

DECLASSIFIED

9. ✓ CG III MAF 010056Z ~~XX~~ SEP69 (C) GP-4
FOR ROSSON FROM NICKERSON
SNIPER RIFLES FOR THE ARVN
10. ✓ CG III MAF 010806Z SEP69 (C) MCEO GP-4
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
"AIR AMBUSH" -- QUOTES 1ST MARDIV 300620Z AUG
11. ✓ CG III MAF 011051Z ~~XU~~X SEP69 (S) GP-4
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
DEPCOMUSMACV WAS HERE
12. ✓ CG III MAF 030206Z SEP69 (S) GP-4
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
VISIT OF "TOM"
13. ✓ CG III MAF 030351Z SEP60 (S) GP-4
FOR ABRAMS INFO BRINGLE FROM NICKERSON
CRUISER NGFS AVAILABILITY

200-726

DECLASSIFIED

14. ✓ CG III MAF 030920Z SEP69 SEP69 (S) GP-4
FOR MILDREN FROM NICKERSON
SA HUYNH PORT CLOSING
15. ✓ CG III MAF 030929Z SEP69 (S) GP-4
FOR ZAIS FROM NICKERSON
DEEP RECON PATROLS -- 101ST ABN DIV
16. ✓ CG III MAF 051405Z SEP69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
CRUISER NGFS AVAILABILITY
17. ✓ CG III MAF 061030Z SEP69 (S) GP-4
NICKERSON TO ABRAMS
DAMAGE FROM ENEMY ROCKET ATTACK
- ~~18. CG III MAF 070510Z SEP69 (S)
FOR MAJ COMDRS FROM NICKERSON
VC STANDOWN 8 11 SEP (US FOLLOW CYN LEAD ON CEASEFIRE)~~
19. ✓ CG III MAF 070958Z SEP69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
CRUISER NGFS AVAILABILITY -- 8" NOT SAME AS 16"
- ~~20. CG III MAF 071337Z SEP69 (S)
NICKERSON TO MAJ I CORPS COMDRS
72 HR CEASEFIRE~~
- ~~21. CG III MAF 071500Z SEP69 (C)
FOR ROSENBERG FROM DOOLEY
CAUSEWAY~~
- ~~22. CG III MAF 071810Z SEP69 (S) EYES ONLY
NICKERSON TO IGTZ MAJ COMDRS
PASSES ABRAMS 071614 72 HR STANDDOWN~~
- ~~23. CG III MAF 071815Z SEP69 (S) EYES ONLY
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
PASSES ABRAMS 071614 72 HR CEASEFIRE~~
24. ✓ CG III MAF 080412Z SEP69 (C) GP-4
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
ROSSON WAS HERE 1SEP
- ~~25. CG III MAF 080430Z SEP69 (C)
NICKERSON TO ALL
INTERPRETATION ON COMUS GUIDANCE ON CEASEFIRE 72 HR STANDDOWN~~

- ~~26. CG III MAF 080730Z SEP69 (S) EXCLUSIVE FOR
NICKERSON TO ALL
CEASEFIRE~~
- ~~27. CG III MAF 080840Z SEP69 (S)
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS (S)~~
- ~~28. CG III MAF 080845Z SEP69 (S)
FOR ABRAMS INFO BRINGLE FROM NICKERSON
ROKMC BDE AMPHIBIOUS OPN~~
29. ✓ CG III MAF 081445Z SEP69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
LTCOL GRAY
- ~~30. CG III MAF 090932Z SEP69 (S) EYES ONLY
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
CEASEFIRE~~
- ~~31. CG III MAF 091202Z SEP69 (S)
FOR BONNER FROM NICKERSON
ATTABOY ON BONNER BRIEF FOR SHILLITO~~
32. ✓ CG III MAF 100708Z SEP69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4
FOR ABRAMS INFO ZAIS FROM NICKERSON
OPERATIONS IN ASHAU VALLEY
33. ✓ CG III MAF 100710Z SEP69 (S) GP-4
FOR ABRAMS & ZUMWALT INFO BUSE, BONNER & DILLON FROM NICKERSON
SUPPLEMENTARY DAMAGE REPORT
- ~~34. CG III MAF 100728Z SEP69 (S) EYES ONLY
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON
CEASEFIRE INCIDENTS~~
- ~~35. CG III MAF 100933Z SEP69 (U)
FOR DONALDSON FROM NICKERSON
CONGRATS ON YOUR SEL FOR PRO TO BG~~
36. ✓ CG III MAF 110855Z SEP69 (S) GP-4
FOR ABRAMS FOM NICKERSON
CEASEFIRE
- ~~37. CG III MAF ~~110855Z~~ 120335Z SEP69 (U)
FOR ANDERSON FROM NICKERSON
HELLO TRANS FOR SHOULDERS RMCM~~
- ~~38. CG III MAF 120849Z SEP69 (S)
FOR ZAIS, SIMPSON, RAMSEY FROM NICKERSON
ATTABOYS IN CONN W/REPORTING CEASEFIRE INCIDENTS~~

39. ✓ ~~CG III MAF 131250Z SEP69 (S) GP-4~~
FOR ROSSON FROM NICKERSON
RECENT ACTIVITIES IN THE HIEP DUC AREA
40. ✓ CG III MAF 140720Z SEP69 (S) GP-4
FOR ZAIS FROM NICKERSON
RECON/SURVEILLANCE FOR ASHAU
- ~~41. CG III MAF 151130Z SEP69 (U)
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
CASWELL WAS WOUNDED~~
42. ✓ CG III MAF 152317Z SEP69 (S) GP-4
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
DEPCOMUS VISITED ON 9 SEP 69
43. ✓ CG III MAF 170207Z SEP69 (S) GP-4
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
ALSO WAS HERE
44. ✓ CG III MAF 170210Z SEP69 (S) GP-4
FOR BUSE FROM TOWNSEND
ALSO WAS HERE
- ~~45. CG III MAF 180006Z SEP69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR WILSON FROM DULACKI
FORCE PLANNING~~
46. ✓ CG III MAF 180530Z SEP69 (S) GP-4 EYES ONLY
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
ASGT OF SNR ARMY INTEL OFF TO HQ III MAF
- ~~47. CG III MAF 181350Z SEP69 (U)
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
CASWELL HAS IMPROVED~~
- ~~48. CG III MAF 191400Z SEP69 (S) EYES ONLY
REDEPLOYMENT CONFERENCE~~
- ~~49. CG III MAF 200846Z SEP69 (U)
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
RELEASE OF 1STLT CASWELL FROM NSA HOSP AND AIR EVAC TO
USNH CHELSEA, MASS.~~
50. ✓ CG III MAF 200916Z SEP69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE GP-4
FOR SIMPSON FROM NICKERSON
MALARIA DISCIPLINE

1. ~~1~~ CG III MAF 210613Z SEP69 (S) *GP-4*
FOR ZAIS FROM NICKERSON
ADJUSTMENT OF FORCE DISPOSITIONS IN CONNECTION WITH
THIRD MARDIV REDEPLOYMENT
2. ~~2~~ CG III MAF 230114Z SEP69 (C) *GP-4* SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR BONNER INFO ZUMWALT FROM NICKERSON
MOVE THE PHUNG CHAU -- EXPEDITIOUSLY!
3. ~~3~~ *MSG NIF* CG III MAF 230348Z SEP69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE LIMDIS *GP-4*
FOR ZAIS FROM NICKERSON
DAVE LAMB STORY -- YR DISCUSSIONS W/LAMB
4. ~~4~~ CG III MAF 230549Z SEP69 (S) *GP-4*
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON
ROSSON WAS HERE 19SEP69
5. ~~5~~ CG III MAF 240940Z SEP69 (S) ABSOLUTE EYES ONLY) *GP-4*
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
ZAIS -- DAVE LAMB & THE UPI STORY
6. ~~6~~ *X* CG III MAF 241027Z SEP69 (S) ABSOLUTE EYES ONLY *GP-4*
FOR ABRAMS INFO ZAIS FROM NICKERSON
ZAIS - DAVE LAMB & THE UPI STORY
7. ~~7~~ ~~CG III MAF 241345Z SEP69 (U)~~
~~BUSE (CANCEL) CG III MAF 240940Z (#5 ABOVE)~~
8. ~~8~~ ~~CG III MAF 260240Z SEP69 (U)~~
~~FOR BARRON INFO BONNER & CARNEY FROM DOOLEY~~
~~SEND GRUNING, VELOTAS & GUY BACK TO DNG -- URGENTLY~~
9. ~~9~~ ~~CG III MAF 260536Z SEP69 (U)~~
~~FOR ANDERSON FROM NICKERSON~~
~~THANKS FOR THE INVITE TO LUNCH BUT I CAN'T MAKE IT~~
10. ~~10~~ ~~CG III MAF 271619Z SEP69 (C)~~
~~FOR ABRAMS INFO ROBERTS FROM NICKERSON~~
~~VISIT OF LTGEN S.W. WELLS~~
11. ~~11~~ ~~CG III MAF 290605Z SEP69 (U)~~
~~FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON~~
~~I PLAN ATTEND SCOTTISH RITES ON OKI 3-6OCT~~
12. ~~12~~ ~~CG III MAF 291324Z SEP69 (C)~~
~~FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY~~
~~JOHN CANTON~~

200 726

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 01 SEPT 1969	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 010056Z SEPT 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT F-O-R
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I		25 Sept	N	REMARKS <i>Feedback</i>
4	DCG	I				THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
6	DC/S PLAN	I				
1	S/S	I				
	G-1					
	G-2					
5	G-3	I				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	FMO					
	SBC					
	7 DSA	I				

ORIG DSA
REL CG

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

REF E

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGOTTCZYUW RHMMAFAB010 2440056-CCCC--RHMSMVA.
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 210056Z SEP 69 ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / F O R G E N R O S S O N F R O M L T G E N N I C K E R S O N
 S N I P E R R I F L E S F O R A R V N (U)

A. DSA ICTZ DANANG 291300Z JUL 69

B. MACV LETTER MACMA-AL OF 7 AUG 69, SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR SNIPER
 EQUIPMENT (U)

C. CG III MAF 110856Z AUG 69

D. CG III MAF 171016Z AUG 69

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING IS AN AMPLIFICATION OF REFERENCES A THRU D AND
 OUTLINES PROPOSED TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF SNIPER TEAMS FOR I CORPS
 (ARVN) UNITS.

2. (C) CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT. ARVN INITIALLY PLANS TO EMPLOY SNIPER
 TEAMS ON THESE TYPES OF OPERATIONS: AMBUSH PATROLS (PLATOON AND SQUAD
 SIZED), RECON/STAY-BEHIND PATROLS, AND COUNTER-SNIPER OPERATIONS.

A. THEY VISUALIZE THAT A 2-5 MAN SNIPER ELEMENT WILL ACCOMPANY AN AM-
 BUSH PATROL. WHEN ENEMY ACTIVITY OR MOVEMENT IS OBSERVED, THE SNIPER
 TEAM WILL BE USED TO ENGAGE SELECTED INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS ENEMY LEADERS,

PAGE 2 RHMMAFAB 0010 C O N F I D E N T I A L / F O R G E N R O S S O N
 RADIO OPERATORS AND CREW-SERVED WEAPONS PERSONNEL, WHILE THE REST OF
 THE PATROL PLACES FIRE UPON THE REMAINDER OF THE ENEMY FORCE.

B. UPON WITHDRAWAL OF A PATROL OR TROOP UNIT FROM AN
 OPERATIONAL AREA, A SNIPER TEAM WITH A SMALL SUPPORT/SECURITY
 ELEMENT WOULD BE USED AS A STAY-BEHIND FORCE TO ENGAGE ANY
 ENEMY FORCE MOVING IN BEHIND THE WITHDRAWING FRIENDLY FORCE.

C. UNITS OR SECURITY OPERATIONS OR FIXED DEFENSIVE POSI-
 TIONS WOULD EMPLOY SNIPERS TO SEARCH FOR AND ENGAGE ENEMY
 SNIPERS.

3. (C) CONCEPT OF TRAINING.

A. SELECTION OF PERSONNEL. THE PROGRAM WILL BE VOLUNTARY.
 FROM THE VOLUNTEERS, THOSE PERSONNEL WITH THE BEST MARKSMANSHIP
 RECORDS WILL BE SELECTED FOR FURTHER TRAINING. THE FIRST
 MARINE DIVISION HAS THE CAPABILITY AND WILL BE USED TO ASSIST
 IN TRAINING THE INITIAL INCREMENT. ADDITIONAL TRAINING IN THE
 USE OF THE STARLIGHT SCOPE WILL BE GIVEN TO THOSE TRAINEES NOT
 ALREADY PROFICIENT. ARVN HAS THE CAPABILITY TO TRAIN THEIR MEN
 IN THE USE OF NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT.

B. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT A MINIMUM OF 4 WEEKS WILL BE RE-
 QUIRED TO COMPLETE THE TRAINING PHASE.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
 COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

9(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 RHMMAFB 0010 C O N F I D E N T I A L / FOR GEN ROSSON

C. THE FIRST INCREMENT WILL BE EMPLOYED FOR A SUFFICIENT LENGTH OF TIME (2 MONTHS) TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM PRIOR TO TRAINING ANY ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL.

4. (C) THE 51ST INFANTRY REGIMENT HAS BEEN SELECTED BY ARVN AS THE PILOT UNIT TO BE TRAINED. 20 MEN (5 MEN FROM EACH BATTALION) WILL BE SELECTED, TRAINED AND RETURNED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS. THE MEN WILL THEN BE EMPLOYED IN OPERATIONS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE AND RESULTS EVALUATED. IF SUCCESSFUL AND EFFECTIVE, ADDITIONAL WEAPONS AND SCOPES WILL BE SOUGHT AND THE PROGRAM EXPANDED. THE SECOND UNIT TO RECEIVE TRAINING WILL BE THE 2ND ARVN REGIMENT (1ST DIVISION) AND THESE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED IN THEIR NORMAL AREA NEAR THE DKZ. FOLLOW ON INCREMENTS WILL SUBSEQUENTLY TRAINED WITH PRIORITY TO 1ST DIVISION UNTIL, EVENTUALLY, ALL BATTALIONS, TO INCLUDE THE THREE RANGER BATTALIONS, WILL HAVE AN ORGANIC 9 MAN SNIPER ELEMENT.

5. (C) FOR THE INITIAL PHASE, 20 WEAPONS WITH SCOPES WILL BE REQUIRED. IF THE PROGRAM IS IMPLEMENTED FOR ALL ARVN I CORPS UNITS, A TOTAL OF 200 WEAPONS AND SCOPES ARE NECESSARY (36 BATTALIONS x 5 WEAPONS PER BATTALION PLUS 20 WEAPONS IN A MAINTENANCE POOL).

PAGE 4 RHMMAFB 0010 C O N F I D E N T I A L / FOR GEN ROSSON

6. (C) SUMMARY. I CORPS HAS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY THE SNIPER BROCHURE PREPARED BY MAJOR ROBERT G. HILCHEY, ASSISTANT GS, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION. IN ESSENCE THEY ARE GOING TO USE THIS BROCHURE AS A GUIDE FOR THE SELECTION, TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF SNIPERS FOR ARVN I CORPS UNITS.

GP-4

BT

0010

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGESCOPY 2 OF 4 COPIES**CONFIDENTIAL**

9(2)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 01 SEPT 1969	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 010806Z SEPT 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	REMARKS
			IN	OUT			
3	CG	I		25/1	N	SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO	<i>Feedback</i>
2	DCG	I					
	DCG AIR						
2	C/S	I			ST		
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	I	9/1		Old g/s		ORIG: C/S REL: C/S
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	SBC						

EXCLUSIVE

FOR

HAS BEEN SENT

10
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OTTUEYUW RHMMAF0093 2440806-CCCC--RUNHFMA.

ZNY CCCCC

O 010806Z SEPT 69

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
FROM LTGEN NICKERSON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
DELIVERY DURING WORKING HOURS

1. THE FOL MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

" O 300620Z AUG 69

FM FIRST MARDIV COC

TO III MAF COC

INFO FIRST MAF COC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

RECENT HEAVY ENEMY MOVEMENT AT NIGHT, IN AND OUT OF THE
QUE SON MOUNTAINS THROUGH PHU LOC VALLEY, ESTABLISHED A
PATTERN WHICH APPEARED TO OFFER AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISRUPT ENEMY
RESUPPLY EFFORT ALONG THIS LOC, AND TO INFLICT SIGNIFICANT
CASUALTIES IN THE PROCESS.

IT WAS DECIDED TO EMPLOY A NEW TECHNIQUE AGAINST THIS TARGET
CALLED THE "AIR AMBUSH". THIS INVOLVED USE OF SENSORS ALONG

PAGE 2 RHMMAF0093 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
WITH CONCENTRATED EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE ATTACK AVIATION BACKED
UP BY THE MASSES FIREPOWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.

THE AIR AMBUSH WAS LAID IN THE MOUTH OF PHU LOC VALLEY ON A
TRAIL AT AT979467, AND WAS CONTROLLED BY A MARINE FORWARD AIR
CONTROLLER, CAPTAIN J. E. SOWER, WHO WAS LOCATED ON HILL 425
WITH RECONNAISSANCE TEAM TURF CLUB.

AT 281925H AUG 69, 3 A-6'S CHECKED IN AND WERE PLACED
IN AN ORBIT WELL EAST OF THE TARGET AREA. AN OV-10 ARRIVED
AND WAS ORBITED WELL CLEAR TO THE NORTH. RADIO CHECKS
REVEALED THAT ALL PARTIES (FAC, ASRT, A6'S AND OV-10) WERE UP
AND READY.

PROMPTLY AT 1930, MOVEMENT WAS DETECTED BY SENSORS (ADSIDS)
PREPLACED IN THE VALLEY. UTILIZING THE NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICE
OVER 60 ENEMY WERE OBSERVED MOVING EAST ON THE TRAIL AND
APPROACHING THE KILLING ZONE. CAPT SOWER CALLED THE ASRT GIVING
THEM AN EIGHT DIGIT COORDINATE SLIGHTLY LEADING THE MOVING FORCE.
THE ASRT RAN THE FIRST AS ON THE TARGET UTILIZING THE TPQ-10 RADAR.
TWENTY EIGHT B2'S (500 LB BOMBS) WITH A MIXTURE OF INSTANTANEOUS
AND DAISY CUTTER FUSING WERE DELIVERED.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

FMFPAC-GEN 2100/1 (3/69)
0101-V04-6601

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

10(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 RHMMAF00093 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

UPON OBSERVING THE BOMBS STRIKE IN THE AFT END OF THE COLUMN, CAPT SOWER CALLED AN ADJUSTMENT TO THE ASRT WHO CORRECTED THEIR DATA AND RAN THE SECOND AG ON THE TARGET. THIS LOAD WAS DELIVERED, ANOTHER CORRECTION WAS GIVEN BY THE ASRT, AND THE FINAL AG SALVOED HIS LOAD.

AT THIS TIME THE OV-10 PILOTTED BY A FAC (A) WAS OVER THE TARGET. HE HAD UNDER HIS CONTROL TWO F-4 AIRCRAFT EACH LOADED WITH 7 NAPALM TANKS. THE FAC (A) UTILIZING HIS OWN FLARES ILLUMINATED THE AREA AND GAVE THE FIRST F-4 HIS TARGET. THE F-4 PILOT SALVOED HIS NAPALM RIGHT ON TARGET - SIX ENEMY WERE OBSERVED TO GET UP AND RUN. THE SECOND F-4 DROPPED HIS NAPALM IN THEIR MIDST.

WHEN THE FAC HAD DETERMINED THE INITIAL TARGET HE HAD ALSO REQUESTED A BACK UP FLIGHT FOR F-4'S. AFTER THE DELIVERY OF THE LAST NAPALM LOAD A FLIGHT OF A4'S CHECKED IN WITH D-1A (SNAKEYE BOMBS) AND NAPALM. THEY WERE HELD IN ORBIT UNTIL MOVEMENT WAS SEEN. UTILIZING THE W O D, WHERE ON THE A-4'S WERE DIRECTED ON TARGET BY. THE FAC(A) - NO FURTHER MOVEMENT WAS OBSERVED FROM THE AIR.

PAGE 4 RHMMAF00093 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

A TOTAL OF 12 ENEMY WERE OBSERVED FROM THE RECON OP GETTING UP AND MOVING AFTER THE STRIKES ON THE KILL ZONE. LATER IN THE NIGHT ADDITIONAL MOVEMENT WAS OBSERVED AS THE ENEMY APPARENTLY-ATTEMPTED TO POLICE THE AREA - THIS WAS ATTACKED BY ARTILLERY. IN THE MORNING, A RECON PATROL SWEEPED THE AREA OF THE AMBUSH FINDING DRAG MARKS, 782 GEAR, PACKS, AND RICE STREWN ALL OVER THE AREA BUT NO BODIES, THE ENEMY APPARENTLY HAVING SUCCEEDED IN REMOVING THE DEAD AND WOUNDED. TWO LONE NVA WERE FOUND IN A CAVE NEXT TO THE TRAIL - ONE WAS KILLED AND ONE WAS CAPTURED; INTERROGATION OF THE POW IS NOT COMPLETED.

PROCEDURES INVOLVED IN THIS TECHNIQUE WILL CONTINUE TO BE REFINED AND FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF THE AIR AMBUSH IS PLANNED.

GP-4"

BT

GP-4

BT

0093

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 1 SEPT 68	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 0110513		COPY# OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET/ FOR GEN SERIES
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I		3 Sept	J	REMARKS (1) Feedback THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SAC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
4	DCG	I			JZ	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I			J	
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN	I		Has dup by B		
1	S/S	I	9/11		OW 4/78	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	I		Has dup by B		
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS	I		Has dup by B		
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SAC					
	DSA	I		Has dup by B		

HAS BEEN SENT

(11)

SECRET

0 011051Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
INFO CG USARV
ZEM

S E C R E T / FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
VISIT OF DEPCOMUSMACV TO ICIZ ON 29AUG69

1. GEN ROSSON ARRIVED 291005H AT THE A & DSL COMPANY
AT HOI AN AND WAS MET BY THE PROVINCE CHIEF AND PSA.
HE RECEIVED A BRIEF BY THE COMPANY COMMANDER WHICH COVERED
THE ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONING, EQUIPMENT STATUS, AND
PERSONNEL STATUS OF THE A & DSL CO. HE EXPRESSED INTEREST
IN THE STATUS OF EQUIPMENT AND ASKED IF THE FIGURES ON TRUCKS
REPAIRED REFLECTED ONLY THOSE REPAIRED IN THE COMPANY
AREA OR INCLUDED THOSE REPAIRED BY CONTACT TEAM AS WELL.
HE WAS TOLD THEY WERE ONLY FOR THOSE REPAIRED IN THE COMPANY
AREA. HE ASKED IF ALL SHORTAGES WERE COVERED BY REQUISITION
AND WAS TOLD THEY ARE. GEN ROSSON WAS ALSO BRIEFED ON
THE FINANCE SECTION. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN
THE RICE ALLOWANCE AND THE PROVINCE CHIEF'S SPECIAL
ORGANIZATION TO HELP PROCESS PAPERS FOR RICE RATIONS FOR
DEPENDENTS. SINCE THE SYSTEM SEEMED TO BE HELPFUL FOR THE
PF'S, GEN ROSSON ASKED THAT THE PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION
BE SENT TO HIM.

