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III MAF PIR 30-69 thru 38-69, 20 Jul - 20 Sep 1969

PIR 30-69, 20-26 Jul 69. Dtd 23 Jul 69. (S&C 911 723 #2)

PIR 31-69, 27 Jul-2 Aug 69. Dtd 5 Aug 69. (S&C 912 196#2)

PIR 32-69, 3-9 Aug 69. Dtd 12 Aug 69. (S&C 912 523 #2)

PIR 33-69, 10-16 Aug 69. Dtd 19 Aug 69. (S&C 912 908)

PIR 34-69, 17-23 Aug 69. Dtd 26 Aug 1969. (S&C 913 279)

PIR 35-69, 29-30 Aug 69. Dtd 2 Sep 69. (S&C 913 628#2)

PIR 36-69, 31 Aug - 6 Sep 69. Dtd 9 Sep 69. (S&C 913 917 #2)

PIR 37-69, 7-13 Sep 69. Dtd 16 Sep 69. (S&C 914 376#2)

PIR 38-69, 14-20 Sep 69. Dtd 23 Sep 69. (S&C 914 743 #2)

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

UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 30-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE



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GROUP - 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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G-3 911723#2

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G-2 Section
DANANG, RVN
22 July 1969
Ser: 089569

PERINTREP 30-69

Period covered: 200001H July - 262400H July 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. The lull in enemy initiated activity, which was first noted during the week of 22-28 June, is now in its fifth week. There were 274 enemy initiated ground incidents during the week. Of these, there were only two company size or larger ground attacks recorded. Assaults by fire were down to seven from last week's ten and the number of incidents of harassing fire dropped off to 149, well below the weekly average of 194 for the past two months. The lull was also reflected in the amount of incoming fire experienced with 708 rounds recorded for the week. The number of enemy KIA's also was relatively low with 897 reported.

With minor exceptions, the level of reported counterintelligence related activity during the week was essentially unchanged from the previous period. Although political meetings and related activity have been reported in QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces, a decrease in other activity, including terrorism, has been recently noted in these provinces. It is believed that this activity pattern reflects a transitional phase towards more politically-oriented programs which will emphasize political and propaganda activity with a corresponding deescalation of terrorism. THUA THIEN (P), on the other hand, continues to experience relatively high levels of activity as the Viet Cong apparatus is attempting to reassert its influence in the coastal lowlands. Throughout the I Corps area continued emphasis is being placed on consolidation of Viet Cong controlled areas, defeat of GVN pacification programs, and the weakening and demoralization of the GVN rural administration through terrorism and anti-GVN propaganda. While the sapper threat continues in DANANG, continued actions by National Police and MSS have apparently been effective, both in the detection and apprehension of the terrorists, thereby disrupting any intended VC plans for an organized terrorist campaign within the city. However, VC terrorist attacks have been noted in both QUANG NAM and THUA THIEN Provinces with key targets continuing to be National Police, local GVN administrators, and pacification assets.

a. QUANG TRI (P). During the reporting period sightings/incidents increased to 230 with 61 of these sightings north of the BEN HAI River. A total of 157 hostile targets were taken under fire this week by artillery, tactical air strikes and naval gunfire.

There were two light attacks by fire emanating from the southern half

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of the DMZ resulting in no casualties or damage. The first occurred when M/3/3 Marines six and one-half kilometers west of GIO LINH (YD 148 735) received eight rounds of 82mm mortar fire on 21 July. The second attack was again directed against M/3/3 Marines six kilometers west northwest of GIO LINH (YD 155744). The Marine unit received 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on 23 July.

Enemy initiated activity in QUANG TRI (P) was relatively light and consisted of two indirect fire attacks and one ground attack. The ground attack occurred on 20 July when an outpost of the 915th RF Company at NHAT LE four kilometers west northwest of DONG HA (YD 202615) received 100 rounds of 82mm mortar fire followed by a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force. The attacking force identified as elements of the 27th Battalion, 31st Group, suffered 25 killed with light friendly casualties. Also in the northeastern portion of the province, 5/2 ARVN two kilometers west of GIO LINH (YD 190729) received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. One other attack by fire occurred on 24 July when I/3/3 Marines seven kilometers north northwest of CAM LO (YD 091653) received 70 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in light friendly casualties.

During the week a series of contacts occurred in southern QUANG TRI (P) as a result of ARVN operations southeast of CA LU. On 20 July, 1/1 ARVN while on a search and clear operation 25 kilometers southeast of CA LU (YD 172268) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The ARVN killed 25 NVA and captured two PW's who were identified as members of the 7th Front. Searching further, the ARVN found a hospital complex consisting of 50 huts. Contacts continued through the 22nd with the ARVN finding 118 enemy bodies approximately two months old buried in the general area of the engagements. At the week's end, the exploitation of this area had resulted in 63 confirmed KIA's and four prisoners of war, all of whom were from the 7th Front.

b. THUA THIEN (P). Enemy initiated activity in THUA THIEN (P) with the exception of a few scattered attacks by fire was generally confined to the western reaches of the province contiguous to QUANG TRI (P) and Base Area 611.

On 24 July 3/1 ARVN, 26 kilometers southeast of CA LU (YD 253290) was attacked by an estimated enemy company. The attacking force identified by a PW as elements of the K.10 Sapper Battalion suffered 21 killed. This action appears related to the 1/1 ARVN contacts southeast of CA LU just across the border in QUANG TRI (P). That the enemy was sensitive to intrusions in this area is reflected in this sapper attack against 3/1. Ordinarily, sapper attacks are conducted after detailed preparation and reconnaissance of the objective. The abortive attack on 3/1 gave every appearance of being hastily developed and executed, possibly designed to discourage further friendly incursions.

To the south on 26 July, A/1/506th Infantry nine kilometers southwest of A LUOI (YC 318939) received a ground attack from an estimated two enemy platoons using satchel charges. Sixteen enemy were killed in this

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attack. In the same general area on 20 July, C and D/2/506th Infantry five and one-half kilometers southwest of A LUOI (YC 335975) received RPG's, automatic weapons fire, small arms fire and grenades from an unknown size enemy force. On 22 July, twenty-seven enemy bodies were also found buried six kilometers west southwest of A LUOI attesting to recent heavy fighting in this area in the past month.

Elsewhere in the province, enemy initiated activity manifested itself in the form of attacks by fire in the vicinity of HUE and Camp EVANS. Attacks occurred on 21 July and 24 July when DONG DA Training Center and PHU LANG in the vicinity of HUE (YD 874157) received eight 122mm rockets on the 21st and two on the 24th resulting in light casualties and damage. This represented the sixth and seventh rocket attacks on DONG DA during the past two months. There have been more than 75 casualties resulting from these attacks including 11 killed in action. DONG DA is the only National Military Training Center in I Corps. It is possible that the apparent concentration by the enemy on DONG DA is for the purpose of illustrating to ARVN trainees that the GVN is unable to protect them during basic training. In the Camp EVANS area on 22 July, the 206th RF Company and 34th RD Team at PHONG DIEN two and one-half kilometers north northwest of Camp EVANS (YD 529345) received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and nine RPG rounds resulting in light casualties. HUE City also received two 122mm rockets on the 27th resulting in no casualties or damage.

The most significant intelligence of the week in THUA THIEN (P) resulted from information elicited from a prisoner captured one kilometer south of DONG AP BIA (YD 3297). This PW stated that he was a member of the 9th Battalion, 29th NVA Regiment and confirmed information previously held that only the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 29th participated in the battle for HILL 937. His battalion, having arrived late, was not involved. This is the first identified contact with the 29th NVA Regiment in more than a month. The weight of the evidence collected in the central A SHAU in recent weeks indicated that the 29th had been withdrawn and replaced by the 803rd. Based on this PW interrogation, it is apparent that at least one battalion of the 29th Regiment remains in the vicinity of the LAOS/VIETNAM border area. It is our present assessment that elements of both the 803rd and the 29th Regiments are currently operating in Base Area 611 in the vicinity of DONG AP BIA.

c. <u>QUANG NAM (P)</u>. Enemy initiated activity in QUANG NAM (P) was confined to the DANANG TAOR and the ROK Marines' AO. This activity manifested itself in the form of indirect fire attacks northwest of AN HOA and ambushes in the DURHAM PEAK AO of the southern DANANG TAOR and the ROK Marines' AO. Early in the reporting period, contact in the DURHAM PEAK AO was light with only one prisoner captured. He identified his unit as the 1st Battalion of the 68B Rocket/Artillery Regiment. With the introduction of additional 1st Marine Division elements into this reported enemy base area, resistance stiffened. On 26 July a platoon from H/2/1 Marine Regiment, fourteen kilometers east southeast

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of AN HOA (AT 980430) was ambushed by an estimated enemy platoon employing small arms fire, RPG's and grenades. The first medevac helicopter into the area also came under fire and was shot down. This activity could be a harbinger of future heavy contact in this area.

To the northeast in the ROK Marine AO, a 9th Engineer road sweep team on Route 1, seven kilometers southeast of DIEN BAN (BT 102515), received small arms fire on 21 July. The team returned fire and moved to a village. In the village the sweep team received 60 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. The 71st PF platoon and RD cadre in the vicinity of the village were ambushed enroute to aid the engineers. During the PF ambush a civilian bus drove into the ambush site, hit a mine and received three RPG rounds. Friendly casualties were 11 killed and 12 wounded. In this same general area the ROK Marines killed 47 enemy in four separate contacts during the week.

In other developments northwest of AN HOA attacks by fire were directed against elements of the 7th Marines. On 24 July, B/1/7 Marines three kilometers northwest of AN HOA (AT 817468) received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 10-15 CHICOM grenades resulting in light casualties. Early the next morning, K/3/7 Marines 10 kilometers north northwest of AN HOA (AT 805550) received 10 rounds of mixed 60/82mm mortar fire. The area of the suspected launch site was swept at first light. A fire fight ensued and the Marines killed 12 of the enemy. At the same time I/3/7 Marines 11 kilometers north northwest of AN HOA (AT 842562) received 40 rounds of mixed 60/82mm mortar fire. Three hours later, I Company received 10 more rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Neither attack by fire resulted in any friendly casualties.

Slightly north of these attacks by fire the HIEU DUC-TUY LOAN-DAI LA Pass area continues to be an area of specific intelligence interest. Agent reports continue to be received indicating enemy activity in the mountains to the west southwest of HIEU DUC. Also, the 1st Marine Division reported a sighting of 100 men in this area on the night of the 26th.

Elsewhere in the southern DANANG TAOR, a CH-46 helicopter received small arms fire while landing. The helo crashed and burned in ANTENNA Valley 13 kilometers southeast of AN HOA (AT 934364).

d. QUANG TIN (P). Enemy initiated activity in QUANG TIN (P) was extremely light during the week with no significant contacts reported.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Enemy initiated activity in QUANG NGAI (P) was also extremely light with one attack by fire recorded in the vicinity of DUC PHO. The remaining activity was confined to small unit engagements in the southeastern quadrant and in the piedmont region. The one attack by fire occurred on 20 July when B/3/1st Infantry eight kilometers west northwest of DUC PHO (BS 738415) received 38 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in no casualties or damage.

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f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. Throughout ICTZ there are no indications that the enemy intends to change his tactics or significantly increase the level of his offensive activity. The enemy remains quiescent along the DMZ apparently content to limit his operations for the present to attacks by fire and an occasional ground probe. In THUA THIEN (P), the previous week's flurry of activity in the eastern sector of this province was not repeated. However, west of the A SHAU Valley the enemy continues to show signs of resisting incursions in the vicinity of the LAOTIAN border area. In QUANG NAM (P), the initiative remains with ARVN and FWMAF as pressure continues to be brought to bear against an enemy force which has been driven southwestward by Operations PIPESTONE CANYON and DURHAM PEAK. Southward all indications point to a continued low level of enemy activity in QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces.

It is estimated that if there is any increase in the tempo of combat operations in ICTZ during the coming week, it will most probably result from friendly initiated operations either in western THUA THIEN (P) in the vicinity of the LAOTIAN border, in the QUE SON Mountain area, or in northeastern QUANG NGAI (P) where the Americal, ARVN and SLF are participating in a combined operation between QUANG NGAI City and CHU LAI. The single exception to this estimate is the possibility of renewed enemy initiated activity in the HIEU DUC-DAI LA Pass area of QUANG NAM Province.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents decreased from 310 to 274 for the week of 20-26 July. These incidents consisted of three ground attacks, two being company size or larger and one platoon size or smaller, two ambushes, seven attacks by fire, 149 harassing fire incidents, 61 mining and booby trap incidents, 10 hamlet harassment incidents, two assassination incidents, 12 espionage incidents, eight kidnapping incidents, 19 propaganda incidents and one sabotage incidents.

a. Strength and Disposition. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserve Reinforcement. Annex A.

d - g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire decreased from 163 to 123 for the reporting period and 33 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative.

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 20-26 July:

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Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	376
60mm Mortar	278
Unk Cal Mortar	22
105mm Artillery	4
122mm Rocket	13
Unk Cal Rocket	15
TOTAL	708

1. - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance. There were 73 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 20-26 July. These long-range patrols reported 27 sightings and six contacts totaling 220 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of four enemy KIA.

s. Captured Enemy Caches.

(1) The following significant cache was captured in the ICTZ during the period 13-19 July:

(a) 19 July: A/1/20th Infantry located a rice cache nine kilometers south of MO DUC (BS 745456) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
9,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was discovered in open terrain and was contained in bags within several huts. The bags were concealed under haystacks with some buried underground. The condition of the rice was good. No further information was available on this cache.

(2) The following significant caches were captured in the ICTZ during the period 20-26 July:

(a) 20 July: A/1/20th Infantry while operating nine kilometers south southwest of MO DUC (BS 738459) located a rice cache as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
5,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was located in several huts with some of the rice concealed under haystacks and some underground; plastic covers were used as tarpaulins in both instances. The quality of the rice was good. No further information was available on this cache.

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(b) 20 July: Elements of 1/1 ARVN while on a search and clear operation 25 kilometers southeast of CA LU (YD 172268) located an ordnance and food cache as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
4,400 LBS	UNK	Rice
1,100 LBS	UNK	Salt
30 EA	UNK	Packets of Medicine
105 EA	UNK	Uniforms
2,000 EA	UNK	Small Arms Ammunition
100 EA	UNK	B-40 Rounds
200 EA	UNK	60/82mm Mortar Rounds

This cache was located in various huts near a hospital complex. No further information was available on this cache.

(c) 22 July: L/3/9 Marines while operating 10 kilometers north northeast of KHE SANH (XD 896503) discovered an ordnance cache as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
221 EA	UNK	82mm Mortar Rounds
17 EA	UNK	60mm Mortar Rounds
36 EA	UNK	82mm RR Rounds
51 EA	UNK	RPG Rounds
500 LBS	UNK	TNT
Undetermined	UNK	Miscellaneous Small Arms Ammunition
8,000 EA	UNK	50 Cal MG Rounds
900 EA	UNK	7.62 Small Arms Ammunition

This cache was located in a bunker complex consisting of 35 bunkers and four mortar pits. It was estimated that this cache has been established for approximately three months. No further information on this cache was available.

(3) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 20-26 July:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery and Rocket Ammunition.

Type	Amount
120mm Mortar	22
82mm Mortar	512
81mm Mortar	34
60mm Mortar	476
175mm Artillery	1

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Type	Amount
155mm Artillery	1
105mm Artillery	15
8" Howitzer	1
82mm RR	36
75mm RR	41
57mm RR	5
TOTAL	1,144

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured.

Individual Weapons	325
Crew-Served Weapons	49

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 20-26 July:

Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
20 Jul	(BS 355162)	70	5th SFGA
20 Jul	(BT 133232)	500	Recon/3/1
20 Jul	(BS 578826)	300	D/1/52
20 Jul	(BS 738459)	5,000	A/1/20
20 Jul	(BS 720410)	2,000	D/3/1
20 Jul	(YD 172268)	4,400	1/1 ARVN
20 Jul	(YD 172268)	1,200 Salt	1/1 ARVN
21 Jul	(AT 908222)	1,700	A/4/31
21 Jul	(BT 167581)	400	CAP
21 Jul	(YC 405881)	50	RCN/1/506
21 Jul	(YC 335973)	100	D/2/506
22 Jul	(BS 545417)	440	5th SFGA
23 Jul	(BS 571758)	40	C/1/52
23 Jul	(BS 491806)	850	B/1/52
23 Jul	(BS 491806)	100 Food	B/1/52
23 Jul	(AT 956424)	40	I/3/5
23 Jul	(AT 961433)	2,000	I/3/5
23 Jul	(AT 961433)	8 Cans mackerel	I/3/5
23 Jul	(AT 961433)	5 Salt	I/3/5
24 Jul	(AT 914535)	3,000	1/1 ARVN
24 Jul	(AT 814483)	300	H&S/1/7
24 Jul	(AT 956432)	40	I/3/5
24 Jul	(BT 274053)	1,000	C/1/501
25 Jul	(BS 499804)	8,145	B/1/2
25 Jul	(BT 205122)	150	B/1/502
25 Jul	(BT 205122)	50 Tobacco	B/1/502
25 Jul	(YD 254546)	30 Food	A/1/61
26 Jul	(YD 905110)	100	CAP
26 Jul	(AT 827472)	200	D/1/7
26 Jul	(AT 827472)	10 Salt	D/1/7

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Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
26 Jul	(AT 824486)	140	C/1/7
26 Jul	(AT 963300)	900	B/4/31
26 Jul	(AT 961399)	800	L/3/5
26 Jul	(BS 707860)	200	D/5/46
26 Jul	(BS 707860)	400 Food	D/5/46
26 Jul	(BS 707860)	25 Salt	D/5/46
26 Jul	(BS 707865)	500	D/5/46
	Total Rice	33,365	
	Total Food	530	
	Total Salt	1,240	
	Cans of Mackeral	8	
	Tobacco	50	

Correction to PIR 29-69: 14 Jul (BS 492808) 6,000 should be 6,075; 16 Jul (BS 737458) 20,000 should be 16,000; change total rice to 43,500.

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	237	Structures Damaged	68
Bunkers Destroyed	320	Bunkers Damaged	53
Secondary Explosions	56	Secondary Fires	40
Rocket Launchers Destroyed	6		

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative.

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Ratio of enemy losses to friendly forces in ICTZ increased in comparison to the previous week. There were 897 KIA's, 42 VC PW's and seven NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative.

h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather.

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(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period.

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	98	93	99	96
Low	77	76	75	76
Rainfall (total)	.72	.69	1.11	.91
Winds (knots)	7	4	6	4
Visibility (miles)	7	7	10	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 27 July-2 August 1969.

General: During the first two days of the period, cloud cover and convective activity over all corps areas will be normal to slightly less than normal. Low level southwesterly winds will increase on 28 and 29 July bringing increased cloudiness and occasional gusty surface winds out of the west to most of the Republic of Vietnam. There will be an increase in shower activity, particularly in the western mountain regions. Weather conditions will gradually return to normal during the remainder of the period with lingering light shower activity and some cloudiness.

ICTZ Forecast: The outlook for the ICTZ area for the forecasting period is partly cloudy to cloudy with some patchy stratus and fog in the mornings. Shower activity will be isolated during the first few days of the period, increasing to a few scattered showers along with occasional periods of light rain during the remainder of the week. Visibility will be mostly unrestricted except two to four miles in showers and patches of valley fog. Winds will occasionally gust at speeds of 25-35 knots in exposed east-west valleys. Precipitation will be 0.5-1.5 inches with isolated instances of 1.5-2.5 inches.

j. - 1. Negative.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

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c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following course of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/ areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to five infantry regiment equivalents, supported by the equivalent of one naval sapper battalion, three artillery regiments and possible armor units.

(2) Attack VANDEGRIFT Combat Base with one infantry regiment supported by one sapper battalion and one artillery battalion.

(3) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(5) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with up to five infantry regiments, supported by four rocket battalions, one sapper battalion and one engineer battalion.

(6) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division equivalent, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/ rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(8) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to seven infantry regiment equivalents.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM'S from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

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i. Vulnerabilities.

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield, sickness, hunger, shortage of ammunition and medical supplies and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ANNEX D - AUGUST WEATHER BRIEF

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CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	5
CG I FFORCEV	5
CG II FFORCEV	1
COMNAVFORV	1
CG 1ST MAR DIV	60
CG 3RD MAR DIV	35
CG 82ND ABN	2
CG AMERICAL DIV	30
CG 101ST ABN DIV	20
CG 1ST MAW	30
CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CG USASUPCOM DANANG	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SAIGON	3
CG 173RD ABN BDE	2
CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7
CG FLC	5
CG 1ST LOG CMD LONG BINH	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1
CO 30 NCR	1
CIB	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTG 79.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 76.4	1
CTF 76	1
CO DASC ATTN: AVCA-GN-DN-OP	2
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	3
CO "B" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	5
CO "C" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	13
1ST CAG	1
2ND CAG	1
3RD CAG	1
4TH CAG	1
7 AF (IGS) BDOC	1
45TH ENGR GROUP	1
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	1
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	1
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1
CO 517TH MI DET	1
CO 3RD MP BN	1
CO 8TH RR FS	1
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHU LAI	4
CO MCB 5	1
CO MCB 3	1
CO MCB 4	1
CO MCB 6	1
CO MCB 7	1
CO MCB 8	1
CO MCB 9	1
CO MCB 10	1
CO MCB 11	1
CTG 115.1	1
CO MCB 40	1
CO MCB 53	1
CO MCB 58	1
CO MCB 62	1
CO MCB 71	1
CO MCB 121	1
OSA/EMB SAIGON ATTN: RAS	1
DODSPECREP	1
DSA I CORPS	11
DSA II CORPS	1
MCB 128	1
DET B 1ST MIBARS	1
366 TAC FIGHTER WING, USAF	1
COMM 7TH PLT	1
366 AIR SECURITY SQD, USAF	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1
7TH PSYOPS BN	1
CICV	4
III MAF LNO 2ND ROKMC BDE	1
620TH TSC	1
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CTF CW. PBR BASE ONE, NSA DANANG	1
SPO-SEC CMD QUI NHON	1
DIRECTOR, CAP III MAF	1
CO USS REPOSE	1
CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 4TH PSYOP GP	1
CO 1ST BN 525TH MI GP DANANG	24
620TH TCS (ATTN: CRC)APO 96203	1

OUT OF COUNTRY

DIR. NSA	3
CMC (A02) (AIRMAIL)	2
CG FMFPAC (AIRMAIL)	2

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CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP 7TH FLEET	1
CG MCDEC	5
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE) 69-69	1
CG 3RD MAW	2
TEAM COMMANDER 19TH CI TEAM CAMP PENDLETON	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CG 2ND MAR DIV	2
CG 5TH MAR DIV	6
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO FICPAC (ATTN: SEN MAR OFF)	1
CG 4TH MAR DIV CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF	1
355TH TFW (DCOI)	1
432ND TFW (DCOI)	1
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
388TH TFW (DCOI)	1

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 30-69 AS OF 262400H JULY 69.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-HQ	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	11	3,295	2	605			13	3,900	12	5,390	25	9,290
Bn's-Maneuver	38	10,460	11	2,275	5	845	54	13,580	30	13,230	84	26,810
Bn's-Support	18	5,105			1	140	19	5,245	7	2,080	26	7,325
Separate Co's	1	130			30	2,320	31	2,450	1	80	32	2,530
TOTAL CONFIRMED		20,955		2,880		3,305		27,140		22,215		49,355
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's	1	575					1	575	5	1,800	6	2,375
Bn's-Maneuver	7	2,195	1	350	2	340	10	2,885	11	4,890	21	7,775
Bn's-Support	4	1,045	1	220			5	1,265	9	1,445	14	2,710
Separate Co's	1	90			4	425	5	515			5	515
TOTAL PROBABLE		3,905		570		765		5,240		8,135		13,375
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,400	3	1,400
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support									22	7,675	22	7,675
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										10,015		10,015
		24,860		3,450		4,070		32,380		40,365		72,745

*See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,490		150	3,640
	Probable	2,095			2,095
	Possible				
	TOTAL	5,585		150	5,735
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,910		440	4,350
	Probable			275	275
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,910		715	4,625
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	6,685	280	955	7,920
	Probable	830	350		1,180
	Possible				
	TOTAL	7,515	630	955	9,100
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,535	1,155	600	4,290
	Probable	580	220	185	985
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,115	1,375	785	5,275
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,335	1,445	1,160	6,940
	Probable	400		305	705
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,735	1,445	1,465	7,645

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS															DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL											
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	33	3		36	8			8	5			5	46	3		49	29	9		38	75	12		87
SAPPER	5	4		9	3	1		4		2		2	8	7		15	1	2		3	9	9		18
TOTAL MANEUVER	38	7		45	11	1		12	5	2		7	54	10		64	30	11		41	84	21		105
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	8	1		9		1		1	1			1	9	2		11	2	5	10	17	11	7	10	28
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	3	1	5	3	3	1	7
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2		1	2	3	1	2	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
TOTAL SUPPORT	18	4		22		1		1	1			1	19	5		24	7	9	22	38	26	14	22	62
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	56	11		67	11	2		13	6	2		8	73	15		88	37	20	22	79	110	35	22	167

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	354	Nam Hoa	70	Hoa Vang	588	Thang Binh	1,140	Binh Son	239
	Mai Linh	87	Huong Tra	58	Hieu Duc	78	Tam Ky	731	Son Tinh	490
	Trieu Phong	197	Hong Dien	59	Dien Ban	1,085	Ly Tin	120	Tu Nghia	456
	Cam Lo	265	Vinh Loc	68	Dai Loc	387	Hiep Duc	242	Nghia Hanh	310
	Gio Linh	202	Phu Loc	231	Thuong Duc	92	Tien Phuoc	274	Mo Duc	675
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	375	Hau Duc	230	Duc Pho	462
	Huong Hoa	14	Phu Vang	43	Que Son	761			Tra Bong	170
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	190	Duy Xuyen	1,137			Ba To	124
			Huong Thuy	101	Hieu Nhon	445			Minh Long	15
			Phong Dien	451					Son Ha	188
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	1,227	THUA THIEN	2,317	QUANG NAM	4,948	QUANG TIN	2,737	QUANG NGAI	3,129

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 13,358

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,195		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Vic XD 6233	XD 8337/18Jun69
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	2,210		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unlocated	
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unloc LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unloc LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unloc LAOS	

*See note #4 on Page A-17
**See note #2 on Page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,950		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,900		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	500		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	PR	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	PR	1,845		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	490	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	520	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
31st Group (-)	NVA	C	1,120		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	325	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2061/20Jul69
15th Bn	NVA	PR	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Secial Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,920		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	365	BA 611	YD 6825/23Apr69
65th Arty Regt	NVA	PR	UNK		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.40 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.41 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.42 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.43 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,760		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,525		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	PR	390	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0566/22May69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	335	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
24B (AKA 57th) Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	XD 8732	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	XD 8732	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	XD 8732	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	XD 8732	XD 8754/26Jun69
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,675		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	XD 7964/12Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400	XD 9265	XD 9666/26May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	405	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	400	XD 8854	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,865		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	340	YD 3639	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	225	YD 3832	YD 3637/27May69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	YD 3339	YD 4147/25May69
K-34 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	250	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn, 812th Regt	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	200	Vic YD 3535	

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	950		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	AU 8100/10Jun68
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	300	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/15Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jul69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,870		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 7896	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	360	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	220	Vic YD 6514	YD 6822/14Jun69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	270	Vic YD 7504	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	220	Vic YC 6586	YD 6902/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
3rd Bn, 803rd Regt	NVA	C	380	Vic YC 3196	YC 3389/19Jul69
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	390	Vic YD 3304	YD 3302/20Jun69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	290	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
C.113 Co	LF	C	145	Vic YD 5043	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
C.117 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 9516	YD 9022/25Oct68
C.118 Co	LF	C	55	Vic YD 9518	YD 9917/12Sep68
C.119 Co	LF	PR	45	Vic YD 9424	YD 9424/27Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	PR	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	15,000		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
1st Bn, 68B Arty Regt	NVA	C	315	AT 8042	
HAI VAN Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,025		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102nd Bn	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 9274/19May69
103rd Bn	NVA	C	325	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
36th Regt	NVA	C	600		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	210	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	130	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	130	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	130	AT 9737	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,365		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	AT 8046	
7th Bn	NVA	C	420	AT 8046	AT 8247/11Jun69
8th Bn	NVA	C	410	AT 8046	
9th Bn	NVA	C	360	AT 8046	AT 8347/17Jun69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,165		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	375	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
368B Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,170		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
R.20 Bn	LF	C	155	BT 0763	AT 9967/11May69
V.25 Bn	LF	C	160	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	265	Vic GO NOI Island	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	70	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	300	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	Unloc vic HOA VANG (D)	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	85	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	105	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	120	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	115	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	140	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	4,630		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	Unlocated	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	850		
Regt Hq	MF	C	230	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	210	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	200	BT 2711	BT 2416/14May69
90th Bn	MF	C	210	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	710		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200	BT 1317	
1st Bn	NVA	C	150	BT 1317	BT 1115/14May69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	185	BT 1317	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	175	BT 1317	BT 0222/4Jun68
70th Bn	MF	C	100	BT 1523	BT 3219/25Feb69
72nd Bn	LF	C	215	BT 2932	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	140	BT 1408	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	110	BT 3127	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	205	BT 2232	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	PR	220	BT 2001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 421[illegible]	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	50	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	75	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	45	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	175	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	140	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
81st Co	LF	C	95	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	215	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb68
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	400	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	220	BS 4677	BS 7268/20May68
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	180	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
526th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	230	BS 5777	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	815		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	160	BS 4386	AT 8349/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	210	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	260	BS 4386	AT 8349/27Feb69
95th Sapper Co	LF	C	60	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68
C.17 Co	LF	C	60	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	90	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	75	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	85	BS 7555	BS 7061/17Nov68
C.120 Co	LF	C	80	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,775		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	1,010		
Regt Hq	MF	C	375	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	200	BS 6733	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	315	BS 7932	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	220	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,030		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	BS 5262	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	260	BS 5262	BS 5262/27May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	290	BS 6646	BS 5262/27May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	295	BS 5262	BS 5262/27May69

See note #2 on page A-17

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CONFIDENTIAL QUANG NGAI (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 3147	BS 7543/11Jun69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 3970/26Aug68
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 3147	BS 0433/4Mar69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 3147	

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...H DINH PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Re	NVA	C	925		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	275	BINH DINH	CR 0952/23Jun68
7th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 9640/12Apr68
8th Bn	NVA	C	250	BINH DINH	CR 0933/23Apr68
9th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 8955/29May68

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes in IcTZ during period 20000H to 262400H July 1969.

a. The 9th NVA Sapper Bn is added to OOB holdings in a probable status based on PW's Doan Van HAI and Cao Dai NGHAI of the 9th Sapper Bn and Hoi Chanh Vu Van NGOAN from the 2nd Sapper Bn.

b. The K51 LF Weapons Co is added to OOB holdings in a probable status based on information provided by Hoi Chanhs from the K51 Weapons Co and the 95th Sapper Co.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the Headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct opreational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to IcTZ.

9. Subordination/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF IntSum 27-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 30-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P).

a. PW, Cpl Nguyen Van CAN, a squad leader with the 5th Co, 27th Bn, 31st Group was captured on 20 Jul 69 in the vicinity of (YD 202614) following an attack against the 915th RF Co (17th ITT Rpt 56-69A) and stated that as of 19 Jul 69 the 5th Co CP was in the vicinity of (YD 1774). The unit's mission was to return to NVN after the attack on the RF Co at Hill 73. CAN stated that half of the 5th Co had received sapper training. Morale was very low, according to CAN, due to inadequate rations and equipment and troops were tired from marching. The LBN for the 5th Co is 94126 XB and the AKA for the 31st Group is SONG HONG Group. PW CAN joined the NVA on 12 May 68 in HA TINH (P) and received training in QUANG BINH (P) for a period of six months. Source then went to VINH LINH (P)(sic) and joined the 5th Co. The unit infiltrated into RVN on 12 May 69 to the vicinity of (YD 1774), and returned to NVN on 10 Jun 69 crossing the BEN HAI River near KINH MON (V) (YD 175765). The company again infiltrated RVN on 19 Jul 69 for the purpose of attacking Hill 73. Each man in CAN's platoon carried 11 blocks of TNT. Reported personalities: 5th Co Cmdr-2ndLt Pham Ngoc LOAN, XO-WO Nguyen Van DUONG, PO-Nguyen Van HAI, APO-2ndLt Nguyen Thanh LAM; 27th Bn PO-Capt LAN; 31st Group CO-Maj PHO, XO-Maj LAI, PO-Maj HONG, APO-Capt MEN.

(G-2 CMT: The NVA has been stressing sapper training in recent months. The LBN is reported for the first time; however, SONG HONG is a known AKA for the 31st (F-3). Personalities are reported for the first time (F-6). All other information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, PFC Tran Quoc DAT, a rifleman with the 5th Co, 27th Bn, 31st Group, captured on 20 Jul 69 in the vicinity of (YD 202615) following an attack on Hill 73 against the 915th RF Co (17th ITT Rpt 55-69A) stated that the 5th Co, with a strength of 100 men, was last known to be located at PHU LAM (YD 1186) on 18 Jul 69. The mission of his unit was to attack and destroy the forces on Hill 73. The PW stated that the 5th Co had received sapper training after completing infantry training. Morale was good as a result of lectures by the unit cadre. The AKA for the 31st Group is SONG HONG Regt and the LBN for the 5th Co is 94126 XB. In Aug 68, the PW completed initial training and traveled by truck to VINH LINH (P) (sic), then proceeded on foot to PHUC LAM (2)(H) (YD 093865), arriving in Jan 69. Source first infiltrated RVN on 15 Jul 69 with a 40 man group from the 5th Co. This group met two VC at the BEN HAI River who ferried them across in groups of 11. They stayed at KHE RON for two days and later moved back to the north side of the BEN HAI River due to the presence of allied forces. On 18 Jul 69 they again crossed the BEN HAI River assisted by the same two VC (NFI). The 5th Co had 32 sappers killed during Feb 69 and Mar 69 during battles with allied forces in the CAM LO area and were replaced by infantrymen. Reported personalities: CO 31st Group-LtCol PHO, XO-Maj HONG; 5th Co Cmdr-2ndLt TINH, XO-2ndLt DUONG, PO-2ndLt SANG.

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(G-2 CMT: Due to the location of the 31st Group it is believed to be near full strength. The trend to sapper training and tactics are indicative of the type of attacks that can be expected in this area in the future. Listed personalities do not agree with OOB holdings (F-6). All information, except personalities rated (F-3).)

2. THUA THIEN (P).

a. PW, Vu LONG of the 7th Co, Chi Thua II Sapper Bn, 5th Regt captured on 17 Jul 69 in the vicinity of (YD 693203) (FSB GERONIMO) (11th ITT Rpt 72-69) stated that the mission of a 12 man section was to attack ARVN installations on a hill in the vicinity of (YD 690203) on the night of 16 July 69. He added that all three companies (C1, C4, C7) of his battalion are located in the vicinity of (YC 640848). PW stated that there are 56 men in the 7th Co and the battalion strength is 180 men. The only subordinate units to the 5th Regt known to the PW are his unit and the Chi Thua I Sapper Bn. Source stated he departed NVN in an infiltration group of 300 men in Feb 69 and arrived in QUANG TRI in late Apr 69. Since the source joined the unit in Apr 69 the 7th Co has lost over 20 KIA and 10 WIA by artillery/air strikes. LONG was one of 30 replacements received by the 7th Co and 70 went to the 1st and 4th Co's. The other 200 men of the source's infiltration group were assigned to other QUANG TRI units. The PW stated that the morale was fair while in training in NVN and during infiltration to RVN but now is low due to losses sustained by artillery and air strikes. Reported personalities: Chi Thua II Sapper Bn CO-VU, XO-CAO, PO-HIEN, CofS-THIN, APO-NHI

(G-2 CMT: The stated location of the Chi Thua II Sapper Bn is within five kilometers of III MAF OOB holdings. The personalities reported by the PW are in accord with III MAF OOB holdings except for CAO, who is listed as being the APO while the XO of the battalion is unknown. All information reported (F-3).)

b. PW, Truong Van PHU of the K4C Bn, 4th Regt captured 17 Jul 69 in the vicinity of (YD 974043) (101st ABN Div Rpt 101-64-69) stated that his company (C2) was located in the vicinity of (ZC 0805). The battalion headquarters was located somewhere near BACH MA (ZC 0692) and the 4th Regt Headquarters was located near (YC 882850). The exact location is unknown beacuse they are always moving as a result of artillery and air strikes. The 4th Regt consists of the K.2 and K.4 Bns, 71st Sapper Unit, C.15 Transportation Co and the C.19 Supply Unit. The subject stated that there are 100 men in his company and 300 men in K4C Bn. The total strength of the 4th Regt is unknown. PHU stated that he was first assigned to his unit in Feb 67 in NVN and infiltrated to RVN in Jun or Jul 67. Source further stated that since TET 68 the K4C Bn had lost 40 men but during both Jul 67 and Mar 68 they had received 40 replacements. The LBN of the C2 Co is currently 71170 but the LBN changes every three months. Their previous LBN was 3114 OK. The PW stated that 30% of the C2 Co has malaria and morale is low because the war keeps them away from their families. None desire to surrender because the PO told them the allies would kill them after interrogation.

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(G-2 CMT: The K2 and K4 Bns are AKA's for the K4B and K4C Bns subordinate to the 4th Regt. The 4th Regt also has as a subordinate, the 71B Sapper Co, which took part in the 19 Jun attack on FSB TOMAHAWK. III MAF OOB carries the 4th Regt and subordinate battalions in the BACH MA area as the PW stated. All information rated (F-3).)

3. QUANG NAM (P).

a. PW, PFC Bui Van DAM, C-2 Co, 2d Mort Bn (AKA GK-33), 2d NVA Div captured on 18 Jul 69 in the vicinity of (BT 077474) (1st ITT Rpt 29-07-69) stated that the battalion was located in the vicinity of (AT 9438) on 14 Jul 69. The battalion was resting, gathering food, and receiving political training. PW stated he had infiltrated with Group 124 in mid Jun 68. The infiltration group consisted of approximately 500 men in four companies. The group arrived in the B46 (CNA) area, QUANG NAM (P) in Sep 68. Seventy men provided replacements to the 2nd Mort Bn. The PW further stated the C-2 Co has six 82mm mortars, and the C-1 and C-4 Companies have five or six 82mm mortars each.

(G-2 CMT: This is the first report of the 2d Mort Bn being an AKA for the GK-33 Bn. There was no mention of the 120mm mortar being part of the armament of this battalion although it has been reported previously. Current OOB holdings place the GK-33 in QUANG TIN (P). All information rated (F-6).)

b. PW's Tran Van HAI, 1st Co, 20th Bn, 31st Regt (3rd ITT Rpt 10-07-69) and Ong Van TON, 1st Co, R.20 Bn (Supp Interr Rpt, 3d ITT 13-07-69) were captured on 15 Jul 69 in the vicinity of (BT 024595). PW TON stated that his mission was to guard the company position, which is in the vicinity of (BT 098644), and to resist FWMAF while HAI stated that his mission was to transport rice for the 2nd and 3rd Co's which were located in DUY XUYEN (D). TON stated that the 2nd and 3rd Co's were located in the vicinity of (BT 080630-070648). HAI located the 1st Co in the vicinity of (BT 030605) on 14 Jul 69. Both PW's gave a LBN of 6789 AP THAI.

(G-2 CMT: The locations given by PW TON is in the same area as currently held by OOB for the R.20 Bn. However, agent reports and another PW (see PW HAO in paragraph 3c below) suggest the possiblity that elements of this battalion are in the vicinity of TON and HAI's capture (F-3). It is unlikely that the 2nd and 3rd Co's are in DUY XUYEN (D) as the PW stated (F-4). The LBN 6789 AP THAI is associated with the 1st Co, R.20 Bn (F-3).)

c. PW, PFC Hoang Van HAO, 3rd Co, D.1 (AKA R.20) Bn, 3rd District, Front 44 was captured on 10 Jul 69 in the vicinity of (BT 035668) (1st ITT Rpt 17-07-69) and stated that the location of the 3rd Co was in the vicinity of (BT 075620) on 9 Jul 69. PW stated the 3rd Co's mission was to relocate to the vicinity of (BT 0366). The PW stated he infiltrated RVN with Training Bn 510, Infiltration Group 1065, 3rd Co, which consisted of 160 men. Approximately 40-50 men were lost enroute due to sickness

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and friendly activity. The infiltration began in Jan 69 and ended in Mar 69 at an unknown area in QUANG NAM (P). The entire 3rd Co of approximately 120 men were assigned to the D.1 Bn.

(G-2 CMT: The company location given by the PW is in the vicinity of III MAF OOB holdings for the R.20 Bn. The infiltration group was previously mentioned in a captured document. (Reference CDEC Bul #22,506) All information reported (F-3).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). No significant reports.

5. QUANG NGAI (P).

a. PW, Pham LONG, C.31 LF Sapper Co, captured in the vicinity of (BS 616880) on 16 Jul 69 (Americal Spot Inter Rpt of 16 Jul 69) stated his company was located in the vicinity of (BS 689875) and its mission is to attack allied outposts using sapper tactics. Subject claimed that his unit had coordinated with the 95th Sapper Co for an attack at PHUOC HOA (H), BINH TRI (V) (BS 6697) on approximately 1 May 69. Subject further stated he had seen several members of the 95th Sapper Unit at BINH PHUOC (V) in the vicinity of (BS 646930).

(G-2 CMT: C.31 LF Sapper Co is a probable AKA for the P.31 LF Sapper Co. The P.31 LF Co is held by III MAF OOB in the vicinity of (BS 6491). The 95th Sapper Co is held at (BS 7090). These units have been known to coordinate for attacks. BINH PHUOC (V) is listed as a VC name for BINH LANG (V) at vicinity (BS 6698). CAP 1-3-3 received 200 rounds of small arms fire from an USEF in this same area on 18 May 69. All information reported (F-3).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 30-69

1. GENERAL.

a. Northern ICTZ. The northern provinces of ICTZ continued to be the scene of relatively intensive counterintelligence related activity during the period. Since the beginning of 1969, the Viet Cong have made a concerted effort to reestablish their influence in many areas of these provinces. In the last several months, particular efforts appear to have been made in the districts of Phu Thu and Vinh Loc in Thua Thien (P). In these provinces, the Viet Cong appear to have adopted a method of operation whereby guerrillas, local force soldiers, and infrastructure cadre combine into small action teams with responsibility for one or several villages. These groups usually do not reside in the villages and are logistically supported by other teams. These VCI/VC activities obviously reflect an intensified effort to compete once again with the GVN for the political control which the VC exercised during and immediately after Tet 1968 and subsequently lost.

b. Southern ICTZ. While frequent reports of political plans and meetings continue to be received in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces, overt VCI activity, including terrorism, has decreased considerably. There is little question that aggressive friendly operations have placed the VC infrastructure more into a defensive posture than has previously been the case and that VC/VCI morale has suffered accordingly. However, the VC continue to control approximately one quarter of a million people in Southern I Corps and are carrying out a continuous and concerted political program to solidify their control and influence over this group. The absence of reported activity cannot be construed as any lessening of VC control over this segment of the populace. As stated earlier in this PERINTREP, the decrease of overt activity may be conjectured as a transitional period and may be modified abruptly as new policies are announced and implemented. It is significant that the pattern in the southern two provinces is not repeated in Quang Nam where intensive terrorist activity has been noted over the past several weeks.

2. ESPIONAGE. Reported Viet Cong espionage activity continued to be high in Quang Tri (P) with only scattered incidents reported elsewhere in ICTZ. Over the past several weeks, a particularly large number of reports have been noted of reconnaissance activity in the My Chanh River area on the border between Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The significance of this activity is still undetermined. A translation of a captured document provides interesting details on the operational methods of Viet Cong reconnaissance units. A summary of the document is contained in Appendix 1.

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a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 9 July, a GVN intelligence source reported that 5 communist cadre appeared in An Don (H) (YD 315512) inquiring about the Trieu Thong (V) PF's and the fortification at Nhan Bien (H). (Rating: C-3)

(2) On 11 July, a GVN intelligence source reported that a VC reconnaissance and sapper unit was located at Cut Sat stream (YD 345440) collecting information on ARVN and Allied activities in adjacent areas. (Rating: C-2)

(3) On 15 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that a 40 man VC reconnaissance team was operating in the vicinity of Gio My (V) (YD 262747), Nhi Ha (H) (YD 274705) and Ruong Resettlement Camp (YD 265647). (Rating: C-3)

(4) On 15 July, a GVN intelligence source reported that VC cadre of the Cam Lo Resettlement Camp had their agents make a list of the People's Self Defense Force members of the camp. (Rating: C-3)

(5) On 17 July, a GVN intelligence source reported that a VC guerrilla squad located at (YD 345463) was gathering information from Phu Long (H) (YD 340431) and intended to attack the RD team operating in Hai Phu (V). (Rating: B-3)

(6) On 18 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that the VC held a meeting in a jungle area of Truong Phuoc (H) (YD 394467) to initiate a new campaign to organize all VC and pro-VC persons in the local populace and induce them to join GVN and ARVN agencies and installations to collect information. (Rating: F-6)

b. Quang Ngai. On 14 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that 2 VC agents are working in Thach Tru (H) (BS 769465) gathering information on U.S. combat patrols. (Rating: F-6)

3. SABOTAGE. The only sabotage incident reported was the delayed report of a bridge at BT 268272 which was 70% destroyed on 11 July 1969 by a floating mine. In addition, a pressure influence mine was found in the vicinity of YD 306677 on the Cua Viet River and a U.S. military intelligence source reported that a group of Viet Cong in the vicinity of YD 283713 had the mission of mining the Cua Viet River.

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. While propaganda activity during the period continued to be high, there were several changes in emphasis noted in both themes and the area distribution of incidents. In the past month, Viet Cong propaganda has heavily concentrated on obtaining support for the NFL's Provisional Revolutionary Government. During the past week, however, this theme did not receive the heavy emphasis which it has in

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the past. The single most prevalent theme was that of increasing food production and contributions to the Viet Cong. It is also significant that 11 of the 19 incidents reported occurred in the northern two provinces of ICTZ. In Thua Thien (P), much of the propaganda was directed against the People's Self Defense Force, reflecting obvious Viet Cong concern over the PSDF effectiveness in that province. As has been the case in previous weeks, the number of Revolutionary Committees in I Corps remained constant. See Appendix 2 for a statistical breakdown of committees in ICTZ.

a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 6 July, a GVN intelligence source reported that the Viet Cong held a meeting in the western area of Quang Tri (P) to motivate young men to join the Viet Cong, increase the purchase of foods, and organize intelligence and assassination cells to work in GVN-controlled areas. (Rating: C-2)

(2) On 8 July, GVN intelligence source reported that a VC propaganda team entered Ha Thong (H) (YD 222725) and discussed the unification of North and South Vietnam in August by a general election. (Rating: C-1)

(3) On 12 July, military intelligence source reported that the VC cadre of Cam Lo (D) (YD 115531) held a meeting to discuss the current situation brought about by changes in North Vietnam and the Paris Peace Talks, and to gain support for a project called Bien Lua or "Ocean of Fire." No further information was available on this project. (Rating: F-3)

(4) On 15 July, GVN intelligence source reported that VC cadre infiltrated Nhat Let (H) (YD 194612) to visit relatives and propagandize the people. (Rating: C-3)

(5) On 18 July, U.S. military intelligence source reported that an Armed Propaganda Company propagandized that it will launch attacks on Gio Le (H), Ga Truong (H) (YD 225715), and Ha Thuong (H) (YD 224724). (Rating: F-6)

b. Thua Thien.

(1) On 13 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that the Viet Cong were holding a political training course for approximately 60 personnel in the vicinity of YD 975815. Upon completion of the course on 30 July, the students were to move to GVN-controlled areas and propagandize Viet Cong plans for a peace settlement. (Rating: B-3)

(2) On 13 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that the Viet Cong held a ceremony in the vicinity of ZC 090932 honoring

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the VC/NVA troops and cadre who had died during the period from January 1969 to June 1969. (Rating: C-6)

(3) On 22 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that Viet Cong cadre and troops held a meeting at Quang Loi (V) (YD 594404) to attempt to persuade the people to remain in VC-controlled areas. (Rating: F-6)

(4) On 17 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that a meeting of the Phong Dien (D) Committee was held (YD 505425) to discuss the upcoming "Campaign of Deep Areas". No further information was available on this campaign. (Rating: F-6)

(5) On 17 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that 3 VC entered Vy Da (H) (YD 779237), distributed leaflets, and withdrew. (Rating: F-6)

(6) On 17 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that 1 platoon of VC entered An Hoa (H) (YD 725209), displayed VC flags and slogans, and withdrew. (Rating: F-6)

(7) On 20 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that a VC platoon known as the "People's Military Group" has been operating in Vinh Giang, Vien Hien, and Vinh Hai, (ZD 070103-ZD 105103) propagandizing NFLSVN victories. (Rating: F-6)

(8) On 20 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that an unidentified NVA company arrived at Chinh An (H) (YD 554423) to propagandize against the pacification program and attack pacification and rural development cadre. (Rating: F-6)

c. Quang Nam.

(1) On 16 July, the 11th ROKMC Company heard a Viet Cong loudspeaker broadcast propaganda in the Vietnamese language in the vicinity of BT 116516.

(2) On 19 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that a Viet Cong Main Force Company held a propaganda meeting in Quang Nam #2 (H) (AT 910819) and urged the people to collect money and buy supplies for Viet Cong troops. (Rating: F-6)

d. Quang Tin.

(1) On 12 July, a GVN intelligence source reported (C-3) that the Viet Cong held a meeting for the people of Tam Can (H) (BT 227213). The purposes of the meeting were to:

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(a) Raise the morale of the Viet Cong troops and the people.

(b) Propagandize Viet Cong victories.

(c) Mobilize civilian laborers.

(d) Force the people to contribute rice and pay troop support taxes.

(2) On 14 July, the Viet Cong held a meeting at Phuoc Long (V) (BT 183233) to mobilize manpower and encourage the people to lend money and food for the troops on the battlefield.

(3) On 16 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that VC cadre held a meeting at Lam Bien (H) (BT 218248) to propagandize VC victories, organize the people to demonstrate against GVN, and gather children under 16 years old to send to North Vietnam for a 3 month indoctrination course. (Rating: C-3)

e. Quang Ngai. On 15 July, a U.S. military intelligence source stated that the Viet Cong held a meeting in Son Trung (V) (BS 574780) to urge the people to call for the formation of a coalition government, support the NLF's People's Revolutionary Government, and collect supplies for the Viet Cong. (Rating: F-6)

5. TERROR. While assassinations decreased considerably from the level which has prevailed over the past month, other categories remained essentially unchanged. Terrorist activity was concentrated in Thua Thien and Quang Nam, while other Corps areas experienced a very low level of activity. See Appendix 3 for a listing of terrorist incidents.

6. FINANCE AND ECONOMY. Continued emphasis is being placed on the collection of foodstuffs and other material by the Viet Cong as well as on the recruitment of civilian laborers. Quang Tin (P), in particular, reported numerous attempts to recruit civilian laborers.

a. Thua Thien. A U.S. military intelligence source reported on 15 July that the Viet Cong were increasing tax collection efforts on Thuy Phu (V) (YD 905126). (Rating: C-2)

b. Quang Tin.

(1) On 1 July, a GVN intelligence source reported that the Viet Cong held a meeting at BT 157237 to urge the people to supply more food for the Viet Cong and to establish a "work rotation cycle". (Rating: C-2) (COMMENT: "Work rotation" appears to be a system which the Viet Cong have established to farm land belonging to people who have left Viet Cong-controlled areas. Almost the entire yield from these lands goes to

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the Viet Cong.)

(2) On 6 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that an unidentified district economic section held a meeting at BT 258344 to criticize the recent activities of the section and to make plans for the mobilization of civilian laborers and tax collection. (Rating: C-3)

(3) On 16 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that the Viet Cong held a series of four meetings in Ky Long (V) (BT 221875) to force the people to contribute money and food to the Viet Cong and to mobilize laborers. (Rating: C-3)

7. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. On 14 July, a GVN intelligence source stated that the Viet Cong had obtained a paper cutting machine with which they were cutting paper to make copies of the GVN ID card. They were particularly interested in examining the ID cards of youths 16 to 18 years old. (Rating: C-2)

b. On 15 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that the VC are masquerading as ARVN Rangers and members of the 51st ARVN Regiment in order to penetrate military bases in Danang and surrounding areas for attacks. The uniform is worn with the sleeves rolled up to reveal a black bracelet as a recognition guide. The password is "Phuong Nam", translated as "Southern Direction". (Rating: F-3)

APPENDIXES.
1-Operations of VC Military Intelligence Section in Quang Da Special Zone
2-Statistical Compilation of People's Revolutionary Committees in ICTZ
3-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 30-69

OPERATIONS OF VC MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION IN QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE

Details of the missions, capabilities, and operating methods of the Military Intelligence Section of the Quang Da Special Zone have recently been obtained from a captured document. Of particular note are the statements that the military intelligence section is responsible for agent operations and has enjoyed some success monitoring friendly communications. The Viet Cong military intelligence organization clearly represents a threat to the security of friendly forces in ICTZ. A summary of the contents of the captured document is contained below:

1. MISSIONS OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, FRONT 4

The primary mission of the Military Intelligence Section Front 4 is to exercise control over organic elements and attached reconnaissance units in the collection of information on the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) forces stationed in Quang Da including I Corps Headquarters, 51st (RVNAF) Regiment, Quang Da Sector, Da Nang Special Zone, in the military, political and economic fields in order to support (VC) tactical operations and political struggles. Reconnaissance personnel are also required to perform other missions such as to annihilate tyrants (possibly meaning assassination of GVN officials), capture prisoners of war, gather enemy documents, and miscellaneous tasks as required.

2. METHODS OF OPERATIONS

Military intelligence and reconnaissance personnel of Front 4 usually have to establish an agent network among local inhabitants, particularly in sensitive areas, and further consolidate this system at hamlet, village, district and provincial levels. Since all (VC/NVA) forces of Front 4 have been operating in the lowlands, the system of collecting information by local inhabitants is fairly practical.

During the preparation of a tactical operation, (VC/NVA) reconnaissance personnel normally set up observation posts near (FWMAF/RVNAF) posts to observe the enemy's patterns of operations. A telephone line would be established between the main observation post with one element of a tactical unit for transmittal of information gathered. Other signal equipment such as 15W and 2W radios have also been employed to transmit such information. Semaphore and couriers are used when an observation post is located nearby.

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One fixed reconnaissance team is designated to follow the enemy activities in a specific area. Other mobile teams may be made available, on order, either to remain close to the enemy or to perform other tasks as dictated by the development of the situation.

All reconnaissance personnel are required to be familiar with the terrain of their assigned area and check the terrain features with their map in order to acquaint themselves with the trails used by friendly observation posts, and to survey the terrain for combat units. Reconnaissance agents usually maintain close coordination with sapper elements to ensure good preparations.

In Canh Trung (possibly Central Sector, Quang Da Special Zone) where friendly (VC) agents are not operative in a number of areas under enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) control, particularly in Roman Catholic areas and those underpopulated areas surrounding Da Nang, our friendly reconnaissance teams must be designated to make deep penetrations and quickly investigate the enemy situation therein. These personnel should carry enough food for ten or twelve days. They would infiltrate the city in darkness, and live in covert observation posts during daytime. Underground caches would be available to hide food and drinking water for an extended period of time as required.

PRC 25 and PRC 10 radios have been used to intercept enemy radio communications, particularly during the encirclement of a military post or a rocket attack.

Necessary coordination is made with local guerrilla units, district units, chapter (Party) committees, military proselyting sections, and other agencies to investigate the enemy situation in their own areas of responsibility. All cadre and combatants are under instructions to immediately report to their parent unit information on the enemy situation that they obtained during the accomplishment of their mission.

Reconnaissance personnel are rotated during their period of operation in the lowlands so that all reconnaissance agents are familiar with the terrain and other aspects of the area (possibly of the Da Nang area) and know how to recruit personnel to operate behind enemy lines.

Reconnaissance units are required to submit hourly and daily reports to their next higher headquarters, and maintain constant communication with lower and higher echelons during the preparations for an attack. Canh Trung (Central Sector) offers a wide variety of terrain features which greatly restricts friendly communication to transmit news and reports. Therefore, a postal communication system using LBN's is set up to transmit correspondence to the boundary area, (possibly of the VC/GVN-controlled areas). Different means are used for such transmittal by village units.

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3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

The document claims that since the beginning of the campaign T25, the 2nd Reconnaissance Company of Front 4 had annihilated 175 enemy, shot down one aircraft, destroyed one 1/4 ton truck, and captured two AR 15's. The 1st Reconnaissance Company, Front 4, captured two prisoners of war in the vicinity of Nam Phuoc Town during April 1968. During preparation to attack the CIDG location at Non Nuoc, Comrade Dinh's reconnaissance team escaped from an enemy ambush by killing eight (FWMAF/RVNAF) personnel.

During the construction of observation posts, some reconnaissance elements wisely selected the high ground which dominated the area around enemy installations, thus improving visibility. Before the attacks on the (FWMAF/RVNAF) armored vehicle parking area and the battle of Non Nuoc CIDG, reconnaissance personnel succeeded in infiltrating defensive perimeter number 2 of Da Nang. Some elements selected a site for their observation post which was approximately 100 to 200 meters from the target.

A large number of local force units have organized a people's intelligence network in which all assistant chiefs of hamlet and village units are responsible for military intelligence and periodically submit reports on the enemy situation. Most districts have their own military intelligence section which directs the activities of their respective villages. Enemy situation reports are submitted from villages to districts and then to Front 4.

A number of local areas and units utilized women in reconnaissance tasks and in the collection and transmittal of military intelligence information.

Regular units and local military intelligence elements established close coordination so that local areas could provide much information to (VC/NVA) regular forces during tactical operations. They also contributed significantly to the preparation of the battlefield.

Nevertheless, the following shortcomings still exist: Reports have not been regularly submitted from villages to districts and some information was obsolete. In several areas, military intelligence personnel were unable to recruit agents in towns, cities, and district capitals.

Another signifidant weakness of the (VC/NVA) reconnaissance personnel is the failure to stay close to the enemy or to successfully pursue him.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 30-69

People's Revolutionary Committees reported by name and/or location as of 26 July 1969

	Quang Tri	Thua Thien	Quang Nam	Quang Tin	Quang Ngai	Total
Region (NFFTE)						1
Province	1	1	1	1	1	5
District	2	5	2	1	9	19
City		1	2			3
Village	37	36	76	49	107	305
Hamlet	31	59	16	11	122	239
Precinct		1				1
Total	71	103	97	62	239	573

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 30-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Thua Thien	16Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 684235	VC attacked Huong Chu (V). Negative casualties.
	17Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 812247	Two civilians were assassinated by VC because they had no money for taxes and were reported to be friends of Americans and ARVNs.
	17Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 807247	VC entered Thuy Van (V) and assassinated 2 civilians.
	18Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 926084	Loc Son (V) received 6 rounds B-40 rockets wounding 3 PSDF.
	19Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 794284	VC wounded an unidentified hamlet chief.
	19Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 934085	VC fired 8 rounds of RPG fire into Loc Son (V) wounding 3 PSDF personnel.
	21Jul69	YD 924172	One VC platoon entered Phu Da (V) and destroyed roofing sheets and rice.
	22Jul69	YD 874157	Dong Da Training Center and Phu Lang received 8 rounds of 122mm rockets wounding 3 civilians and damaging 3 houses.
Quang Nam	12Jul69 (Late Entry)	BT 004719	VC threw 2 grenades into a building wounding 4 PSDF.
	14Jul69 (Late Entry)	AT 919855	Eleven VC entered Kim Cu (SH) to assassinate sub-hamlet chief. Attempt was thwarted after VC made contact with People's Self Defense Forces, resulting in 1 PSDF wounded.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	14Jul69 (Late Entry)	BT 095518	VC ground assault killed one civilian.
	15Jul69 (Late Entry)	BT 163566	VC attacked Cham Chau (V) Committee Headquarters building wounding hamlet chief and 3 PSDF members.
	15Jul69 (Late Entry)	AT 952468	VC kidnapped 3 family leaders and 3 civilians.
	15Jul69 (Late Entry)	BT 166575	VC attacked RD team and PF platoon at An My (H) wounding the hamlet chief.
	16Jul69 (Late Entry)	Danang	VC set off explosives at Labor Union Headquarters in District III, Nam Tho (Q) resulting in negative casualties and damage.
	16Jul69 (Late Entry)	BT 070371	One truck in a US convoy detonated a mine wounding 3 Vietnamese children.
	16Jul69 (Late Entry)	AT 833508	VC infiltrated Thu Bon (H) and kidnapped 3 civilians.
	16Jul69 (Late Entry)	AT 952572	VC kidnapped 1 RF home on leave.
	17Jul69 (Late Entry)	AT 927682	VC wounded 1 RD cadre by sniper fire.
	18Jul69 (Late Entry)	BT 046355	VC kidnapped 1 civilian and took 9 oxen.
	19Jul69 (Late Entry)	AT 989778	Terrorist threw a grenade into the home of the An Kha (V) chief wounding his wife and 5 children.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	19Jul69 (Late Entry)	BT 070334	VC kidnapped 1 PSDF member.
	20Jul69	BT 122577	VC mine killed 2 children of Thanh An (H)
	21Jul69	BT 066710	VC kidnapped 1 civilian member of the Son Thuy (H) PSDF.
	21Jul69	BT 135557	One civilian was killed by a boobytrap along a trail.
	21Jul69	BT 138555	One civilian was killed by detonating a VC mine in vicinity Vinh Chau (H)
	21Jul69	BT 145534	A civilian triggered a 105mm howitzer round resulting in 3 Vietnamese wounded.
	21Jul69	BT 102516	A civilian bus received 3 RPG rounds resulting in 4 civilians killed and 5 civilians wounded.
	22Jul69	BT 102515	A 10 man road sweep received AW fire, grenades and 60 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. The enemy fire killed 9 civilians and wounded 25 civilians.
	23Jul69	BT 089547	A civilian working in vicinity of Cau Lau bridge triggered a boobytrap killing 2 civilians and wounding 3.
	24Jul69	AT 936837	VC terrorist threw an explosive device into a crowd of civilians resulting in 2 civilians killed and 5 wounded.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	24Jul69	AT 887470	Vietnamese boy handed the Xuyen Phu (V) chief a Chicom grenade. Grenade exploding wounding the village chief and 4 civilians.
	24Jul69	BT 144544	A civilian triggered a booby trapped 81mm mortar round wounding 3 civilians.
	24Jul69	AT 932825	An unknown person or persons threw an M-26 grenade into the house of Mr. Nguyen Chi, NP of Hoa Vang, resulting in one NP and one child killed; two NP, one hamlet chief and two children wounded.
Quang Tin	18Jul69 (Late Entry)	BT 457054	VC entered Trung Thanh (V) and kidnapped 1 civilian.
	19Jul69 (Late Entry)	BT 225443	VC entered Tra Doa (H) and burned 42 homes.
	19Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 794284	VC wounded an unidentified hamlet chief.
	19Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 934085	VC fired 8 rounds of RPG fire into Loc Son (V) wounding 3 PSDF personnel.
Quang Ngai	19Jul69 (Late Entry)	BS 784844	Phu Qui (H) received 2 rounds of 82mm mortar fire killing 1 Vietnamese and destroying 2 huts.
	20Jul69	BS 806308	A mine was detonated in a schoolyard killing 3 civilians.

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ANNEX D (AUGUST WEATHER BRIEF) TO III MAF PERINTREP 30-69

1. General Weather. Weather conditions in August will continue to be favorable for tactical operations throughout the I Corps area. A note of caution, however, August and September are two of the worst months for typhoon activity in the Western Pacific. The primary track for typhoons runs west across the Southern Pacific, curves northwest in the vicinity of the Philippines and then recurves northeast toward Japan. One storm in five continues westward across the Philippines and moves toward the coast of North Vietnam. The probability of a typhoon forming or moving into the South China Sea is one every two years, and the incidence of tropical storms is one per year.

2. Precipitation

a. August, along the east coast and inland to the Annam Mountain Range, can be considered a dry season month. West of the mountains, it is considered a wet season month. Precipitation occurs on more than 15 days west of the mountains but in the area east rainfall is observed on less than 10 days.

b. Along the coast from the southern QUANG NGAI border to PHU LOC area, mean precipitation amounts to five inches; increases to 10 or more inches from north of PHU LOC to the southern QUANG TRI (P) border and the entire area west of the mountains; and decreases to five inches in eastern QUANG TRI (P).

c. Maximum August precipitation ranges from less than 20 inches over most of I Corps up to 30 inches west of the mountains.

d. Minimum amounts are one inch or less in southern I Corps to the PHU LOC area located in the eastern THUA THIEN (P) and in eastern QUANG TRI (P), and three inches or less from PHU LOC north to the QUANG TRI (P) border and to the west of the mountains.

e. Maximun 24 hour rainfall amounts to between three and six inches in I Corps.

3. Thunderstorms. The mean number of days with thunderstorms in I Corps in seven days.

4. Cloudiness

a. Cloudiness decreases slightly from July. Convective clouds form over most of I Corps during late morning with afternoon ceilings 2,000 - 4,000 feet (1,000 to 3,000 feet in the highlands) common.

b. Mean cloudiness ranges from 60% to 70%. The mean number of days with total cloud cover equal to or less than 3/10 varies from one to five days.

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5. **Visibility.** Visibility in the coastal area can be expected to be excellent. Low clouds and fog in the mountains and western I Corps will make visibility poor in the late evenings and early morning hours.

6. **Temperature.** The maximum temperature is 90 degrees or less in the coastal area and 80 degrees or more west of the mountains.

7. **Humidity.** The high relative humidity is conducive to corrosion and decay, and tends to make high temperatures seem higher. The highest daily humidities occur during early morning hours and after rainshowers, and the lowest usually occurs during the afternoon. Humidity in I Corps is over 75 percent in the eastern half of I Corps, and 70 to 75 percent over the remainder except for the southwestern corner (DO XA Area) where it drops to 65 percent.

8. **Astronomical Data.** BMCT occurs 23 minutes prior to sunrise, and EECT occurs 23 minutes after sunset.

Date	Sunrise	Sunset	Moonrise	Moonset	Phase	% of Illumination
1	0628	1919	2108	0838		88
2	0629	1918	2146	0934		80
3	0629	1918	2224	1027		71
4	0629	1918	2302	1117		61
5	0629	1917	2342	1212	Last Quarter	51
6	0629	1917	0021	1305		41
7	0629	1917	0027	1358		31
8	0630	1916	0114	1452		23
9	0630	1915	0209	1544		16
10	0630	1915	0258	1632		09
11	0631	1914	0349	1718		05
12	0631	1914	0443	1758		01
13	0631	1914	0534	1836	New Moon	00
14	0632	1912	0625	1913		01
15	0632	1912	0714	1947		03
16	0632	1912	0803	2021		07
17	0632	1910	0852	2055		13
18	0632	1910	0943	2134		21
19	0632	1910	1038	2216		30
20	0632	1908	1135	2302		41
21	0632	1908	1235	2355	First Quarter	52
22	0632	1908	1339	0012		63
23	0633	1906	1444	0056		74
24	0633	1906	1546	0201		84
25	0633	1906	1642	0309		91
26	0633	1905	1733	0416		97
27	0633	1905	1818	0520	Full Moon	100
28	0633	1905	1859	0621		100
29	0634	1903	1939	0718		97
30	0634	1902	2017	0813		91
31	0634	1902	2057	0907		84

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DANANG TIDES FOR AUGUST 1969

Date	Time	Height	Date	Time	Height
01	0154	3.6	16	0124	3.6
	0630	2.9		0624	2.8
	1218	4.1		1206	3.9
	1930	1.6		1900	1.9
02	0218	3.7	17	0136	3.6
	0730	2.7		0706	2.6
	1312	3.9		1254	3.7
	2006	1.9		1924	2.1
03	0242	3.7	18	0154	3.8
	0836	2.6		0800	2.4
	1412	3.5		1348	3.5
	2030	2.2		1942	2.3
04	0312	3.8	19	0218	3.9
	0942	2.5		0900	2.2
	1518	3.2		1454	3.3
	2040	2.5		2006	2.6
05	0342	3.9	20	0242	4.0
	1100	2.3		1000	2.1
	1642	3.0		1624	3.0
	2048	2.7		2018	2.8
06	0412	4.0	21	0318	4.1
	1218	2.2		1124	1.9
07	0448	4.0	22	0400	4.2
	1342	2.0		1248	1.7
08	0530	4.0	23	0500	4.2
	1442	1.8		1400	1.5
09	0618	4.1	24	0618	4.3
	1530	1.6		1500	1.4
10	0712	4.1	25	0000	3.4
	1600	1.5		0030	3.4
11	0800	4.1		0736	4.3
	1642	1.5		1554	1.3
12	0130	3.5	26	0248	3.3
	0300	3.5		0848	4.3
	0854	4.1		1636	1.3
	1712	1.4		2348	3.5
13	0112	3.5	27	0354	3.1
	0406	3.4		0948	4.3
	0942	4.1		1718	1.4
	1742	1.5	28	0006	3.6
14	0106	3.5		0454	2.8
	0454	3.2		1048	4.2
	1030	4.0		1754	1.5
	1806	1.6	29	0030	3.7
15	0118	3.5		0542	2.6
	0542	3.0		1136	4.1
	1118	4.0		1824	1.8
	1830	1.7			

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Date	Time	Height	Date	Time	Height
30	0048	3.8	31	0112	3.9
	0630	2.4		0718	2.2
	1230	3.9		1324	3.6
	1854	2.0		1912	2.3

CHU LAI TIDES FOR AUGUST 1969

Date	Time	Height	Date	Time	Height
01	0248	4.2	16	0130	4.3
	0450	4.1		0512	4.0
	1154	5.7		1124	5.4
	1948	2.2		1854	2.5
02	0248	4.3	17	0130	4.5
	0630	4.0		0624	3.7
	1242	5.2		1224	5.0
	2006	2.7		1918	2.9
03	0254	4.5	18	0148	4.7
	0800	3.8		0736	3.5
	1342	4.7		1324	4.6
	2018	3.1		1936	3.2
04	0312	4.8	19	0206	5.0
	0942	3.6		0854	3.2
	1442	4.1		1448	4.2
	2012	3.5		1942	3.6
05	0330	5.0	20	0236	5.3
	1142	3.3		1024	5.3
	1712	3.6		1700	3.8
	1848	3.6		1918	3.8
06	0400	5.3	21	0312	5.5
	1324	2.9		1154	2.5
07	0436	5.5	22	0400	5.8
	1436	2.5		1318	2.1
08	0512	5.7	23	0500	6.0
	1530	2.2		1424	1.7
09	0554	5.8	24	0606	6.1
	1600	2.0		1518	1.5
10	0642	5.9	25	0712	6.2
	1630	1.9		1608	1.5
11	0730	5.9	26	0818	6.2
	1654	1.8		1654	1.6
12	0818	5.9	27	0924	6.1
	1718	1.8		1730	1.8
13	0906	5.9	28	0042	4.2
	1742	1.9		0336	4.0
14	0954	5.8		1024	5.9
	1806	2.0		1806	2.2

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Date	Time	Height
15	0142	4.2
	0354	4.2
	1036	5.6
	1830	2.3
29	0042	4.2
	0454	3.7
	1118	5.5
	1830	2.6
30	0048	4.4
	0554	3.5
	1212	5.1
	1854	3.1
31	0100	4.6
	0700	3.2
	1312	4.6
	1900	3.5

HUE TIDES FOR AUGUST 1969

Date	Time	Height
01	0313	3.1
	0430	3.0
	1324	7.8
	2017	1.3
02	0319	3.6
	0557	3.1
	1411	6.9
	2039	2.1
03	0337	4.2
	0721	3.1
	1458	5.8
	2051	2.7
04	0404	4.8
	0853	3.3
	1547	4.8
	2050	3.0
05	0436	5.4
	1045	3.1
	1647	3.9
	2026	3.3
06	0514	6.0
	1317	2.7
07	0602	6.4
	1517	2.1
08	0655	6.7
	1614	1.6
09	0755	6.9
	1654	1.3
10	0852	7.2
	1727	1.2
11	0944	7.3
16	0218	3.7
	0452	3.3
	1305	6.7
	1935	2.1
17	0227	4.2
	0558	3.1
	1345	6.3
	1947	2.5
18	0242	4.6
	0707	3.1
	1428	5.5
	1954	3.0
19	0303	5.2
	0826	3.0
	1522	4.6
	1951	3.3
20	0333	5.8
	1000	2.7
	1639	3.7
	1925	3.4
21	0412	6.4
	1158	2.2
22	0504	7.0
	1351	1.6
23	0609	7.3
	1507	1.1
24	0724	7.8
	1603	0.6
25	0838	8.1
	1648	0.5
26	0946	8.2

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Date	Time	Height
	1755	1.1
12	1031	7.5
	1821	1.2
13	1113	7.5
	1843	1.2
14	1151	7.5
	1903	1.5
15	0223	3.4
	0339	3.3
	1229	7.2
	1920	1.8
	1727	0.6
27	1045	8.2
	1801	0.9
28	0122	3.4
	0255	3.1
	1140	7.9
	1829	1.3
29	0118	3.7
	0420	3.0
	1232	7.3
	1852	1.9
30	0132	4.3
	0532	2.7
	1321	6.6
	1909	2.5
31	0152	4.9
	0639	2.5
	1409	5.7
	1917	3.0

SA HUYNH TIDES FOR AUGUST 1969

Date	Time	Height
01	0153	2.9
	0430	2.8
	1204	6.0
	2017	1.7
02	0159	3.2
	0597	2.9
	1251	5.4
	2039	2.2
03	0217	3.6
	0721	2.9
	1338	4.7
	2051	2.6
04	0244	4.0
	0853	3.0
	1327	4.0
	2050	2.8
05	0315	4.4
	1045	2.9
	1527	3.4
	2026	3.0
06	0354	4.8
	1317	2.6
07	0442	5.1
	1517	2.2
16	0058	3.3
	0452	3.0
	1145	5.3
	1935	2.2
17	0107	2.6
	0558	2.9
	1225	5.0
	1947	2.5
18	0925	3.9
	0707	2.9
	1308	4.5
	1954	2.8
19	0143	4.3
	0826	2.8
	1402	3.9
	1951	3.0
20	0213	4.7
	1000	2.6
	1519	3.3
	1925	3.1
21	0252	5.1
	1158	2.3
22	0344	5.5
	1451	1.9

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Date	Time	Height
08	0536	5.3
	1614	1.9
09	0635	5.4
	1654	1.7
10	0732	5.6
	1727	1.6
11	0824	5.7
	1755	1.5
12	0911	5.8
	1821	1.6
13	0953	5.8
	1843	1.7
14	1031	5.8
	1903	1.8
15	0103	3.0
	0339	3.0
	1109	5.6
	1920	2.0

Date	Time	Height
23	0449	5.7
	1507	1.5
24	0604	6.0
	1603	1.2
25	0718	6.2
	1648	1.1
26	0826	6.3
	1727	1.2
27	0925	6.3
	1801	1.4
28	0002	3.1
	0255	2.9
	1020	6.1
	1829	1.7
	2358	3.3
29	0420	2.8
	1112	5.7
	1852	2.1
30	0011	3.7
	0532	2.6
	1201	5.2
	1909	2.5
31	0032	4.1
	0639	2.5
	1249	4.6
	1917	2.8

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ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

JCS CONTROL NUMBER	COPY NO.
	2

MACH. C	DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT	PRI.	SEC.	ORIGINATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.	NO. CYS. RECD.	MICFILM CLAS.	MO.	DA.	YR.
	C92[illegible]196	PERIODIC INTEL RPT 31-69	3K	NAVY FILE NUMBER	MEF 091469		2	48059	DATE		

ROUTING - *Use numbers to show order of routing*

OPERATION CODE

X-ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET
A-FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION
B-FOR COMPLIANCE
C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF _____
D-FOR COMMENT
E-FOR RECOMMENDATION
F-FOR CONCURRENCE
G-FOR INFORMATION
H-RETURN TO _____
I- _____
J-DISPOSITION _____

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
					COMMANDANT
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
1	A	8/13			G-3
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
					JOINT CONTROL
					COUNSEL
					WOMEN MARINES
					STAFF DENTAL
					STAFF MEDICAL
					STAFF CHAPLAIN
					CLASSIFIED FILES

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5 August 1969



UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 31-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE



GROUP - 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
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for Viet Cong political and military cadre. While it is still too early to state with any certainty, the purpose of these meetings may well be to disseminate new politics and missions as well as to critique the results of the Spring and Summer Campaign. No radical changes of policy are expected, but minor shifts in emphasis or tactics are possible.

In summary, Viet Cong counterintelligence and VCI related activity continues to reflect intense efforts to discredit and destroy the GVN through political subversion, terrorism, and supporting intelligence activity, while concurrently strengthening their own political organization represented by revolutionary committees at the village level and the PRG at the national level.

a. QUANG TRI (P). During the reporting period sightings/incidents increased to 321 with 74 of these sightings north of the BEN HAI River. A total of 233 hostile targets were taken under fire this week by artillery, tactical air strikes and naval gunfire.

There were three light attacks by fire emanating from the southern half of the DMZ during the past week. These attacks all consisted of light mortar fire (under 20 rounds per incident) and resulted in only one wounded.

Enemy initiated activity in QUANG TRI (P) was generally characterized by attacks by fire in the area below the central and eastern DMZ. The majority of the remaining activity in the province occurred in the same general area and was the result of friendly initiated contacts by the 3rd Marines and the 11th Infantry.

In the eastern DMZ area, two attacks by fire were directed against combat bases. On 29 July, A-2 Combat Base (YD 213743) received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Three days later, C-2 Combat Base (YD 135645) received twenty-four 107mm rockets in two volleys (18 rockets at 1230H and six more at 1735H). Neither attack resulted in any casualties or damage. Slightly to the west in the central DMZ area, K/3/3 Marines 10 kilometers northwest of CAM LO (YD 072679) received 35-40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in light casualties. The next day K/3/3 Marines received heavy small arms and RPG fire from an estimated enemy platoon. Throughout the week there were several contacts in this same general area with the heaviest contact occurring when elements of the 11th Mechanized Infantry engaged enemy forces on the 30th and 31st. The infantrymen killed 21 NVA in these two contacts; however, a medevac helicopter in support of the 11th Infantry was shot down by an RPG. Nevertheless, total casualties inflicted on the enemy in this area immediately to the west and southwest of CON THIEN numbered 81 killed. A prisoner and captured documents have indicated the presence of two separate enemy units in this area, the 31st Group and the 27th Regiment. It is possible that both of these units are operating in this area on specific mission-oriented assignments without rigid areas of operation.

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The northwestern quadrant of QUANG TRI (P) was quiet. There were no intelligence indicators which would signify any build-up of the enemy in this area. South of Route 9, ground and aerial surveillance efforts have uncovered no new activity of the 24B Regiment. This regiment is currently located south of KHE SANH by III MAF OOB.

To the southeast in approximately the same area in which ARVN elements were heavily engaged last week, 2/1 ARVN engaged an unknown size enemy force (YD 193243) killing seven of the enemy and uncovering a sizable weapons and equipment cache as indicated in paragraph 2.s of this PERINTREP.

As a result of the discoveries made during the past few weeks in this area, there is a growing body of evidence that the location of the 88th Hospital and the supply caches may represent the 7th Front's current safehaven. Base Area 101, long the home of the 7th Front, was recently eliminated due to the fact that many friendly incursions into this area had forced the enemy to abandon it and it no longer met the security criteria required of an NVA/VC base area. Regardless of this fact, the 7th Front is continuing to operate in eastern QUANG TRI (P) and it would be logical for the enemy to have developed a new base area approximately 15 kilometers to the southwest of the old one. It is estimated that this location, more remote yet in the vicinity of a tributary of the DA KRONG thus affording them a supply route leading to LAOS, may well be the 7th Front's current base area. This view is further substantiated by the continued contacts being made in this vicinity reflecting the enemy's interest in the area regardless of the presence of substantial ARVN Forces.

b. THUA THIEN (P). Enemy initiated activity in THUA THIEN (P) was extremely light during the past week with only one light attack by fire reported in the western portion of the province and one bridge sabotage incident seven kilometers east southeast of CAMP EVANS (YD 610312). This resulted in a fire that destroyed a 242 foot timber bridge on Route 1. The attack by fire in the western portion of the province occurred seven kilometers south southeast of A LUOI (YC 409939) when 2/3 ARVN received three rounds of unknown type mortar fire resulting in light friendly casualties. The only other noteworthy incident in the A SHAU Valley area was the discovery of 10 enemy bodies seven and one-half kilometers west southwest of A LUOI (YC 310988).

The remaining action in the province was the result of several friendly initiated small unit contacts in the eastern region. The most significant of these contacts occurred on the 28th when 1/54 ARVN had two contacts with enemy forces 10-11 kilometers south southwest of PHU LOC (ZC 018929 - ZC 028914). These contacts resulted in 26 NVA killed in action. Although no unit identifications were made in these contacts this is the general operating area of the 4th NVA Regiment.

c. QUANG NAM (P). The tempo and intensity of enemy initiated activity in QUANG NAM (P) was extremely light during the week with only one attack on a population center reported. This attack occurred on 30 July when HUONG SON Village six kilometers north northwest of HILL 55 was attacked

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by two enemy platoons. The NVA moved the people out of their homes then burned 12 huts down. There were no friendly casualties; however, this incident reflects the increased enemy effort to discredit the GVN's ability to protect the people in QUANG NAM (P).

In the DURHAM PEAK AO, enemy units chose to remain out of contact with the only significant enemy initiated action being the downing of a CH-46 medevac helicopter 14 kilometers east southeast of AN HOA (AT 971405). In this same area, the cumulative total casualties inflicted on the enemy in Operation DURHAM PEAK, now in its 15th day, number 40 KIA.

During the week prisoners were captured from the 31st, 141st 90th, and 36th Regiments as well as one PW from the T.89 Sapper Battalion. These prisoners provided recent information concerning the present location and future intentions of these units.

The prisoner from the 90th Regiment, who was captured on the southern slope of the central QUE SON Mountains (AT 9939) on 2 August, was on a rice carrying mission at the time he was captured by 2/5 Marines. He located two battalions of the 90th Regiment in southeastern Base Area 112 (ZC 1737) and (ZC 1835) with the third battalion well to the south near the QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN border (AT 8326).

He further stated that it is his estimate that the 90th Regiment will not be able to conduct operations in the immediate future due to the heavy casualties they have sustained. In consequence, the 90th Regiment is presently preparing for the rainy season by building a base camp in Base Area 112.

A prisoner taken from the T.89 Sapper Battalion on 30 July, also in the QUE SON Mountain area (AT 9742), provided information indicating that the T.89 was seeking to avoid contact. He stated that his unit was located in the vicinity of his place of capture until 17 July when it displaced 10 kilometers to the south to the village of SON TRA (BT 0033). It is interesting to note that this displacement occurred 72 hours prior to the commencement of DURHAM PEAK. This PW knew of no impending NVA/VC attack plans but understood that at some undetermined moment in the future the T.89 would coordinate with the D.7 Battalion, the 3rd Sappers, and the 36th Regiment to conduct ambushes.

The new prisoners this week from the 31st and 141st Regiments were both captured on rice carrying missions in the QUANG NAM Lowlands (141st - AT 923703; 31st - AT 935651). The information they provided serves to confirm the locations presently held on these two regiments, which are in the mountains north of THUONG DUC in the case of the 141st, and in the WORTH RIDGE area (AT 8770) for the 31st.

Our most recent prisoner from the 2nd Battalion, 36th Regiment was captured on 1 August by the 5th ARVN Regiment four kilometers west of LZ ROSS (BT 0035). He stated that his battalion was now acquiring supplies from a location eight kilometers southeast of LZ BALDY (BT 1538).

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The review of the information elicted from enemy PW's taken during the past week in QUANG NAM (P) indicates that the enemy is either remaining in his base areas or is withdrawing even further to the south and west away from the lowlands south of DANANG.

d. QUANG TIN (P). Enemy initiated activity in QUANG TIN (P) was extremely light during the reporting period with only one significant engagement occurring in the central portion of the province. On 2 July, B/1/501st Infantry 13 kilometers south southeast of TIEN PHUOC (BT 134015) received heavy small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. With this one exception, there was a complete lack of contact with enemy units. Agent reports have been received indicating that this lull is a resupply period which would soon be completed and a more active period would follow with TAM KY mentioned as a possible target.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). As in the other provinces of ICTZ, QUANG NGAI (P) was quiet during the week. The only significant action occurred as the result of aggressive operations by the TRA BONG Camp Strike Force Company. This unit overran an enemy base camp 17 kilometers southwest of TRA BONG (BS 222761) killing 10 NVA.

There was one change in III MAF order of battle holdings with the 9th Sapper Battalion added to III MAF OOB in southeastern QUANG NGAI (P) (BS 6436) while the 526th Sapper Battalion was dropped as a battalion sized unit. The companies of the 526th are still located to the north and northwest of QUANG NGAI City but are considered to be operating independently rather than under battalion subordination.

In QUANG NGAI (P) as in QUANG TIN (P) agent reports have been received indicating the possible resumption of enemy offensive activities. The most frequent mentioned target has been QUANG NGAI City. While this is possible, there are no other indicators pointing to resumption of NVA/VC offensive actions.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. It is estimated that there will be little change in the tempo of enemy activity during the coming week. All indications continue to point to the conclusion that the enemy will conduct only limited operations. In all areas of confrontation throughout I Corps, the DMZ, western QUANG TRI (P), the A SHAU Valley, PHU LOC, the DANANG TAOR and the coastal lowlands of QUANG NGAI and QUANG TIN Provinces, there are few indications of renewed enemy offensive operations. It is also significant to note that there were no attacks by fire recorded against the major cities of I Corps during the week. DANANG City itself has received no rockets in 57 days. This is the longest period that the DANANG area has been free of rocket attacks in the past nineteen months.

a. Strength and Disposition. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

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c. Reserve Reinforcement. Annex A.

d - g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire decreased from 123 to 117 for the reporting period and 31 aircraft sustained hits.

i - j. Negative.

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 27 July - 2 August:

Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	86
60mm Mortar	131
Unk Cal Mortar	21
107mm Rocket	18
TOTAL	256

l - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance. There were 77 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 27 July - 2 August. These long-range patrols reported 40 sightings and five contacts totaling 325 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of 15 enemy KIA.

s. Captured Enemy Caches.

(1) The following significant cache was captured in the ICTZ during the period 20-26 July:

(a) 25 July: B/1/52, 198th Infantry Brigade while operating 15 kilometers east southeast of TRA BONG (BS 499804) located a rice cache as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
8,145 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was discovered in open terrain. The rice was stored in twenty-eight 55 gallon drums and two cement crocks which were concealed within false walls of several huts. The condition of the rice was good. No further information was available on this cache.

(2) The following significant caches were discovered in the ICTZ during the period 27 July-2 August:

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(a) 29 July: C/1/7 Marines while operating 10 kilometers west of DAI LOC (AT 826537) discovered a food cache as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
6,000 LBS	Native Grown	Corn

This cache was found in flat open terrain and was located in three small huts. The corn was contained in unmarked wicker baskets and burlap sacks. All of the corn was spoiled. No further information on this cache was available.

(b) 30 July: Members of C/1/52, 198th Infantry Brigade operating 14 kilometers south southwest of BINH SON (BS 553778) located a rice cache as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
7,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was discovered in open terrain. The rice was covered with plastic and stored on wooden boards within a tunnel. The condition of the rice was good. No further information on this cache was available.

(c) 31 July: C/1/20 of the 11th Infantry Brigade found a rice cache while operating eight kilometers south southeast of MO DUC (BS 738457) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
7,040 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was located in open terrain and was stored between the walls in two huts. No containers were used and the condition of the rice was good. No further information on this cache was available.

(d) 31 July: C/1/52, 198th Infantry Brigade discovered a rice cache while operating 14 kilometers south southwest of BINH SON (BS 545776) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
4,500 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was discovered in open terrain. The rice was found on the floor in a brick building and the area around the building containing this rice cache was mined. The condition of the rice was known. The building and the rice were destroyed. The troops were led to this cache by a Hoi Chanh.

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(e) 1 August: 2/1 ARVN while operating 27 kilometers south southeast of CA LU (YD 183247) discovered an ordnance cache as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
8 EA	UNK	60mm Mortar Tubes
57 EA	UNK	AK-47s(New)
300 EA	UNK	RPG Rounds
7 EA	UNK	Light Machine Guns
220 LBS	UNK	Medical Supplies

No further information on this cache was available.

(f) 1 August: 2/1 ARVN later discovered a second ordnance cache 27 kilometers south southeast of CA LU (YD 185247) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
100 EA	UNK	RPG-2 Rounds
6 EA	UNK	AK-47s
2 EA	CHICOM	C-9 Radios
3 EA	CHICOM	C-10 Radios
1 EA	CHICOM	Telephone Set
600 EA	UNK	60mm Mortar Rounds

No further information on this cache was available.

(3) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 27 July-2 August:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery and Rocket Ammunition.

Type	Amount
120mm Mortar	1
82mm Mortar	93
81mm Mortar	57
60mm Mortar	697
175mm Artillery	1
155mm Artillery	1
105mm Artillery	7
8" Howitzer	1
122mm Rocket	2
106mm RR	1
57mm RR	20
TOTAL	881

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b. Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured.

Individual Weapons	280
Crew-Served Weapons	53

(4) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 27 July-2 August:

Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
27 Jul	(BT 023483)	200	H/2/5
27 Jul	(BT 033480)	250	H/2/5
28 Jul	(BS 562766)	2,000	C/1/52
28 Jul	(AT 957556)	20	L/3/1
28 Jul	(AT 983608)	500	D/1/1
28 Jul	(AT 965419)	60	I/3/5
28 Jul	(BS 712885)	500	D/5/46
28 Jul	(YD 665150)	450	ARVN
29 Jul	(AT 831488)	500	D/1/7
29 Jul	(AT 826537)	6,000 Food	C/1/7
29 Jul	(AT 826537)	500	C/1/7
29 Jul	(BS 549772)	3,000	C/1/52
29 Jul	(BT 201126)	200	RCN/1/502
30 Jul	(BS 553778)	7,000	C/1/52
30 Jul	(YD 875245)	800	D/1/501
31 Jul	(BS 517713)	35	C/3/1
31 Jul	(BS 738457)	7,040	C/ /20
31 Jul	(AT 974399)	100	M 3/5
31 Jul	(BT 216115)	1,500 Salt	RLN/1/502
31 Jul	(BS 726868)	1,000	D/5/46
1 Aug	(BS 545776)	4,500	C/1/52
1 Aug	(BT 230133)	10	C/1/502
1 Aug	(BT 232126)	25	C/1/502
1 Aug	(BT 232126)	2,000	C/1/502
2 Aug	(ZC 129925)	60	C/1/502
2 Aug	(BS 677905)	50	B/5/46
	Total Rice	30,800	
	Total Food	6,000	
	Total Salt	1,500	

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	220	Structures Damaged	32
Bunkers Destroyed	183	Bunkers Damaged	39
Secondary Explosions	51	Secondary Fires	48
		Boats Destroyed	3

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

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a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative.

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ decreased in comparison to the previous week. There were 629 KIA's, 16 VC PW's and five NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative.

h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather.

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period.

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	97	104	103	102
Low	78	81	78	79
Rainfall (total)	.05	0	.03	.05
Winds (knots)	23	13	6	4
Visibility (miles)	7	7	11	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 2 August-8 August 1969.

General: Southwest low level wind flow will remain weak to moderate during the first two days of the period, allowing slight improvements in amounts of morning stratus in the western highlands. It is expected that flow will increase over the following three days resulting in increased morning low stratiform cloudiness which will extend into the afternoons. Occasional weak low pressure systems and troughs will form offshore of ICTZ creating slight increases in shower activity and cloudiness. Otherwise, normal southwest monsoon weather is expected over most of ICTZ during the period.

ICTZ Forecast: The outlook for the ICTZ area for the forecasting period is partly cloudy to occasionally cloudy with isolated thundershowers in the evening through early morning hours. Surface winds will be 10-20 knots, with isolated gusts of 30-35 knots in exposed locations. Precipitation will be 0.5-1.0 inches with isolated instances of 1-2 inches.

j. - l. Negative.

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4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following course of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/ areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to five infantry regiment equivalents, supported by the equivalent of one naval sapper battalion and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack VANDEGRIFT Combat Base with one infantry regiment supported by one sapper battalion and one artillery battalion.

(3) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(5) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with up to five infantry regiments, supported by four rocket battalions, one sapper battalion and one engineer battalion.

(6) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division equivalent, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/ rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(8) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

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d. Based on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to seven infantry regiment equivalents.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdrew into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities.

