

13. ✓ CG III MAF/AREA COORDINATOR 040100Z AUG69 (C) GP-4
FOR COMMANDERS FROM NICKERSON
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
14. ✓ CG III MAF 040608Z AUG69 (C) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR BOWERS, INFO ZAIS AND WRIGHT FROM NICKERSON
MULLER FOR DSA I CORPS
15. ✓ CG III MAF 050145Z AUG69 (U)
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
HERES A LETTER I RECD FROM KEN WELLS -- HES COMING TO RVN
- ~~16. CG III MAF 060250Z AUG69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
NAVY TURNOVER OF COMMON SUPPORT IN ICTZ (U)~~
17. ✓ CG III MAF 070327Z AUG69 (U)
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
DAVE LAMB UPI NEWS STORY
18. ✓ CG III MAF 100230Z AUG69 (S) PERSONAL GP-4
FOR BRINGLE FROM NICKERSON
OPCON OF SLF HELO SQDNS (U)
19. ✓ CG III MAF 101212Z AUG69 (C) GP-4
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
CHAPPY WAS HERE -- DEPARTED 10 AUG
20. ✓ CG III MAF 101445Z AUG69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-1
FOR TOWNSEND INFO ZAIS & JONES FROM NICKERSON
CONCUR IN REQ FOR ARC LIGHT TARGETS
21. ✓ CG III MAF 101750Z AUG69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON (GARRETSON PASS TO CMC)
E/2/3 MARINES
22. ✓ CG III MAF 110131Z AUG69 () EYES ONLY
FOR CHAPMAN & BUSE FROM NICKERSON
E/2/3 MARINES
23. ✓ CG III MAF 110155Z AUG69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR CHAPMAN & BUSE FROM NICKERSON
E/2/3 MARINES
24. ✓ CG III MAF 110157Z AUG69 (S) EYES ONLY
FOR TOWNSEND INFO ZAIS & JONES FROM NICKERSON
E/2/3 MARINES
- ~~25. CG III MAF 110211Z AUG69 (S) EYES ONLY
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
MEET STRENGTHS BY 31 AUG~~

26. ✓ CG III MAF 110856Z AUG69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE GP-4
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
SNIPER RIFLES FOR ARVN
27. ✓ CG III MAF 120020Z AUG69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
VISIT OF COMUS TO III MAF ON 11 AUG -- IN CONN W/E/2/3
28. ✓ CG III MAF 120025Z AUG69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
VISIT OF COMUS TO III MAF ON 11 AUG 69
29. ✓ CG III MAF 121011Z AUG69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
I DON'T KNOW WHAT HAPPENED AT C TROOP 1/1 LAST NIGHT EITHER
30. ✓ CG III MAF 121405Z AUG69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR RAMSEY FROM NICKERSON
LZ HAWK HILL ACTION -- WANT FULLER RPT BY 131000H
W/ MEMO 13 AUG 1969
31. ✓ CG III MAF 121406Z AUG69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR SIMPSON FROM NICKERSON
WANT MORE DESCRIPTION OF 1ST MARDIV SITUATION
32. ✓ CG III MAF 130756Z AUG69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE GP-4
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
HAWK HILL ACTION - 12 AUG
33. ✓ CG III MAF 151420Z AUG69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE GP-4
FOR SIMPSON FROM NICKERSON
1ST MARDIV CP DEFENSE PLAN
34. ✓ CG III MAF 171016Z AUG69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE GP-4
FOR ROSSON FROM ~~XXXXXX~~ NICKERSON
SNIPER RIFLES FOR ARVN
- ~~35. CG III MAF 171026Z AUG69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEC
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
PASSES COMNAVFORV 160116Z & CINCGRACEIT 162248Z (NAVY MILCON EN~~
- ~~36. CG III MAF 180312Z AUG69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEC
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
STATUS OF NAVY MILCON FUNDS -- PASSES COMNAVFORV 170631Z
WHICH PASSES CNO 142229Z AUG~~
37. ✓ CG III MAF 180545Z AUG69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

38. ✓ CG III MAF 190704Z AUG69 (S) PURPLE DRAGON *GP-4*
JCS SPONSORED OPSEC (PURPLE DRAGON) CONF
- ~~39. CG III MAF 200240Z AUG69 (C) EYES ONLY
FOR ZAIS & RAMSEY FROM NICKERSON
VISIT OF RESOR~~
40. ✓ CG III MAF 200241Z AUG69 (C) EYES ONLY *GP-4*
FOR RAMSEY FROM NICKERSON
VISIT OF RESOR
- ~~41. CG III MAF 201510Z AUG69 (C)
FOR BUSE FROM ~~MYSEK~~ NICKERSON
ORDERS FOR MGEN HAGAN RETURN ON UNSECNAV PLANE~~
42. ✓ CG III MAF 220058Z AUG69 (U)
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
VIP FUNDS
43. ✓ CG III MAF 220122Z AUG69 (C) *GP-4*
FOR ZAIS, SIMPSON, RAMSEY AND THRASH FROM NICKERSON
SAFETY OF VISITORS
44. ✓ CG III MAF 221030Z AUG69 (S) *GP-4*
FOR MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
PASSES III MAF 100230Z & COMSEVENTHFLT 170038Z OPCON OF SLF
HELO SQDNS
- ~~45. CG III MAF 221546Z AUG69 (S) SPECAT ~~██████████~~
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY
STRENGTH REPORTS (FORCE PLANNING)~~
- ~~46. CG III MAF 230345Z AUG69 (C) EYES ONLY
FOR TOWNSEND NFO MILDREN AND BURDETT FROM NICKERSON
DVT HERMAN MCCILL~~
47. ✓ CG III MAF 251520Z AUG69 (C) EYES ONLY *GP-4*
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON (DELIVER TO TOWNSEND)
"A" COMPANY INCIDENT (AMERICAL - 24-25AUG)
48. ✓ CG III MAF 251200Z AUG69 (S) LIMDIS ~~████~~ MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY REPORT *GP-1*
49. ✓ CG III MAF 260102Z AUG69 (C) *GP-4*
FOR BRINGLE FROM NICKERSON
OPCON OF SLF HELO SQDNS -- VISIT AUG27TH -- SUG ANOTHER DATE
w/Encl ITEM 3 (Encl 2)
50. ✓ CG III MAF 260215Z AUG69 (C) EYES ONLY *GP-4*
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
"A" COMPANY INCIDENT

1. ✓ CG III MAF 260246Z AUG69 (C) GP-4
FOR ZAIS, SIMPSON, WRIGHT, JONES, RAMSEY, FEELEY, BONNER & DILLON
EXPOSURE TO HOSTILE FIRE
2. ✓ CG III MAF 260719Z AUG69 (C) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR ABRAMS INFO SIMPSON & RAMSEY FROM NICKERSON
"A" COMPANY INCIDENT
- ~~3. CG III MAF 271224Z AUG69 (C)
FOR BRINGLE FROM NICKERSON
30TH IS CONVENIENT~~
4. ✓ CG III MAF 280726Z AUG69 (C) GP-4
FOR BUSE INFO CHAPMAN FROM NICKERSON
USS NEW JERSEY EMPLOYMENT
5. ✓ CG III MAF 280810Z AUG69 (S) GP-4
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
COMUS WAS HERE 27AUG69
6. ✓ CG III MAF 281338Z AUG69 (C) GP-4
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY
PERSONNEL ACTIONS
7. ✓ CG III MAF 300225Z AUG69 (S) GP-4
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
PASSES SENSOR KILL MSG FROM JONES
8. ✓ CG III MAF 300520Z AUG69 (S) GP-4
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
DEPCOMUSMACV WAS HERE

P 021012Z
 TO CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L EYES ONLY FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM
 LTGEN NICKERSON

A. CG III MAF 200315Z JUL69

1. REF A ADVISED YOU OF THE THUA THIEN PROPOSAL
 TO CIVILIANIZE THREE OF THEIR MOST SECURE DISTRICTS.
 2. I MENTIONED THAT I HAD DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT
 PROPOSAL WITH LTGEN LAM AND RECOMMENDED THAT HE PURSUE
 IT WITH GVN AUTHORITIES IN SAIGON. I AM PLEASED TO
 REPORT THAT I HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT ON 24 JULY,
 1969, LTGEN LAM SENT A LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER,
 CHAIRMAN OF THE PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL,
 SAIGON, WHICH I SHALL QUOTE FOR YOU:

QUOTE SIR:

AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE PD STATUS IS WELL PROGRESSED
 IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE, POPULATION COMPLETELY CONTROLLED
 IS 95.6 PER CENT, AND CONTROL OF 92 PER CENT OF
 HAMLETS, ACCORDING TO THE (HES) DOCUMENT.

ESPECIALLY 3 DISTRICTS: VINH LOC, HUONG DIEN, AND
 PHU VANG. THE REGIONAL OFFICIALS CONTROLLED 100 PER CENT
 OF THEIR OWN POPULATION AND HAMLETS. VCI ARE COMPLETELY
 ELIMINATED AND NEUTRALIZED, PEOPLE SELF DEFENCE FORCES
 ARE WELL TRAINED, ORGANIZED AND ARMED.

IN ORDER TO NORMALIZE LIVING CONDITIONS OF
 PEOPLE AND TO CIVILIANIZE REGIONAL OFFICIALS, THE PD
 COUNCIL/ICIZ PROPOSES TO YOU:

1. TO SELECT 3 DISTRICTS, HUONG DIEN, PHU VANG,
 AND VINH LOC, AS THE TESTING AREAS FOR THE CIVILIANI-
 ZATION OF REGIONAL OFFICIALS.

2. WITHDRAW REGULAR FORCES, REGIONAL FORCES, OUT
 OF THESE AREAS AND ONLY USE NATIONAL POLICE AND NATIONAL
 POLICE FIELD FORCES, POPULAR FORCES AND PSDF TO MAIN-
 TAIN SECURITY.

3. REPLACE DISTRICT CHIEFS WITH CIVILIAN PERSONNEL,
 BUT RIGHT NOW CONTINUE TO USE THOSE MILITARY DISTRICT
 CHIEFS TEMPORARILY.

IN THE FUTURE, THE CIVILIANIZED REGIONAL OFFICIALS
 PROJECT WOULD APPLY TO ADJ CENT DISTRICTS AND PROVINCES,
 AND PROVINCES OF ICIZ. REQUEST YOUR ANSWER AND
 OPINION AS TO WHAT OUR COUNCIL CAN PERFORM. UNQUOTE

3. MY DEPUTY FOR CURDS HAS FURNISHED A COPY OF
 LTGEN LAM'S LETTER TO AMBASSADOR COLBY.

4. YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THIS PROPOSAL IS
 VERY MUCH APPRECIATED.

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 04 AUG 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0401002 AUG 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT F-0-R	
			IN	OUT			
4	CG	I	5 Aug		N	REMARKS <i>Feedback</i> THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.	
5	DCG	I			B		
	DCG AIR						
3	C/S	I			J		
2	DC/S	I	2/4	2/4	W		
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	I	8/4		W D-8		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	SBC						

ORIG G-1
REL CG

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

(13)

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RHMMAF0419 2160100-CCCC--RUMHC RUMHLA RUMHP
 RUMHPPA RUMHPPD RUMLDNA RUMLMHA RUMLMPA RUMHFGA RUMUFGB
 RUMHGKA RUMNVT RUMHFGA.

ZNY CCCCC

RUMHPPA-T-AIRLIFT COMMAND POSTH(MAC) DANANG AIR BASE
 RUMHPPA-T-AIRLIFT CONTROL ELEMENT (ALCE) DANANG AIR BASE
 RUMHGKA-T-MARINE LIAISON OFFICER

ZOC

P 040100Z AUG 69

FM CG III MAF/AREA COORDINATOR ICTZ
 TO ALL US UNITS DANANG AREA

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / P E R S O N A L F O R D E L I V E R Y T O C O M M A N D E R S O N L Y

STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

1. THERE HAVE BEEN AN INCREASING NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
 AT COMMISSIONED OFFICERS MESSES THROUGHOUT THE DANANG AREA
 INVOLVING IMPROPER CONDUCT SUCH AS VULGAR LANGUAGE,
 LOUD ARGUMENTS, DRUNKENNESS, FIGHTING, ROWDYISM AND
 COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR CLUB RULES AND COURTESY.

2. I DO NOT CONSIDER THE LESSENING OF THE STANDARDS
 OF GENTLEMANLY CONDUCT TO BE A REQUIREMENT FOR THE
 ENJOYMENT OF A PERIOD OF REST AND RELAXATION. I EXPECT
 EVERY OFFICER, REGARDLESS OF SERVICE COMPONENT, TO
 CONDUCT HIMSELF AS AN OFFICER AND GENTLEMAN AT ALL TIMES.
 THIS IS PARTICULARLY NECESSARY WHILE PATRONIZING
 ANY CLUB OR MESS.

3. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO ENSURE THAT ALL OFFICERS OF
 YOUR COMMAND ARE INFORMED OF MY POSITION IN THIS MATTER.
 UNBECOMING CONDUCT WILL NEITHER BE CONDONED NOR TOLERATED.

LIGEN NICKERSON

GP-4

BT

0419

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

13 (1) 2100/5 (1/68)

P 04 0608Z
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG USARV
 INFO CG XXIV CORPS
 CG 101ST ABNDIV (AM)
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L/EYES ONLY FOR BGEN BOWERS, INFO
 LTGEN ZAIS, MGEN WRIGHT FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE R2074. BG HENRY J. MULLER, JR., USA, IS ACCEPTABLE FOR POSITION AS DSA, ICTZ.
2. I UNDERSTAND THAT COLONEL RENWANZ IS TO DEPART O/A 4 SEPTEMBER WHICH ALLOWS NO OVERLAP/ORIENTATION IF BG MULLER DOES NOT REPORT UNTIL 11 SEPTEMBER. AS THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE, I WILL ARRANGE WITH THE COMMANDERS CONCERNED TO HAVE BG MULLER UNDERGO APPROPRIATE BRIEFINGS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH COL RENWANZ WHILE DURING THE SAME PERIOD SPENDING THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF TIME IN HIS PRESENT POSITION. ACCORDINGLY, PLEASE INFORM ME SOONEST IF BG MULLER WILL BE ASSIGNED AS DSA AND HIS EXACT DATE OF SUCH ASSIGNMENT.

DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS.

GP-4
 200

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

14(1)

14(1) —

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 05AUG69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE P 050145Z AUG 69		COPY# 1,2,3 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT UNCLAS EFTO FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
			IN	OUT		
3	CG DCG	I		6 Aug	N	REMARKS ① Feedback
2	DCG AIR C/S	I				HAS BEEN SENT
4	DC/S DC/S DM	I	8/6	8/6		
1	S/S	I	8/5			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	ENB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
5	PROTO PSYOPS	I			pm	
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

(15)

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

P 05 0145Z
 RM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. I HAVE THIS DATE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING

LTR FROM KEN WELLS:

QUOTE:

JULY 31, 1969

DEAR NICK:

MY PLANS FOR VIETNAM ARE FINAL. I DEEPLY HOPE TO HAVE A CHANCE TO SEE YOU. PRESIDENT THIEU HAS INVITED ME TO COME AS HIS PERSONAL GUEST---RUTH WILL ACCOMPANY ME. I HAVE CHOSEN GENERAL BRUCE C. CLARKE AS MY COMPANION---HIS WIFE WILL ALSO BE WITH US. ALL OF THIS CAME ABOUT AS A RESULT OF SOME OF MY SPEECHES ON BUILDING A VOLUNTARY SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

COLONEL CHIEU, AIDE TO THE SOUTH VIETNAM AMBASSADOR HERE IN THE STATES - BUI DIEM - WILL PRECEDE US---IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT HE WILL BE MY ESCORT DURING MY STAY THERE.

WE WILL START AT "ICORP" VIA "CHOPPER" ON A FOUR DAY TRIP WITH NUMEROUS STOPS.

IT IS ALSO MY UNDERSTANDING THAT PRESIDENT THIEU IS HOLDING A RECEPTION, OR SOMETHING OF THE KIND, FOR US.

I WAS TO HAVE BEEN THERE A WEEK EARLIER BUT HELD UP KNOWING THAT DICK NIXON WAS PLANNING ON VISITING SAIGON AROUND THE SAME TIME.

WE LEAVE WASHINGTON ON FRIDAY, AUGUST 8, ON UNIT FLIGHT 553 AT 9:00 A.M., FOR SAN FRANCISCO---THAT SAME DAY WE CONTINUE ON PAN-AM FLIGHT 801, ARRIVING IN HONOLULU AT 3:00 P.M., WHERE WE WILL BE STAYING AT A MILITARY FACILITY FOR WHICH BRUCE HAS MADE ARRANGEMENTS. WE WILL REMAIN IN HONOLULU UNTIL AUGUST 12 WHEN WE DEPART ON PAN-AM FLIGHT 841 AT 1:30 A.M., ARRIVING IN SAIGON AT 10:05 A.M., TUESDAY THE 12TH, ACROSS THE DATE LINE.

WE WILL BE STAYING AT THE CARVEL HOTEL IN SAIGON AS GUEST OF PRESIDENT THIEU.

I WILL BE SEEING PRESIDENT THIEU THE FIRST DAY OF MY ARRIVAL--- THE FOLLOWING FOUR DAYS WILL BE SPENT VISITING ALL OF THE PROVINCES--- THE SIXTH DAY, PROBABLY THE 18TH, I WILL AGAIN MEET WITH PRESIDENT THIEU, AND AGAIN ON THE 19TH. BRUCE AND HIS WIFE WILL BE RETURNING TO THE STATES AROUND THE 20TH---RUTH AND I EXPECT TO REMAIN FOR AN ADDITIONAL PERIOD, SO I HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SPEND SOME TIME WITH YOU.

WARM REGARDS,
 KENNETH D. WELLS

UNQUOTE.
 WARM REGARDS.
 3 69

15711

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 07AUG69
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE O 070327Z AUG 69		COPY# 1,2 OF 3 COPIES RECD
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN OUT		INITIAL
					SUBJECT UNCLAS EFTC/LGEN NICKERSON SEIDS FOR GEN ABRAMS
3	CG	I	8 Aug		REMARKS ① <u>HAS BEEN SENT</u> RECEIVED TWO COPIES OF O 070327Z AUG 69 DTOR 07 H AUG 69
4	DCG	I			
	DCG AIR				
2	C/S	I			
	DC/S				
	DC/S DM				
1	S/S	I	8/7		
	G-1				
	G-2				
5	G-3		Hqs Cy # 2 F/INCO		
	G-4				
	G-5				
	G-6				
	ADJ				
	CAP				
	CHAP				
	COMP				
	CORDS				
	DENT				
	EMB/TRANS				
	ENGR				
	FOODS				
	H&S CO				
	INSP				
	ISO				
	LEGAL				
	MTO				
	MED				
	OPANAL				
	ORD				
	PMO				
	POSTAL				
	PROTO				
	PSYOPS				
	REPRO				
	SPL SERV				
	SUPPLY				
	S&C				

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

UNCLASSIFIED

O 070327Z ZYH
 RM 03 III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. COMUSMACV 061126Z AUG 69

1. THE NEWS RELEASE WAS WRITTEN BY MR. DAVE LAMB OF UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL. LAMB ARRIVED IN DANANG ON THE EVENING OF 3 AUGUST 1969, AND FILED THE STORY THE FOLLOWING EVENING. DURING THE INTERIM, LAMB REMAINED AT THE DANANG PRESS CENTER WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ATTENDING A SHORT AND UNCLASSIFIED G-2 BRIEFING AT MY HEADQUARTERS WHICH HE HAD REQUESTED. DURING THIS BRIEFING, LAMB WAS ESCORTED BY AN INFORMATION OFFICER WHO REPORTS THAT THE ENTIRE BRIEFING WAS CONCERNED ONLY WITH THE PRESENT LULL IN ENEMY ACTIVITY. THE BRIEFING DID NOT TOUCH UPON OPERATIONS. PRIOR TO THIS BRIEFING, LAMB DID DIRECTLY QUERY THE ESCORT OFFICER ON WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A CHANGE IN POLICY WITH REGARD TO RELEASING NAMES OF OPERATIONS. THE ESCORT OFFICER NEITHER CONFIRMED NOR DENIED THE QUESTION, BUT SIMPLY ANSWERED THAT QUOTE WE ARE RELEASING NEWS OF ACTIONS AS THEY OCCUR UNQUOTE. LAMB DID NOT PURSUE THE MATTER BUT HIS QUESTION WAS INDICATIVE THAT HE HAD ALREADY DRAWN CONCLUSIONS ON THE SUBJECT. LAMB DID NOT MEET WITH ANY OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS DURING HIS VISIT TO DANANG. PRIOR TO THIS VISIT, LAMB WAS LAST IN I CORPS ON 9 JULY 69.

RECEIVED
 17 (1)

17 (1)

17 (1)

2. ALTHOUGH I HAVE PASSED THE GUIDANCE GIVEN ME AT THE LAST COMMANDERS' MEETING TO MY MAJOR COMMANDERS, I BELIEVE THAT THIS GUIDANCE WAS NEITHER COMPROMISED NOR THE BASIS FOR LAMB'S STORY.

3. FURTHER BACKGROUND ON THE STORY AND THE POLICY CHANGE IT REFERRED TO IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE III MAF INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER RECEIVED AN UNCLASSIFIED TELETYPE MESSAGE FROM MACOI ON 26 JULY 1969 WHICH EXPRESSED A CONTEMPLATED MODIFICATION TO OUR CURRENT POLICY OF RELEASING NAMED OPERATIONS. THE DTG OF THIS MESSAGE IS 261600Z JULY 1969.

B. AFTER THE EXISTENCE OF LAMB'S STORY BECAME KNOWN, THE III MAF INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER CONVERSED WITH LAMB ABOUT THE STORY. LAMB WAS MOST COOPERATIVE IN THIS DISCUSSION, AND VOLUNTEERED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

(1) HE HAD NOTICED THAT RECENT MACV NEWS COMMUNIQUESES SEEMED TO NOT MENTION NAMES OF OPERATIONS AS FREQUENTLY AS IN THE PAST.

(2) THE QUOTE IN THE STORY QUOTE WITH THE (PARIS) TALKS NOW FOCUSED ON DEESCALATION AND TROOP WITHDRAWALS IT DOES NOT SERVE OUR BEST INTERESTS TO BALLYHOO A MULTI-BATTALION DRIVE IN SEARCH OF THE ENEMY UNQUOTE WAS PICKED UP IN SAIGON.

(3) THE QUOTE OPERATION NEAR HUE UNQUOTE REFERRED TO IN THE STORY WAS OPERATION BRISTOL BOOTS, ON WHICH HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED QUOTE SEVERAL MONTHS AGO UNQUOTE BY THE THEN C OF THE 101ST ABD. THE NEWS EMBARGO ON THIS OPERATION WAS NEVER BEEN LIFTED THOUGH THE OPERATION HAS BEEN TERMINATED. 17(2)

4. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, IT IS MY OPINION THAT:

A. LAMB IS AN ASTUTE AND OBSERVANT REPORTER,
AND THAT HIS CONCLUSIONS WERE DRAWN FROM AVAILABLE AND
UNCLASSIFIED EVIDENCE.

B. THE COMMANDERS' MEETING WAS NOT COMPROMISED IN ANY WAY.

C. THE INFORMATION FOR THE STORY WAS NOT OBTAINED HERE.

5. ON 5 AUG 1969, AFTER THE STORY HAD BEEN RELEASED BY UPI,
MY INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER RECEIVED GUIDANCE ON
THE SUBJECT FROM MACOI WHICH WAS ESSENTIALLY AS FOLLOWS:

THE QUOTE PLAYING DOWN UNQUOTE OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
DOES NOT MEAN A CHANGE OF OUR PRESENT POLICY OF RELEASING
SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS (AND ACTIONS INVOLVED THEREIN) TO
NEWSMEN AND TO THE PUBLIC. IT DOES MEAN THAT WE SHOULD NOT GO
OUT OF OUR WAY TO PUBLICIZE THEM IF THEY DO NOT CONTAIN
SUBSTANTIAL NEWS VALUE. III MAF SHOULD CONTINUE, AS IT HAS
IN THE PAST, TO RECOMMEND TO MACV THAT OPERATIONS
(INCLUDING THEIR NICKNAMES) BE RELEASED FOR NEWS COVERAGE.
HOWEVER, IN THE FUTURE, III MAF SHOULD BE SELECTIVE ABOUT
THESE RECOMMENDATIONS. IF AN OPERATION ACHIEVES SIGNIFICANT
RESULTS, AND ITS EXISTENCE IS PROBABLY VERY WELL KNOWN TO
NEWSMEN, IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR BEST INTEREST TO DENY ITS
EXISTENCE.

I BELIEVE THAT THE ABOVE POLICY IS WISE, AND UNLESS
OTHERWISE DIRECTED I INTEND TO IMPLEMENT IT AT III MAF.
WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.
900

17(3)

17(3)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 08 AUG 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 081230Z AUG 69		COPY# OF COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO/LIMDIS	
	CG					REMARKS	
	DCG					THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4.	
	DCG AIR					THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.	
	C/S					ORIG: S/S REL: AS/S	
	DC/S					<p>EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY "LIMDIS" HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p><i>Cy# 1 in Force Planning file</i></p> <p>20</p> <p>TOP SECRET</p>	
	DC/S PLAN						
	S/S						
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	H DASC						
	S&C						

TOP SECRET

PITZYUW RHMMAFA1878 2201230-TTTT RUMLMNA.
 ZNY TTTT
 P 081230Z AUG 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN
 THRASH FROM LTGEN NICKERSON/MCEO
 1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:

P 021949Z AUG 69
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO ZEN/CMC
 INFO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER
 ZEN/CG NINTH MAB

BT

T O P S E C R E T - LINDIS, SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN
 VAN RYZIN, INFO LTGEN NICKERSON AND BGENS GARRETSON
 AND CARNEY FROM LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES

ONLY SECTION 1 OF 2
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
 FORCE PLANNING (U)

- A. CMC 161043Z/JUL69 (TS) NOTAL
- B. CG FMFPAC 162107Z/JUL69 (S) NOTAL
- C. CG FMFPAC 211944Z/JUL69 (TS) NOTAL

1. (TS) FORCE PLANNING CONFERENCE HELD IN RESPONSE
 TO REFERENCE A PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT FORUM FOR
 EXAMINATION OF STATUS OF REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING,
 INCLUDING RELOCATION SITES OF REDEPLOYED FORCES AND

PAGE 2 RUHFMAD433 T O P S E C R E T, SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 ATTENDANT PROBLEM AREAS. THE EXCHANGE OF OBJECTIVES
 AND VIEWS WILL FACILITATE COORDINATION OF PLANNING
 FOR THE MANY ALTERNATIVES THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED
 PENDING ANNOUNCEMENT OF FINITE PARAMETERS DEFINING
 CLEARLY FUTURE REDEPLOYMENT OBJECTIVES (E.G.,
 COMPOSITION OF SECOND REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT,
 MAGNITUDE OF REDEPLOYMENTS DURING CY 69, AND
 STRENGTH RESTRICTIONS ON OKINAWA AND JAPAN). IN
 CONSIDERATION OF THE SENSITIVITY OF PLANNING FOR
 SUBSEQUENT REDEPLOYMENTS, ALL CONFEREES WERE
 CAUTIONED TO LIMIT ACCESS ON A STRICT NEED-TO-KNOW
 BASIS.