11(1)

11(2)

2. AFTER THE BRIEFING, GEN ROSSON ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW OFTEN THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE ALC IN DANANG INSPECTS THE COMPANY. HE WAS TOLD THE INSPECTION TEAM COMES ALMOST EVERY MONTH. HE ASKED IF THERE IS A DS COMPANY FROM ALC TO ASSIST WITH HIGHER ECHELONS OF REPAIR AND WAS TOLD THAT THERE IS A REPAIR TEAM ATTACHED TO THE A & DSL COMPANY FROM THE ALC. GEN ROSSON ASKED FOR OPINIONS ON A REORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD REMOVE THE ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE SECTIONS FROM THE A & DSL COMPANY AND PLACE THEM DIRECTLY UNDER THE DISTRICT CHIEF, BUT WOULD LEAVE THE DSL COMPANY UNDER THE ALC. BOTH THE FINANCE OFFICER AND THE SUPPLY OFFICER WERE IN FAVOR THE THE CHANGE. GEN ROSSON ASKED IF MOVING THE MEDICAL SUPPORT FROM THE ALC TO A MEDICAL GROUP HAD MADE ANY DIFFERENCE IN SUPPLY SUPPORT AND WAS TOLD THAT IT HAD NOT. HE ASKED ABOUT CRITICAL SHORTAGES OF SPECIALISTS AND WAS TOLD THAT THE COMPANY NEEDS 20 MORE ARMORERS AND 6 GENERAL PURPOSE MECHANICS TRAINED ON THE NEW VEHICLES. HOWEVER, THE COMPANY COMMANDER SAID THAT HE COULDN'T ASK FOR THESE PEOPLE BECAUSE THEY ARE ABOVE THE TOE AUTHORIZATION. GEN ROSSON COMMENTED THAT THE COMPANY SHOULD ASK FOR THEM ANYWAY SINCE THE JGS IS CONDUCTING A STUDY ON THE NEEDS OF THE A & DSL COMPANY. THE COMPANY COMMANDER ADDED THAT THE COMPANY NEEDS WRECKERS, FORK LIFTS, AND THE MANUALS FOR THE NEW VEHICLES.
3. UPON HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE COMPANY AT 291205H, GEN ROSSON TOLD THE COMPANY STAFF AND THE ADVISORS THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE THREE BEST A & DSL COMPANIES HE HAS SEEN IN ALL VIETNAM.
4. GEN ROSSON THEN VISITED NSA FOR LUNCH AND A BRIEFING. HE COMMENTED THAT THE BRIEFING WAS VERY PROFESSIONAL AND VERY INFORMATIVE.
5. GEN ROSSON DEPARTED AT 291400.

CP-4

11(2)

11(2)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

CCN: 10

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 03 SEP 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 030206Z SEP 69		COPY# 2 OF 6 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	J		4 OMT	N	REMARKS Feedback
4	DCG	J			73	
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	P			TD	DRAFTED BY: CG RELBY: CG
	D C/S					
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	9/3		CB	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	SBC					

HAS BEEN SENT

12

13

SECRET

SECRET

PTTSZYUW RHMAFA0324 2470206-SSSS--RUHFMA.
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 030206Z SEP 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 BT

S E C R E T

FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 VISIT OF THE CHIEF O NAVAL OPERATIONS

A. CG FMFPAC 290303Z AUG 69

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS
 SUBMITTED CONCERNING CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS VISIT TO
 III MAF 30-31 AUGUST 1969.

2. CNO WAS ACCOMPANIED THROUGHOUT HIS ICTZ VISIT BY CG
 III MAF AND COMNAFORV. THE VISIT IS DIVIDED INTO THREE
 CATEGORIES: (A) VISIT TO III MAF (B) VISIT TO I CORPS
 (C) VISIT NCB AND NSA.

A. VISIT TO III MAF CONSISTED OF A BRIEF FLYOVER OF
 THE DANANG AREA, LUNCH WITH CG III MAF AND A FORMAL STAFF
 BRIEFING FOLLOWED BY DISCUSSIONS. THE FOLLOWING IS A
 SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS DURING CNO BRIEFING AT
 III MAF HQ:

PAGE 2 RHMAFA0324 **S E C R E T**

(1) AFTER A SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT, CNO
 COMMENTED THAT THE BRIEF REFLECTED THE GENERAL CONCENSUS
 OF OPINION IS WASHINGTON. HE STATED THAT THE ENEMY STILL
 HAS POTENT CAPABILITY AND WE WATCH THE DMZ CAREFULLY.

(2) AFTER CORDS BRIEFING ON THE 1969 PACIFICATION
 CAMPAIGN, HE ASKED: "WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE VCI; DO YOU
 FIND MORE YOUNG PEOPLE THAN OLD?" ANSWER: YES MORE YOUNG THAN
 OLD. HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, AND THE DIFFICULTY
 OF RESETTLEMENT. HE COMMENTED ON THE FACT THAT THE HEAVIEST
 NVA/VC ACTIVITY STILL SEEMED TO BE TARGETED AROUND THE MAJOR
 CITIES. CNO SAID IT APPEARED STRANGE THAT THIS IS TRUE
 AFTER WE HAD BEEN FIGHTING SO LONG. MR. FRITZ (ASSTDEPCORDS)
 POINTED OUT THAT THE ENEMY WAS ACTIVELY SEEKING CONTROL IN
 POPULATED AREAS. ALTHOUGH SECURITY FOR HUE AND DANANG PRESENTLY
 IS CONSIDERED ADEQUATE, QUANG NAI CITY IS REPORTED LESS SECURE.
 GEN NICKERSON MADE AMPLIFYING REMARKS ABOUT DANANG AREA
 PROBLEMS THAT RESULTED FROM OVER EMPHASIS ON SAIGON. HE
 STATED THAT DANANG HAD THE TROUBLES OF A REGULAR MEGALOPOLIS
 WITH ALL ITS PEOPLE, AND THIS WAS NOT FULLY APPRECIATED
 BY THE RVN GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

12(1) **SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 3 RHMMAFA0324 S E C R E T

(3) AFTER G-3 BRIEFING ON THE FRIENDLY SITUATION AND THE PRESENT CONCEPT OF CURRENT OPERATIONS IN ICTZ, CNO ASKED: "ISN'T IT FAIR TO SAY THIS IS WHAT WE'VE BEEN DOING ALL THE TIME?" GEN NICKERSON ANSWERED THAT THE KEY DIFFERENCE IN THE PRESENT APPROACH WAS THE COMPLETE INTEGRATION OF U.S., ARVN AND ROKMC FORCES IN THE OVERALL PLAN.

(4) AFTER DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PLANS' BRIEF ON ARVN EFFECTIVENESS, IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION, CNO REMARKED: "IT IS A VERY ENCOURAGING PICTURE HERE, BUT IN THE U.S. THEY CAN'T REALLY DECIDE WHETHER THERE IS A LULL OR NOT. I DON'T KNOW HOW WE CAN MAINTAIN PRESENT FORCES IF THE ENEMY AVOIDS CONTACT. THE PROBLEM IS THE PATIENCE OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. THEY WANT TO BRING THE BOYS HOME. WE HOPE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION SO AS TO NOT SNATCH DEFEAT FROM THE VERY JAWS OF VICTORY. HOW LONG CAN THESE PEOPLE KEEP IT UP?" CG III MAF EXPLAINED THE PHOENIX PROGRAM AND ELIMINATION OF THE VCI AS A MAIN EFFORT IN SOLVING THIS PROBLEM. CG ADDED THAT HE WAS ALSO OFTEN PUZZLED BY THE APPROACH OF SOME VILLAGE ELDERS WHO ARE TOLERANT OF THE VCI WHEN THEIR VERY LIVES ARE AT STAKE.

(5) AFTER BRIEF BY CG FIRST MAW ON AIR OPERATIONS, CNO

PAGE 4 RHMMAFA0324 S E C R E T

ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: HOW MANY AIR FORCE SUPPORT MISSIONS INVOLVING DRONES HAD THE FIRST MAW CONDUCTED? ANSWER: ABOUT 15. WHAT WAS THE FAVORITE TYPE OF AIR ORDNANCE? ANSWER: ROCKEYE. HE SEEMED SURPRISED THAT IS WAS MORE POPULAR THAN CBU.

B. CNO THEN VISITED GEN LAM AT HIS HEADQUARTERS. NO PERTINENT ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED.

C. AT NCB, DISCUSSIONS WERE CONDUCTED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS: FORCE DEPLOYMENT, WORKLOAD, PHASEDOWN PLANNING, VNN BASE CONSTRUCTION, MATERIAL, LOC AND EQUIPMENT.

(1) COMMAND AREAS OF INTEREST:

(A) INTEGRATION OF 703, DEACTIVATION, REDEPLOYMENT AND WORKLOAD PLANNING. CNO COMMENT: SATISFIED.

(B) INADEQUATE NUMBERS TO FULLY STAFF 14 NMCB'S. CNO COMMENT: STRESSED DO NOT DECOMMISSION BELOW 14 NMCB LEVEL. MAINTAIN IN COMMISSIONED STATUS EVEN AT GREATLY REDUCED MANNING. EASIER TO FLESH OUT WITH DPPOS THAN TO RECOMMISSION.

(C) VNN BASE CONSTRUCTION. CNO COMMENT: UNDERSTOOD USE OF VERTICAL CAPABILITY FOR VNN BASES WHICH COM-

PAGE 2 OF 3

12(2) **SECRET**

SECRET

PAGE 5 RHMAFA0324 S E C R E T

PLIMENTS DEMAND FOR HORIZONTAL CAPABILITY ON LOC IN ICTZ.
 UNDERSTOOD VNN BASE WORK WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY SEABEE
 DETAILS STAGED WITH EQUIPMENT, MEN AND MATERIAL OUT OF ICTZ.

(D) MATERIAL. CNO COMMENT: APPRECIATES NATURE
 AND CAUSE OF HIGH STOCK LEVEL PROBLEM AND MANAGEMENT ACTION
 TO CONTROL IT. RETROGRADE OF USE ELSEWHERE ALL POSSIBLE
 ITEMS. SHIP TO REINDEER STATION.

(E) EQUIPMENT. CNO COMMENT: UNDERSTOOD IN-COUNTRY
 NMCB REQUIREMENTS HAVE FIRST CALL ON ORGANIC ALLOWANCE FOR
 PHASED OUT NMCBS. CBPAC, CBLANT AND NAVFAC WOULD INDICATE
 DISTRIBUTION OF REMAINDER.

(2) CNO HAD DINNER AT NSA; FOLLOWING THE DINNER, A
 BRIEFING WAS HELD WITH NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS CONDUCTED.
 3. CNO REMAINED OVER NIGHT AT III MAF HQ 30 AUGUST 1968 AND
 DEPARTED FOR YANKEE STATION AT 0845H ON 31 AUGUST 1968.

GP-4

BT

0324

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

12(2) **SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 03 SEP 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE P 0303517 SEP 69		COPY 1, 2, 3 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT CRUISER NOFS AVAILABILITY
			IN	OUT		
2	CG	I		4 days		REMARKS <i>feedback</i> THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SAC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
2	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	9/3			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	SAC					

HAS BEEN SENT

(13)

SECRET

P 030351Z
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO COMSEVENTHFLEET
 ZEM

S E C R E T FOR GENERAL ABRAMS INFO VADM BRINGLE
 FM LTGEN NICKERSON

SUBJECT: CRUISER NGFS AVAILABILITY

1. THE DEPARTURE OF THE USS ST. PAUL (CA73) FROM THE GUN LINE ON 16 SEP ENROUTE TO HER HOMEPORT OF SAN DIEGO WILL LEAVE ONLY ONE CRUISER ASSIGNED TO THE SEVENTHFLEET. THIS MEANS THERE WILL BE EXTENDED PERIODS WHEN NO CRUISERS ARE AVAILABLE FOR NGFS IN THE DMZ AREA. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE CONTINUED DRAWDOWN OF NGFS AND THE PLANS NOT TO RETURN THE USS NEW JERSEY, CAUSES CONCERN.

2. THE MANY ADVANTAGES OF NGF, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF THE DMZ, NEED NOT BE RESTATED. IMPENDING FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS FROM NICIZ MAKE THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE MOBILE FIREPOWER OF HEAVY NGF SHIPS MORE CRITICAL THAN EVER. THE FACT THAT NGFS CAN BE PROVIDED WITHOUT ANY INCREASE IN IN-COUNTRY SPACES AND WITHOUT ANY REQUIREMENT FOR IN-COUNTRY BASES MAKES IT PARTICULARLY ADVANTAGEOUS AT THIS TIME.

3. THE ASSIGNMENT OF A NGF CRUISER TO ICTZ ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS IS CONSIDERED A NECESSITY.

4. I RECOMMEND REITERATION OF OUR DESIRES FOR, FIRST, THE NEW JERSEY AND, SECONDLY, A CRUISER ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS.

GP-4
 240

REF-3

NNNN



13/11

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 33 SEP 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 3309202		1,2,3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG					SECRET REMARKS <i>(Handwritten signature)</i> THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
4	DCG					
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S	I				
	DC/S					
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	9/3		9/8	HAS BEEN SENT
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
5	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

REF-A

(14)

SECRET

0 030920Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG USARV
 ZEM

S E C R E T/FOR LTGEN MILDREN FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. YR 010338Z SEP69
 SA HUYHN PORT CLOSING

1. REF MSG STATES THAT IT IS DESIRED THAT THE PORT OF SA HUYHN BE CLOSED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN CONSONANCE WITH DESIRES AND CAPABILITIES PREVIOUSLY STATED. IT IS INTENDED THAT THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR DUC PHO BE PROVIDED FROM THE DANANG SUPPORT COMMAND BY LAND LOC.
2. IN RECENT MONTHS THE NVAY HAS BEEN TRYING TO CLOSE THE PORT OF SA HUYHN AND I HAVE STEADFASTLY OPPOSED THIS. THEIR MOST RECENT ATTEMPT WAS ABOUT A MONTH AGO WHEN THEY SUGGESTED TO GEN HEISER THAT HE MIGHT AGREE TO CLOSING THE PORT. JOE DID NOT AGREE AND THE SUBJECT HAS REMAINED DORMANT SINCE. DURING THAT EXCHANGE I STAYED SILENT AND ON THE SIDELINES BUT WAS PREPARED TO STEP IN IF THE SITUATION DICTATED.
3. I BELIEVE THAT A DECISION ON THE CLOSING OF THE PORT OF SA HUYHN WOULD PROPERLY BE MINE, IN AS MUCH AS IT INVOLVES NAVY COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT FOR I CORPS. I BELIEVE THAT THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS STILL DICTATE THE UTILIZATION OF THIS PORT, AND I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY DEMANDS ON THE AMERICAL DIVISION TO KEEP THE LAND LOC OPEN FROM CHU LAI TO DUC PHO.
4. I WOULD REQUEST RECONSIDERATION OF YOUR MESSAGE AND WOULD RECOMMEND ITS CANCELLATION. IF YOU DEEM IT DESIRABLE TO PURSUE THE ISSUE FURTHER, I WOULD REQUEST THAT THE QUERY BE DIRECTED TO ME IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE DIFFICULTIES WITH SUBORDINATES IN THE OPERATIONAL CHAIN.
5. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT MY SOLE PURPOSE IS THE MAINTENANCE OF MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND THE ASSURANCE THAT WE CAN OPERATE UNDER ANY AND ALL CONDITIONS. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE PORT OF SA HUYHN REMAIN OPEN, AT LEAST FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS MAY DICTATE THAT THE PORT BE CLOSED REGARDLESS OF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, BUT I DON'T BELIEVE WE'VE REACHED THAT POINT AS YET.

WARMEST REGARDS

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS



14(1)

14(1)

U 030929Z ZYM
 FM CG III MAF
 TO SSO XXIV CORPS
 ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

LIGEN NICKERSON SENDS FOR LIGEN ZAIS

1. (C) AS YOU MAY KNOW, I RECEIVE A DETAILED BRIEFING EACH MORNING ON THE DEEP RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES OF U.S. FORCES IN ICTZ. I HAVE NOTICED RECENTLY THAT THE NUMBER OF LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS MAINTAINED IN THE FIELD BY THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION HAS BEEN MINIMAL. I BELIEVE THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT ACTIVE AND EXTENSIVE DEEP RECONNAISSANCE IS A VITAL DIMENSION OF OUR EFFORT HERE, ESPECIALLY WITH THE PROSPECTS OF A DIMINISHING NUMBER OF US TROOPS IN ICTZ. I FURTHER BELIEVE THAT A MORE ACTIVE EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO ACHIEVE A HIGHER SUSTAINED LEVEL OF DEEP RECONNAISSANCE PATROLLING ON THE PART OF THE 101ST IN ORDER TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE INFORMED PICTURE OF THE ENEMY AND HIS ACTIVITIES IN THE 101ST AO. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING
 WORKING HOURS.

GP-4
 155

CONFIDENTIAL
 HAS BEEN SENT

NNNN

15(1)

15(1)

0 340997Z LYH
FM CG III IAF
TO CG FMFPAC
ZEN

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
FOR LTGEN DUST FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
O 301201Z ZFF-4 ZFF-1

FM MG TOWNSEND COPS MACV SAIGON
TO LTG WILDREN DCG USARV LONG BINH
GEN BROWN COM 7AF TAN SON NHUT
LTG NICKERSON CG III IAF DANANG
VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON
ZEN



TOP SECRET SENSITIVE MAC 11346 EYES ONLY

1. AT THE DIRECTION OF THE JCS, THREE TROOP LISTS FOR PHASE TWO REDEPLOYMENTS I.E. OF 25,000, 38,500, AND 48,500 HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED.
2. IF PHASE TWO IS ORDERED INTO EXECUTION AT ANY OF THESE LEVELS, REDUCTIONS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY CURTAILING REPLACEMENT FLOW AND BY REDEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL OVER AND ABOVE NORMAL ROTATION. SOME OF THESE PERSONNEL WILL BE MEMBERS OF UNITS DESIGNATED FOR REDEPLOYMENT; HOWEVER, IT IS EXPECTED THAT MOST WILL NOT BE ASSIGNED TO REDEPLOYING UNITS.
3. A MACV MOVEMENTS PLANNING CONFERENCE IS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 9 SEPTEMBER. PURPOSE OF CONFERENCE IS TO DEVELOP AS MUCH DETAILED INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE BEFORE A SIMILAR CINCPAC CONFERENCE WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY AFTER A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEAR REDUCTIONS.

28(1)

~~28~~

4. ACCORDINGLY, COMUSMACV HAS DIRECTED THAT ACTION BE TAKEN BY COMPONENT COMMANDS TO ASCERTAIN/DETERMINE THE FOLLOWING:

- A. PERSONNEL REDEPLOYMENT CRITERIA FOR RESPECTIVE SERVICE PERSONNEL FOR MOVEMENT COMMENCING ABOUT 15 OCTOBER, AND COMPLETION NOT LATER THAN 15 DECEMBER. THESE CRITERIA SHOULD INCLUDE REPLACEMENT FLOW CONSIDERATIONS AS WELL AS RETURNEE CONSIDERATIONS.
 - B. DESIGNATION OF UNITS TO BE:
 - (1) INACTIVATED IN VIETNAM.
 - (2) REDEPLOYED AS UNITS TO A SPECIFIED LOCATION.
 - (3) REDEPLOYED WITHOUT PERSONNEL.
 - C. EQUIPMENT DISPOSITION FOR REDEPLOYING AND INACTIVATING UNITS, WHERE SERVICE POLICY HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN CLEARLY ESTABLISHED.
 - D. DISCHARGE PORTS OR DESTINATIONS FOR REDEPLOYING UNITS.
 - E. IN-COUNTRY APOE/SPOE FOR REDEPLOYING UNITS.
 - F. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL OF COMPONENT COMMANDS TO BE REDEPLOYED AS INDIVIDUALS.
 - G. TIME-PHASING OF MOVEMENT OF UNITS OR INDIVIDUALS.
 - H. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TO BE MOVED WITHIN RVN BY COMMON SERVICE TRANSPORTATION (NON-ORGANIC).
 - I. IDENTIFICATION OF FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS NOW OCCUPIED BY REDEPLOYING UNITS THAT WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR RELEASE TO RVNAF OR OTHER US/PVNAF, AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO THEIR DISPOSITION.
5. REQUEST THAT AS MUCH DATA AS POSSIBLE OF THAT SET FORTH IN PAR 4 BE FURNISHED TO THE MACV STAFF PRIOR TO CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 5 SEPTEMBER.
6. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
UNQUOTE
GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER AT BEGINNING OF WORKING HOURS.

360

28(2)

28(2)
28

Q 041400Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO / EYES ONLY / FOR LTGEN
RUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. CG III MAF 040957Z

1. REFERENCE A, PASEP TO YOUR HQS, CONTAINED INFORMATION CONCERNING
A MACV MOVEMENT PLANNING CONFERENCE FOR PHASE 2 REDEPLOYMENTS.
SUBSEQUENT INFORMATION DELAYED CONFERENCE UNTIL 8 SEP AND DIRECTED
CONFEREES BE PREPARED FOR PLANNING BASED ON PHASE 2 REDEPLOYMENTS OF
25,000 AND 40,500.

2. IN RESPONSE TO THE MACV REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY INFORMATION PRIOR
TO THE CONFERENCE, IT IS MY INTENTION TO TRANSMIT THE BELOW MESSAGE
TO MACV, SUBJECT TO YOUR APPROVAL. YOUR COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED ASAP.
REFERENCE B IN THE BELOW MESSAGE IS MACV APPROVAL, FOR PLANNING,
OF A III MAF RECOMMENDATION TO COMBINE HQS XXIV CORPS AND III MAF.
THE BASIC PLAN AND MACV APPROVAL ARE BEING FORWARDED YOUR HQS BY
MAIL.

3. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED III MAF MSG TO MACV.
QUOTE

FM: CG III MAF
TO: COMUSMACV
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T / EYES ONLY / FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. COMUSMACV 301201Z

B. MACJ-3-022 LTR OF 25AUG69, SUBJ REDUCTION OF FORCES

1. IN REPLY TO REF A THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY INFORMATION IS
SUBMITTED.

A. PERSONNEL REDEPLOYMENT CRITERIA

(1) NOVEMBER RTD'S WILL REDEPLOY IN OCTOBER, THEREBY REDUCING
ROTATION TOUR LENGTHS TO 12 MONTHS.

(2) OCTOBER RTD'S FROM ALL PHASE 2 UNITS WILL ROTATE AS
INDIVIDUALS.

B. DESIGNATION OF UNITS TO BE

(1) INACTIVATED IN VIETNAM - NONE

(2) REDEPLOYED AS UNITS TO SPECIFIED LOCATIONS:

HQ 3D MARDIV	OKINAWA
RLT 4	OKINAWA
1ST MAW (REAR)	OKINAWA
VMA (AW) 533	JAPAN

(3) REDEPLOYED WITHOUT PERSONNEL:

RLY-3 (700 CUSTODIAL PERSONNEL ONLY WILL REDEPLOY) COMUS



29/11

29/14

~~29~~

C. EQUIPMENT DISPOSITION. EQUIPMENT WILL BE RETROGRADED WITH REDEPLOYING UNITS.

D. PORTS OF DEBARKATION: ANY COMBINATION OF IWAKUNE, OKINAWA, HAWAII, OR CONUS.

E. IN-COUNTRY APOE/SPOE FOR REDEPLOYING UNITS.

(1) SPOE INCLUDE DANANG, CUA VIET, TAN MY AND CHU LAI.

(2) APOE INCLUDE DONG HQ/QUANG TRI, DANANG AND CHU LAI.

F. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL OF COMPONENT COMMANDS TO BE REDEPLOYED AS INDIVIDUALS.

(1) 7,900 PERSONNEL WILL BE REDEPLOYED AS INDIVIDUALS.

