

- ~~1. CG 3D MARDIV 031236Z FEB69 (S) EXCLUSIVE
FOR STILWELL FROM DAVIS
CONTINGENCY OPERATION RAID INTO LAOS~~
2. CG FMFPAC 040121Z FEB69 (C) MCEO *Group-4*
III MAF SPEED 6-69: AIR CUSHION VEHICLES (ACV) (U)
3. SSO XXIV CORPS 040633Z FEB69 (S) EYES ONLY *Group - not shown*
RETRANSMITTING LTGEN STILWELL'S MSG TO GEN GETTYS 021720Z JAN(?)
SUBJ: INTEGRATION OF US/ARVN/TERRITORIAL PLANS & OPERATIONS
(C/S MEMO TO CORDS, PLANS, G-3 & DSA FOR ACTION) - DTD 4FEB69)
- ~~4. CG FMFPAC 050209Z FEB 69 (U) FOR
FOR BGEN HOFFMAN
ATTABOY FROM GENERAL BUSE~~
5. CINCPACFLT 031904Z FEB69 (C) FOR
BAUMBERGER TO HOOPER, ZUMWALT, BUSE, CUSHMAN, COMBS, HUSBAND,
BONNER & JOHNSON
ICTZ POWER REPROGRAMMING
- ~~6. SSO HAWAII 072121Z FEB69 (U)
FOR STILWELL FROM COL HEISTAND
"SORRY TO HEAR ABOUT DON PARSONS, WHOSE LT BRIDGES (BRIGGS?)"~~
- ~~7. MC CORCORAN CS MACV 080944Z FEB69 (U) EYES ONLY
CORCORAN TO ALL
PASSED AN ATTABOY FROM GEN MCCONNELL, ActgChm, ICS I, N,
CONNECTION WITH THE "29 Questions" ON SITUATION IN RVN~~
8. BGEN BOLLING CS XXIV CORPS 081107Z FEB69 (C) EYES ONLY *Group - not shown*
FOR DOOLEY FROM BOLLING
BOLLING PASSING MESSAGE IAW GEN STILWELL INSTRUCTIONS:
MSG RECEIVED FROM BUSE TO STILWELL RE: HEROIC ACTION HELO
CREW IN EVAC OF WOUNDED MARINES ON 7 FEB
9. CTG 70.8 080430Z FEB69 (C) FOR *g-4*
FOR MCLAUGHLIN INFO HOFFMAN FROM BAGLEY
"HOW ABOUT VISITING MY GUNLINE BEFORE 20 FEB - NEWPORT NEWS
OPERATING OFF ICTZ"
10. CG 3D MARDIV 092327Z FEB69 (C) EYES ONLY *Group-4*
FOR STILWELL FROM DAVIS
LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING YOU AT A-4 -- 1330
11. CG 3D MARDIV 101042Z FEB69 (C) MCEO SPECAT *Group-4*
RVN IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION
NEGAT REPORT SUBMITTED
12. COMNAVFORV 120538Z FEB69 (S) PERSONAL FOR *g-4*
FOR DOOLEY INFO HOFFMAN AND STIFFERUD FROM ZUMWALT
OPERATIONS ON CUA DAI RIVER (U)

13. CG 3D MARDIV 130938Z FEB69 (S) *Group-4*
 PERSONAL FOR STILWELL FROM DAVIS
 OPCON 3D MAR MINUS
 ("TEMP LOAN OF TWO RFL CO'S F/EMERG EMP IN QUANG TRI DURING TET")
14. CMC 111544Z FEB69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR *gp-4*
 FOR BUSE, YOUNGDALE, QUILTER, SIMPSON, DAVIS, FEELEY & WILLIAMS
 FROM CHAPMAN
 PEREFS OF DECEASED/MEDEVACED PERSONNEL
15. CG NINTH MAB 140256Z FEB69 (C) FOR *gp-4*
 PERSONAL FOR HOFFMAN INFO WEBSTER FROM WILLIAMS
 "WILL MEET YOU WITH HELO ON ARRIVAL NAHA ON 18TH"
16. CG XXIV CORPS 141717Z FEB69 (S) EYES ONLY *gp - not shown*
 FOR ABRAMS INFO CUSHMAN & GETTYS FROM STILWELL
 TERRORISM AT SA HUYNH REFUGEE CAMP REF MAC 1906 (S)
17. CMC 141741Z FEB69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *gp-4*
 FOR BUSE INFO CUSHMAN & WILLIAMS FROM CHAPMAN
 SEA PROGRAM SIX REALIGNMENT (S) (
18. COMUSMACV ~~130128Z~~ FEB69 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-4*
 FOR STILWELL FROM ABRAMS
 SA HUYNH -- NO FRIENDLY REACTION TO VC TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
 KIDNAPPING & BEATING CIVILIANS - NEED EXPLANATION"
19. COMNAVFORV 140649Z FEB69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *gp-4*
 FOR CUSHMAN & BONNER FROM ZUMWALT
 BLACK MARKET ACTIVITIES DANANG (U)
20. COMSEVENTHFLT 150120Z FEB69 (C) *gp-4*
 FOR CUSHMAN FROM BRINGLE
 NGFS ASSIGNMENT "HAPPY TO BE OF HELP"
21. CG FMFPAC (FWD) 150230Z FEB69 (C) *gp-4*
 FOR BGEN HUBBARD
 REQ CONCURRENCE OF PROPOSED ITINERARY F/19FEB VISIT
- ~~22. CG THIRD MARDIV 160420Z FEB69 (C) MCFD
 FOR CUSHMAN FROM DAVIS
 NEWS RELEASES ON DEWEY CANYON~~
23. CG 1ST MARDIV 170405Z FEB69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *gp-4*
 FOR DOOLEY FROM SIMPSON
 RE YR QUERY ABT ASGT ARMORED CAVALRY SQDN (1st MAR AO)
24. CG TF ALPHA NKP 210759Z FEB69 (C) FOR *Group - not shown*
 FOR CUSHMAN FROM DYAS
 PROPOSAL TO VISIT III MAF 17 MAR in/conn w/ visit to CTF 77
25. CG XXIV CORPS 220234Z FEB69 (S) EYES ONLY *Group - not shown*
 FOR CUSHMAN INFO ABRAMS FROM STILWELL
 REC ONNAISSANCE IN FORCE, NORTHWEST QUANG TRI

26. CTF 76 220210Z FEB69 (S) LIMDIS PURPLE DRAGON *group-4*
SECURITY OF ARG/SLF OPERATIONS
27. SSO IFFV 221438Z FEB69 (C) EXCLUSIVE FOR CG III MAF *gp-4*
FOR ABRAMS, MILDREN, ~~Ø~~ INFO CG III MAF, PEERS, KERWIN & ECKHARDT
FROM COL ARON
"A HOI CHANH REPORTED WHEN AND WHERE COMMUNISTS WOULD ATTACK"
28. CG XXIV CORPS 221648Z FEB69 (S) EYES ONLY *group - not shown*
FOR CUSHMAN INFO ABRAMS FROM STILWELL
DEWEY CANYON BORDER INCIDENT (H/2/9 & COMMUNIST TRUCK COLUMN)
29. CG FMFPAC 222047Z FEB69 (C) ~~SPECAT~~ EXCLUSIVE MCEO *gp-4*
FOR CUSHMAN FRM BUSE
FMFPAC REBUILD PROGRAM FOR SECTION "M" (U)
30. COMUSMACV 231049Z FEB69 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-4*
ABRAMS TO ALL
OPERATIONAL REPORTING "
"I AM DISSATISFIED WITH YOUR REPORTING ---- SEE TO IT"
- ~~31. CG XXIV CORPS 232235Z FEB69 (S) EYES ONLY
FOR CUSHMAN INFO ABRAMS FROM STILWELL
DEWEY CANYON SITREP~~
32. CS MACV 240010Z FEB69 (C) EYES ONLY *gp - not shown*
CORCORAN TO ALL
REQUEST SUMMARY SIMILAR TO MACV 2377 NLT 241500H
33. CS MACV 240850Z FEB69 (C) EYES ONLY *gp-4*
CORCORAN TO CUSHMAN, STILWELL, PEERS, KERWIN & ECKHARDT
"YOUR REPORTS WERE HELPFUL TO MACV - CONTINUE SUBMIT DAILY AS OF
1200H -- ARR HERE NLT 1500H"
34. COMUSMACV 241210Z FEB69 (C) EYES ONLY *gp-4*
ABRAMS TO ALL
"YOUR SITREPS HAVE BEEN COMPLETE & FACTUAL & TIMELY -- KEEP THEM UP"
- ~~35. [REDACTED]~~
36. CG FMFPAC 252119Z FEB69 (S) LIMDIS MCEO *gp-4*
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY REPORT
37. C/S MACV 260219Z FEB69 (C) EYES ONLY *gp-4*
CORCORAN TO ALL
"TIMELINESS OF YOUR REPORTS CRITICAL -- FWD SI MATERIAL BOM --
YOUR REPORTS REACH THIS HQ NLT 1500H"
- ~~38. COMSEVENTHFLT 261500Z FEB69 (C) FOR
FOR CUSHMAN FROM BRINGLE
"Accept your invite to the 1015 briefing, but can't stay for lunch."~~

DECLASSIFIED

4. ~~CG XXIV CORPS 200651Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY EXCLUSIVE
FOR CUSHMAN INFO CORCORAN AND DAVIS FROM STILLWELL
EXPLOITATION OF BA 611~~
5. ~~CG XXIV CORPS 220455Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY
FOR DOOLEY FROM ROLLING
"INFO AVAILABLE ON H/2/9"~~
6. ~~COMUSMACV 221143Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY
FOR CUSHMAN INFO CAVANAUGH FROM ABRAMS
EXPLOITATION OF BASE AREA 611
"SOC & MARINES TO WORK HAND IN GLOVE AND EXPLOIT TO MAXIMUM"~~
7. ~~COMUSMACV 231104Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY
TO MCCAIN INFO WHEELER, CUSHMAN & STILLWELL FROM ABRAMS
OPERATIONS NEAR LAOS BORDER (S)~~
8. ✓ MAJGEN CORCORAN 231830Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY *GP-1*
TO CUSHMAN, STILLWELL, PEERS, KERWIN & ECKHARDT FROM CORCORAN
"REPORTING"
COMUSMACV DISSATISFIED WITH YOUR REPORTING
WHAT HAS ENEMY DONE, WHAT CAN HE DO, ACTIONS YOU TOOK & PLAN
9. ✓ CG XXIV CORPS 232113Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY - *GROUP NOT SHOWN*
TO CORCORAN INFO CUSHMAN FROM STILLWELL
ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION (ENEMEY ACTIONS 222400H - 240300HFEB)
10. ~~COMUSMACV 240328Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY
FOR CUSHMAN INFO STILLWELL FROM ABRAMS
EXPLOITATION OF BASE AREA 611 (U)
"AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT GND OPS S. OF LAOS BORDER TO 02 GRID LINE"~~
11. ✓ COMUSMACV 240400Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY - *GROUP NOT SHOWN*
ABRAMS TO ALL
"A RETRANSMITTAL OF MSG FROM ABRAMS TO WHEELER, MCCAIN & BUNKER"
RUNDOWN ON ENEMY OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT SVN -- BEGAN 230200H FEB

2119

DECLASSIFIED

~~39. CG IMPAC 202203Z FEB69 (U) FOR~~

~~DCEN WEINSTEIN WESTING TRIP POSTPONED~~

~~40. RE C/O XXIV CORPS 271630Z FEB69 (S) EYES ONLY~~

~~FOR DOOLEY INFO CORCORAN FROM BOLLING~~

~~"LARGEST CACHE OF THE WAR UNCONFIRMED"~~

41. CG 3D MARDIV 280300Z FEB69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *Group-4*

FOR CUSHMAN AND STILWELL FROM DAVIS

SAPPER ATTACKS ON MARINE POSITIONS (CONCERNS RUSSELL)

42. CG XXIV CORPS 281110Z FEB69 (S) EYES ONLY *go - not shown*

FOR CUSHMAN INFO ABRAMS FROM STILWELL

"KING SIZE CACHE BY D/1/9 -- MORE TO WHAT THEY FOUND YESTERDAY"

~~43. NAICOMESTRAC 281044Z FEB69 (S) FOR~~

~~BRAND FOR GEN HISE PLANE DOWN AOC~~

~~44. CG EMEDAC 292012Z FEB69 (C) FOR~~

~~FOR CUSHMAN INFO WEBSTER AND WILLIAMS FROM RISE~~

~~DELIGHTED ABOUT CARL'S VISIT TO OKI~~

12. ✓ CG XXIV CORPS 240547Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY - GROUP NOT SHOWN
FOR CORCORAN INFO CUSHMAN FROM STILWELL
ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION (230300H - 241200H FB)
- ~~13. SSO SOC 240447Z FEB69 (TS) LIMDIS EYES ONLY
PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATION ORDER (U)~~
- ~~14. CG FMBDAG 250329Z FEB69 (TS) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR CHAPMAN INFO CUSHMAN FROM BUSE
OPERATION DEWEY CANYON UPDATE (U)~~
15. ✓ CG XXIV CORPS 250559Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY - GROUP NOT SHOWN
FOR CORCORAN INFO CUSHMAN FRM STILWELL
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION -- 241200 H - 251200H FEB69
16. ✓ CG XXIV CORPS 250952Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY - GROUP NOT SHOWN
FOR CORCORAN INFO CUSHMAN FROM STILWELL
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION -- AS OF 251630H FEB69
17. CG XXIV CORPS 260350Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY - GROUP NOT SHOWN
FOR CORCORAN INFO CUSHMAN FROM STILWELL
SUBJ: ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION - 251200H TO 261200H FEB69
- ~~18. C/S MACV 261001Z FEB69 (TS) LIMDIS EYES ONLY
FOR CUSHMAN INFO STILWELL FROM CORCORAN
DEWEY CANYON OPERATION IN LAOS AND RELATED NEWS MEDIA
"DON'T SAY ANYTHING AND KEEP THE REPORTERS AWAY FROM THE UNITS"~~
19. ✓ CG XXIV CORPS 270335Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY - GROUP NOT SHOWN
FOR CORCORAN INFO CUSHMAN FROM STILWELL
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: 261200H - 271200H FEB69
20. ✓ CG XXIV CORPS 280621Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY - GROUP NOT SHOWN
FOR CORCORAN INFO CUSHMAN FROM STILWELL
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (FOLLOW - UP TO 0371)
- ~~21. COMUSMACV 240113Z FEB69 (TS) LIMDIS
UNDERWATER CABLE LOCATION (TS)~~
22. ✓ CG XXIV CORPS 280358Z FEB69 (TS) EYES ONLY - GROUP NOT SHOWN
FOR CORCORAN INFO CUSHMAN FROM STILWELL
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
23. ✓ COMNAVFORV 270443Z FEB69 (TS) LIMDIS GP-1
POSSIBLE ENEMY USE OF UNDERWATER COMMUNICATIONS CABLES (TS)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5215 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 030147Z FEB 69		DATE 3 FEB 69
ROUTE			DATE		SUBJECT EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT	
0	CG				REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. <i>5/10 Return for S&C enclosure on 13 Feb 69</i> <i>23 for S&C release</i> <i>will pass to major com mawards including DSH</i>
3	DCG		5 Feb		
	DCG AIR				
2	C/S	I			
5	DC/S		4/5	4/5	
	DC/S PLAN				
1	S/S	I	3 FEB		
9	G-1	I			
7	G-2	I			
6	G-3	I			
10	G-4	I			
	G-5				
	G-6				
8	CAP	I			
	ADJ				
12	CORDS	I			
	EMB/TRANS				
	ENGR				
	H&S CO				
	INSP				
	MTO				
	OP ANAL				
	ORD				
11	PSY OPS	I			
	SUPPLY				
	LEGAL				
	PMO				
	S&C				

SECRET

C/S- 1005, 5 Feb 69
Readdressal herewith;
Recommend release.

V Keyes
Michael Westtetter
#50

0 10 1471 211 1471
TO SEN BRANCH CDR 7AF
LTGG MILDREN DCG 65ARV
LTG CUSHMAN CG III WAF
LTG PEERS CG I FFV
LTG KERWIN CG II FFV
VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV
ME ECKHARDT SA IV CTZ
YSHKOLCC/COL AARON CO 5TH SFG
COL CAVANAUGH CH MACSOB
ZEN

SECRET

*Reflects tightening
of preparation for Tet
by Vietnamese*

SECRET MAC 1483 EYES ONLY
SUBJECT: TET CEASEFIRE (U)

- REF: A. VMAC 111/68 DTG 181330Z DEC 68 (S)
- B. MACV 43469 DTG 202345Z DEC 68 (IS)
- C. MACJ14 LTR, SUBJ: RVNAF TET LEAVE PROCEDURES, 24 JAN 69

1. (S) REF A INCLUDES RECENT JGS INSTRUCTIONS RE TET AAS WELL AS OTHER MEASURES AIMED AT REVERSING THE DESERTION TREND IN RVNAF. REFERENCES B AND C CONTAIN INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHRISTMAS CEASEFIRE.
2. (S) TET THIS YEAR EXTENDS FROM 17 FEB TO 20 FEB. ON 30 JAN, JGS WAS INFORMED BY MACV THAT WE REALIZED IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO OBSERVE SOME TYPE CEASEFIRE AT TET. IT WAS ALSO SUGGESTED TO JGS THAT ANY CEASEFIRE OBSERVED BY THE ALLIED FORCES SHOULD BE NO MORE THAN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS IN LENGTH. TO DATE NO FINAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE AS TO A CEASEFIRE. WHEN THIS DECISION IS MADE, MACV CEASEFIRE INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE ISSUED BASED ON THE PROCEDURES FOLLOWED DURING THE CEASEFIRE AT CHRISTMAS (REFS A AND B). IT IS CONTEMPLATED THAT ALL ALLIED FORCES WILL OBSERVE IDENTICAL RULES DURING THE CEASEFIRE, AS HAS BEEN DONE HERETOFORE.
3. (S) INSTRUCTIONS RECENTLY ISSUED BY THE JGS (REF C) CONCERNING LEAVE POLICIES FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL DURING TET ARE ENCOURAGING. JGS HAS DIRECTED THAT LEAVE FOR ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL BE SUSPENDED FOR A PERIOD OF SEVEN DAYS BEFORE TET TO FIVE DAYS AFTER TET. ALL RVNAF COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO MAKE A MAXIMUM EFFORT IN PROVIDING ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLICITY, AND EXTRA RATIONS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL DURING THE TET CELEBRATION. FAMILIES OF RVNAF SERVICEMEN WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO CELEBRATE TET AT MILITARY POSTS. THIS EFFORT BY THE JGS SHOULD RESULT IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS FOR ALL RVNAF UNITS DURING THE TET CELEBRATIONS. A COPY OF THE JGS TET LEAVE INSTRUCTIONS HAS BEEN PASSED TO ALL U.S. ADVISORS. ALL ADVISORS ARE TO BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THE JGS GUIDANCE AND PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN ACCOMPLISHING THE DIRECTED REQUIREMENTS.

07-4

NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS. PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
301

#50

NIJN

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

P 040121Z FEB 69
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEBHOA/CAC
INFO RHMMAF/CG III MAF

Attempts to forestall transfer of 3 Navy PACV's to III MAF. They are too far gone to potential usefulness.

CONFIDENTIAL MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

- III MAF SPEED 6-69: AIR CUSHION VEHICLES (ACV)
- A. CMC 321550Z JAN69 (C)
- B. CG III MAF 142100Z DEC68 (S)
- C. COMNAVFORV 320618Z FEB69 (C) PASEP

1. (C) REF A REQUESTS COMMENTS ON THE TRANSFER OF THREE NAVY PATROL AIR CUSHION VEHICLES (PACV) TO III MAF TO FULFILL REQUIREMENT STATED IN REF B.
2. (C) THIS HQ HAS OBTAINED AN UNOFFICIAL COPY OF AN INFORMAL EVALUATION OF PATROL AIR CUSHION VEHICLE (PACV) CONDUCTED BY THE CHIEF, U. S. NAVY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT UNIT, VIETNAM, DATED 15 OCT 68, WHICH PROVIDES A DETAILED EVALUATION OF NAVY PACV'S AND THEIR CONDITION AT THE TIME OF THE REPORT. THE DONATOR OF THIS REPORT MUST BE PROTECTED. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE REPORT'S EXISTANCE AT THIS HQ NOT BE DIVULGED.

PAGE TWO RHHMFA02550 CONFIDENTIAL M C E O
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXTRACTED THEREFROM:

- A. PACV'S ARE OVER SIX YEARS OLD.
 - B. AT THE TIME OF THE REPORT, ALL THREE PACV'S WERE DOWN AND REQUIRED EXTENSIVE OVERHAUL.
 - C. STRUCTURAL AND POWER PLANT REPAIR ARE CLOSELY RELATED TO AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE. OPERATION WITHOUT HANGER FACILITIES HAMPER'S ROUTINE MAINTENANCE AND VIRTUALLY ELIMINATES PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE.
 - D. CRAFT HAVE DETERIORATED AND CORROSION OF VEHICLE WIRING AND ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS REQUIRES INCREASING PROPORTION OF MAINTENANCE TO OPERATING HOURS (RATE 5 TO 3 AT TIME OF REPORT).
 - E. PACV PERSONNEL AND BELL AEROSYSTEMS REP ESTIMATED USEFUL LIFE EXPECTANCY OF PACV'S IN RVN AFTER OVERHAUL AS SIX MONTHS TO ONE YEAR.
 - F. REPORT RECOMMENDS REPLACEMENT OF PACV'S IN FALL OF 69.
3. (C) INFORMATION OBTAINED INFORMALLY IS THAT CINCPACFLT HAS INCLUDED SUPPORT IN THE AMOUNT OF 1.2 MILLION DOLLARS FOR PACV'S IN THE RA/IA AREA OF FY70 BUDGET FOR LIMITED OVERHAUL.
 4. (C) INFORMATION RECEIVED THIS HQ FROM BELL AEROSYSTEMS REVEALS THAT ACV MODEL SK-6 HAS BEEN DEVELOPED WHICH INCORPORATES

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURC.									#2

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA2360 C O N F I D E N T I A L M C E O
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS BASED ON EXPERIENCE GAINED IN SK-5 TESTS
AND OPERATION. THE SK-6 IS A STRETCHED VERSION OF THE SK-5
WHICH HAS AN INCREASED PASSENGER CAPACITY OF 35 VS 16 AND PAYLOAD
OF 7,819 LBS VS 4,425. ALL OTHER PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS ARE
ESSENTIALLY THE SAME EXCEPT FOR REDUCTION IN MAX SPEED FROM 60
KNOTS TO 56 KNOTS AND RANGE FROM 175 NAUTICAL MILES TO 160
NAUTICAL MILES.

5. (C) REF C CONFIRMS THAT ALL NAVY PACVS NOW DOWN AWAITING
PARTS.

6. (C) CONCLUSIONS ARE THAT TRANSFER OF PACV'S TO III MAF
WOULD:

A. RESULT IN A COSTLY MAINTENANCE PROBLEM.

B. REQUIRE AN EXTENSIVE CONTRACTOR SUPPORTED TRAINING
PROGRAM FOR OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL.

C. RESULT IN ATTAINMENT OF INADEQUATE DEGREE OF SKILL
REQUIRED FOR OPERATION OF THE VEHICLES WITHIN THEIR ANTICIPATED
LIFE EXPECTANCY.

7. (C) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, RECOMMEND:

A. THAT THE 3 NAVY PACV'S LOCATED IN RVN NOT BE TRANS-
FERRED TO III MAF.

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA 0360 C O N F I D E N T I A L M C E O

B. THAT 6 ACV'S (MODEL SK-5) BE PROCURED TO FULFILL
III MAF REQUIREMENT STATED IN REF B.

C. THAT ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF AN ACV UNIT, REGARDLESS
OF VEHICLE MODEL, BE ACCOMPLISHED IN CONUS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF 2100 (REV. 11-64)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADI.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									# 2

O 040633Z ZYH ZFF-4

FM 550 XXIV CORPS

TO S III MAF

ZEM

S E C R E T PHB 0211

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS RETRANSMITTED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

O 021720Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM LTG STILWELL ACTING CG III MAF DNG

TO MG GETTYS CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI

ZEM

S E C R E T PHB 0207 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: INTEGRATION OF US/ARVN/TERRITORIAL PLANS AND OPERATIONS

1. WHILE I AM THE FIRST TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE TOTALITY OF FACTORS IN THE NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES OF ICTZ DIFFER MEASURABLY FROM THOSE IN QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI, THERE ARE SEVERAL THINGS WHICH CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE INTERFACE AS AMONG THE AMERICAL, 2D ARVN AND PROVINCIAL MILITARY/POLITICAL INSTRUMENTALITIES. TO BE SPECIFIC:

A. CHANGE THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ASSIGNMENT OF SEPARATE TAOR'S TO THE END OF MAKING AMERICAL AND 2D ARVN DIVISIONS JOINTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAME GEOGRAPHY. THIS WOULD ELIMINATE THE PRESENT PROCEDURE OF 60 DAY RENEWAL OF YOUR LEASES AND MAKE APPROPRIATE, TEMPORARY SUBDIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY A MATTER OF JOINT DETERMINATION AS BETWEEN GEN TOAN AND YOU. IN THE LAST WEEK, THIS HAS BECOME GEN LAM'S IDEA AND, SINCE IT ACCORDS WITH III MAF THINKING, IT WILL GO INTO EFFECT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY.

