

DECLASSIFIED

- N. ✓ CG III MAF 240914Z NOV69 (TS) EXCLUSIVE MCEO *gp-4*
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
MACV REDEPLOYMENT PLANS
- O. ✓ CG FMFPAC 252141Z NOV69 (TS) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO *gp-4*
FOR NICKERSON FROM BUSE
FORCE PLANNING
- P. ✓ CMC 262031Z NOV69 (TS) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO *gp-4*
FOR BUSE INFO NICKERSON FROM CHAPMAN
FORCE PLANNING
- Q. ✓ CG III MAF 300656Z NOV69 (TS) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY *gp-4*
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY
FORCE PLANNING
- R. ✓ CG FMFPAC 021845Z DEC69 (TS) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO *gp-4*
FOR WALT INFO NICKERSON FROM BUSE
FORCE PLANNING
- S. ✓ COMUSMACV 231135Z NOV 69 (TS) *gp-4*
FOR MCCAIN FROM ABRAMS (HAND CARRIED BY GEN. BUSE)
FORCE PLANNING

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- E. ✓ CMC 041947Z NOV69 (TS) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO *gp-4*
FOR BUSE INFO NICKERSON FROM CHAPMAN
FORCE PLANNING
- F. ✓ CG III MAF 061406Z NOV69 (TS) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *gp-4*
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
PHASE REDUCTION
- G. ✓ CG FMFPAC 080043Z NOV69 (TS) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *gp-4*
FOR CHAPMAN INFO NICKERSON FROM BUSE
FORCE PLANNING (U)
- H. ✓ COMUSMACV 121456Z NOV69 (TS) SENSITIVE EYES ONLY *gp-4*
FOR NICKERSON FROM TOWNSEND
FORCE PLANNING
- I. ✓ CG FMFPAC 180225Z NOV69 (TS) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO *gp-4*
FOR CHAPMAN INFO NICKERSON FROM BUSE
FORCE PLANNING
- J. ✓ CG FMFPAC 192236Z NOV69 (TS) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO *gp-4*
FOR NICKERSON FROM BUSE
FORCE PLANNING (U)
- K. ✓ CMC ^(ATA) POINT PAPER OF 31OCT69 (TS) SENSITIVE MCEO *gp-not shown*
MARINE CORPS FORCES IN RVN
- L. ✓ CG III MAF 200654Z NOV69 (TS) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO *gp-4*
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON
MACV REDEPLOYMENT PLANS
- M. ✓ CG FMFPAC 212003Z NOV69 (TS) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO *gp-4*
FOR NICKERSON FROM BUSE
FORCE PLANNING AND PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

DECLASSIFIED

LIMDIS HEADQUARTERS
TOP SECRET III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 30 NOV 69
SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 0 300656 NOV 69					COPY NO. 2 OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
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	RDT & E					
	REPRO					
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	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

REMARKS:

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Section	Signature

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ORIG G-3
 REL DC/S

HAS BEEN SENT
EXCLUSIVE
 FOR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

LIMDIS

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OTTTZYUW RNMHAFAS378 6540326-TTTT--RUMFNA

ZNY TTTT

O 300030Z NOV 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMFNA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T /LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE /MARINE COSPS EYES ONLY/

FOR BEEN WILSON FROM EGEM SCOLEY

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CMC 20051Z NOV 69

1. (U) REFERENCE CONTAINS CMC GUIDANCE ON FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS.

2. (IS/NO): THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE PROVIDED FOR REFERENCE:

A. THIS HQ HAS NOT BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO REMOVE 50,000 TROOPS BY MID-MARCH OR MID-APRIL TO INCLUDE 22,000 MARINES.

B. BELIEVE THE DATE IN PARAGRAPH 2.A. SHOULD READ JUNE 1971 VICE JUNE 1970.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3378

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CMC	DATE 27 NOV 69
SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 262031Z NOV 69					COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	F		29 NOV	N	SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
	DCG	F		11/27	JB	
	C/S	I		See		REMARKS:
	DC/S	I		11/28	P	
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					Section Signature _____ _____
	S/S	F	11/29		WY	
	G-1					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	G-2					
	G-3					FOR
	G-4					
	G-5					MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	G-6					
	ADJ					(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT&E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

VPTTZYUW RUEBHOA9624 3302031-TTTT--RUHFMA RHMMAFA.
ZNY TTTT

RUHFMA -T- RHMMAFA

P 262031Z NOV 69

FM CMC

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO LTGEN WICKERSON FROM GEN CHAPMAN
FORCE PLANNING (U)

REF: (A) CMC 041947Z NOV 69

1. (TS) THIS IS IN AMPLIFICATION OF REF A AND BASED ON QUICK
ANALYSIS OF THE CINCPAC AND COMUSMACV COMMENTS RELATIVE TO
A POSSIBLE PHASE III REDEPLOYMENT DURING THE FIRST HALF OF
CY 1970. ASSUME THOSE COMMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO YOU.
2. (TS) COMUSMACV'S RATIONALE FAVORING THE "MARINE-HEAVY"
OPTION VERSUS THE "ARMY-HEAVY" OPTION IN ESSENCE, REFLECTS
HIS PREFERENCE FOR RETAINING ADDITIONAL GROUND COMBAT UNITS
AS A TRADE-OFF FOR MARINE TACTICAL AIR. THE FOLLOWING TABLE
REFLECTS THE DISPARITY OF GROUND COMBAT CAPABILITY LOST UNDER
THE TWO OPTIONS IN THE 100,000 MAN PACKAGE (FIGURES BASED ON
T/O STRENGTHS):

PAGE TWO RUEBHOA9624 T O P S E C R E T SEPCAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE
CORPS EYES ONLY

LOSSES

	MARINE HEAVY	ARMY HEAVY
USMC INF BNS	12	3
USA INF BNS	10(12)	75(30)
USA MECH INF BNS	2	4
PERS IN INF BNS	42,237	7,538
105MM HOWS	144	216
155MM HOWS	42	78
8" HOWS/175MM GUNS	36	30
ONE-TIME HELO LIFT	2,090	1,360

3. (TS) WHILE THE TRUE COMBAT POWER OF A MARINE AIR/GROUND TEAM
CANNOT BE PRECISELY QUANTIFIED IN TERMS OF AN ARMY DFE FROM
THE ABOVE FIGURES GROUND COMBAT STRENGTH REMAINING IN RVN
WOULD APPEAR TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER IF THE MARINE-HEAVY
RATHER THAN THE ARMY HEAVY OPTION WERE SELECTED. IN ANY
EVENT, IT IS ON THIS BASIS THAT THE FIELD COMMANDER HAS
CHOSEN TO SUPPORT THE MARINE HEAVY OPTION, AND IT WOULD
APPEAR UNWISE TO ATTACK THAT RATIONALE.
4. (TS) HOWEVER WHILE THE FIELD COMMANDER CAN (AND DID) LIMIT
HIS CONSIDERATION SOLELY TO THE IMPACT OF THE VARIOUS
ALTERNATIVES ON HIS OWN TACTICAL SITUATION, THE SERVICE

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUEBHQA09624 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
CHIEFS AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MUST CONSIDER OVERALL
IMPACTS ON THE SERVICES, THEIR READINESS AND WORLD-WIDE
POSTURE.

5. (TS) THE SUPPORTING PAPERS (BLUE TABS 2-6 IN MATERIAL DESCRIBED
IN PAR 7 REF. A) WERE PREPARED TO DISPLAY THE DISADVANTAGES
AND ADVANTAGES AS WELL AS MANPOWER LOGISTIC AND AIR
IMPLICATIONS TO THE MARINE CORPS OF A REDEPLOYMENT BY
END FY 1970 OF ALL MARINES VICE REDEPLOYMENT OF ONLY RL1-26.
WHILE A SIMILAR ADDRESSAL HAS NOT BEEN MADE TO COVER THE
22,600 MARINE REDEPLOYMENT UNDER THE NEW ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
TO REMOVE 50,000 U S TROOPS BY MID-MARCH OR MID-APRIL THE
IMPACT PARTICULARLY ON MANPOWER PROGRAMS WOULD REMAIN
EXTREMELY SEVERE.

6. (TS) AT THIS POINT IN TIME CINCPAC'S VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO A
"MARINE-HEAVY VERSUS AN ARMY-HEAVY" OPTION HAVE NOT BEEN
RECEIVED. THE INITIAL FLIMSY DRAFT OF THE PAPER TO BE
CONSIDERED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON 28 NOVEMBER
CAREFULLY AVOIDS THESE TERMS OR ANY INDICATION THAT SUCH
OPTIONS EXIST; ACCORDINGLY THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE NO
REQUIREMENT FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADDRESSAL HERE ON THE ISSUE

PAGE FOUR RUEBHQA09624 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
OF THE "MARINE-HEAVY" OPTION. WHEN THE ISSUE DOES ARISE
MY VIEWS ON MARINE-HEAVY 100,000 (OR) 50,000 PACKAGES ARE AS
EXPRESSED IN REF (A).

7. (TS) OUR INITIAL CONCLUSIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. NONE OF THE THREE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY THE
PRESIDENT AS CONTROLLING THE TEMPO OF U S FORCE
REDEPLOYMENTS, I. E.: PROGRESS AT PARIS; THE ENEMY SITUATION;
OR PROGRESS IN RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION--JUSTIFY
AN ADDITIONAL U S FORCE REDEPLOYMENT AT THIS TIME, AND
NONE SHOULD BE RECOMMENDED.

B. A "MARINE-HEAVY" OPTION CALLING FOR REDEPLOYMENT
OF ALL MARINES FROM RVN WOULD POSE MASSIVE PERSONNEL
PROBLEMS AND SERIOUS LOGISTIC PROBLEMS.

C. A "MARINE-HEAVY" OPTION CALLING FOR REDEPLOYMENT
OF 22,600 MARINES BY MID-MARCH OR MID-APRIL WOULD CAUSE
CRITICAL PERSONNEL PROBLEMS UNLESS THE RETURNING PERSONNEL
COULD BE INDIVIDUALLY HAND SELECTED TO MEET MANPOWER CRITERIA.
LOGISTICALLY, THIS OPTION WOULD CAUSE SOME OVERCROWDING, BUT
COULD BE MANAGED.

D. A "MARINE-HEAVY" OPTION CALLING FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUEBHOA9624 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
22,600 (INCLUDING 3 RLTS'S) WOULD LEAVE A MARINE ELEMENT IN
RVN COMPRISING 32,000 PERSONNEL BUILT AROUND A SINGLE RLT.

2. SHOULD POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS DICTATE A FURTHER
REDEPLOYMENT IN THE FIRST THREE TO SIX MONTHS OF CY 1970,
THE 35,000 ALTERNATIVE PROPOSED BY COMUSMACV PRESENTS THE
LEAST RISK AND CAN BE SUPPORTED LOGISTICALLY AND MANPOWER-WISE.
3. (TS) ACCORDINGLY WE WILL SUPPORT CINCPAC/MACV IN RECOMMENDING
NO REDEPLOYMENT AT THIS TIME; AVOID FOR NOW THE MARINE-HEAVY
VERSUS ARMY-HEAVY ISSUE HERE; AND IF A REDEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE
DIRECTED SUPPORT THE MACV 35,000 PACKAGE WHICH INCLUDES RLT-26.
9. (TS) AMONG THE CONCLUSIONS BY COMUSMACV THE FOLLOWING APPEAR
TO BE PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY AND IF IS ANTICIPATED WILL BE
REFLECTED IN JCS VIEWS FORWARDED TO SECDEF:

A. THE OBJECTIVE OF 600,000 U S PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM BY
JUNE 1970 IS A REALISTIC GOAL FOR ALL TO SET SIGHTS ON WITH FULL
INTENT OF ACHIEVING IT.