G. TIME PHASING OF MOVEMENT OF UNITS OR INDIVIDUALS: SIX EMBARKATION UNITS ARE ANTICIPATED AS FOLLOWS:

UNIT	TIME	MODE
(1) EMBARK UNIT I	D-DAY	PERSONNEL BY AIR, EQUIPMENT BY SURFACE
(2) EMBARK UNIT II	D PLUS 7	PERSONNEL BY AIR, EQUIPMENT BY SURFACE
(3) EMBARK UNIT III	D PLUS 14	PERSONNEL BY AIR, EQUIPMENT BY SURFACE
(4) EMBARK UNIT IV	D PLUS 30	MAJORITY BY SURFACE
(5) EMBARK UNIT V	D PLUS 42	MAJORITY BY SURFACE
(6) EMBARK UNIT VI	D PLUS 55	MAJORITY BY SURFACE

H. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TO BE MOVED WITHIN RVN BY COMMON SERVICE TRANSPORTATION (NON-ORGANIC): COMMON USER AIR WILL BE UTILIZED FOR IN-COUNTRY AND OUT OF COUNTRY AIRLIFT. MST'S SURFACE LIFT MAY BE USED DEPENDING ON COURSE OF ACTION SELECTED.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY - DELIVER AT THE BEGINNING OF WORKING HOURS.

GP-4

29(2)

29(2)

FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO / EYES ONLY / FOR LTGEN
PUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

I. FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS.

(1) FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS TO BECOME AVAILABLE AS A
RESULT OF PHASE TWO REDEPLOYMENTS ARE BASED ON FOLLOWING
ASSUMPTIONS:

(A) CONSOLIDATION OF MARINE HELO ASSETS SOUTH OF HAI VAN
PASS.

(B) ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND DANANG WILL PROVIDE FOR SUPPORT
OF UNITS REMAINING IN NORTHERN I CTZ, LESS SEA TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMON ITEM SUPPLY SUPPORT.

(C) UNITS REDEPLOYING WILL RETROGRADE ORGANIC EQUIPMENT
AND SERVICE PECULIAR ITEMS. CLASS V WILL REMAIN IN POSITION WITH
AN IN-KIND TRANSFER OF ASSETS BETWEEN SERVICES.

(2) LOGISTIC FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS.

LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	INTENDED DISPOSITION
QUANG TRI	CP, FLSG-B	TURN OVER TO ARMY SPT COMD
	ASP (8814 S/T)	SAME
DONG HA	MT MAINTENANCE SHOP	SAME
	ENGR MAINTENANCE SHOP	SAME
	RATION BREAKDOWN POINT	SAME
	(38,000 CU FT REEFER)	
	CLASS V HOLDING POINT	SAME
	(452 S/T OF PROJ 972 MATERIEL)	
	SHIPPING AND RECEIVING STATION	SAME
CUA VIET	FUEL FARM (72X10,000 GAL TANKS)	PHASE OVER TO ARMY SPT COMD
VANDEGRIFT COMBAT BASE	ASP (1846 S/T)	TURN OVER TO RVNAF OR RETROGRADE, DEPENDING ON TACTICAL SITUATION

(3) AVIATION FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS.

LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
PHU BAI	AIRFIELD (60 A/C)	TURN OVER U.S. ASSETS TO XXIV CORPS WITH EXCESS TO RVNAF
QUANG TRI	AIRFIELD (76 A/C)	TURN OVER TO XXIV CORPS FOR RESIDUAL FORCE USE
DONG HA	AIRFIELD	TURN OVER TO RVNAF
VANDERGRIFT	COMBAT BASE AIR STRIP	TURN OVER TO RVNAF OR RETROGRADE, DEPENDING ON TACTICAL SITUATION



29/3
~~29~~

(4) GROUND COMBAT, COMMAND/CONTROL, AND SUPPORT INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES.

LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
VANDEGRIFT	COMBAT BASE (2 MARINE REGT CP'S, 1F HOTEL CP)	TURN OVER TO RVNAF, OR REDUCE DEPENDING UPON TACTICAL SITUATION
FSB NANCY	1ST BN, 77TH ARMOR CAMP, FSB	SAME
LZ SALLY	2D BDE 101ST ABN CP, INF BN	SAME
FSB SHARON	1ST BN, 11TH INF CAMP, FSB	TURN OVER SOUTHERN ONE-THIRD TO RVNAF
DONG HA	COMBAT BASE	TURN OVER THREE-FIFTHS TO RVNAF
CAMP EVANS	NMCB 11 CAMP	TURN OVER TO XXIV CORPS
CAMP HOOVER (DANANG)	NMCB 5 CAMP	TURN OVER TO 1ST MARDIV
CAMP BARNES (DONG HA)	NMCB 62 CAMP	TURN OVER TO RVNAF
CAMP ADNEIR (DANANG)	NMCB 4 CAMP	TURN OVER TO NAVY SUPPORT ACTIVITY COMMAND DANANG

(5) REF B APPROVED MY PROPOSAL TO COMBINE HQ III MAF AND HQ XXIV CORPS. ADDITIONAL ARMY AND MARINE CORPS FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS WILL PROBABLY BECOME AVAILABLE AS A RESULT OF THIS ACTION.

(6) ONE ADDITIONAL NMCB CAMP, YET TO BE DETERMINED, WILL BECOME AVAILABLE AT EITHER QUANG TRI, PHU BAI OR CAMP EAGLE.

(7) MAX FLEXIBILITY HAS BEEN INTEGRATED INTO THIS SUBMISSION TO ALLOW FOR AN ASSUMED COMPOSITION AND BASING OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE. PENDING DECISIONS ON THE RESIDUAL FORCE MAY REQUIRE RECONSIDERATION. 2. THE ABOVE IS THE MOST PRECISE INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME. THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER ALTERNATIVES WHICH ARE BEING CONSIDERED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS PRIMARILY INVOLVING THE DESTINATION OF RLT-3. THESE OTHER ALTERNATIVES CONSIDER RLT-3 REDEPLOYING AS A UNIT. UNQUOTE.

WARM REGARDS. LTGEN NICKERSON.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY - DELIVER AT THE BEGINNING OF WORKING HOURS.

GP-4

29/4)

29/4)

0 061050Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
COMUSMACV
ZEM

TOP SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO / EYES ONLY / FOR MGEN
TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

I. FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS.

(1) FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS TO BECOME AVAILABLE AS A
RESULT OF PHASE TWO REDEPLOYMENTS ARE BASED ON FOLLOWING
ASSUMPTIONS:

(A) CONSOLIDATION OF MARINE HELO ASSETS SOUTH OF HAI VAN
PASS.

(B) ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND DANANG WILL PROVIDE FOR SUPPORT
OF UNITS REMAINING IN NORTHERN I CTZ, LESS SEA TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMON ITEM SUPPLY SUPPORT.

(C) UNITS REDEPLOYING WILL RETROGRADE ORGANIC EQUIPMENT
AND SERVICE PECULIAR ITEMS. CLASS V WILL REMAIN IN POSITION WITH
AN IN-KIND TRANSFER OF ASSETS BETWEEN SERVICES.

(2) LOGISTIC FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS.

LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	INTENDED DISPOSITION
QUANG TRI	CP, FLSG-B	TURN OVER TO ARMY SPT COMD
	ASP (8814 S/T)	SAME
DONG HA	MT MAINTENANCE SHOP	SAME
	ENGR MAINTENANCE SHOP	SAME
	RATION BREAKDOWN POINT	SAME
	(38,000 CU FT REEFER)	
	CLASS V HOLDING POINT	SAME
	(452 S/T OF PROJ 972 MATERIEL)	
	SHIPPING AND RECEIVING STATION	SAME
CUA VIET	FUEL FARM (72X10,000 GAL TANKS)	PHASE OVER TO ARMY SPT COMD
VANDERGRIFT COMBAT BASE	ASP (1846 S/T)	TURN OVER TO RVNAF OR RETROGRADE, DEPENDING ON TACTICAL SITUATION

(3) AVIATION FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS.

LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
PHU BAI	AIRFIELD (60 A/C)	TURN OVER U.S. ASSETS TO XXIV CORPS WITH EXCESS TO RVNAF
QUANG TRI	AIRFIELD (76 A/C)	TURN OVER TO XXIV CORPS FOR RESIDUAL FORCE USE
DONG HA	AIRFIELD	TURN OVER TO RVNAF
VANDERGRIFT	COMBAT BASE AIR STRIP	TURN OVER TO RVNAF OR RETROGRADE, DEPENDING ON TACTICAL SITUATION

30 (1)

[Handwritten signature]

(4) GROUND COMBAT, COMMAND/CONTROL, AND SUPPORT INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES.

LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
VANDEGRIFT	COMBAT BASE (2 MARINE REGT CP'S, 1F HOTEL CP)	TURN OVER TO RVNAF, OR REDUCE DEPENDING UPON TACTICAL SITUATION
FSB NANCY	1ST BN, 77TH ARMOR CAMP, FSB	SAME
LZ SALLY	2D BDE 101ST ARN CP, INF BN CAMP, FSB	SAME
FSB SHARON	1ST BN, 11TH INF CAMP, FSB	TURN OVER SOUTHERN ONE-THIRD TO RVNAF
DONG HA	COMBAT BASE	TURN OVER THREE-FIFTHS TO RVNAF
CAMP EVANS	NMCR 11 CAMP	TURN OVER TO XXIV CORPS
CAMP HOOVER (DANANG)	NMCR 5 CAMP	TURN OVER TO 1ST MARDIV
CAMP PARNES (DONG HA)	NMCR 62 CAMP	TURN OVER TO RVNAF
CAMP ADNEIR (DANANG)	NMCR 4 CAMP	TURN OVER TO NAVY SUPPORT ACTIVITY COMMAND DANANG

(5) REF P APPROVED, FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, MY PROPOSAL TO COMBINE HQ III MAF AND HQ XXIV CORPS. ADDITIONAL ARMY AND MARINE CORPS FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS WILL PROBABLY BECOME AVAILABLE AS A RESULT OF THIS ACTION.

(6) ONE ADDITIONAL NMCR CAMP, YET TO BE DETERMINED, WILL BECOME AVAILABLE AT EITHER QUANG TRI, PHU PAI OR CAMP EAGLE.

(7) MAX FLEXIBILITY HAS BEEN INTEGRATED INTO THIS SUBMISSION TO ALLOW FOR AN ASSUMED COMPOSITION AND PAGING OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE. PENDING DECISIONS ON THE RESIDUAL FORCE MAY REQUIRE RECONSIDERATION.

2. THE ABOVE IS THE MOST PRECISE INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER AT THE BEGINNING OF WORKING HOURS.

720

HAS BEEN SENT

NNNN

30(2)

30(2)

O 061050Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEM

TOP SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO / EYES ONLY / FOR MGEN
TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. COMUSMACV 301231Z

R. MACJ-3-022 LTR OF 25AUG69, SUBJ REDUCTION OF FORCES

1. IN REPLY TO REF A THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY INFORMATION IS
SUBMITTED.

A. PERSONNEL REDEPLOYMENT CRITERIA

(1) NOV RTD'S WILL REDEPLOY AS INDIVIDUALS IN OCT AND BE
CHARGED AGAINST THE REDEPLOYMENT TOTAL. THIS WILL REDUCE THE
ROTATION TOUR LENGTH TO 12 MONTHS.

(2) OCTOBER RTD'S FROM ALL PHASE 2 UNITS WILL ROTATE AS
INDIVIDUALS.

B. DESIGNATION OF UNITS TO BE

(1) INACTIVATED IN VIETNAM - NONE

(2) REDEPLOYED AS UNITS TO SPECIFIED LOCATIONS:

HQ 3D MARDIV

OKINAWA

RLT 4

OKINAWA

1ST MAW (REAR)

OKINAWA/JAPAN

VMA (AW) 533

JAPAN

(3) REDEPLOYED WITHOUT PERSONNEL:

RLT-3 (700 CUSTODIAL PERSONNEL ONLY WILL REDEPLOY)
CONUS

C. EQUIPMENT DISPOSITION. EQUIPMENT WILL BE RETROGRADED WITH
REDEPLOYING UNITS.

D. PORTS OF DEPARTATION; ANY COMBINATION OF IWAKUNI, OKINAWA,
OR CONUS.

E. IN-COUNTRY APOE/SPOE FOR REDEPLOYING UNITS.

(1) SPOE INCLUDE DANANG, CHA VIET, TAN MY AND CHU LAI.

(2) APOE INCLUDE DONG HA/QUANG TRI, DANANG AND CHU LAI.

F. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL OF COMPONENT COMMANDS TO BE
REDEPLOYED AS INDIVIDUALS

(1) 7,900 PERSONNEL WILL BE REDEPLOYED AS INDIVIDUALS, BUT
CHARGEABLE AGAINST THE UNIT REDEPLOYMENT TOTAL.

30(3)

30(3)

~~30~~

G. TIME PHASING OF MOVEMENT OF UNITS OR INDIVIDUALS: THE FOLLOWING EMBARKATION UNITS ARE ANTICIPATED HOWEVER THIS IS SUBJECT TO MODIFICATIONS PENDING DECISION ON PACOM POSTURE, AVAILABILITY OF TRANSPORTATION ASSETS AT TIME OF REDEPLOYMENT, AND INCORPORATION OF TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS/MOVEMENT SCHEDULE IN THE CINCPAC MOVEMENT PLAN.

UNIT	TIME	MODE
(1) EMBARK UNIT I	D-DAY	PERSONNEL BY AIR, EQUIPMENT BY SURFACE
(2) EMBARK UNIT II	D PLUS 7	PERSONNEL BY AIR, EQUIPMENT BY SURFACE
(3) EMBARK UNIT III	D PLUS 14	PERSONNEL BY AIR, EQUIPMENT BY SURFACE
(4) EMBARK UNIT IV	D PLUS 30	MAJORITY BY SURFACE
(5) EMBARK UNIT V	D PLUS 42	MAJORITY BY SURFACE
(6) EMBARK UNIT VI	D PLUS 55	MAJORITY BY SURFACE

H. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TO BE MOVED WITHIN RVN BY COMMON SERVICE TRANSPORTATION (NON-ORGANIC): COMMON USER AIR WILL BE UTILIZED FOR IN-COUNTRY AND OUT OF COUNTRY AIRLIFT. MSTs SURFACE LIFT MAY BE USED DEPENDING ON COURSE OF ACTION SELECTED.

GP-4

SCO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
DELIVER AT THE BEGINNING OF WORKING HOURS.

550

HAS BEEN SENT

30(4)

30(4)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 11SEP69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE P 110856Z SEP 69		COPY# 1-3 OF 7 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	REMARKS
			IN	OUT			
	CG					PHASE 2 REDEPLOYMENT	
	DCG						
	DCG AIR						
	S/S						
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
	S/S						
	G-1	X					
	G-2						
	G-3	X					
	G-4						
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	H DASC						
	S&C						

REMARKS
THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4...
THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.

Joint Preparation HAS BEEN SENT

Cy # 1 in Force Planning

*Cy # 3 to G-1
Repro cy to G-1*
HAS BEEN SENT

31
HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET



P 110856Z
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV
 CG THIRD MARDIV
 CG FIRST MAW
 ZEN/CG FORLOG COMD
 ZEM

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN SIMPSON, MAJGEN JONES, MAJGEN THRASH AND BGEN FEELEY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 PHASE 2 REDEPLOYMENT

1. THE MOST RECENT ALTERNATIVE FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES DURING PHASE 2 PROPOSED BY CG FMFPAC WOULD ESTABLISH 2 RLT'S AND DIV HQ IN OKINAWA AND 1 RLT IN CONUS. FIRST MAW UNITS WILL REDEPLOY TO OKINAWA AND JAPAN AS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED.

2. THIS ALTERNATIVE ALSO ENVISIONS REDUCING WESTPAC TOUR LENGTHS TO 12 MONTHS BY ROTATING NOV RTD'S DURING OCT. THE FOLLOWING METHOD OF ACCOMPLISHING THIS REDEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED:

A. RLT-3 WILL REDEPLOY INITIALLY IN A CADRE STATUS. 700 KEY PERSONNEL WILL ACCOMPANY RECORDS, EQUIPMENT AND FLAGS TO CONUS.

B. THE REMAINDER OF THE TROOP REDEPLOYMENT TO CONUS WILL BE MADE UP OF RTD'S (III MAF AND OTHER WEST PAC UNITS) ROTATING DURING OCT AS INDIVIDUALS, APPROX 7,900 PERSONNEL.

C. FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF RLT-3, DIV HQ, RLT-4 AND DET FLC WILL REDEPLOY TO OKINAWA AT STRENGTHS TO BE ESTABLISHED BY CG FMFPAC.

D. FIRST MAW UNITS WILL REDEPLOY TO OKINAWA AND JAPAN AT STRENGTHS TO BE DETERMINED BY CG FMFPAC.

E. PERSONNEL REMAINING FROM RLT-3 WILL BE REDISTRIBUTED WITHIN III MAF AS REPLACEMENTS FOR NOV RTD'S IN REMAINING UNITS.

3. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS.

A. THIRD MARDIV

(1) IDENTIFY 700 KEY PERSONNEL TO ACCOMPANY RLT-3 TO CONUS. SELECTION WILL BE BASED ON THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE PROPER SECURITY OF RECORDS AND EQUIPMENT. SELECTEES WILL HAVE OVER SEVEN MONTHS IN WESTPAC EXCEPT IN UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN SPECIALISTS ARE MANDATORY.

(2) BE PREPARED TO TRANSFER THOSE RLT-3 PERSONNEL WITH RTD'S BEYOND NOV WHO ARE NOT DESIGNATED AS KEY PERSONNEL TO OTHER III MAF UNITS AS DIRECTED.

(3) PREPARE TO REASSIGN PERSONNEL FROM RLT-3 TO RLT-4 TO MEET REDEPLOYMENT STRENGTHS WHEN DETERMINED.

B. FIRST MARDIV

(1) PREPARE FOR THE LOSS OF NOV RTD'S DURING OCT.

(2) PREPARE TO RECEIVE PERSONNEL REASSIGNED FROM THIRD MARDIV.

C. FIRST MAW. PREPARE FOR THE LOSS OF NOV RTD'S DURING OCT.

D. FLC

(1) PREPARE TO REDEPLOY 400 PERSONNEL AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THOSE REQUIRED BY PROV SERVBN TO SUPPORT THIRD MARDIV (-) ON OKINAWA.

(B) REMAINDER TO CONUS.

(2) PREPARE FOR THE LOSS OF NOV RTD'S DURING OCT.

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 05 SEPT 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE P 051405Z		1,2,3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I				REMARKS ① Feedback THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
4	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
2	C/S					
5	DC/S			7/8	Ⓟ	
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	9/6		CR/9/8	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

①6

SECRET

P 051405Z
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
ZEM

S E C R E T / FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON / EYES ONLY
1. THE FOL MSGS ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:

P 030351Z
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
INFO COMSEVENTHFLEET
ZEM

S E C R E T FOR GENERAL ABRAMS INFO VADM BRINGLE
FM LTGEN NICKERSON

SUBJECT: CRUISER NGFS AVAILABILITY

1. THE DEPARTURE OF THE USS ST. PAUL (CA73) FROM THE GUN LINE ON 16 SEP ENROUTE TO HER HOMEPORT OF SAN DIEGO WILL LEAVE ONLY ONE CRUISER ASSIGNED TO THE SEVENTHFLEET. THIS MEANS THERE WILL BE EXTENDED PERIODS WHEN NO CRUISERS ARE AVAILABLE FOR NGFS IN THE DMZ AREA. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE CONTINUED DRAWDOWN OF NGFS AND THE PLANS NOT TO RETURN THE USS NEW JERSEY, CAUSES CONCERN.
2. THE MANY ADVANTAGES OF NGF, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF THE DMZ, NEED NOT BE RESTATED. IMPENDING FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS FROM NICTZ MAKE THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE MOBILE FIREPOWER OF HEAVY NGF SHIPS MORE CRITICAL THAN EVER. THE FACT THAT NGFS CAN BE PROVIDED WITHOUT ANY INCREASE IN IN-COUNTRY SPACES AND WITHOUT ANY REQUIREMENT FOR IN-COUNTRY BASES MAKES IT PARTICULARLY ADVANTAGEOUS AT THIS TIME.
3. THE ASSIGNMENT OF A NGF CRUISER TO ICTZ ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS IS CONSIDERED A NECESSITY.
4. I RECOMMEND REITERATION OF OUR DESIRES FOR, FIRST, THE NEW JERSEY AND, SECONDLY, A CRUISER ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS.

16(1)

16(1)

0 050820Z

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON VIETNAM
 TO LTGEN NICKERSON CG III MAF DA NANG VIETNAM
 INFO VADM BRINGLE, COMSEVENTHFLT
 ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 11585 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: CRUISER NGFS AVAILABILITY (U)

REF: A. CG, III MAF DTG 030351Z SEP 69 (S)

E. CINCPAC DTG 232356Z AUG 69 (S) (NOTAL)

1. (U) APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN OVER REDUCTION OF HEAVY NGF SHIPS.
2. (S) CINCPAC, BY REF B, HAS PROVIDED JCS WITH HIS ESTIMATE OF THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED BUDGET REDUCTIONS ON CURRENT OPERATIONS. CONCERNING NGFS HE STATED, QUOTE. INACTIVATION OF THREE HEAVY SHIPS (INCLUDING THE USS BOSTON FROM LANTCOM) AND 17 GENERAL PURPOSE DESTROYER (DD) WILL IMPACT HEAVILY ON THE ABILITY OF PACFLT TO PROVIDE EVEN MINIMUM LEVELS OF NGFS. HEAVY NGFS (CA) SHIPS IN WESTPAC WILL BE REDUCED TO ONE IN LATE SEPTEMBER WHEN USS SAINT PAUL RETURNS TO COMUS FOR OVERHAUL WITHOUT RELIEF. SUBSEQUENT TO USS BOSTON OUTCHOP IN DECEMBER, NO HEAVY NGFS SHIPS WILL BE PRESENT IN WESTPAC UNTIL 4TH QUARTER FY 70 WHEN USS SAINT PAUL IS SCHEDULED TO DEPLOY. BARRING INCREASED DEPLOYMENTS FROM CINCLANT ASSETS, LOSS OF 17 DD IS EXPECTED TO RESULT IN A MAJOR REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF DD AVAILABLE FOR NGFS. THE LOSS OF THESE SHIPS, COUPLED WITH THE CONTINUING REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN NEARLY FULLTIME NAVAL PRESENCE IN NEASIA (TF 71 AND TU 71.0.4), WILL REDUCE THE AVAILABILITY OF NGFS DD'S SUBSTANTIALLY BY EARLY 1970. UNQUOTE. IN SUMMARY HE CONCLUDED THAT THE CURTAILMENT ON SEASIA OPS WOULD BE MOST SERIOUS IN THE AREAS OF NGFS, AMPHIBIOUS LIFT, EASIA AIR OPS AND ASW.
3. (U) CONSIDERING THAT CINCPAC HAS ALREADY COMMENTED ON THE NGFS REDUCTION, I DO NOT INTEND TO PRESS THIS MATTER ANY HIGHER.

UNQUOTE
 GP-4

16(2)

16(2)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 06SEP69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 061030Z SEP 69		COPY# 1-3 OF 10 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
2	CG	I		7/14/69	N	SUBJECT: DAMAGE FROM ENEMY ROCKET ATTACK (U) REMARKS ① THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
3	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
	C/S	I				
4	DC/S	I		9/7	W	
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	9/6		(W) 7/8	
	G-1					
	G-2					
68	G-3	I				
5	G-4	I				
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

①7 SECRET

O 061030Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 COMNAVFORV
 INFO CG FMFPAC
 ZEN/COMNAV SUPPACT DNG
 ZEN/COM THIRD NCB DNG
 ZEM
 S E C R E T

SECRET

FOR GEN ABRAMS AND VADM ZUMWALT INFO LTGEN BUSE,
 RADM PONNER AND RADM DILLON FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

DAMAGE FROM ENEMY ROCKET ATTACK (U)

1. (C) THE FOLLOWING DAMAGE ESTIMATE IS PRELIMINARY AND WILL BE REFINED AS ESTIMATES ARE CONFIRMED AND AS EXAMINATIONS OF SPECIFIC DAMAGES ARE COMPLETED.