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield, sickness, hunger, shortage of ammunition and medical supplies and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

W. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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COMUSMACV (MACV J-232) (CIIED)	2	CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4	CO 517TH MI DET	1
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CO 3RD MP BN	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CO 8TH RR FS	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHU LAI	4
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2	CO MCB 5	1
CG USARV	3	CO MCB 3	1
CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	5	CO MCB 4	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CO MCB 6	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CO MCB 7	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO MCB 8	1
CG 1ST MAR DIV	60	CO MCB 9	1
CG 3RD MAR DIV	35	CO MCB 10	1
CG 82ND ABN	2	CO MCB 11	1
CG AMERICAL DIV	30	CTG 115.1	1
CG 101ST ABN DIV	20	CO MCB 40	1
CG 1ST MAW	30	CO MCB 53	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO MCB 58	1
CG USASUPCOM DANANG	1	CO MCB 62	1
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	CO MCB 71	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CO MCB 121	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1	OSA/EMB SAIGON ATTN: RAS	1
		DODSPECREP	1
CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SAIGON	3	DSA I CORPS	11
CG 173RD ABN BDE	2	DSA II CORPS	1
CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7	MCB 133	1
CG FLC	5	DET B 1ST MIBARS	1
CG 1ST LOG CMD LONG BINH	1	HQ, 212TH COMBAT AVN BN	6
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	COMM 7TH PLT	1
CO 30 NCR	1	366 AIR SECURITY SQD, USAF	2
CIB	1	29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1
CTG 79.5	1	7TH PSYOPS BN	1
CTG 79.4	1	CICV	4
CTG 76.5	1	III MAF LNO 2ND ROKMC BDE	1
CTG 76.4	1	620TH TSC	1
CTF 76	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CO DASC ATTN: AVCA-GN-DN-OP	2	CTF CW. PBR BASE ONE, NSA DANANG	1
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	3	SPO-SEC CMD QUI NHON	1
CO "B" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	5	DIRECTOR, CAP III MAF	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	17	CO USS REPOSE	1
		CO USS SANCTUARY	1
1ST CAG	1	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
2ND CAG	1	CO 4TH PSYOP GP	1
3RD CAG	1	CO 1ST BN 525TH MI GP DANANG	2
4TH CAG	1	620TH TCS (ATTN: CRC)APO 96203	1
7 AF (IGS) BDOC	1	OUT OF COUNTRY	
45TH ENGR GROUP	1	DIR. NSA	3
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2	CMC (A02) (AIRMAIL)	2
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	1	CG FMFPAC (AIRMAIL)	2

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CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP 7TH FLEET	1
CG MCDEC	5
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE) 69-69	1
CG 3RD MAW	2
TEAM COMMANDER 19TH CI TEAM CAMP PENDLETON	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CG 2ND MAR DIV	2
CG 5TH MAR DIV	6
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO FICPAC (ATTN: SEN MAR OFF)	1
CG 4TH MAR DIV CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF	1
355TH TFW (DCOI)	1
432ND TFW (DCOI)	1
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
388TH TFW (DCOI)	1

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 31-69 AS OF 022400H AUGUST 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-HQ	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	11	3,285	2	605			13	3,890	14	6,195	27	10,085
Bn's-Maneuver	40	10,860	11	2,275	5	840	56	13,975	33	14,025	89	28,100
Bn's-Support	18	5,105			1	140	19	5,245	7	2,080	26	7,325
Separate Co's	1	130			34	2,730	35	2,860	1	80	36	2,940
TOTAL CONFIRMED		21,345		2,880		3,710		27,935		23,915		52,850
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's	1	575					1	575	3	955	4	1,570
Bn's-Maneuver	6	2,195	1	350	1	110	8	2,660	7	2,660	15	5,315
Bn's-Support	4	1,045	1	220			5	1,265	9	1,445	14	2,710
Separate Co's	1	90			3	195	4	285			4	285
TOTAL PROBABLE		3,905		570		305		4,780		5,555		10,335
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,400	3	1,400
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support									22	7,675	22	7,675
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										10,015		10,015
		25,250		3,450		4,015		32,715		39,485		72,200

*See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,450		150	3,600
	Probable	2,095			2,095
	Possible				
	TOTAL	5,545		150	5,695
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	4,165		670	4,835
	Probable			45	45
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,165		715	4,880
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	6,665	280	955	7,900
	Probable	830	350		1,180
	Possible				
	TOTAL	7,495	630	955	9,080
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,735	1,155	600	4,490
	Probable	380	220	185	785
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,115	1,375	785	5,275
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,330	1,445	1,335	7,110
	Probable	600		75	675
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,930	1,445	1,410	7,785

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS																DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL											
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	34	3		37	8			8	5			5	47	3		50	32	5		37	79	8		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	40	6		46	11	1		12	5	1		6	56	8		64	33	7		40	89	15		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	8	1		9		1		1	1			1	9	2		11	2	5	10	17	11	7	10	28
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	3	1	5	3	3	1	7
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2		1	2	3	1	2	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
TOTAL SUPPORT	18	4		22		1		1	1			1	19	5		24	7	9	22	38	26	14	22	62
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	58	10		68	11	2		13	6	1		7	75	13		88	40	16	22	78	115	29	22	166

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	354	Nam Hoa	70	Hoa Vang	588	Thang Binh	1,140	Binh Son	239
	Mai Linh	87	Huong Tra	58	Hieu Duc	78	Tam Ky	731	Son Tinh	490
	Trieu Phong	197	Hong Dien	59	Dien Ban	1,085	Ly Tin	120	Tu Nghia	456
	Cam Lo	265	Vinh Loc	68	Dai Loc	387	Hiep Duc	242	Nghia Hanh	310
	Gio Linh	202	Phu Loc	231	Thuong Duc	92	Tien Phuoc	274	Mo Duc	675
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	375	Hau Duc	230	Duc Pho	462
	Huong Hoa	14	Phu Vang	43	Que Son	761			Tra Bong	170
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	190	Duy Xuyen	1,137			Ba To	124
			Huong Thuy	101	Hieu Nhon	445			Minh Long	15
			Phong Dien	451					Son Ha	188
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	1,227	THUA THIEN	1,317	QUANG NAM	4,948	QUANG TIN	2,737	QUANG NGAI	3,129

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 13,358

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,195		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Vic XD 6233	XD 8337/18Jun69
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	2,210		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unlocated	
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unloc LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unloc LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unloc LAOS	

*See note #4 on Page A-17
**See note #2 on Page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,950		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,900		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	500		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8526/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,825		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	490	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
31st Group (-)	NVA	C	1,110		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	315	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2061/20Jul69
15th Bn	NVA	PR	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	390	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Secial Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,920		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,775		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
65th Arty Regt	NVA	PR	UNK		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.40 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.41 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.42 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.43 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,740		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,450		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	365	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0566/22May69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
24B (AKA 57th) Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	XD 8732	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	XD 8732	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	XD 8732	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	XD 8732	XD 8754/26Jun69
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,665		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	XD 7964/12Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	400	XD 9265	XD 9666/26May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	395	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	400	XD 8854	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,805		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	330	YD 3639	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	215	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	190	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	250	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn, 812th Regt	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	200	Vic YD 3535	

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	925		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	AU 8100/10Jun68
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	290	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	285	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jul69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,865		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 7896	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	360	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	215	Vic YD 6514	YD 6822/14Jun69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	270	Vic YD 7504	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	220	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
3rd Bn, 803rd Regt	NVA	C	360	Vic YC 3193	YC 3389/19Jul69
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	220	Vic YD 3304	YD 3302/20Jun69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	220	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
C.113 Co	LF	C	145	Vic YD 5043	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
C.117 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 9516	YD 9022/250ct68
C.118 Co	LF	C	55	Vic YD 9518	YD 9917/12Sep68
C.119 Co	LF	PR	45	Vic YD 9424	YD 9424/27Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69
9th Bn, 29th Regt	NVA	C	335	Vic YC 3297	YC 3297/23Jul69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	15,000		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
1st Bn, 68B Arty Regt	NVA	C	315	AT 8042	
HAI VAN Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,025		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102nd Bn	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 9274/19May69
103rd Bn	NVA	C	325	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
36th Regt	NVA	C	600		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	210	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	130	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	130	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	130	AT 9737	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,365		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	AT 8046	
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	AT 8046	AT 8247/11Jun69
8th Bn	NVA	C	410	AT 8046	
9th Bn	NVA	C	360	AT 8046	AT 8347/17Jun69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
368B Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,170		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
R.2C Bn	LF	C	155	BT 0763	AT 9967/11May69
V.25 Bn	LF	C	160	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
V.7 Bn	NVA	C	265	Vic GO NOI Island	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	70	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	290	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	350	Unloc vic HOA VANG (D)	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	85	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	105	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	120	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	115	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	140	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST ST ENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	4,625		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	Unlocated	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	850		
Regt Hq	MF	C	230	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	210	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	200	BT 2711	BT 2416/14May69
90th Bn	MF	C	210	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	710		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200	BT 1317	
1st Bn	NVA	C	150	BT 1317	BT 1115/14May69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	185	BT 1317	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	175	BT 1317	BT 0222/4Jun68
70th Bn	MF	C	100	BT 1523	BT 3219/25Feb69
72nd Bn	LF	C	215	BT 2932	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	140	BT 1408	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	110	BT 3127	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	205	BT 2232	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	PR	220	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4212	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	50	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	75	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	45	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	175	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	135	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
81st Co	LF	C	95	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	215	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb68
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	600	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	220	BS 4677	BS 7268/20May68
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	180	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	810		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	160	BS 4386	AT 8349/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	210	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 4386	AT 8349/27Feb69
95th Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68
C.17 Co	LF	C	60	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	90	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	75	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	85	BS 7555	BS 7061/17Nov68
C.120 Co	LF	C	70	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,775		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	1,010		
Regt Hq	MF	C	375	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	200	BS 6733	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	215	BS 7932	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	220	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,030		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	BS 5262	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	260	BS 5262	BS 5262/27May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	290	BS 6646	BS 5262/27May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	295	BS 5262	BS 5262/27May69

See note #2 on page A-17

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CONFIDENTIAL QUANG NGAI (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 3147	BS 7543/11Jun69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 3970/26Aug68
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 3147	BS 0433/4Mar69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28Mayo8
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 3147	
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	65	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	95	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69

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BINH DINH PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	925		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	275	BINH DINH	CR 0952/23Jun68
7th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 9640/12Apr68
8th Bn	NVA	C	250	BINH DINH	CR 0933/23Apr68
9th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 8955/29May68

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*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes in I CT during period 270001H July 1969 to 022400H August 1969.

a. The 9th Bn, 29th Regt is relocated to THUA THIEN (P) based on statements of PW Doan Van Ke, 9th Bn, 29th Regt, captured on 23 July 1969 in the vicinity of (YC 3297).

b. The 526 LF Sapper Bn is dropped from OOB holdings based on a document cptd on 31May69 vic (BS 487765) which stated the Bn will be dissolved and the lack of information on the Hq's 526th Bn since 15 Apr 69. The Co's that composed the Bn, (506A-506B and 21st) are relisted as separate Co's.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. DMZ (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the Headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct opreational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

9. Subordination/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF SUPLINTEP 27-69 for the latest listing.

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9. Subordination/operational control, "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter Box Numbers (LBN), Armament, and Personalities listing.

NORTHERN I CORPS/DMZ/LAOS

UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
B-5 Front	DMZ Front			Chief of the Rear Service Staff Dept B-5 Front; Hoang KHUE
12th AT Bn			18x7.62mm LMG	
13th Arty Bn			12x60mm Mort 6xHMG 3x82mm Mort 50xLMG/SMG 12x120mm Mort	
14th AA Bn				CO-Luu Van MAN
15th Engr Bn				CO-Capt LOI XO-SrLt TAI
16th Signal Bn				
17th Trans Bn				
19th Medical Bn				

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
304th NVA Div	"Cua Cao" Div; Vin Quang Group		5x82mm Mort 3x75mm RR 9xLMG 5xHMG	CO-SrCol Hoang KIEN XO-Maj HIEN PO-Col CAM APO-LtCol Pham Xuan KINH
Div Hq				
14th AA Bn				
15th Engr Bn				
16th Sig Bn				
18th Med Bn				
19th Trans Bn				
20th Sap Bn		13741 US	9x82mm Mort 9x60mm Mort ?xB-40	CO-Capt Ha Van CU XO-Capt Le Van LOI
9th Regt	U-1; U-9; E-9; D-9; F-9 Song Lo Regt 1			CO-LtCol HOA PO-LtCol Le Dang DUY CofS-KHAM
1st Bn	T-1; D-1	13634 IS (?)		CO-Capt Nguyen Huu TOAN XO-Dac Duy NHAT CofS-Capt A APO-SrLt Dang XUAN

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NORTHERN ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd Bn	T-2; D-2	13639 IS (?)		CO-SrCapt Huynh Ngoc SON XO-Capt DUAN PO-SrCapt TUI APO-THANH
3rd Bn	T-3; D-3	13644 IS (?)		CO- XO- PO-Maj TAM
24B Regt	57th Regt; 2nd Regt; U-2; Yen Tu; E-2; 24th Regt			APO-
4th Bn				
5th Bn		13675 US 13676 US		
6th Bn		13678		
66th Regt	U-3; U-66; 4th Regt; E-3			CO-LtCol Ding Dinh HO XO- PO-LtCol Tran TRAC
7th Bn	T-7	13696 US (?)		CO-Capt TANH XO- PO-Capt NHI
8th Bn	T-8	13701 US		CO-Le Van TAN XO-1stLt NGOAN PO-JrCapt HIEN
9th Bn	T-9	13706 US (?)		CO-SrCapt HAND XO-Capt TRUNG PO-SrCapt TUY APO-PHUC CofS-Capt KHANG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
48th Arty Regt	U-4 (?)		22x105mm How	CO-Maj CIA
325th Div, B-5 Front	Nong Truong Tam Div; 308th Div			CO-Col BINH XO-LtCol KHAN PO-LtCol THAI
14th AA Bn			?x12.7mm AA HMG	
15th Trng Bn				
16th Med Bn				
17th Sig Bn				
18th Engr Bn				
19th DKZ Bn			?x122mm Rkt	
20th Trans Bn	D.20 Bn	18046 XP		CO-Capt Dang Van CO XO-1stLt Do Van THOA PO-JrCapt Tran Xuan THU APO-1stLt LUAN
21st Conval Bn				
25th Sapper Co				
20th Recon Co				
27th Cadre Co				

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
36th Regt	Doan Hong Vu; 1st Regt; 95th Regt	18409 RT		CO-Maj Pham HUNG
1st Bn	D-1; K-1		29xB-40,B-41 6xDKZ 57mm RR 3x82mm Mort 6x60mm Mort	CO-SrCapt TRUC PO-Capt NHAN
2nd Bn	D-2; K-2			
3rd Bn	D-3; K-3	92902		CO-Tran Minh DANG
38th Regt	7003B; F-88; Quyet Thang	62332 18439 TQ		CO-LtCol Do LUONG XO-Maj Nguyen Hung CHUONG PO-Maj DUC CofS-LtCol TRUC
4th Bn	D-4; Z-4			CO-Capt MY XO-1stLt LONG PO-Capt TRI
5th Bn		31278 US		
6th Bn				
102nd Regt	Me Cong; 1001; 7001; Thu Do (?); Dist 70			CO-LtCol LUC XO-Maj THAN PO-LtCol HIEN APO-Maj SUU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	Bn 71			
8th Bn	Bn 73			CO-Capt TAN
9th Bn	Bn 75			CO-Capt LOAN XO-Capt NGHI PO-Capt TAI APO-1stLt HAI
138th Regt, B-5 Front	Bach Dang Regt; 24 Indep Regt; 132nd Regt	30119 US		CO-HOAI XO-HO PO-DU APO-LANG CofS-LUAN
1st Bn		30516	?xLMG ?xB-40, B-41 ?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x12.7mm HMG ?x57mm RR	CO-KHAC XO-DUNG PO-NGOT
2nd Bn	Hau Loc (V), Hong Ha (D)	30521		CO-SrLt TAM XO-SrLt TAM
3rd Bn		30526 XB		CO-Capt HO XO-MAN PO-NGOT
246th Regt	246Z Regt; F-6; F-4			CO-Maj CHU XO-TIEP PO-Maj LONG

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UNIT	AKA	LRN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Bn	H-1; U-1; Phai Khat; K-1	93976 OK 93977 OK 93978 OK 93979 OK		CO-Capt Mac Tinh DANG XO-Mai Van TU PO-Dap THAI
2nd Bn	H-2; U-2	93978 OK		
3rd Bn	H-3; U-3			
270th Regt, B-5 Front	Quang Tri, E-270; 270th Battle Group; 32nd Regt	32549 XB		CO-LtCol Hoang Van DUON XO-Maj Tran Duc MINH APO-Capt LAM
4th Bn	268th Inf Bn; D47; 47th Regt; 47th Bn	32548 XB 32553 XB (?) 32549 XB		CO-TUAN XO-THIEN PO-Maj Nguyen Duy DUC APO-KHANH
5th Bn	310th Inf	32558 XB(?)		CO-SrCapt Duon Xuan HAI
6th Bn		31400 XB(?)	6x82mm Mort	CO-Capt TUONG PO-LINH
27th Regt, B-5 Front	Ken Giang; Phan Rang; 271st Regt	93900 OK		CO-Maj THAT PO-Maj Nguyen Trong TAN APO-Maj LE
1st Bn		93901 OK		
2nd Bn	43rd Bn, Nghe An (F Main Forces; K-2; 43d	93906 OK		

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UNIT	AKA	LRN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Bn	44th Bn, Ha Thinh (P) Main Forces; PR 12	93911 OK	4x82mm Mort 2xLMG 2x57mm RR (DKZ) 8xB-40	CO-1stLt Vo Xuan THAN XO-JrCapt Nguyen Duc DONG
78th Arty Regt, B-5 Front	E.78			
10th Bn	D.10			
11th Bn	D.11			
[illegible] Bn	D.12			
[illegible] Arty Regt, B-5 Front	"Van An" Regt		?x140mm Rkt ?x120mm Mort ?xB-41 ?x122mm Rkt	CO-Maj Ta VAN XO-Maj CO PO-Maj DU
2nd Bn	Thong Nhat; 3[illegible]i Bn(?) K-33	54279 RT (?)		
3rd Bn	Ha Thanh	54283 RT (?)		
4th Bn	Ha Dong	54289 RT (?) 54290 RT (?)	?x140mm Rkt ?x102mm Rkt ?x120mm Mort	CO-Capt HA XO-Le MAN PO-Lt Le Van THIEN APO-Phac THAM CofS-VAN

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
164th Arty Regt, B-5 Front				
1st Bn				
2nd Bn	D-2			CO-Nguyen Phuc TRUNG
3rd Bn				
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt, B-5 Front	K-1 Bn; K.33 Bn			CO-SrCapt LIEN XO-Capt LONG PO-SrCapt CUONG CofS-HUU
665B Arty Regt, B-5 Front	E675B			
Regt Hq				
1st Bn	D85 Bn		6x85mm How	
2nd Bn	D74/1 Bn		6x122mm Gun	
3rd Bn	D74/2 Bn		6x122mm Gun	
NVA Sap Combat Grp, 126th Naval Sapper Regt, B-5 Front	1A, 4007, 4002			CO-Thanh Van MINH XO-NO PO-SrLtCol KHANH APO-SrCapt THAI Rear Services-Capt THUOC Medical Officer-SrLt THAI

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UNIT	AKA	LRN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Co				Co Cmdr-Capt Duy TINH
2nd Co				
3rd Co				PO-SrLt Nguyen Xuan THU
4th Co				Co Cmdr-SrLt CHE XO-SrLt CHINH PO-Lt TRI
33rd Sapper Bn	Kontum; 33	94154 XB 94155 XB 94156 XB 94157 XB 94158 XB 94159 XB	3x60mm Mort 16xB-40 3xB-41	CO-Capt Thai Ba QUYEN XO-Capt THO PO-Capt NGON APO-Capt CHUONG CofS-1stLt Tran XUOC
31st Group, B-5 Front	Doan 31; Song Hong Grp; 31st Regt; Bach Dang			CO-Le Mong HUNG DCofS-Nguyen Duc MIEN
C.9 LF Co	H-30; 30-H; Cam Lo LF Co; K-9	41367 41368		CO-Thai Tang NGO XO-VAN PO-CHAM
C.10 LF Co	4001; 5th Co; Gio Linh Co; K.400 Local Force Co; T.10 Co; Gio Le Co; K.10	41369 41370	3x60mm Mort 2xB-40 6xBAR	CO-1stLt DAM
C.11 LF Sapper Co	K-11			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
27th Indep Bn, 31st Group	27th Support Bn; K-1; 2nd Bn; 7th Ind Bn; Tay Ninh Bn; Cam Lo Bn; 70th Indep Bn; 27th Regt; Song Giang(?); D-27 Co (COWL ZOX)	31728 KT	?xB-40 ?x120mm Mort ?xLMG ?x60mm Mort	CO-Capt THAO XO-2ndLt Nguyen Van DAT PO-Nguyen Khao UNG APO-WO Duong Dinh PHO
15th Bn, 31st Group		94081 OK		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
MRTTH, MR-IV				
MRTTH HQ	Northern Front; Northern Sub-Region; North Div HQ Phan Khu Bac; Di Hai; Tri Di Hai Thien Sector; K-500;	H-700 Bac Do BQ 20 FM		CG-MajGen Le Chuong (AKA Le Truong TIN) XO-Col Bui SINH (AKA DUNG SINH) FGPO-MajGen BAY FGAPO-Gen VAN CofS-Maj MINH
General Staff	K.400	41000 FM KC.10		ACofS-LtCol THAI CON
Operations Section		KC.1		Sec.Chief-LtCol Nguyen THOA
Military Intelligence Section		KC.2		Sec.Chief-Maj NGOC
Signal Section		KC.3		Sec.Chief-LtCol Hoang THANH
Personnel Section		KC.4		Sec.Chief-
Crypto Section		KC.5		Sec.Chief-
Sapper Section		KC.6		Sec.Chief-
Engineer Section		KC.7		Sec.Chief-
Artillery Section		KC.8		Sec.Chief-LtCol Trung KIEN
Training Section		KC.9		Sec.Chief-
Political Staff	K.300	41001 FM KP.12		ACofS-DOAN SUU
Cadre Affairs Section		KP.1		Sec.Chief
Organization Section		KP.2		Sec.Chief
Propaganda Section		KP.3		Sec.Chief
Security Guard Section		KP.4		Sec.Chief-SrCapt TRAN CUC
Military Proselyting Section	K.300B	41003 FM KQ.16		ACofS-Maj VU QUAN
Rear Services Staff	K.200	41002 FM KJ.14		ACofS-Maj KHAM
Plans Section		KJ.1		Sec.Chief-1st Lt DANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quartermaster Section		KJ.2		Sec.Chief-1stLt Tong Viet PHU
Ordnance Section		KJ.3		Sec.Chief-Capt HUONG
Medical Section		KJ.4		Sec.Chief-SrCapt Dinh Nhu DINH
Finance Section		KJ.5		Sec.Chief-
Political Section		KJ.6		Sec.Chief-
Militia Section	K.100	KZ.18		ACofS-LtCol Tong Ho TRINH
MRTTH HQ (FWD)		TBQ 20 FM		CO-SrCol Nguyen Nhu THIET AsstCmdr/CofS-Col Nguyen THI FGPO-Col Xuan TRA
7th Front, MRTTH	Quang Tri Lib. Front; 9th Front; Doan 7; AD.49	EFQ		CO-Col Sung LAM XO-LtCol Vu BINH PO-SrCol Vu THANG APO-LtCol Le Kha PHIEU CofS-LtCol Nguyen Van THU
STAFF SECTION		E1FQ		ACofs-
Plans Sec.				Sec.Chief-SrCapt Phan Van HY
Intelligence Sec.				Sec.Chief-JrCapt TOAN
Sapper Sec.				Sec.Chief-VU
Finance Sec.				Sec.Chief-Capt DUONG
Personnel Sec.				Sec.Chief-Nguyen Ngoc THO
Training Sec.				Sec.Chief-TAM
Signal Sec.				Sec.Chief-MANH
POLITICAL SECTION		E2FQ		AcofS-Maj TOAN
PROSELYTING SECTION		E3FQ		AcofS-Capt TUNG
Propaganda Sec.				Cmdr-1stLt TE
Reorientation Sec.				Cmdr-1stLt HIEU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
REAR SERVICE SECTION		E4FQ		ACofS-Maj KHAM
K-8 Bn, 7th Front	808th Bn; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Forces; 9th Indep Bn; Le Hong Phong Bn; Chu Luc	41344 FQ 41345 FQ 41346 FQ 41347 FQ 41348 FQ	12x60mm Mort 4x82mm Mort 2x75mm RR 2xLMG 48xB-40 12xB-41	CO-Capt Nguyen Duc HONG XO-Capt KHICH PO-Capt THANH APO-SrLt XICH CofS-SrLt Nguyen Thoc NHON
K-14 Bn, 7th Front	814th Bn; H-14; K-7; Bat Nhat	41349 FQ 41350 FQ 41351 FQ 41352 FQ 41353 FQ	3x57mm RR 1xB-40 2xLMG 2x81mm Mort 2x57mm RR	CO-SrCapt XOE XO- PO-Capt NONG APO- CofS-SrLt Tran Thien DUC
10th Sapper Bn, 7th Front	K.20 Bn; 10th Group; 30th Sapper Group; Quang Tri Sapper Unit	41354 FQ 41355 FQ 41356 FQ 41357 FQ 41358 FQ	?xB-40 ?xAK-47	CO-Capt Van DAU XO-SrLt Ho Van THUOC PO-CHINH
K-11 Sapper Bn, 7th Front				XO-BAO CofS-DAT
K-34 Arty Bn, 7th Front, MRTTH			18x122mm Rkt 6x122mm RL	CO-TRACH XO-TUAN PO-TO CofS-CHAT
812th Regt, 324B Div	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; Cong Truong; "1 May" Regt; 4th Regt Song Thu Bon; Ba Vi Song Cua; Thuan Doc Lap; Co Dong (Mobile) Regt; Song Huong Regt; 53rd Regt; Cua Thuan Regt; Nui Ba Vi; Thu Bon River Regt; Cong Truong 7; 7th Regt; D82; Doan 2; AD.35	41399 FQ(?) 31610 RT 31611 RT 31612 RT 31613 RT 31614 RT 31615 RT 31617 RT 31618 RT 31619 RT	?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x60mm Mort ?x57mm RR ?x12.7mm AA MG ?xLMG	CO-LtCol Tong Sy GUY PO-THUONG APO-Bui Van NANG XO-Maj Minh LONG CofS-Maj Nguyen The DAO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
4th Bn	K-4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn; K-18	31620 RT 31621 RT 31622 RT 31623 RT 31624 RT		CO-Capt PHUC XO-JrCapt ANH PO-Capt TRAM APO-1stLt TUYEN CofS-Lt BINH
5th Bn	K-5 Bn; Cong Huong Bn; Tuyen 4; T-4; 4 Ba Vi; D-4; K-16	31625 RT 31626 RT 31627 RT 31628 RT 31629 RT		CO-Nguyen Van PHONG XO- PO-2ndLt Nguyen Van BICH
6th Bn	K-6 Bn; D-6 Bn; Thu Bon; Cuu Long Bn; Tuyen 6; 6th Ba Vi Bn; K-8	31630 RT 31631 RT 31632 RT 31633 RT 31634 RT		CO-Capt Cao BA XO-Nguyen Xuan HOA PO-HAI
4th Regt, MRTTH	AD.14; Doan 4	41410 FT 41418 FT 41420 FT 41425 FT		CO-Maj Tran Huu CHU PO-Maj Tran Van VUNG DepPO-Maj Nguyen Tien THUONG APO-Capt Nguyen Nho TUC XO-Maj Nguyen Van UC
K4B Bn	802nd Bn; K.2; Van Troi Bn; 2nd Bn; H.400	41166 FH 41167 FH 41168 FH 41169 FH 41170 FH	4x81mm Mort 12x60mm Mort 2x57mm RR 6x3.5" RL 10xB-40 6xAA HMG	CO-Capt Nguyen SONG XO-SrLt PHUNG PO-Capt HO
K4C Bn	1st Bn, 4th Regt; 4th Bn, 9th Regt; 822nd Bn; H.402	41522 FT 41523 FT	2x82mm Mort	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUAT XO-1stLt Tran Van BOI PO-Capt Nguyen Van KHANH APC-Asp TRUNG CofS-1stLt THANG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
5th Regt, MRTTH	22nd Regt; AD.25; Doan 5; 5th Worksite; Hue City Unit	41270 FH 41271 FH 41272 FH		CO-LtCol Tran Than MOT XO-SrCapt TUYEN PO-LtCol VAN
K4 Bn	804th Bn; VO 74; Cao Van Grp; Sung Lo; Q.3	41435 FH 41436 FH 41437 FH 41438 FH 41439 FH 41288 FH 41289 FH 41290 FH 41290A FH 41290B FH	1x82mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG 20xRPD 6xB-40 10xB-41	CO-Maj Tran Dinh CHUONG XO-1stLt TAM PO-Capt Nguyen Van HAY APO-SrLt MAI CofS-HUU
K10 Bn	810th Bn; 3rd Bn (?) Q.4	41440 FH 41441 FH 41442 FH 41443 FH 41444 FH 41291 FH 41292 FH 41293 FH 41293A FH 41293B FH	3x81mm Mort 2x82mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 3xRR	CO-SrCapt Le Van BAU XO-Capt Nguyen Van NU PO-Capt Nguyen Van DUY CofS-Do Quoc HUYNH APO-Nguyen Huo DU
Chi Thua 1 Sap Bn	K-1; K-21 (THO)	41283 FH 41284 FH 41285 FH 41285A FH 41285B FH		CO-Maj THO XO-HIEN PO-VU APO-Le Ngoc DIEP
Chi Thua 2 Sap Bn	K.2; K.21 (VU)	41286 FH 41287 FH 41287A FH 41287B FH 41287C FH		CO-Nguyen Van VU XO- PO-HIEN APO-CAO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K.32 Arty Bn, 5th Regt, MRTTH	1st Bn, 84th Arty Regt; QE.02; D.832	41502 FQ 41294 FE 41295 FE 41296 FE 41296A FE 41296B FE		CO-THICH PO-Pham Ngoc BI APO-Capt Le Van VU XO-Nguyen Quang DA CofS-
6th Regt, MRTTH	Cong Truong 6; 6th Work-site; Ham Tu; AD.26; Dean 6	41300 FE 41316 FE 41317 FE 41318 FE 41319 FE 41320 FE 41321 FE 41322 FE 41323 FE 41324 FE 41325 FE		CO-Maj Huynh AN XO-Maj Nguyen Quang KHANH (AKA Nguyen Quoc KHANH) PO-Maj Nguyen Quang CAM APO-SrCapt Tran THO CofS-Capt Hong Kim THO CofPolit Sec-Man Huong Huu AN
800th Bn	K.1; 1st Bn (?); L.1	1520 Q 40700 ST 41301 FE 41302 FE 41303 FE 41304 FE 41305 FE	9x82mm Mort 8x60mm Mort 3x57mm RR 8x3.5" RL 9xB-40 6xLMG 4x75mm RR	CO-Capt DIEN XO-Capt Tran Minh DUONG PO-Capt Nguyen Van THANH APO-SrLt Pham DUYET CofS-SrLt Nguyen Ke VAY
802nd Bn	K.2; 1st Bn, 9th Regt	43920 FE 41306 FE 41307 FE 41308 FE 41309 FE 41310 FE	4x82mm Mort 2x57mm RR 3xHMG ?xLMG ?xB-40	CO-Capt Vo Dai AN XO-SrLt Do Dinh PHUNG PO-Capt Nguyen Huu DAM APO-SrLt Le Duc LOC CofS-SrLt Duong Quang TUOI

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D.10; 3rd (?); 80.T Bn	41311 FE 41312 FE 41313 FE 41314 FE 41315 FE	3x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 3x75mm RR 3x57mm RR 3xHMG 12xB-40 4x3.5" RL	CO- XO-SrLt Pham Quong LOC PO-SrLt Pham Quong VINH CofS-SrLt Hoang CHUC
K.12 Sapper Bn	812th Group 12; Dac Cong 12			CO-SrLt Dang Viet HONG XO- PO-Capt Tran Ba QUAT APO-SrLt Ho Van BA APO-SrLt Van The HANG
9th Regt, MRTTH	Doan 9; AD.79 FR; Thang Long	41390 FR 41391 FR 41392 FR 41393 FR 41394 FR 41395 FR 41396 FR 41397 FR 41398 FR 41399 FR		CO-Maj Dang Thong DE PO-LtCol Phan KY APO-Capt Bui Van DAO XO-Maj Nguyen Tu TY CofS/XO-Maj Le Van A CofPolit Sec-Maj Ha Duc DUC
K.16 Bn	Dong Do; T.902; F.801 FR; 816th Bn; 416th Bn; 3d Bn, 9th Regt	41406 FR 41407 FR 41408 FR 41409 FR 41410 FR		CO- PO-Capt Tran Xuan VU APO-SrLt Pham Tien KHANG XO-SrLt Thai BAY CofS-SrLt Bui Manh TIEN
K.18 Bn	Dong Ha; T.903; F.802 FR; 818th Bn; 418th Bn; 2d Bn, 9th Regt	41411 FR 41412 FR 41413 FR 41414 FR 41415 FR		CO-SrCapt Dang Huy MICH PO-SrCapt Van VU APO-SrLt Le Huy CAY XO-Ho Ba NHUAN CofS-SrLt Nguyen Kim THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K.15 Bn	815th Bn; 415th Bn; 1st Bn, 9th Regt; Q-6; F.800 FR	41416 FH 41297 FH 41298 FH 41299A FH 41299B FH 41400 FR 41401 FR 41402 FR 41403 FR 41404 FR 41405 FR	2xB-40/B-41	CO-Capt HO 1st XO-SrLt Vu Duc HAU XO-SrLt Vu Ngoc TRINH PO-SrCapt Pham Dinh DINH APO-Capt Pham Huu KY CofS-SrLt Vu Ngoc THAO
29th Regt, 325C Div, MRTTH	Ken Giang; Ba Na; 3rd Regt; Song Lo Regt; Doan 8; AD.o8	32868 RT 32706 RT 32722 RT 32723 RT 32724 RT 32725 RT 3272o RT 32727 RT 32728 RT 32729 RT 32730 RT 32731 RT	8x82mm Mort	CO-Maj Chau HOAT/LtCol Tran SIKCH XO-SrCapt Nguyen HOAN PO-SrCapt Vo DUOC APO-Maj CAY CofS-SrCapt Dau Ba HA
7th Bn	K-7; 1st; D-1; D-7	32707 RT 32708 RT 32709 RT 32710 RT 32711 RT	4x82mm Mort 4xHMG 8x60mm Mort	CO-SrLt Nguyen TRAN XO-SrLt Le Van HA PO-
8th Bn	K-8; 2nd; D-2; D-8; Duc Lap Bn	32712 RT 32713 RT 32714 RT 32715 RT 32716 RT	4x82mm Mort 4xHMG	CO-Capt HANG XO-Capt CAN PO-Capt HANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
9th Bn	K-9; 3rd; D-3; B-9	32717 RT 32718 RT 32719 RT 32720 RT 32721 RT		CO-SrCapt Nguyen Van HO XO-Capt CHONG PO-CANH
803rd Regt, 324B Div, MRTTH	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; Cong Truong 2?; Song Huong; Cua Tung; Tam Dao; Cong Truong 1/5(?); 41st Regt; K-14B Regt; Phan Thiet Regt; Doan 1	31551 RT 31552 RT 31553 RT 31554 RT 31555 RT 31556 RT 31557 RT 31558 RT 31559 RT	?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x60mm Mort ?x12.7mm AA ?xLMG	CO-Maj Luu Quang MAU XO-Capt Mau DUYET PO-Maj DAM APO-Capt Le Van DAO CofS-
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K-1 Bn; Tam Dao 1; Song Lam; Song Huong; C-1	31560 RT 31561 RT 31562 RT 31563 RT 31564 RT		CO-Capt Bui Khac HUY XO-Capt Tran PHUOC PO-Nguyen Dinh CU APO-1stLt Le Man CHAU
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K-2 Bn; Thu Bon; Song Huong 2; Tam Dao 2; C-2	31565 RT 31566 RT 31567 RT 31568 RT 31569 RT		CO-Capt DUC XO- PO-SrLt XE APO-SrLt NAM CofS-SrLt SUU
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K-3 Bn; Tam Dao 3; Song Cuong 3; C-3	31570 RT 31571 RT 31572 RT 31573 RT 31574 RT		CO-HO XO-KINH PO-DUC APO-THUY CofS-Do Xam CHI
65th Arty Regt, MRTTH	Doan 12; AD.30			CO-TAN XO- PO-NGHIEP

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K-40 Arty Bn	K-50; QE.06; D.850		?x85mm Field Gun	
K-41 Arty Bn	QE.07		?x122mm How	
K-42 AAA Bn	QE.08		37mm AAA Gun	
K-43 AAA Bn	QE.09		23mm AAA Gun	
H-99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co; Vinh Ling Co		1xLMG	CO-Vo BA XO-Tran BUN PO-DUNG
C.113 Co	Armed Co of Phong Dien District; P.14; D.1; X.11; V.35; H.23; KQ.10; AK-5	41426 FM	1X81mm Mort 2X60mm Mort 12XSMG	CO-LANN XO-Tu YEN PO-THAN APO-Tran Van THUAN
C.114 Co	D-3; P.15; Quang Dien LF Co; V.40; H.25; KQ.20; AK.7; H.319	1847 Bac Ha 41427 FM	2X60mm Mort 4XB-40	CO-MUOI XO-HOA PO-HA
C.115 Co	D-2; X-3; K-5; Huong Tra LF Co; P.16; KQ.30; AK-9	41428 FM	2XHMG 2X60mm Mort ?XSMG	CO-LE XO-LUA PO-HUNG
C.116 Co	D-4; X-4; P.17; Huong Thuy LF Co; KQ.40; V.50; H.29; AK.12; C.268 Co; C.216 Co	41429 FM	2X60mm Mort ?XHMG	CO-Nguyen Huu LUYEN XO-Tran Viet HUNG PO-NGACH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
C.117 Co	D-7; P.18 Co; Phu Vang LF Co V.55; H.30; KQ.50; AK.14	41430 FM	2X60mm Mort ?XLMG 10XSMG	CO-Capt Tran NHON XO-DIEN PO-SAM
C.118 Co	Phu Loc (District) LF Co; P.19 Co; V.60; H.31; KQ 60; AK.16	41431 FM		CO-Nguyen Van THUAN XO-LONG PO-THUONG APO-QUANG
C.119 Co	C.19; BIET DONG Ranger		2XB-40	CO-Ho DOI XO/PO-Nguyen CUONG
Phu Loc Armed Bn	K-3, V-6		3X60mm Mort 3XB-40	CO-Nguyen NGUYEN XO-Phan CHANG PO-Nguyen XUAN

SOUTHERN I CORPS/BINH DINH (P)

UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
Military Region 5	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa; H-601; F-102 KW; Thon An 620	20100 GM 21900 GM Bac Hien		CO-MGen Hoang Van THAI XO-LtCol Nguyen CHANH (AKA BINH) PO-Gen THAI (same as CO) APO-LtCol Tran KHUE CofS-Col Le TRUC
Front 4, MR-5	Unit 70; Group 44; K-44	P6400; 6700 Ap Thai		CO-BGen Le BINH XO-Col HOE PO-THUAN CofS-Maj CUC APO-PHUOC

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
70A, Front 4	Military Staff	P6407; 6707 AP Thai		CO-Capt DONG XO-JrCapt LANH PO-Capt KHANH
70B, Front 4	Political Section Staff	P6414; 6714 AP Thai		CO-LtCol Bui DU XO- PO-
70C, Front 4	Rear Service Staff	P6425; 6725 AP Thai		CO-Tran Dinh TRUC XO-YEN
1st Comm Bn, Front 4	703C	P6460; 6760 AP Thai		CO-Maj Ha Van CAU XO-Capt Van XUAN PO-Maj CHINH
1st Flamethrower Co Front 4		1888 AP Thai	40XLP050 Chicom	CO-1stLt MAI XO- PO-1stLt CANG
HAI VAN Engr Bn	1st Engr Bn; Cuu Long Bn	6780 AP Thai (SVN) 2380 QT (NVN)	?82mm Mort ?60mm Mort 3X30Cal MG's	CO-Nguyen Xuan DU XO-HOANG PO-Pham Van XUYEN APO-Pham Van BUYEN
C-31st Ind Co	Doc Lap Co, Q.55 Co	8302 GD	2X82mm Mort 2X60mm Mort 3X60 30Cal MG's	CO-Pham Van LOI XO-Nguyen Quy Truong PO-Nguyen Van MINH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
31st NVA Inf Regt, 341st Div, Front 4	P25 Regt; Unit 5550; Infil Grp 150C; Song Huong Regt (Red River); 31st Worksite	3134 KT P6270 6670 Ap Thai 31457 3459 KT	9x12.7mm AA Guns 6x82mm Mort 75mm RR	CO-LtCol HUNG XO-Maj XA PO-Col Ho Quang DAM APO-Col Nguyen Chung TANH CofS-SrCapt NGOC
102nd Bn	F.8 Bn; D.8 Bn; D.2 Bn; 150B; 150C; 8th Bn	6687 Ap Thai P6287 31349 31349 KT 6627 Ap Thai Ap Thai 7566	4x82mm Mort 9x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt LUY XO-SrLt DO PO-Tran Minh SON CofS-SrLt Le Dinh THUC APO-Lt DAT
103rd Bn	F.9 Bn; 3rd Bn; D.9 Bn; D.3 Bn; F.9 Bn; 150A; 9th Bn; K.9 Bn; C.9 Bn	P6292 6692 Ap Thai 3459	4x82mm Mort 9x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41 ?x12.7mm AA Gun	CO-Capt TRINH XO-SrCapt Phong LICH PO-Capt NAM CofS-Capt CHINH
36th NVA Inf Regt, 308th Div, Front 4	Unit 1016; Unit 9530 Song Nong Regt; D.304; E.36; Group 6		?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort 6x75mm RR ?x12.7mm AA Guns	CO-LtCol Ngo Dinh SUNG XO-LtCol Do PHAM PO-Maj THANG
1st Bn	Unit 9531; D.1 Bn	6217 Ap Thai 6933 Ap Bac 62205 IS	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xRPG-2 ?xRPG-7 ?x7.62mm LMG ?x12.7mm AA Guns	CO-Capt Minh THUAN XO-Capt LOC PO-Capt BIEN CofS-Capt DINH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd Bn	Unit 9533; Unit 1016A; D.2 Bn; K.2 Bn	6218 Ap Thai 6938 Ap Bac 62201 Ap Bac	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41 ?x12.7mm AA Gun	CO-Capt NHI XO-Capt CHUNG PO-Capt HOA
3rd Bn	D.3; K.12; Replacement No 2006	6219 Ap Thai 6943 Ap Bac 62210 XP	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt THUC XO-SrLt TRINH PO-Capt NHO
90th Regt	3rd Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Danang Grp; Doan 3; AD.10; Cong Truong 63; Cua Viet; Nui Quyet; 60th Regt	41.210 FL 41.211 FL 41.212 FL 41.213 FL 41.214 FL 41.215 FL 41.216 FL 41.217 FL 41.218 FL	?x82mm Mort 3xUnk mm RR 3x120mm Mort	CO-Maj THUOC XO-Capt DANG PO-HOA APO-HA ACofS-Lt CHUONG
7th Bn	K.7 Bn; 17th Bn; D.7 Bn; T.7 Bn; Nui Quyet Bn	41.219 FL 31650 XB 41.220 FL 41.221 FL 41.222 FL 41.223 FL	3x82mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 6xB-40 6xB-41	CO-BAO XO-LY PO-XUAN APO-DIEU
8th Bn	K.8 Bn; 18th Bn; K.38 Bn; D.8 Bn; 108th Bn	41.224 FL 31655 XB 41.225 FL 41.226 FL 41.227 FL 41.228 FL	3x82mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 9xB-40 3xB-41	CO-SrCapt VINH XO-Capt NHI PO-SrCapt DOT APO-Capt NAM

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
9th Bn	K.9 Bn; 19th Bn; D.9 Bn; Nui Quyet Bn; B.19	41.229 FL 31660 XB 41.230 FL 41.231 FL 41.232 FL 41.233 FL	3x82mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 3xB-40 5xB-41 2x7.62mm MG	CO-SrLt THUY XO-SrLt THUY PO-SrLt TUYEN APO-Lt CHUONG CofS-Lt TAN
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20; B-20; Viet Dung; 70th Bn; 1st Bn; F.5 Bn; Q.90 Bn	6788 Ap Thai 21341 GM Ba Ha 190 Viet Dung	4x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Nguyen Thanh CHI XO-KIEN PO-Hoynh NAM CofS-BA
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn; R.25 Bn; 2nd Bn; B.25 Bn; Q.92 Bn; 2nd Indep Bn of Quang Da	2116 Quang Da 192 Viet Dung P6493 6793 Ap Thai A4192 and Dung A44T.193	4x81mm Mort 5x60mm Mort ?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt Tran BINH XO-Nguyen LUONG PO-Tran NINH APO-Le HIEU
D.7 Bn	F.7 Bn; 1st Bn; D.3 Bn; 101st Bn	P6498 6798 Ap Thai Q.80 Anh Dung	5x82mm Mort 5x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt THOM XO-Capt KHOI PO-Capt TRANG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
T.89 Sapper Bn	402nd Sapper Bn; YH.9: Tien Lua Bn	P6454 6754 Ap Thai 370 Thanh Khiet	6x81mm Mort 1x82mm Mort 18xB-40 2xHMG	CO-SrCapt NGOC XO-SrLt TO PO-Capt Tran Kim HUNG CofS-lstLt NAM
3rd Sapper Bn	le3rd Sapper Bn; Lam Son Bn; Q.91 Bn; B-47 Sapper Bn; 710 Bn	P6475 6775 Ap Thai 63148 IS(NVN)	6x82mm Mort 5x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt Pham Van ON XO-HUNG PO-Capt Tran HUYNH CofS-Lt COI
141st Regt, 312th Div, Front 4	1st Regt; 3008 Group	1523 VR(NVN)	?x82mm Mort ?x81mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x12.7mm AA Gun ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Maj NGUYEN XO-Capt DUONG PO-Maj HAO
1st Bn	Pho Thong Bn; K.1 Bn		?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?xB-40 ?x12.7mm Tripod Mounted AA Gun	CO-Capt Nguyen Van CON XO- PO-Capt SAM
2nd Bn			?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x57mm RR ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt MAO XO-HUU PO-SrLt DIEU
3rd Bn		7425(NVN) 74222 CS(NVN)	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41 ?x75mm RR	CO-Capt CANH XO-SrLt BINH PO-SrLt UONG CofS-Lt Doan Van MIA

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
368B Arty Regt, Front 4	Binh Minh Worksite; 575th Unit; Infil Gp 575; E.368	P6301 6500 Ap Binh	122mm Rkt Launchers 140mm Rkt Launchers	CO-Maj Dinh Van HOA XO-Maj Nguyen Xuan TU PO-Maj Do Xuan KHOAT
1st Bn	D.99; D.1	6504 Ap Binh	18 X 122mm Rkt Launchers 6 X 140mm Rkt Launchers	CO-Capt Le Ngoc TOAN XO-Capt TAN PO-Capt CUNG
2nd Bn	D.2 Bn	6508 Ap Binh	18 X 122mm Rkt Launchers 6 X 82mm Mort	CO-Capt Le Quang MINH XO-Capt Tran TIEN PO-Capt DANG
3rd Bn	D.3	6512 Ap Binh	18 X 122mm Rkt Launchers 6 X 140mm Rkt Launchers 57 RR ?x82mm Mort	CO-SrCapt Pham CAN XO-Capt LONG PO-Capt LIEN
T.87 Sapper Bn	Truong Son Bn; 2nd Sap Bn; HH (Hoa Hieu)	P0470 6770 Ap Thai	3 X 82mm Mort 3 X 60mm Mort 3 X B-40's B-41's	CO-PHUNG XO-BINH PO-LIEN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Bn, 68B Arty Regt FRONT 4	130th Bn; 134th Infil Grp; 577th Arty Bn	6620 Ap Hoa 54387 HT	18X122mm Rkt Launchers 6XB-40's 6XB-41's	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUNG XO-Capt Dang Van THUONG PO-Capt To Duc LUC CofS-Lt THANH
2nd NVA Div, MR-5	Thon An 520; Su Dong 2; Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2; Chi Lang; Ta-310; Nam Hai; Nong Truong 2	20601 GM 20925 GM Tay An H.4500 Ap Nam 42.40 HK 41910 KP		CO-BrigGen Le THACH/KIET XO-BrigGen Hoang Minh DAC/SON PO-BrigGen VIET/CHUONG
GK.37 Trans Bn		2062 Nam Hai		CO-Pham Ngoc HOANG
GK.38 Medical Bn		5060 Ap Nam C		CO-Capt Nguyen Van TU XO-1stLt Nguyen Van HIEU PO-Capt Le Hong HAI

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
GK.30 Signal Bn	RQ.20/A Bn;RQ.20; V-107 RQ. 20/B Bn; Nam Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20 HT 20605 GM Tay An		CO-TUNG XO- PO- APO-Nguyen Ba CHU
GK.31 AA Bn	195th AA Bn; 519 AA Bn; 38th AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn; RQ.21		17x12.7mm AA	CO-Capt Huong Quy PHAN XO-Tran Van THIEN PO-QUANG
GK.32 RR Bn	RQ.22	Hai Cang 20	12x75mm RR	CO-SrCapt THUYLET XO-Nguyen KHUAN PO-TRUONG CofS-SrLt Vo Ngoc HANH
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	RQ.33; RQ.23; RQ.330; 7th Bn	1828/CN Hai Cang 20; 60620 GM Tay An; 22861 GH Hai Cang 20 Tay An; 22631 GH Hai Cang 20 Thu An	6x120mm Mort 82mm Mort 81mm Mort	CO-Le Van CAN XO-Nguyen KINH
GK.35 Sapper Bn	D-10 Sapper Bn		9xB-41 Rkt	CO-Nguyen Tien VINH XO-CAO PO-Nguyen Duc DUC
GK.40 Engr Bn	RQ.24	GM 20039 Tay An Nam Hai		CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG XO-Nguyen Viet THO PO-Ngoc PHUOC

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st VC Regt, 2nd Div	Cuong Truong 1; H-800; 108th Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Steel Regt	6000-6199 H 4600 AP NAM 5101 AP NAM		CO-LtCol Chan Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN PO-
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai; 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007 Bau Bang	5645 Quang Trung St.	.30 Cal MG 60mm Mort 81mm Mort 75mm RR 12.7 mm MG	CO-LOC XO-Nguyen Van TUAN
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai; Bong Trang (?) Binh Gia	20735 C.T. An Giang	81mm Mort 60mm Mort 57mm RR 82mm Mort 12.7mm MG	CO-JrCapt SUU XO-Bui BAG PO-1stLt CHAU
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008; Thuan Minh; Song Hong (?) Phong Bien	HT 20100		CO-SANG XO-ANH PO-CHU
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; Cong Truong (?) AN LONG; H 213; V-50	HT 20648 GM An Binh; 880 Nam Ban; H.4880 Ha Bien; H 4700 AP NAM 2; 5201 AP NAM	17x81mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x60mm Mort 2x82mm Mort 4x82mm RR 1x57mm RR	CO-Maj THACH XO-Capt Cao NIEM PO-Maj DUC CofS-CHAU
60th Bn	11th Workshop; 1st Bn; 11th Bn; 4th Bn	6604 Long Thanh; J.4700		CO-Nguyen Van LA XO-JrCapt HUNG PO-SrCapt Lai Van KHOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
70th Bn	135th Bn; 2nd Bn; 72nd Bn (?); 22nd Bn; 5th Bn	J.4770		CO-1stLt GIAO XO-JrCapt SON PO-JrCapt LAI
80th Bn	3rd Bn; 75th Bn (?); Workshop 33; Phi Truong Long Chau; 33rd Bn; 6th Bn	J.4780		CO-1stLt CANH XO-JrCapt AI PO-Capt Nguyen CUONG
3rd NVA Regt	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite 3; Factory 10; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; Nam Ha; 323rd Regt (?); Ap Nam 31st Regt	HT 5503; HT 20801 GM An Binh; H.4810 Ap Nam HT 4880; HT 4241; HT 4842; HT 4849; HT 5317; Ap Nam 3 (?) 5301 Ap Nam H 4800 Ap Nam 3		CO-Maj CAO LIEN XO-Nguyen THANH PO-Nguyen Phan Trung Ta CofS-Bui Thien Cac
1st Bn	X1; Xuong Mot; Ha Mai; Xuong (Bn) 7; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1 64th Bn; K-7	20728 GM An Binh; H.4860 Ha Mai	3x82mm Mort 3x57mm RR	CO-Capt THANH XO- PO-Lt DUC
2nd Bn	Binh Minh; X-2; K-2; 74th Bn; Xuong Hai; Ha Hai; Xuong (Bn) 8; K-8; Binh Da	20837 GM An Binh; H.4870 Ha Hai		CO-Capt KHAO XO-NHU PO-Capt HUONG
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84th Bn; X-3; Q.56; Nguyen Trai; 103rd Bn; Xuong (Bn) Ba; Ha Bien; Xuong (Bn); K-9	HT 20648 GM An Binh; 880 Nam Ban; H.4880 Ha Bien; HT 5317	2x120mm Mort 6x75mm RR 6x82mm Mort 3x50 cal HMG	CO-SrCapt TRU XO-Capt DUY PO-Capt TUNG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd NVA Div, MR-5	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Liem Tinh 10	Hon Thu 2110 GM; 20845 GMT 10 Airfield 10		CO-SrCol VOTU XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN APO-Col NAM
90th Engr Bn	40th Sapper Bn	PH 5082 Ap Dan PH 5081 Ap Dan		CO- XO- PO-
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infiltration Group	1535; 1534; 10th Airport		CO-SrCapt LIEM XO-KUYET PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY Asst PO-Capt MO
300th Arty Bn	513 Infiltration Group; Xom 30; 499th Arty Bn; 400 Bn; Don VI 499th, Phan Doan 300; X-30	1538	3x120mm Mort 4x82mm Mort 3x75mm RR ?x140mm Rkt	CO-Le Van DUYET XO-LAN PO-TRUNG
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn;	1544		CO-CU XO-DO PO-HI Asst PO-DUONG
551st Signal Bn	D-16	20800 KG		CO-Capt BAO XO-Lt HIEN PO-SrCapt DIEU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
600th Medical Bn	Inter-Det 600	1548		CO- XO- PO-
2nd VC Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt; 8th Regt; 96th Regt; 193 GP; 511 Regt	21.100 21.141 21.142 21.143 21.144 21.145 21.146 21.147 21.148 21.149 PH 5100 Ap Dang	6x82mm Mort 6x57mm AA/MG 12xB-41 15xB-40 6x7.62 HMG	CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-Mai Van HA CofS-TRI
93rd Bn	707th Infil Group; Chi Ba (Three Sister); H-21 Bn; 93rd Gp; Piti Truong	6240 21.120	2x82mm Mort 2x57mm AA/MG 2xB-41 4xB-40 2x7.62 HMG 2x57mm RR 1xM-79	CO-Dang DOAN/THANH? XO-BONG PO-SINH/BON?
95th Bn	705th Infil Group; Chi Nam; H-58; Ba Minh	21310 GM	2x57mm RR 1x60mm Mort 1xMG 3xB-40 2xB-41 1xM-79	CO-VINH XO-AN PO-Maj Van HA CofS-LUONG
97th Bn	703rd Infil Group; 207th Bn; Chi Bay; H-21; H-25; Xom; 307th Bn	6340 TL(old) 21.140 GM 21.143	4x60mm Mort 5xB-40 8xB-41	CO-VINH/TRONG? XO-BINH/HOA? PO-OANH/HOA?

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
18th NVA Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803rd Infil Group; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Soa Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt(?); Lien Gia Bon	7173 DS 21155 GM 21150-21199 157; 21 AG Unit 519		CO-Duong Minh NGO XO-HONG PO-Le HOA APO-VOI CofS-DIEU
7th Bn	263rd Bn (Infil); H-7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi 4; Phan Doan 4; 4th Bn	21162-21166 Unit 521		CO-MOC XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI APO-Nguyen Trong MAM
8th Bn	803K Infil Group; Inter-Unit 5; District 12; Lieu Doi 5; Huyen 32; Lien Doi 5; H-32; H-8; Unit 523; 5th Bn	211670 21171 Unit 523		CO-CUONG XO-THUAN PO-THANH CofS-LUONG
9th Bn	H-9; H-33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn	21172-21176 Unit 525		CO-TUY XO-QUANG PO-ANH CofS-HOANG
22nd NVA Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Group; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3rd Regt; E-101(?); 6th Regt; Lien Gia Sau; Cong Truong 3; Worksite 3; Unit 527; Pho Nam Regt	21141 Binh Dinh (P); 1010 Phi Truong 10 PH5200 Ap Than 21175-21199		CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG PO-Ho Si LOC/Ho Dac LIEN? CofS-Capt THANG/LANH?

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517th Bn; Inter Group		1x57mm RR 1x82mm Mort	CO-Capt LUYEN or Tran Van SON XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM/LY? CofS-Capt KHOI
8th Bn	2nd Bn; Bn 516; Xom Tam		4x82mm Mort 1x57mm RR 4x12.7mm MG 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-DUNG XO- PO- Capt THIEN CofS-Capt THANH
9th Bn	3rd Bn; Bn 514; Inter Group 9; Xom Chin	4739/TA	4xB-40 4xB-41 2x82mm Mort 4x60mm Mort	CO-TIN/BINH XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN
120th Bn	Q-20; T-20; 20th Bn; 21st Bn; X-20; Tong Doan 20; V.3 Bn	20135	1x81mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 3x57mm RR 3x75mm RR 5xMG	CO-HAI XO-HIEP PO-Nguyen DAN
406th Sapper Bn	409 Bn; Don Vi 406	4141 Ap Bac	1x60mm Mort 7XB-40 7xB-41 1xRR 2x82mm Mort	CO-HOA XO-DUNG PO-Dung Quang HUAN APO-TU
107th Arty Bn	270th Bn; 2nd 12.7mm AA Bn; D.107th Bn; Mountain Gun Bn; GK.31 AA Bn; Unit 743		5x12.7mm AA 18xSMG 1x75mm RR 6x82mm Mort ?x140mm Rkt	CO-SrCapt Hoang Van THANH XO-CHI PO-LAC CofS-Capt CHI Adj-Lt SIU S1-Nguyen Van CHET S4-1stLt Ong HANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
9th Sapper Bn	2nd Bn	1088	2x60mm Mort 2xB-40	CO-Maj Vu Vinh QUANG XO-Mui Van THIET PO-Mai Van TRUONG
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38; D-3; Unit 133; Nghiep Doan 8; X.13; Black Tiger Bn; Unit 740; Anh Ba Tu	2048 NQ Ba Bao	2xLMG 2x82mm Mort 2x57mm RR 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-MEN/LIEM? XO-TAM PO-Nguyen HAM CofS-Luong Van NAY APO-Nguyen TUAN
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 4th Labor Union; 48th Worksite; 2nd Bn(?); K.48 Bn; Don VI 130; X.13; Unit 741		2x81mm Mort 2x57mm RR 3x60mm Mort 3xLMG 2x82mm Mort 1x75mm RR ?xB-40	CO-Vu Van TRAN XO-Tran Van KHI PO-Vu QUI APO-LONG
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Cuu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-Mountain White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103 Ounh Gia(?); Bong Trang	20647	3x81mm Mort 4x60mm Mort 4x57mm RR 5xLMG 12xB-40 RL	CO-Nguyen Van AN/NAM XO-BOI/BAY PO-Duan Cong THANH/LY

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
72nd Bn	X.72; R.13; H.68; 33rd Bn; Truong Son; Chu Dung; 103rd; 300; 305 GP; Hoi Chang 15; X-22 An Khe (506)	21993 Hanh 21445 GM 25010	2X82mm Mort 2X81mm Mort 6X60mm Mort 3X57mm RR 2X12.7mm AA MG's 15XB-40 RL 6XB-41 RL	CO-Nguyen Van CAN XO-Nguyen Van LE PO-KHANH
74th Bn	V.20; V.74; 75th		1X60mm Mort 1XLMG 3X57mm RR	CO-DUC/QUANG (?) XO-THAI/Yeu THAN PO-QUYET
76th Sapper Bn	K.55; C.75; Flying Tiger 21; V.16 Bn		1X60mm Mort 4XB-40 RL 3XB-41 RL	CO-TIEN XO-VINH PO-XUM
78th Arty Bn	X-78; Xuong 78; 78 DKB		6X122mm RL 5X82mm Mort 2X57mm RR ?XB-41 RL	CO-THONG XO-XAM PO-TOI
81st Co	Worksite 81; Code No T120; D.1; D.81; X.81; T.760; 85th Bn; Bac Son Binh; Unit 742; 81st Bn	773 GM Tran Quoc Tuan	1X60mm Mort 3XB-40's 1XB-41's	CO-LAM XO-THANH PO-NHONG AsstPO-PHANG
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20; 575th Bn; A-58; 409A Bn; K-5 Sapper Bn; Sapper R-5; 307th Bn; Bac Hien	20142 GM 20144 GM Bac Hien 1291 KW Bac Hien; Ba Hoa; X2424; 20142 GM; 4116 A-12 Bac Tien	?X81mm Mort 7X60mm Mort 3X57mm RR	CO-VAN XO-TAO PO-VIET

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UNIT	AKA	LRN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
V.14 Co	A.14 Co; 113th Co; K.53 Co; 14th Co; NK.108; A.19		1xLMG	CO-Huynh TIEN/Pham TO XO-Nguyen PHUONG PO-
V.15 Co	K.51; 107; FO 14; A.10; D.21; Thang Binh Co; B.104		1x60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-QUANG PO-CONG
C.17 Co	Mo Duc Co			CO-Nguyen DIEP XO-Lt PHUOC PO-NOI
V.18 Co				CO-Nguyen Thi THANH XO- PO
C.18 Co	Nghia Hanh LF Co		1x60mm Mort 4xSMG	CO-TAM XO-BINH PO-BAY
C.19 Co	C.19B (?) (Possible)		3x57mm RR 4xB-40 2x60mm Mort 2xLMG	CO-Nguyen SON XO-Le Van THANH PO-MAU
T.20 Co	C.20; Son Tinh Dong Co; V.20; C-137		1x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG	CO-KHANG XO- PO-THANH
P.31 Co	T.19 Co; D.31 Co; T-31 Co		2xB-40	CO-DUC XO-PHUOC PO-MANH APO-NAM
C.74 Co			1x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG	CO-GIO (or GIAO) XO-THUOC PO-NAM

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
C.120 Co	Unit 145		6xThompson SMG 3xMAT-49 SMG	CO- XO- PO-
C.7 Co	Unit 139; C.16 Co; 506 LF Co		1xLMG 1x60mm Mort 6xM-79	CO-DA XO-XU PO-NAM
Q.80 Co, Front 4	Hoi An Co; X.62 Co; 72 Co; Q.12 Co; 44th Bn; F.12 Co	180 Anh Dung	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Tran BUA XO-Bua THAI PO-HIEN
Q.81 Co, Front 4	Duy Xuyen Co; H.52; 103rd Co; 73rd Co; Q.13 Co; Q.13B	181 Anh Dung 2103	3x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Nguyen Dinh BON XO-Nguyen THAM PO-Nguyen HOA
Q.82 Co, Front 4	Dien Ban Co; H.40 Co; X.55 Co; 104th Co; X.65; Q.15 Co	182 Anh Dung 133 Tuong Lai 21335 GM Ba Ha	2x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort ?xRPG-2 ?xRPG-7	CO-Huynh Viet NGAN XO-Tan Chung NGO PO-Mai Phuoc KIEM
Q.83 Co, Front 4	Q.14 Co; H.42 Co; X.64 Co; 74th Co; Dai Loc Co	183 Anh Dung 21334 GM Ba Ha	2x60mm Mort 2x81mm Mort 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-Nguyen CHAU XO-Nguyen Quang HUNG PO-Le Long PHUNG
Q.84 Co, Front 4	Q.16 Co; X.66 Co; X.17 Co; Hoa Vang Co	184 Anh Dung 21336 GM Ba Ha	2x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort 6xB-40	CO-Hoang Minh NGHIEM XO-DONG PO-AI
95th Sapper Co	C-95 Co		1x57mm RR 3xB-40 1x60mm Mort	CO-HOA XO-Le Cong PHAT PO-HIEP APO-LUC

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UNIT	AKA	LBN LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Co	Que Son Independent Co	2184	2x81mm Mort 4x60mm Mort 2x57mm RR 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-1stLt Nguyen HANH XO-2ndLt CA PO-Nguyen UT
C.219 Co	Duc Pho Co; Anh Hai		2x60mm Mort 1xLMG 2xB-40 18xSMG	CO-MAU XO-TUNG PO-CAU
706th Co	C.73; A.16; BK.110; K-43	2002	2x60mm Mort 1x57mm RR 6xLMG	CO-Nguyen THANH XO-Pham PHUONG PO-Pham KHAI
K.51 Wpns Co	C.51 Wpns Co		2x60mm Mort 1x57mm RR 1x81mm Mort	CO- XO- PO-
506 "A" Sapper Co	Unit 506			CO-Xo Duc BA XO-VINH PO-DUONG
506 "B" Sapper Co	H-42	Hon Thu 21618 M	?xSMG ?xB-40	CO-LIEU XO-KY PO-DO/HONG/ANH
21st Sapper Co	T-21, H-40	22422	2xLMG 2x60mm Mort	CO-Ho Khanh DU XO-Ha Thanh LIEM PO-Nguyen Van HU

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 31-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P).

a. PW Ha Tat THANG from the K.34 Arty Bn, 7th Front captured on 21 July 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 172247) (CIEC Intelligence Report 64-69 SA 1st ARVN Div 280900Z July 1969) stated that he was wounded during an airstrike on 30 June 1969 at a rest camp on the QUANG TRI - THUA THIEN border (location unknown) and was taken to the 88th Hospital vicinity (YD 172247) for treatment. Subjects infiltration group was called the 4th Infiltration Bn and was composed of 600 men which left NVN on 18 February 1968 and arrived in HAI LANG, QUANG TRI (P) on 9 May 1968. These replacements went to the K.8, K.14, K.34 Bns and to the transportation and signal units of the 7th Front. Subject does not know locations of these units except for the K.34 which was located at (YD 125154) on 30 June 1969. Subject stated the mission of his unit was to attack all allied and ARVN bases in southern QUANG TRI Province and that the future mission of the unit was unknown.

(G-2 COMMENT: On 27 June 1969 there was an arc light strike at (YD 2415). This could possibly be the airstrike that wounded the PW. The K.34 Arty Bn, 7th Front is currently believed to be located in the vicinity of (YD 2830) (F-4). All other information rated (F-3).)

b. PW Hoang Van MINH, K.12 Transportation Bn, 7th Front captured on 20 July 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 175272) (CIEC Initial Interrogation Report 63-69, SA 1st ARVN Div 270700Z July 1969) stated that his squad was located at (YD 1920) and has the mission of transporting materiels. Subjects infiltration group, the 420th, departed NVN on 15 January 1969 with a strength of 600 men and arrived in QUANG TRI (P) on 22 March 1969. The 420th Group was assigned as replacements to units of the 7th Front.

(G-2 COMMENT: A K.12 Unit, of the 7th Front, has been previously mentioned in captured documents. However, this is the first indication that it is a transportation unit (F-3). The 420th Infiltration Group has been previously reported as entering the THUA THIEN area in mid-1968 (F-4).)

2. THUA THIEN (P).

a. PW, Doan Van KE, of the 2nd Co, 9th Bn, 29th Regt, who was captured on 23 July 1969 in the vicinity of (YC 323977) (11th ITT Rpt 75-69, III MAF 271314Z July 1969) stated that his company's missions were to defend DONG AP BIA (YC 327982); to observe U.S. movement in the vicinity of A LUOI Airfield (YC 387998); and to conduct ambushes. Subject stated that the 1st and 3rd Co's are in the area and probably have the same missions. While in NVN the source was told that the Song Lo Regt (AKA 29th Regt) would attack HUE near the end of 1969. Source stated the location of 3rd Co, 29th Regt was vicinity of the 3rd (AKA

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9th) Bn's Base Camp located in the vicinity of (YC 317963) and has a further mission of defending the base camp. KE located the 1st and 2nd Bns (AKA 7th and 8th), 29th Regt as being in LAOS. According to KE, there are 60 men in his company and 300 men in the 3rd Bn. Source added that the morale of the men was low due to being far from home, worrying about dying, and leading a life of misery. Reported personalities: 29th Regt CO-Doan Van HUNG; 3rd Bn CO-LUP, XO-VUONG.

(G-2 COMMENT: There have been previous reports of an element of the 29th Regt being on Hill 937 (DONG AP BIA). It is very possible that the 7th and 8th Bns are in LAOS recuperating from heavy casualties sustained in the fight for DONG AP BIA on 19 May 1969. Personalities do not match with III MAF OOB holdings. All information rated (F-3).)

3. QUANG NAM (P).

a. Hoi Chanh, Sgt Nguyen Van XUOC, Transportation Section, Rear Service, 2nd NVA Div who rallied on 27 July 1969, in the vicinity of (BT 143457) (SA QUANG NAM Sector 301715Z July 1969 11th ITT Rpt 61-69) stated that his unit was located in the vicinity of (ZC 200200) January 1969, and the mission of his unit was to transport food. The Hoi Chanh stated that local guerrillas, local forces, and main force VC in the area of BINH DUONG (V) QUANG TIN (P) have been attending political training classes and would attack allied forces in July 1969 during the nights of low lunar illumination. XUOC further stated that the division was composed of a headquarters section and three regiments and that the area of operations is the HIEP DUC Mountain area of QUANG TIN (P). The source stated that he infiltrated in January 1966 with the 322nd Bn which had a strength of 500 men and was led by a SrCapt Trau CAU. The code number for the rear service transportation section is R.400 and the LBN is 4500 AP NAM C. Reported personalities: 2nd NVA Div Rear Service CO-Maj THE, XO-SrCapt Bui LAM, Asst XO-SrCapt Trong LINH, QM-Capt TRINH, Armorer-Capt LY.

(G-2 COMMENT: The information concerning attacks in July was reported often through the month but failed to materialize. Personalities are reported for the first time. The LBN and code number correspond to these of the transportation section, 2nd (AKA GK.37) NVA Div. All information rated (F-3).)

b. Hoi Chanh, Lt Nguyen Van KIEN, Assistant Bn PO of 1st Bn, 141st Regt, who rallied on 24 July 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 895599) (9th ITT Interrogation Rpts, 241547Z July 1969, 270150Z July 1969 and 280215Z July 1969) stated that on 17 July 1969 the 1st Bn, with a strength of 252 men, was located in the vicinity of (AT 7957). Their mission was to resupply and avoid contact. KIEN further stated that the battalion CP was located in the vicinity of (ZC 189618) and the regimental CP was located in the vicinity of (ZC 199580). The rallier stated that on 15 July 1969 a LtCol HOA, PO of MR-5 had given a political retraining class at the CP. In a new general offensive, called "TV-Wave," the 1st Bn was

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to attack Hill 10 (AT 925690); 2nd Bn was to attack Hill 65 (AT 880575) and 3rd Bn was to attack Hill 41 (AT 935663). Hoi Chanh stated that morale was low due to hunger, casualties and length of war. In March of 1968, the Hoi Chanh left NVN with the 21st Independent Co (AA) under the 3008 Infiltration Group and arrived in RVN on 16 April 1968. In June 1969, the 141st received 90 replacements from NVN.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holdings place the location of the 141st Regt in the area as stated by KIEN (F-2); Phoc HOA is carried in OOB holdings as a field grade officer and PO of MR-5 and was first mentioned on 26 February 1968 (F-2). The impending attacks reported by this Hoi Chanh parallel possibilities presented by agent reports and PW's received in the last two months (F-3). All other information rated (F-2).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). No significant reports.

5. QUANG NGAI (P).

a. Hoi Chanh, Vu Van NGOAN, 2nd Co, 9th Sapper Bn, MR-5, who defected in the vicinity of (BS 767469) on 20 July 1969 (2nd ARVN Div msg 290430Z July 1969 and III MAF 291446Z July 1969) states his battalion strength is 400 men, and at the end of May 1969, the 9th Sapper Bn was located in the vicinity of (BS 634348), but has since moved to unknown location. Subject have the location of the 2nd Co as being in the vicinity of (BS 890293), the 3rd Co vicinity of (BS 831421) and the 4th Co vicinity of (BS 805425) in May 1969 but did not known the present locations. Subject infiltrated to SVN with the 1088th Infiltration group (AKA 9th Sapper Bn), in the strength of 500 men. The group was composed of four companies. They left NVN in March of 1969 and arrived in DUC PHO (D) QUANG NGAI (P) in late May 1969, except for one sapper company which was supposedly assigned to QUANG NAM (P). Subject stated that he trained with the 2nd Sapper Bn, 305th NVA Div in NVN and that two companies, the 7th and 9th, were assigned to the 9th Bn which was just forming for infiltration. Training included the handling of explosives, grenades, techniques of infiltration and obstacle courses.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB has accepted the 9th Independent Sapper Bn as a possible unit located in the vicinity of (BS 6646) based on the information provided by this and two other PW's (see paragraph 7 of page A-17 of ANNEX A of PERINTREP 30-69). All information rated (F-3).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 31-69

1. GENERAL.

a. The current phase of counterintelligence related VCI activity continues to reflect basic plans and directives issued by various VC/VCI echelons in March and April 1969 which essentially set forth the following missions and guidelines:

(1) Continuously conduct attacks on the enemy to severely destroy their war potential with emphasis on the annihilation of GVN officials and local military forces (RF/PF and PSDF).

(2) Launch surprise attacks on district seats, towns, and cities.

(3) Disintegrate the GVN pacification plan, seize control of the populace in the suburbs, and expand "liberated areas".

(4) Increase the political struggle, enemy proselyting, and propaganda activities.

(5) Consolidate local units and rear bases.

b. Such direction, although not basically changed in overall objectives by the early June announcement of the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), has been modified through varying degrees of emphasis being placed on certain facets of the previous missions. Emphasis has been noted on the following points:

(1) Annihilate RVN pacification teams and self defense forces.

(2) Kill the prescribed numbers of enemy in the suburbs.

(3) Use explosive charges to wear down the enemy's war potential.

(4) Assassinate "tyrants" and self defense groups.

(5) Infiltrate secret guerrillas into war areas.

(6) Increase propaganda and stage political struggles to demand freedom of movement, restoration of peace, end of the war and withdrawal of the US forces.

c. In a more general sense, the following themes have also received added emphasis since June 1969:

(1) Increased concern and emphasis placed on the retention of

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the populace in areas of VC control and the return of refugees to their former areas. These actions are essential if the VC/VCI are to retain and/or expand their influence in the rural areas.

(2) Increased emphasis on all security aspects of the VC/VCI apparatus, with particular attention being directed at the detection, identification, and elimination of GVN "spies" and VC "traitors".

(3) Increased emphasis placed on the production and preservation of foods and supplies in the face of disruptive US/FWMAF operations and the possibility of major floods in the rainy season.

(4) Increased emphasis on political reorientation of cadres at all levels.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. Continued reports were received of enemy reconnaissance of GVN/US positions, with the highest frequency reported in northern ICTZ. A report of significance concerns VC training classes in the English language for youths (male and female) in the 14-20 year age group. Reportedly, upon completion of this training, the trainees are to spread propaganda among US personnel and perform other proselyting tasks (nfi). Incidental to these tasks, it should be anticipated that these personnel will also serve as low level intelligence collectors in and around US installations. Previous reports on similar type training and missions have been substantiated by captured documents obtained primarily in Quang Nam and Quang Tin (P). Other reports of Viet Cong intelligence collection activities included the following:

a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 21 July, a GVN intelligence source reported 5 VC were following the movements of the PF units at Nhu Le (H) (YD 310477) and Tich Tuong (H) (YD 315495). (Eval B-3)

(2) On 16 July, a GVN intelligence source reported one VC squad operating at Cay Mung Forest collected information for an attack on the RD forces in Hai Phu (V) (YD 345484).

(3) On 28 July, 3 VC suspects were arrested at YD 473575 with letters in their pockets describing the military post in Gia Dang (H) (YD 450590).

b. Thua Thien. On 18 July, a US military intelligence source reported that during the nights of 13, 14, and 15 July, the VC performed reconnaissance missions east of Phu Bai #3 (H) (YD 905122). (Eval: F-6)

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c. Quang Nam.

(1) On 24 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that elements of the 31st and 90th Regiments and an unidentified NVA force were sending reconnaissance teams to observe the situation at the Cam Khe Mountain (AT 9774), Hoa Cam training center (AT 9771), and in Hieu Duc (D). (Eval: C-3)

(2) On 24 July, a US military intelligence source reported that, as of 24 July, a three member sapper cell (female) was operating on the southeast fringes of Danang City observing US/ARVN installations and the activities of security forces and National Police elements. They also act as guides and serve as a warning cell during any VC/NVA attack on Danang City. (Eval: C-3)

(3) On 26 July, a US military intelligence source reported that the VC were training Vietnamese boys and girls from the ages of 14 through 16 years old from Dien Ban (D). They are to receive instructions in the use of weapons and explosive charges. Upon completion of the course, they are to be assigned missions of conducting sabotage, assassination, and terrorism directed at GVN officials/installations. (Eval: F-3)

d. Quang Tin. On 2 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported a VC prostitute, Tran Thi Phung, is working at Chu Lai Airbase. She has gained the sympathy of the women who search indigenous U.S. employees at the end of each working day. She reports her information to the VC every 3 to 4 days. (Eval: C-6)

3. SABOTAGE. The relative lull in reported sabotage incidents continued during the week with only two incidents being reported.

a. A possible sabotage incident occurred on 31 July at YD 610312 when a 242' wooden bridge (unguarded) was destroyed by fire.

b. In Quang Nam (P), two (2) culverts were destroyed on a road and bypass at BS 758489 on 27 July 1969.

4. POLITICAL. Viet Cong political and propaganda activity continued in much the same vein as has been prevalent since mid-June. The majority of the Viet Cong's propaganda effort was directed at gaining the support of the people for the NLF's Provisional Revolutionary Government, although in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces the Viet Cong took advantage of the noticeably decreased US presence to claim that the US was deserting the GVN and would soon be forced to withdraw all of its troops. Viet Cong organizational activity appears to have slackened appreciably after the spate of activity which followed the announcement of the formation

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of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, although recently reported reorientation and indoctrination courses for village and hamlet cadre may presage renewed activity. Reports of meeting of Viet Cong cadre were particularly heavy in Quang Nam (P) and may be partially an attempt to counteract the adverse effects of recent friendly operations in the area on the morale of VC cadre.

a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 25 July, a GVN intelligence source reported that VC cadre and agents have propagandized among their own ranks as well as the people of Quang Tri (P) that the NLF's Provisional Revolutionary Government is developing day by day and that the Americans will withdraw their troops and give up unconditionally in the future. A coalition government will then be set up and the country reunified. (Eval: C-2)

(2) On 15 July, a GVN intelligence source reported one VC platoon propagandized the people of Nhat Le (H) (YD 195610), telling them that U.S. troops are leaving Vietnam and the revolutionary forces are winning. (Eval: C-3)

b. Thua Thien.

(1) On 18 July, a captured document revealed that the VC believe they have won the war by forcing the US and GVN to accept the Paris peace talks on their (VC) conditions. The VC formulated the following courses of actions: organize an offensive to force the U.S. to withdraw quickly; break the U.S. strategy of sweep and hold and destroy the ARVN; and reorganize the people's government with the VC at the head, overthrowing all elements of the Republic of Vietnam. Their reported objective is to force complete U.S. and Allied withdrawals while not making any protracted withdrawals themselves.

(2) An unrated GVN intelligence source reported that the Viet Cong have been distributing a new propaganda leaflet in Thua Thien (P). The leaflet is aimed at ARVN troops and states that the Americans have been defeated and are now quitting the war and leaving the ARVN to take up the battles in the mountains. The ARVN soldiers are urged not to die for the Americans and to desert when they are sent into the mountains.

(3) On 26 July, a GVN intelligence source reported that the Tri Thien-Hue Military Region Party Committee had ordered a large scale propaganda campaign, starting 20 June, to convince the people that the People's Revolutionary Government was the only true government representing the people of South Vietnam.

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b. Quang Nam.

(1) On 16 July, VC entered Thu Bon (H) (AT 873497) and distributed propaganda leaflets that called for the immediate and complete break-up of GVN organizations, family groups, hamlet and village councils, and People's Self Defense Force groups. Anyone violating this order would be severely punished. Participation in GVN sponsored elections was also prohibited. The leaflets were signed by the People's Revolutionary Committee of Quang Nam-Danang.

(2) On 17 July, a U.S. military intelligence source reported that village and district cadre from Hieu Duc, Hoa Vang and Dien Ban districts were summoned to the Hieu Duc mountains for training and orientation classes. The course was scheduled for completion on 20 July. Upon completion, cadre were to report back to their respective areas. (Eval: F-3)

(3) On 23 July, the VC displayed a Liberation Front flag at Guild 2, Phuoc Truong (Q) and distributed leaflets at Tan Thai (Q), District III, Danang City. Again on 25 July, leaflets of unknown content were distributed on Thong Nhat and Le Loi Streets in Danang City.

(4) On 29 July, a US military intelligence source reported that the Viet Cong Duy Xuyen District Front has organized a 3 day meeting which was to begin 27 July for their hamlet and village level cadre. They were to discuss and popularize the role of the Viet Cong's temporary government in South Vietnam. (Eval: C-2)

(5) On 29 July, a US military intelligence source reported that the Viet Cong Que Son District Committee had organized a training course for their hamlet and village cadre. The course was to last 7 days starting on 24 July. The training site was located at Que An (H) (BT 067356). (Eval: C-2)

(6) On 1 August, six VC psyops leaflets (English language) were found at BT 151531. Themes were as follows:

(a) Refuse to fight, thus avoid being killed. Demand to be brought home now, alive.

(b) Don't kill the honest people and destroy our life.

(c) American GI's, unite and protest alongside the American people against Nixon's war in Vietnam.

(d) Your lives are precious. Your parents, wife, and children need you. You must not let Nixon decide your destiny.

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c. Quang Tin.

(1) On 20 July, a GVN intelligence source reported that an armed squad entered the Ga Do market in Trung Thanh (H) (BT 457054) and appealed to the people to pay troop support taxes and write to their relatives who work for the GVN to appeal for their return to the VC. (Eval: C-3)

(2) On 23 July, a GVN intelligence source reported that VCI cadre of Binh Nam (V) (BT 295304) believe that peace and a general election are at hand. Therefore, they plan to use cadre and guerrillas as returnees to the GVN so that they can penetrate GVN areas in preparation for political struggles. (Eval: C-3)

(3) A GVN intelligence source (unrated) reported that the Viet Cong planned to withdraw a number of their key cadre from the coastal areas of Quang Tin and send them to the mountains. Several previous reports have been received of plans to move some cadre to more secure areas. (Note: This procedure was followed by the Viet Cong when their cadre became hard pressed in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces in 1968.)

d. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 10 July, a US military intelligence source reported that the VC plan to send teenagers and other personnel from Gio Long (H) (BS 277643) to North Vietnam to be trained in military subjects, culture, politics, and economics for a 3 year period. Upon completion of their training, they will return to South Vietnam to execute a social revolutionary program. (Eval: F-6)

(2) On 23 July, a US military intelligence source reported that the Viet Cong issued an order against listening to GVN radio broadcasts or possessing anti-Viet Cong leaflets. Strict punishments were prescribed for violation of the order. In addition, the death penalty was called for in the case of traitors to the Communist Party. The order was allegedly made by the Provisional Revolutionary Government. (Eval: C-6)

(3) On 26 July, a US military intelligence source reported that the VC sent a number of cadre from Quang Ngai (P) to North Vietnam to attend a political training course (nfi). The cadre were transported by vehicle.

5. TERROR. Although kidnappings and hamlet harassment decreased during the week, the number of assassinations increased. As has been the case for the past month, the majority of the assassinations occurred in Thua Thien (P) and Quang Nam (P). Reports of Viet Cong training children in the use of weapons and explosives also continued to be received. After training, the youths were to be used on assassination and sabotage

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missions. See Appendix 2 for a listing of terrorist incidents in ICTZ.

APPENDIXES
1-Statistical Compilation of People's Revolutionary Committees in ICTZ
2-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 31-69

People's Revolutionary Committees reported by name and/or location as of 02 August 1969

	Quang Tri	Thua Thien	Quang Nam	Quang Tin	Quang Ngai	Total
Region (MRTTH)						1
Province	1	1	1	1	1	5
District	2	5	2	1	9	19
City		1	2			3
Village	37	36	76	49	107	305
Hamlet	31	59	16	11	122	239
Precinct		1				1
Total	71	103	97	62	239	573

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 31-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Tri	24Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 475413	While clearing land, a Vietnamese detonated a VC mine wounding two civilians.
	25Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 860259	One civilian was killed by a VC mine.
	25Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 925155	VC fired 5 rounds of M79 at an RD team position damaging 1 house. Negative personnel casualties.
	26Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 651311	VC fired a B-40 rocket into a house wounding 6 civilians and damaging the house.
	27Jul69	YD 325515	VC entered Thuong Xa (H) and assassinated one civilian.
Thua Thien	26Jul69 (Late Entry)	ZD 207011	VC entered Trung Kien (H) and assassinated one Vietnamese female nurse.
	26Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 705247	VC fired on a village 3 kilometers west of Hue wounding five civilians.
	26Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 640305	VC fired three RPG rounds into Phu Le (H) resulting in 3 civilians wounded.
	30Jul69	YD 825175	VC entered Dong Loc (H) and assassinated 3 civilians and kidnapped one PSDF.
Quang Nam	28Jul69	BT 054650	VC mortar fire killed one civilian and wounded two others.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang'Nam	28Jul69	BT 113545	VC assassinated one civilian in Lang Chau (H).
	28Jul69	AT 875474	VC ambushed a bus, wounding six passengers, killing three, and kidnapping two civilians.
	31Jul69	BT 023785 (Danang)	M-26 hand grenade exploded in an ARVN jeep driven by the OIC, PHUNG HOANG Training School. The driver was killed and two ARVN were wounded.
Quang Ngai	29Jul69	BS 752816	VC entered village and wounded a hamlet chief.

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NORADR 5-7
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NO. 5-7

HEADQUARTERS NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base, Colorado
17 April 1970

Publications Management

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

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Periodic Intelligence Report 32-69

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

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G-2 Section
DANANG, RVN
12 August 1969
Ser: 095169

PERINTREP 32-69

Period covered: 030001H August - 092400H August 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. There was a slight increase in enemy initiated ground incidents during the past week with 268 incidents reported as against the 234 reported the previous week, which was the lowest point reached in the past seven months. However, the increase in the number of incidents was not very meaningful with the overall rise largely attributable to an increase in the number of harassing fire incidents. Although there was a slight increase, enemy incoming continued at a very low level with 349 rounds recorded for the week. There was also an increase in the number of KIA's, from 629 last week to 727 this week.

The most significant enemy activity in I Corps Tactical Zone this week occurred in QUANG TRI Province. In the other four provinces, there were no major contacts or new units identified.

The pattern and intensity of Viet Cong counterintelligence related activity remained essentially unchanged with emphasis on selective assassinations of GVN village and hamlet level officials. Propaganda related activity was again concentrated in the provinces of QUANG NAM and THUA THIEN with only scattered activity in the other three provinces of the ICTZ. Recently captured documents reaffirm that the principal mission of the Viet Cong Infrastructure continues to be control of the population and the defeat of GVN and U.S. pacification assets. A primary component of this population control program is the assassination of GVN officials and the motivation of the population to participate in Viet Cong sponsored demonstrations. While the Viet Cong have had a number of recent successes in their terrorist attacks, there are still no indications that they have been able to motivate an appreciable number of people to participate in political struggles.

a. QUANG TRI (P). During the reporting period sightings/incidents increased to 346 with 97 of these sightings north of the BEN HAI River. A total of 219 hostile targets were taken under fire this week by artillery, tactical air strikes and naval gunfire.

There was substantial enemy activity in QUANG TRI (P) with the majority of the action occurring in the central and eastern DMZ areas. The activity in the central DMZ area was reflected in heavy contacts that resulted in the identification of a new enemy unit on the B-5 Front. Action in the eastern DMZ was characterized by attacks by fire directed at friendly combat bases.

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The first attack by fire occurred on the 5th when the 1/11th Infantry on A-4 Base (YD 112709) received 19x140mm rockets in six volleys. On the same day, I/3/3 Marines on C-2 Base (YD 1364) received 11x140mm rockets in three separate volleys. On the 8th, both C-1 Base (YD 213674) and C-2 Base (YD 135645) received rocket attacks. The former received four 140mm rockets resulting in light friendly casualties while the latter received 10x122mm rockets in two separate volleys.

The central DMZ, however, was the most active area in I Corps. Both the 3rd Marines and the 11th Infantry were involved in heavy contacts in the area northeast of the ROCKPILE. On 7 August, F/2/3 Marines engaged an estimated two companies of NVA eight and one-half kilometers north northeast of the ROCKPILE (XD 996632). The contact lasted for approximately eight hours and resulted in 29 enemy killed. This action resulted in the capture of a number of documents which appear to indicate the presence on the central DMZ Front of all or part of the 9th Regiment of the 304th NVA Division. Among the documents captured at this location was a promotion certificate of an aspirant who belonged to the 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, 304th Division.

In addition, an envelope and a postcard bearing the letter box number 13642 were found. While this number is not held as the precise LBN for the 9th Regiment, III MAF OOB records indicate that 13634 is the LBN for the 1st Battalion, 13639 for the 2nd Battalion and 13644 for the 3rd Battalion. In other words, the 13642 LBN is in the proper block of numbers to be associated with the 9th Regiment. It is interesting to note that when the 24B Regiment was first contacted, a similar experience was encountered. LBN's were obtained which were not precisely associated with previous LBN information on this unit but were in the block of LBN numbers associated with the 24B Regiment. However, this new LBN number was subsequently proven to be that of the 24th Regiment.

Other identifying information captured in this area was a pack bearing the LBN number HT 13642, again having a 9th Regiment association and an RPD which had a "3/1" marked on the stock. This type marking on a weapon normally identifies the item as 3rd Company, 1st Battalion. Two ID cards were also captured marked "Hamlet 105, Village 201, District 309, Province 903", and "Hamlet 123, Village 204, District 309, Province 903." Past experience in working with these ID codes provides the information that Province 903 is the 304th Division and District 309 is the 9th Regiment. Additional evidence of the presence of the 9th Regiment was provided by documents and marks on clothing found on bodies in a bunker on 10 August. These documents and markings identify the24th Sapper Company, an organic element of the 9th Regimental Headquarters. The documents refer to a 24th Company as well as to the 9th Regiment, 304th Division and discuss equipment peculiar to sapper tactics. The uniform markings were U/1/24 on a shirt pocket (possibly 24th Company, 1st Regiment which equates to 24th Sapper Company, 9th Regiment) and 24 on a shirt collar.

Documentary evidence proves reasonably conclusive that a new unit was contacted on the central DMZ Front and that this unit represents at

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least two battalions of the 9th Regiment. While we have had no prior information on the presence of a new unit on the central DMZ Front, the discovery of this regiment, or elements thereof, is not dissimilar to a III MAF experience in April when the 36th NVA Regiment was first located at (YD 039632). This is only three kilometers from the point where the 2/3 contact with the 9th was made. The 36th Regiment apparently relieved the 27th NVA Regiment after the latter had sustained heavy casualties in the early Spring. However, after a short period of time, the 36th withdrew and was once again replaced by the 27th in this AO. It may well be that a similar operation is currently taking place in the central DMZ involving the 9th Regiment.

In a possibly related action eight kilometers to the northeast, D/1/11th Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force (YD 064682) killing 56 of the enemy. The enemy force in this contact was unidentified. Also possibly related to these developments were exceptionally high IR emission readings which were noted in the CAM LO River Valley (XD 910600-XD 995575). During the period 6-8 August, there were 298 emissions detected in this river valley. It is apparent that intelligence information is insufficient to make definitive judgments. However, based on the intelligence collected, it is probable that a new enemy unit is operating in the central DMZ. Intelligence collection assets are being concentrated on this area with a particular view towards analyzing any relation this new unit may have on the operations of the balance of the 304th NVA Division, the redeployment of RLT-9, and a determination as to whether this is a replacement or a reinforcing unit.