B. ONE OUTGROWTH OF THE FOREGOING SHOULD BE THE EVOLVEMENT OF MORE OF LESS PERMANENT WORKING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE THREE ARVN REGIMENTS AND YOUR THREE BRIGADES. THIS, IN TURN, SHOULD LEAD TO JOINT DETERMINATION AS TO HOW BEST TO EMPLOY THE TOTAL ARVN/US RESOURCES WITH THE TWIN ENDS OF INSURING GENERAL SECURITY AND FURTHERING THE 1969 PACIFICATION PLAN. AMONG OTHER THINGS, A MUCH LARGER PROPORTION OF JOINT OPERATIONS SHOULD EVOLVE.

C. PLACEMENT OF PERMANENT LIAISON PARTIES, WITH APPROPRIATE COMMUNICATIONS, AT EACH DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS. FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF XXIV CORPS, THE III MAF PRESCRIBED THIS IN APPENDIX 2, ANNEX F, LOI 26-68 (1 NOVEMBER). MY OWN INQUIRIES HAVE LED ME TO CONCLUDE THAT THIS REQUIREMENT IS NOT NOW BEING MET IN THE SOUTHERN THREE PROVINCES. SOMETIMES WE FIND IT BETTER TO HAVE THE LIAISON AT BRIGADE LEVEL RATHER THAN BATTALION BUT, IN ALL INSTANCES, IT HAS BEEN OF ENORMOUS HELP INFORMATION-WISE, OPERATECHNALLY AND IN PLANNING.

3(21)

D. WE HAVE ALSO FOUND IT VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE PERMANENT REPRESENTATION AT PROVINCIAL LEVEL. IN OUR CASE, IT IS DIVISION TO PROVINCE. ADMITTEDLY, YOU HAVE A MORE COMPLEX PROBLEM.

E. THE QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN 1969 PACIFICATION PLANS WERE PRESENTED, IN DRAFT FORM, TO TRUONG, ME AND MY DIVISION COMMANDERS; AND WERE ADJUSTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR COMMENTS. THIS PROCEDURE WILL BE REPEATED IN FINALIZING THE QUARTERLY INCREMENTS. I BELIEVE THAT GEN TOAN AND YOU SHOULD HAVE THE SAME ROLE IN DETERMINING THE PHASING AND SCOPE OF THE QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PLANS.

F. TO FURTHER BOTH A AND B ABOVE, I AM PRESSING GEN LAM TO VOID THE REQUIREMENT THAT GEN TOAN PASS OPCON OF ONE BATTALION TO EACH OF THE TWO PROVINCES FOR PACIFICATION SUPPORT. THIS IS NOT DONE IN OUR PROVINCES. MY ARGUMENT IS THAT THE ENTIRETY OF THE AMERICAL AND 2D ARVN DIVISIONS ARE CHARGED, THROUGH COMMAND CHANNELS, WITH PROVIDING THE ENVIRONMENT OF SECURITY REQUISITE FOR PACIFICATION; THAT THE DIVISION AND MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS ARE BEST QUALIFIED TO DEPLOY AND MANEUVER THEIR TOTAL RESOURCES TO ACCOMPLISH THIS AIM; AND THAT A SINGLE BATTALION CANNOT BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED EXCEPT IN THIS LARGER CONTEXT. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM WORKING TO INSURE THE EARLY RETURN TO GEN TOAN'S CONTROL OF THE 1ST BN, 5TH REGT NOW DETACHED TO QUANG NAM.

2.H MY HUNCH, PARTIALLY CONFIRMED BY GEN VIEN YESTERDAY, IS THAT COMUSMACV WILL PURSUE THE THEME OF "TOGETHERNESS" DURING HIS VISIT ON 5 FEBRUARY. IN THIS CONNECTION, I HAVE SUGGESTED, BOTH THROUGH GEN LAM AND THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISORS, THAT THE PROVINCE CHIEFS' BRIEFINGS BE PLANTED TOWARDS PLANS/PROGRAMS/SCHEDULES FOR THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF THE 1969 PACIFICATION PLAN. IT WOULD BE QUITE APPROPRIATE TO HAVE THE US BRIGADE AND ARVN REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS MOST CONCERNED PRESENT AT THE RESPECTIVE PROVINCE BRIEFINGS. YOUR REPRESENTATIVES MIGHT WELL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS, IF TIME PERMITS, THEIR BROAD APPROACH TO PACIFICATION SUPPORT--OPERATIONS, ENGINEER ASSISTANCE, CIVIC ACTION AND COLLABORATION WITH ARVN AND RF/PF.

3.H I SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU MONDAY EVENING, 3 FEBRUARY. MEANWHILE, WARM REGARDS.

UNQUOTE

733

3(2)

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CGNR FILE 1 G

		FROM CINCPACFLT	DATE 05 FEB 69
		SERIAL# 0319047 FEB 69	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT	
		EXCLUSIVE FOR	
		DATE	SIGNATURE
6 FEB 69	<i>P. M. ...</i>		
6 Feb 69	<i>R. ...</i>		
6 Feb 69	<i>P. ...</i>		
7 Feb 69	<i>H. C. ...</i>		
	<i>J</i>		
EXCLUSIVE			
FOR			
s/s	COPIES 2,1,3, OF 3 COPIES		
	MAT AND TAPE		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT
SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

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#5

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P 031904Z FEB 69
FM CINCPACFLT
TO CNO
INFO COMNAVFORV
COMNAVFORV REP DANANG
CG FMFPAC
CG III MAF
DEP COMPACNAVFAACENGCOM SEA
NAVFAACENCOMH G
COMSERVPAC

*Support by PACFLT
reclaim effort
50 megawatt
power pkg*

BT
CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
RADM HOOPER INFO VADM ZUNWALT, LTGEN BUSE, LTGEN CLISHMAN, RADM COMBS,
RADM HUSBAND, RADM BONNER, RADM JOHNSON, FROM BAUMBERGER
ICTZ POWER REPROGRAMMING.

A. CNO 232004Z JAN 69 (NOTAL)

1. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR SUGGESTION OF REF A CONCERNING THE ICTZ POWER
REPROGRAMMING REQUEST, WE HAVE REEVALUTATED THE ENTIRE SITUATION AND
CONCLUDE THAT THE ORIGINAL REQUEST IS NOT ONLY STILL VALID BUT
REMAINS AN URGENT REQMT THAT IS ECONOMICALLY AND TECHNICALLY SOUND

2. THE PROPOSED PACKAGE WILL PROVIDE POWER AT MAJOR BASES (A) FOR
CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED NEW FACILITIES WHICH ARE NOT YET COMPLETED AND
FOR WHICH NO POWER IS AVAILABLE, AND (B) FOR RELIEF OF THOSE TACTICAL
GENERATORS PRESENTLY PROVIDING FULL-TIME POWER SO THAT THEY CAN BE
RETURNED TO TACTICAL USES.

A. PROGRAMMED FACILITIES NOT YET COMPLETED AND FOR WHICH NO POWER
AVAILABLE ; (1) DANANG; TOTAL 700K INCLUDES FOLLOWING MAJOR FACILITIES;
CHINA BEACH PUBLIC WORKS SHOPS COMPLEX; TRI-SERVICE AIR TERMINAL
FACILITY; GENERATOR OVERHAUL FACILITY; COVERED AND COLD STORAGE;
MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY (MAG-16) SHOPS, ADDITIONAL HANGERS, AND
OPERATIONS BUILDING; COMPLETION OF SERVICE CRAFT REPAIR FACILITIES SEMI,

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MYO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
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MAG 11 HANGERS AND SHOPS ; FASU HANGARS, VQ-1 FACILITIES;
 TRANSIENT PROCESSING FACILITY.
 (2) CHU LAI ; TOTAL 3000KW INCLUDES FOLLOWING MAJOR FACILITIES ; MAG-13
 SHOPS; VQ-1 OPERATIONS BUILDING AND HANGARS PHILCO-FORD CIVILIAN
 CANTONMENT; AMERICAL DIVISION BERTHING.
 (3) PHU BAI: 6000KW INCLUDES FOLLOWING MAJOR FACILITIES; MAG-36
 HANGERS AND SHOPS; FLSS COVERED AND COLD STORAGE; PW MAINTENANCE SHOP
 CANTONMENTS FOR 14,000 MEN ; PHILCO -FORD CANTONMENT; ARMY MEDICAL
 DEPOT.
 (4) QUANG TRI, TOTAL 9000KW INCLUDES FOLLOWING MAJOR FACILITIES:
 CANTONMENT FOR 18,000 MEN ; FLSS WORK STORAGE DEPOT.
 B. TACTICAL GENERATORS TO BE RELIEVED (ESTIMATED CAPACITIES OF THE
 UNITS, BY AREAS, WHICH WILL BE RELIEVED BY CENTRAL POWER SYSTEM)
 (1) DANANG: 6000KW-1ST MARDIV
 (2) CHU LAI 4000KW - AMERICAL DIV, 1ST AVN BGE .
 (3) PHU BAI: 400 KW - 101ST ABN DIV, 5TH INF DIV, 3RD MARDIV
 XXIV CORPS , MAG 36.
 (4) QUANG TRI: 4000KW-1ST ABN DIV, 5TH INF DIV, 3RD MARDIV,
 MAG-39.

IF THE PROPOSED POWER PACKAGE IS TURNED DOWN , THE NAVY WILL BE FACED
 WITH SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE ICTZ. BUD ZUMWALT PROVIDED THE
 FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTING SITUATION;

A. ASSUME 28MW PACKAGE APPROVED, BY FALL IMPLEMENTATION POWER RATIONING
 LEAVING CURRENT 26MW POOL UNITS IN OPERATION AT MAJOR BASES, AND
 HOLDING LOAD GROWTH TO MINIMUM, FOLLOWING WILL RESULT: (1) BECAUSE MANY
 SMALL POOL AND TOE GENERATORS WILL STILL BE REQUIRED TO REMAIN ON FULL
 -TIME LOAD, MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS WILL INCREASE . THESE GENERATORS ARE
 USUALLY GOOD FOR FOUR YEARS FOR POOL AND 90 DAYS FOR TOE UNITS .
 SHIP PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES NOW EMPLOYED TO MAXIMUM. ANTICIPATE
 DEADLINE WILL INCREASE AS MORE SMALL UNITS ARE RUN TO FAILURE
 WITHOUT OVERHAUL.

(2) POWER RATIONING WILL SHUT DOWN AIR CONDITIONING IN MOST OFFICE AND
 PERSONNEL SUPPORT FACILITIES AT MAJOR BASES. SINCE MAJORITY OF THESE

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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FACILITIES DESIGNED OR ADAPTED FOR AIR CONDITIONING, PERSONNEL EFFICIENCY WILL DROP MARKEDLY IN VIEW NORMAL SUMMER TEMPERATURES IN 110-120 DEGREE FAHRENHEIT RANGE.

(3) LIGHTING WILL BE REDUCED TO MINIMUM EXCEPT WHERE BUILDING DESIGN PROHIBITS. AGAIN, OPERATING EFFICIENCY WILL BE IMPAIRED.

B. ASSUME ENTIRE 50 MW PACKAGE TURNED DOWN.

(1) ITEMS DISCUSSED PARA 3.A ABOVE WILL INCREASE BEYOND MANAGEABLE LIMITS.

(2) BECAUSE LARGE POWER PLANTS DANANG AND CHU LAI WILL BE TAXED TO LIMIT OVERLOAD TRIPS WILL FREQUENTLY DROP ENTIRE DISTRIBUTION CIRCUITS AND DISRUPT COMBAT ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS. THIS WILL HAVE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES SINCE EACH CIRCUIT SUPPLIED NOT ONLY LESS ESSENTIAL LOADS, WHICH WILL ALREADY HAVE BEEN CURTAILED, BUT ALSO MAJOR CRITICAL OPERATING LOADS. IF A CIRCUIT TRIPS, EVERY CONNECTED FACILITY WILL BE OUT OF POWER. THIS HAS ALREADY OCCURRED ON OCCASION IN DANANG AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE. UNEXPECTED - SELECTIVE, INVOLUNTARY LOAD SHEDDING CAN HAVE MAJOR IMPACT ON OPERATIONS.

(3) POWER REQUIREMENTS FOR NEWCON CONSTRUCTION CANNOT BE MET AS DISCUSSED PARA 2 ABOVE.

(4) I CAN APPRECIATE THE OSD OBJECTION TO CONTINUED EXPENDITURES FOR SEMI-PERMANENT FACILITIES IN SEASIA, BUT CANNOT CONCUR THAT THE FACILITIES OF THE ICIZ POWER PACKAGE FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY.

THE MAJORITY OF THE EXPENDITURES INVOLVED IN THE SUBJECT REQUEST ARE FOR GENERATORS, TRANSFORMERS, CONTROLS AND SWITCHES WHICH CAN BE MOVED EASILY OUT OF COUNTRY WHEN NO LONGER REQUIRED.

A DEMONSTRATED NEED FOR THESE FACILITIES DOES EXIST IN RVN FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE (AT LEAST UNTIL THE CLOSE OF FY-70) AND AT THAT TIME THE EQUIPMENT CAN BE EITHER RETURNED TO PWRS OR USED TO SATISFY OTHER NAVY POWER SHORTAGES, A PROBLEM PREVALENT THROUGHOUT PACFLT.

(5) IN SUMMARY, SUBJECT REQUEST REMAINS A VALID REQMT. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD PUSH FOR IT AND THAT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO BACK OFF WHEN THE REQMT IS SO CLEAR CUT. IF ULTIMATELY DISAPPROVED, LET THE DECISION BE MADE AT OSD LEVEL. RECOMMEND, THEREFORE, THAT CONTINUED EFFORTS BE MADE TO PRESENT ALFA STRONG CASE TO OSD OFR THE REPROGRAMMING PROPOSAL INCLUDING A CLEAR - CUT DEFINITION OF THE IMPACT THAT WILL RESULT FROM DISAPPROVAL.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SJRC.								# 5	

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM BG BOLLING C/S XXIV COR		DATE 08 FEB 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 081107Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					
7	DCG				7	REMARKS
7	DCG AIR					①
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	8 FEB		PMH	
	G-1	Copy to			G-1 091630H Feb	
	G-2					

*S/S
Return
for your customer
to S/S*

*Hold for
Crew
Cushman*

*Has seen to
SPECAT catch-up.*

CONFIDENTIAL #8

0081107Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4
 FM BG BOLLING C/S XXIV CORPS
 TO BG DODLEY C/S III MAF

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L PHB 0235 EYES ONLY
 GENERAL STILWELL ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT TO YOU FOR YOUR INFO THE
 FOLLOWING MSG HE SENT TO GEN BUSE ON 8 FEB:

QUOTE

0080555Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4
 FM LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 TO LTG BUSE CG FMFPAC

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L PHB 0243 EYES ONLY

1. PURSUANT TO OUR TELEPHONE CALL, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS
 SUBMITTED WITH REGARD TO THE HEROIC ACTIONS OF FOUR HELICOPTER CREWS
 AND ONE CORPSMAN IN COMPLETING THE EVACUATION OF WOUNDED MARINES
 ON 7 FEBRUARY. ON 2 FEBRUARY, G/2/9 MARINES ENCOUNTERED AN
 ENEMY FORCE NEAR THE LAOTIAN BORDER. THE CONTACT RESULTED IN 5
 MARINES KIA AND 17 WOUNDED. THERE WAS NO LANDING ZONE IN THE AREA,
 AND THE WEATHER PREVENTED ANY MEDICAL EVACUATION. SINCE THE
 ACTION, THE EVACUATION OF THESE MEN HAS BEEN A SOURCE
 OF MAJOR CONCERN TO BOTH GEN DAVIS AND ME. WEATHER CONDITIONS HAVE
 BEEN SUCH THAT NO HELICOPTERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO APPROACH THE AREA
 IN WHICH THE COMPANY WAS LOCATED, AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE
 ENTIRE REGIMENT HAS HAD TO BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE USE OF AIR
 DROP BY RADAR-CONTROLLED C-130 AIRCRAFT AND CARGO HELOS. REPORTS
 FROM THE COMPANY COMMANDER G/2/9 INDICATED THAT, OF THE 17
 WOUNDED, 6 WERE LITTER CASES AND ALL OF THEM REQUIRED EVACUA-
 TION. THROUGHOUT THE ENSUING DAYS A NUMBER OF ATTEMPTS WERE MADE
 TO REACH THE UNIT, ALL WITHOUT SUCCESS. ON 7 FEBRUARY, TWO 1ST
 MAW CH-46 CREWS VOLUNTEERED TO FLY THROUGH THE WEATHER AND ATTEMPT
 AN EXTRACTION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE HAD LOST A HELICOPTER THE
 DAY BEFORE IN A SIMILAR ATTEMPT TO REACH ANOTHER UNIT IN THE SAME
 VICINITY. THESE TWO AIRCRAFT, ACCOMPANIED BY 2 GUNSHIPS, SOMEHOW
 MANAGED TO MAKE THEIR WAY THROUGH THE VALLEYS TO THE COMPANY AND
 EXTRACT NOT ONLY THE WOUNDED PERSONNEL BUT ALSO 12 ADDITIONAL
 PERSONNEL WHO REQUIRED EVACUATION FOR OTHER REASONS. IN MY
 OPINION, THE EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM DISPLAYED BY ALL OF THE MEN
 INVOLVED WARRANTS IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION. I WOULD SOLICIT YOUR
 APPROVAL FOR AN IMPACT AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS
 FOR THE PILOTS AND COPILOTS AND AN AIR MEDAL WITH "V" DEVICE FOR
 THE OTHER CREW MEMBERS AND THE CORPSMAN WHO ACCOMPANIED THE AIR-
 CRAFT. THIS RECOMMENDATION HAS THE HEARTY ENDORSEMENT OF GENERALS
 DAVIS AND QUILTER.

2. SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE PREPARATION OF CITATIONS IS
 AS FOLLOWS: LOCATION -- QUANG TRI PROVINCE, RVN; WEATHER --
 MINIMUM CEILING AND VISIBILITY, DRIZZLING RAIN, INTERMITTENT FOG
 IN VALLEYS; TERRAIN -- MOUNTAINS AND JUNGLES WITH ELEVATIONS
 VARYING FROM 800 TO 3,000 FEET, CHARACTERIZED BY PRECIPITOUS
 JUNGLE-COVERED SLOPES, OCCASIONAL SMALL PLATEAUS, AND DEEP VALLEYS
 CUT BY JUNGLE STREAMS; FLIGHT DISTANCE -- APPROXIMATELY 35 KIS
 ONE-WAY (FROM VANDERGRIFT COMBAT BASE TO AN EMERGENCY LANDING
 ZONE PREPARED APPROXIMATELY 5 KIS WEST SOUTH WEST OF FINE SUPPORT ⁸⁽¹⁾

BASE CUNNINGHAM, ESTIMATED OVERALL ROUND TRIP OF 40 MILES); NAME OF OPERATION -- DEWEY CANYON; UNITS INVOLVED -- G/2/9 MARINES (UNIT SUSTAINING CASUALTIES), HML-167, MAG 16, 1ST MAW (PARENT ORGANIZATION OF GUNSHIP CREWS), HMM 161, MAG-39, 1ST MAW (PARENT ORGANIZATION CH-46 CREWS); ENEMY ACTIVITY -- G/2/9 MARINES ASTRIDE MAJOR ENEMY INFILTRATION ROUTE FROM LAOS TO BASE AREA 101 AND COASTAL LOWLANDS OF SOUTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, TWO MAJOR ENEMY HEADQUARTERS AND ONE NVA REGIMENT KNOWN TO BE IN THE GENERAL VICINITY, DAILY INCIDENTS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE AGAINST ALL TYPES OF AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN THE AREA; CONDITION OF LANDING ZONE -- LANDING ZONE HAD BEEN PREPARED BY THE COMPANY IN CONTACT SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE EVACUATION (MARGINAL CONDITIONS).

3. ALL PERSONNEL INVOLVED WERE VOLUNTEERS AND WERE AWARE OF THE NUMEROUS PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO REACH THE UNIT CONCERNED. AERIAL FLIGHT NECESSITATED USE OF A ROUTE THROUGH THE VALLEYS AT EXTREMELY LOW LEVEL. PERSONNEL WERE CONTINUOUSLY EXPOSED TO THE HAZARDS OF THE ENEMY AAA AND ARTILLERY FIRE AS WELL AS TO THE MINIMAL WEATHER CONDITIONS. MISSION REQUIRED NOT ONLY EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM BUT ALSO GREAT PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE.

4. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ENTAIL AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS FOR EACH PILOT AND CO-PILOT LISTED BELOW AND A IR MEDAL WITH "V" DEVICE FOR OTHER CREW MEMBERS AND THE CORPSMAN. UH-1E GUNSHIP CREWS FROM HML-167, MAG-16, 1ST MAW, CALL SIGN: COMPRISE 5-0.

PILOT - MAJ J.M. DAVIS, JR., 075103

CO-PILOT - 1/LT D.J. COOK, 0100955

CREW CHIEF - CPL D.R. FERGUSON, 2148271

GUNNER - CPL J.L. MOYERS, 2272149

CALL SIGN: COMPRISE 5-2

PILOT - MAJ J.L. STEWART, 074785

CO-PILOT - 1/LT J.R. TURNER, JR., 095471

CREW CHIEF - SSGT P.D. PAGE, 1491539

GUNNER - L/CPL L.L. ELLINGTON, 2241011

CH-46 CREWS FROM HMM 161, MAG-39, 1ST MAW

CALL SIGN: CATTLE CALL 92-1

PILOT - CAPT G.J. FREESE, 093922

CO-PILOT - 1/LT D.E. REINIKI, 0100622

CREW CHIEF - CPL R.E. ERWIN, 2156471

GUNNER - CPL J.L. HARNLY, 2174158

GUNNER - L/CPL G.J. BOWES, 2228480

CORPSMAN - HM-2 G.R. BEASLEY, B 420748

CALL SIGN: CATTLE 92-2

PILOT - 1ST/LT T.H. POWELL, 0101396

CO-PILOT - 1ST/LT G.A. KONRABECKI, 0102060

CREW CHIEF - CPL W.E. HAWK, 2220016

GUNNER - SGT J.W. GORSUCH, JR., 2135758

GUNNER - L/CPL B.W. CARTER, 2289566

UNQUOTE

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

900

#8(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

P 002942
 TCZYUH RHMCUIN0029 0390430-CCCC--RHMMAFA.
 ZNY CCCCC ZYO RHMCS66
 080430Z FEB 69
 FM CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV CC
 INFO RHMMAFA/CG XII MAF
 B.

