

DECLASSIFIED

12. ✓ CG III MAF 020534Z NOV69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4

FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON

ASSIGNMENT OF SENIOR ARMY INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER TO III MAF

~~13. CG III MAF 020640Z NOV69 (U) PERSONAL~~

~~FOR MR. WRIGHT, FDMC FROM NICKERSON~~

~~PERSONAL~~

300 726

DECLASSIFIED

14. ~~CG III MAF 030922Z NOV69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR ROSSON FROM NICKERSON  
BATTALION FOR LTCOL THOMAS~~
15. ✓ CG III MAF 030923Z NOV69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE GP-4  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
ASSIGNMENT OF MGEN WHEELER AS CG 1STMARDIV
16. ✓ ~~CG III MAF 040822Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
COM FOR DCEN LEE, CG 2ND ROYMC BRIGADE~~
17. ~~CG III MAF 040921Z NOV69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
BILLS FOR FLOOD SNOWS AT THE SNCO CLUB III MAF~~
18. ~~CG III MAF 040534Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR WILSON FROM DOOLEY~~
19. ✓ ~~CG III MAF 040922Z NOV69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON  
VISIT OF DR. WELLS~~
20. ~~CG III MAF 051320Z NOV69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR ROSSON FROM NICKERSON  
FROM TO CAPT CASE OF 1STLT NGUYEN VAN THIVEN~~
21. ~~CG III MAF 051135Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
SALUTE TO SPEECH OF 3NOV69~~
22. ✓ CG III MAF 060539Z NOV69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR ZAIS, SIMPSON, COOKSEY, FRITZ AND UNGERLEIDER FROM  
NICKERSON  
VISIT OF BURMA ROAD (SIR ROBERT THOMPSON)
23. ✓ CG III MAF 060933Z NOV69 (C) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR MAJ SEYMOUR FROM DOOLEY  
VISIT OF DEPCOMUSMACV TO ICTZ
24. ~~CG III MAF 060936Z NOV69 (C) EYES ONLY  
FOR TOWNSEND RKO INFO BROWN FROM NICKERSON  
VISIT OF GEN MONYER TO ICTZ~~
25. ✓ EG III MAF 080638Z NOV69 (C) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR SIMPSON AND COOKSEY FROM NICKERSON  
ATTACK ON FSB ST. GEORGE

26. ~~CG III MAF 111252Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR BUSE KRONKE INFO CHAPMAN FROM NICKERSON  
LOM AWARD FOR BGEN LEE, DONS HO RORMC~~
27. ~~CG III MAF 111422Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR WALI FROM NICKERSON  
ARRIVAL OF MR. CAN IN WASHINGTON, D. C.~~
28. ✓ CG III MAF 111456Z NOV69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON  
ROSSON WAS HERE
29. ✓ ~~CG III MAF 121204Z NOV69 (C) SPEGAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
RETURN OF DR. D. B. WODGE OF THE MCOAC~~
30. ✓ ~~CG III MAF 131156Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
RECOMMENDATION FOR LOM, CASE OF LTCEN LAM XUAN HOANG~~
31. ~~CG III MAF 131435Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR CAPT MCINNIS FROM DOOLEY  
COIN ME FOR LUNCH~~
32. ~~CG III MAF 160400Z NOV69 (C) SPEGAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR ZUMWALT FROM NICKERSON  
SCHEDULE FOR DESECDEF BACKARD~~
33. ~~CG III MAF 161004Z NOV69 (C) EYES ONLY  
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON  
RELIEF FOR COL CANTON~~
34. ~~CG III MAF 160316Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR MCINNIS FROM DOOLEY  
LUNCH WITH GEN DOOLEY~~
35. ✓ ~~CG III MAF 161307Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR MILDREN INFO WOOLWINE FROM NICKERSON  
OPERATION HOLLY~~
36. ~~CG III MAF 170616Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR WILSON INFO SIMPSON AND JONES FROM DOOLEY  
TRANSPORTATION FOR MGEN SIMPSON~~
37. ✓ CG III MAF 170557Z NOV69 (S) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR TOWNSEND FROM NICKERSON  
VISIT OF SIR ROBERT THOMPSON
38. ~~CG III MAF 171400Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
CAPT M. J. QUINN USMC~~
39. ✓ CG III MAF 171405Z NOV69 (C) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR ZAIS INFO ABRAMS AND OSTEEEN FROM NICKERSON  
OPERATIONS OF THE 1ST BDE, 5th INF DIV (MECH)



1. CG III MAF 241215Z NOV69 (U) EYES ONLY  
FOR COLBY FROM NICKERSON  
ASSIGNMENT OF CUSHING
- ~~2. CG III MAF 250506Z NOV69 (C)  
FOR BRINGLE FROM NICKERSON  
ATTENDANCE OF BRIEF ON 27NOV69~~
3. CG III MAF 250716Z NOV69 (C) *GP-4*  
FOR RAMSEY FROM NICKERSON  
MESSAGE FROM GEN LAM TO PRESIDENT OF THE RVN
- ~~4. CG III MAF 260530Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON  
CONCUR ON LEAVE~~
- ~~5. CG III MAF 262342Z NOV69 (C)  
FOR BRINGLE FROM NICKERSON  
III MAF BRIEF SKED~~
6. ✓ CG III MAF 270442Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR RAMSEY FROM NICKERSON  
PRESS RELEASE BY REUTERS (EXTRACT)
7. ✓ CG III MAF 270520Z NOV69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *GP-4*  
FOR SMITH FROM NICKERSON  
RED BEACH CAUSEWAY
8. ✓ CG III MAF 270910Z NOV69 (C) EYES ONLY/SENSATIVE *GP-4*  
FOR MABRY INFO SHEDD FROM DOOLEY  
TRANSITIONAL FORCE STATIONING
9. ✓ CG III MAF 270752Z NOV69 (U)  
FOR ABRAMS FROM NICKERSON  
VISIT BY ACTING DASD (CR) MR L. HOWARD BENNETT
10. ✓ CG III MAF 270728Z NOV69 (C) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *GP-4*  
FOR BUSE FROM NICKERSON  
VISIT BY ACTING DASD (CIVIL RIGHTS) MR L. HOWARD BENNETT
11. CG III MAF 270750Z NOV69 (S) SPECAT EXCLUSIVE *GP-4*  
FOR ZUMWALT INFO DILLON FROM NICKERSON  
PROPOSED REDUCTION OF SEABEE BATTALIONS IN THE ICTZ
12. ✓ CG III MAF 270752Z NOV69 (C) SPECATE EXCLUSIVE *GP-4*  
FOR DILLON INFO ZUMWALT NICKERSON  
PROPOSED REDUCTION OF SEABEE BATTALIONS IN THE ICTZ