Elsewhere in the province, the 1st ARVN Reconnaissance Company made contact with an unknown size enemy force 20 kilometers southwest of QUANG TRI City (YD 213364) killing five of the enemy.

b. THUA THIEN (P). Significant enemy initiated activity in THUA THIEN (P) was confined to the western portion of the province. During the evening of 3 August, A/3/5 Cavalry, six kilometers west southwest of A LUOI received one unknown type mortar round followed by a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force. This attack resulted in nine NVA killed with no friendly casualties. The next morning, the CP of the 1/506th Infantry and 2/3 ARVN at FSB CURRAHEE (YC 398949) received 22x122mm rockets in four separate volleys resulting in light friendly casualties with 1,000 gallons of MOGAS and four 500 gallon fuel pods destroyed. Early on the morning of the 5th and less than nine kilometers to the west, B/2/506th and C/1/506th Infantry became engaged in a series of contacts which lasted most of the morning. These contacts, generally located in an area nine kilometers west southwest of A LUOI (YC 312955) resulted in six NVA killed. On the 7th, B/2/506th Infantry, eight and one-half kilometers southwest of A LUOI (YC 312959), received heavy small arms and RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force. This contact resulted in two NVA killed. All these contacts occurred in the same general area. Although no positive unit identification was made, this is the operating area of both the 803rd Regiment and the 9th Battalion of the 29th Regiment. This could be an indication of the enemy's intention to contest

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further friendly incursions into this enemy vital area.

c. QUANG NAM (P). Enemy initiated activity in QUANG NAM (P) during the week was light and confined to the southeastern portion of the province. On 3 August, a USAF F-4 aircraft while on a close air support mission for Special Forces received ground fire, crashed and burned 14 kilometers south southwest of AN HOA (ZC 211330). The only other significant enemy initiated activity occurred when two teen-agers threw two M-26 grenades into a building where village elders were holding a meeting. This terrorist incident occurred in CAM KIM Hamlet, two kilometers southwest of HOI AN (BT 131561) and resulted in four civilians killed and 20 wounded. This incident is consistent with recent agent reports indicating an emphasis on increased training for and the use of teen-agers in terrorist activities.

Although the southern DANANG TAOR was relatively quiet, there were several light contacts precipitated by friendly forces. The most significant of these contacts occurred as the result of ARVN operations and a 196th Infantry AO sighting. The 3/51 ARVN killed 15 enemy in two separate ambushes seven kilometers east of LIBERTY Bridge (BT 002534) and on 8 August, a 196th Brigade AO observed an estimated 25 VC 11 kilometers west southwest of THANG BINH (BT 057389). A fire mission was adjusted and resulted in 15 VC killed. In this same general area, Operation DURHAM PEAK, now in its 22nd day, has resulted in a cumulative figure of only 70 confirmed KIA's. However, there have been a significant number of PW's taken from the 36th Regiment during this operation. The 1st Marine Division reported that nine PW's and ralliers were taken by the 5th Marines on the 9th of August in the southeastern sector of the DURHAM PEAK AO (AT 9738). Most of these PW's and ralliers indicate that they are from the 2d Battalion, 36th Regiment. The poor physical condition of these PW's/Hoi Chanhs and the relatively large number of prisoners taken from this unit in a situation where there has been little contact suggests that the 36th is currently in a low state of combat effectiveness.

There were a number of sightings of the enemy in the mountains south of NONG SON and stretching eastward toward QUE SON. The sighting of enemy units under daylight conditions in southern QUANG NAM may well indicate the difficulties which the enemy is experiencing in this area as he seeks to avoid the aggressive Marine, ARVN, ROK and Americal operations.

North of DANANG, the 2/502nd Infantry, 101st Division, operating in ELEPHANT Valley (ZC 1287-1390-1392) on 5 and 6 August discovered a series of base camps containing a variety of supplies, equipment, and ordnance, including large quantities of blasting caps, fuses and pull friction detonators. On the 6th, B Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd discovered a sapper training area (ZC 131902), including barbed wire fence mock-ups. Clothing, personal items, tools and weapons indicated recent use of these camps. This is the general area held as the base camp area for both the T.87 and HAI VAN Sapper Battalions and it appears that one or both of these units has recently been using these camps for training.

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d. QUANG TIN (P). Enemy initiated activity in QUANG TIN (P) was moderate during the week with the Americal Division reporting 52 enemy killed in 37 separate contacts. The majority of these contacts occurred in the piedmont and jungle canopied areas of QUANG TIN. The most significant enemy activity occurred on 7 August 16 kilometers south of TAM KY (BT 289070) when two light observation helicopters were shot down within three hours and 400 meters of each other. This action attested to the persistence and intensity of the enemy anti-aircraft effort in QUANG TIN. One hour after the second helo went down, elements of the 2/17th Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force in this same general area (BT 289068) killing one NVA. To the north, A/3/21st Infantry, nine kilometers south west of THANG BINH (BT 104352) received three rounds of 60mm mortar fire and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The soldiers returned fire and swept the area finding six NVA killed in action. Elsewhere, 3/5 ARVN and D/1/46 Infantry killed a total of 10 enemy in two separate contacts in the TIEN PHUOC area. Seventeen kilometers south southeast of TIEN PHUOC, D/1/501st Infantry found five graves each containing one VC body. The bodies were approximately one month old and had been killed by artillery. Also during the reporting period several caches were captured in QUANG TIN (P). On 6 August, Recon/1/46th Infantry captured 3,000 pounds of rice 18 kilometers southwest of TAM KY (BT 203 081). On 7 August, the 4th of the 5th ARVN, acting on information provided by a Hoi Chanh, discovered 53 individual weapons, 5,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 11 civilian transistor radios and 20 CHICOM hand grenades in a cache in the PHUOC CHAU Valley (AT 9508). Two days later, the 238th RF Company, also exploiting a Hoi Chanh's information, discovered 16 individual and eight crew-served weapons in the southern sector of Base Area 117 (BT 225025). In an order of battle development, a member of the 70th VC Main Force Battalion turned himself in to a PF unit four kilometers southwest of TAM KY (BT 279197). This was the first PW or Hoi Chanh taken from the 70th Battalion since 25 June.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). While the tempo and intensity of enemy initiated activity in QUANG NGAI (P) was not heavy there were a number of small unit actions recorded. Americal Division reported 63 enemy killed in 39 separate engagements. The most significant of these engagements occurred on 5 August when C/3/1st Infantry killed six VC with artillery 14 kilometers west of QUANG NGAI City (BS 507737). Three days later in the same general area, C/3/1st Infantry while moving into a night defensive position 11 kilometers west of QUANG NGAI City (BS 540760) received one RPG round and heavy automatic weapons fire. The company engaged the enemy killing two VC while suffering two soldiers killed and nine wounded. To the south of this contact, 3/4 ARVN killed 12 enemy in a contact six kilometers north northeast of MO DUC (BS 750590). Another nine enemy were accounted for when B/4/3 Infantry, 13 kilometers southwest of MO DUC (BS 639439) found nine graves with one body in each grave. To the west, in the central portion of the province, the CIDG Mobile Strike Force Company from HA THANH was ambushed by an estimated VC company 15 kilometers southwest of HA THANH (BS 289591). The friendly force lost one killed and 18 wounded.

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Operation BRAVE ARMADA, conducted in the northeastern coastal lowlands of QUANG NGAI (P) terminated on 7 August. This operation accounted for 11 enemy killed. To the south, Operation NANTUCKET BEACH, which commenced on 20 July and is still in progress, has accounted for 37 enemy killed.

Throughout the province PW's and captured documents indicated intensified sapper training and reorganization of sapper units to prepare for upcoming operations.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. Reports continue to be received indicating that the enemy intends to renew offensive operations on or before 18 August. Some reports indicate the commencement of this offensive as early as 11 August. At present there is little hard evidence to support these reports. While the enemy retains the capability of conducting coordinated corps-wide attacks by fire interspersed with limited ground attacks and sapper probes, it is our present estimate that the disposition of his regimental formations in the southern three provinces remain withdrawn from the coastal plain, and there is little likelihood that they will be in position to conduct a major offensive during the next week. However, there is an increased possibility that the enemy will step-up his attacks by fire and sapper operations during that time frame.

In northern I Corps, there was a definite increase in enemy activity during the past week, particularly in northern QUANG TRI (P) in the central DMZ sector. The presence of a new unit, the 9th Regiment, plus the increased level of activity on this front indicates that enemy offensive operations may possibly be on the upswing in the coming week.

It is our estimate that there is a heightened possibility of the enemy launching attacks by fire and limited ground and sapper operations during the coming week including the possibility of coordinated corps-wide attacks of this nature. However, we do not consider the NVA and VC have adequately prepared the battlefield for the conduct of major offensive operations.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased from 234 to 268 for the week of 3-9 August. These incidents consisted of one ambush, four attacks by fire, 159 harassing fire incidents, 70 mining and booby trap incidents, four hamlet harassment incidents, five assassination incidents, eight espionage incidents, three kidnapping incidents, 11 propaganda incidents and three sabotage incidents.

a. Strength and Disposition. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserve Reinforcement. Annex A.

d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment. Annex D (Special Report on VC Map Reading and Plotting VC Coordinates on UTM Map).

e. - g. Negative.

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h. Air Defense. AA fire increased from 117 to 138 incidents for the reporting period and 48 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 3-9 August:

Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	170
60mm Mortar	62
Unk Cal Mortar	48
140mm Rocket	14
122mm Rocket	33
107mm Rocket	16
Unk Cal Rocket	2
155mm Artillery	1
105mm Artillery	3
TOTAL	349

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance. There were 77 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 3-9 August. These long-range patrols reported 50 sightings and 15 contacts totaling 270 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of 18 enemy KIA.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant caches were captured in the ICTZ during the period 3-9 August:

(a) 4 August: A/1/11 Infantry discovered an ordnance and equipment cache nine kilometers west southwest of CON THIEN (YD 050630) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
31 EA	UNK	RR Rounds (Unk Cal)
44 BOXES	UNK	Mine Fuzes
24 BOXES	UNK	50 Cal Rounds (Loose)
3 EA	UNK	RPG Rounds
17 EA	UNK	Composition B (Blocks)
30 EA	CHICOM	Claymore Mines
72 EA	UNK	82mm Mortar Rounds
2 EA	CHICOM	Hand Grenades
1 BAG	UNK	60mm/82mm Mortar Fuzes
1 EA	CHICOM	Gas Mask

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No further information was available on this cache.

(b) 5 August: 1/3/5 while operating eleven kilometers north northwest of QUE SON (AT 966435) located a rice cache as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
4,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was located in a cave (6'x20'x6') in mountainous terrain and stored in four bamboo-woven bins. The entire cache was infested with worms and mildew had begun to appear in over one-fourth of the contents. It was estimated that the cache had been in storage for a period of six months. The entire cache was destroyed. No further information was available on this cache.

(c) 6 August: Recon/1/46 operating within the confines of Base Area 117, twelve kilometers south southeast of TIEN PHUOC (BT 203 081) located a rice cache as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
3,000 LBS	UNK	Rice

This cache was located in the proximity of sixteen huts, several bunkers, and a tunnel which was thirty feet long. No further information was available on this cache.

(d) 7 August: C/1/11 Mechanized Infantry, while operating eight kilometers west southwest of CON THIEN (YD 059643) located a rice, ordnance and equipment cache as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
250 LBS	Native Grown	Rice
46 EA	UNK	82mm Mortar Rounds
26 EA	UNK	60mm Mortar Rounds
48 EA	UNK	60mm Mortar Primers
58 EA	UNK	82mm Mortar Primers
97 EA	UNK	82mm Mortar Fuzes
4 EA	UNK	RPG-7 Rounds
20 EA	CHICOM	Hand Grenades
72 LBS	UNK	TNT
3 EA	CHICOM	Claymore Mines
100 EA	UNK	Time Fuzes
5 EA	UNK	AT Mines
50 EA	UNK	AK Rounds
30 LBS	UNK	Salt

No further information was available on this cache.

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(e) 8 August: 4/5 ARVN acting on information received from a Hoi Chanh discovered an ordnance cache seventeen kilometers west south west of TIEN PHUOC (AT 9508) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
1 EA	US	BAR
4 EA	USSR	SMG
3 EA	USSR	PPS SMG
1 EA	US	M-1 Rifle
1 EA	UNK	SKS Rifle
2 EA	UNK	Sten Guns
7 EA	US	M-1 Carbines
4 EA	French	AR (1924/29)
6 EA	UNK	K-44
9 EA	French	MAS-36
1 EA	UNK	Shot Gun
4 EA	French	9mm MAT-49 SMG
2 EA	Czechoslovakia	7.62 MG
5,000 EA	UNK	Small Arms Ammunition
20 EA	CHICOM	Hand Grenades
10 EA	UNK	Transistor Radios (Civ)
30 EA	UNK	Black Uniforms

No further information was available on this cache.

(f) 9 August: D/1/20 while operating 10 kilometers south southeast of MO DUC (BS 734447) discovered a rice cache as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
10,000 LBS	UNK	Rice

This cache was found underground. No further information was available on this cache.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 3-9 August:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
82mm Mortar	350
81mm Mortar	63
60mm Mortar	263
155mm Artillery	1
105mm Artillery	16
8" Artillery	1

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Type	Amount
140mm Rocket	3
122mm Rocket	2
75mm RR	7
57mm RR	4
Unk Cal RR	3
TOTAL	713

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	314
Crew-Served Weapons	60

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 3-9 August:

Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
3 Aug	(BS 533759)	2,000	B/3/1
3 Aug	(BS 092918)	15 Food	B/1/502
3 Aug	(BS 678898)	900	A/5/46
3 Aug	(BS 680899)	425	A/5/46
4 Aug	(ZC 215343)	17,600	5th SFGA
4 Aug	(ZC 215343)	22,000 Food	5th SFGA
4 Aug	(BT 130398)	2,800	RCN/2/1
4 Aug	(BS 542755)	2,000	B/3/1
4 Aug	(AT 976452)	2,000	G/2/1
5 Aug	(BT 054087)	55 Food	5th SFGA
6 Aug	(AT 934606)	75	H/2/7
6 Aug	(AT 907834)	20	I/3/26
6 Aug	(AT 966435)	4,000	I/3/5
6 Aug	(BS 162982)	2,000	D/1/501
6 Aug	(BS 093952)	100	C/1/502
6 Aug	(BS 093952)	50 Food	C/1/502
6 Aug	(BS 679898)	200	C/1/1
6 Aug	(ZC 135907)	100	B/2/502
7 Aug	(BT 038115)	750	5th SFGA
7 Aug	(BS 486486)	110	5th SFGA
7 Aug	(AT 833488)	100 Food	C/1/7
7 Aug	(BT 203081)	3,000	RCN/1/46
7 Aug	(BS 706918)	250 Food	B/5/46
7 Aug	(BT 010587)	150	L/3/1
7 Aug	(BT 012586)	500	K/3/1
7 Aug	(BT 008537)	100	L/3/1
7 Aug	(BT 010586)	200	K/3/1
7 Aug	(BT 020586)	515	K/3/1
7 Aug	(AT 993377)	30 Food	E/2/5
7 Aug	(AT 947087)	4,000	ARVN
8 Aug	(AT 969302)	1,000	D/4/31

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Date	Location	Amount (lbs)		Capturing Unit
8 Aug	(AT 990529)	50		M/3/1
8 Aug	(BS 123941)	35		C/1/501
8 Aug	(BS 081924)	500		B/1/501
8 Aug	(BS 708912)	500		A/5/46
8 Aug	(YD 550291)	80		A/2/506
8 Aug	(YD 543274)	100		A/2/506
8 Aug	(YC 475872)	15		B/3/187
8 Aug	(YD 059643)	250		C/1/11
8 Aug	(YD 059643)	30	Salt	C/1/11
9 Aug	(AT 887247)	500		A/4/31
9 Aug	(BS 627425)	950		B/4/3
9 Aug	(BS 528748)	2,000		A/3/1
9 Aug	(BS 734447)	10,000		D/1/20
9 Aug	(AT 902635)	30		L/3/7
9 Aug	(AT 922835)	50		M/3/26
9 Aug	(AT 966545)	400		M/3/1
9 Aug	(AT 966545)	200	Food	M/3/1
9 Aug	(AT 983382)	300		F/2/5
9 Aug	(YD 312358)	220		ARVN
	Total Rice	60,525		
	Total Food	22,700		
	Total Salt	30		

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	203	Structures Damaged	57
Bunkers Destroyed	235	Bunkers Damaged	41
Secondary Explosions	23	Secondary Fires	55
Boats Destroyed	1		

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ increased in comparison to the previous week. There were 727 KIA's, 23 VC PW's and 14 NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change.

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i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	99	103	100	101
Low	77	80	80	79
Rainfall (total)	.41	.03	0	0
Winds (knots)	18	7	7	4
Visibility (miles)	7	7	11	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 9-15 August 1969:

General. Only minor changes are expected in wind flow patterns across southeast Asia; therefore, little change in area weather will take place from the previous week. Winds will be particularly gusty over northern ICTZ. Rainfall for the period should be near normal in most areas of I Corps.

ICTZ Forecast. The outlook for the coastal and lowland areas during the forecasting period is partly cloudy to occasionally cloudy with isolated thudershowers. Winds will range from occasionally gusty to 35-40 knots mainly during daylight hours in the early and late portions of the period. Precipitation will be 0-0.5 inches with isolated instances of 0.5-2 inches. The forecast for the mountains is cloudy with some partly cloudy periods during the afternoons. There will be a few rainshowers and isolated thunderstorms mostly during the afternoons and evenings. Winds will range from occasionally gusty to 35-40 knots in exposed areas. Precipitation will be 2-2.5 inches with isolated instances of 2.5-5.5 inches.

j. - 1. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

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c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following course of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/ areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to six infantry regiment equivalents, supported by the equivalent of one naval sapper battalion and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack VANDEGRIFT Combat Base with one infantry regiment supported by one sapper battalion and one artillery battalion.

(3) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(5) Attack installations within the DANANG TACR with up to five infantry regiments, supported by four rocket battalions, one sapper battalion and one engineer battalion.

(6) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division equivalent, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/ rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(8) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to seven infantry regiment equivalents.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

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i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield, sickness, hunger, shortage of ammunition and medical supplies and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ANNEX D - SPECIAL REPORT ON VC MAP READING AND PLOTTING VC COORDINATES ON UTM MAP

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COMUSMACV (MACV J-232)(CIED)	2	CO MCB 5	1
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4	CO MCB 3	1
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COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CO MCB 7	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CO MCB 8	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2	CO MCB 9	1
CG USARV	3	CO MCB 10	1
CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	5	CO MCB 11	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CTG 115.1	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CO MCB 40	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO MCB 53	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CO MCB 58	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	26	CO MCB 62	1
CG AMERICAL DIV	30	CO MCB 71	1
CG 101ST ABN DIV	20	CO MCB 121	1
CG 1ST MAW	30	OSA/EMB SAIGON ATTN: RAS	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	DODSPECREP	1
CG USASUPCOM DANANG	1	DSA I CORPS	11
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	DSA II CORPS	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	MCB 133	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1	DET B 1ST MIBARS	1
CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SAIGON	3	HQ, 212RH COMBAT AVN BN	6
CG 173RD ABN BDE	2	CO 7TH COMM BN	1
CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7	366 AIR SECURITY SQD, USAF	2
CG FLC	5	29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1
CG 1ST LOG CMD LONG BINH	2	7TH PSYOPS BN	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CICV	4
CO 30 NCR	1	III MAF LNO 2ND ROKMC BDE	1
CIB	1	620TH TSC	1
CTG 79.5	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CTG 79.4	1	CTF CW. PBR BASE ONE, NSA DANANG	1
CTG 76.5	1		
CTG 76.4	1	SPO-SEC CMD QUI NHON	1
CTF 76	1	DIRECTOR, CAP III MAF	1
CO DASC ATTN: AVCA-QN-DN-OP	2	CO USS REPOSE	1
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	3	CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO "B" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	5	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	17	CO 4TH PSYOP GP	1
1ST CAG	1	CO 1ST BN 525TH MI GP DANANG	24
2ND CAG	1	620TH TCS (ATTN: CRC) APO 96203	1
3RD CAG	1		
4TH CAG	1	OUT OF COUNTRY	
7 AF (IGS) BDOC	1	DIR NSA	3
45TH ENGR GROUP	1	CMC (ABQ) (AIRMAIL)	2
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2	CG FMFPAC (AIRMAIL)	2
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	1	CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP 7TH FLEET	1
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1		
CO 517TH MI DET	1	CG MCDEC	5
CO 3RD MP BN	1	DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHU LAI	3	CG 3RD MAW	2

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TEAM COMMANDER 19TH CI TEAM, CAMP PENDLETON	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CG 2ND MARDIV	2
CG 5TH MARDIV	6
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO FICPAC (ATTN: SEN MAR OFF)	1
CG 4TH MARDIV, CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA	1
355TH TFW (DCOI)	1
432ND TFW (DCOI)	1
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
388TH TFW (DCOI)	

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 32-69 AS OF 092400H AUGUST 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-HQ	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	11	3,270	2	605			13	3,875	14	6,195	27	10,070
Bn's-Maneuver	40	10,745	11	2,065	5	830	56	13,640	33	14,430	89	28,070
Bn's-Support	18	5,105	1	220	1	140	20	5,465	7	2,080	27	7,545
Separate Co's	1	130			34	2,725	35	2,855	1	80	36	2,935
TOTAL CONFIRMED		21,215		2,890		3,695		27,800		24,220		52,020
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's	1	575					1	575	3	995	4	1,530
Bn's-Maneuver	6	2,195	1	350	1	110	8	2,655	7	3,100	15	5,755
Bn's-Support	4	1,045					4	1,045	9	1,445	13	2,490
Separate Co's	1	90			3	195	4	285			4	285
TOTAL PROBABLE		3,905		350		305		4,560		5,540		10,100
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,400	3	1,400
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support									22	7,675	22	7,675
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										10,015		10,015
		25,120		3,240		4,000		32,360		39,775		72,135

*See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,425		150	3,575
	Probable	2,095			2,095
	Possible				
	TOTAL	5,520		150	5,670
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	4,100		670	4,770
	Probable			45	45
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,100		715	4,815
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	6,630	70	955	7,655
	Probable	830	350		1,180
	Possible				
	TOTAL	7,460	420	955	8,835
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,735	1,375	595	4,705
	Probable	380		185	565
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,115	1,375	780	5,270
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,235	1,445	1,325	7,095
	Probable	600		75	675
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,835	1,445	1,400	7,770

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS																DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL											
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	34	3		37	8			8	5			5	47	3		50	32	5		37	79	8		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	40	6		46	11	1		12	5	1		6	56	8		64	33	7		40	89	15		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	8	1		9	1			1	1			1	10	1		11	2	5	10	17	12	6	10	28
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	3	1	5	3	3	1	7
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2		1	2	3	1	2	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
TOTAL SUPPORT	18	4		22	1			1	1			1	20	4		24	7	9	22	38	27	13	22	62
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	58	10		68	12	1		13	6	1		7	76	12		88	40	16	22	78	116	28	22	166

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	354	Nam Hoa	70	Hoa Vang	588	Thang Binh	1,140	Binh Son	239
	Mai Linh	87	Huong Tra	58	Hieu Duc	78	Tam Ky	731	Son Tinh	490
	Trieu Phong	197	Hong Dien	59	Dien Ban	1,085	Ly Tin	120	Tu Nghia	456
	Cam Lo	265	Vinh Loc	68	Dai Loc	387	Hiep Duc	242	Nghia Hanh	310
	Gio Linh	202	Phu Loc	231	Thuong Duc	92	Tien Phuoc	274	Mo Duc	675
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	375	Hau Duc	230	Duc Pho	462
	Huong Hoa	14	Phu Vang	43	Que Son	761			Tra Bong	170
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	190	Duy Xuyen	1,137			Ba To	124
			Huong Thuy	101	Hieu Nhon	445			Minh Long	15
			Phong Dien	451					Son Ha	188
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	1,227	THUA THIEN	1,317	QUANG NAM	4,948	QUANG TIN	2,737	QUANG NGAI	3,129

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 13,358

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,195		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Vic XD 6233	XD 8337/18Jun69
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	2,210		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unlocated	
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unloc LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unloc LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unloc LAOS	

*See note #4 on Page A-17
**See note #2 on Page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,950		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,900		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	500		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,795		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	490	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	470	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
31st Group (-)	NVA	C	1,085		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	290	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2061/20Jul69
15th Bn	NVA	PR	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Secial Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,910		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,765		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
65th Arty Regt	NVA	PR	UNK		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.40 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.41 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.42 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.43 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,725		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,410		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	345	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0566/22May69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	355	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
24B (AKA 57th) Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	XD 8732	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	XD 8732	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	XD 8732	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	XD 8732	XD 8754/26Jun69
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,660		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	XD 7964/12Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	395	XD 9265	XD 9666/26May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	395	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	400	XD 8854	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,785		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	320	YD 3639	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	205	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	190	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	250	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn, 812th Regt	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	200	Vic YD 3535	

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	925		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	AU 8100/10Jun68
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	290	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	285	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jul69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,835		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 7896	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	360	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	185	Vic YD 6514	YD 6822/14Jun69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	270	Vic YD 7504	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	220	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
3rd Bn, 803rd Regt	NVA	C	345	Vic YC 3193	YC 3389/19Jul69
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	390	Vic YD 3304	YD 3302/20Jun69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	280	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
C.113 Co	LF	C	145	Vic YD 5043	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
C.117 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 9516	YD 9022/25Oct68
C.118 Co	LF	C	55	Vic YD 9518	YD 9917/12Sep68
C.119 Co	LF	PR	45	Vic YD 9424	YD 9424/27Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69
9th Bn, 29th Regt	NVA	C	325	Vic YC 3297	YC 3297/23Jul69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	15,000		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
1st Bn, 68B Arty Regt	NVA	C	315	AT 8042	
HAI VAN Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,025		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102nd Bn	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 9274/19May69
103rd Bn	NVA	C	325	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
36th Regt	NVA	C	580		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	130	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	125	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	130	AT 9737	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,365		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	ZC 1835	AT 8247/11Jun69
8th Bn	NVA	C	410	ZC 1835	
9th Bn	NVA	C	360	ZC 1835	AT 8347/17Jun69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
368B Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,170		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
R.20 Bn	LF	C	155	BT 0763	AT 9967/11May69
V.25 Bn	LF	C	160	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	265	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	70	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	275	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	Unloc vic HOA VANG (D)	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	85	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	105	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	120	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	115	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	140	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST ST ENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	4,625		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	Unlocated	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	850		
Regt Hq	MF	C	230	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	210	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	200	BT 2711	BT 2416/14May69
90th Bn	MF	C	210	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	710		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200	BT 1317	
1st Bn	NVA	C	150	BT 1317	BT 1115/14May69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	185	BT 1317	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	175	BT 1317	BT 0222/4Jun68
70th Bn	MF	C	100	BT 1523	BT 3219/25Feb69
72nd Bn	LF	C	210	BT 2932	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	140	BT 1408	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	110	BT 3127	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	205	BT 2232	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	220	BT 2001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4212	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	50	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	75	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	45	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	170	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	135	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
81st Co	LF	C	95	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	215	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb68
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	600	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	220	BS 4677	BS 7268/20May68
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	180	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	810		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	160	BS 4386	AT 8349/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	210	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 4386	AT 8349/27Feb69
95th Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68
C.17 Co	LF	C	55	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	90	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	75	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	85	BS 7555	BS 7061/17Nov68
C.120 Co	LF	C	70	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,770		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	1,010		
Regt Hq	MF	C	375	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	200	BS 6733	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	215	BS 7932	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	220	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,025		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	BS 5262	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	260	BS 5262	BS 5262/27May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	285	BS 6646	BS 5262/27May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	295	BS 5262	BS 5262/27May69

See note #2 on page A-17

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CONFIDENTIAL QUANG NGAI (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 3147	BS 7543/11Jun69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 3970/26Aug68
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 3147	BS 0433/4Mar69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 3147	
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	65	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	95	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69

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BINH DINH PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	925		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	275	BINH DINH	CR 0952/23Jun68
7th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 9640/12Apr68
8th Bn	NVA	C	250	BINH DINH	CR 0933/23Apr68
9th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 8955/29May68

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes in ICTZ during period 030001H to 092400H August 1969.

a. No significant changes.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the Headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct opreational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

9. Subordination/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF PERINTREP 27-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 32-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P)

a. PW, PFC Luong Van BINH of the 19th Transportation Co, 31st Group, captured in the vicinity of (YD 089629) on 31 July 1969 (CG 3rd MARDIV 041344Z August 1969 17th ITT Interr Rpt #57-69A) stated that the 31st Group CP was located at Vinh Lang (V), Vinh Ninh (D), Quang Tri (P) (CNA). BINH reported the composition of the 31st Group as being the 27th and 15th Bn's along with the K.11 Recon, K.12 Sapper, K.13 Infantry, K.15 Infantry, K.17 Engineers, K.18 and K.19 Transportation Co's. PW also stated that the mission of his unit was to receive, transport and replenish supplies for the 15th Infantry Co from unknown locations along the Ben Hai River. BINH further stated that his unit's morale was low due to lack of contact with the enemy and continual artillery and air strikes on their AO. The PW gave the LBN for the 19th Trans Co as 94141 XB. BINH joined the 19th Trans Co in December of 1968, commenced infiltration to RVN, and after two months of walking arrived at the Ben Hai River. BINH revealed that his company had lost nine men due to disease in the past two months. Reported personalities: 31st Group CO-PHO; 19th Trans Co CHDR-WO Nguyen Cao PHAT, XO-MSgt Tran Van NHAN, PO-Lt Phuong Tan THIET.

(G-2 COMMENT: PW's information correlates with OOB holdings except personalities (F-6). All other information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, CPL Le Van SO of the 5th Co, 2nd Bn, 27th Regt, captured on 28 July 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 134654) (CG 3rd MARDIV 010902Z August 1969 7th ITT Interr Rpt #59-69A) stated that the 5th Co CP was located in the vicinity of (YD 013631), the 6th Co CP was located in the vicinity of (YD 994597) and the 2nd Bn CP was located in the vicinity of (YD 053638). SO, originally of the 45th Bn, Quang Binh Province Unit stated that the mission of the 45th Bn was to augment the 2nd Bn, 27th Regt. The mission of the 5th Co, 2nd Bn was to act as a transportation unit. The PW further stated that he has heard of the 270th Regt and they were operating in the central and eastern portion of Quang Tri (P). He has also heard of the 9th and 75th Arty Bn's. He stated that the 9th Arty Bn belongs to the 4th Military Region, is equipped with 37mm guns and operates in Quang Ninh (D), Quang Binh (P). The 75th Arty Bn also operates in Quang Binh (P). The PW revealed that the morale is high with some troops, but with most it is low because they were afraid of being killed. PW also revealed that the AKA for the 2nd Bn is Thu Bon Bn, the LBN for the 27th Regt is 31515 QP and the LBN for Quang Binh Province Unit is 32515 RT. SO infiltrated into RVN on 5 July 1969 with the 45th, crossing the Ben Hai River at (YD 064722) and following a route to (YD 994597) to (YD 053684) and finally stopping in the vicinity of (YD 053638). The PW stated his company has lost 20 to 30 men in the past month but has not yet received replacements. SO also stated that at an unknown location he saw approximately 50 men

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carrying five big guns which he believed to be 12.7mm HMG, but is not certain. Reported personalities: 45th Bn CO-SrCapt Nguyen Van LONG, XO-1stLt Duong Cong DAN, PO-JrCapt Ha Khac PHAO; 5th Co CMDR-Tran Van KHIEN, XO-2ndLt Le Van LIEN, PO-1stLt Nguyen CON, APO-WO PHONG.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 27th Regt is known to operate in this area. It is possible that NVN may be resorting to supplying replacements to regular units from NVN provincial or security force units. All information rated (F-3).)

2. THUA THIEN (P). No significant reports.

3. QUANG NAM (P)

a. PW, PFC Nguyen The GIAO, 13th RR Co, 60th (AKA 90th) Regt captured on 2 August 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 990395) (1st IT 01-08-69 1st MARDIV 031455Z August 1969 1st ITT 01-08-69, 1st MARDIV 050321Z August 1969 1st ITT 03-08-69) states the total strength of the 13th RR, 14th AA, 16th Comm, 17th Recon, 19th Medical, and 21st Transportation Co's is approximately 262. The PW stated that normally the regimental support companies consist of 80 men. The 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th, and 17th regimental support companies along with Hospital 81 and an unknown transportation unit of Front 4 are located in a multi-base area in the vicinity of (ZC 150393). The 577th Rkt Bn is located in the vicinity of (ZC 189405), Regt CP the 90th along with 15th Engr and 19th Med Co's are located in the vicinity of (ZC 174356). The 7th Bn is located in the vicinity of (ZC 175377), the 8th Bn is located in the vicinity of (ZC 186353) and the 9th Bn is possibly located in the vicinity of (AT 8236). The PW stated morale was low due to heavy losses and fear of death.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is south of the previous operating area for the 90th Regt. Based primarily upon this PW's statements, the 90th Regt has been moved to this area in the III MAF OOB listing. All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, PFC Vu Trong AN, 7th Co, D-8 Bn, 31st Regt, who was captured on 27 July 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 935649) (First MARDIV 281600Z July 1969 9th ITT 08-07-69 and first MARDIV 061250Z August 1969 9th ITT 14-07-69) stated the D-8 Bn's strength is approximately 200 (hearsay) and has been located in the vicinity of (AT 795651) since May of 1969. The present mission, as stated by the PW was rice gathering. AN stated the AKA of the D-8 Bn was 5th Bn. The PW further stated that the morale of those who were sick was very low, but due to meetings held by the political officer, the morale of the others was fair. PW further stated his company was only 50 percent combat effective because of malnutrition. AN also stated he left NVN in December 1968 and arrived in Quang Nam (P) in March 1969 with Infiltration Group number 522. Reported personalities: D-8 Bn CO-Tram LUY, XO-XUONG; 7th CO PO-LAM.

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(G-2 COMMENT: The stated location of the battalion is slightly south of the current estimated location of the 31st Regt. Numerous agent reports continue to locate elements of the 31st throughout this area. First report of the AKA of 5th Bn for the 8th. Personalities, with the exception of LUY, are reported for the first time. All information rated (F-6).)

4. QUANG TIN (U). Guerrilla Huynh HOANG, of the Ly Long (V) Guerrilla Unit returned on 5 August 1969 at (BT 203159) (SA 2nd ARVN Div 050930Z August 1969, 11th MIT Interrogation report) and stated there was a weapons cache in the vicinity of (AT 953094) which consists of 15 RPD automatic weapons and 150 AK-47's. The cache is guarded by a platoon of 28 men. Source futher stated that there was a prison camp (code no 154) located in the vicinity of (AT 948093) and is guarded by a platoon of 30 men and five prison camp cadres.

(G-2 COMMENT: An agent reported on a weapons/munitions factory located at (AT 953074) on 1 July 1969. A report has been received on an ARVN soldier who escaped from a VC PW camp located at (AT 931094) in May 1969. All information rated (F-6).)

5. QUANG NGAI (U)

a. PW, WO Nguyen Van THINH, Lien Gia 6 Bn, 2nd Regt, 3rd NVA Div who was captured on 3 August 1969, (Americal Interr Rpt 050600Z August 1969), stated his battalion was last located in the vicinity of (BS 6152), and the mission was to counterattack U.S. units in the area. Subject also stated that an attack was planned on an LZ in the vicinity of (BS 730430) by a sapper company from the Regt and a mortar company from the battalion. Subject stated the battalion will set up ambushes against allied reaction forces during the "D" Campaign which is to be conducted sometime in August. THINH was enroute to Phu My (D) with the mission of surveying terrain for mortar emplacements to be directed at an allied OP in the vicinity Xuong Rong mountain (BS 7543) when he was captured. Subject claimed he had been in the battalion only a short time and did not know any personalities.

(G-2 COMMENT: OOB holds Lien Gia 6 as an AKA for 22nd NVA Regt. A further verbal report tentatively identifies THINH as being a member of the 7th Bn, 22nd Regt. The Sapper Co mentioned is possibly the 139th Sapper Co. Two previous reports on the "D" offensive have been received. LZ LIZ is located at Xuong Rong mountain (BS 752436). Phu My (D) is unidentified. All information rated (F-6).)

b. Returnee PFC Van Lam, 39th Co, 9th Bn, 22nd Regt, 3rd NVA Div, returned on 4 August 1969 in the vicinity of (BS 470785) (Americal Interr Rpt message 060200Z August 1969) and stated he had been separated from his unit since January of 1969 and could give no current unit location. Subject claims that he spoke to four NVA of an unknown unit in Son Nam (V) on about 26 July 1969, and they claimed that all NVA

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and MF units had received orders to begin one month of training for a new offensive which is to begin around 20 August 1969.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holds the 9th Bn, 22nd NVA Regt in the vicinity of (BS 5262). The 39th Co is an AAA for the 94th Combat Support Co, 22nd Regt. Other reports have been received of an upcoming offensive possibly identified as the "D" Offensive to start in August 1969. All information rated (F-3).)

APPENDIX 1 - CAPTURED DOCUMENT READOUT

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APPENDIX 1 (CAPTURED DOCUMENT READOUT) TO ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS, AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 32-69.

1. Documents captured in the vicinity of (YD 001632) by F/2/3 Marines on 7 and 8 Aug 69 (3rd MARDV Doc Trans Cen, Initial Translation Summary) identified the 9th Regt, 304th Div. Documents are as follows:

a. ID card with: Hamlet 105, Village 201, District 309, Province 903.

b. ID card with: Hamlet 123, Village 204, District 309, Province 903.

c. Envelope with: LBN 13642 US.

d. Post card with: LBN 13642 US.

e. Promotion warrant - 1st Bn, 9th Regt, 304th Div written in clear handwriting. Unit seal 6338 was also on the warrant.

f. Metal tag with U1 $\frac{3}{1}$.

(G-2 CMT: III MAF OOB associates items a. - d. with the 9th Regt, 304th Div. Item e., unit seal no 6338 is associated with the 9th Regt, 304th Div. Item f. is possibly associated with the 3rd Co, 1st Bn, 9th Regt, 304th Div. All information (B-3).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 32-69

1. GENERAL. Viet Cong counterintelligence related activity during the reported period was generally consistent with the pattern of the previous two months. Continued VC pressure on the populace and GVN administration was reflected by reported terrorist activities, highlighted by daylight assassinations in Quang Nam Province. In these and other assassinations, lower level GVN officials and sympathizers appear to be the intended victims. Whether the actual intent of each incident was specifically the demise of the individual or more generally a dramatic display to intimidate both GVN officials and the general populace cannot be determined at present. However, whatever the motive behind these continued assassination and terrorist incidents, they certainly lend credence to current proclaimed VC plans and policies for destruction/intimidation of the GVN rural administration and pacification assets, and the retention of control over the populace in VC controlled areas and the establishment of control over the populace in contested areas.

A series of recently captured documents from Dien Ban (D) in Quang Nam (P) provide some details relative to current Viet Cong plans in that area. While it is not known whether these plans generally reflect Viet Cong policy throughout ICTZ, they appear to be consistent with information received from other contested areas in ICTZ. According to the documents, periods of intensified activity were to be conducted in three phases lasting from 20 June to 10 July, 15 to 26 July and 15 to 20 August respectively. During these periods, intensified military, political, and proselyting activities were to be coordinated to accomplish the overall objectives of controlling the population in GVN areas, preventing the people from fleeing VC controlled areas and destroying the GVN administrative apparatus.

The specific mission of hamlet and village local forces and armed reconnaissance units is to conduct violent attacks on refugee areas, PSDF units, pacification cadre and Popular Forces.

A 15 member teenager special action unit, led by a cadre was also mentioned and is probably targeted against GVN village and hamlet administrative officials. The political struggle sections of villages in Dien Ban were ordered to initiate demonstrations denouncing the:

(1) Concentration of the people in refugee areas.

(2) Use of air strikes, artillery and defoliants.

(3) Restrictions of travel.

Slogans employed in these demonstrations would aim at toppling the present government in Saigon, formation of a peace cabinet and opening of "serious talks" with the NLF.

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2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. The level of Viet Cong espionage activity remained essentially the same as that which has prevailed for the past several months. Techniques employed were also consistent with past practices. Heavy emphasis continues to be placed on the use of children, Vietnamese employees of US bases, reconnaissance personnel dressed as PF, RF, ARVN or RD and questioning of civilians who enter VC controlled or contested areas. Some of the more significant reports received include the following:

a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 26 July, a GVN source reported [redacted] Khac Nghien, an interpreter for an American officer at "Luong Dien base" (LZ Nancy) was working as a VC agent and living in Hai Lang (D) (Eval: C-2).

(2) On 28 July, a GVN source reported an unknown number of VC stopped and questioned gardeners and wood gatherers in the Tram Forest (YD 253455), asking them about the situation at Thuong Phuoc (H) (YD 310487) (Eval: B-3).

(3) On 26 July, a GVN source reported that the VC had sent a number of propaganda and reconnaissance cadres to assist in VC proselyting efforts and the photographing of allied bases (nfi) in Hai Lang (D) (Eval: C-2).

b. Thua Thien. On 2 August, a US military source reported that one unidentified VC/NVA sapper team entered the Cong Phai Lai area (YD 790215) disguised as ARVN, RDC, PSDF and National Police. Some of the personnel have ARVN ID cards. They sent children to the An Cuu market, bus station, and the An Cuu bridge of Hue City (YD 781209) to collect information about these installations so they could raid the market and bus station and sabotage the bridge between the nights of 15-23 August. The team consisted of approximately 34 personnel (Eval: F-6).

c. Quang Nam. On 2 August, 9 children were detained, questioned, and sent to district headquarters (BT 052697) by CAP 2-7-5. The children possessed two miniature models of CAP 2-7-5's position.

d. Quang Ngai. On 31 July, a US MI source reported two VC spy bases were located at Hiep An (BS 740540) serving as a base of operations for 2 VC undercover agents. The agents are: (1) Pham Thanh, who has the mission to spread propaganda to the teenagers of Pho Nghia (V) (BS 758459) and send them to Thach Tru (H) (BS 769465) to collect information. (2) Nguyen Tu, who has the mission of collecting information on Thach Tru (H) (BS 769465) (Eval: C-6).

3. SABOTAGE. Sporatic Viet Cong sabotage continued with four incidents being reported during the week. Techniques employed and targets represented no change from previous practices.

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a. Quang Tri. On 8 August 1969 a culvert at YD 217708 was 70% destroyed by an explosive charge.

b. Thua Thien. Viet Cong sabotage of the Hue-Danang Railroad resumed on 6 August 1969 when two meters of track were destroyed at YD 828177 by a Viet Cong mine.

c. Quang Nam.

(1) An unsuccessful attempt was made to destroy the bridge at AT 998705 on 2 August 1969 by means of a floating mine. A bridge security guard spotted the mine and detonated it with small arms fire while it was still upstream from the bridge. No casualties or damage resulted from the explosion.

(2) At 0130 H on 9 Aug 69 a PF unit observed a raft floating toward the Ba Ren Bridge (BT 102511) and intercepted it. The raft contained a 300 pound command detonated charge. The mine was disarmed and the wires were traced to the point of origin with negative results.

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Viet Cong propaganda continued at a relatively high level in the ICTZ during the period, with no changes in themes that have been prevalent over the past six months being reported. However, two significant political developments were reported during the week. In Thua Thien (P) two reports were received of the formation of an inter-village echelon in Phong Dien (D). The formation of this echelon between the district and village levels is thought to reflect the shortage of qualified village level cadre, difficulties in communications and an attempt to exercise closer control over the lower levels of the infrastructure organization. In Thang Binh (D), Quang Tin (P), interrogation of a Chieu Hoi who rallied on 20 July 1969, tends to confirm information extracted from captured documents and agent reports that the VCI in Thang Binh (D) have conducted a fairly extensive purge of Communist Party members and have ordered many of their cadre to move from the populated coastal areas into the hills. Purges of Communist Party members have probably also been carried out in other areas of Southern ICTZ, notably Binh Son (D), Quang Ngai (P), but appear to have been most extensive in Thang Binh (D). The reason for a purge at this particular time has not been made clear, but it is probable that the Viet Cong are concerned about the image of the Party among the people, its possible penetration by GVN intelligence agencies, and the low morale among many cadre. The most common cause for expulsion given in captured orders is failure to adhere to Party discipline and immoral conduct. The reasons given for sending cadre to the mountainous areas were to avoid friendly operations and to build up base areas. When faced with high cadre losses in Thua Thien (P) (1968) the Viet Cong responded by withdrawing middle and high level cadre to base areas and only now, after nearly a year, in many cases, are they trying again to reestablish their influence in the lowlands. At present they have attained very limited success while

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sustaining high losses. There is little evidence that the Viet Cong are withdrawing cadre from areas other than Thang Binh (D), Quang Tin (P). Several of the more significant reports received follow:

a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 31 July, a US MI source reported that a VC/NVA political warfare company has been operating in the populated areas of Gio Linh (D) propagandizing that the people of North Vietnam longed for peace after 20 years of war and that there will be general elections in both North and South Vietnam when the war does end. (Eval: C-6).

(2) On 31 July, a GVN source reported th... VC squad passed out propaganda leaflets and held a propaganda meeting in Mai Xa Chanh (6) (YD 303679) (Eval: C-3).

b. Thua Thien.

(1) On 25 July, a US MI source reported that during the period 25-28 July, 30 administrative cadre from Phong Loc (V) (YD 535443), Phong Hoa (V) (CNA), and Phong Lau (V) (CNA) of Phong Dien district met at Trach Pho Thuong area vicinity (YD 480410) to discuss the formation of these three villages into the West Inter-Village of Phong Dien district (Eval: F-6).

(2) On 31 July, a US MI source reported that since 25-31 July, 20 VC cadre have been organizing the Northern Phong Dien Inter-Village consisting of four villages; Dien Huong, Dien Mon, Dien Loc and Dien Hoa in Phong Dien district. The two VC names for the four villages are Phong Thu and Phong Thanh (Eval: F-6).

(3) A US MI source reported on 6 August 1969 that the Viet Cong in Thua Thien (P) are planning to select a number of cadre with proven ability and loyalty for duty in the piedmont area. Here they will operate in conjunction with village and hamlet cadre to organize "rear-echelon strike forces" in preparation for possible elections to be held after the cessation of hostilities. The objective is to make the Viet Cong presence felt throughout, at least two thirds of the province, through the distribution and display of flags. Such activity is expected to impress the populace and also the international community with the strength of the Viet Cong. In the event the elections go badly for the Viet Cong, the large number of Viet Cong flags will be used as proof to the world that the elections were fraudulent and did not truly represent the wishes of the people. In order to uplift the morale of their cadre and to entice them to exert a maximum effort, the Viet Cong have widely propagandized that the year 1970 will be the year of decision in the long-range struggle for Vietnam and have made an optimistic assessment of their position.

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(4) On 27 July, a US MI source reported that the military region committee has ordered the Tri-Thien-Hue provincial and city committees to organize a congress between 1 August and 14 August in the Tan Vinh mountain area vic YD 680167. Approximately 250 cadre will attend this meeting. The purpose of the congress is to discuss the Spring-Summer Plan, to study the matter of "Cang Nguyen Nhu Te", (nfi), make provisions for the fall-winter plan and work out the tactic of "shelling before assaulting" (nfi) (Eval: F-6).

c. Quang Nam. On 5 August, a US MI source reported that a directive was issued by a Main Force platoon leader of the VC district 2, Danang unit, instructing VC agents operating in Danang to accomplish the following tasks: (1) conduct propaganda and recruit youths and teenagers in order to support the forthcoming wave of attacks (nfi), (2) establish locations to conceal weapons for VC special action groups, (3) reconnoiter and draw sketches of the area on Pham Chu Trinh and Phan Dinh Phung streets in Danang. The wave of attacks is to take place before the celebration of August Revolution Day, 19 August 1969 (Eval: F-3).

d. Quang Tin.

(1) On 26 July, a US MI source reported that the VC district committee cadre of Tam Ky District held an indoctrination course at Tay Loc (H) (BT 176259). The purpose of the indoctrination course was to (1) study a document called "The victories in Paris Peace talks and Preparation for the establishment of a coalition government in South Vietnam", (2) guide the people to set up political struggles, (3) Organize demonstrations to be held in GVN controlled areas in the near future, (4) mobilize coolies (nfi) (Eval: C-3).

(2) On 28 July, a GVN source reported that the VC has established a new political organization in the hamlets of Tam Ky district called the "Support-Cell". Each hamlet has one cell consisting of ten persons. The personnel of these cells consist of women whom the VC can trust. The purpose of these cells is to encourage traders to stock food and necessary materials for VC troops, bring the bodies of VC KIA's home for burial and collect information for VC cadre (Eval: C-3).

e. Quang Ngai. On 1 August, a US MI source reported that the Mo Duc District Committee held a meeting in Hoai An (H) (BS 742587). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss VCI tasks, to remind civilians and VC troops in Quang Ngai Province to keep the "August Revolutionary Spirit" and the "Ba To Uprising" tradition and, also to motivate all of them to work harder for the revolution (Eval: B-6).

5. TERROR. During the week, the number of selective assassinations of GVN officials continued to rise. This rise was particularly heavy in Quang Nam (P), which along with Thua Thien (P) bore the brunt of Viet

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Cong terrorist attacks reported. The majority of the assassinations gave the appearance of having been planned in detail before the attack and were usually carried out by teenagers. In contrast with past practices, many of the terrorist attacks were staged during daylight hours. Captured documents and agent reports have been indicating for several months that the Viet Cong were placing heavy emphasis on the assassination of GVN officials as a principal component of their plan for control of the population. In concert with the Viet Cong program to establish control over the largest number of people possible, is the resumption of wholesale burning of civilian homes. This is thought to be designed to force refugees to return to Viet Cong controlled areas. (A listing of Viet Cong terrorist incidents is contained in Appendix 2 of this Annex).

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. On 6 Aug 69, a US MI source reported 12 personnel of a U/I VC frogman group moved through Vinh Giang area (vic ZC 063107). These personnel were from Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces. Equipped with various items of underwater swimming gear and plastic explosives and mines, they reportedly were planning means to lay mines to destroy ARVN and US military river craft (nfi), at sometime in the future (Eval: F-6).

b. On 8 Aug 69 a CAP 2-4-3 ambush spotted a large white dog in a treeline at BT 168579, 2 km E of Hoi An. Due to the fact that on every occasion in the last 2 months that the CAP had had contact, this one had only been spotted in the area. The CAP initiated fire on the dog. The CAP immediately received return fire from 3-5 VC in the vicinity of the dog. The CAP requested illumination and the VC fled NW. A sweep of the area had negative results.

APPENDIXES
1-Statistical Compilation of People's Revolutionary Committees in ICTZ
2-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 32-69

People's Revolutionary Committees reported by name and/or location as of 09 August 1969

	Quang Tri	Thua Thien	Quang Nam	Quang Tin	Quang Ngai	Total
Region (MRTTH)						1
Province	1	1	1	1	1	5
District	2	5	2	1	9	19
City		1	2			3
Village	37	36	76	49	107	305
Hamlet	31	59	16	11	122	239
Precinct		1				1
Total	71	103	97	62	239	573

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 32-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Tri	8Aug69	YD 213674	A US element received 4 rounds of 140mm rocket fire wounding 4 civilians.
Thua Thien	30Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 954064	VC entered Nam Pho Ha (H) (YD 954064) and kidnapped one civilian. ARVN reaction force conducted a sweep vicinity (YD 950044) finding the civilian alive.
	31Jul69 (Late Entry)	YD 696250	VC fired one B-40 round into a Community House (nfi), resulting in negative casualties, but damaging the house.
	1Aug69 (Late Entry)	YD 814282	Four VC between 13 and 19 years of age assassinated one civilian 5.5 kilometers southeast of Hue (YD 814282).
	1Aug69 (Late Entry)	YD 768202	VC entered Dong Tien (H) (YD 768202) and assassinated one civilian.
	1Aug69 (Late Entry)	YD 682252	Approximately twenty VC entered Que Chu (H) and stole food from the people. In an ensuing skirmish one civilian was wounded.
	2Aug69 (Late Entry)	YD 613295	An estimated VC squad entered Phong An (V) and destroyed ten homes.
	7Aug69	ZD 153010	Approximately 35 VC entered hamlet and stole beer, cokes, coffee and supplies. Upon leaving they distributed propaganda leaflets and kidnapped one civilian.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	28Jul69 (Late Entry)	BT 055655	VC fired 20 rounds of 82mm mortar into the 181st RF Company and an RF platoon killing one civilian and wounding another.
	30Jul69 (Late Entry)	AT 941673	VC entered Huoc Ninh (H) and burned 22 homes.
	31Jul69 (Late Entry)	AT 943653	VC entered Phu Son (H) and burned 23 homes.
	4Aug69	AT 945645	Unknown size enemy force entered Phu Son #1 (H) and destroyed an unknown number of homes. Negative casualties were reported.
	5Aug69	AT 984655	One VC entered Le Son (H), assassinated three civilians and wounded one other.
	5Aug69	BT 138555	VC threw two hand grenades into a primary school where a meeting was in progress killing three Cam Kim village commissioners and two notables, wounding 6 other commissioners and 15 civilians.
	7Aug69	BT 102515	An RF patrol triggered a 10-15 pound mine 200 meters north of the Ba Ren bridge wounding 6 civilians.
	7Aug69	BT 034512	The deputy hamlet chief of Kien Son (H) was killed when he detonated a VC mine.
	7Aug69	BT 056505	VC assassinated one RF platoon leader.
	7Aug69	AT 938689	Three VC entered Phuoc Ninh #4 (H) approximately 200 meters east of Hieu Duc (D) headquarters (AT 938689) and assassinated 1 civilian.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	8Aug69	AT 943662	One squad of the 153rd company received S/A fire and one B-40 rocket resulting in one civilian wounded and one house burned.
	8Aug69	AT 941673	Two VC entered Huong Son (H) and burned eight homes.
Quang Tin	3Aug69	BT 564000	Three Vietnamese were ambushed by six or seven VC, resulting in one Vietnamese killed.
Quang Ngai	7Aug69	BS 800380	Estimated 10 VC infiltrated into a district hospital and took unknown amount of medicine.

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ANNEX D (SPECIAL REPORT ON VC MAP READING AND PLOTTING VC COORDINATES ON UTM MAP) TO III MAF PERINTREP 32-69.

1. GENERAL. This report is a study by the MACV Combined Document Exploitation Center on VC coordinates and how they are applied to a UTM map. Captured enemy documents received at CDEC occasionally contain ((VC)) coordinates which are parts of fire plans or terrain surveys. Generally, these coordinates are composed of 10 digits (56789-32512), two groups of five digits preceded by the letters X and Y ((lines)) (x = 56789, y = 32512). For greater accuracy, coordinates of 12 or 14 digits are used:

a. 12-digit coordinates: 56789,2 - 32512,7 or x = 56789,2; y = 32512,7.

b. 14-digit coordinates: 56789,25 - 32512,75 or x = 56789,25; y = 32512,75.

2. READING AND PLOTTING VC COORDINATES ON UTM MAP

a. Definition. For all 10-digit coordinates the degree of accuracy expected in making the survey are approximately of the meter (or yard) order. Likewise, 12-digit coordinates are to provide an accuracy of the decimeter order. The accuracy anticipated for the 14-digit coordinates was of the centimeter order. Normally, in the VC coordinates, the X axis is the vertical axis (South-North Grid Line), and the Y axis is the horizontal axis (West-East Grid Line).

(1) In all 10-digit coordinates the first and sixth digits represent the ten-thousand-meter grade.

- The second and seventh digits represent the thousand-meter grade.
- The third and eighth digits represent the hundred-meter grade.
- The forth and ninth digits represent the ten-meter grade.
- The fifth and tenth digits represent the meter grade.

(2) In all 14 digit coordinates the sixth and 13th digits represent decimeter (1/10 meter) grade, whereas the seventh and fourteenth digits represent the centimeter (1/100 meter) grade.

b. Reading and Plotting. In plotting a point on the UTM map with VC 10-digit coordinates, the first step is to read the first three digits of the first ((five-digit)) group on the South-North Grid Line nex, read the first three digits of the second group on the West-East Grid Line, then plot as you would geographical coordinates.

In short, read UP-RIGHT as when reading geographic coordinates on a UTM map.

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Example: VC coordinates of Point A: x = 56789, y = 32512
UTM six-digit coordinates will be: 325567



Remark: The third digit of the five-digit group ((of VC Coordinates)) should be augmented by 1 if the fourth digit is larger than 5. In the cited example, the UTM coordinates should be corrected as 325568.

3. EXCEPTION: Sometimes, VC coordinates are written the same as the UTM coordinates, the above reverse method of map reading can not be applied. In this case, the "x" axis ((of VC coordinates)) is the W-E Grid Line and the "y" axis is the S-N Grid Line of UTM map.

4. CONCLUSION: The cited methods are flexible and they should be applied carefully depending upon VC documents and the experience of the individual concerned. Double check is required when plotting a point on the UTM map by using the VC coordinates. The VC coordinates of objectives are easily found on the map because they are usually significant locations in specific terrain such as cities, towns, FWMAF/RVNAF positions.

It is to be noted that only digits are shown and that the 100,000 meter grid designator never appears in the VC coordinates so far recorded at CDEC. Thus, the grid designator will be determined through the study of other factors, such as the capture location of captured documents and area of responsibility of VC unit.

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HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

MACH. C	DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT	PRI.	SEC.	NAVY FILE NUMBER	ORIGINATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.	NO. CYS. RECD.	MICFILM	CLAS.	MO.	DA.	YR
	C912908	PERINTREF 33-69		BP		MEF	097469	2				48	199

JCS CONTROL NUMBER | COPY NO. 1

DATE

ROUTING - *Use numbers to show order of routing*

OPERATION CODE

X-ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET
A-FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION
B-FOR COMPLIANCE
C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF _____
D-FOR COMMENT
E-FOR RECOMMENDATION
F-FOR CONCURRENCE
G-FOR INFORMATION
H-RETURN TO _____
I- _____
J-DISPOSITION _____

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
					COMMANDANT
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
1	G	8/28/69			G-3
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
					JOINT CONTROL
					COUNSEL
					WOMEN MARINES
					STAFF DENTAL
					STAFF MEDICAL
					STAFF CHAPLAIN
					CLASSIFIED FILES
2	G				Hist (PR)

PERMANENT RETENTION
Classified Files Sect. (Code ABQ)

✓ **DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS**
(AGENCY HAVING PRIMARY INTEREST COMPLETE)

- REQUEST FOR PERMANENT RETENTION (COPY) (BUCKTAG COPY)
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III MAF

PIR #33-69

10-16 Aug 69

P. R.
HIST.

G-3

19 Aug 69

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19 August 1969



UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 33-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE



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G-2 Section
DANANG, RVN
18 August 1969
Ser: 097469

PERINTREP 33-69

Period covered: 100001H - 162400H August 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. The events of the past week were dominated by the commencement of the North Vietnamese "Summer-Autumn" Campaign during the early hours of 12 August. Attacks by fire and ground attacks took place throughout ICTZ but the enemy activity was most predominant in the three southern provinces. Enemy action in I Corps was a part of a larger country-wide effort which delivered 50 attacks by fire and 20 ground attacks in II Corps, 33 attacks by fire and 11 ground attacks in III Corps, while IV Corps recorded 25 indirect fire attacks and 10 ground attacks. The total of 515 enemy initiated ground incidents in I Corps was the highest number of incidents since the week of 11-17 May which was the last attack "high-point" recorded. Enemy incoming was also reflected in the "Summer-Autumn" Campaign with 2,192 rounds recorded for the week, again the highest since 11-17 May. The number of enemy KIA's rose also to 1,305.

Counterintelligence related VCI activity during the week showed marked increases in sabotage and terrorist activity, while other categories of activity either remained unchanged or declined. The upsurge in reported sabotage incidents were primarily directed at LOC's and were in consonance with the general upswing in overall VC activities initiated on 12 August. Terrorist activity, also on the upswing, was characterized by harassment and attacks by fire directed against refugee centers and continued assassinations of low-level administrators and local force personnel. Propaganda and intelligence collection activities generally remained unchanged from previous weeks. However, a marked decrease in the number of reported political meetings was noted throughout ICTZ, possibly indicating that plans and decisions for any current or forthcoming phases of VC activity have been formulated and wait only implementation. The focus of VCI activities, particularly sabotage and terrorism, was once again SICTZ, with QUANG NAM and QUANG NGAI Provinces bearing the brunt of these incidents. The northern two provinces experienced only slightly increased levels of activities, while QUANG TIN (P) had an almost complete absence of reported VCI activity.

The Viet Cong appear to have returned to a pattern of activity which, although on a lower level at present, strongly resembles the periods of increased activity during March and early May of this year. The principal features of this activity include widespread attempts to interdict lines of communication and extensive ground and indirect fire

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attacks directed against populated areas, particularly refugee areas. While agent reports and captured documents reflect definite indications that the increased levels of activities will continue for the immediate future, the traditional local indicators of increased food collection, recruitment of local laborers, intensive propaganda with more emphasis on aggressive themes, preparation of banners and flags and other VCI activities, which have usually preceded extensive military operations, have not been discernible to date.

a. QUANG TRI (P). During the reporting period sightings/incidents in the DMZ area decreased from 346 to 250 with 71 of these sightings north of the BEN HAI River. A total of 171 hostile targets were taken under fire this week by artillery, tactical air strikes and naval gunfire.

Enemy initiated activity in QUANG TRI (P), was characterized by indirect fire attacks in the northeastern quadrant of the province and moderate contacts in the central DMZ area. During the early morning hours of the 11th, light attacks by fire were directed against C/1/44 Artillery five kilometers east of CAM LO (YD 180587) and DONG HA (YD 238 608). Another light attack by fire was directed against DONG HA later that evening. None of the attacks consisted of over 20 rounds and only light casualties resulted from these attacks. During the early morning hours of the 12th, DONG HA was again subjected to an indirect attack by fire consisting of 34 rounds of mortar fire. At the same time, C-1 Base, seven kilometers to the north northwest (YD 213674) received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Neither attack resulted in casualties or damage.

The contacts in the central portion of the DMZ commenced on the evening of the 9th when elements of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines engaged an estimated battalion size enemy force eight kilometers north northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 946630). This contact lasted throughout the night and most of the next day and resulted in 36 NVA killed in action with moderate friendly casualties. Slightly to the east, elements of 3/3 Marines engaged an estimated three enemy platoons five and one-half kilometers northwest of CAM LO (YD 093638). This contact occurred during the afternoon of the 11th and resulted in 18 NVA killed.

In the northwestern portion of the DMZ, there was one light probe against elements of 2/4 Marines 12 kilometers west northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 868592) resulting in one NVA killed. To the south, VANDEGRIFT Combat Base (XD 998489) received four to six 122mm rockets on the 10th resulting in light friendly casualties.

The continued presence of the enemy in and south of the central DMZ has been evidenced by heavy infra-red returns centered about 12 kilometers north of the ROCKPILE. Over the period 14 to 16 August, over 540 returns were recorded. In addition, SLAR returns and sensors give evidence of the southward movement of enemy forces in this area.

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Sensor strings located in the Duel Blade II area had over 1,500 activations this past week. The largest number, 574, of the activations were recorded from sensors located 10 kilometers southwest of CON THIEN (YD 015682).

Sightings and contacts by reconnaissance patrols throughout northern I Corps for the week were minimal except for two patrols that conducted BDA missions on 15 August north of the CAM LO River Valley (XD 9264). The results of these two patrols were 19 enemy sighted with six KIA.

b. THUA THIEN (P). Enemy initiated activity in THUA THIEN (P) was characterized mainly by attacks by fire throughout the province and engagements in the A SHAU Valley region of western THUA THIEN (P).

In the eastern portion of the province, the DONG DA Training Center (YD 867123) received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and RPG fire resulting in light friendly casualties. This attack represented the eighth time in two and one-half months that this training camp has been subjected to indirect attacks by fire. In the same area, the 142nd RF Company eight kilometers northeast of PHU BAI (YD 944195) received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and small arms fire resulting in no casualties or damage. Southwest of HUE, Camp EAGLE received six 122mm rockets. In the extreme southeastern portion of the province, the DANANG to HUE train was derailed by an unknown type mine 17 kilometers east southeast of PHU LOC (AT 836977). A bridge and 50 meters of track were destroyed. This is the first such attack since June 26th. Also in the PHU LOC District, the 918th RF Company 18 kilometers east southeast of PHU LOC (AT 844957) received 70 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, while at the same time and in the immediate vicinity (AT 846954), a 12 meter steel bridge was destroyed. Also at the same time, a 12 meter concrete bridge (AT 836977) two and one-half kilometers to the north northwest was 80% destroyed.

In the north central portion of the province, Camp EVANS received nine 122mm rockets during the early morning hours of the 12th. The PHONG DIEN sub-sector headquarters (YD 529345) received small arms fire, and 30 mixed RPG/mortar rounds during the same time frame. Both attacks resulted in light friendly casualties.

The western portion of the province was by far the most active area of the province during the reporting period. FSB CURRAHEE (YC 398949) on the floor of the A SHAU Valley was subjected to attacks by fire on the 11th, 15th and 16th. On the 11th, CURRAHEE received 34 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in no casualties or damage. There were two attacks by fire on the 15th consisting of 20x122mm rockets and one on the 16th consisting of 13x122mm rockets. West southwest of FSB CURRAHEE, elements of the 1/327th Infantry 10 kilometers southwest of A LUOI (YC 321924) received two attacks by fire on the 11th consisting of a total of 22 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Elements of the 1/327th Infantry were also involved in a series of contacts in this same general area. These contacts resulted in at least 22 NVA killed in action. Although there was no unit identification in any of these contacts this is the

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general operating area of the 803rd NVA Regiment.

c. QUANG NAM (P). The tempo and intensity of enemy initiated activity in QUANG NAM (P) rose sharply as the enemy's much heralded August offensive commenced with ground attacks and attacks by fire in the DANANG TAOR.

In the DANANG City area, there were a series of minor engagements on the evening of the 11th as the enemy units apparently moved into attack positions. The early morning hours of the 12th saw rocket and mortar attacks directed against the 1st Marine Division CP (AT 9575), the 26th Marines at NAM O (AT 9284), the NSA Hospital (BT 0673) and the MARBLE Mountain air facility (BT 0673). At 0200, sappers from the 31st Regiment, supported by mortars, attacked both the 1st Division CP (AT 9575) and the 44th ARVN Artillery position four kilometers to the south (AT 9672). Elements of the Headquarters Battalion and the 11th Marines repulsed the attack against the CP, with the sappers withdrawing to the west where they were intercepted by the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. The final results of the engagement were 18 KIA and nine PW's. The ARVN artillery unit discovered the sappers outside their wire, killing one and capturing two.

To the south, the DAI LOC District Headquarters (AT 9157) received 20 rounds of 82mm mortars and HOI AN (BT 1457) received 25 to 30 mortar rounds. Elsewhere, the 7th Marines on HILL 55 (AT 9762) received two 250 pound lob bombs while HILL 65 (AT 8757) and HILL 37 (AT 9158) were subjected to early morning mortar attacks. Later in the morning 2/1 Marines, 10 kilometers northwest of HOI AN (BT 098665) received a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force which resulted in five enemy KIA.

South of the QUE SON Mountains, LZ ROSS (BT 027342) received two mortar attacks, one at 0305 and one at 1900 on the 12th. At 0120 on the 16th LZ BALDY (BT 133453) received a ground probe supported by mortars. The action resulted in eight enemy KIA.

At AN HOA (AT 8747) the action on the 12th began at 0240 when the Marines received two rocket rounds. At 0445 another rocket hit the base causing neither casualties nor damage. North of AN HOA, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines had an OP probed by an enemy force beginning at 0430. On the 12th, as the action developed, the Battalion CP, B, C, and D Companies became engaged. At 0800 the enemy broke contact with a loss of 58 KIA. C/1/7 initiated a sweep at 0830 and again made contact with the enemy one kilometer to the south. This contact lasted until 1830 and eventually involved A and D Companies of the Battalion. Later interrogation of PW's revealed that the enemy force involved was the 9th Battalion, 90th Regiment. The total results for the day were 147 NVA KIA, four PW's, 42 individual weapons captured and seven crew-served weapons captured.

Early on Wednesday, the 13th, DANANG Air Base received six 122mm rockets, causing light damamge and no casulaties. Later in the morning,

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AN HOA was again subjected to three 122mm rockets which caused neither casualties or damage.

During the afternoon, 1/7 Marines with elements of 3/5 Marines continued their sweep north of AN HOA. In the resulting contact the Marines accounted for an additional 44 NVA KIA and two PW's. Friendly losses were five KIA and 70 WIA.

On the evening of the 13th, the 27th ROK Company fought two engagements seven kilometers west northwest of HOI AN (BT 078589) resulting in 10 enemy KIA and six individual weapons captured. In earlier engagements ROK units killed 14 VC in two separate contacts 14 kilometers west southwest of HOI AN (BT 0151).

On the 14th only two incidents were recorded in QUANG NAM (P), a contact again by 1/7 Marines accounting for 13 enemy KIA and a ground attack against MOC BAI, 11 kilometers south of HOI AN (BT 1446) which resulted in 12 civilians KIA. On the 16th, the 3/5 CP six kilometers west of AN HOA (AT 819488) received 13x122mm rockets. The same day, one other attack by fire was recorded when 12 rounds of mortar fire landed at LZ BALDY (BT 1345).

As the week drew to a close it became apparent the friendly forces in QUANG NAM (P) had only been in contact with a portion of the enemy forces in the province. Conspicuous by their absence in contact were the 141st and 36th Regiments and the 3rd and T.89 Sapper Battalions.

d. <u>QUANG TIN (P)</u>. QUANG TIN Province was the scene of two major ground actions, following in the heels of scattered mortar attacks. During the early hours of the 12th, CHU LAI received 14 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Shortly thereafter LZ BAYONET (BT 5401), FSB CENTER (BT 052253) and TAM KY were mortared. Both ground attacks began during the early morning hours of the 12th. LZ WEST, eight kilometers east of HIEP DUC (AT 990250) came under attack at 0210 by elements of the 1st Battalion, 3rd (AKA 31st) NVA Regiment. Following a preparation by 82mm mortars, sappers began to move against the position. The soldiers of the 4th of the 31st Infantry countered with artillery, mortars and Quad 50's. At daylight, a sweep of the area revealed 50 enemy KIA, seven crew-served weapons, five individual weapons, hand grenades, bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges captured. The enemy unit identification was made through the interrogation of the five PW's taken during the engagement.

To the east, FSB HAWK HILL 12 kilometers northwest of TAM KY (BT 231 315) was attacked from the southwest and southeast at 0245. The attack, preceded by 100 rounds of mortar fire was conducted by an estimated company of sappers, 10 of whom penetrated the perimeter. The sappers concentrated their efforts on sleeping bunkers and other structures while the supporting force outside the wire brought RPG's to bear on the armored vehicles in the perimeter. The attackers were forced to withdraw at the cost of 12 known KIA, with four individual and two crew-served weapons captured. At 0400, F Troop, 18th Cavalry killed 15 NVA

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evading six kilometers to the northeast (BT 228402).

Earlier in the week, on Sunday, F Troop, 17th Cavalry killed 20 enemy while searching for a downed helicopter nine kilometers south southwest of THANG BINH (BT 142325).

In the coastal lowlands CHU LAI (BT 534095) received 122mm rockets on the 13th. One attack of three 122mm rockets occurred at 1542 and a second attack of six 122's occurred at 2305. Also on the 13th, Headquarters of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AM) at TAM KY (BT 3122) was also subjected to a rocket attack.

On the morning of the 14th CHU LAI again received a rocket attack, damaging a fuel tank. Later in the day, a combined CAP/RF operation five kilometers west southwest of TAM KY (BT 262194) supported by air and artillery, killed 33 enemy. While in this same area, an Air Force FAC directed air strikes on an enemy force in the open six kilometers west southwest of TAM KY (BT 258201). This action resulted in 25 enemy killed.

Southwest of TAM KY, Operation LAMAR PLAIN which commenced on 16 May terminated on 13 August. Results of the operation were 524 enemy killed with 256 individual weapons and 62 crew-served weapons captured.

Early in the week, two helicopters were shot down in the same general area and within one-half hour of each other. At 1445 on the 10th an AH-1G helicopter was shot down by small arms fire nine kilometers south southwest of THANG BINH (BT 145325). One-half hour later a light observation helicopter was shot down by ground fire two and one-half kilometers to the west of the scene of the AH-1G incident (BT 172327).

In QUANG TIN (P), very few of the known enemy units were identified. No main force or local force battalions were identified in contacts. However, prisoners from the 70th Main Force Battalion were taken late in the week who place their battalion east of THANG BINH. The 3rd NVA Regiment was identified at LZ WEST. One PW from the 1st VC Regiment was also captured at LZ WEST. However, additional information is required to confirm that the 1st Regiment has moved this far to the northwest of their normal operating area.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Enemy activity stepped up considerably in QUANG NGAI Province this week as attacks by fire and ground attacks increased to 11 and 10 respectively. The early part of the week was deceptively quiet with only two contacts on Monday the 11th. E Troop of the 1st Cavalry was hit by an unknown size enemy force 11 kilometers west southwest of QUANG NGAI City (BS 550753). The engagement resulted in nine VC KIA. Later that evening 4/6 ARVN six kilometers north northwest of MO DUC (BS 696586) received 60 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and RPG fire followed by a ground attack. Eight enemy were killed in this attack. The 4th ARVN Regiment at MO DUC (BS 725545) received four 82mm mortar and eight RPG rounds. One of the rounds hit the jail killing and wounding

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a number of Vietnamese civilians. At 0115, A/1/1 Cavalry and 1/14th Artillery on LZ DOTTIE seven kilometers south southwest of BINH SON (BS 630855) received a mortar attack followed by a sapper attack. The sappers were forced back after penetrating the wire. Nineteen enemy were killed in this attack which resulted in light friendly casualties. The enemy unit engaged was subsequently identified as elements of the 406th Sapper Battalion.

Elsewhere on the 11th, E Troop of the 1st Cavalry made contact 11 kilometers west southwest of QUANG NGAI City killing nine VC.

At the TRA BONG CIDG Camp, a mortar attack began at 0800 on the 12th. Under the cover of the mortars, elements of the 21st NVA Regiment moved against the CIDG Camp's Outpost. Two outposts to the south of the main camp were abandoned and occupied by the enemy. By 1330 the outposts had been retaken by forces for the camp and one PW taken. Earlier that morning, HA THANH (BS 386703) received 20 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire. Later on the 12th, 2/6 ARVN killed 20 enemy in a contact seven kilometers south southwest of BINH SON (BS 631853) and F Troop of the 8th Cavalry accounted for seven VC 12 kilometers west southwest of QUANG NGAI City (BS 528745).

In contrast to the rest of I Corps, ground contacts in QUANG NGAI (P) continued throughout the rest of the week. At 0200 on the 13th, the 107th RF Company and a reinforcing CAP patrol were ambushed 15 kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 772816) resulting in the loss of seven friendly KIA. At 0800 a CIDG patrol from TRA BONG killed seven NVA two kilometers east of their camp (BS 355876), while shortly before noon Americal units accounted for 10 KIA's nine kilometers west southwest of QUANG NGAI City (BS 562742).

To the south, at LZ SAN JUAN HILL (BS 634379) 4/3 Infantry eight kilometers northeast of BA TO (BS 634379) received a ground attack supported by mortars on the morning of the 13th. PW's taken in the engagement identified their unit as elements of the 90th Sapper Battalion, the engineer/sapper battalion organic to the 3rd NVA Division. Two days later while sweeping out from the LZ, the infantrymen killed five NVA, captured a 12.7mm AA machine gun and took two PW's from the 200th AA Battalion, another 3rd NVA Division unit. In the early hours of the 15th, a combined RF/PF cordon and search operation one kilometer south of DUC PHO (BS 807377) resulted in six killed and ten PW's from the C-219 Company, about 15 percent of the unit's total strength. Elsewhere in the province, CIDG units from TRA BONG accounted for 36 enemy killed in contacts on the 15th and 16th. Also on the night of the 15th, MINH DUNG Hamlet (BS 564604) 15 kilometers southwest of QUANG NGAI City received 50x82mm mortar rounds followed by a ground attack by an estimated VC platoon. PF Platoon 123 resides in this hamlet. This attack resulted in one PSDF KIA, seven civilians KIA, one PF WIA and six civilians WIA.

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f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. Continuing reports from PW's, agents and captured documents indicate that the attacks of this past week are but a first phase of a two phase campaign. Popular dates for the commencement of Phase II are 19 August and 2 September. At this time it is difficult to assess the importance of the lack of contact with many of the enemy units in the I Corps area. Whether this is due to their being held for employment during Phase II or being unable to carry out assigned Phase I missions is unknown at this time.

The heavy LOC interdiction effort in QUANG NAM (P) this week plus many incidents occuring after the attacks of the 12th and 13th indicate preparation for further activity. This sort of preparation preceded the February and May offensives. The continuing enemy offensive activity in QUANG NGAI (P) also point toward a second phase.

It is estimated that the enemy will attempt to conduct a Phase II offensive sometime during the coming two weeks. However, the enemy's capabilities may fall well short of his intentions. It is anticipated that mortar and rocket attacks will predominate and that limited objective sapper attacks will be conducted.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased from 268 to 515 for the week of 10-16 August. These incidents consisted of 31 ground attacks, six of which were company size or larger and 25 platoon size or smaller, four ambushes, 35 attacks by fire, 299 harassing fire incidents, 76 mining and booby trap incidents, 32 hamlet harassment incidents, five assassination incidents, eight espionage incidents, two kidnapping incidents, 10 propaganda incidents and 13 sabotage incidents.

a. Strength and Disposition. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserve Reinforcement. Annex A.

d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

(1) A document found on a body by A/1/5 Marines on 11 August near LIBERTY Bridge (AT 932528) includes instructions for preparing the bark of a tree which is then rolled into a tube and used as a fuse for lob bombs. Because of its slow-burning nature, it is said to produce a delay of one-six hours, making it appear to be a dud. Full translation is as follows: "Recently, some village launched artillery shells and bombs, and used the bark of a certain type of tree (named DUNG DINH). Scrape the bark and dry it on a sunny day, then place it in a tube or roll it into a roll of paper. Connect it with one or .5 cm of time fuse. Launch the bomb and let it fly to the target. Depending on the quantity of bark used, the bomb will explode from one to five or six hours later, deceiving the enemy and maintaining safety. This type of fuse is like (possibly paper) and is lit by using an incense stick. After receiving

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this communique, local areas and cadre must experiment to gain experience and report the results for further study."

e. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire increased from 138 to 162 incidents for the reporting period and 48 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 10-16 August:

Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	1,165
60mm Mortar	463
Unk Cal Mortar	319
140mm Rocket	47
122mm Rocket	184
Unk Cal Rocket	14
Total	2,192

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance. There were 84 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 10-16 August. These long-range patrols reported 75 sightings and 15 contacts totaling 450 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of 39 enemy KIA.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant caches were captured in the ICTZ during the period 9-16 August:

(a) 9 August: D/1/20 11th Infantry discovered a rice cache six kilometers south southeast of MO DUC (BS 734447) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
10,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was located in open terrain and the rice was contained in bags which were covered by ponchos and the entire cache was buried underground. The condition of the rice was good and the full contents were evacuated to the local Popular Forces.

(b) 10 August: F/2/3 Marines discovered an ordnance and rice cache nine kilometers north northeast of the ROCKPILE (YD 001633) as indicated below:

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QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
105 EA	CHICOM	Hand Grenades
120 BX	UNK	TNT
1,000 EA	UNK	AK Rounds
14 EA	UNK	RPG Rounds
23 EA	UNK	RPG Boosters
142 EA	UNK	Blasting Caps
1 EA	UNK	Satchel Charge
22 EA	UNK	Packs
22 EA	UNK	Ponchos
1 PR	UNK	Binoculars
10 EA	UNK	Hammocks
21 EA	UNK	Compasses
1 EA	UNK	Telegraph Key
10 EA	UNK	Gas Masks
2 BX	UNK	First Aid Dressings
1 EA	UNK	Medical Book
UNK	UNK	Misc Medical Equipment
UNK	UNK	Documents
100 LBS	UNK	Rice

This cache was located inside of two command post bunkers which were fifteen feet square. No further information was available on this cache.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 10-16 August:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
82mm Mortar	121
81mm Mortar	62
60mm Mortar	79
155mm Artillery	4
105mm Artillery	61
122mm Rocket	3
Unk Cal Rocket	1
75mm RR	3
57mm RR	3
Total	337

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	410
Crew-Served Weapons	85

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 10-16 August:

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Date	Location	Amount (lbs)		Capturing Unit
10 Aug	(YD 006632)	600		2/3
10 Aug	(YD 560304)	75		C/2/506
10 Aug	(YD 001633)	100		2/3
11 Aug	(ZC 203558)	100	Food	K/3/7
11 Aug	(ZC 203558)	10	Salt	K/3/7
11 Aug	(BS 563787)	830		A/1/52
11 Aug	(BS 715882)	200	Food	B/5/46
11 Aug	(BS 696580)	10,000		4/4 ARVN
12 Aug	(BS 710858)	335		A/5/46
12 Aug	(BS 710858)	335	Food	A/5/46
12 Aug	(BS 710858)	330	Food	A/5/46
12 Aug	(YC 300952)	50		D/1/327
13 Aug	(AT 916704)	150		F/2/26
13 Aug	(BS 607396)	30		B/4/3
13 Aug	(YD 306939)	50		A/1/327
15 Aug	(BS 745837)	700	Salt	B/4/46
16 Aug	(BS 544757)	200		A/3/1
16 Aug	(BS 745837)	600	Salt	B/5/46
16 Aug	(BS 645837)	2,000	Salt	B/5/46
16 Aug	(BS 749836)	30,000	Salt	B/5/46
	Total Rice	12,420		
	Total Food	965		
	Total Salt	33,310		

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	273	Structures Damaged	20
Bunkers Destroyed	324	Bunkers Damaged	75
Secondary Explosions	44	Secondary Fires	73
Boats Destroyed	2	Bridges Destroyed	2
Trucks Destroyed	1	Bridges Damaged	1

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ increased in comparison to the previous week. There were 1,305 KIA's, 34 VC PW's and 23 NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative

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h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	92	94	100	100
Low	75	76	74	74
Rainfall (total)	.47	.03	0	0
Winds (knots)	8	6	7	5
Visibility (miles)	7	7	8	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 15-21 August 1969:

General. There has been a deviation in the normal southwesterly monsoon flow. This abnormal pattern of light easterly winds over the southeast Asia peninsula is expected to last over most of the region throughout the forecasting period. Generally good weather with scattered clouds, below normal precipitation and light winds will prevail with some increase in early morning fog caused by nocturnal cooling.

ICTZ Forecast. The outlook for the coastal and lowland areas is clear to partly cloudy with isolated thundershowers in the afternoon and evening hours of the forecasting period. Winds will prevail from an easterly direction at a speed of 5-15 knots becoming variable at 10-15 knots late in the outlook period. Precipitation will be 0-0.5 inches with isolated instances of one inch. The outlook for the mountainous areas of I Corps is partly cloudy. Fog will form during the early morning hours and lift into stratus after sunrise, particularly in the western mountains. Isolated thundershowers will frequent the afternoon and evening hours of the outlook period. Precipitation will be 0.5-1 inch with isolated instances of 1.5-2 inches.

j. - k. Negative

l. Significant Enemy Attacks. The following significant enemy attacks occurred in ICTZ during the period 10-16 August as indicated:

(a) LZ WEST, eight kilometers east of HIEP DUC (AT 990250) came under attack at 120210 by elements of the 1st Battalion, 3rd (AKA 31st NVA Regiment. Following a preparation by 82mm mortars, sappers began to move against the position. The soldiers of the 4th of the 31st Infantry countered with artillery, mortars and Quad 50's. At daylight, a sweep of the area revealed 50 enemy KIA, seven crew-served weapons, five individual weapons, hand grenades, bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges captured. The enemy unit identification was made through the interrogation of the five PW's taken during the engagement.

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4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following course of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to six infantry regiment equivalents, supported by the equivalent of one naval sapper battalion and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack VANDEGRIFT Combat Base with one infantry regiment supported by one sapper battalion and one artillery battalion.

(3) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(5) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with up to five infantry regiments, supported by four rocket battalions, one sapper battalion and one engineer battalion.

(6) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division equivalent, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(8) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to seven infantry regiment equivalents.

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e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield, sickness, hunger, shortage of ammunition and medical supplies and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232)(CIIED)	2	620TH TCS (ATTN: CRC)APO 96203	1
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4	CO MCB 3	1
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CO MCB 6	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CO MCB 7	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CO MCB 8	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2	CO MCB 9	1
CG USARV	1	CO MCB 10	1
CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	10	CO MCB 11	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CTG 115.1	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CO MCB 40	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO MCB 53	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CO MCB 58	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	26	CO MCB 62	1
CG AMERICAL DIV	30	CO MCB 71	1
CG 101ST ABN DIV	20	CO MCB 121	1
CG 1ST MAW	30	OSA/EMB SAIGON ATTN: RAS	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	DODSPECREP	1
CG USASUPCOM DANANG	1	DSA I CORPS	11
CG 9TH INF DIV	1	DSA II CORPS	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	MCB 133	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1	DET B 1ST MIBARS	1
CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SAIGON	3	HQ, 212RH COMBAT AVN BN	6
CG 173RD ABN BDE	2	CO 7TH COMM BN	1
CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7	366 AIR SECURITY SQD, USAF	2
CG FLC	5	29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1
CG 1ST LOG CMD LONG BINH	2	7TH PSYOPS BN	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	1	CICV	2
CO 30 NCR	1	III MAF LNO 2ND ROKMC BDE	1
CIB	1	620TH TSC	1
CTG 79.5	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CTG 79.4	1	CTF CW. PBR BASE ONE, NSA DANANG	1
CTG 76.5	1	SPO-SEC CMD QUI NHON	1
CTG 76.4	1	DIRECTOR, CAP III MAF	1
CTF 76	1	CO USS REPOSE	1
CO DASC ATTN: AVCA-QN-DN-OP	2	CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO "B" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	5	CO 4TH PSYOP GP	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	17	CO 1ST BN 525TH MI GP DANANG	25
1ST CAG	1		
2ND CAG	1		
3RD CAG	1		
4TH CAG	1	OUT OF COUNTRY	
7 AF (IGS) BDOC	1	DIR NSA	3
45TH ENGR GROUP	1	CMC (ABQ) (AIRMAIL)	2
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2	CG FMFPAC (AIRMAIL)	2
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2	CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP 7TH FLEET	1
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1	CG MCDEC	1
CO 517TH MI DET	1	DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1
CO 3RD MP BN	1	CG 3RD MAW	2
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHU LAI	3		

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TEAM COMMANDER 19TH CI TEAM, CAMP PENDLETON	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CG 2ND MARDIV	2
CG 5TH MARDIV	6
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CG 4TH MARDIV, CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA	1
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1
432ND TFW (DCOI)	1

III MAF

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	4
DEP CofS PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	38
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (c/o G-3)	2
PSYOPS	2
1ST RADIO BN (To be picked up)	11
SLF (A) (To be picked up)	1
1ST MP'S DNG (To be picked up)	1
US NAD (To be picked up)	1
CO MCB 5 (To be picked up)	1
RAILWAY SECURITY (To be picked up)	1
MAG 16 (To be picked up)	1
CCN (To be picked up)	1

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 33-69 AS OF 162400H AUGUST 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-HQ	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	11	3,270	2	595			13	3,865	14	6,195	27	10,060
Bn's-Maneuver	39	10,040	11	2,105	5	795	55	12,940	34	14,865	89	27,805
Bn's-Support	18	5,105	1	220	1	200	20	5,525	7	2,080	27	7,605
Separate Co's	1	130			34	2,745	35	2,875	1	80	36	2,955
TOTAL CONFIRMED		20,510		2,920		3,740		27,170		24,655		51,825
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's	1	710					1	710	3	860	4	1,570
Bn's-Manuever	6	2,565	1	350	1	110	8	3,025	7	2,670	15	5,695
Bn's-Support	4	1,045					4	1,045	9	1,445	13	2,490
Separate Co's	1	90				210	4	300			4	300
TOTAL PROBABLE		4,410		350		320		5,080		4,975		10,055
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,400	3	1,400
Bn's-Manuever												
Bn's-Support									22	7,675	22	7,675
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										10,015		10,015
		24,920		3,270		4,060		32,250		39,645		71,895

*See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,370		150	3,520
	Probable	2,615			2,615
	Possible				
	TOTAL	5,985		150	6,135
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,745		670	4,415
	Probable			45	45
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,745		715	4,460
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	6,365	70	955	7,390
	Probable	830	350		1,180
	Possible				
	TOTAL	7,195	420	955	8,570
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,720	1,440	700	4,860
	Probable	380		200	580
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,100	1,440	900	5,440
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,310	1,410	1,265	6,985
	Probable	585		75	660
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,895	1,410	1,340	7,645

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS																DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL											
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	33	3		36	8			8	5			5	46	3		49	33	5		38	79	8		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	39	6		45	11	1		12	5	1		6	55	8		63	34	7		41	89	15		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	8	1		9	1			1	1			1	10	1		11	2	5	10	17	12	6	10	28
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	3	1	5	3	3	1	7
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2		1	2	3	1	2	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
TOTAL SUPPORT	18	4		22	1			1	1			1	20	4		24	7	9	22	38	27	13	22	62
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	57	10		67	12	1		13	6	1		7	75	12		87	41	16	22	79	116	28	22	166

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	354	Nam Hoa	70	Hoa Vang	588	Thang Binh	965	Binh Son	239
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	57	Hieu Duc	76	Tam Ky	672	Son Tinh	491
	Trieu Phong	197	Hong Dien	72	Dien Ban	1,067	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	450
	Cam Lo	261	Vinh Loc	62	Dai Loc	355	Hiep Duc	220	Nghia Hanh	356
	Gio Linh	202	Phu Loc	231	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	281	Mo Duc	665
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	335	Hau Duc	233	Duc Pho	465
	Huong Hoa	14	Phu Vang	24	Que Son	958			Tra Bong	170
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	190	Duy Xuyen	1,100			Ba To	162
			Huong Thuy	101	Hieu Nhon	302			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	437					Son Ha	187
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	1,213	THUA THIEN	1,290	QUANG NAM	4,901	QUANG TIN	2,488	QUANG NGAI	3,199

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 13,091

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,150		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Vic XD 6233	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175	Unlocated	
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unlocated LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	

*See note #4 on page A-17
**See note #2 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,950		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,900		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	500		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
31st Group (-)	NVA	C	1,060		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	265	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2061/20Jul69
15th Bn	NVA	PR	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Secial Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,910		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	
65th Arty Regt	NVA	PR	UNK		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.40 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.41 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.42 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.43 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,670		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,405		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	345	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0566/22May69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn		C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	2,165		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	475	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	480	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,615		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 7964/12Apr69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	375	XD 9265	XD 9666/26May69
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	400	XD 8854	XD 8637/27Jun68
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,805		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	315	YD 3639	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	200	YD 3832	YD 3858/22Aug68
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	190	YD 3339	YD 1726/20Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	250	Vic YD 2730	YD 2630/25Jul69
6th Bn, 812th Regt	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	200	Vic YD 3535	

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	925		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	AU 8100/10Jun68
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	290	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	285	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jul69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,835		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	360	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	185	Vic YD 6514	YD 6822/14Jun69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	270	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	220	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
3rd Bn, 803rd Regt	NVA	C	315	Vic YC 3193	YC 3389/19Jul69
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	390	Vic YD 3304	YD 3302/20Jun69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	280	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
C.113 Co	LF	C	145	Vic YD 5043	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
C.117 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 9516	YD 9022/25Oct68
C.118 Co	LF	C	55	Vic YD 9518	YD 9917/12Sep68
C.119 Co	LF	PR	45	Vic YD 9424	YD 9424/27Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	15,000		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
1st Bn, 68B Arty Regt	NVA	C	315	AT 8042	
HAI VAN Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102nd Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103rd Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	560		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	125	AT 9737	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,140		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	285	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
368B Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,170		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
R.20 Bn	LF	C	155	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	LF	C	160	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	265	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	70	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	275	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	Unloc vic HOA VANG (D)	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1758	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	85	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	105	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	120	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	115	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	140	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	4,560		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	Unlocated	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	815		
Regt Hq	MF	C	220	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	210	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	175	BT 2711	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	210	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	695		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	200	BT 1317	
1st Bn	NVA	C	150	BT 1317	BT 1115/14May69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	185	BT 1317	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	160	BT 1317	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	200	BT 1523	BT 3219/25Feb69
72nd Bn	LF	C	195	BT 2932	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	200	BT 1408	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	110	BT 3127	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	205	BT 2232	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	220	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 421[illegible]	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	80	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	90	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	160	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	125	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	215	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	585	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BS 4677	BS 6385/12Aug69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	180	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	795		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	160	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 4386	BS 3587/13Aug69
95th Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68
C.17 Co	LF	C	55	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	90	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	65	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	80	BS 7555	BS 7061/17Nov68
C.120 Co	LF	C	65	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	90	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	95	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69

*See note #2 on page A-

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,755		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	995		
Regt Hq	MF	C	375	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	200	BS 6733	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 7932	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,025		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	BS 5262	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	260	BS 5262	BS 5262/27May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	285	BS 6646	BS 5262/27May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	295	BS 5262	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 3147	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 3970/26Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 3147	BS 0433/4Mar69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May69
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 3147	

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BINH DINH PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	925		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	275	BINH DINH	CR 0952/23Jun68
7th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 9640/12Apr68
8th Bn	NVA	C	250	BINH DINH	CR 0933/23Apr68
9th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 8955/29May68

*See note #1 on page 17

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7. Significant OOB changes in ICTZ during period 100001H to 162400H August 1969.

a. Due to a lack of contact/information relating to the 24B Regt, 304th Div in its former AO south of KHE SANH, the regiment is dropped to unlocated possibly in LAOS.

b. Based on documents and equipment captured after an enemy group attack on 7 and 8 August, 304th Div is relocated to CAM LO (D), QUANG TRI (P).

c. Based on statements made by PW Doan Van KE, who originally identified his unit as the 9th Bn, 29th Regt but has subsequently changed his unit identification to be the 803rd Regt, the 9th Bn, 29th Regt is dropped from THUA THIEN (P) and relocated to Base Area 611.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3 and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the Headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

9. Subordination/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF PERINTREP 31-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 33-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P). Rallier, PFC Nguyen Quang DAM (AKA Nguyen Tran QUE) of the K.8 Co, 27th Bn, 31st Group rallied on 8 August 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 195620) (7th ITT Rpt 60-69 3rd MARDIV msg 091050Z August 1969) and stated that his unit was ambushed at (YD 175652) while enroute to CAM VU (H) (YD 180616) with the mission of attacking CAM VU (H). He ran from the ambush site, hid in the jungle until daylight, then rallied to RF Headquarters. The K.8 was to provide mortar fire for the K.7 Co, 27th Bn and then proceed along with the K.7 Co to attack TAN LANG (H) (YD 182605). Source further stated that the K.7 and K.8 Co's were also to attack HILL's 73 and 74 (CNA) and DOC MIEU (H) (CNA) during the months of August, September and October. DAN gave the location of the K.8 Co as being one and one-half hours walk north of the BEN HAI River (CNA). DAN further revealed that the morale of the people in NVN was low due to a rice shortage in outlying regions and the north could never win the war due to the fire power of the allied forces in RVN. Rallier states that he infiltrated to RVN on 5 August 1969 with 11 men of K.8 Co. They were met at the south side of the BEN HAI River (CNA) by two local VC who guided them to HILL 48 (YD 112733). The K.8 Co then met the K.7 Co and proceeded south toward CAM VU (H). Reported personalities: K.8 CO-CMDR Lt Nguyen Van NHUNG, XO-Nguyen Dang THINH, PO-Vuong The HUAN.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 31st Group is known to operate in the area of the source's capture. This is the first report of reported personalities. All information rated (F-3).)