2. (TS) THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE
 DISCUSSIONS AND DETERMINATIONS IS PROVIDED:

A. TROOP LISTS - A TROOP LIST, WHICH CONTAINS BOTH
 A REVISED III MAF TROOP LIST FOR A SECOND REDEPLOYMENT
 INCREMENT OF MARINE ELEMENTS FROM RVN (USING PROGRAM
 7 STRENGTHS) AND A REFINED FMFPAC NEAR TERM TROOP LIST
 FOR OKINAWA AND JAPAN WITHIN RESPECTIVE CEILINGS OF
 23,052 AND 7,504, WAS PROVIDED TO REPRESENTATIVES OF

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET ²⁰⁽¹⁾

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUHMFMA0433 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
EACH PARTICIPATING COMMAND. AS A RESULT OF LIMITED
ACCESS DUE TO THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SUBJECT AND TIME
AVAILABLE, CURRENT STATUS OF PLANNING PRECLUDED
DETAILED ADDRESSAL OF DETACHMENTS INCLUDED IN THE
TROOP LISTS. CG III MAF IS CURRENTLY DEVELOPING GRADE
AND MOS BREAKDOWNS AND EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZATIONS/
MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR PROPOSED DETACHMENTS.

B. PRIORITIES LISTING - DEVELOPMENT OF PRIORITIES, BY
UNITS, TO PERMIT RAPID ADJUSTMENT OF RELOCATION TROOP
LISTS, IN THE EVENT CEILINGS FOR OKINAWA AND JAPAN
SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN EXCESS OF, OR LESS THAN,
CURRENT PLANNING FIGURES, WERE CONSIDERED. HOWEVER,
DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE LISTING OR SEVERAL LISTS TO
COVER ALL EXIGENCIES WAS CONSIDERED IMPRACTICAL.
THEREFORE, IT IS PROPOSED THAT VARYING ALTERNATIVES BE
ADDRESSED, WHEN REQUIRED, WITHIN SPECIFIC PARAMETERS
PERTAINING AT THE TIME (E.G., CEILING, TIMING, FACILITIES/
CONSTRUCTION GUIDANCE, ETC).

C. FY70 EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT PROGRAM - IMPACT
OF PROPOSED REDEPLOYMENTS CANNOT BE DETERMINED

PAGE 4 RUHMFMA0433 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
PENDING COMPLETION OF LTI'S ON REDEPLOYED EQUIPMENT.

D. LAAM BN RETROGRADE - REDEPLOYMENT TO CONUS
PRESENTS NO LOGISTIC PROBLEMS.

E. FACILITY REQUIREMENTS - FACILITY SHORTFALL
ASSOCIATED WITH A SECOND REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT CAN
BE DERIVED FROM PREVIOUS FMFPAC T-DAY AND ABRAMS PLAN
SUBMISSIONS BY ADJUSTMENT CONSONANT WITH THE PROPOSED
NEAR TERM TROOP LIST, WHICH ESSENTIALLY PROVIDES FOR
SAME UNIT STRENGTHS AS THOSE CONTAINED IN THE REVISED
MARCORS T-DAY PLAN. EARLY DECISION ON THE PROCEDURE
FOR FUNDING FACILITY REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING USE OF
MAJOR PROCUREMENT FUNDS VICE MILCON FUNDS FOR
PURCHASE OF PRE-ENGINEERED STRUCTURES FOR TEMPORARY
BUILDINGS, IS DEEMED CRITICAL.

F. SEARCHLIGHT BATTERY RETROGRADE - IT IS PROPOSED
THAT THIS UNIT BE RETURNED TO CONUS IN A CADRE STATUS
FOR DEACTIVATION. PERSONNEL ASPECTS ARE CURRENTLY
UNDER STUDY AND WILL BE ADDRESSED SEPARATELY.

G. CADRE UNITS - WITH REGARD TO RECONSTITUTION OF
UNITS REDEPLOYED IN A CADRE STATUS, PRIORITY HAS BEEN

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA0433 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 ASSIGNED TO THE AMTRAC AND TANK BNS, IN THAT ORDER.
 PERSONNEL SPACES TO SUPPORT THEIR RECONSTITUTION CAN
 BE OBTAINED BY DRAWING DOWN ON OTHER REDEPLOYED
 UNITS WITH STRENGTHS EXCEEDING THAT PROPOSED IN THE
 NEAR TERM TROOP LIST. RECONSTITUTION OF ALL UNITS
 REDEPLOYING IN A CADRE STATUS IS NOT FEASIBLE WITHIN
 AN OKINAWA CEILING OF 23,052.

H. DEACTIVATION OF SU NR 2. HQCO, 26TH MAR - REFERENCE
 B REQUESTED AUTHORITY TO DEACTIVATE CERTAIN 26TH MAR
 (REAR) ELEMENTS ON OKINAWA AND PROPOSED DETAILS FOR
 TRANSFER OF FLAG AND DISPOSITION OF PERSONNEL AND
 EQUIPMENT. WHILE 9TH MAB WILL, FOR THE TIME BEING,
 CONTINUE TO RETAIN ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN CONNECTION
 WITH THE SLF'S, PROPOSED DEACTIVATION OF SUB UNIT NR 2. WILL
 NOT IMPACT ON THESE RESPONSIBILITIES. FMFPAC PLANNING
 ENVISIONS THE SLF'S BEING PROVIDED FROM 26TH MARINES
 RESOURCES UNTIL 3D MARDIV IS REDEPLOYED FROM RVN, THEN
 THE SLF'S WILL BE PROVIDED FROM 3D MARDIV RESOURCES
 WITH THE ENTIRE 26TH MARINES BEING DEDICATED TO IN-
 COUNTRY OPERATIONS.

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA0433 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

I. FIXED WING RETROGRADE - REVISED PLANNING FOR
 PROPOSED SECOND REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT PROVIDES
 FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF A VMA(AW) SQUADRON VICE THE VMA
 SQUADRON ORIGINALLY PROPOSED.

J. ROTARY WING RETROGRADE - WITHDRAWAL OF THREE
 HMM'S (AND ONE HMM AND ONE VMO) WILL ALLOW TWO HMM'S TO BE
 DEDICATED TO ARG/SLF OPERATIONS AND PROVIDE REQUIRED
 SUPPORT FOR REMAINING 3D MARDIV FORCES ON OKINAWA.
 IN THE EVENT ONLY ONE ARG/SLF IS MAINTAINED AFLOAT,
 ONE HMM WOULD BE REDEPLOYED TO HAWAII.

K. MACS LOCATION - THE REFINED NEAR TERM TROOP
 LIST FOR OKINAWA/JAPAN, WITHIN AN OKINAWA CEILING OF
 23,052, RETAINS THE ONE AVAILABLE MACS ON OKINAWA.
 FURTHER STUDY IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE A SUITABLE
 LOCATION FOR A SECOND MACS IN WESTPAC, WHEN AVAILABLE
 FROM RVN.

L. SQUADRON STRENGTH OF VMGR-152 ON OKINAWA
 STILL UNDER STUDY, HOWEVER, ANTICIPATE INITIALLY THAT
 A DET VMGR-152 TO BE LOCATED AT IWAKUNI.

M. PROV MAG-39 STATUS - THE REVISED SECOND

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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20(3)
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE 7 RUHHFMA0439 5 9 0 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 T O P S E C R E T - LIMDIS. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 FINAL SECTION OF 2
 INCREMENT TROOP LIST PROVIDES FOR WITHDRAWAL OF PROV
 MAG-39 TO OKINAWA WHERE IT WILL BE REDESIGNATED AS
 1ST MAW (REAR). THROUGH A PERSONNEL MIXMASTER EFFORT
 WITHIN 1ST MAW, THE REDEPLOYED UNIT WILL BE STAFFED
 WITH PERSONNEL REQUIRED. BY THIS APPROACH, THE
 REQUIREMENT CONTAINED IN REFERENCE C IS NO LONGER
 VALID, SINCE THE DANGER OF LOSING SPACES FROM MACV
 ACTION IS OBIATED.

N. OKINAWA TRANSIENT CENTER FACILITY - WHILE IT IS
 DESIRABLE TO RETAIN THE TRANSIENT CENTER IN PLACE AS
 LONG AS POSSIBLE, IMPOSITION OF AN OKINAWA CEILING OF
 23,052 WILL REQUIRE RELOCATION OF THIS ACTIVITY TO CONUS
 TO AVOID A REDUCTION OF APPROXIMATELY 2,000 IN THE
 REFINED NEAR TERM TROOP LIST FOR OKINAWA AND JAPAN.
 3. (U) THE ENTHUSIASM AND PROFESSIONAL APPROACH OF
 CONFEREES WAS SINCERELY APPRECIATED. WARM REGARDS,
 UNQUOTE:

GP-3

BT

1068

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

20(4)

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 13AUG69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 130335Z AUG 69		COPY# 1-3 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4__ THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT. <p style="text-align: center;"><u>HAS BEEN SENT</u></p> <p><i>Cy# 2 to G-1 131500H Aug 69 In 132200A</i></p> <p><i>Cy# 1 in Force Planning</i></p> <p style="font-size: 48pt; font-weight: bold;">22</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(22) TOP SECRET</p>
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
	S/S					
	G-1					
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	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	H DASC					
	S&C					

0 130335Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC

ZEM

I C P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN BUSE FROM LIGEN
NICKERSON/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
MIXMASTER (U)

A. CMC 291451Z AUG69 (IS)

B. FOWECON BETWEEN COL WOOD, G-1 FMFPAC, AND LTCOL
THOMASIDIC, ASST G-1 III MAF, IF 111115H AUG69

1. (TS) REF A ADDRESSED THE EMPLOYMENT OF MIXMASTER/
REDEPLOYMENT CRITERIA TO ANTICIPATED PHASE II
REDEPLOYMENT. REF B REQ CG III MAF COMMENTS/RECOM-
MENDATIONS ON THIS SUBJ. IT IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY
THAT COMBAT READINESS BE PRESERVED FOR UNITS REMAINING
IN VIETNAM, AND UNITS CONSTITUTING THE PACOM RESERVE.
THE FORMER MENTIONED UNITS ARE ALREADY IN COMBAT WITH
THE ENEMY AND THE LATTER UNITS MUST BE READY FOR
COMMITMENT IMMEDIATELY UPON REACHING WESTPAC DESTINATION.
IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN UNIT INTEGRITY, ONLY MINIMAL
MIXMASTERING CAN BE DONE TO UNITS REMAINING IN VIETNAM
OR REDEPLOYING TO WESTPAC DESTINATIONS. THIS IS
TRUE UNDER EITHER SITUATION MENTIONED IN REF A.
WHILE THIS COMMAND DOES NOT HAVE READY ACCESS TO
INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL ROTATION FACTORS FOR PARTICULAR
PERIODS OF TIME, IT IS NOT CONSIDERED THAT MORE THAN
TEN PERCENT OF A UNIT COULD BE MIXMASTERS AND STILL
MAINTAIN UNIT INTEGRITY. THIS IS IN CONSIDERATION
THAT NORMAL ROTATION IS PROCEEDING ACCORDINGLY AT
THE SAME TIME.

2. (TS) ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS ATTENDANT TO RE-
DEPLOYMENT OF UNITS TO EASTPAC AND RESULTANT IN-
EQUITIES OF TOUR LENGTH AND RECOGNIZED.
HOWEVER, MIXMASTERING OF PEOPLE AND THE MAINTENANCE
OF COMBAT READINESS AT THE SAME TIME ARE INCOMPAT-
IBILITIES. IT IS BELIEVED NECESSARY THAT CERTAIN
INEQUITY BE RECOGNIZED AND ACCEPTED.

GP-4

328

NNN

HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET

22(1)

22(1)

HEADQUARTERS
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 AUG 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 100230Z AUG 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT F-O-R
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I	11 Aug		NPB	REMARKS Feedback
4	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S				MP	
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	8/10		MS	
	G-1					
	G-2					
5	G-3	I	Has Cy #3			
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

ORIG G-3
REL CG

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

(18)

SECRET

SECRET

FTTSZYUW RHMMFAF1229 2220230-SSSS--RUHMAF.

ZNY SSSSS

P 100230Z AUG 69 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHGSF/COMSEVENTHFLT

BT

S E C R E T

OPCON OF SLF HELO SQDNS (U)

A. MY 230528Z JUL 69 → 23 0528Z - attached

B. COMSEVENTHFLT 300042Z JUL 69 - attached

PERSONAL VADM BRINGLE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. (S) REF A DISCUSSED A RECOMMENDATION MADE BY A RECENT BOARD CONVENED BY THIS HQS TO EXAMINE THE UTILIZATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MARINE CORPS HELICOPTER ASSETS IN III MAF TO THE EFFECT THAT THE MMM ORGANIC TO AN SLF BE SIMULTANEOUSLY CHOPPED TO 1ST MAW WHEN THE SLF BLT OPERATES ASHORE UNDER OPCON OF ONE OF THE MARINE DIVISIONS. REF B INDICATES YOUR NONCONCURRENCE.

2. (S) I CERTAINLY AGREE WITH THE COMMENTS CONTAINED IN REFERENCE B CONCERNING THE ADVANTAGES OF THE LPH AS A SECURE MOBILE BASE WITH ITS INHERENT MAINTENANCE/REPAIR EXPERTISE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A ENVISIONS THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE MMM FROM THE

PAGE 2 RHMMFAF 1229 **S E C R E T**

LPH, RATHER THAN ASHORE, BUT UNDER THE OPCON OF THE FMAW.

3. (S) THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THE RECOMMENDATION IS THE SHORTAGE OF MARINE HELO ASSETS IN III MAF; IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THERE WILL BE ANY RELIEF IN THIS REGARD IN THE NEAR FUTURE, IN FACT, AVAILABILITY WILL DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER. MY DESIRE IS, THEREFORE, TO INSURE MAXIMUM HELO AVAILABILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN I CORPS.

4. (S) IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE MOST EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF ALL ASSETS, AND TO EQUALIZE THE SUPPORT PROVIDED TO ALL MARINE MANEUVER BATTALIONS, CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES IS NECESSARY. CENTRALIZED ALLOCATION AND CONTROL OF ALL HELO ASSETS BY THE FMAW, THROUGH THE TADC, WOULD INSURE THAT AN SLF BATTALION OPERATING ASHORE UNDER OPCON OF A DIVISION WOULD RECEIVE NECESSARY HELO SUPPORT AND, AT THE SAME TIME, THAT HELO ASSETS ARE UTILIZED EFFICIENTLY FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF III MAF'S OVERALL MISSION.

5. (S) I WHOLEHEARTEDLY CONCUR IN THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE NAVY-MARINE TEAM FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM. HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A WOULD DETRACT FROM REQUIRED READINESS.

PAGE 3 RHMMFAF 1229 **S E C R E T**

ON THE CONTRARY IT WOULD ENHANCE THAT READINESS THROUGH MORE EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT AND MORE SIMPLIFIED COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES.

RECONSIDERATION OF YOUR POSITION IS REQUESTED.

WARM REGARDS. LTGEN NICKERSON.

GP-4

BT

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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18(1)

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 AUG 1969	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 101212Z AUG 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I	10 Aug		N	REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. ORIG: DC/S REL: CG
4	DCG	I			N	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			J	
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	8/11		ORIG: DC/S	
	G-1				REL: CG	
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

FOR
HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

19

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RNMMAFA1502 2221212-CCCC--RNMMAFA.
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 101212Z AUG 69
 FM CG 111 MAF
 TO RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / F O R L I G E N B U S E F R O M L I G E N W I C K E R S O N

1. CHAPPY DEPARTED 111 MAF HQS 10 AUG HEADING YOUR WAY ON SCHEDULE AFTER THREE BUSY DAYS IN 7 CORPS
2. VISIT WAS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL AS EVIDENCED BY HIS MSG BACK TO ME FROM CLARK AFB THIS MORNING IN WHICH HE STATED THAT HE WAS MOST IMPRESSED WITH ALL HE OBSERVED IN ALL UNITS IN 107Z. HE SAID HE BELIEVES WE ARE IN A DOMINANT POSTURE AND HAVING VIEWED THE QUOTE BOB DO UNQUOTE SPIRIT THROUGHOUT THE COMMAND HE IS SURE THAT IN TIME A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THIS CONFLICT IS INEVITABLE. HE ALSO REITERATED HIS PLEASURE OVER THE FIRM GRASP THE COMMAND HAS OF THE SITUATION HERE.
3. THE ITINERARY AS SUBMITTED VIA YOUR HQS WAS CARRIED OUT WITHOUT HITCH. ALL BRIEFINGS WERE WELL RECEIVED BY CMC.
4. FOLLOWING QUESTION WAS ASKED BY DAVE LAMB UPI

PAGE TWO RNMMAFA1502 C O N F I D E N T I A L / F O R L I G E N B U S E
 CORRESPONDENT AT CMC'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND CMC'S ANSWER:
 QUESTION: QUOTE YOU MENTION, GENERAL, THAT WITH THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ARVN AND AS INTENSIFIED PACIFICATION CONTINUES, THE ENEMY WON'T HAVE MANY OPTIONS LEFT TO HIM. HE WILL HAVE TO DO SOMETHING. MILITARILY SPEAKING, WHAT WOULD THESE OPTIONS BE, THAT HE PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE, AS THE ARVN IMPROVES AND PACIFICATION BECOMES MORE FAVORABLE TO THEM?
 UNQUOTE

ANSWER: QUOTE WELL, HE COULD RETIRE AND WAIT FOR A BETTER DAY, OR HE COULD LAUNCH ALL OUT MAIN FORCE ATTACKS IN AN EFFORT TO CREATE DEATH, CHAOS, DESTRUCTION, A FINAL DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO WITHDRAW OUR SUPPORT OF THE WAR. JUST SOME KIND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY IN THE UNITED STATES THAT HE OBTAINED IN TEX 68. I THINK THAT WOULD BE HIS ONLY OPTION AT THAT POINT. OBVIOUSLY, HE CAN'T WIN ANY KIND OF A CONVENTIONAL MILITARY VICTORY UNQUOTE. I WOULD INTERPRET CHAPPY'S COMMENT TO MEAN THAT THE NEXT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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CONFIDENTIAL

19(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA1302 C O N F I D E N T I A L / F O R L Y G E N B U S E
MOVE IS UP TO THE ENEMY.

5. ALL IN ALL, I WOULD SAY THAT THE VISIT WAS
SUCCESSFUL AND WILL STAND CHAPPY IN GOOD STEAD
IN HIS DAILY BATTLES IN WASHINGTON.

GP-4

BT

1302

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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19(2)

O 101445Z ZYU
FM LTGEN NICKERSON CG III MAF
TO MGEN TOWNSEND COFS MACV
INFO MGEN ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS
MGEN JONES CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

REF: PHB 1539 EYES ONLY DTG 100847Z AUG 69

1. I STRONGLY ENDORSE THE INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION AND REQUEST FOR
ARC LIGHT TARGETS CONTAINED IN REF, IN THE PRIORITY AS STIPULATED
BY PARA 6 OF REF. LT GEN NICKERSON.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE IMMEDIATELY.

DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES EARLIEST DUTY HOURS.

GP-4

122

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

20(1)

20(1)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		11 AUG 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE	1,2,3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD		
			0 101750Z			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ① HAS BEEN SENT
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
✓	C/S					
	DC/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F S/A			CH 16	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

②

SECRET

O 101750Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMF PAC
 INFO CG FMF PAC (FWD)
 ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON INFO GEN GARRETSON
 FOR PASS TO CMC

1. THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PERSONAL MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM LTGEN
 ZAIS CONCERNING THIRD MARINE REGIMENT ACTION SOUTH OF DMZ.

O 101450Z ZYH ZFF-3
 FM LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS
 TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 INFO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF
 ZM

S E C R E T PHB 1543 EYES ONLY

1. REFERENCE OUR CONVERSTATION AT 101843H AUGUST 1969, CHRONOLOGY
 OF EVENTS IN 3D REGIMENT, 3D MARINE DIVISION IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. AT 092200, THE 1ST PLATOON, E/2-3 MARINES (REINFORCED) WAS
 IN NDP 14 KM NORTH OF VANDERGRIFT CB WHEN FOUR NVA BEGAN FIRING
 SMALL ARMS AT LP. THE LP RETURNED FIRE AND THREW GRENADES. NVA
 WITHDREW. SHORTLY AFTER, THE PLATOON PERIMETER WAS ATTACKED BY
 10 NVA THROWING SATCHEL CHARGES AND GRENADES AND SUPPORTED BY MACH-
 INE GUNS AND SMALL ARMS FIRE. PLATOON RETURNED FIRE AND ENEMY
 BROKE CONTACT.

B. AT 100415H, THE 3D PLATOON, E/2-3 MARINES (REINFORCED) WAS
 IN NDP WHEN A USEN ASSAULTED FROM THE NORTH FOLLOWED BY ASSAULT FROM
 ALL SIDES. ENEMY PENETRATED POSITION EMPLOYING GRENADES, SMALL ARMS
 FIRE AND SATCHEL CHARGES. THE PLATOON FIRED ARTILLERY AND AN AO WAS
 ON STATION. BY 0615, ENEMY WAS REPULSED, FLED TO NE AND PLATOON
 RESTORED PERIMETER. 17 NVA KIA FOUND INSIDE PERIMETER.

C. AT 100615H AUGUST, THE 1ST PLATOON E/2-3 MARINES WAS AGAIN
 ATTACKED BY AN USEF FROM THE WEST EMPLOYING GRENADES, SAF, SATCHEL
 CHARGES AND MORTARS. ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT WERE EMPLOYED AND
 E CO (-) MOVED TO REINFORCE 1ST PLATOON. ENEMY BROKE CONTACT AT
 0755. 2/111

D. AT 101200H AUGUST 0969, MEDEVAC AND REINFORCEMENTS FROM A/1-3 MARINES WERE UNABLE TO LAND VICINITY 3D PLATOON DUE TO 82MM MORTAR FIRE. LZ WAS SHIFTED TO XD945622 AND REINFORCEMENTS CLOSED AT 101445H AUGUST.

E. MEDEVAC CONTINUED FOR ALL UNITS THROUGHOUT THE DAY AND WAS COMPLETED AT 101930 AUGUST.

F. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES FOLLOW: E CO, 3D MARINES, 11 KIA, 39 WIA; 2/3 MARINES 81 MORTAR SECTION, 7 KIA, 27 WIA. A CO 1/3 MARINES, 1 KIA, 5 WIA (FROM MORTAR FIRE ON LZ). TOTAL 19 KIA, 70 WIA.

G. FRIENDLY ELEMENTS HAVE WITHDRAWN AS FOLLOWS: 1ST AND 2D PLATOON AND CP, E CO NOW AT XD944613; 3D PLATOON, E CO, AND 1ST AND 2D PLATOON A CO, XD940613; H CO MOVING INTO AREA NOW TO REINFORCE. THE 3D REGIMENT PLANS TO MOVE E CO OUT OF THE FIELD BY AIR IN THE MORNING IF POSSIBLE. A CO WILL OPZRATE IN AO NEAR LZ SIERRA TOMORROW. F CO IS 5 KM TO SOUTH AND REMAINING IN POSITION. H CO WILL MOVE TO JOIN A CO IN THE AM.

H. ENEMY FORCES ESTIMATED TO BE BETWEEN 2 COMPANIES AND 1 BATTALION SIZE.

2. IN ESSENCE TWO REINFORCED PLATOONS OF MARINES WERE STRUCK BY A NUMERICALLY SUPERIOR FORCE. THE MARINES WERE NOT SURPRISED. THEY FOUGHT VALIANTLY BUT SUFFERED MANY CASUALTIES. WE DO NOT HAVE A FULL COUNT OF ENEMY DEAD. THE REAL STORY HAS NOT YET BEEN SORTED OUT BUT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT AN AGGRESSIVE ENEMY IS BUILDING UP JUST SOUTH OF THE DMZ. 21(2)

3. CONCENTRATION OF ENEMY FORCES NOW DICTATES REGROUPING AND RE-DISPOSITION OF FRIENDLY FORCES INTO COMPANY TO BATTALION SIZE MANEUVER ELEMENTS. BY PREVIOUS ACTION I HAD REQUESTED ARC LIGHT STRIKES TO SUPPORT 3D MARINES IN VIEW OF RECENT KNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY BUILD UP. THIS REQUEST IS CONSIDERED TO BE EVEN MORE VALID AT THIS TIME.

4. I BELIEVE FORCES AVAILABLE ARE MORE THAN CAPABLE OF HANDLING THE SITUATION; HOWEVER, I HAVE ALERTED THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION TO PROVIDE A BRIGADE IN THE EVENT IT SHOULD BE REQUIRED.

2. REQUEST HAS BEEN SUBMITTED FOR FOUR ARC LIGHT STRIKES SOUTH OF DMZ AND FOUR WITHIN DMZ. LATTER MUST BE APPROVED BY JCS AND TELECOM WITH GENERAL ABRAMS INDICATES HE IS SUPPORTING THIS REQUEST.

3. ADDITIONAL INFO HAS BEEN REQUESTED FROM XXIV CORPS CONCERNING TACTICS, FIREPOWER EMPLOYED, WEATHER CONDITIONS THROUGHOUT PERIOD ETC. I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

750

CP-4

13 Army Standard

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

2/13)

2/13)

Z 112131Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 CG FMFPAC(FWD)
 ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O
 CG FMFPAC (FWD) DELIVER TO GEN CHAPMAN
 FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

O 101505Z
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO CG XXIV CORPS
 INFO CG III MAF
 ZEM

UNCLAS EYES ONLY
 MGEN JONES SENDS FOR LTGEN ZAIS INFO LTGEN NICKERSON
 1. THE FOLLOWING MEMO FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY MY ISO OFFICER
 LICOL DONALD J. GARRETT, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING THE TIME I SPENT
 THIS DATE WITH MR. DAVID LAMB UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL IS AN
 ACCURATE RECORD AND IS SUBMITTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

QUOTE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

AT 1400 THIS DATE THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 3RD MARINE DIVI-
 SION GRANTED AN INTERVIEW TO MR. DAVID LAMB OF UNITED PRESS INTER-
 NATIONAL. THE INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE IN THE OFFICE OF THE C. G. AT
 DONG HA COMBAT BASE, RVN.

