

15. CG III MAF 011200Z APR69 (U/E) *Group-4*  
FOR SIMPSON, DAVIS, QUIHNER & FEELEY FROM NICKERSON  
REASSIGNMENT MARINE CORPS COLONELS WITHIN THIS COMMAND
- ~~16. CG III MAF 011516Z APR69 (U/E)  
FOR GALT FROM WAITE  
ACMC VISIT TO GUAM & USTP~~
17. CG III MAF 031514Z APR69 (S) EXCLUSIVE *gp-4*  
FOR GHTYYS FROM NICKERSON  
ATTABOY ON YOUR BRIEFING TODAY -- CONCEPT APPROVED PRO PLANNING SUBJ TO  
AVAILABILITY OF DELTA FORCE & CGN ELEMENTS
18. CG III MAF 031516Z APR69 (S) EXCLUSIVE *gp-4*  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
NEW JERSEY EMPLOYMENT
19. CG III MAF 042340Z APR69 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-1*  
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON  
IN RESPONSE YOUR QUERY, THIRD MARDIV MSG 020140Z APR69 IS QUOTED FOR INFO  
DAVIS & THE UPD NEWS STORY
20. C/S III MAF 050401Z APR69 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-1*  
FOR VAN RYZIN, BUSE & DAVIS FROM DOOLEY  
READDRESSAL OF NICKERSON'S MSG TO ABRAMS FURNISHING DAVIS'S 020140Z APR69  
DAVIS & THE UPI STORY
21. CG III MAF 051440Z APR69 (S) EYES ONLY *gp - not shown*  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
PASSES CG III MAF MSG 042334Z APR69  
SERVICE FORCE ACTIONS / *Program Six*
22. CG III MAF 060158Z APR69 (C) MCEO *gp-4*  
EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS
23. CG III MAF 060244Z APR69 (C) MCEO *gp-4*  
EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS
24. CG III MAF 060246Z APR69 (C) MCEO *Group 4*  
EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS IN COUNTRY
- ~~25. CG III MAF 080700Z APR69 (C)  
FOR ZUMWALT FROM NICKERSON  
RECEIPT VP MSG FOR SEN TOWER ACKNOWLEDGED -- WILL DELIVER TO TOWER~~

7. ✓ CG III MAF 040145Z APR69 (TS) GP-4  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
✓ READDRESSAL OF ABRAMS 301218Z MAR69, SUBJ: SERVICE FORCE ACTIONS
8. ✓ CG III MAF 040146Z APR69 (TS) GP-4  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
✓ READDRESSAL OF ABRAMS 031042Z APR69, SUBJ: SERVICE FORCE ACTIONS
9. ✓ CG III MAF 040147Z APR69 (TS) GP-1  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
NO SUCCESS W/KY-3 -- WILL TRY 5 APR: (SERVICE ACTIONS TO DECREASE SUPPORT OF WAR)
10. ✓ CG III MAF 042339Z APR69 (TS) EYES ONLY GP-1  
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON  
✓ POSSIBLE PREEMPTIVE MOVE AGAINST ENEMY'S LOC IN BA 614 & KHAM DUC AREA  
NEED DELTA FORCE, CON SUPPORT & AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE -- PREPARED TO DISCUSS
- ~~11. CG III MAF 051415Z APR69 (TS) SENSITIVE EYES ONLY  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
READDRESSAL OF ABRAMS 041237Z APR69 READDRESSING ABRAMS TO MCCAIN 040936Z APR69  
FORCE REDUCTION PLANNING~~
- ~~12. CG III MAF 000145Z APR69 (TS) EYES ONLY  
FORCE REDUCTION PLANNING  
REMAINED IN UNOPENED SEALED ENVELOPE~~
- ~~13. CG III MAF 100737Z APR69 (TS) EYES ONLY  
COPIES REMAINED IN SEALED UNOPENED ENVELOPE~~

14. ✓ CG III MAF 101540Z APR69 (TS) EYES ONLY GP-1  
 PASSES III MAF MSG TO MACV 042339Z APR69  
 OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY IN BA 614/KHAM DUC
15. ✓ CG III MAF 110745Z APR69 (TS) EYES ONLY GP-1  
 READDRESSAL OF III MAF 042339Z  
 SUBJ: OPERATIONS IN THE KHAM/ DUC/BA 614 AREA.
16. ✓ CG III MAF 121400Z APR69 (TS) MCEO GP-4  
 EXCLUSIVE FOR SIMPSON, DAVIS, QUILLTER & FEELEY FROM NICKERSON  
 PASSES CMC MSG 111311Z APR69 (ATTABOY FROM CHAPMAN ON OPS/SECURITY)
17. ✓ CG III MAF 130420Z APR69 (TS) GP-3  
 FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON  
 OPERATIONS SECURITY BRIEF FOR COMUSMACV - 141435H APR69
- ~~18. CG III MAF 140925Z APR69 (TS)  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 FORCE REDUCTION PLANNING~~
- ~~19. CG III MAF 140926Z APR69 (TS)  
 TO CG JEMDAO  
 FORCE REDUCTION PLANNING~~
- ~~20. CG III MAF 171236Z APR69 (TS)  
 FORCE REDUCTION PLANNING~~
- ~~21. CG III MAF 171237Z APR69 (TS)  
 FORCE REDUCTION PLANNING~~
22. ✓ CG III MAF 210645Z APR69 (TS) EYES ONLY GP-1  
 FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
 PASSES III MAF'S 042339Z APR69  
 (SUBJ: POSSIBLE MOVE AGAINST ENEMY'S LOC IN BA 614 & KHAM DUC AREA)

26. CG III MAF 080948Z APR69 (C) *gp-4*  
FOR STILWELL, SIMPSON, DAVIS, GETTYS, QUILTER, ZAIS & FEELEY  
FROM NICKERSON  
CASUALTIES BY FRIENDLY FIREPOWER (UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES)
27. CG III MAF 080952Z APR69 (S) NOFORN *gp-4*  
PERSONAL FOR ZUMWALT INFO HOFFMANN AND STEFFERUD FROM DWYER  
OPERATIONS ON THE CUA DAI RIVER (U)
- ~~28. CG III MAF 081646Z APR69 (U)  
FOR VAN RVZIN INFO WILSON AND FEELEY FROM DOOLEY  
HOCB THE DOC (CJRRP)~~
- ~~29. CG III MAF 090316Z APR69 (C)  
FOR ZUMWALT FROM SENATOR TOWER  
REF ID 080324Z: ROGER & GOOD LUCK~~
30. CG III MAF 100230Z APR69 (C) SPECAT *gp-4*  
FOR SIMPSON, DAVIS & QUILTER FROM NICKERSON  
AIR GROUND PERSONNEL EXCHANGE (RELATES TO USAGE OF HELOS)
31. CG III MAF 100842Z APR69 (S) MCEO *gp-4*  
FIXED WING STRIKE REPORT (U)
32. CG III MAF 101524Z APR69 (S) MCEO *gp-4*  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
VISIT BY SENATOR TOWER TO III MAF
33. CG III MAF 101526Z APR69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *gang-4*  
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON  
VISIT OF SENATOR TOWER TO III MAF
- ~~34. CG III MAF 110730Z APR69 (C)  
FOR BRINGLE FROM NICKERSON  
YOU'RE WELCOME TO COME. I WON'T BE HERE. CARL YOUNGDALE WILL~~
35. CG III MAF 160710Z APR69 (S) *gp-4*  
FOR BGEN LEE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
COMBINED OPERATION TO REOPEN THE SONG CAU DAI *no reply*
36. CG III MAF 161242Z APR69 (S) MCEO *gp-3*  
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES REPORT (U)
37. CG III MAF 180202Z APR69 (S) FOR *gp-4*  
FOR JONES FROM NICKERSON  
ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT DEADLINE (U)
38. CG III MAF 180617Z APR69 (C) FOR *gp-4*  
FOR ZAIS & GETTYS FROM YOUNGDALE  
COMPARISON OF KILL RATIOS

39. CG III MAF 181500Z APR69 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
~~FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON~~  
 THIS MSG RESPONDS TO MACV'S QUERY ON THE ROK INCIDENT ON 15 APRIL  
*near PHUOC MY village*
40. CG III MAF 190410Z APR69 (C) EYES ONLY *gp-4*  
 FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON  
 VISIT TO TFA 29 APR 69
41. CG III MAF 191055Z APR69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *group-4*  
 FOR GETTYS FROM NICKERSON  
 RESETTLEMENT OF CIVILIANS IN BATANGAN PENINSULA
42. CG III MAF 210030Z APR69 (C) FOR *group-4*  
 FOR DYAS FROM NICKERSON  
 REQ CONCURRENCE ON VISIT F/29 APRIL 1969
43. CG III MAF 211120Z APR69 (U) FOR  
 FOR CHAE FROM NICKERSON  
 "ATTABOY ON YOUR DEPARTURE -- SORRY ABOUT YOUR HELICO ACCIDENT & THAT YOU COULDN'T  
 BE HERE WITH US"
44. CG III MAF 241311Z APR69 (S) *group-4*  
 FOR STILWELL FROM NICKERSON  
 SEND US A CAPTURED TRUCK -- GEN LAM WANTS IT
- ~~45. CG III MAF 231527Z APR69 (C) FOR  
 FOR MCLAUGHLIN FROM DOOLEY  
 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (CLARDY & SYDENHAM WILL ATTEND)~~
- ~~46. CG III MAF 251216Z APR69 (U)  
 FOR HAY FROM NICKERSON  
 CONDOLENCES ON DEATH OF WARRANT OFFICER BONDS.~~
47. CG III MAF 251430Z APR69 (S) EYES ONLY *group-4*  
 FOR SIMPSON & GETTYS FROM NICKERSON  
 OPERATION PIERCE VALLEY
- ~~48. CG III MAF 260756Z APR69 (C)  
 FOR STILWELL INFO QUILTER FROM NICKERSON  
 INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGED LACK OF SUPPORT BY FIRST MAW  
 (DCEN HILL INVESTIGATING OFFICER -- REQ VR COOPERATION)~~
49. CG III MAF 270844Z APR69 (C) *group-4*  
 FOR JONES FROM BUSE AND NICKERSON  
 LOCATION OF CAMP CARROLL -- WE CAN'T MOVE IT -- STILL S. RTE 9
- ~~50. CG III MAF 280518Z APR69 (C)  
 FOR DYAS FROM NICKERSON  
 CAN'T COME TO NKT ON 29th -- WILL COME AT LATER DATE -- REGRETS~~

- ~~1. CG III MAF 280555Z APR69 (C)  
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON  
I CANCELLED VISIT TO NKP ON 29TH -- PLAN TO GO AT LATER DATE~~
2. CG III MAF 280600Z APR69 (C) *gp-4*  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
PASSES NOTES GLEANED FROM MR. POCOCK IN AFTER DINNER DISCUSSION --  
CONCERNS POCOCK'S VIEW'S ON CAMBODIA AND SIHANOUK IN PARTICULAR
3. CG III MAF 281130Z APR69 (C) *gp-4*  
FOR ZUMWALT FROM NICKERSON  
ICTZ SHELTER PROGRAM  
"UNDERSTAND FUNDS WILL BE REQ UPON RECEIPT 10 MAY STUDY -- IF SO,  
I CONCUR"
- ~~4. CG III MAF 281253Z APR69 (S)  
FOR PAC FWD PASS TO BUSE  
PASSES III MAF 280622Z APR69 ASP FIRE REPORT NR 3~~
- ~~5. CG III MAF 281254Z APR69 (S)  
FOR PAC FWD PASS TO BUSE  
PASSES III MAF 272321Z APR69 ASP FIRE REPORT NR 2~~
- ~~6. CG III MAF 281256Z APR69 (C)  
FOR PAC FWD PASS TO BUSE  
PASSES III MAF 280945Z APR69 ASP FIRE REPORT NR 4~~
7. CG III MAF 290022Z APR69 (U)  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
FREEDON HILL/R&R TRANSIENT CENTER AND BRIG (ASP-1 FIRE)
- ~~8. CG III MAF 290115Z APR69 (U)  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
REPLACEMENT FOR PERSONAL STENOGRAPHER (MYLIVOTA)~~
9. CG III MAF 291010Z APR69 (S) *gp-4*  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST CONCERNING FIRE AT ASP-1
10. CG III MAF 291332Z APR69 (U) *Col Norton*  
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON  
FREEDOM HILL R&R TRANSIENT CENTER AND BRIG - FIRE AT ASP-1
11. CG III MAF 300644Z APR69 (S) NOFORN *gp-4*  
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON  
RICE CACHE DISCOVERIES IN QUANG NAM JAN/FEB 69 & PROBLEM OF  
FEED RESOURCE CONTROL IN I CORPS (C)
12. CG III MAF 300645Z APR69 (C) *gp-4 Col Norton*  
FOR ZUMWALT INFO BONNER FROM NICKERSON  
YOU SHOULD VISIT DNG AREA AND VIEW DAMAGE AS RESULT OF AS



ZEM

TOP SECRET

FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE FURNISHED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

QUOTE

O 301218Z

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON VIETNAM

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON DC

ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII

INFO GEN BROWN CDR 7TH AF TSN SAIGON VIETNAM

VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON VIETNAM

LGEN MILDREN CG USARV LONG BINH VIETNAM

ZEM

TOP SECRET MAC 4036 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: SERVICE FORCE ACTIONS (U)

REF: MAC 4016 DTG 300316Z MAR 69

1. (TS) I AM BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRESENT THINKING AND MOVES ON THE PART OF THE SERVICES TO REDUCE OUR OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY IN SVN. WHAT IS EQUALLY DISTURBING, THE SERVICE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN INITIATED WITHOUT ADVANCE COORDINATION WITH US. FROM HERE, WE SEE NOTHING IN THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN SVN THAT WARRANTS OUR MAKING A UNILATERAL REDUCTION IN COMBAT POWER AT THIS TIME. ON THE CONTRARY, THE ENEMY HAS DEMONSTRATED ONCE AGAIN IN HIS POST TET ACTIVITIES HIS DETERMINATION TO PURSUE THE WAR WITH THE INTENSITY OF PREVIOUS OFFENSIVES.
2. (TS) OVER THE LAST FOUR-AND-ONE-HALF WEEKS THE CUMULATIVE TOTALS OF HIS ATTACKS BY FIRE, THE NUMBER OF ROUNDS EXPENDED IN THEM AND HIS GROUND ATTACKS REMAIN HIGHER THAN DURING A SIMILAR PERIOD FOR ANY PREVIOUS OFFENSIVE. ATTACKS BY FIRE ARE ONE-AND-ONE-HALF TIMES TET OR 5 MAY, AND MORE THAN TRIPLE THE AUGUST ATTACKS. THE NUMBER OF ROUNDS EXPENDED EXCEEDS THE NUMBER EXPENDED DURING TET BY 31 PERCENT, THE NUMBER EXPENDED DURING THE SECOND OFFENSIVE BY 26 PERCENT, AND IS GREATER BY 142 PERCENT THAN THE NUMBER OF ROUNDS EXPENDED DURING THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. HIS GROUND ATTACKS ARE NEARLY DOUBLE THOSE OF TET, TWO-UND-ONE HALF TIMES THOSE OF THE MAY OFFENSIVE AND MORE THAN FOUR TIMES THOSE OF LAST AUGUST. EVEN THE NUMBER OF BATTALION OR LARGER SIZE ATTACKS IS CLOSE TO THOSE HE CONDUCTED LAST TET. WHILE THE PAST WEEK HAS SEEN SOMETHING OF A DECLINE IN ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY, HIS FORCES REMAIN IN FORWARD POSITIONS NEAR HIS TARGET AREAS, AND DOCUMENTS AS WELL AS POWS DESCRIBE PLANS FOR MORE ATTACKS IN EARLY APRIL. EVIDENCE IS NOW TRICKLING IN WHICH SPEAKS OF ENEMY PLANS FOR YET ANOTHER OFFENSIVE ROUND IN THE COMING MONTHS. CERTAINLY THE TREMENDOUS ENEMY ORDNANCE STORES FOUND DURING OPERATION DENZY CANYON AND THE RECENT DISCOVERY OF 1000 TONS OF RICE IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE ATTESTS TO ENEMY PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR A CONTINUED HIGH INTENSITY OF WARFARE. THE ENEMY'S INTENT IS CLEAR. HE WILL USE ALL THE MILITARY RESOURCES AT HIS DISPOSAL TO...

7/11

PERSONNEL SPACES WILL DO JUST THAT. IN EACH OF THESE AREAS I TAKE STRONG EXCEPTION TO SERVICE THINKING.

A. THE AIR FORCE PROPOSES TO REPLACE FOUR ANG F-100 SQUADRONS WITH TWO F-4 SQUADRONS AND HOLD TWO OTHER F-4 SQUADRONS IN CONUS AT A HIGH STATE OF READINESS.

B. THE NAVY IS CONSIDERING A REDUCTION IN NAVAL SUPPORT AS FOLLOWS:

(1) WITHDRAW ONE OR TWO BARRACK'S SHIPS (APB'S), AND PROBABLY OTHER NAVFORV ASSETS.

(2) WITHDRAW THE DESTROYER ESCORTS (RADAR) (DE) FROM THE OUTER MARKET TIME BARRIER. NORMALLY, TWO OR THREE DER'S SUPPORT THE MARKET TIME BARRIER AT ANY ONE TIME.

C. USARV HAS BEEN DIRECTED THRU SERVICE CHANNELS THAT ITS ARMY LOCAL NATIONAL (LN) CIVILIAN HIRE CEILING IN RVN WILL BE REDUCED BY 31 MAY 1969 TO 98 PERCENT (35,055) OF THE LN ONBOARD STRENGTH AS OF 31 JAN 69 (35,770).

4. (IS) THE SUM TOTAL OF OUR COMBAT POWER IS WHAT THE SERVICES GIVE US. PROPOSED REDUCTIONS IN OUR FORCE LEVELS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY SCRUTINIZED AND SHOULD BE BASED ON SOUND MILITARY REASONS. ONCE THE EROSION SETS IN IT WILL BE HARD TO STOP.

5. (IS) QUITE FRANKLY IT MAKES MY POSITION AS AN OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIBLE COMMANDER IN THE FIELD MOST DIFFICULT IF THE SERVICES PROCEED TO CARVE OUT ON THEIR OWN MY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. I KNOW WHAT THEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED, AND IT HAS BEEN MAGNIFICENT. I ASK ONLY THAT I BE CONSULTED AND GIVEN A CHANCE AS THEY, THE SERVICES, BEGIN TO CUT AND RUN.

UNQUOTE

GP-4

SSO NOTE; DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

588

NNNN

TOP SECRET

7(2)  
TOP SECRET

7/21



O 040146Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T  
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FURNISHED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

QUOTE

O 031042Z ZYH ZFF-6 ZFF-3  
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
 TO GEN BROWN CG 7TH AF  
 LTG MILDREN DCG USARV  
 LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF  
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV  
 INFO ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC  
 GEN WHEELER CJCS

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T MAC 4196 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: SERVICE FORCE ACTIONS (U)

REF: MACV CITE 4036 DTG 301218Z MAR 69

IN ORDER THAT I MAY BE IN A POSITION TO COMMENT ON THE  
 OVERALL OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF ANY SERVICE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS  
 AS DISCUSSED IN REFERENCE, REQUEST THAT YOU PROVIDE ME AT YOUR  
 EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY SUMMARIES OF SEA REDUCTIONS CONTEMPLATED  
 BY YOUR RESPECTIVE SERVICES, TOGETHER WITH YOUR EVALUATION  
 OF THE IMPACT OF THESE REDUCTIONS ON MACV OPERATIONAL  
 CAPABILITY.

UNQUOTE

GP74

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
 200

HAS BEEN USED

TOP SECRET

NNNN

8 (1)

8 (1)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 04 APR 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 040147Z		COPY# OF COPIES RECO 1,2, 3	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT			
3	CG	1	4/4		N	REMARKS (1) THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4...	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR					THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.	
2	C/S	I			D		
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	I	4/4		J		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

(9)  
**TOP SECRET**

O 049100Z  
FM CG 111  
TO CG FMFPAC  
ZEM



**T O P S E C R E T**

FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. NEARLY TWO HOURS OF TRIAL AND ERROR ELAPSED AND NO SUCCESS WITH  
KY-3 TELEPHONE. WILL TRY 5APR AM AS SUGGESTED. CHECKING MY COMM HERE  
FOR REASONS. HAVE PASSED TO YOU CERTAIN MESSAGES SEPARATELY. SWAN SAID  
CHAPPIE HAD TALKED WITH YOU YESTERDAY. LEW HAS READ OUR FILE AND ABE  
PERSONALLY EXPRESSED CONCERN TO HIM RE SERVICES UNILATERAL ACTIONS TO  
DECREASE SUPPORT OF WAR. WARM REGARDS.

GP 71

085

**TOP SECRET**

HAS BEEN SENT

9/11

9(11)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 05 APRIL 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 042339Z	1,2,3, 4	COPY# OF COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TOP SECRET EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4...  THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
3	DCG		9 Apr		M	
4	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/5			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H & S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

Subj: Proposed Kham Duc/Base Area 112 Operation

Ref: (A) MACV'S Request Same Subject

Encl: (1) Proposed Reply to Ref A

1. In essence the proposed message (enclosure 1) <sup>OPMS:JF</sup> states CG III MAF believes proposed operation is desirable and feasible and outlines overall timing (1 May - Mid-September).

2. The message also:

A. Stresses need for Delta Force and CCN effort.

B. Assumes availability of 101st ABN Div to meet force requirements (if it is required for an overriding higher priority mission <sup>elsewhere</sup> then we would need external assistance, i.e. 173rd ABN Bde. Purposely, this specific contingency is not addressed in the message although the CG may want to discuss it with Gen Abrams).

C. Indicates CG'S intentions to obtain ARVN participation (which if made available will reduce U. S. force requirement by an equivalent number of battalions).

D. Indicates the risks involved and the requirement for an available reserve should circumstances warrant.

3. Proposed reply does not info CG XXIV Corps who was info addee on MACV message. CG XXIV Corps undoubtedly will not take kindly to proposal concerning 101st Abn units particularly since he has not been consulted. If submitted in present form it is highly likely he will be made aware of proposal via Army channels. Two alternative approaches are evident:

A. Hold off submission until CG has discussed with Gen Stillwell and then forward with his comments, or

B. State requirement for 173rd at the outset and recast the message accordingly.

4. Do not believe we can be faulted for trying to do the job within own resources and at this juncture it appears that 101st Abn could be tapped. I lean toward CG discussing possible use of 101st with Gen Stillwell.

Very Respectfully

*[Signature]*

*Am prepared to discuss at your convenience*

*W/10*

O 042339Z ZYM ZFF-1  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. MAC 4006 EO 291213Z MAR 69

1. THIS RESPONDS TO YOUR MESSAGE POINTING OUT THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE CREATED FOR THE ENEMY BY OUR INTERDICTION OF THE ASHAU VALLEY, AND RAISING THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE PREEMPTIVE MOVE AGAINST THE ENEMY'S SOUTHERN LOC IN THE BA 614 AND KHAM DUC REGIONS. SPECIFICALLY

YOU ASKED FOR MY VIEWS REGARDING THE DESIRABILITY, FEASIBILITY AND POSSIBLE TIMING OF SUCH A MOVE. ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS CONVEY MY VIEWS.

2. AT THE OUTSET, I BELIEVE SUCH AN EFFORT IS DESIRABLE. I SHARE YOUR INTEREST IN THE WESTERN QUANG TIN AREA AS A LIKELY LOGISTICAL ALTERNATIVE. HIS RECENT LOSSES AND FUTURE DIM PROSPECTS ENEMY IN WESTERN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN APPEAR LIKELY TO DRIVE HIM TO SEEK OTHER ROUTES AS YOU SUGGEST. THE DIFFICULTY AND INACCESSIBILITY OF THE TERRAIN AROUND BA 614 AND KHAM DUC MAKE THAT A MOST LIKELY PROSPECT FOR HIM. RECENT RECON EFFORTS IN THAT REGION, HOWEVER, PRODUCED MIXED RESULTS. SINCE 1 FEBRUARY I HAVE PROGRAMMED FORTY PHOTO RECCE SORTIES INTO THAT AREA. THAT PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALED LITTLE OF SIGNIFICANCE, SLAR MISSIONS HAVE NOT PRODUCES SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND RECENT PHOTOS INDICATE THAT THE ROADS INTO AND AROUND KHAM DUC ARE NOT TRAFFICABLE. WEATHER, HOWEVER, HAS IMPEDED THE DETAILED SURVEILLANCE I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO GIVE THE AREA, SINCE OTHER SOURCES INDICATE RISING ENEMY ACTIVITY. TWO INFRARED DETECTOR MISSIONS FLOWN DURING MARCH REPORTED NUMEROUS EMISSIONS IN THE OF A 614 AND ZC 0112. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALS A ROAD BRANCHING OFF ROUTE 966. SUCCESSFUL TACAIR ROADCUTS ON 11, 17, 27, AND 29 MARCH WERE FILLED THE FOLLOWING DAY. LAST YEAR A GROUND RECON TEAM INSERTED AT ZC 001166 ON 20 SEP WAS EXTRACTED UNDER FIRE AND ONE INSERTED AT ZC 015095 ON 23 OCT WAS ABORTED DUE TO HEAVY GROUND FIRE. IN VIEW OF THESE AND SIMILAR INDICATORS I CONSIDER THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO DEVOTE TO THE AREA, SUFFICIENT EFFORT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE ENEMY IS ACTUALLY DOING, WHERE HE IS, AND WHAT HE HAS IN THE WAY OF FORCES AND SUPPLIES IN THE TARGET AREA. ONCE THIS IS DETERMINED I AM PREPARED TO INVEST THE NECESSARY FORCE TO DISTRUPT THE OPERATION.

3. I CONSIDER THAT A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN STRENGTH IN THE BA 614/ KHAM DUC AREA IS FEASIBLE. I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS AN OPERATION THAT WE MUST APPROACH IN A DELIBERATE FASHION, IN VIEW OF THE REMOTENESS OF THE TARGET AREA AND CONSEQUENT LOGISTIC PROBLEMS; THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY THERE; AND OF THE THINNING OF MY FORCES THAT WILL BE CAUSED BY ASSEMBLING A FORCE OF THE SIZE REQUIRES FOR THIS OPERATION. IN ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY OF THE OPERATION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE RESERVATIONS, I HAVE CONSIDERED THE VARIOUS OPERATIONAL FACTORS AND FORESEE NO INSURMOUNT-

ABLE PROBLEM.

A. THE TERRAIN IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BUT NO MORE SO THAN THE ENTIRE PLATEAU FROM II CTZ TO THE DMZ, WHERE WE OPERATE AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE.

B. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER DURING THE COMING MONTHS IS PREDICTED TO IMPEDE OPERATIONS SOMEWHAT, I DO NOT EXPECT WEATHER TO BE A SERIOUS LIMITING FACTOR.

C. THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION WILL BE CHALLENGING, BUT NOT TO THE DEGREE THAT LOGISTICS BECOMES A DISQUALIFYING FACTOR.

D. BECAUSE OUR INTELLIGENCE OF THE TARGET AREA IS SKETCHY, THE OPERATION SHOULD BE INITIATED WITH A RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT OF SEVERAL WEEKS, THE PRECISE TIME DEPENDING UPON WHAT THE RECON REVEALED. THE EFFORT WOULD CONCENTRATE ALL ORGANIC RESOURCES. I WOULD ALSO RELY HEAVILY ON THE DELTA FORCE AND CCN PATROLS. WE WOULD REQUIRE YOUR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN KEEPING DELTA FORCE WITH US. I CONSIDER THE DELTA FORCE AND PRIORITY CCN PATROL SUPPORT A KEY ELEMENT IN THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CONCEPT.

E. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF TROOP AVAILABILITY, I ESTIMATE THAT THIS OPERATION AT ITS PEAK PHASE WILL REQUIRE TWO BRIGADES, ONE FROM AMERICAL WHICH CHARLIE GETTYS WILL INTRODUCE WHEN HIS RECONNAISSANCE HAS PROGRESSED FAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT HIM TO MAKE A HARD APPRAISAL OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION. CONSIDERING THE PRESENT TEMPO OF OPERATIONS IN QUANG NAM WHERE BOTH SLFS ARE FULLY COMMITTED WITH FIRST MAR DIV AND THE EXTENDED POSTURE OF THIRD MAR DIV IN THE NORTH, THE ONLY COMMAND

WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ADDITIONAL FORCES IS THE 101ST. WHILE IT, TOO, IS ACTIVELY CONDUCTING OPERATIONS, I CONSIDER IT THE MOST LIKELY SOURCE FOR A RESERVE FORCE AT THE PRESENT TIME. TO TAP THE 101ST TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF A SECOND BRIGADE FOR INTRODUCTION INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA WOULD, I BELIEVE, OVER-EXTEND III MAF BEYOND THE SAFETY MARGIN. THIS, COMBINED WITH A POSSIBLE HIGH PRIORITY MISSION UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR 101ST ARGUES FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE SLICE TO III MAF. EVEN WITH AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE, HOWEVER, SOME REPOSITIONING OF MY PRESENT FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY WHICH WILL ENTAIL A CERTAIN DEGREE OF RISK. THE RISK BECOMES MORE ACCEPTABLE WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE.

O 042339Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

R. I BELIEVE ARVN PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATION IS BOTH FEASIBLE AND NECESSARY, TO KEEP THE EMPHASIS ON COMBINED OPERATIONS AND CONTINUE TO HELP ARVN PICK UP A PROGRESSIVELY GREATER SHARE OF THE LOAD. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, I WOULD EXPECT LTGEN LAM TO CONTRIBUTE AT LEAST ONE BATTALION TO THE OPERATION, HOPEFULLY MORE. THE PRECISE SIZE, HOWEVER, OF THE ARVN COMMITMENT, IS A MATTER WHICH I WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH LTGEN LAM AT A LATER DATE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALSO THE INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR TROOPS ELSEWHERE IN ICTZ AS FORCES ARE DEPLOYED TO THE KHAM DUC AREA.

4. BECAUSE WE NEED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE KHAM DUC AREA, THE PACE, SCOPE AND ORIENTATION OF THE MAJOR COMBAT EFFORT WOULD DEPEND ON OUR INITIAL CONCERTED RECONNAISSANCE PHASE. FOR THIS REASON, AVAILABILITY OF PROJECT DELTA FORCES IS A KEY IN THE TIMING. I BELIEVE THAT THE DELTA FORCES COULD BE SHIFTED SOUTH FROM CASS PARK TO INITIATE THEIR OPERATIONS IN KHAM DUC AREA ON 1 MAY. THE FACILITIES OF SEVERAL SITES ARE BEING ANALYZED IN DETAIL TO SELECT ONE WHICH WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR COLOCATION OF BOTH THE DELTA FORCES AND COMMOBILE LAUNCH TEAM. CONSIDERING THE RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT AS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT TO EXPAND THE OPERATION, I WOULD JUDGE A 30 DAY OPERATING PERIOD WOULD TELL THE STORY. ASSUMING THAT THE CONCENTRATED RECON EFFORT DEVELOPED HARD AND EXPLOITABLE INTELLIGENCE, ABOUT 1 JUNE I WOULD INITIATE A 3 BATTALION ASSAULT. WITH ENGINEERS, ARTY AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS INTO THE OLD KHAM DUC BASE AREA TO ESTABLISH AN FOB AND CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS IN ITS IMMEDIATE VICINITY. I ANTICIPATE THAT ABOUT TWO WEEKS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE KHAM DUC A FUNCTIONAL FOB CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING A TOTAL OF 6 INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 3 ARTY BATTALIONS, AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORT ELEMENTS. I WOULD THEN INTRODUCE THE ADDITIONAL COMBAT ELEMENTS OF ANOTHER BRIGADE. RIF WOULD BE ACCELERATED, LASTING AS LONG AS 60 DAYS, DEPENDING UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION. WE COULD CONCLUDE THE OPERATION AT THIS JUNCTURE, BUT I WOULD PROPOSE INSTEAD TO LAUNCH A FOUR BATTALION ATTACK FROM KHAM DUC, NORTHEAST, ASTRIDE THE SONG CAI ENTERING BA 11 FROM THE WEST. CONCURRENTLY, I WOULD TASK THE 1ST MAR DIV TO LAUNCH A COORDINATED ATTACK ON BA 112 FROM THE EASZ WITH AT LEAST ONE REGIMENT. THIS PHASE OF THE OPERATION WOULD CONCLUDE IN MID-SEPTEMBER.

5. IN SUMMARY, I CONSIDER A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN THE BA 614/KHAM DUC AREA BOTH DESIRABLE AND FEASIBLE, ASSUMING DELTA FORCE AVAILABILITY, PRIORITY COMMO SUPPORT, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE WITH ITS NORMAL SUPPORT. WITH NO RADICAL SHIFT IN CURRENT TACTICAL TRENDS, WE ARE PREPARED TO INITIATE THE OPERATION ON 1 MAY. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED OPERATION IN DETAIL WITH CHARLIE GETTYS, AND HOLD HIS PROPOSED CONCEPT AND OPERATION PLAN, WHICH I HAVE TENTATIVELY APPROVED FOR PLANNING. I WOULD BE PLEASED TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSAL WITH YOU OR PRESENT A BRIEFING AT A TIME AND PLACE OF YOUR CHOICE.

CP-1

5

10/3

10/3

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM LTG NICKERSON		DATE 05 APRIL 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 042340Z		1, 2, 3, 4 COPY# OF COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
3	CG			6/11/68	N	REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
1	DCG			6/11/68	N	
1	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/5		YMA 12-78	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	COROS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

**SECRET**

#19

0 MESSAGE IVE 077-1  
FM LTGEN NICKERSON  
TO CG III MAF  
ZEN

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

1. YOUR 041325Z QUERIED THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INTERVIEW DAVID LAMB HELD WITH GEN DAVIS, TO INCLUDE WHAT ACTUALLY WAS SAID BY GEN DAVIS.
2. THIRD MARDIV MESSAGE 020140Z TO CG III MAF IS QUOTED BELOW: QUOTE  
C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON  
UPI PRESS RELEASE BY MR DAVE LAMB
  1. MR LAMB HAS BEEN OPERATING IN THE 3D MARDIV AREA DURING RECENT COMBAT ENGAGEMENTS AND HAS ON MANY OCCASIONS INTERVIEWED GENERAL OFFICERS OF THE DIVISION. HIS ACCOUNTS OF COMBAT AND HIS RELEASES BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN FACTUAL AND HAVE PROVIDED SOLID SUPPORT FOR MARINE OPERATIONS. DURING THE LAST MONTH HE HAS EARNED THE RESPECT AND TRUST OF THOSE DEALING WITH HIM.
  2. ON OTHER OCCASIONS HE HAS BEEN GIVEN OFF THE RECORD AND BACKGROUND ONLY BRIEFINGS. HE DID NOT VIOLATE ANY CONFIDENCE ON THOSE OCCASIONS.
  3. IT WAS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS THAT THE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AN INTERVIEW WITH ME.
  4. HE WANTED TO EXPLORE THE WAR IN DEPTH. HE CAME IN AFTER DINNER AND DISCUSSED FOR AN HOUR THE GENERAL AREAS OF SANCTUARIES, ETC. HE INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT I DID NOT WANT TO BE QUOTED OR OTHERWISE ESTABLISHED AS A SOURCE OF IDEAS AND THAT HE WOULD NOT DO SO. HE WAS TOLD WITH CERTAINTY THAT IT MIGHT BE INFEASIBLE POLITICALLY TO EXPAND OPERATIONS. THE QUOTES WHICH LAMB USED WERE DERIVED FROM A DISCUSSION OF PRESS CLIPPINGS WHICH I HAD ON MY DESK. THESE CLIPPINGS PROPOSED THAT WE HAD ONLY TWO CHOICES IN VIETNAM. ONE WAS TO RESUME THE BOMBING, THE OTHER WAS TO CONTINUE WITH OUR PRESENT TACTICS. HE WAS TOLD THAT WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE POLITICAL ASPECTS THERE ARE CERTAINLY OTHER COURSES OF ACTION WHICH ARE FEASIBLE FROM THE MILITARY STANDPOINT. THEN HE WAS GIVEN MY VIEWS AS TO ONE ALTERNATIVE, THE "SALAMI" TACTIC. THIS WAS NOT REPEAT NOT AS A PROPOSAL, BUT AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WERE INVOLVED IN A BACKGROUND DISCUSSION ONLY BUT IT SOUNDS AS IF TENTATION OVERPOWERED HIM.
  5. THE ISO, WHO WAS IN THE OFFICE WHEN LAMB RETURNED, ASKED HIM ABOUT THE INTERVIEW. IN A KIDDING MANNER LAMB SAID THE GENERAL SAID WE SHOULD GO INTO LAOS OR NORTH VIETNAM, OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. THE ISO TOLD HIM HE CERTAINLY COULD NOT SEE THAT IN A STORY. LAMB SAID HE DID NOT TO MENTION THAT HE WOULD DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD MOUTH THE GENERAL OR GET HIM INTO ANYTHING. HE HAS, IS THE GENERAL...

#19(1)

6. ALTHOUGH I HAVE NOT BEEN THE PRESS REPORTING FROM THE  
 [REDACTED] IT SEEMS THAT I BECAME  
 OVERCONFIDENT IN MY ABILITY TO JUDGE REPORTERS. I WILL MAKE  
 NO FURTHER COMMENTS TO MEMBERS OF THE PRESS  
 ON THE LAMB STORY OR THE ISSUES INVOLVED UNLESS YOUR ISO  
 EXPERTS COME UP WITH SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT HELP TO CALM THE  
 WAVES.

7. WARM REGARDS. MAJGEN DAVIS SENDS.

GP-4 UNQUOTE.

3. OF COURSE GEN DAVIS AND I BOTH REGRET THAT THE STORY WAS WRITTEN  
 AND ATTRIBUTED TO GEN DAVIS. GEN DAVIS DID, IN GENERAL TERMS, MADE  
 STATEMENTS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE ARTICLE, BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR  
 THAT ALL OTHER ASPECTS, S.G. POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS,  
 MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED BY OUR DECISION MAKERS IN MATTERS CONCERNING  
 OUR FORCES AND THEIR GOVERNING DIRECTIVES IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT.

ALL DISCUSSIONS WERE IN THEORETICAL TERMS, AND REMARKS WERE PRE-  
 FACED BY SUCH LANGUAGE AS "STRICTLY FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT,"  
 "CONSIDERING MILITARY ASPECTS ONLY," "DISREGARDING ALL BUT MILITARY  
 CONCERNS," ETC. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ARTICLE DID NOT REFLECT THIS  
 QUALIFYING LANGUAGE.

FURTHER, NO MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS WERE ADVOCATED, BUT WERE DISCUSSED  
 AS FEASIBLE SOLELY FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT. IN OTHER WORDS, FULL  
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS GIVEN TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS  
 ARE BUT A PART OF THE TOTAL PICTURE WHICH MUST BE VIEWED, AND THE  
 OUTCOME WEIGHED, BEFORE SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS CONCERNING U.S. INVOLVEMENT  
 IN VIETNAM ARE MADE.

4. AS STATED IN THE MESSAGE QUOTED FROM GEN DAVIS, HE CONSIDERED  
 THE GROUND RULES FOR THE DISCUSSION TO BE "ON BACKGROUND" AND "NOT  
 ATTRIBUTABLE". I CONSIDER THE FACT THAT HE WAS QUOTED AT ALL WAS A  
 SERIOUS BREACH OF FAITH ON THE PART OF THE CORRESPONDENT. LIGEN  
 WICKERSON SENDS.

GP-1

843

#19(2)

NNNN

SECRET

HASBEENSEN

19(2)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5218 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM <b>BOGEN DOOLEY</b>		DATE <b>05 APR 69</b>	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE <b>P 052401Z</b>		1,2,3. COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT <b>SECRET EYES ONLY</b>	
			IN	OUT			
<b>3</b>	CG	<b>I</b>	<b>6 AM</b>		<b>N</b>	REMARKS <b>SECRET EYES ONLY</b> <b>(THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.)</b>	
<b>4</b>	DCG	<b>I</b>	<b>6 AM</b>		<b>N</b>		
	DCG AIR						
<b>2</b>	C/S	<b>I</b>					
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
<b>1</b>	S/S	<b>I</b>	<b>4/5</b>		<b>(N) WS</b>		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	SBC						

**SECRET**

~~P 050401Z~~  
 FM BGEN DOOLEY, C/S, III MAF  
 TO LTGEN VAN RYZIN, C/S, HQMC  
 LTGEN BUSE, CG, FMFPAC  
 MGEN DAVIS, CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ZEM.

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

1. A MESSAGE FROM GEN NICKERSON TO GEN ABRAMS IS QUOTED BELOW FOR INFO.

QUOTE

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

1. YOUR 041325Z QUERIED THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INTERVIEW DAVID LAMB HELD WITH GEN DAVIS, TO INCLUDE WHAT ACTUALLY WAS SAID BY GEN DAVIS.

2. THIRD MARDIV MESSAGE 020140Z TO CG III MAF IS QUOTED BELOW: QUOTE  
 C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON  
 UPI PRESS RELEASE BY MR DAVE LAMB

1. MR LAMB HAS BEEN OPERATING IN THE D MARDIV AREA DURING RECENT COMBAT ENGAGEMENTS AND HAS ON MANY OCCASIONS INTERVIEWED GENERAL OFFICERS OF THE DIVISION. HIS ACCOUNTS OF COMBAT AND HIS RELEASES BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN FACTUAL AND HAVE PROVIDED SOLID SUPPORT FOR MARINE OPERATIONS. DURING THE LAST MONTH HE HAS EARNED THE RESPECT AND TRUST OF THOSE DEALING WITH HIM.

2. ON OTHER OCCASIONS HE HAS BEEN GIVEN OFF THE RECORD AND BACKGROUND ONLY BRIEFINGS. HE DID NOT VIOLATE ANY CONFIDENCE ON THOSE OCCASIONS.

3. IT WAS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS THAT HE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AN INTERVIEW WITH ME.

4. HE WANTED TO EXPLORE THE WAR IN DEPTH. HE CAME IN AFTER DINNER AND DISCUSSED FOR AN HOUR THE GENERAL AREAS OF SANCTUARIES, ETC. HE INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT I DID NOT WANT TO BE QUOTED OR OTHERWISE ESTABLISHED AS A SOURCE OF IDEAS AND THAT HE WOULD NOT DO SO. HE WAS TOLD WITH CERTAINTY THAT IT MIGHT BE INFEASIBLE POLITICALLY TO EXPAND OPERATIONS. THE QUOTES WHICH LAMB USED WERE DERIVED FROM A DISCUSSION OF PRESS CLIPPINGS WHICH I HAD ON MY DESK. THESE CLIPPINGS PROPOSED THAT WE HAD ONLY TWO CHOICES IN VIETNAM. ONE WAS TO RESUME THE BOMBING, THE OTHER WAS TO CONTINUE WITH OUR PRESENT TACTICS. HE WAS TOLD THAT WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE POLITICAL ASPECTS THERE ARE CERTAINLY OTHER COURSES OF ACTION WHICH ARE FEASIBLE FROM THE MILITARY STANDPOINT. THEN HE WAS GIVEN MY VIEWS AS TO ONE ALTERNATIVE, THE "SALAMI" TACTIC. THIS WAS NOT REPEATED AS A PROPOSAL, BUT AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WERE INVOLVED IN A BACKGROUND DISCUSSION ONLY BUT IT SOUNDS AS IF TEMPTATION OVERPOWERED HIM.

5. THE ISO, WHO WAS IN THE OFFICE WHEN LAMB RETURNED, ASKED HIM ABOUT THE INTERVIEW. IN A KIDDING MANNER LAMB SAID THE GENERAL SAID WE SHOULD GO INTO LAOS OR NORTH VIETNAM, OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. THE ISO TOLD HIM HE CERTAINLY COULD NOT USE THAT IN A STORY. LAMB REPLIED NOT TO WORRY THAT HE WOULD

NEVER WRITE ANYTHING THAT WOULD QUOTE HURT THE GENERAL OR GET  
 HIM INTO TROUBLE. HE WAS, IN THE OPINION OF THE ISO,  
 COULD NOT USE THE MATERIAL IN A STORY.

6. ALTHOUGH I HAVE NOT SEEN THE PRESS CLIPPINGS, FROM THE QUOTES WHICH YOU READ TO ME OVER THE PHONE, IT APPEARS THAT I HAVE BEEN CAUGHT OFF BASE. AFTER A FULL YEAR OF SUCCESS AND GOOD LUCK WITH THE PRESS CORPS, IT SEEMS THAT I BECAME OVERCONFIDENT IN MY ABILITY TO JUDGE REPORTERS. I WILL MAKE NO FURTHER COMMENTS TO MEMBERS OF THE PRESS ON THE LAMB STORY OR THE ISSUES INVOLVED UNLESS YOUR ISO EXPERTS COME UP WITH SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT HELP TO CALM THE WAVES.

7. WARM REGARDS. MAJGEN DAVIS SENDS.

GP74 UNQUOTE.

3. OF COURSE GEN DAVIS AND I BOTH REGRET THAT THE STORY WAS WRITTEN AND ATTRIBUTED TO GEN DAVIS. GEN DAVIS DID, IN GENERAL TERMS, MAKE STATEMENTS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE ARTICLE, BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT ALL OTHER ASPECTS, E.G. POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS, MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED BY OUR DECISION MAKERS IN MATTERS CONCERNING OUR FORCES AND THEIR GOVERNING DIRECTIVES IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT.

ALL DISCUSSIONS WERE IN THEORETICAL TERMS, AND REMARKS WERE PREPARED BY SUCH LANGUAGE AS "STRICTLY FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT," "CONSIDERING MILITARY ASPECTS ONLY," "DISREGARDING ALL BUT MILITARY CONCERNS," ETC. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ARTICLE DID NOT REFLECT THIS QUALIFYING LANGUAGE.

FURTHER, NO MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS WERE ADVOCATED, BUT WERE DISCUSSED AS FEASIBLE SOLELY FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT. IN OTHER WORDS, FULL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS GIVEN TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS ARE BUT A PART OF THE TOTAL PICTURE WHICH MUST BE VIEWED, AND THE OUTCOME WEIGHED, BEFORE SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS CONCERNING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM ARE MADE.

4. AS STATED IN THE MESSAGE QUOTED FROM GEN DAVIS, HE CONSIDERED THE GROUND RULES FOR THE DISCUSSION TO BE "ON BACKGROUND" AND "NOT ATTRIBUTABLE". I CONSIDER THE FACT THAT HE WAS QUOTED AT ALL WAS A SERIOUS BREACH OF FAITH ON THE PART OF THE CORRESPONDENT. LTGEN NICKERSON SENDS.

UNQUOTE

2. THE REFERENCE 041325Z MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE QUOTED MESSAGE CONTAINS A REQUEST FOR INFO AND THERE IS NO NEED TO PASS IT.

GEN NICKERSON IS WITH COMUSMACV TODAY TO ATTEND THE WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE UPDATE PLUS A COMMANDERS CONFERENCE IN THE AFTERNOON.

GP71

900

#20(2)

HAS BEEN SENT

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE Ø5144ØZ	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE Ø5144ØZ	1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN OUT		INITIAL	SUBJECT QUOTE OF CG III MAF Ø42334Z
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	Z				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	F	4/6		YPM ✓	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

**SECRET**

#21

O 051440B ZYM  
 FM CG III MAF  
 CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. COMUSMACV 031042Z APR 69 (PASEP)

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, CG III MAF RESPONSE TO REF A, IS READ-  
 DRESSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

O 042334Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

S E C R E T

SERVICE FORCE ACTIONS (U)

A. COMUSMACV 031042Z APR 69

B. CG III MAF 131000Z OCT 68

C. COMUSMACV 030100Z NOV 68

D. JCSM 36-39

1. (S) IN RESPONSE TO REF A THE FOLLOWING INFO IS SUBMITTED:  
 REF B WAS III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE 1-68 WHICH RECOM-  
 MENDED REALIGNMENT OF THE FORCE STRUCTURE WITHIN PROGRAM SIX  
 CONSTRAINTS, AND WAS APPROVED BY REF C. FOLLOWING UNITS WERE  
 TO BE REDUCED TO ZERO SPACES:

FRN	UNIT
K002T	AI BN
K003T	AI BN
K016	MED TK CO
K017	MED TK CO
K019	UMTRAC BN
K026	HQ BTRY FAG
M012	VMA
K052B	ASRT
K105	MATCU
K055	WERS (MWSG)

2. (S) SECDEF DECISION OF 21 NOV 68 INDICATED THAT  
 NO UNITS OR MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT COULD BE  
 REDEPLOYED OUT OF COUNTRY, THUS CAUSING THE UNITS  
 LISTED ABOVE TO BE RESTORED IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE  
 AS APPROPRIATE. FOLLOWING ADJUSTMENTS WERE MADE:

A. VMA AND WERS (MWSG) WERE RESTORED TO THE  
 FORCE STRUCTURE AT FULL STRENGTH SINCE THEY WERE NOT  
 CONSIDERED SUITABLE FOR CADRES.

