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III MAF: Periodic Intelligence Report 39-69 thru 45-69

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III MAF PERINTREP 39-69 thru 45-69, 21 Sep - 8 Nov 69

PIR 39-69, 21-27 Sep 69. Dtd 30 Sep 69. (S&C 915 031)#2

PIR 40-69, 28 Sep - 4 Oct 69. Dtd 6 Oct 69. (S&C 915 507)

PIR 41-69, 5 - 11 Oct 69. Dtd 14 Oct 69. (S&C 916 030)

PIR 42-69, 12-18 Oct 69. Dtd 21 Oct 69. (S&C 916 197 #2)

PIR 43-69, 19-25 Oct 69. Dtd 28 Oct 69. (S&C 916 597 #2)

PIR 44-69, 26 Oct - 1 Nov 69. Dtd 4 Nov 69, (S&C 916 961#2)

PIR 45-69, 2-8 Nov 69. Dtd 11 Nov 69. (S&C 917 421 #2)

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30 September 1969



UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 39-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE



GROUP - 4
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G-2 Section
DANANG, RVN
30 September 1969
Ser: 0112769

PERINTREP 39-69

Period covered: 210001H September - 272400H September 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13
ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. The past week in ICTZ not only witnessed the lowest level of enemy activity since the week before the "high point" of early August but it also recorded a notable drop in the number of enemy initiated ground incidents, down to 256 from last week's total of 346. Furthermore, there were no attacks by company size or larger units, and only six platoon size or smaller attacks. All other major indices of enemy activity were down also with a sharp drop off of 77 occurring in the attacks-by-fire category where the total fell from 230 to 153. Assaults by fire declined abruptly from 23 to four. Enemy incoming likewise registered a similar substantial decrease, dropping from 1,058 to 451. Enemy KIA's also were down dramatically to 550, the lowest weekly number of enemy killed in I Corps thus far this year.

Reported counterintelligence related VC/VCI activity during the past week reflected concentration on propaganda, civil and military proselyting, tax and food collection.

In contrast with the pattern of previous weeks, acts of terrorism declined sharply, both in scope and intensity, with only eight incidents reported in ICTZ (six in QUANG NAM and two in QUANG NGAI).

Numerous reports continue to indicate that the enemy is utilizing the announced U.S. troop withdrawals to complement and lend credibility to his propaganda and civilian proselyting programs, publicizing the certainty of his "inevitable and forthcoming victory." The same propaganda theme is being used in the enemy's own camp among his own forces.

a. QUANG TRI (P). During the reporting period sightings/incidents in the DMZ area increased to 306 with 59 of these sightings north of the BEN HAI River. A total of 184 hostile targets were taken under fire this week by artillery, tactical air strikes and naval gunfire.

Enemy initiated activity in QUANG TRI (P) was generally characterized by attacks by fire in the northeastern portion of the province with only one noteworthy ground attack reported in the central DMZ area. The remaining activity consisted of friendly initiated engagements with the most significant being an ARVN contact south of the BA LONG Valley.

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In the area below the eastern portion of the DMZ light attacks by fire were directed against A-2 Combat Base (YD 2173) on the 22d and the 25th. In the first attack, eight rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulted in 20 ARVN and three U.S. wounded while the second attack, consisting of six 82mm mortar rounds, resulted in no casualties or damage. Slightly to the south, 5/2 ARVN (YD 249577) received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on the 23d. This attack resulted in no casualties or damage. The evening of the next day, DONG HA Combat Base (YD 2357) received six unknown type rockets resulting in nine Marines wounded and two trucks destroyed.

The single ground attack occurred during the early morning hours of the 27th when G/2/4 Marines two and one-half kilometers north of the ROCKPILE (XD 978587) received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire followed by an attack from an unknown size enemy force. This attack resulted in light friendly casualties. Although no enemy unit identification was made in this contact, the attack was probably made by elements of the 9th Regiment, 304th NVA Division.

Two friendly initiated contacts occurred in the area south of the DMZ. In the east, on 24 September, the A/1-77th Mechanized Scout Platoon observed and engaged eight NVA with organic weapons eight kilometers north of CAM LO (YD 125676) resulting in four NVA KIA, three NVA PW's, three individual and one crew-served weapon captured. Two PW's were taken to the 1-77 CP and the third was taken to the 3rd Medical Battalion at QUANG TRI because of wounds suffered. The two PW's taken to 1-77 CP identified their unit as the 1st Battalion, 27th NVA Regiment (Independent), and stated that they were members of a seven man reconnaissance squad. Capture of PW's from the 27th Regiment in this location tends to confirm our concept of both the area of operations of the 27th Regiment and its modus operandi, which is that it enters RVN only to prepare for or execute a specific mission, of a limited nature. This is the first confirmed contact with the 27th NVA Regiment since 22 May 1969, although a PW was captured alone on 28 July 1969. To the west, on 21 September, a 3rd Marine Division reconnaissance team engaged an estimated 20 enemy seven and one-half kilometers west southwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 906545) resulting in four enemy KIA with two Marines WIA (M). The team broke contact but 20 minutes later, 75 meters to the west, engaged the enemy again resulting in one enemy KIA and one Marine WIA (M). The team was extracted under fire. This contact was probably with an element of the 9th Regiment, 304th Division.

The most significant activity of the week occurred on the 25th, 10 kilometers southwest of BA LONG (YD 212316) when 4/1 ARVN on a search mission engaged an estimated VC company. Identified by captured documents as the K-14 Battalion of the 7th Front, the enemy lost 19 killed in this action.

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In other developments, the 3d Marine Division terminated three operations in northern QUANG TRI (P) on the 25th. Operation GEORGIA TAR which began on 16 July accounted for 41 NVA killed. Operation IDAHO CANYON which also began on 16 July resulted in 565 enemy killed while Operation IROQUOIS GROVE which began on 16 June was responsible for an additional 134 enemy killed in action.

However, by week's end, the pattern of enemy activity in QUANG TRI had provided no clue of any precipitous action the enemy might take in response to recent announcements that the 3d Marine Division would be redeployed out of country. Enemy activities were light but normal in character, and there was no evidence that there was any major repositioning of his forces or that new units had been introduced into the area.

b. THUA THIEN (P). There was little significant enemy activity in THUA THIEN Province recorded during the past week. The notable exceptions to this took the form of highly effective enemy ground fire directed against two 2-17th Cavalry helicopters. In both cases, the helicopters were hit, crashed and were destroyed, one on the 21st, eight kilometers south southwest of PHU LOC (ZC 058927) and the other on the 26th some 11 kilometers south of Camp EVANS (YD 524215).

The balance of notable activity in THUA THIEN consisted of two friendly ambushes in which the enemy lost 10 killed and seven weapons captured. At 241715H, a reconnaissance company from 2/3 ARVN ambushed an estimated enemy squad 15 kilometers west southwest of HUE (YD 608185) resulting in five enemy killed and two individual weapons captured. Two days later a CAP 3-5-1 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 15-20 VC six kilometers southeast of PHU BAI (YD 919105). The CAP unit killed five enemy and captured five individual weapons.

In other developments, a reevaluation of the mass grave uncovered on the 16th, 15 kilometers south of HUE (YD 766074) indicates that as many as 250 civilians were killed and buried at this location following the Tet 1968 offensive as opposed to the originally reported 150 bodies.

c. QUANG NAM (P). In QUANG NAM Province, the enemy engaged in only limited action, in one of the quietest weeks since the end of the lull in early August. On his own initiative, he accounted for only four small attacks by fire. The remainder of the week's contacts were generated as the result of friendly action. Consisting of harassing fires, this week's notable attacks by fire totaled only 30 rounds of mortar fire and two lob bombs at rather widely scattered locations. On the 22d, the 109th RF Company received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire three and one-half kilometers northwest of QUE SON (BT 023380). The next day, I/3/7 Marines 11 kilometers northwest of QUE SON (AT 954414) received seven to ten 60mm mortar rounds resulting in a moderate number of friendly wounded. Then on the 24th, H&S 3/5 Marines 12 kilometers northeast of AN HOA (AT 926 528) received two 250 pound lob bombs which landed outside the perimeter.

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In the most serious attack by fire of the week in QUANG NAM, HOI AN City (BT 146568) received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on 27 September. This attack by fire killed four civilians and injured seven others.

By contrast, ground contacts were for the most part friendly initiated with no discernible pattern or significance. In the five most noteworthy actions in the DANANG TAOR, 22 enemy were killed by Marine and ARVN units. In other developments, the ROK Marines killed 15 enemy in two separate contacts.

There were two notable exceptions to this general pattern of friendly initiated actions. One occurred on the 25th when the enemy reacted sharply when he found a 1st Marine Division reconnaissance team investigating one of his temporarily evacuated base camps about eight kilometers west of HAI VAN Pass (AT 8690). This sudden confrontation resulted in an emergency extraction of the recon team with light friendly casualties.

The other enemy reaction took place a day later on the opposite end of the 1st Marine Division TAOR two kilometers north of AN HOA (AT 838475) when a platoon size patrol from B/1/5 on a combat patrol received heavy fire from an unknown size enemy force. One VC was killed.

Deep friendly reconnaissance teams continue to report enemy movement in remote areas of QUANG NAM Province principally in the ANTENNA Valley south and east of AN HOA and in the ARIZONA area. However, the number of enemy sightings is down substantially over those of recent weeks.

Interrogations from prisoners of war, like the patterns of contacts and reconnaissance, offered few meaningful insights into projected enemy operations. One prisoner stated that the 141st NVA Regiment is in the process of withdrawing from QUANG NAM for reorganization. While it is believed that this regiment has been hurt badly by B-52 strikes, sickness and food shortages, there is virtually no other evidence to corroborate this PW's story. Another PW made a similar statement about the 31st NVA Regiment moving to KONTUM Province to rehabilitate itself, but again other information does not offer any substantiation on which this report can be accepted. In the final analysis, these as well as other PW and agent reports this past week offered little in the way of information on future enemy actions which either seems plausible or can be corroborated at this time.

On balance then, the picture in QUANG NAM Province this past week has been an amorphous one. The enemy is there, but he has been relatively inactive. Furthermore, while there are prisoner and agent reports of enemy attacks in the near future, such reports lack the focus, scope and consistence which would suggest an attack of major proportions during the coming week.

d. QUANG TIN (P). Enemy initiated activity in QUANG TIN (P) followed the predominate I Corps pattern of light attacks by fire. There were no significant ground attacks and the remainder of the activity was the result of friendly initiated operations.

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During the reporting period, there were several light attacks by fire directed against FSB WEST eight and one-half kilometers east of HIEP DUC (AT 995255). On the 22d, elements of the 4-31 Infantry on FSB WEST received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire in four separate volleys which resulted in light friendly casualties. The next day, FSB WEST received two more 82mm mortar rounds while FSB SIBERIA one and one-half kilometers southwest of HIEP DUC (AT 901232) received eight 82mm mortar rounds. Neither of these attacks resulted in casualties. In three other attacks by fire against elements of the 21st Infantry, the enemy expended 32 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire resulting in light friendly casualties.

In contrast to the light attacks by fire, there was sharp enemy reaction, most probably from the 3rd NVA Regiment, when the 3-21st Infantry undertook a combat assault on the 22d in an area about 14 kilometers east southeast of HIEP DUC (BT 0423). Particularly effective was the enemy's ground fire directed against friendly helicopters. Despite standard preparatory fires of landing zones, six helicopters were hit by ground fire during the four-hour battle with three of these being shot down. Overall, this contact resulted in 15 enemy killed.

Later in the day and in the same general area (BT 032221), gunships from the 174th Aviation Battalion received ground fire. The gunships engaged the unknown size enemy force killing 10 of the enemy. In another aviation incident three and one-half kilometers north northwest of THANG BINH (BT 1645), a gunship from the 282d Aviation Battalion while supporting ARVN swift boats was shot down by automatic weapons fire. There were no casualties.

With little other significant action reported this week in QUANG TIN (P) and virtually no usable information derived from PW's or captured documents, the pattern of enemy activity, like those of the other provinces, provided few insights into the enemy's probable course of action in this area during the coming week.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). In QUANG NGAI (P), the tempo and intensity of enemy initiated activity was more pronounced that it was elsewhere in I Corps. There were two notable enemy initiated actions, one on the 21st and another on the 25th. In the first incident, A/4-3 Infantry while in a night defensive position eight kilometers north of BA TO (BS 577415) received a barrage of 45 rounds of 82mm mortar fire followed by small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in moderate friendly casualties. In the action on the 25th, CAP 1-4-6 while on a joint harvest security operation with RF Companies 199 and 380 received small arms fire and 60mm mortar fire from an estimated 15 VC eight kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 705789). The CAP unit engaged the enemy and detained five VC suspects. While returning to the harvest area, the CAP again came under small arms fire again engaging the enemy killing two. Meanwhile, CAP 1-4-5, also participating in the operation came under small arms fire 1,400 meters to the northeast. The CAP unit returned fire and called air strikes killing nine VC. Three more enemy were killed before this action

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terminated. Total results for this action were 14 VC killed, five VC suspects captured and two bunkers destroyed with no friendly casualties.

In assessing the significance of these actions, it is most likely in the case of the BA TO attack that the enemy was registering his sensitivity to incursions by friendly troops into areas which the enemy considers to be his territory. On the other hand, the attack on the harvest security operation most probably was another attempt to degrade in the eyes of the Vietnamese peasant the capability of the GVN to provide adequate security for the countryside.

Elsewhere, there were other light attacks by fire on the 23rd. In the first action, CAP 1-3-3 eight kilometers northeast of BINH SON received 10-20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and small arms fire resulting in light friendly casualties. In the latter action, LZ BRONCO (BS 812383) received three 122mm rockets.

The remaining noteworthy activity was scattered along the coastal lowlands. On the eastern tip of the BATANGAN Peninsula, 19 kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 795851), D/1-1 Cavalry observed 10 VC on the 23d. The soldiers engaged the enemy killing five. To the south, in the MO DUC area, ARVN units accounted for 20 enemy KIA in three separate contacts. Further south, in the DUC PHO area, two contacts on the 26th resulted in 11 enemy killed. In the first action, 2/4 ARVN ambushed an unknown size enemy force three kilometers west northwest of DUC PHO (BS 776386) killing five of the enemy. In the other action, a reconnaissance unit from 4-21 Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force six kilometers east southeast of DUC PHO (BS 863367). The unit engaged the enemy force and called artillery resulting in six enemy killed. While there were no positive enemy unit identifications made as a result of these actions along the coast, it is most probable that the enemy units encountered were local force units which normally operate in the areas of contact.

In summary, while enemy activity during the past week produced no significant new developments which would have serious effects on friendly operations, there was a dramatic drop in the number of terrorist type attacks the enemy directed against Vietnamese population centers in the province. In the nine days immediately prior to this reporting period, the enemy conducted six noteworthy attacks in this category. In sharp contrast, there were no such incidents reported during this past week.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. In assessing the overall enemy situation in ICTZ, there were few indications during the past week in the pattern of enemy activity, prisoner interrogations, captured enemy documents and other reports that the coming week holds any significant change in the type and level of operations the enemy intends to conduct. It is rice harvest time in I Corps, and since the enemy relies on local sources for his food, it is estimated that the enemy will keep his activities at a relatively low level during the coming week as he attempts to obtain rice and prepares for the coming monsoon season. Similar periods in 1968 and 1967 also were at a relatively low level and provide further substantiation for this assessment.

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Enemy intentions concerning the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division remain unknown. The enemy has a substantial capability in and north of the DMZ. This capability can be employed on a practically "no notice" basis. There are currently no indicators of an impending major attack being launched across the DMZ. In the only noteworthy development in the DMZ this week, aerial photography taken on the 8th and 22d of September show two probable 122mm field guns some 13 and one-half kilometers north of CON THIEN. This is the most southern location that field guns of this caliber have been observed. This is the first sighting of enemy field artillery in the VINH LINH-DMZ area since 12 May when two 130mm guns were observed.

It is the assessment in sum, that enemy intentions assume a more critical role than enemy capabilities in the vital area of the DMZ. Elsewhere in ICTZ, it is estimated that there will be another period of low level enemy activity much like that of last week.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents decreased from 346 to 256 for the week of 21-27 September. These incidents consisted of six ground attacks, none of which were company size or larger and six platoon size or smaller, six ambushes, four attacks by fire, 149 harassing fire incidents, 61 mining and booby trap incidents, three hamlet harassment incidents, one assassination incident, three espionage incidents, five kidnapping incidents, 16 propaganda incidents, and two sabotage incidents.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d. New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment. The following information is a copy of a USARV G-2 Spot Report illustrating a recently reported method of rendering claymore mines inoperative.

(1) During an inspection of perimeter defenses at FSB ALVARADO, in III Corps, on 16 September, seventy (70) claymore mine ignition wires were found cut in a manner designed to deceive. The following illustration shows the manner in which the ignition wires were rendered ineffective:



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(2) During inspections of defense positions, the full length of claymore mine ignition wires must be visually inspected. A simple pull of the wire to determine if it is connected is inadequate since it will not serve to detect the type of sabotage described above.

e. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire increased from 115 to 141 incidents for the reporting period and 34 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 21-27 September.

Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	232
60mm Mortar	134
Unk Cal Mortar	74
122mm Rocket	3
Unk Cal Rocket	8
Total	451

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance

(1) There were 82 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 21-27 September. These long-range patrols reported 136 sightings and 21 contacts totaling 1,208 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of 25 enemy KIA.

(2) Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant caches were captured in the ICTZ during the period 21-27 September:

(a) 21-23 September: 2/7 ARVN located a series of caches 21-24 kilometers west southwest of QUANG TRI City (YD 551424-YD 556427) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
7,480 LBS	UNK	Rice

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This cache was discovered near four barracks and there were 30 new foxholes approximately two days old in the same general area. No further information was available on this cache.

(b) 24 September: B/1/20, 11th Brigade discovered a rice cache 12 kilometers south southeast of MO DUC (BS 807427) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
4,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was found in open terrain and the contents were uncovered in 12 to 15 huts. The rice was in very good condition and had not been in storage for a long length of time. The rice was distributed among the refugees in the immediate vicinity.

(c) 26 September: D/1/52 Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade, discovered a salt and gasoline cache 11 kilometers south southeast of TRA BONG (BS 433802) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
52,000 LBS	UNK	Salt
180 GAL	UNK	Gasoline

This cache was discovered in a wooded mountainous area. The salt was found in two huts measuring 6x10x4 feet and the gasoline was stored in one gallon cans. The condition of both items was good. However, they were destroyed by burning due to the unaccessibility of the cache site.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 21-27 September:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
120mm Mortar	1
82mm Mortar	76
81mm Mortar	20
60mm Mortar	68
155mm Artillery	2
105mm Artillery	21
122mm Rocket	17
107mm Rocket	2
57mm RR	14
Total	221

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(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	218
Crew-Served Weapons	27

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 21-27 September:

Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
21 Sep	(YD 647433)	70	3/3
21 Sep	(ZC 186436)	6,000 Salt	RCN/1st Mar Div
21 Sep	(BS 557415)	700 Food	A/4/3
21 Sep	(BS 557415)	800 Food	A/4/3
21 Sep	(BS 557415)	800	A/4/3
21 Sep	(YD 556427)	3,520	2/7 ACAT
21 Sep	(YD 349357)	110	1/1
21 Sep	(YD 349357)	25 Salt	1/1
21 Sep	(YD 364404)	1,100	2/1
21 Sep	(BS 342388)	33	178th Bde
21 Sep	(YD 705315)	140	A/2/502
21 Sep	(YD 514256)	23	D/1/501
21 Sep	(BT 053374)	500	H/2/1
22 Sep	(BT 142250)	600	C/21
22 Sep	(BS 564835)	1,500	C/1/52
22 Sep	(YD 616385)	25	C/2/501
22 Sep	(YD 544442)	410	2/17 Cav
23 Sep	(AT 821507)	75 Salt	D/1/5
23 Sep	(BT 142254)	80	C/2/1
23 Sep	(BS 592419)	150 Salt	A/4/3
23 Sep	(YD 506255)	20	D/1/501
24 Sep	(BS 807427)	[illegible]	B/1/20
24 Sep	(BS 879338)	2,000	RCN/4/21
24 Sep	(BS 590428)	[illegible] Salt	A/4/3
24 Sep	(BS 590428)	200	A/4/3
24 Sep	(BS 590428)	50 Food	A/4/3
25 Sep	(BS 570781)	1,200	C/1/52
26 Sep	(YD 952109)	800	CAP 3-5-2
26 Sep	(AT 987325)	300	G/2/7
26 Sep	(BT 090456)	100	B/1/7
26 Sep	(AT 957237)	200	B/4/31
26 Sep	(BS 794470)	800	C/1/20
26 Sep	(AT 956548)	500 Food	L/3/1
26 Sep	(AT 956548)	200 Food	L/3/1
26 Sep	(YD 919105)	30	CAP 3-5-1
26 Sep	(BS 433802)	52,000 Salt	D/1/52
26 Sep	(YD 585246)	70	D/1/501
27 Sep	(BT 098479)	450	D/1/7
27 Sep	(AT 877834)	280	K/3/26
27 Sep	(AT 813579)	80	H/2/5

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Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
27 Sep	(BS 484717)	3,300	C/1/20
27 Sep	(BS 689823)	4,800	1/6
	Total Rice	26,741	
	Total Food	2,250	
	Total Salt	58,400	

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	178	Structures Damaged	55
Bunkers Destroyed	191	Bunkers Damaged	21
Secondary Explosions	39	Secondary Fires	38
Bridges Destroyed	4		

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ decreased in comparison to the previous week. There were 550 KIA's, 35 VC PW's, and six NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	92	93	94	90
Low	75	75	75	74
Rainfall (total)	0	0	0	0
Winds (knots)	7	8	6	5
Visibility (miles)	7	7	9	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 27 September - 3 October 1969

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General. The outlook for the forecast period in the ICTZ is partly cloudy weather with light to moderate rainfall expected.

ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the coastal areas of ICTZ is clear to partly cloudy becoming occasionally cloudy with afternoon/evening thundershowers. Isolated thundershower activity will exist over ICTZ throughout the outlook period. Patchy morning fog will continue to be observed, especially near the DMZ, burning off by 0900H local. Isolated showers will exist offshore in the morning hours and cloudiness and rainfall will persist for one to three hours after the onset of shower activity. Precipitation will be 0-1.5 inches with isolated instances of two to three inches. The forecast for the mountainous areas of ICTZ is partly cloudy with thundershowers and stratus/ground fog. Isolated thundershowers will occur intermittently during the period. As westerlies come in, an increase in cloudiness will prevail throughout the daylight hours of the period in the areas west of the ridgeline. Precipitation will be one to three inches with isolated instances of three to five inches.

j. - 1. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following courses of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

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(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to six infantry regiment equivalents, supported by the equivalent of one naval sapper battalion and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack VANDEGRIFT Combat Base with one infantry regiment supported by one sapper battalion and one artillery battalion.

(3) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Conduct limited attacks in the PHE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(5) Attack installations within the DANANG TACR with up to six infantry regiments, supported by four rocket battalions, one sapper battalion and one engineer battalion.

(6) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division (-), supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(8) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to seven infantry regiment equivalents.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. <u>Vulnerabilities</u>

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(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield, sickness, hunger, shortage of ammunition and medical supplies and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

FRANK X. HOFF
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Acting

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY
ANNEX E - OCTOBER WEATHER BRIEF

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z.

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ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO III MAF PERINTREP 39-69

A. REGISTERED MAIL		B. BY COURIER	
DIR, NSA	3	COMUSMACV (MACV J-232) (CIIED)	2
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1	COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4
CMC (ABQ)	2	COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2
CG FMFPAC	2	COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2
CG USARV	1	COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2
CG I FFORCEV	5	COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2
CG II FFORCEV	1	CICV	2
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	10
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1	CG 1ST MARDIV	40
CG MCDEC	1	CG 3RD MARDIV	26
CG 5TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CALIF	6	CG AMERICAL DIV	30
CG 4TH MARIDV, CAMPEN, CALIF	1	CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM)	20
CG 3RD MAW	2	CG 1ST MAW	30
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2	CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7
CO "B" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	5	CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1	CG USASUPCOM DNG	1
CO MCB 3	1	CG 173RD ABN BDE	2
CO MCB 6	1	CG FORLOGCMD DNG	5
CO MCB 7	1	CG 1ST LOGCMD LBN	2
CO MCB 8	1	CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CO MCB 9	1	CG 9TH MAB	1
CO MCB 10	1	CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO MCB 11	1	CO 16TH CMBT AVN GROUP CHL	3
CO MCB 53	1	CO 30 NCR	1
CO MCB 58	1	CO "C" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	17
CO MCB 62	1	CO 1ST CAG	1
CO MCB 71	1	CO 3RD CAG	1
CO MCB 133	1	CO 4TH CAG	1
CO USS REPOSE	1	CO 1ST BN, 525TH MI DET	25
CO USS SANCTUARY	1	CO 517TH MI DET	1
CO MHTG-30, MCAF, SANTA ANA, CALIF, 92709	1	CO MCB 40	1
DSA II CORPS	1	CO MCB 121	1
CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP, 7TH FLEET	1	CO 4TH PSYOP GROUP	1
CMDR, 19TH CI TEAM, CAMPEN, CALIF	1	DSA I CORPS	11
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1	CMDR, 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SGN	3
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1	COMNAVFORV	1
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2	COMNAVSUPACT DNG	2
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1	GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2
CTF 76	1	DSA/EMB SAIGON	1
		DET B, 1ST MIBARS	1
		CIB	1
		CTG 79.5	1
		CTG 79.4	1
		CTG 76.5	1
		CTG 76.4	1
		7TH AIR FORCE (IGS) BDOC	1

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45TH ENGR GROUP	1
620TH TCS, APO 96203	1
366TH AIR SEC SQD, USAF	2
620TH TSC	1
SPO-SEC CMD QHN	1

C. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (WITHIN HQ, III MAF)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP C/S PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	42
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
C/S ANALYSIS	1
AMPHIBICAL LIAISON OFFICER (C/O G-3)	2
3D BDE ROKMC LIAISON OFFICER	1
PSYOPS	2
1ST RADIO BN	11
HORN BASC	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1

D. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

CO 1ST MP BN DNG	1
CO 3RD MP BN DNG	1
CO 3D CAG	1
CO 9TH COMM BN	1
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
CO MCB 5	1
SLF (A)	1
CTG 115.1	1
CCN	1
US NAD	1
DIR, CAP	1
7TH PSYOP BN	1
HQ, 212TH CMBT AVN BN	6
RAILWAY SECURITY	1

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 39-69 AS OF 272400H SEPTEMBER 1969

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-HQ	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	11	3,160	2	550			13	3,710	14	6,195	27	9,905
Bn's-Maneuver	39	9,100	11	1,775	5	685	55	11,560	34	15,015	89	26,575
Bn's-Support	18	5,225	2	340	1	190	21	5,755	7	2,080	27	7,835
Separate Co's	1	130			33	2,565	34	2,695	1	80	35	2,775
TOTAL CONFIRMED		19,580		2,665		3,440		25,685		24,805		50,490
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's	1	710					1	710	3	860	4	1,570
Bn's-Maneuver	6	2,355	1	350	1	200	8	2,905	7	2,470	15	5,375
Bn's-Support	4	1,035					4	1,035	9	1,445	13	2,480
Separate Co's	1	90			2	160	3	250			3	250
TOTAL PROBABLE		4,190		350		360		4,900		4,775		9,675
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,400	3	1,400
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support									22	7,675	22	7,675
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										10,015		10,015
		23,770		3,015		3,800		30,585		39,595		70,180

See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,250		150	3,400
	Probable	2,455			2,455
	Possible				
	TOTAL	5,705		150	5,855
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,620		565	4,185
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,620		565	4,185
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	6,150	825	910	7,885
	Probable	830	350		1,180
	Possible				
	TOTAL	6,980	1,175	910	9,065
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,415	600	650	3,665
	Probable	380		285	665
	Possible				
	TOTAL	2,795	600	935	4,330
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,145	1,240	1,165	6,550
	Probable	525		75	600
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,670	1,240	1,240	7,150

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS														DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL									
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	33	3		36	8			8	5			5	46	3		49	34	4		38	80	7		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	39	6		45	11	1		12	5	1		6	55	8		63	35	6		41	90	14		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	9	1		10	1			1	1			1	11	1		12	2	5	10	17	13	6	10	29
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	3	1	5	3	3	1	7
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		2	3	2	1	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1					1			1
TOTAL SUPPORT	19	4		23	2			2	1			1	22	4		26	8	8	22	38	30	12	22	64
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	58	10		68	13	1		14	6	1		7	77	12		89	43	14	22	79	120	26	22	168

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength,

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	269	Nam Hoa	61	Hoa Vang	588	Thang Binh	943	Binh Son	311
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	58	Hieu Duc	65	Tan Ky	672	Son Tinh	474
	Trieu Phong	143	Hong Dien	59	Dien Ban	1,093	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	450
	Cam Lo	150	Vinh Loc	130	Dai Loc	356	Hiep Duc	215	Nghia Hanh	341
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	231	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	258	Mo Duc	433
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	333	Hau Duc	229	Duc Pho	465
	Huong Hoa	5	Phu Vang	24	Que Son	921			Tra Bong	170
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	107	Duy Xuyen	1,098			Ba To	202
			Huong Thuy	101	Hieu Nhon	294			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	437					Son Ha	185
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	947	THUA THIEN	1,254	QUANG NAM	4,868	QUANG TIN	2,432	QUANG NGAI	3,095

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR [illegible] - 12,596

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,110		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Vic XD 6233	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175	Unlocated	
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unlocated LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	

*See note #4 on page A-17
**See note #2 on page A-17

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,950		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	450	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	600	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,900		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	500		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/240ct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1267/24Sep69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
31st Group	NVA	C	1,060		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	220	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2061/20Jul69
15th Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	2,010		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	YD 6825/23Apr69
65th Arty Regt	NVA	PR	UNK		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.40 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.41 Arty Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.42 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
K.43 AAA Bn	NVA	PR	UNK	Unlocated	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,570		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	2,030		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	410	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	410	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,595		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	YD 1259/11Jun69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	355	XD 9265	XD 9666/26May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	400	XD 8854	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,680		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	YD 3858/20Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	185	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	PR	240	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	185	Vic YD 3535	YD 3448/7Sep69

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	895		
Rdgt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	280	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	265	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jun69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,740		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	330	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	190	Vic YD 6514	YD 6019/6Sep69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
3rd Bn, 803rd Regt	NVA	C	215	Vic YC 3193	YC 3389/19Jul69
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	360	Vic YD 3304	YD 5226/8Sep69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
K.35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	
C.113 Co	LF	C	145	Vic YD 4032	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	15,000		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
577th RL Bn	NVA	C	305	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
HAI VAN Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102nd Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103rd Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	525		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,080		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	270	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
368B Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,170		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	635		
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	150	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	150	AT 7930	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	145	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
R.20 Bn	LF	C	150	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	LF	C	130	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	70	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	85	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	125	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	105	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	4,070		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	430		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	AT 9226	
1st Bn	NVA	C	85	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	90	AT 9226	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	85	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	180	BT 2440	BT 2340/12Aug69
72nd Bn	LF	C	175	BT 2932	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	190	BT 3510	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	200	BT 3127	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 2232	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	220	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 421	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	80	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	85	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	115	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	115	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	LF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	130	BS 4677	BS 6385/12Aug69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	685		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4386	BS 3587/13Aug69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69
C.17 Co	LF	C	55	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	65	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7555	BS 7061/17Nov68
C.120 Co	LF	C	50	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	75	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5596	
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,615	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
Div Hq	NVA	C	440		
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	900		
Regt Hq	MF	C	360	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	185	BS 6733	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	185	BS 7932	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	170	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 9512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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BIEN HOA PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,700		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	520	BR 7363	
7th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 7547	
8th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 5950	
9th Bn	NVA	C	300	BR 5929	

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*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 210001H to 272400H September 1969.

a. No significant changes.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

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9. Subordination/operational control, "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter Box Numbers (LBN), Armament, and Personalities listing.

NORTHERN I CORPS/DMZ/LAOS

UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
B-5 Front	DMZ Front			Chief of the Rear Service Staff Dept B-5 Front; Hoang KHUE
12th AT Bn			18x7.62mm LMG	
13th Arty Bn			12x60mm Mort 6xHMG 3x82mm Mort 50xLMG/SMG 12x120mm Mort	
14th AA Bn				CO-Luu Van MAN
15th Engr Bn				CO-Capt LOI XO-SrLt TAI
16th Signal Bn				
17th Trans Bn				
19th Medical Bn				

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
304th NVA Div	"Cua Cao" Div; Vin Quang Group		5x82mm Mort 3x75mm RR 9xLMG 5xHMG	CO-SrCol Hoang KIEN XO-Maj HIEN PO-Col CAM APO-LtCol Pham Xuan KINH
Div Hq				
14th AA Bn				
15th Engr Bn				
16th Sig Bn				
18th Med Bn				
19th Trans Bn				
20th Sap Bn		13741 US	9x82mm Mort 9x60mm Mort ?xB-40	CO-Capt Ha Van CU XO-Capt Le Van LOI
9th Regt	U-1; U-9; E-9; D-9; F-9 Song Lo Regt 1; 1st Regt; Trung Doan Thep			CO-LtCol TROUNG PO-LtCol Le Dang DUY CofS-KHAM
1st Bn	T-1; D-1	13634 IS (?) 13653 US 13638 US		CO-Nguyen Huu TOAN XO-Dac Duy NHAT CofS-Capt A APO-SrLt Dang XUAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd Bn	T-2; D-2	13639 IS (?) 13642 US		CO-SrCapt Huynh Ngoc SON XO-Capt DUAN PO-SrCapt TUI APO-THANH
3rd Bn	T-3; D-3	13644 IS (?) 13644 US		PO-Maj TAN
24B Regt	57th Regt; 2nd Regt; U-2; Yen Tu; E-2; 24th Regt			CO-Maj Tran TRAI XO-NGUYEN PO-Maj Le TAM
4th Bn				
5th Bn		13675 US 13676 US		XO-1stLt CHUNG
6th Bn		13678		
66th Regt	U-3; U-66; 4th Regt; E-3			CO-LtCol Ding Dinh HO XO- PO-LtCol Tran TRAC
7th Bn	T-7	13696 US (?)		CO-Capt TANH XO- PO-Capt NHI
8th Bn	T-8	13701 US		CO-Le Van TAN XO-1stLt NGOAN PO-JrCapt HIEN
9th Bn	T-9	13706 US (?)		CO-SrCapt HAND XO-Capt TRUNG PO-SrCapt TUY APO-PHUC CofC-Capt KHANG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
68th Arty Regt	U-4 (?)		22x105mm How	CO-Maj CIA
325th Div, B-5 Front	Nong Truong Tam Div; 308th Div			CO-Col BINH XO-LtCol KHAN PO-LtCol THAI
14th AA Bn			?x12.7mm AA HMG	
15th Trng Bn				
16th Med Bn				
17th Sig Bn				
18th Engr Bn				
19th DKZ Bn			?x122mm Rkt	
20th Trans Bn	D.20 Bn	18046 XP		CO-Capt Dang Van CO XO-1stLt Do Van THOA PO-JrCapt Tran Xuan THU APO-1stLt LUAN
21st Conval Bn				
25th Sapper Co				
26th Recon Co				
27th Cadre Co				

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UNIT	AKA	IBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
36th Regt	Doan Hong Vu; 1st Regt; 95th Regt	18409 RT		CO-Maj Pham HUNG
1st Bn	D-1; K-1		29xB-40,B-41 6xDKZ 57mm RR 3x82mm Mort 6x60mm Mort	CO-SrCapt TRUC PO-Capt NHAN
2nd Bn	D-2; K-2			
3rd Bn	D-3; K-3	92902		CO-Tran Minh DANG
88th Regt	7003B; F-88; Quyet Thang	62332 18439 TS		CO-LtCol Do LUONG XO-Maj Nguyen Hung CHUONG PO-Maj DUC CofS-LtCol TRUC
4th Bn	D-4; Z-4			CO-Capt MY XO-1stLt LONG PO-Capt TRI
5th Bn		31278 US		
6th Bn				
102nd Regt	Me Cong; 1001; 7001; Thu Do (?); Dist 70			CO-LtCol LUC XO-Maj THAN PO-LtCol HIEN APO-Maj SUU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	Bn 71			
8th Bn	Bn 73			CO-Capt TAN
9th Bn	Bn 75			CO-Capt LOAN XO-Capt NGHI PO-Capt TAI APO-1stLt HAI
138th Regt, B-5 Front	Bach Dang Regt; 24 Indep Regt; 132nd Regt	30119 US		CO-HOAI XO-HO PO-DU APO-LANG CofS-LUAN
1st Bn		30516	?xLMG ?xB-40, B-41 ?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x12.7mm HMG ?x57mm RR	CO-KHAC XO-DUNG PO-NGOT
2nd Bn	Hau Loc (V), Hong Ha (D)	30521		CO-SrLt TAM XO-SrLt TAM
3rd Bn		30526 XB		CO-Capt HO XO-MAN PO-NGOT
246th Regt	246Z Regt; F-6; F-4			CO-Maj CHU XO-TIEP PO-Maj LONG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Bn	H-1; U-1; Phai Khat; K-1	93976 OK 93977 OK 93978 OK 93979 OK		CO-Capt Mac Tinh DANG XO-Mai Van TU PO-Dap THAI
2nd Bn	H-2; U-2	93978 OK		
3rd Bn	H-3; U-3			
270th Regt, B-5 Front	Quang Tri, E-270; 270th Battle Group; 32nd Regt	32549 XB		CO-LtCol Hoang Van DUON XO-Maj Tran Duc MINH APO-Capt LAM
4th Bn	268th Inf Bn; D47; 47th Regt; 47th Bn	32548 XB 32553 XB (?) 32549 XB		CO-TUAN XO-THIEN PO-Maj Nguyen Duy DUC APO-KHANH
5th Bn	310th Inf	32558 XB(?)		CO-SrCapt Duon Xuan HAI
6th Bn		31400 XB(?)	6x82mm Mort	CO-Capt TUONG PO-LINH
27th Regt, B-5 Front	Ken Giang; Phan Rang; 271st Regt	93900 OK		CO-Maj THAT PO-Maj Nguyen Trong TAN APO-Maj LU
1st Bn		93901 OK		
2nd Bn	43rd Bn, Nghe An (P) Main Forces; K-2; 43d Bn	93906 OK		

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Bn	44th Bn, Ha Thinh (P) Main Forces; PR 12	93911 OK	4x82mm Mort 2xLMG 2x57mm RR (DKZ) 6xB-40	CO-1stLt Vo Xuan THAN XO-JrCapt Nguyen Duc DONG
78th Arty Regt, B-5 Front	E.78			
10th Bn	D.10			
11th Bn	D.11			
12th Bn	D.12			
84th Arty Regt, B-5 Front	"Van An" Regt		?x140mm Rkt ?x120mm Mort ?xB-41 ?x122mm Rkt	CO-Maj Ta VAN XO-Maj CO PO-Maj DU
2nd Bn	Thong Nhat; 33rd Bn(?) K-33	54279 RT (?)		
3rd Bn	Ha Tinh	54283 RT (?)		
4th Bn	Ha Dong	54289 RT (?) 54290 RT (?)	?x140mm Rkt ?x102mm Rkt ?x120mm Mort	CO-Capt HA XO-Le MAN PO-Lt Le Van THIEN APO-Phac THAM CofS-VAN

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
164th Arty Regt, B-5 Front				
1st Bn				
2nd Bn	D-2			CO-Nguyen Phuc TRUNG
3rd Bn				
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt, B-5 Front	K-1 Bn; K.33 Bn			CO-SrCapt LIEN XO-Capt LONG PO-SrCapt CUONG CofS-HUU
6[illegible] Arty Regt, B-5 Front	E675B			
Regt Hq				
1st Bn	D85 Bn		6x85mm How	
2nd Bn	D74/1 Bn		6x122mm Gun	
3rd Bn	D74/2 Bn		6x122mm Gun	
NVA Sap Combat Grp, 126th Naval Sapper Regt, B-5 Front	1A, 4007, 4002			CO-Thanh Van MINH XO-NO PO-SrLtCol KHANH APO-SrCapt THAI Rear Services-Capt THUOC Medical Officer-SrLt THAI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Co				Co Cmdr-Capt Duy TINH
2nd Co				
3rd Co				PO-SrLt Nguyen Xuan THU
4th Co				Co Cmdr-SrLt CHE XO-SrLt CHINH PO-Lt TRI
33rd Sapper Bn	Kontum; 33	94154 XB 94155 XB 94156 XB 94157 XB 94158 XB 94159 XB	3x60mm Mort 16xB-40 3xB-41	CO-Capt Thai Ba QUYEN XO-Capt THO PO-Capt NGON APO-Capt CHUONG CofS-1stLt Tran XUOC
31st Group, B-5 Front	Doan 31; Song Hong Grp; 31st Regt; Bach Dang			CO-Le Mong HUNG DCofS-Nguyen Duc MIEN
C.9 LF Co	H-30; 30-H; Cam Lo LF Co; K-9	41367 41368		CO-Thai Tang NGO XO-VAN PO-CHAM
C.10 LF Co	4001; 5th Co; Gio Linh Co; K.400 Local Force Co; T.10 Co; Gio Le Co; K.10	41369 41370	3x60mm Mort 2xB-40 6xBAR	CO-1stLt DAM
C.11 LF Sapper Co	K-11			

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
27th Indep Bn, 31st Group	27th Support Bn; K-1; 2nd Bn; 7th Ind Bn; Tay Ninh Bn; Cam Lo Bn; 70th Indep Bn; 27th Regt; Song Giang(?); D-27 Co (COWL ZOX)	31728 KT	?xB-40 ?x120mm Mort ?xLMG ?x60mm Mort	CO-Capt THAO XO-2ndLt Nguyen Van DAT PO-Nguyen Khac UNC APO-WO Duong Dinh PHO
15th Bn, 31st Group		94081 OK		

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
MRTTH, MR-IV MRTTH HQ	Northern Front; Northern Sub-Region; North Div HQ Phan Khu Bac; Di Hai; Tri Di Hai Thien Sector; K-500;	H-700 Bac Do BQ 20 FM		CG-MajGen Le Chuong (AKA Le Truong TIN) XO-Col Bui SINH (AKA DUNG SINH) FGPO-MajGen BAY FGAPO-Gen VAN CofS-Maj MINH
General Staff	K.400	41000 FM KC.10		ACofS-LtCol THAI CON
Operations Section		KC.1		Sec.Chief-LtCol Nguyen THOA
Military Intelligence Section		KC.2		Sec.Chief-Maj NGOC
Signal Section		KC.3		Sec.Chief-LtCol Hoang THANH
Personnel Section		KC.4		Sec.Chief-
Cryoto Section		KC.5		Sec.Chief-
Sapper Section		KC.6		Sec.Chief-
Engineer Section		KC.7		Sec.Chief-
Artillery Section		KC.8		Sec.Chief-LtCol Trung KIEN
Training Section		KC.9		Sec.Chief-
Political Staff	K.300	41001 FM KP.12		ACofS-DOAN SUU
Cadre Affairs Section		KP.1		Sec.Chief
Organization Section		KP.2		Sec.Chief
Propaganda Section		KP.3		Sec.Chief
Security Guard Section		KP.4		Sec.Chief-SrCapt TRAN CUC
Military Proselyting Section	K.300B	41003 FM K0.16		ACofS-Maj VU QUAN
Rear Services Staff	K.200	41002 FM KJ.14		ACofS-Maj KHAM
Plans Section		KJ.1		Sec.Chief-1st Lt DANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quartermaster Section		KJ.2		Sec.Chief-1stLt Tong Viet PHU
Ordnance Section		KJ.3		Sec.Chief-Capt HUONG
Medical Section		KJ.4		Sec.Chief-SrCapt Dinh Nhu BINH
Finance Section		KJ.5		Sec.Chief-
Political Section		KJ.6		Sec.Chief-
Militia Section	K.100	KZ.10		ACofS-LtCol Tong Ho TRINH
MRTTH HQ (FWD)		TBQ 20 FM		CO-SrCol Nguyen Nhu THIET AsstCmdr/CofS-Col Nguyen THI POPO-Col Xuan TRA
7th Front, MRTTH	Quang Tri Lib. Front; 9th Front; Doan 7; AD.49	EFQ		CO-Col Sung LAM XO-LtCol Vu BINH PO-SrCol Vu THANG APO-LtCol Le Kha PHIEU CofS-LtCol Nguyen Van THU
STAFF SECTION		E1FQ		ACofs-
Plans Sec.				Sec.Chief-SrCapt Phan Van HY
Intelligence Sec.				Sec.Chief-JrCapt TOAN
Sapper Sec.				Sec.Chief-VU
Finance Sec.				Sec.Chief-Capt DUONG
Personnel Sec.				Sec.Chief-Nguyen Ngoc THO
Training Sec.				Sec.Chief-TAM
Signal Sec.				Sec.Chief-MANH
POLITICAL SECTION		E2FQ		AcofS-Maj TOAN
PROSELYTING SECTION		E3FQ		AcofS-Capt TUNG
Propaganda Sec.				Cmdr-1stLt TE
Reorientation Sec.				Cmdr-1stLt HIEU

UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
REAR SERVICE SECTION		E4FQ		ACofS-Maj KHAM
K-8 Bn, 7th Front	808th Bn; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Forces; 9th Indep Bn; Le Hong Phong Bn; Chu Luc	41344 FQ 41345 FQ 41346 FQ 41347 FQ 41348 FQ	12x60mm Mort 4x82mm Mort 2x75mm RR 2xLMG 48xB-40 12xB-41	CO-Capt Nguyen Duc HONG XO-Capt KHICH PO-Capt THANH APO-SrLt XICH CofS-SrLt Nguyen Thoc NHON
K-14 Bn, 7th Front	814th Bn; H-14; K-7; Bat Nhat	41349 FQ 41350 FQ 41351 FQ 41352 FQ 41353 FQ	3x57mm RR 1xB-40 2xLMG 2x81mm Mort 2x57mm RR	CO-SrCapt XOE XO- PO-Capt NONG APO- CofS-SrLt Tran Thien DUC
10th Sapper Bn, 7th Front	K.20 Bn; 10th Group; 30th Sapper Group; Quang Tri Sapper Unit	41354 FQ 41355 FQ 41356 FQ 41357 FQ 41358 FQ	?xB-40 ?xAK-47	CO-Capt Van DAU XO-SrLt Ho Van TRUOC PO-CHINH
K-11 Sapper Bn, 7th Front				CO-Capt Vu Ban CAM XO-BAO CofS-DAT PO-Vu Van TIEN
K-34 Arty Bn, 7th Front, MRTTH			18x122mm Rkt 6x122mm RL	CO-TRACH XO-TUAN PO-TO CofS-CHAT
812th Regt, 324B Div	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; Cong Truong; "1 May" Regt; 4th Regt Song Thu Bon; Ba Vi Song Cua; Thuan Doc Lap; Co Dong (Mobile) Regt; Song Huong Regt; 53rd Regt; Cua Thuan Regt; Nui Ba Vi; Thu Bon River Regt; Cong Truong 7; 7th Regt; D82; Doan 2; AD.35	41399 FQ(?) 31610 RT 31611 RT 31612 RT 31613 RT 31614 RT 31615 RT 31617 RT 31618 RT 31619 RT	?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x60mm Mort ?x57mm RR ?x12.7mm AA MG ?xLMG	CO-LtCol Tong Sy GUY PO-THUONG APO-Bui Van NANG XO-Maj Minh LONG CofS-Maj Nguyen The DAO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
4th Bn	K-4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn; K-18	31620 RT 31621 RT 31622 RT 31623 RT 31624 RT		CO-Capt PHUC XO-JrCapt ANH PO-Capt TRAM APO-1stLt TUYEN CofS-Lt BINH
5th Bn	K-5 Bn; Cong Huong Bn; Tuyen 4; T-4; 4 Ba Vi; D-4; K-16	31625 RT 31626 RT 31627 RT 31628 RT 31629 RT		CO-Nguyen Van PHONG XO- PO-2ndLt Nguyen Van BICH
6th Bn	K-6 Bn; D-6 Bn; Thu Bon; Cuu Long Bn; Tuyen 6; 6th Ba Vi Bn; K-8	31630 RT 31631 RT 31632 RT 31633 RT 31634 RT		CO-Capt Cao BA XO-Nguyen Xuan HOA PO-HAI
4th Regt, MRTTH	AD.14; Doan 4	41410 FT 41418 FT 41420 FT 41425 FT		CO-Maj Tran Buu CHU PO-Maj Tran Van VUNG DepPO-Maj Nguyen Tien THUONG APO-Capt Nguyen Nho TUC XO-Maj Nguyen Van UC
K4B Bn	802nd Bn; K.2; Van Troi Bn; 2nd Bn; H.400	41166 FH 41167 FH 41168 FH 41169 FH 41170 FH	4x81mm Mort 12x60mm Mort 2x57mm RR 6x3.5" RL 10xB-40 6xAA HMG	CO-Capt Nguyen SONG XO-SrLt PHUNG PO-Capt HO
K4C Bn	1st Bn, 4th Regt; 4th Bn, 9th Regt; 822nd Bn; H.402	41522 FT 41523 FT	2x82mm Mort	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUAT XO-1stLt Tran Van BOI PO-Capt Nguyen Van KHANH APO-Asp TRUNG CofS-1stLt THANG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
5th Regt, MRTTH	22nd Regt; AD.25; Doan 5; 5th Worksite; Hue City Unit; 95th Regt	41270 FH 41271 FH 41272 FH		CO-LtCol Tran Than MOT XO-SrCapt TUYEN PO-LtCol VAN
K4 Bn	804th Bn; VO 74; Cao Van Grp; Sung Lo; Q.3	41435 FH 41436 FH 41437 FH 41438 FH 41439 FH 41288 FH 41289 FH 41290 FH 41290A FH 41290B FH	1x82mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG 20xRPD 6xB-40 10xB-41	CO-Maj Tran Dinh CHUONG XO-1stLt TAM PO-Capt Nguyen Van HAY APO-SrLt MAI CofS-HUU
K10 Bn	810th Bn; 3rd Bn (?) Q.4	41440 FH 41441 FH 41442 FH 41443 FH 41444 FH 41291 FH 41292 FH 41293 FH 41293A FH 41293B FH	3x81mm Mort 2x82mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 3xRR	CO-SrCapt Le Van BAU XO-Capt Nguyen Van NU PO-Capt Nguyen Van DUY CofS-Do Quoc HUYNH APO-Nguyen Huo DU
Chi Thua 1 Sap Bn	K-1; K-21 (THO)	41283 FH 41284 FH 41285 FH 41285A FH 41285B FH		CO-Maj THO XO-HIEN PO-VU APO-Le Ngoc DIEP
Chi Thua 2 Sap Bn	K.2; K.21 (VU)	41286 FH 41287 FH 41287A FH 41287B FH 41287C FH		CO-Nguyen Van VU XO- PO-HIEN APO-CAO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K.32 Arty Bn, 5th Regt, MRTTH	1st Bn, 84th Arty Regt; QE.02; D.832	41502 FQ 41294 FH 41295 FH 41296 FH 41296A FH 41296B FH		CO-THICH PO-Pham Ngoc BI APO-Capt Le Van VU XO-Nguyen Quang DA CofS-
6th Regt, MRTTH	Cong Truong 6; 6th Work-site; Ham Tu; AD.26; Doan 6	41300 FE 41316 FE 41317 FE 41318 FE 41319 FE 41320 FE 41321 FE 41322 FE 41323 FE 41324 FE 41325 FE		CO-Maj Huynh AN XO-Maj Nguyen Quang KHANH (AKA Nguyen Quoc KHANH) PO-Maj Nguyen Quang CAM APO-SrCapt Tran THO CofS-Capt Hong Kim THO CofPolit Sec-Man Huong Huu AN
800th Bn	K.1; 1st Bn (?); L.1	1520 Q 40700 ST 41301 FE 41302 FE 41303 FE 41304 FE 41305 FE	9x82mm Mort 8x60mm Mort 3x57mm RR 8x3.5" RL 9xB-40 6xLMG 4x75mm RR	CO-Capt DIEN XO-Capt Tran Minh DUONG PO-Capt Nguyen Van THANH APO-SrLt Pham DUYET CofS-SrLt Nguyen Ke VAY
802nd Bn	K.2; 1st Bn, 9th Regt	43920 FE 41306 FE 41307 FE 41308 FE 41309 FE 41310 FE	4x82mm Mort 2x57mm RR 3xHMG ?xLMG ?xB-40	CO-Capt Vo Dai AN XO-SrLt Do Dinh PHUNG PO-Capt Nguyen Huu DAM APO-SrLt Le Duc LOC CofS-SrLt Duong Quang TUOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D.10; 3rd (?); 80.T Bn	41311 FE 41312 FE 41313 FE 41314 FE 41315 FE	3x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 3x75mm RR 3x57mm RR 3xHMG 12xB-40 4x3.5" RL	CO- XO-SrLt Pham Quong LOC PO-SrLt Pham Quong VINH CofS-SrLt Hoang CHUC
K.12 Sapper Bn	812th Group 12; Dac Cong 12			CO-SrLt Dang Viet HONG XO- PO-Capt Tran Ba QUAT APO-SrLt Ho Van BA APO-SrLt Van The HANG
K35 Arty Bn, MRTTH, 6th Regt		41112 FM		
9th Regt, MRTTH	Doan 9; AD.79 FR; Thang Long	41390 FR 41391 FR 41392 FR 41393 FR 41394 FR 41395 FR 41396 FR 41397 FR 41398 FR 41399 FR		CO-Maj Dang Thong DE PO-LtCol Phan KY APO-Capt Bui Van DAO XO-Maj Nguyen Tu TY CofS/XO-Maj Le Van A CofPolit Sec-Maj Ha Duc DUC
K.16 Bn	Dong Do; T.902; F.801 FR; 816th Bn; 416th Bn; 3d Bn, 9th Regt	41406 FR 41407 FR 41408 FR 41409 FR 41410 FR		CO- PO-Capt Tran Xuan VU APO-SrLt Pham Tien KHANG XO-SrLt Thai BAY CofS-SrLt Bui Manh TIEN
K.18 Bn	Dong Ha; T.903; F.802 FR; 818th Bn; 418th Bn; 2d Bn, 9th Regt	41411 FR 41412 FR 41413 FR 41414 FR 41415 FR		CO-SrCapt Dang Huy MICH PO-SrCapt Van VU APO-SrLt Le Huy CAY XO-Ho Ba NHUAN CofS-SrLt Nguyen Kim THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K.15 Bn	815th Bn; 415th Bn; 1st Bn, 9th Regt; Q-6; F.800 FR	41416 FH 41297 FH 41298 FH 41299A FH 41299B FH 41400 FR 41401 FR 41402 FR 41403 FR 41404 FR 41405 FR	2xB-40/B-41	CO-Capt HO 1st XO-SrLt Vu Duc HAU XO-SrLt Vu Ngoc TRINH PO-SrCapt Pham Dinh DINH APO-Capt Pham Huu KY CofS-SrLt Vu Ngoc THAO
29th Regt, 325C Div, MRTTH	Ken Giang; Ba Na; 3rd Regt; Song Lo Regt; Doan 8; AD.68	32868 RT 32706 RT 32722 RT 32723 RT 32724 RT 32725 RT 32720 RT 32727 RT 32728 RT 32729 RT 32730 RT 32731 RT	8x82mm Mort	CO-Maj Chau HOAT/LtCol Tran SIKCH XO-SrCapt Nguyen HOAN PO-SrCapt Vo DUOC APO-Maj CAY CofS-SrCapt Dau Ba HA
7th Bn	K-7; 1st; D-1; D-7	32707 RT 32708 RT 32709 RT 32710 RT 32711 RT	4x82mm Mort 4xHMG 8x60mm Mort	CO-SrLt Nguyen TRAN XO-SrLt Le Van HA PO-
8th Bn	K-8; 2nd; D-2; D-8; Duc Lap Bn	32712 RT 32713 RT 32714 RT 32715 RT 32716 RT	4x82mm Mort 4xHMG	CO-Capt HANG XO-Capt CAN PO-Capt HANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
9th Bn	K-9; 3rd; D-3; B-9	32717 RT 32718 RT 32719 RT 32720 RT 32721 RT		CO-SrCapt Nguyen Van HO XO-Capt CHONG PO-CANH
803rd Regt, 324B Div, MRTTH	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; Cong Truong 21; Song Huong; Cua Tung; Tam Dao; Cong Truong 1/5(?); 41st Regt; K-14B Regt; Phan Thiet Regt; Doan 1	31551 RT 31552 RT 31553 RT 31554 RT 31555 RT 31556 RT 31557 RT 31558 RT 31559 RT	?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x60mm Mort ?x12.7mm AA ?xLMG	CO-Maj Luu Quang MAU XO-Capt Mau DUYET PO-Maj DAM APO-Capt Le Van DAO CofS-
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K-1 Bn; Tam Dao 1; Song Lam; Song Huong; C-1	31560 RT 31561 RT 31562 RT 31563 RT 31564 RT		CO-Capt Bui Khac HUI XO-Capt Tran PHUOC PO-Nguyen Dinh CU APO-1stLt Le Man CHAU
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K-2 Bn; Thu Bon; Song Huong 2; Tam Dao 2; C-2	31565 RT 31566 RT 31567 RT 31568 RT 31569 RT		CO-Capt DUC XO- PO-SrLt XE APO-SrLt NAM CofS-SrLt SUU
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K-3 Bn; Tam Dao 3; Song Cuong 3; C-3	31570 RT 31571 RT 31572 RT 31573 RT 31574 RT		CO-HO XO-KINH PO-DUC APO-THUY CofS-Do Xam CHI
65th Arty Regt, MRTTH	Doan 12; AD.30			CO-TAN XO- PO-NGHIEP

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K-40 Arty Bn	K-50; QE.06; D.850		?x85mm Field Gun	
K-41 Arty Bn	QE.07		?x122mm How	
K-42 AAA Bn	QE.08		37mm AAA Gun	
K-43 AAA Bn	QE.09		23mm AAA Gun	
H-99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co; Vinh Ling Co		1xLMG	CO-Vo BA XO-Tran BUN PO-DUNG
C.113 Co	Armed Co of Phong Dien District; P.14; D.1; X.11; V.35; H.23; KQ.10; AK-5	41426 FM	1X81mm Mort 2X60mm Mort 12XSMG	CO-LANN XO-LAI PO-THAN APO-Tran Van THUAN
C.114 Co	D-3; P.15; Quang Dien LF Co; V.40; H.25; KQ.20; AK.7; H.319	1847 Bac Ha 41427 FM	2X60mm Mort 4XB-40	CO-MUNG XO-HOA PO-HA
C.115 Co	D-2; X-3; K-5; Huong Tra LF Co; P.16; KQ.30; AK-9	41428 FM	2XHMG 2X60mm Mort ?XSMG	CO-LE XO-LUA PO-HUNG
C.116 Co	D-4; X-4; P.17; Huong Thuy LF Co; KQ.40; V.50; H.29; AK.12; C.268 Co; C.216 Co	41429 FM	2X60mm Mort ?XHMG	CO-Nguyen Huu LUYEN XO-Tran Viet HUNG PO-NGACH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
C.119 Co	C.19; BIET DONG Ranger		2XB-40	CO-Ho DOI XO/PO-Nguyen CUONG
Phu Loc Armed Bn	K-3, V-6		3X60mm Mort 3XB-40	CO-Nguyen NGUYEN XO-Phan CHANG PO-Nguyen XUAN

SOUTHERN I CORPS/BINH DINH (P)

UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
Military Region 5	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa; H-601; F-102 KW; Thon An 620	20100 GM 21900 GM Bac Hien		CO-MGen Hoang Van THAI XO-LtCol Nguyen CHANH (AKA BINH) PO-Gen THAI (same as CO) APO-LtCol Tran KHUE CofS-Col Le TRUC
Front 4, MR-5	Unit 70; Group 44; K-44	P6400; 6700 Ap Thai		CO-BGen Le BINH XO-Col HOE PO-THUAN CofS-Maj CUC APO-PHUOC

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
70A, Front 4	Military Staff	P6407; 6707 AP Thai		CO-Capt DONG XO-JrCapt LANH PO-Capt KHANH
70B, Front 4	Political Section Staff	P6414; 6714 AP Thai		CO-LtCol Bui DU XO- PO-
70C, Front 4	Rear Service Staff	P6425; 6725 AP Thai		CO-Tran Dinh TRUC XO-YEN
1st Comm Bn, Front 4	703C	P6460; 6760 AP Thai		CO-Maj Ha Van CAU XO-Capt Van XUAN PO-Maj CHINH
42nd Recon Bn, Front 4		P.6513 Ap Thai		CO-Capt Tan PHAT XO-SrLt Duc MINH PO-Tranh TRIEU APO-1stLt CAN C/S-QUYNH
1st Flamethrower Co Front 4		1888 AP Thai	40XLP050 Chicom	CO-1stLt HAI XO- PO-1stLt CANG
HAI VAN Engr Bn	1st Engr Bn; Cuu Long Bn	6780 AP Thai (SVN) 2380 QT (NVN)	?82mm Mort ?60mm Mort 3X30Cal MG's	CO-Nguyen Xuan DU XO-HOANG PO-Pham Van XUYEN APO-Pham Van DUYEN
C-31st Ind Co	Doc Lap Co, Q.55 Co	8302 GD	2X82mm Mort 2X60mm Mort 3X60 30Cal MG's	CO-Pham Van LOI XO-Nguyen Quy Truong PO-Nguyen Van MINH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
31st NVA Inf Regt, 341st Div, Front 4	P25 Regt; Unit 5550; Infil Grp 150C; Song Huong Regt (Red River); 31st Worksite	3134 KT P6270 6670 Ap Thai 31457 3459 KT	9x12.7mm AA Guns 6x82mm Mort 75mm RR	CO-LtCol HUNG XO-Maj XA PO-Col Ho Quang DAM APO-Col Nguyen Chung TANH CofS-SrCapt NGOC
102nd Bn	F.8 Bn; D.8 Bn; D.2 Bn; 150B; 150C; 8th Bn	6687 Ap Thai P6287 31349 31349 KT 6627 Ap Thai Ap Thai 7566	4x82mm Mort 9x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-THANH XO-SrLt DO PO-Tran Minh SON CofS-SrLt Le Dinh THUC APO-Lt DAT
103rd Bn	F.9 Bn; 3rd Bn; D.9 Bn; D.3 Bn; F.9 Bn; 150A; 9th Bn; K.9 Bn; C.9 Bn	P6292 6692 Ap Thai 3459	4x82mm Mort 9x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41 ?x12.7mm AA Gun	CO-Capt TRINH XO-SrCapt Phong LICH PO-Capt NAM CofS-Capt CHINH
36th NVA Inf Regt, 308th Div, Front 4	Unit 1016; Unit 9530 Song Nong Regt; D.304; E.36; Group 6		?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort 6x75mm RR ?x12.7mm AA Guns	CO-SOAN XO-KHAI PO-Maj THANG
1st Bn	Unit 9531; D.1 Bn	6217 Ap Thai 6933 Ap Bac 62205 IS	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xRPG-2 ?xRPG-7 ?x7.62mm LMG ?x12.7mm AA Guns	CO-Capt Minh THUAN XO-Capt LOC PO-Capt BIEN CofS-Capt DINH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd Bn	Unit 9533; Unit 1016A; D.2 Bn; K.2 Bn	6218 Ap Thai 6938 Ap Bac 62201 Ap Bac	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41 ?x12.7mm AA Gun	CO-Capt NHI XO-Capt CHUNG PO-Capt HOA
3rd Bn	D.3; K.12; Replacement No 2006	6219 Ap Thai 6943 Ap Bac 62210 XP	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt THUC XO-SrLt TRINH PO-Capt NHO
90th Regt	3rd Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Danang Grp; Doan 3; AD.10; Cong Truong 63; Cua Viet; Nui Quyet; 60th Regt	41.210 FL 41.211 FL 41.212 FL 41.213 FL 41.214 FL 41.215 FL 41.216 FL 41.217 FL 41.218 FL	?x82mm Mort 3xUnk mm RR 3x120mm Mort	CO-Maj THUOC XO-Capt DANG PO-HOA APO-HA ACofS-Lt CHUONG
7th Bn	K.7 Bn; 17th Bn; D.7 Bn; T.7 Bn; Nui Quyet Bn	41.219 FL 31650 XB 41.220 FL 41.221 FL 41.222 FL 41.223 FL	3x82mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 6xB-40 6xB-41	CO-BAO XO-LY PO-XUAN APO-
8th Bn	K.8 Bn; 18th Bn; K.38 Bn; D.8 Bn; 108th Bn	41.224 FL 31655 XB 41.225 FL 41.226 FL 41.227 FL 41.228 FL	3x82mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 9xB-40 3xB-41	CO-SrCapt PHUOC XO-Capt NHI PO-SrCapt DOT APO-Capt NAM

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
9th Bn	K.9 Bn; 19th Bn; D.9 Bn; Nui Quyet Bn; B.19	41.229 FL 31660 XB 41.230 FL 41.231 FL 41.232 FL 41.233 FL	3x82mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 3xB-40 5xB-41 2x7.62mm MG	CO-SrCapt THUY XO-SrLt THUY PO-Capt Phau Thanh THUYEN APO-Lt CHUONG CofS-Lt TAN
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20; B-20; Viet Dung; 70th Bn; 1st Bn; F.5 Bn; Q.90 Bn	6788 Ap Thai 21341 GM Ba Ha 190 Viet Dung	4x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Nguyen Thanh CHI XO-KIEN PO-Hoynh NAM CofS-BA
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn; R.25 Bn; 2nd Bn; B.25 Bn; Q.92 Bn; 2nd Indep Bn of Quang Da	2116 Quang Da 192 Viet Dung P6493 6793 Ap Thai A4192 and Dung A44T.193	4x81mm Mort 5x60mm Mort ?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt Tran BINH XO-Nguyen LUONG PO-Tran NINH APO-Le HIEU
D.7 Bn	F.7 Bn; 1st Bn; D.3 Bn; 101st Bn	P6498 6798 Ap Thai Q.80 Anh Dung	5x82mm Mort 5x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt THOM XO-Capt KHOI PO-Capt TRANG

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UNIT	AKA	LOC	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
T.89 Sapper Bn	402nd Sapper Bn; YH.9; Tien Lua Bn	P6454 6754 Ap Thai 370 Thanh Khiet	6x81mm Mort 1x82mm Mort 18xB-40 2xHMG	CO-SrCapt NGOC XO-SrLt TO PO-Capt Tran Kim HUNG CofS-1stLt NAM
3rd Sapper Bn	1c3rd Sapper Bn; Lam Son Bn; Q.91 Bn; B-47 Sapper Bn; 710 Bn	P6475 6775 Ap Thai 63148 IS(NVN)	6x82mm Mort 5x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt Pham Van ON XO-HUNG PO-Capt Tran HUYNH CofS-Lt COI
141st Regt, 312th Div, Front 4	1st Regt; 3008 Group	1523 VR(NVN)	?x82mm Mort ?x81mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x12.7mm AA Gun ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Maj NGUYEN XO-Capt DUONG PO-Maj HAO
1st Bn	Pho Thong Bn; K.1 Bn		?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?xB-40 ?x12.7mm Tripod Mounted AA Gun	CO-Capt Nguyen Van CON XO- PO-Capt SAM
2nd Bn			?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x57mm RR ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt MAO XO-HUU PO-SrLt DIEU
3rd Bn		7425(NVN) 74222 CS(NVN)	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41 ?x75mm RR	CO-Capt CANH XO-1stLt HAY PO-SrLt UONG CofS-Lt Doan Van MIA

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
368B Arty Regt, Front 4	Binh Minh Worksite; 575th Unit; Infil Gp 575; E.368	P6301 6500 Ap Binh	122mm Rkt Launchers 140mm Rkt Launchers	CO-Maj Dinh Van HOA XO-Maj Nguyen Xuan TU PO-Maj Do Xuan KHOAT
1st Bn	D.99; D.1	6504 Ap Binh	18 X 122mm Rkt Launchers 6 X 140mm Rkt Launchers	CO-Capt Le Ngoc TOAN XO-Capt TAN PO-Capt CUNG
2nd Bn	D.2 Bn	6508 Ap Binh	18 X 122mm Rkt Launchers 6 X 82mm Mort	CO-Capt Le Quang MINH XO-Capt Tran TIEN PO-Capt DANG
3rd Bn	D.3	6512 Ap Binh	18 X 122mm Rkt Launchers 6 X 140mm Rkt Launchers 57 RR ?x82mm Mort	CO-SrCapt Pham CAN XO-Capt LONG PO-Capt LIEN
T.87 Sapper Bn	Truong Son Bn; 2nd Sap Bn; HH (Hoa Hieu)	P6470 6770 Ap Thai	3 X 82mm Mort 3 X 60mm Mort 3 X B-40's B-41's	CO-PHUNG XO-BINH PO-LIEN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
577 Rkt Bn, Front 4	130th Bn; 134th Infil Grp; 1st Bn, 68[illegible] Arty Regt	6620 Ap Hoa 54387 HT	18X122mm Rkt Launchers 6XB-40's 6XB-41's	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUNG XO-Capt Dang Van THUONG PO-Capt To Duc LUC CofS-Lt THANH
2nd NVA Div, MR-5	Thon An 520; Su Dong 2; Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2; Chi Lang; Ta-310; Nam Hai; Nong Truong 2	20601 GM 20925 GM Tay An H.4500 Ap Nam 42.40 HK 41910 KP		CO-BrigGen Le THACH/KIET XO-BrigGen Hoang Minh DAC/SON PO-BrigGen VIET/CHUONG
GK.37 Trans Bn		2062 Nam Hai		CO-Pham Ngoc HOANG
GK.38 Medical Bn		5060 Ap Nam C		CO-Capt Nguyen Van TU XO-1stLt Nguyen Van HIEU PO-Capt Le Hong HAI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
GK.30 Signal Bn	RQ.20/A Bn;RQ.20; V-107 RQ. 20/B Bn; Nam Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20 HT 20605 GM Tay An		CO-TUNG XO- PO- APO-Nguyen Ba CHU
GK.31 AA Bn	195th AA Bn; 519 AA Bn; 38th AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn; RQ.21		17x12.7mm AA	CO-Capt Huong Quy PHAN XO-Tran Van THIEN PO-QUANG
GK.32 RR Bn	RQ.22	Hai Cang 20	12x75mm RR	CO-SrCapt THUYLET XO-Nguyen KHUAN PO-TRUONG CofS-SrLt Vo Ngoc HANH
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	RQ.33; RQ.23; RQ.330; 7th Bn	1828/CN Hai Cang 20; 60620 GM Tay An; 22861 GH Hai Cang 20 Tay An; 22631 GH Hai Cang 20 Thu An	6x120mm Mort 82mm Mort 81mm Mort	CO-Le Van CAN XO-Nguyen KINH
GK.35 Sapper Bn	D-10 Sapper Bn		9xB-41 Rkt	CO-Nguyen Tien VINH XO-CAO PO-Nguyen Duc DUC
GK.40 Engr Bn	RQ.24	GM 20039 Tay An Nam Hai		CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG XO-Nguyen Viet THO PO-Ngoc PHUOC

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st VC Regt, 2nd Div	Cuong Truong 1; H-800; 108th Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Steel Regt	6000-6199 H 4600 AP NAM 5101 AP NAM		CO-LtCol Chan Khoi DICH XO-LtCol Chu An TAN PO-
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai; 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007 Bau Bang	5645 Quang Trung St.	.30 Cal MG 60mm Mort 81mm Mort 75mm RR 12.7 mm MG	CO-LOC XO-Nguyen Van TUAN
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai; Bong Trang (?) Binh Gia	20735 C.T. An Giang	81mm Mort 60mm Mort 57mm RR 82mm Mort 12.7mm MG	CO-SON XO-CHAT PO-MINH
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008; Thuan Minh; Song Hong (?) Phong Bien	HT 20100		CO-SANG XO-ANH PO-CHU
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; Cong Truong (?) AN LONG; H 213; V-50; K-55	HT 20648 GM An Binh; 880 Nam Ban; H.4880 Ha Bien; H 4700 AP NAM 2; 5201 AP NAM	17x81mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x60mm Mort 2x82mm Mort 4x82mm RR 1x57mm RR	CO-Maj THACH XO-Capt Cao NIEM PO-Maj DUC CofS-CHAU
60th Bn	11th Workshop; 1st Bn; 11th Bn; 4th Bn	6604 Long Thanh; J.4700		CO-Ngoc LICH XO-Lt Nguyen Dinh PHUNG PO-Capt Nguyen Duc HO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
70th Bn	135th Bn; 2nd Bn; 72nd Bn (?); 22nd Bn; 5th Bn	J.4770		CO-Nguyen Van THO XO-Lt Nguyen Van CUOC PO-Mai Xuan DIEM
80th Bn	3rd Bn; 75th Bn (?); Workshop 33; Phi Truong Long Chau; 33rd Bn; 6th Bn	J.4780	?x60mm Mort ?xB-41 ?xB-40	CO-Capt THANG XO-QUANG PO-SrCapt ANH
3rd NVA Regt	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite 3; Factory 10; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; Nam Ha; 323rd Regt (?); Ap Nam 31st Regt	HT 5503; HT 20801 GM An Binh; H.4810 Ap Nam HT 4880; HT 4241; HT 4842; HT 4849; HT 5317; Ap Nam 3 (?) 5301 Ap Nam H 4800 Ap Nam 3		CO-NGHIEM XO-Nguyen THANH PO-BINH CofS-Bui Thien Cac
1st Bn	X1; Xuong Mot; Ha Mai; Xuong (Bn) 7; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1 64th Bn; K-7	20728 GM An Binh; H.4860 Ha Mai	3x82mm Mort 3x57mm RR	CO-Capt THANH XO- PO-Lt DUC
2nd Bn	Binh Minh; X-2; K-2; 74th Bn; Xuong Hai; Ha Hai; Xuong (Bn) 8; K-8; Binh Da	20837 GM An Binh; H.4870 Ha Hai		CO-Capt KHAO XO-NHU PO-Capt HUONG
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84th Bn; X-3; Q.56; Nguyen Trai; 103rd Bn; Xuong (Bn) Ba; Ha Bien; Xuong (Bn); K-9	HT 20648 GM An Binh; 880 Nam Ban; H.4880 Ha Bien; HT 5317	2x120mm Mort 6x75mm RR 6x82mm Mort 3x50 cal HMG	CO-MY XO-CHAI PO-HOA

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UNIT	AKA	LOC	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd NVA Div, MR-5	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Liem Tinh 10	Hon Thu 2110 GM; 20845 GMT 10 Airfield 10		CO-SrCol VOTU XO-QUANG PO-Tran VAN APO-Col NAM
90th Engr Bn	40th Sapper Bn	PH 5082 Ap Dan PH 5081 Ap Dan 5555 Ap Dan		CO-THU XO-Pham Hong KHI PO-DUNG APO-PHU
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infiltration Group	1535; 1534; 10th Airport		CO-SrCapt LIEM XO-KUYET PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY Asst PO-Capt MO
300th Arty Bn	513 Infiltration Group; Xom 30; 499th Arty Bn; 400 Bn; Don VI 499th, Phan Doan 300; X-30, Unit 499, K.13	1538	3x120mm Mort 4x82mm Mort 3x75mm RR ?x140mm Rkt	CO-Lam Duy HIEM XO-LAN PO-HUU
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn;	1544		CO-CU XO-DO PO-HI Asst PO-DUONG
551st Signal Bn	D-16	20800 KG		CO-Capt BAO XO-Lt HIEN PO-SrCapt DIEU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
600th Medical Bn	Inter-Det 600	1548		CO- XO- PO-
2nd VC Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt; 8th Regt; 96th Regt; 193 GP; 511 Regt	21.100 21.141 21.142 21.143 21.144 21.145 21.146 21.147 21.148 21.149 PH 5100 Ap Dang	2x82mm Mort 2x57mm AA/MG 2xB-41 3xB-40 6x7.62 HMG	CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-Mai Van HA CofS-TRI
93rd Bn	707th Infil Group; Chi Ba (Three Sister); H-21 Bn; 93rd Gp; Piti Truong	6240 21.120	2x82mm Mort 2x57mm AA/MG 2xB-41 4xB-40 2x7.62 HMG 2x57mm RR 1xM-79	CO-Pham Van BAI XO-BONG PO-DI
95th Bn	705th Infil Group; Chi Nam; H-58; Ba Minh	21310 GM	2x57mm RR 1x60mm Mort 1xMG 3xB-40 2xB-41 1xM-79	CO-VINH XO-AN PO-Maj Van HA CofS-LUONG
97th Bn	703rd Infil Group; 207th Bn; Chi Bay; H-21; H-25; Xom; 307th Bn	6340 TL(old) 21.140 GM 21.143	4x60mm Mort 5xB-40 6xB-41	CO-VINH/TRONG? XO-BINH/HOA? PO-OANH/HOA?

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
18th NVA Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803rd Infil Group; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Soa Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt(?); Lien Gia Bon	7173 DS 21155 GM 21150-21199 157; 21 AG Unit 519		CO-Duong Minh NGO XO-HONG PO-Le HOA APO-VOI CofS-DIEU
7th Bn	263rd Bn (Infil); H-7; H-31; Huyen 31; Lien Doi 4; Phan Doan 4; 4th Bn	21162-21166 Unit 521		CO-MOC XO-Capt Doan Hung SUM PO-Capt Pham Hung KHOI APO-Nguyen Trong MAM
8th Bn	803K Infil Group; Inter-Unit 5; District 12; Lieu Doi 5; Huyen 32; Lien Doi 5; H-32; H-8; Unit 523; 5th Bn	211670 21171 Unit 523		CO-CUONG XO-THUAN PO-THANH CofS-LUONG
9th Bn	H-9; H-33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn	21172-21176 Unit 525		CO-TUY XO-QUANG PO-ANH CofS-HOANG
22nd NVA Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Group; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3rd Regt; E-101(?); 6th Regt; Lien Gia Sau; Cong Truong 3; Worksite 3; Unit 527; Pho Nam Regt	21141 VM Binh Dinh (P); 1010 Phi Truong 10; PH5200 Ap Than 21175-21199		CO-Nguyen Xuan DIEP XO-Maj Nguyen Van DUC or KHANG PO-Ho Si LOC/Ho Dac LIEN? CofS-Capt THANG/LANH?

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517th Bn; Inter Group		1x57mm RR 5x82mm Mort 5xB-41 5x12.7mm AA Gun	CO-Maj Duyen NAI XO-Lt HOANG PO-Capt DIEM/LY? CofS-Capt KHOI
8th Bn	2nd Bn; Bn 516; Xom Tam	21225 Gia Phi/Truong 10	4x82mm Mort 1x57mm RR 4x12.7mm MG 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-DUNG XO- PO- Capt THIEN CofS-Capt THANH
9th Bn	3rd Bn; Bn 514; Inter Group 9; Xom Chin	4739/TA	4xB-40 4xB-41 2x82mm Mort 4x60mm Mort	CO-THI XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN
120th Bn	Q-20; T-20; 20th Bn; 21st Bn; X-20; Tong Doan 20; V.3 Bn	20135	1x81mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 3x57mm RR 3x75mm RR 5xMG	CO-HAI XO-HIEP PO-Nguyen DAN
406th Sapper Bn	409 Bn; Don Vi 406	4141 Ap Bac	1x60mm Mort 7XB-40 7xB-41 1xRR 2x82mm Mort	CO-HOA XO-DUNG PO-Dung Quang HUAN APO-TU
107th Arty Bn	270th Bn; 2nd 12.7mm AA Bn; D.107th Bn; Mountain Gun Bn; GK.31 AA Bn; Unit 743	777 Tran Quoc Tuan	5x12.7mm AA 18xSMG 1x75mm RR 6x82mm Mort ?x140mm Rkt	CO-Nguyen HONG XO-CHI PO-Le Xuan HONG CofS-Capt CHI Adj-Lt SIV S1-BO S4-1stLt Ong HANH

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
9th Sapper Bn	2nd Bn	1088	2x60mm Mort 2xB-40	CO-Maj Vu Vinh QUANG XO-Mui Van THIET PO-Mai Van TRUONG
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38; D-3; Unit 133; Nghiep Doan 8; X.13; Black Tiger Bn; Unit 740; Anh Ba Tu	2048 NQ Ba Bao	2xLMG 2x82mm Mort 2x57mm RR 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-MEN/LIEM? XO-TAM PO-Nguyen HAM CofS-Luong Van NAY APO-Nguyen TUAN
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 4th Labor Union; 48th Worksite; 2nd Bn(?); K.48 Bn; Don VI 130; K.13; Unit 741		2x81mm Mort 2x57mm RR 3x60mm Mort 3xLMG 2x82mm Mort 1x75mm RR ?xB-40	CO- QUA XO-'SANG PO-'Tran TA APO-LONG
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Cuu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-Mountain White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103 Cunh Gia(?); Bong Trang	20647	3x81mm Mort 4x60mm Mort 4x57mm RR 5xLMG 12xB-40 RL	CO-CHUA XO-LY PO-SON

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
72nd Bn	X.72; R.13; H.68; 33rd Bn; Truong Son; Chu Dung; 103rd; 300; 305 GP; Hoi Chang 15; X-22 An Khe (506)	21993 Hanh 21445 GM 25010	2X82mm Mort 2X81mm Mort 6X60mm Mort 3X57mm RR 2X12.7mm AA MG's 15XB-40 RL 6XB-41 RL	CO-Nguyen Van CAN XO-Nguyen Van LE PO-KHANH
74th Bn	V.20; V.74; 75th		1X60mm Mort 1XLMG 3X57mm RR	CO-DUC/QUANG (?) XO-THAI/Yeu THAN PO-QUYET
76th Sapper Bn	K.55; C.75; Flying Tiger 21; V.16 Bn		1X60mm Mort 4XB-40 RL 3XB-41 RL	CO-TIEN XO-VINH PO-XUM
78th Arty Bn	X-78; Xuong 78; 78 DKB		6X122mm RL 5X82mm Mort 2X57mm RR ?XB-41 RL	CO-THONG XO-XAM PO-TOI
81st Co	Worksite 81; Code No T120; D.1; D.81; X.81; T.760; 85th Bn; Bac Son Binh; Unit 742; 81st Bn	773 GM Tran Quoc Tuan	1X60mm Mort 3XB-40's 1XB-41's	CO-LAM XO-THANH PO-NHONG AsstPO-PHANG
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20; 575th Bn; A-58; 409A Bn; K-5 Sapper Bn; Sapper R-5; 307th Bn; Bac Hien	20142 GM 20144 GM Bac Hien 1291 KW Bac Hien; Ba Hoa; X2424; 20142 GM; 4116 A-12 Bac Tien	?X81mm Mort 7X60mm Mort 3X57mm RR	CO-VAN XO-TAO PO-VIET

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
V.14 Co	A.14 Co; 113th Co; K.53 Co; 14th Co; NK.108; A.19		1xLMG	CO-Huynh TIEN/Pham TO XO-Nguyen PHUONG PO-
V.15 Co	K.51; 107; FO 14; A.10; D.21; Thang Binh Co; B.104		1x60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-QUANG PO-CONG
C.17 Co	Mo Duc Co			CO-Nguyen DIEP XO-Lt PHUOC PO-NOI
V.18 Co				CO-Nguyen Thi THANH XO- PO
C.18 Co	Nghia Hanh LF Co		1x60mm Mort 4xSMG	CO-TAM XO-BINH PO-BAY
C.19 Co	C.19B (?) (Possible)		3x57mm RR 4xB-40 2x60mm Mort 2xLMG	CO-Nguyen SON XO-Le Van THANH PO-MAU
T.20 Co	C.20; Son Tinh Dong Co; V.20; C-137		1x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG	CO-KHANG XO- PO-THANH
P.31 Co	T.19 Co; D.31 Co; T-31 Co		2xB-40	CO-DUC XO-PHUOC PO-MANH APO-NAM
C.74 Co			1x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG	CO-GIO (or GIAO) XO-THUOC PO-NAM

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
C.120 Co	Unit 145		6xThompson SMG 3xMAT-49 SMG 2xB-40	CO-QUANG XO-TU PO-
C.7 Co	Unit 139; C.16 Co; 506 LF Co		1xLMG 1x60mm Mort 6xM-79	CO-DA XO-XU PO-NAM
Q.80 Co, Front 4	Hoi An Co; X.62 Co; 72 Co; Q.12 Co; 44th Bn; F.12 Co	180 Anh Dung	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Tran BUA XO-Bua THAI PO-HIEN
Q.81 Co, Front 4	Duy Xuyen Co; H.52; 103rd Co; 73rd Co; Q.13 Co; Q.13B	181 Anh Dung 2103	3x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Nguyen Dinh BON XO-Nguyen THAM PO-Nguyen HOA
Q.82 Co, Front 4	Dien Ban Co; H.40 Co; X.55 Co; 104th Co; X.65; Q.15 Co	182 Anh Dung 133 Tuong Lai 21335 GM Ba Ha	2x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort ?xRPG-2 ?xRPG-7	CO-Huynh Viet NGAN XO-Tan Chung NGO PO-Mai Phuoc KIEM
Q.83 Co, Front 4	Q.14 Co; H.42 Co; X.64 Co; 74th Co; Dai Loc Co	183 Anh Dung 21334 GM Ba Ha	2x60mm Mort 2x81mm Mort 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-Nguyen CHAU XO-Nguyen Quang HUNG PO-Le Long PHUNG
Q.84 Co, Front 4	Q.16 Co; X.66 Co; X.17 Co; Hoa Vang Co	184 Anh Dung 21336 GM Ba Ha	2x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort 6xB-40	CO-Hoang Minh NGHIEM XO-DONG PO-AI
21st Sapper Co	T-21, H-40	22422	2xLMG 2x60mm Mort	CO-Ho Khanh DU XO-Ha Thanh LIEM PO-Nguyen Van HU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Co	Que Son Independent Co	2184	2x81mm Mort 4x60mm Mort 2x57mm RR 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-1stLt Nguyen HANH XO-2ndLt CA PO-Nguyen UT
C.219 Co	Duc Pho Co; Anh Hai		2x60mm Mort 1xLMG 2xB-40 18x6MG	CO-MAU XO-TUNG PO-CAU
706th Co	C.73; A.16; BK.110; K-43	2002	2x60mm Mort 1x57mm RR 6xLMG	CO-Nguyen THANH XO-Pham PHUONG PO-Pham KHAI
K.51 Wpns Co	C.51 Wpns Co		2x60mm Mort 1x57mm RR 1x81mm Mort	CO- XO- PO-
506 "A" Sapper Co	Unit 506			CO-Xo Duc BA XO-VINH PO-DUONG
506 "B" Sapper Co	H-42	Hon Thu 21618 M	?x6MG ?xB-40	CO-LIEU XO-KY PO-DO/HONG/ANH
95A Sapper Co	C95A Sapper Co		1xB-40 1xB-41 2x60mm Mort 1xM-79	CO-Le HOA XO-TUYEN PO-HIEP APO-Nguyen SC
95B Sapper Co	C95B Sapper Co		2xB-40 1x57mm RR 1x60mm Mort	CO-2ndLt Pham Tan HOAI XO-Mgt Phong Hong MINH PO-Asp Le Duy KHANH APO-CAY

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 39-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P)

a. PW, PFC Hoang Phi TUAN (AKA Hoang HAI) 2nd Co, 1st Bn, 9th Regt, 304th Div, captured on 5 September 1969 in the vicinity of (XD 960614) (III MAF 131530Z September 1969 11th ITT Rpt #114-69) stated that the 2nd Co had approximately 90 men and the 1st Bn was located in QUANG NINH (D), QUANG BINH (P), NVN. TUAN revealed that the mission of the 2nd Co was to attack U.S. positions in the vicinity of (XD 960614) prior to daylight on 6 September 1969 and then withdraw to base area in QUANG NINH (D). Subject further stated that the morale in his unit was good because they believed that the 25,000 U.S. troops that withdrew from RVN were sick, weak or wounded. Source states that the 9th Regt has AKA's of 1st Regt, K.27 and U1 and the LBN for the 2nd Co was 13653-US. TUAN also revealed that the 2nd Co received replacements early in July and they sustained one killed by artillery on 28-29 July and one man died of an unknown illness on 27 July. Reported personalities: 9th Regt CO-TRUONG, XO-HUY, APO-DAM, CofS-THO; 1st Bn CO-DIEN; 2nd Co CMDR-TAN, XO-KHAI, PO-KHUC, APO-PHU.