B. THE GREATEST ASSURANCE OF REACHING A REALISTIC GOAL
OF U S TROOP NUMBERS IN RVN IN 1971 WILL COME FROM A "CUT
AND TRY" METHOD AT A PACE WHICH DEVELOPS SPEED GRADUALLY AS
VIETNAMESE COMPETENCE AND CONFIDENCE HAS TO DEVELOP GRADUALLY.

PAGE SIX RUEBHOA9624 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
10. (TS) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE OUR POSITION REMAINS THAT RLT-26
COULD BE REDEPLOYED IN A PHASE III PROGRAM, AND THAT POSSIBLY
SOME AIR AS DISCUSSED IN PAR 6 REF A. COULD BE ADDED. I PREFER
THAT III MAF REDEPLOY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USSM 36 PHASING.
THIS RETAINS MARINE FORCES IN COMBAT AS LONG AS A WAR IS GOING
ON WHICH IS ON PRIME IMPORTANCE TO THE MARINE CORPS. IF TIME-
FRAME IN ITEM 9 ABOVE IS MET, THIS WOULD MEAN REDEPLOYMENT OF
III MAF IN FIRST HALF CY 1971.
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

9624

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

**HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/CORRECTION C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG FMFPAC	DATE 26 NOV 69
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 252141Z NOV 69		COPY NO. 3 OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S					
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	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
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	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT&E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

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**EXCLUSIVE
FOR**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

YYYYYZZZY
 PP RHMMAFA
 DE RUMMFMA 3350 3292 141
 ZNY TTTT
 P 252 141Z NOV 69
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON
 FROM LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING
 WORKING HOURS ONLY.
 FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG III MAF 2409 14Z/NOV69 (TS) (EXCLUSIVE) (MCEO) (LINDIS)

B. CG FMFPAC 192236Z/NOV69 (TS) (EXCLUSIVE) (MCEO)

1. THANKS FOR DOPE IN REF A.

2. PAR 5.A., REF A MENTIONS CMC'S DESIRES TO RETAIN
 A USMC BRIGADE AS PART OF RESIDUAL FORCE AND ALSO
 SUGGESTS CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO POSSIBILITY OF
 INCLUSION OF CAPS THEREIN.

3. DESPITE GUIDANCE YOU MAY HAVE RECEIVED FROM LEW
 WALT IN ABOVE REGARD AND SINCE HE DEPARTED WASH PRIOR TO RELEASE
 OF REF B, I FEEL WE MUST ADHERE TO THAT PROVIDED BY CHAPPY RELATIVE TO
 THE RESIDUAL FORCE WHICH WAS RELAYED IN REF B (PAR 1.D. (1)).

PAGE 2 RUMMFMA3350 T O P S E C R E T M C E O
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3350

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 24 NOV 69
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 240914Z NOV 1969		COPY NO. 1 OF 3	COPIES REC'D
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		25 NOV		Feedback LIMDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO
	DCG	I		11/25		
	C/S	I		Had Seen		
	DC/S					REMARKS: DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Section: _____ Signature: _____ REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document. ORIG: G-3 REL: CG "LIMDIS" EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT (USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
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	G-1					
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	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT. MAJ					

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OTTIZYUW RHMMAFA2797 3280914-TTTT--RUMMFMA.

ZNY TTTT

O 240914Z NOV 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMMFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T / L I N D I S / S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN
NICKERSON/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING
HOURS)

SUBJECT: MACV REDEPLOYMENT PLANS

REF: CG III MAF 200654Z NOV 1969

1. (TS/LD) COMUSMACV'S MONTHLY VIEU MEETING FOR COMMANDERS WAS
HELD ON 22 NOV 69. MEETING LONGER THAN USUAL AND GREATEST PORTION
OF MEETING DEVOTED TO BRIEFING ON AND A DISCUSSION OF FURTHER
REDEPLOYMENTS. CONTENTS OF BRIEFING WAS AS REPORTED IN REFER-
ENCE A. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED.

2. (TS/LD) DURING THE DISCUSSION, I RAISED THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. THE MARINE HEAVY OPTION IS INCONSISTENT WITH NSSM-36
AND NO REASONS HAD BEEN ADVANCED WHICH JUSTIFY SUCH A MAJOR
DEVIATION FROM NSSM-36.

B. THE REASONING THAT THE MARINE HEAVY OPTION IS ADVANTAGEOUS
TO MACV BECAUSE IT INVOLVES THE LOSS OF ONLY 8 BRIGADE FORCES
COMPARED WITH 12 BRIGADE FORCES UNDER THE ARMY HEAVY OPTION IS
FALLACIOUS. ASSUMING AN AVERAGE USA BRIGADE STRENGTH OF 4,000

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA2797 T O P S E C R E T / L I N D I S / S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE
FOR/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

AND AN AVERAGE USMC RTI STRENGTH OF 6,000, THE DIFFERENCE BE-
TWEEN THE TWO OPTIONS IN GROUND COMBAT POWER IS ONLY 1 2/3 USMC
RTIS OR 2 1/2 BRIGADES. BUT IN ADDITION, THE MARINE HEAVY
OPTION INVOLVES THE LOSS OF THE MARINE CAP PROGRAM AND NINE
ATTACH/FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRONS TOTALLING SOME 130 AIRCRAFT,
BOTH OF WHICH ARE IRREPLACEABLE.

C. DURING THE TACAIR DISCUSSION, GENERAL BROWN VOLUNTEERED
THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE FMAW WOULD RESULT IN A 28 PERCENT REDUC-
TION OF IN-COUNTRY TACAIR SORTIES. SOME OF THE OTHER FORCE
COMMANDERS INDICATED THAT THEY ARE NOT NOW RECEIVING ALL OF THE
TACAIR THEY REQUIRE. GENERAL ABRAMS STATED THAT WE HAVE TO LOOK
AT ALL AIR, INCLUDING THE B-52'S; BUT I BELIEVE THAT I GOT TO
HIM ON THE TACAIR ISSUE AND THAT MY POINT SANK IN.

D. CG II FFV COMPLAINED ABOUT LOSING THE 1ST INFANTRY
DIVISION. I POINTED OUT THAT OVER 40 PERCENT OF THE PHASE 1 AND 2
REDEPLOYMENTS HAVE ALREADY COME OUT OF I CORPS.

E. SHIPPING WOULD BE A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM ESPECIALLY
SINCE THE NEW REDEPLOYMENTS WOULD INVOLVE MOVES PRIMARILY TO
CONUS AND NOT TO OKINAWA. GENERAL BROWN AGREED THAT HE WOULD
HAVE MASSIVE PROBLEMS JUST MOVING USAF AIRCRAFT OUT-OF-COUNTRY

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA2797 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
IN A SHORT PERIOD LIKE SIX MONTHS.

F. I RAISED THE QUESTION OF ROKFORV TENURE IN VIETNAM. NO DEFINITIVE ANSWER COULD BE GIVEN EXCEPT THAT AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND GENERAL ABRAMS AGREED THEY WOULD PROBABLY BE AMONG THE LAST TO DEPART. WITH RESPECT TO THE ROK MARINES, I IMPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO MARRY UP A MARINE AIR/GROUND BRIGADE WITH THE ROKMC BRIGADE IN THE RESIDUAL FORCE. I DOUBT IF THIS SANK IN.

3. (TS/LD) GENERAL ABRAMS AND AMBASSADOR BUNKER AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT BEFORE CHRISTMAS. GENERAL ABRAMS STATED THAT WE ARE BETTER OFF THAN WE WERE JUST PRIOR TO THE 1966 TET OFFENSIVE SINCE THE ARVN AND THE TERRITORIALS HAVE IMPROVED IN EFFECTIVENESS, ETC. HOWEVER, WE ARE IN THE DARK AS TO WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN THIS YEAR AND THE TET PERIOD IS EXACTLY WHEN WE NEED ALL OF OUR PRESENT FORCES. BELIEVES WE HAVE THE STRENGTH NOW TO TAKE ON THE NVA SHOULD THEY DECIDE TO COME DOWN. GENERAL ABRAMS INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT IF HE SENT A MESSAGE STATING THAT HE WOULD GO ALONG WITH A 150,000 REDEPLOYMENT DURING 1970, HE WOULD GET A CONCURRENCE BY RETURN MESSAGE. HE BELIEVED FURTHER THAT HE WOULD BE PERMITTED

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA2797 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TO CONTROL THE TIMING OF EXODUS HOWEVER. IN THIS WAY, HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO KEEP EVERYTHING HE NOW HAS THROUGH TET (MARCH) BUT THIS WOULD MEAN THAT REDEPLOYMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPRESSED INTO THE LAST NINE MONTHS OF 1970. ABE'S DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT CAME BEFORE HE AND AMBASSADOR BUNKER MENTIONED PRESIDENT THIEU'S AGREEMENT ON 150K PLUS 65K ALREADY OUT. SEE PARA 4.C. BELOW. THE COMMENTS MAY OR MAY NOT BE RELATED. GENERAL ABRAMS RECOGNIZED THE HORRENDOUS PROBLEMS ALL SERVICES WOULD HAVE. HE STATED THAT IF THE PRESIDENT MUST MAKE ANOTHER ANNOUNCEMENT, HE MIGHT GO ALONG WITH 35,000 BUT THAT HE COULD NOT SAFELY TAKE OUT 50,000 IN THE JAN-MAR TIME FRAME. THIS WAS PART OF GIVE AND TAKE DISCUSSION AND SHOULD BE NOTED AS SOMEWHAT OUT OF CONTEXT.

4. (TS/LD) GENERAL ABRAMS AND AMBASSADOR BUNKER AGREED THAT THE SENSE OF THE MEETING WAS:

- A. CONTINUE THE "CUT AND TRY" APPROACH.
- B. DO NOT REDEPLOY ANY ADDITIONAL TROOPS AT THIS TIME; WAIT TO SEE ENEMY DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH THE TET PERIOD.
- C. IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT THIEU'S STATEMENT THAT HE COULD ACCEPT A 150,000 REDEPLOYMENT NEXT YEAR, BRIEF GENERAL VINH AND HIS STAFF AND HAVE THEM COME UP WITH A SCHEDULE FOR REDE-

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFA2797 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
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 FLOYMENT BUILT AROUND THIEU'S 150,000. THIS IS IN ADDITION TO
 65K ALREADY OUT, OR 215K.
 3. (TS/LD) FOLLOWING ARE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS THAT ARE NOT
 NECESSARILY RELATED TO THE HIEU MEETING:

A. IN VIEW OF CMC'S DESIRES TO RETAIN A USMC BRIGADE AS A
 PART OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE, I SUGGEST WE ALSO CONSIDER THE
 POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING THE CAPS AS A PART OF THE RESIDUAL
 FORCE. IN ADDITION, WE WOULD REQUIRE A ROLL-UP FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY
 3,500 PERSONNEL FOR A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY 90
 DAYS BEYOND THE DEPARTURE OF THE LAST MAJOR USMC ELEMENT.