B. MATCU AND ASRT WERE NOT CONSIDERED MAJOR  
 UNITS (23 SPACES EACH) AND THUS WERE NOT RESTORED TO  
 THE FORCE STRUCTURE.

C. REMAINDER OF THE UNITS LISTED WERE RESTORED  
 TO THE FORCE STRUCTURE AT CADRE STRENGTHS.

## D. SUMMARY OF THESE ACTIONS IS AS FOLLOWS:

UNIT	SPACES REQUIRED
AT BN (-) (CADRE)	19
AT BN (-) (CADRE)	19
MED TK CO (CADRE)	24
MED TK CO (CADRE)	24
AMTRAC BN (CADRE)	137
HQ BTRY FAG (CADRE)	21
VMA	260
WERS (MWSG)	221
TOTAL	725

3. (S) TO OFFSET THE INCREASE OF 725 SPACES, THE FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS IN FORCE STRUCTURE WERE RECOMMENDED THROUGH MARINE CORPS CHANNELS.

FRN	UNIT	SPACES REDUCED
K002U	HQ BN MARDIV	33
K003U	HQ CO MARDIV	33
K002B	HQ CO INF REGT	13
K003B	HQ CO INF REGT	13
K002F	HQ CO INF REGT	13
K003F	HQ CO INF REGT	13
K002J	HQ CO INF REGT	13
K003J	HQ CO INF REGT	13
K002N	HQ BTRY ARTY REGT	16
K003N	HQ BTRY ARTY REGT	16
K022A	MP BN	50
K023	MP BN	50
K033	FLC	164
K052	MACG	64
K060	MABS MAG VF/VA	9
K061	MABS MAG VF/VA	9
K062	MABS MAG VF/VA	9
K076	H&MS MAG VH	19
K077	H&MS MAG VH	19
K078	MABS MAG VH	78
K079	MABS MAG VH	78
	TOTAL	725

4. (S) THE REDUCTION OF THE FMAW UNITS CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF SECURITY PERSONNEL. THIS FUNCTION IS CURRENTLY BEING PERFORMED BY AVIATION PERSONNEL, ALTHOUGH FUTURE ADJUSTMENTS MAY REQUIRE A SLIGHT DRAWDOWN ON INFANTRY UNITS. THE

REDUCTIONS TO THE HQ BN'S, HQ CO'S, UND HQ BTRY'S REPRESENT A CUTBACK IN AUGMENTATION PERSONNEL PROVIDED TO MEET CERTAIN FUNCTIONS PECULIAR TO THE SVN COMBAT ENVIRONMENT, AND SUCH FUNCTIONS WILL HAVE TO BE PROVIDED FROM WITHIN REMAINING ASSETS. REDUCTIONS TO FLC WILL EFFECT THE RESPONSIVENESS OF PROVIDING CERTAIN COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TO A LIMITED DEGREE.

5. (S) IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, FRN K02700, ARMD AMPHIB CO, WAS REDUCED TO ONE OPERATIONAL PLT OF 42 SPACES BY REF B AND APPROVED BY REF C. IT HAS SINCE BEEN DECIDED TO REDUCE THE COMPANY TO CADRE STATUS WITH 42 SPACES. NO TRADE OFF SPACES ARE NECESSARY. THE PRESENT PLAN IS TO LEAVE ONE OPERATIONAL PLT IN SUPPORT OF THE ROKMC BDE WITH A NUCLEUS OF 11 U.S. MARINES AND THE REMAINDER OF THE PLATOON TO BE MANNED BY ROK MARINES. THE REMAINING 31 U. S. MARINES WILL BE THE CADRE FOR THE ARMD AMPHIB CO (-). IN THE EVENT PERMISSION IS GRANTED TO WITHDRAW USMC UNITS FROM SVN, IT IS CURRENTLY PLANNED, SUBJECT TO APPROVAL OF HIGHER HQ, TO REDEPLOY THE ENTIRE ARMD AMPHIB CO TO OKINAWA. THIS WILL ELIMINATE THE ARMD AMPHIB CAPABILITY IN III MAF.

6. (S) WHILE THE REDUCTIONS CITED WERE NOT DESIRABLE, THE SECDEF DECISION OF 21 NOV 68 THAT NO USMC UNITS COULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM SVN LEFT NO CHOICE BUT TO CADRE UNITS THAT HAD BEEN DELETED FROM THE FORCE STRUCTURE OR RESTORE THEM AT FULL STRENGTH, BUT STILL REMAIN WITHIN THE PROGRAM SIX CONSTRAINTS. THE REDUCTIONS OUTLINED TO ACCOMMODATE THIS ACTION ARE INTERNAL III MAF USMC TRADE OFF SPACES AND REPRESENT THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL METHOD AVAILABLE. THE ADJUSTMENTS LISTED HAVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE A DELETERIOUS IMPACT ON III MAF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY AS FOLLOWS:

- A. REDUCTION IN TOTAL FIREPOWER THROUGH THE LOSS OF AT BNS AND ARMD AMPHIB CO.
- B. LOSS OF ONE-THIRD OF THE TANK BN ASSETS.
- C. LOSS OF ONE-HALF OF THE AMTRAC ASSETS.
- D. LOSS OF THE FORCE ARTILLERY CONTROL HQ.
- E. DRAWDOWN OF INFANTRY AND ARTY HQ BASE SUPPORT AUGMENTATION; MP BN SECURITY CAPABILITY; COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CAPABILITY OF FLC; AND AIRFIELD SECURITY, ALL REQUIRED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR USMC UNITS IN THE CURRENT COMBAT ENVIRONMENT IN SVN, NOT PROVIDED IN THE T/O'S.

7. (S) IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT ALL OF THE ABOVE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN SOLELY BECAUSE OF PROGRAM SIX CONSTRAINTS AND NONE WERE SERVICE INITIATED. NO FURTHER REDUCTIONS ARE KNOWN OR CONTEMPLATED.

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

# 21(3)

900

21(3)





**CONFIDENTIAL**

RTTCZYUW RHMMFA0685 0960159-CCCC--RUMMLAA RUMVPA RUMLMHA  
 R UMLMPA.  
 Z NY CCCCC  
 R 060158Z APR 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW  
 R UMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOMD  
 ZEN/HANDS CO III MAF  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS

A. CMC MSG 251636Z MAR 69 (C) (PASEP)

B. CG FMFPAC MSG 060114Z MAR 69 (C) (PASEP)

1. REF A AND B CONTAIN DETAILS ON RELEASE OF EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS TO THE CENTRAL MARINE CORPS REC FUND. THIS COMMAND IS ON RECORD AS IN FAVOR OF THE CONCEPT AND IS PREPARING A REPLY. YOUR INPUT IS REQ TO ARRIVE THIS HQS NLT 14APR.
2. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE UNIT FUND CUSTODIANS COORDINATE WITH THE III MAF CUSTODIAN AND THEIR RESPECTIVE AREA AUDITORS IN ORDER TO STANDARDIZE THE SUBJ INPUTS.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

RTTCZYUW RHMAFA 0693 0960245-CCCC--RUMHLAA RUMVPA RUMLMA  
 RUMLMPA.  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 R 060244Z APR 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMLMA/CG FIRST MAF  
 RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOMD  
 ZEN/HANDS CO III MAF  
 ZEN/1ST RADIO BN  
 P 251636Z MAR 69  
 FM CMC  
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUMFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS

A. CG FMFPAC MSG R060114Z MAR 69 (C)  
 1. REF A CONTAINED THE RESULTS OF AN EXAMINATION OF THE FEASIBILITY OF RETURNING EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS TO THE CENTRAL MC REC FUND. IN ORDER TO MAKE A FINAL DETERMINATION ON THE SUBJECT MATTER, THE FOLLOWING IS REQUESTED:

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0693 C O N F I D E N T I A L MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

- A. YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR THE AMOUNT OF FUNDS WHICH CAN BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE III MAF COMPOSITE FUND AND FROM EACH MEMBER RECREATION FUND IDENTIFIED SEPARATELY.
- B. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF THE III MAF COMPOSITE FUND AND EACH MEMBER FUND; THESE STATEMENTS SHOULD REFLECT BALANCES AS OF 28 FEB 69.
- C. DETAILED PLANS AND PROGRAMS FOR THE UTILIZATION OF OPERATING CAPITAL AND RESERVE ACCOUNTS REMAINING AFTER RETURN OF EXCESS FUNDS.
- D. ANY OTHER INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THIS MATTER.

2. REQUEST ABOVE INFO BY 19 APRIL 1969.

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RTTCZYUW RHMAFA0694 0960247-RUMHAA RUMVPA RUMMHA  
 RUMLMPA.  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 R 060246Z APR 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHAA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMMHA/CG FIRST MAU  
 RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOMD  
 ZEN/HANDS CO III MAF  
 ZEN/1ST RADIO BN  
 R 060114Z MAR 69  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO ZEN/CMC  
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FOR CMC, CODE DS

EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS IN COUNTRY (U)

A. CMC LTR DSB-23BCK SER 805691 OF 250CT68 (C-MCEO)

B. CG III MAF LTR 37/JEU OVER 7000 SER 018269 OF 30JAN69  
(C-MCEO) (NOTAL)

1. (C) REF A REQUESTED AN EXAMINATION OF THE FEASIBILITY OF RETURN-

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0694 C O N F I D E N T I A L MCEO

ING UNCOMMITTED RECREATION FUNDS HELD BY III MAF UNITS TO THE  
 MARCORPS CENTRAL RECREATION FUND. BY REF B, CG III MAF CONCURR-  
 ED, SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION THAT FUNDS RETURNED BE EARMARKED  
 FOR FUTURE USE OF THOSE UNITS' RELEASING FUNDS. CG III MAF  
 FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT ONE FULL QUARTER'S DIVIDEND OF NINE  
 DOLLARS PER MAN, BE RETAINED BY EACH UNIT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE  
 ADEQUATE FUNDS FOR CURRENT RECREATION PROGRAMS IN COUNTRY.

2. (C) THIS HQS INTERPOSES NO OBJECTIONS TO THE RETURN OF  
 EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS TO THE CENTRAL RECREATION FUND PRO-  
 VIDED THAT THOSE CONDITIONS NOTED ABOVE AND THE FOLLOWING ARE  
 OBSERVED:

A. THERE SHOULD BE NO UNDUE RESTRICTIONS AS TO FUTURE  
 WITHDRAWALS OF THE FUNDS BY COMMANDS RETURNING THEM. TIMELY  
 NOTICE OF INTENT TO WITHDRAW WOULD BE NECESSARY BUT FUNDS  
 SHOULD OTHERWISE BE AVAILABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL ON RECOMMENDATION  
 OF RESPECTIVE RECREATION COUNCILS AND SUBSEQUENT COMMAND APPROVAL.

B. THE INITIAL AND SUBSEQUENT AMOUNTS TO BE RETURNED  
 SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY EACH INDIVIDUAL COMMAND ADMINISTERING  
 A RECREATION FUND.

C. PERIODIC STATEMENTS OF RESERVES HELD BY THE CENTRAL

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA 0694 C O N F I D E N T I A L MCEO  
 MARCORPS REC FUND SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE CONTRIBUTING COMMAND,  
 BUT SUCH RESERVES SHOULD NOT BE REPORTED AS ASSETS OF IN COUNTRY  
 RECREATION FUNDS.

D. IN VIEW OF THE EXTENDED TIME PERIOD DURING WHICH CURRENT  
 EXCESSES WERE GENERATED, AND OF THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE  
 CENTRAL MARCORPS RECREATION FUND, NO OBJECTION WOULD BE RAISED  
 BY THIS HQS IF INTEREST EARNINGS ON RESERVES WERE RETAINED BY  
 THAT FUND.

3. (U) OTHER MATTERS MENTIONED BY REF-A WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF  
 SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE.

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CCN:024/OUT FILE:DH

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		08 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECO	
			080948Z APR 69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	T				REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPO- SITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.  ORIG: INSP REL: INSP CG
3	DCG	T	10 APR 69	10 APR 69		
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	T				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	T	4/9			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

**FOR**

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HAS BEEN SENT



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OTTCZYUW RHMMAFA 1066 0980949-CCCC--R UMLBPA RUMHLAA RUMKVA  
RUMLLIA RUMLMHA RUMLMPA.

ZNY CCCCC

XXIV CORPS -T- 101ST ABN DIV

O 080948Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF DNG RVN

TO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PHE RVN

RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG RVN

RUMKVA/CG THIRD MARDIV PHE RVN

RUMLLIA/CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW DNG RVN

RUMLBPA/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV (AM) CP EAGLE RVN

RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOMD DNG RVN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR LTGEN STILWELL, MGEN SIMPSON,  
MGEN DAVIS, MGEN GETTYS, MGEN QUILTER, MGEN ZAIS AND BGEN  
FEELEY FR LTGEN NICKERSON

SUBJ: UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES

A. CG III MAF 110804Z AUG 68

B. CG III MAF 070600Z SEP 68

C. CG III MAF 201440Z NOV 68

1. IN THE PAST, MUCH CONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED BY COMUSMACV AND  
THIS HQ IN REGARDS TO UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES INFLICTED BY FRIENDLY  
FIREPOWER. REFERENCES A, B AND C REFER.

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 1066 C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR

2. ONCE AGAIN I MUST REMIND YOU OF THE GRIM FACT OF THE CASUAL-  
TIES WE ARE INFLICTING ON OUR OWN FIGHTING MEN AND CIVILIANS.

3. DURING THE 2ND QTR FY69, CASUALTIES WERE AS FOLLOWS: 55 MIL  
KILLED, 231 MIL WOUNDED, 92 VN CIVS KILLED, AND 273 VN CIVS  
WOUNDED. OF THESE, 35 PERCENT WERE CAUSED BY ARTY, 35 PERCENT BY  
AIR, 17 PERCENT BY MORTARS, 3 PERCENT BY EXPDEV AND 10 PERCENT  
BY OTHER CAUSES.

4. DURING THE 3RD QTR FY69, THE MILITARY CASUALTIES ALMOST DOUB-  
LED WHILE CIV CASUALTIES DECREASED BY APPROX 50 PERCENT. CASUAL-  
TIES ARE AS FOLLOWS: 107 MIL KILLED, 407 MIL WOUNDED, 57 VN CIVS  
KILLED, AND 134 VN CIVS WOUNDED. OF THESE, 39 PERCENT WERE CAUSED  
BY ARTY, 21 PERCENT BY EXPDEV, 15 PERCENT BY MORTARS, 9 PERCENT  
BY AIR AND 16 PERCENT BY OTHER CAUSES.

5. CAUSES FOR THE TOTAL CASUALTIES FOR BOTH 2ND AND 3RD QTR FY  
60 BY TYPE FIREPOWER ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. ARTY - OF THE 111 KILLED AND 397 WOUNDED BY ARTY, 65 PERCENT  
WERE AS A RESULT OF PERSONNEL ERROR, 30 PERCENT BY FAULTY AMMO AND  
5 PERCENT UNDETERMINED.

B. AIR - OF THE 62 KILLED AND 229 WOUNDED BY AIR, 34 PERCENT WERE  
AS A RESULT OF PERSONNEL ERROR AND 66 PERCENT FAULTY EQUIPMENT.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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PAGE THREE RHMAFA 1066 C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR

C. MORTAR - OF THE 41 KILLED AND 183 WOUNDED BY MORTARS, 44 PER CENT WERE AS A RESULT OF PERSONNEL ERROR, 21 PERCENT FAULTY AMMO AND 35 PERCENT UNDETERMINED.

D. EXPLOSIVE DEVICES - OF THE 36 KILLED AND 127 WOUNDED BY EX-PLDEV, 58 PERCENT WERE PERSONNEL ERROR AND 42 PERCENT UNDETERMINED.

6. PERSONNEL ERRORS BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS:

A. ARTY: PERSONNEL ERRORS ARE ATTRIBUTED TO OTHERS IN THE SYSTEM AS WELL AS THE GUN CREWS. EXAMPLE: FSCC WATCH OFFICER NOT AWARE OF FRIENDLIES IN THE AREA, FDC DID NOT FOLLOW SOP, FO DID NOT GIVE CORRECT POSITION OF FRIENDLIES OR CALL IN DANGER CLOSE MISSION, BTRY WATCH OFFICER MADE ERROR IN TRANSPOSITION OF GRID. GUN CREW ERRORED IN USING WRONG CHARGES, LAYING PIECE WRONG, NON-CALIBRATION OF NEW TUBE.

B. AIR: PERSONNEL ERRORS ARE ATTRIBUTED TO OTHERS IN THE SYSTEM AS WELL AS THE AIR CREWS. EXAMPLES: RADAR CONTROLLER USED WRONG SWITCH THROWING DROP SEVERAL MILES OFF TARGET, AO FAILED TO IDENTIFY PATROL AS FRIENDLIES, CONFUSION ON THE GROUND AS TO WHO WAS WHERE. AIR CREWS ERRORED IN FLIGHT LEADER DROPPING ON WRONG SMOKE, INCORRECT SETTING OF INTERVALOMETER, AND

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 1066 C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR  
AIR CREW DROPPED LONG OR SHORT.

C. MORTAR: PERSONNEL ERRORS ARE ATTRIBUTED TO OTHERS IN THE SYSTEM AS WELL AS THE GUN CREWS. EXAMPLES: SECTION CHIEF USING WRONG AIMING STAKES, MAN ON PLOTTING BOARD MISINTERPRETED TARGET INFO CALLED IN AND DID NOT CONFIRM PRIOR TO PLOTTING, FDC WATCH OFFICER WAS AWARE THAT MISSION WAS NOT CLEARED AND FAILED TO INFORM PERSONNEL IN THE CENTER. GUN CREWS ERRORED IN USING WRONG AZIMUTH OR TUBE SETTING. CREWMAN DOUBLE FED 60MM MORTAR.

D. EXPLOSIVE DEVICES: PERSONNEL ERRORS MAINLY ATTRIBUTED TO CARELESSNESS SUCH AS: EXPLOSIVES IN TRASH BEING BURNED, IMPROPERLY CARRYING GRENADES, IMPROPER IDENTIFICATION OF FRIENDLY VS ENEMY ON PERIMETER WATCH AND AMBUSHES, ORDNANCE DROPPED WHILE LOADING VEHICLE IN ASP.

7. FAULTY EQUIPMENT FOR AIR AS FOLLOWS:

A. MALFUNCTION OF TUBE IN TRIGGER CIRCUIT OF TPQ-10.

B. SHORT IN RELEASE SWITCH OF THE AIR CRAFT CONTROL STICK.

C. ORDNANCE SYSTEM CIRCUITRY MALFUNCTIONED.

8. FAULTY AMMO FOR ARTY AND MORTARS AS FOLLOWS:

A. ARTY - DAMP CHARGES, ERRATIC ROUNDS AND PREMATURE BURST.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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PAGE FIVE RHMMAFA 1066 C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR  
 B. MORTARS - ERRATIC AND DEFECTIVE ROUNDS,  
 MOISTURE, EXPLODED IN TUBE AND EXPLODED WHILE HANDLING.  
 9. I ENJOIN ALL COMMANDERS TO MAKE A MORE AGGRESSIVE  
 REVIEW OF THEIR PROGRAMS AND TO TAKE APPROPRIATE  
 DISCIPLINARY AND/OR CORRECTIVE ACTION TO DRASTICALLY  
 REDUCE THE UNNECESSARY CASUALTY FIGURES.  
 10. I HAVE DIRECTED THE DEPUTY CG III MAF TO VISIT  
 ALL COMMANDERS WITH THE STATED PURPOSE OF REVIEWING  
 WITH EACH COMMANDER THE SUBJECT OF UNNECESSARY  
 CASUALTIES AS TO SOPS, SAFETY PROGRAMS AND RELATED  
 AREAS. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE HIM WITH SUCH  
 INFORMATION AND PROGRAMS THAT HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL  
 IN YOUR COMMAND IN REDUCING INCIDENTS, THUS ENABLING  
 OTHER COMMANDS TO BENEFIT RESULTING IN AN OVERALL  
 I CORPS REDUCTION OF OUR FRIENDLY OR FRIENDLY  
 CASUALTIES.

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 BT  
 1066

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# 26

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

CCN: 026/OUT

FILE: DH

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		08 APR 69	
			SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
			080952Z APR 69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	J			N	REMARKS ORIG: G-3 REL: G-3 FOR
3	DCG	J			N	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	Z				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	Z	4/9		GM 4/8	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET



SECRET/NOFORN

PTTSZYUW RHMMAFA 1068 0980952-SSSS--RUMUGKD.  
ZNY SSSSS

P 080952Z APR 69  
FM CG III MAF DNG RVN  
TO RUMUGKD/COMNAVFORV SGN RVN  
INFO RUMLPAA/CTF ONE ONE FIVE  
RUMCSDG/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

BT

SECRET/NOFORN

OPERATIONS ON THE CUA DAI RIVER (U)  
PERSONAL FOR VADM ZUMWALT INFO CAPT HOFFMANN AND CDR STEFFERUD FROM  
BGEN DWYER

A YOUR 049812Z APR 69

1. (S) REF A REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING TROOPS FOR OPS IN THE  
CUA DAI AREA.

2. (S) SINCE THE PLANNING CONFERENCE ON SUBJ OPS AT III MAF HDQTRS  
ON 3 MAR 1969 WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN FROM GEN LAM A TIME FRAME  
FOR HIS PROMISED TWO ARVN BATTALIONS AND DEPLOYMENT OF A VNN RAG IN  
THE CUA DAI RIVER AREA. ON 7 APRIL, GEN LAM INDICATED DEPLOYMENT  
OF THE RAG AND TWO ARVN BATTALIONS IS BEING EVALUATED AND  
HE HOPES TO HAVE THESE FORCES DEPLOYED ABOUT 15 APR. HOWEVER WE MUST  
APPRECIATE THIS DATE MAY NOT BE MET.

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 1068 SECRET/NOFORN

3. (S) A CONFERENCE WAS HELD 7 APRIL AT III MAF HDQTRS ON SUBJ OPS.  
ATTENDEES INCLUDED CTG 115.1 AND REPS FROM THIS COMMAND, CAP, ROK  
MARINES, AMERICAL DIV, G-3A (VND), US ADV OF QUANG DA SPECIAL  
ZONE, AND DEP PSA HOI AN. THE CONSENSUS IS THAT TO SECURE THE SOUTH  
BANK OF THE SONG CUA DAI WILL REQUIRE PERMANENT FORCES ON BARRIER  
ISLAND AND AN ACTIVE RAG. AS NOTED IN PARA 2 ABOVE THESE FORCES  
HAVE NOT YET BEEN ASSIGNED BY GEN LAM. THEREFORE SEVERAL INTERMED-  
IATE COURSES OF ACTION BRIEFLY OUTLINED BELOW WERE DISCUSSED.

A. REASONABLY FIRM IS A FIVE DAY SWEEP THROUGH BARRIER IS-  
LANDS COMMENCING 15 APR BY ELEMENTS OF 1/1 A/C SQUADRON OF AMER-  
ICAL DIVISION.

B. THE ROK MARINES PLAN A ONE BN OPERATION ON XUYEN-HA ISLAND,  
JUST BELOW HOI AN COMMENCING 9 APR.

C. TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPS IN 3 A AND B ABOVE AN  
ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE, THRU GEN LAM, TO COMMIT AT LEAST ONE ARVN BAT-  
TALION AND A RAG. QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE REPS STATED THAT IF THE  
RAG WERE DEPLOYED TO THE HOI AN AREA THEY IN TURN WOULD TRY  
TO SELL COMMITTING EITHER A RANGER BN OR A BN FROM 51ST REGT, FOR  
A PERIOD OF 30 DAYS. THIS TOO, OF COURSE, REQUIRES GEN LAM'S  
APPROVAL.

D. DEP PSA STATED HE IN TURN WOULD ATTEMPT TO GET AN

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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SECRET/NOFORN

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**SECRET/NOFORN**

PAGE THREE RHMAFA 1068 S E C R E T NOFORN

RF CO ASSIGNED TO BARRIER ISLAND ON A PERMENANT BASIS FOLLOWING THE AFOREMENTIONED OPERATIONS.

4. (S) THE CONSENSUS WAS THAT ARVN FORCES WOULD BE MORE SATISFACTORY THAN US FORCES FOR RAG OPS.

5. (S) ALCON IN THIS AREA AGREE THAT OPS IN THE CUA DAI RIVER TO THIS POINT HAVE BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN OPENING THE RIVER TO CIVILIAN TRAFFIC. AS AN ASIDE, THE DEP PSA (LTCOL USA) WAS QUITE POSITIVE IN HIS VIEWS THAT THE RECENT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY CTG 115.1 HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN THE INCREASED FRIENDLY TRAFFIC ON THE CUA DAI BY BOTH FISHING AND MERCHANT VESSELS. THIS HEALTHY SIGN REFLECTS OUR EFFORTS IN THE AREA, THOUGH I FULLY REALIZE IT HAS CAUSED TG 115.1 CASUALTIES.

6. (S) AT THIS POINT, A BATTALION/RAG OPERATION, WILL BE EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE IN SECURING THE RIVER. FOLLOW ON OPS WILL INCLUDE FURTHER PACIFICATION OF THE AREA AND THE FURTHER OPENING UP OF THE PORT HOI AN. THIS I BELIEVE IS ESSENTIAL IN DEVELOPING THE ECONOMIC STABILITY OF THE AREA. PROCEEDING ON FOREGOING INFO INTEND TO MAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORT TO EFFECT INCREASED TROOP AND RAG SUPPORT FOR YOUR MARKET TIME BOATS ON THE CUA DAI RIVER ASAP.

7. (U) WARM REGARDS.

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BT

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#27

**SECRET/NOFORN**

COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 1002307 APR 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
			IN	OUT		
4	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.  2 ORIG - G-3 REL - CG
3	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I	4/10			
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/10			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
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	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

**EXCLUSIVE**

**FOR**

**HAS BEEN SENT**

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

PTTCZYUW RHMMAFA1325 1000231-CCCC--RUMHLAA RUMHVA RUMLMHA.  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 100230Z APR 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVA/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAF  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR NGEN SIMPSON, NGEN DAVIS AND NGEN QUILTER  
 FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

AIR GROUND PERSONNEL EXCHANGE (U)

1. (C) AS YOU KNOW, I AM TAKING A NUMBER OF STEPS TO MAKE SURE WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO GET THE MOST OUT OF OUR RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS. AMONG THESE STEPS IS THE PANEL I AM CONVENING TO EXAMINE ACROSS THE BOARD OUR HELO OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND COMMAND AND CONTROL.
2. (C) BEYOND THE COMMAND ASPECTS, HOWEVER, THERE IS AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR GOOD UNDERSTANDING BY OUR LOWER RANKING AIR AND GROUND PEOPLE OF THE PROBLEMS OF EACH OTHER. I RECOGNIZE THAT EDUCATION IN THIS REGARD IS COMPLICATED BY THE CONTINUING TURNOVER AND BY THE SHORTAGE OF JUNIOR PEOPLE, WHICH IN TURN KEEPS EVERY-

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA1325 C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR ONE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE JUST TO GET HIS OWN BASIC JOB DONE. BUT THESE COMPLICATIONS DO NOT IN ANY WAY LESSEN THE REQUIREMENT FOR MEMBERS OF THE AIR GROUND TEAM TO BE CONSERVANT WITH WHAT THE TOTAL TEAM CAN DO. ONE TECHNIQUE WHICH WILL HELP THAT UNDERSTANDING IS TO MAINTAIN AN EXCHANGE PROGRAM BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR UNITS, WHERE A FEW PERSONNEL OF BOTH ELEMENTS LIVE AND WORK WITH THEIR AIR OR GROUND COUNTERPARTS FOR A BRIEF PERIOD.

3. (U) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I DESIRE THAT YOU ESTABLISH TOKEN OFFICER EXCHANGE PROGRAMS BETWEEN THE DIVISIONS AND WING. I DO NOT EXPECT A LARGE SCALE PROGRAM TO BE SET UP OVERNIGHT. I DO, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT YOU CAN BEGIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO EXCHANGE A FEW INDIVIDUALS FOR SHORT PERIODS OF TIME. BASED ON INITIAL EVALUATION WE MAY WANT TO EXPAND THE PROGRAM LATER.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1325

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#30



HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 APR 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 1008427 APR 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I	12	14	IV	MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
5	DCG	I	11/80		IV	REMARKS
	DCG AIR					ORIG - G-3
2	C/S	I				REL G-3
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	4/10		IV	MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

HAS BEEN SENT  
on news  
collection of  
Data for  
single  
management

SECRET #31



**SECRET**

RTTSZYUW RHMMFA 1373 1000843-SSSS--RUHKM RUMLMHA RUMHLAA  
RUMHVPA.

ZNY SSSSS

R 100842Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAF

RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

**S E C R E T** FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FIXED WING STRIKE REPORT (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 080306Z APR 69

B. CG FIRST MAF 260132Z MAR 69

1. (U) CONCUR WITH PROPOSAL REF A FOR THIS HQ TO CONSOLIDATE  
AND FWD SUBJ REPORT.

2. (C) FOR FIRST MAF, FIRST MARDIV, AND THIRD MARDIV. SUBMIT  
WRITTEN REPORT IN PRESCRIBED FORMAT TO III MAF, ATTN: G-3 AIR  
WEEKLY FOR PERIOD TUES THROUGH MONDAY WITH DAILY BREAKOUT  
PLUS TOTAL FOR WEEK. REQ REPORT REACH THIS HQ BY FRIDAY  
FOLLOWING REPORTING PERIOD. FIRST SUBMISSION FOR WEEK COMMEN-  
CING 15 APR TO 21 APR.

3. (U) FOR FMFPAC REQ COMMENTS ON PARA 2B OF REF B.

GP-4

BT

1373

**SECRET**

# 31

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 101540Z	1,2,3 COPY#	OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P6511.4...  THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT! <b>HAS BEEN SENT!!</b>  THIS MESSAGE IN TWO SECTIONS.  <b>[WAS SENT TO AFB PAC]</b>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/11		PA/D	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
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	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

**TOP SECRET**

O 101540Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO SSO AMERICAL DIVISION  
 FOR MG GETTYS FROM LTG NICKERSON  
 O 042339Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM


T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. MAC 4006 EO 291213Z MAR69

1. THIS RESPONDS TO YOUR MESSAGE POINTING OUT THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE CREATED FOR THE ENEMY BY OUR INTERDICTION OF THE ASHAU VALLEY, AND RAISING THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE PRE-EMPTIVE MOVE AGAINST THE ENEMY'S SOUTHERN LOC IN THE BA 614 AND KHAM DUC REGIONS. SPECIFICALLY YOU ASKED FOR MY VIEWS REGARDING THE DESIRABILITY, FEASIBILITY AND POSSIBLE TIMING OF SUCH A MOVE. ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS CONVEY MY VIEWS.

2. AT THE OUTSET, I BELIEVE SUCH AN EFFORT IS DESIRABLE. I SHARE YOUR INTEREST IN THE WESTERN QUANG TIN AREA AS A LIKELY LOGISTICAL ALTERNATIVE. HIS RECENT LOSSES AND FUTURE DIM PROSPECTS ENEMY IN WESTERN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN APPEAR LIKELY TO DRIVE HIM TO SEEK OTHER ROUTES AS YOU SUGGEST. THE DIFFICULTY AND INACCESSIBILITY OF THE TERRAIN AROUND BA 614 AND KHAM DUC MAKE THAT A MOST LIKELY PROSPECT FOR HIM. RECENT RECON EFFORTS IN THAT REGION, HOWEVER, PRODUCED MIXED RESULTS. SINCE 1 FEBRUARY I HAVE PROGRAMMED FORTY PHOTO RECCE SORTIES INTO THAT AREA. THAT PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALED LITTLE OF SIGNIFICANCE, SLAR MISSIONS HAVE NOT PRODUCES SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND RECENT PHOTOS INDICATE THAT THE ROADS INTO AND AROUND KHAM DUC ARE NOT TRAFFICABLE. WEATHER, HOWEVER, HAS IMPEDED THE DETAILED SURVEILLANCE I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO GIVE THE AREA, SINCE OTHER SOURCES INDICATE RISING ENEMY ACTIVITY. TWO INFRARED DETECTOR MISSIONS FLOWN DURING MARCH REPORTED NUMEROUS EMISSIONS IN THE OF BA 614 AND ZC 0112. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALS A ROAD

BRANCHING OFF ROUTE 966. SUCCESSFUL TACAIR ROAD CUTS ON 11, 17, 27, AND 29 MARCH WERE FILLED THE FOLLOWING DAY. LAST YEAR A GROUND RECON TEAM INSERTED AT ZC 001166 ON 20 SEP WAS EXTRACTED UNDER FIRE AND ONE INSERTED AT ZC 015095 ON 23 OCT WAS ABORTED DUE TO HEAVY GROUND FIRE. IN VIEW OF THESE AND SIMILAR INDICATORS I CONSIDER THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO DEVOTE TO THE AREA, SUFFICIENT EFFORT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE ENEMY IS ACTUALLY DOING, WHERE HE IS, AND WHAT HE HAS IN THE WAY OF FORCES AND SUPPLIES IN THE TARGET AREA. ONCE THIS IS DETERMINED I AM PREPARED TO INVEST THE NECESSARY FORCE TO DISTURPT THE OPERATION.

14 (1)  


3. I CONSIDER THAT A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN STRENGTH IN THE BA 614/ KHAM DUC AREA IS FEASIBLE. I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS AN OPERATION THAT WE MUST APPROACH IN A DELIBERATE FASHION, IN VIEW OF THE REMOTENESS OF THE TARGET AREA AND CONSEQUENT LOGISTIC PROBLEMS; THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY THERE; AND OF THE THINNING OF MY FORCES THAT WILL BE CAUSED BY ASSEMBLING A FORCE OF THE SIZE REQUIRES FOR THIS OPERATION. IN ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY OF THE OPERATION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE RESERVATIONS, I HAVE CONSIDERED THE VARIOUS OPERATIONAL FACTORS AND FORESEE NO INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEM.

A. THE TERRAIN IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BUT NO MORE SO THAN THE ENTIRE PLATEAU FROM II CTZ TO THE DMZ, WHERE WE OPERATE AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE.

B. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER DURING THE COMING MONTHS IS PREDICTED TO IMPEDE OPERATIONS SOMEWHAT, I DO NOT EXPECT WEATHER TO BE A SERIOUS LIMITING FACTOR.

C. THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION WILL BE CHALLENGING, BUT NOT TO THE DEGREE THAT LOGISTICS BECOMES A DISQUALIFYING FACTOR.

D. BECAUSE OUR INTELLIGENCE OF THE TARGET AREA IS SKETCHY, THE OPERATION SHOULD BE INITIATED WITH A RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT OF SEVERAL WEEKS, THE PRECISE TIME DEPENDING UPON WHAT THE RECON REVEALED. THE EFFORT WOULD CONCENTRATE ALL ORGANIC RESOURCES. I WOULD ALSO RELY HEAVILY ON THE DELTA FORCE AND CCN PATROLS. WE WOULD REQUIRE YOUR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN KEEPING DELTA FORCE WITH US. I CONSIDER THE DELTA FORCE AND PRIORITY CCN PATROL SUPPORT A KEY ELEMENT IN THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CONCEPT. 14(2)

E. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF TROOP AVAILABILITY, I ESTIMATE THAT THIS OPERATION AT ITS PEAK PHASE WILL REQUIRE TWO BRIGADES, ONE FROM AMERICAL WHICH CHARLIE GETTYS WILL INTRODUCE WHEN HIS RECONNAISSANCE HAS PROGRESSED FAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT HIM TO MAKE A HARD APPRAISAL OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION. CONSIDERING THE PRESENT TEMPO OF OPERATIONS IN QUANG NAM WHERE BOTH SLFS ARE FULLY COMMITTED WITH FIRST MAR DIV AND THE EXTENDED POSTURE OF THIRD MAR DIV IN THE NORTH, THE ONLY COMMAND WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ADDITIONAL FORCES IS THE 101ST. WHILE IT, TOO, IS ACTIVELY CONDUCTING OPERATIONS, I CONSIDER IT THE MOST LIKELY SOURCE FOR A RESERVE FORCE AT THE PRESENT TIME. TO TAP THE 101ST TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF A SECOND BRIGADE FOR INTRODUCTION INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA WOULD, I BELIEVE, OVER-EXTEND III MAF BEYOND THE SAFETY MARGIN. THIS, COMBINED WITH A POSSIBLE HIGH PRIORITY MISSION UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR 101ST ARGUES FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE SLICE TO III MAF. EVEN WITH AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE, HOWEVER, SOME REPOSITIONING OF MY PRESENT FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY WHICH WILL ENTAIL A CERTAIN DEGREE OF RISK. THE RISK BECOMES MORE ACCEPTABLE WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE.

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
860

NNNN

**TOP SECRET HASBEENSENT**

14(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ 14(3)

O 101540Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO SSO AMERICAL DIVISION  
 FOR MG GETTYS FROM LTG NICKERSON  
 O 042339Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

F. I BELIEVE ARVN PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATION IS BOTH FEASIBLE AND NECESSARY, TO KEEP THE EMPHASIS ON COMBINED OPERATIONS AND CONTINUE TO HELP ARVN PICK UP A PROGRESSIVELY GREATER SHARE OF THE LOAD. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, I WOULD EXPECT LTGEN LAM TO CONTRIBUTE AT LEAST ONE BATTALION TO THE OPERATION, HOPEFULLY MORE. THE PRECISE SIZE, HOWEVER, OF THE ARVN COMMITMENT, IS A MATTER WHICH I WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH LTGEN LAM AT A LATER DATE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALSO THE INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR TROOPS ELSEWHERE IN ICIZ AS FORCES ARE DEPLOYED TO THE KHAM DUC AREA.

4. BECAUSE WE NEED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE KHAM DUC AREA, THE PACE, SCOPE AND ORIENTATION OF THE MAJOR COMBAT EFFORT WOULD DEPEND ON OUR INITIAL CONCERTED RECONNAISSANCE PHASE. FOR THIS REASON, AVAILABILITY OF PROJECT DELTA FORCES IS A KEY IN THE TIMING. I BELIEVE THAT THE DELTA FORCES COULD BE SHIFTED SOUTH FROM CASS PARK TO INITIATE THEIR OPERATIONS IN KAM DUC AREA ON 1 MAY. THE FACILITIES OF SEVERAL SITES ARE BEING ANALYZED IN DETAIL TO SELECT ONE WHICH WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR COLOCATION OF BOTH THE DELTA FORCES AND CGN MOBILE LAUNCH TEAM. CONSIDERING THE RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT AS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT TO EXPAND THE OPERATION, I WOULD JUDGE A 30 DAY OPERATING PERIOD WOULD TELL THE STORY. ASSUMING THAT THE CONCENTRATED RECON EFFORT DEVELOPED HARD AND EXPLOITABLE INTELLIGENCE, ABOUT 1 JUNE I WOULD INITIATE A 3 BATTALION ASSAULT. WITH ENGINEERS, ARTY AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS INTO THE OLD KHAM DUC BASE AREA TO ESTABLISH AN FOB AND CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS IN ITS IMMEDIATE VICINITY. I ANTICIPATE THAT ABOUT TWO WEEKS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE KHAM DUC A FUNCTIONS FOB CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING A TOTAL OF 6 INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 3 ARTY BATTALIONS, AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORT ELEMENTS. I WOULD THEN INTRODUCE THE ADDITIONAL COMBAT ELEMENTS OF ANOTHER BRIGADE. RIF WOULD BE ACCELERATED, LASTING AS LONG AS 60 DAYS, DEPENDING UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION. WE COULD CONCLUDE THE OPERATION AT THIS JUNCTURE, BUT I WOULD PROPOSE INSTEAD TO LAUNCH A FOUR BATTALION ATTACK FROM KHAM DUC, NORTHEAST, ASTRIDE THE SONG CAI ENTERING BA 11 FROM THE WEST. CONCURRENTLY, I WOULD TASK THE 1ST MAR DIV TO LAUNCH A COORDINATED ATTACK ON BA 112 FROM THE EAST WITH AT LEAST ONE REGIMENT. THIS PHASE OF THE OPERATION WOULD CONCLUDE IN MID-SEPTEMBER.

14 (4)

14 (4)

5. IN SUMMARY, I CONSIDER A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN THE BA 614/KHAM DUC AREA BOTH DESIRABLE AND FEASIBLE, ASSUMING DELTA FORCE AVAILABILITY, PRIORITY CCM SUPPORT, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE WITH ITS NORMAL SUPPORT. WITH NO RADICAL SHIFT IN CURRENT TACTICAL TRENDS, WE ARE PREPARED TO INITIATE THE OPERATION ON 1 MAY. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED OPERATION IN DETAIL WITH CHARLIE GETTYS, AND HOLD HIS PROPOSED CONCEPT AND OPERATION PLAN, WHICH I HAVE TENTATIVELY APPROVED FOR PLANNING. I WOULD BE PLEASED TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSAL WITH YOU OR PRESENT A BRIEFING AT A TIME AND PLACE OF YOUR CHOICE.

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

GPT  
500 OK

NNNN

TOP SECRET

HASBEENSENT

14(5)

14(5)  
~~14~~

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

CCN: 037/OUT

FILE: DH

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 10 APR 69
		SERIAL N° / CONTROL DATE 101524Z APR 69	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG			10 APR 69		EXCLUSIVE FOR REMARKS ORIG: S/S REL: CG
3	DCG			12 APR 69		
	DCG AIR					EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	4/11			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #32

**SECRET**

CCN:037/OUT FILE:DH

		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 10 APR 69
		SERIAL# 101524Z APR 69	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD
DATE	SIGNATURE	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
<del>EXCLUSIVE</del> <del>FOR</del> MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT		DATE	SIGNATURE
s/s	COPY 1-2-3 OF 3 COPIES MAT AND TAPE		

### RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EACH PERSON WHO HANDLES THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT  
SHALL SIGN THIS RECORD

**SECRET**

#32

**SECRET**

OTTSZYUW RHMMAFA1415 1001524-SSSS--RUHMFMA.

ZNY SSSSS

O 101524Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS

SECRET/SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

SUBJ: VISIT BY SENATOR TOWER TO III MAF

1. SENATOR TOWER VISITED III MAF ARRIVING AT 0840H ON 9 APRIL AND DEPARTING AT 0800H ON 10 APRIL. ACCOMPANYING SENATOR TOWER WAS MR. CHARLES B. KERBOW, CHIEF CLERK, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, AND COLONEL JOHN O. MCFALLS, JR., USAF, AIR FORCE LEGISLATIVE LIAISON OFFICE. SENATOR TOWER VISITED OR TOURED THE FOLLOWING:

A. 366TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING

B. STATIC DISPLAY PROVIDED BY CG 1ST MAW AND CG 1ST MARDIV

C. III MAF STAFF FOR BRIEFING

D. XXIV CORPS WHICH INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

(1) OVERFLY OF GIA DINH, CAM VAO, AND DMZ.

(2) LANDED VANDERGRIFT COMBAT BASE, CG 3D MARDIV BRIEFED.

(3) OVERFLEW PURPLE MARTIN AO (FSB GREEN), KHE SANH, SPARK, WHISMAN, UPPER DA KRONG AND BA LONG VALLEY.

2. DINNER WAS HOSTED BY ME AT MY QUARTERS AND WAS ATTENDED BY

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA1415 SECRET SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL LAM AMONG OTHERS.

3. SENATOR TOWER WAS QUITE INTERESTED IN ALL THAT HE SAW AND WAS OBVIOUSLY VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE IN MILITARY AFFAIRS. HE WAS INTERESTED IN DOING WHAT HE COULD TO HELP THE FIGHTING FORCES IN VIETNAM AND I BELIEVE HIS VISIT WAS MOST BENEFICIAL.

4. SENATOR TOWER COMMENTED ON SEVERAL ITEMS OF INTEREST DURING HIS VISIT AND THEY INCLUDED SUCH ITEMS AS THE FOLLOWING:

A. WHY ARE NO MARINES ASSIGNED TO IV CORPS IN THE DELTA?

HE SAID HE HAD NOT RECEIVED A GOOD ANSWER ON THIS POINT ON ANY OF HIS FIVE TRIPS TO VIETNAM. APPARENTLY HE CONSIDERS THAT THE DELTA IS A NORMAL OPERATING ENVIRONMENT FOR MARINES.

B. WHAT DO WE NEED IN HELICOPTERS? BY THIS HE WAS REFERRING TO THE TYPE OF HELICOPTERS REQUIRED TO PERFORM VARIOUS FUNCTIONS SUCH AS UTILITY, MEDEVAC, ETC. HE WAS TOLD THAT WE HAD A REQUIREMENT FOR MORE LIGHT HELOS, COMMAND AND CONTROL HELOS, AND THAT A DEFINITE REQUIREMENT EXISTED FOR A HEAVY LIFT HELO (CH54B OR CH47C). HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT THE HELOS SHOULD BE CONFIGURED FOR INSTRUMENT FLIGHT AND CREWS TRAINED FOR INSTRUMENT CONDITIONS. THE NEED FOR A TERMINAL GUIDANCE SYSTEM WAS ALSO EMPHASIZED.

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES IN IS N330 SVH

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RHMMAFAI415 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 C. THE WAR IN I CORPS WAS DISCUSSED WITH GENERAL LAM, AND  
 ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS.  
 GENERAL LAM STATED, QUOTE: WE KNOW YOU AMERICANS ARE PLANNING  
 ON WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR FORCES, BUT DON'T TALK ABOUT IT. IF YOU  
 SAY YOU ARE GOING TO WITHDRAW YOUR TROOPS IN A YEAR, THEN THE  
 NVA KNOW THEY ONLY HAVE TO HOLD OUT FOR TWO MORE YEARS--AND  
 THEY WILL. SO, IF YOU ARE PLANNING ON WITHDRAWING YOUR FORCES,  
 GO AHEAD AND DO IT, BUT DON'T TALK ABOUT IT. IF YOU TALK,  
 QUOTE TALK STRONG UNQUOTE. (BY QUOTE TALKING STRONG UNQUOTE,  
 LAM MEANT THAT WE ANNOUNCE WE ARE STAYING UNTIL ALL NVA LEAVE.)  
 GENERAL LAM ALSO SAID HE COULD HANDLE THE NVA IF HE HAD AN  
 EQUAL NUMBER OF REGIMENTS. HE SAID THE NVA HAD 22 REGIMENTS IN  
 I CORPS AND HE HAD 10. HE STATED THAT HE ASKED PRESIDENT  
 THIEU TO GO TO FULL MOBILIZATION AND GIVE HIM 10 MORE  
 REGIMENTS THAT HE COULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM. SENATOR TOWER  
 REASSURED GENERAL LAM THAT THE US (PRESIDENT NIXON) WOULD NOT  
 WITHDRAW US TROOPS UNTIL (1), THE NVA LEFT, (2), THE TERRITORIAL  
 SOVEREIGNTY OF SVN WAS ASSURED. LAM SAID THAT IF THE NVA LEFT,  
 NO PROBLEM, HE LAM, COULD HANDLE THE VC IN THREE MONTHS.

D. GENERAL LAM GAVE SENATOR TOWER QUITE A LECTURE ON

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFAI415 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 MARINES' RELATING TO PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. HE USED CAP AS AN  
 EXAMPLE OF HOW IT SHOULD BE DONE.

E. DURING THE DAY, SENATOR TOWER ASKED QUOTE: WHAT WAS THE  
 REASON FOR KHE SANH? WAS IT DESIGNED TO ANCHOR THE TRACE UNQUOTE?  
 I REFERRED HIM TO GENERAL WALT AND SUGGESTED THAT HE CONTACT  
 HIM WHEN HE GETS BACK TO WASHINGTON.