DURING THE INTERVIEW THE C. G. DISCUSSED WITH MR. LAMB THE
 PRESENT AREA OF OPERATIONS OF THE DIVISION AND THE TYPE OF PRO-
 TECTIVE REACTION TACTICS PRESENTLY BEING EMPLOYED BY THE DIVISION.
 THE C. G. STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTING THE REENTRY OF THE
 VC AMONG THE POPULACE, CUTTING OFF THE INFILTRATION ROUTES OF THE
 NVA AS WELL AS SEARCHING OUT, FINDING AND DESTROYING ANY CACHE
 WHICH MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY THE ENEMY. 22(1)

22(1)

WHEN QUESTIONED BY MR. LAMB CONCERNING THE USE OF OPERATIONAL NAMES (NAMED OPERATIONS) THE C. G. REPLIED THAT THERE WERE NO OFFENSIVE TYPE OPERATIONS, IN THE CLASSICAL SENSE, UNDERWAY BUT THAT "OPERATIONAL NAMES" WERE USED FOR EASY IDENTIFICATION OF THE TACTICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.

THE INTERVIEW LASTED APPROXIMATELY 45 MINUTES DURING WHICH THE C. G. BRIEFLY MENTIONED AN ATTACK BY NVA FORCE AGAINST A PLATOON OF THE 3RD MARINES WHICH OCCURRED BEFORE DAYBREAK THIS DATE. FOLLOWING THE C. G. CONDUCTED MR. LAMB ON A TOUR OF A PORTION OF THE AO. THIS TOUR INCLUDED A VISIT TO ELLIOTT FIRE SUPPORT BASE WHERE THE C. G. AND MR. LAMB WERE BRIEFED BY THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER. PRIMARILY THIS BRIEFING CONSISTED OF KNOWN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ATTACKS AGAINST TWO PLATOONS OF THE 2D BN., 3D MARINES WHICH OCCURRED IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS THIS DATE. THE CO, 3D MARINES WHEN QUESTIONED AS TO WHY THESE PLATOONS WERE LOCATED WHERE THEY WERE REPLIED THAT THEY WERE ON A ROUTINE PATROL ALONG PREVIOUSLY USED NVA INFILTRATION ROUTES. WHEN QUESTIONED CONCERNING THE TYPE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED, THE CO STATED THAT THEIR POSITIONS WERE OF A TEMPORARY, OVER-NIGHT POSITION WITH LITTLE IF ANY PROTECTIVE WIRE SINCE THEY WERE ON A PATROL TYPE MISSION. UNDER QUESTIONING THE CO, 3D MARINES INFORMED MR. LAMB OF THE CASUALTY COUNT OF THE TWO PLATOONS (9 KIA, 66 WIA IN ONE PLATOON AND 2 KIA AND 22 WIA IN THE 2D PLATOON). MR LAMB WAS FURTHER INFORMED THAT ALL MEDEVAC CASES HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY EVACUATED. THE CO, 3D MARINES FURTHER TOLD MR. LAMB THAT AT THE TIME THERE HAD BEEN AN ACTUAL COUNT OF 19 NVA DEAD BUT THAT THE AREA HAD NOT YET BEEN COMPLETELY SEARCHED AND IT WAS ANTICIPATED THAT MORE ENEMY DEAD WOULD BE FOUND AS IS INITIATED ATTACK AND THAT OUTSTANDING SUPPORTING ARMS FIRE WAS RECEIVED BY THE UNITS UNDER ATTACK, AND FURTHER THAT EVEN THOUGH CASUALTIES WERE HIGH, THE UNITS CONCERNED WERE STILL OPERATIONAL. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE ATTACK ON THE NVA, HE REPLIED, "I THINK WE BLOODIED THEIR NOSE". THIS QUOTE WAS LATER USED BY MR. LAMB IN HIS RELEASE CONCERNING THIS ACTION. 22/21

FOLLOWING THIS BRIEFING MR. LAMB WAS GIVEN A TOUR OF FIRE SUPPORT BASE CATES AND THEN ESCORTED TO VANDEGRIFT COMBAT BASE. WHILE AT VANDEGRIFT MR. LAMB WAS GIVEN A BRIEFING BY THE C.O. 4TH MARINES. THE EXTENT OF THE TAOR OF THE 4TH MARINES WAS EXPLAINED BUT NO SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION CONCERNING OPERATIONS WERE DISCLOSED OTHER THAN THE REGIMENT WAS CONDUCTING PATROL TYPE ACTIONS IN ORDER TO ATTEMPT TO INTERDICT SUSPECTED NVA INFILTRATION ROUTES AND TO DENY HIM ACCESS TO THE AREA.

UPON RETURN TO DONG-HA MR. LAMB FILED A STORY WITH HIS OFFICE IN SAIGON WHICH WAS OVERHEARD BY THE ISO. HIS RELEASE CONSISTED OF FACTUAL INFORMATION OBTAINED BY HIM DURING THE BRIEFING BY THE C.O. 3D MARINES. HE DID EMPHASIZE THAT THE NVA FORCE INITIATED THE ATTACK; THAT THEY APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN REGULAR FORCES RATHER THAN A SAPPER FORCE; THAT THEY HAD PENETRATED THE PERIMETER OF THE 1ST PLATOON THEY ATTACKED AND THAT THEY WERE REPELLED AFTER ENGAGING IN HAND TO HAND COMBAT WITH THE MARINES. IN HIS RELEASE HE ALSO QUOTED THE C.O. 3D MARINES AS PREVIOUSLY STATED HEREIN.
UNQUOTE

2. INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MORE FULLY DESCRIBES THE SITUATION THAN THE INFO I PASSED YOU LAST NIGHT. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE PRESS HAS A BETTER ACCESS TO SUCH INFO THAN I.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

900

22(3)

22(3)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 11AUG69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 2 116155Z AUG 69		COPY ^{1,2,3} OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT			
	CG					SUBJECT READDRESSAL OF CG XXIV CORPS 102019Z AUG 69 REMARKS (1) THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	2					
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	I	8/11		V B		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

SECRET

(23)

Z 110155Z ZYH

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

CG FMFPAC (FWD) PASS TO GEN CHAPMAN [REDACTED]

ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN BUSE
FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

O 102019Z ZFF-6 ZFF-3

FM LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS

TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF

INFO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV

ZEM

S E C R E T PHE 1545 EYES ONLY

1. IN AMPLIFICATION OF MY EARLIER MESSAGE ON THE CONTACT OF E 2/3
THE BACKGROUND AND ACTION UNFOLDED AS FOLLOWS:

2/3 HAS BEEN OPERATING IN AN AREA APPROX 13 KM NORTH AND 5 KM WEST OF
VANDEGRIFT COMBAT BASE (AND 3 KM SOUTH OF THE DMZ) WITH THE MISSION
OF BLOCKING KNOWN ENEMY INFILTRATION ROUTES IN THEIR AO TO DENY THE
ENEMY ACCESS TO CAM LO VALLEY, ROUTE 9 AND THE POPULATED AREAS TO
THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST. THE MISSION WAS DEFENSIVE IN NATURE. IN
ORDER TO COVER AS MANY ROUTES AS POSSIBLE, COMPANIES WERE OPERATING
IN REINFORCED PLATOON INCREMENTS. SINCE MID JULY THE ENEMY HAS
BEEN STEADILY INCREASING HIS ACTIVITY IN THE AREA. ON 9 AUGUST,
THE BN WAS DISPOSED WITH E AND F COMPANIES GENERALLY ABREAST IN
REINFORCED PLATOON INCREMENTS APPROXIMATELY 3 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF
THE DMZ AND H CO. IN THE LOWER CAM LO VALLEY APPROX 6 KILOMETERS
SOUTH OF THE DMZ. UNITS MOVED EACH DAY.

2. THE 1ST PLATOON (REINF) OF E CO. (STRENGTH 86) WAS IN A NIGHT
DEFENSIVE POSITION AT XD 935627 AND THE 3D PLATOON (REINF) (STRENGTH
56) WAS IN A NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITION AT XD 946630 HAVING MOVED INTO
THOSE POSITIONS PRIOR TO DARK. THE ACTION THAT FOLLOWED
IS AS DESCRIBED IN MY PHE 1543. ADDITIONAL DETAILS ARE NOW AVAILABLE 23/11
CONCERNING TACTICS AND SUPPORTING FIRES.

3. BOTH PLATOONS WERE IN TRIANGULAR SHAPED TEMPORARY OVERNIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WITH LP'S CNT AND NORMAL DEFENSIVE MEASURES IN EFFECT. ARTILLERY SUPPORTED THE CONTACTS AS FOLLOWS:

092252-100001	96RDS 155 HE	SUPPORTING 1ST PLAT
100503-100640	54RDS 155 ILLUM	SUPPORTING 3D PLAT
100513-100745	106RDS 125 HE	SUPPORTING 3D PLAT
100624-100642	30RDS 155 HE	SUPPORTING 3D PLAT
100635-100637	6RDS 125 HE	SUPPORTING 1ST PLAT
100641-100710	4RDS 155 HE	SUPPORTING 1ST PLAT

FIRING BATTERIES WERE K/4/12 AND A/1/12 AT FSE FULLER AND ELLIOTT COMBAT BASE. A TOTAL OF 23 FIGHTER SORTIES SUPPORTED BOTH PLATOONS DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS ON 10 AUGUST. IN ADDITION SPOOKEY EXPENDED 8,000 RDS AND 20 FLARES DURING THE NIGHT IN SUPPORT OF FRIENDLY FORCES.

4. WEATHER WAS NOT A FACTOR IN THIS CONTACT.

5. ALL GROUND CONTACT HAD CEASED BY 120755H AUG, BUT SPORADIC 82MM MORTAR FIRE WAS RECEIVED THROUGHOUT THE DAY.

6. TOTAL NVA KIA NOW KNOWN TO BE 19 VIC. 1ST PLAT AND 17 VIC. 3D PLAT. SINCE FRIENDLY UNITS WITHDREW TO SOUTH, SWEEPS OF AREA WERE NOT PERFORMED. AS A RESULT NVA KIA'S OUTSIDE POSITIONS COULD NOT BE DETERMINED.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO ACTION ADDRESSEE
DELIVER FIRST DUTY HOURS TO INFO ADDRESSEE

UNQUOTE

~~SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY~~

GP-4

530

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

23(2)

23(2)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 11AUG69	
			SERIAL # / CONTROL DATE 8 1101573 AUG 69		COPY# 2,3 OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ① HAS BEEN SENT
	DCG					
2	DCG AIR					
	C/S	I.				
	DC/S					
1	DC/S DM					
	S/S	F	8/11			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	HBS CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

24

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

Z 113157Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO COMUSMACV \$GN
 INFO CG XXIV CORPS PHB
 CG THIRD MARDIV DGH
 ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND INFO LTGEN
 ZAIS AND MGEN JONES FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

O 101505Z
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO CG XXIV CORPS
 INFO CG III MAF
 ZEM

UNCLAS EYES ONLY

MGEN JONES SENDS FOR LTGEN ZAIS INFO LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MEMO FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY MY ISO OFFICER
 LTCOL DONALD J. GARRETT, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING THE TIME I SPENT
 THIS DATE WITH MR. DAVID LAMB UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL IS AN
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QUOTE

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UNQUOTE

FOR XXIV CORPS: DELIVER UPON RECEIPT
FOR III MAF: DELIVER AT FIRST WORKING HOUR

UNQUOTE

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

900

24(2)

24(2)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 11 AUG 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 110856Z AUG 69		COPY# 3 OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. ORIG: G-3 REL: CG EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT CONFIDENTIAL	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
	C/S						
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN		12 Aug	13 Aug	M		
	S/S						
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	HBS CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	SBC						
	DSA						

REF-C

(26)

CONFIDENTIAL

P 110056Z AUG 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM
 LTGEN NICKERSON
 SNIPER RIFLES FOR ARVN

A. DSA ICTZ DNG 221300Z JUL69 CITE 8574

1. REFERENCE A REQUESTED I CORPS ADVISORY SHOULD BE
 AUTHORIZED 20 EACH M1-C RIFLES WITH M-24 SCOPES IN
 ORDER TO INITIATE ARVN SNIPER PROGRAM IN I CORPS. IT
 IS MY UNDERSTANDING RIFLES, SCOPES AND MATCH AMMO ARE
 AVAILABLE. GEN LAM IS MOST ANXIOUS TO COMMENCE PROGRAM
 AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. 1ST MARDIV IS PREPARED TO COMMENCE
 TRAINING PROGRAM FOR ARVN UPON ARVN RECEIPT OF NECESSARY
 EQUIPMENT.

2. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND APPROVAL OF REQUEST CONTAINED
 IN REFERENCE A. A SNIPER CAPABILITY WILL BUILD CONFIDENCE
 IN ARVN SMALL UNITS AND IS CONSIDERED TO BE CONSISTENT
 WITH OUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE AND MODERNIZE RVNAF.
 LTGEN NICKERSON.

GP-4
 BT

1446

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

26(1)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 12 AUG 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 120020Z AUG 69		COPY# 1,2,3, 4 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT VISIT OF COMUSMACV TO III MAF ON 11 AUG 1969
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I				REMARKS (1) <i>Feedback</i> THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPO- SITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
4	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
1	DC/S PLAN	I	8/12			
	S/S					
	G-1					
5	G-2	<i>Hoo Perry</i>			<i>#2</i>	
4	G-3	<i>Hoo Perry</i>			<i>#3</i>	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

(27)

C 120220Z ZYR
FM CG III MAF
TO CG MAFFAC
ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY

FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
VISIT OF COMUSMACV TO III MAF ON 11 AUG 1969



1. COMUSMACV VISITED I CTZ ON THE MORNING OF 11 AUGUST. ARRIVING AT PHU BAI AT APPROXIMATELY 0930H, HE WAS MET BY LTGEN NICKERSON, CG III MAF, AND LTGEN ZAIS, CG XXIV CORPS. FROM PHU BAI THE PARTY PROCEEDED TO THE CP OF THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION AT DONG HA WHERE THEY WERE MET BY THE COMMANDING GENERAL, MGEN JONES AND THE CG OF THE FIRST ARVN DIVISION, MGEN TRUONG. IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL THE ENTIRE GROUP WAS BRIEFED BY THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION STAFF.

2. AT THE OUTSET, GEN ABRAMS REMARKED THAT THE ENEMY OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF THE DMZ COULD NOT HAVE BEEN BETTER TIMED AND THAT THE NVA COULD NOT HAVE DONE BETTER BY US. IF WE CAN DOCUMENT IT, GEN ABRAMS FELT THAT WE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH A PRESS RELEASE ON THE SUBJECT. IT SHOULD BE TREATED IN A RATHER LOW KEY MANNER BUT MAKING IT VERY CLEAR THAT IN THE FACE OF OUR ANNOUNCED TROOP WITHDRAWALS WHICH HAD IN FACT BEEN IMPLEMENTED ALREADY IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI (RLT-9) THAT THE ENEMY HAD INTRODUCED A NEW UNIT INTO THE TACTICAL EQUATION. IT WOULD BE TOO EARLY TO TELL WHAT THE ENEMY'S PURPOSE MIGHT BE, WHETHER THIS NEW ENEMY FORCE REPRESENTED A REINFORCEMENT, REPLACEMENT OR INFILTRATION GROUP. HOWEVER, REGARDLESS OF THIS FACT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CONSTRUCTUE THE ENEMY'S OPERATIONS ON THIS FRONT AS TACIT DEESCALATION IN THE FACE OF OUR TROOP WITHDRAWALS.

3. WITH THESE PREFATORY REMARKS BY GEN ABRAMS, THE 3D MARINE DIVISION STAFF BRIEFING COMMENCED. THE INITIAL PORTION OF THE BRIEFING TREATED INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 13 JULY 1969 WHEN A BUILD-UP BEGAN TO BE DISCERNABLE. SOUTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN DETECTIONS MADE BY SENSORS, IR, SLAR PLUS A FEW INSTANCES OF RECON OBSERVATION AND CONTACTS. AS BUT ONE EXAMPLE, THERE WERE 2,273 SENSOR DETECTIONS RECORDED DURING THE PERIOD 27 JULY-9 AUGUST. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE INCREASING INSTANCES OF RECON TEAMS BEING FIRED ON. DURING THE PERIOD 6-8 AUGUST THERE WERE HEAVY IR READINGS, SOME 298 EMISSIONS BEING RECORDED. THERE WERE NO SIGHTINGS IN THE SOUTHERN DMZ AS WELL AS TO THE WEST OF LZ CATAPULT (XD 326616) AND FSB NEVILLE (XD 792 573). THE OVERALL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE PICTURE WAS ONE QUITE SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH HAD BEEN EXPERIENCED WHEN THE 36TH NVA REGIMENT FIRST ENTERED THE CENTRAL DMZ AND WHEN THE 322TH NVA DIVISION OPERATED IN THIS AREA IN MID-1968.

27(1)

27(1)

4. THE 3D MAR DIV TEL BRIFER NOTED THAT IN THE CONTACTS WHICH HAD OCCURRED DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS IN THE CENTRAL DMZ, THE UNIT WHICH HAD BEEN ENGAGED WAS UNDOUBTEDLY THE 9TH REGIMENT OF THE 304TH NVA DIVISION. SEVENTEEN DOCUMENTS WERE TAKEN FROM THE BODIES OF NVA KIA ON THE BATTLEFIELD WHICH POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED THE PRESENCE OF AT LEAST TWO BATTALIONS OF THIS REGIMENT. IN ADDITION, PAPERS AND MARKINGS ON CLOTHING TENTATIVELY IDENTIFYING THE 24TH SAPPER COMPANY, 9TH NVA REGIMENT WERE FOUND ON BODIES IN A BUNKER. THE CONTENTION THAT THIS WAS A NEW UNIT WAS FURTHER ATTESTED TO BY THE FACT THAT WEAPONS TAKEN ON THE BATTLEFIELD WERE NEW AND SOME HAD NEVER BEEN FIRED. THE BODIES OF THE DEAD WERE CLAD IN RELATIVELY NEW UNIFORMS AND THE CORPSES WERE NOTED TO BE CLEAN-SHAVEN.

5. THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING WAS FOLLOWED BY AN OPERATIONAL BRIEFING COVERING THE ACTION WHICH TOOK PLACE ON THE 10TH. THE ATTACK COMMENCED AT 120215H AGAINST THE 3D PLATOON, "E" COMPANY, 2/3. TWELVE U.S. WERE KIA AND 53 MIA IN THIS ACTION WHILE THE NVA LOST 17 CONFIRMED KIA. IN A SEPARATE ATTACK WHICH OCCURRED AT 122615H, 1ST PLATOON, "E" COMPANY, 2/3 WAS ATTACKED IN THEIR POSITIONS TO THE WEST OF THE 3D PLATOON. THERE WERE NO U.S. CASUALTIES IN THIS ENGAGEMENT AND ENEMY CASUALTIES WERE UNKNOWN. HOWEVER, THE ATTACK AGAINST THE 3D PLATOON WAS RENEWED AT 0750H. IN THIS SECOND ATTACK, 6 U.S. WERE KIA AND 17 MIA WHILE THERE WERE 19 NVA KIA.

6. IN SUPPORT OF THIS OPERATION 2200 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY WERE FIRED FROM 093700 TO 190700 WITH AN ADDITIONAL 1200 ARTILLERY ROUNDS FIRED ON THE 12TH IN SUPPORT OF THIS ENGAGEMENT. SEVEN TOT-1 2300 FIRED AND 700 ADDITIONAL ROUNDS OF ARTY WERE DELIVERED ON 12 TARGETS DEVELOPED BY INTELLIGENCE. CONCERNING AIR SUPPORT, 52 SORTIES WERE FLOWN ON THE 11TH AGAINST 15 TARGETS. SEVENTY-TWO X 500 LB BOMBS, 52 X 500 LB NAPALM CANNISTERS AND 3 SPARROW MISSILES WERE FIRED ON THESE TARGETS. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE 23 TPQ RUNS DELIVERING 500 LB BOMBS FLOWN ON THE NIGHT OF THE 9TH AND 53 MORE TPQ RUNS FLOWN ON THE NIGHT OF THE 10TH WITH ALL REPORTING GOOD COVERAGE.

7. AS TO MED EVAC ALL MIA EMERGENCY EVACS WERE COMPLETED BY 1040H WITH THE BALANCE OF THE CASUALTIES REMOVED FROM THE FIELD PRIOR TO 1900H. MEDEVAC WAS COMPLICATED BY THE RECEIPT OF INCOMING FIRES IN ONE OF THE LZ'S SELECTED FOR EVACUATION. 27 (3)

27 (21)

3. COMMENTS MADE BY GENERAL ABRAMS:

A. COMUSMACV SPOKE TO THE PACLEN OF B-52 STRIKE MISSIONS NOTING THAT THEY WERE CRITICAL RIGHT NOW AS WE HAVE GOOD INTELLIGENCE INDICATING THAT THE ENEMY INTENDS TO ATTACK IN THE III CORPS AREA WITH UP TO FOUR DIVISIONS AND THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS OF RENewed ATTACKS WHICH MAY OCCUR IN THE HIGHLANDS OF II CORPS.

B. GEN ABRAMS QUERIED MGEN JONES AS TO WHAT COVERAGE HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE. COMUSMACV NOTED THAT IT APPEARED THAT GEN JONES HAD GOOD TARGETS SOUTH OF THE DMZ. GEN JONES RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE INDICATING THAT HE HAD UP TO 22 TARGETS RIGHT NOW. COMUSMACV REPLIED THAT UP TO 54 X B-52 SORTIES COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE ON A MAX COMPRESSION EFFORT. HOWEVER, GEN ABRAMS STATED THAT HE MUST REVIEW THE ENTIRE SITUATION AS REGARDS B-52 STRIKES.

C. ABOVE ALL, GEN ABRAMS NOTED THAT WHAT WAS CURRENTLY NEEDED WAS A REVIEW OF ALL THAT HAD TRANSPIRED AND THEN COME UP WITH A COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM WHICH WOULD TIE IN TACTICS AND ALL SUPPORTING ARMS INCLUDING ARTY AND TAC AIR. IN PREPARATION OF THIS PLAN THE QUESTION ARISES AS TO WHETHER WE WANT TO GO INTO THE SHDMZ TO ACCOMPLISH OUR MISSION. IF THE OVERALL SITUATION PERMITS AN OPERATION OF THIS NATURE, IT MUST BE DONE WITH GREAT DELIBERATENESS AND WITH A POWERFUL EFFORT. PREPARATIONS MUST BE IN DEPTH WITH A GOOD, REALISTIC CONCEPT. ACCORDINGLY, COMUSMACV DESIRED THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS BE MADE ON THIS.

D. GEN ABRAMS THEN ASKED MGEN TRUONG CONCERNING THE ENEMY SITUATION IN THE EASTERN SECTOR OF THE DMZ. COL GIAI, CO OF THE 2D ARVN REGT, RESPONDED FOR GEN TRUONG GIVING A GENERAL RUNDOWN AND PRESENTING THE CONCLUSION THAT THE EASTERN SECTOR WAS FAIRLY QUIET ALTHOUGH CONTACTS HAD BEEN MADE WITH SMALL GROUPS OF INFILTRATORS AND SAPPER ATTACKS. COL GIAI NOTED THAT THE 270TH NVA REGIMENT AND THE 31ST GROUP WERE STILL LOCATED ON THE EASTERN DMZ FRONT AND A PRISONER HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THE 27TH BN OF THE 31ST GROUP ONLY LAST WEEK. COL GIAI ALSO NOTED THE RALLYING OF A HOI CHANH WHO HAD FORMED THE INTENTION OF RALLYING IN HANOI AND HAD TRAVELED THE LENGTH OF NVN IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT HIS PLAN. IN HIS TRIP SOUTH THIS HOI CHANH ASSERTED THAT HE HAD SEEN ARTILLERY POSITIONS AND 700 TRUCKS, TWO ITEMS WHICH COULD POSSIBLY BE RELATED TO THE REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED CONCERNING A SUMMER-FALL OFFENSIVE.

E. QUESTIONS WERE ALSO RAISED BY COMUSMACV CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN WESTERN QUANG TRI. COL GIAI, WHO HAD RECENTLY OPERATED IN THE DA KRONG VALLEY, STATED HE ESTIMATED THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE 246TH NVA REGT IN THE NW QUADRANT OF QUANG TRI AND NOTED THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONTACT WITH THE 24B SOUTH OF ROUTE 9 FOR MORE THAN THREE WEEKS. COL CANTON REMARKED THAT ALL INDICATIONS POINTED TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE 24B REGIMENT TO THE EXTREME WESTERN QUANG TRI SALIENT AND POSSIBLY LAOS.

9. GEN ABRAMS LEFT APPARENTLY SATISFIED THAT PROPER ACTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN IN THE E/2/3 CONTACT AND HE WAS SATISFIED THAT THE MARINES HAD NOT BEEN CAUGHT SLEEPING, BUT HAD FOUGHT VALIANTLY AND WELL. I TALKED WITH REGT CO, BN CO AND E CO CO. I AGREE.

WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTED: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.

GP-4

27(3)

27(3)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 12 AUG 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 120025 AUG 69		COPY# 1,2,3 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT VISIT OF COMUSMACV TO III MAF ON 11 AUG 1969
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I				REMARKS (1) Feedback THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPO- SITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
4	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	8/12		CG 12/6	
	G-1					
5	G-2					
6	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

(28)

O 120725Z ZYM
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO CG USARV
 ZEM

S E C R E T/EYES ONLY
 FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 VISIT OF COMUSMACV TO III MAF ON 11 AUG 1969



1. COMUSMACV VISITED I CTZ ON THE MORNING OF 11 AUGUST. ARRIVING AT PHU BAI AT APPROXIMATELY 0930H, HE WAS MET BY LTGEN NICKERSON, CG III MAF, AND LTGEN ZAIS, CG XXIV CORPS. FROM PHU BAI THE PARTY PROCEEDED TO THE CP OF THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION AT DONG HA WHERE THEY WERE MET BY THE COMMANDING GENERAL, MGEN JONES AND THE CG OF THE FIRST ARVN DIVISION, MGEN TRUONG. IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL THE ENTIRE GROUP WAS BRIEFED BY THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION STAFF.

2. INITIAL PORTION OF THE BRIEFING

TREATED INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 13 JULY 1969 WHEN A BUILD-UP BEGAN TO BE DISCERNIBLE. SOUTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN DETECTIONS MADE BY SENSORS, IR, SLAR PLUS A FEW INSTANCES OF RECON OBSERVATION AND CONTACTS. AS BUT ONE EXAMPLE, THERE WERE 2,273 SENSOR DETECTIONS RECORDED DURING THE PERIOD 27 JULY-9 AUGUST. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE INCREASING INSTANCES OF RECON TEAMS BEING FIRED ON. DURING THE PERIOD 6-3 AUGUST THERE WERE HEAVY IR READINGS, SOME 293 EMISSIONS BEING RECORDED. THERE WERE NO SIGHTINGS IN THE SOUTHERN DMZ AS WELL AS TO THE WEST OF LZ CATAPULT (XD 326616) AND FSB NEVILLE (XD 793 573). THE OVERALL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE PICTURE WAS ONE QUITE SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH HAD BEEN EXPERIENCED WHEN THE 36TH NVA REGIMENT FIRST ENTERED THE CENTRAL DMZ AND WHEN THE 32TH NVA DIVISION OPERATED IN THIS AREA IN MID-1968.

