

13. ~~CG III MAF 011420Z JUL69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO~~
~~FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON~~
~~QUOTES NAVFORV 250510Z JUN & III MAF 010412Z JUL~~
14. ~~CG III MAF 010412Z JUL69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE~~
~~FOR ZUMWALT FROM NICKERSON~~
~~I REVIEWED YOUR 250510Z JUN~~
15. ✓ CG III MAF 010802Z JUL69 (C) FOR *GP-4*
FOR SIMPSON, JONES, QUILTER & FEELEY FROM NICKERSON
QUOTES CINCPACFLT 292157Z JUN69 - FY-70 FUNDING CONSTRAINTS
16. ✓ CG III MAF 041340Z JUL69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *GP-4*
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
VISIT OF SENATORS BELLMON AND STEVENS
17. ✓ CG III MAF 041410Z JUL69 (C) *GP-4*
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
1970 GUIDELINES -- THUA THIEN AS TEST CASE
18. ~~CG III MAF 040703Z JUL69 (U)~~
~~FOR COLLISON FROM NICKERSON~~
~~SHIP THE PLAQUES~~
19. ~~CG III MAF 051240Z JUL69 (U)~~
~~FOR FLANAGAN FROM DOOLEY~~
~~PLT ARRANGEMENTS FOR OUTLAW 16JUL~~
20. ~~CG III MAF 060610Z JUL69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE~~
~~FOR JONES FROM NICKERSON~~
~~SSGT D.L. ARNOLD MERITORIOUS GUNNY~~
21. ✓ CG III MAF 061020Z JUL69 *GP-4*
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY
PASSES 3dDIV 060851Z JUL69 -- GSW TO MGEN JONES
22. ✓ CG III MAF 060929Z JUL69 (C) *GP-4*
FOR ZAIS, SIMPSON, WRIGHT AND QUILTER FROM NICKERSON
READDRESSES MACV'S 060421 -- NEWS MEDIA REGARDING ROE
23. ~~CG III MAF 060830Z JUL69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE"~~
~~FOR ZUMWALT FROM NICKERSON~~
~~VIETNAMIZING THE WAR~~
24. ~~CG III MAF 090945Z JUL69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE~~
~~FOR ZUMWALT FROM NICKERSON~~
~~ICDZ COMMON SUPPORT~~
25. ~~CG III MAF 100250Z JUL69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO~~
~~KKRXNKKKKKKKKXKXKX FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON~~
~~ICDZ COMMON SUPPORT~~

26. ✓ CG III MAF 100746Z JUL69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *GP-4*
FOR BUSE INFO WALT FROM NICKERSON
RESPONSE TO CMC'S MSG ON TOAN
27. ✓ CG III MAF 100812Z JUL69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *GP-4*
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
PASSES CMC'S 091824Z JUL69 ON TOAN
- ~~28. CG III MAF 100630Z JUL69 (U) FOR
FOR JONES EYES ONLY
REDEPLOYMENT OF COMPANY COMMANDERS WITH THEIR COMPANIES~~
- ~~29. CG III MAF 110540Z JUL69 (C)
FOR JONES FROM NICKERSON
FAREWELL TO NINTH MARINES~~
- ~~30. CG III MAF 110410Z JUL69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR ZUMWALT FROM NICKERSON
ICTZ COMMON SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES~~
- ~~31. CG III MAF 110630Z JUL69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
FOR JONES FROM NICKERSON
CHAPMAN, BUSE & KRULAK (Buzzy & Skip)~~
- ~~32. CG III MAF 110918Z JUL69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
ICTZ COMMON SUPPORT~~
- ~~33. CG III MAF 110922Z JUL69 (S) S DECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
ICTZ COMMON SUPPORT~~
- ~~34. CG III MAF 131320Z JUL69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
LTGEN DAVISON VISITED ICTZ SUPPORT~~
35. ✓ CG III MAF 141546Z JUL69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *GP-4*
FOR ZAIS, SIMPSON THRASH RAMSEY AND FEELEY FROM NICKERSON
READDRESSAL OF COFS MACV MGEN TOWNSEND 110640Z JUL69 (C)
ON CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
36. ✓ CG III MAF 141548Z JUL69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *GP-4*
FOR JONES, SIMP SON, THRASH AND FEELEY FROM NICKERSON
READDRESSAL OF COMNAVFORV ZUMWALT 130345Z JUL69 (S)
ON CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
- ~~27. CG III MAF 150028Z JUL69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR ZUMWALT FROM NICKERSON
CONCURRENCE WITH COMNAVFORV 130857Z JUL69 (S) (REDUCTION OF
NAVY LEASED SPACES IN DANANG)~~

- ~~38. CG III MAF 150836Z JUL69 (U)
EYES ONLY FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF MACV 150307Z JUL69~~
- ~~39. CG III MAF 151520Z JUL69 (C)
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SIMPSON FROM NICKERSON
MOBILE QUICK REACTION TASK FORCE (U)~~
40. ✓ CG III MAF 160425Z JUL69 (S) GP-4
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
PERSONAL SECURITY AND EMERGENCY EVAC PLAN FOR CJCS
41. ✓ CG III MAF 160630Z JUL69 (S) GP-4
EYES ONLY FOR TOWNSEND INFO CORCORAN AND ZAIS FROM NICKERSON
ITINERARY FOR CJCS
42. ✓ CG III MAF 161058 JUL69 (C) GP-4
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
ENEMY CACHE DISCOVERIES IN ICTZ
43. ✓ CG III MAF 170100Z JUL69 (S) GP-3
LIMDIS/MCEO
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY REPORT
- ~~44. CG III MAF 171512Z JUL69 (U)
FOR GARRETTSON INFO VAN RYZIN, FONTANA AND HISE FROM DOOLEY
TRANSPORTATION FOR MCEN C. S. BOWMAN~~
45. ✓ CG III MAF 180115Z JUL69 (S) GP-1
EYES ONLY FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
VISIT OF PRESIDENT THIEU
46. ✓ CG III MAF 180116Z JUL69 (S) GP-1
EYES ONLY FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
VISIT OF PRESIDENT THIEU
- ~~47. CG III MAF 180945Z JUL69 (C)
FOR BRINGLE FROM NICKERSON
ATTENDANCE AT MORNING BRIEF 19 JUL69~~
48. ✓ CG III MAF 190214Z JUL69 (C) GP-4
FOR ZAIS, RAMSEY, SIMPSON, JONES, THRASH AND FEELEY FROM NICKERSON
VISIT OF CNO (MOORER)
49. CG III MAF 200315Z JUL69 (C) GP-4
EYES ONLY FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
THUA THIEN PROPOSAL
- ~~50. CG III MAF 200752Z JUL69 (C)
READDRESSAL OF CNO 173004Z JUL69
VISIT OF CNO (MOORER)~~

1. ~~CG III MAF 240550Z JUL69 (C) EYES ONLY~~
~~FOR ZAIS FROM NICKERSON~~
~~ICW GEN ABRAMS VISIT TO 9TH RLT CEREMONY~~
2. ~~CG III MAF 250820Z JUL69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCBO~~
~~FOR DUSE FROM NICKERSON~~
~~FRP - ATTENDEES FOR 28-29 JUL CONF AT CAMP SMITH~~
3. ~~CG III MAF 251212Z JUL69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCBO~~
~~FOR THRASH FROM NICKERSON~~
~~FRP - PASSES III MAF 250830Z JUL69~~
4. ~~CG III MAF 290522Z JUL69 (C)~~
~~FOR BRINGLE AND ANDERSON INFO RUDDEN, WISNER, FREEMAN AND~~
~~RUDDEN FROM NICKERSON~~
~~VISIT WELCOME~~
5. ✓ CG III MAF 290950Z JUL69 (S) EYES ONLY *GP-4*
COMUS WAS HERE -- ATTENDED RLT 9 DEPARTURE 25 JUL
6. ✓ CG III MAF 291155Z JUL69 (S) EYES ONLY:Y *GP-4*
NICKERSON TO SIMSØSON, FIRFER, THRASH, RAMSEY, RENWANZ INFO ZAIS
COMUS WAS HERE 25 JUL
7. ✓ CG III MAF 300615Z JUL69 (C) *GP-4*
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
VIPS TO ICTZ - STABLERS
8. ✓ CG III MAF 300650Z JUL69 (C) *GP-4*
NICKERSON TO SIMPSON
BRIEFING AT 7TH MARINES
9. ~~CG III MAF 020400Z JUL69 (U)~~
~~FOR DRAPER FROM NICKERSON~~
~~SORRY WE ARRIVED IN MIDDLE OF YOUR CEREMONY -- YOU KNEW WE WERE~~
~~COMING~~
10. ~~CG III MAF 020710Z JUL69 (C)~~
~~FOR SIMPSON, JONES, THRASH, AND FEELEY FROM NICKERSON~~
~~CMC'S GREETINGS TO MARINE CORPS JUNIORS~~
11. ~~CG III MAF 020712Z JUL69 (C)~~
~~PASS TO MCLAUCHLIN, PASS TO WHEELER, FOR SIMPSON, JONES & THRASH~~
~~ATTENDANCE AT CMC HOUR~~
12. ✓ CG III MAF 021010Z JUL69 (C) EYES ONLY *GP-4*
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
PROPOSAL TO CIVILIANIZE THUA THIEN

200726

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

CONFIDENTIAL

15

CONFIDENTIAL

RITCZYUW RHMAFA0084 1820802-CCCC--RUMHLA RUMHVP RUMLMHA
RUMLMHA.

ZNY CCCCC

R 010802Z JUL 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

RUMLMHA/CG FORLOGCOMD

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L/FOR MGENS SIMPSON, JONES AND QUILTER,
BGEN FEELEY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

COMM NOTE: QUOTE CINCPACFLT 292157Z JUN 69

FM CINCPACFLT

TO RUHHQA/CINCPAC

INFO RUENAAA/CNO

RUMUCKD/COMNAVFORV

RUHGSF/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMMAFA/CGIIMAF

RUWJUA/COMNAVAIRPAC

RUHHA SA/COMASWFORPAC

RUWDSDE/COMFIRSTFLT

RUWJMSA/COMPHIBPAC

ZEN/COMSERVPAC

RUHHADA/COMSUBPAC

RUWJSBB/COMINPAC

RUWJAIA/COMCRUDESPAC

RUWJNRA/COMTRAPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR

ADM MC CAIN, INFO: ADM MOORER, VADM ZUMWALT, VADM

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

15 (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO RUHHBR42991 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 BRINGLE, L GEN NICKERSON, L GEN BUSE, VADM SHINN, VADM BOWEN, VADM
 ROEDER, VADM SMITH, RADM COMBS, RADM SMALL, RADM BIRD, RADM FREEMAN
 FROM HYLAND

FY-70 FUNDING CONSTRAINTS (U)

A. CINCPACFLT 210134Z JUN 69 NDIAL

B. COMNAVIAIRPAC 282037Z JUN 69 PASEP

R. (C) PACFLT INITIAL FUNDING PLAN REQUIRES THAT WE COMMENCE FY
 70 OPS WITH OWN FUNDS GROSSLY (ABOUT 25 PERCENT OR A QUARTER
 BILLION DOLLARS) BELOW OUR STATED REQUIREMENTS. (REF A OUTLINES
 FUNDING PROBLEM.) EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES ARE NECESSARY NOW TO LIVE
 WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE FIRST QUARTER FUNDING PLAN. DEFERRAL
 OF THESE ACTIONS WOULD GENERATE MORE SEVERE FUNDING PROBLEMS WITH
 ATTENDANT AGGRAVATION OF OPERATIONAL IMPACT. REF B, WHICH INDICATES
 FLIGHT HOURS MUST BE DECREASED ABOUT 20 PERCENT, IS THE FIRST OF
 MANY RELATED ACTIONS HAVING AN OPERATIONAL IMPACT.

2. (C) WE ARE CONTINUING EFFORTS TO FIND MEANS OF PROVIDING MAXIMUM
 COMBAT CAPABILITY WITHIN LIMITED FUNDS AVAILABLE AND WILL KEEP YOU
 ADVISED IF THE PICTURE CHANGES. ADM MOORE HAS ADVISED ME THAT THE
 OUTLOOK FOR RELIEF IS NOT BRIGHT. BEST REGARDS. UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

0084

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

15/27

SECRET

PITSZYUW RHMMFA0469 183134G-SSSS--RUHMFMA.
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 041340Z JUL 69
 FM CG 111 MAF
 TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN
 NICKERSON SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
 VISIT OF SENATORS BELLMON AND STEVENS

1. SENATORS BELLMON AND STEVENS VISITED I CORPS ON 2 JULY.
 REMAINED OVER NIGHT AND LEFT THE FOLLOWING MORNING FOR II
 CORPS. THEY WERE MET AT THE AIRPORT BY CARL YOUNGDALE AND
 MYSELF, WERE GIVEN AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING BY G-2 AND G-3
 AFTER WHICH THEY ATTENDED THE MORNING DAILY BRIEFING. THE
 BRIEFING WAS WELL RECEIVED BY THEM AND THEY STATED THAT
 THEY HAD LEARNED MORE FROM IT THAN FROM TIME SPENT IN THE
 PREVIOUS TWO CORPS THEY HAD VISITED. IMMEDIATELY AFTER
 THE BRIEFING WE SAT DOWN IN MY OFFICE FOR ABOUT 30 MINUTES
 AND TALKED ABOUT THE VIETNAMESE SITUATION. THEY EMPHASIZED
 THAT NEXT YEAR IS AN ELECTION YEAR AND THAT THIS WAS PARA-
 MOUNT IN THE THOUGHTS OF THE LEGISLATORS, AND THAT THIS
 FACT IS GOING TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON DECISIONS

PAGE TWO RHMMFA0469 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 IN THE FUTURE. THEY STATED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD
 THEM ON WEDNESDAY LAST THAT THE AMERICAN FORCES WERE NOT
 GOING TO WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM IN NUMBERS WHICH WOULD
 EXCEED THE CAPABILITY OF THE VIETNAMESE TO PROTECT
 THEMSELVES. THEY EMPHASIZED THIS FACT SEVERAL TIMES.
 THEY QUESTIONED THE ABILITY OF THE THIEU GOVERNMENT
 TO REMAIN IN POWER AND SEEMED TO ACCEPT OUR COMMENTS
 OF CONFIDENCE IN THIEU AND HIS GOVERNMENT AT THIS
 POINT IN TIME. FOLLOWING THIS DISCUSSION, WE PRO-
 CEDED TO I CORPS HEADQUARTERS WHERE THEY VISITED
 WITH GEN LAM FOR ABOUT 30 MINUTES. LAM EXPLAINED THE
 CURRENT SITUATION AS HE SAW IT, AND FRANKLY ADMITTED
 THAT THE NICTZ WAS PACIFIED AND THE SICTZ WAS NOT AS
 FAR ADVANCED IN PACIFICATION. HE PRESENTED EACH WITH
 A GIFT. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH GEN LAM, WE
 VISITED THE 7TH MARINES, 1ST ARVN RANGER GROUP, AND
 51ST ARVN REGT. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO CAM LO WHERE WE
 VISITED A COMBINED ACTION PLATOON. WE THEN VISITED
 THE GIA DANG COASTAL FISHING VILLAGE, THE SAME ONE
 THE SECRETARY ROGERS VISITED. FROM THERE WE VISITED

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAF0469 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 FSB NANCY (1ST ARVN REGT, LTCOL DIEM); WHERE BOTH NGEN
 TRUONG AND LTCOL DIEM BRIEFED. FROM THERE WE VISITED
 COL BOWEN (PSA) AND COL THAN (THE PROVINCE CHIEF)
 AT PROVINCE HQS AT NUE. SUBSEQUENT TO THIS WE
 VISITED A NEW RESETTLED HAMLET AT QUONG THO.
 2. THIS VISIT WAS VERY BENEFICIAL TO THE
 SENATORS AND GAVE THEM A MUCH BETTER UNDER-
 STANDING OF THE WAR. I BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE
 SUITABLY IMPRESSED WITH THE CAPABILITY OF THE
 ARVN IN I CORPS AND THEY WERE ALSO MADE AWARE
 OF THE LIMITATIONS OF THE ARVN. FOLLOWING
 DINNER, WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY SEVERAL OF OUR
 GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS HERE, A DISCUSSION
 OF ABOUT ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS TOOK PLACE. I
 MIGHT SAY PARENTHETICALLY THAT YOU KNOW THAT
 THESE ARE BOTH FRESHMEN SENATORS AND AS A
 RESULT, THEY DO NOT HAVE THE DEPTH OF A BYRD
 OR TOWER. THIS DID NOT CONSTRAIN MR. STEVENS
 FROM PUTTING FORTH HIS VIEWS; HOWEVER, MR.
 BELLMON WAS CONSIDERABLY MORE RESTRAINED.

PAGE FOUR RHMMAF0469 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 3. I MIGHT ADD THAT MR. STEVENS IS UP FOR ELECTION
 IN 1970, WHEREAS MR. BELLMON DOES NOT COME UP
 FOR RE-ELECTION FOR ANOTHER FIVE YEARS. BY
 THEIR OWN WORDS, BELLMON CAN BE A STATESMAN
 FOR ANOTHER FIVE YEARS OR SO WHEREAS STEVENS
 HAS TO BE A POLITICIAN NOW.
 4. BOTH SENATORS PROFESSED SUPPORT OF THE
 PROGRAM OUT HERE AND BOTH PROFESSED SUPPORT
 FOR PRESIDENT NIXON. THEY CLAIM THAT THEIR
 TWO VOTES ARE THE DECIDING VOTES WHICH THE
 PRESIDENT NEEDS IN ORDER TO SWING HIS MILITARY
 PROGRAMS. THIS MAY BE TRUE -- I DON'T KNOW --
 HOWEVER, IT APPEARS TO ME THAT STEVENS PRIMARY
 INTEREST LIES IN HIS STATE AND COMMITMENTS IN
 VIETNAM ARE SECONDARY. HE ENJOINED US TO BE
 VERY DOLLAR CONSTRAINED, AND INDICATED THAT
 A MILLION DOLLARS SHOULD NOT BE SPENT ON A
 PROJECT OUT HERE IF IT WEREN'T AS IMPORTANT AS
 A BRIDGE IN ALASKA, FOR EXAMPLE, WHERE A MILLION
 DOLLARS COULD BE SPENT. THEY BOTH POINTED OUT

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFAC469 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FRUGALITY. THEY STATED THAT WE ARE FACED WITH A TREMENDOUS PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES, NAMELY, INFLATION, TO WHICH WE AGREED. CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION ENDED ON PROBLEMS OF INFLATION -- AND THE FACT THAT HERE IS NOW FOUR HUNDRED DOLLARS A MONTH IN FAIRBANKS FOR A VERY SMALL APARTMENT, ETC., ETC. MR. BELLMON MADE THE APPROXIMATE COMMENT THAT QUOTE WE WISH YOU GUYS WOULD HURRY UP AND END THIS OVER HERE SO THAT THE STABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES COULD BE CONSIDERABLY IMPROVED UNQUOTE. BILL BURKE, OUR ARMY BRIGADIER WHO REPLACED WARREN BENNETT, CHALLENGED SENATOR BELLMON AND SAID IN A NICE WAY, QUOTE WHAT DO YOU MEAN -- YOU GUYS -- I THOUGHT THIS WAS AN INTER-DEPENDENT WAR: IT IS BEING FOUGHT OUT HERE BUT BEING DIRECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT BACK IN WASHINGTON, AND WE ARE ALL IN THIS TOGETHER UNQUOTE. ... 5. AT THIS POINT, SENATOR STEVENS TURNED TO GEN LAM AND SAID, QUOTE ONE OF THE PROBLEMS THAT

PAGE SIX RHMMAFAC469 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR WE HAVE BACK IN THE STATES, AND I HOPE YOU WILL FORGIVE ME SIR, IS A LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE VIETNAMESE TO FIGHT THE WAR SUCCESSFULLY IF THE AMERICANS PULL OUT, AND ALSO, THAT POSSIBLY YOUR PREPARATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN AS RAPID OR THOROUGH AS THEY COULD HAVE BEEN UNQUOTE. TO THIS GEN LAM REPLIED, QUOTE I WOULD SAY TO THAT, THAT WE ARE FIGHTING COMMUNISM OUT HERE AND THAT IF THE UNITED STATES WITHDRAWS ALL ITS FORCES BEFORE THE WAR IS OVER WE WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT. THIS IS OUR COUNTRY, THE PEOPLE NORTH OF THE DMZ ARE VIETNAMESE AS WE ARE VIETNAMESE AND I KNOW THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. I ALSO KNOW HO CHI MINH AND I KNOW WHAT HE IS GOING TO DO. HE IS GOING TO HANG ON TO THE VERY LAST MINUTE AND KEEP FIGHTING -- BUT, SO ARE WE. WE MAY LOSE, BUT WE WILL BE FIGHTING TO THE VERY END AND WE ARE NOT GOING TO QUIT UNQUOTE. GEN LAM THEN TURNED TO SENATOR BELLMON AND IN REFERENCE TO A PREVIOUS COMMENT MADE BY BELLMON ABOUT SENATOR KENNEDY, GEN LAM SAID, QUOTE AND I MIGHT SAY TO YOU SIR

GP-4

BT

0469

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES**SECRET**

SECRET

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON SECTION TWO OF TWO SECTIONS THAT WE HAVE SENATORS IN SAIGON WHO TALK TOO MUCH ALSO. AND, FOR SENATORS WHO TALK TOO MUCH, IF THE UNITED STATES IS GOING TO DO ANYTHING, LET THEM GO AHEAD AND DO IT, BUT BE QUIET AND DON'T TALK ABOUT IT UNQUOTE. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT BOTH SENATORS WERE BEYOND THEIR DEPTH WHEN THEY ATTEMPTED TO COMPETE WITH GEN LAM, AND THEY BOTH RECOGNIZED THIS. SENATOR STEVENS SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WOULD BE WONDERFUL FOR SOMEONE LIKE GEN LAM TO MAKE A SPEAKING TOUR OF THE UNITED STATES TO LET THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE FEELINGS AND CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE.