200 726

DECLASSIFIED

~~13. CG III MAF 272350Z NOV69 (C)  
FOR DRINGLE FROM NICKERSON  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF VISIT FOR 20NOV69~~

14. ✓ CG III MAF 272354Z NOV69 (C) EYES ONLY GP-4  
FOR ABRAMS INFO RAMSEY FROM NICKERSON  
ARTICLE BY MIKE NEAL WHICH APPEARED IN THE WASHINGTON  
EVENING STAR

DECLASSIFIED

# NOFORN HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM <b>CG III MAF</b>		DATE <b>02 NOV 69</b>	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <b>P 020534Z NOV 69</b>		COPY NO. <b>2</b> OF <b>4</b> COPIES REC'D.	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	F		3 Nov	N	ASSIGNMENT OF SENIOR ARMY INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER TO HQ III MAF (C)
	DCG	F				
	C/S	F				
	DC/S	F		2 Nov	WMP	
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S		11/2		CRU	
	G-1					
	G-2	X		was copy		
	G-3					
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	AWARDS					
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	INSP					
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	OPANAL					
	ORD					
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	REPRO					
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	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

REMARKS

DISPOSITION:

Retain for \_\_\_\_ months.

Destroy after routing.

Return for permanent retention.

Section	Signature

Ref (ca)

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**SECRET**

P 020534Z ZFF-4

FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZEM

S E C R E T / N O F O R N / E Y E S O N L Y / F O R M G E N I Q W S E N D F R O M L I G E N N I C K E R S O N  
ASSIGNMENT OF SENIOR ARMY INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER TO HQ III  
MAF (O

1. (S) AS YOU WILL RECALL, A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO, I DISCUSSED WITH YOU THE MATTER OF THE RELIEF FOR MY G-2, COL JOHN CANTON, WHO IS DUE TO ROTATE ON 20 DEC. AT THAT TIME, I REQUESTED THAT COL DZIALO ON YOUR STAFF BE MADE AVAILABLE AS HIS RELIEF. HOWEVER, THIS WAS NOT DEEMED FEASIBLE.

2. IN LIGHT OF PRESENT AND PROJECTED CIRCUMSTANCES IN ICTZ, I BELIEVE IT TO BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ARMY COLONEL, INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER, AS A RELIEF FOR CANTON. THIS WOULD PROVIDE FOR THE NECESSARY CONTINUITY IN THE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT AND DIRECTION OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE EFFORT IN ICTZ.

3. (S) IF THIS REQUEST IS GIVEN FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION, IT IS FURTHER REQUESTED THAT THIS OFFICER REPORT MLT 11 DEC IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR AN ADEQUATE TURN-OVER PERIOD.

SSO INSTRUCTIONS: DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS

GP -4

185



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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		02 NOV 69					
			SERIAL NO./CORRECT DATE		COPY NO. 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD					
			020616 NOV 69							
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR				
	DCG									
	C/S					REMARKS:				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION:				
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	G-1					<table border="1"> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
	G-2									
	G-3					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.				
	G-4									
	G-5					The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.				
	G-6									
	ADJ					<p>ORIG C/S REL CG</p>				
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	CAP					EXCLUSIVE				
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	SGT. MAJ									

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

DE RHMMAFA 0161 3060616  
ZNY TTTT  
P 020616Z NOV 69  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC  
BT

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN  
NICKERSON.  
RIF - AMALGAMATION PLAN.

1. AS A RESULT OF A BRIEFING GIVEN LTGEN ZAIS ON 1 NOV  
AT THIS HEADQUARTERS, A NEW PARAGRAPH ON PAGE 5 OF SUBJECT  
PLAN HAS BEEN ADDED AS FOLLOWS:

"11. THIS PLAN HAS BEEN BRIEFED TO LTGEN ZAIS AND WHILE  
HE CONCURS WITH THE GENERAL CONCEPT THEREOF, HE BELIEVES  
THAT AN ARMY LTGEN SHOULD ASSUME COMMAND OF THE JOINT  
HEADQUARTERS ON 15 DECEMBER 1969 FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:  
A. ARMY STRENGTH IN PERSONNEL AND MANEUVER UNITS IS, AND  
WILL REMAIN THROUGHOUT REDEPLOYMENT, LARGER THAN THAT OF  
THE MARINE CORPS.

	CURRENT STRENGTHS	
	ARMY	USMC
PERSONNEL	82,606	54,500

	CURRENT STRENGTHS	
	ARMY	USMC
PERSONNEL	82,606	54,500

PAGE 02 RHMMAFA 0161 3060616 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L  
MANEUVER UNITS \* 27 BNS 14 BNS  
ARTILLERY UNITS \* 18 BNS 6 (PLUS) BNS

\* INCLUDES 13 BNS OF AMERICAL DIV  
\* INCLUDES 6 BNS OF AMERICAL DIV  
B. RESIDUAL FORCE PLANNING ENVISAGES ULTIMATE STATIONING OF  
ARMY FORCES, EXCLUSIVELY, IN RVN. THEREFORE, THE NECESSITY  
TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS WITH THE LEAST AMOUNT OF TURBULENCE AND  
CHANGE SUGGESTS THE NEED FOR APPOINTING AN ARMY COMMANDER  
AT THE INCEPTION OF THE NEW JOINT HEADQUARTERS.  
ADDITIONALLY, HE FEELS THAT THE CG AND DCG SHOULD BE FROM  
DIFFERENT SERVICES IN ORDER TO REPRESENT THE NEEDS OF THE  
SUBORDINATE SERVICE IN THE PROPOSED COMMAND STRUCTURE."  
2. RENUMBER CURRENT PARAGRAPHS 11 AND 12 TO READ 12 AND 13  
RESPECTIVELY. WARM REGARDS.

