

13. X CG III MAF 300919Z SEP69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR ZAIS FROM NICKERSON  
RESPONDS TO ZAIS's 240602 -- Air Spt
- ~~14. CG III MAF 300920Z SEP69 (U)  
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY  
RELIEF FOR GYSGT BARLOW~~
- ~~15. X CG III MAF 010150Z OCT69 (C)  
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON  
JONES LEAVES DWN ON 7 NOV~~
16. X CG III MAF 020040Z OCT69 (S) GP-4  
FOR TOWNSEND FORM NICKERSON  
ROSSON WAS HERE 30SEP
17. X CG III MAF 020820Z OCT69 (S) GP-4  
FOR TOWNSEND FORM NICKERSON  
ABE WAS HERE -- 25SEP
18. X CG III MAF 031000Z OCT69 (C) GP-4  
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY  
VISIT OF MESSRS ROSOTTI & ODEEN
- ~~19. CG III MAF 040634Z OCT69 (C)  
FOR BRINGLE FROM NICKERSON  
WELCOME TO COME ON THE 8TH~~
- ~~20. CG III MAF 050050Z OCT69 (U)  
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY  
GRADECKI~~
21. X CG III MAF 060916Z OCT69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
CLOSE 24 CORPS (?) - LOOK-AROUND AT BLT/SLF CAMP CUBI = MAJ ALTMAN
22. X CG III MAF 070400Z OCT69 (C) GP-4  
FOR ZUMWALT FROM NICKERSON  
PBR OPS ON THE CUA DAI
- ~~23. CG III MAF 070422Z OCT69 (C)  
FOR SULLIVAN  
SEN LAM'S VISIT TO HONG KONG~~
- ~~24. CG III MAF 080624Z OCT69 (C)  
FOR HYLAND, INFO ZUMWALT, BRINGLE & BONNER FROM NICKERSON  
CINCPACFLT VISIT TO ICTZ 14-15OCT (ERROR)~~
- ~~25. X CG III MAF 081348Z OCT69 (C)  
FOR BRINGLE FROM NICKERSON  
COME TO MY BRIEF ANYTIME YOU WANT TO~~

26. ~~CG III MAF 091356Z OCT69 (C)~~  
~~FOR SULLIVAN FROM DOOLEY~~  
~~PAUL MAGINNIS CONSIGNEE FOR GEN LAM'S HONG KONG PURCHASES~~
27. ~~CG III MAF 100004Z OCT69 (C)~~  
~~FOR HISE FROM DOOLEY~~  
~~SEDAN TRANS FOR GUNN~~
28. ~~CG III MAF 100942Z OCT69 (U)~~  
~~FOR BUSE INFO SIMPSON FROM NICKERSON~~  
~~ASGT OF LAWSON~~
29. ✓ CG III MAF 101440Z OCT69 (C) GP-4  
FOR JONES INFO WILSON FROM DOOLEY  
RETURN OF RLT-3 TO CONUS
30. ✓ ~~CG III MAF 111232Z OCT69 (U)~~  
~~FOR ROBERTSHAW INFO BUSE FROM NICKERSON~~  
~~VEGETARIAN~~
31. ✓ CG III MAF 120910Z OCT69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
ASSIGNMENT OF SENIOR ARMY ~~XXX~~ INTEL STAFF OFF TO HQ III MAF
32. ~~CG III MAF 130210Z OCT69 (U)~~  
~~FOR GUNN FROM NICKERSON~~  
~~NOTE OF APPRECIATION~~
33. ~~CG III MAF 140140Z OCT69 (C)~~  
~~FOR HISE FROM DOOLEY~~  
~~CONFIRMATION OF TRANSPORTATION FOR DCEN GUNN, USA~~
34. ✓ CG III MAF 150040Z OCT69 (U)  
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON  
OASD (PA) NEWS RELEASE NO 785-69
35. ✓ CG III MAF 151635Z OCT69 (U)  
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON  
MORATORIUM INCIDENT IN AMERICAL DIV
36. ✓ CG III MAF 160832Z OCT69 (U)  
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON  
MORATORIUM INCIDENT
37. ✓ CG III MAF 161320Z OCT69 (U)  
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON  
MORATORIUM INCIDENT

38. ✓ CG III MAF 170840Z OCT69 (U) EYES ONLY  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
MORATORIUM INCIDENT (READDRESSAL OF CG III MAF 160832Z OCT69,  
CG III MAF 160359Z AND COMUSMACV 170143Z OCT69)
39. ✓ CG III MAF 170841Z OCT69 (U) EYES ONLY  
FOR COOKSEY FROM NICKERSON  
MORATORIUM INCIDENT
40. ✓ CG III MAF 171317Z OCT69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-3  
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY  
ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO III MAF
- ~~41. CG III MAF 171348Z OCT69 (C)  
FOR BRINGLE FROM NICKERSON  
VADM GAYLOR ITINERARY~~
42. ✓ CG III MAF 180930Z OCT69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-3  
FOR ZAIS FROM NICKERSON  
DEEP SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE STUDY
43. ✓ CG III MAF 181110Z OCT69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
DEEP SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE STUDY
44. ✓ CG III MAF 181158Z OCT69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-3  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
DEEP SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE STUDY
- ~~45. ✓ CG III MAF 181225Z OCT69 (C) EYES ONLY  
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY  
PASSAGE OF COMMAND OF CON/ADCON OF 3D FOR RECON CO TO CG  
III MAF~~
46. ✓ CG III MAF 190030Z OCT69 (S) GP-4  
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON  
ASSESSMENTS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS FOR TRANS-  
DMZ OPERATIONS REQUESTED AT WIEU OF 27SEP69
47. ✓ CG III MAF 191419Z OCT69 (C) GP-4  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
MILCON PROJECT C216, ENLISTED BARRACKS, CAMP HORN
48. ✓ CG III MAF 200902Z OCT69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON  
SOVIET TRAWLER INCIDENT
- ~~49. ✓ CG III MAF 210845Z OCT69 (S) EYES ONLY  
FOR BUSE INFO ZAIS AND JONES FROM NICKERSON  
ASSIGNMENT OF CHIEF OF STAFF, I MEF~~
- ~~50. ✓ CG III MAF 220415Z OCT69 (U) EYES ONLY  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
PACIFIC FLEET COMBAT~~

1. ✓ CG III MAF 220718Z OCT69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE GP-4  
FOR ZUMWALT FROM NICKERSON  
PHONG CHAU CLEARANCE OPERATIONS (U)
2. ~~CG III MAF 220920Z OCT69 (U)  
FOR ROBERTSON FROM NICKERSON  
ASSIGNMENT OF CMSGT J. C. COLEMAN~~
3. ✓ CG III MAF 230707Z OCT69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON  
LETTER FROM UNIDENTIFIED VC UNIT
4. ✓ CG III MAF 230708Z OCT69 (U)  
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON  
VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE BROADCAST, ICTZ
5. ✓ CG III MAF 240244Z OCT69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON  
122MM ROCKET INCIDENT AT 3DMARDIV
6. ✓ CG III MAF 250116Z OCT69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON  
READDRESSAL OF LETTER FROM VC UNIT
7. ~~CG III MAF 250608Z OCT69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ WILSON FROM DOOLEY  
ASSIGNMENT OF CHIEF OF STAFF, 1 MEF~~
8. ✓ CG III MAF 260214Z OCT69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO GP-4  
FOR FEELEY FROM DOOLEY  
ACTIVATION OF FIRST SERVICE BATTALION
9. ~~CG III MAF 260850Z OCT69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY~~
10. ~~CG III MAF 300930Z OCT69 (U)  
FOR HISE FROM DOOLEY  
TRANSPORTATION OF BGEN MULLER~~
11. ~~CG III MAF 311452Z OCT69 (C)  
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON  
VISIT OF MGEN MCMAH WITH THE FREEDOMS FOUNDATION GROUP~~

HEADQUARTERS  
III. MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 02 OCT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 0 020040Z OCT 69		COPY NO. OF 4 COPIES REC'D.	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
4	CG	I		2 Oct	N	SECRET FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON VISIT OF DEPCOMUSMACV TO ICTZ 30/SEP 69  REMARKS: (1) Feedback
5	DCG	I				
3	C/S	I				
2	DC/S	I		10/2	mp	
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
1	S/S	I		10/2	CB 478	
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	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
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	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
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	NJA					
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	ORD					
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	SGT MAJ					

DISPOSITION:

Retain for \_\_\_\_\_ months.

Destroy after routing.

Return for permanent retention.

Section	Signature

HAS BEEN SENT

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE) (16)

**SECRET**

P 020000Z ZFF-4  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZFM

S F C R E T / F O P MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
VISIT OF DEPCOMUSMACV TO ICTZ 30 SEP 69

A. COMUSMACV 32267 DIG 301105Z MAY 69

1. FOL SUBMITTED IAW REF A.

2. GEN ROSSON ARR DNG BASE OPS 300933H SEP 69, WAS MET BY LTGEN NICKERSON AND ESCORTED TO HQ III MAF. AFTER A BRIEF CALL ON THE CG, GEN ROSSON WAS BRIEFED BY III MAF STAFF, G-3 & G-4 ON KEY ASPECTS OF KEYSTONE CARDINAL. FOL THE BRIEF, GEN ROSSON ASKED ABOUT SENSOR COVERAGE IN THE NICTZ RECON AREA AND QUERIED THE RATIONALE USED IN SIZING THE 3D MARDIV REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENTS.

3. AT 301013H GEN ROSSON AND GEN NICKERSON DEPARTED HQ III MAF FOR I CORPS HQ AND CALLED ON MGEN TRIONG, ACTING I CORPS COMDR. AT 301050H, ACCOMPANIED BY GEN NICKERSON, GEN TRIONG AND BGEN MULLEN, DSA I CORPS; GEN ROSSON PROCEEDED TO HQ XXIV CORPS WHERE HE WAS MET BY LTGEN ZAIS, MGEN WRIGHT, MGEN JONES AND MGEN WHEELER. FOLLOWING LUNCH AT THE COMMAND MESS, XXIV CORPS, GEN ROSSON WAS BRIEFED BY MEMBERS OF THE XXIV CORPS STAFF. COL ROLLIER, THE G-3, OUTLINED PLANS FOR REDISTRIBUTION OF FORCES DURING THE WITHDRAWAL OF 3D MARDIV AND AFTER THEIR DEPARTURE. HE COVERED RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL UNITS IN NORTHERN I CORPS TO INCLUDE 101ST ABN DIV (AM), 1ST ARVN DIV, 1ST BDE 5TH INF, AND MAI LOC CIDG CAMP. HE THEN BRIEFLY COVERED OPLAN 183-69, HIGHLIGHTING MISSION, CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, MANEUVER AND FIRES. DURING THE DISCUSSION OF MANEUVER, GEN ROSSON ASKED WHERE THE 101ST ABN DIV WOULD BE LOCATED AND WAS INFORMED THAT THEY WOULD BE IN THE VICINITY OF FSB SANDY, WEST OF SANDY AND THE VICINITY OF MAI LOC - - THIS AREA EVENTUALLY BECOMING A RECON ZONE. DURING THE DISCUSSION OF FIRES, GEN ROSSON ASKED WHAT WOULD BECOME OF FSB FULLER AFTER 1 OCT AND WAS INFORMED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE A COMBINED FIRE BASE FOR 2D ARVN REGT AND US ELMS. 16(1)



TASK OF THE DIFFERENT US UNITS AND COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS WERE THEN DISCUSSED. DURING DISCUSSION OF THE 3D MARDIV GEN ROSSON ASKED WHAT THE 3D MARDIV SURVEILLANCE CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT PLATOON (SCAMP) WAS AND WHO WOULD UNDERTAKE ITS MISSION WHEN IT REDEPLOYED. HIS QUESTION WAS ANSWERED BY GEN NICKERSON. GEN ROSSON WAS BRIEFED ON THE PROPOSED CHANGE IN THE XXIV CORPS BOUNDARY PENDING ARRIVAL ASHORE OF THE ENTIRE 26TH MARINE REGT. GEN ROSSON WAS THEN BRIEFED ON XXIV CORPS PROPOSED TACTICAL LOC PLAN. COL PATTON, THE G-2 WAS THE NEXT BRIEFER. HE COVERED VARIOUS INFORMATION COLLECTION AGENCIES AND EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE TO XXIV CORPS. GEN ROSSON ASKED IF 101ST ABN DIV HAD ANY OV-1 AIRCRAFT. GEN WRIGHT ANSWERED THAT THEY WERE IN THE TO&E BUT THE DIVISION HAD NONE. GEN ROSSON ASKED HOW SENSORS WOULD BE EMPLANTED AND WAS INFORMED THAT THEY WOULD BE EMPLANTED BY LONG RANGE PATROLS, HELICOPTER AND FIXED WING AIRCRAFT - - ULTIMATE DENSITY DESIRED. BEING 500. COL VALE OF XXIV CORPS ARTY THEN BRIEFED ON FUNCTIONS AND DISPOSITIONS OF CORPS ARTY. DISCUSSION FOLLOWED REGARDING CONTROLLING AND CLEARANCE PROCEDURES, DEVELOPING AND EXPLOITING TARGET INFORMATION, AND CONTROLLING AIRCRAFT ENTERING THE AREA. LT COL STEIN PRESENTED THE G-4 PORTION OF THE BRIEFING TO INCLUDE BASE CAMP RELOCATION AND DISPOSAL OR REASSIGNMENT OF REAL ESTATE. GEN ROSSON MENTIONED LESSONS LEARNED IN IV CORPS, AND G-4 ANSWERED THAT HE HAD THAT MATERIAL. G-4 LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLAN UTILIZING TAN MY WAS PRESENTED, BASED UPON EVENTUAL CLOSING OF DONG HA - CUA VIET COMPLEX. COL OSTEN, CO 1ST BDE 5TH INF, BRIEFED ON HIS UNIT'S ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE THE NEW AREA OF OPERATION, DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES, MISSION AND TASKS. EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON PHYSICAL LOCATION OF THE UNITS AND FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT QUANG TRI. MGEN WRIGHT COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD BE SENDING SOME AIR ASSETS TO QUANG TRI BUT AT THIS TIME COULD NOT COMMENT OF THE EXACT PACKAGE. GEN ROSSON ASKED WHO WOULD BE AT DONG HA AND WAS TOLD THE 108TH ARTY GP, 2D ARVN REGT, 1ST ARVN DIV HQ (FWD) AND 3D SOCM 5TH CAV. OPEN DISCUSSION FOLLOWED DEALING MAINLY WITH CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF FIRES TO INCLUDE AIR, ARTY, AND NAVAL GUNFIRE WITH APPROPRIATE LIAISON AND CONTROL TO USING UNITS.