2. (C) III MAF COMPOUND: AT APPROX 0200 INITIAL 122MM ROCKET ATTACK RESULTED IN MINOR DAMAGE. AT APPROX 0300 A 122MM ROCKET IMPACTED AT APPROX AT 047786 IN THE ARVN AMMO STORAGE POINT ADJACENT TO THE NSA COVERED STORAGE. THE AMMO IN THE BERM EXPLODED IN A SINGLE LARGE SECONDARY WHICH LEFT A CRATER OF 100 TO 120 FEET IN DIAMETER. THERE WERE NO FURTHER EXPLOSIONS OF AMMO IN ANY OF THE ADJACENT BERMS TO THE ONE IN WHICH THE HIT OCCURED. THIS EXPLOSION AND RESULTANT OVER PRESSURE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BLAST DAMAGE AT III MAF HQ AND NSA AND FOR A FIRE AT NSA. IN THE III MAF COMPOUND MODERATE TO SEVERE DAMAGE TO: (1) ENLISTED MESS (2) SNCO MESS (3) HORN DASC (4) H&S CO SUPPLY (5) CG QTRS (6) C/S QTRS (7) O MESS (8) VIP QTRS (9) G-1, G-6, FOR SURGEON OFFICE. MINOR DAMAGE TO ALL 300'S, SICK BAY AND DISBURSING OFFICE. COC AND G-3 RECEIVED SOME STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. OVERALL ELECTRICAL FIXTURE DAMAGE TO 75 PERCENT OF CAMP. ALL FACILITIES EXCEPT THE VIP QTRS ARE USEABLE AND ARE marginally TO FULLY OPERATIONAL AT THIS TIME WITH QUICK AND IN SOME CASES TEMPORARY REPAIRS. ESTIMATE COST OF REPAIRS FOR III MAF COMPOUND \$100,000.00.

3. (C) NSA COVERED STORAGE:

- A. APPROXIMATELY 80 - 100 BUTLER BUILDINGS (40 BY 100 EQUIVALENT UNITS) ARE DAMAGED WITH DAMAGE VARYING FROM MINOR TO SEVERE. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT 50 PERCENT RECEIVED MODERATE DAMAGE.
- B. REEFERS: 50 PERCENT OF THE CAPACITY IS DAMAGED FROM MODERATE TO SEVERE.
- C. THE AIR CONDITIONED HOUSING FOR THE COMPUTER CENTER IS SEVERELY DAMAGED.
- D. FIRE CAUSED SOME LOSS OF SUPPLIES HOWEVER ESTIMATES ARE NOT FIRM ENOUGH TO QUOTE.



17(1)

17(1)

4. (C) AT NSA ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN TO FORCE ISSUE REEFER STOCKS. SEALAND REEFER VANS HAVE BEEN PLACED IN USE, AND A REEFER SHIP IS BEING PROVIDED TO HOLD REEFER STOCK UNTIL REPAIRS CAN BE MADE. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE COMPUTER STRUCTURE WILL BE REPLACED AND BE OPERATIONAL 48 HOURS FROM NOW.

5. (C) THESE PRELIMINARY DAMAGE ESTIMATES PRICE OUT IN THE RANGE OF TWO MILLION. THIS IS

DEFINITELY OF DISASTER PROPORTIONS AND FAR EXCEEDING OUR NORMALLY AVAILABLE MAINTENANCE FUNDING. EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES WILL HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN REPAIRING AND REPLACING THE DAMAGED AND DESTROYED FACILITIES, AND REALIZING THE CURRENT TIGHT SITUATION ON MILCON FUNDS AM CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. THAT PRESENTLY PLANNED CB REDUCTIONS IN ICTZ BE HELD UP UNTIL DEC 69.

B. WE WILL EXAMINE OUR REQUIREMENTS TO REPLACE THE FULL LOSS AT NSA WITH A VIEW TO A TAPERED, INCREMENTAL REBUILD WITH A BUILT IN REACTION PLAN TO RESPOND TO POSSIBLE FUTURE REDUCED REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMON SUPPORT.

6. (C) WE WILL LOOK OVER THE ARVN AMMO SITUATION CAREFULLY AGAIN, SEEKING WAYS TO REDUCE THE RISK INHERENT IN THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE TWO FACILITIES. LTGEN LAM AND I AGREE THAT ARVN AMMO DUMP MUST BE REMOVED. PROBLEM IS TO WHAT OTHER AREA.

7. AS STATED IN PAR 1 ALL THESE ESTIMATES ARE PRELIMINARY AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO MAJOR REVISIONS. PLEASE TREAT THEM AS SUCH. I WILL FOLLOW WITH A SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AT THE EARLIEST.

8. MY 060735Z DELINEATES THE AREAS WHICH WERE ATTACKED BY FIRE. AS I SEE IT, WE WERE HIT BY 42 ROCKETS, THE MOST OF WHICH WERE 122 CALIBER. INCLUDED IN THIS TOTAL WAS AN ATTACK ON DANANG CITY WITH 5 UNK TYPE ROCKETS, KILLING 11 CIVILIANS AND WOUNDING 41 OTHERS.

9. REGRET THE PROBLEM WE CAUSED YOU BY OUR REPORTING. IMPROVEMENT IS ASSURED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SC0 NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
720

17(2)

17(2)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/ COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/ RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 08 SEPT 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE 0 070958Z		1,2,3, COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET EYES ONLY
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		8/28		REMARKS (D) Feedback HAS BEEN SENT
	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I		9/8		
	D C/S DM					
1	S/S	I	9/8		CR148	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

(19)

SECRET

007 9577 ZYM
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
ZEM

SECRET / FOR LTGEN RUSE FROM LTGEN DICKERSON/EYES ONLY

A. CG III MAF 051405Z SEP69

B. CG III MAF 030351Z SEP69

C. COMUSMACV 053320Z SEP69

1. REF A PASSED REFS B AND C TO CG FMFPAC.


2. MY COMMENT: QUOTE EIGHT INCH DOESN'T EQUAL
SIXTEEN INCH IN ANY WAY UNQUOTE.

WARM REGARDS

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

8-4

090



NNNN

WAS DICKERSON

19(1)

19(1)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

IIIMAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X-ORIGINATOR A-ACTION/COGNIZANCE C-COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I-INFORMATION S-SIGNATURE			CO III MAF		08 SEP 69	
			SERIAL#/CONTROL DATE			
			P 080417Z SEP 69		COPY# 3 OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET/FOR MGR/TOWNSEND FROM LTJG BY NICKERSON
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I				REMARKS ① Feedback
2	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I				
	DC/S					
1	S/S	I	9/8		CO 4/8	
	G-1					
4	G-2					
5	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	CAP					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

24

SECRET

P 080412Z ZFF-6
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSKCOMUSMACV
 INFO CG USARV
 ZEM

SECRET/FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. COMUSMACV 32267 DTG 301105Z MAY69

1. FOL SUBMITTED IAW REF A.-

2. GEN ROSSON ARR PHU BAI 010900H SEP69 AND WAS MET BY LTGEN ZAIS, CG XXIV CORPS AND MGEN BOWMAN, DCG, III MAF. THEY DEPARTED BY HELO AND ARR 3D MARDIV HQ, DONG HA, WHERE GEN ROSSON WAS MET BY MGEN JONES, CG 3D MARDIV; MGEN TRUONG; CG 1ST ARVN DIV; AND COL GIAI, CO 2D ARVN REGT, 3D MARDIV HQ BRIEFED ON THE ENEMY SITUATION AND CURRENT OPERATIONS IN THE 3D MARDIV TAOR. COL GIAI FOLLOWED WITH A BRIEFING ON THE ENEMY SITUATION AND CURRENT OPERATIONS IN THE 2D ARVN REGT TAOR, GEN ROSSON ASKED WHAT WAS THE CURRENT ESTIMATE OF ENEMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE OF THE DMZ (MUTTERS RIDGE), AND WAS INFORMED THAT AN ESTIMATED TWO ENEMY BATTALIONS WERE OPERATING IN THE AREA, HE THEN INQUIRED ABOUT THE DISPOSITION OF THE 4TH NVA REGT AND WAS TOLD THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THEIR PRESENCE IN THE AREA, GEN ROSSON ASKED COL GIAI IF THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE NVA INDEPENDENCE REPRESENTED AN INCREASED THREAT PERIOD. COL GIAI STATED THAT THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE AN INCREASE OF ATTACKS BY FIRE IN THE TAOR. GEN ROSSON ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY INCREASE IN ACTS OF TERRORISM OF AMBUSHES IN THE GENERAL AREA. ANSWER WAS NEGATIVE. GEN JONES THEN BRIEFED ON FUTURE OPERATIONS. GEN ZAIS CONGRATULATED THE 3D MARINES ON THEIR MOBILITY AND QUICK REACTION AROUND MUTTERS RIDGE.

3. GEN ROSSON DEPARTED 3D MARDIV HQ 011050H AND ARR C-2 AT 011100H WHERE HE WAS MET BY THE BN CO'S OF 5/2, 1/61 ARVN, AND 1/5 ARVN INF, HE RECEIVED AN UPDATE BRIEFING ON CURRENT OPERATIONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AO'S, HE ASKED IF THE ARVN WERE USING THE APC'S, AND THE ANSWER WAS AFFIRMATIVE. HE THEN ASKED ABOUT AIR MOBILE OPS IN THE AREA AND WAS TOLD THAT ONLY ONE COMPANY OPERATION HAD BEEN CONDUCTED. HE INQUIRED ABOUT RECON PATROLS IN THE DMZ AND GEN JONES EXPLAINED THE CURRENT RECON EFFORT.

4. GEN ROSSON DEPARTED C-2 AT 011130H AND ARR CAMP ELLIOTT COMBAT BASE AT 011135H WHERE HE WAS MET BY COL SIMLAK, CO OF THE 3D MARINES. HE WAS GIVEN AN UPDATE BRIEFING ON CURRENT OPERATIONS IN THE AO. GEN ROSSON ASKED COL GIAI IF HE HAD ANY TROOPS OPERATING IN THE 3D MARINES AREA, AND COL GIAI REPLIED NEGATIVE. HE ASKED ABOUT A PRISONER WHO WAS CAPTURED BY THE 3D MARINES AND WHAT INTELLIGENCE HE HAD PRODUCED. COL SIMLAK STATED THAT THE PRISONER HAD INDICATED AN INCREASED EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE ENEMY TO INTERDICT RT 9.

5. GEN ROSSON DEPARTED CAMP ELLIOTT AT 011200H AND ARR BACK AT 3D MARDIV HQ AT 011210H. FOLLOWING LUNCH IN THE CG'S MESS, HE DEPARTED AT 011240H FOR PHU BAI ARRIVING AT 011305H. HE DEPARTED IMMEDIATELY FOR TSN.

GP-4

24 (1)

24 (1)

0 081445Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 ZEM

S E C R E T EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 TEMADDO; CASE OF LTCOL A. M. GRAY JR 056067/0802/0302 USMC

A. CG MCDEC 211300Z JUL69

B. CMC 222207Z JUL69

C. MY 060436Z AUG69

D. MY 060438Z AUG69

E. CG MCDEC TEMADDO 46/2/CFC:THD OF 16JUL69

1. REFS A AND B OUTLINE PROBLEM AREAS AND ACTIONS TAKEN AT
 THE CMC, CG MCDEC AND DCPG LEVEL REGARDING OUR CRITICAL
 INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE REQUIREMENTS
 IN ICTZ. PAR TEN REF A ADVISED THAT LTCOL GRAY WOULD
 ACCOMPANY A DCPG TEAM DURING LATE JULY VISIT AND THAT, AT
 CONCLUSION OF VISIT, WOULD REMAIN FOR PERIOD APPROXIMATELY
 ONE MONTH IN CONJUNCTION WITH UPDATING COMBAT SURVEILLANCE
 DOCTRINE.

2. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TWO SUBSEQUENT VISITS TO MACV FOR
 FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON SURVEILLANCE PROBLEMS, LTCOL GRAY'S
 CONTRIBUTION TO THE MACV QMR FOR ADP SUPPORT AND THE
 INTERRELATED TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM WAS CULMINATED BY
 MY APPROVAL OF REFS C AND D ON 6 AUGUST. ACCORDINGLY, LTCOL
 GRAY UNDERTOOK A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF OUR INTELLIGENCE,
 SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS PURSUANT TO
 COLLECTING DATA FOR DOCTRINAL UPDATE.

3. AS YOU WILL RECALL FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS DURING YOUR LAST
 VISIT, I MENTIONED THE INVALUABLE ASSET OF HAVING A MCDEC
 OFFICER ABOARD DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD AND THAT I HAD
 REQUESTED LTCOL GRAY TO ASSIST THE G-2 IN THE FORMULATION OF
 A DYNAMIC AND INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND
 RECONNAISSANCE PLAN THAT WE COULD IMPLEMENT ASAP. I CONSIDER
 THIS TO BE A MATTER OF EXTREME URGENCY IN VIEW OF CURRENT
 AND FORECASTED PLANNING REGARDING FORCE STRUCTURE AND POSTURE.



29(1)

29(1) 1

4. DURING THE PAST FOUR WEEKS, LTCOL GRAY, WORKING IN CLOSE CONCERT WITH THE G-2, HAS DEVELOPED AN INTEGRATED, ALL SOURCE DEEP SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE CONCEPT WHICH I PLAN TO IMPLEMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ADDITIONALLY, HE HAS WORKED WITH OUR PEOPLE TO:

A. DEVELOP A QUICK-FIX FORMATTED FILE SYSTEM TO PUT CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE DATA IN THE FLC COMPUTER SYSTEM.

B. PROVIDE KEY SUGGESTIONS WHICH, UPON IMPLEMENTATION, HAVE ALREADY UPGRADED OUR SI/URS PROGRAM.

C. MATERIALLY ASSIST THE INTEGRATED SENSOR/SURVEILLANCE EFFORT.

5. A PROBLEM HAS ARISEN WHEREIN LTCOL GRAY'S TAD ORDERS (REF E), WHICH READ EFFECTIVE 21 JULY 1969 FOR PERIOD OF THIRTY DAYS, HAVE NOW EXPIRED. IN THIS REGARD, AN INTERIM AND UNCLASSIFIED PROGRESS REPORT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE DEVELOPMENT CENTER VIA LETTER ON 16 AUGUST. THIS LETTER BRIEFLY DESCRIBED STATUS OF PROJECTS AND EFFORT, AND REQUESTED AN EXTENSION OF APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS (THROUGH 12 SEPTEMBER) FINISH THE JOB. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS REPORT APPARENTLY HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED. HENCE A RETROACTIVE EXTENSION IS REQUIRED. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST LTCOL GRAY'S ORDERS BE MODIFIED TO READ FOR PERIOD APPROX SIXTY DAYS IN ORDER TO COMPLETE FINALIZATION OF OUR TOTAL PLAN. REQUEST YOU COVER ME SO THAT LTCOL GRAY REMAINS HERE UNTIL 16 SEPTEMBER TO COMPLETE AFOREMENTIONED ACTIONS. PLAN WOULD BE FOR HIM TO RETURN TO QUANTICO BY 21 SEPTEMBER WITH PROVISIONS FOR ONE TO TWO DAY STOPOVER AT YOUR HQS FOR DEBRIEF. WARM REGARDS. LTGEN NICKERSON

GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

29(2)

ARa

29(2)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 10 SEP 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 100708Z SEP 69		COPY# OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT OPERATIONS IN ASHAU VALLEY (S)
			IN	OUT		
2	CG	I				REMARKS (1) Feedback THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
3	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I		4/11		
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	9/10			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

(32) **SECRET**

**O 100700Z ZYH ZFF-6
FM CG III MAF DMO
TO COMUSMACV
INFO CG XXIV CORPS PHB
ZEM**

**S E C R E T /EYES ONLY/FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LTGEN ZAIS
FROM LTGEN NICKERSON**

SUBJ: OPERATIONS IN ASHAU VALLEY(S)

1. THE APPROACH OF THE NORTHEAST MONSOON AND THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF OPERATING IN THE ASHAU VALLEY DICTATE THAT WE TAKE A HARD LOOK AT PLANS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE ASHAU. THE FOLLOWING IS A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE SIGNIFICANT AND DIVERSE FACTORS WHICH AFFECT DECISION IN REGARD TO ASHAU.

A. HEAVIEST RAINFALL OCCURS IN ICTZ DURING THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER. HOWEVER, FLYING CONDITIONS ARE POOREST DURING THE PERIOD DECEMBER-FEBRUARY DUE TO THE CRACHIN WHICH BRINGS WIDESPREAD CLOUDINESS, POOR VISIBILITY AND DRIZZLE; CEILINGS ARE USUALLY UNDER 500 FEET. WITH PRUDENT USE OF NAVIGATIONAL AIDS, FSB RENDEZVOUS CAN BE MAINTAINED INTO NOVEMBER. ESPECIALLY AFTER NOVEMBER, AIR RESUPPLY AND SUPPORT WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY HAMPERED BY WEATHER CONDITIONS, PRECLUDING IMMEDIATE REACTION AND REINFORCEMENT WHEN AND IF REQUIRED.

B. REDEPLOYMENTS ALREADY COMPLETED AND FURTHER IMPENDING REDEPLOYMENTS DICTATE STRINGENT ECONOMY OF FORCE MEASURES, USE OF RECON AND SURVEILLANCE SCREENS IN THE WESTERN AREAS, WITH OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS LAUNCHED ONLY WHEN MAJOR ENEMY UNITS ARE FIRMLY LOCATED, CONSTITUTE ONE SUCH MEASURE.

C. ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN REQUIRES MAXIMUM SUPPORT. THE ENEMY IS CONCENTRATING ON DISRUPTION OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM; REQUIREMENT FOR FRIENDLY FORCES TO THWART ENEMY EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD IS MORE CRITICAL THAN EVER.

D. 101ST AEW (AM) OPNS IN THE ASHAU HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN DENYING VALLEY TO THE ENEMY AS A NORTH-SOUTH LOC. THE ENEMY HAS REACTED BY USING AN ALTERNATE ROUTE IN LAOS BY-PASSING THE ASHAU. ENEMY WOULD PROBABLY AGAIN USE THE ASHAU AS AN INFILTRATION AND LOGISTICS LOC IF IT WERE EVACUATED BY FRIENDLY FORCES. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE CHANGE IN ENEMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ASHAU WILL ASSUME THE SAME STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO HIM THAT IT HAS IN THE PAST.

E. CONSIDERABLE EFFORT HAS BEEN EXPENDED ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF FSB'S RENDEZVOUS AND BLAZE AND RTE 547. OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE DURING TYPHOON DORIS CONFIRMS THAT, ALTHOUGH THE ROUTE FROM CAMP EAGLE TO FSB BLAZE COULD BE KEPT OPEN WITH MINOR INTERRUPTIONS, THE ROUTE FROM BLAZE TO RENDEZVOUS COULD NOT BE KEPT OPEN ON A ROUTE BASIS WITHOUT MAJOR ENGINEERING EFFORT.

F. MAINTENANCE OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE ASHAU, EVEN THOUGH LIMITED, WOULD EASE PROBLEMS OF REINFORCEMENT IN THE EVENT THE ENEMY DECIDED TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT IN THE VALLEY. THE COST OF MOVING BACK INTO THE VALLEY, ONCE IT HAS BEEN EVACUATED, MIGHT BE CONSIDERABLY GREATER.

G. IF THE ENEMY DECIDED TO MOVE AGAINST RENDEZVOUS IN STRENGTH, WITHOUT A DOUBT WE COULD HOLD IT, ALTHOUGH AT A COST, DURING ADVERSE WEATHER, GREATER THAN MIGHT NORMALLY BE THE CASE. NEVERTHELESS, WE MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO QUESTIONING, A LA KHE SANH, CONCERNING THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF RENDEZVOUS.

H. SEMI-FIXED INSTALLATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN THE FAR WESTERN REACHES, REPRESENT A TEMPTING TARGET TO THE ENEMY. HE COULD BRING PROLONGED PRESSURE TO BEAR AGAINST RENDEZVOUS IN AN EFFORT TO FORCE US TO PULL FRIENDLY FORCES AWAY FROM PACIFICATION SUPPORT.

I. WE HAVE PAID A PRICE FOR THE ASHAU; IT NOW BELONGS TO US. IF WE NOW DECIDE TO EVACUATE THE VALLEY, REGARDLESS OF ANY TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, WE COULD BE SUBJECTED TO QUESTIONING CONCERNING THE WISDOM OF THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE FORCES DEPLOYED IN THE ASHAU AREA:

A. FSB RENDEZVOUS AND VALLEY: 1BDE CP; 1 US INF BN (REINF); 1 ARVN INF BN; 1 US CAV SQDN CONSISTING OF HQS, 2 CAV TROOPS, AND 1 TANK PLATOON; 1 ARVN CAV TRP; 5 US ARTY BTRYS; 1 ARVN ARTY BTRY.

B. FSB BLAZE AND ALONG RTE 547 TO WEST OF BLAZE: 1 US INF BN; 1 TANK CO; 4 ARTY BTRYS.

C. PRIOR TO 15 SEP, THE MECHANIZED FORCES WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM ASHAU LEAVING: 1 BDE HQS; 2 US INF BNS; 1 ARVN INF BN; 3 US ARTY BTRYS; AND 1 ARVN ARTY BTRY. REMAINING FORCE WILL BE SUPPORTED BY GROUND AND AIR LOC'S.

3. MEL ZAIS AND I HAVE CONSULTED IN THIS REGARD, AND WE AGREE, AFTER CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTORS, THAT A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN ASHAU DURING THE MONSOON IS NEITHER REQUIRED NOR IN OUR BEST LONG RANGE INTEREST.

4. FSB RENDEZVOUS WILL BE DISESTABLISHED AND FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM THE ASHAU NO LATER THAN 31 OCTOBER. OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IN ASHAU DEPENDENT UPON INTELLIGENCE, WEATHER CONDITIONS AND AVAILABILITY OF FORCES. FSB BLAZE WILL BE MAINTAINED AS A RECON BASE AND TO PERMIT INTERDICTION OF THE ASHAU BY ARTY FIRE.

NO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

32(2)

32(2)

SECRET

**HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG THE MAF		DATE 10 Sep 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 100710Z Sep 69		COPY NO. 2 OF 6 COPIES REC'D.	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		11/25/69	MS	F O R
	DCG	I			MS	
3	C/S	I				REMARKS
2	DC/S	I		12/11	GS	
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention. Section _____ Signature _____
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
1	S/S	I	9/10		YB	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	I			I have copy of	
	G-4	I			I have copy of	
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT & E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

ORIG: G-4
REL: CG

**FOR
HAS BEEN SENT**

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE) 33

SECRET

SECRET

PTTSZYU/RHMMAFA1229 2530710-SSSS--RHMSMVA RUMUGKD RUHMFMA
RUMUFGA RUMLMPA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 100710Z SEP 69 ZFF-6

FM CG III MAF

TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV

RUMUGKD/COMNAVFORV

INFO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUMUFGA/COMNAVSUPACT DNG

RUMLMPA/COM THIRD NCB

BT

S E C R E T/FOR GEN ABRAMS AND VADM ZUMWALT, INFO
LTGEN BUSE, RADM BONNER AND RADM DILLON FROM
LTGEN NICKERSON

SUPPLEMENTARY DAMAGE REPORT (U)

A. MY 061030Z SEP 69

1. (S) THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE EXPLOSION OF SEPT
SIXTH HAS BEEN FURTHER DEFINED AND OUR PRICE ESTIMATES
REFINED SOMEWHAT. THE COST ESTIMATE OF TWO MILLION
IN REF A STILL APPEARS VALID AND WE SHOULD
NOT EXCEED THAT FIGURE.