28(1)

28(1)

3. THE 3D WAR DIV INTEL BRIEFER NOTED THAT IN THE CONTACTS WHICH HAD OCCURRED DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS IN THE CENTRAL BIZ, THE UNIT WHICH HAD BEEN ENGAGED WAS UNDOUBTEDLY THE 9TH REGIMENT OF THE 324TH NVA DIVISION. SEVENTEEN DOCUMENTS WERE TAKEN FROM THE BODIES OF NVA KIA ON THE BATTLEFIELD WHICH POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED THE PRESENCE OF AT LEAST TWO BATTALIONS OF THIS REGIMENT. IN ADDITION, PAPERS AND MARKINGS ON CLOTHING TENTATIVELY IDENTIFYING THE 24TH SAPPER COMPANY, 9TH NVA REGIMENT WERE FOUND ON BODIES IN A BUNKER. THE CONTENTION THAT THIS WAS A NEW UNIT WAS FURTHER ATTESTED TO BY THE FACT THAT WEAPONS TAKEN ON THE BATTLEFIELD WERE NEW AND SOME HAD NEVER BEEN FIRED. THE BODIES OF THE DEAD WERE CLAD IN RELATIVELY NEW UNIFORMS AND THE CORPSES WERE NOTED TO BE CLEAN-SHAVEN.

4. THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING WAS FOLLOWED BY AN OPERATIONAL BRIEFING COVERING THE ACTION WHICH TOOK PLACE ON THE 16TH. THE ATTACK COMMENCED AT 100215H AGAINST THE 3D PLATOON, "E" COMPANY, 2/3. TWELVE U.S. WERE KIA AND 53 MIA IN THIS ACTION WHILE THE NVA LOST 17 CONFIRMED KIA. IN A SEPARATE ATTACK WHICH OCCURRED AT 100615H, 1ST PLATOON, "E" COMPANY, 2/3 WAS ATTACKED IN THEIR POSITIONS TO THE WEST OF THE 3D PLATOON. THERE WERE NO U.S. CASUALTIES IN THIS ENGAGEMENT AND ENEMY CASUALTIES WERE UNKNOWN. HOWEVER, THE ATTACK AGAINST THE 3D PLATOON WAS RENEWED AT 0750H. IN THIS SECOND ATTACK, 6 U.S. WERE KIA AND 17 MIA WHILE THERE WERE 19 NVA KIA.

5. IN SUPPORT OF THIS OPERATION 2200 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY WERE FIRED FROM 093700 TO 100700 WITH AN ADDITIONAL 1200 ARTILLERY ROUNDS FIRED ON THE 16TH IN SUPPORT OF THIS ENGAGEMENT. SEVEN TOT'S WERE FIRED AND 700 ADDITIONAL ROUNDS OF ARTY WERE DELIVERED ON 12 TARGETS DEVELOPED BY INTELLIGENCE. CONCERNING AIR SUPPORT, 30 SORTIES WERE FLOWN ON THE 16TH AGAINST 15 TARGETS. SEVENTY-TWO X 500 LB BOMBS, 52 X 500 LB NAPALM CANISTERS AND 8 SPARROW MISSILES WERE FIRED ON THESE TARGETS. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE 23 TPO RONS DELIVERING 500 LB BOMBS FLOWN ON THE NIGHT OF THE 16TH AND 50 MORE TPO RONS FLOWN ON THE NIGHT OF THE 17TH WITH ALL REPORTING GOOD COVERAGE.

28(2)

28(2)

6. AS TO MED EVAC ALL WIA EMERGENCY EVACS WERE COMPLETED BY 1943H WITH THE BALANCE OF THE CASUALTIES REMOVED FROM THE FIELD PRIOR TO 1930H. MEDEVAC WAS COMPLICATED BY THE RECEIPT OF INCOMING FIRES IN ONE OF THE LZ'S SELECTED FOR EVACUATION.

7. COMMENTS MADE BY GENERAL ABRAMS:

A. COMUSMACV SPOKE TO THE PROBLEM OF B-52 STRIKE MISSIONS NOTING THAT THEY WERE CRITICAL RIGHT NOW AS WE HAVE GOOD INTELLIGENCE INDICATING THAT THE ENEMY INTENDS TO ATTACK IN THE III CORPS AREA WITH UP TO FOUR DIVISIONS AND THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS OF RENEWED ATTACKS WHICH MAY OCCUR IN THE HIGHLANDS OF II CORPS.

B. GEN ABRAMS QUERIED MGEN JONES AS TO WHAT COVERAGE HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE. COMUSMACV NOTED THAT IT APPEARED THAT GEN JONES HAD GOOD TARGETS SOUTH OF THE DMZ. GEN JONES RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE INDICATING THAT HE HAD UP TO 22 TARGETS RIGHT NOW. COMUSMACV REPLIED THAT UP TO 54 K B-52 SORTIES COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE ON A MAX COMPRESSION EFFORT. HOWEVER, GEN ABRAMS STATED THAT HE MUST REVIEW THE ENTIRE SITUATION AS REGARDS B-52 STRIKES.

C. ABOVE ALL, GEN ABRAMS NOTED THAT WHAT WAS CURRENTLY NEEDED WAS A REVIEW OF ALL THAT HAD TRANSPIRED AND THEN COME UP WITH A COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM WHICH WOULD TIE IN TACTICS AND ALL SUPPORTING ARMS INCLUDING ARTY AND TAC AIR. IN PREPARATION OF THIS PLAN THE QUESTION ARISES AS TO WHETHER WE WANT TO GO INTO THE SHDMZ TO ACCOMPLISH OUR MISSION. IF THE OVERALL SITUATION PERMITS AN OPERATION OF THIS NATURE, IT MUST BE DONE WITH GREAT DELIBERATENESS AND WITH A POWERFUL EFFORT, PREPARATIONS MUST BE IN DEPTH WITH A GOOD, REALISTIC CONCEPT. ACCORDINGLY, COMUSMACV DESIRED THAT RECOMMENDATIONS BE MADE ON THIS.

D. GEN ABRAMS THEN ASKED MGEN TRUONG CONCERNING THE ENEMY SITUATION IN THE EASTERN SECTOR OF THE DMZ. COL GIAI, CO THE 2D ARVN REGT, RESPONDED FOR GEN TRUONG GIVING A GENERAL RUNDOWN AND PRESENTING THE CONCLUSION THAT THE EASTERN SECTOR WAS FAIRLY QUIET ALTHOUGH CONTACTS HAD BEEN MADE WITH SMALL GROUPS OF INFILTRATORS AND SAPPER ATTACKS. COL GIAI NOTED THAT THE 270TH NVA REGIMENT AND THE 31ST GROUP WERE STILL LOCATED ON THE EASTERN DMZ FRONT AND A PRISONER HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THE 27TH BN OF THE 31ST GROUP ONLY LAST WEEK. COL GIAI ALSO NOTED THE RALLYING OF A HOI CHANH WHO HAD FORMED THE INTENTION OF RALLYING IN HANOI AND HAD TRAVELED THE LENGTH OF NVN IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT HIS PLAN. IN HIS TRIP SOUTH THIS HOI CHANH ASSERTED THAT HE HAD SEEN ARTILLERY POSITIONS AND 700 TRUCKS, TWO ITEMS WHICH COULD POSSIBLY BE RELATED TO THE REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED CONCERNING A SUMMER-FALL OFFENSIVE.

E. QUESTIONS WERE ALSO RAISED BY COMUSMACV CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN WESTERN QUANG TRI. COL GIAI, WHO HAD RECENTLY OPERATED IN THE DA KRONG VALLEY, STATED HE ESTIMATED THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE 246TH NVA REGT IN THE NW QUADRANT OF QUANG TRI AND NOTED THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONTACT WITH THE 24B SOUTH OF ROUTE 9 FOR MORE THAN THREE WEEKS. COL CANTON REMARKED THAT ALL INDICATIONS POINTED TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE 24B REGIMENT TO THE EXTREME WESTERN QUANG TRI SALIENT AND POSSIBLY LAOS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

880

28(3)

28(3)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 12 AUG 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 121011Z AUG 69		COPY # 1,2,3 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT (S) EYES ONLY FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LT GEN NICKERSON	
			IN	OUT			
3	CG		13	14		REMARKS <i>Subbook</i> THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPO- SITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.	
7	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	T					
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	I	8/12		CGE		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	SBC						

HAS BEEN SENT

(29)

SECRET

O 121011Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEM

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
A. YOUR 120724Z AUG69 (S)
1. NEITHER CAN I AND I HAVE BEEN TRYING ALL DAY
TO FIND OUT. WILL REPORT ASAP.
WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE : DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
GP-4-
070
1

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

29(11)

29(11)

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 13 AUG 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 0 121405Z		1,2,3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				LZ HAWK HILL ACTION
	DCG	I				REMARKS
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				HAS BEEN SENT
	DC/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	8/13			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

(30)

SECRET

O 121405Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG AMERICAL DIV
 ZEM

S E C R E T/EYES ONLY/FOR MGEN RAMSEY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 LZ HAWK HILL ACTION

A. YR 120835 AUG 69

1. REF A IS ACKNOWLEDGED.

2. HOWEVER, I DESIRE A MORE DETAILED DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AT HAWK HILL PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ENEMY ATTACK AS WELL AS ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE COURSE OF THE ATTACK.

3. SPECIFICALLY, AS A MINIMUM, ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE REQUESTED. WHAT WAS THE DETAILED DEFENSIVE PLAN? DID THE PLAN PROVIDE FOR LISTENING POSTS AND OUTPOSTS; IF SO WERE THEY MANNED AND HOW DID THEY REACT PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL ATTACK? WHAT WAS THE NORMAL PATROLLING PATTERN? DID THE PLAN PROVIDE FOR ADDITIONAL PATROLLING IN THE EVENT OF AN ALERT OR THE IMMINENT POSSIBILITY OF ATTACK? WHAT PATROLS WERE OUT PRIOR TO THE ATTACK? THE ADEQUACY OF INTERLOCKING FIRES ON THE DEFENSIVE PERIMETER? NATURE OF WARNING DEVICES IN THE PERIMETER, I.E., TRIP FLARES, FUGASSE, POWDER BAGS, ETC? WAS THE DEFENSIVE PLAN REHEARSED PREVIOUSLY? THE ADEQUACY IN NUMBER AND LOCATION OF FIGHTING HOLES AS DISTINGUISHED FROM LIVING BUNKERS? IT IS NOTED IN REF (A) THAT MOVEMENT WAS DETECTED AT 120005; IN ADDITION TO FIRES PLACED ON THE AREA OF MOVEMENT, WERE PATROLS OR REACTION FORCES DISPATCHED TO THE AREAS OF MOVEMENT?

4. USE OF A SKETCH MAP TO DEPICT THE DEFENSIVE PLAN IS SUGGESTED.

5. YOUR COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED CONCERNING THE DESIRABILITY OF UTILIZING ARMORED VEHICLES AS FIGHTING POSITIONS IN FIXED BASE DEFENSES. IN ADDITION, YOUR EVALUATION OF THE MANNER THE DEFENSE WAS CONDUCTED AND THE PERFORMANCE OF RESPONSIBLE COMMANDERS AT LOCATION

6. THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS REQUESTED BY 131022H
 (SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.)

GP-4

303

30(1)

30(1)

Memorandum

13 Aug 69

From: Commanding General

To: C/S

1. Send to COMUS

2. Act on OAC, OAC
discuss with MG. R.

L

NOT MADE A
DECISION YET
Pvt. →

He is about
for the
will.

called



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96374

13 Aug 69

Rec'd
N

AVDF-CG

13 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General Nickerson

SUBJECT: Sapper Attack at LZ HAWK HILL

Reference: a. My msg (C) 120835Z August Subj: Sapper attack at
LZ HAWK HILL.

b. Yr 121405Z August

1. The following information requested by Reference b is submitted:

a. Background

Placing the 2-1 Infantry at HAWK HILL was the initial step in relocating the 196th Brigade headquarters from LZ BALDY to HAWK HILL replacing the 1-1 Cavalry. The 1-1 Cavalry relinquished control of the AO to 196th Brigade effective 101200 August 1969. HAWK HILL was occupied by elements of 2-1 Infantry on 10 August and C/1-1 Cavalry was placed under operational control to 196th Brigade pending assumption of all missions by 196th Brigade. Prior to 10 August, the 1-1 Cavalry had provided for the defense of HAWK HILL.

b. Defensive Plan

On the night of 11-12 August the Cav Troop was integrated into the defenses (See sketch) pending readjustment of the perimeter to accommodate 2-1 Infantry and its organic weapons. The perimeter obstacles consist of double apron barbed wire fence plus a triple row of concertina. Claymore mines and trip flares were installed in and forward of the wire. Other devices such as fougasse and powder bags were not utilized. A reaction force of 15 EM and 1 officer was organized and briefed as to their duties. During the attack, which commenced at approximately 120230 August, the force was employed to secure the TOC and to assist in evacuating the wounded. Illumination and fire support was provided by 155mm artillery and 81mm mortar located on HAWK HILL. The Cav troop has had extensive rehearsals on the defense of HAWK HILL. The 2-1 Infantry had not conducted a rehearsal although all personnel had been briefed.

c. Patrols and LP

The plan of defense did not provide for listening posts outside of the perimeter but did provide for the alertness of personnel at each fighting

30

AVDF-CG

13 August 1969

SUBJECT: Sapper Attack at LZ HAWK HILL

position to strange sounds close to the wire. Listening posts are not practical because of the proximity of several villages close to the perimeter. In addition, the local PF forces patrol and establish ambushes nightly in the immediate vicinity of HAWK HILL. These forces are considered as part of the defense. (See sketch) Because of frequent night time patrols by the local PF in the vicinity no US patrols are dispatched from HAWK HILL during darkness. However, a very low level hover type patrol of the perimeter was conducted at last light by observation helicopters. The downwash of the rotor blades assist in the detection of enemy personnel who may be concealed in tall grass or shrubs. This technique of close in patrolling by air has proved effective.

d. Positions

There are a total of 38 fighting positions for both vehicles and dismounted troops. All fighting positions are located approximately 50 meters apart with clear fields of interlocking fire from 500 to 1000 meters to the front. Troop living bunkers are located near the fighting positions for quick response. There are about as many living bunkers for combat troops as fighting positions.

e. Reaction to initial enemy movement.

At 12005 August movement was detected on the southeast portion of the perimeter. Fire was placed in the area where movement had been observed. The unit was placed on 100 per cent alert. No patrols were sent into the area for reasons described in paragraph c above regarding PF ambushes.

f. Use of Armored Vehicles

Armored vehicles in defense of HAWK HILL was used since the preponderance of combat power stationed at HAWK HILL was armored cavalry. Each troop of armored cavalry was rotated weekly between defense of HAWK HILL and combat operations. The armored vehicle has the advantage of greater firepower, and communications but is vulnerable to close-in dismounted enemy attack without accompanying infantry. A combination of armor and infantry is most desirable force for defense. In my opinion the troop commander had too many men on the ACAV's and not enough men in fighting positions outside the ACAV's.

2. I am not at all satisfied with the manner in which the defense was conducted especially by the troop commander of C/1-1 Cavalry. The berm around the ACAV's were not up to the standard desired. As stated above, there were too many men on the ACAV's and not enough men in individual fighting positions. It also appears that when the initial movement occurred at 12005 August the commander at HAWK HILL, the Executive Officer 2-1 Infantry, placed his troops

AVDF-CG
SUBJECT: Sapper Attack at LZ HAWK HILL

13 August 1969

on 100 per cent alert but did not place C Troop, 1-1 Cavalry, which was under his operational control on a 100 per cent alert. There was some very excellent individual and heroic action accomplished but this does not replace a good organized defense. I have discussed this entire action with the Squadron Commander 1-1 Cavalry and have given him specific guidance as to how to improve his entire squadron. I am getting deeper into this problem with the 1-1 Cavalry Squadron Commander and with the 196th Brigade Commander who had a battalion taking over the defense of HAWK HILL.

3. There have been considerable confusion regarding combat losses of ACAV's. It seems that the troop commander and the squadron commander were using a different yardstick regarding what constituted a combat loss. As it stands now there were 3 ACAV's destroyed, 4 additional ACAV's were hit by RPG and one by a recoilless weapon. It appears that 4 of the 5 can be repaired. A technical inspection is being conducted. One mortar track was also hit by RPG and it appears that it can be repaired.


LOYD B. RAMSEY
Major General, USA
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 13AUG69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE O 121406Z AUG 69		COPY# 1-3 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
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3	CG	F				REMARKS (1) THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. HAS BEEN SENT RECEIVED THREE COPIES OF O 121406Z AUG 69 DTOR 130804 H AUG 69
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	SBC					

(31)

SECRET

O 121413Z ZYA
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FIRST MARDIV
ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY FOR MGEN SIMPSON FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
A. YR 120259Z AUG 69

1. REF (A) IS ACKNOWLEDGED.
2. HOWEVER, A MORE DETAILED DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN THE 1ST MARDIV HQS AREA IS REQUESTED.
3. REQUEST YOUR EVALUATION OF THE DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO INCLUDE SPECIFICALLY, YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE PATROLLING EFFORT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE ENEMY WAS ABLE TO COME INTO THE WIRE WITHOUT DETECTION, THAT HE WAS ABLE TO POSITION MORTARS IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS WITHOUT DETECTION, AND THAT HE WAS ABLE TO CLOSE TO A RANGE SUITABLE FOR FIRING RPG'S. WAS THE DEFENSIVE PLAN ADEQUATE? WAS IT IMPLEMENTED AGGRESSIVELY AND FULLY IN VIEW OF ATTACK WARNINGS, AND WERE APPROPRIATE REACTION MEASURES TAKEN ONCE ENEMY PRESENCE WAS DETECTED?

SSO NOTE: DELIVER FIRST WAKING HOUR.
GP-4
130

NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

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31 (1)

31 (1)

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		13 AUG 69	
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			130756Z AUG69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
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1	DCG AIR					
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	G-6					
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	CAP					
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	MTO					
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	S&C					

(32)

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SECRET

O 130756Z AUG 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 BT

S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LIGEN NICKERSON
 LZ HAWK HILL ACTION ON 12 AUGUST (C)

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED THIS DATE BY GENERAL RAMSEY IN RESPONSE TO A SERIES OF QUESTIONS FROM ME IN REGARD TO THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE OF HAWK HILL ON THE NIGHT OF 11-12 AUGUST.

2. (S) QUOTE.

A. BACKGROUND. PLACING THE 2-1 INFANTRY AT HAWK HILL WAS THE INITIAL STEP IN RELOCATING THE 196TH BRIGADE HEAD-QUARTERS FROM LZ BALDY TO HAWK HILL REPLACING THE 1-1 CAVALRY. THE 1-1 CAVALRY RELINQUISHED CONTROL OF THE AO TO 196TH BRIGADE EFFECTIVE 101200 AUGUST 1969. HAWK HILL WAS OCCUPIED BY ELEMENTS OF 2-1 INFANTRY ON 10 AUGUST AND C/1-1 CAVALRY WAS PLACED UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL TO 196TH BRIGADE PENDING ASSUMPTION OF ALL MISSIONS BY 196TH BRIGADE. PRIOR TO 10 AUGUST, THE 1-1 CAVALRY HAD PROVIDED FOR THE DEFENSE OF HAWK HILL.

B. DEFENSIVE PLAN. ON THE NIGHT OF 11-12 AUGUST THE CAV TROOP WAS INTEGRATED INTO THE DEFENSES PENDING READJUSTMENT OF THE PERIMETER TO ACCOMMODATE 2-1 INFANTRY AND ITS ORGANIC WEAPONS. THE PERIMETER OBSTACLES CONSIST OF DOUBLE APRON BARBED WIRE FENCE PLUS A TRIPLE ROW OF CONCERTINA. CLAYMORE MINES AND TRIP FLARES WERE INSTALLED IN AND FORWARD OF THE WIRE. OTHER DEVICES SUCH AS FOUASSE AND POWDER BAGS WERE NOT UTILIZED. A REACTION FORCE OF 15 EM AND 1 OFFICER WAS ORGANIZED AND BRIEFED AS TO THEIR DUTIES. DURING THE ATTACK, WHICH COMMENCED AT APPROXIMATELY 120230 AUGUST, THE FORCE WAS EMPLOYED TO SECURE THE TOC AND TO ASSIST IN EVACUATING THE WOUNDED. ILLUMINATION AND FIRE SUPPORT WAS PROVIDED BY 155MM ARTILLERY AND 81MM MORTAR LOCATED ON HAWK HILL. THE CAV TROOP HAS HAD EXTENSIVE REHEARSALS ON THE DEFENSE OF HAWK HILL. THE 2-1 INFANTRY HAD NOT CONDUCTED A REHEARSAL ALTHOUGH ALL PERSONNEL HAD BEEN BRIEFED.

C. PATROLS AND LP. THE PLAN OF DEFENSE DID NOT PROVIDE FOR LISTENING POSTS OUTSIDE OF THE PERIMETER BUT DID PROVIDE FOR THE ALERTNESS OF PERSONNEL AT EACH FIGHTING POSITION TO STRANGE SOUNDS CLOSE TO THE WIRE. LISTENING POSTS ARE NOT PRACTICAL BECAUSE OF THE PROXIMITY OF SEVERAL VILLAGES CLOSE TO THE PERIMETER. IN ADDITION, THE LOCAL PF FORCES PATROL AND ESTABLISH AMBUSHES NIGHTLY IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF HAWK HILL. THESE FORCES ARE CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE DEFENSE. BECAUSE OF FREQUENT NIGHT TIME PATROLS BY THE LOCAL PF IN THE VICINITY NO U.S. PATROLS ARE DISPATCHED FROM HAWK HILL DURING DARKNESS. HOWEVER, A VERY LOW LEVEL HOVER TYPE PATROL OF THE PERIMETER WAS CONDUCTED AT LAST LIGHT BY OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS. THE DOWNWASH OF THE ROTOR BLADES ASSIST IN THE DETECTION OF ENEMY PERSONNEL WHO MAY BE CONCEALED IN TALL GRASS OR SHRUBS. THIS TECHNIQUE OF CLOSE-IN PATROLLING BY AIR HAS PROVED EFFECTIVE.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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D. POSITIONS. THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 38 FIGHTING POSITIONS FOR BOTH VEHICLES AND DISMOUNTED TROOPS. ALL FIGHTING POSITIONS ARE LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 50 METERS APART WITH CLEAR FIELDS OF INTERLOCKING FIRE FROM 500 TO 1000 METERS TO THE FRONT. TROOP LIVING BUNKERS ARE LOCATED NEAR THE FIGHTING POSITIONS FOR QUICK RESPONSE. THERE ARE ABOUT AS MANY LIVING BUNKERS FOR COMBAT TROOPS AS FIGHTING POSITIONS.

E. REACTION TO INITIAL ENEMY MOVEMENT. AT 120005 AUGUST MOVEMENT WAS DETECTED ON THE SOUTHEAST PORTION OF THE PERIMETER. FIRE WAS PLACED IN THE AREA WHERE MOVEMENT HAD BEEN OBSERVED. THE UNIT WAS PLACED ON 100 PER CENT ALERT. NO PATROLS WERE SENT INTO THE AREA FOR REASON DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH C ABOVE REGARDING PF AMBUSHES.

F. USE OF ARMORED VEHICLES. ARMORED VEHICLES IN DEFENSE OF HAWK HILL WAS USED SINCE THE PREPONDERANCE OF COMBAT POWER STATIONED AT HAWK HILL WAS ARMORED CAVALRY. EACH TROOP OF ARMORED CAVALRY WAS ROTATED WEEKLY BETWEEN DEFENSE OF HAWK HILL AND COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE ARMORED VEHICLE HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF GREATER FIREPOWER, AND COMMUNICATIONS BUT IS VULNERABLE TO CLOSE-IN DISMOUNTED ENEMY ATTACK WITHOUT ACCOMPANYING INFANTRY. A COMBINATION OF ARMOR AND INFANTRY IS MOST DESIRABLE FORCE FOR DEFENSE. IN MY OPINION THE TROOP COMMANDER HAD TOO MANY MEN ON THE ACAV'S AND NOT ENOUGH MEN IN FIGHTING POSITIONS OUTSIDE THE ACAV'S.

G. CONCLUSIONS. I AM NOT AT ALL SATISFIED WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH THE DEFENSE WAS CONDUCTED ESPECIALLY BY THE TROOP COMMANDER OF C/1-1 CAVALRY. THE BERMS AROUND THE ACAV'S WERE NOT UP TO THE STANDARD DESIRED. AS STATED ABOVE, THERE WERE TOO MANY MEN ON THE ACAV'S AND NOT ENOUGH MEN IN INDIVIDUAL FIGHTING POSITIONS. IT ALSO APPEARS THAT WHEN THE INITIAL MOVEMENT OCCURRED AT 120305 AUGUST THE COMMANDER AT HAWK HILL, THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER 2-1 INFANTRY, PLACED HIS TROOPS ON 100 PER CENT ALERT BUT DID NOT PLACE C TROOP, 1-1 CAVALRY, WHICH WAS UNDER HIS OPERATIONAL CONTROL, ON A 100 PER CENT ALERT. THERE WAS SOME VERY EXCELLENT INDIVIDUAL AND HEROIC ACTION ACCOMPLISHED BUT THIS DOES NOT REPLACE A GOOD ORGANIZED DEFENSE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS ENTIRE ACTION WITH THE SQUADRON COMMANDER 1-1 CAVALRY AND HAVE GIVEN HIM SPECIFIC GUIDANCE AS TO HOW TO IMPROVE HIS ENTIRE SQUADRON. I AM GETTING DEEPER INTO THIS PROBLEM WITH THE 1-1 CAVALRY SQUADRON COMMANDER AND WITH THE 196TH BRIGADE COMMANDER WHO HAD A BATTALION TAKING OVER THE DEFENSE OF HAWK HILL. UNQUOTE.

3. (S) IT IS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT THERE WERE SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES BOTH IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSIVE PLAN AND THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE PRIOR TO THE INITIATION OF THE ENEMY ATTACK AS WELL AS DURING THE ATTACK. I HAVE MADE MY VIEWS KNOWN TO GENERAL RAMSEY AND DIRECTED IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION.

