

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE		FROM AMERICAL DIV	DATE 1 JUNE 69
		SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 110103 JUN 69	1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL
			IN	OUT	
3	CG				
	DCG				
	DCG AIR				
2	C/S	I			
	DC/S				
6	DC/S PLAN	I			
1	S/S	I	6/11		
	G-1				
4	G-2	B			
5	G-3	A			
	G-4				
	G-5				
	G-6				
	CAP				
	ADJ				
	CORDS				
	EMB/TRANS				
	ENGR				
	H&S CO				
	INSP				
	MTO				
	OP ANAL				
	ORD				
	PSY OPS				
	SUPPLY				
	LEGAL				
	PMO				
	S&C				

SUBJECT
TOP SECRET AGD 597 EYES ONLY

REMARKS ①
THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4...

THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.

Handwritten notes:
 → gll
 63
 2/83
 keep the delta
 coming
 Decisions
 on plans
 DUC after

(32)

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

From: Chief of Staff

To:

Pierce
Valley

~~Wainwright~~



G. E. DOOLEY

COPY TO: 6-3 Y NO

PLANS Y NO

Route to Plans for copy

~~Route to~~

B-2 has copy 

0 110110Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4
 FM MG RAMSEY CG AMERICAL DIV
 TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF
 EM

T O P S E C R E T A C D 537 EYES ONLY

SB : OPERATION PIERCE VALLEY

REF: MSG 230143Z MAY (TF), SUBJ SAME, MG GETTYS TO LTG NICKERSON

1. ASSESSMENT OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE PIERCE VALLEY AREA:

A. INITIAL INDICATION OF EXTENSIVE USE OF THE KHAM DUC AREA BY SUBSTANTIAL ENEMY FORCES FOR THE INFILTRATION OF MEN AND SUPPLIES WERE NOT BORNE OUT BY PRELIMINARY GROUND RECONNAISSANCE OF THE AREA. OTHER RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS INSERTED, SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE OF THE MESSAGE REFERENCED ABOVE, IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF KHAM DUC, IN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE CAMP NEAR THE QUANG TIN/ KONTUM PROVINCE BORDER, AND IN AN AREA APPROXIMATELY PKM SOUTHWEST OF KHAM DUC HAVE ALSO FAILED TO DISCLOSE THE PRESENCE OF SIGNIFICANT ENEMY TROOPS OR THE UTILIZATION OF THE AREA BY ANYTHING OTHER THAN MINIMAL SECURITY FORCES. THESE FORCES ALSO UTILIZED A SYSTEM OF SIGNAL SHOTS TO MAINTAIN CONTACT AS HAS BEEN NOTE PREVIOUSLY IN AREAS TO THE EAST OF THE CAMP. AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR NOTED

IN THE GENERAL VICINITY OF YC9000 WAS THE SOUND OF BARKING DOGS, POSSIBLY USED TO TRACK THE RECONNAISSANCE TEAM. THE READINESS AND SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE ENEMY SECURITY FORCES WAS FOUND TO VARY FROM POOR IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF KHAM DUC TO FAIR IN THE AREA VIC ZB0186.

B. IN SUMMARY, RECONNAISSANCE EFFORTS HAVE FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR THE THESIS THAT THIS AREA IS BEING UTILIZED AS A MAJOR BASE AREA OR AS A PRIMARY INFILTRATION ROUTE INTO SOUTHERN I CORPS.
 2. ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE AMERICAL TAOI.

A. ALLIED FORCES IN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE AMERICAL DIVISIONS TAOI, IN THE VICINITY OF BASE AREA 117, ARE OPPOSED BY ENEMY FORCES EQUIVALENT TO A REINFORCED DIVISION. THESE FORCES CONSIST OF THE 1ST MF REGT, 2D NVA DIV REINFORCED BY THE 80TH BN OF THE 21ST NVA REGT, 2D NVA DIV, THE 3D NVA REGT, 2D NVA DIV AND MF AND LF BATTALIONS AND COMPANIES.

B. IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION TAOI ALLIED FORCES ARE OPPOSED BY ENEMY FORCES EQUIVALENT TO A DIVISION. THESE ENEMY FORCES CONSIST OF THE 21ST NVA REGT, 2D NVA DIV, THE 22D NVA REGT, 3D NVA DIV AS WELL AS MF AND LF ELEMENTS IN THE VICINITY OF QUANG NGAI CITY, AND THE 8 MF REGT, 3D NVA DIV REINFORCED BY SAPPER AND LF COMPANIES THREATENING MO LUC AND BUC PHO.