(G-2 COMMENT: LBN 13653-US falls in the same series as LBN's revealed by captured documents after the significant contact with the 9th Regt on 7 August 1969. All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, PFC Nguyen Van CUONG, 1st Co, 1st Bn, 9th Regt, 304th Div, captured on 5 September 1969 in the vicinity of (XD 961617) (3rd MARDIV 080842Z September 1969 7th ITT Rpt #67-69A) gives the 1st Co's strength as 50 men and they were located on HILL 484 (XD 968617). CUONG also stated that his unit's mission was to observe and harass FWMAF in the same vicinity as his place of capture. Subject further stated that elements of the 22nd Transportation Co were operating with his unit and that their mission was to return to the battalion CP within the DMZ (CNA) to obtain food and ammunition. Source revealed that morale was low in his unit because of lack of food, lack of motivation, men are not allowed to return home to visit their families, letters are not being received from home and the men are tired of the war. CUONG also states that the LBN for the 1st Co was 13653-US. Subject revealed that his unit was guided by elements of the 22nd Transportation Co from VINH LINH (D) across the BEN HAI River into RVN during hours of darkness between 1 and 5 August 1969. Reported personalities: 304th Div CO-Huong DAN; 9th Regt CO-TRUONG; 1st Bn CO-CUOC; 1st Bn CMDR-DIEU, XO-KHAI.

(G-2 COMMENT: LBN 13653-US was previously reported by a PW from the 1st Bn, 9th Regt and it also falls in the same series as LBN's revealed by captured documents after the significant contact with the 9th Regt, 304th Div on 7 August 1969. The 9th Regt CO, THUONG, has also been previously reported by a PW from the 9th Regt. All information rated (F-3).)

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c. PW, WO Nguyen Thanh SON of the C.4, K.34 Arty Bn, 7th Front, captured on 20 September 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 357376) (SA 1st ARVN Div Interro Rpt 240730Z September 1969) while on a food gathering mission, stated that his unit's mission was to mortar ARVN units in QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Districts. SON further stated that the companies of the battalion are operating independently: 1st Co, K-34 in THUA THIEN area; 3rd Co, K-34 in QUANG HA area; 4th Co, K-34 in the vicinity of (YD 3337). The PW also revealed that there are three infantry companies (1, 3 and 4) for a total strength of approximately 120 men. SON reveals the subordinate units to the 7th Front area: K.34 (Artillery), K.11 (Sapper), K.11 and K.8 (Infantry), C.20 (Transportation), C.25 (Road Security), C.24 (Engineer), C.23 (Reconnaissance) and C.18 (Unknown). Weapons reported for the battalion include 12 DKZB's and three 82mm Mortars. Reported personalities: Bn CO-TUAN, XO-1stLt NO, CofS-CHAT, 4th Co CMDR-2ndLt Pham THAO, XO-2ndLt VAN, PO-2ndLt HE.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first report of the personalities other than CofS-CHAT. III MAF OOB carries the recent strength of the K.34 Arty Bn as 240 men. The K.11 Infantry Bn is probably the K.14 Infantry Bn. All information rated (F-3).)

2. THUA THIEN (P). No significant reports.

3. QUANG NAM (P)

a. Hoi Chanh, Nguyen Thi LE of the THANH THUY (V), Commo-Liaison Section who rallied on 19 September 1969 in the vicinity of (BT 069638) (CG 1st MARDIV 231515Z September 1969 Initial Interr Rpt) stated that her mission was to attend Commo-Liaison Meetings. The Hoi Chanh stated that the PHONG HO (H) LFVC was composed of 10 guerrillas located in the vicinity of (BT 063628) and has a unit designated as "40" with a composition of approximately 180 men who were located in DIEN BAN (D) (COORD UNK) about 10 kilometers west of DIEN BAN City. The base area was maintained in PHONG HO (H), THANH THUY (V), BIEN BAN (D), QUANG NAM (P) (BT 063628). The Hoi Chanh further stated that an attack by the VC/NVA was to begin in the first 10 days of October 1969. This will be a three pronged attack on the 2/1 Bn, USMC, the ROKMC Compound, and a CAP unit at DIEN BAN (D) Headquarters, and HOI AN City. The three positions would be attacked simultaneously so that possible mutual assistance from the three positions would be eliminated. The Q.82 Bn would combine with approximately 200 local, and district VC for the attack on 2/1. The R.20 Bn would attack the two positions at DIEN BAN (D) Headquarters, and the 40th Bn would attack HOI AN City. The Q.82 Bn is located south of GO NOI Island and will travel across GO NOI to arrive in the 2/1 TAOR. Their route of march would be cleared by the local VC. The location of the R.20 Bn is unknown. Once the battalions are in position, the signal for the local VC to assemble would be three burning piles of trash or weeds in DIEN BAN (D). The fires would be so placed as to send up three columns of smoke.

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The exact location of the burning piles is unknown. Should the attack be delayed for a few days, the Q.82 Bn would be staged near the boundary of the ROKMC and 2/1 Bn's TAOR south of CAM SA Nr 1 (H) (COORD UNK).

(G-2 COMMENT: This Hoi Chanh voluntarily led a Marine squad to a cache of 28x122mm rockets, and 1,500 rounds of AK ammunition. The information received for the stated attack is a first report. The Q.82 LF Unit is the DIEN BAN LF Unit and could possibly mass enough people for an attack by combining local force elements. The "Unit 40" designation is also recorded for the first time. It is conceivable that the R.20 Bn could come south from their present approximate location to attack HOI AN or surrounding areas. All information rated (F-3).)

b. Hoi Chanh, Laborer, Nguyen Huu MUOI, 7th Co, D.130 Transportation Bn, Group 44, QUANG DA who ralled on 13 September 1969 in the vicinity of THUONG DUC SS HQ (ZC 149533) (SA QUANG NAM Sector HOI AN RVN 180939Z September 1969 Initial Interr Rpt 11th ITT HOI AN 78-69) stated the last known location of his unit was in the vicinity of (YD 785613) as of 6 September 1969. MUOI stated that the unit's mission is to transport weapons, ammunition and produce food in support of main force units of QUANG DA Province. Source further stated that the composition of the 130th Transportation Bn was five companies and a battalion headquarters section. The 1st and 2nd Co's of the battalion are composed of Montagnard Tribesmen. The companies are designated 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7. The 3rd Co is made up mostly of Montagnards. The 7th Co is composed mostly of personnel from detention camps released to work as laborers. MUOI stated that there was a detention camp, designated "150" and is located in TA GIA (V) (ZC 750590). The camp includes four sections with each section approximately one day walk apart. Also that total of 500 civilians were detained at the camp and that many of the detainees became sick and died. The detainees must provide their own food. The Hoi Chanh stated that weapons and ammunition are stored along "a rain stream" located in the vicinity of (ZC 040508) for delivery to NVA units. Also there are weapons and ammunition located in the vicinity of (YC 988621) KEN Village. The Hoi Chanh stated that morale was low due to lack of food, hard work, and a desire to return to the low-lands. The Hoi Chanh stated that the battalion's LBN was S6865 AP THAI and the AKA was "TRUNG SON Group".

(G-2 COMMENT: The 130th Transportation Bn has been previously mentioned as subordinate to Front 4. This location given for the units is close to Route 614 which would be in accordance with the unit's mission. Composition of the unit is mentioned for the first time as well as the AKA and LBN given. Information on the detention camp is also reported for the first time. All information rated (F-3).)

c. Hoi Chanh, Pvt Nguyen Van TAC, K.6 Co, 8th Bn, 31st Regt, Central Wing, who rallied on 19 September 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 947700) (CG 1st MARDIV 230427Z September 1969 Supr Interr Rpt 15th ITT 07-09-69) stated

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that the K.6 Co had an estimated strength of 16 men, while the 8th Bn's strength was placed at 80 men. The 31st Regt was composed of the 8th and 9th Bn's. The 8th Bn was located approximately one hours walk west from (AT 849715) approximately located in the vicinity of (AT 805715) as of 17 September 1969. The Hoi Chanh stated that a base camp was also maintained in this vicinity. TAC further stated that the morale was low due to lack of food and medical supplies and that the men have expressed desires to return to NVN. The Political Officers tell the men they endure less hardships than those of FWMAF. The Hoi Chanh described their rations as one and one-half cans of rice and milk mixture per day per man, salt and no meat. Source further revealed that the Company Commander of the K.6 Co has been missing since 12 September 1969. Reported personalities: K.6 Co CMDR-JrLt TRUNG, XO-Asp HO, PO-JrLt HUAN, APO-Asp PHIEN. The Hoi Chanh stated resupply routes and pick up points were HOA THINH (V) (AT 953712) and HOA PHU (V) (AT 922726).

(G-2 COMMENT: The location given for the Hoi Chanh's former unit is within keeping with the current OOB holdings on this unit. The stated strengths for his company and battalion were exceptionally low and reported for the first time. The mention of milk mixture with the rice is reported here for the first time. Although, no origin for the milk was given, it is probably obtained at the rice re-supply villages which are within close proximity of this unit. The personalities mentioned are for the first time. All information rated (F-3).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). PW, Kieu VUONG, 18th Signal Co, 31st Regt (AKA 3rd Regt), 2nd NVA Div, captured on 13 September 1969 in the vicinity of (BT 019244) (Americal 131633Z September 1969 Americal 357-69) stated that his company's strength was 100 and was located in the vicinity of (BT 0019). VUONG revealed that the mission of his company is to supply the three infantry battalions of the 31st Regt with RTO's and radio equipment. Source also gave the 9th (AKA 3rd) Bn, 31st Regt as having a strength of 350 and located in the vicinity of (BT 0126) with a mission of attacking allied fire bases, OP's and base camps in QUANG NAM (P) particularly in TIEN PHUOC (D). Subject further stated the code name for the 31st Regt is HA NOI and the code name for the 9th Bn is SON TAY. VUONG stated that the morale of the 18th Co and 9th Bn is average. Source began infiltration southward on 22 April 1967 in Infiltration Group #121 which had a strength of 700 at that time, and arrived in RVN in early August 1967. Reported personalities: 31st Regt CO-NGHIEM, XO-THANH, PO-BINH; 9th Bn CO-MY, XO-CHAT, PO-HOA; 18th Co CMDR-LAP.

(G-2 COMMENT: The locations source gave for his unit and 9th Bn are possibly true. Agent reports and enemy activity in the area tend to add credence to VUONG's statement (F-3). The strength of 350 given by the source for the 9th Bn seems rather high in light of the heavy losses that the 31st Regt sustained in late August of this year (F-4). III MAF OOB has no information on any of the personalities except THANH, 31st Regt XO. There is no record of Infiltration Group #121 (F-6).)

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5. QUANG NGAI (P). PW, Name unknown, captured on 17 September 1969 in the vicinity of (BR 907974), BINH DINH (P) (2nd ARVN Div Spt Rpt 192315Z September 1969) stated that she read a letter which directed the 18th Regt to coordinate with all BINH DINH forces to conduct attacks throughout BINH DINH (P) on 27 September 1969. Two days prior to captured, she overheard two VC cadre discussing the move of an NVA regiment from QUANG NGAI (P) to BINH DINH (P). The move was to be completed several days prior to 27 September 1969.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB believes that probably this regiment is the 2nd MF Regt of the 3rd Div with a possibility of it being the 22nd Regt. Both have been known to operate across the BINH DINH border. All information rated (F-3).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 39-69

1. GENERAL. Reported counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities during the past week reflected a continuation of emphasis on the conduct of military, political, and civil proselyting to strengthen the enemy's revolutionary organizational cadre and forces.

High priority is being directed toward the widespread cultivation of penetration agents in GVN/Allied installations through military, political, and civil proselyting and subsequent recruitment of agents. Enemy success in this endeavor cannot be accurately estimated, but detection of some penetration agents reflect at least limited enemy success in this area and establishes the continuing necessity of effective Allied/ARVN/GVN active, passive, and denial countermeasure programs.

Reports have indicated initiation of a program for regrouping selected civilians, cadre, and soldiers to North Vietnam for specialized training and to prepare them for eventual positions of leadership in South Vietnam following the enemy anticipated establishment of a communist state and reunification of the country. Publicizing of the plan, along with propaganda of an eventual victory, may also be an attempt to restore the people's confidence in the VC to a point where they would be willing to lend greater support. Reported sabotage activities continued at a generally low level.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. Reported VC/VCI intelligence collection efforts during the past week continued to focus emphasis on the cultivation and recruitment of penetration agents through civilian and military proselyting. Captured enemy documents continue to reflect the successes of VC "fifth columnists" (penetration agents) currently serving in various military units and civilian government agencies (GVN). The necessity for continuous and effective implementation of active, passive, and denial countermeasures in combatting this enemy threat, cannot be overemphasized.

Details of reported enemy intelligence gathering efforts during the past week are as follows:

a. Quang Tri. A GVN source reported that Bui Van BANG, assisted by Mai TUE, led a Viet Cong (V) element into Cat Son Phuong (H) vicinity of (YD 250805)during the night of 21 September 1969. The element intended to infiltrate Xuan Khanh resettlement hamlet (YD 325697), meet with intelligence sources living in the hamlet and to propagandize the people. The element was then to move to the vicinity of (YD 260625) Dong Phong (V) to conduct reconnaissance operations against U.S. forces operating near the Cua Viet River. (Eval: C-3).

b. Quang Nam.

(1) The following information was taken from an enemy document

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captured on 18 September 1969, vicinity (AT 846477):

Notebook entries dated 6 November 1968 to 10 September 1969 by Pham Hong THUONG, a cadre of a military proselyting section (probably of Dien Ban (D), Quang Nam) contains notes from meetings, training sessions, and information on enemy (RVNAF) servicemen's dependents and fifth columnists in various areas of Quang Nam Province.

A Note dated September 1969, taken from a directive issued by superior headquarters, (nfi) states: "The military proselyting sections in various city wards (possibly of Danang City) should be urgently consolidated for immediate use and also for future purposes when there is a political solution (for the VN war). A propaganda operation aimed at the enemy ranks is to be initiated, during which fifth columnists should be recruited within the Puppet Army for future use".

The notebook further contains information about nine (VC) fifth columnists currently serving in various (RVNAF) units. They were recruited by R (possibly COSVN and the Military Region 5). One of them operated in an artillery unit, one in a CIDG unit, one in an engineer battalion, one is an NCO serving as an interpreter, one a psywar NCO, and the others are servicemen (nfi).

(2) The following information was taken from an enemy document captured on 18 September 1969, vicinity (AT 987576):

Letter, dated 22 July 1969, from a member of the Military Proselyting Section (possibly of Quang Da Special Zone, Region 5), addressed to THUONG military proselyting cadre of K533 (Dien Ban (D), QDSZ), directs the latter to prepare for a military proselyting mission on the Biet Dong (possibly RVNAF Ranger unit) in his area in order to recruit fifth columnists. Document states that NGOC, a member of this section, was designated to assist the chiefs of (Dien) Van, (Dien) Tien, (Dien) Tho and (Dien) Phuoc villages to make plans for this attack. Also NGOC was to receive a number of legal cadre (those operating in RVN controlled areas) from the district, to assist in the military proselyting mission, in compliance with a previous assignment order.

c. Quang Ngai. A GVN source reported that on 10 September 1969 a meeting of the VC Counterintelligence Agency (nfi) of the Quang Ngai Provincial unit was held in the vicinity of (BS 369399), Ba Tra (V), Ba To (D). The meeting was called to commemorate the death of MINH and to ensure secret orders (nfi). They also discussed the establishment of a counterintelligence school to teach methods of elicitation and observation so that the number of spies in the GVN-controlled area could be doubled. (Eval: F-3).

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3. SABOTAGE. Reported sabotage activities in ICTZ during the past week consisted of the destruction of a foot path culvert and reports of enemy intentions to sabotage US and ARVN installations and patrol boats. Details of the sabotage incident and reported enemy sabotage intentions are as follows:

a. Thua Thien. A US MI source reported that on 17 September 1969, 12 personnel of a VC/NVA sapper frogman team, commanded by LO, arrived in the Tan Sa area vicinity (YD 952223). The unit's mission is to sabotage many US and ARVN patrol boats in order to create the appearance of many sapper units in the area while the sapper units of Vin Loc, Phu Thu and Phu Loc go to Hoi Mit in the vicinity (AT 820940) for a meeting on 22 September 1969. The main topic of this meeting will be the changing of operational areas. (Eval: F-2).

b. Quang Nam.

(1) A US MI report reveals that the Quang Da Special Zone Committee has ordered its cadre to pick up all dud ammo and ordnance for use as command detonated mines. The committee reportedly insisted that its agents mingle with carpenters and/or masons working on construction of US and GVN installations, and then attempt to put these explosives under the floor, running a wire outside. Such command detonated mines would be activated upon completion and occupation of the structure. Reporting agency comments that the VC attempted to carry out this type of sabotage at Cam Chau (V) headquarters, Hieu Nhon (D), but that the device was discovered on 9 September 1969.

(2) At 212055H September 1969, a culvert along a foot trail at An Dong (H) approximately 200 meters east of Dai Loc (D) Headquarters vicinity (AT 916575) was destroyed by an explosive device (nfi).

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Reports of VC/VCI political and propaganda activities continued at a high level and generally reflected the same policy and themes as emphasized over the past several weeks. Reports and translations of captured documents received during the past week reflect a concentration of emphasis on propaganda, civil and military proselyting, and tax and food collection.

Numerous reports indicate that the enemy is utilizing announced US troop withdrawals to compliment and lend credibility to propaganda and civil and military proselyting programs, in publicizing the certainty of his inevitable and forthcoming victory. This same tactic is being used to offset serious morale problems among enemy forces, and has been of far greater value, in this regard, than the rededication and resolve to win policies generated at recent widespread ceremonies commemorating the death of Ho Chi MINH.

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The strengthening and expansion of revolutionary organizational cadre and forces through civil, military, and political proselyting continues as the immediate enemy objective in anticipation of continued US troop withdrawals.

Details of reported enemy political and propaganda activity during the past week are as follows:

a. Quang Tri. A US MI source reported that VC activity covering 14-20 September 1969 was extremely light. Very few contacts were made and all were squad size or less. Liaison reports indicate the main activity in Mai Linh and Hai Lang (D), Quang Tri Province has been rice collections vicinity (YD 3247) and (YD 4343) and propagandizing Hai Thuong (V) vicinity (YD 3840). Indications are that the VC/VCI are avoiding contact with allied units and travelling in squad size units for political and resupply purposes.

b. Thua Thien. On 18 September 1969, approximately one VC platoon entered Van Xa (H), (YD 663280), Huong Phu (V), Huong Tra (D), distributed leaflets (nfi) and obtained foodstuffs (nfi).

c. Quang Tri-Thua Thien. Extract from XXIV Corps INTSUM 267-69 concerning VC/NVA propaganda in regards to US troop withdrawals:

Keeping in mind the communist policy of combining military and political efforts, the VC/NVA will use the US troop withdrawal as a basis for strong propaganda themes which will generally state that US troops have been defeated and that the GVN cannot protect the people. This is based upon a study of past VC/NVA activities immediately after a US troop withdrawal. The last troop withdrawal was completed by 31 August 1969. During that period and immediately afterward, the enemy increased its military activity. Coupled with this, military activity was increased in Quang Tri (P). There have been increased attempts to intimidate the local militia since the announcement of US troop withdrawals. The activity is politically inspired and the goal is to use this propaganda in the elections in Vietnam. Another report states that the enemy depicts the US withdrawals as an abandonment of the GVN. Such propaganda, when used in conjunction with terrorist attacks, may cause dissatisfaction among people who are as yet uncommitted. Another theme which has been noted is that the Americans are willing to negotiate which is a sign of weakness and failure. With this in mind, certain themes can be expected in VC/NVA propaganda in the near future. They may be as follows:

(1) VC/NVA military victories have forced the US to withdraw its troops.

(2) The US is abandoning the GVN because they realize that the war is lost.

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(3) The RVNAF are being used to protect US troops who remain in defensive positions.

d. Quang Nam.

(1) The following information was extracted from an enemy document captured on 12 September 1969, vicinity (AT 951617):

Letter, dated 12 September 1969, addressed from Thi TUY, a female political struggle cadre who was on TDY in the K2 (Area 2, Hoa Vang (D)) to A30 (Political Struggle Section, QDSZ), stated as follows: "I have received no letter or information from you (Cadre of A30) since I left the agency. I want to mail this letter to you via HUY to report to you on the situation of K2. The enemy (GVN) is now making his greatest efforts to carry out his on-the-spot pacification scheme in the area, especially at (Hoa) Luong and (Hoa) Binh villages in the upper part of the "Song Yin" (River). The number of (VC) nucleus agents (of former political struggles in the area), being relatives of the Revolution (meaning VC cadre and soldiers) and who were previously successful in political struggles against the Americans, are no longer suitable for present (political) struggles against the "Puppet" (SVN) Government and its Army due to their illegal status (meaning having no GVN legal papers). As a result, I have to recruit new nucleus agents (for future political struggles) and have already recruited 30 persons since I arrived here on TDY.

I am now trying to recruit more nucleus agents and transform myself into a legal cadre (meaning a cadre who possesses RVN legal papers)".

(2) A CAS debriefing of an NVA company level Political Officer revealed that on 25 August 1969, a meeting for party members of an NVA unit was held. The Company Political Officer said that the "National Front for the Liberation of SVN (NFLSVN) would soon be replaced by the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). He explained that the NFLSVN was not recognized by many countries as a legal government elected by the people, but only as a front whose representatives had been appointed. He claimed the PRG was an elected government of the people which was becoming very strong, and that recognition of the PRG as a popularly elected government by other countries was very important. (CAS Comment: Source did not mention the names of other countries, but believe he was referring to Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand). He added that the mission of the VC and NVA was to support the PRG while it waged a political war.

On 29 August 1969, the battalion Political Officer met with source's company and elaborated on the PRG. He stated that the PRG must be recognized as the legal government of SVN which was elected by the people, and therefore must have an established capital, such as Tay Ninh or Hue.

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Once the capital was established and defended by the VC and NVA, other governments would be able to meet with the PRG. The Battalion Political Officer believed Tay Ninh would make an ideal capital because it is near the Cambodian border and does not have a large presence of US and GVN troops. (CAS Comment: Source maintained that the occupation of Hue during TET 1968 was only a tactic in the Communist Liberation Campaign for SVN and was not an attempt to establish a base for a planned PRG).

(3) A US MI source reported that on 18 September 1969, two VC movements existed and were called the "Movement to Revolt" and the "People's Movement". The "People's Movement", led by VC cadre was based primarily in VC controlled areas and had the mission of supporting the "Movement to Revolt" in cities and towns. Cadre of the "Movement to Revolt" have already been trained and have infiltrated national areas with falsified documents. Their goal was to convince laborers and students to participate in these movements. Once sufficient participation has been acquired, attempts to revolt against the GVN will be made.(Eval: C-3).

(4) The following information was extracted from an enemy document captured on 18 September 1969 vicinity of (AT 978578):

Directive, classified (VC) SECRET, dated 15 July 1969, signed by QUOC for F65 (Current Affairs Committee, Quang Da Special Zone) concerns the conduct of a military proselyting campaign throughout Area A (nfi):

Document states that a military proselyting campaign encompassing the following three phases was scheduled to last from August to December 1969. Phase I would start from 5 August to 5 September 1969; Phase II during October, and Phase III in December 1969.

During this campaign, efforts would be made to (1) conduct military proselyting activities aimed at all types of US, RVNAF, and satellite personnel stationed throughout the battlefield by means of leaflets, slogans, and proselyting letters, (2) prepare to employ military proselyting forces in the killing of tyrants and destruction of the GVN administrative machinery, (3) create a political struggle movement in units of the RVNAF and (4) strive to plant fifth-columnists in the Puppet units according to the following criteria: Two fifth-columnists per 100 regular unit personnel and three agents per 100 civil guard personnel.

(5) The following information was extracted from an enemy document captured on 18 September 1969, vicinity (AT 987576):

Notebook, with entries made from an unspecified date to 13 July 1969, maintained by Ngo Quoc HAI, a military proselyting cadre of an unidentified district (possibly Dien Ban (D), QDSZ, Military Region 5), contains the author's biographical data and a resolution on proselyting

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activities to be performed in Quang Da Special Zone. This resolution, which was adopted by KU (nfi) was recorded by the author during a political reorientation session on 13 July 1969. It provides an outline of enemy FWMAF/RVNAF composition and capabilities in Quang Da, and an assessment of the military situation within the Special Zone since the beginning of 1968 to date.

In a subsequent paragraph, the resolution prescribes that the following proselyting activities should be performed in the immediate future:

(a) Careful investigation should be conducted in order to obtain accurate information on the organization, morale, and combat plans of enemy units (in Quang Da). Such investigations were to be conducted by (VC) fifth columnists in enemy command agencies.

(b) Enemy personnel should be proselyted through personal letters, propaganda leaflets, and loudspeakers. Servicemen (FWMAF) should be incited to clamor for repatriation, whereas Puppet (RVNAF) personnel should be induced to think that US troops are withdrawing from SVN because they are losing the war.

(c) Positive steps should be taken to disorganize the overall enemy people's defense organizations. It would be profitable (for VC) to disband these organizations, and then try to convert their members to (VC) guerrillas. In addition, Puppet (RVNAF) servicemen's dependents should be motivated to collaborate (with VC).

(6) The following information was extracted from another enemy document captured on 18 September 1969, vicinity (AT 987757).

Report, dated 15 August 1969, originated by P5-B260 (military proselyting section, Precinct 2, Danang), reflects the morale of enemy personnel during the first half of 1969. The report indicates that since the time US troops turned over part of the fighting responsibility to the Puppet (RVNAF) forces, Puppet personnel's morale has been deteriorating. Furthermore, US troops seemed to lose confidence in President NIXON's conduct of the war and in his plan to de-Americanize it. South Korean units were also affected by the antiwar feelings, especially the Blue Dragon Brigade.

Letter, dated 6 September 1969, addressed by P5-B260 to T1-B260, (unknown section, Precinct 2, Danang) instructs the latter to submit a report on its military proselyting achievements to P5-B260. Also to be included in this report were activities of (VC) fifth columnists in (RVNAF) ranks in the recent period.

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(7) The following information was extracted from enemy documents captured on 18 September 1969 vicinity (AT 846477) and concerns the assessment of the situation by the North Vietnamese Politburo:

Notes, incomplete, taken during a security meeting by an unidentified cadre (possibly of Security Section, Quang Nam (P), Region 5), concerns the security task to be performed from May to December 1969.

The security task consists of setting up as many people's informant networks as possible, and to defeat the enemy's (FWMAF/RVNAF) intelligence organizations, to include those of the free world and neutral nations.

Document quotes the assessment of the situation in SVN by the (NVN) Politburo, which indicates the de-escalation of the war in Vietnam stemmed from overexpenditures by the US government. This constituted the major cause for struggles initiated by more than 3,000 different antiwar organizations. Moreover, the US had reached the uppermost step of the (war) escalation and is now compelled to de-escalate it. Still the US wishes to proceed gradually with the de-escalation and to create conditions favorable to the GVN and US. The withdrawal of US troops from SVN will be carried out gradually and the replacement of US troops by RVNAF will only be realized when the consolidation of the "Puppet Government" is successful.

(8) A report received from Hieu Duc (D) Intelligence Operations and Coordinating Center on 19 September 1969 revealed that the Quang Da Province Chief has ordered all villages to organize a training course on Ho Chi MINH's Revolutionary History, this being done to commemorate Ho Chi MINH.(Uneval).

(9) The following information was taken from an enemy document captured on 19 September 1969, vicinity (BT 871611).

Directive, number 34/CT/TV, dated 13 July 1969, signed by Nguyen TAM for C70 (Current Affairs Committee, Dai Loc (D), QDSZ), instructs its subordinate agencies to take appropriate measures to stabilize the disturbed situation of a number of hamlets such as Hamlet 9, O Gia and Khanh Van of Loc Phuoc (V). Being frightened by the rigors of enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) military activity, the people of these hamlets, including a number of our (VC) cadre, were running away to live in enemy (GVN) controlled areas, moving all their property with them. Addressees are instructed to motivate the demoralized cadre to return to their position, to conduct indoctrination for youths, and for members of the Farmer's and Women's Associations. In addition, security measures should be taken to deal with stubborn cadre and betrayers, by confiscating all the property of civilian people who refuse to return to live in their native hamlets, and to apply stern punitive measures on a number of them, so as to influence the others.

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Simultaneously, efforts should also be made to step up the guerrilla warfare movement, political struggles, and military and enemy proselyting activities.

(10) On 19 September 1969, a GVN source reported that a Front 44 Headquarters Directive issued the following policy for internal and external military attacks and harrassment of US and GVN units and installations:

In reference to the 24 July 1969 COSVN decision to form Provisional Revolutionary Government control of all Liberation Front Committees in South Vietnam, all city and province level cadre will prepare and plan for concerted attacks against US and GVN installations from 15 to 30 September 1969; appropriate command cadre will stringently control all city sapper cells and cell leaders to ensure the compliance with all Front 44 Directives; sabotage and sapper type attacks will be increased with the goal of harrassing and interdicting Allied transportation and supply lines; all sapper cell leaders and special action leaders are directed to document and annotate "all" of their activity and decisions in a notebook to be utilized later at prearranged cell meetings for the constructive exchange of information..."The Current Affairs Committee of Front 44". (Eval: F-3).

(11) On 20 September 1969, a GVN source reported that 14 VC guerrillas under the command of Huyh-THONG, and Tran TU, natives of Man Quan I (H) vicinity (BT 045699) crossed the river in sampans at approximately 2000 to 2030 hours every other evening for the express purpose of recruiting young men to join guerrilla and sapper forces.

They also attempt to gain tangible support of their efforts in the form of foodstuffs, such as manioc, sweet potatoes, salt, fish sauces and tobacco.

While in the vicinity they expound the propaganda theme that a renewed and revitalized effort must be concerted against the Americans and the Thieu-Ky government in honor of Ho Chi MINH's death and that exposing local villagers who work for the government or Americans was their duty (Eval: F-3).

(12) The 5th CIT reported that at 212230H Sep 69, a patrol from CAP 2-7-6 discovered a bundle of fifteen (15) National Liberation Front leaflets laying in the ditch beside the road vicinity of (BT 079708). All fifteen (15) leaflets were the same. The following is an English translation of subject leaflets:

FRIENDS OF THE LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE!

You are the children of laborers. Your mothers and fathers work

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hard, but they are oppressed by the cruel Americans. Your mothers and fathers work hard but they are surrounded by graft and cannot earn a decent living. You keep watch for the cruel Americans and Vietnamese so they can sleep peacefully. What you do not realize is how cruel the Americans and Vietnamese are, or how sad they make our people.

You help the cruel Americans and Vietnamese move our people into refugee camps and cities. You help the Americans build fences so they can sleep peacefully. When we attack the Americans in these compounds, you are the frontline forces who are killed first. The heavy losses suffered by the American and Vietnamese forces causes them to utilize you as guards for them. In the future, they will send you to ARVN training, then to the field to be used as targets.

DEAR BROTHERS AND SISTERS!

The cruel Americans will lose this war. All they think of now is returning home. When they go home, THIEU, KY and HUONG will die. Our military will launch a big attack over all of South Vietnam. The cruel Americans and Vietnamese will be like rats in a rat hole. We shall go into the rat holes and kill them. Now, you must refuse any duties the Americans give you. You must have courage to refuse to join the military. You must refuse to guard the Americans and request to go home to work. You must join us to help kill these American and Vietnamese troops, and to demonstrate against them. Sanity is returning to South Vietnam, you must try to have courage. You have been angry a long time, now turn that anger on the Americans and attack them and their servants. Demand peace and freedom, liberation and independence for the country.

NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

Quang Nam - DaNang

e. Quang Tin.

(1) A GVN source reported that on the night of 18 September 1969, from 2100-0215 hours, a meeting was held by the Provincial Party Committee. The meeting was held at the home of Mrs. Nguyen Thi QUYEN at Thanh Lam in the vicinity of (BT 187105). Approximately 45 persons attended, including Le AN who was the Provincial Party Committee representative and Dao NGO who was a Provincial Economic cadre. These two individuals were the speakers at this meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to elect personnel to collect money for the Military Support Fund, collect taxes, and collect or buy food supplies in Quang Tin Province. From northern Tam Ky (BT 280240) to Chien Dan (BT 240250), DINH and CHAU (nfi) were to have the support of the V.16 Company in their tax collecting efforts. In southern Tam Ky, from Xuan Trung (BT 290210) to Ky Tan (BT 245185), NIEP and KAT (nfi) were to have the support of the V.12 Company. Groups

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of six individuals each were to collect taxes and funds for the Military Support Fund during the daytime and attempt to scare people into leaving their homes unattended during the night by telling them of mortar attacks. As the residents sought shelter, the VC would enter their homes and confiscate whatever they could find. These plans were in response to announced US troop withdrawals to enable the VC to support the armed forces during the Autumn-Winter Campaign (Eval: C-3).

(2) On 21 September 1969, a GVN source reported that a VC congress was to be conducted in Dich An Tay (H) vicinity of (BT 155195). This congress was to be conducted between 22 September to 25 September 1969, with the function of deciding targets for attacks and political and military (possibly proselyting) tactics. The congress was attended by province and district level military and political cadre (Eval: F-6).

f. Quang Ngai. A GVN source reported that on 180700H September 1969, a meeting of VC cadre was held at Tam Phuoc vicinity (BS 561906). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss plans for the collection of taxes for the "Troop Support Fund". Village and hamlet cadre were to collect taxes from the people and forward the taxes via District cadre to Province. Sixty-two village and district level cadre attended the meeting. The following is a reconstruction of Bui HONG's (nfi) speech:

Everyone of us regrets the death of Ho Chi MINH. To be worthy of merit in the eyes of "Uncle HO", we must provide rice and money for the Revolutionary troops to fight the American Imperialists and their henchmen in Saigon. Our cadre (VC) will have to force each family to give at least 2,000$VN along with one to three liters of rice. Our forces (VC/NVA) in SVN will be reinforced for a quick victory for peace. The Commanding Staff of MR 5 has requested two more NVA divisions from NVN. One division is already in the mountains. Another division is on the way, but was delayed by the American B52s which forced the division into hiding. They will move south later. One of them will be in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai (P) areas, so we have to collect funds for the Autumn-Winter Campaign. The decision of the Fifth Zone is that we occupy Quang Ngai, Danang, and Hue to build up the peace administration. It is the duty of each cadre to work with double effort according to the will of "Uncle Ho" and the Party. After the meeting the cadre were sent to their respective areas to collect the funds. These funds were to be obtained not on a voluntary basis but rather by means of force (Eval: C-3).

5. TERROR. In contrast with the pattern of previous weeks, reported acts of terrorism declined sharply, both in scope and intensity. See Appendix 1 for details of reported terrorist incidents during the past week.

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6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Thua Thien.

CAP report of 191600H - 201600H September 1969:

182130H September 1969 - ten NVA and 5 VC entered a hamlet at ZD 217013. The enemy force stole an unknown quantity of fish and rice and attempted to learn from the villagers the location of CAP 3-2-3's ambush sites.

b. Quang Nam. On 21 September 1969, a GVN source reported that the Finance and Economy Section of Quang Da Special Zone has given its District Committees 50 million piasters to purchase rice during the coming harvest. (Eval: F-3).

c. Quang Tin. A GVN source reported that, on 16 September 1969, a VC military training course began in the vicinity of (AT 955056). The course was scheduled to continue until 26 September 1969 and was conducted by members of the 21st NVA Regiment for new recruits from Que Son (D), Quang Nam (P) and Thang Binh (D), Quang Tin (P). Approximately 160 trainees were in attendance. The training staff was headed by Captain CONG and 1stLt TUNG both from the 21st Regiment. The graduates of this course were to be used as replacements for the 21st NVA Regiment. The training consisted of practice in the use of weapons and other military skills. The trainees who were 14-16 years of age had low morale due to the fact that most of them had been forced to attend this training course (Eval: C-6).

d. People's Revolutionary Committees. No change during the reporting period. See Appendix 1 to Annex C (Counterintelligence) III MAF PERINTREP 37-69.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 39-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	11Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 066356	VC entered Phuoc Duc (H) and kidnapped the Son Xuan (V) Deputy Chief.
	13Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 025657	VC planted a plastic charge (nfi) at the Ba Xa market place. It exploded and killed two civilians.
	16Sep69 (Late Entry)	AT 925685	VC fired six 122mm rockets into vicinity of the aforementioned grid, wounding one civilian.
	16Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 070334	VC entered Khanh Duc (H) and abducted five civilians.
	18Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 109575	VC fired SAF into US position, killing two civilians.
	18Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 157547	Xuyen Long Refugee Camp received SAF and a B-40 rocket attack from an estimated company of VC, resulting in one RF and three civilians wounded.
	18Sep69 (Late Entry)	AT 900584	VC entered Nghia Bac (H) and assassinated one civilian (nfi).
	18Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 129565	VC mortared Cam Ha (V), wounding two civilians.
	20Sep69 (Late Entry)	AT 928578	VC entered Hoan My (H), destroyed one house and wounded one civilian.
	21Sep69	BT 096517	VC entered Phuoc My (H) and abducted thirty-one civilians for unknown reasons. All persons have been returned to Phuoc My (H).

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	22Sep69	BT 065655	The hamlet chief's office at Than Thuy (H) received one hand grenade during a meeting, resulting in five civilians killed and twenty-nine wounded.
	24Sep69	BT 027771	Enemy detonated an explosive charge against a vehicle of the 2nd ARVN Division in Danang, wounding two civilians.
	25Sep69	BT 176545	One civilian was killed by detonating a VC mine.
	25Sep69	BT 172550	One Vietnamese civilian was killed by a booby trapped grenade while cutting bamboo on Xuyen Long River Island.
	25Sep69	BT 146568	Hoi An City received ten rounds of 82mm mortar fire, resulting in four civilians killed and seven wounded.
Quang Ngai	19Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 725728	VC entered Hung Nhon (H) and killed one member of the village People's Council and abducted one civilian.
	20Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 812383	LZ Bronco vicinity received four rounds of 122mm rocket fire, wounding seven civilians.
	20Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 602925	VC entered Tuong Van Refugee Camp, killed nine civilians and destroyed two homes.
	20Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 603912	VC fired 20 82mm mortar rounds into Tuong My Resettlement Camp, killing ten Vietnamese youth soldiers and wounding two.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Ngai	20Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 752490	VC entered Tu Son (H) and abducted two civilians.
	21Sep69	BS 534515	Minh Long Special Forces Camp received 10-15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, killing one civilian and wounding three.
	24Sep69	BS 793412	A Vietnamese Lambretta (bus) travelling from Duc Pho to Quang Ngai City detonated a mine resulting in fourteen civilians killed. One of the civilians killed was the hamlet chief of Dong Quang (H).

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ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 39-69

1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY

a. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company recon teams observed over 500 enemy moving in no discernible pattern in the southwestern sector of the 1st Marine Division AO. 1st Force Recon team sightings and contacts during the week resulted in 8 NVA KIA. Recon teams from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion observed over 300 enemy, almost all of the sightings being made north of An Hoa between the Song Thu Bon and Song Vu Gia. 14 enemy were killed as a direct result of 1st Recon Battalion team actions during this reporting period.

b. In the 3d Marine Division AO, 3d Force Reconnaissance Company recon teams observed 83 enemy and 1 contact resulted in 1 enemy KIA. During this reporting period 3d Reconnaissance Battalion recon teams observed 123 enemy and killed 7 as a result of unavoidable contacts.

c. Americal Division Ranger Company Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) observed 154 enemy during this reporting period. 100 of the sightings were made by Ranger Team Alabama in the western part of Base Area 117. Ranger Team engagements with the enemy resulted in 8 enemy KIA.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY

a. Sensor strings located in the DMZ and Duel Blade area detected heavy activity vicinity coordinates YD 075712, YD 135752, YD 005661, and XD 675522. In the 3d Marine Division and ARVN Duffel Bag area, sensor detected activity was very light with only three fire missions consisting of 30 rounds of 175mm artillery being fired against 10 targets. In the US and ARVN DMZ area a total of 147 targets were detected with 77 fire missions consisting of 523 rounds of 105mm, 122 rounds of 175mm, and 72 rounds of 8 inch being fired. BDA was not possible. Elsewhere in the US and ARVN Duel Blade area 18 targets were detected and 49 fire missions consisting of 37 rounds of 155mm, 308 rounds of 105mm, 246 rounds of 175mm, 22 rounds of 4.2 mortar, 160 rounds of 81mm mortar, and 70 rounds of 60mm mortar being fired. BDA was unobserved in all cases.

b. Sensor detected enemy activity in the 1st Marine Division Area was still at a low level with a moderate increase noted from the past week's activity. Ambushes, once again being alerted by PSIDs, accounted for 10 enemy KIA. Enemy activity through line sensors increased from 155 to 189 enemy detected during this reporting period.

c. In the Americal area sensors detected 80 enemy and 133 rounds of artillery were fired in response with no BDA.

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ANNEX E (OCTOBER WEATHER BRIEF) TO JTT MAP PRINTREP 39-69

1. General. During October, the transition to the northeast monsoon will be completed. Cloudiness is expected to increase significantly in the area east of the ANNAM Mountains and an increase in precipitation (especially during the latter half of the month) can be expected. Normally, temperatures are slightly cooler in October than during September. Temperatures will range from a maximum of mid 80's to a minimum of near 70 degrees; however, relative humidity will remain essentially the same as during September.

2. Precipitation

a. October is a wet season month in the ICTZ except for the area west of the ANNAM Mountain range. The largest increase in precipitation occurs in the area around HUE. It can be expected that there will be four to seven days with rainfall values greater than one inch, and two to five days with amounts greater than two inches.

b. Precipitation occurs more than 15 days during the month except in the western portion of ICTZ where rain can be expected 10 to 15 days. In the HUE area, rainfall can be expected to occur more than 20 days during the period.

c. Mean precipitation is over 20 inches in ICTZ, except for the southwest portion where it ranges between 10 and 15 inches.

d. Although DANANG has a mean maximum precipitation of 49.4 inches, the balance of ICTZ receives a mean maximum of 40 inches. The mean minimum precipitation is six inches or less throughout the ICTZ.

e. Maximum 24 hour precipitation amounts range from three to six inches in the area west of the ANNAM range to more than 12 inches east of the range. QUANG NGAI has recorded a one day rainfall of 19 inches.

3. Thunderstorms. Thunderstorm activity decreases over the ICTZ. The mean number of days with thunderstorms in the ICTZ is two, except in the southwest portion where the average is four days.

4. Clouds. Cloudiness increases significantly over all of the ICTZ. Mean cloudiness is over 60 percent throughout most of ICTZ and over 70 percent along the coast. The mean number of days with total cloud cover equal to or less than 3/10 varies from five to 10 days.

5. Visibility. The northeast monsoon brings fog, drizzle, and low visibility over most of ICTZ. However, visibility is generally good in the southwest portion. Generally, visibilities can be expected to increase daily five miles after 1000H except during rainshowers.

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DANANG TIDES FOR OCTOBER 1969

Date	Time	Height
01	0400	4.0
	1306	1.6
	2218	3.5
02	0006	3.5
	0542	3.9
	1412	1.6
	2200	3.6
03	0212	3.3
	0724	3.8
	1500	1.7
04	0318	2.9
	0842	3.8
	1542	1.8
	2230	3.7
05	0406	2.6
	0948	3.8
	1618	2.0
	2248	3.8
06	0448	2.3
	1042	3.7
	1648	2.2
	2306	3.9
07	0524	2.1
	1130	3.7
	1712	2.5
	2324	4.0
08	0600	1.9
	1218	3.5
	1730	2.6
	2336	4.1
09	0636	1.8
	1306	3.4
	1742	2.8
10	0718	1.8
	1400	3.2
	1742	2.8
11	0012	4.1
	0754	1.8
	1512	3.1
12	0030	4.2
	0836	1.8
13	0042	4.1
	0930	1.8
14	0100	4.1
	1030	1.8
15	0142	4.0
	1142	1.9
16	0148	3.8
	1248	1.9
	2248	3.6
17	0146	3.6
	0348	3.6
	1342	1.9
	2148	3.6
18	0230	3.3
	0654	3.5
	1430	1.9
	2142	3.6
19	0306	2.9
	0824	3.6
	1506	2.0
	2142	3.7
20	0342	2.5
	0930	3.7
	1536	2.2
	2200	3.9
21	0418	2.1
	1042	3.7
	1612	2.4
	2218	4.0
22	0454	1.8
	1118	3.7
	1642	2.6
	2236	4.2
23	0554	1.5
	1212	3.6
	1706	2.8
	2306	4.4
24	0624	1.3
	1312	3.5
	1730	3.0
	2336	4.5
25	0712	1.2
	1418	3.4
	1748	3.1
26	0006	4.5
	0806	1.2
	1554	3.3
	1754	3.3
27	0024	4.4
	0906	1.3
28	0124	4.3
	1006	1.4

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Date	Time	Height	Date	Time	Height
29	0212	4.1	30	0342	3.8
	1118	1.6		1224	1.7
	2054	3.6	31	0118	3.3
	2100	3.6		0536	3.6
				1323	1.9
				2048	3.7

CHU LAI TIDES FOR OCTOBER 1969

Date	Time	Height	Date	Time	Height
01	0012	5.7	14	0642	2.0
	0908	2.4		1418	4.3
02	0036	5.7		1636	4.2
	1012	2.4		2330	5.6
03	0106	5.7	15	0742	1.8
	1118	2.3	16	0000	6.1
04	0136	5.6		0842	1.6
	1218	2.4	17	0036	6.1
05	0212	5.5		0948	1.6
	1306	2.4	18	0124	6.1
06	0312	5.2		1108	1.6
	1348	2.4	19	0224	5.8
07	0500	5.0		1206	1.8
	1418	2.5	20	0348	5.5
	2254	4.6		1306	2.0
08	0136	4.5	21	0530	5.2
	0636	4.9		1400	2.3
	1448	3.6		2136	4.6
09	0254	4.1	22	0142	4.2
	0802	4.8		0718	5.0
	1518	2.8		1436	2.7
	2200	4.7		2124	4.6
10	0336	3.6	23	0254	3.6
	0918	4.7		0842	4.8
	1542	3.1		1512	3.1
	2206	4.8		2130	4.8
11	0418	3.2	24	0348	3.1
	1024	4.7		1006	4.6
	1606	3.4		1536	3.5
	2218	5.1		2142	5.1
12	0506	2.7	25	0442	2.6
	1130	4.6		1124	4.5
	1624	3.7		1542	3.9
	2236	5.4		2154	5.4
13	0554	2.3	26	0530	2.3
	1242	4.4		1248	4.3
	1642	4.0		1530	4.2
	2300	5.6		2154	5.7

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Date	Time	Height	Date	Time	Height
27	0618	2.0	30	0842	1.9
	2230	5.9		2342	6.0
28	0706	1.9	31	0930	2.0
	2300	6.0			
29	0800	1.9			
	2318	6.1			

HUE TIDES FOR OCTOBER 1969

Date	Time	Height	Date	Time	Height
01	0146	3.6	16	0124	3.8
	0904	2.0		0906	2.6
02	0218	3.6	17	0106	3.9
	1027	2.0		1024	2.0
03	0256	3.6	18	0258	3.9
	1206	2.0		1146	2.0
04	0344	3.6	19	0401	3.8
	1330	2.0		1258	2.0
05	0450	3.5	20	0521	3.7
	1426	1.9		1401	1.9
06	0615	3.4	21	0650	3.5
	1503	2.0		1432	00
07	0638	3.4	22	0806	3.4
	1528	2.0		1500	-1.9
08	0847	3.4		2130	2.7
	1547	2.0	23	0302	2.5
	2332	2.7		0822	3.2
09	0144	2.6		1521	2.1
	0946	3.3		2236	2.9
	1602	2.1	24	0317	2.2
	2314	2.8		1039	3.0
10	0303	2.4		1534	2.2
	1039	3.2		2252	3.1
	1615	2.2	25	0423	2.0
	2320	3.0		1142	2.9
11	0403	2.2		1544	2.4
	1132	3.1		2313	3.3
	1627	2.3	26	0521	-1.9
	2334	3.1		1247	2.7
12	0500	2.1		1545	2.5
	1227	3.0		2338	3.5
	1636	2.4	27	0534	-1.8
	2354	3.3		1402	2.6
13	0556	1.9		1534	2.5
	1329	2.8		0006	3.6
	1637	2.5	28	0700	-1.9
14	0019	3.5		0036	3.7

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Date	Time	Height	Date	Time	Height
	0654	1.8	29	0805	-1.9
	1448	2.7		0107	3.7
	1623	2.6	30	0906	-1.9
25	0048	3.7	31	0140	3.7
	0755	2.0		1010	-1.9

SA HUYNH TIDES FOR OCTOBER 1969

Date	Time	Height	Date	Time	Height
01	0020	6.0	16	0004	6.4
	0912	2.5		0914	1.8
02	0058	6.0	17	0046	6.5
	1035	2.5		1032	1.7
03	0136	6.0	18	0138	6.5
	1211	2.5		1154	1.7
04	0224	5.9	19	0241	6.3
	1330	2.5		1306	1.8
05	0330	5.7	20	0401	6.1
	1434	2.4		1401	2.0
06	0455	5.6	21	0530	5.8
	1511	2.5		1440	2.2
07	0618	5.5	22	0656	3.5
	1530	2.6		1508	2.5
08	0727	5.5		2118	4.1
	1555	2.7	23	0202	3.6
	2232	4.0		0810	5.2
09	0152	3.8		1529	2.9
	0826	5.4		2116	4.5
	1610	2.9	24	0325	3.1
	2154	4.3		0919	4.8
10	0301	3.5		1542	3.2
	0919	5.2		2138	5.0
	1623	3.1	25	0431	2.7
	2200	4.6		1022	4.4
11	0411	3.1		1553	3.4
	1011	5.0		2153	5.4
	1035	3.3	26	0529	2.4
	2234	5.4		1127	4.1
12	0508	2.8		1553	3.6
	1107	4.7		2218	5.8
	1644	3.5	27	0624	2.1
	2234	5.4		1242	3.8
13	0604	2.4		1542	3.6
	1229	4.3		2246	6.0
	1049	3.7	28	0658	1.9
	2259	5.8		2316	6.2

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Date	Time	Height
14	0702	2.1
	1328	4.0
	1631	3.8
	2328	6.2
15	0803	1.9
29	0813	1.9
	2347	6.2
30	0914	1.9
31	0020	6.1
	1018	2.0

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HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

JCS CONTROL NUMBER	COPY NO.
	1

MACH. C	DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT	PRI.	SEC.	NAVY FILE NUMBER	ORIGINATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.	NO. CYS. RECD.	MICFILM CLAS.	MO.	DA.	YR.
	C915507	PERIODIC INTEL RPT		3K	MEF 0114569			2	4X079			

ROUTING - *Use numbers to show order of routing*

OPERATION CODE

X-ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET
A-FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION
B-FOR COMPLIANCE
C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF _____
D-FOR COMMENT
E-FOR RECOMMENDATION
F-FOR CONCURRENCE
G-FOR INFORMATION
H-RETURN TO _____
I- _____
J-DISPOSITION _____

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
					COMMANDANT
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
1	D	10/15	10/16	lam	G-3
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
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

UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 40-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE



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HQ III MAF, G-2
DANANG, RVN
7 October 1969
Ser: 0114569

PERINTREP 40-69

Period covered: 280001H September - 042400H October 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13
ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. The level of enemy activity for this reporting period continued to show the relative decline of recent weeks. The number of enemy initiated ground incidents dropped from last week's 256 to 183, the lowest number recorded since the week of 29 December 1968 to 4 January 1969. Although the overall number of enemy initiated ground attacks decreased from six to three, the number of company size attacks increased by two while the number of platoon size or smaller attacks dropped by five. Despite the decline in the number of enemy initiated ground incidents, there was a slight increase in the number of enemy incoming rounds, up 31 rounds from 451 to 482. This low level of enemy activity is also reflected in the relatively small number of enemy KIA registered, 563. This figure, while up 13 from last week, is still the lowest number of enemy KIA recorded in I Corps during the last 12 months. Also of interest is the fact that enemy losses were further aggravated by a 31 percent weekly increase in Hoi Chanhs, a total of 174. This is the highest number of Hoi Chanhs since the week of 11-17 May 1969.

At the same time, reports of counterintelligence-related VC/VCI activity during the past week reflected emphasis on military proselyting; strengthening of guerrilla forces through local conscription; placement of cadre and penetration agents through the Chieu Hoi program; and the use of females and teen-agers to trade, purchase, and collect information in GVN-controlled areas. Concentrated efforts on food collection, particularly rice, was reflected in numerous reports as the fall harvest season comes to an end in ICTZ.

For the second consecutive week, reported acts of terrorism remained at an extremely low level decreasing to only five incidents as compared with eight during the previous week. No acts of sabotage were reported.

a. QUANG TRI (P). During the reporting period, sightings/incidents in the DMZ area decreased to 241 with 21 of these sightings north of the BEN HAI River. A total of 241 hostile targets were taken under fire this week by artillery, tactical air strikes and naval gunfire.

Enemy initiated activity in QUANG TRI (P) increased noticeably from that of the previous week with the enemy launching two estimated company size ground attacks on the central DMZ Front. On the first day of this reporting period, after a week of relative inactivity, the enemy struck with small arms, RPG's, and mortars against C/1-11th Mechanized Infantry

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about eight kilometers northwest of CAM LO (YD 37639). In the ensuing three and one-half hour battle, the enemy force lost 24 killed in action along with a small quantity of ordnance and rice. In contrast to this daylight attack, the enemy mounted a second ground attack four days later, this time at night, in the early morning hours of the 2nd of October. This second thrust, four kilometers north northeast of the first one (YD 072677), was directed against B/1-77 Mechanized Infantry in night defensive positions about five kilometers southwest of the ROCKPILE. Of about equal intensity and duration as the previous action, the second enemy attack resulted in 14 enemy KIA along with 11 weapons and 90 rockets and grenades captured.

During the second enemy attack, a prisoner was captured who has identified himself as a member of the K-45 Battalion. Based upon III MAF Order of Battle holdings and previous enemy unit identifications in this area, the enemy unit involved in this second attack most probably was an element of the 27th NVA Regiment. In addition, because of proximity in time and location, the enemy unit which staged the prior attack on the 28th of September was also probably part of the 27th Regiment.

These two sharp contacts were the high points of combat activity last week in QUANG TRI Province and overshadowed the fact that the enemy also launched four attacks by fire, two against combat bases and two against units in the field. The heaviest of these was a barrage of 23 82mm mortars directed against C/1-506th Infantry 12 and one-half kilometers west northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 857591), on 2 October. Three days prior, G and F/2/4 Marines while on a sweep three and one-half kilometers north of the ROCKPILE (XD 972953) received 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in light friendly casualties. Additionally, both QUANG TRI and DONG HA Combat Bases were subjected to attacks by fire. On the 28th, the former (YD 2754) received seven 122mm rockets resulting in light damage and no casualties while the latter (YD 2460) received five 140mm rockets on the 4th. There was no damage from this last attack and only one Marine was wounded.

By contrast, there was very little activity generated as the result of friendly initiated operations. Two relatively minor contacts were recorded during the reporting period. On the 30th, a 3d Marine Division reconnaissance team observed five NVA moving northwest eight kilometers southeast of CAM LO (YD 178534). An air strike was called resulting in all five NVA KIA. Two days later, C/2-506 Infantry made contact with an estimated enemy platoon about nine kilometers northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 923623). Light friendly casualties resulted from this contact while enemy casualties were unknown.

While the enemy increased the tempo of his attacks during the past week, there was little indication at week's end that the enemy would undertake any dramatic increase in the level and intensity of his operations during the coming week. It is estimated that the enemy will continue to

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maintain his operations at a relatively low level while he reprovisions and concerns himself with the problems brought on by heavy monsoon rains.

b. THUA THIEN (P). In sharp contrast with the increased tempo of enemy activity in QUANG TRI Province, THUA THIEN Province continued to be relatively quiet. Significant activity was limited to one friendly initiated ground action on the first day of the reporting period and one attack by fire which occurred five days later.

The friendly initiated action occurred on the 28th when 2/7 ACAT (ARVN) engaged an unknown size enemy force 10 and one-half kilometers north northeast of Camp EVANS (YD 570421) killing five of the enemy and capturing a prisoner who identified his unit as the C.113 Local Force Company.

The only reported enemy initiated activity was an attack by fire on the 3d which was directed at Camp EVANS (YD 536322). This attack, consisting of three 122mm rockets, resulted in no casualties or damage.

In other developments in the province, four 101st Division (AM) operations terminated on the 28th. Operation RICHLAND SQUARE, which commenced on 15 August accounted for seven enemy killed. Operation LOUISIANA LEE which commenced on 16 August resulted in 66 enemy killed. Eighty-five enemy were killed in Operation CUMBERLAND THUNDER which began on 18 August while an additional 38 enemy were KIA in Operation CLAIBORNE CHUTE which commenced on 20 August.

While enemy activity provided few insights into the enemy situation in THUA THIEN Province, some limited clues were provided by a captured document and a returnee. The enemy document indicated that the 7th Front is experiencing difficulties and shortages in supplying its troops while the returnee from the 6th NVA Regiment indicated an emphasis being placed on gathering rice and cooperating with local forces in the coastal lowlands northwest of HUE.

With this scarcity of contact with the enemy in THUA THIEN as well as the absence of indicators to the contrary, there is little reason to believe that the enemy is preparing for any dramatic change in the pattern of his operations in this province during the coming week.

c. QUANG NAM (P). Enemy initiated activity in QUANG NAM (P) continued at the same limited pace as the preceding week. There were seven indirect attacks by fire with only two of these being in excess of 20 rounds. On 1 October, the 37th ARVN Rangers six kilometers west northwest of AN HOA (ZC 214465) received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 100 RPG rounds resulting in no casualties. Two days later, I/3/7 Marines five kilometers west of QUE SON (AT 987345) received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in light friendly casualties. The remaining attacks by fire were directed at ASP-1 in the vicinity of DANANG (AT 982732); AN HOA Combat Base (AT 873473); Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division (AT 936747); 1st Marine Regiment Headquarters (AT 970620); and a defensive position of H/2/7 Marines (AT 970 286). These attacks by fire resulted in only three minor wounds and no damage.

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At the same time, reconnaissance sightings remained at a lower than normal level in QUANG NAM Province while there were only three instances of note wherein friendly forces were able to initiate contact with the enemy. The most significant of these, from an intelligence point of view, occurred on the 2d when the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion engaged an unknown size enemy force five kilometers west of AN HOA (AT 792455). Fifteen of the enemy were killed and two prisoners were captured. These prisoners identified the 7th Battalion, 90th NVA Regiment and indicated that their battalion was located about nine kilometers southwest of AN HOA (ZC 2040). While the PW's revealed that the 7th Battalion is targeted against the 5th Marine Regiment in the AN HOA area, they also said that their battalion is looking for a new base camp, most probably one in Base Area 112 which would afford them protection from both friendly air attacks and the heavy rains of the northeast monsoon.

The other two friendly initiated contacts also occurred on 2 October. During the early morning hours, a reconnaissance platoon from the QUANG NAM Sector Regional Forces contacted an unknown size enemy force five kilometers southwest of HOI AN (BT 105540) resulting in 11 enemy killed. Then at noon, D/1/1 Marines observed five VC nine kilometers northwest of HOI AN (BT 074625). The Marines engaged the enemy force killing all five.

In an order of battle development, the interrogation of an NVA prisoner captured on the 28th of September by DIEN BAN PF's and the reinterrogation of two other prisoners captured earlier in the month locate the 3d Battalion of the 36th NVA Regiment as now being based in eastern DUY XUYEN District in the vicinity of (BT 1253), about 13 kilometers east of where this unit had been held previously. The mission of the 3d Battalion, according to the more knowledgeable of the PW's, is to conduct sapper attacks in the general area where the battalion is located.

In summary then, there is little in the picture of the enemy situation which has developed in QUANG NAM Province during the past week which would suggest any significant or dramatic change in his tactical posture or activities.

d. <u>QUANG TIN (P)</u>. Enemy initiated activity in QUANG TIN (P) during the reporting period was limited with the only significant incident occurring on 29 September when a UH-1H helicoper in an LZ of A/1-46 Infantry seven kilometers east southeast of TIEN PHUOC (BT 181112) received small arms fire and 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. The helo took one small arms round in one of its rotor blades but continued on the mission. Ten soldiers were wounded in this action.

Else where in QUANG TIN, it took friendly initiated action to draw the enemy into contact. In the eastern portion of the province, the most noteworthy action occurred on 30 September when two gunships from the 282nd Assault Helicopter Company of the 212th Aviation Battalion while returning from escorting Vietnamese Navy swift boats killed 26 enemy. This action occurred about eight to 12 kilometers south southeast of HOI AN. The day before, TAM KY PF's on a sweep along the coastal

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lowlands 14 kilometers north of TAM KY (BT 295365) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The PF's engaged the enemy force killing six. On the 2nd, 3/6 ARVN contacted an unknown size enemy force 15 kilometers south southeast of TAM KY (BT 351032) resulting in eight enemy KIA. The next day in the northeastern portion of the province, PF Platoons 114 and 136 four kilometers northwest of THANG BINH (BT 452446) killed seven VC by detonating two claymore mines when the enemy force approached the PF's position. To the west in the central portion of the province, there were several friendly initiated contacts which for the most part were light and desultory, except for two which occurred in the vicinity of TIEN PHUOC (BT 1116). The first of these took place on the 29th of September when the 3/5 ARVN made contact with an estimated enemy company nine kilometers northeast of TIEN PHUOC (BT 295365). As a result, 25 of the enemy were killed while seven weapons and 2,000 rounds of small arms ammunition were captured with no friendly casualties.

The second action of note took the form of a friendly initiated ambush during the afternoon hours of the 3rd, nine kilometers northwest of TIEN PHUOC (BT 038190). On this occasion, the TIEN PHUOC Mobile Strike Force Company attacked an unknown size NVA force with small arms and mortar fire. After a four hour battle, the enemy broke contact and withdrew leaving 13 dead. There were no friendly casualties. In the three remaining incidents in the north central portion of the province, 25 enemy were accounted for with 20 of these being body finds.

Other than these ground actions and attacks by fire, there was little significant information developed on the enemy in QUANG TIN Province through PW interrogations or agent reports. However, since the beginning of September, there have been about 70 returnees from two villages in THANG BINH District. A large proportion of these returnees have been attributed to one Tran QUYEN who claimed to be the commanding officer of the C-9 Local Force Company. However, subsequent ARVN investigation indicates that it is more probable that he was the guerrilla unit leader for the two villages. It is further estimated that the principal reasons for rallying are the effectiveness of friendly sweep operations and the lack of food.

In assessing events of the past week in QUANG TIN Province, there is little discernible evidence to suggest that the enemy is preparing for any dramatic increase in the level and tempo of his operations.

e. <u>QUANG NGAI (P)</u>. Enemy initiated activity in QUANG NGAI (P) declined noticeably from the previous week. The majority of the action in the province was the result of friendly initiated activities. The principal incident of note occurred on the 2d when a PF platoon engaged a force of an estimated 40 VC, most probably from the 95A Local Force Sapper Company. After a brief contact, in which three VC were killed, the enemy force evaded the PF and entered DONG BINH Hamlet eight kilometers south southeast of CHU LAI (BS 578994). In the hamlet, the VC threw a grenade into a house killing three Vietnamese civilians and wounding three more. To

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the south, on 3 October a reconnaissance team from the QUANG NGAI Subsector Regional Forces ambushed an unknown size enemy force four kilometers west southwest of QUANG NGAI City (BS 614711) resulting in seven enemy killed. Further south along the coast, the 16th RF Group while on a patrol eight kilometers north of MO DUC (BS 734618) engaged an unknown size enemy force killing six.

Southwest of DUC PHO there was a series of five contacts initiated by the 3/4 and 4/4 ARVN between the 30th of September and the 3rd of October in an area 10 to 15 kilometers south southwest of DUC PHO (BS 776284 - BS 763237). As a result of these ARVN attacks, the enemy force, most probably elements of the 2d VC Regiment, lost 33 killed and 15 weapons captured at the cost of no ARVN casualties.

Other than this relative low level of activity in QUANG NGAI Province, the principal item of significance was developed from the interrogation of two prisoners who were captured on the 4th as a result of a contact with the 173rd Airborne Brigade 18 kilometers south of DUC PHO (BS 856204) in BINH DINH Province of II CTZ. These PW's identify the 93rd Battalion of the 2d VC Regiment as now operating some three kilometers below the southern boundary of I Corps. This evidence supports information which was derived from an enemy document on 22 September in a contact which the 173rd Airborne Brigade had with a 50 man enemy force identified as the 93rd Battalion about one kilometer inside the BINH DINH Border (BS 870190). This information sheds additional light on an earlier low level report that the 3rd NVA Division was to send one regiment south to operate in BINH DINH Province along with another regiment of the 3rd NVA Division, the 18th, which normally operates in the northern portion of the ARVN II CTZ. While this move is of some intelligence interest, its true significance in ICTZ is somewhat limited for two reasons. First, even though this battalion has crossed an RVN provincial boundary, the real distances involved are relatively small. Secondly, the move made was entirely within the normal operating areas of the enemy's Military Region 5 which extends much farther south into the ARVN II CTZ. Furthermore, it is Military Region 5 to which the 3rd NVA Division is tactically subordinate. Hence, it is entirely reasonable that this unit should move back and forth across this ARVN provincial boundary with relative ease. However, further intelligence is necessary before we can accept other elements of the 2d VC Regiment moving south also to operate in the ARVN II Corps area.

In reviewing the enemy situation in QUANG NGAI Province, the pattern and level of activity during the past week was much the same as that of QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN Provinces. In addition, there was no evidence of substance in PW interrogations, enemy documents or agent reports which would indicate any significant developments in the type and tempo of enemy activity in QUANG NGAI Province during the coming week.

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f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. In assessing the enemy situation in I Corps as a whole for the forthcoming week, there is little in the way of indicators which point to any significant change in the level of intensity or tempo of enemy operations, especially with reference to the redeployment of the 3rd Marine Division. During the past week, enemy initiated activity was at a low level suggesting that the enemy is seasonally preoccupied with reprovisioning his stocks of rice and with problems associated with the rains of the northeast monsoon. This sort of seasonal effort is reinforced in the statistics of previous years for enemy initiated activity which show a relative decline in enemy activity for the month of October. Providing further evidence for this view is the fact that while friendly ground reconnaissance efforts have remained essentially constant, the number of enemy sightings had declined noticeably from the previous week and appreciably from the level which could be identified as an indicator of impending large scale or widespread enemy attacks. Further, PW interrogations, enemy documents, and agent reports, while they do make reference to future enemy attacks, are vague and lack the detail and consistency necessary to give them much credence. Therefore, it is estimated that the current relatively low level of enemy activity experienced during the past week will continue through the coming week with no dramatic change in the level or type of enemy operations.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents decreased from 256 to 183 for the week of 28 September - 4 October. These incidents consisted of three ground attacks, two of which were company size or larger and one platoon size or smaller, two ambushes, 11 attacks by fire, 102 harassing fire incidents, 41 mining and booby trap incidents, two hamlet harassment incidents, four assassination incident, five espionage incidents, one kidnapping incidents, 12 propaganda incidents, and no sabotage incidents.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative.

h. Air Defense. AA fire decreased from 141 to 87 incidents for the reporting period and 31 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative.

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 28 September - 4 October.

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Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	244
81mm Mortar	1
60mm Mortar	178
Unk Cal Mortar	37
140mm Rocket	10
122mm Rocket	10
Unk Cal Rocket	2
Total	482

l. - q. Negative.

r. Reconnaissance

(1) There were 91 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 28 September - 4 October. These long-range patrols reported 71 sightings and eight contacts totaling 167 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of 10 enemy KIA.

(2) Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 28 September - 4 October:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
82mm Mortar	161
81mm Mortar	12
60mm Mortar	115
Unk Cal Mortar	28
105mm Artillery	13
140mm Rocket	2
Total	331

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	164
Crew-Served Weapons	21

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 28 September - 4 October.

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Date	Location	Amount (lbs)		Capturing Unit
28 Sep	(BT 094459)	1,000		D/1/7
28 Sep	(BT 093463)	1,200		D/1/7
28 Sep	(BT 095465)	900		D/1/7
28 Sep	(BS 422809)	500		C/1/52
28 Sep	(BS 422809)	100		C/1/52
28 Sep	(BS 409811)	100		D/1/52
28 Sep	(BT 020590)	40		A/1/1
29 Sep	(BS 448758)	50		D/3/1
30 Sep	(AT 992371)	100	Salt	L/3/7
30 Sep	(BS 457792)	50	Salt	C/1/52
30 Sep	(BS 451798)	100	Salt	C/1/52
30 Sep	(AT 835933)	200		B/2/326
02 Oct	(BT 021393)	20		I/3/1
02 Oct	(AT 961511)	2,000		C/1/5
02 Oct	(BT 068454)	900		B/1/1
02 Oct	(BT 332095)	15		B/1/6
02 Oct	(BS 603420)	700		D/4/3
02 Oct	(YD 347407)	220		2/1
02 Oct	(AU 833045)	55		RCN/2/502
02 Oct	(AU 833045)	60	Food	RCN/2/502
03 Oct	(BT 068475)	15		B/1/7
03 Oct	(BT 066487)	350		B/1/7
03 Oct	(BT 343096)	15		D/1/6
03 Oct	(BS 845405)	10		C/1/20
03 Oct	(BS 587367)	350		A/4/3
03 Oct	(BS 781436)	10		B/1/20
03 Oct	(BS 683799)	3,000		D/5/46
03 Oct	(AU 804058)	77	Food	RCN/2/502
04 Oct	(BS 798241)	120		B/4/21
04 Oct	(BT 078477)	1,000		B/1/7
04 Oct	(BT 082483)	800		B/1/7
04 Oct	(AT 875378)	50		A/1/7
	Total Rice	13,720		
	Total Food	137		
	Total Salt	250		

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	67	Structures Damaged	22
Bunkers Destroyed	63	Bunkers Damaged	23
Secondary Explosions	20	Secondary Fires	18
.50 Cal Sites Destroyed	2		

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

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c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ increased in comparison to the previous week. There were 563 KIA's, 44 VC PW's, and five NVA PW's

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	100	95	102	95
Low	72	72	74	71
Rainfall (total)	4.03	12.21	7.76	9.18
Winds (knots)	8	8	6	7
Visibility (miles)	7	6	7	5

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 4-10 October 1969

(a) General. Tropical Storm FLOSSIE is now off the east coast of TAIWAN and is forecast to move northeast and weaken. As FLOSSIE moves northeastward, the ridge now oriented approximately north-south over southeast ASIA will move slowly eastward and the east-west monsoon trough now over RVN will move northward to a position near 14 degrees north. These changes should take place by the end of the outlook period resulting in gradual improvement of the weather situation in ICTZ. Weather expected during the forecast period is that associated with early October norms.

(b) ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the coastal areas of I Corps is partly cloudy with patchy stratus/fog in the early mornings. A two day period of moderate to heavy rainshowers and cloudy skies during the middle of the period is predicted. Precipitation will be one to two inches during the last four days with isolated instances of two to four inches. The forecast for the mountainous areas of I Corps is mostly cloudy except partly cloudy from late morning to early evening. There will also be occasional afternoon/evening thundershowers during the period. Stratus and ground fog will be patchy, dissipating in most areas by 1000H. Precipitation will be two to three inches with isolated instances of four to five inches.

j. - l. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

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5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following courses of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to six infantry regiment equivalents, supported by the equivalent of one naval sapper battalion and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(3) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with the equivalent of up to six infantry regiments, supported by four rocket battalions, one sapper battalion and one engineer battalion.

(5) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division (-), supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(6) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to seven infantry regiment equivalents.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

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f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions fro. NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield, sickness, hunger, shortage of ammunition and medical supplies and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

FRANK X. HOFF
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Acting

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z.

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ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO III MAF PERINTREP 40-69

A. REGISTERED MAIL

DIR, NSA	3
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1
CMC (ABQ)	2
CG FMFPAC	2
CG USARV	1
CG I FFORCEV	5
CG II FFORCEV	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CG MCDEC	1
CG 5TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CALIF	6
CG 4TH MARIDV, CAMPEN, CALIF	1
CG 3RD MAW	2
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2
CO "B" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	5
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1
CO MCB 3	1
CO MCB 6	1
CO MCB 7	1
CO MCB 8	1
CO MCB 9	1
CO MCB 10	1
CO MCB 11	1
CO MCB 53	1
CO MCB 58	1
CO MCB 62	1
CO MCB 71	1
CO MCB 133	1
CO USS REPOSE	1
CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO MHTG-30, MCAF, SANTA ANA, CALIF, 92709	1
DSA II CORPS	1
CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP, 7TH FLEET	1
CMDR, 19TH CI TEAM, CAMPEN, CALIF	1
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CTF 76	1

B. BY COURIER

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232) (CIIED)	2
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2
CIGV	2
CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	10
CG 1ST MARDIV	40
CG 3RD MARDIV	26
CG AMERICAL DIV	30
CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM)	20
CG 1ST MAW	30
CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7
CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CG USASUPCOM DNG	1
CG 173RD ABN BDE	2
CG FORLOGCMD DNG	5
CG 1ST LOGCMD LBN	2
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GROUP CHL	3
CO 30 NCR	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	17
CO 1ST CAG	1
CO 3RD CAG	1
CO 4TH CAG	1
CO 1ST BN, 525TH MI DET	25
CO 517TH MI DET	1
CO MCB 40	1
CO MCB 121	1
CO 4TH PSYOP GROUP	1
DSA I CORPS	11
CMDR, 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SGN	3
COMNAVFORV	1
COM.AVSUPACT DNG	2
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2
OSA/EMB SAIGON	1
DET B, 1ST MIBARS	1
CIB	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTG 79.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 76.4	1
7TH AIR FORCE (IGS) BDOC	1

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45TH ENGR GROUP	1
620TH TCS, APO 96203	1
366TH AIR SEC SQD, USAF	2
620TH TSC	1
SPO-SEC CMD QHN	1

C. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (WITHIN HQ, III MAF)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP C/S PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	42
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (C/O G-3)	2
2D BDE ROKMC LIAISON OFFICER	1
PSYOPS	2
1ST RADIO BN	11
HORN DASC	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1

D. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

CO 1ST MP BN DNG	1
CO 3RD MP BN DNG	1
CO 2ND CAG	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
CO MCB 5	1
SLF (A)	1
CTG 115.1	1
CCN	1
US NAD	1
DIR, CAP	1
7TH PSYOP BN	1
HQ, 212TH CMBT AVN BN	6
RAILWAY SECURITY	1

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 40-69 AS OF 042400H OCTOBER 1969

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-HQ	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	11	3,160	2	550			13	3,710	14	6,195	27	9,905
Bn's-Maneuver	39	9,075	11	1,810	5	685	55	11,570	34	15,010	89	26,580
Bn's-Support	18	5,125	2	340	1	195	21	5,660	7	1,980	27	7,640
Separate Co's	1	130			33	2,535	34	2,665	1	80	35	2,745
TOTAL CONFIRMED		19,455		2,700		3,415		25,570		24,700		50,270
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's	1	710					1	710	3	860	4	1,570
Bn's-Maneuver	6	2,330	1	350	1	200	8	2,880	7	2,470	15	5,350
Bn's-Support	4	1,035					4	1,035	9	1,145	13	2,180
Separate Co's	1	90			2	160	3	250			3	250
TOTAL PROBABLE		4,165		350		360		4,875		4,475		9,350
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,200	3	1,200
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support									22	6,625	22	6,625
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										8,765		8,765
		23,620		3,050		3,775		30,445		37,940		68,385

See note =1 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,150		150	3,300
	Probable	2,430			2,430
	Possible				
	TOTAL	5,580		150	5,730
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,610		560	4,170
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,610		560	4,170
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	6,135	875	900	7,910
	Probable	830	350		1,180
	Possible				
	TOTAL	6,965	1,225	900	9,090
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,415	600	655	3,670
	Probable	380		285	665
	Possible				
	TOTAL	2,795	600	940	4,335
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,145	1,225	1,150	6,520
	Probable	525		75	600
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,670	1,225	1,225	7,120

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS														DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL									
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	33	3		36	8			8	5			5	46	3		49	34	4		38	80	7		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	39	6		45	11	1		12	5	1		6	55	8		63	35	6		41	90	14		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	9	1		10	1			1	1			1	11	1		12	2	3	10	15	13	4	10	27
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	5
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		2	3	2	1	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1					1			1
TOTAL SUPPORT	19	4		23	2			2	1			1	22	4		26	8	4	22	34	30	8	22	60
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	58	10		68	13	1		14	6	1		7	77	12		89	43	10	22	75	120	22	22	164

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	269	Nam Hoa	61	Hoa Vang	588	Thang Binh	943	Binh Son	311
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	58	Hieu Duc	65	Tam Ky	672	Son Tinh	474
	Trieu Phong	143	Hong Dien	59	Dien Ban	1,093	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	450
	Cam Lo	150	Vinh Loc	130	Dai Loc	356	Hiep Duc	215	Nghia Hanh	341
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	231	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	258	Mo Duc	483
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	333	Hau Duc	229	Duc Pho	465
	Huong Hoa	5	Phu Vang	24	Que Son	921			Tra Bong	170
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	107	Duy Xuyen	1,098			Ba To	202
			Huong Thuy	101	Hieu Nhon	294			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	437					Son Ha	185
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	947	THUA THIEN	1,254	QUANG NAM	4,868	QUANG TIN	2,432	QUANG NGAI	3,095

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,596

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,085		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Vic XD 6233	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175	Unlocated	
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unlocated LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	

*See note #4 on page A-17
**See note #2 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	300		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1267/24Sep69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
31st Group	NVA	C	1,055		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	215	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1062/27Sep69
15th Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	2,010		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	Unlocated	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	YD 6825/23Apr69
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,570		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	2,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	400	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	395	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,595		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	YD 1259/11Jun69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	355	XD 9265	XD 9666/26May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	300	XD 8354	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,680		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	YD 3858/20Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	185	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	PR	240	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	185	Vic YD 3535	YD 3448/7Sep69

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	890		
Rdgt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	275	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	265	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jun69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,740		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	330	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	185	Vic YD 6514	YD 6019/6Sep69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
3rd Bn, 803rd Regt	NVA	C	215	Vic YC 3193	YC 3389/19Jul69
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	360	Vic YD 3304	YD 5226/8Sep69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
K.35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	
C.113 Co	LF	C	140	Vic YD 4032	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	15,000		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
577th RL Bn	NVA	C	305	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
HAI VAN Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102nd Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103rd Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	525		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	185	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,065		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
368B Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,170		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	180	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	330	Unlocated	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	685		
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	175	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
R.20 Bn	LF	C	145	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	LF	C	130	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	70	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.37 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	125	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	105	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST ST.ENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	4,070		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	415		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	AT 9226	
1st Bn	NVA	C	85	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	90	AT 9226	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	85	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	180	BT 2440	BT 2340/12Aug69
72nd Bn	LF	C	175	BT 2932	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Weps Bn	LF	C	195	BT 3510	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	200	BT 3127	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 2232	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	220	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4212	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	80	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	85	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	115	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	115	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
40th Sapper Bn	MF	C	130	BS 4677	BS 6385/12Aug69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	685		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4386	BS 3587/13Aug69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69
C.17 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	60	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7555	BS 7061/17Nov68
C.120 Co	LF	C	45	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	75	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5596	
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,615		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	880		
Regt Hq	MF	C	355	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	180	BS 6733	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	180	BS 7932	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	165	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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BINH DINH PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
13th NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,700		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	520	BR 7363	
7th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 7547	
8th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 5950	
9th Bn	NVA	C	300	BR 5929	

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 280001H September 1969 - 042400H October 1969.

a. A review of all information on strengths of NVA artillery units indicates that the normal artillery battalion averages about 300 men, with 300 to 400 men in the Regimental Headquarters. Accordingly, strength figures of the 78th, 84th and 164th Arty Regt's have been reduced to reflect this latest estimate.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units witnin the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

9. Subordinate/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF PERINTREP 39-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 40-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P)

a. PW, PFC Chu The DUNG (AKA Nguyen The DUNG) 2nd Co, 1st Bn, 9th Regt, 304th Div, captured 5 Sep 69 at (XD 960614) (11th ITT Report #128-69, 260120Z Sep 69) gave his unit strength as 70 men. DUNG stated the 1st Bn was located in QUANG NINH (D), QUANG BINH (P), NVN. DUNG also stated the mission of the 2nd Co was to attack U. S. positions vicinity (XD 960616) prior to daylight on 5 Sep 69 and then return to their base area in QUANG NINH (D), QUANG BINH (P), NVN. Further, each company of the 1st Bn was to rotate in attacks on U. S. positions south of the BEN HAI River (NFI). DUNG stated the morale in his unit was fair, most troops didn't want to fight for fear of death and that they were homesick. Source revealed that U-2 and K-27 were AKA's for the 9th Regt and the LBN for the 2nd Co was 13652 US. PW DUNG states his unit received 30 replacements in early July 1969. Source stated the 304th Div had three infantry regiments designated (U-1, U-2, and U-3), unknown transportation battalions, unknown 120mm mortar battalions, unknown 12.7 AA battalions and a 20th Sapper Bn. Source stated the 9th Regt had three infantry battalions designated (1, 2, and 3), 16th DKZ RR Co, 24th Sapper Co, 22nd Transportation Co, 18th Communications Co, unknown 82mm Mortar Co and a 23rd Recon Co. DUNG states the 1st Bn had three companies designated as the 1st Infantry Co, 2nd Infantry/Sapper Co and 3rd Infantry Co. Reported personalities: 9th Regt CO-Maj TRUONG, XO-Maj KINH or Maj HUY, PO-Maj DAN, CofS-Sr Capt THO; 2nd Co Cmdr-Lt TAN (KIA) or Lt DIEN, XO-Asp KHAI, PO-Lt KHUY.

