RESULT:

(1) BECAUSE MANY SMALL POOL AND IOE GENERATORS WILL STILL BE REQUIRED TO REMAIN ON FULL-TIME LOAD, MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS WILL INCREASE. THESE GENERATORS ARE USUALLY GOOD FOR 4 YEARS FOR POOL AND 90 DAYS FOR IOE UNITS. SKIP PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES NOW EMPLOYED TO MAXIMUM. ANTICIPATE DEADLINE WILL INCREASE AS MORE SMALL UNITS ARE RUN TO FAILURE WITHOUT OVERHAUL.

(2) POWER RATIONING WILL SHUT DOWN AIR CONDITIONING IN MOST OFFICE AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT FACILITIES AT MAJOR BASES. SINCE MAJORITY OF THESE FACILITIES DESIGNED OR ADAPTED FOR AIR CONDITIONING, PERSONNEL EFFICIENCY WILL DROP MARKEDLY IN VIEW NORMAL SUMMER TEMPERATURES IN 110-120 DEGREE FAHRENHEIT RANGE.

(3) LIGHTING WILL BE REDUCED TO A MINIMUM EXCEPT WHERE BUILDING DESIGN PROHIBITS. AGAIN, PPERATING EFFICIENCY WILL BE IMPARED.

B. ASSUME ENTIRE 50 MW BACKAGE RURNED DOWN.

(1) ITEMS DESSCUSSED PARA 4.A. ABOVE WILL INCREASE BEYOND MANAGEABLE LIMITS.

(2) BECAUSE LARGE POWER PLANTS DANANG AND CHU LAI WILL BE TAXED TO LIMIT,

OVERLOAD TRIPS WILL REEQUENTLY DROP ENTIRE DISTRUBUTION CIRCUITS AND DISRUPT COMEAT ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS. THIS WILL HAVE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES SINCE EACH CIRCUIT SUPPLIES NOT ONLY LESS ESSENTIAL LOADS, WHICH WILL ALREADY HAVE BEEN CURTAILED, BUT ALSO MAJOR CRITICAL OPERATION LOADS. IF A CIRCUIT TRIPS, EVERY CONNECTED FACILITY WILL BE OUT OF POWER. THIS HAS ALREADY OCCURRED ON OCCASION IN DANANG AND CAN BE EXPECTE

TO INCREASE. THIS UNEXPECTED, NON-SELECTIVE, INVOLUNTARY LOAD SHEEDING CAN HAVE MAJOR IMPACT ON OPERATIONS.

(3) ELECTRICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION CANNOT BE MET AS DISCUSSES PARA 2 ABOVE.

5. (U) SHORT BACKGROUND PROVIDED AS SUMMARY PREVIOUS TRAFFIC THIS SUBJECT. ELECTRIC POWER PROVIDED BY NAVY TO OVER 50 LOCATION IN I CORPS, RANGING IN SIZE FROM ADVANCED MARINE FIRE SUPPORT BASES TO MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX DANANG. ESTIMATE TOTAL ELECTRICAL GENERATION REQUIRED IN 1969 TO BE 197 MW, OF WHICH 144 MW IS NOW IN SERVICE, 15 MW REQUIRED FOR LOAD GROWTH AT EXISTING FACILITIES, AND 38 MW ESTIMATE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT KEY CONSTRUCTION FUNDED AND APPROVED THROUGH FY 68 MCON PROGRAM.

