

13. CG III MAF 010140Z ~~MAY69~~ (C) *group*
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
MISSING GERMAN PERSONNEL -- FIVE MISSING: NOT TWO (EVENTS)
- ~~14. CG III MAF 010250Z ~~MAY69~~ (C)
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
PLAN TO MAKE VISIT TO NKP ON 12 MAY IF YOU CONCUR~~
- ~~15. CG III MAF 020450Z ~~MAY69~~ (C)
FOR DVAS FROM NICKERSON
VISIT TO TASK FORCE ALPHA ~~PLAN VISIT ON 12 MAY~~~~
16. CG III MAF 031426Z MAY69 (U)
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
VIETNAMESE MARINES "COMUS CAN'T SPT AT THIS TIME"
17. CG III MAF 040724Z ~~MAY~~69 (C) MCEO *gp-4*
EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS
18. CG III MAF 060526Z MAY 69 (S) EXCLUSIVE *gp-4*
FOR STIDWELL FROM NICKERSON
ENEMY SITUATION IN I CORPS - 10-25 MAY HIGH THREAT - DELAY ENTRY 3D MARDIV
UNITS INTO APACHE SNOW UNTIL AFTER 25 MAY
19. CG III MAF 060528Z MAY69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *gp-4*
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
APPEARS THAT ~~XXXX~~ HIGH THREAT PERIOD IS 10-25 MAY - PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES
20. CG III MAF 060553Z MAY69 (C) *gp-4*
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
HERE'S YOUR ITINERARY FOR TOMORROW'S VISIT TO ICTZ (HQ III MAF) ON 7 MAY
21. CG III MAF 061010Z MAY69 (C) *gp-4*
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
LUMBER INDUSTRY IN NICTZ - SENT ABE A MEMO - WILL TALK TO HIM TOMORROW ABOUT IT
22. CG III MAF 061430Z MAY69 (C) *group-4*
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
POSSIBLE GAS ATTACK ON M/3/4 ON 4 MAY: "YOU ASKED ABOUT IT ON PHONE THIS AM"
23. CG III MAF 071205Z MAY69 (S) *group - not shared*
FOR SIMPSON, QUILTER & GETTYS FROM NICKERSON
READDRESSES III MAF 060526Z MAY69 - ENEMY SITUATION IN I CORPS
- ~~24. CG III MAF 080045Z MAY69 (S) ABSOLUTELY EYES ONLY FOR ADDRESSEE
FOR STIDWELL FROM NICKERSON
SEARCHED IN "EYES ONLY FOLDER"~~
25. CG III MAF 090123Z MAY69 (S) EXCLUSIVE *gp-4*
FOR STIDWELL FROM NICKERSON
REF YR 071700Z MAY69 - APPROVED

- ~~26. CG III MAF 100516Z MAY69 (S) EXCLUSIVE
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
EVALUATION OF CASWELL - HARBIS CG 2D CASW comments on CASWELL - AS REQ BY CMC~~
- ~~27. CG III MAF 101540Z (S)
FOR STILLWELL FROM NICKERSON
SCRIPT FOR HELICOPTER DROPPED - WHY DID MARY HEAR ABOUT IT BEFORE CG III MAFOM~~
- ~~28. CG III MAF 130142Z MAY69 (U)
FOR WILSON INFO DRAKE FROM DOOLEY
ITINERARY FOR MAUGEN DRAKE~~
29. CG III MAF 141001Z MAY69 (S) EYES ONLY *gp-4*
FOR TOWNSEND FROM DOOLEY
INVESTIGATION OF THE PHUOC MY HAMLET INCIDENT OF 15 APRIL INVOLVING ROKS
30. CG III MAF 141230Z MAY69 (C) *gp-4*
FOR STILLWELL FROM NICKERSON
VISIT OF SEC STATE " ABOUT BRIEFINGS, KEEP TO MINIMUM & STICK TO FACTS"
- ~~31. CG III MAF 150522Z MAY69 (U)
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
NOTIFICATION OF VIP VISITS TO ICTZ - HAVE YR PROTOCOL OFFICE HANDLE THEM~~
- ~~32. CG III MAF 150902Z MAY69 (U)
FOR MAJ COLLISON FROM HEMPHILL
MAUGEN YOUNGBLANK WANTS A OTHER CABINET MADE~~
33. CG III MAF 151400Z MAY69 (S) *gp-4*
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
I REAFFIRM THE REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL BRIGADE IN ICTZ
34. CG III MAF 160655Z MAY69 (S) HVNCO *gp-4*
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
PASSES III MAF 121400Z MAY69 TO BUSE (REAFFIRM REQMT FOR ADDITIONAL BRIGADE)
- ~~35. CG III MAF 161000Z MAY69 (S)
FOR STILLWELL FROM NICKERSON
WR REQ FOR LV APPROVED - CONSIDER TIME AS MINIMUM~~
36. CG III MAF 161342Z MAY69 (S) HVNCO *gp-4*
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
READDRESSES COMUSMACV'S 161015Z MAY69
37. CG III MAF 161630Z MAY69 (S) EXCLUSIVE MCEO *group-4*
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
READDRESSES CG III MAF'S 151400Z MAY 69 & COMUSMACV'S 161015Z MAY69
- ~~38. CG III MAF 170930Z MAY69 (S)
FOR ROSSON FROM NICKERSON
CONGRATS ON YOUR FOURTH STAR~~
39. CG III MAF 170958Z MAY69 (S) *gp-3*
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
CASUALTIES -- SITUATION HERE IN III MAF BETTER THAN YR 150823Z PORTRAYS

40. CG III MAF 181410Z MAY69 (U)
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
UPDATE ON FREEDOM HILL, R&R TRANSIENT CENTER SITUATION

~~41. CG III MAF 200512Z MAY69 (C)
FOR NICKERSON FROM PRINGLE
YOU MAY COME TO MORNING BRIEF ON WED 21 MAY~~

~~42. CG III MAF 210400Z MAY69 (C)
FOR WILSON INFO JONES FROM DOOLEY
CLIFF BRAKE TAKING OVER TRIP FROM FOR GARNNEY INFO MISSING IN MORE, DEBAM FULLER~~

~~43. CG III MAF 211730Z MAY69 (U)
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY
GARNNEY HAS MALARIA~~

44. CG III MAF 220008Z MAY69 (S) MCEO *gp-3*
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES REPORT

~~45. CG III MAF 220150Z MAY69 (U)
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY
GEN GARNNEY'S CONDITION (MALARIA)~~

~~46. CG III MAF 221250Z MAY69 (U)
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY
GEN GARNNEY'S CONDITION~~

47. CG III MAF 220300Z MAY69 (C) EYES ONLY *gp-4*
FOR GENTYS FROM DOOLEY
PASSES MACV'S 221036Z-- GEN ABRAMS VISIT I CORPS 25 MAY

~~48. CG III MAF 230056Z MAY69 (U)
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY
GEN GARNNEY'S CONDITION~~

~~49. CG III MAF 231400Z MAY69 (U)
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY
GEN GARNNEY'S CONDITION~~

~~50. CG III MAF 240146Z MAY69 (U)
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY
GEN GARNNEY'S CONDITION~~

DECLASSIFIED

39 ✓ CG III MAF 250956Z MAY69 (TS) GP-4
FOR ABRAMS INFO GETTYS FROM NICKERSON
OP PIERCE VALLEY PHASE II

40 ✓ CG III MAF 271346Z MAY69 (TS) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO GP-4
FOR LIGEN BUSE FROM LIGEN NICKERSON
SECNAV WAS HERE 24 May

DECLASSIFIED

²⁰
~~27. CC III MAR 1007047 MAY 60 (MS)~~

~~FORGE PLANNING~~

~~ALL COPIES IN HEVRS ONLY FOLDER~~

~~24. CC III MAR 1004307 MAY 60 (MS)~~

~~FORGE PLANNING~~

~~ALL COPIES IN HEVRS ONLY FOLDER~~

~~25. CC III MAR 1004317 MAY 60 (MS)~~

~~FORGE PLANNING~~

~~ALL COPIES IN HEVRS ONLY FOLDER~~

- ~~26. CG III MAF 100432Z MAY69 (TS)
FORGE PLANNING
"EYES ONLY" FOLDER~~
- ~~27. CG III MAF 100433Z MAY69 (TS)
FORGE PLANNING
"EYES ONLY" FOLDER~~
- ~~28. CG III MAF 100520Z MAY69 (TS)
FORGE PLANNING
"EYES ONLY" FOLDER~~
29. ✓ CG III MAF 131517Z MAY69 (TS) GP-4
FOR TOWNSEND INFO STILLWELL FROM NICKERSON
PASSES STILLWELL'S 131145Z MAY69 -- TO TOWNSEND
"TRESPASS OF LAOTIAN BORDER"
30. ✓ CG III MAF 141000Z MAY 69 (TS) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR STILLWELL FROM NICKERSON
EXPLOITATION OF BA 607 "DON'T INTEND TO TAKE ACTION ON YOUR PROPOSAL NOW"
31. ✓ CG III MAF 141645Z MAY69 (TS) EXCLUSIVE GP-4
FOR GEITYS FROM NICKERSON
PHASE II PIERCE VALLEY -- "NEED YOUR VIEWS BY 25MAY ON FOLLOWING 3 POINTS"
32. ✓ CG III MAF 161632Z MAY69 (TS) EXCLUSIVE/MCEO GP-1
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
READRESSES III MAF'S 121040Z MAY (OPS INTEL SUMMARY)
33. ✓ CG III MAF 190622Z MAY69 (TS) GP-4
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
SEC STATE WAS HERE ON 18 MAY 1969 (MORE FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS ON LAOS
BORDER AND IN THE SHDMZ)
34. ✓ CG III MAF 190606Z MAY69 (TS) MCEO GP-4
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
SAME AS 33 ABOVE EXCEPT FOR COUPLE OF WORDS -- SEC STATE WAS HERE
- ~~35. CG III MAF 211441Z MAY69 (TS) EYES ONLY
FORGE REDUCTIONS SEE EYES ONLY FOLDER~~
- ~~36. CG III MAF 211446Z MAY69 (TS) EYES ONLY
FORGE REDUCTIONS SEE EYES ONLY FOLDER~~
- ~~37. CG III MAF 211449Z MAY69 (TS) EYES ONLY
FORGE REDUCTIONS SEE EYES ONLY FOLDER~~
- ~~38. CG III MAF 230735Z MAY69 (TS) EYES ONLY
FORGE REDUCTIONS SEE EYES ONLY FOLDER~~

1. CG III MAF 240352Z MAY69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO *group-4*
FOR BUSE INFO SIMPSON
REDUCTION OF FIRST ARMD Amphib CO TO CADRE STATUS
2. CG III MAF 240400Z MAY69 (U)
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
MALARIA CHEMOPROPHYLAXIS
- ~~3. CG III MAF 241430Z MAY69 (S)
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY
GEN GARNETT'S CONDITION~~
- ~~4. CG III MAF 250150Z MAY 69 (U)
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY
GENERAL GARNETT'S CONDITION~~
5. CG III MAF 250956Z MAY69 (C) *gp-4*
FOR STILLWELL, SIMPSON, GEPYS & QUILTER INFO JONES & WRIGHT FROM NICKERSON
HELICOPTER FLYING SAFETY
- ~~6. CG III MAF 260400Z MAY69 (U)
FOR BAILEY FROM NICKERSON
CONGRATS ON YOUR SELECTION AS SCHEMAJ USMC~~
- ~~7. CG III MAF 260946Z MAY69 (C)
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY
ROSS WILL BE IN OKI 27 30 MAY SHOPPING & SEE IN ON SIE MATS GOING/SECNAV~~
8. CG III MAF 261405Z MAY69 (U)
FOR BENNETT & DAVISON
ATTABOYS FOR BENNETT & DAVISON -- BEST WISHES TO MEN OF 199TH FROM III MAF
9. CG III MAF 271048Z MAY69 (U)
FOR ECKHARDT & WETHERILL FROM NICKERSON
ATTABOYS BOYS -- SORRY I CAN'T MAKE YOUR CHANGE OF COMMAND
10. CG III MAF 281105Z MAY69 (U)
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
SAM PRYOR COMING TO SAIGON -- LIKE TO HAVE HIM VISIT ME 8-9 JUNE
11. CG III MAF 290410Z MAY69 (S) NOFORN MCEO *gp-4*
RELOCATION OF 1ST AMTRAC BN (U)
12. CG III MAF 290424Z MAY69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSVIE *gp-4*
FOR SIMPSON FROM NICKERSON
PASSES CMC'S 28-2317Z (ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION) BALTO PAPER)
- ~~13. CG III MAF 291430Z MAY69 (U)
FOR MCEL THRASH AND MCEL ADAMS FROM BOTH DOOLEY
RED POLLING ARRIVING EL TORO * PLEASE MEET HIM AND GET HIM TO LA~~

300730 MAX local

~~14. CG III MAF 300020Z MAY 69 (U)~~

~~FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON~~

~~I CALL WOOD YESTERDAY IN GOOD SHADE BACK TO ENJOY UNLESS YOU ADVISE~~

~~15. CG III MAF 300007Z MAY 69 (U)~~

~~FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON~~

~~OLIVER IS BACK AND YOUTH CORDS BEGAN HIS TIME~~

~~16. CG III MAF 300004Z MAY 69 (U)~~

~~FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY~~

~~CONGRATULATE DRIVER, I SEND MSG TO BOB DELL~~

~~17. CG III MAF 300006Z MAY 69 (U)~~

~~FOR MORN DELL (USMC) PANAM~~

~~DEAR BOB, PLEASE FIND DRIVER AND TELL HIM I'M OK, TUNE OK, LET ME KNOW TO SEE GENTS II~~

18. CG III MAF 301054Z MAY 69 (U)

FOR GETTYS & RAMSEY FROM NICKERSON

ATTABOYS, BOYS, * HEARTFELT THANKS TO GETTYS, WELCOME TO IOTZ FOR RAMSEY
(CHANGE OF COMMAND AT AMERICAL, 1 JUNE 1969)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 1 MAY 68	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 080400		COPY# OF COPIES RECO 1,2,3	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT			
4	CG	I	2 May		N	SUBJECT RECEIVED SERIAL #080400 (1) REMARKS (1)	
5	DCG	I	2 May		N		
6	DCG AIR	I			N	RECEIVED THREE COPIES OF MESSAGE	
3	C/S	I			N		
2	D C/S	I	5/1	5/1	SLP		
	D C/S DM						
1	S/S	I	5/1		N		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	HQS CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

Feed back

CONFIDENTIAL

P 010140Z
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
 TO COMUSMACV
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 MISSING GERMAN PERSONNEL (U)

1. (C) THE EVENTS CONCERNING THE FIVE MISSING GERMAN PERSONNEL ARE RECAPPED AS FOLLOWS:

A. AT 272035H APR 1ST MARDIV REPORTED THAT 2 GERMAN NATIONALS JEEP HEADED IN DIRECTION OF NONG SON ON SIGHTSEEING TRIP. JEEP WAS FOUND PARKED AT 857407. PF'S IN AREA REPORTED OBSERVING GERMANS LEAVE JEEP AND WALK EAST INTO ANTENNA VALLEY.

B. SUBSEQUENTLY AT 280930H 1ST MARDIV ADVISED THAT 5 GERMAN NATIONALS WERE MISSING (3 WOMEN AND 2 MEN) INSTEAD OF TWO.

C. AT 291800H 1ST MARDIV REPORTED THAT LATER INFO REVEALED THAT AT 271000H, 5 GERMAN HOSP PERSONNEL TRAVELLED FROM NONG SON ROAD TO A POINT JUST NORTH OF BRIDGE AT ATR58408. TRIP WAS MADE AGAINST ADVICE OF DUC DUC DISTRICT HQ, DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISOR AND MR CAN OF AN HOA INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF 5TH MARINE REGT. AT 271900H, 5TH MAR WERE NOTIFIED BY MR CAN AND DR BEISING (GERMAN HOSP) THAT VEHICLE WAS PARKED NORTH OF BRIDGE. GERMAN PERSONNEL PROCEEDED INTO ANTENNA VALLEY AGAINST ADVICE OF LOCAL CIVILIANS WHO TOLD THEM VC WERE IN THE AREA. LOCAL VILLAGE CHIEF SENT PF UNIT INTO VALLEY TO INVESTIGATE WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

2. (U) THE NAMES OF GERMAN PERSONNEL ARE AS FOLLOWS:

MISS MONICA SCHWINS
 MISS HENRIKA KORTMAN
 MISS MARIE KERBER
 MR GEORGE BARTSU
 MR BERNARD DIEHL

3. YESTERDAY, AFTER DISCUSSING THE MATTER WITH LTGEN LAM, I DIRECTED MGEN SIMPSON TO INFORM THE HEAD OF THE GERMAN HOSPITAL THAT PERSONNEL OF HIS STAFF MUST FIRST OBTAIN APPROVAL PRIOR TO TRAVELING IN AREAS UNDER OUR COGNIZANCE. LTGEN LAM AND I MUTUALLY AGREED THAT EITHER THE GERMAN HOSPITAL STAFF AT AN HOA WILL COMPLY WITH OUR ORDERS FOR THEIR SAFETY OF LTGEN LAM WILL ASK THEM TO LEAVE. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

GP-4.

450

NNNN

SECRET

III MAF Fact Sheet

Date: 26 April 1969

Subject: Increased Force Structure of the Vietnamese Marine Corps

I. GENERAL:

At the weekly Commanders Conference at Headquarters MACV, during a discussion of RVNAF manpower limitations, COMUSMACV expressed dissatisfaction with the 5th and 18th ARVN Divisions, particularly the desertion rates, and stated that he would like to see better utilization of RVNAF manpower. CG III MAF then strongly recommended an increase of three battalions to the RVN Marine Corps, to which COMUSMACV responded that he could not give any more personnel. At this point CG III MAF turned to COMNAVFORV and requested he study the problem to see if he could come up with the assets for the three RVN Marine battalions and offered III MAF assistance. No more was said on the matter.

II. CURRENT STATUS/FC

On the morning of Assistant Chief of Staff Senior Marine Corps Act for his estimate of the battalions for the RVN was that it looks favorable. COMNAVFORV favor the idea by Colonel B. G. CASS, COMUSMACV in discussion anticipated with obtaining personnel to meet the ceiling. Colonel CORE can be found.

COMNAVFORV will discuss the problem at presentation to JGS or ask Colonel CASS to act

III. RECOMMENDATIONS:

None.

Prepared by: LtCol O

Memorandum

From: Commanding General

nal
se

To: I asked about today he said not at present when I pushed him about come going from his unit he said it was a matter of space

out.

#16

SECRET

#16

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 03 MAY 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 031426Z		COPY# 1, 2, 3 OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT VIETNAMESE MARINES
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I	5/4/69		N	REMARKS ① Feedback
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			J	
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
1	S/S	I	5/4		W	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

#16

P 031426Z
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
SUBJ: VIETNAMESE MARINES

1. DURING OUR CONVERSATION ON THE TELEPHONE ON 1 MAY YOU INFORMED ME THAT THE COMMANDANT HAD STATED THAT HE IS PREPARED TO SUPPORT THREE MORE BATTALIONS OF VIETNAMESE MARINES IF COMUSMACV WOULD ASK FOR THEM.
2. YOU WILL RECALL THAT WE WERE ADVISED THAT CORBETT HAD BRIEFED COMUSMACV AND THAT COMUSMACV FAVORED THE IDEA. HOWEVER, YOU WILL ALSO RECALL THAT WE STATED THAT A POSSIBLE HITCH COULD BE THE INABILITY OF THE JGS TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE CURRENT MANPOWER CEILING.
3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT COMUSMACV HAS APPROACHED THE JGS ON THIS SUBJECT, AND WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET A FEED-BACK ON THE RESULTS OF THIS MEETING SINCE YOU CALLED.
4. ON THE AFTERNOON OF 1 MAY, I SAW GEN ABRAMS AT THE CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY FOR GENERAL CHAE AT NHA TRANG, AND I ASKED HIM ABOUT THE SITUATION. HE WAS QUITE UNCOMMUNICATIVE AND SAID QUOTE NOT AT THE PRESENT UNQUOTE. I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY CORBETT AND HE WOULD NOT ADMIT THAT HE HAD. WHEN I PRESSED HIM ABOUT CHAPPIE ASSISTING HIM FROM THE WASHINGTON END, HE SAID IT WAS A MATTER OF SPACES AND THAT HE COULDN'T SUPPORT IT RIGHT NOW.
5. ALL IN ALL THE CONVERSATION WAS UNPRODUCTIVE. I SUSPECT THAT HE DID MEET WITH THE JGS AND THAT THEY DIDN'T GIVE HIM ANY ENCOURAGEMENT. I WOULD ALSO SUSPECT THAT NO ACTION IS GOING TO BE TAKEN ON VIETNAMESE MARINES FROM THE MACV END FOR SOME TIME. I WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED AND WILL ALSO REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF HIS MEETING WITH THE JGS WHEN WE CAN GET A READ-OUT.

283

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

UNCLAS/EI

HEADQUARTERS
1st MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

1st MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG 1st MAF		20 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL	DATE	COPY# / OF# COPIES RECD	
			040724Z	MAY 69	1 / 5	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG			5 MAY		EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS (U)
	DCG			25 MAY		REMARKS
	DCG AIR					THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND
	G/S					MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN
	DC/S		5/20	5/20		7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION
	DC/S PLAN					ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
1	S/S	Z	5/14			ORIG - G-1 (FOR SPEC 3V6)
	G-1					REL - G-1
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

Copy 3 to G-1 08 10 10 24 May 69
Shaufalan

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RTECZYUW RHMMAFA0510 1240724-0000--RUEBHOA RUMHFA RUMHAA
RUMHVA.

ZNY 00000

R 040724Z MAY 69

FM CG XII MAF

TO RUEBHOA/CMG

INFO RUMHFA/CG TNEPAC

RENHAA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHVA/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS (U)

A. CMG MSG 251636Z MAR 69 (U-NGEO)

1. (C) REF A REQUESTED RESULTS OF AN EXAMINATION OF THE
FEASIBILITY OF RETURNING EXCESS RECREATION FUNDS TO THE
CENTRAL MARINE CORPS RECREATION FUND.

2. (U) DURING THE RECENT ASP-1 FIRE THE FREEDOM HILL COMPLEX
SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE. CONSIDERATION OF REBUILD INCLUDES
SOURCES OF FUNDS, BOTH APPROPRIATED AND NONAPPROPRIATED. IN
ADDITION, EXPANSION OF OTHER KEY COMMON USER RECREATION
FACILITIES IN THE DANANG AREA IS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

3. (C) THEREFORE WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT FEASIBLE TO COMMENT ON
THE DESIRABILITY OR THE AMOUNT OF FUNDS WHICH COULD BE WITHDRAWN

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA0510 C O N F I D E N T I A L - NGEO

FROM THE MEMBERS OF THE FUND. WE WILL PROVIDE DETAILS ON PLANS AND
PROGRESS AS SOON AS A FIRM RESOLUTION OF REQUIREMENTS AND
ABILITY TO EXECUTE THEM IS REACHED.