5. AFTER DINNER, GENERAL LAM WAS PREPARING TO LEAVE AND SENATOR  
 TOWER ASKED TO SPEAK TO HIM PRIVATELY. THE CONVERSATION WAS  
 QUITE ANIMATED ALTHOUGH I WAS NOT PRESENT. AFTER GENERAL LAM  
 LEFT, THE SENATOR STATED TO ME THAT HE TALKED TO GENERAL LAM  
 ABOUT THE ROKS AND THAT HE TOLD GENERAL LAM THAT A HIGH ROK  
 OFFICIAL HAD MADE THE STATEMENT THAT IF AN AMERICAN DIVISION  
 WERE WITHDRAWN FROM VIETNAM, HE WOULD OFFER TWO ROK DIVISIONS  
 TO COMPENSATE. SENATOR TOWER ASKED GENERAL LAM IF THE GVN WOULD  
 ACCEPT MORE ROKS AND WHERE WOULD HE (LAM) LOCATE THE ADDITIONAL  
 ROK FORCES IF THEY WERE PROVIDED TO HIM. GENERAL LAM'S ANSWER  
 WAS QUOTE: YES, THE GVN WOULD ACCEPT AND THE FORCES SHOULD BE  
 LOCATED IN THE HILLS UNQUOTE. MY CHIEF OF STAFF ESCORTED GENERAL  
 LAM TO THE BOAT DOCKS AS HE DEPARTED AND GENERAL LAM STATED THAT  
 SENATOR TOWER HAD ASKED ABOUT THE ROKS. GENERAL LAM STATED THAT

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

HAS BEEN SENT

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFA 1415 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR HE TOLD THE SENATOR THAT HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE ROKS WERE THEMSELVES BRUTAL, BUT THAT THEY WERE GOOD FIGHTERS. HE CITED A COUPLE OF INSTANCES WHEREIN TWO VILLAGES WERE DESTROYED SOMETIME AGO BY THE ROKS, BUT HE HASTENED TO ADD THAT THE DESTRUCTION WAS IN CONNECTION WITH ENEMY OPERATIONS. I THINK THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN TOWER AND LAM MIGHT BE SUMMED UP AS: YES, THE VIETNAMESE WOULD ACCEPT THE TWO DIVISIONS IF OFFERED AND THE VIETNAMESE WOULD DESIRE TO PUT THEM IN LESS POPULATED AREAS. IN MY VIEW, A LOCATION IN THE VICINITY OF THE DMZ WOULD OFFER THREE ADVANTAGES. (1), IT WOULD PUT APPROPRIATE TROOP DENSITY IN THE AREA, (2) IT WOULD LOCATE THE ROKS GENERALLY IN UNPOPULATED AREAS, AND (3), IT WOULD PROVIDE AN INTERNATIONAL FLAVOR TO THE POLICING OF THE DMZ.

6. ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING, SENATOR TOWER MET WITH THE FORCE SURGEON AND THE FORCE CHAPLAIN AND HIS ASSISTANT. HE SAID HE DESIRED TO TALK TO THE OFFICERS WHO WORKED CLOSELY WITH PEOPLE. IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE DOCTOR HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT MORALE, AND WAS TOLD ABOUT THE MARS SYSTEM AND THE RAPID RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY LEAVE AS BEING SIGNIFICANT FACTORS.

A. THE SENATOR ASKED ABOUT MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL

PAGE SIX RHMMAFA 1415 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR AND WAS TOLD THAT WE ARE PROUD OF OUR EXISTING SYSTEM, THAT OUR BUREAU WAS MOST RESPONSIVE TO REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND THAT WE ARE IN BETTER SHAPE NOW WE HAD EVER BEEN.

B. HE COMMENTED ON THE LOW MORTALITY RATE (1 PERCENT) AND THE DOCTOR SAID THAT WHILE THIS MIGHT BE TRUE COUNTRY-WIDE, OUR FIGURES HERE WERE HIGHER. THE DOCTOR POINTED OUT THAT THE HELO EVAC BROUGHT MEN TO THE HOSPITALS STILL ALIVE BUT SO GRAVELY INJURED THAT THEY COULD NOT RECOVER.

C. THE SURGEON STRESSED OUR READY ACCESS IN EMERGENCIES TO MEDICAL FACILITIES OF THE OTHER SERVICES.

D. THE DISCUSSION LATER GOT TO NEGROES AND WAS QUITE EXTENSIVE. THE SURGEON SAID THAT A BEARDED NEGRO DID NOT NECESSARILY INDICATE A NON-CONFORMIST OR MILITANT; THAT THEIR TENDANCY TO GET INGROWN HAIRS CAUSED A REAL PROBLEM AND THAT THERE WERE VALID MEDICAL REASONS FOR ISSUING NON-SHAVING CHITS.

E. THE SENATOR HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH CAP MED-CAPPING ON A PREVIOUS VISIT AND ASKED IF THIS WAS STILL A BIG EFFORT. HE WAS TOLD THAT IT WAS.

F. THERE WAS A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF MORALE AND THE GENERAL SENSE OF THE TALK WAS THAT MORALE WAS HIGH. AT ONE POINT, LACK

GP-4

BT

1415

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**SECRET**

#52

**SECRET**

## MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

OTTSZYUW RHMMAFA1423 1001524-SSSS--RUHMFMA.  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 101524Z APR 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS  
 SECRET / SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 OF LIBERTY IN THE CITIES AND VILLAGES CAME UP; THE DOCTOR  
 ATTRIBUTED OUR LOW VD RATE TO THIS. BOTH CHAPLAIN RADCLIFFE  
 AND CHAPLAIN JOSEPH WERE PRESENT DURING THIS DISCUSSION.  
 SUBJECTS WHICH WERE EMPHASIZED BY THE CHAPLAINS WERE:

- (1) THE HIGH MORALE OF MARINES AND THE REASONS THEREFORE.
- (2) THE CHAPLAINS ROLE AND THE RESPONSE TO HIS RELIGIOUS PROGRAM.
- (3) THE CHAPLAINS POSITIVE ALTHOUGH UNCOERCED RESPONSE TO OUR GOVERNMENT'S VIETNAMESE POLICY.
- (4) RACE PROBLEMS.
- (5) REACTION OF TROOPS TO DISSENSION AND UNREST AT HOME AND TO CRITICISM OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM.

ALL SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO REFLECT CREDIT ON THE MARINE IN GENERAL AND THE MARINE CORPS IN PARTICULAR. SENATOR TOWER IDENTIFIED HIS CONCURRENCE WITH

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA1423 SECRET SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR THE OPINIONS OF THE CHAPLAINS AND DOCTOR AND SUPPORTED THAT CONCURRENCE WITH REFERENCE TO PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS MADE DURING THIS AND FOUR PREVIOUS VISITS TO VIETNAM. HE LATER SAID THAT THIS LAST DISCUSSION WAS ONE OF THE MOST BENEFICIAL HE HAS HAD ON HIS TRIP

7. AT ONE TIME, MR. KERBOW INDICATED TO ME THAT HE MIGHT BE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE.

8. ALL IN ALL, I WOULD SAY THAT THE VISIT OF SENATOR TOWER WAS QUITE BENEFICIAL. I AM SURE THAT SENATOR TOWER LEFT HAPPY WITH I CORPS AND THAT WE WILL USE HIS INFLUENCE TO ASSIST ALL THE FORCES IN VIETNAM.

9. MOST OF THE ABOVE HAS BEEN PASSED TO COMUSMACV

GP-4

BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

HAS BEEN SENT

**SECRET**

#32

HEADQUARTERS  
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 11 APR 69
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 101526Z APR 69	COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I	12 Apr 69		N	EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL ABRAMS  REMARKS  ORIG - S/S REL - CG
3	DCG	I	12 Apr		N	
3	DCG AIR	I			CD	
2	C/S	I			D	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	4/11		H	
	G-1					
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	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

#33



**SECRET**

ZNY SSSSS  
 O 101526Z APR 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 BT

**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 SUBJECT: VISIT BY SENATOR TOWER TO III MAF.

1. SENATOR TOWER VISITED III MAF ARRIVING AT 0840H ON 9 APRIL AND DEPARTING AT 0800H ON 10 APRIL. ACCOMPANYING SENATOR TOWER WAS MR. CHARLES B. KERBOW, CHIEF CLERK, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, AND COLONEL JOHN O. MCFALLS, JR., USAF, AIR FORCE LEGISLATIVE LIAISON OFFICE. SENATOR TOWER VISITED OR TOURED THE FOLLOWING:

- A. 366TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING
- B. STATIC DISPLAY PROVIDED BY CG 1ST MAW AND CG 1ST MARDIV
- C. III MAF STAFF FOR BRIEFING
- D. XXIV CORPS WHICH INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

(1) OVERFLY OF GIA DINH, CAM VAU, AND DMZ.

(2) LANDED VANDERGRIFT COMBAT BASE, CG 3D MARDIV BRIEFED.

(3) OVERFLEW PURPLE MARTIN AO (FSB GREEN), KHE SANH, SPARK, WHISMAN, UPPER DA KRONG AND BA LONG VALLEY.

2. DINNER WAS HOSTED BY ME AT MY QUARTERS AND WAS ATTENDED BY

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA1415 **S E C R E T** SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL LAM AMONG OTHERS.

3. SENATOR TOWER WAS QUITE INTERESTED IN ALL THAT HE SAW AND WAS OBVIOUSLY VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE IN MILITARY AFFAIRS. HE WAS INTERESTED IN DOING WHAT HE COULD TO HELP THE FIGHTING FORCES IN VIETNAM AND I BELIEVE HIS VISIT WAS MOST BENEFICIAL.

4. SENATOR TOWER COMMENTED ON SEVERAL ITEMS OF INTEREST DURING HIS VISIT AND THEY INCLUDED SUCH ITEMS AS THE FOLLOWING:

A. WHY ARE NO MARINES ASSIGNED TO IV CORPS IN THE DELTA?

HE SAID HE HAD NOT RECEIVED A GOOD ANSWER ON THIS POINT ON ANY OF HIS FIVE TRIPS TO VIETNAM. APPARENTLY HE CONSIDERS THAT THE DELTA IS A NORMAL OPERATING ENVIRONMENT FOR MARINES.

B. WHAT DO WE NEED IN HELICOPTERS? BY THIS HE WAS REFERRING TO THE TYPE OF HELICOPTERS REQUIRED TO PERFORM VARIOUS FUNCTIONS SUCH AS UTILITY, MEDEVAC, ETC. HE WAS TOLD THAT WE HAD A REQUIREMENT FOR MORE LIGHT HELOS, COMMAND AND CONTROL HELOS, AND THAT A DEFINITE REQUIREMENT EXISTED FOR A HEAVY LIFT HELO (CH54B OR CH47C). HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT THE HELOS SHOULD BE CONFIGURED FOR INSTRUMENT FLIGHT AND CREWS TRAINED FOR INSTRUMENT CONDITIONS. THE NEED FOR A TERMINAL GUIDANCE SYSTEM WAS ALSO EMPHASIZED.

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

**SECRET**  
# 33

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE RHMMFAI415 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 C. THE WAR IN I CORPS WAS DISCUSSED WITH GENERAL LAM, AND  
 ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS.  
 GENERAL LAM STATED, QUOTE: WE KNOW YOU AMERICANS ARE PLANNING  
 ON WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR FORCES, BUT DON'T TALK ABOUT IT. IF YOU  
 SAY YOU ARE GOING TO WITHDRAW YOUR TROOPS IN A YEAR, THEN THE  
 NVA KNOW THEY ONLY HAVE TO HOLD OUT FOR TWO MORE YEARS--AND  
 THEY WILL. SO, IF YOU ARE PLANNING ON WITHDRAWING YOUR FORCES,  
 GO AHEAD AND DO IT, BUT DON'T TALK ABOUT IT. IF YOU TALK,  
 QUOTE TALK STRONG UNQUOTE. (BY QUOTE TALKING STRONG UNQUOTE,  
 LAM MEANT THAT WE ANNOUNCE WE ARE STAYING UNTIL ALL NVA LEAVE.)  
 GENERAL LAM ALSO SAID HE COULD HANDLE THE NVA IF HE HAD AN  
 EQUAL NUMBER OF REGIMENTS. HE SAID THE NVA HAD 22 REGIMENTS IN  
 I CORPS AND HE HAD 10. HE STATED THAT HE ASKED PRESIDENT  
 THIEU TO GO TO FULL MOBILIZATION AND GIVE HIM 10 MORE  
 REGIMENTS THAT HE COULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM. SENATOR TOWER  
 REASSURED GENERAL LAM THAT THE US (PRESIDENT NIXON) WOULD NOT  
 WITHDRAW US TROOPS UNTIL (1), THE NVA LEFT, (2), THE TERRITORIAL  
 SOVEREIGNTY OF SVN WAS ASSURED. LAM SAID THAT IF THE NVA LEFT,  
 NO PROBLEM, HE LAM, COULD HANDLE THE VC IN THREE MONTHS.

PAGE FOUR RHMMFAI415 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 5. AFTER DINNER, GENERAL LAM WAS PREPARING TO LEAVE AND SENATOR  
 TOWER ASKED TO SPEAK TO HIM PRIVATELY. THE CONVERSATION WAS  
 QUITE ANIMATED ALTHOUGH I WAS NOT PRESENT. AFTER GENERAL LAM  
 LEFT, THE SENATOR STATED TO ME THAT HE TALKED TO GENERAL LAM  
 ABOUT THE ROKS AND THAT HE TOLD GENERAL LAM THAT A HIGH ROK  
 OFFICIAL HAD MADE THE STATEMENT THAT IF AN AMERICAN DIVISION  
 WERE WITHDRAWN FROM VIETNAM, HE WOULD OFFER TWO ROK DIVISIONS  
 TO COMPENSATE. SENATOR TOWER ASKED GENERAL LAM IF THE GVN WOULD  
 ACCEPT MORE ROKS AND WHERE WOULD HE (LAM) LOCATE THE ADDITIONAL  
 ROK FORCES IF THEY WERE PROVIDED TO HIM. GENERAL LAM'S ANSWER  
 WAS QUOTE: YES, THE GVN WOULD ACCEPT AND THE FORCES SHOULD BE  
 LOCATED IN THE HILLS UNQUOTE. MY CHIEF OF STAFF ESCORTED GENERAL  
 LAM TO THE BOAT DOCKS AS HE DEPARTED AND GENERAL LAM STATED THAT  
 SENATOR TOWER HAD ASKED ABOUT THE ROKS. GENERAL LAM STATED THAT

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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BT

1415

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GP-4  
 BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

**SECRET**  
# 33

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 11 MAR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 110745Z	1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4...
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
2	C/S	I	Handwritten signature			
	DC/S					<u>HAS BEEN SENT</u>
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	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

**TOP SECRET**

O 110745Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG XXIV CORPS  
 CG FIRST MARINE DIVISION  
 CG FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
 ZEN/CG FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND  
 ZEM

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 FOR LTGEN STILWELL, MGEN SIMPSON, MGEN QUILTER AND BGEN FEELEY FROM  
 LTGEN NICKERSON

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS READRESSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:

O 042339Z ZYH ZFF-1  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM.

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. MAC 4006 EO 291213Z MAR 69 - SI

1. THIS RESPONDS TO YOUR MESSAGE POINTING OUT THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE CREATED FOR THE ENEMY BY OUR INTERDICTION OF THE ASHAU VALLEY, AND RAISING THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE PREEMPTIVE MOVE AGAINST THE ENEMY'S SOUTHERN LOC IN THE BA 614 AND KHAM DUC REGIONS. SPECIFICALLY YOU ASKED FOR MY VIEWS REGARDING THE DESIRABILITY, FEASIBILITY AND POSSIBLE TIMING OF SUCH A MOVE. ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS CONVEY MY VIEWS.
2. AT THE OUTSET, I BELIEVE SUCH AN EFFORT IS DESIRABLE. I SHARE YOUR INTEREST IN THE WESTERN QUANG TIN AREA AS A LIKELY LOGISTICAL ALTERNATIVE. HIS RECENT LOSSES AND FUTURE DIM PROSPECTS ENEMY IN WESTERN PUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN APPEAR LIKELY TO DRIVE HIM TO SEEK OTHER ROUTES AS YOU SUGGEST. THE DIFFICULTY AND INACCESSIBILITY OF THE TERRAIN AROUND BA 614 AND KHAM DUC MAKE THAT A MOST LIKELY PROSPECT FOR HIM. RECENT RECON EFFORTS IN THAT REGION, HOWEVER, PRODUCED MIXED RESULTS. SINCE 1 FEBRUARY I HAVE PROGRAMMED FORTY PHOTO RECCES SORTIES INTO THAT AREA. THAT PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALED LITTLE OF SIGNIFICANCE, SLAR MISSIONS HAVE NOT PRODUCED SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND RECENT PHOTOS INDICATE THAT THE ROADS INTO AND AROUND KHAM DUC ARE NOT TRAFFICABLE. WEATHER, HOWEVER, HAS IMPEDED THE DETAILED SURVEILLANCE I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO

GIVE THE AREA, SINCE OTHER SOURCES INDICATE RISING ENEMY ACTIVITY. TWO INFRARED DETECT OR MISSIONS FLOWN DURING MARCH REPORTED NUMEROUS EMISSIONS IN THE OF BA 614 AND ZC 0112. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALS A ROAD

BRANCHING OFF ROUTE 966. SUCCESSFUL TACAIR ROAD CUTS ON 11, 17, 27, AND 29 MARCH WERE FILLED THE FOLLOWING DAY. LAST YEAR A GROUND RECON TEAM INSERTED AT ZC 001166 ON 20 SEP WAS EXTRACTED UNDER

FIRE AND ONE INSERTED AT ZC 015095 ON 23 OCT WAS ABORTED DUE TO HEAVY GROUND FIRE. IN VIEW OF THESE AND SIMILAR INDICATORS I CONSIDER THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO DEVOTE TO THE AREA, SUFFICIENT EFFORT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE ENEMY IS ACTUALLY DOING, WHERE HE IS, AND WHAT HE HAS IN THE WAY OF FORCES AND SUPPLIES IN THE TARGET AREA. ONCE THIS IS DETERMINED I AM PREPARED TO INVEST THE NECESSARY FORCE TO DISRUPT THE

3. I CONSIDER THAT A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN STRENGTH IN THE BA 614

KHAM DUC AREA IS FEASIBLE. I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS AN OPERATION THAT WE MUST APPROACH IN A DELIBERATE FASHION, IN VIEW OF THE REMOTENESS OF THE TARGET AREA AND CONSEQUENT LOGISTIC PROBLEMS; THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY THERE; AND OF THE THINNING OF MY FORCES THAT WILL BE CAUSED BY ASSEMBLING A FORCE OF THE SIZE REQUIRES FOR THIS OPERATION. IN ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY OF THE OPERATION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE RESERVATIONS, I HAVE CONSIDERED THE VARIOUS OPERATIONAL FACTORS AND FORESEE NO INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEM.

A. THE TERRAIN IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BUT NO MORE SO THAN THE ENTIRE PLATEAU FROM II CTZ TO THE DMZ, WHERE WE OPERATE AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE.

B. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER DURING THE COMING MONTHS IS PREDICTED TO IMPEDE OPERATIONS SOMEWHAT, I DO NOT EXPECT WEATHER TO BE A SERIOUS LIMITING FACTOR.

C. THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION WILL BE CHALLENGING, BUT NOT TO THE DEGREE THAT LOGISTICS BECOMES A DISQUALIFYING FACTOR.

D. BECAUSE OUR INTELLIGENCE OF THE TARGET AREA IS SKETCHY, THE OPERATION SHOULD BE INITIATED WITH A RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT OF SEVERAL WEEKS, THE PRECISE TIME DEPENDING UPON WHAT THE RECON REVEALS. THE EFFORT WOULD CONCENTRATE ALL ORGANIC RESOURCES. I WOULD ALSO RELY HEAVILY ON THE DELTA FORCE AND CON PATROLS. WE WOULD REQUIRE YOUR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN KEEPING DELTA FORCE WITH US. I CONSIDER THE DELTA FORCE AND PRIORITY CON PATROL SUPPORT A KEY ELEMENT IN THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CONCEPT.

E. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF TROOP AVAILABILITY, I ESTIMATE THAT THIS OPERATION AT ITS PEAK PHASE WILL REQUIRE TWO BRIGADES, ONE FROM AMERICAL WHICH CHARLIE GETTYS WILL INTRODUCE WHEN HIS RECONNAISSANCE HAS PROGRESSED FAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT HIM TO MAKE A HARD APPRAISAL OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION. CONSIDERING THE PRESENT TEMPO OF OPERATIONS IN QUANG NAM WHERE BOTH SLFS ARE FULLY COMMITTED WITH FIRST MAR DIV AND THE EXTENDED POSTURE OF THIRD MAR DIV IN THE NORTH, THE ONLY COMMAND WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ADDITIONAL FORCES IS THE 101ST. WHILE IT, TOO, IS ACTIVELY CONDUCTING OPERATIONS, I CONSIDER IT THE MOST LIKELY SOURCE FOR A RESERVE FORCE AT THE PRESENT TIME. TO TAP THE 101ST TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF A SECOND BRIGADE FOR INTRODUCTION INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA WOULD, I BELIEVE, OVER-EXTEND III MAF BEYOND THE SAFETY MARGIN. THIS, COMBINED

WITH A POSSIBLE HIGH PRIORITY MISSION UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR 101ST ARGUES FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE SLICE TO III MAF. EVEN WITH AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE, HOWEVER, SOME REPOSITIONING OF MY PRESENT FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY WHICH WILL ENTAIL A CERTAIN DEGREE OF RISK. THE RISK BECOMES MORE ACCEPTABLE WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE.

O 042339Z ZYH ZFF-1  
 FM C6 III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

F. I BELIEVE ARVN PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATION IS BOTH FEASIBLE AND NECESSARY, TO KEEP THE EMPHASIS ON COMBINED OPERATIONS AND CONTINUE TO HELP ARVN PICK UP A PROGRESSIVELY GREATER SHARE OF THE LOAD. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, I WOULD EXPECT LTGEN LAM TO CONTRIBUTE AT LEAST ONE BATTALION TO THE OPERATION, HOPEFULLY MORE. THE PRECISE SIZE, HOWEVER, OF THE ARVN COMMITMENT, IS A MATTER WHICH I WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH LTGEN LAM AT A LATER DATE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALSO THE INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR TROOPS ELSEWHERE IN ICTZ AS FORCES ARE DEPLOYED TO THE KHAM DUC AREA.

4. BECAUSE WE NEED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE KHAM DUC AREA, THE PACE, SCOPE AND ORIENTATION OF THE MAJOR COMBAT EFFORT WOULD DEPEND ON OUR INITIAL CONCERTED RECONNAISSANCE PHASE. FOR THIS REASON, AVAILABILITY OF PROJECT DELTA FORCES IS A KEY IN THE TIMING. I BELIEVE THAT THE DELTA FORCES COULD BE SHIFTED SOUTH FROM CASS PARK TO INITIATE THEIR OPERATIONS IN KAM DUC AREA ON 1 MAY. THE FACILITIES OF SEVERAL SITES ARE BEING ANALYZED

IN DETAIL TO SELECT ONE WHICH WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR COLOCATION OF BOTH THE DELTA FORCES AND CCN MOBILE LAUNCH TEAM. CONSIDERING THE RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT AS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT TO EXPAND THE OPERATION, I WOULD JUDGE A 30 DAY OPERATING PERIOD WOULD TELL THE STORY. ASSUMING THAT THE CONCENTRATED RECON EFFORT DEVELOPED HARD AND EXPLOITABLE INTELLIGENCE, ABOUT 1 JUNE I WOULD INITIATE A 3 BATTALION ASSAULT. WITH ENGINEERS, ARTY AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS INTO THE OLD KHAM DUC BASE AREA TO ESTABLISH AN FOB AND CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS IN ITS IMMEDIATE VICINITY. I ANTICIPATE THAT ABOUT TWO WEEKS

WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE KHAM DUC A FUNCTIONAL FOB CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING A TOTAL OF 6 INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 3 ARTY BATTALIONS, AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORT ELEMENTS. I WOULD THEN INTRODUCE THE ADDITIONAL COMBAT ELEMENTS OF ANOTHER BRIGADE. RIF WOULD BE ACCELERATED, LASTING AS LONG AS 60 DAYS, DEPENDING UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION. WE COULD CONCLUDE THE OPERATION AT THIS JUNCTURE, BUT I WOULD PROPOSE INSTEAD TO LAUNCH A FOUR BATTALION ATTACK FROM KHAM DUC, NORTHEAST, ASTRIDE THE SONG CAI ENTERING BA 11 FROM THE WEST.

CURRENTLY, I WOULD TASK THE 1ST MAR DIV TO LAUNCH A COORDINATED ATTACK ON BA 112 FROM THE EAST WITH AT LEAST ONE REGIMENT. THIS PHASE OF THE OPERATION WOULD CONCLUDE IN MID-SEPTEMBER.

5. IN SUMMARY, I CONSIDER A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN THE BA 614/KHAM DUC AREA BOTH DESIRABLE AND FEASIBLE, ASSUMING DELTA FORCE AVAILABILITY, PRIORITY CCN SUPPORT, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE WITH ITS NORMAL SUPPORT. WITH NO RADICAL SHIFT IN CURRENT TACTICAL TRENDS, WE ARE PREPARED TO INITIATE THE K OPERATION ON 1 MAY. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED OPERATION IN DETAIL WITH CHARLIE GETTYS, AND HOLD HIS PROPOSED CONCEPT AND OPERATION PLAN, WHICH I HAVE TENTATIVELY APPROVED FOR PLANNING. I WOULD BE PLEASED TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSAL WITH YOU OR PRESENT A BRIEFING AT A TIME AND PLACE OF YOUR CHOICE.

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

CCN: 048/OUT

FILE: DH

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 12 APR 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 121400Z APR 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN OUT		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
	CG					REMARKS	
3	DCG		13 Apr		3	THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4.	
	DCG AIR					THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.	
2	C/S	I				ORIG: S/S REL: CG	
	DC/S					<p><b>EXCLUSIVE FOR</b> <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b></p>	
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	I	4/13		901	<p><b>HAS BEEN SENT</b> <b>TOP SECRET</b></p>	
	G-1						
	G-2						
4	G-3	I				<p><b>HAS BEEN SENT</b> <b>TOP SECRET</b></p>	
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

**TOP SECRET**

OTITZYUW RHMMAFA1697 1021400-TTTT--RUMLMAA R'MHVPA R'MLMHA  
 RUMLMPA.

ZNY TTTT

O 121400Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMLMAA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAF

RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCMD

ZI

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L / E X C L U S I V E M C E O F O R M A J G E N S I M P S O N , M A J G E N  
 D A V I S , M A J G E N Q U I L T E R A N D B G E N F E E L E Y F R O M L I G E N N I C K E R S O N

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS READDRESSSED FOR YOU INFORMATION:

QUOTE CMC 111311Z APR 69 (TS) UNQUOTE

P 111311Z APR 69

FM CMC

TO CG FMFPAC

CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y F O R L I G E N  
 B U S E A N D L I G E N N I C K E R S O N F R O M G E N E R A L C H A P M A N

1. (TS) ON 9 APRIL 1969 REPRESENTATIVES FROM CINCPAC PRESENTED TO THE  
 JCS THE TRIANNUAL UPDATE BRIEFING ON OPERATIONS SECURITY (PURPLE

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA1697 T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E M C E O F O R  
 D R A G O N ) P R O G R E S S I N S O U T H E A S T A S I A . C O M M E N T S M A D E D U R I N G T H E  
 B R I E F I N G A S T O T H E C O M M A N D A T T E N T I O N G I V E N B Y M A R I N E C O M B A T  
 C O M M A N D E R S I N T H E C R I T I C A L A R E A W E R E M O S T C O M P L I M E N T A R Y .

2. (TS) MARINE RECOGNITION OF OPERATIONS SECURITY AS AN IMPORTANT  
 E L E M E N T I N S U C C E S S F U L C O M B A T O P E R A T I O N S I S A S O U R C E O F P R I D E T O M E .  
 Y O U R C O N T I N U E I N G P E R S O N A L A T T E N T I O N T O O P E R A T I O N S S E C U R I T Y M A T T E R S  
 I S D E E P L Y A P P R E C I A T E D .

3. (TS) I UNDERSTAND THAT ROTARY WING OPERATIONS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF  
 A N O P E R A T I O N S S E C U R I T Y S U R V E Y I N T H E C O M I N G M O N T H S , A N D I L O O K  
 F O R W A R D T O T H E C I N C P A C B R I E F I N G O N T H I S A S P E C T O F O U R C O M B A T  
 O P E R A T I O N S . W A R M R E B A R D S .

BT

WARM REGARDSGP-4

BT

1697

COMM NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

HAS BEEN SENT

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	DATE 13 APR 69
	SERIAL# / CONTROL O 130420Z	DATE 1,2,3,4
		COPY# OF COPIES RECO OF 45

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL
			IN	OUT	
3	CG	I	14		
4	DCG	I			
	DCG AIR				
2	C/S	I			
2A	DC/S	I	4/14	4/14	
	DC/S PLAN				
1	S/S	I	4/13		
	G-1				
	G-2				
	G-3				
	G-4				
	G-5				
	G-6				
	CAP				
	ADJ				
	CORDS				
	EMB/TRANS				
	ENGR				
	H&S CO				
	INSP				
	MTO				
	OP ANAL				
	ORD				
	PSY OPS				
	SUPPLY				
	LEGAL				
	PMO				
	SBC				

SUBJECT  
**TOP SECRET**

REMARKS ①  
THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4...

THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.

RECEIVED THREE COPIES OF  
O 130420Z

*Copy to G3 Dave D*

**TOP SECRET**

O 130420Z ZYH  
 TO CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEN

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 FUTURE ICTZ OPERATIONS

A MAC 4535 DTG 130935Z APR 69

1. PRIOR RECEIPT REF A I HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED EXTENSION  
 OF ASSIGNMENT OF DELTA FORCE WITH GEN LAM WHO INDICATED  
 HIS INTENTION TO REQUEST THEIR CONTINUED AVAILABILITY IN  
 ICTZ. WILL REAFFIRM AT OUR NEXT MEETING. APPRECIATE YOUR  
 SUPPORT AT SAIGON LEVEL.

2. BRIEFING FOR GEN ABRAMS HAS BEEN SCHEDULED FOR 141435H  
 APR WITH PRINCIPAL III MAF COMMANDERS ATTENDING.

G-3

169

NNN

**TOP SECRET**

*Has Been  
 17 (1) SENT*

*17(1)*

*(Signature)*



HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE


SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 16 APR 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 160710Z APR 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					FOR BGEN LEE DONG HO
4	DCG					REMARKS
	DCG AIR					
3	C/S	I				ORIG - G-3
2	D C/S	I	7/16	7/16		REL - CG
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	4/16			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT



160710Z APR 69

SECRET #35

**SECRET**

PP RUMHGK  
 DE RHMAFA 2216 1060710  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 160710Z APR 69  
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN  
 TO RUMHGK/CG SECOND ROKMC BDE HOI AN RVN  
 BT

**S E C R E T**

FOR BGEN LEE DONG HO FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. (S) FOR SOME TIME, I HAVE BEEN INTERESTED IN CONDUCTING A COMBINED OPERATION WITH ROKMC AND ARVN FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH AND EAST OF HOI AN TO REOPEN THE SONG CUA DAI TO NORMAL COMMERCE AND ELIMINATE A MAJOR ENEMY COMMO-LIAISON ROUTE. WE HAVE SPOKEN IN GENERAL TERMS WITH YOU AND YOUR STAFF CONCERNING POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN THIS AREA.
2. (S) RECENTLY, SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ELIMINATING THE ENEMY THREAT FROM THANH NHUT AND NEIGHBORING AREAS, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN A MARKED INCREASE IN CIVILIAN RIVER TRAFFIC BETWEEN HOI AN AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. YOUR OPERATIONS TO THE SOUTHWEST OF HOI AN HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCREASED SECURITY. IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE SONG CUA DAI IS NOW OPEN TO UNINTERRUPTED BOAT TRAFFIC, DESPITE OUR PREVIOUS EFFORTS. I BELIEVE WE NEED TO CONDUCT

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 2216 **S E C R E T**

A MULTIBATTALION COMBINED OPERATION TO COMPLETELY BREAK THE ENEMY'S HOLD AND PERMANENTLY OPEN THE SONG CUA DAI.

3. (S) IF YOU AGREE WITH THIS CONCEPT, I AM PREPARED TO REQUEST THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE FROM GEN LAM, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAVFORV AND OTHERS TO COMMENCE THE OPERATION ABOUT 1 MAY FOR A PERIOD OF TWO TO THREE WEEKS. SCHEME OF MANEUVER, PLANS FOR SUPPORTING FIRES AND APPROPRIATE FORCES AND OTHER MATTERS INVOLVING COORDINATION CAN BE WORKED OUT BY OUR STAFFS FOR OUR MUTUAL APPROVAL.
- WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2216

**SECRET**

# 35

82 / 98  
 83 /   
 Plans / Has seen  
 Unit. Lt. & Ship.



PP RHMMAFA  
 DE RUMNGK #G497 1101747  
 ZNR UUUUU  
 P 201747Z APR69  
 FM CG SECOND ROK MAR BDE  
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF  
 BT

ACT G-2  
 DIST A  
 CCN 22250

MSG REC'D FOR THE FIRST TIME  
 AT 21/2110Z APR 69

UNCLAS  
 REF: (A) YOUR MESSAGE P 160710Z APR69  
 1. (I AGREE WITH YOUR MESSAGE REF (A)).  
 BT  
 #0502

**"LIMDIS"**

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

CGN:055/OUT

FILE:DH

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 16 APR 69
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 161242Z APR 69		COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ORIG: G-2 REL: G-2
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
3	C/S	I				
2	D C/S	I	4/25	4/25		MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	E	4/17			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

HAS BEEN SENT

**"LIMDIS"**

**SECRET**

# 36



**SECRET**

PTTSZYUW RHHMFA2253 1061242-SSSS--RUHHMFA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 161242Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHHMFA/CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET / LIMDIS / M C E O  
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES REPORT (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 020116Z NOV 68

1. (U) EXCEPT AS NOTED IN PARA 2. BELOW, SUBORDINATE COMMANDS REPORTED NO INCIDENTS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF REF A.

2. (S) AN ANTI-MILITARY NINEOGRAPHED NEWSPAPER QUOTING THE "ALLY", THE "VIETNAM GI", AND SIMILAR PUBLICATIONS HAS APPEARED IN THE MAG-16/DANANG EAST AREA. PAPER APPEARS TO BE UNDER JOINT ARMY-MARINE CORPS SPONSORSHIP BY PERSONS UNKNOWN, NO EFFECT APPARENT ON U. S. PERSONNEL. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING. REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED AS FURTHER INFORMATION IS DEVELOPED.

G-3

BT

2253

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES"LIMDIS"  
**SECRET**  
# 36

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 18 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 180202Z APR 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT FOR MGEN JONES
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITH IN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.  ORIG - G-4 REL- CG  <b>FOR</b>  <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b>
3	DCG	I	19 Apr		NY	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			JJ	
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/18		JA/	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4	<del>HAS COPY</del>				
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

PTTSZYUW RHMAFA2483 1080202-SSSS--RUMHUPA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 180202Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHUPA/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

**S E C R E T**

FOR MGEN JONES FR LTGEN NICKERSON  
ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT DEADLINE (U)

1. (S) SINCE MY RETURN TO VIETNAM I HAVE NOTED WITH SOME CONCERN THE DEADLINE RATE OF ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT IN THE THIRD MARDIV. SOME OF THIS DEADLINE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO HORS OVER WHICH YOU HAVE NO CONTROL OTHER THAN TO INSURE TIMELY REPAIR PARTS REQUISITIONING AND FOLLOW-UPS. HOWEVER IN SOME CASES I SEE WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT ON NORM DEADLINE. FOR EXAMPLE: ON 10APR69, THE THIRD MARDIV REPORTED 16 M48A3 TANKS DEADLINED OF WHICH 11 WERE NORM; FIVE M67A2 FLAME TANKS DEADLINED, FOUR OF WHICH WERE NORM; 40 LVTP5A1'S DEADLINED OF WHICH 38 WERE NORM; AND OF THE THREE M51 RETRIEVERS DEADLINED, TWO WERE NORM.
2. (U) I REALIZE THAT YOU HAVE JUST ASSUMED COMMAND AND HAVE HAD LITTLE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A GOOD LOOK AT THE

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 2483 **S E C R E T**  
SITUATION; HOWEVER, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR GIVING THIS MATTER YOUR EARLY ATTENTION. THE RESOURCES OF THIS HQ AND FORLOGCMD ARE AVAILABLE SHOULD YOU DESIRE ASSISTANCE.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

#37

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 18 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 186617Z		COPY# 1,2 OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					<b>KILL RATIOS</b>  REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG		19 Apr		2	
	DCG AIR					
	C/S	J			J	
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	J	4/19		J	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

⊖ **STAFF SECRETARY**  
**III MAF** 4/19

**MEMORANDUM**  
FOR: C/S

DCG directed routing to C/S only.

RSC  
James Hankin  
D/AIA

**CONFIDENTIAL**

R 14 61X  
 IN CG 111 MAF  
 TO SSO 101 ABN DIV (AM)  
 SO AMERICAL DIV  
 ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL

MGEN YOUNGDALE DEPUTY CG SENDS FOR MGEN ZAIS AND MGEN GETTYS  
 KILL RATIOS

1. THE FOLLOWING 101ST ABN DIVISION AND AMERICAL DIVISIONS FRIENDLY  
 AND ENEMY RATIOS ARE REPORTED AS REQUESTED:

101ST ABN			AMERICAL DIV			
FR	EN	RATIO	FR	EN	RATIO	
14	305	1 TO 21.6	JUL 68	40	781	1 TO 19.5
5	583	1 TO 10.6	AUG 68	65	1384	1 TO 21.3
2	268	1 TO 22.3	SEP 68	84	1294	1 TO 15.4
9	397	1 TO 44.1	OCT 68	38	685	1 TO 18
3	272	1 TO 8.2	NOV 68	30	1059	1 TO 35.3
10	221	1 TO 22.1	DEC 68	32	1146	1 TO 35.8
16	196	1 TO 12.2	JAN 69	71	1001	1 TO 14.1
20	128	1 TO 6.4	FEB 69	74	1257	1 TO 17
47	199	1 TO 4.2	MAR 69	105	1212	1 TO 11.6
THRU 13						
28	83	1 TO 2.9	APR 69	14	278	1 TO 19.8
24	2652	1 TO 10.8		553	10097	1 TO 18.2

2. ENJOY YOUR DRINK CHARLIE. WARM REGARDS TO YOU BOTH.

GP-4  
 187

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

HASBEENSENT

+32





0 181500Z ZYH  
 M CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY FOR MAJGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 A YOUR 180442Z APR 69

B AX CONSUL DNG 171130Z APR 69

1. INFORMATION QUOTED IN REF B WAS PASSED PREMATURELY AND NOT COMPLETELY FACTUAL.

2. AN INCIDENT DID OCCUR ON 15 APRIL NEAR PHUOC MY VILLAGE (BT 102511) INVOLVING ROKS AND VIETNAMESE. US MARINES AND US ARMY TROOPS WERE ALSO INVOLVED.

3. EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INCIDENT HAVE NOT YET BEEN SORTED OUT AND A JOINT BOARD HAS BEEN CONVENED TO DETERMINE WHAT HAPPENED AND TO FIX RESPONSIBILITY. THIS BOARD IS COMPOSED OF A VIETNAMESE OFFICER, A ROK MARINE OFFICER AND A US MARINE OFFICER. THE SENIOR MEMBER IS THE US MARINE/ THE PRECEPT WAS SIGNED JOINTLY BY LTGEN LAM, BGEN LEE AND MYSELF ON 16 APRIL 1969.

4. ON THE 15TH OF APRIL A ROAD SWEEP WAS BEING CONDUCTED ON RTE 1. AMERICAN FORCES (MARINE AND ARMY) WERE MOVING NORTH AND ROK FORCES WITH US MARINES WERE MOVING SOUTH/ IN THE VICINITY OF PHUOC MY, ROK MARINES HALTED. THE ROKS CLAIM THAT THE REASON THEY HALTED WAS INCOMING SNIPER FIRE FROM THE VILLAGE. THE VIETNAMESE SUPPOSEDLY PROFESS NO KNOWLEDGE OF SNIPER FIRE. SNIPER FIRE SUPPOSEDLY HAS BEEN VERIFIED BY US MARINES WITH THE ROKS. THE ROKS THEN PROCEEDED INTO A MINEFIELD AND 5 ROKS AND 2 US MARINES WERE WOUNDED BY AN EXPLODING MINE. THE VIETNAMESE CLAIM THEY WARNED THE ROKS OF THE MINEFIELD. THE ROKS DENY THIS AND SAY THEY COULD NOT HAVE ENTERED THE MINEFIELD IF THEY WERE SO WARNED.

5. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS ARE EVEN MORE CLOUDED AND CAN ONLY BE CLEARLY DETERMINED THROUGH THE INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED. THE ROKS MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE SHOT UP THE VILLAGE. THE ROKS DENY THAT THEY DID AND NOTHING HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO DATE TO PROVE THAT THEY DID. ROKS SUPPOSEDLY DID ASK FOR AND RECEIVE CLEARANCE TO FIRE MORTARS IN VICINITY OF VILLAGE. TWO OR MORE OF THESE MORTARS MAY HAVE LANDED IN THE VILLAGE CAUSING CASUALTIES AND PROBABLY DID. HOWEVER, ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO FRAGMENTARY AND CONTRADICTORY THAT I AM RELUCTANT TO GIVE CREDENCE TO ALLEGATIONS BY EITHER THE ROKS OR VIETNAMESE AT THIS POINT IS

6. THE INCIDENT WAS BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION DURING THE EVENING OF 15 APRIL. I IMMEDIATELY DISPATCHED MY CHIEF OF STAFF TO MEET WITH BGEN LEE IN HOI AN. BGEN LEE WAS QUITE CONCERNED WITH THE INCIDENT AND HE OPENLY DISCUSSED BOTH SIDES OF THE ISSUE AS HE ~~HEARD~~ ~~IT~~ ~~AT~~ ~~THE~~ ~~TIME~~. HE WAS NOT AT ALL VAGUE WITH MY CHIEF OF STAFF AND READILY AGREED TO THE CONDUCT OF A JOINT INVESTIGATION. HE POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE THAT THE INVESTIGATION BE HEADED BY A US MARINE BECAUSE OF THE EMOTION EXISTING IN THE ROK AND VIETNAMESE CAMPS AND THAT ANYONE WHO IS RESPONSIBLE SHOULD BE PUNISHED.

7. THE INVESTIGATION IS CONTINUING AND I WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

8. I AM CONCERNED WITH THE CONTENTS OF THE INITIAL REPORT TO THE EMBASSY. I HAVE PREVIOUSLY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS THAT I AM EXERTING EVERY EFFORT TO SUPPORT THE ROKS AND TO MAKE SURE THEY ARE A FULL PARTNER IN I CORPS -- THAT ANY BREACH OF FAITH WILL BE ON THEIR PART AND NOT MINE -- AND THAT I AM THE ONLY AMERICAN IN THIS CORPS ZONE WHO SHOULD SPEAK WORDS OF CONDEMNATION. THE CONTENTS OF REF B DO NOT SUPPORT MY GUIDANCE. BUT THAT IS MY PROBLEM AND I WILL TAKE CARE OF IT.

WARM REGARDS.

G-4

580

#39(2)

SECRET

NNN

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	19 APR 69
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	
	P 7964161	COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES RECO

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	I				REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION / DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
5	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
3	C/S	I				
2	DC/S	I	4/20	4/20		
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/19			
	G-1					
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	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
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	H&S CO					
	INSP					
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	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

**CONFIDENTIAL**

P 198418Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR GENERAL ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

VISIT TO TASK FORCE ALPHA NAKHON PHANOM THAI

1. SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE PLAN TO VISIT NAKHON PHANOM THAILAND 29 APRIL. WILL BE AWAY FROM III MAF 290930H TO APPROXIMATELY 291745H.
2. APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE WITH BGEN DYAS FOR SUBJECT VISIT.

UP-4

89

NNN

WASBEESEN

CONFIDENTIAL



O 191055Z ZYH  
FM CG III MAF DNG RVN  
TO CG AMERICAL DIVISION CHL RVN  
ZEM

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN GETTYS FROM LIGEN NICKERSON  
BATANGAN RESETTLEMENT AREA (U)

1. (S) AS YOU ARE AWARE I AM PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT WE TAKE ADEQUATE MEASURES TO ENSURE PROPER TREATMENT AND SECURITY FOR THE CIVILIANS RESETTLED IN THE BATANGAN PENINSULA. ONCE HAVING MADE THE DECISION TO MOVE THEM BACK INTO THE AREA -IN A SENSE A MODEL AREA--IT BEHOVES US NOW TO DEMONSTRATE TO ALL CONCERNED, FRIENDLY AND VC ALIKE, THAT WE REALLY MEAN BUSINESS BY DEED AS WELL AS WORD. THE VC CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO INTIMIDATE THE PEOPLE IN THE RESETTLEMENT AREA NOR CAN WE STAND STILL FOR LESS THAN ADEQUATE LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE AREA. CERTAINLY THESE PEOPLE SHOULD BE ACCORDED ALL THEY ARE ENTITLED TO UNDER THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THEY FIND THEMSELVES.

2. (S) I HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE RECENT SECURITY MEASURES YOU HAVE TAKEN IN COORDINATION WITH GENERAL TOAN WHICH I ENTHUSIASTICALLY ENDORSE. WE MUST INVEST WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THIS VENTURE ON A CONTINUING BASIS. WE CANNOT FAIL. I KNOW YOU SHARE MY VIEWS ON THIS IMPORTANT PROJECT AND I LOOK TO YOU TO BRING TOGETHER ALL THE AGENCIES INVOLVED IN MAKING THIS AFFAIR A SUCCESSFUL AND GOING CONCERN. MY STAFF STANDS READY TO ASSIST YOU AT ANY TIME. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
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NNNN

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CCN:068/OUT

FILE:DH

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 21 APR 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 210030Z APR 69		COPY# 2 OF 5 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	I			N	SUBJECT FOR BGEN DYAS, USAF  REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.  ORIG: S/S REL: C OF S  <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b>
5	DCG	I	21 APR		N	
	DCG AIR					
3	C/S	I	4/21	4/21		
2	DC/S	I	4/21	4/21		
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/21		M/D	
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	G-6					
	CAP					
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	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					
	photo has copy #4					

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**HAS BEEN SENT**

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 21 APR 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE P 210645Z		1, 2, 3, 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TOP SECRET EYES ONLY	
			IN	OUT			
	CG					REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5311.4...  THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.  <u>HAS BEEN SENT</u>	
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22  
**TOP SECRET**

P 210645Z

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO  
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

QUOTE

O 042339Z

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. MAC 4006 EO 291213Z MAR69

1. THIS RESPONDS TO YOUR MESSAGE POINTING OUT THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE CREATED FOR THE ENEMY BY OUR INTERDICTION OF THE ASHAU VALLEY, AND RAISING THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE PRE-EMPTIVE MOVE AGAINST THE ENEMY'S SOUTHERN LOC IN THE BA 614 AND KHAM DUC REGIONS. SPECIFICALLY YOU ASKED FOR MY VIEWS REGARDING THE DESIRABILITY, FEASIBILITY AND POSSIBLE TIMING OF SUCH A MOVE. ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS CONVEY MY VIEWS.

2. AT THE OUTSET, I BELIEVE SUCH AN EFFORT IS DESIRABLE. I SHARE YOUR INTEREST IN THE WESTERN QUANG TIN AREA AS A LIKELY LOGISTICAL ALTERNATIVE. HIS RECENT LOSSES AND FUTURE DIM PROSPECTS ENEMY IN WESTERN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN APPEAR LIKELY TO DRIVE HIM TO SEEK OTHER ROUTES AS YOU SUGGEST. THE DIFFICULTY AND INACCESSIBILITY OF THE TERRAIN AROUND BA 614 AND KHAM DUC MAKE THAT A MOST LIKELY PROSPECT FOR HIM. RECENT RECON EFFORTS IN THAT REGION, HOWEVER, PRODUCED MIXED RESULTS. SINCE 1 FEBRUARY I HAVE PROGRAMMED FORTY PHOTO RECCE SORTIES INTO THAT AREA. THAT PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALED LITTLE OF SIGNIFICANCE, SLAR MISSIONS HAVE NOT PRODUCED SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND RECENT PHOTOS INDICATE THAT THE ROADS INTO AND AROUND KHAM DUC ARE NOT TRAFFICABLE. HWEATHER, HOWEVER, HAS IMPEDED THE DETAILED SURVEILLANCE I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO GIVE THE AREA, SINCE OTHER SOURCES INDICATE RISING ENEMY ACTIVITY. TWO INFRARED DETECTOR MISSIONS FLOWN DURING MARCH REPORTED NUMEROUS EMISSIONS IN THE OF BA 614 AND ZC 0112. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALS A ROAD

BRANCHING OFF ROUTE 966. SUCCESSFUL TACAIR ROADCUTS ON 11, 17, 27, AND 29 MARCH WERE FILLED THE FOLLOWING DAY. LAST YEAR A GROUND RECON TEAM INSERTED AT ZC 001166 ON 20 SEP WAS EXTRACTED UNDER FIRE AND ONE INSERTED AT ZC 015095 ON 23 OCT WAS ABORTED DUE TO HEAVY GROUND FIRE. IN VIEW OF THESE AND SIMILAR INDICATORS I CONSIDER THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO DEVOTE TO THE AREA, SUFFICIENT EFFORT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE ENEMY IS ACTUALLY DOING, WHERE HE IS, AND WHAT HE HAS IN THE WAY OF FORCES AND SUPPLIES IN THE TARGET AREA. ONCE THIS IS DETERMINED I AM PREPARED TO INVEST THE NECESSARY FORCE TO DISTRUPT THE

22/11  
27

3. I CONSIDER THAT A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN STRENGTH IN THE BA 614/KHAM DUC AREA IS FEASIBLE. I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS AN OPERATION THAT WE MUST APPROACH IN A DELIBERATE FASHION, IN VIEW OF THE REMOTENESS OF THE TARGET AREA AND CONSEQUENT LOGISTIC PROBLEMS; THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY THERE; HAND OF THE THINNING OF MY FORCES THAT WILL BE CAUSED BY ASSEMBLING A FORCE OF THE SIZE REQUIRES FOR THIS OPERATION. IN ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY OF THE OPERATION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE RESERVATIONS, I HAVE CONSIDERED THE VARIOUS OPERATIONAL FACTORS AND FORESEE NO INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEM.