B. IN REGARD TO THE REDEPLOYMENT OF TWO CG BATTALIONS TO
 IV CORPS, GENERALS MILDREN, CONROY OR TOWNSEND WERE UNAWARE OF
 YATES' MOVES IN THIS REGARD. GENERAL MILDREN BELIEVES YATES
 IS TWISTING SOME FACTS; HE INTENDS TO TALK WITH YATES SINCE THE
 MOVE OF THE TWO CG BATTALIONS WOULD CREATE MANY PROBLEMS FOR
 USARV. I WANT TO INFORM YOU THAT I DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM WITH
 GENERAL WALT AND TOLD HIM IF THE PROBLEM IS NOT RESOLVED IN OUR
 FAVOR I WILL NOTIFY YOU IMMEDIATELY SO THAT YOU CAN RAISE THE
 ISSUE AT CINCPAC LEVEL OR HIGHER.
 AS YOU KNOW MUCH OF THE ABOVE IS SENSITIVE. PLEASE PROTECT

PAGE SIX RHMMAFA2797 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
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 YOUR SOURCE: WARM REGARDS.
 NICKERSON.

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2797

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 6-67)

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TOP SECRET

PP RHMMAFA
 DE RUHMFMA 2834 3252003
 ZNY TTTT
 P 212003Z NOV 69
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM
 LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. (DELIVER DURING
 WORKING HOURS)

FORCE PLANNING AND PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

A. CG III MAF 200654Z NOV 69 (TS) (EXCLUSIVE)

B. CG FMFPAC 192200Z NOV 69 (TS) (EXCLUSIVE)

1. APPRECIATE VERY MUCH YOU KEEPING ME INFORMED
 CONCERNING STATUS OF MACV REDEPLOYMENT PLANS (REF A
 APPLIES). IN VIEW OF CMC GUIDANCE IN THIS REGARD
 PROVIDED YOU BY REF B, YOUR BEST JUDGMENT SHOULD
 PREVAIL IN ENSUING NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. TOM MILLER SHOULD ARRIVE DANANG ON 18 DEC
 1969 AND, AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED, YOU MAY USE
 HIM AS YOU SEE FIT. IF YOU PREFER A GROUND OFFICER
 AS III MAF G-3, I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO TOM FILLING
 THE ASST DIV CMDR BILLET. AT THE PRESENT TIME, I

PAGE TWO RUHMFMA 2834 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 DON'T CONSIDER IT PRUDENT TO REASSIGN LENNY FRIBOURG
 AS THERE IS AN URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR THE 3D MARDIV
 TO REORIENT FROM A COMBAT TO A TRAINING ENVIRONMENT.
 ADDITIONALLY, A LOT OF INGENIOUS LEADERSHIP WILL BE
 NECESSARY TO COMBAT THE ESCALATING RACIAL PROBLEMS
 TAKING PLACE THERE. I FEEL LENNY CAN MAKE A
 SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION IN BOTH AREAS.

3. PLAN ALSO TO SEND COLONEL STEPHENSON TO MACV.
 GEORGE AND LOU ARE WORKING OUT THE TIMING ON THIS.

4. ON THE SUBJECT OF III MAF/XXIV CORPS CONSOLIDATION,
 I KNOW THAT LOU HAS INFORMED GEORGE OF THE NECESSITY
 FOR RETENTION OF THE TERM "III MAF" IN WHATEVER TITLE
 IS FINALLY AGREED UPON CONCERNING THE CONSOLIDATED
 HEADQUARTERS AS LONG AS A MARINE IS IN COMMAND (E.G.,
 "I CORPS FIELD FORCE VIETNAM/III MAF"). HOWEVER, THE
 DESIGNATION "JOINT FIELD FORCE VIETNAM/III MAF" I
 BELIEVE WOULD BE REDUNDANT IN CONVEYING THE JOINT NATURE
 OF THE HEADQUARTERS. I CONCUR WITH YOU THAT AS LONG
 AS YOU CONTINUE AS "CG I CORPS FIELD FORCE VIETNAM/
 CG III MAF" THE INTEGRITY OF OUR AIR/GROUND TEAM

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUHWFMA 2834 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 WILL BE PRESERVED. ALSO, THE STATUS OF III MAF AS
 A UNI-SERVICE COMMAND WILL BE PRESERVED AS
 WILL DIRECT ACCESS TO COMUSMACV. HOWEVER, I AM CON-
 CERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE SHAPE OF THINGS SHOULD YOU BE
 SUCCEEDED BY AN ARMY LTGEN WHILE THE 1ST DIVISION AND
 1ST WING ARE STILL IN-COUNTRY. GEORGE BOWMAN COULD
 ASSUME DUTIES AS CG III MAF BUT WOULD THE NEW ARMY CG
 LOOK WITH FAVOR ON HIS STAFF ALSO SERVING CG III MAF,
 A SUBORDINATE COMMANDER? I WOULD THINK NOT AND THERE-
 FORE IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE FOR YOU TO PLAN FOR THE
 FORMATION OF A STAFF FOR GEORGE SHOULD HE BECOME CG
 III MAF. AN AUSTERE STAFF COULD BE EARMARKED FROM ASSETS
 OF THE 1ST DIVISION AND 1ST WING AND COULD SATELLITE
 ON THE DIVISION OR WING SHOULD ACTIVATION BE NECESSARY.
 WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON THIS. WARM REGARDS.

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

LIMDIS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

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ZNY TITTT

O 200654Z NOV 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFFAC

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WORKING HOURS)

SECTION ONE OF TWO

SUBJECT: MACV REDEPLOYMENT PLANS (U)

1. (TS/LD) III MAF G-3 ATTENDED MEETING AT HQS MACV ON 19 NOV 69
IN REGARD TO MACV PLANS FOR FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS. PURPOSE OF
MEETING WAS TO PRESENT TO FORCE COMMANDERS AND COMPONENT COMMANDERS
REPRESENTATIVES PREVIEW OF BRIEFING WHICH WILL BE GIVEN TO COMMANDERS
AT 22 NOV 69 WIEU.

2. (TS/LD) BRIEFING WAS INTRODUCED BY MACV J-3 WHO, AFTER HIS
INTRODUCTION, DEPARTED. GIST OF J-3 REMARKS AS FOLLOWS:

A. A NEW ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN RVN WAS MADE; PREVIOUS
ASSESSMENT 5 WEEKS AGO CONCLUDED NO POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL REDE-
PLOYMENTS. LATEST ASSESSMENT CONCLUDED THAT, ON BASIS OF ENEMY
SITUATION, THERE SHOULD NOT BE ADDITIONAL REDEPLOYMENTS DURING FIRST

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA2337 T O P S E C R E T /LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
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FEW MONTHS OF 1970. HOWEVER, THE POLITICAL PRESSURES ARE SUCH
THAT ADDITIONAL REDEPLOYMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE.

B. ASSUMPTION IS THAT A 35,000 REDEPLOYMENT PACKAGE WILL
BE ANNOUNCED IN EARLY DECEMBER TO BE COMPLETED IN APRIL. HOW-
EVER, PENTAGON IS THINKING OF A FIGURE HIGHER THAN 35,000.

C. NSSM-36 HAS SERVED AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR EXAMINATION
OF POSSIBLE FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS.

D. COMUSMACV HAS RECEIVED GUIDANCE FROM CJCS BASED ON
SECDEF MEMO CONCERNING LONG RANGE OUTLOOK FOR RVN. INSTEAD OF
RESIDUAL FORCE OF ABOUT 285,000 SHOULD NOW START THINKING OF
260,000 OR AS LOW AS 190,000. NO PROSPECT OF SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGETS IN
FUTURE; SHOULD START THINKING OF DRAWING DOWN TO
MAAG ONLY WITHIN TWO YEARS; NO LONGER VALID, IN LONGER RANGE,
TO PLAN ON PROVIDING A LOT OF COMBAT SUPPORT TO RVNAF. THE
TERM "RESIDUAL FORCE". NO LONGER A GOOD TERM AND WILL BE
REPLACED BY "U.S. FORCES". PREVIOUSLY, VIETNAMIZATION WAS CONSTRUED
TO MEAN RVN CAPABILITY TO HANDLE "INTERNAL THREAT";
NOW IS EXTENDED TO MEAN "EXTERNAL THREAT" AS WELL. WILL
PROBABLY DRAW DOWN TO 190K-260K BY JULY 1971 AND TO MAAG

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

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PAGE THREE RHMMAFA2337 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
ALONE BY JULY 1973.

E. IN VIEW OF PARAGRAPH D. ABOVE; COMUSMACV WAS TO HAVE MEETING LATER THAT DAY IN REGARD TO DRAWING UP NEW PLANS FOR WHAT HE WANTS RVNAF TO LOOK LIKE IF IT IS TO BE FULLY SELF-SUFFICIENT. EXAMINATION WILL INVOLVE RVNAF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES, TROOPS, WEAPONS, INCREASING OR DECREASING NUMBERS AND TYPES OF UNITS, ETC., MACV REQUIRED TO SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS TO JCS SOONEST (PROBABLY MID-DECEMBER) FOR SUBMISSION TO SECDEF BY 31 JAN 1970.

3. (TS/LINDIS) SUMMARY OF BRIEFING BY J-3 ACTION OFFICER AS FOLLOWS:

A. ASSESSMENT. THE FUTURE IS UNCERTAIN. THE KEY TO WHAT HAPPENS NEXT IN RVN STILL LIES WITH ENEMY. IT NOW APPEARS HE IS SIMULTANEOUSLY PREPARING TWO STRATEGIC OPTIONS. FIRST, TO INCREASE OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY EARLY IN 1970. SECOND, TO CONTINUE THE WAR AT A GENERALLY LOW LEVEL OF ACTIVITY, PUNCTUATED BY OCCASIONAL HIGH POINTS. IN CONJUNCTION WITH EITHER, HE CAN INCREASE TERRORISM, PROPAGANDA, AND POSSIBLY TRY TO DISRUPT GVN PACIFICATION PROGRAMS. THE AMBIGUITY SURROUNDING THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS REMAINS, AND THE SITUATION AS YET

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA2337 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
DOES NOT PROVIDE A SOUND BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS ON FURTHER U.S. TROOP REDEPLOYMENTS.

B. PHASE 3 REDEPLOYMENTS WERE CONSIDERED IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF APPROXIMATELY 200,000 FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS NECESSARY TO REDUCE TO APPROXIMATELY 285,000 SUPPORT LEVEL.

C. SEVERAL FACTORS INFLUENCED MACV THINKING. FIRST, ON 15 OCT 69 CJCS REQUESTED VIEWS ON A SECDEF PROPOSAL TO REDEPLOY 100,000 TROOPS IN FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1970 SPECULATING THAT GREATER FLEXIBILITY COULD BE OBTAINED BY SCHEDULING REDEPLOYMENTS AROUND WHAT WAS DESCRIBED AS THE "TROOP TURBULENCE DURING TET". ON 21 OCT MACV RESPONDED THAT SUCH AN INCREASE ALLOWED VIRTUALLY NO FLEXIBILITY; IT ABANDONED THE "CUT AND TRY" APPROACH; IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO TRY TO SCHEDULE AROUND A POSSIBLE ENEMY SPRING OFFENSIVE. ON 22 OCT, CJCS INDICATED THAT SECDEF MAY WISH TO DISCUSS PHASE 3 REDEPLOYMENTS SOMETIME EARLY IN DECEMBER. CINCPAC FOLLOWED CJCS MESSAGE WITH ITS OWN REQUEST FOR PHASE 3 RECOMMENDATIONS BY 24 NOV. ON 13 NOV CINCPAC REITERATED HIS REQUEST FOR MACV RECOMMENDATIONS ON A PHASE 3 FORCE PACKAGE FOR CINCPAC PLANNING PURPOSES. AS A CONSEQUENCE, MACV HAS BEEN EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES AT THE

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TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFA2337 T O P S E C R E T/LIMDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

100,000 AND 200,000 LEVELS AS A FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH SPECIFIC REDOMMENDATIONS FOR PHASE 3 COULD BE MADE.