GP-3  
BT  
0161

NNNN

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COSMIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		03 NOV 69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. OF COPIES REC'D					
			031100Z NOV 69							
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
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	C/S					REMARKS:				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.				
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ORIG: COFS  
REL: COFS

EXCLUSIVE  
FOR

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*Cy #1 to Amalgamation folder*

**79**

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL USE)

TOP SECRET

(39)

TOP SECRET

PTTZYUW RHMMAFA0300 3071100-TTIT--RUHFMA.  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 031100Z NOV 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM  
 LTGEN NICKERSON  
 RIF-AMALGAMATED PLAN  
 A. MY 020616Z NOV 69  
 1. MY DIRECTIVE FROM GENERAL ABRAMS CONCERNING THE  
 PLAN OF THE AMALGAMATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF  
 XXIV CORPS AND III MAF INCLUDED A STATEMENT THAT  
 HE WANTED ME TO COORDINATE WITH XXIV CORPS ON THE  
 EXECUTION OF THE PLAN. ACCORDINGLY, PRIOR TO SUB-  
 MISSION OF THIS PLAN I HAD MEL ZAIS COME TO MY  
 HEADQUARTERS AND I GAVE HIM THE SAME TYPE BRIEFING  
 WHICH YOU RECEIVED WHEN YOU WERE HERE LAST MONTH.  
 HE REQUESTED THAT I ADD THE PROVISIO WHICH WENT INTO  
 REFERENCE (A) CONCERNING AN ARMY LIEUTENANT  
 GENERAL TAKING OVER. I DID NOT OBJECT AND, AS A  
 RESULT, THE REVISED VERSION WAS SUBMITTED TO ABE.

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA0300 T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO ABE WHETHER I BLESSED  
 IT OR NOT SO I DON'T BELIEVE ANY CONCESSION WAS MADE.  
 2. I AM SURE THE ARMY WILL WANT TO TAKE OVER AS SOON  
 AFTER 15 DECEMBER AS POSSIBLE. THIS COULD ALLOW MEL  
 ZAIS TO TAKE COMMAND WITH THE FEWEST VIBRATIONS  
 OCCURRING IN THE ARMY CAMP. BUT I ALMOST HAVE TO BE  
 ORDERED OUT BEFORE THE ARMY CAN TAKE OVER BECAUSE OF  
 MY SENIORITY. THE LONGER I AM HERE, THE GREATER THE  
 PROBLEM FOR THE ARMY. ZAIS CAN'T JUST SIT IN THE  
 WINGS AND ABE DOESN'T HAVE MUCH SENIORITY FLEXIBILITY  
 IF HE WANTS TO TAKE OVER THE JOB. MILDREN AND ROSSON  
 ARE AVAILABLE IN COUNTRY BUT NEITHER ARE LIKELY  
 CANDIDATES IN MY OPINION.  
 3. YOU WILL RECALL THAT WE DID NOT INCLUDE A SEPARATE  
 STAFF OVER THE DIVISION AND WING BASED ON OUR THOUGHTS  
 THAT WE SHOULD RETAIN COMMAND INDEFINITELY TO PROTECT  
 OUR AIR GROUND ORGANIZATION. IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR  
 ME TO STICK AROUND AS CG III MAF UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE  
 1ST DIVISION, FIRST WING AND FLC ARE WELL OUT OF THIS  
 AREA. MY ORIGINAL THOUGHTS ON TIMING APPEAR TO BE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

III MAF 2100/4

39/11  
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMAFA0300 T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR STILL VALID. I COULD STAY UNTIL 1 APRIL BUT WOULD HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS ON ANY ADDITIONAL TIME. IF THE ALTERNATIVE WHICH RETAINS THE MARINE CORPS IN VIETNAM IS IMPLEMENTED, IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR III MAF TO REMAIN IN COMMAND. IF THE MARINES ARE TO LEAVE DURING THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY 70 TO 30 JUNE 70, THEN I WOULD THINK THAT MIDWAY THROUGH THE PERIOD WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO TRANSFER COMMAND. I WOULD THINK THAT THE BEST THING FOR US TO DO, FOR YOU AND CHAPPY TO DO, WOULD BE TO INSIST THAT I STAY AS CG III MAF UNTIL A LARGE NUMBER OF OUR FORCES ARE DEPLOYED IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE AIR GROUND TEAM. DEPENDING UPON WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAYS ON THE 3RD OF NOVEMBER AND ASSUMING THAT THERE WILL BE A MAJOR WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE I WOULD GUESS THAT BY 1 APRIL WE WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED OUR PURPOSE.

4. I HAVE HEARD NOTHING FROM TOWNSEND OR ABE ON THE PROPOSED PLANS. I DO EXPECT A RESPONSE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

PAGE FOUR RHMAFA0300 T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 5. WARM REGARDS.  
 GP-4  
 BT  
 0300

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES39(2)  
TOP SECRET

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 03 NOV 1969	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 030923Z NOV 69		COPY NO. / OF 3 COPIES REC'D.	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
	DCG	I				
	C/S	I				REMARKS
	DC/S	I				
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION:  <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention.
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
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	ADJ					Section                      Signature _____ _____
	AWARDS					
	CAP					ORIG: COFS REL: CG
	CHAP					<h2 style="font-size: 2em; margin: 0;">EXCLUSIVE</h2>  <h2 style="font-size: 2em; margin: 0;">FOR</h2>  <h2 style="font-size: 2em; margin: 0;">HAS BEEN SENT</h2>
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	SUPPLY					
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	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PITTSYUW RHMMAFA0298 3070922-SSSS--RUHMFMA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 030922Z NOV 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN BUSE FROM LIGEN  
NICKERSON1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:  
QUOTE

FM: COL HANIFEN SJS MACV SAIGON

TO: BGEN DOOLEY COPS III MAF DANANG

CONFIDENTIAL MAC 14239 EYES ONLY

1. THIS RESPONDS TO YOUR PHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
MG TOWNSEND, COPS, MACV ON 1 NOVEMBER 1969.
2. MG TOWNSEND HAS INFORMED GEN ABRAMS OF CMC REQUEST  
FOR COMUSMACV CONSIDERATION AND CONCURRENCE IN HAVING  
MG WHEELER SUCCEED MG SIMPSON AS CG, 1ST MARDIV AFTER  
AMALGAMATION OF III MAF AND XXIV CORPS HQS.
3. GEN ABRAMS APPROVES THIS SUCCESSION OF MG WHEELER FOR  
MG SIMPSON.
4. WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE.