A. THE TERRAIN IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BUT NO MORE SO THAN THE ENTIRE PLATEAU FROM II CTZ TO THE DMZ, WHERE WE OPERATE AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE.

B. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER DURING THE COMING MONTHS IS PREDICTED TO IMPEDE OPERATIONS SOMEWHAT, I DO NOT EXPECT WEATHER TO BE A SERIOUS LIMITING FACTOR.

C. THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION WILL BE CHALLENGING, BUT NOT TO THE DEGREE THAT LOGISTICS BECOMES A DISQUALIFYING FACTOR.

D. BECAUSE OUR INTELLIGENCE OF THE TARGET AREA IS SKETCHY, THE OPERATION SHOULD BE INITIATED WITH A RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT OF SEVERAL WEEKS, THE PRECISE TIME DEPENDING UPON WHAT THE RECON REVEALED. THE EFFORT WOULD CONCENTRATE ALL ORGANIC RESOURCES. I WOULD ALSO RELY HEAVILY ON THE DELTA FORCE AND CCN PATROLS. WE WOULD REQUIRE YOUR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN KEEPING DELTA FORCE WITH US. I CONSIDER THE DELTA FORCE AND PRIORITY CCN PATROL SUPPORT A KEY ELEMENT IN THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CONCEPT.

E. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF TROOP AVAILABILITY, I ESTIMATE THAT THIS OPERATION AT ITS PEAK PHASE WILL REQUIRE TWO BRIGADES, ONE FROM AMERICAL WHICH CHARLIE GETTYS WILL INTRODUCE WHEN HIS RECONNAISSANCE HAS PROGRESSED FAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT HIM TO MAKE A HARD APPRAISAL OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION. CONSIDERING THE PRESENT TEMPO OF OPERATIONS IN QUANG NAM WHERE BOTH SLFS ARE FULLY COMMITTED WITH FIRST MAR DIV AND THE EXTENDED POSTURE OF THIRD MAR DIV IN THE NORTH, THE ONLY COMMAND WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ADDITIONAL FORCES IS THE 101ST. WHILE IT, TOO, IS ACTIVELY CONDUCTING OPERATIONS, I CONSIDER IT THE MOST LIKELY SOURCE FOR A RESERVE FORCE AT THE PRESENT TIME. TO TAP THE 101ST TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF A SECOND BRIGADE FOR INTRODUCTION INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA WOULD, I BELIEVE, OVER-EXTEND III MAF BEYOND THE SAFETY MARGIN. THIS, COMBINED WITH A POSSIBLE HIGH PRIORITY MISSION UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR 101ST ARGUES FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE SLICE TO III MAF. EVEN WITH AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE, HOWEVER, SOME REPOSITIONING OF MY PRESENT FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY WHICH WILL ENTAIL A CERTAIN DEGREE OF RISK. THE RISK BECOMES MORE ACCEPTABLE WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE.

900

HASBEENSENT

TOP SECRET

23(2)

23(2)

P 210645Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

O 042339Z

FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

F. I BELIEVE ARVN PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATION IS BOTH FEASIBLE AND NECESSARY, TO KEEP THE EMPHASIS ON COMBINED OPERATIONS AND CONTINUE TO HELP ARVN PICK UP A PROGRESSIVELY GREATER SHARE OF THE LOAD. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, I WOULD EXPECT LTGEN LAM TO CONTRIBUTE AT LEAST ONE BATTALION TO THE OPERATION, HOPEFULLY MORE. THE PRECISE SIZE, HOWEVER, OF THE ARVN COMMITMENT, IS A MATTER WHICH I WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH LTGEN LAM AT A LATER DATE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALSO THE INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR TROOPS ELSEWHERE IN ICTZ AS FORCES ARE DEPLOYED TO THE KHAM DUC AREA.

4. BECAUSE WE NEED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE KHAM DUC AREA, THE PACE, SCOPE AND ORIENTATION OF THE MAJOR COMBAT EFFORT WOULD DEPEND ON OUR INITIAL CONCERTED RECONNAISSANCE PHASE. FOR THIS REASON, AVAILABILITY OF PROJECT DELTA FORCES IS A KEY IN THE TIMING. I BELIEVE THAT THE DELTA FORCES COULD BE SHIFTED SOUTH FROM CASS PARK TO INITIATE THEIR OPERATIONS IN KAM DUC AREA ON 1 MAY. THE FACILITIES OF SEVERAL SITES ARE BEING ANALYZED

IN DETAIL TO SELECT ONE WHICH WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR COLOCATION OF BOTH THE DELTA FORCES AND CCN MOBILE LAUNCH TEAM. CONSIDERING THE RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT AS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT TO EXPAND THE OPERATION, I WOULD JUDGE A 30 DAY OPERATING PERIOD WOULD TELL THE STORY. ASSUMING THAT THE CONCENTRATED RECON EFFORT DEVELOPED HARD AND EXPLOITABLE INTELLIGENCE, ABOUT 1 JUNE I WOULD INITIATE A 3 BATTALION ASSAULT. WITH ENGINEERS, ARTY AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS INTO THE OLD KHAM DUC BASE AREA TO ESTABLISH AN FOB AND CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS IN ITS IMMEDIATE VICINITY. I ANTICIPATE THAT ABOUT TWO WEEKS

WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE KHAM DUC A FUNCTIONS FOB CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING A TOTAL OF 6 INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 3 ARTY BATTALIONS, AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORT ELEMENTS. I WOULD THEN INTRODUCE THE ADDITIONAL COMBAT ELEMENTS OF ANOTHER BRIGADE. RIF WOULD BE ACCELERATED, LASTING AS LONG AS 60 DAYS, DEPENDING UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION. WE COULD CONCLUDE THE OPERATION AT THIS JUNCTURE, BUT I WOULD PROPOSE INSTEAD TO LAUNCH A FOUR BATTALION ATTACK FROM KHAM DUC, NORTHEAST, ASTRIDE THE SONG CAI ENTERING BA 11 FROM THE WEST. CONCURRENTLY, I WOULD TASK THE 1ST MAR DIV TO LAUNCH A COORDINATED ATTACK ON BA 112 FROM THE EAST WITH AT LEAST ONE REGIMENT. THIS PHASE OF THE OPERATION WOULD CONCLUDE IN MID-SEPTEMBER. (3)

22/3  
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5. IN SUMMARY, I CONSIDER A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN THE BA 614/KHAM DUC AREA BOTH DESIRABLE AND FEASIBLE, ASSUMING DELTA FORCE AVAILABILITY, PRIORITY CCN SUPPORT, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE WITH ITS NORMAL SUPPORT. WITH NO RADICAL SHIFT IN CURRENT TACTICAL TRENDS, WE ARE PREPARED TO INITIATE THE OPERATION ON 1 MAY. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED OPERATION IN DETAIL WITH CHARLIE GETTYS, AND HOLD HIS PROPOSED CONCEPT AND OPERATION PLAN, WHICH I HAVE TENTATIVELY APPROVED FOR PLANNING. I WOULD BE PLEASED TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSAL WITH YOU OR PRESENT A BRIEFING AT A TIME AND PLACE OF YOUR CHOICE.

UNQUOTE

2. (S) GEN ABRAMS VISITED ICTZ ON 14 APR 69. WHILE AT HQ III MAF, COMUSMACV RECEIVED A JOINT III MAF - AMERICAL DIV BRIEFING ON THE PROPOSED OPERATION IN WESTERN QUANG TIN PROVINCE. AMERICAL DIV PRESENTED A FOUR PHASE OPERATION, FOLLOWING THE CONCEPT DISCUSSED IN PARA 1. PHASE I IS RECONNAISSANCE BY CCN AND PROJECT DELTA. PHASE II IS A ONE BRIGADE OPERATION AROUND KHAM DUC AND PHASE III EXPANDS THE OPERATION TO THE SOUTH, USING A TWO BRIGADE FORCE. PHASE IV PROVIDES FOR OPERATIONS FROM SOUTH AND EAST BY AMERICAL DIV AND 1ST MARDIV ALONG AND INTO BA 112. GEN ABRAMS APPROVED PHASE I TO BEGIN APPROXIMATELY 1 MAY AND PROJECT DELTA HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE. A COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION OF THIS RECON PHASE WILL BE MADE PRIOR TO THE COMMITMENT OF MAJOR FORCES IN PHASE II.

3. (U) I SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

00 RUSDTH  
 DE RUSVDB 2898 1110030  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 210030Z APR 69 ZFF-1  
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN  
 TO RUSDTH/TASK FORCE ALPHA NAKHON PHANOM THAI  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 FOR BGEN DYAS, USAF FROM LTGEN NICKERSON, USMC  
 VISIT TO TASK FORCE ALPHA (U)

1. REQ CONCURRENCE FOR VISIT 29 APR 69 TO TASK FORCE ALPHA FOR FOL  
 PARTY:

LTGEN H. NICKERSON, JR., CG III MAF  
 BGEN W. K. BENNETT, DC/S, PLANS, III MAF  
 BGEN G. E. DOOLEY, C/S, III MAF  
 LTCOL J. W. SIMPLE, STAFF SECRETARY, III MAF  
 CAPT L. H. ANDERSON, AIDE DE CAMP, III MAF  
 2. ALL MBRS PARTY CERTIFIED TOP SECRET CLEARANCE.  
 3. TENTATIVE ITINERARY:

ARR	DEPART	LOCATION	A/C
290935 I	290930H	DANANG AB	T-39
291735 H	291530 I	NAKHON PHANOM	T-39
GP-4		DANANG AB	T-39

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HAS BEEN SENT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# 42

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

CGN:069/OUT

FILE:DH

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	21 APR 69
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	SUBJECT
4	CG	I	23 April 69		[Signature]	FOR LTGEN CHAE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
5	DCG	I	23 Apr		[Signature]	REMARKS
	DCG AIR					ORIG: S/S
3	C/S	I			[Signature]	REL: CG
2	DC/S	I	4/20	4/20	[Signature]	
	DC/S DM					
1	S/S	I	4/22		[Signature]	
	G-1					
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	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

FOR  
HAS BEEN SENT  
(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #43



PTTUZYUW RHMAFA2994 111127-UUUU--RHMSMVA RUMHGKA.

ZNR UUUUU

P 211120Z APR 69 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF DNG RVN

TO RHMSMVA/CG ROK FORCES VN SGN VN

INFO RUMHGKA/CG 2NDROAMCBDE HUI AN

BT

UNCLAS FOR LTGEN CHAE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR DEPARTURE FROM VIETNAM AND ON BEHALF OF ALL FREE WORLD FORCES IN THE ICTZ, PLEASE ACCEPT MY HEARTFELT APPRECIATION FOR YOUR UNSELFISH AND DEDICATED SERVICE IN ASSISTING IN MOLDING OUR COMBINED FORCES INTO THE EFFECTIVE FORCE IN ARMS THAT IT IS TODAY. YOUR INSPIRING LEADERSHIP CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO THE MANY SUCCESSES WE AND YOUR SECOND ROK MARINE CORPS BRIGADE HAVE ACHIEVED IN COMBATTING THE INSURGENT VIET CONG AND NVA FORCES IN DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.
2. I SINCERELY REGRET THAT YOUR HELICOPTER ACCIDENT PRECLUDED YOUR BEING WITH US TODAY. I KNOW AND APPRECIATE THE DISAPPOINTMENT YOU MUST FEEL IN NOT BEING ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH YOUR PLANNED FAREWELL VISIT TO OUR FIELD FORCES HERE IN ICTZ.

PAGE TWO RHMAFA2994 UNCLAS

3. I HUMBLY ACCEPT THE CHUNG MU AWARD OF YOUR COUNTRY. I WILL WEAR IT PROUDLY AS A BOND OF COMRADESHIP-IN-ARMS AND AS A CONSTANT REMINDER OF THE CONTINUING BATTLE OF FREE MEN AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION.

4. I WISH YOU A SPEEDY RECOVERY AND THE VERY BEST IN YOUR NEW AND CHALLENGING ASSIGNMENT. LTGEN NICKERSON SENDS.

BT

2994

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

HAS BEEN SENT

#43

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 24 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 241311Z		1,2 COPY# OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	J	25 Apr 69		N	REQUEST FOR CAPTURED ENEMY TRUCK
	DCG					REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	F				for e.s. John Cantin sent this out - 2 had to be him tho to program a message for you release - to expedita the report by release of the message
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	F	4/25		WAT 2-8	
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	G-2					
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	SUPPLY					
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**CONFIDENTIAL**

241311Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO HQ III CORPS  
INFO AND ASST ABN DIV (AM)  
LHM

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
LIGEN NICKERSON SENDS FOR LIGEN STILWELL  
REQUEST FOR CAPTURED ENEMY TRUCK (U)  
1. GEN LAM HAS EXPRESSED A DESIRE FOR ONE OF  
THE VEHICLES RECENTLY CAPTURED IN OPERATION  
MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER BY C/1/502 INFANTRY.  
2. REQUEST YOU HAVE ONE OF THE TRUCKS EVACUATED  
TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

GP-4  
169

NNNN

HASDEENSEN

CONFIDENTIAL

#44

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5215 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 25 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 251430Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT OPERATION PIERCE VALLEY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.  <i>Cy #1 to Plans 260800H Apr 69</i> <i>RJ [Signature]</i> <i>Cy #2 to G-2 260800H Apr 69</i> <i>[Signature]</i> <i>Cy #3 to G-4 260800H Apr 69</i> <i>[Signature]</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
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	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
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	SBC					

47

**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5215 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 25 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL 251430Z	DATE 1,2,3	COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT OPERATION PIERCE VALLEY
			IN	OUT		
	CG	<i>Drum</i>				REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
3	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	<i>T</i>				
	DC / S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	<i>I</i>	<i>4/26</i>		<i>MI</i>	
	G-1					
7	G-2	<i>C</i>				
5	G-3	<i>H</i>				
6	G-4	<i>H</i>				
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	G-6					
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	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					
4 Plans copy # 1- <i>MI</i>						

**SECRET**

#47

O 251430Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG 1ST MARDIV  
 SSO AMERICAL DIVISION  
 ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

LTGEN NICKERSON SENDS FOR MGEN SIMPSON AND MGEN GETTYS  
 OPERATION PIERCE VALLEY

A. CG III MAF 251308Z APR 69

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE ON 14 APRIL GEN ABRAMS APPROVED PHASE I OPERATIONS FOR PIERCE VALLEY WHICH PROVIDES FOR IN COUNTRY RECONNAISSANCE IN THE KHAM DUC-BA 614 AREAS; OUT OF COUNTRY RECONNAISSANCE IN ADJACENT AREA IN LAOS; LOGISTIC PREPARATIONS AND PRELIMINARY ACTIONS BY AMERICAL DIV. COVER AND DECEPTION MEASURES WERE ALSO PLANNED TO COVER PREPARATORY TROOP MOVES AND LOGISTICS BUILDUP.

2. REF A IS FOR COVER AND DECEPTION PURPOSES ONLY. ACCORDINGLY REQUEST ONLY FOLLOWING ACTIONS BE IMPLEMENTED TO ADD CREDENCE TO COVER PLAN OUTLINED REF A.

A. FIRST MARDIV:

(1) PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN ESTABLISHING FOB FOR PROJECT DELTA VIC AN HOA COMBAT BASE.

(2) CONTINUE RECON EFFORT IN BA 112.

(3) WITHIN AVAILABLE ASSETS CONDUCT PERIODIC VR FLIGHTS OF BA 112 DURING NEXT TWO WEEKS TO INDICATE INCREASED INTEREST IN THAT AREA.

B. AMERICAL DIV:

IMPLEMENT MEASURES OUTLINED PARA 2B REF A AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE AND CONSISTENT WITH ACTUAL REPEAT ACTUAL OPERATIONS PLANNED FOR THOSE AREAS.

3. OORDER GOVERNING ACTUAL EMPLOYMENT OF PROJECT DELTA TO BE ISSUED 1 MAY 1969.

4. I WISH TO RE-EMPHASIZE THAT PROVISIONS OF REF A ARE ONLY FOR COVER AND DECEPTION PURPOSES. ONLY THOSE TASKS OUTLINED HEREIN NEED BE ACCOMPLISHED. AMPLIFYING INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING ACTUAL OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IN SUBSEQUENT PHASES OF PIERCE VALLEY WILL BE ISSUED AT SUCH TIME AS INTELLIGENCE PICTURE IN KHAM DUC/BA 614 AREA IS CLARIFIED.

GP-4

200

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HASBEENSENT

#47

SECRET





**CONFIDENTIAL**

OTICZYUW RHMMFA3836 1170844-CCCC--RUMHVPA.

ZNY CCCCC

O 270844Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / F O R M G E N J O N E S F R O M L I G E N B U S E A N D L I G E N

WICKERSON

SUBJ: LOCATION OF CAMP CARROLL

1. NO MATTER HOW HARD WE TRIED, WE CAN'T MOVE CAMP CARROLL.

IT'S STILL SOUTH OF RTE 9 -- AS YOU REPORTED.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

3836

**FOR**

HAS BEEN SENT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#49

281830A

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 28 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 280600Z		1, 2, 3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT CONFIDENTIAL
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	T	30 Apr 69		N	REMARKS (1)
3	DCG	I			N	
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	S&C					

**CONFIDENTIAL**

0 280600Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

**CONFIDENTIAL**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR LIGEN BUUSE FROM LIGEN NICKERSON

1. ON THE 24TH OF APR, MR. POCOCK, WHO WAS UNTIL RECENTLY THE AUSTRALIAN CHARGE DE AFFAIRES TO CAMBODIA, VISITED III MAF. MR. POCOCK WILL BE THE HEAD OR ASSISTANT HEAD OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS FOR INDO-CHINESE AFFAIRS. HE IS CURRENTLY ON A TOUR OF VIETNAM, HAVING PREVIOUSLY TOURED LAOS. WE BRIEFED HIM ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 24TH OF APRIL, AND THAT EVENING I HOSTED HIM FOR DINNER.

2. DURING A POST DINNER DISCUSSION HE MADE A NUMBER OF INTERESTING OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OF THE OBSERVATIONS, AS RECALLED BY THOSE PRESENT WITHOUT NOTE-TAKING, ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A. SIHANOUK HAS BASED EARLIER POLICY AND ACTION ON BELIEF THAT US WOULD WITHDRAW IN DEFEAT FROM SVN IN NEAR FUTURE.

B. HIS ASSESSMENT HAS PROBABLY NOW CHANGED AND HE FEELS US WITHDRAWAL MAY NOT TAKE PLACE FOR SOME TIME.

C. AS A RESULT, HE IS NOW PREPARED TO WORK OUT AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH US.

D. SIHANOUK VIEWS THIS AS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, AS HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE LEFT OUT OF REGIONAL SETTLEMENT TALKS WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE IN PARIS, AND BELIEVES THAT US SPONSORSHIP CAN BE HIS TICKET OF ADMISSION TO PARIS TALKS.

E. HIS BASIC APPRECIATION OF EVENTUAL COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN SVN PROBABLY STILL STANDS, THEREFORE, BASIC REALIGNMENT OF HIS POLICY IS UNLIKELY.

F. ONE THING HE DOES FEAR IS N. VIETNAMESE VIRTUAL OCCUPATION OF EASTERN PART OF CAMBODIA. HE DOES NOT WORRY ABOUT THEM TAKING OVER COUNTRY.

G. HE IS LIKELY TO VIEW PROVISION OF US AID AS HIS DUE, AND IS UNLIKELY TO MAKE ANY CONCESSION TO INDUCE OFFERS OR AS QUID PRO QUO FOR AID.

H. ARMS TRAFFIC TO SUPPORT VC/NVA IS COMING THROUGH THE PORT OF SIHANOUKVILLE. ITEMS ARE MOSTLY SMALL ARMS AND AMMO DESTINED FOR THE VC/NVA IN IV AND III CORPS. THERE IS NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT SUCH ITEMS WERE INTENDED TO, OR DID, REACH ENEMY UNITS AS FAR NORTH AS ICTZ.

I. THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY ORGANIZED POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO SIHANOUK. HE HAS COUNTRY FIRMLY IN HIS CONTROL AND HAS NO NEED TO MANEUVER FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL GAIN.

J. PRIME MINISTER SEEMS TO BE IMPLICATED IN VC ARMS TRADE.

K. SIHANOUK'S PRESENT WIFE (SIXTH; ITALIAN) IS INVOLVED WITH A NUMBER OF COHORTS IN GAINING CONTROL OF MUCH OF THE

L. RELATIONS BETWEEN SIHANOUK AND HIS MOTHER ARE NOT CLOSE; PRIMARY REASON IS MOTHER'S DISLIKE OF PRESENT WIFE.

M. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZED COMMUNIST PARTY IN CAMBODIA.

N. POCOCK'S TRAVEL WITHIN CAMBODIA WAS SEVERELY RESTRICTED, PARTICULARLY IN PROVINCES ADJACENT TO SVN; AS REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRALIA ALSO REPRESENTING US, HE DARED NOT PRESS THE MATTER TOO VIGOROUSLY DUE TO VIRTUAL CERTAINTY OF BEING DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA.

O. THE US BOWLES MISSION IN EARLY 1968 WAS EXPECTED TO PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS, BUT ENDED AS A GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT TO ALL. SUBSEQUENTLY, ONLY ONE OF THE US "PACKAGES" OF EVIDENCE "PROVING" VC/NVA USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY SEEMED PERSUASIVE AND CONVINCING. THIS PACKAGE SEEMED TO "SHAKE" SIHANOUK.

P. IT IS MR. POCOCK'S JUDGMENT THAT CAMBODIA CANNOT SURVIVE AS A NATION WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE AND/OR AS PART OF A BROADER REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT.

Q. SIHANOUK WAS A CONSUMMATE HOST WHEN HE CHOSE TO BE. AT AFFAIRS INVOLVING THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY, THE UNUSUAL REGIONAL GROUPINGS OF PERSONNEL PERTAINED. SIHANOUK'S DANCE BAND PLAYED FOR SOCIAL AFFAIRS, AND HE OFTEN WOULD SING EVERY SONG FOR AS LONG AS FOUR HOURS (2200-0200).

3. THESE INFORMAL VIEWS OF MR. POCOCK WERE DISCUSSED QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE, AND SHOULD BE CLOSELY HELD.

GP-4

769

CONFIDENTIAL

2(2)

NNNN

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

PTTCZYUW IHMMFA3988 1101130-CCCC--RUMUGKD.

ZNY CCCCC

P 281130Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMUGKD/COMNAVFORV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR VADM ZUMWALT FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

ICTZ SHELTER PROGRAM (U)

A. COMNAVFORV 261104Z APR 69 (U)

1. I INTERPRET PAR 4, QUOTE DEFERRAL OF REQUEST FOR CONTINGENCY FUNDS FOR REQUIREMENTS OF PAR 5B OF REA A UNQUOTE, THAT THESE FUNDS WOULD BE REQUESTED UPON RECEIPT OF STUDY DUE 10 MAY.

SUBJECT TO THE ABOVE I CONCUR WITH THE MESSAGE.

GP-4

BT

3 988

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# 3

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

CCN: 089/OUT

FILE: DH

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		29 APR 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# 3 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
			2900227 APR 69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS  <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">FOR</p> <p>ORIG: S/S REL: CG</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">HAS BEEN SENT</p>
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2900022

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

#7



PTTEZYUW RHMMAFA5051 1190022-EEE--RUHFMMA.

ZNY EEEEE

P 290022Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF DNG RVN

TO RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR LIGEN BUSE FROM LIGEN NICKERSON

FREEDOM HILL R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER AND BRIG

1. THE FOLLOWING IS AN UPDATE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AT THE SUBJECT FACILITIES. GEN YOUNGDALE WILL CONDUCT A CONFERENCE TODAY TO ESTABLISH PRIORITIES OF EFFORT FOR RECONSTRUCTION REQUIRED THROUGHOUT THE DANANG AREA. YOU HAVE BEEN KEPT ADVISED OF THE GENERAL SITUATION, BUT I FELT YOU MIGHT WISH SOME SPECIFIC INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE SUBJECT FACILITIES.

2. THE BRIG HAS SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE AND EOD PERSONNEL HAVE GIVEN ITS CLEARANCE A HIGH PRIORITY SO THAT PRECISE RECONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS CAN BE DETERMINED AT THE EARLIEST. PRISONERS (333) ARE CURRENTLY CONFINED AT FLC, AND POW'S (32) ARE LOCKED UP AT NSA HOSPITAL. WE ANTICIPATE DISPATCHING 39 GCM (DD OR BCD AACA) PRISONERS TO CONUS WITHIN A FEW DAYS, AND ARE MAKING A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO HAVE

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 5051 UNCLAS E F T O

COMMANDERS RESTORE AS MANY AS PRACTICABLE TO DUTY.

3. THE NEW TRANSIENT BARRACKS WERE EITHER DESTROYED OR RENDERED COMPLETELY UNSAFE FOR HABITATION, AND THEIR CONDITION IS PROBABLY WELL BEYOND REPAIR. DEMOLITION AND REBUILD APPEARS AS ONLY RECOURSE. THE R&R TERMINAL, TRANSIENT TERMINAL AND LOUNGE SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE. THEIR FUTURE CAN BE DECIDED ONLY BY THOROUGH ENGINEER INSPECTION. ONLY LIGHT TO MODERATE DAMAGE WAS SUSTAINED BY THE MESSHALL AND THE OLD R&R BARRACKS WHICH INITIALLY APPEAR TO POSSIBLY BE USEABLE WITH SOME REFURBISHMENT.

4. AT FREEDOM HILL ALL BUILDINGS SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE. IN MOST CASES, AT BEST ONLY THE FRAMES REMAIN AS SALVAGEABLE, WITH ROOFS, SIDES AND MINOR FRAME MEMBERS BADLY BATTERED AND BENT. EXCHANGE MERCHANDISE LOSS IS INITIALLY ESTIMATED AT 75,000 DOLLARS. ENTIRE COMPLEX IS UNUSABLE AND SECURED. TIMELY EVACUATION PREVENTED LOSS OF LIFE, WHILE FLYING ORDNANCE AND SECURITY PREVENTED ANY SIGNIFICANT PILFERAGE AT BOTH CENTERS.

5. R&R AND TRANSIENT OPERATIONS WERE MOVED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (27 APRIL) TO THE CHINA BEACH IN-COUNTRY

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

COPY 3 OF 6 COPIES HAS BEEN SENT

# 7

PAGE THREE RHMAFA 5051 UNCLAS E F T O  
 R&R CENTER WHICH HAS HAD TO BE TAKEN OVER COMPLETELY FOR THIS PURPOSE. NORMAL CAPACITY IS ABOUT 375, BUT WE HAVE ADDED BUNKS, ARE PROVIDING EMERGENCY MESSING AND WILL BE ABLE TO HANDLE UP TO 700 ON A SHORT-TIME TEMPORARY BASIS. NSA HAS ALSO PROVIDED US 200 EMERGENCY SPACES AT TIEN SHA. WE EXPECT ALL R&R AND TRANSIENT FLIGHTS DEPARTING 29 APRIL AND THEREAFTER TO BE PROCESSED, LOADED AND DESPATCHED ON SCHEDULE AND WITHOUT DELAY. UNFORTUNATELY WE WERE UNABLE TO REACT IN TIME TO LOAD ONE EARLY R&R FLIGHT TO BANGKOK THIS MORNING. WE ARE DEVELOPING THE EMERGENCY TEMPORARY SITUATION AT CHINA BEACH WITH THE CONSIDERATION THAT IT WILL HAVE TO BE OUR MAIN R&R AND TRANSIENT FACILITY FOR 3 TO 4 WEEKS, AT LEAST, EVEN IF WE CAN EXPEDITIOUSLY RESURRECT THE OLD BARRACKS AND MESSHALL AT THE R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER AS A PARTIAL CAPACITY. THIS PRESENTS A MOST UNDESIREABLE SITUATION IN THAT THE CHINA BEACH FACILITY IS SORELY NEEDED AS AN IN-COUNTRY R&R SITE, AS WELL AS A DAYTIME RECREATION AREA. I AM VERY CONCERNED OVER THE SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF SUCH

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 5051 UNCLAS E F T O  
 SITES, NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE. WE ARE CONSIDERING THIS SITUATION NOT ONLY FOR THE DANANG AREA, BUT FOR DIVISION AREAS AS WELL. HOWEVER, THE MAIN CONCERN IS THE DANANG AREA DUE TO ITS AFFILIATION WITH THE ENTREPOT ACTIVITIES AT DANANG AB. WE WILL GIVE WIDEST CONSIDERATION TO ALL FACETS OF THE PROBLEM. WE WILL EVEN GIVE CONSIDERATION TO MOVING THE FREEDOM HILL RECREATION COMPLEX, R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER TO CHINA BEACH IF, AS WE SUSPECT AT THIS EARLY STAGE, THE MAJORITY OF THOSE FACILITIES ARE BEYOND SALVAGE. SUCH A DECISION HOWEVER COULD ONLY FOLLOW A COMPLETE ENGINEER STUDY INCLUDING CONSIDERATION OF SALVAGEABLE ASSETS (E.G. UNDERGROUND UTILITIES, GRADING, ETC.). WE WOULD DRASTICALLY EXPAND THE BEACH FRONTAGE TO CREATE AN IN-COUNTRY R&R CENTER (WITH MACV AID); BUT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES PROVIDE ADEQUATE DAY FACILITIES SINCE WE ARE DANGEROUSLY OVER-CROWDED IN THIS CATEGORY OF RECREATION FACILITIES. AT ANY EVENT, AS YOU CAN WELL APPRECIATE, THE PRESENT EMERGENCY UTILIZATION OF THE CHINA BEACH FACILITY IS STRICTLY A MAKE-SHIFT EMERGENCY MEASURE. WE MUST FIND A MEANS TO RE-BUILD THE FREEDOM

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES HAS BEEN SENT  
 COPY 3 OF 6 COPIES

#7

PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 5051 UNCLAS E F T O  
HILL RECREATION AND R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER COMPLEXES ASAP,  
ON EITHER CURRENT SITES OR A NEW LOCATION TO BE DETERMINED.  
THE NEED IS OBVIOUS AND URGENT, AND WE MAY NEED YOUR  
HELP.

BT  
5051

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

COPY 3 OF 6 COPIES

HAS BEEN SENT  
# 7





Z 291810Z ZYH  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC  
ZEM

**SECRET**

SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO  
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST QUESTIONS CONCERNING  
DANANG ASP-1 FIRE

1. MACV DIRECTED THAT WE PROVIDE ANSWERS TO NINE SPECIFIC  
REQUIREMENTS TO BE PASSED BY MACV TO THE NMCC INCIDENT TO  
BRIEFING OF PRESIDENT NIXON AT 291900H CONCERNING THE DANANG ASP-1  
FIRE.

FOLLOWING ARE THE STATED REQUIREMENTS:

QUOTE: 1. A CONCISE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.  
2. ITEMIZED LISTING OF LOSSES AND DAMAGE. INCLUDE DOLLAR  
COST WHERE AVAILABLE.  
3. ANY OTHER PARTICULARS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT.  
4. INTERIM RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION IN PROGRESS IN TERMS  
OF CAUSE, CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN AND OTHER PARTICULARS CONSID-  
ERED PERTINENT.  
5. OPERATIONAL STATUS OF BASE FACILITIES AND EFFECT ON  
MISSION, (IF THERE IS NO CHANGE TO OUR PREVIOUS ASP SITREPS  
WE CAN SO STATE IN OUR REPLY). UNQUOTE.

2. IN RESPONSE THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED:

QUOTE:

Z 290645Z APR 69  
FM CG III MAF  
TO UOME/COMUSMACV SEM

BT

SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO

ATTN: MACV CMD CTR

PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST - REPORT ON ASP-1 FIRE

A. TELECON COL. ROGERS MACV CMD CNTR TO LTCOL.

CHARON III MAF COC.

1. (C) CONCISE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

A. 271045H INITIAL REPORT RECD THAT FIRE OF UNK ORIGIN  
WAS OUT OF CONTROL IN ASP-1. FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT  
HAD RESPONDED QUICKLY BUT OBVIOUSLY HAMPERED BY EXPLODING  
AMMO AND HIGH WINDS.

B. 271120H EVACUATION OF BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY  
PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE AREA INITIATED.

C. FIRE SPREAD RAPIDLY INTO ASP-1 AS AMMO BEGAN EX-  
PLODING. CAMP MONAHAN (AT 954726) REPORTED ON FIRE AT  
271132H. SOON THEREAFTER POWDER BAGS AND WP EXPLODED  
CAUSING FIRE TO SPREAD TO AF ASP (BT 003755).

D. EVACUATION OF NEARBY AREAS CONTINUED RAPIDLY DURING  
EARLY AFTERNOON, WHICH CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO LOW  
CASUALTIES.

L. FIRE SPREAD RAPIDLY DURING EARLY AFTERNOON WITH NUMEROUS HIGH ORDER EXPLOSIONS.

F. 271335H DANANG AB CLOSED EXCEPT FOR EMERGENCIES.

G. 271530H FIRE WAS SPREADING TO SOUTH SIDE OF AIRFIELD. SOME POL FIRES. POL FIRES AT AIRFIELD OUT OR UNDER CONTROL BY 1606H.

H. 271700H. FIRES REPORTED IN NSA PACKAGED POL DUMP (AT 992716) LOSSES WERE NOT SEVERE.

I. THROUGHOUT AFTERNOON, HIGH ORDER EXPLOSIONS CAUSED SEVERE CONCUSSION DAMAGE TO BLDGS NEAR THE ASP.

J. FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT, BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. STRONG SECURITY MEASURES WERE IMPLEMENTED IN THE DAMAGED AREAS AND ALL UNITS IN VICINITY MAINTAINED INCREASED APT TO PREVENT POSSIBLE ENEMY EXPLOITATION OF SITUATION. NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY EFFORT OCCURRED.

K. EMERGENCY ACTIONS INITIATED TO PRECLUDE SHORTAGES OF AMMO. THESE INCLUDED REDISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS WITHIN I CORPS AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXPEDITED SHIPMENTS FROM WESTPAC STORAGE FACs.

L. 280640H DANANG AB OPENED.

M. 28 APRIL FIRE DIMINISHED BUT CONTINUED TO BURN THROUGHOUT THE DAY. EMERGENCY REPAIRS COMMENCED IN AREAS OUTSIDE THE IMMED VICINITY OF ASP-1. DETAILED DAMAGE ASSESSMENT COMMENCED AFTERNOON 28 APRIL.

N. 281400H. ALL MAJOR ROADS IN VICINITY OF ASP REOPENED TO TRAFFIC. CA PLATOON 1ST MAR DIV WORKING WITH VN RELIEF AGENCIES IN DANANG CIVILIAN AREAS.

O. LATE AFTERNOON 28 APR SIGNIFICANT FIRES DIED OUT. LAST MAJOR DETONATION WAS AT 272330H. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND RECOVERY/REPAIR NOW IN FULL SWING.

2. LOSSES AND DAMAGE WITH COST ESTIMATE:

A. FACILITIES

(1) 1ST MARINE DIV CANTONMENTS

(A) EXTENSIVE DAMAGE

1 1ST SHORE PARTY BATTAL

2 1ST BN 1ST MAR

(B) MODERATE AND LIGHT DAMAGE TO SOME FACILITIES

1 4TH BN 11TH MAR

2 1ST TK BN

(C) LIGHT DAMAGE TO SOME FACILITIES

1 1ST MED BN

2 7TH COMM BN

3 HQ BN

4 1ST 175 MM GUN

(2) 1ST MAR AIR WING CANTONMENTS/FLIGHTLINE

(A) EXTENSIVE DAMAGE

1 "C" ENTRY 1ST LAAM BN

**SECRET**

Z 291010Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN WICKERSON  
 RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST QUESTIONS CONCERNING  
 DANANG ASP-1 FIRE (CONT).

(B) MODERATE DAMAGE TO SOME FACILITIES

1 NWSG-17

2 MWHG 1

(C) LIGHT DAMAGE TO SOME FACILITIES

1 MAG-11

2 MACG-18

3 FORLOGCOMD CANTONMENTS/ FACILITIES

(A) ESSENTIALLY DESTROYED

1 ASP NR 1

2 3D MP BN (INCLUDES III MAF BRIG AND POW COMPOUND)

3 7TH SEPARATE BULK FUEL CO AND AMMO CO SUP BN 1ST FSR

4 III MAF TRANSIENT AND R&R PROCESSING CENTER (50 PCT  
 ESSENTIALLY DESTROYED, 50 PCT EXTENSIVE DAMAGE).

(B) MODERATE DAMAGE TO SOME FACILITIES.

1 MAINT BN FACILITIES (UNIT MOVE TO NEW FACILITIES PREVIOUSLY  
 SKED FOR 5 MAY WILL ELIMINATE NEED FOR EXTENSIVE REPAIRS).

(4) 3NCS

(A) ONE SEABEE CAMP ESSENTIALLY DESTROYED

(5) NAVAL SPT ACT DNG

(A) LIGHT DAMAGE TO SOME FAC

1 NORTHWEST TK FARM

2 FLEET AIR SPT UNIT

3 OLD PKG POL FAC (FAC WAS IN PROCESS OF BEING RELOCATED)

(6) US ARMY

(A) MODERATE DAMAGE TO 138TH AVN BN FLIGHT LINE

(B) LIGHT DAMAGE TO MORTUARY

(7) 366TH TAC FIGHTER WING

(A) 692 4TH SECURITY SQDN OP AND MUNITIONS FAC RECEIVED EXTENSIVE  
 DAMAGE

(B) LIGHT TO MODERATE DAMAGE TO MANY FAC ON EAST SIDE OF DNG AB

(8) OICC - CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR

(A) EXTENSIVE TO MODERATE DAMAGE TO CANTONMENT AND SHOPS

(9) EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO FREEDOM HILL EXCHANGE AND  
 SPECIAL SERVICES FAC.

(10) GENERAL NOTES

(A) MODERATE DAMAGE IS MOSTLY CONFINED TO EXTENSIVE  
 CRUMPLING OF SHEET METAL BLDG WALLS AND ROOFS. IN MOST  
 INSTANCES FRAMES NOT SEVERELY DAMAGED.

(B) DAMAGE ROUGHLY ESTIMATED AT 6.8 MIL AS FOLLOWS:

- 1 1.5 MIL FOR MISCEL RECOVERY IN VARIOUS CAVPS.
- 2 1.8 MIL FOR TRANSIENT AND R&R PROCESSING CENTER.
- 3 1.89 MIL FOR ESSENTIALLY DESTROYED CANTONMENTS
- 4 1.60 MIL FOR USAK FAC
- 5 0.89 MIL FOR US ARMY FAC
- 6 0.50 MIL FOR FREEDOMHILL EXCHANGE AND REC FAC.
- 7 0.25 MIL TO REBUILD ASP.

• ORDNANCE

(1) ASP 1. ESTIMATE TOTAL LOSS. CLASS V(A) 14:741  
S/T, CLASS V(W) 24,390 S/T. COST OF ORDNANCE 79 MILLION.

Z 290645Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO UUMS/COMUSMACV

BT

S E C R E T

FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS

ATTN: MACV CMD CNTR

SUBJECT TO DOWNWARD REVISION UPON DETAILED INSPECTION.

(2) 366 IFW ASP 70 PERCENT DESTROYED. 366 IFW MISSION  
READY ANMO STORAGE 15 PERCENT DESTROYED. NO ESTIMATE OF  
TONNAGE OR COST AVAILABLE.

C. CIVILIAN HOUSING. 2342 HOMES DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY  
FIRE AND EXPLOSION. NO COST AVAILABLE. BASED ON ARVN-GVN  
SOURCES.

D. CASUALTIES. U.S. MILITARY 1 KILLED, 16 WOUNDED AND  
HOSPITALIZED. 5 U.S. CIVILIANS, WOUNDED, HOSPITALIZED.  
VN CIVILIANS 1 KIA CONFIRMED, 2 KIA UNCONFIRMED. HOSPITALIZED  
21. BASED ON POSSIBLY INCOMPLETE REPORTING FROM ARVN-GVN  
SOURCES.

UNQUOTE

BF-4

QUOTE

Z 290921Z APR 69 ZFF-6

FROM CG III MAF

TO UUMS/COMUSMACV SGM

BT

S E C R E T

ATTN: MACV CMD CNTR

PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST-REPORT OF ASP-1 FIRE

A: TELECON COL, ROGERS MACV CMD CNTR TO LT COL CHARON III MAF COC.

B. CG III MAF 290645Z APR 68

1. (U) THIS MESSAGE COMPLETES RESPONSE TO REF A.

2. (U) RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 2 PROVIDED BY REF B.

## 3. (S) IMPORTANT PARTICULARS.

A. EXCEPT FOR SMALL NUMBER OF CARGO TRUCKS AND FORMLIFTTRUCKS IN THE ASP, THERE WAS LITTLE DAMAGE TO TACTICAL EQUIP. NO DAMAGE TO A/C WAS REPORTED. / ONE A/C WERE EVACUATED OR D MERTED TO NHS LAI AND OTHER LOCATIONS.

B. JOINT SERVICE CENTRALLY CONTROLLED EOD EFFORT HAS BEEN INITIATED TO MAKE BEST USE OF ALL AVAIL EOD PERSONNEL IN PRIORITY AREAS.

C. MEETING HELD III MAF 290800H ESTABLISHED PRIORITIES FOR REPAIR EFFORTS, TASKED ALL AVAIL ENGR ASSETS, ESTABLISHED CONTROLS ON ISSUE OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS.

D. INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT IN-COUNTRY AMMO ASSETS CONTINUING. INITIAL EST STORAGE CAP SHORTFALL OF 24,000 S/T IN I CORPS. THIS HQ INVESTIGATING ALL MEANS OF RESTORING STORAGE CAP INCLUDING USE OF SHIPS AS FLOATING STORAGE. AMMO ISSUE POINT IN OPERATION AT ASP-2.

E. R&R CENTER/TRAN FAC IN OPERATION ON AUSTERE BASIS AT CHINABLACH. R&R FLIGHTS HAVE RESUMED.

F. EXPEDITIOUS EVACUATION OF THREATENED AREAS AND AVAILABILITY OF BUNKERS CONSIDERED MAJOR FACTORS IN LOW CASUALTY TOTALS.

## 4. (S) INTERIM RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

A. CAUSE. A WIND OF 13 KNOTS AND GUSTING FROM SE TO NW BLEW SPARKS FROM A CIVILIAN TRASH DUMP SOUTH OF AND ACROSS THE ROAD FROM THE ESP INTO A GRASS AREA OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE ASP FENCE. FIRE QUICKLY SPREAD INTO GRADE II AREA OF ASP WHERE WOODEN CONTAINERS AND THREE PALLETS OF 3.5 WP ROCKETS LOCATED. APPROX 35 MEN IN ASAP AREA WERE IMMEDIATELY DISPATCHED TO AREA BUT WERE UNABLE TO CONTAIN FIRE WITH WATER FROM BARRELS AND HAND TOOLS. MEN WERE FORCED TO PULL BACK WHEN WP ROCKETS STARTED EXPLODING.

B. ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS OF ALL ASP'S HAVE BEEN INITIATED TO ENSURE STRICT ADHERENCE TO ALL SAFETY PRECAUTION WITHIN THE STORAGE SITE AND TO IDENTIFY AND ELIMINATE ALL POSSIBLE EXTERNAL FIRE HAZARDS.

5. (C) OPERATIONS STATUS OF BASE FACILITIES AND EFFECT ON M SSIOC. NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS ASP SITREPS.

UNQUOTE

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 29 APR 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 291332Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT R & R , TRANSIENT CENTER & BRIG
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS 3
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
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	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
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	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
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	LEGAL					
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	MED					
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	ORD					
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	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED # 10

0 21330Z ZYK  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
FREEDOM HILL R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER AND BRIG

1. THE FOLLOWING IS AN UPDATE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AT THE SUBJECT FACILITIES. MGEN YOUNGDALE CONVENED A CONFERENCE TODAY TO ESTABLISH PRIORITIES OF EFFORT FOR RECONSTRUCTION REQUIRED THROUGHOUT THE DANANG AREA. THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE YOU SOME SPECIFIC INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE SUBJECT FACILITIES.
2. THE BRIG HAS SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE AND EOD PERSONNEL HAVE GIVEN ITS CLEARANCE A HIGH PRIORITY SO THAT PRECISE RECONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS CAN BE DETERMINED AT THE EARLIEST. PRISONERS (333) ARE CURRENTLY CONFINED AT FLC, AND POW'S (32) ARE LOCKED UP AT NSA HOSPITAL. WE ANTICIPATE DISPATCHING 39 GCM (DD OR BCD AACA) PRISONERS TO CONUS WITHIN A FEW DAYS, AND ARE MAKING A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO HAVE COMMANDERS RESTORE AS MANY AS PRACTICABLE TO DUTY.
3. THE NEW TRANSIENT BARRACKS WERE EITHER DESTROYED OR RENDERED COMPLETELY UNSAFE FOR HABITATION, AND THEIR CONDITION IS PROBABLY WELL BEYOND REPAIR. DEMOLITION AND REBUILD APPEARS AS ONLY RECOURSE. THE R&R TERMINAL, TRANSIENT TERMINAL AND LOUNGE SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE, THEIR FUTURE CAN BE DECIDED ONLY BY THOROUGH ENGINEER INSPECTION. ONLY LIGHT TO MODERATE DAMAGE WAS SUSTAINED BY THE MESSHALL AND THE OLD R&R BARRACKS WHICH INITIALLY APPEAR TO POSSIBLY BE USABLE WITH SOME REFURBISHMENT.
4. AT FREEDOM HILL ALL BUILDINGS SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE. IN MOST CASES, AT BEST ONLY THE FRAMES REMAIN AS SALVAGEABLE, WITH ROOFS, SIDES, AND MINOR FRAME MEMBERS BADLY BATTERED AND BENT. EXCHANGE MERCHANDISE LOSS IS INITIALLY ESTIMATED AT 75,000 DOLLARS. ENTIRE COMPLEX IS PRESENTLY UNUSABLE AND SECURED. TIMELY EVACUATION PREVENTED LOSS OF LIFE, WHILE FLYING ORDNANCE AND SECURITY PREVENTED ANY SIGNIFICANT PILFERAGE AT BOTH CENTERS.

R&R TRANSIENT OPERATIONS WERE MOVED AFTERNOON OF 21 APRIL  
 TO THE CHINA BEACH IN-COUNTRY R&R CLUSTER WHICH HAS HAD TO BE  
 TAKEN OVER COMPLETELY FOR THIS PURPOSE. NORMAL CAPACITY IS  
 ABOUT 575, BUT WE HAVE ADDED BUNKS, ARE PROVIDING EMERGENCY  
 MESSING AND WILL BE ABLE TO HANDLE MORE ON A SHORT-TIME TEMPORARY  
 BASIS. NSA HAS ALSO PROVIDED US 200 EMERGENCY SPACES AT TIEN  
 SMA. WE EXPECT ALL R&R AND TRANSIENT FLIGHTS DEPARTING 29 APRIL  
 AND THEREAFTER TO BE PROCESSED, LOADED AND DISPATCHED ON  
 SCHEDULE AND WITHOUT DELAY. WE ARE DEVELOPING THE EMERGENCY  
 TEMPORARY SITUATION AT CHINA BEACH WITH THE CONSIDERATION THAT  
 IT WILL HAVE TO BE OUR PRIMARY R&R AND/OR TRANSIENT FACILITY  
 FOR SOME TIME, AT LEAST UNTIL WE CAN RESURRECT THE OLD BARRACKS  
 AND MESSHALL AT THE CR&R/TRANSIENT CENTER AS A PARTIAL CAPACITY.  
 THIS PRESENTS A MOST UNDESIRABLE SITUATION IN THAT THE CHINA  
 BEACH FACILITY IS SORELY NEEDED AS AN IN-COUNTRY R&R SITE, AS  
 WELL AS A DAYTIME RECREATION AREA. I AM VERY CONCERNED OVER THE  
 SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF SUCH SITES, NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE. WE ARE  
 CONSIDERING THIS SITUATION NOT ONLY FOR THE DANANG AREA, BUT FOR  
 THE DIVISION AREAS AS WELL. HOWEVER, THE MAIN CONCERN IS THE  
 IS THE DANANG AREA DUE TO ITS AFFILIATION WITH THE ENTREPOT  
 ACTIVITIES AT DANANG AB. WE WILL GIVE WIDEST CONSIDERATION  
 TO ALL FACETS OF THE PROBLEM. WE WILL EVEN GIVE CONSIDERATION  
 TO MOVING THE FREEDOM HILL RECREATION COMPLEX, R&R/TRANSIENT  
 CENTER TO CHINA BEACH IF, AS WE SUSPECT AT THIS EARLY STAGE,  
 THE MAJORITY OF THOSE FACILITIES ARE BEYOND SALVAGE. SUCH A  
 DECISION HOWEVER COULD ONLY FOLLOW A COMPLETE ENGINEER STUDY  
 INCLUDING CONSIDERATION OF SALVAGEABLE ASSETS (E.G. UNDERGROUND  
 UTILITIES, GRADING, LOCATION, ETC.). WE WOULD DRASTICALLY EX-  
 PAND THE BEACH FRONTAGE TO CREATE AN IN-COUNTRY R&R CENTER  
 (WITH MACV AID); BUT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES PROVIDE ADEQUATE  
 DAY FACILITIES SINCE WE ARE DANGEROUSLY OVER-CROWDED IN THIS  
 CATEGORY OF RECREATION FACILITIES. AT ANY EVENT, AS YOU CAN  
 WELL APPRECIATE, THE PRESENT EMERGENCY UTILIZATION OF THE  
 CHINA BEACH FACILITY IS STRICTLY A MAKE-SHIFT EMERGENCY  
 MEASURE. WE MUST FIND A MEANS TO RE-BUILD THE FREEDOM HILL  
 RECREATION AND R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER COMPLEXES ASAP, ON EITHER  
 CURRENT SITES OR A NEW LOCATION TO BE DETERMINED. THE NEED  
 IS OBVIOUS AND URGENT, AND WE MAY NEED YOUR HELP.