D. TWO BROAD ALTERNATIVES WERE CONSIDERED. FIRST ALTERNATIVE, FOLLOWS SCHEME LAID OUT IN ORIGINAL NSSM-36 PLAN, I.E., ADDITIONAL ARMY TROOPS COULD BE REDEPLOYED UNTILL THE ARMY SUPPORT LEVEL, WHICH REMAINS AFTER PHASE 6, IS REACHED, THEN TAKE OUT THE REST OF THE MARINES. THIS WOULD MEAN TAKING OUT 12 BRIGADE FORCES AND THREE DIVISION BASES.

E. IN THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE, THE PROCESS IS REVERSED. ALL THE MARINES AND SOME ARMY FORCES WOULD REDEPLOY IN THE NEXT 100,000. THIS WOULD INVOLVE ONLY EIGHT BRIGADES AND TWO DIVISION BASES. HOWEVER, UNDER THIS OPTION NINE USMC FIGHTER/ATTACK SQUADRONS WOULD ALSO BE REDEPLOYED.

F. THE FOLLOWING WERE GIVEN AS ADVANTAGES OF THE MARINE HEAVY OPTION:

(1) DELAYS DRAWDOWN ON GROUND COMBAT FORCES BY SAVING FOUR BRIGADES AND ONE DIVISION BASE.

(2) FACILITATES READJUSTMENT OF COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN I CORPS, I.E., AMALGAMATION OF XXIV CORPS AND III MAF.

(3) FACILITATES CLOSING NSA DANANG.

PAGE SIX RHMMAFA2337 T O P S E C R E T/LIMDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

(4) APPEASES CRITICS WHO HAVE CRITICIZED EXCESSIVE TACAIR STRENGTH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

(5) ELIMINATES DUPLICATIONS OF TWO SERVICES, I.E., USA AND USMC SERVICES HEADQUARTERS AND LOGISTIC SYSTEMS.

(6) ASSISTS IN RECONSTITUTING PACOM RESERVE.

G. THE FOLLOWING WERE GIVEN AS DISADVANTAGES TO MARINE HEAVY OPTION:

(1) EARLY DRAWDOWN ON TACAIR.

(2) EARLY REQUIREMENT FOR USARV TO RELIEVE NSA DANANG.

(3) MAY REQUIRE IN-COUNTRY DEPLOYMENTS TO COUNTER

ENEMY.

(4) UNCERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON GVN LEADERS IN ICTZ.

(5) ROKMC SUPPORT A PROBLEM.

(6) POTENTIAL SERVICE PROBLEM BY "TAKING OUT THE VOLUNTEERS" AND REPLACING WITH "DRAFTEES".

H. THE MACV PREFERRED OPTION ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE FACTORS IS THE MARINE HEAVY PACKAGE.

I. THE FIRST INCREMENT OF 35,000 WOULD CONSIST OF AN ARMY DIVISION (1ST INFANTRY DIVISION) FOLLOWED BY RLT-26 OR AN ARMY

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TOP SECRET

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 FM CG III MAF
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T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
FROM LTGEN NICKERSON/ MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING
NORMAL WORKING HOURS) SECTION TWO OF TWO
 BRIGADE. ON BASIS OF ENEMY SITUATION, MACV PREFERS TO GO WITH
 RLT-26. THE SECOND INCREMENT OF ABOUT 27,000 WOULD CONSIST OF
 TWO RLT'S, A BRIGADE AND SERVICE SUPPORT. FINALLY, IN THE
 THIRD INCREMENT, THE REST OF THE MARINES WOULD REDEPLOY AND
 THERE WOULD BE A TRANSFER OF NECESSARY PORTIONS OF NSA DANANG
 TO THE ARMY.

J. RECOMMENDATIONS BY MACV STAFF TO COMUSMACV AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) APPROVE ASSESSMENT, UPDATE AND FORWARD TO CJCS AND CINCPCAC.
- (2) MARINE HEAVY OPTION BE ADOPTED FOR FURTHER PLANNING.
- (3) PHASE 3 REPLY TO CINCPCAC TO CONSIST OF 35,000 PACKAGE FOR PLANNING BUT NO RECOMMENDATION AS TO TIMING.

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA2338 **T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR**
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

4. (TS/LD) IN DISCUSSIONS AFTER BRIEFING, BRIEFER INDICATED THAT COMUSMACV PERSONALLY FAVORS THE MARINE HEAVY OPTION AND THE 35,000 FIRST INCREMENT PACKAGE CONTAINING RLT-26; THE OVER-RIDING FACTOR WAS THE LOSS OF 8 BRIGADES VERSAS 12 BRIGADES; BELIEVES, IF HE IS REQUIRED TO REDEPLOY 100,000, THE OPTION WHICH RETAINS THE MOST COMBAT FORCES MUST BE ACCEPTED. ACKNOWLEDGED DRAWDOWN ON TACAIR BUT ESTIMATE REMAINING AIR FORCE SQUADRONS HAVE A SURGE CAPABILITY TO MAKE UP 80 PERCENT OF DIFFERENCE. BRIEFER STATED THE DRASTIC DEPARTURE FROM NSSM-36 WAS DUE TO FACT THAT ENEMY SITUATION HAS NOT PROGRESSED AS FAVORABLY AS WAS EXPECTED AND, THEREFORE, IN EFFECT, PHASE 6 WAS FLIP-FLOPPED WITH PHASES 3 4 AND 5 TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF BRIGADE FORCES REMAINING. IN ADDITION, SINCE RESIDUAL FORCE WILL CHANGE IN MAKE-UP, I.E., LESS EMPHASIS ON U.S. COMBAT SUPPORT, REQUIRE MAXIMUM COMBAT FORCES.
5. (TS/LD) BRIEFER INDICATED COMMANDERS WOULD BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT AT VIEU BUT COMUSMACV HOPED COMMENTS WOULD NOT INVOLVE POLITICAL/SERVICE MATTERS. REALIZES FINAL DECISION WILL BE MADE AT JCS LEVEL AND WOULD PREFER LATTER TO THRASH OUT SERVICE POLITICS; WOULD HOPE HIS COMMANDERS, AS HE, APPROACH THE PROBLEM FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A FIELD COMMANDER

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TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA2338 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT
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 ONLY. UNDERSTANDS USMC DESIRE TO "KEEP FLAG IN-COUNTRY" BUT
 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ARE OVER-RIDING.
 6. (TS/LD) COMUSMACV REPORTEDLY INTENDS TO FORWARD HIS RECOM-
 MENDATIONS ON THE 35,000 PACKAGE TO CINCPAC ON 23 NOV 1969, THE
 DAY AFTER WIEU; IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THERE IS SOME SLIGHT
 POSSIBILITY THAT HE MIGHT CHANGE HIS MIND ON INCLUDING RL1-26
 IN FIRST INCREMENT. HOWEVER, IT FURTHER APPEARS THAT HE
 BELIEVES THE MARINE HEAVY OPTION IS THE MOST PRACTICAL SOLUTION
 AND THAT ANY SERVICE RAMIFICATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED
 AT JCS LEVEL.

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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLYATA-jnf-12
31 October 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: MARINE CORPS FORCES IN RVN

Ref: (a) Admin FMFPAC 281901Z October 1969 (MCEO)

1. PURPOSE. To examine the implications of proposed alternative redeployment packages for the period 1 January-30 June 1970 and to recommend a Marine Corps position in the premise.

2. BACKGROUND.

a. NSSM-36, dated 10 April 1969, Vietnamizing the War, directed that "timetables should be drawn up for the transfer of the combat role to the GVN and restriction of the US role to combat support and advisory missions only, with alternative completion dates of December 31, 1970, June 30, 1971, December 31, 1971 and December 31, 1972."

b. JCSM 522-69, dated 25 August 1969, provided the final interagency report in response to NSSM-36. The report comprises a plan for Vietnamizing the War; redeploying US forces in six phases; and leaving a US residual force in RVN of 267,500 to 285,100 depending on the timetable selected. The report emphasizes the need for flexibility in execution; for utilizing a cut-and-try approach; and accordingly, does not prescribe schedules for the execution of the phases under the various timetables.

c. Phase I redeployments were completed on 31 August 1969, and Phase II redeployments are currently underway, scheduled for completion on 15 December 1969. On completion of Phase II, the US force authorization will be 484,000 troops, as compared to the pre-NSSM-36 level of 549,500.

d. In response to a request by CJCS (JCS 221548Z October 1969), the MACV staff is currently preparing alternative packages for a possible 100,000 man redeployment to be accomplished during the first six months of CY 1970.

e. The most recent MACV staff proposal, summarized in reference (a), offers two options for accomplishing a 100,000 man redeployment during the first six months of CY 1970. These options, together with the NSSM-36 redeployment program are depicted in the spread sheet at Blue Tab 1. As indicated, Option #1 would totally remove Marine Corps combat forces from RVN by 30 June 1970; Option #2 would retain III MAF, less RLT-26 and a limited number of combat service support troops, for an indefinite period beyond 30 June 1970.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLYATA-jnf-12
31 October 1969

3. ASSUMPTIONS. In examining the pros and cons of the MACV staff options, the following assumptions have been accepted:

- a. The decision will be announced not later than 15 December 1969.
- b. Under Option #1, pressure would be intense for a precipitate reduction in Marine Corps structure and end-strength.
- c. Under Option #2, RLT-26 would be inactivated coincident with redeployment.
- d. Under Option #2, III MAF would continue to exercise command in I CTZ.

4. DISCUSSION.

a. The NSSM-36 final report (JCSM 522-69) is the result of a comprehensive effort initiated in April 1969. The basic study on which the report is based was prepared in MACV, thoroughly studied by CINCPAC, and subjected to intensive analysis and review by the Joint Staff, the Services, and representatives of OSD, State Department and CIA prior to its approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Option #1 in the MACV staff proposal offers a radically different priority of redeployment of ground forces from that contained in JCSM 522-69. In effect, it carries Marine Corps redeployments completely through Phase VI, the final phase; concurrently, it removes only those Army combat units scheduled for redeployment in Phase III, and provides for an overall Army redeployment 25% smaller than that established in Phase III.

c. In contrast, Option #2 is essentially consistent with a balanced execution of NSSM-36 Phases III, IV and V redeployments of Marine Corps and Army ground combat forces. Option #2 provides for redeployment of RLT-26 (as in NSSM-36 Phase V) and of three Army divisions and three separate brigades (as compared with three Army divisions and two brigades in NSSM-36 Phases III, IV and V).

d. No rationale is available here to justify the preparation of the Option #1 package which contrasts so drastically with the carefully developed and thoroughly staffed NSSM-36 plan.

5. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES.

- a. The advantages and disadvantages of Option #1 and Option #2 are outlined on the spread sheet at Blue Tab 2.
- b. Manpower implications are discussed in Blue Tab 3.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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ATA-jnf-12
31 October 1969

- c. Logistic implications are analyzed in Blue Tab 4.
- d. Implications for Marine Corps Air are provided in Blue Tab 5.
- e. Basic policy implications are set forth in Blue Tab 6.