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 FOR BGEN MCLAUGHLIN INFO BGEN HOFFMAN FROM BAGLEY

A: NY 290934Z JAN 69

1. WOULD BE MOST PLEASED IF YOUR SCHEDULE PERMITS A VISIT PRIOR MY DEPARTURE FROM GUN LINE ABOUT 20 FEB.
2. PROPOSE TO DISCUSS REF A, YOUR REVISED GUN LINE ASSIGNMENT GUIDANCE, AND ANY OTHER MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF CARL OR ROSS DWYER COULD JOIN US.
3. NEWPORT NEWS WILL BE OPERATING OFF EYE CTZ WITH THE WELCOME MAT OUT. HOPE YOU CAN BREAK AWAY FOR A LITTLE NAVY R AND R. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

B.
 #0029

26

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#9	

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG THIRD MARDIV		DATE 10 FEB 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 092327Z	COPY # 3 OF 4 COPIES RECD		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
Z	CG DCG	I			S	REMARKS
	DCG AIR					
IA	C/S	I			✓	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
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	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

Sin: 
 Ref msg must
 have been released
 by XXIV Corps SSO
 Since DTG
 091723Z = 100123H
 We do not hold
 ref msg.
 Resp'y
 EMH

CONFIDENTIAL

#10

070923Z FEB 69 ZNY ZNY-1

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO CG III MAF

ZNY

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY

FM LTGEN STILWELL FM MGEN DAVIS

A. YOUR 291723Z FEB 69.

1. CONGR. LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING YOU AT A-4 ABOUT 1330.

GP-1

250

NAVS

CONFID

#10

CONFIDENTIAL

RR RHMAFA
 DE RUMHVP 1114 041104Z
 ZNY CCCCC
 R 101042Z FEB 69
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 INFO ZEN/TWELFTH MAR
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION (U)
 A. CG III MAF 131434Z NOV 68
 B. CG THIRD MARDIV 181344Z NOV 68
 C. CG THIRD MARDIV 120530Z DEC 68
 1. LAW REF A NEGATIVE RPT IS SUBMITTED FOR THIS PERIOD.
 RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN REF B AND C REMAIN VALID.
 GP-4

BT
 1114

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III MAF 2100/11 REV. 11-66

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PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#11	

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM COMNAVFORV		DATE 12 FEB 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 120538Z FEB 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG					REMARKS <i>See serial has seen FOR 2/13/69 Route to 93 to 93 frace</i>
3	DCG	I	13 Feb	X		
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I	13 Feb			
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	13 Feb	EMH		
	G-1					
	G-2					
1	G-3	A	Per #4 Routed 8-3			

*Hold for
Gen
Cushman*

*Has seen in
SPECAT catch-up.*

SECRET

SECRET

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PAGE TWO NUMEROUS SECRET

TROOPS FROM THE AN INTO CAN THANH ISLANDS AND THE TWO ISLANDS TO THE SOUTHEAST OF HOI AN. A NOTICEABLE CHANGE IN THE AREA HAS BEEN OBSERVED WHERE CRAFT TRANSITING THE CUA DAI HAD PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED FIRE FROM BOTH BANKS. ONLY THE SOUTH BANK NOW REMAINS HOSTILE. SUPPOSED MORTAR POSITIONS ON CAN THANH ISLAND HAVE BEEN NEUTRALIZED BY THE ARVN PRESENCE, THEREBY REDUCING THIS THREAT TO HOI AN AND THE CO 14 BASE.

4. (S) CO 14 UNITS ARE OPERATING IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARVN TROOPS NOW DEPLOYED AND WITH IMPROVED WEATHER/SEA CONDITIONS IT IS INTENDED THAT PCF'S FROM BINH WILL AGAIN BE DEPLOYED, RESEMBLING TO HOI AN. CO 14 UNITS WILL BE ON STBY AND FURTHER PACIFICATION OF THE RIVER AND ITS SOUTH BANK. THE POSSIBILITY OF OPERATING BEYOND HOI AN IS NOT CONSIDERED FEASIBLE IN THE CURRENT DEPTHS IN THE AREA.

5. (U) WE ARE MONITORING POSSIBLE CO 14 UNITS AND DRAFT PERS FOR SOME ACTION IN THAT AREA.

6. (U) WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO COOP WORK WITH YOUR UNITS THIS AREA IF APPROPRIATE.

G-4

BT

SECRET
#12

SECRET

P 130938Z FEB 69
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO RHMMAFA/CG THIRD MAF
 INFO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS
 BT

S E C R E T

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN STILWELL FROM MAJGEN DAVIS
 OPCON 3D MAR MINUS
 A. YOUR 121150Z

1. PENDING DECISION CONCERNING RETURN OF 3D MAR MINUS REQ TEMPORARY LOAN OF TWO RIFLE COMPANIES FOR EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT OVER TET HOLIDAY PERIOD.
2. MAJ DE, NEWLY ARRIVED SECTOR CHIEF, HAS PREPARED NEW PLAN FOR DEFENSE INSIDE QUANG TRI CITY WHICH IS VERY SOUND BUT REQUIRES AUGMENTATION BY US ELEMENTS IF IT IS TO BE FULLY EFFECTIVE ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. I AM PROVIDING TWO COMPANIES FROM MY LIMITED RESOURCES IN VIEW OF MY CONTINUING CONCERN OVER THE INTERNAL DEFENSES IN QUANG TRI.
3. WITH THE CONTINUATION OF DEWEY CANYON IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO FRAGMENT REMAINING FORCES TO PROVIDE MINIMUM SCREEN FOR THE

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 1508 S E C R E T

CUA VIET, FOR THE AREA NORTH OF DONG HA, FOR CAM LO/MAI LOC, AND FOR DOZER CLEARING OPERATIONS IN THE LEATHERNECK SQUARE AND A-2 AREA. TEMPORARY LOAN OF TWO RIFLE COMPANIES FROM THE 3D MAR, WHICH I UNDERSTAND ARE BEING PLACED IN A STAND DOWN, REHAB POSTURE, WOULD HELP TO OFFSET THE PRESENT FRAGMENTED POSTURE IN KEY QUANG TRI PROVINCE AREAS.

4. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PROVISION OF 3D MAR COMPANIES WOULD BE TO SUGGEST TO GEN TRUONG THAT HE REDUCE HIS PRESENT COMMITMENT OF FOUR ARVN BATTALIONS IN OHIO RAPID/DEWEY CANYON AND RETURN THEM TO THE DONG HA, QUANG TRI AREA PRIOR TO TET.
5. WARM REGARDS:

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

0724

ZNY CCCCC
 R 111544Z FEB 69
 FM CMC
 TO CG FMFPAC
 CG THIRD MAF
 CG FIRST MAF
 CG FIRST MARDIV
 CG THIRD MARDIV
 CG FORLOGCOMD
 CG NINTH MAB
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 LT GEN BUSE, MGEN YOUNGDALE, MGEN QUILTER, MGEN SIMPSON,
 MGEN DAVIS, BGEN FEELEY AND BGEN WILLIAMS FROM GEN CHAPMAN.
 THIRD MAF TAKE FOR ACTION PASS TO FORLOGCOMD.
 PERSONAL EFFECTS OF DECEASED AND MEDEVAC MARINES (U).
 A. MY 231707Z OCT 68.
 1. (U) BY REF A I DISCUSSED SUBJ PROBLEM AND ASKED FOR MORE STRINGENT
 PROCEDURES IN THE HANDLING OF PERSONAL EFFECTS.
 2. (U) GEN ABRAMS RECENTLY BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION TWO SPECIFIC CASES
 OF INORDINATE DELAY AT THE UNIT LEVEL AND APPARERS INADEQUATE CUSTODIAL

PAGE TWO RUYHSDD0023 CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 PROCEDURES INVOLVING THE PERSONAL EFFECTS OF DECEASED MARINES.
 3. (UU) THIS VITAL AREA CONTINUES TO BE DESERVING OF YOUR PERSONAL
 ATTENTION AND THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF YOUR SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS.

GP-4

III MAF 001 (REV. 11-64)

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CC	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#14

CONFIDENTIAL

PT007583
 POTCZYUH RUABOMA0227 0450000-CCCC--RHMAFA.
 DE RUABOL #6144 0450256
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 140256Z FEB 69
 FM CG NINTH MAB
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 INFO ZEN/DEPCURFMFPAC (FWD)
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 PERSONAL FOR BGEN HOFFMAN, INFO BGEN WEBSTER FROM WILLIAMS
 A. CG III MAF 130950Z FEB69
 1. (CJNL WILL MEET YOU WITH HELO ON ARRIVAL NAHA 18 FEB AS
 SCHEDULED REF A AND PROCEED KADENA. TWO SETS OF HEIRLOOM HAVE
 BEEN PLACED IN PROTECTED STATUS PENDING YOUR INSPECTION.
 2. (C) ON COMPLETION KADENA TASK, PLAN HELO TO COURTNEY FOR
 SHIFT OF UNIFORM, THEN ONWARD TO NAHA TO CONNECT WITH NW 4.
 3. (U) GREETINGS TO ROSS AND WARM REGARDS.
 GP-4
 BT
 #6144

26

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#15	

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM LTJEN STILLWELL CG XXIV CORPS		DATE 15 FEB 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 141717Z FEB 69		COPY# 1, 2, 3, 4 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		EYES ONLY	
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. <i>This is Gen Stilwells reply to message from Gen Abrams. Gen Gettys sent a message to Gen Stilwell (We Don't Hold). Gen Stilwell prepared his own reply</i> <i>JR</i> <i>D</i>	
3	DCG		15 Feb				
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	I					
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	I	15 FEB		RJH		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

16
SECRET

O 141717Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM LTC STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN
 INFO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DNG
 MG GETTYS CG AMERICAL DIV (PLEASE PASS ALSO TO PSA QUANG NGAI)
 S E C R E T PHB 0277 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: TERRORISM AT SA HUYNH REFUGEE CAMP
 REF MAC 1906 (S)

1. THIS CONSTITUTES THE EXPLANATION, DIRECTED BY REFERENCE MESSAGE, AS TO HOW REPORTED INCIDENT COULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN DAYLIGHT, WITHOUT LOCAL RESISTANCE AND WITHOUT REACTION BY FRIENDLY FORCES.
2. THE FIRST RELEVANT POINT IS THAT THERE WAS AN ERROR IN REPORTING. THE INCIDENT OCCURRED BETWEEN DUSK AND 2000 HOURS ON THE NIGHT OF 11 FEB. ENTRY WAS COVERT, THE VC GROUP MINGLING WITH PERSONNEL RETURNING FROM FIELDS TO REFUGEE CAMP. THE VC GROUP APPARENTLY SURPRISED A SELF-DEFENSE ELEMENT AS IT WAS READYING FOR ITS NIGHT'S DUTIES. THE VC TOOK CUSTODY OF FOUR CSDF PERSONNEL (TWO LATER ESCAPED) AND SEVEN WEAPONS, AND IMMEDIATELY EXFILTRATED TO POINTS UNKNOWN. THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT COMMOTION. THE VILLAGE CHIEF HIMSELF LEARNED OF THE INCIDENT AFTER THE FACT. THE OTHER AND SIZEABLE GVN FORCES IN THE AREA (SEE BELOW) REMAINED UNAWARE OF THE INCIDENT FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD.
3. A SECOND RELEVANT POINT IS THAT, THANKS TO EFFECTIVE LIAISON WITH THE DUC PHO DISTRICT, THE 11TH

IB WAS PROMPTLY NOTIFIED OF THE INCIDENT AND WAS PREPARED TO REACT IMMEDIATELY IF INTERVENTION DESIRED. VILLAGE CHIEF REPORTED INCIDENT TO DUC PHO DISTRICT, WHICH PASSED WORD (ALBEIT GARBLED) TO 11TH BRIGADE HQ AT 112005 HOURS. INITIAL REPORT WAS SIMPLY THAT VC WERE IN SA-HUYNH VILLAGE. COL DONALDSON CALLED SUB-SECTOR ADVISOR AND STATED D/1X20 BN, LOCATED IN SA-HUYNH VICINITY, WAS PREPARED TO HELP. ADVISOR INFORMED COL DONALDSON THAT SITUATION WELL IN HAND AND NO ASSISTANCE NEEDED.

#16(1)

16(1)

4. A THIRD RELEVANT POINT IS THAT THE VILLAGE OF SA-HUYNH IS IN A HEAVILY CONTESTED AREA, IS ITSELF LESS THAN SECURE (WHATEVER THE HES MAY SAY) AND IS IMPERFELY ORGANIZED FOR EFFECTIVE DEFENSE (PARTICULARLY INTERNAL). SA-HUYNH, IN THE TOUGHEST PART OF DUC PHO, HAS SWELLED FROM 7,000 TO 11,000 INHABITANTS OVER PAST YEAR. BULK OF INCREASE REPRESENTS POPULATION OF REFUGEE CAMP, AN INTEGRAL PART OF BUILT-UP AREA. RF COMPANY, IN AN OUTPOST ON HIGH GROUND OVERLOOKING SA-HUYNH, CONTRIBUTES NOMINALLY TO OVERALL SECURITY; COMPANY IS COMPOSED OF MONTAGNARDS AND I AM INFORMED RELATIONS WITH VILLAGE ARE LIMITED. SIGNIFICANTLY, THERE ARE NO POPULAR FORCES IN SA-HUYNH AREA. BUT, EQUALLY SIGNIFICANT, TWO COMPLETE RD TEAMS, BOASTING 118 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, ARE POSITIONED THERE. ACCORDING TO FORMULA, STEPS HAD BEEN TAKEN TO DEVELOP SELF DEFENSE FORCE FROM POPULATION OF REFUGEE CAMP AND 18 WEAPONS ISSUED; THESE WERE VC TARGET. ALL RD CADRE MUST HAVE BEEN IN ANOTHER PART OF VILLAGE (A GOOD QUESTION IS WHY) BECAUSE THEY WERE UNAWARE OF INCIDENT FOR INDETERMINATE LENGTH OF TIME AFTERWARD.

5. ON MORNINL FOLLOWING INCIDENT, 12 FEB, COL DONALDSON PROCEEDED TO SA-HUYNH WITH DISTRICT CHIEF, SUB SECTOR ADVISOR AND CO 1/20 INF BN. ONLY THEN WAS NATURE OF INCIDENT ASCERTAINED. MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL IN SA-HUYNH FAR FROM IMPRESSIVE. DONALDSON STRUCK BY FACT THAT NUMBER OF YOUNGSTERS CARRYING WEAPONS (WHETHER RD CADRE, SDF OR BOTH) HAD NO ID CARDS; GVN OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGED REGISTRATION FAR FROM COMPLETE. NO CLUE AS TO WHERE VC BAND MIGHT HAVE GONE. SUBSEQUENTLY, ONE OF ABDUCTEES CHECKED IN TO PLATOON OF D/1/20, REPORTED HE'D ESCAPED, AND LED PLATOON TO AREA WHERE HE'D ALLEGEDLY BEEN HELD. PLATOON FOUND NUMEROUS CAVES AND TUNNELS BUT NO TRACE OF VC. A SECOND ABDUCTEE EVENTUALLY TURNED UP.

6. GIVEN THE DISPATCH WITH WHICH THE FOUR MEN WERE BUNDLED OFF, THERE IS STRONG SUSPICION THAT ONE OR MORE OF THE SDF WERE VC PENETRATION AGENTS--OBVIOUSLY COULD BE EITHER RETURNEES OR MISSING. NATIONAL POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH IS INVESTIGATING.

7. MUCH NEEDS TO BE DONE TO CREATE AN EFFECTIVE INTERNAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN SA-HUYNH; AND ACTION RESIDES, IN MAIN, WITH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS. WE ARE ASSURED BY GENERAL GETTYS THAT AMERICAL WILL PROVIDE ALL REASABLE ASSISTANCE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER 0730 15 FEB
700

#16(2)

SECRET

J RHMHFA RHMMFA
 DE RUEBHOA7323 0451747
 PAC - I - MAF
 NY SSSSS
 O 141741Z FEB 69
 FM CMC
 TO RHMHFA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO FHMMAFA/CG III MAF

ZEN/CG NINTH MAB

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO LTGEN CUSHMAN
 AND BGEN WILLIAMS FROM GEN CHAPMAN

SEA PROGRAM 6 REALIGNMENT (S)

A. CG III MAF 210704Z NOV 68 (S) NOTAL

VB. CINCPAC 040405Z DEC (S) NOTAL

C. CMC 150050Z JAN69 (S) SPECAT NOTAL

D. CG FMFPAC 050245Z FEB 69 (S) NOTAL

1. (S) BY REF A BOB CUSHMAN PROVIDED COMUSMACV WITH A SCHEDULE FOR
 WITHDRAWAL OF SPECIFIC UNITS FROM SVN TO OKINAWA AND JAPAN. THIS
 REQUEST WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SUPPORTED BY REF B. BY REF C YOU WERE
 ADVISED THAT THE JCS WERE GOING TO RECLAMA THE DEPSEDEF 21 NOVEMBER
 DECISION WHICH PRECLUDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF MARINE CORPS UNITS FROM
 SVN. REF C ALSO ASKED THAT BOB CUSHMAN INITIATE ACTION TO CADRE
 AND EFFECT MANNING LEVEL REDUCTIONS IN CERTAIN DESIGNATED UNITS. BY

AGE TWO RUEBHOA7323 S E C R E T SPECATE EXCLUSIVE FOR
 REF D, AUTHORITY WAS REQUESTED TO TRANSFER FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN
 SPACES FROM MCC 159 TO MCC 167 FOR AIRFIELD SECURITY PURPOSES.

2. (S) AS A RESULT OF THE JCS RECLAMA SECDEF PUBLISHED A DECISION ON
 5 FEB WHICH IS QUOTED IN PART FOR YOUR INFORMATION AS FOLLOWS:

" I APPRECIATE THE CONCERN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF... AND I WOULD
 BE HAPPY TO CONSIDER DEPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT REQUESTS ALONG THE
 LINES INDICATED... IN PARTICULAR:

" A. THE MARINE CORPS FORCE STRUCTURE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS NOT
 "FROZEN," AND THE JCS ARE ENCOURAGED TO RECOMMEND WHATEVER ADJUSTMENTS
 THEY BELIEVE NECESSARY."

" B. I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADJUST-
 MENTS THROUGH THE USUAL SOUTHEAST ASIA DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM ADJUSTMENT
 PROCEDURES."

3. (S) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I AM PLANNING TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING
 ACTIONS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE REQUEST FORWARDED BY REFERENCE A.

A. TO REQUEST AUTHORITY

(1) TO WITHDRAW THE VMFA SQUADRON AND ITS ASSOCIATED H&MS AND
 MABS DET FROM SVN AND REDEPLOY THEM TO JAPAN DURING MARCH 1969.

(2) TO WITHDRAW AND REDEPLOY THE BELOW LISTED UNITS DURING APRIL
 1969 AS INDICATED. (READ IN THREE COLUMNS)

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

SECRET

#17

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUEBHOA7323 S E C R E T SPECATE EXCLUSIVE FOR
 SEQUENCE UNIT DESTINATION

1	AT BNW	OKINAWA
1	AT BN(-)	OKINAWA
	AMTRACBN	OKINAWA
3	ARMD AMPHIB CO(-)	OKINAWA
4	MED TK CO REIN	OKINAWA
4	MED TK CO REIN	OKINAWA
5	WERS	JAPAN

B. TO REQUEST APPROVAL FOR AN APPROPRIATE CEILING INCREASE IN OKINAWA AND JAPAN TO SUPPORT THE FOREGOING REDEPLOYMENTS.
 4. (S) WE MAY RECEIVE A FAVORABLE DECISION WITHIN THE NEXT THIRTY DAYS TO REDEPLOY, WITH A COMMENSURATE CEILING INCREASE, SOME IF NOT ALL OF THE UNITS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE. THIS DECISION COULD CREATE SPACES WHICH CAN BE UTILIZED BY BOB CUSHMAN TO IMPROVE THE MANNING OF REMAINING SVN UNITS OR TO MEET AIRFIELD SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. THEREFORE, I AM DEFERRING DECISION ON REF (D) UNTIL A DECISION ON THE REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITS FROM SVN IS RECEIVED.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4
 BI
 7323

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

#17

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM <i>COMUSMACV</i>		DATE <i>13 FEB 69</i>	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE <i>130128Z Feb 69</i>		COPY# OF COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
<i>3</i>	CG				<i>RMH</i>	REMARKS <i>MESSAGE from Gen Abrams to Gen Stilwell Re assault on refugees at SA HUYNH</i> <i>VR</i> <i>D</i>
<i>4</i>	DCG		<i>15 Feb</i>		<i>RMH</i>	
<i>1</i>	DCG AIR					
<i>2</i>	C/S	<i>I</i>			<i>RMH</i>	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
<i>1</i>	S/S	<i>I</i>	<i>15 FEB</i>		<i>RMH</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

18

SECRET

TO HQ 112 HQ
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO HQ
FROM HQ 112 HQ

BS 930225

010010Z FEB 68
FM HQ 112 HQ
TO HQ 112 HQ

S F E T HAS 1005 EYES ONLY
IT IS REPORTED TO ME THAT AT 120000 FEB, SIX VC
ENTERED SA-NUTCH REFUGEE CAMP ASSAULTED AND KILLED
TWO WALK CIVILIAN DEFENDERS, SEIZED ONE THOMPSON
SUB-MG AND SIX US CARTRIDGES AND THEN LEFT THE CAMP
TAKING TWO MORE CIVILIAN DEFENDERS WITH THEM ON THE
WAY OUT. NO SHOOTING, NO DAMAGE, NO FRIENDLY REACTION,
ALL THIS DONE IN DAYLIGHT. PLEASE PROVIDE ME WITH AN
EXPLANATION.

INFO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
PASS TDF-4 AND TDF-1 TO HQ
INFOINTEA. THIS MSG SHOWN TO BE DULLING

133

SECRET

#18

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM GOMNAVFORV		DATE 15 FEB 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 140649Z FEB 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG				lo	REMARKS EXCLUSIVE FOR
3	DCG	HAS	See			
1	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I	HAS	See		
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	16 FEB		PHH	
	G-1	HAS	See			
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP.					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL #19

CONFIDENTIAL

R 140649Z FEB 69
FM COMNAVFORV
TO CG III MAF
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG
BT

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT
EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN CUSHMAN AND RADM BONNER FROM ZUMWALT

BLACK MARKET ACTIVITY DANANG (U)

A. COMNAVSUPACT DANANG 120601Z FEB 69.

1. (C) I SHARE COMPLETELY THE CONCERN EXPRESSED BY REF A., AND CONCUR THAT VIGOROUS ACTION IS NEEDED TO CONTROL THIS ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN STOLEN MERCHANDISE THAT HAS REACHED UNACCEPTABLY HIGH PROPORTIONS. THIS PROBLEM, AS YOU WELL KNOW, IS NOT PECULIAR TO THE DANANG AREA, BUT IS NATIONAL IN ITS SCOPE. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE THE TOTAL IMPACT THAT BLACK MARKET ACTIVITY HAS ON THE MILITARY

EFFORT AND THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF VIETNAM, BUT ONE CAN SAFELY ASSUME THAT IS IS ALL PERVASIVE, AFFECTING EVERY LEVEL OF LIFE AND DISRUPTING NOT JUST THE ALLIED MILITARY EFFORT, BUT THE WHOLE NATION-BUILDING PROCESS. THE CRACKING DOWN RECOMMENDED COULD WELL LEAD TO HIGH PLACES ON GOVERNMENT SIDE, AND IS OBVIOUSLY A SENSITIVE MATTER. THEREFORE, I WOULD URGE THAT BEFORE ANY COORDINATED ACTION IS TAKEN IN THE DANANG AREA THAT COMUSMACV BE REQUESTED TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH AMEMB SAIGON AS A NATIONAL PROBLEM, AND REQUIRING A NATIONAL APPROACH.

2. (U) BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT AF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SEPV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTCOL	PM
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#19

CONFIDENTIAL

R140619Z FEB 69

FM COMNAVFORV
TO CG 3 MAP
COMNAVSUPFACT DANANG**CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT**
EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN CUSHMAN AND RADM BONNER FROM ZUMWALT**BLACK MARKET ACTIVITY DANANG (U)**

A. COMNAVSUPFACT DANANG 120601Z FEB 69.

1.(C) I SHARE COMPLETELY THE CONCERN EXPRESSED BY REF A., AND CONCUR THAT VIGOROUS ACTION IS NEEDED TO CONTROL THIS ILLEGAL TRAFFIC IN STOLEN MERCHANDISE THAT HAS REACHED UNACCEPTABLY HIGH PROPORTIONS. THIS PROBLEM, AS YOU WELL KNOW, IS NOT PECULIAR TO THE DANANG AREA, BUT IS NATIONAL IN ITS SCOPE. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE THE TOTAL IMPACT THAT BLACK MARKET ACTIVITY HAS ON THE MILITARY EFFORT AND THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF VIETNAM, BUT ONE CAN SAFELY ASSUME THAT IT IS ALL PERVASIVE, AFFECTING EVERY LEVEL OF LIFE AND DISRUPTING NOT JUST THE ALLIED MILITARY EFFORT, BUT THE WHOLE NATION-BUILDING PROCESS. THE CRACKING DOWN RECOMMENDED COULD WELL LEAD TO HIGH PLACES ON GOVERNMENT SIDE, AND IS OBVIOUSLY A SENSITIVE MATTER. THEREFORE, I WOULD URGE THAT BEFORE ANY COORDINATED ACTION IS TAKEN IN THE DANANG AREA THAT COMUSMACV BE REQUESTED TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH AMEMB SAIGON AS A NATIONAL PROBLEM, AND REQUIRING A NATIONAL APPROACH.