2. (S) UPDATE TO DAMAGES

A. III MAF HQTRS. THE ENLISTED MESS IS IN DANGER OF

PAGE 2 RHMMAFA 1229 S E C R E T/FOR

COLLAPSE AND MAY BE A TOTAL LOSS. OTHERWISE THE
ESTIMATE OF \$100,000 REMAINS VALID AND REPAIRS ARE
IN PROGRESS.

B. AT NSA WE HAVE TO REVISE THE ORIGINAL ESTIMATE OF
DAMAGE SOMEWHAT. ALMOST 100 PERCENT OF THE WAREHOUSE
BUILDINGS SUFFERED SOME DAMAGE, ABOUT 50 PERCENT
MINOR AND ANOTHER 50 PERCENT MODERATE TO SEVERE.
THE REEFER LOSS CAME TO 45 PERCENT OF PRE-ATTACK
CAPACITY OR ABOUT 236 THOUSAND CUBIC FEET LOST. SOME
COMPONENTS OF THE DAMAGED REEFERS WILL BE SALVAGEABLE
BUT WE CANNOT QUOTE AT THIS TIME.

3. (S) PLANS FOR RECOVERY ARE COMPLETE AND WE COMMENCE
10 SEPT. WE HAVE CHOSEN AN ALTERNATIVE THAT GIVES US
ALMOST ALL THE SPACE BACK, HOWEVER WE HAVE CUT CORNERS
BY REPLACING STANDARD BUTLER SIDING WITH CORRUGATED
SHEET IRON WHICH WE HAVE ON HAND IN LONG SUPPLY,
REDUCING THE SIZE OF SOME BUILDINGS BY NOT REPLACING
DAMAGED END WALLS, AND OTHER SHORTCUTS, ALL OF WHICH
WILL RETURN US SOUND STRUCTURES, BUT WITHOUT WASTED
EFFORT ON ESTHETIC APPEARANCE. IN RECOVERY OF WAREHOUSES

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 RHMMAFA 1229 S E C R E T / F O R
 WE CONSIDERED FOUR ALTERNATIVES RANGING IN COST FROM \$353,000 TO \$477,000. THE LOWEST COST BEING TO REPAIR ROOFS AND DRAINS ONLY, THE HIGHEST BEING COMPLETE RETURN TO PRE-EXPLOSION STATUS. WE HAVE CHOSEN TO REPAIR ROOFS AND DRAINS AND PROVIDE FOR WEATHER AND SECURITY PROTECTION ON SIDES OF ALL WAREHOUSES AT AN ESTIMATED COST OF \$427,000. WE ESTIMATE THE COST FOR REEFERS AT \$1,006,000 AND MUST RESERVE \$250,000 TO COVER INSTALLATION COSTS FOR REEFERS. WE HAVE 40,000 CUBIC FEET OF REEFERS ON HAND, ALL OTHERS WILL HAVE TO COME FROM CONUS.

4. (S) WE ARE PLANNING TO USE SEABEES FOR AT LEAST 50 PERCENT OF THIS WORK. WE HAVE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY AND BY RETAINING MCB 5 IN COUNTRY FOR THREE WEEKS TO COMPLETE THE ISTMEDBN PROJECT WE WILL GAIN TWO-THIRDS OF THE MAN DAYS REQUIRED. BY RETAINING A DELAY PARTY FROM MCB-11 WE CAN ACQUIRE THE REMAINDER. THIS WILL ENABLE THE MAIN BODY OF MCB-11 TO REDEPLOY AS SCHEDULED ON 15 OCTOBER, AND ALL FACTORS CONSIDERED WILL RESULT IN THE MINIMUM DISRUPTION TO THE DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE. THIS WILL NOT RESULT IN EXTENDED IN COUNTRY.

PAGE 4 RHMMAFA 1229 S E C R E T / F O R
 TIME FOR MCB-11 PERSONNEL BEYOND NORMAL DEPLOYMENT. THE FOREGOING ACTIONS RELATIVE TO SEABEE UNITS ENABLES MEETING PHASE II GOALS ON SCHEDULE. HOWEVER THE CAPABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY TO MEET THE URGENT CONSTRUCTION DEMANDS OF DISASTER WILL HAVE BEEN GREATLY REDUCED. CONCEIVABLY A SITUATION CAN ABRUPTLY ARISE THAT WOULD NECESSITATE THE TEMPORARY IN COUNTRY DEPLOYMENT OF THE PACIFIC ALERT SEABEE BATTALION.

5. (S) THE PRESENCE OF THE ARVN AMMO DUMP STILL LOOMS AS A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM AREA. I AM CONTINUING TO PURSUE REMOVAL WITH LTGEN LAM. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1229

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET

C 110655Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEM

S E C R E T / EYES ONLY / FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
CEASEFIRE INCIDENTS 101201H TO 110100H SEP 69

A. COMUSMACV 080331Z SEP 69

C. CG III MAF 1007382Z SEP 69

1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, FIVE INCIDENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OCCURRED IN ICTZ BETWEEN 101201H AND THE END OF THE VC UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE AT 110100H THIS MORNING.

A. SUBSEQUENT TO SUBMISSION OF REF B, A REPORT WAS RECEIVED THAT AT 100555H, CO E, 2ND BN, 1ST MARINES IN NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS SEVEN KILOMETERS SOUTH OF MARPLE MOUNTAIN (RT 072645) ENGAGED APPROXIMATELY E5 NVA MOVING SOUTH. THE ENEMY BROKE CONTACT AND FLED SOUTH. A SWEEP OF THE AREA AT FIRST LIGHT CAPTURED THREE SUSPECTED NVA.

B. AT 101300H, I CO, 3RD BN, 3RD MARINES FOUR KILOMETERS WEST OF MUTTERS RIDGE (XD 052621) OBSERVED THREE NVA IN BUNKERS AND RECEIVED SMALL ARMS FIRE. AN AIR STRIKE KILLED APPROXIMATELY SEVEN ENEMY. ONE MARINE WAS WOUNDED.

C. AT 101315H, A COMMAND DETONATED MINE DESTROYED A FUEL TANKER TRAVELING WEST ON HWY 535 (RT 100414). TWO MARINES WERE WOUNDED.

D. AT 101430H, A PATROL FROM B CO, 1ST BN, 26TH MARINES IN OPERATION DEFIANT STAND ENGAGED AN ESTIMATED ENEMY PLATOON VIC (RT 201518) WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE THREE KILLED AND THREE WOUNDED.

E. AT 101500H, 4/I ARVN ENGAGED AN USEF VIC (VD 168222) (10 KILOMETERS WEST OF FSB DAVIS) KILLING FIVE NVA.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE THERE WERE 13 OTHER INCIDENTS OF WHICH EIGHT INVOLVED ONLY ARVN FORCES. TWO ARVN WERE KILLED, TWO U.S. AND TWO ARVN WOUNDED AND 17 ENEMY KILLED.

3. (G) WITH THE TERMINATION OF THE UNILATERALLY DESIGNATED CEASE FIRE PERIOD AT 0100H THIS MORNING, WE ARE IN A POSITION TO MAKE AN ESTIMATE OF HOW THE ENEMY USED IT. I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE TRUCE WAS EMPLOYED PRIMARILY TO REST THEIR TROOPS AND CONDUCT RESUPPLY OPERATIONS IN PREPARATION FOR THEIR NEXT ROUND OF ATTACKS. THERE HAVE BEEN AN INCREASING NUMBER OF INDICATORS DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS WHICH SERVE TO CONFIRM MY CONVICTION THAT A RENEWAL OF ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY IS IMMINENT, AND I HAVE TAKEN THE STEPS NECESSARY TO MEET IT.

GP-4
300



SECRET

**HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 14 SEPT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 0 131250Z		1,2,3, COPY NO. OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I				RECENT ACTIVITIES IN THE HIEP DUC AREA. REMARKS ① DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention. Section _____ Signature _____
	DCG	I				
	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I				
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
1	S/S	I	9/14			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	X			Have Copy 14	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT&E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

HAS BEEN SENT

39

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SECRET

0 151250Z ZYH ZPP-4
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY FOR GEN ROSSON FROM LIGEN NICKERSON
 RECENT ACTIVITIES IN THE HIEP DUC AREA

1. (S) REPORTS OF THE ATTACKS ON LZ SIBERIA DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF THE 11TH AND YESTERDAY'S ACTIVITIES AROUND HIEP DUC HAVE ALREADY BEEN TRANSMITTED TO YOUR COC. THESE REPORTS CONTAIN ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION FROM THE FIELD. THE FOLLOWING IS TO PUT THESE REPORTS IN PERSPECTIVE.
2. (S) LLOYD RAMSEY HAS SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ON THE GROUND AT LZ SIBERIA AND IN THE HIEP DUC AREA DURING THE PAST TWO DAYS. HIEP DUC IS RECEIVING PRIORITY ATTENTION BY BOTH US AND ARVN COMMANDERS AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE FIRST CALL ON ANY AMERICAN RESOURCES WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED IN ITS DEFENSE. SO FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO NEED. THE DEFENSE OF LZ SIBERIA WAS WELL PLANNED AND EXECUTED AND 3 OF THE 4 US KIA RESULTED FROM DIRECT RPG HITS ON TWO BUNKERS. AS YOU KNOW, 32 NVA WERE KILLED. THE ENEMY HAS NOT SEEN FIT TO RENEW THE ACTION.
3. (S) IN THE HIEP DUC ENGAGEMENTS STARTING ON THE 11TH AND CONTINUING YESTERDAY, BOTH THE RF/PF AND THE ARVN UNITS HAVE ACQUIRED THEMSELVES SPLENDIDLY. COL THO THE PROVINCE CHIEF REACTED QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO THE GROUND ATTACK BY EMPLOYING AIR STRIKES IN THE WESTERN PORTION OF THE CONTROLLED FIRE ZONE WHICH SURROUNDS HIEP DUC. AT THE SAME TIME COL VINH, CO 5TH ARVN REGIMENT, COL TACKBERRY CO 196TH BRIGADE, AND COL THO PLANNED A HELICOPTER ASSAULT FOR THE FOLLOWING DAY BY THE 2D BN, 5TH ARVN REGIMENT WHICH WAS THEN IN TAM KY. DURING THE AFTERNOON AND EVENING TWO COMPANIES OF THE 4TH BN, 31ST INF WERE MOVED INTO BLOCKING POSITIONS AND A TROOP OF CAVALRY WAS DEPLOYED INTO TAM KY FROM CHU LAI. THE HELICOPTER ASSAULT BY 2/5 ARVN AT NOON YESTERDAY INTO HILL 188 WAS SMOOTHLY AND AGGRESSIVELY EXECUTED. THE LZ WAS COLD ALTHOUGH LATER IN THE AFTERNOON CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED WITH AN USEF. A POW CAPTURED BY THE ARVN STATED THAT THERE WERE 150 ENEMY (1 INF CO, 1 SAPPER CO, AND 1 ENGINEER CO) IN THE AREA AND THAT 50 ENEMY HAD BEEN KILLED. ESTIMATES OF ENEMY STRENGTH VARY, BUT THE ARVN BELIEVE ELEMENTS OF 3 COMPANIES ARE STILL IN THE GENERAL AREA. IN ANY EVENT, THE RF/PF REOCCUPIES A PORTION OF THE VILLAGE WHERE A GROUP OF NVA ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE SPENT THE NIGHT OF 11/12 AND CONTACT BECAME SPORADIC LATE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND EVENING. AS OF 122000H 11 NVA HAD BEEN KILLED AND 2 CAPTURED. FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE 1 ARVN KIA AND 3 WIA AND FOR THE US 1 MIA AND 2 WIA.
4. (S) OVERALL, THE RF/PF APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN VERY AGGRESSIVE AND TO HAVE USED SOUND TACTICS. ARVN ACTIONS HAVE BEEN PROMPT AND EXECUTED EXCEEDINGLY WELL. IN SHORT THE PERFORMANCE OF VIETNAMESE FORCES HAS BEEN IMPRESSIVE. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE ENEMY WILL STAND AND FIGHT OR ONCE AGAIN ATTEMPT TO SNEAK AWAY, I CONCUR WITH LLOYD RAMSEY'S PROPOSAL TO LET DISTRICT, PROVINCE, AND ARVN FORCES CONTINUE THEIR OPERATIONS WHILE WE STAND READY TO ASSIST IF CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE SHARPLY. FOR US TO PREEMPT THEM NOW AFTER THEIR HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS OF THE PAST TWO DAYS COULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS GREATER VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR.

REC 13
 1967 11 18 11 17

GP-4

COPIES DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

39(1)
 39(1)

TOP SECRET

OTITZYUW RHMAFA1857 2571450-TTIT-0RUHFMA.

ZNY TTTT

O 141450Z SEP 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE / SENSITIVE / FOR BGEN WILSON
FROM BGEN DOOLEY / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY / PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION
ONLY DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.
FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 220337Z

B. CG, FMFPAC LTR SER: 0002355 TO CMC OF 11 AUG 69; SUBJ: FORCE PLANNING
1. (TS) SPECIFIC GUIDANCE IS REQUESTED TO CONTINUE PLANNING FOR
FORTHCOMING PHASE 2 REDEPLOYMENTS.

2. (TS) IT IS REQUESTED THAT ANSWERS BE PROVIDED TO THE FOLLOWING
QUESTIONS BASED ON TROOP LISTS CONTAINED IN REFERENCES A AND B:

A. WHAT IS THE BREAKDOWN, BETWEEN OKINAWA AND CONUS, BY PRO-
GRAM 7 STRENGTHS, ACTUAL STRENGTHS BY SKILLS, AND EQUIPMENT TO BE
REDEPLOYED FROM THE FOLLOWING UNITS:

(1) 3D BRIDGE CO (-)	123
(2) 7TH COMM BN (-)	363
(3) 11TH ENGR BN (-)	725

PAGE TWO RHMAFA1857 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE / SENSITIVE /
FOR / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

B. WHAT IS REQUIRED BY TO/TE FROM THE DET FLC (400) TO ENABLE
THE PROSERVEN ON OKINAWA TO SUPPORT THE 3D MARDIV (-) SUBSEQUENT
TO PHASE 2?

C. WHAT IS REQUIRED IN PROGRAM 7 STRENGTHS, ACTUAL STRENGTHS
AND EQUIPMENT TO REDEPLOY TO CONUS FROM THE DET FLC?

D. WHEN WILL CUT OFF FOR RAR IN REDEPLOYING UNITS OCCUR?

E. WILL NORMAL ROTATION ON A 12 MONTH BASIS FOR MEMBERS OF
THE 3D MARDIV AND 1ST MAW CONTINUE DURING NOVEMBER REDEPLOYMENT?

F. IN PHASE 1 REDEPLOYMENTS, REPLACEMENTS WERE SELECTIVELY
DIVERTED AS INCREMENTS DEPLOYED. WE ARE ASSUMING THAT SUCH A
SYSTEM WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IN PHASE 2.

G. WHAT EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE REDISTRIBUTION OF
THOSE PERSONNEL IN RLT-3 THAT WILL NOT ROTATE OR REDEPLOY AS PART
OF THE 700 KEY PERSONNEL? NATURALLY A PORTION OF THESE PERSON-
NEL WILL BE ASSIGNED TO RLT-4 TO OFFSET ROTATION LOSSES, WITH THE
REMAINDER BEING REDISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT THE REMAINING IN-COUNTRY
UNITS. GUIDANCE IS NEEDED AS TO STRENGTH RLT-4 WILL BE REQUIRED
TO DEPLOY PRIOR TO DETERMINATION OF EXCESS PERSONNEL TO BE RE-
DISTRIBUTED.

H. WILL A TRANSFER OPTION BE GRANTED TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RMMMAFA1857 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/SENSITIVE/
FOR/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
WHO HAVE EXTENDED OVERSEAS TOURS TO REMAIN IN WESTPAC? SUBJECT
TO YOUR CONCURRENCE, INDIVIDUALS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TO UNITS RE-
DEPLOYING TO OKINAWA WILL ACCOMPANY THOSE UNITS.

GP-4

BT

1857

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

OTTIZYUW RHMMFAFA1865 2571538Z TTTT--RUHMFMA.

ZNY TTTT

O 141538Z SEP 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN BUSE FROM

LIGEN NICKERSON/ MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE FOL MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE P 131353Z SEP 69

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUSVDB/CG III MAF DNG

INFO RUEADWI/DCPG WASH DC

BT

T O P S E C R E T NOFORM 52298 (J3)

THIS IS A DUFFEL BAG MESSAGE

SUBJ: QMR FOR ADP FACILITY TO SUPPORT III MAF TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (TSS) AND RELATED SENSOR EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS (C)

REF A. CG III MAF LTR SER 059869 DTD 18 MAY 69, SUBJ: ADP FACILITY TO SUPPORT TSS (C)

B. CG MCDEC DTG 211300Z JUL 69 (S) (NOTAL)

C. CMC DTG 222207Z JUL 69 (S) (NOTAL)

PAGE TWO RHMMFAFA1865 T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/FOR/MCEO

D. DCPG LIAISON VISIT III MAF, 29 JUL 69 (C) (NOTAL)

E. CG III MAF DTG 060438Z AUG 68 (TS) (NOTAL)

F. CMC DTG 142203Z AUG 69 (S)

1. (S-NOFORM) REF A IDENTIFIED THE GENERAL CAPABILITIES REQUIRED OF AN ADP FACILITY CAPABLE OF PROCESSING SENSOR COLLECTED INFORMATION AND INTEGRATING IT WITH OTHER INTELLIGENCE DATA NECESSARY TO SUPPORT COMBAT OPERATIONS. REF B SUMMARIZED PREVIOUS MESSAGES AND RELATED DISCUSSIONS, AND PROVIDED A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE TYPE ADP FACILITY DCPG WOULD SUPPORT IF THE MARINE CORPS WOULD ACCOMPLISH SUPPORTING TASKS AS SPECIFIED. REF C REQUESTED III MAF TO PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS AFTER REVIEW OF REF B. REF D LIAISON VISIT BY DCPG PERSONNEL ON 29 JULY 69, TO III MAF REVIEWED THE III MAF QMR FOR THE ADP FACILITY TO SUPPORT THE TSS. IN ADDITION, THE DCPG TEAM INTRODUCED THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING SENSOR RELATED EQUIPMENT IN THE BASS TYPE CONFIGURATION TO INCLUDE AN INDIVIDUAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM, (LORAN MANPACK). REF E ACKNOWLEDGED III MAF'S AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT THE DCPG REDUCED VERSION OF THE ADP/TSS QMR AND CITED ADDITIONAL SENSOR HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT A RESPONSIVE TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (TSS) WITHIN THE I CORPS AREA. REF F REFLECTS CMC'S SUPPORT OF THE III MAF CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT AND WILLINGNESS

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2300/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET 33 (11)

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMAFA1865 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E F O R / M C E O S
TO PERFORM SUCH TASKS AS DCPG MAY ASSIGN TO FIELD THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
THIS MESSAGE IS IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCE E.

2. (S-NFORN) INITIAL PLANNING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TSS WAS
INITIATED IN OCTOBER 1968. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND GENERAL SYSTEM
REQUIREMENTS WERE FORMALIZED BY A QMR IN MAY 69. SUBSEQUENT DISCUS-
SIONS WERE HELD BETWEEN III MAF, MACVJ3-04 AND DCPG TO EVALUATE THE
IMPACT OF A REDUCED SYSTEM CAPABILITY OFFERED BY DCPG. THE FORGOING
DISCUSSIONS WERE CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH THE SYSTEM'S CAPABILITIES
AND DID NOT WEIGH THE IMPACT OF PROPOSED TROOP REDUCTIONS NOR THE
LONG LEAD TIME TO OBTAIN THE SYSTEM. A REEVALUATION OF THE III MAF
REQUEST HAS BEEN CONDUCTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS. FACTORS CONSIDERED
INCLUDED ANTICIPATED REDEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES, SIGNIFICANT OSD
BUDGETARY REDUCTIONS, INCREASED VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR, AND THE
LONG LEAD TIME FOR EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
AT THIS LATE DATE, SEP 69, THE ACQUISITION AND FIELDING OF THE
PROPOSED ADP SYSTEM TO SUPPORT THE TSS CAN NO LONGER BE SUPPORTED BY
THIS HEADQUARTERS.

3. (S-NFORN) CG III MAF IDENTIFIED REQUIREMENTS FOR BASS TYPE
CONFIGURED SENSOR EQUIPMENT AND LORAN MANPACK IN REF E. THE
EQUIPMENT REQUESTED WOULD ENHANCE THE EXECUTION OF THE SENSOR

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA1865 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E / F O R / M C E O
PROGRAM IN I CORPS AREA. HOWEVER, BOTH SYSTEMS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE
INTRODUCED INTO RVN DURING OCT 69 ON A TEST AND EVALUATION BASIS.
COUNTRY WIDE DEPLOYMENT WILL BE CONTINGENT UPON TEST AND EVALUATION
RESULTS. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, AND THE FACTORS CITED IN PARA 2
ABOVE, VALIDATION AND THE SUBSEQUENT REQUEST FOR DELIVERY OF THESE
SYSTEMS FROM DCPG WILL BE SUSPENDED.

GP-3

BT

1865

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2300/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

33(2)
TOP SECRET

G2

SECRET NOFORN HEADQUARTERS MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 14 SEP 69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE O 340720Z SEP 69		COPY NO. 1-3 OF 7 COPIES REC'D					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					SECRET NOFORN FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON - RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE PLANNING FOR ASHAW VALLEY REMARKS (2) DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention. <table border="1"> <tr> <td>Section</td> <td>Signature</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
	DCG									
	C/S									
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS									
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ									
	S/S									
	G-1									
	G-2	X			C					
	G-3									
	G-4									
	G-5									
	G-6									
	ADJ									
	AWARDS									
	CAP									
	CHAP									
	CIB									
	COMP									
	DENT									
	ENGR									
	FOODS									
	FSEO									
	HQ CMDT									
	INSP									
	MTO									
	NJA									
	OPANAL									
	ORD									
	PMO									
	POSTAL									
	PROTO									
	PSYOPS									
	RDT&E									
	REPRO									
	SJA									
	SPL SERV									
	SUPPLY									
	FORMED O									
	SIC									
	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

HAS BEEN SENT

HAS BEEN SENT

HAS BEEN SENT

NOFORN

40

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SECRET

0 140720Z ZYH
FM CG III MAF DNG RVN
TO CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN
ZEM

SECRET NOFORN
FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE PLANNING FOR ASHAU VALLEY
A. LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS 081059Z/178° SEP69
B. CG III MAF 100708Z SEP 69.

1. REFERENCES A AND B ARE DISCUSSIONS OF PLANNED OPERATIONS IN THE A SHAU VALLEY IN THE FORTHCOMING MONTHS. I WANT TO CONTINUE TO DENY TO THE ENEMY THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE REDEVELOPMENT OF THE A SHAU VALLEY INTO A MAJOR INFILTRATION AND LOGISTICS COMPLEX AFTER OUR DISESTABLISHMENT OF FSP RENDEZVOUS AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM THE A SHAU.