(G-2 COMMENT: LBN 13652 US is mentioned for the first time but it falls in the same series as LBN's for the 9th Regt and its units. The AKA's U-1 and K-27 have been previously mentioned by PW's and are carried in III MAF OOB holdings. The majority of the units composition given by PW DUNG correlates with III MAF OOB holdings and most of the reported personalities were mentioned by previous PW's. All information rated (F-2).)

b. PW, Cpl Le Hong LINH, 1st Bn, 27th NVA Regt (IND), captured 24 Sep 69 at (YD 126675) (3rd MAR DIV 260505Z Sep 69, 517 MID Report #56-A-69) gave his unit strength as 478 men and their location as vicinity (YD 0472). LINH stated the mission of his unit was to attack U. S. vehicles on Highway 75 between CON THIEN (YD 115703) and BAI SON (YD 120668) at nightfall on 24 Sep 69. Source revealed the LBN for the 1st Bn was 94032 XB, with an AKA of T-73 and the AKA for the 27th Regt was E-27. Source also revealed if he saw any NVA soldiers he was to tell them he was from B.25 Unit. PW LINH stated 10 men from the 1st Co had malaria, two men were WIA and the APO was KIA on 18 Sep 69 by arty fire. Source further stated the 1st Bn has received 100 replacements

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and is composed of a headquarters section, three infantry companies and a heavy mortar company. Reported personalities: 1st Bn CO-JrCapt Thi FNU, APO-Dang FNU (KIA), CofS-JrCapt HIONG, Commo Section Ldr-TRUNG, Weapons Supply Chief-MAN, Rear Serv Chief-THUST, Bn Manager-MSgt BAN, 1st Co Cmdr-WO Pham Van DONG.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first time LBN 94032 XB and AKA T-73 have been mentioned, and the second time that the 1st Company Commander was given as WO Pham Van DONG by a PW from the 27th Regt. All other personalities are mentioned for the first time. All information rated (F-6).)

c. Rallier PFC Dang Dinh NAM, K-8 Co, 27th Bn, 31st Group, who rallied on 27 Sep 69 at (YD 105628) (3rd MAR DIV 290801Z Sep 69, 517 MID Report #57-A-69) stated the 27th Bn was composed of three companies designated (K-6, K-7 and K-8) with the strength broken down as follows: 60 men, 60 men and 50 men respectively. NAM also stated the base area for the 27th Bn was located vicinity (YD 1379) and (YD 1479). NAM further stated the mission of his unit was one of combat and supplying ammo/food to guerrillas operating in CUA Valley (MAI LOC Area). Source revealed the morale in his unit was very low because of lack of food and medical supplies. Source states the LBN for the K-8 Co is 94230 XB. Rallier NAM stated he and approximately 150 others left THANH HOA (P) in Feb 69 and proceeded on foot along Highway 1 to waiting station 70 (CNA). From there NAM and 20 others were sent to the 27th Bn. Source revealed there were supply caches at vicinity (YD 0650) and (YD 0750). Source also stated the area of operations for the 27th Bn was in the DMZ from vicinity (YD 1079) to (YD 2279) and south around A-4 Base. NAM stated PFC DAU from his unit Chieu Hoied in Aug 69 because of lack of supplies. Reported personalities: Infiltration Group Cmdr-1stLt Le Hun VAN, XO-2ndLt Hach FNU; 31st Group CO-Hong PHO; 27th Bn CO-DIEN, XO-HUNG; K-8 Co Cmdr-Capt NHIN, XO-LstLt SIN, PO-1stLt HIN; 1st Plt Ldr, K-8 Co-LY, 2nd Plt Ldr-MINH, 3rd Plt Ldr-BE; K-7 Co Cmdr-PHO.

(G-2 COMMENT: LBN 94230 XB was given by a previous PW as being the LBN for K-8 Co. The K-8 Co Cmdr, XO and 1st Plt Ldr, K-8 Co are mentioned for the second time by a PW from the K-8 Co. All other personalities are mentioned for the first time. PFC Nguyen Quang DAU who rallied 8 Aug 69 (YD 195620) was a member of the K-8 Co, 27th Bn, 31st Group. All information rated (F-3).)

2. THUA THIEN (P). No significant reports.

3. QUANG NAM (P)

a. Hoi Chanh, Sgt Doan Hong LONG (AKA Duc VAN) 2d Co, 42d Recon Bn, Group 44, who rallied on 14 Sep 69 vicinity (AT 982432) (CG First MAR DIV, 230650Z Sep 69, Supp Interr Rpt 1st ITT 32-09-69) located the 2d Co vicinity (BT 120520), and stated that the previously reported "T-50"

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designation was incorrect due to an error in pronunciation. Actual designation is "P-50." The Hoi Chanh further stated the P-50 is not a separate unit subordinate to Group 44 but is AKA for "QUANG DA FRONT" which is the same as Group 44. The Hoi Chanh further stated that messages concerning FWMAF Troop activities are sent by a coded message by runner to a radio operator. The radio operator then sends the message in code to the company. The company correlates all recon teams' reports and forwards them to P-50. Hoi Chanh stated further that frequency and call signs were unknown to him.

(G-2 COMMENT: No mention was made to the english speaking radio intercept personnel that were previously mentioned (Ref: 9th ITT 17-09-69, and 9th ITT 18-09-69). All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, PFC Hoang SAM, 4th Co, 409th Sapper Bn, captured 4 Sep 69 at (BT 004396), (1st MAR DIV msg 280850 Sep 69, Supp Interr Rpt 1st ITT 39-09-69) stated the 409th's strength is 380 men and is located in the vicinity of KY THINH Base Area (BT 204215). The battalions mission is to create chaos and disorder with sapper attacks against FWMAF and ARVN positions. PW HOANG states the 1st and 4th Co belong to the 2d Wing operations in southern TAM KY Area vicinity (BT 195032) with the 2nd and 3rd Co's belonging to the 1st Wing, operating in northern TAM KY Area vicinity of HIEP DUC and QUE SON. Subject infiltrated to RVN in mid Jan 69 with the 2nd Sapper Bn. He later joined the 409th Sapper Bn on 27 Mar 69 at the battalions base area vicinity (BT 195032).

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first report of a PW from the 409th being captured in QUANG NAM Province. The information regarding a 1st and 2nd Wing and their assignment areas is reported for the first time in QUANG TIN (P). It is possible that the 409th Sapper Bn has split as stated. Agents in June, July and August have divulged the same information therefore contributing to the validity of this PW's statements (F-3).

It is unusual that a man from a southern unit, 4th Co, has been captured so far from his units AO. It is possible, however, that he was on a food gathering mission for his company. All other information rated (F-6).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). No significant reports.

5. QUANG NGAI (P). PW, Cpl Nguyen Van LY, 2nd Co, 401st Bn, unknown regiment, captured on 27 Sep 69 in the vicinity (BS 569259) (Americal msg 290355Z) locates his unit in the vicinity (BS 569259) as of 22 Sep 69. PW also states his company is a mortar company (82mm mortar) with a mission of attacking allied positions. Subject infiltrated from NVN, with Group "22, composed of 400 men, on 13 Mar 69 from KIEU (U), THAN HOA (P). Infiltration was by foot through THANH HOA (P),

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NGHE AN (P), QUANG BINH (P), LAOS, and arriving in QUANG NGAI (P) RVN in Jan 69. PW LY, along with 250 men, was assigned to the 401st battalion. The disposition of the remainder of group is unknown.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first report on the 401st Bn (F-3). It is possible that the 3rd Div is forming a new regiment to operate with the 18th Regt in BINH DINH (P) (F-6).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 40-69

1. GENERAL. Reported counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities during the past week reflected primary emphasis on military proselyting and continuing efforts on civil and political proselyting. Propaganda themes were generally oriented to complement and support the military and civil proselyting activities. VC/VCI intelligence gathering activities focused on the use of females and young teenagers to collect information in GVN-controlled areas while often conducting simultaneous trade, purchasing and food collection activities; penetration of GVN-controlled areas, agencies and organizations through possible exploitation of the Chieu Hoi program; and use of Vietnamese employees to collect information aboard US installations.

A VC rallier and former security cadre reported numerous locations in Quang Tin and southern Quang Nam (P) that allegedly had recently been under observation by the VC preparatory to future attacks on unknown dates by VC Main Force and NVA units.

A US MI source report (Eval: C-6) concerned enemy reconnaissance activity in east-central Duy Xuyen (D) in preparation for future combined operations (nfi).

Numerous reports reflected widespread efforts at food collection, particularly rice, as the Fall harvest season terminates and the northeast monsoon commences in ICTZ.

Other miscellaneous reports concern VC/NVA rice shortages in Thua Thien (P), financial difficulties, agricultural production in VC-controlled areas, and additional information on the reported newly formed VC Que Tien (D) located near the border between Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces.

Reported acts of terrorism remained at an extremely low level for the second consecutive week and no acts of sabotage were reported.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. Reports of VC/VCI intelligence gathering activities focused on the use of females and teenagers to collect information in GVN controlled areas while conducting trade, purchasing, and food collection activities; placement of specially trained and selected cadre and penetration agents in GVN agencies, organizations and areas through use of the Chieu Hoi program; reconnaissance activities in the east-central portion of Duy Xuyen (D) in preparation for future combined operations (nfi); and use of female employees to collect information aboard US installations.

A VC rallier and former security cadre reported numerous locations in Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces that had been under observation by the VC preparatory to future attacks on unknown dates by VC Main Force and NVA units.

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Details of reported enemy intelligence gathering activities during the past week are as follows:

a. Quang Tri. On 20 September 1969, a US MI source reported female Nguyen Thi THIEN, age 27, to be a VC cadre travelling from An Hung (H) (YD 360580) to Bich La Hau (H) (YD 356558), to organize rice collection and collect information on PF and US forces in the area (Eval: C-2).

b. Thua Thien. A US MI source reported on 29 September 1969 that Nguyen HAN, a member of the Phu Loc District Current Affairs Committee, and Vo Dai AN, a member of the Public Security Section of the Current Affairs Committee have been operating throughout Phu Loc District. They contacted Le Thi CAM, 24 years old, native of An Thach (H) vicinity of (YD 934094), Loc Son (V), Phu Loc (D) and requested that she purchase some supplies (nfi) for them and attempt to gain employment at a US base (nfi) to collect information (Eval: C-3).

(III MAF SCI Note: Vo Dai AN is believed to be same VCI personality that has been operating in the same area since 1964.)

c. Quang Nam. A US MI source reported that on 26 September 1969, an U/I reconnaissance element of approximately 30 men from the V.25 LF Battalion was deployed in the vicinity of (BT 123548). Intentions were to obtain detailed information on current ARVN and FWMAF activities in the area in preparation for the movement of the V.25 Bn. to this area to conduct combined operations with the Q.81 LF company (Eval: C-6).

d. Quang Tin. A VC rallier of 27 September, who was formerly the Security Officer for the Military and Administrative Security Agencies of Quang Tin (P) (VC Quang Nam) attended a meeting in August 1969 and related the following: The security section was assigned the mission of observing Allied/ARVN installations in the province in order to gain information to be utilized in conducting operations against these installations at unknown later dates. These installations were an unknown OP located in the vicinity of (BT 185155), Cha Go OP located vicinity (BT 232189), Nui Vang OP located vicinity (BT 248159), Chop Chai OP located vicinity (BT 282158), Ky Tra OP located vicinity (BT 318088), and Bung Xanh OP located vicinity (BT 278202). Province Main Force units were to be utilized in attacking the above locations. The following locations were to be attacked by NVA units. Go Gia OP located vicinity (BT 173082), Thien Phuoc (SS) located vicinity (BT 118143), US base southeast of Chu Lai (mortar attack) located vicinity (BT 538072), Tran Duong OP located vicinity (BT 232314) and the Quang Tin (P) headquarters located vicinity (BT 291228) (Uneval).

e. Quang Ngai.

(1) A US MI source reported that on 12 September 1969 the Political Section of the Quang Ngai Provincial Committee held a meeting

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under a heavy canopy of trees in Lang Chai in the vicinity of (BS 367403), Ba Tra (V), Ba To (D), Quang Ngai (P). The meeting was called to discuss an order from the South Central Office (COSVN) to choose party members who would be trained and then sent to the GVN side as returnees in order to work as spies for VC struggle efforts during the post-hostilities stage. "Order 27" dated 10 August 1969 belonging to "Decision 5" of the North Vietnam political office dated May 1969:

Commencing in October 1969, many party members would be carefully trained for three months in North Vietnam or in the South Central Office in Cambodia. After graduating, the members would arrange to work for GVN installations or turn themselves over to the GVN as returnees. They would work as spies after the war ended (F-6).

(2) A US MI source reported that on 20 September 1969, the Son Tinh VC District Mobile Office held a meeting in Phuong Trung (H) vicinity of (BS 491841), Son Phuong (V), to discuss the following plans:

(a) Choose "hard-core" cadres to go over to the GVN side as returnees in order to join GVN organizations and work as counterintelligence agents.

(b) Make the youths (13 years and older) join the guerrilla forces or make them work harder and at more dangerous tasks. They should be intimidated into joining the guerrilla forces. The youths will not be able to defect to the GVN-controlled areas during ARVN operations if they are forced to join the guerrilla forces.

(c) Organize females and teenagers into groups to go to the GVN-controlled areas to trade, collect intelligence information and buy food for the VC.

(d) Assassinate or kidnap GVN hard-core cadre.

(e) Let beautiful girls live with allied forces soldiers in order to collect information from them.

(f) Establish hard-core cadres to make preparations for the peace (nfi).

(g) Choose high grade soldiers and send them to study the construction of mines and hand grenades so they can train local force soldiers after graduating (Eval: F-6).

3. SABOTAGE. No acts of sabotage were reported during the period.

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Reported VC/VCI political activities reflected primary emphasis on military proselyting. Continuing efforts

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on civil and political proselyting was designed to incite people to support and participate in political struggles against the GVN. Propaganda themes were generally oriented to complement and support the military and civil proselyting efforts. Typical themes are designed to instigate RVNAF personnel and civilians to demand an end to the war, cause widespread opposition to GVN conscription, and create unfavorable reaction to GVN travel restrictions.

Details of reported enemy political and propaganda activities during the past week are as follows:

a. Quang Tri. (XXIV Corps INTSUM No. 273-69) On 24 September 1969, at (YD 334581), Mai Linh (D), CAP 4-1-3 and the 67th PF platoon heard a voice (nfi) outside their perimeter. The voice stated that the VC would kill all Americans that night. A search of the area turned up one portable radio.

b. Thua Thien.

(1) A US MI source reported that on 18 September 1969, an approximate VC platoon collected foodstuffs and distributed propaganda leaflets (nfi) at Van Xa (H) in the vicinity of (YD 663280) (Uneval).

(2) A US MI source reported that during 25-27 September 1969, there was a meeting of the Tri-Thien Quang Provincial Political Military Cadre in the vicinity of (YD 805075). Present were 12 representatives from Quang Tri, six from Thua Thien and six from Quang Da. The purpose of the meeting was to combine the activities of the three provinces because Thua Thien was having great difficulty in providing enough food for its troops. Quang Da would have to help supply food. The following guidelines of the Autumn-Winter Campaign were discussed:

(a) Increase the VC installation by harrassing RVN people so that they will join the VC.

(b) Organize commo-liaison stations erratically so as to avoid detection by US and ARVN troops.

(c) Operate in small units until ARVN and US troops separate and then attack with large sized units. (Eval: F-6).

(3) A US MI source reported that during 27-29 September 1969, the Phu Loc District Committee installation and one unidentified armed company were located at the vicinity of (ZC 190960). On 27 September 1969, there was a meeting at this location at which time the village level cadre were instructed in the following points:

(a) Set deep agents into self defense forces.

(b) Set legal underground cadre in village governments of RVN.

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(c) Develop the available number of cadre and reorganize "Peoples Groups".

It was also mentioned that if they can get a "good grip on the people" of their localities, they will accept a referendum, but if not, they will continue the long range struggle through "terrorism and sabotage". (Eval: F-3).

(4) XXIV Corps INTSUM 273-69) On 28 September 1969, one company of VC fired four rounds of B-40 rocket and M79 rounds into the ambush position of 2-5-5 RF platoon at (YD 942125). When the firing ceased the VC gave a political propaganda talk using loudspeakers from a distance of approximately 100 meters. The speech encouraged the RFs to join the VC.

c. Quang Nam.

(1) The Hieu Duc DIOCC provided the following on 23 September 1969:

Information extracted from a Viet Cong document revealed that "an agency of the Viet Cong 1st Zone will organize and operate for two months from September to October. They will engage in political and military proselyting. The Viet Cong will guide the people to organize the political struggle with the GVN. They will request "Peace" from 22 September to 27 November 1969" (nfi) (Uneval).

(2) On 25 September 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division operating in the vicinity of (AT 957630) discovered a document on the body of an enemy soldier KIA. The document was translated as follows:

Directive number 69/CT/TV, dated 22 August 1969, signed by Nguyen Ba TUNG of TK40 (Party Committee, Area 2, Hoa Vang District, Quang Da Special Zone), sent to Party Committees of subordinate agencies, pertains to intensification of military proselyting activities. Document first states that the morale of FWMAF/RVNAF troops was much affected by the current situation (sic), especially the annihilation of "tyrants" at N4, N7, N8 and N3 (VC villages of Hoa Loi, Hoa Luong, Hoa Binh and Hoa Thai, Area 2, Hoa Vang) which had created panic among the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) troops. Subsequently, addressees were instructed to intensify military proselyting activities. Each subordinate Party Chapter was to build up 20 military proselyting cells and motivate local residents and members of associations to participate in military proselyting activities. To establish Party Chapters and Youth Group Chapters in the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) units and to instigate enemy troops to demand an end of the VN war. (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No: 10-1033-69) (Eval: B-3).

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(3) On 25 September 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division operating vicinity (AT 957630) obtained a letter from the body of an enemy KIA. The letter dated 18 July 1969, prepared for the signature of Tung, Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Committee, Area 2, Hoa Vang (VC), states that the building of the (VC) government's organization was a main objective in the present situation and addressees were instructed to complete the building of (VC) government machinery in the villages, and to step up its activities as prescribed by the district (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No. 10-1038-69) (Eval: B-3).

(4) On 25 September 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division operating vicinity (AT 957630), obtained a letter from the body of an enemy KIA. The letter, dated 19 August 1969, signed by Van Bien, V7, (VC Hoa Tho (V), Area 2, Hoa Vang) addressed to Kien, reads in part as follows: "I have just received a training document providing instructions for the motivation of the populace (to support the Revolution), and a directive pertaining to the preparation for the upcoming climaxing phase. Please send me immediately a detailed report on the accomplishments and personnel strength of your unit in July 1969. In addition, you are to drop from the records the names of all personnel who shirk responsibility, and send a letter to me through N7 (VC Hoa Luong (V) Area 2, Hoa Vang)". (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No. 10-1039-69) (Eval: negative)

(5) A document captured 25 September 1969 vicinity (AT 957630) revealed the following missions were to be accomplished by N19 (nfi) in compliance with a directive of the Current Affairs Committee, K40 (possibly VC Area 2, Hoa Vang District Party Committee, Quang Da Special Zone, MR-5). Document reveals that missions consist of:

(a) launching three-pronged attacks to achieve greater victories

(b) manufacturing rudimentary weapons and laying booby traps

(c) strengthening the local forces in order to provide replacements to higher headquarters

(d) recruiting teenagers

(e) destroying Strategic Hamlet 3

(f) improving troops combat tactics and techniques and

(g) conducting political struggles in towns and cities (CDEC DOC LOG NO. 10-1039-69) (Eval: B-3).

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d. Quang Ngai. On 21 September, elements of the Americal Division operating vicinity (BS 708908) discovered a document. The document was a resolution concerning the 1969 Fall-Winter Campaign (possibly in Binh Son District). The resolution was dated 21 August 1969 and stated that the major missions to be carried out in the last five months of 1969 by the district level units were to accelerate the "D" Campaign (possibly the 1969 Fall-Winter Campaign), in order to expand the (VC) liberated areas, break the enemy oppressive control, consolidate combat villages and hamlets, gain the control of the populace in rural areas, and develop (VC) local forces, especially political forces in city areas along communication routes and US controlled areas. (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No. 10-1030-69) (Eval: B-3).

5. TERROR. For the second consecutive week, reported acts of terrorism remained at an extremely low level. Only five incidents of terrorism were reported during the past week.

See Appendix 1 for details of reported terrorist incidents.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Quang Tri.

(1) A US MI source reported that on 8 and 9 September 1969, a group of six VC entered An Thai (H), Mai Linh (D), vicinity (YD 353512) to collect rice. (Uneval).

(2) A US MI source reported that on 15 September 1969, 20 VC collected rice at Giap Hau (H), Hai Lang (D) vicinity (YD 430445). (Uneval).

(3) A GVN source reported that on 15 September 1969, an armed VC squad collected food at Trung Don (H), Hai Lang District (YD 454494). (Eval: C-2)

(4) A GVN source reported on 16 September 1969, that 20 VC were collecting rice at An Hung (H) vicinity (YD 370581) and Tan Luong (H) vicinity (YD 380576), Trieu Phong (D). (Eval: B-3)

(5) On 25 September 1969, a US MI source reported local VCI of the Ha Thanh area, vicinity (YD 222672), Gio Linh (D), to be buying excessive quantities of rice, cigarettes, and clothing at the Dong Ha and Ha Thanh markets. It was suspected that this material was for distribution to the VC in areas of Ky Truc (H) vicinity (YD 240660), Vinh Quang Ha (H) vicinity (YD 265650), and Mai Xa Chanh (H) vicinity (YD 282670). (Eval: F-6)

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b. Thua Thien.

(1) A US MI source reported that on 15 September 1969, Nguyen THIEU (aka: Tung), Commo-Liaison Chief of Phong Dien (D) and Nguyen LOC distributed 5000$VN to the people of Uu Thuong (H) vicinity (YD 505635), Phong Dien (D), with instructions to buy food, supplies and personal items for the VC. On 17 September 1969, National Police cadre of Phong Nguyen (V) collected the 5000$VN from the people. (Uneval)

(2) On 21 September 1969, a GVN source reported that female Bui Thi Lien, age 36, was a VC commo-liaison cadre operating at Loc An (V) vicinity (YD 958084) (Eval: C-2).

(3) A US MI source reported that on 21 September 1969, a VC unit collected rice and other supplies at Nam Pho Can (H) vicinity (YD 959045) (Eval: F-6).

(4) A GVN source reported that on 21 and 22 September 1969, one platoon of the 3rd Company, Phu Loc Armed Battalion collected rice at Loc Thuy (H) vicinity (ZD 148003) Phu Loc (D) (Eval: F-6).

(5) On 22 September 1969, a GVN source reported that female Le Thi Tu, age approximately 60, was a supplier of food to the VC at Luu Boa (H) vicinity (YD 710209) (Eval: C-2).

(6) A US MI source reported that on 23 September 1969, a VC squad took one pig at Luong Dien Dong (H) vicinity (YD 986057) (Uneval).

(7) A US MI source reported that on 24 September 1969, approximately 25 VC collected 300 lbs. of rice at Lieu Coc Thuong (YD 679255), Huong Tra (D) (Uneval).

(8) On 25 September 1969, a US MI source reported that cadre from the VC Administrative Committee for Area #1 located vicinity (AT 855095) Phu Loc (D), frequently filter into nearby areas to buy food from the civilian populace (Eval: C-6).

(9) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 282400 hours September 1969. Approximately one VC company entered Que Chu (H) vicinity (YD 682252) and stole rice from the people.

(10) A US MI source reported on 28 September 1969, that an unknown number of VC cadre from Phong Dien and Quang Dien (D) and the Phong Dien Armed company held a meeting vicinity (YD 530255), concerning the mission of concentrating efforts on attacking recently pacified hamlets and assassinating hamlet cadre. They also intended to attack civilian transport trucks and destroy bridges on Highway 1,

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between Hue and Quang Tri, during the monsoon season (Eval: C-3).

(11) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT. 292230 hours September 1969. Approximately one VC squad entered Luong Dien Dong (H) vicinity (YD 986057) and seized rice from the people.

c. Quang Nam.

(1) An official letter, dated 8 September 1969, with the signature block of QUY, for the Current Affairs Committee (possibly of Dien Ban District, Quang Da Special Zone, MR 5), addressed to all members of the District Party Committee, key cadre of subordinate agencies in local areas and financial cadre, was found in a bunker by an element of the 1st Mar Div on 18 September 1969 vicinity (BT 067633). The letter reads in part as follows:

"At present, the district Party Committee does not have enough money to cover expenditures, relating to the (Party) activities, subsistance allowances for cadre and party members, and the implementation of newly approved financial estimates. In addition, it cannot find money to purchase office supplies. To eliminate these difficulties, the District Party Committee appeals to all members and civilians to heighten responsibility and develop initiative in the contribution of funds to the revolutionary budget. In case you fail in (tax) collection, you may borrow money from local inhabitants. The District Party Committee will be responsible for reimbursement to them. Each key cadre ought to borrow about 20,000$VN (118$VN = $1.00 US) from civilians whereas the others operating either in the front (possibly GVN controlled areas) or in the rear (possibly VC controlled areas) should obtain 10,000$ (SVN) each from the civilians. This fund drive must be completed on 15 September 1969. We beg you to overcome every difficulty so as to gain success in your mission". (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO. 09-1978-69) (Eval: B-3)

(2) SIA Quang Nam Sector WIR of 22-28 Sept. 1969. According to a VC document which was captured on 12 September 1969 in the Loc Hiep Area, the QDSZ management section ordered Dai Loc (D) Committee to solve the famine of 1000 people who have been lacking sufficient food since the beginning of the year. These people are living in VC controlled areas of Dai Loc (D).

(3) An element of the 1st MarDiv discovered a typewritten plan in a hut on 20 September 1969, vicinity (AT 831468). The plan was undated, unsigned and prepared by an unidentified individual (possibly of Dai Loc District). This plan outlines instructions for (agricultural) production during the summer of 1969 and reads in part as follows:

Loc Quang, (Loc) Tan, (Loc) My, (Loc) Binh, (Loc) Hoa, (Loc) Phuoc, (Loc) Thuan, (Loc) Xuan, (Loc) Thanh and (Loc) Son are required to grow

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rice, corn, vegetables and to raise stock in order to check the threat of starvation. Document further states that with the critical situation, the agricultural production in 1969 plays an important role with specific significance. The production and protection of crops are considered as important as combat missions. Furthermore, the tactics of three-pronged attacks should be applied whenever possible in the lowlands and highlands in order to keep the local inhabitants from being dislocated by the enemy. These inhabitants should be kept on the (VC) side to drastically increase the farming production. In conclusion, all Party members are required to exercise effective leadership over the agricultural production which is one of the most paramount missions for the time being in order to consolidate our (VC) rear area and to support the Frontline. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO. 09-1979-69) (Eval: B-3)

(4) On 21 August 1969, RVNAF, ICTZ, Quang Nam (P) obtained a document which concerned the intensification of security activities in Dien Ban (D), QDSZ, MR 5. This directive, dated 30 March 1969 was unsigned and prepared by A83 (Security Section, Dien Ban (D), QDSZ, MR 5), revealed that in compliance with a directive from F-83 (Current Affairs Committee, Dien Ban (D)), and A-65 (Security Section, QDSZ), subordinate units and agencies were instructed to intensify security activities in the district seat, its outskirts, and liberated (VC controlled) areas. In the District Seat, and its outskirts, they must compile records and classify the following categories of personnel as "tyrants": village officials, police and security personnel, district officials, leaders of nationalist political parties, and supervisors of detention and Chieu Hoi (rallier) camps.

In liberated areas, they must uncover secret enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) agents and members of pacification and "Chieu Hoi" teams at the entry and exit points, accelerate the establishment of security networks, and motivate the population to maintain security and uncover counter-revolutionary organizations.

The directive further states that security activities should be intensified especially on the highway (unspecified) and on the outskirts of the District Seat.

In regard to political attacks on GVN officials and police agents, motivate their dependents to proselyte their husbands or relatives to abandon their positions.

Concerning the development of security forces, each village must organize one illegal and two legal reconnaissance cells, annihilate "tyrants" and accelerate the establishment of security networks in GVN official and religious organizations.

The district must bring to full strength its Security Section, consisting of 12 security cadre, 12 reconnaissance agents and 15 armed elements. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO. 09-2007-69) (Eval: B-3)

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(5) G-2 I Corps provided the following information on 22 September 1969:

An agent report dated 21 September 1969 indicated the 16th Bn., (aka: 2d Bn), 141st Regiment had moved to Hoa Loi (V), Hoa Vang (D) (AT 981659). Mission was to operate vicinity Hoa Vang (D) and collect rice. (Eval: C-3)

(6) Hieu Duc DIOCC provided the following information:

The Hoa Hieu (D) VC chief has ordered all Village Economy/Finance Sections to collect taxes for "1969", and for the above same sections to purchase six (6) tons of rice during this harvest period. (Uneval)

APPENDIX
1-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 40-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Thua Thien	19Sep69 (Late Entry)	YD 760074	Elements of the 101st Airborne Division discovered a mass grave site. Further investigation by GVN officials of Nam Hoa (D) Thua Thien (P) resulted in the finding of the remains of 250 bodies which had been buried approximately one year. Examination of the skulls revealed that the majority of victims had their skulls crushed. Some had been shot. Seventy-one victims have been identified through clothing, jewelry and seven legible ID cards. Indications from the type of clothing found, estimated age of the bodies and missing persons reports tend to identify these as victims of 1968 TET Offensive in Hue and vicinity.
	26Sep69 (Late Entry)	YD 902175	A CAP patrol discovered the bodies of two civilians, a man and boy, in a shallow grave. Relatives identified the bodies and related that the victims had been kidnapped by the VC on the night of 17 June 1969.
	27Sep69 (Late Entry)	YD 958061	VC entered Zuan An (H) and demanded rice at a civilian home. When refused, the VC beat one female civilian (nfi).
	28Sep69	YD 832170	An unknown number of VC entered Dong Luc (H) and assassinated one deputy hamlet chief (nfi).

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
	28Sep69	YD 823176	Approximately eight VC entered a hamlet 5½ kilometers SE of Hue City and assassinated one PSDF member.
Quang Nam	25Sep69 (Late Entry)	AT 959698	One civilian was killed and two wounded when a VC threw a grenade in Bo Ban (H).
	27Sep69 (Late Entry)	AT 972662	VC assassinated one civilian (nfi) from Le Son (H).
	27Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 163573	VC attacked Son Pho (H), wounded two civilians and destroyed two homes.
	27Sep69 (Late Entry)	BT 158562	Five civilians killed and 12 wounded by VC mortar fire in vic of Cam Nam.
	29Sep69	BT 043325	One civilian of Son Loc (V) was wounded by VC mortar fire (nfi).
Quang Ngai	17Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 629814	One civilian was killed when he accidentally detonated a booby trapped grenade.
	18Sep69 (Late Entry)	BS 809372	While in NDP, PF platoon 107 received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, wounding two civilians.
	30Sep69	BS 768850	While providing security for Vietnamese woodcutters, 13 kilometers NE of Quang Ngai City, CAP 1-4-2 received SAF from approximately six VC, resulting in two civilians wounded.
	20Oct69	BS 578994	VC entered Dong Binh (H) and threw a grenade into a civilian home, killing three civilians and wounding three.

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ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 40-69

1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY

a. Enemy observations by ground reconnaissance patrols throughout ICTZ during this reporting period were minimal and in widely dispersed locations.

(1) 1st Force Recon Company teams observed only 39 enemy in the area south of antenna valley.

(2) 1st Recon Bn teams observed a total of 142 enemy in the vicinity of An Hoa. Observations and contacts resulted in 6 enemy KIA.

(3) The 3d Force Recon Company teams had only a total of 9 enemy observed during the reporting period. One enemy was KIA.

(4) The 3d Recon Bn teams observed 50 enemy for the period and actions taken against the enemy resulted in 3 enemy KIA.

(5) The Americal Ranger Company teams observed a total of 19 enemy for the period.

(6) The 1st Infantry Brigade 5 Infantry Division (Mech) Ranger teams detected an estimated 150 enemy through use of sensors near the DMZ. Actions against the enemy during the period resulted in 2 enemy KIA.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY

a. In the 3d Marine Division DMZ area 73 targets were detected. 23 fire missions were conducted consisting of 100 rounds of 175mm, 123 rounds of 8 inch, and 58 rounds of 105mm artillery fired in response. Recon Team, Fancy Dan, encountered 2 enemy after being alerted by a PSID. Results was 1 enemy KIA and one enemy POW. Elsewhere in the Division Duel Blade area 136 targets were detected and reacted to by 32 fire missions consisting of 435 rounds of 175mm, 90 rounds of 155mm, and 120 rounds of 105mm artillery. BDA was unobserved.

b. There were no significant sensor detections in the 3d Marine Division, 101st Airborne Division (AM), and Americal Division Duffel Bag areas.

c. In the 1st Marine Division PSIDs, NODs, and BPS detected approximately 175 enemy during the reporting period. Reaction to the sensor detections resulted in 5 confirmed enemy KIA.

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HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

JCS CONTROL NUMBER	COPY NO.
	2 of 4X149

MACH. CI	DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT	PRI.	SEC.	ORIGINATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.	NO. CYS. RECD.	MICFLM	CLAS.	DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
	C916030	PERIODIC INTEL RPT 41-69		3K	MEF 0116569							
			NAVY FILE NUMBER									

ROUTING - *Use numbers to show order of routing*

OPERATION CODE

X-ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET
A-FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION
B-FOR COMPLIANCE
C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF _____
D-FOR COMMENT
E-FOR RECOMMENDATION
F-FOR CONCURRENCE
G-FOR INFORMATION
H-RETURN TO _____
I- _____
J-DISPOSITION _____

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
					COMMANDANT
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
1	A	10/24/1027	10/27	[illegible]	G-3 By L.R.
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
					JOINT CONTROL
					COUNSEL
					WOMEN MARINES
					STAFF DENTAL
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14 October 1969



UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 41-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE



G-3

GROUP - 4
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HQ III MAF, G-2
DANANG, RVN
14 October 1969
Ser: 0116569

PERINTREP 41-69

Period covered: 050001H - 112400H October 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13 ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. The level of enemy activity for this reporting period again continued to decline from that of previous weeks. The number of enemy initiated ground incidents dropped another 25, from 183 to 158, the lowest number since the week of 20 to 26 October 1968. The number of enemy incoming rounds also registered a decline, from 482 to 443, the lowest number since the week of 3 to 9 August of this year. In keeping with this pattern, the number of enemy KIA showed a decrease too. This number dropped 196 to a new figure of 367, down from 563. This is the lowest weekly figure for enemy KIA recorded since January 1968 when this Headquarters began to maintain weekly totals for this category of information.

Reports of counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities and plans during the past week reflected continued emphasis on the intensification of political struggles utilizing guerrilla and local forces in an expanded support role.

Recent reports indicate concerted efforts at strengthening and training guerrillas and local forces; particularly in sapper techniques, in order to maintain a credible level of military and terrorist activities through economy of force tactics. It appears that guerrilla and local forces will also be used to augment VCI proselyting and propaganda efforts directed toward the people in contested and outlying GVN controlled areas.

Reports of intelligence collection activities consisted primarily of bridge reconnaissance preparatory to future interdiction.

Terrorist and sabotage activities continued at low levels. Numerous reports during the past week reflected continued VC/VCI intentions to direct efforts against GVN administrators, officials and intelligence sources, PSDF, RD cadre, supporters and sympathizers, and interdiction of lines of communication, particularly bridges.

a. QUANG TRI (P). During the reporting period, sightings/incidents in the DMZ area decreased to 184 with 11 of these sightings north of the BEN HAI River. A total of 164 hostile targets were taken under fire this week by artillery, tactical air strikes and naval gunfire.

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Enemy initiated activity in QUANG TRI Province proceeded at a reduced but occasionally vigorous pace during the past week despite the heavy rains which characterized the I Corps weather scene. However, most of the incidents which the enemy initiated were confined to the latter part of the week.

The first major action which the enemy undertook occurred during the early morning hours of the 9th when an estimated two NVA platoons, possibly from the 27th NVA Regiment, conducted a sharp attack against elements of L/3/4 Marines in night defensive positions four kilometers east of the ROCKPILE (YD 016562). Lasting about three hours, this attack resulted in nine enemy killed with light friendly casualties.

After remaining quiet again on the 10th, the enemy resumed what appeared to be primarily a harassment effort during the early morning hours of the 11th when an unknown size enemy force attacked the 101st RF Company one kilometer south southeast of GIO LINH (YD 216724) resulting in light friendly casualties. The enemy force, possibly elements of the 33rd Independent Sapper Battalion, suffered the loss of eight KIA and six individual weapons captured.

The same day, the enemy launched an attack by fire against ARVN and Marine positions eight kilometers southwest of CAM LO (YD 062548) with 15x122mm rockets fired in three volleys.

There was only one noteworthy friendly initiated contact during the reporting period. This contact occurred on the 5th when 2/1 ARVN conducted a raid on an unknown size enemy force 14 kilometers south southwest of QUANG TRI City (YD 320397) resulting in eight enemy killed with no friendly casualties. In another incident on the 5th, 3/2 ARVN found 20 NVA bodies seven and one-half kilometers north northeast of the ROCKPILE (XD 998630). These bodies were about one month old and had been killed by air strikes.

Also on the 5th, a MAG-36 UH-1E helicopter on a medevac mission seven kilometers west northwest of CAM LO (YD 065630) was hit with small arms and automatic weapons fire and crashed. The aircraft carried four personnel of which three were killed and one injured.

Also, earlier in the week, evidence was uncovered which indicates the enemy is preparing to continue limited attacks and attacks by fire in the DMZ area during the coming weeks. On the 6th, C/1-506th Infantry, discovered a sizeable, and apparently recently established enemy ammunition and supply cache 16 kilometers west northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 831625). Most notable among the variety and substantial quantity of items found were 22x122mm rockets, 230 mortar rounds, over 6,000 pounds of food and a large quantity of small arms ammunition. Later in the same day, C/1-506th Infantry also

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captured a prisoner in the same area who indicated that his unit had been engaged in stocking the cache. Identifying the 2d Battalion, 246th NVA Regiment, the PW stated that upon completing the prepositioning of supplies, his unit was to return north of the BEN HAI where it was to prepare for a combat mission in the south sometime after the 5th of October.

There was further evidence of enemy activity in the western DMZ area later in the week when A/2-17th Cavalry engaged an estimated 10 NVA, most probably from the 246th Regiment, seven kilometers north northwest of FSB NEVILLE (XD 783641). Six enemy were killed in this contact.

Additional indications of continued enemy activity elsewhere along the DMZ were found on the 8th much farther to the east, about six kilometers northeast of GIO LINH (YD 253774). Here, an ARVN patrol, while operating in the southern half of the DMZ, found a substantial amount of ammunition, including 50 mortar rounds and two 140mm rocket launchers. The bunkers and ammunition were destroyed.

b. THUA THIEN (P). THUA THIEN Province continued to remain relatively quiet. Significant activity in the province was limited to two friendly initiated contacts. On the 6th, C/1-327 Infantry engaged an unknown size enemy force four and one-half kilometers north northwest of PHU BAI (YD 867190) resulting in one VC killed and seven VC captured. The prisoners were identified as members of the HUE City Unit. These PW's served to confirm previously held suspicions of the existence of this unit after a previous HUE City Unit was used to form the nucleus of the 5th NVA Regiment. The other contact occurred on the 9th when a 1st ARVN Division reconnaissance company engaged an estimated NVA squad 12 kilometers west southwest of HUE (YD 628212) resulting in nine enemy killed with no friendly casualties.

c. QUANG NAM (P). The level of enemy initiated activity in QUANG NAM Province declined even further from its limited pace of previous weeks. Attacks by fire and reconnaissance sightings were well below normal while contact with the enemy, mostly friendly initiated, was light and scattered. It is most probable that this absence of significant enemy activity was a function of the heavy rains which fell during the past week and which made operations difficult.

The first noteworthy activity occurred on the 8th when a CAP 2-9-2 patrol moving through a hamlet four kilometers northeast of AN HOA (AT 865493) received three M-26 grenades which resulted in light friendly casualties. The CAP unit returned fire and killed one VC. The next day another CAP unit, 2-1-5, while participating in a combined operation with RF's surrounded five VC in a bunker five kilometers north of HILL 55 (AT 957667). One VC surrendered but the other four attempted to escape and were killed. The VC that surrendered was subsequently identified as the commanding officer of the Q.84 Local Force Company. Of particular

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interest was his statement that the 31st Regiment and 575th Artillery Battalion had withdrawn farther into the mountains to the west for reorganization. He indicated that this movement of the NVA units had occurred during the past month.

The most significant action in the province occurred on the 9th when E/2/7 Marines while on a company sweep 12 kilometers west northwest of QUE SON (AT 926379) observed 40 to 50 enemy in small groups. Artillery was adjusted on the enemy force. A forward observer with the Marines counted 21 enemy killed by artillery.

In another development during the week, Marines captured two prisoners from the 36th NVA Regiment. Identifying both the 2d and 3d Battalions, these PW's indicate the continued presence of the 36th Regiment in its normal area of operations.

Finally in QUANG NAM Province, continued pressure was placed upon enemy food supplies between 4 and 11 October when the 5th and 7th Marines discovered a combined total of 3,400 pounds of rice.

d. QUANG TIN (P). In contrast with the low level of enemy activity in QUANG NAM Province, the enemy in QUANG TIN Province continued to make his presence known from time to time through periodic attacks by fire. Avoiding contact on the ground, as elsewhere most probably because of the heavy rain, the enemy employed mortar fire which was mostly harassing fire directed against friendly positions in the HIEP DUC area. A/4-31 Infantry in an area four to five kilometers northeast of HIEP DUC (AT 9427) received attacks by fire on the 6th and the 7th. The first consisted of five rounds of 82mm mortar fire while the latter attack consisted of 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire in three separate volleys. The heaviest volume of fire occurred on the 11th when elements of 4-31 Infantry at LZ SIBERIA one and one-half kilometers southwest of HIEP DUC (AT 901232) received 47 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. However, this barrage did not cause any casualties or damage.

Elsewhere in the province, a swift boat eight kilometers south southeast of HOI AN (BT 175499) received one round of RPG fire resulting in one USN killed and one USN wounded. The swift boat was damaged but later recovered.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Enemy activity in QUANG NGAI Province increased appreciably both with respect to the other two provinces of southern I Corps and to the pattern of activity for the preceding week. With a characteristically lighter rainfall in QUANG NGAI Province than in the other provinces of I Corps, the enemy remained active throughout the week conducting both ground attacks and harassing fires. He conducted three significant ground attacks, one each against U.S., CIDG and CAP units with a combination of small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. The most

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notable of these occurred during the early morning hours of the 9th when the enemy conducted what was an apparently coordinated attack by an estimated VC company against the night defensive positions of CAP 1-4-4, CAP 1-4-5 and the 380th RF Company located in an area 10 to 13 kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 753818, BS 735785, BS 737791). Most notable in this action was the volume of mortar fire employed. In the course of the contact, which lasted about an hour, the enemy fired about 140 rounds of 82mm mortar fire.

The attack against the U.S. unit occurred on the 5th when B/5-46 Infantry nine kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 703806) was attacked by an estimated enemy platoon employing small arms fire and 60mm mortars. Enemy casualties were unknown while light friendly casualties were inflicted. The attack against the CIDG force occurred on the 8th, when the MINH LONG CIDG Mobile Strike Force Company five kilometers northwest of BA TO (BS 515388) received 60mm mortar, automatic weapons and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in no casualties or damage. Then two hours later and one kilometer to the southeast (BS 523382) the same company received the same type weapons fire from an estimated two enemy squads. Again this attack resulted in no casualties or damage.

Other than these ground attacks, the enemy conducted scattered harassing fires with two attacks by fire being reported. One was against the 2/4 ARVN on the 6th three kilometers east southeast of MO DUC (BS 761532) when twenty 82mm mortar rounds were fired.

The second attack by fire was delivered on the 11th against CAP 1-3-4 10 kilometers north of BINH SON (BT 621017). Twenty to twenty-five 82mm mortar rounds were fired. Both attacks resulted in only light friendly casualties.

The remaining noteworthy activity reported in the province occurred as the result of three light and scattered friendly initiated contacts in which 16 enemy were killed.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. In assessing the overall situation in I Corps this past week and looking forward to the coming week, there is little evidence of significant change. While the heavy rains of the past week undoubtedly retarded and hindered enemy operations, the enemy remained active in the DMZ area where his posture is most favorable for the conduct of limited attacks and attacks by fire against friendly forces. In southern I Corps, the enemy was also relatively active in QUANG NGAI where he has been characteristically aggressive. Through attacks by fire and harassing fire, the enemy continued to make his presence known in QUANG TIN Province, while THUA THIEN remained relatively quiet. Only in QUANG NAM was enemy activity substantially below normal, which can be attributed to the heavy rains of the past week. With few indications of impending large scale or widespread enemy attacks, enemy activity can be expected to remain at its normal seasonal level during the coming week.

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2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents decreased from 183 to 158 for the week of 5-11 October. These incidents consisted of seven ground attacks, two of which were company size or larger and five platoon size or smaller, two ambushes, seven attacks by fire, 83 harassing fire incidents, 26 mining and booby trap incidents, six hamlet harassment incidents, one assassination incident, six espionage incidents, four kidnapping incidents, 10 propaganda incidents, and six sabotage incidents.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire decreased from 87 to 62 incidents for the reporting period and 22 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 5-11 October.

Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	252
60mm Mortar	87
Unk Cal Mortar	80
140mm Rocket	5
122mm Rocket	15
107mm Rocket	2
Unk Cal Rocket	2
TOTAL	443

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance

(1) There were 44 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 5-11 October. These long-range patrols reported 17 sightings and two contacts totaling 36 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of three enemy KIA.

(2) Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

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(1) The following significant enemy caches were captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 5-11 October 1969:

(a) 6 Oct: C/1/506 Infantry captured a rice and ordnance cache 16 kilometers west northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 831625) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
1 EA	UNK	SKS Rifle
1 EA	UNK	AK-27 Rifle
22 EA	UNK	122mm Rockets
100 EA	UNK	60mm Mortar Rounds
130 EA	UNK	82mm Mortar Rounds
13 EA	CHICOM	Grenades
12 EA	CHICOM	Claymores
18 EA	UNK	Rucksacks
3,850 LBS	UNK	Polished Rice
2,200 LBS	UNK	Fish
MISC	UNK	Medical Supplies

There was no further information available on this cache.

(b) 11 Oct: B/1/20 Infantry captured a cache two kilometers east northeast of DUC PHO (BS 799396) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
200 EA	UNK	81mm Mortar Rounds

There was no further information available on this cache.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 5-11 October:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
82mm Mortar	228
81mm Mortar	293
60mm Mortar	202
155mm Artillery	1
105mm Artillery	31
140mm Rocket	5
122mm Rocket	23
75mm RR	1
57mm RR	7
TOTAL	791

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(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	177
Crew-Served Weapons	14

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 5-11 October.

Date	Location	Amount (lbs)		Capturing Unit
05 Oct	(BT 017403)	100		M/3/26
05 Oct	(BT 083474)	2,000		B/1/7
05 Oct	(BT 034490)	44		51R ROKMC
05 Oct	(BT 340096)	10		D/1/6
05 Oct	(BT 340096)	100		RCN/1/6
05 Oct	(BS 544411)	700		B/4/3
05 Oct	(XD 832637)	200		C/1/506
05 Oct	(XD 865251)	50		B/1/327
06 Oct	(BT 079479)	900		B/1/7
06 Oct	(BT 072462)	100		B/1/7
06 Oct	(BS 548405)	300		B/4/3
06 Oct	(BS 552402)	1,600		B/4/3
06 Oct	(XD 831625)	3,850		C/1/506
06 Oct	(XD 831625)	2,200	Food	C/1/506
07 Oct	(BS 373812)	110		C/1/52
07 Oct	(BS 373812)	100	Salt	C/1/52
07 Oct	(BS 841288)	10	Salt	B/1/1
09 Oct	(YD 893237)	800		CAP 3-3-3
09 Oct	(AT 954684)	300		CAP 2-1-4
09 Oct	(AT 943372)	120		E/2/7
09 Oct	(BS 686804)	3,000		A/5/46
10 Oct	(BT 090472)	625		D/1/7
10 Oct	(AT 897504)	300		L/3/5
10 Oct	(BS 799441)	3,500		B/1/20
10 Oct	(BS 556912)	45		CAP 1-3-8
11 Oct	(BT 093468)	400		D/1/7
11 Oct	(AT 913365)	500		F/2/7
11 Oct	(AT 913365)	20	Salt	F/2/7
11 Oct	(AT 913365)	10	Food	F/2/7
11 Oct	(AT 892498)	1,100		L/3/5
11 Oct	(BT 078486)	200		C/1/7
11 Oct	(BT 078486)	20	Salt	C/1/7
11 Oct	(YD 857196)	250		C/1/327
	TOTAL RICE	21,204		
	TOTAL FOOD	2,210		
	TOTAL SALT	150		

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t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	64	Structures Damaged	28
Bunkers Destroyed	21	Bunkers Damaged	3
Secondary Explosions	2	Secondary Fires	10

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ decreased in comparison to the previous week. There were 367 KIA's, 31 VC PW's, and seven NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	82	85	83	84
Low	68	70	72	71
Rainfall (total)	23.18	34.40	26.20	21.88
Winds (knots)	7	11	6	8
Visibility (miles)	4	4	5	5

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 11-17 October 1969

(a) General. The heavy rain and cloudiness caused by the weak front currently over ICTZ will subside during the middle of the forecast period and the forecast is clear with occasional scattered clouds along the ridge line.

(b) ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the coastal plain of ICTZ is occasional cloudiness. The coastal inland should experience patchy stratus and ground fog in low areas from midnight until 0900H. The mountain areas will be frequented with isolated showers during the afternoons and evenings. Precipitation for ICTZ will be three to six inches with isolated instances of eight to 10 inches.

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j. - 1. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following courses of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to six infantry regiment equivalents, supported by the equivalent of one naval sapper battalion and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(3) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with the equivalent of up to six infantry regiments, supported by three rocket battalions, two sapper battalions and one engineer battalion.

(5) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division (-), supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(6) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

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d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to seven infantry regiment equivalents.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield, sickness, hunger, shortage of ammunition and medical supplies and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z.

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 41-69 AS OF 112400H OCTOBER 1969

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-HQ	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	10	2,960	2	535			12	3,495	14	6,195	26	9,690
Bn's-Maneuver	39	9,170	11	1,810	5	685	55	11,665	34	15,010	89	26,675
Bn's-Support	16	4,135	2	340	1	195	19	4,670	7	1,980	26	6,650
Separate Co's	1	130			33	2,460	34	2,590	1	80	35	2,670
TOTAL CONFIRMED		18,360		2,685		3,340		24,385		24,700		49,085
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's	1	710					1	710	3	860	4	1,570
Bn's-Maneuver	6	2,295	1	350	1	200	8	2,845	7	2,470	15	5,315
Bn's-Support	5	1,335					5	1,335	9	1,145	14	2,480
Separate Co's	1	90			2	160	3	250			3	250
TOTAL PROBABLE		4,430		350		360		5,140		4,475		9,615
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,200	3	1,200
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support									22	6,625	22	6,625
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										8,765		8,765
		22,790		3,035		3,700		29,525		37,940		67,465

See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,135		150	3,285
	Probable	2,395			2,395
	Possible				
	TOTAL	5,530		150	5,680
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,600		485	4,085
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,600		485	4,085
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	4.945	875	900	6,720
	Probable	1,130	350		1,480
	Possible		300		300
	TOTAL	6,075	1,525	900	8.500
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,535	600	655	3.790
	Probable	380		285	665
	Possible				
	TOTAL	2,915	600	940	4,455
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,145	1,210	1,150	6,505
	Probable	525		75	600
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,670	1,210	1,225	7,105

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS																DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL											
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	33	3		36	8			8	5			5	46	3		49	34	4		38	80	7		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	39	6		45	11	1		12	5	1		6	55	8		63	35	6		41	90	14		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	6	2	1	9	1			1	1			1	8	2	1	11	2	3	10	15	10	5	11	26
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	5
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		2	3	2	1	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1					1			1
TOTAL SUPPORT	16	5	1	22	2			2	1			1	19	5	1	25	8	4	22	34	27	9	23	59
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	55	11	1	67	13	1		14	6	1		7	74	13		88	43	10	22	75	117	23	23	163

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	269	Nam Hoa	61	Hoa Vang	588	Thang Binh	943	Binh Son	311
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	58	Hieu Duc	65	Tam Ky	672	Son Tinh	474
	Trieu Phong	143	Hong Dien	59	Dien Ban	1,093	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	450
	Cam Lo	150	Vinh Loc	130	Dai Loc	356	Hiep Duc	215	Nghia Hanh	341
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	231	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	258	Mo Duc	483
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	333	Hau Duc	229	Duc Pho	465
	Huong Hoa	5	Phu Vang	24	Que Son	921			Tra Bong	170
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	107	Duy Xuyen	1,098			Ba To	202
			Huong Thuy	101	Hieu Nhon	294			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	437					Son Ha	185
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	947	THUA THIEN	1,254	QUANG NAM	4,868	QUANG TIN	2,432	QUANG NGAI	3,095

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,596

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,050		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Vic XD 6233	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175	Unlocated	
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unlocated LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	

*See note #4 on page A-17
**See note #2 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	300		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YR 0505/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/240ct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1267/24Sep69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
31st Group	NVA	C	1,055		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	215	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1062/27Sep69
15th Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	2,010		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YD 0309	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	YD 6825/23Apr69
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,570		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,970		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	380	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	380	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,590		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	YD 1259/11Jun69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	XD 9265	XD 9666/26May69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	300	XD 8854	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,670		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	YD 3858/20Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	175	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	PR	240	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	185	Vic YD 3535	YD 3448/7Sep69

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	890		
Rdgt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	275	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	265	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jun69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,730		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	330	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	375	Vic YD 6514	YD 5019/6Sep69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
3rd Bn, 803rd Regt	NVA	C	215	Vic YC 3193	YC 3389/19Jul69
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	360	Vic YD 3304	YD 5226/8Sep69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
K.35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	
C.113 Co	LF	C	75	Vic YD 4032	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	15,000		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
577th RL Bn	NVA	C	305	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
Hai Van Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102d Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103d Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	505		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	165	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2d Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3d Bn	NVA	C	110	BT 1252	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,065		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2d Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3d Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
573d Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unlocated	
575th Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unlocated	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	685		
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	175	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
R.20 Bn	MF	C	145	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	MF	C	130	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	70	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	125	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	105	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	3,805		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	520		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	AT 9226	
1st Bn	NVA	C	125	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	130	AT 9226	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	125	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	180	BT 2440	BT 2340/12Aug69
72nd Bn	LF	C	175	BT 2932	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	195	BT 3510	BT 2208/31May63
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	200	BT 3127	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 2232	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	220	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4213	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	80	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	85	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	115	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	115	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
40th Sapper Bn	MF	C	130	BS 4677	BS 6385/12Aug69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	685		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4386	BS 3587/13Aug69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69
C.17 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	60	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7555	BS 7061/17Nov68
C.120 Co	LF	C	45	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	75	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5596	
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,615		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	820		
Regt Hq	MF	C	345	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	180	BS 6733	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	180	BS 7932	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	165	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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BIEN HOA PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,700		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	520	BR 7363	
7th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 7547	
8th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 5950	
9th Bn	NVA	C	300	BR 5929	

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 060001H to 102400H October 1969.

a. A review of all information on composition, and disposition of NVA rocket/artillery units in QUANG NAM Province indicates the 368B Artillery Regiment no longer exists as a regimental entity. Three rocket/artillery battalions now exist. The 573rd Rocket Bn, the 575th Rocket Bn, and the 577th NVA Rocket Bn which has already been carried by MACV since 31 May 1969.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

9. Subordinate/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF PERINTREP 39-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS, AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 43-69

1. QUANG TRI (P). No significant reports.

2. THUA THIEN (P).

a. Hoi Chanh, Nguyen Xuan MAI, SrSgt, C.3 Co, K.1 Bn, 6th Regt who rallied on 1 Oct 69 vicinity (YD 312352) (MACV Dir 381-11 19 Apr 69) to the 222d RF Co stated the K.1 Bn is composed of the C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, Co's and the C.3 Co had a strength of 42 men. The source stated the C.1, C.2, and C.4 Co's had a mission of transporting rice and ammunition to store for the rainy season. MAI stated the C.3 Co is attached to the PHONG DIEN Unit to coordinate with the LF units in attacks on pacification groups and LOC's with major targets being PHO TRACH Bridge (YD 519 348), TAN NGUYEN (H) (YD 528347), TRACH THUNG Market (YD 527344), TRACH TA (H) (YD 522353), KHANH MU (H) (YD 537335), VINH NGUYEN (H) (YD 524340) and AP THUONG (H) (YD 505364). Source stated units must attack two locations each month regardless of the consequences. Reported personalities are: K.1 Bn CO-Capt SU, Dep CO-CON, PO-XEM, APO-VAN, Opn/Trng-THAI, Adj-THUA.

(G-2 COMMENT: Researching of past OOB files shows the K.1 Bn operated in northern areas of THUA THIEN (P) and that the K.2 Bn has an assigned mission of collecting rice/ammunition and support of local force companies in the lowlands. According to this information the two units appear to have exchanged missions. Personalities are new to our OOB files. All information rated (F-3).)

b. Returnee, Pham Quang HO, 2dLt, Asst CO, C.4 Co, K.1 Bn, 6th Regt, captured on 30 Sep 69 vicinity (YD 5138) (101-76-69/020820Z Oct 69) stated his unit strength is 135 and has a mission of supporting the QUANG DIEN (P) Unit. On 29 Sep 69 the C.4 Co was located vicinity (YD 4324). PHAM stated the C.4 Co is not the regular C.4 Co of the K.1 Bn, 6th Regt, but a special company (NFI). Source stated his company had been with the K.1 Bn since 1 May 69 and prior to that had been working with the NHAT LE Independent Bn in QUANG TRI (P) (NFI). Source further stated the unit's morale was low due to a shortage of food, sickness (namely malaria) and a lack of medicine. Reported personalities are: C.4 CO-1stLt Nguyen Thanh MUNG, PO-2dLt Nguyen Van BU; K.1 Bn PO-Phan SEN; QUANG DIEN District Unit-SrCapt QUANG TO.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the old AO of the 6th Regt and it is possible that companies from its battalions are being sent to assist local units in the procurement of rice. Personalities are reported for the first time. All information rated (F-3).)

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3. QUANG NAM (P).

a. Hoi Chanh, Chau NO, 3d Co, Q.83 Bn, who rallied on 17 Sep 69 at DAI LOC (D) HQ vicinity (AT 916577) (070640Z Oct 69 CG 1st Mar Div Supp Interog Rpt 7th ITT) stated his company was located vicinity MY DONG (H), LOC TAN (V) (AT 845545) on 16 Sep 69. The 1st Co was located vicinity MY HOA (H), LOC TAN (V) vicinity (AT 861550) on 12 Sep 69. The 2d Co was located vicinity NGAC KINH (H), LOC VINH (V) vicinity (ZC 205540) on 15 Sep 69. The Hoi Chanh stated that all three companies that make up the Q.83 LF Bn contained 50 men each. The 1st Co maintained a base camp vicinity LOC TAN (V) (AT 840540), LOC PHUOC (V) (AT 901542) and LOC HOA (V) (AT 866546). The 2d Co base camp was located vicinity LOC TAN (V) (AT 840540) and LOC VINH (H) (ZC 170530) and the 3d Co base camp was located LOC TAN (V) (AT 840540), LOC HOA (V) (AT 866546) and LOC PHUOC (V) (AT 901542). Source also added that the Q.83 Bn was approximately 70-80% NVA and had received approximately 120 NVA troops in Jun 69. NO further stated the morale of the unit was high for the officers as they must set the example, but low for enlisted men because of hard work and hardships. He stated that the unit would attack soon (NFI). Reported personalities are: Q.83 Bn CO-MOI, XO-Nguyen THUAN, C/S-CAM. At the time NO rallied, his battalion was apparently engaged in rice gathering.

(G-2 COMMENT: The locations given for this unit and base camps are within the AO of the Q.83 LF Co. Our OOB carries this unit as a LF company and not a battalion. All locations are within or near the SONG VU GIA. This possibly indicates a great dependence on river traffic for supply and escape from FWMAF operations. The strength given is far higher than what is held in OOB. Our OOB carries the Q.83 LF Co at only 30% NVA. 120 NVA replacements is very high and the first report of this high a number of NVA in the unit. Morale being high at least for officers is noted for the first time in several months by any enemy unit. Personalities mentioned were mentioned for the first time with the exception of CAM who is in our OOB files as possibly being the PO of the Q.83 LF Co. All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, Cpl Nguyen Van YEN, 8th Co, 2d Bn, 36th Regt, Front 4, captured on 5 Oct 69 vicinity (BT 013404) (051424Z Oct 69, CG 1st Mar Div, 9th ITT Spot Interog Rpt/071446Z Oct 69, CG 1st Mar Div Init Interog Rpt, 1st ITT 04-10-69) stated the mission of his battalion was to complete a new base area and gather rice prior to the monsoon season. The PW further stated that the 2d Bn began moving into the new base area in mid-Aug 69 to avoid air strikes and artillery fire. The 2d Bn was the only unit known to the PW as being in the area vicinity (AT 960363). The PW stated his infiltration commenced on 3 Jan 69 with the 510th Bn, 19th Regt, Infiltration Group 1065. The infiltration group departed NVN by crossing the TRUONG SON Mountain Range, through LAOS into QUANG NAM (P). The group consisted of approximately 400 men when departing NVN and arrived on 23 Mar 69 vicinity of the HON TAU Mountain area (AT 970389). Approximately 70 men were assigned to the 2d Bn, 36th Regt and an unknown number went to the 91st Sapper Bn and other units in QUANG DA.

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(G-2 COMMENT: The location stated for this PW's battalion is within the proximity of where our OOB currently holds the bulk of the 36th Regt. The HON TAU Mountain area has long been used by enemy units for a storage and assembly point. The 36th Regt has been located within this area since their move from the GO NOI Island area during Operation PIPESTONE CANYON. All information rated (F-2).)

c. PW, Nguyen Van BO, K.12 Co, 3d Bn, 36th Regt, captured 28 Sep 69 (BT 067563) (280530Z Sep 69, SA QUANG NAM Sector HOI AN Spot Rpt 11th ITT HOI AN 81-69/300630Z Sep 69, SA QUANG NAM Sector HOI AN Init Interog Rpt) stated the last known location of his unit was vicinity (BT 105520-120550) on 27 Sep 69. The mission of his unit was to combine with local guerrillas and attack patrol boats on CAU LAU River, and to disrupt Vietnamese elections on 28 Sep 69. The PW stated the composition of the regiment included three infantry battalions and a battalion headquarters with an unknown number of special companies. The 1st Bn had 100 men, the 2d had 150, and the 3d had three companies with approximately 150 AK's and CKC's. The 36th Regt Headquarters and 1st and 2nd Bn's were located in the HON TAU Mountain area (AT 950380). The 11th and 12th Co's of the 3d Bn were located (BT 125 545). The PW further stated the regiment usually collects rice at HAMLET (1), XUYEN TRA (V) (BT 055453) and had recently collected one ton of rice which was buried there. The PW also stated that elements of his regiment had been hit three times by B-52 strikes, two of which were on the HON TAU Mountain area. The PW only knew of nine people who were killed by these strikes.

(G-2 COMMENT: This PW was the first PW who stated his mission was to disrupt the recent elections. This is also the first mention of a unit targeting themselves against the river patrol craft that recently began deeper operations into the waterways of QUANG NAM (P). The strength of the battalions is slightly more than the present estimated OOB strength. The area of the HON TAU Mountains has been previously mentioned by other PW's and is probably the base area and resupply routes and pickup points given by previous PW's. All information rated (F-3).)

d. PW, Cpl Do Viet KIEN, 3d Co, 7th Bn, 60th Regt (AKA 90th Regt) captured 2 Oct 69 (ZC 193456) (030645Z Oct 69, CG 1st Mar Div, 13th ITT Spot Rpt/061400Z Oct 69, CG 1st Mar Div Supp Interog Rpt 13th ITT 02-01-69) stated the 3d Co was located (ZC 199425) on 2 Oct 69 and the 7th Bn was located (ZC 204425) since Aug 69. The 3d Co maintained a base camp at (ZC 199245). The 7th Bn had a strength of 200 men. The regiment is composed of three battalions (K-7, K-8, K-9). The 7th Bn has three companies designated 1, 2, and 3. Armament included six 60mm mortar tubes. The 7th Bn suffered approximately 200 men KIA, WIA, and from malaria within the period Jun 69 to Sep 69 with no replacements. Morale was low due mainly to homesickness and being tired of fighting. The PW stated his infiltration ended in Jun 69 upon arriving in RVN at (AT 801549). The PW and eight others went to the HON TAU Mountains (AT 970387) for the purpose of carrying rice from XUYEN TRUONG (V) (BT 040520) to the HON TAU Mountains

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(AT 978374) and returned to 3d Co in Aug 69 when the PW and three other men were assigned to HILL 200 (ZC 193456) to fire at helicopters flying in the area. They never fired at helicopters because they always flew out of range.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location given for the units stated is within the area where the elements of the 90th Regt have been previously reported. Again the HON TAU Mountain area was reported as being a focal point for enemy resupply efforts. The designations and composition were previously recorded and carried by our OOB for this unit. All information rated (F-2).)

e. PW, Do Trong HO, Armed Security Sqd, Security Sect, District 3, East Wing, QUANG DA Special Zone, captured 2 Oct 69 vicinity (BT 077636) (CG 1st Mar Div 021542Z Oct 69, 1st ITT Spot Rpt, CG 1st Mar Div 060258Z Oct 69 Init Interog Rpt) stated he was assigned as an assistant squad leader with a function of participating in terror raids and assassinations. The PW stated that the entire District 3 Headquarters was believed to be located in the vicinity of (BT 077636) in tunnels (exact location of tunnels unknown). The D.1 (AKA R.20) Bn located CENTER HAMLET (VC name) DIEN NGOC (V) (possibly vicinity of (BT 0664)). The Nguyen Huu THONG Company (AKA THONG) was located CENTER Sub-Hamlet, A-3 (H), DIEN NGOC (V) (exact location unknown). The PW further stated his mission was to avoid FWMAF operations. On 29 Sep 69 the PW overheard the unit's mission was to be conducted at an unknown date in Oct 69. The Armed Security Sqd was to attack the National Police Post at DONG GIAN 3 Intersection in DANANG City (BT 045779). The CK.4 Rocket Co was to launch an unknown number of 122mm rockets on DANANG City docks (location unknown) and the III MAF Headquarters (BT 043785). Other targets were MARBLE Mountain Air Facility (BT 063 738) and the CK.2 Mortar Co to fire 82mm mortars on USN post K1 (Camp 1) near MONKEY Mountain (probably TIEN SHA post (BT 064822)). The Nguyen Huu THONG Co was to launch sapper attacks against K.1 Post after daylight infiltration into the area. The D.1 (AKA R.20) Bn is to attack CON KHE Post (BT 080657). The PW when captured had various personal documents in his possession. One was written in English that stated the PW had worked for the USSF (U. S. Special Forces) as a driver and clerk in 1965.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location mentioned for the D.1 (AKA R.20) Bn is within proximity of where our OOB presently holds this unit. These units are probably subordinate to District 3, Eastern Wing and probably made up of local force personnel. The mention of 122mm rockets from this unit has special significance due to the large cache found recently in the area south of DANANG. All information rated (F-3).)

f. PW, Dinh Duc THANH, 2d Co, V.25 Bn, captured 19 Sep 69 vicinity of BINH DUONG (BT 217505) (060510Z Oct 69, CG III MAF DNG Trans ARVN Interog Rpt, 11th ITT 136-69) stated the strength of the V.25 Bn was 150 men. During Sep 69 the 2d Co, V.25 Bn was located (BT 121520). While at this location the PW was accidentally shot by his squad leader due to careless handling of a rifle. The PW was moved to a hospital in BINH DUONG (BT 216526). While recovering in this hospital the PW was captured

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by ROKMC forces. The PW further stated he was part of Infiltration Group 1058. The unit entered RVN through QUANG NAM Province in Mar 69 and moved to the HON TAU Mountains (AT 960387). The strength when infiltration began was 550. A number of people became sick along the way. When the unit was near the LAOTIAN Border it was struck by a B-52 strike that caused an unknown number of killed and wounded. The effective strength upon arrival in RVN was approximately 320 men. Distribution of personnel was: 17th Co went to the transportation units of Front 4, the 18th Co went to the D.3 Bn, 70 men of the 19th Co went to the V.25 Bn, and members of the 20th Co went to various sapper units. The PW had heard that the V.25 Bn was composed of four companies, but the battalion was now composed of three companies due to losses. The V.25 Bn CO, Capt QUY replaced QUYET who had returned to NVN in Jun 69. The PW further stated the LBN was 6793 AP THAI and the code number was D.2. The unit is armed with three 60mm mortars, eight B-40's, four B-41's, two MG's, and sufficient AK's and CKC's.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location of his unit is within the area we presently hold the V.25 Bn. The knowledge of the unit was somewhat limited due to the length of time spent in the hospital recovering from gunshot wounds. The strength of the unit is slightly more than what is held by our OOB. The HON TAU Mountain area is once again mentioned as a distribution point in QUANG NAM (P) for infiltrating NVA. The personalities were mentioned for the first time as well as the code number. OOB currently holds this unit with an unknown number of B-40's, B-41's and the reported number of mortars is less than currently held. All information rated (F-3).)

g. PW, Nguyen Van LAC, 2d Co, R.20 Bn, captured 21 Sep 69 (BT 020 664) (050652Z Oct 69 CG III MAF Trans ARVN Interog Rpt, 11th ITT 135-69) stated the strength of the R.20 Bn was approximately 120 men and the last known location of the battalion was in DIEN NAM (BT 072624). The PW stated he was originally a member of the 5th Bn, Vietnamese Marine Corps but deserted from the unit in 1963. In 1964 he was kidnapped by local guerrillas. In Aug 66, the PW deserted the guerrillas and joined the PF's in QUANG TIN (P). In Feb 67 he deserted the PF's and returned to the VC side joining the R.20 Bn. He had left the R.20 Bn to visit his family when he was bitten by a snake and subsequently captured. He stated he was considered to be an "undisciplined malingerer" and was not permitted to participate in political reorientation. He heard from the company XO that the R.20 Bn had recently selected 40 men from the companies to send to the Q.82 Bn in DIEN BAN (D). The Q.82 Bn would then divide them into three man teams to coordinate operations between the Q.82 Bn and the local forces. These 40 men were to learn the road systems in the DIEN BAN (D) area and establish VC hamlet and village political structure. All missions were to be completed by Dec 69. The remainder of the R.20 Bn in Sep 69 was to move to the mountains to regroup and reorganize because the unit is not combat effective due to total exhaustion of supplies and personnel. The PW stated that all men in the battalion at present are NVA soldiers.

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(G-2 COMMENT: The 40 man detachment from the R.20 Bn and its mission have been mentioned previously in reports. This gives an indication of a possible renewal of attacks in QUANG NAM (P) beginning in Dec 69. The PW goes from side to side in this war in an apparent effort to be on the "winning side" of wherever he lives at the time. All information rated (F-6).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). Returnee Nguyen Huu DUC, Security Officer for Military and Administrative Security Agencies of QUANG NAM (QTIN) Provincial Committee, who defected 27 Sep 69 at HAMLET 1, BINH TRIEU (V), THANG BINH (D) to 2/5 ARVN (2d ARVN Div msg 030740Z Oct 69 Reinterog of VC Ret) stated that the committee was composed of 16 sections. At the time of defection the Provincial Cimmittee was located vicinity (BT 298085) with the security element located vicinity (BT 284064) and had a strength of 160 men. In addition to the Security Section, the following agencies of the committee were also mentioned by DUC: Propaganda and Training Section; Communications and Transportation Section, Farmers Association, F-2 Dispensary, Production Section, Economic Section, and a Political Section. DUC stated that the mission of the Security Section was to observe all Allied and ARVN installations in the province in order to gain information which could be utilized at an unknown later date in conducting operations against these installations. The mission of the Economic Section was to buy food for the troops and to initiate a fund drive in VC controlled areas with the Political Section having the mission of conducting population committee elections in the same area. These were the only assignments mentioned for these committees. Returnee DUC also plotted the locations of several units on an overlay. They are as follows: 70th MF Bn (BT 139234), Rear Service Area of 70th MF Bn (BT 160164); 72d LF Bn (BT 160177), Rear Service Area of the 72d (BT 160170). He indicated the 74th Hvy Wpns Bn as having split into two companies, one being at (BT 139228) and the other at (BT 156169). Other units DUC plotted were the 409th Sapper Bn (BT 338043), the 1st MF Regt (BT 145222) who coordinates with the 70th and the 74th Bn's for the receipt of rice and salt, X-16 Sapper Bn (AKA for the 76th Sapper Bn) was located (BT 310085) and (BT 300090) in late Aug and early Sep 69. During Aug 69 the 76th Sapper Bn operated in the area from (BT 320120) and (BT 275078) (F-3). DUC mentioned that a new committee became operational in Jun 69 with the title of QUE SON Committee located at (BT 070228) and also stated that the TIEN PHUOC Committee was located at (BT 195090) which is in Base Area 117. DUC related to the interrogator that the 409th Sapper Bn was divided into two groups which are the water sapper detachment, and the rocket detachment. The water detachment has the mission to attack the ships and bridges in KY HOA, KY HA, and KY LIEN (BT 482093) and (BT 490095). The unit also received its food and supplies from the above villages when operating in this area. The rocket detachment has the mission to shell the CHU LAI Air Base during the month of Oct and was located, at the time of his defection, vicinity (BT 323050). In Aug 69 he heard from Huy XUYEN, allegedly the Security Chief of south TAM KY (D), that at an unknown future date there will be an attack on th. U. S. base at CHU LAI with the forces commanded by LtCol NGOAN (NFI). The 409th will participate in this attack. The subject further stated that the 409th Sapper Bn is usually located

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vicinity (BT 225048), Base Area 117. Reported personalities are: QUANG NAM (QTIN) Provincial Force Commander is Hoang Dinh NEAM (AKA CANH). DUC heard from the Deputy Secretary Committee that MR-5 was located (BS 195928). He states that MR-5 is commanded by General Nam CONG, and the Deputy Commander is Gen Truong Cong THUA.

(G-2 COMMENT: The locations of the units referred to by DUC are possibly true. Reports received at this command from agents during late Sep 69 and in Oct 69 are reporting those units in the same general area as the returnee indicates. All information with the exception of the local units is rated (F-6).)

5. QUANG NGAI (P). PW, Pvt Nguyen Van DUC, 1st Co, unknown battalion, captured 27 Sep 69 vicinity (BS 783434) (Americal Interog Spot Rpt, Amer 365-69) located his unit in base area (BS 823302) with a mission of combat (NFI). DUC left NVN with Infiltration Group 007 during May 69 with 500 men. Their route of travel was through the following provinces: THAI BINH, THANH HOA, NGHE AN, HA TINH, and QUANG BINH, NVN. Source's unit then traveled through LAOS to KONTUM (P) and arrived in QUANG NGAI (P) in Aug 69 with a strength of 400 men. Subject and 10 others were assigned to his present unit upon arriving in QUANG NGAI (P). Subject also stated his company commander was MAN. While subject was in his unit, he received a propaganda speech on how the NVA/VC were winning the war against Allied Forces.

(G-2 COMMENT: DUC is thought to belong to the 93d Bn, 2d MF Regt (F-3). This is a second report on Infiltration Group 007 (F-1).)

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vicinity (BT 225048), Base Area 117. Reported personalities are: QUANG NAM (QTIN) Provincial Force Commander is Hoang Dinh NEAM (AKA CANH). DUC heard from the Deputy Secretary Committee that MR-5 was located (BS 195928). He states that MR-5 is commanded by General Nam CONG, and the Deputy Commander is Gen Truong Cong THUA.

(G-2 COMMENT: The locations of the units referred to by DUC are possibly true. Reports received at this command from agents during late Sep 69 and in Oct 69 are reporting those units in the same general area as the returnee indicates. All information with the exception of the local units is rated (F-6).)

5. QUANG NGAI (P). PW, Pvt Nguyen Van DUC, 1st Co, unknown battalion, captured 27 Sep 69 vicinity (BS 783434) (Americal Interog Spot Rpt, Amer 365-69) located his unit in base area (BS 823302) with a mission of combat (NFI). DUC left NVN with Infiltration Group 007 during May 69 with 500 men. Their route of travel was through the following provinces: THAI BINH, THANH HOA, NGHE AN, HA TINH, and QUANG BINH, NVN. Source's unit then traveled through LAOS to KONTUM (P) and arrived in QUANG NGAI (P) in Aug 69 with a strength of 400 men. Subject and 10 others were assigned to his present unit upon arriving in QUANG NGAI (P). Subject also stated his company commander was MAN. While subject was in his unit, he received a propaganda speech on how the NVA/VC were winning the war against Allied Forces.

(G-2 COMMENT: DUC is thought to belong to the 93d Bn, 2d MF Regt (F-3). This is a second report on Infiltration Group 007 (F-1).)

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APPENDIX 1 (REORGANIZATION AND REDESIGNATION OF ROCKET/ARTILLERY REGIMENTS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE) TO ANNEX B (INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS, AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 41-69

1. Between Feb 69 and Aug 69 three significant PW's gave indications that the 368B Artillery Regt (AKA 575th Artillery Regt) does not exist anymore. The most significant of these three PW's was Captain Nguyen Thanh LONG, XO of the 141st Regt who was captured on 25 Feb 69 vicinity (AT 957667) (Reference: III MAF PIR 11-69 of 16 Mar 69). The Captain stated that the 368B no longer existed as a separate regimental unit. LONG further stated there were three separate independent battalions subordinate to Front 4. Additional mention of this was made in a captured document dated 29 Nov 68 that stated some units subordinate to the 575th were reorganized to meet combat requirements. (Reference: CDEC Bulletin 22,140 of 29 May 69).

2. The assets of the 368B Artillery Regt were instrumental in serving as a basis to create the artillery setup as it now exists in QUANG NAM Province. The personnel from the 368B Regt formed the 57th Rocket Bn and the 573d Rocket Bn. The 573d Rocket Bn is presently unlocated in HOA VANG District. Repeated mention has been made of this unit in agent reports and PW/Hoi Chanh's statements have helped to confirm this unit's existence. The 575th Rocket Bn is unlocated in HIEU DUC District, but statements of PW's, documents, and agent reports indicate that the 575th Bn is in support of the 31st Regt and maintains a threat to the DANANG area.

3. Therefore, we now have in QUANG NAM Province three rocket battalions, and have deleted the 368B Artillery Regt from OOB holdings. These units are the 573d Rocket Bn in support of the Northern Wing, Front 4; the 575th Rocket Bn in support of forces in the Central Wing, and the 577th NVA Rocket Launcher Bn in the Southern Wing currently located vicinity (AT 8042) on 7 Jun 69.

Reference PW's:

a. Vy Van DINH, MSgt, 5th Co, 8th Bn, 31st Regt, captured 29 May 69 at (AT 890725).

b. Le Dinh KINH, Cpl, K.5 Co, 8th Bn, 31st Regt, Central Wing, captured 27 May 69 at (AT 904730).

c. Nguyen Thanh LONG, Capt, XO of the 141st NVA Regt captured 25 Feb 69 at (AT 957667).

d. Nguyen Van VIET, 12th Co, 575th Bn, Central Wing captured 12 Aug 69 at (AT 818541).

e. Ngoc HA, Comm Plt, 577th Rkt Bn, captured 17 Apr 69 at (BT 019508).

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f. Nguyen Van THAO, Sgt, 7th Co, 573d Bn, Northern Wing, Front 4, captured 9 May 69 (ZC 103762).

Reference Hoi Chanhs:

a. Pham Cong HAN, Asp, 1st Co, T.87 Sapper Bn rallied 12 Sep 69 to RF 1/25.

b. Duong Duc CHINH, Asp, Trans Sect, Rear Service Grp, Front 4, rallied 10 Jun 69 at (AT 8647).

Reference CDEC Documents:

a. CDEC Bulletin 24,693 of 29 Sep 69.

b. CDEC Bulletin 24,702 of 30 Sep 69.

c. CDEC Bulletin 22,140 of 29 May 69.

Reference Agent Reports:

a. 29 Sep 69, SIA QUANG NAM Sector HOI AN RVN rated (C-3).

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 41-69

1. GENERAL. Counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities during the past week reflected emphasis on intensification of political struggle efforts utilizing guerrilla and local forces in an expanded support role.

In addition to upgrading reliance on guerrilla and local forces to maintain a credible level of military and terrorist activities through economy of force tactics, it is indicated that guerrilla and local forces will directly assist in conducting VCI proselyting and propaganda programs in contested and outlying GVN-controlled areas.

Terrorist and sabotage activities continued at a low level and reported enemy policy concerning these categories was consistent with that previously reported.

Reported enemy intelligence gathering activities consisted primarily of reconnaissance of various scattered outposts and bridges in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces preparatory to possible future attacks during upcoming periods of reduced lunar illumination.

Other miscellaneous reports concern intimidation of PSDF personnel; defection of VCI cadre and associated morale problems; collection and storage of food and supplies; youth sapper activity in the Danang area; tax collection and financial allocations involving piasters, gold, and possibly US dollars.

Information concerning the reported newly established VC Que Tien (D), allegedly located along the border area between Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces, was inadvertently omitted from III MAF PERINTREP 40-69 and is, therefore, included with miscellaneous reports in this PERINTREP.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. Reports of enemy intelligence gathering activities consisted primarily of reconnaissance of bridges and scattered outposts in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces preparatory to future attacks during the impending period of reduced lunar illumination.

Details of reported enemy intelligence gathering activities during the past week are as follows:

a. Quang Nam.

(1) A US MI source reported that as of 3 October 1969, a combined force of an unidentified QUANG DA Main Force unit and the Q82 LF was dispersed between HA NONG TAY vicinity (BT 005596) and DONG TIEN vicinity (BT 015600), DIEN BAN (D). The unit's strength was estimated

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to be approximately 200 men. Recon elements were studying the situation of BANG AN outpost, VINH DIEN bridge vicinity (BT 056575), and THANH QUYT vicinity (BT 030620), in preparation for surprise attacks during the coming nights (nfi). (Eval: C-3) (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st Bn (Prov), 525th MI Gp, Report Number 1/A/AX/0539/69).

(2) A US MI source reported that as of 3 October 1969, forces of an unidentified NVA unit and the V25 Bn were dispersed in DUY XUYEN (D), southwest of HOI AN City, and planning attacks on outposts in the vicinity.

The unidentified NVA unit, with a strength of about 300 men, was dispersed between THI LAI vicinity (BT 125517) and VAN QUAT vicinity (BT117516, BT 115520 , BT 110515). A group of 20 laborers accompanied the unit , carrying ammunition. Recon Teams from the unit were operating near BA REN and NAM PHUOC outposts (nfi) in preparation for mortar and ground attacks during the days, assisted by the V25 Bn.

At the same time, the V25 MF Bn, with a strength of about 200 men, was dispersed at XUYEN TAN (3) vicinity (BT 140504), - (BT 145510), and THI LAI vicinity (BT 146514). A recon team from the unit was studying military positions at NAM PHUOC, CAU LAU, AND CAM KIM (nfi) in preparation for mortar and ground attacks during the coming moonless nights. (Eval: F-3) (Ref: CO, DetC, 1st Bn (Prov), 525th MI Gp, Report Number 1/A/AX/0537/69.

(3) A US MI Source reported that as of 3 October 1969, the Headquarters of the Q80 HOI AN City Force and a subordinate force of about 150 men was located between Ngai Le Vicinity (BT 200530) and Dong Son Vicinity (BT 210520), Duy Xuyen (D). The force was commanded by Nguyen Hong Thai. The HOI AN City Party (nfi) had ordered the Q80 LF to organize a plan of ambushes and surprise attacks on forces of the (US Navy) 14th Coastal Unit operating between CUA DAI Vicinity (BT 210580), HOI AN , and CAU LAU vicinity (BT093545). Another company of the Q80 LF, commanded by Tran BUA, was dispersed at THANH NHUT vicinity (BT 184565 and BT 188568). The strength of the company was about 60 men plus an additional force of 50 guerrillas from CAM AN and CAM THANH Villages. A recon team from the unit was operating at THANH DONG vicinity (BT 182585) in preparation for surprise attacks on PHUOC TRACH Bridge vicinity (BT 181589) and outposts north of the HIEU NHON District Seat during the coming moonless nights. (Eval: F-3) (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st Bn (Prov), 525th MI Gp, Report Number 1/A/AX/0536/69.

(4) The 2nd ROK Marine BDe reported that as of 4 October 1969 local VC with an estimated strength of nine men, armed with individual weapons, were located vicinity (BT 126590) with intentions of infiltrating Hoi An City to collect information (nfi). (Eval: C-2) (Ref: 2nd ROK MAR Bde INTSUM NR 277).

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b. Quang Ngai.

(1) A US MI source reported that on 29 September 1969, an unidentified LF Sapper platoon, commanded by 1stLt MINH and Bach Tong CHI, was located vicinity (BS 578260) Dai Loc (H), Son Kim (V), Son Tinh (D), with an estimated strength of 27 men. This unit was collecting information concerning Son Tinh (D) sub-sector and the Song Tra Khuc Bridge vicinity (BS 642746). (Eval: F-3) (Ref: Det D, 1st MI Bn, 525th MI Gp, Report #1/A/EX/0217/69).

(2) A US MI source reported that on 29 September 1969, an unidentified LF platoon, commanded by CHI, was located in the vicinity of (BS 599789), Ha Nhai (H), Son Kim (V), Son Tinh (D). The unit's estimated strength was 25 men. This unit's members were posing as civilians and collecting information in the Phu Hoa area in order to harass the Phu Hoa Refugee Camp vicinity (BS 625765) and organize proselyting activities within the camp. (Eval: F-3) (Ref: Det D, 1st MI Bn, 525th MI Gp, Report #1/A/EX/0217/69).

3. SABOTAGE. Acts of sabotage continued at an extremely low level. Only two incidents were reported during the past week and consisted of damage/destruction of one bridge and a road culvert. Intelligence reports reflected enemy intentions to sabotage the Hue-Danang Railway, the An Lo Bridge in Phu Loc (D), Thua Thien (P), and numerous bridges in Quang Ngai (P). Details of sabotage incidents and reported enemy sabotage intentions are as follows:

a. Quang Tri. A 517 MID report (DOI unknown) states that a sapper organization existed in Trieu Phong (D), and that it consisted of twenty men who were being trained by a man named BANG (nfi). Reportedly, the sapper's goal is to have a team of fifty men. CTF CLEARWATER comments that the man named BANG may be Bui Van BANG, a swimmer/sapper reported to have operated in Gio Linh (D). (Ref: COMNAVFORV INTSUM 240-69 dtd 6 Oct 69) (Eval: F-6).

b. Thua Thien.