2. THUA THIEN (P). PW, Nguyen Van HOI from the C-2 Co., K.35 Arty Bn was captured on 12 August 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 707183) (Translation of THUA THIEN Sector Interro Rpt, XXIV Corps msg 130813Z August 1969) and stated that his cell (consisting of three men) was on a reconnaissance mission of LONG HO HA (YD 707183) and if they completed their mission, the subject's platoon would then come to buy and collect rice. HOI stated that the 2nd Plt and C-2 Co's CP is located in the vicinity of (YD 668105) and he had heard the Company Commander say the K.35 Artillery Bn's CP was located in the vicinity of (YD 588155).

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first PW from the K.35 Bn. The K.35 Bn is believed to be directly subordinate to MRTTH but OP CON to the 6th Regt. Elements of the 6th Regt, however, have been located at the northern end of the A SHAU Valley. The PW's location of the battalion CP this far east can be considered to indicate one of two things; either the K.35 is no longer OP CON to the 6th Regt or the 6th Regt has made a major eastward move, toward HUE. Additional information is required to determine which is the case. All information rated (F-3).)

3. QUANG NAM (P). From 2 August through 10 August 1969 there have been 14 PW's and two Hoi Chanhs taken from the 36th Regt. (1st and 13th ITT Spot Rpts dated 2 to 10 August 1969). All of them were taken within the

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QUE SON Mountain area in the vicinity of (AT 9737 - 9738 - 9739). There was one from the 1st Bn, 11 from the 2nd Bn, one from the 3rd Bn and three from the support companies. Four of the PW's stated their mission was to either counter FWMAF operations, or attack HOI AN, or DANANG at an unknown time. Twelve of the PW/Hoi Chanhs stated their mission was to rest, gather food, await replacements, prepare for the rainy season and avoid contact with FWMAF. The location of the 36th Regt, or its elements was stated to be in the vicinity of (AT 9737 - 9738 - 9739).

(G-2 COMMENT: The 36th Regt is considered to be in a poor state of combat effectiveness and it is estimated that the 36th Regt will continue to attempt to avoid contact with FWMAF. All information rated (F-2).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). PW, Tran Van NGHIA, 2nd (AKA 60th) Bn, 1st Regt, 2nd Div, captured on 12 August 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 980250) (Americal 130600Z August 1969) stated that the mission of his unit, which was supported by the 12th AA Co., was to attack LZ WEST (AT 9825).

(G-2 COMMENT: The 1st Regt is currently held by III MAF OOB in the vicinity of (BT 2711). Previous information on the 1st Regt indicated they were moving south. It is possible that an element was detached from the Regt to conduct this attack. However, this is a preliminary interrogation, in which limited information was provided. All information rated (F-6).)

5. QUANG NGAI (P)

a. PW, Pvt, Du Van KHE, 6th Co, 6th Bn, 21st Regt, 2nd Div, captured in the vicinity of (BS 335874) on 12 August 1969 during an attack on TRA BONG CIDG Camp (Americal msg Interr Spt Rpt 121101Z August 1969) stated that the 6th Co's strength is 36 men and the 6th Bn's strength is 120 men. Subject's unit served as a harassment element with light weapons fire and grenades while other elements of his battalion moved in to attack its objective. PW also stated that the composition of his battalion is three companies numbered 4, 5 and 6 with 36 men each, and the 21st has three battalions number 4, 5 and 6 with 120 men each.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holds the 6th Bn as an AKA for the 80th Bn, and the 4th and 5th Bn's as AKA's for the 60th and 70th Bn's of the 21st NVA Regt. This is the current operating area of the 21st Regt. The reported strength for the battalion is considered low (F-4). All other information rated (F-3).)

b. PW's, CPL, Chi Ngoc CANH, 3rd Co, 406th Bn and PFC Nguyen Hong QUANG, 4th Co, 406th Bn were captured on 11 August 1969 in the vicinity of (BS 628853) during an attack on BINH LIEN OP (BS 628857) (2d ARVN Div msg 120400Z August 1969). CANH stated that the 406th Bn's strength is over 200 while QUANG gave the Bn's strength at 150. Both stated that prior to 11 August, the 406th Bn was located in the vicinity of (BS 450750). Their mission at their time of capture was to attack BINH LIEN

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OP. CANH left NVN in April of 1968 with Infiltration Group 4597 which arrived in QUANG NGAI (P) in September of 1968 with a strength of 100 men. The group was commanded by 2nd Lt KINH and was assigned to the 401st Regt. QUANG left NVN in early May of 1969 with 250 men of Infiltration Group 307 and arrived in QUANG NGAI (P) at the end of July 1969. Approximately 100 men were lost enroute due to malaria, other diseases and desertions. The group, which was commanded by Major Nguyen Viet TAI, reinforced the 406th Sapper Bn.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holdings place the 406th Sapper Bn in the vicinity of (BS 4677) in the strength of 220 men (F-3). This is a first report of Infiltration Group 4597. There has been a previous report of an Infiltration Group 307 which arrived in NVN in April of 1968 (F-6).

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ADDENDUM 1 (DOCUMENT READOUT) TO ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS, AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 33-69.

1. A document was captured from a dead enemy on 10 Aug 69 by H/2/7 in the vicinity of (AT 9465) (7th IT Doc Trans Rpt #31-8-69 of 13 Aug 69) four kilometers north of HILL 55. Among the items contained in the document was a listing of troop strengths and firepower (ARVN and US) in Zone II strongholds (Zone II meaning the areas west and southwest of DANANG). The names given of the places are VC names although HILLS 10 and 55 are familiar. The two items that follow are extracted verbatim from the document as an example of the type information contained therein.

Location	Coordinates	Troop and Firepower Strength
BO BO (HILL 55)	721-961	Regt Hq, 7th Regt, 3rd Bn, 7th Regt, 11th Arty Regt, 350 troops, 1st Battery, 39th Arty Bn, 2x175's, 6x105's, 6x155's, 2x106's, 7 or 8x 81's, two guard towers, 30 block houses, 6x113 personnel carriers
DUONG MAO (HILL 10)	790-913	2d Bn, 7th Regt, 700 Americans, 2x105's, 2x105's, 4x 155's, 8x81's, 6x141 vehicles, two guard towers

(G-2 COMMENT: It appears that intensive reconnaissance is being carried out against [illegible] positions. Furthermore, the nature of some of the detailed information gathered in this document suggests that much of the information was obtained through indigenous personnel working within the areas mentioned. All information rated (F-2).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 33-69

1. GENERAL. This past week saw a marked increase in general activity throughout ICTZ, commencing on the night of 11-12 August. Based on previous indications, as derived from agent reports and captured documents, the upsurge of VCI activity followed the pattern outlined with marked increases in sabotage and terrorist incidents. Reported sabotage incidents were almost exclusively directed at disrupting land communication routes. Terrorist activity was primarily characterized by hamlet harrassment, ABF's directed at local defense units and refugee centers and continued assassinations of lower echelon GVN administrators and local defense personnel. Reported propaganda incidents and intelligence collection activities generally remained unchanged from previous weeks. A marked decrease, however, was noted in the number of reported political meetings throughout ICTZ, possibly indicating that plans and decisions for any current or forthcoming phases of VC/VCI activity have been formulated and wait only implementation.

Northern ICTZ, although the scene of several intense NVA initiated incidents, experienced only slight increases in levels of reported VCI activities. Several recent reports indicate a possible upsurge in VC/VCI activity in the northern portion of Phu Thu (D), Thua Thien (P).

In southern ICTZ, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces were the focus of reported VCI related counterintelligence incidents. Quang Tin (P) had almost a complete absence of reported VCI activities.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. Intelligence collection activities, although generally reported with little change in frequency from previous weeks, was perhaps better reflected by successes gained and accuracy of information collected previous to the recent upsurge in ground activity. Several recently captured documents have provided some insight into the ability of the VC to collect intelligence on friendly positions, dispositions, unit identifications, personalities, activities, patterns of activities and intents derived from these patterns. Sources, as indicated in the documents and by the nature of intelligence gained, are myriad and, as in the past, many may well continue to be undetected.

Other captured documents and agent reports indicate that the Viet Cong are showing increased concern for improving their intelligence collection and subversive capabilities through penetration of GVN government agencies and ARVN/US/FWMAF. Such is expected to continue as a priority effort on the part of the VCI.

Some of the more significant reports received are included as follows:

a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 2 August 1969, a U.S. MI source reported that Hoang Chau, a VC village chief held a meeting at Truong Phuoc (H) (YD 383455) where he instructed the people to collect rice and information for the VC (Eval: C-6).

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(2) On 4 August 1969, a U.S. MI source reported that a Hue VC Municipal Committee member, Truong Cong Thanh, contacted one of his agents, a penetration agent, in an alleyway near Tu Do stadium (Eval: F-6).

(3) On 5 August 1969, a GVN source reported one squad of VC collected information from wood gatherers at Thuong Phuoc Forest (YD 281481) (Eval: C-3).

b. Thua Thien. On 4 August 1969, a GVN source reported four VC cadre collected intelligence at Huong Ho (V) (YD 715194) (Eval: C-2).

c. Quang Tin. On 9 August 1969, a U.S. MI source reported that Tran Thi Phung is still operating at Chu Lai airbase. She has orders to gain the "affection" of GVN officials, National Police, and GIs at Chu Lai. She reports the information she has gathered to a VC cadre at Dong Co (BT 410020) once a week. She is reportedly three months pregnant and has asked the VC to allow her to abort the pregnancy. The VC will not allow this, however, because they want her to become a patient at the base hospital (nfi) (Eval: C-3).

d. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 6 August 1969, a U.S. MI source reported a VC spy, Bui Xuan Ba, living in Tan Phong (H) (BS 730438) has three missions:

(a) To act as a courier for the Duc Pho district rear bases (nfi).

(b) To collect and report information concerning the GVN to the VC.

(c) To lead a motor-cycle transportation group that is subordinate to the Provincial Trading Section (Eval: F-6).

(2) On 9 August 1969, a U.S. MI source reported that Le Van Xuan, a native of Phu Le (H) (BS 565938) was recruited to work as a penetration agent within the GVN-controlled Popular Forces of Binh Son District. Xuan is currently a security cadre of the Popular Forces. In this position he has the ability to operate unhindered in the collection of information for the VC. Xuan's chief contact is Vo Duc Chinh, a former ARVN soldier who deserted to the VC and is now operating in Tan Phuoc (H) (BS 535895). To maintain the favor of the GVN officials, Xuan helps them to apprehend VC sympathizers who sell marijuana to U.S. forces in the area (Eval: C-6).

3. SABOTAGE. Sabotage increased fourfold during the week in ICTZ, as the Viet Cong launched a concerted drive to interdict LOCs in Quang Nam, Quang Ngai and to a lesser extent in the two northern provinces. Targets attacked were primarily undefended culverts and smaller bridges on Highway 1. The Hue-Danang Railway was also interdicted on two occasions. In

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addition to the listed incidents, several larger bridges were unsuccessfully attacked with indirect fire weapons. There was only one reported attempt to interdict the Cua Viet or Cua Dai Rivers. Several of the more significant incidents are included as follows:

a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 8 August 1969, VC damaged a culvert with an explosive charge at YD 217 09.

(2) On 10 August 1969, a CAP patrol discovered three VC in the process of blowing a culvert on Route 1 at YD 219636. An investigation revealed minor damage to the culvert.

(3) On 16 August 1969, a rubber innertube, floating in the Cua Viet River, with a basket attached underneath was spotted and later identified as a mine with a 200 pound explosive charge.

b. Thua Thien.

(1) On 12 August 1969, an engine and one car were derailed by a VC mine at AT 836977. A small bridge and 60 meters of track were destroyed.

(2) On 15 August 1969, a CAP patrol discovered one NVA floating in a river at YD 926103. The NVA had 100 pounds of C-4 connected to two delay fuses and one diving snorkel on his body. Cause of death unknown.

c. Quang Nam.

(1) On 12 August 1969, a 149' long bridge at BT 042621 was sabotaged, destroying the second and third spans. A later ground attack, by an estimated thirty enemy, completely destroyed the bridge.

(2) On 12 August 1969, a 36 inch culvert was 50% destroyed by the VC at BT 036634.

(3) On 12 August 1969, a road sweep team reported that six culverts were blown in the vicinity of AT 922572.

(4) On 12 August 1969, a VC sapper element exploded a 105mm howitzer round under a bridge on Route 538 at BT 168579. Bridge was slightly damaged, but was still usable.

(5) On 13 August 1969, a culvert was destroyed by explosives at AT 838972.

(6) On 13 August 1969, a sweep operation by CAP 2-1-4 at AT 945694 found five x 20lb. charges with electrical firing devices

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emplaced under a bridge on Route 540.

(7) On 15 August 1969, a twelve meter concrete railroad bridge was 80% destroyed by an explosion at AT 836977.

d. Quang Tin. On 13 August 1969, two culverts were blown at BT 221356 and BT 218360.

e. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 12 August 1969, a bridge in Mo Duc at BS 739533 was blown by two 40-50lb. charges. The bridge is impassable.

(2) On 12 August 1969, the VC blew a culvert in the vicinity of BS 633811.

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Viet Cong propaganda themes and activity generally remained unchanged and at the same level of previous weeks. In contrast to other areas of intensified Viet Cong activity, propaganda themes did not become noticeably more aggressive. Two propaganda techniques which have been relatively neglected by the Viet Cong in the recent past, re-occurred in Quang Nam (P) and Quang Tri (P), where the display of Viet Cong flags and the use of loudspeakers were reported. One of the five flags found on 12 August was boobytrapped with a grenade. Reported Viet Cong political activity remained relatively light and there have been no significant indications that the immediate political objectives and tactics of the Viet Cong have been modified. (See also Appendix 3 - a summary of Viet Cong objectives during the Summer Campaign - Dien Ban (D), Quang Nam (P).

a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 28 July 1969, a U.S. MI source reported that one VC cell distributed pamphlets at Bo Rang (H) (YD 337628) describing VC victories and pointing out American willingness to negotiate as a sign of weakness and failure (Eval: F-3).

(2) On 8 August 1969, an unknown number of VC set up loudspeakers and broadcast propaganda near Ha Thuong (H) (YD 217719).

(3) On 9 August 1969, a U.S. MI source reported that the members of the Quang Tri Provincial Current Affairs Committee have met with district level cadre and presented three directives to be carried out in the political conflict with the GVN.

(a) The first directive was to establish and strengthen the organization of the Provisional Revolutionary Committees in the hamlets and villages.

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(b) The second directive was to increase support for the theme of a coalition government.

(c) The third directive was to develop installations for the organization of the People's Revolutionary Party (Eval: F-6).

(4) On 16 August 1969, a U.S. MI source reported a Provincial level meeting of communist cadre was held at Di Loan (YD 230818). The meeting was attended by an estimated 100 communist cadre. The purpose of the meeting was to promulgate the fundamental resolutions of the People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and to commence preparations for a ceremony to commemorate "Autumn Revolutionary Day" on 19 August 1969 (Eval: C-6).

(5) On 14 August 1969, while on patrol, a CAP unit found 250 NLF propaganda leaflets at YD 225617. Villagers claimed the leaflets were distributed on 13 and 14 August by unknown persons.

b. Thua Thien. On 3 August 1969, a GVN source reported six VC cadre operating at Phuong Lam (H) (YD 822167), Gia Le Thuong (H) (YD 824162), and Thuong Lam (H) (YD 823173). They were conducting propaganda operations and called upon the villagers to prevent relatives from joining the PSDF (Eval: C-2).

c. Quang Nam.

(1) On 8 August 1969, a U.S. MI source reported that the people who had relatives who had joined the NLF since 1954 no longer had faith in the Viet Cong because their relatives never returned home and were most likely killed by Allied forces. The people are now beginning to refuse to support the VC and will not act as laborers for them anymore. However, the people still fear for their lives when VC enter their hamlets (Eval: F-6).

(2) On 10 August 1969, an NP agent report stated that a meeting was held urging the populace to exert efforts to try and gather rice for a new offensive to take place from 10-28 August 1969. During the offensive, enemy units will attack throughout the Da Nang area. Sapper elements are to conduct sabotage in the city and political cadre are to work within the city (Unevaluated).

(3) On 11 August 1969, a U.S. MI source reported that commencing 7 August 1969 and running for 5 days until 12 August 1969, VC political cadre from village level and above and all military cadre from company level and above were to attend a major VC/NVA conference in the Trung Nang Mountains (nfi) to discuss the opening of the "Rainy Season Offensive" in the NVA/VC Quang Da Special Zone. The people have been ordered to collect food stuffs in preparation for the new offensive (Eval: F-3).

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(4) On 12 August 1969, between 0700 and 0930, road sweep teams found four VC flags at AT 982623, AT 968598, AT 975623, and AT 961577. At coordinates AT 968598, 24 English language and 5 Vietnamese language propaganda leaflets were found along with a flag.

(5) On 12 August 1969, CAP 2-7-6 and the 38th PF platoon were retrieving an NVA flag at Tho Son (H) (BT 067711) and triggered two M-26 grenade booby traps, resulting in one PF wounded.

(6) During the night of 11-12 August, approximately 30 VC and 12 District cadre entered Mieu Dong (H) (BT 013677), Quang Chau #2 (H) (BT 007687) and Yen Ne #4 (H) (AT 970673) and propagandized that U.S. troops would be out of South Vietnam by the end of 1969 and there would be no Thieu-Ky-Huong government. The political cadre claimed to be from the so-called Quang Da Revolutionary Committee and were wearing ARVN fatigues (U.S. MI Eval: F-6).

(7) A CAP unit, while in defensive positions at Tra Quang BT 171569, heard a Viet Cong loudspeaker broadcast in the Vietnamese language. An interpreter stated that the broadcast stated that the CIDG, RF and PF should not take up arms against the Viet Cong and that the Viet Cong would attack Hoi An City soon.

(8) On 12 August 1969, a GVN source reported that the VC presently are sending young children to North Vietnam to prepare them for their Plan (nfi) after the war is over. Seventeen children were listed by name as having been recently sent from the area (Uneval).

d. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 12 August 1969, four VC ambushed and killed one PSDF member at BS 664980. CAP 1-3-3 swept the area finding pamphlets stating that CAP 1-3-3 would be attacked on 19 August.

(2) On 13 August 1969, a U.S. MI source reported that approximately 40 Viet-Montagnard communist cadre of district and village level held a meeting in the vicinity of the Gay-Eo area (BS 330705). They were to be divided into two groups. One group was to cover the area between Gi-Lang (BS 283645), Xa Truong (BS 390745) and Nuoc Ngo (BS 405765). The other group was to cover the area between Lang Mon (BS 380560) to Ha Thanh (BS 470700). Their mission will be to propagandize such Montagnard victories as the destruction of U.S. planes (nfi) and the protection given VC bases. They were to motivate villages to provide cash and food gifts to outstanding troops (nfi). A campaign would be conducted in each village (nfi) (Eval: C-6).

5. TERROR. A significant increase in terrorism occurred in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces during the week, while the remaining provinces of the Corps showed either no increase or only moderately increased levels. Terrorist activity consisted primarily of attacks by fire or ground attacks

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on refugee camps and hamlets. These attacks are thought to have the multiple objectives of forcing refugees back into GVN-controlled areas, disrupting the pacification program, intimidating GVN officials and demonstrating to the people that the GVN is unable to protect them. The majority of the reported terrorism during the week appeared to be conducted by VC/NVA units, as opposed to the local VCI and assassination teams. (A listing of Viet Cong terrorist incidents is contained in Appendix 2 of this Annex).

6. FINANCE/ECONOMY. Viet Cong food and tax collection activities during the period appeared to be at a very low level. Reports of such activities were most evident in Thua Thien and Quang Ngai Provinces. Reports of activity in Thua Thien included one report of instructions from district committees directing the collection of food to support units during the "August Revolution" from 10-15 August and three reports of general food collection. Reports from Quang Ngai consisted of one report of food and medicine purchasing and two reports of labor conscription of 100 persons each to transport food, ammunition and wounded soldiers in the area of western Binh Son (D) and Tra Bong (D). (Note: a major attack was launched at Tra Bong (D) during the reporting period.)

a. Thua Thien.

(1) On 1 August, a US MI source reported that the VC village organizations in Phu Vang and Phu Thu districts received instructions from respective district committees that cadre and regional main force and armed force troops must collect food for VC units so that they can prepare for battles in the Plains area. They will have a "Strong Fight" program from 10-15 August to commemorate the August Revolution (Eval: F-6).

(2) On 4 August 1969, a US MI source reported that a 40 man VC village headquarters unit located at YD 946000, sent out teams of personnel to collect food at Bang Mon (H) (YD 970075), Nam Pho Can (H) (YD 960050) and Ke Bang (H) (YD 970035) (Eval: F-3).

(3) On 8 August 1969, a US MI source reported a 15-20 man VC unit entered Quang Xuyen (YD 885246) and collected food after threatening the people to contribute (Eval: F-6).

(4) On 10 August 1969, a GVN source reported one VC squad entered Co Buo hamlet (YD 705228) and confiscated 44 cans of rice.

b. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 30 July 1969, a US MI source reported that there were seven female VC food procurement cadre operating in Binh Son district. All seven live in Phuoc Thuan (BS 575916), Tien Dao (BS 581921), Phu Le (nfi) and Chau Tu (BS 580930). Two of the cadre are Bui Thi Mua and Mrs. Hien. They are given money by the VC to buy rice, sauce, salt, milk, sugar and medicine, which are procured at the Chau O and Nuoc Mau

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markets (Eval: C-3).

(2) On 30 July 1969, a US MI source reported that on 1 August, 100 laborers were to report to Tan Phuoc (BS 535894). They were divided into groups and dispatched to carry rice, potatoes, and corn to Tra Bong and then to the mountains (nfi) (Eval: C-3).

(3) On 6 August 1969, a US MI source reported that 100 laborers were to report to Tan Phuoc (BS 535893) on 7 August. They were taken to join combat units (nfi) to carry ammunition and wounded soldiers (Eval: C-3).

APPENDIXES
1-Statistical Compilation of People's Revolutionary Committees in ICTZ
2-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ
3-Translation of Captured Enemy Documents

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 33-69

People's Revolutionary Committees reported by name and/or location as of 17 August 1969

	Quang Tri	Thua Thien	Quang Nam	Quang Tin	Quang Ngai	Total
Region (MRTTH)						1
Province	1	1	1	1	1	5
District	2	5	2	1	9	19
City		1	2			3
Village	37	36	76	49	107	305
Hamlet	31	59	16	11	122	239
Precinct		1				1
Total	71	103	97	62	239	573

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 33-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Tri	5Aug69 (Late Entry)	YD 233677	A VC platoon kidnapped 2 PSDF members at Mai Xu Chanh (H).
	11Aug69	YD 410537	Two Vietnamese civilians were assassinated in Lam Thuy Hamlet. Villagers believe the murderers to be VC.
Thua Thien	7Aug69 (Late Entry)	YD 815181	VC entered Dong Tien Hamlet and assassinated one civilian.
	12Aug69	YD 734235	Hue City received three rounds of 122mm rocket fire vicinity of (YD 734235) resulting in negative casualties or damage.
	12Aug69	YD 779211	Hue City received two rounds of 122mm rocket fire, resulting in one civilian killed and fifteen wounded and one house destroyed.
	13Aug69	ZD 077014	Five VC entered Gia Luong Hamlet and assassinated two Vietnamese civilians for unknown reasons.
	14Aug69	YD 925210	VC platoon entered Than Luong Vinh Hamlet and threw a grenade wounding seven civilians.
Quang Nam	4Aug69 (Late Entry)	AT 945645	VC entered Phu Son Hamlet and burned ten civilian homes.
	6Aug69 (Late Entry)	AT 926669	Ten VC entered Dinh Bon's home in Tuy Loan (2) Hamlet and kidnapped his wife because he ran away and refused to accompany the VC.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	7Aug69 (Late Entry)	BT 075515	A VC mine exploded in Xuyen Chau Village wounding ten civilians.
	7Aug69 (Late Entry)	BT 035504	One civilian accidentally detonated a VC mine in Truong Dong Hamlet, resulting in one civilian killed.
	8Aug69 (Late Entry)	AT 946678	VC entered Huong Son Hamlet, killed one civilian and burned nine homes.
	8Aug69 (Late Entry)	AT 885484	VC entered A-Dong Hamlet and assassinated one inter-family chief.
	8Aug69 (Late Entry)	AT 943689	Three VC entered the home of Lam Luc, a farmer in Cam Toai Trung Hamlet and assassinated him for unknown reasons.
	11Aug69	BT 014724	An explosive charge was detonated in a small restaurant in Khue Trung #1 Hamlet wounding thirteen civilians including the hamlet chief and assistant hamlet chief.
	11Aug69	Da Nang	On the night of 11 August two explosions occurred in District III. The first occurred in Tran Thi Thanh's Bar, Nam Tho #4 Hamlet (BT 064805) wounding one child. The second occurred near the Civil Defense House in An Cuu #1 Hamlet (BT 051766) resulting in negative casualties.
	11Aug69	AT 936711	CAP 2-3 reported that while on a road sweep they received SAF, which killed two civilians and wounded twelve.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	12Aug69	BT 075711	NSA hospital received two rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 20 casualties.
	12Aug69	Hoi An	A VC mortar attack on Hoi An City resulted in seven civilians killed and 137 homes destroyed.
	12Aug69	BT 156562	Three civilians were wounded by a mortar attack on Cam Nam village.
	12Aug69	AT 919574	While in a defensive position at An Dong hamlet the 81st, 89th, 90th and 95th PF platoons received SAF and 25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in four civilians killed, three wounded and 29 homes destroyed.
	12Aug69	BT 058587	Cong Gia Refugee Camp received one round of B-40 rocket fire which wounded four civilians and damaged two homes.
	12Aug69	AT 885465	CAP 2-9-1 received ten rounds of 60mm mortar fire, three rounds of 122mm rocket fire and five rounds of B-40 rocket fire resulting in three civilians killed, three civilians wounded and one house damaged.
	12Aug69	BT 053697	One Vietnamese civilian was killed when he accidentally triggered an M-26 grenade booby trap in Binh Ky hamlet.
	12Aug69	BT 044347	The 321st RF company and a PSDF team at Cang Tay #2 hamlet received SAF and Chicom grenades from an enemy squad, resulting in six civilians wounded and six homes destroyed.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	13Aug69	AT 870476	The 5th Marines, while in a defense perimeter, received four rounds of 122mm rocket fire, resulting in five civilians killed, four wounded and one house destroyed.
	13Aug69	BT 162550	One VC squad infiltrated into Xuyen Long Refugee Camp, assassinated one Hoi Chanh and kidnapped three civilians.
	14Aug69	BT 027779	Three or four suspected VC threw a homemade bomb, believed to have been a Coke can filled with C-4, into a ROK MP station on Thi Diem Street in Da Nang City, wounding one ROK marine.
	14Aug69	BT 125571	One squad of VC attacked Thanh Tay Refugee Camp with SAF and ten B-40 rocket rounds, resulting in one PF killed, two RD killed, seven PF wounded, one RD wounded and one Hamlet Chief wounded.
	14Aug69	BT 150450	The 147th PF platoon while in perimeter defense at Phu Hiep Hamlet received SAF and 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from an estimated enemy platoon resulting in 11 civilians wounded and 20 homes destroyed.
	15Aug69	BT 163565	A PSDF team at Thanh Nam hamlet received SAF, six M-26 grenades and two Chicom grenades resulting in four PSDF and four civilians killed, four PSDF and two civilians wounded.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	16Aug69	AT 992750	VC threw a grenade at a police station, resulting in negative casualties or damages.
	16Aug69	BT 148570	Hoi An City received eight rounds of 82mm mortar fire, resulting in two RF, 16 civilians, one National Police, and two ARVN wounded.
	17Aug69	AT 916579	Village received seven rounds of 82mm mortar fire, wounding four civilians.
Quang Ngai	9Aug69	BS 737544	PSDF platoon 104 was ambushed resulting in one PSDF killed and one wounded.
	10Aug69	BS 706624	Unknown number of VC infiltrated the night defense position of PF platoon 98 inflicting negative casualties, but destroying 30 homes.
	10Aug69	BS 681666	A B-40 rocket hit a Vietnamese house, killing three civilians and wounding two.
	11Aug69	BS 716606	VC infiltrated Duc Quang Refugee Camp and destroyed one house.
	12Aug69	BS 601922	A satchel charge wounded six civilians near Binh Son District Headquarters.
	12Aug69	BS 691647	PF platoon received 2 x B-40 rocket and four 82mm mortar rounds resulting in one PF and one civilian wounded.
	12Aug69	BS 745548	An unknown number of VC infiltrated into Duc Thach Refugee Camp, and destroyed 10 homes.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Ngai	12Aug69	BS 567966	An estimated ten enemy raided a hamlet, resulting in four houses destroyed, 3 civilians killed and three wounded.
	12Aug69	BS 623001	A PF platoon at Tan My Hamlet received an unknown number of mortar rounds resulting in three civilians wounded and three houses destroyed.
	12Aug69	BS 806384	PF platoon 108 was attacked with B-40 rockets resulting in five PF and three civilians wounded.
	13Aug69	BS 759820	One platoon of VC attacked Son Hai Refugee Camp killing two civilians.
	13Aug69	BS 755818	One platoon of VC attacked Son Quang Refugee Camp resulting in three civilians killed and ten wounded.
	14Aug69	BS 768817	One platoon of VC attacked the Son My Refugee Camp resulting in three PSDF and six civilians killed.
	14Aug69	BS 668975	A CAP 1-3-3 patrol received sniper fire while investigating rifle shots in a village, resulting in one Vietnamese civilian being wounded.
	16Aug69	BS 564604	A VC platoon attacked Minh Dung Hamlet, resulting in eight civilians killed and seven wounded.
	Night 16-17 Aug 69	BS 640724	An unknown size enemy force entered Quang Ngai City after a mortar attack on the city and 2nd ARVN Division headquarters. Casualties and damage unknown.

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 33-69

Translation of Captured Enemy Documents

The following is a translated condensation of portions of captured enemy documents published by the Dien Ban District Party Current Affairs Committee QDSZ, dated 18 April and 4 May 1969, in response to directives received by them from higher echelons concerning objectives of the 1969 summer campaign.

The enemy (GVN/FWMAF) continues to carry out their "Clear, Hold, and Withdraw" strategy, consolidate the defensive system surrounding Da Nang, attack areas bordering the city, enlarge "Clear and Hold" operations in liberated areas, tries to carry out the pacification plan, and rebuild observation posts to intercept our attacks and protect the Da Nang base. Additionally, the enemy resorted to cunning and wicked schemes to work out a political solution for the war. This causes difficulties to our strategy. The enemy is in a passive position while our forces have continued to develop attack and encirclement positions. We should be determined to step up the all-out offensive and mass uprising to gain a decisive victory. Frustrate the US's "Clear, Hold, and Withdraw" policy, destroy US key agencies, war facilities, and storage areas etc...We should thwart the US plan of using the puppet troops and government. We should concentrate all forces to attack the puppet government agencies. The main objectives are to annihilate the pacification and administrative personnel and destroy the local administrative systems.

We should promote the people's uprisings, kill tyrants, break the oppressive control over the population, protect the people, build penetration bases and bring the people's guerrilla warfare to the cities. Develop and enlarge liberated areas by motivating the people to demand that they be allowed to return to their former homes. Incite the people to demonstrate against artillery bombardment, air bombardment, and forced mobilization. Secretly stimulate meetings and peace interviews with Buddhist organizations, create political consciousness among them, and attempt to gain their leadership. Motivate the people to participate in the enemy troop proselyting movement. Try to create mass desertions, military revolts, and dissension among American and satellite troops.

Motivate and perfect the organization of cells in conducting their political struggle in cities, district seats, posts and strongholds. Be determined not to let any village be without our personnel. Party chapters and cells should be established in district seats. Political tasks should be assigned immediately to those organs.

Note: Certain portions are underlined as specific points of interest by SCI, III MAF.

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HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

JCS CONTROL NUMBER

MACH. CI	DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT	PRI.	SEC.	ORIGINATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.	NO. CYS. RECD.	MICFLM	CLAS.	DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
	C913279	PERIODIC INTEL RPT 34-69	3K		MEF 099669		2				48	269
			NAVY FILE NUMBER									

ROUTING - *Use numbers to show order of routing*

OPERATION CODE

X-ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET
A-FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION
B-FOR COMPLIANCE
C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF _____
D-FOR COMMENT
E-FOR RECOMMENDATION
F-FOR CONCURRENCE
G-FOR INFORMATION
H-RETURN TO _____
I- _____
J-DISPOSITION _____

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
					COMMANDANT
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
1	A	3/3	9110	GHB	G-3 A03H hl PR
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
					JOINT CONTROL
					COUNSEL
					WOMEN MARINES
					STAFF DENTAL
					STAFF MEDICAL
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G-3

III MAF

PIR # 34-69

17-23 Aug 69

26 Aug 69

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26 August 1969



UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 34-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE



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G-2 Section
DANANG, RVN
26 August 1969
Ser: 099669

PERINTREP 34-69

Period covered: 170001H - 232400H August 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. It was apparent from the level of enemy activity recorded during the past week that the NVA/VC's well publicized Summer-Fall Campaign was continuing into its second week. While enemy initiated ground activity did not equal last week's 515 incidents, the total number recorded was 415, well above the level recorded during the past eight weeks. The statistical comparisons of enemy incoming fire provided a similar pattern. There were only 1,298 rounds of incoming recorded as opposed to 2,192 during the week preceding, however, with the exception of last week, it was the highest number of rounds received during a single week period since mid-June. The number of enemy KIA's, however, remained high with almost the same number recorded this week (1,214) as was compiled during the first week of the Summer-Fall Campaign (1,305). The maintenance of this continued high level of enemy combat losses is largely attributable to the heavy fighting which took place both to the northeast and the southeast of HIEP DUC.

Counterintelligence related VCI activity during the reporting period, although reduced in the frequency of reported incidents from the previous week, continued to reflect the continuing emphasis that the VC place on those activities designed to either destroy or otherwise render ineffective the local government administration, GVN military forces, and pacification assets and programs.

Terrorist activity continued to inflict substantial casualties on the civilian population through both the selective assassination of local administrators and supporters, attacks by fire, and hamlet harassment directed against refugee centers.

Propaganda and proselyting activity remains at a higher level than usual. Available information, on these aspects, indicate that the primary emphasis of the VCI remains on fomenting political struggles, penetrating GVN agencies and ARVN forces, increasing its influence over the population, and concurrently weakening the RVN government, military and pacification structures.

There are indications of growing concern by the Viet Cong regarding the Chieu Hoi program. Sterner measures reportedly are being adopted to prevent cadre and soldiers from rallying and appear to be part of an overall effort to decrease the effectiveness of friendly intelligence collection activities.

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The screening of recently captured documents has not disclosed any discernible change to previously reported VCI intent to carry forward the traditional three pronged (military, political and proselyting) attack during the months of August and September.

a. QUANG TRI (P). There was a reduction in the tempo of enemy initiated activity in QUANG TRI Province during the past week. The enemy effort was largely characterized by attacks by fire with two large and several small ground contacts recorded in the central DMZ sector during the week. The major engagements of the week in QUANG TRI (P) were the result of contacts made by the 1st of the 2nd ARVN Regiment on 18-19 August five kilometers southwest of CON THIEN in which the enemy suffered 90 KIA. The first occurred on the late afternoon of the 18th at (YD 065674) with 39 confirmed kills recorded. On the following morning, 1/2 was again engaged with the enemy in the same area (YD 060682). This time an additional 51 NVA were killed in action. One prisoner was taken in these two contacts. He was identified as a member of the 49th Quang Binh Provincial Unit. The presence of Quang Binh Provincial Unit personnel south of the DMZ is not uncommon. The three southern provinces of NVN (QUANG BINH, HA TINH, and NGE AN) have regularly provided both personnel and units from their district and province main forces to man B-5 Front units. As an example, the 27th NVA Regiment is made up almost exclusively of personnel from this source.

There continued to be small unit contacts made to the northwest of the ROCKPILE in the vicinity of the CAM LO River Valley (XD 9362). On the 20th and again on the 22nd, Marine units made contact with small enemy forces at this location. The most notable of these contacts was a contact made by L/3/3 with an unidentified enemy unit while this company was en route to its night defensive positions. Eight enemy were killed in action in this contact which took place within one kilometer of the heavy engagement which elements of 2/3 Marines were involved in on 9 August. Also of interest is the fact that the 1/2 ARVN contact mentioned previously in which 51 KIA's were recorded, was at the same location as the D/1/11 Infantry contact of 7 August in which 56 of the enemy were killed. These renewed contacts suggest the continued presence of significant enemy forces immediately south of the central DMZ. However, by the end of the week the lack of movement and the nature of the enemy defensive works encountered suggest that the enemy has assumed a defensive posture in most areas of the central DMZ.

Concerning attacks by fire which were recorded during the week in QUANG TRI Province, VANDEGRIFT Combat Base was hit by six 107mm rockets on the 20th, the Project DELTA forward operating base at MAI LOC (YD 1151) received 15x60mm mortar rounds as well as RPG and small arms fire on the 20th, and QUANG TRI City received two 122mm rockets on the 22d.

Elsewhere in QUANG TRI Province, enemy contact was light. In the northwestern quadrant of QUANG TRI Province, Project DELTA forces noted three 30-40 man platoon size units at (XD 7863) suggesting the continued

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presence in that area of a major enemy unit, most probably the 246th NVA Regiment. In south central QUANG TRI (P) (YD 301340) elements of the 4th of the 1st ARVN Regiment engaged an estimated enemy platoon which resulted in inflicting nine KIA's upon the enemy force. Two-hundred pounds of TNT was included among the items captured in this contact with an unidentified unit, most probably an element of the 7th Front.

b. THUA THIEN (P). Enemy initiated activity in THUA THIEN Province was extremely light during the past week. There were no significant ground contacts and the enemy's efforts were largely restricted to attacks by fire. In the eastern sector of this province, PHU BAI Combat Base (YD 878140) received four 122mm rockets on the 20th with no casualties or damage reported and Camp EAGLE (YD 8116) received two 122mm rockets on the evening of the 23d with light personnel casualties reported.

To the west, within the A SHAU Valley, Fire Support Base CURRAHEE (YC 398949) received a 20 round 60mm mortar barrage on the 23d. Two helicopters were lost in the A SHAU Valley during the week. In both cases the aircraft were struck by small arms fire. In the first instance, which occurred on 17 August, an LOH was downed when struck by small arms fire four kilometers northeast of the A SHAU (YC 546847). The second incident occurred on the 23d when a UH-1H operating six kilometers to the southeast of the location where the LOH had been shot down (YC 5091) was also downed by small arms fire.

Elsewhere in the A SHAU Valley, B/3/187 Infantry and A Troop of the 3/5 Cavalry found one two and one-half ton truck and a bulldozer on the afternoon of the 21st in the vicinity of (YC 507806). The vehicles were of Russian manufacture and were in poor condition. In addition, 20 K-44 rifles and one LMG were also discovered at this location.

In the extreme southwestern corner of THUA THIEN Province, B Troop, 2/17th Cavalry observed seven enemy around a hut at (YC 7073) and engaged them with gunships which resulted in six KIA's and one secondary explosion. The location of this enemy force suggests that their parent unit is either the 5th NVA Regiment or elements of the 220th Transportation Regiment.

c. QUANG NAM (P). Enemy activity in QUANG NAM Province was generally restricted to stand-off attacks by fire. These attacks were widespread with incidents reported throughout the DANANG TAOR. In the immediate vicinity of DANANG, there were two rocket attacks recorded. The first occurred on the 19th when MARBLE MOUNTAIN Air Facility received nine 122mm rockets with the only serious damage occurring when one round impacted on the MAG-16 sickbay killing two and wounding seven others. On the 22nd, DANANG Air Base received 11x122mm rockets. One KIA was reported in this attack. The 5th Marines, operating in the vicinity of AN HOA were also the recipients of several attacks by fire during the week. One of them, which occurred on the 19th, was directed at the AN HOA Combat Base itself. In this attack, rocket preparatory fire was followed by a sapper probe. Nine NVA were killed as a result of this abortive

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attack. The heaviest attack by fire recorded during the week was directed against L/3/5 located in the vicinity of (AT 821498) when on the 19th they received 104 rounds of mixed mortar and rocket fire. Other locations where attacks by fire were received included HOI AN, LZ BALDY (BT 133453), the vicinity of the 2nd CAG Compound (BT 108576), the TAM HOA Refugee Camp (AT 866574), LZ ROSS (BT 027342) and the HOA CAM Training Center (AT 977716). In addition to these mortar and rocket attacks, the 1st Marines' CP on HILL 55 (AT 970620) received three lob bombs.

Other evidence of enemy activity during the week manifested itself in the form of extensive enemy troop sightings. While reconnaissance teams reported enemy troop movements throughout the southern DANANG TAOR, a substantial number of the sightings detected appeared to be in a north or easterly direction. These reconnaissance sightings in conjunction with agent reports and prisoner interrogations may indicate that the enemy is moving his forces back into the QUE SON Mountains and the QUANG NAM lowlands. Prior to and during the early stages of Operations PIPESTONE CANYON and DURHAM PEAK, all intelligence indicators pointed toward the withdrawal of the enemy in order to avoid friendly operations. These recent sightings and reports may indicate that the enemy is in the process of returning to his former AO's.

d. QUANG TIN (P). The heaviest contacts with the enemy in I Corps last week occurred along the QUANG NAM-QUANG TIN border. Units of the Americal Division's 21st and 31st Infantry were heavily engaged throughout the week with three major and many minor contacts being recorded. On the afternoon of the 18th, D/4/31 Infantry eight kilometers east southeast of HIEP DUC (BT 004224) received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. In the ensuing eight hour engagement, 97 enemy were killed in action with only light friendly casualties. On the same day B/4/31 Infantry operating approximately seven kilometers to the northwest of D/4/31's contact (AT 938278), was heavily engaged by another unidentified enemy force. In this contact 91 NVA were killed in action. Two days later, on 20 August, C/4/31 operating two kilometers to the northeast of HIEP DUC (AT 938270) contacted still another unidentified enemy force. A subsequent search of the battlefield resulted in confirming an additional 103 enemy KIA's.

In addition to these three major contacts there were a number of smaller contacts made both by ground units and gunships in the area generally described by a triangle running between TIEN PHUOC, HIEP DUC and QUE SON. By the end of the week, Americal Division conservatively estimated that the enemy had suffered a minimum of 427 killed in action in this area alone.

There were no further unit identifications made in this area of heavy enemy contact during the past week. However, in the initial engagements of 11-12 August, elements of both the 1st VC Regiment and the 3rd NVA Regiment were identified based upon prisoner interrogation. It is our present estimate that the bulk of the evidence would point toward the

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conclusion that both of the above cited regiments are present in the QUANG NAM-QUANG TIN border area. This estimate is supported by the evidence of the continuing heavy contact in this area, the large number of casualties inflicted upon the enemy, the absence of any contact with these units in their former AO's (3rd NVA Regiment east of TIEN PHUOC and the 1st VC Regiment east of Base Area 117), and information from URS.

It is our present estimate that the heavy enemy activity in the QUANG NAM-QUANG TIN border area resulted from a continuing NVA/VC effort to inflict maximum casualties on U.S. forces located in this area. In addition, these attacks may have a secondary purpose of drawing U.S. forces inland so that the enemy's provincial and local force units can operate more effectively against GVN pacification efforts in the coastal plain.

Elsewhere in QUANG TIN Province, TAM KY was subjected to a rocket and mortar attack on the evening of 22 August. Six 122mm rockets and 35x82mm mortar rounds were received resulting in one civilian killed.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). While attention in the two southern provinces of I Corps was focused upon the heavy fighting which took place in northern QUANG TIN (P), a number of significant contacts were made with the enemy in QUANG NGAI Province.

On the night of 17 August QUANG NGAI City received a mortar and ground attack by an unknown size enemy force. The attack was directed against the southern half of the city with the enemy's objective apparently being the 2d Division's Headquarters and the ARVN's 4th Armored Cavalry. Six of the enemy were killed in the contact without any ARVN losses, however, there were seven civilians WIA and a number of houses destroyed.

To the south, the enemy in the DUC PHO area, probably directing fire against the 11th Brigade's CP, fired eight 120mm mortar rounds. The rounds hit within the city of DUC PHO and resulted in 13 civilians and ARVN killed and 79 wounded. Also in southern QUANG NGAI Province, a serious ground contact ensued on the 22d when a road sweep team from D/19th Engineers was ambushed two kilometers southeast of DUC PHO. As a result of this action ten NVA were killed and two prisoners taken from the 2d VC Regiment. This was the first identified contact with the 2d Regiment since mid-June. It is our estimate that approximately 400 KIA's were inflicted upon this regiment in the two month period prior to mid-June, and that since that time this unit has been resting and refitting.

To the northwest of this ambush site, in the immediate vicinity of the CIDG Camp at MINH LONG, FSB CRUNCH (BS 5351) received a mortar barrage of approximately 75 rounds on the 19th.

In a follow-up report concerning major caches, an element of the 46th Infantry which had reported finding a salt cache of six to eight tons on the BATANGAN Peninsula (BS 755835) on 16 August, found a much larger salt

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cache in the immediate vicinity of the first one. The total amount of salt which has now been seized is 110 tons with more than 70,000 pounds of it bagged.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. It is our estimate that the level of enemy initiated activity which can be expected in the coming week will approximate that which we have experienced during the last two weeks. From a myriad number of sources we have received information that the enemy intends to maintain his current stepped-up level of operations into early September. The NVA/VC activity of the past week was a reflection of this intention. It remains to be seen if the enemy's capabilities will match his intentions. He has lost in excess of 2,500 personnel in confirmed KIA's alone during the past two weeks. This fact in combination with the disruptive effect of ARVN and FWMAF firepower may make it difficult for him to sustain his effort through the next few weeks.

As was noted earlier, the intensity of enemy operations in the DMZ Front was below the previous week's level. However, the location of the contacts which were made and the high IR readings in the vicinity of the DMZ both attest to the continued presence of the enemy in this area and the fact that the NVA retain the capability to conduct attacks on this front at the time and place of their own choosing and on a practically no notice basis. In THUA THIEN (P) there are few signs indicating that the enemy intends to significantly increase his offensive efforts although attacks by fire and sapper probes against isolated fire support bases can be expected to continue to be noted. In QUANG NAM (P), there is an increased possibility that limited attacks may occur as has been attested to by the number of enemy sightings observed during the week plus the possibility that the widespread attacks by fire of this week might be part of the enemy's preparation of the battlefield.

In QUANG TIN we expect that enemy contacts will continue in the HIEP DUC area but will decrease by the end of the week due to ARVN/FWMAF pressure. Finally, in QUANG NGAI Province there is an increased likelihood of a higher level of enemy activity in the coming week. The 2d VC Regiment which apparently has been resting and refitting in southern QUANG NGAI (P) returned to action this week in the DUC PHO area. There are persistent reports of renewed sapper attacks to be directed at the major cities, district headquarters, fire support bases, and CIDG camps throughout the province.

In summary, it is estimated that there will be a continuation of the sapper probes, attacks by fire and these forms of enemy action may possibly be interspersed with limited ground attacks in the coming week.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents decreased from 515 to 415 for the week of 17-23 August. These incidents consisted of 12 ground attacks, two of which were company size or larger and 10 platoon size or smaller, one ambush, 11 attacks by fire, 267 harassing fire incidents, 75 mining and booby trap incidents, eight hamlet harassment incidents, two assassination incidents, five espionage incidents, one kidnapping incident, 21 propaganda incidents and 12 sabotage incidents.

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a. Strength and Disposition. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserve Reinforcement. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire increased from 162 to 173 incidents for the reporting period and 53 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 17-23 August:

Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	514
60mm Mortar	432
Unk Cal Mortar	85
140mm Rocket	28
122mm Rocket	193
107mm Rocket	11
Unk Cal Rocket	5
TOTAL	1,268

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance. There were 94 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 17-23 August. These long-range patrols reported 85 sightings and 13 contacts totaling 979 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of 29 enemy KIA.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant caches were captured in the ICTZ during the period 17-23 August:

(a) 17-23 August: B/5/46th, 198th Brigade discovered a salt cache 16 kilometers south southeast of BINH SON (BS 755835) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
110 TONS	UNK	Salt

This cache was located in open terrain and the salt was found under haystacks, in houses, and under trees. The condition of the salt was good and no further information was available on this cache.

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(b) 21 August: B/3/187 Airborne Infantry discovered a vehicle, ordnance and equipment cache five kilometers north northwest from the northern boundary of Base Area 607 as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
1 EA	RUSSIAN	Truck (2½ ton)
1 EA	RUSSIAN	Bulldozer (D-7)
20 EA	UNK	Rifles (K-44)
1 EA	UNK	RPD Machine Gun
75 EA	UNK	60mm Mortar Rounds
71 EA	UNK	82mm Mortar Rounds
1 EA	UNK	RPD-7 Round
2 EA	CHICOM	Claymore Mines

The cache was all in poor condition, however, it showed signs of recent use. There were four pyramid-shaped rockpile markers displayed in a straight line. This cache was uncovered by an airstrike. The weapons and ordnance was evacuated and the other equipment was destroyed.

(c) 22 August: A/1/52, 198th Infantry Brigade discovered a rice cache ten kilometers west northwest of QUANG NGAI (BS 547778) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
6,400 LBS	NATIVE GROWN	Rice

This cache was discovered in open terrain and was contained in 55 gallon drums which were placed in several bunkers. The condition of the rice was good and the entire cache was evacuated to SON TINH (D) Headquarters.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 17-23 August:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
82mm Mortar	645
60mm Mortar	112
155mm Artillery	2
105mm Artillery	7
140mm Rocket	6
106mm RR	1
57mm RR	1
Total	774

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(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	280
Crew-Served Weapons	32

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 17-23 August:

Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
17 Aug	(BS 555858)	200	D/1/52
17 Aug	(BS 567868)	225	D/1/52
17 Aug	(AT 957547)	200	M/3/1
18 Aug	(BS 563867)	500	D/1/52
19 Aug	(BT 015403)	100	E/2/7
19 Aug	(BT 107471)	300	F/3/7
21 Aug	(BS 700938)	2,000	A/5/46
22 Aug	(BS 547778)	6,400	A/1/52
22 Aug	(BS 547778)	700	A/1/52
22 Aug	(AT 995352)	25	H/2/7
22 Aug	(YC 710842)	660	1/1 ARVN
23 Aug	(BS 553779)	1,440	A/1/52
	Total Rice	12,750	

Correction to PERINTREP 33-69: 16 August 1969 (BS 755835) 30,000 pounds salt should read 220,000 pounds salt. Change total salt to 223,310 pounds.

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	296	Structures Damaged	28
Bunkers Destroyed	296	Bunkers Damaged	55
Secondary Explosions	64	Secondary Fires	107

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ decreased in comparison to the previous week. There were 1,214 KIA's, 46 VC PW's and seven NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative

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h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	100	95	100	98
Low	72	77	73	75
Rainfall (total)	0	0	0	0
Winds (knots)	6	7	8	6
Visibility (miles)	7	7	9	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 22-28 August 1969:

General. The normal southwesterly monsoon flow is still being disrupted by the high pressure ridge that has prevailed over southeast Asia for the past 10 days. This pattern is expected to persist for about three to four more days with a gradual return to weak southwesterly flow at low levels during the remainder of the week. Good weather with generally scattered clouds, below normal precipitation and light winds will prevail during the early part of the outlook period with a gradual increase in cloudiness and shower activity in the mountains during the last half of the outlook period.

ICTZ Forecast. The outlook for the coastal and lowland areas is clear to partly cloudy with isolated thundershowers in the afternoon and evenings. Winds will be from the southeast at a speed of 5-15 knots, becoming southwesterly late in the period. Precipitation will be 0-0.5 inches with isolated instances of one inch. The outlook for the mountains of I Corps during the first half of the forecast period is partly cloudy with isolated afternoon/evening thundershowers. Partly cloudy to cloudy weather with an increase in shower activity, particularly in the western highlands will prevail during the latter half of the forecast period. Patchy fog will form during early morning hours and lift into stratus after sunrise during the entire outlook period, becoming more extensive after midweek. Precipitation will be 1.0-1.5 inches with isolated instances of 2.0-2.5 inches.

j. - 1. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

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a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following course of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to six infantry regiment equivalents, supported by the equivalent of one naval sapper battalion and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack VANDEGRIFT Combat Base with one infantry regiment supported by one sapper battalion and one artillery battalion.

(3) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(5) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with up to five infantry regiments, supported by four rocket battalions, one sapper battalion and one engineer battalion.

(6) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division equivalent, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(8) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to seven infantry regiment equivalents.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

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g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield, sickness, hunger, shortage of ammunition and medical supplies and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232)(CIIED)	2	620TH TCS (ATTN: CRC)APO 96203	1
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4	CO MCB 3	1
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CO MCB 6	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CO MCB 7	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CO MCB 8	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2	CO MCB 9	1
CG USARV	1	CO MCB 10	1
CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	10	CO MCB 11	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CTG 115.1	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CO MCB 40	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO MCB 53	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CO MCB 58	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	26	CO MCB 62	1
CG AMERICAL DIV	30	CO MCB 71	1
CG 101ST ABN DIV	20	CO MCB 121	1
CG 1ST MAW	30	OSA/EMB SAIGON ATTN: RAS	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 1ST BN 525TH MI GP DANANG	25
CG USASUPCOM DANANG	1	DSA I CORPS	11
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHU LAI	3	DSA II CORPS	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	MCB 133	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1	DET B 1ST MIBARS	1
CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SAIGON	3	HQ, 212RH COMBAT AVN BN	6
CG 173RD ABN BDE	2	CO 7TH COMM BN	1
CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7	366 AIR SECURITY SQD, USAF	2
CG FLC	5	29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1
CG 1ST LOG CMD LONG BINH	2	7TH PSYOPS BN	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	2	CICV	2
CO 30 NCR	1	III MAF LNO 2ND ROKMC BDE	1
CIB	1	620TH TSC	1
CTG 79.5	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CTG 79.4	1	CTF CW. PBR BASE ONE, NSA DANANG	1
CTG 76.5	1	SPO-SEC CMD QUI NHON	1
CTG 76.4	1	DIRECTOR, CAP III MAF	1
CTF 76	1	CO USS REPOSE	1
CO DASC ATTN: AVCA-QN-DN-OP	2	CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO "B" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	5	CO 4TH PSYOP GP	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	17		
1ST CAG	1		
2ND CAG	1		
3RD CAG	1		
4TH CAG	1	OUT OF COUNTRY	
7 AF (IGS) BDOC	1	DIR NSA	3
45TH ENGR GROUP	1	CMC (ABQ) (AIRMAIL)	2
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2	CG FMFPAC (AIRMAIL)	2
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2	CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP 7TH FLEET	1
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1	CG MCDEC	1
CO 517TH MI DET	1	DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1
CO 3RD MP BN	1	CG 3RD MAW	2

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TEAM COMMANDER 19TH CI TEAM, CAMP PENDLETON	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	6
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CG 4TH MARDIV, CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA	1

III MAF (To be picked up)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	4
DEP CofS PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	42
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (c/o G-3)	2
PSYOPS	2
1ST RADIO BN	11
SLF (A)	1
1ST MP'S DNG	1
US NAD	1
CO MCB 5	1
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
MAG 16	1
CCN	1

ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 34-69 AS OF 232400 AUGUST 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMPINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-HQ	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	11	3,230	2	580			13	3,810	14	6,195	27	10,005
Bn's-Maneuver	39	9,675	11	2,060	5	780	55	12,515	34	14,820	89	27,335
Bn's-Support	18	5,085	2	340	1	200	21	5,625	7	2,080	27	7,705
Separate Co's	1	130			34	2,700	35	2,830	1	80	36	2,910
TOTAL CONFIRMED		20,085		2,980		3,680		26,745		24,610		51,355
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's	1	710					1	710	3	860	4	1,570
Bn's-Manuever	6	2,480	1	350	1	110	8	2,940	7	2,670	15	5,610
Bn's-Support	4	1,045					4	1,045	9	1,445	13	2,490
Separate Co's	1	90				210	4	300			4	300
TOTAL PROBABLE		4,325		350		320		4,995		4,975		9,970
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,400	3	1,400
Bn's-Manuever												
Bn's-Support									22	7,675	22	7,675
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										10,015		10,015
		24,410		3,330		4,000		31,740		39,600		71,340

*See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,350		150	3,500
	Probable	2,590			2,590
	Possible				
	TOTAL	5,940		150	6,090
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,645		670	4,315
	Probable			45	45
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,645		715	4,360
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	6,315	190	935	7,440
	Probable	830	350		1,180
	Possible				
	TOTAL	7,145	540	935	8,620
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,545	1,390	685	4,620
	Probable	380		200	580
	Possible				
	TOTAL	2,925	1,390	885	5,200
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,230	1,400	1,240	6,870
	Probable	525		75	600
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,755	1,400	1,315	7,470

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS																DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL											
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	33	3		36	8			8	5			5	46	3		49	33	5		38	79	8		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	39	6		45	11	1		12	5	1		6	55	8		63	34	7		41	89	15		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	8	1		9	1			1	1			1	10	1		11	2	5	10	17	12	6	10	28
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	3	1	5	3	3	1	7
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2		1	2	3	1	2	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1					1			1
TOTAL SUPPORT	18	4		22	2			2	1			1	21	4		25	7	9	22	38	28	13	22	63
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	57	10		67	13	1		14	6	1		7	76	12		88	41	16	22	79	117	28	22	167

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	354	Nam Hoa	70	Hoa Vang	588	Thang Binh	965	Binh Son	239
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	57	Hieu Duc	76	Tam Ky	672	Son Tinh	491
	Trieu Phong	197	Hong Dien	72	Dien Ban	1,067	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	450
	Cam Lo	261	Vinh Loc	62	Dai Loc	355	Hiep Duc	220	Nghia Hanh	356
	Gio Linh	202	Phu Loc	231	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	281	Mo Duc	665
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	335	Hau Duc	233	Duc Pho	465
	Huong Hoa	14	Phu Vang	24	Que Son	958			Tra Bong	170
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	190	Duy Xuyen	1,100			Ba To	162
			Huong Thuy	101	Hieu Nhon	302			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	437					Son Ha	187
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	1,213	THUA THIEN	1,290	QUANG NAM	4,901	QUANG TIN	2,486	QUANG NGAI	3,199

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 13,091

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,150		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Vic XD 6233	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175	Unlocated	
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unlocated LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	

*See note #4 on page A-17
**See note #2 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,950		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,900		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	500		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
31st Group (-)	NVA	C	1,060		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	220	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2061/20Jul69
15th Bn	NVA	PR	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Secial Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,910		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	
65th Arty Regt	NVA	PR	UNK		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.40 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.41 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.42 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.43 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,590		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,405		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	345	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0566/22May69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	2,140		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	465	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	465	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,605		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	XD 7964/12Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	365	XD 9265	XD 9666/26May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	400	XD 8854	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,795		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	310	YD 3639	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	195	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	190	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	250	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	200	Vic YD 3535	

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	925		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	AU 8100/10Jun68
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	290	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	285	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jul69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,815		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	360	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	185	Vic YD 6514	YD 6822/14Jun69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	270	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
3rd Bn, 803rd Regt	NVA	C	235	Vic YC 3193	YC 3389/19Jul69
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	390	Vic YD 3304	YD 3302/20Jun69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	280	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
C.113 Co	LF	C	145	Vic YD 5043	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
C.117 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 9516	YD 9022/250ct68
C.118 Co	LF	C	55	Vic YD 9518	YD 9917/12Sep68
C.119 Co	LF	PR	45	Vic YD 9424	YD 9424/27Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	15,000		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
1st Bn, 68B Arty Regt	NVA	C	315	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
HAI VAN Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102nd Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103rd Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	550		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	190	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,125		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	285	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	385	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
368B Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,170		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
R.20 Bn	LF	C	155	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	LF	C	160	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	265	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	70	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	Unloc vic HOA VANG (D)	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	85	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	105	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	120	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	105	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	4,300		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	Unlocated	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	775		
Regt Hq	MF	C	210	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	200	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	165	BT 2711	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	200	BT 2711	BT 2514/25Sep68
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	530		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	BT 1317	
1st Bn	NVA	C	110	BT 1317	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	140	BT 1317	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	100	BT 1317	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	190	BT 2440	BT 3219/25Feb69
72nd Bn	LF	C	185	BT 2932	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	200	BT 3510	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	110	BT 3127	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	205	BT 2232	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	220	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 421[illegible]	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	80	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	90	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	70	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	155	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	125	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BS 4677	BS 6385/12Aug69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	750		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	215	BS 4386	BS 3587/13Aug69
95th Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68
C.17 Co	LF	C	55	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	90	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	65	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	80	BS 7555	BS 7061/17Nov68
C.120 Co	LF	C	65	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	85	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	35	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	50	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	90	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,725		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	990		
Regt Hq	MF	C	370	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	200	BS 6733	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 7932	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	290	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6237	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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BINH DINH PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	925		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	275	BINH DINH	CR 0952/23Jun68
7th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 9640/12Apr68
8th Bn	NVA	C	250	BINH DINH	CR 0933/23Apr68
9th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 8955/29May68

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes in ICTZ during period 170001H to 232400H August 1969.

a. Based on statements of PW Tran Hoang DIEP who identified his unit as the K-6 Bn, 7th Front and the fact that the entire 812th Regt less the K-6 Bn, has been carried as unlocated since 16 May 1969 and has possibly returned to NVN, the K-6 Bn will be carried as subordinate to the 7th Front.

b. Based on information provided by hoi chanh Nguyen Manh RI, PW Le Thanh CAN, captured documents and an agent report, the 42nd Reconnaissance Bn, Front-4 is added to the OOB listing.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3 and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the Headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

9. Subordination/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF PLAINTAIP 31-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 34-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P)

a. Returnee, CPL Nguyen Than LONG, 4th Co, 1st Bn, 42A Regt, 350th Div rallied to 1st ARVN Div at (YD 215745) on 10 August 1969 (1st ARVN Div HUE Interr Rpt #68-69, 160500Z August 1969) and gave the 1st Bn's strength as 280 men and stated that their location was from (YD 169774) to (YD 191785). LONG further stated that the present primary mission of the 1st Bn was to attack ARVN and U.S. bases near the DMZ and it's alternate mission was to support an unknown infantry battalion which was planning to infiltrate into RVN. LONG revealed that there was a 75mm Pack Howitzer Bn (NFI) in the vicinity of (YD 1279) which is in support of his unit. LONG further stated that the morale was low in the 1st Bn because of food shortage and fear of death. He states that while in transit the 1st Bn was called the Song Hong Group. He further states he was assigned to the 1st Bn in September of 1968 and it was located in THANH HOA (P), NVN and was there for mortar training. The 1st Bn remained in THANH HOA (P) until July 1969 when they infiltrated to the northern bank of the BEN HAI River. Reported personalities: 350th Div CO-JrCol TIEP; 42A Regt CO-LtCol LOI, XO-THANH, PO-Hai VAN, APO-Nguyen CHAT; 1st Bn CO-JrCapt PHUNG, XO-JrCapt Nguyen NUI, PO-JrCapt Pham DOT, APO-JrCapt Nguyen NHUAN; 4th Co Cmdr-1stLt NONG, XO-2ndLt NGHIA, PO-2ndLt KHOAT, APO-2nd Lt DONG.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first PW, rallier, returnee from this unit. Song Hong is an AAA for the 31st Group; however no other information relates to this group. First report of personalities. All information rated (F-6).)

b. Returnee, 2nd Lt Nguyen Xuan CUONG, Hq Co, 282nd AAA Regt, 500th Div (Rein) who rallied to 11th Mech in the vicinity of (YD 131729) on 11 August 1969 (3rd MARDIV 140330 August 1969 7th ITT Rpt 63A-69) stated that the Hq Co had approximately 200 men and their location was HUONG SON (D), HA TINH (P), NVN. CUONG further stated that the current mission of his unit is to provide AAA security for HUONG SON Base Area. The regiment had recently returned to NVN from LAOS where it's mission was to support the PATHET LAO. Subject revealed that the morale in his unit was fair and that the Hq Co's LBN was 33480-T. Subject states he left HANOI City on 24 July 1969 and traveled by train, truck and foot to his place of rally. Source stated that the 282nd AAA Regt sustained 20 KIA, and an unknown amount of WIA's from aerial bombing and had several cases of malaria while in LAOS during the period January through April of 1969. A few replacements were received when they returned to Base Area at HUONG SON (NFI). The regiment is reportedly supposed to return to LAOS in September 1969. Source stated the headquarters company had six 37mm AAA guns. The 500th Div (Rein) is composed of Infantry (including sappers), artillery, engineers, supply (including transportation) and medical units. Reported personalities: 282nd AAA Regt CO-LtCol Cao PHONG, XO-Maj Nguyen

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Van DAN, PO-Maj Nguyen Duc MIEN; 1st Bn CO-SrLt NGUYEN, PO-Capt QUANG; 2nd Bn CO-Capt TAI, PO-HUNG; 3rd Bn CO-Capt MACH, PO-Capt GIAO; Chief of Staff Section CofS-Capt Nguyen Trung CONG, Operations Officer-SrLt THANH, Recon Off-2ndLt Tran Van LONG; Recon Off-1stLt Nguyen Van TIEU, Recon Off-WO Tran THAI.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first report of this unit. Due to the large number of AAA Regiments in NVN, the 282nd may possibly be in existance. However, the statements made by CUONG of the Headquarters Company having 37mm AAA guns does not agree with OOB holdings. A Headquarters Company of an AAA Regiment is not normally equipped with heavy weapons. All information (F-6).)

c. PW, PFC Tran Hoang DIEP, 3rd Co, K-6 Bn, 7th Front captured on 15 August 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 361402) (XXIV Corps msg 141516Z August 1969) during an ARVN operation, while he was on a rice collecting mission stated that the base area for the 3rd Co, K.6 Bn is located in a mountainous area in the vicinity of (YD 3133). The PW states that the battalion consists of four infantry companies, numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4, and one combat support company (5th Co), and has a total strength of approximately 350 men. Personalities reported: 3rd CO Cmdr-SO, XO-DAT, PO-DAT.

(G-2 COMMENT: The K.6 Bn, 812th Regiment is currently held by III MAF OOB in the vicinity of (YD 3538). However, the K.6 is the only battalion of the 812th that has remained in the area after the remainder of the regiment had returned to either LAOS or NVN. It is likely that the K.6 is now directly subordinate to the 7th Front. This is a preliminary interrogation; however, source had been assigned to his unit for only 15 days and was on his first mission at time of capture, therefore knowledge is limited. All information rated (F-3) with the exception of the composition of the K.6 Bn which is rated (F-6). OOB holds the K.6 Bn as having three infantry and one support companies.)

d. Rallier, CPL, Thinh THU, C4 Co, K.34 Arty Bn, 7th Front rallied on 15 August 1969 at LZ NANCY (YD 440408) (517 MID Interr Rpt #48-69 of 15 August 1969 and 517 MID Interr Rpt #48-A-69 of 17 August 1969) while on a rice carrying mission and stated that the mission of the C4 Co is to shell allied bases in the area. Source further stated that his battalion's AO is HAI PHU (V) (NFI). He also revealed that the battalion consists of three companies (C.1, C.3 and C.4) for a total strength of 150 men. The morale is high because his platoon has good resupply and has had no contact with allied forces. Source does not know the exact location of any of the companies, but that the CP of the K.34 Bn is in LAOS (location unknown), and the base area of C.1 Co is about two and one-half days walk west of LZ NANCY and a five day walk from Hq C.4. The Hq of C.3 is a three day walk from Hq C.4. LBN's for the battalion are: K.34-51305 BC; C.1-51303 BC; C.3-5130 BC; C.4-51300 BC. Reported personalities: C.4 CO Cmdr-Pham Van DAT, XO-Hoang Van HOAN, PO-Pham Van THOI, APO-Lai Van HUONG.

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(G-2 COMMENT: The reported strength is in close agreement with totals listed in captured documents of 20 July 1969. All information rated (F-3).)

2. THUA THIEN (P). No significant reports.

3. QUANG NAM (P). No significant reports.

4. QUANG TIN (P)

a. PW, PFC Nguyen Van UYEN of the 2nd Co, 70th Bn captured 12 August 1969 in the vicinity of (BT 240405) (III MAF 203344Z August 1969 11th ITT Interr Rpt 94-69) during an attack on an RF unit, stated that his company's mission, supported by nine men from the 1st and 4th Co's and nine men from the 3rd Co was to attack an ARVN position in the vicinity of (BT 240405) on the night of 11 August 1969. The 1st and 3rd Co's were to conduct harassing fire and sapper attacks on Tam KY with specific mission to occupy City Government Administration Offices. UYEN further stated that his battalion was dispersed, with 500-600 meters between each of four companies, possibly in the vicinity of (AT 970290). The morale of the unit, according to UYEN, is fair because many of the men are young, excited and anxious to participate in battle. The LBN for the 70th Bn is 566 QT. Losses are unknown to the source but UYEN stated that he was one of 13 replacements received by the 2nd Co on 25 July 1969 and approximately 2 August 1969, the 4th Co received 15 to 16 replacements. UYEN further stated that all four companies of the 70th Bn have been receiving sapper training since early 1969. At that time, the 70th Bn was designated 70th Sapper Bn as a result of outstanding performance during the battle of DINH DUONG.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holds the 70th Bn in the vicinity of (BT 2440). Due to the increased emphasis on sapper type attacks, the 70th may very well be sapper trained. This is the first report of LBN. All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, PFC Le Minh KHOI, 3rd Bn, 31st (AKA 3rd) Regt captured on 12 August 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 990250) (III MAF 180632Z August 1969, 11Th ITT Interr Rpt 91-69) stated that the 3rd Bn CP is located in the vicinity of (AT 854176) and the mission of the 3rd Co was to attack a FWMAF unit located in the vicinity of (AT 920250). Source gave Farmsite 31 as an AKA for the 31st Regt. In February of 1969 source started infiltrating south with Group No. 2732 with a strength of 500. Source traveled through LAOS and KONTUM finally arriving in QUANG TIN (P) in early June 1969.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holds the 3rd Bn, 3rd Regt at (BT 1317). It is possible that the 3rd Bn is located in the area as stated by KHOI. There have been APD reports in this area. III MAF OOB has no information on an attack on FWMAF units at (AT 920250), however, there were attacks by fire on 4/31 Infantry located in the vicinity of (AT 901232) on 12 August 1969. All information rated (F-3).)

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5. QUANG NGAI (P)

a. PW, CPL, Le Van DINH, 1st Co 4th Bn, 21st Regt, 2nd NVA Div, captured in the vicinity of (BS 567865) on 17 August 1969 (Americal msg 171100Z August 1969) located his unit in the vicinity of BINH BAC (H) (BS 5382). Subject stated his units mission was to attack allied operations and installations.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holds the 4th Bn as an AKA for the 60th Bn, 21st NVA Regt, and is held in the vicinity of (BS 4386). This is the current operating area of the 21st Regt. All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, PFC Pham Xuam SINH, 5th Co, 40th Sapper Bn, 3rd NVA Div, captured on 12 August 1969 in the vicinity of (BS 631375) (Americal msg 151120Z August 1969) stated his unit is located in the vicinity of (BS 625374) and their mission was to attack and counterattack allied units in its AO. Subject infiltrated south with Infiltration Group #1552 in early May of 1969 with 600 men. They left HAI PHONG City and traveled by train to VINH City and then from VINH City to LAOS by train and truck, and on into KNOTUM (P) by foot. Subject arrived at destination around late May. The infiltration group was assigned to more than one unit. Subject and 23 other men went to the 7th Bn of the PHO NAM Regt, 3rd Div. SINH was later reassigned to the 5th Co, 40th Sapper Bn. SINH did not know to what units the rest of the group was assigned to. Subject claimed his unit is being supplied with hollow tubes, two feet in length, but did not know what these would be used for. Subject stated that 30 percent of the 40th Bn was unable to participate in the last battle due to malnutrition and disease.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holds the 40th Sapper Bn as an AKA for the 90th Engr Bn, 3rd NVA Div. The PHO NAM Regt is an AKA for the 22nd NVA Regt, 3rd NVA Div. The AO subject mentions is LZ SAN JUAN HILL located in the vicinity of (BS 6337). On initial interrogation, subject mentioned Infiltration Group #1152, neither, 1152 or 1552 have been previously reported. It is possible that the remainder of subject's infiltration Group was assigned to other units within the 3rd NVA Div. It is possible that the two foot tubes unit was supplied with could be used in making bangalore torpedoes. All information rated (F-3).)

c. PW's, PVT Pham Quanh LONG and CPL Nguyen Xuan KHANH, 3rd Co, 12th Bn, Pho Bac Regt captured on 15 August 1969 in the vicinity of (BS 621343) (Americal msg's 151415Z and 151420Z August 1969) stated that the 200th AA Bn, 90th Engr Bn, 300th Arty Bn, 600th Med Bn and the 7th and 8th Bn's, 22nd Regt participated in the shelling and attack of LZ SAN JUAN HILL (BS 634379) on 13 August 1969. If this attack was successful they would then attack LZ BRONCO (BS 812383). PW's also stated that the 300th Bn is equipped with an unknown number of 122mm rockets and an unknown number of A-12 rockets, six 120mm mortars, an unknown number of 82mm mortars, six 106mm mortars, nine 75mm RR's and nine 57mm RR's. It was reported that the 90th Engr Bn is subordinate to the 22nd NVA Regt.

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LONG departed NVN with an unknown infiltration unit on 28 February 1969 with a strength of 399 and arrived in RVN in April of 1969 with a strength of 300. Here, 100 men went to the 200th AA BN and the remainder went to unknown units in QUANG NAM (P). KHANH infiltrated with Group #37 with a strength of 660 men, in April of 1968. They arrived in RVN in May of 1968 with a strength of 630, with losses due to malaria and artillery fire. Ninety men went to the 200th AA Bn and the rest went to unknown units.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 12th Co is an AKA for the 200th AA Bn, and PHO BAC Regt is an AKA 3rd NVA Div. On 13 August 1969 there was a shelling and an attack on LZ SAN JUAN HILL (A-1) which these PW's participated in. There has been a previous report of a P.37 Infiltration Bn that left in February 1968 and arrived in RVN in May of 1968. A12 is an AKA for the 140mm Rocket. It is unlikely that the 300th Bn is equipped with all the weapons as stated (F-4). All other information rated (F-3).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 34-69

1. GENERAL. Counterintelligence related VCI activity, although reduced in scale from the previous week, brought to light, certain aspects that either are not likely to be reported or are difficult to attribute directly to the VC/VCI. Aside from the continuing reports concerning various dates for selected periods of increased activity, other reports, propaganda leaflets and captured documents are surfacing VC intents and plans to incite "legal struggles". By citing such grievances as travel restrictions on land and waterways, "crimes" against the people, destruction to homes, property and farm lands, death brought by artillery and air strikes, and "oppression" by "corrupt GVN officials" etc., the VC apparently hope to motivate the people to demand redress and compensation for the "crimes" and "destruction of property". With this approach, the VC seemingly hope to not only impress the people, but probably more significantly seek to challenge the GVN's capacity to effectively process and/or satisfy any such demands generated.

SICTZ continued as the focus of reported VCI activity. Terrorist and sabotage activities continued to be most evident in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces, with several incidents reported in Thua Thien Province.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. A decrease was noted in the number of reported Viet Cong intelligence collection incidents. However, a number of reports have been received concerning Viet Cong efforts to preclude friendly (US/GVN) intelligence agencies from obtaining information on Viet Cong units and activities. Included are such measures as increasing camouflage, noise, and light discipline of Viet Cong units, close supervision of strangers entering Viet Cong controlled areas and admonishment not to discuss sensitive information. Another report dealt with measures to counter the Chieu Hoi program, that reportedly included strict punishments for those who listen to Chieu Hoi broadcasts or read leaflets, close checks on the morale and attitudes of soldiers and cadre by supervisors, and propaganda to counter the Chieu Hoi program.

a. Thua Thien.

(1) On 12 August 1969, a US MI source reported that VC commo-liaison cadre and intelligence-reconnaissance cadre were ordered to increase their activities, in Hue City, by reporting daily instead of once every three days as they had previously (Eval: F-6).

(2) On 13 August 1969, a GVN intelligence source reported that the VC in Phu Vang (D) have infiltrated a number of female cadre into Hue City to collect information, conduct proselyting activities, and contact GVN civil servants (Uneval).

b. Quang Nam. On 21 August 1969 a US MI source reported that a three member intelligence/sapper cell was operating out of the home of Pham Van Cu in Danang City. The cell consisted of a commo-liaison member

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and two action agents who collected information on the area around I Corps Headquarters and the Trinh Minh The Bridge (Eval: B-6).

c. Quang Tin. On 11 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the 72nd MF Bn sent out a five man scout group to collect information in northwestern Quang Tin Province (nfi) (Eval: C-3).

d. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 12 August 1969, a US MI source reported that Le Van Xu, a VC spy, was living in Thach Tru (H) (BS 769465). He operates under the cover of a radio repairman and is also in charge of a VC infiltration team subordinate to a VC sapper unit. The VC have now directed Xu to return to the VC controlled area for an unknown reason (Eval: F-6).

(2) On 22 July 1969, a GVN source reported that a VC Bn received a special order from Quang Ngai Province which listed measures to be taken to prevent VC cadre from rallying to the GVN. The measures included:

(a) Study and determine the ideological motivation of the cadre.

(b) Counsel members and force participants in VC activities to take an oath before joining the party.

(c) Cadre will not be allowed to listen to GVN radio broadcasts.

(d) Cadre will not hide Chieu Hoi leaflets.

(e) Private discussions are not permitted. (Unevaluated)

3. SABOTAGE. While there was a distinct decrease in the number of reported incidents during the week, sabotage activity remained at a higher than usual level. The focus of sabotage incidents again was centered in the southern three provinces of ICTZ. LOC interdiction seemingly remains the primary purpose. No interdiction attempts were reported on the Cua Viet and Cua Dai Rivers or the Hue-Danang Railway. A listing of reported sabotage incidents follows:

a. Quang Tri. On 12 August 1969, a culvert on Route 1 at YD 448426 was destroyed by a 20lb mine.

b. Thua Thien. On 13 August 1969, an unknown number of VC tried to demolish utility poles with explosive charges at Thuy Phuong (V) (YD 830175). No damages were reported.

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c. Quang Nam.

(1) On 14 August 1969, three culverts were discovered to be destroyed at AT 922551 along Route 537.

(2) On 16 August 1969, a culvert was discovered destroyed at AT 0740 at the intersection of Routes 537 and 536.

(3) On 18 August 1969, a bridge at Thanh Tay (H) (BT 178584) was 100% destroyed by a command detonated mine. The mine was exploded as a truck load of ARVN engineers was crossing the bridge; resulting in 3 KIA's and 11 WIA's.

(4) On 19 August 1969, a bridge security element observed a can floating in a stream at AT 991641. SAF was employed resulting in one secondary explosion.

d. Quang Tin.

(1) On 17 August 1969, a sixty inch culvert was destroyed at BT 255295 on Route 1.

(2) On 17 August 1969, an engineer sweep team found an explosive device under a bridge at BT 238328.

e. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 15 August 1969, a culvert was partially destroyed at BS 782434 on Route 515.

(2) On 16 August 1969, an unknown number of VC destroyed a culvert at BS 725567 on Route 14.

(3) On 17 August 1969, one span of a two-span, 95 meter long bridge at BS 706618 was damaged by a 40lb. explosive charge on Route 1.

(4) On 20 August 1969, a culvert was destroyed by a 15-20lb. charge at BS 783430 on Route 1.

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Viet Cong propaganda activities continued at a relatively high level. Reports similar to those received during June and July 1969 concerning plans by the Viet Cong to form Liberation Committees at Province, District and Village level have been noticeably absent in recent weeks. Propaganda themes in support of the NLF Provisional Revolutionary Government have also seemingly decreased in recent weeks. Particular mention was made during the week of efforts and plans to incite political struggles and to penetrate GVN agencies. As yet, little evidence has been received of any Viet Cong successes in inciting large scale demonstrations. However, it is probable that the Viet Cong have, at least temporarily, abandoned this tactic, which has met with a notable lack of

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success, in favor of "legal struggles". Legal struggles are thought to basically take the form of demands of redress for "crimes" and damages against the people and their property. By this method, the Viet Cong probably seek to impress the people with the Viet Cong concern for their welfare, demonstrate that concerted effort can bring results, stir up grievances against the GVN, and make demands that cannot reasonably be met by the GVN, which can consequently be exploited. This type of activity is much less likely to be reported and is difficult to attribute to the Viet Cong.

a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 12 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the C3 Armed Propaganda Company was located in the vicinity of YD 190699 to YD 170697. Their mission was to conduct a propaganda program in the Gio Linh area, and destroy the bridge on Route 1 at YD 213731 (Eval: F-3).

(2) On 17 August 1969, a propaganda leaflet printed in English was found at YD 217724. The leaflet urged American soldiers and officers who were tired of the war to let themselves be captured by the Viet Cong. They would be taken to a safe area and treated if sick or wounded. While in captivity they would not be deprived of their personal possessions and would be allowed to correspond with their families and friends.

(3) On 18 August 1969, a US MI source reported that one unidentified VC LF company was located in Ha Thanh (H) (YD 218687) and Lac Tan (H) (YD 223730) with the mission of rebuilding local VC infrastructure in each of the above mentioned hamlets (Eval: F-6).

b. Thua Thien.

(1) On 12 August 1969, a US MI source reported that prior to 12 August 1969, four VC sapper units/guerrilla units received instructions to infiltrate and attack Hue City as part of the Fall Offensive. Instructions were sent to the guerrillas as follows:

(a) 1st Period; from 15-30 August will be centered around 19 August, Revolution Day.

(b) 2nd Period; from 1-15 September will celebrate 2 September, Independence Day.

(c) 3rd Period; from 16 September to 15 October will center on the Russian October Revolution.

The objective of the VC sapper/guerrilla units is to sabotage crowded places such as hotels, theaters, and cafeterias. They will also propagandize the people to petition for peace (Eval: F-6).

(2) On 19 August 1969, the VC displayed one liberation flag and set one mine at the communal house in Dien Mon Village (YD 555463).

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(3) On 19 August 1969, a US MI source reported that an unknown number of VC distributed propaganda leaflets at An Cuu Market (YD 781213) Hue City (Eval: F-6).

c. Quang Nam.

(1) On 18 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the VC held meetings in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces concerning the military campaign which began on 11 August 1969 and was to last until 20 August 1969. The purpose of the meetings was to assign missions to guerrillas, local forces and sappers in Quang Ngai, Quang Nam and Da Nang City areas. The sappers are to infiltrate the towns and cities to collect information and blow up GVN offices. The guerrillas are to persuade the people to demonstrate against ARVN and Allied forces and enlist children to distribute propaganda leaflets (Eval: C-3).

d. Quang Tin.

(1) On 11 August 1969, a US MI source reported that a meeting of village and district level VC cadre was held in Quang Tin province (nfi). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss plans called "Down to the Street Movement". These plans were to turn pro-GVN residents of Quang Tin province to the VC side by accusing GVN officials of corruption. After persuading the pro-GVN residents to accept their views, the VC will have them infiltrate GVN organizations and areas to collect information. The VC intend to use similar tactics to infiltrate Chu Lai Airbase (Eval: C-6).

(2) On 13 August 1969, a GVN source reported that a political meeting was held by cadre of the VC district committee of Thang Binh District at Tay Loc #5 (H) (BT 162246) to study a document to launch the First Campaign of the Autumn 1969 High Point. According to the document the objectives of the First Campaign were to:

(a) Struggle against GVN.

(b) Launch demonstrations to call ARVN soldiers and GVN cadre to the revolution.

(c) Break the pacification plans of the GVN.

(d) Support the Armed Forces that attack cities (Eval: C-3).

(3) On 14 August 1969, a GVN source reported that in recent days the VC of Tam Ky district have held meetings for the people to talk about their plans, as follows:

(a) Frontline coolies were to prepare tools for evacuation of wounded, two angs of rice, two cans of boiled salt and wait for orders.

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(b) Every family was to have on hand two angs of rice, bandages and drugs for the wounded.

(c) Everyone had to call his sons or brothers back to the VC area.

(d) Young men 15-20 years old were to be drafted into the VC army to establish rear bases.

This plan is to be carried out from 10 August 1969 to 6 September 1969. The VC disclosed that they would attack and reoccupy areas recently pacified by the GVN, especially along the coast (Eval: C-3).

(4) On 14 August 1969, a GVN source reported that the VC are choosing loyal cadre from Tam Ky district and sending them to North Vietnam to attend a re-education course (Eval: C-5).

(5) On 14 August 1969, a GVN source reported that the VC Front Committee of Tien Phuoc District held a VC cadre meeting vic BS 170994. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the following points:

(a) Send district cadre to villages to carry out two missions; 1 production, and 2 fighting.

(b) Carry out the VC trade policy.

(c) Building secret tunnels for VC cadre.

(d) Send VC cadre to GVN under the Chieu Hoi program to act as penetration agents (Eval: C-2).

(6) On 15 August 1969, a GVN source reported that the VC established a new district named Que Tien in July of 1969. This district is operated by Tran Ngoc-Anh, former secretary of Tien Phuoc District (Eval: C-2).

e. Quang Ngai.

(1) A GVN source reported that on 21 July 1969, the VC sent a number of Party members from Chapter Party committee level and higher to North Vietnam to attend a political training course. Seventeen cadre from Tu Phuoc (V) (BS 465765) were sent (Unevaluated).

(2) On 12 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the VC in Mo Duc District planned to conduct a campaign during period 10-20 August 1969. The objectives were to:

(a) Rebuild the trust of the people.

(b) Gain support for political struggles (nfi).

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(c) Achieve the power needed to have a strong stand at the Paris Peace Talks.

The VC planned to:

(3) Stop ARVN rebuilding plans.

(4) Propagandize by raising the NLF flag on important city and province buildings (nfi).

(5) Win people to their side by dispersing the people living in refugee camps.

(6) Divide the enemy's forces by destroying the lines of communication (Eval: F-6).

5. TERROR. Although terrorist incidents decreased markedly during the week, reports continue to be received of Viet Cong emphasis on the assassination of GVN officials and supporters. Further evidence of the role youngsters are to play in this campaign was supplied by a US military intelligence source who reported that a training camp for 10-13 year old sappers was operating in the vicinity of AT 894168 (Eval: C-6). See Appendix 2 for a listing of terrorist incidents in ICTZ.

APPENDIXES
1-Statistical Compilation of People's Revolutionary Committees in ICTZ
2-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 34-69

People's Revolutionary Committees reported by name and/or location as of 24 August 1969

	Quang Tri	Thua Thien	Quang Nam	Quang Tin	Quang Ngai	Total
Region (MRTTH)						1
Province	1	1	1	1	1	5
District	2	5	2	1	9	19
City		1	2			3
Village	37	36	76	49	107	305
Hamlet	31	59	16	11	122	239
Precinct		1				1
Total	71	103	97	62	239	573

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 34-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Tri	17Aug69	YD 216727	Gio Linh (H) received three rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in one civilian killed and two wounded.
	21Aug69	YD 341526	Mai Linh (H) received two rounds of 122mm rocket fire, resulting in two civilians killed.
	22Aug69	Quang Tri City	Received two rounds of 122mm rockets wounding two civilians.
Thua Thien	16Aug69 (Late Entry)	YD 622266	An unknown person booby trapped the front door of a civilian home. Booby trap disarmed by CAP 3-4-6. Negative casualties or damages.
	17Aug69	YD 862155	Phu Luong (H) received three rounds of 122mm rocket fire, resulting in negative casualties or damages.
	19Aug69	YD 793228	Six VC entered Thon-Van-Buong (V) and assassinated two civilians in retaliation for their refusal to supply the VC information on CAP teams in the area.
	20Aug69	YD 908107	One platoon of VC fired six B-40 rounds and eight rounds of 60mm mortar fire into Phu Bai #2 (H) wounding one civilian and destroying one house.
	21Aug69	YD 965068	Estimated enemy squad entered Nam Pho Ha (H) and went to the Village Chief's house to collect taxes. Upon leaving they kidnapped the Chief's son.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Thua Thien	23Aug69	YD 751219	Two rounds of 122mm rocket fire impacted at YD 751219 destroying one house and killing one civilian.
Quang Nam	13Aug69 (Late Entry)	BT 110460	VC assassinated one civilian and wounded three in Phu Trach (H).
	13Aug69 (Late Entry)	AT 946678	VC entered Huong Son (H) and burned seven homes and wounded one PF.
	13Aug69 (Late Entry)	AT 899470	707th RF Company received five rounds of 82mm mortar fire, destroying one house in My Son A1 (H).
	14Aug69 (Late Entry)	BT 061368	VC burned five homes in Thanh Phuoc (H).
	16Aug69 (Late Entry)	AT 935557	Two civilians tripped a booby trapped M-79 round two kilometers southeast of Dai Loc, wounding two civilians.
	16Aug69 (Late Entry)	AT 916581	The 81st PF platoon while in a night defensive position received six rounds of 82mm mortar fire, wounding two PFs and two civilians.
	17Aug69	AT 866574	Tam Hoa Refugee Camp received small arms fire and a grenade attack from an estimated fifteen VC, resulting in two killed, ten wounded and twenty homes destroyed.
	18Aug69	BT 145535	A civilian triggered an 81mm mortar round booby trap, resulting in one civilian killed.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	19Aug69	AT 875476	The 5th Marines, while in a perimeter defense received ten rounds of 122mm rocket fire, resulting in five civilians killed, five wounded, and three homes destroyed.
	20Aug69	AT 897815	VC sapper team infiltrated Hoa Loc (V) and set off a plastic charge in the village market place, killing three civilians and wounding eleven. Of the eleven wounded, six were government officials, which included the village chief, the hamlet chief, the deputy village chief, and two other unidentified GVN officials.
	20Aug69	AT 945654	Ten VC entered Phu Son #1 (H) and destroyed four homes.
	20Aug69	BT 149537	Two civilians on Xuyen Long river island triggered a booby trap, resulting in one civilian killed and one wounded.
	22Aug69	AT 941673	An unknown number of VC entered Phuoc Ninh #1 (H) and destroyed five homes.
	23Aug69	BT 045773	Two VC threw a plastic explosive charge at the home of an interpreter in An Hai (V). Casualties and damages are unknown.
Quang Tin	19Aug69	BT 174240	Three rounds of 122mm rocket fire impacted at BT 174240, killing two civilians.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Tin	23Aug69	BT 293224	Tam Ky City received six rounds of 122mm rocket fire and 35 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, killing one civilian and wounding six.
Quang Ngai	17Aug69	BS 758818	PF platoon 58 received small arms fire and five hand grenades from an unknown size enemy force while in a night defensive position, resulting in one civilian killed and two wounded.
	19Aug69	BS 701757	VC kidnapped two civilians at Son Ha (V).
	21Aug69	BS 807378	Duc Pho (D) captial received eight rounds of 122mm rocket fire, killing ten civilians and wounding 62.
	22Aug69	BS 600920	Binh Son City received fifty satchel charges and five RPG rounds resulting in fifteen houses damaged, three PFs killed and three wounded.
	23Aug69	BS 814358	An enemy rocket hit a civilian vehicle, killing one civilian and wounding twelve.
	23Aug69	BS 615930	Village received three to five unknown size mortar rounds, wounding four civilians.