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HAS BEEN SENT TO  
 THE DIRECTOR

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CA III MAR		DATE 30 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 300644Z		COPY# OF COPIES REC'D 1, 2, 3 OF 4	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG			1/24/69	N	SUBJECT <b>SECRET NOFORN</b>  REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.  <i>Feed Back</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I	4/30	4/10	SC	
	DC/S	I				
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/30		MA	
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	CORDS					
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	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

**SECRET**

#11

O 300644Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO SSO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

SECRET NOFORN SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 PERSONAL FOR GEN. ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 RICE CACHE DISCOVERIES IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE JANUARY-FEBRUARY  
 1969 AND THE PROBLEM OF FEED RESOURCE CONTROL IN I CORPS. (C)  
 A. COMUSMACV LTR MACJ02 DTD 20 APR 1969.

1. (S/NOFORN) IAW WITH REF A THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS SUB-  
 MITTED. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY PURSUING THE MAJOR  
 RICE CACHE DISCOVERIES AND THE PROBLEM OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL  
 IN ICTZ SINCE JANUARY OF THIS YEAR. THE FOLLOWING IS A CHRONOL-  
 OGICAL RESUME OF THE MAJOR EVENTS WHICH HAVE TRANSPIRED IN THE  
 PAST FEW MONTHS ON THIS MATTER:

A. ON 11 JANUARY 1969, THE 2ND ROK MARINE BRIGADE UNCOVERED  
 A MAJOR RICE CACHE EXCEEDING 200 TONS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE. THE  
 MANY UNUSUAL FEATURES WHICH SURROUNDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS  
 CACHE EXCITED PARTICULAR INTEREST, AND ACCORDINGLY, THE G-2 OF III MAF  
 WAS DIRECTED TO PREPARE A DETAILED REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT.

B. THE REPORT WHICH THE G-2 PREPARED IS TOO VOLUMINOUS TO BE  
 QUOTED IN ITS ENTIRETY, HOWEVER, THE MAJOR FINDINGS CONCERNING  
 THIS CACHE WERE THESE:

(1) THE RICE CACHE SITE WAS UNUSUAL IN THAT IT HAD BEEN  
 BURIED IN AN OPEN FIELD IN A SERIES OF SHALLOW TRENCHES WITHIN  
 THE ROK MARINE BRIGADE'S NORMAL AO.

(2) THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE RICE FOUND WITHIN THE  
 CACHE SITE WAS IDENTIFIED AS HAVING BEEN OF U.S. GROWTH AND  
 CONTAINED WITHIN BAGS OF U.S. MANUFACTURE. HOWEVER, THE MA-  
 JORITY OF THE BAGS HAD BEEN OPENED AND A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF  
 VN RICE MIXED WITH THE U.S. RICE BEFORE THE BAGS WERE CLOSED  
 ONE MORE.

C. AS IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE RICE DISCOVERED IN THIS  
 CACHE WAS OF A TYPE COMMONLY SOLD BY THE U.S. TO GVN, THE  
 NEXT STEP TAKEN BY III MAF WAS TO ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE HOW  
 THIS RICE HAD ARRIVED AT THE CACHE SITE. DEP CORDS III MAF  
 WAS CALLED INTO OUR INVESTIGATION AT THIS POINT AND SEVERAL  
 DIFFERENT TASKS WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY PURSUED. MR. FRANCIS L.  
 BARNETT, SENIOR PSD, ICTZ WAS CALLED IN AND REQUESTED TO DE-  
 TERMINE THROUGH HIS POLICE ADVISORS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE IF  
 ANY INFORMATION COULD BE OBTAINED WHICH MIGHT SERVE TO CLARI-  
 FY THE ISSUE. SECONDLY, MR. FRED F. EUBANKS, CHIEF LOGISTICS  
 DIVISION FOR CORDS III MAF, WAS REQUESTED TO PROVIDE FURTHER  
 INFORMATION CONCERNING THE GVN HANDLING OF SHIPMENTS OF RICE  
 INFO I CORPS. THE PURPOSE HERE WAS TO ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE  
 IF A CHAIN OF RECEIPTS MIGHT EXIST WHICH COULD POSSIBLY RELATE  
 THE RICE FOUND IN THE CACHE WITH ANY WHOLESALER OR RETAILER.

D. ALTHOUGH BOTH MR. BARNETT AND MR. EIBANKS WERE MOST HELPFUL, THEIR EFFORTS DID NOT PROVIDE US WITH ANY EVIDENCE WHICH COULD BE UTILIZED TO FURTHER ADVANCE THIS INVESTIGATION. WHAT WAS DETERMINED, HOWEVER, WAS THAT AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL DISTRUST EXISTED BETWEEN THE GVN OFFICIALS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE AND THE KOREAMS. SECONDLY, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL IN I CORPS LEFT TOO MUCH TO BE DESIRED IN THAT NO SYSTEM EXISTED WHICH WOULD ADEQUATELY CONTROL THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD SO AS TO REASONABLY INSURE THAT FOODSTUFFS WOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE VIET CONG.

E. DURING THIS PERIOD A MEETING WAS HELD AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION ON 28 JANUARY 1969. MGEN SIMPSON, THE DIVISION COMMANDER, LTCOL LE TRI TIN, PROVINCE CHIEF OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE, AND SELECTED MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION AND PROVINCE ADVISORY STAFFS WERE PRESENT. AGAIN THE SUBJECT OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL WAS DISCUSSED BY COL TIN AND THE THRUST OF HIS REMARKS MADE IT CLEAR THAT COL TIN WAS PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH THE UNAUTHORIZED TRANSHIPMENT OF FOODSTUFFS BY KOREAN TRUCKS. NO EVIDENCE WAS PROVIDED BY COL TIN IN SUPPORT OF THIS ALLEGATION.

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# 11(2)

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S E C R E T NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
 PERSONAL FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 RICE CACHE DISCOVERIES IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE JANUARY-FEBRUARY  
 1969 AND THE PROBLEM OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL IN I CORPS. (C)  
 A. COMUSMACV LTR MACJ02 DTD 20 APR 1969. (CONT'D)

F. ON 29 JANUARY 1969 FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD BE-  
 TWEEN III MAF AND FIRST MARINE DIVISION REPRESENTATIVES. AT  
 THIS TIME IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT WHILE IT WAS APPARENT THAT  
 SERIOUS MUTUAL DISTRUST EXISTED BETWEEN THE ROK MARINES AND  
 THE GVN QUANG NAM PROVINCE ADVISORS, THERE WAS NO HARD EVIDENCE  
 AVAILABLE WHICH COULD RELATE THE KOREANS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT  
 OF THIS RICE CACHE. IN THE ABSENCE OF HARD EVIDENCE IT WAS  
 CONCLUDED THAT A CONTINUED PROBING OF THIS MATTER MIGHT EASILY  
 RESULT IN INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS THE MAGNITUDE OF WHICH  
 MIGHT NOT BE CONTROLLABLE. HOWEVER, SHOULD NEW EVIDENCE BE  
 UNEARTHED WHICH COULD PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF THE COMPLICITY OF  
 ONE OR MORE PARTIES, REGARDLESS OF NATIONALITY, THE INVESTI-  
 GATION SHOULD BE REOPENED.

G. IN ADDITION, IT WAS FELT THAT WHILE THE CONTROL OF THE  
 MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES BY A SYSTEM OF CHECK POINTS MIGHT BE HELP-  
 FUL, IT WOULD NOT GET AT THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM. THE ESSEN-  
 TIAL PROBLEM WAS THAT OF INADEQUATE COMMODITY CONTROL OVER FOOD  
 RESOURCES IN I CORPS. AS THIS MATTER IS ONE OF EXCLUSIVE CON-  
 TROL BY THE GVN, THE PROBLEM WAS ONE WHICH TRANSCENDED I CORPS  
 RESPONSIBILITIES AND WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE RESOLVED ON  
 THE MACV/AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.

H. ON 2 FEBRUARY 1969, A SECOND LARGE RICE CACHE WAS DIS-  
 COVERED IN SOUTHERN QUANG NAM BY THE 7TH MARINE REGIMENT.  
 WHILE BY NO MEANS OF SIMILAR SIZE, IT WAS A LARGE CACHE OF  
 MORE THAN 62 TON AND DISPLAYED THE SAME UNUSUAL CHARACTERIS-  
 TICS CONCERNING THE METHOD OF CONCEALMENT WHICH WERE NOTED IN  
 THE ORIGINAL KOREAN RICE CACHE. IN ADDITION, IT WAS ONLY NINE  
 KILOMETERS FROM THE FIRST RICE CACHE. THIS CACHE WAS ALSO  
 CAREFULLY INVESTIGATED BY III MAF. AFTER SIFTING ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE  
 IT WAS DETERMINED THAT NO CONCLUSIONS COULD BE REACHED CONCER-  
 NING THE PERSON OR PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS ESTABLISHMENT.

I. AS A RESULT OF THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAD OCCURRED  
 OVER THE PERIOD 11 JANUARY-2 FEBRUARY 1969, A COMPLETE REVIEW  
 OF THE PROBLEM OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
 WAS PREPARED BY THE III MAF STAFF.

J. THE CONCLUSION REACHED BY III MAF ON 14 FEBRUARY 1969  
 AS A RESULT OF THIS REVIEW WAS THAT DEPUTY FOR CORDS III MAF  
 SHOULD BE TASKED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING RECOM-  
 MENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF FOOD RESOURCE  
 CONTROL IN I CORPS.

K. ON 18 FEBRUARY 1969 MR. GORDON ARMSTRONG, THE USAID INVESTIGATION TEAM CHIEF MET WITH THE III MAF STAFF FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING THE RICE CACHES IN DETAIL. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THESE DISCUSSIONS A REQUEST WAS MADE BY USAID FOR A COPY OF OUR FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL INVESTIGATION. A COPY OF THIS INVESTIGATION WAS RELEASED TO DEP CORDS III MAF FOR USE AS BACKGROUND FOR THE USAID INVESTIGATION TEAM. IT WAS MADE CLEAR AT THIS TIME TO DEP CORDS THAT INFORMATION CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF GVN OR THIRD COUNTRY PERSONNEL IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS CACHE SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED AS THEY REPRESENTED ALLEGATIONS THAT COULD NOT BE PROVED AND THAT RELEASE OF INFORMATION OF THIS NATURE COULD BE MOST DELETERIOUS TO ARVN/FWMAF RELATIONSHIPS IN I CORPS.

2. (S/NOFORN) THIS, IN SUMMARY, ARE THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE RICE CACHE PROBLEM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP, AS WE SEE IT, WITH THE PROBLEM OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL IN I CORPS. I WILL PROVIDE UNDER SEPARATE COVER A COPY OF MY FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL STUDY IN QUANG NAM FOR YOUR MORE DETAILED PERUSAL OF THE PROBLEM. IN ADDITION, A COPY OF THE RICE CACHE INVESTIGATIONS WILL ALSO BE FORWARDED YOU. BASED UPON THESE STUDIES I HAVE TAKEN ACTION TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL IN I CORPS.

3. (S/NOFORN) THIS REPRESENTS A RESUME OF THE INVESTIGATION AS OF THIS DATE. I AM CONTINUING TO PURSUE THIS MATTER ALONG THE LINES NOTED IN YOUR RECENT LETTER. HOWEVER, AS IT IS OBVIOUSLY A MOST SENSITIVE ISSUE, I BELIEVE THIS IS AN AREA IN WHICH WE MUST MAKE HASTE SLOWLY. I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED AS TO THE RESULTS OF MY FURTHER INVESTIGATION AS IT PROGRESSES.

4. RELATED TO THE ABOVE, I HAVE BEEN GIVEN A COPY OF A PAPER FROM THE POLAD/DANANG (MACK) TO POL/SAIGON (THORNE) DATED 25 APR 69. THE SUBJ IS "OVERVIEW OF 2ND ROY MARINE BRIGADE ACTIVITIES JAN 68 - APR 69 IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE". I WILL FORWARD YOU A COPY OF THE PAPER, MEANWHILE, I'M TRYING TO SORT OUT FACTS AND OPINIONS.

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#11(4)

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
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**CONFIDENTIAL**



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TO COMNAVFORV SGN RVN  
INFO ZEN/COMNAVXUPACT DNG RVN  
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR VADM ZUMWALT FROM LT GEN NICKERSON INFO RADM BONNER  
1. I THINK IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE IF YOU WOULD TAKE  
THE TIME TO VISIT THE DANANG AREA AND VIEW THE DAMAGE  
WHICH RESULTED FROM THE ASP I DISASTER. IF YOU AGREE,  
PLEASE ADVISE THE TIME IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR  
YOU AND I WOULD BE HAPPY TO MAKE SUCH ARRANGEMENTS  
AS ARE NECESSARY FOR YOUR VISIT.

2. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
100

NNNN

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 04 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 040147Z		1,2, COPY# OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	<i>[initials]</i>		<i>[initials]</i>	<i>[initials]</i>	REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4...
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
2	C/S	<i>I</i>			<i>[initials]</i>	
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	<i>I</i>	<i>4/4</i>		<i>[initials]</i>	
	G-1					
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	G-6					
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	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

*[9]*  
**TOP SECRET**

O 0491 000 000  
FM CG 111 000  
TO CG FMPPAC  
ZEM



**T O P S E C R E T**

FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. NEARLY TWO HOURS OF TRIAL AND ERROR ELAPSED AND NO SUCCESS WITH  
KY-3 TELEPHONE, WILL TRY 5APR AM AS SUGGESTED, CHECKING MY COMM HERE  
FOR REASONS. HAVE PASSED TO YOU CERTAIN MESSAGES SEPARATELY. SWAN SAID  
CHAPPIE HAD TALKED WITH YOU YESTERDAY. LEW HAS READ OUR FILE AND ABE  
PERSONALLY EXPRESSED CONCERN TO HIM RE SERVICES UNILATERAL ACTIONS TO  
DECREASE SUPPORT OF WAR. WARM REGARDS.

GP71

085

**TOP SECRET**

HAS BEEN SENT

914

9(11)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 05 APRIL 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 042339Z		1,2,3, 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TOP SECRET EYES ONLY
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	CG					REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4...  THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
3	DCG		9 Apr		M	
3	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
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	CAP					
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	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

Subj: Proposed Kham Duc/Base Area 112 Operation

Ref: (A) MACV'S Request Same Subject

Encl: (1) Proposed Reply to Ref A

1. In essence the proposed message (enclosure 1) states CG III MAF believes proposed operation is desirable and feasible and outlines overall timing (1 May - Mid-September). <sup>OPPOSITE</sup>

2. The message also:

A. Stresses need for Delta Force and CCN effort.

B. Assumes availability of 101st ABN Div to meet force requirements (if it is required for an overriding higher priority mission *elsewhere* then we would need external assistance, i.e. 173rd ABN Bde. Purposely, this specific contingency is not addressed in the message although the CG may want to discuss it with Gen Abrams).

C. Indicates CG'S intentions to obtain ARVN participation (which if made available will reduce U. S. force requirement by an equivalent number of battalions).

D. Indicates the risks involved and the requirement for an available reserve should circumstances warrant.

3. Proposed reply does not info CG XXIV Corps who was info addee on MACV message. CG XXIV Corps undoubtedly will not take kindly to proposal concerning 101st Abn units particularly since he has not been consulted. If submitted in present form it is highly likely he will be made aware of proposal via Army channels. Two alternative approaches are evident:

A. Hold off submission until CG has discussed with Gen Stillwell and then forward with his comments, or

B. State requirement for 173rd at the outset and recast the message accordingly.

4. Do not believe we can be faulted for trying to do the job within own resources and at this juncture it appears that 101st Abn could be tapped. I lean toward CG discussing possible use of 101st with Gen Stillwell.

Very Respectfully

*Am prepared to discuss at your convenience*

*W/10*

O 042339Z ZYH ZFF-1  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. MAC 4006 EO 291213Z MAR 69

1. THIS RESPONDS TO YOUR MESSAGE POINTING OUT THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE CREATED FOR THE ENEMY BY OUR INTERDICTION OF THE ASHAU VALLEY, AND RAISING THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE PREEMPTIVE MOVE AGAINST THE ENEMY'S SOUTHERN LOC IN THE BA 614 AND KHAM DUC REGIONS. SPECIFICALLY

YOU ASKED FOR MY VIEWS REGARDING THE DESIRABILITY, FEASIBILITY AND POSSIBLE TIMING OF SUCH A MOVE. ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS CONVEY MY VIEWS.

2. AT THE OUTSET, I BELIEVE SUCH AN EFFORT IS DESIRABLE. I SHARE YOUR INTEREST IN THE WESTERN QUANG TIN AREA AS A LIKELY LOGISTICAL ALTERNATIVE. HIS RECENT LOSSES AND FUTURE DIM PROSPECTS ENEMY IN WESTERN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN APPEAR LIKELY TO DRIVE HIM TO SEEK OTHER ROUTES AS YOU SUGGEST. THE DIFFICULTY AND INACCESSIBILITY OF THE TERRAIN AROUND BA 614 AND KHAM DUC MAKE THAT A MOST LIKELY PROSPECT FOR HIM. RECENT RECON EFFORTS IN THAT REGION, HOWEVER, PRODUCED MIXED RESULTS. SINCE 1 FEBRUARY I HAVE PROGRAMMED FORTY PHOTO RECCE SORTIES INTO THAT AREA. THAT PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALED LITTLE OF SIGNIFICANCE, SLAR MISSIONS HAVE NOT PRODUCES SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND RECENT PHOTOS INDICATE THAT THE ROADS INTO AND AROUND KHAM DUC ARE NOT TRAFFICABLE. WEATHER, HOWEVER, HAS IMPEDED THE DETAILED SURVEILLANCE I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO GIVE THE AREA, SINCE OTHER SOURCES INDICATE RISING ENEMY ACTIVITY. TWO INFRARED DETECTOR MISSIONS FLOWN DURING MARCH REPORTED NUMEROUS EMISSIONS IN THE OF A 614 AND ZC 0112. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALS A ROAD

BRANCHING OFF ROUTE 966. SUCCESSFUL TACAIR ROADCUTS ON 11, 17, 27, AND 29 MARCH WERE FILLED THE FOLLOWING DAY. LAST YEAR A GROUND RECON TEAM INSERTED AT ZC 001166 ON 20 SEP WAS EXTRACTED UNDER FIRE AND ONE INSERTED AT ZC 015095 ON 23 OCT WAS ABORTED DUE TO HEAVY GROUND FIRE. IN VIEW OF THESE AND SIMILAR INDICATORS I CONSIDER THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO DEVOTE TO THE AREA, SUFFICIENT EFFORT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE ENEMY IS ACTUALLY DOING, WHERE HE IS, AND WHAT HE HAS IN THE WAY OF FORCES AND SUPPLIES IN THE TARGET AREA. ONCE THIS IS DETERMINED I AM PREPARED TO INVEST THE NECESSARY FORCE TO DISTRUPT THE OPERATION.

3. I CONSIDER THAT A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN STRENGTH IN THE BA 614/ KHAM DUC AREA IS FEASIBLE. I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS AN OPERATION THAT WE MUST APPROACH IN A DELIBERATE FASHION, IN VIEW OF THE REMOTENESS OF THE TARGET AREA AND CONSEQUENT LOGISTIC PROBLEMS; THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY THERE; AND OF THE THINNING OF MY FORCES THAT WILL BE CAUSED BY ASSEMBLING A FORCE OF THE SIZE REQUIRES FOR THIS OPERATION. IN ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY OF THE OPERATION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE RESERVATIONS, I HAVE CONSIDERED THE VARIOUS OPERATIONAL FACTORS AND FORESEE NO INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEM.

A. THE TERRAIN IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BUT NO MORE SO THAN THE ENTIRE PLATEAU FROM II CTZ TO THE DMZ, WHERE WE OPERATE AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE.

B. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER DURING THE COMING MONTHS IS PREDICTED TO IMPEDE OPERATIONS SOMEWHAT, I DO NOT EXPECT WEATHER TO BE A SERIOUS LIMITING FACTOR.

C. THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION WILL BE CHALLENGING, BUT NOT TO THE DEGREE THAT LOGISTICS BECOMES A DISQUALIFYING FACTOR.

D. BECAUSE OUR INTELLIGENCE OF THE TARGET AREA IS SKETCHY, THE OPERATION SHOULD BE INITIATED WITH A RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT OF SEVERAL WEEKS, THE PRECISE TIME DEPENDING UPON WHAT THE RECON REVEALED. THE EFFORT WOULD CONCENTRATE ALL ORGANIC RESOURCES. I WOULD ALSO RELY HEAVILY ON THE DELTA FORCE AND CCN PATROLS. WE WOULD REQUIRE YOUR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN KEEPING DELTA FORCE WITH US. I CONSIDER THE DELTA FORCE AND PRIORITY CCN PATROL SUPPORT A KEY ELEMENT IN THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CONCEPT.

E. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF TROOP AVAILABILITY, I ESTIMATE THAT THIS OPERATION AT ITS PEAK PHASE WILL REQUIRE TWO BRIGADES, ONE FROM AMERICAL WHICH CHARLIE GETTYS WILL INTRODUCE WHEN HIS RECONNAISSANCE HAS PROGRESSED FAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT HIM TO MAKE A HARD APPRAISAL OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION. CONSIDERING THE PRESENT TEMPO OF OPERATIONS IN QUANG NAM WHERE BOTH SLFS ARE FULLY COMMITTED WITH FIRST MAR DIV AND THE EXTENDED POSTURE OF THIRD MAR DIV IN THE NORTH, THE ONLY COMMAND

WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ADDITIONAL FORCES IS THE 101ST. WHILE IT, TOO, IS ACTIVELY CONDUCTING OPERATIONS, I CONSIDER IT THE MOST LIKELY SOURCE FOR A RESERVE FORCE AT THE PRESENT TIME. TO TAP THE 101ST TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF A SECOND BRIGADE FOR INTRODUCTION INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA WOULD, I BELIEVE, OVER-EXTEND III MAF BEYOND THE SAFETY MARGIN. THIS, COMBINED WITH A POSSIBLE HIGH PRIORITY MISSION UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR 101ST ARGUES FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE SLICE TO III MAF. EVEN WITH AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE, HOWEVER, SOME REPOSITIONING OF MY PRESENT FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY WHICH WILL ENTAIL A CERTAIN DEGREE OF RISK. THE RISK BECOMES MORE ACCEPTABLE WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE.

0342339Z ZYH ZFF-1

M CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

4. I BELIEVE ARVN PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATION IS BOTH FEASIBLE AND NECESSARY, TO KEEP THE EMPHASIS ON COMBINED OPERATIONS AND CONTINUE TO HELP ARVN PICK UP A PROGRESSIVELY GREATER SHARE OF THE LOAD. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, I WOULD EXPECT LTGEN LAM TO CONTRIBUTE AT LEAST ONE BATTALION TO THE OPERATION, HOPEFULLY MORE. THE PRECISE SIZE, HOWEVER, OF THE ARVN COMMITMENT, IS A MATTER WHICH I WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH LTGEN LAM AT A LATER DATE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALSO THE INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR TROOPS ELSEWHERE IN ICTZ AS FORCES ARE DEPLOYED TO THE KHAM DUC AREA.

4. BECAUSE WE NEED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE KHAM DUC AREA, THE PACE, SCOPE AND ORIENTATION OF THE MAJOR COMBAT EFFORT WOULD DEPEND ON OUR INITIAL CONCERTED RECONNAISSANCE PHASE. FOR THIS REASON, AVAILABILITY OF PROJECT DELTA FORCES IS A KEY IN THE TIMING. I BELIEVE THAT THE DELTA FORCES COULD BE SHIFTED SOUTH FROM CASS PARK TO INITIATE THEIR OPERATIONS IN KAM DUC AREA ON 1 MAY. THE FACILITIES OF SEVERAL SITES ARE BEING ANALYZED IN DETAIL TO SELECT ONE WHICH WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR COLOCATION OF BOTH THE DELTA FORCES AND CCM MOBILE LAUNCH TEAM. CONSIDERING THE RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT AS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT TO EXPAND THE OPERATION, I WOULD JUDGE A 30 DAY OPERATING PERIOD WOULD TELL THE STORY. ASSUMING THAT THE CONCENTRATED RECON EFFORT DEVELOPED HARD AND EXPLOITABLE INTELLIGENCE, ABOUT 1 JUNE I WOULD INITIATE A 3 BATTALION ASSAULT. WITH ENGINEERS, ARTY AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS INTO THE OLD KHAM DUC BASE AREA TO ESTABLISH AN FOB AND CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS IN ITS IMMEDIATE VICINITY. I ANTICIPATE THAT ABOUT TWO WEEKS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE KHAM DUC A FUNCTIONAL FOB CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING A TOTAL OF 6 INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 3 ARTY BATTALIONS, AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORT ELEMENTS. I WOULD THEN INTRODUCE THE ADDITIONAL COMBAT ELEMENTS OF ANOTHER BRIGADE. RIF WOULD BE ACCELERATED, LASTING AS LONG AS 60 DAYS, DEPENDING UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION. WE COULD CONCLUDE THE OPERATION AT THIS JUNCTURE, BUT I WOULD PROPOSE INSTEAD TO LAUNCH A FOUR BATTALION ATTACK FROM KHAM DUC, NORTHEAST, ASTRIDE THE SONG CAI ENTERING BA 11 FROM THE WEST. CONCURRENTLY, I WOULD TASK THE 1ST MAR DIV TO LAUNCH A COORDINATED ATTACK ON BA 112 FROM THE EASZ WITH AT LEAST ONE REGIMENT. THIS PHASE OF THE OPERATION WOULD CONCLUDE IN MID-SEPTEMBER.

5. IN SUMMARY, I CONSIDER A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN THE BA 614/KHAM DUC AREA BOTH DESIRABLE AND FEASIBLE, ASSUMING DELTA FORCE AVAILABILITY, PRIORITY CCM SUPPORT, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE WITH ITS NORMAL SUPPORT. WITH NO RADICAL SHIFT IN CURRENT TACTICAL TRENDS, WE ARE PREPARED TO INITIATE THE OPERATION ON 1 MAY. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED OPERATION IN DETAIL WITH CHARLIE GETTYS, AND HOLD HIS PROPOSED CONCEPT AND OPERATION PLAN, WHICH I HAVE TENTATIVELY APPROVED FOR PLANNING. I WOULD BE PLEASED TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSAL WITH YOU OR PRESENT A BRIEFING AT A TIME AND PLACE OF YOUR CHOICE.

GP-1

512

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-66)

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			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 042340Z	1, 2, 3, 4 COPY# OF COPIES REC'D		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET EYES ONLY
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3	CG			6 April	N	REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
4	DCG			6 Apr	N	
5	DCG AIR					
6	C/S	I				
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	DC/S PLAN					
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	G-6					
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	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

**SECRET**

#19

0  
FM LTGEN NICKERSON  
TO GEN DAVIS  
ZEN

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

1. YOUR 041325Z QUERIED THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INTERVIEW DAVID LAMB HELD WITH GEN DAVIS, TO INCLUDE WHAT ACTUALLY WAS SAID BY GEN DAVIS.
2. THIRD MARDIV MESSAGE 020140Z TO CG III MAF IS QUOTED BELOW: QUOTE  
C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON  
UPI PRESS RELEASE BY MR DAVE LAMB
  1. MR LAMB HAS BEEN OPERATING IN THE 3D MARDIV AREA DURING RECENT COMBAT ENGAGEMENTS AND HAS ON MANY OCCASIONS INTERVIEWED GENERAL OFFICERS OF THE DIVISION. HIS ACCOUNTS OF COMBAT AND HIS RELEASES BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN FACTUAL AND HAVE PROVIDED SOLID SUPPORT FOR MARINE OPERATIONS. DURING THE LAST MONTH HE HAS EARNED THE RESPECT AND TRUST OF THOSE DEALING WITH HIM.
  2. ON OTHER OCCASIONS HE HAS BEEN GIVEN OFF THE RECORD AND BACKGROUND ONLY BRIEFINGS. HE DID NOT VIOLATE ANY CONFIDENCE ON THOSE OCCASIONS.
  3. IT WAS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS THAT THE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AN INTERVIEW WITH ME.
  4. HE WANTED TO EXPLORE THE WAR IN DEPTH. HE CAME IN AFTER DINNER AND DISCUSSED FOR AN HOUR THE GENERAL AREAS OF SANCTUARIES, ETC. HE INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT I DID NOT WANT TO BE QUOTED OR OTHERWISE ESTABLISHED AS A SOURCE OF IDEAS AND THAT HE WOULD NOT DO SO. HE WAS TOLD WITH CERTAINTY THAT IT MIGHT BE INFEASIBLE POLITICALLY TO EXPAND OPERATIONS. THE QUOTES WHICH LAMB USED WERE DERIVED FROM A DISCUSSION OF PRESS CLIPPINGS WHICH I HAD ON MY DESK. THESE CLIPPINGS PROPOSED THAT WE HAD ONLY TWO CHOICES IN VIETNAM. ONE WAS TO RESUME THE BOMBING, THE OTHER WAS TO CONTINUE WITH OUR PRESENT TACTICS. HE WAS TOLD THAT WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE POLITICAL ASPECTS THERE ARE CERTAINLY OTHER COURSES OF ACTION WHICH ARE FEASIBLE FROM THE MILITARY STANDPOINT. THEN HE WAS GIVEN MY VIEWS AS TO ONE ALTERNATIVE, THE "SALAMI" TACTIC. THIS WAS NOT REPEAT NOT AS A PROPOSAL, BUT AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WERE INVOLVED IN A BACKGROUND DISCUSSION ONLY BUT IT SOUNDS AS IF TENTATION OVERPOWERED HIM.
  5. THE ISO, WHO WAS IN THE OFFICE WHEN LAMB RETURNED, ASKED HIM ABOUT THE INTERVIEW. IN A KIDDING MANNER LAMB SAID THE GENERAL SAID WE SHOULD GO INTO LAOS OR NORTH VIETNAM, OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. THE ISO TOLD HIM HE CERTAINLY COULD NOT USE THAT IN A STORY. LAMB REPLIED NOT TO WORRY THAT HE WOULD BE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT WOULD MAKE THE GENERAL LOOK LIKE A FOOL.

#19(1)

6. I THINK I HAVE NOT BEEN THE PRESS CLIPPING FROM THE  
 SOURCE UNDER THE NAME TO BE OVER THE PHONE. IT APPEARS THAT  
 I HAVE BEEN QUOTED IN THE PAST, AFTER A FULL YEAR OF SERVICE  
 IN THE ARMY WITH THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION, IT SEEMS THAT I BECAME  
 OVERCONFIDENT IN MY ABILITY TO JUDGE REPORTERS. I WILL MAKE  
 NO FURTHER COMMENTS TO MEMBERS OF THE PRESS  
 ON THE LAMB STORY OR THE ISSUES INVOLVED UNLESS YOUR ISO  
 EXPERTS COME UP WITH SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT HELP TO CALM THE  
 WAVES.

7. WARM REGARDS. MAJGEN DAVIS SENDS.

GP-4 UNQUOTE.

5. OF COURSE GEN DAVIS AND I BOTH REGRET THAT THE STORY WAS WRITTEN  
 AND ATTRIBUTED TO GEN DAVIS. GEN DAVIS DID, IN GENERAL TERMS, MAKE  
 STATEMENTS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE ARTICLE, BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR  
 THAT ALL OTHER ASPECTS, S. G. POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS,  
 MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED BY OUR DECISION MAKERS IN MATTERS CONCERNING  
 OUR FORCES AND THEIR GOVERNING DIRECTIVES IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT.

ALL DISCUSSIONS WERE IN THEORETICAL TERMS, AND REMARKS WERE PRE-  
 FACED BY SUCH LANGUAGE AS "STRICTLY FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT,"  
 "CONSIDERING MILITARY ASPECTS ONLY," "DISREGARDING ALL BUT MILITARY  
 CONCERNS," ETC. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ARTICLE DID NOT REFLECT THIS  
 QUALIFYING LANGUAGE.

FURTHER, NO MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS WERE ADVOCATED, BUT WERE DISCUSSED  
 AS FEASIBLE SOLELY FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT. IN OTHER WORDS, FULL  
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS GIVEN TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS  
 ARE BUT A PART OF THE TOTAL PICTURE WHICH MUST BE VIEWED, AND THE  
 OUTCOME WEIGHED, BEFORE SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS CONCERNING U. S. INVOLVEMENT  
 IN VIETNAM ARE MADE.

4. AS STATED IN THE MESSAGE QUOTED FROM GEN DAVIS, HE CONSIDERED  
 THE GROUND RULES FOR THE DISCUSSION TO BE "ON BACKGROUND" AND "NOT  
 ATTRIBUTABLE". I CONSIDER THE FACT THAT HE WAS QUOTED AT ALL WAS A  
 SERIOUS BREACH OF FAITH ON THE PART OF THE CORRESPONDENT. LIGEN  
 NICKERSON SENDS.

GP-1

543

#19(2)

NNNN

SECRET

HASBEENSEN

19(2)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM <b>BOEN DOOLEY</b>		DATE <b>05 APR 69</b>	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE <b>P 050401Z</b>	1,2,3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT <b>SECRET EYES ONLY</b>
			IN	OUT		
3 4	CG DCG	I		6 APR 69	N M	REMARKS <b>SECRET EYES ONLY</b> THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/5		W1 W8	
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	INSP					
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	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

**SECRET**

+20

~~P 050401Z~~  
 FM GEN DOOLEY, C/S, III MAF  
 TO LTGEN VAN RYZIN, C/S, HQMC  
 LTGEN BUSE, CG, FMFPAC  
 MGEN DAVIS, CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

1. A MESSAGE FROM GEN NICKERSON TO GEN ABRAMS IS QUOTED BELOW FOR INFO.

QUOTE

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

1. YOUR 041325Z QUERIED THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INTERVIEW DAVID LAMB HELD WITH GEN DAVIS, TO INCLUDE WHAT ACTUALLY WAS SAID BY GEN DAVIS.
2. THIRD MARDIV MESSAGE 020140Z TO CG III MAF IS QUOTED BELOW: QUOTE  
 C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON  
 UPI PRESS RELEASE BY MR DAVE LAMB
  1. MR LAMB HAS BEEN OPERATING IN THE D MARDIV AREA DURING RECENT COMBAT ENGAGEMENTS AND HAS ON MANY OCCASIONS INTERVIEWED GENERAL OFFICERS OF THE DIVISION. HIS ACCOUNTS OF COMBAT AND HIS RELEASES BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN FACTUAL AND HAVE PROVIDED SOLID SUPPORT FOR MARINE OPERATIONS. DURING THE LAST MONTH HE HAS EARNED THE RESPECT AND TRUST OF THOSE DEALING WITH HIM.
  2. ON OTHER OCCASIONS HE HAS BEEN GIVEN OFF THE RECORD AND BACKGROUND ONLY BRIEFINGS. HE DID NOT VIOLATE ANY CONFIDENCE ON THOSE OCCASIONS.
  3. IT WAS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS THAT HE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AN INTERVIEW WITH ME.
  4. HE WANTED TO EXPLORE THE WAR IN DEPTH. HE CAME IN AFTER DINNER AND DISCUSSED FOR AN HOUR THE GENERAL AREAS OF SANCTUARIES, ETC. HE INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT I DID NOT WANT TO BE QUOTED OR OTHERWISE ESTABLISHED AS A SOURCE OF IDEAS AND THAT HE WOULD NOT DO SO. HE WAS TOLD WITH CERTAINTY THAT IT MIGHT BE INFEASIBLE POLITICALLY TO EXPAND OPERATIONS. THE QUOTES WHICH LAMB USED WERE DERIVED FROM A DISCUSSION OF PRESS CLIPPINGS WHICH I HAD ON MY DESK. THESE CLIPPINGS PROPOSED THAT WE HAD ONLY TWO CHOICES IN VIETNAM. ONE WAS TO RESUME THE BOMBING, THE OTHER WAS TO CONTINUE WITH OUR PRESENT TACTICS. HE WAS TOLD THAT WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE POLITICAL ASPECTS THERE ARE CERTAINLY OTHER COURSES OF ACTION WHICH ARE FEASIBLE FROM THE MILITARY STANDPOINT. THEN HE WAS GIVEN MY VIEWS AS TO ONE ALTERNATIVE, THE "SALAMI" TACTIC. THIS WAS NOT REPEATED AS A PROPOSAL, BUT AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WERE INVOLVED IN A BACKGROUND DISCUSSION ONLY BUT IT SOUNDS AS IF TEMPTATION OVERPOWERED HIM.
  5. THE ISO, WHO WAS IN THE OFFICE WHEN LAMB RETURNED, ASKED HIM ABOUT THE INTERVIEW. IN A KIDDING MANNER LAMB SAID THE GENERAL SAID WE SHOULD GO INTO LAOS OR NORTH VIETNAM, OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. THE ISO TOLD HIM HE CERTAINLY COULD NOT USE THAT IN A STORY. LAMB REPLIED NOT TO WORRY THAT HE WOULD NEVER WRITE ANYTHING THAT WOULD QUOTE HURT THE GENERAL OR GET HIM QUOTE. HE WAS, IN THE OPINION OF THE ISO, THAT HE COULD NOT USE THE MATERIAL IN A STORY.

6. ALTHOUGH I HAVE NOT SEEN THE PRESS CLIPPINGS, FROM THE QUOTES WHICH YOU READ TO ME OVER THE PHONE, IT APPEARS THAT I HAVE BEEN CAUGHT OFF BASE. AFTER A FULL YEAR OF SUCCESS AND GOOD LUCK WITH THE PRESS CORPS, IT SEEMS THAT I BECAME OVERCONFIDENT IN MY ABILITY TO JUDGE REPORTERS. I WILL MAKE NO FURTHER COMMENTS TO MEMBERS OF THE PRESS ON THE LAMB STORY OR THE ISSUES INVOLVED UNLESS YOUR ISO EXPERTS COME UP WITH SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT HELP TO CALM THE WAVES.

7. WARM REGARDS. MAJGEN DAVIS SENDS.

GP74 UNQUOTE.

3. OF COURSE GEN DAVIS AND I BOTH REGRET THAT THE STORY WAS WRITTEN AND ATTRIBUTED TO GEN DAVIS. GEN DAVIS DID, IN GENERAL TERMS, MAKE STATEMENTS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE ARTICLE, BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT ALL OTHER ASPECTS, E.G. POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS, MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED BY OUR DECISION MAKERS IN MATTERS CONCERNING OUR FORCES AND THEIR GOVERNING DIRECTIVES IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT.

ALL DISCUSSIONS WERE IN THEORETICAL TERMS, AND REMARKS WERE PREFACED BY SUCH LANGUAGE AS "STRICTLY FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT," "CONSIDERING MILITARY ASPECTS ONLY," "DISREGARDING ALL BUT MILITARY CONCERNS," ETC. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ARTICLE DID NOT REFLECT THIS QUALIFYING LANGUAGE.

FURTHER, NO MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS WERE ADVOCATED, BUT WERE DISCUSSED AS FEASIBLE SOLELY FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT. IN OTHER WORDS, FULL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS GIVEN TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS ARE BUT A PART OF THE TOTAL PICTURE WHICH MUST BE VIEWED, AND THE OUTCOME WEIGHED, BEFORE SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS CONCERNING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM ARE MADE.

4. AS STATED IN THE MESSAGE QUOTED FROM GEN DAVIS, HE CONSIDERED THE GROUND RULES FOR THE DISCUSSION TO BE "ON BACKGROUND" AND "NOT ATTRIBUTABLE". I CONSIDER THE FACT THAT HE WAS QUOTED AT ALL WAS A SERIOUS BREACH OF FAITH ON THE PART OF THE CORRESPONDENT. LTGEN NICKERSON SENDS.

UNQUOTE

2. THE REFERENCE 041325Z MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE QUOTED MESSAGE CONTAINS A REQUEST FOR INFO AND THERE IS NO NEED TO PASS IT.

GEN NICKERSON IS WITH COMUSMACV TODAY TO ATTEND THE WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE UPDATE PLUS A COMMANDERS CONFERENCE IN THE AFTERNOON.

GP71

900

#20(2)

HAS BEEN SENT

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5215 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE Ø5144ØZ	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE Ø5144ØZ		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					SUBJECT QUOTE OF CG III MAF Ø42334Z  REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	Z				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	F	4/6		gms	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

**SECRET**

#21

O 051440B ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. COMUSMACV 031042Z APR 69 (PASEP)

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, CG III MAF RESPONSE TO REF A, IS READ-DRESSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

O 042334Z

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

S E C R E T

SERVICE FORCE ACTIONS (U)

A. COMUSMACV 031042Z APR 69

B. CG III MAF 131000Z OCT 68

C. COMUSMACV 030100Z NOV 68

D. JCSM 36-39

1. (S) IN RESPONSE TO REF A, THE FOLLOWING INFO IS SUBMITTED: REF B WAS III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE 1-68 WHICH RECOMMENDED REALIGNMENT OF THE FORCE STRUCTURE WITHIN PROGRAM SIX CONSTRAINTS, AND WAS APPROVED BY REF C. FOLLOWING UNITS WERE TO BE REDUCED TO ZERO SPACES:

FRN	UNIT
K002T	AT BN
K003T	AT BN
K016	MED TK CO
K017	MED TK CO
K019	UMTRAC BN
K026	HQ BTRY FAG
M012	VMA
K052B	ASRT
K105	MAICU
K055	WERS (MWSG)

2. (S) SECDEF DECISION OF 21 NOV 68 INDICATED THAT NO UNITS OR MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT COULD BE REDEPLOYED OUT OF COUNTRY, THUS CAUSING THE UNITS LISTED ABOVE TO BE RESTORED IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE AS APPROPRIATE. FOLLOWING ADJUSTMENTS WERE MADE:

A. VMA AND WERS (MWSG) WERE RESTORED TO THE FORCE STRUCTURE AT FULL STRENGTH SINCE THEY WERE NOT CONSIDERED SUITABLE FOR CADRES.

B. MAICU AND ASRT WERE NOT CONSIDERED MAJOR UNITS (23 SPACES EACH) AND THUS WERE NOT RESTORED TO THE FORCE STRUCTURE.

C. REMAINDER OF THE UNITS LISTED WERE RESTORED TO THE FORCE STRUCTURE AT CADRE STRENGTHS.

## D. SUMMARY OF THESE ACTIONS IS AS FOLLOWS:

UNIT	SPACES REQUIRED
AT BN (-) (CADRE)	19
AT BN (-) (CADRE)	19
MED TK CO (CADRE)	24
MED TK CO (CADRE)	24
AMTRAC BN (CADRE)	137
HQ BTRY FAG (CADRE)	21
VMA	260
WERS (MWSG)	221
TOTAL	725

3. (S) TO OFFSET THE INCREASE OF 725 SPACES, THE FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS IN FORCE STRUCTURE WERE RECOMMENDED THROUGH MARINE CORPS CHANNELS.

FRN	UNIT	SPACES REDUCED
K002U	HQ BN MARDIV	33
K003U	HQ CO MARDIV	33
K002B	HQ CO INF REGT	13
K003B	HQ CO INF REGT	13
K002F	HQ CO INF REGT	13
K003F	HQ CO INF REGT	13
K002J	HQ CO INF REGT	13
K003J	HQ CO INF REGT	13
K002N	HQ BTRY ARTY REGT	16
K003N	HQ BTRY ARTY REGT	16
K022A	MP BN	50
K023	MP BN	50
K033	FLC	164
K052	MACG	64
K060	MABS MAG VF/VA	9
K061	MABS MAG VF/VA	9
K062	MABS MAG VF/VA	9
K076	H&MS MAG VH	19
K077	H&MS MAG VH	19
K078	MABS MAG VH	78
K079	MABS MAG VH	78
	TOTAL	725

4. (S) THE REDUCTION OF THE FMAW UNITS CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF SECURITY PERSONNEL. THIS FUNCTION IS CURRENTLY BEING PERFORMED BY AVIATION PERSONNEL, ALTHOUGH FUTURE ADJUSTMENTS MAY REQUIRE A SLIGHT DRAWDOWN ON INFANTRY UNITS. THE

EDUCTIONS TO THE HQ BN'S, HQ CO'S, UND HQ BTRY'S REPRESENT A CUTBACK IN AUGMENTATION PERSONNEL PROVIDED TO MEET CERTAIN FUNCTIONS PECULIAR TO THE SVN COMBAT ENVIRONMENT, AND SUCH FUNCTIONS WILL HAVE TO BE PROVIDED FROM WITHIN REMAINING ASSETS. REDUCTIONS TO FLC WILL AFFECT THE RESPONSIVENESS OF PROVIDING CERTAIN COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TO A LIMITED DEGREE.

5. (S) IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, FRN K02700, ARMD AMPHIB CO, WAS REDUCED TO ONE OPERATIONAL PLT OF 42 SPACES BY REF B AND APPROVED BY REF C. IT HAS SINCE BEEN DECIDED TO REDUCE THE COMPANY TO CADRE STATUS WITH 42 SPACES. NO TRADE OFF SPACES ARE NECESSARY. THE PRESENT PLAN IS TO LEAVE ONE OPERATIONAL PLT IN SUPPORT OF THE ROKMC BDE WITH A NUCLEUS OF 11 U.S. MARINES AND THE REMAINDER OF THE PLATOON TO BE MANNED BY ROK MARINES. THE REMAINING 31 U. S. MARINES WILL BE THE CADRE FOR THE ARMD AMPHIB CO (-). IN THE EVENT PERMISSION IS GRANTED TO WITHDRAW USMC UNITS FROM SVN, IT IS CURRENTLY PLANNED, SUBJECT TO APPROVAL OF HIGHER HQ, TO REDEPLOY THE ENTIRE ARMD AMPHIB CO TO OKINAWA. THIS WILL ELIMINATE THE ARMD AMPHIB CAPABILITY IN III MAF.

6. (S) WHILE THE REDUCTIONS CITED WERE NOT DESIRABLE, THE SECDEF DECISION OF 21 NOV 68 THAT NO USMC UNITS COULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM SVN LEFT NO CHOICE BUT TO CADRE UNITS THAT HAD BEEN DELETED FROM THE FORCE STRUCTURE OR RESTORE THEM AT FULL STRENGTH, BUT STILL REMAIN WITHIN THE PROGRAM SIX CONSTRAINTS. THE REDUCTIONS OUTLINED TO ACCOMMODATE THIS ACTION ARE INTERNAL III MAF USMC TRADE OFF SPACES AND REPRESENT THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL METHOD AVAILABLE. THE ADJUSTMENTS LISTED HAVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE A DELETERIOUS IMPACT ON III MAF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY AS FOLLOWS:

- A. REDUCTION IN TOTAL FIREPOWER THROUGH THE LOSS OF AT BNS AND ARMD AMPHIB CO.
- B. LOSS OF ONE-THIRD OF THE TANK BN ASSETS.
- C. LOSS OF ONE-HALF OF THE AMTRAC ASSETS.
- D. LOSS OF THE FORCE ARTILLERY CONTROL HQ.
- E. DRAWDOWN OF INFANTRY AND ARTY HQ BASE SUPPORT AUGMENTATION; MP BN SECURITY CAPABILITY; COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CAPABILITY OF FLC; AND AIRFIELD SECURITY, ALL REQUIRED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR USMC UNITS IN THE CURRENT COMBAT ENVIRONMENT IN SVN, NOT PROVIDED IN THE T/O'S.

7. (S) IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT ALL OF THE ABOVE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN SOLELY BECAUSE OF PROGRAM SIX CONSTRAINTS AND NONE WERE SERVICE INITIATED. NO FURTHER REDUCTIONS ARE KNOWN OR CONTEMPLATED.