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA0298 S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

2. IN TALKING TO GEN TOWNSEND, GEORGE INFORMED HIM THAT  
WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION IT APPEARS  
THAT ED WHEELER IS AVAILABLE. HE ALSO STATED THAT WE HAD  
FORWARDED OUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO GEN ABRAMS CONCERNING THE  
AMALGAMATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF XXIV CORPS AND III MAF  
AND RECOMMENDED IT TAKE PLACE ON OR ABOUT 15 DECEMBER.  
YOU WILL NOTE THAT HANIFENS MESSAGE SAYS "AFTER AMALGAMATION  
OF III MAF AND XXIV CORPS" I DON'T SEE ANY PARTICULAR  
PROBLEMS HERE AND I RECOMMEND THAT WE GO AHEAD AND ORDER ED  
WHEELER TO TAKE OVER THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION ON OR ABOUT 15  
DECEMBER.

3. CARTER TOWNSEND IS ON LEAVE AT THE PRESENT TIME AND  
WILL BE BACK IN ABOUT 48 HOURS. I WILL CONFIRM THE 15  
DECEMBER DATE WITH HIM AND IF THERE IS ANYTHING TO CHANGE  
MY RECOMMENDATION IN ABOVE, I WILL SO INFORM YOU.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0298

**SECRET**

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

## TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-62)

OPERATION CODE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 5 NOV 69					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 050918Z NOV 69		COPY NO. OF COPIES RECD					
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## TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

PTTZYUW RHMMAFA0528 3100916-TTIT--RUHNFMA.  
 ZNY TTIT  
 P 050918Z NOV 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHNFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

TOP SECRET/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN BUSE FROM  
 LIGEN NICKERSON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
 RIF-ANALGAMATION PLANS

- A. CG FMFPAC 04211Z NOV 69
- B. CG III MAF 231100Z NOV 69
- C. CMC 041947Z NOV 69

1. I AM IN RECEIPT OF REFERENCE A IN WHICH YOU EXPRESSED THE CONCERN OF THE COMMANDANT OVER TWO SPECIFIC AREAS. YOU ALSO SUGGESTED THAT I DEVELOPE A RECLAMA POSITION FOR USE IN THE EVENT ABE AGREES TO THE ZAIS POSITION.
2. I AM FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH TAKING ACTION NECESSARY TO PRESERVE OUR AIR GROUND TEAM AND WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO DO SO. REFERENCE B WAS SUBMITTED WITH THIS THOUGHT IN MIND AND I STATED IN REFERENCE B THAT I WOULD THINK THE

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA0528 TOP SECRET/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 BEST THING FOR US TO DO WOULD BE TO INSIST THAT I STAY AS CG III MAF UNTIL A LARGE NUMBER OF OUR FORCES ARE DEPLOYED IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE AIR GROUND TEAM. YOU MAY NOT HAVE BEEN IN RECEIPT OF REFERENCE B WHEN YOU RELEASED REFERENCE A, BUT I THINK THAT I HAVE PROVIDED A RECLAMA POSITION IN THE EVENT ABE DOES DECIDE TO GO ALONG WITH MEL ZAIS' PROPOSAL. IT IS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT FOR ABE TO MOVE ME OUT AND I WOULD THINK THAT THE TIME PHASING I MENTIONED WOULD ALSO BE APPROPRIATE.

3. CONCERNING THE SECOND PORTION WHICH WAS THE LOSS OF THE COMPONENT COMMANDER TYPE PRIVILEGES DIRECTLY UNDER ABE. I WILL TAKE ACTION IF IT IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL BE A MARINE CORPS TYPE IN THE EVENT THAT THE LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARMY HAS COMMAND AND WOULD EXECUTE THOSE FUNCTIONS NORMALLY ATTENDANT TO A MARINE AIR GROUND TEAM HEADQUARTERS. YOU MAY RECALL WE INCLUDED THAT IN OUR LETTER TO GENERAL ABRAMS

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

40(1)

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE THREE RHMMFA0528 TOP SECRET/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 ORIGINALLY AND WE MUTUALLY AGREED TO WITHDRAW  
 IT ON THE BASIS OF RETAINING OVERALL COMMAND  
 OF III MAF UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

4. IN THE EVENT I HAVEN'T COME TO GRIPS WITH WHAT  
 YOUR THOUGHTS ARE WOULD YOU PLEASE ADVISE AND IF  
 YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS I WOULD BE MOST HAPPY TO  
 RECEIVE THEM.

5. REFERENCE C WAS RECEIVED A SHORT TIME AGO.  
 WE WILL COMPLY. AS OF NOW, NEITHER OPTION HAS  
 BEEN FLOATED FOR COMMENT. MEANWHILE, I HAVE  
 ADVISED SAM JASKILKA OF CMC'S POSITION.

6. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0528

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

40(2)  
**TOP SECRET**

**HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF		DATE 06 NOV 69					
			SERIAL NO / CONTROL DATE 061406Z NOV 69		COPY NO. OF COPIES REC'D							
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	REMARKS					
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	G-4					HAS BEEN SENT <b>EXCLUSIVE</b> <i>Cop #1 to Force Reduction Folder</i> <b>FOR</b> <span style="font-size: 4em; font-weight: bold;">41</span>						
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**TOP SECRET**

PITAZYUW RHMMFA0694 3101406-AAAA--RUHFMA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 061406Z NOV 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON.  
PHASE REDUCTION

1. A BRIEFING WAS GIVEN TO GENERAL ABRAMS THIS AFTERNOON CONCERNING PHASE REDUCTION IN VIETNAM. SAM JASKILKA WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE MEETING. HOWEVER, HE HAS PROVIDED AN INITIAL REPORT ALTHOUGH LIMITED IN CONTENT. SAM HAS NOT BEEN WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM AND THE INFO HE PROVIDED WAS OBTAINED THROUGH HIS DIGGING.
2. IN GEORGE'S CONVERSATION WITH LOU EARLIER THIS MORNING HE MENTIONED AN OPTION WHICH INVOLVED THE REDUCTION OF 35,000 PEOPLE INCLUDING RLT 26. SAM TELLS US THAT THE OPTIONS BRIEFED TO GENERAL ABRAMS THIS AFTERNOON WERE THE ORIGINAL OPTIONS 1 AND 2. IN ADDITION, GENERAL ABRAMS WAS BRIEFED TODAY ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF 35,000 TROOPS (INCLUDING RLT 26). THESE 35,000 WOULD BE THE INITIAL WITHDRAWALS UNDER EITHER OPTION 1 OR 2.
3. THERE WERE NO DECISIONS MADE ON EITHER OPTION 1 OR 2 TODAY. GENERAL ABRAMS MADE THE STATEMENT THAT NO TROOPLISTS WOULD BE FORWARDED UNTIL HE WAS REQUIRED TO DO SO. HE ALSO SAID THAT NO DECISION WOULD BE MADE ON EITHER OPTION 1 OR 2 UNTIL AFTER THE NEXT COMMANDERS CONFERENCE ON 22 NOVEMBER AT WHICH TIME ALL COMMANDERS WOULD BE ASKED TO COMMENT.
4. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS MEMO IS PROVIDED AS AN INTERIM REPORT. IT CONSTITUTES A FIRST REPORT AND HAS ALL THE HAZARDS OF A FIRST REPORT. WE EXPECT A MESSAGE FROM GENERAL ABRAMS IN THE NEAR FUTURE WHICH SUPPOSEDLY WILL PROVIDE US PLANNING INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE 22 NOVEMBER MEETING. WE WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED.
5. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0694

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III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES41(1)  
**TOP SECRET**

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - DRIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM <b>CG III MAF</b>		DATE <b>06 NOV 69</b>					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <b>0 060539Z NOV 69</b>		COPY NO. <b>2</b> OF <b>12</b> COPIES REC'D.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
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	CG	I		7/1/69	[Signature]	VISIT OF BURMA ROAD				
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	C/S	I				REMARKS				
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	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION:  <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention.				
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(23)

**SECRET**

O 060539Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG XXIV CORPS  
 CG FIRST MARDIV  
 CG AMERICAL DIV  
 ZEN/DEP CORDS I CORPS  
 ZEN/DSA I CORPS  
 ZEM

COPY 2 OF 12 COPIES

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN ZAIS, MGEN SIMPSON, BGEN  
 COOKSEY, MR. FRITZ AND COL UNGERLEIDER FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 VISIT OF BURMA ROAD

A. CG III MAF 050840Z NOV 69 (GENSER)

1. REFERENCE A OUTLINED VISIT OF BURMA ROAD AND PROVIDED GUIDANCE TO BE USED IN PLANNING ITINERARIES FOR FIELD TRIPS.

2. PARA 6, REF A REQUESTED TRIP REPORT. IN AMPLIFICATION PARA 6, REF A REQUEST EACH OF YOU PROVIDE A BACK CHANNEL REPORT THIS HEADQUARTERS FOR FORWARDING TO COMUSMACV ON VISIT OF BURMA ROAD IN YOUR AREA. REPORT TO BE FORWARDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER VISIT AND IN ANY EVENT NOT LATER THAN THREE DAYS AFTER VISIT. REPORT SHOULD INCLUDE:

A. MAJOR AREAS OF VISITORS INTEREST.

B. PERTINENT QUESTIONS.

C. ANY IMPRESSIONS VISITS MAY HAVE TENDERED.

D. ANY OTHER INFORMATION YOU MAY CONSIDER OF INTEREST TO COMUSMACV.

3. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
 208



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HAS BEEN SENT

SECRET  
 22 (1)

22 (1)

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 06 NOV 69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 0 060933Z NOV 69		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES RECD.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
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	CG	I		7 NOV		VISIT OF DEPCOMUSMACV TO THE ICTZ ON 7 NOV 1969				
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	C/S	I				REMARKS DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.				
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O 060933Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L/EYES OCLY FOR MAJ SEYMOUR, AIDE TO DEP  
 COMUSMACV FROM BGEN DOOLEY

VISIT OF DEPCOMUSMACV TO THE ICTZ ON 7 NOV 1969

AS YOUR 060207Z NOV 69

1. IAW GUIDANCE CONTAINED REFERENCE A THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED  
 ITINERARY IS SUBMITTED:

DATE/TIME EVENT

7 NOV 69

-0900 ARRIVE DMG BASE OPS BY T-39/GREETED BY CG III MAF  
 0900-0910 ENR HQ I CORPS (HOTEL PAD) BY HELICOPTER (III MAF)  
 0910-1015 VISIT WITH CG I CORPS  
 1015-1145 ENR TO/ATTEND 3D MAR DIV CEREMONY AND BUFFET  
 1145-1155 ENR HQ III MAF (LZ-1) BY HELICOPTER (III MAF)  
 1155-1210 ENR NATIONAL POLICE TRAINING CENTER BY SEDAN (III MAF)  
 1215-1410 VISIT NPTC  
 1410-1425 ENR HQ III MAF (LZ-1) BY SEDAN (III MAF)  
 1425-1435 ENR (LZ-425) 3D AM TRACK BN  
 1435-1715 AS ARRANGED BY CG 1ST MAR DIV TO INCLUDE VISIT FSBS.  
 TO ARRIVE DMG BASE OPS BY 1715H.