6. THE VISITORS LEFT THE NEXT MORNING.

PAGE TWO RHMMAF03480 S E C R E T SPECAT-EXCLUSIVE FOR I BELIEVE THAT THEY BOTH SUPPORT THE WAR EFFORT AND I BELIEVE THAT MR. BELLMON IS GOING TO BE A VALUABLE ASSET IN THE FUTURE. MR. STEVENS, IN MY OPINION, HAS A LOT OF MIS- INFORMATION AND DOES NOT HESITATE TO DISCUSS ANY SUBJECT WHETHER HE KNOWS ANYTHING ABOUT IT OR NOT. I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEY BOTH SENSED AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE NESS THAT ALTHOUGH THE GUESTS WERE BEING TREATED WITH COURTESY, THE MEMBERS WERE NOT BUYING EVERYTHING THAT THEY WERE SAYING. I REPEAT, MR. BELLMON WAS RELATIVELY CONSTRAINED.

GP-4

BT

0480

outstanding message!
D

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

SECRET

P 041418Z
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
1970 GUIDELINES

A. CG III MAF 221436Z MAY69

B. COMUSMACV 120140Z JUN69

1. BY REF A I RECOMMENDED THAT ALL ARVN, US AND
EVENTUALLY ALL RF FORCES BE WITHDRAWN FROM DISTRICTS
THAT HAVE ACHIEVED A HIGH DEGREE OF SECURITY AND THAT
ALL AUTHORITY BE VESTED IN THE DISTRICT. (THIS TO BE
A LOGICAL STEP IN RETURNING AUTHORITY TO THE
VIETNAMESE. IT COINCIDES AT THIS TIME WITH THE
DEVELOPMENT OF GVN FORCES AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF
OUR OWN FORCES.)

2. REF B STATED THAT THUA THIEN IS UNDER ACTIVE
CONSIDERATION AS A TEST PROVINCE FOR THE EARLY-ON
EXECUTION OF AREA SECURITY PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION.
IT ALSO STATED THAT THE PROPOSAL COULD NOT BE
IMPLEMENTED UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ARE RECEIVED
THROUGH BOTH US AND GVN CHANNELS. A COPY OF THE
STUDY AS REQUESTED AND HAS BEEN FORWARDED.

3. TODAY I WAS VISITED BY LT COL TEMP FROM YOUR
HQs WHO HAD MADE A VISIT TO THUA THIEN AT THE REQUEST
OF AMB COLBY.

4. WHILE, IN GENERAL, CONCURRENCE WITH OUR PROPOSALS
WAS INDICATED, HE ALSO STATED THAT:

A. THE PROPOSAL MUST BE IN CONSONANCE WITH
AREA SECURITY.

B. THE PROPOSAL MUST COMPLY WITH GVN LAWS AND
DIRECTIVES.

C. WE COULD USE ONLY ASSEYS THAT ARE AVAILABLE.
LT COL TEMP POINTED OUT THAT ONE OF THE CONFLICTS
OUR PROPOSAL HAD WITH THE ABOVE WAS THE PROPOSED
ELECTION OF DISTRICT CHIEFS, AND THE CONSTITUTION MUST
BE RE-WRITTEN TO ACCOMMODATE IT IN THE FUTURE. I
AGREE AND BELIEVE THIS TEP CAN BE TAKEN LATER.

17(1)

17(1)

5. LT COL TERP COMMENTED THAT AMB COLBY WANTED US TO STAFF THIS PAPER (WHICH WE HAVE) AND FORWARD IT ON TO MACV FOR FURTHER DETAILED STAFFING. (YOUR STAFF HAS A COPY.) HE ALSO REQUESTED THAT GEN LAM'S POSITION BE FORWARDED. I HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO HAVE GEN LAM FORWARD HIS COMMENTS ON THIS PROPOSAL. I HAVE TALKED TO HIM IN THE PAST AND HE DOES AGREE. I AM DISTURBED, THOUGH, BY THE POTENTIAL DELAYS IN STAFFING WHICH I FORESEE ARE GOING TO OCCUR UNLESS WE TAKE STEPS NOW TO PREVENT SUCH DELAYS. I BELIEVE THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO TAKE STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THIS PROPOSAL. I KNOW YOU REALIZE THAT I MUST FIND OUT IF THE AREAS IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES ARE REALLY PACIFIED AND I MUST ALSO FIND OUT (AND NOW) IF THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION CAN BE SPREAD OUT TO REACT PROPERLY TO FILL THE GAPS CREATED BY THE DEPARTURE OF AMERICAN FORCES. TO ME, THIS IS THE DIRECTION IN WHICH WE MUST GO. I AM THANKFUL THAT YOU ARE CONSIDERING MAKING THUA THIEN A TEST CASE, BUT I SUGGEST THAT WE DO IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WHAT WE LEARN HERE CAN APPLY TO ALL OTHER PROVINCES IN VIETNAM.

6. MEANWHILE, I AM GOING TO GEN LAM TO GET THE ARVN OPINION ON OUR STUDY AND HAVE HIM FORWARD HIS COMMENTS THROUGH GVN CHANNELS TO SAIGON. I WOULD HOPE THAT AMB COLBY WOULD BE DOING THE SAME ON HIS END. I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ASSISTANCE THAT YOU CAN GIVE THAT WILL GET THIS MOVING.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4
750

HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

17 (2)

17 (2)

TOP SECRET

PTTZYUW RHMMFA0499 1660210-TTIT--RUHHFMA RUMLMHA.

ZNY TTIT

P 050210Z JUL 69

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

BT

T O P S E C R E T / SENSITIVE / SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE / INFO
NGEN QUILTER, FROM LTGEN NICKERSON / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY / DELIVER
DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY
FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. ADMIN FMFPAC 270311Z JUN 69

1. (S) APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS EXPRESSED IN REF A ON F-4B/F-4J
DEPLOYMENT. CONSIDER FOLLOWING INFO TO BE PERTINENT.

2. (S) THE PROPOSAL TO REDEPLOY VMFA-334 VICE VMFA-115 UNDER MACV
OPLAN 182-69 WAS MADE WITH THE INTENTION OF REQUESTING AUTHORITY OF
CG FMFPAC FOR AN INTER-FMFPAC EXCHANGE OF VMFA-122 (F-4B) AND VMFA-232
(F-4J) SHORTLY AFTER THE VMFA-334 MOVE IN ORDER TO INSURE THAT SINGLE
SITE IMA SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR THE F-4J AIRCRAFT WOULD BE CONTINUED
AT IWAKUNI. THESE REDEPLOYMENTS WOULD COMPLY WITH THE INTENT OF OMC
MSG 121458Z JUN AND ENHANCE THE CURRENT MAG-15 AIR-TO-AIR COMMITMENT
WITH THE IMPROVED F-4J WEAPONS SYSTEM.

PAGE TWO RHMMFA0499 T O P S E C R E T / SENSITIVE / SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
LTGEN BUSE / INFO NGEN QUILTER, FROM LTGEN NICKERSON / MARINE CORPS EYES
ONLY / DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY

3. (TS) THE SEQUENTIAL EXECUTION OF THESE PROPOSED REDEPLOYMENTS ARE
AS FOLLOWS:

13 AUG-VMFA-334 SURFACE LIFT IN APPROVED LST SHIPPING DEPARTS
FROM CHU LAI

22 AUG-LST SHIPPING ARRIVES IWAKUNI

25 AUG-VMFA-334 STANDS DOWN FROM IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONS

28 AUG-VMFA-334 PERSONNEL, AVIONICS VANS AND SELECTED REI
ROTABLE POOL SPARES DEPART BY AIR LIFT FOR IWAKUNI
(AIRFIELD OPENS)

30 AUG-VMFA-334 (F-4J) ACFT DEPART FOR IWAKUNI VIA AERIAL
REFUELING AND CHOPS TO 9TH MAB/MAG-15

03 SEP-VMFA-334 ACCEPTS AIR-TO-AIR CONTINGENCY COMMITMENT
FROM VMFA-122

06 SEP-VMFA-122 PERSONNEL AIRLIFTED IWAKUNI TO CHU LAI.
RETURN FLIGHT VMFA-232 PERSONNEL AIRLIFTED CHU LAI TO
IWAKUNI

07 SEP-VMFA-122 (F-4B) ACFT DEPART FOR CHU LAI VIA AERIAL
REFUELING AND CHOPS TO FIRST MAW

10 SEP-VMFA-232 (F-4J) ACFT DEPART FOR IWAKUNI VIA AERIAL
REFUELING AND CHOPS TO 9TH MAB/MAG-15.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMNAFAD499 T O P S E C R E T /SENSITIVE/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
LTGEN BUSE/INFO MGEN QUILTER, FROM LTGEN NICKERSON/MARINE CORPS EYES
ONLY/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY

NOTES: 1. VMFA-232 CAN OPERATE IN THE AIR-TO-GROUND MODE
FOR 12-14 DAYS AND AIR-TO-AIR MODE 2-3 DAYS
W/O INA SUPPORT WHICH DEPARTS 28 AUG. SQUADRON
WILL BE TASKED FOR AIR-TO-GROUND ROLE WHILE IN
COUNTRY.

2. REQUISITE ADVANCE PARTIES ALL SQUADRONS WILL BE
AIRLIFTED TO RELOCATED BASE.

4. (S) LOGISTIC ASPECTS CONSIDERED ENVISION THE SEA TAIL OF BULK AND
HEAVY LIFT SCHEDULED ON THE APPROVED SHIPPING. THE VMFA-122/232
EXCHANGE WOULD BE CONFINED TO REDEPLOYING PERSONNEL AND MINOR
EQUIPMENT BY AIRLIFT.

A. SHIPPING-VMFA-334 MARINE CORPS T/E, FAIR SHARE GSE/INRL,
SECTION H, NON-RFI ROTABLE SPARES, AND F-4J SUPPLY SUPPORT.

B. AIRLIFT-SEVEN AVIONICS VANS, SELECTED RFI ROTABLE POOL
SPARES AND 15 DAY PACK-UP.

C. GARRISON PROPERTY-VMFA-334 WILL NOT MOVE GARRISON PROPERTY
SINCE MAG-15 HAS ADEQUATE QUANTITY ON HAND.

D. SECOND INCREMENT OF AVCAL OUTFITTING AT EL TORO- IT IS
UNDERSTOOD THAT MONEY HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO FUND THE SECOND
AVCAL OUTFITTING INCREMENT BEING ASSEMBLED AT EL TORO. THIS

PAGE FOUR RHMNAFAD499 T O P S E C R E T /SENSITIVE/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
LTGEN BUSE/INFO MGEN QUILTER, FROM LTGEN NICKERSON/MARINE CORPS EYES
ONLY/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY

PACKAGE COULD BE DIVERTED TO MAG-15 VICE MAG-13 AND SHOULD ARRIVE
THERE DURING THE GENERAL TIME FRAME OF THE PROPOSED RELOCATION.

5. (S) INITIAL REASONING FOR SUBSTITUTING VMFA-334 VICE VMFA-115
AS PART OF PHASE I REDEPLOYMENT WAS TO PRECLUDE HAVING TO ROTATE
TWO VMFA (F-4B) SQUADRONS BACK IN-COUNTRY AT A LATER DATE.

GP-4

BT

0499

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

111 MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET 6(2)

O 061022Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
ZEM

S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN WILSON FROM BGEN DOOLEY
DELIVER TO GEN WILSON IMMEDIATELY

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

O 060351Z
FM CG THIRD MARDIV (REIN)
TO CG III MAF
INFO CG XXIV CORPS
ZEM

S E C R E T

SUB: COMMAND INCIDENT REPORT

1. MAJ GEN WILLIAM K. JONES, USMC RECEIVED A GUNSHOT WOUND
AT DONG HA COMBAT BASE, THIS DATE, UNDER FOLLOWING CIRCUM-
STANCES:

A. TIME - APPROX 1240H, 6 JULY 1969

B. PLACE - OUTSIDE GENERAL'S MESS ON WAY TO QUARTERS
AFTER LUNCH.

C. LOCATION - MISSILE ENTRY - WEB PORTION OF LEFT HAND
BETWEEN THUMB AND INDEX FINGER. COURSE UNDER SKIN FOR SEVERAL
INCHES AND RESULTING IN SLIGHT FRACTURE OF THIRD METACARPAL.
ROUND APPARENTLY ENTERED AT TERMINAL VELOCITY.

D. ACTION - FLOWN BY HELICOPTER TO 3D MEDICAL BATTALION.
ROUND SUCCESSFULLY REMOVED BY SURGERY AND NO COMPLICATIONS
ENCOUNTERED. PATIENT FLOWN TO HOSPITAL SHIP USS SANCTUARY
SUBSEQUENT TO OPERATION FOR INITIAL CONVALESCENCE.

E. INVESTIGATION - DIVISION PROVOST MARSHAL PERSONALLY
CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION. INITIAL REPORT INDICATES UNKNOWN
CALIBER FIRED FROM FOREIGN BOLT ACTION TYPE WEAPON.

F. PROGNOSIS - EXCELLENT. RETURN TO DUTY WITHIN 7-14 DAYS.

G. COMMAND - BRIG GEN FULLER ASSUMES COMMAND RELOCATES
CP AT DHCB.

UNQUOTE

GP-4

375

NNNN

21(1)

21(1)

HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 07 JULY 69	
				SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 0 050929Z ZZZ		1,2,3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT CONFIDENTIAL	
			IN	OUT			
3	CG	T	8 July		✓	REMARKS ① feedback	
4	DCG	T			✓		
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	T			✓		
	D C/S						
	D C/S DM						
1	S/S	I	7/7		✓	HAS BEEN SENT	
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
	CAP						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	S&C						

CONFIDENTIAL

(22)

O 060929Z ZYM
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 CG FIRST MARDIV DNG
 CG AMERICAL DIV CHL
 CG FRIST MAW DNG
 ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR LTGEN ZAIS,
 MGENS SIMPSON, RAMSEY AND QUILTER FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS READDRESSSED FOR YOUR
 INFORMATION AND COMPLIANCE:

QUOTE

O 060421Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1
 FM MG TOWNSEND CHIEF OF STAFF MACV SAIGON
 TO GENERAL BROWN CDR 7TH AIR FORCE
 LTG MILDREN DCG USARV LONG BINH
 LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF DANANG
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON
 LTG CORCORAN CG IFFV NHA TRANG
 LTG EWELL CG IFFV LONG BINH
 MG WETHERILL CG DMAC CAN THO
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 8685 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH NEWS MEDIA REGARDING RULES OF
 ENGAGEMENT (U)

1. (C) RECENTLY A SENIOR U.S. OFFICER AND HIS ARVN COUNTERPART
 HELD A JOINT NEWS BRIEFING DURING WHICH THEY WERE ASKED SPECIFICALLY
 IF FIRE UPON THEIR INSTALLATIONS HAD ORIGINATED IN CAMBODIA AND IF
 THEY HAD RETURNED FIRE INTO CAMBODIA. THEY REPLIED ACCURATELY AND
 TRUTHFULLY THAT RETURN FIRES INTO CAMBODIA HAD BEEN MADE; HOW-
 EVER, THEIR STATEMENTS WENT BEYOND THE APPROVED POLICY OF MERELY
 STATING THAT COMMANDERS HAVE THE INHERENT RIGHT TO RETURN FIRE IN
 DEFENSE OF THEIR POSITIONS. THEY SHOULD HAVE ANSWERED ALL OTHER
 SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WITH "NO COMMENT" AND THAT "RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
 ARE SOMETHING WHICH THE COMMAND DOES NOT DISCLOSE FOR OBVIOUS
 REASONS."

2. (C) DCOMUSMAC HAS DIRECTED THAT COMMANDERS BE REMINDED TO
 INSTRUCT THEIR STAFF PERSONNEL AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO
 EXERCISE EXTREME CARE IN ANSWERING QUESTIONS WHICH DEAL WITH
 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND SPECIFICALLY WITH RETURNING FIRES INTO
 NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. COMMANDERS, THEIR IOS, AND OTHER
 PERSONNEL WHO MAY BE EXPOSED TO THE PRESS SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO
 ANSWER "NO COMMENT," "THAT IS A SUBJECT BEYOND MY PURVIEW AND
 COMPETENCE," OR "OUR FORCES HAVE THE INHERENT RIGHT TO DEFEND
 THEMSELVES AND WHEN THEY ARE FIRED ON, THEY FIRE BACK." UNTIL
 THERE IS A CHANGE IN CURRENT POLICY, ANYTHING BEYOND FOREGOING
 STATEMENTS IS NOT REPEAT NOT AUTHORIZED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

GP-4
 469

22(11)

22(11)

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

ORIG C/S
REL C/S

EXCLUSIVE
FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

26

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RHHMAFA1251 1918746-CCCC--RUHHFMA.