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

# 21(3)

900

21(3)





**CONFIDENTIAL**

RTTCZYUW RHMAFA0685 0960159-CCCC--RUMHLAA RUMVPA RUMLMHA  
R UMLMPA.

Z NY CCCCC

R 060158Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAF

RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOMD

ZEN/HANDS CO III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS

A. CMC MSG 251636Z MAR 69 (C) (PASEP)

B. CG FMFPAC MSG 060114Z MAR 69 (C) (PASEP)

1. REF A AND B CONTAIN DETAILS ON RELEASE OF EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS TO THE CENTRAL MARINE CORPS REC FUND. THIS COMMAND IS ON RECORD AS IN FAVOR OF THE CONCEPT AND IS PREPARING A REPLY. YOUR INPUT IS REQ TO ARRIVE THIS HQS NLT 14APR.
2. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE UNIT FUND CUSTODIANS COORDINATE WITH THE III MAF CUSTODIAN AND THEIR RESPECTIVE AREA AUDITORS IN ORDER TO STANDARDIZE THE SUBJ INPUTS.

GP-4

BT

0685

**CONFIDENTIAL**





**CONFIDENTIAL**

RTTCZYUW RHMAFA0693 0960245-CCCC-RUMHAA RUMVPA RUMLMHA  
RUMLMPA.

ZNY CCCCC

R 060244Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHAA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOMD

ZEN/HANDS CO III MAF

ZEN/1ST RADIO BN

P 251636Z MAR 69

FM CMC

TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF

INFO RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS

A. CG FMFPAC MSG R060114Z MAR 69 (C)

1. REF A CONTAINED THE RESULTS OF AN EXAMINATION OF THE FEASIBILITY OF RETURNING EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS TO THE CENTRAL MC REC FUND. IN ORDER TO MAKE A FINAL DETERMINATION ON THE SUBJECT MATTER, THE FOLLOWING IS REQUESTED:

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0693 C O N F I D E N T I A L MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A. YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR THE AMOUNT OF FUNDS WHICH CAN BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE III MAF COMPOSITE FUND AND FROM EACH MEMBER RECREATION FUND IDENTIFIED SEPARATELY.

B. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF THE III MAF COMPOSITE FUND AND EACH MEMBER FUND; THESE STATEMENTS SHOULD REFLECT BALANCES AS OF 28 FEB 69.

C. DETAILED PLANS AND PROGRAMS FOR THE UTILIZATION OF OPERATING CAPITAL AND RESERVE ACCOUNTS REMAINING AFTER RETURN OF EXCESS FUNDS.

D. ANY OTHER INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THIS MATTER.

2. REQUEST ABOVE INFO BY 19 APRIL 1969.

GP-4

BT

0693

**CONFIDENTIAL**





**CONFIDENTIAL**

RTTCZYUW RHMAFA0694 0960247-RUMHLAA RUMVPA RUMLMHA  
 RUMLMFA.  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 R 060246Z APR 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMLMFA/CG FORLOGCOMD  
 ZEN/HANDS CO III MAF  
 ZEN/1ST RADIO BN  
 R 060114Z MAR 69  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO ZEN/CMC  
 INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 FOR CMC, CODE DS

EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS IN COUNTRY (U)

A. CMC LTR DSB-2:BCK SER 805691 OF 250CT68 (C-MCEO)

B. CG III MAF LTR 37/JEW OVER 7000 SER 018269 OF 30JAN69  
 (C-MCEO) (NOTAL)

1. (C) REF A REQUESTED AN EXAMINATION OF THE FEASIBILITY OF RETURN-

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 0694 C O N F I D E N T I A L MCEO  
 ING UNCOMMITTED RECREATION FUNDS HELD BY III MAF UNITS TO THE  
 MARCORPS CENTRAL RECREATION FUND. BY REF B, CG III MAF CONCURR-  
 ED, SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION THAT FUNDS RETURNED BE EARMARKED  
 FOR FUTURE USE OF THOSE UNITS' RELEASING FUNDS. CG III MAF  
 FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT ONE FULL QUARTER'S DIVIDEND OF NINE  
 DOLLARS PER MAN, BE RETAINED BY EACH UNIT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE  
 ADEQUATE FUNDS FOR CURRENT RECREATION PROGRAMS IN COUNTRY.  
 2. (C) THIS HQS INTERPOSES NO OBJECTIONS TO THE RETURN OF  
 EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS TO THE CENTRAL RECREATION FUND PRO-  
 VIDED THAT THOSE CONDITIONS NOTED ABOVE AND THE FOLLOWING ARE  
 OBSERVED:

A. THERE SHOULD BE NO UNDUE RESTRICTIONS AS TO FUTURE  
 WITHDRAWALS OF THE FUNDS BY COMMANDS RETURNING THEM. TIMELY  
 NOTICE OF INTENT TO WITHDRAW WOULD BE NECESSARY BUT FUNDS  
 SHOULD OTHERWISE BE AVAILABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL ON RECOMMENDATION  
 OF RESPECTIVE RECREATION COUNCILS AND SUBSEQUENT COMMAND APPROVAL.

B. THE INITIAL AND SUBSEQUENT AMOUNTS TO BE RETURNED  
 SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY EACH INDIVIDUAL COMMAND ADMINISTERING  
 A RECREATION FUND.

C. PERIODIC STATEMENTS OF RESERVES HELD BY THE CENTRAL

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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#24

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PAGE THREE RHMMAFA 0694 C O N F I D E N T I A L MCEO  
 MARCORPS REC FUND SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE CONTRIBUTING COMMAND,  
 BUT SUCH RESERVES SHOULD NOT BE REPORTED AS ASSETS OF IN COUNTRY  
 RECREATION FUNDS.

D. IN VIEW OF THE EXTENDED TIME PERIOD DURING WHICH CURRENT  
 EXCESSES WERE GENERATED, AND OF THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE  
 CENTRAL MARCORPS RECREATION FUND, NO OBJECTION WOULD BE RAISED  
 BY THIS HQS IF INTEREST EARNINGS ON RESERVES WERE RETAINED BY  
 THAT FUND.

3. (U) OTHER MATTERS MENTIONED BY REF A WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF  
 SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE.

GP-4

BT

0694

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# 54

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CCN:024/OUT FILE:DH

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 08 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 080948Z APR 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	T		10 APR 69	MA	REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.  ORIG: INSP REL: INSP CG
3	DCG	T	10 APR	10 APR	MA	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	T				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	T	4/9		MA	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

**FOR**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HAS BEEN SENT



**CONFIDENTIAL**

OTTCZYUW RHMMAFA 1066 0980949-CCCC--R UMLBPA RUMHLAA RUMVPA  
RUMLLIA RUMLMHA RUMLMPA.

ZNY CCCCC

XXIV CORPS -T- 101ST ABN DIV

O 080948Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF DNG RVN

TO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN

RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG RVN

RUMVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV PHB RVN

RUMLLIA/CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW DNG RVN

RUMLBPA/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV (AM) CP EAGLE RVN

RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOND DNG RVN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR LTGEN STILWELL, MGEN SIMPSON,  
MGEN DAVIS, MGEN GETTYS, MGEN QUILTER, MGEN ZAIS AND EGEN  
FEELEY FR LTGEN NICKERSON

SUBJ: UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES

A. CG III MAF 110804Z AUG 68

B. CG III MAF 070600Z SEP 68

C. CG III MAF 201440Z NOV 68

1. IN THE PAST, MUCH CONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED BY COMUSMACV AND  
THIS HQ IN REGARDS TO UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES INFLICTED BY FRIENDLY  
FIREPOWER. REFERENCES A, B AND C REFER.

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 1066 C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR

2. ONCE AGAIN I MUST REMIND YOU OF THE GRIM FACT OF THE CASUAL-  
TIES WE ARE INFLICTING ON OUR OWN FIGHTING MEN AND CIVILIANS.

3. DURING THE 2ND QTR FY69, CASUALTIES WERE AS FOLLOWS: 55 MIL  
KILLED, 231 MIL WOUNDED, 92 VN CIVS KILLED, AND 273 VN CIVS  
WOUNDED. OF THESE, 35 PERCENT WERE CAUSED BY ARTY, 35 PERCENT BY  
AIR, 17 PERCENT BY MORTARS, 3 PERCENT BY EXPDEV AND 10 PERCENT  
BY OTHER CAUSES.

4. DURING THE 3RD QTR FY69, THE MILITARY CASUALTIES ALMOST DOUB-  
LED WHILE CIV CASUALTIES DECREASED BY APPROX 50 PERCENT. CASUAL-  
TIES ARE AS FOLLOWS: 107 MIL KILLED, 407 MIL WOUNDED, 57 VN CIVS  
KILLED, AND 134 VN CIVS WOUNDED. OF THESE, 39 PERCENT WERE CAUSED  
BY ARTY, 21 PERCENT BY EXPDEV, 15 PERCENT BY MORTARS, 9 PERCENT  
BY AIR AND 16 PERCENT BY OTHER CAUSES.

5. CAUSES FOR THE TOTAL CASUALTIES FOR BOTH 2ND AND 3RD QTR FY  
60 BY TYPE FIREPOWER ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. ARTY - OF THE 111 KILLED AND 397 WOUNDED BY ARTY, 65 PERCENT  
WERE AS A RESULT OF PERSONNEL ERROR, 30 PERCENT BY FAULTY AMMO AND  
5 PERCENT UNDETERMINED.

B. AIR - OF THE 62 KILLED AND 229 WOUNDED BY AIR, 34 PERCENT WERE  
AS A RESULT OF PERSONNEL ERROR AND 66 PERCENT FAULTY EQUIPMENT.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA 1066 C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR

C. MORTAR - OF THE 41 KILLED AND 183 WOUNDED BY MORTARS, 44 PER CENT WERE AS A RESULT OF PERSONNEL ERROR, 21 PERCENT FAULTY AMMO AND 35 PERCENT UNDETERMINED.

D. EXPLOSIVE DEVICES - OF THE 36 KILLED AND 127 WOUNDED BY EX-PLDEV, 58 PERCENT WERE PERSONNEL ERROR AND 42 PERCENT UNDETERMINED.

6. PERSONNEL ERRORS BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS:

A. ARTY: PERSONNEL ERRORS ARE ATTRIBUTED TO OTHERS IN THE SYSTEM AS WELL AS THE GUN CREWS. EXAMPLE: FSCC WATCH OFFICER NOT AWARE OF FRIENDLIES IN THE AREA, FDC DID NOT FOLLOW SOP, FO DID NOT GIVE CORRECT POSITION OF FRIENDLIES OR CALL IN DANGER CLOSE MISSION, BTRY WATCH OFFICER MADE ERROR IN TRANSPOSITION OF GRID. GUN CREW ERRORED IN USING WRONG CHARGES, LAYING PIECE WRONG, NON-CALIBRATION OF NEW TUBE.

B. AIR: PERSONNEL ERRORS ARE ATTRIBUTED TO OTHERS IN THE SYSTEM AS WELL AS THE AIR CREWS. EXAMPLES: RADAR CONTROLLER USED WRONG SWITCH THROWING DROP SEVERAL MILES OFF TARGET, AO FAILED TO IDENTIFY PATROL AS FRIENDLIES, CONFUSION ON THE GROUND AS TO WHO WAS WHERE. AIR CREWS ERRORED IN FLIGHT LEADER DROPPING ON WRONG SMOKE, INCORRECT SETTING OF INTERVALOMETER, AND

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA 1066 C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR  
AIR CREW DROPPED LONG OR SHORT.

C. MORTAR: PERSONNEL ERRORS ARE ATTRIBUTED TO OTHERS IN THE SYSTEM AS WELL AS THE GUN CREWS. EXAMPLES: SECTION CHIEF USING WRONG AIMING STAKES, MAN ON PLOTTING BOARD MISINTERPRETED TARGET INFO CALLED IN AND DID NOT CONFIRM PRIOR TO PLOTTING, FDC WATCH OFFICER WAS AWARE THAT MISSION WAS NOT CLEARED AND FAILED TO INFORM PERSONNEL IN THE CENTER. GUN CREWS ERRORED IN USING WRONG AZIMUTH OR TUBE SETTING. CREWMAN DOUBLE FED 60MM MORTAR.

D. EXPLOSIVE DEVICES: PERSONNEL ERRORS MAINLY ATTRIBUTED TO CARELESSNESS SUCH AS: EXPLOSIVES IN TRASH BEING BURNED, IMPROPERLY CARRYING GRENADES, IMPROPER IDENTIFICATION OF FRIENDLY VS ENEMY ON PERIMETER WATCH AND AMBUSHES, ORDNANCE DROPPED WHILE LOADING VEHICLE IN ASP.

7. FAULTY EQUIPMENT FOR AIR AS FOLLOWS:

A. MALFUNCTION OF TUBE IN TRIGGER CIRCUIT OF TPQ-10.

B. SHORT IN RELEASE SWITCH OF THE AIR CRAFT CONTROL STICK.

C. ORDNANCE SYSTEM CIRCUITRY MALFUNCTIONED.

8. FAULTY AMMO FOR ARTY AND MORTARS AS FOLLOWS:

A. ARTY - DAMP CHARGES, ERRATIC ROUNDS AND PREMATURE BURST.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE FIVE RHMNFA 1066 C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR  
 B. MORTARS - ERRATIC AND DEFECTIVE ROUNDS,  
 MOISTURE, EXPLODED IN TUBE AND EXPLODED WHILE HANDLING.

9. I ENJOIN ALL COMMANDERS TO MAKE A MORE AGGRESSIVE  
 REVIEW OF THEIR PROGRAMS AND TO TAKE APPROPRIATE  
 DISCIPLINARY AND/OR CORRECTIVE ACTION TO DRASTICALLY  
 REDUCE THE UNNECESSARY CASUALTY FIGURES.

10. I HAVE DIRECTED THE DEPUTY CG III MAF TO VISIT  
 ALL COMMANDERS WITH THE STATED PURPOSE OF REVIEWING  
 WITH EACH COMMANDER THE SUBJECT OF UNNECESSARY  
 CASUALTIES AS TO SOPS, SAFETY PROGRAMS AND RELATED  
 AREAS. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE HIM WITH SUCH  
 INFORMATION AND PROGRAMS THAT HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL  
 IN YOUR COMMAND IN REDUCING INCIDENTS, THUS ENABLING  
 OTHER COMMANDS TO BENEFIT RESULTING IN AN OVERALL  
 I CORPS REDUCTION OF OUR FRIENDLY OR FRIENDLY  
 CASUALTIES.

GP-4

BT

1066

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

# 24





SECRET/NOFORN

PTTSZYUW RHMAFA 1068 0980952-SSSS--RUMUGKD.

ZNY SSSSS

P 080952Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF DNG RVN

TO RUMUGKD/COMNAVFORV SGN RVN

INFO RUMLPAA/CTF ONE ONE FIVE

RUMCSDG/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

BT

S E C R E T NOFORN

OPERATIONS ON THE CUA DAI RIVER (U)

PERSONAL FOR VADM ZUMWALT INFO CAPT HOFFMANN AND CDR STEFFERUD FROM  
BGEN DWYER

A YOUR 049812Z APR 69

1. (S) REF A REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING TROOPS FOR OPS IN THE  
CUA DAI AREA.2. (S) SINCE THE PLANNING CONFERENCE ON SUBJ OPS AT III MAF HDQTRS  
ON 3 MAR 1969 WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN FROM GEN LAM A TIME FRAME  
FOR HIS PROMISED TWO ARVN BATTALIONS AND DEPLOYMENT OF A VNN RAG IN  
THE CUA DAI RIVER AREA. ON 7 APRIL, GEN LAM INDICATED DEPLOYMENT  
OF THE RAG AND TWO ARVN BATTALIONS IS BEING EVALUATED AND  
HE HOPES TO HAVE THESE FORCES DEPLOYED ABOUT 15 APR. HOWEVER WE MUST  
APPRECIATE THIS DATE MAY NOT BE MET.

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 1068 S E C R E T NOFORN

3. (S) A CONFERENCE WAS HELD 7 APRIL AT III MAF HDQTRS ON SUBJ OPS.  
ATTENDEES INCLUDED CTG 115.1 AND REPS FROM THIS COMMAND, CAP, ROK  
MARINES, AMERICAL DIV, G-3A (VN), US ADV OF QUANG DA SPECIAL  
ZONE, AND DEP PSA HOI AN. THE CONSENSUS IS THAT TO SECURE THE SOUTH  
BANK OF THE SONG CUA DAI WILL REQUIRE PERMANENT FORCES ON BARRIER  
ISLAND AND AN ACTIVE RAG. AS NOTED IN PARA 2 ABOVE THESE FORCES  
HAVE NOT YET BEEN ASSIGNED BY GEN LAM. THEREFORE SEVERAL INTERMED-  
IATE COURSES OF ACTION BRIEFLY OUTLINED BELOW WERE DISCUSSED.A. REASONABLY FIRM IS A FIVE DAY SWEEP THROUGH BARRIER IS-  
LANDS COMMENCING 15 APR BY ELEMENTS OF 1/1 A/C SQUADRON OF AMER-  
ICAL DIVISION.B. THE ROK MARINES PLAN A ONE BN OPERATION ON XUYEN-HA ISLAND,  
JUST BELOW HOI AN COMMENCING 9 APR.C. TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPS IN 3 A AND B ABOVE AN  
ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE, THRU GEN LAM, TO COMMIT AT LEAST ONE ARVN BAT-  
TALION AND A RAG. QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE REPS STATED THAT IF THE  
RAG WERE DEPLOYED TO THE HOI AN AREA THEY IN TURN WOULD TRY  
TO SELL COMMITTING EITHER A RANGER BN OR A BN FROM 51ST REGT, FOR  
A PERIOD OF 30 DAYS. THIS TOO, OF COURSE, REQUIRES GEN LAM'S  
APPROVAL.

D. DEP PSA STATED HE IN TURN WOULD ATTEMPT TO GET AN

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

#27

SECRET/NOFORN

COPY 3 OF 6 COPIES

SECRET/NOFORN

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA 1068 S E C R E T NOFORN  
 RF CO ASSIGNED TO BARRIER ISLAND ON A PERMENANT BASIS FOLLOWING  
 THE AFOREMENTIONED OPERATIONS.

4. (S) THE CONSENSUS WAS THAT ARVN FORCES WOULD BE MORE SATISFACTORY  
 THAN US FORCES FOR RAG OPS.

5. (S) ALCON IN THIS AREA AGREE THAT OPS IN THE CUA DAI RIVER  
 TO THIS POINT HAVE BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN OPENING THE RIVER  
 TO CIVILIAN TRAFFIC. AS AN ASIDE, THE DEP PSA (LTCOL USA) WAS  
 QUITE POSITIVE IN HIS VIEWS THAT THE RECENT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS  
 CONDUCTED BY CTG 115, I HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN THE INCREASED  
 FRIENDLY TRAFFIC ON THE CUA DAI BY BOTH FISHING AND MERCHANT  
 VESSELS. THIS HEALTHY SIGN REFLECTS OUR EFFORTS IN THE AREA,  
 THOUGH I FULLY REALIZE IT HAS CAUSED TG 115, I CASUALTIES.

6. (S) AT THIS POINT, A BATTALION/RAG OPERATION, WILL BE  
 EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE IN SECURING THE RIVER. FOLLOW ON OPS WILL  
 INCLUDE FURTHER PACIFICATION OF THE AREA AND THE FURTHER  
 OPENING UP OF THE PORT NOI AN. THIS I BELIEVE IS ESSENTIAL IN  
 DEVELOPING THE ECONOMIC STABILITY OF THE AREA. PROCEEDING ON  
 FOREGOING INFO INTEND TO MAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORT TO EFFECT  
 INCREASED TROOP AND RAG SUPPORT FOR YOUR MARKET TIME BOATS ON  
 THE CUA DAI RIVER ASAP.

7. CUA WARM REGARDS.

G-A

BT

1068

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

#27

SECRET/NOFORN

COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 1002307 APR 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG			11 Apr 69	N	EXCLUSIVE FOR
3	DCG			10 Apr 69	N	REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.  ORIG - G-3 REL - CG
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	E	4/10			
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	E	4/10			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

**EXCLUSIVE**

**FOR**

**HAS BEEN SENT**

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

PTTCZYUW RHMAFA1325 1000231-CCCC--RUMHLAA RUMKVA RUMLMHA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 100230Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMKVA/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN SIMPSON, MGEN DAVIS AND MGEN QUILTER  
FROM LTGEN WICKERSON

AIR GROUND PERSONNEL EXCHANGE (U)

1. (C) AS YOU KNOW, I AM TAKING A NUMBER OF STEPS TO MAKE SURE WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO GET THE MOST OUT OF OUR RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS. AMONG THESE STEPS IS THE PANEL I AM CONVENING TO EXAMINE ACROSS THE BOARD OUR HELO OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND COMMAND AND CONTROL.

2. (C) BEYOND THE COMMAND ASPECTS, HOWEVER, THERE IS AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR GOOD UNDERSTANDING BY OUR LOWER RANKING AIR AND GROUND PEOPLE OF THE PROBLEMS OF EACH OTHER. I RECOGNIZE THAT EDUCATION IN THIS REGARD IS COMPLICATED BY THE CONTINUING TURNOVER AND BY THE SHORTAGE OF JUNIOR PEOPLE, WHICH IN TURN KEEPS EVERY-

PAGE TWO RHMAFA1325 C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR ONE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE JUST TO GET HIS OWN BASIC JOB DONE. BUT THESE COMPLICATIONS DO NOT IN ANY WAY LESSEN THE REQUIREMENT FOR MEMBERS OF THE AIR GROUND TEAM TO BE CONSERVANT WITH WHAT THE TOTAL TEAM CAN DO. ONE TECHNIQUE WHICH WILL HELP THAT UNDERSTANDING IS TO MAINTAIN AN EXCHANGE PROGRAM BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR UNITS, WHERE A FEW PERSONNEL OF BOTH ELEMENTS LIVE AND WORK WITH THEIR AIR OR GROUND COUNTERPARTS FOR A BRIEF PERIOD.

3. (U) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I DESIRE THAT YOU ESTABLISH TOKEN OFFICER EXCHANGE PROGRAMS BETWEEN THE DIVISIONS AND WING. I DO NOT EXPECT A LARGE SCALE PROGRAM TO BE SET UP OVERNIGHT. I DO, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT YOU CAN BEGIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO EXCHANGE A FEW INDIVIDUALS FOR SHORT PERIODS OF TIME. BASED ON INITIAL EVALUATION WE MAY WANT TO EXPAND THE PROGRAM LATER.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1325

**CONFIDENTIAL**

#30

HEADQUARTERS  
I. MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 100842Z APR 69		COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS  ORIG - G-3  REL G-3  MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  HAS BEEN SENT  <i>Cy # 2 in AC/SM file</i> <i>cy # 3 to G-3 102030H Apr 69</i> <i>W. O. Weber</i>  <b>31</b>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 APR 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 1008427 APR 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
5	CG	I	12 NP		IV	REMARKS
	DCG	I	11/6/69		IV	ORIG - G-3
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				REL G-3
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	4/10		IV	MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT  
on news  
collection of  
Data for  
single  
management

SECRET



**SECRET**

RTTSZYUW RHMMAFA1373 1000843-SSSS--RUHKM RUMLMHA RUMHLAA  
RUMHVPA.

ZNY SSSSS

R 100842Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

SECRET FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FIXED WING STRIKE REPORT (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 080306Z APR 69

B. CG FIRST MAW 260132Z MAR 69

1. (U) CONCUR WITH PROPOSAL REF A FOR THIS HQ TO CONSOLIDATE  
AND FWD SUBJ REPORT.

2. (C) FOR FIRST MAW, FIRST MARDIV, AND THIRD MARDIV. SUBMIT  
WRITTEN REPORT IN PRESCRIBED FORMAT TO III MAF, ATTN: G-3 AIR  
WEEKLY FOR PERIOD TUES THROUGH MONDAY WITH DAILY BREAKOUT  
PLUS TOTAL FOR WEEK. REQ REPORT REACH THIS HQ BY FRIDAY  
FOLLOWING REPORTING PERIOD. FIRST SUBMISSION FOR WEEK COMMEN-  
CING 15 APR TO 21 APR.

3. (U) FOR FMFPAC REQ COMMENTS ON PARA 2B OF REF B.

GP-4

BT

1373

**SECRET**  
# 51

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 101540Z		COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					READDRESSAL OF III MAF 042339Z  REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4...  THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT! <i>HAS BEEN SENT.</i>  THIS MESSAGE IN TWO SECTIONS.  <i>[WAS SENT TO AMFPAC]</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/11		PR/D	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

**TOP SECRET**

O 101540Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO SSO AMERICAL DIVISION  
 FOR MG GETIYS FROM LTG NICKERSON

O 042339Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. MAC 4006 EO 291213Z MAR69

1. THIS RESPONDS TO YOUR MESSAGE POINTING OUT THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE CREATED FOR THE ENEMY BY OUR INTERDICTION OF THE ASHAU VALLEY, AND RAISING THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE PRE-EMPTIVE MOVE AGAINST THE ENEMY'S SOUTHERN LOC IN THE BA 614 AND KHAM DUC REGIONS. SPECIFICALLY YOU ASKED FOR MY VIEWS REGARDING THE DESIRABILITY, FEASIBILITY AND POSSIBLE TIMING OF SUCH A MOVE. ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS CONVEY MY VIEWS.

2. AT THE OUTSET, I BELIEVE SUCH AN EFFORT IS DESIRABLE. I SHARE YOUR INTEREST IN THE WESTERN QUANG TIN AREA AS A LIKELY LOGISTICAL ALTERNATIVE. HIS RECENT LOSSES AND FUTURE DIM PROSPECTS ENEMY IN WESTERN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN APPEAR LIKELY TO DRIVE HIM TO SEEK OTHER ROUTES AS YOU SUGGEST. THE DIFFICULTY AND INACCESSIBILITY OF THE TERRAIN AROUND BA 614 AND KHAM DUC MAKE THAT A MOST LIKELY PROSPECT FOR HIM. RECENT RECON EFFORTS IN THAT REGION, HOWEVER, PRODUCED MIXED RESULTS. SINCE 1 FEBRUARY I HAVE PROGRAMMED FORTY PHOTO RECCE SORTIES INTO THAT AREA. THAT PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALED LITTLE OF SIGNIFICANCE, SLAR MISSIONS HAVE NOT PRODUCES SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND RECENT PHOTOS INDICATE THAT THE ROADS INTO AND AROUND KHAM DUC ARE NOT TRAFFICABLE. WEATHER, HOWEVER, HAS IMPEDED THE DETAILED SURVEILLANCE I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO GIVE THE AREA, SINCE OTHER SOURCES INDICATE RISING ENEMY ACTIVITY. TWO INFRARED DETECTOR MISSIONS FLOWN DURING MARCH REPORTED NUMEROUS EMISSIONS IN THE OF BA 614 AND ZC 0112. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALS A ROAD

BRANCHING OFF ROUTE 966. SUCCESSFUL TACAIR ROADCUTS ON 11, 17, 27, AND 29 MARCH WERE FILLED THE FOLLOWING DAY. LAST YEAR A GROUND RECON TEAM INSERTED AT ZC 001166 ON 20 SEP WAS EXTRACTED UNDER FIRE AND ONE INSERTED AT ZC 015095 ON 23 OCT WAS ABORTED DUE TO HEAVY GROUND FIRE. IN VIEW OF THESE AND SIMILAR INDICATORS I CONSIDER THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO DEVOTE TO THE AREA, SUFFICIENT EFFORT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE ENEMY IS ACTUALLY DOING, WHERE HE IS, AND WHAT HE HAS IN THE WAY OF FORCES AND SUPPLIES IN THE TARGET AREA. ONCE THIS IS DETERMINED I AM PREPARED TO INVEST THE NECESSARY FORCE TO DISTRUPT THE OPERATION.

3. I CONSIDER THAT A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN STRENGTH IN THE BA 614/ KHAM DUC AREA IS FEASIBLE. I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS AN OPERATION THAT WE MUST APPROACH IN A DELIBERATE FASHION, IN VIEW OF THE REMOTENESS OF THE TARGET AREA AND CONSEQUENT LOGISTIC PROBLEMS; THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY THERE; AND OF THE THINNING OF MY FORCES THAT WILL BE CAUSED BY ASSEMBLING A FORCE OF THE SIZE REQUIRES FOR THIS OPERATION. IN ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY OF THE OPERATION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE RESERVATIONS, I HAVE CONSIDERED THE VARIOUS OPERATIONAL FACTORS AND FORESEE NO INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEM.

A. THE TERRAIN IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BUT NO MORE SO THAN THE ENTIRE PLATEAU FROM II CTZ TO THE DMZ, WHERE WE OPERATE AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE.

B. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER DURING THE COMING MONTHS IS PREDICTED TO IMPEDE OPERATIONS SOMEWHAT, I DO NOT EXPECT WEATHER TO BE A SERIOUS LIMITING FACTOR.

C. THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION WILL BE CHALLENGING, BUT NOT TO THE DEGREE THAT LOGISTICS BECOMES A DISQUALIFYING FACTOR.

D. BECAUSE OUR INTELLIGENCE OF THE TARGET AREA IS SKETCHY, THE OPERATION SHOULD BE INITIATED WITH A RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT OF SEVERAL WEEKS, THE PRECISE TIME DEPENDING UPON WHAT THE RECON REVEALED. THE EFFORT WOULD CONCENTRATE ALL ORGANIC RESOURCES. I WOULD ALSO RELY HEAVILY ON THE DELTA FORCE AND CCN PATROLS. WE WOULD REQUIRE YOUR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN KEEPING DELTA FORCE WITH US. I CONSIDER THE DELTA FORCE AND PRIORITY CCN PATROL SUPPORT A KEY ELEMENT IN THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CONCEPT. 14(2)

E. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF TROOP AVAILABILITY, I ESTIMATE THAT THIS OPERATION AT ITS PEAK PHASE WILL REQUIRE TWO BRIGADES, ONE FROM AMERICAL WHICH CHARLIE GETTYS WILL INTRODUCE WHEN HIS RECONNAISSANCE HAS PROGRESSED FAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT HIM TO MAKE A HARD APPRAISAL OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION. CONSIDERING THE PRESENT TEMPO OF OPERATIONS IN QUANG NAM WHERE BOTH SLFS ARE FULLY COMMITTED WITH FIRST MAR DIV AND THE EXTENDED POSTURE OF THIRD MAR DIV IN THE NORTH, THE ONLY COMMAND WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ADDITIONAL FORCES IS THE 101ST. WHILE IT, TOO, IS ACTIVELY CONDUCTING OPERATIONS, I CONSIDER IT THE MOST LIKELY SOURCE FOR A RESERVE FORCE AT THE PRESENT TIME. TO TAP THE 101ST TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF A SECOND BRIGADE FOR INTRODUCTION INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA WOULD, I BELIEVE, OVER-EXTEND III MAF BEYOND THE SAFETY MARGIN. THIS, COMBINED WITH A POSSIBLE HIGH PRIORITY MISSION UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR 101ST ARGUES FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE SLICE TO III MAF. EVEN WITH AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE, HOWEVER, SOME REPOSITIONING OF MY PRESENT FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY WHICH WILL ENTAIL A CERTAIN DEGREE OF RISK. THE RISK BECOMES MORE ACCEPTABLE WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE.

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
860

NNNN

**TOP SECRET HASBEENSENT**

14(3)

*[Handwritten signature]* 14(3)

O 101540Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO SSO AMERICAL DIVISION  
 FOR MG GETTYS FROM LIG NICKERSON  
 O 042339Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
 F. I BELIEVE ARVN PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATION IS BOTH FEASIBLE AND NECESSARY, TO KEEP THE EMPHASIS ON COMBINED OPERATIONS AND CONTINUE TO HELP ARVN PICK UP A PROGRESSIVELY GREATER SHARE OF THE LOAD. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, I WOULD EXPECT LTGEN LAM TO CONTRIBUTE AT LEAST ONE BATTALION TO THE OPERATION, HOPEFULLY MORE. THE PRECISE SIZE, HOWEVER, OF THE ARVN COMMITMENT, IS A MATTER WHICH I WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH LTGEN LAM AT A LATER DATE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALSO THE INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR TROOPS ELSEWHERE IN ICTZ AS FORCES ARE DEPLOYED TO THE KHAM DUC AREA.

4. BECAUSE WE NEED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE KHAM DUC AREA, THE PACE, SCOPE AND ORIENTATION OF THE MAJOR COMBAT EFFORT WOULD DEPEND ON OUR INITIAL CONCERTED RECONNAISSANCE PHASE. FOR THIS REASON, AVAILABILITY OF PROJECT DELTA FORCES IS A KEY IN THE TIMING. I BELIEVE THAT THE DELTA FORCES COULD BE SHIFTED SOUTH FROM CASS PARK TO INITIATE THEIR OPERATIONS IN KAM DUC AREA ON 1 MAY. THE FACILITIES OF SEVERAL SITES ARE BEING ANALYZED IN DETAIL TO SELECT ONE WHICH WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR COLOCATION OF BOTH THE DELTA FORCES AND CCN MOBILE LAUNCH TEAM. CONSIDERING THE RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT AS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT TO EXPAND THE OPERATION, I WOULD JUDGE A 30 DAY OPERATING PERIOD WOULD TELL THE STORY. ASSUMING THAT THE CONCENTRATED RECON EFFORT DEVELOPED HARD AND EXPLOITABLE INTELLIGENCE, ABOUT 1 JUNE I WOULD INITIATE A 3 BATTALION ASSAULT. WITH ENGINEERS, ARTY AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS INTO THE OLD KHAM DUC BASE AREA TO ESTABLISH AN FOB AND CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS IN ITS IMMEDIATE VICINITY. I ANTICIPATE THAT ABOUT TWO WEEKS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE KHAM DUC A FUNCTIONS FOB CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING A TOTAL OF 6 INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 3 ARTY BATTALIONS, AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORT ELEMENTS. I WOULD THEN INTRODUCE THE ADDITIONAL COMBAT ELEMENTS OF ANOTHER BRIGADE. RIF WOULD BE ACCELERATED, LASTING AS LONG AS 60 DAYS, DEPENDING UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION. WE COULD CONCLUDE THE OPERATION AT THIS JUNCTURE, BUT I WOULD PROPOSE INSTEAD TO LAUNCH A FOUR BATTALION ATTACK FROM KHAM DUC, NORTHEAST, ASTRIDE THE SONG CAI ENTERING BA 11 FROM THE WEST. CONCURRENTLY, I WOULD TASK THE 1ST MAR DIV TO LAUNCH A COORDINATED ATTACK ON BA 112 FROM THE EAST WITH AT LEAST ONE REGIMENT. THIS PHASE OF THE OPERATION WOULD CONCLUDE IN MID-SEPTEMBER.

14 (4)

14 (4)

5. IN SUMMARY, I CONSIDER A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN THE BA 614/KHAM DUC AREA BOTH DESIRABLE AND FEASIBLE, ASSUMING DELTA FORCE AVAILABILITY, PRIORITY CCM SUPPORT, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE WITH ITS NORMAL SUPPORT. WITH NO RADICAL SHIFT IN CURRENT TACTICAL TRENDS, WE ARE PREPARED TO INITIATE THE OPERATION ON 1 MAY. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED OPERATION IN DETAIL WITH CHARLIE GETTYS, AND HOLD HIS PROPOSED CONCEPT AND OPERATION PLAN, WHICH I HAVE TENTATIVELY APPROVED FOR PLANNING. I WOULD BE PLEASED TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSAL WITH YOU OR PRESENT A BRIEFING AT A TIME AND PLACE OF YOUR CHOICE.

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

GP71  
500 OK

NNNN

TOP SECRET

HASBEENSENT

14(5)

14(5)

~~14(5)~~

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

CCN: 037/OUT

FILE: DH

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 101524Z APR 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG			10 APR 69		REMARKS ORIG: S/S REL: CG <b>EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT</b>
3	DCG			12 APR 69		
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	4/11			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET #32



**SECRET**

OTTSZYUW RHMMAFA1415 1001524-SSSS--RUHFMA.

ZNY SSSSS

O 101524Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS

SECRET/SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

SUBJ: VISIT BY SENATOR TOWER TO III MAF

1. SENATOR TOWER VISITED III MAF ARRIVING AT 0840H ON 9 APRIL AND DEPARTING AT 0800H ON 10 APRIL. ACCOMPANYING SENATOR TOWER WAS MR. CHARLES B. KERBOW, CHIEF CLERK, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, AND COLONEL JOHN O. MCFALLS, JR., USAF, AIR FORCE LEGISLATIVE LIAISON OFFICE. SENATOR TOWER VISITED OR TOURED THE FOLLOWING:

A. 366TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING

B. STATIC DISPLAY PROVIDED BY CG 1ST MAW AND CG 1ST MARDIV

C. III MAF STAFF FOR BRIEFING

D. XXIV CORPS WHICH INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

(1) OVERFLY OF GIA DINH, CAM VAO, AND DMZ.

(2) LANDED VANDERGRIFT COMBAT BASE, CG 3D MARDIV BRIEFED.

(3) OVERFLEW PURPLE MARTIN AO (FSB GREEN), KHE SANH, SPARK, WHISMAN, UPPER DA KRONG AND BA LONG VALLEY.

2. DINNER WAS HOSTED BY ME AT MY QUARTERS AND WAS ATTENDED BY

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA1415 SECRET SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL LAM AMONG OTHERS.

3. SENATOR TOWER WAS QUITE INTERESTED IN ALL THAT HE SAW AND WAS OBVIOUSLY VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE IN MILITARY AFFAIRS. HE WAS INTERESTED IN DOING WHAT HE COULD TO HELP THE FIGHTING FORCES IN VIETNAM AND I BELIEVE HIS VISIT WAS MOST BENEFICIAL.

4. SENATOR TOWER COMMENTED ON SEVERAL ITEMS OF INTEREST DURING HIS VISIT AND THEY INCLUDED SUCH ITEMS AS THE FOLLOWING:

A. WHY ARE NO MARINES ASSIGNED TO IV CORPS IN THE DELTA?

HE SAID HE HAD NOT RECEIVED A GOOD ANSWER ON THIS POINT ON ANY OF HIS FIVE TRIPS TO VIETNAM. APPARENTLY HE CONSIDERS THAT THE DELTA IS A NORMAL OPERATING ENVIRONMENT FOR MARINES.

B. WHAT DO WE NEED IN HELICOPTERS? BY THIS HE WAS REFERRING TO THE TYPE OF HELICOPTERS REQUIRED TO PERFORM VARIOUS FUNCTIONS SUCH AS UTILITY, MEDEVAC, ETC. HE WAS TOLD THAT WE HAD A REQUIREMENT FOR MORE LIGHT HELOS, COMMAND AND CONTROL HELOS, AND THAT A DEFINITE REQUIREMENT EXISTED FOR A HEAVY LIFT HELO (CH54B OR CH47C). HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT THE HELOS SHOULD BE CONFIGURED FOR INSTRUMENT FLIGHT AND CREWS TRAINED FOR INSTRUMENT CONDITIONS. THE NEED FOR A TERMINAL GUIDANCE SYSTEM WAS ALSO EMPHASIZED.

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES IN 3 N310 SVH

**SECRET**

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PAGE THREE RHMMAFAI415 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR C. THE WAR IN I CORPS WAS DISCUSSED WITH GENERAL LAM, AND ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS. GENERAL LAM STATED, QUOTE: WE KNOW YOU AMERICANS ARE PLANNING ON WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR FORCES, BUT DON'T TALK ABOUT IT. IF YOU SAY YOU ARE GOING TO WITHDRAW YOUR TROOPS IN A YEAR, THEN THE NVA KNOW THEY ONLY HAVE TO HOLD OUT FOR TWO MORE YEARS--AND THEY WILL. SO, IF YOU ARE PLANNING ON WITHDRAWING YOUR FORCES, GO AHEAD AND DO IT, BUT DON'T TALK ABOUT IT. IF YOU TALK, QUOTE TALK STRONG UNQUOTE. (BY QUOTE TALKING STRONG UNQUOTE, LAM MEANT THAT WE ANNOUNCE WE ARE STAYING UNTIL ALL NVA LEAVE.) GENERAL LAM ALSO SAID HE COULD HANDLE THE NVA IF HE HAD AN EQUAL NUMBER OF REGIMENTS. HE SAID THE NVA HAD 22 REGIMENTS IN I CORPS AND HE HAD 10. HE STATED THAT HE ASKED PRESIDENT THIEU TO GO TO FULL MOBILIZATION AND GIVE HIM 10 MORE REGIMENTS THAT HE COULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM. SENATOR TOWER REASSURED GENERAL LAM THAT THE US (PRESIDENT NIXON) WOULD NOT WITHDRAW US TROOPS UNTIL (1), THE NVA LEFT, (2), THE TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OF SVN WAS ASSURED. LAM SAID THAT IF THE NVA LEFT, NO PROBLEM, HE LAM, COULD HANDLE THE VC IN THREE MONTHS.

D. GENERAL LAM GAVE SENATOR TOWER QUITE A LECTURE ON

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFAI415 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINES' RELATING TO PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. HE USED CAP AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW IT SHOULD BE DONE.

E. DURING THE DAY, SENATOR TOWER ASKED QUOTE: WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR KHE SANH? WAS IT DESIGNED TO ANCHOR THE TRACE UNQUOTE? I REFERRED HIM TO GENERAL WALT AND SUGGESTED THAT HE CONTACT HIM WHEN HE GETS BACK TO WASHINGTON.

5. AFTER DINNER, GENERAL LAM WAS PREPARING TO LEAVE AND SENATOR TOWER ASKED TO SPEAK TO HIM PRIVATELY. THE CONVERSATION WAS QUITE ANIMATED ALTHOUGH I WAS NOT PRESENT. AFTER GENERAL LAM LEFT, THE SENATOR STATED TO ME THAT HE TALKED TO GENERAL LAM ABOUT THE ROKS AND THAT HE TOLD GENERAL LAM THAT A HIGH ROK OFFICIAL HAD MADE THE STATEMENT THAT IF AN AMERICAN DIVISION WERE WITHDRAWN FROM VIETNAM, HE WOULD OFFER TWO ROK DIVISIONS TO COMPENSATE. SENATOR TOWER ASKED GENERAL LAM IF THE GVN WOULD ACCEPT MORE ROKS AND WHERE WOULD HE (LAM) LOCATE THE ADDITIONAL ROK FORCES IF THEY WERE PROVIDED TO HIM. GENERAL LAM'S ANSWER WAS QUOTE: YES, THE GVN WOULD ACCEPT AND THE FORCES SHOULD BE LOCATED IN THE HILLS UNQUOTE. MY CHIEF OF STAFF ESCORTED GENERAL LAM TO THE BOAT DOCKS AS HE DEPARTED AND GENERAL LAM STATED THAT SENATOR TOWER HAD ASKED ABOUT THE ROKS. GENERAL LAM STATED THAT

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

HAS BEEN SENT

**SECRET**

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PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 1415 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR  
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 THEMSELVES BRUTAL, BUT THAT THEY WERE GOOD FIGHTERS. HE CITED A  
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 AGO BY THE ROKS, BUT HE HASTENED TO ADD THAT THE DESTRUCTION  
 WAS IN CONNECTION WITH ENEMY OPERATIONS. I THINK THE CONVERSATION  
 BETWEEN TOWER AND LAM MIGHT BE SUMMED UP AS: YES, THE VIETNAMESE  
 WOULD ACCEPT THE TWO DIVISIONS IF OFFERED AND THE VIETNAMESE  
 WOULD DESIRE TO PUT THEM IN LESS POPULATED AREAS. IN MY VIEW, A  
 LOCATION IN THE VICINITY OF THE DMZ WOULD OFFER THREE  
 ADVANTAGES. (1), IT WOULD PUT APPROPRIATE TROOP DENSITY IN THE  
 AREA, (2) IT WOULD LOCATE THE ROKS GENERALLY IN UNPOPULATED  
 AREAS, AND (3), IT WOULD PROVIDE AN INTERNATIONAL FLAVOR TO THE  
 POLICING OF THE DMZ.

6. ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING, SENATOR TOWER MET WITH THE FORCE  
 SURGEON AND THE FORCE CHAPLAIN AND HIS ASSISTANT. HE SAID HE  
 DESIRED TO TALK TO THE OFFICERS WHO WORKED CLOSELY WITH PEOPLE.  
 IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE DOCTOR HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS  
 ABOUT MORALE, AND WAS TOLD ABOUT THE MARS SYSTEM AND THE RAPID  
 RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY LEAVE AS BEING SIGNIFICANT FACTORS.

A. THE SENATOR ASKED ABOUT MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 1415 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR  
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B. HE COMMENTED ON THE LOW MORTALITY RATE (1 PERCENT) AND THE  
 DOCTOR SAID THAT WHILE THIS MIGHT BE TRUE COUNTRY-WIDE, OUR  
 FIGURES WERE HIGHER. THE DOCTOR POINTED OUT THAT THE HELO  
 EVAC BROUGHT MEN TO THE HOSPITALS STILL ALIVE BUT SO GRAVELY  
 INJURED THAT THEY COULD NOT RECOVER.

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 TO MEDICAL FACILITIES OF THE OTHER SERVICES.

D. THE DISCUSSION LATER GOT TO NEGROES AND WAS QUITE  
 EXTENSIVE. THE SURGEON SAID THAT A BEARDED NEGRO DID NOT  
 NECESSARILY INDICATE A NON-CONFORMIST OR MILITANT; THAT THEIR  
 TENDANCY TO GET INGROWN HAIRS CAUSED A REAL PROBLEM AND THAT  
 THERE WERE VALID MEDICAL REASONS FOR ISSUING NON-SHAVING CHITS.

E. THE SENATOR HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH CAP MED-CAPPING  
 ON A PREVIOUS VISIT AND ASKED IF THIS WAS STILL A BIG EFFORT.  
 HE WAS TOLD THAT IT WAS.

F. THERE WAS A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF MORALE AND THE GENERAL  
 SENSE OF THE TALK WAS THAT MORALE WAS HIGH. AT ONE POINT, LACK

GP-4

BT

1415

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

## MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

OTISZYUW RHMMAFAI423 1001524-SSSS--RUHMFMA.

ZNY SSSSS

O 101524Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS  
 SECRET / SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 OF LIBERTY IN THE CITIES AND VILLAGES CAME UP; THE DOCTOR  
 ATTRIBUTED OUR LOW VD RATE TO THIS. BOTH CHAPLAIN RADCLIFFE  
 AND CHAPLAIN JOSEPH WERE PRESENT DURING THIS DISCUSSION.

SUBJECTS WHICH WERE EMPHASIZED BY THE CHAPLAINS WERE:

- (1) THE HIGH MORALE OF MARINES AND THE REASONS THEREFORE.
- (2) THE CHAPLAINS ROLE AND THE RESPONSE TO HIS RELIGIOUS PROGRAM.
- (3) THE CHAPLAINS POSITIVE ALTHOUGH UNCOERCED RESPONSE TO OUR GOVERNMENT'S VIETNAMESE POLICY.
- (4) RACE PROBLEMS.
- (5) REACTION OF TROOPS TO DISSENSION AND UNREST AT HOME AND TO CRITICISM OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM.

ALL SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO REFLECT CREDIT ON THE MARINE IN GENERAL AND THE MARINE CORPS IN PARTICULAR. SENATOR TOWER IDENTIFIED HIS CONCURRENCE WITH

PAGE TWO RHMMAFAI423 SECRET SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR THE OPINIONS OF THE CHAPLAINS AND DOCTOR AND SUPPORTED THAT CONCURRENCE WITH REFERENCE TO PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS MADE DURING THIS AND FOUR PREVIOUS VISITS TO VIETNAM. HE LATER SAID THAT THIS LAST DISCUSSION WAS ONE OF THE MOST BENEFICIAL HE HAS HAD ON HIS TRIP

7. AT ONE TIME, MR. KERBOW INDICATED TO ME THAT HE MIGHT BE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE.

8. ALL IN ALL, I WOULD SAY THAT THE VISIT OF SENATOR TOWER WAS QUITE BENEFICIAL. I AM SURE THAT SENATOR TOWER LEFT HAPPY WITH I CORPS AND THAT WE WILL USE HIS INFLUENCE TO ASSIST ALL THE FORCES IN VIETNAM.

9. MOST OF THE ABOVE HAS BEEN PASSED TO COMUSMACV

GP-4

BT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

HAS BEEN SENT

**SECRET**

#32

HEADQUARTERS  
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	11 APR 69
	SERIAL/CONTROL DATE	COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD
	101526Z APR 69	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG			12 Apr 69	N	EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL ABRAMS
	DCG			12 Apr	N	REMARKS
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				ORIG - S/S
	D C/S					REL - CG
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	4/11			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

EXCLUSIVE

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET #33



**SECRET**

ZNY SSSSS  
 O 101526Z APR 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 BT

**S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL ABRAMS FROM LTGEN WICKERSON  
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B. HE COMMENTED ON THE LOW MORTALITY RATE (1 PERCENT) AND THE DOCTOR SAID THAT WHILE THIS MIGHT BE TRUE COUNTRY-WIDE, OUR FIGURES HERE WERE HIGHER. THE DOCTOR POINTED OUT THAT THE HELO EVAC BROUGHT MEN TO THE HOSPITALS STILL ALIVE BUT SO GRAVELY INJURED THAT THEY COULD NOT RECOVER.