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HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
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NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

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					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
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					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
1	A	9/10	9/11	BNO	G-3 A03H
					G-4
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					INFORMATION
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					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
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

UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 35-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE



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G-2 Section
DANANG, RVN
2 September 1969
Ser: 0102369

PERINTREP 35-69

Period covered: 240001H - 302400H August 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. The number of enemy initiated ground incidents dropped once again this week to 326 from the summer's high of 515 recorded two weeks ago. However, the cause for the drop in the number of incidents recorded was largely due to a sharp decrease in incidents of harassing fire while more important criteria such as company size and larger and platoon size and smaller attacks, ambushes and assaults by fire remained constant. Enemy incoming followed the same downward trend with only 775 rounds recorded last week. Enemy KIA's also dropped to 928.

Counterintelligence related Viet Cong activity consisted primarily of meetings to plan and coordinate the pressing forward of the "People's Struggle for Liberation" and the policies of the NLF's Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) during the next phase of the Summer-Autumn offensive. Continued emphasis to incite "legal struggles" aimed at discrediting the GVN and demonstrating VC concern for the people was also noted. Specific propaganda themes mentioned during the past week included the abolishment of the draft, a peaceful settlement of the war, and the formation of a coalition government with the PRG. Additionally, in an apparent attempt to capitalize on publicity surrounding U. S. troop withdrawals, the VC have directed propaganda themes at the GVN soldier in an attempt to influence him into a "position of neutrality" by discrediting the initiative and intentions of U. S. forces in RVN.

Reflected in a VC document captured in QUANG NAM (P) was a statement of a cadre member that "it is no longer a people's guerrilla war, but only a guerrilla war". This is considered significant inasmuch as it reflects much of the frustation and failure the VC have encountered in attempting to gain the people's support. The high level of terrorism directed toward refugees and other civilians during the past several weeks aptly demonstrates the necessity of the VC to revert to a campaign of coercion and terror to force the people from GVN controlled areas, and reflects the widespread lack of popular support for their activities.

One of the more significant terrorist incidents reported, that reflects both the destructive and selective nature of VC terrorism, occurred on the night of 27-28 August, when at approximately 2000, an estimated 60-80 armed VC entered a series of three refugee resettlement camps in close proximity to NGHIA HANH (D) Headquarters, QUANG NGAI (P). After

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a series of lectures that both chastised the villagers for not heeding previous VC warnings to return to their native areas and propagandized the populace to take every opportunity to kill Americans. The VC then reportedly instructed all villagers who were living in houses built by the GVN to vacate their belongings. Those persons who lived in their native homes were told not to worry, that nothing would happen to their homes. At sometime shortly before 0300, the VC then set fire to all the GVN built homes in the three hamlets (a total of 260 houses were destroyed). They departed the area with 41 hostages, presumably to preclude any reaction against the VC by local force units, who had previously surrounded the hamlets.

a. QUANG TRI (P). During the reporting period, there were 238 sightings/incidents in the DMZ area with 25 of these sightings north of the BEN HAI River. A total of 186 targets were taken under fire this week by artillery, tactical air strikes and naval gunfire. The tempo and intensity of enemy initiated activity in QUANG TRI (P) was light during the reporting period. On 26 August, the CP of 1/4 Marines at VANDEGRIFT Combat Base (YD 001484) received four 107mm rockets. That same evening, QUANG TRI Combat Base received three unknown rocket rounds. In the central DMZ area of the province, B/1/3 Marines while in night defensive positions on the 25th, eight kilometers north northeast of the ROCKPILE (YD 009629) received RPG and heavy small arms fire. The Marines returned fire and swept the area accounting for six enemy killed in action. Also in this vicinity, A Troop 4/12 Cavalry captured two prisoners 11 kilometers northwest of CAM LO (YD 0500) on the 30th. The prisoners gave their units as the 45th and 49th Provincial Units of QUANG BINH, probably under the operational control of the 27th NVA Regiment. Attesting to previous fighting in the central DMZ area was the discovery of 21 enemy bodies along with small amounts of miscellaneous equipment, arms and munitions.

In the southeastern portion of the province, a Hoi Chanh from the K-14 Battalion, 7th Front rallied at LZ NANCY (YD 4440). The information provided by this Hoi Chanh plus a recent document which indicated that 80% of this battalion and 60% of the 30th Sapper Battalion have malaria, provides further evidence of the weakness of the 7th Front's forces.

b. THUA THIEN (P). Enemy initiated activity in THUA THIEN (P) increased slightly from the previous week. The most noteworthy action occurred on the 24th when FSB BERCHTESGADEN six kilometers east northeast of A LUOI (YD 440015) was probed by a squad size enemy force and then attacked by a company size force. The enemy failed to penetrate the perimeter and suffered 28 confirmed KIA's. This is the first time since the 14th of June that such an attack has been directed against BERCHTESGADEN and although no unit identification was established as a result of this attack, it is estimated that it was most probably elements of the K.12 Sapper Battalion of the 6th NVA Regiment. Elsewhere in the A SHAU Valley, FSB CURRAHEE (YC 398849) received nine 122mm rockets on the 24th and six 122mm rockets on the 25th.

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To the north of the A SHAU, 3/1 ARVN 17 kilometers west southwest of Camp EVANS (YD 371292) received an indirect fire attack consisting of 30 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Later in the day, 3/1 ARVN made contact 700 meters to the southeast of the attack by fire and killed 16 of the unknown size enemy force. Two days later on the 29th, 3/1 ARVN again made contact, this time with an estimated enemy platoon 15 kilometers west southwest of Camp EVANS (YD 390300). The contact resulted in five enemy killed. Although no positive enemy unit identification was made in these contacts, the number of engagements with the enemy which have occurred in this same general area during the past two months support the contention that major elements of the 7th Front continue to operate in the area.

In the eastern portion of the province, PHU BAI (YD 8814) received seven 122mm rockets on the 27th. No casualties or damage occurred as a result of this attack by fire. To the southeast, the HUE-DANANG Railroad was mined for the 19th and 20th times this year. On the 29th, a command detonated mine was set off under an ARVN patrol train 17 kilometers east southeast of PHU LOC (AT 836977). The engine was damaged and five cars were derailed and damaged. Later in the day, a work train on the way to the site of the mining incident, was the victim of a second mine. This second detonation occurred one and one half kilometers to the south southeast of the first train derailment (AT 841962).

In other developments to the west of HUE (YD 607198) a reconnaissance team from the 1st ARVN Division captured a prisoner from the K.10 Battalion of the 5th NVA Regiment. The seizure of this prisoner reinforces the most recently held location of this battalion which is only four kilometers to the southeast of where the prisoner was captured. However, the balance of the 5th NVA Regiment continues to be held well to the south in the southwestern reaches of THUA THIEN (P). As further evidence in support of this location for the balance of the 5th Regiment, is the fact that 1/1 ARVN contacted an estimated enemy platoon approximately 12 miles west of RUONG RUONG (YD 730878) on 27 August killing 12 enemy in the contact without friendly loss.

c. <u>QUANG NAM (P)</u>. With the exception of the QUANG NAM-QUANG TIN border area, enemy initiated activity of significance in QUANG NAM (P) was limited to one sapper attack, one attack by fire and troop movements in the general vicinity of the QUE SON Mountains.

The sapper attack occurred on the morning of the 24th when a squad size enemy force attempted to penetrate the wire of the Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division six kilometers west southwest of DANANG Air Base (AT 946745). The enemy attempt was repulsed at the loss of five enemy killed with light friendly casualties. To the south, M/3/1 Marines three kilometers east northeast of LIBERTY Bridge (AT 963537) received an indirect fire attack consisting of 20-25 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

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In the coastal lowlands southeast of HOI AN, I/3/7 Marines eight kilometers southeast of HOI AN (BT 215533) accounted for 25 confirmed enemy killed in action when a fire mission was adjusted on an enemy force numbering about 60 men. In addition, reconnaissance teams continued to report large bodies of enemy troops moving in the general vicinity of the QUE SON Mountains. These sightings were noted on several occasions throughout the week both visually and by sensor devices. There were a total of 595 individual sightings noted between 24-30 August with the majority of the movement being in an easterly direction. Both an artillery fire mission and an air strike adjusted on two of these sightings by reconnaissance units accounted for a total of 75 enemy killed.

This movement of large numbers of enemy troops in an easterly direction is perhaps an indication that the 90th and/or the 36th NVA Regiments are moving in the general direction of routes leading toward DIEN BAN and HOI AN.

In addition to the troop movements in the QUE SON region, there is a growing body of evidence being received concerning the presence of the T.89, D.3 and R.20 Battalions in the QUANG NAM lowlands north of DIEN BAN. As there is little rice grown in this area their presence in this vicinity, if accurately reported, cannot be explained by the rationale that they are on rice gathering missions. Thus, their presence in this area represents an attack indicator.

d. QUANG TIN (P). The intense combat operations which have been taking place in the QUANG TIN-QUANG NAM border area since 11 August, continued into this week. However, by the close of the reporting period the majority of the indications were that the enemy initiated activity in the vicinity of HIEP DUC was beginning to subside. Contacts continued to be made through the end of the week, but the type attacks and their intensity appeared to indicate the units with which we are presently contacting are covering forces. Reinforcing this view are the number of IR emissions detected which indicate a movement of enemy forces in a northwest and southeast direction from locations west of HIEP DUC. It is estimated that the enemy has lost in excess of 800 KIA's in the action which has taken place within the HIEP DUC-QUE SON-TIEN PHUOC triangle since 11 August.

Following the heavy fighting of the previous week in this area, there was a lull in the action on 22-24 August. Action again commenced on the 25th when B/1-46th Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force three kilometers northeast of HIEP DUC (AT 932266). The infantrymen using artillery and gunships killed 74 NVA in the two hour engagement. On the same day about 10 kilometers northwest of TIEN PHUOC (BT 0219), 3/5 ARVN reported 152 enemy killed in two separate incidents. In the first incident, the ARVN adjusted an artillery mission on an unknown size enemy force killing 52 enemy while three hours later they reported 100 bodies which had been killed by air strikes resulting from earlier Americal operations. In this same general area other Americal units found an additional 36 enemy bodies which had been killed by artillery.

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The next day, C/4/31st Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force four kilometers northeast of HIEP DUC (AT 9427). In this action the infantrymen killed five NVA. Two days later, B/4/31st Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the same area (AT 9426) and killed five of the enemy. On the 29th, 3/5 ARVN again accounted for eight more enemy killed in an ambush seven kilometers east southeast of HIEP DUC (AT 9722). On the 30th, two light attacks by fire were directed against Americal artillery positions. One and one-half kilometers southwest of HIEP DUC (AT 9023), C/3-82nd Artillery received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire while at the same time C/3-18th Artillery four kilometers west southwest of HIEP DUC (AT 8723) received 10 rounds of 82mm RR fire and six rounds of 60mm fire.

Commencing on the 24th of August, elements of the 7th Marines began moving southward in QUANG NAM (P) in order to link up with the 31st Infantry to the south. During the next four days this regiment experienced moderate to heavy ground contact and heavy mortar attacks before the link-up was effected on the 28th. In a contact prior to linkup, K/3/7 Marines made contact with an enemy force five kilometers northeast of HIEP DUC (AT 9527). This contact lasted throughout the day and resulted in 18 NVA killed.

It is the III MAF estimate that the 1st VC and the 2nd NVA Regiments of the 2nd NVA Division were involved in the engagements in this area. This estimate is corroborated by the interrogation of prisoners taken in the contacts of the past two weeks. There have been reports that the remaining regiment of the 2nd NVA Division, the 21st, may be moving northward from QUANG NGAI (P). However, the majority of the intelligence, including prisoners taken in contacts in the vicinity of TRA BONG, lends credence to the conclusion that the 21st remains in northern QUANG NGAI (P).

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Activity in QUANG NGAI (P) was generally confined to the areas around QUANG NGAI City and DUC PHO.

The action in the QUANG NGAI City area came as the result of friendly initiated contacts to the west northwest and to the southeast of the city. On the 25th, 3/6 ARVN made contact with an unknown size enemy force 11 kilometers southeast of TRA BONG (BS 422806). This contact resulted in 12 enemy killed. The next day, seven kilometers to the east (BS 494798), 1/6 ARVN killed eight enemy in another contact while further to the west, a TRA BONG CIDG Company five kilometers southwest of TRA BONG (BS 300856) killed an additional five enemy in an ambush. In still another friendly initiated contact 11 kilometers southeast of QUANG NGAI City, (BS 742663), the 937th RF Company accounted for seven enemy KIA. All these contacts appeared unrelated and no positive unit identifications were made.

The contacts in the DUC PHO area occurred to the south and southeast of the city. On the 24th, 4/4 ARVN six kilometers south southeast of DUC PHO (BS 826325) received a barrage of 100 rounds of mixed 60 and 82mm mortar fire followed by a ground attack from an estimated enemy company. This attack was repulsed at the cost to the enemy of 20 killed. Two days later, C Troop 1/1 Cavalry five kilometers south southeast of

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DUC PHO (BS 829331) received an attack by fire consisting of recoilless rifle rounds and 50 rounds of mixed RPG and mortar fire. Then on the 29th, C Troop made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the same general area (BS 828319). Nine enemy were killed in this contact but an M48 tank was hit by an RPG round and was a combat loss. Although no unit identification was made, it was probably elements of the 2nd NVA Regiment. Also on the 29th, A/1-1 Cavalry and D/3-4 Infantry six kilometers south southeast of DUC PHO (BS 823322) received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and three RPG rounds. This attack by fire occurred in almost the same location as the 4/4 ARVN contact on the 24th. Later in the day, D/3-4 again was subjected to an attack consisting of RPG and small arms fire. A contact followed and resulted in unknown enemy casualties and light friendly casualties. Further to the south, a reconnaissance team engaged an unknown size enemy force on the 27th, nine kilometers south of DUC PHO (BS 799289) and killed six NVA.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. It is estimated that the level of enemy initiated activity will increase during the coming week. For some time now reports have been received that early September will be another high point in the enemy's Summer-Fall offensive with the night of 1-2 September most often mentioned as the date upon which the NVA/VC will markedly increase their efforts. Among the specific targets which have been mentioned are QUANG TRI City, HAI LANG and PHONG DIEN District Headquarters, HOA CAM Training Center, and U. S. and ARVN positions in and around the DANANG City area.

It is estimated that should the enemy increase his activity in the coming week that it will most probably take the form of renewed attacks by fire and sapper probes. There are few indications that the enemy intends to launch a major offensive. However, there are a number of indicators pointing to an upsurge in enemy activity, and these indicators are not only I Corps but VIETNAM-wide.

It is expected that any increase in enemy activity will most probably be concentrated in the southern three provinces of I Corps as has been the case in almost all coordinated enemy efforts during the past seven months.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents decreased from 415 to 326 for the week of 24-30 August. These incidents consisted of 11 ground attacks, two of which were company size or larger and nine platoon size or smaller, two ambushes, 10 attacks by fire, 163 harassing fire incidents, 92 mining and booby trap incidents, seven hamlet harassment incidents, six assassination incidents, eight espionage incidents, four kidnapping incidents, 16 propaganda incidents and seven sabotage incidents.

a. Strength and Disposition. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

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c. Reserve Reinforcement. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire decreased from 173 to 155 incidents for the reporting period and 29 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 24-30 August:

Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	336
60mm Mortar	311
Unk Cal Mortar	56
140mm Rocket	18
122mm Rocket	42
107mm Rocket	4
Unk Cal Rocket	8
TOTAL	775

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance. There were 78 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 24-30 August. These long-range patrols reported 83 sightings and 19 contacts totaling 1,455 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of 77 enemy KIA.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant caches were captured in the ICTZ during the period 24-30 August:

(a) 22-29 August: B/5/46th, 198th Infantry Brigade discovered a salt cache 16 kilometers south southeast of BINH SON (BS 755835) as indicated below:*

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
225 TONS	UNK	Salt

*110 tons of salt was previously reported by this same unit in PERINTREP 34-69. This represents a cumulative figure.

This cache was located in open terrain and the salt was found under haystacks, in houses and under trees. Approximately 75 and one-quarter tons have been evacuated to QUANG NGAI City, BINH SON (D) Headquarters, SON TINH (D), LZ GATOR, LZ BRONCO, LZ MINUTEMAN, and Company CAP Teams.

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(b) 26 August: C/1/11 Mechanized Infantry discovered an ordnance cache five kilometers south southwest of CON THIEN (YD 061688) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
52 EA	UNK	82mm Mortar Rounds
40 EA	UNK	60mm Mortar Rounds

No further information was available on this cache.

(c) 30 August: 4/3 ARVN Battalion discovered an ordnance cache four kilometers north of the northern boundary of Base Area 607 (YC 595822) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
100 EA	UNK	60mm Mortar Rounds
50 LBS	UNK	TNT

This cache was located in six huts (4m x 4m) and no further information was available on this cache.

CORRECTION TO PERINTREP 30-69: Under paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) on page 7, unit listed should read, "L/3/4 Marines" vice "L/3/9 Marines".

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in I CTZ during the week of 24-30 August:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
82mm Mortar	125
81mm Mortar	19
60mm Mortar	107
175mm Artillery	1
155mm Artillery	2
105mm Artillery	11
122mm Rocket	2
107mm Rocket	2
106mm RR	1
57mm RR	15
TOTAL	285

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	273
Crew-Served Weapons	57

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless

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otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 24-30 August:

Date	Location	Amount (lbs)		Capturing Unit
24 Aug	(AT 920858)	300		L/3/26
24 Aug	(BS 553783)	1,250		A/1/52
24 Aug	(BS 718922)	900		A/5/46
24 Aug	(YD 573416)	75		B/2/506
25 Aug	(AT 831518)	40		L/3/5
25 Aug	(BS 552756)	200		A/1/52
25 Aug	(BS 552756)	50	Tobacco	A/1/52
26 Aug	(BT 052417)	3,000		K/3/7
26 Aug	(BS 568758)	500		C/1/52
26 Aug	(BS 536864)	200		D/1/52
26 Aug	(YD 558426)	250		B/2/506
26 Aug	(YD 550423)	250		B/2/506
27 Aug	(BS 543765)	500		C/1/52
28 Aug	(BT 120407)	1,200		A/1/7
28 Aug	(BT 120407)	300	Food	A/1/7
28 Aug	(AT 959630)	1,000		HQ/1st Mar
28 Aug	(BS 523925)	50		D/1/6
28 Aug	(BS 554804)	275		D/1/52
28 Aug	(BS 583388)	50	Salt	B/4/3
28 Aug	(BS 583388)	300		B/4/3
29 Aug	(BS 554792)	500		D/1/52
29 Aug	(BS 724458)	300		C/1/20
29 Aug	(BS 742854)	500		RCN/5/46
29 Aug	(BS 688130)	1,100		4/6 ARVN
30 Aug	(AT 855565)	75		CAP
30 Aug	(AU 805050)	50		RCN/2/327
30 Aug	(AT 976662)	50		L/3/1
30 Aug	(BS 719472)	60		C/1/20
	Total Rice	12,925		
	Total Food	300		
	Total Salt	50		
	Total Tobacco	50		

Correction to PERINTREP 33-69. 16 August 1969 (BS 755835) 30,000 pounds salt updated to read 450,000 pounds. Total salt should be 453,310 pounds.

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	328	Secondary Explosions	41
Bunkers Destroyed	306	Structures Damaged	34
50 Cal Sites Destroyed	5	Bunkers Damaged	63
Boats Destroyed	2	Secondary Fires	172

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

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b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ decreased in comparison to the previous week. There were 928 KIA's, 13 VC PW's, and 14 NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	105	97	100	95
Low	76	72	73	75
Rainfall (total)	0	0	0	0
Winds (knots)	7	7	6	5
Visibility (miles)	7	7	8	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 29 August - 4 September 1969:

General. The ridge of high pressure plus Typhoon Doris which have dominated the weather over southeast Asia this past week are slowly receding to the northeast allowing the southwest monsoon flow to gradually return. Increased cloudiness and shower activity will come to most areas by the end of the outlook period.

ICTZ Forecast. The outlook for the coastal areas of ICTZ for the forecasting period is partly cloudy with isolated thundershowers, occasional cloudiness, and a slight increase in shower activity during the latter part of the period. Winds will prevail from the southeast during the first half of the period at 10-20 knots and from the southwest during the latter half of the period at 10-20 knots. There will be occasional gusts of up to 30 knots due to the winds from LAOS. Precipitation will be near 0.5 inches with isolated instances of 1-3 inches. The outlook for the mountain areas of ICTZ is partly cloudy with isolated afternoon and evening thundershowers during the first half of the period. Rainfall will increase notably during the latter part of the period. Fog and stratus will form during the early morning hours and become more extensive after midweek. Precipitation will be 1.5 to 2.5 inches with isolated instances of three to four inches.

j. - l. Negative

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4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following course of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to six infantry regiment equivalents, supported by the equivalent of one naval sapper battalion and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack VANDEGRIFT Combat Base with one infantry regiment supported by one sapper battalion and one artillery battalion.

(3) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(5) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with up to five infantry regiments, supported by four rocket battalions, one sapper battalion and one engineer battalion.

(6) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division equivalent, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(8) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to seven infantry regiment equivalents.

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e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield, sickness, hunger, shortage of ammunition and medical supplies and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerabilitiy to psychological warfare operations.

J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ANNEX D - SEPTEMBER WEATHER BRIEF

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DISTRIBUTION

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232)(CIRED)	2	620TH TCS (ATTN: CRC)APO 96203	1
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4	CO MCB 3	1
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CO MCB 6	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CO MCB 7	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CO MCB 8	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2	CO MCB 9	1
CG USARV	1	CO MCB 10	1
CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	10	CO MCB 11	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CTG 115.1	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CO MCB 40	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO MCB 53	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CO MCB 58	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	26	CO MCB 62	1
CG AMERICAL DIV	30	CO MCB 71	1
CG 101ST ABN DIV	20	CO MCB 121	1
CG 1ST MAW	30	OSA/EMB SAIGON ATTN: RAS	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 1ST BN 525TH MI GP DANANG	25
CG USASUPCOM DANANG	1	DSA I CORPS	11
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHU LAI	3	DSA II CORPS	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	MCB 133	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1	DET B 1ST MIBARS	1
CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SAIGON	3	HQ, 212RH COMBAT AVN BN	6
CG 173RD ABN BDE	2	CO 7TH COMM BN	1
CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7	366 AIR SECURITY SQD, USAF	2
CG FIC	5	29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1
CG 1ST LOG CMD LONG BINH	2	7TH PSYOPS BN	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	2	CICV	2
CO 30 NCR	1	III MAF LNO 2ND ROKMC BDE	1
CIB	1	620TH TSC	1
CTG 79.5	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CTG 79.4	1	CTF CW. PBR BASE ONE, NSA DANANG	1
CTG 76.5	1	SPO-SEC CMD QUI NHON	1
CTG 76.4	1	DIRECTOR, CAP III MAF	1
CTF 76	1	CO USS REPOSE	1
CO DASC ATTN: AVCA-QN-DN-OP	2	CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO "B" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	5	CO 4TH PSYOP GP	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	17		
1ST CAG	1		
2ND CAG	1		
3RD CAG	1		
4TH CAG	1	OUT OF COUNTRY	
7 AF (IGS) BDOC	1	DIR NSA	3
45TH ENGR GROUP	1	CMC (ABQ) (AIRMAIL)	2
GLO, 36(TH TFW (DCOI)	2	CG FMFPAC (AIRMAIL)	2
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2	CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP 7TH FLEET	1
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1	CG MCDEC	1
CO 517TH MI DET	1	DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1
CO 3RD MP BN	1	CG 3RD MAW	2

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TEAM COMMANDER 19TH CI TEAM, CAMP PENDLETON	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	6
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CG 4TH MARDIV, CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA	1

III MAF (To be picked up)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	4
DEP CofS PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	42
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (c/o G-3)	2
PSYOPS	2
1ST RADIO BN	11
SLF (A)	1
1ST MP'S DNG	1
US NAD	1
CO MCB 5	1
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
MAG 16	1
CON	1

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 35-69 AS OF 0240OH AUGUST 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-HQ	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	11	3,195	2	560			13	3,755	14	6,195	27	19,950
Bn's-Maneuver	39	9,410	11	1,870	5	765	55	12,045	34	14,820	89	26,865
Bn's-Support	18	5,085	2	340	1	195	21	5,620	7	2,080	27	7,700
Separate Co's	1	130			33	2,600	34	2,730	1	80		2,810
TOTAL CONFIRMED		19,785		2,770		3,560		26,115		24,610		50,725
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's	1	710					1	710	3	860	4	1,570
Bn's-Manuever	6	2,465	1	350	1	200	8	3,015	7	2,670	15	5,685
Bn's-Support	4	1,045					4	1,045	9	1,445	13	2,490
Separate Co's	1	90				210	4	300			4	300
TOTAL PROBABLE		4,310		350		410		5,070		4,975		10,045
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,400	3	1,400
Bn's-Manuever												
Bn's-Support									22	7,675	22	7,675
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										10,015		10,015
		24,095		3,120		3,970		31,185		39,600		70,785

*See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,330		150	3,480
	Probable	2,575			2,575
	Possible				
	TOTAL	5,905		150	6,055
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,580		565	4,145
	Probable			45	45
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,580		610	4,190
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	6,240	190	930	7,360
	Probable	830	350		1,180
	Possible				
	TOTAL	7,070	540	930	8,540
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,440	1,220	665	4,325
	Probable	380		290	670
	Possible				
	TOTAL	2,820	1,220	955	4,995
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,195	1,360	1,250	6,805
	Probable	525		75	600
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,720	1,360	1,325	7,405

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS														DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL									
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	33	3		36	8			8	5			5	46	3		49	33	5		38	79	8		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	39	6		45	11	1		12	5	1		6	55	8		63	34	7		41	89	15		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	8	1		9	1			1	1			1	10	1		11	2	5	10	17	12	6	10	28
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	3	1	5	3	3	1	7
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2		1	2	3	1	2	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1					1			1
TOTAL SUPPORT	18	4		22	2			2	1			1	21	4		25	7	9	22	38	28	13	22	63
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	57	10		67	13	1		14	6	1		7	76	12		88	41	16	22	79	117	28	22	167

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	354	Nam Hoa	70	Hoa Vang	588	Thang Binh	965	Binh Son	239
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	57	Hieu Duc	76	Tam Ky	672	Son Tinh	491
	Trieu Phong	197	Hong Dien	72	Dien Ban	1,067	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	450
	Cam Lo	261	Vinh Loc	62	Dai Loc	355	Hiep Duc	220	Nghia Hanh	356
	Gio Linh	202	Phu Loc	231	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	281	Mo Duc	665
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	335	Hau Duc	233	Duc Pho	465
	Huong Hoa	14	Phu Vang	24	Que Son	958			Tra Bong	170
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	190	Duy Xuyen	1,100			Ba To	162
			Huong Thuy	101	Hieu Nhon	302			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	437					Son Ha	187
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	1,213	THUA THIEN	1,290	QUANG NAM	4,901	QUANG TIN	2,488	QUANG NGAI	3,199

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 13,091

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,145		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Vic XD 6233	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175	Unlocated	
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unlocated LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	

*See note #4 on page A-17
**See note #2 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,950		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,900		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	500		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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DMZ/NVA/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
31st Group (-)	NVA	C	1,060		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	220	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2061/20Jul69
15th Bn	NVA	PR	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Secial Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,870		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	
65th Arty Regt	NVA	PR	UNK		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.40 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.41 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.42 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.43 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,575		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,405		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	345	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0566/22May69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	2,135		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	460	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	465	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,605		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	XD 7964/12Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	365	XD 9265	XD 9666/26May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	400	XD 8854	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,765		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	300	YD 3639	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	185	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	190	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	250	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	190	Vic YD 3535	

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	925		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	AU 8100/10Jun68
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	290	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	285	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jul69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YD 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	360	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	185	Vic YD 6514	YD 6822/14Jun69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	270	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	190	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
3rd Bn, 803rd Regt	NVA	C	220	Vic YC 3193	YC 3389/19Jul69
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	370	Vic YD 3304	YD 3302/20Jun69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
C.113 Co	LF	C	145	Vic YD 5043	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
C.119 Co	LF	PR	45	Vic XD 9424	XD 9424/27Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	15,000		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
577th RL Bn	NVA	C	315	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
HAI VAN Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102nd Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103rd Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	525		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,125		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	285	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	385	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
368B Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,170		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
R.20 Bn	LF	C	155	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	LF	C	160	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	265	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	70	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	Unloc vic HOA VANG (D)	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	85	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	100	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	120	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	105	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	4,015		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	625		
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	BT 0827	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	150	BT 0827	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	120	BT 0827	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	150	BT 0827	BT 2514/25Sep68
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	455		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	150	AT 9226	
1st Bn	NVA	C	90	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	100	AT 9226	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	85	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	185	BT 2440	BT 2340/12Aug69
72nd Bn	LF	C	180	BT 2932	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	195	BT 3510	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	200	BT 3127	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	205	BT 2232	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	220	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4213	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	80	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	90	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	60	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	150	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	120	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	185	BS 4677	BS 6385/12Aug69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	725		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	175	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	215	BS 4386	BS 3587/13Aug69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	85	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69
C.17 Co	LF	C	55	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	65	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	80	BS 7555	BS 7061/17Nov68
C.120 Co	LF	C	60	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	80	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	50	BS 5596	
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,690		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	965		
Regt Hq	MF	C	370	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	195	BS 6733	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	200	BS 7932	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	200	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	990		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6237	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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BINH DINH PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
13th NVA Regt	NVA	C	925		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	275	BINH DINH	CR 0952/23Jun68
7th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 9640/12Apr68
8th Bn	NVA	C	250	BINH DINH	CR 0933/23Apr68
9th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 8955/29May68

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes in ICTZ during the period 240001H to 302400H August 1969.

a. Based on statements of a PW and two Hoi Chanhs who stated that the C.117 and C.118 Companies have been disbanded, these two companies are dropped from the OOB listing.

b. Based on statements of PW's Huynh Tan SUU and Vo HOA of the 95A Sapper Company and Hoi Chanh Nguyen QUANG of the 95B Sapper Company and a captured document listing the 95A and 95B Companies, the 95th LF Company is redesignated the 95A LF Sapper Co and the 95B LF Sapper Co is added to the OOB in a confirmed status.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

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9. Subordination/operational control, "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter Box Numbers (LBN), Armament, and Personalities listing.

NORTHERN I CORPS/DMZ/LAOS

UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
B-5 Front	DMZ Front			Chief of the Rear Service Staff Dept B-5 Front; Hoang KHUE
12th AT Bn			18x7.62mm LMG	
13th Arty Bn			12x60mm Mort 6xHMG 3x82mm Mort 50xLMG/SMG 12x120mm Mort	
14th AA Bn				CO-Luu Van MAN
15th Engr Bn				CO-Capt LOI XO-SrLt TAI
16th Signal Bn				
17th Trans Bn				
19th Medical Bn				

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UNIT	AKA	LRN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
304th NVA Div	"Cua Cao" Div; Vin Quang Group		5x82mm Mort 3x75mm RR 9xLMG 5xHMG	CO-SrCol Hoang KIEN XO-Maj HIEN PO-Col CAM APO-LtCol Pham Xuan KINH
Div Hq				
14th AA Bn				
15th Engr Bn				
16th Sig Bn				
18th Med Bn				
19th Trans Bn				
20th Sap Bn		13741 US	9x82mm Mort 9x60mm Mort ?xB-40	CO-Capt Ha Van CU XO-Capt Le Van LOI
9th Regt	U-1; U-9; E-9; D-9; F-9 Song Lo Regt 1			CO-LtCol HOA PO-LtCol Le Dang DUY CofS-KHAM
1st Bn	T-1; D-1	13634 IS (?)		CO-Capt Nguyen Huu TOAN XO-Dac Duy NHAT CofS-Capt A APO-SrLt Dang XUAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd Bn	T-2; D-2	13639 IS (?)		CO-SrCapt Huynh Ngoc SON XO-Capt DUAN PO-SrCapt TUI APO-THANH
3rd Bn	T-3; D-3	13644 IS (?)		PO-Maj TAM
24B Regt	57th Regt; 2nd Regt; U-2; Yen Tu; E-2; 24th Regt			CO-Maj Tran TRAI XO-NGUYEN PO-Maj Le TAM
4th Bn				
5th Bn		13675 US 13676 US		XO-1stLt CHUONG
6th Bn		13678		
66th Regt	U-3; U-66; 4th Regt; E-3			CO-LtCol Ding Dinh HO XO- PO-LtCol Tran TRAC
7th Bn	T-7	13696 US (?)		CO-Capt TANH XO- PO-Capt NHI
8th Bn	T-8	13701 US		CO-Le Van TAN XO-1stLt NGOAN PO-JrCapt HIEN
9th Bn	T-9	13706 US (?)		CO-SrCapt HAND XO-Capt TRUNG PO-SrCapt TUY APO-PHUC CofS-Capt KHANG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
68th Arty Regt	U-4 (?)		22x105mm How	CO-Maj CIA
325th Div, B-5 Front	Nong Truong Tam Div; 308th Div			CO-Col BINH XO-LtCol KHAN PO-LtCol THAI
14th AA Bn			?x12.7mm AA HMG	
15th Trng Bn				
16th Med Bn				
17th Sig Bn				
18th Engr Bn				
19th DKZ Bn			?x122mm Rkt	
20th Trans Bn	D.20 Bn	18046 XP		CO-Capt Dang Van CO XO-1stLt Do Van THOA PO-JrCapt Tran Xuan THU APO-1stLt LUAN
21st Conval Bn				
25th Sapper Co				
26th Recon Co				
27th Cadre Co				

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
36th Regt	Doan Hong Vu; 1st Regt; 95th Regt	18409 RT		CO-Maj Pham HUNG
1st Bn	D-1; K-1		29xB-40,B-41 6xDKZ 57mm RR 3x82mm Mort 6x60mm Mort	CO-SrCapt TRUC PO-Capt NHAN
2nd Bn	D-2; K-2			
3rd Bn	D-3; K-3	92902		CO-Tran Minh DANG
88th Regt	7003B; F-88; Quyet Thang	62332 18439 TQ		CO-LtCol Do LUONG XO-Maj Nguyen Hung CHUONG PO-Maj DUC CofS-LtCol TRUC
4th Bn	D-4; Z-4			CO-Capt MY XO-1stLt LONG PO-Capt TRI
5th Bn		31278 US		
6th Bn				
102nd Regt	Me Cong; 1001; 7001; Thu Do (?); Dist 70			CO-LtCol LUC XO-Maj THAN PO-LtCol HIEN APO-Maj SUU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	Bn 71			
8th Bn	Bn 73			CO-Capt TAN
9th Bn	Bn 75			CO-Capt LOAN XO-Capt NGHI PO-Capt TAI APO-1stLt HAI
138th Regt, B-5 Front	Bach Dang Regt; 24 Indep Regt; 132nd Regt	30119 US		CO-HOAI XO-HO PO-DU APO-LANG CofS-LUAN
1st Bn		30516	?xLMG ?xB-40, B-41 ?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x12.7mm HMG ?x57mm RR	CO-KHAC XO-DUNG PO-NGOT
2nd Bn	Hau Loc (V), Hong Ha (D)	30521		CO-SrLt TAM XO-SrLt TAM
3rd Bn		30526 XB		CO-Capt HO XO-MAN PO-NGOT
246th Regt	246Z Regt; F-6; F-4			CO-Maj CHU XO-TIEP PO-Maj LONG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Bn	H-1; U-1; Phai Khat; K-1	93976 OK 93977 OK 93978 OK 93979 OK		CO-Capt Mac Tinh DANG XO-Mai Van TU PO-Dap THAI
2nd Bn	H-2; U-2	93978 OK		
3rd Bn	H-3; U-3			
270th Regt, B-5 Front	Quang Tri, E-270; 270th Battle Group; 32nd Regt	32549 XB		CO-LtCol Hoang Van DUON XO-Maj Tran Duc MINH APO-Capt LAM
4th Bn	268th Inf Bn; D47; 47th Regt; 47th Bn	32548 XB 32553 XB (?) 32549 XB		CO-TUAN XO-THIEN PO-Maj Nguyen Duy DUC APO-KHANH
5th Bn	310th Inf	32558 XB(?)		CO-SrCapt Duon Xuan HAI
6th Bn		31400 XB(?)	6x82mm Mort	CO-Capt TUONG PO-LINH
27th Regt, B-5 Front	Ken Giang; Phan Rang; 271st Regt	93900 OK		CO-Maj THAT PO-Maj Nguyen Trong TAN APO-Maj LU
1st Bn		93901 OK		
2nd Bn	43rd Bn, Nghe An (P) Main Forces; K-2; 43d Bn	93906 OK		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Bn	44th Bn, Ha Thinh (P) Main Forces; PR 12	93911 OK	4x82mm Mort 2xLMG 2x57mm RR (DKZ) 8xB-40	CO-1stLt Vo Xuan THAN XO-JrCapt Nguyen Duc DONG
78th Arty Regt, B-5 Front	E.78			
10th Bn	D.10			
11th Bn	D.11			
12th Bn	D.12			
84th Arty Regt, B-5 Front	"Van An" Regt		?x140mm Rkt ?x120mm Mort ?xB-41 ?x122mm Rkt	CO-Maj Ta VAN XO-Maj GO PO-Maj DU
2nd Bn	Thong Nhat; 33rd Bn(?) K-33	54279 RT (?)		
3rd Bn	Ha Tinh	54283 RT (?)		
4th Bn	Ha Dong	54289 RT (?) 54290 RT (?)	?x140mm Rkt ?x102mm Rkt ?x120mm Mort	CO-Capt HA XO-Le MAN PO-Lt Le Van THIEN APO-Phac THAM CofS-VAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
164th Arty Regt, B-5 Front				
1st Bn				
2nd Bn	D-2			CO-Nguyen Phuc TRUNG
3rd Bn				
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt, B-5 Front	K-1 Bn; K.33 Bn			CO-SrCapt LIEN XO-Capt LONG PO-SrCapt CUONG CofS-HUU
665B Arty Regt, B-5 Front	E675B			
Regt Hq				
1st Bn	D85 Bn		6x85mm How	
2nd Bn	D74/1 Bn		6x122mm Gun	
3rd Bn	D74/2 Bn		6x122mm Gun	
NVA Sap Combat Grp, 126th Naval Sapper Regt, B-5 Front	1A, 4007, 4002			CO-Thanh Van MINH XO-NO PO-SrLtCol KHANH APO-SrCapt THAI Rear Services-Capt THUOC Medical Officer-SrLt THAI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Co				Co Cmdr-Capt Duy TINH
2nd Co				
3rd Co				PO-SrLt Nguyen Xuan THU
4th Co				Co Cmdr-SrLt CHE XO-SrLt CHINH PO-Lt TRI
33rd Sapper Bn	Kontum; 33	94154 XB 94155 XB 94156 XB 94157 XB 94158 XB 94159 XB	3x60mm Mort 16xB-40 3xB-41	CO-Capt Thai Ba QUYEN XO-Capt THO PO-Capt NGON APO-Capt CHUONG CofS-1stLt Tran XUOC
31st Group, B-5 Front	Doan 31; Song Hong Grp; 31st Regt; Bach Dang			CO-Le Mong HUNG DCofS-Nguyen Duc MIEN
C.9 LF Co	H-30; 30-H; Cam Lo LF Co; K-9	41367 41368		CO-Thai Tang NGO XO-VAN PO-CHAM
C.10 LF Co	4001; 5th Co; Gio Linh Co; K.400 Local Force Co; T.10 Co; Gio Le Co; K.10	41369 41370	3x60mm Mort 2xB-40 6xBAR	CO-1stLt DAM
C.11 LF Sapper Co	K-11			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
27th Indep Bn, 31st Group	27th Support Bn; K-1; 2nd Bn; 7th Ind Bn; Tay Ninh Bn; Cam Lo Bn; 70th Indep Bn; 27th Regt; Song Giang(?); D-27 Co (COWL ZOX)	31728 KT 94081 OK	?xB-40 ?x120mm Mort ?xLMG ?x60mm Mort	CO-Capt THAO XO-2ndLt Nguyen Van DAT PO-Nguyen Khao UNG APO-WO Duong Dinh PHO
15th Bn, 31st Group				

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
MRTTH, MR-IV MRTTH HQ	Northern Front; Northern Sub-Region; North Div HQ Phan Khu Bac; Di Hai; Tri Di Hai Thien Sector; K-500;	H-700 Bac Do BQ 20 FM		CG-MajGen Le Chuong (AKA Le Truong TIN) XO-Col Bui SINH (AKA DUNG SINH) FGPO-MajGen BAY FGAPO-Gen VAN CofS-Maj MINH
General Staff	K.400	41000 FM KC.10		ACofS-LtCol THAI CON
Operations Section		KC.1		Sec.Chief-LtCol Nguyen THOA
Military Intelligence Section		KC.2		Sec.Chief-Maj NGOC
Signal Section		KC.3		Sec.Chief-LtCol Hoang THANH
Personnel Section		KC.4		Sec.Chief-
Crypto Section		KC.5		Sec.Chief-
Sapper Section		KC.6		Sec.Chief-
Engineer Section		KC.7		Sec.Chief-
Artillery Section		KC.8		Sec.Chief-LtCol Trung KIEN
Training Section		KC.9		Sec.Chief-
Political Staff	K.300	41001 FM KP.12		ACofS-DOAN SUU
Cadre Affairs Section		KP.1		Sec.Chief
Organization Section		KP.2		Sec.Chief
Propaganda Section		KP.3		Sec.Chief
Security Guard Section		KP.4		Sec.Chief-SrCapt TRAN CUC
Military Proselyting Section	K.300B	41003 FM KO.16		ACofS-Maj VU QUAN
Rear Services Staff	K.200	41002 FM KJ.14		ACofS-Maj KHAM
Plans Section		KJ.1		Sec.Chief-1st Lt DANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quartermaster Section		KJ.2		Sec.Chief-1stLt Tong Viet PHU
Ordnance Section		KJ.3		Sec.Chief-Capt HUONG
Medical Section		KJ.4		Sec.Chief-SrCapt Dinh Nhu BINH
Finance Section		KJ.5		Sec.Chief-
Political Section		KJ.6		Sec.Chief-
Militia Section	K.100	KZ.18		ACofS-LtCol Tong Ho TRINH
MRTTH HQ (FWD)		TBQ 20 FM		CO-SrCol Nguyen Nhu THIET ~~AsstCmdr/CofS-Col Nguyen THI~~ FGPO-Col Xuan TRA
7th Front, MRTTH	Quang Tri Lib. Front; 9th Front; Doan 7; AD.49	EFQ		CO-Col Sung LAM XO-LtCol Vu BINH PO-SrCol Vu THANG APO-LtCol Le Kha PHIEU CofS-LtCol Nguyen Van THU
STAFF SECTION		E1FQ		ACofs-
Plans Sec.				Sec.Chief-SrCapt Phan Van HY
Intelligence Sec.				Sec.Chief-JrCapt TOAN
Sapper Sec.				Sec.Chief-VU
Finance Sec.				Sec.Chief-Capt DUONG
Personnel Sec.				Sec.Chief-Nguyen Ngoc THO
Training Sec.				Sec.Chief-TAM
Signal Sec.				Sec.Chief-MANH
POLITICAL SECTION		E2FQ		AcofS-Maj TOAN
PROSELYTING SECTION		E3FQ		AcofS-Capt TUNG
Propaganda Sec.				Cmdr-1stLt TE
Reorientation Sec.				Cmdr-1stLt HIEU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
REAR SERVICE SECTION		E4FQ		ACofS-Maj KHAM
K-8 Bn, 7th Front	808th Bn; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Forces; 9th Indep Bn; Le Hong Phong Bn; Chu Luc	41344 FQ 41345 FQ 41346 FQ 41347 FQ 41348 FQ	12x60mm Mort 4x82mm Mort 2x75mm RR 2xLMG 48xB-40 12xB-41	CO-Capt Nguyen Duc HONG XO-Capt KHICH PO-Capt THANH APO-SrLt XICH CofS-SrLt Nguyen Thoc NHON
K-14 Bn, 7th Front	814th Bn; H-14; K-7; Bat Nhat	41349 FQ 41350 FQ 41351 FQ 41352 FQ 41353 FQ	3x57mm RR 1xB-40 2xLMG 2x81mm Mort 2x57mm RR	CO-SrCapt XOE XO- PO-Capt NONG APO- CofS-SrLt Tran Thien DUC
10th Sapper Bn, 7th Front	K.20 Bn; 10th Group; 30th Sapper Group; Quang Tri Sapper Unit	41354 FQ 41355 FQ 41356 FQ 41357 FQ 41358 FQ	?xB-40 ?xAK-47	CO-Capt Van DAU XO-SrLt Ho Van TRUOC PO-CHINH
K-11 Sapper Bn, 7th Front				CO-Capt Vu Ban CAM XO-BAO CofS-DAT PO-Vu Van TIEN
K-34 Arty Bn, 7th Front, MRTTH			18x122mm Rkt 6x122mm RL	CO-TRACH XO-TUAN PO-TO CofS-CHAT
812th Regt, 324B Div	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; Cong Truong; "1 May" Regt; 4th Regt Song Thu Bon; Ba Vi Song Cua; Thuan Doc Lap; Co Dong (Mobile) Regt; Song Huong Regt; 53rd Regt; Cua Thuan Regt; Nui Ba Vi; Thu Bon River Regt; Cong Truong 7; 7th Regt; D82; Doan 2; AD.35	41399 FQ(?) 31610 RT 31611 RT 31612 RT 31613 RT 31614 RT 31615 RT 31617 RT 31618 RT 31619 RT	?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x60mm Mort ?x57mm RR ?x12.7mm AA MG ?xLMG	CO-LtCol Tong Sy GUY PO-THUONG APO-Bui Van NANG XO-Maj Minh LONG CofS-Maj Nguyen The DAO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
4th Bn	K-4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn; K-18	31620 RT 31621 RT 31622 RT 31623 RT 31624 RT		CO-Capt PHUC XO-JrCapt ANH PO-Capt TRAM APO-1stLt TUYEN CofS-Lt BINH
5th Bn	K-5 Bn; Cong Huong Bn; Tuyen 4; T-4; 4 Ba Vi; D-4; K-16	31625 RT 31626 RT 31627 RT 31628 RT 31629 RT		CO-Nguyen Van PHONG XO- PO-2ndLt Nguyen Van BICH
6th Bn	K-6 Bn; D-6 Bn; Thu Bon; Cuu Long Bn; Tuyen 6; 6th Ba Vi Bn; K-8	31630 RT 31631 RT 31632 RT 31633 RT 31634 RT		CO-Capt Cao BA XO-Nguyen Xuan HOA PO-HAI
4th Regt, MRTTH	AD.14; Doan 4	41410 FT 41418 FT 41420 FT 41425 FT		CO-Maj Tran Huu CHU PO-Maj Tran Van VUNG DepPO-Maj Nguyen Tien THUONG APO-Capt Nguyen Nho TUC XO-Maj Nguyen Van UC
K4B Bn	802nd Bn; K.2; Van Troi Bn; 2nd Bn; H.400	41166 FH 41167 FH 41168 FH 41169 FH 41170 FH	4x81mm Mort 12x60mm Mort 2x57mm RR 6x3.5" RL 10xB-40 6xAA HMG	CO-Capt Nguyen SONG XO-SrLt PHUNG PO-Capt HO
K4C Bn	1st Bn, 4th Regt; 4th Bn, 9th Regt; 822nd Bn; H.402	41522 FT 41523 FT	2x82mm Mort	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUAT XO-1stLt Tran Van BOI PO-Capt Nguyen Van KHANH APO-Asp TRUNG CofS-1stLt THANG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
5th Regt, MRTTH	22nd Regt; AD.25; Doan 5; 5th Worksite; Hue City Unit; 95th Regt	41270 FH 41271 FH 41272 FH		CO-LtCol Tran Than MOT XO-SrCapt TUYEN PO-LtCol VAN
K4 Bn	804th Bn; VC 74; Cao Van Grp; Sung Lo; Q.3	41435 FH 41436 FH 41437 FH 41438 FH 41439 FH 41288 FH 41289 FH 41290 FH 41290A FH 41290B FH	1x82mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG 20xRPD 6xB-40 10xB-41	CO-Maj Tran Dinh CHUONG XO-1stLt TAM PO-Capt Nguyen Van HAY APO-SrLt MAI CofS-HUU
K10 Bn	810th Bn; 3rd Bn (?) Q.4	41440 FH 41441 FH 41442 FH 41443 FH 41444 FH 41291 FH 41292 FH 41293 FH 41293A FH 41293B FH	3x81mm Mort 2x82mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 3xRR	CO-SrCapt Le Van BAU XO-Capt Nguyen Van NU PO-Capt Nguyen Van DUY CofS-Do Quoc HUYNH APO-Nguyen Huo DU
Chi Thua 1 Sap Bn	K-1; K-21 (THO)	41283 FH 41284 FH 41285 FH 41285A FH 41285B FH		CO-Maj THO XO-HIEN PO-VU APO-Le Ngoc DIEP
Chi Thua 2 Sap Bn	K.2; K.21 (VU)	41286 FH 41287 FH 41287A FH 41287B FH 41287C FH		CO-Nguyen Van VU XO- PO-HIEN APO-CAO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K.32 Arty Bn, 5th Regt, MRTTH	1st Bn, 84th Arty Regt; QE.02; D.832	41502 FQ 41294 FH 41295 FH 41296 FH 41296A FH 41296B FH		CO-THICH PO-Pham Ngoc BI APO-Capt Le Van VU XO-Nguyen Quang DA CofS-
6th Regt, MRTTH	Cong Truong 6; 6th Worksite; Ham Tu; AD.26; Doan 6	41300 FE 41316 FE 41317 FE 41318 FE 41319 FE 41320 FE 41321 FE 41322 FE 41323 FE 41324 FE 41325 FE		CO-Maj Huynh AN XO-Maj Nguyen Quang KHANH (AKA Nguyen Quoc KHANH) PO-Maj Nguyen Quang CAM APO-SrCapt Tran THO CofS-Capt Hong Kim THO CofPolit Sec-Man Huong Huu AN
800th Bn	K.1; 1st Bn (?); L.1	1520 Q 40700 ST 41301 FE 41302 FE 41303 FE 41304 FE 41305 FE	9x82mm Mort 8x60mm Mort 3x57mm RR 8x3.5" RL 9xB-40 6xLMG 4x75mm RR	CO-Capt DIEN XO-Capt Tran Minh DUONG PO-Capt Nguyen Van THANH APO-SrLt Pham DUYET CofS-SrLt Nguyen Ke VAY
802nd Bn	K.2; 1st Bn, 9th Regt	43920 FE 41306 FE 41307 FE 41308 FE 41309 FE 41310 FE	4x82mm Mort 2x57mm RR 3xHMG ?xLMG ?xB-40	CO-Capt Vo Dai AN XO-SrLt Do Dinh PHUNG PO-Capt Nguyen Huu DAM APO-SrLt Le Duc LOC CofS-SrLt Duong Quang TUOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D.10; 3rd (?); 80.T Bn	41311 FE 41312 FE 41313 FE 41314 FE 41315 FE	3x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 3x75mm RR 3x57mm RR 3xHMG 12xB-40 4x3.5" RL	CO- XO-SrLt Pham Quong LOC PO-SrLt Pham Quong VINH CofS-SrLt Hoang CHUC
K.12 Sapper Bn	812th Group 12; Dac Cong 12			CO-SrLt Dang Viet HONG XO- PO-Capt Tran Ba QUAT APO-SrLt Ho Van BA APO-SrLt Van The HANG
9th Regt, MRTTH	Doan 9; AD.79 FR; Thang Long	41390 FR 41391 FR 41392 FR 41393 FR 41394 FR 41395 FR 41396 FR 41397 FR 41398 FR 41399 FR		CO-Maj Dang Thong DE PO-LtCol Phan KY APO-Capt Bui Van DAO XO-Maj Nguyen Tu TY CofS/XO-Maj Le Van A CofPolit Sec-Maj Ha Duc DUC
K.16 Bn	Dong Do; T.902; F.801 FR; 816th Bn; 416th Bn; 3d Bn, 9th Regt	41406 FR 41407 FR 41408 FR 41409 FR 41410 FR		CO- PO-Capt Tran Xuan VU APO-SrLt Pham Tien KHANG XO-SrLt Thai BAY CofS-SrLt Bui Manh TIEN
K.18 Bn	Dong Ha; T.903; F.802 FR; 818th Bn; 418th Bn; 2d Bn, 9th Regt	41411 FR 41412 FR 41413 FR 41414 FR 41415 FR		CO-SrCapt Dang Huy MICH PO-SrCapt Van VU APO-SrLt Le Huy CAY XO-Ho Ba NHUAN CofS-SrLt Nguyen Kim THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K.15 Bn	815th Bn; 415th Bn; 1st Bn, 9th Regt; Q-6; F.800 FR	41416 FH 41297 FH 41298 FH 41299A FH 41299B FH 41400 FR 41401 FR 41402 FR 41403 FR 41404 FR 41405 FR	2xB-40/B-41	CO-Capt HO 1st XO-SrLt Vu Duc HAU XO-SrLt Vu Ngoc TRINH PO-SrCapt Pham Dinh DINH APO-Capt Pham Huu KY CofS-SrLt Vu Ngoc THAO
29th Regt, 325C Div, MRTTH	Ken Giang; Ba Na; 3rd Regt; Song Lo Regt; Doan 8; AD.68	32868 RT 32706 RT 32722 RT 32723 RT 32724 RT 32725 RT 32726 RT 32727 RT 32728 RT 32729 RT 32730 RT 32731 RT	8x82mm Mort	CO-Maj Chau HOAT/LtCol Tran SIKCH XO-SrCapt Nguyen HOAN PO-SrCapt Vo DUOC APO-Maj CAY CofS-SrCapt Dau Ba HA
7th Bn	K-7; 1st; D-1; D-7	32707 RT 32708 RT 32709 RT 32710 RT 32711 RT	4x82mm Mort 4xHMG 8x60mm Mort	CO-SrLt Nguyen TRAN XO-SrLt Le Van HA PO-
8th Bn	K-8; 2nd; D-2; D-8; Duc Lap Bn	32712 RT 32713 RT 32714 RT 32715 RT 32716 RT	4x82mm Mort 4xHMG	CO-Capt HANG XO-Capt CAN PO-Capt HANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
9th Bn	K-9; 3rd; D-3; B-9	32717 RT 32718 RT 32719 RT 32720 RT 32721 RT		CO-SrCapt Nguyen Van HO XO-Capt CHONG PO-CANH
803rd Regt, 324B Div, MRTTH	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; Cong Truong 21; Song Huong; Cua Tung; Tam Dao; Cong Truong 1/5(?); 41st Regt; K-14B Regt; Phan Thiet Regt; Doan 1	31551 RT 31552 RT 31553 RT 31554 RT 31555 RT 31556 RT 31557 RT 31558 RT 31559 RT	?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x60mm Mort ?x12.7mm AA ?xLMG	CO-Maj Luu Quang MAU XO-Capt Mau DUYET PO-Maj DAM APO-Capt Le Van DAO CofS-
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K-1 Bn; Tam Dao 1; Song Lam; Song Huong; C-1	31560 RT 31561 RT 31562 RT 31563 RT 31564 RT		CO-Capt Bui Khac HUY XO-Capt Tran PHUOC PO-Nguyen Dinh CU APO-1stLt Le Man CHAU
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K-2 Bn; Thu Bon; Song Huong 2; Tam Dao 2; C-2	31565 RT 31566 RT 31567 RT 31568 RT 31569 RT		CO-Capt DUC XO- PO-SrLt XE APO-SrLt NAM CofS-SrLt SUU
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K-3 Bn; Tam Dao 3; Song Cuong 3; C-3	31570 RT 31571 RT 31572 RT 31573 RT 31574 RT		CO-HO XO-KINH PO-DUC APO-THUY CofS-Do Xam CHI
65th Arty Regt, MRTTH	Doan 12; AD.30			CO-TAN XO- PO-NGHIEP

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K-40 Arty Bn	K-50; QE.06; D.850		?x85mm Field Gun	
K-41 Arty Bn	QE.07		?x122mm How	
K-42 AAA Bn	QE.08		37mm AAA Gun	
K-43 AAA Bn	QE.09		23mm AAA Gun	
H-99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co; Vinh Ling Co		1xLMG	CO-Vo BA XO-Tran BUN PO-DUNG
C.113 Co	Armed Co of Phong Dien District; P.14; D.1; X.11; V.35; H.23; KQ.10; AK-5	41426 FM	1X81mm Mort 2X60mm Mort 12XSMG	CO-LANN XO-Tu YEN PO-THAN APO-Tran Van THUAN
C.114 Co	D-3; P.15; Quang Dien LF Co; V.40; H.25; KQ.20; AK.7; H.319	1847 Bac Ha 41427 FM	2X60mm Mort 4XB-40	CO-MUOI XO-HOA PO-HA
C.115 Co	D-2; X-3; K-5; Huong Tra LF Co; P.16; KQ.30; AK-9	41428 FM	2XHMG 2X60mm Mort ?XSMG	CO-LE XO-LUA PO-HUNG
C.116 Co	D-4; X-4; P.17; Huong Thuy LF Co; KQ.40; V.50; H.29; AK.12; C.268 Co; C.216 Co	41429 FM	2X60mm Mort ?XHMG	CO-Nguyen Huu LUYEN XO-Tran Viet HUNG PO-NGACH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
C.119 Co	C.19; BIET DONG Ranger		2XB-40	CO-Ho DOI XO/PO-Nguyen CUONG
Phu Loc Armed Bn	K-3, V-6		3X60mm Mort 3XB-40	CO-Nguyen NGUYEN XO-Phan CHANG PO-Nguyen XUAN

SOUTHERN I CORPS/BINH DINH (P)

UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
Military Region 5	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa; H-601; F-102 KW; Thon An 620	20100 GM 21900 GM Bac Hien		CO-MGen Hoang Van THAI XO-LtCol Nguyen CHANH (AKA BINH) PO-Gen THAI (same as CO) APO-LtCol Tran KHUE CofS-Col Le TRUC
Front 4, MR-5	Unit 70; Group 44; K-44	P6400; 6700 Ap Thai		CO-BGen Le BINH XO-Col HOE PO-THUAN CofS-Maj CUC APO-PHUOC

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
70A, Front 4	Military Staff	P6407; 6707 AP Thai		CO-Capt DONG XO-JrCapt LANH PO-Capt KHANH
70B, Front 4	Political Section Staff	P6414; 6714 AP Thai		CO-LtCol Bui DU XO- PO-
70C, Front 4	Rear Service Staff	P6425; 6725 AP Thai		CO-Tran Dinh TRUC XO-YEN
1st Comm Bn, Front 4	703C	P6460; 6760 AP Thai		CO-Maj Ha Van CAU XO-Capt Van XUAN PO-Maj CHINH
42nd Recon Bn, Front 4		P.6513 Ap Thai		CO-Capt Tan PHAT XO-SrLt Duc MINH PO-Tranh TRIEU APO-1stLt CAN C/S-QUYNH
1st Flamethrower Co Front 4		1888 AP Tnai	40XLP050 Chicom	CO-1stLt HAI XO- PO-1stLt CANG
HAI VAN Engr Bn	1st Engr Bn; Cuu Long Bn	6780 AP Thai (SVN) 2380 QT (NVN)	782mm Mort 760mm Mort 3X30Cal MG's	CO-Nguyen Xuan DU XO-HOANG PO-Pham Van XUYEN APO-Pham Van DUYEN
C-31st Ind Co	Doc Lap Co, Q.55 Co	8302 GD	2X82mm Mort 2X60mm Mort 3X60 30Cal MG's	CO-Pham Van LOI XO-Nguyen Quy Truong PO-Nguyen Van MINH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
31st NVA Inf Regt, 341st Div, Front 4	P25 Regt; Unit 5550; Infil Grp 150C; Song Huong Regt (Red River); 31st Worksite	3134 KT P6270 6670 Ap Thai 31457 3459 KT	9x12.7mm AA Guns 6x82mm Mort 75mm RR	CO-LtCol HUNG XO-Maj XA PO-Col Ho Quang DAM APO-Col Nguyen Chung TANH CofS-SrCapt NGOC
102nd Bn	F.8 Bn; D.8 Bn; D.2 Bn; 150B; 150C; 8th Bn	6687 Ap Thai P6287 31349 31349 KT 6627 Ap Thai Ap Thai 7566	4x82mm Mort 9x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-THANH XO-SrLt DO PO-Tran Minh SON CofS-SrLt Le Dinh THUC APO-Lt DAT
103rd Bn	F.9 Bn; 3rd Bn; D.9 Bn; D.3 Bn; F.9 Bn; 150A; 9th Bn; K.9 Bn; C.9 Bn	P6292 6692 Ap Thai 3459	4x82mm Mort 9x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41 ?x12.7mm AA Gun	CO-Capt TRINH XO-SrCapt Phong LICH PO-Capt NAM CofS-Capt CHINH
36th NVA Inf Regt, 308th Div, Front 4	Unit 1016; Unit 9530 Song Nong Regt; D.304; E.36; Group 6		?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort 6x75mm RR ?x12.7mm AA Guns	CO-SOAN XO-KHAI PO-Maj THANG
1st Bn	Unit 9531; D.1 Bn	6217 Ap Thai 6933 Ap Bac 62205 IS	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xRPG-2 ?xRPG-7 ?x7.62mm LMG ?x12.7mm AA Guns	CO-Capt Minh THUAN XO-Capt LOC PO-Capt BIEN CofS-Capt DINH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd Bn	Unit 9533; Unit 1016A; D.2 Bn; K.2 Bn	6218 Ap Thai 6938 Ap Bac 62201 Ap Bac	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41 ?x12.7mm AA Gun	CO-Capt NHI XO-Capt CHUNG PO-Capt HOA
3rd Bn	D.3; K.12; Replacement No 2006	6219 Ap Thai 6943 Ap Bac 62210 XP	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt THUC XO-SrLt TRINH PO-Capt NHO
90th Regt	3rd Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Danang Grp; Doan 3; AD.10; Cong Truong 63; Cua Viet; Nui Quyet; 60th Regt	41.210 FL 41.211 FL 41.212 FL 41.213 FL 41.214 FL 41.215 FL 41.216 FL 41.217 FL 41.218 FL	?x82mm Mort 3xUnk mm RR 3x120mm Mort	CO-Maj THUOC XO-Capt DANG PO-HOA APO-HA ACofS-Lt CHUONG
7th Bn	K.7 Bn; 17th Bn; D.7 Bn; T.7 Bn; Nui Quyet Bn	41.219 FL 31650 XB 41.220 FL 41.221 FL 41.222 FL 41.223 FL	3x82mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 6xB-40 6xB-41	CO-BAO XO-LY PO-XUAN APO-
8th Bn	K.8 Bn; 18th Bn; K.38 Bn; D.8 Bn; 108th Bn	41.224 FL 31655 XB 41.225 FL 41.226 FL 41.227 FL 41.228 FL	3x82mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 9xB-40 3xB-41	CO-SrCapt PHUOC XO-Capt NHI PO-SrCapt DOT APO-Capt NAM

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
9th Bn	K.9 Bn; 19th Bn; D.9 Bn; Nui Quyet Bn; B.19	41.229 FL 31660 XB 41.230 FL 41.231 FL 41.232 FL 41.233 FL	3x82mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 3xB-40 5xB-41 2x7.62mm MG	CO-SrCapt THUY XO-SrLt THUY PO-Capt Phau Thanh THUYEN APO-Lt CHUONG CofS-Lt TAN
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20; B-20; Viet Dung; 70th Bn; 1st Bn; F.5 Bn; Q.90 Bn	6788 Ap Thai 21341 GM Ba Ha 190 Viet Dung	4x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Nguyen Thanh CHI XO-KIEN PO-Hoynh NAM CofS-BA
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn; R.25 Bn; 2nd Bn; B.25 Bn; Q.92 Bn; 2nd Indep Bn of Quang Da	2116 Quang Da 192 Viet Dung P6493 6793 Ap Thai A4192 and Dung A44T.193	4x81mm Mort 5x60mm Mort ?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt Tran BINH XO-Nguyen LUONG PO-Tran NINH APO-Le HIEU
D.7 Bn	F.7 Bn; 1st Bn; D.3 Bn; 101st Bn	P6498 6798 Ap Thai Q.80 Anh Dung	5x82mm Mort 5x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt THOM XO-Capt KHOI PO-Capt TRANG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
T.89 Sapper Bn	402nd Sapper Bn; YH.9; Tien Lua Bn	P6454 6754 Ap Thai 370 Thanh Khiet	6x81mm Mort 1x82mm Mort 18xB-40 2xHMG	CO-SrCapt NGOC XO-SrLt TO PO-Capt Tran Kim HUNG CofS-1stLt NAM
3rd Sapper Bn	1o3rd Sapper Bn; Lam Son Bn; Q.91 Bn; B-47 Sapper Bn; 710 Bn	P6475 6775 Ap Thai 63148 IS(NVN)	6x82mm Mort 5x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt Pham Van ON XO-HUNG PO-Capt Tran HUYNH CofS-Lt COI
141st Regt, 312th Div, Front 4	1st Regt; 3008 Group	1523 VR(NVN)	?x82mm Mort ?x81mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x12.7mm AA Gun ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Maj NGUYEN XO-Capt DUONG PO-Maj HAO
1st Bn	Pho Thong Bn; K.1 Bn		?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?xB-40 ?x12.7mm Tripod Mounted AA Gun	CO-Capt Nguyen Van CON XO- PO-Capt SAM
2nd Bn			?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x57mm RR ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt MAO XO-HUU PO-SrLt DIEU
3rd Bn		7425(NVN) 74222 CS(NVN)	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41 ?x75mm RR	CO-Capt CANH XO-1stLt HAY PO-SrLt UONG CofS-Lt Doan Van MIA

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
368B Arty Regt, Front 4	Binh Minh Worksite; 575th Unit; Infil Gp 575; E.368	P6301 6500 Ap Binh	122mm Rkt Launchers 140mm Rkt Launchers	CO-Maj Dinh Van HOA XO-Maj Nguyen Xuan TU PO-Maj Do Xuan KHOAT
1st Bn	D.99; D.1	6504 Ap Binh	18 X 122mm Rkt Launchers 6 X 140mm Rkt Launchers	CO-Capt Le Ngoc TOAN XO-Capt TAN PO-Capt CUNG
2nd Bn	D.2 Bn	6508 Ap Binh	18 X 122mm Rkt Launchers 6 X 82mm Mort	CO-Capt Le Quang MINH XO-Capt Tran TIEN PO-Capt DANG
3rd Bn	D.3	6512 Ap Binh	18 X 122mm Rkt Launchers 6 X 140mm Rkt Launchers 57 RR ?x82mm Mort	CO-SrCapt Pham CAN XO-Capt LONG PO-Capt LIEN
T.87 Sapper Bn	Truong Son Bn; 2nd Sap Bn; HH (Hoa Hieu)	P6470 6770 Ap Thai	3 X 82mm Mort 3 X 60mm Mort 3 X B-40's B-41's	CO-PHUNG XO-BINH PO-LIEN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
577 Rkt Bn, Front 4	130th Bn; 134th Infil Grp; 1st Bn, 68B Arty Regt	6620 Ap Hoa 54387 HT	18X122mm Rkt Launchers 6XB-40's 6XB-41's	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUNG XO-Capt Dang Van THUONG PO-Capt To Duc LUC CofS-Lt THANH
2nd NVA Div, MR-5	Thon An 520; Su Dong 2; Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2; Chi Lang; Ta-310; Nam Hai; Nong Truong 2	20601 GM 20925 GM Tay An H.4500 Ap Nam 42.40 HK 41910 KP		CO-BrigGen Le THACH/KIET XO-BrigGen Hoang Minh DAC/SON PO-BrigGen VIET/CHUONG
GK.37 Trans Bn		2062 Nam Hai		CO-Pham Ngoc HOANG
GK.38 Medical Bn		5060 Ap Nam C		CO-Capt Nguyen Van TU XO-1stLt Nguyen Van HIEU PO-Capt Le Hong HAI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
GK.30 Signal Bn	RQ.20/A Bn;RQ.20; V-107 RQ. 20/B Bn; Nam Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20 HT 20605 GM Tay An		CO-TUNG XO- PO- APO-Nguyen Ba CHU
GK.31 AA Bn	195th AA Bn; 519 AA Bn; 38th AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn; RQ.21		17x12.7mm AA	CO-Capt Huong Quy PHAN XO-Tran Van THIEN PO-QUANG
GK.32 RR Bn	RQ.22	Hai Cang 20	12x75mm RR	CO-SrCapt THUYLET XO-Nguyen KHUAN PO-TRUONG CofS-SrLt Vo Ngoc HANH
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	RQ.33; RQ.23; RQ.330; 7th Bn	1828/CN Hai Cang 20; 60620 GM Tay An; 22861 GH Hai Cang 20 Tay An; 22631 GH Hai Cang 20 Thu An	6x120mm Mort 82mm Mort 81mm Mort	CO-Le Van CAN XO-Nguyen KINH
GK.35 Sapper Bn	D-10 Sapper Bn		9xB-41 Rkt	CO-Nguyen Tien VINH XO-CAO PO-Nguyen Duc DUC
GK.40 Engr Bn	RQ.24	GM 20039 Tay An Nam Hai		CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG XO-Nguyen Viet THO PO-Ngoc PHUOC

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st VC Regt, 2nd Div	Cuong Truong 1; H-800; 108th Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Steel Regt	6000-6199 H 4600 AP NAM 5101 AP NAM		CO-LtCol Chan Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN PO-
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai; 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007 Bau Bang	5645 Quang Trung St.	.30 Cal MG 60mm Mort 81mm Mort 75mm RR 12.7 mm MG	CO-LOC XO-Nguyen Van TUAN
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai; Bong Trang (?) Binh Gia	20735 C.T. An Giang	81mm Mort 60mm Mort 57mm RR 82mm Mort 12.7mm MG	CO-SON XO-CHAT PO-MINH
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008; Thuan Minh; Song Hong (?) Phong Bien	HT 20100		CO-SANG XO-ANH PO-CHU
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; Cong Truong (?) AN LONG; H 213; V-50	HT 20648 GM An Binh; 880 Nam Ban; H.4880 Ha Bien; H 4700 AP NAM 2; 5201 AP NAM	17x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x60mm Mort 2x82mm Mort 4x82mm RR 1x57mm RR	CO-Maj THACH XO-Capt Cao NIEM PO-Maj DUC CofS-CHAU
60th Bn	11th Workshop; 1st Bn; 11th Bn; 4th Bn	6604 Long Thanh; J.4700		CO-Ngoc LICH XO-Lt Nguyen Dinh PHUNG PO-Capt Nguyen Duc HO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
70th Bn	135th Bn; 2nd Bn; 72nd Bn (?); 22nd Bn; 5th Bn	J.4770		CO-Nguyen Van THO XO-Lt Nguyen Van CUOC PO-Mai Xuan DIEN
80th Bn	3rd Bn; 75th Bn (?); Workshop 33; Phi Truong Long Chau; 33rd Bn; 6th Bn	J.4780		CO-SrCapt HIEN XO-Lt Nguyen Thanh SON PO-Capt THIEN
3rd NVA Regt	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite 3; Factory 10; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; Nam Ha; 323rd Regt (?); Ap Nam 31st Regt	HT 5503; HT 20801 GM An Binh; H.4810 Ap Nam HT 4880; HT 4241; HT 4842; HT 4849; HT 5317; Ap Nam 3 (?) 5301 Ap Nam H 4800 Ap Nam 3 20728 GM An Binh; H.4860 Ha Mai		CO-Maj CAO LIEN XO-Nguyen THANH PO-Nguyen Phan Trung Ta CofS-Bui Thien Cac
1st Bn	X1; Xuong Mot; Ha Mai; Xuong (Bn) 7; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1 64th Bn; K-7		3x82mm Mort 3x57mm RR	CO-Capt THANH XO- PO-Lt DUC
2nd Bn	Binh Minh; K-2; K-2; 74th Bn; Xuong Hai; Ha Hai; Xuong (Bn) 8; K-8; Binh Da	20837 GM An Binh; H.4870 Ha Hai		CO-Capt KHAO XO-NHU PO-Capt HUONG
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84th Bn; K-3; Q.56; Nguyen Trai; 103rd Bn; Xuong (Bn) Ba; Ha Bien; Xuong (Bn); K-9	HT 20648 GM An Binh; 880 Nam Ban; H.4880 Ha Bien; HT 5317	2x120mm Mort 6x75mm RR 6x82mm Mort 3x50 cal HMG	CO-SrCapt TRU XO-Capt DUY PO-Capt TUNG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd NVA Div, MR-5	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Liem Tinh 10	Hon Thu 2110 GM; 20845 GMT 10 Airfield 10		CO-SrCol VOTU XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN APO-Col NAM
90th Engr Bn	40th Sapper Bn	PH 5082 Ap Dan PH 5081 Ap Dan 5555 Ap Dan		CO-THU XO-Pham Hong KHI PO-DUNG APO-PHU
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infiltration Group	1535; 1534; 10th Airport		CO-SrCapt LIEM XO-KUYET PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY Asst PO-Capt MO
300th Arty Bn	513 Infiltration Group; Xom 30; 499th Arty Bn; 400 Bn; Don VI 499th, Phan Doan 300; X-30, Unit 499, K.13	1538	3x120mm Mort 4x82mm Mort 3x75mm RR ?x140mm Rkt	CO-Le Van DUYET/Lam Duy HIEM XO-LAN PO-TRUNG
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn;	1544		CO-CU XO-DO PO-HI Asst PO-DUONG
551st Signal Bn	D-16	20800 KG		CO-Capt BAO XO-Lt HIEN PO-SrCapt DIEU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
600th Medical Bn	Inter-Det 600	1548		CO- XO- PO-
2nd VC Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt; 8th Regt; 96th Regt; 193 GP; 511 Regt	21.100 21.141 21.142 21.143 21.144 21.145 21.146 21.147 21.148 21.149 PH 5100 Ap Dang	2x82mm Mort 2x57mm AA/MG 2xB-41 3xB-40 6x7.62 HMG	CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-Mai Van HA CofS-TRI
93rd Bn	707th Infil Group; Chi Ba (Three Sister); H-21 Bn; 93rd Gp; Piti Truong	6240 21.120	2x82mm Mort 2x57mm AA/MG 2xB-41 4xB-40 2x7.62 HMG 2x57mm RR 1xM-79	CO-Dang DOAN/THANH? XO-BONG PO-SINH/BON?
95th Bn	705th Infil Group; Chi Nam; H-58; Ba Minh	21310 GM	2x57mm RR 1x60mm Mort 1xMG 3xB-40 2xB-41 1xM-79	CO-VINH XO-AN PO-Maj Van HA CofS-LUONG
97th Bn	703rd Infil Group; 207th Bn; Chi Bay; H-21; H-25; Xom; 307th Bn	6340 TL(old) 21.140 GM 21.143	4x60mm Mort 5xB-40 6xB-41	CO-VINH/TRONG? XO-BINH/HOA? PO-OANH/HOA?

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
18th NVA Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803rd Infil Group; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Soa Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt(?); Lien Gia Bon	7173 DS 21155 GM 21150- 21199 157; 21 AG Unit 519		CO-Duong Minh NGO XO-HONG PO-Le HOA APO-VOI CofS-DIEU
7th Bn	263rd Bn (Infil); H-7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi 4; Phan Doan 4; 4th Bn	21162- 21166 Unit 521		CO-MOC XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI APO-Nguyen Trong MAM
8th Bn	803K Infil Group; Inter-Unit 5; District 12; Lieu Doi 5; Huyen 32; Lien Doi 5; H-32; H-8; Unit 523; 5th Bn	211670 21171 Unit 523		CO-CUONG XO-THUAN PO-THANH CofS-LUONG
9th Bn	H-9; H-33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn	21172- 21176 Unit 525		CO-TUY XO-QUANG PO-ANH CofS-HOANG
22nd NVA Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Group; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3rd Regt; E-101(?); 6th Regt; Lien Gia Sau; Cong Truong 3; Worksite 3; Unit 527; Pho Nam Regt	21141 VM Binh Dinh (P); 1010 Phi Truong 10; PH5200 Ap Than 21175- 21199		CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG PO-Ho Si LOC/Ho Dac LIEN? CofS-Capt THANG/LANH?

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517th Bn; Inter Group		1x57mm RR 5x82mm Mort 5xB-41 5x12.7mm AA Gun	CO-Maj Duyen NAI XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM/LY? CofS-Capt KHOI
8th Bn	2nd Bn; Bn 516; Xom Tam	21225 GM Phi/Truong 10	4x82mm Mort 1x57mm RR 4x12.7mm MG 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-DUNG XO- PO- Capt THIEN CofS-Capt THANH
9th Bn	3rd Bn; Bn 514; Inter Group 9; Xom Chin	4739/TA	4xB-40 4xB-41 2x82mm Mort 4x60mm Mort	CO-TIN/BINH XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN
120th Bn	Q-20; T-20; 20th Bn; 21st Bn; X-20; Tong Doan 20; V.3 Bn	20135	1x81mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 3x57mm RR 3x75mm RR 5xMG	CO-HAI XO-HIEP PO-Nguyen DAN
406th Sapper Bn	409 Bn; Don Vi 406	4141 Ap Bac	1x60mm Mort 7XB-40 7xB-41 1xRR 2x82mm Mort	CO-HOA XO-DUNG PO-Dung Quang HUAN APO-TU
107th Arty Bn	270th Bn; 2nd 12.7mm AA Bn; D.107th Bn; Mountain Gun Bn; GK.31 AA Bn; Unit 743		5x12.7mm AA 18xSMG 1x75mm RR 6x82mm Mort ?x140mm Rkt	CO-SrCapt Hoang Van THANH XO-CHI PO-LAC CofS-Capt CHI Adj-Lt SIU S1-Nguyen Van CHET S4-1stLt Ong HANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
9th Sapper Bn	2nd Bn	1088	2x60mm Mort 2xB-40	CO-Maj Vu Vinh QUANG XO-Mui Van THIET PO-Mai Van TRUONG
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38; D-3; Unit 133; Nghiep Doan 8; X.13; Black Tiger Bn; Unit 740; Anh Ba Tu	2048 NQ Ba Bao	2xLMG 2x82mm Mort 2x57mm RR 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-MEN/LIEM? XO-TAM PO-Nguyen HAM CofS-Luong Van NAY APO-Nguyen TUAN
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 4th Labor Union; 48th Worksite; 2nd Bn(?); K.48 Bn; Don VI 130; X.13; Unit 741		2x81mm Mort 2x57mm RR 3x60mm Mort 3xLMG 2x82mm Mort 1x75mm RR ?xB-40	CO-Vu Van TRAN XO-Tran Van KHI PO-Vu QUI APO-LONG
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Cuu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-Mountain White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103 Ounh Gia(?); Bong Trang	20647	3x81mm Mort 4x60mm Mort 4x57mm RR 5xLMG 12xB-40 RL	CO-CHUA XO-LY PO-SON

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
72nd Bn	X.72; R.13; H.68; 33rd Bn; Truong Son; Chu Dung; 103rd; 300; 305 GP; Hoi Chang 15; X-22 An Khe (506)	21993 Hanh 21445 GM 25010	2X82mm Mort 2X81mm Mort 6X60mm Mort 3X57mm RR 2X12.7mm AA MG's 15XB-40 RL 6XB-41 RL	CO-Nguyen Van CAN XO-Nguyen Van LE PO-KHANH
74th Bn	V.20; V.74; 75th		1X60mm Mort 1XMG 3X57mm RR	CO-DUC/QUANG (?) XO-THAI/Yeu THAN PO-QUYET
76th Sapper Bn	K.55; C.75; Flying Tiger 21; V.16 Bn		1X60mm Mort 4XB-40 RL 3XB-41 RL	CO-TIEN XO-VINH PO-XUI
78th Arty Bn	X-78; Kuong 78; 78 DKB		6X122mm RL 5X82mm Mort 2X57mm RR ?XB-41 RL	CO-THOAI XO-XAM PO-TOI
81st Co	Worksite 81; Code No T120; D.1; D.81; X.81; T.760; 85th Bn; Bac Son Binh; Unit 742; 81st Bn	773 GM Tran Quoc Tuan	1X60mm Mort 3XB-40's 1XB-41's	CO-LAM XO-THANH PO-NHONG AsstPO-PHANG
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20; 575th Bn; A-58; 409A Bn; K-5 Sapper Bn; Sapper R-5; 307th Bn; Bac Hien	20142 GM 20144 GM Bac Hien 1291 KW Bac Hien; Ba Hoa; X2424; 20142 GM; 4116 A-12 Bac Tien	?X81mm Mort 7X60mm Mort 3X57mm RR	CO-VAN XO-TAO PO-VIET

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
V.14 Co	A.14 Co; 113th Co; K.53 Co; 14th Co; NK.108; A.19		1xLMG	CO-Huynh TIEN/Pham TO XO-Nguyen PHUONG PO-
V.15 Co	K.51; 107; FO 14; A.10; D.21; Thang Binh Co; B.104		1x60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-QUANG PO-CONG
C.17 Co	Mo Duc Co			CO-Nguyen DIEP XO-Lt PHUOC PO-NOI
V.18 Co				CO-Nguyen Thi THANH XO- PO
C.18 Co	Nghia Hanh LF Co		1x60mm Mort 4xSMG	CO-TAM XO-DINH PO-BAY
C.19 Co	C.19B (?) (Possible)		3x57mm RR 4xB-40 2x60mm Mort 2xLMG	CO-Nguyen SON XO-Le Van THANH PO-MAU
T.20 Co	C.20; Son Tinh Dong Co; V.20; C-137		1x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG	CO-KHANG XO- PO-THANH
P.31 Co	T.19 Co; D.31 Co; T-31 Co		2xB-40	CO-DUC XO-PHUOC PO-MANH APO-NAM
C.74 Co			1x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG	CO-GIO (or GIAO) XO-THUOC PO-NAM

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
C.120 Co	Unit 145		6xThompson SMG 3xMAT-49 SMG 2xB-40	CO-QUANG XO-TU PO-
C.7 Co	Unit 139; C.16 Co; 506 LF Co		1xLMG 1x60mm Mort 6xM-79	CO-DA XO-XU PO-NAM
Q.80 Co, Front 4	Hoi An Co; X.62 Co; 72 Co; Q.12 Co; 44th Bn; F.12 Co	180 Anh Dung	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Tran BUA XO-Bua THAI PO-HIEN
Q.81 Co, Front 4	Duy Xuyen Co; H.52; 103rd Co; 73rd Co; Q.13 Co; Q.13B	181 Anh Dung 2103	3x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Nguyen Dinh BON XO-Nguyen THAM PO-Nguyen HOA
Q.82 Co, Front 4	Dien Ban Co; H.40 Co; X.55 Co; 104th Co; X.65; Q.15 Co	182 Anh Dung 133 Tuong Lai 21335 GM Ba Ha	2x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort ?xRPG-2 ?xRPG-7	CO-Huynh Viet NGAN XO-Tan Chung NGO PO-Mai Phuoc KIEM
Q.83 Co, Front 4	Q.14 Co; H.42 Co; X.64 Co; 74th Co; Dai Loc Co	183 Anh Dung 21334 GM Ba Ha	2x60mm Mort 2x81mm Mort 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-Nguyen CHAU XO-Nguyen Quang HUNG PO-Le Long PHUNG
Q.84 Co, Front 4	Q.16 Co; X.66 Co; X.17 Co; Hoa Vang Co	184 Anh Dung 21336 GM Ba Ha	2x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort 6xB-40	CO-Hoang Minh NGHIEM XO-DONG PO-AI
21st Sapper Co	T-21, H-40	22422	2xLMG 2x60mm Mort	CO-Ho Khanh DU XO-Ha Thanh LIEM PO-Nguyen Van HU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Co	Que Son Independent Co	2184	2x81mm Mort 4x60mm Mort 2x57mm RR 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-1stLt Nguyen HANH XO-2ndLt CA PO-Nguyen UT
C.219 Co	Duc Pho Co; Anh Hai		2x60mm Mort 1xLMG 2xB-40 18xSMG	CO-MAU XO-TUNG PO-CAU
706th Co	C.73; A.16; BK.110; K-43	2002	2x60mm Mort 1x57mm RR 6xLMG	CO-Nguyen THANH XO-Pham PHUONG PO-Pham KHAI
K.51 Wpns Co	C.51 Wpns Co		2x60mm Mort 1x57mm RR 1x81mm Mort	CO- XO- PO-
506 "A" Sapper Co	Unit 506			CO-Xo Dub BA XO-VINH PO-DUONG
506 "B" Sapper Co	H-42	Hon Thu 21618 M	?xSMG ?xB-40	CO-LIEU XO-KY PO-DO/HONG/ANH
95A Sapper Co	C95A Sapper Co		1xB-40 1xB-41 1x60mm Mort 1xM-79	CO-Le HOA XO-TUYEN PO-DAY APO-Nguyen SO
95B Sapper Co	C95B Sapper Co		2xB-40 1x57mm RR 1x60mm Mort	CO-2ndLt Pham Tan HOAI XO-MSgt Phong Hong MINH PO-Asp Le Duy KHANH APO-CAY

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 35-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P)

a. Returnee, 1st Lt Nguyen Van THANH, Company Commander of the C.25 Co, 6th AA Bn, 270th NVA Regt, who rallied on 18 August 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 131683) (1st ARVN Div 230800Z August 1969 Inter Rpt 69-69) stated that the 6th Bn, which is composed of the C.25 thru C.28 Co's, has a strength of approximately 250 men. Subject provided the following unit locations: 270th Regt Hqs (YD 188870); Regt Staff Section (YD 150921); Rear Service Section (YD 160890); Rear Regt Command Section (YD 187868); 6th AA Bn Hqs (YD 156913), C.25 Co (YD 170889), C.26 Co (YD 095876), C.27 Co (YD 153893), C.28 Co (YD 158862), C.12 Med Co (YD 120933); 164th Arty Regt located along coastal area of VINH LINH Special Zone with positions at (YD 135815), (YD 220868) and (YD 140755); and the 218th AA Regt located from QUANG BINH (P) to VINH LINH (P) (CNA). THANH stated the mission of his unit was to shoot down U.S./Allied aircraft. According to THANH, the troops were not directly involved with AA Guns might possibly be transferred to infantry units as reinforcements during the Autumn-Winter Offensive and would infiltrate into RVN to attack allied forces in the B-5 Front area. THANH also stated that the mission of the 164th Arty Regt was to protect VINH LINH (P) and provide artillery support for infantry units in northern QUANG TRI (P), and that the mission of the 218th AA Regt was road and bridge defense. Source revealed that most men in his company were unhappy because they did not like the policy which favors the Communist Party Members and that they have never been granted any leave. Source provided the following LBN'S: 6th AA Bn - 32552 XB, 25th Co - 32553 XB, 26th Co- 32554 XB, 27th Co - 32555 XB and 28th Co - 32556 XB. Subject stated his company lost 45 men and two 37mm AA Guns before the bombing halt, but they received replacements almost immediately. Subject also stated that each company in his battalion had four 37mm AA Guns. The 164th Arty Regt is equipped with an unknown number of 85mm, 105mm, 175mm, and 203mm artillery pieces, and the 218th AA Regt has 14mm, 37mm, 50mm, 57mm, and 85mm weapons. Reported personalities: 270th Regt CO-Col Hoang DUON, XO-Maj KHOI, CofS-Maj KHOI, PO-Maj LAN, APO-Maj Bui TAN, Services CO-Capt THUONG; 6th AA Bn CO-Capt PHU, XO-Capt Nguyen KY, CofS-Capt Nguyen KY, PO-Capt PHU, APO-1stLt DUNG; C.25 Co XO-2ndLt Lai Van THINH, PO-2ndLt Nguyen Thu BA; C.26 Co Cmdr-1stLt Nguyen HAI, XO-2ndLt NGUYEN; C.27 Co Cmdr-1stLt VE, PO-1stLt SAM; C.28 Co Cmdr-1stLt VUONG; 218th AA Regt CO-Ong NGO.

(G-2 COMMENT: Two recent PW's, CPL Hoang Minh TAN, 4th Sapper Co, 270th Regt, captured on 8 June 1969 and PVT Le Van TRUNG, 9th Co, 6th Bn, 270th Regt, captured on 18 June 1969 revealed there was a 6th AA Bn, 270th Regt. The personality given as 270th Regt CO correlates with III MAF OOB holdings (F-2). III MAF OOB carries the armament of the 164th Arty Regt as 105mm Howitzers and 60mm Mortars. The NVA are not credited with possessing the 175 or 203mm artillery pieces (F-4). The 218th AA Regt is carried in NVN OOB as subordinate to the 367th AAA Command. Reported composition of 270 Regiment is rated (F-2).)

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b. PW, PFC Nguyen Van CU, 3rd Co, 49th Bn, QUANG BINH (P) Unit, captured on 19 August 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 060688) (1st ARVN Div 251400Z August 1969 Inter Rpt 70-69) stated there were approximately 300 men in the 49th Bn which is composed of three companies (1, 2, and 3). PW also stated he saw approximately 100 men of the Hqs Section, QUANG BINH (P) Unit located near the 49th Bn CP which is located vicinity (XD 9777) and the location of the 3rd Co was near (YD 060688). The mission of his unit was to attack ARVN forces in RVN. CU revealed that prior to joining the 3rd Co, 49th Bn, he received four months of training on 85mm direct fire weapons with the 3rd Co, 13th Arty Bn, QUANG BINH (P) Unit which was located in the vicinity of (YD 650305). CU provided the following LBN's: 13th Arty Bn - 32245 RT, 2nd Co, 13th Arty Bn - 32246 RT, 13th Arty Bn - 32247 RT. Source stated the 3rd Co, 49th Bn left the base area which is located in the vicinity of (XD 9777) on 17 August 1969 and crossed BEN HAI River (XD 993704) then proceeded to ambush site (YD 060688). Source also stated that the 49th Bn had five Chicom 702-D Radios. Call signs for the companies were: T1 (1st Co) and T2 (2nd Co). Reported personalities: QUANG BINH (P) Unit Hqs Section CO-LtCol SU, PO-NGHI; 3rd Co, 49th Bn, Cmdr-VIEN, XO-LA, PO-THANG; 13th Arty Bn, CO-1stLt DIEN, XO-1stLt DANG; 2nd Co Cmdr-1stLt GIAO, XO-TON, PO-BAN; 3rd Co Cmdr-1stLt DINH, PO-TOAN; 7th Co Cmdr-CAY, XO-TRA, PO-THAN.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB carries a 13th Arty (Mortar) Bn subordinate to the B-5 Front located in VINH LINH Special Zone. The 49th Bn has been previously reported by a PW from a 45th Bn, QUANG BINH Provincial Unit who stated that there were five battalions in the Provincial Unit designated 45 thru 49. All information (F-6).)