6. CONCLUSIONS.

a. The Marine Corps should resist any attempt to adopt Option #1 as developed by the MACV planners.

b. The Marine Corps should continue to support the orderly and balanced progression of redeployments established in JCSM 522-69, Vietnamizing the War. Option #2, while not identical, is consistent with that progression, and can be supported subject to the inclusion of a Marine Corps Air element.

c. The Marine Corps should continue to develop plans to minimize the impact of the possible total redeployment of III MAF during the second half of CY 70, or early CY 1971.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS. It is recommended that:

a. The above conclusions be approved as the Marine Corps position.

b. This position be transmitted, by appropriate means to CG, FMFPAC.

APPROVED

DISAPPROVED

Paragraph 7.a.

Paragraph 7.b.

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~
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~~MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY~~
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(A)

COMPARISON OF
COMPARISON OF

OPTION #1

ADVANTAGES

1. Ends Marine Corps casualties.
2. Eliminates combat attrition of aircraft/equipment.
3. Facilitates early attainment of Post-Vietnam posture.
4. Improves deployed vs. non-deployed ratio.
5. Reduces O&M costs.
6. Reduces ammo consumption to peacetime level.
7. Permits attainment of stronger PACOM reserve.

TOP SECRET - SECURITY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

OPTIONS #1 AND #2

DISADVANTAGES

1. Removes all Marine Corps combat forces from a hot war. ✓
2. Generates temporary facilities requirements.
3. Causes massive personnel turbulence.
4. Causes air-basing problems.
5. Could generate demands for too-rapid end-strength reductions, adversely affecting readiness. ✓
6. Establishes FMF forces in CONUS/Okinawa garrisons with inadequate amphibious lift to respond to contingencies. ✓
7. Results in mass retrograde of supplies and equipment with attendant storage/maintenance/accountability problems. ✓
8. Could place Marine Corps, as only uncommitted Service, last in line for increasingly scarce Defense dollars. ✓
9. Could cause problems in aborting shipments of materiel to RVN.
10. Terminates opportunity for R&D, training and experience under combat conditions.

III MAF: Force Reduction (annex-11)
 10 Oct - 17 Dec 69
 w/ Embassy "K"

OPTION #2

ADVANTAGES

1. Is consistent with thoroughly staffed NSSM-36 plan.
2. Retains significant Marine Corps role in hot war with division/wing team committed, and command in I CTZ.
3. Eases base-loading problems.
4. Permits orderly manpower actions, reducing turbulence and facilitating readiness.
5. Permits orderly retrograde of materiel.
6. Supports Marine Corps acquisition of "fair share" of Defense dollars.
7. Avoids highlighting serious scarcity of amphibious lift.
8. Results in modest savings through redeployment and inactivation of RLT-26.
9. Permits continued R&D, training and experience under combat conditions.

ON #2

DISADVANTAGES

1. Marine Corps casualties continue.
 2. Combat attrition of aircraft/equipment continues.
 3. O&M costs only slightly reduced.
 4. Ammo consumption continues at higher rate.
 5. Deployed vs. non-deployed ratio remains unfavorable.
 6. Attainment of Post-Vietnam posture is delayed.
 7. This option reduces/defers problems attendant on redeployment of III MAF, but does not eliminate them.
-

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

(PHASE APPLIES ONLY TO NSSM-36 COLUMN)

NSSM-36

PHASE 1&2 REDEPLOYMENTS AND FORCES REMAINING IN-COUNTRY

1	9th Inf Div(-)& Spt	15.4
	RLT-9 & Spt	8.4
	Task Force 117 & Spt	1.2
		<u>25.0</u>
2	USA Spt Elm	3.6
	3d MD(-)& 1st MAW(REAR)	18.4
	USN Spt Elm	1.7
	USAF Tact Elm	1.3
		<u>25.0</u>
3	Inf Div, Separate	
	Brigade & Spt	41.1
	USMC Spt Elm	.8
	USN Spt Elm	3.4
	USAF Tact & Spt Elm	4.7
		<u>50.0</u>
4	Four Brigades, one Div	34.3
	Base & Spt	
	USN Spt Elm	.7
	USAF, Tact & Spt Elm	.9
		<u>35.9</u>
5	Four Brigades, one Div	29.5
	Base & Spt	
	One USMC RLT & Spt	6.3
	USN Spt Elm	2.5
	USAF Tact & Spt Elm	.8
		<u>39.1</u>
6	Four Brigades, one Div	26.5
	Base & Spt	
	One Mar Div, 1st MAW	47.7
	(-) & Spt	
	USN Spt Elm	14.8
	USAF Tact & Spt Elm	.4
		<u>89.4</u>

- SAME -

One Brigade & Spt	14.0
3d MD(-) 1st MAW (REAR)	18.5
USN Spt	5.4
USAF Tact Elm	2.6
	<u>40.5</u>

Forces Remaining in RVN

1st Inf Div	
4th Inf Div	
23d Inf Div	
199th LIB	
3d BDE 9th Inf Div	
25th Inf Div	
173d ABN BDE	
1st BDE, 5th Mech	
101st ABN Div (AM)	
1st Cav Div (AM)	
11th ARMD Cav Regt	
Combat Spt	
Combat Service Spt	
TOTAL USA	<u>338.4</u>

1st Mar Div	
RLT-26	
1st MAW(-)	
Combat Spt	
Combat Service Spt	
TOTAL USMC	<u>55.5</u>

Tactical Spt	
Service Spt	
TOTAL USN & CG	<u>30.8</u>

Tactical Spt	
Service Spt	
TOTAL USAF	<u>59.3</u>

TOTAL FORCES AFTER
15 DECEMBER 1960 707.0

US RESIDUAL FORCE IN NSSM-36

Forges	18-Month	24-Month	30-Month	42-Month
<u>USA</u>				
2 Airmobile Divisions				
2 Separate Brigades				
Combat Spt				
Combat Svc Spt				
TOTAL USA	217.9	217.9	216.7	205.8
<u>USMC</u>				
One Anglico				
Support Elements				
TOTAL USMC	.6	.6	.6	.6
<u>USN</u>				
Combat Spt				
Svc Spt				
TOTAL USN & CG	13.2	13.0	12.3	10.1
<u>USAF</u>				
Combat Spt				
Svc Spt				
TOTAL USAF	53.4	53.4	52.6	51.0
TOTAL RESIDUAL FORCE	285.1	284.9	282.2	267.5

III MAF: Force Reduction Planning,
 10 Oct - 17 Dec 69
 w/ Entry "K"

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

OPTION #1

OPTION #2

To be Redeployed - Phase 3
1st Inf Div
One Brig, 4th Inf Div
Service Spt

TOTAL USA 30.6

To be Redeployed - Phase 3
1st Inf Div
4th Inf Div
23d Inf Div
199th LIB
3d BDE, 9th Inf Div
Service Spt

TOTAL USA 86.9

1st Mar Div
RLT-26
1st MAW(-)
Combat Spt
Combat Service Spt

TOTAL USMC 54.6

RLT-26
Service Spt

TOTAL USMC 7.5

USN Elements

TOTAL USN 11.2

USN Elements

TOTAL USN 2.0

USAF Elements

TOTAL USAF 3.6

USAF Elements

TOTAL USAF 3.6

PHASE 3 REDEPLOYMENTS 100.0

PHASE 3 REDEPLOYMENTS 100.0

FORCES REMAINING AFTER 1 JUL 1970

USA

4th Inf Div(-)
 23d Inf Div
 199th LIB
 3d BDE, 9th Inf Div
 25th Inf Div
 173d ABN BDE
 1st BDE, 5th Mech
 101st ABN Div (AM)
 1st Cav Div (AM)
 11th ARMD Cav Regt
 Combat Spt & Svc Spt

TOTAL USA 307.8

USMC Support Elements .9

USN & CG Support Elements 19.6

USAF Tactical & Support 55.7

TOTAL FORCES IN RVN 384.0

FORCES REMAINING AFTER 1 JUL 1970

USA

25th Inf Div
 173d ABN BDE
 1st BDE, 5th Mech
 101st ABN Div (AM)
 1st Cav Div (AM)
 11th ARMD Cav Regt
 Combat Spt & Svc Spt

TOTAL USA 251.5

USMC

1st Mar Div
 1st MAW(-)
 Combat Spt & Svc Spt

TOTAL USMC 48.0

USN & CG Support Elm 28.8

USAF Tact & Spt 55.7

TOTAL FORCES IN RVN 384.0

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

23d Inf Div

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

IMPLICATIONS ON MARINE CORPS MANPOWER

1. This paper summarizes the impact of Options #1 and #2 on manpower and recommends that redeployment and deactivation (reduction of requirements) be phased so as to permit a corresponding reduction in strength.
2. The peacetime strength goal has been taken as full manning of the structure proposed for PO-72, including certain previously approved peacetime objectives from PO-71. The objective strength required is about 226.9 thousand.
3. Option #1
 - a. This option reduces the end strength requirement on 30 June 1970 to essentially the peacetime level. Because of additional patients, an end strength not exceeding 230 thousand could be justified. The current approved peacetime FYDP is 205.3 thousand.
 - b. Strengths of this magnitude cannot reasonably be attained by 30 June 1970, in the face of a redeployment of 30 June 1970.
 - c. Assuming return of all forces to CONUS by 30 June 1970, recruit input could be reduced beginning in January to a peacetime level of about 4000 per month. This action, combined with the current (61K) early release program, would reduce strength to 272 thousand by 30 June 1970. Continuation of this action would produce an end strength of 228 thousand by end FY 71.
 - d. Reduction of recruit input on 1 January 1970 to peacetime levels means that the Marine Corps could not support any forces in combat, or more than 2/3 MEF deployed in WestPac beyond 30 June 1970. Should a significant contingency arise after that date, emergency personnel actions could be required to make initial deployments, while calling up Reserves might be required to sustain such additional deployment. (K)
 - e. This risk could be reduced in direct proportion to additional recruits accessed; the cost would be either a slower phasedown (i.e., greater strength at end FY 70) or a larger early release program with its serious effect on turbulence, readiness and on the would-be career Marine.
 - f. Rapid phasedown such as would be required under this option would require significant relief from normal grade limitations in FY 70 and 71 in the enlisted force, and would require early release of officers. In addition, assuming it is possible to return 55,000 Marines in the short time envisioned, serious base loading problems would be created at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune -- although the load would be significantly lower at recruit depots.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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~~MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY~~

g. Further, the structure would be over-manned by about 50,000 Marines at the beginning of FY 71. This strength excess would have to be reduced as quickly as possible. To do this would require a different concept of early release than the current program. The early release program now planned for FY 71 will early release about 5,000 additional Marines each month during FY 71. In addition to these losses, 15,000 additional Marines whose normal EAS is in FY 72 or beyond would have to be released in each of the first three months of FY 71 in order to reduce most of the structure over-manning. This drastic action would essentially require each unit to devote most of their energy to separation activities during this period. Despite this, total strength would be about 245K at the end of this 3 month period, and would not reach peacetime levels until the end of FY 71.

h. Since strength cannot be reduced as rapidly as the requirement is reduced, the monetary savings which might be expected will not accrue.

i. This option is judged to be unsatisfactory because of the impact on morale, base loading, and fiscal considerations.

4. Option #2

a. This option is both preferable and more feasible.

b. Assuming that RLT-26 would be returned by 30 June and deactivated immediately thereafter, recruit input would be reduced beginning 1 January 1970. This coupled with the planned early release program, will keep the phasedown of manpower in phase with the reduction of requirements.

c. In addition, this option provides for the redeployment of a unit of a size which eases transportation problems, base loading, turbulence, management problems, and impact on individuals.