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1415

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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 BT

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**SECRET**  
# 33



O 110745Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG XXIV CORPS  
 CG FIRST MARINE DIVISION  
 CG FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING  
 ZEN/CG FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND  
 ZEM

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 FOR LT GEN STILWELL, M GEN SIMPSON, M GEN QUILTER AND B GEN FEELEY FROM  
 LT GEN NICKERSON

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS READ DRESSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:

O 042339Z ZYH ZFF-1  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM.

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LT GEN NICKERSON

A. MAC 4006 EO 291213Z MAR69 - SJ

1. THIS RESPONDS TO YOUR MESSAGE POINTING OUT THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE  
 CREATED FOR THE ENEMY BY OUR INTERDICTION OF THE ASHAU VALLEY,  
 AND RAISING THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE PREEMPTIVE MOVE AGAINST THE  
 ENEMY'S SOUTHERN LOC IN THE BA 614 AND KHAM DUC REGIONS. SPECIFICALLY  
 YOU ASKED FOR MY VIEWS REGARDING THE DESIRABILITY, FEASIBILITY AND  
 POSSIBLE TIMING OF SUCH A MOVE. ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS  
 CONVEY MY VIEWS.

2. AT THE OUTSET, I BELIEVE SUCH AN EFFORT IS DESIRABLE. I SHARE  
 YOUR INTEREST IN THE WESTERN QUANG TIN AREA AS A LIKELY LOGISTICAL  
 ALTERNATIVE. HIS RECENT LOSSES AND FUTURE DIM PROSPECTS ENEMY IN  
 WESTERN PUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN APPEAR LIKELY TO DRIVE HIM TO SEEK  
 OTHER ROUTES AS YOU SUGGEST. THE DIFFICULTY AND INACCESSIBILITY OF  
 THE TERRAIN AROUND BA 614 AND KHAM DUC MAKE THAT A MOST LIKELY PROS-  
 PECT FOR HIM. RECENT RECON EFFORTS IN THAT REGION, HOWEVER, PRODUCED  
 MIXED RESULTS. SINCE 1 FEBRUARY I HAVE PROGRAMMED FORTY PHOTO  
 RECCE SORTIES INTO THAT AREA. THAT PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALED  
 LITTLE OF SIGNIFICANCE, SLAR MISSIONS HAVE NOT PRODUCES  
 SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND RECENT PHOTOS INDICATE THAT THE ROADS  
 INTO AND AROUND KHAM DUC ARE NOT TRAFFICABLE. WEATHER,  
 HOWEVER, HAS IMPEDED THE DETAILED SURVEILLANCE I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO

GIVE THE AREA, SINCE OTHER SOURCES INDICATE RISING ENEMY ACTIVITY.  
 TWO INFRARED DETECTOR MISSIONS FLOWN DURING MARCH REPORTED NUMEROUS  
 EMISSIONS IN THE OF BA 614 AND ZC 0112. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALS  
 A ROAD

BRANCHING OFF ROUTE 966. SUCCESSFUL TACAIR ROAD CUTS ON 11, 17,  
 27, AND 29 MARCH WERE FILLED THE FOLLOWING DAY. LAST YEAR A  
 GROUND RECON TEAM INSERTED AT ZC 001166 ON 20 SEP WAS EXTRACTED UNDER

FIRE AND ONE INSERTED AT ZC 015095 ON 23 OCT WAS ABORTED DUE TO  
 HEAVY GROUND FIRE. IN VIEW OF THESE AND SIMILAR INDICATORS I  
 CONSIDER THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO DEVOTE TO THE AREA, SUFFICIENT  
 EFFORT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE  
 ENEMY IS ACTUALLY DOING, WHERE HE IS, AND WHAT HE HAS IN THE WAY  
 OF FORCES AND SUPPLIES IN THE TARGET AREA. ONCE THIS IS DETERMINED  
 I AM PREPARED TO INVEST THE NECESSARY FORCE TO DISRUPT THE

3. I CONSIDER THAT A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN STRENGTH IN THE BA 614

KHAM DUC AREA IS FEASIBLE. I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS AN OPERATION THAT WE MUST APPROACH IN A DELIBERATE FASHION, IN VIEW OF THE REMOTENESS OF THE TARGET AREA AND CONSEQUENT LOGISTIC PROBLEMS; THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY THERE; AND OF THE THINNING OF MY FORCES THAT WILL BE CAUSED BY ASSEMBLING A FORCE OF THE SIZE REQUIRES FOR THIS OPERATION. IN ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY OF THE OPERATION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE RESERVATIONS, I HAVE CONSIDERED THE VARIOUS OPERATIONAL FACTORS AND FORESEE NO INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEM.

A. THE TERRAIN IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BUT NO MORE SO THAN THE ENTIRE PLATEAU FROM II CTZ TO THE DMZ, WHERE WE OPERATE AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE.

B. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER DURING THE COMING MONTHS IS PREDICTED TO IMPEDE OPERATIONS SOMEWHAT, I DO NOT EXPECT WEATHER TO BE A SERIOUS LIMITING FACTOR.

C. THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION WILL BE CHALLENGING, BUT NOT TO THE DEGREE THAT LOGISTICS BECOMES A DISQUALIFYING FACTOR.

D. BECAUSE OUR INTELLIGENCE OF THE TARGET AREA IS SKETCHY, THE OPERATION SHOULD BE INITIATED WITH A RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT OF SEVERAL WEEKS, THE PRECISE TIME DEPENDING UPON WHAT THE RECON REVEALED. THE EFFORT WOULD CONCENTRATE ALL ORGANIC RESOURCES. I WOULD ALSO RELY HEAVILY ON THE DELTA FORCE AND CON PATROLS. WE WOULD REQUIRE YOUR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN KEEPING DELTA FORCE WITH US. I CONSIDER THE DELTA FORCE AND PRIORITY CON PATROL SUPPORT A KEY ELEMENT IN THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CONCEPT.

E. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF TROOP AVAILABILITY, I ESTIMATE THAT THIS OPERATION AT ITS PEAK PHASE WILL REQUIRE TWO BRIGADES, ONE FROM AMERICAL WHICH CHARLIE GETTYS WILL INTRODUCE WHEN HIS RECONNAISSANCE HAS PROGRESSED FAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT HIM TO MAKE A HARD APPRAISAL OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION. CONSIDERING THE PRESENT TEMPO OF OPERATIONS IN QUANG NAM WHERE BOTH SLFS ARE FULLY COMMITTED WITH FIRST MAR DIV AND THE EXTENDED POSTURE OF THIRD MAR DIV IN THE NORTH, THE ONLY COMMAND WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ADDITIONAL FORCES IS THE 101ST. WHILE IT, TOO, IS ACTIVELY CONDUCTING OPERATIONS, I CONSIDER IT THE MOST LIKELY SOURCE FOR A RESERVE FORCE AT THE PRESENT TIME. TO TAP THE 101ST TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF A SECOND BRIGADE FOR INTRODUCTION INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA WOULD, I BELIEVE, OVER-EXTEND III MAF BEYOND THE SAFETY MARGIN. THIS, COMBINED

WITH A POSSIBLE HIGH PRIORITY MISSION UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR 101ST ARGUES FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE SLICE TO III MAF. EVEN WITH AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE, HOWEVER, SOME REPOSITIONING OF MY PRESENT FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY WHICH WILL ENTAIL A CERTAIN DEGREE OF RISK. THE RISK BECOMES MORE ACCEPTABLE WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE.

O 042339Z ZYM ZFF-1  
 FM C6 III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

F. I BELIEVE ARVN PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATION IS BOTH FEASIBLE AND NECESSARY, TO KEEP THE EMPHASIS ON COMBINED OPERATIONS AND CONTINUE TO HELP ARVN PICK UP A PROGRESSIVELY GREATER SHARE OF THE LOAD. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, I WOULD EXPECT LTGEN LAM TO CONTRIBUTE AT LEAST ONE BATTALION TO THE OPERATION, HOPEFULLY MORE. THE PRECISE SIZE, HOWEVER, OF THE ARVN COMMITMENT, IS A MATTER WHICH I WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH LTGEN LAM AT A LATER DATE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALSO THE INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR TROOPS ELSEWHERE IN ICIZ AS FORCES ARE DEPLOYED TO THE KHAM DUC AREA.

4. BECAUSE WE NEED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE KHAM DUC AREA, THE PACE, SCOPE AND ORIENTATION OF THE MAJOR COMBAT EFFORT WOULD DEPEND ON OUR INITIAL CONCERTED RECONNAISSANCE PHASE. FOR THIS REASON, AVAILABILITY OF PROJECT DELTA FORCES IS A KEY IN THE TIMING. I BELIEVE THAT THE DELTA FORCES COULD BE SHIFTED SOUTH FROM CASS PARK TO INITIATE THEIR OPERATIONS IN KAM DUC AREA ON 1 MAY. THE FACILITIES OF SEVERAL SITES ARE BEING ANALYZED

IN DETAIL TO SELECT ONE WHICH WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR COLOCATION OF BOTH THE DELTA FORCES AND COMMOBILE LAUNCH TEAM. CONSIDERING THE RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT AS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT TO EXPAND THE OPERATION, I WOULD JUDGE A 30 DAY OPERATING PERIOD WOULD TELL THE STORY. ASSUMING THAT THE CONCENTRATED RECON EFFORT DEVELOPED HARD AND EXPLOITABLE INTELLIGENCE, ABOUT 1 JUNE I WOULD INITIATE A 3 BATTALION ASSAULT. WITH ENGINEERS, ARTY AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS INTO THE OLD KHAM DUC BASE AREA TO ESTABLISH AN FOB AND CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS IN ITS IMMEDIATE VICINITY. I ANTICIPATE THAT ABOUT TWO WEEKS

WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE KHAM DUC A FUNCTIONAL FOB CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING A TOTAL OF 6 INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 3 ARTY BATTALIONS, AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORT ELEMENTS. I WOULD THEN INTRODUCE THE ADDITIONAL COMBAT ELEMENTS OF ANOTHER BRIGADE. RIF WOULD BE ACCELERATED, LASTING AS LONG AS 60 DAYS, DEPENDING UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION. WE COULD CONCLUDE THE OPERATION AT THIS JUNCTURE, BUT I WOULD PROPOSE INSTEAD TO LAUNCH A FOUR BATTALION ATTACK FROM KHAM DUC, NORTHEAST, ASTRIDE THE SONG CAI ENTERING BA 11 FROM THE WEST.

5. CURRENTLY, I WOULD TASK THE 1ST MAR DIV TO LAUNCH A COORDINATED ATTACK ON BA 112 FROM THE EAST WITH AT LEAST ONE REGIMENT. THIS PHASE OF THE OPERATION WOULD CONCLUDE IN MID-SEPTEMBER.

5. IN SUMMARY, I CONSIDER A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN THE BA 614/KHAM DUC AREA BOTH DESIRABLE AND FEASIBLE, ASSUMING DELTA FORCE AVAILABILITY, PRIORITY COMMO SUPPORT, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE WITH ITS NORMAL SUPPORT. WITH NO RADICAL SHIFT IN CURRENT TACTICAL TRENDS, WE ARE PREPARED TO INITIATE THE K OPERATION ON 1 MAY. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED OPERATION IN DETAIL WITH CHARLIE GETTYS, AND HOLD HIS PROPOSED CONCEPT AND OPERATION PLAN, WHICH I HAVE TENTATIVELY APPROVED FOR PLANNING. I WOULD BE PLEASED TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSAL WITH YOU OR PRESENT A BRIEFING AT A TIME AND PLACE OF YOUR CHOICE.

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

CCN:048/OUT

FILE:DH

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 12 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 121400Z APR 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					<b>EXCLUSIVE FOR:</b>  REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P8511.4...  THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.  ORIG: S/S REL: CG <b>EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT</b>   <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b> (16) <b>TOP SECRET</b>
3	DCG		13 Apr		3	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/13		VM	
	G-1					
	G-2					
4	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
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	H&S CO					
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	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

**TOP SECRET**

OITIZYUW RHMMAFA1697 1021400-TITT--RUMLNAA RUMHVA RUMLMHA  
RUMLMPA.

ZNY TTTT

O 121400Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMLNAA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHVA/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAF

RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCMD

ZI

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE MCEO FOR MAJGEN SIMON, MAJGEN  
DAVIS, MAJGEN QUILTER AND BGEN FEELEY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS READDRESSSED FOR YOU INFORMATION:

QUOTE CMC 111311Z APR 69 (TS) UNQUOTE

P 111311Z APR 69

FM CMC

TO CG FMFPAC

CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN  
BUSE AND LTGEN NICKERSON FROM GENERAL CHAPMAN

1. (TS) ON 9 APRIL 1969 REPRESENTATIVES FROM CINCPAC PRESENTED TO THE  
JCS THE TRIANNUAL UPDATE BRIEFING ON OPERATIONS SECURITY (PURPLE

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA1697 T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE MCEO FOR  
DRAGON) PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. COMMENTS MADE DURING THE  
BRIEFING AS TO THE COMMAND ATTENTION GIVEN BY MARINE COMBAT  
COMMANDERS IN THE CRITICAL AREA WERE MOST COMPLIMENTARY.

2. (TS) MARINE RECOGNITION OF OPERATIONS SECURITY AS AN IMPORTANT  
ELEMENT IN SUCCESSFUL COMBAT OPERATIONS IS A SOURCE OF PRIDE TO ME.  
YOUR CONTINUING PERSONAL ATTENTION TO OPERATIONS SECURITY MATTERS  
IS DEEPLY APPRECIATED.

3. (TS) I UNDERSTAND THAT ROTARY WING OPERATIONS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF  
AN OPERATIONS SECURITY SURVEY IN THE COMING MONTHS, AND I LOOK  
FORWARD TO THE CINCPAC BRIEFING ON THIS ASPECT OF OUR COMBAT  
OPERATIONS. WARM REGARDS.

BT

WARM REGARDSGP-4

BT

1697

COMM NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

HAS BEEN SENT

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

**TOP SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAF FORM 3216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 13 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 130420Z		1,2,3,4 COPY# OF 5 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TOP SECRET
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I	14 April			REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4...  THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.  RECEIVED THREE COPIES OF 0 130420Z  Copy to G3 Dave D
4	DCG	I				
1	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
2A	DC/S	I	4/14	4/14		
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/13			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
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	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SAC					

**TOP SECRET**

O 130420Z ZYH

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEN

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE FOR NGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 FUTURE ICTZ OPERATIONS

A MAC 4535 DTG 130935Z APR 69

1. PRIOR RECEIPT REF A I HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED EXTENSION  
 OF ASSIGNMENT OF DELTA FORCE WITH GEN LAN WHO INDICATED  
 HIS INTENTION TO REQUEST THEIR CONTINUED AVAILABILITY IN  
 ICTZ. WILL REAFFIRM AT OUR NEXT MEETING. APPRECIATE YOUR  
 SUPPORT AT SAIGON LEVEL.

2. BRIEFING FOR GEN ABRAMS HAS BEEN SCHEDULED FOR 141435H  
 APR WITH PRINCIPAL III MAF COMMANDERS ATTENDING.

GP-3

169

NNN

**TOP SECRET**

*Has Been  
17 (1) SENT*

*17(1)*

*(Handwritten mark)*

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

J1MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 16 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 168718Z APR 69		COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT FOR BGEN LEE DONG HO
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS  ORIG - G-3 REL - CG  <b>FOR</b>  HAS BEEN SENT <i>Cy 2 to G-3 231000H apr 69 R</i> <i>In 231005H apr 69 D</i> <i>Cy # 4 to G-3 181400H apr 69 B</i> <i>W. O. White</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
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	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

35

SECRET



**SECRET**

PP RUMHGK  
 DE RHMAFA 2216 1060710  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 160710Z APR 69  
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN  
 TO RUMHGK/CG SECOND ROKMC BDE HOI AN RVN  
 BT

S E C R E T

FOR BGEN LEE DONG HO FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. (S) FOR SOME TIME, I HAVE BEEN INTERESTED IN CONDUCTING A COMBINED OPERATION WITH ROKMC AND ARVN FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH AND EAST OF HOI AN TO REOPEN THE SONG CUA DAI TO NORMAL COMMERCE AND ELIMINATE A MAJOR ENEMY COMMO-LIAISON ROUTE. WE HAVE SPOKEN IN GENERAL TERMS WITH YOU AND YOUR STAFF CONCERNING POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN THIS AREA.
2. (S) RECENTLY, SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ELIMINATING THE ENEMY THREAT FROM THANH NHUT AND NEIGHBORING AREAS, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN A MARKED INCREASE IN CIVILIAN RIVER TRAFFIC BETWEEN HOI AN AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. YOUR OPERATIONS TO THE SOUTHWEST OF HOI AN HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCREASED SECURITY. IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE SONG CUA DAI IS NOW OPEN TO UNINTERRUPTED BOAT TRAFFIC, DESPITE OUR PREVIOUS EFFORTS. I BELIEVE WE NEED TO CONDUCT

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 2216 S E C R E T

A MULTIBATTALION COMBINED OPERATION TO COMPLETELY BREAK THE ENEMY'S HOLD AND PERMANENTLY OPEN THE SONG CUA DAI.

3. (S) IF YOU AGREE WITH THIS CONCEPT, I AM PREPARED TO REQUEST THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE FROM GEN LAM, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAVFORV AND OTHERS TO COMMENCE THE OPERATION ABOUT 1 MAY FOR A PERIOD OF TWO TO THREE WEEKS. SCHEME OF MANEUVER, PLANS FOR SUPPORTING FIRES AND APPROPRIATE FORCES AND OTHER MATTERS INVOLVING COORDINATION CAN BE WORKED OUT BY OUR STAFFS FOR OUR MUTUAL APPROVAL.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2216

**SECRET**

#35

82 / 98  
 83  
 Plans / Has Seen  
 Unit. Lt. Ship.

✓  
 ✓  
 7  
 2

OP RHMAFA  
 DE RUMHCK #0497 1101747  
 LNR UUUU  
 P 201747Z APR69  
 DE CG SECOND ROK MAR BDE  
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF

ACT G-2  
 DIST A  
 CCN 22250

BT  
 UNCLAS

MSG REC'D FOR THE FIRST TIME  
 AT 21/2110Z APR 69

REF: (A) YOUR MESSAGE P 160710Z APR69  
 1. I AGREE WITH YOUR MESSAGE REF (A).  
 BT  
 #0502

**LIMDIS**

HEADQUARTERS  
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

CCN: 055/OUT

FILE: DH

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	16 APR 69
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD
	161242Z APR 69	

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					ORIG: G-2
3	C/S	I				REL: G-2
2	D C/S	I	4/25	4/25	<i>[Signature]</i>	MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	E	4/17		<i>[Signature]</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
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	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

**LIMDIS**

**SECRET** # 36



**SECRET**

PTTSZYUW RHHMFA2253 1061242-SSSS--RUHMF.A.

ZNY SSSSS

P 161242Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHMF.A/CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET / LIMDIS / M C E O  
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES REPORT (U)

A CG FMFPAC 020116Z NOV 68

1. (U) EXCEPT AS NOTED IN PARA 2. BELOW, SUBORDINATE COMMANDS REPORTED NO INCIDENTS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF REF A.
2. (S) AN ANTI-MILITARY MINEOGRAPHED NEWSPAPER QUOTING THE "ALLY", THE "VIETNAM GI", AND SIMILAR PUBLICATIONS HAS APPEARED IN THE MAG-16/DANANG EAST AREA. PAPER APPEARS TO BE UNDER JOINT ARMY-MARINE CORPS SPONSORSHIP BY PERSONS UNKNOWN. NO EFFECT APPARENT ON U. S. PERSONNEL. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING. REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED AS FURTHER INFORMATION IS DEVELOPED.

GP-3

BT

2253

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

**LIMDIS  
SECRET**

# 36

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5213 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 18 APR 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 180202Z APR 69		COPY# <u>2</u> OF <u>6</u> COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		FOR MGEN JONES	
	CG					<b>REMARKS</b> THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.  ORIG - G-4 REL - CG  <div style="font-size: 2em; text-align: center;">FOR</div>  <div style="font-size: 2em; text-align: center;">HAS BEEN SENT</div>	
<u>3</u>	DCG	<u>I</u>	<u>19 Apr</u>	<u>Y</u>			
	DCG AIR						
<u>2</u>	C/S	<u>I</u>		<u>J</u>			
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
<u>1</u>	S/S	<u>I</u>	<u>4/18</u>	<u>Y/P</u>			
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4	<u>HAS COPY</u>					
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
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	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

PTTSZYUW RHMAFA2483 1080202-SSSS--RUMHVPA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 180202Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T

FOR MGEN JONES FR LTGEN NICKERSON

ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT DEADLINE (U)

1. (S) SINCE MY RETURN TO VIETNAM I HAVE NOTED WITH SOME CONCERN THE DEADLINE RATE OF ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT IN THE THIRD MARDIV. SOME OF THIS DEADLINE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO HORS OVER WHICH YOU HAVE NO CONTROL OTHER THAN TO INSURE TIMELY REPAIR PARTS REQUISITIONING AND FOLLOW-UPS. HOWEVER IN SOME CASES I SEE WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT ON NORM DEADLINE. FOR EXAMPLE: ON 10APR69, THE THIRD MARDIV REPORTED 16 M48A3 TANKS DEADLINED OF WHICH 11 WERE NORM; FIVE M67A2 FLAME TANKS DEADLINED, FOUR OF WHICH WERE NORM; 40 LVIPSAI'S DEADLINED OF WHICH 38 WERE NORM; AND OF THE THREE M51 RETRIEVERS DEADLINED, TWO WERE NORM.
2. (U) I REALIZE THAT YOU HAVE JUST ASSUMED COMMAND AND HAVE HAD LITTLE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A GOOD LOOK AT THE

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 2483 S E C R E T

SITUATION; HOWEVER, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR GIVING THIS MATTER YOUR EARLY ATTENTION. THE RESOURCES OF THIS HQ AND FORLOGCMD ARE AVAILABLE SHOULD YOU DESIRE ASSISTANCE.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

# 37

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 18 APR 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 180617Z		COPY# 1,2 OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT			
	CG					KILL RATION  REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.	
	DCG		19 Apr		Y		
	DCG AIR						
	C/S	J					
	DC / S						
	DC / S PLAN						
1	S/S	J	4/19		H/D		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
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	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

**STAFF SECRETARY**  
**III MAF** 4/19

**MEMORANDUM**  
FOR: C/S

DCG directed routing to C/S only.

RSG  
JMS Hankin  
D/AIA

438

**CONFIDENTIAL**

R 10 61X  
 IN CG III MAF  
 TO MSG 101 000 DIV (AMT)  
 SO AMERICAL DIV  
 ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL

MGEN YOUNGDALE DEPUTY CG SENDS FOR MGEN ZAIS AND MGEN GETTYS  
 KILL RATIOS

1. THE FOLLOWING 101ST ABN DIVISION AND AMERICAL DIVISIONS FRIENDLY  
 AND ENEMY RATIOS ARE REPORTED AS REQUESTED:

101ST ABN				AMERICAL DIV		
FR	EN	RATIO		FR	EN	RATIO
14	305	1 TO 21.6	JUL 68	40	781	1 TO 19.5
55	583	1 TO 10.6	AUG 68	65	1384	1 TO 21.3
12	268	1 TO 22.3	SEP 68	84	1294	1 TO 15.4
9	397	1 TO 44.1	OCT 68	38	685	1 TO 18
33	272	1 TO 8.2	NOV 68	30	1059	1 TO 35.3
10	221	1 TO 22.1	DEC 68	32	1146	1 TO 35.8
16	196	1 TO 12.2	JAN 69	71	1001	1 TO 14.1
20	128	1 TO 6.4	FEB 69	74	1257	1 TO 17
47	199	1 TO 4.2	MAR 69	105	1212	1 TO 11.6
			THRU 13			
28	83	1 TO 2.9	APR 69	14	278	1 TO 19.8
24	2652	1 TO 10.8		553	10097	1 TO 18.2

2. ENJOY YOUR DRINK CHARLIE. WARM REGARDS TO YOU BOTH.

GP-4  
 187

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN  
 HASBEENSENT





0 181500Z ZYM  
 R CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY FOR MAJGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 A YOUR 180442Z APR 69

B AX CONSUL DNG 171130Z APR 69

1. INFORMATION QUOTED IN REF B WAS PASSED PREMATURELY AND NOT COMPLETELY FACTUAL.

2. AN INCIDENT DID OCCUR ON 15 APRIL NEAR PHUOC MY VILLAGE (BT 102511) INVOLVING ROKS AND VIETNAMESE. US MARINES AND US ARMY TROOPS WERE ALSO INVOLVED.

3. EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INCIDENT HAVE NOT YET BEEN SORTED OUT AND A JOINT BOARD HAS BEEN CONVENED TO DETERMINE WHAT HAPPENED AND TO FIX RESPONSIBILITY. THIS BOARD IS COMPOSED OF A VIETNAMESE OFFICER, A ROK MARINE OFFICER AND A US MARINE OFFICER. THE SENIOR MEMBER IS THE US MARINE/ THE PRECEPT WAS SIGNED JOINTLY BY LTGEN LAM, BGEN LEE AND MYSELF ON 16 APRIL 1969.

4. ON THE 15TH OF APRIL A ROAD SWEEP WAS BEING CONDUCTED ON RTE 1. AMERICAN FORCES (MARINE AND ARMY) WERE MOVING NORTH AND ROK FORCES WITH US MARINES WERE MOVING SOUTH/ IN THE VICINITY OF PHUOC MY, ROK MARINES HALTED. THE ROKS CLAIM THAT THE REASON THEY HALTED WAS INCOMING SNIPER FIRE FROM THE VILLAGE. THE VIETNAMESE SUPPOSEDLY PROFESS NO KNOWLEDGE OF SNIPER FIRE. SNIPER FIRE SUPPOSEDLY HAS BEEN VERIFIED BY US MARINES WITH THE ROKS. THE ROKS THEN PROCEEDED INTO A MINEFIELD AND 5 ROKS AND 2 US MARINES WERE WOUNDED BY AN EXPLODING MINE. THE VIETNAMESE CLAIM THEY WARNED THE ROKS OF THE MINEFIELD. THE ROKS DENY THIS AND SAY THEY COULD NOT HAVE ENTERED THE MINEFIELD IF THEY WERE SO WARNED.

5. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS ARE EVEN MORE CLOUDED AND CAN ONLY BE CLEARLY DETERMINED THROUGH THE INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED. THE ROKS MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE SHOT UP THE VILLAGE. THE ROKS DENY THAT THEY DID AND NOTHING HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO DATE TO PROVE THAT THEY DID. ROKS SUPPOSEDLY DID ASK FOR AND RECEIVE CLEARANCE TO FIRE MORTARS IN VICINITY OF VILLAGE. TWO OR MORE OF THESE MORTARS MAY HAVE LANDED IN THE VILLAGE CAUSING CASUALTIES AND PROBABLY DID. HOWEVER, ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO FRAGMENTARY AND CONTRADICTORY THAT I AM RELUCTANT TO GIVE CREDENCE TO ALLEGATIONS BY EITHER THE ROKS OR VIETNAMESE AT THIS POINT IS

6. THE INCIDENT WAS BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION DURING THE EVENING OF 15 APRIL. I IMMEDIATELY DISPATCHED MY CHIEF OF STAFF TO MEET WITH BGEN LEE IN HOI AN. BGEN LEE WAS QUITE CONCERNED WITH THE INCIDENT AND HE OPENLY DISCUSSED BOTH SIDES OF THE ISSUE AS HE ~~HEARD~~ ~~IT~~ ~~AT~~ ~~THE~~ ~~TIME~~. HE WAS NOT AT ALL VAGUE WITH MY CHIEF OF STAFF AND READILY AGREED TO THE CONDUCT OF A JOINT INVESTIGATION. HE POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE THAT THE INVESTIGATION BE HEADED BY A US MARINE BECAUSE OF THE EMOTION EXISTING IN THE ROK AND VIETNAMESE CAMPS AND THAT ANYONE WHO IS RESPONSIBLE SHOULD BE PUNISHED.

7. THE INVESTIGATION IS CONTINUING AND I WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

8. I AM CONCERNED WITH THE CONTENTS OF THE INITIAL REPORT TO THE EMBASSY. I HAVE PREVIOUSLY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS THAT I AM EXERTING EVERY EFFORT TO SUPPORT THE ROKS AND TO MAKE SURE THEY ARE A FULL PARTNER IN I CORPS -- THAT ANY BREACH OF FAITH WILL BE ON THEIR PART AND NOT MINE -- AND THAT I AM THE ONLY AMERICAN IN THIS CORPS ZONE WHO SHOULD SPEAK WORDS OF CONDEMNATION. THE CONTENTS OF REF B DO NOT SUPPORT MY GUIDANCE. BUT THAT IS MY PROBLEM AND I WILL TAKE CARE OF IT.

WARM REGARDS.

Φ-4

580

#39(2)

SECRET

PROBLEMS

NNN

39(2)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			00 III MAF		19 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE		COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES RECO	
			P 1984102			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN.	OUT		
4	CG	I				REMARKS (1) THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
5	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
3	C/S	I				
2	DC/S	I	4/20	4/20		
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/19			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

**CONFIDENTIAL**

P 19841Z  
IN CB III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR GENERAL ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

VISIT TO TASK FORCE ALPHA NAKHON PHANOM THAI

1. SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE PLAN TO VISIT NAKHON PHANOM THAILAND 29 APRIL. WILL BE AWAY FROM III MAF 290930H TO APPROXIMATELY 291745H.
2. APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE WITH BGEN DYAS FOR SUBJECT VISIT.

GP-4

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WASBEENSEN

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 20 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 191055Z		1,2,3, 4 COPY# OF COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I	21 Apr 69		N	REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.  <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b>
2	DCG	I	21 Apr 69		N	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
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	PSY OPS					
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	LEGAL					
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**SECRET**

#44

O 191055Z ZYH  
FM CG III MAF DNG RVN  
TO CG AMERICAL DIVISION GHL RVN  
ZEM

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN GETTYS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
BATANGAN RESETTLEMENT AREA (U)

1. (S) AS YOU ARE AWARE I AM PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT WE TAKE ADEQUATE MEASURES TO ENSURE PROPER TREATMENT AND SECURITY FOR THE CIVILIANS RESETTLED IN THE BATANGAN PENINSULA. ONCE HAVING MADE THE DECISION TO MOVE THEM BACK INTO THE AREA -IN A SENSE A MODEL AREA--IT BEHOOVES US NOW TO DEMONSTRATE TO ALL CONCERNED, FRIENDLY AND VC ALIKE, THAT WE REALLY MEAN BUSINESS BY DEED AS WELL AS WORD. THE VC CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO INTIMIDATE THE PEOPLE IN THE RESETTLEMENT AREA NOR CAN WE STAND STILL FOR LESS THAN ADEQUATE LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE AREA. CERTAINLY THESE PEOPLE SHOULD BE ACCORDED ALL THEY ARE ENTITLED TO UNDER THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THEY FIND THEMSELVES.

2. (S) I HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE RECENT SECURITY MEASURES YOU HAVE TAKEN IN COORDINATION WITH GENERAL TOAN WHICH I ENTHUSIASTICALLY ENDORSE. WE MUST INVEST WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THIS VENTURE ON A CONTINUING BASIS. WE CANNOT FAIL. I KNOW YOU SHARE MY VIEWS ON THIS IMPORTANT PROJECT AND I LOOK TO YOU TO BRING TOGETHER ALL THE AGENCIES INVOLVED IN MAKING THIS AFFAIR A SUCCESSFUL AND GOING CONCERN. MY STAFF STANDS READY TO ASSIST YOU AT ANY TIME. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 21 APR 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE P 210645Z		COPY# 1,2,3, 4 OF COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TOP SECRET EYES ONLY	
			IN	OUT			
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P8511.4...	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR					THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT. <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b>	
2	C/S	2					
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	T	4/21		M/		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
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	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
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	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

27  
**TOP SECRET**

P 210645Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FMPPAC

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO  
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

QUOTE

O 042339Z

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. MAC 4006 EO 291213Z MAR69

1. THIS RESPONDS TO YOUR MESSAGE POINTING OUT THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE CREATED FOR THE ENEMY BY OUR INTERDICTION OF THE ASHAU VALLEY, AND RAISING THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE PRE-EMPTIVE MOVE AGAINST THE ENEMY'S SOUTHERN LOC IN THE BA 614 AND KHAM DUC REGIONS. SPECIFICALLY YOU ASKED FOR MY VIEWS REGARDING THE DESIRABILITY, FEASIBILITY AND POSSIBLE TIMING OF SUCH A MOVE. ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS CONVEY MY VIEWS.

2. AT THE OUTSET, I BELIEVE SUCH AN EFFORT IS DESIRABLE. I SHARE YOUR INTEREST IN THE WESTERN QUANG TIN AREA AS A LIKELY LOGISTICAL ALTERNATIVE. HIS RECENT LOSSES AND FUTURE DIM PROSPECTS ENEMY IN WESTERN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN APPEAR LIKELY TO DRIVE HIM TO SEEK OTHER ROUTES AS YOU SUGGEST. THE DIFFICULTY AND INACCESSIBILITY OF THE TERRAIN AROUND BA 614 AND KHAM DUC MAKE THAT A MOST LIKELY PROSPECT FOR HIM. RECENT RECON EFFORTS IN THAT REGION, HOWEVER, PRODUCED MIXED RESULTS. SINCE 1 FEBRUARY I HAVE PROGRAMMED FORTY PHOTO RECCE SORTIES INTO THAT AREA. THAT PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALED LITTLE OF SIGNIFICANCE, SLAR MISSIONS HAVE NOT PRODUCED SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND RECENT PHOTOS INDICATE THAT THE ROADS INTO AND AROUND KHAM DUC ARE NOT TRAFFICABLE. WEATHER, HOWEVER, HAS IMPEDED THE DETAILED SURVEILLANCE I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO GIVE THE AREA, SINCE OTHER SOURCES INDICATE RISING ENEMY ACTIVITY. TWO INFRARED DETECTOR MISSIONS FLOWN DURING MARCH REPORTED NUMEROUS EMISSIONS IN THE OF BA 614 AND ZC 0112. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALS A ROAD

BRANCHING OFF ROUTE 966. SUCCESSFUL TACAIR ROADCUTS ON 11, 17, 27, AND 29 MARCH WERE FILLED THE FOLLOWING DAY. LAST YEAR A GROUND RECON TEAM INSERTED AT ZC 001166 ON 20 SEP WAS EXTRACTED UNDER FIRE AND ONE INSERTED AT ZC 015095 ON 23 OCT WAS ABORTED DUE TO HEAVY GROUND FIRE. IN VIEW OF THESE AND SIMILAR INDICATORS I CONSIDER THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO DEVOTE TO THE AREA, SUFFICIENT EFFORT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE ENEMY IS ACTUALLY DOING, WHERE HE IS, AND WHAT HE HAS IN THE WAY OF FORCES AND SUPPLIES IN THE TARGET AREA. ONCE THIS IS DETERMINED I AM PREPARED TO INVEST THE NECESSARY FORCE TO DISRUPT THE

22/11  
22

3. I CONSIDER THAT A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN STRENGTH IN THE BA 614/ KHAM DUC AREA IS FEASIBLE. I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS AN OPERATION THAT WE MUST APPROACH IN A DELIBERATE FASHION, IN VIEW OF THE REMOTENESS OF THE TARGET AREA AND CONSEQUENT LOGISTIC PROBLEMS; THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY THERE; AND OF THE THINNING OF MY FORCES THAT WILL BE CAUSED BY ASSEMBLING A FORCE OF THE SIZE REQUIRES FOR THIS OPERATION. IN ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY OF THE OPERATION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE RESERVATIONS, I HAVE CONSIDERED THE VARIOUS OPERATIONAL FACTORS AND FORESEE NO INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEM.

A. THE TERRAIN IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BUT NO MORE SO THAN THE ENTIRE PLATEAU FROM II CTZ TO THE DMZ, WHERE WE OPERATE AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE.

B. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER DURING THE COMING MONTHS IS PREDICTED TO IMPEDE OPERATIONS SOMEWHAT, I DO NOT EXPECT WEATHER TO BE A SERIOUS LIMITING FACTOR.

C. THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION WILL BE CHALLENGING, BUT NOT TO THE DEGREE THAT LOGISTICS BECOMES A DISQUALIFYING FACTOR.

D. BECAUSE OUR INTELLIGENCE OF THE TARGET AREA IS SKETCHY, THE OPERATION SHOULD BE INITIATED WITH A RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT OF SEVERAL WEEKS, THE PRECISE TIME DEPENDING UPON WHAT THE RECON REVEALED. THE EFFORT WOULD CONCENTRATE ALL ORGANIC RESOURCES. I WOULD ALSO RELY HEAVILY ON THE DELTA FORCE AND CCN PATROLS. WE WOULD REQUIRE YOUR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE IN KEEPING DELTA FORCE WITH US. I CONSIDER THE DELTA FORCE AND PRIORITY CCN PATROL SUPPORT A KEY ELEMENT IN THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CONCEPT.

E. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF TROOP AVAILABILITY, I ESTIMATE THAT THIS OPERATION AT ITS PEAK PHASE WILL REQUIRE TWO BRIGADES, ONE FROM AMERICAL WHICH CHARLIE GETTYS WILL INTRODUCE WHEN HIS RECONNAISSANCE HAS PROGRESSED FAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT HIM TO MAKE A HARD APPRAISAL OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION. CONSIDERING THE PRESENT TEMPO OF OPERATIONS IN QUANG NAM WHERE BOTH SLFS ARE FULLY COMMITTED WITH FIRST MAR DIV AND THE EXTENDED POSTURE OF THIRD MAR DIV IN THE NORTH, THE ONLY COMMAND WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ADDITIONAL FORCES IS THE 101ST. WHILE IT, TOO, IS ACTIVELY CONDUCTING OPERATIONS, I CONSIDER IT THE MOST LIKELY SOURCE FOR A RESERVE FORCE AT THE PRESENT TIME. TO TAP THE 101ST TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF A SECOND BRIGADE FOR INTRODUCTION INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA WOULD, I BELIEVE, OVER-EXTEND III MAF BEYOND THE SAFETY MARGIN. THIS, COMBINED WITH A POSSIBLE HIGH PRIORITY MISSION UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR 101ST ARGUES FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE SLICE TO III MAF. EVEN WITH AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE, HOWEVER, SOME REPOSITIONING OF MY PRESENT FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY WHICH WILL ENTAIL A CERTAIN DEGREE OF RISK. THE RISK BECOMES MORE ACCEPTABLE WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE.

900

HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET <sup>23(2)</sup>

~~22~~ 23(2)

P 210645Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

O 042339Z

FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

F. I BELIEVE ARVN PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATION IS BOTH FEASIBLE AND NECESSARY, TO KEEP THE EMPHASIS ON COMBINED OPERATIONS AND CONTINUE TO HELP ARVN PICK UP A PROGRESSIVELY GREATER SHARE OF THE LOAD. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, I WOULD EXPECT LTGEN LAM TO CONTRIBUTE AT LEAST ONE BATTALION TO THE OPERATION, HOPEFULLY MORE. THE PRECISE SIZE, HOWEVER, OF THE ARVN COMMITMENT, IS A MATTER WHICH I WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH LTGEN LAM AT A LATER DATE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALSO THE INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR TROOPS ELSEWHERE IN ICTZ AS FORCES ARE DEPLOYED TO THE KHAM DUC AREA.

4. BECAUSE WE NEED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE KHAM DUC AREA, THE PACE, SCOPE AND ORIENTATION OF THE MAJOR COMBAT EFFORT WOULD DEPEND ON OUR INITIAL CONCERTED RECONNAISSANCE PHASE. FOR THIS REASON, AVAILABILITY OF PROJECT DELTA FORCES IS A KEY IN THE TIMING. I BELIEVE THAT THE DELTA FORCES COULD BE SHIFTED SOUTH FROM CASS PARK TO INITIATE THEIR OPERATIONS IN KAM DUC AREA ON 1 MAY. THE FACILITIES OF SEVERAL SITES ARE BEING ANALYZED IN DETAIL TO SELECT ONE WHICH WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR COLOCATION OF BOTH THE DELTA FORCES AND CCN MOBILE LAUNCH TEAM. CONSIDERING THE RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT AS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT TO EXPAND THE OPERATION, I WOULD JUDGE A 30 DAY OPERATING PERIOD WOULD TELL THE STORY. ASSUMING THAT THE CONCENTRATED RECON EFFORT DEVELOPED HARD AND EXPLOITABLE INTELLIGENCE, ABOUT 1 JUNE I WOULD INITIATE A 3 BATTALION ASSAULT. WITH ENGINEERS, ARTY AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS INTO THE OLD KHAM DUC BASE AREA TO ESTABLISH AN FOB AND CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS IN ITS IMMEDIATE VICINITY. I ANTICIPATE THAT ABOUT TWO WEEKS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE KHAM DUC A FUNCTIONS FOB CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING A TOTAL OF 6 INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 3 ARTY BATTALIONS, AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORT ELEMENTS. I WOULD THEN INTRODUCE THE ADDITIONAL COMBAT ELEMENTS OF ANOTHER BRIGADE. RIF WOULD BE ACCELERATED, LASTING AS LONG AS 60 DAYS, DEPENDING UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION. WE COULD CONCLUDE THE OPERATION AT THIS JUNCTURE, BUT I WOULD PROPOSE INSTEAD TO LAUNCH A FOUR BATTALION ATTACK FROM KHAM DUC, NORTHEAST, ASTRIDE THE SONG CAI ENTERING BA 11 FROM THE WEST. CONCURRENTLY, I WOULD TASK THE 1ST MAR DIV TO LAUNCH A COORDINATED ATTACK ON BA 112 FROM THE EAST WITH AT LEAST ONE REGIMENT. THIS OPERATION WOULD CONCLUDE IN MID-SEPTEMBER.

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5. IN SUMMARY, I CONSIDER A PREEMPTIVE OPERATION IN THE BA 614/KHAM DUC AREA BOTH DESIRABLE AND FEASIBLE, ASSUMING DELTA FORCE AVAILABILITY, PRIORITY CCN SUPPORT, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE WITH ITS NORMAL SUPPORT. WITH NO RADICAL SHIFT IN CURRENT TACTICAL TRENDS, WE ARE PREPARED TO INITIATE THE OPERATION ON 1 MAY. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED OPERATION IN DETAIL WITH CHARLIE GETTYS, AND HOLD HIS PROPOSED CONCEPT AND OPERATION PLAN, WHICH I HAVE TENTATIVELY APPROVED FOR PLANNING. I WOULD BE PLEASED TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSAL WITH YOU OR PRESENT A BRIEFING AT A TIME AND PLACE OF YOUR CHOICE.

UNQUOTE

2. (S) GEN ABRAMS VISITED ICTZ ON 14 APR 69. WHILE AT HQ III MAF, COMUSMACV RECEIVED A JOINT III MAF - AMERICAL DIV BRIEFING ON THE PROPOSED OPERATION IN WESTERN QUANG TIN PROVINCE. AMERICAL DIV PRESENTED A FOUR PHASE OPERATION, FOLLOWING THE CONCEPT DISCUSSED IN PARA 1. PHASE I IS RECONNAISSANCE BY CCN AND PROJECT DELTA. PHASE II IS A ONE BRIGADE OPERATION AROUND KHAM DUC AND PHASE III EXPANDS THE OPERATION TO THE SOUTH, USING A TWO BRIGADE FORCE. PHASE IV PROVIDES FOR OPERATIONS FROM SOUTH AND EAST BY AMERICAL DIV AND 1ST MARDIV ALONG AND INTO BA 112. GEN ABRAMS APPROVED PHASE I TO BEGIN APPROXIMATELY 1 MAY AND PROJECT DELTA HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE. A COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION OF THIS RECON PHASE WILL BE MADE PRIOR TO THE COMMITMENT OF MAJOR FORCES IN PHASE II.

3. (U) I SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

GP-1  
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HASSELNSEN

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*[Handwritten signature]*



**CONFIDENTIAL**

00 RUSDTI  
 DE RUSVDB 2898 1110030  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 210030Z APR 69 ZFF-1  
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN  
 TO RUSDTI/TASK FORCE ALPHA NAKHON PHANOM THAI  
 BT

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
 FOR BGEN DYAS, USAF FROM LTGEN NICKERSON, USMC  
 VISIT TO TASK FORCE ALPHA (U)  
 1. REQ CONCURRENCE FOR VISIT 29 APR 69 TO TASK FORCE ALPHA FOR FOL  
 PARTY:

- LTGEN H. NICKERSON, JR., CG III MAF
  - BGEN W. K. BENNETT, DC/S, PLANS, III MAF
  - BGEN G. E. DOOLEY, C/S, III MAF
  - LTCOL J. W. STEMPLE, STAFF SECRETARY, III MAF
  - CAPT L. H. ANDERSON, AIDE DE CAMP, III MAF
2. ALL MBR'S PARTY CERTIFIED TOP SECRET CLEARANCE.

3. TENTATIVE ITINERARY:

ARR	DEPART	LOCATION	A/C
290935 I	290930H	DANANG AB	T-39
291735 H	291530 I	NAKHON PHANOM	T-39
GP-4		DANANG AB	T-39

BT  
 2898

HAS BEEN SENT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED CCN:069/OUT

FILE:DH

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 21 APR 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 211120Z APR 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	I	23	4/21/69	[Signature]	REMARKS FOR LTGEN CHAE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON ORIG: S/S REL: CG
5	DCG	I	23	4/21/69	[Signature]	
	DCG AIR					
3	C/S	I			[Signature]	
2	DC/S	I	4/22	4/22	[Signature]	
	DC/S DM					
1	S/S	I	4/22		[Signature]	
	G-1					
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	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
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	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
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	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

FOR  
HAS BEEN SENT

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

#43



PTTUZYUW RHMAFA2994 111120-UUUU--RHMSMVA RUMHGKA.  
 ZNR UUUUU  
 P 211120Z APR 69 ZFF-1  
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN  
 TO RHMSMVA/CG ROK FORCES VN SGN VN  
 INFO RUMHGKA/CG 2NDROAMCBDE HUI AN

BT

UNCLAS FOR LTGEN CHAE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR DEPARTURE FROM VIETNAM AND ON BEHALF OF ALL FREE WORLD FORCES IN THE ICTZ, PLEASE ACCEPT MY HEARTFELT APPRECIATION FOR YOUR UNSELFISH AND DEDICATED SERVICE IN ASSISTING IN MOLDING OUR COMBINED FORCES INTO THE EFFECTIVE FORCE IN ARMS THAT IT IS TODAY. YOUR INSPIRING LEADERSHIP CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO THE MANY SUCCESSES WE AND YOUR SECOND ROK MARINE CORPS BRIGADE HAVE ACHIEVED IN COMBATTING THE INSURGENT VIET CONG AND NVA FORCES IN DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.
2. I SINCERELY REGRET THAT YOUR HELICOPTER ACCIDENT PRECLUDED YOUR BEING WITH US TODAY. I KNOW AND APPRECIATE THE DISAPPOINTMENT YOU MUST FEEL IN NOT BEING ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH YOUR PLANNED FAREWELL VISIT TO OUR FIELD FORCES HERE IN ICTZ.

PAGE TWO RHMAFA2994 UNCLAS

3. I HUMBLY ACCEPT THE CHUNG MU AWARD OF YOUR COUNTRY. I WILL WEAR IT PROUDLY AS A BOND OF COMRADESHIP-IN-ARMS AND AS A CONSTANT REMINDER OF THE CONTINUING BATTLE OF FREE MEN AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION.