LIGEN NICKERSON.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

32/21

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 15 AUG 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 151420Z AUG 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
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(33)

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PTTSZYUW RHMAFA2076 2271420-SSSS--RUMHLA

ZNY SSSSS

P 151420Z AUG 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN SIMPSON FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
1ST MARDIV CP DEFENSIVE PLAN (U)

A. CG 1ST MARDIV 140230Z AUG 69

1. (S) I HAVE EXAMINED THE 1ST MARDIV DEFENSIVE PLAN FOR THE DIV HQ
AREA. I CONSIDER IT TO BE TACTICALLY SOUND AND ADEQUATE TO THE
CURRENT SITUATION.2. (S) MY EVALUATION IS THAT THE 1ST MARDIV REACTION TO THE ATTACK
BY FIRE AND SAPPER ELEMENTS DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 12AUG69
WAS SATISFACTORY.3. (S) PROVIDING THE PRISONERS FROM THE 31ST NVA REGIMENT ARE
TELLING THE TRUTH, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE HOA VAN DISTRICT CHIEF,
THROUGH HIS DOICC AND OTHER RESOURCES, HAS NOT EFFECTIVELY PURSUED
THE ANTI-VCI ELIMINATION PROGRAM. IN THIS REGARD, I AM DIRECTING
CORDS TO REVIEW THIS SITUATION AND IMPLEMENT IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE
ACTION.

GP-4

BT

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

2076

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

33/11

SECRET

TOP SECRET

PITIZYUW RHMMFA2262 2290254-TITI--RUHFMA.

ZNY TITIT

P 170254Z AUG 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

TOP SECRET/FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN

NICKERSON/LIMDIS/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:

P 151051Z AUG 69

FM COMUSMACV

TO ZEN/CG USARV LONG BINH

ZEN/COMNAVFORV

RUSVDB/CG III MAF DANANG

BT

TOP SECRET LIMDIS 47025 (J)

SUBJ: COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT IN I CTZ (U)

REF: A. COMUSMACV 41882 DTD 190434Z JUL 69 (C).

B. COMNAVFORV 100712Z JUL 69 (S) NOTAL.

C. MACV BOOKLET CONTROL NBR 0002516-69 (TS).

1. (U) THE JOINT WORKING GROUP CONVENED BY REFERENCE A IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCE B HAS COMPLETED ITS STUDY. THE WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION FOR TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT IN I CTZ IS IN CONSONANCE WITH APPROVED PLAN, REFERENCE C.

2. (TS) IN ADDITION TO THE GUIDANCE OF REFERENCE C, THE FOLLOWING WILL APPLY WHEN DEVELOPING DETAILED PLANS FOR THE TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUBJECT SUPPORT:

A. THE TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT

PAGE 2 RUSVDE 9102 TOP SECRET LIMDIS

IN I CTZ IS TO BE EFFECTED DURING PHASE SIX UPON COMPLETION OF REDEPLOYMENT OF MARINE COMBAT FORCES.

B. U.S. ARMY IS TO PLAN TO TAKE OVER AND MAN ONLY THOSE FACILITIES AND FUNCTIONS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT TO RESIDUAL FORCES, OR THAT ARE NEEDED BY ARMY DURING ROLL-UP PHASE.

C. U.S. NAVY IS TO PLAN TO PHASE OUT AND DISPOSE OF FACILITIES AND MATERIAL NOT REPEAT NOT REQUIRED BY U.S. ARMY.

D. CG III MAF IS TO COORDINATE TIMING OF TRANSFER OF ANY FUNCTION WITH CONSIDERATION TO TACTICAL SITUATION IN I CTZ.

E. EACH SERVICE IS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR RETROGRADE OR DISPOSAL OF ITS OWN EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL. UNQUOTE:

GP-4

BT

2262

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

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OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 17 AUG 1969	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 170256Z AUG 69		COPY# OF COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN OUT		INITIAL	SUBJECT SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR	
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4. THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT. ORIG: AC/S G-4 REL: CG EXCLUSIVE FOR <i>Cy#3 to G-4 17 2100H Aug 69 in 172200H Aug</i> HAS BEEN SENT <i>Cy#1 in ICT2 SpA file Cy#2 in ICT2 SpA file book #3</i> 24 TOP SECRET	
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TOP SECRET

PTTIZYUW RHMAFA2263 2290256-TTTT--RUHFMA.
 ZNY TTTT
 P 170256Z AUG 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 BT

T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM
 LTGEN NICKERSON.

COMMON SUPPORT SYSTEM IN ICTZ (U)

A. MY MSG 060258Z AUG 69

1. (TS) THE DANANG MEETING REFERRED TO IN REF A WAS COM-
 PLETED ON THE 8TH AND PRODUCED ANOTHER STAFF STUDY.
 THERE WERE SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES DERIVED AND
 DEFINED IN SOME DETAIL BUT THE FIRST TWO WERE
 THE MOST IMPORTANT. THE FIRST (A) IS "NAVY
 RETAINS RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT
 THROUGH ROLL-UP, THEN A COMPREHENSIVE TRANSFER TO
 USARV OR ARMY ELEMENT IN MAAG IS EFFECTED". AL-
 TERNATIVE (B) "COMPREHENSIVE TRANSFER IN PHASE
 VI UPON COMPLETION OF REDEPLOYMENT OF MARINE COM-
 BAT FORCES". AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DANANG
 MEETING THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF AGREEMENT BY

PAGE TWO RHMAFA2263 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 THE ARMY OR THE NAVY ON EITHER OF THESE TWO AL-
 TERNATIVES.

2. (TS) MACV CALLED FOR A MEETING IN SAIGON TO
 FURTHER DISCUSS THE ALTERNATIVES AND AC IEVE AN
 AGREEMENT, IF POSSIBLE. AT THE MEETING IN SAIGON
 ON 12 AUGUST CHAIRED BY J-4 PLANS AND ATTENDED BY
 MY G-4, AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED THAT ALTERNATIVE
 (B) WOULD BE PURSUED AND THAT THE FOLLOWING WOULD
 APPLY IN DEVELOPING DETAILED PLANS FOR THE TRANSFER
 OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ICTZ COMMON SUPPORT.

A. THE TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMMON SERVICE
 SUPPOT IN ICTZ IS TO BE EFFECTED DURING PHASE SIX
 UPON COMPLETION OF REDEPLOYMENT OF MARINE COMBAT
 FORCES.

B. U.S. ARMY IS TO PLAN TO TAKE OVER AND MAN ONLY
 THOSE FACILITIES AND FUNCTIONS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE
 COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT TO RESIDUAL FORCES, OR THAT
 ARE NEEDED BY ARMY DURING ROLL-UP PHASE.

C. U.S. NAVY IS TO PLAN TO PHASE OUT AND DISPOSE
 OF FACILITIES AND MATERIAL NOT REQUIRED

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA2263 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BY U.S. ARMY.

D. CG III MAF IS TO COORDINATE TIMING OF TRANSFER OF ANY FUNCTION WITH CONSIDERATION TO TACTICAL SITUATION IN ICTZ.

E. EACH SERVICE IS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR RETRO-GRADE OR DISPOSAL OF IT'S OWN EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL. THE ARMY AND NAVY REPS AGREED TO THESE POINTS AS WELL AS TO ALTERNATIVE "B" FOR ALL FUTURE PLANNING PURPOSES. WE REITERATED OUR POSITION THAT NO DISRUPTION OR LOSS OF CONTINUITY COULD BE TOLERATED UNTIL AFTER ALL MARINE COMBAT FORCES HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN, AND THAT AS LONG AS III MAF COMMANDED OPERATIONS IN ICTZ WE REQUIRED AND EXPECTED THE NAVY COMMON SUPPORT SYSTEM TO REMAIN VIABLE AND IN PLACE.

3. (TS) IN VIEW OF THE APPARENT AGREEMENT BY THE NAVY TO DROP THEIR HOT PURSUIT OF AN EARLY DEPARTURE FROM ICTZ, AND THE FACT THAT THE MACV STAFF NOW HAS A CLEAR LINE TO FOLLOW IN PLANNING FOR THE ULTIMATE TURN OVER OF THE COMMON SUPPORT SYSTEM HERE IN ICTZ,

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA2263 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR I AM A LITTLE MORE COMFORTABLE. HOWEVER I INTEND TO FOLLOW UP AT ALL STAGES TO SEE THAT THE MACV PLANS STAY ON THE TRACK AND TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS.

4. (TS) RELATED TO THE ABOVE, ON 13 AUG RADM BONNER DROPPED IN TO SEE GEORGE DOOLEY AND STATED THAT THE NAVY HAD REVIEWED THEIR POSITION ON COMMON SUPPORT FOR I CORPS, AND THAT THEY HAD DECIDED TO STAY UNTIL THE MARINES HAD LEFT. BONNER STATED THAT THEY HAD SOME BACK CHANNELS FROM JOHNNY HYLAND AND ADN BAUMBERGER. APPARENTLY THEY HAD DIRECTED HIM TO FALL OFF OF THE NAVY POSITION.

5. (TS) ON THE 14TH OF AUG I WAS UP NORTH AND BUD ZUMWALT WAS IN TO SEE GEORGE BOWMAN. HE ALSO STOPPED BY GEORGE DOOLEY'S OFFICE AND STATED THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED IN SAIGON TO SUPPORT OPTION B MENTIONED ABOVE. HE ASKED IF THE MARINES AGREED AND GEORGE SAID, YES; ZUMWALT STATED THAT THE ARMY AGREED ALSO. HE FELT THAT THE MARINES WERE THE WINNERS IN THIS DEAL. WE TOLD HIM THAT WE DIDN'T CONSIDER IT A VICTORY, BUT RATHER THE PROPER COURSE OF

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFA2263 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ACTION TO FOLLOW.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2263

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

24/2)
TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

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ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT EXCLUSIVE FOR
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPO- SITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. ORIG C/S REF CG EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT CONFIDENTIAL
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(34)

CONFIDENTIAL

P 171016Z AUG 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ROSSON
 FROM LIGEN NICKERSON
 SNIPER RIFLES FOR ARVN

A. DSA IGTZ DNG 291300Z JUL 69

B. MACV LTR MACMA-AL OF 7 AUG 69, SUBJ: REQUEST
 FOR SNIPER EQUIPMENT (AU)

C. CG III MAF 110856Z AUG 69

1. BY REF A, I SUBMITTED A REQUEST THAT SNIPER RIFLES WITH SCOPES BE AUTHORIZED FOR THE SNIPER PROGRAM FOR ARVN FORCES IN I CORPS. REF B DISAPPROVED THIS REQUEST STATING THAT THE VALUE OF THE SNIPER TEAMS DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE JUSTIFIED AS AN OPERATIONAL NECESSITY IN VIEW OF THE MACV POLICY FOR UPGRADING ARVN DIVISIONAL UNITS. THE POLICY IS: QUOTE NO NEW EQUIPMENT ABOVE THAT PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED IS TO BE INTRODUCED INTO ARVN UNITS. EMPHASIS FOR THE PRESENT IS TO BE ON DEVELOPING MAXIMUM PROFICIENCY WITH PRESENT EQUIPMENT TO INCLUDE THE IMPROVEMENT OF MAINTENANCE STANDARDS UNQUOTE.
2. I WOULD SAY THAT MY REQUEST MEETS THE DEFINITION OF OPERATIONAL NECESSITY AND ONE THAT WILL BE MORE CRITICAL IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
3. PRIOR TO THE RECEIPT OF REF B, I SUBMITTED REF C REQUESTING GEN ABRAMS ASSISTANCE. REF C WAS SUBMITTED BECAUSE OF INFORMATION I HAD RECEIVED INDICATING THAT YOUR STAFF BELIEVED THAT GEN ABRAMS WAS NOT IN FAVOR OF THIS PROPOSAL.
4. IN TALKING WITH YOU THE OTHER DAY, I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY TRUE AND THAT GEN ABRAMS SUPPORTS THE PROGRAM. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I REQUEST THAT RECONSIDERATION OF REF B. ANY ASSISTANCE YOU MAY PROVIDE WILL BE DEEPLY APPRECIATED.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

34 (1)

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 18AUG69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE O 180545Z AUG 69		COPY# 1-4 OF 7 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTL- REMARKS VITIES. <i>Feedback</i> HAS BEEN SENT FOUR RECEIVED THE COPIES OF O 180545Z AUG 69 DTOR <u>18</u> H AUG 69 HAS BEEN SENT (37) SECRET
	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	S/18			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

0 180545Z ZYM
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY FOR MOEN TOWNSEND FROM LT GEN NICKERSON
SUBJ: COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

A. IR MSG MAC 10405 DIG 100902Z AUG69

1. THE FOLLOWING SYSTEM IS USED TO ENSURE AN EXCHANGE OF
INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN PSA'S AND DSA'S:

A. PSA'S AND DSA'S ROUTE COPIES OF ALL ROUTINE AND SPECIAL
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO EACH OTHER TO INCLUDE DAILY AND
PERIODIC INSUM'S.

B. SCHEDULED INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS ARE NOT CONDUCTED WITH
PSA'S AND DSA'S ATTENDING; HOWEVER, TWO PSA'S AND DSA'S ATTEND A
WEEKLY STAFF MEETING HELD BY THEIR COUNTERPARTS WHICH INCLUDES
INTELLIGENCE.

C. FREQUENT MEETINGS ARE HELD BETWEEN PSA'S AND DSA'S TO
INCLUDE OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION MEETINGS AND PERSONAL
VISITS.

D. PSA'S ROUTE ALL REQUIRED 1 CORPS HQ ADVISORY TEAM
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THROUGH THE RESPECTIVE DIVISION ADVISORY
IOC'S.

E. PROVINCE AND DIVISION INTELLIGENCE AND LIAISON
PERSONNEL FREQUENTLY VISIT EACH OTHER AND TRADE INTELLIGENCE.

2. THERE ARE NO DIA ADVISORY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.

3. THE CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE SYSTEM CONSISTS OF:

A. REQUIRING THAT 1 CORPS HQ ADVISORY TEAM INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS BE REPORTED THRU DIVISION ADVISORY IOC'S.

B. CONDUCTING FREQUENT COMMAND AND STAFF INSPECTIONS/
VISITS TO PROVINCE AND DIVISION ADVISORY TEAMS.

4. I HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING THE ADVISORS TO LET THE ARVN'S
CONDUCT THEIR OWN OPERATIONAL MATTERS. THEREFORE, I RECOMMEND
THAT ANY EMPHASIS ON THE ADVISORY INTELLIGENCE EFFORT BE
DISCOURAGED. I WOULD PREFER TO CONCENTRATE ON IMPROVING THE
PROVINCE CHIEF/DIVISION COMMANDER'S FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE AND
ON REDUCING THE OPERATIONAL AND REPORTING BURDENS OF THE
ADVISORS.

Gr-4
311

SSU NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS



37(1)

37(1)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		19 AUG 1969	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY#	
			190704Z AUG 1969		4 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	F				REMARKS ORIG: G-3 PROG REL: G-3 HAS BEEN SENT
4	DCG	F				
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	F				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	F	8/20			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

(38)

SECRET

SECRET

PTISZYUW RHMAFA2567 2310704-SSSS--RUHFMA RUEBHOA.

ZNY SSSSS

FMFPAC -I- CMC

P 190704Z AUG 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUEBHOA/CMC

BT

SECRET

JCS SPONSORED OPSEC (PURPLE DRAGON) CONFERENCE (U)

A. CMC 120018Z AUG 69

B. JCS 082347Z AUG 69

C. CG III MAF 100002Z AUG 69 (PASEP)

D. CG III MAF 110506Z AUG 69 (PASEP)

E. III MAF FORO 05510.4 (PASEP)

1. (S) FOR FMFPAC G-3. FOR CMC A03H. REF A PASSED REF B TO THIS COMD FOR INFO, INDICATED INVITATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SUBJECT CONFERENCE WILL BE ISSUED THROUGH UNIFIED COMD CHANNELS AND FURTHER REQUESTED CMC BE INCLUDED AS INFO ON RESPONSES TO PAR 5 OF REF B.
2. (S) TO DATE, THIS COMMAND HAS NOT BEEN INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SUBJECT CONFERENCE, THROUGH UNIFIED COMD CHANNELS. HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION TO BE PRESENTED BY FMFPAC REPRESENTATIVE:

July = being serviced by comm

PAGE TWO RHMAFA2567 SECRET

A. ON 22 AND 30 ~~AUG~~ ^{JUL} 69, THE III MAF OPSEC PANEL CONVENED TO DETERMINE THE PROPER APPROACH TO CORRECT OPSEC WEAKNESSES IN THE PLANNING OF OPS WHICH REQUIRE COORD WITH RVNAF, RF, PF, NP, NPFF, RDC AND PRU, PARTICULARLY IN SUPPORT OF PHASE II ACCELERATED PACIFICATION EFFORTS.

B. REF C AND REF D WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSMITTED TO III MAF MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS FOR ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE.

C. A COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE III MAF OPSEC PANEL MEETINGS OF 22 AND 30 JUL 69 AND A COPY OF THE III MAF OPSEC ORDER, REF E, ARE BEING FORWARDED BY MAIL FOR AMPLIFYING INFORMATION.

GP-4

BT

2567

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AIRBORNE FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 28 AUG 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE P 200241Z AUG 69		COPY 4, 2, 3 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	I	27 Aug		AS	VISIT OF SECRETARY OF THE ARMY RESOR (A) REMARKS (1) Rec'd THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. C/S - → Gen Bunker
3	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			AS	
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	8/20		CHD AS	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

CONFIDENTIAL

(40)

P 200241Z

FM CG III MAF
TO CG AMERICAL DIV
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L EYES ONLY FOR MGEN RAMSEY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
SUBJECT: VISIT OF SECRETARY OF THE ARMY RESOR (C)

1. FOL MESSAGE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND ACTION AS
APPROPRIATE:
QUOTE

O 181229Z ZFF-6 ZFF 3
FM MG TOWNSEND COFS MACV SAIGON
TO LTG MILDREN DCG USARV
LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF
LTG CORCORAN CG I FFV
LTG EWELL CG II FFV
MG WETHERILL CG DMAC
INFO LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS
ZEM



C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 10708 EYES ONLY
SUBJECT: VISIT OF SECRETARY OF THE ARMY RESOR (C)

1. SECRETARY RESOR HAS GIVEN HIS CONCURRENCE TO THE PROPOSED ITINERARY WITH A FEW MODIFICATIONS. THESE ARE:
 - A. DELETE THE VISIT TO THE THAIS ON 22 AUGUST. EXTEND THE VISIT TO THE 18TH ARVN AND THE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION.
 - B. VISIT THE 196TH BDE DURING VISIT TO AMERICAL DIVISION.
 - C. VISIT THE 3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV, DURING THE VISIT TO THE 4TH INF DIV.
2. MR. RESOR HAS INDICATED TO COMUSMACV:
 - A. THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE USEFULNESS OF THE SENSORS IN THE DUFFLE BAG/TIGHT JAW PROGRAM. HE HAS READ THE FIELD REPORTS AND REALIZES THEY HAVE BEEN WELL RECEIVED BY THE FIELD COMMANDERS. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE COST OF THE PROGRAM, HE WOULD LIKE TO BE BETTER INFORMED WHEN CALLED UPON TO DEFEND THE PROGRAM DURING BUDGET REVIEWS.
 - B. THAT HE HAS RECEIVED NUMEROUS INQUIRIES FROM THE DEPUTY SECDEF CONCERNING THE SCOPE OF THE LOC PROGRAM. HE WILL BE DISCUSSING ANY CHANGES IN SCOPE UNDER CONSIDERATION AS A PART OF THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM.
3. COMUSMACV HAS DIRECTED THAT MR. RESOR'S PREFERENCES IN THE MATTER OF BRIEFINGS BE RE-EMPHASIZED. MR RESOR PREFERS:
 - A. A MINIMUM NUMBER OF PEOPLE PRESENT DURING A BRIEFING.
 - B. BRIEFERS WITH WHOM HE CAN DISCUSS THE SUBJECT RATHER THAN JUST LISTEN.
 - C. THE AVOIDANCE OF CANNED BRIEFINGS. OPERATIONAL MAPS PROVIDE THE ONLY BACKDROP NEEDED FOR THE DISCUSSIONS BELOW CORPS LEVEL.
 - D. INFORMALITY.
4. REQUEST THAT THE FOREGOING PREFERENCES BE METICULOUSLY FOLLOWED.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
UNQUOTE

40(1)

40(1)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		22 AUGUST 1969	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
			220058Z AUG 1969			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				F-0-R REMARKS <i>Feedback</i> ORIG: G-2 REL: CG
	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S DM					
1	S/S	I	8/22		<i>CONS</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	COMP					
	CORDS					
	DENT					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	HQS CO					
	INSP					
	ISO					
	LEGAL					
	MTO					
	MED					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	REPRO					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

43

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLAS

PP RUSVDE
 DE RUSVDB 2936 2340058
 ZNR UUUUU
 P 220058Z AUG 69 ZFF-6
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV
 BT

UNCLAS
 FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 VIP FUNDS

1. I HAVE JUST COMPLETED A REVIEW OF THE RECENTLY IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON VOLUNTEER INFORMANT PROGRAM (VIP) EXPENDITURES TO INCLUDE IN DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS. IT IS MY CONCLUSION THAT THE LOSS OF VIP FUNDS WILL BE DIRECTLY REFLECTED IN AN INCREASE IN CASUALTIES FROM MINE, BOOBY TRAPS AND OTHER EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.
2. I CORPS MINE AND BOOBY TRAP CASUALTIES FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS AMOUNTED TO 5,161 OF WHOM 547 WERE KILLED. THE BULK OF THESE CASUALTIES WERE CAUSED BY CONVENTIONAL ORDNANCE RIGGED AS MINES.
3. RECOGNIZING THE SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF CASUALTIES FROM MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS, WE HAVE ORIENTED OUR VIP EFFORT TOWARD COLLECTING ORDNANCE WHICH COULD LATER BE REDIRECTED

- PAGE TWO RUSVDB 2936 UNCLAS
- AGAINST OUR FORCES AS VC MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS. BY PROVIDING VIP FUNDS, WE HAVE DECENTRALIZED THE ORDNANCE COLLECTION EFFORT AND INVOLVED EACH SOLDIER AND MARINE IN THE CAMPAIGN TO REDUCE THIS VERY REAL MINE THREAT. WITH FULL COMMAND SUPPORT AND A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PSYOPS PROGRAM WE HAVE PROSECUTED THE VIP EFFORT TO THE UTMOST.
4. OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS WE HAVE COLLECTED THROUGH THE VIP 25,449 PIECES OF ORDNANCE WHICH COULD BE RIGGED AS A MINE. DURING THE SAME PERIOD FORCES IN ICTZ HAVE AVERAGED NEARLY 1.4 CASUALTIES PER MINE INCIDENT (THIS FIGURE INCLUDES MINE BOTH NEUTRALIZED AND DETONATED). APPLYING THIS FIGURE TO THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF MINE AND BOOBY TRAP ITEMS TAKEN PER MONTH UNDER THE VIP WE CAN CONCLUDE THAT THE VIP EFFORT CONTRIBUTES TO THE PREVENTION OF UP TO 5,900 CASUALTIES PER MONTH. I REALIZE, OF COURSE, THAT NOT EVERY ITEM OF ORDNANCE ACQUIRED THROUGH THE VIP, WHICH COULD BE USED AS A MINE, WOULD IF NOT RECOVERED, ULTIMATELY BE USED AS A MINE IN EACH CASE. BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT THESE FIGURES STRONGLY POINT OUT THE SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL OF THE VOLUNTEER INFORMANT PROGRAM.
 5. THE REDUCTION IN THE AVAILABILITY OF VIP FUNDS PRESENTS THIS

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

UNCLAS

42/11

UNCLAS

PAGE THREE RUSVDB 2936 UNCLAS

COMMAND AND OTHERS, WITH A MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM. WE ARE PLACED IN A POSITION WHERE WE MUST REDUCE THE SCOPE OF A PROGRAM WHICH WE KNOW, BOTH AT THE COMMAND LEVEL AND AT THE TROOP LEVEL, HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN REDUCING CASUALTIES.

6. I REALIZE THAT THE VIP FUNDS ARE DERIVED FROM INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FUNDS (ICF), AND IT MAY BE THAT THE VIP EFFORT AS APPLIED TO ORDNANCE COLLECTION IS A MISAPPLICATION OF THIS PARENT FUND. HOWEVER, THIS IS A PROGRAM WHICH PRODUCES TANGIBLE RESULTS IN OUR CONTINUING MAJOR EFFORT TO SAVE LIVES WHILE ENGAGED IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT. I BELIEVE THAT THERE MUST CERTAINLY BE ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF FUNDS FROM WHICH THIS PROGRAM CAN BE SUPPORTED.

7. I ASK THAT YOU AND YOUR STAFF EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY FUNDING TO ENABLE US TO CONTINUE THIS MOST EFFECTIVE CASUALTY REDUCTION EFFORT THROUGH THE VOLUNTARY INFORMANT PROGRAM.

BT

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

UNCLAS

42(2)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 22 AUGUST 1969	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 220122Z AUG 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT F-0-R
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I	22 Aug			REMARKS <i>Feedback</i> THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. ORIG: DC/S REL: CG FOR WAS BEEN SENT
	DCG	I	22 Aug		YS	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
2	DC/S	I				
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	8/22			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	CORDS		8/24	8/24		
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTTCZYUW RHMMFA2940 2340122-CCCC--RUMLBPA RUMMLA RUMLLIA
RUMLMHA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 220122Z AUG 69 ZFF-6

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PH3

RUMMLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG

RUMLLIA/CG AMERICAL DIV CHL

RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAU DNG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / F O R L I G E N Z A I S , M G E N S I M P S O N , M G E N R A M S E Y
A N D M G E N T H R A S H F R O M L I G E N N I C K E R S O N

S A F E T Y O F V I S I T O R S

1. DURING THE PAST MONTH THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT
INCREASE IN ALL PROVINCES OF I CORPS IN ENEMY ANTIAIRCRAFT
ACTIVITY. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY
HAS PASSED INSTRUCTIONS TO CONCENTRATE ON HELICOPTERS.
WITH AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF OUR HELICOPTERS LOST
TO ENEMY ACTION, I AM CONCERNED FOR THE SAFETY OF THE
LARGE NUMBER OF DISTINGUISHED VISITORS WE HAVE TRAVELING
IN I CORPS. I WOULD LIKE EACH OF YOU TO CAREFULLY
CONSIDER THE AREAS WHERE VIPS ARE TAKEN AND SELECT THOSE
PLACES WHERE WE CAN FULFILL THEIR DESIRES YET NOT NEED-

PAGE TWO RHMMFA2940 C O N F I D E N T I A L
LESSLY EXPOSE THEM TO POSSIBLE HOSTILE FIRE. WITH THE
ADVENT OF THE MONSOON SEASON, WEATHER SHOULD ALSO BE A
STRONG CONSIDERATION IN SELECTION OF AREAS TO BE VISITED.

GP-4

BT

2940

HEADQUARTERS
II MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 22 AUG 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 221030Z AUG 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT F-0-R
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ORIG AS/S REL S/S FOR HAS BEEN SENT TO MGEN THRASH c/s directed s/s released <i>(44)</i> SECRET
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	8/22			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

SECRET.