(1) A US MI source reported that on 2 October 1969, 110 personnel of an unidentified company of the K.6 Bn was located vicinity (YD 610276). The commander of this company was unknown. There were 20 females from Phong Son village (CNA), who supplied the company with food. The company sabotaged a bridge designated Bridge Number 2177 (nfi). This company plans to sabotage the An Lo Bridge vic (AT 8895) by putting an automatic mine (nfi) on a raft and letting the raft drift into the bridge. (Eval: F-6) (Ref: Det B 1st MI Bn, 525th MI Gp, Report #1/B/CX/1089/69).

(2) A US MI source reported that as of 3 October 1969, 80 personnel of an unidentified company of the K.4 Bn was deployed near

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DA BA Mountain vicinity (ZC 050916). The commander of the company was unknown, however, it was believed that Than Trong MOT, (CO, 5th Regt), had come to encourage the troops in their next mission. MOT had been accompanied by a Capt. TAN. A number of personnel of this unit were sent to the Da Bac area disguised as woodcutters to collect information concerning the schedule of US and ARVN patrols in that area. MOT said that the unit must sabotage the railroad and stop traffic in the Phuoc Song Pass Area during the period 4-12 Oct 69. (Eval: F-3) (Ref: Det B, 1st MI Bn, 525th MI Gp, Report #1/B/CX/1090/69).

c. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 5 October 1969, interrogation of a VC returnee revealed that on 20 September 1969 Subject saw a document stating that units of the Tu Nghia District force had an upcoming two-phase offensive. The document was a dispatch from the Quang Ngai Province force. The 1st phase was to commence between 3-15 October 1969. The second phase to commence between 12-31 October 1969. The C65 sapper company and B66 engineer platoon had the mission to destroy Cay Bua bridge vicinity (BS 684657), LA HA Bridge vicinity (BS 660699), Song Ve Bridge vicinity (BS 695635), and attack the Quang Ngai Province Chieu Hoi Center vicinity (BS 658701). C75 company had the mission to attack Da Che OP vicinity (BS 680609) and all hamlets in eastern Tu Nghia (D). Document further stated that VC units of the Quang Ngai Province force have the mission to attack many locations in Quang Ngai City (nfi). C75 company was reported to be deployed from vicinity of (BS 730673) to (BS 725690). The C65 sapper company has a strength of 40 men, located vicinity (BS 730673). C66 Engineer Platoon has a strength of 19 men, located vicinity (BS 729672). (Ref: SA, 2d ARVN Div, Quang Ngai msg DTG 061415Z Oct 69). (Eval: Unrated).

(2) On 8 October 1969, an unknown number of VC destroyed a culvert on the road to Nui Ong Du vicinity (BS 746531). (Ref: Quang Ngai INTSUM-230, Dated 091050Z Oct 69).

(3) A VC returnee of 10 October 1969, stated that the B65 Sapper Platoon was located and usually operates vicinity (BS 667585) and was subordinate to the Tu Nghia District force. On 6 October 1969, subject heard from Platoon PO that their future mission was to attack Highway 1 and destroy bridges on Highway 1. Date/time/location of attacks, unknown to subject. (Eval: Unrated) (Ref: SA, 2d ARVN Div., Quang Ngai msg 100235Z Oct 69).

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Reports of VC/VCI political and propaganda activities during the past week reflected continued emphasis on the intensification of political struggles utilizing guerrilla and local forces in an expanded support role.

Recent reports have reflected the enemy's apparent intent to upgrade

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the use of guerrilla and local forces in maintaining a credible level of military and terrorist activities through economy of force tactics. Additionally, it appears that guerrilla and local forces are to directly assist in conducting VCI proselyting programs, particularly in contested and outlying GVN-controlled areas.

Propaganda themes featured instruction on the history and goals of Ho Chi Minh and the withdrawal of US troops.

People were encouraged to participate in and promote political struggles, voluntarily provide money and rice to the VC, and support candidates loyal to the NLF in possible future elections.

Details of reported enemy political and propaganda activities during the past week are as follows:

a. Thua Thien. G-2 I Corps provided the following information:

Two PWs, PHAM DINH TAN and PHAM XUAN CHAU were captured on 6 October 1969 vicinity (YD 867190) by the 1st ARVN Div. Both sources located their unit (HUE City Sapper), consisting of nine men, south of the Parfume River vicinity (YD 842198). Their mission is to operate in the area, attack the Self-Defense Corps and pass out leaflets. Sources reported Phu Vang (D) sappers located vicinity (YD 905225).

b. Quang Nam.

(1) A US MI source reported that on 2 and 3 October 1969, about 15 VC of a Hieu Duc District Main Force entered Thai Lai (H) vicinity (AT 925729) and Khe Lam (H) vicinity (AT 919766). They divided into three man cells, entered the peoples homes in the above hamlets, and propagandized the people by telling them the Americans will soon be gone and within the next few months, the VC will conduct elections. The people should not vote for persons working for the THIEU-KY government, but only the people who are loyal to the NLF. (Ref: OSI Det 5003 Rpt Draft DDIIR 10-7 dtd 4 Oct 69) (Eval: C-3)

(2) A US MI source reported that on 3 October 1969, an unidentified VC MF unit was deployed vicinity (BT 112548). The strength of the force was approximatly 200 men, commanded by Tran Vinh. The unit was coordinating with local VC cadre to plan training sessions in which local residents were to be instructed in the history of Ho Chi Minh. Further intentions of the unit were to launch harrassment attacks against Popular Force units in Xuyen Quang (V) vicinity (BT 1054) and XUyen My (V) vicinity (BT0853). (Ref: CO Det C, 1st MI Bn (P), 525th MI Gp, Rep No. 1/B/BX/21-CA-69-7). (Eval: C-3).

(3) A US MI source reported that on 4 October 1969, approximately 350 personnel of an unidentified NVA Bn-size unit, commanded by Nguyen Huy SON, was deployed vicinity (BT067473). Intentions of the unit are to obtain the cooperation of other units (nfi) for operations in the Duy Xuyen District area. The purpose of these operations, which are to take place during the month of October 1969, is to encourage residents of Duy Xuyen to study the life of Ho Chi Minh and to increase

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the number of assassinations and kidnappings. (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st MI Bn (P), 525th MI Gp, Rep No. 1/B/BX/21-CA-69-7). (Eval: C-6)

(4) A US MI source reported that on 9 October 1969, one VC sapper platoon of about thirty men passed through Trung Son (H) vicinity (AT 920810) and moved to Xuan Thieu (H) vicinity (AT 930813). They were carrying approximately (50) sandbags and their intentions were to propagandize the people and induce them to provide money and rice. (Unevaluated). (Ref: 1st Coastal Zone Intelligence Officer Msg dtd 100945Z Oct 69).

(5) On 14 September 1969, elements of the 1st MARDIV operating vicinity (BT 091661) obtained an enemy directive containing the following information:

Directive, dated 10 August 1969, signed by Thanh for C68 ((possibly a district agency in Quang Da Special Zone, MR-5)), addressed to various subordinate villages, instructs them that, in order to fullfil the Party's strategic requirements, they should strive to meet higher headquarters criteria in the development of guerrilla forces. By 10 September 1969, each village should have activated one new guerrilla platoon. Furthermore, two-thirds of village guerrillas should get ready to attend a sapper training course which would be conducted ((possibly by C68)) in early September 1969. Addressees were also instructed to submit their strength reports to 75 Dien Ban (D) Unit, Quang Da Special Zone)) prior to 20 August 1969. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOC No. 09-2053-69) (Eval: B-3)

c. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 3 October 1969, a US MI source reported that as of 29 September 1969, the 506A LF Sapper Company, located vicinity (BS 591806), and two unidentified sapper platoons, located respectively in the vicinity of (BS 578260) and (BS 599789), were participating in "The Uprising Movement" in preparation for the up-coming "Winter-Spring Campaign" which will begin on 5 November 1969. "The Uprising Movement" which will end on 28 October 1969 consists of the following objectives:

(a) To organize meetings for the people and cadre.

(b) To organize proselyting activities.

(c) To collect money and foodstuffs for the "Combat Fund".

(d) To continue to attack scattered outposts.

(e) To reduce VC combat losses.

(Eval: F-3) (Ref: Det C, 1st MI Bn, 525th MI Gp, Report #1/A/EX/0217/69).

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(2) The National Police, Quang Ngai (P) reported on 6 October 1969, that the VC had reinforced lowland areas by placing one NVA battalion in Mo Duc, Duc Pho and Tu Nghia Districts. Binh Son and Son Tinh districts were reinforced by Provisional Main Force units and 2 political cadre from each district (nfi). Mission was to combine with local cadre and elements of the Quang Ngai City Unit to organize a spy system to support the political struggle, urge the people to resist the GVN and demand the withdrawal of US forces. The mission was to last until the end of October 1969. (Ref: Quang Ngai Daily INTSUM 228; msg DTG 071125Z Oct 69).

(3) G-2 I Corps provided the following information:

A VC returnee, NGUYEN DU, who rallied on 8 October 1969, vicinity (BS 703705) stated that Quang Ngai (P) had issued an order to the district (nfi) during September to organize one guerrilla platoon from each of the villages to implement political plans. Source stated that they couldn't carry out the order due to recruiting difficulties. (Unrated).

d. Countrywide. Information obtained from captured enemy documents captured 22 Sept. 1969, RTAVF, (YS 250978) (Ref: CDEC Bulletin 24791, document 10-1080-69): Reproduction of Ho Chi MINH's testament, made by an unspecified agency on 8 September 1969, reads in part as follows: "As I have reached 79 years of age, I am feeling a little weaker although my mind is still as keen as ever. I know that sooner or later I will have to depart this world and go to join Marx, Lenin, and other elder revolutionaries; and this makes me feel that it is necessary to leave a few words to all my comrades in the Party and all my countrymen. Since the birth of the (VN Communist) Party, our people have always been its loyal followers; and I think that it is the Party's task now to better the cultural and economic life of our country and improve the living standard of our compatriots. Our resistance against the Americans may go on for quite some time and our people may be asked to endure more sacrifices; but in any case, we ought to strengthen our determination to fight the Americans until the final victory is achieved. Whatever hardships and difficulties our people may confront, I am convinced that the US imperialists, eventually, will have to get out of our land and the two parts of the country will be reunited. We will be known by the rest of the world as a nation which, even though small, gloriously defeated two big imperialist countries, ie., France and the USA".

5. TERROR. Reported acts of terrorism continued at a low level and remained essentially unchanged for the fourth consecutive week. However, captured documents and various intelligence reports reflect enemy intentions to continue directing terrorist tactics at GVN administrators, officials and intelligence sources, PSDF, RD cadre, and various other GVN supporters and sympathizers, as determined necessary, to support enemy objectives and [illegible] Additionally, some civilian casualties

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continue to result incidental to limited enemy attacks and attacks by fire on various governmental and military agencies, outposts, and installations. Such casualties often reflect a complete enemy disregard for the presence or close proximity of civilian men, women and children.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Quang Nam.

(1) Hieu Duc DIOCC reported the following: At 222100H September 1969, the Viet Cong released four (4) of the nine (9) females that were abducted from Phu Son (H) vicinity (BT 952650), Hoa Luong (V), on 13 September. The females, all members of the Civilian Self-Defense Group were told by the Viet Cong that they would be killed if they continued to work with the above mentioned group.

III MAF COMMENT: Abduction of the above females reported in PERINTREP 38-69 (Terrorist Incidents).

(2) On 27 September 1969, elements of the 1st MARDIV, while operating in the vicinity of (AT 813579) discovered a document containing the following information:

Report, number 41/VP/HC, dated 22 September 1969, signed by RU for the Current Affairs Committee, B264 ((Loc My village, Dai Loc District, Quang Da Special Zone)), addressed to C70 ((possibly Dai Loc (D) Party Committee)) and B340 ((possibly Current Affairs Committee, Dai Loc (D)))concerned the morale of subordinate cadre and members who were affected by enemy ((RVNMAF/RVNAF)) activities. The report revealed the capture of ten members of ((VC)) agencies in the village, and stated that ((VC)) activities were strictly limited, due to the defection of three members of the village, who compromised ((VC)) organizations.

The report listed the names of the three ((VC)) ralliers (Nguyen DIET, Pham DANG and Nguyen CU), and stated that as result of enemy ((RVNMAF/RVNAF)) activities, local residents no longer had confidence in ((VC)) troops. The majority of cadre and members of the village were completely demoralized, and had a tendency to defect to the enemy. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO. 10-1294-69)(Eval: B-3).

(3) A US MI source reported that as of 2 October 1969, about 150 men from the 3rd Sapper Bn was dispersed in the DA THE Mountains vicinity (BT 010460). The unit had been supplied by a labor group of twenty men which was escorted by six soldiers of the DUY XUYEN Forward Element (nfi). According to soldiers of the 3rd Sapper Bn who retrieved the supplies, their unit had moved to the area to pick up badly needed reserve supplies, for the Monsoon Season, Transported from the areas of XUYEN TRA and XUYEN HIEP villages where the production level was high. Purchase and requisition teams had been sent to CAU LAU, NAM PHUOC and BA REN to retrieve rice, salted fish, and

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other necessary items (nfi), while the unit awaited further operational orders. (Eval: C-6) (Ref: CO Det C. 1st Bn (PROV), 525th MI Gp, Report No. 1/A/AX/0540/69).

(4) A US MI source reported on 5 October 1969, that a VC Hospital had been established in the BA HAO Mountains vicinity (BT 005 440). The hospital was administered by one doctor and twenty male and female nurses. Barracks had been constructed under the trees (nfi). A group of ten laborers guided by a VC squad from the DUY XUYEN LF, had su supplied the hospital with rice, salted fish, peanut oil, and other materials (nfi) which were carried in bags. On 2 October 1969, the group assembled at THANH BINH vicinity (BT 080498). At 2100 hours the group commenced to travel southwest along a trail from MAU HOA vicinity (BT 070480) to CAM SON vicinity (BT 060460 to BT 050640) and KHE SUOI NOI vicinity (BT 030468). The group continued southwest into the BA HOA Mountains, where, in the vicinity (BT 010448), it released its supplies to ten VC soldiers. The laborers were ordered to rest and remain at that site while the supplies were forwarded to the hospital. Approximately two hours later, the squad of ten soldiers returned, and the entire group subsequently returned to THANH BINH vicinity (BT 080498). (Eval: C-6) (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st Bn (PROV), 525th MI Gp, Report No 1/A/AX/ 0541/69).

(5) On 6 October 1969, a US MI source reported that as of 4 October, a VC Sapper squad was located vicinity (BT 057677) Hai An #1 (H). The squad consisted of approximately 15 youths, age 15-17 years old. Their mission was to infiltrate Danang City, assassinate GVN and ARVN officials, and throw grenades and plastic explosives at unsuspecting targets of opportunity.

The demolition charges were concealed at the base of Marble mountain at Son Thuy (H), vicinity (AT 081711). (Eval F-3) (REF: OSI Det 5003 rpt draft 10-10 of 6 Oct 69).

b. Quang Tin. An interrogation report from SA, 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Ngai (P), on 3 October 1969, revealed the following information:

A VC rallier of 27 September, who was formerly the Security Officer for Military and Security agencies of Quang Tin (P) (VC Quang Nam) reported that the Que Tien (D) Committee was located vicinity (BT 070228). This unit became operational in June 1969. Que Tien District was composed of Phuoc Son, Phuoc Ha and Phuoc Cam villages of Tien Phuoc (D); Binh Son, and Binh Lam villages in Thang Binh (D); Son Hoa, Son Binh, Son Trisn Tay and Son Tan villages in Hiep Duc (D).

(III MAF SCI COMMENT: Binh Son (V) reported as being located in Thang Binh (D) is actually located in Hiep Duc (D); Son Hoa (V) located in Que Son (D) vice Hiep Duc (D). Details of this report were inadvertently omitted from PERINTREP 40-69. The information reflected in this report generally substantiates earlier information concerning VC Que Tien (D) reported in III MAF PERINTREP 34 and 37-69).

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c. Quang Ngai.

(1) A US MI source reported that on 28 September 1969, a VC Economic Plan was determined to exist in the Nui Dat area vicinity (BS 730470) Duc My (V), Mo Duc (D). There were four provincial VC Economic cadres:

(a) Truong Chuoc, age 17

(b) Nguyen Hoang, aka Ba, age 38

(c) Nguyen Luu, aka Cao, age 52

(d) Tran Kinh, age 51

These four men were guarded by 20 VC Main Force troops while collecting tax money in eastern Mo Duc (D) during the period 22-26 September 1969. Because of an ARVN operation in that area, they could only collect 150,000$VN during that period. Therefore, they moved to Ba Binh vicinity (BS 670570) where they continued to collect money.

The VC had recently dug two secret bunkers in the Nui Dat area on the route between Thach Thang (H) vicinity (BS 790490) and Ba Nha vicinity (BS 430450). The bunkers were used for rice storage and as a secret hiding place for the VC cadre.

An undetermined amount of dollars (nfi) was provided by North Vietnam in order to buy food for the troops in South Vietnam. Once the dollars arrived in the South, they were sold at the Mo Duc and Duc Pho (D) markets. Furthermore, an undetermined number of 500$VN bills were brought into Quang Ngai (P) from Nam Vang City, Laos.

All money collected would be divided as follows:

(a) Dollars (nfi), gold and/or 500$VN bills sent to MR-5 from North Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos, would be given to VC regular units and VC cadre of regional level and higher.

(b) Tax money collected from local inhabitants by the VC would be given to the VC provincial main forces and province-level cadres.

(c) Food and/or money derived from public rice fields (nfi) and abandoned rice fields would be given to VC District guerrilla forces.

(d) VC village guerrilla forces would provide for themselves, supplemented with food and money from the VC district troops supply section as b[illegible].

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The VC admitted that they had seriously failed in the economic warfare (nfi) and felt, therefore, that they would also fail in the political and military battles. They were pessemistic about the current fall-winter season. (Ref: CO, Det D, 1st MI Bn, 525th MI Gp, Report #1/B/DX/1227/69).

(2) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT # PSS 280-09.

At At 022200 October 1969, VC entered My Yen (H) vicinity (BS 610912) and took away twelve bags of rice from the people.

(3) PSA/PSD/CORDS REPORT # PSS 281-07.

At 052000 October 1969, VC entered Phu Hoa (H) vicinity (BS 613764), approached Mr. Dang The VINH's house and forced him to give them 10,000$VN and 120 bags of rice.

APPENDIX
I-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 41-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Tri	30ct69 (Late Entry)	(YD 287524)	While an element of CAP 4-3-1 and local villagers were building a fence, approximately six kilometers NW of Quang Tri City, a SFD exploded, killing one Vietnamese civilian, wounding one PF and six civilians. The SFD (nfi) had been attached to a roll of barbed wire.
Quang Nam	20ct69 (Late Entry)	(CNA)	VC threw two grenades into Xuyen Long Refugee Camp, Nieu Nhon (D), wounding one civilian.
	30ct69 (Late Entry)	(BT 078535)	VC entered Xuyen Dong (H) and abducted five civilians.
	30ct69 (Late Entry)	(AT 989686)	VC fired one B-40 rocket into Hoa Thai (V) Committee Headquarters, killing one detainee and wounding two others.
	50ct69	(AT 871570)	A CAP 2-2-4 patrol found a wounded Vietnamese civilian at the edge of a rice paddy. VC had shot him for refusing to make a rice payment.
	60ct69	(BT 163574)	The village chief of Cam Chau (V) discovered that his office desk had been booby trapped with an M-26 grenade and a 2 lb. plastic charge, rigged to detonate when the desk drawer was opened.
	80ct69	(AT 865493)	A CAP 2-9-2 patrol received three M-26 grenades from an unknown source killing one PF and one Vietnamese civilian, and wounding seven PFs.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	80ct69	(BT 073706)	A 20 lb. charge of C-4 was located under the porch of a store in Nui Kim Son (H). The store is owned by the village chief of Hoa Hai (V) and serves as the Village Administrative Office.
	80ct69	(ZC 168537)	An USEF entered Duc Tinh (H), abducted four Vietnamese civilians, and moved to vicinity (ZC 189536) (nfi).
Quang Ngai	10ct69 (Late Entry)	(BS 760818)	VC killed one civilian, 14 years old, of Son Hai (V) (nfi).
	20ct69 (Late Entry)	(BS 577987)	VC threw a grenade at the People's House (nfi) in Binh Nghia (V), killing three civilians and wounding five.
	30ct69 (Late Entry)	(BS 727645)	An unknown number of VC entered My Vien (H), stole two bags of rice, 12,000 piasters, medicine, and abducted one member of the 207th RF company.
	60ct69	(BS 622008)	VC mortared Binh Sa (V), killing one civilian.
	60ct69	(BS 655734)	VC fired one unknown type rocket into Phu Hoa (H), wounding one civilian.
	60ct69	(BS 631735)	Quang Ngai City received two rounds of unknown type rocket fire, killing one civilian.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Ngai	90ct69	(BS 743808	A CAP 1-4-4 CP and the surrounding hamlet received approximately 35 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and SAF from an estimated two platoons of VC located vicinity (BS 760824). Villagers reported one Vietnamese child was killed and several homes damaged by the mortars. One Vietnamese child was kidnapped by the fleeing VC.
	90ct69	(CNA)	CAP 1-4-5 CP and the surrounding hamlet received 25-30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and SAF from vicinity (BS 735785). Villagers reported that several dwellings were damaged by the enemy mortar attack.
	110ct69	(BS 655770)	An estimated 1-5 VC threw an unknown type plastic explosives into Phu My (H). Negative casualties or damage.

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ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 41-69

1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY. Heavy rainfall throughtout ICTZ during this reporting period hampered insertion and extraction of ground reconnaissance patrols. Enemy observations for the period were extremely limited.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY.

a. In the 3d Marine Division DMZ area 68 targets were detected by sensors. This is a decrease of five from the previous reporting period. Sixteen fire missions were conducted in response to these targets consisting of 255 rounds of 175mm, 14 rounds of 105mm, four rounds of 81mm mortar, and four rounds of 4.2mm mortar ammunition. BDA was unobserved. In the U. S. Duel Blade area 197 targets were detected. This is an increase of 61 targets from the previous reporting period. The most active sensors were located at YD 017664, XD 823633, XD 665538, XD 809420, and XD 681527. Forty-six fire missions were conducted in response to the 197 Duel Blade targets consisting of 634 rounds of 175mm, 50 rounds of 155mm, 336 rounds of 105mm, and four rounds of eight inch artillery. BDA was unobserved.

b. There were no significant sensor detections in the 3d Marine Division, 101st Airborne Division (AM), and Americal Division Duffel Bag areas.

c. In the 1st Marine Division area, sensor detected activity decreased sharply this reporting period. There were a total of 78 activations for the reporting period.

d. The 1st ARVN Division Tight Jaw sensors located at XD944035 detected enemy activity at 101920H October 1969. One hundred twenty rounds of 105mm artillery were fired in response. A sweep of the area confirmed four NVA killed by artillery and accounted for one NVA PW and five AK 47s being captured.

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ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO III MAF PERINTREP 41-69

A. REGISTERED MAIL

DIR, NSA	3
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1
CMC (ABQ)	2
CG FMFPAC	2
CG USARV	1
CG I FFORCEV	5
CG II FFORCEV	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CG MCDEC	1
CG 5TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CALIF	6
CG 4TH MARIDV, CAMPEN, CALIF	1
CG 3RD MAW	2
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2
CO "B" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	5
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1
CO MCB 3	1
CO MCB 6	1
CO MCB 7	1
CO MCB 8	1
CO MCB 9	1
CO MCB 10	1
CO MCB 11	1
CO MCB 53	1
CO MCB 58	1
CO MCB 62	1
CO MCB 71	1
CO MCB 133	1
CO USS REPOSE	1
CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO MHTG-30, MCAF, SANTA ANA, CALIF, 92709	1
DSA II CORPS	1
CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP, 7TH FLEET	1
CMDR, 19TH CI TEAM, CAMPEN, CALIF	1
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CTF 76	1
CO USASSD, ACSI DA ATTN: DOD SPECREP, MACV, APO SF, CAL 96222	1

B. BY COURIER

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232) (CIIED)	2
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2
CICV	2
CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	10
CG 1ST MARDIV	40
CG 3RD MARDIV	26
CG AMERICAL DIV	30
CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM)	20
CG 1ST MAW	30
CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7
CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CG USASUPCOM DNG	1
CG 173RD ABN BDE	2
CG FORLOGCMD DNG	5
CG 1ST LOGCMD LBN	2
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GROUP CHL	3
CO 30 NCR	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	17
CO 1ST CAG	1
CO 3RD CAG	1
CO 4TH CAG	1
CO 1ST BN, 525TH MI DET	25
CO 517TH MI DET	1
CO MCB 40	1
CO MCB 121	1
CO 4TH PSYOP GROUP	1
DSA I CORPS	11
CMDR, 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SGN	3
COMNAVFORV	1
COMNAVSUPACT DNG	2
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2
OSA/EMB SAIGON	1
DET B, 1ST MIBARS	1
CIB	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTG 79.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 76.4	1
7TH AIR FORCE (IGS) BDOC	1

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45TH ENGR GROUP	1
620TH TCS, APO 96203	1
366TH AIR SEC SQD, USAF	2
620TH TSC	1
SPO-SEC CMD QHN	1

C. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (WITHIN HQ, III MAF)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP C/S PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	42
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (C/O G-3)	2
2D BDE ROKMC LIAISON OFFICER	1
PSYOPS	2
1ST RADIO BN	11
HORN DASC	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1

D. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

CO 1ST MP BN DNG	1
CO 3RD MP BN DNG	1
CO 2ND CAG	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
CO MCB 5	1
SLF (A)	1
CTG 115.1	1
CCN	1
US NAVY	1
DIR, CAP	1
7TH PSYOP BN	1
HQ, 212TH CMBT AVN BN	6
RAILWAY SECURITY	1

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HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

JCS CONTROL NUMBER | COPY NO. 2

MACH. C	DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT	PRI.	SEC.	ORIGINATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.	NO. CYS. RECD.	MICFILM CLAS.	DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
	C916197	PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE RPT 42-69		3P	MEF	0119869	2		4	X21	9
			NAVY FILE NUMBER								

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F-FOR CONCURRENCE
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H-RETURN TO _____
I- _____
J-DISPOSITION _____

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
					COMMANDANT
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
1	A	10/29/70	10/30/70	[illegible]	G-3
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
					JOINT CONTROL
					COUNSEL
					WOMEN MARINES
					STAFF DENTAL
					STAFF MEDICAL
					STAFF CHAPLAIN
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21 October 1969

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

UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 42-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE



G-3

GROUP - 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
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HQ III MAF, G-2
DANANG, RVN
21 October 1969
Ser: 0119869

PERINTREP 42-69

Period covered: 120001H - 182400H October 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13
ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. During the past week, the various indicators of enemy activity registered modest increases after recording a number of low points during the previous period. The number of enemy initiated incidents rose by 80, from 158 to 238. However, the number and type of enemy initiated ground attacks remained essentially unchanged. The number of enemy incoming rounds for the week also increased, this time by 137 for a new total of 580, up from 443. The number of enemy KIA's remained low, 439, even though it is 72 higher than last week's 18 month low of 367. However, the most dramatic statistic of the week was contained in the number of Hoi Chanhs. The number was up sharply, 222, an increase of 130 over the previous week's total of 92. This is the second highest number of Hoi Chanhs for 1969 with the highest of 223 being recorded during the week of 4 to 10 May.

VC/VCI subversive, espionage, sabotage, and terrorist activities reported during the past week reflected a continuation of tactics and policies as reported during the past several months. No significant change in intensity of activity was discernible. In addition, considerable enemy effort continues to focus on the collection, storage, distribution and transport of rice. Reports received reflected widespread use of conscripted civilian labor to transport the rice.

Of notable significance were recent captured documents and military intelligence source reports which reflect widespread enemy frustration concerning the morale, disaffection, and defection of many of his personnel, both civilian and military; and the success of GVN and Allied forces in penetrating his organizations, both military and civilian. Specific mention was made of GVN/Allied use of widespread intelligence networks and the cultivation, recruitment, and doubling of former VC/VCI personnel who either rallied or were captured. Additional mention was made of the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX and Chieu Hoi organizations as being particularly "cunning and wicked" in their schemes and tactics to identify, locate, and neutralize VC/VCI personnel. Specified enemy countermeasures include a concerted personnel security education program; investigation of recruits, families of personnel, malcontents, and missing personnel who later return to their unit; and the avowed use of severe punishments, to include confinement in thought reform prisons and/or execution, as deemed appropriate. Considerable emphasis was being placed on controlling the thoughts and attitudes, as well as the maintenance of iron discipline

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among VC cadre, soldiers, and inhabitants of VC controlled areas. Such emphasis is consistent with the Communist concept that military forces are subordinate to the party committees and are an instrument of the party.

a. QUANG TRI (P). In QUANG TRI Province, contact with the enemy increased noticeably over the reduced level of the previous week. However, the contacts which were made were, for the most part, friendly initiated with the enemy restricting himself to three notable attacks by fire and two attacks on friendly reconnaissance elements. While contact with the enemy has remained rather consistent throughout most of the week, the level and pattern of activity was relatively light and scattered. There were no new or unusual enemy unit identifications in these contacts except that a prisoner captured on the 13th nine kilometers northwest of DONG HA stated that the mission of his unit was to reconnoiter Route 9. The identification of the PW's unit has not yet been firmly established but we believe it to be either the 27th Battalion of the 31st Group or the 33rd Sapper Battalion.

A notable exception to relative calm in QUANG TRI Province occurred on the 14th when the enemy directed about 100 rounds of 82mm mortar fire against the positions of 2/11 ARVN Cavalry along the eastern DMZ approximately seven kilometers northeast of GIO LINH (YD 280768). The vigorous response of the ARVN countermortar fire apparently surprised the enemy, for a subsequent sweep of the suspected enemy positions uncovered 30 82mm mortar rounds, 20 Claymore mines, and 500 rounds of small arms ammunition, most likely abandoned by the enemy in his haste to withdraw. In addition, to this intense mortar attack, the enemy also directed three 122mm rockets against the QUANG TRI Combat Base (YD 3055) on the night of the 15th and another fifteen rounds of 60mm mortar fire on the 13th against positions of A/2-506th Infantry just south of the central DMZ (YD 215644). Neither of these attacks by fire produced any friendly casualties or damage.

The actions involving the reconnaissance units occurred on the 12th and 17th. In the first action, a 3d Marine Division reconnaissance team received small arms fire from an estimated enemy squad 10 kilometers south southwest of DONG HA (YD 204514). The team adjusted artillery on the enemy force killing six. In the latter action, 3/1 ARVN, while engaged in reconnaissance work, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force 15 kilometers southwest of QUANG TRI City (YD 256407). The ARVN engaged the enemy force killing seven.

The most noteworthy friendly initiated engagement occurred on the 14th when 3/1 ARVN made contact with an unknown size enemy force 12 kilometers southwest of QUANG TRI City (YD 273427). The ARVN unit killed 10 enemy without any friendly casualties. The remaining activity occurred in the central portion of the province and resulted in 29 enemy bodies accounted for in two engagements and three body finds.

b. THUA THIEN (P). Enemy initiated activity in THUA THIEN (P) was light and desultory consisting of one mining incident and the downing of one helicopter. The mining incident occurred on the 16th when 2/54 ARVN found 120 meters of railroad track and a wooden bridge destroyed by two

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mines, three kilometers south of FSB LOS BANOS (AT 838972) and (AT 838974). This marked the 23d time this year that the enemy has directed efforts against the HUE-DANANG Railroad. Two days prior, a 101st Division OH-6A helicopter on a visual reconnaissance mission received small arms fire and crashed 13 kilometers west southwest of PHU BAI (YD 774066). The helicopter was a combat loss.

Friendly initiated actions followed the same pattern of enemy activity with only light and scattered contacts. On the 12th, 4/3 ARVN made contact with an unknown size enemy force 14 kilometers west southwest of HUE (YD 618188) resulting in five enemy killed. The next day, a platoon of B/3-187th Infantry observed 25 enemy near their position six kilometers northwest of Camp EVANS (YD 491363). The platoon engaged the enemy force killing six.

The balance of significant enemy activity in THUA THIEN (P) for this week was recorded in prisoner of war interrogations which indicate the 5th and 6th Regiments continue to be located in the mountains of western THUA THIEN (P) while they dispatch small units to the lowlands to collect food and to cooperate with the enemy's local force units in the coastal areas.

c. QUANG NAM (P). The tempo of enemy activity in QUANG NAM (P) increased in comparison with that of the previous week, but remained relatively low. There were several significant small unit contacts and attacks by fire throughout the week. On 12 October, the 162d RF Co and the 174th PF Platoon 10 kilometers southwest of HOI AN (BT 104487) while on an operation made contact with an unknown size enemy force. This action resulted in nine NVA KIA and one PF KIA. On 15 October, M/3/7 Marines, five kilometers west of QUE SON (AT 987366) was ambushed by an estimated 20 man enemy force resulting in light friendly casualties. Also on the same day, 1/22 RF Company (BT 095510) made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in light friendly casualties. The enemy losses were four killed. Approximately one hour later the RF company again made contact resulting in six enemy killed with light friendly losses.

Enemy initiated attacks by fire during the week began on 15 October when PF Platoon #100, seven kilometers northeast of QUE SON (BT 082390) received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire, resulting in light friendly casualties. On the same day B/1/7 Marines, seven kilometers northeast of QUE SON (BT 085392) received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, approximately 20 grenades, RPG's, and small arms fire from approximately 10-15 enemy. This resulted in no damage or casualties to the Marine unit. On 16 October, the 70oth RF Company, three kilometers east northeast of HOI AN (BT 181 587) received 20 82mm mortar rounds approximately 150 meters from the PHUOC THAN Bridge. The rounds did not strike the bridge; however, an unknown type charge destroyed approximately 70% of the bridge. The charge was either placed there by floating it down the river or by a swimmer-sapper. On the day before, the 15th, another mine in the form of a 105mm rounds with a pressure type detonator wounded six Marines two kilometers east of HILL 55 (AT 990623).

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Two bunkers were observed and fired upon on the 15th, eight kilometers northwest of QUE SON (AT 967385) by G/2/7 Marines. The enemy returned mortar and small arms fire resulting in eight NVA killed with light friendly casualties. On the 18th, two gunships were called in to support swift-boats seven kilometers east of HOI AN (BT 140628). Approximately nine kilometers up the coast to the northwest, the gunships engaged five enemy (BT 140628). The contact resulted in five enemy KIA, five structures and one sampan destroyed with no friendly casualties. Also on the 18th, a Hoi Chanh working with the 3d ITT in Operation PIPESTONE CANYON identified 19 VC who were trying to pass through a cordon one kilometer south of HILL 55 (AT 966605).

A significant amount of rice was captured during the reporting period on 12 October when C/1/7 Marines, nine kilometers west of LZ LION (BT 085 495) found 4,000 pounds of rice and 200 pounds of salt. Due to lack of available transportation, the rice and salt were destroyed. On the 15th, I&M/3/7 Marines vicinity (AT 957316-AT 982346) found a total of 2,500 pounds of rice. This made a total of 6,500 pounds of rice taken from the enemy. Also of significance was the discovery of 15 enemy bodies found in a grave by M/3/1 Marines on the 14th, three kilometers north of HILL 55 (AT 981650) that had apparently been killed in earlier contact with the unit.

In addition to the enemy activity experienced during the past week, continuity of information on the enemy was provided by a number of prisoners and ralliers. For example, a prisoner was captured on the 14th (ZC 182602) who identified the 2d Battalion, 141st NVA Regiment in the same general area where this unit has been held. Recent reports indicated that the 141st was in the process of withdrawing from QUANG NAM (P) in order to reconstitute itself. This prisoner adds support to the assessment that the 141st Regiment continues to be located in the CHARLIE Ridge area to the northeast of THUONG DUC (ZC 1453). Meanwhile, several other prisoners report a high incidence of malaria in two enemy units, the 2d Battalion, 30th Regiment with 85% and the 160th Transportation Battalion with 60%. While it is difficult to assess the validity of these percentages, it is consistent with our assessment that malaria is present in enemy units. However, it is our current estimate that the impact of malaria on present enemy capabilities is minimal.

In addition to the information provided by PW's, a rallier who returned to the 51st ARVN Regiment on 1 October has suggested that Front 4 is making an effort to form a new regiment in QUANG NAM (P) with three battalions which have been operating in the eastern part of the province. The three battalions are the R-20 and V-25 Main Force Battalions and the D.3 NVA Battalion. The rallier, an NVA Sergeant from the Signal Platoon of the 3d VC District, stated that he was given this information by a VC cadre who further indicated that these units were "to move back" presumably to a base area or base camp, in order to make this change beginning some time during last August. This new regiment would be subordinate to Front 4, according to the NVA rallier. These battalions were formerly assigned to the 38th NVA Regiment before it was disbanded in August 1968.

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While the formation of such a new regiment is plausible, it should be noted that the information was hearsay insofar as the rallier is concerned. Furthermore, prisoners and documents continue to locate these battalions in their normal AO's. Therefore, it is estimated that further intelligence is needed before the formation of a new enemy regiment under Front 4 can be accepted. In any case, since such a regiment would be formed principally from existing units, it should be noted that such a development would have little significant impact on the threat the enemy poses to DANANG and QUANG NAM (P).

d. QUANG TIN (P). In QUANG TIN (P), the enemy continued his low key attacks by fire against ARVN and FWMAF positions in the HIEP DUC area. In this effort, the enemy fired a reported 27 82mm mortar rounds over a period of six days inflicting only light casualties and no materiel damage. The first of these occurred on 14 October when the 3-21st Infantry located 14 kilometers east northeast of HIEP DUC (BT 052263) received 12 82mm mortar rounds. Another attack by fire took place in the same area on the 18th, two and one-half kilometers northeast of HIEP DUC when elements of the 4-31st Infantry received 15 82mm mortar rounds. Both of these attacks by fire resulted in light friendly casualties and no materiel damage.

In addition to attacks by fire, ground activity with the enemy resumed after only minimal contact during the preceding week. However, such contact, all of which was friendly initiated, was at a relatively low level as can be seen from the fact that friendly operations produced only five contacts which resulted in 21 enemy killed. The 607th RF Company made contact with two enemy squads eight kilometers northeast of THANG BINH (BT 235463) on the 12th, killing six enemy and capturing three PW's with no friendly casualties. Another contact on the 12th by the 722th RF Company 13½ kilometers north northeast of TAM KY (BT 275358) resulted in six PW's captured with no friendly casualties. The same day, a NONG SON CIDG force killed three enemy and captured two about 15 kilometers northwest of HIEP DUC (ZC 215325). The PW's resulting from these three contacts have been identified as local force guerrillas. On the 15th, the 928th RF Company made contact seven kilometers southwest of TAM KY (BT 246196) resulting in seven enemy killed with light friendly casualties. Also of significance was a contact made by the 13th RF Group on 17 October nine kilometers southwest of TAM KY. When the enemy broke contact the results were five enemy killed with no friendly casualties.

The most significant development in QUANG TIN (P) during the reporting period occurred in THANG BINH District where some 113 Hoi Chanhs rallied to the GVN cause. This week's surge of Hoi Chanhs follows a similar surge two weeks ago when another 23 Hoi Chanhs rallied. Overall, more than 200 persons have come over to the friendly side in this district since 1 September. About 75 of these were guerrillas while the balance represented a broad spectrum of VC and VCI functional organizations. For example, 13 were from a young association, 11 were from a farmers' association, nine VC teachers, nine economic cadre, and various others. It is our estimate that this favorable development is due to a combination of factors including a lack of food and the difficult life in VC controlled

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areas in this district. Probably the most important reason is that unfavorable weather coupled with friendly operations has forced the VC/VCI into the open and has caused their committees to leave the area or be eliminated. However, the Hoi Chanhs appear to be unwilling to leave their hamlets and villages to which the rural Vietnamese have deep emotional and cultural ties. Under such circumstances, the opportunity to "Chieu Hoi" becomes either welcome or expedient. At the same time, it should be noted that there is a potential danger inherent in this type of development, for programs such as the Chieu Hoi program, from a counterintelligence point of view, offers the enemy an excellent opportunity to infiltrate agents of various types into the Republic of Vietnam.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). In QUANG NGAI Province, the enemy continued to initiate actions which would serve to discredit the capability of the GVN to provide security for the rural Vietnamese.

In keeping with this theme, there were two attacks against CAP units and one attack against a village. Both of the attacks against the CAP units occurred on the 12th. During the early morning hours of the 12th, CAP 1-3-5, 12½ kilometers east northeast of BINH SON (BS 723957) received a combined mortar and ground attack from an estimated company size enemy force. This one-hour contact resulted in light friendly casualties. The other attack occurred later that evening when an unknown size enemy force, probably from the 48th Local Force Battalion, attacked the night defensive positions of another CAP unit, Cap 1-4-6, some seven kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 7177). In addition to firing 20 82mm mortar rounds into the CAP positions, the enemy employed small arms and automatic weapons fire as well as satchel charges before breaking contact and withdrawing. Six days later, on the 18th, a reinforced platoon of A/4-21 Infantry while guarding a bridge on Route 1, 13½ kilometers southeast of DUC PHO (BS 889 272) received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The unit then heard fire to the northwest in the vicinity of DIEN TRUONG (3) (BS 887275). Twenty minutes later, 18 wounded civilians approached the unit's position and stated that an unknown size enemy force had attacked their village (DIEN TRUONG (3)). Only two of the wounded required evacuation. These attacks appear to be part of an evolving pattern in which the enemy seems to be seeking out pacification security elements in QUANG NGAI (P) as a special target in their efforts to destroy the credibility of the GVN to provide security for the Vietnamese people, especially in the countryside.

Unlike the other ground attacks, the remaining ground attack which took place on the 17th was directed against an ARVN unit. This attack was mounted by an estimated enemy company, believed to be from the 38th Local Force Battalion, against the night defensive positions of a company size element of 4/4 ARVN, two and one-half kilometers north northeast of MO DUC (BS 740564). When the enemy was confronted with effective friendly counteraction, he broke contact and withdrew leaving six of his dead.

Meanwhile, there were five significant friendly initiated contacts in the MO DUC and QUANG NGAI City/BINH SON areas. These contacts,

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most likely against local force, units netted 53 enemy killed. The most successful friendly effort occurred on the night of the 17th when a combined force of RF and PF troops were able to ambush an estimated enemy platoon, most probably from the 38th Local Force Battalion, six kilometers south southeast of MO DUC (BS 746485). Twenty enemy were killed and nine weapons captured with only light friendly casualties.

There were two friendly initiated actions on the 16th. The first occurred at 0900H when PF's and a CAP unit killed five enemy nine kilometers north northwest of QUANG NGAI City (BS 618814). Later that afternoon, an ARVN reconnaissance company engaged an unknown size enemy force 12 kilometers east southeast of BINH SON (BS 713884) killing 12 of the enemy. The next day, 4/4 ARVN killed six enemy three kilometers north northeast of MO DUC (BS 740570). Then on the 18th, 3/4 ARVN made contact with an unknown size enemy force four kilometers northeast of MO DUC (BS 762566).

At the same time, a returnee from the 38th Local Force Battalion who rallied on 14 October has indicated that this enemy unit, one of three independent main force/local force battalions located in QUANG NGAI (P), has shifted its area of operations from the west side of Route 1 to the east side of that highway, mostly north of MO DUC (in the vicinity of BS 7158). While this is probably true, an ARVN operation which has just been undertaken in the area believed to be the new AO of the 38th, is expected to confirm or deny this contention.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. In the assessment of the overall situation in I Corps this past week and looking forward to the coming week, it appears that the general thrust and direction of the enemy's operations continue to be in the direction of limited attacks, sapper probes and acts of terrorism. The tempo of enemy operations is characteristically low key during the month of October due to food resupply activities and preparations for the monsoon season. It is also evident that the enemy can and will continue to mount locally sharp attacks to discredit the GVN, cripple the pacification effort, maintain pressure on the politico-diplomatic scene and public opinion as well as to maintain the morale and fighting spirit of his own troops. The precise level and tempo of the enemy operations which can be expected from week to week during the current wet season most likely will be a function of the weather. During the next week, However, there have been several low level reports of an increase in activity beginning on 20 October. Nonetheless, there appears to be little evidence to suggest that there will be any significant increase in enemy operations beyond the type, level and intensity which characterized the enemy situation just prior to the onset of the recent period of extended rainfall.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased from 158 to 238 for the week of 12-18 October. These incidents consisted of five ground attacks (one of which was company size or larger and four platoon size or smaller) four ambushes, six attacks by fire, 126 harassing fire incidents, 50 mining and booby trap incidents, two hamlet

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harassment incidents, two assassination incidents, eight espionage incidents, five kidnapping incidents, 20 propaganda incidents, and 10 sabotage incidents.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire increased from 62 to 98 incidents for the reporting period and 20 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 12-18 October:

Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	459
81mm Mortar	3
60mm Mortar	82
Unk Cal Mortar	30
122mm Rocket	3
Unk Cal Rocket	3
	580

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance

(1) There were 94 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 12-18 October. These long-range patrols reported 47 sightings and nine contacts totaling 308 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of two enemy KIA.

(2) Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant enemy caches were captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 12-18 October 1969:

(a) 12 Oct: D/5/46 Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade captured a rice cache 15 kilometers south southeast of BINH SON (BS 726828) as indicated below:

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QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
10,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was located in open terrain and was stored in several baskets inside some village huts. The rice was evacuated to SON TIN (D) Headquarters.

(b) 12 Oct: A/1/7 Marines captured a rice and salt cache 10 kilometers southwest of HOI AN (BT 085495) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
4,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice
200 LBS	UNK	Salt

This cache was located within three huts and stored in unmarked burlap bags. Due to the unavailibility of transportation, the cache was destroyed by dumping it into a river.

(c) 17 Oct: Elements of 101st Airborne Division discovered a weapons and ordnance cache seven kilometers south southwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 888539) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
22 EA	UNK	AT Mines
125 EA	CHICOM	Grenades
317 EA	UNK	82mm Mortar Rds
2,800 EA	UNK	AK-47 Rds

There was no further information available on this cache.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 12-18 October.

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
82mm Mortar	516
81mm Mortar	4
60mm Mortar	71
155mm Artillery	19
105mm Artillery	19
140mm Rocket	3
106mm RR	1
TOTAL	633

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(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	206
Crew-Served Weapons	24

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 12-18 October.

Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
12 Oct	(BT 009443)	825	A/1/7
12 Oct	(BT 085495)	4,000	C/1/7
12 Oct	(BT 085495)	200 Salt	C/1/7
12 Oct	(BT 424063)	200	RCN/1/6
12 Oct	(BS 728827)	10,000	D/5/46
12 Oct	(YD 838038)	660	3/54
13 Oct	(AT 791342)	60	C/5th SFGA
13 Oct	(BS 566829)	1,050	A/1/52
13 Oct	(BS 456893)	200	D/1/1
13 Oct	(BS 579917)	200	D/1/1
14 Oct	(BT 282193)	50	CAP 1-1-4
14 Oct	(ZC 182603)	30 Salt	RCN/1st MARDIV
14 Oct	(BT 093494)	700	C/1/7
15 Oct	(BT 003508)	100	RCN/1st MARDIV
15 Oct	(AT 957316)	1,500	I/3/7
15 Oct	(AT 955311)	250	I/3/7
15 Oct	(AT 982346)	1,000	M/3/7
15 Oct	(YD 273424)	44	3/1
17 Oct	(BS 602416)	750	B/4/3
17 Oct	(BT 102460)	600	D/1/7
17 Oct	(XD 990332)	210	D/2/17
17 Oct	(XD 990332)	225 Food	D/2/17
17 Oct	(XD 990332)	40 Food	D/2/17
17 Oct	(XD 990332)	90 Food	D/2/17
18 Oct	(BT 108472)	2,000	D/1/7
18 Oct	(AT 918378)	500	H/2/7
18 Oct	(AU 833070)	100	D/2/502
18 Oct	(AU 833070)	25 Salt	D/2/502
	TOTAL RICE	24,999	
	TOTAL FOOD	355	
	TOTAL SALT	255	

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	207	Structures Damaged	96
Bunkers Destroyed	64	Bunkers Damaged	9
Secondary Explosions	17	Secondary Fires	34
Mortar Sites Destroyed	2	50 Cal Sites Dest	1
		Mortar Sites Dam	1

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3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ increased in comparison to the previous week. There were 439 KIA's, 43 VC PW's, and seven NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	97	91	102	90
Low	70	73	73	74
Rainfall (total)	.28	.83	1.26	2.26
Winds (knots)	7	7	4	6
Visibility (miles)	7	7	8	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 18-24 October 1969

(a) General. Weak upper level troughs are forecast to move across northern North VIETNAM. As these troughs migrate to the east they will cause direction and speed changes in the lower level easterlies. Increases in the east-northeasterly flow should affect RVN during the reporting period. The increasing wind flow will be accompanied by increased cloudiness in I Corps to the east of the ANNAMS.

(b) ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the I Corps Tactical Zone for the outlook period is increasing cloudiness with isolated thundershowers and rainshowers during the late afternoons and evenings. The coastal plain will have scattered cumulus and strato-cumulus cloud conditions and scattered fog. The mountains will experience scattered cloudiness and isolated thundershowers with patchy fog between the hours of 0100-1100H. Precipitation in I Corps will be approximately one to three inches with isolated instances of three to five inches.

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j. - 1. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following courses of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to five infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(3) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with the equivalent of up to five infantry regiments supported by three rocket battalions, two sapper battalions and one engineer battalion.

(5) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division (-), supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(6) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

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d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to five infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield, sickness, hunger, shortage of ammunition and medical supplies and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z.

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 42-69 AS OF 182400H OCTOBER 1969

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-HQ	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	10	2,960	2	535			12	3,495	14	6,195	26	9,690
Bn's-Maneuver	38	3,930	11	1,830	5	870	54	11,630	36	15,225	80	26,855
Bn's-Support	16	4,135	2	340	1	195	19	4,670		1,980	26	6,650
Separate Co's	1	130			33	2,385	34	2,515	1	80	35	2,595
TOTAL CONFIRMED		18,120		2,705		3,450		24,275		24,915		49,190
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's	1	710					1	710	3	860	4	1,570
Bn's-Maneuver	6	2,200	1	350	1	200	8	2,750	7	2,465	15	5,215
Bn's-Support	5	1,335					5	1,335	9	1,145	14	2,480
Separate Co's	1	90			2	160	3	250			3	250
TOTAL PROBABLE		4,335		350		360		5,045		4,470		9,515
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,200	3	1,200
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support									22	6,625	22	6,625
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										8,765		8,765
		22,455		3,055		3,810		29,320		38,150		67,470

See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,120		150	3,270
	Probable	2,300			2,300
	Possible				
	TOTAL	5,420		150	5,570
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,380		475	3,855
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,380		475	3,855
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	4,945	895	840	6,680
	Probable	1,130	350		1,480
	Possible		300		300
	TOTAL	6,075	1,545	840	8,460
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,535	600	655	3,790
	Probable	380		285	665
	Possible				
	TOTAL	2,915	600	940	4,455
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,140	1,210	1,330	6,680
	Probable	525		75	600
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,665	1,210	1,405	7,280

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS																DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL											
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	Pr	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	32	3		35	8			8	5			5	46	3		48	35	4		39	81	7		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	38	6		44	11	1		12	5	1		6	55	8		62	36	6		42	91	14		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	6	2	1	9	1			1	1			1	8	2	1	11	2	3	10	15	10	5	11	26
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	5
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		2	3	2	1	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1					1			1
TOTAL SUPPORT	16	5	1	22	2			2	1			1	19	5	1	25	8	4	22	34	27	9	13	51
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	54	11	1	66	13	1		14	6	1		7	74	13		87	44	10	22	76	118	23	23	163

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	269	Nam Hoa	50	Hoa Vang	812	Thang Binh	940	Binh Son	311
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	56	Hieu Duc	50	Tam Ky	449	Son Tinh	474
	Trieu Phong	113	Hong Dien	69	Dien Ban	1,090	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	437
	Cam Lo	150	Vinh Loc	43	Dai Loc	341	Hiep Duc	208	Nghia Hanh	336
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	251	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	279	Mo Duc	453
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	333	Hau Duc	172	Duc Pho	463
	Huong Hoa	5	Phu Vang	11	Que Son	943			Tra Bong	166
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	107	Duy Xuyen	1,065			Ba To	197
			Huong Thuy	77	Dien Nhon	291			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	529					Son Ha	170
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	917	THUA THIEN	1,239	QUANG NAM	5,045	QUANG TIN	2,163	QUANG NGAI	3,021

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,385

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,035		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Vic XD 6233	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175	Unlocated	
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unlocated LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	

*See note #4 on page A-17
**See note #2 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	300		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1267/24Sep69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
31st Group	NVA	C	1,055		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	215	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1062/27Sep69
15th Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	2,010		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YD 0309	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	YD 6825/23Apr69
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,570		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	215	Unlocated	YC 3497/19Jul69
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,955		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	Unlocated	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	370	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	375	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	Unloc CAM LO (D), Q-TRI (P)	
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,575		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	YD 1259/11Jun69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	335	XD 9265	XD 8362/60ct69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	300	XD 8854	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,590		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	YD 3858/20Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	175	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	PR	240	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	105	Vic YD 3535	YD 2540/17Sep69

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	890		
Rdgt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	275	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	265	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jun69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,725		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	330	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YD 6514	YD 6019/6Sep69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	360	Vic YD 3304	YD 5226/8Sep69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
K.35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	
C.113 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 4032	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	65	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	15,000		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
577th RL Bn	NVA	C	305	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
Hai Van Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102d Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103d Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	505		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	165	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2d Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3d Bn	NVA	C	110	BT 1252	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,065		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2d Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3d Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
573d Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unlocated	
575th Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unlocated	

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TOTAL

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	SAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	685		
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 2956	[illegible]
40th Bn	MF	C	175	AT 2933	[illegible]
60th Bn	MF	C	150	AT 2930	[illegible]
90th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 2930	[illegible]
K.20 Bn	MF	C	345	BT 0763	BT 1065/22Aug69
V.25 Bn	MF	C	130	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	90	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	125	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	45	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	3,805		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	[illegible]		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	1[illegible]	AT 9226	
1st Bn	NVA	C	1[illegible]	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	13[illegible]	AT 9226	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	125	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	180	BT 162[illegible]	BT 2340/12Aug69
72nd Bn	LF	C	175	BT 191[illegible]	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	195	BT 211[illegible]	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	200	BT 221[illegible]	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 3304	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	220	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4213	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	80	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	85	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	115	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	300	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	130	BS 4677	BS 6385/12Aug69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	680		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	150	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4386	BS 3587/13Aug69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69
C.17 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	55	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov67
C.19 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7555	BS 7061/17Nov68
C.120 Co	LF	C	45	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	75	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5596	
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,615		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	870		
Regt Hq	MF	C	345	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	180	BS 6733	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	180	BS 7932	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	165	BS 6733	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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BINH DINH PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,700		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	520	BR 7363	
7th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 7547	
8th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 5950	
9th Bn	NVA	C	300	BR 5929	

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 112400H to 182400H October 1969.

a. A review of information from varied sources has dictated the moves of the following enemy organizations to their present locations within QUANG TIN (P). 70th MF Battalion (BT 1623); 72nd LF Battalion (BT 1917); 74th LF Heavy Weapons Battalion (BT 2113); 76th LF Sapper Battalion (BT 2217); 409th MF Sapper Battalion (BT 3304).

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

9. Subordinate/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF PERINTREP 39-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS, AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 42-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P). No significant reports.

2. THUA THIEN (P). PW, PFC Dao Quang DAT, Signal Plt, K4A/5th Worksight, captured (YC 9397) on 10 Oct 69 (CIC/1st ARVN Div/112000H Oct 69) stated that the K4A Bn/5th Regt (code name-"SONG HUONG") has a strength of 180 men. DAT also stated that the K4A Bn was composed of four companies numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4 with an additional signal platoon (code #50) and a reconnaissance squad. Source further gave the mission of K4A Bn and its companies as follows. K4A Bn is to attack HUE City in the future. The 3rd Co, K4A Bn mission is to procure rice at NAM PHO RAM and the 2d Co has the same mission but acquires their rice from NAM PHU VANG and NAM PHO HA. The 1st Co operates in the HA THUY area. DAT gave the following company locations. The 1st Co, K4A Bn at HA THUY (YD 8600), 2d Co, K4A Bn on top of KHE LY NO Hill (YD 9296), and the 3rd Co, K4A Bn at the foot of HILL 303 (YD 9400). Reported personalities: K4A Bn CO-THONG, PO-HAY, APO-XIEM, Rear CO-KY, Chief of Staff-TRUNG, Signal Officer-CHI.

(G-2 COMMENT: The K4A Bn CO, PO, and Signal Officer are the only personalities known to OOB. This is the first time the APO, Rear CO and Chief of Staff have been mentioned. III MAF OOB carries the K4A Bn in vicinity (YD 7900) with a strength of 330 men. The missions given for the units are in agreement with other information on NVA units in the MRTTH lowlands (F-3). All other information rated (F-6).)

3. QUANG NAM (P)

a. Hoi Chanh, Tran Van BIEN, District Commissioner, Agriculture Executive Committe, HOA VANG (D) and HIEU DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P) who rallied on 7 Oct 69 to HIEU DUC (D) SS HQ (111630Z Oct 69 SA QUANG NGAI Sector HOI AN RVN, Init Inter Rpt (VC Ret) 11th ITT HOI AN 83-69) stated the District Committe is broken into sections according to jobs and the sections are numbered H-1 through H-16. The agriculture Committe/Section is designated H-10. The mission of his unit was to organize production, collection, and storage of foodstuffs. The last known location of his unit was vicinity (ZC 217630) on 5 Oct 69. The Hoi Chanh further stated the breakdown of the District Committe was: District Commissioner - H-1, Propaganda and Training Section - H-2, Military Section - H-3, H-4 unknown, Security Section - H-5, Political Section - H-6, Troop and Enemy Proselyting Section - H-7, Economic Section - H-8, Public Health Section - H-9, Agriculture Section - H-10, Youth Affairs Section - H-11, Sections H-12 through H-15 were unknown. The District Armed Forces Section (designated H-16) contained 70 men, 20 VC and 50 NVA regulars. The Armed Forces Section is divided into three units, one sapper unit, one engineer unit, and one 82mm mortar unit. The Hoi Chanh further stated that the district Committee and its various sections are located in a base area vicinity

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(ZC 217630). Sections H-1 through H-16 are approximately 30 minutes walking distance apart. The Hoi Chanh stated there was a rice cache located vicinity PHU SON (H), HOA LUONG (V) (AT 953653). There are four rice caches in the area. Another cache was located in vicinity LA CHAU (H), HOA LUONG (V) and one cache (AT 950628). One cache contains approximately 600 kilos and another cache contains approximately 1,200 kilos of rice (NFI). The Hoi Chanh had some knowledge of other enemy units. He stated that the 31st Regt is currently located near the District Committee Headquarters vicinity (ZC 217630). He also stated that prior to the end of May 69 he had furnished supplies for the 141st Regt and he has hearsay information that the 141st Regt was moving but stated he did not know where or when. Source has not heard of or seen the 141st Regt since the end of May 69.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location BIEN stated for his unit is close to where our OOB holds the 141st Regt. All indications recently reaffirm the location of the 141st Regt as being in this area. Other than this Hoi Chanh's statement of hearsay there is no other information indicating the 141st Regt has moved from its present estimated location (HAPPY Valley area). All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, PFC Le Cong DAN, 2d Co, 160th Transportation Bn, QUANG DA, captured on 9 Oct 69 vicinity (AT 936374) (121603Z Oct 69 CG 1st Mar Div Init Interr Rpt) stated the mission of the battalion was to transport rice from QUE SON (D) to the 80th Hospital, and evacuate wounded from the 78th Hospital to the 80th Hospital. The 78th Hospital, QUANG DA, has been located vicinity (BT 006459) since approximately 20 Sep 69 and the 80th Hospital, QUANG DA is located vicinity (AT 788303). The PW's battalion was located vicinity (AT 949381) on 9 Oct 69. The PW stated he belonged to the 2d Co, 32d Bn, HANOI Capital Regt while in NVN. The 32d Bn spent two months of training as a parade unit in HANOI. The PW infiltrated with the 32d Bn from HANOI on 14 May 69 with a strength of 580 men. The unit travelled by train from HANOI to VINH City arriving about 19 May 69, and then travelled by truck to QUANG BINH (P). Travel from QUANG BINH (P) was by foot, crossing into LAOS on 26 May 69. The battalion then entered KONTUM (P), RVN on 7 Jun 69 and moved to QUANG NAM (P) on approximately 10 Jun 69 (exact location unknown). In this location they rested for about 15 days and moved to SON PHUC (V) vicinity (AT 900375), DUC DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P) in late Jun 69. The unit had 550 men upon arrival in RVN, but four men were lost as a result of air strikes, 16 men deserted and an unknown amount were lost due to malaria. The other three companies that composed the unit were assigned to unknown units; however, the PW's company was assigned to the 160th Transportation Bn.

(G-2 COMMENT: Many of the recent large troop sightings in the QUE SON Mountains have been attributed to transportation activity. The location of this unit is in proximity to the present estimated location of the 36th Regt and the 3d Sapper Bn. The 160th has been previously mentioned as a

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transportation unit subordinate to Front 4's rear service element. The designations of the hospitals have been previously mentioned in QUANG NAM (P). The 32d Bn has been reported previously and is in accordance with statements made by prior PW's from the 30th and 32d Battalions that have infiltrated into RVN in Jun 69. All information rated (F-3).)

c. PW, PFC Nguyen Van LAN, 6th Co, 12th Bn, 36th Regt captured 7 Oct 69 vicinity (AT 937373) (120125Z Oct 69 CG 1st Mar Div 9th ITT 04-10-69 Init Interr Rpt) stated the last known location of the battalion was vicinity (AT 970389) on 6 Oct 69. The 36th Regt CP was located vicinity (AT 981412) on 29 Sep 69. The mission of the battalion was to counter FWMAF operations. The PW stated he began infiltration on 3 Jul 69 with the K-9 Bn designated as Infiltration Group 559 consisting of 700 men. Travel from THANH HOA (P) to QUANG BINH (P) was made by trucks. The group moved into LAOS by foot and entered RVN in QUANG TRI (P) and on 28 Jul 69 the group moved back into LAOS reentering RVN through KONTUM (P) on 5 Aug 69. The unit then proceeded to QUANG NAM (P) arriving on 7 Aug 69. The strength of the unit upon arrival in QUANG NAM (P) was unknown. However, the PW did state he knew of four men who deserted. The PW along with 20 other men were assigned to the 12th Bn the remainder of the group went to unknown units.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 12th Bn has been recorded as an AKA for the 2d Bn, 36th Regt. The location of the battalion as stated by LAN is where our OOB currently holds the 36th Regt. The location he stated for the regiment is slightly north of where OOB currently holds this unit but is still within the general area. Infiltration data has been previously reported but with a variation of strength and departure date from NVN. This infiltration group was previously reported as having a strength of 460 men and departed from NVN in Mar 69. All information rated (F-3).)

d. Hoi Chanh, Le Dinh BON, 3d Co, 3D Bn, AKA: 90th Bn, 1st Worksite/ 2d Agricultural Site (AKA 2d Division) rallied on 30 Sep 69 at DAI LOC (D) Headquarters, (AT 977577) (112324Z Oct 69 CG III MAF DNG RVN, ARVN Trans Interr Rpt 11th ITT 140-69 (VC/Ret). The Hoi Chanh stated the 1st Regt, 2d NVA Div had a strength of 500 men and the regiment had a rear area in the CHAM Mountains vicinity (AT 895325) with the 3d Battalion (AKA 90th Bn) located in the BANG Mountains, DAI LOC (possible location ZC 1451). The 1st Bn (AKA 40th Bn) was located in the SON PHUC area of DUC DUC (D) (hearsay) (possible vicinity AT 900375). The 2d Bn (AKA 60th Bn) was in the QUE SON Mountains. In Mar 69, the regiment was located in the TY SE area vicinity (AT 790395). In May 69, the entire regiment moved to PHUOC LAM (V) for 15 days to pick-up replacements after which the unit moved to the TAM KY area around KY HGHIA (V), KY LONG. In Jul 69, the entire regiment moved to TRA MY vicinity (BT 085395) near the vicinity of the QUANG NGAI Border. The regiment operated in the QUANG NAM area and stayed in the vicinity of the DONG LANG Mountains located (ZC 190260) to establish a base area. The Hoi Chanh stated he left the unit on 6 Aug 69 and since then he had heard the regiment moved to KONTUM Province (hearsay). The Hoi Chanh further stated the 1st Regt was composed of

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three infantry battalion's and eleven support and service companies designated T-1 through T-11, as follows: T-1 Signal and Liaison; T-2 Sapper; T-3 Recon; T-4 Engineer; T-5 12.7 AA Guns; T-6 82mm Mortars; T-7 75 RR and B-41; T-8 Transportation; T-9 Medical; T-10 Training; T-11 First Aid Station. The Hoi Chanh also stated that many of the men of the regiment were sick and weak. He also stated there was a hospital with a [illegible] bed capacity vicinity (BS 425820).

(G-2 COMMENT: The composition, structure, and strength of the 1st Regt is in keeping with statements and records previously reported, although the exact holdings of the Support and Service Companies differ somewhat with present OOB holdings. We carry only nine companies, listed as follows: K-1 Recon; K-2 Signal; K-3 Engineer; K-4 AA; K-5 RR; K-6 Mortar; K-7 Transportation; K-8 Medical; K-9 Training. The major difference would be the "T" designations vice the old "K" designations, and the addition of a sapper company, which is probably in keeping with the plans of the enemy to concentrate more on the sapper attacks. The location stated by this Hoi Chanh is in the general vicinity of our present OOB holdings since 12 Sep 69. All information rated (F-3).)

e. Hoi Chanh, SrLt Tran Van KIT, Company Commander, C.84 Local Force Company (AKA H.16) of Region Unit 2, HOA VANG Unit who rallied on 9 Oct 69 (AT 957667) (101400Z Oct 69 CG 1st Mar Div, Init Interr Rpt (VC/Returnee), 111400Z Oct 69, SA QUANG NAM Sector, HOI AN RVN) stated the location of his company was approximately one day's walk northwest of NUI CHUA Mountain vicinity (AT 865680). The mission of the unit was to wait for the rice harvest to be collected vicinity (AT 944663) and then to destroy it. The rice storage was for the refugee center located at southern COC KHA Mountain vicinity (AT 943663). Heavy rains prevented the accomplishment of this mission. The Hoi Chanh further stated his unit maintained a Base Camp located in vicinity (ZC 190635). The troops get two cans of rice per day and 10 piasters a day for market money, and company grade officers get 18 piasters per day. The morale is down because the war has lasted so long and has become so fierce that more and more people are returning to the GVN controlled areas. The military discipline has become a problem because of hunger. The Hoi Chanh further stated the strength of his unit was 45 men. The unit is composed of three platoons. The first platoon is composed of 17 men and led by Ngo LUONG. The second platoon has a strength of 12 men and is led by Phong SON, and the third platoon with a strength of 11 men led by Bong (FNU). The headquarters element was composed of five men. The Hoi Chanh gave additional information on the "HOA VANG Region Unit 2", stating the unit was composed of 30 people and held an AKA of H.3. He further stated the unit was armed with one 60mm mortar, one B-40, and one B-41, and two RPD light machine guns and the C.84 LF Co received artillery support from the 575th Bn. The Hoi Chanh stated the 575th Bn transports DKB (122mm Rkt) rounds through PHU SON NAM (H) vicinity (AT 920662). They often hide in the villages of THAN SON vicinity (AT 961610), and HOA LOI vicinity (AT 970660). The Hoi Chanh had hearsay information that the 575th Bn has moved to the mountains (location unknown) and sometimes travel to HOA

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LUONG (V) vicinity (AT 920630) to collect rice from the village chief. Source additionally stated that elements of the 31st Regt and the 141st Regt were located in vicinity of his unit.

(G-2 COMMENT: The rallier here has not been mentioned before as a personality normally associated with this unit. This could be because of the short length of time he has spent as the CO of the unit. The mention of the other NVA units in his area is within the present holdings of our OOB, and in keeping of the statements of recent Hoi Chanhs and PW's. The AKA "H-16" has been used previously for this unit. Of special significance here is the stated strength of his unit. Present OOB listings are much higher than what is stated here. All information rated (F-2).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). No significant reports.

5. QUANG NGAI (P). Returnee, Pvt Tran GIAO, 2d Co, 48th LF Bn, QUANG NGAI (P) Force who returned on 10 Oct 69, vicinity (BS 708883) (SA 2d ARVN Div, QUANG NGAI msg 130325Z Oct 69) gave his company strength as 100 men, and his battalion strength as 300 men, 250 of which are NVA. GIAO further stated his battalion's effective combat strength is 200 men. On 30 Sep 69 subject stated the 48th Bn was located at PHU MY (H) vicinity (BS 737823) with a mission to train three man teams at PHU MY (H) for combat. Future mission of the 48th Bn was unknown to subject. The Hoi Chanh stated his battalion is equipped with four 82mm mortars, four MG's, four B-41's, four B-40's, two 57mm RR, four AN/PRC-25 radios, and 10 miscellaneous radios (NFI). Subject stated the battalion is divided into five companies designated 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The 1st, 2d, and 3rd are infantry companies, the 4th a heavy weapons company and the 5th a transportation company.

(G-2 COMMENT: Information coincides with III MAF OOB holdings of the 48th Bn (F-2). All other information rated (F-6).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 42-69

1. GENERAL. VC/VCI subversive, espionage, sabotage, and terrorist activities reported during the past week reflected a continuation of tactics and policies as reported during the past several months. No significant change in intensity of activity was discernable.

Reported enemy intelligence collection activities consisted primarily of reconnaissance of various US/GVN positions in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces.

Enemy implementation of security countermeasure programs and education of personnel, both military and civilian, in aspects of the maintenance of secrecy regarding their dispositions, activities, identity of personnel, and location of supplies and equipment reflected VC/VCI frustration at the success of the US/GVN intelligence apparatus to identify, locate, and neutralize enemy personnel, supplies, and equipment.

Other miscellaneous reports of enemy activity concerned procurement, storage, distribution, and transportation of foodstuffs, particularly rice; tax collection; extortion of money; food shortages; conscription of civil labor; civil health plans and missions; collection of cans for the manufacture of mines and grenades; attack preparations in Dien Ban (D), Quang Nam (P); and orders for cadre to vacate certain areas in close proximity to certain selected targets.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. Of noteable significance are recent captured documents and military intelligence source reports which reflect widespread enemy frustration concerning the morale, disaffection, and defection of many of his personnel, the civilian populace, and the success of GVN and Allied forces in penetrating his organizations, both military and civilian. Specific mention was made of GVN/Allied use of widespread intelligence networks and the cultivation, recruitment, and doubling of former VC/VCI personnel who either rallied or were captured. Additional mention was made of the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX and Chieu Hoi organizations as being particularly "cunning and wicked" in their schemes and tactics to identify, locate, and neutralize VC/VCI personnel. Specified enemy countermeasures include a concerted personnel security education program; investigation of recruits, families of personnel, malcontents, and missing personnel who later return to their unit; and the avowed use of severe punishments, to include confinement in thought reform prisons and/or execution, as deemed appropriate. Considerable emphasis is being placed on controlling the thoughts and attitudes, as well as the maintenance of iron discipline among VC cadre, soldiers, and inhabitants of VC controlled areas.

Offensive enemy intelligence gathering activities consisted of reconnaissance of various US/GVN positions vicinity of My Thinh Bac (BS 570735),

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Quang Ngai (P); Hieu Duc (D) Headquarters; Cam Ne (AT 977695), Yen Ne (AT 990679), and Ha Dong (AT 990640). Elements of V25 Battalion, dressed in civilian clothing were reported in the vicinity Lang Trung (BT 148548).

Reports continue to reflect enemy use of children and teenagers to collect information in GVN-controlled areas.

Details of enemy intelligence gathering activities and security countermeasure efforts during the past weeks are as follows:

a. Quang Nam.

(1) On 3 October 1969, elements of the 1st MarDiv operating vicinity (BT 068475) obtained a document from an enemy KIA containing the following information:

A plan dated 17 September 1969, prepared by A45 (Security Section, QDSZ) concerns the performance of security missions in the city outskirts and friendly (VC/NVA) liberated areas from 1 September to December 1969.

Document states that in the (city) outskirts, friendly security elements, military and para-military forces must conduct violent attacks to help the masses kill stubborn ringleaders of the enemy, Phung Hoang (PHOENIX agents), pacification cadre, spies, and informants, Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) cadre, tyrants and wicked (RVN) administrative personnel.

To effectively carry out the above activities, efforts should be made in the conduct of investigations on the organizations, activities, and schemes of the PHOENIX and espionage networks and those of secret agents, reactionary religious sects, and political parties. In addition, the masses must also be motivated to help friendly units in (1) the practice of counterespionage and the preservation of secrecy; (2) following up of enemy activities and situations; (3) warning of infiltration of the enemy Biet-Kich (special action units) and spies; (4) safeguarding of revolutionary forces, agencies, warehouse facilities, and transportation corridors; (5) frustration of enemy psywar, Chieu Hoi, and pacification activities; and (6) strengthening of security elements at hamlet and village levels.

The document further provides instructions governing the phasing of security activities, including the investigation of the situation, compiling of records and segregation of suspects, suppression of tyrants, and training of security agents to be conducted in the villages of Duy Xuyen, Hoi An, Dien Ban, Dai Loc, Hoa Vang, and Area II (Quang Da Special Zone) from September to December 1969. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 10-1405-69). (Eval: B-3).

(2) A US MI source reported that as of 10 October 1969, a force of 150 men of the T89 Sapper Bn. was dispersed vicinity Le Son (5)

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(AT 956645), Le Son (4) vicinity (AT 960647), An Trach (1) vicinity (AT 968655) and Le Son (3) vicinity (AT 970645), Dien Ban (D). The unit is remaining in its present location for the purpose of protecting the areas around Hoa Luong vicinity (AT 950660), Hoa Loi vicinity (AT 980650), and Hoa Thai vicinity (AT 980690), which the VC consider to be good areas to collect and purchase foods. In addition, the unit intended to protect the supply routes from the above areas north to Dong Nghe vicinity (AT 880650) and Nui Son Ga vicinity (AT 888628). The T89 Sapper Bn. also planned to study US/GVN positions along the railroad tracks between Yen Ne (3) vicinity (AT 990679) and Ha Dong vicinity (AT 990640) while waiting for orders to launch surprise attacks against these positions. (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st Bn. (Prov), 525th MI Gp, Rep #1/A/AX/0548/69). (Eval: C-3).

(3) A US MI source reported that as of 10 October 1969, three battalions of the 31st NVA Regt., each with a strength of less than 150 men, were dispersed between the vicinity of (AT 820705), (AT 820715), (AT 840705) and (AT 840715), in the mountainous area west of Cao Sun, in Hieu Duc (D). Three recent B-52 strikes (nfi) resulted in heavy casualties, sickness, the lack of medical treatment, inadequate clothing, and poor living conditions. The advent of the monsoon rains added to the loss of morale. Fatigue left the troops with little fighting spirit. While recuperating and awaiting replacement, the regiment conducted food gathering activities. A recon team of about 40 men from the unit was deployed at Binh Thai vicinity (AT 885714) with the mission of studying US/GVN positions around Hieu Duc (D) seat and Cam Ne vicinity (AT 977695). The recon team had the additional responsibility to move to Ninh An, Thai Lai vicinity (AT 922715), Thon Truc Dong, and Thon Phuoc Hung (AT 912720) in order to urge local organizations to collect rice and salt and help in transporting goods back to the base areas. Other teams of the unit were moving south to Dong Nghe vicinity (AT 880650), Phu Son vicinity (AT 9065), Hoa Luong vicinity (AT 9566), Hoi Loi vicinity (AT 9865) and Hoa Thai vicinity (AT 9869) in order to gather foodstuffs (nfi). (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st Bn (Prov), 525th MI Gp, Rpt #1/A/AX/0554/69). (Eval: C-3).

(4) The V25 LF battalion reportedly plans to destroy the resettlement camp in Xuyen Long vicinity (BT 100538) and ambush the Navy River Patrol unit operating along the Cua Dai River. In addition, a three man recon team from the V25 Battalion, dressed in civilian clothes and armed with hand grenades and K54 pistols were operating in the vicinity of Lang Trung vicinity (BT 148548). (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st Bn (P), 525th MI Gp, Rep #1/A/AX/0543/69). (Eval: F-3).

(5) A US MI source reported that on 12 October 1969, approximately 200 personnel of the Quyet Thang Bn. (nfi) commanded by Doan Van Hung deployed vicinity (BT 147535). Unit intentions were to harass ARVN posts in Hoi An City and attempt to train young children, nine to thirteen years of age, to collect intelligence information by penetrating secure areas and selling items such as beer and cigarettes to ARVN and Americans.

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(Ref: CO, Det C, 1st MI Bn (P), 525th MI Gp, Rep #1/B/BX/0781/69).

(6) A US MI source reported that in Thuong Duc (D) and Dai Loc (D) areas, vicinity (ZC 191558, 194559), the VC have enlisted the aid of six (6) children who act as cattle watchers. These children inform the VC cadre of any VN/Allied operations in the area. (Ref: SIA QUANG NAM SECTOR HOI AN RVN, msg 150515Z Oct 69). (Eval: B-3).

b. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 11 October 1969, a VC returnee disclosed that Nguyen Xuan, Nguyen Sa, Nguyen Truong, Nguyen Ngoc, and Ton Hoa entered the My Thinh Bac area, vicinity (BS 570735), one kilometer northwest of Hill 10, to collect information (nfi). During the day they stayed at Mo Co vicinity (BS 545746) to make reports (nfi). (Ref: SIA Quang Ngai Sector Quang Ngai RVN msg 131240Z Oct 69). (Eval: F-3).

(2) A GVN source reported on 13 October 1969, that approximately 70 VC appeared at Phu Thuan vicinity (BS 540715) on 10 October 1969. Their weapons consisted of 57mm cannon, 2 82mm mortars, 4 B-40s and individual weapons. Their mission was to attempt to combine with town mission teams (nfi) to operate along Quang Ngai boundary and establish spy systems, structure (nfi), and also harass outposts and refugee camps vicinity Quang Ngai City on future nights. (Ref: SIA Quang Ngai Sector Quang Ngai RVN, QNG INSTUM 234). (Eval: C-3).

3. SABOTAGE. Acts of enemy sabotage activities during the past week consisted of damage/destruction of a road culvert in Quang Tri (P); the Hue-Danang railroad and a railroad bridge in Thua Thien (P); the Phuoc Trac bridge in Quang Nam (P); the Duc Vinh bridge, a culvert, and a drain (nfi) in Quang Ngai (P). Attempts were made against an electrical power station in Danang and a report reflected enemy intentions to damage; destroy the Nam O bridge in Quang Nam (P).

Details of sabotage incidents and reported enemy sabotage plans/ intentions are as follows:

a. Quang Tri. COMUSMACV reported that on 12 October 1969, the VC destroyed a culvert located approximately 4 km NNW of Dong Ha vicinity (YD 213636). (Ref: COMUSMACV msg 130848Z Oct 69).

b. Thua Thien. An investigation revealed that two mines, probably homemade, were used to destroy portions of railroad track vicinity (AT 838972) and (AT 838974) on 16 Oct 69. The first mine detonated at (AT 838972), resulting in 50 meters of track destroyed; the second mine went off at (AT 838974) resulting in 70 meters of track and one wooden bridge 100% destroyed. (Ref: XXIV Corps COC Spt Rpt 162345 H Oct 69)

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c. Quang Nam.

(1) At 1030 on 8 October 1969, the VC placed approximately 6kgs of explosives at the electrical station at the corner of Phan Chau Trinh and Chu Van An streets in Danang. The explosives were discovered and picked up by US Military Police, causing no damages or casualties. (Ref: Phung Hoang Committee Rpt #1625/DN/PH dated 90ct69)

(2) A US MI source reported that at about 142300 H October 1969, two VC swimmer/sappers armed with mines (nfi) and knives arrived vicinity (AT 930834) on the Song Cu De and hid vicinity (AT 933833). The VC reportedly plan to observe allied activity and blow the Nam O Bridge vicinity (AT 928842). The two swimmer/sappers are probably from the T87 Bn. A rallier of 12 September 1969 indicated that the T87 has a swimmer/sapper capability. (Unrated). (Ref: COMNAVFORV msg 160944Z October 1969, COMNAVFORV INTSUM 249-69).

(3) On 16 October 1969, a swift boat discovered three US hand grenades and three pounds of TNT tied to a Vietnamese fishing float in the vicinity (BT 110810). (Ref: Coastal Surveillance Group Spot Rpt. 162240H Oct 69).

(4) At approximately 160155H October 1969, the Phuoc Trac Bridge, approximately 1800 meters northeast of Hieu Nhon (D) headquarters vicinity (BT 181588) was 100% destroyed by a floating mine. (Ref: SIA QUANG NAM SECTOR HOI AN RVN, msg 160400Z Oct 69).

d. Quang Ngai.

(1) VC blew up the Duc Vinh Bridge vicinity (BS 746531) causing 80% damage. (Ref: PSA/PSD Rpt 284-04 of 9 Oct 69).

(2) A US MI source reported that on 112040 hours October 1969, a culvert was 60% damaged vicinity (BS 726564) on Highway 1 (nfi). (Ref: SIA Quang Ngai Sector Quang Ngai (P) RVN, QNG INTSUM 233, msg 131240Z Oct 69).

(3) At 2340 hours, 12 October 1969, the VC blew up the Duc Phuoc drain (nfi) vicinity (BS 724570), causing 70% damage. (Ref: PSA/PSD CORDS Quang Ngai Rpt 287-06).

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Reports of VC/VCI political and propaganda activities focused on plans and objectives for the Winter-Spring Campaign and indicated a continuation of the same tactics and policies as reported during the past several months. No significant change in intensity of reported political and propaganda activities during the week was discernable.

Details of reported enemy political and propaganda activities are as follows:

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a. Quang Tri.

(1) NILO Quang Tri reports that there has been an increase in propaganda and proselyting activity in Quang Tri (P). The propaganda is primarily directed against the civilian population in an attempt to gain support for the PRG. The death of Ho Chi MINH and the withdrawal of the 3rd Marine Regiment have also affected the propaganda. Ho is being portrayed as a martyr who should be venerated and his teachings followed. The 3rd Marines are being portrayed as having been driven out of the country by the VC, and the enemy is saying that the GVN can no longer provide security for the people. The Marine's withdrawal is being compared to the withdrawal of the French in 1954. (Ref: COMNAVFORV INTSUM 244-69)

(2) On 13 October 1969, a US MI source reported that on 11 October, the communist cadre of Quang Binh and Quang Tri Provinces organized a meeting in the area of Tung Luat vicinity (YD 230805). Participating in the meeting were about 100 cadre of various levels. The meeting was presided over by LtCol CAO, Political Officer of Vinh Linh Special Zone. The spokesman was Truong Cong PHEIN and the secretary was Nguyen HAP. Purpose of the meeting was to collect and relay the wishes of provincial cadre of the 4th Military Region. The objectives decided upon at the meeting were as follows:

(a) That the 4th Military Region will reinforce NVA units operating in the Quang Tri area;

(b) That NVA troops should be armed with modern weapons in order to make preparations for the Winter-Spring Campaign;

(c) That taxes be levied on farming products and rice to obtain more money to support the war efforts;

(d) That all men ranging in age from 14 to 50 years be obligated to serve in the Army and

(e) That the war effort be solved by means of arms and not the Paris Peace Conference. (Eval: C-6) (Ref: Det A, 1st MI Bn., 525th MI Group msg 141000Z Oct 69)

(3) At approximately 150210H October 1969, a CAP 4-1-5 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on an USEF vicinity (YD 224614), 1 kilometer northwest of Dong Ha City. The enemy fled in an unknown direction. A sweep of the area disclosed enemy propaganda leaflets (nfi), 2 NVA helmets, and 5 Chicom grenades. (Ref: CAP Daily Operations Summary 141600H-151600H October 1969)

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b. Quang Nam.

(1) On 14 September 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division, operating vicinity (BT 091661) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Note, dated 15 August 1969, signed by Le Trong DU of an unspecified element, sent to comrades Tah and those of A72 (Dien Binh Village, Dien Ban District, Quang Da Special Zone, MR-5), orders an increase in violent actions against the (RVN) paramilitary forces such as pacification teams, Popular Forces and People's Self-Defense Forces in order to eliminate tyrants, break the enemy's (GVN's) oppressive control over the population, and pull the people back to their former hamlets. In addition, the development of (VC) forces on the "inside" (possibly meaning in the GVN controlled areas) was to be stepped up. In the event friendly forces remain weak and do not control a sizeable number of the population, serious difficulties will effect electoral campaigns in the future (nfi).

Document emphasizes the importance of TL (possibly VC Political Campaign) and states that all the party cadre are to redouble their efforts in the accomplishment of their missions. Document also contains a general view on the situation in the area (possibly Quang Nam Province), revealing that large scale attacks were conducted everywhere (by the VC) except Area C. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 10-5243-69) (Eval: B-3).

(2) On 18 September 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division, operating vicinity (AT 846477) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Notebook, entries dated 16 April 1968 to 16 September 1969. An undated entry pertains to missions to be completed by Dai Loc District by the end of 1969, which consists of:

(a) Winning the support of 80,000 people no matter where the people are, even in enemy controlled areas. Party Chapters have to send cadre to stay close to them in order to lead them from under enemy (GVN) control and to return to live in their native areas when the order is given.

(b) Increasing attacks on tyrants (RVN officials), pacification cadre and pacification support forces, and developing guerrilla strength; upgrading experienced guerrillas to the level of district local forces; and 6% of the teenagers and old men were to become secret guerrillas.