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6. (U) TOTAL OF 144 MW EXISTING SITUATION COMPRISES:
 - A. 20 MW BASIC UNITS AT DANANG AND CHU LAI.
 - B. 21 MW MUSE PORTABLE UNITS AT DANANG, CHU LAI, PHU BAI.
 - C. 26 MW I CORPS POOL UNITS AT ALL MAJOR BASES.
 - D. 18 MW ORGANIC (TOE) UNITS AT ALL MAJOR BASES.
 - E. 30 MW I CORPS POOL UNITS AT OUTLYING SITES.
 - F. 29 MW TOE UNITS AT OUTLYING SITES AND IN FIELD USE.
 7. (U) MAJOR PURPOSES SUBJECT PROGRAM ARE:
 - A. TO MEET REQUIREMENTS OF EXPECTED LOAD GROWTH AND CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED CONSTRUCTION AT MAJOR BASES.
 - B. TO RELIEVE THOSE POOL AND TOE GENERATORS WHICH CURRENTLY PROVIDE FULL-TIME POWER AT MAJOR BASES, SO THAT THEY CAN BE UTILIZED AT SMALLER SITES AND BE OVERHAULED TO SUPPORT FIELD OPERATIONS.
 8. (U) ESTIMATED DEFICIT OF GENERATION AT MAJOR BASES ONLY IS 68 MW, COMPRISING 34 MW REQUIRED TO SERVE NEW CONSTRUCTION AND PARTIALLY TO MEET EXPECTED GROWTH OF EXISTING FACILITIES, AND 34 MW TO REPLACE SMALL POOL AND TOE GENERATORS. ORIGINAL PROGRAM PROPOSED TO FUND 50 MW OF THIS DEFICIT.
 9. (U) NAVFACENGCOM GAVE OSD COST-ESTIMATE TO PROVIDE MINIMUM 28 MW BY CONTINUED USE OF SMALL POOL AND TOE UNITS WHICH SHOW PROJECTED 1-YEAR O AND M AND CAPITAL RECOVERY COST OF 11, 238 PPP DOLLARS VICE 2,029,000 DOLLARS FOR PROPOSED LARGE UNITS. THIS ESTIMATE ASSUMES SMALL UNITS WILL CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE, WHICH MAY NOT REMAIN TRUE IF GENERATOR DEADLINE CONTINUES TO GROW. COST TO PROVIDE TOTAL 50 MW PROGRAM WITH SMALL GENERATORS IS SOME 16 MILLION DOLLARS GREATER THAN PROPOSED LARGE UNITS, ASSUMING SMALL GENERATORS AND OPERATING PERSONNEL CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE.
 10. (U) DO NOT CONCUR IN USE OF DESCRIPTIVE TERM "SEMI-PERMANENT". PROPOSED GENERATORS, CONTROLVANS, TRANSFORMERS, AND SWITCH GEAR AND SELF-CONTAINED, VAN ENCLOSED, RELOCATABLE UNITS WHICH CAN BE MOVED EASILY OUT OF COUNTRY WHEN NO LONGER REQUIRED.
 11. (C) CONCUR PARA 3 REF B. BELIEVE NAVY HAS VALIDATED REQUIREMENT AND THAT THIS REQUIREMENT WILL EXIST FOR UNDETERMINED FUTURE (AT LEAST UNTIL CLOSE OF FY SEVEN ONE). FURTHER BELIEVE NAVY CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY HIGH COST OF THE ALTERNATIVES TO THIS PROJECT.
- GP-4

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM SSO XXIV CORPS		DATE 30 JAN 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 301114Z JAN 69		COPY# 1, 2, 3, 4 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
3	DCG		2 Feb		24	
2	DCG AIR					
	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	1/31		H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
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	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

32 No

SECRET

#47

O 351114Z ZYH ZFF-4

FM SSO XXIV CORPS

TO CG III MAF

ZEM

S E C R E T PHB 0181 EYES ONLY

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MSG FROM GEN ABRAMS
FOR LTG STILWELL.

QUOTE

O 305929Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV

TO MG BETTYS CG AMERICAL DIV

INFO LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS

ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 1329 EYES ONLY

PLAN TO VISIT YOUR AREA ON 5 FEBRUARY 1969. WILL
ARRIVE CHU LAI BY T-39 AIRCRAFT 1915 HOURS. DESIRE TO
VISIT SOME AMERICAL BRIGADES, LZ BRONCO (PRESENTATION
OF THREE DSC AWARDS), 2D ARVN DIV HQS, QUANG NGAI
PROVINCIAL HQS, AND QUANG TIN PROVINCIAL HQS. DETAILED
ITINERARY UP TO YOU. WILL DEPART FOR SAIGON AT 1615.

UNQUOTE

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

125

NNNN

SECRET

#47

O 010502 ZTR ZFF-5
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO GEN BROWN CDR 7TH AF
LTG MILDREN CDB USARV
LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
LTG PEERS CG I FFV
LTG KEARIN CG II FFV
V/ADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV
MG ECHARDT SA IV CORPS
YONKOLC/COL AARON CG 5TH SF
INFO LTG STILWELL XXIV CORPS
ZEM

*Guidance on troop
reduction discussions*

T O P S E C R E T MAC 1360 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: US TROOP REDUCTION

1. THE CJCS HAS RELAYED TO ME FROM THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE MATTER OF DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE SELECTED US TROOP REDUCTIONS. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE SUBSTANCE OF THAT GUIDANCE AND MY RELATED INSTRUCTIONS.
2. SHOULD PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF WITHDRAWAL OR US TROOP REDUCTION BECOME UNAVOIDABLE ON YOUR PART, IT SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE SUBJECT OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS.
3. I MYSELF INTEND TO REMAIN SILENT. IT IS ALSO MY INTENT TO MAKE STRONG REPRESENTATION TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS, TO ISSUE SIMILAR GUIDANCE TO HIS SENIOR OFFICIALS. IN DEALING WITH YOUR COUNTERPARTS, I HOPE YOU CAN QUIETLY DISSUADE THEM FROM ANY PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF OPINION ON WITHDRAWAL OR US TROOP REDUCTION WHICH COULD BE HARMFUL TO THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS. GP-3

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

SSO

UNCLAS

TOP SECRET

3 (1)

3 (1)