DATE/TIME EVENT

7 NOV 69

1715- DEPART FOR TSN BY T-39

2. LISTED BELOW ARE THE NAMES/TITLES OF INDIVIDUALS DEPCOMUSMACV  
 WILL MEET:

COL USMC - GUILDO COISPOTTI, CO, 7TH MARINES  
 LTCOL - RAY KUMMEROW, USMC, CO, 3/7  
 LTCOL - KARL MEULLER, USMC, CO, 3/11  
 POLICE COMMISSIONER NGUYEN DUC THINH (POLICE SCHOOL U.S. GOOD ENGLISH)  
 LTCOL - TIEP: REGIONAL NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF  
 MR. WALD BURMESTER: CHIEF PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION CORDS  
 MR. CARL R. FRITZ, DEPUTY FOR CORDS, I CORPS (ACTING)  
 3. CHANGES IN SPECIFIC TIMES FROM REF A HAVE BEEN MADE TO  
 MEET LOCAL SCHEDULES WHICH CONFLICTED. BELIEVE GEN ROSSON'S  
 DESIRES AND REQUIREMENTS ARE MET.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

355

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CONFIDENTIAL

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23(11)

23(11)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 08 NOV 69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 080638Z NOV 69		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					CONFIDENTIAL READDRESSAL ATTACK ON FSB ST. GEORGE				
	DCG									
	C/S					REMARKS DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.				
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P 080638Z ZFF-1 ZFF-4

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FIRST MARDIV

CG AMERICAL DIV

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN SIMPSON AND BGEN COOKSEY  
FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

1. COMUSMACV DIRECTED THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE RETRANSMITTED  
TO ADDRESSEES:

QUOTE

O 0703 10Z

FM LTG CORCORAN CG I FFORCEV NHA

TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L NHT 2003 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: ATTACK ON FSB ST. GEORGE (U)

(C) THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MG PEPKE GIVING THE ACCOUNT  
OF THE ATTACK ON FSB ST. GEORGE (AR 856 145) IS REPEATED FOR  
YOUR INFORMATION. QUOTE:

ON 05 NOVEMBER 1969, 1ST BATTALION, 14TH INFANTRY, WAS OPERAT-  
ING IN ITS AO SOUTH OF CAMP ENARI. FSB ST. GEORGE WAS OCCUPIED  
BY BN CP, CO D, RECON PLT AND BN TRAINS. COMPANY B WAS OPERAT-  
ING 8 KMS NE OF BN FSB; CO A WAS DEPLOYED N OF THE FSB WITH A  
SHORT RANGE PATROL (SRP) SCREEN AGAINST POSSIBLE ENEMY MOVE-  
MENT FROM N (HAVING JUST RETURNED FROM TWO WEEKS OPCON TO 2/8  
INF). CO C WAS 6-8 KMS WEST OF FSB ST. GEORGE ON A COMBINED  
OPERATION WITH RF UNITS FROM PLEIKU, CIDG FROM PLEI ME, AND  
RF/PF FROM PHU NHON DISTRICT. CO A EMPLOYED FOUR NIGHT AMBUSHES;  
CO C EMPLOYED FOUR NIGHT AMBUSHES; AND CO D HAD DEPLOYED FIVE



25(1)

25(1)

(5) SRP'S AT A DISTANCE OF 3-4 KMS AROUND THE FSB. THE BN HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP TO 2/3 ALERT -- CONDITION YELLOW -- AS A RESULT OF INCREASED ACTIVITY IN THE 4TH INF DIV AREA. NIGHT FIRE PROGRAM PLANNED WAS 61 RDS 105 HE AND 75 RDS 81MM MORTAR (INCLUDING 30 RDS OF ILLUMINATION). AT 0030 PF PLT 2 KMS NW OF FSB REPORTED TO CP 1-14 A PROBE BY AN ESTIMATED NVA PLT. THIS REPORT LATER PROVED TO BE FALSE. SIMULTANEOUSLY, FSB ST. GEORGE BEGAN RECEIVING INTENSE B-40 AND AUTOMATIC RIFLE FIRE. A HEAVY SAPPER ATTACK BY AN ESTIMATED TWO PLTS STRUCK THE PERIMETER WIRE FROM S AND W. WARNING OF THE ATTACK WAS PROVIDED BY TRIP FLARES, A TOTAL OF 17 BEING ACTIVATED DURING THE COURSE OF THE NIGHT. THE INITIAL ATTACK WAS MAINTAINED UNTIL 0130. AT 0045 WEIGT-DAVIS ROCK QUARRY REPORTED TO 1-14 CP RECEIVING APPROXIMATELY 20 RDS OF GIW AND 60MM MORTAR. RESULTS: TWO LIGHTLY WOUNDED. DUSTOFF NOT REQUIRED. A FLARE SHIP WAS ON STATION 0125; GUNSHIPS ON STATION 0135. BETWEEN 0130 AND 0200 THERE WAS A NOTICEABLE LULL, ALTHOUGH ENEMY SNIPING CONTINUED. AT 0200 THE ENEMY LAUNCHED A SECOND ATTACK AGAINST THE PERIMETER, CONCENTRATING ON THE WESTERN EDGE. MAKING A DETERMINED EFFORT TO BREACH THE WIRE THE ENEMY CONTINUED TO EMPLOY B-40 AND HEAVY AUTOMATIC RIFLE FIRE. DEFENSE USED CLAYMORES, 105 ARTY (INCLUDING FIRECRACKER), 4.2 MORTARS, 81 MORTARS, ALL INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, CS (E-8) CANNISTER, AND XM-191 MULTISHOT FLAME WEAPONS. THE ENEMY ATTACK CONTINUED FOR TWO HOURS AND TWENTY MINUTES. AT 0420 THERE WAS A LULL IN ENEMY FIRE. SNIPING CONTINUED. SAPPERS HAD THROWN LARGE QUANTITIES OF SACHEL CHARGES (61 WERE RECOVERED UNEXPLODED), AND HOMEMADE HAND GRENADES, FIRST DUSTOFF WAS COMPLETED 0302 HOURS. AT 0507 A RESUPPLY OF SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION WAS MADE TO FSB ST. GEORGE. AT 0610 THE ENEMY COMMENCED HEAVY SNIPER FIRE FROM THE E AND SE. AS DAWN APPROACHED THE ENEMY PINNED DOWN AROUND THE OUTSIDE OF THE PERIMETER BEGAN TO TRY AND EVADE. AGAIN GUNSHIPS AND ARTILLERY WERE EMPLOYED (INCLUDING FIRECRACKER). AT 0830 THE RECON PLT, 1-14, SUPPORTED BY A MECH PLT, 2-8, MOVED SOUTH OUT OF ST. GEORGE AND SWEEP CLOCKWISE AROUND THE OUTSIDE OF FSB.