2.(U) BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL**

#19

CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCFE295CZCYGA052

VZCZCLB298

PTTCZYUW RUYGSAF1131 0460120-CCCC--RUYPSYD.

ZNY CCCCC ZYD RUYGSHH

P 155120Z FEB 69

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO RUYPSYD/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR LIGEN CUSHMAN FROM VADM B8NGLE

NGFS YW ASSIGNMENT (U)

W. OKG III MAF DNG RVN 141736Z FEB 69

1. FLAGSHIP ASSIGNMENT TO HUE AREA 18-20 FEB COMPATIBLE WITH OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS. WE ARE PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO HELP.

2. BEST REGARDS

GP-4

BT

1131

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									20

CONFIDENTIAL

Please Reply As FOLs

1. CONCUR WITH ITINERARY EXCEPT REQUEST
^{OPPORTUNITY FOR}
~~TO~~ ~~BE~~ BRIEF COURTESY CALLS CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 AND CG 9TH MAB SUBJECT ^{TO} TOTAL CONCURRENCE
 AND ^{CONVICTION CS.} ~~CONVICTION CS.~~
2. IF TIME IS A FACTOR ^{IN SCHEDULING THESE CALLS} RECOMMEND DEWOTE
 THE TV INTERVIEW

 * C O N F I D E N T I A L *

JWS

PT008271
 PQTCZYUW RUABCM A0187 0460000-CCCC--RHMMAFA.
 DE RUABGL #1437 0460230
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 150230Z FEB 69
 FM CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 TO RHMMAFA/CG XII MAF
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 FOR BGEN HUBBARD

1. REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE WITH FOLLOWING PROPOSED ITINERARY
 FOR VISIT 19FEB69

- 19 FEB 1969 WED
 BREAKFAST AS DESIRED
 0940-0945 ENROUTE MCAF FUTEMA CONFERENCE ROOM (SEDAN)
 0945-1015 CONFERENCE WITH OKINAWA MARIVE ISO'S
 1015-1030 ENROUTE AFRT STUDIO (SEDAN)
 1030-1115 TOUR AFRT
 1115-1200 VIDEO TAPE INTERVIEW AFRT (SUBJECT = MARINE CORPS
 INFORMATION PROGRAM)
 1200-1215 ENROUTE MCAF FUTEMA
 1215- LUNCH AS DESIRED/FREE TIME

2. ABOVE TIMES CAN BE ADJUSTED AS DESIRED.

GP-4

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTD	POSTAL	PROTOCOI	Pm.
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SJP.	SURG.								#21	

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG FIRST MABDIV		DATE 17 FEB 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 170405Z FEB 69		COPY# 1 of 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I				REMARKS
4	DCG	I	17 Feb			
	DCG AIR					
7	C/S	I				
8	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	17 FEB		EMH	<p>EXCLUSIVE</p> <p>FOR</p> <p><i>No action Regd</i></p>
	G-1					
5	G-2					
	G-3		16 Feb			
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

S/S-2

SECRET #23

SECRET

PP RHMAFA
 DE RUMHA 2058 0480405
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 170409Z FEB 69
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV
 TO CG III MAF

BT

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGAN DOOLLY FROM MGEN SIMPSON

A. III MAF 13155Z FEB 69

1. RESPONDING TO YOUR QUERY IT WOULD BE MY JUDGEMENT THAT THE ASSIGNMENT OF THIS ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON WOULD RELEASE NO MORE THAN ONE INFANTRY BATTALION IF ASSIGNED FIRST MARINES AO.
2. AS A FOLLOW ON, I THINK IT WOULD BE A MISUSE OF THE SPECIAL CAPABILITY OF THIS UNIT TO TIE IT TO THE FIRST MARINES AO. IN ADDITION IT COULD BE EMPLOYED IN AO OF THIRD BATTALION, SEVENTH MARINES AND 1ST BN 7TH MAR. AS FAR WEST AS THONG DUC AND IN AN HOI BASIN TO INCLUDE ARIZONA.
3. I REALIZE THIS IS PROBABLY NOT THE ANSWER SOUGHT BUT IT IS MY BEST JUDGEMENT. WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO HAVE THIS OUTFIT BUT I THINK IT SHOULD BE EMPLOYED AS INDICATED RATHER THAN ON A ONE-FOR-ONE REPLACEMENT BASIS.

GP-4

BT

2058

NNNN

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

#23

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR

P 210759Z FEB 69 ZFF6

FM TASK FORCE ALPHA NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI
TO RHMMAFA/III MAF DA NANG RVN
INFO RUMLSBN/XXIV CORPS PHU BAI RVN
RUMHVP/THIRD MARINE DIVISION DONG HA RVN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L C

FOR LT GEN CUSHMAN FROM BRIG GEN DYAS.

I AM PRESENTLY MAKING ARRANGEMENTS TO VISIT WITH VADM COUSINS,
CTF 77, ON 17 AND 18 MARCH. IF IT IS CONVENIENT TO YOUR SCHEDULE,
I WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE A DUAL PURPOSE VISIT AND ARRIVE AT YOUR
STATION EARLY ON THE MORNING OF THE 17TH TO SPEND SOME TIME WITH
YOU. WOULD ALSO VISIT THE XXIV CORPS AT PHU BAI, AND THE THIRD
MARINE DIVISION AT DONG HA, PRIOR TO DEPARTING DA NANG FOR THE
VISIT WITH CTF 77 ON THE EVENING OF THE 18TH. MY PARTY WILL CON-
SIST OF FIVE OFFICERS: MYSELF, MY AIDE, TWO REPRESENTATIVES FROM
OPERATIONS AND ONE FROM INTELLIGENCE. IF THIS PROGRAM MEETS WITH
YOUR APPROVAL I WILL HAVE MY PROJECT OFFICER WORK OUT THE FINAL
DETAILS WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVE. THIS MESSAGE IS DOWNGRADED
TO UNCLASSIFIED ON 20 MARCH.

BT

#0015

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-64)

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CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURC.								#24	

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM LTG STILWELL		DATE 22 FEB 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0220234Z		1,2, COPY# OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN OUT		INITIAL	
					SUBJECT SECRET PHB 0326 EYES ONLY	
3	CG	I			REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE CG WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION POSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.	
4	DCG	I				
5	DCG AIR	I				
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	ZZFEB			FW ANN
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

SECRET

#25

3 22 2342 ZVN 27771
 FM LTG STILWELL CC XVIV CORPS PMS
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DNG
 INFO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV GEN
 ZEM

SECRET

S E C R E T PMS 0326 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: RIF, NORTHWEST QUANG TRI

1. WEATHER PERMITTING, FSB ALPINE (XD 75532) WILL BE REOCCUPIED ON 22 FEB AND FSB ARGONKE (XD 875573) THE FOLLOWING DAY. RECONNAISSANCE/SEARCH OPERATIONS WILL BE CONCLUDED BY 1/4 MARINES. OPNS WILL INCLUDE AUTHORIZED LEVEL OF DMZ PATROLLING, SUPPLEMENTING FCB-1 INSERTS.
2. THERE ARE CERTAINLY SOME NVA IN THE A EA. ON 22 FEBRUARY, WE ATTEMPTED TO INSERT RECON TEAM ONTO FSB ARGONNE ONLY TO FIND ENEMY ON THE HILL. SUNSHIPS ACCOUNTED FOR SEVEN. INSERTS IN SAME GENERAL AREA, SCHEDULED FOR 21 FEB, ABORTED DUE WEATHER.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ON

Y.

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

152

SECRET

NNNN

#25

SECRET

220210Z FEB 69
 FM CTF SEVEN SIX
 TO RUHHQA/CINCPAC
 INFO RHMMA/COMUSMACV
 RUHNBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUHNFMA/CG FMF PAC
 RUHNSAF/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUYPSTYD/CG III MAF
 RUWJMSA/COMPHIBPAC
 RUSVB/CDR SEVENTH AF
 RUSV/DIRECTOR TACC SEVENTH AF
 RUWUFGD/CTG VEN SPX FT FOUR
 RUWFKU/CTG SEVEN SIX FT FIVE
 BT

S E C R E T LIMDIS PURPLE DRAGON
 CINCPAC ATTN J3C4

SECURITY OF ARG/SLF OPERATIONS (C)

- A. ADMIN CINCPAC 162127Z NOV 68 (NOTAL)
- B. MY 211056Z NOV 68 (NOTAL)
- C. COMUSMACV 220066Z NOV 68 (NOTAL)

PAGE TWO RUADHAG015 S E C R E T LIMDIS PURPLE DRAGON

1. (S) REF A REFERRED TO THE ARG/SLF NOTAM AS A PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED POTENTIAL SOURCE OF ENEMY FOR KNOWLEDGE OF ARG/SLF OPS AND REQUESTED STATUS OF COMUSMACV/CDR 7TH AF/CTF 76 NOTAM NEGOTIATION.
2. (S) IN RESPONSE TO REF A, REFS B AND C REPORTED STREAMLINING OF NOTAM TO REDUCE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE CONTENT, REDUCTION OF UNCLASSIFIED RELEASE LEAD TIME, AND AN EXTENDED RANGE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NOT THEN OPERATIONAL) FOR SAIGON AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER AS A POSSIBLE FACTOR IN ALTERING NOTAM DISSEMINATION PROCEDURES.
3. (S) SUBSEQUENT LIAISON BETWEEN ORIG, COMUSMACV, AND DIRECTOR TACC SEVENTH AF HAS RESULTED IN THE FOLLOWING MUTUALLY HELD CONCLUSIONS:
 - A. THE NOTAM REQUIREMENT DERIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION TREATIES AND IS THEREFORE ESSENTIALLY NOT NEGOTIABLE.
 - B. REDUCTION OF UNCLAS RELEASE LEAD TIME TO LESS THAN PRESENT FOUR HOURS WOULD SERIOUSLY DEGRADE EFFECTIVENESS IN THAT NOTAM INFO MUST BE TRANSMITTED TO OUT-OF-COUNTRY POINTS OF ORIGIN FOR DISSEMINATION TO FLIGHTS INBOUND TO RVN.
 - C. THE EXTENDED RANGE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM NOW OPERATIONAL IS A REMOTE TRANSMITTER EXTENSION OF SAIGON AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER GROUND-TO-AIR CONTROL CAPABILITY TO DANANG AND AS SUCH IS NOT A FACTOR IN EITHER NOTAM REQUIREMENT OR RELEASE TIME.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

26

SECRET

#26

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUADHAB0215 S E C R E T LINDIS PURPLE DRAGON

D. CONTENT OF UNCLAS NOTAM HAS BEEN FURTHER STREAMLINED AND ALL SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE ELIMINATED WHILE RETAINING SIMPLIFIED USABILITY BY AIRMEN. 3/EXAMPLE:

CHU LAI

EXTENSIVE AIR, NGF, AND ARTILLERY ACTIVITY HAZARDOUS TO FLIGHT 10 TO 15 MILES SE OF CHU LAI; AIRCRAFT DESIRING TO TRANSIT THIS AREA BELOW 10,000 FEET CONTACT ICEPACK ON 357.0 MHZ FOR CLEARANCE AND NGF/ARTILLERY ADVISORIES.

4. (S) THE NOTAM WAS USED AS A DECEPTION MEASURE IN OPN BOLD MARINER A CONSIDERABLY MORE EXPLICIT NOTAM FOR THE MODUC DEMONSTRATION AOA WAS RELEASED EIGHT HOURS PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF THE DEMONSTRATION, AND TRANSIENT AIRCRAFT WERE CONTROLLED WITHIN THE DEMO AIRSPACE ON A CLEAR VOICE NET BY THE AMPHIBIOUS TACTICAL AIR CONTROL CENTER UNTIL COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTUAL ASSAULT. THE SUBSEQUENT NOTAM FOR THE ACTUAL ASSAULT, ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL TO THE ABOVE EXAMPLE, WAS RELEASED FOUR HOURS PRIOR TO THE OPERATION. COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF ENEMY REACTIONS CLEARLY INDICATES THAT THE NOTAM, THUS APPLIED, DID NOT IN ANY WAY COMPROMISE THE OPERATION AND MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS OF THE DECEPTION.

5. (C) CINCPAC OPSEC REFS FULLY CONCURRED IN THE CONCLUSIONS IN PARA 3 DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH ORIG ON 20 JAN 69.

GP-4

WABIS

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 10 COPIES

SECRET
26

FM SSG IFY
 ZEN/GEN ABRAMS, COMUSMACV
 ZEN/LTG WILDREN, CG USARV
 INFO CG III MAF
 ZEN/LTG PEERS, CG, IFFV
 ZEN/LTG KERWIN, CG II FFV
 ZEN/LTG ECKHARDT, SA IV CTZ
 ZEN

CONFIDENTIAL NHT 2328 INTEL

COL AARON, CG, 5TH SFGA, SENDS EXCLUSIVE FOR CG III MAF

1. A HAI CHANH FORMER COMMUNIST CAPTAIN WHOSE RELIABILITY
 CAN NOT BE DETERMINED REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON 22
 FEB 69:

A. SAIGON WILL BE ATTACKED DURING NIGHT OF 22/23 FEB 69 AS
 FOLLOWS:

(1) 1ST SUBREGION FORCES; ATKS AGAINST HOC NON, BA DIEM, AND
 QUANG TRUNG MILITARY TRAINING CENTER.

(2) 2D SUBREGION FORCES; ATTKS WITH SIX (6) BNS AND ONE
 REGT OF 9TH NVA DIV AGAINST BINH CHANH, 6TH PRE-
 CINCT, AND TGTS LOCATED IN SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE TOWN.

(3) 3D SUBREGION FORCES; ATKS WITH SIX (6) INF BNS AGAINST
 CAU KHUOI, CAU CHUY, AND CAU NHI THIEN DUONG.

(4) SUBREGION FORCES; ATKS CAT LAI PHAM THANH GIANG BRIDGE,
 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HOUSE, AND THE INDEPENDENCE PALACE.

(5) 5TH SUBREGION FORCES; ATKS ON GIA DINH SECTOR AND
 THEN FORWARD TO SAIGON FOR SUPPORT TO THE 4TH SUBREGION FORCES.

(6) 6TH SUBREGION FORCES AND COMMANDOS HAVE
 PENETRATED SAIGON WITH 1500 MEN, WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND EX-
 PLOSIVES.

B. TAN SON NHUT AIRPORT WILL BE BOMBARDED AND DESTROYED
 BEFORE OPENING THE ATK.

C. ENEMY UNITS ARE PREPARING FOR FIVE DAYS OF DRY RATIONS.
 IDENTIFICATION SIGNS DURING THE ATK WILL BE WHITE OR RED HAND-
 KERCHIEFS TIED ON LEFT HAND.

2. THIS INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO S2, 5TH SFGA BY VNSFHC, G2
 KIASION OFFICER AT 2345 HOURS, 22 FEB 69.

SP-4

SSG NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO GEN ABRAMS; ALL OTHER
 ADDRESSEES DELIVER MAKING HOURS

395

CONFIDENTIAL

#27

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM BTG STILLWELL		DATE 23 FEB 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 221648Z		1,2,3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET PHB 0332 EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S	I			Hand Seen	
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
	S/S	X	23 Feb		TSW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

SECRET

#28

O 221048Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4
 FM LTC STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 TO LTC CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 INFO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 MG DAVIS CG 3D MAR DIV
 ZEM
 S E C R E T PHO 0332 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: DEWEY CANYON BORDER INCIDENT
 PART I

1. ON THE NIGHT OF 21/22 FEBRUARY, H/2/9 MARINES MOVED SOUTH FROM ITS POSITION ON THE THEORETIC VN/LAOTIAN BORDER FOR A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER TO YO 148028. AT 220240H, ELEMENTS OF THE COMPANY AMEUSHED AN NVA TRUCK COLUMN MOVING FROM EAST TO WEST ON ROUTE 922, DESTROYING THREE LARGE TRUCKS (INCLUDING ONE FULL OF AMMUNITION WHICH CONTINUED TO EXPLODE UNTIL DAYLIGHT), KILLING AT LEAST TEN ENEMY AND EFFECTIVELY BLOCKING THE ROAD. THIS MISSION ACCOMPLISHED, THE COMPANY WITHDREW NORTHWARD TO THE MILITARY CREST OF THE HILL, WITHIN 200 METERS OF THE BORDER, ESTABLISHING AN OP FROM WHICH POINT 922 COULD BE OBSERVED AND AIR/ARTILLERY FIRES DIRECTED THEREON.

2. IN DIRECTING THE H/2/9 ACTION, THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER ACTED, IN HIS ESTIMATE, UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF PARA 58 AND 59 OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT GOVERNING THE LAOTIAN BORDER (COMUSMACV, DTG 120724Z FEB 69. HIS SPECIFIC REASONS, AS I LEARNED FIRST HAND FROM HIM LATE THIS AFTERNOON, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:

A. ROUTE 922 RUNS AT RIGHT ANGLES TO THE REGIMENTAL ZONE OF ADVANCE AND JUST BEYOND THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER.

B. BULK OF BOTH 1/9 AND 2/9 HAVE BEEN IN CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY, AT OR IMMEDIATELY NORTH OF THE BORDER.

C. AIR AND ARTILLERY FIRES HAVE NOT DENIED THE ENEMY USE OF ROUTE 922, FOR RESUPPLY AND/OR REINFORCEMENT OF ENGAGED FORCES.

D. ADDITIONALLY, INTELLIGENCE INTERCEPTS, OVER SEVERAL DAYS, HAVE CONFIRMED ENEMY INTENTIONS TO RESIST STRONGLY ON GROUND AND DISPLACE ARTILLEY FROM THE IMMEDIATE BATTLE AREA WEST ALONG ROUTE 922 TO SECURE POSITIONS FROM WHICH FIRES COULD BE DIRECTED AT THE 9TH MARINES.

E. THUS, POSITIVE BLOCKING OF ROUTE 922 WOULD REDUCE THE WEIGHT OF GROUND ACTION AND ATTACK BY FIRE AGAINST BOTH ENGAGED MARINE BATTALIONS.

*28(1)

28(1)

3. AT MID-AFTERNOON, I DISPATCHED A MESSAGE TO BG GARRETSON (ACTING DIVISION COMMANDER) AND COLONEL BARROW (CO, 9TH MARINES) WHICH IN ESSENCE STATED THAT:

A. I CONCLUDED, ON THE BASIS OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION, THAT HIS INITIATIVE TO PROTECT THE FLANKS OF 1/9 AND 2/9 (-) WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE PROMULGATED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

B. THE LIMITED OBJECTIVE HAVING BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, W/2/9, IF NOT ALREADY WITHDRAWN, SHOULD BE QUICKLY REPOSITIONED NORTHWARD TO THE MILITARY CREST OF THE RIDGE ALONG WHICH THE BORDER RUNS.

4. PER THE MESSAGE CITED IN PARAGRAPH 2, I INDORSED AND ASSUMED FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ORDERS OF CO, 9TH MARINES.

PART II

5. THE LARGER QUESTION IS THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE DIRECTION OF OPERATIONS DENEY CANYON. THE 1ST AND 2D BATTALIONS, WHOSE COMPANIES ARE AT OR IMMEDIATELY NORTH OF THE BORDER, HAVE OVERRUN A NUMBER OF ENEMY INSTALLATIONS (AS YET UNEXPLORED), ARE IN THE MIST OF OTHERS, AND STILL OTHER SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS ARE DIRECTLY AHEAD. THE ENEMY IS RESISTING WITH TENACITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE 1/9 SECTOR, AS WOUNDED MARINES INFORMED ME TODAY. THEY AND OTHERS REPORT CONSIDERABLE ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES AT THE BORDER (WE ARE REALLY IN THE MIST OF BASE AREA 611) WITH WHICH OUR MARINES, UNDER PRESSURE, CANNOT NOW COPE. THE BATTLE IS RAGING THROUGHOUT THIS NIGHT. ELEMENTS OF 3/9 MARINES, ATOP AND SOUTH OF TIGER MOUNTAIN (YD 25 09) PHYSICALLY INTERDICT ROUTE 922 WHERE IT DEBOUCHES INTO THE A SHAU, BUT WEST THEREOF, THE ENEMY CAN USE ROUTE 922 AND ITS FEEDERS FOR LATERAL MOVEMENT--ALBEIT WITH DIFFICULTY--UNLESS AND UNTIL PHYSICALLY INTERDICTED.

28(2)

28(2)

6. THE ABOVE IS ONE SIDE OF THE COIN; THERE IS ANOTHER. AS A RESULT OF ONE OF THE SPECTACULAR TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE BREAKTHROUGHS OF THIS CONFLICT, WE KNOW THAT THE OPPOSING FORCES ARE DISORGANIZED, DEMORALIZED, HUNGRY AND FRIGHTENED. IT HAS BEEN A LONG TIME SINCE WE HAVE OPERATED IN THE MIDDLE OF AN ENEMY'S REAR SERVICE AREA AND BROUGHT GROUND WEAPONS TO BEAR ON HIS COMMUNISM. MY CONSIDERATION IS THE SAFETY OF OUR TROOPS. AS COLONEL BARROW PUTS IT BLUNTLY, "IF GROUND INTERDICTION OF ROUTE 922 IS NOT AUTHORIZED, MY TROOPS SHOULD NOT BE HERE." SUCH POSITIVE INTERDICTION COULD BE EFFECTED WERE AUTHORITY GRANTED FOR SELECTED ADVANCE SOUTH TO THE EAST-WEST 02 GRID LINE--A DISTANCE NOT EXCEEDING TWO KILOMETERS FROM THE BORDER AT ANY POINT; I SUBSTITUTE THIS FOR THE LARGER RECOMMENDATION THAT GENERAL ABRAMS IS NOW WEIGHING.

3. ALTERNATIVELY, IF DEPLOYMENT CAN BE EFFECTED 23 OR 24 FEBRUARY, IT IS POSSIBLE, BUT ONLY POSSIBLE, THAT SOG TEAMS CAN ACCOMPLISH THE INTERDICTION MISSION; I WOULD MUCH PREFER GROUND LAUNCH THROUGH OUR FRONT LINES BUT SOG PENCHANT IS FOR HELO INSERT.

9. MEANWHILE, WE PRAY FOR FAIR WEATHER (ONLY EMERGENCY FLIGHTS COMPLETED THESE LAST TWO DAYS).

12. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
999

28(3)

NNNN

SECRET

28(3)

CONFIDENTIAL

CCN 087 FILE SJ

		FROM CG FMFPAC	DATE 23 FEB 69
		SERIAL# 222047Z FEB 69	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT FMFPAC REBUILD PROGRAM FOR SECTION M	
23 FEB 69	<i>R. M. Hunter</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE
23 Feb 69	<i>T. Woodham</i>		
23 Feb 69	<i>[Signature]</i>		
24 Feb 69	<i>J. D. Henderson</i>		
EXCLUSIVE			
FOR			
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY			
TOR	222325Z FEB 69		
S/S	COPIES 1,2,3 OF 3 COPIES		
	MAT AND TAPE		

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT
SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

CONFIDENTIAL

#29

CONFIDENTIAL

PP RHMAFA
 DE RUHMFMA 3166 0532047
 ZNY CCCCC
 P-222047Z FEB 69
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL, SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN FROM
 LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

FMFPAC REBUILD PROGRAM FOR SECTION "M" (U)

- A. CG III MAF 210228Z/FEB69
- B. THIRD FORSERVREGI 180639Z/FEB69 (PASEP)

1. I NOTE FROM REF A THAT YOU HAVE REQUESTED CERTAIN
 ACTIONS FROM PWC YOKOSUKA. WHILE I APPLAUD THE INITIATIVE,
 SUCH REQUESTS CAN ONLY SERVE TO CONFUSE PWC YOKOSUKA AS TO
 CONTROL OF THE WESTPAC REBUILD PROGRAM. THE WESTPAC CONTROL
 AGENCY FOR THE REBUILD PROGRAM IS 3RD FSR, UNDER THE DIRECTION
 OF MY HQ.