4. (U) THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS REQUESTED BY REF A FOLLOW BY
REGISTERED MAIL.

GP-4

BT

0510

CONFIDENTIAL

#19

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5215 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM 00 III MAF		DATE 06 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 060526Z	1,2,3, 4	COPY# OF COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I			10 05 Sam	REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. "HAS BEEN SENT"
4	DCG	I			11 May	
5	DCG AIR	I			09V	
2	C/S	I			14 05 Sam	
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	5/6			
	6-1					
	6-2					
	6-3					

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

From: Chief of Staff

5/6/69

To: C. S.

With your
concurance,
I will re address
060526Z
for info to:

Gettys
Simpson
Quilley

OK - 7 May 69
Walter Hilliard
in line here
to talk today
1330c

G. E. DOOLEY

SECRET

O 060526Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG XXIV CORPS
 ZEM

S E C R E T

EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN STILWELL FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 ENEMY SITUATION IN I CORPS

1. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE THE ENEMY APPEARS TO BE READYING HIMSELF TO RESUME OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ONCE AGAIN. WHERE HIS PRINCIPAL EFFORTS WILL BE DIRECTED STILL REMAINS UNCLEAR. CERTAINLY HIS POSTURE FAVORS MOVES IN SEVERAL AREAS. HE HAS POSITIONED FORCES IN THE ADJACENT TO THE DMZ AND IN WESTERN QUANG TRI. IN THE SOUTH FORCES OF DIVISION SIZE GIVE EVIDENCE OF AN INCREASING THREAT TO QUANG NGAI/MO DUC/DUC PHO AREAS.
2. IN THIS REGARD I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT WE MAINTAIN A FLEXIBLE AND BALANCED POSTURE DURING THE POTENTIALLY HIGHER THREAT PERIOD 10-25 MAY IN ORDER TO RESPOND PROMPTLY AND DECISIVELY ONCE THE ENEMY COMMITS HIMSELF OR HIS WHEREABOUTS IS DETERMINED.
3. OPERATIONS WHICH KEEP THE PRESSURE ON HIS LOC'S MAY UPSET OR PREEMPT A MAJOR ATTACK. TO THIS END YOUR CONCEPT FOR APACHE SNOW IS CERTAINLY MOST APPROPRIATE AND ONE WHICH I FULLY ENDORSE. HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF PRESENT UNCERTAINTY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION AND IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A FLEXIBLE POSITION IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, I AM RELUCTANT TO BECOME TOO HEAVILY COMMITTED JUST AT THIS TIME. ACCORDINGLY, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONSIDERATION OF DELAYING ENTRY OF 3RD MARDIV UNITS INTO APACHE SNOW UNTIL AFTER 25 MAY. THIS WOULD PERMIT ADDITIONAL TIME FOR THE SITUATION TO CLARIFY WITHOUT BEING TOO DISRUPTIVE TO THE OVERALL CONCEPT FOR THE OPERATION YOU HAVE PLANNED FOR THE LOWER DAKRONG-UPPER ASHAU AREA. AT THE SAME TIME SUFFICIENT FORCES WILL BE RELATIVELY FREE FOR COMMITMENT SHOULD THE ENEMY PRESENT US WITH A LUCRATIVE TARGET. IN THIS REGARD, REQUEST YOU BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE TWO BN REGT/BDE FORCE WITH NORMAL SUPPORTING SLICE FOR EMPLOYMENT ANYWHERE IN I CORPS ON 12 HOURS NOTICE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

450

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

#18

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

JTMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 26 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 060528Z	1, 2, 3, 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECD		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I		4 MAY	N	REMARKS ① "HAS BEEN SENT"
4	DCG				N	
5	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	5/6			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

O 0605 04Z 73
 FM CG III
 TO COM
 ZEM

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. I HAVE BEEN KEEPING A CLOSE WATCH ON DEVELOPING ENEMY ACTIVITIES AND IT APPEARS THAT THE WEIGHT OF AVAILABLE EVIDENCE NOW SUGGESTS 10-25 MAY AS A HIGH THREAT PERIOD. WHERE THE PRINCIPAL ENEMY EFFORT WILL BE MADE IS STILL UNCLEAR. HOWEVER, HIS POSTURE WILL SUPPORT MOVES IN SEVERAL AREAS. HE HAS POSITIONED FORCES IN AND ADJACENT TO THE DMZ, IN WESTERN QUANG TRI, FURTHER TO THE WEST IN LAOS AND BA 611. IN THE SOUTH FORCES OF UP TO DIVISION SIZE GIVE EVIDENCE OF INCREASING THREAT TO QUANG NGAI/MO DUC/DUC PHO AREAS. WE'VE SEEN SUFFICIENT INDICATIONS WHICH POINT TO A REPEAT OF THE OFFENSIVE PATTERN OF ACTIVITY EXPERIENCED ON 23 FEB.

2. ACCORDINGLY I HAVE TAKEN THE FOLLOWING PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES:

A. DIRECTED ALL COMMANDS TO INCREASE THEIR STATE OF ALERT AND TO TAKE APPROPRIATE SECURITY MEASURES TO COUNTER EXPECTED ENEMY ATTACKS WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO PROTECTION OF POPULATED AREAS.

B. REQUESTED 7TH FLT MAINTAIN ARG/SLF IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS PREPARED FOR EMPLOYMENT ANYWHERE IN LITTORAL OF I CORPS WITH PARTICULAR PRIORITY TO QUANG NGAI PROVINCE.

C. REQUESTED ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL MOBILE STRIKE FORCE BN TO PROVIDE INCREASED REACTION CAPABILITY DURING THE FORTHCOMING HIGH THREAT PERIOD.

D. INITIATED AN INCREASED RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT IN NW AND WESTERN QUANG TRI.

E. I'VE ASKED DICK STILWELL TO BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY A TWO BN REGT/BDE ANYWHERE IN I CORPS ON 12 HOURS NOTICE.

F. IN COORDINATION WITH LTGEN LAM AND BGEN LEE INITIATED OPERATIONS IN VICINITY OF HOI AN TO PRE-EMPT RENEWED ENEMY ATTACKS THERE. THE SLF BLT PRESENTLY COMMITTED THERE CAN BE REEMBARKED IN SHORT NOTICE IF REQUIRED ELSE WHERE.

G. MAINTAINED CONTINUED PRESSURE ON ENEMY'S FAVORITE STAGING AREAS AND LOC'S.

H. REVIEWED STEEL CABLE PLANS AND AM PREPARED TO SUBMIT TIMELY RECOMMENDATIONS ON RECOMMENDED AREAS OF EMPLOYMENT IF STEEL CABLE REINFORCING BDES ARE REQUIRED BY DEVELOPING SITUATION IN I CORPS.

GP-4

488

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 05 MAY 69	
			SERIAL N/CONTROL DATE 0 060553Z		1,2,3,4 COPY# OF COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS (1)
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
3	C/S					HAS BEEN SENT
2	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S		5/6			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

0 060553Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
INFO CG-FIRST MARDIV
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO GEN SIMPSON FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
COMUSMACV VISIT TO HQ III MAF ON 7MAY69

A. YOUR 050814Z MAY69

1. FOLLOWING ITINERARY PROVIDED TO SUPPORT SUBJ VISIT IAW
REF (A):

070930H	ARRIVE DANANG BASE OPNS
0935-0945	FLYOVER ASP-1 AREA TO TERMINATE AT FREEDOM HILL (LZ 54)
0945-1010	TOUR FREEDOM HILL-TRANSIENT CENTER AREA BY JEEP
1010-1020	ENROUTE III MAF HQ (HELO)
020-1040	DISCUSSIONS WITH CG III MAF
1040-1200	III MAF BRIEF AS REQUESTED
1200-1320	LUNCH WITH CG III MAF
1320-1330	ENROUTE 1ST MARDIV
1330-1500	AS ARRANGED BY CG 1STMARDIV TO TERMINATE AT DANANG BASE OPNS
1500-----	DEPART FOR TSN

SSO NOTE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
GP-4
180

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 25 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 281515Z		1,2,3, 4 COPY# OF COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG		7 May		N	REMARKS (1)
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					"HAS BEEN SENT"
2	C/S	I			(S)	
	D C/S					Feedback
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	5/6		AM 2/8	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

0 061010Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR MGEN TOWNSEND, C/S MACV, FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
SUBJ: LUMBER INDUSTRY IN NICTZ

1. AS YOU KNOW, DICK STILWELL IS QUITE INTERESTED IN FURTHERING THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN NICTZ. I AM QUITE INTERESTED IN DICK'S PROPOSALS AND SUPPORT FULLY WHAT HE IS DOING. IN THIS REGARD I HAVE MAILED A MEMORANDUM TO GEN ABRAMS ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH YOU HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED. I INTEND TO TALK TO HIM AT LENGTH TOMORROW ABOUT THE MEMORANDUM AND FORESTRY AND LUMBERING IN I CORPS.

2. THE ABOVE IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY.
SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

GP-4
150

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

#21

HEADQUARTERS
II, MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 06 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 061430Z		1, 2, 3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG	V	7 May 69		N	POSS GAS ATTACK
	DCG					REMARKS
	DCG AIR					<p><i>HAS BEEN SENT</i> <i>See</i> <i>ATTN Com Kung</i></p> <p><i>Feedback</i></p> <p><i>enclosed</i></p>
2	C/S	E				
	D C/S					
	D C/SDM					
1	S/S	F	31 7		M D	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HQS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

P 064430Z
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 ZEM

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

SUBJ: POSSIBLE GAS ATTACK INVOLVING M/3/4 ON 4 MAY 1969

1. DURING OUR CONVERSATION THIS MORNING YOU INQUIRED ON THE POSSIBLE GAS ATTACK INVOLVING M/3/4 ON 4 MAY. THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED AS INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US AT THE PRESENT TIME:
 - A. AT 0710H THE POINT OF THE LEAD SQUAD OF ONE PLATOON DETECTED ENEMY CLAYMORES IN VICINITY OF XD 970618. THE PLATOON HALTED IMMEDIATELY, ONE COMMAND DETONATED CLAYMORE WAS FIRED AND RESULTED IN 2 USMC KIA, 3 USMC WIA (E).
 - B. DETONATION OF THE CLAYMORE WAS FOLLOWED BY 5 SMALL EXPLOSIONS IN THE AIR WITH LITTLE CONCUSSION OR FRAGMENTATION. THE EXPLOSIONS WERE LOUD LIKE CONCUSSION GRENADES RATHER THAN GAS GRENADES.
 - C. THE POINT SQUAD IMMEDIATELY RECEIVED SAF FROM THE EAST FLANK FROM 1 OR 2 NVA. 3 NVA WERE SPOTTED 150 METERS NORTH, MOVING EAST. NO LATER EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD. (THE ORIGINAL 5 EXPLOSIONS COULD HAVE BEEN PROPELLING CHARGES FOR AN AIR BURST OR ORDNANCE COULD HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED IN TREES AND DETONATED.)
 - D. ARTILLERY, 81 MM MORTARS AND FIXED WING WERE USED ON ENEMY POSITIONS WHILE EVACUATION WAS COMPLETED.
 - E. ABOUT 6 HOURS LATER ONE PLATOON MOVED INTO THE AREA OF INITIAL CONTACT AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE MEN COMPLAINED OF BURNING SENSATIONS OF THE EYELIDS, FOREHEAD AND EXPOSED SKIN PLUS CRAMPS OF THE ARMS, HANDS AND LEGS WITH CONSTRICTION OF THE MOUTH AND STOMACH MUSCLES RESULTING IN NAUSEA. UNIT SUSPECTED CHEMICAL AGENT AND MOVED BACK OUT OF AREA. THOSE INDIVIDUALS MOST AFFECTED WERE EVACUATED (10 MEDEVAC)
 - F. THE POSSIBILITY THAT A DRY AGENT CACHE WAS DETONATED BY ENEMY ORDNANCE OR FRIENDLY SUPPORTING ARMS SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED AS MANY OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH THE ABOVE SYMPTOMS DID NOT ENTER OR COME NEAR THE AREA OF THE ORIGINAL CONTACT.
 - G. THERE WERE NO BLISTERS ON THE SKIN AND 3D MED SUSPECTS AGENT WAS CS.
 - H. TROOPS DID NOT HAVE THEIR GAS MASKS AT THE TIME.
2. AS SOON AS WE HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER ON THIS, I WILL PASS IT ON TO YOU.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

420

#22

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

*For C/S
FOLLOW UP*

*6 May 69
Send to Bull Base
as requested.*

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE GAS ATTACK INVOLVING M/3/4 ON 4 MAY 1969.

AT 0710H THE POINT OF THE LEAD SQUAD OF ONE PLATOON DETECTED ENEMY CLAYMORES IN VICINITY OF XD 970618. THE PLATOON HALTED IMMEDIATELY. ONE COMMAND DETONATED CLAYMORE WAS FIRED AND RESULTED IN 2 USMC KIA, 3 USMC WIA (E).

DETONATION OF THE CLAYMORE WAS FOLLOWED BY 5 SMALL EXPLOSIONS IN THE AIR WITH LITTLE CONCUSSION OR FRAGMENTATION. THE EXPLOSIONS WERE LOUD LIKE CONCUSSION GRENADES RATHER THAN GAS GRENADES.

THE POINT SQUAD IMMEDIATELY RECEIVED SAF FROM THE EAST FLANK FROM 1 OR 2 NVA. 3 NVA WERE SPOTTED 150 METERS NORTH, MOVING EAST. NO LATER EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD. (THE ORIGINAL 5 EXPLOSIONS COULD HAVE BEEN PROPELLING CHARGES FOR AN AIR BURST OR ORDNANCE COULD HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED IN TREES AND DETONATED.)

ARTILLERY, 81 MM MORTARS AND FIXED WING WERE USED ON ENEMY POSITIONS WHILE EVACUATION WAS COMPLETED.

ABOUT 6 HOURS LATER ONE PLATOON MOVED INTO THE AREA OF INITIAL CONTACT AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE MEN COMPLAINED OF BURNING SENSATIONS OF THE EYELIDS, FOREHEAD AND EXPOSED SKIN PLUS CRAMPS OF THE ARMS, HANDS AND LEGS WITH CONSTRICTION OF THE MOUTH AND STOMACH MUSCLES RESULTING IN NAUSEA. UNIT SUSPECTED CHEMICAL AGENT AND MOVED BACK OUT OF AREA. THOSE INDIVIDUALS MOST AFFECTED WERE EVACUATED (10 MEDEVAC).

#22

THE POSSIBILITY THAT A DRY AGENT CACHE WAS DETONATED BY ENEMY ORDNANCE OR FRIENDLY SUPPORTING ARMS SHOULD NOT BE OVER LOOKED AS MANY OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH THE ABOVE SYMPTOMS DID NOT ENTER OR COME NEAR THE AREA OF THE ORIGINAL CONTACT.

THERE WERE NO BLISTERS ON THE SKIN AND 3D MED SUSPECTS AGENT WAS CS.

TROOPS DID NOT HAVE THEIR GAS MASKS AT THE TIME.

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 08 MAY 69	
			SERIALN/CONTROL DATE 0 0712/5Z		1,2,3, COPYN OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I	8 May			REMARKS (1) <u>READDRESSAL OF</u> <u>HAS BEEN SENT.</u> Feedback
4	DCG	I	11 May			
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	5/8			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

O 071205Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG 1ST MARDIV
 G 1ST NAV
 CG AMERICAL DIVISION

ZEM

S E C R E T

FOR MGEN SIMPSON, MGEN GUILIER AND MGEN GETTYS FROM LTGEN
 NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLWOING MESSAGE IS READDRESSSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

O 060526Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG XXIV CORPS

ZEM

S E C R E T

EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN STILWELL FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 ENEMY SITUATION IN I CORPS

1. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE THE ENEMY APPEARS TO BE READYING HIMSELF TO RESUME OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ONCE AGAIN. WHERE HIS PRINCIPAL EFFORTS WILL BE DIRECTED STILL REMAINS UNCLEAR. CERTAINLY HIS POSTURE FAVORS MOVES IN SEVERAL AREAS. HE HAS POSITIONED FORCES IN THE ADJACENT TO THE DMZ AND IN WESTERN QUANG TRI. IN THE SOUTH FORCES OF DIVISION SIZE GIVE EVIDENCE OF AN INCREASING THREAT TO QUANG NGAI/MO DUC/DUC PHO AREAS.

2. IN THIS REGARD I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT WE MAINTAIN A FLEXIBLE AND BALANCED POSTURE DURING THE POTENTIALLY HIGHER THREAT PERIOD 10-25 MAY IN ORDER TO RESPOND PROMPTLY AND DECISIVELY ONCE THE ENEMY COM-

MITTS HIMSELF OR HIS WHEREABOUTS IS DETERMINED.

3. OPERATIONS WHICH KEEP THE PRESSURE ON HIS LOC'S MAY UPSET OR PREEMPT A MAJOR ATTACK. TO THIS END YOU CONCEPT FOR APACHE SNOW IS CERTAINLY MOST APPROPRIATE AND ONE WHICH I FULLY ENDORSE. HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF PRESENT UNCERTAINTY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION AND IN GRDR TO MAINTAIN A FLEXIBLE POSITION IN THE IMMEDIALE FUTURE, I AMIRE-LUCIANT TO BECOME TOO HEAVILY COMMITTED JUST AT THIS TIME. ACCORD-INGLY, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONSIDERATION OF DELAYING ENTRY OF 3RD MARDIV UNITS INTO APACHE SNOW UNTIL AFTER 25 MAY. THIS WOULD PERMIT ADDITIONAL TIME FOR THE SITUATION TO CLARIFY WITHOUT BEING TOO DISRUPTIVE TO THE OVERALL CONCEPT FOR THE OPERATION YOU HAVE PLANNED FOR THE LOWER DAKRONG-UPPER ASHAU AREA. AT THE SAME TIME SUFFICIENT FORCES WILL BE RELATIVELY FREE FOR COMMITMENT SHOULD THE ENEMY PRE-SENT US WITH A LUCRATIVE TARGET. IN THIS REGARD, REQUEST YOU BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE TWO BN REGT/BDE FORCE WITH NORMAL SUPPORTING SLICE FOR EMPLOYMENT ANYWHERE IN I CORPS ON 12 HOURS NOTICE. WARM REGARDS. ✓

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

GP-4
 400

*8 May 69
 4/5
 I expect a request to
 come from 3rd Corp on
 the point.*

O 090123Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO CG XXIV CORPS
ZEM

S E C R E T

SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN STILWELL FROM LIGEN NICKERSON

A. YOUR PHB 0842 071700Z MAY 69

1. DESIGNATIONS OF RESERVE AND EMPLOYMENT OF 9TH MARINES AS
OUTLINED REF A APPROVED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

GP-4

075

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 131517Z	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 131517Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN OUT		INITIAL	SUBJECT READDRESSAL OF XXIV CORPS 131145Z	
3	CG	I	15 May		N	REMARKS (1) THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P8511.4.	
	DCG		15 May		X		
	DCG AIR					THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT. HAS BEEN SENT. <i>Feedback</i>	
2	C/S	A			X		
	DC/S					D	
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	I	5/14		J/D		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

(29)
TOP SECRET

0 131517Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO CG XXIV CORPS
 ZEM

TOP SECRET
 FOR MGEN TOWNSEND, INFO LTGEN STILWELL FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

0 131145Z
 FM LTG STILWELL CG XXIV CORPS
 TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF
 ZEM

TOP SECRET PHB 0882 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: TRESPASS OF LAOTIAN BORDER

1. GENERAL TRUONG AND I VISITED 3/1 ARVN THIS MORNING, LANDING AT BATTALION TAC CP ON ROUTE 922 AT APPROXIMATELY YD 195038. THE BATTALION IS STRUNG OUT ALONG ROAD, FROM THAT POINT EASTWARD; AND IS OPERATING TO THE NORTH THEREOF. PRINCIPAL TASK OF BATTALION IS TO CHECK SIDES OF ROAD FOR BURIED SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT; IN THIS THEY HAVE DONE VERY WELL SO FAR.
2. FOR REASONS OF ELEMENTAL SECURITY, BATTALION COMMANDER HAS SECURITY DETACHMENTS DEPLOYED 2-300 METERS TO THE SOUTH OF ROAD. THIS, ACCORDING TO MAP TRACE, PUTS HIM ACROSS THE BORDER.
3. TRUONG AND I CONSIDER THAT BATTALION COMMANDER'S DISPOSITIONS ARE ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE; AND THAT THEREFORE HIS DISPOSITIONS ARE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.
4. IT IS MY ESTIMATE THAT THE BATTALION WILL BE IN THE AFOREMENTIONED POSTURE FOR ANOTHER 40 HOURS, AT WHICH TIME THE BATTALION WILL BEGIN MOVEMENT ON A NORTHERLY AXIS TO SEARCH AND CLEAR THE RIDGES AND DRAWS LEADING AWAY FROM ROUTE 922.
4. YOUR COC HAS BY NOW RECEIVED THE SPOT REPORT ON THE CRASH OF THE 101ST ABN DIV LCH JUST WEST OF THE BORDER AND TO THE SOUTH OF THE 3/1 ARVN ACTIVITY. OPERATING ON PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED INTERPRETATION OF THE RCE, GEN. ZAIS TOOK THE NECESSARY ACTION TO EXTRACT THE THREE PERSONNEL ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT, AFTER WHICH IT WAS DESTROYED BY FIRE FROM ARA AND FIXED WING AIRCRAFT.
5. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
 GP-4
 200

(Handwritten signature) 29/1)

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

ZIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM III MAF		DATE 14 MAY 69	
			SERIALS/CONTROL DATE 141281X	COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I		15 May	N	INVESTIGATION OF PHUOC MY HAMLET REMARKS ① 'HAS BEEN SENT' Feedback
4	DCG	I		15 May	N	
	DCG AIR	I				
2	C/S	I			D	
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	5/4		SM DS	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

0 141000Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
INFO

SECRET BEFORE EYES ONLY

FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM BGEN DOOLEY
INVESTIGATION OF THE PHUOC MY HAMLET INCIDENT ON 15 APRIL
INVOLVING THE ROKMC

A. CG III MAF 181500Z APR 69

1. THE BOARD OF INVESTIGATION DISCUSSED IN REF A HAS COMPLETED ITS WORK AND SUBMITTED ITS REPORT TO LTGEN LAM. THE BOARD WAS COMPOSED OF AN AMERICAN OFFICER (SENIOR MEMBER), A VIETNAMESE OFFICER AND A KOREAN OFFICER. FOLLOWING IS A SYNOPSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. THAT ROKMC BDE MAKE SOLATIUM PAYMENTS ASAP FOR THE DEATHS, WOUNDS AND PROPERTY DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY CIVILIANS AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT.