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C. RECENT ENEMY ACTIVITY HAS REMAINED AT A MODERATE LEVEL WITHIN THE TAOI SINCE THE REF MSG. THE SITUATION WEST OF TAM KY AND IN BA 117 HAS IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF INCREASED TROOP DENSITY PROVIDED BY 1/101ST ABN BDE. ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY IS STILL ACTIVE IN THIS AREA IN STRENGTH, HE HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY ATTRITED AND WE ARE CONTINUING TO WORK TO ACCELERATE HIS DESTRUCTION. IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR I REMAIN CONCERNED OVER THE THREATS POSED TO QUANG NGAI, MO DUC, AND DUC PHO.

D. FURTHER, A CONTINUATION OF THE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PHASE OF OPERATION PIERCE VALLEY WOULD DEMAND AVIATION AND TROOP ASSETS AS A REACTION FORCE FOR PROJECT DELTA. THESE REQUIREMENTS WOULD CONTINUE TO DEROGATE MY CAPABILITY TO RESPOND IN SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO THE ENEMY THREAT, STILL WELL FOR AND IN THE ACTIVE AMERICAL TAOI.

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE ASSESSMENTS I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT OPERATIONS IN THE KHAM DUC AREA WOULD, AT THIS TIME, BE REMUNERATIVE ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY THE COMMITMENT OF THE SIZE FORCE THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED. ADDITIONALLY, ~~ANY REDUCTION OF TROOP DENSITY IN MY CURRENT AREAS OF OPERATION WOULD BE TACTICALLY INAPPROPRIATE.~~ ACCORDINGLY, I RECOMMEND THE IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF PHASE I OF OPERATION PIERCE VALLEY AND THE CANCELLATION OF ALL SUBSEQUENT, PLANNED PHASES.

4. THERE IS A LIKELIHOOD, HOWEVER, THAT THOSE CONDITIONS WHICH ORIGINALLY PROMPTED COMUSMACV AND YOURSELF TO CONSIDER AN OPERATION IN THE VICINITY OF KHAM DUC/BASE AREA 614 MAY, AT A FUTURE DATE, EMERGE AGAIN. THUS, IF SUBSEQUENT ENEMY DISPOSITIONS FAVOR SUCH AN OPERATION AND IF THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN THE AMERICAL TAOI PERMITS, THE AMERICAL DIVISION IS PREPARED TO REINITIATE OPERATIONS IN THE AREA.

WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
929

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TOP SECRET

32(2)

32(2)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM GEN ABBAMS		DATE 24 JUN 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 2810007		1, 2, 3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG		28 June		N	COMMAND AND CONTROL IN EMERGENCY REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P8011.4...
4	DCG		25 Jun		N	
	DCG AIR					THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.
2	C/S	I			D	
	DC/S					6/25/69 g3 pass → major emphasis to them that decision is responsibility of Gen N and will not be delegated (para 4)
1	S/S	F	6/25		N	
	G-1					NOTE See c/s MAEV 2810007 Aug 69 F/charge
	G-2					
5	G-3					TOP SECRET
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

P 241122Z ZFF-A ZFF-10

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON VIETNAM
 TO GEN BROWN CDR 7TH AF TSA SAIGON VIETNAM
 LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF DA NANG VIETNAM
 LTG CORCOYAN CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG VIETNAM
 LTG SWELL CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH VIETNAM
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON VIETNAM
 CG WETHERILL CG 5MAC CAN THO VIETNAM
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T MAC 8094 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: COMMAND AND CONTROL IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS (U)

REF: CINCPAC MSG DTG 220201Z JUN 69 (TS) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) REFERENCE CONTAINS BROAD GUIDANCE TO PACOM COMMANDERS AND STATES THAT ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN TO IMPROVE EXISTING PROCEDURES IN ORDER TO ENSURE EXPEDITIOUS REACTION TO EMERGENCY SITUATIONS SUCH AS THAT INVOLVING THE EC 121 SHOOTDOWN ON 15 APR, AS AUTHORIZED BY CURRENT ROE FOR SEA. THESE IMPROVEMENTS ARE BEING DEVELOPED TO ENSURE IMMEDIATE REACTION BY FORWARD OPERATING FORCES WITHOUT WAITING FOR SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY.

2. PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFERENCE IS QUOTED AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE. PENDING IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW PROCEDURES OR CHANGES TO EXISTING PROCEDURES, I REQUEST THAT YOU, AND YOUR SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS, TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION IN RESPONSE TO ANY SHORT-DURATION, HOSTILE CRISIS SITUATION WHICH REQUIRES A US DEFENSIVE REACTION AND FOR WHICH YOU HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT:

A. INSURE THERE IS COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING WITHIN YOUR COMMAND OF THE CURRENT ROE.

B. MOVE AND EMPLOY IMMEDIATELY ANY FORCES UNDER YOUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL THAT ARE CAPABLE OF ASSISTING ANY OTHER US FORCES WHICH INDICATE THAT THEY ARE UNDER ATTACK OR UNDER THREAT OF IMMINENT ATTACK.