2. BY COINCIDENCE, 3RD FSR IN REF B REQUESTED VERY SIMILAR
 INFORMATION FROM PWC YOKOSUKA. ACCORDINGLY, I WOULD APPRECIATE
 YOUR REQUESTING PWC YOKOSUKA TO FURNISH THEIR REPLY TO YOUR
 REF A TO 3RD FSR VICE III MAF. I WILL ASSURE THAT 3RD FSR
 PROVIDES A RESPONSE TO YOUR HQ. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

3166

III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 13 OF 3 COPIES

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CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SERV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.								#29	

2-001 132 271 255-3
 TO GEN BROWN CDR 7AF SAIGON
 LTG CUSHMAN CG II MAF DA NANG
 LTG PEERS CG IFFV NHA TRANG
 LTG KERWIN CG II FFV LONG BINH
 MAGI ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON
 MAG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS CAN THO
 INFO LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS PHU BAI
 ZET

SECRET TAG 2359 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: OPERATIONAL REPORTING

1. (S) I AM DISSATISFIED WITH THE REPORTING FROM YOUR COMMANDS DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD. DECISIONS OF GREAT MOMENT DEPEND ON THAT REPORTING. SUCCESS IN GETTING THINGS DONE HINGE ON HAVING THE FACTS IN THIS HEADQUARTERS; THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE HERE FORMS THE BASIS FOR IMPORTANT RECOMMENDATIONS TO HIGHER AUTHORITY. WITHOUT THE FACTS, EITHER THERE CAN BE NO MEANINGFUL RECOMMENDATIONS OR THEY ARE INADEQUATELY SUPPORTED.

2. (S) IT IS A MATTER OF CRITICAL NECESSITY IN THE DAYS AHEAD THAT THERE BE A DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT IN TIMELY AND FACTUAL REPORTING. SEE TO IT!

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

230

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM MG CORCORAN		DATE 24 FEB 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 240010Z	1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
						MAC 2381 EYES ONLY
4	CG					REMARKS
5	DCG		24 Feb			
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I	2/24	2/24		for GED
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	X	24 Feb			
	G-1					
	G-2					
3	G-3	A	2/24	2/24		WILCO
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

#32

Z 240610Z ZYH ZFF-1
 FM MG CORCORAN C/S MACV
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 LTG PEERS CG I FFV
 LTG KERWIN CG II XXV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 2381 EYES ONLY
 REFERENCE MAC 2377.

REQUEST A SUMMARY SIMILAR TO THE ONE REQUESTED IN
 REFERENCE BE FURNISHED THIS HEADQU

ARTERS. THQKUMMARY
 SHOULD BE AS OF 241200H AND MUST BE IN THIS HEADQUARTERS
 NO LATER THAN 241500H.

SSTBNOTE: DELIVER IMMDFIAHKLY
 100

CONFIDENTIAL

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#32

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM MG CONCORAN COPS MACV		DATE 21 FEB 69	
			SERIAL N/CONTROL DATE 0 240850Z		1,2,3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					CONFIDENTIAL MAC 2408 EYES ONLY
	DCG					
3	DCG AIR					REMARKS ①
1	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	24 FEB			EMH
	G-1					
	G-2					NEW DRUGS Took DTG copy - noted
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

copy to
xg 2
g3
Done
Done

5/5-39

CONFIDENTIAL

#33

O 240302 ZYH ZFF-1
 FM MG CORCORAN OOPS SACV
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 LTG PEERS CG I FFV
 LTG KERWIN CG II FFV
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL MAC 2408 EYES ONLY
 REFERENCES: A. MAC 2377, DTG 231830Z FEB 69.
 B. MAC 2381, DTG 240010Z FEB 69.

1. (C) REPORTS FURNISHED IN RESPONSE TO THE REFERENCES WERE MOST HELPFUL TO COMUSMACV. FOR THAT REASON, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THEY BE SUBMITTED DAILY AS OF 1200H AND ARRIVE IN THIS HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAN 1500H.
 2. (C) THESE REPORTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE FURNISHED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE DURING THE CURRENT PERIOD OF INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY.
- GP-4.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

159

CONFIDENTIAL

#33

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABRAMS		DATE 24 FEB 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 241210Z	1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT OPERATIONAL REPORTING EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS (1)
	DCG					THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED
3	DCG AIR					THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED
2	C/S	I				THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED
	DC/S					THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	24 FEB		FGWEMH	
	G-1					
3	G-2					THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED
7	G-3					THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

#34

LTJG BROWN CDR 7AF SAIGON
 LTJG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DA NANG
 LTJG PEERS CG IFFV NHA TRANG
 LTJG KEVIN CG II FFV LONG BINH
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAF RV SAIGON
 CG ECKHART SA IV CORPS CAN TRU
 INFO LTJG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS THU BAI
 SEN
 C/O M F I D E N T I A L MAC 2422 EYES ONLY
 REF: MAC 2369, DTG 231049Z FEB 69, SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL
 REPORTING.

1. (C) THE SITUATION REPORTS THAT YOU HAVE SUBMITTED TO ME SUBSEQUENT TO THE REFERENCED MESSAGE HAVE BEEN TIMELY, COMPLETE, AND FACTUAL. THIS HAS BEEN A DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT. THE INFORMATION FURNISHED HAS BEEN UTILIZED BY AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND MYSELF IN IMPORTANT MESSAGES TO HIGHER AUTHORITY.
 2. (C) AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE REQUESTED A DAILY REPORT ON THE SITUATION WITHIN EACH OF YOUR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. KEEP UP THE TIMELY REPORTS AND I AM SURE THAT WE WILL BE IN THE BEST POSITION TO RESPOND TO THE SITUATION AND TO MAKE THE PROPER RECOMMENDATIONS TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.
- GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

200

MMHM


CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

FORM 8210 (REV 5-60)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COMZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM MAJ GEN CORCORAN		DATE 24 FEB 69	
			SERIAL/CONTROL DATE 23 1830Z		1,2,3 COPY OF 4 COMES REC?	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TOP SECRET MAC 2377 EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG			Has seen		REMARKS answered 280600
2	DCG		24 Feb		JK	
3	DCG AIR					
1	C/S	I			12	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S	X	2/24		FW	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	SEC					


TOP SECRET

Z POLICE UNIT 75-1
FM HQ OF MORGAN
TO LTG CUSHMAN III WAF
LT GEN STILLWELL CG XXIV CORPS
LTG PEERS CG I FFV
LTG KERWIN CG II FFV
MG EDWARDS SA IV CORPS
ZEE

TOP SECRET MAC 2377 EYES ONLY

COMUSMACV HAS EXPRESSED HIS DISSATISFACTION WITH THE
REPORTING SYSTEM AND HAS DISPATCHED A MESSAGE TO THIS EFFECT TO YOU.

WE REQUIRE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EVENTS SINCE 2400Z 23 FEB TO
ARRIVE IN THIS HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAN 0600Z 24 FEB. SPECIFICALLY,
① WHAT IS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF WHAT THE ENEMY HAS DONE ② WHAT HE IS CAPABLE
OF DOING ③ ENEMY INTENTIONS AS YOU SEE THEM ④ THE ACTIONS YOU HAVE
TAKEN AND YOUR PLANS FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

GP-1

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
123

UNEN

TOP SECRET

8(1)

8(1)

TO: CDR ST ILLIEN, 3D MAR DIV CORPS
 TO: MG CONCORAN, C/S MACV
 INFO: LTG CUSHMAN, CG III MAF
 ZEN

TOP SECRET PHB 8339 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: ESTIMATE OF SITUATION
 REF: MAC 2377 EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

1. ENEMY ACTIONS, 222400H TO 243300H

A. ENEMY INITIATIVE IN THE 11TH DTA/XXIV CORPS OVER THE LAST THIRTY HOURS DIFFERED ONLY SLIGHTLY FROM THE PATTERN OF SEVERAL MONTHS STANDING--A PATTERN WHOSE SALIENT FEATURES ARE LOW LEVEL OF ACTIVITY AND INCIDENTS SCATTERED GEOGRAPHICALLY.

B. DURING THE NIGHT OF 22/23 FEBRUARY ENEMY UNIT FROM DMZ (SUSPECTED TO BE ELK 13TH NVA REGT) LAUNCHED A SAPPER-TYPE ATTACK AGAINST A 3D MAR DIV OUTPOST AT VC 29171 NORTHWEST OF C-4; ENEMY WAS DISCOVERED IN PRE-ASSAULT PHASE, PREVENTED FROM USING HIS MORTARS OR REACHING PERIMETER AND FINALLY DRIVEN OFF (TWO FRO KIA). ENEMY ATTEMPTED SIMILAR ATTACK AGAINST A 15MM HOWITRY AT TEMPORARY FSB SWORD WEST OF CAMP EVANS; SAPPERS DISCOVERED IN WIRE, ABORTING ATTACK; ENEMY SUSPECTED TO BE ELKS 6 REGT AGAINST WHICH 1/506 ABN/AM OPERATING. IN LEATHERNECK SQUARE THERE WAS MORE THAN USUAL MOVEMENT REPORTED. FINALLY, ENEMY SAPPERS INTRODUCED ONE OR MORE MINES IN CUA VIET RIVER; ONE LOP HEAVILY DAMAGED.

C. ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE FROM NORM WAS TWO SAPPER-TYPE ATTACKS IN A SINGLE NIGHT WITHIN AO.

2. ENEMY INTENTIONS.

A. I AM OF THE OPINION THAT THE ENEMY ATTEMPTED TO BE A PARTICIPANT IN THE 22 FEBRUARY ATTACK. THROUGHOUT JANUARY AND EARLY FEBRUARY, HE MADE AN EFFORT TO INFILTRATE FORCES AND EQUIPMENT THROUGH THE DMZ AND THROUGH BASE AREA 511 INTO BASE AREAS 131 AND 114. CONTINUOUS SEARCH OPERATIONS BY THE 3D MAR DIV WERE EFFECTIVE IN SPOILING HIS EFFORTS TO POSITION EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION AT FORWARD SUPPLY POINTS, AND COMBINED US AND ARVN OPERATIONS IN BASE AREAS 131 AND 114 PREVENTED THE ENEMY FROM BECOMING ESTABLISHED IN THOSE LOCATIONS. OF SIGNIFICANCE WAS THE MOVEMENT OF THE US AND ARVN ELEMENTS INTO THE DEVEY CANYON AO, FROM WHICH HE UNDOUBTEDLY COULD HAVE LAUNCHED AN ATTACK AGAINST THE COASTAL AREA. THIS LATTER OPERATION HAD A MAJOR IMPACT ON HIS ABILITY TO CONTROL COMBAT UNITS PROCESSING THROUGH BASE AREA 511, PREVENTED THE 6TH NVA REGIMENT FROM OPERATING IN THE COASTAL AREA AGAINST HELICOPTERS, AND RESULTED IN THE DESTRUCTION OF HELICOPTER ELEMENTS, REAR SERVICES UNITS, AND OTHER COASTAL ELEMENTS.

911

911

2. I BELIEVE THAT HE STILL TENDS TO CONSIDER ATTACKS COMPENSATE WITH HIS CAPABILITIES. HOWEVER, HE IS CURRENTLY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE LOSSES SUSTAINED IN THE VICINITY OF BASE AREA 611 AND IS CONFUSED AS TO WHAT SPECIFIC ACTIONS HE IS CAPABLE OF UNDERTAKING. IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION, HE WILL PROBABLY UNDERTAKE LIMITED ATTACKS BY FIRE AGAINST US AND ARVN INSTALLATIONS ALONG QL-1, AND HE MAY ATTEMPT TO PLACE FIRE ON THE CITIES OF HUE, QUANG TRI AND DONG HA. ANY GROUND ATTACKS WILL, OF NECESSITY, BE LIMITED IN NATURE AND WILL BE DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE PROPAGANDA BENEFITS RATHER THAN MILITARY VICTORY. OVER THE LONGER TERM, THE ENEMY WILL ALSO: INCREASE THE LEVEL OF CROSS-BENZ ACTIVITY IN HOPES OF DIVERTING AND INHIBITTING ADDITIONAL US/ARVN FORCES NORTH OF QUANG TRI/COASTLINE; REESTABLISH SUBSTANTIAL BATTAL FORCES IN HIS ESTABLISHED BASE AREAS (111, 114, 114B, ET C.) TO PROVIDE OPERATIONAL/LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE RESIDUAL AND POLITICAL/MILITARY STRUCTURE IN THUA THIEN AND QUANG TRI; AND ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE ATTAINMENT OF OAS 1969 PACIFICATION GOALS BY HARASSING ACTION AGAINST POPULATED AREAS, PARALLEL TROOP FORCES, AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERSHIP.

3. ACTIONS TAKEN AND IMMEDIATE FUTURE PLANS.

A. GENERAL TRUONG AND I BELIEVE THAT OUR TIGHT INTEGRATION OF FORCES, TO INCLUDE INTIMATE, RESPONSIVE WORKING RELATIONS WITH TERRITORIAL AGENCIES AND UNITS MORE THAN COUNTERAVAIL ANY ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

B. IN EARLY FEBRUARY, WE DECIDED THAT OUR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY LOC AND BASE AREAS WOULD HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON HIS CAPABILITY TO PURSUE THE WAR AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE COMBINED THROUGH TET. CONSEQUENTLY, ALTHOUGH SOME US AND ARVN UNITS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM THE WEST PRIOR TO 10 FEBRUARY AND POSITIONED IN THE GENERAL VICINITY OF THE THREE KEY CITIES, NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO DIMINISH THE FORCES IN THE BENEY CANYON AG AND IN THE TWO ARVN AG'S ADJACENT TO IT.

C. ADDITIONALLY, PLANS WERE MADE FOR THE 3D MAR DIV TO FOLDEN THE WESTERN PORTION OF ITS TACR AS SOON AS UNITS WERE MADE AVAILABLE FROM THE TAYLOR COMMON OPERATION. THE 121ST ABN DIV INITIATED REDEPLOYMENT DURING THE TET PERIOD INTO THE JUNGLES DUE SOUTH OF HUE. CONCURRENTLY, ALL US AND RVNAF UNITS IN THE PIEDMONT AND COASTAL AREAS INCREASED THE INTENSITY OF NIGHT ACTIONS WITH A VIEW TO SPOILING ANY EFFORT BY LOCALLY DEPLOYED NVA UNITS TO CONDUCT GROUND ATTACKS AGAINST MILITARY AND

ADMINISTRATIVE.

9(2)

9(2)

CONTINUATION OF ON-GOING SUPPORT FOR PACIFICATION EFFORT, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE RECREATING OF LANDS IN BOTH THUAN THIEN AND QUANG TRI PROVINCES FOR OCCUPATION BY REFUGEES; REOCCUPATION OF FSP ARGONNE IN THE FAR WESTERN PORTION OF THE 3D MAR DIV TAOR AND THE CONDUCT OF EXTENSIVE SEARCH OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE WESTERN DNE AREA; CONTINUATION OF THE PRESSURE AGAINST BA 611 AND THE NVA BASES IN THE DEVEY CANYON AND UPPER A-SHAU AREAS; INTRODUCTION OF PROJECT DELTA FORCES INTO THE A-SHAU VALLEY WITH A VIEW TO ULTIMATE OCCUPATION OF THAT AREA BY THE 131ST ADV DIV; INITIATION OF AN OPERATION BY THE 131ST ADV DIV DIRECTED TOWARD THE NORTHWEST PORTION OF QUANG WAI PROVINCE AND DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE THE ENEMY THREAT TO DA NANG FROM THE NORTH AND WEST; AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NVA REGIMENTS WHICH ARE CURRENTLY OPERATING IN THE JUNGLE.

E. ENEMY REACTION TO THE ON-GOING DEVEY CANYON OPERATION MAY ESTABLISH A REQUIREMENT TO DEVIATE FROM THE AFOREMENTIONED PLANS, BUT NOTHING SHORT OF IMMINENT ENEMY ATTACK ACROSS THE DNE OR A MAJOR REINFORCEMENT OF BA 611 WOULD PREVENT THE IMMEDIATE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ALL OF THEM.

SSO NOTE DELIVER UPON RECEIPT
333

TOP SECRET

9(3)

9(3)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

FMV FORM 620 (REV 5-60)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	COMUSMACV	24 FEB 69
SERIAL/CONTROL DATE		COPY 1, 2, 3, 4 COMFO REG.
240400Z FEB 69		

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		

2
3
4

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE	INITIAL
1	CG			Has seen
2	DCG		24 Feb	yx
3	DCG AIR			Q. J.
1	C/S	I		
	C C/S			
	D C/S DM			
	S/S	X	24 Feb	TJW
	G-1			
7	G-2			copy to - Done R
8	G-3			copy to - Done R
	G-4			
	G-5			
	G-6			
	ADJ			
	SAC			

PRESENATION OF ENEMY OFFENSIVES

REMARKS ①
 RECEIVED THREE COPIES OF 240400Z

 DTG

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TOP SECRET

020000Z FEB 68
 TO GEN BROWN CDR 7TH AF
 LTG CHILDREN DCS USARV
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV
 LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 LTG PEERS CG I FFV
 LTG KERWIN CG II FFV
 VADM BRINGLE COMSEVENTH FLT
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 ZEN

TOP SECRET SECTION ONE OF THREE MAC 2392 EYES ONLY
 THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS TRANSMITTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:
 FM GENERAL ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO GENERAL WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
 ADMIRAL MCCAIN CINCPAC
 AIR BUNKER SAIGON
 ZEN

TOP SECRET SECTION ONE OF THREE MAC 2385 EYES ONLY
 THE ENEMY BEGAN HIS PRESENT OFFENSIVE AT ABOUT 2200,
 23 FEBRUARY. THE MAJORITY OF THE ACTIONS WERE ATTACKS BY
 FIRE WHICH RANGED FROM LIGHT TO MODERATE. MOST OF THE ENEMY'S
 MAIN FORCE REGIMENTS AVOIDED CONTACT.
 THE PURPOSE OF THESE ATTACKS APPEARED TO BE: (1) TO
 PRESENT AN APPEARANCE OF STRENGTH THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WHILE
 CONSERVING MANPOWER AND AMMUNITION; (2) TO CONFUSE US AS TO
 HIS FUTURE INTENTIONS; (3) TO RECONNOITER OUR POSITIONS AND
 FIRE PLANS; AND (4) TO COVER MOVEMENT OF HIS FORCES.

THE ENEMY CAN PROBABLY MAINTAIN THIS LEVEL OF COMBAT FOR
 SEVERAL DAYS, MEANWHILE CONSERVING HIS TROOPS FOR A MORE
 INTENSIVE EFFORT. HE CAN STILL MAKE MAJOR EFFORTS AT DANANG,
 PLEI KLENG, BIEN HOA-LONG DINH, IN THE DAU TIENG-TRANG BANG
 AREA AND POSSIBLY IN THE SAIGON AREA.

THE INTENTIONS OF THE 9TH VC DIVISION AND THE 7TH NVA
 DIVISIONS ARE UNCERTAIN. THE 9TH DIV MAY INTEND TO ATTACK IN
 THE ANGEL'S WING AREA, OR IT MAY ATTEMPT TO GET TO SAIGON,
 AS NUMEROUS REPORTS TESTIFY. THE 7TH DIV MAY CONTINUE TO
 HARRASS PROVINCE AND DISTRICT OUTPOSTS IN BIEN LONG PROVINCE.
 IT MAY ATTEMPT TO MOVE SOUTH INTO THE SR-5 AREA.

IN SUMMARY, WE HAVE AS YET SEEN ONLY THE FIRST PHASE OF
 THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE. MAJOR ATTACKS BY STRONG ENEMY UNITS
 IN CRITICAL AREAS IN THE NEXT 48 HOURS APPEAR TO BE THE
 ENEMY'S MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION.

ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION BY COMBAT ZONE, WE SEE THAT IN I CTZ, IN THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES, ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY HAS REMAINED LIGHT WHILE USMC FORCES APPARENTLY REMAIN IN THEIR BASE AREAS. AT PRESENT THE EN HAS CONDUCTED ONLY TOWN GROUND AND SAPPER TYPE PROES AGAINST A USMC OUTPOST SOUTH OF THE DIAZ APPROXIMATELY 5 KM NE OF GIO LINH, AND FSB SWORD 19 KM SE OF QUANG TRI CITY IN THUA THIEN PROV. CONTACT WITH EN FORCES IN SOUTHERN QUANG TRI NEAR BASE AREA STY CONTINUES. THE MAJOR PORTION OF THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE WAS LAUNCHED IN MILITARY REGION 5. HE UTILIZED A COMBINATION OF ABF AND SAPPER TYPE ATTACKS AGAINST THE MAJORITY OF THE COASTAL POPULATION CENTERS IN QUANG NAM, QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES. IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE THE EN HAS COMMITTED ELEMENTS OF THE 31ST, 38TH, 141ST REGTS AND A MAJORITY OF THE DANANG SPECIAL SAPPER ACTION UNITS.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE THUS FAR APPEARS TO BE MARGINAL. MAJOR DAMAGE APPEARS TO BE LIMITED TO A TOTAL OF 2 LARGE ANNO DUMPS LOCATED IN DANANG AND AN HOA. THUS FAR THE EN HAS FAILED TO LAUNCH ANY EFFECTIVE GROUND ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE SOUTHERN THREE PROVINCES. HIS MOST SUCCESSFUL GROUND ATTACK APPEARS TO BE HOI AN CITY WHERE IT IS ESTIMATED THAT 2 ENEMY SQUADS REMAIN WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS. IN MR-5 THE ENEMY STILL HAS YET TO COMMIT EITHER THE 2ND OR THE 3RD NVA DIVS. PWS INDICATE THAT THE 1ST VC REGT, 2ND NVA DIV WILL REINFORCE LF FORCE UNITS IN QUANG TIN TO ATTACK TAY KY CITY. GROUND ACTION WEST OF TAY KY CITY HAS THUS FAR RESULTED IN 125 EN KILLED. A PW FROM THE 14 AA BN, 2ND NVA DIV STATES THAT ELEMENTS OF THE 3RD REGT, 2ND DIV WILL COMBINE WITH 3RD NVA DIV ELEMENTS TO ATTACK QUANG NGAI PROVINCE BEFORE 26 FEB. DURING THE NEXT 4 DAYS THE EN WILL CONTINUE TO LAUNCH ABF AND GROUND PROES THROUGHOUT MR-5. HIS MAIN EFFORTS WILL PROBABLY BE DIRECTED AGAINST DANANG, HOI AN, TAY KY CITY AND QUANG CITY, UTILIZING MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE 2ND AND 3RD NVA DIVISIONS IN COORDINATION WITH LF UNITS.

TO DATE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS REPORTED IN I CTZ IS 55, 12 OF WHICH ARE CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ROCKET AND MORTAR ROUNDS FOR THE 25 ATTACKS FOR WHICH THE NUMBER OF ROUNDS WAS REPORTED IS 464 FOR AN AVERAGE OF 13 ROUNDS PER ATTACK.

SSC NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT
927

11(2)

11(2)

TO GEN BROWN CER 7TH AF
 LTJG WILBREN 800 USARV
 LTJG CUSHMAN CG III USAF
 MAJ GEN WALT SCHWAFER
 LTJG STANWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 LTJG PEERS CG I AFV
 LTC KERRIN CG II AFV
 MAJ TRINGLE CG SEVENTH FLT
 TO ECKHART SA IV CORPS
 ZEN

T O P S E C R E T SECTION TWO OF THREE MAC 2562 EYES ONLY
 THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS TRANSMITTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

BY GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
 ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC
 AND BUNKER SAISON
 ZEN

T O P S E C R E T SECTION TWO OF THREE MAC 2375 EYES ONLY
 II OTZ:

(C) DURING THE PAST 43 HRS THE ENEMY EXTENDED HIMSELF IN THE II CORPS ZONE BY GREATLY INCREASING HIS ATTACKS BY FIRE. THERE HAVE BEEN 57 AFB REPORTED WITH A TOTAL OF 1115 RDS EXPENDED FOR AN AVERAGE OF 23 RDS PER ATTACK. SIGNIFICANTLY, HIS ACTION IS PRIMARILY DIRECTED AGAINST RF AND PF POSITIONS.