B. THAT ROKMC BDE TAKE APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATHS, INJURIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE.

C. THAT I CORPS, TOGETHER WITH ROKMC BDE, EMBARK ON AN IMMEDIATE, VIGOROUS PSYOPS/CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM DESIGNED TO BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ROKMC AND THE CIVILIAN POPULACE IN THE ROKMC TAOR.

D. THAT SECURITY FOR THE ROAD SWEEP ON HIGHWAY NR 1 FROM THE CAU IAU BRIDGE TO THE BA REN BRIDGE (UREA OF DISSENSION BETWEEN ROKMC AND VN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) BE PROVIDED BY ARVN (RF).

E. THAT REGULAR AND SUSTAINED LIAISON BE ESTABLISHED AND MAINTAINED BETWEEN ROKMC BDE UNITS PROVIDING ROAD SWEEP SECURITY AND THE ARVN (RF UNITS) WHENEVER THEY OPERATE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY.

2. I POINT OUT THAT THESE ARE THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BOARD. THE REPORT OF FINDINGS OF FACTS, OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WAS SUBMITTED TO LTGEN LAM SUNDAY EVENING, 11 MAY, FOR HIS FINAL ACTION. COPIES OF THE INVESTIGATION HAVE BEEN PROVIDED LTGEN NICKERSON AND BGEN LEE. DUE TO THE LENGTH OF THE REPORT, I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT IT HAS BEEN TRANSLATED INTO VIETNAMESE OR KOREAN AT THIS TIME.

3. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT BGEN LEE'S REACTION TO THE REPORT WAS OR WILL BE. HOWEVER, I SUBMIT THAT HE AND HIS MEMBER OF THE BOARD WERE MOST COOPERATIVE THROUGHOUT THE INVESTIGATION. I AM SURE THAT HIS MEMBER KEPT HIM ADVISED OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

4. I WILL INFORM YOU WHEN LTGEN LAM'S ACTION IS COMPLETED OR SHOULD ANYTHING OF SIGNIFICANCE OCCUR BEFORE THAT TIME. WE WILL THEN PROVIDE YOU WITH A COPY OF THE COMPLETED INVESTIGATION.

5. AS THE INVESTIGATION HAS JUST BEEN COMPLETED AND ALL PARTIES HAVE NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW/UPPROVE THE RECOMMENDATIONS, I WOULD URGE CAUTION IN ANY BRIEFINGS/DISCUSSIONS OUTSIDE THE US FAMILY AT THIS TIME.

USO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

HEADQUARTERS
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

CGN:038/OUT

FILE:DH

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG 415 015		14 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
			141230Z MAY 69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2-1	CG		15 MAY		N	FOR LTGEN STILWELL
2-2	DCG	J	15 MAY		N	REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	J				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	J	5/15			
	G-1					
	G-2					
3	G-3	J	15 MAY			
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMS/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTG					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

ORIG: S/S
REL: 66

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

Feedback

CONFIDENTIAL

HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

OTTCZYUW RHMMAFA2071 1341230-CCCC--RUMLBPA.
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 141230Z MAY 69
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
 TO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PNB RVN
 BT

FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L/FOR LTGEN SYLVELL FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 SUBJ: VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE (C)

1. I HAD MY CHIEF CALL CARTER TOWNSEND TODAY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS ANY GUIDANCE TO BE ISSUED CONCERNING BRIEFINGS FOR MR. ROGERS. SPECIFICALLY, CARTER WAS ASKED IF WE WOULD RECEIVE ANY FALL-OUT FROM GENERAL ABRAMS' VISIT WITH THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY OR IF IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT HE, GENERAL ABRAMS, WOULD FORWARD ANY GUIDANCE UPON HIS RETURN. THE ANSWER WAS NEGATIVE IN BOTH CASES. CARTER DID EMPHASIZE THAT MR. ROGERS DESIRED THAT THE BRIEFINGS BE KEPT TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM AND THAT HIS TIME BE SPENT PRINCIPALLY IN VISITING UNITS AND PEOPLE. HE ASKED THAT THE BRIEFINGS BE KEPT LOW-KEY, AVOIDING ANY CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES WHICH ARE MORE APPROPRIATELY ADDRESSED BY GENERAL ABRAMS. HE FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT OUR BRIEFINGS STICK TO THE FACTS WITHOUT ANY EDITORIALIZING.

2. THE ABOVE IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION

GP-4

BT

2071

HAS BEEN SENT**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 141000Z MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 141000Z	1,2,3	COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXPLOITATION OF BASE AREA 607
			IN	OUT		
3	CG		15 MAY		N	REMARKS (1) THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4...
4	DCG		15 MAY		M	
	DCG AIR					THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
2	C/S	T			D	
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	F	5/14		AM H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	HAS COPY				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT
Feedback

(30)
TOP SECRET

0 141800Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG XXIV CORPS
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY

FOR LTGEN STILWELL FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

SUBJ: EXPLOITATION OF BASE AREA 607

A. CG XXIV CORPS 130054Z MAY69 (TS)

1. YOUR REQUEST WHICH SPEAKS OF THE SUSPECTED PRESENCE OF CONSIDERABLE ENEMY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IN BASE AREA 607 IS VIEWED WITH INTEREST.
2. MILITARILY YOUR TIMING IS GOOD IN ONE SENSE IN THAT YOUR FORCES ARE AVAILABLE AND POISED FOR THE RIF REQUESTED. IN ANOTHER SENSE, I DO NOT DESIRE TO HAVE FORCES COMMITTED THERE IF AVOIDABLE BECAUSE OF HIGHER PRIORITY COMPLETING REQUIREMENTS ELSEWHERE IN I CORPS.
3. AT THIS POINT IN TIME, BA 607 POSES NO IMMEDIATE THREAT. FORCES WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ENGAGE THAT TARGET CAN BE MORE PROFITABLE EMPLOYED IN THOSE AREAS WHERE THE THREAT IS INSTANT, CONSTANT, AND DEFINITELY MORE CERTAIN. MY MAJOR CONCERN AT THE MOMENT IS FOR THOSE AREAS WHERE TROOP DENSITY IS INADEQUATE. CORRECTION OF THIS SITUATION MUST BE MY PRIORITY UNDERTAKING FOR NOW.
4. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I DO NOT INTEND TO TAKE ACTION ON YOUR PROPOSAL AT THIS TIME. MEANWHILE, REQUEST YOU OBTAIN SUCH ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE AS POSSIBLE (CCM) TO STRENGTHEN THE CASE. I SUSPECT, AS YOU DO, THAT THE SUPPLIES ARE THERE. REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY, DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

GP-4
 200

HAS BEEN SENT

NNNNXX

~~TOP SECRET~~

30W

30(1)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 14 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 1416527 / 45		COPY# 1,2,3 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	J	15 May		N	PHASE II PIERCE VALLEY REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4... THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
4	DCG	J	15 May		N	
5	DCG AIR	J			AG	
2	C/S	L				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	E	5/15		A	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

(31)
TOP SECRET

0-1234567 1234
 56789101112

TO SSO AMERICAL DIVISION
 ZEM

TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN GETTYS FROM LIGEN NICKERSON
 PHASE II PIERCE VALLEY

1. WHILE RECOGNIZING THEY WERE DELAYED IN INITIATING OPERATIONS, THE RETURNS FROM DELTA FORCE TO DATE HAVE NOT BEEN TOO REMUNERATIVE IN PRODUCING HARD INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. WE'LL NEED TO KNOW A GREAT DEAL MORE BEFORE A RECOMMENDATION CAN BE SUBMITTED TO GEN ABRAMS WITH RESPECT TO PHASE II PIERCE VALLEY. OUR EXPERIENCE INDICATES THE NEED FOR A MAXIMUM RECON EFFORT FROM NOW UNTIL 25 MAY SINCE I BELIEVE COMUSMACV WILL BE EXPECTING A RECOMMENDATION BY THEN.

2. CLOSELY RELATED TO THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENT FOR SOLID INTELLIGENCE INFO ON THE KHAM DUC/BA 614 AREA IS AN ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT NOW FACING YOU IN THE AMERICAL AO AND ITS IMPACT ON YOUR ABILITY TO RELEASE FORCES FOR PHASE II OPS IN PIERCE VALLEY IF A DECISION IS MADE TO EXECUTE.

3. TO ASSIST ME IN DEVELOPING A RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION I WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING YOUR VIEWS BY 25 MAY ON THE FOLLOWING PLUS ANY OTHER FACTORS YOU CONSIDER PERTINENT:

A. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ENEMY SITUATION NOT ONLY OF KHAM DUC/BA 112 AREA BUT IN THE ENTIRE AMERICAL AO AS WELL.

B. A RECOMMENDATION AS TO EXECUTION, POSTPONEMENT OR CANCELLATION OF PHASE II WITH SUPPORTING RATIONALE.

C. AMERICAL'S CAPABILITY TO EXECUTE SUBSEQUENT PHASES OF PIERCE VALLEY (IF SUCH A DECISION IS MADE) WITH PERHAPS ONLY TWO ADDITIONAL ARVN BNS AND NO US REINFORCEMENTS.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

201

NNN

HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET

(Handwritten signature) 31(1)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 6216 (REV 3-66)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 15 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 151400Z		COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT REQ FOR BRIGADE
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I	16 May			REMARKS ① fuel tank - HAS BEEN SENT has been read through to you Base for info Call 45 (ECT) and tell him this was sent by me via AT COMUS NEGAT
2	DCG	I	16 May			
5	DCG AIR	I				
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	5/16			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

Call 45
6/19/69

O 151400Z ZYM

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

SECRET

FOR MGEN TOWNSEND, CHIEF OF STAFF MACV FROM LT GEN NICKERSON

A. CG III MAF 121040Z MAY 69

B. COMUSMACV MAC 6135 141248Z MAY 69

C. COMUSMACV MAC 6139 141459Z MAY 69

D. CG III MAF 141728Z MAY 69

1. IN REF A I EXPRESSED MY VIEWS CONCERNING THE THREATS IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN I CORPS, THE IMPLICATION OF SHIFTING XXIV CORPS ELEMENTS SOUTHWARD AT THIS TIME AND RECOMMENDED THAT AN ADDITIONAL BDE SIZED FORCE BE DEPLOYED TO I CORPS TO INCREASE THE TROOP DENSITY IN THE AMERICAL DIVISION AO. WM IN LIGHT OF CONTINUED ENEMY PRESSURE IN SICIZ AND THE FACT THAT CHARLIE GETTY'S FORCES ARE SEVERELY TAXED IN MEETING THE INCREASED THREAT I HAVE ORDERED THE DEPLOYMENT TODAY OF A 2 BN BDE OF 101ST AVN DIV (AM) TO TAM KY AND PLACED IT UNDER THE OPCON OF AMERICAL DIVISION. (REF D). THE AFLOAT SLF HAS BEEN POSITIONED OFF THE COAST BETWEEN TAM KY AND QUANG NGAI AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT IF REQUIRED. THE SECOND SLF, CURRENTLY ENGAGED ASHORE IN OPN DARING REBEL, HAS BEEN ALERTED TO BE PREPARED TO RE-EMBARK ON Y HOURS NOTICE TO ASSUME THE ROLE OF A MOBILE RESERVE.
2. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE (REF C) THE ENEMY HAS SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED HIS FORCES IN AND NORTH OF THE DMZ AND WESTERN QUANG TRI.
3. AS NOTED IN REF A THERE IS A NEED TO INCREASE THE TROOP DENSITY IN THE SICIZ IF SATISFACTORY PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE TOWARD IMPROVING OUR PACIFICATION EFFORTS THERE. THE PRESENT INCREASED THREAT HIGHLIGHTS THE PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH MY PREFERENCE WAS NOT TO SHIFT XXIV CORPS ELEMENTS CONSIDERING THE NORTHERN THREAT, THE URGENCY OF THE SOUTHERN SITUATION AT THIS TIME DICTATED THE COURSE OF ACTION I HAVE CHOSEN NOTWITHSTANDING THE RISKS INVOLVED.
4. I BELIEVE THAT WITH THE FORCES NOW ALLOCATED TO SICIZ WE CAN COUNTER THE CURRENT THREAT THERE. HOWEVER, THE OVERALL BALANCE OF FORCES REMAINS DELICATE IN VIEW OF THE DUAL THREAT WE FACE. TO COMBAT THIS THREAT I WOULD PREFER TO RETURN THE ELEMENTS OF THE 101ST AVN DIV (AM) TO XXIV CORPS TO PROVIDE DICK STILWELL WITH SOME FLEXIBILITY TO REACT AND TO BOLSTER THE AMERICAL DIVISION WITH A BRIGADE FROM SOURCES EXTERNAL TO III MAF, IF PROVIDED.
5. ACCORDINGLY, TO IMPROVE MY PRESENT POSTURE IN LIGHT OF THE DUAL THREAT FACING US AND TO RAISE THE TROOP DENSITY TO A LEVEL WHICH PERMITS US TO MOVE AHEAD TOWARD SOLVING THE PACIFICATION SITUATION IN SICIZ, I REAFFIRM THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DPLYMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE FORCE TO I CORPS.
6. AS A RELATED MATTER THIS MORNING I RECOMMENDED TO LT GEN LAM THAT HE CONSIDER MOVING AN ARVN REGT FROM THE NORTH TO THE TWO SOUTHERN PROVINCES. HE INDICATED THAT HE IS CONSIDERING MOVING AN ADDITIONAL BATTALION OF THE 3-48 ARVN REGT.

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 16 MAY 69	
			SERIALS / CONTROL DATE 0 140055		1, 2, 3, 4 COPIES OF COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS (2) HAS BEEN SENT
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	5/16		WJ B-15	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

ZEW

S E C R E T

HANDLE VIA NAVY CIRCUITS ONLY

FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS READDRESSSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

QUOTE

O 191400Z

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEW

S E C R E T

FOR MAJEN TOWNSEND, CHIEF OF STAFF MACV FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. CG III MAF 121840Z MAY 69

B. COMUSMACV MAC 6135 141248Z MAY 69

C. COMUSMACV MAC 6139 141459Z MAY 69

D. CG III MAF 141728Z MAY 69

1. IN REF A I EXPRESSED MY VIEWS CONCERNING THE THREATS IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN I CORPS, THE IMPLICATION OF SHIFTING XXIV CORPS ELEMENTS SOUTHWARD AT THIS TIME AND RECOMMENDED THAT AN ADDITIONAL BDE SIZED FORCE BE DEPLOYED TO I CORPS TO INCREASE THE TROOP DENSITY IN THE AMERICAL DIVISION AO.

2. IN LIGHT OF CONTINUED ENEMY PRESSURE IN SICIZ AND THE FACT THAT CHARLIE BETTY'S FORCES ARE SEVERELY TAXED IN MEETING THE INCREASED THREAT I HAVE ORDERED THE DEPLOYMENT TODAY OF A 2 BN BDE OF 181ST AVN DIV (AM) TO TAM KY AND PLACED IT UNDER THE OPCON OF AMERICAL DIVISION. (REF D). THE AFLOAT SLF HAS BEEN POSITIONED OFF THE COAST BETWEEN TAM KY AND QUANG NGAI AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT IF REQUIRED. THE SECOND SLF, CURRENTLY ENGAGED ASHORE IN OPN DARING REBEL, HAS BEEN ALERTED TO BE PREPARED TO RE-EMBARK ON 6 HOURS NOTICE TO ASSUME THE ROLE OF A MOBILE RESERVE.

3. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE (REF C) THE ENEMY HAS SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED HIS FORCES IN AND NORTH OF THE DMZ AND WESTERN QUANG TRI.

4. AS NOTED IN REF A THERE IS A NEED TO INCREASE THE TROOP DENSITY IN THE SICIZ IF SATISFACTORY PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE IN THE COMING AND PARTICIPATION EFFORTS THERE. THE PRESENT TROOPING THREAT FULFILLS THE PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH MY PREFERENCE WAS NOT TO SHIFT XXIV CORPS ELEMENTS CONSIDERING THE ENEMY THREAT, THE URGENCY OF THE SOUTHERN SITUATION

BALANCE OF FORCES REMAINS DELICATE IN VIEW OF THE DURESS WE FACE. TO COMBAT THIS THREAT I WOULD PREFER TO RETURN THE ELEMENTS OF THE 101ST ABR DIV (AM) TO XXIV CORPS TO PROVIDE DICK STILWELL WITH SOME FLEXIBILITY TO REACT AND TO COLSTER THE AMERICAL DIVISION WITH A BRIGADE FROM SOURCES EXTERNAL TO III MAP, IF PROVIDED.

6. ACCORDINGLY, TO IMPROVE MY PRESENT POSTURE IN LIGHT OF THE DUAL THREAT FACING US AND TO RAISE THE TROOP DENSITY TO A LEVEL WHICH PERMITS US TO MOVE AHEAD TOWARD SOLVING THE PACIFICATION SITUATION IN SICIZ, I REAFFIRM THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE FORCE TO I CORPS.

7. AS A RELATED MATTER THIS MORNING I RECOMMENDED TO LTGEN LAN THAT HE CONSIDER MOVING AN ARVN REGT FROM THE NORTH TO THE TWO SOUTHERN PROVINCES. HE INDICATED THAT HE IS CONSIDERING MOVING AN ADDITIONAL BATTALION OF THE 54TH ARVN REGT.

UNQUOTE

SSG NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY.
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

34(2)

OP-4
500

NNNN

SECRET

HAS BEEN

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

ZIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM OO III MAF		DATE 16 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 161342Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT READERSSAL OF MAF 6248 EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ①
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F 5/17			H	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET

O 161342Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 ZEM
 S E C R E T

SECRET

HANDLE VIA NAVY CIRCUITS ONLY
 FOR LT GEN BUSE FROM LT GEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS READDRESSSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:
 QUOTE

O 161015Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN
 TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 6248 EYES ONLY
 REF: CG III MAF 151400Z MAY 69

1. YOUR MOVE IN REDEPLOYING THE TWO-BATTALION BRIGADE OF THE
 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION AND HOLDING BLT 3-26 AFLOAT OFF SOUTHERN
 I CTZ IS UNDERSTOOD, REEMBARKING BLT 2-26 WILL GIVE YOU ADDED
 FLEXIBILITY.

2. I CONCUR THAT FORCES CURRENTLY DEPLOYED IN SOUTHERN I CTZ CAN
 COUNTER THE ENEMY THREAT THERE. IN ADDITION E TWO BATTALIONS
 AFLOAT WILL GIVE YOU A RESERVE WHICH MAY REACT WHERE REQUIRED
 THROUGHOUT I CTZ.

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, IT IS CONSIDERED UNTIMELY TO COMMIT
 ANY FORCES UNDER OPLAN STEEL CABLE AT THIS TIME.

UNQUOTE

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY.
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

GP-4
 ZS0

SECRET

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

#36

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

CCN:047/OUT

FILE:DH

III MAF FORM 5213 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 16 MAY 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 161630Z MAY 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SAC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. ORIG: S/S REL: CG
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

SECRET**EXCLUSIVE
FOR****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

CITTSZYUW RHMMFA2442 1361630-SSSS--RUHMF.A.

ZNY SSSSS

O 161630Z MAY 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHMF.A/CG FMFPAC

BT

S E C R E T/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWIN MESSAGES ARE READDRES FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE: CG III MAF 151400Z MAY 69

O 151400Z

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

S E C R E T

FOR MGEN TOWNSEND, CHIEF OF STAFF MACV FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. CG III MAF 121040Z MAY 69

B. COMUSMACV MAC 6135 141248Z MAY 69

C. COMUSMACV MAC 6139 141459Z MAY 69

D. CG III MAF 141728Z MAY 69

1. IN REF A I EXPRESSED MY VIEWS CONCERNING THE THREATS IN
NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN I CORPS, THE IMPLICATION OF SHIFTING
XXIV CORPS ELEMENTS SOUTHWARD AT THIS TIME AND RECOMMENDED
THAT AN ADDITIONAL BDE SIZED FORCE BE DEPLOYED TO I CORPS TO
INCREASE THE TROOP DENSITY IN THE AMERICAL DIVISION AO.2. IN LIGHT OF CONTINUED ENEMY PRESSURE IN SICTZ AND THE
FACT THAT CHARLIE GETTY'S FORCES ARE SEVERELY TAXED IN
MEETING THE INCREASED THREAT I HAVE ORDERED THE DEPLOYMENT
TODAY OF A 2 BN BDE OF 101ST AVN DIV (AM) TO TAM KY AND
PLACED IT UNDER THE OPCON OF AMERICAL DIVISION. (REF D).
THE AFLOAT SLF HAS BEEN POSITIONED OFF THE COAST BETWEEN TAM
KY AND QUANG NGAI AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT IF
REQUIRED. THE SECOND SLF, CURRENTLY ENGAGED ASHORE IN OPN
DARING REBEL, HAS BEEN ALERTED TO BE PREPARED TO RE-EMBARK
ON 6 HOURS NOTICE TO ASSUME THE ROLE OF A MOBILE RESERVE.

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SECRET

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SECRET

3. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE (REF C) THE ENEMY HAS SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED HIS FORCES IN AND NORTH OF THE DMZ AND WESTERN QUANG TRI.

4. AS NOTED IN REF A THERE IS A NEED TO INCREASE THE TROOP DENSITY IN THE SICIZ IF SATISFACTORY PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE TOWARD IMPROVING OUR PACIFICATION EFFORTS THERE. THE PRESENT INCREASED THREAT HIGHLIGHTS THE PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH MY PREFERENCE WAS NOT TO SHIFT XXIV CORPS ELEMENTS CONSIDERING THE NORTHERN THREAT, THE URGENCY OF THE SOUTHERN SITUATION AT THIS TIME DICTATED THE COURSE OF ACTION I HAVE CHOSEN NOTWITHSTANDING THE RISKS INVOLVED.

5. I BELIEVE THAT WITH THE FORCES NOW ALLOCATED TO SICIZ WE CAN COUNTER THE CURRENT THREAT THERE. HOWEVER, THE OVERALL BALANCE OF FORCES REMAINS DELICATE IN VIEW OF THE DUAL THREAT WE FACE. TO COMBAT THIS THREAT I WOULD PREFER TO RETURN THE ELEMENTS OF THE 101ST ABN DIV (AM) TO XXIV CORPS TO PROVIDE DICK STILWELL WITH SOME FLEXIBILITY TO REACT AND TO COLSIER THE AMERICAL DIVISION WITH A BRIGADE FROM SOURCES EXTERNAL TO III MAF, IF PROVIDED.

6. ACCORDINGLY, TO IMPROVE MY PRESENT POSTURE IN LIGHT OF THE DUAL THREAT FACING US AND TO RAISE THE TROOP DENSITY TO A LEVEL WHICH PERMITS US TO MOVE AHEAD TOWARD SOLVING THE PACIFICATION SITUATION IN SICIZ, I REAFFIRM THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE FORCE TO I CORPS.