ZNY CCCCC

RUHHFMA -T- RUEBHQA

P 100746Z JUL 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUEBHQA/CNC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E

FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO GEN WALT FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. CMC MSG 091824Z JUL69

1. IN RESPONSE TO REQ CONTAINED IN REF A, PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT IN JULY OF 1967 A CONVOY RETURNED FROM TRA BONG WITH EIGHT TONS OF CINNAMON ON TWO OR THREE TRUCKS. GEN LAM HAD AN ORDER OUT AGAINST HAULING CINNAMON ON TRUCKS: WHETHER OR NOT GEN TOAN KNEW IT, I DON'T KNOW. BUT, HE, GEN TOAN, INFORMED GEN LAM THAT THIS CINNAMON HAD BEEN BROUGHT OUT FROM TRA BONG. THE SITUATION WAS AIRD AT THIS TIME AND AMONG OTHERS, GEN VINH KNEW ABOUT IT.

2. THE MAN WHO RECEIVED THE CINNAMON GAVE 200,000 PIASTERS TO THE 2ND ARVN DIVISION FUND, AND THE FUNDS WERE DISTRIBUTED TO THE TROOPS. NO FUNDS WENT TO GEN

PAGE 2 RHHMAFA 1251 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E
TOAN. IN MY ESTIMATION, HE IS CLEAN. I HAVE SEEN THE FILES AND PAPERS ON THIS, AND ALTHOUGH I DON'T READ VIETNAMESE, I DO READ FIGURES.

3. AT THE TIME THAT THIS SITUATION AROSE, THERE WAS A DISCUSSION IN SAIGON AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TO GIVE TOAN COMMAND OF THE 23D INFANTRY DIVISION VICE THE 2D ARVN DIVISION. THE DECISION WAS NO; THAT THERE WAS NO REASON FOR IT AND THAT EVERYTHING WAS IN ORDER.

4. LAM SAID THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION IS POLITICALLY INSPIRED. IT STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT THERE IS A NEW INSPECTOR IN SAIGON NOW WHO HAS DUG UP SOME OLD PAPERS.

5. GEN LAM DISCUSSED WITH ME THE HISTORY OF THE ANIMOSITY WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN THE CATHOLICS AND BUDDHISTS OVER MANY YEARS AS A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR WHAT IS CONSIDERED TO BE A POLITICAL PLOY NOW. IT APPEARS TO ME THAT THIS MANEUVER IS REALLY AIMED AT THIEU AND LAM THROUGH TOAN.

6. TOAN HAS NOT BEEN RELIEVED OF HIS COMMAND. AND,

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGESCOPY 2 OF 3 COPIES**CONFIDENTIAL**

26 (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 RHMMAFA 1251 C O N F I D E N T I A L/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 AS A MATTER OF FACT, HE WAS AT A DINNER GIVEN BY
 GEN LAM WHICH HONORED MGENS YOUNGDALE AND QUILTER
 LAST NIGHT. EVERYTHING APPEARED TO BE IN ORDER
 AND HE RETURNED TO HIS DIVISION THIS MORNING.
 7. GEN ROSSON WAS BRIEFED ON THIS SITUATION
 BY GEN LAM THIS MORNING DURING A VISIT THAT ROSSON
 MADE TO I CORPS. I WAS PRESENT.
 8. THERE IS NO PARTICULAR IMPACT ON THE 2D ARVN
 DIVISION AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, I DO BELIEVE THAT
 THE IMPACT WOULD BE SERIOUS IF TOAN WERE RELIEVED.
 9. RELATED TO THE ABOVE, WE HAVE ANOTHER STICKY
 WICKET WHICH EXISTS IN THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION. GEN
 TRUONG IS CLEAN, BUT APPARENTLY SOME OFFICERS FROM
 HIS DIVISION G-4 SHOP CONNIVED WITH SOME US ARMY
 OFFICERS TO SELL POL TO VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS. THERE
 IS AN INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY BOTH THE
 US AND ARVN. SUITABLE ACTION IS ABOUT TO BE TAKEN
 TO DISCIPLINE ALL PARTIES CONCERNED. TRUONG FEELS
 QUITE BADLY ABOUT IT BECAUSE HE CONSIDERS IT A BLOT
 AGAINST HIS RECORD. HE HAS OFFERED HIS RESIGNATION,

PAGE 4 RHMMAFA 1251 C O N F I D E N T I A L/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 BUT GEN LAM WILL NOT ACCEPT IT. WE CANNOT AFFORD
 TO LOSE TRUONG. I MIGHT ADD THAT I DO NOT EXPECT
 SIMILAR PUBLICITY ON THIS ONE AS ON TOAN.

GP-4

BT

1251

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

26/27

HEADQUARTERS MARINE / MARINE FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE				FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				CG III MAF		18 JUL 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 3 COPIES RECO	
				100812Z JUL 69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
	CG					REMARKS	
	DCG					THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND	
	DCG AIR					MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN	
	C/S					7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPO-	
	DC/S					ITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.	
	DC/S PLAN					ORIG C/S	
	S/S					REL C/S	
	G-1					EXCLUSIVE FOR	
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL					CONFIDENTIAL	
	PMO						
	S&C						

(27)

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RHMMFA1258 1916012-CCCC--RUHMFNA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 160812Z JUL 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHMFNA/CG /MFFAG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

P 091824Z JUL 69

FM CMC

TO RHMMFA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM
GEN WALT

CHARGES AGAINST BOEN TYAN

1. (C) AP DISPATCHES FROM SAIGON REPORT GEN TYAN CHARGED
WITH MISUSE OF COMBAT SUPPORT FUNDS; PROFITEERING AND
PROVIDING GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION FOR DANANG BUSINESSMEN.
2. (C) WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO YOU HAVE ON CIRCUMSTANCES,
AND MORE IMPORTANT, YOUR ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT OF INCIDENT

PAGE 2 RHMMFA 1258 C O N F I D E N T I A L/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
ON EFFECTIVENESS IN SECOND ARVN DIVISION AND SITUATION IN
QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCE.

3. (U) WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE

2. MY 100746Z JUL 69 IS RESPONSE TO MSG QUOTED PAR 1.

GP-4

BT

1258

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

27(1)

HEADQUARTERS II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 15 JUL 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 141546Z JUL 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		EXCLUSIVE FOR	
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPO- SITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	I					
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	I	7/15		M H		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP					ORIG AS/S RE AS/S EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT CONFIDENTIAL	
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTD						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

(35)

CONFIDENTIAL

OTTCZYUW RHMMFAI881 1951546-CCCC--RUMLBPA RUMHLAA RUMLMHA RUMLLIA
 RUMLMPA,
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 141546Z JUL 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG
 RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW DNG
 RUMLLIA/CG AMERICAL DIV CHL
 RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOMD DNG
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/FOR LTGEN ZAIS,
 MGEN SIMPSON, MGEN THRASH, MGEN RAMSEY AND BGEN
 FEELEY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:
 QUOTE

O 110640Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1
 FM MG TOWNSEND COFS MACV SAIGON
 TO GEN BROWN KDR 7AF
 LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF DANANG
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON
 LTG CORCORAN CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
 LTG VEWELL CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH

PAGE 2 RHMMFAI881 C O N F I D E N T I A L/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 MG WETHERILL DMAC CAN THO
 MG MABRY ASST DCG USARV LONG BINH
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 8929 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

1. DEPCOMUSMACV HAS ISSUED THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. IN THE LIGHT OF PRESENT PLANNING, REQUEST THAT ADDRESSEES
 CONTINUE TO REVIEW CLOSELY THE CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM IN
 RESPECTIVE AREAS. PROJECTS THAT CAN BE DONE WITHOUT OR ARE
 NICE TO HAVE ARE TO BE STOPPED, OR REDUCED IN SCOPE TO ABSOLUTE
 ESSENTIALS. AUSTERITY IS TO BE OBSERVED IN ORDER TO CONSERVE
 DWINDLING CONSTRUCTION FUNDS NEEDED FOR RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND
 MODERNIZATION.

B. AS U. S. FORCES ARE REDUCED IN BASE AREAS, EVERY POSSIBLE
 EFFORT IS TO BE MADE TO PROVIDE THE VACATED FACILITIES TO THE
 RVNAF IN ORDER TO CONSERVE MASF CONSTRUCTION FUNDS. THOSE
 FACILITIES TURNED OVER TO THE RVNAF ARE EXPECTED TO BE IN
 GOOD OPERATIVE CONDITION AND AS GOOD AS THOSE PROGRAMED
 UNDER THE FORCE STRUCTURE INCREASE PROGRAM.

C. IN ADDITION TO THE CONSTRUCTION REVIEW, A HARD LOOK IS

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

35(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 RHMNAPA 1881 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR
REQUIRED AT CURRENT WORK BEING PERFORMED FOR OPERATIONAL
SUPPORT OR MINOR NEW CONSTRUCTION TO BE SURE THAT OVER-
BUILDING IS NOT REPEAT NOT BEING DONE.

2. WARM REGARDS,

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

1881

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

35 (2)

SECRET

DE RHMAFA1882 1951548
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 141548Z JUL 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAF
 RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOND
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN JONES, MGEN SIMPSON, MGEN
 THRASH AND MGEN FEELEY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION
 "QUOTE"

R 130345Z JUL 69
 FM COMNAVFORV
 TO CG III MAF
 COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE PERSONAL FOR
 LTGEN NICKERSON AND RADM BONNER FROM VADM ZUMWALT

PAGE 2 RHMAFA1882 SECRET /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

A. COMUSMACV 110640Z JUL 69 (NOTAL)

1. (C) REF A EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO CLOSELY REVIEW THE CONSTRUCTION
 PROGRAM IN ORDER TO CONSERVE CONSTRUCTION FUNDS NEEDED FOR RVNAF
 IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION.

2. (U) THE PLAN TO PROVIDE FOR IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF
 RVNAF REQUIRES SUPPORTING FACILITIES. THE COST TO PROVIDE THESE
 FACILITIES EXCEEDS FUNDS PRESENTLY AVAILABLE.

3. (C) ASSISTANT SECDEF (I AND L) SCHEDULED TO BE IN-COUNTRY
 LATTER PART ON JULY. HE IS EXPECTED BY MACV TO CRITICALLY
 REVIEW CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF PARA 1.A
 AND 1.B OF REF A. ADVERSE RESULTS OF REVIEW WILL RESULT IN
 LOSS OF FUNDS AVAILABILITY. FOLLOWING PROJECTS ARE RECOMMENDED
 FOR SPECIFIC REVIEW TO ASCERTAIN THAT THEY CANNOT BE STOPPED
 OR CUT BACK IN SCOPE IMMEDIATELY:

PROJECT
 C-212
 C-303
 C-501B
 C-502

DESCRIPTION
 PHU BAI AIRFIELD IMPROVEMENTS
 FIRST MEDICAL BATTALION HOSPITAL
 MARINE AIR TERMINAL AT DANANG
 AIRCRAFT HIGH SPEED REFUELERS

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

36/11 **SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 3 RHMMAFA1882 S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
AT DANANG

C-527

C-584

PARALLEL T/W AT MARBLE MOUNTAIN

MAINTENANCE FACILITIES FOR FIRST MAW

NUMEROUS OTHER PROJECTS PROVIDING FOR ROADS, OPEN STORAGE, PARKING,
COVERED STORAGE, COLD STORAGE AND OTHER UTILITIES.

4. (C) YOUR AGGRESSIVE PURSUANCE OF THE POLICY OF REF A IS URGENTLY
NEEDED TO CONSERVE CONSTRUCTION FUNDS SO THAT WE CAN ASSURE
REALIZATION OF VITAL FACILITIES FOR VNN AND VNMC ENHANCEMENT.

5. (C) YOU ARE PROBABLY WAY AHEAD OF ME BUT I NEED SOME SPECIFICS.
THEREFORE, REQUEST ADVISE RESULTS OF YOUR REVIEW BY 28 JUL WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIFIC PROJECT MODIFICATIONS/CANCELLATIONS.
MY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING REP, CAPT SAUNDERS, WILL VISIT YOU 13-14
JULY WITH LOCAL DETAILS.

6. (U) WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE

QUOTE

P 131010Z

FM COMNAVFORV

PAGE 4 RHMMAFA1882 S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
TO CINCPACFLT

CG III MAF

ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

PERSONAL FOR VADM BAUMBERGER AND LTG NICKERSON FROM ZUMWALT

QUOTE

P 130738Z

FM BG YATES SGN VIETNAM

TO GEN BROWN CDR 7TH AF

VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SGN VIETNAM

MG MABRY ACTING DCG USARV LBN VIETNAM

ZEN/MG CONROY J-4 SGN VIETNAM

ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 9032 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM VIETNAM

1. RECENT COMMUNICATIONS FROM JCS AND DOD POSE SOME HARD TO ANSWER
QUESTIONS CONCERNING OUR ON-GOING CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM AND THAT
PLANNED FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. AS AN EXAMPLE I'M CHARGED WITH
ANSWERING THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BEFORE SECRETARY SKILLITO ASD(I&L)
ON 28 JULY.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET
36(2)

SECRET

PAGE 5 RHMNAFA1882 S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

N A. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS CURRENT PROGRAM BEEN CURTAILED TO ELIMINATE ALL BUT MOST CRITICAL OPERATIONAL AND RVNAF MODERNIZATION NEEDS?

B. TO WHAT EXTENT ARE RVNAF MODERNIZATION FACILITY REQUIREMENTS BEING ACCOMMODATED BY REPROGRAMMING OF CURRENTLY HELD RESOURCES?

C. TO WHAT EXTENT CAN RVNAF MODERNIZATION FACILITY REQUIREMENTS BE SATISFIED BY U.S. FACILITIES?

2. THE BIG QUESTION IS WHY WE NEED MORE MONEY AT THIS LATE DATE AND WHY CAN'T WE FUND MORE RVNAF ENHANCEMENT PROJECTS WITH FUNDS PRESENTLY HELD EITHER UNPROGRAMMED, UNOBLIGATED OR PROGRAMED TO ON-GOING CONSTRUCTION. THE APPROACH IS A HARD LINE AND OUR ANSWERS MUST BE ACCURATE AND FULLY JUSTIFIED. DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS I WILL BE TALKING TO YOUR ENGINEER STAFF ASKING FOR THEIR HELP IN PREPARING OUR ANSWERS. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR HELP IN PROVIDING ADVICE THRU THESE OFFICERS. SPECIFICALLY UNDER SCRUTINY ARE THE PROJECTS SUBMITTED BY THE RECENT "PRIORITY LIST OF MILCON PROJECTS" SUBMITTED BY COMUSMACV MSGS 36646 DTG 221051Z MAY AND 35769 DTG 171056Z JUNE. YOUR REVIEW OF THOSE PROJECTS TO SEE WHICH ARE SOFT AND CAN BE ELIMINATED OR THOSE THAT CAN BE FUNDED WITH FUNDS NOW HELD WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

1882

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

36 (3)

TOP SECRET

[illegible]

Cy # 2 to Vietnamization of war
152030H Jul 69
48

8

TOP SECRET

O 151020Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG XXIV CORPS
 CG AMERICAL DIV
 CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/DSA I CORPS
 ZEN

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN ZAIS, MGENS RAMSEY
 AND SIMPSON AND COL RENWALT FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. MEL ZAIS AND I HAVE BEEN TASKED TO PROVIDE NLT 161500H JUL 69 TO
 COMUSMACV OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE FOLLOWING:

A. UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPT OF "VIETNAMIZATION" OF THE WAR IN
 VIETNAM BY RVNAF AT SENIOR OFFICER, JUNIOR OFFICER, NCO AND LOWER
 LEVELS.

B. REACTION ON THE PART OF RVNAF AT FOREGOING LEVELS TO THE CURRENT
 REPLACEMENT OF 25,000 US TROOPS BY GVN FORCES.

C. EFFECT ON RVNAF MORALE OF THE CURRENT REPLACEMENT OF 25,000 US
 TROOPS BY GVN FORCES.

D. UNDERSTANDING OF "VIETNAMIZATION" ON THE PART OF US FORCES AND
 ATTITUDE OF US FORCES TOWARD THE REPLACEMENT CITED ABOVE.

2. IN ORDER TO PRESENT AN ASSESSMENT WHICH CONTAINS A COMPREHENSIVE
 OVERVIEW OF ALL I CORPS I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE
 ABOVE QUESTIONS TO REACH ME NLT 160600H BY THIS SAME CHANNEL.

3. FOR LTGEN ZAIS: YOUR INPUT TO ME ALSO REQUESTED BY 160600H.

4. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE TO III MAF TELEPHONE 5425 OR
 5255.

GP-4

209

NNNN

HAS BEEN SE

TOP SECRET NOFORN

8(1)

8(1)

TOP SECRET

[illegible]

Cy #1 to Vietnamization File

9

TOP SECRET

O 160000Z 2 YH ZFF-1 ZFF-4
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN EYES ONLY FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THIS RESPONDS TO YOUR MESSAGE MAC9093 DTS 150305Z JUL 69.
THE FOLLOWING INCLUDES THE ASSESSMENT OF CG, XXIV CORPS, WHICH
HE DISPATCHED DIRECT TO YOU.

2. UNDERSTANDING OF THE "VIETNAMIZATION" CONCEPT. ALTHOUGH WE
NEVER USE THE TERM "VIETNAMIZATION" IN DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR
COUNTERPARTS, I AM CERTAIN THAT SENIOR ARVN OFFICERS UNDERSTAND
FULLY THAT AMERICAN SPOKESMEN, IN USING THE TERM ARE DESCRIBING
A CONCEPT IN WHICH THE ARVN WILL BE REQUIRED TO REPLACE U.S.
FORCES IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. I AM SURE THAT LESSEER RANKS
UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT, ALTHOUGH THEY BECOME LESS DISCERNING,
THE LOWER THE RANK.

3. REACTION TO ARVN REPLACEMENT OF 25,000 TROOPS. A GENERALLY
FAVORABLE REACTION STEMMING FROM NATIONALISTIC PRIDE THAT THEY
HAVE COME OF AGE, AS PROUD PATRIOTS AND PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS
THEY WELCOME THIS AS AN OBJECTIVE AND LOOK FORWARD TO ITS
ATTAINMENT. DURING DISCUSSIONS, SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE VOICED
A DETERMINATION THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO HANDLE THE SITUATION
AND I AM UNAWARE OF ANY GLOOMY OR SULLEN EXPRESSIONS OF PARTI-
CULAR CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE ARVN COMMANDERS. HOWEVER, I
DO DETECT SOME UNDERSTANDABLE APPREHENSION AS TO THEIR ABILITY
TO ASSUME THE PRESENT U.S. ROLE ENTIRELY ALONE WITHIN THE TIME
FRAME THEY THINK THE USG HAS IN MIND, PARTICULARLY IF THE PRE-
SENT NVA THREAT REMAINS. I BELIEVE SENIOR OFFICERS LOOK UPON
THE PRESENT 25,000 AS CAUSING NO PARTICULAR CONCERN, ALTHOUGH
FUTURE WITHDRAWALS MIGHT IF THEY ARE MADE WITH SUCH RAPIDITY
THAT THE ARVN CANNOT REACT FAST ENOUGH TO FILL THE VOIDS ENTIRE-
LY FROM THEIR OWN RESOURCES. ALTHOUGH I'M NOT SURE LTGEN LAN
IS AWARE OF FURTHER WITHDRAWALS FROM NICTZ IN NEAR FUTURE, HE
HAS STATED ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION THAT THE U.S. COULD WITH-
DRAW MANY TROOPS FROM THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IF THE NVA ALSO
WITHDREW. THE COMMANDERS OF THE 1ST AND 2ND ARVN DIVISIONS CON-
TINUE TO SHOW AN INTEREST IN, AND PLANNING FOR ASSUMING GREATER
AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY RESULTING FROM THE WITHDRAWALS. ON
14 JULY WHEN THE 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES DEPARTED DANANG FOR
REDEPLOYMENT TO OKINAWA, ARVN CONFIDENCE MANIFESTED ITSELF IN
LARGE PROFESSIONALLY PAINTED SIGNS AND SPEECHES BY SENIOR
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS ALL PROCLAIMING THAT THE GVN/
ARVN WAS READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO TAKE OVER THE TASK.