4. GEN ROSSON DEPARTED PHU BAI FOR DANANG 301505H AND DEPARTED DANANG FOR SAIGON AT 301535Z.

GP-4

16(2)

16(2)

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 02 OCT 69				
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 020820Z OCT 69		COPY NO. 1,2,3 4	OF COPIES REC'D.				
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG	I		30/2	MM	VISIT OF COMUSMACV TO ICTZ 25 SEP 69 <i>Feedback</i>				
	DCG	I								
	C/S	I				REMARKS ①				
	DC/S	I		10/3	MM					
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION:  <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention.				
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**HAS BEEN SENT**

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**SECRET**

P 020820Z ZFF-4  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

SECRET /FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 VISIT OF COMUSMACV TO ICTZ 25SEP 1969

A. COMUSMACV 32267 DTG 301105Z MAY69

1. FOL SUBMITTED IAW REF A.  
 2. GEN ABRAMS ARR BASE OPNS DANANG 250820H SEP WHERE HE WAS MET BY CG III MAF AND CG XXIV CORPS. PARTY PROCEEDED IMMEDIATELY TO III MAF BRIEFING ROOM FOR A PRESENTATION BY XXIV CORPS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF OPLAN 183-69. THE FORMAL BRIEFING DEALT GENERALLY WITH THE CONCEPT OF 3D MARDIV REDEPLOYMENT, REPOSITIONING OF OTHER XXIV CORPS ELEMENTS AND ARVN FORCES. THE BRIEFING WAS CONDUCTED BY COL ROLLIER, US ARMY, G-3 XXIV CORPS. THE FOL QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS OCCURRED DURING THE BRIEFING:

A. GEN ABRAMS: WHAT ABOUT THE PHASED REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 4TH MARINES? ANS: A BN ON 5 OCT; 22 OCT AND 5 NOV ALTHOUGH DATES ARE NOT YET FIRM.

B. GEN ABRAMS: REFERRED TO INFO IN THE BRIEFING AND ASKED QUOTE WHERE DID LAMB (DAVID LAMB, UPI REPORTER) GET THIS DOPE UNQUOTE? GEN ZAIS REPLIED THAT HE JUST DIDN'T KNOW -- THAT LAMB MUST HAVE PUT PIECES TOGETHER.

C. GEN ABRAMS: AT WHAT TIME DOES GEN JONES RELINQUISH RESPONSIBILITY AS A COMMANDER? GEN ZAIS ANSWERED, ON ORDER, DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF NOV. HE REPEATED THE TENTATIVE DATES THE 4TH MARINES WERE PHASING OUT. GEN ABRAMS: AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY ARE BEING TRANSFERRED BY STAGES ON THESE DATES? GEN ZAIS REPLIED, YES SIR.

D. GEN ABRAMS: IS THE 1ST ARVN DIV GOING TO ESTABLISH AN ADVANCE CP? GEN ZAIS: NO AUTH FROM SAIGON PRESEMLY. WE MUST DO SOMETHING ABOUT THIS.

E. GEN ABRAMS: WE NEED COLOCATION OF THE 1ST OF THE 5TH AND 1ST ARVN DIV. GEN ZAIS: DONG HA WILL BE POINT OF COORDINATION FOR 2D ARVN REGT, 1ST OF THE 5TH AND 1ST ARVN DIV FWD CP IF AUTH. I WILL LEAVE 1ST OF THE 5TH AT QUANG TRI. I NEED A GEN OFFICER IN THAT AREA. MAY PLACE ARTY COMDR AS AREA COORDINATOR. THIS IS ONE REASON I WANTED TO TALK TO GEN MILDREN ABOUT NEW CORPS ARTY OFFICER.

17(1)

17(1)

## 3. POST-BRIEF DISCUSSION PERIOD:

A. GEN ZAIS: WANT TO GIVE UP VANDY (VCB) BUT MUST MOVE MAI LOC VILLAGE. WILL TAKE FIVE DAYS. WANT TO ESTABLISH NEW FSB AT CARROLL ON SITE OF OLD FSB. HE DISCUSSED LONG RANGE ARTY CAPABILITIES FROM FSB CARROLL AND FSB FULLER.

B. GEN ZAIS: POSED THE QUESTION OF MARINE AVIATION SUPPORT LEFT TO SUPPORT ARVN AND 1ST OF THE 5TH. WITHOUT USMC SUPPORTIN REQUIREMENTS WOULD OVERLOAD 101ST HELO RESOURCES. AFTER CG III MAF DECIDES WHAT HE CAN PROVIDE, WILL ASK FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPORT IF NEEDED.

C. GEN NICKERSON: DISCUSSED TWO MEDIUM AND ONE LIGHT SQDNS AT PHU BAI. HAD NOT DECIDED EXACTLY. STAFF IS LOOKING INTO THE PROBLEM. WILL LET GEN ABRAMS KNOW. DESCRIBED RECON ELEMENTS THAT WILL COVER VACATED AREAS. NOT AS STRONG AS DELTA FORCE BUT WILL HELP. STATED PLAN TO INCREASE SENSORS AND USE AUTOMATIC READOUT DATA TO SHOOT 170MM GUNS FROM FSB'S.

D. GEN ZAIS STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF AIR READOUT FOR A/C IN PLACE. RESIDUAL CAPABILITY WITH OTTERS AND AN EXPERIMENTAL TOWER. G-2 IS WORKING WITH BGEN BURKE, (DC/S, PLANS III MAF) ON SENSORS. MUCH TO BE DONE.

E. GEN ZAIS: DISCUSSED CONCEPT OF ROAD NETS FROM QL-1 TO ALL FSB'S TO PRECLUDE HELO REQUIREMENT DURING MARGINAL WEATHER AND WOULD REQUIRE LESS FUTURE HELO SUPPORT FOR ARVN. NEXT STEP IS FOR LINE OF SIGHT READOUTS BETWEEN FSB'S AND SENSORS WITH A CANOPY OF FIRE SUPPORT. ENGRS ARE DEVELOPING.

4. GEN ABRAMS DEPARTED DANANG BASE OPNS AT 250950H SEP 69 FOR TSN.

GP-4  
620

17(2)

17(2)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 03 OCT 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 030120Z OCT 69		COPY# OF COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT ASSESSMENT OF ENEMY SITUATION IN IOTZ
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4...  THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.  <i>for gen &amp; Peterson Feedback</i>  <i>2. see gen 2015 info.</i>  <i>Gen 2015 Has Seen</i>
	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I				
	DC/S PLAN					
1	S/S	I	10/3			
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	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT  
TOP SECRET

34

O 030120Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

I O P S E C R E T / SENSITIVE / LIMDIS / EYES ONLY  
 FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 ASSESSMENT OF ENEMY SITUATION IN ICTZ

1. THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT ADDRESSES THE ENEMY SITUATION WHICH CONFRONTS US IN ICTZ. THE OVERALL THREAT REMAINS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED IN TERMS OF TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTHS, UNITS AND CAPABILITIES. THE FOCAL POINTS OF ENEMY ATTENTION CONTINUE TO BE CONCENTRATED ON THE DMZ, DANANG, HIEP DUC AND THE BA TO-DUC PHO AREAS. IN ADDITION, THE ENEMY RECENTLY HAS DEMONSTRATED A SPECIAL INTEREST IN ATTACKING REFUGEE SETTLEMENT LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT EASTERN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE. THE THRUST OF HIS OPERATIONS HAS REFLECTED AN ECONOMY OF FORCE STRATEGY. HIS ACTIONS HAVE BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY ATTACKS BY FIRE AND HIT-AND-RUN SAPPER ATTACKS WITH PERIODIC HIGH POINTS IN WHICH THERE IS SOME INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. COMPLEMENTED BY INCREASED ENEMY POLITICAL ACTIVITY, THIS PATTERN OF MILITARY OPERATIONS HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A STEPPED UP CAMPAIGN OF TERROR, PROPAGANDA, ASSASSINATION, KIDNAPPINGS AND OTHER FORMS OF COERCION.

2. LOOKING AT ICTZ AS A WHOLE, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE BY FAR IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IS THE REDEPLOYMENT OUT-OF-COUNTRY OF THE 3RD MARINE DIVISION AND HERE IN NICTZ IS WHERE WE HAVE OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERN. MAJ GEN TRUONG'S EVALUATION IS ESSENTIALLY AS FOLLOWS:

A. CAPABILITIES: THE ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF REGIMENTAL SIZE ATTACKS ONLY IN THE VICINITY OF THE DMZ OR NEAR THE LAOTIAN FRONTIER (I. E. BASE AREA 511), BATTALION ATTACKS IN THE PIEDMONT AREAS AND POSSIBLY COMPANY SIZE ATTACKS IN THE COASTAL PLAINS. HE CONSIDERS THE LATTER TO BE UNLIKELY. THE ENEMY CAN CONTINUE ATTACKS BY FIRE, THE USE OF MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS, AND SMALL TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE POPULATION AREAS AT ABOUT THE SAME SCALE AS IN RECENT MONTH. THE ENEMY DOES, OF COURSE, HAVE THE CAPABILITY FOR A LARGE SCALE, MULTI-REGIMENTAL ATTACK BUT THIS WOULD BE IN THE NATURE OF A "GO-OR-DIE" EFFORT AND NOT AS A RATIONAL MILITARY ACTION OR CAPABILITY. SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD PROBABLY BE AIMED AT THE HUE-PHU BAI AREA WITH A SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK ON ALLIED FORCES ALONG THE DMZ. 34/11

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 3

34(1)



**B INTENTIONS:** GENERAL TRUONG IS AWARE OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OF A POSSIBLE ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN OCTOBER BUT CONSIDERS IT MORE PROBABLE THAT THE LEVEL AND TYPE OF CONTACTS WILL REMAIN ABOUT THE SAME THROUGH DECEMBER. THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY MAY RISK A STRONG ATTACK AS A PROBE OR TEST OF OUR NEW DISPOSITIONS SOUTH OF THE DMZ DURING OR AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 3RD MARINE DIVISION. THERE IS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER REMOTE, OF A MAJOR ENEMY OFFENSIVE SOUTH FROM THE DMZ AND EAST FROM THE MOUNTAINS TOWARD HUE-PHU BAI. THIS WOULD OCCUR ONLY IF A POLITICAL SITUATION SHOULD OBTAIN IN WHICH HANOI MAY BE LED TO BELIEVE THAT A FINAL DESPERATE EFFORT COULD LEAD TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE WAR AND ACCORDINGLY WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE DESTRUCTION OF MOST OF THE FORCES INVOLVED. IN SUCH A FINAL, "ALL-OUT" OFFENSIVE, THE POSSIBILITY OF NVA AIR ATTACKS SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED. GEN TRUONG STATED THAT SINCE HE WAS NOT REALLY AWARE OF THE US CAPABILITY TO DETECT AND THWART AN ENEMY AIR ATTACK, HE COULD NOT VERY WELL EVALUATE HANOI'S WILLINGNESS TO TAKE THE RISK. NEVERTHELESS, HE BELIEVES WE SHOULD RETAIN SOME ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY AROUND THE PRINCIPAL POPULATION CENTERS AND KEY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ON THE COASTAL PLAINS. HE EXPECTS THAT ENEMY UNITS WILL MOVE INTO THE A SHAU VALLEY AND WESTERN QUANG TRI AS ALLIED TROOPS WITHDRAW FROM THESE AREAS BUT THAT IT WILL BE MUCH EASIER TO DISLodge THEM THIS TIME WHEN WE RETURN TO THE WESTERN REGIONS AFTER THE MONSOON SEASON. HE POINTS OUT THAT IT TAKES A LONG TIME FOR THE ENEMY TO BUILD AND SUPPLY A STRONG BASE CAMP. SOME OF THE BASE CAMPS DESTROYED BY THE ALLIED UNITS IN THIS YEAR'S WESTERN OFFENSIVES REQUIRED TWO TO THREE YEARS TO PREPARE.

**C. SAPPERS:** HE IS AWARE OF THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OF THE ENEMY'S EFFORTS TO TRAIN NEW SAPPER UNITS BUT DOES NOT BELIEVE THIS WILL BE VERY SUCCESSFUL. HE COMPARED GOOD SAPPERS TO GOOD SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIERS. THE NUMBER OF MEN SUITED FOR THESE SKILLS WAS VERY LIMITED AND THAT REAL PROFICIENCY REQUIRED A VERY LONG TRAINING PERIOD. HE NOTED THAT RECENT ATTACKS BY THE NEWLY TRAINED SAPPERS WERE NOT VERY EFFECTIVE AND WERE VERY COSTLY TO THE ENEMY.

3. I CONSIDER GENERAL TRUONG'S EVALUATION TO BE SOUND AND WELL FOUNDED IN FACT. I BELIEVE AS HE DOES, THAT IN PREFERENCE TO MAJOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, THE ENEMY IS MORE LIKELY TO CONTINUE CONDUCTING LIMITED ATTACKS ON OUR FORCES IN ICTZ, STRESSING ATTACKS BY FIRE AND SAPPER ATTACKS AND PLACING PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. COUPLED WITH THIS IS THE MARKED POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY MAY ATTEMPT TO TEST US AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNE MOMENT WITH ATTACKS UP TO REGIMENTAL SIZE, MOST ESPECIALLY IN THE DMZ AREA. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WILL SEEK TO DISCREDIT THE GVN CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ITS PEOPLE. THUS, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE ENEMY WILL CONTINUE HIS ECONOMY OF FORCE EFFORTS IN ICTZ AND PROCEED WITH CAUTION AS THE PRESENT SITUATION CLARIFIES ITSELF. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL MAKE A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN HIS COURSE OF ACTION UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE REACTION TIME OF US GROUND COMBAT FORCES IN ICTZ AND ON A COUNTRYWIDE BASIS HAS BEEN REDUCED TO THE POINT HE JUDGES TO BE FAVORABLE TO HIM.

**SSG NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
DELIVER DURING NORMAL HOURS.**

34(2) ~~34~~

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAP FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAP		04 OCT 69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. OF COPIES REC'D.					
			0 031000Z OCT 69		3					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG	I		6 Oct		CONFIDENTIAL/FOU BGEN WILSON F OM BGEN DOOLEY VISIT OF MESSRS ROSSOTTI AND COHEN				
	DCG	I								
	C/S	F				REMARKS ①				
	DC/S	I		10/4						
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention. <table border="1"> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
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	DEP CORDS									
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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

0 211000Z ZND ZEE-A

FM CC III MAF

TO CC WEMERAC

ZEM

CONFERENCES WITH A L/ECR BOEN WILSON FROM BOEN DOOLEY  
WIGHT OF MEMORS ROSSOTTI AND DEEN

1. MR. ROSSOTTI, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY (SYSTEMS ANALYSIS), AND MR. DEEN,  
ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (REGIONAL  
PROGRAMS) WILL BE VISITING US ON THE 15TH OF THE  
MONTH. WE ARE WONDERING IF THERE ARE ANY PROBLEMS  
BACK IN WASHINGTON OF WHICH THESE GENTLEMEN ARE CON-  
CERNED WITH AT THE PRESENT TIME WHICH MIGHT SURFACE  
UPON THEIR ARRIVAL OUT HERE. OR, DO THEY HAVE ANY  
PARTICULAR PROJECTS WHICH YOU MIGHT KNOW OF THAT  
WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR. IF YOU HAVE ANY  
INFORMATION AT ALL, OR IF YOU CAN OBTAIN ANY, WE  
WOULD APPRECIATE IT AT THE EARLIEST. JOHN CHALSON  
MAY HAVE A FEEL FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES IN WASHINGTON  
AND MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP US.

WARM REGARDS.

CR-A

SEE NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION  
ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

104

18(1)

18(1)

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 06 OCT 69				
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE O 060916Z		COPY NO. 3 OF 4 COPIES REC'D.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
2	CG	F		10/7	N/S	SECRET/FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON/EYES ONLY <i>Feedback</i>				
3	DCG	I								
	C/S	F								
	DC/S					REMARKS ① DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention. <table border="1"> <tr> <td>Section</td> <td>Signature</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
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(21)

**SECRET**

0 060916Z ZYH  
 CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

SECRET/FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON/EYES ONLY  
 . ZAIS SAYS ARMY WOULD LOOK BAD IF THEY DON'T CLOSE  
 OUT XXIV CORPS EXPEDITIOUSLY AFTER THIRD MARDIV LEAVES.  
 2. CMC ASKED ME ON TELEPHONE BEFORE I WENT TO OKINAWA  
 IF ANYTHING NEW ON THIS STAFF OR XXIV CORPS. ANSWER  
 WAS THAT YOU HAD RECOMMENDED TO HIM AND I DID NOT HAVE  
 KNOWLEDGE OF HIS REPLY.