7. AS A RELATED MATTER THIS MORNING I RECOMMENDED TO LTGEN LAM THAT HE CONSIDER MOVING AN ARVN REGT FROM THE NORTH TO THE TWO SOUTHERN PROVINCES. HE INDICATED THAT HE IS CONSIDERING MOVING AN ADDITIONAL BATTALION OF THE 54TH ARVN REGT.

UNQUOTE
QUOTE COMUSMACV 161051Z MAY 69
O 161015Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN
TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF
ZEM

SECRET MAC 6248 EYES ONLY
REF: CG III MAF 151400Z MAY 69

1. YOUR MOVE IN REDEPLOYING THE TWO-BATTALION BRIGADE OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION AND HOLDING BLT 3-26 AFLOAT OFF SOUTHERN I CTZ IS UNDERSTOOD, REEMBARKING BLT 2-26 WILL GIVE YOU ADDED FLEXIBILITY.

2. I CONCUR THAT FORCES CURRENTLY DEPLOYED IN SOUTHERN I CTZ CAN COUNTER THE ENEMY THREAT THERE. IN ADDITION THE TWO BATTALIONS AFLOAT WILL GIVE YOU A RESERVE WHICH MAY REACT WHERE REQUIRED THROUGHOUT I CTZ.

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, IT IS CONSIDERED UNTIMELY TO COMMIT ANY FORCES UNDER OPLAN STEEL CABLE AT THIS TIME.

UNQUOTE

BT *Group-4*
2442

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SECRET
#37

TOP SECRET

0000ZYLW RHHMAFA2445 161632Z-TTTT--RUHHMA.

ZNY TTTT

O 161632Z MAY 69

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

TOP SECRET / SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/ MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NECKERSON1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS READDRESSSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:
QUOTE CG III MAF 121040Z MAY 69

O 121040Z ZYH

FM CG III MAF

TO SSO MACV

INFC CG FIRST MARDIV

CG FIRST MAW

SSO AMDIV

SSO XKIV CORPS

ZEM

TOP SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO

FOR W/GEN TOWNSEND, CHIEF OF STAFF MACV

III MAF OPS/INTELL, SUMMARY 121200H MAY 69

A. CG III MAF 120321Z MAY 1969

1. GENERAL. THE ENEMY'S CURRENT OFFENSIVE BEGAN SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT LAST NIGHT. DURING THE FIRST TWELVE HOURS THERE WAS A SHARP RISE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY. IN THE MORN, THE ATTACKS TOOK THE FORM OF ATTACKS BY FIRE INTERSPERSED WITH GROUND PROBES AND AFTER ATTACKS. WHILE ACTION WAS REPORTED IN ALL FIVE PROVINCES OF I CORPS THE MAJORITY OF THE ENEMY'S EFFORT APPEARED TO BE FOCUSED UPON THE SOUTHERN THREE PROVINCES.

2. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITY. EN INITIATED ATKS BEGAN TO OCCUR THROUGHOUT ICTZ AT APPROX 0100H. IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, MAG-39 (YD 305505) REC'D 7X122MM RKT'S RESULTING IN MOD DAM TO 7 CH-46 A/C AND LIGHT DAM TO 1 OV-10 AND 1 UH-1E. IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE SCATTERED INDIRECT FIRE ATKS OCCURRED NORTH OF HUE CITY ITSELF REC'D 3 OR 4X122MM RKT'S RESULTING IN 1 CIV WIA AND 1 TB HOSPITAL BLDG DAM. IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, ATKS APPEARED TO BE CONCENTRATED ON REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION CP'S AS WELL AS SEVERAL CAL LOCATIONS. INITIAL ATKS WERE IN GENERAL CHARACTERIZED BY MORTARS AND RPG FOLLOWED BY LIMITED GND PROBES. 1ST MARRS CP (AT 995623) REC'D IN EXCESS OF 50 RDS EACH OF MORTAR AND RPG FOLLOWED BY A PROBING ATK FROM THE SOUTH. THE EN REACHED THE WIRE BUT WAS BEATEN OFF. COUNTER ATTACKING FORCE WAS IN PSM TO ENVELOP EN AS HE PULLED BACK. 2/1 MAR CP (BT 072699) REC'D A COORDINATED MORTAR AND GND ATK. THE EN EMPLOYED TEAR GAS

EXCLUSIVE**FOR****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

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III MAF 2100/4

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32 (1)
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

USING MORTAR SHELLS BUT FWD PERSONNEL DOWNED MAINTAINED QUICKLY AVOIDING ANY SIGNIFICANT EFFECT. THE 5TH MAR CP (AT 875416) ALSO REC'D A COORDINATED MORTAR AND GND ATK AS AN EST BN CO ASSAULTED THE 1ST AND REACHED THE WIRE BEFORE BEING DRIVEN OFF BY AF AND DIRECT FIRE OF TANKS AND 105MM HOWITZERS. THE 7TH MAR CP (AT 964612) REC'D UNK/82MM MORT RDS WITHOUT AN ASSOCIATED GND ATK. THE 26TH MAR CP (AT 993753) REC'D RPG FIRE VIC LUNG CO BRIDGE WITH NO GND ATK. THE LAAM DIRY REC'D UNK/82MM MORT RDS RESULTING IN 1 USMC KIA AND 2 HAWK MISSILES IGNITED WHICH FLEW OFF AND PROBABLY IMPACTED IN THE OCEAN. THE 11TH ROX CO CP REC'D A GND ATK AND 40X60MM MORT RDS. DIEN BAN REC'D 6 RDS OF UNK TYPE INCOMING AND THE 7TH ROX CO REC'D 3X60MM MORT RDS. THE 59TH RF BN (BT 616684) REC'D AN ATK WITH MORTARS AND GAS. ONE ARVN RGR CO WAS RPT'D IN CONTACT IN THE DODGE CITY AREA. AT 0448H, DANANG AIRBASE REC'D 5X140MM RKT'S RESULTING IN 1 SPOOKY DAMAGED. IN QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES, THE FOLLOWING UNIT LOCATIONS REPORTED INCOMING. LZ'S CHARLIE BROWN (BS 952222), BRONCO (BS 812383), RAYONET (BT 549216), BALDY (BT 143453), HAWK HILL (BT 231315), SAN JUAN (BS 634380), PROFESSIONAL (BT 173278), QUANG NGAI CITY, SON TIN DISTRICT HQ AND TAM KY. THE FOLLOWING UNIT LOCATIONS REC'D BOTH INCOMING AND GND PROBES: LZ'S CENTER (BT 052253), ROSS (BT 027342), BUFF (BS 938824), GATOR (BS 538961) AND SNOOPIE (BS 709618). CHU LAI REC'D 4 UNK CAL RKT'S (NEG DAM). THE NUI YON RF CAMP (BT 249168) IS BELIEVED TO BE OVERRUN. AT 120525H A CAP COMPOUND LOCATED IN THE VIC CAU LAU BRIDGE (BT 167377), WAS OVERRUN RESULTING IN 6 RMC KIA, 3 RMC WIA, 11 PF KIA AND 12 PF WIA.

THE ENEMY CONTINUED HIS OFFENSIVE EFFORTS INTO THE DAYLIGHT HOURS OF 12 MAY S ADDITIONAL REPORTS OF ATTACKS BY FIRE IN WIDELY SCATTERED AREAS OF ICTZ WERE RECEIVED. AT 0920H THIS MORNING VANDEGRIFT CBT BASE REC'D FIVE SUSP 140MM RKT'S (NEG CAS/DAM). AT 0923H, AN HOA CBT BASE REC'D SEVEN UNK SIZE RKT'S. TWO IMPACTED INSIDE PERIMETER. RES: 1 USA WIA(E). AT 1014H, CHU LAI CBT BASE RPT'D FOUR INCOMING RKT'S OF UNK SIZE. TWO RDS IMPACTED IN WATER. SLIGHT MATL. DAM. NEG CAS RPT'D.

3. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS. THE MAJOR ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING THE FIRST 12 HOURS OF HIS RENEWED OFFENSIVE EFFORT WAS DIRECTED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY AGAINST UNITED STATES MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, COMMAND POSTS, ASES, AND AIRFIELDS. A FEW POPULATION CENTERS WERE ALSO TARGETS.

A. THERE ARE STRIKING SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THIS ATTACK AND THE ONE WHICH OCCURRED ON 23 FEBRUARY 1969. (1) THE ATTACKS ARE WIDE-SPREAD AND CORPS-WIDE. (2) THEY ARE CHARACTERIZED BY ATTACKS BY FIRE INTERSPERSED WITH SAPPER ATTACKS AND GROUND PROBES. (3) ALTHOUGH ATTACKS BY FIRE HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES THE PRINCIPAL ATTACKS HAVE OCCURRED IN SOUTHERN I CORPS. (4) THE ATTACKS EXPERIENCED THUS FAR HAVE LACKED REAL PUNCH AND SUGGEST THAT THE ENEMY'S INTENTION IS TO ASSERT HIS PRESENCE AND CAPABILITY OF HARASSING OUR FORCES RATHER THAN DIRECTED AT SEIZING MAJOR OBJECTIVES (I.E. DANANG, HUE, ETC.) AND POSSIBLY TO COVER TROOP MOVEMENTS.

GP-1

BT

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32(2)
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OYTZYUW RHMMAFA2444 1331632-TYTT--RUMMFA.

ZNY TTTT

O 131632Z MAY 69

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T / SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/ MAPANE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR LIGEN BUSE FROM LIGEN NICKERBOG

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS READDRESSSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE CG III MAF 121040Z MAY 69

O 121040Z ZYH

FM CG III MAF

TO SSO MACV

INFO CG FIRST MARDIV

CG FIRST MAW

SSO ANDIV

SSO XXIV CORPS

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO

B. DAMAGE TO DATE, BOTH TO PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL, CONSIDERING THE WIDESPREAD NATURE OF THE ATTACK, APPEARS TO BE MINIMAL. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE USUAL PLACES IMMEDIATELY TO THE SOUTH OF DANANG: HOA VANG -- THE CAM LE AND CAN DO BRIDGES -- THE TUY LOAN BRIDGE AND DAI LA AREAS WERE NOT SUBJECTED TO SERIOUS ATTACKS AND THE MASSING OF FORCES IN THIS AREA HAS NOT YET MATERIALIZED. IN THE LAST TWO MAJOR EFFORTS BY THE ENEMY -- IN THE THIRD OFFENSIVE IN AUGUST AND AGAIN IN THE POST-TET '69 EFFORT -- THE ENEMY RECOGNIZING HIS INFERIORITY IN BOTH FIREPOWER AND MOBILITY MADE HIS MAJOR EFFORT IN THE FIRST 24 HOURS KNOWING THE TYPE REACTION HE COULD EXPECT FROM OUR FORCES. HE COULD BE FOLLOWING THE SAME PATTERN THIS TIME, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF EITHER CONTINUED LOW LEVEL OFFENSIVE ACTION OR THE POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR EFFORT -- WITH THE ATTACKS OF LAST NIGHT BEING ONLY THE FIRST PHASE.

C. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS ANALYSIS IS A TENTATIVE ASSESSMENT BASED ON FRAGMENTARY REPORTS AND ONLY ELEVEN HOURS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

4. ACTIONS TAKEN AND PLANNED

A. IN REVIEWING LAST NIGHT'S ACTIONS OUR FORCES WERE MORE THAN ADEQUATE IN SIZE TO HANDLE THE INITIAL ENEMY EFFORTS THOUGH NOT WITHOUT SUFFERING SOME LOSSES. AS INDICATED ABOVE HIS INITIAL FLURRY OF ATTACKS WAS AGAIN CONCENTRATED IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES AND IN THIS AREA WE CAN ALREADY COUNT 222 ENEMY KIA. AVE FOR THE CAP COMPOUND AND THE NUI YON RF CAMP OUR UNITS SUCCESSFULLY DEFEATED THE ATTACKS. WE RECENTLY HAVE TAKEN A NUMBER OF PREEMPTIVE ACTIONS WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY AFFECTED THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO ATTACK WITH GREATER FORCE AND EFFECT. IN THE 1ST

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TOP SECRET

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HARDENED AREA, FOR EXAMPLE, AT LEAST 233 ENEMY HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE PAST THREE DAYS 8KM NNE OF AN HOA. AT THE SAME TIME, OPERATION DARING REBEL/VU NINH 03 HAS CERTAINLY DISRUPTED THE ENEMY'S PLANS AGAINST HOA AN. THE OPERATION JUST SOUTH OF THAT CITY, ON BARRIER ISLAND, HAS IN THE PAST SEVEN DAYS, ACCOUNTED FOR MORE THAN 226 EN KIA, 197 VC POW, 66 VCI CAPTURED, AND NUMEROUS HOI CHANHS. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT HOA AN, THE QUANG NAM PROVINCE CAPITAL, WAS NOT ATTACKED DURING THIS LATEST COORDINATED OFFENSIVE. C. NO MAJOR TROOP SHIFTS HAVE BEEN MADE. OUR OVERALL POSTURE IS SOUND. AT THIS JUNCTURE I BELIEVE ANY SIGNIFICANT REDISPOSITION WOULD BE PREMATURE. HOWEVER, AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE BEEN WATCHING THE SITUATION IN QUANG NGAI CAREFULLY AND HAVE ALTERED THE UNCOMMITTED ARG/SLF FOR POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT IN THAT AREA. ALL THE NECESSARY COORDINATION HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THEY'RE PREPARED TO RESPOND ON SHORT NOTICE. IT COULD WELL DEVELOP THAT MORE THAN A BDE MAY BE REQUIRED FOR THE TASK AHEAD. IN THIS REGARD A TWO BN BDE OF THE 101ST ABN (AM) IS ON 12 HOURS NOTICE FOR EMPLOYMENT ANYWHERE IN I CORPS WHICH I COULD USE PROVIDING THE CURRENT DMZ AND WESTERN QUANG TRI SITUATIONS IS NOT ALTERED SUBSTANTIALLY. AS YOU WILL RECOGNIZE THE SITUATION IN SICHU HAS FOR SOME TIME INDICATED A NEED TO INCREASE OUR TROOP DENSITY THERE EVEN WITHOUT THE PRESENT THREAT TO QUANG NGAI, I BELIEVE THAT AN ADDITIONAL BDE SIZED FORCE COULD BE PROFITABLY EMPLOYED IN AMERICAL'S AO. SINCE WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR A MOVE IN THE DMZ OR WESTERN QUANG TRI AREAS, I WOULD PREFER NOT TO SHIFT XXIV CORPS ELEMENTS SOUTH. ACCORDINGLY, RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO DEPLOYING NOW A BDE FORCE TO I CORPS FOR EMPLOYMENT IN AMERICAL AO.

D. IN SUMMARY, THE ENEMY'S INITIAL MOVES HAVE BEEN HANDLED WITHOUT BREAK IN STRIDE OR DISRUPTING CURRENT OPERATIONS NOW UNDERWAY. WE'RE WELL POSTURED FOR HIS NEXT MOVE AND WITH AN ADDITIONAL BDE CHARLIE GETTYS' CAPABILITY TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE IN THE TWO SOUTHERN PROVINCES WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED.

5. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY CONTAINED IN REF A.

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BT

2444

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TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 17 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 170958Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT CASUALTIES
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	J	18 May		N	REMARKS ① Feedback
3	DCG	J	18 May		ny	
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	D C/S	J				
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9. REF B REVEALS THAT DURING THE FIRST 48 HOURS OF THE ENEMY'S RECENT INCREASED ACTIVITY, 34 OF THE 68 ENEMY GROUND ATTACKS COUNTRY-WIDE OCCURRED IN ICTZ. THIS SUGGESTS A GREATER INTENSITY OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE EFFORT IN THIS AREA. WHEN THE ENEMY TAKES THE OFFENSIVE, OUR CASUALTIES INEVITABLE RISE IN PROPORTION TO HIS, JUST AS THE REVERSE IS TRUE WHEN WE STEP UP OUR OFFENSIVE EFFORTS. IT IS PARTICULARLY NOTE-WORTHY THAT SEVERAL GROUND ATTACKS DURING THE PERIOD WERE CONDUCTED BY SAPPER UNITS. A SAPPER ATTACK WHICH ACHIEVES ANY SUCCESS AT ALL WILL OFTEN PRODUCE AN UNFAVORABLE KILL RATIO BASED ON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE ENEMY TO SACRIFICE LIVES IN ORDER TO INFLICT MAXIMUM CASUALTIES. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS KIND OF ATTACK OCCURRED AT FSB AIRBORNE ON 13 MAY. THE INITIAL SPOT REPORT REFLECTED IN REF A SHOWED 20 FRIENDLY KIA AND 20 ENEMY KIA. (THE FIGURES WERE SUBSEQUENTLY UPDATED TO 22 FRIENDLY KIA AND 32 ENEMY KIA.) MY CONCLUSION HERE IS NOT SO MUCH THAT OUR ENEMY-FRIENDLY KILL RATIO CAME IN LARGE PART FROM A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF ENEMY GROUND ATTACKS, BUT RATHER THAT THIS CATEGORY OF CONFLICT PRODUCED FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WHICH INCREASED ALERTNESS COULD POSSIBLY HAVE MINIMIZED. THE PROBLEM HAS MY PERSONAL ATTENTION, AND IN THE MATTER OF GROUND ATTACKS/SAPPER ATTACKS WE CONTINUE TO SEEK AND EXPLOIT LESSONS LEARNED.

10. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE HAVE RECENTLY OBSERVED AN ENEMY TACTIC WHICH CONSISTS OF EMPLOYING A VERY FEW MEN IN A WELL CONCEALED AND WELL DUG IN CELLULAR DEFENSIVE POSITION FROM WHICH THEY LAUNCH B-40 ROCKETS IN HEAVY BARRAGES AGAINST OUR MANEUVERING FORCE. THIS TOO IS A SACRIFICIAL TACTIC FOR ULTIMATELY BY HEAVY USE OF FIREPOWER AND PROPER MANEUVER WE CARRY THE POSITION. WHILE HIS LOSSES MAY BE COMPLETE, THEY ARE FEW, TOTALLING PERHAPS 5 TO 10. ON THE OTHER HAND, HIS INITIAL B-40 BARRAGE FIRES INFLICT A DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES ON US. AMERICAN DIV, IN IT'S EFFORTS TO RETAKE NUI YON RF CAMP, ENCOUNTERED THAT TACTIC.

11. FROM ALL OF THIS, I BELIEVE IT REASONABLE TO SAY THAT THE PICTURE HERE IN III NAF IS SUBSTANTIALLY BETTER THEN THAT PORTRAYED BY REFERENCE A.

GP-3

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

900

39-2

SECRET

P 170958Z

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

SECRET

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM L GEN NICKERSON

CASUALTIES (U)

SECRET

A. COMUSMACV MAC 6179 150323Z MAY 69

B. COMUSMACV MAC 6135 141248Z MAY 69

1. IN REF A YOU REQUESTED COMMENTS ON THE APPARENT KILL RATIO IMBALANCE IN III MAF UNITS DURING THE PERIOD 10 - 13 MAY AS RELATED TO COUNTRYWIDE PERCENTAGES OF US KIA AND ENEMY KIA BY US FORCES DURING THAT PERIOD.

2. ALTHOUGH I DO NOT LIKE THE BODY COUNT TECHNIQUE OF JUDGING MILITARY PROGRESS, AS TRANSLATED TO ENEMY-FRIENDLY KILL RATIO IT RECEIVES MY UNDIVIDED ATTENTION AT EACH DAY'S BRIEFING. THE KILL RATIO SERVES TO FOCUS MY ATTENTION ON APPARENT USELESS OR DISPROPORTIONATE CASUALTIES. IN TURN WE SEEK TO DETERMINE THE REASONS FOR AN UNFAVORABLE RATIO AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, DEVELOP AND EXPLOIT LESSONS LEARNED.

3. EXAMINATION OF OUR REPORTS TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS FOR THE PERIOD SHOWN IN REF A REPORT 904 ENEMY KIA VICE 880.

4. NINE SUBSEQUENT INCIDENTS OF ENEMY BODIES FOUND PRODUCED 135 ADDITIONAL ENEMY KIA. EIGHT LATE REPORTS ADD 75 ENEMY KIA TO OUR TOTALS. THESE FIGURES, ATTRIBUTED TO THE PERIOD 10 - 13 MAY, CHANGE THE RATIO AS FOLLOWS: 1114 EN/169FR; A RATIO OF 6.5:1.

5. WHEN WE DELETE FRIENDLY CASUALTIES FROM MINES AND SURPRISE FIRING DEVICES, TOTALLING 13 FR KIA, THE RATIO CHANGES AS FOLLOWS: 1114 EN/156FR; A RATIO OF 7:1.

6. WHEN WE FURTHER ELIMINATE CASUALTIES SUFFERED IN ATTACKS BY FIRE (10 FR KIA) AND AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN (22 FR KIA), THE RATIO CHANGES AS FOLLOWS: 1114 EN/124 FR; RATIO 9:1.

7. MINES AND SURPRISE FIRING DEVICES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR A HIGH PROPORTION OF OUR CASUALTIES UNDER "NORMAL" CIRCUMSTANCES. WE HAVE PUBLICIZED AND EMPLOYED ALL THE LESSONS LEARNED WITHOUT ELIMINATING THIS PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH THE EFFORT IS CONTINUOUS. CASUALTIES FROM THIS SOURCE SEEM TO GO HAND IN GLOVE WITH AGGRESSIVE SWEEPING AND PATROLLING.