2. I REQUEST THAT YOU PROVIDE ME AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE YOUR THOUGHTS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF EFFECTIVE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE OF THE A SHAU VALLEY UNDER ALL WEATHER CONDITIONS, DURING THE NEXT FIVE MONTH. KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR PLANS IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS WILL GREATLY ASSIST PLANNING IN PROGRESS AT MY HEADQUARTERS:

- A. GROUND RECONNAISSANCE PLAN.
- B. AERIAL AND GROUND SURVEILLANCE PLAN TO INCLUDE PLANNED EMPLOYMENT OF SENSORS. IN THIS REGARD, REQUESTS FOR PLANNED SENSOR REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED AT THE EARLIEST.
- C. VISUAL AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLAN.

3. WARM REGARDS
GP-4
210



NNND HAS BEEN SENT

40(1)

40(1)

HEADQUARTERS MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF		DATE 16SEP69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 152317Z SEP 69		COPY NO. 1-3 OF 4 COPIES REC'D.							
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET/FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON VISIT OF DEPCOMUSMACV TO ICTZ, 09SEP69						
			IN	OUT								
4	CG	I		17 SEP 69	[Signature]	DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention. <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">Section</td> <td style="width: 50%;">Signature</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>			Section	Signature		
Section	Signature											
3	DCG	I										
2	C/S	I										
	DC/S											
	DCS PLANS											
	DEP CORDS											
	DSA ICTZ											
1	S/S	I	9/16		[Signature]							
	G-1											
	G-2											
	G-3											
	G-4											
	G-5											
	G-6											
	ADJ											
	AWARDS											
	CAP											
	CHAP											
	CIB											
	COMP											
	DENT											
	ENGR											
	FOODS											
	FSEO											
	HQ CMDT											
	INSP											
	MTO											
	NJA											
	OPANAL											
	ORD											
	PMO											
	POSTAL											
	PROTO											
	PSYOPS											
	RDT&E											
	REPRO											
	SJA											
	SPL SERV											
	SUPPLY											
	FORMED O											
	SIC											
	TCC											
	SGT MAJ											

HAS BEEN SENT


HAS BEEN SENT

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

42

SECRET

7 152317Z
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 INFO CG USARV
 ZEM



SECRET/FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 VISIT OF DEPCOMUSMACV TO ICTZ, 9SEP69
 A. COMUSMACV 32267 DTG 301105Z MAY69

1. FOL SUBMITTED IAW REF A.
2. GENERAL ROSSON ARR DANANG 090910H SEP69. HE WAS GREETED BY LTGEN LAN, CG OF I CORPS, AND MGEN BOWMAN, DEPUTY CG III MAF. GENERAL'S ROSSON AND BOWMAN DEPARTED FOR III MAF HQ WHERE HE WAS MET BY RADM BONNER, COMNAVSUPACT, DAG. THE PARTY PROCEEDED TO NSA FOR A TOUR OF THEIR WORK SHOPS AND THE PUBLIC WORK CENTER. THE DAMAGE FROM THE ROCKET ATTACK OF 5SEP WAS ALSO INSPECTED. CAPT LOCKE, ASSIST PUBLIC WORKS OFFICER, USN, CONDUCTED THE TOUR. AT 1050 THE PARTY DEPARTED III MAF FOR THE 1ST MARDIV HQ.
3. GENERAL ROSSON ARR 1ST MARDIV AT 091100H AND WAS GREETED BY MGEN SIMPSON, CG 1ST MARDIV. AN INFORMAL BRIEF WAS GIVEN BY GENERAL SIMPSON IN HIS QUARTERS. GENERAL ROSSON DEPARTED THE 1ST MARDIV HQ 091135H, AND FLEW TO AN HOA. HE WAS GREETED BY COL BECK, CG OF THE 5TH MARINES, AND TOURED THE REGT CO. HE THEN WAS MET BY LT COL ALEP, CG OF THE 1ST AIRBORNE GROUP, AND RECEIVED AN UPDATE ON THE ENEMY SITUATION AND CURRENT OPERATIONS.

42(1)

42(1)

GENERAL ROSSON ASKED WHAT ENEMY UNITS THE 1ST RANGERS GROUP HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH RECENTLY. COL HIEP REPLIED THE 1300 PROVINCIAL BN, A LOCAL FORCE VC BN. GENERAL ROSSON THEN INQUIRED TO THE NUMBER OF NVA KILLED BY THE RANGERS. THE ANSWER WAS SEVEN. HE INQUIRED FROM WHAT UNIT WERE THE NVA. COL HIEP REPLIED UNIDENTIFIED. GENERAL ROSSON THEN ASKED WHAT TYPE INSTRUCTIONS OR ORDERS HE HAD RECEIVED FROM HIS SENIORS CONCERNING THE NVA PROCLAIMED CEASE FIRE. COL HIEP REPLIED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED NO SPECIAL ORDERS OR INSTRUCTIONS. GENERAL ROSSON THEN ASKED ABOUT HIS OPERATIONAL PLANS FOR THE NEXT THREE DAYS. THE ANSWER WAS TO CONTINUE RICE SECURITY OPERATIONS. GENERAL ROSSON INQUIRED ABOUT HIS FIELD STRENGTHS AND WAS GIVEN THE FIGURES OF 455 AND 427 IN THE RESPECTIVE BATTALIONS. HE THEN ASKED ABOUT COL HIEP'S ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT. COL HIEP INFORMED THE GENERAL HE HAD TWO ARVN BATTERIES, PLUS REINFORCING FIRES FROM THE MARINES. HE SAID THAT HE RECEIVED HIS AIR SUPPORT FROM THE MARINES. AT THIS POINT, GENERAL ROSSON ASKED ABOUT C&C HELICOPTERS FOR THE BATTALIONS. HE WAS TOLD THE BATTALIONS DID NOT HAVE C&C ASSIGNED, BUT THE RANGERS GROUP HAD A C&C HELICOPTER THE BATTALION USED. COL HIEP ADDED THAT HE WAS RESUPPLIED EVERY 3 TO 4 DAYS BY HELICOPTER. GENERAL ROSSON ASKED WHAT THE MISSION WAS OF WA/VC PRISONERS TAKEN BY THE RANGERS. THE ANSWER WAS TO KEEP THE RESUPPLY LINES OPEN, AND FOOD GATHERING ASSIGNMENTS. AT THIS POINT, GENERAL SIMPSON MADE THE OBSERVATION THAT THE RANGERS WERE DOING, AND HAD DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB. GENERAL ROSSON DEPARTED AN HOA AT 1400 TO VISIT HILL 65

3. GENERAL ROSSON WAS MET BY LTCOL BOWEN, CO OF THE 2DBN, 5THMAR AND RECEIVED A SHORT UPDATE BRIEF, AND HE SPOKE WITH A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF MARINES FROM THE BN. THE PARTY LEFT HILL 65 AT 1435, AND FLEW TO LIBERTY BRIDGE.
4. GENERAL ROSSON WAS GREETED AT LIBERTY BRIDGE BY MAJOR O'TOOLE, CO OF 1STBN, 5THMAR. HE RECEIVED A SHORT UPDATE BRIEF, AND SPOKE WITH ANOTHER GROUP OF MARINES FROM THE BATTALION.
5. GENERAL ROSSON LEFT LIBERTY BRIDGE AT 1500 FOR DANANG. HE DEPARTED DANANG AT 1525 FOR TSN.

GP-4

42(2)

42(2)

SECRET

**HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 17 SEP 69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 170207Z SEP 69		COPY NO. 1,2,3 OF 4 COPIES REC'D					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					VISIT OF MR. JOSEPH ALSOP TO ICTZ				
	DCG									
	C/S					REMARKS ①				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention.				
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ									
	S/S									
	G-1									
	G-2									
	G-3									
	G-4									
	G-5									
	G-6									
	ADJ					<table border="1"> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
	AWARDS									
	CAP									
	CHAP									
	CIB									
	COMP									
	DENT									
	ENGR									
	FOODS									
	FSEO									
	HQ CMDT									
	INSP									
	MTO									
	NJA									
	OPANAL									
	ORD									
	PMO									
	POSTAL									
	PROTO									
	PSYOPS									
	RDT&E									
	REPRO									
	SJA									
	SPL SERV									
	SUPPLY									
	FORMED O									
	SIC									
	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

HAS BEEN SENT

④43

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SECRET

P 170207Z ZFF-4
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMUSMACV
 ZEM

SECRET

S E C R E T /EYES ONLY/ FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM
 LTGEN NICKERSON

VISIT OF MR. JOSEPH ALSOP TO ICTZ

1. MR. ALSOP'S TOUR OF ICTZ COMMENCED UPON ARRIVAL AT
 CHU LAI 081800H SEP AND TERMINATED WITH HIS DEPARTURE
 FROM DANANG BASE OPS AT 111730H SEP. HIS THREE-PART
 VISIT (AMERICAL, XXIV CORPS, III MAF) WAS CHARACTERIZED
 BY IN-DEPTH BACKGROUND DISCUSSIONS WITH KEY LEADERS
 ON ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE, CASUALTY FIGURES, AND
 PACIFICATION PROGRESS. HE COVERED A GREAT DEAL OF GROUND
 AND TALKED TO MANY PEOPLE. THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS INTERESTS,
 COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS ARE SUMMARIZED IN RELATION TO
 THE THREE AREAS HE VISITED.

2. AMERICAL

A. MR. ALSOP'S STAY IN AMERICAL AO COMMENCED WITH
 INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MGEN RAMSEY AND SELECTED
 STAFF OFFICERS ON 8 SEP. ON 9 SEP HE RECEIVED A G-2/G-3/G-5
 BRIEFING AT THE DIV CP, VISITED 2D ARVN DIV HQ, QUANG
 NGAI PC, QUANG TIN PC, 5TH ARVN REGT, 196TH LIB, HIEP DUC
 RESETTLEMENT VILLAGE, 4-131ST INF, 3-21ST INF, 1-46TH INF,
 3-1ST INF AND OVERFLEW BATANGAN PENINSULA. PRIOR TO
 DEPARTURE, HE ATTENDED THE EVENING BRIEF.

B. MR. ALSOP WAS EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN STRENGTH
 AND CAPABILITIES OF 2D AND 3D NVA DIVISIONS. G-2 AMERICAL
 PROVIDED HIM WITH A FACT SHEET WHICH LISTED PRESENT
 STRENGTH OF NVA/VC REGTS IN AMERICAL AO. FACT SHEET
 REFLECTED AN AVERAGE STRENGTH OF APPROX 900 NVA PER REGT.



43(1)

43(1)

3. XXIV CORPS

A. DEPARTED CHU LAI 091800H FOR XXIV CORPS. MR. ALSOP RON XXIV CORPS HQ ON 9 SEP. ON 10 SEP HE SPENT THE ENTIRE DAY IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE PRIMARILY VISITING WITH COL THANH, THE PROVINCE CHIEF. HE ALSO HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH MGEN WHEELER, DCG XXIV CORPS, MGEN JONES, CG 3D MARDIV, AND MGEN WRIGHT, CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM). HE RON AT XXIV CORPS HQ AND DEPARTED FOR DANANG AT 100700Z SEP69.

B. MR. ALSOP EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE TROOP REDUCTIONS IN THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES. HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH RVNAF PROGRESS AND THE RECOVERY EFFORT IN HUE, BUT FORECAST ENEMY CAPABILITIES BEING USED TO EXPLOIT US WITHDRAWALS. HE THINKS FURTHER TROOP REDUCTIONS WILL BE LETTING THE PEOPLE DOWN AND FORFEITING THE EXCELLENT PROGRESS MADE IN PACIFICATION.

C. HE LISTED THE RISKS OF REDUCING TROOPS AND SAID HE THINKS THE MILITARY LEADERS WOULD AGREE WITH HIM IF THEY COULD SAY SO. HE RECALLED HIS LAST VISIT WITH 3D DIV WHEN GEN DAVIS BRIEFED HIM ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE LAOTIAN BORDER. HE AGREED WITH PRESENT RECON EFFORTS TO PROVIDE AN ALERT FOR ANY ENEMY BUILDUP.

D. HE AGREED THAT HAMBURGER HILL WAS NECESSARY TO DENY THE ASHAU VALLEY TO THE ENEMY. HE CONCEDED THAT THE NVA HAD SUFFERED GREAT LOSSES BUT RETAINS THE ABILITY TO COME BACK. ON SUMMARY, HE IS CONCERNED WITH THE VACUUM THAT WILL BE LEFT IN THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES IF TROOP REDUCTIONS TAKE PLACE. HE DEPARTED XXIV CORPS 111100H SEP. 43(2)

4. III MAF

A. MR. ALSOP ARRIVED DANANG BASE OPS AT 111130H SEP AND WAS MET BY CG III MAF AND DEP CORDS. HIS VISIT AT III MAF CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF SEPARATE IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CG III MAF AND DEP CORDS AS SUMMARIZED BELOW:

B. CG III MAF. HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT DMZ. ENEMY HAS FIVE REGTS PLUS NUMBER OF DIVISIONS NORTH. OUR SCREEN IS TOO THIN. ENEMY CAN STRIKE SOUTH AND DESTROY ALL PACIFICATION DOWN TO HUE. IT WOULD BE A FATAL BLOW. FRENCH LOST WAR BEFORE DIEN BIEN PHU WHEN THE LOST BINH LONG PROVINCE. HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH INCREASED CONTROL OVER POPULATED AREAS. HE DISCUSSED THE ENEMY'S DILEMMA OF CONTINUING AT PRESENT PACE AND LOSING HIS GRIP. HE QUERIED THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SAPPER ATTACKS. HE DISCOUNTED IMPORTANCE OF VC INFRA-STRUCTURE AND EXPRESSED CONCERN ONLY FOR MAN WITH THE GUN. SAID VCI WOULD DIE WITHOUT. HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH AMERICAN PURSUIT OF MAIN FORCE ELEMENTS. COMMENTED THAT PF'S FIGHT LIKE MARINES; VERY AGGRESSIVE. WHEN BRIEFED THAT MOST ENEMY UNITS ARE 75 PERCENT STRENGTH AND SOME BELOW BECAUSE OF MALARIA, FOOD SHORTAGE AND ATTRITION, HE DISCOUNTED MALARIA AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR, SAYING IT IS INHERENT TO THE NATIVE VIETNAMESE. HE REQUESTED AND WAS PROVIDED A FACT SHEET LISTING DETAILED FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CASUALTY FIGURES FOR 1969.

C. CORDS. MR. ALSOP'S DISCUSSION WITH MR. FIRFER, DEP CORDS III MAF, COVERED THE ENTIRE GAMUT OF PACIFICATION. COPIES OF BRIEFING SLIDES WITH DETAILED STATISTICS WERE REQUESTED AND MADE AVAILABLE. IN CONVERSATION, MR. ALSOP AND MR. FIRFER AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- (1) POPULATION CONTROL IS NOW 15 PERCENT OF THE OVERALL PROBLEM IN CONTRAST TO THE 45 PERCENT IT WAS IN FEBRUARY 1968.
- (2) GEOPGRAPHICALLY, OBVIOUS PROBLEM AREAS ARE MO DUC TO DUC PHO AROUND QUANG NGAI CITY, AND PARTS OF VALLEY FROM AN HOA TO HOI AN IN QUANG NAM.
- (3) NEW HAMLET AND VILLAGE GOVERNMENTS ARE MORE POPULAR THAN DEMOCRATIC BUT A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.
- (4) IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FIX AN ACCURATE ESTIMATE ON THE ENEMY GUERILLA STRENGTH.

MR. ALSOP COMMENTED THAT THE NVA MADE A MISTAKE IN COMMITTING THEMSELVES SO STRONGLY AT HIEP DUC. HE REQUESTED A MEETING WITH OSA REPS MCCARTHY AND KELLY TO EXAMINE HIS THESIS ON WANING VC GUERILLA STRENGTH. IN GENERAL THEY AGREED. MR. ALSOP CONCLUDE WITH COMPLIMENTARY REMARKS ABOUT WHAT HE CONSIDERED THE IMPROVED COMMAND POSTURE AND QUALITY OF III MAF SINCE HIS LAST VISIT.

GP-4
876

43(3)

43(3)

HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM		DATE					
			CG III MAF		17 SEP 69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE	COPY NO. 1,2,3 OF 4 COPIES REC'D.						
			P 170210Z SEP 69							
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG	I				VISIT OF MR. JOSEPH ALSOP TO ICTZ				
	DCG	I								
	C/S	I				REMARKS ①				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention.				
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ					<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
1	S/S	I	9/17		Coy 4 B					
	G-1									
	G-2									
	G-3									
	G-4									
	G-5									
	G-6									
	ADJ									
	AWARDS									
	CAP									
	CHAP									
	CIB									
	COMP									
	DENT									
	ENGR									
	FOODS									
	FSEO									
	HQ CMDT									
	INSP									
	MTO									
	NJA									
	OPANAL									
	ORD									
	PMO									
	POSTAL									
	PROTO									
	PSYOPS									
	RDT&E									
	REPRO									
	SJA									
	SPL SERV									
	SUPPLY									
	FORMED O									
	SIC									
	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

HAS BEEN SENT

44

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SECRET

P 170210Z ZFF-4

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

ZEM

SECRET/EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOL MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

P 170207Z ZFF-4

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

SECRET/EYES ONLY/FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM

LTGEN NICKERSON

VISIT OF MR. JOSEPH ALSOP TO ICTZ

1. MR. ALSOP'S TOUR OF ICTZ COMMENCED UPON ARRIVAL AT CHU LAI 081800H SEP AND TERMINATED WITH HIS DEPARTURE FROM DANANG BASE OPS AT 111730H SEP. HIS THREE-PART VISIT (AMERICAL, XXIV CORPS, III MAF) WAS CHARACTERIZED BY IN-DEPTH BACKGROUND DISCUSSIONS WITH KEY LEADERS ON ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE, CASUALTY FIGURES, AND PACIFICATION PROGRESS. HE COVERED A GREAT DEAL OF GROUND AND TALKED TO MANY PEOPLE. THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS INTERESTS, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS ARE SUMMARIZED IN RELATION TO THE THREE AREAS HE VISITED.

2. AMERICAL

A. MR. ALSOP'S STAY IN AMERICAL AO COMMENCED WITH INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MGEN RAMSEY AND SELECTED STAFF OFFICERS ON 8 SEP. ON 9 SEP HE RECEIVED A G-2/G-3/G-5 BRIEFING AT THE DIV CP, VISITED 2D ARVN DIV HQ, QUANG NGAI PC, QUANG TIN PC, 5TH ARVN REGT, 196TH LIB, Hiep Duc RESETTLEMENT VILLAGE, 4-131ST INF, 3-21ST INF, 1-46TH INF, 3-1ST INF AND OVERFLEW BATANGAN PENINSULA. PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, HE ATTENDED THE EVENING BRIEF.

B. MR. ALSOP WAS EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES OF 2D AND 3D NVA DIVISIONS. G-2 AMERICAL PROVIDED HIM WITH A FACT SHEET WHICH LISTED PRESENT STRENGTH OF NVA/VC REGTS IN AMERICAL AO. FACT SHEET REFLECTED AN AVERAGE STRENGTH OF APPROX 900 NVA PER REGT.

SECRET



44(1)

44(1)

3. XXIV CORPS

A. DEPARTED CHU LAI 091800H FOR XXIV CORPS. MR. ALSOP RAN XXIV CORPS HQ ON 9 SEP. ON 10 SEP HE SPENT THE ENTIRE DAY IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE PRIMARILY VISITING WITH COL THANH, THE PROVINCE CHIEF. HE ALSO HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH MGEN WHEELER, DCG XXIV CORPS, MGEN JONES, CG 3D MARDIV, AND MGEN WRIGHT, CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM). HE RAN AT XXIV CORPS HQ AND DEPARTED FOR DANANG AT 100700Z SEP69.

B. MR. ALSOP EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE TROOP REDUCTIONS IN THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES. HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH RVNAF PROGRESS AND THE RECOVERY EFFORT IN HUE, BUT FORECAST ENEMY CAPABILITIES BEING USED TO EXPLOIT US WITHDRAWALS. HE THINKS FURTHER TROOP REDUCTIONS WILL BE LETTING THE PEOPLE DOWN AND FORFEITING THE EXCELLENT PROGRESS MADE IN PACIFICATION.

C. HE LISTED THE RISKS OF REDUCING TROOPS AND SAID HE THINKS THE MILITARY LEADERS WOULD AGREE WITH HIM IF THEY COULD SAY SO. HE RECALLED HIS LAST VISIT WITH 3D DIV WHEN GEN DAVIS BRIEFED HIM ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE LAOTIAN BORDER. HE AGREED WITH PRESENT RECON EFFORTS TO PROVIDE AN ALERT FOR ANY ENEMY BUILDUP.

D. HE AGREED THAT HAMBURGER HILL WAS NECESSARY TO DENY THE A SHAU VALLEY TO THE ENEMY. HE CONCEDED THAT THE NVA HAD SUFFERED GREAT LOSSES BUT RETAINS THE ABILITY TO COME BACK. ON SUMMARY, HE IS CONCERNED WITH THE VACUUM THAT WILL BE LEFT IN THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES IF TROOP REDUCTIONS TAKE PLACE. HE DEPARTED XXIV CORPS 111100H SEP.

4. III MAF

A. MR. ALSOP ARRIVED DANANG BASE OPS AT 111130H SEP AND WAS MET BY CG III MAF AND DEP CORDS. HIS VISIT AT III MAF CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF SEPARATE IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CG III MAF AND DEP CORDS AS SUMMARIZED BELOW:

44(2)

44(2)

B. CG III MAF. HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT DMZ. ENEMY HAS FIVE REGTS PLUS NUMBER OF DIVISIONS NORTH. OUR SCREEN IS TOO THIN. ENEMY CAN STRIKE SOUTH AND DESTROY ALL PACIFICATION DOWN TO HUE. IT WOULD BE A FATAL BLOW. FRENCH LOST WAR BEFORE DIEN BIEN PHU WHEN THE LOST BINH LONG PROVINCE. HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH INCREASED CONTROL OVER POPULATED AREAS. HE DISCUSSED THE ENEMY'S DILEMMA OF CONTINUING AT PRESENT PACE AND LOSING HIS GRIP. HE QUERIED THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SAPPER ATTACKS. HE DISCOUNTED IMPORTANCE OF VC INFRA-STRUCTURE AND EXPRESSED CONCERN ONLY FOR MAN WITH THE GUN. SAID VCI WOULD DIE WITHOUT. HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH AMERICAN PURSUIT OF MAIN FORCE ELEMENTS. COMMENTED THAT PF'S FIGHT LIKE MARINES; VERY AGGRESSIVE. WHEN BRIEFED THAT MOST ENEMY UNITS ARE 75 PERCENT STRENGTH AND SOME BELOW BECAUSE OF MALARIA, FOOD SHORTAGE AND ATTRITION, HE DISCOUNTED MALARIA AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR, SAYING IT IS INHERENT TO THE NATIVE VIETNAMESE. HE REQUESTED AND WAS PROVIDED A FACT SHEET LISTING DETAILED FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CASUALTY FIGURES FOR 1969.

C. CORDS. MR. ALSOP'S DISCUSSION WITH MR. FIRFER, DEP CORDS III MAF, COVERED THE ENTIRE GAMUT OF PACIFICATION. COPIES OF BRIEFING SLIDES WITH DETAILED STATISTICS WERE REQUESTED AND MADE AVAILABLE. IN CONVERSATION, MR. ALSOP AND MR. FIRFER AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- (1) POPULATION CONTROL IS NOW 15 PERCENT OF THE OVERALL PROBLEM IN CONTRAST TO THE 45 PERCENT IT WAS IN FEBRUARY 1968.
- (2) GEOGRAPHICALLY, OBVIOUS PROBLEM AREAS ARE MO DUC TO DUC PHO AROUND QUANG NGAI CITY, AND PARTS OF VALLEY FROM AN HOA TO HOI AN IN QUANG NAM.
- (3) NEW HAMLET AND VILLAGE GOVERNMENTS ARE MORE POPULAR THAN DEMOCRATIC BUT A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.
- (4) IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FIX AN ACCURATE ESTIMATE ON THE ENEMY GUERRILLA STRENGTH.