4. I WISH YOU A SPEEDY RECOVERY AND THE VERY BEST IN YOUR NEW AND CHALLENGING ASSIGNMENT. LTGEN NICKERSON SENDS.

BT

2994

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

HAS BEEN SENT

443

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 24 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 241311Z		COPY# OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	J	25 Apr 69		N	REQUEST FOR CAPTURED ENEMY TRUCK
	DCG					REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	J				REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
1	S/S	F	4/25		WAL VBS	
	G-1					<p>for e.s.                  John Cantin                  sent this out -                  2 had to be him                  the to prepare                  a message                  for your                  release - to                  expedite the                  request to                  release the                  message</p>
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
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	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

**CONFIDENTIAL**

241812  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO HQS XXIV CORPS  
 INFO HQS 1ST ABN DIV (AM)

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 LTGEN NICKERSON SENDS FOR LTGEN STILWELL  
 REQUEST FOR CAPTURED ENEMY TRUCK (U)  
 1. GEN LAM HAS EXPRESSED A DESIRE FOR ONE OF  
 THE VEHICLES RECENTLY CAPTURED IN OPERATION  
 MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER BY C/1/502 INFANTRY.  
 2. REQUEST YOU HAVE ONE OF THE TRUCKS EVACUATED  
 TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

GP-4  
 169

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HASDEENSENT

CONFIDENTIAL

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 25 APR 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 251430Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT OPERATION PIERCE VALLEY	
			IN	OUT			
	CG	<i>Drasman</i>				REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.	
3	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	<i>T</i>					
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	<i>F</i>	<i>4/26</i>		<i>MI D/S</i>		
	G-1						
7	G-2	<i>CU H</i>					
5	G-3	<i>CU H</i>					
6	G-4	<i>CU H</i>					
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						
<i>4 Plus copy # 1 - [unclear]</i>							

**SECRET**

#47

O 251430Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG 1ST MARDIV  
 SSO AMERICAL DIVISION  
 ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

LTGEN NICKERSON SENDS FOR MGEN SIMPSON AND MGEN GETTYS  
 OPERATION PIERCE VALLEY

A. CG III MAF 251308Z APR 69

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE ON 14 APRIL GEN ABRAMS APPROVED PHASE I OPERATIONS FOR PIERCE VALLEY WHICH PROVIDES FOR IN COUNTRY RECONNAISSANCE IN THE KHAM DUC-BA 614 AREAS; OUT OF COUNTRY RECONNAISSANCE IN ADJACENT AREA IN LAOS; LOGISTIC PREPARATIONS AND PRELIMINARY ACTIONS BY AMERICAL DIV. COVER AND DECEPTION MEASURES WERE ALSO PLANNED TO COVER PREPARATORY TROOP MOVES AND LOGISTICS BUILDUP.

2. REF A IS FOR COVER AND DECEPTION PURPOSES ONLY. ACCORDINGLY REQUEST ONLY FOLLOWING ACTIONS BE IMPLEMENTED TO ADD CREDENCE TO COVER PLAN OUTLINED REF A.

A. FIRST MARDIV:

(1) PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN ESTABLISHING FOB FOR PROJECT DELTA VIC AN HOA COMBAT BASE.

(2) CONTINUE RECON EFFORT IN BA 112.

(3) WITHIN AVAILABLE ASSETS CONDUCT PERIODIC VR FLIGHTS OF BA 112 DURING NEXT TWO WEEKS TO INDICATE INCREASED INTEREST IN THAT AREA.

B. AMERICAL DIV:

IMPLEMENT MEASURES OUTLINED PARA 2B REF A AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE AND CONSISTENT WITH ACTUAL REPEAT ACTUAL OPERATIONS PLANNED FOR THOSE AREAS.

3. OORDER GOVERNING ACTUAL EMPLOYMENT OF PROJECT DELTA TO BE ISSUED 1 MAY 1969.

4. I WISH TO RE-EMPHASIZE THAT PROVISIONS OF REF A ARE ONLY FOR COVER AND DECEPTION PURPOSES. ONLY THOSE TASKS OUTLINED HEREIN NEED BE ACCOMPLISHED. AMPLIFYING INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING ACTUAL OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IN SUBSEQUENT PHASES OF PIERCE VALLEY WILL BE ISSUED AT SUCH TIME AS INTELLIGENCE PICTURE IN KHAM DUC/BA 614 AREA IS CLARIFIED.

GP-4

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HASBEENSFNT

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SECRET





O 280600Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

**CONFIDENTIAL**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR LIGEN BUZE FROM LIGEN NICKERSON

1. ON THE 24TH OF APR, MR. POCOCK, WHO WAS UNTIL RECENTLY THE AUSTRALIAN CHARGE DE AFFAIRES TO CAMBODIA, VISITED III MAF. MR. POCOCK WILL BE THE HEAD OR ASSISTANT HEAD OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS FOR INDO-CHINESE AFFAIRS. HE IS CURRENTLY ON A TOUR OF VIETNAM, HAVING PREVIOUSLY TOURED LAOS. WE BRIEFED HIM ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 24TH OF APRIL, AND THAT EVENING I HOSTED HIM FOR DINNER.

2. DURING A POST DINNER DISCUSSION HE MADE A NUMBER OF INTERESTING OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OF THE OBSERVATIONS, AS RECALLED BY THOSE PRESENT WITHOUT NOTE-TAKING, ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A. SIHANOUK HAS BASED EARLIER POLICY AND ACTION ON BELIEF THAT US WOULD WITHDRAW IN DEFEAT FROM SVN IN NEAR FUTURE.

B. HIS ASSESSMENT HAS PROBABLY NOW CHANGED AND HE FEELS US WITHDRAWAL MAY NOT TAKE PLACE FOR SOME TIME.

C. AS A RESULT, HE IS NOW PREPARED TO WORK OUT AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH US.

D. SIHANOUK VIEWS THIS AS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, AS HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE LEFT OUT OF REGIONAL SETTLEMENT TALKS WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE IN PARIS, AND BELIEVES THAT US SPONSORSHIP CAN BE HIS TICKET OF ADMISSION TO PARIS TALKS.

E. HIS BASIC APPRECIATION OF EVENTUAL COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN SVN PROBABLY STILL STANDS, THEREFORE, BASIC REALIGNMENT OF HIS POLICY IS UNLIKELY.

F. ONE THING HE DOES FEAR IS N. VIETNAMESE VIRTUAL OCCUPATION OF EASTERN PART OF CAMBODIA. HE DOES NOT WORRY ABOUT THEM TAKING OVER COUNTRY.

G. HE IS LIKELY TO VIEW PROVISION OF US AID AS HIS DUE, AND IS UNLIKELY TO MAKE ANY CONCESSION TO INDUCE OFFERS OR AS QUID PRO QUO FOR AID.

H. ARMS TRAFFIC TO SUPPORT VC/NVA IS COMING THROUGH THE PORT OF SIHANOUKVILLE. ITEMS ARE MOSTLY SMALL ARMS AND AMMO DESTINED FOR THE VC/NVA IN IV AND III CORPS. THERE IS NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT SUCH ITEMS WERE INTENDED TO, OR DID, REACH ENEMY UNITS AS FAR NORTH AS ICTZ.

I. THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY ORGANIZED POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO SIHANOUK. HE HAS COUNTRY FIRMLY IN HIS CONTROL AND HAS NO NEED TO MANEUVER FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL GAIN.

J. PRIME MINISTER SEEMS TO BE IMPLICATED IN VC ARMS TRADE.

K. SIHANOUK'S PRESENT WIFE (SIXTH; ITALIAN) IS INVOLVED WITH A NUMBER OF COHORTS IN GAINING CONTROL OF MUCH OF THE

281830H

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

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			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 280600Z		1, 2, 3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT CONFIDENTIAL
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	I	30 Apr 69		N	REMARKS (1)
3	DCG	I			N	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			N	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	4/68		N	
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	G-2					
	G-3					
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	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

O 280600Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

**CONFIDENTIAL**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR LTGEN BUZE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

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K. SIHANOUK'S PRESENT WIFE (SIXTH; ITALIAN) IS INVOLVED WITH A NUMBER OF CONORTS IN GAINING CONTROL OF MUCH OF THE COUNTRY'S BUSINESS.

L. RELATIONS BETWEEN SIHANOUK AND HIS MOTHER ARE NOT CLOSE; PRIMARY REASON IS MOTHER'S DISLIKE OF PRESENT WIFE.

M. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZED COMMUNIST PARTY IN CAMBODIA.

N. POCOCK'S TRAVEL WITHIN CAMBODIA WAS SEVERELY RESTRICTED, PARTICULARLY IN PROVINCES ADJACENT TO SVN; AS REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRALIA ALSO REPRESENTING US, HE DARED NOT PRESS THE MATTER TOO VIGOROUSLY DUE TO VIRTUAL CERTAINTY OF BEING DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA.

O. THE US BOWLES MISSION IN EARLY 1968 WAS EXPECTED TO PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS, BUT ENDED AS A GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT TO ALL. SUBSEQUENTLY, ONLY ONE OF THE US "PACKAGES" OF EVIDENCE "PROVING" VC/NVA USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY SEEMED PERSUASIVE AND CONVINCING. THIS PACKAGE SEEMED TO "SHAKE" SIHANOUK.

P. IT IS MR. POCOCK'S JUDGMENT THAT CAMBODIA CANNOT SURVIVE AS A NATION WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE AND/OR AS PART OF A BROADER REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT.

Q. SIHANOUK WAS A CONSUMMATE HOST WHEN HE CHOSE TO BE. AT AFFAIRS INVOLVING THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY, THE UNUSUAL REGIONAL GROUPINGS OF PERSONNEL PERTAINED. SIHANOUK'S DANCE BAND PLAYED FOR SOCIAL AFFAIRS, AND HE OFTEN WOULD SING EVERY SONG FOR AS LONG AS FOUR HOURS (2200-0200).

3. THESE INFORMAL VIEWS OF MR. POCOCK WERE DISCUSSED QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE, AND SHOULD BE CLOSELY HELD.

GP-4

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CONFIDENTIAL

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF	DATE 28 APR 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 281130Z APR 69	COPY# 2 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	J	28 APR 69		MM	REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION / DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.  ORIG - FEO REL - D/CG  <b>FOR</b>  <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b>   <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>
	DCG	J				
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	T.				
	DC / S					
	DC / S PLAN					
1	S/S	J	4/29		MM	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
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	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					



**CONFIDENTIAL**

PTTCZY UW RHMMAFAS988 110113Z-CCCC--RUMUGKD.

ZNY CCCCC

P 281130Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMUGKD/COMNAVFORV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR VADM ZUMWALT FROM LT GEN NICKERSON

ICTZ SHELTER PROGRAM (U)

A. COMNAVFORV 261104Z APR 69 (U)

1. I INTERPRET PAR 4, QUOTE DEFERRAL OF REQUEST FOR CONTINGENCY FUNDS FOR REQUIREMENTS OF PAR 5B OF REA A UNQUOTE, THAT THESE FUNDS WOULD BE REQUESTED UPON RECEIPT OF STUDY DUE 10 MAY.

SUBJECT TO THE ABOVE I CONCUR WITH THE MESSAGE.

GP-4

BT

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

# 3

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

CCN: 089/OUT

FILE: DH

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 29 APR 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 2900227 APR 69		COPY# 3 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS  <b>FOR</b>  ORIG: S/S REL: CG  <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
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	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
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	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
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	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
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	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

290022

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

#7



PTTEZYUW RHMMFA5051 1190022-EEE--RUHFMA.  
 ZNY EEEEE  
 P 290022Z APR 69  
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN  
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

FREEDOM HILL R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER AND BRIG

1. THE FOLLOWING IS AN UPDATE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AT THE SUBJECT FACILITIES. GEN YOUNGDALE WILL CONDUCT A CONFERENCE TODAY TO ESTABLISH PRIORITIES OF EFFORT FOR RECONSTRUCTION REQUIRED THROUGHOUT THE DANANG AREA. YOU HAVE BEEN KEPT ADVISED OF THE GENERAL SITUATION, BUT I FELT YOU MIGHT WISH SOME SPECIFIC INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE SUBJECT FACILITIES.

2. THE BRIG HAS SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE AND EOD PERSONNEL HAVE GIVEN ITS CLEARANCE A HIGH PRIORITY SO THAT PRECISE RECONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS CAN BE DETERMINED AT THE EARLIEST. PRISONERS (333) ARE CURRENTLY CONFINED AT FLC, AND POW'S (32) ARE LOCKED UP AT NSA HOSPITAL. WE ANTICIPATE DISPATCHING 39 GCM (DD OR BCD AACA) PRISONERS TO CONUS WITHIN A FEW DAYS, AND ARE MAKING A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO HAVE

PAGE TWO RHMMFA 5051 UNCLAS E F T O

COMMANDERS RESTORE AS MANY AS PRACTICABLE TO DUTY.

3. THE NEW TRANSIENT BARRACKS WERE EITHER DESTROYED OR RENDERED COMPLETELY UNSAFE FOR HABITATION, AND THEIR CONDITION IS PROBABLY WELL BEYOND REPAIR. DEMOLITION AND REBUILD APPEARS AS ONLY RECOURSE. THE R&R TERMINAL, TRANSIENT TERMINAL AND LOUNGE SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE. THEIR FUTURE CAN BE DECIDED ONLY BY THOROUGH ENGINEER INSPECTION. ONLY LIGHT TO MODERATE DAMAGE WAS SUSTAINED BY THE MESSHALL AND THE OLD R&R BARRACKS WHICH INITIALLY APPEAR TO POSSIBLY BE USEABLE WITH SOME REFURBISHMENT.

4. AT FREEDOM HILL ALL BUILDINGS SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE. IN MOST CASES, AT BEST ONLY THE FRAMES REMAIN AS SALVAGEABLE, WITH ROOFS, SIDES AND MINOR FRAME MEMBERS BADLY BATTERED AND BENT. EXCHANGE MERCHANDISE LOSS IS INITIALLY ESTIMATED AT 75,000 DOLLARS. ENTIRE COMPLEX IS UNUSABLE AND SECURED. TIMELY EVACUATION PREVENTED LOSS OF LIFE, WHILE FLYING ORDNANCE AND SECURITY PREVENTED ANY SIGNIFICANT PILFERAGE AT BOTH CENTERS.

5. R&R AND TRANSIENT OPERATIONS WERE MOVED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (27 APRIL) TO THE CHINA BEACH IN-COUNTRY

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

COPY 3 OF 6 COPIES HAS BEEN SENT

# 7

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA 5051 UNCLAS E F T O  
 R&R CENTER WHICH HAS HAD TO BE TAKEN OVER COMPLETELY FOR THIS PURPOSE. NORMAL CAPACITY IS ABOUT 375, BUT WE HAVE ADDED BUNKS, ARE PROVIDING EMERGENCY MESSING AND WILL BE ABLE TO HANDLE UP TO 700 ON A SHORT-TIME TEMPORARY BASIS. NSA HAS ALSO PROVIDED US 200 EMERGENCY SPACES AT TIEN SHA. WE EXPECT ALL R&R AND TRANSIENT FLIGHTS DEPARTING 29 APRIL AND THEREAFTER TO BE PROCESSED, LOADED AND DESPATCHED ON SCHEDULE AND WITHOUT DELAY. UNFORTUNATELY WE WERE UNABLE TO REACT IN TIME TO LOAD ONE EARLY R&R FLIGHT TO BANGKOK THIS MORNING. WE ARE DEVELOPING THE EMERGENCY TEMPORARY SITUATION AT CHINA BEACH WITH THE CONSIDERATION THAT IT WILL HAVE TO BE OUR MAIN R&R AND TRANSIENT FACILITY FOR 3 TO 4 WEEKS, AT LEAST, EVEN IF WE CAN EXPEDITIOUSLY RESURRECT THE OLD BARRACKS AND MESSHALL AT THE R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER AS A PARTIAL CAPACITY. THIS PRESENTS A MOST UNDESIREABLE SITUATION IN THAT THE CHINA BEACH FACILITY IS SORELY NEEDED AS AN IN-COUNTRY R&R SITE, AS WELL AS A DAYTIME RECREATION AREA. I AM VERY CONCERNED OVER THE SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF SUCH

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA 5051 UNCLAS E F T O  
 SITES, NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE. WE ARE CONSIDERING THIS SITUATION NOT ONLY FOR THE DANANG AREA, BUT FOR DIVISION AREAS AS WELL. HOWEVER, THE MAIN CONCERN IS THE DANANG AREA DUE TO ITS AFFILIATION WITH THE ENTREPOT ACTIVITIES AT DANANG AB. WE WILL GIVE WIDEST CONSIDERATION TO ALL FACETS OF THE PROBLEM. WE WILL EVEN GIVE CONSIDERATION TO MOVING THE FREEDOM HILL RECREATION COMPLEX, R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER TO CHINA BEACH IF, AS WE SUSPECT AT THIS EARLY STAGE, THE MAJORITY OF THOSE FACILITIES ARE BEYOND SALVAGE. SUCH A DECISION HOWEVER COULD ONLY FOLLOW A COMPLETE ENGINEER STUDY INCLUDING CONSIDERATION OF SALVAGEABLE ASSETS (E.G. UNDERGROUND UTILITIES, GRADING, ETC.). WE WOULD DRASTICALLY EXPAND THE BEACH FRONTAGE TO CREATE AN IN-COUNTRY R&R CENTER (WITH MACV AID); BUT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES PROVIDE ADEQUATE DAY FACILITIES SINCE WE ARE DANGEROUSLY OVER-CROWDED IN THIS CATEGORY OF RECREATION FACILITIES. AT ANY EVENT, AS YOU CAN WELL APPRECIATE, THE PRESENT EMERGENCY UTILIZATION OF THE CHINA BEACH FACILITY IS STRICTLY A MAKE-SHIFT EMERGENCY MEASURE. WE MUST FIND A MEANS TO RE-BUILD THE FREEDOM

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES HAS BEEN SENT  
 COPY 3 OF 6 COPIES

#7

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFA 5051 UNCLAS E F T O  
HILL RECREATION AND R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER COMPLEXES ASAP,  
ON EITHER CURRENT SITES OR A NEW LOCATION TO BE DETERMINED.  
THE NEED IS OBVIOUS AND URGENT, AND WE MAY NEED YOUR  
HELP.

BT

5051

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

COPY 3 OF 6 COPIES

HAS BEEN SENT  
# 7





Z 291010Z ZYM  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC  
ZEM

**SECRET**

**S E C R E T** SECTION ONE OF TWO  
FOR LTCEN BUSE FROM LTCEN NICKERSON  
RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST QUESTIONS CONCERNING  
DANANG ASP-1 FIRE

1. MACV DIRECTED THAT WE PROVIDE ANSWERS TO NINE SPECIFIC  
REQUIREMENTS TO BE PASSED BY MACV TO THE NMCC INCIDENT TO  
BRIEFING OF PRESIDENT NIXON AT 291900H CONCERNING THE DANANG ASP-1  
FIRE.

FOLLOWING ARE THE STATED REQUIREMENTS:

QUOTE: 1. A CONCISE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

2. ITEMIZED LISTING OF LOSSES AND DAMAGE. INCLUDE DOLLAR  
COST WHERE AVAILABLE.

3. ANY OTHER PARTICULARS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT.

4. INTERIM RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION IN PROGRESS IN TERMS  
OF CAUSE, CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN AND OTHER PARTICULARS CONSID-  
ERED PERTINENT.

5. OPERATIONAL STATUS OF BASE FACILITIES AND EFFECT ON  
MISSION, (IF THERE IS NO CHANGE TO OUR PREVIOUS ASP SITREPS  
WE CAN SO STATE IN OUR REPLY). UNQUOTE.

2. IN RESPONSE THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED:

QUOTE:

Z 290645Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO UUMS/COMUSMACV SEN

BT

**S E C R E T** SECTION ONE OF TWO

ATTN: MACV CMD CTR

PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST - REPORT ON ASP-1 FIRE

A. TELECON COL. ROGERS MACV CMD CNTR TO LTCOL.

CHARON III MAF COC.

1. (C) CONCISE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

A. 271045H INITIAL REPORT RECD THAT FIRE OF UNK ORIGIN  
WAS OUT OF CONTROL IN ASP-1. FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT  
HAD RESPONDED QUICKLY BUT OBVIOUSLY HAMPERED BY EXPLODING  
AMMO AND HIGH WINDS.

B. 271120H EVACUATION OF BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY  
PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE AREA INITIATED.

C. FIRE SPREAD RAPIDLY INTO ASP-1 AS AMMO BEGAN EX-  
PLODING. CAMP MONAHAN (AT 984726) REPORTED ON FIRE AT  
271132H. SOON THEREAFTER POWDER BAGS AND WP EXPLODED  
CAUSING FIRE TO SPREAD TO AF ASP (BT 003755).

D. EVACUATION OF NEARBY AREAS CONTINUED RAPIDLY DURING  
EARLY AFTERNOON, WHICH CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO LOW

SMALL CASUALTIES.

L. FIRE SPREAD RAPIDLY DURING EARLY AFTERNOON WITH NUMEROUS HIGH ORDER EXPLOSIONS.

F. 271335H DAMANG AB CLOSED EXCEPT FOR EMERGENCIES.

G. 271338H FIRE WAS SPREADING TO SOUTH SIDE OF AIRFIELD. SOME POL FIRES. POL FIRES AT AIRFIELD OUT OR UNDER CONTROL BY 1806H.

H. 271700H. FIRES REPORTED IN NSA PACKAGED POL DUMP (AT 992716) LOSSES WERE NOT SEVERE.

I. THROUGHOUT AFTERNOON, HIGH ORDER EXPLOSIONS CAUSED SEVERE CONCUSSION DAMAGE TO BLDGS NEAR THE ASP.

J. FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT, BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. STRONG SECURITY MEASURES WERE IMPLEMENTED IN THE DAMAGED AREAS AND ALL UNITS IN VICINITY MAINTAINED INCREASED ALERT TO PREVENT POSSIBLE ENEMY EXPLOITATION OF SITUATION. NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY EFFORT OCCURRED.

K. EMERGENCY ACTIONS INITIATED TO PRECLUDE SHORTAGES OF AMMO. THESE INCLUDED REDISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS WITHIN I CORPS AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXPEDITED SHIPMENTS FROM WESTPAC STORAGE FACs.

L. 280640H DAMANG AB OPENED.

M. 28 APRIL FIRE DIMINISHED BUT CONTINUED TO BURN THROUGHOUT THE DAY. EMERGENCY REPAIRS COMMENCED IN AREAS OUTSIDE THE IMMED VICINITY OF ASP-1. DETAILED DAMAGE ASSESSMENT COMMENCED AFTERNOON 28 APRIL.

N. 281400H. ALL MAJOR ROADS IN VICINITY OF ASP REOPENED TO TRAFFIC. CA PLATOON 1ST MARDIV WORKING WITH VN RELIEF AGENCIES IN DAMAGED CIVILIAN AREAS.

O. LATE AFTERNOON 28 APR SIGNIFICANT FIRES DIED OUT. LAST MAJOR DETONATION WAS AT 272330H. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND RECOVERY/REPAIR NOW IN FULL SWING.

2. LOSSES AND DAMAGE WITH COST ESTIMATE:

A. FACILITIES

(1) 1ST MARINE DIV CANTONMENTS

(A) EXTENSIVE DAMAGE

1 1ST SHORE PARTY BN

2 1ST BN 1ST MAR

(B) MODERATE AND LIGHT DAMAGE TO SOME FACILITIES

1 4TH BN 11TH MAR

2 1ST TK BN

(C) LIGHT DAMAGE TO SOME FACILITIES

1 1ST MED BN

2 7TH COMM BN

3 HQ BN

4 1ST 175 MM GUN

(2) 1ST MAR AIR WING CANTONMENTS/FLIGHTLINE

(A) EXTENSIVE DAMAGE

1 "C" ENTRY 1ST LAAM BN

**SECRET**

Z 291010Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST QUESTIONS CONCERNING  
 DANANG ASP-1 FIRE (CONT).

(B) MODERATE DAMAGE TO SOME FACILITIES

1 MWSG-17

2 MWHG 1

(C) LIGHT DAMAGE TO SOME FACILITIES

1 MAG-11

2 MACG-18

3 FORLOGCOMD CANTONMENTS/ FACILITIES

(A) ESSENTIALLY DESTROYED

1 ASP NR 1

2 3D MP BN (INCLUDES III MAF BRIG AND POW COMPOUND)

3 7TH SEPARATE BULK FUEL CO AND AMMO CO SUP BN 1ST FSR

4 III MAF TRANSIENT AND R&R PORCESSING CENTER (50 PCT  
 ESSENTIALLY DESTROYED, 50 PCT EXTENSIVE DAMAGE).

(B) MODERATE DAMAGE TO SOME FACILITIES.

1 MAINT BN FACILITIES (UNIT MOVE TO NEW FACILITIES PREVIOUSLY  
 SKED FOR 5 MAY WILL ELIMINATE NEED FOR EXTENSIVE REPAIRS).

(4) 3MCS

(A) ONE SEABEE CAMP ESSENTIALLY DESTROYED

(5) NAVAL SPT ACT DNG

(A) LIGHT DAMAGE TO SOME FAC

1 NORTHWEST TK FARM

2 FLEET AIR SPT UNIT

3 OLD PKG POL FAC (FAC WAS IN PROCESS OF BEING RELOCATED)

(6) US ARMY

(A) MODERATE DAMAGE TO 138TH AVN BN FLIGHT LINE

(B) LIGHT DAMAGE TO MORTUARY

(7) 366TH TAC FIGHTER WING

(A) 692 4TH SECURITY SQDN OP AND MUNITIONS FAC RECEIVED EXTENSIVE  
 DAMAGE

(B) LIGHT TO MODERATE DAVAGE TO MANY FAC ON EAST SIDE OF DNG AB

(8) OICC - CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR

(A) EXTENSIVE TO MODERATE DAMAGE TO CANTONMENT AND SHOPS

(9) EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO FREEDOM HILL EXCHANGE AND  
 SPECIAL SERVICES FAC.

(10) GENERAL NOTES

(A) MODERATE DAMAGA IS MOSTLY CONFINED TO ETENSIVA  
 CRUMPLING OF SHEET METAL BLDG WALLS AND ROOFS. IN MOST  
 INSTANCES FRAMES NOT SEVERLY DAMAGED.

(B) DAMAGE ROUGHLY ESTIMATED AT 6.8 MIL AS FOLLOWS:

- 1 1.5 MIL FOR MISCEL RECOVERY IN VARIOUS CAVPS.
- 2 1.8 MIL FOR TRANSIENT AND R&R PROCESSING CENTER.
- 3 1.89 MIL FOR ESSENTIALLY DESTROYED CANTONMENTS
- 4 1.60 MIL FOR USAK FAC
- 5 2.09 MIL FOR US ARMY FAC
- 6 0.50 MIL FOR FREEDOMHILL EXCHANGE AND REC FAC.
- 7 2.25 MIL TO REBUILD ASP.

\* ORDNANCE

(1) ASP 1. ESTIMATE TOTAL LOSS. CLASS V(A) 14:741  
S/T, CLASS V(W) 24,390 S/T. COST OF ORDNANCE 79 MILLION.

Z 290645Z APR 69

FM CG III MAF

TO UUMS/COMUSMACV

BT

S E C R E T

FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS

ATTN: MACV CMD CNTR

SUBJECT TO DOWNWARD REVISION UPON DETAILED INSPECTION.

(2) 366 TFW ASP 70 PERCENT DESTROYED. 366 TFW MISSION  
READY ANMO STORAGE 15 PERCENT DESTROYED. NO ESTIMATE OF  
TONNAGE OR COST AVAILABLE.

C. CIVILIAN HOUSING. 2342 HOMES DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY  
FIRE AND EXPLOSION. NO COST AVAILABLE. BASED ON ARVN-GVN  
SOURCES.

D. CASUALTIES. U.S. MILITARY 1 KILLED, 16 WOUNDED AND  
HOSPITALIZED. 5 U.S. CIVILIANS, WOUNDED, HOSPITALIZED.  
VN CIVILIANS 1 KIA CONFIRMED, 2 KIA UNCONFIRMED. HOSPITALIZED  
21. BASED ON POSSIBLY INCOMPLETE REPORTING FROM ARVN-GVN  
SOURCES.

UNQUOTE

REF-4

QUOTE

Z 290921Z APR 69 ZFF-6

FROM CG III MAF

TO UUMS/COMUSMACV SGN

BT

S E C R E T

ATTN: MACV CMD CNTR

PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST-REPORT OF ASP-1 FIRE

A: TELECON COL, ROGERS MACV CMD CNTR TO LTCOL CHARON III MAF COC.

B. CG III MAF 290645Z APR 68

1. (U) THIS MESSAGE COMPLETES RESPONSE TO REF A.

2. (U) RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 2 PROVIDED BY REF B.

## 3. (S) IMPORTANT PARTICULARS.

A. EXCEPT FOR SMALL NUMBER OF CARGO TRUCKS AND FORMLIFTTRUCKS IN THE ASP, THERE WAS LITTLE DAMAGE TO TACTICAL EQUIP. NO DAMAGE TO A/C WAS REPORTED. / ONE A/C WERE EVACUATED OR DIVERGED TO NHS LAI AND OTHER LOCATIONS.

B. JOINT SERVICE CENTRALLY CONTROLLED EOD EFFORT HAS BEEN INITIATED TO MAKE BEST USE OF ALL AVAIL EOD PERSONNEL IN PRIORITY AREAS.

C. MEETING HELD III MAF 290800H ESTABLISHED PRIORITIES FOR REPAIR EFFORTS, TASKED ALL AVAIL ENGR ASSETS, ESTABLISHED CONTROLS ON ISSUE OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS.

D. INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT IN-COUNTRY AMMO ASSETS CONTINUING. INITIAL EST STORAGE CAP SHORTFALL OF 24,000 S/T IN I CORPS. THIS HQ INVESTIGATING ALL MEANS OF RESTORING STORAGE CAP INCLUDING USE OF SHIPS AS FLOATING STORAGE. AMMO ISSUE POINT IN OPERATION AT ASP-2.

E. R&R CENTER/TRAN FAC IN OPERATION ON AUSTERE BASIS AT CHINABLACH. R&R FLIGHTS HAVE RESUMED.

F. EXPEDITIOUS EVACUATION OF THREATENED AREAS AND AVAILABILITY OF BUNKERS CONSIDERED MAJOR FACTORS IN LOW CASUALTY TOTALS.

## 4. (S) INTERIM RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

A. CAUSE. A WIND OF 13 KNOTS AND GUSTING FROM SE TO NW BLEW SPARKS FROM A CIVILIAN TRASH DUMP SOUTH OF AND ACROSS THE ROAD FROM THE ESP INTO A GRASS AREA OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE ASP FENCE. FIRE QUICKLY SPREAD INTO GRADE II AREA OF ASP WHERE WOODEN CONTAINERS AND THREE PALLETS OF 3.5 WP ROCKETS LOCATED. APPROX 35 MEN IN ASAP AREA WERE IMMEDIATELY DISPATCHED TO AREA BUT WERE UNABLE TO CONTAIN FIRE WITH WATER FROM BARRELS AND HAND TOOLS. MEN WERE FORCED TO PULL BACK WHEN WP ROCKETS STARTED EXPLODING.

B. ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS OF ALL ASP'S HAVE BEEN INITIATED TO ENSURE STRICT ADHERENCE TO ALL SAFETY PRECAUTION WITHIN THE STORAGE SITE AND TO IDENTIFY AND ELIMINATE ALL POSSIBLE EXTERNAL FIRE HAZARDS.

5. (C) OPERATIONS STATUS OK BASE FACILITIES AND EFFECT ON M SSIIC. NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS ASP SITREPS.

UNQUOTE

SP-1

END

9(5)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 29 APR 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 291332Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT R & R , TRANSIENT CENTER & BRIG
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS 3
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
	S/S					
	G-1				<i>MA</i>	
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED # 10

0 201330Z ZYH  
FM CG III MAJ  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
FREEDOM HILL R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER AND BRIG

1. THE FOLLOWING IS AN UPDATE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AT THE SUBJECT FACILITIES. MGEN YOUNGDALE CONVENED A CONFERENCE TODAY TO ESTABLISH PRIORITIES OF EFFORT FOR RECONSTRUCTION REQUIRED THROUGHOUT THE DANANG AREA. THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE YOU SOME SPECIFIC INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE SUBJECT FACILITIES.
2. THE BRIG HAS SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE AND EOD PERSONNEL HAVE GIVEN ITS CLEARANCE A HIGH PRIORITY SO THAT PRECISE RECONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS CAN BE DETERMINED AT THE EARLIEST. PRISONERS (333) ARE CURRENTLY CONFINED AT FLC, AND POW'S (32) ARE LOCKED UP AT NSA HOSPITAL. WE ANTICIPATE DISPATCHING 39 GCM (DD OR BCD AACA) PRISONERS TO CONUS WITHIN A FEW DAYS, AND ARE MAKING A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO HAVE COMMANDERS RESTORE AS MANY AS PRACTICABLE TO DUTY.
3. THE NEW TRANSIENT BARRACKS WERE EITHER DESTROYED OR RENDERED COMPLETELY UNSAFE FOR HABITATION, AND THEIR CONDITION IS PROBABLY WELL BEYOND REPAIR. DEMOLITION AND REBUILD APPEARS AS ONLY RECOURSE. THE R&R TERMINAL, TRANSIENT TERMINAL AND LOUNGE SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE, THEIR FUTURE CAN BE DECIDED ONLY BY THOROUGH ENGINEER INSPECTION. ONLY LIGHT TO MODERATE DAMAGE WAS SUSTAINED BY THE MESSHALL AND THE OLD R&R BARRACKS WHICH INITIALLY APPEAR TO POSSIBLY BE USABLE WITH SOME REFURBISHMENT.
4. AT FREEDOM HILL ALL BUILDINGS SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE. IN MOST CASES, AT BEST ONLY THE FRAMES REMAIN AS SALVAGEABLE, WITH ROOFS, SIDES, AND MINOR FRAME MEMBERS BADLY BATTERED AND BENT. EXCHANGE MERCHANDISE LOSS IS INITIALLY ESTIMATED AT 75,000 DOLLARS. ENTIRE COMPLEX IS PRESENTLY UNUSABLE AND SECURED. TIMELY EVACUATION PREVENTED LOSS OF LIFE, WHILE FLYING ORDNANCE AND SECURITY PREVENTED ANY SIGNIFICANT PILFERAGE AT BOTH CENTERS.

R. R&R TRANSIENT OPERATIONS WERE MOVED AFTERNOON OF 29 APRIL  
 TO THE CHINA BEACH IN-COUNTRY R&R CENTER WHICH HAS HAD TO BE  
 TAKEN OVER COMPLETELY FOR THIS PURPOSE. NORMAL CAPACITY IS  
 ABOUT 375, BUT WE HAVE ADDED BUNKS, ARE PROVIDING EMERGENCY  
 MESSING AND WILL BE ABLE TO HANDLE MORE ON A SHORT-TIME TEMPORARY  
 BASIS. NSA HAS ALSO PROVIDED US 200 EMERGENCY SPACES AT TIEN  
 SHA. WE EXPECT ALL R&R AND TRANSIENT FLIGHTS DEPARTING 29 APRIL  
 AND THEREAFTER TO BE PROCESSED, LOADED AND DISPATCHED ON  
 SCHEDULE AND WITHOUT DELAY. WE ARE DEVELOPING THE EMERGENCY  
 TEMPORARY SITUATION AT CHINA BEACH WITH THE CONSIDERATION THAT  
 IT WILL HAVE TO BE OUR PRIMARY R&R AND/OR TRANSIENT FACILITY  
 FOR SOME TIME, AT LEAST UNTIL WE CAN RESURRECT THE OLD BARRACKS  
 AND MESSHALL AT THE CR&R/TRANSIENT CENTER AS A PARTIAL CAPACITY.  
 THIS PRESENTS A MOST UNDESIRABLE SITUATION IN THAT THE CHINA  
 BEACH FACILITY IS SORELY NEEDED AS AN IN-COUNTRY R&R SITE, AS  
 WELL AS A DAYTIME RECREATION AREA. I AM VERY CONCERNED OVER THE  
 SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF SUCH SITES, NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE. WE ARE  
 CONSIDERING THIS SITUATION NOT ONLY FOR THE DANANG AREA, BUT FOR  
 THE DIVISION AREAS AS WELL. HOWEVER, THE MAIN CONCERN IS THE  
 IS THE DANANG AREA DUE TO ITS AFFILIATION WITH THE ENTREPOT  
 ACTIVITIES AT DANANG AB. WE WILL GIVE WIDEST CONSIDERATION  
 TO ALL FACETS OF THE PROBLEM. WE WILL EVEN GIVE CONSIDERATION  
 TO MOVING THE FREEDOM HILL RECREATION COMPLEX, R&R/TRANSIENT  
 CENTER TO CHINA BEACH IF, AS WE SUSPECT AT THIS EARLY STAGE,  
 THE MAJORITY OF THOSE FACILITIES ARE BEYOND SALVAGE. SUCH A  
 DECISION HOWEVER COULD ONLY FOLLOW A COMPLETE ENGINEER STUDY  
 INCLUDING CONSIDERATION OF SALVAGEABLE ASSETS (E.G. UNDERGROUND  
 UTILITIES, GRADING, LOCATION, ETC.). WE WOULD DRASTICALLY EX-  
 PAND THE BEACH FRONTAGE TO CREATE AN IN-COUNTRY R&R CENTER  
 (WITH MACV AID); BUT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES PROVIDE ADEQUATE  
 DAY FACILITIES SINCE WE ARE DANGEROUSLY OVER-CROWDED IN THIS  
 CATEGORY OF RECREATION FACILITIES. AT ANY EVENT, AS YOU CAN  
 WELL APPRECIATE, THE PRESENT EMERGENCY UTILIZATION OF THE  
 CHINA BEACH FACILITY IS STRICTLY A MAKE-SHIFT EMERGENCY  
 MEASURE. WE MUST FIND A MEANS TO RE-BUILD THE FREEDOM HILL  
 RECREATION AND R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER COMPLEXES ASAP, ON EITHER  
 CURRENT SITES OR A NEW LOCATION TO BE DETERMINED. THE NEED  
 IS OBVIOUS AND URGENT, AND WE MAY NEED YOUR HELP.

# 10(2)

900

#HANKKLEW/

HAS BEEN SENT

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		10 APR 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL	DATE		
			0 3006443			
			COPY#	OF	COPIES REC'D	
			1,2,3	4		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG			1/24/69	N	SECRET BEFORE  REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.  <i>Feed Back</i>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I	4/30	4/10	200	
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	4/30		M A	
	G-1					
	G-2					
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	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

**SECRET**

#11

O 300644Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO SSO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

SECRET NOFORN SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 PERSONAL FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 RICE CACHE DISCOVERIES IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE JANUARY-FEBRUARY  
 1969 AND THE PROBLEM OF FEED RESOURCE CONTROL IN I CORPS. (C)  
 A. COMUSMACV LTR MACJ02 DTD 20 APR 1969.

1. (S/NOFORN) IAW WITH REF A THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS SUBMITTED. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY PURSUING THE MAJOR RICE CACHE DISCOVERIES AND THE PROBLEM OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL IN ICTZ SINCE JANUARY OF THIS YEAR. THE FOLLOWING IS A CHRONOLOGICAL RESUME OF THE MAJOR EVENTS WHICH HAVE TRANSPIRED IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS ON THIS MATTER:

A. ON 11 JANUARY 1969, THE 2ND ROK MARINE BRIGADE UNCOVERED A MAJOR RICE CACHE EXCEEDING 200 TONS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE. THE MANY UNUSUAL FEATURES WHICH SURROUNDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS CACHE EXCITED PARTICULAR INTEREST, AND ACCORDINGLY, THE G-2 OF III MAF WAS DIRECTED TO PREPARE A DETAILED REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT.

B. THE REPORT WHICH THE G-2 PREPARED IS TOO VOLUMINOUS TO BE QUOTED IN ITS ENTIRETY, HOWEVER, THE MAJOR FINDINGS CONCERNING THIS CACHE WERE THESE:

(1) THE RICE CACHE SITE WAS UNUSUAL IN THAT IT HAD BEEN BURIED IN AN OPEN FIELD IN A SERIES OF SHALLOW TRENCHES WITHIN THE ROK MARINE BRIGADE'S NORMAL AO.

(2) THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE RICE FOUND WITHIN THE CACHE SITE WAS IDENTIFIED AS HAVING BEEN OF U.S. GROWTH AND CONTAINED WITHIN BAGS OF U.S. MANUFACTURE. HOWEVER, THE MAJORITY OF THE BAGS HAD BEEN OPENED AND A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF VN RICE MIXED WITH THE U.S. RICE BEFORE THE BAGS WERE CLOSED ONE MORE.

C. AS IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE RICE DISCOVERED IN THIS CACHE WAS OF A TYPE COMMONLY SOLD BY THE U.S. TO GVN, THE NEXT STEP TAKEN BY III MAF WAS TO ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE HOW THIS RICE HAD ARRIVED AT THE CACHE SITE. DEP CORDS III MAF WAS CALLED INTO OUR INVESTIGATION AT THIS POINT AND SEVERAL DIFFERENT TASKS WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY PURSUED. MR. FRANCIS L. BARNETT, SENIOR PSD, ICTZ WAS CALLED IN AND REQUESTED TO DETERMINE THROUGH HIS POLICE ADVISORS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE IF ANY INFORMATION COULD BE OBTAINED WHICH MIGHT SERVE TO CLARIFY THE ISSUE. SECONDLY, MR. FRED F. EUBANKS, CHIEF LOGISTICS DIVISION FOR CORDS III MAF, WAS REQUESTED TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING THE GVN HANDLING OF SHIPMENTS OF RICE INFO I CORPS. THE PURPOSE HERE WAS TO ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF A CHAIN OF RECEIPTS MIGHT EXIST WHICH COULD POSSIBLY RELATE THE RICE FOUND IN THE CACHE WITH ANY WHOLESALER OR RETAILER.

# 11(1)

D. ALTHOUGH BOTH MR. BARNETT AND MR. EMBANKS WERE MOST HELPFUL, THEIR EFFORTS DID NOT PROVIDE US WITH ANY EVIDENCE WHICH COULD BE UTILIZED TO FURTHER ADVANCE THIS INVESTIGATION. WHAT WAS DETERMINED, HOWEVER, WAS THAT AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL DISTRUST EXISTED BETWEEN THE GVN OFFICIALS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE AND THE KOREANS. SECONDLY, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL IN I CORPS LEFT TOO MUCH TO BE DESIRED IN THAT NO SYSTEM EXISTED WHICH WOULD ADEQUATELY CONTROL THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD SO AS TO REASONABLY INSURE THAT FOODSTUFFS WOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE VIET CONG.

E. DURING THIS PERIOD A MEETING WAS HELD AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION ON 28 JANUARY 1969. MGEN SIMPSON, THE DIVISION COMMANDER, LICOL LE TRI TIN, PROVINCE CHIEF OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE, AND SELECTED MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION AND PROVINCE ADVISORY STAFFS WERE PRESENT. AGAIN THE SUBJECT OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL WAS DISCUSSED BY COL TIN AND THE THRUST OF HIS REMARKS MADE IT CLEAR THAT COL TIN WAS PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH THE UNAUTHORIZED TRANSHIPMENT OF FOODSTUFFS BY KOREAN TRUCKS. NO EVIDENCE WAS PROVIDED BY COL TIN IN SUPPORT OF THIS ALLEGATION.

GP-4  
669

# 11(2)

HAS BEEN SENT

**NOFORN**

SECRET

NNNN

# 11(2)

O 300644Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO SSO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

SECRET NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
 PERSONAL FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 RICE CACHE DISCOVERIES IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE JANUARY-FEBRUARY  
 1969 AND THE PROBLEM OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL IN I CORPS. (C)  
 A. COMUSMACV LTR MACJ02 DTD 20 APR 1969. (CONT'D)

F. ON 29 JANUARY 1969 FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD BETWEEN III MAF AND FIRST MARINE DIVISION REPRESENTATIVES. AT THIS TIME IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT WHILE IT WAS APPARENT THAT SERIOUS MUTUAL DISTRUST EXISTED BETWEEN THE ROK MARINES AND THE GVN QUANG NAM PROVINCE ADVISORS, THERE WAS NO HARD EVIDENCE AVAILABLE WHICH COULD RELATE THE KOREANS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS RICE CACHE. IN THE ABSENCE OF HARD EVIDENCE IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT A CONTINUED PROBING OF THIS MATTER MIGHT EASILY RESULT IN INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS THE MAGNITUDE OF WHICH MIGHT NOT BE CONTROLLABLE. HOWEVER, SHOULD NEW EVIDENCE BE UNEARTHED WHICH COULD PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF THE COMPLICITY OF ONE OR MORE PARTIES, REGARDLESS OF NATIONALITY, THE INVESTIGATION SHOULD BE REOPENED.

G. IN ADDITION, IT WAS FELT THAT WHILE THE CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES BY A SYSTEM OF CHECK POINTS MIGHT BE HELPFUL, IT WOULD NOT GET AT THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM. THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM WAS THAT OF INADEQUATE COMMODITY CONTROL OVER FOOD RESOURCES IN I CORPS. AS THIS MATTER IS ONE OF EXCLUSIVE CONTROL BY THE GVN, THE PROBLEM WAS ONE WHICH TRANSCENDED I CORPS RESPONSIBILITIES AND WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE RESOLVED ON THE MACV/AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.

H. ON 2 FEBRUARY 1969, A SECOND LARGE RICE CACHE WAS DISCOVERED IN SOUTHERN QUANG NAM BY THE 7TH MARINE REGIMENT. WHILE BY NO MEANS OF SIMILAR SIZE, IT WAS A LARGE CACHE OF MORE THAN 62 TON AND DISPLAYED THE SAME UNUSUAL CHARACTERISTICS CONCERNING THE METHOD OF CONCEALMENT WHICH WERE NOTED IN THE ORIGINAL KOREAN RICE CACHE. IN ADDITION, IT WAS ONLY NINE KILOMETERS FROM THE FIRST RICE CACHE. THIS CACHE WAS ALSO CAREFULLY INVESTIGATED BY III MAF. AFTER SIFTING ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE IT WAS DETERMINED THAT NO CONCLUSIONS COULD BE REACHED CONCERNING THE PERSON OR PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS ESTABLISHMENT.

I. AS A RESULT OF THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAD OCCURRED OVER THE PERIOD 11 JANUARY-2 FEBRUARY 1969, A COMPLETE REVIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE WAS PREPARED BY THE III MAF STAFF.

J. THE CONCLUSION REACHED BY III MAF ON 14 FEBRUARY 1969 AS A RESULT OF THIS REVIEW WAS THAT DEPUTY FOR CORDS III MAF SHOULD BE TASKED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL IN I CORPS.

#1163

K. ON 18 FEBRUARY 1969 MR. GORDON ARMSTRONG, THE USAID INVESTIGATION TEAM CHIEF MET WITH THE III MAF STAFF FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING THE RICE CACHES IN DETAIL. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THESE DISCUSSIONS A REQUEST WAS MADE BY USAID FOR A COPY OF OUR FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL INVESTIGATION. A COPY OF THIS INVESTIGATION WAS RELEASED TO DEP CORDS III MAF FOR USE AS BACKGROUND FOR THE USAID INVESTIGATION TEAM. IT WAS MADE CLEAR AT THIS TIME TO DEP CORDS THAT INFORMATION CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF GVN OR THIRD COUNTRY PERSONNEL IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS CACHE SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED AS THEY REPRESENTED ALLEGATIONS THAT COULD NOT BE PROVED AND THAT RELEASE OF INFORMATION OF THIS NATURE COULD BE MOST DELETERIOUS TO ARVN/FWMAF RELATIONSHIPS IN I CORPS.

2. (S/NOFORN) THIS, IN SUMMARY, ARE THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE RICE CACHE PROBLEM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP, AS WE SEE IT, WITH THE PROBLEM OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL IN I CORPS. I WILL PROVIDE UNDER SEPARATE COVER A COPY OF MY FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL STUDY IN QUANG NAM FOR YOUR MORE DETAILED PERUSAL OF THE PROBLEM. IN ADDITION, A COPY OF THE RICE CACHE INVESTIGATIONS WILL ALSO BE FORWARDED YOU. BASED UPON THESE STUDIES I HAVE TAKEN ACTION TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF FOOD RESOURCE CONTROL IN I CORPS.

3. (S/NOFORN) THIS REPRESENTS A RESUME OF THE INVESTIGATION AS OF THIS DATE. I AM CONTINUING TO PURSUE THIS MATTER ALONG THE LINES NOTED IN YOUR RECENT LETTER. HOWEVER, AS IT IS OBVIOUSLY A MOST SENSITIVE ISSUE, I BELIEVE THIS IS AN AREA IN WHICH WE MUST MAKE HASTE SLOWLY. I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED AS TO THE RESULTS OF MY FURTHER INVESTIGATION AS IT PROGRESSES.

4. RELATED TO THE ABOVE, I HAVE BEEN GIVEN A COPY OF A PAPER FROM THE POLAD/DANANG (MACK) TO POL/SAIGON (THORNE) DATED 25 APR 69. THE SUBJ IS "OVERVIEW OF 2ND ROY MARINE BRIGADE ACTIVITIES JAN 68-APR 69 IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE". I WILL FORWARD YOU A COPY OF THE PAPER, MEANWHILE, I'M TRYING TO SORT OUT FACTS AND OPINIONS.

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
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**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
FOR VADM ZUMWALT FROM LT GEN NICKERSON INFO RADN BONNER  
1. I THINK IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE IF YOU WOULD TAKE  
THE TIME TO VISIT THE DANANG AREA AND VIEW THE DAMAGE  
WHICH RESULTED FROM THE ASP I DISASTER. IF YOU AGREE,  
PLEASE ADVISE THE TIME IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR  
YOU AND I WOULD BE HAPPY TO MAKE SUCH ARRANGEMENTS  
AS ARE NECESSARY FOR YOUR VISIT.  
2. WARM REGARDS.  
GP-4  
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