5. Recommendation

a. Option #2 is far superior to Option #1 since it's adverse impact on individual Marines, turbulence, and force renewal is much less. Required strength reduction could be attained with no increase in turbulence above that already existing, or expected, due to current early release and redeployments. For this reason, Option #2 is recommended. K

6. Phasedown Schedule

a. From a G-1 standpoint the most desirable approach to phasedown would be a phased reduction of requirements which would reduce the requirements in step with the ability to reduce total strength. The ability to reduce total strength is greatly dependent on the reduction in recruit input in advance of, but in phase with, the reduction of requirements for recruits. This would minimize turbulence, effect on individual Marines, and would reduce over-manning.

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b. If Option #2 were considered to be a starting point for further redeployments, such a phased reduction of requirements could proceed as follows:

- (1) 15 Dec 69 decision to implement all phases.
- (2) 30 Jun 70 redeploy RLT-26 and associated support to CONUS and deactivate.
- (3) 31 Dec 70 redeploy all remaining Marines, except for 1 MEB, to CONUS and deactivate all remaining temporary structure.
- (4) During the period 31 Dec 70 to 30 Jun 71 restructure Marine Corps to desired postwar structure.
- (5) Following redeployment of MEB, which could be as early as 30 Jun 71, assume peacetime strength.

c. Strengths (approximate)

	<u>Strengths During Period</u>	<u>End Period Requirement</u>
1 Jan - 30 Jun 70	300K - 290K	294K
30 Jun - 31 Dec 70	290K - 270K	270K
31 Dec 70 - 30 Jun 71	270K - 250K	234K
30 Jun 71 - 30 Jun 72	250K - 227K	227K

d. The key requirement to effect a phasedown of this rapidity is the decision, prior to beginning the sequence, that the sequential actions will occur. This is necessary to minimize the risk associated with reducing recruit input 6 months in advance of the time the requirement is actually reduced.

(K)

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

IMPLICATIONS FOR MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS

Ref: (a) Your ltr ATA-dnc-12 of 29Oct69

Encl: (1) Logistic Analysis

1. In accordance with paragraph 4 of reference (a) the following information is submitted.
2. Option #2 is recommended as the best choice and is considered most consistent with the best interests of the Marine Corps. Additionally, plans are now prepared for incremental withdrawals. Advantages and disadvantages for both options are delineated in enclosure (1).
3. Current base loading and basing alternatives for redeployment of ground and air units are outlined in Tab A, enclosure (1).
4. A comparison of potential annual O&M savings for the 1st year after redeployment is at Tab B to enclosure (1). Estimates of procurement costs cannot be determined until specific units and dates are known, however, savings would be realized, primarily in ammunition costs.
5. Whether a "roll-up" force is required beyond the 6 month period would be contingent on a number of variables, i.e., shipping availability, changes in policy regarding what equipment would be turned over to RVN, etc. Current Marine Corps policy is that units will redeploy with all serviceable and unserviceable repairable equipment including Non-TAM Garrison Property which can be economically repaired. Materiel would be handled in the following manner:

(a) T/E and T/A equipment in hands of FLC belonging to units would be shipped to owning units or repair facility as appropriate.

(b) Any excess would be first screened by FMFPAC to satisfy any West/Mid PAC requirements. Remaining excess would be screened through PURA. Undocumented information has been obtained from FMFPAC, G-4 plans that if all combat and combat support units were withdrawn during the first four months, that remaining FLC units could complete the roll-up of all equipment in the remaining two months. Again this would depend on the availability of shipping.

K (Contd)

6. Preliminary actions would have to be taken to determine the following:

a. By FMFPAC:

- (1) Availability of shipping.
- (2) Total weight, cube, and square feet of vehicles/cargo.
- (3) Type of lift, i.e., combat vs. administrative.

b. By CMC:

- (1) Decisions be made on basing alternatives.

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(2) Availability and release of temporary construction/ tents for units to be redeployed to the West Coast as outlined in Tab A to enclosure (1).

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

(K)

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLYLOGISTIC ANALYSISOption #1Advantages

- a. Saves combat loss costs, reduces ammunition consumption to peacetime level, as offset by cost to reconstitute PWRs.
- b. Reduces O&M costs as shown in Tab B.

Disadvantages

- a. Potential reductions in combat effectiveness of major Marine Corps units due to mass redeployment during a short period of time where units may be separated from equipment/supplies because of shipping/time constraints.
- b. Generates temporary facility requirements. See Tab A.
- c. Mass retrograde of material within a limited time period will generate evaluation and accountability problems.
- d. Possible problems in frustrating shipments of material to RVN.

Option #2Advantages

- a. Only 1 regiment potentially ineffective during redeployment versus a MEF under Option #1.
- b. Minimal problems retrograding material.
- c. Minimal facility impact. No projected temporary facility requirements.

Disadvantages

- a. Procurement/O&M costs continue at a higher rate than under Option #1.

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NAVY MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TAB A

CAPACITY/CURRENT LOADS

A. GENERAL: These loads reflect status after phase II redeployments. BKS load shows those actually requiring billeting space and total load includes all personnel assigned. An RLT is based upon approximately 7,500 total personnel. All billeting shown is at crowded conditions (i.e. 50SF/man). No temporary facility requirements are foreseen for Option #2, therefore the following addresses Option #1.

B. STATUS

<u>INSTALLATION</u>	<u>CROWDED CAPACITY 50SF/MAN</u>	<u>TOTAL LOAD</u>	<u>CURRENT BKS LOAD 1/</u>	<u>VACANCIES (RLTs & MAGS/SQDNS)</u>
Butler	24,060	18,018	16,307	1-RLT 2/
Futema	4,539	2,173	1,879	1-HMH 2/ 1-MATCU Det VMGR (4 A/C)
Iwakuni	7,646	3,591	3,591	1-MAG (4-fixed)
Kaneohe	9,903	3,633	2,219	2/3 - RLT 1-MAG (2-fixed/2-helo/ VMO)
Pendleton	43,215	44,303	36,949	1-RLT
29 Palms	8,200	4,059 3/	2,138 3/	1/3 RLT 3/
El Toro	7,288	8,148	4,206	2-MAGS (4-fixed)
Santa Ana	2,513	2,968	1,644	1-MAG (4-helo) 4/
Camp Lejeune	32,350	38,641	22,935	1-RLT
Totals - 4 RLT's & 5 MAG's				

Footnote:

- 1/ Less SLF
- 2/ Would require adjustment in troop ceiling or Air/Ground split
- 3/ With Phase II CE School move, increases to 6,189 total/4,230 BKS load
- 4/ MAG currently at Santa Ana will deactivate

C. BASING ALTERNATIVES: Three possible basing alternatives with estimated cost are:

1. Using all available spaces listed in paragraph B

Ground 4-RLT	30,000 spaces
Air 5 MAGS	11,500 spaces
TOTAL avail	41,500 spaces
Total redeploying (Option #1 USMC & USN)	56,500 pers

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	<u>Shortfall</u>	15,000 spaces
	less officers (BAQ)	<u>-1,500</u> spaces
	NET	13,500 spaces
Estimated cost (\$279/man-tent camp		\$3.8M say
cost model)		<u>\$4.0M</u>

2. Using all available spaces listed in paragraph B less Camp Butler.

	<u>Ground</u>	22,500 spaces
	<u>Air</u>	<u>11,500</u> spaces
	Total avail	34,000 spaces
Total redeploying (Option #1 USMC&USN)		56,500 pers
	Shortfall	22,500 spaces
	less officers (BAQ)	<u>-2,250</u> spaces
	NET	20,250 spaces
Estimated cost (\$279/man-tent camp		<u>\$5.6M</u>
Cost model)		

3. Using all available spaces listed in paragraph B less Camp Butler and Camp Lejeune.

	Ground	15,000 spaces
	Air	<u>11,500</u> spaces
	Total avail	26,500 spaces
Total redeploying (Option #1 USMC-USN)		56,500 pers
	Shortfall	30,000 spaces
	less officers (BAQ)	<u>-3,000</u> spaces
	NET	27,000 spaces
Estimated cost (\$279/man-tent camp		<u>\$7.5M</u>
cost model)		

TAB A

(K)

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TAB B

Order of Magnitude Annual Savings for O&M the 1st year after redeployment.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>OPTION #1</u>	<u>OPTION #2</u>
Operating Cost	\$60M	\$8.7M
Transportation of Things	\$35M	\$5.0M
Facility Operations/Training/ Base Support (Average strength 220,000)	\$30M	0

Note: The current FY 71 O&MMC budget is for \$424.7M. The FY 72 (post war) budget is estimated at \$243.0M. (Post war strength 205,000)

(5)

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

IMPLICATIONS FOR MARINE CORPS AIR

1. If one RLT is redeployed (Option #2), commensurate tactical air reductions would logically fall within the following range:

<u>LOW</u>		<u>HIGH</u>	
1 VMFA	385	1 VMFA	385
1 HMM	<u>279</u>	1 VMA	260
	664	1 HMM	279
		1 HMH	263
		1 H&MS	458
		1 MABS	<u>450</u>
			2095

The 7,500 personnel figure would have to be increased to include the air units redeployed.

2. If all Marines are redeployed (Option #1), it is assumed that all SEA-augment air units (MAG-56, 2 HMLs) will be deactivated. 1stMAW headquarters and two fixed-wing MAGS would be located at Iwakuni, a helo MAG and VMGR at Futema, and the remaining two fixed wing MAGS and one helo MAG would return to El Toro/Santa Ana.

3. As requested at the action officers meeting on 29 October, Pros and Cons on Options #1 and #2 are provided below:

a. Option #1 (All USMC withdrawn by 30Jun70)

(1) Pros:

(a) Consolidate USMC aviation essentially in post-RVN posture, simplifying maintenance/supply support.

(b) Eliminates combat attrition of aircraft.

(c) Improves deployed vs non-deployed ratio as units redeploy to CONUS.

(2) Cons:

(a) Assuming there is no reduction in USMC strength, causes critical (super emergency) basing problems--MilCon to accommodate all units not complete by 30Jun70, with loss of Atsugi as base for one MAG, base loading is impossible. Navy VP squadrons must be out of Iwakuni before two fixed wing USMC MAGS can be accommodated there. (K)

(b) If large-scale attempt to salvage SATS matting is made, a large "roll-up" force would be required beyond 30Jun70.

(c) Personnel turbulence would impact unfavorably on overall readiness.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

b. Option #2

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(1) Pros:

- (a) Eases base loading problems.
- (b) Keeps SEA-augment units (which USMC hopes to add to permanent structure) active.
- (c) Reduces personnel turbulence and improves readiness.
- (d) Keeps parts priority high (for aircraft in combat) and aids in budget allocations.
- (e) Allows continued R&D under combat conditions.
- (f) If III MAF keeps command of I Corps, allows continued operation under the current air control system and integrity of air/ground team.

(2) Cons:

- (a) Combat attrition of aircraft continues.
- (b) Deployed/non-deployed ratio remains unfavorable.
- (c) Maintenance/supply remain unconsolidated.