25(2)

25(2)

AT 0930 CO B WAS LIFTED BY HELICOPTER FROM ITS AO 8 KMS TO THE NE AND AERIAL ASSAULTED INTO BLOCKING POSITIONS SW OF ST. GEORGE, THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THE ENEMY WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE WITHDRAWN.

"RESULTS TO DATE: (1700, 6 NOV 69)

US KIA - 9

US WIA - 31

EN KIA - 40 NVA

EN PW - 1 NVA

CIA - 11 AK 47'S

9 RPG (2S & 7S)

1 PISTOL

61 SATCHEL CHARGES

THIS WAS AN EXTREMELY DETERMINED EFFORT TO OVERRUN A BN FSB, DESTROY ARTILLERY AND CAUSE HEAVY CASUALTIES. A SUSTAINED ATTACK OF THIS NATURE IS A RARE EVENT IN THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 4TH INF DIV, THE CLOSEST PARALLEL BEING THE ATTACK ON OASIS ON 11 MAY. THE SUCCESS OF THE DEFENSE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO STRONG FORTIFICATIONS, A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF BARRIERS AND ANTI PERSONNEL DEVICES SUCH AS TRIP FLARES AND CLAYMORES, AND THE TIMELY EMPLOYMENT OF ILLUMINATION, ARTILLERY, AND GUNSHIP SUPPORT. END QUOTE.

2. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

700

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HAS BEEN SENT

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25(3)

25(3)

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 12 NOV 69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE F 111456Z NOV 69	COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D						
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT SECRET/EYES ONLY/FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON VISIT OF DEPCOMUSMACV TO ICTZ 7 NOV 69				
			IN	OUT						
	CG	I	<i>was seen</i>			REMARK ① <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;">                     DISPOSITION:   <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months.  <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.  <input type="checkbox"/> Return for permanent retention.                 </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">Section</td> <td style="width: 50%;">Signature</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
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**SECRET**

P 111456Z ZFF-4  
 FM CG 2II MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

SECRET/EYES ONLY/FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 VISIT OF DEPCOMUSMACV TO ICTZ 7 NOV 1969

A. COMUSMACV CITE 32267 DTG 301105Z MAY 69

1. FOLLOWING SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A.
2. GEN ROSSON'S VISIT CONSISTED OF THREE PARTS:  
 BRIEFING/DISCUSSION AT HQ I CORPS, DEPARTURE CEREMONY  
 OF 3D MARINE DIVISION AND VISIT TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION.
3. PART ONE: GENERAL ROSSON ARRIVED DANANG BASE OPS  
 AT 070900H NOV 1969, WAS MET BY LTGEN NICKERSON AND  
 ESCORTED TO HQ I CORPS. GEN ROSSON WAS BRIEFED BY I  
 CORPS STAFF AS FOLLOWS:

A. CURRENT SITUATION BY G-2/G-3.

B. UP DATE ON ALL OPERATIONS UNDERWAY WITH TOTAL FOR  
 YEAR TO DATE.

C. ACTIVATIONS OF PF AND RF UNITS WITH EMPHASIS ON  
 TRAINING RF/PF PERSONNEL IN INTELLIGENCE, REFRESHER ON  
 MINE DETECTION AND THE I CORPS INTENSIFIED PACIFICATION  
 PROGRAM.

D. GEN ROSSON DISCUSSED NEW TAX ON WATER PUMPS AND THE  
 INCREASE COST OF RICE. GEN LAM MENTIONED THE RISING  
 COST OF GASOLINE AND TRANSPORTATION AS CONTRIBUTING  
 FACTORS IN THE RISING COST OF FOOD.

E. I CORPS STAFF BRIEFING. THE FOLLOWING PERSONS  
 ATTENDED: LTGEN NICKERSON, COL UNGERLEIDER, COL VINH  
 AND COL DANG. LTCOL BINH (G-2) AND LTCOL NHAU (G-3)  
 WERE BRIEFING OFFICERS

4. PART II: AT 071015H NOV 1969 GEN ROSSON ACCOMPANIED  
 BY LTGEN LAM AND LTGEN NICKERSON DEPARTED I CORPS HQ FOR  
 MWSH-17 HANGER OF DEPARTURE CEREMONY OF THE 3D MARINE  
 DIVISION. GEN ROSSON WAS GREETED BY MGEN JONES. GEN  
 ROSSON ADDRESSED THE FORMATION. AFTER THE FORMATION MGEN  
 SIMPSON ESCORTED GEN ROSSON TO THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION HQ.



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5. PART III: GEN ROSSON ON THE AFTERNOON OF 7 NOV 1969, WAS ESCORTED BY MGEN SIMPSON AND TOURED THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION STAND DOWN CENTER FOR INFANTRY COMPANIES ("STACK ARMS"); JOINED HERE BY LTGEN LAM AND LTGEN NICKERSON; 7TH MARINES AND D/S ARTY BN 3/11 AT LZ BALDY AND FSB ROSS PLUS FORWARD CP OF 1ST ARVN ARMORED BRIGADE AT FSB ROSS. IN ADDTION, HE WITNESSED A DEMONSTRATION ON THE INTEGRATED OBSERVATION DEVICE (I.O.D.) AND XM-174 (M-79 MACHINE GUN). GEN ROSSON SEEMED TO BE INTENSELY INTERESTED IN EVERYTHING AND EVERYBODY HE SAW. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ARVN ARMORED BRIGADE AND QUESTIONED CO (COL HIEP) AND CG I CORPS (LTGEN LAM) REGARDING COMPOSITION OF BRIGADE AND PLANS FOR FUTURE EMPLOYMENT. NO UNUSUALY SIGNIFICANT COMMENTS AND SPEDIFIC GUIDANCE ISSUED.