9(1)

9(1)



4. EFFECT ON ARVN MORALE OF CURRENT REPLACEMENT OF 23,000 U.S. TROOPS. SOMEWHAT EARLY AT THIS POINT IN TIME TO BE CONCLUSIVE, ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN NO NOTICEABLE DIMINUTION OF MORALE. AS YOU KNOW, THE ARVN RELY HEAVILY ON U. S. FORCES FOR COMBAT SUPPORT. IF THE REDEPLOYMENTS ARE ACCOMPLISHED TOO RAPIDLY AND THE ARVN ARE REQUIRED TO CONDUCT ADDITIONAL OPERATIONS BEFORE THIS COMBAT SUPPORT IS REPLACED EITHER BY THE ARVN, RVNAF, RESIDUAL U.S. FORCES OR A COMBINATION OF ALL, IT WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT AND MORALE WILL TAKE A TURN FOR THE WORST. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IF THE RELATIVELY SIGNIFICANT THREATS ALONG THE BORDER AREAS AND CURRENT NVA PRESENCE WITHIN ICTZ HAVE NOT DIMINISHED.

5. U.S. UNDERSTANDING OF "VIETNAMIZATION". ALTHOUGH THE TERM IS SELDOM USED AMONG U.S. TROOPS, I BELIEVE ITS CONCEPT IS UNDERSTOOD BY ALL U.S. PERSONNEL. THEY ACCEPT THE WITHDRAWAL AS AN EXPECTED, ALTHOUGH NOT COMPLETELY SATISFACTORY, COURSE OF ACTION AND ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSIST THE ARVN TO BECOME A MORE PROFICIENT FIGHTING FORCE. GENERAL ATTITUDE IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS DEFINITELY BECAUSE OF COMPLICATIONS ON ONE HAND OR AN UNDERSTANDABLE DESIRE TO RETURN HOME AND ON THE OTHER HAND THE PAROCHIAL PRIDE WHICH QUESTIONS THE ABILITY OF ANYONE, CERTAINLY THE ARVN, TO TRULY REPLACE THEM. MARINES OF 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES EXPRESSED CONCERN AS TO WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE 4TH MARINES AFTER 9TH MARINES LEAVE. SENIOR OFFICERS WITH AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ENEMY SITUATION ARE CURRENTLY MAKING PLANS TO FILL THE VOIDS RESULTING FROM BOTH RECENT AND FUTURE WITHDRAWALS. SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT U.S. COMBAT PERSONNEL OF ALL TANKS ENTERTAIN IN VARYING DEGREES AN APPREHENSION AS TO THE ABILITY OF ARVN UNITS TO WITHSTAND ALONG THE CURRENT NVA THREAT OR THAT CAPABLE OF BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR IN THE FUTURE.

GP-4

669

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT
NOT FORN

TOP SECRET

9(2)

9(2)



0 160425Z ZYH

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN WICKERSON
PERSONAL SECURITY AND EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN FOR CJCS.

A. MAC 0097 EYES ONLY DTG 150319Z JUL 69

B. MACV 40907 DTG 140555Z JUL 69

C. OPLAN 302-69 CG III MAF 121426 MAY 69

1. (S) FOLLOWING SECURITY AND EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN
WILL BE IN EFFECT DURING VISIT OF CJCS.

A. ARRIVAL AT DANANG BASE OPERATIONS (1200H).

(1) SECURITY BY 366TH SECURITY SQUADRON PER
REFERENCE C.

B. ENROUTE III MAF BY HELO (1205-1215H)

(1) LIGHT FIRETEAM (TWO GUNSHIPS) WILL ACCOMPANY
PARTY (1ST MAF).

(2) CHASE HELO WILL TRAIL PARTY (1ST MAF).

(3) HARBOR PATROL BOAT WILL BE ON STATION DANANG
RIVER VICINITY FLIGHT PATH (NSA).

C. LUNCH AND BRIEFING AT III MAF (1215-1445H).

(1) SECURITY INSIDE III MAF COMPOUND PROVIDED BY III MAF
SECURITY PER REFERENCE C.

(2) SECURITY OUTSIDE III MAF COMPOUND PROVIDED BY 3RD MP
BN PER REFERENCE C.

(3) ALL HELOS WILL REMAIN ON PAD AT III MAF COMPOUND DURING
TIME PARTY IS THERE TO EFFECT EMERGENCY EVACUATION IF REQUIRED.

D. ENROUTE TO I CORPS HQ (1445 - 1505H).

(1) PARAGRAPHS 1, B (1) (2) AND (3) ABOVE APPLY.

E. CALL ON LTGEN LAM (1505 - 1535H).

(1) SECURITY IN FRONT OF I CORPS HQ PROVIDED BY 3RD MP BN.

(2) SECURITY WITHIN I CORPS HQ COMPOUND PROVIDED BY ARVN.

(3) ALL HELOS WILL REMAIN ON PAD AT I CORPS COMPOUND
DURING VISIT TO EFFECT EMERGENCY EVAC IF REQUIRED.

F. ENROUTE DANANG BASE OPERATIONS (1535 - 1600H).

(1) PARAGRAPHS 1, B (1) AND (2) APPLY.

G. DEPART DANANG BASE OPERATIONS (1645H).

(1) PARAGRAPH 1, A (1) APPLIES.

2. (S) EMERGENCY EVACUATION: HELICOPTER READINESS FOR IMMEDIATE
EVACUATION OF PARTY FROM SITES VISITED (III MAF AND I CORPS HQ)
IS DESCRIBED ABOVE. EVACUATION PRIORITY WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARA 3-REF A.

3. (S) REACTION FORCE: 1ST MPBN WILL PROVIDE REACTION FORCE
ON IMMEDIATE ALERT FROM 181130H TO 181700H JULY 69.

GP-4

360

40(1)

40(1)

O 160630Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO CG IFFV NHA TRANG RVN
 CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN
 ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND INFO LTGENS CORCORAN AND
 ZAIS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A MGEN TOWNSEND 9094 DTG 150307Z JUL69

1. IAW REF A THE FOLLOWING ITINERARY IS PROVIDED:

DATE/TIME
 18 JULY 1969
 1200

ARR DANANG BASE OPS (T-39) GREETED BY
 CG III MAF

1200-1210

ENR HQ III MAF (LZ-1) HELO (III MAF)

1210-1315

LUNCH HOSTED BY CG III MAF (CG'S QTRS)

1320-1455

BRIEFING BY III MAF STAFF (COC ROOM NR 1)

1455-1535

VISIT WITH CG I CORPS (LTGEN LAM)

1535-1545

ENR DANANG BASE OPS/HELO (III MAF)

1545

DEPART FOR TSN (T-39)

GP-4

135

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

41 (1)

NNNN

41 (1)

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

(42)

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RHMAFA2099 1971058-CCCC--RHMSMVA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 161058Z JUL 69

FM CG III MAF DNG RVN

TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LTGEN NICKERSON SENDS FOR NGEN TOWNSEND

DECREASE IN ENEMY CACHE DISCOVERIES IN ICTZ (U)

A. COMUSMACV 091214Z JULY 69

1. (C) REF A REFERS. IT IS OUR ESTIMATE THAT THE DECREASE IN ENEMY CACHE DISCOVERIES IN ICTZ IN RECENT MONTHS HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE LARGE CACHES DISCOVERED DURING OPERATION DEWEY CANYON (22 JAN-18 MAR) AND MAINE CRAG (15 MAR-2 MAY) IN WESTERN THUA THIEN AND QUANG TRI PROVINCES CAUSED UNUSUALLY HIGH TOTALS FOR CACHE FINDS DURING THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF 1969. IN FOUR CATEGORIES OF SUPPLIES TAKEN IN CACHES THROUGHOUT ICTZ DURING THIS PERIOD WE NOTE THE FOLLOWING PERCENTAGES WHICH WERE CAPTURED IN THESE TWO OPERATIONS ALONE:

ITEM	TOTAL ICTZ JAN, FEB, MAR, APR	TOTAL MAINE CRAG/ DEWEY CANYON	PERCENTAGE
------	----------------------------------	-----------------------------------	------------

PAGE 2 RHMAFA 2099 C O N F I D E N T I A L

IND WPNS (NO.)	2,860	1,607	56 PERCENT
CSW (NO.)	290	258	89 PERCENT
AMMO (TONS)	857.3	726.8	85 PERCENT
RICE (TONS)	1139.1	466	41 PERCENT

IT IS ALSO INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT OF THE TOTAL FIGURES FOR WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION CAPTURED IN OPERATIONS DEWEY CANYON AND MAINE CRAG, ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL CAME FROM JUST ONE CACHE FOUND ON 27 FEB IN OPERATION DEWEY CANYON.

B. IN REACTION TO DEWEY CANYON AND MAINE CRAG IT IS OUR ESTIMATE THAT THE ENEMY STOPPED THE FLOW OF MATERIEL INTO THAT AREA, AND IN FACT ATTEMPTED TO REMOVE AS MUCH OF HIS SUPPLIES AS POSSIBLE BACK INTO LAOS.

C. OBVIOUSLY, THE FACT THAT THESE MAJOR CACHES HAD BEEN DISCOVERED REDUCED THE AMOUNT OF SUPPLIES AVAILABLE TO BE DISCOVERED IN LATER MONTHS.

D. WE ESTIMATE THAT THE ENEMY NOW ACCOMPLISHES HIS MAJOR STOCKPILING OF SUPPLIES IN LAOS RATHER THAN WITHIN ICTZ.

E. AN OVERALL DECREASE IN ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY IN ICTZ IN MAY AND JUNE HAS PROBABLY RESULTED IN A REDUCED REQUIREMENT FOR FORWARD CACHES, PARTICULARLY OF ARMS AND AMMO.

PAGE 3 RHMAFA 2099 C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. (U) SO LONG AS THE ENEMY OPERATES AT REDUCED LEVELS OF ACTIVITY AND NO LONGER ESTABLISHES NEW CACHES IN ICTZ OF THE SIZE OF THE VAST STORES UNCOVERED THIS WINTER, WE MUST EXPECT A CONTINUATION OF THE MARKEDLY LOWER LEVELS OF CACHE SEIZURES IN THE COMING MONTHS.

GP-4

BT

2099

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

42/11

TOP SECRET

OPERATION CODE						FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE						CG III MAF		17 JUL 69	
						SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE		COPY# OF COPIES RECO	
						171350Z JUL 69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT			
			IN	OUT					
	CG					EXCLUSIVE FOR REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4. THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT. ORIG C/S REL C/S EXCLUSIVE FOR <i>Cy #1 in Vietnamese for</i> HAS BEEN SENT D TOP SECRET			
	DCG								
	DCG AIR								
	C/S								
	DC/S								
	DC/S PLAN								
	S/S								
	G-1								
	G-2								
	G-3								
	G-4								
	G-5								
	G-6								
	CAP								
	ADJ								
	CORDS								
	EMB/TRANS								
	ENGR								
	H&S CO								
	INSP								
	MTO								
	OP ANAL								
	ORD								
	PSY OPS								
	SUPPLY								
	LEGAL								
	PMO								
	S&C								

TOP SECRET

O 171350Z JUL 69
FM CG III MAF
TO COMNAVFORV
BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM ZUNWALT FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
VIETNAMIZING THE WAR (U)

A. COMNAVFORV 040757Z JUL69

B. COMNAVFORV 070836Z JUL69

C. YR LTR SER: NS/0004-69 OF 6JUL69

D. YR LTR TO COMUSMACV SAME SUBJ OF 29JUN69

E. YR LTR TO COMUSMACV SAME SUBJ OF 11JUL69

1. (TS/LD) REF C AND D PROVIDED MY REPS IN SAIGON, HAVE HELPED CLARIFY THE RELATIONSHIP OF NAVAL FORCES PROGRAMMED FOR REDEPLOYMENT WITH MARINE FORCES SIMILARLY PROGRAMMED.

2. AS I HAVE STATED BEFORE, ANY DEGRADATION IN NAVY COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT WHILE MARINES ARE IN ICTZ IS UNACCEPTABLE. THUS YOUR OPTION A, IN WHICH USARV UNITS REPLACE NAVY COMMON SUPPORT FORCES IN PHASE 4 IS UNACCEPTABLE.

3. REF C SHOWS 1104 NAVY PERSONNEL PHASING OUT FROM NSA DANANG IN PHASE 3. THAT WOULD APPEAR TO BE AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN PROPORTION TO THE MARINES DEPLOYING AT THAT TIME ALTHOUGH I CANNOT VERIFY THAT THIS IS SO. PLEASE CONFIRM.

4. RELATED TO THE ABOVE, I BELIEVE THERE ARE 1401 NAVY PERSONNEL PHASING FROM NSA DANANG IN PHASE 5. THIS TOO APPEARS IN PROPORTION, HOWEVER, I REQUEST THAT, AS IN PAR 3 ABOVE, YOU AFFIRM THAT PERFORMANCE OF NAVY COMMON SUPPORT FUNCTIONS FOR ICTZ WILL NOT BE DEGRADED.

5. THE CB PHASE DOWN IN PHASE 2 AND PHASE 3 APPEARS TO BE IN PROPORTION, HOWEVER, ANY AGREEMENT ON MY PART TO PHASE DOWN CB BN'S IN ICTZ IS PREDICATED ON THE RETENTION OF THESE BN'S IN ICTZ.

GP-1

BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

SECRET

PTTSZYUW RHMMFA2154 1980100-SSSS--RUHHMFA.
ZNY SSSSS

P 170100Z JUL 69

FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC

BT

S E C R E T LIMDIS/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR AC/S G-2

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY REPORT (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 020116Z NOV 69

1. (U) MAR CORPS COMMANDS REPORT NO INCIDENTS DURING THE PRECEDING WEEK WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF REF A.

2. (S/MCEO) FYI, III MAF WATCH COMMITTEE MET ON 15 JUL 69 AND DISCUSSED VARIOUS INCIDENTS WITH RACIAL OVERTONES OR CAUSES. AIR FORCE REF MENTIONED A REPORT FROM A SOURCE OF UNKNOWN RELIABILITY CONCERNING THE FORMATION OF A NEW BLACK POWER ORGANIZATION KNOWN ONLY AS QUOTE TOPPS UNQUOTE. AIR FORCE REP STATED PURPOSE OF ORGANIZATION IS TO COLLECT MONEY FOR POOR PEOPLE IN MISSISSIPPI, HOWEVER, MONEY COLLECTED IS ALLEGEDLY USED TO PURCHASE WEAPONS FOR BLACK PANTHER GROUP IN SAN FRANCISCO. NO MARINES ARE KNOWN TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS GROUP. NO OTHER INFO IS AVAILABLE TO CONFIRM OR REFUTE THE TOPPS REPORT. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE RACIAL

PAGE TWO RHMMFA2154 S E C R E T LIMDIS MCEO
SITUATION IN I CORPS IS BEING EXPLOITED BY ORGANIZED RACIAL MILITANTS OR SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS. COORDINATION BETWEEN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF ALL SERVICES AND THE WARCH/ACTION COMMITTEES THROUGHTOUT I CORPS CONTINUES AND IS DESIGNED FOR EARLY DETECTION OF SUBVERSIVE INFLUENCES.

GP-3

BT

2154

SECRET

43(1)

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]

45

P 180115Z

FM CG III MAP

TO CG FMFPAC

ZEM

SECRET NOFORN EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
VISIT OF PRESIDENT THIEU TO I CORPS PACIFICATION REVIEW HELD
IN HUE 15 JULY 1969

1. PRESIDENT THIEU AND HIS MINISTERS REVIEWED OUR I CORPS PACIFICATION PROGRESS AND PLANS FOR PHASE II YESTERDAY IN HUE. THE MAIN DECISIONS INVOLVED: (A) REFUGEES NOT ON ROLLS AND IN REFUGEE CAMPS WILL NOT BE CLASSIFIED AS REFUGEES (B) THERE IS A VITAL NEED FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO CONCENTRATE ON WINNING THE PEOPLE IN THE CITIES (C) THIS IN TURN LEADS TO FUNDING FOR CITIES WHICH ARE REALLY SEVERAL VILLAGES COMBINED, AND (D) A NEED TO UPGRADE CLASS C HAMLETS TO A AND B STATUS. THE PRESIDENT REVIEWED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PHOENIX PROGRAM AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE VCI.
2. THE PRESIDENT AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE DISCUSSED RECENT DECREES WHICH PROVIDE FOR DRAFT DEFERMENT IN CERTAIN CASES. THEY FEEL THAT THIS DEFERMENT WOULD REDUCE THE SHORTAGE OF HAMLET AND VILLAGE CADRE. THE PRESIDENT ALSO STATED THAT WHERE RECRUITMENT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED FROM THESE DIFFERENT GROUPS THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ASSIGN PF'S TO THESE JOBS UNTIL OTHER ALTERNATIVES DEVELOPED.
3. THERE IS A SHORTAGE OF THE VIS CADRE, AND IN DISCUSSING THIS THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT THE EMERGENCY NEED FOR VIS CADRE COULD BE MET BY HIRING RD CADRE AND PAYING THEM A BONUS OF 1/4 OF THE STANDARD VIS CADRE SALARY.
4. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SET TARGETS FOR UPGRADING C HAMLETS SO THAT 50 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION THIS YEAR WOULD REACH AN A OR B STATUS, AND THAT BY THE END OF THE YEAR THE A AND B STATUS WOULD EXTEND TO 90 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE.
5. THE VISIT RESULTED IN A GOOD AIRING OF VIEWS. A PLEASANT LUNCHEON WAS HELD AT HUE. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE PRESIDENT VISITED THE 101ST AIRBORNE. HERE HE WAS PRESENTED A CAPTURED RUSSIAN-MADE SCOUT CAR WHICH HE PROCEEDED TO DRIVE. LT COL TIN (THE PROVINCE CHIEF AT QUANG NAM) WAS PROMOTED TO COL. A VISIT TO THE QUANG DA TRAINING CENTER WITH A SPEECH BY PRESIDENT THIEU TO THE STUDENTS ENDED THE VISIT.
6. LTGEN LAM ADVISED ME THAT BGEN TOAN WAS RETAINED IN COMMAND OF THE 2ND ARVN DIVISION. THIS HAD TO BE A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION, NOT JGS. I AM PLEASED WITH THIS DECISION. I WILL HAVE A MORE DETAILED MEMO FOR YOUR READING WHEN YOU VISIT US. MEANWHILE, I HAVE AN IDEA THAT LEW WALT WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THAT BGEN TOAN HAS BEEN RETAINED.