ZNY SSSSS
 P 221030Z AUG 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW
 BT

S E C R E T/FOR MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 1. THE FOL MSGS ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

P 100230Z AUG 69 ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHGSF/COMSEVENTHFLT
 BT

S E C R E T

OPCON OF SLF HELO SQDNS (U)

A. MY 230520Z JUL 69

B. COMSEVENTHFLT 300042Z JUL 69.

PERSONAL FOR VADM BRINGLE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. (S) REF A DISCUSSED A RECOMMENDATION MADE BY A RECENT BOARD CONVENED BY THIS HQS TO EXAMINE THE UTILIZATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MARINE CORPS HELICOPTER ASSETS IN III MAF TO THE EFFECT THAT THE HMM ORGANIC TO AN SLF BE SIMULTANEOUSLY CHOPPED

PAGE 2 RHMAFA 3003 **S E C R E T**

TO 1ST MAW WHEN THE SLF BLT OPERATES ASHORE UNDER OPCON OF ONE OF THE MARINE DIVISIONS. REF B INDICATES YOUR NONCONCURRENCE.

2. (S) I CERTAINLY AGREE WITH THE COMMENTS CONTAINED IN REFERENCE B CONCERNING THE ADVANTAGES OF THE LPH AS A SECURE MOBILE BASE WITH ITS INHERENT MAINTENANCE/REPAIR EXPERTISE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A ENVISIONS THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE HMM FROM THE LPH, RATHER THAN ASHORE, BUT UNDER THE OPCON OF THE FMAW.

3. (S) THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THE RECOMMENDATION IS THE SHORTAGE OF MARINE HELO ASSETS IN III MAF; IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THERE WILL BE ANY RELIEF IN THIS REGARD IN THE NEAR FUTURE, IN FACT, AVAILABILITY WILL DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER. MY DESIRE IS, THEREFORE, TO INSURE MAXIMUM HELO AVAILABILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN I CORPS.

4. (S) IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE MOST EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF ALL ASSETS, AND TO EQUALIZE THE SUPPORT PROVIDED TO ALL MARINE MANEUVER BATTALIONS, CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES IS NECESSARY. CENTRALIZED ALLOCATION AND CONTROL OF ALL HELO ASSETS BY THE FMAW, THROUGH THE TADC, WOULD INSURE THAT AN SLF BATTALION OPERATING ASHORE UNDER OPCON OF A DIVISION

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

44 (11)

SECRET

PAGE 3 RHMAFA 3003 S E C R E T

WOULD RECEIVE NECESSARY HELO SUPPORT AND, AT THE SAME TIME, THAT HELO ASSETS ARE UTILIZED EFFICIENTLY FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF III MAF'S OVERALL MISSION.

5. (S) I WHOLEHEARTEDLY CONCUR IN THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE NAVY-MARINE TEAM FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM. HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A WOULD DETRACT FROM REQUIRED READINESS. ON THE CONTRARY IT WOULD ENHANCE THAT READINESS THROUGH MORE EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT AND MORE SIMPLIFIED COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES.

RECONSIDERATION OF YOUR POSITION IS REQUESTED.

WARM REGARDS. LGEN NICKERSON.

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE

QUOTE

P 170038Z AUG 69

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO RUYPSTYD/CG III MAF

BT

PAGE 4 RHMAFA 3003 S E C R E T

S E C R E T

FOR LGEN NICKERSON FROM BRINGLE

OPCON OF SLF HELO SQDNS (U)

A. CG III MAF 100230Z AUG 69

1. (S) IN VIEW OF REF A WE HAVE AGAIN REEXAMINED OUR POSITION RELATIVE TO THE OPCON OF THE HELO SQUADRONS ATTACHED TO THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCES IN SEVENTHFLT. IT IS BECAUSE OF THIS COMMONALITY IN OUR OBJECTIVES, I.E., SUPPORT OF IN-COUNTRY FORCES BY MAINTAINING MAXIMUM HELO AVAILABILITY COUPLED WITH A SIMPLIFIED COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENT, THAT WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE CURRENT OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AS HAVING SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES TO THAT PROPOSED BY THE IN-COUNTRY BOARD.

2. (S) THE SITUATION UNDER WHICH THE PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE A CHOP OF FORCES IS INFREQUENT IN I CORPS JATHDEPLTS HAVE BEEN MOSTLY INDEPENDENT UNDER THE OPCON OF THE ARG/SLF COMMANDERS. WHEN OUR ARG DOES DEPART THE AOA WE ROUTINELY CHOP THE BLT AND HMM TO THE APPROPRIATE MARDIV CDR AND FMAW. DURING OUR JUNE-JULY REHAB OF BLT 2/26 IN OKI/SUBIC WE ALSO CHOPPED THE MAJORITY OF OUR OPERATIONAL HELOS TO FMAW EVEN THOUGH THE TROOPS REMAINED WITH THE SHIPS. IT NOW APPEARS PROBABLE TTT WE WILL HAVE ONE HMM CHOPPED ASHORE CONTIN-

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 5 RHMAFA 3003 S E C R E T

UOUSLY OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS AS OUR ARG'S BECOME INVOLVED IN OTHER OPERATIONS.

3. (S) I BELIEVE THE RATIONALE PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED ON THIS SUBJECT CONTINUES VALID AND OUR COMMON INTERESTS CAN BEST BE SERVED BY MAINTAINING THE SAME SUCCESSFUL PROCEDURES ADHERED TO THROUGHOUT THE PRESENT CONFLICT. THE AMPHIB ORGANIZATION HAS A FLEXIBLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO IN-COUNTRY FORCES IN ADDITION TO CONTINUING THE COMBAT AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARG/SLF. IT APPEARS THIS ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE IS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS THAN ONE IN WHICH HELOS UNDER THE OPCONHUE FMAW WOULD OPERATE FROM BASES (LPH) NOT UNDER HIS OPCON. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ASSIST FMAW WITH ARG/SLF HELO ASSETS WHETHER THE BLT IS EMBARKED IN THE ARG OR ASHORE UNDER THE OPCON OF SEVENTHFLT OR 1ST/THIRD MARDIV. IF THERE ARE OTHER AREAS WHERE IMPROVEMENT IN SUPPORT IS POSSIBLE OR DESIRABLE WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO WORK IT OUT THROUGH COORDINATION.

4. THE FLAGSHIP WILL BE IN THE DANANG AREA ABT 27 AUG AND I WILL BE PLEASED TO DISCUSS IT FURTHER IF YOU DESIRE. IN THE MEANTIME I BELIEVE WE SHOULD DEFER ANY PERMANENT COMMITMENTS OR POLICY CHANGES UNTIL WE EMERGE FROM THIS PERIOD OF TRANSITION AND THE FUTURE ROLE

PAGE 6 RHMAFA 3003 S E C R E T

OF THE ARG/SLF CAN BE REASONABLY DETERMINED. WE WILL CONTINUE TO ENSURE THAT MAX HELO SUPPORT PRACTICABLE IS AFFORDED FMAW REGARDLESS OF OPNS IN PROGRESS OR THE OPCON STATUS OF THE BLT.

5. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

3003

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES**SECRET**

0 251520Z ZYH

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON/EYES ONLY

1. THE FOL MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

0 251348Z ZFF-1

FM MG RAMSEY CG AMERICAL DIVISION

TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L ACD 818 EYES ONLY

I HAVE HEARD THE AP NEWS STORY BY PETER ARNETT AND HORST FAUS REGARDING A COMPANS REFUSING TO MOVE TO AN OBJECTIVE. THE STORY WAS PHONED TO THIS HQS BY USARV IO. THE STORY IS BASICALLY CORRECT; HOWEVER, IT LEAVES OUT SOME FACTS REGARDING HOW MANY MEN WERE INVOLVED THEREBY MAKING THE STORY VERY MUCH EXAGGERATED.

THE FACTS AS I HAVE GATHERED THEM FROM THE BDE CMDR AND BN CMDR ARE AS FOLLOWS:

THE BN CMDR, LT COL ROBERT C. BACON, HAD ORDERED 1ST LT EUGENE SHURTZ, C.O. A CO, 3D BN, 21ST INFANTRY, TO MOVE OFF OF NUI LON AT 0900 AND SWEEP THE AREA TO THEIR WEST WHERE THEY HAD BEEN THE PREVIOUS DAY. THEIR ORDERS INCLUDED TO ATTEMPT TO RETRIEVE TWO MISSING IN ACTION IN THAT AREA. THE BN CMDR BECAME CONCERNED WHEN THE COMPANY DID NOT MOVE AND HAD SOME DISCUSSIONS BY RADIO WITH THE CO. EVIDENTLY CORRESPONDENT HORST FAUS, WHO WAS ON NUI LON, WAS IN HEARING DISTANCE OF THE RADIO TRANSMISSION. AS TIME PASSED, THE CO CALLED THE BN CO AND SAID THAT SOME OF HIS SOLDIERS WHO HAD A SHORT TIME LEFT IN COUNTRY DID NOT WANT TO MOVE OUT. THEY WERE TIRED FROM PREVIOUS DAYS OF FIGHTING AND THEY WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE MORE CASUALTIES. THE BN CO TOLD THE CO TO ORDER THE COMPANY TO MOVE OUT AND TO FOLLOW HIM. THE BN CO ADVISED THE CO THAT THERE WAS NO ENEMY ACTION OR ENEMY CONTACT IN THE AREA AT THE PRESENT TIME. THE BN CO THEN SENT HIS EX OFFICER, MAJ RICHARD WAITE AND SGT E-7 OKIE BLANKENSHIP TO THE COMPANY AREA ON NUI LON BY HELICOPTER. MAJOR WAITE FOUND THE CO, 1ST LT SHURIZ TIRED AND EMOTIONALLY RATTLED. HE TALKED TO THE CO AND GOT HIM SETTLED DOWN. MAJ WAITE AND SGT BLANKENSHIP THEN TALKED TO MANY OF THE MEN AND FOUND ONLY FIVE OF THEM WHO WERE HESITANT TO MOVE BECAUSE OF THE PREVIOUS DAYS OF BATTLE AND BECAUSE OF THE REMIINING TIME LEF IN COUNTRY. MAJ WAITE TALKED TO THESE FIVE MEN AND TEN MINUTES LATER THE COMPANY MOVED OUT ON ITS MISSION. THEY MOVED OUT AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 HRS, WHICH WAS A ONE HOUR DELAY FROM THE INITIAL ORDER. THE COMPANY TOOK NO CASUALTIES DURING THE DAY OF 24 AUG.

47(1)

47(1)

IT APPEARS THAT THE INCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY LT SHURIZ AND 5 RELUC-
TANT EM. LT SHURIZ HAD BEEN THE CO FOR SLIGHTLY OVER TWO WEEKS
AND IT APPEARS HE LACKED THE DRIVE, INITIATIVE AND OVER ALL LEADERSHIP
TO BE A COMPANY COMMANDER. LT SHURIZ WAS RELIEVED OF HIS COMMAND
THIS AFTERNOON, 25 AUG, BY HIS BN CMDR WHO HAD DISCUSSED THE SITUATION
WITH THE BDE CMDR PRIOR TO RELIEVING HIM. THE RELIEF WAS MADE
HOURS BEFORE THE BDE HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE AP STORY

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
UNQUOTE

2. THE 196TH LIB HAS PERFORMED IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER.
SINCE THE 12TH OF AUG THROUGH 241830H THEY HAVE ACCOUNTED
FOR 524 ENEMY KILLED WHILE LOSING 34 OF THEIR OWN TROOPS.
ACTIONS OF AN INEXPERIENCED YOUNG LIEUTENANT WHO FOUND
HIMSELF IN COMMAND OF A COMPANY IN COMBAT IS REGRETTED,
BUT SHOULD NOT DETRACT FROM THE MEMORY OR THE DEEDS
OF THE LATE LTCOL HOWARD AND THE MANY OTHERS WHO FOUGHT
VALIANTLY AGAINST THE COMMUNIST ENEMY.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO MGEN TOWNSEND
C/S MACV IMMEDIATELY

620



NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

HAS BEEN SENT

47(2)

47(2)

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

II MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	DATE 25 AUG 69
	SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 251200Z AUG 69	COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECD

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARKS ORIG G-2 REL G-2 "LIMDIS" MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT
	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
	C/S					
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	8/26			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

RA

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 26 AUG 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 260102Z AUG 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT F-0-R
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	I	26 Aug		N	REMARKS <i>Feedback</i> THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
3	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I	8/27	8/22	4/8	
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	8/26		8/8	
	G-1					
	G-2					
5	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

ORIG C/S
REL CG

**FOR
HAS BEEN SENT**

49
CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

PTTSZYUW RHMMAFA3408 2371200-SSSS--RUMHLA RUMHVP RUMLMHA
 RUMLMPA.
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 251200Z AUG 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAU
 RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCMD
 BT

S E C R E T/LIMDIS/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY REPORT (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 020116Z NOV 68 - ~~SECRET~~

B. CG III MAF 040834Z NOV 68 - ~~SECRET~~

C. CG FMFPAC 252119Z FEB 69

D. CG FMFPAC READDRESSAL 090113Z AUG 69 (NOTAL)

1. (S) REF A ESTABLISHED THE REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT A WEEKLY STATUS REPORT ON ORGANIZED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY. SPECAT MCEO/OFFICER EYES ONLY EXCLUSIVE FOR AC/S, G-2.
2. (S) REF B PROVIDED GUIDANCE TO SUBORDINATE CMDS ON THE REPORTING OF INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF REF A.
3. (S) REF C MODIFIED SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS TO READ SECRET LIMDIS/MCEO AND CHANGED SUBJ TO READ SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY REPORT (U).

PAGE 2 RHMMAFA 3408 S E C R E T/LIMDIS/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FURTHER ADVISED THAT NEGATIVE RPTS MAY BE SUBMITTED BY UNCLAS MSG.

4. (S) REF (D) READDRESS A RECENT CMC SPECAT MSG. EXCERPTS FOLLOW:
 BASED ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING RACIAL INCIDENTS IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT ALL INCIDENTS ARE REPORTED TO ALLOW EVALUATION AND DETERMINATION IF TRENDS WHICH WERE COMMON TO ONE INCIDENT ARE DEVELOPING IN OTHER AREAS.
5. (S) ACCORDINGLY, ANY SUBVERSIVE/RACIAL INCIDENTS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN THE PAST AND WHICH BECAUSE OF APPARENT INSIGNIFICANCE, HAVE NOT BEEN REPORTED SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN NEXT REPORT SUBMITTED. (NLT 1200 27 AUG 69)
6. (C) WHEN INFO CONTAINED IN REPORT IS DERIVED FROM "A SOURCE" AN EVALUATION OF THE SOURCE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE INFORMATION SHALL BE INCLUDED.
7. (S) ADDITIONALLY, REPORTS SHALL CONTAIN A COMMAND ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT THREAT TO THE COMMAND FROM SUBVERSIVE/RACIAL STANDPOINT. THIS REQUIREMENT NEGATES THE AUTHORITY TO SUBMIT NEGATIVE REPORTS AS OUTLINED PARA 3 REF B. REPORTS SUBMITTED TO ARRIVE THIS HQS NLT 1200 EACH WED.
8. (S) ALL COMMANDS WILL ENSURE THAT INFORMATION REPORTED TO THIS HQ IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS IS COORDINATED WITH LOCAL

PAGE 3 RHMMAFA 3408 S E C R E T/LIMDIS/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 NIS REPRESENTATIVES AND LOCAL LEADERSHIP COUNCILS:

GP-1

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3408
 III MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

48(11)

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OTICZYUW RHMAFA3476 2380102-CCCC--RUHGSAF.

ZNY CCCCC

O 260102Z AUG 69 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHGSAF/CONSEVENTHFLT

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / F O R V A D M B R I N G L E F R O M L I G E N W I C K E R S O N

A. CONSEVENTHFLT 170038Z AUG 69.

OPCON OF SLF HELICOPTER SQUADRONS

I. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR NEXT VISIT TO THE DANANG AREA AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT THE OPCON OF SLF HELO SQDNS. IN REF (A) YOU INDICATED A POSSIBILITY OF THE 27TH OF AUGUST. PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT I HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT GENERAL ABRAMS WILL BE VISITING THAT DAY. I WOULD SUGGEST A LATER DATE. THE EARLIEST THAT I WOULD BE FREE WOULD BE THE AFTERNOON OF THE 28TH. BETWEEN THEN AND TOM MOORER'S ARRIVAL WOULD BE A BETTER TIME FOR ME.

GP-4

BT

3476

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES**CONFIDENTIAL**

49/11

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

1. ITEM 3: Control and Utilization of ARG/SLF Helicopters

2. DISCUSSION :

a. Normally one HMM squadron is assigned OPCON to each SLF unit (Alpha and Bravo). The present rotation plan consists of one CH-46A and one UH-34 squadron. Commencing on or about 1 June 1969, both SLF units will have CH-46A squadrons in support of their operations.

b. When the ARG/SLF BLT is engaged in independent operations ashore, the HMM squadron attached to the SLF provides support to the BLT. The remaining eleven helicopter squadrons of the 1st MAW must support twenty maneuver battalions. Thus, 1st MAW helicopter support is heavily unbalanced in favor of the SLF battalion. In addition, the 1st MAW is frequently required to furnish heavy lift helicopter (CH-46D or CH-53A) support from asset ashore to move BLTs and squadron from the LPH to locations ashore since the SLF helicopters are CH-46 Alphas.

c. When the ARG/SLF BLT is chopped ashore for Division OPCON and the HMM remains afloat, 1st MAW does not have OPCON of the squadron but is obligated to provide some helicopter support to the BLT while the squadron remains aboard the LPH. In this case, 1st MAW requests HMM augmentation from the squadron afloat. The normal support given to the 1st MAW ranges between four and six aircraft, depending upon the willingness of the ARG/SLF Commanders. Four or five aircraft are used to support the ARG/SLF staff administratively. When the HMM squadron is aboard the LPH with eighteen CH-46As, assuming 60% availability, the requirements for four aircraft for the SLF staff only allows a minimum number of helicopters to augment 1stMAW. Such an arrangement does not provide optimum utilization of critical Marine helicopter assets in WestPac and support for our Divisions ashore. Only when the ARG/SLF departs the Vietnam area for upkeep, portcalls, etc. and the HMM squadron's physically move ashore, does 1st MAW obtain OPCON and the appropriate utilization of these squadrons in support of our Marine Divisions.

d. Communication with shipboard based HMMs is minimal at best. Lack of adequate communications inhibits passing of information pertinent to aircraft availability, augmentation, and greatly increases response time. When helicopter crews return to the LPH for crew changes and maintenance it is difficult, if not impossible to communicate with the squadron to determine when they will return to the mission ashore. In addition helicopter mission assignment and briefing for missions ashore are not always possible.

ENCLOSURE (2)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That whenever the Marine ARG/SLF BLT operates ashore OPCON to the Division, the HMM afloat be simultaneously chopped to 1st MAW. This will increase the number of helicopters available for support of Marine Divisions.

b. That communications be established between 1stMAW and the ARG/SLF HMM afloat to increase helicopter responsiveness and operational effectiveness.

	<u>APPROVED</u>	<u>DISAPPROVED</u>
3.a.	<i>[Signature]</i> 20 May 64	_____
3.b.	<i>[Signature]</i> 17 May 64	_____

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (2)

49

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1. ITEM 3 ENCLOSURE (2)

2. BOARD RECOMMENDATION: 3.a. "That whenever the Marine ARG/SLF BLT operates ashore OPCON to the Division, the HMM afloat be simultaneously chopped to 1st MAW. This will increase the number of helicopters available for support of Marine Divisions."

3. STAFF COMMENT: The cover letter to the study submitted by the board states that "very early in the proceedings and indeed throughout, witnesses stated that the shortage of helicopter assets in terms of numbers, types (particularly armed helicopters), mix and lift capacity is at the root of our problem." While there is a shortage of helicopters there is also an imbalance in the manner in which they are allocated. When the ARG/SLF is engaged in independent operations one BLT of the SLF is supported by one HMM of the SLF. Simultaneously 1st MAW is supporting 20 maneuver battalions with 11 helicopter squadrons. When the SLF BLT chops OPCON to a Division ashore, the SLF HMM remains OPCON to the SLF afloat. When the BLT is ashore (and OPCON to a Division) and the HMM is afloat, COMSEVENTHFLEET has directed that the HMM afloat provide maximum support to the 1st MAW. This arrangement has not been completely satisfactory. From the helo package afloat, 4 or 5 aircraft are used to support the ARG/SLF staff administratively. The assignment when related to aircraft availability, provides only a minimum number of aircraft to augment the 1st MAW.

In actuality, OPCON of the helicopter squadron should pass to the 1st MAW simultaneously with the passage of OPCON of the BLT to the Division and this is true whether the squadron remains afloat or not. Since the helicopter shortage is one of the prime causes of our overall support problem in country, it is necessary that the 1st MAW have maximum control of available helicopter assets to provide maximum support to maneuver battalions ashore. At the present the Navy has OPCON of the SLF. Thus the Navy has OPCON of the HMM. Our proposed change in policy should be passed to COMSEVENTHFLT for comment and appropriate follow up steps should be taken to implement.

4. STAFF RECOMMENDATION: Approve.

5. ACTION REQUIRED: G-3 prepare a message to COMSEVENTHFLT requesting comments on the board's recommendation.

My 20 Aug 69

CONFIDENTIAL

49

O 200215Z ZYA
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L/EYES ONLY
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
1. THE FOL MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:
QUOTE:

O 251520Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON/EYES ONLY
1. THE FOL MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

O 201343Z ZFF-1
FM MG RAMSEY CG AMERICAL DIVISION
TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L ACD 818 EYES ONLY

I HAVE HEARD THE AP NEWS STORY BY PETER ARNETT AND HORST FAUS REGARDING A COMPANS REFUSING TO MOVE TO AN OBJECTIVE. THE STORY WAS PHONED TO THIS HQS BY USARV IO. THE STORY IS BASICALLY CORRECT; HOWEVER, IT LEAVES OUT SOME FACTS REGARDING HOW MANY MEN WERE INVOLVED THEREBY MAKING THE STORY VERY MUCH EXAGGERATED.

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50(1)

50(1)

MAJOR WAITE FOUND THE CO, 1ST LT SHURTZ TIRED AND EMOTIONALLY RATTLED. HE TALKED TO THE CO AND GOT HIM SETTLED DOWN. MAJ WAITE AND SGT BLANKENSHIP THEN TALKED TO MANY OF THE MEN AND FOUND ONLY FIVE OF THEM WHO WERE HESITANT TO MOVE BECAUSE OF THE PREVIOUS DAYS OF BATTLE AND BECAUSE OF THE REMAINING TIME LEFT IN COUNTRY. MAJ WAITE TALKED TO THESE FIVE MEN AND TEN MINUTES LATER THE COMPANY MOVED OUT ON ITS MISSION. THEY MOVED OUT AT APPROXIMATELY 1900 HRS, WHICH WAS A ONE HOUR DELAY FROM THE INITIAL ORDER. THE COMPANY TOOK NO CASUALTIES DURING THE DAY OF 24 AUG.

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SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
UNQUOTE

2. THE 196TH LIB WAS PERFORMED IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER. SINCE THE 12TH OF AUG THROUGH 241332H THEY HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR 524 ENEMY KILLED WHILE LOSING 34 OF THEIR OWN TROOPS. ACTIONS OF AN INEXPERIENCED YOUNG LIEUTENANT WHO FOUND HIMSELF IN COMMAND OF A COMPANY IN COMBAT IS REGRETTED, BUT SHOULD NOT DETRACT FROM THE MEMORY OR THE DEEDS OF THE LATE LICOL HOWARD AND THE MANY OTHERS WHO FOUGHT VALIANTLY AGAINST THE COMMUNIST ENEMY.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO AGEN TOWNSEND
C/S MACV IMMEDIATELY

UNQUOTE:

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

SSO

50(2)

50(2)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 26 AUG 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 260104Z AUG 69		COPY# 2 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT VISIT SEGNAV
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I	28 Aug			REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4... THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT. ORIG: A/S/S RELBY: EG FOR HAS BEEN SENT 25 TOP SECRET
	DCG	I	28 Aug			
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I	28 Aug	28 Aug		
	DC/S PLAN	I	Has	28 Aug		
1	S/S	I	8/26			
	G-1					
	G-2	I	Has	28 Aug		
	G-3	I	Has	28 Aug		
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	H DASC					
	S&C					

TOP SECRET

PTTIZYUW RHMMAFA3477 2380104-TTTT--RUHMFMA.

ZNY TTTT

P 260104Z AUG 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T / F O R L I G E N B U S E F R O M L I G E N N I C K E R S O N S E C T 1 O F 2
V I S I T O F T H E U N D E R S E C R E T A R Y O F T H E N A V Y (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 150042Z AUG69

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A THE FOL INFORMATION IS SUBMITTED CONCERNING UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY VISIT TO III MAF 19-21 AUG 1969.

2. THE VISIT IS BROKEN DOWN INTO FOUR CATEGORIES: (A) VISIT TO THIRD MARDIV, (B) VISIT TO FIRST MARDIV, (C) VISIT TO FIRST MAF, (D) VISIT WITH CG III MAF AND HQS III MAF.

A. VISIT TO THIRD MARDIV ENCOMPASSED THREE MAIN AREAS OF INTEREST: (1) BRIEFING ON TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM, (2) VISIT TO TF CLEARWATER, (3) VISIT AND BRIEFING AT CAG-4.

(1) AT THE BRIEFING ON TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM, MGEN JONES POINTED OUT EXTENSIVE REQUIREMENTS OF

PAGE 2 RHMMAFA 3477 T O P S E C R E T / F O R L I G E N B U S E
THE DIVISION DUE TO LARGE RECONNAISSANCE ZONE WITHIN AO. UNSECNV WAS INTRODUCED TO THREE THIRD MARDIV INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AGENCIES. DIVISION AERIAL OBSERVERS BRIEFED ON MISSION, EQUIPMENT AND OPERATIONS. UNSECNV ASKED IF AO'S SPOTTED FOR NGF. WHEN RESPONDED TO IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, HE ASKED IF THEY THOUGHT NGF EFFECTIVE. AO'S RESPONDED BY STATING THAT IT WAS A VERY EFFECTIVE WEAPON. GROUND SURVEILLANCE UNIT BRIEFED ON DISPLAYED EMPLACEMENT, READOUT, AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TEAMS AND EQUIPMENT. NO SIGNIFICANT QUESTIONS WERE ASKED. RECONNAISSANCE TEAM BRIEFED ON ITS PROJECTED MISSION INTO THE WESTERN RECONNAISSANCE ZONE. A 3D FORCE RECONNAISSANCE TEAM THEN BRIEFED ON ITS RECENTLY COMPLETED MISSION IN THE DMZ. NO SIGNIFICANT QUESTIONS WERE ASKED.