2. THUA THIEN (P). No significant reports.

3. QUANG NAM (P)

a. PW, PFC Nong Van TU, 5th Co, 91st Sapper Bn, who was captured on 20 August 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 8747) (SA QUANG NAM Sector HOI AN RVN 230830Z 11th ITT 67-69) stated the 91st Sapper Bn has a strength of 320 men and location of the unit was in the vicinity of (AT 875475). The battalion has a base camp located in the vicinity of (AT 950410). The PW further stated the mission of the unit was to continuously attack USMC locations in the vicinity of DUC DUC (D) Headquarters in order to demoralize the U.S. Troops. The PW stated his infiltration began in December of 1968 (Infiltration Group Number is unknown) taking a route through QUANG BINH (P), NVN, into LAOS, to KONTUM (P), RVN finally arriving in QUANG NAM (P) on 1 April 1969. Reported personalities: 91st Bn CO-Capt DUOC, XO-Capt HOA, PO-Capt HUNG.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 91st is an AKA for the 3rd Sapper Bn. The strength given by the PW for this unit is higher than currently held by OOB. Current strength is estimated at 250 (F-4). The location of the units

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base camp is very close to where OOB currently holds the 3rd Sapper Bn. This is the first report of the personalities in association with this unit. All information except strength (F-3).)

b. Hoi Chanh, CPL Pham Van NGOC, 5th Co, 577th Arty Bn who rallied on 25 August 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 867474) (SA QUANG NAM Sector 11th ITT HOI AN 68-69, 272115Z August 1969) stated his unit, with 500 men, was located in the vicinity of (ZC 180560) as of 21 August 1969. The Hoi Chanh further stated the mission of his unit was to shell air-strips at DUC DUC Hqs and DANANG, the industrial area of AN HOA and to collect rice for the rainy season. According to the Hoi Chanh, 80 men of his unit are looking for a chance to desert. Reported personalities: Bn CO-SrCapt LAU, XO-SrCapt THE.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location for the 577th Bn is in the area held by OOB. The mission, morale and personalities all coincide with OOB Holdings (F-3).)

c. PW, SrLt Duong Van KHUYEN, Bn PO of 1st Bn, 36th Regt, captured on 8 August 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 957373) (1st MARDIV 13th ITT Interr Rpts 091522Z, 110755Z, 195558Z and 221545Z August 1969) stated that the 1st Bn was located in the vicinity of (AT 9538) and the 36th Regt CP was located in the vicinity of (AT 9539) as of 28 July 1969. PW stated that the present mission of the 1st Bn was to block U.S. operations in HON TAU Mountain area, and the future mission is to attack HILL 55 (AT 970620) and VINH DIEN (BT 065583) as part of many large attacks that are to take place in the offensive. Morale is low due to heavy casualties and fear of death. Reported personalities: 36th Regt CO-Major Do PHAN, XO-Sr Capt Nguyen SOAN, PO-May Truong Trung THANG; 1st Bn CO-Capt Luan MINH.

(G-2 COMMENT: The PWs location for the 1st Bn corresponds with present OOB holdings. His statements concerning the planned attack on HILL 55, the personalities and unit morale are in accord with OOB Holdings. All information rated (F-2).)

d. Hoi Chanh, PFC Nguyen Hoai LOC, 11th Co, 16th (AKA 2nd) Bn, 141st Regt, who rallied on 19 August 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 922685) (1st MARDIV 11th ITT Rpts 201354Z and 270747Z August 1969) stated that the location of the 11th Co was in the vicinity of NUI CHAU Mountain (AT 895685) and that the company, with 45 men, had a mission of collecting rice. The morale is low and there is no will to fight because of lack of food. Reported personalities: 11th Co Cmdr-Lt LANG, XO-WO DUC, PO-DONG.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location given for the 11th Co is within the AO of the 141st Regt. All information rated (F-3).)

e. Hoi Chanh, SrSgt Nguyen Duc HANH, 3rd Co, 69th Replacement Bn, unknown Regt, Front-4 who rallied on 20 August 1969 in the vicinity of

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(BT 084498) (CG First MARDIV 231617Z 1st ITT 54-08-69) stated that the 3rd Co is located in the vicinity of (AT 989460) and the 1st Co is located in the vicinity of (AT 9944). The Hoi Chanh stated that they were waiting for reassignment to units in Front 44 and were to go on a rice gathering mission in the vicinity of (BT 040520) and (BT 070475). Hoi Chanh further stated he infiltrated with the 32nd Bn, Capital Regt, Infiltration Group No 1083 strength 450, on 14 March 1969. The Hoi Chanh crossed into LAOS on foot and proceeded on to KONTUM (P) in late April of 1969. In early June, the unit moved to an unknown mountain area in QUANG NAM (P). The 3rd and 4th Co's, 32nd Bn were assigned to the 69th Replacement Bn.

(G-2 COMMENT: There have been previous reports by PW's of a 69th Replacement unit or a D.69 Unit which is reportedly located on the ONG THU Slope in the vicinity of Base Area 112. Previous reports have been received of the 32nd Bn. All information (F-3).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). No significant reports.

5. QUANG NGAI (P). Hoi Chanh, CPL, Tran Van CHIEU, 71st Co, 7th Bn, 22nd NVA Regt, 3rd NVA Div rallied on 26 August 1969 in the vicinity of (BS 544436) (AMERICAL msg 2607302 August 1969) stated the 7th Bn has five companies designated 71 thru 75 and each company has a strength of 23 to 30 men. CHIEU also stated that the 7th Bn was located in the vicinity of (BS 0643) on 22 August 1969. Subject stated that he left NVN in June of 1969 with the 3rd Bn, strength 400, and arrived in QUANG NGAI (P) RVN in April 1969. Tran Van TAI was the infiltration group leader.

(G-2 COMMENT: Subject located the 7th Bn six kilometers north of where III MAF presently holds the location of the 7th Bn (F-3). Subject is believed to be underestimating the strength of the 7th Bn (F-4).)

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ADDENDUM 1 TO ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 35-69

1. PW, Be Ich DAO, of the Independent Transportation Platoon, 2nd Agricultural Unit (AKA 2nd NVA Div) captured in the vicinity of (BT 172129) on 22 August 69 ("C" Co, 5th SFGA, Interog Rpt SF-107-69 of 22 Aug 69) stated his platoon's strength is 30 men and its mission is to gather rice and transport it to the TRA MY area (BS 1198) in QUANG TIN (P). Source further stated that the location of the Staff Hqs of the 2nd Div is located in the vicinity (BS 115981). The morale in the source's unit is low as the troops have misgivings about the bombardments, numerous allied ground operations and the superior weaponry used against them. Many of them have not heard from home in years and it has had a demoralizing effect on them. Subject began his infiltration in March 68. From THAI NGUYEN (P), NVN, DAO travelled through LAOS and arrived at the 1st Liberation Station (which is also known as Area "B") in January 69. The station, which is located in the vicinity of (BS 0499), is where NVA units are assigned to units in QUANG TIN (P).

(G-2 COMMENT: The location of the 2nd NVA Div Hqs reported by DAO is in the same area as reported by another PW in June 69. Due to the regiments of the division being located from QUANG TIN to QUANG NGAI (P's) it is very likely that the division Hqs is located in the area as stated. All information rated (F-3).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 35-69

1. GENERAL. Counterintelligence related VC/VCI activity during the reporting period was characterized by numerous reports concerning VC meetings and intents related to furthering the "people's struggle for liberation" during the late August-mid-September phase of the Summer-Fall offensive. The most often mentioned objectives of this planned offensive continue to be the disruption of pacification programs, undermining of the GVN administration, control of the population and "neutralization" of attitudes against the PRG.

The intended plans call for maximum coordination of the "three pronged attack" (military, political and proselyting) to be carried out at all levels. Current indications are that the political and proselyting efforts are underway as evidenced by increased levels of propaganda activity and continued emphasis on harassment of refugee/resettlement camps.

Sabotage activity during the week was low and primarily centered in NICTZ with no reports noted in the southern two provinces.

Reported terrorist incidents continue at a relatively high level and continue to reflect a concerted effort to "drive" the populace away from refugee/resettlement camps, and to intimidate GVN administrators and/or disrupt all pacification programs. There presently seems to be little question that the basic intent of reported terrorist incidents is to dramatically display to the populace that the GVN cannot effectively provide security for the people.

Recent reports, captured documents and PW's indicate recent upgrading in the use of sapper units to carry out the military tasks in support of political objectives. It appears that VC reconnaissance/sapper units, special action units and city sapper cells are being given greater emphasis in the overall strategy for "victory" and, as such, will pose a substantial threat to US installations and US personnel. It should also be noted that recent VC propaganda and captured documents point towards intensified targeting of US materials and personnel.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. Reported VC/VCI intelligence gathering activities during this week fails to depict any definable pattern of either an increased or significant VCI intelligence collection effort. However, this should not be construed as indicating any reduced intelligence gathering effort.

Captured documents continually reflect the degree of past successes in the collection efforts of both military reconnaissance units and VCI elements throughout ICTZ.

Some of the more significant reports received follow:

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a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 13 August 1969, a US MI source reported that 22 VC were operating between Thon Thiet Trang (H) (YD 114498) and Dinh Dien Xoa (H) (YD 087501) collecting information on the Project Delta Special Forces Camp (Eval: F-6).

(2) On 18 August 1969, a US MI source reported the H-3 NVA platoon dispatched personnel dressed as farmers to collect information at Phuong Son (H) (YD 382587), An Luu (H) (YD 395583), Thuong Trach (H) (YD 402577), Linh Cau (H) (YD 418567), and Van Phong (H) (YD 405567) (Eval: F-6).

(3) On 20 August 1969, a US MI source reported that seventeen VC were on an intelligence collection and reconnaissance mission at YD 080566 (Eval: F-6).

(4) On 24 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the VC cadre of Hai Lang and Mai Linh Districts held a joint meeting in the jungle area along the Chu stream at YD 356432. The purpose of the meeting was to review operations and to improve the operational policies of the two districts. They also discussed sapper and counterintelligence activities in Quang Tri City and neighboring areas (F-6).

b. Thua Thien. On 18 August 1969, a US MI source reported that two unidentified VC/NVA companies were located at YD 499323 asking villagers of the Huynh Lien area about friendly forces at the Pho Trach Bridge (YD 519348) (Eval: F-6).

c. Quang Nam. On 23 August 1969, a US MI source reported that an unidentified main force suicide unit was located in the vicinity of BT 058499 with the intention of disguising themselves as civilians in order to collect information on the Cau Lau Bridge BT 092553 and the Nam Phuoc Post (CNA) (Eval: C-6).

d. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 21 August 1969, a GVN source reported that the Quang Ngai city VC committee has infiltrated 16 male and female sappers into the city to obtain information and to harass and support the VC when they attack the city. Two female sappers, Thi Hoang and Thi Quyen penetrated the city on 15 August 1969. Two hairpins are worn parallel in the left side of their hair for recognition and communications (unevaluated).

(2) On 23 August 1969, a US MI source reported that Company C-47, located in the vicinity of BS 662612 had the mission of organizing a spy system, collecting information and gathering food (Eval: C-2).

3. SABOTAGE. Reported sabotage incidents again showed a decrease from the previous week. Reported incidents were primarily in Quang Nam (P)

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with no incidents reported in the two southernmost provinces of ICTZ. LOC interdiction remained the primary target of sabotage attempts. There were two successful sabotage incidents against the Hue-Danang Railway. Of particular interest is the reported sapper targeting of specific US billets in Danang City. A listing of reported sabotage incidents is as follows:

a. Quang Tri. On 23 August 1969, the VC fired 20 rounds of mixed 60mm mortar and B-40 rocket fire into the Cam Lo Bridge (vic YD 148601) resulting in negative casualties. (No damage assessment indicated).

b. Thua Thien. On 24 August 1969, a US MI source reported that 14 personnel of an unidentified VC frogman team were dispersed in houses and boats in Tan Sa (H) (YD 950224). They observe ARVN and US river craft movements in the areas of Thuy Tu (CNA), Cu Thuan (CNA) and Cua Hien (CNA). They plan to sabotage these craft on the night of 26 August 1969 (Eval: F-6).

c. Quang Nam.

(1) On 25 August 1969, a US MI source reported that 17 personnel of an unidentified VC/NVA sapper team were located in the vicinity of AT 942928. They plan to lay explosives at an unidentified dock on Son Cha Island (BT 015945) at unknown time in the future (Eval: C-6).

(2) On 29 August 1969, a command type detonated mine destroyed five meters of railroad track, damaged the train engine, five railroad cars and wounded one railroad security official at AT 834982.

(3) On 29 August 1969, a rescue train ran over a command detonated type mine, damaging the engine, derailing four cars, destroying ten meters of track and wounding seven Vietnamese railroad security officials at AT 841962.

(4) A recently captured document states that the following locations have been targeted for sapper attacks in the Danang area.

(a) US officers quarters located at the corner of Nguyen Thi Giang and Pasteur Streets, Danang.

(b) Grand Hotel on Bach Dang Street.

(c) US Hotel on Bach Dang Street near the civilian ferryboat, CORDS building, and Industrial Relations Department building.

The period of greatest damage is believed to be between 29 August and 2 September 1969 (III MAF Eval: F-3).

(5) On 29 August 1969, the 9th Engineers Bn discovered a 250lb. bomb rigged for electrical detonation at the north end of the Ba Ren Bridge (BT 102512).

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4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Viet Cong propaganda activities continued at a high level. VC cadre were directed to push forward the "people's struggle for liberation" and the policies and propaganda of the NLF'S Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). The people were to be incited to conduct demonstrations utilizing slogans and demands for abolishment of the draft, a peaceful settlement of the war, and the formation of a coalition government with the PRG. The people have been generally unreceptive to this type activity and the demonstrations have, as yet, failed to materialize. Recent VC propaganda leaflets have been directed at the GVN forces emphasizing the NLF's "Ten Points for Peace" and attempting to discredit the initiative and intentions of US forces in RVN.

The general failure of the VC to persuade people to return to VC controlled areas has resulted in more emphasis on use of coercion and terror to force the people out of GVN controlled areas.

a. Quang Tri. On 19 August 1969, a platoon of VC entered Bac Binh (H) (YD 132602) to distribute propaganda leaflets and hold propaganda lectures. They (VC) talked about the US troop withdrawal of 25,000 men and that the NLF had won a great victory.

On 23 August 1969, a US MI source reported a VC sapper platoon made contact with a PF platoon and Civil Defense troops at YD 218708. The VC broke contact and fled, leaving behind propaganda leaflets. The leaflets were translated as follows:

2nd ARVN Regiment, why do you have to go on operations in the jungle area so much?

(1) To avoid American casualties in the time period nearing the end of the war. They force you to operate in these areas, so Americans will be safe in the rear areas.

(2) How many days have you been on operations in each month in the last following months? More than 500 soldiers in 4th Bn were killed or wounded in April 1969 because Americans forced them into the jungle area.

(3) 2nd ARVN Regiment, the Americans will be defeated, and can't avoid it, so Americans have been trying to retreat from this war. Why don't you try and avoid dying by doing the following:

(a) Talk against all the operation orders, don't go to the field and don't join the service and fight.

(b) Make contact with NLF cadres, and make an agreement that you won't kill the people working with NLF troops.

(c) Leave the enemy lines, put down your weapons and give up whenever you meet NLF troops, so you can avoid being killed, then you

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will be safe and returned to your families. By doing this, no bombs and ammunition will be fired your way. The people of North and South Vietnam are ready to welcome you.

Ten principles for guidance for the solution of all the problems of South Vietnam, they contribute to reform peace in Vietnam by the NLF of South Vietnam. These were used at the Paris Peace Talks in the meeting on 8 May 1969:

(1) Respect foundation rights of the Vietnamese people that are independence, sovereignty, unification, territorial integrity of Vietnam that are confirmed by the Geneva Convention of 1954.

(2) U.S. government should retreat their troops, war facilities and its Allies from Vietnam without any conditions, destroy all American combat bases in South Vietnam, abandon all aggression to both South and North Vietnam's country, sovereignty, and security.

(3) The right of Vietnamese people to fight to save their country is their individual right. All the Armed Forces problem in South Vietnam will be settled by themselves.

(4) The people in South Vietnam settle their internal problems by themselves without interference from outside the country. The people shall decide and vote for the political regime of South Vietnam by general election, democratic freedom.

(5) In this period of time during the general election, no one will force the people in South Vietnam to vote other than for his political regime. All the political force representatives will be for the people and political trends in South Vietnam must include all of the people. Countries outside of Vietnam must agree for peace, independence and be neutral in order to talk. These countries must agree that a Provisional Coalition government will be the answer for independence in South Vietnam.

(6) South Vietnam wants a neutral foreign policy, with Cambodia and Laos and establish foreign relations for economics with all countries.

(7) The unification of Vietnam to be realized between North and South Vietnam, depending on the Peace Talks.

(8) During the waiting time for unification the following will be observed:

(a) South and North Vietnam will not join up with any foreign country for military assistance.

(b) All foreign military troops will leave South Vietnam.

(c) All POW's will be freed.

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(9) U.S. government will be held responsible for damages caused by Americans to the North Vietnamese people.

(10) We will agree for international supervision for POW and war facilities of Americans out of South Vietnam.

Second ARVN Regiment, with this statement, "if you want peace," request Saigon and U.S. government to agree to the above ten principles.

b. Thua Thien. On 20 August 1969, four NVA approached a group of woodcutters at ZD 035008 and asked about their attitudes toward U.S. troops and the NLF. They also made an appeal for recruits.

On 25 August 1969, a US MI source reported that on 23 August 1969, approximately 80 personnel of one unidentified VC/NVA company deployed in the Ba Tron area (YD 595378) and approximately 150 personnel of two unidentified VC/NVA companies deployed in the Chanh An area (YD 560433). The personnel spoke with a Quang Tri accent and wore brown uniforms, blue shawls around their neck, and rubber sandals. They divided into five to six man teams to propagandize the populace to interfere with the efforts of the pacification and RDC organizations and to establish their own rural government and cadre organizations (Eval: F-3).

c. Quang Nam. On 18 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the Hoa Vang (D) level cadre have directed all VC village and hamlet level cadre to push forward the people's struggle for liberation and the policies and propaganda of Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). The Hoa Vang (D) directive set down a series of "Military" and "Political" policies to be instituted by village and hamlet level cadre.

Military

All NVA/VC units must prepare for the up-coming offensive; drilling, training, studying enemy targets, and disciplining themselves for the struggle.

All NVA/VC Main Force, Local Force, and guerrilla units will unite in a solidarity effort to strike the enemy with a devastating blow.

Local Force and guerrilla units will prepare for the offensive by properly training all cadre in sapper tactics of harrassment and destruction in order to strike the enemy's war supply lines.

All enemy para-military units will be attacked and eliminated-National Police units, Revolutionary Cadre units, and Popular Force units.

By the end of 1969 each village will have formed a guerrilla squad of 10-15 men exclusively trained in sapper tactics; each district will have formed two companies of 60-70 men, also, particularly trained in sapper tactics.

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Special sapper units will interdict enemy check points and road blocks in the critical zone of Danang City and in Hoa Vang (D).

Political

All political cadre will prepare for PRG victory by instructing all military forces, such as guerrilla units and special action units, in the ideology and policy of the PRG.

All units will push forward proselyting in order to neutralize the Open Arms Program and the Psywar of the GVN.

All political units will agitate the people against the GVN Draft Law and recruit young people in the cities and villages for reinforcement of existing NVA/VC units in the field.

All political cadre will unite to organize the labor force to serve as commo-liaison cadre, ammunition carriers, and to assist in the evacuation of wounded soldiers during offensive activities.

All military and political units will push to consolidate and further unify the liberated zones.

The infiltration of all resettlement areas will be organized and carried out by political cadre to propagandize the policies of the PRG in order to prepare for the coming phase of political struggle.

Political cadre will motivate the people to struggle everywhere for peace and for social justice and democracy from the GVN oppressors (Eval: F-3).

On 19 August 1969, a US MI source reported that about 30 members of Q-81 LF company entered the people's homes of Tra Khe #1 (H) (BT 090681), Tra Khe #2 (BT 075681), and Tra Khe #3 (H) (BT 076673) and told them that the summer campaign had started and that the NLF flag must be displayed throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The VC were commanded by Hung (nfi) and they will attempt to kidnap local government cadre (Eval: F-3).

On 23 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the VC have received instructions to increase Allied harrassment by increasing sapper attacks where American personnel gather, such as snackbars, restaurants and bars. These attacks are to be country wide. In Quang Nam (P) the VC will launch rocket attacks against Danang airbase, Danang City, and all refugee centers (Eval: B-2).

On 24 August 1969, two PF's were wounded by a booby trapped M-26 grenade as they attempted to remove VC propaganda placards attached to bamboo poles at AT 888476.

On 25 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the Hoa Vang (D) VC cadre held a meeting at Hoa Cuong (V) (BT 026738) to discuss the formulation

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of a listing of all villagers in each village of the district. This will be done to help the VC control the population of each village. The control mechanism will consist of numerous three man cells which will operate in the liberated sections of each village. These cells will ensure that the survey is conducted properly, money is collected to support VC efforts and that whenever PRG elections are held, the cell leaders will ensure that the people will vote for the NLF (Eval: F-3).

On 25 August 1969, a US MI source reported that VC political cadre have directed that during the period 27 August to 2 September 1969, all people will commemorate the Buddhist 15th of July Lunar Year Holiday (27 August 1969) by demonstrating against the GVN and American occupation forces. The people are directed to use slogans and demands for the abolishment of the draft, a peaceful settlement of the war, and the formation of a coalition government with the PRG (Eval: F-3).

On 26 August 1969, a US MI source reported that on the nights of 25 and 26 August 1969, one VC political team entered Son Thuy (H) (BT 066710) and Dong Hai (H) (BT 075707) and propagandized the people that the summer campaign has not been successful, the people have the responsibility to support the PRG and they must protect VC cadre whenever they enter a hamlet (Eval: F-3).

d. Quang Ngai. On 23 August 1969, a US MI source reported that on 15 August 1969, the VC held a meeting in Phu Nhieu (H) (BS 723867). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the development of a base area (nfi), a plan to expand the area that is under their control and keep the population from moving to the GVN controlled area. The 40 participants who attended the meeting were ordered to destroy the GVN pacification program, assassinate GVN officials and to dispatch troops (nfi) and sapper units (nfi) to destroy GVN administrative agencies (nfi) (Eval: F-6).

On 25 August 1969, a US MI source reported that on 22 August 1969, a VC meeting was held in the vicinity of the Da Son area (BS 478712). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss missions of the "Fall, Summer" campaign 1969 (Eval: F-6).

On 21 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the VC had established an Inter-Region Task Force" in eastern Son Tinh and Binh Son districts. The mission of the task force is to reorganize low level PRG committees, execute the PRG's policies concerning education, public health, farm production, and military proselyting (Eval: F-3).

On 24 August 1969, a GVN source reported that the VC District Committee of Duc Pho (D) is initiating a campaign to disrupt the people of Duc Pho (D) by increasing shelling attacks, attacks on refugee camps; thus forcing the people back to VC controlled areas. Also the VC plan to attack ARVN bases in Duc Pho (D) between 22 August 1969 and 2 September 1969 (Unevaluated).

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On 24 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the VC District Committee of Mo-Duc (D) held a three day congress at Thach Thang (H) (BS 785505). The VC gave instructions to their action teams, district forces and guerrillas to launch many large offensives into GVN base areas to break up pacification programs, penetrate refugee camps to release the people and force them to return to their native villages (Unevaluated).

5. TERROR. Reported terrorist incidents remained at a relatively high level and generally unchanged in character from the previous week. The trend of the past week indicates added emphasis is being directed toward forcing the people, particularly those in refugee and resettlement camps to return to VC controlled areas. The form of terrorism being utilized appears to be political indoctrination followed by destruction of homes, assassinations and kidnappings. Reports indicate that NVA/VC High command has recently upgraded the rating of sapper units in the field and in cities. Sapper tactics are apparently being given greater emphasis in the overall military strategy for victory. Reported targeting of Allied military installations, particularly in the Danang area, has intensified and poses a threat to the security of US installations and an individual threat to American personnel as targets of opportunity for sapper tactics.

A report from a US MI source indicated that the VC Special Action (SAPPER) Squads in Quang Nam (P) have been instructed to use two explosive charges equipped with time fuses when planting explosives in US/ARVN vehicles. The second charge with an additional 15 minute delay would be planted nearby in the hope of causing high personnel casualties (Eval: C-3).

A US MI source reported that the VC organized a sapper group of about 40 young boys and girls between the ages of 12-17 years old. One group of about 20 infiltrated Danang City and the other group infiltrated Can Le Village, Hoa Vang (D). They are equipped with satchel charges (nfi) and individual weapons (nfi). The sappers intend to place satchel charges at places which are frequented by Allied forces and GVN cadre such as restaurants and bars (nfi) (Eval: F-6).

See Appendix 2 for a listing of terrorist incidents in ICTZ.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Quang Tri. On 19 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the Cua-Mai Loc VC cadre intend to create ten villages sympathetic to the communist/VC program. Experimental sites for these villages were the My Son area (YD 110513), Thiet Ha (YD 100504), and Mai Trung (YD 1055070). The populace will consist of guerrillas, VC cadre and pro-communist refugees (Eval: F-6).

On 20 August 1969, a US MI source reported that six VC were to collect food, money and clothing at Luong Kin (H) (YD 325650), Coa Hy (H) (YD 320640), Viet Yen (H) (YD 307640), Vinh Lai (H) (YD 325628), and Ba La (H) (YD 324630) (Eval: C-3).

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b. Thua Thien. CAP 3-4-2 was informed by villagers that their hamlet at YD 688245, 5 km west of Hue, had been entered by approximately 120 VC who stole 1,000 pounds of rice and 500 pounds of peanuts before fleeing west.

APPENDIXES
1-Statistical Compilation of People's Revolutionary Committees in ICTZ
2-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 35-69

People's Revolutionary Committees reported by name and/or location as of 30 August 1969

	Quang Tri	Thua Thien	Quang Nam	Quang Tin	Quang Ngai	Total
Region (MRTTH)						1
Province	1	1	1	1	1	5
District	2	5	2	1	9	19
City		1	2			3
Village	37	36	76	49	107	305
Hamlet	31	59	16	11	122	239
Precinct		1				1
Total	71	103	97	62	239	573

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 35-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Tri	21Aug69 (Late Entry)	YD 435495	Three VC entered Cu Hoan (H) and assassinated one civilian (nfi).
	21Aug69 (Late Entry)	YD 333520	VC fired two rounds of 122mm rocket fire into Thach Nan (H) killing two civilians and wounding eight.
	21Aug69 (Late Entry)	YD 337538	VC fired six rounds of 60mm mortar fire into Co Thanh (H). Negative casualties or damages.
Thua Thien	21Aug69 (Late Entry)	YD 505408	One VC squad entered a resettlement camp at Phong Binh (H), killed one civilian and wounded three.
	22Aug69 (Late Entry)	YD 958067	VC entered Loc An (V) and kidnapped one civilian.
	24Aug69	YD 916216	The 955th RF Company engaged an USEF with SAF. A sweep of the area revealed one old woman, apparantly beaten to death by the VC.
	24Aug69	YD 907104	An USEF entered Phu Bai #2 (H) and kidnapped two civilians (nfi). Later that same day, the same force kidnapped one civilian at Phu Bai #1 (H) (YD 902112).
	26Aug69	ZD 088017	VC entered Loc Tri (V) and assassinated one civilian.
	27Aug69	YD 955084	VC fired ten rounds of B-40 rocket fire into the 956th RF Company, wounding one civilian.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Thua Thien	27Aug69	YD 911222	One civilian was wounded when he triggered a booby trap (nfi).
Quang Nam	22Aug69 (Late Entry)	BT 111500	A Vietnamese civilian was ambushed while riding a motor scooter on Highway 1, by four VC, resulting in one civilian wounded.
	22Aug69 (Late Entry)	AT 936688	VC entered Huong Son (H) and burned seven homes.
	22Aug69 (Late Entry)	BT 095528	VC shelled Long Huyen (H) with B-40 rockets, wounding four civilians.
	24Aug69	AT 821371	Ninh Binh (H) received SAF and two rounds of B-40 rocket fire, wounding the village chief.
	24Aug69	BT 168580	Two Vietnamese, digging in a filled-in foxhole, triggered an M-26 grenade booby trap, resulting in one civilian killed and one wounded.
	24Aug69	BT 012572	VC entered Triem Trung (H) and kidnapped 14 youths.
	24Aug69	BT 095518	VC entered Phuoc My (H) and assassinated one youth (nfi).
	25Aug69	AT 983628	RD team #34, while at a resettlement camp at That Cam (H) triggered an unknown type mine, killing two civilians (one the Cau Son (H) chief) and wounding three.
	25Aug69	BT 161573	The Cam Chau (V) chief opened the door to his office at Son Pho (H), triggering an unknown type booby trap, wounding the village chief and two other civilians.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	26Aug69	AT 991760	A mixed group of ARVN soldiers and civilians were playing cards when two explosive charges were detonated, resulting in two killed and fifteen wounded.
	27Aug69	BT 082557	Cau Mong (H) received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, killing one civilian and wounding 18 others.
	27Aug69	BT 070575	VC entered Trung Phu (H) and kidnapped six PSDF.
	27Aug69	BT 018483	A civilian, who was attending a Buddhist holiday ceremony, detonated a VC booby trap resulting in his death.
	28Aug69	BT 135526	A civilian accidentally detonated a VC mine in Xuyen An (V). One civilian killed and one wounded.
	28Aug69	AT 928578	VC placed a claymore mine at a civilian home in Hoan My (H), which exploded, killing one civilian and wounding eight others.
	28Aug69	BT 022490	Two children were killed by a VC mine.
	30Aug69	BT 034786	At 17 Yen Bai street a soda can was thrown into a jeep which was parked and unattended. The soda can contained a blasting cap and probable C-4. The cap exploded but didn't ignite the C-4. Negative casualties or damages.
Quang Tin	22Aug69 (Late Entry)	BT 281211	VC fired three rounds of 122mm rocket fire and twenty rounds of 82mm mortar fire into a location 1.5 kilometers west of Tam Ky (C), killing five civilians.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Tin	27Aug69	BT 250150	Long Son (H) received twelve rounds 82mm mortar fire, destroying five houses.
	28Aug69	BT 474050	A hand grenade exploded during a PSYOPS movie, killing eight civilians and wounding forty-five.
	29Aug69	AT 952278	Seven Vietnamese, including adults and children, were found dead, believed to have been assassinated by the NVA. All apparently had been shot in the head at close range.
Quang Ngai	21Aug69 (Late Entry)	BS 307397	PF platoon 115 while in night defensive position received fifteen rounds of 82mm mortar fire, killing nine civilians and wounding thirty-eight.
	22Aug69 (Late Entry)	BS 920348	180/172 RF Company were ambushed by an estimated one hundred NVA, killing one civilian, wounding one RF and eleven civilians.
	22Aug69 (Late Entry)	BS 807378	115th PF platoon received four rounds of 120mm mortar fire, wounding one PF and two civilians.
	22Aug69 (Late Entry)	BS 814358	A US road sweep team was ambushed on Route 1 by an USEF, killing one civilian and wounding eleven civilians and one PF.
	22Aug69 (Late Entry)	BS 819409	Two VC squads stopped two civilian buses about 3.5 kilometers NE of Duc Pho (C) and killed one civilian and wounded two others.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Ngai	24Aug69	BS 648795	PF platoon while providing hamlet security received SAF from an USEF, resulting in one civilian killed and ten civilians wounded.
	24Aug69	BS 643787	PSDF while guarding hamlet received SAF from an USEF killing three civilians and one PSDF member.
	27Aug69	BS 625655	A VC Company entered Phu Binh (V) and gathered the people for political speeches. Upon departing, the VC destroyed two hundred and sixty homes and abducted forty-one civilians.

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ANNEX D (SEPTEMBER WEATHER BRIEF) TO III MAF PERINTREP 35-69

1. General Weather. Weather conditions in September will continue to be generally favorable for tactical operations throughout the I CTZ, except for short periods of reduced visibility during rain showers and in the low lying stratus clouds on the windward mountains slopes. During the first half of the month, the I CTZ will remain under the effects of the southwest monsoon; however, the transition to the northeast monsoon generally commences during the latter half of the month in the area north of DANANG. Little change in humidity may be expected, but the mean temperature in the coastal areas drop four to six degrees. September is the month of maximum typhoon activity. Typhoons form or move into the South China Sea on the average of two every three years. The incidence of tropical storms has been three every two years.

2. Precipitation.

a. Although the mean rainfall varies little from August to September, a significant increase can be expected along the coast of the I CTZ. The majority of precipitation occurs during afternoon and evening showers and thundershowers.

b. Precipitation occurs 10 to 15 days during the month along the coastal zone of I Corps, and up to 20 days in the interior. However, in the extreme southwest area (DO XA) precipitation may be expected up to 25 days of the month.

c. Mean precipitation is 10 to 20 inches throughout the I CTZ except for the DUC PHO area where less than 10 inches is normal, and the A SHAU Valley area where in excess of 20 inches can be expected.

d. The mean maximum precipitation has ranged from 40 to 60 inches in I CTZ except for northeastern QUANG TRI Province, where it is less than 40 inches. The mean minimum precipitation has been as low as one inch in the MO DUC - DUC PHO area; three inches in eastern QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces, and northeastern QUANG TRI Province; and six inches over the remainder of the I CTZ.

3. Thunderstorms. The mean number of days with thunderstorms in the I CTZ is seven.

4. Clouds

a. Cloudiness increases significantly in the area to the east of the ANNAM Mountains, while approximating that of August in the remainder of the I CTZ. Afternoon ceilings between 2,000 and 4,000 feet (1,000 to 3,000 in western I CTZ) are common.

b. Mean cloudiness ranges from 60 to 70 percent. The mean number of days with total cloud cover equal to or less than 3/10 varies from one to five.

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5. Visibility. Visibility in the coastal area should be excellent except during showers and thunderstorms. Early morning fog in the interior valleys occasionally restricts visibility to less than three miles. The poorest visibility during the year occurs in September on the western slopes of the ANNAM Mountains due to the fog and drizzle.

6. Temperature. The mean maximum temperatures are 85 degrees to 90 degrees along the coast, and 70 degrees to 85 degrees over the remainder of the zone. The mean minimum temperature is 74 degrees to 78 degrees along the coast, and 60 degrees to 70 degrees in the mountains.

7. Humidity. During September the mean relative humidity increases only slightly, with the exception of the eastern coastal plain where there is a significant increase. The highest daily humidities occur during early morning hours and after rainshowers, and the lowest usually occur during the afternoon. Mean relative humidity ranges between 80 to 90 percent throughout the ICTZ.

8. Astronomical Data. BMCT occurs 23 minutes prior to sunrise, and EECT occurs 23 minutes after sunset.

Date	Sunrise	Sunset	Moonrise	Moonset	Phase	% of Illumination
1	0634	1900	2235	1109		76
2	0634	1900	2317	1205		67
3	0634	1859	2337	1327		57
4	0634	1858	0003	1428	Last Phase	47
5	0634	1857	0055	1451		38
6	0635	1857	0148	1538		29
7	0635	1856	0240	1602		21
8	0635	1855	0334	1703		14
9	0635	1854	0427	1741		08
10	0635	1853	0519	1815		03
11	0635	1852	0611	1850		01
12	0635	1851	0701	1921	New Moon	00
13	0635	1850	0752	1951		01
14	0635	1849	0843	2032		05
15	0636	1848	0940	2112		11
16	0636	1847	1039	2158		18
17	0636	1847	1142	2249		27
18	0636	1846	1246	2347		38
19	0636	1846	1350	0054	1st Qtr	49
20	0636	1845	1449	0149		60
21	0636	1844	1543	0155		71
22	0636	1843	1633	0302		81
23	0636	1842	1716	0406		89
24	0637	1841	1756	0507		96
25	0637	1841	1833	0605		99
26	0637	1840	1909	0702	Full Moon	100
27	0637	1839	1948	0759		98
28	0637	1838	2027	0856		94
29	0637	1838	2109	0952		89
30	0637	1838	2155	1050		81

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DANANG TIDES FOR SEPTEMBER 1969

DATE	TIME	HEIGHT	DATE	TIME	HEIGHT
01	0130	3.9	16	0042	4.1
	0812	2.1		0740	1.8
	1418	3.4		1406	3.4
	1930	2.6		1854	2.7
02	0154	4.0	17	0106	4.2
	0906	2.1		0830	1.7
	1524	3.1		1524	3.2
	1936	2.8		1906	2.9
03	0218	4.0	18	0142	4.2
	1012	2.1		0936	1.7
	1724	2.9		1724	3.1
	1842	2.9		1836	3.1
04	0248	4.0	19	0218	4.3
	1130	2.0		1054	1.6
05	0318	4.0	20	0312	4.2
	1254	1.9		1218	1.6
06	0354	3.9	21	0424	4.1
	1400	1.8		1330	1.5
07	0448	3.8		2300	3.5
	1454	1.8		2318	3.5
08	0624	3.8	22	0606	4.0
	1530	1.7		1436	1.5
	2354	3.6		2224	3.5
09	0312	3.5	23	0212	3.3
	0754	3.8		0742	4.0
	1606	1.7		1524	1.6
	2342	3.6		2230	3.6
10	0348	3.3	24	0318	2.9
	0900	3.8		0900	4.0
	1636	1.7		1606	1.7
	2342	3.6		2242	3.7
11	0424	3.0	25	0406	2.6
	0954	3.8		1000	4.0
	1700	1.8		1624	1.8
	2342	3.6		2300	3.8
12	0500	2.8	26	0454	2.3
	1042	3.8		1054	3.9
	1724	1.9		1712	2.1
	2354	3.7		2324	3.9
13	0536	2.5	27	0536	2.0
	1124	3.8		1148	3.8
	1748	2.1		1742	2.3
14	0006	3.8		2342	4.0
	1612	2.2	28	0618	1.9
	1218	3.7		1236	3.6
	1812	2.3		1800	2.5

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DATE	TIME	HEIGHT	DATE	TIME	HEIGHT
15	0024	3.9	29	0006	4.1
	0654	2.0		0706	1.8
	1306	3.6		1330	3.4
	1836	2.5		1818	2.8
			30	0030	4.2
				0748	1.7
				1430	3.2
				1824	2.9

CHU LAI TIDES FOR SEPTEMBER 1969

DATE	TIME	HEIGHT	DATE	TIME	HEIGHT
01	0118	4.9	16	0024	5.2
	0806	3.1		0746	2.6
	1418	4.2		1412	4.3
	1848	3.7		1818	3.9
02	0136	5.2	17	0054	5.5
	0924	2.9		0854	2.4
03	0154	5.4	18	0124	5.7
	1054	2.8		1006	2.2
04	0224	5.5	19	0206	5.9
	1230	2.6		1130	2.0
05	0306	5.6	20	0300	5.9
	1342	2.4		1242	1.8
06	0348	5.6	21	0418	5.8
	1430	2.3		1348	1.8
07	0448	5.5	22	0542	5.8
	1506	2.2		1448	1.8
08	0554	5.5	23	0712	5.7
	1536	2.2		1536	2.0
09	0706	5.4		2306	4.4
	1600	2.2	24	0206	4.2
10	0812	5.4		0830	5.5
	1624	2.3		1612	2.3
11	0000	4.3		2254	4.4
	0254	4.2	25	0318	3.8
	0900	5.3		0936	5.4
	1648	2.5		1642	2.7
12	0354	3.9		2300	4.5
	1006	5.2	26	0424	3.3
	1712	2.7		1036	5.1
	2336	4.5		1712	3.1
13	0448	3.5		2306	4.7
	1100	5.1	27	0518	3.0
	1736	3.0		1142	4.8
	2348	4.7		1724	3.5
14	0542	3.2		2318	5.0
	1154	4.9	28	0612	2.7

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DATE	TIME	HEIGHT	DATE	TIME	HEIGHT
	1800	3.3		1248	4.5
15	0000	5.0		1730	3.9
	0636	2.9		2330	5.3
	1300	4.6	29	0706	2.5
	1812	3.6		2354	5.5
			30	0800	2.4

HUE TIDES FOR SEPTEMBER 1969

DATE	TIME	HEIGHT	DATE	TIME	HEIGHT
01	0216	3.2	16	0133	3.3
	0741	2.2		0733	2.1
	1501	3.0		1458	2.8
	1908	2.5		1807	2.6
02	0244	3.3	17	0202	3.5
	0859	2.2		0846	2.0
	1704	2.7	18	0237	3.7
	1842	2.6		1013	2.0
03	0317	3.4	19	0328	3.3
	1037	2.2		1155	1.8
04	0355	3.5	20	0422	3.8
	1247	2.1		1329	1.9
05	0446	3.6	21	0540	3.8
	1431	2.0		1435	1.9
06	0552	3.6	22	0707	3.8
	1528	2.0		1524	1.9
07	0710	3.6	23	0828	3.8
	1606	2.0		1602	1.8
08	0823	3.6	24	0940	3.7
	1636	2.0		1632	1.9
09	0923	3.6		2352	2.7
	1700	2.0	25	0226	2.5
10	1012	3.7		1040	3.6
	1718	2.0		1655	2.0
11	0053	2.6		2352	2.8
	0214	2.6	26	0345	2.3
	1057	3.6		1137	3.5
	1733	2.0		1714	2.2
12	0037	2.7	27	0006	3.0
	0331	2.5		0453	2.1
	1140	3.6		1230	3.3
	1747	2.1		1726	2.4
13	0041	2.8	28	0026	3.2
	0432	2.4		0553	2.0
	1222	3.4		1325	3.0
	1802	2.2		1732	2.5

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DATE	TIME	HEIGHT	DATE	TIME	HEIGHT
14	0053	3.0	29	0050	3.4
	0531	2.3		0654	2.0
	0337	3.3		1423	2.8
	1810	2.4		1728	2.6
15	0111	3.1	30	0117	3.5
	0628	2.2		0755	2.0
	1357	3.1		1540	2.6
	1814	2.5		1658	2.6

SA HUYNH TIDES FOR SEPTEMBER 1969

DATE	TIME	HEIGHT	DATE	TIME	HEIGHT
01	0056	5.1	16	0013	5.4
	0749	3.1	17	0741	2.8
	1311	4.6	18	1338	4.3
	1926	3.7		1815	3.8
02	0124	5.4	17	0042	5.8
	0907	3.1		0854	2.6
	1444	4.0	18	0117	6.1
	1850	3.8		1021	2.5
03	0157	5.6	19	0202	6.3
	1045	3.0		1204	2.3
04	0235	5.8	20	0302	6.4
	1255	2.9		1337	2.1
05	0326	5.8	21	0420	6.4
	1439	2.7		1443	2.0
06	0432	5.9	22	0547	6.4
	1536	2.5		1532	2.0
07	0550	5.9	23	0708	6.3
	1614	2.4		1610	2.1
08	0703	6.0	24	0820	6.2
	1644	2.4		1640	2.4
09	0803	6.0		2232	4.0
	1708	2.5	25	0234	3.6
10	0852	6.1		0920	6.0
	1726	2.6		1703	2.7
	2333	2.9		2232	4.3
11	0222	3.8	26	0355	3.2
	0937	6.0		1017	5.7
	1741	2.7		1722	3.0
	2317	4.0		2246	4.7
12	0339	3.6	27	0501	2.9
	1020	5.9		1110	5.3
	1755	2.9		1734	3.4
	2321	4.3		2306	5.1

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DATE	TIME	HEIGHT	DATE	TIME	HEIGHT
13	0440	3.4	28	0601	2.7
	1102	5.6		1205	4.8
	1810	3.1		1740	3.6
	2333	4.6		2350	5.5
14	0539	3.2	29	0702	2.6
	1147	5.3		1303	4.3
	1818	3.4		1736	3.8
	2351	5.0		2357	5.8
15	0636	3.0	30	0803	2.5
	1237	4.8		1420	3.9
	1822	3.6		1706	3.8

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HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

JCS CONTROL NUMBER	COPY NO.
	2

MACH. CL	DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT	PRI.	SEC.	ORIGINATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.	NO. CYS. RECD.	MICFILM CLAS.	MO.	DA.	YR.
	C913917	PERIODIC INTEL RPT 36-69	3P		MEF	0104669	2	49099			
			NAVY FILE NUMBER					DATE			

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- B-FOR COMPLIANCE
- C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF _____
- D-FOR COMMENT
- E-FOR RECOMMENDATION
- F-FOR CONCURRENCE
- G-FOR INFORMATION
- H-RETURN TO _____
- I- _____
- J-DISPOSITION _____

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
					COMMANDANT
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
1	A	9/16	9/22	KM	G-3
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAM
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
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					COUNSEL
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P.R. TO G-2

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HIST

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PIR 36-69 31 Aug - 6 Sep 69

6 Sep 69

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9 September 1969



UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 36-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

NORTH VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
QUANG TRI
Quang Tri
HUE
THUA THIEN
SOUTH CHINA SEA
DA NANG
CU LAC CHAM
Hoi An
LAOS
QUANG NAM
Song Thu Bon
Tam Ky
QUANG TIN
CU LAC RE
Quang Ngai
QUANG NGAI
0 25 50 Miles
0 25 50 Kilometers
II CORPS

G-3

GROUP - 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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G-2 Section
DANANG, RVN
9 September 1969
Ser: 0104669

PERINTREP 36-69

Period covered: 310001H August - 062400H September 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. With the exception of the series of attacks by fire and sapper probes which took place at the close of the week in the immediate vicinity of DANANG, there was no increase in the level of enemy activity in I Corps during the past week. A renewed high point in the level of enemy activity was expected to occur on or about 1-2 September. However, when these dates arrived, I Corps had been inundated by the effects of Typhoon DORIS which may have hindered the enemy in coordinating his attack plans. It was not until the early hours of Saturday morning, 6 September, that an increase in enemy activity occurred and then it was restricted to the DANANG area. For the week, enemy initiated ground incidents decreased for the third straight week, down to 297 in comparison to 515, 415, and 326 in the three preceding weeks. Almost all categories of incidents showed a drop with the exception of assaults by fire which rose from 10 to 19, largely as a result of the attacks by fire occurring around DANANG. Enemy incoming was up for the week from 775 rounds to 1,037 and once again this was attributed to the DANANG attacks. However, the number of enemy killed in action followed the trend line established by enemy initiated ground incidents by dropping off for the third straight week to 763 as opposed to 1,305, 1,214 and 928 in the three previous weeks.

Reported counterintelligence related VC/VCI activity was at a generally low level during the reporting period. This increase from the previous week may be attributed in part to the storm which affected the northern three provinces during the period 1-2 September.

Reported VCI activities during the week failed to depict any definable pattern of increased or significant VCI effort. Conversely, there were no indications of any changes to previously reported objectives and/or methods utilized to attain these objectives. The primary objective continues to be the expansion and strengthening of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) and its policies in the light of an eventual U. S. withdrawal and the election of a future RVN government. Priorities of VCI efforts continue to be the retention and expansion of control over the rural populace with prime emphasis placed on forcing people from the refugee and resettlement camps back to their native areas. Closely aligned with this are the efforts being aimed at the disintegration of existing GVN administration and its efforts at pacification and rural development through terror and subversion. Other priorities,

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not necessarily in order of precedence, include: inflicting the maximum number of casualties and/or damage on US/FWMAF personnel and materials; demoralization and "neutralization" of ARVN, RF/PF and local force personnel, and development of other conditions suitable for the eventual establishment of a coalition government.

In regard to the death of Ho Chi MINH and the proclaimed cease fire during the period 8-11 September, available intelligence indicates no immediate change to current NVN policies for the conduct of the war in the south.

a. QUANG TRI (P). During the reporting period, sightings/incidents in the DMZ area decreased to 131 with 18 of these sightings north of the BEN HAI River. A total of 101 hostile targets were taken under fire this week by artillery, tactical air strikes and naval gunfire.

Enemy initiated activity in QUANG TRI (P) was limited to indirect attacks by fire in the northeastern DMZ area. The attacks by fire commenced during the evening hours of the 31st when QUANG TRI Combat Base (YD 3353) received 31x122mm rockets resulting in three killed and 33 wounded with 12 buildings destroyed and 14 damaged. This attack by fire was repeated at 2215H on the 4th when the combat base received four 122mm rockets followed by four more at 2400H. There were no casualties or damage from either attack.

Slightly to the north, DONG HA Combat Base (YD 2360) experienced two attacks by fire. On the 1st, DONG HA received four 140mm rockets while on the 7th the combat base received eight more 140mm rockets. This last attack resulted in light casualties and minor damage.

The central DMZ area was the scene of light friendly initiated activity during the week. On the 1st, B/1/3 Marines made contact with an estimated enemy squad nine kilometers north northeast of the ROCKPILE (YD 027634). This contact resulted in five enemy killed with light friendly casualties. Also in this area, significant intelligence was derived from prisoners taken during the week. On 5 September, 3/3 Marines captured two prisoners approximately five kilometers northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 960614). These prisoners were identified as members of the 9th Regiment of the 304th NVA Division. Although there had been evidence of the presence of this unit in the same vicinity, as a result of contacts which had occurred in early August, these PW's were the first additional indications that the 9th Regiment is in this sector. Other prisoners picked up during the week confirmed the fact that elements of the QUANG BINH Provincial Unit have been conducting limited operations south of the DMZ in the central sector of the B-5 Front.

b. THUA THIEN (P). Enemy initiated activity in THUA THIEN (P) consisted of light attacks by fire. Also during the week there were several scattered friendly initiated ground contacts.

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In the eastern portion of the province, HUE City (YD 739233) received two 122mm rockets on the 4th resulting in one civilian killed, one ARVN wounded, and 12 other civilians wounded with light materiel damage. At the same time and slightly to the northwest, the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division on LZ SALLY (YD 638274) received 15-20 rounds of unknown type mortar fire. In the same general area and at approximately the same time, the 3rd ARVN Regimental Headquarters on FSB PK-17, ten kilometers northwest of HUE (YD 653278) received 30-40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in light friendly casualties. Another enemy initiated incident in the province occurred on the 1st in the A SHAU Valley region when FSB BERCHTESGADEN six kilometers east northeast of A LUOI (YD 440015) received two 122mm rockets resulting in no casualties or damage.

The remainder of the activity was friendly initiated and scattered throughout the province. In the east, 1/3 ARVN engaged an unknown size enemy force 15 kilometers west southwest of HUE (YD 603194). This contact lasted for two hours and resulted in 12 enemy killed and two prisoners captured. The PW's identified their unit as the K-10 Battalion, 5th NVA Regiment. To the south, a 326th Engineer working party made contact with an unknown size enemy force 16 kilometers south southwest of PHU BAI (YC 850990) resulting in seven enemy killed with no friendly casualties reported. In this same general area, 1/54 ARVN made contact with an unknown size enemy force 19 kilometers south southwest of PHU BAI again resulting in seven enemy killed with no reported friendly casualties. In the PHU LOC District, reconnaissance elements of the 2/327th Infantry engaged six NVA with small arms fire 13 kilometers southeast of PHU BAI (YD 960042) resulting in five enemy killed. Although there were no positive unit identifications made in the three above engagements, these contacts were most probably made with elements of the K.4 Battalion of the 5th Regiment.

Elsewhere in the province, 3/1 ARVN made contact with an unknown size enemy force 12 kilometers west of Camp EVANS (YD 411325) resulting in nine enemy killed and one ton of small arms ammunition captured. To the south, 4/3 ARVN made contact with an estimated enemy platoon 11 kilometers east southeast of A SHAU Valley (YC 606817) resulting in seven enemy killed, probably from the 5th NVA Regiment.

c. QUANG NAM (P). The enemy's expected second high point of the "Summer-Autumn" offensive which, according to agents and PW's, was scheduled to occur on or about 1-2 September, may have commenced, at least in QUANG NAM (P) during the early morning hours of the 6th. During the period 060105H to 061025H, there were four sapper attacks, 11 mortar attacks and five volleys of rockets in the DANANG area. The sapper attacks took place at the HOA CAM Training Center, the 4/11 Marines CP, the 3rd MP Battalion and in the vicinity of the 1st Marine Division CP. At 060115H, the HOA CAM Training Center (AT 975722) received small arms fire and at the same time received a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force. The attack was repulsed with light friendly casualties while one NVA was killed. At 060200H, the 4/11

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Marine's CP (AT 988718) received an attack from an estimated 10-15 sappers. The attack was repulsed without friendly casualties. At 060245H, the 3rd MP Battalion (AT 982732) was attacked by an estimated 15 enemy. During the fire fight one enemy was observed to fall. About one-half hour later, 12 more enemy were observed and taken under fire. At 060010H, ASP-2 in the vicinity of the 1st Marine Division CP (AT 945774) received small arms fire and a sapper attack from approximately 10-12 enemy. The results of this attack were light friendly casualties and three enemy killed. In summary, all of the sapper attacks were easily repulsed with very light friendly casualties or damage. The 141st NVA Regiment was believed to be the unit involved in the HOA CAM attack. In addition, the T.89 Sapper Battalion was identified in the attack on the 4/11 position. In an additional sapper attack on the evening of the 6th, a platoon of F/2/26 Marines in night defensive positions 10 kilometers southwest of DANANG (AT 935718) was attacked by an estimated 15 sappers. The attack lasted for about one hour and resulted in four NVA KIA with light friendly casualties.

The major rocket attack targets were MCB-53 (AT 951806), NSA Hospital (BT 062729), 366th TFW (BT 062729), MAG-16 (BT 064737) and the vicinity of III MAF Headquarters (BT 0478). By far the greatest materiel damage occurred at the NSA storage area and to a lesser extent to the nearby III MAF Headquarters. One rocket impacted in the ARVN ammunition dump resulting in the secondary explosion of 4,000 AT mines, an explosion equivalent to 37 tons of TNT. Buildings in the III MAF compound received considerable blast damage while three Marines were wounded and evacuated. The NSA covered storage area was damaged extensively. Five rockets impacted in DANANG City and killed 11 civilians and wounded 41 others. However, the majority of the casualties from the attacks by fire resulted from a barrage of 100x82mm mortar rounds which preceded the light sapper probe at the 3rd MP Battalion (AT 982732). Three Marines were killed and 90 wounded with 76 requiring evacuation. The large number of casualties from this attack resulted from the initial rounds landing in the living quarters of the prisoners and the brig staff. In summary, a total of approximately 60 rockets and 272 mortar rounds were fired from 19 suspected launch sites to the south and west of DANANG.

In the AN HOA area, the 5th Marines were also subjected to attacks by fire on the morning of the 6th. At 0200H, C/1/5 Marines one kilometer southwest of LIBERTY Bridge (AT 927527) received 15-20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in no casualties or damage. At the same time, the 5th Marine's CP four kilometers northeast of AN HOA (AT 873473) received 20-25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and a ground probe from an unknown size enemy force. There were no casualties reported. Then at 1315H, AN HOA (AT 873474) received seven 140mm rockets. Again there were no casualties or damage from this attack. Finally on the evening of the 6th, H&S/3/5 Marines six and one-half kilometers north northeast of AN HOA (AT 854518) received ten 122mm rockets without friendly losses.

d. QUANG TIN (P). After more than two weeks in which events in QUANG TIN (P) have dominated reports of enemy activity in ICTZ, there

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has been an abatement of the intense fighting and heavy casualties which characterized operations in northern QUANG TIN during the latter half of August.

The most significant action of the week occurred when a CIDG Strike Force Company from the TIEN PHUOC CIDG Camp initiated contact with an estimated enemy company seven and one-half kilometers south of TIEN PHUOC (BT 123065). The contact lasted one hour and resulted in 21 enemy killed with very light friendly casualties. While no unit identification was made, it is most probable that this force represented elements of the 3rd (AKA 31st) Regiment which had been involved in the battle at HIEP DUC and appears to have now returned to their former AO.

In the area between HIEP DUC and TIEN PHUOC, 20 additional enemy bodies were discovered in three separate incidents. This is further testimony to the recent heavy fighting in this area. Also in this vicinity, fire missions adjusted on two enemy sightings accounted for 11 additional enemy killed. In another sighting southeast of TIEN PHUOC (BT 225051), C/1-46 Infantry killed five enemy with artillery. In seven separate sightings, F Troop, 8th Cavalry, ten kilometers west northwest of TAM KY (BT 213255) killed ten enemy with gunships.

Concerning the 1st VC Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division which has been involved in numerous contacts with the Americal Division in the past three weeks, the best available evidence indicates that it has now slipped northward. Two prisoners from the 60th Battalion of this regiment were taken west of QUE SON (AT 9632) on 3 September indicating that they were breaking contact and seeking safe havens in western QUANG NAM.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Activity in QUANG NGAI (P) centered about the southeastern quadrant of the province in the general vicinity of DUC PHO. On a almost daily basis, elements of the 1st of the 1st Cavalry were in contact with the enemy south southeast of DUC PHO and during a number of engagements inflicted at least 80 confirmed kills upon the enemy force. The enemy unit, although not positively identified, is most probably elements of the 2nd VC Regiment, a unit which has been engaged on a regular basis in this area in recent weeks.

In northeastern QUANG NGAI, 1/6 ARVN 18 kilometers southwest of BINH SON (BS 473795) received an unknown number of mortar rounds followed by a ground attack. The ARVN repelled the attack killing 38 of the enemy force while sustaining light friendly casualties. A prisoner was taken in the aftermath of this battle who identified his unit as the 4th Battalion of the 21st NVA Regiment, once again indicating the continued presence of this unit in northern QUANG NGAI (P). To the northeast of this attack, 2/6 ARVN received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force nine kilometers south southwest of BINH SON (BS 557844). The ARVN engaged the enemy and killed five without taking any casualties. In another isolated incident, B/4-3 Infantry six kilometers north northeast of BA TO (BS 580398) adjusted an artillery fire mission on six VC killing all six.

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In the area southeast of DUC PHO, where the majority of the activity in the province occurred, C/1-1 Cavalry found 34 enemy bodies in the general area seven to eight kilometers south southeast of DUC PHO. The bodies were less than 24 hours old and had been killed earlier by American units. In addition, elements of the 1-1 Cavalry engaged an unknown size enemy force on the 2nd of September killing 22 of the enemy while taking only light friendly casualties. This contact which lasted for three and one-half hours occurred seven kilometers south southeast of DUC PHO (BS 819311). The next day in the same area, D/1-1 Cavalry engaged seven VC and killed all seven. Slightly to the northeast of this contact, the Aero Rifle Platoon of D/1-1 eight kilometers southeast of DUC PHO (BS 873337) killed six VC on the 1st. In the only significant enemy initiated activity in this area, A/1-1 Cavalry six kilometers south southeast of DUC PHO (BS 824319) received an attack by fire consisting of 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on the 4th. No casualties or damage resulted from this attack.

Based on information received from various sources, it is believed that the enemy units are in a regrouping and resupply status and intend to maintain the present low level of operations with small unit sapper attacks, RPG and mortar fire, particularly around DUC PHO and the vicinity of QUANG NGAI City.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. The estimate of the level of enemy initiated activity which will occur during the coming week is difficult to assess. A review of battlefield indicators must be balanced against the announcement from North Vietnam which indicates that there will be a three day stand-down of NVA/VC initiated offensive operations commencing at 0100H on 8 September.

However, examining the situation strictly from the viewpoint of intelligence indicators in I Corps, there are few indicators present which suggest any significant increase in enemy activity. In QUANG TRI (P) and along the DMZ Front there are no indications that the enemy intends to carry out any activity other than their customary attacks by fire throughout the province and ground probes on the central DMZ Front. In THUA THIEN (P) ground contact with the enemy is almost exclusively the result of meeting engagements resulting from ARVN and FWMAF sweeps. In QUANG TIN (P), the NVA and VC activity indicators point toward a reduction rather than an increase in activity in the wake of the HIEP DUC battle. In QUANG NGAI (P), the indicators are of a continuance of the type of harassment and probing which has characterized enemy operations for many weeks. There are no indications that the enemy is massing his forces for attacks on the eastern coastal lowlands of QUANG NGAI with the three critical units in this province, the 2d VC Regiment, and the 22nd and 21st NVA Regiments still in their normal AO's.

In QUANG NAM Province, there are some indications of renewed activity. Reconnaissance teams continue to report unusually large sightings of enemy forces, particularly in the southern DANANG TAOR. Agents report that the 90th NVA Regiment which has been held in Base Area 112 and the

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ONG THU Slope may be moving back into the ARIZONA area. Elements of the R.20 and D.3 Battalions are currently held in the QUANG NAM lowlands and a prisoner was taken from the T.89 Battalion in the attack on 4/11 which is evidence of the presence of elements of this force in the vicinity of DANANG.

It is estimated that enemy activity in I Corps in the coming week will probably be maintained at the same approximate levels of intensity as characterized NVA and VC operations during the past week with the focal point of the enemy's attention continuing to be fixed on eastern QUANG NAM (P) and DANANG.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents decreased from 326 to 297 for the week of 31 August-6 September. These incidents consisted of four ground attacks, one of which was company size or larger and three platoon size or smaller, two ambushes, 19 attacks by fire, 158 harassing fire incidents, 85 mining and booby trap incidents, six hamlet harassment incidents, five assassination incidents, four espionage incidents, one kidnapping incident and 13 propaganda incidents.

a. Strength and Disposition. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserve Reinforcement. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire decreased from 155 to 98 incidents for the reporting period and 28 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 31 August-6 September:

Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	599
60mm Mortar	241
Unk Cal Mortar	68
140mm Rocket	6
122mm Rocket	106
Unk Cal Rocket	17
TOTAL	1,037

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance

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(1) There were 75 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 31 August-6 September. These long-range patrols reported 117 sightings and 18 contacts totaling 1,389 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of 74 enemy KIA.

(2) Enemy sightings by reconnaissance patrols were frequent and in large numbers in the QUE SON Mountain area of QUANG NAM Province. SLF Recon Team "YOUTH", while carrying out a mission south of ANTENNA Valley, observed over 500 enemy from 2-4 September 1969. On 2 September, Recon Team "SHAVING MUG" observed three enemy groups totaling 110, called artillery and accounted for 20 confirmed enemy KIA approximately six kilometers north of AN HOA.

(3) Sensors located in the DUEL BLADE II area were less active than last week. Strings located approximately six to 10 kilometers southwest of CON THIEN continued to be the most active. See Annex D.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 31 August-6 September:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
82mm Mortar	67
81mm Mortar	4
60mm Mortar	25
Unk Cal Mortar	15
175mm Artillery	2
155mm Artillery	3
105mm Artillery	17
140mm Rocket	6
122mm Rocket	12
75mm RR	2
57mm RR	10
TOTAL	163

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	189
Crew-Served Weapons	40

(2) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 31 August-6 September.

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Date	Location	Amount (lbs)		Capturing Unit
31 Aug	(BS 525793)	900		D/1/52
31 Aug	(BS 523796)	50		D/1/52
31 Aug	(BS 599405)	950		B/4/3
31 Aug	(BS 612399)	50	Food	RCN/4/3
31 Aug	(YC 675867)	300	Food	B/2/502
1 Sep	(BT 133464)	1,000		HQ/7th Mar
1 Sep	(BS 373953)	100		D/1/6
1 Sep	(BS 373953)	30	Salt	D/1/6
1 Sep	(BS 373953)	150	Tobacco	D/1/6
2 Sep	(BS 534781)	250		C/1/52
2 Sep	(BS 752834)	2,000		D/5/46
3 Sep	(BS 648942)	140		CAP
3 Sep	(AT 981356)	60		1/3/7
3 Sep	(BT 112382)	1,100		A/1/1
3 Sep	(BS 384939)	2,000	Food	D/1/6
3 Sep	(BS 384939)	500		D/1/6
4 Sep	(YC 592937)	700		C/2/506
5 Sep	(BT 006397)	20		M/3/7
5 Sep	(BS 523741)	300		D/3/1
5 Sep	(YD 009353)	250	Food	RCN/2-B/2
5 Sep	(YD 871082)	25		A/2/502
6 Sep	(BT 056638)	400		CAP
6 Sep	(BT 056638)	200	Salt	CAP
6 Sep	(YD 199296)	4,400		4/1 ARVN
6 Sep	(YD 199296)	220	Salt	4/1 ARVN
6 Sep	(AT 897805)	80		K/3/26
6 Sep	(BT 218250)	2,000		TF ALLISON
6 Sep	(BS 566754)	100		C/3/1
6 Sep	(BS 540752)	2,000		D/3/1
	Total Rice	17,075		
	Total Food	2,600		
	Total Salt	450		
	Total Tobacco	150		

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	184	Structures Damaged	38
Bunkers Destroyed	238	Bunkers Damaged	33
50 Cal Sites Destroyed	3	Secondary Fires	41
Secondary Explosions	17	Recoilless Rifles Destroyed	1

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

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c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ decreased in comparison to the previous week. There were 763 KIA's, 59 VC PW's, and 12 NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	90	92	96	93
Low	75	75	75	75
Rainfall (total)	13.5	7.5	5.3	7.3
Winds (knots)	15	9	12	7
Visibility (miles)	5	6	7	6

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 6-12 September 1969

General. South of 15 degrees north, moderate southwesterly flow has returned to southeast Asia. North of this latitude, the low level winds are light and southeasterly. East of the Phillipines, a large area of low pressure and cyclonic circulation is developing. Conditions are good for further development and by the end of the outlook period the cyclone or potential tropical storm should be in the eastern South China Sea. Ridging ahead of this disturbance should give improving weather to ICTZ during the last half of the outlook period.

ICTZ Forecast. The outlook for the coastal areas of ICTZ for the forecasting period is partly to occasionally cloudy with isolated thundershowers. Surface winds will be variable at 10-15 knots becoming mostly easterly in ICTZ during the last half of the period. Precipitation will be 0.5-0.1 inches with isolated instances of one to two inches. The outlook for the mountain areas of ICTZ is mostly cloudy with a few thundershowers in the afternoon through early morning for the first half of the reporting period. Conditions will improve for the northern mountains during the latter half of the period becoming partly cloudy to occasionally cloudy with isolated thundershowers. Early morning hours will bring fog; stratus will form and become less extensive in the northern areas after midweek. Precipitation will be one to three inches with isolated instances of three to four inches.

j. - k. Negative

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1. Significant Enemy Attacks. In northeastern QUANG NGAI, 1/6 ARVN, 18 kilometers southwest of BINH SON (BS 473795) received an unknown number of mortar rounds followed by a ground attack. The ARVN repelled the attack killing 38 of the enemy force while sustaining light friendly casualties. A prisoner was taken in the aftermath of this battle who identified his unit as the 4th Battalion of the 21st NVA Regiment, once again indicating the continued presence of elements of this force in northern QUANG NGAI Province.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following course of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to six infantry regiment equivalents, supported by the equivalent of one naval sapper battalion and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack VANDEGRIFT Combat Base with one infantry regiment supported by one sapper battalion and one artillery battalion.

(3) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(5) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with up to six infantry regiments, supported by four rocket battalions, one sapper battalion and one engineer battalion.

(6) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division (-), supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

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(8) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to seven infantry regiment equivalents.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS on North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield, sickness, hunger, shortage of ammunition and medical supplies and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerabilitiy to psychological warfare operations.

J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ANNEX D - SENSOR ACTIVITY

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DISTRIBUTION

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232)(CIIED)	2
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2
CG USARV	1
CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	10
CG I FFORCEV	5
CG II FFORCEV	1
COMNAVFORV	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40
CG 3RD MARDIV	26
CG AMERICAL DIV	30
CG 101ST ABN DIV	20
CG 1ST MAW	30
CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CG USASUPCOM DANANG	1
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHU LAI	3
CG 25TH INF DIV	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SAIGON	3
CG 173RD ABN BDE	2
CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7
CG FLC	5
CG 1ST LOG CMD LONG BINH	2
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	2
CO 30 NCR	1
CIB	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTG 79.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 76.4	1
CTF 76	1
CO DASC ATTN: AVCA-QN-DN-OP	2
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2
CO "B" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	5
CO "C" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	17
1ST CAG	1
2ND CAG	1
3RD CAG	1
4TH CAG	1
7 AF (IGS) BDOC	1
45TH ENGR GROUP	1
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1
CO 517TH MI DET	1
CO 3RD MP BN	1
620TH TCS (ATTN: CRC)APO 96203	1
CO MCB 3	1
CO MCB 6	1
CO MCB 7	1
CO MCB 8	1
CO MCB 9	1
CO MCB 10	1
CO MCB 11	1
CTG 115.1	1
CO MCB 40	1
CO MCB 53	1
CO MCB 58	1
CO MCB 62	1
CO MCB 71	1
CO MCB 121	1
OSA/EMB SAIGON ATTN: RAS	1
CO 1ST BN 525TH MI GP DANANG	25
DSA I CORPS	11
DSA II CORPS	1
MCB 133	1
DET B 1ST MIBARS	1
HQ, 212RH COMBAT AVN BN	6
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
366 AIR SECURITY SQD, USAF	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1
7TH PSYOPS BN	1
CICV	2
III MAF LNO 2ND ROKMC BDE	1
620TH TSC	1
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CTF CW. PBR BASE ONE, NSA DANANG	1
SPO-SEC CMD QUI NHON	1
DIRECTOR, CAP III MAF	1
CO USS REPOSE	1
CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 4TH PSYOP GP	1

OUT OF COUNTRY

DIR NSA	3
CMC (ABQ) (AIRMAIL)	2
CG FMFPAC (AIRMAIL)	2
CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP, 7TH FLEET	1
CG MCDEC	1
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1
CG 3RD MAW	2

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TEAM COMMANDER 19TH CI TEAM, CAMP PENDLETON	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
388TH TFW (DCQK)	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	6
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CG 4TH MARDIV, CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA	1

III MAF (To be picked up)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	4
DEP CofS PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	42
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (c/o G-3)	2
PSYOPS	2
1ST RADIO BN	11
SLF (A)	1
1ST MP'S DNG	1
US NAD	1
CO MCB 5	1
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
CCN	1

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 36-69 AS OF 062400H SEPTEMBER 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-HQ	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	11	3,195	2	560			13	3,755	14	6,195	27	9,950
Bn's-Maneuver	39	9,235	11	1,825	5	765	55	11,825	34	14,820	89	26,645
Bn's-Support	18	5,075	2	340	1	195	21	5,610	7	2,080	27	7,690
Separate Co's	1	130			33	2,565	34	2,695	1	80		2,775
TOTAL CONFIRMED		19,600		2,725		3,525		25,850		24,610		50,460
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's	1	710					1	710	3	860	4	1,570
Bn's-Manuever	6	2,460	1	350	1	200	8	3,010	7	2,670	15	5,680
Bn's-Support	4	1,045					4	1,045	9	1,445	13	2,490
Separate Co's	1	90				210	4	300			4	300
TOTAL PROBABLE		4,305		350		410		5,065		4,975		10,040
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,400	3	1,400
Bn's-Manuever												
Bn's-Support									22	7,675	22	7,675
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										10,015		10,015
		23,905		3,075		3,935		30,915		39,600		70,515

*See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,290		150	3,440
	Probable	2,570			2,570
	Possible				
	TOTAL	5,860		150	6,010
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,525		565	4,090
	Probable			45	45
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,525		610	4,135
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	6,165	190	920	7,275
	Probable	830	350		1,180
	Possible				
	TOTAL	6,995	540	920	8,455
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,440	1,220	665	4,325
	Probable	380		290	670
	Possible				
	TOTAL	2,820	1,220	955	4,995
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,180	1,315	1,225	6,720
	Probable	525		75	600
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,705	1,315	1,300	7,320

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS												DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL							
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	33	3		36	8			8	5			5	46	3		49	33	5		38	79	8		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	39	6		45	11	1		12	5	1		6	55	8		63	34	7		41	89	15		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	8	1		9	1			1	1			1	10	1		11	2	5	10	17	12	6	10	28
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	3	1	5	3	3	1	7
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2		1	2	3	1	2	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1					1			1
TOTAL SUPPORT	18	4		22	2			2	1			1	21	4		25	7	9	22	38	28	13	22	63
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	57	10		67	13	1		14	6	1		7	76	12		88	41	16	22	79	117	28	22	167

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	354	Nam Hoa	70	Hoa Vang	588	Thang Binh	965	Binh Son	239
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	57	Hieu Duc	76	Tam Ky	672	Son Tinh	491
	Trieu Phong	197	Hong Dien	72	Dien Ban	1,067	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	450
	Cam Lo	261	Vinh Loc	62	Dai Loc	355	Hiep Duc	220	Nghia Hanh	356
	Gio Linh	202	Phu Loc	231	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	281	Mo Duc	665
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	335	Hau Duc	233	Duc Pho	465
	Huong Hoa	14	Phu Vang	24	Que Son	958			Tra Bong	170
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	190	Duy Xuyen	1,100			Ba To	162
			Huong Thuy	101	Hieu Nhon	302			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	437					Son Ha	187
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	1,213	THUA THIEN	1,290	QUANG NAM	4,901	QUANG TIN	2,488	QUANG NGAI	3,199

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 13,091

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,140		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Vic XD 6233	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175	Unlocated	
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unlocated LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	

*See note #4 on page A-17
**See note #2 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,950		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,900		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	500		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,405		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	345	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0566/22May69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
31st Group	NVA	C	1,060		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	220	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2061/20Jul69
15th Bn	NVA	PR	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,870		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	
65th Arty Regt	NVA	PR	UNK		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.40 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.41 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.42 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.43 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,575		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	2,130		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	460	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	460	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,605		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	XD 7964/12Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	365	XD 9265	XD 9666/26May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	400	XD 8854	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,725		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	285	YD 3639	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	165	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	185	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	250	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	190	Vic YD 3535	

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	920		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	AU 8100/10Jun68
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	290	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	280	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jul69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,755		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	345	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	185	Vic YD 6514	YD 6822/14Jun69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	255	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
3rd Bn, 803rd Regt	NVA	C	220	Vic YC 3193	YC 3389/19Jul69
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	370	Vic YD 3304	YD 3302/20Jun69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
C.113 Co	LF	C	145	Vic YD 5043	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
C.119 Co	LF	PR	45	Vic XD 9424	XD 9424/27Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	15,000		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
577th RL Bn	NVA	C	305	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
HAI VAN Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102nd Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103rd Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	525		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,095		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	285	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
368B Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,170		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
R.20 Bn	LF	C	155	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	LF	C	160	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	265	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	70	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	275	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	Unloc vic HOA VANG (D)	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	85	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	105	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	120	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	115	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	140	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST ST ENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	4,045		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	625		
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	BT 0827	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	150	BT 0827	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	120	BT 0827	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	150	BT 0827	BT 2514/25Sep68
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	455		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	150	AT 9226	
1st Bn	NVA	C	90	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	100	AT 9226	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	85	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	185	BT 2440	BT 2340/12Aug69
72nd Bn	LF	C	180	BT 2932	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	195	BT 3510	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	200	BT 3127	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	205	BT 2232	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	220	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 421[illegible]	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	80	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	90	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	60	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	150	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	120	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	175	BS 4677	BS 6385/12Aug69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	720		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	215	BS 4386	BS 3587/13Aug69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69
C.17 Co	LF	C	55	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	65	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	80	BS 7555	BS 7061/17Nov68
C.120 Co	LF	C	50	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	75	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	50	BS 5596	
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,645		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	930		
Regt Hq	MF	C	370	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	185	BS 6733	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	195	BS 7932	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	180	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6237	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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BINH DINH PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	925		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	275	BINH DINH	CR 0952/23Jun68
7th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 9640/12Apr68
8th Bn	NVA	C	250	BINH DINH	CR 0933/23Apr68
9th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 8955/29May68

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes period 310001H August to 062400H September 1969.

a. No significant changes.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

9. Subordinate/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF PERINTREP 35-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 36-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P)

a. PW Duong Van NO (AKA Duong Minh DAM) of the 3rd Co, K.8 Bn, 7th Front, captured on 29 August 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 134439) (CG 3rd MARDIV 301320Z August 1969), while he was transporting supplies, stated that the location of his platoon is in the vicinity of (YD 1343) and that his unit's mission was to furnish supplies for the four companies of the K8 Bn. He further stated that each platoon has approximately 24 personnel and that there are approximately 20 Vietnamese women in the company who are conscripts. Source trained in NVN with the 330th Div, and began infiltrating to RVN in February 1969. He entered RVN during May 1969 via LAOS with a group of 90 men. NO revealed the location of a food cache consisting of corn and potatoes as being in the vicinity of (YD 126443). Reported personalities: 3rd Co CMDR-Nguyen Xuan TIEN, XO-Tran Van TY, PO-Nguyen Van DINH, APO-Kieu Van HOA.

(G-2 COMMENT: OOB holds the K.8 Bn, 7th Front at (YD 3639). This is considerably east of NO's place of capture; however, as he was on a supply mission it is likely that the remainder of the battalion is still located in the area south to southwest of QUANG TRI City. This is the first report of personalities. All information rated (F-3).)

b. Returnee, Cpl Tran Van KHOAT, 1st Co, K.6 Bn, 7th Front who rallied on 30 August 1969 at LZ NANCY (YD 440408) (CG 3rd MARDIV 311230Z August 1969) stated that his unit is located approximately six hours walk into the mountains west of LZ NANCY. The unit has both a combat mission and a rice collection mission. He has no knowledge of current plans or mission. KHOAT revealed that the K.6 Bn was divided into four companies with a total strength of 140 personnel. The morale, according to KHOAT, is very low due to dislike of war and lack of food and supplies. Most of the men would like to Chieu Hoi, but are afraid of their officers as well as allied troops. The health of the troops is poor due to inadequate diet and limited medical supplies. Source heard that a large rice cache is located in TRUONG THO (H), HAI TRUNG (V) (YD 398447). Reported personalities: K.6 Bn CO-Capt LAI, PO-SrLt DIEN.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holds the K.6 Bn, 7th Front, located in the vicinity of (YD 3538) which agrees with returnee's information. The strength given by this returnee is lower than currently held by OOB. Current strength is estimated at 250 (F-4). This is the first report of the personalities in association with this unit. All information except strength is rated (F-3).)

2. THUA THIEN (P). No significant reports.

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3. QUANG NAM (P)

a. PW, Cpl Nguyen Van CAC, 3rd Co, D.3 Bn, Front 4, who was captured on 29 August 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 991483) (CG 1st MARDIV 040005Z September 1969, Supp Interr Rpt 1st ITT 83-08-69) stated that the battalion was located in the vicinity of (BT 0452) on 14 August and that the present mission of the battalion is to attack FWMAF. The PW further stated that during the past three months the battalion has received 30 men as replacements. The PW also stated that morale was low due to airstrikes and artillery.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location given for the battalion places them in the GO NOI Island area. The battalion is currently held in the QUE SON Mountain area; however, it is possible that the battalion has returned to GO NOI as this is their normal AO. All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, Nguyen Danh CU, 5th Co, 577th Rocket Bn, Front 4, who was captured on 1 September 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 815385) (CG 1st MARDIV 040001Z August 1969, 13th ITT 02-09-69) stated that the combined strength of the 5th, 6th, and 8th Co's and Hq Group of the 577th was 249 men and their mission was to stock up with food and ammunition for the monsoon season. The PW further stated that the battalion CP with the 6th and 8th Co's are located in the vicinity of (AT 807529) while the 5th Co is located at their base camp vicinity AN BANG Mountains (ZC 186485). The battalion is composed of a Communications Section, Medical Section, Reconnaissance and Security Section, and three companies designated 5, 6, and 8. CU further stated that the unit's morale was low due to lack of food and fear of allied bombs and artillery. According to CU the battalion CO (Nguyen Van DIEN) and XO (Nguyen Van KHAN) were killed in July 1969 near THUONG DUC by bombs.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location given for this battalion is north of where OOB currently holds this unit. The company's location is within Base Area 112 in the immediate vicinity of where this unit is currently held. The personalities reported are new with the exception of KHAN who was possibly a SrLt with the 3rd Bn, 68B Arty. This unit was dropped from the OOB listing recently as having been incorporated into the 577th. All information rated (F-3).)

c. PW,Cpl Vu Duc VINH, 5th Co, 8th Bn, 31st Regt, who was captured on 27 August 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 915727) (CG 1st MARDIV 290300Z August 1969, 15th ITT 01-08-69 and CG III MAF 011120Z August 1969, 11th ITT 99-69) stated that the 8th Bn was located in the vicinity of (AT 820-710) and that the 9th Bn was in the same general area in early July 1969. The 5th Co Base Area was reported as located in the vicinity of (AT 820-700). The PW stated that the present mission (along with 15 other men) was to pick up rice at HOA THUONG (V) (AT 9370). VINH stated that the morale was low because of insufficient training, lack of food and fear of death, and homesickness. The PW further stated that his infiltration began on 20 January 1969 with the 4th Co, 52lst Regt, traveled by train and foot to QUANG BINH (P) then on to VINH LINH (P). They then crossed

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into LAOS and arrived in RVN at an unknown location on approximately 1 June 1969. The group arrived with a strength of 90 men in the company after having lost 12 to malaria and 10 to desertion. Five men were assigned to the 31st Regt and the remainder went to unknown units.

(G-2 COMMENT: The locations stated by this PW corroborates other information previously received placing the 31st Regt in this area. All information rated (F-3).)

d. PW, PFC Nguyen Huu QUY, 1st Co, 17th Signal Bn, 2nd Regt, 2nd NVA Div, captured on 6 August 1969 in the vicinity of (BT 067407) stated that the 17th Bn was located in the vicinity of (BS 1295) with the mission to furnish radio operators for units of the 2nd Regt. At time of capture, QUY, along with his squad and six other men from a reconnaissance unit of the 2nd Regt, had the specific mission to observe allied activity along Highway 535 and radio this information to another CP. PW departed NVN on 7 March 1969 in Infiltration Group 1085 which consisted of 650 men. They arrived in RVN on 1 June 1969 with a strength of 600. Losses were due to 10 men contracting malaria and 40 men deserting. PW stated that 25 men were assigned to the 17th Bn, but he did not know where the remainder went. The CO of Group 1085 was THAO, the XO was VAN and the PO was XA. PW also stated that on 3 August 1969, three companies (100 men each) of the 91st Bn came to the OP where subject was located. They stayed until 6 August 1969, then departed heading west.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 2nd Regt is an AKA for the 21st Regt, 2nd NVA Div. There is no known 17th Signal Bn subordinate to the 21st Regt; however, another recent PW (see report on Nguyen Van HAI, para 4.a.) from the 17th Communications Bn states his unit is subordinate to the 2nd NVA Div. It is likely that QUY is also a member of this unit as the division T/O calls for a communications battalion while a regiment T/O calls for a company. From PW's place of capture, he would have a clear view of Highway 535 and could easily spot allied activity on the Highway (F-2). This is a first report of Infiltration Group 1085; however, reports have been received of other groups in the 1080 series (F-3). The 91st Bn is an AKA for the 3rd Sapper Bn, and it's quite possible that the battalion was at PW's OP as it is within their AO (F-3).)

4. QUANG TIN (P)

a. Rallier, PFC Nguyen Van HAI, 3rd Co, 17th Communications Bn, 2nd NVA Div, who rallied on 25 August 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 969322) (1st MARDIV 040004Z September 1969, 1st ITT 02-08-69) stated his unit was located with the 2nd Division's CP (Forward) in the vicinity of (AT 9628) and its mission is to provide telephone communications and maintain landlines between the Division CP and the 1st and 3rd Regt's. Source further stated that the 1st and 3rd Regt's were located in the vicinity of (AT 9628). Morale in the 3rd Co is reportedly high due to political indoctrination. The battalion's LBN is 5051 Ap Nam 4. Reported personalities: 17th Bn CO-Dao Doan THICH.

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(G-2 COMMENT: The Signal Bn for the 2nd NVA Div is carried as being the GK.30, and the 17th is probably an AKA for this unit. The location HAI gave for his unit and 3rd Regt is possibly true as the 1st and 3rd Regt's have been identified as being in contact recently in the HIEP DUC area. This is the first report of LBN 5051 Ap Nam 4. All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, PFC, Ngo Duc TOAI, 13th Sapper Co, 3rd Regt, captured 27 August 1969 in the vicinity of (BT 034197) (Americal Div 280830Z August 1969) stated that his unit is located in the vicinity of (BT 0020) and the unit's mission was to attack allied OP's and LZ's. TOAI's infiltration group, the 704th, left NVN in January of 1969 and arrived in RVN during March 1969 with a strength of 300. The group was commanded by HIEN.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holds the 13th Co, 3rd Regt, 2nd Div as a reconnaissance company. This is the first information received stating the existence of a 13th Sapper Co (F-6); however, due to the enemy's increased emphasis on sapper tactics, the unit may possibly be cross trained. Source is possibly telling the truth about his mission as LZ WEST (AT 9525) was attacked on 12 August 1969 (F-3).)

5. QUANG NGAI (P). PW, PFC Bui Van SI, 2nd Co, 106th Bn, 3rd Regt, unknown Div was captured on 28 August 1969 in the vicinity of (BS 895-273) (Americal 310600Z August 1969) and stated that the five companies of his battalion are located in PHO CHAU (V) (BS 920165), PHO HIEP (V) (BS 880310), PHO KANH (V) (BS 850380) and PHOA THACH (V) (BS 925223) in DUC PHO (D). SI stated that the mission of his battalion is to attack U.S. convoys on Highway #1. Subject also states that the D.40 Sapper Bn moved from MO DUC (D) to DUC PHO (D) approximately 15 days ago. SI revealed that the 2nd Co has suffered nine personnel killed and 40 to 50 wounded in the last three months but has been reinforced by two platoons of approximately 30 men each. Subject claims all squads of the 106th Bn are equipped with either B-40 or B-41 Grenade Lauchers. SI also claims that his unit has attacked three U.S. convoys within the last two months.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first report on the 106th Bn, but is possibly the 95th Bn, 2nd Regt (F-6). The 95th Bn was identified as being the unit which conducted an attack on a convoy on Highway #1 south of DUC PHO (BS 8234) on 22 June 1969. The D.40 Sapper Bn is an AKA for the 90th Engineer (Sapper) Bn, 3rd NVA Div which OOB holds in the area just west of DUC PHO City (F-3).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 36-69

1. GENERAL. Reported counterintelligence related VC/VCI activity was at a generally low level during the past week, which may be attributed in part to the typhoon which affected the northern three provinces during the period 1-2 September and the death of Ho Chi Minh announced on 3 September.

Although reported VCI activities during the week failed to depict any pattern of significant VCI effort, there were no indications of any changes to previously reported objectives and/or methods utilized to obtain those objectives. The death of Ho Chi Minh is not expected to generate any immediate change in current NVN policies regarding the conduct of the war in the south.

Reports of planning and preparation for an Autumn/Winter Campaign continues to filter down through VC echelons outlining the same objectives as for the Summer Campaign, which were to expand and strengthen the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) and its policies in the light of an eventual US withdrawal and the election of a future SVN government. Priorities of VCI effort continue to be the retention and expansion of control over the rural populace; organization, strengthening, and expansion of urban cadre; and the disintegration of existing GVN administration and its efforts at pacification and rural development, through terror and subversion. Other priorities continue to be inflicting the maximum amount of casualties and/or damage to US/FWMAF personnel and materials, demoralization and "neutralization" of ARVN, RF, PF and PSDF personnel and development of other conditions suitable for the eventual establishment of a coalition government pursuant to the ultimate goal of gaining complete control of the country.

In light of recent tactics, the enemy apparently places some priority on the continuation of ABF's and limited ground attacks to assert his presence and ability to conduct such attacks, possibly in furtherance of his debasement strategy at the Paris Peace Conference.

Much emphasis is placed on rice collection during the harvest period from late August through September in ICTZ. While rice collecting is being conducted in SICTZ, the collection in the north is usually delayed to late September when the rice is dry and hence easier and lighter to transport. The typhoon of 1-2 September caused extensive damage to the rice crop in Thua Thien and Quang Tri (P) (perhaps 50% destruction) and may further complicate enemy problems in line with his often reported food shortages.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. Reports of VC/VCI intelligence gathering activities remained low and again is interpreted as failure to detect such activities rather than the lack thereof. Captured documents, POW, agent, and rallier reports along with a VC/NVA propensity for appearing to have prior knowledge concerning GVN/FWMAF locations, disposition, identification, and activities tend to confirm the existance of a complex and effective

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VCI/VC/NVA intelligence gathering capability along with the ability to conduct intelligence collection undetected.

VCI/VC/NVA intelligence collection continues to be targeted against GVN/FWMAF organizations and units, their locations, disposition, identification, and activities. Much emphasis is placed on the penetration of GVN/US/ARVN/FWMAF agencies and organizations.

Some of the more significant reports received during the week are as follows:

a. Thua Thien.

(1) On 24 August 1969, a US MI source reported three unidentified platoon size sapper units were dispersed in Huong Thuy and Phu Thu (D) to reconnoiter unidentified areas of Thua Thien (P) (Eval: F-3).

(2) On 27 August 1969, a US MI source reported that 63 personnel of an unidentified assault unit moved from the Nam Hoa mountainous areas and dispersed from Xuyen Hoa-Xom Dap vicinity YD 810228 to Van Duong vicinity YD 799227. The personnel masqueraded as farmers. Their mission was to reconnoiter and report on an unidentified interrogation center near a stadium in Hue City because it was an easy target to attack (Eval: F-3).

(3) On 2 September 1969, a US MI source reported that as of 25-31 August 1969, units of the 32nd Battalion, 5th Regiment was deployed as follows: (1) 150 personnel, consisting of one recon platoon and one artillery platoon of one U/I company was located vicinity YD 630140 with the mission of preparing to shell Hue City within the next few days. (2) 100 personnel, consisting of one recon platoon and one 122mm rocket platoon of one U/I Battery, was located vicinity YD 660150. The recon platoon was to carry out terrain reconnaissance in Huong Tra (D) (CNA) in order to shell Hue City (Eval: F-6).

b. Quang Tin. On 5 September 1969, a US MI source reported that as of 26 August 1969, a VC squad consisting of approximately ten men was operating in the vicinity of Hoa Khoai (BT 485015). During the night the squad operates in Tich Tay (BT 505046), Long Phu (BT 510030) and Chu Lai Airbase. The mission of the squad is to spot agents for use in the penetration of Chu Lai Airbase. These penetration agents are to be used to collect information and act as saboteurs (Eval: C-6).

c. Quang Ngai. On 27 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the following females are working as VC spies, penetrating GVN controlled areas. The females are: Nguyen Thi Ngan, age 36, Nguyen Thi Cong, age 16, Nguyen Thi Tam, age 22, and Do Thi Buong, age unknown. So far they have gained access to Rung Lang (BS 610730) and Ong Bo (BS 619723) to collect information (Eval: D-3).

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3. SABOTAGE. No reports of sabotage incidents were received. Reports of seven sabotage incidents were reported during the previous week.

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Reported Viet Cong propaganda activities remained at a high level, but decreased slightly from the previous week. Political and propaganda activities reflected no change in objectives and themes reported previously. The primary objective continues to be the expansion and strengthening of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) and its policies in light of an eventual US withdrawal and the election of a future SVN government. Propaganda is being directed primarily at VN civilians with the ARVN soldier as a second priority target. Themes urge people to "foresake" the ways of the "puppet government" and support a coalition with the PRG. The VCI/VC appear to be anticipating an end to hostilities and are continuing to increase efforts at gaining control of populated areas as well as GVN resettlement areas. The people are urged to support the "fall revolution". Word of the Autumn/Winter Campaign continues to filter down through VC echelons and paraphrases previous policies as follows (not necessarily in order):

a. Reorganize agent nets and establish secret cache systems.

b. Penetrate VC agents in PSDF in preparation for the coming offensive.

c. Gather information on GVN security agencies, ARVN defensive posts and activities.

d. VC cadre in lowlands are to prepare to receive PRG members and aid in recruiting drives.

e. VC cadre to organize a system for purchasing rice for the Autumn/Winter Campaign.

f. PSDF is to be terrorized.

g. Local guerrillas are to be dispersed within the VC political system.

h. RD cadre are to be terrorized and refugees forced to return to their former homes.

i. Collect intelligence on all GVN activities.

Propaganda activities in support of political policies will probably continue at a high level and may increase from the present high level. No change in previous policies is indicated as the result of the death of Ho Chi Minh, announced on 3 September, nor during the transition to new leadership in NVN.

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(1) Quang Tri. On 1 September 1969, a US MI source reported that on 30 August 1969, an NVA Public Safety Group moved from the northern DMZ to deploy in the Xuam-Long area at YD 207891. In the area were about twenty houses belonging to pro-communist sympathizers. At the time of observation the members of the group were deployed in those houses. Estimated strength of the group was 150 men, commanded by Truong-Thien and guided by Nguyen Luong. All members of the group were North Vietnamese. They carried many propaganda leaflets and slogan banners. At the time of observation, the group was preparing slogans and flags of the National Liberation Front. Their intentions were to infiltrate into Gio-Linh (D) resettlement areas for the purpose of re-organizing their infrastructure. The group also intended to display flags and slogans in order to provoke the people in the resettlement areas to stage demonstrations in September (Eval: C-6).

(2) Thua Thien.

(a) On 27 August 1969, a US MI source reported that three cadre of the Current Affairs Section of the Thua Thien (P) Party conducted a meeting in a cave vicinity YD 554235. The participants were representatives of the Phong Dien, Quang Dien, and Huong Dien (D) Party Chapter Committees. They discussed the "Operation Phase of the Rainy Season". During this phase the VC/NVA will open a "Series of Attacks" on the district seats of Phong Dien, Quang Dien and Huong Dien, while the People's Armed Forces will fight to gain more land. In order to accomplish these goals they must establish underground shelters near district seats and establish caches along routes to the target area before the rainy season commences (Eval: C-6).

(b) On 30 August 1969, a US MI source reported that a meeting of the "Internal Military and Political Headquarters" of Southern Thua Thien (P) was held to study a new policy. The policy consisted of three parts: (1) The guerrilla is to be the core of this principle. (2) The mobile regular forces principle which consists of concentrating regular force units into larger size, about regimental size. (3) The sapper operation principle which involves increasing sapper operations in the city to create panic and draw ARVN forces into the city for defense (Eval: F-6).