MR. ALSOP COMMENTED THAT THE NVA MADE A MISTAKE IN COMMITTING THEMSELVES SO STRONGLY AT HIEP DUC. HE REQUESTED A MEETING WITH OSA REPS MCCARTHY AND KELLY TO EXAMINE HIS THESIS ON WANING VC GUERRILLA STRENGTH. IN GENERAL THEY AGREED. MR. ALSOP CONCLUDE WITH COMPLIMENTARY REMARKS ABOUT WHAT HE CONSIDERED THE IMPROVED COMMAND POSTURE AND QUALITY OF III MAF SINCE HIS LAST VISIT.

WARM REGARDS

BT

44(3)

44(3)

HEADQUARTERS MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE	FROM CG III MAF	DATE 18 SEP 69
SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 180530Z SEP 69		COPIES OF 4 COPIES REC'D

ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG	I		19 Oct	[Signature]	ASSIGNMENT OF SENIOR ARMY INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER TO HQ III MAF (C)				
	DCG	I			[Signature]					
	C/S	I		9/18	[Signature]	REMARKS [Signature]				
	DC/S	I								
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention. <table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">Section</td> <td style="width: 50%;">Signature</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ									
1	S/S	I	9/18		[Signature]					
	G-1									
	G-2	X			[Signature]					
	G-3									
	G-4									
	G-5									
	G-6									
	ADJ									
	AWARDS									
	CAP									
	CHAP									
	CIB									
	COMP									
	DENT									
	ENGR									
	FOODS									
	FSEO									
	HQ CMDT									
	INSP									
	MTO									
	NJA									
	OPANAL									
	ORD									
	PMO									
	POSTAL									
	PROTO									
	PSYOPS									
	RDT & E									
	REPRO									
	SJA									
	SPL SERV									
	SUPPLY									
	FORMED O									
	SIC									
	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

HAS BEEN SENT

[Handwritten mark]

46

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

REF-A TO ABOVE MSG.

SECRET

P 180530Z ZFF-4

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

ZEM

S E C R E T/EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
ASSIGNMENT OF SENIOR ARMY INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER TO HQ
III MAF (C)

1. (S) AS YOU KNOW, CURRENT PLANNING ANTICIPATES REDEPLOYMENT FROM VIETNAM OF USMC FORCES INCLUDING III MAF HQ, WHICH WILL BE REPLACED BY A HQ STAFFED BY U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL.
2. (C) AS A COROLLARY MATTER, MY G-2, COLONEL JOHN CANTON, WILL ROTATE TO CONUS IN JANUARY 1970. AMONG AVAILABLE AND ANTICIPATED PERSONNEL ASSETS, THERE ARE NO MARINE COLONELS WITH THE QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE NECESSARY TO BE AN EFFECTIVE III MAF G-2.
3. (S) IN VIEW OF THESE TWO FACTORS, I AM CONSIDERING A REQUEST TO COMUSMACV FOR THE ASSIGNMENT TO HQ III MAF OF AN ARMY COLONEL WHO IS AN INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER. I ENVISION THAT SUCH AN OFFICER WOULD BE ASSIGNED INITIALLY AS DEPUTY G-2 PRELIMINARY TO TAKING OVER AS ACOFS G-2 UPON THE DEPARTURE OF CANTON. THIS APPROACH, I BELIEVE, WOULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF A RELIEF FOR CANTON AND AT SAME TIME WOULD LAY THE GROUNDWORK DURING THE COMING MONTHS FOR PROVIDING NECESSARY CONTINUITY FOR THE DIRECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE EFFORT IN ICTZ.
4. (U) SINCE SUCH A MOVE REPRESENTS A DEPARTURE FROM EXISTING PROCEDURES, I WOULD MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS IN THIS MATTER BEFORE I TAKE ANY FURTHER ACTION.

GP-4

250

NNNN

SECRET



46(1)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AIRBORNE FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 20 SEP 1969	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 200916Z SEP 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT			
	CG	I		21/8	N	SUBJECT SPECAT EBCLUSIVE FOR REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. ORIG: G-4 REL: CG	
	DCG	I					
	DCG AIR						
	C/S	I		9/21	SMO		
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	X	9/21		CKY		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4	X					
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT

50

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RHMMAFA2610 2630916-UUUU--RUMHLA.
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 200916Z SEP 69
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN SIMPSON
 FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 MALARIA DISCIPLINE

1. THE MALARIA RATE FOR YOUR MARINES HAS BEEN
 VERY HIGH AND INDICATIONS ARE THAT YOU WILL
 HAVE OVER 500 CASES IN SEPTEMBER, WITH OVER
 200 DURING THE WEEK OF 11-17 SEPTEMBER.
 2. FROM THE RATES IT IS APPARENT THAT YOUR
 EXCELLENT DIRECTIVE ON MALARIA DISCIPLINE IS NOT
 BEING FOLLOWED. I AM VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS
 MATTER AND WANT YOU TO HOLD THE OFFICERS IN
 COMMAND PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPROVEMENT.
 I KNOW YOU SHARE MY CONCERN AND UNDERSTAND MY
 METHODS.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2610

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

1ST MARDIV 2100/4 (9/67)

50(1)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 21 SEP 69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 0 210613Z SEP 69		COPY NO. 1,2,3 OF 4 COPIES REC'D.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT (S) LINDIS/EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					REMARKS <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention. </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
	DCG									
	C/S									
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS	<i>F</i>	<i>Had</i>	<i>copy</i>						
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ									
	S/S									
	G-1									
	G-2	<i>I</i>	<i>Had</i>	<i>copy</i>						
	G-3	<i>A</i>	<i>Had</i>	<i>copy</i>						
	G-4	<i>E</i>	<i>Had</i>	<i>copy</i>						
	G-5									
	G-6									
	ADJ									
	AWARDS									
	CAP									
	CHAP									
	CIB									
	COMP									
	DENT									
	ENGR									
	FOODS									
	FSEO									
	HQ CMDT									
	INSP									
	MTO									
	NJA									
	OPANAL									
	ORD									
	PMO									
	POSTAL									
	PROTO									
	PSYOPS									
	RDT&E									
	REPRO									
	SJA									
	SPL SERV									
	SUPPLY									
	FORMED O									
	SIC									
	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

*Cop #1 to Force Reduction File
Cop #3 to G-3 for action*

HAS BEEN SENT

1

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SECRET

O 210613Z ZYH
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG XXIV CORPS
 ZEM

SECRET

SECRET LIMDIS/EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 ADJUSTMENT OF FORCE DISPOSITIONS IN CONNECTION WITH 3D MARINE
 DIVISION (-) REDEPLOYMENT (S)

A. CG III MAF 191914Z SEP 69
 B. CG XXIV CORPS 191450Z SEP 69

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

1. (S) REFERENCE A AND OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION OF 19 SEP CONCERNED A III MAF PROPOSAL TO DEPLOY ONE BATTALION OF THE 26TH MARINES IN THE PHU LOC DISTRICT OF THUA THIEN PROVINCE AND EXPANDING THE 1ST MARDIV TAOR NORTHWARD ACCORDINGLY.
2. (S) DURING THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION AND SO LONG AS AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING IS AVAILABLE, IT IS MY INTENT TO MAINTAIN ONE BATTALION OF THE 26TH MARINES AS A MOBILE RESERVE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT ANYWHERE IN ICTZ WITH PRIORITY TO NICTZ IN THE EVENT THE ENEMY ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION DURING THE MOVEMENT OF THE 3D MARDIV.
3. (S) ALTHOUGH A DECISION HAS NOT YET BEEN MADE AS TO TIMING, AT SOMETIME DURING OR AFTER THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 3D MARDIV, AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING WILL NO LONGER BE AVAILABLE IN THE ICTZ LITTORAL (PROBABLY ABOUT 1 NOVEMBER); CONSEQUENTLY, SLF'S WILL ALSO NO LONGER BE AVAILABLE. AT THAT TIME, THE SLF BATTALION WILL BE ESTABLISHED ASHORE PERMANENTLY AND NOT ON A TRANSITORY BASIS.
4. (S) AS YOU KNOW, ONE OF THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DECISION IN REGARD TO OPERATIONS IN THE A SHAU WAS THE IMPENDING DEPARTURE OF THE 3D MARDIV. THIS FACTOR DICTATED THAT WE CONSOLIDATE OUR FORCES. CONSISTENT WITH THIS MOVE, THE DEPLOYMENT OF ANOTHER AVAILABLE BATTALION NORTH OF HAI VAN PASS WOULD PERMIT FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF YOUR FORCES IN NICTZ.
5. (S) I APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS CONCERNING THE ADVANTAGES OF MILITARY BOUNDARIES COINCIDING WITH POLITICAL BOUNDARIES. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE PARAMOUNT IN THIS CASE, THE ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HAI VAN LAND MASS, WHICH SERVES AS AN ENEMY APPROACH ROUTE INTO THE DANANG AREA, TO A SINGLE MILITARY COMMAND. THE PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION AND LIAISON CAN CERTAINLY BE OVERCOME AS THEY HAVE BEEN IN OTHER AREAS IN THE PAST.
6. (S) ANOTHER CONSIDERATION, JUST AS IT WAS IN THE RETURN OF THE 1ST BDE 101ST ABN, IS UNIT INTEGRITY WITH ITS OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES.
7. (S) FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, WHEN THE BATTALION OF THE 26TH MARINES BECOMES AVAILABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT ASHORE ON A PERMANENT BASIS, IT IS MY INTENTION TO EMPLOY IT IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF PHU LOC DISTRICT AND ASSIGN THAT PORTION OF THUA THIEN PROVINCE TO THE 1ST MARDIV. YOUR COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED ON THE ACTUAL TRACE OF THE BOUNDARY AS PROPOSED IN REFERENCE A.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

GP-4
 476



HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE Amphibious Force

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 23 SEP 69	
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 230114Z SEP 69		COPY# 1 OF 3 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT			
	CG	I		23 Sep		SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET. DRAFTED BY: AC/S G-4 RELBY: CG EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT CONFIDENTIAL	
	DCG	I			73		
	DCG AIR						
	C/S	I	✓	9/23	mg		
	DC/S						
	DC/S PLAN						
1	S/S	I		9/23	Wry		
	G-1						
	G-2						
	G-3						
	G-4	X		Had copy #2			
	G-5						
	G-6						
	CAP						
	ADJ						
	CORDS						
	EMB/TRANS						
	ENGR						
	H&S CO						
	INSP						
	MTO						
	OP ANAL						
	ORD						
	PSY OPS						
	SUPPLY						
	LEGAL						
	PMO						
	S&C						

REF (A)

2

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE****FOR**

OTICZYUW RUYVSYH2913 2660114-CCCC--RUYVSYB RUYVSYD.
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 230114Z SEP 69
 FM CG III MAF DNG
 TO RUYVSYB/COMNAVSUPPACT DNG
 RUYVSYD/COMNAVFORV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM BONNER, INFO
 VADM ZUMWALT FROM LTGEN NICKERSON.

A. CG III MAF 051344Z SEP 69

B. COMNAVSUPPACT DNG 210804Z SEP 69

1. (C) BY REF A I REQUESTED REMOVAL OF THE MV PHONG
 CHAU FROM THE DNG RIVER. FROM REF B AND OTHER RECENT
 MESSAGES IT APPEARS THAT SUFFICIENT SURVEYS AND
 INVESTIGATIONS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED AND THE BEST MEANS
 OF REMOVAL HAS BEEN DETERMINED. IT IS MY DESIRE THAT
 REMOVAL OF PHONG CHAU BE ACCOMPLISHED IN AN EXPEDITIOUS
 MANNER.

2. (C) AS STATED REF A THE CG ICTZ WILL PROVIDE
 APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTATION HOLDING THE UNITED STATES
 FREE OF ANY CLAIMS BY THE OWNERS OR THE GVN FOR THE
 WRECK BEING REMOVED IN ANY MANNER FROM ITS PRESENT

PAGE 2 RUYVSYD2913 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 POSITION. THESE DOCUMENTS ARE NOW BEING PREPARED BY THE
 STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE AND WILL BE FORWARDED IMMEDIATELY
 BY SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE.

3. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2913

HAS BEEN SENTCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

2(1)

SECRET

**HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 23 SEP 69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 2203487 SEP 69		COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG	I				SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR				
	DCG	I								
	C/S	I				REMARKS				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention. <table border="1"> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
1	S/S	I	9/23		<i>cu 76</i>					
	G-1									
	G-2									
	G-3									
	G-4									
	G-5									
	G-6									
	ADJ									
	AWARDS									
	CAP									
	CHAP									
	CIB									
	COMP									
	DENT									
	ENGR									
	FOODS									
	FSEO									
	HQ CMDT									
	INSP									
	MTO									
	NJA									
	OPANAL									
	ORD									
	PMO									
	POSTAL									
	PROTO									
	PSYOPS									
	RDT&E									
	REPRO									
	SJA									
	SPL SERV									
	SUPPLY									
	FORMED O									
	SEC									
	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

ORIG: CG
RELBY: CG

*Pass to CG 7017th
& also reply*
**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

HAS BEEN SENT

"LIMDIS"

MSG NLF
3

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 23 SEP 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 230549Z SEP 69		COPY NO. 1,2 OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				VISIT OF DEPENDENCY TO ICTZ, 19 SEP 69 REMARKS ①
	DCG	I				
	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I				
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
1	S/S	I	9/23		(initials)	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT&E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	S&C					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

DISPOSITION:

Retain for _____ months.

Destroy after routing.

Return for permanent retention.

Section	Signature

HAS BEEN SENT

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

(4)

SECRET

FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEN

S E C R E T/FOR NGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
SECTION ONE OF TWO

VISIT OF DEPCOMUSMACV TO ICTZ, 19SEP69

A. MACV 32267 DTF 301105Z MAY69

1. FOL SUBMITTED IAW REF A.

2. GEN ROSSON VISITED UNITS IN THE AMERICAL TAOI ON 19 SEP 1969. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY CG, AMERICAL DIV, DEP CG, III MAF AND CG, 2ND ARVN DIV. UPON HIS ARRIVAL AT THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD, GEN RAMSEY BRIEFED GEN ROSSON ON THE POINTED OUT THE SUCCESSFUL PF/RF ACTIONS IN RECENT ENEMY ATTACKS ON TRA BONG, HIEP DUC AND AN PHOUNG/OP GEORGE AND THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH THEIR QUICK REACTION DURING THE OPERATIONS. GEN ROSSON STATED THAT THE REPORTS HE RECEIVED DID NOT GIVE THE RF'S CREDIT FOR ANY LARGE BODY COUNT IN THE AN PHOUNG ACTION. FUTURE REPORTING SHOULD INCLUDE ALL SUCCESSFUL TERRITORIAL FORCE REACTIONS SO THAT THIS INFORMATION CAN BE DISSEMINATED PROPERLY.

3. THE PARTY THEN DEPARTED FOR LZ WEST, WHERE GEN ROSSON WAS BRIEFED BY THE CO, 196TH INF BDE, CO, 5TH ARVN REGT AND CO, 4-31 INF ON CURRENT OPERATIONS AND THE BATTLE THAT TOOK PLACE IN HIEP DUC. GEN ROSSON ASKED THE CO, 196TH BDE ABOUT THE ENEMY TACTICS IN THE HIEP DUC AREA. COL TACKBERRY REPLIED THAT THE ENEMY UTILIZED DIVERSIONARY TACTICS; HE GAVE AS AN EXAMPLE THE ATTACK ON LZ SIBERIA ON 11 SEP WITH THE MAIN ATTACK AIMED AT HIEP DUC ON THE FOLLOWING NIGHT.

4. THE PARTY THEN FLEW TO LZ STINSON WHERE GEN ROSSON RECEIVED A SITUATION BRIEFING FROM THE CO, 198TH BDE, CO, 6TH ARVN REGT, CO, 1-52 INF. GEN ROSSON ASKED IF THEY THOUGHT THE ENEMY'S PLANS AND MISSIONS WERE TO DISRUPT THE PACIFICATION EFFORT IN THE AREA. THE QUESTION WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE TWO RECENT ATTACKS ON TRA BONG AND AN PHOUNG/OP GEORGE. THE CO, 1-52 INF, CONFIRMED GEN ROSSON'S COMMENT. GEN ROSSON ASKED THE PRESENT STRENGTH OF THE BNS OF THE 6TH REGT. COL THANH REPLIED THAT HIS AVERAGE STRENGTH IS BETWEEN 350-375. GEN ROSSON ASKED GEN TOAN HOW THE ARVN LIKED THE COMBAT RATION AND IF THE SUPPLY WAS ADEQUATE, GEN TOAN SAID THAT THE SUPPLY WAS ADEQUATE AND O.K. FOR A THREE TO FIVE DAY PERIOD, BUT THAT THE RICE IN THE RATION WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE VN DIET, AND WAS THEREFORE, NOT TOO WELL LIKED. GEN ROSSON THEN ASKED LTCOL BROWN, CO, 1-52 INF, ABOUT LIAISON TEAMS WITH CAP'S AND DIST HQ. LTCOL BROWN REPLIED THAT HE MAINTAINED LIAISON BY RADIO CONTACT WITH ALL CAP TEAMS TO DISTRICT HQ. CO WHITTINGTON STATED THAT BDE MAINTAINS LIAISON AT ALL DIST HQ WITH AN OFFICER FROM THE BN THAT HABITUALLY WORKS IN THAT AREA. ARTILLERY LIAISON IS ALSO MAINTAINED AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL. GEN ROSSON ASKED GEN TOAN FOR HIS OPINION OF THE RF GROUP HQ. GEN TOAN REPLIED THAT THE GROUP'S MISSION IS NOW MORE CLEARLY DEFINED AND BECAUSE OF THIS IT IS MORE FUNCTIONAL THAN IN THE PAST. GEN TOAN STATED THAT EXTRA TRAINING SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE

5. THE PARTY THEN PROCEEDED TO FSB 411, WHERE GEN ROSSON RECEIVED A BRIEFING FROM THE CO, 3-1 INF AND CO 4TH ARVN REGT ON CURRENT OPERATIONS AND GROUND CLEARING OPERATIONS. WHEN LTCOL ELLIS (CO, 3-1 INF) HAD COMPLETED HIS BRIEFING, GEN ROSSON ASKED ABOUT THE CURRENT NCO STATUS IN THE BN. LTCOL ELLIS REPLIED THAT HIS COMMAND WAS THE SAME AS OTHERS IN RVN IN THAT THERE WAS A SHORTAGE OF E6'S AND E7'S.

6. AFTER FLYING TO LZ SAN JUAN HILL, GEN ROSSON RECEIVED A CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS BRIEFING BY THE CO, 4-3 INF.

7. AT LZ BRONCO GEN ROSSON RECEIVED A BRIEFING BY THE 11TH BDE STAFF ON CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS. GEN ROSSON QUESTIONED THE RECENT AMBUSHES ALONG QL 1 SOUTH OF LZ BRONCO AND ASKED THE DISTRICT CHIEF OF DUC PHO IF HE HAD ANY PRIOR INTELLIGENCE OR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ENEMY CONCERNING THESE ATTACKS. THE DC STATED THAT HE THOUGHT THEY WERE MEMBERS OF A NVA SAPPER ELEMENT ASSIGNED THE MISSION TO INTERDICT MOVEMENT ON QL 1. GEN ROSSON THEN ASKED THE DC ABOUT HIS INFORMATION PROGRAM. THE DC ANSWERED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT IT WAS SATISFACTORY, AS REFLECTED BY THE HIGH NUMBER OF VCI THAT HE HAS ELIMINATED. GEN ROSSON STATED THAT THE DC HAS EVERYTHING NEEDED FOR A GOOD INFORMATION PROGRAM BUT SHOULD USE HIS PERSONNEL RESOURCES (VILLAGE CHIEF, HAMLET CHIEFS) TO PASS INFORMATION MORE EFFECTIVELY. HE INDICATED THAT TOO OFTEN THE DISTRICTS WANTED MORE LOUDSPEAKERS, DRAMA TEAMS, ETC. RATHER THAN MAKING THE BEST USE OF WHAT WAS AVAILABLE. GEN ROSSON ASKED THE DISTRICT CHIEF WHAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN THE MOVEMENT OF THE CATHOLIC CONTINGENT OF DUC PHO TO A RESETTLEMENT AREA ABOUT 5 KMS NORTH ON QL 1. THE DISTRICT CHIEF REPLIED THAT ALL OF THE PEOPLE HAD DECIDED TO GO TO CAM RANH BAY OR QUANG NGAI. GEN ROSSON ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE MOVEMENT OF THE PEOPLE FROM DIEN TRUONG TO A RD AREA. DISTRICT CHIEF REPLIED THAT THEY HAD ESTABLISHED A CORDON AROUND THE VILLAGE FOR 3 DAYS AND RELOCATED THE VILLAGERS TO A RD AREA 2 KMS TO THE NORTH.

8. PROCEEDING TO QUANG NGAI, GEN ROSSON RECEIVED A BRIEFING FROM THE PROV CHIEF ON THE QUANG NGAI PACIFICATION EFFORT AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES. GEN ROSSON STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A GOOD INFORMATION PROGRAM AS HE DID IN DUC PHO.

9. WHILE FLYING FROM ONE AREA TO ANOTHER, GEN ROSSON ASKED GEN RAMSEY ABOUT THE PLANS TO UPGRADE THE RAILROAD IN QUANG NGAI AND QUANG TIN. GEN RAMSEY STATED THAT HE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY SPECIFIC PLANS TO UPGRADE THE RAILROAD IN THIS AREA.

10. UPON RETURN TO CHU LAI, GEN ROSSON STATED THAT HE WAS WELL PLEASED WITH THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE AMERICAN DIVISION, ESPECIALLY THE COOPERATION, COORDINATION AND TEAM EFFORT OF US, ARVN AND GVN FORCES. AT EACH STOP HE HAD PREVIOUSLY COMPLIMENTED BOTH US AND ARVN COMMANDERS FOR THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND TEAM EFFORT. HE DEPARTED CHU LAI AT 1715 HOURS, 19 SEP 1969.