THE EN'S OFFENSIVE THUS FAR HAS BEEN MARKED BY HIS RELUCTANCE OR INABILITY TO LAUNCH COORDINATED GROUND ATTACKS. THE 24TH AND 66TH NVA REGT ARE APPARENTLY NOT TARGETED AGAINST MAJOR CITIES, AND MOST VC MF AND LF BNS SEEM TO BE AVOIDING CONTACT. THE EN HAS EXPENDED AT LAST 900 MORTAR AND ROCKET ROUNDS SINCE THE NIGHT OF 22-23 FEB, AND HIS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THE INITIAL INTENSITY OF THE AFB IS DOUBTFUL. WHILE HE COULD LAUNCH VC MF AND LF BNS AGAINST PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT CAPITALS, HIS LOSSES WOULD BE PROHIBITIVE. ONLY IN BINH THUAN PROVINCE, WHERE 4 EN BNS ARE OPERATING NEAR PHAN THIET, DOES A LARGE-SCALE ATTACK AGAINST A POPULATION CENTER APPEAR LIKELY. SAPPER ACTIVITY, AFB, AND ISOLATED GROUND ATTACKS WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE AT A HIGHER THAN NORMAL LEVEL FOR THE REMAINDER OF FEB, AND 6000 GMS IN THE WESTERN 11(3)

(SECRET) IN III CTZ, THE ENEMY'S CORPS-WIDE OFFENSIVE BEGAN AT ABOUT 0230 HOURS, 23 FEB. THE MOST STRIKING CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS ACTION THROUGH THE MORNING OF 24 FEB ARE THE MAJOR UNCOMMITTED ENEMY FORCES, AND HIS CONSERVATION OF AMMUNITION. THIS INDICATED THAT HE MAY INTEND TO SUSTAIN HIS ACTION OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD, AND THAT HIS MAJOR ATTACKS ARE TO COME. OF HIS 4 DIVISIONS HE HAS COMMITTED ONLY THE 550 NVA REGT, 1ST NVA DIV AT DAU TIENG. ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE 271ST AND 272ND VC REGTS, 9TH VC DIV HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN AN AREA FROM TRUNG BANG IN HAU NGHIA PROVINCE SOUTH TO BEN LUC IN LONG AN PROVINCE. THE 9TH VC DIV MAY BE DEPLOYING OUT OF CAMBODIA TOWARD SAIGON ON A BROAD FRONT. THE INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS THROUGHOUT HAU NGHIA PROVINCE ON THE MORNING OF 23 FEB MAY HAVE BEEN MADE TO COVER THIS MOVEMENT. THE 4 REGTS OF THE 5TH VC DIV HAVE NOT YET BEEN COMMITTED AGAINST LONG BINH/BIEN HOA. THE ENEMY UNIT IDENTIFIED SOUTH OF LONG BINH POST ON 23 FEB WAS THE 3RD BN, 274TH VC REGT. THAT UNIT AND THE ATTACKS BY FIRE AT LONG BINH/BIEN HOA AND AT FIRE SUPPORT BASE JERRY, 20 KM TO THE EAST MAY HAVE BEEN COVERING THE 5TH VC DIV MOVEMENT TO THEIR TARGETS. TWO REGTS OF THE 7TH NVA DIV ARE POSSIBLY NEAR THE MICHELIN PLANTATION. FROM THIS POSITION THEY CAN MOVE QUICKLY TO LIKELY TARGETS AT LAI KHE AND BEN CAT IN BINH DUONG PROV. IT IS NOTeworthy THAT NONE OF THE SUBREGIONAL FORCES HAVE YET BEEN COMMITTED. HENCE, THE ENEMY RETAINS HIS MOST LIKELY SPEARHEAD FORCES FOR A SAIGON ATTACK, AND HAS SO FAR CONSERVED HIS DIVISIONAL MAIN FORCES. THE 5TH VC DIV CAN ATTACK LONG BINH/BIEN HOA AT ANY TIME. THE 9TH VC DIV AND SUBREGIONAL FORCES CAN MOVE ON SAIGON WITHIN 24 TO 48 HOURS. THE 7TH NVA DIV APPEARS TO BE IN A RESERVE OR CONTINGENCY ROLE AT THIS TIME. THE ENEMY CAN CONTINUE CONSERVATIVE INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE CORPS FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD AND PROBABLY INTENDS TO DO SO.

BETWEEN 230430 AND 231325 HOURS, 23 FEBRUARY 69, THE ENEMY FIRED TEN 122MM ROCKETS INTO SAIGON IN TWO SEPARATE ATTACKS. THEY IMPACTED IN THE 1ST, 2ND, 4TH AND 5TH PRECINCTS AT THE FOLLOWING COORDINATES: XS864939, XS868393, XS863911, XS867912, XS866913, XS374913, XS861907, XS862922, XS864914, XS867934, KILLING ELEVEN CIVILIANS AND WOUNDING 31 OTHERS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF IMPACT, THE INACCURACY OF THESE WEAPONS IS SUCH THAT THEY CANNOT BE USED WITH ANY ASSURANCE THAT ANY POINT TARGET CAN BE STRUCK. THE ROCKETS WERE USED AS AN AREA WEAPON, AND THAT AREA WAS DENSELY POPULATED SAIGON. THROUGHOUT III CTZ, SINCE 0301 HOURS THERE HAVE BEEN 79 INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS IN THE III CTZ. A TOTAL OF 1255 ROUNDS WERE EXPENDED BY THE ENEMY--AN AVERAGE OF 13 ROUNDS PER TARGET.

SSO NOTE:

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT

11/4)

11/4)

TO GEN WHEELER CDR 7TH AF
 LTG CHILDREN CGG USARV
 LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFCRY
 LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 LTG PEERS CG I FFV
 LTG KERWIN CG II FFV
 VADM BRINGLE CG SEVENTH FLT
 MG ECKHARDT SA IV CORPS
 ZEN

T O P S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF THREE MAC 2392 EYES ONLY
 THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS TRANSMITTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
 ADM YOCAM CINCPAC
 AMB BUNKER SAIGON
 ZEN

T O P S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF THREE MAC 2385 EYES ONLY
 IV CTZ

BEGINNING AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 HOURS ON 23 FEB THE ENEMY CONDUCTED WIDESPREAD INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS AND GROUND PROBES THROUGHOUT IV CTZ. IN IV CTZ, THERE HAVE BEEN 72 INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS IN WHICH A TOTAL OF 813 ROUNDS HAVE BEEN FIRED FOR AN AVERAGE OF 11 ROUNDS PER ATTACK. THE MOST INTENSE ACTIVITY OCCURRED IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE AND IN PARTICULAR AT MY THO CITY AND THE DONG TAN MILITARY BASE. OF THE HIGH NUMBER OF VC INITIATED INCIDENTS ONLY A VERY LIMITED NUMBER WERE GROUND ATTACKS. HOWEVER, ENEMY EFFORTS HAVE FAILED TO GIVE HIM ANY SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF MILITARY SUCCESS. WHILE A COMPLETE ASSESSMENT OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH ENEMY CAPABILITIES HAVE BEEN DEGRADED BY HIS ACTIVITIES OF 23 FEB CANNOT BE MADE AT THIS TIME, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT IT WAS CONSIDERABLE. IT IS EXPECTED THAT HE WILL CONTINUE CURRENT ACTIVITY ON A LIMITED SCALE UNTIL HE RECEIVES THE NECESSARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT FOR RESUPPLY AND REFITTING. 11/5)

IT IS Doubted THAT HE CAN CONTINUE HIS HIGH LEVEL LEVEL OF ACTIVITY FOR MORE THAN A FEW DAYS. HOWEVER, NO VC MAIN FORCE UNITS WERE REPORTED TO BE INVOLVED IN ANY OF THE INCIDENTS. THESE FORCES, ESPECIALLY ELEMENTS OF THE D-1 AND D-2 REGIMENTS SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST OF CAN THO, REMAIN A THREAT FOR THE NEXT 48 HOURS. THE PREPONDERANCE OF FUTURE ACTIVITY WILL BE IN THE FORM OF INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS AND HARRASSMENTS. A LIMITED NUMBER OF GROUND ATTACKS WILL PROBABLY OCCUR, AND AN INCREASE IN SAPPER/TERRORIST ACTIVITY REMAINS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY.

SUMMARY. THE ENEMY APPEARS TO HAVE ACCOMPLISHED VERY LITTLE BY THIS INITIAL FLURRY OF ATTACKS IN ALMOST EVERY PROVINCE IN COUNTRY. NO MAJOR GOVERNMENT HELD OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN SEIZED. HE MAY BE CONSERVING HIS DIVISIONS AND MAIN FORCE UNITS FOR WHAT HE MAY BELIEVE WILL ACCRUE FROM THIS FIRST PHASE. THIS MAY EXPLAIN THE RATHER LIMITED USE OF AMMUNITION AND THE FAILURE OF OBVIOUSLY WELL POSITIONED MAIN FORCE UNITS TO BE COMMITTED. HE MAY EXPECT A SHORT PERIOD OF REDUCED ACTIVITY, CONTINUED ADF, AMBUSHES, AND ATTACKS ON RE/PE OUTPOSTS, ATTEMPTS BY HIS MAJOR UNITS TO TEMPORARILY AVOID CASUALTIES AND CONTACT AND TO POSITION THESE FORCES IN THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS MANNER TO FULLY EXPLOIT ANY SITUATION THAT OCCURS.

CONTRACTS BELIEVED IMMEDIATELY ON 11/6/67

11/6/67

11/6/67

TO: GENERAL ST. WELLS
 TO: MG CORCORAN, C OF S MACV
 INFO: LTJ CUSHMAN, CG III MAF DMG
 ZEN

TOP SECRET PWD 0343 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

REF: MAC 2377, MAC 2331

1. (TS) ENEMY ACTIONS, 232300H TO 241200H.

A. ENEMY INITIATIVE IN THE 11TH STAFF/XXIV CORPS OVER THE NINE (9) HOUR REPORTING PERIOD REFLECTED THE SAME PATTERN AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, NAMELY, LOW LEVEL OF ACTIVITY AND WIDELY SCATTERED INCIDENTS.

B. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACTION DURING THE PERIOD WAS THE SPRINGING OF AN AMBUSH BY ELEMENTS OF THE 5TH MARINE REGIMENT IN DEWEY CANYON AGAINST AN ENEMY FORCE OF BETWEEN 10 TO 15 MEN. THIS OCCURRED AT 2330 HOURS, CONSISTED OF AN EXCHANGE OF FIRE BY THE TWO ELEMENTS, AND RESULTED IN THREE (3) KIA. IN ADDITION TO THIS INCIDENT, THERE WERE A SERIES OF REPORTS OF SMALL GROUPS OF PEOPLE SEEN ALONG THE COA VIET RIVER DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS. ADDITIONALLY, THE CIG LINH DISTRICT HQ LOCATED NEAR THE DMZ (YD 237323) RECEIVED TWO (2) ROUNDS OF INCOMING MORTAR FIRE AT 2325H BUT SUSTAINED NO DAMAGE. IN GENERAL, THE ENEMY CONTINUES TO AVOID CONTACT THROUGHOUT THE CORPS AO, TO INCLUDE THE DEWEY CANYON AREA.

2. (TS) ENEMY INTENTIONS.

A. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE ENEMY INTENDS TO CHANGE THE CURRENT PATTERN OF ACTIVITY, ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO MANEUVER FORCES AGAINST MARINE ELEMENTS IN THE DEWEY CANYON AO. CO, 9TH MARINES REPORTED AT 1200 HOURS THIS DATE THAT THE SITUATION IN HIS AREA IS QUIET AND THAT PATROLS HAVE ENCOUNTERED NO ENEMY FORCES. WEATHER CONDITIONS IN THE DA NANG PREVENT THE CONTINUATION OF THE ATTACK AND THE RESUPPLY OF FORCES, TO THE EXTENT THAT CO, 9TH MARINES HAS RESTRICTED HIS ACTIVITIES TO SMALL UNIT PATROLLING UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE WEATHER CLEAR.

12/11

12/11

1. MY STATEMENT OF ENEMY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES, REFLECTED IN PARA 2B OF MY PHB 0339, REMAINS UNCHANGED. I BELIEVE THAT THE ENEMY WILL CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO CONDUCT ATTACKS BY FIRE AGAINST PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT HQ AND MILITARY BASES, AND THERE ARE INCREASING INDICATIONS THAT DAYLIGHT AMBUSHES CAN BE EXPECTED ON THE LOGS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HE IS CAPABLE OF RESPONDING TO THE BENEY CANYON OPERATION WITH SUFFICIENT FORCE TO MATERIALLY AFFECT THE SITUATION. ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE NVA FORCES LOCATED IN THE GENERAL VICINITY OF BASE AREA 114 MAY ATTEMPT TO ACCOMPANY ATTACKS BY FIRE WITH A GROUND ATTACK AGAINST CAMP EVANS, FSD SALLY, OR THE AN LO BRIDGE, SUCH ATTACKS WOULD PROVE TO BE COSTLY TO HIM. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE ENEMY MAY ATTEMPT TO INCREASE THE INFILTRATION ACROSS THE DMZ, PARTICULARLY IN THE WESTERN PORTIONS. PLANNED OPERATIONS OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION IN THE VICINITY OF FSD ARCONNE AND ACROSS THE TRACE OF THE DMZ SHOULD PROVE TO BE AN ADEQUATE DETERRENT.

2. (TS) - ACTIONS TAKEN AND IMMEDIATE FUTURE PLANS.

A. ACTIONS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY ARE AS DESCRIBED IN MY PHB 0339. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD HAVE BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY LOW CEILINGS AND RAIN AND HAVE TEMPORARILY DELAYED THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES TOWARD THE WESTERN PORTION OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AREA AND INTO THE JUNGLES SOUTH OF HUE. NEVERTHELESS, PREPARATIONS ARE COMPLETED, AND UNITS WILL MOVE AS SOON AS WEATHER PERMITS. CONTINUED PRESSURE WILL BE MAINTAINED AGAINST BA 611 AND ALL NVA INSTALLATIONS IN THE BENEY CANYON AND UPPER ASHAW AREAS.

B. IN COMPLIANCE WITH COMUSMACV DIRECTIVE, SSC HAS EFFECTED COORDINATION WITH HQ 3D MARINE DIVISION AND ELEMENTS OF THE 6TH MARINE REGIMENT. PLANNED INFILTRATION OF SSC ELEMENTS INTO BASE AREA 611 WILL TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS THE WEATHER PERMITS.

SSC NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

12/2

12/2

12/2

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

FMV FORM 630 (REV 5-61)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COORDINANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM 1ST BATTAL, 60 MHC CORPS SERIAL/CONTROL DATE 250559Z FEB 69		DATE 25 FEB 69	
			1, 2, 3, or 4		COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TOP SECRET FID 0353 EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
7	CG				ko	REMARKS ①
4	DCG		26 Feb		37	
5	DCS AIR					
Z	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S ON					
1	S/S	I	25 FEB		fgw emh	
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	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	SAC					

copy to
g 2 - Done B
g 3 - Done B

15
TOP SECRET

ON 15/11/68, THE DEWEY CANYON AREA REVEALED A TOTAL OF EIGHT (8) RE/PC, 30 BLOCS OF FM, AND ASSORTED ENEMY UNIFORMS. THE RE/PC SUSTAINED TWO (2) KIA; ENEMY MOVEMENT IN THE VICINITY OF K/3/3 MARINES AT YD 147683 (THE ENEMY WAS TAKEN UNDER FIRE AND PREVENTED FROM ATTACKING. TWO (2) NVA KIA WERE DISCOVERED AFTER THE ACTION); AND AN ATTACK BY FIRE, AT 242230 HOURS, AGAINST ELEMENTS OF 3/2 ARVN BATTALION (YD 215675), DURING WHICH THE UNIT RECEIVED 18 ROUNDS OF 82MM MORTAR FIRE, NO CASUALTIES.

C. THE DEWEY CANYON AREA REMAINED RELATIVELY QUIET THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD. A SHORT BREAK IN THE WEATHER PERMITTED SOME RESUPPLY. THE ONLY ENEMY ACTIVITY AGAINST THE 9TH MARINE REGIMENT CONSISTED OF TWO SMALL MORTAR ATTACKS JUST PRIOR TO DARKNESS AND A GROUND ATTACK AT 2155 HOURS BY AN ENEMY PLATOON EARLIER IN THE DAY, AT 241520 HOURS, 1/3/9 OVERRAN TWO ADDITIONAL 120MM GUNS, BOTH OF WHICH HAD BEEN SPIKED. THESE GUNS WERE FOUND AT YD 243043.

D. IN THE 101ST ABN DIVISION AREA OF OPERATIONS, ENEMY ACTIVITY WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A CONTINUATION OF SMALL HARASSING ATTACKS AGAINST MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY INSTALLATIONS. THESE INCLUDED A MORTAR ATTACK AGAINST A RADIO-RELAY SITE, AN RPO ATTACK AGAINST AN ARVN OUTPOST NORTH OF FSE BASTOGNE, AND A SMALL CONTACT BETWEEN ENEMY FORCES AND TWO VC TEAMS IN THE GENERAL VICINITY OF FSE SANDY.

2. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.

A. ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING AND IN CONSIDERATION OF AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE, IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE ENEMY HAS MOVED FORCES ACROSS THE LINE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTACKING FSB BASES IN THE WESTERN PORTION OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AREA, ROUTE

9, CAT LO, AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE COASTAL AREA. THERE ARE STILL INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY REMAINS CONFUSED IN THE DEWEY CANYON AREA, THAT HE IS ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE AVAILABLE FORCES TO COUNTER THE OPERATIONS OF THE 9TH MARINE REGIMENT, AND THAT HE MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO DEPLOY ELEMENTS OF THE 6TH NVA REGIMENT AGAINST THE 9TH MARINES. WITH REGARD TO THE LATTER, THE CONFUSION THAT HAS BEEN CREATED IS BELIEVED TO BE THE RESULT OF A COORDINATED EFFORT AT THIS TIME.

15(2)

15(2)

... AT THE TIME THAT THE ENEMY'S INTENTION TO LAUNCH THE LINE IS
 ... ON THE PART OF THE ENEMY TO TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF ENEMY
 FORCES IN THE DEWEY CANYON AREA. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THESE
 ATTACKS ARE A PART OF THE CURRENT GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND WOULD
 HAVE TAKEN PLACE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. IN ANY CASE, IT IS
 ANTICIPATED THAT ADDITIONAL ATTACKS OF THIS NATURE WILL BE
 MADE AGAINST ALL FIRE BASES ALONG THE SOUTHERN TRACE OF THE LZ.
 FURTHER INDICATION OF THIS INTENTION WAS THE INITIATION BY THE
 ENEMY OF A 122MM ROCKET ATTACK AGAINST FSB ELLIOT AT 25 05 00
 HOURS AND AGAIN AT 25 11 00 HOURS. BY THE CLOSE OF THE REPORTING
 PERIOD, 17 ROCKETS HAD BEEN FIRED AGAINST THIS BASE.

C. IT IS ALSO ANTICIPATED THAT THE NVA FORCES IN THE VICINITY
 OF BASE AREA 114, IN THE 101ST ABN DIVISION AREA, WILL UNDERTAKE
 ATTACKS AGAINST INSTALLATIONS ALONG QL-1, THE MOST LIKELY
 TARGETS BEING CAMP EVANS, FSB SALLY AND THE ANILO BRIDGE.

3. ACTIONS TAKEN AND IMMEDIATE FUTURE PLANS.

A. WITH REGARD TO THE ATTACKS AGAINST FSB NEVILLE AND
 RUSSELL, IMPROVING WEATHER PERMITTED EVACUATION OF ALL
 CASUALTIES IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS. REPLACEMENTS WERE
 DISPATCHED TO THE TWO FIRE BASES AND SWEEPS OF THE ADJACENT
 AREAS WERE UNDERTAKEN TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF ENEMY KILLED
 IN THE TWO ACTIONS. (ENEMY CASUALTY FIGURES WILL BE SUBMITTED
 AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE). AS A MEANS OF THICKENING THE AC
 IN THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AREA, CG, 101ST ABN DIVISION HAS
 BEEN ALERTED TO PREPARE FOR THE IMMEDIATE MOVEMENT TO THE NORTH
 OF AN ADDITIONAL TROOP AND THE REELEMENT OF THE 3/5 CAV. A
 REQUEST HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO CG, III MAF FOR CONSIDERATION OF
 THE IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT TO THE ~~AREA OF THE CL~~
 CURRENTLY STANDING OFF OF THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF 10TZ.

CGG NOTE: RELIEVED IMMEDIATELY

15 (B)

15 (3)

TO THE CORROGAN CHIEF OF STAFF MACON SON
 THE LTJG DUSHIAN CG III MAI DMS

TO C P S E T ONE 1353 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

5. THE ATTACKS BY THE ENEMY AND THE NEW INDICATIONS OF INCREASED PRESSURE ALONG THAT PORTION OF THE CORPS AS IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE DZ HAVE ELICITED NO MAJOR CHANGES IN ONGOING PLANS. THE DEWEY BAYCON OPERATION WILL CONTINUE. THE MOVEMENT OF MARINE FORCES TO THE WESTERN PORTION OF SON NAM AND IT AS WILL BE COMPLETED AS WEATHER PERMITS, AND, THE DEPLOYMENT OF 121ST AVN DIVISION FORCES INTO THE JOINT AREA SOUTH OF FSE NORMANBY (~~SEAGRAVE BARRIES~~) IS UNDERWAY. AS OF THE CLOSE OF THE REPORTING PERIOD, FSE ALPINE (YT 75533) HAD BEEN OCCUPIED BY F/2/4 LARINES AND ONE ARTILLERY BATTERY. THE REMAINDER OF 2/4 LARINES IS IN THE VICINITY OF WADDENGRIFT CE AWAITING AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROCEED TO FSE ARGONNE. IN THE 131ST AVN DIVISION AREA, ONE COMPANY OF THE 2/522 ADD BN, THE RECON PLATOON, AND AN ENGINEER ELEMENT HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO FSD SPEAR (YC 655924). THE REMAINDER OF THE BATTALION IS AT FSE NORMANBY PREPARING FOR DEPLOYMENT. THE 3/157 AVN BATTALION OF THE 131ST AVN DIVISION HAS THREE (3) COMPANIES DEPLOYED APPROXIMATELY EIGHT (8) KMS SOUTHWEST OF LEEON ISLAND IN THE VICINITY OF LZ SUSAN (YC 752924). THE 3/3 AVN BATTALION WILL BE DEPLOYED IN THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF THE SPEAR BARRIES AREA AS WEATHER PERMITS. FINALLY, TO PLACE INCREASED PRESSURE IN THE COASTAL AREA EAST OF HUE, THE 1/521 AVN BATTALION WAS JOINED WITH THE 1/54 AVN BN AND PROVINCIAL FORCES IN THE COURSE OF AN EXTENSIVE SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATION GENERALLY SOUTH OF FSD SALLY. ALL OTHER SEARCH AND CLEAR AND FACIFICATION OPERATIONS IN THE COASTAL AREA ARE CONTINUING AS SCHEDULED.

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM LTG STILWELL		DATE 25 FEB 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 250952Z	1,2,3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4...
4	DCG		26 FEB			
	DCG AIR					THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
Z	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
I	S/S	I	25 FEB		PMH	
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	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
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	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

16
TOP SECRET

O 250950Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM LTC ST ILWELL CG XXIV CORPS PHE
 TO MG CORCORAN CHIEF OF STAFF MACV SGN
 INFO LTC CUSHMAN CG III WAF DNG

ZFY
 T O P S E C R E T PHE 0354 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
 REF: PHE 0353 DTG 250559Z FEB 69

1. AS OF 251630 HOTEL HOURS, THE FRIENDLY CASUALTIES RESULTANT FROM THE ATTACKS ON FSB NEVILLE AND FSB RUSSELL REPORTED IN THE REFERENCE TOTALED THIRTY-SIX (36) KIA, SEVENTY-SEVEN (77) MIA (EVAC) AND TWENTY (20) MIA (MINOR); KNOWN ENEMY CASUALTIES TOTAL FIFTY-SIX (56) KIA.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
 115

NNNN

TOP SECRET

16/11

16/11

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM LTG STILWELL		DATE 26 FEB 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 260350Z	1,2,3, 4	COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					TOP SECRET PHB 0360 EYES ONLY REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P511.4... THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT. 1410 2/26/69 1. Received 1410 Did not receive input requested by our message of last night. This apparently is intended to suffice was received too late to put in our msg. our msg was released at 1350 V B See msg on left - rec'd 1458 ① TOP SECRET
3	DCG		27 Feb			
	DCG AIR					
1	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
	S/S	X	26 Feb			
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	ORD					
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	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

0 260350Z ZYH 000-1 ZFF-4

FM L/3/4 ST NEVILLE CG 4TH AV BATT
 TO MG GORCORAN CHIEF OF STAFF MACV
 INFO L/3/4 CUSHMAN CG III MAF
 ZEN

T/O P/S E 3 R E T/PHE 0800 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO
 SUBJECT: ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. ENEMY ACTIONS 25 1200 HOURS TO 26 1200 HOURS FEB 69.