(c) On 1 September 1969, a US MI source reported that the Central Committees of the Liberation Front Party has started directives for collection of supplies for VC/NVA forces. As a result of shortages in the food supplies of VC/NVA units, units have forced the people to contribute more than the "fixed quantity". In response to this situation, on 12 June 1969, the Central Committee of the Liberation Front Party disseminated a message numbered 13.494/MT/TU/KTT/CT which was copied by the Thua Thien Provincial Committee and then distributed to the Precinct Committees as message number 1469/MT/TT/AB/CT, dated 19 July 1969 and signed by Ho Van Do, chief of the Thua Thien front. The content of the message was a reminder to military and civilian levels not to use the designation of

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"Front" by collecting too many supplies and causing dissatisfaction among the people. The problem of food supplies for the NVA has been difficult to solve because the precinct committees have not supplied enough rice to the Provincial Committee, to be placed in stores, for supplying regular forces. In Thua Thien (P) there was a civilian proselyting group, consisting of 300 personnel, most of whom were Montagnards, divided into nine teams, undertaking the transport of supplies to Ong Gia mountain, vicinity YD 560230 and Bach Ma area vicinity ZC 020920. Main force troops were to be supplied entirely at Province level. Local guerrillas were to be self-sufficient and obtain supplies by proselyting the people. The guerrillas were to communicate with the Economy-Finance section to receive rice only when they were about to go on a training mission. Inner and extra-city cadre who did not live with their families would be given rice. If these cadre lived in nationally controlled areas, they were to obtain rice by their own means, and would be given only 500$VN per month by the Hamlet-Village Front section for miscellaneous expenses. Political cadre were normally paid between 6000 and 9000$VN per month. During the last months, however, all cadre levels had been given temporary living rations only, which consisted of 450 grams per day of rice, salt, and dried fish instead of the previous 600 grams per day ration. The reason for the ration cut was that VC/NVA proselyting of the people to obtain supplies was inadequate. During the month of July 1969, Huong (nfi) and Phu Vang districts were commended for providing the greatest quantity and variety of rice in the Province (Eval: F-6).

(d) On 4 September 1969, one VC squad entered La Chu hamlet (YD 695240), bought a quantity of food and spread propaganda leaflets before withdrawing.

(e) On 4 September 1969, one VC squad entered An Ninh Thuong hamlet (YD 720219), displayed one liberation battle-front flag at the school and placed one mine at the flag pole.

(3) Quang Nam.

(a) On 28 August 1969, a US MI source reported that VC/NVA forces, including the 31st and 368B NVA regiments have planned to initiate a wave of sapper attacks and shellings throughout the Danang TAOR beginning 2 September 1969. The attacks are designed to support the mission of establishing cells of the PRG and aid in propaganda efforts demanding the formulation of a coalition government and an end to the war (Eval: C-2).

(b) On 4 September 1969, a US MI source reported that according to directives issued by the Viet Cong (VC) Quang Da Special Zone Headquarters, the VC 1969 "Summer-Autumn Campaign" was to consist of two phases. The first phase was to last from 1 September 1969 to 15 September 1969 and the second phase was to last from 15 September to 25 September 1969. In order to execute the two phases, the VC Quang Da Special Zone was to be reinforced by an U/I NVA regiment which moved from the A Shau Valley to the Nam Dong areas (YD 750100) in Thua Thien (P) and was to continue moving south into Hieu Duc (D), Quang Nam (P). This U/I NVA

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regiment had the mission to coordinate with local forces in an attack on Danang City, Hoi An City and outposts in Hieu Duc (D) (Eval: F-3).

(c) On 5 September 1969, the Danang City National Police reported that the VC distributed a number of leaflets in the Dong Giang Resettlement Camp, District III, to appeal to the civilians defense members. At the same time they displayed two slogans near the convalescence camp in the above area. The content of the slogans reads as follows: "Build up our life for a great and happy life. Victory has come, what will happen to your life if you still carry the U.S. weapon?"

(4) Quang Ngai.

(a) On 24 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the VC have established a thought reform camp at BS 412816. The camp designation was the H-10th VC Thought Reform camp, subordinate to the Son Tinh (D) VC Committee. Approximately 40 prisoners are being held here, consisting of RVN cadre members and VC cadre members who were suspects. Prisoners who had families in the GVN controlled area would not be freed until they had promised to move their families to VC controlled areas (Eval: C-6).

(b) On 28 August 1969, a US MI source reported that approximately 38 VC of Mo Duc (D) held a meeting in the vicinity of Minh Tan Bac (H) (BS 765580) to discuss new tasks. Le A, who opened the meeting, passed out an order which originated from a higher level (nfi). The order stated that the VC were to liberate GVN controlled areas (nfi) and rebuild a three point (political, military and economic) combat village. To execute these orders the following tasks had to be accomplished: (1) VC had to recruit 200 laborers to carry wounded personnel and supplies. (2) A report was to be submitted to the district unit, giving the number of refugees in GVN controlled areas. (3) Instruct civilians in fire prevention and tell them to have dry food and make hiding places for their supplies (nfi) (Eval: B-6).

(c) On 28 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the VC issued a plan in the vicinity of Hung Ngai (H) (BS 733457). The plan consisted of the following items: (1) The VC were to stage a ground attack against a main target in Quang Ngai City (nfi). Sapper units were to be armed with homemade mines to use against ARVN and US patrols (nfi). (3) Infiltrate refugee camps to kidnap and assassinate GVN officials and destroy GVN agencies. (4) Drive out GVN pacification units (nfi) in order to rebuild combat villages (Eval: C-6).

(d) On 3 September 1969, a US MI source reported that approximately fifty VC district-level and province-level cadre assembled vicinity BS 365934 Tra Bong (D). The purpose of this assembly was to attend a political training course which was to begin on 4 September 1969. The course was scheduled to last for five days, ending on 8 September 1969. The assembly was headed by Le Hong Phuc, a Quang Ngai province-level cadre.

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The training course was to be conducted at an abandoned military camp located vicinity BS 365934. There were several caves in the area which were to be used in case of Allied air strikes. There were two phases to the plans which were to be discussed. The first phase included the liberation of the rural areas and encirclement of the cities. This phase was to be accomplished by both military forces and VC administrative units. The second phase included assassination of American and GVN officials within the cities. The information which was to be disseminated during this training course was also to be recorded in documents and distributed to village-level cadre and also NVA units (Eval: C-6).

(e) On 3 September 1969, a GVN source reported that the VC held a meeting at Diem Dien (BS 725806) to discuss the Autumn Campaign, which will possibly last from 3 to 18 September 1969. It was disclosed that Regiment 2 will support this campaign (Eval: F-4).

(f) On 3 September 1969, a GVN source reported an unidentified battalion from Regiment 18/3 was located at BS 424528, acting as a support unit for other units in Quang Ngai (P) during the first ten days of September (Eval: D-4).

5. TERROR. Reported terrorist incidents during the week declined sharply from those of the previous week. The effect of the weather and terrain conditions caused by a typhoon in NICTZ probably contributed to the decrease of terrorist activities inasmuch as the terrorism conducted was generally confined to SICTZ with no incidents reported in Quang Tri (P). The targets and objectives of terrorist activity continued to reflect that of the two previous weeks. See Appendix 2 for a listing of terrorist incidents in ICTZ.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Quang Tri. On 31 August 1969, a US MI source reported that eight VC were observed in Vinh Quang Nhang Refugee Village, (YD 240700), propagandizing young people to join the VC and collected food and taxes from the people (Eval: F-3).

b. Thua Thien. On 1 September 1969, approximately 30 VC entered a hamlet at YD 689245, stole 1 duck, 10 lbs. of peanuts, and distributed propaganda leaflets.

c. Quang Nam.

(1) On 15 August 1969, a GVN source reported that the Party Committee of Dien Ban (D) held a meeting of the VC Self Administrative sections of Thanh Son (V) (AT 965618), Thanh Trung (V) (BT 998652), Thanh Truong (V) (BT 039627), Thanh Phong (V) (BT 046599), and Ky Minh (V) (AT 985600). During this meeting the Autumn-Winter campaign, code named Z-3, was discussed. Each family was ordered to buy four kilos of sugar, two kilos of dried shrimp and one kilo of dried salted shrimp (Eval: F-3).

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(2) On 29 August 1969, a US MI source reported that an element of about 80 men from the Q-82 Local Force, combined with an unknown number of local guerrillas were dispersed at Phong Nhut (BT 027602-BT -34601). Their mission was to launch surprise attacks on PF units and Revolutionary Development cadre operating in the area, mine roads and interrupt traffic between Thanh Quyt (BT 042622, Vinh Dien (BT 057585) and the Giap Ba Bridge (Eval: C-3).

(3) On 1 September 1969, a US MI source reported that a battalion of the 36th NVA Regiment was dispersed north of the Tra Son mountains at AT 972507, AT 972504, and AT 978507. About forty laborers accompanied the unit, carrying ammunition in rice bags (Eval: C-3).

d. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 27 August 1969, a GVN source reported 80 VC laborers moved ammo from BS 730200 to BS 797982 on the night of 25 August 1969 for resupply of approximately 60 NVA who were preparing for operations in the near future to celebrate the independence day, 2 September 1969 (Eval: C-3).

(2) On 27 August 1969, a US MI source reported that the Son Tinh Trade Section has sent people to markets of Gia Hoa (BS 696760), Phu Hoa (BS 627762) and Son Long (CNA) to purchase rice and food. These foodstuffs would then be transported to the Nui Nghenh Area (BS 590795) for use by the VC (Eval: C-3).

(3) On 28 August 1969, a GVN source reported an unidentified LF company located at BS 800465-BS 810470. They were collecting laborers for a 15 day mission (nfi) (Eval: D-4).

(4) On 28 August 1969, a GVN source reported that NVA units are holding reindoctrination courses in their rear bases (nfi) for sappers and guerrillas. They were dressed in ARVN uniforms and were to penetrate Quang Ngai City on motorcycles (Unevaluated).

(5) On 25 August 1969, a US MI source reported that a rice cache was located in the vicinity of BS 375816. Working at the cache were seven guerrillas who had collected rice taxes and troop feeding funds (nfi) from villages in Son Tinh (D). Nguyen Luan and Le Hoa were in charge of the cache (Eval: C-6).

APPENDIXES
1-Statistical Compilation of People's Revolutionary Committees in ICTZ
2-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 36-69

People's Revolutionary Committees reported by name and/or location as of 06 September 1969

	Quang Tri	Thua Thien	Quang Nam	Quang Tin	Quang Ngai	Total
Region (MRTTH)						1
Province	1	1	1	1	1	5
District	2	5	2	1	9	19
City		1	2			3
Village	37	36	76	49	107	305
Hamlet	31	59	16	11	122	239
Precinct		1				1
Total	71	103	97	62	239	573

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 36-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Thua Thien	27Aug69 (Late Entry)	YD 537337	One VC platoon entered Con San Resettlement Camp and assassinated one commissioner and two PF's.
	31Aug69	ZD 143007	VC entered Thu Yen (H) and assassinated one civilian, a 65 year old male, because he had two sons in the ARVN.
	3Sep69	YD 988146	VC entered Nghia Lap (H) and assassinated one civilian.
	4Sep69	YD 739233	Hue City received one round of 122mm rocket fire, killing one civilian, wounding six and destroying three homes.
Quang Nam	26Aug69 (Late Entry)	AT 838369	VC entered Ninh Phuoc (H) and assassinated one civilian.
	28Aug69 (Late Entry)	BT 058508	Three civilians of Truong Dong (H) were wounded by accidentally detonating a VC mine.
	30Aug69 (Late Entry)	BT 070575	VC entered Truong Phu (H) and assassinated one civilian.
	30Aug69 (Late Entry)	BT 095528	One civilian of Long Xuyen (H) was killed by a VC confrontation (nfi).
	31Aug69 (Late Entry)	AT 889476	Xuyen Phu (V) received unknown size and number of mortar rounds, killing one civilian and wounding four.
	1Sep69	BT 094537	A civilian triggered an M-79 grenade booby trap near Gia Tinh (V), resulting in one civilian killed.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	1Sep69	BT 084513	One civilian was killed when he accidentally detonated a VC mine.
	2Sep69	Danang City	A National Police representative reported a grenade incident (nfi) in the vicinity of the Danang Hotel, wounding one guard.
	3Sep69	CNA	VC abducted ten civilians from Thu Bon (H), Xuyen Thu (V), Duy Xuyen (D) (nfi).
	4Sep69	Danang City	VC fired three rockets into the First District (CNA), killing one civilian and wounding five.
	6Sep69	BT 034772	One round of unknown type rocket impacted in Danang City, resulting in twelve civilians killed and fifteen wounded.
	6Sep69	AT 032788	One unknown type rocket impacted, killing four civilians.
	6Sep69	Danang	The Long Giang area in District III received eight rounds of unknown type rocket fire, wounding five civilians and damaging one home.
	6Sep69	Danang	Danang Airbase and Danang City received ten rounds of unknown type rocket fire. One round impacted in Nai Hien Dong (Q) (CNA) killing eight civilians and wounding seven and destroying three homes. Another rocket impacted in Inter-family 9, Thac-Gian (Q) (CNA), wounding three civilians and destroying three homes.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	6Sep69	BT 095528	One hundred ninety second RF company and the 79th RF platoon received 35 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and 15 rounds of B-40 rocket fire, resulting in seven civilians killed and four wounded (nfi).
Quang Tin	4Sep69	BT 497095	PF platoon received SAF, three rounds of B-40 rocket fire, killing one PF, wounding one PF and two civilians.
Quang Ngai	29Aug69 (Late Entry)	BS 801395	Tan Tu (H) received one round of B-40 rocket fire, killing one civilian and wounding four.
	29Aug69 (Late Entry)	BS 795405	A civilian bus hit a mine, completely destroying the bus, and wounded four civilians.

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ANNEX D (SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 36-69.

1. DUEL BLADE II AREA

a. In the DMZ and Western Recon Zone, 3rd Marine Division sensors continued to be one of the primary means to detect enemy movement. This was particularly true during the hours of darkness. Strings showing significant movement were located vicinity coordinates YD 010682, XD 935665, XD 664522, and YD 065702. Division Air Readout sensors combined detected a total of 98 targets which were fired on with 578 rounds of 105mm, 97 rounds of 155mm, 164 rounds of 175mm, and 98 rounds of 8 inch artillery. This compares with 113 targets which were fired on with 1161 rounds of 105mm, 46 rounds of 155mm, 107 rounds of 175mm, and 175 rounds 8 inch artillery for the period 26 to 30 August 1969.

2. DUFFEL BAG

a. In the 1st BDE, 5th Inf Div (Mech) AO, vicinity YD 294469, on 1 September, VC were heard talking near an emplaced acoubuoy. An artillery mission was fired and shouts and screams were heard. A recon of the area at daylight revealed several blood trails and one pith helmet.

b. In the 1st Marine Division AO, enemy activity through line sensors increased with a total of 258 enemy detected resulting in 14 fire missions. At 310020H, a Recon OP located AT 998473, using ADSIDS and NOD, detected 11 enemy moving northeast. A fire mission was called resulting in 6 NVA KIA. At 012045H, an I/3/1 squad ambush using PSIDs located AT 901600 detected 15 enemy moving east. A fire mission was called resulting in 9 NVA KIA. At 012310H, H&S/2/26 BPS detected 14 enemy at AT 924670. Fire mission was called resulting in 2 NVA KIA. A Recon OP, using ADSIDs detected 6 enemy moving east vicinity AT 998 473 at 032000H. Fire mission was called but dust obscured the target. No further movement detected.

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NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

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	2

MACH. C	DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT	PRI.	SEC.	ORIGINATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.	NO. CYS. RECD.	MICFILM CLAS.	MO.	DA.	YR. DATE
	C914376	PERIODIC INTEL RPT 37-69	3K	NAVY FILE NUMBER	MEF	0107269	2	49169			

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B-FOR COMPLIANCE
C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF _____
D-FOR COMMENT
E-FOR RECOMMENDATION
F-FOR CONCURRENCE
G-FOR INFORMATION
H-RETURN TO _____
I- _____
J-DISPOSITION _____

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
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					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
1	G	9/23	9/25	KM	G-3 By Ltr
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
					JOINT CONTROL
					COUNSEL
					WOMEN MARINES
					STAFF DENTAL
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16 September 1969



UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 37-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

NORTH VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
QUANG TRI
Quang Tri
HUE
THUA THIEN
SOUTH CHINA SEA
DA NANG
CU LAO CHAM
Hoi An
LAOS
QUANG NAM
Tam Ky
QUANG TIN
CU LAO RE
Quang Ngai
QUANG NGAI
1
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515
0 25 50 Miles
0 25 50 Kilometers
II CORPS

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GROUP - 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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G-2 Section
DANANG, RVN
16 September 1969
Ser: 0107269

PERINTREP 37-69

Period covered: 070001H September - 132400H September 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. Regardless of the fact that the past week included the three day unilaterally announced NVA/VC cease fire marking the passing of Ho Chi MINH, there was no decrease in the levels of enemy operations. In fact, there was an increase in most categories of enemy initiated ground activity. There were a total of 376 incidents reported for the week which included 15 small scale attacks and two company size or larger. The increase in incidents was echoed in the statistics related to other enemy activity. There were 1,206 rounds of incoming recorded for the week and 774 enemy killed in action.

Reported counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities during the past week were highlighted by an upsurge during the period 12-13 September. Even with a noted lull during the so-called truce period of 8-11 September, evidence indicates that planning and organizing activities were continuous and primarily concerned with developments of plans and policies to carry out military, political, and proselyting activities during the current phase of VC offensive activity. The overall level of each area of counterintelligence interest remains high and is expected to increase in the coming weeks.

a. QUANG TRI (P). During the reporting period sightings/incidents in the DMZ area increased to 258 with 32 of these sightings north of the BEN HAI River. A total of 164 hostile targets were taken under fire this week by artillery, tactical air strikes and naval gunfire.

In QUANG TRI Province, there were only minor contacts and attacks by fire throughout the week. In general, there were few violations of the North Vietnamese unilaterally announced cease fire, the most notable being the mining of the fleet oiler USS NOXUBEE (AOG-56). At 082140H, a white object and two swimmers were sighted near the oiler while it was moored to a POL buoy in the vicinity of the mouth of the CUA VIET River (YD 3670). The ship took the object and swimmers under fire and got underway. At 090201H, there was an explosion on the port side while the ship was steaming in the vicinity of (YD 450640). An 18 inch hole was sustained on the port side below the water line. There were no injuries and the flooding was contained. This incident was probably carried out by a team from the 126th Naval Sapper Group which has operated in and around the CUA VIET on an intermittent basis for at least the past 21 months.

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Another major violation of the truce was a deliberately prepared "U" shaped ambush seven kilometers northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 950621). This squad size ambush was initiated at 0735H on the 10th against a platoon patrol from I/3/3 Marines resulting in light friendly casualties. Although not during the NVA truce period, another ambush occurred in this same general area on the evening of the 13th when L/3/3 Marines moving into a night defensive position six kilometers northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 944610) was alerted by a scout dog. The Marine company deployed and the enemy opened up with heavy small arms and machine gun fire along with RPG's and 82mm mortar fire. The results of this action were one NVA killed with light friendly casualties. Although no positive unit identifications were made in these two ambushes, they were most probably executed by the 9th Regiment of the 304th NVA Division.

In the eastern DMZ area, enemy initiated activity was characterized by indirect attacks by fire. During the early morning hours of the 12th, A Battery/62nd ARVN Artillery on A-2 Base (YD 213741) received 13 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in light friendly casualties with one 105mm howitzer destroyed and one 105 slightly damaged. That same evening A-2 Base again received a volley of ten rounds of 82mm mortar fire. This time there were no casualties or damage. Also early on the 12th, 1/77th Armor three kilometers west of A-3 Base (YD 145729) received three 140mm rockets with no casualties or damage reported. During the early morning hours of the 13th, two population centers were subjected to attacks by fire. HA THANH Hamlet, seven kilometers north northwest of DONG HA (YD 224674) received four 122mm rockets resulting in light civilian casualties while no casualties were reported when MAI XA Refugee Center, seven kilometers north of DONG HA (YD 240670) received four rounds of 122mm rockets.

In the central portion of the DMZ, in addition to the two previously mentioned ambushes, 3/3 Marines received an attack by fire on the 12th. At 1812H on the 12th, K/3/3 Marines sweeping an area of previous contact six kilometers north northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 960616) received 60 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in light friendly casualties. Elements of the 3rd Marines accounted for 14 enemy in two separate incidents when I/3/3 Marines killed seven NVA, seven kilometers north northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 952621) and D/1/3 Marines found another seven enemy bodies, seven and one-half kilometers north northeast of the ROCKPILE (XD 997631).

In the eastern portion of QUANG TRI (P), QUANG TRI Combat Base (YD 339538) received eight 122mm rockets on the 12th. To the west, VANDEGRIFT Combat Base (YD 000484) received six 122mm rockets. Neither attack produced casualties or damage.

In the central portion of the province, north of the BA LONG Valley, 1/2 ARVN while searching an area of the previous day's contact (YD 195435) found eight NVA bodies and miscellaneous arms, munitions, and equipment. Three days later, 1/3 ARVN in the same general area (YD 173427) received 28 rounds of 82mm mortar fire with no reported casualties. South of the

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BA LONG Valley, 4/1 ARVN killed five enemy on the 7th (YD 193296) and killed another eight on the 10th (YD 168282). Elsewhere in the province, a 3rd Marine Division reconnaissance team ambushed an enemy rice carrying party six and one-half kilometers southwest of QUANG TRI City (YD 291485). The Marines killed five of the enemy.

In an order of battle development, one significant prisoner was taken in HAI LANG District (YD 3448) during the week from the K-11 Sapper Battalion of the 7th Front. While there have been documents and allusions by other prisoners to the existence of the K-11, this was the first prisoner taken from this unit.

b. THUA THIEN (P). Action in THUA THIEN Province was light with no significant activity reported. Enemy initiated activity was limited to an attack by fire west of HUE and a mining incident in the PHU LOC District. In the first instance, 2/3 ARVN 15 kilometers west southwest of HUE (YD 600194) received four RPG rounds and 50 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on the 11th resulting in light casualties. In the latter case, the HUE/DANANG Railroad received its 21st mining incident of the year directed against the railroad or its road bed, culverts, retaining walls and bridges. This incident on the 8th, occurred 17 kilometers east southeast of PHU LOC (AT 838974) and resulted in heavy damage to the locomotive with two cars derailed and three meters of track damaged. As has been the case in all previous incidents, damage was quickly repaired and the railroad returned to operation.

There were several light contacts in the north central portion of the province. On the 7th, a platoon from 2/506th Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force seven kilometers south southwest of Camp EVANS (YD 523256) resulting in six enemy killed. Slightly to the west, 3/1 ARVN engaged an unknown size enemy force on the 12th, 15 kilometers west southwest of Camp EVANS (YD 384294). The ARVN killed seven enemy in this contact. The next day, 3/1 found five more enemy bodies in the same area (YD 384295). In another engagement with an unknown size enemy force, 15 kilometers west of PHU LOC (YC 937990) 1/54 ARVN killed five enemy.

In western THUA THIEN (P), there were no reports of enemy initiated activity as the 101st has closed down its main fire support bases, BERCHTESGADEN (YD 4401) and CURRAHEE (YC 3994) and now is currently operating out of a single base in this area, FSB RENDEZVOUS (YC 4396).

c. QUANG NAM (P). In QUANG NAM Province, there was no repetition of the rocket and mortar attacks which took place in the DANANG area during the early morning hours of the 6th. In part, this may be attributed to the three day NVN truce; however, it is most probable that improved countermeasures have inhibited the enemy's capabilities and movement in the vicinity of his most commonly employed launching sites. However, on the 10th there was a sapper attack on ASP-2 seven kilometers west of DANANG (AT 947772) in clear violation of the NVN's self-imposed truce. Only light casualties and minor damages resulted. A prisoner captured in the attack identified the attacking force as the C-31st Independent

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Company of the Northern Command, Front 4. This was the first known offensive action south of NAM O carried out by this unit in recent months.

In another development, a warrant officer rallier has provided an update and confirmation of the Northern Command. He states that it is composed of the T.87 Sapper and HAI VAN Engineer Battalions supported by elements of the 573d Rocket Artillery Battalion and two local force companies, C-31 and Q.55. In the same area the Force Logistics Command (AT 945793) received five rounds of unknown type mortar fire on the 12th resulting in minor damage. Slightly to the southwest, an 11th Marines AO received small arms fire from 30-35 enemy 12 kilometers northwest of HILL 55 (AT 880707) on the 9th. The AO called air strikes on the enemy force killing ten.

On the 12th, an A/1/1 Marine patrol observed eight enemy crossing the SONG YEN River five kilometers north of HILL 55 (AT 967670). The Marines engaged the enemy killing all eight. In the same general area, I/3/1 Marines killed 14 NVA on the 9th, two kilometers southeast of HILL 55 (AT 983605). Two days later, I/3/1 killed an additional five NVA three kilometers southwest of HILL 55 (AT 943592).

There were several attacks by fire in the AN HOA vicinity as well as several friendly initiated contacts. On 7 September, M/3/5 Marines in night defensive positions seven kilometers north of AN HOA (AT 837524) received 20 RPG rounds, 30 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and 30-40 CHICOM grenades in addition to small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The Marines engaged the enemy killing five. Also on the 7th, the Headquarters of the 5th Marines four kilometers northeast of AN HOA (AT 875475) received six 140mm rockets resulting in no casualties or damage. Early the next morning, K/3/5 Marines seven kilometers north northeast of AN HOA received small arms fire, 40 RPG rounds, 100 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds resulting in light friendly casualties. On the 12th, AN HOA Combat Base (AT 874475) received two 140mm rockets while the next day and three kilometers to the northeast (AT 849485), B/1/5, M/3/5, and H&S/3/5 Marines received 20-25 rounds of 60mm mortar fire followed by a ground attack from an estimated enemy platoon. This attack resulted in five enemy killed with light friendly casualties.

In a friendly initiated contact on the 7th, eight kilometers west northwest of LIBERTY Bridge (AT 855548) the 21st ARVN Rangers contacted an unknown size enemy force killing 13 VC. Four days later, I/3/5 Marines two kilometers north of AN HOA (AT 842478) made contact with an estimated 30 enemy killing seven. The next day in almost the same location (AT 834477), the 39th ARVN Rangers made contact with an unknown size enemy force killing 15. South of HOI AN, elements of the 2nd ROK Marine Brigade accounted for over 44 confirmed enemy killed as they continued their aggressive sweeps and cave exploitations.

Of continuing interest are the unusually large sightings of enemy personnel in the southeastern reaches of QUANG NAM Province with special

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emphasis upon the PHU LOC and ANTENNA Valleys. In the past week there have been in excess of 2,000 individual sightings in this area. Ordinarily, unusually heavy movements of enemy forces in a given area presage offensive operations. However, as several weeks have now passed without the development of any significant offensive efforts by the NVA/VC which could be related to these almost constant sightings, other reasons for this movement must be considered. One of the most probable reasons underlying enemy movement noted in these areas can possibly be related to resupply operations. While some of this activity can clearly be attributed to the movement of ordnance from the QUE SON Mountains down to the lowlands of QUANG NAM (P), it seems unlikely that the ammunition requirements of the enemy would require such great numbers of personnel. For this reason, one possibility is that these sightings are related to the movement of foodstuffs from the lowlands back into the mountains to support the enemy's needs during the fall and winter months. It is known that little or no food is imported into QUANG NAM from out-of-country and that Front 4 is expected to meet their own food needs from local sources. Secondly, food resource control in QUANG NAM (P) remains a problem, and surplus foodstuffs do exist in this province. The most readily accessible sources have in the past been DIEN BAN, HOI AN, and the market towns in eastern QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN. Although the fall rice crop has not yet been harvested, there are significant sources of American grown rice available in these areas.

An alternate possibility to explain the degree of movement which is being detected in this area is that the movements have been precipitated by aggressive friendly operations which require almost constant movement on the part of the enemy. However, as these sightings and sensings of the enemy are generally in the same geographical locations, the flow of movement does not indicate evasion, but rather some form of purposeful activity, the reasons for which are as yet unknown.

d. QUANG TIN (P). While action in QUANG TIN (P) was at a relatively low level throughout the period of the NVN cease fire, one hour after the close of the truce period, action again erupted with the focus of enemy initiated activity located in the vicinity of HIEP DUC. At 110205H, B/4-31 Infantry on FSB SIBERIA, one and one-half kilometers southwest of HIEP DUC (AT 901232) was attacked by a force estimated to be two rifle companies in strength and tentatively identified as elements of the 1st VC Regiment. The attack was two pronged with the enemy force employing small arms fire, RPG's, recoilless rifle fire and flamethrowers. The enemy unit, while inflicting light casualties on the defenders by the employment of RPG fire failed to penetrate the perimeter and sustained 31 killed in their abortive effort.

At 111400H, the enemy renewed offensive operations as approximately 100 rounds of 82mm mortar fire fell on HIEP DUC. This barrage was followed by a ground attack from an estimated enemy platoon. The enemy force lost eight killed while moderate friendly casualties resulted from this action as well as 50 houses destroyed. Contact was renewed at HIEP DUC with the RF/PF being engaged by two enemy companies during the early

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morning hours of the 12th. This enemy effort was also successfully thwarted and at noon on the 12th the friendly forces at HIEP DUC were reinforced by the arrival of 2/5 ARVN which was helilifted to HILL 118 two kilometers northeast of HIEP DUC (AT 921259). Later in the day, D/4-31st Infantry while sweeping the area one and one-half kilometers northwest of HIEP DUC (AT 902258) killed 11 enemy. In the two days of fighting the enemy lost a minimum of 51 confirmed killed in action.

Prisoners have been taken confirming the presence of elements of both the 1st VC and 3rd NVA Regiments of the 2nd NVA Division in these contacts. In addition, one prisoner claims he is from the 10th Sapper Battalion, 2nd NVA Division. There is information that between November 1968 and June 1969, the 305th NVA Division in the vicinity of HANOI trained six sapper battalions which were subsequently infiltrated into ICTZ. Three of these battalions were broken up and used as individual replacements while the other three are believed to be employed as new sapper battalions. The 9th Sapper Battalion has already been identified in QUANG NGAI (P). The second new sapper battalion is believed to be the 11th, now a part of the 7th Front. The 10th is currently held as an AKA for the GK-35 Sapper Battalion of the 2d NVA Division. However, there is the possibility that this unit is a third new and separate sapper battalion.

Prior to the overshadowing events of the HIEP DUC engagements, elements of the 5th ARVN Regiment at FSB PREP 11 kilometers west of TIEN PHUOC (BT 008148) received 16 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in light casualties. To the northeast, B/3-21 Infantry on the 8th, found 24 enemy bodies which had been killed in the recent heavy fighting in this area. Three days later, an additional seven NVA bodies were discovered by C/3-21 Infantry 13 kilometers east northeast of HIEP DUC (BT 039261).

In the eastern reaches of the province, activity during the week was generally limited and consisted of scattered attacks by fire and light ground contacts. On the 7th, the 607th RF Company four kilometers east northeast of THANG BINH (BT 207434) was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force. The RF's engaged the ambushing force suffering light friendly casualties.

Noteworthy enemy activity in this area subsided until the early morning hours of the 11th, when A/2-1 Infantry on LZ HAWK HILL (BT 231315) received three 122mm rockets and two 82mm mortar rounds. Two days later, TAM KY (BT 291235) received two 122mm rockets. Neither of these light attacks by fire caused casualties or damage. Also in this eastern area, a gunship from F Troop, 8th Cavalry killed eight VC in three separate sightings 12-13 kilometers north northeast of TIEN PHUOC (BT 1327).

In other significant intelligence gathered during the past week, elements of the 72d LF Battalion were contacted in the PINEAPPLE Forest area (center of mass BT 2522) approximately eight kilometers west of TAM KY. Two prisoners were taken from this unit who reported that 30 members of their battalion were then operating in the PINEAPPLE Forest.

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The 72d Battalion is currently credited with a strength of 185 personnel with their AO generally eight kilometers to the northeast of the point where the prisoners were taken.

In another development of particular significance, a long range reconnaissance patrol from Americal sighted two enemy moving along the main trail which leads southeast through central QUANG TIN (P) (AT 835152) and killed them. Documents found on their bodies indicated that they were returning to their units in eastern QUANG TIN (P) after having attended the 2d NVA Division's sapper school. This is the first positive indication held by this command that the enemy is operating a division sapper school.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). As was the case in QUANG TIN (P), there was a noticeable decrease in enemy initiated activity in QUANG NGAI (P) during the three day period of the so-called cease fire followed by an immediate return to normal levels of action.

Particularly noted were the enemy attacks against refugee camps in BINH SON District. At 0200 on the 11th, AN CHAU Refugee Village in the vicinity of BINH SON (BS 600914) received a ground attack from an estimated 18 sappers believed to be from the 95A Sapper Company. At the same time, the DONG XUAN Refugee Camp, 15 kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 760819) was attacked by an estimated enemy platoon. In both cases civilian casualties resulted from the attacks. Also early that morning, 3/6 ARVN engaged an unknown size enemy force 11 kilometers southeast of BINH SON (BS 667836) killing five of the enemy.

The heaviest contact of the week in ICTZ occurred on the 13th when CAP 1-3-9, 14 kilometers west southwest of BINH SON (BS 4787) was attacked by an estimated two NVA companies. The NVA penetrated AN PHONG Village complex (Hamlets 1, 2, and 3) and AN HOA Refugee Village (all in the vicinity of BS 4787). At the same time, OP GEORGE on HILL 141 (BS 4786) received 60 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 160 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. The NVA also employed small arms fire, hand grenades, RPG's and satchel charges. At 1000H, 1-52 Infantry and 2/6 ARVN reinforced CAP 1-3-9. One RF Company from BINH SON was also helilifted into the area as reinforcements. This attack cost the enemy unit 116 killed. However, there were 260 houses destroyed by fire in the village. In this action, a PW was captured from the 6th Battalion of the 21st NVA Regiment. The seizure of this PW provided renewed evidence that the 21st Regiment has not displaced northward.

The end of the cease fire period also brought a resumption of enemy activity around MO DUC and DUC PHO. On the 12th, 3/4 ARVN five kilometers east northeast of MO DUC (BS 781547) received an unknown number of mortar rounds followed by a ground attack from an unknown size enemy force. The ARVN repelled the attack killing 11 enemy while taking only light friendly casualties.

In the DUC PHO area, LZ BRONCO (BS 812383) received three 122mm rockets on the 11th while on the 15th D/4-21 Infantry, four kilometers south

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southeast of FSB DEBBIE (BS 885288) received three 140mm rockets. Neither of the attacks resulted in casualties. Also on the 11th, reconnaissance elements of 4-21 Infantry five kilometers east southeast of DUC PHO (BS 852361) killed five enemy.

To the west of DUC PHO, prisoners were taken at (BS 7042) and (BS 7038) who were identified as members of the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 22d NVA Regiment. This was the first identified contact with this regiment since 13 August. However, the 22d NVA Regiment has been held within six kilometers of these locations for some time.

For the first time in many months there was significant enemy activity reported around the BA TO CIDG Camp. On the 12th, C/4-3 Infantry seven and one-half kilometers north northeast of BA TO (BS 583412) killed five NVA in two separate contacts. Early the next morning, C/4-3 in almost the same location (BS 591411) received 20-25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in light casualties. Later in the day, the same unit found nine more NVA bodies killed in the previous days contacts.

It is too early to tell if there is a threat developing in this area. However, it is estimated, as a slipping southwestward of 3d NVA Division units has been noted in recent weeks, that it is more likely the result of the presence of the enemy in this general vicinity being challenged by American and ARVN units that has precipitated these contacts.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. There has been little change in the enemy situation during the past week. It becomes increasingly apparent with the passage of each week that the enemy is carrying forward its announced program of conducting sapper attacks and attacks by fire. The increase in terrorism, particularly the attacks on refugee settlements, makes it abundantly clear that the enemy intends to do everything within its power to defeat the GVN's pacification effort and plant and nurture the seed in the minds of the people of Vietnam that their government is incapable of affording them adequate protection. It is our estimate that the coming week will see a continuation by the enemy of these same type operations throughout I Corps but with special emphasis on the southern three provinces.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased from 297 to 375 for the week of 7-13 September. These incidents consisted of 17 ground attacks, two of which were company size or larger and 15 platoon size or smaller, one ambush, 13 attacks by fire, 220 harassing fire incidents, 58 mining and booby trap incidents, 18 hamlet harassment incidents, three assassination incidents, seven espionage incidents, nine kidnapping incidents, 24 propaganda incidents and six sabotage incidents.

a. Strength and Disposition. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

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c. Reserve Reinforcement. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire decreased from 98 to 84 incidents for the reporting period and 11 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 7-13 September.

Type	Expended
120mm Mortar	6
82mm Mortar	540
60mm Mortar	558
Unk Cal Mortar	30
140mm Rocket	27
122mm Rocket	45
TOTAL	1,206

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance

(1) There were 93 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 7-13 September. These long-range patrols reported 143 sightings and 13 contacts totaling 2,630 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of 16 enemy KIA.

(2) Sensor Activity:

(a) In the XXIV Corps area sensors located in the western QUANG TRI (P)/LAOS border area and central DMZ area were the most active and detected an estimated 581 enemy personnel.

(b) The 1st Marine Division sensor detections continue at a moderate level. During the week, as a result of sensor activations, 43 fire missions were called resulting in 31 confirmed NVA KIA and one PW. Twenty of the 31 KIA occurred in the vicinity of the recon OP located at (AT 988464).

(c) In the Americal Division area, 157 enemy personnel were detected with 421 rounds being fired. The concentration of activity was in the DUC PHO area.

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s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant caches were captured in the ICTZ during the period 7-13 September:

(a) 7-13 September: B/5/46th, 198th Infantry Brigade discovered a salt cache 16 kilometers south southeast of BINH SON in the vicinity of (BS 749836) and (BS 755835). *

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
282.4 TONS	UNK	Salt

This cache was located in open terrain and the salt was found in large piles that were covered with grass mats and bamboo and were further discovered under haystacks, in houses and under trees. 279.2 tons of the salt were distributed to QUANG TIN (P) and QUANG NGAI (P) Headquarters, 196th, 198th, and the 11th Infantry Brigade. 3.2 tons was utilized as wages for indigenous personnel.

* 225 tons of salt were previously reported by the 198th Infantry Brigade in PERINTREP 34 and 35-69. 282 tons represents the final cumulative figure.

(b) 10 September: 4/1 ARVN discovered an ordnance and rice cache 26 kilometers south southwest of QUANG TRI City (YD 166282) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
200 EA	UNK	82mm Mortar Rounds
80 EA	UNK	RPG-2 Rounds
220 LBS	Native Grown	Rice
UNK	UNK	Assorted Documents

The above cache was found in several huts and barracks and no further information was available.

(c) 13 September: L/3/7 Marines while operating 14 kilometers east southeast of AN HOA (AT 983437) discovered a rice cache as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
5 TONS	Native Grown	Rice, polished

This cache was discovered at the foot of a steep slope along a jungle trail. The rice was contained in a wooden box 6'x8'x12' and two large baskets, inside an underground shaft which was covered by NVA ponchos. The rice will be evacuated when helicopters become available.

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(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 7-13 September:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
82mm Mortar	293
81mm Mortar	3
60mm Mortar	45
105mm Artillery	6
140mm Rocket	1
122mm Rocket	7
106mm RR	1
90mm RR	2
57mm RR	6
TOTAL	364

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	292
Crew-Served Weapons	52

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 7-13 September.

Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
7 Sep	(AT 826543)	200	F/2/5
7 Sep	(AT 826530)	300 (Food)	F/2/5
8 Sep	(AT 850520)	1,000	I/3/5
8 Sep	(BS 790381)	800	C/4/3
9 Sep	(AT 839528)	300	M/3/5
9 Sep	(AT 9757)	200	I/3/1
10 Sep	(YD 168282)	220	ARVN
11 Sep	(BT 108388)	1,000	H/2/7
11 Sep	(BT 111385)	3,000	H/2/7
11 Sep	(AT 850485)	200 (Food)	M/3/5
11 Sep	(BS 522628)	100	B/3/1
12 Sep	(BT 092477)	2,000	H/2/7
12 Sep	(BS 501754)	350 (Food)	D/1/52
12 Sep	(BS 712428)	200	C/1/20
12 Sep	(YC 458896)	200	A/2/17
12 Sep	(YD 580230)	230	RCN/1/501
13 Sep	(BS 745643)	2,200	ARVN
13 Sep	(BT 194293)	50	D/2/1
13 Sep	(BT 037397)	60	E/2/7
13 Sep	(AT 833631)	40	RCN/1st MARDIV
13 Sep	(AT 983437)	10,000	L/3/7
	Total Rice	21,800	
	Total Food	850	

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CORRECTION TO PERINTREP 33-69: 16 August 1969 (BS 749836) 30,000 pounds salt updated to read 564,800 pounds. Total salt should be 568,110 pounds. This is the final total for this cache.

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	149	Structures Damaged	35
Bunkers Destroyed	132	Bunkers Damaged	29
.50 Cal Sites Destroyed	4	Secondary Fires	28
Secondary Explosions	15	Boats Destroyed	3
Mortar Sites Destroyed	2		

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ increased in comparison to the previous week. There were 774 KIA's, 57 VC PW's, and six NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	94	95	95	96
Low	73	73	75	72
Rainfall (total)	.68	0	2.00	0
Winds (knots)	5	5	4	6
Visibility (miles	6	6	7	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 13-19 September 1969

General. Weak southwesterly flow will prevail over ICTZ with the flow becoming northerly to northeasterly over ICTZ for short periods during the week.

ICTZ Forecast: The forcast for the coastal areas of ICTZ is partly cloudy to occasionally cloudy with isolated afternoon and evening

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thundershowers. Patchy ground fog will form in the mornings, particularly in the vicinity of the DMZ. Precipitation will be 0.5-1.5 inches with isolated instances of 1.5-2.5 inches. The forecast for the mountain areas of ICTZ is occasionally to partly cloudy with a few thundershowers from early afternoon to late evening. Precipitation will be 0.5-1.5 inches with isolated instances of 1.5-2.5 inches.

j. - k. Negative

l. Significant Enemy Attacks

(1) At 110205H, B/4-31 Infantry on FSB SIBERIA, one and one-half kilometers southwest of HIEP DUC (AT 901232) was attacked by a force estimated to be two rifle companies in strength and tentatively identified as elements of the 1st VC Regiment. The attack was two pronged with the enemy force employing small arms fire, RPG's, recoilless rifle fire and flamethrowers. The enemy unit, while inflicting light casualties on the defenders by the employment of RPG fire failed to penetrate the perimeter and sustained 31 killed in their abortive effort.

(2) The heaviest contact of the week in ICTZ occurred on the 13th when CAP 1-3-9, 14 kilometers west southwest of BINH SON (BS 4787) was attacked by an estimated two NVA companies. The NVA penetrated AN PHONG Village complex (Hamlets 1, 2, and 3) and AN HOA Refugee Village (all in the vicinity of BS 4787). At the same time, OP GEORGE on HILL 141 (BS 4786) received 60 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 160 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. The NVA also employed small arms fire, hand grenades, RPG's and satchel charges. At 1000H, 1-52 Infantry and 2/6 ARVN reinforced CAP 1-3-9. One RF Company from BINH SON was also helilifted into the area as reinforcements. This attack cost the enemy unit 116 killed. However, there were 260 houses destroyed by fire in the village. In this action, a PW was captured from the 6th Battalion of the 21st NVA Regiment. The seizure of this PW provided renewed evidence that the 21st Regiment has not displaced northward.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

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c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following course of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to six infantry regiment equivalents, supported by the equivalent of one naval sapper battalion and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack VANDEGRIFT Combat Base with one infantry regiment supported by one sapper battalion and one artillery battalion.

(3) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(5) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with up to five infantry regiments, supported by four rocket battalions, one sapper battalion and one engineer battalion.

(6) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division equivalent, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(8) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to seven infantry regiment equivalents.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

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(2) Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield, sickness, hunger, shortage of ammunition and medical supplies and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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DISTRIBUTION

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232)(CIIED)	2	620TH TCS (ATTN: CRC)APO 96203	1
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4	CO MCB 3	1
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2	CO MCB 6	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2	CO MCB 7	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2	CO MCB 8	1
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2	CO MCB 9	1
CG USARV	1	CO MCB 10	1
CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	10	CO MCB 11	1
CG I FFORCEV	5	CTG 115.1	1
CG II FFORCEV	1	CO MCB 40	1
COMNAVFORV	1	CO MCB 53	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40	CO MCB 58	1
CG 3RD MARDIV	26	CO MCB 62	1
CG AMERICAL DIV	30	CO MCB 71	1
CG 101ST ABN DIV	20	CO MCB 121	1
CG 1ST MAW	30	OSA/EMB SAIGON ATTN: RAS	1
CG 1ST INF DIV	1	CO 1ST BN 525TH MI GP DANANG	25
CG USASUPCOM DANANG	1	DSA I CORPS	11
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHU LAI	3	DSA II CORPS	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	MCB 133	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1	DET B 1ST MIBARS	1
CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SAIGON	3	HQ, 212RH COMBAT AVN BN	6
CG 173RD ABN BDE	2	CO 7TH COMM BN	1
CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7	366 AIR SECURITY SQD, USAF	2
CG FIC	5	29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1
CG 1ST LOG CMD LONG BINH	2	7TH PSYOPS BN	1
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	2	CICV	2
CO 30 NCR	1	III MAF LNO 2ND ROKMC BDE	1
CIB	1	620TH TSC	1
CTG 79.5	1	COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
CTG 79.4	1		
CTG 76.5	1		
CTG 76.4	1	SPO-SEC CMD QUI NHON	1
CTF 76	1	DIRECTOR, CAP III MAF	1
CO DASC ATTN: AVCA-QN-DN-OP	2	CO USS REPOSE	1
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2	CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO "B" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	5	CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GP (ABN)	17	CO 4TH PSYOP GP	1
1ST CAG	1		
2ND CAG	1		
3RD CAG	1		
4TH CAG	1	OUT OF COUNTRY	
7 AF (IGS) BDOC	1	DIR NSA	3
45TH ENGR GROUP	1	CMC (ABQ) (AIRMAIL)	2
GLO, 35TH TFW (DCOI)	2	CG FMFPAC (AIRMAIL)	2
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2	CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP, 7TH FLEET	1
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1	CG MCDEC	1
CO 517TH MI DET	1	DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1
CO 3RD MP BN	1	CG 3RD MAW	2

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TEAM COMMANDER 19TH CI TEAM, CAMP PENDLETON	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	6
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CG 4TH MARDIV, CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA	1

III MAF (To be picked up)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP CofS PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	42
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (c/o G-3)	2
PSYOPS	2
1ST RADIO BN	11
SLF (A)	1
1ST MP'S DNG	1
US NAD	1
CO MCB 5	1
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
CCN	1

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 37-69 AS OF 132400H SEPTEMBER 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-HQ	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	11	3,185	2	560			13	3,745	14	6,195	27	9,940
Bn's-Maneuver	39	9,165	11	1,765	5	755	55	11,685	34	14,820	89	26,505
Bn's-Support	18	5,075	2	340	1	190	21	5,605	7	2,080	27	7,685
Separate Co's	1	130			33	2,585	34	2,715	1	80	35	2,795
TOTAL CONFIRMED		19,520		2,665		3,530		25,715		24,610		50,325
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's	1	710					1	710	3	860	4	1,570
Bn's-Maneuver	6	2,445	1	350	1	200	8	2,995	7	2,670	15	5,665
Bn's-Support	4	1,035					4	1,035	9	1,445	13	2,480
Separate Co's	1	90			2	160	3	250			3	250
TOTAL PROBABLE		4,280		350		360		4,990		4,975		9,965
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,400	3	1,400
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support									22	7,675	22	7,675
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										10,015		10,015
		23,800		3,015		3,890		30,705		39,600		70,305

See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,280		150	3,430
	Probable	2,545			2,545
	Possible				
	TOTAL	5,825		150	5,975
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,480		565	4,045
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,480		565	4,045
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	6,165	800	935	7,900
	Probable	830	350		1,180
	Possible				
	TOTAL	6,995	1,150	935	9,080
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,415	600	655	3,670
	Probable	380		285	665
	Possible				
	TOTAL	2,795	600	940	4,335
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,180	1,265	1,225	6,670
	Probable	525		75	600
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,705	1,265	1,300	7,270

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS														DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL									
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	33	3		36	8			8	5			5	46	3		49	33	5		38	79	8		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	39	6		45	11	1		12	5	1		6	55	8		63	34	7		41	89	15		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	8	1		9	1			1	1			1	10	1		11	2	5	10	17	12	6	10	28
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	3	1	5	3	3	1	7
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2		1	2	3	1	2	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1					1			1
TOTAL SUPPORT	18	4		22	2			2	1			1	21	4		25	7	9	22	38	28	13	22	63
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	57	10		67	13	1		14	6	1		7	76	12		88	41	16	22	79	117	28	22	167

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	269	Nam Hoa	61	Hoa Vang	588	Thang Binh	943	Binh Son	311
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	58	Hieu Duc	65	Tam Ky	672	Son Tinh	474
	Trieu Phong	143	Hong Dien	59	Dien Ban	1,093	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	450
	Cam Lo	150	Vinh Loc	130	Dai Loc	356	Hiep Duc	215	Nghia Hanh	341
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	231	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	258	Mo Duc	483
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	333	Hau Duc	229	Duc Pho	465
	Huong Hoa	5	Phu Vang	24	Que Son	921			Tra Bong	170
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	107	Duy Xuyen	1,098			Ba To	202
			Huong Thuy	101	Hieu Nhon	294			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	437					Son Ha	185
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	947	THUA THIEN	1,254	QUANG NAM	4,868	QUANG TIN	2,432	QUANG NGAI	3,095

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,596

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,130		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Vic XD 6233	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175	Unlocated	
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unlocated LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	

*See note #4 on page A-17
**See note #2 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,950		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,900		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	500		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/240ct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,405		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	345	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0566/22May69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
31st Group	NVA	C	1,060		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	220	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2061/20Jul69
15th Bn	NVA	PR	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,860		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	
65th Arty Regt	NVA	PR	UNK		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.40 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.41 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.42 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.43 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,575		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	2,120		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,605		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	XD 7964/12Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	365	XD 9265	XD 9666/26May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	400	XD 8854	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,700		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	285	YD 3639	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	155	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	185	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	240	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	185	Vic YD 3535	YD 3448/7Sep69

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	915		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	AU 8100/10Jun68
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	290	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	275	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jul69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,735		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	360	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	175	Vic YD 6514	YD 6822/14Jun69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
3rd Bn, 803rd Regt	NVA	C	220	Vic YC 3193	YC 3389/19Jul69
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	360	Vic YD 3304	YD 3302/20Jun69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
C.113 Co	LF	C	145	Vic YD 4032	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	15,000		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
577th RL Bn	NVA	C	305	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
HAI VAN Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102nd Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103rd Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	525		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,095		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	285	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
368B Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,170		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	635		
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 9632	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	150	AT 9632	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9632	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	150	AT 9632	BT 2514/25Sep68
R.20 Bn	LF	C	155	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	LF	C	150	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	70	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	Unloc vic HOA VANG (D)	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	85	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	125	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	105	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	4,020		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	430		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	AT 9226	
1st Bn	NVA	C	85	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	90	AT 9226	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	85	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	180	BT 2440	BT 2340/12Aug69
72nd Bn	LF	C	180	BT 2932	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Weps Bn	LF	C	190	BT 3510	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	200	BT 3127	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 2232	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	220	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4213	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	80	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	85	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	150	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	120	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	130	BS 4677	BS 6385/12Aug69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	720		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	215	BS 4386	BS 3587/13Aug69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69
C.17 Co	LF	C	55	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	65	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	80	BS 7555	BS 7061/17Nov68
C.120 Co	LF	C	50	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	75	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	50	BS 5596	
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,640		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	925		
Regt Hq	MF	C	370	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	185	BS 6733	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	195	BS 7932	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	175	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May69
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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BINH DINH PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	925		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	275	BINH DINH	CR 0952/23Jun68
7th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 9640/12Apr68
8th Bn	NVA	C	250	BINH DINH	CR 0933/23Apr68
9th Bn	NVA	C	200	BINH DINH	BR 8955/29May68

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 070001H to 132400H September 1969.

a. Due to the lack of contact since September 1968 and the high probability that its few members have been abosorbed into other nearby LF units, particularly the PHU LOC Armed Bn, the C.119 LF Company is dropped from the OOB listing.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units witnin the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

9. Subordinate/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF PERINTREP 35-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 37-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P)

a. PW, Cpl Nguyen Trung CHINH, 3rd Co, 49th Bn, QUANG BINH Provincial Unit captured on 30 August 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 088695) (3rd MARDIV 311224Z August 1969, MID Rpt #53-A-69) stated that the unit he was with consisted of 100 men composed of soldiers from each company of the 49th Bn and the entire C.8 Arty Co. This force was located in the vicinity of (YD 050706) with the mission to lay mines on the eastern side of HILL 161 (YD 059683) and to defend the hill. Source revealed that his unit sustained 21 killed and eight wounded on 18 August 1969 in a contact with allied forces (CNA). CHINH also revealed that the 49th Bn, which is located in the vicinity of (YD 0472) was to move back to BO TRACH (D), QUANG BINH (P), NVN by 1 September 1969. Reported personalities: 49th Bn CO-Capt DUOC; 3rd Co Cmdr-2ndLt Ho Gia TRONG.

(G-2 COMMENT: None of the reported information correlates with previous information from the QUANG BINH Provincial Unit. All information rated (F-6).)

b. PW, Pvt Phan Van GIANG, 4th Co, 45th Bn, QUANG BINH Provincial Unit, captured on 30 August 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 0668) (3rd MARDIV 060528Z September 1969, 17th ITT Rpt #58-69A) stated that the QUANG BINH Provincial Unit has three battalions, the 45th, 48th and 49th. The 4th Co of the 45th Bn is located in the vicinity of (YD 050683), the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Co's are located in VINH LINH (D), the 2nd Co of the 49th Bn is located vicinity (YD 0268), the 3rd Co, 49th Bn vicinity (YD 0568), the remainder of the 49th is located in LE TOY (D), QUANG BINH (P), the 48th Bn is located in QUANG BINH (D), QUANG BINH (P) (CNA), the 3rd and 4th Bn's, 270th NVA Regt are located approximately two kilometers west of CON THIEN (YD 0770) and the 5th and 6th Bn's, 270th are located in QUANG BINH (P) (CNA). GIANG also stated that the mission of the 4th Co was to support the 2nd and 3rd Co's and the 270th Regt was supplying his unit with rations. Source revealed that the morale was low in his unit due to fear of air strikes and artillery attacks. Since 9 August 1969, approximately 30 men from his unit were killed by naval gunfire and fire fights. Source also revealed that the LBN for the 4th Co was 32189 RT. GIANG further stated that the 4th Co, 45th Bn and 2nd and 3rd Co's, 49th Bn were to return to NVN by 1 September 1969. Reported personalities: QUANG BINH Provincial Unit CO-SrCapt TAO, XO-SrCapt BACH, PO-Capt THUY; 45th Bn CO-Capt LONG, XO-Capt THOCH, PO-1stLt DUONG; 4th Co Cmdr-2ndLt LUONG, XO-2ndLt BACH, PO-1stLt HONG, APO-2ndLt MANH; 48th Bn CO-1stLt CHICH, PO-SrCapt THUONG; 2nd Co Cmdr, 49th Bn-1stLt ZIEN.

(G-2 COMMENT: Revealed LBN falls in the same series as LBN's given by a previous PW from the QUANG BINH Provincial Unit. The 45th Bn commander correlates with that of a previous PW's statement. Previous reports

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stated that there are five battalions, the 45th thru the 49th, in the QUANG BINH Provincial Unit. III MAF OOB carries three battalions subordinate to the 270th Regt. All information rated (F-3).)

c. PW, Le Trong DAT of the 2nd Co, K.11 Sapper Bn, 7th Front, captured on 7 September 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 347488) during an attack on a QUANG TRI PF platoon (3rd MARDIV 080840Z September 1969, 17th ITT Rpt 60-69) stated that the 5th Co, K.11 Bn was last located at GIO GIO Mountain (CNA) and that the 2nd and 6th Co's were last located in the vicinity of HAI PHU (V) (YD 3448). DAT further stated that the mission of his unit was to attack and harass American and other allied positions from the rear in order to divert their attention from the north (NFI). PW received nine months of sapper training at TANG KHAU (H), DONG THAI (V), QUANG DAI (D), HA TAY (P), NVN. Reported personalities: K.11 Bn CO-Capt BAO, XO-Capt XE.

(G-2 COMMENT: OOB holds the K.11 Sapper Bn, 7th Front at (YD 3535). Captain BAO is carried as the XO of K.11 Bn. All information rated (F-3).)

2. THUA THIEN (P). No significant reports.

3. QUANG NAM (P)

a. Hoi Chanh, Vo Thi NGOA, 77th Hospital Unit, Group 44, who rallied on 3 September 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 863478) (CG, 1st MARDIV 070455Z September 1969 Supp Interr Rpt 08-09-69) stated that the 77th Hospital, Group - 44, and the C.2 Sapper Co of Group - 44 was located in the vicinity of (AT 933907) as of 24 April 1969. The Hoi Chanh further stated that the mission of the unit was to give medical aid to wounded NVA and VC. The 77th Hospital Unit had a strength of 30 personnel with one NVA doctor. The Hoi Chanh stated that the morale of the unit was low due to hard work, insufficient food, and bad living conditions. The PO's told the wounded NVA that they had won great victories and that the hospital staff worked very hard so they could get well and return to fight and win more victories.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location for this hospital is in the HAI VAN Pass area and in the vicinity of a recently discovered base area which was hit with air strikes. The Hoi Chanh is very far south of her unit and has probably been gone for some time. It is unlikely that the Front 4 Headquarters (AKA Group - 44) was located this far north. All information rated (F-6).)

b. Hoi Chanhs Vo Van ANH, 2nd Co, 703rd Communications Bn, and Vo Van MUOI, 3rd Co, 703rd Communications Bn, Front 44 rallied on 3 September 1969, Supp Interr Rpt 13th ITT 12-09-69 and SA QUANG NAM Sector HOI AN, RVN 081730Z September 1969, Initial Interr Rpt). ANH stated that the location of his unit as of 20 August 1969 was in the vicinity of (ZC 180410), and MUOI stated the location of his unit was vicinity (AT 970550). The mission of both companies is to support LF and MF

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units in QUANG DA Province with communication facilities, radios, and runners. Both Hoi Chanhs stated that the 703rd Communications Bn is composed of four companies and a battalion headquarters with a strength of approximately 250 men. The strength consists of approximately 200 NVA and 50 VC. The Hoi Chanhs stated the location of the Front 44 (AKA Front 4) Headquarters is in the vicinity of (ZC 100205). The R.20 MF Bn, whose commander is TRI, moves between KY NINH (V), KY NGOC (V), THANH PHUONG (V) and PHU MY (V) (CNA) DIEN BAN (D). The R.20's LBN is 6788 AP THAI and the Code No. is P.6488. The V.25 MF Bn is located in the vicinity of PHU LOC (V) and KY CHANH (V) (CNA), DIEN BAN (D) and its LBN is 6797 AP THAI and the Code No. is 6493. The Q.91 Sapper Bn is located in the vicinity of KY TAN (V) and KY QUANG (V) DIEN BAN (D) and its CO is MINH. The 3rd QUANG DA Bn, commanded by KHOI, is located in the vicinity of (AT 985606). The T.89 Bn is located in the vicinity of (AT 982558) and has an LBN of 6789 AP THAI and a Code No. of P.6489. The Q.82 LF Bn is located in the vicinity of (AT 890555). The Q.82 LF Bn was recently reinforced with 40 NVA Regulars. The Hoi Chanhs stated that many of the NVA are disillusioned with the war and want to return home. The Hoi Chanhs further stated that units in QUANG DA Province will launch attacks in September of 1969 in support of the Paris Peace Talks.

(G-2 COMMENT: Much of the information given by these Hoi Chanhs is not in accordance with III MAF OOB holdings. OOB carries the 1st (AKA 703rd) Communications Bn as unlocated Base Area 112. ANH's statement giving the location as (ZC 180410) would be considered more accurate than MUOI's stated location (F-2). III MAF holds this unit as an NVA unit. The stated location for Front 4 would place the headquarters in QUANG TIN (P) and is not considered likely (F-5). OOB holds the R.20 Bn as a LF unit (F-4) and this is the first report of the CO (F-6). The reported LBN is held for this battalion (F-3). The V.25 Bn is carried as a LF unit by OOB, and normally operates in DUY XUYEN (D). The LBN given is associated with the V.25 Bn (F-3). The Q.91st Sapper (AKA 3rd Sapper) Bn normally operates in DUC DUC (D). The 3rd QUANG DA (AKA D.7) Bn location given is within the normal AO of this unit (F-3). The name stated by the Hoi Chanh matches the CO's name held by OOB (F-3). The T.89 Sapper Bn is carried by OOB as being in the vicinity mentioned (F-3). The LBN stated is a LBN normally held by the R.20 Bn (F.3). Although the VC/NVA refer to the local force units as battalions, they are not usually in the strength of a battalion. The stated possibility of an offensive to begin in September 1969 has been reported on numerous occasions recently (F-3).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). PW, PFC Le NHON, C.3 Co, 60th Bn 1st VC Regt, 2nd NVA Div captured on 3 September 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 964326) (1st MARDIV 092338Z September 1969, 9th ITT 03-09-69) stated that the 60th Bn's strength was 170 and the battalion was located approximately two hours walk due west of his place of capture. The unit's present mission is to resupply and to prepare to move from the area. The unit's morale is low due to poor leadership. AKA's for the 60th Bn are D.2 Bn and 2nd Bn, and the 1st Regt is also known as K.45 Regt. Reported personalities:

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60th Bn CO-TIEP; 3rd Co Cmdr Lt BAY, XO-QUYET, PO-DUONG.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 60th Bn's location given by the PW is probably true, (F-2). First report of Bn Cmdr TIEP (F-6). All other information rated (F-3).)

5. QUANG NGAI (P). PW, Pvt, Nguyen Van DAN, 2nd Plt, Hqs element, 4th Bn, 21st NVA Regt, 2nd NVA Div captured on 25 August 1969 in the vicinity of (BS 537864) (AmericaI Interr Rpt 317-69 dtd 28 August 1969) stated that the 2nd Plt's strength is 30 men and the 4th Bn's strength is 600 men and was located in the vicinity of (BS 495731) as of 19 August 1969. The 2nd Plt's mission is to provide mortar support for the 4th Bn. Subject states that two other platoons which are directly in support of the 4th Bn Headquarters are a recoilless rifle and a machine gun platoon. Subject had no knowledge of the morale of his unit, but stated about five percent of the 4th Bn have contracted malaria. Subject stated K.55 is an AKA for the 21st Regt. Subject left NVN with the 1008th Infiltration Group in late February 1969 with a strength of 700 men. They traveled by foot from THANH HOA (P) through NGHE AN and HA TINH Province NVN, through LAOS, and then into RVN in late May of 1969. Subject arrived at his destination (21st Regt) in early June of 1969. The infiltration group CO was DICH and the XO was AN. Both returned to NVN. Reported personalities: 4th Bn CO-DANG, XO-VAN, PO-PHUONG.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 4th Bn is an AKA for the 60th Bn, 21st Regt. Reported strength is considerably higher than III MAF estimates (F-4). A previous recent report stated that the 60th Bn is operating northwest of SON TINH (D) with a VC company and the 406th Sapper Bn (F-3). This is a first report on Infiltration Group 1008 and all personalities (F-3).

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 37-69

1. GENERAL. Counterintelligence related VC/VCI activity remained at a relatively high level during the past week despite the enemy's unilaterally declared cease fire during the period 080100H to 110100H to commemorate the death of Ho Chi Minh. Enemy emphasis was focused on the use of attacks by fire, and limited attacks featuring relatively small units (less than Battalion size), particularly sappers, and intensive use of civilian and military proselyting, propaganda, terrorism, and the cultivation and widespread use of penetration agents to obtain his objectives. The prime objective is clearly to promote conditions suitable for the establishment of a coalition government as an interim step to eventual attainment of governmental control in South Vietnam.

Terrorism was intensely directed at refugee and resettlement areas in continuing attempts to force the people to return to VC controlled rural areas.

Propaganda themes were directed at supporting civilian and military proselyting activities and stressed the futility of US troop efforts in assisting the GVN. Others were aimed at causing the dissaffection of American Negro troops and National Police personnel.

A VC rallier has contributed additional information concerning the formation of a possible new VC district (previously reported in III MAF PERINTREP 34-69) named Que Tien in Quang Tin (VC Quang Nam) (P). The district is reported to include Son Tan, Son Tay, Son Tin, Binh Son, Son Phuoc, Son Hiep, and Son Binh villages in Hiep Duc (D); Phuoc Son, Phuoc Ha, and Phuoc Cam villages in Tien Phuoc (D); Binh Tam village in Thang Binh (D), and Son Hoa village in Que Son (D).

The reason claimed for establishing the new district was to facilitate attendance at district level meetings since the cadre previously had to travel long distances to attend meetings at their respective district headquarters.

Numerous intelligence, PW, and rallier reports indicate widespread critical food shortages and deteriorating morale problems among both the VC/NVA units and VCI elements and likewise reflect emphasis on efforts toward gathering foodstuffs, particularly rice during the present harvest season.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. Reported VC/VCI intelligence gathering activities continue to reflect increased emphasis, and at least limited success, in penetrating GVN organizations and agencies; conducting covert reconnaissance of GVN/FWMAF installations and activities and elicitation of people's attitudes regarding GVN/FWMAF and VC/NVA activities and programs. Recent reports of trained penetration agents in the form of ralliers has been confirmed. Some of the more significant reports received during the past week were as follows:

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a. Quang Tri.

An interrogation report dated 9 September 1969, of an NVA Political Cadre rallier, indicated that the rallier had been previously assigned to infiltrate the Chieu Hoi Program and settle in Binh Thuan (P), IICTZ. He was instructed by political cadre of Tuyen Quan (P), NVN, to collect information regarding the economics and political personalities in Binh Thuan (P), IICTZ. Rallier was to turn information over to an unknown agent who would take it to North Vietnam. Subject rallied to PF unit vicinity Ha Thuong (H) (nfi), Quang Tri (P) on 8 September 1969 after infiltrating SVN via "Freedom Bridge" on 5 September 1969. Subject was unarmed and carried no documents.

b. Thua Thien.

On 1 September 1969, a GVN source reported that a 20 man VC team exhorted the residents of Phu Bai I vic YD 900113 and Phu Bai II vic YD 909166 to dig shelter-pits and collect information (Eval: B-3).

c. Thua Thien.

On 9 September 1969, a US MI source reported that during 2-5 September 1969, the Phong Dien (D) Committee met to organize an operation to penetrate the Chieu Hoi returnee ranks. They decided to infiltrate those ranks due to lack of success in attempts to stop troops of all ranks from rallying to the RVN side.

Three main points brought up at this meeting were:

(1) They must train agents who will surrender to the Chieu Hoi program. These will be long term agents who will use the Chieu Hoi program for nourishing revolutionary organizations.

(2) The criteria for selecting agents would be that they must be between the ages of 23-28 years old, have an 8th grade education or better, have a close association with someone living in GVN-controlled areas, have a good attitude about the revolution and be enthusiastic. Furthermore, they must have made some contribution for the revolution and must be trained in NVN.

(3) The goals of these agents is to construct and develop organizations among returnee ranks, thoroughly break down the Chieu Hoi policy of RVN and create panic among the people of RVN. (Eval: C-6).

d. Quang Nam.

On 10 September 1969, a PW captured in the vic of AT 922695 stated he led members of the 9th Bn., 31st NVA Regt., and the 575th

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NVA Arty Bn., on a reconnaissance mission of Hoa Cam Training Center and the 44th ARVN Arty Bn. (nfi) (Unrated).

e. Quang Nam.

At approximately 1000 hours on 11 September 1969 a Vietnamese civilian walking in Quan Nam #6 (SH) vic AT 917828 was approached by two VC soldiers. The Vietnamese was questioned as to the number of Marine patrols in the area and whether or not he was an informant for the GVN. The VN stated that he had no knowledge of Marine patrols or of GVN intelligence operations in the area because he was a poor fisherman and too busy providing for his family. The VC demanded to see his GVN identification card, after which they allowed him to continue on his way.

The two VC were wearing green uniforms, conical hats and both were armed with AK-47s. Both VC spoke with the local dialect (Eval: C-2).

f. Quang Tin.

On 22 August 1969, a US MI source reported that Tran Thi Phung was still operating as a VC penetration agent on Chu Lai Airbase vic BT 5505. Recently she has reported information to the VC concerning a fuel dump located near MAG 13. Phung has acquired a new boyfriend at the Airbase since her former boyfriend, ROBERTS, has rotated to another assignment. The identity of her latest American boyfriend is unknown. There were several other agents working on the airbase other than Phung. These agents are being hired without obtaining a security clearance (nfi) (Eval: C-3).

g. Quang Ngai.

A VC prison camp administrator, after surrendering to the National Police, Ba To (D) on 8 September 1969, led the National Police to detect 12 VC undercover agents, including an interpreter for a Special Forces camp and a National Police officer.

3. SABOTAGE. Two sabotage incidents were reported during the past week. A U.S. Navy ship operating in the vicinity of the Cua Viet River mouth, Quang Tri (P) was damaged by an underwater explosive device and a Hue-Danang railway train was hit by a mine in Thua Thien (P). Details of both incidents are as follows:

a. Quang Tri.

The USS Noxubee was damaged by an underwater explosive device on 9 Sept. vic of YD 450640. A hole was blasted in the forward cargo hold along the port side below the water line. Negative casualties.

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b. Thua Thien.

On 8 September 1969, a Hue-Danang Railway train hit a command detonated mine vic AT 838974, resulting in 80% damage to the engine, two cars derailed, three meters of track destroyed and one RF member wounded.

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Reports of VC/VCI political and propaganda activities continued at a high level, increasing slightly over the previous week. Themes of political and propaganda activities were keyed toward controlling a large part of rural areas, important strategic areas, city outskirts, and parts of urban areas to be in favorable position to attain control of existing SVN government when U.S. troops eventually withdraw. Emphasis is focused on maintaining military pressure on US/GVN forces while simultaneously conducting intensive civilian and military proselyting; disruption of the GVN pacification effort; development of penetration agents in government and military organizations and agencies, and the strengthening and expansion of the VCI Revolutionary Government base.

a. Quang Tri.

On 29 August 1969, an estimated VC squad distributed propaganda leaflets and VC flags at Vinh Quang Ha and Vinh Quang Thuong (H) in the vic of YD 233674.

b. Quang Tri.

On 3 September 1969, a US MI source reported that VC Armed Propaganda Company 86, totalling an estimated 100 men and commanded by BON were camped in the area of Dong Dai (H) Phu Tho vic YD 170197. They were dispersed in small groups throughout the campsite and had dug trenches and defensive positions. They were in the Phu Tho area to disseminate propaganda and create disturbances against GVN forces (nfi) (Eval: F-6).

c. Quang Tri.

At 0900 on 5 September 1969, Sweep Team #308, A Co., 3rd Engr Bn., while on a sweep of route 9, discovered a partially destroyed culvert at YD 041566. The surrounding area was littered with propaganda leaflets that were written in both English and Vietnamese. One particular document was a postal card type with colored flowers on one side and the other side imprinted with the following text (written in English):

"American Negro soldiers! Unite with Vietnamese people in the struggle against our common enemy, the U.S. ruling circles who simultaneously are intensifying their war of aggression against the Vietnamese people and carrying out the policy of racial discrimination back home.

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Unite with and support the Vietnamese people who are fighting against the U.S. war-mongers and U.S. hirelings in Saigon, such is your international obligation, you American workers and laboring people!"

The South Vietnam National
Front for Liberation

Subsequent to finding the propaganda materials, an NVA flag, two (2) large banners and one (1) small banner were sighted in an area approximately 100 meters to the south of Route 9. The flag and large banners were suspended from poles 8-10 feet in height and the small banner was hung on a small stick. It was discovered that the flag and the large banners were each booby trapped with a (DH-10) mine rigged to be detonated by movement of the poles or tripped by someone approaching the area.

d. Quang Tri.

On 5 September 1969, a US MI source reported a VC team led by Hoang THIET were distributing propaganda leaflets each Tuesday and Friday at Bo Bang (H) vic YD 338629 (Eval: F-6).

e. Thua Thien.

On 30 August 1969, a US MI source reported a meeting of a Party Central Committee in Huyen Market, near the Ben Hoi river (CNA). Policies of this meeting were sent to province committees. The two policies were: (1) MF and guerrilla-force units are to increase terrorism, especially in Hue City. (2) The Military Region Committee assigned Truong THANH and Hoang Phu NGOC to determine unidentified targets. They have two batteries (nfi) under their control, consisting of Battery P25, K.3 Battalion, located vic YD 670228 and Battery P39 located vic YC 970998 (Eval: F-6).

f. Thua Thien.

On 5 September 1969, a US MI source reported that a VC/NVA pamphlet and document printing installation was located at MU MU Stream area in the vic of YD 735928. Leaflets and documents were picked up twice daily by unidentified personnel and transferred to unidentified places. The installation had three PRC-25 radios (Eval: B-6).

g. Thua Thien.

On 6 September 1969, a US MI source reported that on 12 June 1969, the Central Party Committee sent a letter of instruction to the

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Regional, Provincial, and City committees signed by Ho Van DO. An excerpt from the letter reads as follows: "All levels, from province to chapter committee members, must study "Dan-Vi-Ban" (People are the Principle) and "Dan-Nong-Cot" (People are the Core). The people are the source of living and comfort. The people are the source of victory. If we want to eat, we must request from them. If we want clothes, we must borrow from them. People are the principle." (Eval: F-6)

h. Thua Thien.

On 9 September 1969, a US MI source reported that since 31 August 1969, commanders of unidentified VC/NVA units have been issuing the following policies for the Fall-Winter Campaign 1969 to troops and cadre:

(1) A military "self-improvement" policy, which states that soldiers must strive to capture enemy weapons to increase their own unit's strength. Units which capture many weapons will them be able to recruit more troops for support.

(2) A political "self-improvement" policy, which states that each soldier is to act as a political cadre, to teach and propagandize the people so that a bond will be created between the army and the people.

(3) An economic "self-living" policy which states that the soldier must lean on the people for food and other supplies and must penetrate the enemy-controlled areas to capture supplies. During the Fall-Winter Campaign main force units are ordered to maintain a tight hold on their "localities" and regular force units will support them when required (Eval: B-6).

i. Quang Nam.

A GVN source reported that on several occasions between 31 August 1969, and 8 September 1969, elements of the QT70 NVA Battalion entered Hoa Thanh (V) vic AT 909789 for the purpose of collecting food supplies, distributing propaganda leaflets and showing the people that the NVA can go any place they choose (Eval: F-1).

The following are samples of NVA propaganda leaflets distributed in Hoa Thanh (V):

(1) American GIs! The recent great and violent offensive of the South Vietnamese people and their armed forces over hundreds of U.S. and puppet military positions, airfields, wharfs, storages and all cities and towns throughout SVN since Feb. 22, 1969 has caused the U.S. and puppet troops heavy losses on lives and war means of all kinds.

It indicates that no place in SVN is safe for the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys.

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It is vain to disguise the fact that they're facing an imminent and total failure in SVN.

American GIs! Be aware of the critical situation in which you are placed and then act wisely.

There are only two alternatives: Fight and die in vain in SVN or leave immediately this country. The reason and your conscience will tell you the right choice.

Be ready to join your fellows-in-arms in opposing the Vietnam war as U.S. army men have done in many places in SVN.

Refuse to fight any longer.

Demand to be returned to your homeland soon.

The Quang-Da N.F.L.

(2) American GIs! The THIEU-KY-HUONG clique is a traitorous gang despised by all Vietnamese people:

(a) They represent no one but themselves.

(b) On orders of U.S. aggressors, they perpetrate the most inhuman crimes against the Vietnamese people.

(c) Who but they are carrying out the U.S. most odious schemes to protract the war in South Vietnam.

Not only they live wastefully on the bones and blood of their compatriots, they also make their fortune upon your GI's bones and blood as well.

They are the enemy of every Vietnamese and U.S. people longing for peace.

Don't be so foolish as to die for such a rotten and warlike regime.

Refuse to fight.

Support the South Vietnamese people's struggle for independence, peace and neutrality.

Demand to be sent back to your homeland now and still alive!

(3) American Servicemen! If you wish to be home soon, you ought to...

(a) Demand that you be sent home immediately.

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(b) Support the Vietnamese people's struggle for the overthrow of Thieu, Ky, Huong.

(c) We wish you an early return home.

Note: The preceding propaganda leaflets were printed in English.

Note: The following propaganda leaflets were printed in Vietnamese and were translated as follows:

(4) Members of the Civil Defense Forces

As brothers, sisters, children of the laborers who are innocently working for their living, do not let yourselves be forced, cheated or profited to do guard duty so that the blood-thirsty Americans and its inhuman tyrants can sleep well. It is them who bring destruction and death to our people. It is them who confine you in the collecting points and cities. It is them who use your bodies as a shield to protect themselves from the punishments of our soldiers and people.

Due to their failure in the battle fields and shortage of troops, the Americans and its flunkeys have forced you to stand guard, to oppress the people. Gradually they will send you to the battle fields hoping to reduce their casualties.

The American aggressors are being defeated and have planned to withdraw from SVN. Thieu-Ky-Huong are coming to the end of their lives. Our people and soldiers will achieve many more victories and the enemy will completely be defeated.

(a) Do not let the Americans and its tyrants take advantage of you. Do not do anything against our people.

(b) Do not receive military training, do not let yourselves be drafted, do not stand guard, stay home.

(c) Join the "revolutionary activities" to destroy the American oppressors.

Express your hate through actions, destroy the American aggressors and its tyrants to bring peace, freedom and liberty for the country.

National Liberation Front

Quang Nam - Danang

(5) Fire Storm in Danang City

Closely coordinated with the overall battle field in South Vietnam, people and soldiers of Quang Nam and Danang have begun the first phase

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of the General Offense and General uprising campaign. The fire storm is on the heads of the Americans and its tyrants.

Between 22 and 27 February 1969, more than 100 enemy base camps, compounds, headquarters in Danang, Hoi An area were under attack.

(a) Eight enemy headquarters including 2 Artillery Battalions, III MAF, I Corps, 1st Mar Div, 2nd Division, 5th Marines and 51st Tyrant Regiment were under attack and suffered heavy damages.

(b) Airfields and harbors were paralized.

(c) Burned and destroyed scores of ammunition dumps, POL depots, including An Don depot, the biggest depot in Central Vietnam.

(d) Destroyed 40 strategic hamlets, refugee centers and re-settlement hamlets.

Uncomplete report shows enemy casualties in the five day period of nearly 4,000 killed, including 2,750 Americans and 1,000 officers, technicians, soldiers of the tyrant regime.

(a) Sank 3 battle ships, shot down 5 airplanes, damaged many others.

(b) Destroyed millions of tons of bombs, ammunition and war materials.

Citizens, officers, soldiers, National Police, we have seized power in many places in town, chasing the tyrants, burning outposts, taking control of many agencies.

Soldiers, Officers and National Police, don't you see who is going to win the war? Do something to save yourselves and your country. Be practical! The only practical action at this moment is to kill the Americans and tyrants and return to the right cause of the National Liberation Front.

Do not hesitate, do not wait, act fast.

National Liberation Front

Quang Nam - Danang

j. Quang Nam.

A GVN source reported that, on 6 September 1969, a VC Quang Da Special Zone Committee directive issued the following requirements to all VC hamlet, village, and district level cadre to prepare for the Monsoon Season and military activity:

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(1) All VC local force units will mobilize their units to full strength capacity in all all-out effort to destroy and liquidate the American and GVN/ARVN tyrants. Local Force Units will interdict US/ARVN supply lines, attack isolated vehicles, and conduct small unit hit-and-run ground attacks against vulnerable Allied outposts. All physical and mental hardships must be overcome for the achievement of the final victory.

(2) All VC political units are commanded to push forward the proselyting of the South Vietnamese people. Loudspeakers, propaganda dissemination, and leaflet distribution will be utilized in order to gain the support of all South Vietnamese people and to undermine the power structure of the GVN.

(3) In preparation for the Monsoon season the Quang Da Current Affairs Committee directed all village units to institute the following measures:

(a) Prepare defensive fortifications against American air attacks. Build adequate bunkers to hide the village's VC. Install anti-aircraft weaponry to repell American war planes.

(b) VC Local Force Units will initiate attacks to neutralize Allied Force patrols and ambushes in the respective villages of responsibility. Booby traps, mines, and hidden firing devices will be laid to demoralize and confuse ARVN/US patrols. Bridges will be blown-up and targets of opportunity exploited.

(c) All VC Local Force Units will maintain constant surveillance of Allied military force activities during the monsoon season, taking note of all movement and activity. Any Allied military operations will be met with devastating guerrilla opposition. Small unit contact with Allied units will be initiated to inflict maximum material and personnel casualties at a minimum of VC casualties.

(d) All units will prepare for the monsoon season by collecting and storing food and equipment in dry, secure, areas.

(e) VC Local Force and guerrilla units will initiate attacks on all "New Life Hamlet Areas," will eliminate all "Joint House Group Systems," and will maintain constant military pressure on GVN/ARVN Self-Defense Forces (Eval: F-3).

k. Quang Nam.

On 6 September 1969, CAP 2-7-5, while on combat patrol in the vic of BT 052685, received SAF and three rounds of B-40 rocket fire. SAF was immediately returned. A sweep of the area revealed a large number of propaganda leaflets.

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l. Quang Nam.

On 7 September 1969, a GVN source reported that one NVA squad and a VC platoon (H-16) (nfi) of Hoa Vang (D) carried about twelve 122mm rockets from Yen Ne (1) (H) to Giang Dong (H) vic BT 007677, but for some unknown reason they decided to return to An Trach (1) (H) vic AT 965664 with the rockets. The members of the H-16 platoon then split up into small cells, consisting of three men in each cell and propagandized the theme; "The people must set up altars in their homes in honor of Ho Chi Minh, as he was a great hero for all the people of both North and South Vietnam." They also told the people that they must stand up and request the Americans and their allies to withdraw from Vietnam and the Vietnam situation must be settled by Vietnamese citizens (Eval: F-3).

m. Quang Nam.

On 7 September 1969, the 162nd RF company while guarding a bridge in the vic of BT 144457, received 27 rounds of 81mm mortar fire, killing one RF. A sweep of the suspected enemy location revealed a large number of propaganda leaflets.

n. Quang Nam.

On 11 September 1969, the 9th Company, 2nd ROK Marine Brigade heard VC propaganda loud speaker broadcast (nfi) in the vic of BT 169540.

o. Quang Nam.

On 11 September 1969, the 7th Company, 2nd ROK Marine Brigade heard VC propaganda loud speakers broadcast (nfi) in Korean in the vic BT 095524.

p. Quang Tin.

On 10 September 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

(1) During a mid-July 1969 People's Revolutionary Party meeting in Tien Phuoc District, new instructions from the (PRP) Province Committee were discussed. Efforts were to be exerted to hold all residents in areas controlled by the Viet Cong in preparation for country-wide elections which were expected to be held following a cease-fire and the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam. Attempts were to be made to motivate residents in areas controlled by GVN to return to VC-controlled areas, but if the attempts failed, the people were to be moved forcibly. Henceforth, the only mission of the Tien Phuoc (D) Main Force unit was to attack, hold and move civilians into VC-controlled areas. If VC Main Force units, while under attack were unable to repel their attackers, they would retreat to the mountains, taking along with them the civilians. Military operations in contested areas, were to be limited to ambushes. North Vietnamese army units were to be used for attacking outposts.

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The source stated that in compliance with the new directive, a Tien Phuoc (D) VC Main Force company was ordered to attack Hamlet #1 in Phuoc Tien (V) in an attempt to move hamlet residents to a VC-controlled area. Although the company's strength was 65 men, only 25 participated in the attack. The company had sufficient small arms and ammunition but lacked mortars. The attack failed and the company suffered one casualty.

The source also reported that during the mid-July meeting, VC district-level cadres for the first time were ordered to assist in food production. Each cadre was told to obtain 400 manioc seedlings to cultivate and harvest for use by the VC. There was much grumbling among the cadre over the order, since they doubted that they would receive anything in return for their efforts. One complained that allied forces would destroy the crop through defoliation, but was informed that the order must be obeyed (Uneval).

q. Quang Ngai.

On 26 August 1969, a US MI source reported that a meeting of the Son Ha VC District Committee was held in a warehouse at Vi Mia (H) (BS 254610). The meeting was called by the VC-MR-7 to discuss the motivation of the civilian population in regard to assisting the military in the accomplishment of its mission. Food, shelter, and replacements must come from the civilian population and all methods available must be used to accomplish this task. The VC must prepare for the large scale attack during the Fall-Winter Campaign which will begin on 17 October 1969 and end on 22 December 1969. Until the Fall-Winter Campaign starts, large scale attacks will stop. Units will disperse and operate independently. Advance training must be given during this period and modern weapons (nfi) issued. The Son Ha VC District Committee was instructed to conduct classes (nfi) among the civilian population and to concentrate efforts on the political struggle in GVN-controlled areas to gain sympathy among the GVN population (Eval: B-6).

r. Quang Ngai.

A US MI source reported that on 28 August 1969, a VC proselyting plan was discussed at a meeting of the Son Ha District Viet-Montagnard Communist Committee held at Vi Mia (H) vic BS 254610. Contents of the plan was as follows:

(1) VC cadre members were to go to each village in Son Ha (D) where all inhabitants were to be informed of the plan.

(2) The inhabitants of each village would be required to attend a meeting where they would be informed that each resident in the VC-controlled area who had relatives who were ARVN soldiers or GVN officials living in the GVN-controlled area, would be required to go to the GVN-controlled area and attempt to motivate these relatives to defect to the VC. It was compulsory for each family sent to the GVN to cause the defection of 1-3 soldiers within two months. In addition, each person was to carry proselyting leaflets to the GVN area and drop them in hamlets

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to influence the populace to work for the VC (Eval: C-6).

s. Quang Ngai.

A US MI source reported that on 3 September 1969, the 8th Regular Battalion, with an estimated strength of 200 personnel and commanded by Ca and Tien was deployed at Ho Xoai vic BS 715455. They were setting up defensive positions at the above location. They were to remain in the area for an undetermined length of time until they would combine with other units (nfi) and fight against the GVN-rebuilding plan (nfi) along the coastal areas of Mo Duc (D). In order to feed the troops, some of the personnel were preparing to go east to Highway I (nfi) where food would be given to them (nfi). A secret surveillance program was being conducted to weed-out any personnel planning to desert or defect and any cowards. Those found guilty would be disarmed and forced to work as transportation laborers or be shot. This lowered the troop morale (Eval: C-3).

t. Quang Ngai.

A US MI source reported that during the period 3-9 September 1969, there was a VC training session for thirty low-level village and hamlet cadre at Da Mieu mountain, Binh Son (D), vic BS 448937.

Political, economic, and military subjects were taught during the training session.

Political portions included the improvement of political organizations and the selection of outstanding individuals for extensive leadership training.

Tasks discussed in the economic portions were methods of collecting funds for the military supply group, commercial tax, and fishing tax.

Military training consisted of techniques to encourage young men to become members of guerrilla forces (Eval: C-3).

u. Quang Ngai.

A US MI source, on 5 September 1969, reported that on 19 August 1969, a meeting of district-level VC cadre was held in the vic of BS 435950. General plans for the period September-December 1969 were discussed at this meeting. The plans discussed at this meeting included three phases; military, political and economic. The military phase consisted of reinforcement of present guerrilla units and the formation of new units at both the province and district levels, the formation of new sapper groups and assassination groups, and the establishment of intelligence cadre with emphasis on recruiting penetration agents targeted against ARVN units and high level GVN offices. The political phase was to consist of efforts to control all levels of Vietnamese society with emphasis on obtaining the support of students. These plans also included the use of informants to collect information on the general population. The economic

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phase consisted of establishment of supply and finance cadres at village, district, and province levels. The economic plans also included the use of young girls to obtain money by prostitution, and the use of older women to obtain money by working as merchants (Eval: C-6).

v. Quang Ngai.

A US MI source on 5 September 1969, reported that the VC intend to hold a political demonstration throughout the province, asking U.S. personnel to leave Vietnam and set up a Peace Government (Eval: D-5).

w. Quang Ngai.

A US MI source on 6 September 1969, reported that a meeting was held by the VC Inter-District Committee of Mo Duc (D) and Nghia Hanh (D) at Phu An (H) (BS 687587). The meeting was called to establish a unified observance of the death of President Ho Chi Minh. There were 30 representatives of Mo Duc (D) and 20 representatives from Nghia Hanh (D). The personnel present were required to kneel and repeat the following oath:

(1) Swear to change the sorrow of the death of Ho Chi Minh to revolutionary action, never fearing hardship.

(2) Unite and engage the enemy to win victory for the PRG.

(3) Place responsibility and honor above all else in the anti-American war.

(4) Be willing to die for the survival of the fatherland.

(5) Swear to be loyal to the revolutionary cause.

The committee also vowed to continue attacks and make an all out effort for victory in the coming "Fall-Winter Campaign". Particular emphasis would be placed on resistance of US/ARVN sweep operations and the protection of the liberated area (Eval: B-3).

x. Quang Ngai.

A US MI source, on 8 September 1969, reported that a special meeting was called by the VC Military Affairs Committee of the Tu Nghia (D) in the vic of BS 480730. The meeting was called to inform the members of a special plan of action which will take place from 11-13 September 1969. The period will be known as the "Change of Sorrow for Ho Chi Minh's Death to Revolutionary Action." The following plan of action is to take place during this period:

(1) VC sapper cells would be ordered into Quang Ngai City with orders to assassinate GVN cadre, ARVN officers, GVN policemen and intelligence officers with explosives.

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(2) The provincial VC armed forces would be ordered to enter Quang Ngai City and support a mobile propaganda group who would try to motivate the people to join the revolutionary struggle.

(3) VC political cadre were to move to the area surrounding Quang Ngai City and eastern Tu Nghia (D) to motivate local inhabitants to support the VC in the revolutionary struggle and help protect the VC-controlled area (Eval: C-3).

y. Quang Ngai.

A US MI source, on 8 September 1969, reported that a VC provincial main force company with an estimated strength of 100 personnel was deployed at Kin Thanh Thuong (H) vic BS 550635. They were setting up defensive positions and motivating local inhabitants to mourn the death of Ho Chi Minh on 10 September 1969. While propagandizing to local inhabitants, some of the unit members stated that the unit would attack outposts in the Nghia Hanh (D) (nfi), at an undetermined date in accordance with the policy of the PRG which was "Change the Sorrow to Revolutionary Action" (Eval: C-3).

5. TERROR. Terrorist activity was at a high level, increasing sharply from the previous week. The primary target of terrorist activity continued to be refugee and resettlement areas with the purpose of forcing people to return to their former homes in VC-controlled areas. Additional targets of continued intensified terrorist activity were PSDF, RD cadre, NP personnel and GVN officials. See Appendix 2 for a listing of reported terrorist incidents in ICTZ.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Quang Tri.

(1) A US MI source reported a five man VC team collected rice on 27 August 1969 at Giap My II (H) (YD 430433) (Eval: F-3).

(2) A US MI source reported that, on 27 August 1969, one VC squad collected rice from Giap Trung II (H) (YD 450428) (Eval: F-3).

(3) A US MI source reported that one VC platoon collected rice, on 29 August 1969, from the residents of Giap Hau (H) (YD 430438) (Eval: F-6).

b. Thua Thien.

(1) A US MI source reported that one squad of VC began on 25 August 1969, to regularly collect rice at Tan To (H) (YD 907149) (Eval: F-3).

(2) A US MI source reported four VC collected rice, on 31 August 1969, at Phu Bai III (H) (YD 903156) and Thuy Tay (V) (YD 896156) (Eval: F-6).

(3) A US MI source reported that four personnel from the Nuoc Mot VC village (ZC 175955), collected rice, on 4 September 1969, at Thuy

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Cam (H) (ZC 150985) (Eval: C-6).

(4) A US MI source reported that, on 5 September 1969, 90 personnel of an unidentified LF company and six female trading cadre deployed at Chanh Loc area in the vicinity of YD 540457 to YD 540460. The personnel were dressed as civilians. They dispersed in small groups into areas where many of the population were refugees to buy rice, salt, pepper, nylon and rubber sandals. The six female trading cadre had approximately 1,000,000$VN in 500$VN bills (Eval: F-6).

(5) A US MI source reported that, on 5 September 1969, a company of K.10 Battalion was deployed in the vicinity of YD 929021 with the mission of attacking Loc Son (V) (YD 928079), or destroying a refugee hamlet vic YD 935089, or destroying a bridge vic YD 933085 on an unspecified date (Eval: F-3).