3. WHILE WAITING PLANE REPAIRS AT CUBI PT 3 OCT, I  
 VISITED THE BLT/SLF CAMP WITH RADM LAMPERT AND COL  
 NAT PACE. GALLEY NEEDS RANGES AND DRAINAGE. BELIEVE A  
 GOOD ENGR WOULD GET 6 OR 7 ADDITIONAL 72-MAN QUONSETS  
 OR EQUIVALENT SEA HUTS INTO THE AREA. HELOS OF SLF  
 WOULD HAVE TO USE SMALL BOAT REPAIR AREA. SHOULD BE NO  
 PROBLEM. COL PACE WAS GOING TO VISIT BOB CARNEY THIS  
 WEEK TO DISCUSS. I'M TRYING TO SHAKE LOOSE SOME  
 BUTLERS AND WILL ADVISE.

4. NEW SUBJ: I WOULD LIKE TO SPRING MAJOR JESSE  
 ALTMAN LOOSE FROM OKINAWA TO BE MY SENIOR AIDE. HE  
 HAS MADE HIS PERSONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HAS OVER TWO  
 YEARS THERE NOW: IS DUE IN FEBRUARY ANYWAY. THIS  
 WOULD GIVE CAPT LEE ANDERSON A ONE-HALF TOUR CHANGE  
 AND GIVE ME AN AIDE I KNOW AND TRUST. HATE TO  
 LOSE ANDY BUT I WOULD NOT LET HIM GET FAR AWAY.  
 MAJOR JESSE ALTMAN, 064322, IS EXO, SUPPLY BN,  
 3D FSR. HE WILL COMPLETE THIRTY MONTHS IN FEB 1970.  
 WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR HELP TO GET HIM.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION DELIVER DURING WORKING  
 HOURS.

265

MINN HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

21/11

21(1)

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

## CONFIDENTIAL

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		87 OCT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE	COPY NO. 2 OF 6 COPIES REC'D.		
			0724807 OCT 69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I		10/7	N	PER OPERATIONS ON THE CUA DAI RIVER SYSTEM (U)
1	DCG	I				
	C/S	I				REMARKS
	DC/S	I		10/7		
	DCS PLANS					<b>DISPOSITION:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.
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Copy 3 to G-3 111600H Oct 69

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

(22)

## CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

OTTCZYUW RHMMAFA0755 2800400-CCCC--RUMUGKD,  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 O 070400Z OCT 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMUGKD/COMNAVFORV  
 BT

**FOR**

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
 FOR VADM ZUMWALT FROM LTGEN NICKERSON DELIVER AT BEGINNING  
 OF DUTY HOURS  
 PER OPERATIONS ON THE CUA DAI RIVER SYSTEM (U)  
 A. YOUR 030808Z OCT 69

1. (C) CONCUR IN THE RATIONALE CONTAINED IN REF (A). HOWEVER,  
 IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF TF CLEARWATER OPERATIONS  
 ON THE CUA VIET AND PERFUME RIVERS AND THE REDUCTION OF FORCES  
 IN NICTZ, I RECOMMEND THAT, INITIALLY, EIGHT PBR'S BE TRANSFERRED  
 TO OPCON CTG 115.1 FOR OPERATIONS IN THE CUA DAI. AFTER A SUITABLE  
 PERIOD OF OPERATIONS, WE CAN RE-EVALUATE THE SITUATION TO DETERMINE  
 THE BEST DISTRIBUTION OF PBR ASSETS ON A PERMANENT BASIS.  
 2. (C) I WILL DISCUSS THE REDEPLOYMENT OF RAG-32 WITH LTGEN LAM.  
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT  
 0755

NNNN

COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES**CONFIDENTIAL**

22/11

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAR			DATE 11 OCT 69				
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE O 101402		COPY NO. 4 OF 4 COPIES RECD.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					RETURN OF RLT-3 TO COMUS				
	DCG									
	C/S					REMARKS ③				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION:  <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.  Return for permanent retention.				
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**CONFIDENTIAL**

0 101440Z ZYH ZFF-6  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 INFO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR MAJGEN JONES INFO RGEN WILSON  
 FROM RGEN DOOLEY

RETURN OF RLT-3 TO CONUS

A. CG THIRD MAF 081715Z OCT69

B. CG THIRD MAF 081721Z OCT69

1. REFS A AND B REFER. IN ADDITION TO THE GUIDANCE  
 CONTAINED IN REFS A AND B, THE FOLLOWING ARE NOTES THAT  
 HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED OVER THE TELEPHONE AMONG THE  
 THREE OF US AND HAVE BEEN COMPILED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

A. CMC HAS RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTIES OF OBTAINING  
 THE 330 RLT PEOPLE AND HAS AUTH A COMPROMISE SOLUTION.  
 IT IS NECESSARY THAT RLT-3 PERSONNEL ONLY BE LOADED IN  
 THE FIRST PLANE AND INCLUDE COL SIMLIK, SGTMAJ DUDEK  
 AND THE COLOR GUARD.

B. THE SECOND PLANE CAN INCLUDE ANYONE RETURNING  
 TO CONUS FROM THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION.

C. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE CONCERNING  
 PERSONNEL APPEARANCE:

(1) ALL INDIVIDUALS WILL BE IN DUNGAREES;  
 STARCHED AND ALL OF THE SAME TYPE. (PERSONNEL SHOULD  
 CARRY ONE SET OF STARCHED DUNGAREES ON HANGER ABOARD  
 PLANE AND CHANGE SHORTLY PRIOR TO LANDING AT EL TORO.)

(2) HELMETS, GREEN SIDE OUT, WILL BE WORN.  
 AFTER THE CEREMONY THEY WILL BE PICKED UP BY REPS OF  
 THE 3TH MARDIV. (CG 3D MAF RECOMMENDS THAT PERSONNEL  
 CARRY A DUNGAREE COVER IN THEIR GEAR -- WILL BE WORN  
 AFTER STEEL HELMETS HAVE BEEN TURNED IN.)

(3) RECOMMENDED THAT ACCOMMODATIONS FOR  
 SHAVING ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT BE ARRANGED.

(4) PERSONNEL WILL BE FORMED INTO TWO  
 COMPANIES OF 80 MEN EACH ON EACH OF THE AIRCRAFT.

(5) COMPANY GUIDONS OR BATTALION COLORS ARE  
 NOT REQUIRED-- REGIMENTAL COLORS ARE.

(6) RIFLES WILL BE PROVIDED BY MCAS EL TORO  
 TO THE COLOR GUARD UPON ARRIVAL.

(7) THERE WILL BE NATIONAL TV COVERAGE FOR  
 THE ENTIRE CEREMONY. PERFORMANCE OF OUR MARINES WILL  
 BE OF THE HIGHEST STANDARDS WITH REGARD TO PERSONAL  
 APPEARANCE AND MILITARY BEARING.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING  
 WORKING HOURS.



29(1)

29(1)

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF		DATE 12 OCT 69				
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 120910Z OCT 69		COPY NO. <u>3</u> OF <u>4</u> COPIES REC'D.						
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN      OUT		INITIAL	SUBJECT <b>SECRET/EYES ONLY</b> ASSIGNMENT OF SENIOR ARMY IN- TELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER TO HQ III MAF					
	CG	I	<del>Classified</del>			REMARKS <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;">                     DISPOSITION:   <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months.  <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.  <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention.                 </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">Section</td> <td style="width: 50%;">Signature</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>		Section	Signature		
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31

**SECRET**

P 120910Z 7FF-1 7FF-4

FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC  
ZEM

S E C R E T/EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN BYSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
ASSIGNMENT OF SENIOR ARMY INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER TO  
HQ III MAF

A. CG III MAF 180530Z SEP 1969

B. CG FMFPAC 190343Z SEP 69


1. IN REF A, I ADVANCED THE MATTER OF REQUESTING COMUSMACV TO  
PROVIDE AN ARMY COLONEL INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER AS EVENTUAL  
RELIEF FOR CANTON. BY REFERENCE B, YOU REQUESTED I WITHHOLD  
ACTION TEMPORARILY.

2. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT HQMC IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE A SUIT-  
ABLE REPLACEMENT DURING THIS TIME FRAME, IT APPEARS ADVISABLE THAT  
THE COURSE OF ACTION OUTLINED IN REF A BE IMPLEMENTED AS SOON AS  
PRACTICABLE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR AN ORDERLY TURNOVER.

3. I WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS BEFORE INITIATING  
ACTION IN THIS MATTER. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS  
167



SECRET HAS BEEN SENT

NNNN

31/11

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV. 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		15 OCT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D.	
			P 150040Z			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		15/10/69	10	A. OASD (PA) NEWS RELEASE NO. 785-69 OF 22 SEP 69
	DCG	I			42	
	C/S	I				REMARKS
	DC/S	I		10/15	445	
	DCS PLANS					HAS BEEN SENT <i>Feedback</i>
	DEP.CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					HAS BEEN SENT
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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

(34)

P 150040Z ZFF-4  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZFM

UNCLAS E F T O/FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. OASD (PA) NEWS RELEASE NO. 785-69 OF 22SEP69

1. REF A IS QUOTED FOR INFORMATION:

QUOTE--SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JOHN H. CHAFEE TODAY (22SEP69) ANNOUNCED THE FOLLOWING MARINE CORPS ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE ECONOMIES IN CURRENT FISCAL YEAR EXPENDITURES:

- - DEACTIVATION OF THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE 26TH REGIMENT, WHICH IS IN VIETNAM.
- - A REDUCTION OF APPROXIMATELY \$115 MILLION IN MARINE CORPS EXPENDITURES.
- - AN END-STRENGTH REDUCTION OF 20,300 MARINES DURING FISCAL YEAR 1970.
- - PLANS TO BASE ON OKINAWA AND AT CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA, ELEMENTS OF THE 3RD MARINE DIVISION BEING REDEPLOYED FROM VIETNAM.

ELEMENTS OF THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION TO BE DEACTIVATED, NOW STATIONED AT CAMP PENDLETON, ARE THE 27TH MARINES, THE 28TH MARINES, ELEMENTS OF THE 13TH MARINES (AN ARTILLERY REGIMENT,) AND SUPPORTING DIVISION UNITS. THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION WAS REACTIVATED IN MARCH, 1966, AS PART OF THE VIETNAM BUILD-UP.

TWO REGIMENTS, THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORTING UNITS ARE INVOLVED IN THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 3RD MARINE DIVISION. THE FOURTH MARINES, ALONG WITH DIVISION HEADQUARTERS WILL RETURN TO THEIR HOME BASES ON OKINAWA, WHERE THEY WILL REJOIN THE NINTH MARINES, WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM VIETNAM. THE THIRD MARINES WILL RETURN TO CAMP PENDLETON. - UNQUOTE.

2. REF A WAS RECEIVED BY THIS COMMAND BY MAIL ON AN INFORMAL BASIS ON 11OCT69. A CHECK OF MY COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU AND MACOI REVEALED THAT NEITHER HAD PREVIOUSLY SEEN THE ABOVE STATEMENT, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT CINCPAC HAS NOT SEEN IT EITHER. APPARENTLY THE OASD (PA) RELEASE OR GUIDANCE WAS NOT DISSEMINATED EITHER TO CINCPAC OR YOUR HEADQUARTERS.

3. YOU MAY NOTE THAT THIS MESSAGE STATES THAT THE 4TH MARINES AND THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS ARE RETURNING TO OKINAWA WHILE THE 3D MARINES ARE RETURNING TO CAMP PENDLETON, ON 11 OCTOBER WHEN WE RECEIVED THIS MESSAGE WE WERE DRAFTING A MESSAGE TO YOU REQUESTING YOUR ASSISTANCE IN DOWNGRADING THE MOVEMENT OF THE 4TH MARINES TO OKINAWA. MEANWHILE IT HAD BEEN DOWNGRADED BY OASD 19 DAYS BEFORE.

4. THE ABOVE IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

WARM REGARDS.

34(1)

34 (1)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		16 OCT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES RECD.	
			O 151635Z OCT 69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				MORATORIUM INCIDENT
	DCG	I				
	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I				
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP. CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	X	10/16			
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	I				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB	A				
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT&E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED.O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	\$GT MAJ					

REMARKS

HAS BEEN SENT

HAS BEEN SENT

HAS BEEN SENT

35

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

O 151635Z ZYH

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON/EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

O 151330Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM BG COOKSEY CG AMCAL DIV

TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF

ZEM

F O U O ACD 1057 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: MORATORIUM INCIDENT

1. THE INCIDENT REPORTED BY THE ASSOCIATED PRESS OCCURRED AT COMPANY C, 1ST BN., 52ND INF., 198TH INF BDE, AT APPROXIMATELY 1030 HOURS, 15 OCTOBER 1969.

2. THE REPORTER, CHARLES RYAN, ARRIVED AT A FIELD LOCATION AT APPROXIMATELY 1030 HOURS. REPORTS HERE INDICATE THAT ONE OFFICER AND FOUR ENLISTED MEN WEARING BLACK MATERIAL TIED AROUND ONE ARM WERE IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA. IN THE CASE OF LT. JESSE ROSEN, PLATOON LEADER OF THE 2ND PLATOON, THE MATERIAL WAS A BLACK SOCK. COMMENTS MADE WERE EXPRESSED AS INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT OF THE MORATORIUM. THE MISSION OF THE UNIT WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THESE INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSIONS. THE COMPANY IS ON A SWEEP MISSION NORTHWEST OF QUANG NGAI CITY AND HAD SUCCESSFULLY ENGAGED AND KILLED TWO ARMED VIET CONG PRIOR TO THE REPORTER'S ARRIVAL AT THE COMPANY'S LOCATION.

3. (FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY BECAUSE I HAVE NOT YET CONFIRMED) INFORMATION HERE REVEALS THAT LTM ROSEN'S MOTHER IS A SUPPORTER OF DR. SPOCK'S ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT.

4. LT. ROSEN WAS AWARE OF THE MORATORIUM AS THE RESULT OF A TIME MAGAZINE ARTICLE HE READ YESTERDAY. THE MAGAZINE ARRIVED AT THE COMPANY LOCATION 14 OCTOBER ON A SUPPLY HELICOPTER.

5. I PLAN TO GO TO THE LOCATION TOMORROW AND TALK TO LT. ROSEN. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

7NQUOTE

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
DELIVER AT BEGINNING OF WORKING HOURS

360



35(1)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV. 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		16 OCT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES RECD.	
			O 160832Z OCT 69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		17 Oct	[Signature]	MORATORIUM INCIDENT
	DCG	I			[Signature]	
	C/S	I			[Signature]	REMARKS
	DC/S	I			[Signature]	
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP. CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	X	10/16		copy	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	I		Was copy		
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB	A		Was copy		
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT & E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

HAS BEEN SENT

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

36

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

REF A

O 160832Z ZYH ZZS ZFF-4

FM US CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LIGEN  
NICKERSON

MORATORIUM INCIDENT

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:  
QUOTE:

O 160359Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM BG COOKSEY CG AMERICAL DIV

TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF

ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O F O U O ACD 1058 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: MORATORIUM INCIDENT

1. THIS MORNING I VISITED LZ STINSON, HEADQUARTERS OF THE 1ST  
BATTALION, 52ND INFANTRY, AND TALKED WITH THE 198TH BRIGADE  
COMMANDER, THE BATTALION COMMANDER AND LT JESSE ROSEN, THE  
PLATOON LEADER QUOTED BY ASSOCIATED PRESS.