8. ROUTINELY, WE SUFFER A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF CASUALTIES FROM AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN. (FOR THE PERIOD 10 - 13 MAY, 22

FRIENDLY KIA). AGAIN, THESE HIGH RATES REFLECT THE TEMPO OF OUR OPERATIONS -

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

CGN:052/OUT

FILE:DH

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAR		DATE 18 MAY 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 181410Z MAY 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT FOR LTGEN BUSE
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	CG					REMARKS ORIG: 6-1 G-1 REL: CG FOP
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	F				
	DC/S	F	5/19	5/19		
	DC/S DM					
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	ADJ					
	CAP					
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	ENGR					
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	H&S CO					
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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #40

UNCLAS EFT

PTIEZYUW RHMMFA2719 1381410-EEEE--RUHMFA.
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 181410Z MAY 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHMFA/CG FMFPAC
 BT

FOR

UNCLAS E F TO FOR LIGEN BUSE FROM LIGEN NICKERSON
 FREEDON HILL, R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER SITUATION, UPDATE

1. WE HAVE MADE GOOD PROGRESS ON THE EMERGENCY REBUILD OF THE R&R/TRANSIENT CENTER. THE MESS HALL, OLD BARRACKS AND THE TRANSIENT TERMINAL REPAIRS ARE COMPLETE. FORLOG-COMD HAS SHIFTED BOTH TRANSIENT AND R&R PROCESSING OPERATIONS FROM CHINA BEACH TO THE ABOVE FACILITIES. IN ORDER TO ALLEVIATE BILLET SHORTAGE LOCAL PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REPORT ON DAY OF SCHEDULED FLIGHT. WORK I WELL ALONG ON REBUILD OF THE NEW BARRACKS, R&R TERMINAL AND LOUNGE. THE INTERIOR OF THE R&R TERMINAL IS BEING MODIFIED TO PROVIDE FOR SMOOTHER PROCESSING.
2. SAFETY REPAIRS HAVE BEEN MADE AT THE RECREATION CENTER. USO PERSONNEL ARE WORKING AT OTHER USO CENTERS. RED CROSS CLUB-MOBILE IS OPERATING OUT OF THE RED CROSS BILLET. PLANS AND PRIORITIES ARE BEING ESTABLISHED FOR RAPID AND COMPLETE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FREEDOM HILL RECREATION COMPLEX, ESSENTIALLY AS IT WAS. APPROPRIATED FUND SOURCES WILL BE USED FOR THE STRUCTURAL REBUILD OF THOSE ELEMENTS AT THE FREEDOM HILL RECREATION COMPLEX WHICH WERE SO FUNDED. NON-APPROPRIATED FUNDS WILL BE USED WHERE NECESSARY FOR INTERIOR ITEMS NOT PROVIDED BY APPROPRIATED FUNDS. ASSISTANCE IN THIS LATTER INSTANCE FROM MACV, GRANTS, LOANS OR INSURANCE REVENUES WILL BE CONSIDERED. POST EXCHANGE CONCESSIONAIRES AND USO WILL REFUND THEIR OWN INTERIOR REQUIREMENTS.
3. IN ADDITION WE ARE CONSIDERING AN EXPANSION OF THE CHINA BEACH FACILITY, PARTICULARLY IN DEVELOPMENT OF A LARGER DAY USER FACILITY. WE ARE ALSO LOOKING INTO DEVELOPMENT NEAR CHINA BEACH EXCHANGE OF A CENTRALLY LOCATED INDOOR/OUTDOOR SPORTS AREA. WE HOPE TO USE JOINT NON-APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR THIS PURPOSE. THERE IS A SLIGHT EVIDENCE OF MACV INTEREST IN FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE IN-COUNTRY R&R CENTER THERE. WE ARE LOOKING INTO THE CAPABILITY OF THE LIMITED AVAILABLE SPACE AT CHINA BEACH TO SUSTAIN INCREASED DEVELOPMENT OF THIS FACILITY. OUR MAIN CONSIDERATION IS THE NECESSITY OF PROVIDING SUFFICIENT DAY USER RECREATIONAL AREA AND FACILITIES.

BT

2719

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UNCLAS EFTO

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 3216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 19 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 190622Z	1, 2, 3, 4	COPY# OF COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT GEN ABRAMS FROM LTG NICKERSON
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I	30 May		N	REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4... THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
4	DCG	I				
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HAS BEEN SENT
Feed Back

(33)

TOP SECRET

O 150222 ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO C ONEMAFC
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T

FOR GENERAL ABRAMS FROM LTGEN WICKERSON

SUBJ: VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO ICIZ ON 18 MAY 1969

1. THE SECRETARY ENTERED I CORPS AT PHU BAI WHERE HE WAS MET BY LTGEN LAM, LTGEN STILWELL AND MYSELF. WE PROCEEDED TO XXIV CORPS BRIEFING ROOM WHERE WE GAVE HIM AN OVERVIEW OF I CORPS. RGEN DWYER PRESENTED THE III MAF SIDE COVERING THE ENEMY THREAT, ALLIED TACTICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPOSITIONS, RECENT AND CURRENT OPERATIONS, STATUS OF PACIFICATION AND RVNAF IMPROVEMENT. DICK STILWELL REVIEWED THE DISPOSITIONS OF UNITS WITHIN HIS CORPS, BRIEFLY DESCRIBED RECENT AND CURRENT OPERATIONS AND DESCRIBED PROGRESS MADE IN PACIFICATION IN XXIV CORPS, I.E., EXPANDING ROAD NETWORKS, RELAXING OF FISHING RESTRICTIONS, THE BUDDING LUMBERING ACTIVITIES, RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES, ETC.

2. DURING THE COURSE OF DICK'S PRESENTATION ON OPERATIONS NEAR BA 611 (SUCH AS DEWEY CANYON AND APACHE SNOW) THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THE RESTRICTIONS LIMITING FRIENDLY MANEUVER INTO LAOS DID NOT APPEAR TO MAKE MUCH SENSE. HE ALSO ASKED IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE WERE PERMITTED TO MANEUVER INTO THE SHDMZ. AT THIS POINT, GENERAL ABRAMS TOOK OVER THE FLOOR AND DESCRIBED THE ACTIONS OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION IN DEFEATING THE 320TH NVA DIVISION EARLY LAST FALL IN THE CENTRAL DMZ AREA. IN ESSENCE, HIS MESSAGE WAS THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD HAVE MORE FREEDOM TO MOVE INTO THE SHDMZ OF INTO LAOS IN ORDER TO EXPLOIT A GIVEN SITUATION SUCH AS THE ACTION AGAINST THE 320TH NVA DIVISION OR IN DEWEY CANYON, BUT NOT JUST FOR THE SAKE OF CONDUCTING PREPLANNED CROSS BOUNDARY OPERATIONS AS A MATTER OF COURSE. THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED AND GAVE THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT HE FAVORED SOME RELAXATION OF THE CURRENT RULES.

3. AFTER THIS BRIEFING WE PROCEEDED TO THE USS REPOSE WHERE HE VISITED THE TROOPS. HIS SON IS A NAVIGATOR ON THE REPOSE AND HE WAS TRAVELLING WITH THE SECRETARY'S PARTY WHILE THE SECRETARY WAS IN VIETNAM. LUNCH WAS HELD TOPSIDE ON THE REPOSE WITH AMBULATORY PATIENTS PRESENT.

4. FROM THERE, THE PARTY PROCEEDED TO THE GIA DANG FISHING VILLAGE WHERE THE SECRETARY WAS BRIEFED BY THE QUANG TRI PROVINCE CHIEF, COL AN. THE EMPHASIS HERE WAS ON PACIFICATION AND THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF IT.

5. FROM GIA DANG THE PARTY MOVED TO THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AT DONG HA WHERE RGEN JONES BRIEFED ON CURRENT OPERATIONS IN HIS AO, INFILTRATION ROUTES, ETC. THE SECRETARY TALKED WITH TROOPS FROM THE 3D FORCE RECON COMPANY AND THEN PROCEEDED TO THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION AT LZ NANCY. RGEN TRUONG AND OTHER OFFICERS WERE PRESENT AND TRUONG

33(1)

5. FROM HERE THE PARTY MOVED TO THANG HOA, QUANG BINH PROVINCE. COL THAI, AND THE SENIOR MILITARY ATTACHE, COL BOWEN, FINISHED WITH A VISIT OF THE RESETTLEMENT CAMP AT THANG HOA. WEATHER MOVED IN AT THIS TIME AND VISIT TO AN FSB OF THE 101ST WAS SCRUBBED AND THE PARTY MOVED BACK TO XXIV CORPS HEADQUARTERS.

7. FURTHER INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS FOLLOWED AND DURING THIS TIME, THE SECRETARY CALLED ME ASIDE AND SAID IN SUBSTANCE: I DON'T UNDERSTAND THIS LAST BORDER SITUATION. I SEE NO REASON WHY WE SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CROSS THE BORDER. THE LAO'S ARE OUR FRIENDS AND OUR ALLIES. IF THE LAO'S CAN OPERATE THERE, IT WOULD APPEAR TO ME THAT WE SHOULD HAVE THE SAME PRIVILEGE. I WILL TALK TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THIS WHEN I GET BACK TO WASHINGTON, BUT IT WOULD APPEAR TO ME THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE THE PRIVILEGE OF OPERATING ACROSS THAT BORDER WITHOUT ANY RESTRICTIONS BEING IMPOSED. END. DURING THIS CONVERSATION, HE AGAIN COMMENTED ON THE DMZ SITUATION. HE INTIMATED THAT AS FAR AS HE IS CONCERNED, WE SHOULD ALSO HAVE THE FREEDOM TO MANEUVER IN THE DMZ. HE SAID THAT

HE HAD ADVISED THE PRESIDENT IN THE CASE WITH KOREA -- THIS IS A DIFFERENT CASE, THOUGH. HE SAID HE WOULD TALK TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT US OPERATING IN THE DMZ ALSO.

8. WEATHER WAS LAID BY THE SECRETARY AT THE SAIGON GRAVE SITE WHERE SEVERAL HUNDRED UNIDENTIFIED VIETNAMESE VICTIMS OF TET CAN BE SEEN. GOOD PHOTO COVERAGE. LAO AND DAN DISCUSSED VC ACTS WITH THE SECRETARY AT LENGTH.

9. PRIOR TO TAKE OFF AND BY ROUTE TO PHU LAI THE OFFICIAL PARTY CHIEF FLEW BDE CITY. THE SECRETARY DEPARTED PHU LAI AT ABOUT 1715 FOR SAIGON.

10. I WOULD SAY THAT THE VISIT WAS QUITE IMPRESSIVE. TWO POINTS THAT HE EMPHASIZED WERE HIS THINKING ON CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO LAOS AND FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH. I WOULD SAY THAT HE HAD A GOOD GRASP OF THE SITUATION AND IS ABLE TO SEE IT THROUGH THE EYES OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER. WE WERE ALL MOST ENCOURAGED BY THIS REFRESHING ATTITUDE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND I AM SURE THAT THERE WERE MANY STATE DEPARTMENT TYPES THERE YESTERDAY WHO VIEWED WITH ALARM WHAT THE SECRETARY WAS SAYING. I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE SECRETARY IS ADVOCATING THAT WE HAVE UNLIMITED OPERATIONS IN LAOS, BUT THAT HE IS SAYING THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRAINED JUST BECAUSE OF THE BORDER BEING CONTIGUOUS TO OUR OPERATING AREA.

SP-4

BT

000 NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY.

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

000

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

CGN:055/OUT

FILE:DH

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 19 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 190606Z MAY 69		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
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3	CG	I	20 May		N	REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4... THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT. <i>Feedback</i> ORIG: S/S REL: CG EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT (34) TOP SECRET
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	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

FOR

OYTYZYUW RHMHFA2348 180606Z MAY 69--RHMHFA.

ZNY TTTT

O 180606Z MAY 69

FM CG III MAF DNG NVN

TO RHMHFA/CG PRRPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/FOR LIGEN ROSE FROM LEAHN BACHERSON
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER
DURING WORKING HOURS.

SUBJ: VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO VCIZ ON 18 MAY 1969

1. THE SECRETARY ENTERED I CORPS AT PHU DAI WHERE HE WAS MET
BY LIGEN LAM, LIGEN STELLWELL AND MYSELF. WE PROCEEDED TO
XXIV CORPS BRIEFING ROOM WHERE WE GAVE HIM AN OVERVIEW
OF I CORPS. ROSS DYER PRESENTED THE III MAF SIDE COVERING
THE ENEMY THREAT, ALLIED TACTICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
DISPOSITIONS, RECENT AND CURRENT OPERATIONS, STATUS OF
PACIFICATION AND RVMAP IMPROVEMENT. DICK STELLWELL REVIEWED
THE DISPOSITIONS OF UNITS WITHIN HIS CORPS, BRIEFLY DESCRIBED
RECENT AND CURRENT OPERATIONS AND DESCRIBED PROGRESS MADE
IN PACIFICATION IN XXIV CORPS, I.E., EXPANDING ROAD NETWORKS,
RELAXING OF FISHING RESTRICTIONS, THE BUDDING LUMBERING
ACTIVITIES, RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES, ETC.

PAGE TWO RHMHFA2348 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/FOR HQCG

2. DURING THE COURSE OF DICK'S PRESENTATION ON OPERATIONS
NEAR BA 611 (SUCH AS DEWEY CANYON AND APACHE SNOW) THE
SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THE RESTRICTIONS LIMITING FRIENDLY
MANEUVER INTO LAOS DID NOT APPEAR TO MAKE MUCH SENSE. HE
ALSO ASKED IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE WERE PERMITTED TO
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INTO THE SHDMZ OR INTO LAOS IN ORDER TO EXPLOIT A GIVEN
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PREPLANNED CROSS BOUNDARY OPERATIONS AS A MATTER OF COURSE.
THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE MILITARY
CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED AND GAVE THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT
HE FAVORED SOME RELAXATION OF THE CURRENT RULES.

3. AFTER THIS BRIEFING WE PROCEEDED TO THE USS REPOSE
WHERE HE VISITED THE TROOPS. YOU KNOW THAT HIS SON IS A NAVIGATOR
ON THE REPOSE AND HE WAS TRAVELLING WITH THE SECRETARY'S PARTY

HAS BEEN SENT PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA2848 T O P S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE/FOR MICOE
WHILE THE SECRETARY WAS IN VIETNAM. LUNCH WAS HELD TOPSIDE
ON THE REPOSE WITH AMBULATORY PATIENTS PRESENT.

4. FROM THERE, THE PARTY PROCEEDED TO THE GIA DANG FISHING
VILLAGE WHERE THE SECRETARY WAS BRIEFED BY THE QUANG TRI
PROVINCE CHIEF, COL AM. THE EMPHASIS HERE WAS ON
PACIFICATION AND THE ECONOMICS ASPECTS OF IT.

5. FROM GIA DANG THE PARTY MOVED TO THE 3D MARINE DIVISION
AT DONG HA WHERE BILL JONES BRIEFED ON CURRENT OPERATIONS
IN HIS AO, INFILTRATION ROUTES, ECT. THE SECRETARY TALKED
WITH TROOPS FROM THE 3D FORCE RECON COMPANY AND THEN PROCEEDED
TO THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION AT LZ KANCO. NGUYEN TRUONG AND HIS
REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS WERE PRESENT AND TRUONG BRIEFED THE
SECRETARY ON ARVN OPERATIONS.

6. FROM HERE THE PARTY MOVED TO THANH HUONG WHERE THE
THUA THIEN PROVINCE CHIEF, COL THAN, AND THE SENIOR MILITARY
ADVISOR, COL BOWEN, ESCORTED HIM ON A VISIT OF THE RESETTLE-
MENT VILLAGE OF THANH HUONG. WEATHER MOVED IN AT THIS TIME
AND VISIT TO FSB OF THE 101ST WAS SCRUBBED AND THE PARTY
MOVED BACK TO XXIV CORPS HEADQUARTERS.

7. RATHER INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS FOLLOVED AND DURING THIS

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA2848 T O P S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE/FOR MICOE
TIME, THE SECRETARY CALLED ME ASIDE AND SAID IN SUBSTANCE: I
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ARE OUR FRIENDS AND OUR ALLIES SUPPOSEDLY. IF THE ENEMY
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THIS WHEN I GET BACK TO WASHINGTON, BUT IT WOULD APPEAR TO
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THAT BORDER WITHOUT ANY RESTRICTIONS BEING IMPOSED. END. DURING
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OF YET 68 ARE BURIED. GOOD PHOTO COVERAGE. LAN AND THAN
DISCUSSED VC ACTS WITH THE SECRETARY AT LENGTH.

9. PRIOR TO TAKE OFF AND EN ROUTE TO PHU DAI THE OFFICIAL

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFA2848 T O H S E N R E T SPECAT ENCLUSIVE/FOR MORSO
PARTY OVER-FLW HUE CITY. THE SECRETARY DEPARTED PHU BAY
AT ABOUT 1710 FOR SAIGON.

10. I WOULD SAY THAT THE VISIT WAS QUITE IMPRESSIVE.
TWO POINTS THAT HE EMPHASIZED WERE HIS THINKING ON CROSS-
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REFRESHING ATTITUDE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND I AM SURE
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WHO VIEWED WITH ALARM WHAT THE SECRETARY WAS SAYING. I
MIGHT EMPHASIZE THAT I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE SECRETARY IS
ADVOCATING THAT WE HAVE UNLIMITED OPERATIONS IN LAOS,
BUT THAT HE IS SAYING THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRAINED
JUST BECAUSE OF THE BORDER BEING CONTIGUOUS TO OUR
OPERATING AREA.

GP-4

BT

2848

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 25 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 250946Z		COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO 1,2,3	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I	26 May		N	OP PIERCE VALLEY, PHASE II (U) REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4... THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
4	DCG	I	26 May		N	
8	DCG AIR	I			N	
2	C/S	I			N	
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	SUPPLY					
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	PMO					
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HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET

TO COMUSMACV
INFO CG AMERICAL DIV
LHM

O P S E C R E T

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON INFO MRGEN GETTYS
OF PIERCE VALLEY, PHASE II (U)

CG III MAF 251308Z MAY69

1. (S) ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE, INCLUDING REPORTS FROM PROJECT DELTA, INDICATES THERE IS NO MAJOR ENEMY ACTIVITY IN OP PIERCE VALLEY AREA AT THIS TIME. PROBABLE ENEMY TROOPS IN THE AREA ARE REAR AREA SECURITY, ENGINEER AND COMMO-LIAISON. REACTION TO RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT HAS VARIED FROM POOR TO WELL ORGANIZED MOBILIZATION OF PLATOON SIZE REACTION FORCES. NO MOTORABLE ROADS HAVE BEEN FOUND AND ONLY TWO HIGH SPEED TRAILS ARE KNOWN. QL-14, FROM KHAM DUC SOUTH, ROUTE 9661 AND ROUTE 534 EVIDENCE MODERATE FOOT TRAFFIC.

2. (TS) PROJECT DELTA AND SOG HAVE NOT YET PENETRATED THE HEART OF BA-614, LAOTIAN BORDER-ROUTE 966/165 AREA, IMMEDIATE KHAM DUC AREA, OR ROUTE 9661. RECON OPERATIONS ARE PRESENTLY SCHEDULED UNTIL 31 MAY WITH INSERTIONS PLANNED AT ZC 845095, ZB 828998, YB 951876, AND FROM ZB 843971 TO ZB 842968.

3. (S) AS A RELATED MATTER, ENEMY ACTIVITY IN AMERICAL TAOI HAS FALLEN OFF IN RECENT DAYS, BUT EACH OF THE FOUR BRIGADES CONTINUES IN MODERATE TO HEAVY CONTACT. WHILE THE THREAT HAS DECREASED, MAJOR ENEMY FORCES REMAIN WITHIN STRIKING RANGE OF TAN KY, QUANG NGAI CITY, NG DUC AND DUC PHO.

4. (TS) AT THIS TIME, THREE COURSES OF ACTION ARE SUGGESTED BY CURRENT SITUATION:

A. C/A 1. BEGIN PHASE II ON 1 JUNE. THIS COURSE OF ACTION CONSIDERED INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME DUE TO LACK OF A CONFIRMED REMUNERATIVE TARGET IN THE KHAM DUC AREA. FURTHERMORE, THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE AMERICAL TAOI MITIGATES AGAINST REDUCING TROOP DENSITY IN COASTAL PLAIN AREA.

B. C/A 2. CANCEL OP PIERCE VALLEY. ALTHOUGH RECON TO DATE HAS YET TO PRODUCE INTELLIGENCE OF SIGNIFICANT ENEMY ACTIVITY, SEVERAL IMPORTANT AREAS REMAIN TO BE RECONNOITERED BY PROJECT DELTA AND SOG, SPECIFICALLY THE HIGH GROUND AROUND KHAM DUC, ROUTE 9661 AND ROUTE 966. THIS COURSE OF ACTION CONSIDERED PREMATURE AT THIS TIME.

C. C/A 3. CONTINUE PHASE I RECON INTO FIRST TWO WEEKS OF JUNE. THIS COURSE OF ACTION RETAINS FULL CAPABILITY TO INITIATE SUBSEQUENT PHASES PENDING CONTINUED RECON EFFORT AND EVALUATION OF OP PIERCE VALLEY AREA.

5. (S) IN VIEW OF FOREGOING IT IS MY INTENTION TO IMPLEMENT COURSE OF ACTION 3. EXTENSION OF DELTA FORCE IS NECESSARY TO THIS C/A. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST YOUR SUPPORT FOR REF A. GEN LAN INFORMED ME THAT HE HAS REQUESTED DELTA EXTENSION THROUGH HIS CHANNELS.

(S) 39/11

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	27 MAY 69
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY#
	271346Z MAY 69	1 OF 3 COPIES RECO

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
5	CG	I	29 May		[initials]	EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4... THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT. ORIG - S/S REL - CG
4	DCG	I	29 May		[initials]	
6	DCG AIR	I			[initials]	
3	C/S	I			[initials]	
2	DC/S	I	5/27	5/27	[initials]	
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	5/28		[initials]	
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	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

EXCLUSIVE
FOR
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT

(40)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PTTZYUW RHMMFA5 134 1471346-TTTT--RUHFMMA.

ZNY TTTT

P 271346Z MAY 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

**T O P S E C R E T / SPECAT EXCLUSIVE / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY / FOR
LIGEN BUSE FROM LIGEN NICKERSON SEC ONE OF THREE
SECNAV'S VISIT TO WESTPAC (S)**

A. CG FMFPAC 14222SZ MAY69

1. IAW REF A THE FOLLOWING REPORT SUBMITTED:

A. HEADQUARTERS III MAF

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY WAS BRIEFED AT HQS III MAF FOR ONE HOUR ON 24 MAY 1969. THE BRIEFING WAS AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ICTZ, AND COVERED INTELLIGENCE, DISPOSITION OF FORCES, RECENT AND CURRENT OPERATIONS, THE COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM, AND THE PRESENT STATUS OF PACIFICATION IN ICTZ. QUESTION AND ANSWERS EVOLVING FROM THE BRIEFING ARE AS FOLLOWS:

QUESTION: WHAT DO ARVN NEED TO HOLD ICTZ BELOW PRESENT LEVEL OF US/FVM FORCES?

ANSWER: THIS IS A FUNCTION OF ENEMY THREAT, BASED ON CURRENT SITUATION ALL FORCES NOW IN ICTZ ARE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN PROGRESS. SHOULD

PAGE TWO RHMMFA 5134 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
THE NVA FORCES WITHDRAW COMPLETELY AND NVA PERSONNEL ARE NOT USED TO FILL VC UNITS, THE RESIDUAL VC THREAT IS WITHIN THE CAPABILITY OF ARVN FORCES.

QUESTION: WHY IS NGF REQUESTED OVER ARTILLERY?

ANSWER: THE LONG COASTLINE OF SVN AND THE MANY LUCRATIVE TARGETS LOCATED ALONG THE COASTLINE PRESENTS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE USE OF NGF. PUT ANOTHER WAY, NGF CAN GAIN RAPID ACCESS TO ANY TARGET ALONG THE COAST, WHILE ARTILLERY IN MANY INSTANCES WOULD REQUIRE SLOWER DISPLACEMENT AND DRAW-DOWN ON USE ELSEWHERE. SPECIFIC ADVANTAGES: INCLUDE NGF CAPABILITY TO DESTROY HEAVILY CONSTRUCTED FORTIFICATIONS; DIRECT FIRE ACCURACY; AND CAPABILITY TO ASSUME A FAVORABLE GUN-TARGET LINE.