(6) Approximately one squad of VC, on 6 September 1969, entered Phu O (H) (YD 696250) and stole food from the people (Eval: F-6).

(7) Approximately one squad of VC, on 8 September 1969, entered Ninh Thuong (H) (YD 720219) and collected food and information from the people (Eval F-6).

c. Quang Nam.

(1) A US MI source reported that from January 1969 to the present, the Viet Cong (VC) Current Affairs Committee of the Quang Da Special Zone succeeded in collecting 2.14% of the total VC tax requirement for Danang from the citizens of Danang and environs. Therefore, during the forthcoming period (nfi), the Current Affairs Committee has ordered the VC to initiate a four phase tax collection plan in order to raise the sum of collected taxes. A VC directive, dated 3 July 1969, ordered VC agents operating in Danang and environs to apply the following plan concerning tax collection:

(a) All legal VC agents in Danang and environs were to take the NLF black-mail letters (nfi) to the targets (nfi) requesting them to support the "revolution".

(b) Working class citizens and VC agents within Danang were required to pay a "tax sum" ranging from 1,000$VN to 10,000$VN (nfi).

(c) Two-thirds of all the VC female agents living in Danang were required to execute the tax collecting procedures.

(d) In order to facilitate tax collection, the VC agents were to use the name of the Buddhist rescue and fund drive organization (nfi).

In addition, another VC directive, dated 5 July 1969, instructed the

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district economical and financial sections (nfi) to collect at least 10,000$VN from each businessman who owns property (Eval: C-3).

(2) A US MI source reported that a 20 man VC force was to come to Phuoc Thuan (H) (AT 937732) to pick up rice, money, and other food supplies at about 2400 hours on 6 September 1969 (Eval: F-3).

(3) A US MI source reported that the D3 Bn., on 5 September 1969, with a strength of less than 200 men, moved from Da Hoa to Thuy Bo (AT 980590) and Giang La (AT 977598 and AT 974602). Recon teams from the unit were studying the area of Dat Son (Hill 55) (AT 980590), and AT 974602 and the section of road between Hill 55 and Ai Nghia (AT 915578) in preparation for a series of mortar attacks and ambushes during the coming days (nfi) (Eval: C-3).

(4) The 100th PF platoon, on 7 September 1969, captured a number of VC documents in the vic of BT 020361, Que Son (D). These documents were translated to read as follows:

(a) The VC have ordered civilians to collect dud rounds and turn them over to the VC.

(b) Village guerrillas will recruit women and children and instruct them to gather envelopes from the dump at LZ Ross.

(c) An order stating certain individuals will be honored for committing heroic acts.

(d) A village cadre will come to a location known as "TC-16" (location unknown) to pick up 480,000$VN. This money will be used to purchase rice and supplies (Uneval).

(5) A US MI source reported that one NVA battalion of the 36th Regiment and one artillery company was located at Thach Bo (H) (AT 946687) and La Chau (H) (AT 950679) on 8 September 1969. They intended to coordinate with local forces to gather rice and purchase supplies (Eval: F-3).

(6) A US MI source reported that on 3 September 1969 elements of the 5th VC Main Force Bn. moved from Thach Yen Mountain (nfi) to Quang Nam #3 (H) (AT 902818). The mission of this unit was to collect supplies and attack ARVN and FWMAF in the Quan Nam (H) complex and Hoa Lac (V) (AT 880749). The battalion was preparing to attack with mortars, the Le My USMC compound (Hill 190) (AT 885823), the Thanh Vinh Artillery Compound (AT 926794), and the Red Beach compound complex during the first ten days of September 1969 (Uneval).

(7) A US MI source reported that as of 5 September 1969, a combined force of the V25 Bn. and the Q80 LF, with a total strength of approximately 200 men, was dispersed between Tay Thanh (BT 180505), and Ngai Le (BT 190520). Another element of the Q80 LF had moved to Can Thanh

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(BT 190565), to conduct reconnaissance activities before the raids on Xuyen Cong (nfi) (Eval: F-3).

(8) A US MI source reported that during the cease-fire period of 8-11 September 1969, in commemoration of the death of Ho Chi Minh, the VC (nfi) would collect and gather foodstuffs (Eval: C-2).

(9) A US MI source reported, on 8 September 1969, that VC agents and sympathizers had organized ceremonies to commemorate the death of Ho Chi Minh at Tung Lam (BT 034704), Lin Lac (BT 027695), Man Quan (BT 045685), and Khai Tay (BT 047675), Hoa Vang (D). The time for the ceremonies was unknown. VC cadre had been ordered to instruct their agents and VC sympathizers to wear crepe black and white mourning bands (nfi). Main Force units (nfi) had been tasked to support the village committees and guerrillas in organizing the ceremonies (nfi) (Eval: C-3).

(10) On 10 September 1969, a GVN source reported that an NVA company of 50 men was located at AT 905785. Their mission was to recon and attack units in Northern Hoa Vang (D) to include ASP-2, 7th Engineers, 26th Marines and 58th TC. During the day the unit hid in the mountains, vic AT 915784 (Uneval).

(11) At approximately 1500 hours on 11 September 1969, the body of a Vietnamese male washed up on the beach in the vic of AT 947818. The body was approximately 20 to 22 years old and appeared to have been in the water approximately two days. The only article of clothing on the body was a pair of drawstring, khaki swimmer's trunks. No wounds were observed on the body.

When the body was moved, internal hemorrhaging commenced and blood began to flow from the mouth and nostrils which may indicate death by concussion. Hemorrhaging, plus the type of haircut, clothing and ulcerous scars on the calves of the body, indicate that the individual may have been an NVA underwater sapper or frogman (Eval: B-3).

d. Quang Tin.

(1) A VC rallier, on 14 August 1969, reported that during an early August 1969 meeting of Viet Cong hamlet cadres in Phuoc Tuy (H), Binh Son (V) (VC Thang Phuoc Village), Hiep Duc (D), Quang Tin (P) (VC Quang Nam) (P). The political officer of VC Binh Son guerrilla unit reported that Binh Son Village had been made a part of a newly created VC district named Que Tien. The new district included Son Tan, Son Tay, Son Tin, Binh Son, Son Phuoc, Son Hiep and Son Binh villages in Hiep Duc (D); Phuoc Son, Phuoc Ha and Phuoc Cam villages in Tien Phuoc (D), Binh Lam village in Thang Binh (D) and Son Hoa village in Que Son (D). The reason claimed for establishing the new district was to facilitate attendance at district-level meetings since the cadre previously had to travel long distances to attend meetings at their respective district headquarters.

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The rallier stated that Lam HUNG would become chief of the new district and that all previous village-level cadre in the new district would be promoted to district-level cadre.

Rallier believes the new district headquarters is located in Son Phuoc Village because villagers were forbidden to travel within an area where both guerrilla and district main force units were located.

Comment: This is the second report of the possibly newly formed VC district. Previously reported in III MAF PERINTREP 34-69 (F-2).

(2) A VC Hoi Chanh who rallied in Que Son (D) reported that on 26 August 1969 the Province Economic Cadre received 6 machine gun ammo cases filled with counterfeit money. All of the bills were in 500 piaster notes. The money came from a commo-liaison station at an unknown location on Highway 19. The bills are slightly smaller than actual bills, and this money was distributed to various unit economic cadres for use (Uneval).

e. Quang Ngai.

(1) A US MI source reported that as of 22 August 1969, the VC had formulated the following plans for the collection of taxes in Binh Son (D), Quang Ngai (P). These plans were to apply to VC-controlled areas, GVN-controlled areas, and contested areas. Each family was to be assessed a certain amount each month based on the wealth of the family. This assessment was to be made by the VC village-level organization. Each family was to be visited by a representative of the VC village-level organization, who was to explain to the family why the taxes were required and how much that family had been assessed. After this visit the VC were to send a letter to each family explaining how and where the tax was to be collected. Usually instructions were to bury the money at a specific location. If the money was not deposited at the proper location within five days, then all the family's possessions were to be confiscated by the VC. If a member of the taxed family informed the GVN authorities, then this individual was to be murdered by the VC in addition to all the family's goods being confiscated (Eval: C-6).

(2) A US MI source, on 6 September 1969, reported that an unidentified battalion from Regiment 22 was located at BS 715455 with 40 laborers. Their mission was to wait for supplies and hold counter-attacks against ARVN units (Eval: C-2).

(3) A US MI source, on 6 September 1969, reported that Company H-16 was located at Van Hoa (BS 577802). The company is to wait for supplies and lay mines along routes (nfi) (Eval: D-4).

(4) A US MI source, on 6 September 1969, reported an unidentified NVA battalion was located from BS 545715 to BS 580700. Their mission is to attack a civilian hospital, CORDS warehouse, an electric plant and Thu Lo Refugee Camp (Eval: C-3).

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(5) A US MI source reported that Company C-45 was located vic BS 705555, on the nights of 6 and 7 September, with the mission of collecting taxes, moving food to the mountains, harassing hamlets around Mo Duc headquarters and mortaring Mo Duc (D) headquarters (Eval: C-3).

(6) A US MI source, on 6 September 1969, reported that Company C-18 was located in the vicinity of BS 660584 with the mission of consolidating a combat village, collecting food and conducting political courses (Eval: C-3).

APPENDIXES
1-Statistical Compilation of People's Revolutionary Committees in ICTZ
2-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 37-69

People's Revolutionary Committees reported by name and/or location as of 13 September 1969

	Quang Tri	Thua Thien	Quang Nam	Quang Tin	Quang Ngai	Total
Region (MRTTH)						1
Province	1	1	1	1	1	5
District	2	5	2	1	9	19
City		1	2			3
Village	37	36	76	49	107	305
Hamlet	31	59	16	11	122	239
Precinct		1				1
Total	71	103	97	62	239	573

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 37-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Tri	5Sep69 (Late Entry)	YD 439436	Approximately one squad of VC entered Giap My (H) and assassinated two civilians and wounded one.
	13Sep69	YD 228679	Ha Thanh Refugee Camp received four rounds of 140mm rocket fire, killing four civilians and wounding eight.
	13Sep69	YD 240670	Mai Xa Refugee Camp received four rounds of 122mm rocket fire, resulting in negative casualties or damages.
	11Sep69	YD 326534	A truck carrying VN civilians returning from Quang Tri City to Quang Tri Combat Base took 8-9 rounds small arms fire. Negative casualties or damage.
Thua Thien	4Sep69 (Late Entry)	YD 885246	VC fired four rounds of B-40 rocket fire into Phu Xuan (V), resulting in negative casualties.
	5Sep69 (Late Entry)	ZD 144010	VC fired four rounds of B-40 rocket fire into the Headquarters of Loc Thuy (V). Negative casualties.
	5Sep69 (Late Entry)	ZD 010129	One Vietnamese civilian was killed when he accidentally detonated a VC mine in Vinh Ha (V).
	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	YD 696250	Approximately one squad of VC entered Phu O (H) and stole rice from the people.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Thua Thien	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	ZD 156017	CAP 3-2-5 received 4-5 RPG rounds resulting in nine civilians wounded.
	7Sep69	YD 785114	The 177th RF Company, while guarding a village, received RPG and AWF, resulting in one civilian killed.
Quang Nam	2Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 034509	Duy Xuyen received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, killing one civilian, wounding six and destroying two homes.
	5Sep69 (Late Entry)	AT 955695	A Vietnamese woman was wounded when she tripped a booby trap.
	5Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 042622	The VC blew up a civilian block (nfi) in Thanh Quyt (H), wounding one civilian.
	5Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 057585	VC entered Vinh Dien (H), kidnapped three civilians and wounded one hamlet chief (nfi).
	5Sep69 (Late Entry)	AT 944688	VC mortar fire killed one civilian and wounded ten in Cam Toa Trung (H).
	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	AT 863431	An unknown number of VC penetrated the Loc Hoa and Loc Quy resettlement camp, burned 68 homes and wounded three civilians.
	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 182579	PSDF of Thanh Tan (H) received SAF and seven rounds of B-40 rocket fire, resulting in one PSDF killed, two PSDF wounded, three civilians wounded and three civilians kidnapped.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 017664	A Vietnamese child was wounded when the water buffalo he was riding stepped on a booby trapped M-26 grenade.
	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	CNA	VC mortar fire killed one civilian in Hieu Duc (D) town.
	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 032990	VC rocket impacted in Nai Hien Tay (V), killing thirteen civilians and wounded nine.
	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	CNA	VC entered A Dong (H), Xuyen Phu (V), Duc Duc (D) and kidnapped three civilians.
	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	AT 995749	VC rockets killed two civilians, wounded eight and destroyed three homes in Hoa Phat (V).
	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	CNA	One civilian was killed, six wounded and 58 homes destroyed by a VC attack on Go Chua Refugee Camp, Duc Duc (D) (nfi).
	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 038509	A VC mortar attack on Xuyen Kieu killed one civilian, wounded eight and destroyed six homes.
	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	CNA	Two civilians were killed, seven wounded and four civilian buses destroyed as a result of a VC attack on Nam Phuoc Town, Duy Xuyen (D) (nfi).
	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	AT 880572	VC assassinated the Phu My (H) chief and kidnapped two civilians. Later the VC entered Tam Hoa Refugee Camp and burned seven homes.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	CNA	VC shot one civilian as he rode his motorcycle on the district roadway near Goc Kha (H), Loc Binh (V), Thuong Duc (D).
	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 055658	An estimated 20 VC of the R-20 Battalion entered the people's homes in Binh Ky resettlement area, captured two men and one woman, and took them to Ky La (BT 049711) where they murdered the two men. VC then departed Ky La with the woman.
	7Sep69	AT 938732	VC entered Phuoc Thuan (H) and assassinated one village commissioner (nfi).
	8Sep69	AT 917578	A terrorist threw an explosive device into a village chief's hut near Dai Loc (D) headquarters, killing two civilians and wounding eleven.
	8Sep69	BT 031775	Two Vietnamese males threw a satchel charge into a parked jeep. The charge detonated prematurely, wounding both terrorists and an innocent bystander. The jeep was destroyed.
	8Sep69	BT 030507	Three civilians of Kieu Son (H) were wounded by detonating a VC mine.
	10Sep69	AT 945695	Duong Lam #1 (H) received three rounds of sniper fire, wounding one civilian.
	10Sep69	BT 118570	The 01 platoon found the body of the Cam Ha (V) PSDF team leader. He apparently died of gunshot wounds to the stomach.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	11Sep69	ZC 191559	An estimated VC platoon ambushed a national policeman and a civilian, as they were driving down Highway Number 4, resulting in one national policeman killed and one civilian kidnapped.
	11Sep69	AT 869479	One VC squad infiltrated A Dong Refugee Camp, killed eight civilians, wounded three and burned six homes.
	12Sep69	BT 088398	An Xuan #1 (V) received 10-12 satchel charges and 60mm mortar rounds, killing one civilian, and wounding two PF's.
Quang Tin	7Sep69	BT 432169	Approximately thirty VC kidnapped four civilians and one RD member.
	8Sep69	BT 260280	A bus moving north on Route 1 was struck with a command detonated 105mm round, resulting in twelve civilians killed and 18 wounded.
Quang Ngai	6Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 767471	VC entered Thach Tru (H) and abducted three civilians.
	7Sep69	Highway 1	A CAP 1-4-1 member received sniper fire from one VC, resulting in one civilian killed.
	11Sep69	BS 600914	An Chau Refugee (V) received ground attack from an estimated 18 sappers, resulting in one civilian killed, 23 wounded and seven huts destroyed.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Ngai	11Sep69	BS 754818	Refugee village received mortar and SAF attack, resulting in two civilians killed.
	11Sep69	BS 760819	Dong Zuan Refugee Camp received ten rounds of B-40 rocket fire and five hand grenades, resulting in three civilians killed, three kidnapped, two wounded and five huts destroyed.
	12Sep69	BS 605863	Three civilians of Phu Hau (H) were kidnapped by the VC.
	13Sep69	BS 474564	An Hoa Refugee Camp and adjacent PF outpost received mortar and ground attack from an unknown size enemy force, resulting in the camp being 80% destroyed, eight civilians killed and 9 PFs killed.
	13Sep69	BS 470873	An unknown PF unit and CAP 1-3-9 while in NDP, vic. An Phung (V) complex received mortar, small arms, and a ground attack from an estimated VC battalion. The VC were using the civilians as shields. The attack resulted in eight civilians killed, eight PF killed, one PF wounded and approximately 260 homes destroyed by fire.

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HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

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H-RETURN TO _____
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					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
1	A	9/30	10/1	KWK	G-3
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					CC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
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23 September 1969



UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 38-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

NORTH VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
QUANG TRI
Quang Tri
HUE
THUA THIEN
SOUTH CHINA SEA
DA NANG
CU LAC CHAM
Hoi An
LAOS
QUANG NAM
Song Thu Bon
Tam Ky
QUANG TIN
CU LAO RE
Quang Ngai
QUANG NGAI
545
0 25 50 Miles
0 25 50 Kilometers
II CORPS

PERMANENT RETENTION
Report Destruction to HQ classified

GROUP - 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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RELEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

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G-2 Section
DANANG, RVN
23 September 1969
Ser: 0109869

PERINTREP 38-69

Period covered: 140001H September - 202400H September 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13
ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. During the past week, the number of enemy initiated incidents decreased somewhat over the level of the previous week, 346 down 30 from 376. However, the decline is even more substantial when it is noted that last week there was a three day unilaterally declared NVA/VC cease fire commemorating the death of Ho Chi MINH. Most categories of enemy initiated activity were down with the notable exceptions of ambushes, assaults by fire and attacks by company size units or larger. Of the five company size attacks recorded during the past week, three were associated with the extended period of enemy contacts in which L/3/3 Marines was involved. Of the two remaining such attacks, one consisted of a light attack directed against a Marine position on the 17th, and the other involved the terror attack on the village of MINH TRI in QUANG NGAI Province. Therefore, the real increase of three in company size attacks can be attributed to what was essentially one localized battle in the central DMZ area. Notable also is the appreciable decline in attacks of platoon size or smaller. These dropped from 15 to six. The number of incoming rounds also decreased somewhat during the past week from 1,206 to 1,058, a drop of 148 rounds. However, the number of enemy killed rose noticeably higher than the level of the previous two weeks with an increase of 165, up to this week's total of 939.

Reported counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities during the past week indicated a continuation of emphasis on the conduct of military, political, and civil proselyting to strengthen the enemy's cadre and forces. Acts of terrorism, conducted to complement and speed implementation of enemy objectives, continued at a high level and were directed primarily at refugee and resettlement areas, GVN officials and functionaries, PSDF, and RD cadre. Despite numerous reports of serious food shortages in VC/NVA units and morale problems, it is expected that the present level of VC/VCI counterintelligence related activity will continue, and is likely to increase, in an attempt to create the most favorable position possible when (in the enemy's opinion) U.S. forces are withdrawn and a coalition government is implemented. In this regard, reports have indicated the initiation of a program for regrouping selected civilians, cadre, and soldiers to North Vietnam for specialized training to prepare them for leadership positions in South Vietnam at a later date.

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a. QUANG TRI (P). During the reporting period sightings/incidents in the DMZ area decreased to 250 with six of these sightings north of the BEN HAI River. A total of 214 hostile targets were taken under fire this week by artillery, tactical air strikes and naval gunfire.

Activity in QUANG TRI Province during the last week was dominated by a series of sharp contacts between elements of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines and an enemy force believed to be part of the 9th NVA Regiment. Other than this heavy fighting, enemy initiated activity was confined to an attack on a 3rd Marine Division Reconnaissance Team and indirect attacks by fire. The few remaining contacts of the week were friendly initiated.

The contacts involving elements of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines began on the opening day of the reporting period and were a continuation of the attempted ambush of L/3/3 Marines on the 13th as that unit was moving into night defensive positions about six kilometers northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 944610). With his attempted ambush successfully countered, the enemy apparently tried on the following day, the 14th, to lure into a trap a platoon from L/3/3 sweeping the area of the previous night's contact. Subsequently, there was a heavy exchange of fire, but the fighting was broken off when the friendly force was unable to maneuver into a favorable position prior to darkness. The friendly attempt to outmaneuver the enemy was resumed on the morning of the 15th resulting again in heavy contact which lasted until 1530H. Significant action did not resume then until the night of 16-17 September when this period of fighting reached its peak. Beginning at 0050H, the enemy conducted several probes of the night defensive positions of L/3/3 with the enemy's main attack coming somewhat after 0200H under the cover of heavy mortar and RPG fire. Briefly penetrating the friendly perimeter, this and a subsequent attack were repulsed by 0430H with a heavy volume of friendly defensive fires even though one platoon was cut off for a short period of time. However, following the breaking of contact, enemy mortar fire continued until daylight. Reinforced, the Marines moved out during daylight hours of the 17th to sweep the areas in the vicinity of the previous night's contacts. Sporadic, and sometimes sharp enemy resistance was met during these sweep operations to include mortaring of a reinforcement unit, I/3/4 Marines, late in the afternoon as it was medevacing wounded from an earlier contact. From this high point, enemy activity subsided for the remainder of the reporting period except for one probe which the enemy attempted against the night defensive positions of L/3/3 about 0500H on the 19th. However, in the face of effective friendly counter action, the enemy withdrew.

The intensity of these enemy attacks against L/3/3 Marines was attested to by the enemy litter found on the battlefield. All this suggests that enemy casualties were even greater than the tangible evidence of 51 killed with 12 individual and two crew-served weapons captured.

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The remaining enemy initiated activity in QUANG TRI Province took the form of an attack on a reconnaissance team and several attacks by fire. The reconnaissance team, from the 3rd Marine Division, was attacked on the 16th five and one-half kilometers south southwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 951511) by an estimated 30 enemy employing small arms and 60mm mortar fire. Air strikes were called and the team was extracted after 10 enemy had been killed. On the other hand, the attacks by fire were light and involved a total of 19 rockets directed at A-4 Base (YD 118701), A-2 Base (YD 213743), TF CLEARWATER (YD 353699), VANDEGRIFT Combat Base (XD 998489) and DONG HA Combat Base (YD 235575).

The balance of ground action in QUANG TRI Province was friendly initiated and was focused southeast of QUANG TRI City and in the extreme southern portion of the DA KRONG Valley. The first contact occurred on the 17th when elements of 2/1 ARVN engaged an estimated enemy platoon 15 kilometers south southeast of QUANG TRI City (YD 356376) killing 11 of the enemy. In addition, 15 individual and six crew-served weapons along with 100 B-40 and B-41 rockets were captured. The second incident took place two days later when a 2/1 ARVN patrol encountered an unknown size enemy force in the same area and killed seven enemy. The action in the DA KRONG Valley occurred on the 14th in the form of resistance to the helicopter landing of D/3/187 Infantry in an LZ four and one-half kilometers southeast of FSB ERSKINE (YD 197080). In addition to RPG and small arms fire, the enemy opposed this insertion with tear gas, which he also subsequently used to break contact. There were light friendly casualties as a result of this action, while the enemy casualties are unknown.

b. THUA THIEN (P). Action in THUA THIEN Province continued in the pattern of the past several weeks with the number of incidents in the province being small and scattered. Enemy initiated activity was confined to two rocket attacks and the latest in a series of mining incidents which have harassed the operations of the HUE-DANANG Railroad throughout the current year. The remaining incidents during the period were generated either in response to or as the result of friendly initiated actions.

The enemy rocket attacks occurred at widely separated points in THUA THIEN with the first consisting of three 122mm rockets being fired into the city of HUE (YD 600194) on the night of the 14th. Two civilians were injured and one building received minor damage in this attack. The second attack took place the following day in western THUA THIEN when FSB RENDEVOUS (YD 4396) received fourteen 122mm rockets resulting in light friendly casualties.

The remaining enemy initiated activity also took place during the earlier part of the reporting period on the 16th when an ARVN security train received substantial damage as the result of two command mines detonated about 16 kilometers east southeast of PHU LOC, (AT 837978) on the HUE-DANANG Railroad.

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The 22nd mining incident of the year, this action occurred 75 meters north of the site of an 8 September mine incident and only two hours after a sweep of this section of track had been completed. The mines were detonated when the engine passed between the two which were placed 40 feet apart. The engine received 70 percent damage while one car was completely destroyed with three others receiving lesser damage. Personnel casualites were light, and service was restored within two days.

In a friendly initiated action in the northcentral portion of the province on the 15th, 3/1 ARVN 1½ kilometers west southwest of Camp EVANS (YD 393305) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. In this particular action, the ARVN killed five of the enemy and captured two individual weapons with no friendly casualties.

During the latter part of the week, little enemy activity was in evidence. However, on the 16th, A/1/502 Infantry discovered 150 bodies in a mass grave which was uncovered by rain in an area 15 kilometers south of HUE (YD 766074). Since the bodies were dressed in civilian clothes and sandals, it is presently presumed that the people involved were among those reported missing following the Tet 1968 offensive. Two days after finding this mass grave, on the 18th a Hoi Chanh led C Troop of 2/17 Cavalry to a weapons cache 15 kilometers west southwest of Camp EVANS (YD 388280). This cache, consisting of 30 individual and crew-served weapons, was located in the same general area where earlier contacts had been made with unknown size enemy forces by 3/1 ARVN on the 12th and again on the 15th.

c. QUANG NAM (P). Enemy initiated activity dropped off noticeably from a series of high points which have been recorded in QUANG NAM Province since the end of the so-called "lull" in early August. There were only two enemy initiated ground attacks of note and these were widely separated. One was targetted against a 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Team while the other was initially directed against a G/2/7 Marines' ambush position. The loss of the enemy's tactical momentum was also reflected in the number and volume of his attacks by fire. Only one of four such attacks involved more than 20 rounds, with two numbering five or less. The remaining five noteworthy encounters with the enemy were friendly initiated with the exception of one major mining incident in which an amphibian tractor was destroyed. The balance of the picture of enemy activity for this reporting period occurred in Operation DEFIANT STAND, which was characterized by light and scattered enemy resistance. This detailed search and clear operation in the QUANG NAM/ QUANG TIN border lowlands terminated on the 19th and resulted in a total of 293 enemy killed.

Of the enemy initiated ground actions, the first did not occur until about 1200H on the 18th when an unknown size enemy force attempted to surround the position of a 1st Marine Division reconnaissance team about 13 kilometers south of AN HOA (AT 846329). In order to preempt the enemy's efforts, the reconnaissance team opened fire and called for an air strike

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resulting in 11 enemy killed with no friendly casualties. The second enemy initiated ground action took place early the next morning, when at 0030H, an unknown size enemy force directed 50 M-79 rounds at a G/2/7 Marines' squad ambush position about four and one-half kilometers west southwest of QUE SON (AT 994337). The Marines returned fire and subsequently withdrew to the company CP located at FSB ROSS (BT 027343). The enemy force probably pursued the withdrawing squad. Beginning about 0110H, the company CP came under attack receiving 10 to 15 chicom grenades, ten to twelve 82mm mortar rounds, two 120mm mortar rounds and twenty-four 82mm recoilless rifle rounds.

The limited number of enemy ground attacks was matched by the small number of attacks by fire which he undertook during the reporting period. Only two of these attacks exceeded 20 rounds. One took place on the night of 15-16 September when the enemy fired sixty 82mm mortar rounds into the command post of 2/7 Marines located at FSB ROSS (BT 021343). It was not until five days later that the enemy undertook his second attack by fire. This time he directed 20-30 rounds of mixed RPG and 60mm mortar fire against defense positions of G/2/7 Marines four kilometers west of QUE SON (AT 998352).

Other noteworthy encounters with the enemy during the reporting period were friendly initiated. Most notable of these involved D/1/7 and C/1/5 Marines. The D/1/7 action occurred on the morning of the 15th when elements of the company, about 10 kilometers northeast of QUE SON (BT 079-443), initiated small arms and artillery fire on an estimated 18 to 20 enemy observed moving northeast resulting in 15 NVA killed. On the following day, elements of C/1/5 Marines ambushed an estimated 15 enemy on a trail three kilometers north northeast of AN HOA (AT 852486) resulting in five NVA killed. On the 18th, C/1/5 activated another ambush in the same area and killed another five NVA.

A particular success was noted during the week by a Marine interrogation team. During a cordon and search operation of several villages about 14 kilometers south of DANANG on the 12th of September, several Vietnamese civilians were detained. One of these Vietnamese was subsequently identified as a VC Village Chief. Under interrogation by members of the 3rd Interrogation-Translation Team attached to the 1st Marine Division, the VC identified two commo-liaison personnel who lived in the vicinity. Apprehended and detained, one of these individuals under further questioning by the same Marine interrogation team revealed what was suspected to be some sort of ordnance cache. Through the skill and persistence of the interrogators over a period of a week, the PW led elements of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines to an area where twenty-eight 122mm rockets and 1,500 rounds of AK-47 ammunition were eventually found.

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d. QUANG TIN (P). While the enemy remained active in QUANG TIN Province during this reporting period, harassing fires rather than ground attacks were emphasized in the HIEP DUC area, scene of heavy fighting since the enemy resumed his offensive activities early in August. With one exception, ground contacts resulted from friendly operations rather than from enemy initiatives. In addition to the five significant ground actions reported, a weapons cache was found and a number of NVA bodies discovered. Two separate sightings of 100 and 120 VC and a mining incident between TAM KY and THANG BINH on the 16th round out the highlights of enemy activity in QUANG TIN Province.

Throughout the week, the enemy directed intermittent harassing fires at FSB SIBERIA (AT 901232), FSB WEST (AT 990250) and FSB CENTER (BT 053-250), all in the HIEP DUC area. This harassing fire consisted principally of 81 and 82mm HE mortar fire, but on the 15th, seven mortar rounds of CS gas were employed against FSB CENTER while on the 20th, one CS round was directed against FSB WEST. In all, about 100 rounds of harassing mortar fire were received at these locations during the reporting period. In addition to this enemy initiated fire in the HIEP DUC area, there were two other noteworthy attacks by fire, one occurring on the 14th with the other taking place four days later. In the case of the former, D/2/1 Inf and F Troop of the 17th Cavalry 15 kilometers northwest of TAM KY (BT 188308) received approximately 20 rounds of B-40 rockets. Late on the evening of the 18th, the enemy directed 26 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and four 122mm rockets against the 109th RF Company in night defensive positions at NUI LOC SON Village 12 kilometers east northeast of HIEP DUC (BT 023288).

The HIEP DUC area was also the focus of the ground actions which took place during the reporting period. The single enemy initiated ground action of note occurred late on the afternoon of the 16th when C/4/31st Infantry operating about one and one-half kilometers north northwest of HIEP DUC (AT 905258) came under an enemy mortar attack followed by small arms and automatic weapons fire. The friendly force replied with organic weapons, artillery and gunships. The contact terminated at dusk with light friendly and no known enemy casualties. The four remaining ground actions of note during the week were initiated by friendly units as they conducted sweep and patrolling operations. Each involved an unknown size enemy force, with these contacts occurring the 14th, 15th and 16th, resulting in a total of 12 known enemy killed at the cost of light friendly casualties.

In addition to these ground actions precipitated by friendly sweep and patrolling operations, elements of the Americal Division also uncovered a total of 34 NVA bodies in the HIEP DUC area in two different incidents on the 16th and 17th. Elsewhere, about 23 kilometers southwest of TIEN PHUOC (BS 084916) C/5/46th Infantry discovered a small cache consisting of eight 122mm rocket launchers, associated equipment and three U.S. field telephones.

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The picture of enemy activity in QUANG TIN Province for this reporting period is rounded out by noting two large sightings of VC in the coastal areas between TAM KY and THANG BINH. The sightings both took place on the 16th. The first occurred at 1330H when a gunship from the 71st Aviation Battalion observed and engaged approximately 120 VC about 15 kilometers north northwest of TAM KY (BT 280380) resulting in 12 NVA killed. The second sighting was made later that day about 1930H when a PF unit observed an estimated 100 VC in the open about 12 kilometers east southeast of THANG BINH (BT 282370). Artillery was called with the result that 12 VC were killed. The relative times and locations of these two sightings suggest that possibly the VC involved constituted one group rather than two.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Activity in QUANG NGAI Province during the past week focused on four principal incidents and a number of secondary events. The four principal events consisted of two sharp attacks on a rural population center and a refugee camp, the ambush of a sizeable U. S. vehicle convoy and sharp contact between a U. S. unit and an unknown size enemy force which resulted in 22 enemy killed.

Early in the reporting period, on the night of the 15th, the enemy continued his recent pattern of attacks on civilian population centers by conducting a raid on the rural village of MINH TAI (BS 543533) in south central QUANG NGAI Province. Beginning at 2230H, an estimated 200 enemy attacked the village employing rockets, mortars, small arms fire and hand grenades. During the ensuing two hours, the enemy killed 21 civilians and injured six more in addition to three PF's who were killed in action. Before withdrawing, the enemy punctuated what appeared to be an attempt to intimidate the population by destroying 170 houses, or approximately 75 percent of the village.

Four nights later, beginning at 0200H on the 20th, a second such incident occurred when an unknown size enemy force fired twenty 82mm mortar rounds into TUONG MY Refugee Camp near BINH SON (BS 608921). This mortar attack was followed by a ground attack in which nine civilians were killed and 80 percent of the refugee camp destroyed.

The other two principal events of the week in QUANG NGAI took place on the afternoon of the 17th at widely separated locations, one 10 kilometers southeast of TRA BONG (BS 443846) and the second about four kilometers southeast of DUC PHO. In the first instance, the incident developed when A/1/52nd Infantry and H Troop of the 17th Cavalry received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The friendly force developed the situation through the employment of small arms fire, artillery, gunships and air strikes. As a result, the enemy lost 22 killed at the cost of light friendly casualties. In the second instance, hostile action was precipitated by the ambush of a 57th Transportation Battalion truck convoy en route to DUC PHO (BS 825339). At 1530H, the enemy

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delivered destructive RPG and automatic weapons fire on the center of the 13 vehicle convoy, destroying two 5,000 gallon fuel tankers. The enemy fire was returned, and a reaction force was deployed to the area with the contact lasting until dark. One NVA was killed and two U.S. were wounded. Route 1 was closed until a sweep of the area had been made.

In the other actions in QUANG NGAI during the reporting period, one occurred on the 14th when 4/4 ARVN made contact with an unknown size enemy force 10½ kilometers southwest of DUC PHO (BS 745295). In this and three similar actions in this area during the week, the 4th ARVN Regiment accounted for 29 enemy killed.

The balance of enemy initiated activity during this period took the form of one rocket and three mortar attacks. On the morning of the 20th, LZ BRONCO (BS 812383) received six 122mm rockets. On the 17th, 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire were directed at FSB DEBBIE eight and one-half kilometers southeast of DUC PHO (BS 872324) resulting in light friendly casualties. In sharp contrast, the other two mortar attacks were made on the 16th against two civilian population centers, AN PHONG Village (BS 473866) and AN HOA Refugee Camp (BS 474868), both of which had previously been targets of enemy terrorist attacks earlier in the month. In these later attacks, a total of 11 civilians were killed and another 39 injured.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. With the notable exception of the sharp contacts between the NVA and elements of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines near the central DMZ and the additional attacks on population centers in QUANG NGAI Province, the enemy's Summer-Autumn Campaign gave every evidence this past week of losing momentum. For the most part, the enemy avoided contact with our forces while his attacks by fire diminished in frequency and intensity. In view of this, the enemy may well be involved in an effort to regroup his forces and to prepare them for renewed operations, possibly in mid-October. However, when and how he may react to the redeployment of the balance of the 3d Marine Division is difficult to assess at this time. The enemy retains the capability to exert heavy pressure on our forces at a time and place of his own choosing. In the absence, as yet, of any discernible indicators, enemy intentions, not capabilities, are the imponderables in the current enemy situation.

At the present time, there are few indicators which would suggest that the enemy will make any significant change in the type and level of his operations during the coming week over those of the week just ended. Therefore, it is estimated that enemy initiated activity in I Corps remain light and scattered except in the vicinity of the central DMZ and QUANG NGAI Province. In the central DMZ area, until the impact of the new U.S. redeployments becomes clear, we can expect the enemy to seize upon

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any local situation which he may consider to be tactically exploitable. In QUANG NGAI Province, we can expect further attacks on population centers and refugee camps as the enemy continues his campaign to discredit the GVN in the eyes of the civilian population in that province.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents decreased from 376 to 346 for the week of 14-20 September. These incidents consisted of 11 ground attacks, five of which were company size or larger and six platoon size or smaller, nine ambushes, 23 attacks by fire, 207 harassing fire incidents, 44 mining and booby trap incidents, 12 hamlet harassment incidents, four assassination incidents, six espionage incidents, seven kidnapping incidents, 17 propaganda incidents, and six sabotage incidents.

a. Strength and Disposition. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserve Reinforcement. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire increased from 84 to 115 incidents for the reporting period and 34 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 14-20 September.

Type	Expended
120mm Mortar	2
82mm Mortar	721
60mm Mortar	191
Unk Cal Mortar	68
140mm Rocket	11
122mm Rocket	53
Unk Cal Rocket	4
105mm Artillery	8
Total	1,058

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance

(1) There were 92 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 14-20 September. These long-range

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patrols reported 73 sightings and 12 contacts totaling 772 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of 41 enemy KIA.

(2) Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant caches were captured in the ICTZ during the period 14-20 September:

(a) 15 September: 3/2/3 ARVN discovered an ordnance and equipment cache 15 kilometers west southwest of HUE City (YD 619154) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
7 EA	CHICOM	MG Barrels
110 EA	UNK	60mm Mortar Rounds
50 EA	UNK	RPG-2 Rounds
20 EA	UNK	82mm Mortar Rounds
15 EA	UNK	RPG-7 Rounds
4 EA	UNK	2.5 Rockets
2 EA	UNK	57mm RR Bipods
1 EA	UNK	Rifle Sight
1,150 EA	UNK	AK-47 Rounds
1,200 M	UNK	Comm Wire

No further information was available on this cache.

(b) 16 September: D/1/4 Marines discovered an ordnance cache eight kilometers west southwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 887497) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
142 EA	UNK	82mm Mortar Rounds
10 EA	UNK	60mm Mortar Rounds
200 EA	UNK	TNT (¼ pound blocks)
130 EA	UNK	82mm Mortar Fuzes
7 CANS	UNK	82mm Mortar Increments
5 CANS	UNK	60mm Mortar Increments
50 EA	UNK	.50 Cal Rounds

This cache was found within 25 "L" shaped barracks. The barracks and the ordnance were destroyed.

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(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 14-20 September.

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
82mm Mortar	271
81mm Mortar	1
60mm Mortar	328
175mm Artillery	1
155mm Artillery	5
105mm Artillery	5
122mm Rocket	13
57mm RR	3
Total	627

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	316
Crew-Served Weapons	54

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 14-20 September.

Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
13 Sep	(AT 937702)	150	CAP 2-1-3
14 Sep	(BS 517924)	100	C/1/6
14 Sep	(BS 817455)	300	A/1/20
14 Sep	(BT 069638)	300	E/2/1
14 Sep	(YD 580230)	20	C/1/501
15 Sep	(AT 865587)	20	F/2/5
15 Sep	(BS 546399)	30	B/4/2
16 Sep	(BS 878336)	1,400	RCN/4/21
16 Sep	(BT 197519)	440	27th Co ROKMC
16 Sep	(YD 542255)	40	A/1/501
16 Sep	(YD 542275)	60	D/1/501
17 Sep	(BT 073350)	600	H/2/7
17 Sep	(BS 565742)	3,500	A/3/1
17 Sep	(BS 565742)	400 Food	A/3/1
17 Sep	(BS 565742)	40 Food	A/3/1
17 Sep	(BS 546404)	120 Food	A/4/3
17 Sep	(YD 595284)	300	A/1/501
17 Sep	(YD 563290)	5	D/1/501
17 Sep	(YC 372973)	25	A/2/17

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Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
18 Sep	(BS 542416)	300	A/4/3
18 Sep	(BS 546408)	100 Food	A/4/3
18 Sep	(BS 550707)	20 Food	A/4/3
19 Sep	(BT 175294)	800	D/2/1
19 Sep	(AT 946705)	10	F/2/26
19 Sep	(BS 536738)	2,000	A/3/1
19 Sep	(XD 873610)	25	3/4
19 Sep	(ZD 117027)	240	A/2/327
20 Sep	(ZD 118029)	135	A/2/327
20 Sep	(BT 105314)	250	C/2/1
20 Sep	(BS 504850)	250	A/1/52
20 Sep	(BS 747712)	1,100	16th Junk Flt, RVN
	Total Rice	12,400	
	Total Food	680	

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	118	Structures Damaged	34
Bunkers Destroyed	138	Bunkers Damaged	30
.50 Cal Sites Destroyed	2	Secondary Fires	42
Secondary Explosions	22	Boats Destroyed	8
Mortar Sites Destroyed	2	Gun Site Destroyed	1

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ increased in comparison to the previous week. There were 939 KIA's, 41 VC PW's, and nine NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

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	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	94	95	94	94
Low	70	72	74	74
Rainfall (total)	10.4	12.34	4.97	4.08
Winds (knots)	7	8	8	7
Visibility (miles)	6	6	6	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 20-26 September 1969

General. The main weather producing feature will be the formation of weak tropical cyclones developing over the South China Sea. They will create mostly cloudy conditions over ICTZ with occasional heavy showers and associated low ceilings and visibilities. With the current weather situation gradually improving early during the week, periods of peak activity will be most likely around midweek and again near the end of the outlook period.

ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the coastal areas of ICTZ is mostly cloudy with occasional thundershowers primarily between the hours of 1500H and 0500H. Patches of ground fog are expected in the mornings near the DMZ. Precipitation will be 2-4 inches with isolated instances of 4-6 inches. The forecast for the mountainous areas of ICTZ is cloudy to partly cloudy particularly during early midday hours. Some thundershowers will prevail during the early evenings of the period with intermittent rain often persisting throughout the nights. Precipitation will be 2-4 inches with isolated instances of 4-6 inches.

j. - k. Negative

1. Significant Enemy Attacks. The following significant enemy attacks occurred in ICTZ during the period 14-20 September as indicated:

(1) The contacts involving elements of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines began on the opening day of the reporting period and were a continuation of the attempted ambush of L/3/3 Marines on the 13th as that unit was moving into night defensive positions about six kilometers northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 944610). With his attempted ambush successfully countered, the enemy apparently tried on the following day, the 14th, to lure into a trap a platoon from L/3/3 sweeping the area of the previous night's contact. Subsequently, there was a heavy exchange of fire, but the fighting was broken off when the friendly force was unable to maneuver into a favorable position prior to darkness. The friendly attempt to outmaneuver the enemy was resumed on the morning of the 15th resulting again in heavy contact which lasted until 1530H. Significant action did not resume then until the night of 16-17 September when this period of fighting reached its peak. Beginning at 0050H, the enemy conducted several probes of the night defensive positions of L/3/3 with the enemy's main attack coming somewhat after 0200H under the cover of heavy mortar and RPG fire. Briefly penetrating the friendly perimeter,

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this and a subsequent attack were repulsed by 0430H with a heavy volume of friendly defensive fires even though one platoon was cut off for a short period of time. However, following the breaking of contact, enemy mortar fire continued until daylight. Reinforced, the Marines moved out during daylight hours of the 17th to sweep the areas in the vicinity of the previous night's contacts. Sporadic, and sometimes sharp enemy resistance was met during these sweep operations to include a mortar attack on a reinforcement unit, I/3/4 Marines, late in the afternoon as it was medevacing wounded from an earlier contact. From this high point, enemy activity subsided for the remainder of the reporting period except for one probe which the enemy attempted against the night defensive positions of L/3/3 about 0500H on the 19th. However, in the face of effective friendly counter action, the enemy withdrew. The intensity of these enemy attacks against L/3/3 Marines was attested to by the enemy litter found on the battlefield. All this suggests that enemy casualties were even greater than the tangible evidence of 51 killed with 12 individual and two crew-served weapons captured.

(2) Early in the reporting period, on the night of the 15th, the enemy continued his recent pattern of attacks on civilian population centers by conducting a raid on the rural village of MINH TRI (BS 543533) in south central QUANG NGAI Province. Beginning at 2230H, an estimated 200 enemy attacked the village employing rockets, mortars, small arms fire and hand grenades. During the ensuing two hours, the enemy killed 21 civilians and injured six more in addition to three PF's who were killed in action. Before withdrawing, the enemy punctuated what appeared to be an attempt to intimidate the population by destroying 170 houses, or approximately 75 percent of the village.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following course of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

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(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to six infantry regiment equivalents, supported by the equivalent of one naval sapper battalion and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack VANDEGRIFT Combat Base with one infantry regiment supported by one sapper battalion and one artillery battalion.

(3) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(5) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with up to six infantry regiments, supported by four rocket battalions, one sapper battalion and one engineer battalion.

(6) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division (-), supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(8) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to seven infantry regiment equivalents.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

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(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield, sickness, hunger, shortage of ammunition and medical supplies and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

FRANK X. HOFF
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Acting

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY

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DISTRIBUTION

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232)(CIIED)	2
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2
CG USARV	1
CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	10
CG I FFORCEV	5
CG II FFORCEV	1
COMNAVFORV	1
CG 1ST MARDIV	40
CG 3RD MARDIV	26
CG AMERICAL DIV	30
CG 101ST ABN DIV	20
CG 1ST MAW	30
CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CG USAS JPCOM DANANG	1
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHU LAI	3
CG 25TH INF DIV	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SAIGON	3
CG 173RD ABN BDE	2
CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7
CG FLC	5
CG 1ST LOG CMD LONG BINH	2
COMNAVSUPACT DANANG	2
CO 30 NCR	1
CIB	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTG 79.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 76.4	1
CTF 76	1
CO DASC ATTN: AVCA-QN-DN-OP	2
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2
CO "B" 5TH JSSF GP (ABN)	5
CO "C" 5TH JSSF GP (ABN)	17
1ST CAG	1
2ND CAG	1
3RD CAG	1
4TH CAG	1
7 AF (IGS) BDOC	1
45TH ENGR GROUP	1
GLO, 36TH TFW (DCOI)	2
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1
CO 517TH MI DET	1
CO 3RD MP BN	1
620TH TCS (ATTN: CRC)APO 96203	1
CO MCB 3	1
CO MCB 6	1
CO MCB 7	1
CO MCB 8	1
CO MCB 9	1
CO MCB 10	1
CO MCB 11	1
CTG 115.1	1
CO MCB 40	1
CO MCB 53	1
CO MCB 58	1
CO MCB 62	1
CO MCB 71	1
CO MCB 121	1
OSA/EMB SAIGON ATTN: RAS	1
CO 1ST BN 525TH MI GP DANANG	25
DSA I CORPS	11
DSA II CORPS	1
MCB 133	1
DET B 1ST MIBARS	1
HQ, 212TH COMBAT AVN BN	6
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
366 AIR SECURITY SQD, USAF	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1
7TH PSYOPS BN	1
CICV	2
III MAF LNO 2ND ROKMC BDE	1
620TH TSC	1
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
SPO-SEC CMD QUI NHON	1
DIRECTOR, CAP III MAF	1
CO USS REPOSE	1
CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 4TH PSYOP GP	1

OUT OF COUNTRY

DIR NSA	3
CMC (ABQ) (AIRMAIL)	2
CG FMFPAC (AIRMAIL)	2
CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP, 7TH FLEET	1
CO MCMEC	1
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1
CG 3RD MAW	2

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TEAM COMMANDER 19TH CI TEAM, CAMP PENDLETON	1
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CG 5TH MARDIV	6
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CG 4TH MARDIV, CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA	1

III MAF (To be picked up)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP CofS PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	42
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (c/o G-3)	2
PSYOPS	2
1ST RADIO BN	11
SLF (A)	1
1ST MP'S DNG	1
US NAD	1
CO MCB 5	1
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
CCN	1

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 38-69 AS OF 202400H SEPTEMBER 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-HQ	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	11	3,160	2	550			13	3,710	14	6,195	27	9,905
Bn's-Maneuver	39	9,110	11	1,775	5	730	55	11,615	34	14,820	89	26,435
Bn's-Support	18	5,225	2	340	1	190	21	5,755	7	2,080	27	7,835
Separate Co's	1	130			33	2,570	34	2,700	1	80	35	2,780
TOTAL CONFIRMED		19,590		2,665		3,490		25,745		24,610		50,355
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's	1	710					1	710	3	860	4	1,570
Bn's-Maneuver	6	2,375	1	350	1	200	8	2,925	7	2,670	15	5,595
Bn's-Support	4	1,035					4	1,035	9	1,445	13	2,480
Separate Co's	1	90			2	160	3	250			3	250
TOTAL PROBABLE		4,210		350		360		4,920		4,975		9,895
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,400	3	1,400
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support									22	7,675	22	7,675
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										10,015		10,015
		23,800		3,015		3,850		30,665		39,600		70,265

See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,250		150	3,400
	Probable	2,475			2,475
	Possible				
	TOTAL	5,725		150	5,875
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,630		565	4,195
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,630		565	4,195
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	6,150	825	915	7,890
	Probable	830	350		1,180
	Possible				
	TOTAL	6,980	1,175	915	9,070
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,415	600	650	3,665
	Probable	380		285	665
	Possible				
	TOTAL	2,795	600	935	4,330
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,145	1,240	1,210	6,595
	Probable	525		75	600
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,670	1,240	1,285	7,195

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS												DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL							
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	33	3		36	8			8	5			5	46	3		49	33	5		38	79	8		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	39	6		45	11	1		12	5	1		6	55	8		63	34	7		41	89	15		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	9	1		10	1			1	1			1	11	1		12	2	5	10	17	13	6	10	29
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	3	1	5	3	3	1	7
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2		1	2	3	1	2	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1					1			1
TOTAL SUPPORT	19	4		23	2			2	1			1	22	4		26	7	9	22	38	29	13	22	64
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	58	10		68	13	1		14	6	1		7	77	12		89	41	16	22	79	118	28	22	168

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	269	Nam Hoa	61	Hoa Vang	588	Thang Binh	943	Binh Son	321
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	58	Hieu Duc	65	Tam Ky	672	Son Tinh	474
	Trieu Phong	143	Hong Dien	59	Dien Ban	1,093	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	450
	Cam Lo	150	Vinh Loc	130	Dai Loc	356	Hiep Duc	215	Nghia Hanh	341
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	231	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	258	Mo Duc	483
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	333	Hau Duc	229	Duc Pho	465
	Huong Hoa	5	Phu Vang	24	Que Son	921			Tra Bong	170
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	107	Duy Xuyen	1,098			Ba To	202
			Huong Thuy	101	Hieu Nhon	294			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	437					Son Ha	185
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	947	THUA THIEN	1,254	QUANG NAM	4,868	QUANG TIN	2,432	QUANG NGAI	3,095

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,596

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT— PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,130		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Vic XD 6233	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175	Unlocated	
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unlocated LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	

*See note #4 on page A-17
**See note #2 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,950		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,900		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	500		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/240ct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,405		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	345	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0566/22May69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
31st Group	NVA	C	1,060		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	220	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2061/20Jul69
15th Bn	NVA	PR	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	2,010		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	[illegible]	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	YD 6825/23Apr69
65th Arty Regt	NVA	PR	UNK		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.40 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.41 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.42 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.43 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,575		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	2,050		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	420	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	420	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,595		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	YD 1259/11Jun69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	355	XD 9265	XD 9666/26May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 64th Arty Regt	NVA	C	400	XD 8854	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,680		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	YD 3858/20Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	185	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	PR	240	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	185	Vic YD 3535	YD 3448/7Sep69

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	915		
Rdgt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	275	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	280	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jun69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,735		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	340	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	175	Vic YD 6514	YD 6019/6Sep69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
3rd Bn, 803rd Regt	NVA	C	220	Vic YC 3193	YC 3389/19Jul69
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	360	Vic YD 3304	YD 5226/8Sep69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
K.35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	
C.113 Co	LF	C	145	Vic YD 4032	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	15,000		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
577th RL Bn	NVA	C	305	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
HAI VAN Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102nd Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103rd Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	525		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,080		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	270	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
368B Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,170		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	635		
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	150	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	150	AT 7930	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	145	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
R.20 Bn	LF	C	155	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	LF	C	130	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	70	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	85	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	125	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	105	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	4,070		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	430		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	AT 9226	
1st Bn	NVA	C	85	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	90	AT 9226	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	85	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	180	BT 2440	BT 2340/12Aug69
72nd Bn	LF	C	175	BT 2932	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	190	BT 3510	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	200	BT 3127	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 2232	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	220	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4213	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	80	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	85	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	150	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	120	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	LF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb68
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	130	BS 4677	BS 6385/12Aug68
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	685		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4386	BS 3587/13Aug69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69
C.17 Co	LF	C	55	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	65	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	70	BS 7555	BS 7061/17Nov68
C.120 Co	LF	C	50	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	75	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5596	
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,615		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	900		
Regt Hq	MF	C	360	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	185	BS 6733	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	185	BS 7932	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	170	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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BINH DINH PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,700		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	520	BR 7363	
7th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 7547	
8th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 5950	
9th Bn	NVA	C	300	BR 5929	

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 140001H to 202400H September 1969.

a. Based on information provided by PW Nguyen Van HOI and other sources, the K-35 Artillery Bn, MRTTH, is added to the OOB listing. While K-35 is subordinate to MRTTH, it is believed to be under the operational control of the 6th Regt.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units witnin the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

9. Subordinate/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF PERINTREP 35-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 38-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P). PW, Cpl Duong Xuan CAI, 3rd Co, K-8 Bn, 7th Front, was captured on 8 September 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 197438) (CG XXIV Corps 151535Z September 1969, 1st ARVN Div Interr Rpt #72-69) during an ARVN sweep operation as subject was unable to move away from the area due to malaria. Source stated that the K-8 Bn Headquarters was located in the vicinity of (YD 2031) as of 4 September 1969 and the battalion consists of three infantry companies, one combat support company, a signal platoon, and a reconnaissance platoon, for a total strength of 300 men. CAI further stated that the mission of his unit was to join with the QUANG HA Railroad unit (NFL) to attack the popular forces in the areas of TRIEU THUONG, TRIEU AI, TRIEU LUONG and TRIEU LE (CNA) in TRIEU PHONG District. CAI stated that medical supplies are very short as they only have malaria pills and bandages. The K-8 Bn had reportedly lost many men before he joined the unit. Source revealed that a large cache was located in the vicinity of (XD 810233) containing individual weapons, crew-served weapons, ammunition, 122mm rockets, and explosives. Reported personalities: 3rd Co Cmdr-2ndLt TUNG, XO-WO TAM, PO-2ndLt DINH.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB carries the K-8 Bn in the vicinity of (YD 3639) with a total strength of 285 men. It is possible that the K-8 Bn is located in the vicinity of (YD 2031) as this is within the AO of the 7th Front. This is the first report of personalities. All information rated (F-3).)

2. THUA THIEN (P)

a. PW, PFC Le Van THO of the 3rd Co, K-10 Bn, 5th Regt, captured on 6 September 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 603193) (SA 1st INFDIV 100900Z September 1969, CIEC Interr Rpt #71-69) stated that the mission of the 3rd Co was to collect rice in HUONG TRA foot hills area, (possibly YD 6921) and to build up the rear base area (YD 6016) in order to conduct offensives against FWMAF. He further stated that the location of his unit was in the vicinity of (YD 588198) and that the main base area was in the vicinity of (YD 6419). Reported personalities: K-10 Bn CO-XUAN, XO-NHAN, PO-LAC; 3rd Co Cmdr-MINH, XO-KHUYEN, PO-DE.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB carries the K-10 Bn, 5th Regt in the vicinity of (YD 6514) which is in the general vicinity stated by the PW. This is the first report on the personalities with the exception of KHUYEN who is carried as the XO, K-10 Bn. All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, Pvt Dang Van CHU, 3rd Co, 6th Bn, 5th Regt, captured on 8 September 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 523264) (IPW 2nd Bde 090350Z September 1969 Interr Rpt #101-2-117) as a result of wounds from an ambush, stated that the mission of the 3rd Co is to conduct reconnaissance of the PHONG DIEN District area and to collect rice. DANG further stated that his company's AO is PHONG DIEN District and the base area is located approximately five to six hours walk in a southeasterly direction from the subject's point of capture (possible location YD 5423). The PW also

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stated that the strength of the 6th Bn is approximately 250 to 300 men. According to DANG, the unit is very short on supplies, such as food, ammunition, and medical supplies. The reported LBN for the 3rd Co is 91155 KP. Reported personalities: K-6 Bn CO-Maj SEN; 3rd Co Cmdr-DUNG, XO-QUI.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB carries the K-6 Bn in the vicinity of (YD 3309) with a strength of 360 men. It is possible that the K-6 Bn is located in this vicinity as other units within the 6th Regt have been reported in this general area indicating a northeasterly movement of the 6th Regt. This is the first report on the LBN and personalities. All information rated (F-3)with the exception of LBN which is rated (F-4).)

3. QUANG NAM (P)

a. PW, Cpl Do Van ON, 20th Independent Co, 36th Regt, who was captured on 14 September 1969 in the vicinity of (BT 048443) (CG 1st MARDIV 161547Z September 1969 Supp Interr Rpt 9th ITT 14-09-69) stated that the company was composed of 45 men and that the mission of his company was to transport wounded, and collect rice for the 36th Regt. Subject stated that the 36th Regt was located in the vicinity of the HON TAU Mountains (AT 977386) as of 17 February 1969. The PW further stated that the morale of his unit was low due to homesickness and that the 36th Regt has suffered heavy casualties in past contacts. The PW also stated that the 36th Regt resupply routes followed a route from the regimental CP at (AT 977386) along a stream (AT 980389) to the base of a mountain (AT 989387) around KHUC SON Mountain through a pass (AT 998384) to NGHI THOUNG (H) (BT 005393) then through a pass at (BT 020401) to NHA BO Mountain (BT 035416) to NGHI SON 1 (H) (BT 046422) where the rice is collected. This route is also used for the return trip.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 20th Medical Co is carried by OOB as one of the 36th's support companies. The location of the regiment given is in very close proximity to III MAF OOB holdings for this unit. The resupply route stated generally follows the flow of personnel observed moving through the QUE SON Mountains recently. This tends to support previous statements that this area is a major infiltration route for supplies through this area. All information rated (F-2).)

b. Hoi Chanh, Cpl Vu Van HAI, Headquarters 3rd (AKA D-16) Bn, 141st Regt who rallied on 12 September 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 923694) (CG 1st MARDIV 150915Z September 1969 Initial Interr Rpt) stated that the battalion was located in the vicinity of (AT 8371) while the battalion headquarters was located in the vicinity of (AT 856722). The Hoi Chanh further stated that his infiltration began in November 1968 with the 526th Infiltration Bn from HAI PHONG (P) and traveled to VINH City by train then by foot through HA TINH, NGHE AN, and QUANG BINH (P's) and then into LAOS. In January 1969, the battalion entered QUANG TRI (P). After a rest period the battalion marched into QUANG NAM (P) (location unknown).

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(G-2 COMMENT: The location given for this battalion is far north of the 141st Regt's normal AO. There have been numerous reports of elements of the 141st Regt moving north toward HAPPY VALLEY (AT 8970). This indicates possible expanded intentions of offensive action from this regiment which has been relatively unheard of for sometime now. All information rated (F-3).)

c. PW, MSgt Le Van NGHIA, THAI PHIEN Independent Co who was captured on 6 September 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 985714) (CG 1st MARDIV 120242Z September 1969 Supp Interr Rpt 15-09-69) stated that the company was located in the vicinity of DIEN CHINH (V) (BT 027540) on CO NOI Island since 15 July 1969. The Hoi Chanh stated that his present mission was to attack the DUONG BAU Post, HILL 34 (AT 9770) the CP for 4th Bn, 11th Marines. The PW stated that the units morale was high in May and June 1969 due to the formation of the company, but became low because of air strikes sustained in July and August of 1969. NGHIA further revealed that the THAI PHIEN Independent Co was formed on 1 May 1969 with reconnaissance and communication liaison troops of which 15 men were South Vietnamese from District II, Front 4 and 32 were NVA Sappers from an unknown unit.

(G-2 COMMENT: Until this PW's capture the "THAI PHIEN" Independent Co had not been reported. The formation of an independent company is feasible while emphasizing sapper tactics. All information rated (F-3).)

d. PW, PFC Tran Huu NGHIEM, 20th Independent Medical Co, 36th Regt who was captured 14 September 1969 in the vicinity of (BT 048445) (CG 1st MARDIV 161548Z Sep 1969 Supp Interr Rpt 9th ITT 16-09-69) stated that his mission was to treat and evacuate the sick and wounded of the 36th Regt and that the 20th Co was located in the vicinity of (AT 978373). The PW stated that there were approximately 30 men in the company armed with AK-47's and SKS's. The PW further revealed that the resupply route normally used begins at the base camp (AT 978373) then leads south to a road (AT 965362) then follows the road to (AT 982353) and then proceeds to (BT 012382), then north to (BT 012397), then continues northeast to (BT 027408) and continues northeast to the pickup point at (BT 1047).

(G-2 COMMENT: The given location for the company is in the area where III MAF OOB carries the 36th Regt. The resupply route stated by this PW generally parallels that stated by PW Do Van ON of the 20th Independent Co, 36th Regt (F-2).)

4. QUANG TIN (P)

a. PW, Pham Van PHE, 17th Signal Bn, 31st (AKA 3rd) Regt captured in the vicinity of (BT 169125) on 11 September 1969 (Americal 140012Z September 1969 Interr Rpt #352-69) stated that his unit's mission was to provide communications for infantry units of the 2nd Div. PHE also stated that he had been hospitalized since January 1969 and could not provide the location of his unit. PHE's infiltration group (number unknown) with a strength of 400 left NVN on 13 February 1969 and after traveling through LAOS arrived in RVN on 25 August 1969.

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(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB does not hold a 17th Signal Bn subordinate to the 3rd Regt. The 17th Communications Bn was previously reported as being directly subordinate to the 2nd Div, and is probably an AKA for the GK-30 Signal Bn. All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, PFC Le Van CUONG, 2nd Co, T-12 Bn, captured 11 September 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 9027) (Americal 120710Z September 1969 Interr Rpt #351-69) stated that his unit was located in the vicinity of (BT 0122) and the present mission is to attack allied forces. Source's infiltration group (number unknown) began its infiltration on 29 March 1969 with a strength of 600. The group entered RVN through QUANG NAM (P) from LAOS in June of 1969. Reported personalities: Infiltration Group CO-HANH, XO-CHAT, PO-THONG.

(G-2 COMMENT: T-12 has previously been reported as a transportation battalion and located in the vicinity of (BT 1104). The personalities for source's infiltration group remain unidentified. All information rated (F-6).)

5. QUANG NGAI (P). Returnee, Pham Dinh CHUONG, 86th Co, 107th Arty Bn, who returned at the Americal Division main gate, CHU LAI, on 13 September 1969 (Americal msg 140200Z September 1969) stated that his company is composed of 86 men and were located in the following hamlets: 1st Plt-LAM THUONG (H) (BS 7553), MO DUC (D), 2nd Plt-VAN HOA (H) (CNA), MO DUC (D), and 3rd Plt-DUC LUONG (H) (CNA), MO DUC (D). Subject claims that his unit was to attack THACH TRU (H) (CNA), MO DUC (D) on 17 September 1969 with mortars. Subject gives the composition of the 107th Bn as consisting of four companies desginated as the 74th, 83rd, 84th, and 86th. CHUONG further stated that his company is equipped with the following weapons: two 57mm RR's, two B-40's, one flamethrower, one 81mm Mortar and two M-79's. Reported personalities: 86th Co Cmdr-Nguyen Van VO, XO-Nguyen Van PHUNG, PO-Nguyen Van TOAN.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holds the 107th Bn in the vicinity of (BS 5676). This is a first report of an element of the 107th Bn operating in MO DUC (D), however; reports have been received suggesting that the company's have been operating independently in BINH SON (D) and it is possible that a company has relocated to MO DUC (D) (F-3). Personalities have been previously reported (F-3).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 38-69

1. GENERAL. The direction and scope of counterintelligence related VC/VCI activity continues in essentially the same manner and level as previously reported.

The announced withdrawal of US troops from ICTZ may lead to a marked increase in proselyting, propaganda and terrorism, as the VC/VCI attempt to reiterate their propaganda alleging the "defeat of the aggressor forces".

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. VC/VCI intelligence gathering efforts continued to be reflected in numerous reports concerning the cultivation of penetration agents through civilian, military, and political proselyting activities. Widespread development of penetration agents throughout Allied/GVN military installations and GVN governmental agencies is a high priority enemy objective. However, enemy success in this endeavor cannot be accurately estimated. The detection and apprehension of several of these agents has reflected at least limited enemy success in ICTZ and exemplifies the necessity for continuous and effective implementation of active, passive, and denial countermeasure programs.

Some of the more significant reports of enemy intelligence gathering efforts during the past week were as follows:

a. Thua Thien.

(1) On 5 September 1969, a rallier identified female Ngo Thi TU as a VC informant operating vicinity of Phu Bai #1 (YD 905115), Huong Thuy (D).

(2) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 132300H September 1969. Approximately one VC squad infiltrated Thanh Chu (H), Huong Chu) (V), Huong Tra (D) vicinity of YD 710239, stole foodstuffs and collected information (nfi).

b. Quang Nam.

(1) The 1st Marine Division reported three alleged cases of enemy radio imitative deception conducted against division artillery nets during the period 14-16 September. Deception attempt was in the form of a bogus station requesting information concerning friendly unit locations and intentions.

(2) A US MI source reported that on 11 September 1969, VC conducted a meeting in Hoa Hai (V) (BT 013725) to discuss the possibility of selecting good looking Vietnamese (nfi) who could speak good English to apply for jobs at various ARVN/US installations in order to conduct espionage (Eval: F-6).

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(3) A US MI source reported that on 13 September 1969, Ho BAI, a VC district level cadre of Hoa Vang (D), directed VC cadre and VC sympathizers in northwest Hoa Vang (D), and in particular Hoa Hiep (V) vicinity AT 915849 and Hoa Lac (V) vicinity AT 885799, to carry out the following directives:

(a) Select intelligent and fairly educated military cadre to turn themselves into GVN authorities under the Open Arms Program. Those pre-selected individuals would conduct espionage and propagandize anti-GVN themes while in captivity as Chieu Hoi's. They would discredit the GVN in an attempt to undermine the political structure of the GVN and propagandize for the establishment of a coalition government.

(b) In the mixed control areas VC cadre would attempt to buy or steal metal containers and boxes (ie., ammunition boxes) from US trash dumps. For the purchase of these metal boxes the individuals involved were authorized to spend between 300$VN to 500$VN. These containers would be used to store food during the coming monsoon season (Eval: F-3).

3. SABOTAGE. Sabotage activities continued to be directed at lines of communication, including military craft on navigable waterways. Targets of sabotage during the past week consisted of a Hue-Danang railway train and two patrol craft. Additionally, two road culverts and a bridge were destroyed and two roads were cratered. Details of reported sabotage incidents during the past week are as follows:

a. Thua Thien. Hue/Danang railway train was struck by two command-detonated mines, vic AT 836978, on 16 September 1969. An investigation revealed two mines were detonated approximately 40 ft. apart as the engine passed between them. Detonation resulted in derailment of four cars and the engine. One car was destroyed, three cars damaged, engine 70% damaged and 9 meters of track destroyed. Twenty-three civilians were wounded. Charges were estimated to contain 50 lbs. of TNT each.

b. Quang Nam.

(1) On 15 September 1969, an unknown size enemy unit placed an explosive charge under a culvert on Highway 535 in the vicinity BT 089413. The culvert was 100% destroyed.

(2) At 152115H September 1969, H/2/1 discovered a large crater in road vicinity BT 081389 caused by unknown type explosive device.

(3) At 162120H September 1969, PCF 61 observed a large explosion in the vicinity of BT 207568. Investigation revealed two CG 14 units completely destroyed, probably by a floating mine. Incident resulted in four Vietnamese personnel wounded and three missing.

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c. Quang Tin.

(1) At 110750H September 1969, 26th Engineers reported culvert destroyed vicinity BT 421119.

(2) At 140615H September 1969, Americal Division reported bridge 435 blown with estimated 70 lb. charge vicinity BT 219358.

d. Quang Ngai. At 140850H September 1969, Americal Division reported four foot hole blown in road caused by undetermined type explosive device vicinity BT 040577.

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Reports of VC/VCI political and propaganda activities remained at a high level during the past week, decreasing slightly from the previous week, and reflected a continuation of emphasis on the conduct of military, political and civil proselyting to strengthen the enemy's revolutionary organizational cadre and forces.

VC propaganda directed at US Negro troops was reported in Quang Nam Province. The document involved was a copy of one recently reported in Quang Ngai Province. Agent reports and captured documents indicate a continuation of a program for regrouping selected civilians, cadre, and soldiers to North Vietnam for specialized training to prepare them for positions of leadership in South Vietnam following what the enemy believes to be inevitable; the formation of a communist state and reunification of the country.

Details of enemy political and propaganda activity during the past week was as follows:

a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 1 September 1969, a GVN source reported that two VC spread propaganda leaflets (nfi) at Tan My (H) vicinity YD 295465, Mai Linh (D) (GVN Evaluation: C-1).

(2) A US MI source reported that, during the period 9-11 September 1969, three VCI cadre; a village propaganda agent, a village chief, and a VC recruiter infiltrated into An-Cu-Phuong (H) (YD 320631), An-Loi-Thuong (H) (YD 326637), and Cao-Hy (H) (YD 324631), Trieu-Phuoc (V), Trieu Phong (D). Their mission was to extort money and food, gather intelligence and conduct liaison. They operated in the above hamlets during the hours of 0230 to sunrise (Unevaluated).

(3) On 11 September 1969, Hoang THIET, aka: Phong District level political cadre Trieu Phong (D), Quang Tri (P) was captured vicinity YD 400635, during a combined US/GVN exploitation operation. (On 5 September 1969, a US MI source reported THIET distributing propaganda leaflets on Tuesdays and Fridays at Bo Bang (H) in the vicinity YD 338629, Trieu Phong (D). Previously reported in III MAF PERINTREP 37-69).

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b. Thua Thien.

(1) A US intelligence source relayed the following summary concerning VC Resolution 10-V.4 dated 3 September 1969:

The People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) exhorted its members to recruit until there was at least one member for every 100 inhabitants. Recruitment drives for each new "phase" were to be built around important Party anniversaries. The Resolution emphasized improving the ideological education of prospective members. The ideal arrangement was for each party member to have three to five hard-core cadres; each hamlet, 15 to 20 cadres with one-third legally documented; each village, 40 to 50 cadres. In the "second phase", all villages were to have Party Committees, and two-thirds of all hamlets a Party Chapter.

(2) A US intelligence source relayed the following information concerning a report of a possible reorganization of the Tri-Thien-Hue Region PRP Committee with the inclusion of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) personnel:

The report stated that the Regional Party Committee was carrying out a reorganization plan whereby NVA officers who were politically and militarily skilled would be assigned to all Party Committees (nfi).

(3) A US MI source reported that during the period 9-10 September 1969, a meeting of the Thua Thien-Hue Political Leadership Section took place in Nhat Dong (H), vicinity YD 796218, Huong Thuy (D).

Present at the meeting were the three members of the Section Chairmanship, four Economic and Political Commissioners of Region IV and ten other unidentified cadre.

Purpose of the meeting was to announce the following:

(a) Activities at the Regular Force Level will cease while guerrilla and shelling activities are maintained.

(b) The effort to establish "Political Bases" must be increased.

(c) Preparations must be made for a general referendum election for "Command Levels".

(d) The people must be urged to support the "Two Great Comrades" Pham Van DONG and Vo Nguyen GIAP.

(e) Guerrilla forces must be strengthened and more control of these forces must be transferred to political cadre.

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(f) More "deep agents" must penetrate GVN military, civilian, and political organs and, specifically the political parties in Hue City.

(4) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 102200H September 1969. An unknown number of VC entered Phu Cuong (H), Loc Thuy (V), Phu Loc (D) in the vicinity ZD 138014, distributed leaflets and hung slogans (nfi).

(5) On 12 September, a CAP unit ambush initiated SAF on 1 VC moving west at YD 819175 5 km SE of Hue. The VC fled to the south. A sweep of the area disclosed a package of VC propaganda leaflets (nfi).

(6) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 122230H September 1969. An unknown number of VC entered the Huong Xuan (V) Refugee Camp, Huong Tra (D) in the vicinity YD 695264, stole foodstuffs and distributed leaflets.

(7) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 122230H September 1969. Approximately one VC company infiltrated Que Chu (H), Huong Chu (V), Huong Tra (D) in the vicinity YD 682252, stole foodstuffs and distributed a number of anti-GVN propaganda leaflets.

(8) On 12 September 1969, a CAP unit ambushed an estimated 12 VC at YD 706199. A sweep of the area found VC propaganda leaflets (nfi).

(9) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 150130H September 1969. Three VC entered My Lam (H) (YD 833238), distributed a number of leaflets and fired one B-40 rocket round into an elementary school (nfi).

c. Quang Nam.

(1) A US intelligence source (unrated), reported that in late June 1969, the Viet Cong instituted a program for regrouping selected cadre to North Vietnam for specialized training and to replace able-bodied North Vietnamese men who in turn would be infiltrated into the South. The cadre to be selected included elderly personnel who had been active People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) members in South Vietnam for more than ten years, soldiers from VC local and main forces and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) personnel who had distinguished themselves in combat or who had suffered multiple or disabling wounds rendering them unfit for further combat.

Upon their arrival in North Vietnam, the cadre were to be classified according to their education, intelligence level and social class. Those meeting specified requirements were to receive special training to prepare them for leadership positions in South Vietnam. Those not selected for specialized training, amputees and elderly PRP members were to be trained as replacements for able-bodied North Vietnamese, who would either be drafted into the NVA or sent to the South to fill vacant PRP slots at District and Province level (III MAF F-2).

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(2) A letter dated 30 May 1969, addressed from Ngoc LONG, leading cadre of an unidentified exfiltration group, to the Current Affairs Committee of F85 (Dai Loc (D), Quang Da Special Zone, Military Region 5), reads in part as follows:

As ordered by the Current Affairs Committee, we are responsible for leading a group of cadre and children (SV) to North Vietnam. Due to enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) situation, we had to take a by-pass and today, we reached Way station "CO2" after six days of continuous moving. CO2 is a Socialist Way station (meaning a way station under the control of NVN) where we have been ordered to prepare ten days of rations for the remainder of our trip.

The above letter was among enemy documents captured on 6 September 1969 vicinity AT 871543.

(3) A US MI source reported on 9 September that a meeting was held in Duong Lam (AT 953696), Hieu Duc (D) by VC cadre to discuss directives of a military and political nature to be employed for the remainder of the year.

This two-day meeting held on 28-29 August 1969, was attended by cadre representatives from Quang Da (P) Committee, Dien Ban (D) Committee and Hoa Hieu (VC) District Party Committee (nfi). Other cadre attending the meeting included Sapper Organization members from Hue Crossroads vicinity AT 986775 west of Danang City and Thanh Quyt (BT 049632). Approximately 25 additional cadre attended the meeting (nfi).

The cadre were urged to develop cells of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) at all levels - Province, City, District, Village and Hamlet. Cadre were told that they must recruit and insert agents into all GVN controlled areas and Allied installations.

Propaganda is to be directed at students, progressive youth groups and Buddhists to enhance the "legal struggle" under control of VC cadre and agents. These groups are to call for the complete withdrawal of US forces and to end the war. Compensation for war damages are to be demanded.

During the meeting the following measures necessary to end the war before 1970 were discussed:

(a) Annihilation of personnel and installations of key agencies, such as province headquarters, city halls, National Police headquarters, Military Police headquarters, and all US agencies, harbor facilities, storage facilities and gas depots.

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(b) Each cadre must assassinate three US or GVN officials per month, and must deliver the victim's credentials as proof. Individuals meeting this standard will be rewarded.

(c) The acts of terrorism will enhance the power and influence of the PRG. If cadre carry out the assassinations, local GVN officials will be demoralized, will malinger, and close their eyes to VC agents operating in their areas because of fear for their lives. The PRG will guide the populace through the struggle until final victory is achieved.

(d) The PRG must struggle for public opinion and consolidate its organization to carry on the revolution in order to achieve victory, gain independence and the unification of North and South Vietnam. Cadre must take advantage of the Paris negotiations, stall for time to organize, close the ranks and train for the final political struggle.

Discussions concerning future military strategy revealed the following:

(a) If the GVN has continued to resist the revolution by the beginning of 1970, VC/NVA forces, with the aid and support of the socialist camp, including Red China (sic), will open a General Spring Offensive to gain the final victory.

(b) Sapper, sabotage, and assassination activities, supported by mortar attacks, would be used to destroy the war material of the US and puppet (sic) forces. District, Main, and Local Force units would be used to counter Allied operations and the Revolutionary Development (RD) Program. NVA units will use battalion and company sized forces to attack key positions on the perimeters and the important areas (nfi) only so as to minimize casualties and damage in the face of Allied air and artillery superiority.

(c) Participants of the meeting reacted unfavorably to the proposals and thought it unrealistic for each cadre to assassinate three officials per month and produce the victim's credentials as evidence of accomplishment (Eval: C-3).

(4) Elements of Company B, 1st Recon Bn., 1st Mar Div, on 142040H September 1969 vic AT 800538, captured the following propaganda leaflet (printed in English):

Floyd B. McKissick, National
Director of CORE (Congress of
Racial Equality) says

"...the colored peoples over there (Asia) are fighting for the same thing that we're fighting for. They see the U.S. as an aggressor,

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"...they say you're fighting against communists. If I'm here in New York City and a man has got his foot on my neck and is beating me on the head and I say, "Take your foot off my neck, I want my freedom", they say, "You're a communist".

"...Let's look at what happened to the black man in Mississippi and what happened to the Vietnamese. There's hardly any difference.

"...The common factor between the colored man in Asia and the black man in the U.S. is THE DESIRE TO BE FREE".

On the reverse side of the McKissick leaflet is the following:

"I am a black soldier
And black is my skin
I must kill a man
Who would be my friend
I'm fighting for nothing
I don't understand,
Dear God!

Why am I in this unknown land?
This is my battle, that's what they say
And I must keep on killing and
I am ordered today
And maybe one day I be killed too"

One GI of the 4th Infantry Division

"PROPAGANDA LEAFLET FOR THE BLACK SOLDIER"

III MAF Note: Same leaflet was found on 11 Sep vicinity LZ Siberia (AT 9023). Taken from body of NVA KIA.

(5) At approximately 1230 on 18 September 1969, acting on information from PF's, CAP 2-3-2 searched a house vicinity BT 049614 4 km north of Dien Ban. The search revealed VC propaganda leaflets (nfi), assorted medical supplies and various documents. A Vietnamese woman attempted to bury the medical supplies as the CAP conducted the search. The woman and another Vietnamese female present in the house were delivered to District Headquarters for interrogation.

(6) The 5th CIT, III MAF received information on 18 September 1969 from a GVN village official that indicates the Viet Cong plan to infiltrate into populated areas disguised as National Policemen or ARVN soldiers and attempt to influence the province wide election to select a representative from Quang Nam for the House of Representatives in the National Government. The election will be conducted on 28 November 1969.

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(7) On 20 September 1969, at 0700, a typewritten paper was found in Nui Kim Son vicinity BT 072704, Hoa Vang (D). This paper was a warning to all families who reside near military outposts, check points and compounds, to move away as soon as possible. In the event these targets were attacked, the VC would not be responsible for the destruction of personal property or lives of the people who chose to ignore this order. The paper also warned the people not to talk to or gather with any Americans for their own safety. It further warned anyone who is against the Revolution or serves the Americans would be punished.

The above paper was from the Commander, All Forces, Liberation Front and was dated 19 August 1969, at the Headquarters, Civilian Armed Force, 5th Liberation Front, Quang Da Province.

d. Quang Ngai. A US MI source on 2 September 1969, reported that a VC study course (nfi) was to have taken place during the period 26 August-4 September 1969 at Khanh My (H) in the vicinity of BS 549847, Son Tra (V), Son Tinh (D). The course was conducted by province level VC Security Cadre for approximately 140 individuals, including many "notable men" (nfi), hamlet and village cadre, section chiefs and guerrilla leaders.

On the opening day of the course, the following points were stressed:

(1) Upon completion of the study course, the VC will greatly increase their activities due to a recently received order to harass everywhere and to motivate the local populace to rebel against GVN authorities.

(2) The VC are to increase the tax collection rates for the next two harvests of the Lunar 8th and 10th months (nfi).

(3) VC are to expand their military proselyting activities by sending more young men into the GVN's military ranks. This is to be accomplished by bribing village chiefs or youth groups authorities (nfi) to allow the young men to join the Popular Forces (PF) or the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) (Eval: F-6).

5. TERROR. Terrorist activity continued at a high level during the past week, and was similar to that of the previous week, both in intensity and type of activity conducted. Terrorism was again directed primarily at refugee and resettlement areas, GVN officials and functionaries, PSDF, and RD cadre. See Appendix 1 for details of reported terrorist incidents during the past week in ICTZ.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Quang Tri.

(1) A US MI source reported that at approximately 0400 on 12

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September 1969, four VCI agents were in Xuan Khan refugee hamlet, vicinity YD 330698, Trieu Do (V), Trieu Phong (D). The four VCI were armed with individual weapons. Their mission was to organize a number of the PSDF into guerrilla bands (Eval: F-3).

(2) A skimmer craft on a routine scare charge clearing run on the Thach Han River observed an explosion and a 30-foot water spout vicinity YD 298670 on 160620H September 1969. There were no friendly casualties. There have been indications that elements of the 126th Naval Sapper Regiment have been moving south into the Cua Viet River area.

(3) 180620 September 1969. A mine sweep on the Cua Viet River detonated a mine. A 60 foot water plume and an approximate 4 foot base was observed while employing one pound scare charges. The explosion occured in vicinity (YD 306675) approximately 25 feet behind the skimming craft. There were no casualties or damage.

b. Thua Thien.

(1) On 3 September 1969, a GVN source reported an unknown number of VC taxed the villagers of Xom Nien (H) (YD 505516), Phong Dien (D). (GVN Evaluation: C-2).

(2) On 4 September 1969, a GVN source reported an unknown number of VC taxed the people of Duc Tich (H) (YD 538375), Phong Dien (D) (GVN Evaluation: C-2).

(3) A US MI source reported that on 11 September 1969, approximately forty personnel of the P.1 Phong Dien District Armed Force Company were dispersed in Dai Phu (H) (YD 570425), Chan Loc (H) (YD 538452), and Phu Nong (H) (YD 535452) of Phong Loc (V). The company plans to operate in Phong Hoa (V) and Phong Loc (V), assassinating village and hamlet officials and attacking RDC teams some time in the future (Eval: B-3).

(4) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 112200H September 1969, an unknown number of VC entered La Chu (H) vicinity (YD 695240), Huong Chu (V), Huong Tra (D), stole foodstuffs and engaged village PF units with SAF. One civilian was wounded by a stray bullet.

(5) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 112400H September 1969, approximately one VC squad entered Huong Phu (V), vicinity (YD 644273), Huong Tra (D), and stole three bags of rice from the people.

(6) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 110020H September 1969, an unknown number of VC infiltrated Nam Pho Ha (H), vicinity (YD 953064), Loc An (V), Phu Loc (D), hung up slogans and set up an altar to commemorate the death of Ho Chi MINH. The people did not attend.

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(7) On 12 September 1969, approximately 50 VC entered a hamlet vic (YD 691247). Twenty of the VC proceeded to (YD 702255) where they stole 200 lbs. of peanuts and an undetermined amount of rice.

(8) A US MI source reported that on 12 September 1969, two VC bought 25lbs. of rice for 1,000$VN at Long Khe (H) vic (YD 621268), Huong Tra (D) (Unevaluated).

(9) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 120200H September 1969, about one platoon of VC entered Te Xuan (H) vicinity (YD 967054) and Que Chu (H) vicinity (YD 967053), Loc Dien (V), Phu Loc (D), gathered the people to commemorate the death of Ho Chi MINH and seized foodstuffs.

(10) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 122100H September 1969, about 20 VC (mostly female) infiltrated Phuoc Truong (H) vicinity (ZD 117023, Loc Tri (V), Phu Loc (D) and stole foodstuffs.

(11) On 13 September 1969, approximately one VC squad confiscated foodstuffs at Thanh Chu (H) vicinity (YD 710239), Huong Tra (D) (Uneval.).

(12) CAP REPORT. At approximately 171400H September 1969, about 30 VC/NVA entered a hamlet from the NE, vicinity (ZD 040016) and gave the villagers 2,500$VN to buy rice for them. As the VC departed the villagers were told they would be shot if they did not buy the rice by the time the force returned the next day.

c. Quang Nam. A US MI source reported that on 10 September 1969, a thirty-man sapper element of the Q80 Hoi An City Force combined with twenty village guerrillas (nfi), was dispersed at Thanh An (H), Cam Ha (V) vicinity (BT 123588) and (BT 123586), Hieu Nhon (D). Armament included two ARs, three B-40s and individual weapons. The mission of the unit was to launch surprise attacks on outposts north of Hoi An City and destroy resettlement camps in Hieu Duc (D) during the coming nights (Eval: F-3).

d. Quang Tin. On 15 September 1969, a PW stated that his unit was an engineer unit of Phang Binh (D) Force (nfi). The mission of this unit was to collect dud rounds for use as booby traps and to attack Dong Tai in the vicinity of (BT 213468).

e. Quang Ngai.

(1) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 090230H September 1969, the VC entered My An (H) vicinity (BS 702644), Tu Luong (V), Tu Nghia (D), took from the people 2,770 piasters and a bag of rice, amount unknown (Unevaluated).

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(2) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 102300H September 1969, VC entered An Phu (H), vicinity (BS 795398), Duc Pho (D), gathered the people at Mr. Hoang MAI's house for the purpose of commemorating the death of Ho Chi MINH and hung up a banner across Highway #1 (Unevaluated).

(3) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 110100H September 1969. A VC platoon gathered the people of Nang An (H), vicinity (BS 715635) and led them to the home of Mr. Le Quang BA in order to commemorate the death of Ho Chi MINH (Unevaluated).

(4) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 150200H September 1969. VC entered Dai An (H) vicinity (BS 355875), took 40,000 piasters and four bags of rice from the people (Unevaluated).

f. People's Revolutionary Committees. No change during reporting period. See Appendix 1 to Annex C (Counterintelligence) PERINTREP 37-69.

APPENDIX
1-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 38-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Tri	13Sep69 (Late Entry)	YD 227685	VC fired four 140mm rocket rounds into Ha Thanh (H), killing four civilians and wounding eight.
	15Sep69	YD 223683	One hand grenade exploded in the house of the village chief of Gio My (V), wounding the chief and two civilians. A second hand grenade exploded in the yard killing two PFs and wounding seven civilians and four PFs. The grenades were armed with a timing device, believed placed by two PFs.
	15Sep69	YD 233686	VC threw a grenade into vicinity of a PF platoon four kilometers SSE Cam Lo (D) town, resulting in two PFs killed, five PFs and seven civilians wounded.
Thua Thien	13Sep69 (Late Entry)	YD 734213	A VC sniper squad entered Huong Long (V) headquarters on an assassination mission (nfi). VC engaged PF unit in vicinity with SAF resulting in four civilians wounded.
	14Sep69	YD 858228	A booby trapped grenade killed one civilian and wounded one (nfi).
	14Sep69	YD 7523	Hue City received three rounds of 122mm rocket fire, wounding seven civilians.
	14Sep69	YD 694207	Approximately 50 VC entered a hamlet five kilometers west of Hue and assassinated one civilian.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	10Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 033507	VC entered Kieu Son (H) and abducted four PSDF members and one inter-family chief.
	11Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 098544	One civilian in Xuyen Quang (V) was wounded by a VC booby trap (nfi).
	11Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 070360	A B-40 rocket attack on Phuoc Duc (H) destroyed two civilian homes.
	12Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 122577	Unknown number of VC attacked Thanh-An (H), destroying two homes and killing one civilian.
	13Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 063580	USEF infiltrated into Kim Thanh Refugee Camp, wounded six civilians, one PSDF, and destroyed 70 homes.
	13Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 065581	Vinh Dien (V) received heavy SAF and 82mm mortar fire resulting in 48 civilians wounded and 30 homes destroyed.
	13Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 952650	VC abducted nine members of a PSDF (nfi).
	13Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 043577	A mortar attack on Vinh Hoa (V) wounded one civilian and destroyed 13 homes.
	13Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 058508	VC entered Truong Dong (H) and abducted two civilians (nfi).
	13Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 087580	VC infiltrated Hung An (nfi) and burned four homes. Two self-defense soldiers were reported missing after the incident.
	14Sep69	BT 001702	VC entered Phong Le (H) and captured a PF. The PF escaped so the VC killed his father.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	14Sep69	BT 077704	VC entered Dong Hai (H) and assassinated a village commissioner.
	14Sep69	AT 005703	VC entered Phong Nam (H) and assassinated one inter-family chief.
	14Sep69	AT 972662	VC entered Le Son (H) and abducted five youths.
	15Sep69	BT 001702	VC entered Phong Le (V) and killed one civilian for unknown reasons.
	15Sep69	BT 084395	Two Vietnamese civilians while riding a motor bike on Highway 535 at Phuoc Thuong #1 (H) triggered a mine, resulting in one civilian killed and one wounded.
	15Sep69	BT 012572	The VC threw a grenade into the local Village Committee headquarters building in Triem Trung (H), killing one PSDF member.
	16Sep69	AT 945692	Duong Lam #1 (H) received one round of 122mm rocket fire, wounding one civilian.
	16Sep69	BT 072702	Approximately 30 VC entered Nui Kim Son (H) and assassinated two Vietnamese civilians.
	16Sep69	BT 147614	A PF platoon while in NDP at Quang Loc Tay #3 (H), received SA and four rounds of B-40 rocket fire resulting in two civilians killed.
	16Sep69	BT 045613	CAP 2-3-2 received RPG and SAF from an estimated VC squad, wounding two civilians.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	17Sep69	BT 033507	VC entered Kieu Son (H) and wounded one civilian (nfi).
Quang Tin	12Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 297287	One round of 82mm mortar fire impacted in a friendly village six kilometers north of Tam Ky, wounding seven civilians.
Quang Ngai	10Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 633815	VC entered The Long (H), killed two civilians and wounded one.
	10Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 635780	VC entered Son Huong (H) and blew up (nfi) the Son Huong RD sub-station (nfi), resulting in negative casualties.
	11Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 649715	VC entered Go Phu (H), blew up (nfi) the technical high school and abducted one RDC member.
	11Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 602926	VC entered An Chau (H), destroyed an unknown number of homes, killed one civilian and wounded five.
	11Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 601925	VC entered Tuong My (H), destroyed 13 homes, killed one civilian and wounded 13.
	12Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 607867	VC infiltrated Kim Son (H) and kidnapped three civilians.
	12Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 612959	At 0200 an USEF infiltrated My Hoa (H) and kidnapped 15 children. By 121200H eight of these children had been returned to GVN control.
	13Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 605858	One member of an RF company, while home on leave, was shot to death by the VC in Tho Loc (H).

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Ngai	15Sep69	BS 544533	Two VC Montagnard companies attacked Minh Long (H) with mortar fire and satchel charges, resulting in 170 homes destroyed, five civilians killed and six wounded.
	16Sep69	BS 474868	An Hoa (V) received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire, killing six civilians and wounding 13.
	17Sep69	BS 473866	An Phong (V) received three rounds of 60mm mortar fire, wounding 35 civilians and killing six.
	17Sep69	BS 629814	One civilian was killed by detonating a VC booby trap (nfi).
	18Sep69	BS 809372	A PF platoon, while in NDP received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, killing 2 civilians.

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ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 38-69

1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY

a. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company recon teams observed over 530 enemy moving in no discernible pattern in the southwestern sector of the 1st Marine Division AO. In an unavoidable contact with 25 enemy on 18 September 1969, 13 km south of An Hoa, Recon Team, Grim Reaper, killed 11 enemy. In another action on the 18th, 18 km south southwest of An Hoa, Recon Team, Swift Scout killed 5 enemy while attempting a PW snatch.

b. Recon Teams from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion observed approximately 150 enemy, the majority 10 km northwest of Ha Tan in the Charlie Ridge area. 4 actions by 1st Reconnaissance Battalion teams accounted for 10 enemy killed.

c. The 3d Reconnaissance Battalion teams made one significant contact with approximately 30 enemy on 16 September 1969, 5 km southwest of the Rockpile, resulting in 10 enemy being killed. Other recon team actions for the reported period accounted for 5 enemy killed.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY

a. Sensor detected targets in the Duel Blade area were at a low level except for those strings located approximately 10 km west, southwest of Con Thien. U.S. Forces fired 110 fire missions with unknown results against sensor detected targets.

b. Sensor detected enemy activity in the 1st Marine Division area was at a low level. However, squad ambushes, being alerted by PSIDs, killed 26 enemy while a recon OP detected 5 enemy using ADSIDs and accounted for 5 additional enemy KIA. A total of 155 enemy were detected moving across the Division line sensors.

c. Sensor detected targets in the Americal area were also at a low level. 57 enemy were detected and 137 rounds of artillery were fired in response with no BDA.

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