4. Based on the foregoing and overall Marine Corps impact, Option #2 is recommended.

(K)

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ATA-jnf-12

31 October 1969

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

1. This paper addresses the policy considerations fundamental to development of a Marine Corps position in support of MACV staff Option #1 or Option #2. The physical capability of the Marine Corps to accomplish Option #1 and the manpower, air and logistic implications of such a rapid redeployment are addressed in similar supporting papers and accordingly are not included herein.
2. It would appear that the single most controlling factor in determining whether the Marine Corps should opt for a rapid redeployment from RVN, or for retaining III MAF in-country beyond 30 June 1970 is the anticipated course of that war over the next 6-18 months. Should the NSSM-3 assumption be accepted - that US combat involvement ceases after 1 July 1970 - the earliest feasible withdrawal of Marine Corps forces should be pursued. Conversely, should the alternative NSDM-27 Assumption B be accepted - a phasedown to about 260,000 troops by 30 June 1971 with combat continuing through 30 June 1973 - the Marine Corps should strive to retain its division/wing team in RVN until mid-year 1971 at which time the level of US forces will be reduced to the residual force strength.
3. There is no persuasive evidence that the US combat role can be terminated safely by June 1970. While the intensity of combat may remain comparatively low, the capability of the NVA/VC forces to conduct significant offensive operations will continue to pose a threat which RVNAF alone cannot contain. Removal of Marine Corps forces from RVN under such conditions would be indefensible - a denial of the Marine Corps' reason for existence.
4. To redeploy Marine Corps forces from the existing combat environment could only be rationalized, if at all, on the basis of the Corps' high standard of readiness and its capability for rapid reentry or for commitment in some other contingency situation. However, the paucity of amphibious lift invites serious question as to our reaction capability. FMF units in CONUS or WestPac garrisons, supported by inadequate lift, could be expected to draw heavy fire from the force and budget cutters.

(K) (cont'd)

5. While a premature withdrawal of Marine Corps forces from the combat zone must be resisted, retention of those forces in RVN beyond the period of gainful military employment would be equally undesirable. Current efforts are focused on the rapid turnover of the combat role to RVNAF. SecDef has expressed a desire to speed up Vietnamization to make it an 18 month program (indicating completion by end CY 1970). The existing NSSM-36 provides an orderly progression of redeployments, including the withdrawal of all remaining US forces, less the Residual Force, during Phase VI. It is in this phase that III MAF is

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scheduled to redeploy, leaving essentially only a Marine Corps advisory element in RVN. The timing of Phase VI redeployments is flexible - it could commence as early as October 1970 (18 month timetable) or as late as October 1973 (42 month timetable). In any event, the President has consistently held to his position, announced at Midway on 8 June 1969, that troop replacements will be governed by the three criteria: First, the progress insofar as the training and equipping of South Vietnamese forces; second, progress on the Paris peace talks; and, third, the level of enemy activity.

6. Of the two options proposed by MACV planners, Option #1 should be totally rejected by the Marine Corps; Option #2 is considered to be generally consistent with the NSSM-36 approach, and therefore should be accepted if a decision is made for redeployment of 100,000 US troops in the first half of CY 1970. However, efforts should be made to include an appropriate Marine Corps air element in the redeployment package.

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HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG FMFPAC	DATE 20 NOV 69
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 92236Z NOV 69		COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		11/20	CBY	SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG	I		11/20	CBY	
	C/S	I		11/20		
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
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REMARKS:

DISPOSITION:

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Section	Signature

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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TOP SECRET

PP RHMAFA
 DE RUHFMA 2595 3232236
 ZNY TTTT
 P 192236Z NOV 69
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RHMAFA/CG III MAF
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN NICKERSON FROM
 LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING
 WORKING HOURS ONLY.

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 180225Z/NOV69 (TS) (EXCLUSIVE)

B. CMC 190011Z/NOV69 (TS)(EXCLUSIVE)(NOTAL)

1. (TS) REF A REQUESTED GUIDANCE IN CONNECTION WITH
 CURRENT PLANNING ON THE SUBJECT. BY REF B CMC PRO-
 VIDED THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE:

A. DURING HIS CURRENT VISIT, SECRETARY PACKARD
 WILL DISCUSS THE SUBJECT WITH GENERAL ABRAMS, WHO WILL ADVISE
 CINCPAC/JCS ON A 190K RESIDUAL FORCE ALTERNATIVE ASAP
 AFTER THE DISCUSSIONS. JCS CONSIDER THEY HAVE A
 HANDLE ON A 260K RESIDUAL FORCE ALTERNATIVE AS
 APPROXIMATED IN NSSM-36, BUT VARIOUS BUDGET DRILLS IN
 WASHINGTON ARE REQUIRING EXAMINATION OF VARIOUS RESIDUAL

PAGE TWO RUHFMA 2595 T O P S E C R E T MCEO
 FORCE LEVELS AND DATES FOR ACCELERATING THE VIETNAMIZATION
 PROGRAM.

B. IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR MARINE CORPS
 INPUT IN CONNECTION WITH THE 190K RESIDUAL FORCE
 ALTERNATIVE UNDER CONSIDERATION, OUR PROPOSAL SHOULD
 BE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

(1) NO MARINES IN EITHER THE 260K OR 190K
 RESIDUAL FORCE OTHER THAN THE .6K ADVISORY AND ANGLICO
 PERSONNEL PROVIDED FOR IN NSSM-36.

(2) PHASING OF REDEPLOYMENTS SUBJECT TO ABE'S
 DESIRES AND NATIONAL APPROVAL.

(3) REDEPLOYMENT PHASING OF MARINE FORCES SHOULD
 PROVIDE FOR BALANCED AIR/GROUND PACKAGES WITH ADEQUATE
 COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT.

(4) MINIMUM FORCE FOR ROLLUP AS REQUIRED BY III MAF.
 2. (TS) IN RESPONSE TO CINCPAC REQUEST FOR RECOMMEN-
 DATIONS FOR INCORPORATION INTO A CINCPAC TASKING MESSAGE
 TO ABE RELATIVE TO DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN FOR PHASE
 III RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, AS
 CITED IN REF A. I PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING:

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUHNFMA 2595 T O P S E C R E T M C E O
A. EMPHASIZE THE REQUIREMENT FOR DETAILED CON-
SIDERATION OF TIME-PHASING CONCERNING INTERRELATED
MATTERS OF RVNAF IMPROVEMENT, THE VC/NVA THREAT AND
U.S. FORCE REDEPLOYMENTS.

B. ADHERENCE, AS FAR AS PRACTICABLE, TO THE
PRIORITIES OF U.S. FORCE REDEPLOYMENTS AS CONTAINED
IN NSSM-36. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
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2595

*Contradicts
1 B 2*

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

(J)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG FMFPAC	DATE 18 NOV 69
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 180225Z NOV 69		COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
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	CG	I		11/20	CB	SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
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Ref (a)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PP RUEBHOA RHMAFA
DE RUHFMA 2307 3220225

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P 180225Z NOV 69

FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEBHOA/CMC
INFO RHMAFA/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO
LTGEN NICKERSON FROM LTGEN BUSE, MARINE CORPS EYES
ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY
FORCE PLANNING (U)

- A. DJS 111501Z/NOV69 (TS) (EXCLUSIVE) (NOTAL)
B. CINCPAC MEMO SER: 00091-69 OF 13NOV 69 (TS)
(SENSITIVE) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) REF A, OBTAINED FROM A PRIVILEGED SOURCE, ADVISED
CINCPAC CONCERNING TWO SECDEF MEMOS DATED 10NOV1969;

A. MEMO FOR JCS DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT, MLT 31JAN
1970, OF A PLAN FOR A PHASE III RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND
MODERNIZATION PROGRAM TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

(1) RAISING RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS TO THE
POINT WHERE GVN CAN MAINTAIN AT LEAST CURRENT LEVELS
OF SECURITY WHILE U.S. FORCES ARE PHASED DOWN FIRST TO

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 2307 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
A SUPPORT FORCE (I.E., EITHER APPROX 260K OR 190K) BY
1JULY1971 AND THEN PROGRESSIVELY TO THE LEVEL OF AN
ADVISORY FORCE (MAAG WITH NO STRENGTH LEVEL PRESCRIBED)
BY 1JULY1973.

(2) UPDATED EXAMINATION OF U.S. FORCE
REDEPLOYMENTS.

(3) ASSESSMENT OF GVN CAPABILITY BASED ON
CURRENT VC/NVA THREAT.

B. MEMO FOR SERVICE SECRETARIES TO REVIEW THEIR
RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION EFFORTS TO ENSURE
THEY ARE IN ACCORD WITH THE REVISED GUIDANCE PROVIDED
JCS, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREAS OF TRAINING, COMBAT
SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT.

2. (TS) REF B, ADVISED CINCPAC SERVICE COMPONENT
COMMANDERS OF THE FOLLOWING:

A. THAT CINCPAC EXPECTS TO BE TASKED BY JCS
BY APPROX 15NOV69 TO DEVELOPE A PLAN FOR PHASE III RVNAF
IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF RAISING
RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS TO THE POINT WHERE GVN CAN MAINTAIN
AT LEAST CURRENT LEVELS OF SECURITY WHILE U.S. FORCES

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMHMA 2307 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
ARE PHASED DOWN.

B. THAT PLAN MUST INCLUDE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW
OF RVNAF MISSIONS, FORCE STRUCTURE AND FORCE MIX, AS
WELL AS EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS.

C. THAT PLAN MUST INCLUDE UPDATED EXAMINATION
OF U.S. FORCE REDEPLOYMENTS.

D. THAT PLAN SHOULD INCLUDE ALTERNATIVE SUPPORT
FORCE PACKAGES, INCLUDING MISSIONS AND TYPES OF UNITS
BY SERVICE, AND AN ASSESSMENT OF RISKS.

E. THAT CINCPAC SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS WERE
TO REVIEW THE ANTICIPATED TASKING AND TO SUBMIT,
BY COB 18NOV1969, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCORPORATION
IN A COORDINATED TASKING MESSAGE TO COMUSMACV.

3. (TE) WHILE CINCPAC HAS NOT PASSED REF A TO US OFFICIALLY,
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT RECEIPT OF REF A AT CINCPAC HAS
PROMPTED REF B.

4. (IS) SHOULD NICK BE CALLED UPON TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION
TO COMUSMACV BASED ON REF A, REQUEST YOUR GUIDANCE
CONCERNING DESIRED SCHEDULE FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF MARINE
FORCES UNDER THE PARAMETERS ESTABLISHED BY REF A.

PAGE 4 RUMHMA 2307 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2307

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM MG TOWNSEND C/S MACV	DATE 13 NOV 69
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Section	Signature

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*Is on Butler's Study
in COMUSMACV
hands - ?*

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

TOP SECRET

0. 101456Z ZYX ZEE-4 ZEE-1
 EXTANT TO-NEXT 243 MACV SAIGON
 TO ZEN/SEN BRONN CDR 2ND TAY SON
 LTC MILDREN DCG USARV LONG BINH
 WADM ZIMMALT CDR NAVFORV SAIGON
 LTC NICKERSON CG III MAF DA NANG
 LTC CORCORAN CG I FORCEV NHA TRANG
 LTC EWELL CG II FORCEV LONG BINH
 LTC ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS PHU BAI
 MG WETHERILL CG DVAC CANH HO
 ZEN

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE MAC 14576 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. ON 6 NOV 69, COMUSMACV DIRECTED THAT A SPECIAL BRIEFING BE PRESENTED TO THE COMMANDERS AT THE MICH ON 20 NOV 69. COMMANDERS IN ATTENDANCE WILL BE AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT. THIS SPECIAL BRIEFING WILL INCLUDE:

A. AN UPDATE OF THE 15 OCT 69 ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM WHICH WILL BE SENT TO CIGS ON 23 NOV 69.