GP-1

34

45(1)

45(1)

P 182115Z

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEN

SECRET NOFORN EYES ONLY FOR BEN ABRAMS FROM LT GEN NICKERSON
VISIT OF PRESIDENT THIEU TO I CORPS PACIFICATION REVIEW HELD
IN HUE 15 JULY 1969

1. PRESIDENT THIEU AND HIS MINISTERS REVIEWED OUR I CORPS PACIFICATION PROGRESS AND PLANS FOR PHASE II YESTERDAY IN HUE. THE MAIN DECISIONS INVOLVED: (A) REFUGEES NOT ON ROLLS AND IN REFUGEE CAMPS WILL NOT BE CLASSIFIED AS REFUGEES (B) THERE IS A VITAL NEED FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO CONCENTRATE ON WINNING THE PEOPLE IN THE CITIES (C) THIS IN TURN LEADS TO FUNDING FOR CITIES WHICH ARE REALLY SEVERAL VILLAGES COMBINED, AND (D) A NEED TO UPGRADE CLASS C HAMLETS TO A AND B STATUS. THE PRESIDENT REINFORCED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PHOENIX PROGRAM AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE VUL.

2. THE PRESIDENT AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE DISCUSSED RECENT DECREES WHICH PROVIDE FOR DRAFT DEFERMENT IN CERTAIN CASES. THEY FEEL THAT THIS DEFERMENT WOULD REDUCE THE SHORTAGE OF HAMLET AND VILLAGE CADRE. THE PRESIDENT ALSO STATED THAT WHERE RECRUITMENT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED FROM THESE DIFFERENT GROUPS THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ASSIGN PF'S TO THESE JOBS UNTIL OTHER ALTERNATIVES DEVELOPED.

3. THERE IS A SHORTAGE OF THE VIS CADRE, AND IN DISCUSSING THIS THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT THE EMERGENCY NEED FOR VIS CADRE COULD BE MET BY HIRING RD CADRE AND PAYING THEM A BONUS OF 1/4 OF THE STANDARD VIS CADRE SALARY.

4. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SET TARGETS FOR UPGRADING C HAMLETS SO THAT 50 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION THIS YEAR WOULD REACH AN A OR B STATUS AND THAT BY THE END OF THE YEAR THE A AND B STATUS WOULD EXTEND TO 90 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE.

5. THE VISIT RESULTED IN A GOOD AIRING OF VIE WS. A PLEASANT LUNCHEON WAS HELD AT HUE. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE PRESIDENT VISITED THE 101ST AIRBORNE. HERE HE WAS PRESENTED A CAPTURED RUSSIAN-MADE SCOOT CAR WHICH HE PROCEEDED TO DRIVE. LT COL TIN (THE PROVINCE CHIEF AT QUANG NAM) WAS PROMOTED TO COL. A VISIT TO THE QUANG DA TRAINING CENTER WITH A SPEECH BY PRESIDENT THIEU TO THE STUDENTS ENDED THE VISIT.

6. LT GEN LAM ADVISED ME THAT BGEN TOAN WAS RETAINED IN COMMAND OF THE 2ND ARVN DIVISION BY PRESIDENTIAL DECISION.

GP

HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 19 JULY 1969	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 190502Z JULY 69		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO	
3	CG	I	30 July			REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5311.4__.	
4	DCG	I					
	DCG AIR					THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.	
	C/S	I					
2	DC/S	I	7/20	7/20	W/18	ORIG: G-3 REL: CG	
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	I	7/20			EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT	
	G-1						
	G-2					TOP SECRET	
	G-3	HAS COPY					
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

TOP SECRET

PTTZYUW RHMMFA2503 2000502-TTIT--RUHNMFA RUEBHQA.

ZNY TTTTT

RUHNMFA -T- RUEBHQA

P 190502Z JUL 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHNMFA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUEBHQA/CMC

BT

T O P S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM
LTGEN NICKERSON. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

PROV MAG-39 PROGRAM SIX SPACES (U)

A. USMC DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES PROGRAM LISTING OF 22JUN69

1. (S) AS YOU KNOW, PROV MAG-39 WAS FORMED IN APR 68 TO
MORE EFFECTIVELY CONTROL HELO OPNS IN QUANG TRI/DONG HA/
KHE SANH AREA. UNIT IS A TASK ORGANIZATION, MANNED FROM
INTERNAL FIRST MAW MANNING LEVEL ASSETS, AND HERETOFORE
NOT AUTHORIZED FORCE STRUCTURE/PROGRAM SIX SPACES. REF A
REVISED FORCE STRUCTURE ALIGNMENT AND AUTHORIZED PROV
MAG-39 353 SPACES.2. (TS) CG FIRST MAW DESIRES TO DEACTIVATE PROV MAG-39
DURING MACV PHASE 2 REDEPLOYMENT SINCE REQUIREMENT
WILL NO LONGER EXIST. IF REQUIREMENT FOR MARINE

PAGE TWO RHMMFA2503 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC
AIR STILL EXISTS IN NICTZ, MAG-36 WILL PROVIDE
NECESSARY SUPPORT. HOWEVER, IF WE REDEPLOY UNIT AS PROV
MAG-39 AND THEN DISBAND IT ON OKINAWA, WE RUN THE RISK
OF LOSING THE 353 SPACES. IF WE CAN TRANSFER THE SPACES TO
OTHER UNITS BEFOREHAND, THEN WE CAN REDEPLOY 353 SPACES TO
OKINAWA TO FORM FIRST MAW (REAR) AND STILL RETAIN ADEQUATE
RESOURCES IN RVN TO EFFECTIVELY CONTROL THE REMAINING FIRST MAW
ASSETS. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST YOUR HQ INITIATE ACTION AT THIS
TIME TO TRANSFER THE 353 DOD AUTH PROGRAM SIX SPACES FROM
PROV MAG-39 (FRN 05J039) TO THE FOLLOWING UNITS:

FRN	UNIT	PRESENT DOD AUTH STRENGTH	INCREASE	PROPOSED DOD AUTH STRENGTH
99K051	MAW HQ	493	47	540
99K076	H&MS-16	443	3	446
99K077	H&MS-36	509	3	512
99K078	M&BS-16	539	16	555
05J036	H&MS-1	126	110	236
05J038	MWFS-1	127	3	130
05J044	H&MS-17	632	114	746
99K058	H&MS-12	506	4	510

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAF2503 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

99K060	HABS-11	356	6	362
99K061	HABS-12	385	22	407
99K062	HABS-13	391	23	414

(BOTH H&MS-16 AND H&MS-36 WILL REDEPLOY 21 SPACES WITH PHASE 1 REDEPLOYMENT).

3. (TS) THE 353 PROV MAG-39 SPACES HAVE ALREADY BEEN USED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IN SUPPORT OF PHASE 2 REDEPLOYMENT, BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT APPROVAL FOR PROGRAM SIX ADJUSTMENT OF SPACES COULD BE OBTAINED. SUBJECT TO FINAL MACV APPROVAL, PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED PLANS WILL BE REVISED AS FOLLOWS FOR PHASE 2 FOR FIRST MAW (REAR):

FRN	UNIT	DOD AUTH SPACES
99K051	MAW HQ	120
05J036	H&MS-1	105
05J044	H&MS-17	128
	TOTAL SPACES	353

4. (S) IF ACTION PAR 2 IS APPROVED, APPROPRIATE REQUEST FOR MANNING LEVEL TRANSFERS/ADJUSTMENTS WILL BE SUBMITTED.

5. (TS) IN VIEW OF THE PROBABILITY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF REDEPLOYMENT PLANS INVOLVING ABOVE UNITS AS EARLY AS 1 SEP 69,

PAGE FOUR RHMMAF2503 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
REQUEST ACTION ON ADJUSTMENT OF PROV MAG-39 SPACES EARLIEST.
WARM REGARDS.

GP-1

BT

2503

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**TOP SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 19 JULY 1969	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 190256Z JUL 1969		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT			
3	CG	I	20 July			SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO	
3	DCG	I					
2	DCG AIR					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5311.4_.	
	C/S	I					
2	DC/S	I	7/20	7/20		THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.	
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	I	7/20		N 18	ORIG: C/S REL: CG EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT 12 TOP SECRET	
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	SBC						

TOP SECRET

OTTIZYUW RHMMFA2483 2000256-TTTT--RUHMF.

ZNY TTTT

O 190256Z JUL 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHMF/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN
NICKERSON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CJCS VISIT

1. GEN WHEELER, ADM MCCAIN AND GEN ABRAMS VISITED I CORPS TODAY. ARRIVED APPROXIMATELY 1230, HAD LUNCH AND WERE BRIEFED BY THE III MAF STAFF. MR. HERZ JOINED THE PARTY LATE.
2. THE BRIEFING ACTUALLY CONSISTED OF TWO PARTS. PART I, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND FRIENDLY DISPOSITIONS. PART II CONSISTED OF PHASE II OF THE 1969 PACIFICATION PLAN, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE PACIFICATION PLAN IN I CORPS AND A DISCUSSION OF ARVN EFFECTIVENESS AND ARVN IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WITHIN THE CORPS AREA.
3. THE G-2 DISCUSSED THE ORDER OF BATTLE. THERE ARE MORE ENEMY MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE TODAY THAN THERE WERE IN NOVEMBER 1968. ENEMY STRENGTH IS SLIGHTLY HIGHER NOW THAN IN NOVEMBER 1968. THE CHARAC-

PAGE TWO RHMMFA2483 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
TER OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION HAS CHANGED. THERE ARE FEWER LARGE GROUND ATTACKS AND MORE SAPPER ATTACKS AND LIGHT ATTACKS BY FIRE. THE ENEMY IS NOW CONCENTRATING ON THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE. THE ENEMY'S REACTION TO RLT-9 REDEPLOYMENT WAS ANALYZED. THERE IS, AS YET NO EVIDENCE OF A SIGNIFICANT ENEMY REACTION. HOWEVER, CONTINUOUS PRESSURE IS BEING MAINTAINED BY SMALL UNIT ACTIONS. FUTURE ENEMY CAPABILITIES WERE DISCUSSED. IT WAS ESTIMATED THE ENEMY WOULD MOST LIKELY CONTINUE THE SAME GENERAL LEVEL OF ACTIVITY THAT HE HAS MAINTAINED IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS CONCENTRATING ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE WAR. IT WAS ALSO BROUGHT OUT THAT THE ENEMY COULD REVERT TO MAJOR CONVENTIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE EVENT ONE OF TWO CONDITIONS WERE TO BE MET (1) GVN SHOWS THE CAPABILITY TO COPE WITH THE COVERT POLITICAL THREAT AND (2) AN ACCELERATED REDEPLOYMENT OF U. S. FORCES CREATES A SITUATION WHICH HANOI CONSIDERS MILITARILY EXPLOITABLE.

4. THE G-2 THEN ANALYZED THE ENEMY'S PRESENT MILITARY STRATEGY SPECIFICALLY BASED ON GEN GIAP'S PRONOUNCEMENTS CONCERNING INSURGENCY OPERATIONS VERSUS CONVENTIONAL WAR.

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET 12/11

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA2488 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PRESENT STRATEGY IS ONE OF
 EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE PREDOMINANTLY BECAUSE
 IT FITS THE PRESENT POLITICAL AND MILITARY CLIMATE AND
 ENCOURAGES U. S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THIS STRATEGY CALLS FOR
 THE UTILIZATION OF SMALL UNIT SAPPER ATTACKS AND ATTACKS
 BY FIRE AIMED AT THE DISRUPTION OF THE PACIFICATION PRO-
 GRAM AND THE ATTAINMENT OF POLITICAL ENDS. GEN WHEELER
 ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY REDUCTION IN QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP ON
 THE BATTLE FIELD, OBSERVED AMONG THE UNITS OF THE NVA/VC.
 GEN ZAIS STATED THAT ENEMY HE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH COULD
 FIGHT; HOWEVER, OVERALL LEADERSHIP WAS NOT AT THE LEVEL IT
 HAD BEEN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. GEN ABRAMS BROUGHT OUT THAT THE
 29TH AND 36TH REGIMENTS HAD BEEN RECENTLY REFURBISHED IN NVN
 AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT THEIR LEADERSHIP WOULD BE HIGHER THAN
 LOCAL UNITS IN-COUNTRY.

5. THE G-3 PRESENTED A DISCUSSION OF THE NUMBER OF MANEUVER
 BATTALIONS PRIOR TO THE BOMBING HALT AS COMPARED TO THOSE
 AVAILABLE NOW. ROK, ARVN AND U. S. BASICALLY THE ARVN AND
 ROK HAVE REMAINED CONSTANT WHERE AT THE U. S. MANEUVER BATTALIONS
 IN 1 COPS HAVE DROPPED FROM 56 TO 43 (INCLUDING THE SLF'S)

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA2488 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 6. THE DEP CORDS, MR. FIRFER, DISCUSSED THE 1969 PACIFICATION
 CAMPAIGN FOR I CORPS. HE DISCUSSED PHASE I GOALS AND ACHIEVE-
 MENTS AND PHASE II PROSPECTS. GEN WHEELER OPINED SOME PROGRAMS
 SEEMED AMBITIOUS ALTHOUGH SEVERAL AMBITIOUS PROGRAMS IN
 THE PAST DID MAKE THEIR GOALS. HE ADDED THAT PRESIDENT
 THIEU'S PERSONAL INTEREST GOT THEM MOVING. GEN WHEELER
 ALSO COMMENTED ON THE HES STATISTICS. HE STATED THAT
 ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE CERTAIN INADEQUACIES, THEY INDICATE
 TRENDS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN
 I CORPS. EARLIER, MR. FIRFER COMMENTED THAT THE PRESIDENT
 HAD DECIDED TO CUT REFUGEES FROM THE ROLLS IF THEY WERE NOT
 IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS. THEREFORE REFUGEE CHARTS WOULD SHOW
 CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT. GEN ABRAMS TOOK ISSUE WITH THIS
 AND STATED THAT IT DOESN'T DO ANY GOOD TO TAKE THEM OFF
 THE ROLLS TO IMPROVE THE CHARTS. THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS THESE
 PEOPLE, THEIR VOTES AND HELP. THE G-3 THEN REVIEWED
 MILITARY PLANS TO SUPPORT THE 1969 PHASE II PACIFICATION
 PLAN. GEN ABRAMS NOTED THAT ONE OF THE ASSUMPTIONS WAS THE
 UTILIZATION OF THE DELTA FORCE. GEN ABRAMS POINTED OUT THAT
 FIELD COMMANDERS WHO HAVE DELTA FORCES ASSIGNED BERATE THEM

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

111 MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET 12 (2)

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMMFA2488 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO AND COMPLAIN ABOUT INORDINATE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS, YET THEY JUSTIFY THEIR REQUESTS FOR THEM WHEN THEY DON'T HAVE THEM BY GLOWING PRAISE OF THEIR WORK. GEN ZAIS STATED THAT HIS ONE EXPERIENCE WITH DELTA FORCES HAD BEEN GOOD. GEN ABRAMS WAS NOT COMPLETELY CONVINCED. GEN NICKERSON STATED THAT THE NEGATIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY DELTA FORCES LED TO DECISION NOT TO INITIATE OPERATION PIERCE VALLEY. REGARDLESS OF THIS, GEN ABRAMS STATED THAT NO REPORTS GOT TO HIM TO INDICATE THAT THE INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED BY DELTA FORCES WAS DEEMED VALUABLE BY THE FORCES SUPPORTED. ONE OF THE THINGS NOT BROUGHT OUT AT THE BRIEFING WAS THAT THE DELTA FORCES WOULD ASSIST IN PROVIDING INFORMATION TO A COMMANDER FACED WITH THE REDUCTION OF U. S. FORCES.

7. THE G-3 DISCUSSED THE ARVN, ROK AND U. S. PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY PLAN TO SUPPORT THE PACIFICATION EFFORT AND POINTED OUT HOW ALL THREE ARE INTEGRATED. GEN WHEELER COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS NO OTHER WAY TO DO IT. HOWEVER, HE DID QUESTION THE SECURITY PROBLEMS THAT WERE GENERATED. GEN NICKERSON STATED THAT HE WOULD HOLD INFORMATION TO THE LAST MINUTE. PRESENT PLANS ARE GENERAL IN NATURE AND ARE

PAGE SIX RHMMFA2488 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO NOT SPECIFIC. GEN WHEELER ASKED "HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE 2ND ARVN DIVISION" AND GEN NICKERSON STATED THAT IT HAS IMPROVED OVER THE LAST 18 MONTHS, TO WHICH GEN ABRAMS AGREED. GEN WHEELER ASKED IF THERE HAS BEEN AN IMPACT ON THE ARVN BY THE WITHDRAWAL. GEN NICKERSON REPLIED NOT AT THE TOP LEVEL. GEN BURKE THEN DISCUSSED IN GENERAL TERMS THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ARVN OVER THE PAST YEAR AND THE RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

8. GEN ABRAMS ASKED IF THERE HAS BEEN ANY PROBLEMS IN RLT-9'S MOVEMENT TO DATE AND GEN NICKERSON REPLIED NEGATIVE.

9. FROM HERE THE PARTY MOVED TO GEN LAM'S HEADQUARTERS. GEN WHEELER ASKED GEN LAM WHAT EFFECT THE 9TH MARINES DEPLOYMENT HAD ON HIS FORCES. GEN LAM STATED NO PROBLEM. MORALE IS HIGHER THAN EVER, EVEN IN RF AND PF. GEN LAM STATED HIS PROBLEM IS NVA. 87 PER CENT OF LOCAL FORCES ARE NVA. IF THEY WOULD LEAVE, HE WOULD NOT HAVE ANY PROBLEMS. GEN LAM STATED THAT THE NVA HAVE TRIED TO PUT POLITICAL AGENTS INTO THE HAMLETS. HOWEVER, THEY WERE EASILY IDENTIFIED. AS A MATTER OF FACT TWO OF THEM WERE CAPTURED IN DANANG. MR. HERZ ASKED ABOUT THE SPEECH PRESIDENT THIEU MADE ABOUT FREE ELECTIONS. GEN LAM

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

111 MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**TOP SECRET** (12/3)

TOP SECRET

PAGE SEVEN RHMMAFA2488 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 STATED THAT PRESIDENT THIEU EXPLAINED IT TO THE I CORPS
 OFFICERS AND, FURTHER, THAT THE I CORPS OFFICERS HAVE REASONS
 TO BE AGAINST COMMUNISM. HE SEES NO PROBLEMS WITH FREE
 ELECTIONS. GEN WHEELER STATED THAT IT WAS O.K. TO HAVE AN
 OPPOSITION PARTY. WE HAVE ONE IN OUR OWN COUNTRY. GEN
 WHEELER ASKED IF RIM IS GOING SATISFACTORILY. GEN LAM STATED
 YES THE TROOPS ALL HAVE M16'S, M-79'S AND OTHER MODERN
 WEAPONS AND THAT THEY WERE CONFIDENT. GEN LAM STATED HE HAD
 MANY VICTORIES IN PAST IS MOS EVEN AMONG TERRITORIAL
 FORCES. ONCE AGAIN HE WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM IF THE NVA
 WOULD GO. GEN WHEELER MADE A COMMENT ABOUT THE NUMBER OF RF
 PLATOONS TO BE ACTIVATED AND ASKED IF GEN LAM WOULD HAVE
 ENOUGH PEOPLE TO MAN THEM AND GEN LAM STATED THAT HE HAD
 PLENTY OF PEOPLE. GEN LAM GAVE GEN WHEELER AN I CORPS
 PLAQUE AND AN IVORY SWAGGER STICK.

10. NO PARTICULAR PROBLEMS CAME UP DURING THE DAY AND GEN
 WHEELER DID NOT DIVULGE ANY INFORMATION AND ADM MCCAIN
 WAS STRANGELY SILENT.