2. LT ROSEN IS AND HAS BEEN AN OUTSTANDING PLATOON LEADER AND  
HIS PLATOON HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE IN COMBAT.

3. AFTER TALKING WITH LT ROSEN AND HIS COMMANDERS AND IN VIEW  
OF HIS OTHERWISE HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE, I DO NOT PLAN  
TO TAKE PUNITIVE MEASURES AGAINST LT ROSEN OR THE OTHER FOUR  
MEMBERS OF HIS PLATOON. HOWEVER, ALL COMMANDERS ARE AGAIN  
BEING CAUTIONED TO BE ALERT TO THIS PROBLEM.

4. IF THE SITUATION CHANGES IN ANY WAY, I WILL ADVISE YOU ASAP.  
WARM REGARDS

UNQUOTE:

2. FROM TALKING WITH GEN COOKSEY THIS AFTERNOON IT WAS  
HIS IMPRESSION THAT LT ROSEN HAD "DEEP REMORSE" FOR HIS  
ACTIONS AND REGRETTED ANY UNFAVORABLE PRESS REACTIONS  
WHICH MAY RESULT.

3. I CONCUR IN COOKSEY'S COURSE OF ACTION RELATIVE TO DIS-  
CIPLINING LT ROSEN SUBJECT TO THE DISCLOSURE OF ANY  
ADDITIONAL FACTS WHICH MAY BE BROUGHT OUT LATER.

4. FOR YOUR INFORMATION OTHER MEMBERS OF PRESS INTER-  
VIEWED LT ROSEN AFTER GEN COOKSEY LEFT HIM THIS AM.  
WARM REGARDS

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

300



36(1)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV. 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		16 OCT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES RECD.	
			O 161320Z OCT 69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		17 Oct	R	MORATORIUM INCIDENT
	DCG	I				
	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I				
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP.CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	I	10/17		(R) 4	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	I		was copy		
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB	A		was copy		
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT&E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED.O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

SUBJECT  
MORATORIUM INCIDENT

REMARKS

HAS BEEN SENT

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE) 37(1)

REF B

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

U 161520Z ZYH  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN  
WICKERSON  
MORATORIUM INCIDENT

A. CG III MAF 160800Z OCT 69

1. I HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT AP, UPI AND NBC HAVE FILED  
STORIES BASED ON TODAY'S INTERVIEWS WITH MEMBERS OF THE  
1ST BN, 52ND INF, 198TH INF BRIG; THE BN COMMANDER, "C"  
CO COMMANDER, PLATOON WHO ALLEGEDLY WORE BLACK ARM BANDS  
FOUR OF THE EIGHT WERE SOMEWHAT HARKISH IN THEIR VIEWS  
WHILE THE OTHER FOUR SAID THEY FULLY SUPPORTED THE  
MORATORIUM. ALL INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED STATED THAT  
THESE WERE PERSONAL VIEWS AND NOT PART OF AN OVERALL  
GROUP ACTION.

2. AP AND NBC DEPARTED FOR THE III MAF COMBAT INFORMA-  
TION BUREAU WHILE UPI CONTINUES TO REMAIN AT CHU LAI.

3. APPARENTLY EVERYTHING WENT AS WELL AS COULD BE  
EXPECTED. IF THE NEWS MEDIA PERSONNEL FILE ACCURATE  
STORIES THIS SHOULD END THE INCIDENT.

4. UNLESS ANYTHING FURTHER DEVELOPS TO THE CONTRARY,  
I MAINTAIN SUPPORT AND CONCURRENCE FOR GEN COOKSEY'S  
PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION REFERRED TO IN REF A.  
WARM REGARDS

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

208



37(1)

37(1)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		17 OCT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES RECD.	
			P 170840Z			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I		18/10	W	MORATORIUM INCIDENT
	DCG	I			W	
	C/S	I			W	
	DC/S	I			W	REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT <i>Feedback</i>
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP.CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	X	10/18		4	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT & E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED.O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

HAS BEEN SENT

HAS BEEN SENT

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

38(1)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

P 170340Z ZFF-4

CG III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O/EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN  
NICKERSON

MORATORIUM INCIDENT

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR  
INFORMATION:  
QUOTE:

O 161320Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN  
NICKERSON

MORATORIUM INCIDENT

A. CG III MAF 160832Z OCT69

1. I HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT AP, UPI AND NBC HAVE FILED  
STORIES BASED ON TODAY'S INTERVIEWS WITH MEMBERS OF THE  
1ST BN, 52ND INF, 198TH INF BRIG; THE BN COMMANDER, "C"  
CO COMMANDER, PLATOON WHO ALLEGEDLY WORE BLACK ARM BANDS.  
FOUR OF THE EIGHT WERE SOMEWHAT HASKISH IN THEIR VIEWS  
WHILE THE OTHER FOUR SAID THEY FULLY SUPPORTED THE  
MORATORIUM. ALL INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED STATED THAT  
THESE WERE PERSONAL VIEWS AND NOT PART OF AN OVERALL  
GROUP ACTION.

2. AP AND NVC DEPARTED FOR THE III MAF COMBAT INFORMA-  
TION BUREAU WHILE UPI CONTINUES TO REMAIN AT CHU LAI.

3. APPARENTLY EVERYTHING WENT AS WELL AS COULD BE  
EXPECTED. IF THE NEWS MEDIA PERSONNEL FILE ACCURATE  
STORIES THIS SHOULD END THE INCIDENT.

4. UNLESS ANYTHING FURTHER DEVELOPS TO THE CONTRARY,  
I MAINTAIN SUPPORT AND CONCURRENCE FOR GEN COOKSEY'S  
PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION REFERRED TO IN REF A.  
WARM REGARDS

238



38 (1)

38 (1)

O 160832Z  
 FM US CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM  
 UNCLAS E F T O/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LIGEN  
 NICKERSON  
 MORATORIUM INCIDENT  
 1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:  
 QUOTE:

DE YSQQD I 2890400  
 O 160359Z ZYH ZFF-1  
 FM BG COOKSEY CG AMERICAL DIV  
 TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF  
 ZEM  
 UNCLAS E F T O F O U O ACD 1058 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: MORATORIUM INCIDENT

1. THIS MORNING I VISITED LZ STINSON, HEADQUARTERS OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 52ND INFANTRY, AND TALKED WITH THE 198TH BRIGADE COMMANDER, THE BATTALION COMMANDER AND LT JESSE ROSEN, THE PLATOON LEADER QUOTED BY ASSOCIATED PRESS.
  2. LT ROSEN IS AND HAS BEEN AN OUTSTANDING PLATOON LEADER AND HIS PLATOON HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE IN COMBAT.
  3. AFTER TALKING WITH LT ROSEN AND HIS COMMANDERS AND IN VIEW OF HIS OTHERWISE HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE, I DO NOT PLAN TO TAKE PUNITIVE MEASURES AGAINST LT ROSEN OR THE OTHER FOUR MEMBERS OF HIS PLATOON. HOWEVER, ALL COMMANDERS ARE AGAIN BEING CAUTIONED TO BE ALERT TO THIS PROBLEM.
  4. IF THE SITUATION CHANGES IN ANY WAY, I WILL ADVISE YOU ASAP.
- WARM REGARDS

UNQUOTE:

38(2)

38(2)

2. FROM TALKING WITH GEN COOKSEY THIS AFTERNOON IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT LT ROSEN HAD "DEEP REMORSE" FOR HIS ACTIONS AND REGRETTED ANY UNFAVORABLE PRESS REACTIONS WHICH MAY RESULT.
  3. I CONCUR IN COOKSEY'S COURSE OF ACTION RELATIVE TO DISCIPLINING LT ROSEN SUBJECT TO THE DISCLOSURE OF ANY ADDITIONAL FACTS WHICH MAY BE BROUGHT OUT LATER.
  4. FOR YOUR INFORMATION OTHER MEMBERS OF PRESS INTERVIEWED LT ROSEN AFTER GEN COOKSEY LEFT HIM THIS AM.
- WARM REGARDS  
300

O 170143Z  
FM MG TOWNSEND C/S MACV  
TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O MAC 13472 EYES ONLY

REFERENCES: A. III MAF DTG 160832Z OCT 69  
B. III MAF DTG 161320Z OCT 69

1. COMUSMACV HAS READ BOTH REFERENCES.
  2. HE CONCURS IN PARA 4, REFERENCE B.
  3. WARM REGARDS-
- 095

UNQUOTE:

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

38(3)

38(3)

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

## UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV. 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		17 OCT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES RECD.	
			P 170841Z			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	<i>[Handwritten]</i>		18 Oct	<i>[Handwritten]</i>	MORATORIUM INCIDENT
	DCG	<i>[Handwritten]</i>			<i>[Handwritten]</i>	
	C/S	<i>[Handwritten]</i>			<i>[Handwritten]</i>	
	DC/S	<i>[Handwritten]</i>			<i>[Handwritten]</i>	
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	<i>[Handwritten]</i>	10/18		<i>[Handwritten]</i>	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT&E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED.O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

REMARKS

HAS BEEN SENT

*Feedback*

HAS BEEN SENT

HAS BEEN SENT

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

*(39)*

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

## UNCLASSIFIED

P 170841Z ZFF-4

FM CG III MAF  
TO AMERICAL DIV  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O/EYES ONLY FOR BGEN COOKSEY FROM LT GEN  
NICKERSON  
MORATORIUM INCIDENT

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR  
INFORMATION:  
QUOTE:

②

O 161320Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LT GEN  
NICKERSON  
MORATORIUM INCIDENT

A. CG III MAF 160832Z OCT69

1. I HAVE BEEN INFORMD THAT AP, UPI AND NBC HAVE FILED  
STORIES BASED ON TODAY'S INTERVIEWS WITH MEMBERS OF THE  
1ST BN, 52ND INF, 198TH INF BRIG; THE BN COMMANDER, "C"  
CO COMMANDER, PLATOON WHO ALLEGEDLY WORE BLACK ARM BANDS.  
FOUR OF THE EIGHT WERE SOMWHAT HASKISH IN THEIR VIEWS  
WHILE THE OTHER FOUR SAID THEY FULLY SUPPORTED THE  
MORATORIUM. ALL INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED STATED THAT  
THESE WERE PERSONAL VIEWS AND NOT PART OF AN OVERALL  
GROUP ACTION.

2. AP AND NVC DEPARTED FOR THE III MAF COMBAT INFORMA-  
TION BUREAU WHILE UPI CONTINUES TO REMAIN AT CHU LAI.

3. APPARENTLY EVERYTHING WENT AS WELL AS COULD BE  
EXPECTED. IF THE NEWS MEDIA PERSONNEL FILE ACCURATE  
STORIES THIS SHOULD END THE INCIDENT.

4. UNLESS ANYTHING FURTER DEVELOPS TO THE CONTRARY,  
I MAINTAIN SUPPORT AND CONCURRANCE FOR GEN COOKSEY'S  
PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION REFERRED TO IN REF A.

WARM REGARDS

238



39(1)

39(1)

O 160832Z  
 FM US CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O / EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LT GEN  
 NICKERSON  
 MORATORIUM INCIDENT

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:  
 QUOTE:

DE YSQKQD 1 2890400  
 O 160359Z ZYH ZFF-1  
 FM BG COOKSEY CG AMERICAL DIV  
 TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF  
 ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O F O U O ACD 1058 EYES ONLY  
 SUBJECT: MORATORIUM INCIDENT

1. ~~THIS MORNING I VISITED LZ STINSON, HEADQUARTERS OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 52ND INFANTRY, AND TALKED WITH THE 198TH BRIGADE COMMANDER, THE BATTALION COMMANDER AND LT JESSE ROSEN, THE PLATOON LEADER QUOTED BY ASSOCIATED PRESS.~~
  2. LT ROSEN IS AND HAS BEEN AN OUTSTANDING PLATOON LEADER AND HIS PLATOON HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE IN COMBAT.
  3. AFTER TALKING WITH LT ROSEN AND HIS COMMANDERS AND IN VIEW OF HIS OTHERWISE HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE, I DO NOT PLAN TO TAKE PUNITIVE MEASURES AGAINST LT ROSEN OR THE OTHER FOUR MEMBERS OF HIS PLATOON. HOWEVER, ALL COMMANDERS ARE AGAIN BEING CAUTIONED TO BE ALERT TO THIS PROBLEM.
  4. IF THE SITUATION CHANGES IN ANY WAY, I WILL ADVISE YOU ASAP.
- WARM REGARDS

39(2)

39(2)

UNQUOTE:

2. FROM TALKING WITH GEN COOKSEY THIS AFTERNOON IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT LT ROSEN HAD "DEEP REMORSE" FOR HIS ACTIONS AND REGRETTED ANY UNFAVORABLE PRESS REACTIONS WHICH MAY RESULT.
  3. I CONCUR IN COOKSEY'S COURSE OF ACTION RELATIVE TO DISCIPLINING LT ROSEN SUBJECT TO THE DISCLOSURE OF ANY ADDITIONAL FACTS WHICH MAY BE BROUGHT OUT LATER.
  4. FOR YOUR INFORMATION OTHER MEMBERS OF PRESS INTERVIEWED LT ROSEN AFTER GEN COOKSEY LEFT HIM THIS AM.
- WARM REGARDS  
300

O 170143Z

FM MG TOWNSEND C/S MACV  
TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O MAC 13472 EYES ONLY

REFERENCES: A. III MAF DTG 160832Z OCT 69  
B. III MAF DTG 161320Z OCT 69

1. COMUSMACV HAS READ BOTH REFERENCES.
  2. H CONCURS IN PARA 4, REFERENCE B.
  3. WARM REGARDS-
- 095

UNQUOTE:

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

520

39(3)

39(3)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM <b>CG III MAF</b>		DATE <b>18 OCT 69</b>	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE <b>P 171317Z OCT 69</b>		COPY# <b>2</b> OF <b>4</b> COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
			IN	OUT		
<b>3</b>	CG	<b>I</b>		<b>13 Oct</b>	<b>N</b>	REMARKS TO III MAF THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE SBC WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
<b>2</b>	DCG	<b>I</b>			<b>N</b>	
	<del>DGG AIR</del>	<b>I</b>				
	C/S	<b>I</b>			<b>N</b>	
	DC/S	<b>I</b>			<b>N</b>	
	DC/S PLAN				<b>N</b>	
	S/S	<b>X</b>	<b>10/18</b>		<b>N</b>	
	G-1					
<b>4</b>	G-2	<b>I</b>		<b>who copy</b>		
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

**SECRET**

(40)

P 1713 17Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

SECRET / EYES ONLY FOR BGEN WILSON FROM BGEN DOOLEY  
 ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO III MAF

1. I PROMISED YOU A MESSAGE ON THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER PROBLEM A FEW DAYS AGO AND ALSO DURING OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION TODAY, GEN NICKERSON HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO GEN BUSE ON CONSOLIDATION OF HEADQUARTERS WHICH ALSO TOUCHES ON THE SAME SUBJECT. MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT AN ARMY COL RELIEVE JOHN CANTON WHEN JOHN IS DUE TO ROTATE IN LATE DECEMBER. HOWEVER, IF IT IS DESIRED THAT A MARINE REMAIN IN THIS BILLET, I WOULD NOMINATE COL DZIALO. COL DZIALO IS A SUITABLE RELIEF FOR COL CANTON. I HAVE CANVASSED III MAF OFFICER ASSETS FOR A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT FOR COL DZIALO AT MACV AND FIND THAT COL RAINFORTH WHO PRESENTLY IS SERVING AS III MAF LIAISON OFFICER TO MACV HAS PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS G-2 FMFPAC AND COULD POSSIBLY BE ASSIGNED AS RELIEF FOR COL DZIALO. IF COL RAINFORTH IS NOT CONSIDERED SUITABLE, THE ONLY OTHER ALTERNATIVE REPLACEMENTS FOR COL DZIALO OR COL CANTON MUST BE REQUESTED FROM CMC. IN THAT REGARD INFORMATION AVAILABLE THIS HEADQUARTERS INDICATE THAT THE FOLLOWING OFFICERS ARE POTENTIAL CANDIDATES AND ARE ELEGIBLE FOR TRANSFER IN NEAR FUTURE. COL FOREST J HUNT NOW SERVING AT MCE&DC QUANTICO AND LT COL WILLIAM WENTWORTH, COLONEL SELECTEE NOW SERVING AT HQMC. EITHER COULD FILL THE III MAF BILLET OR THE MACV BILLET ALTHOUGH DZIALO WOULD BE THE BEST CHOICE FOR III MAF.