(c) Stepping up political struggles aimed at frustrating the enemy accelerated pacification program, countering enemy acts of terrorism, defending the legal rights of travel of the civilian population, and combining the political struggle in rural areas with the struggle in the cities.

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(d) Focusing efforts on organizing military proselyting cadre in hamlets and villages, so that the latter would be able to exploit the tactics of military proselyting to the fullest extent and with great effectiveness, in efforts to wear down the enemy's (GVN/RVNAF/FWMAF) strength.

(e) Consolidating Party chapters and developing Party members. Each party member should be able to recruit one new party member. (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No: 09-2016-69) (Unrated)

(3) On 29 September 1969, elements of the Americal Division operating in the vicinity of (BT 308119) discovered a document containing the following information:

Directive, dated 18 September 1969, signed by HIEN, for the Propaganda and Training Section, Quang Nam (Province Party Committee, Region 5), pertains to entertainment activities to be performed during the period September 1969 to January 1970. The purpose of this entertainment motivation was to create enthusiasm among local force units, agencies and the masses. Document stated that an entertainment activity plan had been recently sent to all cadre in charge of entertainment. They were to pay attention to accomplishing the following specific missions: to urge military and civilian personnel in the entire province to compose (new) popular songs and satirical poems, and to collect literary works of the past and present expressing anti-American sentiments. Document also stressed that every one should try to compose songs and poems to commemorate the late President Ho Chi Minh on his revolutionary achievements, and conduct entertainment performances in all units and agencies as well as in various districts and villages. Document further stated that worthy literary works should be forwarded to the Province Propaganda and training Section for further dissemination. (Ref: CDEC Log No: 10-5417-69) (Eval: B-3)

(4) A US MI source reported on 10 October 1969, that Front 4 had stressed the following points:

(a) Main Force VC and NVA units have suffered great losses of material and troop strength during the Spring and Autumn Campaigns. Even with the addition of troop replacements, the general fitness of units dictated that they move into base areas for recuperation and more replacements. While deployed in the base areas, the units assigned food requisition and other preparatory activities to some of their troops while training others in equipment maintenance and warehouse construction in preparation for the Monsoon. If the food requisition and other preparatory activities proceed as planned, Front 4 plans to begin the Winter-Spring Campaign as early as November 1969. Strategy of the Winter-Spring Campaign stresses the collaboration of main and local force units in support of guerrilla forces. Using the tactics of dividing into small teams for raids and ambushes, the guerrilla forces are to strike at and annihilate isolated Allied outposts and RD teams in an effort to disrupt the pacification program. In addition, Sapper units have been directed to

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concentrate their activities in areas under tenuous GVN control. Using sabotage as a primary weapon, the sappers have the mission to create turbulance in the rear areas in support to underground cadre and organizations (nfi).

(b) Cadre have been directed to target military proselyting activities against families whose children are servicemen or work in the employ of Allied forces. They should motivate the families to urge their sons to desert from the service, leave their posts, and turn in their weapons to the Viet Cong. An alternative course is that the sons work for Allied forces and carry on proselyting activities of the own. All public servants, and servicemen should be urged to join the Revolutionary struggle, particularly members of the People's Self-Defense Groups.

(c) Finally, aspects of the political struggle were emphasized. Cadre were directed to infiltrate the weak border areas of Province, City and District headquarters in order to recruit agents and stimulate the revolutionary movement. The movement, Front 4 urged, must be elevated to a legal status. Cadre should directly confront Americans, asking them to withdraw, to disband the GVN government, and end the war. The objectives of a restored peace and the organization of elections in accordance with the 10 points of the NLF should be stressed in proselyting activities. To fulfill these objectives, cadre were directed to motivate the people to destroy hamlets, speak out for the NLF, and break the GVN hold over the populace. By moving the people back into the liberated, or VC-controlled areas, the production of foodstuffs would be assured. (Ref: CO, Det C, 1stBn, (Prov), 525th MI Gp, Danang, Report Number: 1/A/AX/0552/69) (Eval: C-3)

(5) A US MI source reported that as of 10 October 1969 the 3rd Sapper Battalion was dispersed in the Ho Cay Mountains vicinity (AT 945465) and (AT 945452), Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam (P). Soldiers of the Battalion had in the previous nights traveled north on the Duong Thoung Road on a food gathering mission to La Thap vicinity (AT 935515), Le Nam (3) vicinity (AT 950514) and Cu Ban (3) vicinity (AT 950524). At these locations the soldiers received food from guerrillas of Xuyen Thanh (V) vicinity (AT 950500) (nfi). The 3rd Sapper Battalion has been under orders from the District Committee to intensify their purchasing and requisitioning efforts so that they may have a reserve of food and money for the monsoon season. They have been instructed to intensify their efforts in collecting rice, obtaining money for the troop mess fund, and winning the support of the populace through anti-American propaganda (nfi). Morale of the soldiers, engaged in these activities was low. They appeared to be fatigued after their food gathering mission. (Ref: CO, Det C, 1stBn (Prov), 525th MI Gp Report Number 1/A/AX/0550/69) (Eval: C-3)

(6) A GVN source reported that at 2200 hours 10 October 1969, a group of village and district level VC cadre held a meeting, conducted by Tran Van DANG, in Hoa Hai (V) vicinity (BT 089678). DANG directed the local VC leaders to develop the prestige of the PRG in the eyes of the people and to enhance the stature of the PRG throughout the area. He stated that it was imperative for the villagers to contribute more rice,

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salt, and foodstuffs for the monsoon season. The commo-liaison system must be made more efficient. In order to expedite communications between village and hamlet committees, all commo-liaison cadre must be keep in constant contact with their counterparts in order that information be passed quickly and securely. DANG is a representative of the PRG to Hoa Vang (D). At the meeting the members further agreed that all families with sons in the ARVN or GVN must be surveilled and their names put on the control roster. It was added that during the course of the meeting that 100,00 piasters was spent to print individual biographic data cards on the people (nfi). This card index would assist in controlling the people during the coming election and aid the VC in identifying those those individuals hostile to their cause. (Ref: OSI, Det 5003, Danang Air Base, Draft DDIIR 10-22) (Eval: F-6).

(7) A US MI source reported that on 12 October 1969, approximately 250 personnel of the 105th Battalion commanded by Nguyen Tan Nghia deployed vicinity (AT 992472) to (AT 993477). The southern perimeter of the deployment is bounded by the Hon Coc Mountains. Morale appeared low. The men appeared tired and were resting. The intentions of the unit was to seek the cooperation of local political cadre to spread propaganda against the Americans and ARVN and to encourage local residents to study the life and teachings of Ho Chi Minh. (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st MI Bn (Prov), 525th MI Gp Report Number 1/B/BX/0779/69) (Eval: C-3)

(8) A US MI source reported that on 13 October 1969, the 70th Battalion was dispersed in eastern Duy Xuyen (D) vicinity (BT 141524) to (BT 138517). The unit had a strength of approximately 200 men and was commanded by Ho Tich. Mission of the Battalion was to support local VC cadre in the instruction of the residents in the history of Ho Chi Minh and the benefits of a coalition government (nfi). Further intentions of this unit were to launch harassment attacks against the Nam Phuoc Post, the Ba Ren Post, and the Cau Lau Post, during future nights (nfi). (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st MIBn (Prov), 525th MI Gp, Report Number: 1/B/BX/0780/69) (Eval: C-3)

c. Quang Tin.

(1) A Hoi Chanh who rallied on 26 August 1969 in Tien Phuoc (D), Quang Tin (P) stated that since early July 1969 approximately twenty-five (25) students and 5 VC political and military cadre had been sent to Hanoi, North Vietnam from Tien Phuoc (D) for training. They were to return to RVN, at an unspecified time, after peace was restored and would resume their previous functions. The rallier further stated that the cadre were informed that following a ceasefire in Vietnam, they must be prepared to resume the fighting in Laos. Another Hoi Chanh who rallied on 12 September 1969, stated that since approximately April 1968, girls between the ages of 13 and 16 from Nghia Hanh (D), Quang Ngai (P) had departed for North Vietnam. They were to be educated in North Vietnamese culture and ideology and return after peace was restored. This activity reflects the enemy's continued interest in building a strong, viable, VC infrastructure as a political base from which to launch his campaign to discredit the

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government of South Vietnam and gain control of the population after a negotiated settlement. (Ref: J-2 MACV DISUM 285-69 for period 110001 to 112400 Oct 69, msg 121820Z Oct 69) (Unrated)

d. Quang Ngai.

(1) The following information was reported by a US MI source on 10 October 1969:

On 6 October, a meeting of the Female Liberation Society was held at the home of Mrs. TAM in Van Thuong (H) vicinity (BS 789442), Pho Hung (V). The meeting was held in order to familiarize those in attendance with the policies of the Female Liberation Society. Thirty (30) persons, most of whom were female, attended the meeting. Those present included:

Mrs. TUNG, Assistant Secretary of the Provincial Female Liberation Society and Chairman of the meeting

THUYEN, Chairman of the VC District Liberation Front

Mrs. SUONG, Southern Quang Ngai Provincial Troop Proselyting and Enemy Proselyting Section Chief

Mrs. DOAN, District Female Liberation Society cadre

Mrs. XUAN, District Female Liberation Society cadre

Representatives of local Female Societies consisting of 7 personnel (nfi) from Duc Pho (D) and 7 personnel (nfi) from Mo Duc (D).

Twelve female representatives of organizations and branches in Duc Pho (D) and Mo Duc (D), including:

(1) Thi TUYET, District security cadre

(2) Thi CHAU, District Troop Proselyting cadre

(3) Thi VUONG, District Population Proselyting cadre

The meeting was opened at 2030 hours on 6 October and the following subjects were discussed:

To select the executive committees of the Duc Pho and Mo Duc (D) Female Liberation Societies.

To give a mission to the females.

The following personnel were selected to be members of the Executive committees:

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Mo Duc (D) Female Liberation Society:

Thi BA, Chairman and Female Section Secretary

Thi MAI, Vice-chairman

Thi THIEN, Secretary

Thi DEN, Political Struggle

Thi HA, Troop Proselyting

Duc Pho (D) Female Liberation Society:

Tran Thi QUAN, Female Section Secret Secretary

Nguyen Thi MAI, Assistant Secret Secretary

Dang Thi XUAN, Secretary

Bach Thi HUYEN, Struggle in GVN controlled area

Thi CAI (AKA TUYET), Troop Proselyting

Thi PHUONG, In charge of Southern Duc Pho (D)

Thi DAU, Communications-liaison

Huynh Thi DAO, In charge of Teenagers Liberation (nfi)

Prior to mentioning the mission that was to be given the females, Mrs. TUNG discussed the rights which Ho Chi MINH gave to the females of South Vietnam. She appealed to the women to change the sorrow over Ho Chi MINH's death to "Liberation Activities". She then gave a mission requiring the women to:

Try to produce (nfi)

Try to give (nfi)

Establish contact with city females in order to aid the political struggle.

Try to duplicate the careers of the women who were active prior to the war (nfi).

Lead and educate the children.

In order to establish contact with females in the city to aid the political struggle, the women at the meeting were told that:

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Since the greatest concentration of women was in the markets, each one of the eight markets between Sa Huynh (H) and the Song Ve river would be assigned one Cell Leader to guide the members in propagandizing to the working class in the following areas:

The damage that the war has caused.

The dangers of the defoliant powder.

The fact that America is retreating and peace will come soon.

Women should call husbands and sons to desert and defect in order to survive the war and live during the peace.

Spread untrue rumors.

To guide females related to GVN cadres to tell those cadre about the inadequate supplies, food and shelter possessed by the inhabitants of the VC controlled areas and to appeal for their help. Once the relatives become sympathetic to the problems of the inhabitants of the VC controlled areas, they would attempt to motivate their relatives to desert or defect.

The primary goal of the women during the Winger-Spring campaign would be to develop a female anti-war movement which will aid the war effort on the diplomatic front. (Ref: Det D, 1stBn (Prov), 525th MI Gp Report Number 1/B/DX/1267/69 dtd 11 Oct 69) (Eval: F-3)

(2) The following information was reported by a US MI source on 10 October 1969:

On 8 October 1969, a VC message numbered 1109/GP/57 from the Son Tinh District Committee was being sent to all VC agencies in eastern Son Tinh and eastern Binh Son districts. The message was derived from a meeting of the Son Tinh (D) committee which was held on 4 October 1969 and contained the signature and stamp of Tung SON (nfi). The message referenced the Quang Ngai Provinicial Committee message number 1517 (nfi) and contained the following Information:

1. Purpose of the Message:

a. To reinforce all VC Task Units (nfi).

b. To develope the VC intelligence nets (nfi).

c. Develop troop, population, economic and religious proselyting missions.

d. Rebuild low level installations which had been destroyed by ARVN/US operations.

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2. Missions:

a. Task units (nfi) were responsible to establish agencies close to GVN hamlets, Outposts, Refugee Camps and Pacification areas such as Tam Son and Tam Binh. In addition, task units were responsible to disguise themselves as ARVN soldiers or GVN officials in order to assassinate or kidnap GVN high level cadre and bring fear into the GVN organizations.

b. Intelligence agencies (nfi) should motivate local residents to go to the GVN controlled area, collect information and spread rumors in order to lower the morale of the GVN troops and identify weaker GVN soldiers in order that those persons could be recruited and provide information to the VC.

c. The proselyting mission was to spread propaganda about the VC victory at the Paris Peace talks. To accomplish this task they were to use beautiful girls to go into the GVN area, motivate GVN soldiers and residents who had members of their family serving in the ARVN to defect to the VC.

d. The message urged the agencies to accomplish the tasks on a timely basis in order to prepare for the "Winter-Spring" campaign and for progress in the Paris Peace talks. (Ref: Det D, 1st MI Bn (Prov), 525th MI Gp Report Number: 1/B/DX/1269/69 dtd 10Oct69) (Eval: F-6)

(3) The following information was obtained from a debrief of a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol on 10 October 1969:

At 101435H October 1969 operating in the vicinity of (BS 440895), the LRRP found one hut 10 feet by 30 feet. The hut contained an underground shelter, fresh fruit, assorted clothing, anti-US propaganda leaflets, and leaflets printed in English encouraging US servicemen to demand the unconditional withdrawal of all US troops from Vietnam. The English language propaganda leaflets were well-written, without grammatical errors, and were on uncut sheets which might indicate the presence of a printing press in the immediate area. (Ref: CG, Americal Div msg 111008Z Oct 69)

(4) The following information was reported by a US MI source on 11 October 1969:

On 9 October, the Tu Nghia VC District Armed Force Unit, with 80 personnel, most of whom were guerrilla members, and commanded by DANH was deployed at Hung Nhuong (H) (BS 479772), Son Dong (V), Son Tinh (D). The unit had recently moved from Trung Phuoc (H) (BS 465765), they were hiding because of an operation (nfi) in the area. Some members of the unit carried husked rice, but all of the members were hungry. They looked very tired and the unit's commanding officer had to watch the personnel carefully because they appeared to want to go to the Nui Tron

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outpost (BS 517778) as returnees. They were setting up defensive positions at the above location. The unit's mission was to stop the residents in western Tu Nghia (D) from moving in to the GVN controlled area. In addition, the unit was to conduct a trial for any inhabitants who attempted to move. This new policy was to be put into effect by 10 October because it was felt that the VC would not survive unless the people remained with the VC. (Ref: Det D, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Report Number: 1/B/DX/1275/69 dtd 11 Oct 69) (Eval: F-6)

(5) A GVN source reported on 12 October 1969, that an unidentified NVA battalion, with a strength of 300 personnel, were located at Song Giang vicinity (BS 415790). Their mission is to hold political indoctrination courses in Montagnard houses. (Ref: SIA Quang Ngai msg 131240Z Oct69) (Eval: C-4)

5. TERROR. Reported acts of terrorism continued at a relatively low level. Targets of terrorist activity remained essentially unchanged from previous weeks and no change in policy or tactics was discernable.

Details of terrorist incidents in ICTZ during the past week are listed in Appendix 1.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

b. Quang Tri.

(1) A US MI source reported that on 1 October 1969, people residing in Ha Tay (H) vicinity (YD 344679), Trieu Van (V), Trieu Phong (D) have been supplying food and information to VC living in bunkers surrounding Linh An Phuong (H) vicinity (YD 381642). The relatives of these VC leave Ha Tay (H) every morning carrying rice and supplies to the VC. (Ref: CG XXIV Corps msg 111432Z Oct 69) (Eval: F-3).

(2) An agent report of 15 October 1969, revealed that at about 140400H Oct 69, six VC led by Hoang Quang NGUYEN and Hoang TIEN were located vicinity (YD 293646) and (YD 302641) Their mission was to extort money and food. Ref: CTF Clearwater msg 151515Z Oct 69) (Eval: F-3)

b. Thua Thien.

(1) A US MI source reported that on 1-3 October 1969, one VC platoon of the C-3 Company, K-4B Battalion entered Nam Pho Can (H) vicinity (YD 962049), Loc An (V), Phu Loc (D). They told the residents that all who cultivated over 150 square yards of field must sell 600 kilograms of rice to the VC and all who cultivated from 75 to 150 square yards of field must sell at least 300 kilograms of rice. The VC informed the residents that they would return for the rice between 3 and 20 October 1969.

The following members of the C-3 company were identified: Dao CAP, village unit chief of the hamlet guerrillas, Troung thi My CHAU,

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hamlet secretary, Huyen Ngoc TAN, platoon leader of the KT platoon (nfi), Nguyen TE, chairman of the village administrative section of Nam Pho Can (V), Nguyen thi SAO, Nguyen CAN, Nguyen THIET, Ho THANG and Ho THIEN (nfi). (Ref: 204th MID, AVII-MI, Report Number: XXIV-283-2-69) (Eval: F-6).

(2) A US MI source reported that on 13 October 1969, five VC entered Phu O (H) vicinity (YD 690249), Huong Chu (V), Huong Tra (D) and forced the villagers to feed them. The villagers report that the VC were starving but took no food when they left. (Ref: CG XXIV Corps msg 141432Z Oct 69) (Uneval).

(3) On 13 October 1969, a US MI source reported that on 11 October personnel of the C.113 Company moved to vicinity of (YD 533303) and (YD 460257) to support a VC rice transportation operation in Phong Diem District. For the transportation mission a labor group had been brought to the above two locations. The group consisted of 42 persons, most of whom were women, who had been impressed into the labor group and brought to the two locations by VC cadre of Phong Dien District. The laborers were drawn from the villages of Thuong Hoa (CNA), Dong Lam (YD 565312) and Pho Ninh (YD 607294). Phong Dien (D). The labor group arrived at the above areas on 10 October 1969.

Two of the VC cadre were Hoang DA and Duong AU. Hoang DA informed the labor group that they were about to begin a rice transportation mission which would last four days and that they must cooperate or they would not be released after the mission was completed. Approximately 2500 kilograms of rice had been concentrated at vicinities (YD 533303) and (YD 550278) to be transported to U/I locations in the Tri-Thien border area at some time in the near future. The rice had been collected and purchased in the hamlets of Lam Dong and Phong An (CNA) during the last harvest (nfi). (Ref: Det B, 1stBn (Prov), 525th MI Gp msg 141055Z Oct 69) (Eval: C-3) (III MAF SCI Comment: Lam Dong (CNA), described above as a hamlet is not listed in current HES dated 30 Sep 69. Lam Dong is probably Dong Lam (H). Phong An is a village, vice hamlet, in which Dong Lam (H) (YD 565312) is located).

c. Quang Nam.

(1) A Hoi Chanh, who rallied on 7 October 1969 at Hieu Duc (D) Headquarters, stated that the enemy's main activity now is purchasing food in government controlled areas. A number of finance cadre were sent to the villages in the delta areas to coordinate with village finance sections. One ANG of rice, approx 8 kilograms, cost 600$VN. The enemy is using counterfeit 500 piaster bills from North Vietnam. (Ref: SIA Quang Nam msg 010800Z Oct 69) (Unrated).

(2) A GVN source reported on 8 October 1969, that Nguyen van SON, secretary of the VC Hoa Phung Liberation Front Committee, organized and controls the following VC females in their functions as commo-liaison and Finance cadre:

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Thai thi TUYET, 27 years old, is a VC Team Leader (nfi) in Binh Ky Resettlement area. Under her direct control are the following three VC females:

Tran thi NEN, daughter of Tran DUONG, is 26 years old and lives in Binh Ky Resettlement area.

Doan thi CAN, 29 years old, daughter of Doan De, lives in Binh Ky Resettlement area.

Doan thi NGA, 25 years old, daughter of Doan TU, lives in Binh Ky Resettlement area.

The three mentioned VC females furnish information and tax revenues to Thai thi TUYET who inturn delivers the information and/or money to Nguyen van SON. The operational area of this VC female cell is from Binh Ky vicinity (BT 055658) north to District 3, Danang City, and from Binh Ky southeast to Ngan Cau (3) (H) vicinity (BT 060678). (Ref: OSI DET 5003, Danang Airbase, DRAFT DDIIR 10-17) (Eval: F-3)

(3) A US MI source reported that at or about 092400H October 1969, six VC dressed in shorts (nfi) and armed with two pistols, four AK-50's/AK-47's, two blocks of explosives and grenades passed through An Thuong Inter Block vicinity (BT 048758) and moved to the vicinity of An Vinh Inter Block vicinity (BT 044770). Another US MI source reported that at or about 092300H October 1969, four VC sappers armed with four AK type weasons presented themselves at the Nam Tho Refugee Camp vicinity (BT 064813). Their reported intentions are to establish VCI in this area. Since some of the inhabitants at the refugee camp have relatives in the VC they were induced to provide provisions and to assist the VC in the collection of supplies. (Ref: FCZIO msg 100935Z Oct 69) (FCZIO Comment: The information concerning the presence of VC in the above areas is considered possibly true, however it is considered unlikely that they would be armed with AK-47's or similar weapons which would be somewhat conspicuous. Information concerning AK-47's Eval F-4; all else, F-3).

(4) A US MI source reported that as of 10 October 1969, two companies of the Q82 LF Battalion, with a combined strength of about 150 men were dispersed at Ha Nong Tay (2) vicinity (BT 005597), Dong Lien vicinity (BT 012600), and Tay Bang An vicinity (BT 025590), Dien Ban(D). The mission of the unit was to block Allied operations during rice gathering missions in the deployment area, attack outposts at Bang An (3) vicinity (BT 043593), and Phong Nhi vicinity (BT 045605), and to design a plan of destroying the Vinh Dien Bridge vicinity (BT 055588). (Ref: CO, Det C, 1stBn (Prov), 525th MI Gp, Report #1/A/AX/0546/69) (Eval: C-3).

(5) On 10 October 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division operating vicinity (AT 995607) removed a document from an enemy KIA. The document revealed the following information:

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Record, undated, prepared by an unspecified cadre of A56 (Dien An Village) ((VC name)), Dien Ban District, Quang Da Special Zone, Military Region 5), reveals that up to 15 October 1969, the guerrilla forces of A56 had to: (1) Complete the preparations for attacks on the RVN pacification teams in Dong Mieu, Dong Ngo, and Phong Nhi areas (possibly vicinity BT 044606); (2) Kill the local RVN administrative personnel, especially Xa and Nghinh; (3) carry out intensive raids coupled with attacks by mines on Route 1 and the route newly built by the ROK troops; (4) launch continual attacks with catapult launchers on enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) military installations in the local area; and (5) check the mines planted previously to insure that they are servicable.

Party Chapter 1 was to plant mines (on the route) from the railroad to Cau Kien (Bridge) (possibly vicinity BT 002680), 100 meters from the end of the bridge on the route to Dg Lien (possibly Dong Lien (H), vicinity BT 015603); Party Chapter 5 was to plant mines from the elementary school (nfi) to Ha Lien (H).

The document further listed guidelines to be used by A56 in farm production and tax collection. (Ref: CDEC Doc Log #10-1687-69) (Eval: B-3)

(6) A US MI source reported that as of 10 October 1969, a force of 80 men from the Q83 LF Battalion was dispersed vicinity Dai An (AT 890604), Dai Loc (D). A second force of approximately 80 men from the Q83 LF Battalion was dispersed to the south at My Phu (AT 870550) (nfi). The Q83 LF Battalion has been instructed by the Province Committee to combine with and support guerrillas in all villages. The combined force is to persuade the populace in GVN controlled villages to contribute to the famine rescue plan, which is a fund and food raising drive to aid people in the liberation areas who have been displaced from their homes because of American exploitation and destruction (nfi). The Q83 LF Battalion has also been instructed to achieve their normal monthly quota of food and money (nfi). (Ref: CO, Det C, 1stBn,(Prov), 525th MI Gp Report # 1/A/AX/0551/69) (Eval: C-3)

(7) On 11 August 1969, elements of the 4th Battalion, 51st Infantry Regiment, operating vicinity (AT 977570) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Directive, number 69/VP, dated 20 June 1969, signed by LE NGOAN, Chief, Civil Health Section, Quang Da Province, addressed to Duy Xuyen, Dien Ban and Dai Loc Districts, Areas 1 through 3, (possibly of K51OB (possibly an element, Civil Health Section, Quang Da Province Party Committee), directed addressees to perform the following civil health missions in both friendly (VC) and enemy (RVN) controlled areas in an attempt to hold the people. To successfully perform these missions, addressees were to pay attention to: (1) Recruitment of a large number of public health personnel to create hatred against the enemy among the people, and conduct political struggles; (2) launching of propaganda activities on preventive medicine everywhere; (3) giving prompt medical care to the people, urging them to create medicine chests; disseminate information on the use of oriental medicines; and (4) the receiving of anti-epidemic medicine from province for treatment of emergency cases. Handwritten annotation of the document reveals that this directive was addressed to K530 (Area 3, Hoa Vang(D)). (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-5217-69) (Eval: B-3)

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d. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 6 October 1969, a US MI source reported that on 29 September, the VC conducted a rice collection mission at Lang Vuc (H) (BS 340700), Ha Long (V), Son Ha (D). The local inhabitants of the hamlet were required to provide 60 laborers. Dinh DUONG, VC District cadre, Thi PHU and Thi NGO, VC village female cadre were in charge of the mission. The 60 personnel were divided into three cells to collect the rice as cultural tax, security tax, and troop supply tax. The rice was to be carried to a cache (nfi) for safekeeping. The farmers were also ordered to hide their rice so that it would not be destroyed by US or ARVN operations. The group was to collect all of the rice of persons who lived in the GVN controlled area, but farmed in the contested area, and promised to return the rice only if the persons returned to the contested area. (Ref: Det D, 1stBn (Prov), 525th MI Gp Report Number 1/B/BX/1249/69 dtd 7Oct69) (Eval: C-6).

(2) On 6 October 1969, a US MI source stated that the Son Ha VC District Committee planned to collect rice at Ly Lang (H) vicinity (BS 380610), Ha Trung (V) on 28 September 1969. The plan consisted of the following items:

(a) The district was divided into sub-zones, each under the supervision of District cadre who would select guerrillas from village units.

(b) The area between Ly Lang (H), Thi Dum (H) (BS 400644), Co Da (H) (BS 395600), and Ka Hok (H) (BS 360623), was assigned to Truong GIAP, Dinh MIENG and THACH who were VC district cadre and each had a guerrilla platoon to provide security and collect rice.

(c) The VC cadre were to go to the hamlets and villages and hold meeting and motivate the local inhabitants to give rice. A list of all inhabitants would be made and each person's house searched to determine the amount of rice they had. Half of the guerrilla platoon was to be used to collect rice and provide security while the remainder built caches to protect the rice. If a sufficient amount of rice was not given, the rice was to be taken from the residents.

(d) The VC were to divide the harvest of farmers who lived in the GVN controlled area, but farmed in the contested area, into two parts. The VC would take one-half and the farmer the other. The VC were to tell the farmers that they had protected his rice field and that one-half of his harvest was payment for this protection. (Ref: Det D, 1stBn (Prov), 525th MI Gp Report Number: 1244/69 dtd 6 Oct 69) (Eval: C-6)

(3) A GVN source reported that during the month of October a number of youngsters, ages 10 to 15, living at Nghi Hanh (D) usually go to Quang Ngai city for the bread sale. Later, they go to restaurants to purchase empty cans such as: Coke, beer, etc., and carry the cans to the VC controlled area. If questioned by GVN authorities the youths allege

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the cans are for resale to tinsmiths for use in making lamps. Upon entering Nghia Khuong (V) they would go directly to the An-Dinh area and resell the cans to the VC. The cans are alleged to be used in the manufactor of mines and grenades. (Ref: FIR dtd 7Oct69, Viet Report Number 658/TB/TRINH SAT) (Eval: Unrated).

APPENDIX

1 - Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 42-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Tri	130ct69	(YD 317699)	An unknown type time bomb exploded in the house-office of the Gio Hai village chief, destroying one room and two radios. There were negative casualties.
Quang Nam	30ct69 (Late Entry)	(AT 924578)	The VC blew up (nfi) Mr. Nguyen Tung's house, killing one civilian.
	70ct69 (Late Entry)	(BT 126430)	VC entered Thach Khe (H) and killed a civilian, (nfi).
	120ct69	(BT 081635)	A civilian truck detonated a mine (nfi) eight kilometers NNW of Bien Dan (D) town, killing one civilian and wounding three.
	120ct69	Danang City	At 1940 hours, an unknown terrorist threw a grenade into a restaurant at Number 121, Phan Chu Trinh Street, wounding five civilians.
	120ct69	Danang City	At approximately 2345 hours, a grenade (nfi) exploded in front of a house at 191 Phan Chau Trinh Street, resulting in four civilians wounded.
	140ct69	(BT 144552)	Vietnamese civilians, while helping in the construction of an RF outpost on Xuyen Long Island, detonated a VC booby trapped 81mm mortar round, killing two civilians, wounding seven.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	15Oct69	(AT 933817)	At approximately 1645 hours, two (2) Viet Cong entered the house of Pham DO, located in Xom Con (SH), Xuan Thieu (H), Hoa Hiep (V). Pham DO was a member of the Regional Force Company 1/324, Quang Nam Sector, who had been on leave at his residence since 13 October 1969. The VC directed DO to accompany them. DO attempted to escape out the front of the house. The VC recaptured DO, shot him to death, and departed in a northerly direction.
	16Oct69	(AT 923578)	One Vietnamese civilian detonated a plastic mine, at Giao Dong (1) (H) approximately 500 meters SE of Dai Loc (D) headquarters, resulting in one civilian wounded.
Quang Tin	10ct69 (Late Entry)	(BT 151399)	A civilian (nfi) was kidnapped by the VC while returning home from a rice field (nfi).
	80ct69 (Late Entry)	(BT 410020)	VC entered Trung Luong (H) and kidnapped a civilian (nfi).
	80ct69 (Late Entry)	(BT 235175)	Three RD cadre and one deputy hamlet chief were wounded by the VC (nfi).
	15Oct69	(BT 308227)	A CORDS compound at Tam Ky received three rounds of B-40 rocket fire, killing one VN civilian guard and wounding two others.
Quang Ngai	90ct69 (Late Entry)	(BS 760820)	VC clashed with the 46th and 50th PF platoons at Son My (V), resulting in two civilians wounded, one civilian abducted, and two homes destroyed.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Ngai	90ct69 (Late Entry)	(BS 743810)	VC attacked vicinity of CAP 1-4-4 position nine kilometers northeast of Quang Ngai City, resulting in one civilian kidnapped and three wounded.
	110ct69 (Late Entry)	(BS 618879)	Eight to twelve VC destroyed village chief's house with two satchel charges. There were no casualties.
	110ct69 (Late Entry)	(BT 621017)	CAP 1-3-4A received SAF and 10-15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, wounding one civilian.
	130ct69	(BS 605897)	VC entered Binh Hoi (H) and abducted Mr. Pham Vo, 17 years old (nfi).
	140ct69	(BS 807366)	VC entered An Thuong (H), blew up Mr. Cao Van Duong's house, killed his son and wounded his wife.
	140ct69	(BS 723797)	While in the process of dusting off (nfi) three Vietnamese civilians, CAP 1-3-5 detonated a mine resulting in two civilians wounded.
	170ct69	(BS 716716)	An estimated VC squad infiltrated into Hoi An Village and burned 15 houses. There were no casualties.

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ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 42-69

1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY.

a. On 17 October Recon Team Isthmus from the 3d Force Recon Company located a 100 bunker complex in the vicinity of YD 140752. A search of the area located one RPG round and 10X20 pound antitank mines. On 18 October 3d Force Recon Company Recon Team Eversharp found 15 bunkers located at YD 067699. An artillery fire mission was called and resulted in three secondary explosions. Also on 18 October Recon Team Eversharp had contact with approximately 25-30 NVA/VC. Air strikes were called with unknown results and negative friendly casualties.

b. On 18 October Recon Team Rummage from the 1st Recon Battalion observed 150 enemy in the vicinity of AT 985516. Artillery was called. Subsequently, a check of the area by the Recon Team resulted in a 105mm artillery round rigged as a surprise firing device being detonated. Four Marines and one Navy corpsman were WIA. Recon Team Wedding Ring from the 1st Recon Battalion was attacked by an unknown size enemy force on 19 October in the vicinity of ZC 201580 by small arms fire and hand grenades. One NVA was KIA and two Marines were WIA.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY.

a. In the U.S. DMZ area 29 targets were detected by sensors. This is a decrease of 39 targets from the previous reporting period. Nine fire missions were conducted in response to these targets consisting of 60 rounds of 175mm and 18 rounds of eight inch ammunition. BDA was unobserved. In the U.S. Duel Blade area 135 targets were detected. This is a decrease of 62 targets from the previous reporting period. Forty fire missions were conducted in response to these targets consisting of 809 rounds 175mm, 205 rounds of 155mm, and 119 rounds of 105mm ammunition. BDA was unobserved except for six confirmed NVA KIA in the vicinity of XD 985632 on 12 October 1969. The most active sensors were located at XD 809420, XD 917670, and XD 656538.

b. Sensor detected activity in the 1st Marine Division remained at a low level for the reporting period. No targets were detected by RF sensors and line sensors detected eight targets which were reacted to by nine fire missions. BDA was unobserved.

c. Americal Division sensors detected a total of 14 targets for the reporting period. Ten fire missions were conducted with negative BDA.

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ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO III MAF PERINTREP 42-69

A. REGISTERED MAIL

DIR, NSA	3
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1
CMC (ABQ)	2
CG FMFPAC	2
CG USARV	1
CG I FFORCEV	5
CG II FFORCEV	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CG MCDEC	1
CG 5TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CALIF	6
CG 4TH MARIDV, CAMPEN, CALIF	1
CG 3RD MAW	2
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2
CO "B" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	5
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1
CO MCB 3	1
CO MCB 6	1
CO MCB 7	1
CO MCB 8	1
CO MCB 9	1
CO MCB 10	1
CO MCB 11	1
CO MCB 53	1
CO MCB 58	1
CO MCB 62	1
CO MCB 71	1
CO MCB 133	1
CO USS REPOSE	1
CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO MHTG-30, MCAF, SANTA ANA, CALIF, 92709	1
DSA II CORPS	1
CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP, 7TH FLEET	1
CMDR, 19TH CI TEAM, CAMPEN, CALIF	1
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CTF 76	1
CO USASSD, ACSI DA ATTN: DOD SPECREP, MACV, APO SF, CAL 96222	1

B. BY COURIER

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232) (CIIED)	2
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2
CICV	2
CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	10
CG 1ST MARDIV	40
CG 3RD MARDIV	26
CG AMERICAL DIV	30
CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM)	20
CG 1ST MAW	30
CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7
CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CG USASUPCOM DNG	1
CG 173RD ABN BDE	2
CG FORLOGCMD DNG	5
CG 1ST LOGCMD LBN	2
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GROUP CHL	3
CO 30 NCR	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	17
CO 1ST CAG	1
CO 3RD CAG	1
CO 4TH CAG	1
CO 1ST BN, 525TH MI DET	25
CO 517TH MI DET	1
CO MCB 40	1
CO MCB 121	1
CO 4TH PSYOP GROUP	1
DSA I CORPS	11
CMDR, 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SGN	3
COMNAVFORV	1
COMNAVSUPACT DNG	2
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2
OSA/EMB SAIGON	1
DET B, 1ST MIBARS	1
CIB	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTG 79.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 76.4	1
7TH AIR FORCE (IGS) BDOC	1

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45TH ENGR GROUP	1
620TH TCS, APO 96203	1
366TH AIR SEC SQD, USAF	2
620TH TSC	1
SPO-SEC CMD QHN	1

C. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (WITHIN HQ, III MAF)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP C/S PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	42
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (C/O G-3)	2
2D BDE ROKMC LIAISON OFFICER	1
PSYOPS	2
1ST RADIO BN	11
HORN DASC	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1

D. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

CO 1ST MP BN DNG	1
CO 3RD MP BN DNG	1
CO 2ND CAG	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
HQ 212TH CMBT AVN BN	6
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
CTG 115.1	1
CCN	1
US NAD	1
DIR, CAP	1
7TH PSYOP BN	1
1ST FORCE RECON COMPANY	1

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HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

JCS CONTROL NUMBER | COPY NO. 2

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			NAVY FILE NUMBER				DATE					

ROUTING - *Use numbers to show order of routing*

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B-FOR COMPLIANCE
C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF _____
D-FOR COMMENT
E-FOR RECOMMENDATION
F-FOR CONCURRENCE
G-FOR INFORMATION
H-RETURN TO _____
I- _____
J-DISPOSITION _____

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
					COMMANDANT
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
1	G	11/5	11/26	KM	G-3 By PR
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY/LEGAL
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
					JOINT CONTROL
					COUNSEL
					WOMEN MARINES
					STAFF DENTAL
					STAFF MEDICAL
					STAFF CHAPLAIN
					CLASSIFIED FILES

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(AGENCY HAVING PRIMARY INTEREST COMPLETE)

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PIR 43-69
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28 October 1969



UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 43-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

NORTH VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
Quang Tri
QUANG TRI
HUE
THUA THIEN
SOUTH CHINA SEA
DA NANG
CU LAC CHAM
Hoi An
LAOS
QUANG NAM
Song Thu Bon
Tam Ky
QUANG TIN
CU LAC RE
Quang Ngai
QUANG NGAI
1
9
5
B
15
0 25 50 Miles
0 25 50 Kilometers
II CORPS

GROUP - 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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HQ III MAF, G-2
DANANG, RVN
28 October 1969
Ser: 0121569

PERINTREP 43-69

Period covered: 190001H - 252400H October 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13
ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. During the past week, the various indicators of enemy initiated activity registered decreases after the modest increases which had been recorded the previous week. The number of enemy initiated ground incidents declined from 238 to 218 with little change in the pattern of attacks except for enemy ambushes which dropped from four to zero. At the same time, the number of incoming rounds fell by 247 from 580 to 333, the lowest number since the week of 3-9 August. Meanwhile, the number of enemy KIA's reversed the weekly trend by rising by 83 to a new total of 522, up from 439. The trend in Hoi Chanhs also maintained itself, rising somewhat from last week to a new total of 233, up 11 from 222.

Counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities during the past week reflected no discernible change in tactics, policy, or intensity and was consistent with the enemy's "three-pronged attack" policy featuring concerted political and proselyting efforts coupled with economy of force military tactics.

Pursuant to the ultimate goal of unification of North and South VIETNAM under the direction and control of North VIETNAM's LAO DONG party, intermediate enemy objectives continue as follows:

(1) To perpetrate, through propaganda exploitations of every available means, the accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops from South VIETNAM.

(2) To undermine, intimidate, and discredit the GVN, particularly at the hamlet, village, and district levels.

(3) To disrupt and/or destroy the GVN pacification effort.

(4) To continue to strengthen and expand the revolutionary organizational cadre and forces.

(5) To intensify political struggle efforts leading to the formation of a coalition government and possible eventual communist control.

a. QUANG TRI (P). In QUANG TRI Province, contact with the enemy was light and scattered except for brief surges of enemy initiated activity which occurred on the 21st and 22d when the enemy mounted three sizeable attacks by fire and a ground attack in the central DMZ area. Two of the

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attacks by fire and the ground attack were directed against elements of the 1-11th Mechanized Infantry and B/1-77th Armor conducting operations west southwest of CON THIEN.

The first in this series of actions occurred on the morning of the 21st when the enemy, possibly elements of the 27th NVA Regiment, directed 43 rounds of mixed 60 and 82mm mortar fire against B/1-11th Mechanized Infantry conducting a search and clear operation seven kilometers west southwest of CON THIEN (YD 050681). Countermortar was fired with unknown results.

Later in the day, about mid-afternoon, B/1-77th Armor was attacked by an unknown size enemy force about two kilometers east of the morning's contact (YD 075680) while the tank unit was returning to its base at CON THIEN. The enemy, employing small arms and RPG fire, broke contact after meeting effective counteraction. Three of the enemy were killed.

On the morning of the following day, A/1-11th Mechanized Infantry along with B/1-77th Armor returned to sweep the area of the previous afternoon's contact. In so doing, this friendly force again came under enemy attack, this time with 40-50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire causing light friendly casualties.

That afternoon, the enemy launched another mortar attack farther to the west. This time, the enemy, probably elements of the 246th NVA Regiment, engaged D/2-502d Infantry about eight kilometers northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 925627) with 32 rounds of 82mm mortar fire.

The only reported mining incident for the period occurred on the 24th when an APC from A/3-5 Infantry detonated an unknown type mine two kilometers northwest of CAM LO (YD 115609) causing minor injuries to the personnel but disabling the vehicle. Later the same day, an OH-6A helicopter on a visual reconnaissance mission received small arms fire in the vicinity of CAM LO (YD 055641) and crashed.

Despite the fact that these three attacks were sharp and aggressive, the absence of follow-up actions by the enemy suggest that they were designed to be harassing in nature rather than ones in which decisive action was sought. This posture of the enemy was also reflected in the balance of enemy initiated activity during the week which was light and scattered.

In addition to this enemy activity, PW interrogations this past week produced the identification of the 12th Sapper Company, 31st Group as the enemy unit which was involved in the contact which occurred on the 13th nine kilometers northwest of DONG HA. This makes four PW's from the 31st Group which have been captured during the past month in the area of CAM LO-CON THIEN-ROUTE 9. Three prisoners identified the 27th Battalion and provided indications that elements of the 31st Group not only are operating south of the DMZ but also possibly south of Route 9 as well.

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b. THUA THIEN (P). Activity in THUA THIEN Province continued to remain relatively quiet. The enemy again attempted to mine the railroad between DANANG and HUE with three 55 pound TNT mines. However, on the 20th, an ARVN security train discovered the mines nine kilometers west northwest of PHU LOC before they could do any damage.

The most significant activity of the week occurred on the morning of the 25th when the 2d Company of 1/54 ARVN while on a search and clear operation engaged an estimated enemy platoon about 14 kilometers south southwest of PHU BAI (YD 854007) resulting in 10 enemy killed and six weapons captured with no friendly casualties. A similar size action also took place earlier in the week on the 20th when 4/3 ARVN made contact with another estimated enemy platoon, probably a local force unit, 15 kilometers west southwest of HUE (YD 617174). In this contact, the enemy lost seven killed with six weapons and a small assortment of ordnance items captured.

At the same time, other friendly operations uncovered almost 1,800 pounds of rice and produced two successful ambushes which resulted in 13 enemy killed and 11 weapons captured with no friendly casualties.

Lastly, three VC returnees who rallied on the 22d between HUE and PHU BAI (YD 856174) provided information which, if true, may reflect that the VC is having some difficulty maintaining itself in the lowlands of THUA THIEN. Two of the returnees stated that they were the last VC in their village while the other indicated that only three remained in his.

c. QUANG NAM (P). In QUANG NAM Province, the number of noteworthy contacts with the enemy increased during the past week. However, with the exception of two attacks by fire and one relatively small enemy initiated ground attack, engagements were small unit actions and supporting arms missions generated by normal friendly reconnaissance and surveillance efforts.

The most significant enemy initiated activity during the week took the form of an attack by fire during the early morning hours of the 21st when the enemy directed thirteen 82mm mortar rounds against the MARBLE Mountain Air Facility. Forewarned of the attack by an agent report, there were no personnel casualties. However, six helicopters and some facilities received varying degrees of damage. Earlier the same night, the 10th Company of the 2d ROKMC Brigade received three 122mm rockets six kilometers east southeast of HOI AN (BT 203490) causing a number of friendly casualties and some materiel damage, starting a fire in the company ammunition dump.

The enemy initiated ground attack occurred on the night of the 21st when an unknown size force, possibly the Q-82 Local Force Company, delivered small arms fire against K/3/1 Marines three kilometers south southwest of HILL 55 (AT 956588). When confronted with effective counteraction, the enemy withdrew dragging away six enemy who had been killed by artillery fire.

In addition to these relatively few enemy initiated actions, observations of enemy movement increased noticeably during the past week but still remained well below the norm of recent months.

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At the same time, 14 varying types of friendly initiated actions produced some 76 enemy killed while friendly informants lead to the discovery, on the 22d, of 3,500 pounds of rice by a patrol from I/3/1 Marines 10 kilometers southwest of DANANG (AT 957693). In addition, I/3/7 Marines, three days later on the 25th, discovered another 2,400 pounds of rice in a cache about seven kilometers southwest of QUE SON (AT 975306).

While the tempo of activity quickened in QUANG NAM Province, prisoner of war interrogations continue to reflect the emphasis the enemy is placing on rice missions including in at least some instances, staff and specialist personnel. The most significant PW interrogation of the past week however, developed from the capture of another prisoner from the 2d Battalion, 141st Regiment who has added further information of a possible westward displacement of the main body of the 141st. The PW, a rifleman, who was captured on the 19th, stated that 20 men from the 2d Battalion and an unknown number from the other battalions had been left behind to reinforce bunkers, build new tunnels and collect rice in preparation for the return of the 141st Regiment in the Spring of 1970. This PW provides confirmation to early PW reports indicating that the 141st and possibly elements of the 31st Regiment and the 575th Artillery Battalion have left their normal AO's for training, rest and reorientation.

d. QUANG TIN (P). Enemy initiated activity in QUANG TIN Province was limited to a single contact and scattered mixed mortar fire of some 36 rounds. The ground action took place on the 21st while C/3-21st Infantry was on a reconnaissance-in-force operation five kilometers southeast of QUE SON (BT 090327). They were engaged by an unknown size enemy force who broke contact when confronted with effective counteraction. Five enemy were killed.

Friendly operations produced only one contact of note. This occurred on the 25th when 1/5 ARVN engaged an unknown size enemy force, probably from local force units, 72d and/or 76th Sapper Local Force Battalions, about 10 kilometers southwest of TAM KY (BT 237163). Five of the enemy were killed with no friendly casualties.

In addition to this activity, A/2-1st Infantry on the 23d found approximately 1,800 pounds of unpolished rice about 10 kilometers west northwest of TAM KY (BT 204239).

The recent surge of Hoi Chanhs sustained itself during the last week with 97 additional personnel rallying, in contrast with 113 for the previous week, with 76 of those doing so coming again from THANG BINH District.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). The enemy continued to harass the pacification effort in the province but in a somewhat lower key than the previous week. While he conducted no major ground attacks against pacification security elements, the enemy did harass them with several attacks by fire on the 22d and several light ground attacks on the 25th.

The attacks by fire occurred on opposite ends of the province during the early morning hours of the 22d when the enemy directed five rounds of mixed 60 and 82mm mortar fire against the 98th RD Team 10 kilometers southeast of DUC PHO (BS 883312) and another 20 rounds of 60mm mortar

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fire against the 61st RF Platoon about 13 kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 751816).

The ground attacks consisted of a notable sapper attack occurring in the early morning of the 19th when a CAP 1-3-8 Platoon had returned to the night defensive position two and one-half kilometers west of BINH SON (BS 574923) and another platoon was preparing to leave, when an unknown size enemy force launched a surprise attack employing satchel charges, RPG's bangalore torpedoes and hand grenades. The defensive position was penetrated in the initial attack preventing artillery support due to the intermingling of friendly and enemy troops. Contact broke and the enemy withdrew to the east. A/5-46th Infantry arrived by helicopter and received small arms fire as they landed. "A" Company returned fire and the enemy fled to the west. Total friendly casualties were light with five enemy killed. Two other ground attacks occurred on the morning of the 25th about 10 kilometers south of BINH SON (BS 598821 and BS 600834). One contact involved the 54th PF Platoon and the other a platoon from 1-52d Infantry engaged in pacification operations. The enemy lost 10 killed and nine weapons captured in these two incidents.

Friendly operations produced three widely scattered actions which resulted in 18 enemy killed. Of particular significance during the past week was the fact that both U.S. and ARVN forces uncovered about nine tons of rice. On the 25th, a platoon from 4/4 ARVN and C/5/46th Infantry found over six tons in two separate locations in the QUANG NGAI City area (BS 465701) and (BS 672794) while earlier in the week on the 21st, B/1-20th Infantry located another two and one-half tons in a tunnel complex about seven kilometers north of DUC PHO (BS 797454).

Lastly in QUANG NGAI Province, a prisoner from the 406th Sapper Battalion stated that the cadre of the battalion recently made a liaison visit to the headquarters of Military Region 5 where they were briefed on future operational missions, among them an attack on LZ STINSON (BS 540823) on an unspecified date. In the meantime, the battalion itself is engaged in collecting rice and practicing sapper attacks. In addition, a VC returnee from the H-16 Engineer unit of the QUANG NGAI Provincial Unit indicated that seven members of his unit were attending a water sapper training course being conducted by an instructor from MR-5. When this training is completed, these personnel are to be targetted against the bridges along Highway 1 between TU NGHIA District (BS 6668) and MO DUC (BS 7154).

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. The enemy's efforts continue to be principally harassing attacks against both regular combat formations and pacification security elements. However, these attacks appear to be low key, designed possibly to make his continued presence known while he prepares for future operations. For the most part, there are indications that a number of major elements are moving deeper into the mountains for training, rest and reorientation. This is not unusual for this time of the year; however, it should be noted that the distances involved in such possible moves are relatively small, and it is within the capability of the enemy to return to the main battle arena rapidly with little or no notice. Until such time as the enemy elects to resume a greater degree of activity than we are presently seeing, it can be expected that the enemy will continue with varying degrees of intensity attacks by fire, limited ground attacks against friendly forces and installations with particular emphasis on attacks on pacification security elements, acts of terrorism, and interdiction of lines of communication.

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2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents decreased from 238 to 218 for the week of 19-25 October. These incidents consisted of four ground attacks (two of which were company size or larger and two platoon size or smaller) no ambushes, five attacks by fire, 123 harassing fire incidents, 54 mining and booby trap incidents, five hamlet harassment incidents, two assassination incidents, two espionage incidents, five kidnapping incidents, 14 propaganda incidents, and four sabotage incidents.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire increased from 98 to 114 incidents for the reporting period and 12 aircraft sustained hits.

i. Negative

j. Results of MACV Base Area Study of 1 October 1969. The following is the MACV current inventory of enemy base areas and their accepted locations. The major changes to the VC/NVA base areas according to MACV Base Area Study of 1 October are:

(1) ICTZ

(a) Base Area 117 was reconfigured to reflect changes in enemy activity as follows: BT 170140, BT 260140, BT 300100, BS 180990, BT 100020.

(b) Base Area 124 was reactivated and enlarged due to a significant increase in enemy activity as follows: BS 720360, BS 790320, BS 790230, BS 710290.

(c) Two new base areas, 126 and 127 were added to the inventory to reflect increased in enemy activity as follows: Base Area 126 - YC 820280, YC 940280, YC 940110, YC 820110; Base Area 127 - ZC 080670, ZC 200680, ZC 200610, ZC 170570, ZC 070570.

(2) Out of Country

(a) Base Areas 604 and 611 were reconfigured to reflect changes in enemy activity as follows: Base Area 604 - XD 200630, XD 300630, XD 380570, XD 380370, XD 180370, XD 060430; Base Area 611 - XD 625240, XD 540222, XD 600000, XC 690950, YC 310900, YD 310000, YD 250060, XD 000040, XD 710085.

(b) Base Area 610 was deleted from the inventory; however, the area previously enclosed in this base area was added to Base Area 611.

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k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 19-25 October:

Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	151
60mm Mortar	67
Unk Cal Mortar	106
140mm Rocket	1
122mm Rocket	6
Unk Cal Rocket	2
TOTAL	333

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance

(1) There were 69 long-range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 19-25 October. These long-range patrols reported 44 sightings and 18 contacts totaling 651 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of 36 enemy KIA.

(2) Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant enemy caches were captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 19-25 October 1969:

(a) 21 October: B/1-20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade captured a rice cache seven and one-half kilometers north of DUC PHO (BS 797454) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
5,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was located in open terrain and was stored in plastic sacks in a tunnel complex under a hut. The rice was distributed to the NUI OG DO New Life Hamlet.

(b) 25 October: I/3/7 Marines found a cache seven and one-half kilometers southwest of QUE SON (AT 975306) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
2,400 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was stored in three boxes and one 55 gallon drum. There was no further information available on this cache.

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(c) 25 October: C/5-46th Infantry found a cache seven kilometers north northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 672794) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
12,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was located while searching some huts and was stored in baskets and 55 gallon drums. The rice was evacuated to BINH SON for distribution to refugees.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 12-18 October.

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
82mm Mortar	83
81mm Mortar	8
60mm Mortar	195
155mm Artillery	4
105mm Artillery	68
107mm Rocket	7
106mm RR	11
90mm RR	15
57mm RR	3
TOTAL	394

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	133
Crew-Served Weapons	13

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 19-25 October.

Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
20 Oct	(AT 923501)	800	M/3/5
20 Oct	(AT 993331)	800	L/3/7
20 Oct	(YD 924208)	1,000	A/1/327
20 Oct	(YD 932181)	50	A/1/327
20 Oct	(YD 611330)	20	D/3/187
20 Oct	(YD 530450)	2,000	C/3/187
20 Oct	(YD 570411)	200	RCN/3/184
21 Oct	(BS 590782)	11,200	C/1/52
21 Oct	(BS 797450)	500	B/1/20
21 Oct	(AT 983336)	800	L/3/7
21 Oct	(AT 836490)	200	H&S/1/5

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Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
21 Oct	(YD 525432)	1,760	185 RF Co
21 Oct	(BT 063464)	1,100	1/51
22 Oct	(AT 987318)	50	L/3/7
22 Oct	(AT 951630)	3,000	I/3/1
22 Oct	(AT 896395)	1,000	H/2/7
22 Oct	(BS 445267)	100	C/5th SFGA
22 Oct	(YD 525430)	660	C/3/187
22 Oct	(YD 162712)	15	D/1/11
23 Oct	(AT 935713)	20	CAP 2-1-3
23 Oct	(BT 204239)	1,800	A/2/1
23 Oct	(BS 487747)	100	B/3/1
23 Oct	(BS 713804)	50	A/1/1
23 Oct	(BS 713804)	25 Food	A/1/1
23 Oct	(BS 700815)	400	A/1/1
23 Oct	(BT 035395)	150	K/3/7
23 Oct	(AT 935517)	500	K/3/5
23 Oct	(BT 159485)	150	RCN/1st MARDIV
23 Oct	(YD 340419)	110	1/1
24 Oct	(AT 975692)	200	L/3/7
24 Oct	(BS 482896)	50	RCN/1/6
24 Oct	(BS 615436)	200	A/4/3
25 Oct	(AT 912383)	500	E/2/7
25 Oct	(AT 943271)	400	RCN/4/31
25 Oct	(BS 672974)	12,000	C/5/46
	TOTAL RICE	41,885	
	TOTAL FOOD	25	

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	215	Structures Damaged	45
Bunkers Destroyed	150	Bunkers Damaged	35
Secondary Explosions	30	Secondary Fires	55
Bridge Destroyed	1	Bridge Damaged	1
Boats Destroyed	2	AW Positions Dest	1

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ increased in comparison to the previous week. There were 522 KIA's, 35 VC PW's, and four NVA PW's.

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e. Morale. No change

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	DONG HA	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	98	92	99	93
Low	76	74	75	75
Rainfall (total)	0	0	.03	0
Winds (knots)	6	7	5	5
Visibility (miles)	7	7	9	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 25-31 October 1969

(a) General. A weak easterly wind flow is forecasted for the outlook period. Minor directional and speed changes in the low level wind flow will introduce only slight variations in the day to day weather.

(b) ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the I Corps Tactical Zone for the outlook period is fair with occasional ceilings of 1500-3000 feet, and a few thundershowers and rainshowers occurring during the early morning and afternoon hours. The maximum cloudiness and shower activity is expected to be in the southern portion of the ICTZ. Precipitation in I Corps will be approximately one to three inches with isolated instances of four inches.

j. - l. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

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c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following courses of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to five infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(3) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with the equivalent of up to five infantry regiments supported by three rocket battalions, two sapper battalions, and one engineer battalion.

(5) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with an infantry division (-), supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(6) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to five infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

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(2) Continuing shortages of food and medical supplies coupled with sickness and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY
ANNEX E - NOVEMBER WEATHER BRIEF

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z.

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 43-69 AS OF 252400H OCTOBER 1969

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-hq	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	10	2,960	2	535			12	3,495	14	6,195	26	9,690
Bn's-Maneuver	38	8,900	11	1,830	5	850	54	11,580	36	15,215	80	26,795
Bn's-Support	16	4,135	2	340	1	195	19	4,670	8	1,980	27	6,650
Separate Co's	1	130			33	2,365	34	2,495	1	80	35	3,575
TOTAL CONFIRMED		18,090		2,705		3,410		24,205		24,905		49,110
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's									3	1,570	3	1,570
Bn's-Maneuver	3	955	1	350	1	200	5	1,505	9	3,710	14	5,215
Bn's-Support	5	1,335					5	1,335	4	1,145	9	2,480
Separate Co's	1	90			2	160	3	250			3	250
TOTAL PROBABLE		2,380		350		360		3,090		6,425		9,515
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									3	1,200	3	1,200
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support									22	6,625	22	6,625
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										8,765		8,765
		20,470		3,055		3,770		27,295		40,095		67,390

See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,120		150	3,270
	Probable	345			345
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,465		150	3,615
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,355		475	3,830
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,355		475	3,830
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	4,945	895	340	6,680
	Probable	1,130	350		1,480
	Possible		300		300
	TOTAL	6,075	1,545	340	8,460
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,530	600	655	3,785
	Probable	380		285	665
	Possible				
	TOTAL	2,910	600	940	4,450
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,140	1,210	1,290	6,640
	Probable	525		75	600
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,665	1,210	1,365	7,240

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS												ICTZ TOTAL				DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF															
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	32	0		32	8			8	5			5	45			45	35	7		42	80	7		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	38	3		41	11	1		12	5	1		6	54	5		59	36	9		45	90	14		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	6	2	1	9	1			1	1			1	8	2	1	11	2	3	10	15	10	5	11	26
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	5
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		2	3	2	1	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1					1			1
TOTAL SUPPORT	16	5	1	22	2			2	1			1	19	5	1	25	8	4	22	34	27	9	23	59
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	54	8	1	63	13	1		14	6	1		7	73	10	1	84	44	13	22	79	117	23	23	163

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	269	Nam Hoa	50	Hoa Vang	812	Thang Binh	940	Binh Son	311
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	56	Hieu Duc	50	Tam Ky	449	Son Tinh	474
	Trieu Phong	113	Hong Dien	69	Dien Ban	1,090	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	437
	Cam Lo	150	Vinh Loc	43	Dai Loc	341	Hiep Duc	208	Nghia Hanh	336
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	251	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	279	Mo Duc	453
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	333	Hau Duc	172	Duc Pho	463
	Huong Hoa	5	Phu Vang	11	Que Son	943			Tra Bong	166
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	107	Duy Xuyen	1,065			Ba To	197
			Huong Thuy	77	Hieu Nhon	291			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	529					Son Ha	170
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	917	THUA THIEN	1,239	QUANG NAM	5,045	QUANG TIN	2,163	QUANG NGAI	3,021

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,385

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	PO	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,035		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	570	Unlocated	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	575	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	PR	325	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	PR	370	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	PR	375	Unlocated LAOS	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
68th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,175	Unlocated	
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	375	Unlocated LAOS	
4th Bn	NVA	PO	400	Unlocated LAOS	

*See note #4 on page A-17
**See note #2 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	300		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 1576/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1267/24Sep69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
31st Group	NVA	C	1,045		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	205	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1062/27Sep69
15th Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,955	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	710	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0063/7Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	PR	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	2,010		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YD 0309	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	YD 6825/23Apr69
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,570		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	215	Unlocated	YC 3497/19Jul69
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	LST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,575		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	YD 1259/11Jun69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	335	XD 9265	XD 8362/60ct69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	300	XD 8854	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,590		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 3858/22Aug68
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	YD 3858/20Aug68
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	175	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	PR	240	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	105	Vic YD 3535	YD 2540/17Sep69

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	890		
Rdgt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	275	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	260	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jun69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,725		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	330	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	160	Vic YD 6514	YD 6019/6Sep69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
S06th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	350	Vic YD 3304	YD 5226/8Sep69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
K.35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	
C.113 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 4032	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	65	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	UNK		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
577th RL Bn	NVA	C	305	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
Hai Van Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	PR	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102d Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103d Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	505		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	165	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2d Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3d Bn	NVA	C	110	BT 1252	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,065		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	ZC 1835	ZC 1945/50ct69
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2d Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3d Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
573d Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unlocated	
575th Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unlocated	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	685		
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	175	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
R.20 Bn	MF	C	145	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	MF	C	130	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	90	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	125	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	45	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	3,805		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	515		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	AT 9226	
1st Bn	NVA	C	125	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	125	AT 9226	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	125	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	180	BT 1623	BT 2340/12Aug69
72nd Bn	LF	C	175	BT 1917	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	195	BT 2113	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	200	BT 2217	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 3304	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	220	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4213	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	80	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	85	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	105	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	290	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
40th Sapper Bn	MF	C	130	BS 4677	BS 6385/12Aug69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	680		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	150	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4386	BS 3587/13Aug69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69
C.17 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	55	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7555	BS 7559/17Oct69
C.120 Co	LF	C	45	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	70	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 5596	
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,615		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	870		
Regt Hq	MF	C	345	BS 7825	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	180	BS 7825	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	180	BS 7825	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	165	BS 7825	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6541	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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BINH DINH PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,700		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	520	BR 7363	
8th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 5950	
9th Bn	NVA	C	300	BR 5929	

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 180001H to 252400H October 1969.

a. The 7th Bn, 18th NVA Regt, 3d NVA Div has been dropped from OOB holdings based on COMUSMACV message 210425Z October 1969, which had the statements of three PW's formerly of the 7th Bn, 18th NVA Regt until the battalion was deactivated in November of 1968. Also, a PW from the 510th LF Co (Ref COMUSMACV DISUM 280-69) states the 7th Bn has not been identified in contact during 1969.

The 18th Regt is held in the PERINTREP for information due to the 18th Regt operating in II Corps BINH DINH (P).

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

9. Subordinate/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF PERINTREP 39-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS, AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 43-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P)

a. PW, PFC Hoang Van HUONG, 12th Sapper Co, 31st Group, captured 13 October 1969 at (YD 172656) (3d MARDIV 150801Z October 1969, 517 MID Rpt II 58-A-69) stated that his company's strength was approximately 60 men and the 1st Squad, 3d Section, 12th Sapper Co was located in the vicinity of (YD 139513) or (YD 172524) while the remainder of the 12th Sapper Co was located in VINH LONG (V), VINH LINH (D), NVN. Source also stated that the 27th Bn Headquarters' strength was approximately 60 men and the 27th Bn was located approximately (YD 0886) seven kilometers west of the 31st Group Headquarters. Source further stated that the 31st Group Headquarters and the 11th, 12th and 13th Independent Co's were located in the vicinity of (YD 145869). PW HUONG revealed that the mission of the 12th Sapper Co was to conduct reconnaissance of U.S. bases in the vicinity of Route 9 (NFI). Subject stated that the 27th Bn consisted of the 5th, 6th, and 7th Infantry Co's and the 8th Mortar Co and that the 31st Group consisted of the 9th Infantry Co, 10th Sapper Co, 11th Sapper Co, 12th Sapper Co, 13th Mortar Co, 16th Transportation Co, 17th Engr Co, and the 19th Transportation Co, all of which are independent. Subject revealed that the AKA for the 12th Sapper Co was K.12 and the AKA for the 31st Group was SONG HONG Regt. Subject also reported the following LBN's: 12th Co, 31st Group-94136 XB; 27th Bn Hq-94226 XD, 5th Co-94227 XB, 6th Co-94228 XB, 7th Co-94229 XB, and 8th Co-94230 XB. PW HUONG stated that "XB" was the letter designation for units based in VINH LINH (D), NVN. Source stated that he and seven companions crossed the BEN HAI River at (YD 173774). Source also stated that the 15th Bn, 31st Group has been reassigned to the B-5 Front. Reported personalities: 31st Group CO-Maj HUNG, XO-Maj HONG, PO-Maj LOI; 27th Bn CO-Capt DIEM, XO-CA, CofS-1stLt HUNG, DCofS-1stLt XUAN and 2ndLt NA, PO-Capt HAT, APO-THAO, Staff Asst for PW-TAN; 5th Co Cmdr-Asp NAM, XO-BON, PO-AT; 6th Co Cmdr-LUYEN, XO-THIEN, PO-KHUC; 7th Co Cmdr-PHO, XO-HIEU, PO-VIET; 8th Co Cmdr-NHUNG, XO-SIENH, PO-HUONG; 12th Sapper Co Cmdr-DON, XO-LOC, PO-TUSN and 3d Section, 12th Sapper Co Plt Ldr-SSgt QUANG.

(G-2 COMMENT: Eighty percent of the reported personalities correlate with III MAF OOB holdings. Two previous PW's from the K.8 Co, 31st Group revealed the same LBN for the K.8 Co. All information rated (F-2).)

b. PW, PFC Nguyen Trong DAT, 7th Co, 2d Bn, 246th NVA Regt, captured 6 October 1969 in the vicinity of (XD 833626) (101st Abn Div 10 October 1969, Rpt 101-77-69) reported his company had a strength of 132 men and was located in the vicinity of (XD 8363) while the rest of the 2d Bn was located in the DONG LONG mountain region vicinity (XD 8559). PW DAT also stated that the 7th Co was on a combat mission in the DONG LONG mountain area (NFI). Source revealed that he infiltrated into RVN eight months ago with the 20th Infiltration Bn and was assigned as a replacement to his present unit. Reported personalities: 246th Regt CO-BE, XO-HIEU,

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PO-KHANG; 2d Bn CO-SrCapt HIEN, XO-LAM; 7th Co Cmdr-1stLt Nguyen Ngai QUY, XO-Ho Khai DUOC, PO-LY.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first PW from the 246th Regt since early June of 1969. PW was captured in the known AO of the 246th Regt; however, none of the reported personalities correlate with III MAF OOB holdings. All information rated (F-3).)

2. THUA THIEN (P)

a. PW, Soldier Nguyen Tri TRUC, 3d Recon Plt, 3d Bn, 6th Worksite, captured on 3 October 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 564434) (11th ITT 146-October 1969) in Operation LAM SON 346 (NFI), stated that the 3d Bn, 6th Regt was located in the vicinity of (YD 553214) with a strength of 300 men. The weapons of this unit are: AK-47, 60mm Mortars, two B-40 and one B-41. The source also located the 1st Bn, 2d Bn and Hq Bn in the vicinity of (YD 5817). Reported personalities: XO-THANG, PO-THUAN, APO-THANG. The PW stated that morale was low due to men being afraid of being killed and believing they are fighting for a lost cause against a better equipped enemy.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holds the 3d Bn, 6th (AKA 806th) Regt in the vicinity of (YD 3309) and Headquarters 6th Regt in the vicinity of (YD 0309), 3d Bn, 6th Regt is carried with a strength of 360 men. Personalities given by PW are new to OOB files. All information rated (F-6).)

b. PW, MSgt Nguyen Van MINH, 4th Co, K.10 Bn, 5th Regt was captured on 15 October 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 561061) (1st ARVN Div, 170900Z October 1969) while going for food rations and stated the K.10 Bn has a strength of approximately 200 men and is composed of four companies; 1, 2, 3 and 4. The PW further stated that the armament of the K.10 Bn included 82 and 60mm Mortars, B-40 and B-41 and AK's (quantity unknown). Reported personalities: Bn CO-BAU, XO-XYAN, PO-DUY. The PW reported that the K.10 Bn has the mission of collecting rice at LA CHU (H) and transporting rice to the western area. Source located the K.10 Bn base area in the vicinity of (YD 4503).

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB files hold the K.10 Bn, 5th Regt in the vicinity of (YD 6514) with a strength of 185 men. OOB files carry BAU as battalion CO. PO DUY and XO XUAN are new to OOB files. All information rated (F-3).)

c. PW, MSgt Ngo Viet HAI of the K.10 Bn, 5th Worksite was captured on 12 October 1969 in the vicinity of (YD 522107) (ARVN Interr Rpt, 121200Z October 1969). MSgt HAI reported his unit as the K.10 Bn, 5th Regt and is located in the vicinity of (YD 5912). The K.10 Bn is composed of four companies, 1, 2, 3 and four. The armament consists of 60mm Mortars, B-41 and AK's (quantity unknown). Reported personalities: PO-DUY, CofS-LAC, Rear CO-SON, Bn CO-BAU. The PW stated that his unit was short on rice and many men had malaria; morale is low.

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(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB carries the K.10 Bn, 5th Regt in the vicinity of (YD 6514). The personalities stated by the PW are all new to OOB with the exception of one; Bn CO-BAU, who is carried as CO, F.10 Bn, 5th Regt. All information rated (F-3).)

3. QUANG NAM (P)

a. Hoi Chanh, PFC Le Van XOI, C.10 Co, 9th Bn, 31st Regt, rallied on 20 October 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 918725) (210930Z October 1969, SA QUANG NAM Sector, HOI AN RVN, Initial Interr Rpt 11th ITT HOI AN 86-69) and stated that the last known location of his unit was in the vicinity of (ZC 205606) (NFI). The mission of the unit was to collect rice, protect western QUANG NAM Province, harass DANANG area outposts and counter ARVN operations. The Hoi Chanh stated that the 31st Regt was composed of three battalions; the 8th, 9th and a support battalion. The 9th Bn (XOI's unit) is composed of four companies; the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th. The 10th Co has only 30 men, and the T/O of the unit is 70 men. The 9th Co is composed of approximately 100 men. The 10th Co, 9th Bn is armed with one B-40, one 60mm Mortar, two 82mm Mortars, and Automatic Rifles and small arms. The Hoi Chanh infiltrated with unit number 1071, leaving NVN in early March of 1969 from HOA BINH Province. The infiltration strength was estimated at 500 men. The unit infiltrated via HOA BINH (P), NGHE AN (P), HA TINH (P) to LAOS then into KONTUM (P), RVN, then on to the ONG THUA Slope in QUANG NAM (P). The replacements, approximately 100 men, upon arrival, went to the 31st. The remainder of the men were distributed to unknown units. The soldiers of the 31st Regt receive two and one-half cans of rice a day except when they cannot collect rice, then the rations are very small. The 10th Co has lost seven wounded and six killed in the last three months (NFI). The 31st Regt has one surgery ward and one dispensary. The dispensary includes one doctor and 10 medics. All are presumed to be NVA personnel; however, there are four female nurses who are South Vietnamese. Subject further stated that he had hearsay information concerning the 141st Regt being sent to the lowlands to collect rice and steal chickens, on approximately 10 October 1969 (NFI). The NVA soldiers have lost their motivation and fighting spirit because of the lack of food and sickness from malaria.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 31st NVA Infantry Regt is currently carried as being composed of two battalions; the 102d and 103d, plus the regimental support companies. OOB carries 11 companies as regimental support companies. The reduction in support companies could possibly be due to personnel losses. The movement of the 141st Regt to the lowlands is mentioned for the first time. Previous reports have indicated the 141st Regt moving towards western QUANG NAM Province. All information rated (F-3).)

b. Hoi Chanh, Sgt Ngo Van BINH, A-1 Medical Squad, QUYET THANG Transportation Bn, MR-5, rallied on 16 October 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 870760) (201554Z October 1969 CG 1st MARDIV Supp Interr Rpt 15th ITT 07-10-69). At the time of rallying, the Hoi Chanh was moving north with 18 NVA soldiers to an unknown unit in the Northern Wing. He was to

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work for this unit as a Corpsman. The Hoi Chanh stated that he had heard that the unit he was going to was the HAI VAN Engr Bn and the unit was located in the vicinity of (AT 8488) as of 1 October 1969. The QUYET THANG Bn was located in the vicinity of (BS 1978) as of 31 August 1969 and maintains a base area in this location consisting of four thatched houses on the side of a mountain. Each house provides shelter for approximately 30 men, except the last house which serves as a messhall. The strength of the battalion was 90 men and the morale was high due to a lack of combat operations. The men each received two and one-quarter cans of rice per day. Additionally, they received two meals of meat per month, vegetables and fish sauce. The Hoi Chanh, having been trained as a medic, stated that the unit has on hand the following items: penincillin, morphine, novocaine, sleeping pills, aspirin, iodine, bandages, quinine, vitamin K, surgical soap, dried blood diarrhea pills, and smelling salts. The battalion Political Officer also tells the men to work hard and the U.S. and ARVN are being defeated at the Paris Peace Talks. The Hoi Chanh stated all the men believe the PO. BINH stated that he had been kidnapped in the 1968 Tet offensive from his village at NAM O, HOA VANG (D), QUANG NAM (P). The Hoi Chanh was taken to a medical officer's training school at an unknown location in QUANG NGAI Province. The training the Hoi Chanh received was divided into three phases. Phase one, first aid training lasted about two months. Phase two consisted of advanced first aid and lasted about three months. Phase three was concerned with internal medicine and lasted for five months. A supplementary training phase was conducted that consisted of interpreting medical documents. Upon completion of training the Hoi Chanh reported to the QUYET THANG Bn for duty in May of 1969.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location given for the battalion the Hoi Chanh was travelling to is possibly the HAI VAN Engr Bn as the area given is close to where OOB currently holds this battalion. This is the first PW or Hoi Chanh in many months that has stated the morale of an enemy unit as being high. The amount of food and medicine stated here is also high. All of this is attributed to the location of the unit and its lack of contact with FWMAF. All information rated (F-3).)

c. A current policy directive issued by Front-4/MR-5 (525th MI Group Rpt No. 1/Z/AX/0559/69 of 17 October 1969 rated (C-3)) stresses great emphasis on the reorganization of infantry, local force and guerrilla units. The directive stated that firepower of the local guerrilla would be increased by utilization of the B-40 weapon. Additional emphasis was placed on guerrillas banding together in three to five man cells for increased pressure on the revolutionary development cadre. The directives additionally stated that NVA soldiers would remain in RVN and would reinforce local and main force units. It further reveals that the unit designations would be withdrawn to North Vietnam thus deceiving the people of the world that NVA soldiers are being withdrawn to NVN. In this manner, the North Vietnamese hope to strengthen their bargaining position at the Paris Peace Talks. This will enable the NVA personnel to become more knowledgable of the populace and terrain in RVN, thereby, when future replacements are sent from NVN to NVA regiments in RVN, these regiments

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will posses a strong base of personnel familiar with the local terrain and populace. This is expected to greatly bolster the guerrilla strength and enable them to carry out increased terrorist and propaganda efforts against the GVN forces/cadre. In addition, the 44th QUANG DA Front/AKA Front-4 specifically stated that elements of the 31st and 141st Regt's would reinforce the T.89 Sapper Bn, and all local companies in HOA HIEU District, QUANG NAM (P) (NFI).

(G-2 COMMENT: A recent PW and a previously received agent report have indicated that the 141st Regt as well as their supporting companies have been withdrawn to the VINH LINH Special Zone for regrouping and reorganization. Another recent PW stated that the 141st Regt (less one battalion) was presently in the vicinity of the Laotian Border, but they would return to launch a Spring offensive. It is possible that this is a deception plan initiated by enemy forces designed to create the impression that NVA units have withdrawn from RVN. (See Hoi Chanh Chau NHC, Q.83d LF Co, 070400Z October 1969, Supp Interr Rpt, 7th IT concerning the influx of NVA into local units, and information from Hoi Chanh Le Van XOI, 210930Z October 1969 Initial Interr Rpt concerning current disposition of the 141st Regt). All information rated (F-3).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). Rallier, Nguyen Qui TAI (AKA Nguyen Tien QUYET), 1st Co, D.10 Sapper Bn (AKA for GK-35 Sapper Bn) defected on 21 September 1969 to the 37th ARVN Rangers in the vicinity of (AT 844544) (Initial Interr Rpt QDSZ Msg 030202Z October 1969). Initial interrogation report stated that he last saw the D.10 Sapper Bn in mid-January 1969 in the vicinity of (ZC 035435). In late May 1969, he heard that they had moved back to QUE SON (D). The only mission that TAI was aware of was his own, which was to gather rice for Hospital No. 21. TAI stated that he was drafted on 30 July 1967 and had trained with the 1/2/1/383/3/320 Div (1st Squad, 2d Plt, 1st Co, 383d Bn, 3d Regt, 320th NVA Div). He received basic infantry training from August 1967 to October 1967 in YEN QUANG (V), NHO QUANG (D), HINH BINH (P). His infiltration battalion was the 383d Bn with a designation of 152. On 24 November 1967, Source's unit departed the above training area with an approximate strength of 650 men and arrived in THUA THIEN (P), date unknown, with 600 men. The losses were due to desertion and bombings. After reaching THUA THIEN (P), they continued moving southeast through the jungle, passing within 10 kilometers of the A LUOI Airstrip on the northern end of the A SHAU Valley. Upon arriving at the recruiting receiving station of Front 4, they rested for approximately three days before being assigned to their individual units. After the brief rest, TAI and 49 others were assigned to the D.10 Sapper Bn. Reported personalities: Infiltration Group Bn CO-SrCapt Le NGA, PO-SrCapt Cao Xuan HONG, APO-Capt TAO, Political Training-Asp ON, Medical Officer-Lt TAY; 1st Co CO-SrLt KHIEN, XO-Lt HUONG, PO-HIEN.

(G-2 COMMENT: The route of infiltration is acceptable. Another prisoner from the 10th NVA Bn (AKA for GK-35) was very vague in regard to the location of his battalion. Both PW's appeared to remember only the things that seemed to be important in their lives. The rate of attrition appears to be low also. All information rated (F-3).)

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5. QUANG NGAI (P)

a. Returnee, Capt Nguyen Chi MINH, Production Section, 3d NVA Div who returned on 26 September 1969 in the vicinity of (BS 670648) (11th ITT Rpt dtd 11 October 1969) stated that the 3d Div Production Unit is composed of approximately 42 men, and is located near the slope of NUOC Y Stream, BA TO (D) (NFI), with a mission of supplying the 3d Div with rice, potatoes, and corn. The subject was formerly the XO of the 7th Bn, 22d Regt, 3d NVA Div for approximately two years. Subject states the strength for the 71st Co, 7th Bn was 70-80 men, and the mission of the 7th Bn, 22d Regt was to destroy allied installations and harass allied troops. The returnee was also formerly the CO of a transportation company for one year and the company strength ranged from 30-150 and was located in a rear area in a montangnard region of BA TO (D). The subject claims that the AKA for the 14th Regt, 3d Div is "PHO DONG", formerly "LIEN GIA 2". The AKA for the 18th Regt was formerly "LIEN GIA 4" and the AKA for the 22d Regt is "527". He states that the morale of all the units is considered low because of U.S. artillery and airstrikes, poor medical facilities and low supplies. The death of Ho Chi MINH has also added to the morale problem. Reported personalities: 3d Div CO-TRI, XO-SON, PO-SONG, APO-TOAN, CofS-TAN; Rear Services PO-TIEN, Acting Rear Services Chief-XUAN; 22d Regt CO-YHUAN, XO-CO, PO-HUNG, APO-SAO, CofS-BAI, ACofS-QUE; 7th Bn CO-DUYEN, PO-HAN. Subject claims the transportation battalion and the 7th Bn were approximately 65 percent NVA. Subject believes that there is going to be a big drive against the 11th Brigade in DUC PHO (D) and BA TO (D) by the 14th and 22nd Regt's.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first report on the Division Headquarters moving south due to airstrikes (F-3). The 14th Regt is possibly an AKA for the 2d Regt, 3d Div which has been operating around DUC PHO from 1 August to the end of September 1969, and is at present, in southern Base Area 124 near the BINH DINH border (F-2). This is the first report of the personalities (F-6).)

b. PW, Nguyen KHO from the HOA VINH (H) Guerrilla Unit was captured on 17 October 1969 in the vicinity of (BS 577846) (Americal 384-69) and stated that his unit's strength was six guerrillas and operates in the vicinity of HOA VINH (H) to protect the hamlet against the invasion of allied troops. The PW, states that on 9 October 1969 70 men from the 48th Bn travelled through his hamlet en route to VINH LOC (V) vicinity (BS 5488). He states that the morale of the guerrillas is low due to the amount of allied troops in the area and of being afraid they will be killed.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first report received on this guerrilla unit. It is believed that the 48th Bn was in resupply status. It is possible that the 48th Bn had men in this area vicinity (BS 5488) on a resupply mission. All information rated (F-3).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 43-69

1. GENERAL. Counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities during the past week reflected no discernible change in tactics, policy, or intensity and was consistent with the enemy's "three-pronged attack" policy featuring concerted political and proselyting efforts coupled with economy of force military tactics.

Pursuant to the ultimate goal of unification of North and South Vietnam under the direction and control of North Vietnam's Lao Dong Party, intermediate enemy objectives continue as follows:

a. To perpetrate, through propaganda exploitation of every available means, the accelerated withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam.

b. To undermine, intimidate, and discredit the GVN, particularly at the hamlet, village, and district levels.

c. To disrupt and/or destroy the GVN pacification effort.

d. To continue to strengthen and expand the revolutionary organizational cadre and forces.

e. To intensify political struggle efforts in anticipation of a possible formation of a coalition government.

Terrorism remained at a low level during the reporting period. No acts of sabotage were reported, although an attempt was made against a Hue-Danang Railway train.

Enemy intelligence gathering activities were limited to reconnaissance of various outposts and installations in Quang Tri, Quang Nam, and Quang Ngai Provinces. Selection of personnel to attend a counterintelligence training school was reported. Personnel were to gain access to GVN controlled areas as false ralliers, gain positions in various governmental agencies/ installations, and assist in effecting a communist takeover at an undetermined future date.

Miscellaneous reports of enemy activity concerned enemy actions to be conducted upon withdrawal of portions of US forces in Quang Tri (P), censorship of and security countermeasures for enemy troops, tax collection, activities of Women's Associations, removal of people living in GVN resettlement areas to VC controlled areas, security measures to protect people in VC controlled areas, proselyting, recruiting, and extortion of money through kidnapping and ransom payments.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. Reported enemy intelligence gathering activities during the past week consisted of reconnaissance of various outposts and installations in Quang Tri, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces. Additionally a US MI source reported that selected enemy personnel were being nominated to attend a counterintelligence training course, infiltrate through the Chieu

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Hoi program as false ralliers, gain positions in various governmental agencies/installations, and assist in effecting a future communist takeover of the government at an undetermined date. Details are as follows:

a. Quang Tri. An NVA PW, captured on 16 October 1969 vicinity (YD 091593) stated that his unit was the 33rd Sapper Bn (information from S-2, 2nd ARVN Regiment). Source reported attacks (nfi) would be conducted primarily on areas west of Quang Tri City. Areas already reconnoitered were highpoint 151 vicinity (YD 125552) and high point 130 vicinity (YD1451). Source's squad, composed of six men, left from north of the Ben Hai River on 14 October 1969. PW's squad was to lead the 9th Company attacks on the areas reconnoitered. (Ref: Memorandum from G-2 I Corps, dated 19 October 1969) (Unrated).

b. Quang Nam.

(1) A report by a US MI source on 17 October 1969, revealed the following information:

As of 16 October 1969, an unidentified force of approximately 80 personnel from the Q81 LF Company were dispersed throughout An Phuoc (H) vicinity (BT 107550 - BT 115550), Xuyen Quang (V), Duy Xuyen (D). A recon team from this force, dressed in civilian clothes was moving to Con Cau Lau vicinity (BT 092551) to study positions there (nfi). (Ref: CO, Det D, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Report No. 1/A/AX/0555/69 dtd 17Oct69) (Eval: F-3).

(2) As of 19 October 1969, a force of 150 men of the T.89 Sapper Battalion were dispersed in the vicinity of Phu Tay (3) (AT 956560), Giao An (AT 956570), and Bau Tay (4) (AT 945570) on the Dai Loc - Dien Ban District border. Approximately one-third of the unit spoke with a Northern dialect. Recon teams from the unit studied outposts located at Hon Bang (BT 032510) and Doi Chiem Son (AT 985507) in preparation of rocket and mortar attacks during the latter part of October (nfi). (Ref: CO, Det C, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Report No. 1/A/AX/0564/69 dtd 22Oct69) (Eval: C-3).

c. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 12 September 1969, a VC briefing was conducted near the Song Re River (BS 578512). The briefing was conducted by Hung ANH, Security Section Chief in charge of Quang Ngai (P) counterintelligence. The briefing was attended by one VC cadre from each district and six security personnel from each VC tactical unit in Quang Ngai (P) (nfi). Purpose of this briefing was to discuss COSVN goals (nfi) and to elect candidates for a special counterintelligence training course. This course was to be held in North Vietnam or Cambodia and was to be of three months duration. After completing the course, individuals would return to South Vietnam and pretend to rally to the GVN. Once they gained the confidence of GVN officials they would attempt to gain positions on government installations. They planned to take part in village and/or hamlet governments. They would hold those positions until the time came

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ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 43-69

1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY.

a. Command of the 3d Force Recon Company was passed to the Commanding General, III MAF at 220001H October 1969. The Company has redeployed from Quang Tri to Phu Bai and will recommence operations 1 November 1969.

b. Recon Team Veneer from the 3d Recon Battalion had contact with eight enemy at 231920H in the vicinity of YD 193504. This was the only sighting and/or contact during the reporting period.

c. The 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) Ranger Company teams had only one sighting of three NVA during the reporting period.

d. The 101st Airborne Division (AM) Ranger teams observed 16 enemy during this reporting period. Team Andorra observed 15 of these 16 on 20 and 21 October 1969 in the vicinity of YC 644950.

e. Recon Team Grim Reaper from the 1st Force Recon Company was inserted as a reaction force at 230040H in the vicinity of ZC 156480 in support of Recon Team Big Flower. A claymore type surprise firing device was command detonated resulting in five Marines being WIA.

f. The 1st Recon Battalion Teams observed over 450 enemy during the reporting period. Recon Team contacts and artillery fire missions called as a result of sightings by Recon Teams resulted in 32 confirmed enemy KIA. A majority of the observations were made nine to ten kilometers north and northwest of An Hoa.

g. Americal Division Ranger Team contacts for this reporting period resulted in a total of eight enemy KIA. The most significant contact was with an estimated enemy company at 250805H in the vicinity of BS 777 267 which accounted for four enemy KIA. Other sightings for the period totaled approximately 90 enemy and occurred throughout the Americal AO.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY.

a. In the U.S. DMZ area 33 targets were detected by sensors. Nine fire missions were conducted in response consisting of 23 rounds of 105 mm and 127 rounds of 175mm artillery. BDA was unobserved. In the U.S. Duel Blade II area 69 targets were detected. This is a decrease of 66 targets from the previous reporting period. Nineteen fire missions were conducted in response to these targets and consisted of ten rounds of 105mm, 113 rounds of 155mm, 25 rounds of eight inch, and 185 rounds of 175mm artillery. BDA was unobserved.