QUESTION: HOW EFFECTIVE WAS THE NEW JERSEY?

ANSWER: VERY EFFECTIVE. THE HIGHLY DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF 16" WAS EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE AND MUCH FEARED BY THE ENEMY. ADDITIONALLY, ITS RANGE GAVE IT ACCESS TO AREAS OTHERWISE INACCESSIBLE TO NGF. IN SUMMARY, NO OTHER WEAPON, AIR OR ARTILLERY, CAN MATCH IT FOR COMBINATION OF ACCURACY AND DESTRUCTION. CG III MAF ELABORATED ON NEED FOR BATTLESHIP TO BE CONSTANTLY ON STATION AND SUGGESTED THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO TRAINING REPLACEMENT GUN CREWS ON

PAGE 1 OF 9 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES40(1)
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA 5134 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 BATTLESHIP(S) NOW IN MOTH BALLS AND ROTATE ENTIRE SHIPS CREWS,
 RELIEVING ON STATION. UPKEEP COULD BE PERFORMED IN WESTPAC.
 (COMMENT: AS SECRETARY OF THE NAVY VISIT PROGRESSED IT APPEARED
 THAT HE WAS FAVORABLY DISPOSED TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR
 BATTLESHIP AND RETURN OF THE NEW JERSEY.)

QUESTION: HOW ABOUT THE SLF, WHAT DOES IT GIVE YOU?

ANSWER: YOU ARE HERE DURING A PERIOD WHEN ITS USEFULNESS
 IS CLEARLY EVIDENT. CURRENTLY, THERE ARE SEVERAL WIDELY
 SEPARATED HIGH THREAT AREAS IN ICTZ. THE SLF IS PREPARED TO
 RESPOND TO THE SITUATION BECAUSE OF ITS UNIQUE DOUBLE MOBILITY
 CAPABILITY -- BY SHIP UP AND DOWN THE COAST AND BY SURFACE
 CRAFT AND HELICOPTERS INLAND. IT IS OUR ONLY FORCE THAT THE
 ENEMY DOESN'T HAVE A FIX ON AND HE HAS TO BE CONCERNED AS TO
 WHERE WE MAY CHOOSE TO USE IT. FURTHERMORE, THE BLT OF THE
 SLF, BEING DISENGAGED FROM COMBAT AND REFRESHED AFLOAT, IS
 MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE INITIAL THAN A BATTLE-WEARY BATTALION
 COMMITTED ASHORE. (COMMENT: THE SECRETARY'S INTEREST IN THE
 SLF CONTINUED THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT AND HE APPEARS TO FAVOR THE
 2 SLF CONCEPT.)

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE SIZE OF AN AVERAGE ENEMY BATTALION?

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA 5134 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

ANSWER: AT FULL STRENGTH BETWEEN 400 AND 500 MEN, BUT
 OVERALL IN ICTZ, BATTALIONS AVERAGE ONLY ABOUT 60 PERCENT FULL
 STRENGTH.

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE CALIBER OF THE ENEMY YOU ARE MEETING?

ANSWER: GOOD. THEY ARE ADEQUATELY EQUIPPED AND TRAINED.
 WE HAVE NOTICED IN THE PAST YEAR THEY SEEM TO BE A BIT YOUNGER.
 IN GENERAL, THEY APPEAR TO BE WELL-MOTIVATED HAVING HAD THREE
 TO FOUR MONTHS OF TRAINING IN NORTH VIETNAM PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT;
 HOWEVER, WE HAVE CAPTURED PRISONERS WHO STATED THEY HAD NO
 TRAINING. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE 29TH NVA REGIMENT WHICH WE
 RECENTLY CONTACTED IN THE A SHAU VALLEY BORE EVIDENCE OF BEING
 WELL-TRAINED, EVEN SEIZING THE INITIATIVE UPON OCCASION.

QUESTION: WHAT KIND OF PW'S ARE WE GETTING? ARE THEY HARD
 TO GET?

ANSWER: IN GENERAL, PW'S ARE QUITE HARD TO GET BUT ARE
 GENERALLY COOPERATIVE ONCE THEY HAVE COME INTO OUR HANDS. THEY
 ARE STILL FAIRLY RESISTENT IN THE FIRST STAGES OF INTERROGATION
 AS IT IS APPARENT THAT THEIR POLITICAL OFFICERS ARE STILL
 PREACHING TO THEM THAT THEY ARE WINNING. HOWEVER, THEY SOON
 BREAK DOWN AS A GENERAL RULE AND BECOME COOPERATIVE.

PAGE 2 OF 9 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 5134 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

QUESTION: WHAT ABOUT THE VC? HOW STRONG ARE THEY?

ANSWER: WE FEEL THAT THEY HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED BY THE FIGHTING OF THE PAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS. WE HAVE NOTED THAT ABOUT 87 PER CENT OF THE PERSONNEL IN ORGANIZED UNITS ARE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ORIGIN. THIS IS A DIRECT REFLECTION UPON THE DECLINING TROOP STRENGTH OF THE VC MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE UNITS AND THE ENEMY'S INABILITY TO RECRUIT REPLACEMENTS FOR HIS BATTLEFIELD LOSSES.

QUESTION: BEFORE THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE, WHAT PER CENT OF THE ENEMY'S FORCES IN I CORPS WERE OF NVA ORIGIN?

ANSWER: OUR STATISTICS INDICATE THAT ABOUT 70 PER CENT OF THE ENEMY'S STRENGTH IN I CORPS AT THAT TIME WERE NVA.

QUESTION: ARE THERE ONLY MARINES IN CAPS?

ANSWER: YES, EXCEPT FOR THE NAVY CORPSMEN.

QUESTION: HOW COME THE ARMY HASN'T DEVELOPED A CAP PROGRAM?

ANSWER: THEY ARE LOOKING INTO IT AND STUDING IT VERY CAREFULLY.

QUESTION: DO YOU HAVE A DEMAND FOR MORE CAPS?

ANSWER: INDEED WE DO. THE PEOPLE LOVE TO HAVE A CAP IN THEIR VILLAGE.

PAGE SIX RHMAFA 5134 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR NCEO

QUESTION: ONCE CAP GOES INTO A VILLAGE, DO THEY STAY?

ANSWER: YES, UNTIL THE PF'S ARE SUFFICIENTLY TRAINED TO HANDLE THE VILLAGE SECURITY BY THEMSELVES. MARINE ELEMENTS OF 52 CAPS HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO NEW VILLAGES SINCE THE PROGRAM'S INCEPTION.

QUESTION: DOES CAP STILL HAVE A HIGH EXTENSION RATE?

ANSWER: YES, BUT WE'RE BECOMING MORE SELECTIVE.

QUESTION: WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THE ELIMINATION OF THE VCI? HOW ARE THE VCI ELIMINATED?

ANSWER: THEY ARE EITHER KILLED, TAKEN PRISONER, OR ACCEPTED UNDER THE CHIEU HOI (RALLIER) PROGRAM.

B. FIRST MARINE DIVISION

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY WAS BRIEFED ON THE OVERALL SITUATION IN FIRST MARDIV, OPERATION OF RECON TEAMS AND SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS OF FIRST BATTALION, SEVENTH MARINES. HE AWARDED THREE SILVER STAR MEDALS TO MEMBERS OF FIRST BATTALION, SEVENTH MARINES. POSSIBLY REFLECTING HIS MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE IN KOREA, HE SEEMED MOST INTERESTED IN SMALL UNIT EQUIPMENT PARTICULARLY ITEMS OF HARDWARE FOR USE BY INFANTRY THAT HAVE BECOME AVAILABLE SINCE KOREA. HE ALSO SHOWED INTEREST IN SOME

GP-4

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5134

PAGE 3 OF 9 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PTTZYUW RHMMAFA5135 1471346-TTTT--RUHMFMA.

ZNY TTTT

P 271346Z MAY 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

**T O P S E C R E T / SPECAT EXCLUSIVE / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY / FOR
LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON SECTION TWO OF THREE
ASPECTS OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SUCH AS REENLISTMENT BONUS AND
EXTENSION OF TOURS IN RVN.**

C. FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

SECNAV CONDUCTED A WALK-THROUGH TOUR OF SHIPPING &
RECEIVING WAREHOUSE, PP&P FACILITY, AUTOMATED SERVICES CENTER,
CCP AND MAINT BN SHOPS. VISIT MADE TO THE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL
WHERE SECRETARY INDICATED INTEREST IN AND PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE
OF THE PLAN FOR SPONSORSHIP BEING ASSUMED BY THE WORLD RELIEF
COMMISSION.

D. FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY HAD LUNCHEON WITH FIFTY OF THE
JUNIOR OFFICERS OF THE FIRST MAW. OVERALL, THE SECRETARY WAS
RELAXED, JOVIAL, EASY TO TALK TO AND APPARENTLY WAS PLEASED TO
BE WITH THE YOUNGER OFFICERS. BEFORE LUNCHEON HE WANDERED

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 5135 **T O P S E C R E T** EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
ABOUT FREELY AND ENCOURAGED DISCUSSION ON A WIDE RANGE OF
ITEMS CONCERNING AVIATION MATTERS. HE DISCUSSED COMBAT LOSSES
VS KILL RATIO AND MADE A REMARK THAT THIS WAS A WAR OF STATISTICS.

A GENERAL OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF THE QUESTIONS ASKED
BY THE SECRETARY AND ANSWERS PROVIDED BY THE JUNIOR OFFICERS
RESPONDING FOLLOWS:

QUESTION: DO THE SECOND TOUR PILOTS BELIEVE WE ARE GAINING
IN THE WAR SINCE THEIR LAST TRIP?

ANSWER: BELIEVE WE WERE WINNING THE WAR THE FIRST TRIP
OUT HERE BUT NOW MORE OR LESS WAR IN IN A STABILIZED STATE:
HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT LOSING.

QUESTION: WHAT DO SECOND TOUR HELO PILOTS THINK OF THEIR
DAILY WORK?

ANSWER: FUTILE SITUATION. TAKE ASSUALT TROOPS TO LZ DUMP
THEM OUT, GO BACK LATER TO PICK UP DEAD AND WOUNDED. THEN
A FEW DAYS LATER RETURN TO THE SCENE, RETRACT THOSE WHO SURVIVE,
THEN REPEAT SAME CYCLE WEEKS OR MONTHS. LATER AT SAME PLACE.

QUESTION: HOW IS MARINE CORPS SUPPLY SYSTEM?

ANSWER: HAVE TO CANNIBALIZE TO KEEP FLYING. (HERE THE
SECRETARY TOOK OUT HIS NOTEBOOK TO WRITE.) PARTS SUPPORT FOR

PAGE 4 OF 9 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMAFA 5135 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
CH-46 IS A REAL PROBLEM. NOT ENOUGH AIRCRAFT TO MEET COMMITMENTS.
ALL SQUADRONS HAVE THE SAME PROBLEM.

QUESTION: HOW IS R&R? WHERE DO MOST OF THE AIR CREWS
GO AND HOW ARE THEY PICKED?

ANSWER: MOST CREWS R&R IN SIDNEY OR HAWAII. THEY ARE
PICKED BY LENGTH OF TIME IN COUNTRY. THE GUY WITH THE LONGEST
TIME IN COUNTRY GETS FIRST CHOICE.

QUESTION: DO MANY WIVES MEET HUSBANDS IN HAWAII AND HOW
MUCH DOES THIS COST?

ANSWER: MOST OF THE AIR CREWS MEET THEIR WIVES IN HAWAII.
THE OVERALL COST IS BETWEEN 800-1000 DOLLARS DEPENDING ON
INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS. ROUND TRIP AIR FARE FROM WEST COAST IS
ABOUT 170.00 DOLLARS.

QUESTION: WHAT IS AVERAGE LENGTH OF TOUR IN VN FOR MARINES?

ANSWER: THIRTEEN MONTHS.

QUESTION: HOW OFTEN DO YOU FLY?

ANSWER: MOST CREWS FLY EVERY DAY.

QUESTION: HOW DOES THE CLIMATE AFFECT AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS?

ANSWER: SAND CLOGS THE ENGINES, AFFECTS ROTORS AND OTHER
MOVING PARTS OF THE AIRCRAFT. (A REMARK WAS MADE ABOUT THE COST

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 5135 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
OF PARTS TO REPLACE EQUIPMENT.)

QUESTION: HOW MANY OFFICERS AND MEN EXTEND?

ANSWER: NOT MANY OFFICERS BUT MANY MEN DO. (HOWEVER, THERE
WAS ONE OFFICER IN THE GROUP WHO HAD 25 MONTHS SERVICE IN VN)
(OV-10 A0, 1STLT.)

QUESTION: DO A6 CREWS REALLY SEE TRUCKS AT NIGHT?

ANSWER: YES. CONFIRMED, BECAUSE THE TA4F TAC (A) AIRCRAFT
OVERFLYS A6 ROUTES THE NEXT DAY AND FIND DESTROYED TRUCKS BY
SIDE OF THE ROAD. ALSO, A6 AIRCRAFT ARE KNOCKING OFF MORE
TRUCKS NOW THAN DURING PREVIOUS MONTHS.

QUESTION: WHY ARE SO MANY YOUNGER OFFICERS GETTING OUT OF
THE MARINE CORPS?

ANSWER: MOST ARE GETTING OUT TO GO BACK TO SCHOOL TO GET
LAW OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL DEGREES.

POINTS BROUGHT UP IN CONVERSATION:

- A. A COUPLE OF CH-46 PILOTS TURNED IN THEIR WINGS.
THE SECRETARY ACTED SURPRISED ABOUT THIS BUT SAID NOTHING.
B. THE PROBLEM OF OVERLOADING HELOS IN HOT WEATHER WAS
BRIEFLY MENTIONED. THE SECRETARY MADE NO RESPONSE.
C. SOME OFFICERS MADE COMPARISONS BETWEEN MARINE

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COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFA 5135 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO LIVING CONDITIONS AND THOSE OF THE AIR FORCE ACROSS THE FIELD. THEY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE MARINE CORPS HAD BEEN HERE SO LONG, STILL HAD POOR EQUIPMENT, POOR FUEL PITS, POOR QUARTERS, GENERALLY JUST POOR ACCOMMODATIONS. ONE OFFICER POINTED OUT THIS WAS THE DIFFERENCE IN THE MARINE CORPS AS CONTRASTED WITH THE AIR FORCE. WE ARE READY TO MOVE, HAVE MOBILITY; BUT, THE AIR FORCE COMES TO STAY AND DIGS IN.

THE SECRETARY ASKED THE CG FIRST MAW HOW THE WAR WAS GOING; IS THE END IN SIGHT? THE CG RESPONDED THAT HE BELIEVED THE VCI ARE LOSING GROUND DAY BY DAY AND IN THAT SENSE, TIME IS ON OUR SIDE AND WE ARE MAKING HEADWAY.

DURING THE BRIEFING, THE SECRETARY ASKED THE AC/S, G-3 THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

QUESTION: WHAT IS CH-53 FLYING HOURS PROGRAM? WHAT IS THE UTILIZATION RATE IF PARTS AND FUNDS?

ANSWER: 31 HOURS PER MONTH PER AIRCRAFT PER MONTH. SPARE PARTS SITUATION WORSE NOW AND NO FIRM ANSWER IN SIGHT. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM IS TOTALLY INADEQUATE, NOT ENOUGH TO SUPPORT AIRCRAFT. NORS RATE LAST QUARTER, LAST YEAR WAS 20 PER CENT; THIS YEAR, FIRST QUARTER 31 PER CENT. ONLY SOLUTION IS TO INCREASE

PAGE SIX RHMMAFA 5135 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO FUNDING FOR FLYING HOURS AND PROVIDE SPARE PARTS REQUIRED, TO CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS.

QUESTION: HOW MUCH AIR SUPPORT IS PROVIDED BY THE AIR FORCE IN ICTZ?

ANSWER: VARIES BETWEEN 8 AND 18 PERCENT. MONTH OF APRIL 12 PERCENT. FOR THE NAVY DURING APRIL 10 PER CENT.

IN PARTING THE SECRETARY ASKED THE CG WHAT COULD WASHINGTON DO TO HELP MORE. THE CG ANSWERED THAT ALL EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO PROCURE PARTS SUPPORT PROVISIONING; THAT THE BIGGEST HELP WOULD BE IN PARTS SUPPORT.

E. THIRD MARINE DIVISION

THE SECRETARY WAS BRIEFED ON FSB FULLER CONSISTING OF TERRAIN ORIENTATION, THE DIVISION AO, FRIENDLY FORCES, ENEMY FORCES, CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, USE OF RECON ELEMENTS, CURRENT OPERATIONS AND DIVISION GROUND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM.

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

A. ENEMY WEAPONS AND TACTICS IN GENERAL.

B. TECHNIQUE OF ENEMY SAPPER ATTACKS ON FIRE

SUPPORT BASES.

C. COMBAT OPERATIONS AND RESULTS IN AREA OF AO JUST

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TOP SECRET

PTTZYUW RHMMAFA5136 1471346-TTTT--RUHFMA.

ZNY TTTT

P 271346Z MAY 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y / F O R
 LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON FINAL SECTION OF THREE
 SOUTH OF DMZ AND NORTH OF ROUTE 9 DURING LAST TWO MONTHS.

D. HOW FSBS AND LANDING ZONES ARE CONSTRUCTED.

E. OPERATION OF CAP 4/2/6 AT NHU LE.

PERTINENT QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: (TO COMMANDING
 GENERAL THIRD MARDIV)

A. WHILE OBSERVING AN AIR STRIKE APPROXIMATELY
 5 KILOMETERS WEST OF VCB HE ASKED HOW IT WAS POSSIBLE TO BE
 ATTACKING ENEMY TROOPS THIS CLOSE TO A LARGE INSTALLATION. HE
 WAS TOLD THAT THIS WAS THE AREA WHERE THEY HAD EMPLACED 122MM
 ROCKETS AND FIRED ON VCB.

B. WHAT IS THE TYPICAL TYPE OF CONTACT?(ENEMY) A
 TYPICAL TYPE OF CONTACT IS WHEN WE MEET ONE OF THEIR (ENEMY) MAIN
 FORCE UNITS COMING DOWN TO DO BATTLE. THEY HAVE TO PREPARE
 THE BATTLEFIELD BEFORE THEY CAN FIGHT. THIS MEANS THEY MUST

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 5136 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 PRE-STAGE THEIR SUPPLIES AND RECONNOITER PRIOR TO THE MAIN UNITS
 COMING DOWN. WE TRY TO GET IN AND DISRUPT BEFORE THEY GET SET.

QUESTIONS ASKED AT LUNCHEON WITH COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS:

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE FEELING OF THE MARINES IN
 REFERENCE TO THE POTENTIAL PEACE SETTLEMENT?

ANSWER: WE CAN SEE NO INDICATORS FOR AN IMMEDIATE
 SETTLEMENT.

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE FEELING IN REFERENCE TO THE
 ARVN -- ARE THEY READY?

ANSWER: THE ARVN COULD NOT ASSUME THE MISSION OF
 DEFENDING SVN WITHOUT US ASSISTANCE.

QUESTION: WHY DON'T WE CAPTURE MORE PRISONERS? (THE
 SECRETARY NOTED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN VERY FEW PWS EVEN IN LARGE
 CONTACTS.)

ANSWER: BECAUSE WE ARE FIGHTING A HARD CORE, WELL
 DISCIPLINED AND THOROUGHLY POLITICALLY ORIENTED ENEMY. HE IS
 PROFESSIONAL AND POLICES HIS BATTLEFIELD WELL.

QUESTION: ARE WE WINNING?

ANSWER: WE ARE WINNING BATTLES. IN OTHER WORDS,
 WHEN WE DO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE NVA, HE LOSES.

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III MAF 2100/4

40(7)
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMAFA 5136 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

QUESTION: IS THE DMZ A HAVEN?

ANSWER: YES. MOST OF OUR HEAVY CONTACT IS ALONG THE PERIPHERY OF OUR DIVISION'S AO. THAT IS, ALONG BOTH THE SOUTHERN TRACE OF THE DMZ AND THE LAOTIAN BORDER.

F. WHILE VISITING NORTHERN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE, SECNAV ASKED THE CG XXIV CORPS ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF COMMITTING FORCES TO ENTER LAOS AND SHDMZ. LTGEN STILWELL REPLIED THAT THE RESTRICTIONS LIMITED FRIENDLY MANEUVER INTO BOTH LAOS AND SHDMZ. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD HAVE MORE FREEDOM TO MOVE INTO SHDMZ OR INTO LAOS IN ORDER TO EXPLOIT A GIVEN SITUATION SUCH AS THE ACTION AGAINST THE 320TH NVA DIVISION OR IN DEWEY CANYON, BUT NOT JUST FOR THE SAKE OF CONDUCTING PREPLANNED CROSS BOUNDARY OPERATIONS AS A MATTER OF COURSE. THIS REPLY WAS IN CONCORDANCE WITH THAT GIVEN BY GEN ABRAMS TO MR. ROGERS (SECSTATE) ON HIS RECENT VISIT.

G. BEFORE AND AFTER DINNER AT GEN LAM'S ON 26 MAY 69, THE SECRETARY ASKED SEVERAL GENERAL OFFICERS: WHAT CAN BE DONE TO SOLVE THE WAR? WOULD A REDUCTION IN OUR FORCES CAUSE THE ARVN FORCES TO TAKE OVER MORE RESPONSIBILITY AND QUICKER?

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA 5136 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
THE RESPONSE GENERALLY, WAS THAT IF WE WANT TO SOLVE THE WAR THAT WE MUST CONVINCE THE NVA THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO PULL OUT. WE HAVE GIVEN UP CONSIDERABLE LEVERAGE BY OUR POLITICAL ACTIONS IN RECENT MONTHS AND AS A RESULT THE WAR, IF CONDUCTED UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS, COULD CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. IF WE REDUCED OUR FORCES THE ARVN WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO TAKE OVER MORE RESPONSIBILITY. BUT THEIR SUCCESS WOULD BE QUESTIONABLE UNLESS THERE WAS A SIZEABLE REDUCTION OF NVA FORCES -- THAT THE ARVN FORCES CANNOT PROSECUTE THE WAR SUCCESSFULLY AS LONG AS THE NVA REMAIN IN THESE NUMBERS. AFTER LEAVING GEN LAM'S RESIDENCE, THE SECRETARY PRESSED ORM SIMPSON FURTHER ON THE INDEFINITE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR. ORM REITERATED THAT AS LONG AS THE PRESENT SITUATION CONTINUED, AS LONG AS THE NVA REMAIN, AS LONG AS HE CHOOSES TO HIT AND RUN AND NOT STAND AND FIGHT, AS LONG AS WE ARE CONSTRAINED TO OPERATE AIR GROUND AND NAVAL FORCES WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF SOUTH VIETNAM, THAT THE ENEMY COULD CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. THE SECRETARY DID NOT WANT TO HEAR THIS BUT HE ACCEPTED IT.