2. TIME CONSTRAINTS MAY MILITATE AGAINST MOVING DZIALO TO III MAF BECAUSE OF DOUBLE SHUFFLES REQUIRED, UNLESS RAINFORTH IS ACCEPTABLE. IF DZIALO COMES HERE, HE SHOULD ARRIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PREPARE FOR TAKING OVER AS III MAF G-2.

3. I HAVE NOT APPROACHED MACV ON THE POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF DZIALO AND WILL NOT UNTIL WE HEAR THAT THIS IS THE ROUTE YOU WOULD LIKE US TO FOLLOW. I WOULD PREFER NOT TO STIR THE MACV POT UNTIL WE HAVE A FIRM PLAN IN MIND.  
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

400



40(1)

40(1)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 18 OCT 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE 0 17 1315Z OCT 69		COPY# 2 OF 4 COPIES RECO	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TOPSECRET CONSOLIDATION OF THE III MAF HQ AND XXIV CORPS REMARKS
			IN	OUT		
3	CG	I		18 Oct	[Signature]	<p>THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE RETAINED OVER NIGHT EXCEPT AS NOTED IN FORCE ORDER P5511.4.</p> <p>THE RECORD OF DISCLOSURE MUST BE SIGNED BY ALL PERSONS SIGHTING THIS DOCUMENT.</p>
2	DCG	I			[Signature]	
	<del>DGC AIR</del>	<del>I</del>				
	C/S	I			[Signature]	
	DC/S	I			[Signature]	
	DC/S PLAN					
	S/S	X	10/18		[Signature]	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H & S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	H DASC					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

(35)  
**TOP SECRET**

O 171315Z ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T / EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN  
 NICKERSON

CONSOLIDATION OF THE III MAF HQ AND XXIV CORPS

A. YOUR LTR TO CHAPPY DATED 15 SEP 1969

1. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A  
 PLAN ON THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE HQ OF III MAF AND XXIV  
 CORPS. WE EXPECT TO SUBMIT THIS TO GEN ABRAMS IN EARLY  
 NOV AND WE WILL BRIEF YOU ON IT DURING YOUR NEXT VISIT.  
 MEANWHILE WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE 3RD MARDIV, THE  
 XXIV CORPS HQ HAS BECOME QUITE VISIBLE AND ITS RE-  
 DUNDANCY IS OBVIOUS. IT IS A MATTER OF TIME UNTIL THIS  
 ISSUE WILL COME TO A HEAD AND AT THAT TIME THE HQ WILL  
 HAVE TO GO, I AM SURE. IT WOULD APPEAR TO ME THAT AN  
 APPROPRIATE TIME FOR THE DEACTIVATION OF XXIV CORPS  
 WOULD BE ABOUT 15 DEC. THIS WOULD GIVE US SUFFICIENT  
 TIME TO PLAN FOR AND EXECUTE THE DEACTIVATION SUBSEQUENT  
 TO THE DEPARTURE OF THE 3D MARDIV.

2. SIMILARLY, I BELIEVE THAT THE CONTINUATION OF A  
 MARINE LTGEN AS CG SHOULD BE DECIDED. DO WE WANT TO TRY  
 TO RETAIN THIS COMMAND FOR ANOTHER YEAR OR NOT? WHILE  
 IT WOULD BE CHAPPIE'S DECISION I WOULD THINK THAT IT IS  
 NOT PROBABLE (NOR DESIRABLE) THAT III MAF HOLD ON TO THIS  
 BILLET SUBSEQUENT TO MY DEPARTURE. I BELIEVE THAT WE  
 SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS THOUGHT TO GIVING IT UP TO THE ARMY  
 FOR REASONS YOU STATED. IF THIS IS ACCEPTED AS A VALID  
 PLANNING FACTOR THEN WE COULD PREPARE FOR AMALGAMATION  
 OF THE TWO HQS SUBSEQUENT TO THE DEACTIVATION OF XXIV  
 CORPS AND IN ANTICIPATION OF THE MARINE CORPS GIVING UP  
 THE BILLET WHEN I AM DETACHED. A RECOMMENDED TIME  
 FRAME FOR ME TO TURN OVER CMD HERE COULD BE 1-15 MARCH.

3. THIS LEADS INTO ANOTHER PROBLEM AND RELATES TO  
 RELIEF OF PRESENT INCUMBENTS. AS YOU KNOW, TOM MILLER  
 IS ON HIS WAY OUT HERE AS A NUMERICAL REPLACEMENT FOR GEORGE  
 DOOLEY AND I HAD INTENDED TO MAKE LEO MY CHIEF OF STAFF.  
 HOWEVER, IF THIS AMALGAMATION IS TO BE COMPLETED WHEN I  
 LEAVE IN MARCH, I WOULD THINK IT TO BE ACCEPTABLE FOR AN  
 ARMY BRIGADIER TO RELIEVE GEORGE, PROVIDING I COULD  
 CHOOSE HIM. I WOULD THEN RETAIN LEO AS MY G-3 AND HE  
 WOULD REMAIN THE G-3 OF THE NEW HQ UNTIL HE IS REPLACED  
 IN JUNE. TOM MILLER WOULD BE ACCESS TO THIS HEADQUAR-  
 TERS. HE COULD BE ASSIGNED AS AWC 1ST MAW. OF COURSE THIS IS  
 ONLY ONE OF MANY PERSONNEL ACTIONS WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED  
 AND IS MENTIONED TO POINT OUT THAT WE HAVE A PROBLEM WITH WHICH  
 WE MUST COME TO GRIPS IMMEDIATELY.



35/11

35/11

4. I SPECIFICALLY NEED GUIDANCE AND AT THE EARLIEST. IN ONE CASE I AM REQUIRED TO ADVISE ABE ON THE BEST WAY TO SOLVE A PROBLEM. AT THE SAME TIME ANY SOLUTION I OFFER HIM MUST HAVE YOURS AND CHAPPY'S APPROVAL AND WILL HAVE AN EFFECT ON PERSONNEL ACTIONS YOUR ARE PRESENTLY DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING. YOUR LETTER (REFERENCE (A)) HAS ALERTED HIM TO THE PROBLEM.
5. I AGREE WITH YOUR LETTER TO CHAPPY ALTHOUGH THE SMALL HQ WILL POSE A PROBLEM. WE ARE MAKING PLANS FOR A SMALL HQ TO BE GENERATED OUT OF III MAF ASSETS TO ASSUME OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND PRESERVE THE INTGRIITY OF OUR DIVISION/WING TEAM. I BELIEVE THE CG SHOULD BE A MGEN WHO COULD ALSO SERVE AS DEPUTY CG OF THE NEW AMALGAMATED COMMAND. IN THIS REGARD, I AM CONCERNED WITH THE DEGREE OF CONTROL THAT THIS STAFF WOULD PERFORM. AS YOU POINTED OUT, WE COULD NOT MAKE IT SO LARGE AS TO CONTRAVENE THE INTENT OF THE III MAF AND XXIV CORPS CONSOLIDATION. AT THE SAME TIME, I REMEMBER HE GROWING PAINS WE HAD WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE III MAF HQ WHEN WE UNDER ESTIMATED WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED. IF IT IS GOING TO BE OPERATIONAL, IT NEEDS A CAPABILITY. WHILE I AGREE WITH YOUR PROPOSALS, IT IS NOT GOING TO BE EASY.
6. I THINK IT IS APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME TO ADDRESS THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER SITUATION AGAIN. CANTON WILL LEAVE IN LATE DEC UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND AS YOU KNOW WE ARE HAVING DIFFICULTIES FINDING A MARINE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO REPLACE HIM. I THINK THAT AN APPROPRIATE SOLUTION WOULD BE TO RELIEVE HIM WITH AN ARMY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. THIS WOULD LEAD INTO THE AMALGAMATION OF THE HQ AND I THINK IT WOULD BE A GOOD SOLUTION WHETHER WE AMALGAMATE OR NOT.
7. PLEASE DON'T THINK THAT I AM ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE A MAJOR PULL OUT OF THE MARINES OR OF III MAF. I DO SEE THE HANDWRITING ON THE WALL AND I THINK THAT EARLY MARCH WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR THE MARINES TO TURN OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER TO THE ARMY. IF WE WAIT ANY LONGER, I AM SURE IT WILL BE TAKEN FROM US.
8. IF WE DO AWAY WITH XXIV CORPS ON 15 DEC I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE ARMY WOULD DO WITH MEL ZAIS DURING THE ENSUING PERIOD UNTIL EARLY MARCH. HOWEVER, I CONSIDER THAT TO BE GENERAL ABRAMS PROBLEM. THE POSSIBILITY COULD ALWAYS EXIST THAT A PROPOSAL WOULD BE MADE FOR ZAIS TO COME DOWN HERE IF XXIV CORPS IS DISESTABLISHED ON 15 DEC AND FOR ME TO BE REPLACED. I PERSONALLY THINK THAT WOULD BE A MISTAKE AND THAT I SHOULD STAY UNTIL THE END OF MY TOUR.
9. AS I MENTIONED EARLIER. WE WELL BRIEF YOU DURING YOUR NEXT VISIT. ANY GUIDANCE YOU CAN GIVE ME AT THAT TIME WOULD BE MOST WELCOME. PLEASE REMEMBER THAT I AM SUBMITTING A PAPER TO ABE ON OR ABOUT 1 NOVEMBER SO THERE ISN'T MUSH TIME LEFT.

WARM REGARDS

GP-3

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

200

35(2)

35(2) 



PL 00247 255-4  
FM CG III AF  
TO SSC XXIV CORPS  
FM

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
III MAF DEEP SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE STUDY

A. CG III MAF LTR SERIAL 001099-69 OF 22 SEP 69

B. YOUR PHB 1977 DTG 010145Z OCT 69 **SI-HELD BY G-2**

1. APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS CONCERNING THE PLAN FOR DEEP RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE (SRC) OPERATIONS (REF A), AND YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED IN XXIV CORPS WITHOUT SOME MODIFICATIONS.

2. CONCUR THAT YOUR HEADQUARTERS HAS THE STAFF CAPABILITY AND COMPETENCE TO EMPLOY ALL AVAILABLE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE RESOURCES IN RESPONSE BOTH TO YOUR OWN NEEDS AND BY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS. REASSURED THAT YOU CAN MANAGE THE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE EFFORT WITH YOUR ORGANIC RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE ASSETS. I INTEND TO ASSURE COMADCON OF THE 3D FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY ON OR ABOUT 22 OCTOBER 1969, FOLLOWING REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION OUT OF COUNTRY. FOR INFORMATION, I PLAN TO RELOCATE THE 3D FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY TO PHU BAI WITH MARINE HELICOPTER ASSETS AND EMPLOY THEM IN QUANG NAM AND QUANG TIN PROVINCES.

3. WARM REGARDS.  
GP-3



REF (CB)

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING FIRST DUTY HOURS

21

42/11

42/11

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM <b>CG III MAF</b>		DATE <b>18 OCT 69</b>	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE <b>B 181110Z OCT 69</b>		COPY# <b>2</b> OF <b>3</b> COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT III MAF DEEP SURVEILLANCE AND AND RECONNAISSANCE STUDY
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPO- SITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I				
	DC/S PLAN					
	S/S	X	10/19		4	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT

(43)

**SECRET**

FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 O 010145Z  
 FM LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS  
 TO LTG NICKERSON CG III MAF  
 ZFM

P 181110Z ZFF-4

SECRET

S E C R E T PHB 1977 EYES ONLY  
 SUBJ: III MAF DEEP SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE STUDY  
 REF: LTR, HQ, III MAF, SUBJ AS ABOVE, CITE NR 00109969, DTD  
 22 SEP 69.

1. I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE REF PLAN FOR DEEP RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE (R&S) OPERATIONS AND THOUGH IT APPEARS SOUND IN CONCEPT I RECOMMEND IT NOT BE IMPLEMENTED IN XXIV CORPS WITHOUT SOME MODIFICATIONS IN THE CONTROL MECHANISMS.

2. NATURALLY I FEEL THAT MY HEADQUARTERS HAS THE STAFF, CAPABILITY AND COMPETENCE TO EMPLOY ALL AVAILABLE R&S RESOURCES IN RESPONSE BOTH TO OUR OWN NEEDS AND YOUR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS. OUR EXPERIENCE WITH THE DELTA FORCE HAS, IN MY OPINION, PROVEN THE VALUE OF NORMAL CONTROL AND COORDINATION CHANNELS IN DEEP R&S OPERATIONS. I KNOW OF NO INSTANCE IN WHICH SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE ACQUIRED BY DELTA FORCE HAS NOT BEEN PASSED QUICKLY TO YOUR STAFF, AND I BELIEVE THE TARGETING OF DELTA RECON TEAMS HAS BEEN RESPONSIVE TO YOUR NEEDS.

3. ONE ASPECT IN PARTICULAR OF THE DEEP R&S CONCEPT IN REF STUDY GIVES ME CONCERN. THE 101ST ABN DIV (AM) AND PARTICULARLY ITS AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON, ARE WELL CONFIGURED FOR QUICK, FORMIDABLE REACTION TO ENEMY INCURSIONS ACROSS THE WESTERN DMZ AND THE LAOTIAN BORDER. MULTIPLE, SMALL III MAF RECON ZONES IN THOSE AREAS WOULD INHIBIT SWIFT REACTION, AND IN MY OPINION, A LARGE, PERMANENT SURVEILLANCE AND RECON ZONE (SARZ) WOULD SERIOUSLY RESTRICT OUR REACTION CAPABILITIES.

4. I WOULD, OF COURSE, BE DELIGHTED TO EMPLOY THE MARINE FORCE RECON COMPANY IN XXIV CORPS AO. I HAVE SEEN IT IN OPERATION ALONG WITH THE RECON TEAMS OF THE 3D MAR RECON BN AND I KNOW THESE TEAMS TO BE AS EFFECTIVE AS THEY ARE GALLANT. I AM CONVINCED HOWEVER THAT DIRECTION, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT OF THESE DEEP R&S OPERATIONS WOULD BE ENHANCED UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF XXIV CORPS IN THE USUAL MANNER.

5. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: FIRST AVAILABLE DUTY HOURS  
 365



43 (1)

43 (1)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 18 OCT 69	
			SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE P 181158Z OCT 69		COPY# 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT III MAF DEEP SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE STUDY
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				REMARKS THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.
	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I				
	DC/S PLAN					
	S/S	X	10/17		4	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

HAS BEEN SENT  
**SECRET**

44

P 181158Z ZFF-4  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 P 180930Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO SSO XXIV CORPS  
 ZEM

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 III MAF DEEQ SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE STUDY


A. CG III MAF LTR SERIAL 001099-69 OF 22 SEP 69

B. YOUR PHB 1977 DTG 010145Z OCT 69 SI- Held BY G-2

1. APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS CONCERNING THE PLAN FOR DEEP RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE (SRC) OPERATIONS (REF A), AND YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED IN XXIV CORPS WITHOUT SOME MODIFICATIONS.
  2. CONCUR THAT YOUR HEADQUARTERS HAS THE STAFF CAPABILITY AND COMPETENCE TO EMPLOY ALL AVAILABLE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE RESOURCES IN RESPONSE BOTH TO YOUR OWN NEEDS AND MY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS. REASSURED THAT YOU CAN HANDLE THE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE EFFORT WITH YOUR ORGANIC RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE ASSETS. I INTEND TO ASSUME OPCON/ADCON OF THE 3D FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY ON OR ABOUT 22 OCTOBER 1969, FOLLOWING REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION OUT OF COUNTRY. FOR INFORMATION, I PLAN TO RELOCATE THE 3D FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY TO PHU BAI WITH MARINE HELO ASSETS AND EMPLOY THEM IN QUANG NAM AND QUANG TIN PROVINCES.
  3. WARM REGARDS.
- GP-3

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING FIRST DUTY HOURS

218



44(1)

44(1)

NOFORN

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 3-68)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM CG III MAF		DATE 19OCT69
				SERIAL# / CONTROL DATE P 190030Z OCT 69		COPY# 2 OF 7 COPIES REC'D
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	REMARKS
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				<p>SUBJECT ASSESSMENTS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS FOR TRANS DIVE OPERATIONS</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>THIS DOCUMENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND MUST BE RETURNED TO FORCE S&amp;C WITHIN 7 DAYS. PLEASE INDICATE ACTION/DISPOSITION ON THIS ROUTE SHEET.</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>HAS BEEN SENT</p>
	DCG	I				
	DCG AIR					
	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I				
	DC/S PLAN					
	S/S		10/17			
	G-1					
	G-2	X			was copy	
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	CAP					
	ADJ					
	CORDS					
	EMB/TRANS					
	ENGR					
	H&S CO					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	OP ANAL					
	ORD					
	PSY OPS					
	SUPPLY					
	LEGAL					
	PMO					
	S&C					

46

SECRET

NOFORN

P 1000 200 ZFF-4  
FM CC III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZFF

SECRET NOFORN SECTION ONE OF TWO  
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

ASSESSMENTS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS FOR TRANS-DMZ OPERATIONS REQUESTED BY YOU AT WIEU OF 27 SEP 1969

1. AN EXAMINATION OF THE DMZ/BEN HAI AREA, AND A REVIEW OF THE ENEMY'S HISTORY OF TRANS-DMZ OPERATIONS, HAVE PROVIDED A SET OF PARAMETERS FOR USE IN ASSESSING HIS INTENTIONS, CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS TO CONDUCT SUCH OPERATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

2. A DRY SEASON ANALYSIS OF THE REGION REVEALS THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE MOUNTAINOUS WESTERN REGION CHANNELIZES MOVEMENT THROUGH NATURAL TERRAIN CORRIDORS. THE JUNGLE OFFERS EXCELLENT COVER AND CONCEALMENT, AND THE LOC NETWORK CONSISTS OF TRAILS AND FOOTPATHS, AND ONE SECTION OF MOTORABLE ROAD. THE UPPER REACHES OF THE BEN HAI, ALSO KNOWN AS THE BAC THANH, VARY IN WIDTH FROM FIVE METERS AT ITS ORIGIN TO 65 METERS. THE BANK AND BOTTOM MATERIALS ARE SILT AND SAND. WITH BANK SLOPES OF LESS THAN 15 DEGREES THIS PORTION OF THE RIVER IS NAVIGABLE ONLY TO PIROGUES. THE RIVER IS EASILY FORDED AND PRESENTS NO OBSTACLES TO DETERMINED TRANS-DMZ MOVEMENT.

B. THE PIEDMONT IS LESS RESTRICTIVE TO CROSS COUNTRY MOVEMENT, HAS A MORE EXTENSIVE TRAIL NETWORK, AND ONE POOR ROAD. COVER AND CONCEALMENT IS FAIR. THE BEN HAI IS NAVIGABLE THROUGHOUT TO SAM-PANS AND HAS RELATIVELY FEW FORDS. BANK MATERIALS ARE SILT, SAND, AND CLAY WITH SLOPES BETWEEN 15 AND 45 DEGREES. WITH DEPTHS UP TO THREE METERS AND VARYING IN WIDTH FROM 65 TO 175 METERS, IT PRESENTS A CONSIDERABLE OBSTACLE TO MOVEMENT WITHOUT FLOTATION DEVICES.

C. THE COASTAL PLAIN HAS A DENSE TRAIL NETWORK FAVORABLE FOR ACCESS TO THE BEN HAI. EXTENSIVE BOMBARDMENT BY AERIAL AND GROUND ORDNANCE HAS CREATED AN OBSTACLE OF WATER-FILLED CRATERS AND DESTROYED VEGETATION. THESE FACTORS COMBINED WITH WET GROUND CONDITIONS MAKE CROSS-COUNTRY TRAFFICABILITY VERY DIFFICULT. THE BEN HAI RIVER VARIES FROM 65 TO 475 METERS IN WIDTH AND IS UNFORDABLE WITHOUT FLOTATION AIDS. THE BANK MATERIALS ARE SILT, SAND, AND CLAY. SLOPE OF THE BANK VARIES FROM MODERATE TO STEEP, ALTHOUGH BANK HEIGHTS ARE LESS THAN ONE METER. INFORMATION ON TIDAL INFLUENCE INDICATES THAT IT OCCURS ONLY IN THIS SEGMENT. IT IS NAVIGABLE AT ALL TIMES TO LOC-7'S. 46(1)

46(1)

3. THE WET SEASON ANALYSIS PROVIDES A DIFFERENT PICTURE:

A. IN THE WESTERN MOUNTAINS, FLASH FLOODING, WASHOUTS AND LANDSLIDES SEVERELY CURTAIL TRAIL MOVEMENTS. FLASH FLOODING, HIGH WATER AND SWIFT CURRENTS OBLITERATE MANY CROSSING POINTS ON THE BEN HAI. THE RIVER IS STILL FORDABLE BY DETERMINED FORCES EXCEPT IN THE MOST SEVERE CIRCUMSTANCES.

B. THE SAME TRAFFICABILITY PROBLEMS EXIST ON THE LOC'S IN THE PIEDMONT. THE BEN HAI IS SUBJECT TO LOCALIZED FLOODING, AND DEPTHS INCREASE TO AS MUCH AS SEVEN METERS. THE RIVER IS NAVIGABLE TO SAMPANS, BUT PRESENTS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO TRANS-DMZ MOVEMENT.

C. IN THE COASTAL REGION, FLOODING IS MORE WIDESPREAD AND WASHOUTS OCCUR FREQUENTLY ON THE LOC'S. THE RIVER REMAINS IMPASSABLE TO FORCES WITHOUT AN EXTENSIVE FLOTATION AND BRIDGING CAPABILITY.

4. THE BEN HAI IS ALSO AN OBSTACLE TO TRACKED AND WHEELED VEHICLES. THE COASTAL PLAINS HAVE POOR TRAFFICABILITY DUE TO SOIL COMPOSITION, WET GROUND, AND BOMB DAMAGE. THE BEN HAI IS AFFECTED BY TIDES AND IS TOO DEEP TO FORD. THERE IS A LACK OF STAGING AREAS, NATURAL BRIDGING MATERIALS, AND COVER AND CONCEALMENT. THE PIEDMONT IS THE MOST SUITABLE AREA FOR VEHICLE FORDING WITH A SUITABLE TRAIL NETWORK, STABLE BANK, GOOD SUPPLY OF BRIDGING MATERIALS AND COVER AND CONCEALMENT. RIVER DEPTHS REQUIRE SNORKLING IN SPOTS. THE MOUNTAINS OFFER EXCELLENT COVER AND CONCEALMENT. HOWEVER, MOST FORDING POINTS ARE NOT ACCESSIBLE TO VEHICLES, THERE ARE FEW STAGING AREAS, AND CROSS COUNTRY TRAVEL IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.

5. THE HEAVIEST RAINFALL IN THE DMZ REGION OCCURS BETWEEN SEPTEMBER AND DECEMBER. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE ENEMY HAS NOT CONDUCTED ANY OF HIS MAJOR DMZ OPERATIONS DURING THIS PERIOD.


6. IN ADDITION TO PRECIPITATION, VISIBILITY IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR DURING THE MONSOON SEASON. ADVERSE CONDITIONS PEAK DURING THE MONTHS OF JANUARY AND FEBRUARY. HERE THE ADVANTAGE IS TO THE ENEMY, AS THE NET IMPACT IS TO REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND CAPABILITY WITH WHICH WE CAN EMPLOY HELICOPTERS AND OUR SUPPORTING ARMS, ESPECIALLY AIR.

CP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

756

COPY 3 OF 7 COPIES



46(2)

P 1966707 ZBT-4  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZBT

SECRET NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON (CONT'D)

7. SINCE JULY 1966 THERE HAVE BEEN FIVE MAJOR BATTLES IN THE DMZ AREA WHICH HAVE INVOLVED ONE OR MORE NVA DIVISIONS. FROM MID-66 THROUGH 1967 THE ENEMY INFILTRATED MAJOR NVA UNITS SOUTH THROUGH THE DMZ, COMMITTED THEM TO MONTH LONG OPERATIONS, AND THEN WITHDREW THEM NORTH AGAIN FOR A MONTH OF REMANNING AND REFURBISHING. IN 1968 HE ATTEMPTED TO SUSTAIN INDEFINITELY A LARGE COMBAT FORCE SOUTH OF THE DMZ. IN 1969, THE ENEMY HAS APPARENTLY ABANDONED THE FORMAT OF DIVISION SIZE OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE DMZ. HISTORICALLY, THE ENEMY HAS CROSSED THE CENTRAL DMZ WEST OF CON THIEU, WHEN HE HAS ELECTED TO CONDUCT SUCH OPERATIONS, EVEN THOUGH AVENUES OF APPROACH THROUGH THE COASTAL AND PIEDMONT AREAS MIGHT APPEAR MORE SUITABLE.

8. INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS DETECTING IMPENDING ENEMY ATTACKS IN MAJOR DMZ BATTLES HAVE VARIED. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE GAVE SOME INDICATION IN ALL OF THE CASES. PW UNTERROGATION, INFORMANTS, AGENTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS PROVIDED FEWER INDICATIONS AND ESTABLISHED NO SET PATTERN. ALL OF THE BATTLES INVOLVED OCCURRED PRIOR TO THE BOMBING HALT AND THE EXTENSIVE UTILIZATION OF GROUND SENSORS TO DETECT ENEMY MOVEMENT.

9. IF THE ENEMY ELECTS TO MOUNT MAJOR TRANS-DMZ OPERATIONS, HE WILL PROBABLY CROSS SOMEWHERE IN THE CENTRAL DMZ REGION AT ANY TIME SUITABLE TO HIM BETWEEN JANUARY AND SEPTEMBER, JANUARY THROUGH MARCH BEING MOST ADVANTAGEOUS TO HIM IN TERMS OF VISIBILITY. HIS PROXIMITY OF SANCTUARY REDUCES THE TIME AND DISTANCE FACTORS DURING WHICH HIS MOVEMENT TO CONTACT CAN BE DETECTED. INFORMATION ON ENEMY TRANS-DMZ MOVEMENT IS INCOMPLETE, BUT INDICATIONS ARE THAT HE PREFERENCES TO ASSEMBLE HIS FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THEN COMMENCE OFFENSIVE ACTIONS, RATHER THAN MOVING SOUTH IN A LARGE SIZE RIVER CROSSING OPERATION.

10. THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF DETECTION OF IMPENDING MAJOR TRANS-DMZ ATTACKS ARE SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE, AN AGGRESSIVE AERIAL AND GROUND RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE EFFORT, AND EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC GROUND SENSING DEVICES. OUR IMPROVED SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE POSTURE AND INCREASED ASSETS IN THE AREAS OF SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC SENSING DEVICES PROVIDES US WITH A MORE RELIABLE AND MUCH EXPANDED CAPABILITY FOR EARLY DETECTION OF ENEMY MOVEMENT.

11. A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY ON ENEMY CAPABILITIES FOR TRANS-DMZ OPERATIONS IS BEING PREPARED BY MY STAFF, COMPLETE WITH VUGRAPHS AND AIDS SUITABLE FOR PRESENTATION, AND WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOU IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

GP-4

SSG NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

452

COPY 3 OF 7 COPIES



46(3)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAP FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OO III MAP		20 OCT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 2 OF 3 COPIES REC'D.	
			P 191419X OCT 69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		20 Oct		MILCON PROJECT C216, ENLISTED BARRACKS, CAMP HORN  REMARKS DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.  Section _____ Signature _____
	DCG	I				
	C/S	I				
	DC/S	I				
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	X	20 Oct			
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P 191419Z  
 FM CG III WAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L / FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 MILCON PROJECT C216, ENLISTED BARRACKS, CAMP HORN

A. JCS 031745Z SEP69  
 B. COMUSMACV 111143Z OCT69 (NOTAL)  
 C. COMNAVFORV 070309Z OCT69

1. I HAVE A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM OF EXTREME OVERCROWDING IN THE BARRACKS WHICH WERE DENIED BY OSD BECAUSE THEY SAY THE PROJECT DOES NOT APPEAR TO CONFORM TO LATEST SECDEF POLICY ON NEW CONSTRUCTION STARTS AS STATED IN REF A. I REQUESTED COMUSMACV TO RECLAMA TO OSD WHICH WAS DONE BY REF B. REF B NOT HELD BY THIS HQ, BUT IS BELIEVED TO BE VERY SIMILAR IN CONTENT TO REF C.

2. I NEED THE THREE BARRACKS TO RELIEVE THE OVERCROWDING WHICH CAUSES A SERIOUS HEALTH HAZARD AND HAS FORCED SOME OF MY TROOPS TO LIVE IN SHOPS AND WORK SPACES. PRESENT SPACE PROVIDES 42 SQUARE FEET PER MAN VICE STANDARD OF 70 PHASE II REDEPLOYMENT WOULD INCREASE THIS TO ONLY 43.7 SQUARE FEET PER MAN. NEW BARRACKS WILL PROVIDE 54 SQUARE FEET PER MAN AFTER REDEPLOYMENT. I CONSIDER THIS TO BE AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM TO PROVIDE LIVING SPACE THAT WILL NOT BE UNSANITARY AND DEGRADE MORALE AND ALL OF ITS ATTENDANT PROBLEMS. WE ARE NOW IN THE MIDST OF THE RAINY SEASON WHICH AGGRAVATES THE HEALTH HAZARDS OF THE EXISTING SITUATION.