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b. In the 101st Airborne Division (AM) AO, sensors located in the vicinity of YD 8004 and YD 7705 detected activity on 19, 20, and 21 October. The XM-63 firing device and artillery were employed. BDA revealed blood trails throughout the area.

c. In the Americal Division AO, sensors detected 144 enemy. Fourteen targets were engaged with a total of 298 artillery rounds. The sensor fields located at LZ West, vicinity AT 989244, and LZ Professional, vicinity BT 173076, were the most active. Sensor detections resulted in 10 confirmed enemy KIA during this reporting period.

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ANNEX D (NOVEMBER WEATHER BRIEF) TO III MAF PERINTREP 43-69.

1. General. By November, all of the ICTZ is under the influence of the northeast monsoon. Most cloudiness and precipitation occur on the eastern slopes of the ANNAM Range. Temperatures are slightly cooler in November than during October with a maximum of 74° to 80° in the highlands and 82° to 89° along the coast. Minimum temperatures range from the high 50's in the highlands to the high 60's along the coast. Relative humidity remains essentially the same as during October.

2. Precipitation

a. November is a transitional month between wet and dry seasons over all the ICTZ except the east coast. While mean rainfall amounts remain near seasonal peaks along the east coast, they decrease elsewhere. It can be expected that there will be four to ten days with rainfall values greater than one inch, and two to five days with amounts greater than two inches.

b. Precipitation occurs more than 15 days during the month in the western portion of ICTZ increasing toward the east to a high of between 20 and 25 days around HUE.

c. Mean precipitation is over 20 inches in ICTZ, except for the southwest portion (DO XA) where it ranges between 10 and 15 inches. The highest reported mean precipitation in ICTZ is BA NA, 35 miles southwest of HUE, where the mean monthly precipitation is 56 inches.

d. Although DANANG and HUE have a maximum precipitation of more than 50 inches, the balance of ICTZ receives a maximum of between 30 and 50 inches. The minimum precipitation is three inches or less throughout ICTZ.

e. Maximum 24 hour precipitation amounts range from six to twelve inches over the ANNAM mountain range to more than 12 inches east of the range. TIEN TCHA, 10 miles northeast of DANANG, has a record one day rainfall of 19 inches.

3. Thunderstorms. Thunderstorm activity decreases over the entire ICTZ. The mean number of days with thunderstorms in the ICTZ is one.

4. Clouds. Cloudiness increases significantly over all of ICTZ. Mean cloudiness is over 70 percent throughout most of I Corps except along the coast where it is over 80 percent. The mean number of days with total cloud cover equal to or less than 3/10 varies from one to five days.

5. Visibility. The northeasterly monsoonal flow brings fog, drizzle, and low visibilities along the coast north of QUANG NGAI. However, conditions improve slightly in the western part of ICTZ. Visibilities in all areas generally increase to five miles after 1000 hours local standard time.

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6. Temperature. The mean maximum terperature is 80 degrees along the coast, and 75 degrees to 80 degrees over the remainder of ICTZ. The mean minimum temperature is 60 degrees to 65 degrees throughout ICTZ.

7. Humidity. Mean relative humidity ranges between 80 and 90 percent throughout ICTZ.

8. Astronomical Data. BMCT occurs 23 minutes prior to sunrise, and EECT occurs 23 minutes after sunset.

Date	Sunrise	Sunset	Moonrise	Moonset	Phase	% of Illumination
1	0621	1748	2343	1228		62
2	0621	1748	0035	1309	Last Qtr	53
3	0622	1747	0036	1345		43
4	0622	1746	0125	1422		34
5	0623	1746	0215	1451		25
6	0623	1745	0307	1525		17
7	0624	1745	0359	1600		10
8	0624	1745	0453	1638		05
9	0625	1745	0553	1721		01
10	0626	1744	0656	1810	New	00
11	0626	1744	0803	1907		02
12	0627	1744	0909	2010		06
13	0628	1744	1012	2116		13
14	0628	1743	1111	2212		21
15	0629	1743	1201	2327		31
16	0629	1743	1247	0027		43
17	0630	1743	1317	0027	First Qtr	54
18	0630	1743	1402	0126		65
19	0631	1743	1438	0215		75
20	0631	1742	1515	0315		84
21	0632	1742	1552	0408		91
22	0633	1742	1633	0505		96
23	0634	1742	1715	0600		99
24	0635	1742	1802	0659	Full	100
25	0635	1742	1854	0759		99
26	0635	1742	1948	0849		96
27	0636	1742	2041	0942		91
28	0636	1742	2135	1023		85
29	0637	1742	2228	1103		78
30	0638	1742	2316	1142		70

Subtract one minute for CHU LAI; add two minutes for HUE; subtract two minutes for SA HUYNH.

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DANANG TIDES FOR NOVEMBER 1969

Date	Time	Height
01	0024	4.1
	0948	1.7
02	0030	3.9
	1048	1.8
	2348	3.7
03	1142	1.9
	2124	3.6
04	1236	2.0
	2054	3.6
05	0248	3.2
	1554	3.2
	0324	2.2
	2048	3.7
06	0300	2.8
	0748	3.3
	1406	2.3
	2054	3.8
07	0324	2.5
	0900	3.3
	1436	2.4
	2106	3.9
08	0354	2.1
	1000	3.4
	1506	2.6
	2124	4.1
09	0430	1.8
	1100	3.4
	1536	2.8
	2124	4.3
10	0506	1.5
	1154	3.4
	1600	3.0
	2206	4.4
11	0542	1.2
	1254	3.4
	1618	3.1
	2242	4.5
12	0630	1.1
	1400	3.4
	1648	3.2
	2312	4.6
13	0718	1.1
	1524	3.3
	1648	3.2
16	0118	4.2
	1000	1.5
	1906	3.5
	2054	3.5
17	0236	3.9
	1106	1.7
	1906	3.6
	2054	3.5
18	0418	3.6
	1206	1.9
	1930	3.7
19	0112	2.9
	0618	3.4
	1300	2.1
	1954	3.8
20	0224	2.5
	0749	3.4
	1342	2.4
	2018	4.0
21	0306	2.1
	0916	3.4
	1418	2.6
	2042	4.1
22	0354	1.8
	1024	3.4
	1454	2.8
	2106	4.3
23	0436	1.5
	1130	3.3
	1518	3.0
	2136	4.4
24	0518	1.4
	1230	3.3
	1536	3.1
	2200	4.4
25	0554	1.3
	1348	3.3
	1548	3.3
	2224	4.4
26	0636	1.3
	2248	4.4
27	0712	1.3
	2312	4.3
28	0748	1.4

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Date	Time	Height	Date	Time	Height
	2312	4.6		2330	4.2
14	0806	1.1	29	0830	1.5
15	0030	4.4		2354	4.0
	0900	1.3	30	0906	1.6

CHU LAI TIDES FOR NOVEMBER 1969

Date	Time	Height	Date	Time	Height
01	0600	5.9	16	0054	6.0
	1012	2.1		1030	1.6
02	0030	5.7	17	0200	5.6
	1054	2.2		1118	2.0
03	0100	5.4	18	0330	5.1
	1136	2.4		1212	2.4
04	0118	5.0		2006	4.7
	1218	2.6	19	0048	4.2
	2130	4.7		0530	4.6
05	0142	4.6		1254	2.9
	0348	4.6		2000	4.8
	1254	2.8	20	0212	3.6
	2048	4.8		0730	4.3
06	0224	4.1		1324	3.3
	0624	4.3		2006	5.1
	1324	3.0	21	0312	3.0
	2036	4.9		0924	4.1
07	0306	3.6		1336	3.7
	0818	4.2		2024	5.4
	1354	3.3	22	0412	2.5
	2042	5.1		1124	4.1
08	0342	3.0		1324	4.0
	0942	4.2		2036	5.7
	1424	3.6	23	0500	2.1
	2054	5.4		2100	6.0
09	0424	2.5	24	0542	1.8
	1112	4.2		2124	6.2
	1436	3.9	25	0624	1.6
	2118	5.7		2148	6.3
10	0512	2.0	26	0706	1.5
	1238	4.2		2218	6.3
	1442	4.2	27	0736	1.6
	2142	6.0		2242	6.3
11	0600	1.6	28	0812	1.6
	2212	6.3		2306	6.1
12	0648	1.3	29	0848	1.8
	2248	6.5		2336	5.9
13	0742	1.2	30	0918	2.0
	2324	6.5			
14	0836	1.2			
	0012	6.3			
	0930	1.3			

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HUE TIDES FOR NOVEMBER 1969

Date	Time	Height	Date	Time	Height
01	0220	4.2	16	0251	4.5
	1119	-1.2		1119	-1.6
02	0305	4.1	17	0383	4.2
	1220	0.6		1211	-1.4
03	0401	4.0	18	0506	4.0
	1335	2.4		1251	-1.2
04	0513	3.8	19	1317	2.5
	1336	2.6		2122	3.6
05	0636	3.7	20	0105	3.0
	1358	2.6		0759	3.5
	2229	3.3		1334	2.7
06	0135	3.2		2123	3.5
	0759	3.6	21	0245	2.8
	1413	2.7		0929	3.4
	2200	3.4		1344	2.8
07	0217	3.0		2140	3.7
	0916	3.5	22	0355	2.5
	1431	2.8		1057	3.1
	2202	3.6		1344	2.9
08	0324	2.7		2205	4.0
	1029	3.4	23	0454	-1.0
	1442	2.9		1236	3.0
	2219	3.8		1330	2.9
09	0423	2.5		2233	4.1
	1144	3.3	24	0545	-1.4
	1450	3.0		2304	4.3
	2242	4.0	26	0722	-1.6
10	0518	2.5		0010	4.3
	1307	3.1	27	0808	-1.6
	1405	3.0		0044	4.3
	2311	4.3	28	0857	2.7
11	0613	2.7		0124	4.3
	2345	4.4	29	0944	-2.0
12	0710	3.1	30	0200	2.7
	0023	4.6		1129	2.6
13	0711	-1.5			
	0107	4.8			
14	0914	-1.5			
15	0156	4.8			
	1019	3.1			

SA HUYNH TIDES FOR NOVEMBER 1969

Date	Time	Height	Date	Time	Height
01	0100	6.6	16	0131	7.0
02	1127	2.7		1127	2.0
	0145	6.4	17	0233	6.6

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Date	Time	Height
	1228	2.8
03	0241	6.1
	1313	2.9
04	0353	5.8
	1344	3.0
05	0516	5.6
	1406	3.2
	2109	4.6
06	0043	4.5
	0639	5.3
	1326	3.4
	2100	4.9
07	0225	4.0
	0756	5.1
	1439	3.6
	2042	5.3
08	0332	3.5
	0909	4.8
	1450	3.6
	2059	5.7
09	0431	3.0
	1024	4.0
	1458	4.0
	2122	6.2
10	0526	2.5
	1147	4.3
	1454	4.2
	2151	6.7
11	0621	2.1
	2225	7.0
12	0718	1.8
	2303	7.3
13	0819	1.7
	2347	7.4
14	0922	1.7
15	0036	7.3
	1026	1.8
	1219	2.3
18	0346	6.1
	1259	2.7
19	0509	5.5
	1325	3.1
	2002	4.7
20	0113	4.1
	0639	5.0
	1342	3.4
	2003	5.1
21	0253	3.6
	0809	4.5
	1352	3.7
	2020	5.6
22	0403	3.1
	0937	3.2
	1352	4.4
	2045	6.1
23	0403	3.1
	0937	4.2
	1352	3.8
	2045	6.1
24	0502	2.7
	1116	4.0
	1338	3.9
	2113	6.4
25	0642	2.1
	2217	6.8
26	0730	2.0
	2250	6.8
27	0816	1.7
	2324	6.7
28	0905	2.1
29	0001	6.6
	0952	2.2
30	0040	6.4
	1037	2.3

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ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO III MAF PERINTREP 43-69

A. REGISTERED MAIL

DIR, NSA	3
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1
CMC (ABQ)	2
CG FMFPAC	2
CG USARV	1
CG I FFORCEV	5
CG II FFORCEV	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CG MCDEC	1
CG 5TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CALIF	6
CG 4TH MARIDV, CAMPEN, CALIF	1
CG 3RD MAW	2
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2
CO "B" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	5
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1
CO MCB 3	1
CO MCB 6	1
CO MCB 7	1
CO MCB 8	1
CO MCB 9	1
CO MCB 10	1
CO MCB 11	1
CO MCB 53	1
CO MCB 58	1
CO MCB 62	1
CO MCB 71	1
CO MCB 133	1
CO USS REPOSE	1
CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO MHTG-30, MCAF, SANTA ANA, CALIF, 92709	1
DSA II CORPS	1
CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GROUP, 7TH FLEET	1
CMDR, 19TH CI TEAM, CAMPEN, CALIF	1
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CTF 76	1
CO USASSD, ACSI DA ATTN: DOD SPECREP, MACV, APO SF, CAL 96222	1

B. BY COURIER

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232) (CIIED)	2
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2
CICV	2
CG XXIV CORPS VIETNAM	10
CG 1ST MARDIV	40
CG 3RD MARDIV	26
CG AMERICAL DIV	30
CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM)	20
CG 1ST MAW	30
CG 2ND BDE ROKMC	7
CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CG USASUPCOM DNG	1
CG 173RD ABN BDE	2
CG FORLOGCMD DNG	5
CG 1ST LOGCMD LBN	2
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GROUP CHL	3
CO 30 NCR	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	17
CO 1ST CAG	1
CO 3RD CAG	1
CO 4TH CAG	1
CO 1ST BN, 525TH MI DET	25
CO 517TH MI DET	1
CO MCB 40	1
CO MCB 121	1
CO 4TH PSYOP GROUP	1
DSA I CORPS	11
CMDR, 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SGN	3
COMNAVFORV	1
COMNAVSUPACT DNG	2
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2
OSA/EMB SAIGON	1
DET B, 1ST MIBARS	1
CIB	1
CTG 76.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTF 115	1
7TH AIR FORCE (IGS) BDOC	1

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45TH ENGR GROUP	1
620TH TCS, APO 96203	1
366TH AIR SEC SQD, USAF	2
620TH TSC	1
SPO-SEC CMD QHN	1

C. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (WITHIN HQ, III MAF)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP C/S PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	42
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (C/O G-3)	2
2D BDE ROKMC LIAISON OFFICER	1
PSYOPS	5
1ST RADIO BN	11
HORN DASC	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO.	1

D. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

CO 1ST MP BN DNG	1
CO 3RD MP BN DNG	1
CO 2ND CAG	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
HQ 212TH CMBT AVN BN	6
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
CTG 115.1	1
CCN	1
US NAD	1
DIR, CAP	1
7TH PSYOP BN	1
1ST FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
CO MCB 74	

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

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NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

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			NAVY FILE NUMBER								DATE	

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G-FOR INFORMATION
H-RETURN TO _____
I- _____
J-DISPOSITION _____

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
					COMMANDANT
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
1	G	11/13	11/17	GS	G-2 for I P.R.
					G-3
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
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					WOMEN MARINES
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PIR #44-69 26 Dec - 1 Nov 69

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

UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 44-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE



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HQ III MAF, G-2
DANANG, RVN
3 November 1969
Ser: 0122969

PERINTREP 44-69

Period covered 260001H October - 012400H November 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13 ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. Most indicators of enemy initiated activity registered declines again last week, following the trend of the previous reporting period. However, incoming for the week totaled 568 rounds, an increase of 71 percent over last week's 333 rounds. Enemy initiated ground incidents declined by 49 last week, dropping from 218 to 169. This is the second lowest total recorded so far this year. The lowest was 158 for the week 5-11 October. Enemy KIA also decreased during the reporting period, down 27 to 495. The number of Hoi Chanhs dropped sharply last week from 233 to 125, a decrease of 108 or 46 percent.

Counterintelligence related VC/VCI Activities of the past week reflect concerned emphasis on gaining the allegiance and loyalties of the south Vietnamese people through political indoctrination, social exploitation, and propaganda techniques. In this regard, high priority is being placed on the expansion of women's, youth, and farmer's front associations through concerted recruiting and proselyting program. Simultaneously, large scale efforts appear to be underway to obtain legal documentation and status for enemy cadre by such means as false rallying and attempted bribing or coercing of civil servants. Such efforts are designed to infiltrate selected cadre into GVN controlled areas and agencies in order to perpetrate the political struggle from within. As was expected, the enemy was quick to exploit the peace moratorium, conducted in the U. S. on 15 October. Propaganda themes allude that the moratorium demonstrated the discontent of the American people and that President NIXON would soon be forced to capitulate to their demands for peace, thus delivering Vietnam into the hands of the NLF and PRG. A captured enemy document dated 12 October 1969 related to the changes in disposition and increased vulnerability of remaining GVN/Allied Forces as the result of the 3d Marine Division being withdrawn from QUANG TRI and the Route 9 Area. The document directed that a careful reconnaissance be conducted in that area prepatory to launching violent military, political, and military proselyting attacks. Enemy terrorist activities remained at a low level during the past week. No sabotage incidents were reported.

a. QUANG TRI (P). In QUANG TRI Province, the pattern of enemy initiated action changed somewhat during the past week in that the

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focus of his attacks shifted from the central DMZ Area to the eastern DMZ and he reserved his efforts for ARVN units in preference to U. S. elements. In addition he confined himself to attacks by fire rather than combining them with periodic ground attacks as has been the case in recent weeks.

For the most part, the enemy used 82mm mortars in his attacks, using rockets only on the 27th when he fired five 122mm's into the rear command posts of the 1st ARVN Regiment and 11 ACAT at LA VANG, four kilometers southwest of QUANG TRI City (YD 325495).

The remaining attacks by fire were fairly well distributed throughout the week with the heaviest attacks occurring on the 29th when the enemy, probably elements of the 270th NVA Regiment, attacked and harassed elements of 2/1 ARVN, 3/2 ARVN, and 3/7 ACAT as they operated in and close to the DMZ four to five kilometers northeast of GIO LINH. Obviously sensitive to a small 2/1 ARVN patrol operating in the southern half of the DMZ, the enemy first directed 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire at the patrol about mid-morning and another 110 rounds in the late afternoon at the patrol and the reaction force dispatched to assist its exit from the DMZ. There were no ARVN casualties reported in either instance. Meanwhile, the enemy used harassing mortar fire against elements of 3/2 ARVN and 3/7 ACAT as they operated in the same general area, but south of the DMZ. Firing twenty-eight rounds of 82mm mortar on three different occasions about mid-day, the enemy was unsuccessful in inflicting any casualties or damage on these latter ARVN units.

Other than this protracted series of attacks by fire on the 29th when the enemy fired a total of 158 rounds of 82mm mortars, the enemy fired another 138 rounds of 82's against elements of the 1st ARVN Division in the GIO LINH area on the 26th, 30th and the 31st.

It is believed to be too soon to say what significance should be placed upon these events in the past week, but since none of the attacks by fire were followed by ground attacks. It may well be that the enemy is simply registering his sensitivity to friendly operations close to the DMZ.

b. THUA THIEN (P). THUA THIEN Province continued to remain relatively quiet with one notable exception. This took place on the 27th when 4/1 ARVN made contact with an estimated enemy company 18 kilometers west southwest of Camp EVANS (YD 370257). Subsequently identified through captured documents as an element of the K-35 Artillery Battalion of Military Region TRI-TIEN-HUE, the enemy suffered 23 KIA. The ARVN unit also captured four 120mm mortars in this engagement which is the first instance of this number of 120mm mortars being captured in northern I Corps, rather than being recovered from a cache. Later the same day, the 1st Company 3/54 ARVN while searching bunkers nine kilometers southeast of PHU BAI (YD 970147) found three VC, who surrendered, one 60mm mortar, four AK-47's, one SKS, and assorted documents.

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c. QUANG NAM (P). In QUANG NAM Province, the tempo of activity dropped off somewhat during the past week with noteworthy enemy initiated activity limited to two attacks by fire. The remaining contacts made during the week were friendly initiated and resulted from friendly patrolling, reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. The first attack by fire occurred on the 28th when the enemy, probably elements of the 90th NVA Regiment, directed 10 60mm mortar rounds against H&S Company, 1/5 Marines, three kilometers north of AN HOA (AT 840487) with no casualties or damage. The second attack occurred on 1 November when H&S 3/7 Marines received 16 unknown type mortar rounds 16 kilometers southeast of AN HOA (BT 002427). The enemy fire, probably initiated by elements of the 36th Regiment or 3d Sapper Battalion resulted in light casualties.

In contrast with this enemy initiated activity, friendly operations made 10 contacts with the enemy in a variety of situations ranging from reconnaissance teams calling artillery missions on enemy troops which they had observed to patrol contacts. These engagements resulted in 67 enemy killed and nine weapons captured. In addition to these results, A/1/7 Marines discovered two tons of rice buried in earthen jars about 12 kilometers northeast of QUE SON (BT 072462).

For the most part, particularly large combat units sought to avoid contact during the week with a growing number of reports that the 141st NVA Regiment has moved from its normal base area northeast of THUONG DUC (ZC 1861) to a new location in the vicinity of the Laotian Border. In contrast with this, prisoners captured this past week indicate that local force are preparing to increase their activities. For example, the executive officer of the C-2 Company R-20 Battalion who was captured on the 28th has stated that the R-20 Battalion and several other local force units were scheduled to attack a number of targets in and around DANANG in late October and early November. While the enemy's plans may have been preempted by the capture of this PW as well as by friendly operations, it appears that the enemy's current plan may call for large combat units to regroup and prepare for future operations beginning probably in December of January, while local force units insure that FWMAF are kept preoccupied by a series of limited ground attacks, attacks by fire and interdiction of lines of communication. Such attacks may well include emphasis on sapper attacks, for in such attacks, the enemy can inflict substantial damage with relatively few troops. To stage sapper attacks in QUANG NAM Province, the enemy has at least three sapper battalions (3rd NVA, T-87 MF and T-89 MF) with growing evidence there may be a fourth such battalion, the 10th. In addition, there are also increasing reports of so called water sappers and water sapper training which most likely emphasizes attacks against bridges as well as ships and boats of various types.

d. QUANG TIN (P). Noteworthy contacts with the enemy in QUANG TIN Province remained at a relatively low level. Significant enemy initiated activity was restricted to scattered attacks by

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fire while friendly operations produced only one contact of note in which five enemy were killed about 15 kilometers north of TAM KY (BT 287378).

The two most noteworthy attacks by fire occurred on the 29th and 31st. In the attack on the 29th, the enemy, probably the 78th Artillery Battalion, directed four 122mm rockets at the CHU LAI Area about midday. Casualties and damage were light.

The other attack by fire took place two days later on the 31st when the 3rd PF Platoon nine kilometers south southwest of THANG BINH (BT 150330) were hit by an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds while they were building an outpost. Two PF's were killed and another four wounded.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). QUANG NGAI Province was relatively quiet, except for several engagements in the MO DUC area, there was only one other action of note wherein H Troop 17th Cavalry engaged and killed six enemy 17 kilometers west northwest of QUANG NGAI City (BS 481772).

The several engagements in the MOC DUC area took place on the 30th and 31st and most likely involved the 38th Local Force Battalion believed to be operating in that area. On the 30th, while elements of 2/4 ARVN were preparing night defensive positions, they were attacked by an estimated two enemy platoons. Preceded by 40 rounds of mixed mortar and RPG fire, the attack was broken off after about an hour. Enemy casualties are unknown while the ARVN casualties were light.

The second contact occurred the following day farther to the northeast (BS 765598) when 3/4 ARVN on a search and clear operation engaged an estimated enemy platoon. This time the enemy lost 10 killed and five weapons captured with no friendly casualties.

While friendly operations produced few contacts with the enemy, they did uncover three sizeable enemy supply caches, one on the 25th was mainly an ammunition cache found eight kilometers northwest of BA TO (BS 523407), another on the 1st was principally a weapons cache 20 kilometers west of QUANG NGAI City (BS 451747) while the final one, again on the 1st, was a food cache containing about four tons of rice 18 kilometers west northwest of QUANG NGAI City (BS 481783).

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. The analysis of the situation remained essentially the same as it was last week.

Indications of enemy movement into the mountains for training, rest and reorientation continue. However, this is not unusual, and the enemy retains his capability of returning quickly to his area of operations on short notice. Agent reports and PW interrogations have consistently been predicting a Winter/Spring Offensive to start sometime in November or early December. The enemy, while preparing for this possible offensive and awaiting further developments in our

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conduct of the war, will follow the pattern of harassing attacks against combat units, with particular emphasis being placed on attacks on pacification security elements, terrorism and interdiction of lines of communications.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents decreased from 218 to 169 for the week of 26 October - 1 November. These incidents consisted of one ground attack (none of which were company size or larger and one platoon size or smaller) no ambushes, eight attacks by fire, 93 harassing fire incidents, 39 mining and booby trap incidents, no hamlet harassment incidents, one assassination incident, no espionage incidents, no kidnapping incidents, and 26 propaganda incidents.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire decreased from 114 to 95 incidents for the reporting period and 20 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 26 October - 1 November.

Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	394
60mm Mortar	96
Unk Cal Mortar	49
122mm Rocket	29
TOTAL	568

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant enemy caches were captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 26 October to 1 November 1969.

(a) 27 October: B/1-20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade captured a rice cache in the vicinity of DUC PHO (BS 789443) as

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indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
8,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was buried underground in assorted clay crocks, baskets plastic bags and wooden boxes. The rice was in poor condition and was destroyed.

(b) 29 October: B/1-20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade captured a rice cache in vicinity of DUC PHO (BS 793448) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
4,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was found under a false floor in a hut that lead to a small bunker in which the rice was found. The rice was wrapped in plastic. The rice was evacuated to MACV - DUC PHO and given to refugees.

(c) 31 October: A/1/7 Marines discovered a rice cache 12 kilometers northeast of QUE SON (BT 072462) as indicated below:

QUANTITY	MANUFACTURER	ITEM
4,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was found in a village and was buried approximately eight inches below the surface. It was contained in earthen jars and usable. The rice was evacuated and turned over to G-5 representative.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 26 October - 1 November.

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
120mm Mortar	4
82mm Mortar	178
81mm Mortar	23
60mm Mortar	127
175mm Artillery	6
155mm Artillery	1
105mm Artillery	106
122mm Rocket	1
106mm RR	9
57mm RR	1
TOTAL	456

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(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	210
Crew-Served Weapons	31

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 26 October - 1 November.

Date	Location	Amount (lbs)		Capturing Unit
26 Oct	(AT 975306)	2,400		I/3/7
26 Oct	(YD 150434)	250	Food	D/1/506
27 Oct	(AT 905372)	500		E/2/7
27 Oct	(AT 969312)	100		I/3/7
27 Oct	(BS 622458)	300		A/4/3
28 Oct	(AT 918707)	30		D/1/26
28 Oct	(AT 834586)	25		B/1/5
28 Oct	(AT 979282)	60		E/2/5
28 Oct	(BT 078455)	1,500		A/1/7
29 Oct	(AT 811471)	250	Tea	B/1/5
29 Oct	(AT 811471)	200		B/1/5
29 Oct	(AT 811471)	25	Salt	B/1/5
29 Oct	(BS 793448)	4,000		B/1/20
30 Oct	(AT 885548)	400		E/2/5
30 Oct	(AT 905397)	1,000		E/2/5
30 Oct	(AT 887544)	100		H/2/5
30 Oct	(AT 947598)	300		B/1/5
30 Oct	(BT 071469)	740		A/1/7
31 Oct	(BT 088459)	1,000		A/1/7
31 Oct	(BT 071469)	1,300		A/1/7
31 Oct	(AT 887542)	1,800		H/2/5
31 Oct	(AT 887542)	850	Food	H/2/5
31 Oct	(AT 887542)	30	Tobacco	H/2/5
31 Oct	(AT 887542)	50	Food	H/2/5
31 Oct	(AT 899398)	300		A/1/5
31 Oct	(BT 002426)	150		K/3/7
31 Oct	(BT 072460)	4,000		A/1/7
01 Nov	(AT 877512)	400		A/1/5
01 Nov	(AT 849486)	250		B/1/5
01 Nov	(AT 849486)	50	Tea	B/1/5
01 Nov	(AT 873558)	50		H&S/2/5
01 Nov	(AT 873558)	50	Food	H&S/2/5
01 Nov	(AT 873558)	100	Food	H&S/2/5
01 Nov	(BS 481783)	8,000		H/17 Cav
01 Nov	(AT 955586)	500		L/3/1
01 Nov	(BT 659016)	300	Salt	A/5/46
01 Nov	(BT 659016)	50		A/5/46
	TOTAL RICE	29,455		
	TOTAL SALT	325		
	TOTAL FOOD	1,300		
	TOTAL TEA	300		
	TOTAL TOBACCO	30		

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t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA.

Structures Destroyed	160	Structures Damaged	50
Bunkers Destroyed	80	Bunkers Damaged	11
Secondary Explosions	5	Secondary Fires	30
Boats Destroyed	1	Bridge Damaged	1

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ decreased in comparison to the previous week. There were 495 KIA's, 42 VC PW's, and 18 NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	QUANG TRI	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	85	90	94	87
Low	72	73	73	73
Rainfall (total)	6.50	13.71	7.52	10.88
Winds (knots)	7	9	6	6
Visibility (miles)	5	6	7	6

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 1 - 7 November 1969

(a) General. A front presently situated in central CHINA is expected to move southwards bringing increased northeasterly winds into ICTZ. The resulting deterioration of the weather will last until the end of the outlook period.

(b) ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the period is partly cloudy with occasional ceilings as low as 2500-3000 feet along the coast and 1000-2000 feet in the mountains with isolated showers in the late afternoon and evenings. Increased cloudiness and rainfall begining 4 November and continuing to the end of the outlook period. Precipitation in ICTZ will be approximately two-five inches with isolated instances

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of six-ten inches maximum precipitation occurring mainly in the western section.

3. - 1. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following courses of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to five infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(3) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with the equivalent of up to five infantry regiments supported by three rocket battalions, four sapper battalions, and one engineer battalion.

(5) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with six infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and two artillery battalions.

(6) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and two artillery battalions.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

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d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to five infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Continuing shortages of food and medical supplies coupled with sickness and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z.

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 44-69 AS OF 012400H NOVEMBER 1969

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-hq	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	10	2,960	2	535			12	3,495	16	7,480	28	10,975
Bn's-Maneuver	38	9,050	13	2,110	3	570	54	11,730	44	18,470	98	30,200
Bn's-Support	16	4,130	2	370	1	195	19	4,695	10	2,480	29	7,175
Separate Co's	1	130			33	2,345	34	2,475	1	80	35	2,555
TOTAL CONFIRMED		18,235		3,015		3,110		24,360		29,945		54,305
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's									1	285	1	285
Bn's-Maneuver	3	955	1	350	1	200	5	1,505	1	455	6	2,460
Bn's-Support	5	1,335					5	1,335	4	1,145	9	2,480
Separate Co's	1	90			2	155	3	245			3	245
TOTAL PROBABLE		2,380		350		355		3,085		1,885		4,970
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									2	800	2	1,800
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support									17	4,950	17	4,950
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										6,690		6,690
		20,615		3,365		3,465		27,445		38,520		65,965

See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,120		150	3,270
	Probable	345			345
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,465		150	3,615
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,355		475	3,830
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,355		475	3,830
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	4,945	1,180	550	6,675
	Probable	1,130	350		1,480
	Possible		300		300
	TOTAL	6,075	1,830	550	8,455
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,680	630	650	3,960
	Probable	380		280	660
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,060	630	930	4,620
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,135	1,205	1,285	6,625
	Probable	525		75	600
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,660	1,205	1,360	7,225

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS																DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL											
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	32	0		32	10			10	3			3	45			45	35	7		42	80	7		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	38	3		41	13	1		14	3	1		4	54	5		59	36	9		45	90	14		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	6	2	1	9	1			1	1			1	8	2	1	11	2	3	10	15	10	5	11	26
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	5
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		2	3	2	1	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1					1			1
TOTAL SUPPORT	16	5	1	22	2			2	1			1	19	5	1	25	8	4	22	34	27	9	23	59
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	54	8	1	63	15			16	4	1		5	73	10	1	84	44	13	22	79	117	23	23	163

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	269	Nam Hoa	50	Hoa Vang	812	Thang Binh	940	Binh Son	311
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	56	Hieu Duc	50	Tam Ky	449	Son Tinh	474
	Trieu Phong	113	Hong Dien	69	Dien Ban	1,090	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	437
	Cam Lo	150	Vinh Loc	43	Dai Loc	341	Hiep Duc	208	Nghia Hanh	336
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	251	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	279	Mo Duc	453
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	333	Hau Duc	172	Duc Pho	463
	Huong Hoa	5	Phu Vang	11	Que Son	943			Tra Bong	166
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	107	Duy Xuyen	1,065			Ba To	197
			Huong Thuy	77	Hieu Nhon	291			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	529					Son Ha	170
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	917	THUA THIEN	1,239	QUANG NAM	5,045	QUANG TIN	2,163	QUANG NGAI	3,021

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,385

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,035		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	570	Unlocated	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	PR	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	575	Unlocated	XD 8732/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	C	325	Unlocated	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	C	370	Unlocated	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	C	375	Unlocated	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	

*See note #4 on page A-17
**See note #2 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	300		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1576/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/17Jun69
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1267/24Sep69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,045		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	YD 1765/13Oct69
C.11 Sapper Co	NVA	C	80	VINH LINH Special Zone	
27th Bn	NVA	C	205	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0959/16Oct69
15th Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,955	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Regt Hq	NVA	C	710	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 9661/5Sep69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	2,010		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YD 0309	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,570		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	215	Unlocated	YD 3300/15Jul69
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,575		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	YD 1259/11Jun69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	335	XD 9265	XD 8362/60ct69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27Jun68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	300	XD 8854	
C-9 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	45	Vic YD 1566	
C-10 Co, 31st Group	LF	C	70	Vic YD 2667	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,590		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 4541/160ct69
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	YD 1943/8Sep69
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	175	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	240	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	105	Vic YD 3535	YD 2540/17Sep69

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	890		
Rdgt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	275	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	260	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jun69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,725		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	330	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	160	Vic YD 6514	YD 6019/6Sep69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	350	Vic YD 3304	YD 5226/8Sep69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
K.35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	
C.113 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 4032	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	65	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	UNK		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
577th RL Bn	NVA	C	305	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
Hai Van Engr Bn	NVA	PR	325	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	C	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102d Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103d Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	505		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	165	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	110	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2d Bn	NVA	C	120	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3d Bn	NVA	C	110	BT 1252	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,065		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	ZC 1835	ZC 1945/50ct69
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
2d Bn	NVA	C	240	ZC 1861	AT 8754/10May69
3d Bn	NVA	C	305	ZC 1861	AT 8355/21Apr69
573d Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unlocated	
575th Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unlocated	

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	685		
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	175	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
R.20 Bn	MF	C	145	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	MF	C	130	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.7 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	100	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	115	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	45	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	3,955		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	665		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	AT 9226	
1st Bn	NVA	C	175	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	175	AT 9226	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	175	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	180	BT 1623	BT 2340/12Aug69
72nd Bn	LF	C	175	BT 1917	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	195	BT 2113	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	200	BT 2217	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 3304	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	250	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4213	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	80	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	105	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	290	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	125	BS 4677	BS 5279/20Oct69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	165	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	680		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	150	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4386	BS 4786/13Sep69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69
C.17 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	55	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7555	BS 7559/17Oct69
C.120 Co	LF	C	45	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	70	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 5596	
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,615	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
Div Hq	NVA	C	440		
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	870		
Regt Hq	MF	C	345	BS 7825	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	180	BS 7825	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	180	BS 7825	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	165	BS 7825	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6337	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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BINH DINH PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,700		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	520	BR 7363	
8th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 5950	
9th Bn	NVA	C	300	BR 5929	

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 250001H October to 012400H November 1969

a. No significant changes.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

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9. Subordination/operational control, "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter Box Numbers (LBN), Armament, and Personalities listing.

NORTHERN I CORPS/DMZ/LAOS

UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
B-5 Front	DMZ Front			Chief of the Rear Service Staff Dept B-5 Front; Hoang KHUE
12th AT Bn			18x7.62mm LMG	
13th Arty Bn			12x60mm Mort 6xHMG 3x82mm Mort 50xLMG/SMG 12x120mm Mort	
14th AA Bn				CO-Luu Van MAN
15th Engr Bn				CO-Capt LOI XO-SrLt TAI
16th Signal Bn				
17th Trans Bn				
19th Medical Bn				

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
304th NVA Div	"Cua Cao" Div; Vin Quang Group		5x82mm Mort 3x75mm RR 9xLMG 5xHMG	CO-SrCol Hoang KIEN XO-Maj HIEN PO-Col CAM APO-LtCol Pham Xuan KINH
Div Hq				
14th AA Bn				
15th Engr Bn				
16th Sig Bn				
18th Med Bn				
19th Trans Bn				
20th Sap Bn		13741 US	9x82mm Mort 9x60mm Mort ?xB-40	CO-Capt Ha Van CU XO-SrLt Vu Van LOC PO-Capt Bui Dinh TU APO-SrLt Nguyen Trung TU
9th Regt	U-1; U-9; E-9; D-9; F-9 Song Lo Regt 1; 1st Regt; Trung Doan Thep; K-27			CO-LtCol TROUNG PO-LtCol Le Dang DUY CofS-SrCapt THO XO-Maj HUY
1st Bn	T-1; D-1	13634 IS (?) 13653 US 13638 US		CO-Nguyen Huu TOAN XO-Dac Duy NHAT CofS-Capt A APO-SrLt Dang XUAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd Bn	T-2; D-2	13639 IS (?) 13642 US		CO-SrCapt Huynh Ngoc SON XO-Capt DUAN PO-SrCapt TUI APO-THANH
3rd Bn	T-3; D-3	13644 IS (?) 13644 US		PO-Maj TAM
24B Regt	57th Regt; 2nd Regt; U-2; Yen Tu; E-2; 24th Regt			CO-Maj Tran TRAI XO-NGUYEN
4th Bn				PO-Maj Le TAM
5th Bn		13675 US 13676 US		XO-1stLt CHUONG
6th Bn		13678		
66th Regt	U-3; U-66; 4th Regt; E-3			CO-LtCol Ding Dinh HO XO- PO-LtCol Tran TRAC
7th Bn	T-7	13696 US (?)		CO-Capt TANH XO- PO-Capt NHI
8th Bn	T-8	13701 US		CO-Le Van TAN XO-1stLt NGOAN PO-JrCapt HIEN
9th Bn	T-9	13706 US (?)		CO-SrCapt HAND XO-Capt TRUNG PO-SrCapt TUI APO-PHUC CofS-Capt KHANG

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
325th Div, B-5 Front	Nong Truong Tam Div; 308th Div			CO-Col BINH XO-LtCol KHAN PO-LtCol THAI
14th AA Bn			?x12.7mm AA HMG	
15th Trng Bn				
16th Med Bn				
17th Sig Bn				
18th Engr Bn				
19th DKZ Bn			?x122mm Rkt	
20th Trans Bn	D.20 Bn	18046 XP		CO-Capt Dang Van CO XO-1stLt Do Van THOA PO-JrCapt Tran Xuan THU APO-1stLt LUAN
21st Conval Bn				
25th Sapper Co				
26th Recon Co				
27th Cadre Co				

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
36th Regt	Doan Hong Vu; 1st Regt; 95th Regt	18409 RT	29xB-40,B-41 6xDKZ 57mm RR 3x82mm Mort 6x60mm Mort	CO-Maj Pham HUNG
1st Bn	D-1; K-1			CO-SrCapt TRUC PO-Capt NHAN
2nd Bn	D-2; K-2	92902		CO-Tran Minh DANG
3rd Bn	D-3; K-3			CO-LtCol Do LUONG XO-Maj Nguyen Hung CHUONG PO-Maj DUC CofS-LtCol TRUC
88th Regt	7003B; F-88; Quyet Thang	62332 18439 TQ		
4th Bn	D-4; Z-4			CO-Capt MY XO-1stLt LONG PO-Capt TRI
5th Bn		31278 US		
6th Bn				
102nd Regt	Me Cong; 1001; 7001; Thu Do (?); Dist 70			CO-LtCol LUC XO-Maj THAN PO-LtCol HIEN APO-Maj SUU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	Bn 71			
8th Bn	Bn 73			CO-Capt TAN
9th Bn	Bn 75			CO-Capt LOAN XO-Capt NGHI PO-Capt TAI APO-1stLt HAI
138th Regt, B-5 Front	Bach Dang Regt; 24 Indep Regt; 132nd Regt	30119 US		CO-HOAI XO-HO PO-DU APO-LANG CofS-LUAN
1st Bn		30516	?xLMG ?xB-40, B-41 ?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x12.7mm HMG ?x57mm RR	CO-KHAC XO-DUNG PO-NGOT
2nd Bn	Hau Loc (V), Hong Ha (D)	30521		CO-SrLt TAM XO-SrLt TAM
3rd Bn		30526 XB		CO-Capt HO XO-MAN PO-NGOT
246th Regt	246Z Regt; F-6; F-4			CO-Maj CHU XO-TIEP PO-Maj LONG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Bn	H-1; U-1; Phai Khat; K-1	93976 OK 93977 OK 93978 OK 93979 OK		CO-Capt Mac Tinh DANG XO-Mai Van TU PO-Dap THAI
2nd Bn	H-2; U-2	93978 OK		
3rd Bn	H-3; U-3			
270th Regt, B-5 Front	Quang Tri, E-270; 270th Battle Group; 32nd Regt	32549 XB		CO-LtCol Hoang Van DUON XO-Maj Tran Duc MINH APO-Capt LAM
4th Bn	268th Inf Bn; D47; 47th Regt; 47th Bn	32548 XB 32553 XB (?) 32549 XB		CO-TUAN XO-THIEN PO-Maj Nguyen Duy DUC APO-KHANH
5th Bn	310th Inf	32558 XB(?)		CO-SrCapt Duon Xuan HAI
6th Bn		31400 XB(?)	6x82mm Mort	CO-Capt TUONG PO-LINH
27th Regt, B-5 Front	Ken Giang; Phan Rang; 271st Regt ; E-27	93900 OK		CO-Maj THAT PO-Maj Nguyen Trong TAN APO-Maj LU
1st Bn		93901 OK		
2nd Bn	43rd Bn, Nghe An (P) Main Forces; K-2; 43d Bn	93906 OK		

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd Bn	44th Bn, Ha Thinh (P) Main Forces; PR 12	93911 OK	4x82mm Mort 2xLMG 2x57mm RR (DKZ) 8xB-40	CO-1stLt Vo Xuan THAN XO-JrCapt Nguyen Duc DONG
78th Arty Regt, B-5 Front	E.78			
10th Bn	D.10			
11th Bn	D.11			
12th Bn	D.12			
84th Arty Regt, B-5 Front	"Van An" Regt		?x140mm Rkt ?x120mm Mort ?xB-41 ?x122mm Rkt	CO-Maj Ta VAN XO-Maj CO PO-Maj DU
2nd Bn	Thong Nhat; 33rd Bn(?) K-33	54279 RT (?)		
3rd Bn	Ha Tinh	54283 RT (?)		
4th Bn	Ha Dong	54289 RT (?) 54290 RT (?)	?x140mm Rkt ?x102mm Rkt ?x120mm Mort	CO-Capt HA XO-Le MAN PO-Lt Le Van THIEN APO-Phac THAM CofS-VAN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
164th Arty Regt, B-5 Front				
1st Bn				
2nd Bn	D-2			CO-Nguyen Phuc TRUNG
3rd Bn				
1st Bn, 204th Arty Regt, B-5 Front	K-1 Bn; K.33 Bn			CO-SrCapt LIEN XO-Capt LONG PO-SrCapt CUONG CofS-HUU
665B Arty Regt, B-5 Front	E675B			
Regt Hq				
1st Bn	D85 Bn		6x85mm How	
2nd Bn	D74/1 Bn		6x122mm Gun	
3rd Bn	D74/2 Bn		6x122mm Gun	
NVA Sap Combat Grp, 126th Naval Sapper Regt, B-5 Front	LA, 4007, 4002			CO-Thanh Van MINH XO-NO PO-SrLtCol KHANH APO-SrCapt THAI Rear Services-Capt THUOC Medical Officer-SrLt THAI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st Co				Co Cmdr-Capt Duy TINH
2nd Co				
3rd Co				PO-SrLt Nguyen Xuan THU
4th Co				Co Cmdr-SrLt CHE XO-SrLt CHINH PO-Lt TRI
33rd Sapper Bn	Kontum; 33	94154 XB 94155 XB 94156 XB 94157 XB 94158 XB 94159 XB	3x60mm Mort 16xB-40 3xB-41	CO-Capt Thai Ba QUYEN XO-Capt THO PO-Capt NGON APC-Capt CHUONG CofS-1stLt Tran XUOC
31st Group, B-5 Front	Doan 31; Song Hong Grp; 31st Regt; Bach Dang			CO-Le Mong HUNG DCofS-Nguyen Duc MIEN
C.9 LF Co	H-30; 30-H; Cam Lo LF Co; K-9	41367 41368		CO-Thai Tang NGO XO-VAN PO-CHAM
C.10 LF Co	4001; 5th Co; Gio Linh Co; K.400 Local Force Co; T.10 Co; Gio Le Co; K.10	41369 41370	3x60mm Mort 2xB-40 6xBAR	CO-1stLt DAM
C.11 NVA Sapper Co	K-11			CO-TINH

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UNIT	AKA	LRN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
27th Indep Bn, 31st Group	27th Support Bn; K-1; 2nd Bn; 7th Ind Bn; Tay Ninh Bn; Cam Lo Bn; 70th Indep Bn; 27th Regt; Song Giang(?); D-27 Co (COWL ZOX)	31728 KT	?xB-40 ?x120mm Mort ?xLMG ?x60mm Mort	CO-Capt DIEN XO-2ndLt Nguyen Van DAI PO-Nguyen Khao UNG APO-WO Duong Dinh PHO
15th Bn, 31st Group		94081 OK		CO-LUU

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UNIT	AKA	LRN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
MRTTH, MR-IV				
MRTTH HQ	Northern Front; Northern Sub-Region; North Div HQ Phan Khu Bac; Di Hai; Tri Di Hai Thien Sector; K-500;	H-700 Bac Do BQ 20 FM		CG-MajGen Le Chuong (AKA Le Truong TIN) XO-Col Bui SINH (AKA DUNG SINH) FGPO-MajGen BAY FGAPO-Gen VAN CofS-Maj MINH
General Staff	K.400	41000 FM KC.10		ACofS-LtCol THAI CON
Operations Section		KC.1		Sec.Chief-LtCol Nguyen THOA
Military Intelligence Section		KC.2		Sec.Chief-Maj NGOC
Signal Section		KC.3		Sec.Chief-LtCol Hoang THANH
Personnel Section		KC.4		Sec.Chief-
Crypto Section		KC.5		Sec.Chief-
Sapper Section		KC.6		Sec.Chief-
Engineer Section		KC.7		Sec.Chief-
Artillery Section		KC.8		Sec.Chief-LtCol Trung KIEN
Training Section		KC.9		Sec.Chief-
Political Staff	K.300	41001 FM KP.12		ACofS-DOAN SUJ
Cadre Affairs Section		KP.1		Sec.Chief
Organization Section		KP.2		Sec.Chief
Propaganda Section		KP.3		Sec.Chief
Security Guard Section		KP.4		Sec.Chief-SrCapt TRAN CUC
Military Proselyting Section	K.300B	41003 FM KO.16		ACofS-Maj VU QUAN
Rear Services Staff	K.200	41002 FM KJ.14		ACofS-Maj KHAM
Plans Section		KJ.1		Sec.Chief-1st Lt DANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quartermaster Section		KJ.2		Sec.Chief-1stLt Tong Viet PHU
Ordnance Section		KJ.3		Sec.Chief-Capt HUONG
Medical Section		KJ.4		Sec.Chief-SrCapt Dinh Nhu [illegible]
Finance Section		KJ.5		Sec.Chief-
Political Section		KJ.6		Sec.Chief-
Militia Section	K.100	KZ.10		ACofS-LtCol Tong Ho TRINH
MRTTH HQ (FWD)		TBQ 20 FM		CO-SrCol Nguyen Nhu THIET AsstCmdr/CofS-Col Nguyen Thi [illegible] POL-Col Nguyen THA
7th Front, MRTTH	Quang Tri Lib. Front; 9th Front; Doan 7; AD.49	EFQ		CO-Col Sung LAM XO-LtCol Vu BINH PO-SrCol Vu THANG APO-LtCol Le Kha PHIEU CofS-LtCol Nguyen Van THU
STAFF SECTION		E1FQ		ACofs-
Plans Sec.				Sec.Chief-SrCapt Phan Van HY
Intelligence Sec.				Sec.Chief-JrCapt TOAN
Sapper Sec.				Sec.Chief-VU
Finance Sec.				Sec.Chief-Capt DUONG
Personnel Sec.				Sec.Chief-Nguyen Ngoc THO
Training Sec.				Sec.Chief-TAM
Signal Sec.				Sec.Chief-MANH
POLITICAL SECTION		E2FQ		AcofS-Maj TOAN
PROSELYTING SECTION		E3FQ		AcofS-Capt TUNG
Propaganda Sec.				Cmdr-1stLt TU
Reorientation Sec.				Cmdr-1stLt HIEU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
REAR SERVICE SECTION		E4FQ		ACofS-Maj KHAM
K-8 Bn, 7th Front	808th Bn; 8th Bn; 2nd Prov Forces; 9th Indep Bn; Le Hong Phong Bn; Chu Luc	41344 FQ 41345 FQ 41346 FQ 41347 FQ 41348 FQ	12x60mm Mort 4x82mm Mort 2x75mm RR 2xLMG 48xB-40 12xB-41	CO-Capt Nguyen Duc HONG XO-Capt KHICH PO-Capt THANH APO-SrLt XICH CofS-SrLt Nguyen Thoc NHON
K-14 Bn, 7th Front	814th Bn; H-14; K-7; Bat Nhat; K-6	41349 FQ 41350 FQ 41351 FQ 41352 FQ 41353 FQ	3x57mm RR 1xB-40 2xLMG 2x81mm Mort 2x57mm RR	CO-SrCapt XOE XO- PO-Capt NONG APO- CofS-SrLt Tran Thien DUC
10th Sapper Bn, 7th Front	K.20 Bn; 10th Group; 30th Sapper Group; Quang Tri Sapper Unit	41354 FQ 41355 FQ 41356 FQ 41357 FQ 41358 FQ	?xB-40 ?xAK-47	CO-Capt Van DAU XO-SrLt Ho Van TRUOC PO-CHINH
K-11 Sapper Bn, 7th Front				CO-Capt Vu Ban CAM XO-BAO CofS-DAT PO-Vu Van TIEN
K-34 Arty Bn, 7th Front, MRTTH			18x122mm Rkt 6x122mm RL	CO-TRACH XO-TUAN PO-TO CofS-CHAT
812th Regt, 324B Div	Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; Cong Truong; "1 May" Regt; 4th Regt Song Thu Bon; Ba Vi Song Cua; Thuan Doc Lap; Co Dong (Mobile) Regt; Song Huong Regt; 53rd Regt; Cua Thuan Regt; Nui Ba Vi; Thu Bon River Regt; Cong Truong 7; 7th Regt; D82; Doan 2; AD.35	41399 FQ(?) 31610 RT 31611 RT 31612 RT 31613 RT 31614 RT 31615 RT 31617 RT 31618 RT 31619 RT	?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x60mm Mort ?x57mm RR ?x12.7mm AA MG ?xLMG	CO-LtCol Tong Sy GUY PO-THUONG APO-Bui Van NANG XO-Maj Minh LONG CofS-Maj Nguyen The BAO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
4th Bn	K-4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn; K-18	31620 RT 31621 RT 31622 RT 31623 RT 31624 RT		CO-Capt PHUC XO-JrCapt ANH PO-Capt TRAM APO-1stLt TUYEN CofS-Lt BINH
5th Bn	K-5 Bn; Cong Huong Bn; Tuyen 4; T-4; 4 Ba Vi; D-4; K-16	31625 RT 31626 RT 31627 RT 31628 RT 31629 RT		CO-Nguyen Van PHONG XO- PO-2ndLt Nguyen Van BICH
6th Bn	K-6 Bn; D-6 Bn; Thu Bon; Cuu Long Bn; Tuyen 6; 6th Ba Vi Bn; K-8	31630 RT 31631 RT 31632 RT 31633 RT 31634 RT		CO-Capt Cao BA XO-Nguyen Xuan HOA PO-HAI
4th Regt, MRTTH	AD.14; Doan 4	41410 FT 41418 FT 41420 FT 41425 FT		CO-Maj Tran Huu CHU PO-Maj Tran Van VUNG DepPO-Maj Nguyen Tien THUONG APO-Capt Nguyen Nho TUC XO-Maj Nguyen Van UC
K4B Bn	802nd Bn; K.2; Van Troi Bn; 2nd Bn; H.400	41166 FH 41167 FH 41168 FH 41169 FH 41170 FH	4x81mm Mort 12x60mm Mort 2x57mm RR 6x3.5" RL 10xB-40 6xAA HMG	CO-Capt Nguyen SONG XO-SrLt PHUNG PO-Capt HO
K4C Bn	1st Bn, 4th Regt; 4th Bn, 9th Regt; 822nd Bn; H.402	41522 FT 41523 FT	2x82mm Mort	CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUAT XO-1stLt Tran Van BOI PO-Capt Nguyen Van KHANH APO-Asp TRUNG CofS-1stLt THANG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
5th Regt, MRTTH	22nd Regt; AD.25; Doan 5; 5th Worksite; Hue City Unit; 95th Regt	41270 FH 41271 FH 41272 FH		CO-LtCol Tran Than MOT XO-SrCapt TUYEN PO-LtCol VAN
K4 Bn	804th Bn; VO 74; Cao Van Grp; Sung Lo; Q.3	41435 FH 41436 FH 41437 FH 41438 FH 41439 FH 41288 FH 41289 FH 41290 FH 41290A FH 41290B FH	1x82mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG 20xRPD 6xB-40 10xB-41	CO-Maj Tran Dinh CHUONG XO-1stLt TAM PO-Capt Nguyen Van HAY APO-SrLt MAI CofS-HUU
K10 Bn	810th Bn; 3rd Bn (?) Q.4	41440 FH 41441 FH 41442 FH 41443 FH 41444 FH 41291 FH 41292 FH 41293 FH 41293A FH 41293B FH	3x81mm Mort 2x82mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 3xRR	CO-SrCapt Le Van BAU XO-Capt Nguyen Van NU PO-Capt Nguyen Van DUY CofS-Do Quoc HUYNH APO-Nguyen Huo DU
Chi Thua 1 Sap Bn	K-1; K-21 (THO)	41283 FH 41284 FH 41285 FH 41285A FH 41285B FH		CO-Maj THO XO-HIEN PO-VU APO-Le Ngoc DIEP
Chi Thua 2 Sap Bn	K.2; K.21 (VU)	41286 FH 41287 FH 41287A FH 41287B FH 41287C FH		CO-Nguyen Van VU XO- PO-HIEN APO-CAO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K.32 Arty Bn, 5th Regt, MRTTH	1st Bn, 84th Arty Regt; QE.02; D.832	41502 FQ 41294 FH 41295 FH 41296 FH 41296A FH 41296B FH		CO-THICH PO-Pham Ngoc BI APO-Capt Le Van VU XO-Nguyen Quang DA CofS-
6th Regt, MRTTH	Cong Truong 6; 6th Work-site; Ham Tu; AD.26; Doan 6	41300 FE 41316 FE 41317 FE 41318 FE 41319 FE 41320 FE 41321 FE 41322 FE 41323 FE 41324 FE 41325 FE		CO-Maj Huynh AN XO-Maj Nguyen Quang KHANH (AKA Nguyen Quoc KHANH) PO-Maj Nguyen Quang CAM APO-SrCapt Tran THO CofS-Capt Hong Kim THO CofPolit Sec-Man Huong Huu AN
800th Bn	K.1; 1st Bn (?); L.1	1520 Q 40700 ST 41301 FE 41302 FE 41303 FE 41304 FE 41305 FE	9x82mm Mort 8x60mm Mort 3x57mm RR 8x3.5" RL 9xB-40 6xLMG 4x75mm RR	CO-Capt DIEN XO-Capt Tran Minh DUONG PO-Capt Nguyen Van THANH APO-SrLt Pham DUYET CofS-SrLt Nguyen Ke VAY
802nd Bn	K.2; 1st Bn, 9th Regt	43920 FE 41306 FE 41307 FE 41308 FE 41309 FE 41310 FE	4x82mm Mort 2x57mm RR 3xHMG ?xLMG ?xB-40	CO-Capt Vo Dai AN XO-SrLt Do Dinh PHUNG PO-Capt Nguyen Huu DAM APO-SrLt Le Duc LOC CofS-SrLt Duong Quang TUOI

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UNIT	AKA	LRN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
806th Bn	2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le Loi; D.10; 3rd (?); 80.T Bn	41311 FE 41312 FE 41313 FE 41314 FE 41315 FE	3x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 3x75mm RR 3x57mm RR 3xHMG 12xB-40 4x3.5" RL	CO- XO-SrLt Pham Quong LOC PO-SrLt Pham Quong VINH CofS-SrLt Hoang CHUC
K.12 Sapper Bn	812th Group 12; Dac Cong 12			CO-SrLt Dang Viet HONG XO- PO-Capt Tran Ba QUAT APO-SrLt Ho Van BA APO-SrLt Van The HANG
K35 Arty Bn, MRTTH, 6th Regt		41112 FM		
9th Regt, MRTTH	Doan 9; AD.79 FR; Thang Long	41390 FR 41391 FR 41392 FR 41393 FR 41394 FR 41395 FR 41396 FR 41397 FR 41398 FR 41399 FR		CO-Maj Dang Thong DE PO-LtCol Phan KY APO-Capt Bui Van DAO XO-Maj Nguyen Tu TY CofS/XO-Maj Le Van A CofPolit Sec-Maj Ha Duc DUC
K.16 Bn	Dong Do; T.902; F.801 FR; 816th Bn; 416th Bn; 3d Bn, 9th Regt	41406 FR 41407 FR 41408 FR 41409 FR 41410 FR		CO- PO-Capt Tran Xuan VU APO-SrLt Pham Tien KHANG XO-SrLt Thai BAY CofS-SrLt Bui Manh TIEN
K.18 Bn	Dong Ha; T.903; F.802 FR; 818th Bn; 418th Bn; 2d Bn, 9th Regt	41411 FR 41412 FR 41413 FR 41414 FR 41415 FR		CO-SrCapt Dang Huy MICH PO-SrCapt Van VU APO-SrLt Le Huy CAY XO-Ho Ba NHUAN CofS-SrLt Nguyen Kim THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K.15 Bn	815th Bn; 415th Bn; 1st Bn, 9th Regt; Q-6; F.800 FR	41416 FH 41297 FH 41298 FH 41299A FH 41299B FH 41400 FR 41401 FR 41402 FR 41403 FR 41404 FR 41405 FR	2xB-40/B-41	CO-Capt HO 1st XO-SrLt Vu Duc HAU XO-SrLt Vu Ngoc TRINH PO-SrCapt Pham Dinh DINH APO-Capt Pham Huu KY CofS-SrLt Vu Ngoc THAO
29th Regt, 325C Div, MRTTH	Ken Giang; Ba Na; 3rd Regt; Song Lo Regt; Doan 8; AD.68	32868 RT 32706 RT 32722 RT 32723 RT 32724 RT 32725 RT 32726 RT 32727 RT 32728 RT 32729 RT 32730 RT 32731 RT	8x82mm Mort	CO-Maj Chau HOAT/LtCol Tran SIKCH XO-SrCapt Nguyen HOAN PO-SrCapt Vo DUOC APO-Maj CAY CofS-SrCapt Dau Ba HA
7th Bn	K-7; 1st; D-1; D-7	32707 RT 32708 RT 32709 RT 32710 RT 32711 RT	4x82mm Mort 4xHMG 8x60mm Mort	CO-SrLt Nguyen TRAN XO-SrLt Le Van HA PO-
8th Bn	K-8; 2nd; D-2; D-8; Duc Lap Bn	32712 RT 32713 RT 32714 RT 32715 RT 32716 RT	4x82mm Mort 4xHMG	CO-Capt HANG XO-Capt CAN PO-Capt HANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
9th Bn	K-9; 3rd; D-3; B-9	32717 RT 32718 RT 32719 RT 32720 RT 32721 RT		CO-SrCapt Nguyen Van HO XO-Capt CHONG PO-CANH
803rd Regt, 324B Div, MRTTH	Cuu Long; 1st Regt; Cong Truong 21; Song Huong; Cua Tung; Tam Dao; Cong Truong 1/5(?); 41st Regt; K-14B Regt; Phan Thiet Regt; Doan 1	31551 RT 31552 RT 31553 RT 31554 RT 31555 RT 31556 RT 31557 RT 31558 RT 31559 RT	?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x60mm Mort ?x12.7mm AA ?xLMG	CO-Maj Luu Quang MAU XO-Capt Mau DUYET PO-Maj DAM APO-Capt Le Van DAO CofS-
1st Bn	T-1 Bn; K-1 Bn; Tam Dao 1; Song Lam; Song Huong; C-1	31560 RT 31561 RT 31562 RT 31563 RT 31564 RT		CO-Capt Bui Khac HUY XO-Capt Tran PHUOC PO-Nguyen Dinh CU APO-1stLt Le Man CHAU
2nd Bn	T-2 Bn; K-2 Bn; Thu Bon; Song Huong 2; Tam Dao 2; C-2	31565 RT 31566 RT 31567 RT 31568 RT 31569 RT		CO-Capt DUC XO- PO-SrLt XE APO-SrLt NAM CofS-SrLt SUU
3rd Bn	T-3 Bn; K-3 Bn; Tam Dao 3; Song Cuong 3; C-3	31570 RT 31571 RT 31572 RT 31573 RT 31574 RT		CO-HO XO-KINH PO-DUC APO-THUY CofS-Do Xam CHI
65th Arty Regt, MRTTH	Doan 12; AD.30			CO-TAN XO- PO-NGHIEP

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
K-40 Arty Bn	K-50; QE.06; D.850		?x85mm Field Gun	
K-41 Arty Bn	QE.07		?x122mm How	
K-42 AAA Bn	QE.08		37mm AAA Gun	
K-43 AAA Bn	QE.09		23mm AAA Gun	
H-99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co; Vinh Ling Co		1xLMG	CO-Vo BA XO-Tran BUN PO-DUNG
C.113 Co	Armed Co of Phong Dien District; P.14; D.1; X.11; V.35; H.23; KQ.10; AK-5	41426 FM	1X81mm Mort 2X60mm Mort 12XSMG	CO-LANN XO-LAI PO-THAN APO-Tran Van THUAN
C.114 Co	D-3; P.15; Quang Dien LF Co; V.40; H.25; KQ.20; AK.7; H.319	1847 Bac Ha 41427 FM	2X60mm Mort 4XB-40	CO-MUNG XO-HOA PO-HA
C.115 Co	D-2; X-3; K-5; Huong Tra LF Co; P.16; KQ.30; AK-9	41428 FM	2XHMG 2X60mm Mort ?XSMG	CO-LE XO-LUA PO-HUNG
C.116 Co	D-4; X-4; P.17; Huong Thuy LF Co; KQ.40; V.50; H.29; AK.12; C.268 Co; C.216 Co	41429 FM	2X60mm Mort ?XHMG	CO-Nguyen Huu LUYEN XO-Tran Viet HUNG PO-NGACH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
C.119 Co	C.19; BIET DONG Ranger		2XB-40	CO-Ho DOI XO/PO-Nguyen CUONG
Phu Loc Armed Bn	K-3, V-6		3X60mm Mort 3XB-40	CO-Nguyen NGUYEN XO-Phan CHANG PO-Nguyen XUAN

SOUTHERN I CORPS/BINH DINH (P)

UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
Military Region 5	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa; H-601; F-102 KW; Thon An 620	20100 GM 21900 GM Bac Hien		CO-MGen Hoang Van THAI XO-LtCol Nguyen CHANH (AKA BINH) PO- APO-LtCol Tran KHUE CofS-Col Le TRUC
Front 4, MR-5	Unit 70; Group 44; K-44	P6400; 6700 Ap Thai		CO-BGen Le BINH XO-Col HOE PO-THUAN CofS-Maj CUC APO-PHUOC

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
70A, Front 4	Military Staff	P6407; 6707 AP Thai		CO-Capt DONG XO-JrCapt LANH PO-Capt KHANH
70B, Front 4	Political Section Staff	P6414; 6714 AP Thai		CO-LtCol Bui DU XO- PO-
70C, Front 4	Rear Service Staff	P6425; 6725 AP Thai		CO-Tran Dinh TRUC XO-YEN
1st Comm Bn, Front 4	70SC	P6460; 6760 AP Thai		CO-Maj Ha Van CAU XO-Capt Van XUAN PO-Maj CHINH
42nd Recon Bn, Front 4		P.6513 Ap Thai		CO-Capt Tan PHAT XO-SrLt Duc MINH PO-Tranh TRIEU APO-1stLt CAN C/S-QUYNH
1st Flamethrower Co Front 4		1888 AP Thai	40XLP050 Chicom	CO-1stLt MAI XO- PO-1stLt CANG
HAI VAN Engr Bn	1st Engr Bn; Cuu Long Bn	6780 AP Thai (SVN) 2380 QT (NVN)	1x82mm Mort 2x60mm Mort 6xB-40 1xB-41 3xRPD LMG's	CO-Capt CHU XO-Capt DINH PO-DINH APO-Pham Van DUYEN
C-31st Ind Co	Doc Lap Co, Q.55 Co	8302 GD	2X82mm Mort 2X60mm Mort 3X60 30Cal MG's	CO-Pham Van LOI XO-Nguyen Quy Truong PO-Nguyen Van MINH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
31st NVA Inf Regt, 341st Div, Front 4	P25 Regt; Unit 5550; Infil Grp 150C; Song Huong Regt (Red River); 31st Worksite	3134 KT P6270 6670 Ap Thai 31457 3459 KT	9x12.7mm AA Guns 6x82mm Mort 75mm RR	CO-LtCol HUNG XO-Maj SA PO-LTC Ho Quang DAM APO-Maj Nguyen Chung TANH CofS-SrCapt NGOC
102nd Bn	F.8 Bn; D.8 Bn; D.2 Bn; 150B; 150C; 8th Bn	6687 Ap Thai P6287 31349 31349 KT 6627 Ap Thai Ap Thai 7566	4x82mm Mort 9x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-THANH XO-SrLt DO PO-Tran Minh SON CofS-SrLt Le Dinh THUC APO-Lt DAT
103rd Bn	F.9 Bn; 3rd Bn; D.9 Bn; D.3 Bn; F.9 Bn; 150A; 9th Bn; K.9 Bn; C.9 Bn	P6292 6692 Ap Thai 3459	4x82mm Mort 9x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41 ?x12.7mm AA Gun	CO-Capt TRINH XO-SrCapt Phong LICH PO-Capt NAM CofS-Capt CHINH
36th NVA Inf Regt, 308th Div, Front 4	Unit 1016; Unit 9530 Song Nong Regt; D.304; E.36; Group 6		?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort 6x75mm RR ?x12.7mm AA Guns	CO-LtCol Do PHAM XO-Maj SOAN PO-LtCol Nguyen THANG APO-Maj SANG CofS-DUONG
1st Bn	Unit 9531; D.1 Bn	6217 Ap Thai 6933 Ap Bac 62205 IS	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xRPG-2 ?xRPG-7 ?x7.62mm LMG ?x12.7mm AA Guns	CO-SrCapt Nguyen MINH XO-UNK PO-Nguyen MINH CofS-SrLt HAI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
2nd Bn	Unit 9533; Unit 1016A; D.2 Bn; K.2 Bn	6218 Ap Thai 6938 Ap Bac 62201 Ap Bac	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41 ?x12.7mm AA Gun	CO-SrCapt CHUONG XO-SrLt SON PO-Capt HOA
3rd Bn	D.3; K.12; Replacement No 2006	6219 Ap Thai 6943 Ap Bac 62210 XP	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-SrCapt NHUY XO-DUNG PO-SrCapt DINH APO-SrLt MIEN
90th Regt	3rd Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Danang Grp; Doan 3; AD.10; Cong Truong 63; Cua Viet; Nui Quyet; 60th Regt; 38th Regt	41.210 FL 41.211 FL 41.212 FL 41.213 FL 41.214 FL 41.215 FL 41.216 FL 41.217 FL 41.218 FL	?x82mm Mort 3xUnk mm RR 3x120mm Mort	CO-LTC THUOC XO-Capt DANG PO-HOA APO-HA ACofS-Lt CHUONG
7th Bn	K.7 Bn; 17th Bn; D.7 Bn; T.7 Bn; Nui Quyet Bn	41.219 FL 31650 XB 41.220 FL 41.221 FL 41.222 FL 41.223 FL	3x82mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 6xB-40 6xB-41	CO-Capt Hong Ba LANG XO-Lt LOC PO-Lt XUAN APO-UNK
8th Bn	K.8 Bn; 18th Bn; K.38 Bn; D.8 Bn; 108th Bn	41.224 FL 31655 XB 41.225 FL 41.226 FL 41.227 FL 41.228 FL	3x82mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 9xB-40 3xB-41	CO-SrCapt PHUOC XO-Capt NHI PO-SrCapt DOT APO-Capt NAM

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
9th Bn	K.9 Bn; 19th Bn; D.9 Bn; Nui Quyet Bn; B.19	41.229 FL 31660 XB 41.230 FL 41.231 FL 41.232 FL 41.233 FL	3x82mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 3xB-40 5xB-41 2x7.62mm MG	CO-SrCapt THUY XO-SrLt THUY PO-Capt Phau Thanh THUYEN APO-Lt CHUONG CofS-Lt TAN
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20; B-20; Viet Dung; 70th Bn; 1st Bn; F.5 Bn; Q.90 Bn	6788 Ap Thai 21341 GM Ba Ha 190 Viet Dung	4x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-SrCapt THONG XO-MY PO-BA CofS-BA APO-BE
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn; R.25 Bn; 2nd Bn; B.25 Bn; Q.92 Bn; 2nd Indep Bn of Quang Da	2116 Quang Da 192 Viet Dung P6493 6793 Ap Thai A4192 and Dung A44T.193	4x81mm Mort 3x60mm Mort ?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR 8xB-40 4xB-41	CO-Capt Tran BINH XO-Nguyen LUONG PO-Tran NINH APO-Le HIEU
D.7 Bn	F.7 Bn; 1st Bn; D.3 Bn; 101st Bn	P6498 6798 Ap Thai Q.80 Anh Dung	5x82mm Mort 5x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt THOM XO-Capt KHOI PO-Capt TRANG

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
T.89 Sapper Bn	402nd Sapper Bn; YH.9; Tien Lua Bn	P6454 6754 Ap Thai 370 Thanh Khiet	6x81mm Mort 1x82mm Mort 18xB-40 2xHMG	CO-SrCapt NGOC XO-SrLt TO PO-Capt Tran Kim HUNG CofS-1stLt NAM
3rd Sapper Bn	103rd Sapper Bn; Lam Son Bn; Q.91 Bn; B-47 Sapper Bn; 710 Bn	P6475 6775 Ap Thai 63148 IS(NVN)	6x82mm Mort 5x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt Pham Van ON XO-HUNG PO-Capt Tran HUYNH CofS-Lt COI
141st Regt, 312th Div, Front 4	1st Regt; 3008 Group	1523 VR(NVN)	?x82mm Mort ?x81mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x12.7mm AA Gun ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Maj NGUYEN XO-Capt DUONG PO-Maj HAO
1st Bn	Pho Thong Bn; K.1 Bn		?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?xB-40 ?x12.7mm Tripod Mounted AA Gun	CO-Capt Nguyen Van CON XO- PO-Capt SAM
2nd Bn			?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x57mm RR ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt MAO XO-HUU PO-SrLt DIEU
3rd Bn		7425(NVN) 74222 CS(NVN)	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41 ?x75mm RR	CO-Capt CANH XO-1stLt HAY PO-SrLt UONG CofS-Lt Doan Van MIA

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
573rd Rocket Bn,	Unk	Unk	122mm Rkt Launchers	CO-SrCapt Do Nguyen VAN XO-Capt DAN PO-SrCapt Cao Van THOI APO-Capt Nguyen KIM ADJ-SrLt HONG CofS-SrLt LY
575th Rocket Bn,	Unk	Unk	122mm Rkt Launchers	CO-THUC XO-TUC PO-Unk APO-Capt Nguyen The DUOC CofS-GIAO
T.87 Sapper Bn	Truong Son Bn; 2nd Sap Bn; HH (Hoa Hieu)	P6470 6770 Ap Thai	3 X 82mm Mort 3 X 60mm Mort 3 X B-40's B-41's	CO-NGON XO-CAN PO-LIEN

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
577 Rkt Bn, Front 4	130th Bn; 134th Infil Grp;	6620 Ap Hoa 54387 HT	18X122mm Rkt Launchers 6XB-40's 6XB-41's	CO- Nguyen Thanh THUAN. XO-Capt Dang Van THUONG PO-Capt To Duc LUC.. CofS- KHAM APO-DOAN
2nd NVA Div, MR-5	Thon An 520; Su Dong 2; Ham Tu 2; 620th Div; Agricultural Site #2; Chi Lang; Ta-310; Nam Hai; Nong Truong 2	20601 GM 20925 GM Tay An H.4500 Ap Nam 42.40 HK 41910 KP		CO-BrigGen Le THACH/KIET XO-BrigGen Hoang Minh DAC/SON PO-BrigGen VIET/CHUONG
GK.37 Trans Bn		2062 Nam Hai		CO-Pham Ngoc HOANG
GK.38 Medical Bn		5060 Ap Nam C		CO-Capt Nguyen Van TU XO-1stLt Nguyen Van HIEU PO-Capt Le Hong HAI

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
GK.30 Signal Bn	RQ.20/A Bn;RQ.20; V-107 RQ. 20/B Bn; Nam Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20 HT 20605 GM Tay An		CO-TUNG XO- PO- APO-Nguyen Ba CHU
GK.31 AA Bn	195th AA Bn; 519 AA Bn; 38th AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn; RQ.21		17x12.7mm AA	CO-Capt Huong Quy PHAN XO-Tran Van THIEN PO-QUANG
GK.32 RR Bn	RQ.22	Hai Cang 20	12x75mm RR	CO-SrCapt THUYLET XO-Nguyen KHUAN PO-TRUONG CofS-SrLt Vo Ngoc HANH
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	RQ.33; RQ.23; RQ.330; 7th Bn	1828/CN Hai Cang 20; 60620 GM Tay An; 22861 GH Hai Cang 20 Tay An; 22631 GH Hai Cang 20 Thu An	6x120mm Mort 18x82mm Mort 81mm Mort	CO-Le Van CAN XO-Nguyen KINH
GK.35 Sapper Bn	D-10 Sapper Bn/T-10 10th Sapper Bn	5053 AP Nam Tu	9xB-41 Rkt	CO-Nguyen Tien VINH XO-CAO PO-Nguyen Duc DUC
GK.40 Engr Bn	RQ.24	GM 20039 Tay An Nam Hai		CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG XO-Nguyen Viet THO PO-Ngoc PHUOC

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
1st VC Regt, 2nd Div	Cuong Truong 1; H-800; 108th Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Steel Regt	6000-6199 H 4600 AP NAM 5101 AP NAM		CO-LtCol Chan Khoi; DIEM XO-LtCol Chu An TAN PO-
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai; 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007 Bau Bang	5645 Quang Trung St.	.30 Cal MG 60mm Mort 81mm Mort 75mm RR 12.7 mm MG	CO-LOC XO-Nguyen Van TUAN
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai; Bong Trang (?) Binh Gia	20735 C.T. An Giang	81mm Mort 60mm Mort 57mm RR 82mm Mort 12.7mm MG	CO-SON XO-CHAT PO-MINH
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008; Thuan Minh; Song Hong (?) Phong Bien	HT 20100		CO-SANG XO-ANH PO-CHU
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; Cong Truong (?) AN LONG; H 213; V-50; K-55	HT 20648 GM An Binh; 880 Nam Ban; H.4880 Ha Bien; H 4700 AP NAM 2; 5201 AP NAM	17x81mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x60mm Mort 2x82mm Mort 4x82mm RR 1x57mm RR	CO-TIEP XO-Nguyen TIEP PO-Capt CHIEN CofS-CHAU APO-Maj DAN
60th Bn	11th Workshop; 1st Bn; 11th Bn; 4th Bn	6604 Long Thanh; J.4700		CO-Ngoc LICH XO-Lt Nguyen Dinh PHUNG PO-Capt Nguyen Duc HO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
70th Bn	135th Bn; 2nd Bn; 72nd Bn (?); 22nd Bn; 5th Bn	J.4770		CO-Nguyen Van THO XO-Lt Nguyen Van CUOC PO-Mai Xuan DIEN APO-Capt TUNG
80th Bn	3rd Bn; 75th Bn (?); Workshop 33; Phi Truong Long Chau; 33rd Bn; 6th Bn	J.4780	?x60mm Mort ?xB-41 ?xB-40	CO-1stLt BONG XO-QUANG PO-SrCapt ANH
3rd NVA Regt	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite 3; Factory 10; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; Nam Ha; 323rd Regt (?); Ap Nam 31st Regt; 33d Regt; Lien Gia 33	HT 5503; HT 20801 GM An Binh; H.4810 Ap Nam HT 4880; HT 4241; HT 4842; HT 4849; HT 5317; Ap Nam 3 (?) 5301 Ap Nam H 4800 Ap Nam 3		CO-NGHIEM XO-Nguyen THANH PO-BINH CofS-Bui Thien Cac
1st Bn	X1; Xuong Mot; Ha Mai; Xuong (Bn) 7; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1 64th Bn; K-7; D7	20728 GM An Binh; H.4860 Ha Mai	3x82mm Mort 3x57mm RR	CO-Capt THANH XO- PO-Lt DUC
2nd Bn	Binh Minh; X-2; K-2; 74th Bn; Xuong Hai; Ha Hai; Xuong (Bn) 8; K-8; Binh Da; D8	20837 GM An Binh; H.4870 Ha Hai		CO-Capt KHAO XO-NHU PO-Capt HUONG
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84th Bn; X-3; Q.56; Nguyen Trai; 103rd Bn; Xuong (Bn) Ba; Ha Bien; Xuong (Bn); K-9; D9	HT 20648 GM An Binh; 880 Nam Ban; H.4880 Ha Bien; HT 5317	2x120mm Mort 6x75mm RR 6x82mm Mort 3x50 cal HMG	CO-MY XO-CHAI PO-HOA

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
3rd NVA Div, MR-5	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Liem Tinh 10; Pho Bac	Hon Thu 2110 GM; 20845 GMT 10 Airfield 10		CO-TRI XO-SON PO-SONG APO-TOAN CofS-TAN
90th Engr Bn	40th Sapper Bn	PH 5082 Ap Dan PH 5081 Ap Dan 5555 Ap Dan	3xB-40 1xB-41	CO-THU XO-Pham Hong KHI PO-DUNG APO-PHU
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infiltration Group	1535; 1534; 10th Airport	12x12.7 AA MG's 18xLMG	CO-SrCapt LIEM XO-KUYET PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY Asst PO-Capt MO
300th Arty Bn	513 Infiltration Group; Xom 30; 499th Arty Bn; 400 Bn; Don VI 499th, Phan Doan 300; X-30, Unit 499, K.13; 30th Rkt Bn	1538	3x120mm Mort 4x82mm Mort 3x75mm RR ?x140mm Rkt ?x122mm Rkt 6x60mm Mort	CO-Lam Duy HIEM XO-LAN PO-HUU
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn;	1544	?x57mm RR	CO-CU XO-DO PO-HI Asst PO-DUONG
551st Signal Bn	D-16	20800 KG		CO-Capt BAO XO-Lt HIEN PO-SrCapt DIEU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
600th Medical Bn	Inter-Det 600; 60th Field Hospital Bn	1548		CO- XO- PO-
2nd VC Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Chien; Worksite II; Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song Hong; 1st Regt; 8th Regt; 96th Regt; 193 GP; 511 Regt; Lien Gia #2; 14th Regt, Pho Dong; Sao Vang; Unit 511	21.100 21.141 21.142 21.143 21.144 21.145 21.146 21.147 21.148 21.149 PH 5100 Ap Dau	2x82mm Mort 2x57mm RR 2xB-41 3xB-40 6x7.62 HMG	CO-KHANH XO-HOANG PO-Mai Van HA CofS-TRI
93rd Bn	707th Infil Group; Chi Ba (Three Sister); H-21 Bn; 93rd Gp; Piti Truong; 104th Bn; 1st Bn	546 Ap Dau 6240 21.120	2x82mm Mort 2xB-41 4xB-40 2x7,62 HMG 2x57mm RR 1xM-79	CO-Dang DOAN XO-BONG PO-DI
95th Bn	705th Infil Group; Chi Nam; H-58; Ba Minh Thong Rang 260; Xom Hai; 2d Bn	21310 GM	2x57mm RR 3x60mm Mort 1xMG 3xB-40 4xB-41 1xM-79	CO-HOA XO-AN PO-TRUNG CofS-LUONG
97th Bn	703rd Infil Group; 207th Bn; Chi Bay; H-21; H-25; Xom 3; 307th Bn; 3d Bn	6340 TL(old) 21.140 GM 21.143	4x60mm Mort 5xB-40 6xB-41	CO-VINH/TRONG? XO-BINH/HOA? PO-OANH/HOA?