11. EARLIER, GEN NICKERSON MADE A PITCH TO GET THE NEW JERSEY BACK.
 GEN'S WHEELER AND ABRAMS SEEMED AGREEABLE. ADM MCCAIN WAS
 ALSO AGREEABLE, BUT SAID HE HAD A MONEY PROBLEM.

GP-1

BT

2488

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

111 MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

12/4
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OPERATION CODE				FROM	DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				00 111 ME SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 190315Z JUL 69	19 JUL 69 COPY 4, 2, 3 OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I	20 JUL			REMARKS
3	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
4A	DC/S	I	7/19	7/12		
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	7/19			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

0-130315Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

I O P S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO

EYES ONLY FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
CJCS VISIT

1. GEN WHEELER, ADM MCCAIN AND GEN ABRAMS VISITED I CORPS TODAY. ARRIVED APPROXIMATELY 1230, HAD LUNCH AND WERE BRIEFED BY THE III MAF STAFF. MR HERZ JOINED THE PARTY LATE.

2. THE BRIEFING ACTUALLY CONSISTED OF TWO PARTS. PART I INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND FRIENDLY DISPOSITIONS. PART II CONSISTED OF PHASE II OF THE 1969 PACIFICATION PLAN, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE PACIFICATION PLAN IN I CORPS AND A DISCUSSION OF ARVN EFFECTIVENESS AND ARVN IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WITHIN THE CORPS AREA.

THE G-2 DISCUSSED THE ORDER OF BATTLE. THERE ARE MORE ENEMY MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE TODAY THAN THERE WERE IN NOVEMBER 1968. ENEMY STRENGTH IS SLIGHTLY HIGHER NOW THAN IN NOVEMBER 1969. THE CHARACTER OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION HAS CHANGED. THERE ARE FEWER LARGE GROUND ATTACKS AND MORE SAPPER ATTACKS AND LIGHT ATTACKS BY FIRE. THE ENEMY IS NOW CONCENTRATING ON THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE. THE ENEMY'S REACTION TO RLI-9 REDEPLOYMENT WAS ANALYZED. THERE IS, AS YET NO EVIDENCE OF A SIGNIFICANT ENEMY REACTION. HOWEVER, CONTINUOUS PRESSURE IS BEING MAINTAINED BY SMALL UNIT ACTIONS. FUTURE ENEMY CAPABILITIES WERE DISCUSSED. IT WAS ESTIMATED THE ENEMY WOULD MOST LIKELY CONTINUE THE SAME GENERAL LEVEL OF ACTIVITY THAT HE HAS MAINTAINED IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS CONCENTRATING ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE WAR. IT WAS ALSO BROUGHT OUT THAT THE ENEMY COULD REVERT TO MAJOR CONVENTIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE EVENT ONE OF TWO CONDITIONS WERE TO BE MET (1) GVN SHOWS THE CAPABILITY TO COPE WITH THE COVERT POLITICAL THREAT AND (2) AND ACCELERATED REDEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES CREATES A SITUATION WHICH HANOI CONSIDERS MILITARILY EXPLOITABLE.

13(1)

4. THE G-2 THEN ANALYZED THE ENEMY'S PRESENT MILITARY STRATEGY SPECIFICALLY BASED ON GEN GIAP'S PRONOUNCEMENTS CONCERNING INSURGENCY OPERATIONS VERSUS CONVENTIONAL WAR. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PRESENT STRATEGY IS ONE OF EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE PREDOMINANTLY BECAUSE IT FITS THE PRESENT POLITICAL AND MILITARY CLIMATE AND ENCOURAGES U. S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THIS STRATEGY CALLS FOR THE UTILIZATION OF SMALL UNIT SAPPER ATTACKS AND ATTACKS BY FIRE AIMED AT THE DISRUPTION OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM AND THE ATTAINMENT OF POLITICAL ENDS. GEN WHEELER ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY REDUCTION IN QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP ON THE BATTLE FIELD, OBSERVED AMONG THE UNITS OF THE NVA/VC. GEN ZAIS STATED THAT ENEMY HE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH COULD FIGHT; HOWEVER, OVERALL LEADERSHIP WAS NOT AT THE LEVEL IT HAD BEEN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. GEN ABRAMS BROUGHT OUT THAT THE 29TH AND 36TH REGIMENTS HAD BEEN RECENTLY REFURBISHED IN NVN AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT THEIR LEADERSHIP WOULD BE HIGHER THAN LOCAL UNITS IN/COUNTRY.

5. THE G-3 PRESENTED A DISCUSSION OF THE NUMBER OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS PRIOR TO THE BOMBING HALT AS COMPARED TO THOSE AVAILABLE NOT. ROK, ARVN AND U. S. BASICALLY THE ARVN AND ROK HAVE REMAINED CONSTANT WHERE AT THE U. S. MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN I CORPS HAVE DROPPED FROM 56 TO 43 (INCLUDING THE SLF'S)

799

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT TOP SECRET

13(2)

~~13~~

0 190315Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEN

TOP SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO

EYES ONLY FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
CJCS VISIT CONTINUED

6. THE DEP CORDS, MR. FIRFER, DISCUSSED THE 1969 PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN FOR I CORPS. HE DISCUSSED PHASE I GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS AND PHASE II PROSPECTS. GEN WHEELER OPINED SOME PROGRAMS SEEMED AMBITIOUS ALTHOUGH SEVERAL AMBITIOUS PROGRAMS IN THE PAST DID MAKE THEIR GOALS. HE ADDED THAT PRESIDENT THIEN'S PERSONAL INTEREST GOT THEM MOVING. GEN WHEELER ALSO COMMENTED ON THE HES STATISTICS. HE STATED THAT ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE CERTAIN INADEQUACIES, THEY INDICATE TRENDS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN I CORPS. EARLIER, MR. FIRFER COMMENTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED TO CUT REFUGEES FROM THE ROLLS IF THEY WERE NOT IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS. THEREFORE REFUGEE CHARTS WOULD SHOW CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT. GEN ABRAMS TOOK ISSUE WITH THIS AND STATED THAT IT DOESN'T DO ANY GOOD TO TAKE THEM OFF THE ROLLS TO IMPROVE THE CHARTS. THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS THESE PEOPLE, THEIR VOTES AND HELP. THE G-3 THEN REVIEWED MILITARY PLANS TO SUPPORT THE 1969 PHASE II PACIFICATION PLAN. GEN ABRAMS NOTED THAT ONE OF THE ASSUMPTIONS WAS THE UTILIZATION OF THE DELTA FORCE. GEN ABRAMS POINTED OUT THAT FIELD COMMANDERS WHO HAVE DELTA FORCES ASSIGNED BERATE THEM AND COMPLAIN ABOUT INORDINATE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS, YET THEY JUSTIFY THEIR REQUESTS FOR THEM WHEN THEY DON'T HAVE THEM BY GLOWING PRAISE OF THEIR WORK. GEN ZAIS STATED THAT HIS ONE EXPERIENCE WITH DELTA FORCES HAD BEEN GOOD. GEN ABRAMS WAS NOT COMPLETELY CONVINCED. GEN NICKERSON STATED THAT THE NEGATIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY DELTA FORCES LED TO DECISION NOT TO INITIATE OPERATION PIERCE VALLEY. REGARDLESS OF THIS, GEN ABRAMS STATED THAT NO REPORTS GOT TO HIM TO INDICATE THAT THE INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED BY DELTA FORCES WAS DEEMED VALUABLE BY THE FORCES SUPPORTED. ONE OF THE THINGS NOT BROUGHT OUT AT THE BRIEFING WAS THAT THE DELTA FORCES WOULD ASSIST IN PROVIDING INFORMATION TO A COMMANDER FACED WITH THE REDUCTION OF U. S. FORCES.

7. THE G-3 DISCUSSED THE ARVN, ROK AND U. S. PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY PLAN TO SUPPORT THE PACIFICATION EFFORT AND POINTED OUT HOW ALL THREE ARE INTEGRATED. GEN WHEELER COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS NO OTHER WAY TO DO IT. HOWEVER, HE DID QUESTION THE SECURITY PROBLEMS THAT WERE GENERATED. GEN NICKERSON STATED THAT HE WOULD HOLD INFORMATION TO THE LAST MINUTE. PRESENT PLANS ARE GENERAL IN NATURE AND ARE NOT SPECIFIC. GEN WHEELER ASKED "HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE 2ND ARVN DIVISION" AND GEN NICKERSON STATED THAT IT HAS IMPROVED OVER THE LAST 18 MONTHS, TO WHICH GEN ABRAMS AGREED. GEN WHEELER ASKED IF THERE HAS BEEN AN IMPACT ON THE ARVN BY THE WITHDRAWAL. GEN NICKERSON REPLIED NOT AT THE TOP LEVEL.

GEN WHEELER THEN DISCUSSED THE PACIFICATION PLAN OF THE ARVN OVER THE PAST YEAR AND THE PACIFICATION AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

13(3)

13(3)

8. GEN ABRAMS ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY PROBLEMS IN
 THE 9TH'S MOVEMENT TO DATE AND GEN NICKERSON REPLIED
 9. FROM HERE THE PARTY MOVED TO GEN LAM'S HEADQUARTERS.
 GEN WHEELER ASKED GEN LAM WHAT EFFECT THE 9TH MARINES DEPLOY-
 MENT HAD ON HIS FORCES. GEN LAM STATED NO PROBLEM. MORALE
 IS HIGHER THEN EVER, EVEN IN RF AND PF. GEN LAM STATED HIS
 PROBLEM IS NVA. 87 PERCENT OF LOCAL FORCES ARE NVA. IF THEY WOULD
 LEAVE, HE WOULD NOT HAVE ANY PROBLEMS. GEN LAM STATED THAT
 THE NVA HAVE TRIED TO PUT POLITICAL AGENTS INTO THE HAMLETS,
 HOWEVER, THEY WERE EASILY IDENTIFIED. AS A MATTER OF FACT TWO
 OF THEM WERE CAPTURED IN DANANG. MR. HERZ ASKED ABOUT THE
 SPEECH PRESIDENT THIEU MADE ABOUT FREE ELECTIONS. GEN LAM
 STATED THAT PRESIDENT THIEU EXPLAINED IT TO THE I CORPS
 OFFICERS AND, FURTHER, THAT THE I CORPS OFFICERS HAVE REASONS
 TO BE AGAINST COMMUNISM. HE SEES NO PROBLEMS WITH FREE
 ELECTIONS. GEN WHEELER STATED THAT IT WAS O.K. TO HAVE AN
 OPPOSITION PARTY. WE HAVE ONE IN OUR OWN COUNTRY. GEN
 WHEELER ASKED IF RIM IS GOING SAATISFACTORILY. GEN LAM STATED
 YES THE TROOPS ALL HAVE M16'S, M-79'S AND OTHER MODERN
 WEAPONS AND THAT THEY WERE CONFIDENT GEN LAM STATED HE HAD
 MANY VICTORIES IN THE PAST 18 MONTHS EVEN AMONG TERRITORIAL
 FORCES. ONCE AGAIN HE WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM IF THE NVA
 WOULD GO. GEN WHEELER MADE A COMMENT ABOUT THE NUMBER OF RF
 PLATOONS TO BE ACTIVATED AND ASKED IF GEN LAM WOULD HAVE
 ENOUGH PEOPLE TO MAN THEM AND GEN LAM STATED THAT HE HAD
 PLENTY OF PEOPLE. GEN LAM GAVE GEN WHEELER AN I CORPS
 PLAQUE AND AN IVORY SWAGGER STICK.
 10. EARLIER, GEN NICKERSON MADE A PITCH TO GET THE NEW JERSEY BACK.
 GEN S WHEELER AND ABRAMS SEEMED AGREEABLE. ADM MCCAIN WAS
 ALSO AGREEABLE BUT SAID HE HAD A MONEY PROBLEM.

GP-1

900

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT TOP SECRET

13(4)

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

CONFIDENTIAL

48

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RHMMFA2485 2000214-CCCC--RUMLBPA RUMLLIA RUMHLA
 RUMHVP RUMLMHA RUMLMPA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 190214Z JUL 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN

TUMLLIA/CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG RVN

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DGH RVN

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW DNG RVN

RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOMD DNG RVN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 FOR LTGEN ZAIS, MGEN RAMSEY, MGEN SIMPSON, MGEN JONES,
 MGEN THRASH AND BGEN FEELEY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE P 171304Z JUL 69 ZFFG

FM CNO

TO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUHGSF/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUHJOSA/COMNAVMARIANAS

RUMWGA/COMNAVPHIL

RUMUGKD/COMNAVFORV

RUADLBA/COMNAVFORJAPAN

RUMFZFF/COMCARDIV FIVE

RHMMFA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
 FOR ADMIRAL HYLAND, INFO VICE ADMIRAL BRINGLE, VICE ADMIRAL
 ZUMWALT, VICE ADMIRAL WEISNER, LIEUTENANT GENERAL NICKERSON,
 REAR ADMIRALS KAUFFMAN, SMITH AND COLE FROM MOORER.

1. (C) IT APPEARS THAT MY SCHEDULE IS SHAPING UP SO THAT
 I CAN GET AWAY FOR ABOUT A TEN DAY VISIT TO WESTPAC AND
 AM TENTATIVELY THINKING IN TERMS OF THE ITINERARY OUTLINED
 BELOW FROM 25 AUGUST TO 4 SEPTEMBER.

2. (C) MY PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO VISIT FLEET AND SHORE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

48(1)

P 200315Z
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L EYES ONLY
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

- A. COMUSMACV MSG DTG 161145Z JUL 69(C)
- B. CG III MAF MSG DTG 291436Z MAY 69(C)
- C. DISCUSSION BETWEEN GEN ROSSON AND LTG NICKERSON, 10 JUL 69
- D. COMUSMACV MSG 36080 DTG 190140Z JUN 69(C)
- E. CG III MAF MSG DTG 041410Z JUL 69(C)

1. (U) THIS IS IN REPLY TO REF A.
2. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE PROVIDED IN THE ORDER WHICH REQUESTED:

A. I DO NOT FEEL THAT THERE IS ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE THUA THIEN PROPOSAL AND THE MACV STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE PLAN FOR AREA SECURITY. THE PROPOSAL IS AN EXTENSION OF THE AREA SECURITY PLAN IN WHICH THE TARGET DISTRICTS ARE IN FACT ALREADY SECURE AREAS. THE II, III AND IV PHASES OF THE PROPOSAL WILL BE IN CONSONANCE WITH THE AREA SECURITY PLAN'S CONSOLIDATION AND CLEARING ZONES. THE THUA THIEN PROPOSAL INDICATES THAT FURTHER PHASING WILL DEPEND ON PROGRESS OF OTHER DISTRICTS. THIS WILL ALLOW FOR ANY NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS WHEN THE AREA SECURITY CONCEPT IS INCORPORATED WITH THE 1970 PACIFICATION PLAN AND AB145. WE SHALL REMAIN FLEXIBLE.

B. IT IS FULLY REALIZED THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR ELECTION OF DISTRICT CHIEFS IS IN CONTRAVENTION OF EXISTING GVN LAWS. THIS PART OF THE PROPOSAL WAS MADE IN AN ATTEMPT TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE ISSUE OF THE FUTURE OF DISTRICT CHIEFS IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE. I CONSIDER THAT THE CURRENT PLAN TO DO AWAY WITH THE DISTRICT CHIEFS AND HAVE PROVINCE CHIEFS DEAL DIRECTLY WITH VILLAGE CHIEFS NEEDS FURTHER STUDY AND CONSIDERATION. IN THE MEANTIME THE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION OF APPOINTING CIVILIAN DISTRICT CHIEFS SEEMS BOTH FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE. THE IMPORTANT ISSUE HERE IS CREATING THE IMAGE OF A COMPLETE AND TOTAL RETURN TO CIVIL AUTHORITY. EVEN IF ONLY IN THE THREE DISTRICTS PROPOSED IN THE THUA THIEN PLAN. #9(1)

C. I HAD HOPED THAT THE THUA THIEN PROPOSAL WOULD BE ADOPTED AS A NATIONAL PILOT PROGRAM WHICH, BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANT IMAGE PROJECTED, WOULD RECEIVE THE MINIMAL RESOURCES NECESSARY TO INSTITUTE THE PROJECT, IE: TWO ADDITIONAL NPFF COMPANIES AND 115 NATIONAL POLICE. IN THE EVENT THIS IS TOTALLY IMPOSSIBLE, THE REMAINING ALTERNATIVES OF RETRAINING RF COMPANIES AS NPFF AND TRANSFERRING THEM TO THE NPFF, OR SIMPLY TRAINING RF COMPANIES AS NPFF WITHOUT TRANSFERRING THEM TO THE NPFF WILL BE PURSUED. THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE DISTRICT ADVISORY TEAMS IS BEING STUDIED BY MY CORDS STAFF WITH THE OBJECT OF UTILIZING EXISTING ASSETS.

THE REPLACEMENT OF RF UNITS WITH NPFF IS DESIGNED TO UTILIZE THE BROAD CHARTER FOR LAW AND ORDER EXTANT IN THE LAWS AUTHORIZING NPFF UNITS. THUS, NPFF DO NOT "REPLACE" RF COMPANIES, THE RF IS REMOVED FROM THE DISTRICTS AND NPFF ARE ASSIGNED TO CARRY OUT THEIR PROPERLY ASSIGNED MISSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, MAINTAINING SECURITY, VCI NEUTRALIZATION, PATROLS AND AMBUSHES, AND SAFEGUARDING THE EXTENSION OF THE NATIONAL POLICE.

3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE PREREQUISITE FOR GVN INITIATIVE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE THUA THIEN PROPOSAL. THE PROVINCE CHIEF OF THUA THIEN, COLONEL THAN, HAS BRIEFED GEN LAM ON THE PROPOSAL AND I HAVE ALSO DISCUSSED IT WITH HIM. I AM OF THE IMPRESSION THAT HE CONCURS AND SUPPORTS THE CONCEPT AND AS OF NOW I AM AWAITING HIS FORMAL REPLY TO A LETTER I SENT TO HIM ON THE SUBJECT ON 24 JUNE 1969. I WILL URGE GEN LAM TO FORWARD THE PROPOSAL TO CPDC WHEN IN FACT HE DOES APPROVE IT.

4. THE INITIATIVE CLEARLY RESTS WITH THE GVN AT THIS MOMENT AND SPECIFICALLY WITH GEN LAM. YOUR ASSURANCE OF THE MACV STAFF WORKING CLOSELY WITH JGS AND GVN COUNTERPARTS TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION IS SINCERELY APPRECIATED. I SHALL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR EARLY SUBMISSION OF THE PROPOSAL TO CPDC BY GEN LAM

BP-4
548

49(2)

49(2)

TOP SECRET

OITTYUW RHHMFA2949 2030630Z-TTTT--RHHMFA.