H. SUMMARY

I THINK THE SECRETARY'S VISIT WAS VERY BENEFICIAL.

PAGE 8 OF 9 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMAFA 5136 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 HE SAW A LOT OF THE MARINE CORPS IN THE FIELD AND A LOT OF
 NAVAL FORCES. HE APPEARED TO HAVE A MUCH BETTER GRASP ON HIS
 DEPARTURE THAN HE HAD ON HIS ARRIVAL. WE EMPHASIZED TO HIM THE
 REQUIREMENT FOR MORE HELICOPTER SPARE PARTS, MORE LIGHT
 HELICOPTERS, MORE HELICOPTER LIFT CAPABILITY AND WE EXPRESSED
 OUR DESIRE TO HAVE THE NEW JERSEY RETURNED AT THE EARLIEST.
 A PRESS CONFERENCE WAS CONDUCTED AT PLANE SIDE JUST PRIOR
 TO HIS DEPARTURE AT WHICH NOTHING SIGNIFICANT SURFACED. HE
 EXPRESSED HIS THANKS UPON DEPARTURE FOR EVERYTHING THAT WAS
 BEING DONE. I BELIEVE WE HAVE A FRIEND. ONE ADDED NOTE:
 MR. BOWSHER SOAKED IT ALL UP AND REPRESENTS AN INCREASINGLY
 POWERFUL ALLY IN THE FISCAL ARENA.

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LIMDIS

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

CCN:069/OUT

FILE:DH

III MAF FORM 5215 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF	DATE 22 MAY 69	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 220008Z MAY 69	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	I	23 May		N	MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
3	DCG	I	22 May			REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. ORIG: G-2/CI REL: G-2/CI MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT
3	DCG AIR	I				
2	C/S	I				
2	DC/S	E	5/22	5/20		
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	5/22			
	G-1					
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	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
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	PSY OPS					
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	LEGAL					
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LIMDIS

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PTTSZYUW RHMMFA3237 1420008-SSSS--RUHMFA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 220008Z MAY 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHMFA/CG FMFPAC

BT

S E C R E T / LIMDIS / MCEO

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES REPORT (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 020116Z NOV 68

B. CG III MAF 161242Z APR 69

C. CMC 142241Z MAY 69

D. NISRA DANANG, RVN ROI 04-12-69N84-0530-7XNA OF 16 MAY 69

E. NISRA DANANG, RVN ROI 04-12-69N84-0530-7XNA OF 17 MAY 69

F. NISRA EL TORO CALIF ROI 02-12-68/11-1265-7N(NA) OF 9 MAR 68

1. (S) IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, FOLLOWING REPORT SUBMITTED:

A. CONNECTION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN "PEACE AND FREEDOM" NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED AT MAG-16 AS REPORTED IN REF B AND MAILING OF ANTI-MILITARY PUBLICATIONS TO SVN AS REPORTED BY REF C.

B. NIS INVESTIGATION HAS REVEALED LCPL HILTON LEE BROOKS, 2351647, USMC, PREVIOUSLY MEMBER OF 1ST MAW AND NOW UNDERGOING TREATMENT FOR HEPATITIS AT US NAVAL HOSPITAL, PENSACOLA FLA, AS PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANT IN PUBLICATION AND

PAGE TWO RHMMFA3237 S E C R E T / LIMDIS / MCEO
DISTRIBUTION OF "PEACE AND FREEDOM" PAPER: REFS D AND E PROVIDE DETAILS ON CASE.

C. REF C LISTED LCPL H. L. BROOKS, 2351647, HMM-165, 1ST MAW AS A RECIPIENT FOR A PACKAGE OF ANTI-MILITARY PUBLICATIONS BEING SENT TO SVN BY THE "HEAD-ON STEERING COMMITTEE" AT CAMP LEJEUNE.

D. WITH TRANSFER OF LCPL BROOKS, IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF "PEACE AND FREEDOM" PAPER MAY BE RESOLVED. ACTIONS OF 1STLT GILBERT JAMES LEE BARCELO, 095421, USMC, IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MATTER ARE STILL UNDER REVIEW. REF F CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFO ON LT BARCELO'S INVOLVEMENT IN NARCOTICS CASE AT EL TORO DURING 1968.

E. REFS D, E, AND F ARE AVAILABLE THROUGH NISOPAC.

2. (S) WHILE INCIDENTS WITH RACIAL OVERTONES CONTINUE TO OCCUR ON SPORADIC BASIS, NO PATTERN OF WIDE SPREAD DISSIDENCE OR EVIDENCE OF SUBVERSIVE OR ORGANIZED INFLUENCE HAS BEEN DETECTED.

GP-3

BT

3237

HAS BEEN SENT

LIMDIS

SECRET

#44

HEADQUARTERS
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE	FROM	DATE
	CG III MAF	23 MAY 69
	SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE	COPY# OF COPIES RECO
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ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	REMARKS
			IN	OUT		
	CG					SUBJECT CONFIDENTIAL REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. <u>HAS BEEN SENT READDRESS A I</u> * M Gen GETTEYS
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	5/23			
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	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY FOR MGEN GETTYS FROM BGEN DOOLEY

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS READDRESSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

COMM NOTE: QUOTE

O 221036Z ZYH ZFF-6 ZFF-3

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF

INFO LTG R G STILWELL XXIV CORPS PHU BAI

ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL MAC 6538 EYES ONLY
 WILL ARRIVE PHU BAI ON T-39 25 0930 MAY69. UPON ARRIVAL
 DESIRE TO VISIT HQS 3 MAR DIV AND COL GIAI, 2D ARVN REGT
 FOR BRIEFING ON DMZ SITUATION. WOULD LIKE TO HAVE
 GEN TRUONG PRESENT DURING VISIT TO 2D ARVN REGT. AFTER
 CHANGE OF COMMAND, LUNCH, CAMP EAGLE, DESIRE UPDATE
 BRIEFING BY 101ST. DURING REMAINDER OF AFTERNOON WILL
 VISIT UNITS AND LOCATIONS OF YOUR CHOICE IN SOUTHERN I CORPS.
 INCLUDE IN ITINERARY VISIT TO QUANG TIN PROV HQS WITH LAST
 STOP AMERICAL DIV. WILL DEPART CHU LAI 1630 HRS
 SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

GP-4
 (6)

WINNIA
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CONFIDE

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5213 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF	DATE 24 MAY 1969	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 240352Z MAY 1969	COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG			25 May		EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE MCEO REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
2	DCG	I		24 May		
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	3/24			
6	G-1	I		31-76		
	G-2					
4	G-3	I				
5	G-4	I				
	G-5					
	G-6					
7	CAP	I		26 May		
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

ORIG: G-3
REL: CG

SECRET

SECRET

PTTSZYUW RHMMAFA3615 1440352-SSSS--RUHFMA RUMHLAA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 240352Z MAY 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO MAJGEN SIMPSON.
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.
REDUCTION OF FIRST ARMD AMPHIB CO TO CADRE STATUS (S)

A. CG III MAF 131354Z MAY 69 (PASEP)

B. COMUSMACV 190844Z MAY 69 (PASEP)

1. (S) REF A SUMMARIZES THE PERSONNEL PROBLEM CONCERNING THE
SECOND ROKMC BDE AND THE LVTH-6 PLT OF THE FIRST ARMD AMPHIB
CO, WHICH IS PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE ROKMC BDE AND ALSO TO THE
CAP UNITS OPERATING IN THAT AREA. ADDITIONALLY, REF A REQUESTS
THE ASSISTANCE OF COMUSMACV IN OBTAINING THE REQUIRED ROKMC
PERSONNEL FROM KOREA. REF B IS COMUSMACV REPLY TO REF A.

2. (S) THE ORIGINAL PLAN TO CADRE THE FIRST ARMD AMPHIB CO
AND CONTINUE TO MAN THE PLT SUPPORTING THE ROKMC BDE WITH
ELEVEN US MARINES AND THE REMAINDER WITH ROKMC PERSONNEL WAS
BASED ON THE VERBAL STATEMENT OF CG SECOND ROKMC BDE IN LATE

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA3615 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
JAN 69 THAT HE HAD SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL AVAILABLE TO REPLACE
THE USMC PERSONNEL TO BE WITHDRAWN, BUT NOT NECESSARILY ON A
ONE FOR ONE BASIS. HE REITERATED THIS STATEMENT VERBALLY WHEN
THE PLAN WAS PRESENTED TO HIM DURING A STAFF VISIT PRIOR TO
BEING OFFICIALLY SUBMITTED FOR HIS CONCURRENCE ON 19 MAR 69.
HE OFFICIALLY CONCURRED WITH THE PLAN ON 26 MAR 69, BUT
INDICATED HE HAD PERSONNEL PROBLEMS AND MADE HIS FIRST REQUEST
FOR MY ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING ADDITIONAL ROKMC PERSONNEL FROM
KOREA VIA COMUSMACV. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT INDICATE, AT THAT TIME,
THAT HE COULD NOT IMPLEMENT THE PLAN WITHOUT THE ADDITIONAL
ROKMC PERSONNEL. IN SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE TRAFFIC, STAFF LIAISON VISITS AND
DURING ONE OF MY VISITS WITH HIM, GEN LEE INDICATED HE COULD NOT COMPLY
WITH THE PLAN UNLESS HE RECEIVED ADDITIONAL TRAINED PERSONNEL FROM
KOREA, OR UNLESS ALLOWED THREE MONTHS TO TRAIN ROKMC PERSONNEL CURRENTLY
IN-COUNTRY. REF B FORECLOSES ON THE FIRST OF THESE POSSIBILITIES.

3. (S) I DESIRE TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE LVTH-6 SUPPORT TO THE
ROKMC BDE, BUT MORE ESPECIALLY THE CAP UNITS IN THE AREA. THERE
ARE TWO CACO'S WITH A TOTAL OF ELEVEN CA PLT'S, CURRENTLY
RECEIVING NINETY PERCENT OF THEIR ARTY SPT FROM THIS LVTH-6 PLT.
TO CONTINUE SUPPORT WITH USMC PERSONNEL WILL CAUSE A DRAWDOWN

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMAFA3615 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO OF 2 OFF AND 45 ENL MARINES ON OTHER FIRST MARDIV ASSETS FOR THE THREE MONTH PERIOD REQUIRED TO TRAIN ROKMC PERSONNEL CURRENTLY IN-COUNTRY.

4. (S) AS STATED IN REF B COMUSMACV WILL NOT SUPPORT AN INCREASE IN ROKFV SPACES TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL TRAINED ROKMC PERSONNEL FROM KOREA.

5. (S) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, REQUEST PERMISSION TO DELAY WITHDRAWAL OF THE 47 USMC PERSONNEL FROM THE LVTH-6 PLT SUPPORTING THE ROKMC BDE UNTIL 31 AUG 69. MANNING LEVEL ADJUSTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE SUBMITTED UPON RECEIPT OF APPROVAL OF THIS REQUEST.

6. (S) ACTION TO CADRE THE FIRST ARMD AMPHIB CO (-) WILL CONTINUE AND BE COMPLETED BY 30 MAY 69, AS DIRECTED.

GP-4

BT

3615

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**SECRET**

#1

THIS CORRESPONDENCE WILL BE ASSIGNED A FILE NUMBER AS LISTED BELOW.

FILE NUMBER _____

ACTION SECTION WILL COMPLETE	
ACTION COMPLETED ON:	
RETAINED BY _____ SECTION	
DATE	SIGNATURE AND RANK

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO

CLASSIFIED

FOR ROSEN TO DIRECTOR FROM LTJEN NICKERSON

MALARIA CHEMOPROPHYLAXIS

1. CG 111 NAF 030938Z APR69

2. CG 111 NAF 151348Z APR69

3. BUMED 861740Z MAY69 (PAGEP)

1. REF A PROVIDES POLICY GUIDANCE FOR USE OF DAPSONE AS A CHEMOPROPHYLAXIS FOR NAVY AND MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL IN SVN. THE MEDICAL OPINION CONTAINED THEREIN RECOMMENDS THAT DAPSONE BE GIVEN TO GROUND COMBAT OPERATIONAL UNITS ONLY WHEN CHLOROQUINE RESISTANT FALCIPARUM MALARIA ESTABLISHED AT 20 TO 25 PER CENT LEVEL. THIS HQS AGREES WITH THIS OPINION.

2. REFS A & B CONTAIN GUIDANCE I ISSUED TO ALL US FORCES IN ICZ DIRECTING THE ADMINISTRATION OF DAPSONE TO ALL PERSONNEL IN ICZ LESS CERTAIN EXEMPTIONS. THIS WAS IN KEEPING WITH MACV DIR 48-11 OF 3 OCT 67 W/ CHANGES 1 AND 2.

3. SUBSEQUENT TO ISSUANCE OF REFS A AND B, REF C WAS RECEIVED. (REF C WAS ISSUED IN RESPONSE TO A RECOMMENDATION BY ME THAT BUMED AND SURGERY STATE THEIR POLICY RE DAPSONE.)

REF C PROVIDES POLICY GUIDANCE FOR USE OF DAPSONE AS A CHEMOPROPHYLAXIS FOR NAVY AND MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL IN SVN. THE MEDICAL OPINION CONTAINED THEREIN RECOMMENDS THAT DAPSONE BE GIVEN TO GROUND COMBAT OPERATIONAL UNITS ONLY WHEN

CHLOROQUINE RESISTANT FALCIPARUM MALARIA ESTABLISHED AT 20 TO 25 PER CENT LEVEL. I AGREE WITH THIS OPINION AND INTEND TO EXEMPT ALL MARINE CORPS AND NAVY UNITS IN ICZ FROM THE DAILY DAPSONE REQUIREMENT UNTIL MEDICAL EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES

A 20 PER CENT LEVEL OF FALCIPARUM MALARIA PROVED CHLOROQUINE RESISTANT IN COMPANY SIZED OR LARGER UNIT. I BELIEVE THAT MY ACTION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE MACV DIRECTIVE AS MODIFIED BY YOUR MEMO OF 14 MAR 69. AT THE SAME TIME I AM COMPLYING WITH MY SERVICE CHANNELS MEDICAL DIRECTIONS.

4. I HAVE AVOIDED GIVING SUCH DIRECTION TO ARMY UNITS IN ICZ AS BEING BEYOND MY CHARTER. HOWEVER, YOU MAY WISH TO EXAMINE THE BUMED POLICY WITH A VIEW TO ADOPTING A SIMILAR POLICY FOR ARMY UNITS IN VIETNAM. I BELIEVE IT IS A SOUND POLICY. IT AVOIDS USE OF DAPSONE UNTIL THE RISK BECOMES SUCH THAT UNDESIRABLE EFFECTS OF THE USE OF DAPSONE BECOMES SECONDARY.

SSO NOTE

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

BT

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 25 MAY 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 250956Z MAY 69		COPY# 2 OF 10 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					SUBJECT PERSONAL FROM LTGEN NICKERSON REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. ORIG - G-3 REL - CG <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">FOR</div> <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">HAS BEEN SENT</div>
3	DCG	I	26 May			
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	5/26			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RHMMFA3803 1450956-CCCC--RUMLBPA RUMHLAA RUMLLIA RUMLMHA
RUMHVPA.

ZNY CCCCC

RUMLBPA -T- 101ST ABN DIV

P 250956Z MAY 69

FM CG III MAF DNG RVN

TO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN

RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG RVN

RUMLLIA/CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW DNG RVN

INFO RUMHVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV DGH RVN

RUMLBPA/CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM) CEE RVN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FROM LIGEN NICKERSON TO LTGEN STILLWELL, MGEN SIMPSON,
MGEN GETTYS, MGEN QUILTER, INFO MGEN JONES AND MGEN WRIGHT.
HELICOPTER FLYING SAFETY (U)

1. (C) THE NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS WHICH
OCCUR IS A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO ME. COMBAT LOSSES WE
CAN ACCEPT, HOWEVER, WE CAN NOT AFFORD THE OPERATIONAL LOSSES OF
HELICOPTERS/CREWS AND THE RESULTANT REDUCTION OF OPERATIONAL
CAPABILITIES. FOR THE MOST PART, CAREFUL ATTENTION TO DUTY BY AIR
CREWS, MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL AND GROUND SUPPORT PERSONNEL WILL

PAGE TWO RHMMFA3803 C O N F I D E N T I A L

PREVENT OPERATIONAL MISHAPS.

2. (C) I AM WELL AWARE THAT ALL SERVICES HAVE YOUNG, INEXPERI-
ENCED PERSONNEL WHO ARE SUDDENLY THRUST INTO EXTREMELY RESPONSIBLE
SITUATIONS. WE MUST GIVE THESE PERSONNEL THE VERY BEST COUNSEL
AND SUPERVISION AT ALL ECHELONS. THE INEXPERIENCED MUST NOT BE ALLOWED
TO BECOME OVER ZEALOUS AND TAKE UNNECESSARY RISKS, NOR MUST WE
ALLOW THE INEXPERIENCED TO BECOME COMPLACENT.

3. (C) IN ADDITION, WITH THE ONSET OF EXTREMELY HOT WEATHER
AND HIGH WINDS, PLANNED HELICOPTER OPERATIONS IN WESTERN I CORPS
WILL BE MORE HAZARDOUS. SPECIAL ATTENTION MUST BE GIVEN TO ENSURE FOB'S
ARE ADEQUATE IN SIZE AND FREE OF OBSTACLES AND FLIGHT HAZARDS.
HELICOPTER LOADS WILL NECESSARILY BE REDUCED.

4. IN THIS REGARD, I WOULD ASK YOUR CAUTION ON THE NUMBER OF
TROOPS CARRIED PER HELICOPTER. IN A RECENT ACCIDENT, 72 RF'S
PLUS THE CREW WERE ABOARD ONE AIRCRAFT. THERE ARE TIMES WHEN
THE TACTICAL SITUATION DICTATES THE LOADING TO THE MAXIMUM WEIGHT
CARRYING CAPACITIES OF THE PARTICULAR AIRCRAFT. WHEN THIS
SITUATION DOESN'T EXIST, THE LOAD SHOULD MORE REALISTICALLY
COMPARE TO THE RATED NUMBERS FOR WHICH EACH AIRCRAFT IS
CONFIGURED. I REQUEST YOUR ATTENTION IN THIS REGARD TO INSURE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

#5

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA3803 C O N F I D E N T I A L
THAT HELICOPTERS ARE NOT LOADED TO THE MAXIMUM WHEN PRUDENCE
DICTATES LESSER LOADS AND A HIGHER SAFETY FACTOR.
5. (C) I REQUEST EACH OF YOU STRESS THESE MATTERS AND THAT
COMMAND ATTENTION BE GIVEN TO ALL ASPECTS OF FLIGHT DISCIPLINE.
GP-4
BT
3803

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 26 MAY 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 261405Z MAY 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ORIG - S/S REL - CG FOR 1 HAS BEEN SENT
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
1	S/S	F	5/27		W H S	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #8

THIS CORRESPONDENCE WILL BE ASSIGNED A FILE NUMBER AS LISTED BELOW.

FILE NUMBER _____

ACTION SECTION WILL COMPLETE	
ACTION COMPLETED ON:	
RETAINED BY _____ SECTION	
DATE	SIGNATURE AND RANK

PTTUZYUW RHMAFA3970 1461405-UUUU--RUMUFQD.

ZNR UUUUU

P 261405Z MAY 69 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF DNG RVN

TO RUMUFQD/CG ONE NINE NINE LIGHT INF BDE, CAMP FRENZEL JONES

BT

UNCLAS

FOR BGEN BENNETT AND BGEN DAVISON FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. FOR BGEN DAVISON: ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR DEPARTURE, ALL III MAF JOINS ME IN EXTENDING HEARTFELT APPRECIATION FOR YOUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF YOUR BRIGADE IN COMBAT ARE WELL PUBLICIZED AND YOU SHOULD BE JUSTIFIABLY PROUD. GODSPEED AND GOOD LUCK IN YOUR NEW ASSIGNMENT.

2. FOR BGEN BENNETT: OUR HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND OF THE FAMED 199TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE. YOUR PERFORMANCE ON THE III MAF TEAM AS MY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PLANS WAS CHARACTERIZED THROUGHOUT BY PROFESSIONALISM OF THE HIGHEST ORDER. YOU WILL BE SORELY MISSED. I KNOW TOO THAT YOU WILL SORELY MISS THE STRAINS OF OUR MARINE CORPS HYMN RESOUNDING EACH MORNING THROUGHOUT THE FOUR CORNERS OF OUR HEADQUARTERS. WE AT III MAF EXTEND EVERY WISH FOR CONTINUED SUCCESS AS YOU FIND - FIX - FIGHT - MOVE AND COMMUNICATE WITH YOUR NEW COMMAND ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE.

PAGE TWO RHMAFA 3970 UNCLAS

3. FOR THE GALLANT OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE 199TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE: DURING THIS EXCHANGE OF YOUR COMMANDERS, I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND FROM YOUR COMRADES-IN-ARMS OF III MAF IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES AND THE DMZ AREA OUR WARMEST REGARDS AND BEST WISHES FOR CONTINUED SUCCESS IN THE BATTLE AGAINST OUR COMMON ENEMY. LIEUTENANT GENERAL NICKERSON, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, COMMANDING GENERAL, III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE.

BT

3970

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

#8

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 27 MAY 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 271048Z MAY 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I		28 May	LL	FOR MGEN ECKHARDT AND MGEN WETHER LL
	DCG					REMARKS
	DCG AIR					ORIG - S/S
2	C/S	S				REL - C/S
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
1	S/S	I	5/27		LL	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED #9

THIS CORRESPONDENCE WILL BE ASSIGNED A FILE NUMBER AS LISTED BELOW.

FILE NUMBER _____

ACTION SECTION WILL COMPLETE	
ACTION COMPLETED ON:	
RETAINED BY _____ SECTION	
DATE	SIGNATURE AND RANK

PTTEZYUW RHMMFA5108 1471048-EEEE--RUMUJLB.

ZNY EEEEE

P 271048Z MAY 69 ZFF-I

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMUJLB/COMMANDER/SA IV CORPS

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR MGEN ECKHARDT AND MGEN WETHERILL FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. SINCERELY REGRET PREVIOUS ENGAGEMENT PRECLUDES ATTENDANCE AT YOUR CHANGE OF COMMAND ON 1 JUNE.

2. FOR MGEN ECKHARDT: MY WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS, GEORGE, AND ALL THE BEST TO YOU IN YOUR NEW ASSIGNMENT AT CARLISLE.

3. FOR MGEN WETHERILL: CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR NEW COMMAND.

WHILE NOT NEW TO OUR MACV NATION-BUILDING TEAM, I AM SURE YOU WILL FIND YOUR NEW ASSIGNMENT DIFFERENT, BUT EVERY BIT AS CHALLENGING, INTERESTING -- AND -- REWARDING. LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AT THE NEXT CONFERENCE IN SAIGON.