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
18th NVA Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803rd Infil Group; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Soa Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt(?); Lien Gia Bon	7173 DS 21155 GM 21150-21199 157; 21 AG Unit 519		CO-Duong Minh NGO XO-HONG PO-Le HOA APO-VOI CofS-DIEU
8th Bn	803K Infil Group; Inter-Unit 5; District 12; Lieu Doi 5; Huyen 32; Lien Doi 5; H-32; H-8; Unit 523; 5th Bn	211670 21171 Unit 523		CO-CUONG XO-THUAN PO-THANH CofS-LUONG
9th Bn	H-9; H-33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn	21172-21176 Unit 525		CO-TUY XO-QUANG PO-ANH CofS-HOANG
22nd NVA Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Group; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3rd Regt; E-101(?); 6th Regt; Lien Gia Sau; Cong Truong 3; Worksite 3; Unit 527; Pho Nam Regt ; Lien Gia 6	21141 VM Binh Dinh (P); 1010 Phi Truong 10; PH5200 Ap Than 21175-21199		CO-YHUAN XO-CO PO-HUNG CofS-BAI APO-SAO

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517th Bn; Inter Group		1x57mm RR 5x82mm Mort 5xB-41 5x12.7mm AA Gun	CO-Tran Van DUYEN XO-Pham Con TUYEN PO-HAN CofS-Capt KHOI
8th Bn	2nd Bn; Bn 516; Xom Tam	21225 Gm Phi Truong 10	4x82mm Mort 1x57mm RR 4x12.7mm MG 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-DUNG XO- PO- Capt THIEN CofS-Capt THANH
9th Bn	3rd Bn; Bn 514; Inter Group 9; Xom Chin; K-3	4739/TA	4xB-40 4xB-41 2x82mm Mort 4x60mm Mort	CO-THI XO-Capt XUNG PO-Capt KHIEN
120th Bn	Q-20; T-20; 20th Bn; 21st Bn; X-20; Tong Doan 20; V.3 Bn	20135	1x81mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 3x57mm RR 3x75mm RR 5xMG	CO-HAI XO-HIEP PO-Nguyen DAN
406th Sapper Bn	409B Bn; Don Vi 406; Tang Son	4141 Ap Bac	1x60mm Mort 7XB-40 7xB-41 1xRR 2x82mm Mort	CO-Pham SU XO-DUNG PO-Dung Quang HUAN APO-TU
107th Arty Bn	270th Bn; 2nd 12.7mm AA Bn; D.107th Bn; Mountain Gun Bn; GK.31 AA Bn; Unit 743	777 Tran Quoc Tuan	5x12.7mm AA 18xSMG 1x75mm RR 6x82mm Mort ?x140mm Rkt	CO-Nguyen HONG XO-CHI PO-TY CofS-Capt CHI Adj-Lt SIU S1-BO S4-1stLt Ong HANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
9th Sapper Bn	2nd Bn	1088	2x60mm Mort 2xB-40	CO-Maj Vu Van QUANG XO-Mui Van THIET PO-Mai Van TRUONG
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38; D-3; Unit 133; Nghiep Doan 8; X.13; Black Tiger Bn; Unit 740; Anh Ba Tu	2048 NQ Ba Bao	2x30 Cal LMG 1x82mm Mort 2x57mm RR 8xB-40 8xB-41 4x60mm Mort	CO-MAI XO-TAM PO-DUA CofS-Luong Van NAY APO-HAI CofS-SANG
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 4th Labor Union; 48th Worksite; 2nd Bn(?); K.48 Bn; Don VI 130; X.13; Unit 741		2x81mm Mort 2x57mm RR 3x60mm Mort 3xLMG 2x82mm Mort 1x75mm RR ?xB-40 3xM-79	CO-TAN XO-QUA PO-LANH APO-LONG CofS-SANG
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Cuu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-Mountain White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103 Ounh Gia(?); Bong Trang	20647	3x81mm Mort 4x60mm Mort 4x57mm RR 5xLMG 12xB-40 RL	CO-CHUA XO-LY PO-SON

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
72nd Bn	X.72; R.13; H.68; 33rd Bn; Truong Son; Chu Dung; 103rd; 300; 305 GP; Hoi Chang 15; X-22 An Khe (506)	21993 Hanh 21445 GM 25010	2X82mm Mort 2X81mm Mort 6X60mm Mort 3X57mm RR 2X12.7mm AA MG's 15XB-40 RL 6XB-41 RL	CO-Nguyen Van CAN XO-Nguyen Van LE PO-KHANH
74th Bn	V.20; V.74; 75th		1X60mm Mort 1XIMG 3X57mm RR	CO-DUC/QUANG (?) XO-THAI/Yeu THAN PO-QUYET
76th Sapper Bn	K.55; C.75; Flying Tiger 21; V.16 Bn; X-16		1X60mm Mort 4XB-40 RL 3XB-41 RL	CO-TIEN XO-VINH PO-XUM
78th Arty Bn	X-78; Xuong 78; 78 DKB; F-78		6X122mm RL 5X82mm Mort 2X57mm RR ?XB-41 RL	CO-THONG XO-XAM PO-TOI
81st Co	Worksite 81; Code No T120; D.1; D.81; X.81; T.760; 85th Bn; Bac Son Binh; Unit 742; 81st Bn	778 GM Tran Ducc Suan	1X60mm Mort 3XB-40's 1XB-41's	CO-Nguyen Ba LAM XO-THANH PO-Nguyen Ngoc NHAN AsstPO-PHANG
409th Sapper Bn	Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach Son Worksite; X-20; 575th Bn; A-58; 409A Bn; K-5 Sapper Bn; Sapper R-5; 307th Bn; Bac Hien	20142 GM 20144 GM Bac Hien 1291 KW Bac Hien; Ba Hoa; X2424; 20142 GM; 4116 A-12 Bac Tien	?X81mm Mort 7X60mm Mort 3X57mm RR	CO-VAN XO-TAO PO-VIET

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
V.14 Co	A.14 Co; 113th Co; K.53 Co; 14th Co; NK.108; A.19		1xLMG	CO-Huynh TIEN/Pham TO XO-Nguyen PHUONG PO-
V.15 Co	K.51; 107; FO 14; A.10; D.21; Thang Binh Co; B.104		1x60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-QUANG PO-CONG
C.17 Co	Mo Duc Co			CO-Nguyen DIEP XO-Lt PHUOC PO-NOI
V.18 Co				CO-Nguyen Thi THANH XO- PO
C.18 Co	Nghia Hanh LF Co		1x60mm Mort 4xSMG	CO-TAM XO-BINH PO-BAY
C.19 Co	C.19B (?) (Possible)		3x57mm RR 4xB-40 2x60mm Mort 2xLMG	CO-Nguyen SON XO-Le Van THANH PO-MAU
T.20 Co	C.20; Son Tinh Dong Co; V.20; C-137		1x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG	CO-KHANG XO- PO-THANH
P.31 Co	T.19 Co; D.31 Co; T-31 Co		2xB-40	CO-DUC XO-PHUOC PO-MANH APO-NAM
C.74 Co			1x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG	CO-GIO (or GIAO) XO-THUOC PO-NAM
C.75 Co	Unit 139; C-16 Co; 506 LF Co		6xM-79 2xB-41 ?xB-40 1xMG 1x60mm Mort	CO-DA XO-XU PO-NAM

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
C.120 Co	Unit 145		6xThompson SMG 3xMAT-49 SMG 2xB-40	CO-QUANG XO-TU PO-
C.7 Co	Unit 139; C.16 Co; 506 LF Co		1xLMG 1x60mm Mort 6xM-79	CO-DA XO-XU PO-NAM
Q.80 Co, Front 4	Hoi An Co; X.62 Co; 72 Co; Q.12 Co; 44th Bn; F.12 Co	180 Anh Dung	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Tran BUA XO-Bua THAI PO-HIEN
Q.81 Co, Front 4	Duy Xuyen Co; H.52; 103rd Co; 73rd Co; Q.13 Co; Q.13B	181 Anh Dung 2103	3x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Nguyen Dinh BON XO-Nguyen THAM PO-Nguyen HOA
Q.82 Co, Front 4	Dien Ban Co; H.40 Co; X.55 Co; 104th Co; X.65; Q.15 Co	182 Anh Dung 133 Tuong Lai 21335 GM Ba Ha	2x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort ?xRPG-2 ?xRPG-7	CO-Huynh Viet NGAN XO-Tan Chung NGO PO-Mai Phuoc KIEM
Q.83 Co, Front 4	Q.14 Co; H.42 Co; X.64 Co; 74th Co; Dai Loc Co	183 Anh Dung 21334 GM Ba Ha	2x60mm Mort 2x81mm Mort 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-Nguyen CHAU XO-Nguyen Quang HUNG PO-Le Long PHUNG
Q.84 Co, Front 4	Q.16 Co; X.66 Co; X.17 Co; Hoa Vang Co	184 Anh Dung 21336 GM Ba Ha	2x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort 6xB-40	CO-Hoang Minh NGHIEM XO-DONG PO-AI
21st Sapper Co	T-21, H-40	22422	2xLMG 2x60mm Mort	CO-Ho Khanh DU XO-Ha Thanh LIEM PO-Nguyen Van HU

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
105th Co	Que Son Independent Co	2184 LBN	2x81mm Mort 4x60mm Mort 2x57mm RR 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-1stLt Nguyen HANH XO-2ndLt CA PO-Nguyen UT
C.219 Co	Duc Pho Co; Anh Hai		2x60mm Mort 1xLMG 2xB-40 18xSMG	CO-Nguyen TAM XO-Pham BUOI PO-CAU
706th Co	C.73; A.16; BK.110; K-43	2002	2x60mm Mort 1x57mm RR 6xLMG	CO-Nguyen THANH XO-Pham PHUONG PO-Pham KHAI
K.51 Wpns Co	C.51 Wpns Co		2x60mm Mort 1x57mm RR 1x81mm Mort	CO- XO- PO-
506 "A" Sapper Co	Unit 506			CO-Xo Duc BA XO-VINH PO-DUONG
506 "B" Sapper Co	H-42	Hon Thu 21618 M	?xSMG ?xB-40	CO-LIEU XO-KY PO-DO/HONG/ANH
95A Sapper Co	C95A Sapper Co		1xB-40 1xB-41 1x60mm Mort 1xM-79	CO-Le HOA XO-TUYEN PO-HIEP APO-Nguyen SO
95B Sapper Co	C95B Sapper Co		2xB-40 1x57mm RR 1x60mm Mort	CO-2ndLt Pham Tan HOAI XO-MSgt Phong Hong MINH PO-Asp Le Duy KHANH APO-CAY

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS, AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 44-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P). No significant reports.

2. THUA THIEN (P). No significant reports.

3. QUANG NAM (P)

a. PW, Sgt Nguyen Thai HUNG, Transportation Co, Section 5 (support sub-section), 70A, Front 4, who was captured on 23 October 1969, 17 kilometers southwest of AN HOA (BT 018412) (271428Z Oct 69 CG First MAR-DIV Init Interr Rpt 28 Oct 69, G-2 I Corps Brief Notes) stated that the mission of the transportation company was to gather and store rice in base areas for pick-up by agencies of 70A. The rice gathering point was located in Hamlet #4, XUYEN TRA (V) (BT 072495). The rice gathering missions are run every other day. The various groups, composed of over 100 men, rendevous between 1900H and 2000H and are composed of members from various units. The PW had talked with individuals from the 21st Regt, 2d NVA Div, 36th Regt, 91st Sapper Bn, and the 69th Replacement Bn during these missions. The rice is transported by boat, moving up river, to the collection point. The boats usually number eight to ten and are operated by a unit designated as "K650". The PW stated that the 2d Plt, with the PO and XO of the company was located vicinity (BT 002417). The 1st Plt, with the Company Commander was located at the HON TAU Mountain (AT 970385) (hearsay) and the 70A (military staff section of Headquarters, Front 4) was located vicinity (ZC 1437) as of 23 October 1969. The PW further stated that a water-sapper unit had infiltrated into RVN in July of 1969 and was currently hiding in a secret area known as the "HON TAU" area. The unit was equipped with small automatic weapons and numerous explosives (NFI). The mission of this unit is to destroy shipping and bridges in the vicinity of DANANG City (NFI) but no dates were given for these attacks. The PW also gave the following units and their locations within QUANG NAM Province: (1) Front 4 vicinity (ZC 0638) (April 1969 to present); (2) 31st Regt, HAPPY Valley area (VIC AT 8570); (3) 36th Regt, HON TAU area (VIC AT 9837); (4) 141st Regt, since August 1969 have been moving from the ARIZONA area to a back area (NFI) for reorganization; (5) 575th Arty Bn, vicinity (ZC 185400); and (6) D.91 Sapper, ARIZONA area center of mass (AT 8350).

(G-2 COMMENT: The reference to the rice pick-up point at "XUYEN TRA (V)" has been reported many times as a main supply point in the enemy's food procurement program. It is believed that this area is important to many enemy units in QUANG NAM Province, but this is the first time that the 21st Regt and elements of the 2d NVA Div coming to QUANG NAM Province for rice has been mentioned. The K650 Unit is a supply unit that operates in the southern area of the province. The statement of a sapper unit equipped with small automatic weapons might refer to the 7.65mm VZSOR 60 Machine Pistol (VZ 61) (Skorpion) which was reportedly issued to sapper units last

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summer. Statements pertaining to the locations of various units is in accordance with previously reported information, with the exception of the 91st Sapper Bn which is currently held in the QUE SON Mountains (AT 9639). All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, Hoang Ngoc TUAN, Company XO, C-2 Co, D.1 Bn/AKA R.20 MF Bn, District III, was captured on 28 October 1969 10 kilometers south of DANANG (BT 045685) (290829Z Oct 69 CG First MARDIV 1st IT Spt Rpt) stated that the D.1 Bn was located in DUY XUYEN (D), exact location unknown, as of 28 October 1969. The 2d Plt was located in MANG QUANG #2 (H) (BT 045685) as of 28 October 1969 and the 1st Plt with the Company Commander near CAM SA #1 (BT 078643 as of 28 October 1969. Their mission was to recon an ARVN unit located in TRUNG LUONG (H) (BT 044727). The PW stated that the future mission for the 2d Plt, with three members of the LF VC, was to attack the ARVN post at vicinity (BT 044724) in two elements on 30 October around 0100H. District III is to begin a series of small attacks on 30 October. A large scale offensive was to begin on 2 November and terminated on 2 December 1969. This offensive is code designated "LB". The D.1 Bn is to attack the 51st ARVN Regt, located vicinity (BT 025607) (approximately 020100H Nov 69). The Nguyen Huu THONG Co is to attack the MARBLE Mountain area (exact location unknown) (hearsay). The CK4 Rocket Co is to rocket the DANANG Air Field with 122mm rockets fired from vicinity HOA PHUNG (V) center of mass (BT 055700) (020200H Nov 69) and the CK2 Water-Sapper Co is to destroy the I Corps Bridge on 020100H Nov 69. The K36 LF VC Co, subordinate to III Unit, Front 4, is to mortar MARBLE Mountain Air Facility with 82mm mortars from HOA PHUNG (V) center of mass (BT 055700). Also on the same date and time, the 4th Mortar Co of the R.20 Bn will mortar an ARVN OP located vicinity (BT 018680) to neutralize ARVN counterfire.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location given for the D.1 Bn/AKA R.20 Bn in DUY XUYEN (D) coincides generally with present III MAF holdings. The information concerning the 2 November attacks is recorded in such detail for the first time and gives strong indications of a new offensive to coincide with "Vietnam National Day" on 1 November. All information rated (F-3).)

c. PW, PFC Tran Van MIEN, 7th Co, K.2 Bn, 141st Regt who was captured on 19 October 1969 seven kilometers east of THUONG DUC (ZC 213554) (221730Z Oct 69, SA QUANG NAM Sector, HOI AN Init Interr Rpt 280542Z Oct 69, CG III MAF Trans ARVN Interr Rpt 11th ITT 156-69) stated that the 141st Regt started its departure from QUANG NAM Province in early August 1969. Some elements of the 31st Regt and the 575th Rocket Bn went with the 141st Regt for training, rest and reorientation. The remaining elements of the 31st and 575th Rocket Bn were located in the vicinity (ZC 160550 - 175552 - 174575 - 155575). The last battalion of the 141st Regt to leave the base area was the K.2 Bn. The K.1 and K.2 Bn's left behind 20 men each in the vicinity (ZC 181610). The rear element from the K.2 was commanded by a platoon leader named THUY. Their mission was carrying rice, building bunkers, tunnels, and huts for the return of the

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regiment after the monsoon season (Spring, 1970). The PW had hearsay information that the new base area of the 141st Regt was in an area near the LAOS/CAMBODIA/RVN border. From the base camp at (ZC 181610) it takes approximately 11 days to travel to the "new" area. According to the PW, the regiment is being supplied by truck in their new locations. The PW stated that the morale was very low but that NVA troops were encouraged by radio reports of draft resisters, anti-war demonstrations, and anti-war elements in the USA.

(G-2 COMMENT: The statements concerning the withdrawal of the 141st Regt has been previously recorded in both PW and agent reports. The statement concerning the withdrawal of this unit is somewhat substantiated by the general lack of activity or contact with this unit. All information rated (F-3).)

d. Hoi Chanh, Vo Thien TAM/AKA SON, Recon Team, Q.81 Local Force Bn (DUY XUYEN District Forces) who rallied on 15 October 1969 at XUYEN HIEP (V) (BT 005485) (202010Z Oct 69 SA QUANG NAM Sector Init Interr Rpt 11th ITT HOI AN 85-69). The Hoi Chanh related details of a forthcoming attack to take place between 28 October and 5 November 1969. The first mission of "B" Co, supported by the 2d Plt of "C" Co, was to attack the Refugee Center at XUYEN HIEP (BT 005485). The second mission for "B" Co, with one platoon from "C" Co in support, was to attack the ARVN unit billeted in and around the Catholic Church at XUYEN KIEU (V) (BT 040505). Also, one company (NFI) and one platoon from "C" Co was to attack NON TRUC Hill (BT 041511). All attacks were to take place between 28 October and 5 November 1969. The Hoi Chanh further stated that the DUY XUYEN Unit was composed of two infantry companies designated "A" and "B" and a support company designated "C" with a headquarters section. The battalion is composed of 201 men (this includes 10 NVA who joined in September 1969) and is armed with eight B-40 and B-41's, two 60mm Mortars, four 82mm Mortars, two 81mm Mortars, three Heavy Machine Guns and six M-79 Grenade Launchers. Communications equipment includes one PRC-25 and two K-63 Radios used for communicating with Front 4. The unit has one doctor and four medics. The medical personnel were supplied with malaria pills, aspirin, penicillin and Vitamin B12 Tablets. Each man receives two and one-half cans of rice plus $10 VN a day. Rice is collected mainly from PHUOC MY (H), XUYEN CHAU (V) (BT 071508). The Hoi Chanh could only contribute limited knowledge on other enemy units' activities. The 36th Regt was located in XUYEN TUONG (V) (BT 0452 - 0252) in August and September 1969. The Hoi Chanh additionally stated that he had seen 30 men from the 91st Sapper Bn collecting rice at XUYEN HIEP (V) (BT 005485) on 11 or 12 October 1969. Also, the Hoi Chanh had spoken with a man who identified himself as a commo-liaison member of the 141st Regt. The "Dispensary 78" was located in vicinity (AT 969392) (NFI). The Hoi Chanh stated that the morale of the cadre was high but that of the soldiers was low. The LBN of the unit was given as being 181 AN DUNG. Approximately 30% of the battalion's personnel are sick with malaria. The unit maintained a base area in vicinity of Hamlet 8, PHU THANG (V), QUE SON (D) (BT 096510).

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Co "A" was located in vicinity NGAM DONG (H) (BT 005485). Co "B" was located in XUYEN THO (V) (BT 185518) and Co "C" was located in XUYEN THANH (V) (AT 855469). Reported personalities: Bn CO-SrCapt Ngo Dinh TUONG, XO-UNK, PO-SrCapt Than Van LIEM.

(G-2 COMMENT: The strength, composition, armament and designation are all different and much higher than that held by III MAF for the DUY XUYEN District LF Unit. The LHN number given has been previously recorded for this unit. The personalities are reported here for the first time. From the Hoi Chanh's statement, the unit is apparently well supplied, heavily armed and ranks are filled to battalion size. Information concerning the attacks coincides with previously reported information indicating that enemy activity could possibly be on the increase during early November 1969. All information rated (F-3).)

e. PW, Cpl Nguyen Van THANG, 1st Plt, Rear Services Section, 70B, Front 4, was captured on 22 October 1969 in vicinity (AT 846476) (271425Z Oct 69 CG First MARDIV Supp Interr Rpt 13th ITT 11-10-69) and stated that 70B, Front 4 had the responsibility for propaganda and indoctrination of subordinate units and the civilian population. He also stated that 70A, 70B and 70C, Front 4, were located in vicinity (ZC 1548) as of 21 October 1969 and had been in this area since February 1969. Within the base area there are many thatched huts and underground bunkers. The 70B Section is composed of 120 men organized into one propaganda and training section, one civilian training section, one security section, and one troop proselyting section. The re-supply route commonly utilized by the 70B Unit begins in the base camp area (ZC 1548) and continues through the mountains in generally an easterly direction to LOC SON (V) (AT 8046), through AN BANG (3) (H) (AT 808468), AN BANG (2) (H) (AT 818468), and AN BANG (1) (H) (AT 828468), to the THU BON River Bank (AT 8346), and then follows the east bank of the river to the PHU THUAN Market (AT 878516). The PW stated that this route is used almost daily by Front 4 elements. A second route begins at the base camp area (ZC 1548) and continues through the mountains in a southeasterly direction to the THU BON River (AT 8238) (AT 8238), through the southern ANTENNA Valley (AT 9136) then northeast to the HON TAU Mountain (AT 9638), and the railroad tracks at (BT 0647), then north to a bridge (BT 062512), and to XUYEN TRA (H) (BT 068518). The PW further stated that the CO of Front 4 is SrCol TRUC, Col LAM is CO 70B and the XO of 70B is Maj THUAN. The PW said that the troops are tired of fighting. Meetings are held once a month and troops are told how many FWMAF troops were killed and how many aircraft were shot down. The PW additionally stated that movement across the VU GIA River is accomplished with the assistance of the local populace sympathetic to the VC, who provide them with sampans. When not in use, the sampans are hidden underwater.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location given for the elements of Front 4 are in general agreement with recently reported information. The additional breakdown on the 70B Section is reported for the first time as is the

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report of SrCol TRUC as the CO of Front 4. BGen BINH is currently carried as CO by III MAF. Resupply points of HON TAU Mountain area, PHU THUAN Market, and THU BON River have been reported previously, but a detailed supply route has not been outlined before. The existence of this route has been indicated by reconnaissance sightings and PW/Hoi Chanh statements. All information rated (F-2).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). No significant reports.

5. QUANG NGAI (P)

a. PW, PFC Nguyen Van TAC, 30th Co, 406th Sapper Bn, was captured on 20 October 1969 vicinity (BS 522798) (CG Americal 240459Z Oct 69) and gave the location of the 406th Bn as being in the NUI DA NE Mountain (BS 440787), with a mission to prepare for an attack which he thought would take place at LZ STINSON (BS 4887), to gather rice and salt for the rainy season. Subject further stated that two nights before the attack is to take place, the company CO and PO are to enter through the protective wire and observe the outpost. A model is used to practice for the attack and after-action critique. Subject also stated that his company has five binoculars which are used to observe where the dead and wounded fall so they can be picked up during the night. Subject gives "TANG SON" as an AKA for the 406th Bn. TAC infiltrated into RVN with Group #4065. His group had 150 men and left NVN on 10 January 1969 traveling from HA BAC (P) to THANH HOA (P), NVN by train, then from THANH HOA (P) to NGHE AN (P), NVN, by truck. From NGHE AN (P) to QUANG NINH (P), the mode of transportation was by foot and boat. The remaining infiltration was accomplished on foot to KONTUM (P) and into QUANG NGAI (P). The infiltration group's officers were CO-VUNG, XO-HUNG and PO-CAN.

(G-2 COMMENT: Agents have previously reported that the mission of the 406th is to attack allied OP's in the vicinity of LZ STINSON (F-2). The location given for the 406th Bn coincides with present III MAF holdings (F-2). Infiltration Group #4065 is recorded for the first time.

b. PW, PFC Nguyen Van HAI, 44th Mortar Co, 22d Regt, 3d Div, who was captured on 25 October 1969 vicinity (BS 5030) (CG Americal 280920Z Oct 69) stated that his company had a strength of 67 men, and was located near AN BA (H) (BS 680581), with a mission of supporting the infantry units of the 22d Regt. The PW infiltrated from NVN in February 1969 with 500 men, and arrived in June 1969 with a strength of 390 men. One-hundred and ten men were lost either to malaria or malnutrition. The subject claims his company has four 82mm Mortars and 36 82mm mortar rounds. The PW gives the following personalities: CO-TAM, XO-TAI, PO-DUC.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 44th Co is the second company of the 22d Regt, which operates throughout the 22d Regt's AO, now thought to be in the southern SON HA District. This is the first report on the personalities (F-3).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 44-69

1. GENERAL. Counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities of the past week reflected concerted efforts and intentions to gain the allegiance and loyalties of the South Vietnamese people through political indoctrination, social exploitation, and propaganda techniques. This type of activity is consistent with enemy plans and directives calling for intensification of political and proselyting efforts.

High priority is being placed on the expansion and use of Women's, Youth, and Farmers Front Associations.

Enemy plans and policies appear to be contingent upon a cease-fire agreement which the enemy anticipates as early as the end of 1969. Preparations have begun to carry on the political struggle from within an enemy expected coalition framework. Present enemy activities in support of post-conflict planning reportedly includes preparation of detailed listings of civilians, military, and government functionaries and their loyalties.

Simultaneously, large scale efforts appear to be underway to obtain legal documentation for enemy cadre by such means as false rallying and bribing/coercing civil servants. Such efforts are designed to infiltrate cadre into GVN controlled areas and activities to continue the political struggle from within.

As was expected, the enemy was quick to seize upon the US Peace Moratorium for propaganda exploitation. Recent propaganda themes allude that the Moratorium demonstrated the discontent of the American people and that President NIXON would soon be forced to capitulate to the peace demands, thus delivering Vietnam into the hands of the NLF and PRG.

An enemy directive instructed subordinates to conduct detailed reconnaissance in northern Quang Tri Province, in light of withdrawal of the US 3rd Marine Division, and preparatory to military attacks and concerted political and proselyting efforts. Other reported enemy intelligence collecting activities consisted primarily of reconnaissance of various bridges, lines of communications, and friendly dispositions, installations, and activities.

Various reports of miscellaneous VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities are listed in paragraph 6 of this Annex.

Enemy terrorist activities remained at a low level during the past week. No sabotage incidents were reported.

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2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. Reported enemy intelligence collection activities during the past week in ICTZ consisted of selective reconnaissance and surveillance of various bridges, terrain, lines of communication, truck convoys, disposition and activities of friendly military units and installations.

The possible detection of a possible agent attempting to establish an agent net on Chu Lai Airbase was reported.

A captured document mentioned maintenance of "tyrant" rosters (probably target lists) in the area of Danang City.

Of particular significance was a captured enemy document, dated 12 October 1969, relating to the changes in disposition and increased vulnerability of remaining GVN/Allied forces as the result of the 3rd Marine Division being withdrawn from Quang Tri and the Route 9 area. The document directed that a careful reconnaissance be conducted in that area preparatory to launching military, political, and military proselyting attacks.

Details of enemy intelligence collection activities reported during the past week in ICTZ are as follows:

a. Quang Tri.

(1) A US MI source reported on 13 October 1969 that one VC squad collected information from wood-cutters vicinity (YD 342437) Hai Phu (V) (nfi). (Ref: XXIV Corps INTSUM 301-69, msg 291420Z Oct 69).

(2) On 23 October 1969, elements of the US Army 101st Airborne Division operating vicinity (AT 863914) removed a document from an enemy KIA which disclosed the following:

Letter, dated 12 Oct 69, signed by Tu SON, addressed to LUONG stated as follows:

"According to information from higher headquarters, the 3rd USMC Division will be withdrawn from Quang Tri and Route 9 area. The enemy (RVNAF) has planned to have one battalion of the 3rd Regiment and another one of the 2nd Regiment (possibly of the 1st RVNAF Infantry Division) relieve the above Division. This will cause many changes in the enemy tactical formation and many vulnerabilities. Furthermore, Puppet (RVNAF) forces will be confounded and demoralized by the fact that they will have to fight on their own. Hence, this is the most opportune period for us to attack (elements of 2nd and 3rd RVNAF Regiments). Y20 now wants you to conduct a careful reconnaissance and find out what the enemy's weak points are. Next, a violent attack is to be launched by you on all

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fronts and in all three fields, ie., military, political, and military proselyting." (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No. 10-2270-69) (Eval: B-3).

b. Thua Thien.

(1) A US MI source reported the following information on 22 October 1969:

On 16 October 1969, 110 personnel of an U/I NVA Bn commanded by HUAN, plus three personnel of the C.113 company moved from vicinity (YD 569168) to (YD 580096). This Bn. had moved from vicinity (YD 569165) Phuong Do mountain area in company sized units. This battalion was collecting information about the May Nha mountain area near hill 224 (CNA). Plans are to operate along road 547 from Binh Dien (YD 670090) and Ta Luong (YD 540030) during the month of October. (Ref: Det B, 1st Bn, 525th MI Gp msg 230225Z Oct 69) (Eval: F-3).

(2) A US MI source reported the following information on 23 October 1969:

On 21 October 1969, 100 personnel, including 30 Montagnards, designated the C.1 company, commanded by KIM and TRI, were deployed at Hoi Mit mountain area vicinity (AT 845930). The company was reconnoitering the area, drawing maps of Phu Gia, Lang Co, and Hai Van villages and plotting bridges and roads (nfi). (Ref: Det B, 1st Bn, 525th MI Gp msg 240635Z Oct 69) (Eval: C-3).

(3) A US MI source reported that on 25 October 1969, 180 personnel of an unidentified NVA battalion, commanded by Hoan Xuan DUNG, moved from an unknown location in Quang Nam (P) and deployed at the following four locations: 70 personnel deployed in Hon Truoi, vicinity (YC 965988); 60 personnel deployed south of Cau Hai, vicinity (ZC 100968); 50 personnel disguised as farmers, deployed at Bang Mon vicinity (YD 977076) and Cao Doi vicinity (ZC 095996). DUNG frequently sent troops disguised as civilians to Loc Tri (H) near Thua LUU primary school to study the terrain. This unit planned to attack Phu Loc (D) Headquarters and Truoi (CNA) on 30 October 1969 or 1 November 1969. (Ref: Det B, 1st MI Bn, 525th MI Gp, Rpt #1/B/CX/1149/69 dtd 27 Oct 69). (Eval: F-6).

c. Quang Nam.

(1) At or about 1630 on 22 October 1969, as a CAP 2-7-4 patrol was moving through a hamlet, a VN male was observed running from a house into a treeline at Thanh Quit (H) (5) vicinity (BT 044634), Thanh Truong (V), 5 km NW of Dien Ban. The CAP proceeded to the house to investigate. Finding no one at home, the CAP PF's searched the house and found a letter from the man of the house to his wife asking her to keep close watch on the CAP USMC and report their activities to him. The CAP PF's knew the

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wife, and after a short search located her leaving a neighbor's house. The CAP apprehended her along with a second VN woman who tried to flee as the CAP approached. The second woman had no ID card. Along with the letter, both women were detained and turned over to District Headquarters for interrogation. (Ref: CAP Daily Opns Summary 22-23 Oct 69).

(2) A PW captured on 23 October 1969, vicinity (AT 884514) stated that his unit was the 3rd Platoon, 2nd Company, 91st Sapper Bn. PW remarked that the 2nd Company was located at Vinh Cuong (H) vicinity (AT 908491) with the mission of collecting rice and establishing liaison with local force VC. The Company's future mission was to attack An Hoa Combat Base sometime in late October or early November 1969. A reconnaissance mission was conducted on 9 October 1969 (nfi). (Ref: MEMORANDUM from SITTC dtd 292130 October 1969).

(3) On 25 October 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division operating vicinity (BT 060628) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Letter, undated, from an unspecified cadre (an RVNAF soldier who deserted and worked for the VC) to HOA, requests permission to discontinue his (collection) activity for a period of time as he was being tracked down by GVN police.

Document also mentions that, according to the population, the assassination of the Chief of Police Danang City by a police sergeant, was due to a personal problem. The roster of tyrants previously submitted by him remained unchanged. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-2230-69). (Eval: B-3).

d. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 23 October 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 18 October 1969, there was a VC plan to attack US and ARVN convoys. The VC have had reconnaissance teams observing both US and ARVN convoys traveling between Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. Types of vehicles and times of travel have been observed. District forces, local guerrilla units, and sapper groups will attempt to ambush convoys along Route 1, vicinity The Loi road section, from (BS 632845 to BS 623835) (nfi). (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt #1/B/BX/0794/69 dtd 23 Oct 69) (Eval: C-6).

(2) A US MI source reported on 21 October 1969 it was determined that the Son Tinh (D) Security Section recently used Nguyen Dinh Quy, a Vietnamese employee at the Chu Lai Airbase, as a penetration agent. The Son Tin District Security Section was collecting information through Quy on US activity and types of arms and ammunition located on the base.

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Quy was required to assess Vietnamese civilian employees working at Chu Lai and establish an intelligence net. (Ref: Det D, 1st MI Bn, (P), 525th MI Gp, Rpt #1/B/DX/1350/69, dtd 22 Oct 69). (Eval: F-6).

3. SABOTAGE. No incidents involving sabotage were reported in ICTZ during the past week. Details of a US MI source report and a translated enemy document reflecting possible future enemy sabotage activities and intentions are as follows:

a. Quang Tin.

On 24 October 1969, elements of the US Army 196th Infantry Division while operating vicinity (BT 197229) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following:

Combat order, number 67/CT, dated 11 Sep 69, classification, (VC) TOP SECRET, signed by Nguyen Minh THONG for the Engineer Sub-Section, (Agency) 123A (Rear Services Staff Section, Quang Nam Province (GVN: Quang Tin) Unit, Military Region 5), and Hoang Xuan Phuong, Chief of (Agency) 123A (Military Staff Section, Quang Nam Province (GVN: Quang Tin), outlines the combat missions to be implemented by subordinate engineer units in Oct, Nov and Dec 1969.

The document reveals that the primary efforts of the engineer units are to be focused on the destruction of Routes 1, 105, and 16, the route from Tam Ky (D) to the Ba Ren area, and key bridges, especially the Ba Ren, Huong An, Tam Ky, and An Tan Bridges.

In the first phase of the operational campaign, attacks are to be launched on enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) engineer elements, bulldozers, road patrol groups, and convoys. The primary objectives will be Routes 1 and 105. Intensive and continuous raids are to be conducted to cut off the routes of communication and to prevent the enemy from repairing the routes destroyed.

The following are specific missions of Unit 123's subordinate engineer forces:

(1) The 1st Engineer Company is to carry out independent or coordinated attacks on the following objectives:

(a) Ba Ren and Huong An Bridges (primary objectives)

(b) Ke Xuyen and Ba Du Bridges (secondary objectives)

(c) Canh Lien and Cong Boi culverts in Northern Tam Ky District and Cong Siem and La Mat culverts in Thang Binh Districts

The unit is to also destroy 1,000 meters of the route from the Ke Xuyen area to the Moc Bai area, 1,000 meters of the route from Tam Ky (D)

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to Tien Phuoc (D), and coordinate with the Antitank Company of Northern Tam Ky (D) to annihilate an enemy convoy of 10 to 15 vehicles.

(2) The Antitank Company (possibly of Northern Tam Ky (D)) is to coordinate with the troops at province level to conduct attacks with mines, and coordinate with the 1st Engineer Company and the Engineer Company of Northern Tam Ky (D) to attack at least one enemy convoy.

(3) The engineer unit(s) of the Chu Lai area are to carry out attacks with catapult bombs, mines, and other explosives in coordination with (VC) troops in the local province; sabotage the An Tan, Tam Ky, Ba Bau, and Ong Be Bridges; and destroy 3,000 meters of Route 1.

(4) The Engineer Unit of Northern Tam Ky (D) and the village engineer units in the local district are to cut off the route from Tam Ky (D) to the Khanh Tien area, from the Ba Du area to the Khanh Tien area, and from the Ba Du area to the Tuan Duong area, for three to seven days; establish killing zones with explosives in the wooded areas of the Cha Vu, Nui Thi, and Duong Hue areas; and cut off Route 1 for three to seven days.

(5) The Engineer Unit of Thang Binh (D) is to sabotage bridges including Cam Lu and Ke Xuyen Bridges; destroy Cong Siem, La Mat, Cong 2, Bau Lat, and Cay Gang culverts; and destroy 2,000 meters of Route 1.

(6) The Engineer Unit of Que Son (D) is to sabotage Cho Dung Bridge twice, destroy five other bridges and seven culverts, including Cong 1 and 2 culverts in the Phu Tho area and Phu Dien and Vong Khoai culverts; destroy 2,000 meters of Routes 1 and 105, especially the portion of the route from the Huong An area to the Ba Ren area; and cut off (local routes of communication) for five to seven days.

(7) The Engineer Unit of Tien Phuoc (D) is to plant mines in the border areas of local enemy military positions; destroy the Phuoc Thanh and Cau Vong Bridges; destroy five culverts; and cut off the route from Hamlet 1, Tien Dl (possibly village), to Tien Phuoc (possibly District seat).

The final reports on preparations for this campaign were to be submitted to 123A (Military Staff Section, VC Quang Nam; GVN Quang Tin Province) not later than 25 Sep 69 for consideration. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-2296-69) (Eval: B-3).

b. Quang Ngai.

On 25 October 1969, a US MI source supplied the following information:

A VC returnee who rallied on 19 October 1969 vicinity (BS 716599) to the 98th PF platoon, gave his unit as the H.16 Engineer Company, Quang Ngai (P) Forces. In the middle of September 1969, the H.16 Company sent seven personnel to attend water sapper training vicinity (BS 450724).

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Training was conducted by a sapper squad from MR-5. After training, the seven men were to reinforce the mobile forces of Quang Ngai. Water sappers are targeted against all bridges on Highway 1 between Mo Duc (D) and Tu Nghia (D). (Ref: G-2 I Corps memo dtd 25 Oct 69).

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Reported VC/VCI political and propaganda activities during the past week in ICTZ reflected concerted emphasis on gaining the support, allegiance, and loyalties of the South Vietnamese people through political indoctrination, social exploitation and propaganda techniques. In this regard, expanded use of Women's, Youth, and Farmer's Front Associations in proselyting and political activities, received high priority.

Propaganda themes allude that the US Peace Moratorium of 15 October demonstrated the discontent of the American people and that President NIXON would soon be forced to capitulate to their demands for peace, thus delivering Vietnam into the hands of the NLF and PRG.

Various reports of meetings, plans and intentions openly reflect enemy preparations to carry on the political struggle from within a possible coalition framework.

a. Quang Tri.

Elements of the 101st US Army Airborne Division operating vicinity (YD 143516) discovered an enemy document which revealed the following information:

Notes on a resolution of (T15 Village) Party Chapter prescribes that the missions to be carried out from October to December 1969 would consist of conducting attacks on the (RVN) People's Self-Defense elements and tyrants, strengthening the Party and Youth Group agencies, motivating military proselyting activities, initiating political struggle movements, and striving to have provisions for three months on hand. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-2186-69) (Eval: B-4).

b. Thua Thien.

(1) A Hoi Chanh who rallied on 15 October 1969, vicinity (YD 943169) stated that on the night of 12 October 1969 the Forward Section of Phu Thanh (V) held a meeting at Don Cat vicinity (YD 945160) which was attended by the cadre and people of An Luu (H) vicinity (YD 945172) and Duc Thai (H) vicinity (YD 945182). The purpose of the meeting was to publicize the following missions:

(a) The Cadre must control the people and struggle to retake the hamlets.

(b) Anti-pacification.

(c) All the people in the village must produce food to support the mission.

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DICH, the village chairman presided over the meeting. (Ref: CG, XXIV Corps Phu Bai, msg 290826 Oct 69). (Unrated).

(2) On 23 October 1969, elements of the US Army 101st Airborne Division operating vicinity (AT 863914) removed a document from an enemy KIA which disclosed the following:

Letter, dated 5 Oct 69, signed by Tu Son for A7, addressed to Luong (possibly a security cadre), reveals that a plenary meeting was held by Y20 (possibly an agency, Tri-Thien-Hue Region) from 20 to 28 Sep 69. Subjects for discussion during this meeting were:

(a) An estimate of enemy capabilities in the immediate future

(b) Friendly (VC/NVA) activities during the (1969) fall season

(c) Consolidation of (Party) leadership in various villages, districts, and cities.

Furthermore, Y20 instructed all subordinate units/agencies to supply adequate information on their personnel strengths and on the current political situation in cities (of Tri-Thien-Region). (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-2270-69) (Eval: B-3).

(3) At 230300 hours October 1969 an unknown number of VC entered Hoa Mau (H) vicinity (ZC 092997), stole rice from the people and distributed numerous leaflets (English language) calling for the US to withdraw. (Ref: PSA/PSD/CORDS/Thua Thien, R-28/1027140, dated 27 October 1969).

c. Quang Nam.

(1) Elements of ROK Marine Brigade operating vicinity (BT 060628) discovered an enemy document which revealed the following information:

Directive, Flash precedence, number 55/VP/NC, dated 20 Sep 69, signed by Hoang Van LAI for A45 (Security Section, QDSZ), sent to various H5's, ordered addressees to submit reports concerning the attitudes of Thieu, Ky, and their followers; that of the US, Puppet (RVNAF), and satellite (FWMAF) troops; and that of political parties regarding the successive withdrawal of 60,000 US troops.

Document also orders addressees to investigate the people's opinions regarding the NFLSVN ten-point program and activation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, to include the Puppet (GVN) economic situation and the people's living conditions. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-2212-69) (Eval: B-3).

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(2) On 11 October 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division operating vicinity (AT 913365) discovered a document containing the following information:

Plan, dated 30 July 1969, originated by the Current Affairs Committee, Farmer's Association, Que Son District, provides guidance for the organization of political indoctrination sessions at various villages and hamlets to boost agricultural production efforts during the 3rd quarter of 1969. The plan contends that ideological guidance would be of vital importance to enlighten the people on this subject.

Document also outlines the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) situation and his future plans which were expected to be aimed at improving the Puppet (GVN) administrative machinery and de-Americanization of the war. It provided instructions for the conduct of a political indoctrination session for members of Farmer's Associations to include the missions to be carried out.

In addition to the agricultural production and animal husbandry activities to be implemented, the populace was to be motivated to intensify three-pronged attacks by organizing armed elements within the Farmer's Association and by participating in military proselyting and political struggle movements.

Furthermore, the document urged various villages to correctly apply (VC) land policy and settle land problems, to ensure solidarity and the tilling of all land available. (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No. 10-5864-69) (Eval: B-3).

(3) A GVN source reported that USMC elements conducted an operation vicinity of Man Quan (1) and (2) hamlets vicinity (BT 035689), (BT 045684), Hai AN (1) and (2) hamlets vicinity (BT 057677), (BT 058682), Khai Tay (3) (H) vicinity (BT 048667) and Thi An (1) (H) vicinity (BT 029668) on 12 and 13 October 1969. The VC suffered a large number of casualties (nfi), however Huynh Duc THAO, Huynh THONG and Tran TU along with two other VC political cadre and an unknown number of VC guerrillas escaped on the night of 12 October 1969. The VC moved from Man Quan hamlets to Tra Lo hamlet vicinity (BT 084684) and propagandized the people along the lines, "The Americans received orders from President NIXON to prepare for a cease fire and when this occurs there will be no more Americans in South Vietnam". The VC also told the people that relatives who have graduated from college should return to their native hamlets and not join the Thieu-Ky government. (Ref: OSI Det 5003, Danang Airbase, DRAFT DDIIR 10-28, dtd 15 Oct 69) (Eval: F-3).

(4) On 15 October 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division operating vicinity (AT 884494), discovered a document containing the following information:

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Activity report, undated, prepared by the Military Proselyting Section of Xuyen Phu Village (Duy Xuyen (D), Quang Nam (P), contains information on activities of the section during the period 1 Oct 1968 to 30 August 1969. Document states that the village is situated in an area adjacent (GVN) An Hoa Industrial Complex and the Song Thu River, where enemy (RVNAF/FWMAF) activities were described as very weak. US troops were reported to have not dared to move into the village during a recent sweep operation due to fear of (VC) mines. "Puppet" (GVN) forces in the village were known to have a shirking attitude. As a result, the village Military Proselyting Section succeeded in activating nine military proselyting cells, (including four "legal status" teenager cells with a total of 12 children, who were reported to have successfully put VC propaganda leaflets into backpacks of US troops during recent operations), distributing 1,340 propaganda leaflets, publishing 274 posters in English, and handing 35 propaganda letters directly to enemy (GVN) officials and troops. In addition, it was reported that five fifth column cells were activated by the Section. Ten fifth-column cells have come into action on two occasions, killing one (GVN) district policeman and four US officials riding in a jeep. (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No. 10-5793-69) (Eval: B-5).

(5) Elements of ROK Marine Brigade operating vicinity (BT 060628) discovered enemy documents which revealed the following information:

Letter, dated 15 Oct 1969, from DAO (female military proselyting cadre, An Hai City Ward, QDSZ, Military Region 5) to QUY, informs addressee that recently a US delegation composed of secret agents (sic) visited a number of towns and cities in SVN without the knowledge of US and Thieu-Ky agencies. They carried two pictures - one of President Nguyen Van Thieu and the other of Ho Chi MINH. Seeing an aged woman, these agents showed her the picture of President Thieu and asked her opinion about him. The aged woman replied that she did not know who he was. These agents then showed her Ho Chi MINH's picture and the aged woman replied, "This is the picture of Ho Chi MINH, Chairman of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam". Then the same inquiry was repeated to others. Most of the people recognized only Ho Chi MINH's picture. Reports were then immediately sent back to the US.

The writer also noted that groups of other American secret agents planned to visit a number of towns and cities of SVN to inquire about the Vietnamese people's aspirations. Because of the results of the other visits, the Saigon government conducted reorientation classes for people and spent a large sum of money trying to bribe them.

Another document disclosed that peace will be restored in 1969. DAO asked addressee if he had received her report on military proselyting activities conducted in An Hai City Ward (possibly of 3rd Precinct, Quang Da Special Zone). (Ref: CDEC Log No 10-2206-69) (Eval: B-4).

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(6) A GVN source reported that on the nights of 16 and 17 October 1969, four VC political district level cadre, Dang Cong LAN, Nguyen BONG, Pham CHI and Thi LUOM, entered people's homes in Thach Nham (H) vicinity (AT 947715), Thai Lai (H) vicinity (AT 925729), Dai La (H) vicinity (AT 942751), Khe Lam (H) vicinity (AT 919766), Van Duong (H) vicinity (AT 905805), and told the people they (VC) had organized the demonstrations that were currently taking place in the United States and had sent some of their political cadre to the United States to maneuver and guide the demonstrations. The VC also told the people that President NIXON had issued orders for the American troops to return to the US within 60 days, so "wake up" and support the VC in their effort to bring down the THIEU-KY government and drive the Americans out of the country. (Ref: OSI Det 5003, Danang Airbase, DRAFT DDIIR 10-33, dtd 18 Oct 69) (Eval: F-3).

(7) A GVN source reported that Tran Van DANG, a VC District level cadre, held a meeting of all VC village level military, political, and guerrilla cadre of Hoa Vang (D) on 18 October 1969, at 2200 hours, vicinity (AT 915825). At this meeting discussions were conducted concerning indoctrination of the people to VC socio-economic and political ideology of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). Major emphasis was on proselyting of ARVN to support the VC cause. ARVN soldiers were to be persuaded to join in military and political struggles to free Vietnam from the oppression of the GVN and US. Political agitation in the resettlement areas was to be increased. All villagers would henceforth be required to display the VC flag from their homes and to demonstrate and agitate for US withdrawal from Vietnam. GVN targets of opportunity were to be exploited through assassination or kidnapping. Families of ARVN soldiers residing in VC and disputed areas were to be required to attend special courses for retraining in policies of the PRG and NLF. In the near future country wide elections were to be held to elect PRG representatives for the unification of the country (nfi). DANG also stated that on 25 October 1969, a general meeting for all political district level cadre was to be held by Front 44, Quang Da Special Zone in the Dong Den mountains vicinity (AT 832828). (Ref: OSI Det 5003, Danang Airbase, DRAFT DDIIR 10-37, dtd 20 Oct 69). (Eval: F-3).

(8) At 230300 October 1969, an estimated VC company entered Nam Phuoc Town and wrote anti-GVN/US/ROK slogans (in Korean). (Ref: PSA/PSD/CORDS/Quang Nam, R-15/10241600, dtd 24 October 1969).

(9) On 23 October 1969, a document was captured vicinity (BT 059587) containing information directed to officers, GVN troops, RF/PF forces and CIDG personnel, as follows:

"The Americans have had many casualties, both military and political, in South Vietnam. The war effort will decrease because the Americans will move out of Vietnam. President Thieu and Ky have obeyed President NIXON's order that GVN troops will replace Allied troops. The Americans are leaving the war behind.

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Can you take over this strong war? Did you know that President Thieu and Ky are preparing to go to the US?

The Americans lost and then they go home. Thieu and Ky are going abroad. How about you? Where should you go? (Ref: CO C, 5th Special Forces Gp (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, dtd 25 Oct 69).

(10) A GVN source reported that on 24 October 1969, a VC meeting was held at Hoa Loc Pagoda, Hoa Loc (V) vicinity (AT 918765), about 13 km northwest of Danang Airbase, and was attended by approximately 130 farmers and villagers from the area. The following VC cadre were identified:

Che Viet TAN - First Secretary of the NLF, Quang Da Committee, who presided as chairman of the meeting. TAN is about 57 years old and a native of Hieu Duc (D).

Do DIEU - Political Officer, about 49 years old.

Pham Trong HOANG - Major, in charge of military situation. HOANG is about 40 years old and a native of Que Son (D). HOANG possesses a GVN identification allowing him to travel freely and undetected through US/ARVN posts.

TAN propagandized that "The Americans are completely defeated in Vietnam". He alluded to the recent Moratorium held in the United States and said it demonstrated the discontent of the American people with the NIXON administration. NIXON would soon be forced to capitulate to the American people's demands and thus deliver Vietnam into the hands of the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). TAN further stated that when a cease fire came the VC would be able to demonstrate in support of their military activities while their military initiates a general attack to overthrow the THIEU-KY government. The political struggle for control of the people will start about 25 October and continue through 11 November 1969, with a general military attack beginning on 1 November 1969 and continuing through Vietnamese Tet (Jan 70). People are not to worry, for the general uprising will be of short duration, a few weeks, and when the cease fire occurred the PRG would seize absolute power, bringing an end to the present puppet government. (Ref: OSI Det 5003, Danang Airbase, DRAFT DDIIR, 10-50, dtd 25 Oct 69) (Eval: F-3).

(11) On 24 October 1969, elements of ROK Marine Brigade operating vicinity (BT 060628) discovered an enemy document which revealed the following information:

Directive, number 13/CT/TV, dated 18 Oct 69, signed by QUY, concerns the conduct of political struggles.

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Document states that to implement missions prescribed for the fourth quarter of 1969, C56 (possible agency of Duy Xuyen (D), QDSZ) decided to conduct a noisy political struggle movement designed to create disturbances in enemy controlled areas so as to raise the revolutionary pride and lower the enemy's prestige.

Document also reveals that political struggles conducted in tandem with military activities were designed to motivate the masses to rise up and demand democratic rights, improvement of their living conditions, end of conscription, termination of war, and restoration of peace. (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No. 10-2212-69) (Eval: B-3).

d. Quang Tin.

(1) On 19 October 1969, elements of the US Army Americal Division operating vicinity (BT 159097), discovered a document containing the following information:

Notebook, with entries dated between 9 July and 13 October 1969, maintained by members Hanh and Lieu of the Women's Association, Tien Phuoc District, (VC Quang Nam Province, Region 5), records the total number of women and the Women's Association members, directives, and communiques issued by this Association during the cited period. Document provides criteria for military proselyting and female proselyting activities which would be performed from 15 September to 5 November 1969. These activities were to consist mainly of gaining control of the population in rural areas, breaking the enemy's oppressive control over the population, disrupting the (GVN) accelerated pacification program, eliminating tyrants (RVN officials), destroying war facilities, recruiting fifth columnists in Puppet (RVNAF) units, instigating Puppet troops to desert and their dependants participate in political struggles, step up the anti-Vietnam war campaign among US servicemen, develop military proselyting personnel at village and hamlet levels, collect and purchase food supplies from the enemy (RVN) controlled areas and increase farm production.

During the period 15 September to 15 October 1969, subordinate village Women's Associations were to instigate 50 Puppet soldiers to desert, break up the relationship between (RVNAF) soldiers and their dependents, motivate 50% of the women in villages to enlist in village guerrilla units and 10% into hamlet guerrilla units, and increase Women's Association members by 100%.

(2) On 19 October 1969, elements of the US Army Americal Division operating vicinity (BT 159097) discovered a document containing the following information:

Minutes of a conference incomplete, and undated, originated by an unspecified individual (possibly of the Women's Association, Tien Phuoc District) pertains to a conference convened by the Women's Association

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of Tien Phuoc District, on 13 September 1969, to review activities of the Association and study the resolution on female proselyting in Region (5). Present at the conference were representatives from the Women's Associations of six villages and representatives of district agencies, including THANG, Secretary of Tien Phuoc District Party Headquarters; Sister Chin, representative of the District Women's Association, and Xim, representative of the Province Women's Association. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-5865-69) (Eval: B-3).

(3) On 19 October 1969, elements of the US Army Americal Division operating vicinity (BT 159097), discovered a document containing the following information:

Activity Plan, dated 3 October 1969, prepared for the signature of TAN, for the Current Affairs Committee, Quang Nam Province Women's Association (GVN Quang Tin Province), pertains to the development of Women's Associations in subordinate districts, villages, and hamlets, in the second phase. Document states that in liberated areas, every woman must be urged to join the Association (the criteria to be attained would be 100%). Document also directs that 30% of the women in the Province capital and various district seats and 50% of the women in its adjacent areas must join Association by the end of October 1969. Document further discloses that cadre of village and hamlet Women's Associations must be sent to short-term refresher courses conducted by district or province level units and new members of Women's Associations must also be given one day of training. In December 1969, newly assigned cadre of District Women's Associations would attend a 10-day training course held by the Province Women's Association. (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No. 10-5866-69) (Eval: B-3).

(4) At approximately 1820 on 30 October 1969, a CAP 1-1-6 ambush heard a VC Psyops broadcast coming from vicinity (BT 232244), 7 kilometers NW of Tam Ky. The CAP called an artillery mission on the suspected enemy location silencing the broadcast. A daylight sweep of the area was nonproductive. (CAP Daily Opns Summary 301600H-311600H Oct 1969).

e. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 17 October 1969, the 81st LF company was dispersed vicinity (BS 534838) and (BS 549846), Khanh My (H), Son Tra (V), Son Tinh (D). Unit's CO was NAM, XO was HUONG, and Political Officer was CUONG. Unit's estimated strength was 78 men and 40 laborers who carried food and ammunition. The unit was engaged in spreading the following propaganda themes:

(a) The US is de-escalating the war and will soon withdraw all its forces.

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(b) The US people support the VC.

(c) A coalition government will soon assume power in South Vietnam. (Ref: Det D, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp Rpt #1/A/EX/0236/69 dtd 21 Oct 69) (Eval: F-3).

(2) A US MI source reported that on 19 October 1969, a VC meeting was held at Vinh Tuy (H) vicinity (BS 465840), Son Phuong (V), Son Tinh (D). Attending the meeting were:

Thanh TRA, Quang Ngai VC Province Security Section Chief, Chairman of the meeting.

THU, Son Tinh VC District Section Cadre.

Pham VONG, Son Loc VC Village Public Security cadre, and other unknown VC cadre from Son Kim, Son Chau, Son Phuong, Son Tra, Son Nam, Son Bac, Son Tay, and Son Dong villages. The meeting was called to discuss and distribute the new policy of operations in both the political and military fields, and consisted of the following subjects:

Political Field. During the period of 20 October to 10 November 1969, the VC village security cadres should inform the entire population to make preparations for a demonstration which would be directed towards the following goals:

Support the great anti-war demonstration in the U.S.

Request an end to Vietnam's war.

Use propaganda pamphlets to inform GVN officials and ARVN soldiers of peace proposals by the VC at the Paris Peace Talks.

Make an all out effort to conduct a massive demonstration. In this vein, the population must be indoctrinated on the goals of the VC.

Military Field.

Continue to accomplish the "D High Point Campaign" (nfi) which was to be concluded on 30 December 1969.

The "Bung Dan Campaign" or "Proving the VC Power to the Population Campaign" was no longer effective and was to be replaced by the "Loi Dan Campaign" or "Winning the Population Campaign". This Campaign began on 20 October 1969, and was to remain in effect until new orders were received. The policy for the new Campaign was as follows:

Guerrilla and Main Forces Units were not to attack Operational Forces in the VC-controlled area. These Forces were to absolutely avoid

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Allied Forces so that bombings would cease and inhabitants would not be afraid to return to the VC-controlled area.

Try to provide a good life for residents who lived in the GVN-controlled areas near Allied posts so that the residents would provide a hiding place for VC cadre.

By 25 October 1969, selection of Main Forces soldiers considered hard core VC would be accomplished and organized into new units of company size designated People's Armed Force. These units were to receive modern weapons, mines and explosive charges. The units were to deploy to the mixed controlled areas, especially areas which had undergone pacification, and establish penetration agents, intelligence agencies, and sapper units (nfi).

Weak cadre who worked in various local units and local political systems were to be dismissed and replaced with proletariate cadre who would govern the population and attract residents to return to VC-controlled areas, thereby preparing for encounters with GVN officials during the next stage (nfi). (Ref: Det D, 1st MI Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rep #1/B/DX/1321/69 dtd 22 Oct 69) (Eval: F-6).

(3) On 21 October 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

The VC established a political study course during the period 14-28 Oct 69 vicinity (BS 602483) Nghia Phu (V), Nghia Hanh (D). Approximately 270 men attended the course including hamlet and village level cadre, armed civilians, village guerrilla forces, and district main forces (nfi). Personnel attending the meeting were from Son Tinh, Tu Nghia, Nghia Hanh and Mo Duc Districts. Participants were divided into teams of 7-11 men each and studied political documents (nfi). Instructors were MR5 cadre and TRA (nfi) was one of the instructors. The course was conducted only at night. During the day, participants moved into the mountains (nfi). (Ref: Det D, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp Rpt #1/A/EX/0235/69 dtd 21 Oct 69) (Eval: F-3).

(4) At 232200 hours, October 1969, VC entered Pho Tan village vicinity (BS 805398), gathered about 30 villagers and lectured them on the GVN pacification program. (Ref: PSA/PSD/CORDS/Quang Ngai, R-17/10251053, dtd 25 October 1969).

(5) A US MI source reported that on 23 October 1969, a province-level, armed propaganda team (nfi), commanded by THANH, with BA as assistant commander was located at Phuoc Lam (H) vicinity (BS 543747), Tu Phuoc (V), Tu Nghia (D). The unit's strength was approximately 70 men and 20 women. They were wearing civilian clothes. All personnel were armed with colts (nfi) and AK rifles. The unit had one PRC-10 radio and two loudspeakers. Plans were to use the loudspeakers to broadcast an appeal in English and in Vietnamese to US and ARVN soldiers. The

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broadcasts were to be an appeal for support of the anti-war movement in the United States. The unit planned to distribute propaganda leaflets in US areas of operation, while infiltration agents mingled with local civilians and disseminated leaflets soliciting support for an anti-war meeting (nfi). (Ref: Det D, 1st MI Bn (P), 525th MI Gp, Rpt #1/C/EX/0094/69, dtd 26 Oct 69). (Eval: F-6).

(6) Report dated 24 October 1969, of VC plan Son Tinh (D), and pertaining to the entire Quang Ngai Province:

Armed teams are dispersed to stay close to the city, towns, and posts to drop leaflets and use megaphones for calling on GVN soldiers and cadre to desert and follow the VC.

Sapper cells are deployed to penetrate into the city for harrassment, sabotage of public agencies, power plants, etc.

Have cadre mingle with religious parties to induce the people to demonstrate against the war, against the capture of youths for soldiers and call on Allied soldiers to respond to the anti-war movement in the United States.

Attack city bridges, especially Tra Khuc and Song Ve Bridges, and culverts. Attack Son Tinh district seat, various posts, and support the plan. The time of the operation is between 30 October and 7 November 1969. (Ref: SIA QUANG NGAI SECTOR QUANG NGAI RVN, QUANG NGAI INTSUM 248, msg 300910Z Oct 69). (Unrated).

(7) A US MI source reported that on 24 October 1969, the 506A Sapper Company and the 48th Main Force Battalion, with an estimated combined strength of three hundred fifty (350) men, were deployed vicinity of Son Quang (V) (BS 707821) and Tung Son vicinity (BS 717828) and (BS 721822), Son Tinh (D). Their mission was to destroy the GVN pacification program in eastern Son Tinh (D) by propagandizing victory over US troops and attacking various refugee camps in eastern Binh Son (D) (nfi) between 3 and 10 November 1969. (Ref: Det D, 1st MI Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt #1/B/DX/1352/69, dtd 27 Oct 69) (Eval: F-3).

(8) On 28 October 1969, an unidentified Quang Ngai Armed Propaganda Company with an estimated strength of 70 men was located at Phuoc Lam vicinity (BS 445747). Their mission was to attack ARVN and Allied units in support of the anti-war drive in the United States. (Ref: SIA QUANG NGAI SECTOR, QUANG NGAI INTSUM 247, dtd 291135Z Oct 69) (Eval: D-4).

5. TERROR. Terrorist activity in ICTZ continued at a low level during the past week. Victims of terrorist activity included civilians, associates and relatives of PF/RF personnel and a national policeman.

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Of significance, has been the recent lack of terrorism associated with forcing people to leave refugee/resettlement areas and return to areas outside GVN protective control. Recent incidents of school destruction were reported in Quang Ngai (P).

The following extract from documents captured on 24 October 1969 vicinity (BT 060628) ICTZ, by 27th Company, 2nd ROK Marine Brigade generally reflects intended targets of selected terrorist tactics vicinity of Danang and is typical of further intended activities throughout ICTZ:

Letter, dated between 29 September and 14 October 1969, from Son, Hai, and Sister Sau to Comrade Ba, Sau, and other cadre (possibly of the Security Section, 3rd Precinct Unit, Danang City, Quang Da Special Zone, MR-5), revealed that a meeting was held by the Security Section, Danang City, on 25 September 1969 to assess achievements recorded by personnel in the assassination of First Lieutenant Son of the Biet Hai (sic possibly meaning a Ranger unit of the RVN Navy) on 10 September 1969. To gain further achievements, a phase for killing tyrants was scheduled to last from 1 to 30 October 1969. During this phase, efforts would be made to kill 3 to 15 city ward and village administrative officials; indoctrinate People's Self-Defense Force members; and assassinate Phoenix cadre, spies, informants and secret agents.

After the death of Lt. Son, proselyting letters (nfi) were dropped to undermine the morale of the Puppet (RVNAF) personnel. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-2206-69) (Eval: B-3).

Details of terrorist incidents in ICTZ during the past week are listed in Appendix 1.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Quang Tri. On 10 October a GVN source reported an armed unit of 25 men was requesting residents of Tan My (H) vicinity (YD 295774), Mai Linh (D) to collect rice and oil for the VC. (Ref: XXIV Corps INTSUM 301-69 msg 291420Z Oct 69). (Eval: C-3).

b. Thua Thien.

(1) On 21 October 1969, a US MI source reported that the 1st Platoon, 1st Company, K-4A Battalion and one local guerrilla platoon are operating at Loc An (V) (YD 950050), Phu Loc (D) in the hamlets of Nam Pho Can (YD 957402) and Phuoc My (YD 959049). Their mission is to collect rice and food supplies in preparation for the Fall-Winter Offensive. The enemy normally travels a route which passes between (YD 957042) and (YD 959042).

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(2) At 2400 hours on 19 October 1969, one squad of the Phu Loc Armed Battalion entered Bat Son (H) (ZC 009301), Loc Diem (V), Phu Loc (D) and collected food and milk from the homes of the villagers. They informed Nguyen DANG, a resident of Bat Son (H) that he must give them eight large cans of rice when they come to Bat Son again. (Ref: 204th MID, AVII Rpt XXIV-292-1-69 dtd 21 Oct 69). (Eval: F-6).

(3) On 24 October 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 22 October, Phu Loc District Committee received seven (7) suicide cadre who had just graduated from a course at At Ro (CNA) which is near Ben Giang, Quang Nam (P). The course was called "Plans and Techniques for Killing Cadre of the Puppet GVN". The class included 200 students and after graduating the course these students were given a pistol and hand grenades. This suicide sapper team came to Vinh Loc (D) to assess and assassinate cadre of the GVN. They plan to operate in Vinh Loc and Phu Tu Districts. (Ref: Det B, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp msg 250340Z Oct 69) (Eval: F-3).

(4) A US MI source reported that on 25 October 1969, the Thua Thien Province Committee distributed a letter dated 20 October 1969, signed by Hoang ANH who was the political commissioner of the 4th region, to all province, district and city committee cadre. The letter informed all cadre to be prepared to attend a meeting that would be held on 31 October 1969 vicinity (YD 490290). It was expected that 200 cadre would attend this meeting. Hoang ANH, a former regional commissioner who more recently was the political commissioner of the 4th Region, was to be the chairman. At this meeting the regional committee was to distribute a new plan (nfi). Delegates from Student Affairs and Regional Affairs Committees were also to be in attendance. (Ref: Det D, 1st MI Bn., 525th MI Gp, Report 1/B/CX/1152/69, dtd 27 Oct 69). (Eval: F-6).

c. Quang Nam. Elements of the US Army 51st Infantry while operating vicinity (AT 987575) on 30 August 1969, discovered enemy documents, translated as follows:

Letter, number 54/CT/TM, dated 25 Jul 69, signed by Pham Duc NAM for K45 (Finance and Economy Section, QDSZ), sent to the Trade-Finance Section of various B's (possibly District QDSZ) and a directive dated 3 Aug 69, prepared for the signature of Duc NAM for C50 (Current Affairs Committee, QDSZ Party Committee, Military Region 5), urged addressees to make efforts in the initiation of a fund drive in the city and its outskirts to fulfill criteria established in 1969.

Document stated that during the first six months of 1969, the collection of taxes was not successful because B250 (Precinct I, Danang),

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B260 (Precinct II, Danang), B270 (Precinct III, Danang), B280 (Area I, Hoa Vang (D), QDSZ), and B290 (Area II, Hoa Vang (D), QDSZ) could collect only from 1.88% to 21.4% of the prescribed criteria.

It was therefore directed that a fund drive be initiated in cities and outskirts from now (possibly 25 Jul 69) to 30 Oct 69). The VC fund drive would encompass two phases: Phase I was scheduled to last from 25 Jul to 19 Aug 69, and Phase 2 from 20 Aug to 30 Oct 1969. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-5750-69) (Eval: B-3).

A PW captured on 14 October 1969 vicinity (AT 954688) stated that the political officer of Hieu Duc (D) held two meetings monthly for cadre and guerrillas of Hoa Hung (V). The Political Officer reportedly told cadre and guerrillas that they must treat the people with respect and not take their property. They should avoid contact with large units but should always be willing to fight against small units. (Ref: INTERROGATION REPORT, 11th ITT 158-69, dtd 30 Oct 69). (Unrated).

On 20 October 1969, a GVN source reported that all villagers residing in VC controlled areas of eastern Hoa Vang (D) are required by the VC to have in their possession a VC issued pass to enable them to go from VC controlled areas to GVN controlled areas. The pass is written in ball point pen on a 10cm x 15cm piece of paper. Villagers are allowed to travel out of VC controlled areas to GVN controlled areas on either odd or even numbered dates of the month. Villagers who are allowed to travel on even numbered days of the month are required to carry a pass on which the first and last digits of the pass number add up to ten (ie., 474926, 240298). Villagers allowed to travel on odd days of the month are required to carry a pass on which the first and the last digits of the pass number add up to eleven (ie., 942862, 393858). (Ref: OSI, Det 5003, Danang AB, DRAFT DDIIR 10-35, dtd 20 Oct 69) (Eval: F-6).

On 19 October 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division while operating vicinity (AT 992599) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Letter, dated 20 Sep 69, signed by Phan NIEN for B19, P41 (Security Section, Dien Ban (D), QDSZ), addressed to the chiefs of security sections, Dien Van, Dien Tien and Dien Xuan Villages (Dien Ban District), reads in part as follows:

"Thanh TU, a cadre of A50 (Security Section, QDSZ), wants to discuss a number of tasks to be carried out in Danang City with you! Please, introduce him to some city dwellers having good relations with the (VC) Revolution or some teenagers in your villages who are able to make frequent trips to Danang City without attracting the enemy's suspicion. Thanh TU needs them for certain missions". (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-1978-69) (Eval: B-3).

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On 23 October 1969, an enemy document captured vicinity (BT 059587) contained the following information directed toward GVN officers, GVN troops, RF/PF forces and CIDG personnel.

PUNITIVE ORDER

In order to uncover American plots and to save people's life and property this order of forbiddance is directed.

(1) No one is to keep GVN troops in their houses. People will be ordered executed for this violation.

(2) No one is to have any contact with GVN troops.

(3) No one is to receive any paper work from GVN agencies such as ID cards, passes, letters of recommendation, or paper work for families, etc.

(4) No one is to join GVN organizations such as hamlet self-defense, hamlet security, etc. Anyone who attends such meetings will be held responsible to the liberation population.

(5) No one is to go out between 1900H and 0500H because the Liberation Party is active during this time.

Revolutionary Population of Dien Ban District

(Ref: CO C, 5th Special Forces Gp (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, dtd 25 Oct 69).

On 24 October 1969, elements of the 2nd ROK Marine Brigade, operating vicinity (BT 060628) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Directive, number 01/CT, dated 17 October 1969, signed by Luong Xuan LAN, (CO Q92 Precinct 3 Danang Force) concerns the development of the district armed force (nfi). Document states that the district armed force was given the following missions:

(1) Promote the guerrilla warfare movement throughout the district area.

(2) Conduct continuous attacks on the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) with the full cooperation and participation of the masses.

(3) Develop and strengthen the armed forces in city wards and housing areas, and conduct the three-pronged attacks in order to complete the Party strategic plan.

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(4) Kill enemy personnel, using mines, explosives, spikes and grenades; disseminate leaflets and hang posters in enemy city wards and public squares; destroy enemy war facilities and capture weapons.

To fulfill the criteria established in the District Party Committee resolution concerning the development of the armed forces, document reveals that each city ward or housing quarter must assign one military cadre and form one three-man cell composed of personnel who can use weapons. The cells are to create explosions, (nfi) kill enemy personnel, capture weapons, and set up road obstacles and spike-pits to create disturbances. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-2212-69, dtd 29 Oct 69) (Eval: B-3).

d. Quang Tin. A VC medic who rallied with his family on 29 August 1969, revealed that it is common knowledge among MF units that NVA deserters have banded together in small groups, generally of squad size, and are subsisting primarily on rations taken from VC porters. The band reportedly divides into groups when conducting an ambush of VC porters, and fires only long enough to frighten the porters into dropping their supplies and running. Seldom do the deserters shoot to kill. They generally use sites for those ambushes that were previously used by GVN forces. Shortly after the ambushes began, the security section (of the ralliers unit) was reportedly given the task of preparing a reaction plan whereby the MF unit was to move into the area of an expected ambush and attempt to capture the deserters. It was revealed that various reports set the NVA deserter figure in Quang Tin (P) at between 450-500 men. (Ref: JOMNAVFORV INTSUM 260-69, 290944Z Oct 69) (Unrated).

e. Quang Ngai. A US MI source reported that on 5 October 1969, a VC PLAN was disclosed which concerned the reorganization of VC military zones in Quang Ngai (P). Quang Ngai (P) was divided into four (4) military zones as follows:

Quang Ngai Military Zone 4 consisting of Mo Duc and Duc Pho (D)

Quang Ngai Military Zone 5 consisting of Nghia Hanh and Tu Nghia (D)

Quang Ngai Military Zone 6 consisting of Binh Son and Son Tinh (D)

Quang Ngai Military Zone 7 consisting of Ba To, Minh Long, Son Ha and Tra Bong (D).

These Quang Ngai military zones were subordinate to the Quang Ngai Provincial VC Forward Front Section. Each military zone was commanded by a VC regimental commander or a senior battalion officer who had an excellent record. Each commander was selected by the Quang Ngai VC Provincial Forward Front Committee.

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The purpose of establishing zones was for control purposes. The MZ Commander was required to discuss an operational plan with two (2) military committee members of the two (2) districts in the military zone. There were no units assigned to the MZ. When the MZ commander had a requirement, the VC Provincial Committee would assign provincial units to combine with district units, both under the command of the MZ commander. The only exception was in MZ 7, where the mountain area contains many secret zones and VC installations. A battalion would be assigned the MZ commander for security purposes.

The military zones were structured as follows:

MZ 4: Current commander is unknown.

MZ 5: Current commander is unknown.

MZ 6: Commanded by Bui Quang CHINH, a VC regimental commander who was previously a provincial forward front committee member. CHINH was born in Son Loc (V), Son Tinh (D), Quang Ngai (P), and is the younger brother of Bui TOAN, a Son Tinh VC district cadre.

MZ 7: Commanded by Dinh Thanh aka Dinh NHI who was a VC regimental commander and was promoted to the Quang Ngai VC Provincial Forward Front Committee in 1968. He was born at Ha Bac (V), Son Ha (D), Quang Ngai (P). From 1945-1946, he was a VC village chairman; from 1947-1949, the Son Ha District assistant chairman; 1950-1954, a provincial military section member; 1954-1957, in North Vietnam. He returned from North Vietnam in 1957 as the battalion commander of the 120th VC Battalion. Vice Chief of MZ 7 was YEN, a North Vietnamese, who was a battalion commander. MZ 7 had two (2) sub-sections which consisted of Minh Long and Ba To (D) which was commanded by Dinh LAM; Son HA and Tra BONG (D) which was commanded by Kinh ROT and Dinh DUONG (nfi) (Ref: Det D, 1st MI Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt #1/B/DX/1319/69, dtd 22 Oct 69) (Eval: B-6).

A US MI source reported that on 9 October 1969, a VC training session was concluded at Thanh Gi (H) aka Ca XEN (H) vicinity (BS 435506), Minh Thuong (V), Minh Long (D). The course was held to critique operational methods and lasted four weeks. Attending the course were 100 personnel including Montagnard and Vietnamese cadre of four mountain districts. Three of the districts represented were:

MINH LONG (D)

Dinh DOI, District Liberation Committee Chairman.

Dinh MUM, Economic Section.

Tran KY, District Regular Secretary.

Le DAM, Military Cadre.

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BA TO (D)

Dinh TIA aka Chanh TIA

Dinh CON, District Secretary

SON HA (D)

Dinh NIA, aka (PHOS NIAS)

The session was opened at 0800 hours on 13 September 1969. The first order of business was reporting by VC district cadre on operational matters during the Summer Campaign. It was determined that the following conditions existed:

Cadre and soldier's morale was very low because they did not believe the VC would be victorious, therefore a large number had defected.

The population was starving, therefore, they didn't help the VC.

After receiving reports, the VC Provincial Committee gave the following corrective actions to be taken:

Military

Reorganize the various provincial mobile units and District MF units into Sapper Units. Each platoon to be divided into 5 or 6 cells with 3 personnel in each cell and armed with hand grenades, mines and explosive charges in order to accomplish guerrilla warfare. They would raid ARVN or US outposts and cities (nfi) using sapper methods. The smaller amount of personnel would insure a small casualty rate and the destruction would be claimed as VC victories which would win the confidence of the population.

Sapper units should undergo training to prepare them for coming missions.

Political

In order to regain the trust of cadre and the population, VC village and/or hamlet cadre who were ineffective would be dismissed.

Request headquarters to assign a number of cadre returned from North Vietnam to assist in controlling local inhabitants.

Destroy all refugee camps and force the residents to return to VC-controlled areas.

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Contact various political organizations (nfi) that are neutral and express a desire to help them. Thus, they will become sympathetic to the VC cause.

Economic

Collect the August harvest and other crops. Farm effectively and develop fields under preparation (nfi). The above missions should be accomplished prior to the end of October 1969 in order to prepare for the Winter-Spring Campaign beginning in November 1969.

The course ended at 1400 hours on 9 October 1969. Security had been provided by a VC company with an estimated strength of 100 personnel and commanded by Dinh LUC. The unit was armed with rifles and prohibited the travel of local inhabitants within 1 kilometer of the course site. (Ref: Det D, 1st MI Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt 1/B/DX/1308/69, dtd 20 Oct 69) (Eval: F-3).

A US MI source reported that on 18 October 1969, a message entitled "Orders For Tax Collection", which was sent from the Mo Duc (D) VC National Liberation Front to all members of the Mo Duc (D) Finance and Economy cadre, was discovered at Hoai An (H) vicinity (BS 740590), Duc Phuoc (V), Mo Duc (D). The message was dated 9 October 1969 and was signed by Tran Tan VINH, Chairman of the Mo Duc (D) National Liberation Front. The message concerned the following topics:

Farm production in Mo Duc (D) was divided into three separate classes:

1st Class Rice: Each 360 square meters yields 180 kilos of fresh rice.

2nd Class Rice: Each 360 square meters yields 150 kilos of fresh rice.

3rd Class Rice: Each 360 square meters yields 120 kilos of fresh rice.

Forty percent of the "real" production of rice (the rice remaining after natural damage from the elements and after damages caused by war) was to be collected in taxes. Any individual who wanted to give money instead of rice, as his tax payment, must have a legitimate reason and must receive permission from the VC District Committee to do so. Each six kilos of rice was worth 107$VN.

The tax for the first six months of 1969 should be completely collected prior to 27 October 1969 and the tax for the second half of 1969 should be completely collected prior to 31 October 1969.

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Farmers would be forbidden by the VC Farmers Association to grow any rice for the next harvest if they did not pay taxes and failed to have a valid excuse. Farmers accused of this offense could not appeal for exemption to the punishment. Additionally, notes on the back of the message gave estimates of what percentages of the rice harvest were destroyed (nfi) in various villages of Mo Duc (D) as follows:

Duch Minh (V) and Duc Dung (V)	30%
Duc Hoa (V) and Duc Phong (V)	20%
Duc Nhuan (V)	15%
Duc Chanh (V)	10%

Total amount of rice which had been collected was reflected as follows:

Duc Minh (V) 3,084 kilos of rice (514 "ang")

Duc Dung (V) 1,200 kilos of rice (200 "ang")

(Ref: Det D, 1st MI Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt 1/B/DX/1317/69, dtd 21 Oct 69) (Eval: B-6).

A US MI source reported the following information on 24 October 1969:

On 20 October 1969, the Son Tinh District Youth Liberation Group held a meeting at Hung Nhuong (H) (BS 480784), Son Dong (V), Son Tinh (D). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss previous accomplishments and failures, and to plan for future missions. The Youth Group is comprised entirely of females, 30 of whom were present. The meeting included:

Thi YEN, president of the meeting and a member of the Provincial People's Revolutionary Youth Group, Son Loc (V), Son Tinh (D)

Thi Nhu HOA, Son Tinh District People's Revolutionary Youth Group Secretary.

14 Village Youth Group cadre (nfi) and 12 Youth Group cadre from villages in western Son Tinh (D) (nfi).

The meeting began with opening remarks from the president who discussed results of tasks assigned Village Youth Groups during the 3rd Winter-Spring campaign up to the present. Several good examples (nfi) were pointed out from the Youth Groups of Son My (V) aka Tinh Dhe (V), Son Loc (V) aka Tinh Son (V) and Son Kim (V) aka Tinh Hiep (V).

The President then introduced five tasks to be accomplished during the 4th Winter-Spring campaign as follows:

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Conscription for the Army. Females between the ages of 15 and 24 should set the standard and join various Armed forces in villages, districts or province. Tasks that they could accomplish with the Armed forces were reconnaissance, liaison, communication cadre, transportation, and nurses aids. A resolution, of 3 "Don'ts" and 5 "Do's", was stressed as follows:

The Three "Don'ts"

Anyone who does not have a fiance will not do so.

Those who have a fiance will not accept a marriage offer.

Anyone who had received a marriage offer would not get married at the present time.

The Five "Do's"

Join the Army.

Work in production fields.

Transport with labor groups willingly.

Collect tax and buy food.

Accomplish troop proselyting task.

Transportation tasks. Beginning in November 1969, the VC Provincial Committee would need a large number of transportation laborers who would be used on a mission for one month. Son Tinh (D) would be required to supply 150 personnel. Members assigned the transportation mission would be relieved of all local requirements.

Production tasks. This task has not yet been passed from the Provincial Committee. Villages would be informed of the requirements as received.

Tax Collection and marketing tasks. Female youths would combine with local guerrilla units and collect taxes from local villages. Money would be provided various sub-groups from the Provincial Economic and Finance Committee who would in turn go to markets in GVN controlled areas to purchase food and other essential goods (nfi). The Finance and Economic Committee had budgeted 1,000,000$VN for this purpose.

Enemy troop proselyting tasks. On the 1st of November, the Son Tinh District Committee would be responsible for sending 20 females to attend a course on troop proselyting. Upon graduation they would be sent

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to cities or districts where US and ARVN soldiers hold important positions, such as SIA and District headquarters. These cadre would be responsible to collect information from US and ARVN soldiers. The females selected would be judged on beauty, educational qualification and political and party loyalty. This task was considered the most difficult, but important task to be undertaken. (Ref: Det D, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp msg 250700Z Oct 69) (Eval: F-6).

A US MI source reported that on 22 October 1969, between 0930 and 1230, residents of Van Ha (H) (BS 783508), Duc Thuan (V) Mo Duc (D) were called to attend a meeting at the home of Mrs. HONG. The purpose of the gathering was to call upon the residents to provide money, property, and man power for the VC. Nguyen LUAN, Nui Thi HONG, and Nguyen CONG, spoke to the residents.

The people were divided into four classes and were required to provide money, rice and manpower in accordance with their class. The classes were divided as follows:

Class A. Any person who had a relative working for the GVN. This class was required to pay the VC 500$VN for each member of the family.

Class B. Each person who was a landowner (high class) was required to pay 300$VN for each member of the family.

Class C. Farmers who were considered middle class were required to pay 200$VN for each member of the family.

Class D. Each person of a poor family was required to pay 100$VN. If a family had any relative working for the revolutionary committee, the following deductions were applied:

Class A: 50%

Class B: 30%

Class C: 20%

Class D: 10%

Each family who were farmers and had rice production crops were required to give the VC 40% of the crop. If any person refused to obey the order they would be sent to a thought reform camp for three months. (Ref: Det D, 1st MI Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt 1/B/DX/1348/69, dtd 27 Oct 69) (Eval: F-6).

On 30 October 1969, during an attack on Nui Ong Do OP, there were indications that an enemy unit was monitoring friendly radio traffic.

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A US advisor stated he would mark his position with smoke, as indicated by his radio transmissions, and smoke would immediately appear in the enemy position. Personnel should be alert to this type of deception. Additionally, providing he has the capability, the enemy can enter a net for such things as denying clearance for requested artillery missions. (Ref: SA 2nd Infantry Division ARVN Quang Ngai, Advisory team 2 daily INTSUM No. 285, msg 310610Z Oct 69)

APPENDIX
I-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 44-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Thua Thien	230ct69 (Late Entry)	(YD 926185)	One civilian was wounded by detonating a VC mine (nfi).
	240ct69 (Late Entry)	(YD 817813)	A US Navy vehicle from Phu Bai Combat Base traveling to Hue, received SAF and one round of RPG fire from an USEF, resulting in one civilian killed and one wounded.
Quang Nam	220ct69 (Late Entry)	(AT 005703)	One female civilian (nfi) was shot to death by the Viet Cong.
	240ct69 (Late Entry)	(AT 867498)	A CAP 2-9-2 patrol received SAF and one 60mm mortar round from an USEF. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and the enemy broke contact. As the patrol was proceeding back to its daytime CP, four Vietnamese were found in a field KIA by SAF. It was determined that the Vietnamese had been to the rear of the CAP patrol, in the enemy's line of fire, and were killed as the VC initiated SAF on the CAP patrol.
	240ct69 (Late Entry)	(BT 069508)	One civilian, gathering firewood, was killed when he accidentally detonated a VC mine.
	270ct69	(BT 089538)	VC placed a mine on the body of a PF who was killed in a VC ambush. When the PF's relatives came to claim the body, the mine exploded, killing four civilians and wounding eighteen.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	280ct69	(BT 086545)	The 174th PF Company and an unknown number of civilians escorting a funeral procession for a member of the 174th PF Company detonated an undetermined type anti-personnel mine, killing seven civilians and wounding 14.
	290ct69	(BT 034637)	A NPFF, while crossing a street in Viem Tay (3) (H), was killed by sniper fire from one VC.
Quang Ngai	230ct69 (Late Entry)	(BS 520780)	VC entered Son Huong (V), burned one schoolhouse and one dispensary. There were negative casualties.
	240ct69 (Late Entry)	(BS 596862)	PF platoon 60 received an unknown number M-79 rounds, resulting in one civilian in vicinity wounded.
	280ct69	(BS 517778)	An unknown number of VC raided Dien Nien (H) and completely destroyed the schoolhouse.

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ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 44-69

1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY.

a. There were 87 long range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 26 October to 1 November 1969. These long range patrols reported 58 sightings and 12 contacts totaling 708 enemy moving in no discernible pattern. The contacts resulted in a total of 28 enemy KIA.

b. Reconnaissance teams from the Third Reconnaissance Battalion observed approximately 95 enemy during the reporting period. One significant contact occurred on 1 November 1969 in the vicinity of YD 273659 when team Barcroft was engaged by an estimated 15-20 enemy using Chicom grenades. Enemy casualties could not be determined.

c. The 101st Airborne Division (AM) Ranger teams Tahiti and New Guinea on 31 October 1969 in the vicinity of YC 706967 observed 20 enemy which were engaged with tactical air with unknown results.

d. The First Infantry Brigade, Fifth Infantry Division (Mech) Ranger team Killer 15 observed three NVA at YD 079702 on 291357H October 1969. On 011828H November 1969 Ranger team Killer 13 had contact with two VC in the vicinity of YD 261535. One VC was KIA.

e. The First Force Reconnaissance Company teams had only one sighting/contact for the reporting period. Team Record made unavoidable contact with six VC on 311030H October 1969 in the vicinity of AT 835 930. Contact was broken with negative friendly or enemy casualties.

f. First Reconnaissance Battalion teams observed over 600 enemy during this reporting period. The teams accounted for 20 confirmed enemy KIA. The majority of the enemy observations occurred in a ten kilometer radius west, north, and north east of An Hoa.

g. Reconnaissance efforts of the Americal Division Ranger teams resulted in 19 enemy being observed and four enemy KIA during the reporting period. The four enemy KIA resulted during a contact with Ranger team Nevada on 261315H October 1969 in the vicinity of BS 664342.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY.

a. In the U.S. DMZ area, First Infantry Brigade, Fifth Infantry Division (Mech) (1/5) monitored sensors detected seven targets. Three fire missions were conducted in response consisting of 30 rounds of 155mm and three rounds of eight inch artillery. Twenty-nine targets were detected by 1/5 monitored sensors in the Duel Blade II area. Eight fire missions were conducted consisting of 35 rounds of 105mm, 13 rounds of eight inch, 28 rounds of 155mm, and four rounds of 175mm artillery. Reconnaissance of sensor string kill zone located in the vicinity of YD 039685 on 31 October 1969 confirmed two enemy KIA.

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b. In the 101st Airborne Division (AM) DMZ sensor area no targets were detected. Thirty targets were detected in the Duel Blade II area. Response consisted of 210 rounds of 105mm, 28 rounds of 155mm, and 106 rounds of 175mm artillery. BDA was unobserved.

c. The First Marine Division RF sensors detected no targets during the reporting period. Line sensors detected six targets and were responded to with six fire missions. BDA was unobserved. The most significant line sensor activity was located in 26th Marines area in the vicinity of AT 885815.

d. In the Americal Division the heaviest concentration of enemy activity through sensor monitored areas was at LZ West and LZ Professional. Americal RF sensors detected 33 targets. Twenty-one fire missions were conducted in response with negative BDA.