GP-4

4(2)

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
A - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		25 Sep 64	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 1 OF 1 COPIES REC'D.	
			24 0940 Z			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				Has been advised TO BUSE - DAUE LAMMS UPI STORY REMARK (1) DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention. Section _____ Signature _____ Has Been Cancelled J
	DCG	I				
	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I				
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
1	S/S	I	9/25		YB	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT & E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SECRET

0 240940Z ZYH ZFF-4

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC (FWD)

ZEM

SECRET SPECAT SECTION ONE OF THREE/ABSOLUTELY EYES ONLY/FOR
LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

CG FMFPAC (FWD) NOT AN ADDEE -- DELIVER ONLY TO LTGEN BUSE

1. THE FOL MSGS ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:

0 230348Z SEP 69

FM CG III MAF DNG

TO CG XXIV CORPS PHB

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM
LTGEN NICKERSON LIMDIS

1. BASED ON OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THIS
MORNING THE FOLLOWING IS THE ARTICLE WHICH DAVE
LAMB FILED:

QUOTE DANANG, VIETNAM, UPI---THE U.S. MARINE
CORPS HAS REDUCED THE VIETNAM TOUR FOR ITS TROOPS
FROM 13 TO 12 MONTHS, INFORMED MILITARY SOURCES SAID
MONDAY. THE ORDER WILL AFFECT ALL MARINES SENT TO
VIETNAM IN THE FUTURE AND MOST OF THE 72,000
LEATHERNECKS CURRENTLY SERVING IN THE WAR ZONE.
THE MARINES CLOSED DOWN THEIR DESOLATE FIRE SUPPORT
BASES SUNDAY AND IMMEDIATELY STARTED TO QUOTE
STAND DOWN UNQUOTE IN A SEMI-DEFENSIVE POSTURE.
ABOUT 18,000 LEATHERNECKS ARE INVOLVED IN THE
PULLOUT. SOURCES SAID THE 3D MARINE REGT WHICH IS
HEADED FOR THE U.S. WILL LEAVE VIETNAM BY OCT 15.
THE 4TH REGT WILL ARRIVE ON OKINAWA BY OCT 31. THE
3D DIVISION (GARBLE) WILL REPORT TO NEW (GARBLE),
SOURCES SAID. THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE PENTAGON
EARLIER THIS MONTH IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. THE
12-MONTH PERIOD IS MEASURED FROM THE DAY A SOLDIER
LEAVES THE U.S. TO THE DAY HE RETURNS. HUNDREDS OF
BATTLE-WEARY LEATHERNECKS MEANWHILE CONTINUED TO
(GARBLE) AT THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN PREPARATION
FOR THEIR DEPARTURE FROM VIETNAM. U.S. ARMY, NAVY
AND AIR FORCE ALREADY SERVE 12-MONTH TOURS, BUT
SOURCES SAID MANY OF THEM ARE NOW LEAVING VIETNAM
TWO TO FOUR WEEKS BEFORE THEIR SCHEDULED ROTATION
DATES. THE U.S. SOURCES SAID MOST LEATHERNECKS WHO
HAVE SPENT AT LEAST 10 MONTHS WITH THE 1ST MARINE
DIVISION AT DANANG WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE 3D
MARINE DIVISION WHICH IS BEING WITHDRAWN FROM
VIETNAM. THE DIVISION'S 9TH REGT WAS REDEPLOYED TO
OKINAWA IN JULY AND AUGUST (GARBLE) THE PULLOUT
OF THE FIRST 25,000 U.S. TROOPS FROM VIETNAM. THE
MARINES RAPID WITHDRAWAL WAS PROMPTED BY THE U.S.
COMMAND'S DESIRE TO MINIMIZE THE LENGTH OF TIME ITS
TROOPS WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO ATTACK. THE COMMAND
ALSO WAS NOT ANXIOUS TO HAVE TO SEND ITS MEN INTO
COMBAT DURING THEIR FINAL DAYS IN VIETNAM, THE
SOURCES SAID. UNQUOTE



5 (1)

5 (1)

2. MY INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER, COLONEL REDMAN, CALLED IN DAVE LAMB AND ADVISED HIM THAT HE HAD FILED A STORY WHICH WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE MACV INSTRUCTIONS.

3. FOLLOWING THIS DISCUSSION DAVE LAMB INFORMED ANOTHER MEMBER OF MY COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU THAT IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN HIM AND YOURSELF ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1969 AT PHU BAI, HE WAS GIVEN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION BY YOU - IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE AND QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE.

A. THE 101ST ABN DIV (AM) WILL ASSUME CONTROL OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION'S AO AFTER RE-DEPLOYMENT: THE 1ST BRIGADE WAS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN THIS REGARD.

B. THAT THERE WOULD BE A GREATER RECON AREA WHICH WOULD BEGIN JUST WEST OF CAM LO.

C. THAT THE 1ST BRIGADE, US 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION WOULD MOVE FARTHER WEST JUST TO THE EAST OF CAM LO.

D. THE XXIV CORPS WOULD EVENTUALLY TAKE OVER AND THAT III MAF WOULD BE DISSOLVED.

E. THAT THE 101ST ABN DIV (AM) WOULD BE PULLING OUT OF THE A SHAU VALLEY AND RESETTLING ALONG THE COASTLINE.

F. WHEN ASKED TO COMMENT ON KENNEDY'S RECENT PROBLEMS, YOU STATED, QUOTE AT LEAST I RECOVER MY DEAD UNQUOTE.

4. BASED ON OUR PREVIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH MR. LAMB, IF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY YOU - AND I HAVE NO WAY OF VERIFYING THIS - YOU WERE ILL-ADVISED SINCE FUTURE TROOP REDEPLOYMENTS SHOULD NEVER BE DISCUSSED ON AN QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE BASIS. THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT MR. LAMB WILL FILE OR HAS ALREADY FILED A STORY CONTAINING THE ABOVE INFORMATION. ALSO, YOU CAN NEVER RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE MIGHT QUOTE YOU DIRECTLY.

5/21

5/21

5. AS EVIDENCED BY THE FILED STORY, LAMB REPORTS ON EVERYTHING HE SEES AND HEARS. WE MUST TAKE STEPS NOW TO INFORM GEN ABRAMS SO THAT HE WILL NOT BE CAUGHT OFF GUARD.

YOUR MESSAGE 230348Z SEP 69

1. MY REASON FOR CONSENTING TO AN INTERVIEW WITH DAVE LAMB (UPI) AND JAY SHARBUTT (AP) 20 SEP WAS THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO GIVE BOTH INDIVIDUALS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION IN XXIV CORPS WITH THE ANNOUNCED REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 3D MAR DIV. IN THIS WAY THE POSSIBILITY OF RUMOR AND SPECULATION GROWING INTO NEWS ARTICLES COULD BE AVOIDED. OBVIOUSLY, IN THEIR TRAVELS IN THE AREA THEY WOULD SEE AND HEAR FRAGMENTS THAT COULD BE MISINTERPRETED OR MISJUDGED OR THROWN TOGETHER TO FORM A WRONG CONCLUSION. MY INTENT WAS TO ALSO GIVE THEM A BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND THEREBY GIVE ACCURATE REPORTING OF THE CHANGES THAT WILL BECOME APPARENT IN THE FUTURE.

2. THE MAIN POINT COVERED IN THE INTERVIEW WAS THE EFFECT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 3D MR DIV WOULD HAVE ON THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN XXIV CORPS. I BRIEFED BOTH LAMB AND SHARBUTT ON THE FACTORS THAT WILL DICTATE OUR POSTURE AFTER THE 3D MR DIV'S DEPARTURE. I POINTED OUT THAT OBVIOUSLY WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN UNITS IN ALL THE LOCATIONS THAT WE ARE NOW ABLE TO. WITH THE DECREASE IN COMBAT STRENGTH IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO REDRAW THE BOUNDARIES, CONCENTRATING OUR STRENGTH CLOSER TO THE POPULATED AREAS OF THE TWO PROVINCES. DOING THIS WILL MEAN THAT A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE WESTERN PART OF THE AO WOULD BE MORE LIGHTLY DEFENDED. BY GIVING UP THE REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN FIXED BASES IN THE UNPOPULATED AREA WE WOULD GIVE GREATER PROTECTION FOR THE POPULATION AND AT THE SAME TIME FREE FORCES OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE FOR BETTER USE IN AN AIRMOBILE ROLE. I EMPHASIZED THY POINT THAT THIS DID NOT MEAN WE WOULD TURN OUR BACKS TO THE WESTERN PORTION BUT WOULD MAKE USE OF OUR SURVEILLANCE AND PATROL CAPABILITY TO ENSURE THAT THE ENEMY DOES NOT BUILD UP UNMOLESTED. IF A THREAT SHOULD DEVELOP WE WOULD HAVE THE COMBAT POWER OF THE AIRMOBILE TROOPS TO COUNTER WHERE NECESSARY. 5(3)

3. REGARDING THE POINTS LAMB PASSED TO GIB PERSONNEL:

A. LAMB WAS NOT TOLD THAT THE 101ST AIRBORNE WOULD TAKE OVER THE 3D MAR DIV AO. HE RAISED THE QUESTION OF THIS POSSIBILITY AND I TOLD HIM THAT WE WOULD STILL HAVE THE 1ST ARVN AND THE 1 T BRIGADE, 5TH MECH IN THE AREA AND THEY COULD PROVIDE THE FORCES TO PROTECT THE POPULATED AREA AND BLOCK FORCES COMING THROUGH THE DMZ. THEY WERE TOLD THAT OBVIOUSLY THERE WOULD NOT BE AS MUCH COMBAT POWER IN THE AREA AND OF NECESSITY SOME OF THE FIXED BASES WOULD GO.

B. HE WAS TOLD THAT THE WESTERN PORTION OF BOTH PROVINCES WOULD BECOME MORE OF A RECON ZONE SINCE WE WOULD NOT HAVE THE FORCE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN FIXED BASES IN THE AREA. HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT WE WOULD STILL HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF MEETING ANY THREAT IN THE AREA AS NECESSARY.

C. HE WAS TOLD THAT THEY WOULD OPERATE FROM THE COAST TO THE BOUNDARY OF THE RECON ZONE.

D. LAMB STATED THAT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF SPECULATION IN DA NANG THAT III MAF WOULD BE DISSOLVED AND THAT XXIV CORPS WOULD TAKE OVER ITS MISSION. REPLIED THAT I KNOW OF NO SUCH PLAN AND THAT I ACTUALLY HAD NOT EVEN BEEN CONSULTED ON THE DETAILS OF SUCH A CHANGE.

5(4)

5(4)

E. SHARBUTT BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF WHAT EFFECT THE REDEPLOYMENT WOULD HAVE ON FORCES IN THE A SHAU. I TOLD HIM THAT FOR SOME TIME I HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN POSITIONS IN THE VALLEY IN THE COMING BAD WEATHER. THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 3D MAR DIV ONLY SERVED TO HASTEN A DECISION TO EVENTUALLY LEAVE THE VALLEY. I DID NOT PROVIDE A DATE WHEN THIS WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED.

F. THE MATTER OF SENATOR KENNEDY'S PROBLEM, I REGRET, DID COME UP AT THE BEGINNING OF OUR TALK. THE COMMENTS WERE IN A JOKING VEIN AND WENT ABOUT AS FOLLOWS:

LAMB- " I ASSUME THE PUBLICITY FROM HAMBURGER HILL AND ALL IS OVER AND YOU ARE NOT GETTING ANY MORE OF THAT."

ZAIS- "NO, EXCEPT AS THEY COMPARE IT WITH WHAT HAPPENED TO LLOYD RAMSEY."

LAMB- "YOU KNOW THE STANDARD JOKE AROUND SAIGON IN THE NEWSPAPER OFFICES FOR AWHILE AFTER TEDDY KENNEDY'S AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT WAS ASKING WHAT WOULD BE GENERAL ZAIS' REACTION. THE STANDARD RESPONSE WAS GENERALLY "DEFINITELY IRRESPONSIBLE."

ZAIS- "NO, I HAD AN ANSWER TO THAT. MY ANSWER WAS THAT AT LEAST I EVACUATED MY CASUALTIES." I NOW REGRET THAT IN AN EFFORT TO BE HUMOROUS I SOUNDED CALLOUS. IT WAS NOT MY INTENTION TO DERIDE THE SENATOR NOR ADD TO HIS BURDENS.

4. MY UNDERSTANDING WITH LAMB AND SHARBUTT WAS THAT MY REMARKS COULD ONLY BE USED ON A BACKGROUND BASIS. IN READING LAMB'S ARTICLE I SEE NOTHING THAT WAS GAINED THROUGH THE INTERVIEW WITH ME. WE DID NOT DISCUSS THE TIMETABLE FOR THE IMPENDING MOVE OF THE 3D MAR DIV. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT LAMB HAS OBSERVED THE CONDITION UNDER WHICH I TALKED WITH HIM.

5. AGAIN I ADD THAT IN GRANTING THE INTERVIEW, IT WAS MY OPINION THAT WE WOULD AVOID SPECULATIVE OR RUMOR BASED ARTICLES WHICH WOULD ONLY ADD TO THE PROBLEMS WE FACE.

6. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE QUOTES ASCRIBED TO ME IN YOUR MESSAGE ARE NOT EXACTLY TRUE OR SOMEWHAT OUT OF CONTEXT, I ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HAVING BRIEFED THESE TWO CORRESPONDENTS ON A NON-ATTRIBUTABLE BASIS WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY AS THE BASIS FOR BETTER REPORTING.

2. I HAVE FORWARDED A MSG TO GEN ABRAMS WHICH CONDENSES THE CONTENTS OF THE ABOVE MSGS BUT GIVES HIM ESSENTIALLY THE SAME INFORMATION.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

5(6)

5(6)

SECRET

**HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMBIBIOUS FORCE**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 24 SEPT 69					
				SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 0 241027Z		1,2,3, COPY NO. OF 4 COPIES REC'D.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT					
			IN	OUT		SECRET ABSOLUTELY EYES ONLY					
	CG					REMARKS <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention. </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>		Section	Signature		
Section	Signature										
	DCG										
	C/S										
	DC/S										
	DCS PLANS										
	DEP CORDS										
	DSA ICTZ										
	S/S										
	G-1										
	G-2										
	G-3										
	G-4										
	G-5										
	G-6										
	ADJ										
	AWARDS										
	CAP										
	CHAP										
	CIB										
	COMP										
	DENT										
	ENGR										
	FOODS										
	FSEO										
	HQ CMDT										
	INSP										
	MTO										
	NJA										
	OPANAL										
	ORD										
	PMO										
	POSTAL										
	PROTO										
	PSYOPS										
	RDT&E										
	REPRO										
	SJA										
	SPL SERV										
	SUPPLY										
	FORMED O										
	SIC										
	TCC										
	SGT MAJ										

Ex # 2 to loban base

6

(USE THIS SPACE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

(6)

SECRET

0 241027Z ZYH ZFF-6

FM LTGEN NICKERSON, CG III MAF
TO GEN ABRAMS, COMUSMACV
INFO LTGEN ZAIS, CG XXIV C RPS
ZEM

SECRET/ABSOLUTELY EYES ONLY FOR ADDRESSEES
1. THE FOLLOWING STORY WAS FILED ON 22 SEP 69 BY
MR. DAVID LAMB OF UPI:

QUITE DANANG, VIETNAM, UPI---THE U.S. MARINE
CORPS HAS REDUCED THE VIETNAM TOUR FOR ITS TROOPS
FROM 13 TO 12 MONTHS, INFORMED MILITARY SOURCES SAID
TODAY. THE ORDER WILL AFFECT ALL MARINES SENT TO
VIETNAM IN THE FUTURE AND MOST OF THE 72,000
LEATHERNECKS CURRENTLY SERVING IN THE WAR ZONE.
THE MARINES CLIMBED DOWN THEIR OLD LATE FIRE SUPPORT
BASES SUNDAY AND IMMEDIATELY STARTED TO QUITE
STAND DOWN UNQUOTE IN A SEMI-DEFENSIVE POSTURE.
ABOUT 18,000 LEATHERNECKS ARE INVOLVED IN THE
PULLOUT. SOURCES SAID THE 3D MARINE REGT WHICH IS
HEADED FOR THE U.S. WILL LEAVE VIETNAM BY OCT 15.
THE 4TH REGT WILL ARRIVE IN KINAWA BY OCT 31. THE
3D DIVISION (GARBLE) WILL REPORT TO NEW (GARBLE).
SOURCES SAID THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE PENTAGON
EARLIER THIS MONTH IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. THE
12-MONTH PERIOD IS MEASURED FROM THE DAY A SOLDIER
LEAVES THE U.S. TO THE DAY HE RETURNS. HUNDREDS OF
BATTLE-WEARY LEATHERNECKS MEANWHILE CONTINUED TO
(GARBLE) AT THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN PREPARATION
FOR THEIR DEPARTURE FROM VIETNAM. U.S. ARMY, NAVY
AND AIR FORCE ALREADY SERVE 12-MONTH TOURS, BUT
SOURCES SAID MANY OF THEM ARE NOW LEAVING VIETNAM
TWO TO FOUR WEEKS BEFORE THEIR SCHEDULED ROTATION
DATES. THE U.S. SOURCES SAID MOST LEATHERNECKS WHO
HAVE SPENT AT LEAST 10 MONTHS WITH THE 1ST MARINE
DIVISION AT DANANG WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE 3D
MARINE DIVISION WHICH IS BEING WITHDRAWN FROM
VIETNAM. THE DIVISION'S 9TH REGT WAS REDEPLOYED TO
KINAWA IN JULY AND AUGUST (GARBLE) THE PULLOUT
OF THE FIRST 25,000 U.S. TROOPS FROM VIETNAM. THE
MARINES RAPID WITHDRAWAL WAS PROMPTED BY THE U.S.
COMMAND'S DESIRE TO MINIMIZE THE LENGTH OF TIME ITS
TROOPS WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO ATTACK. THE COMMAND
ALSO WAS NOT ANXIOUS TO HAVE TO SEND ITS MEN INTO
COMBAT DURING THEIR FINAL DAYS IN VIETNAM, THE
SOURCES SAID. UNQUOTE

2. MY INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER, COL REDMAN,
CALLED IN LAMB IN THE EVENING OF 22 SEP AND ADVISED
HIM THAT HE HAD FILED A STORY WHICH WAS IN VIOLATION
OF THE STANDING MACV INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PRESS SINCE
FUTURE TROOP MOVEMENTS WERE INVOLVED.

SEP 21 1969

6 (11)

6 (11)

3. FOLLOWING THIS DISCUSSION LAMB INFORMED AN OTHER MEMBER OF MY COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU THAT ON 20 SEP HE HAD BEEN GIVEN A BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY LTGEN ZAIS AND THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING OUR POSTURE IN XXIV CORPS AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION. MR. LAMB FURTHER STATED THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS GIVEN TO HIM OFF THE RECORD AND IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE.

4. IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN HOW MUCH INFORMATION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO MR. LAMB, I IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED LTGEN ZAIS AND REQUESTED HIS COMMENTS ON THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE BACKGROUND BRIEFING GIVEN TO LAMB.

5. LTGEN ZAIS INFORMED ME THAT THE MAIN POINT COVERED WAS THE EFFECT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 3D MARDIV WOULD HAVE ON THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN XXIV CORPS. AT THE TIME THESE POINTS WERE MENTIONED AS A TIME SCHEDULE GIVEN, LTGEN ZAIS POINTED OUT THAT USUALLY WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN UNITS IN ALL OF THE PRESENT LOCATIONS THAT WE ARE NOW ABLE TO WITH A DECREASE IN COMBAT STRENGTH AND IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CONCENTRATE OUR STRENGTH CLOSE TO THE POPULATED AREAS OF THE TWO PROVINCES. HIS IN TURN WOULD MEAN THAT A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE WESTERN PART OF THE AREA WOULD BE MORE LIGHTLY DEFENDED. BY GIVING UP THE REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN FIXED BASES IN THE UNPOPULATED AREA, LTGEN ZAIS EXPLAINED WE WOULD GIVE GREATER PROTECTION FOR THE POPULATION AND AT THE SAME TIME FREE FORCES OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE FOR BETTER USE IN AN AIRMOBILE ROLE. IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS DOES NOT MEAN WE WOULD TURN OUR BACKS TO THE WESTERN PORTION BUT WOULD MAKE USE OF OUR SURVEILLANCE AND PATROL CAPABILITY TO ENSURE THAT THE ENEMY DOES NOT BUILD UP UNMOLESTED. ALSO IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT IF A THREAT SHOULD DEVELOP WE WOULD HAVE THE COMBAT POWER OF THE AIRMOBILE TROOPS TO COUNTER WHERE NECESSARY.

6. THE PURPOSE OF THIS BACKGROUND BRIEFING WAS TO GIVE LAMB A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION IN XXIV CORPS WITH THE ANNOUNCED REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 3D MARDIV. IN THIS WAY IT WAS HOPED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF GUMB AND SPECULATION GROWING INTO NEWS ARTICLES COULD BE AVOIDED.

7. THE INFORMATION GIVEN MR. LAMB AT THE BACKGROUND BRIEFING DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THE SOURCE FOR HIS ARTICLE OF 22 SEP. HOWEVER BASED ON PAST DIFFICULTIES WITH MR. LAMB, THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT HE HAS FILED OR WILL FILE A STORY IN CONNECTION WITH THE INFORMATION PROVIDED HIM. CONSEQUENTLY I AM FURNISHING YOU THIS INFORMATION SO THAT YOU WILL NOT BE CAUGHT OFF GUARD.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY 6/21

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		30 SEPT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		1, 2, 3, OF 4 COPIES REC'D.	
			0 300919Z			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I		200	N	SECRET/EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
2	DCG	I				
	C/S	I				REMARKS (1) DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention. Section _____ Signature _____
	DC/S	I		10/1	chs	
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
1	S/S	I	10/1		cays	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	X			HON COPY 18	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT&E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

HAS BEEN SENT

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

(13)

SECRET

O 300910Z ZYH ZFF-4
FM CG III MAF
TO CG XXIV CORPS
ZFM

SECRET / EYES ONLY / FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
A. CG, XXIV CORPS 240602Z SEP 69

1. (S) A MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, AS A PART OF THE AIR/GROUND TEAM, IS ORGANIZED TO SUPPORT THE REQUIREMENTS OF A MARINE DIVISION OF THREE INF REGIMENTS. THE WING HELICOPTER SUPPORT NORMALLY CONSISTS OF TWO HMM'S, FOR HMM'S, TWO HML'S AND ONE UMC SQUADRON. THE FIRST MARDIV (REINF) CURRENTLY CONSISTS OF FOUR INF REGIMENTS. IN ADDITION TO SUPPORTING THE 1ST MARDIV (REINF), THE FMAN IS TASKED TO SUPPORT THE ROKMC BDE, ARVN FORCES IN DANANG AREA CONSISTING OF 1 REGT AND 1 RANGER GP, FORCE RECONNAISSANCE UNITS AND OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS.

2. (S) UPON THE COMPLETION OF THE PHASE II WITHDRAWALS THE FMAN WILL BE ORGANIZED AS DESCRIBED ABOVE AND THE UNITS TO BE SUPPORTED WILL REMAIN THE SAME. DUE TO SPACE AND MONETARY CONSIDERATIONS I HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO LOCATE ONE HMM AND ONE HML AT PHU RAI AS TENANT ACTIVITIES. THESE TWO SQUADRONS WILL BE ORGANIC TO MAC-16 AND WILL RECEIVE SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FROM THEIR PARENT UNIT WHICH WILL BE LOCATED AT MARBLE MOUNTAIN.

3. (S) IN VIEW OF THE LOSS OF 42 HELICOPTERS DURING PHASE II REDEPLOYMENT AND NO REDUCTION OF THE SUPPORT COMMITMENTS, IT IS NOT FEASIBLE FOR FMAN TO PROVIDE SUPPORT OF XXIV CORPS OPERATIONS ON A PERMANENT BASIS. EMERGENCY REQUESTS CAN BE HANDLED ON A MISSION BASIS AND ALL SUCH REQUESTS WILL RECEIVE MY FULLEST CONSIDERATION CONSISTENT WITH OVERALL TACTICAL SITUATION.

4. (S) YOU ARE NO DOUBT AWARE THAT THE VNAF 213TH HELO SQUADRON WILL BECOME OPERATIONAL ON 1 OCT. HOWEVER, THEIR 1E OF 20 AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO SWING THE BALANCE OF AVAILABLE HELICOPTER ASSETS TO ARVN FORCES.

5. (S) I HAVE EXAMINED THE HELICOPTER POSTURE OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION. IN MY OPINION THEY CANNOT BE TASKED FOR ANY ADDITIONAL HELICOPTER SUPPORT.

6. (S) YOU SHOULD THEREFORE PLAN ON MEETING HELICOPTER SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF THE WICIZ WITH YOUR ORGANIC ASSETS. IF, IN YOUR OPINION THIS SUPPORT IS NOT ADEQUATE TO THE TASK, THE COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED IN REF (A) IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE AND ENCOURAGED.

WARM REGARDS
GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

422

13(1)



13(1)