WARM REGARDS.

BT

5108

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

#9

THIS CORRESPONDENCE WILL BE ASSIGNED A FILE NUMBER AS LISTED BELOW.

FILE NUMBER _____

ACTION SECTION WILL COMPLETE	
ACTION COMPLETED ON:	
RETAINED BY _____ SECTION	
DATE	SIGNATURE AND RANK

P 281109Z
FM CG III MAF
TO SSO MACV
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
SUBJ: VISIT OF MR. SAMUEL F. PRYOR WITH CG III MAF

1. MR. PRYOR, WHO IS AN EXECUTIVE OF PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS
AND A US TREASURY AGENT, WILL BE IN SAIGON JUNE 8TH AND
9TH EN ROUTE TO LAOS.

2. MR. PRYOR IS A PERSONAL FRIEND OF MINE, AND DURING
HIS STAY IN RVN, I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE HIM COME TO I CORPS
FOR A VISIT, PREFERABLY UP ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 8TH
AND RETURN ON THE 9TH. IN THIS CONNECTION, I
SOLICIT YOUR ASSISTANCE IN HAVING YOUR PROTOCOL OFFICER
OBTAIN CLEARANCE AND ARRANGE TRANSPORTATION FOR MR. PRYOR'S
VISIT TO MY HEADQUARTERS. I WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATIVE OF
ANY ASSISTANCE THAT YOU COULD PROVIDE.

3. PLEASE ADVISE: I WILL HAVE MR. PRYOR CONTACT YOUR
PROTOCOL OFFICER UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN SAIGON.
WARM REGARDS.

132

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

UNCLAS



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
FPO. SAN FRANCISCO 96602

IN REPLY REFER TO:

38/jtb
29 May 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DISTRIBUTION LIST

Subj: Visit by Argentine Observer Group

1. The purpose of the visit for the Argentine Observer Group is to provide a general orientation on U.S. operations with suggested emphasis for briefings (all unclassified)

#10

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5213 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF	DATE 29 MAY 1969	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 2904107 MAY 1969	COPY# OF COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					RELOCATION OF 1ST ANTRAC BN (U) REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITH IN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. ORIG: G-4 PLANS REL: C/S NO FORM <i>copy 3 to G-4 300800H May 69</i> <i>[Signature]</i> MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY <i>copy 2 to G-1 300815H May 69</i> <i>[Signature]</i> HAS BEEN SENT <i>copy 2 to G-3 311030H May 69</i> <i>[Signature]</i> <i>[Signature]</i> SECRET
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5213 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 29 MAY 1969	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 290410Z MAY 1969		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT RELOCATION OF 1ST AMTRAC BN (U)
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	T	30 May		N	REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITH IN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
3	DCG	T	30 May		X	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	T	NOV		SEM	
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	T	30 May		W L S	
5	G-1	Cy # 2	30 May		62	
	G-2					
6	G-3	Cy # 2	31 May		62	
7	G-4	Cy # 3	30 May		62	
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

ORIG: G-4 PLANS
REL: C/S

NO FORN

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

SECRET/NOFORN

PTTSZYUW RHMMAFA5311 1490410-SSSS--RUHHFMA RUMHVPA.
ZNY SSSSS

P 290410Z MAY 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMHVPA/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T NOFORN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

RELOCATION OF 1ST AMTRAC BN(U)

A. CG III MAF 041750Z MAY 69

1. (C) REFERENCE A REPORTED 1ST AMTRAC BN IN A CADRE STATUS.

2. (SECRET NOFORN) (MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY) PRESENT LOCATION OF 1ST AMTRAC BN AT CUA VIET UNSATISFACTORY FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. CADRE MISSION IS MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY ORIENTED AND CUA VIET LOCATION DOES NOT AFFORD READY ACCESS TO SUPPORTING MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY ORGANIZATION, I.E., FLSG-BRAVO AT DONG HA/QUANG TRI.

B. UNIT HAS NO IMMEDIATE COMBAT CAPABILITY AND AREA & FACILITIES PRESENTLY OCCUPIED ARE URGENTLY REQUIRED FOR TACTICAL FORCES WITH COMBAT MISSIONS.

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA5311 **S E C R E T** NOFORN MCEO

3. (SECRET NOFORN) (MARINE CORP EYES ONLY) TO OVERCOME THESE DEFICIENCIES, THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS EXAMINED AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES AND DETERMINED THAT THE MOST ACCEPTABLE AVAILABLE COURSE OF ACTION IS TO RELOCATE THE 1ST AMTRAC BN TO THE RED BEACH AREA OF THE DANANG TAOR. THIS RELOCATION WILL COMMENCE ON OR ABOUT 15 JUNE 1969. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, CERTAIN IMPLICATIONS IN THIS SOLUTION. THESE ARE:

A. COST OF REQUIRED FACILITIES WHICH MUST BE CONSTRUCTED APPROXIMATES ONE HUNDRED-FORTY THOUSAND DOLLARS (\$140,000). WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO SCALE THIS COST DOWN BUT THIS IS THE COST TO CONSTRUCT A PROPER FACILITY.

B. INCREASED DENSITY OF PROFITABLE TARGETS FOR ROCKET, SAPPER AND GROUND ATTACKS IN THE RED BEACH AREA.

4. (SECRET NOFORN) (MARINE CORP EYES ONLY) THE IDEAL SOLUTION WOULD BE TO MOVE THE CADRED 1ST AMTRAC BN TO OKINAWA. SUCH A MOVE WOULD:

A. REMOVE FROM IN-COUNTRY A UNIT WHICH

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET/NOFORN

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SECRET/NOFORN

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA5311 S E C R E T NOFORN MCEO
CONTRIBUTES NO COMBAT CAPABILITY TO
III MAF.

B. REDUCE THE LOAD ON IN-COUNTRY MAINTENANCE
AND SUPPLY FACILITIES.

C. FACILITATE ATTAINMENT OF A SATISFACTORY
MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY POSTURE.

D. ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL CON-
STRUCTION.

E. IN ADDITION, IT IS BELIEVED THAT SHOULD
THERE BE AN IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT TO RETURN THIS
UNIT TO A COMBAT READY STATUS FOR IN-COUNTRY USE,
THE ADVANTAGES WHICH WOULD ACCRUE FROM THE OKINAWA
LOCATION WOULD MORE THAN OFF-SET THE ADDITIONAL
TIME THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REDEPLOY THE 1ST
AMTRAC BN INTO COUNTRY.

5. (SECRET NOFORN) (MARINE CORP EYES ONLY) IN
VIEW OF THE ABOVE, RECOMMEND THAT SUCH ACTION OR
REPRESENTATION AS NECESSARY BE INITIATED EARLIEST
TO PROVIDE FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 1ST AMTRAC
BN FROM THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (CUA VIET) TO

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA5311 S E C R E T NOFORN MCEO
OKINAWA.

6. (SECRET NOFORN) (MARINE CORP EYES ONLY) IT
IS FURTHER REQUESTED THAT A DECISION BE PROVIDED
NOT LATTER THAN 15 JUNE 1969 IN ORDER TO ENSURE
MAXIMUM GAIN FROM AN OKINAWA REDEPLOYMENT.

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
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O 290424Z MAY 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN SIMPSON~~
~~FROM LTGEN NICKERSON~~

FOLLOWING MESSAGE READDRESS FOR YOUR INFORMATION

QUOTE CMC 282317Z MAY 69

FM CMC

TO RUYHSYA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUYPSYD/CG III MAF

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN WALT SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS~~

SUBJ: ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

1. OFFICES OF BALTIMORE AFRO-AMERICAN NEWSPAPER CHAIN RECENTLY RECEIVED A LETTER SIGNED BY 105 MEMBERS OF 3D BN, 1ST MARINES.

TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS: QUOTE

"WE THE BLACK MAN,

"WE THE BLACK MAN IN VIET NAM BEAR WITNESS TO THE EXISTENCE OF RACIAL PREJUDICE IN VIET NAM. THE CONTENTS OF THIS LETTER DESCRIBES THE SITUATION EXISTING IN 3/1 BN. WE, WHO SIGN HOLD EVIDENCE AS TO IT'S VALIDITY. WE BASE IT UPON OUR OWN OBSERVATIONS AND EXPERIENCES. WE DO SO IN HOPE OF ESTABLISHING BETTER RELATIONS AMONG MEN AND FREEDOM FOR ALL.

" THE AMERICAN BLACKMAN

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA4121 ~~CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN WALT~~
 IN VIET NAM;

"WE, THE AMERICAN BLACK MEN SERVING IN VIET NAM, ADDRESS THIS LETTER TO THE PEOPLE OF AMERICA. WE URGE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS LETTER NOT ONLY FOR OUR OWN SAKES BUT FOR AMERICAS.

"OUR FUTURE THE BLACK MAN, IS PREDESTINED BUT AMERICA'S FUTURE STILL LIES IN THE HANDS OF ITS PEOPLE. WE SPEAK NOT TO AMERICA AS A WHOLE BUT TO EACH AMERICAN AS AN INDIVIDUAL. AMERICA'S SELF-DESTRUCTION GROWS NEAR DUE TO FAULTS OF ITS OWN INHABITANTS. WE ASK EACH AMERICAN INDIVIDUAL TO CAST HIS OWN EYES UPON HIMSELF, AND EVALUATE HIS OWN PERSON BEFORE CONSIDERING OUR LETTER. WE SEE NO FAVORS OR GRATITUDE BUT ONLY TO SEE JUSTICE IN ITS TRUE NATURE.

"REALIZE AMERICA IS ALREADY FAMILIAR WITH THE PROBLEM WE CONFRONT HER WITH; BUT STILL WE FIND IT NECESSARY TO BRING AWARENESS TO ITS EXISTENCE ONCE MORE, THE PROBLEM IS RACIAL PRUDICE.

"THE SAME RACIAL PREJUDICE THAT HAS BEEN PREVALENT IN AMERICA SINCE BIRTH, YET AFTER OVER 300 YEARS IT IS STILL PRESENTS IN VIET NAM, RACIAL PREJUDICE EXISTS ONLY IN THE MINES OF THE

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PAGE THREE RUEBHOA4121 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN WALT AMERICAN PEOPLE. IT IS AN INTANGIBLE EVIL THAT LURKS INSIDE OF MANS BRAIN CAUSING HIM TO DISCRIMINATE AND REBEL AGAINST HIS OWN KIND. WE FIND IT PRESENCE IS NOT ONLY IN OUR OWN BATTALION BUT IN ALL OF SOUTH VIET NAM. WE FIND OURSELVES FREQUENTLY CONFRONTED WITH PREJUDICE HERE IN 3RD BN. 1ST MARINES.

*ANY OPPOSITION WE OFFER IN DEFENSE SERVES ONLY AS A CATALYST CAUSING IT TO BECOME MORE AGGRESSIVE DUE TO ITS NATURE, IT CAN ONLY BE MORE DESTROYED BY ITS MAKER, THE WHITE MAN. ITS APPROACH IS THAT OF THE (BEAST), THE CORRUPTED AMERICAN WHITE MAN, AND WE THE BLACK MAN ARE IT'S CONTENDERS. BEFORE THE BLACK MAN CAN BE RCOGNIZED AS AN AMERICAN THE ELIMINATION OF THIS PRODUCT MUST TAKE PLACE. WE LEAVE THE SOLUTION TO YOU, THE AMERICAN INDIVIDUAL, BUT WILL REMAIN RESTLESS UNTIL SOME RESULTS ARE SHOWN TOWARD THIS SOLUTION.

*RACIAL PREJUDICE EXISTING IN 3RD BN 1ST MARINES IS WELL PROTECTED BY THE BEASTS. TO A MAN WHO HAS NEVER BEEN SUBJECTED TO PREJUDICENESS TO HIM IT IS SHOCKING AT WHAT HE WITNESSES WITH OUR BATTALION.

*OUR CAUSE ISNT TO ACCUSE ORE JUSTIFY ANYONE'S ACTIONS BUT TO BRING AWARENESS TO THEIR ACTIONS. WE DO THIS IN HOPE THAT

PAGE FOUR RUEBHOA4121 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN WALT MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN TO SUBDUE THIS PROBLEM AND PREVENT ITS OCCURRENCE IN THE FUTURE.

*DUE TO RACIAL PREJUDICE HERE IN VIET NAM THE BLACK MAN IS BEING SUBJECTED TO UNNECESSARY DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE BEASTS. WE FIND OURSELVES STEADILY ABUSED AND HARASSED BY THE BEASTS. OUR LIVES ARE PLAYED WITH AS IF WE WERE THINGS OR TOYS, INSTEAD OF HUMANS. AS A RESULT OF THESE RIDICULOUS AND OUTRAGEOUS ACTS PERFORMED BY THE BEASTS MANY BLACKMEN ARE SERVING OVERTIME IN VIETNAM. DURING THIS TIME THEY ARE RETURNED TO CONFRONT WITH THE ENEMY WHEN THEY SHOULD BE BACK IN AMERICA. THOSE WHO AREN'T PHYSICALLY OR MENTALLY FIT ARE ALSO SENT OUT TO CONFRONT WITH THE ENEMY. THOSE WHO ARE ACCEPTED AS UNFIT FOR COMBAT, REMAIN IN THE REAR ONLY FOR HARASSEMENT AND TO BE SUBJECTED TO UNNECESSARY DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS. IN ANY EVENT OF CRIMES COMMITTED IN OUR BATTALION THE BLACK MAN IS FIRST LOOKED UPON AS A CRIMINAL. HE IS GUILTY BEFORE THE CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED. HE SEEMS TO BE A STEADY LAWBREAKER BUT DOESN'T STAND A FAIR CHANCE TO PROVE HIS INNOCENCE.

*WE BLACK MEN ARE UNDER THE WHITE MAN'S LAW IN VIET NAM. WE SEE THE WHITE MANS LAWA AS LAWS WE HAD NO CHOICE IN MAKING

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PAGE FIVE RUEBHOA4121 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN WALT
 CONTRARY TO THIS WE LIVE BY THEM AS WELL OR IF NOT BETTER THAN
 HE DOES HIMSELF. WE SEE HIS LAWS BEING ENFORCED AT DIFFERENT
 TIMES ON CERTAIN PEOPLE. HE USES US AS HIS PERSONAL TARGETS.
 WE FIND HIS LAWS ARE TO FLEXIBLE THAT THEIR TRUE MEANING IS
 NEVER EMPHASIZED BUT STRIPPED AWAY. WE SEE HIM USING THESE
 LAWS TO HIS OWN ADVANTAGE WE FIND ONLY ONE INTERPRETATION
 OF RIGHT-BUT THE BEASTS HAVE MANY INTERPRETATIONS OF RIGHT.
 THEIR LAWS CAN BE CHANGED AND ADDITIONS RENDERED AT ANY TIME.
 THEIR LAWS SEEM TO BE AN ESCAPE ROUTE FOR ALL THE WRONG THEY
 DO. WHEN WE ENFORCE HIS LAWS, RIGHT IS STILL SACRIFICED FOR
 WRONG. OR A COMPROMISE IS MADE BETWEEN THE TWO. BUT NEVER IS
 RIGHT RIGHT OR WRONG WRONG, THE LAWS ARE A FRONT THEREFORE
 SO ARE HIS LIFE AND HIS BELIEFS. HOW CAN JUSTICE PREVAIL
 IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF PRETENCE?

" IN 371 BATTALION WE HAVE A WATCH ACTION COMMITTEE WHOSE
 RESPONSIBILITY IS TO BRING FORTH COMPLAINTS AND PROBLEMS
 CONCERNING RACIAL PREJUDICE. THE COMMITTEE IS COMPOSED OF A
 BLACK MAN FROM EACH COMPANY WITHIN THE BATTALION. HE CONFRONTS
 THE EXECUTIVE PROBLEMS AND THEY ARE DISCUSSED. AS FOR A
 SOLUTION TO THESE PROBLMS WE SEE THAT MORE ATTENTION IS
 UNQUOTE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R L T G E N B U S E A N D L T G E N N I C K E R S O N F R O M L T G E N W A L T S E C T I O N 2 O F T W O S E C T I O N S T A K E N T O W A R D S T H E I R C O N C E A L M E N T . T H E O F F E N D E R O R M A I N P E R S O N R E S P O N S I B L E I S I G N O R E D , T H E O F F E N D E D I S R E C O N C I L I A T E D , A N Y M E A N S O F R E H A B I L I T A T I O N I S L O S T A N D T H E O F F E N D E R I S L E F T F R E E T O R E P E A T A N O T H E R O F F E N S E .

"WE SEE REASONS USED AS MEANS OF JUSTIFYING AN OFFENSE. JUSTIFICATION OF AN OFFENSE ISN'T POSSIBLE, FOR REASONS ARE FOR DETERMINING WHY AN ACT IS DONE AND THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE AND NOT ITS VALIDITY OR VOID.

"WE THE BLACK MEN IN VIET NAM DO NOT SEEK JUSTIFICATION FOR OUR OWN ACTIONS BUT SO SOLEMNLY BELIEVE THEM. OUR ACTIONS WE CAN'T SAY ARE OUR WILL BUT IS A RETALIATION TOWARD THE BEASTS. THIS RETALIATION IS A BUILT-IN REFLEX WHICH SERVES AS OUR ONLY DEFENSE AGAINST THE BEASTS.

PAGE TWO RUEBH0A4133 C O N F I D E N T I A L S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R L T G E N B U S E A N D L T G E N N I C K E R S O N F R O M L T G E N W A L T

"ACCORDING TO THE BEASTS WE KNOW NO RIGHT WE ARE ONLY CONNECTED WITH WRONG. THEREFORE OUR ACTIONS ARE CONSIDERED WRONG. AND COMPROMISE ONLY STRAYS FURTHER AWAY FROM THE TRUTH. WE CAN'T BE AMERICAN SOLDIERS OR TROOPERS WHEN WE AREN'T RECOGNIZED AS MEN, WE CAN NO LONGER SACRIFICE OUR LIVES FOR A COUNTRY THAT DOESN'T STAND FOR WHAT IT REPRESENTS. WE CAN'T FIGHT ANY LONGER FOR AN INDEPENDENCE THAT WE DON'T HAVE OURSELVES. WE CAN NO LONGER OBEY LAWS THAT ARE PHONY; LAWS THAT CAN BE CHANGED AND INTERPRETED ANYWAY THAT FITS THE SITUATION AT HAND. WE CAN NO LONGER LISTEN TO THE FOUL WORDS THE BEASTS SPEAK OF AS AIDING US WHEN WE SEE NO RESULTS. WE CAN'T CLAIM TO BE AMERICAN BUT JUST BLACK MEN. WE NO LONGER SERVE AMERICA WITH PRIDE AND HONOR BUT ONLY FIGHT BECAUSE THE BEASTS CONFRONT US WITH ONE OTHER ALTERNATIVE WHICH WOULD ONLY ADD TO THE PROBLEM.

"HOWEVER IF NOT SOLUTION IS BROUGHT FORTH SOON WE BLACK MEN WILL NO LONGER CONFRONT AMERICA WITH IT'S PROBLEM BUT WILL SEEK OUR SOLUTION WHETHER IT MEANS OUR LIVES OR THE WHITE MANS- (BEASTS)!!!!!! WE SHALL HAVE OUR MANHOOD; OR THE EARTH WILL BE LEVELED BY OUR ATTEMPTS TO GAIN IT.

"WE URGE ALL WHO READ THIS TO GIVE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO OUR

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PAGE THREE RUEBHOA4133. C O N F I D E N T I A L. SPECAT. EXCLUSIVE FOR
 LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN WALT.
 SAYINGS. WE REALIZE THAT THEIR ARE SOME WHITE MEN WHO ARE ON
 OUR SIDE. BUT THEN THERE IS THE BEASTS WHO IS THE ONE TO FALL.
 AND FALL HE SHALL" UNQUOTE
 2. MANAGING EDITOR OF BALTIMORE AFRO-AMERICAN AGREED TO
 WITHHOLD PUBLICATION FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK PENDING
 RECEIPT OF INFO FROM HQMC.
 3. REQUEST YOU INVESTIGATE AND PROVIDE REPORT TO FEACH THIS
 HQ NOT LATER THAN 3 JUN.
 WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE
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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 301054Z MAY 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		FOR MGEN GETTYS AND MEGEN RAMSEY	
3	CG	I	31 May			REMARKS	
3	DCG	I	31 May			feedback	
3	DCG AIR	I				ORIG - S/S	
2	C/S	I				REL - CG	
	DC/S	I	5/30	5/31			
	DC/S DM						
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	G-1						
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FILE NUMBER _____

ACTION SECTION WILL COMPLETE	
ACTION COMPLETED ON:	
RETAINED BY _____ SECTION	
DATE	SIGNATURE AND RANK

OTTEZYUW RHMMAFA5505 1501054-EEEE -RUMLL IA.

ZNY EEEEE

O 301054Z MAY 69

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMLL IA/CG AMERICAL DIV CHL

BT

UNCLAS E F T O/FOR MGEN GETTYS AND MGEN RAMSEY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. FOR MGEN GETTYS:

A. ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR CHANGE OF COMMAND AND DEPARTURE FROM VIETNAM, ALL III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE JOINS ME IN EXTENDING OUR HEARTFELT APPRECIATION FOR YOUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

B. THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION HAVE BEEN WELL PUBLICIZED HERE AND ABROAD. THE NAMES "WHEELER-WALLAWA" AND "BURLINGTON TRAIL" ARE SYNONYMOUS WITH "AMERICAL" AND SUCCESS IN BATTLE.

C. UNDER YOUR INSPIRING LEADERSHIP NEW CHAPTERS HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE ALREADY ILLUSTRIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION. YOU SHOULD BE JUSTIFIABLY PROUD OF YOUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF YOUR DIVISION. YOU WILL BE SORELY MISSED. MY HEARTIEST "WELL DONE", BEST WISHES IN YOUR NEW ASSIGNMENT IN WASHINGTON.

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA 5505 UNCLAS E F T O

2. FOR MGEN RAMSEY: WELCOME TO THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE AND TO OUR III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE NATION-BUILDING TEAM. MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND OF ONE OF THE FINEST COMBAT DIVISIONS IN AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY. I AM FULLY CONFIDENT THAT UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP, THE AMERICAL WILL CONTINUE TO ACQUIRE NEW LAURELS AS YOU FIND -FIX-FIGHT-MOVE-AND COMMUNICATE ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE WITH YOUR NEW COMMAND.

3. FOR THE GALLANT OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE AMERICAL: ON THE OCCASION OF THIS CHANGE IN YOUR COMMANDERS AND ON BEHALF OF YOUR I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE COMRADES-IN-ARMS, I EXTEND WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS AND BEST WISHES FOR CONTINUED BATTLEFIELD SUCCESS AGAINST OUR COMMON ENEMY. LIEUTENANT GENERAL NICKERSON, COMMANDING GENERAL, III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE.

BT

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