ZNY TTTT

O 220630Z JUL 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RHHMFA/CG 7HFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:

O 171350Z JUL 69

FM CG III MAF

TO COMNAVFORV

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM ZUMWALT FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
VIETNAMIZING THE WAR (U)

A. COMNAVFORV 040757Z JUL69

B. COMNAVFORV 070836Z JUL69

C. YR LTR SER: NS/0004-69 OF 6JUL69

D. YR LTR TO COMUSMACV SAME SUBJ OF 29JUN69

E. YR LTR TO COMUSMACV SAME SUBJ OF 11JUL69

1. (TS/LD) REF C AND D PROVIDED MY REPS IN SAIGON, HAVE
HELPED CLARIFY THE RELATIONSHIP OF NAVAL FORCES PRO-PAGE TWO RHHMFA2949 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR
GRAMMED FOR REDEPLOYMENT WITH MARINE FORCES SIMILARLY
PROGRAMMED.2. AS I HAVE STATED BEFORE, ANY DEGRADATION IN NAVY
COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT WHILE MARINES ARE IN ICTZ IS
UNACCEPTABLE. THUS YOUR OPTION A, IN WHICH USARV UNITS
REPLACE NAVY COMMON SUPPORT FORCES IN PHASE 4 IS UN-
ACCEPTABLE.3. REF C SHOWS 1164 NAVY PERSONNEL PHASING OUT FROM NSA DANANG
IN PHASE 3. THAT WOULD APPEAR TO BE AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN
PROPORTION TO THE MARINES DEPLOYING AT THAT TIME ALTHOUGH I
CANNOT VERIFY THAT THIS IS SO. PLEASE CONFIRM.4. RELATED TO THE ABOVE, I BELIEVE THERE ARE 1401 NAVY
PERSONNEL PHASING FROM NSA DANANG IN PHASE 3. THIS TOO
APPEARS IN PROPORTION, HOWEVER, I REQUEST THAT, AS IN PAR 3
ABOVE, YOU AFFIRM THAT PERFORMANCE OF NAVY COMMON SUPPORT
FUNCTIONS FOR ICTZ WILL NOT BE DEGRADED.5. THE CB PHASE DOWN IN PHASE 2 AND PHASE 3 APPEARS TO BE
IN PROPORTION, HOWEVER, ANY AGREEMENT ON MY PART TO PHASE
DOWN CB BN'S IN ICTZ IS PREDICATED ON THE RETENTION OF THESE
BN'S IN ICTZ. UNQUOTE.

GP-1

TDJAI

TE 2949

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

TOP SECRET

[illegible]

Cy#1 in Vietnamese file

15-

TOP SECRET

0 220642Z ZYM
FM CG III MAF
TO CG PMFAC
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

0 181029Z JUL 69

FM COMNAVFORV

TO CG III MAF

INFO COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON INFO RADM
BONNER FROM ZIMWALT

VIETNAMIZING THE WAR (C)

A. YOUR 171350Z JULY 69 NOTAL

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING RESPONDS TO REF A.

2. (TS) NAVY COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT, I CORPS. YOUR VIEWS OF THE COMMON SUPPORT ROLE IN I CTZ ARE UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED. THE MATTER OF NAVY PROVIDING COMMON SUPPORT TO YOUR MARINES IS NOT THE ISSUE. THE ISSUE IS THE NAVY PROVIDING COMMON SUPPORT TO THE ENTIRE I CTZ, A UNIQUE ROLE AND A VERY EXPENSIVE ROLE FOR THE U.S. NAVY. THE U.S. ARMY EVENTUALLY MUST ASSUME THE COMMON SUPPORT FUNCTIONS IN I CTZ. THE TIMING IS THE QUESTION. I MUST CONTINUE TO PERSUE A COURSE THAT WILL RESULT IN A FIRM COMMITMENT FROM USARV ON THE TIMING FOR THE TRANSFER OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY. I WILL DO SO IN A WAY WHICH PERMITS FULL EXPRESSION OF YOUR VIEWS AT ALL TIMES.

3. (TS) CONFIRMATION OF APPROPRIATENESS OF NSAD CUTS, PHASE 3. AS COMPONENT COMMANDER I WAS DIRECTED TO NOMINATE SPECIFIC REDUCTIONS TO MEET A QUOTA ASSIGNED ME BY COMUSMACV TO BE READY TO SUPPORT A PROSPECTIVE NATIONAL POLICY DECISION. AT A MEETING ATTENDED BY YOUR REPRESENTATIVES I RECLAIMED THE SIZE OF NAVY'S QUOTA AND GENERAL ABRAMS MADE AN ADJUSTMENT WHICH REDUCED NAVY'S QUOTA. I HAVE MADE THE SPECIFIC DETERMINATIONS AS TO WHICH NAVAL ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE REDUCED TO FILL THAT QUOTA. I MADE THE BEST JUDGEMENT I COULD AS TO HOW BEST TO APPORTION THESE NUMBERS TO MAINTAIN SUPPORT OF THE WAR. I "JUDGE" THAT THE REDUCTION AT NSAD WILL PERMIT THAT ACTIVITY TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE COMMON SUPPORT FOR I CTZ, IF THE THREAT AND DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY EFFORT REMAINS AS AT PRESENT. BUT I CANNOT "VERIFY" ANYMORE THAN YOU CAN WHETHER THE REMAINING NUMBERS WILL SUPPORT THE SPECIFIC LEVEL OF EFFORT REQUIRED TO MEET THE SPECIFIC THREAT EXISTING AT THE TIME A DECISION TO REDUCE THOSE FORCES IS MADE. IF I AM CONSULTED PRIOR TO THE NEXT DECISION I CAN COME CLOSER TO VERIFYING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THESE NUMBERS FOR THE SITUATION EXISTING AT THAT TIME. I AM HOPEFUL THAT BOTH YOU AND I WILL BE SO CONSULTED.

4. (TS) CONFIRMATION OF APPROPRIATENESS OF NSAD CUTS, PHASE 5 AND CB BNS. ABOVE PHILOSOPHY PERTAINS ONLY MORE SO.

5. (U) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I CANNOT AT THIS TIME CONFIRM ANY OF THE SPECIFIC QUESTION YOU HAVE RAISED IN REF A. HOWEVER, I WILL CONTINUE TO DO MY BEST TO KEEP YOU ADVISED AS THE SITUATION

DEVELOPS. YOUR REGARDS.

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

P 231406Z JUL 69
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC
BT

T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN
BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON/FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING LTR FROM CG III MAF TO COMUSMACV
IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE CG III MAF LTR 38/HMS 3000 SER: 00085569 OF 18 JUL 1969
FROM: COMMANDING GENERAL

TO: COMMANDER, U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

SUBJ: REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING

REF: (A) COMNAVFORV LTR TO COMUSMACV OF 11JUL69

(B) COMNAVFORV 100712Z JUL69

(C) COMNAVFORV MEMO FOR COFS, MACV OF 6JUL69

1. PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFERENCE (A) SUBMITS A PROPOSED PHASED
REDEPLOYMENT OF COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
UNITS MAINLY IN I CORPS. THE PROPOSED REDUCTION IS DEPENDENT
ON THE PHASED REDUCTION OF MARINE CORPS UNITS AND UPON THE
COMMON SUPPORT ROLE SHIFTING FROM U. S. NAVY TO U. S. ARMY

PAGE 2 RHMAFA 3146 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
UNDER TWO OPTIONS.

A. OPTION A - USARV UNITS REPLACE NAVY COMMON SUPPORT
FORCES IN PHASE 4.

B. OPTION B - NAVY COMMON SUPPORT FORCE DEPARTURE COIN-
CIDES WITH MARINE CORPS UNITS.

2. I CANNOT AND DO NOT CONCUR IN OPTION A. I BELIEVE THAT
THE NEAR FUTURE HOLDS SIGNIFICANT CHANGES FOR I CORPS TACTICAL
ZONE WHICH WILL TAX MY CURRENT SUPPORT SYSTEM TO THE MAXIMUM.
REGARDLESS OF THE EXCELLENCE OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE
ARMY OR THE EXCELLENCE OF ANY TURNOVER PLAN DEVELOPED, EXECU-
TION OF SUCH A PLAN WOULD PRODUCE SOME DIMINUTION IN SUPPORT
CAPABILITY IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. CONSIDERING THE MANY
POSSIBILITIES AND ALTERNATIVES WHICH I NOW FACE, I CANNOT
AGREE WITH ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD REDUCE MY CAPABILITIES AT
SUCH A CRITICAL TIME. MY VIEWS ON THIS HAVE BEEN PASSED PRE-
VIOUSLY BY REFERENCE (B).

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU NOT APPROVE OP-
TION A.

4. RELATIVE TO THE ABOVE, REFERENCE (C) INDICATES REDEPLOY-
MENT OF FOUR (4) NAVY MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS IN PHASE

PAGE 3 RHMAFA 3146 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
2 AND 3. THIS REDEPLOYMENT APPEARS TO CONFORM WITH ANTICIPATED
COMMITMENTS AND CAN BE ACCEPTED. HOWEVER, I WOULD ADD THAT
SUCH CONCURRENCE IS PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE RE-
MAINING SIX (6) NAVY MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS WILL REMAIN
IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.

H. NICKERSON, JR.

UNQUOTE
GP-1

BT
3146 MAF 2100/4

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

16/11
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PITTYUW RUMHAFASWP WPTUPPATTIT--RUMLMHA.

ZNY ITTTT

P 240700Z JUL 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN THRASH
FROM LIGEN NICKERSON/ FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:

P 232345Z JUL 69

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO RUMHAF/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN DOOLEY FROM
MGEN WILSON. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 180107Z/JUL69 (S) MGEN

1. (S) REF A ADVISED OF PROPOSED CONFERENCE ON SUBJECT
AT CAMP SMITH ON 28-29 JULY.2. (U) THE CONFERENCE DATES PROPOSED IN REF A ARE CON-
FIRMED.3. (TS) FOR INFORMATION, THE FOLLOWING AGENDA ITEMS
WILL BE DISCUSSED:

A. STATUS OF FORCE REDUCTION PLANNING.

B. FMFPAC FORCE REDUCTION PLANNING OBJECTIVES.

C. DEACTIVATION OF SUB UNIT NR2, HQCO, 26TH

MARINES.

D. III MAF SECOND INCREMENT REDEPLOYMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA3587 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE MCEO
TROOP LIST, TO INCLUDE:

(1) COMPOSITION/EQUIPMENT OF AVAITION
DETACHMENTS.
(2) REDEPLOYMENT PHASING OF SECOND REDEPLOY-
MENT INCREMENT.

(3) PROGRAM SIX STATUS OF PROV MAG-39.

E. MANPOWER CEILINGS FOR OKINAWA/JAPAN.

F. INTERIM WESTPAC POSTURE, PRIOR TO CESSATION
TK HOSTILITIES, UPON EXECUTION OF A SECOND REDEPLOYMENT
INCREMENT, TO INCLUDE.

(1) IMPACT OF USN PERSONNEL WITH REDEPLOYING
USMC UNITS.

(2) RESTORING TO COMBAT CAPABLE STATUS UNITS
REDEPLOYED AT CADRE STRENGTH.

(3) PROPOSED INTERIM WESTPAC TROOP LIST.

(4) REQUIREMENTS AND FINANCIAL IMPACT ON
FY70 PROCUREMENT PROGRAM.

(5) MILCON REQUIREMENTS.

G. FMFPAC POSTURE UPON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
(T-DAY), TO INCLUDE:

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3587 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE MCEO

(1) IMPACT OF MANPOWER CEILING.

(2) PROPOSED WESTPAC/MIDPAC TROOP LIST.

WARM REGARDS.

UNQUOTE:

GP-4

BT

3220

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

OPERATION CODE				FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR				CG III MAF		26 JULY 1969	
A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE			
C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION				260532Z JUL 69		COPY# / OF 3 COPIES RECO	
I- INFORMATION							
S- SIGNATURE							
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
	CG	I	27	July	N	REMARKS	
	DCG					THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED	
	DCG AIR					OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE	
2	C/S	I				ORDER P5511.4.	
	DC/S					THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE	
	DC/S PLAN					SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS	
1	S/S	I	7/27		RH	DOCUMENT.	
	G-1					ORIG: G-3	
	G-2					REL: C/S	
	G-3					EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT	
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP					18 TOP SECRET	
	MTD						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

ZNY TTTT
 O 260532Z JUL 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO COMNAVFORV
 COMSEVENTHFLT
 BT

T O P S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (U)

A. COMUSMACV 241136Z JUL 69

- 1 (U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NGFS.
2. (TS) NGFS IS SELDOM AFFECTED BY WEATHER CONDITIONS. THUS DURING THE MONSOON SEASONS WHEN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IS RESTRICTED, NGF IS FREQUENTLY ONLY FIRE SUPPORT AVAILABLE TO TROOPS. NGF FREQUENTLY CAN STRIKE TARGETS THAT ARE OUT OF RANGE OF OR IN DEFILADE FOR ARTILLERY; FOR EXAMPLE, CA CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO SUPPORT OPERATION DURHAM PEAK FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF STRIKING HARD TARGETS IN THE QUE SON MOUNTAIN AREA WHICH ARE IN DEFILADE FOR ARTILLERY. THUS THERE ARE TIMES WHEN, BECAUSE OF WEATHER, RANGE, OR LOCATION OF TARGETS, NGF IS THE ONLY FIRE SUPPORT WHICH CAN BE EFFECTIVELY DELIVERED. IN ADDITION, CERTAIN HARD TARGETS ARE VULNERABLE ONLY TO THE PENETRATION CAPABILITIES OF NGF.
3. (TS) SUBORDINATE FIELD COMMANDERS' EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NGFS CAN BEST BE INDICATED BY THE FACT THAT REQUIREMENTS SUBMITTED TO THIS HQS CONSISTENTLY EXCEED NGFS AVAILABLE.
4. (TS) ANOTHER IMPORTANT REASON FOR THE RETENTION OF NGFS IS THE FACT THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF RLY-9 WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF 3 BATTERIES OF 105 HOW, 1 BATTERY OF 155 HOW, AND 1 BATTERY OF 107 MORTARS. THE REDUCTION OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT IN THE VITAL DMZ AREA, DICTATES THAT SUPPLEMENTARY FIRE SUPPORT WHICH CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR IMMEDIATELY IN THE EVENT THE ENEMY MOVES ACROSS THE DMZ BE READILY AVAILABLE.
- 5 (TS) ESPECIALLY DURING THE FOURTHCOMING PERIOD OF REDEPLOYMENTS WHEN THE INTENTION OF THE ENEMY IS UNKNOWN, THE IMPORTANCE OF NGFS INCREASES. ITS INHERENT FLEXIBILITY AND MOBILITY GIVES US AN ADVANTAGE WHICH WE CAN ILL AFFORD TO LOSE.
6. (TS) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I STRONGLY URGE THAT THE CURRENT LEVEL OF NGFS NOT ONLY NOT BE REDUCED BUT THAT IT BE ENHANCED BY THE RETURN OF THE BATTLESHIP NEW JERSEY AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE.

GP-1

BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

18/11
TOP SECRET

III MAF 2100/4

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

TOP SECRET

0 290550Z ZYH

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T /EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM
LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOL MSGS ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE:

0 241136Z ZYH ZFF-6 ZFF-3

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON VIETNAM

TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF DA NANG VIETNAM

LTG CORCORAN CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG VIETNAM

LTG EWELL CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH VIETNAM

VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON VIETNAM

MG WETHERILL CG DMAC CAN THO VIETNAM

INFO LTG MILDREN DCGUSARV LONG BINH VIETNAM

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T MAC 9547 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (U)

1. (TS) I HAVE BEEN QUERIED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY AS TO THE VALUE
OF NAVAL SHORE BOMBARDMENT OF TARGETS IN SVN.

2. (C) YOUR SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVENESS
OF NGFS ARE REQUESTED ON A PRIORITY BASIS, FOR INCORPORATION INTO
A RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST.

3. (U) YOUR RESPONSES ARE REQUESTED MLT 261200H JULY.

GP-4

UNQUOTE:

QUOTE:

0 251115Z ZYH ZFF-3 ZFF-6

FM COMNAVFORV

TO GEN ABRAMS, COMUSMACV

INFO LTGEN NICKERSON, CG III MAF

LTG CORCORAN, CG I FFORCEV

LTG EWELL, CG II FFORCEV

MG WETHERILL, CG DMAC

LTG MILDREN, DCG USARV

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (U)

1. (TS) VALUE OF NGFS VARIES AMONG THE FOUR CTZ'S.

I AND II CTZ ARE BORDERED BY RELATIVELY DEEP WATER
ALONG THE COAST PERMITTING NGFS COVERAGE

OUT TO NEAR MAXIMUM GUN RANGES. III AND IV CTZ ARE
GENERALLY BORDERED BY SHALLOW WATER WHICH

LIMITS BOTH EFFECTIVE RANGES AND TARGET AREAS.

HOWEVER, IN ALL NAVIGABLE AREAS NGFS REPRESENTS
A FLEXIBLE MOBILE CAPABILITY WITH LONG STAY TIME
AND IS THUS PARTICULARLY VALUABLE IN APPLYING

FORCE TO TARGETS INACCESSIBLE TO ARTILLERY. I DEFER

TO THE ADDRESSES FOR EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS IN

RESPONSIBILITY.

2. (TS) NGFS HAS FREQUENTLY PLAYED A VITAL ROLE IN THE PROTECTION OF SHIPPING TRANSITING THE RSSZ. PRIOR TO ACQUISITION OF THE VMC ARTILLERY, IT REPRESENTED THE ONLY SURFACE SUPPORTING ARM AVAILABLE. CURRENTLY, NGFS IS COMPLEMENTING OTHER SUPPORTING ARMS IN OUR INCREASED COMBINED EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE SHIPPING ATTACKS. AS PART OF THE VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR EFFORT, CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF NGFS REPRESENTS ONE MEANS OF PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE RVNAF AT A RELATIVELY LOW INVESTMENT OF PERSONNEL AND ZERO INCREASE IN IN-COUNTRY SPACES. ADDITIONALLY, NGFS REPRESENTS A SURGE CAPABILITY OF CONCENTRATED FIREPOWER TO REACT TO ANY INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY ALONG OR NEAR THE SVN COAST, ESPECIALLY AT THE DMZ.

GP-4

UNQUOTE:

QUOTE:

O 260532Z JUL 69

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

INFO COMNAV FORV

COMSEVENTH FLEET

BT

T O P S E C R E T

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (U)

A. COMUSMACV 241136Z JUL 69

1 (U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NGFS.

2. (TS) NGFS IS SELDOM AFFECTED BY WEATHER CONDITIONS. THUS DURING THE MONSOON SEASONS WHEN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IS RESTRICTED, NGF IS FREQUENTLY ONLY FIRE SUPPORT AVAILABLE TO TROOPS. NGF FREQUENTLY CAN STRIKE TARGETS THAT ARE OUT OF RANGE OF OR IN DEFILADE FOR ARTILLERY; FOR EXAMPLE, CA CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO SUPPORT OPERATION DURHAM PEAK FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF STRIKING HARD TARGETS IN THE QUE SON MOUNTAIN AREA WHICH ARE IN DEFILADE FOR ARTILLERY. THUS THERE ARE TIMES WHEN, BECAUSE OF WEATHER, RANGE, OR LOCATION OF TARGETS, NGF IS THE ONLY FIRE SUPPORT WHICH CAN BE EFFECTIVELY DELIVERED: IN ADDITION, CERTAIN HARD TARGETS ARE VULNERABLE ONLY TO THE PENETRATION CAPABILITIES OF NGF.

19/2/

 19/2/

3. (TS) SUBORDINATE FIELD COMMANDERS' EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NGFS CAN BEST BE INDICATED BY THE FACT THAT REQUIREMENTS SUBMITTED TO THIS HQS CONSISTENTLY EXCEED NGFS AVAILABLE.