3. PRIOR TO CANCELLATION WORK HAD STARTED AND FLOOR SLABS WITH ROUGH PLUMBING HAVE BEEN PLACED FOR TWO BARRACKS. ALL MATERIALS ARE AVAILABLE AT 3NCB.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ASSISTANCE TO ENSURE POSITIVE RESPONSE BY OSD TO REF B. LOU WILSON CONTACTED GEORGE AXTELL PREVIOUSLY WHEN WE RECLAMAED TO MACV.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
 350



HAS BEEN SENT

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

47(1)



O 2009027 ZYH  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZFM

S E C R E T FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON/EYES ONLY  
 SUPJ: SOVIET TRAWLER INCIDENT (U)

REF: A. UR 190657Z OCT69

1. (S) REFERENCE REQUESTED REPORT ON SOVIET TRAWLER INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON 17 OCT.
2. (S) THIS HQS WAS NOTIFIED BY CTG 115.1 AT 1355 THAT: TWO VNN PGM'S HAD ATTEMPTED TO DETAIN SOVIET TRAWLER WHICH HAD APPROACHED WITHIN 7 MILES OF CU LAO CHAM ISLAND AND HAD FIRED UNKNOWN TYPE AND AMOUNT OF ORDNANCE AT TRAWLER IN EFFORT TO STOP IT; PGM INSTRUCTIONS FROM LTGEN LAM AND VNN CNO WERE TO DETAIN SHIP BUT NOT TO SINK IT. III MAF WAS REQUESTED TO PLACE TWO HELO GUNSHIPS ON GROUND ALERT FOR REACTION IN SUPPORT OF PGM'S IF REQUIRED. ABOVE INFO PASSED IMMEDIATELY TO MACV. CTG 115.1 AND FMAW INFORMED OF CG III MAF DECISION THAT U.S. AIRCRAFT OR FORCES WOULD NOT BE UTILIZED.
3. (S) AT 1420 CTG 115.1 INFORMED III MAF THAT LTGEN LAM HAD ISSUED ORDERS TO VNN TO ENGAGE IN HOT PURSUIT AND FIRE AT TRAWLER IF NECESSARY; VNAF ALERTED A-37 AIRCRAFT FOR LAUNCH.
4. (S) AT 1445 THIS HQS INFORMED BY CTG 115.1 THAT VNN PGM'S WERE ORDERED NOT TO FIRE BUT RATHER TO TRAIL TRAWLER AND THAT VNAF A-37 AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT BE LAUNCHED. FURTHER REPORTED THAT TRAWLER APPARENTLY HIT BY ONE 40MM ROUND.
5. (S) SHORTLY THEREAFTER, CG III MAF RECEIVED TELECOM FROM COMNAVFORV IN WHICH LATTER CONFIRMED HIS ORDERS TO CTG 115.1 NOT TO ASSIST VNN AND STATED MAJGEN TOWNSEND WAS ENROUTE TO JGS TO DISCUSS SITUATION.
6. (S) AT 1530 CTG 115.1 INFORMED THIS HQS THAT VNN PGM'S WERE ORDERED TO CEASE TRAILING TRAWLER AND RESUME NORMAL PATROLLING. 48(1)

7. (S) DURING THE INCIDENT LTGEN LAM WAS HAVING LUNCH WITH BGEN TOAN AT ARVN 2D DIVISION HQS. LTCOL COX FROM ICAAG WAS AT LUNCHEON. HE REPORTS THAT DURING THE LUNCHEON LTGEN LAM DISCUSSED THE TRAWLER WITH HIS G-2. THE G-2 LEFT THE LUNCHEON FOR A SHORT PERIOD. UPON HIS RETURN HE AGAIN HAD A DISCUSSION WITH LTGEN LAM WHO INFORMED THE ATTENDEES THAT THE SOVIET TRAWLER WAS EIGHT MILES OFF SHORE AND THAT HE HAD GIVEN THE ORDER TO FIRE. THE G-2 LEFT THE LUNCHEON A SECOND TIME ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF LTGEN LAM AND RETURNED BUT THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF HIS ACTIONS AT THAT TIME. THE LUNCHEON ENDED AT APPROXIMATELY 1330. MAJOR GENERAL TIMMES WAS ALSO AN ATTENDEE AT THE LUNCHEON AND HE MAY BE ABLE TO ELABORATE ON THE PROCEEDINGS IN SO FAR AS THEY CONCERNED THE TRAWLER. MAJGEN TIMMES STOPPED BY PDS III PAF ON HIS RETURN TO DAMANG THAT EVENING TO INFORM THIS HQS OF THE INCIDENT. HE HAD NO ADDITIONAL DETAILS AS TO WHAT TRANSPIRED.

8. (S) MY DECISION NOT TO ASSIST WAS MADE IN VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND THE FACT THAT SINCE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF GVN WERE INVOLVED IT WAS THE GVN WHO WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE ON THE COURSE OF ACTION TO BE PURSUED. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT LTGEN LAM ACTED CALMLY AND THAT HIS DESIRE WAS TO SEIZE THE TRAWLER, ONCE IT HAD VIOLATED TERRITORIAL WATERS, RATHER THAN SINK IT. HE TOOK ACTION HE DEEMED NECESSARY IN A TIMELY MANNER.  
WARM REGARDS.

CP-4 SSC NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY  
676



NNNN  
HAS BEEN SENT

48(2)

48(2)



O 231300Z ZYH ZFF-4

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T/EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. (IS) ON 20 AND 21 OCT 1969 ONE OF MY PLANNERS ATTENDED A STAFF MEETING AT MACV HEADQUARTERS. A QUERY HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY COMUSMACV FROM JCS CONCERNING THE FEASIBILITY OF A 100,000 MAN REDUCTION COMMENCING ON 1 JAN 1970 TO BE COMPLETED BY 30 JUNE 1970.

2. (IS) BASED ON THIS QUERY MACV PLANNERS HAVE BEGUN WORK ON SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION TO ACCOMPLISH THIS REDUCTION IF AND WHEN IT COMES. OF THE 3 ALTERNATIVES CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION, IT APPEARED THAT MACV PLANNERS WERE LEANING TOWARD ALTERNATIVE A. THE 3 ALTERNATIVES BEING CONSIDERED ARE AS FOLLOWS:

ALTERNATIVE A

ARMY FIRST INF DIV	17.5
23D INF DIV	21.0
4TH INF DIV	18.0
199TH LIB	5.5
SVC SPT	31.2
NAVY ELMIS	2.0
AF ELMIS	3.6
USMC ELMIS	1.2

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100

ALTERNATIVE B

ARMY FIRST INF DIV	17.5
SVC SPT	14.2
NAVY ELMIS	10.0
AF ELMIS	3.6
USMC ALL	54.7

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100

ALTERNATIVE C

ARMY 4TH INF DIV	18.0
SVC SPT	13.7
NAVY ELMIS	10.0
AF ELMIS	3.6
USMC ALL	54.7

-----  
100

36 (1)

~~36~~  
36 (1)

3. (IS) THE ABOVE REFLECTS INITIAL PLANNING ESTIMATES ONLY AND IS NOT FIRM. THE ARMY COMBAT ELEMENTS IN A1 A CONSTITUTE ALL MAJOR ARMY COMBAT UNITS NOT SLATED FOR THE RESIDUAL FORCE. ARMY SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS MAKE UP THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TOTAL OF OTHER UNITS LISTED AND 100,000. THE AIR FORCE FIGURE WILL BRING THEM DOWN TO THEIR RESIDUAL FORCE LEVEL. THE MARINE CORPS FIGURE IS THAT SHOWN AS PHASE 3 IN ORIGINAL PLANNING.

4. (IS) THE ARMY HAS INDICATED THAT THEY WILL HAVE A SHORTFALL OF OVER 10,000 IN THE SERVICE SUPPORT AREA IN A1 A. MACV PLANNERS ARE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE UP THIS SHORTFALL FROM THE ONLY 2 SOURCES AVAILABLE, THE NAVY AND THE MARINE CORPS. THEY HAVE ASKED US FOR ~~BY AIRS APPROXIMATING 2,000~~ ADDITIONAL SPACES SHORT OF REMOVING COMBAT UNITS. IF SHORTFALL STILL EXISTS, AND IT MOST CERTAINLY WILL, THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO REDEPLOY ADDITIONAL COMBAT UNITS.

5. PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ABOVE INFO IS CLOSELY HELD HERE. I WOULD REQUEST THAT YOU PROTECT YOUR SOURCE.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY  
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

434

NNNN



**TOP SECRET**

36(2)

36(2)

*(Handwritten signature)*

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		22 OCT 69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D.					
			220718Z OCT 69							
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
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	DCG	+								
	C/S	+				REMARKS				
	DC/S	+								
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention. <table border="1"> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
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**EXCLUSIVE  
FOR  
HAS BEEN SENT**

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PTTCZYUW RUYVSYH2713 2950718-CCCC--RUYVSYD.

ZNY CCCCC

P 220718 OCT 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUYVSYD/COMNAVFORV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR VADM ZUMWALT FROM  
LTGEN NICKERSON

PHONG CHAU CLEARANCE OPN (U)

A. COMNAVFORV R 180129Z OCT 69

1. (C) THE MOTOR VESSEL PHONG CHAU CONTINUES TO BLOCK THE UN-  
RESTRICTED USE OF AN IMPORTANT COMMERCIAL PIER IN THE DANANG RIVER.  
THE HULK MUST BE MOVED ASAP TO FREE THAT PORTION OF THE DANANG PORT  
FACILITIES FOR MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL SHIPPING. THE UNRESTRICTED USE  
OF DANANG HARBOR IS A MILITARY NECESSITY PARTICULARLY DURING THIS  
CRITICAL PERIOD WHEN THE VIETNAMIZATION OF THE CONFLICT IS SHIFTING  
HEAVY OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS ON ICTZ COMMANDER.
2. (C) IN VIEW OF PRESENT CONGESTION OF PORT FACILITIES AND REQUEST  
FROM GVN FOR REMOVAL OF OBSTRUCTION, INTEREST OF U. S. GOVT IS CLEAR  
CUT, NOT BODERLING.
3. (C) PHONG CHAU SUNK ON 6 JUNE 1969. OWNERS GIVEN UNTIL 15 OCT  
1969 BY GVN TO REMOVE VESSEL BY COMMERCIAL SALVAGE OR OTHER MEANS.  
UPON FAILURE OF OWNERS TO ACCOMPLISH OR EVEN COMMENCE ANY SALVAGE  
OPERATION, THE GVN HAS TAKEN OVER, HAS REQUESTED U. S. FORCES TO REMOVE  
OBSTACLE WITH OUR FACILITIES ON AND AFTER 16 OCT 1969, AND HAS FURNISHED  
REQUIRED RELEASE OF LIABILITY TO U. S.
4. (C) SINCE OWNER DID NOT OBTAIN COMMERCIAL SALVAGE WITHIN SPECIFIED  
TIME AND THE GVN HAS NOT INDICATED THAT SUCH WAS OR IS AVAILABLE  
WITHIN THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT REQUEST OF GVN  
BE HONORED AND CLEARANCE OPERATIONS COMMENCED IMMEDIATELY.
5. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2713

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

1ST MARDIV 2100/4 (9/67)

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
1 (1)

# HEADQUARTERS MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 23 OCT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 230707Z OCT 69		COPY NO. <b>2</b> OF <b>4</b> COPIES REC'D.	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		24/10/69	<i>[Signature]</i>	EO FOR MGEN TOWNSEND
	DCG	I			<i>[Signature]</i>	
	C/S	I			<i>[Signature]</i>	REMARKS HAS BEEN SENT
	DC/S	I			<i>[Signature]</i>	
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION:  <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention.
	DEP CORDS					
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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**SECRET**

P 230700Z ZFF-1 ZFF-4

FM CG III MAF

TO SSO TACV

ZEM

SECRET/EYES ONLY/FOR MGEM TOWNSEND FROM LTJGEM NICKERSON

1. LTC PNO, G-2 2D ARVN DIV, HAS FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN CONFIDENCE. A LETTER FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED VC UNIT WAS BROUGHT TO THE ARVN BN COMMANDED AT LZ YOUNG (ET 109153) BY PFC JESSE HARRIS WHEN HE RETURNED FROM CAPTIVITY ON 20 OCT 69. THE LETTER PURPORTEDLY STATES THAT IF THE ARVN FORCES REMAIN ON LZ YOUNG AND DO NOT ENGAGE IN OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY, THE VC WILL ALSO ABSTAIN FROM INITIATING OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY. THE LETTER FURTHER STATED THAT ADDITIONAL PW'S WOULD BE RELEASED AND/OR HAD BEEN RELEASED AND LISTED THE NAMES OF SEVERAL PW'S.
2. IN PASSING THIS INFORMATION IN CONFIDENCE, LTC PNO STATED THAT HE WAS INVESTIGATING THIS MATTER AND REQUESTED THAT WE TAKE NO ACTION AT THIS TIME. PNO INDICATED THAT WE WOULD KEEP US INFORMED, AND I IN TURN WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.
3. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE FOLLOWING THIS SITUATION CLOSELY AND ARE PREPARED TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTION IS INDICATED AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.  
155



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HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

3(1)

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV. 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 23 OCT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 230708Z OCT 69		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES RECD.	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		24 Oct	[initials]	VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE BROADCAST ICTZ
	DCG	I			[initials]	
	C/S	I				REMARKS
	DC/S	I			[initials]	
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP.CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S		10/23/69		[initials]	
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Key (a)

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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

P 230700Z ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O/FCR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTJEN WICKERSON  
VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE BROADCAST, ICTF

1. FOR MANY MONTHS WE CONDUCTED A ONE-HOUR VIETNAMESE  
LANGUAGE TV BROADCAST OVER APTV, DANANG BETWEEN 1.00-1.00  
DAILY. THIS PRACTICE WAS DISCONTINUED 1 SEPTEMBER WHEN  
THE HAI VAN PASS TV RELAY STATION WAS ESTABLISHED TO  
PROVIDE THIS AREA FULL VIETNAMESE TV COVERAGE FROM HUE.  
THIS RELAY WAS OPERATIONAL FOR ONLY A FEW DAYS AND HAS  
BEEN COMPLETELY NONREPEALABLE SINCE 29 SEPTEMBER. REPLACEMENT  
OF MAJOR COMPONENTS APPEAR NECESSARY AND NO ACCURATE  
ESTIMATE OF THE DELAY IS PRESENTLY AVAILABLE.

2. FOR THIS REASON I AM REQUESTING YOUR ASSISTANCE TO  
AT LEAST PARTIALLY ALLEVIATE THE SITUATION BY RESUMING  
THE DAILY ONE-HOUR VIETNAMESE BROADCAST ON APTV, DANANG  
IN DEFECT. UNTIL THE NEW SYSTEM BECOMES A REALITY, I  
NEED TO REINSTATE THE OLD. YOUR CONCURRENCE IS REQUESTED.  
WARM REGARDS.