A. THE INTENSE ENEMY ACTIVITY WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE NIGHT OF 24-25 FEB DIMINISHED PERCEPTIVELY THROUGHOUT THE REPORTING PERIOD. DURING THE DAYLIGHT HOURS OF 25 FEB, THERE WERE OCCASIONAL INSTANCES OF INSTALLATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF THE DMZ RECEIVING ROCKET AND MORTAR FIRE. APPROXIMATELY TEN (10) ROUNDS OF 122 MM AND 127 MM ROCKET AND AN UNIDENTIFIED NUMBER OF MORTAR ROUNDS WERE FIRED SPORADICALLY DURING THE DAY IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF FSB ELLIOT. ADDITIONALLY, AT 1430 HOURS A PLATOON FROM K/3/3 MARINES (YO 18755) RECEIVED NINE (9) ROUNDS OF 142 MM ROCKET, SUSTAINING ONE (1) KIA AND EIGHT (8) WIA. THE SAME UNIT RECEIVED EIGHT (8) ADDITIONAL 142 MM ROCKET ROUNDS AT 1745 HOURS, SUSTAINING NO CASUALTIES OR DAMAGE. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS THAT IT REPRESENTS A CHANGE IN PATTERN FROM PURELY NIGHTTIME ATTACKS TO OCCASIONAL DAYLIGHT ATTACKS BY FIRE. THIS CHANGE DID NOT PROVE, HOWEVER, TO BE AN ACCURATE INDICATION THAT THE ENEMY WOULD CONTINUE HIS ATTACKS DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS. THERE WERE NO ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE GENERAL VICINITY OF THE DMZ FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE REPORTING PERIOD, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A MORTAR ATTACK (25 ROUNDS) ON A CIDG INSTALLATION IN MAI LOC AO (YO 091511). THIS ATTACK RESULTED IN TEN (10) FRIENDLY WIA, SIX (6) OF WHICH WERE US PERSONNEL.

B. DESPITE THE LACK OF ACTIVITY DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS, THE ENEMY ONCE AGAIN INITIATED DAYLIGHT ATTACKS AGAINST FRIENDLY FORCES ON THE MORNING OF 26 FEB. AT 0800 HOURS, FSB NEVILLE RECEIVED THREE (3) ROUNDS OF MORTAR FIRE. AT 0930 HOURS, L/3/4 MARINES, OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF FSB RUSSELL ENTERED A BOOBY TRAPPED AREA. THE UNIT RECEIVED SMALL ARMS AND MORTAR FIRE AND SUSTAINED TWO (2) FRIENDLY KIA AND THREE (3) WIA. CONTACT WAS CONTINUING AT THE CLOSE OF

17/11

AGAINST SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME ENEMY OPPOSITION THAT HAS BEEN ENCOUNTERED TO DATE. AN ADDITIONAL 122 MM GUN AND TWO (2) 40 MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS WERE SEIZED. AN FV3 WAS OVERRUN, EQUIPMENT IN WHICH WAS RELATIVELY SOPHISTICATED AND OF RUSSIAN MANUFACTURE. ELEMENTS OPERATING THROUGHOUT THE AO CONTINUED TO DISCOVER VARIOUS TYPES OF AMMUNITION EXTENDING FROM 140 MM ROCKETS (EIGHT IN NUMBER) TO SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION. AT 251300 HOURS, M/3/9 MARINES MADE CONTACT WITH A SMALL NVA FORCE, SUSTAINING NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES AND ACCOUNTING FOR FOUR (4) ENEMY KIA. IN THIS ACTION, A LARGE QUANTITY OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT WAS OVERRUN. AT 1600 HOURS, E/1/9 MARINES RECEIVED 40 ROUNDS OF 82 MM FIRE, SUSTAINING NO CASUALTIES.

C. ACTIVITY IN THE 151ST AVN DIVISION AO CONTINUED TO BE CHARACTERIZED BY LIGHT, SPORADIC CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY. AT 2200 HOURS, THE 151ST AVN DISTRICT HQ RECEIVED FOUR (4) ROUNDS OF EITHER RPG OR MORTAR FIRE, SUSTAINING ONE (1) KIA. ORGANIS FIRES WERE RETURNED AGAINST SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITIONS.

2. ENEMY INTENTIONS.

A. ALTHOUGH IT IS APPARENT THAT THE ENEMY HAS DEPLOYED ADDITIONAL FORCES IN THE AREA JUST SOUTH OF THE DMZ, THERE IS YET NO EVIDENCE THAT HE HAS INFILTRATED SUFFICIENT FORCES TO REPRESENT A MAJOR THREAT. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT UNITS PARTICIPATING IN THE ATTACKS THE NIGHT OF 24-25 FEB WERE PROBABLY ELEMENTS OF THE 27TH NVA REGIMENT. CURRENTLY PLANNED TROOP DEPLOYMENTS OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION IN THE VICINITY OF FSB ARGONNE SHOULD PROVE TO BE AN ADEQUATE COUNTERMEASURE AGAINST THESE PERSONNEL, PROVIDED THERE IS NO INCREASE IN INFILTRATION THROUGH THE DMZ.

B. NVA UNITS CURRENTLY OPERATING IN THE AO ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE ATTACKS ON US/ARVN POSITIONS THROUGHOUT THE AREA. ADDITIONAL COORDINATED GROUND ATTACKS ON SMALL, ISOLATED UNITS AND POSITIONS ARE ANTICIPATED. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY WILL MAKE A CONCERNED EFFORT TO INTERRUPT ROUTES BETWEEN CAN LU AND VANDERGRIFT SCOUT BASE WITH BOTH FIRE AND PERSONNEL.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

127

1721

1721

O 20 0321Z FEB 68
 FM LTJG STILLWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 TO HQ CORCORAN CHIEF OF STAFF MACV
 INFO LTJG BUSBYIAN CG III MAF
 ZEN

T O P S E C R E T P R I V E E Y E S O N L Y F I N A L S E C T I O N O F T W O

C. PREVIOUS PREDICTIONS RELATIVE TO THE CONFUSION INDICATED BY THE ENEMY IN THE DEWEY CANYON AREA CONTINUE TO APPLY. IT IS APPARENT THAT THE ENEMY IS NOW COMMITTING ADDITIONAL FORCES IN A PIECE-MEAL MANNER IN AN ATTEMPT TO SLOW OR HALT PROGRESS OF THE 5TH MVA REGIMENT AND ARVN FORCES. TO DATE, HE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO ASSEMBLE SUFFICIENT FORCES TO LAUNCH A COORDINATED COUNTERATTACK.

D. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE OPERATIONS OF THE 121ST AIRBORNE DIVISION AND ARVN UNITS OPERATING IN THAT AO HAVE PREVENTED ENEMY UNITS NEAR BASE AREA 114 FROM UNDERTAKING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THE COMBINATION OF CLEAR AND SEARCH OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT BASE AREA 114 AND THE DEWEY CANYON OPERATIONS HAVE HAD A MAJOR IMPACT ON ENEMY ATTEMPTS TO PENETRATE THE PIEDMONT AND COASTAL AREAS FROM BASE AREA 611. THE EXTENSIVE COMBINED CLEAR AND SEARCH OPERATION DUE EAST OF HUE, WHICH WAS INITIATED ON 25 FEB AND WHICH WILL BE REINFORCED ON 26 FEB BY TWO COMPANIES, SHOULD PREVENT ANY EFFORTS BY THE ENEMY TO REENTER THE PHU THU/PHU YANG AREA. ONGOING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE 5TH MVA REGIMENT IN THE JUNGLES DUE SOUTH OF HUE (SPOKANE RAPIDS) SHOULD SERVE AS AN ADEQUATE DETERRENT AGAINST ENEMY OPERATIONS FROM THE SOUTH.

17(3)

17(3)

5. ACTIONS TAKEN AND ANTICIPATED FUTURE PLANS.

A. AS INDICATED IN THE PREVIOUS REPORT, ENEMY ACTIVITIES IN THE XXIV CORPS AO DICTATE NO MAJOR CHANGE IN CURRENT PLANS. AT 251300 HOURS, AN ADDITIONAL TROOP AND THE HEADQUARTERS OF 3/5 CAV MOVED NORTH AND WERE PLACED UNDER THE OPCON OF 3D MAR DIV FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING A REACTION CAPABILITY IN THE EVENT OF AN ENEMY ATTACK FROM THE NORTH. CO, 3D MAR DIV MADE SOME MINOR ADJUSTMENTS IN HIS INTERNAL BOUNDARIES. THESE INVOLVED PRIMARILY THE TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EASTERN PORTION OF AO KENTUCKY TO THE 1/5TH MECHANIZED BRIGADE, THUS FREEING ELEMENTS OF 3/5 MARINES FOR OPERATIONS TO THE WEST. ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR TWO COMPANIES OF THE 3/3 MARINES (CURRENTLY LOCATED IN THE VICINITY DONG HANG MOUNTAIN) TO REINFORCE THE 4TH MARINE REGIMENT IN SCOTLAND AO IN THE EVENT OF A COORDINATED ENEMY ATTACK. MARGINAL WEATHER AND THE REQUIREMENT TO TRANSPORT REPLACEMENTS TO FSE'S NEVILLE AND RUSSELL PREVENTED THE DEPLOYMENT OF ELEMENTS OF 1/4 MARINES TO FSE ARGONNE. THIS DEPLOYMENT IS PLANNED FOR 26 FEB, WEATHER PERMITTING.

B. CLEAR AND SEARCH OPERATIONS IN THE DEWEY CANYON AO WILL CONTINUE ALONG THE SAME GENERAL PATTERN UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IT IS APPARENT THAT ALL ENEMY INSTALLATIONS HAVE BEEN OVERRUN.

C. IN THE 101ST ABN DIVISION AO, MOVEMENT INTO THE SPOKANE RAPIDS AREA WAS COMPLETED BY THE 3/137 AND THE 2/502 ABN BATTALIONS. CLEAR AND SEARCH OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE SPOKANE RAPIDS AO ARE NOW UNDERWAY. THE 3/8 ARVN BATTALION WAS UNABLE TO BE DEPLOYED TO THE SPOKANE RAPIDS AREA BECAUSE OF WEATHER. HOWEVER, IT IS PREPARED TO MOVE AS SOON AS WEATHER PERMITS.

D. ALL PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED CLEAR AND SEARCH AND PACIFICATION OPERATIONS IN THE COASTAL AREAS ARE CONTINUING.

SSC NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
SIC

17/49

17(4)

SECRET

ZNY SSSSS
 P R 252119Z FEB69
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CAMP BUTLER
 ZEN/MCAF FUTEMA
 ZEN/MCAS IWAKUNI
 ZEN/CAMP SMITH
 ZEN/MCAS KANEOME
 INFO ZEN/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMLMPA/CG FLC

BT

SECRET LIMDIS MCEO

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY REPORT (U)

- A. ADMINO FMFPAC 172158Z/SEP68 (NOTAL) *Not Held* } *this command*
 B. CG FMFPAC 020116Z/NOV68 (NOTAL) *Not Held*
 C. OMC 181449Z/FEB69 (NOTAL) *Not Held*
1. (U) REFS A AND B ESTABLISHED SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS ASSIGNED TO SUBJECT REPORTS.

PAGE TWO RUHFMA3470 SECRET LIMDIS MCEO

2. (S) REF C AUTHORIZES THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS TO REFS A AND B.

A. DELETE SPECAT AND OFFICERS EYES ONLY AND REPLACE WITH LIMDIS. SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD NOW BE LISTED IN FOLLOWING ORDER ON MSG: SECRET LIMDIS MCEO.

B. NEW UNCLAS SUBJ OF THIS MSG REPLACES SUBJ IN REFS A AND B.

C. NEGATIVE REPORTS MAY BE SUBMITTED BY UNCLAS MSG TO THIS HQS ATTN G-2.

GP-4

BT

3470

SECRET

36

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM MG CORCORAN C/S MACV		DATE 26 FEB 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 260219Z FEB 69		COPY# 1,2,3,4 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT MAC 2480 EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
2	CG	I			lf	REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
3	DCG	I	26 Feb		lf	
6	DCG AIR	I			Q.H.	
1	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
	S/S	X	26 Feb		rgw	
	G-1					
5	G-2	I	Memorandum			
4	G-3	I	copy # 3			
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					

Memorandum

DATE: 27 Feb 1969

FROM : Admin Asst to Chief of Staff
 FOR : Administrative Officer, G-2 Section
 SUBJECT: C/S MACV's message 260219Z FEB69 (C)
 EYES ONLY

1. Chief of Staff indicates that subject message should be routed to AC/S, G-2 for information. Therefore, it is requested that subject message be brought to the attention of the AC/S, G-2.

R. M. HUNTER
 Captain USMC

#37

s/s-40

CONFIDENTIAL

#37

LTC ST ILLWELL CG XXIV CORPS
LTC PEERS CG IFFV
LTC KERWIN CG II FFV
CG EDWARD SA IV CTE

CONFIDENTIAL TAC 2430 EYES ONLY
REFERENCE TAC 2402

1. IN THIS PERIOD OF INCREASED ACTIVITY, YOUR DAILY REPORTS ARE MOST HELPFUL TO GENERAL ADRAYS. WE ALSO DEPEND ON THEM AS A MAJOR SOURCE IN PREPARING REPORTS TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES.
2. SINCE SI MATERIAL MUST BE HANDLED IN A SPECIAL MANNER, FORWARD THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION AS A SUPPLEMENTAL AND SEPARATE PORTION OF YOUR REPORTS.
3. THE TIMELINESS OF THESE REPORTS, THEREFORE, IS CRITICAL. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THESE BE IN THIS BOX BY 1500 HOURS AT THE LATEST. THIS MEANS THAT THEY SHOULD BE FILED IN YOUR COMM CENTER WLT LAST HOURS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

175

*We were not sending
our SI separately.
will do so now*

XXXXVZ

3

CONFIDENTIAL

#37

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM LTG STILWELL		DATE 27 FEB 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 270335Z		1,2,3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TOP SECRET PHB 0367 EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
2	CG					REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4... THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
3	DCG		27 Feb			
3	DCG AIR					
11	C/S	T				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
	S/S	X	27 Feb		rgu	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

Copy to - Done
Sig 2 - Done

19

TOP SECRET

O 210335Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
TO MG CORCORAN CHIEF OF STAFF MACV
INFO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T PHB 0367 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. (TS) ENEMY ACTIONS 261200 FEB 69 TO 271200 FEB 69.

A. DURING THE PERIOD, THE INTENSITY OF THE ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE CORPS AO CONTINUED ALONG THE SAME GENERAL PATTERN. THERE WERE NO MAJOR GROUND ATTACKS AGAINST ANY INSTALLATION, ALTHOUGH AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT THE 27TH NVA REGIMENT HAS NOW INFILTRATED THROUGH THE DMZ AND IS PREPARING FOR AN ATTACK AND THE 138TH NVA REGIMENT MAY BE IN THE PROCESS OF INFILTRATING THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE DMZ.

B. THE ENEMY CONTACT BETWEEN L/3/4 MARINES IN THE VICINITY OF FSB RUSSELL (REFERRED TO IN THE PREVIOUS REPORT) WAS BROKEN BY THE ENEMY AT 261200 HOURS FEB. ACCUMULATIVE RESULTS OF THIS ACTION WERE: FRIENDLY - NINE (9) KIA, EIGHT (8) WIA, AND ENEMY - FOUR (4) KIA. THE UNIT IS CONTINUING ITS OPERATION IN THE VALLEY AT GRID COORDINATES XD 973593.

C. DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS, SMALL PROBES WERE MADE AGAINST FSB'S NEVILLE, FULLER, AND RUSSELL. THESE PROBES WERE NOT ACCOMPANIED BY MORTAR FIRE BUT CONSISTED OF RECONNAISSANCE PERSONNEL APPROACHING THE WIRE AND, UPON DISCOVERY, USING HAND GRENADES AND SATCHEL CHARGE AGAINST FRIENDLY FORCES. MARINE ELEMENTS AT FSB RUSSELL KILLED TWO (2) OF THE ENEMY, AND THE DEFENDING FORCES AT NEVILLE SUSTAINED TWO (2) WIA. ADDITIONALLY, IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS AN ENEMY FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN (15) PERSONNEL WAS SIGHTED BY THE DONG HA RIVER PATROL OF TASK FORCE CLEARWATER. THE ENEMY ELEMENT WAS TAKEN UNDER FIRE, AND A REACTION FORCE WAS IMMEDIATELY DISPATCHED TO THE LOCATION IN WHICH THE ENEMY WAS SIGHTED. ONE ENEMY KIA (WITH IW) WAS DISCOVERED BY THE REACTION FORCE. 19/11

D. ALTHOUGH INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT THE 138TH NVA REGIMENT IS IN THE PROCESS OF INFILTRATING THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE DMZ, RADAR SIGHTINGS THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT WERE RELATIVELY FEW IN NUMBER, AND NO GROUND CONTACTS WERE MADE BY FORCES LOCATED IN THE AREA.

E. IN THE DEWEY CANYON AO, OPERATIONS CONTINUED WITHOUT MAJOR INCIDENT. L/3/4 MARINES OVERRAN TWO (2) HEAVY MACHINE GUNS, AND OTHER 9TH MARINE ELEMENTS CONTINUED TO FIND SMALL QUANTITIES OF SUPPLIES. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DISCOVERY OF THE REPORTING PERIOD WAS MADE BY K/3/9 MARINES AND CONSISTED OF 260 60 MM MORTAR ROUNDS. AT 2000 HOURS, THERE WAS A SMALL, UNSUCCESSFUL ENEMY PROBE AGAINST K/3/9 MARINES AND AT 2155 HOURS, C/1/9 MARINES RECEIVED AN ATTACK BY FIRE, SUSTAINING NO CASUALTIES OR DAMAGE. ADDITIONALLY, THE 2/2 ARVN BATTALION WERE SUBJECTED TO A SMALL ATTACK BY FIRE, IN WHICH FIVE (5) PERSONNEL WERE WOUNDED.

F. ACTIVITY IN THE 101ST ABN DIVISION AO CONTINUED TO BE LIGHT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A SERIES OF SMALL CONTACTS BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF THE 3/187 ABN BATTALION AND UNITS FROM THE 5TH NVA REGIMENT IN THE VICINITY OF LZ SUSAN. OF SIGNIFICANCE IS THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO ENEMY ATTACKS BY FIRE AGAINST ANY INSTALLATION IN THE 101ST ABN DIVISION AO. 11721

19(2)

2. (TS) ENEMY INTENTIONS

A. ALTHOUGH ENEMY ACTIVITY CONTINUES TO BE RELATIVELY LIGHT, INDICATIONS ARE THAT NVA ELEMENTS ARE PLANNING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE IN THAT PORTION OF THE AO JUST SOUTH OF THE DMZ. PREVIOUS PREDICTIONS OF ATTACKS AGAINST 3D MARINE DIVISION INSTALLATIONS, HWAY 9, THE CAM LO AREA, AND THE CUA VIET AREA REMAIN UNCHANGED. THERE IS AN UNCONFIRMED INDICATION THAT SOME KIND OF ENEMY EFFORT MAY BE MADE AGAINST INSTALLATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF QUANG TRI. IF SUCH AN ATTACK IS UNDERTAKEN, IT WOULD PROBABLY CONSIST OF AN ATTACK AGAINST THE QUANG TRI COMBAT BASE RATHER THAN AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.

B. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE ENEMY HAS ANY CAPABILITY TO UNDERTAKE A MAJOR ATTACK AGAINST INSTALLATIONS IN THE 101ST ABN DIVISION AREA. ENEMY UNITS IN THAT AO APPEAR TO BE REACTING AGAINST FRIENDLY INITIATIVE IN THE DEWEY CANYON AO AND AGAINST ONGOING OPERATIONS IN THE OHIO RAPIDS AND SPOKANE RAPIDS AO'S.

C. WEATHER CONTINUES TO BE A PROBLEM, WITH PREDICTIONS FOR THE NEXT FIVE (5) DAYS LESS THAN OPTIMISTIC. THIS ANTICIPATED ADVERSE WEATHER WILL PROBABLY DELAY THE MOVEMENT OF 3D MARINE DIVISION ELEMENTS TO FSB ARGONNE AND THE MOVEMENT OF ARVN ELEMENTS INTO THE SPOKANE RAPIDS AO. FIRST PRIORITY AT THIS TIME FOR THE USE OF HELICOPTERS IS THE RESUPPLY OF FORCES IN THE DEWEY CANYON AO AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF REPLACEMENTS AND REINFORCEMENTS TO FSB'S NEVILLE AND RUSSELL.

3. (TS) ACTIONS TAKEN AND IMMEDIATE FUTURE PLANS

A. CURRENT PLANS REMAIN UNCHANGED. ALL UNITS ARE OPERATING DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS ON AN INCREASED STATE OF ALERT IN ANTICIPATION OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE GROUND ACTION, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA JUST SOUTH OF THE DMZ. BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING THREAT AGAINST FSB'S NEVILLE AND RUSSELL, PLANS ARE UNDERWAY TO REINFORCE THESE TWO BASES DURING THE DAYLIGHT HOURS OF 27 FEB. WITH REGARD TO FSB NEVILLE, ONE COMPANY (F/2/4) WILL BE MOVED FROM FSB ALPINE TO FSB NEVILLE. THE REMAINING FORCES ON FSB ALPINE WILL CONSIST OF AN ARTILLERY BATTERY AND ONE MARINE COMPANY (D/1/4).

B. IN THE DEWEY CANYON AO, CLEAR AND SEARCH OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE. IN THE 101ST ABN DIVISION AO, CLEAR AND SEARCH OPERATIONS IN THE SPOKANE RAPIDS AO WILL CONTINUE. IN THE VICINITY OF THE AN LO BRIDGE A COMBINED CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATION ALONG THE NORTH BANKS OF THE SONG BO RIVER AND SOUTH OF Q-1 WILL BE INITIATED ON 27 FEB.

C. ALL PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED CLEAR AND SEARCH AND PACIFICATION OPERATIONS IN THE COASTAL AREAS ARE CONTINUING.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
900

19(3)

19(3)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM COMNAVFORV		DATE 27 FEB 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 2704497 FEB 69		COPY# 2 OF 2 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					TOP SECRET LINDIS REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER PSSII.4__ THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
4	DCG					
3	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	27 FEB			
	G-1					
3	G-2	A				
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

23 ①
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PT006991
 OTTTZYUW RUMUGKD1888 0580443-TTTT-RUMUFGA.
 ZNY TTTT
 O P 270443Z FEB 69
 FM COMNAVFORV
 TO RUMUFGA/COMNAVSUPACT DNG
 RHMCSDE/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
 INFO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV
 BT

T O P S E C R E T L I M D I S
 POSSIBLE ENEMY USE OF UNDERWATER COMMUNICATIONS CABLES (TS)
 1. (TSL) A BOTTOM SEARCH TO CONFIRM THE EXISTENCE OF POSSIBLE U/W COMMUNICATIONS CABLES IN THE DANANG AREA IS SCHEDULED TO COMMENCE ON OR ABOUT 2 MAR. SEA/WEATHER PERMITTING. OPERATION ENVISIONS A SIMULATED NIGHT AIRCRAFT CRASH VICINITY BY 070787/9 TO PROVIDE PLAUSIBLE COVER FOR DIVING OPERATIONS. POSIT OF U/W COMMUNICATION CABLES, IF LOCATED, WILL BE BUOYED APPROXIMATELY TEN FEET BELOW SURFACE AND IN ADDITION AN ACCURATE NAVIGATIONAL FIX WILL BE OBTAINED TO FACILITATE EVENTUAL EXPLOITATION.
 2. (TSL) FOR COMNAVSUPACT DNG, DIVING TEAM OF ONE OFFICER AND FOUR ENLISTED PLUS LCDR ANDERSON, COMNAVFORV

PAGE TWO RUMUGKD1888 T O P S E C R E T L I M D I S
 SALVAGE OFFICER AS OINC WILL ARRIVE DANANG ONE MAR. REQ ARRANGE BERTHING FOR PERIOD OF ABOUT ONE WEEK.
 FURTHER REQUEST:

- A. UTILIZATION OF SUITABLE DIVING BOAT TO SUPPORT SEARCH OPERATIONS.
 - B. SUITABLE SUBMERSIBLE MARKER BUOY WITH APPROXIMATELY 50 FEET ONE HALF/FIVE EIGHTS INCH WIRE AND ANCHORS/CLUMPS TO MARK SITE OF U/W COMMUNICATIONS CABLE IF/WHEN LOCATED.
 - C. TWO 50 GALLON DRUMS OF DIESEL FUEL, NECESSARY EXPLOSIVES TO DETONATE AND IGNITE SAME, AND SERVICES OF EOD PERSONNEL TO SIMULATE INCIDENT.
 - D. OTHER MISCELLANEOUS SUPPORT THAT MAY BE REQUIRED.
3. (TSL) FOR CTF ONE ONE FIVE. UPON RECEIPT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF SEARCH OPERATION (VIA L/L) REQUEST ASSISTANCE MARKET TIME UNIT (PREFERABLY NEAREST MSO/MSC ASSIGNED) TO PLANT MARKER BUOYS ALONG 30 FT CURVE AT ET 072797/2 AND BT 066778/6. IF EFFORT UNSUCCESSFUL AT THIS DEPTH WILL REQUIRE SUBSEQUENT PLANTING OF BUOYS ALONG 40 FOOT CURVE AT BT 081797/2 AND BT 075778/4. ADDITIONALLY DESIRE

PAGE THREE RUMUGKD1888 T O P S E C R E T L I M D I S
 UNIT ASSIGNED PROVIDE NAVIGATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO DIVING.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAP 2100/5

COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES

TOP SECRET

23(1)

TOP SECRET

* TOP SECRET *

BOAT PERIODICALLY AND TO OBTAIN ACCURATE TERRESTRIAL FIX
USING BOTH BEARINGS AND SEXTANT ANGLES OV SITE OF U/W
COMMUNICATION CABLES IF/WHEN LOCATED.