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ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO III MAF PERINTREP 44-69

A. REGISTERED MAIL

DIR, NSA	3
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1
CMC (ABQ)	2
CG FMFPAC	2
CG USARV	1
CG I FFORCEV	5
CG II FFORCEV	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CG MCDEC	1
CG 5TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CAL	6
CG 4TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CAL	1
CG 3RD MAW	2
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2
CO "B" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	5
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1
CO MCB 3	1
CO MCB 6	1
CO MCB 7	1
CO MCB 8	1
CO MCB 10	1
CO MCB 11	1
CO MCB 53	1
CO MCB 58	1
CO MCB 62	1
CO MCB 71	1
CO MCB 133	1
CO USS REPOSE	1
CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO MHTG-30, MCAF, SANTA ANA, CALIF 92709	1
DSA II CORPS	1
CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GRP, 7TH FLEET	1
CMDR, 19TH CI TM, CAMPEN, CAL	1
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CTF 76	1
CO USASSD ACSI DA (ATTN DOD SPEC-REP) MACV APO SF 96222	1
HQ, 12TH TAC FTR WING (ATTN ARMY GRD LIAISON OFF) APO SF 96326	1
NILO CHU LAI, NAVAL ADVISOR, BOX 210, NSAD FPO 96696	1
NILO QUANG NGAI, ADVISOR TEAM 2 APO 96260	1
NILO HUE, BOX 9, AT-3, APO 96258	1
NILO QUANG TRI, BOX 16, AT-19, APO 96495	1

B. BY COURIER

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232) (CIIED)	2
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2
CICV	2
CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN	10
CG 1ST MARDIV DNG RVN	40
CG 3D MARDIV DGH RVN	26
CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN	30
CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM) CEA RVN	20
CG 1ST MAW DNG RVN	30
CG 2D BDE ROKMC HAN RVN	7
CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CG USASUPCOM DNG RVN	1
CG 173D AVN BDE	2
CG FORLOG CMD DNG RVN	5
CG 1ST LOG CMD LBN	2
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHL RVN	3
CO 30 NCR	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GRP (ABN)	17
CO 1ST CAG	1
CO 3RD CAG	1
CO 4TH CAG	1
CO 1ST BN, 525TH MI DET	25
CO 517TH MI DET	1
CO MCB 40	1
CO MCB 121	1
CO 4TH PSYOP GRP	1
DSA I CORPS	11
CMDR, 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SGN RVN	3
COMNAVFORV	1
COMNAVSUPACT DNG RVN	2
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2
OSA/EMB SGN RVN	1
DET B, 1ST MIBARS	1
CIB	1

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CTG 76.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTF 115	1
7TH AIR FORCE (IGS) BDOC	1
45TH ENGR GRP	1
620TH TCS APO 96203	1
366TH AIR SEC SQD, USAF	2
620TH TSC	1
SPO-SEC CMD QHN RVN	1

C. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (WITHIN HQ, III MAF)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP CofS, PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	42
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (C/O G-3)	2
2D ROKMC BDE LIAISON OFFICER	1
PSYOPS	5
1ST RADIO BN	11
HORN DASC	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO	1

D. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

CO 1ST MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 3RD MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 2ND CAG	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
HQ 212TH CMBT AVN BN	6
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
CTG 115.1	1
CCN	1
USNAD	1
DIR CAP	1
7TH PSYOP BN	1
1ST FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
CO MCB 74	1

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HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

JCS CONTROL NUMBER | COPY NO. 2

MACH. CI	DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT	PRI.	SEC.	ORIGINATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.	NO. CYS. RECD.	MICFLM CLAS.	MO.	DA.	YR.
	C917421	PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE RPT 45-69		3L	MEF	0124869	2		4	Y	11
			NAVY FILE NUMBER				DATE				

ROUTING - *Use numbers to show order of routing*

OPERATION CODE

X-ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET
A-FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION
B-FOR COMPLIANCE
C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE
OF _____
D-FOR COMMENT
E-FOR RECOMMENDATION
F-FOR CONCURRENCE
G-FOR INFORMATION
H-RETURN TO _____
I- _____
J-DISPOSITION _____

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
					COMMANDANT
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
1	AG	11/20	11/25	KM	G-3 By DIR
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAM
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
					JOINT CONTROL
					COUNSEL
					WOMEN MARINES
					STAFF DENTAL
					STAFF MEDICAL
					STAFF CHAPLAIN
					CLASSIFIED FILES

DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
(AGENCY HAVING PRIMARY INTEREST COMPLETE)

✓ REQUEST FOR PERMANENT RETENTION (COPY) (BUCKTAG COPY)
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DESTROY AFTER ROUTING *(No record or information value)*
RETAIN BUCKTAG COPY PERMANENTLY IN FILE *(Will be screened for further disposition when due for retirement and transferred to Federal Records Center unless otherwise indicated.)*
DISTRIBUTE EXTRA COPIES TO
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SECTION | SIGNATURE

ACTION OFFICE:

REMARKS *(Entries to be signed and dated. For lengthy comments attach separate page and indicate "Bucktag Comment Attached." Do not assign separate Control Number to Bucktag Comments.)*

P.R. to Hist after Routing

PERMANENT RETENTION
Report Destruction to HQ Classified Files Sect. (Code ABQ)

HIST

G-3

RETURN TO ABQ
UPON COMPLETION OF ROUTING

DO NOT DETACH—THIS FORM IS A PERMANENT PART OF THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH IT IS ATTACHED

MATERIAL ATTACHED IS

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RELEASABLE TO FWMAF & RVNAF

11 November 1969

UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic Intelligence Report 45-69

AIR GROUND TEAM
III
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE



G-3

GROUP - 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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HQ III MAF, G-2
DANANG, RVN
11 November 1969
Ser: 0124?69

PERINTREP 45-69

Period covered: 020001H - 082400H November 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, NF 48-13
ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. Most indicators of enemy initiated activity increased during the past week. Incoming rose for the third straight week to a total of 628 rounds, an increase of 60 rounds from the previous week's total. This is the highest number of incoming rounds recorded since the week of 14-20 September. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased as well to 223, up 54 from the last reporting period. Enemy KIA's also registered an increase, rising to 498, an increase of three over last week's total. Hoi Chanhs declined for the second week, dropping to 107, down 18 from last week. The increase in enemy activity was also reflected by the total number of PW's and detainees for the week. FWMAF accounted for 25, while the ARVN acquired 60 for a total of 85, the highest number recorded since the week of 1-7 June when the total was 92.

Despite the increase in enemy initiated activity of the past week, VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities reflected a continuation of the same policy and tactics of the past several months. No change in scope or intensity of these activities, including terrorism, was discernible. The VC/VCI continued to suppress a growing morale problem and desertion/defection rate by implementation of stern punitive measures, continuous group activity, political indoctrination, new censorship, and heavy reliance on propaganda regarding US troop withdrawals and a subsequent quick victory.

a. QUANG TRI (P). The enemy continued to follow the course of action established last week reacting to friendly operations near the DMZ, as well as conducting several attacks by fire. On 2 November, C-1 Base at the eastern end of the DMZ received three 140mm rockets which resulted in no damage and negligible casualties. On 8 November, C-2 Base (YD 135645) received two 122mm rockets with negative results. Again on the 8th, Camp CARROLL (YD 063549) was hit by eight 140mm rockets which destroyed one ammunition bunker. Elements of the 1/61st Infantry at C-2 Base observed a launch site (YD 042635) and fired artillery resulting in four secondary explosions. Two ARVN patrols conducting B-52 strike BDA came under mortar fire as they conducted operations in the vicinity of the DMZ. A reaction force of one company from 2/1 ARVN reinforced by elements of the 2/7 ACAT was committed in support of each patrol. While in the area of the strikes the forces had eight minor contacts resulting in six enemy killed. The ARVN also found 280 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition and a quantity of rice and corn. The strike areas revealed 105 bunkers, 30 of which had been destroyed, a large

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quantity of clothing and 13 NVA bodies. Many more bodies are believed to be buried in the collapsed bunkers. In a similar action on the 7th, two patrols from the 1/7 Cavalry drew mixed mortar and small arms fire near GIO LINH. This action resulted in 17 enemy killed and one PW who revealed that he was from the T.6 Company of the 27th Battalion, 31st Regiment.

On 3 November, a Ranger Team from the 1/5 Mechanized Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force five kilometers northeast of CON THIEN (YD 148747) and called in gunships resulting in seven enemy KIA. Another Ranger Team from the 1/5 called gunships on approximately 50 NVA moving near their position (YD 053697) on the morning of 6 November. During the remainder of the day, this team observed 50 more NVA in small groups apparently looking for dead and wounded. In both cases, the enemy were probably from the 31st Regiment, as were members of a small group of NVA engaged by the 560th RF Company seven kilometers west of DONG HA (YD 180619), and another group five kilometers northwest of GIO LINH (YD 178 758) engaged by a squad size patrol of the 3/2 ARVN. Closing out the week's activity, on 7 November, a Ranger Team from 1/5 Mechanized Infantry sighted 173 enemy moving in the southern half of the DMZ (YD 054710) again possibly elements of the 31st Regiment. The team requested tactical air strikes which resulted in 11 enemy KIA.

b. THUA THIEN (P). THUA THIEN Province was quiet during the week of 2-8 November, with no significant enemy contact or enemy initiated activity reported. On 5 November, a Vietnamese official was informed by a villager that he had discovered a grave site. A team from PHU THU District Headquarters investigated and found a grave located near CON LAC Village 15 Kilometers east of HUE (YD 925205). An initial estimate by the team is that the grave contains 300 bodies. Excavation of the grave was scheduled to commence on 8 November.

c. QUANG NAM (P). The level of enemy activity increased during the past week in QUANG NAM Province with five significant attacks by fire reported. On 3 November, two RF Companies, the 924th, seven kilometers southeast of HOI AN (BT 214556) and the 927th, two and one-half kilometers northwest of DIEN BAN (BT 052586) received a total of 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The rounds that impacted near DIEN BAN hit a PW compound resulting in light casualties among the prisoners. Also on 3 November, 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire landed near the HOI AN area (BT 1456). There was no reported materiel damage or casualties. The third incident took place on 4 November when the 709th RF Company and the 20th PF Platoon, nine kilometers northwest of DIEN BAN (AT 988625) received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire while in night defensive positions, resulting in light friendly casualties.

The most significant attack took place at 0050H on 3 November when the MARBLE MOUNTAIN Air Facility (BT 0673) received 19 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in damage to five helicopters, and light casualties. F/2/1

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Marines were patrolling in the area and observed the firing site (BT 060 700) and the 134th RF Group was dispatched as a reaction force. No counterbattery was fired due to the proximity of friendly troops in the area.

Ground contact with enemy forces during the period was light, with only three incidents occurring during the reporting period. On 4 November, the 3d Battalion of the 51st ARVN Regiment made contact with an unknown size enemy force five kilometers northeast of QUE SON District Headquarters (BT 0540), killing seven of the enemy. The following day, the 10th Company, 2d ROK Marine Brigade, on northern BARRIER Island, exchanged heavy small arms fire with another unknown size enemy force. On 8 November, 4/5 ARVN on a search and clear operation, eight kilometers southeast of QUE SON received small arms fire, M-79 fire, and 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from an estimated VC platoon. The ARVN returned the fire and called air strikes with unknown results, while suffering moderate casualties. Two other incidents on 5 November resulted in 21 enemy KIA.

On 6 November, in a sabotage incident, twenty feet of bridging was destroyed two kilometers south southwest of HILL 55 (AT 965605). Terrorist attacks continued on 5 November as CAM HA Village, four kilometers west of HOI AN, was infiltrated by several VC who threw hand grenades into a number of houses killing four and wounding six.

Sizeable amounts of foodstuffs were captured during the week, including 10,000 pounds of rice. The largest single find was made seven and one-half kilometers north of DIEN BAN (BT 086657) when 2,000 pounds of rice was discovered packed in 55 gallon drums and bags.

An attack by fire was apparently thwarted on 7 November when 10 140mm rockets being prepared for firing were discovered by Marines on a company sweep seven kilometers southwest of the NAM O Bridge (AT 862812). The following day three more 140mm rockets were found in the same general location. Also on the 8th, a Marine forward observer on HILL 65 observed a group of 13 VC eight kilometers west of LIBERTY Bridge (AT 843542). An artillery mission was called resulting in nine enemy killed.

d. QUANG TIN (P). Activity in QUANG TIN Province increased over the low level of the preceding weeks with three significant attacks by fire and one enemy initiated ground attack. On 5 November, two companies of 2/5 ARVN occupying night defensive positions 14 kilometers northwest of TIEN PHUOC (BT 215325) received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire followed an hour later by a probing attack from an unknown size enemy force. The attack was repulsed resulting in three enemy KIA. On 6 November, the TAM KY Airfield (BT 301195) was hit by 16 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and two RPG rounds resulting in minor damage to two aircraft. Later on the same day, eighteen 82mm mortar rounds impacted in the 144th RF Company area six kilometers southwest of TAM KY (BT 250185) with negative damage. Both these incidents

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probably involved elements of the 72d LF Battalion, 76th Sapper Battalion, and the V-18 Company.

In contrast to the single significant friendly initiated contact reported last week, there were four during this reporting period, three on 5 November and one on the 6th, resulting in a total of 28 enemy dead and negative friendly casualties or damage.

On 5 November, at approximately 0930H, three US soldiers who were released by the enemy, walked into CAP 1-1-4's position five kilometers southwest of TAM KY (BT 250193). All three appeared to be in good physical condition.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Enemy initiated activity increased in QUANG NGAI Province this week. On 3 November, the 933d RF Company contacted an enemy force eight kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BT 705796) killing one and capturing eight. On the 4th, 2/4 ARVN, three kilometers northeast of MO DUC captured nine VC without weapons. Later in the week on the 7th, 1/4 ARVN on a search and clear mission 12 kilometers southeast of DUC PHO (BS 908300) made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in four VC KIA, capturing nine.

Four caches of rice totaling almost five tons were confiscated during the week. Most of it was evacuated and will be distributed to refugees.

On 5 November, the 711th RF Company seven and one-half kilometers southeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 717698) received 60 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in negative casualties or damage. In QUANG NGAI City, sappers fired six B-41 rockets and threw hand grenades into the KIM THONG High School early on the 5th. No one was injured, but the school and several adjacent houses suffered heavy damage. Several hours later, QUANG NGAI City was hit by two 122mm rockets. One round landed in the MACV compound resulting in negligible casualties. On 6 November, FSB 411 received one 122mm rocket (BS 538732) resulting in negative casualties or damage. Less than an hour later, A/4/21st received 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire five kilometers southeast of DUC PHO (BS 866369) again with negative casualties or damage.

On 8 November, troops of the 3/6 ARVN, 11 kilometers southeast of BINH SON (BS 714885) discovered 20 enemy bodies killed by air strikes, and 1/4 ARVN captured six unarmed VC 12 kilometers southeast of DUC PHO (BS 900300).

The enemy initiated ground incidents seem to have been conducted by local force and guerrilla units as no NVA units were identified as having taken part. The rocket attacks were the first since August in QUANG NGAI Province and were possibly fired by the 107th Artillery Battalion.

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f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. Agent reports and PW interrogations have been predicting a Winter-Spring Offensive to start some time in November or early December. The increases in enemy initiated action in almost all categories this week would seem to indicate that the offensive was under way. However, it is still too early to make an accurate assessment of the situation. It is significant that only one of the attacks by fire this week was followed by a ground attack. Also of interest is the fact that in many areas the enemy attacks were conducted by local force or main force units, and that NVA units were noticeably absent, except in the southern DMZ area. The pattern of harassing attacks against combat units can be expected to continue into the coming week, characterized by attacks by fire, light ground attacks, and interdiction of lines of communication.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased from 169 to 223 for the week of 2-8 November. These incidents consisted of five ground attacks (one of which was company size or larger and four platoon size or smaller) no ambushes, seven attacks by fire, 93 harassing fire incidents, 39 mining and booby trap incidents, no hamlet harassment incidents, one assassination incident, no espionage incidents, no kidnapping incidents, and 26 propaganda incidents.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire decreased from 95 to 63 incidents for the reporting period and 19 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 2-8 November.

Type	Expended
82mm Mortar	358
60mm Mortar	200
Unk Cal Mortar	40
140mm Rocket	23
122mm Rocket	6
	628

l. - q. Negative

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r. Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 2-8 November.

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, and Rocket Ammunition

Type	Amount
82mm Mortar	459
60mm Mortar	199
175mm Artillery	1
105mm Artillery	8
140mm Rocket	15
122mm Rocket	9
	691

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	160
Crew-Served Weapons	12

(2) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 2-8 November.

Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
1 Nov	(YD 104623)	20	C/3/5 Cav
1 Nov	(YC 549939)	200	B/2/7
2 Nov	(AT 899549)	25	H/2/5
2 Nov	(AT 965428)	100	C/1/7
3 Nov	(AT 900539)	100	H/2/5
3 Nov	(AT 900539)	50	H/2/5
3 Nov	(AT 956368)	200	I/2/7
3 Nov	(AT 962418)	350	D/1/7
3 Nov	(BT 672015)	1,000	A/5/46
3 Nov	(YD 252797)	440	2/1 ARVN
3 Nov	(BS 470798)	880	1/6 ARVN
4 Nov	(BT 086651)	2,000	E/2/1
4 Nov	(AT 964586)	1,200	L/3/1
5 Nov	(AT 853517)	300	H&S/1/5
5 Nov	(AT 854501)	200	B/1/5
5 Nov	(AT 951278)	1,500	D/4/31
6 Nov	(BT 039419)	400	L/3/7
6 Nov	(AT 986219)	200	C/4/31

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Date	Location	Amount (lbs)	Capturing Unit
6 Nov	(BT 091303)	500	D/3/21
6 Nov	(BS 475460)	500	A/3/1
6 Nov	(BS 789444)	600	RCN/1/20
6 Nov	(YD 933186)	99	142d RF Co
6 Nov	(YD 841018)	45	A/2/502
6 Nov	(YD 585406)	200	C/3/187
7 Nov	(AT 855518)	600	H&S/1/5
7 Nov	(BS 510831)	2,000	D/1/52
7 Nov	(BS 694305)	20	C/4/3
8 Nov	(BS 504842)	800	D/1/52
8 Nov	(BS 504844)	900	D/1/52
	Total Rice	15,429	

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA.

Structures Destroyed	198	Structures Damaged	81
Bunkers Destroyed	54	Bunkers Damaged	13
Secondary Explosions	19	Secondary Fires	26
Boats Destroyed	1	Bridges Damaged	1

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ increased in comparison to the previous week. There were 498 KIA's, 68 VC PW's, and 17 NVA PW's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	QUANG TRI	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Temperature				
High	85	88	94	85
Low	65	71	69	72
Rainfall (total)	4.43	2.39	3.15	3.70

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	QUANG TRI	PHU BAI	DANANG	CHU LAI
Winds (knots)	12	12	94	85
Visibility (miles)	6	6	7	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 8-14 November 1969

(a) General. Moderate northeasterly to easterly winds are expected to prevail over Southeast Asia during the coming week. No surges in the monsoon or tropical storm activity are expected to directly effect the Republic of Vietnam during the period and weather changes from the past week are expected to be minor in nature.

(b) ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the period is partly cloudy along the coast and mostly cloudy in the mountains. Low cloud ceilings will be at 1,500-2,500 feet. Precipitation in ICTZ will be approximately one to three inches with isolated instances of three to five inches.

j. - 1. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following courses of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to five infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(3) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

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(4) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with the equivalent of up to six infantry regiments supported by three rocket battalions and four sapper battalions.

(5) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with six infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and two artillery battalions.

(6) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and two artillery battalions.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to five infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Continuing shortages of food and medical supplies coupled with sickness and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.

J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE
ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z.

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 45-69 AS OF 082400 NOVEMBER 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 3 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

	I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL	
	NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA			
	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH	NO. UNITS	EST STRENGTH
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-hq	1	650					1	650			1	650
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue									1	855	1	855
Front HQ's	2	750					2	750	1	UNK	3	750
Div HQ's	2	565					2	565	1	580	3	1,145
Regt HQ's	10	2,960	2	535			12	3,495	16	7,480	28	10,975
Bn's-Maneuver	38	9,105	13	2,105	3	655	54	11,865	44	18,455	98	30,320
Bn's-Support	16	4,130	2	370	1	195	19	4,695	10	2,480	29	7,175
Separate Co's	1	130			31	2,225	32	2,355	1		32	2,360
TOTAL CONFIRMED		18,290		3,010		3,075		24,375		29,850		54,225
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's									1	285	1	285
Bn's-Maneuver	3	830	1	350	1	190	5	1,370	1	455	6	1,825
Bn's-Support	5	1,335					5	1,335	4	1,145	9	2,480
Separate Co's	1	90			2	150	3	240			3	240
TOTAL PROBABLE		2,255		350		340		2,945		1,885		4,830
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350
Regt HQ's									2	800	2	1,800
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support	1	300					1	300	17	4,950	18	5,250
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440
TOTAL POSSIBLE										6,690		6,990
		20,845		3,360		3,415		27,620		38,425		66,045

See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		NVA	MF/VC	LF/VC	TOTALS
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,110		35	3,145
	Probable	345			345
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,455		35	3,490
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,350		475	3,825
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,350		475	3,825
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	5,030	1,180	550	6,760
	Probable	1,005	350		1,355
	Possible	300			300
	TOTAL	6,335	1,530	550	8,415
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,665	625	650	3,940
	Probable	380		265	645
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,045	625	915	4,585
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	4,135	1,205	1,365	6,705
	Probable	525		75	600
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,660	1,205	1,440	7,305

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

	I CORPS														DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL									
MANUEVER	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	32	0		32	10			10	3			3	45			45	35	7		42	80	7		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	38	3		41	13	1		14	3	1		4	54	5		59	36	9		45	90	14		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	[illegible]			9	1			1	1			1	8	2	1	11	2	3	10	15	10	5	11	26
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	5
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		2	3	2	1	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1					1			1
TOTAL SUPPORT	16	5	1	22	2			2	1			1	19	5	1	25	8	4	22	34	27	9	23	59
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	54	8	1	63	15			16	4	1		5	73	10	1	84	44	13	22	79	117	23	23	163

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	QUANG TRI	STR	THUA THIEN	STR	QUANG NAM	STR	QUANG TIN	STR	QUANG NGAI	STR
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	269	Nam Hoa	50	Hoa Vang	812	Thang Binh	940	Binh Son	311
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	56	Hieu Duc	50	Tam Ky	449	Son Tinh	474
	Trieu Phong	113	Hong Dien	69	Dien Ban	1,090	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	437
	Cam Lo	150	Vinh Loc	43	Dai Loc	341	Hiep Duc	208	Nghia Hanh	336
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	251	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	279	Mo Duc	453
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	333	Hau Duc	172	Duc Pho	463
	Huong Hoa	5	Phu Vang	11	Que Son	943			Tra Bong	166
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	107	Duy Xuyen	1,065			Ba To	197
			Huong Thuy	77	Hieu Nhon	291			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	529					Son Ha	170
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	917	THUA THIEN	1,239	QUANG NAM	5,045	QUANG TIN	2,163	QUANG NGAI	3,021

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,385

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,035		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	570	Unlocated	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	575	Unlocated	XD 8723/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	C	325	Unlocated	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	C	370	Unlocated	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	C	375	Unlocated	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	

*See note #4 on page A-17
**See note #2 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	300		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0565/22Apr69
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9862/17May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1675/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/18Jun69
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1267/24Sep69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1365/28Jul69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,030		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	YD 1765/13Oct69
27th Bn	NVA	C	190	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1775/7Nov69
15th Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,955	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Regt Hq	NVA	C	710	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 9661/5Sep69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	855	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	2,010		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YD 0309	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,570		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	215	Unlocated	YD 3300/15Jul69
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,565		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	YD 1259/11Jul69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	325	XD 9265	XD 8362/60ct69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27 Jul68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	300	XD 8854	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,590		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 4541/160ct69
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	YD 1943/8Sep69
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	175	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
K-34 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	240	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	105	Vic YD 3535	YD 2540/17Sep69

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	885		
Rdgt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	270	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	260	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jun69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,725		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	330	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	160	Vic YD 6514	YD 6019/6Sep69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	350	Vic YD 3304	YD 5226/8Sep69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
K.35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	
C.113 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 4032	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	65	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Front 4	NVA	C	UNK		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	ZC 1341	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
577th Rocket Bn	NVA	C	305	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
Hai Van Engr Bn	NVA	PR	200	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	C	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102d Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103d Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	610		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	165	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	135	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2d Bn	NVA	C	155	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3d Bn	NVA	C	135	BT 1252	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,065		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	ZC 1835	ZC 1945/50ct69
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	YC 8360	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	YC 8360	AT 8355/21Apr69
2d Bn	NVA	C	240	YC 8360	AT 8754/10May69
3d Bn	NVA	C	305	YC 8360	AT 8355/21Apr69
573d Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unlocated	
575th Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	ZC 1960	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	685		
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	175	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
R.20 Bn	MF	C	145	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	MF	C	130	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.3 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	100	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	115	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	45	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	3,955		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	648		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	AT 9226	
1st Bn	NVA	C	160	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	175	AT 9226	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	175	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	175	BT 1623	BT 2340/12Aug69
72nd Bn	LF	C	175	BT 1917	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	195	BT 2113	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	190	BT 2217	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 3304	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	250	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4213	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	75	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
38th Bn	LF	C	190	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	290	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
40[illegible]th Sapper Bn	MF	C	125	BS 4677	BS 5279/20Oct69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	165	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	680		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	150	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4386	BS 4786/13Sep69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69
C.17 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	55	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7555	BS 7559/17Oct69
C.120 Co	LF	C	45	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	65	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 5596	
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,615		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	870		
Regt Hq	MF	C	345	BS 7825	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	180	BS 7825	BS 8331/13May69
95th Bn	MF	C	180	BS 7825	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	165	BS 7825	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 4741	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 5542	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 4543	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6546	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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BINH DINH PROVINCE *

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,700		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	520	BR 7363	
8th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 5950	
9th Bn	NVA	C	300	BR 5929	

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 080001H to 142400H November 1969.

a. Based on numerous PW, Hoi Chanh and agent reports, the bulk of the 141st NVA Regiment has been moved to the vicinity of A YIN (YC 8360) approximately 36 kilometers from their old base camp in eastern Base Area 127 (ZC 1861) in QUANG NAM Province. A detachment of the 141st NVA Regiment remains in the old base camp to improve facilities, provide security, and gather rice, in anticipation of the regiment's return possibly for the Spring 1970 Offensive.

b. The 22d NVA Regiment, 3d NVA Division, has been re-located based on information received from PW's, a Hoi Chanh and agent reports. The regiment, with the 7th and 8th Bns, have been re-located west and north of BA TO, while the 9th Bn maintains a presence in the lowland area 10 kilometers southwest of MO DUC.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVA LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

9. Subordinate/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF PERINTREP 44-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS, AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 45-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P). PW, PFC Nguyen Xuan THUY, 8th Co, 27th Bn, 31st Regt captured 16 Oct 69 (YD 091593) (241258Z Oct 69 11th ITT Rpt #153-69) stated the 8th Co's strength was 80 men and the 31st Regt's Headquarters was located in PHUOC LANG (V), VINH LINH Special Zone while the 27th Bn's Headquarters and 8th Co were located two hours walk north of the BEN HAI River near an unknown river landing (CNA). Source also stated the mission of the 8th Co was to conduct attacks on targets of opportunity at vicinity (High Point 135) (CNA) and High Point 137 vicinity (YD 0764). The 8th Co also was to conduct attacks on military vehicles traveling on the road between CAM LO (YD 1259) and the BA LONG Valley area (YD 1639). These attacks were to be conducted during the period 15-30 Oct 69. PW THUY revealed the morale in his unit was fair; however, all of the troops feared death because they lost many soldiers in battle. The 8th Co had 15 WIA and an unknown number of KIA since late Aug 69. Source stated that the 27th Bn received 80 replacements in late Aug 69. Source also stated the AKA's for the 31st Regt were the 31st Group, SONG HONG Regt, and the SONG HONG Group and the AKA for the 27th Bn was D.27. PW THUY revealed these LBN's: 8th Co-94320 XB; 22d Skeleton Training Regt-32890 OK. Reported personalities: 27th Bn CO-DIEN, XO-THIEN, PO-HAT, CofS-XUAN, Opns and Trng-LAU; 8th Co XO-Nguyen Dang SINH, PO-Vuong The HUAN, APO-Duong Cong HUONG.

(G-2 COMMENT: Approximately 50 percent of reported personalities correlate with III MAF OOB. All reported AKA's and the LBN for the 8th Co correlate with III MAF OOB. All information rated (F-2).)

2. THUA THIEN (P)

a. PW, Sgt Doa Van NO, 2d Co, 439th Bn, 5th NVA Regt, captured on 8 Oct 69 vicinity (YD 773084) (101-76-69/081720 Oct 69) stated the 439th Bn reinfiltrated into RVN in Mar 69 and reached its present location (YD 7500) with a strength of 400 men in Sep 69. The mission of the 439th Bn is to engage all U. S. and ARVN forces and to protect their base area. The PW also stated that morale was low after the death of Ho Chi MINH and has dropped even lower due to a shortage of food. NO stated that the 439th Bn is composed of three rifle companies designated 1, 2, 3 and one heavy weapons company designated 4. The C-2 Co's strength has dropped from 40 to 20 men as a result of casualties. Each company of the 439th Bn has the following weapons; two 60mm Mortars, three B-40 RL, one AK-47 per man plus one or two NVA hand grenades per man. The C-4 Heavy Weapons Company has an unknown number of 82mm Mortars, B-41's, and machine guns. Reported personalities: 439th Bn CO-Vu DINH, XO-AN, PO-THINH.

(G-2 COMMENT: All information corresponds closely with other information held on the 439th Bn, 5th Regt. Pending full interrogation results on another PW captured on 4 Nov 69 from the same unit, OOB anticipates accepting this unit. All information rated (F-2).)

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b. Rallier, (soldier) Le NAM of the 3d Co, PHU LOC Armed Bn, who rallied 28 Oct 69 after escaping from guard duty, (SA/1st ARVN Div/Rpt 76-69 281200H Oct 69) stated his unit was located vicinity (AU 839060) and had the mission of collecting rice. He also stated his battalion's future mission was to set ambushes on Highway #1 and kill government cadre. The PW stated the following locations: PHU LOC Armed Bn Hqs (ZD 1504), Element "A" of 3d Co located at (AU 839060). Element "B" of 3d Co operates vicinity (AT 812015). Reported personalities: PHU LOC Armed Bn CO-NGUYEN; Element "A" of 3d Co CO-TRI, XO-TUONG, PO-HA, APO-THE; Element "B" leader-KHANH. Strength of 3d Co is 30 men.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB locates the 3d Co at (YC 031988). All personalities are new to OOB with the exception of NGUYEN, who is held as CO of the PHU LOC Armed Bn (AKA K-3 Bn). All information rated (F-3).)

3. QUANG NAM (P). PW, Col Tran Van DIEP, 2d Co, 91st Sapper Bn, captured 23 Oct 69 approximately seven kilometers northeast of AN HOA Combat Base (AT 884514) (040328Z Nov 69 CG First MARDIV Supp Interr Rpt 1st ITT 26-10-69) stated the battalion headquarters was located vicinity of HON TAU Mountains, (AT 935421) on 10 Oct 69. He also stated 2d Co was located near VINH CUONG (H), XUYEN PHU (V), DUC DUC (D) vicinity (AT 908491) as of 11 Oct 69. The base area that was currently being occupied by the company was not permanent but the company had been there since 2 Oct 69. The battalion headquarters was located on the southern slope of HILL 323. The 1st Co was located 200 meters northeast of the battalion headquarters, the 3d Co located 200 meters southwest of the battalion headquarters and the 5th Co located 200 meters northwest of the battalion headquarters. The PW stated the current mission of his unit was to collect rice, and set up liaison with local force VC of DUC DUC (D), with a future mission of attacking AN HOA Combat Base in late Oct or early Nov. A recon element had left the battalion headquarters on 9 Oct 69 (NFI). The battalion had a strength of 150 men, with each company having approximately 33 men. There are four companies and a battalion headquarters section. The battalion is armed with two 82mm mortars, one flame thrower, one bangalore torpedo, and two B-40's per platoon. When in the mountains the men receive one and one-half cans of rice per day. In the lowlands they receive two and one-half cans a day plus salt, and wild vegetables when available. The battalion sends rice collecting units of 50 men 10 times a month to XUYEN TRA (V) 12 kilometers southwest of HOI AN (BT 060490). Each man carries approximately 35 pounds while on these missions. The unit was equipped with two, 2-watt CHICOM radios at the battalion headquarters (radio, CHICOM type 71B radio) plus two runners for communications. The battalion additionally had one male nurse at the battalion headquarters and one corpsman per company. The medical supplies consisted of an unknown amount of quinine, bandages, iodine, and diarrhea medicine. The PW further stated he had formerly been with the 69th Replacement Bn from 4 Jan 69 until 2 Oct 69 when he joined the 91st Sapper Bn. The PW claims morale of the battalion is low due to casualties from artillery, not enough food, the death of Ho Chi MINH, and the length of the war. The APO, WO Nguyen CUONG tells the men of the 2d Co, to fight harder to support the Paris Peace Talks. That the U. S. is losing the war and they are withdrawing troops from RVN.

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Additionally, the men of the battalion must collect plenty of rice for a forthcoming mission. Reported personalities: Bn CO-SrCapt Nguyen Van THANH, XO-SrLt Nguyen Van NHUNG (who was KIA in Oct 69), PO-SrCapt Nguyen LOI, APO-SrLt Tran LIEU, CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van BINH.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location given for the battalion as being in the HON TAU Mountains is within close proximity of present III MAF holdings. The 91st Sapper Bn is an AKA for 3d Sapper Bn/AKA Lam Son Bn. The indication of attacks in late Oct or early Nov has been previously reported by other sources. All personalities were reported for the first time with the exception of CO THANH, and APO LOI. OOB carries slightly more armament than the PW mentions here. All information rated (F-2).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). No significant reports.

5. QUANG NGAI (P)

a. PW, PFC Nguyen Van HAI, 44th Mortar Co, 22d NVA Regt, 3d NVA Div, captured on 25 Oct 69, six kilometers southwest of BA TO (BS 5030) (Americal msg 270920Z Oct 69) stated the strength of his company was 67 men and gave their location as an area near AN BA (H), (BS 700549) four kilometers west of MO DUC in MO DUC (D), with a mission of providing support for the infantry units of the 22d Regt. Subject departed NINH BINH (P) in NVN in Feb 69 with Infiltration Group #496. The group which consisted of 500 men, traveled via the HOI CHI MINH Trail to QUANG NGAI (P) RVN. Subject stated that the infiltration group arrived at their destination in Jun 69 with a strength of 390. The remaining 110 men were lost due to either malaria or malnutrition. Subject further stated that group was assigned to the 22d Regt. Reported personalities: Group CO-TAM, XO-TAI, PO-DUC.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 44th Co is the 44th (82mm mortar) Co, 22d Regt. This is the first report of the company located in MO DUC (D). Infiltration Group #496 is unidentified as are the personalities mentioned. All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, PFC Vu Duy TAI, DKZ (Independent) Co, 22d Regt, 32d NVA Div, captured on 25 Oct 69, 12 kilometers west northwest of LZ SJ HILL (BS 518404) (5th SFGA Inter Rpt SF-126-69 dtd 30 Oct 69). Subject stated his company's strength is 30 men and is located vicinity (BS 468419) 11 kilometers northwest of BA TO with a mission to provide security for the 22d Regt Headquarters and to resupply foodstuffs and ammunition. Subject located the following units: 82d Mortar and DKZ Co located vicinity (BS 468423), 11 kilometers northwest of BA TO, with mission to support the 22d Regt; 22d Regt Headquarters located vicinity (BS 471411) 10 kilometers northwest of BA TO; 7th Bn and 77th Weapons Co located vicinity (BS 553426) eight kilometers north northwest of LZ SJ HILL; 8th Bn located vicinity (BS 452435), 12 kilometers north northwest of BA TO, and the 9th Bn located (BS 6546) eight kilometers

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north of LZ SJ HILL. Subject stated the future mission of his company is to prepare all weapons and personnel for the coming monsoon offensive. Subject heard that they will shell an outpost and airfield (NFI) during this period. The PW said that the morale is very high in his unit and that his PO does a good job indoctrinating the troops. TAI's infiltration group was #527 with strength of 240 which left NVN in Mar 69, traveling from NINH BINH (P) to VINH (P) by train; VINH (P) to HA TINH (P) by boats; HA TINH (P) through LAOS on foot; then through KONTUM (P) to QUANG NAM, arriving in May 69. At this point they were assigned to the 22d Regt in QUANG NGAI (P). Approximately 25 men including subject were assigned to the 77th Co, 7th Bn Subject was reassigned to the new DKZ Weapon Co on 16 Oct 69. Subject stated that twenty men were expected to arrive from the 9th Bn. The 7th and 8th Bn's sent 15 replacements as part of their commitment toward this newly formed unit on 16 Oct 69. Reported personalities: DKZ Co PO-2/Lt TONG, 77th Co Cmdr-2/Lt QUYNH; 77th Co XO-Aspirant TUYET, 77th Co PO-2/Lt NHY; 7th Bn Cmdr-1/Lt DUYEN, PO-1/Lt DUC.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first report on the DKZ (Independent) Co. The 77th Weapons Co, 7th Bn is unidentified. The locations given for the 22d Regt coincide with previous reports. Infiltration Group 527 is reported for the first time. All company personalities are unidentified. Most information rated (F-3).)

c. PW, PFC Nguyen Van LUONG, 7th Co, 5th Bn, 2d Regt, 2d MF Div was captured on 25 Oct 69 12 kilometers southeast of TRA BONG (BS 484784) (Americal msg 290900Z Oct 69 Americal Inter Rpt 401-69 dtd 29 Oct 69) stated the strength of the 7th Co is approximately 30 men. The rear base area for the 5th Bn is in SON HA (D) (NFI), and the battalion AO is SON TINH (D). The 7th Co's mission was to harass and destroy allied positions. Subject claimed the 7th Co had been reinforced with a 12.8mm (believed to be 12.7) Plt, but had no idea of future plans. Subject was a member of a battalion infiltration group #115. In Jun 68, the battalion left MINH BINH (P) NVN and traveled on foot through HA TINH (P), QUANG BINH (P), LAOS, and entered RVN through QUANG NAM (P), in Aug 68. The 17th Plt which is supporting the 7th Co is armed with an unknown number of 82mm mortars and two 12.8mm machine guns. Reported personalities: Infiltration Group CO-NGOC, XO-LINH, PO-ICH; Bn Cmdr-THO, XO-VIEN (dead), Co XO-NGH, PO-DUC.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 7th Co, 5th Bn, 2d Regt, 2d Div is AKA 3d Co, 70th Bn, 21st Regt, 2d NVA Div. III MAF OOB holds the 70th Bn vicinity (BS 4386) with an estimated strength of 70 men. The 21st Regt moved to QUANG NGAI (P) in late Apr 69 and has operated in TRA BONH, SON HA and SON TINH Districts since that time. The 2d Regt (AKA 21st Regt) is broken down into three subordinate battalions 4th, 5th and 6th (AKA 60th, 70th and 80th). VIEN, DIEN and BAO have been reported in captured documents to hold the positions mentioned. All information rated (F-2).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 45-69

1. GENERAL. Counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities of the past week reflected a continuation of the same policy and tactics of the past several months. No change in scope or intensity of activities, including terrorism, was discernible.

An increasing number of reports related to enemy preparations for intensified civil and military proselyting and assassination of selected GVN officials in conjunction with more aggressive military activities during the variously described and recently initiated "Winter-Spring Campaign".

The VC/NVA continue to suppress a growing morale problem and desertion/defection rate by implementation of stern punitive measures, continuous group activity, political indoctrination, news censorship, and heavy reliance on propaganda regarding US troop withdrawals and a subsequent quick victory. What effect, if any, President NIXON's policy address on 3 November will have on this problem, or to what extent enemy doctrine and tactics will be adjusted as a result thereof, is yet to be indicated.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. Reported enemy intelligence collection activities consisted primarily of reconnaissance and surveillance in northern Quang Tri Province; the Ta Bat - La Luong areas of the A Shau valley; possible routes of approach to and withdrawal from Hue; the 51st ARVN Regiment Headquarters in Hoa Vang (D), Quang Nam (P); all possibly in conjunction with infiltration and/or intended attacks during the announced Winter/Spring Campaign.

Reports continue to mention the identification and collection of personnel data on selected individuals (possibly targeting data) of various GVN agencies, organizations, and political parties.

Details of enemy intelligence collection activities reported during the past week in ICTZ are as follows:

a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 1 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 29 October 1969, an unidentified battalion of the 27th NVA Regiment was deployed in the area from Cam Pho Huong vicinity (YD 235765) to Cam Pho vicinity (YD 250764). Estimated strength of the battalion was 400 men, all of whom were North Vietnamese.

Each week an unidentified transportation group transports rice, canned food, and ammunition from the northern DMZ to supply the

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reported battalion. At the time of observation, the unit was closely monitoring the redeployment of US Forces. The battalion intended to wait until all US troops were withdrawn and then attack and liberate the Gio Linh delta area. (Ref: Det A, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt No. 1/B/AI/ 0603/69) (Eval: C-3).

(2) On 3 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 27 October 1969, an unidentified VC unit, totaling an estimated 80 men, was camped near a stream in a thickly-wooded area of Huong Hoa (D) vicinity (XD 876435). Future intentions of the unit were to conduct reconnaissance missions in the Ba Long area (nfi). (Ref: Det A, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt No. 1/V/EX/0370/69) (Eval: F-3).

(3) An NVA returnee, Nguyen Xuan THANH, who rallied on 6 November 1969, vicinity (YD 431436) stated he was a staff officer with Front 7. Source was on a reconnaissance mission with one company of the K-8 Battalion, two security platoons of Front 7, and an element of the recon company, Front 7. Their mission was to recon the Hai Lang (D) area for the next attack in the Winter campaign. (Ref: G-2 I Corps briefing memo dtd 8 Nov 69).

b. Thua Thien.

(1) An enemy document captured by an element of the 101st US Airborne Division on 31 October 1969, vicinity (YC 549939) disclosed the following:

Personal documents of Truong GIANG, K.11A (possibly Reconnaissance Battalion, 324B NVA Division).

Note, dated 29 October 1969, reveals that GIANG's element was assigned to make surveys of Dong A So (possibly Dong A Vo vicinity YD 553014), Binh Dien area, and the area between Route 59 and the area south of Hue City; and to secure Routes 12 and 59. Specifically, this element was to reconnoiter the routes to (Dong) A Tay (possibly vicinity YC 490980) and High Point 557 (possibly vicinity YD 517998), and establish an observation post on High Point 557. GIANG's element was also to reconnoiter Khe Nghe and An Ho (possibly vicinity YD 545049) and the vicinity of the landing zone (possibly Ta Luong Heliport vicinity YD 552027) for intercepting (FWMAF/RVNAF) reinforcements; the route from Ta Bat (possibly YC 425952) to its area of operation; and routes of approach and withdrawal for friendly (VC/NVA) infantry troops in the vicinity of High Point 557. They were also to select an area near High Point 557 in which to construct billeting facilities for (VC) troops.

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Subsequent notes indicate that GIANG's element was ordered to establish communications and liaison, and complete overlays and signal orders (including recognition signals) not later than 13 Nov 69.

Also recorded are fragmentary notes on food supply and assignment of cadre which reveals that GIANG's element had 17 members.

Overlay scale 1:50,000, undated, covering an area of Nam Hoa District, Thua Thien Province, shows Dong A Vo, Dong A La, Dong Ong Doi, Dong My Lo, Dong A Tay, Dong A Tay Luat, Dong An Hui, Dong An Ho, Dong Cu Mong, Dong Chuc Mao, Dong Can Bon, Son La Pass, a portion of Route 12, and various brooks and high points including High Point 557 (possibly vicinity YC 517998). (C) CDEC COMMENT: Documents were captured with others referring to personal documents of Truong Giang, K.11A Reconnaissance Battalion, Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 11-1290-69) (Eval: B-3).

Another enemy document (CDEC Log No. 11-1339-69) captured by elements of the 101st Airborne Division on 31 October 1969, vicinity (YC 549939), contained a letter, dated 15 Sep 69 which read as follows:

"Forty additional members of the unit (nfi) have just come from NVN. They were all assigned to the Ta Bat area. Some of them got sick and have been treated at E9" (possibly 9th NVA Regiment, Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region) (Eval: B-3).

(2) On 31 October 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 29 October 1969, 90 personnel of the H.7 Company of an unidentified separate Reconnaissance Battalion, including 30 Montagnards and 14 women, commanded by Mai DU were deployed vicinity (YC 960970). This company was taking advantage of the rainy season to reconnoiter the terrain, troop positions and defensive positions along National Highway 1, from Truoi (YD 967062) to Nong (YD 926103). At the same time they planned to establish contact and deploy stay-behind agents and penetration organizations (nfi). (Ref: Det B, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt No. 1/B/CX/1167/69) (Eval: F-6).

c. Quang Nam.

(1) On 24 October 1969, elements of the 2nd ROKMC Brigade while operating vicinity (BT 060628) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following:

Activity plan, dated 25 Sep 69, signed by Le Quang DANG for the Armed Reconnaissance Unit, Security Section, 2nd Precinct Unit, Danang City (Quang Da Special Zone, Military Region 5), outlines activities to be performed during the last three months of 1969.

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The cited unit should, from date until the end of December, recruit 12 additional personnel and activate one reconnaissance squad. Each subordinate cell should, during the reported period, perform thorough reconnaissance on two enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) positions (possibly located in Danang's 2nd Precinct). Each reconnaissance cell should be capable of identifying, shadowing, and eliminating one or two targets (GVN local officials), while each individual must make constant efforts in obtaining and compiling properly concealed data for other targets. Weapons to be properly concealed by each subordinate cell or "doi" (detachment) consisted of one pistol, three kilograms of explosives, three detonators, and three M-26 grenades. Political attacks should be initiated in an effort to demoralize Puppet (RVN) local organizations, especially (RVN) security and intelligence agencies. A total of 2,000 propaganda leaflets and 500 NFLSVN flags should be disseminated.

In addition, thorough reconnaissance should be conducted to gather adequate information on the following:

(1) Puppet police, security, and spy elements.

(2) Puppet administration at various levels from inter-family to city ward.

(3) Reactionary political parties, such as NVQDD (VN Nationalist Party), CLNV (Labor-Human Dignity Party), and DV (Great Vietnamese Party). (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-2268-69) (Eval: B-3).

(2) An enemy document captured by an element of the US 1st Marine Division on 30 October 1969, vicinity (BT 062451), revealed the following:

Letter, dated 19 Oct 69, signed by Hong of an unspecified reconnaissance unit (possibly in Dien Ban District, QDSZ), addressed to Cam (possibly a subordinate), states as follows:

"In preparation for the two meetings to be held by B2 and B3 in the immediate future, Z (possibly meaning Headquarters, Military Region 5) has instructed us to gather adequate information on various types of enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) forces from "inside" (possibly meaning Dien Ban District seat) and to make an assessment of the combat performance of B3 during the recent past. Thus, we will have to carry out the following during Nov 69: (1) prepare an estimate of the enemy's capabilities and his probable combat intentions; (2) make a recapitulation report on recent achievements of B3; (3) develop friendly (VC) reconnaissance and intelligence organizations in cities and towns (within Dien Ban District); and (4) eliminate the tyrants (GVN local officials) and initiate political attacks inside the enemy (GVN) controlled areas'. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 11-1283-69) (Eval: B-3).

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(3) The following information was reported by a US MI source on 5 November 1969:

As of 2 November 1969, forces of the Danang City 3rd District (R.20 and Q.92) were planning to reconnoiter the area of Mieu Bong and the Headquarters of the 51st ARVN Regiment vicinity (BT 0268), Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province in preparation for attacks during the coming nights. (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp Rpt #1/A/AX/0580/69) (Eval: F-3).

3. SABOTAGE. Enemy sabotage activity remained at a low level during the past week and consisted of damage to a bridge and two road culverts.

A GVN source related possible enemy sabotage intentions to utilize children to place delayed action grenades in gas tanks of military vehicles stopped along Highway 1. The information was received at XXIV Corps Headquarters and, although primarily intended for areas of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, is indicative of the need for reminding personnel to remain alert to this type of activity.

Details of reported enemy sabotage activities and intentions of the past week are as follows:

a. Quang Tri-Thua Thien.

Information received from GVN source stated that sabotage attempts may be made utilizing children to place delayed action grenades in gas tanks of military vehicles stopped along QL-1 (nfi). (Ref: CG XXIV Corps msg 080935Z Nov 69).

b. Quang Nam.

On 6 November at approximately 2200H, bridge security personnel on north end of a bridge 15 kilometers SW of Danang, vicinity (AT 965605), observed movement 50 meters north of bridge. Personnel fired five pop-up flares, but observed nothing. Three minutes later personnel threw ¼ pound of C4 into water. Two minutes later an explosion occurred and destroyed 20 feet of the south end of the bridge. (Ref: 1st MarDiv Spot report to III MAF COC of 070015H Nov 69).

c. Quang Ngai.

(1) At approximately 1045 on 31 October 1969, it was discovered that the VC had detonated a mine in a culvert located in Mo Duc (D) vicinity (BS 724569), causing 30 per cent damage. (Ref: Quang Ngai DISUM 250-69).

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(2) At approximately 050300H November 1969, VC mine damaged a culvert on Highway 1, vicinity (BS 631823), six kilometers south of Son Tinh. Traffic was partially halted (nfi). (Ref: J-2 MACV DISUM 310-69).

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Enemy propaganda and political activities reported in ICTZ during the past week continued with efforts designed to destroy the people's confidence in the GVN and presentation of the NLF's PRG as a valid alternative.

Rises in the cost of living in South Vietnam prompted "inflation" propaganda themes directed primarily at GVN civil servants and RVNAF personnel.

After heavy reliance on antiwar element activity in the US to cause immediate withdrawal of all US troops, the effect of President NIXON's policy address of 3 November and the apparent support it received from the American people, is yet to be indicated.

Details of enemy political and propaganda activities in ICTZ during the past week are as follows:

a. Quang Tri. On 3 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

In the recent past (exact date unknown), the NVA had four unidentified divisions, totaling approximately 30,000 men, assembled in Thanh Hoa Province, North Vietnam. These four divisions were prepared to infiltrate into South Vietnam in early November. One unidentified regiment, 316th NVA Division was withdrawn from Muong Suoi (CNA) to reinforce the four divisions already assembled in Thanh Hoa Province. The four divisions intended to infiltrate into South Vietnam and reinforce units in I, II, and III Corps Tactical Zones for the execution of the NVA Winter-Spring Campaign. During the Winter-Spring Campaign, the NVA intend to attack and occupy from one to two provinces in each of the three mentioned Corps Tactical Zones, then to conscript all young men residing within these occupied provinces and send them into various NVA Secret Zones for political indoctrination and training. Upon completion of their political training, the young men would be released. Thereafter, North Vietnam would approve the solution of war in Vietnam by means of a general election; depending upon the indoctrinated young men to sway the election in favor of North Vietnam's goals. (Ref: Det A, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt No. 1/B/AX/0609/69).

b. Thua Thien.

(1) On 21 October 1969, elements of the US Army 101st Airborne Division while operating vicinity (YD 977012) removed a document from an enemy KIA which disclosed the following:

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Envelope, addressed from Thuyen to Chau, Dien Loc Village, (possibly VC Phu Loc District, Thua Thien Province, Tri-Thien Military Region). The reverse side of the document contains fragmentary notes taken from a resolution passed by DOAN (possibly 4th NVA Regiment) Party Committee. The resolution states that the antiwar movement in the United States was in full bloom and was supported by the people throughout the world. We (VC) had to cease execution of other tasks and urgently take advantage of the present situation by focusing our primary efforts on the implementation of political activities. We had to motivate the population to rise up and to kill the (RVN) administrative and intelligence personnel. We had further to realize that the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) would continue to intensify their military operations (possibly in Tri-Thien Military Region), because he has redeployed this unit by the 1st Marine Regiment (sic) from Danang). (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-2291-69) (Eval: B-3).

(2) An enemy document captured by elements of the US 101st Airborne Division on 22 October 1969, vicinity (YD 940186), disclosed the following:

Register, undated, maintained by an unidentified individual (possibly of the Propaganda & Training Section, Phu Vang (D), Thua Thien (P), Tri-Thien-Region), contains a report which recapitulates enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) and friendly (VC) activities in the first six months of 1969.

Report first outlines the composition and personnel strength of enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) units, including E54 (possibly 54th RVNAF Regiment) and two US D (battalions) in Phu Vang (D).

In regard to friendly (VC) political activities, the agency disseminated 7,250 leaflets, created four desertions in D4 (possibly 4th Battalion, 54th RVNAF Regiment) in Feb 69, and conducted political struggles in Phu Vang RVNAF District seat with the participation of 320 inhabitants.

In military proselyting activities, the agency motivated RVNAF troops' dependents to proselyte their husbands or relatives to join the VC revolution. It also conducted propaganda activities in RVNAF units and established military proselyting networks.

Report further reveals that in Aug and Sep 69, the performance of propaganda activities encountered difficulties, due to a shortage of cadre and personnel. In addition, enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) "Chieu Hoi" (Open Arm) activities were intensified in the district. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 11-5149-69) (Eval: B-3).

(3) Enemy document captured on 22 October 1969, vicinity (YD 976010) by the US 101st Airborne Division contains a plan of attack by elements of the 4th NVA Regiment against RVN elements in VC Phu Loc

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(D), RVN Vinh Loc District. Correspondence dated 20 October 1969 directed various (VC/NVA) units (operating in Phu Loc (D)) to intensify their attacks because the present situation is favorable.

Specifically, K2 (possibly aka 802nd Battalion of 4th NVA Regiment) was to carry out an attack at all costs, on the Self-Defense (meaning Popular Force) unit stationed at An Bang (vicinity ZD 031165) and strive to annihilate MAU's company of the 1st (RVN) Marine Regiment (sic) which was recently assigned to operate in Phu Loc (D) as replacements for a (RVN) Airborne Brigade. C2, K4 (possibly 2nd Company, 804th Battalion, 4th NVA Regiment) is required to annihilate at all costs, the (RVN) People's Self-Defense elements and tyrants (GVN officials and functionaries) in Luong Loc and Dien Loc villages, (possibly of VC Vinh Loc (D)) in order to improve the political situation. (Summary will be published under CDEC Doc Log No. 10-2256-69) (Ref: COMUSMACV msg 301108Z Oct 69).

(4) On 23 October 1969, elements of the US Army 101st Airborne Division while operating vicinity (AT 863914) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following:

Letter, dated 8 Oct (possibly 69), originated by A7 (possibly an element of Tri-Thien Military Region), addressed to Luong and Vinh of VQ6 (possibly security personnel of Hue City), instructs them to implement the Resolution for Oct 69, recently adopted by Y20 (Current Affairs Committee, Tri-Thien Region). The letter points out that due to the current flood in many areas (in Thua Thien Province), it was difficult to fulfill all the tasks set forth by the Resolution. VQ6 was to take advantage of the flood to motivate the local population to stage political struggles, with the purpose of clamoring for relief funds (from the GVN). Specifically (the merchants of) Bong Ba Market (located in Hue City) should be incited to request indemnity (from the GVN) for the damages they sustained due to the flood. Emphasis should be placed on motivation of the Buddhist followers and on dissemination of Ho Chi MINH's testament during these political struggles. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 11-1005-69) (Eval: B-3).

(5) A US MI source reported that on 3 November 1969, approximately twenty VC entered Nam Pho (H) vicinity (YD 953064), Loc An (V), Phu Loc (D), distributed leaflets (nfi), stole an unknown amount of rice, and raised a flag (nfi). (Ref: PSA/PSD/CORDS msg R-23/11 051430Z Nov 69).

(6) On 4 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 2 November 1969, there was a meeting of the Ve Huong Thai Village Committee in the An Do area vicinity (YD 660220). There were 20 males and 10 females at the meeting, which began at 2200H. The purpose of the meeting was to distribute instructions from the District Committee. Ngo Viet THO was the chairman and principle speaker. THO explained that

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the GVN authorities will soon liquidate each other and the government will soon fall, as the cost of living continues to increase and the political parties compete with one another. Soon the Americans will grow tired of the war and completely withdraw. Therefore, the VC will be in a position to gain much with little effort. The main mission of the Committee will be to start a whispering propaganda campaign that the Piaster is about to collapse and the Americans are going to leave soon, so that the population will buy up as much rice as possible, thus increasing the price of rice and making it more difficult for the RVN government to solve its economic problems. This will also make it easier to collect rice when the VC attack the cities and district seats. This Committee will concentrate on political activities from 2-15 November while military activities are being decreased. (Ref: Det B, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt No. 1/B/CX/1180/69). (Eval: F-3).

c. Quang Nam.

(1) On 28 October 1969, elements of the US 1st Marine Division operating vicinity (AT 937540) obtained from an enemy PW, a document which disclosed the following:

Circular, number 25/TT, dated 20 Oct 69, prepared for the signature of Nguyen THOA for A70 (organization section, QDSZ), reveals the following:

The death of Ho Chi MINH created a great loss for friendly (VC/NVA) forces. Taking advantage of this opportunity, enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) psywar organizations resorted to every possible means to create dissension among friendly cadre and undermine their morale.

To disrupt the enemy psywar schemes, document urges hamlet and village cadre to follow up and report the enemy psywar activities to include his propaganda themes, the feelings and thoughts of the people, (VC) cadre and members living in district seats, towns, and in friendly liberated areas, to A70 (Organization Section, QDSZ) for countermeasures. (Ref: CIEC Log No. 11-1081-69) (Eval: B-3).

(2) A rallier of 3 November 1969 vicinity (AT 872468), gave the following reasons for rallying:

The rallier was told in North Vietnam that three-fourths of South Vietnam had already been liberated by the NVA and the remaining youths were to be drafted to complete the liberation. On the way to South Vietnam source saw much hunger and death and when he arrived in South Vietnam he realized the cadre had lied to him. The morale of the men was very bad because of constant threat of bombing and shelling. Source heard a Chieu Hoi broadcast, picked up a leaflet, and decided to Chieu Hoi. (Ref: SA Quang Nam Sector Hoi An RVN msg 070550Z November 1969).

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d. Quang Tin.

(1) An enemy document captured by elements of the US Americal Division on 24 October 1969, vicinity (BT 197229), disclosed the following:

Directive, dated 7 Sep 69, signed by Huynh Binh, Commanding Officer of Unit 123B (Political Section, VC Quang Nam Province), addressed to subordinate units, instructs addressees to promote ideological guidance for cadre and motivate combatants to resolutely fight the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) upon completion of the mourning period in honor of Uncle Ho (Chi MINH). (Ref: CDEC Log No. 11-5150-69) (Eval: B-3).

(2) An enemy document captured by elements of the US Americal Division on 24 October 1969, vicinity (BT 197229), disclosed the following information:

Directive, number 634/GOI, undated, prepared for the signature of Trinh, Unit 500 (possibly Headquarters, Military Region 5), pertains to improvement on the utilization of the armed units in controlling the population.

Document points out the weaknesses of the armed units, then states that in order to overcome difficulties and deficiencies, subordinate cadre and members should be politically indoctrinated to ensure that they are fully aware of their missions in gaining and maintaining control of the population, and that this is a main target in the present situation, which would significantly contribute to the final victory. In addition, they are to be provided with experience in motivation of the population and strengthening of controlled areas, to properly observe regulations concerning troop movements, and military and civilian proselyting policies, in order to fulfill their missions. (CDEC Log No. 11-5183-69) (Eval: B-3).

(3) On 24 October 1969, elements of the US 1st Marine Division while operating vicinity (AT 863497) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following:

An entry, dated 3 Aug 69, contains a resolution of the Coordination and Operations Committee, (Unit) 111, dictating missions to be carried out from now until the end of the year (1969). Cultivate a firm determination to struggle for the Revolution; improve the combat efficiency of VC local forces and guerrillas by conducting training courses at the opportune moment; promote guerrilla warfare; annihilate 200 of the enemy located at Tam Ky, Tien Phuoc (Districts, VC Quang Nam Province); kill tyrants (RVN officials); and destroy hostile aircraft and vehicles. Military operations should be coordinated with political struggles and military proselyting actions to achieve major successes. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 11-1057-69) (Eval: B-3).

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(4) On 4 November 1969, a CAP 1-2-7 ambush received SAF from 6-8 VC vicinity (BT 453055). The CAP returned organic weapons fire causing the enemy to flee. A sweep of the area revealed a packet of propaganda leaflets (nfi). (Ref: CAP DAILY OPS SUMMARY 051600H-061600H November 1969).

(5) A returnee, Tran Thanh TRUNG, who rallied on 4 Nov 1969 to Thang Binh (D) stated he was a squad leader in the 2nd Sqd, AT Co, Thang Binh (D). The mission of Thang Binh units is to attack the pacification effort in northeastern Thang Binh (D) from 5-15 Nov 69. They are also preparing the population for the future political struggle. (Ref: G-2 I Corps briefing memo dtd 7 Nov 69).

e. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 29 October 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 20 October 1969, the Quang Ngai VC Provincial Political Office held a training course at Ta Con (H) (BS 350470), Ha Thuong (V), Son Ha (D). The course was held to train all VC cadre who worked in branches concerned with the subject of troop and enemy troop proselyting during periods of general attack and general uprising. The course lasted four days. (Between 16 and 20 Oct 69).

There were 20 trainees who were members of the various branches of the Provincial Committee and 10 trainees who were members in charge of the troop proselyting section of the 10 district committees in Quang Ngai Province.

During the four day training period the trainees were taught from two documents; (1) Ho Chi MINH's testament, which stressed the need for a new general offensive called a "2 Chan 3 Min" or a three-pronged attack in mountain and lowland districts consisting of military, political, and enemy troop proselyting; (2) a lesson plan for troop end enemy troop proselyting branches.

Most of the trainees felt that the VC were preparing for a general attack sometime between winter and spring or between January and February, 1970.

Before the general offensive can take place the battle will be carefully pre-planned, the cadre will know the methods of achieving their goals, and there will be trouble in the cities to divert RVN troops. After completing their training course on 20 October, the trainees were sent back to their organizations. (Ref: Det D, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp Rpt No. 1/B/DX/1364/69). (Eval: F-3).

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f. Country-wide.

Enemy documents captured on 4 November 1969 vicinity (YS 378720) by the 1st ATF and received at CDEC on 8 November contained a directive, classified (VC) SECRET, dated 27 October 1969, signed by Minh Nguyen LE for A183 (possibly Vung Tau City Headquarters, T7 Region) forwarded to subordinate K's and H's (possibly units and agencies), outlining the major military, political, and military proselyting tasks to be accomplished in November 1969. The document states that in response to the deceitful speech which would be delivered by (President) NIXON on 3 November 1969 and in support of the upcoming struggle of the American people for peace in South Vietnam and the withdrawal of the US troops, we (VC) are to launch intensive attacks, in all aspects, on the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) on 14 and 15 November 1969. In the military field, we are to carry out annihilation attacks on the (RVN) people's self defense, popular and regional forces, accelerate annihilation of tyrants, and conduct deep penetration raids. We are to strive to fulfill half of our combat criteria established for the last three months of 1969 in November 1969. We are to accelerate the annihilation of the (RVN) administrative personnel at hamlet and village levels to gradually break loose the (GVN) administrative grip, to expand our revolutionary organizations, and to accelerate the antiwar movement (in SVN) in support of the struggle campaign for peace which would be initiated by the American people on 14 and 15 November 1969. Summary will be published under CDEC document log number 11-1408-69. (Ref: COMUSMACV msg 080811Z Nov 69)

III MAF CI COMMENT: Although areas in ICTZ were not specifically mentioned in the directive, the information may be applicable to all areas of RVN.

5. TERROR. Terrorist activity remained at a low level throughout ICTZ during the past week and continued to be directed primarily against hamlet and village level administrators and functionaries, security elements, and pacification personnel.

Details of terrorist activity conducted in ICTZ during the past week are listed in Appendix 1.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Thua Thien.

A US MI source reported the following information on 29 October 1969:

During the period 22-25 October 1969, a meeting was attended by 15 commanders and assistant commanders of the 4th, 5th and 6th regiments, Main Force units, the Thua Thien Province Committee, representatives of

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the sub-regions and Central Committee, in the Don Cong mountain area vicinity (YC 800860).

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the 3rd high point of the Winter-Spring offensive. The chairman of this meeting was THAI, a General from the Central Committee.

The first point of the meeting was that 4th, 5th and 6th regiments would comprise the main forces of the Thua Thien Provincial Committee and would be directly commanded by MOT. Secondly, the 3rd high point of the Winter-Spring offensive was to extend from 15 November 1969 to TET Nguyen Dan (TET 1970). For this offensive, 28 infrastructure organizations, called the "National People's Front", have been organized and strengthened. Military preparations have been arranged to open a general attack on Thua Thien Province with the main objective being Hue City. The third point was that when the offensive on Hue City begins, the 6th Regiment would be the main force that would advance through Phong Dien (D) to Hue City, the 5th Regiment would infiltrate Hue City from Nam Hoa (D), and the 4th Regiment would penetrate Hue City via Phu Loc (D) and then through Phu Thu (D) and Phu Vang (D). The plan would be supported by the 324th B Division which has been ordered to move into Thua Thien Province. The fourth point was that the "People's Fronts" charged with the development of the "People's Struggle" will organize the commo-liaison routes and guide the main force units along the proper routes. The meeting ended on 25 October 1969. (Ref: Det B, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp Rpt No. 1/B/CX/1162/69). (Eval: B-3).

On 21 October 1969, elements of the US Army 101st Airborne Division while operating vicinity (YD 977012) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following:

Letter and envelope, dated 12 Oct 69, prepared for the signature of Nguyen Quoc HUNG for Phu Loc District Unit, (Thua Thien Province, Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region), addressed to local force and guerrilla units, urged addressees to carry out the following immediate missions:

(1) Concentrate efforts on purchasing food provisions and transporting them to the (VC combat units).

(2) Launch continuous attacks on the enemy to annihilate an important part of the enemy's war potential, and liquidate tyrants (GVN officials).

(3) Pay much attention to the development of guerrilla units.

The envelope reads: From L122FA to HV8. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 10-2295-69) (Eval: B-3).

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On 31 October 1969, a US MI source reported that at 242400H October 1969, a meeting of the VC Quang Thai Village Committee was held at the Dong Ho (GVN: Quang Lo) area vicinity (YD 595290). Attending the meeting were 15 village cadre and various finance and economy cadre. Presently about 150 personnel of the village are organized in squads. The purpose of the meeting was to provide these squads with organized leaders and to start preparing to join the main forces during the third high point of the Autumn-Winter Plan around 15 November 1969. (Ref: Det B, 1st MI Bn., 525th MI Gp, Phu Bai, Rpt #1/B/CX/1172/69). (Eval: F-3).

Documents captured in MRTTH on 31 October 1969, 12 kilometers east of Ta Bat (YC 549939) have been identified as belonging to the 11A Reconnaissance Battalion, 324B NVA Division. One of these documents, an annotated map of Thua Thien (P), reveals the location of 13 commo-liaison stations within Laos and Thua Thien Province (19A, XD 705159; 20A, XD 818101; 27, YC 027993; ME0, YC 008997; 46, YD 126965; 47, YC 186955; 48, YC 271951; 49, YC 319921; 45, YC 427933; 51, YC 464936; 46, YC 493835; 47, YC 502758; 48, YC 565722). These stations have been frequently mentioned by PW's and ralliers as well as noted in captured documents. They were however, previously carried as either unidentified or in general area locations. It is significant to note that the route traced by the stations for the infiltration of personnel, avoids the main road network and the northern portion of the A Shau Valley, entering and crossing the valley at a point south of Ta Bat (YC 425953). At present it is not known which of the in-country stations are operable, if any. (Ref: XXIV Corps All Source Summary 309-69).

b. Quang Nam.

On 28 October 1969, elements of the US 1st Marine Division operating vicinity (AT 937540) obtained a document from an enemy PW which revealed the following:

Directive, number 67/TV, dated 17 Oct 69, from Nguyen TAM for C70 (Current Affairs Committee, Dai Loc District, QDSZ), reveals that B263 (Loc Quang village, Dai Loc District) and B261 (Loc Binh village, Dai Loc District) were selected by the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) as primary targets for pacification.

His (FWMAF/RVNAF) troops would conduct violent attacks in conjunction with air and artillery fire, psywar, Chieu Hoi (Open Arms), and espionage activities in an attempt to destroy friendly infrastructures. In addition, the enemy would infiltrate his agents into friendly intelligence organizations for the purpose of undermining friendly (VC/VCI) solidarity, creating hatred and dissension among revolutionary cadre, and destroying their work.

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Therefore, to cope with the enemy's schemes, hamlets and villages were urged to conduct an immediate personnel security investigation of friendly agents in order to purge enemy agents from friendly intelligence organizations. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 11-1081-69) (Eval: B-3).

On 28 October 1969, a PW captured south of Danang vicinity (BT 034680), WO Ngoc TUAN, who identified himself as the Executive Officer of the 2nd Company, D-1 Bn (aka R-20), stated that the Battalion is to participate in the "LB Offensive". This offensive will consist of attacks launched throughout MR-5 from 2 November to 22 December, 1969. The R-20 Battalion has been assigned the mission of attacking the Headquarters, 51st ARVN, vicinity (BT 025657) during the offensive. Source further stated that the primary objectives of these large scale attacks are to force a rapid withdrawal of US forces and to bolster the morale of both the Local Force VC and R-20 Battalion personnel. Two additional objectives are to gain control of the population and increase proselyting of ARVN forces. (Ref: J-2 MACV DISUM 307-69).

The following information was reported by a US MI source on 5 November 1969:

In a move to prepare for the 1969 Winter-Spring Campaign, Front 4 has issued the following:

Province Main Force and District Local Force units have been instructed to combine with guerrilla forces to prepare for operations in the first phase of the 1969 Winter-Spring Offensive. To initiate this phase, Front 4 has ordered units to attack all GVN and Allied outposts south and southwest of Danang in the coming moonless nights (nfi). (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt #1/A/AX/0579/69). (Eval: C-3).

On 5 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 1 November 1969, there was a VC meeting held vicinity (BS 362931), consisting of five Provincial Party members and twelve military officers (nfi). The purpose of the meeting was to formulate plans for future attacks in Military Region 5 during the month of November 1969.

Three separate attempts will be made to attack Hue, Danang, Quang Tin, Chu Lai, Quang Ngai, and Qui Nhon. Command responsibility will be given to the Provincial Party Committee in each Province (nfi). (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp Rpt #1/B/BX/0812/69) (Eval: C-6).

Statements of ralliers and a captured document indicate that the VC are purging their cadre in order to have a strong apparatus in the event of a cease fire and the formation of a coalition government. A document dated 17 Oct 69 (CDEC Bulletin number 25,593), captured on

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29 October 1969 vicinity (AT 937540) is a directive revealing that B26 and B261 (Loc Binh (V), Dai Loc District) were selected by allied forces as primary targets for pacification activities. In order to cope with allied forces "schemes", hamlets and villages were urged to conduct immediate personnel security investigations of VC agents in order to purge enemy (GVN) agents from their intelligence organizations. A rallier, chief of the VC Farmers Association and Secretary of the Party Committee of Son Phuc (V), Duc Duc (D), stated that a sweeping purge of the Son Phuc Village VC Infrastructure was undertaken in mid-August. The first step was the armed removal and execution of three cadre of the village administration on 12 August. Shortly thereafter, a guerrilla squad arrived in the village and removed five more members of the infrastructure to the mountains under armed guard. About one week later other cadre were taken to the mountains under armed guard. Another rallier, a former deputy chief of the Son Thanh village Propaganda and Indoctrination Section in Que Son (D), stated the VC Infrastructure in Son Thanh (V) was subjected to a "purification" campaign in August. The criteria for retaining important positions in the VC village administrative structure was proof of loyalty in the form of party membership, proof that relatives had died in the service of the revolution, and proof that there were no relatives working or living in GVN controlled areas. (Ref: J-2 MACV DISUM 311-69).

c. Quang Tin.

An enemy document captured by an element of the US Americal Division vicinity (BT 159097) on 19 October 1969 disclosed the following information:

Plan of activity, dated 4 Sep 69, prepared by the Women's Association, Tien Phuoc District (VC Quang Nam Province, Region 5) pertains to the motivation of women, particularly those in enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) controlled areas, to participate in the "Four Responsibilities Movement". These responsibilities are to (1) eliminate the enemy, (2) conduct political struggles, (3) carry out military proselyting and production missions, and (4) take care of their families and participate in the development of revolutionary forces.

Document also stipulates that efforts should be devoted to motivating 50% of the women in liberated areas, and 20% to 30% of the women in the cities and outskirts to enlist in local guerrilla units. It was also mandatory that "Soldier's Mother Associations" be consolidated. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 11-5008-69) (Eval: B-3).

An enemy document captured by elements of the US Americal Division on 24 October 1969, vicinity (BT 197229), revealed the following information:

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Directive, number 225/CT, dated 5 Aug 69, signed by Huynh Quang Phat, Commander of Unit 123B (possibly aka Chief, Political Section, VC Quang Nam Province Unit, Military Region 5) provides guidance on how to destroy the local (RVN) administration, and keep the local inhabitants in their home villages. Document covers the following main instructions: Destroy the (RVN) administration and those areas where the enemy concentrates local inhabitants; control the people who live near the enemy and those held in enemy controlled areas; keep the civilian population in liberated areas; promote guerrilla warfare and consolidate (VC) combat villages; increase farm production to raise the welfare of the people. (Ref: CDEC Log No. 11-5152-69) (Eval: B-3).

On 24 October 1969, elements of the US Americal Division operating vicinity (BT 197229) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following:

Plan, incomplete, and undated, classified (VC) Absolute Secret, prepared by (a member of) Unit 123 (VC Quang Nam Province Unit, Military Region 5), addressed to Son, Northern Tam Ky District Unit, (VC Quang Nam Province), prescribes various instructions to strengthen guerrilla and self-defense forces in mountainous areas, liberated (possibly VC controlled) areas, and enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) controlled areas. The percentage of local inhabitants to be recruited as secret self-defense personnel in district capitals, cities and towns should attain five per cent. This recruitment was to last from now until the end of 1969. Secret guerrillas (VC) should attain one per cent of local inhabitants living in enemy controlled areas. Those villages having from 1,000 to 4,000 inhabitants, should have 20-25 guerrillas; those having 4,000 inhabitants or more, should recruit 50-70 guerrillas. Liberated villages in the lowlands should organize seven to 10 sapper guerrillas, broken down into two teams. Villages along both sides of Highway 1, and other strategic roads, should organize one engineer team for the attack of enemy tanks (possibly armored personnel carriers). (Ref: CDEC Log No. 11-1025-69) (Eval: B-3).

On 2 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

A VC congress will take place in Trung Dinh (H) #1 vicinity (BT 250235). The congress will open on 5 Nov 1969. District chiefs, and commanders of units in Quang Tin and southern Quang Nam provinces will attend. The congress will discuss the following: (1) Preparing for attacks on installations, (2) infiltration into cities, (3) storing food in safe places and (4) the sending of Vietnamese women (mostly young) to work in US and ARVN installations with the purpose of collecting information. (Ref: Det D, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt No. 1/A/CX/0240/69 (Eval: F-6).

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d. Quang Ngai.

A rallier, of September 1969, vicinity (BS 564731), provided information on possible reorganization of VC guerrilla platoons in Tu Nghia (D), Quang Ngai (P). The source, who identified himself as a guerrilla platoon leader, stated, that in late July, he was informed by the village chief that the Tu Nghia village guerrilla platoon was to be reorganized and assigned new missions. The platoon was to be retrained in all basic military subjects and organized into three man teams. The teams were to infiltrate GVN pacified areas with the mission of spreading VC propaganda and committing terrorist attacks against GVN and US personnel. Additionally, the source alleged to have been told that his platoon might be augmented by NVA personnel. His statements are somewhat substantiated by another rallier who stated that in August he read a document from Headquarters, MR5 outlining the Region's plans and objectives for the period late 1969 through early 1970. The document indicated that the primary goal was the transformation of the present war into a peoples guerrilla war. The document called on every village to organize a guerrilla platoon, whose mission would be to propagandize and capture GVN cadre and continue the war through guerrilla tactics, if no suitable settlement was obtained at Paris. (Ref: J-2 MACV DISUM 311-69) (Unrated).

APPENDIX
I-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 45-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Tri	2Nov69	(YD 216673) (YD 224672)	Two 140mm rockets impacted at the aforementioned coordinates, wounding one civilian.
Quang Nam	29Oct69 (Late Entry)	(BT 031511)	One VC entered Chien Son #2 (H) and assassinated one (1) civilian (nfi).
	29Oct69 (Late Entry)	(BT 034638)	One NPFF of the 104/2 Company, was shot by a VC sniper while driving his motorbike from Hoi An to Danang on Highway 1.
	30Oct69 (Late Entry)	(BT 165550)	The 194th RF Company, while in NDP vicinity Xuyen Long Refugee Camp, received four rounds of B-40 rocket fire and SAF from an USEF, resulting in one civilian wounded and one house damaged.
	1Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BT 165578)	The hamlet chief of An My (H) reported a booby trap in his yard. CAP 2-4-5 went to confirm same before calling for an EOD team. While investigating the booby trap, it exploded, killing one RF and two USMC.
	3Nov69	(BT 165552)	The 194th RF Company, while in NDP vicinity Xuyen Long Refugee Camp, received four rounds of B-40 rocket fire and SAF from an estimated enemy squad, resulting in six (6) civilians wounded and one house destroyed.
	3Nov69	(BT 065582)	VC mortar fire wounded eleven (11) detainees at the local detention camp in Dien Ban Detention Town.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Nam	3Nov69	(BT 145572)	VC shelled (nfi) Hoi An City, damaging five (5) trucks of the local RD service and the Land Reform Service building. There were no casualties.
	4Nov69	(BT 071703)	At approximately 2000, 14 VC entered Nui Kim Son (H), approximately 600 meters east of Hoa Vang (D) Headquarters and abducted one Vietnamese male and three boys. The boys were released vicinity of Nui Kim Son bridge (BT 073702).
	5Nov69	(BT 108578)	At approximately 0200 three (3) VC sappers entered Cam Ha (V), Hieu Nhon (D), fired six B-41 rounds and threw four grenades into the KIM THONG School, Catholic Church and the Priest's house. One Vietnamese male was killed. A Vietnamese Nun and a priest were wounded. VC then attacked the village chief's house with SAF and a grenade, killing two of the village chief's children and wounding his wife. Material damage consisted of six (6) civilian houses destroyed; five classrooms of the school 40% damaged and one room in the church received 20% damage.
	7Nov69	(BT 145532)	At approximately 0850, Vietnamese civilians, while cutting bamboo on Xuyen Long island, detonated a booby-trapped 105mm artillery round resulting in four VN civilians killed and three VC civilians wounded.
	7Nov69	(BT 031793)	At approximately 2315 a US Army officer was slightly wounded when a terrorist threw a grenade at his jeep. Incident occurred on Le Loi Street, Danang City.

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Province	Date	Coordinates	Incident
Quang Ngai	4Nov69	(BS 613806)	VC infiltrated Khanh Van (H), and killed one civilian, one PF, and one PF trainee.
	4Nov69	(BS 728788)	Two Vietnamese civilians stepped on a mine of VC origin, resulting in two civilians killed.
	5Nov69	(BS 689736)	Quang Ngai City received two 122mm rockets. One impacted in a MACV compound, killing one civilian and wounding two.
	5Nov69	(BS 650720)	VC fired grenades and RPG into the Provincial Capital, destroying one house and damaging six others.
	5Nov69	(BS 701757)	The VC blew up (nfi) the Tan Ley (H) office, wounding six (6) children.
	5Nov69	(BS 715648)	A VC squad infiltrated into My Vien (H) and killed one civic action cadre (nfi).
	5Nov69	(BS 687680)	A VC platoon infiltrated into Phu Noa (H), killed a quarter leader (nfi), and passed out propaganda leaflets.
	5Nov69	(BS 723734)	VC destroyed a public meeting place (nfi).
	5Nov69	(BS 671645)	A VC company entered An Nanh (H), Tu Luong (V) and killed one woman (nfi).

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ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 45-69

1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY.

a. There were 56 long range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 2-8 November 1969. These long range patrols reported 63 sightings and five contacts totaling 610 enemy. Of this total, 273 enemy were observed during 6 and 7 November 1969 six kilometers west, northwest of Con Thien and 263 enemy were observed in the 1st Marine Division AO during the reporting period. The contacts and air and artillery fire missions conducted by patrol teams resulted in 40 enemy KIA.

b. Ranger Team, Killer 17, from 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) observed 100 enemy on 6 November and 173 enemy on 7 November six kilometers west, Northwest of Con Thien. Air strikes were called and resulted in 11 enemy KIA.

c. Patrols from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division observed 263 enemy during the reporting period. Actions taken by the patrols resulted in 23 enemy KIA. Team Hireling observed 145 of the total of 263 enemy and accounted for 22 of the 23 KIA. These actions were in the vicinity of AT 803489.

d. Americal Division Ranger teams observed a total of 39 enemy during the reporting period and five contacts resulted in four confirmed enemy KIA.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY.

a. In the U.S. DMZ area, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) sensors detected 47 targets during this reporting period. Forty-one fire missions were conducted in response. The following bomb damage assessment was obtained:

(1) One NVA KIA was discovered at YD 087622 in the kill zone of string 539 on 4 November.

(2) On 5 November fresh drag marks were observed at YD 017662 after firing of artillery in this area due to sensor detections.

b. The 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) sensors in the Duffel Bag area detected 48 targets this reporting period. Twenty-three fire missions were fired in response.

c. The most active sensors monitored by the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) were located in the vicinity of YD 197617, YD 087622, and YD 017662.

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d. In the 1st Marine Division AO the greatest level of line sensor detected enemy activity was in the 27th Marines AO through the low foot hills southwest of Hill 190. Thirteen targets were detected by the Division line sensors and 13 fire missions were conducted in response with negative bomb damage assessment. The Division 'E' sensors detected only two targets this reporting period in the vicinity of AT 935375.

e. In the Americal Division area sensor detections of enemy activity were concentrated mainly around LZ West (AT 990250) and LZ Professional (BT 173078). Sensors detected 12 targets for this reporting period.

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ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO III MAF PERINTREP 45-69

A. REGISTERED MAIL

DIR, NSA	3
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1
CMC (ABQ)	2
CG FMFPAC	2
CG USARV	1
CG I FFORCEV	5
CG II FFORCEV	1
CG 25TH INF DIV	1
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1
CG MCDEC	1
CG 5TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CAL	6
CG 4TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CAL	1
CG 3RD MAW	2
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2
CO "B" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	5
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1
CO MCB 3	1
CO MCB 6	1
CO MCB 7	1
CO MCB 8	1
CO MCB 10	1
CO MCB 11	1
CO MCB 53	1
CO MCB 58	1
CO MCB 62	1
CO MCB 71	1
CO MCB 133	1
CO USS REPOSE	1
CO USS SANCTUARY	1
CO MHTG-30, MCAF, SANTA ANA, CALIF 92709	1
DSA II CORPS	1
CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GRP, 7TH FLEET	1
CMDR, 19TH CI TM, CAMPEN, CAL	1
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1
CTF 76	1
CO USASSD ACSI DA (ATTN DOD SPEC-REP) MACV APO SF 96222	4
HQ, 12TH TAC FTR WING (ATTN ARMY GRD LIAISON OFF) APO SF 96326	1
NILO CHU LAI, NAVAL ADVISOR, BOX 210, NSAD FPO 96696	1
NILO, HOI AN, DRAWER 18, ADVISORY TEAM 15, APO 96349	1
NILO HUE, BOX 9, AT-3, APO 96258	1
NILO QUANG TRI, BOX 16, AT-19, APO 96495	1

B. BY COURIER

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232) (CIIED)	2
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2
CICV	2
CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN	10
CG 1ST MARDIV DNG RVN	40
CG 3D MARDIV DGH RVN	26
CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN	30
CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM) CEA RVN	20
CG 1ST MAW DNG RVN	30
CG 2D BDE ROKMC HAN RVN	7
CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CG USASUPCOM DNG RVN	1
CG 173D AVN BDE	2
CG FORLOG CMD DNG RVN	5
CG 1ST LOG CMD LBN	2
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHL RVN	3
CO 30 NCR	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GRP (ABN)	17
CO 1ST CAG	1
CO 3RD CAG	1
CO 4TH CAG	1
CO 1ST BN, 525TH MI DET	25
CO 517TH MI DET	1
CO MCB 40	1
CO MCB 121	1
CO 4TH PSYOP GRP	1
DSA I CORPS	11
CMDR, 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SGN RVN	3
COMNAVFORV	1
COMNAVSUPACT DNG RVN	2
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2
OSA/EMB SGN RVN	1
DET B, 1ST MIBARS	1
CIB	1

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CTG 76.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTF 115	1
7TH AIR FORCE (IGS) HDQC	1
45TH ENGR GRP	1
620TH TCS APO 96203	1
366TH AIR SEC SQD, USAF	2
620TH TSC	1
SPO-SEC CMD QHN RVN	1

C. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (WITHIN HQ, III MAF)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP CofS, PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	43
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (C/O G-3)	2
2D ROKMC BDE LIAISON OFFICER	1
PSYOPS	5
1ST RADIO BN	11
HORN DASC	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO	1

D. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

CO 1ST MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 3RD MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 2ND CAG	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
HQ 212TH CMBT AVN BN	6
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
CTG 115.1	1
CCN	1
USNAD	1
DIR CAP	1
7TH PSYOP BN	1
1ST FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
3RD FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
CO MCB 74	1

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