38(1)

T. C. REPORT IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY TO HIGHER HEAD-
QUARTERS TO INCLUDE CINCPAC AND TO LATERAL HEADQUARTERS OF ALL
SERVICES, DETAILS OF ANY REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE AND ACTION BEING
TAKEN. USE IMMEDIATE OR HIGHER PRECEDENCE. THE UNIT AGAINST
WHOM THE HOSTILE ACTION IS DIRECTED WILL REACT WITHIN THE CURRENT
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, WILL REQUEST APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE AS

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AVAILABLE FROM LATERAL UNITS AND WILL REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
EXISTING DIRECTIVES. END QUOTE.

3. (TS) THE QUOTED PARAGRAPH ABOVE IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFOR-
MATION AND ACTION AS APPROPRIATE. IT OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT MEANT TO
APPLY TO THE MACV IN-COUNTRY COMBAT SITUATION, BUT RATHER TO INCI-
DENTS COMPARABLE TO THE EXAMPLE IN PARAGRAPH 1, ABOVE. WE ARE TO
BE READY TO REACT TO CRISIS SITUATIONS INVOLVING FORCES OR
UNITS OF OTHER PACIFIC COMMANDS.

A. (TS) ADDRESSEES ARE AUTHORIZED TO MOVE AND EMPLOY FORCES

UNDER THEIR OPERATIONAL CONTROL TO ASSIST US FORCES UNDER ATTACK
OR UNDER THREAT OF IMMEDIATE ATTACK. IN ANY INSTANCE WHERE THIS
INVOLVES US FORCES NOT UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF USMACV,
THE DECISION WILL BE MADE BY ADDRESSEES ONLY AND MACV HEADQUARTERS

NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY, IF THE SITUATION PERMITS, AND
DELAY WILL NOT JEOPARDIZE THE SAFETY OF THE THREATENED US FORCE
OR UNIT, COMUSMACV CONCURRENCE WILL BE SOUGHT ON THE CONTEMPLATED
ACTION.

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550

TOP SECRET

38/27

38/21

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM MG TOWNSEND		DATE 28 JUNE 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 281100Z		1,2,3 COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT VIETNAMIZATION
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	T				REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4. THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT. ABSOLUTELY FOR ADDRESSES' EYES ONLY Route to GEN BURKE Gen D LACKI Col NORRIS 1. This is the requirement LT Col summons mentioned RE out of country losses - IMPACT OF. 2. No requirement for us to respond until queried by J3 + J4 NO ACTION NOW. (40)
4	DCG	T				
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
7	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	T	6/29			
	G-1					
	G-2					
5	G-3			6/29		
6	G-4					
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	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

TOP SECRET

O 281100Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1
 FM MG TOWNSEND C/S MACV
 TO GEN BROWN CMDR 7AF
 LTG MILDREN DCG USARV
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV
 LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T SENSITIVE MAC 8300 EYES ONLY
 EYES OF ADDRESSEES ONLY!!

SUBJECT: VIETNAMIZATION (C)

REF: CINCPAC 220405Z JUN 69, SUBJ: VIETNAMIZATION (C) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) CONTENTS OF REFERENCE ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

A. NSSM 36 HAS BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE OUT-OF-COUNTRY FORCES. CINCPAC HAS HELD THAT US FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA OUTSIDE OF SOUTH VIETNAM SHOULD NOT BE REDUCED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH REDUCTIONS INSIDE SOUTH VIETNAM. CINCPAC'S OBJECTIVE IS TO RETAIN A DETERRENT AND PROTECTIVE CAPABILITY THAT WOULD HELP TO PRECLUDE A NEED FOR REENTRY OF US FORCES INTO SOUTH VIETNAM.

B. CINCPAC HAS REQUESTED COMPONENT SERVICE INPUTS TO ASSIST IN SUPPORTING THE ABOVE POSITION. CINCPAC COMPONENTS ALSO ARE TO IDENTIFY AND REPORT OUT-OF-COUNTRY ELEMENTS WHICH, IF REDUCED, WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADE COMBAT CAPABILITY AND TO DEVELOP AND SUBMIT UNIT LISTINGS BY PRIORITY FOR A 25 PERCENT REDUCTION IF SUCH A REDUCTION WERE ORDERED.

2. (U) IF TASKED FOR INPUT WITHIN COMPONENT CHANNELS, REQUEST COMUSMACV BE INCLUDED AS INFO ADDRESSEE IN RESPONDING MESSAGES. GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 300

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TOP SECRET

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