B. RECOMMENDED CONCEPTS FOR FURTHER TROOP REDEPLOYMENTS.

2. TO ASSIST ADDRESSEES IN PREPARING FOR THE MICH DISCUSSIONS WITH COMUS, IT IS REQUESTED THAT ADDRESSEES: C-3'S OR C-3 REPRESENTATIVE, AND AN ACTION OFFICER FAMILIAR WITH THE CLOSURE SUBJECT MATTER, TOTAL OF (2) ATTEND A PRE-BRIEF AT MACV HQ AT 1430 HRS, 19 NOV 69 IN ROOM 2435.

3. ACTION OFFICER IS COL HANLET, MAC 13-03, EXT 2987

CP-A

330 NOTE: DELIVER DURING OPENING DUTY HOURS

233



TOP SECRET



HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-60)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG FMFPAC	DATE 08 NOV 1969
			SERIAL NO./CORTEL DATE 080043Z NOV 69		COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
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EXCLUSIVE
FOR
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

VV PAC56G
 PP RUEBHOA RMMMAFA
 DE RUMHFA 1147 3120043
 ZNY TTTTT
 P 080043Z NOV 69
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC
 INFO RMMMAFA/CG III MAP

BT

T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN
 NICKERSON FROM LTGEN BUSE. DELIVER DURING WORKING
 HOURS ONLY.

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. ADMIN FMFPAC 281901Z/OCT69 (TS) (MCEO)
 B. CMC POINT PAPER ATA-JNT-12 DATED 31 OCT 69

SUBJ: MAR CORPS FORCES RVN

1. (TS) MOST RECENT INFO FROM NICK CONCERNING MACV
 PLANNING FOR FURTHER REDUCTION OF FORCES IN RVN RE-
 PORTS THE FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS:

A. OPTIONS 1 AND 2, AS REPORTED BY REF A, WERE
 BRIEFED TO ABE ON THE 6TH. ADDITIONALLY, ABE WAS
 BRIEFED ON A 35 K PACKAGE (INCLUDING RLT-26), WHICH
 WAS PROPOSED AS THE INITIAL WITHDRAWAL INCREMENT UNDER

PAGE 2 RUMHFW1147 **T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 EITHER OPTION 1 OR 2. THE USMC PORTION TOTALS 7.5 K.

B. NO DECISIONS WERE MADE AT THIS TIME. ABE'S
 DECISION IS NOT ANTICIPATED UNTIL AFTER HIS NEXT
 COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE ON 22 NOVEMBER, AT WHICH TIME
 NICK AND OTHER MACV COMMANDERS WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY
 TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS. IN ADDITION TO SUPPORTING
 YOUR GUIDANCE ON THE 100 K OPTIONS, NICK PLANS TO OBJECT
 TO THE MARINE PORTION OF THE 35 K PACKAGE FOR PHASE
 3 INCLUDING RLT-26, WHICH WAS SLATED FOR REDEPLOYMENT
 DURING PHASE 3 IN NSSM-36 PLANNING.

2. (TS) STAFF LEVEL CONTACT WITH CINCPAC PLANNERS IN
 CONNECTION WITH THE SUBJECT REVEALED THE FOLLOWING:

A. CINCPAC HAS REQUESTED MACV SUBMIT BY 24
 NOVEMBER RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PHASE 3 REDEPLOYMENTS,
 WITHOUT ESTABLISHING PARAMETERS FOR TOTAL SPACES OR
 TIME FRAME FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT PHASE.

B. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE MACV RECOMMENDATION
 WILL CONSIST OF A 35 K PACKAGE, SINCE ACTUAL PHASE 1
 AND 2 REDEPLOYMENTS FROM RVN EXCEEDED NSSM-36 PLANNING
 FOR PHASES 1 AND 2 BY APPROXIMATELY 15 K. NSSM-36

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAP 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

PAGE 3 RUNHDM1147 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 PLANNING FOR PHASE 3 REDEPLOYMENTS PROVIDED FOR A 50
 K PACKAGE.

C. CINCPAC PLANS TO PROVIDE JCS WITH A RECOMMENDED
 PHASE 3 REDEPLOYMENT PACKAGE DURING FIRST WEEK OF
 DECEMBER.

3. (TS) CONSIDERING THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN PARA 6 REF B,
 SHOULD NICK'S EFFORTS TO DELETE RLT-26 FROM THE MACV
 STAFF PROPOSALS FOR A 35 K PHASE 3 REDEPLOYMENT PACKAGE
 NOT BE SUCCESSFUL, THIS WOULD PRESENT NO MAJOR PROBLEM
 FROM A MARINE CORPS POINT OF VIEW. DURING MY RECENT
 WESTPAC TRIP, I DISCUSSED WITH NICK THE INCLUSION OF
 SOME FIXED WING ASSETS IN THE RLT-26 REDEPLOYMENT
 PACKAGE. HE IS PRESENTLY MAKING A STUDY OF TROOP
 DISPOSITIONS THAT WILL PREVAIL AFTER RLT-26 REDEPLOYS
 TO DETERMINE FIXED WING REQUIREMENTS AT THAT TIME.
 WILL ADVISE RESULTS OF STUDY WHEN KNOWN.

4. FOR CG III MAF. PAUL FONTANA WILL HAND CARRY REF B ON
 HIS FORTH COMING TRIP. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

1147

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 06 NOV 69
					SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 061406Z NOV 69	COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
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061406Z NOV 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

TOP SECRET/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
PHASE REDUCTION

1. A BRIEFING WAS GIVEN TO GENERAL ABRAMS THIS AFTERNOON CONCERNING PHASE REDUCTION IN VIETNAM. SAM JASKILKA WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE MEETING. HOWEVER, HE HAS PROVIDED AN INITIAL REPORT ALTHOUGH LIMITED IN CONTENT. SAM HAS NOT BEEN WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM AND THE INFO HE PROVIDED WAS OBTAINED THROUGH HIS DIGGING.

2. IN GEORGE'S CONVERSATION WITH LOU EARLIER THIS MORNING HE MENTIONED AN OPTION WHICH INVOLVED THE REDUCTION OF 35,000 PEOPLE INCLUDING RLT 26. SAM TELLS US THAT THE OPTIONS BRIEFED TO GENERAL ABRAMS THIS AFTERNOON WERE THE ORIGINAL OPTIONS 1 AND 2. IN ADDITION, GENERAL ABRAMS WAS BRIEFED TODAY ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF 35,000 TROOPS (INCLUDING RLT 26). THESE 35,000 WOULD BE THE INITIAL WITHDRAWALS UNDER EITHER OPTION 1 OR 2.

3. THERE WERE NO DECISIONS MADE ON EITHER OPTION 1 OR 2 TODAY. GENERAL ABRAMS MADE THE STATEMENT THAT NO TROOPLISTS WOULD BE FORWARDED UNTIL HE WAS REQUIRED TO DO SO. HE ALSO SAID THAT NO DECISION WOULD BE MADE ON EITHER OPTION 1 OR 2 UNTIL AFTER THE NEXT COMMANDERS CONFERENCE ON 22 NOVEMBER AT WHICH TIME ALL COMMANDERS WOULD BE ASKED TO COMMENT.

4. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS MEMO IS PROVIDED AS AN INTERIM REPORT. IT CONSTITUTES A FIRST REPORT AND HAS ALL THE HAZARDS OF A FIRST REPORT. WE EXPECT A MESSAGE FROM GENERAL ABRAMS IN THE NEAR FUTURE WHICH SUPPOSEDLY WILL PROVIDE US PLANNING INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE 22 NOVEMBER MEETING. WE WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

5. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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6694

NNNN

III MAF 2100/4

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TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

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III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

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P 041947Z NOV 69

FM CMC

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RHMMAF/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR
LTGEN BUSE, INFO LTGEN NICKERSON, FROM GEN CHAPMAN
FORCE PLANNING (U)

REF: (A) ADMIN FMFPAC 281901Z OCT 69

1. (TS) REFERENCE A SURFACED TWO MACV PROPOSED OPTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3 REDEPLOYMENT OF 100,000 PERSONNEL DURING THE FIRST HALF OF CY 70.
2. (TS) OF THE TWO OPTIONS PROPOSED BY MACV PLANNERS, OPTION 1 SHOULD BE TOTALLY REJECTED FOR THE REASONS CITED IN PARAGRAPH 4 BELOW. OPTION 2 IS CONSIDERED TO BE GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR T-DAY PLANNING AND VIETNAMIZING THE WAR (NSSM-36).
3. (TS) OPTION 1 OFFERS A RADICALLY DIFFERENT PRIORITY OF REDEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES FROM THAT CONTAINED IN NSSM-36. IN EFFECT, IT CARRIES MARINE CORPS REDEPLOYMENTS COMPLETELY THROUGH PHASE 6, THE FINAL PHASE; CONCURRENTLY, IT REMOVES ONLY THOSE

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ARMY COMBAT UNITS SCHEDULED FOR REDEPLOYMENT IN PHASE 3, AND PROVIDES FOR AN OVERALL ARMY REDEPLOYMENT 25 PERCENT SMALLER THAN THAT ESTABLISHED IN PHASE 3. IN CONTRAST, OPTION 2 IS CONSISTENT WITH A BALANCED EXECUTION OF NSSM-36 PHASES 3, 4, AND 5 REDEPLOYMENTS OF USMC AND USA GROUND COMBAT FORCES. NO RATIONALE IS AVAILABLE HERE TO JUSTIFY THE PREPARATION OF OPTION 1 WHICH CONTRASTS SO DRASTICALLY WITH THE CAREFULLY DEVELOPED AND THOROUGHLY STAFFED NSSM-36 PLAN.

4. (TS) IN EXAMINING THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO OPTION 1 ARE HIGHLIGHTED:
 - A. CAUSES MASSIVE PERSONNEL TURBULENCE FOR PROTRACTED PERIOD.
 - B. COULD GENERATE DEMANDS FOR TOO-RAPID END-STRENGTH REDUCTIONS ADVERSELY AFFECTING READINESS.
 - C. COULD PLACE USMC, AS ONLY UNCOMMITTED SERVICE, LAST IN LINE FOR INCREASINGLY SCARCE DEFENSE DOLLARS.
 - D. GENERATES TEMPORARY FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS.
 - E. CAUSES AIR BASING PROBLEMS.
 - F. IN VIEW OF SCARCITY OF AMPHIB LIFT, COULD PLACE FMF FORCES IN GARRISON WITHOUT CAPABILITY FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT.
 - G. RESULTS IN MASS RETROGRADE OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT WITH

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TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUEBHOA1130 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO ATTENDANT STORAGE/MAINTIENANCE/ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEMS.

H. TERMINATES OPPORTUNITY FOR TRAINING, EXPERIENCE AND R&D UNDER COMBAT CONDITIONS.

5. (TS) SHOULD THE OPTION 1 PROPOSAL BE FLOATED FOR COMMENT, WE SHOULD OPPOSE IT AT EVERY LEVEL. CINCPAC AND CINCPACFLT SUPPORT SHOULD BE SOLICITED IF OPTION 1 IS PROPOSED OFFICIALLY BY MACV.

1. (TS) WHILE OPTION 2 IS CONSIDERED GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE NSSM-36 PLAN, BELIEVE WE SHOULD LOOK INTO DESIRABILITY OF ADDING AN APPROPRIATE AIR ELEMENT. IT APPEARS THAT MINIMUM OF 1 VMFA AND 1 HMM COULD BE REDEPLOYED AT SAME TIME AS RLI-26.

7. (U) DETAILED PRESENTATION OF THE FOREGOING BEING FORWARDED CUSTODY ADM CLARY'S AIDE ETA HICKAM 060130Z.
WARM REGARDS.

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