(2) AT TF CLEARWATER UNSECNV HAD A TOUR OF RAMP FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT. HE QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS WAS STANDARD ON SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FOR RVN. ANSWER STANDARD. THE UNSECNV TRAVELED ABOARD AN NSAD PUSHER BOAT TO THE PUSHER BOAT CAUSEWAY

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PAGE 3 RHMMAFA 3477 T O P S E C R E T /FOR LIGEN BUSE
WHERE HE WAS BRIEFED BY CTF, CLEARWATER, ON MISSION,
ORGANIZATION AND PACIFICATION EFFORTS. HE THEN HAD
A DEMONSTRATION RIDE ON A PBR.

(3) SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES AT CAG-4 IS
DIVIDED INTO THREE PHASES, (A) VIETNAMESE BRIEF,
(B) CAP BRIEFING, (C) INSPECTION OF CAP 4-3-3.

(A) THE VIETNAMESE BRIEFING WAS CON-
DUCTED BY MAJOR NGUYEN DUC NHIEM, THE DISTRICT CHIEF.
HE DISCUSSED PACIFICATION, MILITARY SITUATION, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AND AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT. THE UNSECNV
QUESTIONED THE DISTRICT CHIEF REGARDING LAND OWNER-
SHIP. ANSWER GIVEN WAS THAT LAND IS EITHER OWNED
LOCALLY BY THE PEOPLE WHO FARM IT, OR BY THE COM-
MUNITY. NO LARGE LAND HOLDERS.

(B) AT THE CAP BRIEFING, UNSECNV
WAS BRIEFED ON THE MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE
COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM BY CO CACO 4-3. THE BRIEF
COVERED THE TACTICAL SITUATION AND INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING. UNSECNV RAISED QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE
COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM IN I CORPS AND EXPRESSED

PAGE 4 RHMMAFA 3477 T O P S E C R E T /FOR LIGEN BUSE
FURTHER INTEREST IN THE TECHNIQUES OF GATHERING IN-
FORMATION. ANSWER GIVEN WAS THAT SINCE THE PF'S ARE
NATIVE TO THE AREA, THEY ARE EXCELLENT SOURCES OF
INTELLIGENCE AND HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL.

(C) AT THE INSPECTION OF CAP 4-3-3,
THE UNSECNV ASKED QUESTION CONCERNING THE PERSONAL
AFFAIRS OF THE MEN. ANSWER WAS THAT ALL PERSONNEL
WERE ENTHUSIASTIC REGARDING THEIR DUTIES.

(4) WHILE IN NICTZ HE VISITED FSB BARBARA AND
TALKED WITH CO 1ST ARVN REGT. FROM THERE HE WENT TO
HONORS CEREMONY AND BRIEFING BY 1ST ARVN DIV AT HUE
CITADEL. MGEN TRUONG AND HIS STAFF DID AN OUTSTANDING
JOB. UNSECNV THANKED GEN TRUONG PUBLICALLY AT END OF
BRIEFING. HE THEN VISITED 101ST WITH A BRIEFING. FROM
101ST HE RETURNED TO SICTZ.

B. AT THE VISIT TO 1ST MARDIV NO BRIEFINGS WERE
PRESENTED. AT THE VARIOUS STOPS THE LOCAL SITUATION
WAS EXPLAINED ON THE GROUND BUT NO BRIEFINGS AS SUCH.
UNSECNV WAS LITERALLY INTERESTED IN EVERYTHING AND
EVERYBODY. HE WAS PERHAPS MORE INTERESTED IN PEOPLE

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PAGE 5 RHMAFA 3477 T O P S E C R E T /FOR LTGEN BUSE
THAN IN THINGS. ALL HIS QUESTIONS WERE PERTINENT AND
WIDE-RANGING. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW THINGS WORK AND
WHAT PEOPLE DO. HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING
ARVN ORGANIZATION, CHAIN OF COMMAND, RELATIONS WITH
U. S. SIDE, HOW WE CONDUCTED COMBINED OPERATIONS, ETC.
NOTHING SIGNIFICANT WAS DISCUSSED.

C. VISIT TO FIRST MAW:

(1) UNSECNV BRIEFED ON THE COMPOSITION AND LOCATION OF 1ST MAW
UNITS IN VIETNAM, THE TYPES OF AIR OPERATIONS BEING CONDUCTED, IN-
CLUDING IN-COUNTRY AND OUT-OF-COUNTRY MISSIONS, THE MAGNITUDE OF AIR
OPERATIONS AND THE MAJOR COMMANDS BEING SUPPORTED, THE UTILIZATION OF
FIXED WING AND HELICOPTER ASSETS, AND THE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM BEING
EMPLOYED.

(2) AREAS OF INTEREST INCLUDED THE MECHANICS OF THE AIR CONTROL SY-
STEM, THE PROCEDURE FOR REQUESTING AIR SUPPORT, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY
AND METHODS OF FULFILLING AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS.

(3) PRINCIPAL QUESTION ASKED: ARE YOU HAVING ANY PROBLEMS WITH THE
SINGLE MANAGER CONCEPT FOR AIR. ANSWER: THE SINGLE MANAGE CONCEPT
AS IT IS PRESENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED DOES NOT POSE ANY SIGNIFICANT
PROBLEMS TO THE 1ST MARINE AIR WING.

PAGE 6 RHMAFA 3477 T O P S E C R E T /FOR LTGEN BUSE

(4) UNSECNV VISITED THE MAG-11 FLIGHT LINE AND OPERATING
AREA. PRESENTATION FOR UNSECNV WAS ARRANGED
AS STATIC DISPLAY OF FOLLOWING MAG-11 AIRCRAFT:

(A) TA4F WITH AUXILIARY DISPLAY OF FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT.

(B) F4B WITH SATS LOADER AND LOADED MER.

(C) EA6A

(D) EF10B

(E) RF4B CONFIGURED WITH DECM PODS.

(5) THE FOLLOWING SELECTED BRIEFING ITEMS ARE CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT:

(A) F4B - UNSECNV SAID HE HAD FLOWN IN AN F4B FROM A CV AND WAS
FAMILIAR WITH THE AIRCRAFT.

(B) AGA - UNSECNV SHOWED A STRONG INTEREST IN THIS AIRCRAFT, WHICH
WAS NOT FOCUSED ON ANY SINGLE CAPABILITY. HE EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO FLY
IN THE AIRCRAFT, AND WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH ROCKEYE II
CONFIGURATION AND THE WEAPON CAPABILITY. HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD BEEN
LOOKING FOR THIS WEAPON BUT HAD NOT SEEN IT BEFORE.

(C) EA6A - UNSECNV INDICATED FAMILIARITY WITH THIS ECM AIRCRAFT AND
WAS PROVIDED THE INFORMATION THAT THIS WAS THE FINEST "JAMMING" AIRCRAFT
IN THE WORLD.

(D) EF10B-THE BRIEFER INFORMED UNSECNV THAT THIS AIRCRAFT WAS

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PTTZYUW RMMMAFA3485 2380104-TTTT--RUHFMA.

ZNY TTTT

P 260104Z AUG 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T /FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON SECT 2 OF 2 SECT
PHASEING OUT AT THE RATE OF TWO A MONTH AND THAT AVERAGE AGE WAS
15-16 YEARS.

(E) RF4B- UNSECNAV EXAMINED THE COCKPIT AND WAS BRIEFED ON A
STANDARD PHOTO MISSION.

QUESTION: IS DECM EQUIPMENT OPERATED FROM THE BACK SEAT?

ANSWER: YES

QUESTION: IS THE RF4B FLOWN MOSTLY IN SUPPORT OF MARINES
OR THE AIR FORCE?

ANSWER: AIRCRAFT IS FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF MARINES AND OTHERS AS
FRAGGED OUT OF SAIGON.

(6) AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: UNSECNAV WAS INTERESTED IN THE SCHEDU-
LING AND CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT FROM LAUNCH, TO, AND IN THE TARGET AREA. A
COMPLETE PRESENTATION OF THIS INFORMATION WAS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF
THE LIMITATIONS OF TIME AND THE NOISE ON THE FLIGHT LINE.
UNSECNAV INDICATED SOME SURPRISE AT THE TOTAL INVENTORY OF AIRCRAFT
IN MAG-11. CONCERNING A PREVIOUS FLT HE HAD MADE IN THE OV-10A,

PAGE 2 RMMMAFA 3485 T O P S E C R E T /FOR LTGEN BUSE
HE STATED HE HAD CONSIDERED THE REQUIREMENT FOR AIR CONDITIONING
TO BE UNJUSTIFIED UNTIL HIS DEMONSTRATION FLIGHT CONVINCED
HIM OTHERWISE.

(7) UNSECNAV MADE A FAMILIARIZATION FLIGHT IN THE A6A AIRCRAFT,
0730-0830 ON 21 AUG 1969, IN WHICH HE OVERFLEW THE MAJORITY OF
I CORPS. UNSECNAV WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE
FLIGHT AND EXPRESSED HIS SATISFACTION AT HAVING
BEEN ABLE TO SEE THE AREA FROM THE AIR.

D. VISIT WITH CG III MAF AND HQS III MAF: NO
BRIEFINGS WERE PRESENTED DURING VISIT TO III MAF.
UNSECNAV CALLED ON LTEN NICKERSON AT WHICH TIME
GEN NICKERSON PROVIDED AN OVERALL ORIENTATION OF
III MAF AND ICTZ. RETURN OF THE NEW JERSEY TO THE
RVN GUNLINE AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE WAS
REITERATED BY GEN NICKERSON WITH JUSTIFICATION THAT
THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE NEW JERSEY IS MORE CRITICAL
NOW THAN EVER BEFORE, AND THAT BATTLESHIP NAVAL GUN-
FIRE IS A COST EFFECTIVE WEAPONS SYSTEM. A POSITION
PAPER ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE NEW JERSEY WAS GIVEN TO
UNSECNAV. A POSITION PAPER ON III MAF'S POSITION ON

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PAGE 3 RHMMAFA 3485 T O P S E C R E T /FOR LTGEN BUSE
 WESTPAC POSTURE OF FMF UNITS FOLLOWING PHASE II
 REDEPLOYMENTS WAS ALSO GIVEN THE UNSECNV STATING THAT
 FORCES AVAILABLE TO III MAF SUBSEQUENT TO PHASE II
 REDEPLOYMENTS REPRESENT AN OPTIMUM POSTURE FOR
 REACTING TO CONTINGENCIES IN I CORPS, PROVIDING THE
 TWO SLF'S AFLOAT AND THE NEW JERSEY WITH OTHER NGF
 ARE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN I CORPS. COPIES OF
 BOTH POSITION PAPERS HAVE BEEN MAILED TO YOUR HQS.

3. UNSECNV ALSO MADE A CALL ON LTGEN LAM, CG
 I CORPS. NOTHING SIGNIFICANT WAS DISCUSSED.

4. AS A GENERAL COMMENT, I WOULD SAY THAT THE
 UNSECNV IS A HIGHLY ENTHUSIASTIC YOUNG MAN. HE
 WAS INTERESTED IN DOING THINGS AND SEEING THINGS
 AND HE ENJOYED THIS VISIT IMMENSELY. I AM ALSO
 SURE THAT HE ACHIEVED TREMENDOUS BENEFIT FROM THE
 VISIT.

WARM REGARDS.

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BT

3485.

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III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE AUG 69	
				SERIALS/CONTROL DATE 5108202 AUG 69		COPY# OF COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN OUT		INITIAL	SUBJECTIVE EYES ONLY	
	CG					REMARKS	
	DCG					THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4.	
	DCG AIR					THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.	
	C/S						
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
	S/S						
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3	I				ORIG CG	
	G-4	T				REL CG	
	G-5					EYES ONLY	
	G-6						
	CAP					HAS BEEN SENT	
	ADJ					Cy # 1 in Force Planning	
	CORDS					Cy # 3 9/11/69 Daily Duty Plans	
	EMB/TRANS					26 TOP SECRET	
	ENGR						
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OTI:ZYUW RHMMAF 5224 2430826-TTIT--RUMLBPA RUMLMHA RUMLMPA
RUMHVP.

RUMLBPA -T- CG 101ST ABN DIV

RUMLMPA -T- COM THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE DNG

O P 310826Z AUG 69

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PHB

RUMLMHA/CG FMAN DNG

RUMUFGA/COMNAVFORV REP DNG

RUMLMPA/COM THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE DNG

RUMLMPA/CG FOR LOG COMMAND DNG

INFO ZEN/CG USARV LBN

RUMLBPA/CG 101ST ABN DIV

RUMHVP/CG 3RD MARDIV DMA

BT

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L S E N S I T I V E E Y E S O N L Y

TO LTG ZAIS, MAJ GEN THRASH, RADM BONNER, RADM DILLON,

BGEN FEELEY, INFO LTG MILDREN, MG WRIGHT, MGEN JONES

FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. A MACV MOVEMENTS PLANNING CONFERENCE IS SCHEDULED FOR 5 SEPTEMBER. PURPOSE OF CONFERENCE IS TO DEVELOP MAXIMUM INFORMATION RELATIVE TO PHASE TWO REDEPLOYMENTS PRIOR TO A SIMILAR CINCPAC CONFERENCE SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE

PAGE 2 RHMMAF 5224 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L S E N S I T I V E E Y E S O N L Y
IMMEDIATELY AFTER A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PHASE TWO REDUCTION. COMUSMACV HAS THEREFORE DIRECTED COMPONENT COMMANDERS TO SUPPLY CERTAIN INFORMATION PRIOR TO 5 SEPTEMBER. THIS MESSAGE ADDRESSES ONLY THE "FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS" INFORMATION OF THE MACV REQUIREMENT.

2. ASAP, BUT IN ANY CASE NOT LATER THAN 1200 HOURS, TUESDAY, 2 SEPTEMBER 1969 REQUEST YOU IDENTIFY THOSE FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS VACATED AS A RESULT OF UNIT REDEPLOYMENTS THAT WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR RELEASE TO RVNAF OR OTHER US/FVNAF TO INCLUDE RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO THEIR DISPOSITION AND SUPPORTING RATIONALE THEREFOR. FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS WHICH WILL BE ONLY PARTIALLY VACATED BY THE REDEPLOYMENTS SHOULD ALSO BE INDICATED AND THE REQUIREMENT, IF ANY, FOR USE OF THE VACATED PORTION.

3. FOLLOWING ARE APROPOS TO THE FOREGOING REQUIREMENT:

A. COGNIZANCE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE FUTURE STATIONING OF THE DIVISION RESIDUAL FORCE IN ICTZ. ELABORATION ON THIS CONTINGENCY CAN BE SUPPLIED THROUGH STAFF LIAISON FROM III MAF IF NECESSARY.

B. THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL EFFECT NECESSARY COORDINATION WITH

PAGE 3 RHMMAF 5224 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L S E N S I T I V E E Y E S O N L Y
USARV.

C. XXIV CORPS LOI 1-69. (FOR CG XXIV CORPS).

5. THIS REQUIREMENT CLOSE HOLD.

6. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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0 31112Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEM

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LIGEN
NICKERSON

A. CONVERSATION WITH J303 ACTION OFFICER, LT COL WILSON AND
MY G-3 ACTION OFFICER

B. COFS MACV MAC 11333 ED 300926Z AUG 69

1. REF A ADVISED THAT A MESSAGE WOULD BE FORTHCOMING WHICH
WOULD REQUIRE A REDUCTION IN MY HEADQUARTERS OF ABOUT 100
SPACES DURING PHASE 2 AND THAT SOME LESSER NUMBER, ABOUT
62 OR MORE, WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS.

2. REF B REQUESTED REDUCTIONS TOTALLING 100 SPACES. FURTHER
LIAISON WITH YOUR STAFF ESTABLISHED THAT A FIGURE OF 62 OR
MORE WOULD STILL SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT.

3. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST YOU ADD FOLLOWING TO OUR PROPOSED
TROOPLIST FOR PHASE 2:

UIC	FRN	UNIT	NR
M 20128	99K001A	HQ III MAF	70

4. REQUEST YOU CONVEY CHANGE TO CG FMFPAC.

5. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

180



NNNN

HAS BEEN SENT

27(1)
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~~27~~

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PTTCZYUH RHMMAFA3488 2380246-CCCC--RUMLBPA RUMHLA RUMLMJA
 RUMHVP RUMLLIA RUMLMPA RUMUFGA RUMLMFA RUMHVT.

ZNY CCCCC

P 268246Z AUG 69

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO RUMLBPA/CG XXIV CORPS PNB

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV DNG

RUMLMJA/CG ONE ZERO ONE ABN DIV(AM) CAMP EAGLE

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV DGH

RUMLLIA/CG AMERICAL DIV CHL

RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOMD DNG

RUMUGFA/COMNAVSUPPACT DNG

RUMLMFA/COM THIRD MCB DNG

RUMHVT/CG USA RMY SPT COMD DNG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR LTGEN ZAIS, MGEN SIMPSON, MGEN WRIGHT,
 MGEN JONES, MGEN RAMSEY, BGEN FEELEY, RADM BONNER, RADM DILLON
 AND BGEN GUNN FROM LTGEN NICKERSON.

EXPOSURE TO HOSTILE FIRE

1. FOR PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL REASONS, IT BECOMES NECESSARY
 FOR ME TO BRING A VERY SENSITIVE MATTER TO YOUR PROMPT ATTENTION.
 AS THE ENEMY CONTINUES HIS TRANSITION BACK TO CLASSICAL
 GUERRILLA WARFARE, OBVIOUS EMPHASIS IS BEING PLACED ON

PAGE 2 RHMMAFA3488 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SPECTACULAR ACTS THAT WILL DRAMATIZE OUR INABILITY TO
 COMPLETELY SUPPRESS HIM. IN TURN, HIS GREATLY INCREASED
 EFFECTIVENESS IN USE OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS/TECHNIQUES
 CREATES EVEN MORE HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS FOR THOSE OF US
 EXERCISING AGGRESSIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL.

2. I HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY
 OF DISTINGUISHED GUESTS. NOW I REMIND EACH OF YOU THAT
 GENERAL/FLAG OFFICERS MUST ALSO RESTRAIN THEIR TRAVEL
 UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. WHILE WE CONTINUE TO PUNISH
 THE ENEMY SEVERELY, NOTHING COULD ENHANCE HIS CAUSE MORE
 QUICKLY THAN THE DESTRUCTION OF AN AIRCRAFT CARRYING
 ONE OR MORE OF OUR SENIOR OFFICERS. THE ENEMY IS BREAKING
 DOWN INTO SMALL GROUPS AND IS ATTEMPTING TO HURT US IN
 THIS MANNER OF WARFARE. FOR THIS REASON AND OTHER OBVIOUS
 ONES I COUNSEL YOU TO BE UNUSUALLY PRUDENT IN YOUR OWN
 TRAVELS AND VISITS TO HOSTILE AREAS.

3. FREQUENT PATTERNS OF ARRIVAL BY HELOS AT CONTESTED FSB'S
 OR UNITS IN CONTACT ARE INCREASINGLY LIKELY TO OFFER AN
 ALERT ENEMY HIS LONG AWAITED TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY. DON'T
 SHOW UP IN THE MIDDLE OF A FIRE FIGHT. IN MOST CASES, THE

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PAGE 3 RHMMAFA3488 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 BEST HELP THAT YOU CAN GIVE TROOPS THAT ARE ENGAGED IN COMBAT IS TO LEAVE THEM ALONE. REMEMBER TOO THAT YOU AND YOUR HELOS DRAW FIRE AND THIS IS OBVIOUSLY ALWAYS UNWELCOME, ESPECIALLY BY THE TROOPS BEING VISITED.

4. I WOULD SPECIFICALLY CAUTION YOU ON WEATHER. WITH THE APPROACH OF THE MONSOON SEASON YOU MAY FIND IT NECESSARY TO REDUCE TERRAIN CLEARANCE IN ORDER TO REMAIN UNDER THE WEATHER CEILING. WHEN THE TERRAIN CLEARANCE IS REDUCED TO THE POINT WHERE YOU ARE FORCED INTO THE RANGE OF ENEMY WEAPONS, YOU SHOULD NOT PENETRATE THE AREA.

5. RESPONSIBILITY TO UNIT AND RECOGNITION OF THE SENSITIVE POLITICAL EFFECTS MUST TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE FACTOR OF PERSONAL COURAGE. IN THIS REGARD, INSPIRATION TO YOUR TROOPS IS AN IMPORTANT MATTER, BUT I CHOOSE THIS TIME TO CAUTION YOU AND REQUEST CAREFUL PLANNING FOR FUTURE VISITS AND FLIGHT PLANS.

GP-4

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1 (2)

O 262719L ZYI
 FM CG 114 MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO CG FIRST MARDIV
 CG AMERICAL DIV
 ZEM
 C O N F I D E N T I A L / EYES ONLY
 FOR GEN ABRAMS
 INFO MGEN SIMPSON AND MGEN RAMSEY
 FROM LT GEN NICKERSON



SUBJ: RESULTS OF OPERATIONS IN AREA OF HIEP DUC

1. THE FOLLOWING CHRONOLOGY IS PROVIDED ON THE ACTIONS IN THE VICINITY OF HIEP DUC COMMENCING ON 12 AUGUST. 4/31 INF AND 3/21 INF OF THE 196TH LIB AMERICAL WERE THE PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS IN THESE ACTIONS. THE 2D BN 7TH MARINES CONTACTS ARE INCLUDED SINCE FOR A SHORT PERIOD PRIOR TO 21 AUGUST THIS BATTALION WAS OPCON TO THE 196TH LIB IN CONNECTION WITH BOUNDARY CHANGES BEING EFFECTED; SINCE THAT TIME 2/7 HAS BEEN OPERATING TO THE NE OF HIEP DUC IN CONJUNCTION WITH AMERICAL OPNS.

2. SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS:

EVENT NO.	ACTION	EN KIA	FRD KIA
A. (AT 990250)	120215H. CO A, 4/31 INF REC'D UNK NUMBER OF 31MM MORT RDS FOLLOWED BY A GND ATK BY AN USEF. ORG WPNS AND ARTY WERE EMPLOYED AND THE EN WITHDREW.	50	0
B. (BT 170135)	170345H. CIDG PLAT AMBUSHED LARGE USEF. EN WORE KHAKI UNIFORMS AND WERE ARMED WITH SA, B-40 RKTS, AND MORTS. THE PLT BROKE CONTACT AND CALLED AIR AND ARTY.	6	0
C. (AT 940200)	171000H. 4/31 INF WHILE SEARCHING THE AREA FOUND 6 NVA BODIES KILLED BY SAF SEVERAL DAYS AGO.	6	0
D. (BT 005229)	171645H. CO D, 4/31 INF CAME IN CONTACT WITH AN EST EN CO. THE CONTACT BROKE AT 1915H.	5	1
E. (BT 004224)	181145H. CO D, 4/31 INF RECD SAF FROM A USEF. D CO RECD FIRE WITH ORG WPNS AND CALLED GUNSHIPS AND SPOOKY. CONTACT LASTED 3 HOURS.	97	4

2/11

F. (AT 938287)	181200H. RECON PL1, 4/31 INF CAME IN CONTACT WITH A USEF.	5	0
G. (AT 938273)	181335H. CO E, 4/31 INF MADE CONTACT WITH A USEF AND EMPLOYED ORG WPNS, SPOOKY, AND GUNSHIPS. CONTACT BROKE AT 2105H.	91	10
H. (BT 015405)	181300H. CO E, 2/7 MAR OBS'D 10 EN AND CALLED A/S'S.	5	0
I. (BT 015225)	190320H. F/3 CAV ENGAGED AN EN .50 CAL MG PSN.	15	0
J. (BT 002371)	190930H. CO E, 2/7 MAR OBS'D 48 EN IN A TREE LINE. THE EN WERE CARRYING PACKS AND MOVING W. AIR AND ARTY CALLED ON ENEMY	36	0
K. (BT 015255)	191710H. C AND C HELO FROM 3/21 INF REC'D .50 CAL FIRE. CRASHED AND BURNED. BN CO, BNSGT MAJ AND AP PHOTOGRAPHER LOST.	0	3
L. (BT 030212)	200730H. A&B CO, 3/21 INF WHILE MOVING TO DOWNED C&C HELO REC'D SAF, AWF, AND RPG FIRE FROM USEF. SOLDIERS RET'D FIRE AND CALLED ARTY AND A/S'S.	20	6
M. (BT 039223)	201300H. CO C, 3/21 INF OBS'D 9 NVA IN A RICE PADDY. CALLED ARY.	0	0
N. (BT 025215)	210600H. BTRY C, 3/16 ARTY FIRED A MSN ON USEF.	5	0
O. (BT 055212)	210330H. CO B, 3/21 INF MADE CONTACT WITH A USEF.	9	0
P. (BT 015220)	211007H. CO A, 3/21 INF CAME UNDER FIRE FROM USEF, THE CO RET'D ORG WPNS FIRE.	3	2
Q. (AT 938230)	211230H. CO C, 4/31 INF WHILE SEARCHING AREA AFTER CONTACT FIND 100 NVA KIA.	100	2
R. (BT 034212)	211030H. FAC DIRECTED A/S'S ON EN FORCE.	14	0

2(2)

2(2)

S. (BT 022193)	211300H. AV'USS' EN FORCE AND CALLED ARTY.	10	0
T. (BT 022215)	220300H. CO A, 3/21 INF REC'D SA/AV FIRE FROM EST EN SQD IN A BUNKER COMPLEX. THE CO RET'D SAF, BROKE CONTACT AND LATER SWEEP THE AREA.	5	1
U. (BT 026210)	221320H. CO B, 3/21 INF ENGAGED USEF IN A BUNKER COMPLEX.	8	0
V. (AT 021263)	231410H. CO D, 1/46 INF CAME INTO CONTACT WITH AN EST NVA PLT. THE CO ENGAGED AND CALLED GUNSHIPS IN SPI. THE CONTACT BROKE 55 MINUTES LATER AND THE CO SWEEP THE AREA.	11	0
W. (AT 070230)	241300H. CO E, 2/7 MARINES REC'D 60-50X32MM MORT RDS. C/D WAS FIRED ON SJEP EN MORT SITE.	10	0
X. (BT 030211)	200900H. CO E, 3/21 INF FND 9 GRAVES EACH CONTAINING 1 NVA BODY APPROX 5 DAYS OLD KILLED BY SAF.	9	0
Y. (BT 012226)	201020H. CO C, 2/1 INF FND 10 GRAVES EACH CONTAINING 1 NVA BODY APPROX 5 DAYS OLD.	10	0
Z. (AT 049266)	201000H. CO B, 2/1 INF MADE CONTACT WITH A USEF AND WAS REINFORCED BY CO B, 1/46 INF. THE EN EMPLOYED SAF AND MORTS. CONTACT BROKE AT 1600H.	12	0
AA. (AT 052280)	201020H. CO H, 2/7 MAR REC'D SNIPER FIRE FROM USEF. G & R'S CO WHILE MOVING TO THE LEFT OF H CO CAME UNDER INTENSE SAF. ALL 3 COS RET'D ONE WEPS FIRE WITH ARTY AND A/S'S IN SPI. FRO FORCES BROKE CONTACT AT DARK.	UNK	11

2/31

2/31

SECRET

OTTSZYUW RHMMAFA3810 2400726-SSSS--RUHMFMA RUEBHOA.
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 280726Z AUG 69 ZFF-6
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMMFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC
 BT

S E C R E T

FOR LGEN BUSE, INFO GEN CHAPMAN, FROM LGEN NICKERSON
 USS NEW JERSEY EMPLOYMENT (U)

1. (U) THE USS NEW JERSEY, SCHEDULED FOR DEPLOYMENT TO WEST PAC IN SEP 69, NOW REPORTEDLY IS NOT DEPLOYING AND IS SCHEDULED FOR DECOMMISSIONING.
2. (S) I FEEL THAT THE FOLLOWING DATA SUPPORTS THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW JERSEY AS SCHEDULED:

A. FROM THE ARRIVAL OF THE USS NEW JERSEY ON THE GUN-LINE ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1968, UNTIL HER DEPARTURE ON 31 MARCH 1969, SHE SUPPORTED ICTZ ON 85 DAYS. DURING THIS PERIOD SHE EXPENDED NEARLY 4,000 ROUNDS OF 16 INCH AMMUNITION AND NEARLY 11,000 ROUNDS OF 5 INCH AMMUNITION IN SUPPORT OF III MAF. AS HER PRINCIPAL EMPLOYER, III MAF WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO SEE HER DEPART. GUN DAMAGE ASSESSMENT WHILE

PAGE 2 RHMMAFA 3810 **S E C R E T**

IN SUPPORT OF III MAF INCLUDED MORE THAN 1000 STRUCTURES AND BUNKERS, AND 100 CAVES AND TUNNEL COMPLEXES DESTROYED OR DAMAGED, SOME 120 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND OVER 90 CONFIRMED KIA.