155



HAS BEEN SENT

UNCLAS/EFTO

4(1)

4(1)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 240244Z		DATE 24 OCT 69					
			COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D							
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG	I		24 OCT		122 MM ROCKET INCIDENT				
	DCG	I								
	C/S	I				REMARKS				
	DC/S	I		10/28						
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention.				
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ					<table border="1"> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
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H A S B E E N S E N T

H A S B E E N S E N T

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

⑤

**SECRET**

P 240244Z ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

S E C R E T/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 IT YOU MAY RECALL THAT YESTERDAY A 122 MILIMETER ROCKET  
 HIT THE CP OF KILO 3/4 KILLING ONE AND INJURING 9, AND  
 A SPOT REPORT THIS MORNING REVEALED THAT ONE OF THE 9  
 WOUNDED HAD DIED ABOARD THE USS REPOSE. COUNTERBATTERY  
 WAS NOT ABLE TO FIRE BACK BECAUSE OF ARVN TROOPS AND  
 VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS IN THE VICINITY OF THE LAUNCHING  
 SITE. A SWEEP OF THE AREA WAS CONDUCTED BY AN ARMORED  
 CAVALRY TROOP BUT THE LAUNCHING SITE WAS NOT LOCATED.  
 2. TODAY WE REPORTED TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS BY COC  
 CHANNELS THAT COL GIAI HAD FOUND 3 MORE ROCKETS ON  
 ANOTHER LAUNCHING SITE AND HAD FIRED ONE OF THE ROCKETS  
 NNW AT A SUSPECTED ENEMY LOCATION. A LITTLE BACKGROUND  
 FOLLOWS: AFTER THE UNSUCCESSFUL SWEEP BY THE ARMORED  
 CAVALRY TROOPS IN THE MORNING, COL GIAI SWEEP THE AREA  
 BY HELICOPTER IN THE AFTERNOON. HE FOUND THE THREE  
 ROCKETS ON THE LAUNCHING SITE WIRED AND READY TO BE FIRED.  
 HE ALSO FOUND THE LAUNCHING SITE OF THE ONE ROCKET THAT  
 HAD BEEN FIRED EARLIER. UPON RETURN HE REPORTED THAT HE  
 HAD FOUND THE THREE ROCKETS AND IN THE COURSE OF HIS  
 DISCUSSION REPORTED THAT IT HAD BEEN TURNED IN. WHEN  
 QUIRIED AS TO THE DISPARITY BETWEEN 3 AND 2 HE REPLIED  
 "I TURNED ONE OF THEM AROUND AND FIRED IT BACK OVER THE  
 DMZ AND IT BURNED REAL SMOOTH"  
 3. COL GIAI WAS FORMERLY THE CO OF THE 2ND ARVN REGIMENT  
 AND IS NOW DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS/CO 1ST ARVN DIVISION CP  
 FORWARD AND IS ONE OF THE FINEST SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM.  
 THIS INCIDENT IS AN EXAMPLE OF HIS AGGRESSIVENESS AND  
 INGENUITY. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 250

NNNN

HAC BEEN SENT



5(1)

5(1)

# HEADQUARTERS MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

## SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		25 OCT 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. OF COPIES REC'D.	
			0 250116Z OCT 69		2 OF 4	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	F				MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
	DCG	F				
	C/S	F				
	DC/S	F				
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
1	S/S	*	25Oct		CS	
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	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
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	SGT MAJ					

REMARKS

DISPOSITION:

Retain for \_\_\_\_\_ months.

Destroy after routing.

Return for permanent retention.

Section	Signature

# HAS BEEN SENT

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE) 16

## SECRET

0 25 0116Z ZYH

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

S E C R E T/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:



0 24 0840Z ZYH

FM BG COOKSEY CG AMERICAL DIV

TO BG DOOLEY CS III MAF

ZEM

S E C R E T ACD 1091 EYES ONLY

REF: ACD 1080 EYES ONLY

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER DELIVERED BY PFC HARRIS TO THE ARVN BN CO AT LZ YOUNG ON 20 OCT 69: QUOTE

FROM: THE NLF QUANG NAM

TO: CO 2/5 ARVN

2B ARVN DIVISION

TO EXECUTE THE RELEASE ORDER FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE NLF SOUTH VIET NAM ABOUT THE APPROVAL TO RELEASE THE WOUNDED AMERICAN NAMED "HARI" (SIC) SN 11 842 085 BELONGS TO THE 101ST AIR BORNE DIVISION CAPTURED BY LIBERATION SOLDIERS PERMITTED "RELEASED" TO REJOIN HIS FAMILY. WE HAND OVER TO YOU THIS WOUNDED AMERICAN, THAT YOU CAN HELP HIM TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE NEAREST US UNIT.

THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME WE (NLF) HAVE RELEASED US PRISONERS BUT WE (NLF) HAVE DONE THE SAME THING MANY TIMES FOR NOT ONLY AMERICANS. TO PREVIOUSLY. WE (NLF) OF THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS HAD LIBERATED 30 ARVN OFFICERS AND THOUSANDS OF VN SOLDIERS WHO HAVE BEEN FORCED BY THE US TO BE ARMED LACKEYS, AND WERE CAPTURED. AMONG THESE PRISONERS WERE MAJOR VO DUX MINH, COMMANDER OF THE 2D ENGINEER BN OF 1ST (I CORPS) TACTICAL ZONE, MAJOR LE VAN CU, ASSISTANT PROVINCE CHIEF AND INTERNAL SECURITY OFFICER OF PLEIKU PROVINCE, CPT VINH HO S-2 OF PLEIKU PROVINCE, CPT NGUYEN VAN NGOC, CO 2D BN, 51ST REGT (SEPARATE).

6(11)

6(11)

BY THE WAY, WE HAVE A MATTER THAT OUGHT TO BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN YOU AND US THAT RECENTLY THIEU, KY, AND THE US GOVERNMENT SPOKE ILL OF "AMERICANS COMING TO HELP VN". NIXON ANNOUNCED TO WITHDRAW 6000 TROOPS. IS IT THE GOOD WILL OF NIXON? IS THAT TRUE? THE STATEMENTS OF US POLITICIANS AND THE OPINIONS OF WESTERNERS UNCOVERED THE DISHONEST ARGUMENT. EXAMPLE: EISENHOWER 4 AUGUST 1953, "IF WE LOSE INDO CHINA THE IRON AND GOLD OF THIS AREA WILL BE LOST." ON 7 FEB 1966 AT HONOLULU, PRESIDENT JOHNSON SAID, "WE SHOULD FIGHT AGAINST THE DOGS AND THE VIET CONG, OR WE MAY HAVE TO FIGHT SOMEWHERE ELSE AT A GREATER COST." ON 16 JAN 1969, HUMPHERY (SIC) SAID, "FIRST OF ALL WE ARE IN VIET NAM BECAUSE OF NATIONAL INTEREST. BUT WITH 250,000 CASUALTIES THIS IS THE SECOND LARGEST NUMBER OF CASUALTIES THAT THE US HAS HAD IN ANY WAR." ON 13 JAN 1969 GENERAL ABRAMS SAID, ((THIS PORTION OF THE DOCUMENT WAS UNREADABLE))

SENATOR ROBERT KENNEDY SPOKE BEFORE A CROWD IN NEW YORK ON 7 FEB 1968 STATING, "IT IS TIME TO CONSIDER THAT THE WAR IN VIET NAM TODAY IS AGAINST THE INTEREST OF OUR COUNTRY." "THIS WAR MAY CAUSE TRAGEDY FOR THE US." SENATOR MAGA(?) ALSO CONDEMNED THE WAR, "IT IS AN UNFORGIVABLE MATTER IF AMERICANN CASUALTIES ARE STILL RISING." THEREFORE SENATOR MCGOVEREN AND MASSIVE AMERICAN OPINION DEMANDED FROM NIXON THAT AMERICANS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM VN RIGHT AWAY. THE NEW YORK TIMES ON 22 SEPT 69 JUDGED THAT "THE PROGRESSIVE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS IS TO DIMINISH THE AMERICAN DEMAND TO STOP THE WAR IN VN QUICKLY."

IT IS CLEARLY TRUE THAT US TROOPS CAME TO VIET NAM TO CONQUER AND NOW NIXON DECLARES THAT HE IS PULLING TROOPS OUT BECAUSE OF THE US'S FAILURE IN VIET NAM, AND BECAUSE OF US PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST THE WAR. THEREFORE, HE IS PULLING TROOPS OUT LITTLE BY LITTLE, QUELLING DEMANDS BY THE PUBLIC TO "PULL OUT OF VN NOW." THE ANTI-WAR FACTION IN THE US TO WITHDRAW RAPIDLY FROM A WAR THAT HAS COST MUCH MONEY AND MANY LIVES. BY DOING THIS, THE PARIS PEACE TALKS WILL PROGRESS. THIEU, KY, AND HIS AIDS KNOW THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD GO HOME. HENCE, THEY SENT THEIR WIVES AND CHILDREN TO ITALY AND SWITZERLAND AND THEIR GOLD TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO FALL BACK ON.

6(2)

6(2)

YOU ARE VIETNAMESE, ALTHOUGH YOU HAVE LED THE WRONG LIFE, YOU STILL DEEP INSIDE YOU HATE THE AMERICANS, WHO USE BOMBS AND AMMUNITION TO DESTROY HAMLETS AND VILLAGES IN VIETNAM. THE GRAVES OF ANCESTORS WHICH HAVE BEEN UNTOUCHED FOR MANY YEARS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED BY BULLDOZERS. MOURNING CLOTHES MUST BE WORN SEVERAL TIMES BY INNOCENT CHILDREN. THE HONOR OF THE VIETNAMESE HAS BEEN STEPPED ON. THE VIETNAMESE HAVE BEEN GROUND UNDER THE HEELS OF THE AMERICAN IN ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. AND NO ONE WHO IS VIETNAMESE IS NOT PROUD WHEN THEY READ THE PROUD HISTORY OF VIETNAM AND THE CONFESSIONS OF THE ENEMY FRENCH IN THE PRIME MINISTERS DIARY OF THE "TRAGEDY OF DIEN BIEN PHU AND GENEVA."

TODAY, AMERICAN MAGAZINES TELL ABOUT THE AMERICANS BOMBING THE NVN AND WINNING A VICTORY, BUT THE AMERICANS CANNOT DESTROY NVN BY BOMBING. THE LEADERS IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE PENTAGON HAVE TO CONFESS THAT THEY CANNOT WIN THE WAR BY MILITARY MEANS. ALTHOUGH OUR PEOPLE ARE FEW, THEY ARE HEROIC. WE DEFEATED TWO STRONG IMPERIALIST POWERS, AND ARE PROUD TO BE THE VIETNAMESE PATRIOTS OF THE 20TH CENTURY. THE WAR WILL END IN THE FUTURE, OUR COUNTRY WILL BE INDEPENDENT, AND OUR PEOPLE AND OUR COUNTRY WILL BE UNIFIED. THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT WILL HAPPEN. THE DAY WILL COME SOON.

WE PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING, WITH THE HELP OF THE PEOPLE AND THE COUNTRY; THAT BETWEEN THE 2/5 ARVN AND THE NLF NEITHER SIDE WILL ATTACK THE OTHER IN AN ACTIVE MANNER.

6(3)

6(3)

THIS MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED SECRETLY IF YOU DO NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY. BOTH SIDES WILL TRY TO HELP THE PEOPLE IN LIVING TRAVELLING AND TRADING. WHEN LIBERATION TROOPS ATTACK "AMERICAN TROOPS", YOU WILL NOT REINFORCE THEM. IT WILL BE OF GREAT VALUE IF YOU CAN SECRETLY OR LEGALLY ACT WITH US TO DESTROY THE AMERICAN TROOPS.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, WE THINK THAT BOTH SIDE SHOULD SEND REPRESENTATIVES FOR A MEETING IN A LOCATION SUITABLE TO BOTH SIDES. THIS WILL BE FOR THE GOOD OF OUR COUNTRY.

THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, THIEU, AND KY WENT DIRECT TO PARIS TO TALK WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, AND WITH THE PROVINCIAL SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. SO BETWEEN US VIETNAMESE, IT IS EASIER ER US TO TALK TOGETHER. WE CAN TALK ABOUT GOALS AND BRING PEACE TO OUR COUNTRY. WE DESIRE YOUR ANSWER TO THE ABOVE ITEMS.

SINCERELY  
UNIFICATION FOR RESISTANCE  
AGAINST AMERICA  
19 OCT 69  
FOR QUANG NAM NLF  
DONG LUONG / PROFESSOR

UNQUOTE

2. LTC PHO, G-2 2B ARVN DIV, NO LONGER INTERPOSES ANY OBJECTION TO THE RELEASE OF THIS INFORMATION

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
900

HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET

NNNN

6(4)

6(4)

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 26 OCT 69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 260214Z OCT 69	COPY NO. <u>1</u> OF <u>3</u> COPIES REC'D.						
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG	I		26 Oct	MP	SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY				
	DCG	I								
	C/S	I				REMARKS				
	DC/S	I								
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION:  <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention.  <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">Section</td> <td style="width: 50%;">Signature</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
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HAS BEEN SENT  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
EXCLUSIVE  
FOR

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**SECRET**

PTTSZYUW RHMMFA3210 2991214-SSSS--RUMLMPA.  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 260214Z OCT 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMLMPA/CG FORLOGCOMD

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN FEELEY FROM BGEN DOOLEY  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

ACTIVATION OF FIRST SERVICE BATTALION (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 232143Z OCT 69

1. (S) REF A ADVISED OF CG FMFPAC'S DESIRE TO DISCUSS  
 DURING FORTHCOMING WESTPAC TRIP THE RETURN OF LOGISTIC  
 SUPPORT FROM FLC CONCEPT TO SERVICE BN/MWSG AND FSR CON-  
 CEPT.

2. (U) WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY  
 271600H OCT 69.

GP-4

BT

3210

NNNN

111 MAF 2100/7 (3/68)

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

8(11) SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		27 OCT 69					
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. OF 4 COPIES REC'D					
			0 270530Z OCT 69							
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					FORCE PLANNING  REMARKS: DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.  <table border="1"> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.	Section	Signature		
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*Copy #9 to Force Planning folder*

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**57**

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**TOP SECRET**

*(37)*

0 27 53 MZ ZYH ZFF-4  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TOCG FMFRAC  
 ZEM

COPY 3 OF 4 COF

T O P S E C R E T /EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 FORCE PLANNING

REF A CG III MAF 231300Z OCT 69

1. ON 26 OCT ONE OF MY PLANNERS ATTENDED A STAFF MEETING  
 AT MACV HEADQUARTERS IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE 100,000 MAN  
 REDUCTION DURING THE FIRST HALF OF CY 70.

2. MACV PLANNERS HAVE DEVELOPED TWO OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE  
 THIS DRAWDOWN DIFFERING SOMEWHAT FROM THEIR INITIAL PLANNING  
 ALTERNATIVES AS REPORTED TO YOU IN REF A. THE THREE ORIGINAL  
 ALTERNATIVES HAVE BEEN DISCARDED.

3. THE TWO OPTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

OPTION 1

ARMY	1ST INF DIV	
	BDE 4TH INF DIV	
	SVC SPT	
	SUBTOTAL	30,600
USMC	ALL	54,600
USN	ELMTS	11,200
USAF	ELMTS	3,600
	TOTAL	100,000

OPTION 2

ARMY	1ST INF DIV	
	23D INF DIV (AMERICAL)	
	4TH INF DIV	
	199TH LIB	
	BDE 9TH INF DIV	
	SVC SPT	
	SUBTOTAL	86,900
USMC	RLI-26	
	SVC SPT	
	SUBTOTAL	7,500
USN	ELMTS	2,000
USAF	ELMTS	3,600
	TOTAL	100,000

4. MACV PLANNERS INTEND TO BRIEF COMUSMACV ON THESE TWO  
 OPTIONS ON THE 3D OR 4TH OF NOV. THEIR CURRNET INTENTION IS TO  
 RECOMMEND OPTION 1 TO COMUSMACV.

WARM REGARDS  
 GP-4



SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY.  
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

37(1)