4. (TS) ANOTHER IMPORTANT REASON FOR THE RETENTION OF NGFS IS THE FACT THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF RLY-9 WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF 3 BATTERIES OF 105 HOW, 1 BATTERY OF 155 HOW, AND 1 BATTERY OF 107 MORTARS. THE REDUCTION OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT IN THE VITAL DMZ AREA, ~~DICTATES THAT SUPPLEMENTARY FIRE SUPPORT~~ WHICH CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR IMMEDIATELY IN THE EVENT THE ENEMY MOVES ACROSS THE DMZ BE READILY AVAILABLE.

5 (TS) ESPECIALLY DURING THE FOURTHCOMING PERIOD OF REDEPLOYMENTS WHEN THE INTENTION OF THE ENEMY IS UNKNOWN, THE IMPORTANCE OF NGFS INCREASES. ITS INHERENT FLEXIBILITY AND MOBILITY GIVES US AN ADVANTAGE WHICH WE CAN ILL AFFORD TO LOSE.

6. (TS) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I STRONGLY URGE THAT THE CURRENT LEVEL OF NGFS NOT ONLY BE REDUCED BUT THAT IT BE ENHANCED BY THE RETURN OF THE BATTLESHIP NEW JERSEY AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE.

GP-1

UNQUOTE:

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION
ONLY - DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS

GP-1

840

19(3)

19(3)

HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 29 JULY 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 290950Z		COPY# 1,2,3 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET EYES ONLY	
			IN	OUT			
	CG			31 JUL 69		REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOS- ITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	2					
	DC / S						
	DC / S PLAN						
1	S/S	I	7/30		9M H 5		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP					<u>HAS BEEN SENT</u>	
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	SBC						

SECRET

0 290950Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
~~TO COMUSMACV~~
INFO CG USARV
ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

VISIT OF COMUSMACV TO XXIV CORPS HQS

A. COMUSMACV 32267, DTG 301105Z MAY69

1. GEN ABRAMS ATTENDED THE CEREMONY HONORING THE DEPARTURE OF RLT NINE FROM COUNTRY AT QUANG TRI ON 25 JULY. UPON COMPLETION OF THE CEREMONY HE PROCEEDED TO CAMP RED DEVIL WHERE HE WAS BRIEFED BY THE STAFF. HE QUERIED THE PROPAGANDA CAPABILITY OF THE ENEMY AND STATED THAT IT WAS A FAILURE AND COULD NOT/WOULD NOT SUCCEED. COMUS WANTED INFORMATION ON SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: SQUAD, PLATOON AND COMPANY, AND THEIR USE OF ARMOR. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE BRIEFING HE WAS SHOWN A QUOTE LOB CLAYMORE UNQUOTE WHICH WAS FOUND NEAR KHE SANH. COMUS ASKED ABOUT THE OPERATIONAL READINESS RATINGS OF TANKS, APC AND 548'S AND WAS TOLD THAT THE RATINGS WERE 95 PERCENT, 98 PERCENT AND 75 PERCENT RESPECTIVELY. HE ALSO DISCUSSED RADAR AND SENSORS AND THEIR USE/EXPLOITATION BY THE 1ST OF THE 5TH. FROM RED DEVIL HE WENT TO CAMP EAGLE WHERE HE HAD LUNCH AND A SHORT G-2/G-3 BRIEF. FROM EAGLE, HE WENT TO FIRE SUPPORT BASE CURRAHEE WITH AN OVERFLY OF ROUTE 547. AT CURRAHEE HE WAS BRIEFED BY COL SIEGRIST, CO 3D BDE AND COL HOA, CO 3D REGT, 1ST ARVN DIV. WHILE AT CURRAHEE GEN ABRAMS SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHETHER THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION WAS RECEIVING ADEQUATE SUPPORT IN B-52 STRIKES. HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE INTELLIGENCE THAT HAD BEEN DEVELOPED AND EMPHASIZED THE REQUIREMENT TO QUOTE DUMP BOMBS ON ENEMY LOCATIONS UNQUOTE. FROM HERE HE PROCEEDED TO 1ST ARVN DIV HQS WHERE HE RECEIVED A G-2/G-3 BRIEFING. HE THEN VISITED FSB BARBARA WHERE HE WAS BRIEFED BY LTCOL DIEM, CO 1ST ARVN REGT. FROM BARBARA HE DEPARTED FOR PHU BAI THEN SAIGON.

5(1)

5(1)

2. GENERAL COMMENTS:

A. COMUSMACV EXPRESSED, THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT, AN INTEREST IN THE VCI. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CASES WHERE VCI WERE BEING REPORTED EITHER BY AGENTS OR BY CITIZENS WITHIN HAMLETS AND VILLAGES. HE INDICATED THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO DENY THE OPPORTUNITY OF NVA POLITICAL ORGANIZERS OR VC TO CONTACT LOCAL CIVILIANS WITH POLITICAL PROPAGANDA.

B. COMUSMACV MADE REFERENCE TO THE ROAD LEADING FROM QUANG TRI TO GIA DANG RESETTLEMENT PROJECT AND EXPRESSED HIS SUPPORT FOR ON-GOING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE ROAD SYSTEM THROUGHOUT THE CORPS AREA AS A STIMULUS FOR THE ECONOMY.

C. GENERAL ABRAMS ALSO PLACED EMPHASIS ON THE REQUIREMENT FOR EVALUATION BY COMMANDERS OF THE SENSOR PROGRAM, INDICATING THAT CONSIDERABLE MONEY HAD BEEN DEVOTED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS SYSTEM. HE DIRECTED THAT A DILIGENT EFFORT BE MADE TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS PRODUCING RESULTS FOR UNITS IN THE FIELD.

D. COMUSMACV DISCUSSED THE NEED TO BRING RVNAF INTO THE ARC LIGHT PICTURE. HE MADE REFERENCE TO BEN HET, INDICATING THAT AN ARVN CAPABILITY TO REQUEST ARC LIGHTS DURING THE SIEGE OF THAT INSTALLATION WOULD HAVE MADE THE PROBLEM EASIER TO RESOLVE. HE STATED THAT HE INTENDED TO DEVELOP PROCEDURES WHEREBY RVNAF WOULD RECEIVE B-52 SUPPORT IN THE FUTURE.

5(2)

5(3)

E. DURING THE FLIGHT TO THE HUE CITADEL, GENERAL ABRAMS DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR US FORCES TO RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR PRIMARY ROLE IS THE PROTECTION OF THE POPULACE AND THAT ALL OF OUR ACTIONS, WHEREVER THEY TAKE PLACE, ARE DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION. HE STATED THAT HE WANTS MILITARY COMMANDERS TO DESCRIBE THEIR ACTIVITIES ALONG THIS GENERAL LINE, WITH EACH ACTIVITY BEING RELATED TO THE REQUIREMENT TO PACIFY THE COUNTRY SIDE.

F. IN DISCUSSIONS NEAR THE END OF THE VISIT, COMUSMACV EMPHASIZED THE REQUIREMENT FOR A COMBINED EFFORT, TO INCLUDE THE EFFECTIVE USE OF RF, PF, POLICE, AND ARVN -- ALL WORKING TOGETHER TOWARD A COMMON GOAL. RESPONDING TO GENERAL LAM'S STATEMENT THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO HAVE ALL AT THE SAME TIME, GENERAL ABRAMS INDICATED THAT THIS SHOULD BE A GOAL FOR WHICH WE AIM.

3. GEN ZAIS, BEING PRESENT DURING THE VISIT, HAS INITIATED ACTION TO ASSURE THAT EACH OF THE AFOREMENTIONED EXPRESSIONS OF POLICY ARE BEING ADDRESSED AT BOTH COMMAND AND STAFF LEVEL. I WILL PASS THIS MESSAGE TO MY OTHER MAJOR COMMANDERS FOR SIMILAR IMPLEMENTATION.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION
ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

711

5(3)

5(3)

O 291155Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/DEP CORDS ICTZ
 CG FIRST MAW
 CG AMERICAL DIV
 ZEN/DSA I CORPS
 INFO CG XXIV CORPS
 ZEM

SECRET/EYES ONLY/FOR MGEN SIMPSON, MR. FIRFER,
 MGEN THRASH, MGEN RAMSEY AND COL RENWANZ, INFO LTGEN ZAIS
 FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
 YOUR ATTENTION IS INVITED TO PAR 3 FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.
 O 290950Z

FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO CG USARV
 ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY
 VISIT OF COMUSMACV TO XXIV CORPS HQS
 A. COMUSMACV 32267, DTG 301105Z MAY69
 1. GEN ABRAMS ATTENDED THE CEREMONY HONORING THE DEPARTURE
 OF RLT NINE FROM COUNTRY AT QUANG TRI ON 25 JULY. UPON
 COMPLETION OF THE CEREMONY HE PROCEEDED TO CAMP RED DEVIL
 WHERE HE WAS BRIEFED BY THE STAFF. HE QUERIED THE
 PROPAGANDA CAPABILITY OF THE ENEMY AND STATED THAT IT WAS
 A FAILURE AND COULD NOT/WOULD NOT SUCCEED. COMUS WANTED
 INFORMATION ON SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: SQUAD, PLATOON
 AND COMPANY, AND THEIR USE OF ARMOR. AT THE CONCLUSION
 OF THE BRIEFING HE WAS SHOWN A QUOTE LOB CLAYMORE UNQUOTE
 WHICH WAS FOUND NEAR KHE SANH. COMUS ASKED ABOUT THE
 OPERATIONAL READINESS RATINGS OF TANKS, APC AND 548'S AND
 WAS TOLD THAT THE RATINGS WERE 95 PERCENT, 98 PERCENT
 AND 75 PERCENT RESPECTIVELY. HE ALSO DISCUSSED RADAR AND
 SENSORS AND THEIR USE/EXPLOITATION BY THE 1ST OF THE 5TH.
 FROM RED DEVIL HE WENT TO CAMP EAGLE WHERE HE HAD LUNCH
 AND A SHORT G-2/G-3 BRIEF. FROM EAGLE, HE WENT
 TO FIRE SUPPORT BASE CURRAHEE WITH AN OVERFLY OF
 ROUTE 547. AT CURRAHEE HE WAS BRIEFED BY COL SIEGRIST, CO 3D
 BDE AND COL HOA, CO 3D REGT, 1ST ARVN DIV. WHILE AT CURRAHEE
 GEN ABRAMS SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHETHER THE 101ST AIRBORNE
 DIVISION WAS RECEIVING ADEQUATE SUPPORT IN B-52 STRIKES.
 HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE INTELLIGENCE
 THAT HAD BEEN DEVELOPED AND EMPHASIZED THE REQUIREMENT
 TO QUOTE DUMP BOMBS ON ENEMY LOCATIONS UNQUOTE. FROM HERE
 HE PROCEEDED TO 1ST ARVN DIV HQS WHERE HE RECEIVED A
 G-2/G-3 BRIEFING. HE THEN VISITED FSB BARBARA WHERE
 HE WAS BRIEFED BY LT COL DIEM, CO 1ST ARVN
 REGT. FROM BARBARA HE DEPARTED FOR PHU BAI THEN SAIGON.

2. GENERAL COMMENTS:

A. COMUSMACV EXPRESSED, THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT, AN INTEREST IN THE VCI. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CASES WHERE VCI WERE BEING REPORTED EITHER BY AGENTS OR BY CITIZENS WITHIN HAMLETS AND VILLAGES. HE INDICATED THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO DENY THE OPPORTUNITY OF NVA POLITICAL ORGANIZERS OR VC TO CONTACT LOCAL CIVILIANS WITH POLITICAL PROPAGANDA.

B. COMUSMACV MADE REFERENCE TO THE ROAD LEADING FROM QUANG TRI TO GIA DANG RESETTLEMENT PROJECT AND EXPRESSED HIS SUPPORT FOR ON-GOING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE ROAD SYSTEM THROUGHOUT THE CORPS AREA AS A STIMULUS FOR THE ECONOMY.

C. GENERAL ABRAMS ALSO PLACED EMPHASIS ON THE REQUIREMENT FOR EVALUATION BY COMMANDERS OF THE SENSOR PROGRAM, INDICATING THAT CONSIDERABLE MONEY HAD BEEN DEVOTED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS SYSTEM. HE DIRECTED THAT A DILIGENT EFFORT BE MADE TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS PRODUCING RESULTS FOR UNITS IN THE FIELD.

D. COMUSMACV DISCUSSED THE NEED TO BRING RVNAF INTO THE ARC LIGHT PICTURE. HE MADE REFERENCE TO BEN HET, INDICATING THAT AN ARVN CAPABILITY TO REQUEST ARC LIGHTS DURING THE SIEGE OF THAT INSTALLATION WOULD HAVE MADE THE PROBLEM EASIER TO RESOLVE. HE STATED THAT HE INTENDED TO DEVELOP PROCEDURES WHEREBY RVNAF WOULD RECEIVE B-52 SUPPORT IN THE FUTURE.

E. DURING THE FLIGHT TO THE HUE CITADEL, GENERAL ABRAMS DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR US FORCES TO RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR PRIMARY ROLE IS THE PROTECTION OF THE POPULACE AND THAT ALL OF OUR ACTIONS, WHEREVER THEY TAKE PLACE, ARE DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION. HE STATED THAT HE WANTS MILITARY COMMANDERS TO DESCRIBE THEIR ACTIVITIES ALONG THIS GENERAL LINE, WITH EACH ACTIVITY BEING RELATED TO THE REQUIREMENT TO PACIFY THE COUNTRY SIDE.

F. IN DISCUSSIONS NEAR THE END OF THE VISIT, COMUSMACV EMPHASIZED THE REQUIREMENT FOR A COMBINED EFFORT, TO INCLUDE THE EFFECTIVE USE OF RF, PF, POLICE, AND ARVN -- ALL WORKING TOGETHER TOWARD A COMMON GOAL. RESPONDING TO GENERAL LAM'S STATEMENT THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO HAVE ALL AT THE SAME TIME, GENERAL ABRAMS INDICATED THAT THIS SHOULD BE A GOAL FOR WHICH WE AIM.

3. GEN ZAIS, BEING PRESENT DURING THE VISIT, HAS INITIATED ACTION TO ASSURE THAT EACH OF THE AFOREMENTIONED EXPRESSIONS OF POLICY ARE BEING ADDRESSED AT BOTH COMMAND AND STAFF LEVEL. I WILL PASS THIS MESSAGE TO MY OTHER MAJOR COMMANDERS FOR SIMILAR IMPLEMENTATION.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. 612

IIIAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

DECLASSIFIED

P 300615Z
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEM

HAS BEEN SENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
NOTIFICATION OF VIP VISITS TO ICTZ
A. CG III MAF 150522Z MAY69

1. IN REF A I DISCUSSED PROBLEMS WHICH CONCERNED LACK OF NOTIFICATION OF VISITS OF DISTINGUISHED PERSONAGES TO I CORPS. THE MESSAGE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO VISITS SCHEDULED BY AMB COLBY'S OFFICE.

2. AT 1700H ON 29 JULY MR. MCNAMARA (FSO-4), AMERICAN CONSUL, DANANG, VISITED MY AIDE AND INFORMED HIM THAT MR. AND MRS. NEIL STAEBLER WOULD BE ARRIVING IN I CORPS ON THE EVENING OF 31 JULY. MR. MCNAMARA SUGGESTED THAT I HOST A DINNER FOR THEM ON THAT EVENING AND THAT THE STAEBLERS CALL ON GEN LAM THE FOLLOWING MORNING. THE PARTY WOULD BE IN I CORPS THROUGH SATURDAY AFTERNOON AND MR. MCNAMARA HAD PREPARED A SUGGESTED ITINERARY WHICH INCLUDED VISITS TO VARIOUS POLITICAL PERSONAGES AND INCLUDED GENERAL LAM.

MR. MCNAMARA RECEIVED HIS INFORMATION FROM MR. THORN FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN SAIGON. APPARENTLY, THE STAEBLERS ARE UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE EMBASSY.

3. I KNOW VERY LITTLE ABOUT MR. STAEBLER, EXCEPT THAT HE IS A MEMBER OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, WAS A FORMER THREE-TERM CONGRESSMAN FROM MICHIGAN, WAS AN UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR AND IS A MEMBER OF THE LIBERAL WING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. WHAT FUNCTIONS HE IS NOW PERFORMING OR WHAT THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT IS, IS NOT KNOWN TO ME, NOR DO I KNOW IF COMUS HAS ANY PARTICULAR DESIRES ONE WAY OR THE OTHER REGARDING THE STAEBLERS. MR. MCNAMARA STATES THAT THEIR PRINCIPAL INTEREST IS POLITICAL MOBILIZATION.

4. I AM MOST DESIROUS OF PERFORMING THE APPROPRIATE ATTENITIES TO THE APPROPRIATE PEOPLE AND I CAN UNDERSTAND WHERE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD DICTATE AN OCCASIONAL SHORT NOTICE. HOWEVER, I DO NOT HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS PROPER IN THE CASE OF MR. STAEBLER.

5. IN REF A I STATED THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO US IF THESE VISITS WERE SCHEDULED BY YOUR PROTOCOL OFFICE THE SAME WAS AS IS DONE WITH ALL OTHER IMPORTANT VISITORS: I WOULD HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE DESIRES OF COMUS AND WOULD BE IN A POSITION OF INSURING THAT THEY WERE CARRIED OUT. INFORMATION CONCERNING SECURITY CLEARANCES, PERMISSION TO TRAVEL BY GOVT AIR, ETC., WOULD BE PROVIDED AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE. IF YOU CAN GIVE ME ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING MR. STAEBLER, I WOULD APPRECIATE IT. AND IF YOU CAN TAKE STEPS TO GET THIS IN THE PROPER CHANNELS IN THE FUTURE, I WOULD APPRECIATE THAT ALSO.

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

CONFIDENTIAL

P 30065 Z
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FIRST MARDIV
ZEM

HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN SIMPSON FROM LT GEN
NICKERSON


SUBJ: BRIEFING AT 7TH MARINES ON 29 JULY 1969

1. I BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY THAT I COMMENT UPON
THE CONTENT AND TENOR OF THE BRIEFING WHICH WAS
GIVEN TO CG FMFPAC ON THE OCCASION OF HIS VISIT
TO THE 7TH MARINES ON 29 JULY. I BELIEVE THAT THE
BRIEFING PRESENTED INFORMATION TO CG FMFPAC THAT
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRESENTED WITHOUT MY PRIOR
KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT. CRITICISM OF COMMAND POLICIES
OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION AND III MAF WAS IMPLICIT
IN THE CONDUCT OF THE BRIEFING. THE BRIEFING CON-
TAINED INFORMATION AND PROPOSALS WHICH MORE APPROPRIATELY
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AIRD AT THAT TIME OR PLACE.

2. THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION OF
THE RF/PF AND THEIR PLACE IN THE OPERATIONAL SPECTRUM
CONCERNED MATTERS WHICH MORE APPROPRIATELY SHOULD BE
TAKEN CARE OF BY LOCAL ACTION RATHER THAN DISCUSSION WITH
HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

3. I WAS NOT PLEASED WITH THE CONDUCT OF THE BRIEFING
NOR WAS I PLEASED THAT THE CO, 7TH MARINES PERSISTED IN
PRESENTING INFORMATION WHEN DISCRETION DICTATED
OTHERWISE. IT WAS MADE QUITE CLEAR ON MORE THAN ONE
OCCASION THAT I DID NOT AGREE AND WAS NOT IN FULL
SUPPORT OF THE PROGRAM. I WOULD ADVISE YOU TO TAKE
APPROPRIATE STEPS TO INSURE THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES
DO NOT REOCCUR.

GP-4
240



HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

8(1)

NNNN

8(1)