B. NEW JERSEY DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE NGFS AT RANGES UP TO 35,000 METERS INLAND. THIS IS ABOUT HALF AGAIN THE RANGE THAT ANY OTHER NGF SHIP IS CAPABLE OF.

C. ACCORDING TO BOTH GROUND AND AERIAL SPOTTERS THE BATTLESHIP FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM IS CONSISTENTLY MORE ACCURATE AND MORE RESPONSIVE TO SPOTS THAN ANY NAVAL GUNFIRE FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM USED IN VIETNAM. AVERAGE INITIAL SALVO ERROR IS LESS THAN 300 YARDS IN RANGE AND 100 YARDS IN DEFLECTION. THE ROUNDS ARE USUALLY ON TARGET WITH NO MORE THAN TWO SPOTTING ADJUSTMENTS.

D. THE CAPABILITY, ON SHORT NOTICE, TO PROVIDE A TIME, QUICK OR DELAYED FUZE ACTION ON A 2000 NR PROJECTILE HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF VERSATILITY OVER AIR DROPPED WEAPONS. ARTILLERY HAS NO WEAPON IN VIETNAM THAT CAN COMPARE IN RANGE, EXPLOSIVE POWER OR ACCURACY WITH THE 16"/50 NAVAL GUN.

E. THE EXTENDED RANGE AND MOBILE FIREPOWER OF THE BATTLESHIP GIVE THE GROUND COMMANDERS GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE

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PAGE 3 RHMAFA 3810 S E C R E T
 POSITIONING AND EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY BATTERIES. E.G.,
 ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY BATTERIES CAN BE LOCATED IN THE WESTERN-
 MOST REGIONS WITH NGF REPLACING THE RELOCATED ARTILLERY BATTERIES.

F. THE PRESENCE OF THE BATTLESHIP NEW JERSEY UNDOUBTEDLY
 HAS AN ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON THE MORALE OF ENEMY GROUND
 TROOPS AND MOST LIKELY WOULD CAUSE ENEMY COMMANDERS CONCERN IN
 THE EVENT THEY CONTEMPLATE LARGE SCALE MOVEMENTS ACROSS THE DMZ.

G. BATTLESHIP NGF SUPPORT HAS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES OVER AIR-
 CRAFT/ARTILLERY. THESE INCLUDE:

(1) GREATER ABILITY TO PENETRATE "HARDENED" TARGETS.
 THE 16" ARMOR PIERCING ROUND CAN PENETRATE 21 FEET OF REINFORCED
 CONCRETE OR 35 FEET OF EARTH AND LOGS.

(2) GREATER ACCURACY AGAINST TARGETS PRESENTING PRI-
 MARILY VERTICAL AREAS TO LINE OF FIRE.

(3) ALL WEATHER CAPABILITY.

(4) ABILITY TO REMAIN ON STATION FOR PROLONGED PERIODS.

(5) NO VULNERABILITY TO ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS. THE
 CREW IS SAFE FROM SAPPERS AND GROUND ATTACK AND AMMUNITION IS
 NOT DEPENDENT ON A LAND LOCKED SUPPLY SYSTEM.

(6) REQUIRES NO ADVANCE BASE CONSTRUCTION IN SOUTHEAST

PAGE 4 RHMAFA 3810 S E C R E T
 ASIA.

3. (S) THE 9TH RLT HAS ALREADY DEPLOYED FROM RVN; IMPENDING
 DECISIONS INDICATE THE PROBABILITY OF ADDITIONAL FORCES BEING
 REDEPLOYED. IMPENDING BUDGETARY RESTRICTIONS DICTATE THE
 NECESSITY TO CLOSELY EXAMINE THE RELATIVE COSTS OF VARIOUS
 WEAPONS SYSTEMS AVAILABLE TO FORCES COMMITTED IN RVN. THESE
 FACTORS, MORE THAN EVER BEFORE, ESTABLISH A REQUIREMENT FOR THE
 NEW JERSEY AND JUSTIFY ITS EMPLOYMENT. THE FOLLOWING FACTS
 ARE PERTINENT:

A. THE REDUCTION OF TROOP STRENGTHS, PARTICULARLY IN THE
 AREA SOUTH OF THE DMZ, DICTATES A REQUIREMENT FOR THE TREMEN-
 DOUS, MOBILE FIREPOWER OF THE BATTLESHIP IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO
 REACT QUICKLY IN THE EVENT THE ENEMY DECIDES TO EXPLOIT THE
 SITUATION BY COMING ACROSS THE DMZ IN FORCE.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES ARE BEING THINNED OUT THROUGHOUT I CORPS.
 THE MOBILE FIREPOWER OF THE BATTLESHIP, PERMITS RAPID REACTION
 TO ANY ENEMY ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION ANYWHERE IN I
 CORPS (OR THROUGHOUT RVN).

C. THE PRESENCE OF THE NEW JERSEY OFF THE COAST OF RVN
 REPRESENTS AN INVALUABLE FIRE SUPPORT CAPABILITY WITHOUT RE-

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

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PAGE 5 RHMAFA 3810 **SECRET**
 QUIRING ANY INCREASE OF IN-COUNTRY SPACES.

D. IT IS REPORTED THAT THE COST OF REFITTING THE NEW JERSEY WAS \$22,000,000. SHE IS REPORTED TO BE IN GOOD CONDITION AND HAS CONSIDERABLE REDUNDANCY. FROM A COST-EFFECTIVENESS STANDPOINT, THE CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT OF THE NEW JERSEY REPRESENTS A UTILIZATION OF FUNDS ALREADY INVESTED. IN ADDITION, CONSIDERABLE 16" AMMUNITION IS ALREADY LOCATED IN WESTPAC FOR UTILIZATION BY THE NEW JERSEY, AS INDICATED BY THE FOLLOWING:

TYPE AMMO	CAM RANK BAY	SUBIC	SASEBO	TOTAL
HC	450	3875	971	5296
AP		447	74	521
MARK 19 FIRECRACKER		1136	60	1196

4. (C) IN CONCLUSION THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE NEW JERSEY IS MORE CRITICAL THAN EVER. THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE NEW JERSEY ON THE RVN GUNLINE WILL SAVE COUNTLESS LIVES. IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE NEW JERSEY BE DEPLOYED TO WESTPAC AS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED.

GP-4
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 3810

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION / COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 28 AUG 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 0 280800Z		COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I	28 Aug		[Signature]	VISIT OF COMUSMACV TO ICTZ 27AUG69 REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
4	DCG	I			[Signature]	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			[Signature]	
	DC/S	I				
	DC/S PLAN	I			[Signature]	
1	S/S	I	8/28		[Signature]	
	G-1					
	G-2	I			[Signature]	
	G-3	I			[Signature]	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

③ SECRET

O 280810Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO CG USARV
 ZEM

S E C R E T FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 VISIT OF COMUSMACV TO ICTZ 27AUG69 (U)

A. COMUSMACV 32267 DTG 301105Z MAY69

1. FOL SUEMITTED IAW REF A.

2. GEN ABRAMS VISITED UNITS IN THE AMERICAL TAOI ON 27AUG69. HE ARRIVED AT CHU LAI AT 1005H AND WAS MET BY LTGEN NICKERSON, CG III MAF, LTGEN LAM, CG I CORPS, MGEN RAMSEY, CG AMERICAL DIV AND BGEN TOAN, CG 2D ARVN DIV. THE PARTY TOOK OFF WITHOUT DELAY BE HELO FOR TAM KY, QUANG TIN PROVINCE HQS. GEN ABRAMS WAS GREETED THERE BY COL THO, PROVINCE CHIEF, AND LTCOL STAFFORD, PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR. COL THO BRIEFED GEN ABRAMS ON THE ENEMY SITUATION IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE SINCE THE FIRST OF THE YEAR AND THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE PROVINCIAL FORCES. COL THO ALSO COVERED THE RD AND PACIFICATION PROGRAM. AT THIS POINT GEN ABRAMS ASKED COL THO WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THE RD SCHOOL AT VUNG TAU. COL THO STATED THAT HE THOUGHT THE SCHOOL WAS GOOD AND VERY BENEFICIAL, BUT HE CONSIDERED THE DISTANCE TOO GREAT FROM I CORPS. GEN LAM RAISED THE NEED FOR 44 MORE PF PLATOONS. GEN ABRAMS THEN ASKED COL THO HOW HE STOOD ON PF PLATOONS. COL THO REPLIED THAT HE NEEDED AN ADDITIONAL 65 PLATOONS.

3. GEN ABRAMS DEPARTED QUANG TIN PROVINCE HQ AT 1050H FOR AN OVERFLIGHT AND VISUAL RECON OF THE AREA IN THE VICINITY OF LZ WEST, HIEP DUC AND LZ CENTER WHERE THE 196TH LIB HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE 1ST AND 3D NVA REGTS. GEN RAMSEY POINTED OUT THE AREAS OF CONTACT AND DESCRIBED RECENT OPERATIONS IN THE AREA. THE PARTY LANDED AT FSB CENTER WHERE GEN ABRAMS WAS INTRODUCED TO KEY BDE OFFICERS AND NCO'S. THE BN CO 3/21 INF, LTCOL BACON, HAD HIS INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS SGTS BRIEF GEN ABRAMS FROM A VANTAGE POINT ON THE BN OPERATIONS SOUTHWEST OF LZ CENTER. GEN ABRAMS ASKED HOW LONG IT TOOK THE VC/NVA TO BUILD BUNKER COMPLEXES LIKE THOSE FOUND. LTCOL BACON ANSWERED AT LEAST THREE WEEKS. GEN ABRAMS STATED, QUOTE, THAT'S WHAT THEY'RE DOING WHEN YOU THINK THEY'RE DOING NOTHING UNQUOTE. GEN ABRAMS ALSO RECEIVED A BRIEFING AT THAT POINT BY LTCOL VINH, CO 5TH REGT, 2D ARVN DIV, ON HIS REGT'S PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATIONS. GEN ABRAMS THEN WALKED AROUND THE FIRE BASE TALKING WITH MEMBERS OF 3/21 INF, 81MM MORIAR PLATOON AND B BIRY, 3-32 ARTY. 5(1)

4. GEN ABRAMS DEPARTED LZ CENTER AND LANDED AT LZ BALDY AT 1205 HRS. HE WAS BRIEFED IN THE 196TH LIB TOC BY COL CODISPO11, CO 7TH MAR REGT, ON THE OPERATIONS OF HIS REGT WHICH HAS ONE BATTALION COMMITTED TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. GEN RAMSEY THEN COVERED THE OPERATIONS IN THE OTHER AREAS OF THE AMERICAL AO. GEN ABRAMS HAD NO QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS.
5. DURING LUNCH AT THE 196TH LIB OFFICERS MESS, GEN ABRAMS COMPLIMENTED GEN TOAN ON HOW WELL THE 2D ARVN DIV WAS PERFORMING. HE STATED THAT REPORTS INDICATED THE 2D ARVN DIV WAS MAKING STEADY PROGRESS. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE 1ST AND 2D ARVN DIVISIONS WERE THE BEST IN VIETNAM. AFTER LUNCH GEN ABRAMS DEPARTED FOR DANANG WITH GEN NICKERSON.
6. GEN ABRAMS VISITED FIRST MARDIV FROM 1250H TO 1415H. AT HILL 37, CP OF 3/1, HE MET REGT CO, COL WILKERSON, 4 BN COS PLUS SGTMAJS; ALSO DISTRICT CHIEF OF DAI LOC, DSA AND A COMBINED ACTION COMPANY CO. HE WAS SHOWN STATIC DISPLAY OF LOB BOMB, AND GIVEN AN UPDATE BRIEFING ON OPERATIONS OF FIRST MARDIV, WHICH INCLUDED USE OF BPS LINE SENSOR IN DANANG BARRIER. PARTY THEN WENT TO HILL 10, CP OF 2/26, TO SEE READ-OUT APPARATUS. EMPLOYMENT OF THE BPS IN DEFENSE OF DANANG WAS EXPLAINED BY CO 2/26.
7. NO SIGNIFICANT COMMENTS AND NO GUIDANCE RECEIVED. FLEW TRACE FROM HILL 10, NAMO BRIDGE, THENCE TO BASE OPNS, DANANG. DEPARTED FOR SAIGON AT 1430H.
GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS.

600

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5(2)

5(2)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 28 AUG 1969	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 281338Z AUG 1969		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		FOR BGEN WILSON	
3	CG		29 Aug		N	REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. ORIG: C/S REL: C/S <i>col called has seen 8/29/69</i> FOR HAS BEEN SENT <i>Signature</i> (6) CONFIDENTIAL	
4	DCG						
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	G-6						
	CAP						
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	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
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	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RHMMAFA3865 2401338-CCCC--RUHNFMA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 281338Z AUG 69

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / F O R B G E N W I L S O N F R O M B G E L D O O L E Y
SUBJ: PERSONNEL ACTIONS

1. ORM SIMPSON HAS AN IMMEDIATE AND URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR A BATTALION COMMANDER FOR 2/7. BILL JONES HAS AGREED TO MAKE LTCOL JOSEPH EDWARD HOPKINS, #35212, IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. HOPKINS IS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED G-3 TRAINING AT THIRD MARDIV. BOTH ORM AND BILL AGREE AS DOES GEN NICKERSON. WOULD YOU PLEASE EFFECT AN IMMEDIATE TRANSFER FROM THE THIRD DIVISION TO THE FIRST DIVISION?

2. ORM SIMPSON, BILL JONES, GAY THRASH AND I SPENT ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF TOGETHER TODAY, WORKING ON COLONELS ASSIGNMENTS. WE WENT THROUGH ALL AVAILABLE PEOPLE ATTEMPTING TO FIND A POTENTIAL REGIMENTAL COMMANDER FOR THE 9TH MARINES. JO VAN METER CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE BY THE FIRST DIVISION. BUT FROM THERE ON THE

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA3865 C O N F I D E N T I A L / F O R
SITUATION IS PRETTY TIGHT AND NO ONE WANTS TO DISRUPT THEIR PRESENT ORGANIZATION. THE DRAWBACK WITH THIS NOMINATION IS THAT JO WILL BE LEAVING IN MID-DECEMBER. HOWEVER, IF GEN BUSE WOULD SEE FIT TO GIVE JO THE 9TH MARINES, WE WILL TRY TO BACK HIM UP IN DECEMBER BY PULLING WILL SIMLIK OUT OF THE THIRD MARINES IF THEY SHOULD DEPLOY OR RETURN COL ROBERT E. BARDE FROM HERE TO THE NINTH MARINES TO RELIEVE VAN METER. REQUEST GEN BUSE'S CONSIDERATION. THE MINIMUM DISRUPTION TO ALL CONCERNED WOULD INVOLVE THE TRANSFER OF VAN METER TO OKI.

3. WE WOULD ALSO REQUEST THAT YOU DIVERT ROBERT L. PARNELL, #36955, COL, 9907 TO III MAF VICE FIRST MAN AS PRESENTLY SCHEDULED. CG FIRST MAN CONCURS.

4. WE ALSO ASK YOUR HELP AT THIS TIME IN PLANNING FOR THE RELIEF OF JOHN CANTON. AS YOU KNOW JOHN'S JOB IS ONE OF THE KEY JOBS IN THIS HQS AND WE DO NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE NUMBER TWO MAN IN THE G-2 SHOP NOW. COULD YOU REQUEST HQMC TO PROGRAM A TOP-NOTCH INTELLIGENCE TYPE TO RELIEVE JOHN WHEN HE DEPARTS IN JAN OF 1970.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGESFMFPAC-GEN 2100/1 (3/69)
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6(11)

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29 Aug 65

Discussed
with com
Wilson
at 0800
there last

PAGE THREE RHMMAF3865 C O N F I D E N T I A L / P O R
5. CHARLIE WALKER, WHO IS NOW CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
FIRST DIVISION, HAS FAILED SELECTION TWICE AND HAS NOT
BEEN RETAINED. HE IS DUE TO ROTATE IN MAY OF 1970.
GEN NICKERSON AND ORN SIMPSON BOTH WOULD AGREE TO
HIS DEPARTURE FROM VIETNAM PRIOR TO CHRISTMAS OF
1969, WITH OR WITHOUT A RELIEF, IN ORDER TO GIVE
HIM SOME CONSIDERATION PRIOR TO HIS RETIREMENT.

GP-4
BT
3865

← WALKER
KNOWS NOT
OF THIS

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

REC - NOR
DO I KNOW IF
HE WOULD AGREE.
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6/2)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 30 AUG 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE P 300225Z AUG 69		COPY# 1, 2, 3, 4 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT (S) FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I				REMARKS ① <i>Fuller</i> THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
4	DCG	I				
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2	C/S	I				
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1	S/S	I	8/30			
	G-1					
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	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SBC					

HAS BEEN SENT

①

SECRET

P 302225Z
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 ZEM

S E C R E T / FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. PURSUANT TO OUR DISCUSSION ON SENSORS DURING YOUR
 LAST VISIT, THE FOLLOWING MSG FROM BILL JONES IS QUOTED
 FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:

P 290100Z
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO CG III MAF
 INFO CG XXIV CORPS
 ZEM

S E C R E T

SUBJ: PROBABLE KILL OF NVA RESULTING FROM SENSOR ACTIVITY.
 MGEN JONES SENDS FOR LTGEN NICKERSON INFO LTGEN ZAIS.

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE INFORMATION I HOLD RELATIVE TO THE PRO-
 BABLE KILL OF 12 NVA AS A RESULT OF SENSOR ACTIVITY IN THE VIC-
 INITY OF FSB SAIGON.

2. AT 0900 ON 7 AUGUST A PROJECT DELTA RECONNAISSANCE TEAM DIS-
 COVERED 12 NVA BODIES AT XD 829270. THE BODIES WERE CLAD IN
 GREEN UNIFORMS, HELMETS AND BOOTS, BUT WEAPONS AND WEB GEAR HAD
 APPARENTLY BEEN REMOVED. THE TIME OF DEATH WAS ESTIMATED TO BE
 APPROXIMATELY 10 DAYS PRIOR TO DISCOVERY AND CAUSE OF DEATH WAS
 ARTILLERY FIRE OR AIR DELIVERED ORDNANCE.

3. THE LOCATION OF THE BODIES WAS IN THE VICINITY OF ONE OF THE
 KILL ZONES OF SENSOR STRING 604. SENSORS IN THIS STRING ARE
 LOCATED AT XD 82282820, XD 81702740 AND XD 81882750 AND WERE
 HAND EMPLACED BY A GROUND SURVEILLANCE TEAM ON 1 JULY 1969. SEN-
 SORS OF STRING 604 WERE ACTIVATED BETWEEN 15 JULY AND 5 AUG DE-
 TECTING A TOTAL OF 31 PERSONNEL.

4. ALL ROUNDS FIRED INTO THE AREA WERE 175MM. IN ADDITION, BECAUSE
 OF SENSOR ACTIVITY AND SIGHTINGS, DELAY BOMBS WERE SEEDED IN THE
 GENERAL AREA (UPPER LEFT 8127 AND LOWER RIGHT 8223).

5. FROM THE PROXIMITY OF THE BODIES TO THE SENSOR STRING KILL
 ZONE, IT WAS DEDUCED THAT THESE KILLS PROBABLY RESULTED FROM
 THE FIRES IN RESPONSE TO SENSOR ACTIVITY OF STRING 604. NO
 H&I FIRES HAD BEEN DIRECTED AT THIS AREA DURING THE PERIOD 25
 JULY THROUGH 7 AUGUST.

V

UNQUOTE - WARM REGARDS.

GP4

314



7(1)

7(1)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM NAVY SECRETARY		DATE 20 JUN 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE F 3005200 170 05		COPY# 2-5 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT INFORM OF DEPARTMENTAL VISIT TO ICFB 26 June 69 (1)
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		31 Aug 69		REMARKS ① Feedback THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPO- SITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
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	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	8/30		H JS	
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	G-2					
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	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
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	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

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HAS BEEN SENT

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SECRET

P 300520Z
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO CG USARV
 ZEM

S E C R E T / FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 REPORT OF DEPCOMUSMACV VISIT TO ICTZ 26AUG69 (U)

A. COMUSMACV 32267 DTG 301105Z MAY69

1. FOL SUBMITTED IAW REF A. GEN ROSSON WAS MET AT PHU BAI OPNS AT 261020H AUG69 BY LTGEN NICKERSON, LTGEN ZAIS, AND MGEN TRUONG, CG 1ST ARVN DIV. HE VISITED DONG DA TRAINING CENTER WHERE HE WAS BRIEFED ON PERSONNEL STRENGTHS AND AUTH TRAINING OBJECTIVES BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER, LTCOL PHUOC.
2. FOL THE BRIEFING GEN ROSSON AND LTCOL PHUOC DISCUSSED THE DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS, ADEQUACY OF NUMBERS OF TRENCHES AND BUNKERS FOR EACH MAN IN EVENT OF MORTAR ATTACK, AVAILABILITY OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL, AMOUNT OF MONEY RECEIVED FOR TRAINEES PER DAY AND ADEQUACY OF WATER SUPPLY. COL PHUOC RESPONDED AS FOLLOWS: AMBUSH GROUPS ARE SENT OUT AT NIGHT TO INCLUDE PATROLS (USING 3-5 WK STUDENTS): THERE ARE SUFFICIENT TRENCHES AND BUNKERS BUT ADDITIONAL MATERIALS ARE NEEDED TO CONSTRUCT MORE BUNKERS; 47 VNS PER DAY IS RECEIVED FOR TRAINEES RATIONS -- WHICH IS NOT CONSIDERED ADEQUATE. HE HAS NO WATER PROBLEMS. HE NEEDS HELP IN BUYING MATERIALS TO BUILD AND COVER BUNKERS, AND HE HAS A REQUIREMENT FOR SIX ADDITIONAL KITCHENS AND BARRACKS.
3. GEN ROSSON ASKED IF THE TRAINING CENTER WAS PROGRAMMED TO TAKE 7,000 TRAINEES AT ONE TIME. COL PHUOC SAID THAT HE HAD NOT RECEIVED AUTH FROM VN GOVT TO INCREASE TO THAT NUMBER, BUT THAT HE COULD HANDLE AN INCREASE WITH SOME ADDITIONAL HELP. CURRENTLY WAS AUTH 170 OFF, BUT HAD ONLY 137 ON HAND -- 15 WERE IN THE HOSPITAL AND 4 OTHERS UNAVAILABLE. COL PHUOC SAID HE DOES HAVE SOME CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS IN EFFECT WITH A DOCTOR CHECKING THE PEOPLE IN THE HAMLET. RECENTLY THEY BUILT A SCHOOL NEAR THE TRAINING CENTER. GEN ROSSON TOLD COL PHUOC THAT SAIGON CONSIDERS THE TRAINING CENTER'S MISSION VERY HIGHLY AND THE FUTURE DEPENDS ON THE SUCCESS OF THE EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.

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4. AFTER LUNCH AT THE MACV ADVISORS MESS, GEN ROSSON VISITED THE THUA THIEN RF TRAINING CENTER WHERE HE WAS MET BY THE CO, MAJ BAO. DISCUSSION BETWEEN GEN ROSSON AND MAJ BAO WAS SIMILAR TO THAT BETWEEN GEN ROSSON AND COL PHUOC EXCEPT THAT MAJ BAO INDICATED THAT AT PRESENT HE HAD 2,087 TRAINEES WHILE THE CENTER'S CAPACITY WAS ONLY 1500. THE CENTER PROVIDES INSTRUCTION ON THE M-14, M-1 AND CARBINE (EACH STUDENT FIRES 400 RDS) BUT NO INSTRUCTION IS GIVEN ON THE M-16; TRAINEES COME FROM BOTH THUA THIEN AND QUANG TRI PROVINCES, AND THE TRAINEE DRAWS A WEAPON UPON REPORTING AND TURNS THE WEAPON IN UPON LEAVING THE TRAINING CENTER.

5. MAJ BAO AND CAPT BRACKNEY, MACV ADVISOR, ESCORTED GEN ROSSON AND PARTY ON A TOUR OF THE TRAINING CENTER. THE MAJOR TOPIC OF DISCUSSION DURING THE TOUR WAS THE 1200 NEW M-16 RIFLES; STILL IN CARTONS. UPON COMPLETION OF THE VISIT TO THUA THIEN, DEPCOMUSMACV AND PARTY DEPARTED FOR CAMP EAGLE.

6. AT CAMP EAGLE, GEN ROSSON RECEIVED A BRIEFING BY MGEN WRIGHT. INCLUDED IN THE BRIEFING, THE RETENTION OF FSB RENDEZVOUS AS A BASE FOR OPERATIONS IN THE A SHAU VALLEY DURING THE FALL-WINTER CAMPAIGN WAS DISCUSSED. THIS IS UNDER STUDY AND I WILL RECOMMEND COURSE OF ACTION TO YOU SOON.

7. GEN ROSSON DEPARTED PHU BAI OPERATIONS AT 261445H FOR SAIGON.

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