4. (TSL) FOR PLANNING; SEARCH OPERATION SHOULD COMPLETE
WITHIN FOUR DAYS AFTER SIMULATED INCIDENT.

5. (TSL) BECAUSE OF EXTERMELY DELICATE NATURE OF THIS
OPERATION; DISSEMINATION IS TO BE STRICTLY LIMITED;

ACTION ADDRES ACKNOWLEDGE

GP-1

BT

#1888

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM STILWELL, LTGEN		DATE 28 FEB 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 287621Z		COPY# OF COPIES RECO 1,2, OF 3	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TOP SECRET PHB 0372	
			IN	OUT			
	CG					REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4... THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
1	C/S	I			7		
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
	S/S	X	28 Feb		JSW		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
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	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

②0
TOP SECRET

0 230521Z ZYR ZFF-0

FM LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
TO MG CORCORAN CHIEF OF STAFF MACV
INFO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

TOP SECRET PHB 0372 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. (TS) AS A FOLLOW-UP TO MY PHB 0371 DTG 23033Z FEB, SUBJECT AS ABOVE, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM 3D MAR DIV SUBSEQUENT TO TRANSMITTAL OF DAILY REPORT: AT 272250 HOURS, RECONNAISSANCE TEAM TEMPLE LAKE, OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF XD 827235, HEARD VEHICULAR MOVEMENT TO ITS NORTH AND PERSONNEL MOVEMENT TO THE SOUTH. THE ENEMY WAS MOVING FROM WEST TO EAST, WITH THE VEHICLES PROCEEDING ALONG ROUTE 926. THE TOTAL ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH WAS 200. AT 233215 HOURS, THE TEAM AGAIN HEARD FROM THREE TO FIVE TRUCKS OPERATING APPROXIMATELY 500 METERS NORTH OF ITS POSITION. ONE VEHICLE WAS OBSERVED. THE TEAM REPORTED THAT THE TRUCKS SOUNDED AS IF THEY WERE TOWING EQUIPMENT WITH CHAINS. AGAIN! AT 280900 HOURS TWO ENEMY SOLDIERS WERE OBSERVED WORKING WITH SHOVELS AT XD 828237. 45 MINUTES LATER SIX MORE ENEMY SOLDIERS ARRIVED AT THAT SAME LOCATION. A VEHICLE AT THAT LOCATION WAS NOTED TO BE TRACKED AND OF THE SAME APPROXIMATE SIZE AS A 6 X 6.
2. (TS) ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING INFORMATION, THE TARGET WAS STRUCK BY TPQ IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 28 FEB. AT 231130 HOURS, THE TEAM COULD STILL SEE ENEMY TROOPS WORKING IN THE AREA BUT REPORTED THAT ALL VEHICULAR MOVEMENT HAD CEASED.
3. (TS) ONE ADDITIONAL ITEM. JUST PRIOR TO THE TRANSMISSION OF THIS SPOT REPORT, A TELEPHONE CALL WAS RECEIVED FROM COLONEL BARROW, CO 9TH MARINES, IN WHICH HE INDICATED THAT F/2/9 MARINES HAD JUST OVERRUN TWO (2) ADDITIONAL 65MM GUNS. A TOTAL OF FOUR (4) SUCH WEAPONS HAVE NOW BEEN CAPTURED BY THE 9TH MARINES

340

NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

TOP SECRET

20/11

20/11

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM ISS [unclear] CO [unclear] [unclear] SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 28 03582 FEB 69		DATE 28 FEB 69	
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ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
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2	CG				[initials]	REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4... THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
3	DCG		1 Mar		[initials]	
4	DCG AIR				[initials]	
1	C/S				[initials]	
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23
TOP SECRET

0 260358Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
TO MG CORCORAN CHIEF OF STAFF MACV
INFO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T PHB #371 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO
SUBJECT: ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. (TS) ENEMY INTENTIONS:

A. ENEMY OPERATIONS IN THE 11TH DTA/XXIV CORPS AREA DURING THE 24-HOUR REPORTING PERIOD CONTINUED TO REFLECT DECREASING INITIATIVE. THERE WERE NO REPORTED GROUND ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE CORPS AO.

B. IN THE AREA IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE DMZ, THERE WERE ONLY THREE ATTACKS BY FIRE (TWO MORTAR ATTACKS IN THE EARLY EVENING ON UNITS IN THE VICINITY OF GIO LINH, AND ONE MORTAR ATTACK AT 0430 HOURS IN THE VICINITY OF CON THINH). DURING THE AFTERNOON HOURS OF 27 FEB, THERE WERE TWO ISOLATED INSTANCES OF SMALL GROUPS OF DETAINEES BEING APPREHENDED, AND A TOTAL OF 24 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS FOUND DURING SWEEPS AROUND FSB'S NEVILLE AND RUSSELL.

C. DESPITE UNACCEPTABLE WEATHER CONDITIONS, THE 9TH MARINES CONTINUED ITS SEARCH OPERATIONS IN THE DEWEY CANYON AO, UNCOVERING A NUMBER OF SMALL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION CACHES AND ONE CACHE (AT YD 215833) OF CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE. THE CONTENTS OF THE LARGE CACHE, WHICH CONSISTED OF MORE THAN 22,000 ROUNDS OF ASSORTED MORTAR, ARTILLERY, AND ROCKET AMMUNITION AND MORE THAN 300 WEAPONS OF VARIOUS SIZES, HAS BEEN DESCRIBED IN A PREVIOUS COMMUNICATION AND WILL BE REPORTED THROUGH ROUTINE CHANNELS UPON COMPLETION OF THE SEARCH. 9TH MARINE ELEMENTS ALSO OVERRAN (AT YD 159825) ONE SMALL UNWORKABLE BULLDOZER AND ONE 122 MM GUN (COMPLETED) AND (AT YD 153832) A SECOND BULLDOZER IN EXCELLENT CONDITION. AT 1630 HOURS, ANOTHER ARTILLERY POSITION AT YD 167832 WAS OVERRUN, RESULTING IN THE CAPTURE OF TWO - 85 MM GUNS BOTH OF WHICH HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY THE ENEMY. THERE WERE THREE CONTACTS THROUGHOUT THE REPORTING PERIOD. THESE CONTACTS WERE OF PLATOON SIZE OR LOWER AND RESULTED IN A TOTAL OF FIVE FRIENDLY KIA'S, 19 FRIENDLY WIA'S AND 25 NVA KIA'S. 22(1)

D. ACTIVITIES IN THE 101ST ABN DIVISION AO REFLECTED NO CHANGE IN PATTERN. THERE WAS A SMALL ARVN CONTACT JUST NORTH OF FSB BIRMINGHAM IN THE AFTERNOON HOURS OF 27 FEB. THE CORDON AND SEARCH IN THE VICINITY OF THE AN LO BRIDGE PRODUCED SIX VCI. TWO VC TURNED THEMSELVES IN IN THE PHU VANG AREA. AN AMBUSH ALONG THE BOWLING ALLEY RESULTED IN ONE VC KIA. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY IN THE 101ST ABN DIVISION AREA WAS THE DISCOVERY, BY 2/501 ABN BN, OF ANOTHER LARGE CACHE IN THE OLD 5TH NVA REGIMENTAL CP AREA NEAR FSB BRICK. THIS DISCOVERY, WHICH OCCURRED AT 271420 HOURS, CONSISTED OF MORE THAN 700 MIXED MORTAR ROUNDS, 7,000 ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION, AND 1,000 STICKS OF TNT.

E. WEATHER THROUGHOUT THE CORPS AO CONTINUED TO BE THE PRIMARY OBSTACLE CONFRONTING ALL FRIENDLY FORCES, RESTRICTING OPERATIONS IN THE JUNGLE AREA TO LIMITED PATROLS BECAUSE OF THE REQUIREMENT TO CONSERVE AMMUNITION AND RATIONS PENDING RESUPPLY BY AIR. ONLY ONE SUCCESSFUL RESUPPLY FLIGHT WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN THE DEWEY CANYON AO DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. THIS CONSISTED OF AN AIR DROP BY C-130 AIRCRAFT ON FSB CUNNINGHAM OF TEN (10) INDIVIDUAL PARACHUTE LOADS (240 ROUNDS OF 105 MM AMMUNITION AND FOUR (4) DRUMS OF DF-2). AT THE CLOSE OF THE REPORTING PERIOD, THE WEATHER WAS SLIGHTLY IMPROVED. ALL LOGISTICS RESOURCES WERE ORIENTED TOWARD THE RESUPPLY EFFORT BY BOTH AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTER. WEATHER PREDICTIONS FOR THE NEXT FEW DAYS INDICATE A CONTINUATION OF LIMITED CEILINGS.

2. (TS) ENEMY INTENTIONS:

A. ENEMY INTENTIONS ARE NOW THE PRIMARY CONCERN OF XXIV CORPS. DESPITE THE SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN ACTIVITY (AS INDICATED BY THE REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF ATTACKS, A DECREASE IN RADAR INTERCEPTS ALONG THE DMZ, AND A REDUCTION IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ENEMY CONTACTS), THERE IS STILL SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT ENEMY FORCES IN THE NORTH ARE ATTEMPTING TO REFRAIN FROM CONTACT WITH FRIENDLY ELEMENTS WHILE ORGANIZING FOR A SERIES OF COORDINATED ASSAULTS. FRIENDLY COUNTER-OPERATIONS MAY BE SERVING AS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
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22 (2)

0280358Z ZYH ZFF-5

FM LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
TO MG CORCORAN CHIEF OF STAFF MACV
INFO LI CUSHMAN CG III MAF
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T PHB 0371 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

B. ~~THERE IS INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT THE COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE DEWEY CANYON AND 101ST ABN DIVISION AO'S HAVE PRE-EMPTED ENEMY ATTACK PLANS ALONG QL-1 IN THE VICINITY OF HUE. FORCES THAT WERE ASSEMBLING IN THE VICINITY OF BASE AREA 114 NOW APPEAR TO BE WITHDRAWING TOWARD BASE AREA 611, WITH THE 9TH NVA REGT HAVING ARRIVED IN THAT LOCATION. THE 5TH NVA REGT IS FULLY OCCUPIED IN THE SPLKANE RAPIDS AO, AND THE 4TH NVA REGT HAS NOT YET PROVED TO BE CAPABLE OF UNDERTAKING ANY EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS ON THE HWYWAY SOUTH OF PHU BAI.~~

C. THERE IS STILL EVIDENCE THAT THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ENEMY CONFUSION IN BASE AREA 611 CONTINUES TO PREVAIL. ALTHOUGH SOME COMBAT ELEMENTS APPEAR TO BE DEPLOYING IN THAT DIRECTION, THE ENEMY HAS SO FAR INDICATED NO CAPABILITY OF ORGANIZING AN EFFECTIVE COUNTEROFFENSIVE. ON THE CONTRARY, HIS PIECE MEAL COMMITMENT OF FORCES HAS PROVED TO BE COSTLY TO HIM. HE HAS ABANDONED ALL EFFORTS TO WITHDRAW EQUIPMENT AND IS CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO DESTROY SAME BEFORE IT IS OVERRUN.

3. ACTIONS TAKEN AND IMMEDIATE FUTURE PLANS.

A. THERE CONTINUES TO BE NO REQUIREMENT TO MODIFY ONGOING OPERATIONS OR CHANGE CURRENT PLANS. IT IS APPARENT THAT OPERATIONS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY HAVE BEEN A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN PREVENTING PLANNED ENEMY ATTACKS FROM TAKING PLACE. A CONCERTED EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO UNDERTAKE THE OPERATION OUT OF FSB ARGONNE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. AS REPORTED YESTERDAY, IT WAS THE INTENTION OF CG, 3D MAR DIV TO MOVE ONE COMPANY FROM FSB ALPINE TO FSB NEVILLE. BECAUSE OF THE WEATHER, THIS COMPANY (F/2/4 MARINES) PROCEEDED OVERLAND IN THE DIRECTION OF FSB NEVILLE WITH THE MISSION OF SEARCHING THE AREA WHILE EN ROUTE, TO COUNTER POSSIBLE ENEMY THREAT IN THE CAN LO AND COASTAL AREAS IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE DMZ. CG, 3D MAR DIV HAS MADE SOME MINOR INTERNAL AO ADJUSTMENTS WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR A DETAILED SEARCH OF LEATHERNECK SQUARE AND TIGHTER CONTROL OF SEARCH OPERATIONS AROUND CAN LO.

B. THE DISCOVERY OF THE SIGNIFICANT CACHE IN THE DEWEY CANYON AO DICTATES THAT ~~THE OPERATION CONTINUE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ALL ENEMY INSTALLATIONS IN THAT AREA HAVE BEEN OVERRUN. ADDITIONALLY, THE DISCOVERY OF THE 5TH NVA REGT'S SUPPLY BASE FURTHER JUSTIFIES THE CONTINUATION OF THE SPOKANE RAPIDS OPERATIONS~~

C. ALL PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED CLEAR AND SEARCH AND PACIFICATION OPERATIONS IN THE COASTAL AREA ARE CONTINUING.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
388

22(3)

22(3)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM GG THIRD MARDIV		DATE 28 FEB 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 280300Z FEB 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
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EXCLUSIVE
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CONFIDENTIAL #41

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P 280300Z FEB 69
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
INFO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
R UMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN CUSHMAN AND
LTGEN STILWELL

SUBJ: SAPPER ATTACKS AGAINST MARINE POSITIONS

1. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION
QUOTE 1. BASED ON MY DISCUSSIONS WITH INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY
COMMANDERS WITHIN POSITIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN ATTACKED BY SAPPERS
PLUS AN ANALYSIS OF DETAILED ENEMY PLANS CAPTURED FOLLOWING
THE ATTACK ON FSE RUSSEL I HAVE ARRIVED AT THE FOLLOWING
TENTATIVE GENERAL CONCLUSIONS:

- A. UNDER COVER OF ENEMY MORTAR FIRE PLUS THE NOISE OF OUR OWN ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE THE ENEMY HAD DISPLAYED A CAPABILITY TO PENETRATE OUR WELL PREPARED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WITH UP TO 50 SAPPERS WITHOUT BEING DETECTED.
- B. ONCE INSIDE THE WIRE THESE WELL ORGANIZED FOUR MAN SAPPER TEAMS WHO HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED IN GREAT DETAIL HAVE

PAGE TWO RUNHVP 3581 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT
HAVE A CAPABILITY OF INFLICTING MAJOR DAMAGE AGAINST THE
INTERIOR OF THE POSITION.

C. MAJOR REVISIONS OF OUR APPROACH TO THE SECURITY OF
OUR VITAL INSTALLATIONS ARE NECESSARY.

2. ACCORDING TO THE CAPTURED PLANS FOUR ENEMY GROUPS EACH
CONSISTING OF 3-4 MAN TEAMS MOVED TO WITHIN 100 METERS OF THE
WIRE AT 1800 HOURS, MOVED TO THE WIRE BY 0200 HOURS, BREACHED
THE WIRE WITH WIRE CUTTERS AND BY THROWING LIMBS AND BRANCHES
OVER THE WIRE, THEN MOVED QUICKLY THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE POSI-
TION ALL UNDER THE COVER OF MORTAR AND ARTILLERY NOISE PLUS
A VERY THICK BANK OF FOG. ATTACKS BY SMALL ARMS AND RPGS
FROM OUTSIDE THE POSITION PLUS THE HEAVY DAMAGE DONE BY VERY
ACCURATE 82MM FIRE LEAD TO SUCH DEFECTION AND CONFUSION WITHIN
THE PERIMETER THAT THE SAPPERS WERE ABLE TO DESTROY MANY
BUNKERS AND KILL MANY MARINES WITH SATCHEL CHARGES AND POINT
BLANK AK47 FIRE THROUGHOUT THE INTERIOR OF THE PERIMETER.
OUR OWN MORTAR CREWS, HEADQUARTERS INSTALLATIONS, AND ARTILLERY
CREWS SUFFERED MOST OF THE CASUALTIES. THREE LISTENING POSTS
OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER WERE NOT AWARE OF THE ENEMY PRESENCE;
NONE OF THE TRIP WIRES WERE SET OFF. ALTHOUGH A MAJORITY OF

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III MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-66)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO	
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	INS.	INT. SEC.	INT. COMDT.	INSPE.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#41	

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE RUMHVP 3581 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT
THE SAPPERS WERE KILLED INSIDE THE POSITION THE COST IN MARINE
LIVES WAS EXCESSIVE.

3. WHAT CAN BE DONE?

A. THE BEST DEFENSE FOR ANY BASE CONTINUES TO BE ACTIVE
PATROLLING, AMBUSHES, AND LISTENING POSTS OUTSIDE THE POSITION.

B. SINCE IT IS OBVIOUS FROM ENEMY PLANS AND SKETCHES THAT HE
IS ABLE TO PRECISELY PLAN HIS ATTACKS, WE MUST THEREFORE
PRESENT HIM WITH A CONTINUOUSLY CHANGING ARRANGEMENT OF OUR
DEFENSES.

C. PERIODIC ENEMY INCOMING HAS LEAD US TO INCREASED
RELIANCE ON BUNKERS FOR PROTECTION. ONCE GROUND ACTION COMM-
ENCES THESE BUNKERS ARE DEATH TRAPS. PROBABLY 20 MARINES IN OPEN
FOX HOLES IN THE INTERIOR AREA OF RUSSELL COULD HAVE KILLED THE 40
ENEMY BEFORE THEY DID ANY MAJOR DAMAGE. HUNDREDS OF MARINES
ENCLOSED IN BUNKERS CANNOT STOP EVEN A SMALL ATTACK.

WE NEED MORE FIGHTING PLACES AND LESS HIDING PLACES.

4. WE NEED TO EXPERIMENT WITH ALL MEANS OF PROVIDING IMMEDIATE
ALARM, SOME KIND OF ILLUMINATION IN FOG, FOOL PROOF TRIP FLARES,
INCREASED USE OF TANGLE FOOT BARRIERS OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE
POSITIONS, AND OTHER METHODS FOR INCREASING THE ENEMY'S DIFFI-

PAGE FOUR RUMHVP ETIQ C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT
CULTIES.

5. COMMANDERS AT ALL ECHELONS WILL GIVE THE ABOVE THEIR
IMMEDIATE AND CONTINUNG ATTENTION. MAJ GEN DAVIS. UNQUOTE.

GP-4

BT

3581

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

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11 MAF 2100/1 (REV. 11-56)

CG	AFC	CS	DC/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT.	ADJ.	CHAP.	CEO
CIB	COC	DENT. O.	EMB.	ENGR.	FD. SRV.	HQ. COMDT.	INSP.	LEGAL	MTO	POSTAL	PROTOCOL	PMO
PSY. OPS.	SPL. SERV.	SUP.	SURG.									#41

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5215 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM LT GEN STILWELL		DATE 28 FEB 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 28 1110Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
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	CG					SECRET PHB 0377 EYES ONLY
	DCG					REMARKS (1)
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SECRET

#42

C 231110Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1
 FM LTG STILLWELL CG XXIV COR S
 TO LTG CUSHMAN CG III MAF DNG
 GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN
 ZEM

SECRET PHB 0377 EYES ONLY

1. LAST NIGHT WE REPORTED A KING SIZE CACHE UNCOVERED BY D/1/9, RIGHT ON THE LAOTIAN BORDER, AS EXPLOITATION OF SA 41 CONTINUES. TRUONG AND I SPENT A GOOD DEAL OF TIME IN THE OPNL AREA TODAY (THE WEATHER PHENOMENUM WHICH PARTS CLOUDS OVER DEWEY CANYON--AND ONLY THERE-- FORTUITOUSLY OCCURRING AGAIN). CONGRATS ON YESTERDAY'S FIND WERE COUNTERED WITH "HOLD YOUR BREATH--THERE'S MORE COMING", AS A/1/9 MOVED UP TO HELP D/1/9 SECURE AND EXPLOIT.

2. HERE IS TODAY'S TAKE, ALL ENTRIES ADDITIVE TO EARLIER REPORT:

A. INDIVIDUAL WPNS (357):

305 SKS RIFLES

21 AK-47/50

18 K-44

13 SMG'S

B. CREW WERVED WPNS (63):

11 EA 12.7 AA GUNS

12 EA 57MM RR'S

2 EA 82MM MORTARS

2 EA 60MM MORTARS

3 EA 23MM AA GUNS

30 EA RPD'S OR LMG'S

3 EA MACHINE GUNS, MEDIUM

C. AMMUNITION:

770 122MM ROCKETS

410 122MM ARTY RDS

4000 120MM MORTAR RDS

10000 82MM MORTAR RDS

950 75MM RR RDS

19900 60MM MORTAR RDS

3160 RPG RDS

20000 37MM AA RDS

20000 HAND GRENADES (CHICOM)

6540 RIFLE GRENADES

11500 12.7MM AA RDS

500 AT MINES

300 AP MINES

42(i)

42(i)

- H (OTHER SMALL ARMS AMMO NOT YET COUNTED.)
3. IT MAY NOT HAVE COME OUT CLEARLY IN OUR INCREMENTAL REPORTING BUT TRUCK/TRACKED CARRIER/BULLDOZER TOTAL (CAPTURED OR DESTROYED BY AIR AND OVERRUN) STANDS AT 56. TO DATE, 9TH MARINES AND AIR HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR 11 122MM GUNS (EVACUATED, 4 SPIKED BY NVA, 5 DESTROYED BY AIR) AND 4 85MM GUNS (2 SPIKED, 2 DESTROYED BY AIR). INCIDENTALLY, TAC AIR SUPPORT HAS BEEN MAGNIFICENT AND INDISPENSABLE AND SO HAS THE HELO SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE 101ST ABN.
4. TODAY, ONE MARINE 105MM HOW BTRY AND ONE ARVN BTRY (-) WERE POSITIONED ATOP TIGER MTN (1228 METERS), COMMANDING A SHAU VALLEY.
5. ON TAM BOI MTN (YC 246042) HAD OPPORTUNITY CONFIRM THIS AREA UNDOUBTEDLY HOUSED MAJOR HEADQUARTERS (PROBABLY 65TH ARTY REGT). 122MM GUN POSITIONS THERE PERMITTED ONLY ONE DIRECTION OF FIRE: SOUTHEAST DOWN A SHAU. RESULTS OF IMMEDIATE AIRLIGHT (T 0512) PREVENTED REPOSITIONING TO ENGAGE MARINES ADVANCING IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION. 3/9HBN, ON TAM BOI SLOPES, HAS BEEN MOST SUCCESSFUL IN NIGHT AMBUSHES AGAINST ENEMY ELMS ATTEMPTING INFILTRATE NORTH. PATROLS OF THATBN HAVE UNCOVERED BY-PASS FROM RTE 922 TO RTE 548, RUNNING E-W THROUGH YD 258028. BN MOVING OUT TO EXPLOIT 1 MARCH.
6. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER. 010730H MAR.

#42(2)

95

SECRET

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42(2)