6. AT 071715H NOV 1969 GEN ROSSON DEPARTED AREA FOR DANANG BASE OPS ESCORTED BY LTGEN LAM, LTGEN NICKERSON MGEN SIMPSON AND COL UNGERLEIDER AND DEPARTED FOR TSN.

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# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

## TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

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ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
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	CG					<b>PERSONNEL ADJUSTMENTS RELATED TO          REALLOCATION OF III MAF AND XXIV          CORPS</b> REMARKS: <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;">           DISPOSITION:  <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months.  <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.         </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> <p>REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.</p> <p>The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.</p>	Section	Signature		
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## TOP SECRET

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P 138832 ZFF-4

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

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T O P S E C R E T/EYES ONLY/FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN  
NICKERSON

PERSONNEL ADJUSTMENTS RELATED TO THE AMALGAMATION OF  
III MAF HEADQUARTERS AND XXIV CORPS

A. CG III MAF LTR 26D/CRS OVER 3000 SER: 000122369 OF

30 OCT 1969, SUBJ: RIF-AMALGAMATION

B. CG III MAF 020534Z NOV 69

1. BY REFERENCE A, I FORWARDED A PROPOSED PLAN ON THE AMALGAMATION OF THE III MAF HEADQUARTERS AND XXIV CORPS HEADQUARTERS. THIS PLAN RECOMMENDED AN IMPLEMENTATION DATE COMMENCING ON OR ABOUT THE 15TH OF DECEMBER. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT FOR VARIOUS REASONS THIS 15 DECEMBER TARGET DATE MAY NOT BE MET AND THE DECISION TO IMPLEMENT THE AMALGAMATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS MAY BE DELAYED.
2. REGARDLESS OF THIS, THERE ARE CERTAIN PERSONNEL ACTIONS WHICH MUST BE TAKEN IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. BY REFERENCE B, I REQUESTED YOUR CONSIDERATION IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ARMY COLONEL TO REPLACE COLONEL CANTON AS MY G-2 WHEN CANTON LEAVES SOMETIME IN DECEMBER. I UNDERSTAND, IN LIAISON WITH YOUR HEADQUARTERS, THAT ACTION IS BEING TAKEN IN THIS AREA.
3. I DO HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS IN MY STAFF THAT REQUIRE ACTION IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE OTHER THAN THE G-2 AS MENTIONED ABOVE. FOR EXAMPLE, I AM MOVING THE ASSISTANT G-3 TO MEET ANOTHER REQUIREMENT ON 1. DECEMBER 1969. IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE ABOVE, THIS BILLET SHOULD APPROPRIATELY BE FILLED BY AN ARMY COLONEL. I CANNOT LEAVE THIS BILLET VACANT FOR LONG. ACCORDINGLY, I INTEND TO ORDER A MARINE INTO THE BILLET. HOWEVER, I WOULD PREFER TO PROCEED WITH THE AMALGAMATION.
4. MY CHIEF OF STAFF, UNDER THE NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS, IS DUE TO LEAVE SOMETIME IN DECEMBER. THE MARINE CORPS HAD A BRIGADIER PROGRAMMED TO RELIEVE MY G-3 AND MY G-3 WOULD HAVE MOVED UP TO BE MY CHIEF OF STAFF. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE PLANNING INVOLVED WITH THE AMALGAMATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS, HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS HAS HELD THE REPLACEMENT BRIGADIER IN THE STATES ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN ARMY BRIGADIER WOULD RELIEVE MY PRESENT CHIEF OF STAFF. IF THE AMALGAMATION IS TO BE DELAYED, I MUST ADVISE HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS TO PROVIDE A BRIGADIER REPLACEMENT, AND I MUST ADVISE THEM NOW. IF THE AMALGAMATION IS TO BE EFFECTED ON 15 DECEMBER OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER, IT WON'T BE NECESSARY FOR HQMC TO ORDER A BRIGADIER TO III MAF
5. YOUR EARLY REPLY WOULD BE DEEPLY APPRECIATED.
6. WARM REGARDS.

SSD NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

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G. QUESTION: SHORT OF ENEMY'S CROSSING THE DMZ, JUST HOW MUCH TROUBLE CAN HE GIVE YOU? WHAT IS HIS CAPABILITY TO INFLICT MAX U. S. CASUALTIES? ANSWER: WE CAN CONTAIN HIM BUT HE MAY CAUSE A LOT OF DAMAGE IF HE CHOOSES TO COMMIT ALL OF HIS FORCES. THEY ARE HERE NOW IF HE DECIDES IT WILL BE TO HIS ADVANTAGE. HE COULDN'T LAST MORE THAN TWO OR POSSIBLY THREE WEEKS.

H. SIR ROBERT COMMENTED ON HIS CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY TO STOP THE ENEMY BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE U. S. PUBLIC'S REACTION TO SUSTAINED HEAVY LOSSES. HE PROBED FOR OPINIONS ON THE ENEMY'S INTENTIONS WHICH RESULTED IN A DISCUSSION OF POSSIBILITIES.

4. PSA, QHANG NAM PROVINCE, 9 NOV 69. THE PARTY ARRIVED AT HOI AN BY USMC HELICOPTERS AT 1120 AS SCHEDULED. THEY WERE MET AT THE HELO PAD BY LTCOL TUAN, DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR PACIFICATION, LTCOL HUNG, DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR SECURITY, AND MR. PARKER, PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR. COL LE TRI TIN, THE PROVINCE CHIEF, BEING ILL, WAS NOT ABLE TO RECEIVE THE VISITORS AT ANY TIME DURING THE VISIT.

A. THE OFFICIALS WERE TAKEN TO PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS WHERE LTCOL TUAN PRESENTED A TWENTY MINUTE BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY SITUATION AND ON THE STATUS OF PACIFICATION. UPON COMPLETION OF THE BRIEFING THE PARTY WAS TAKEN TO THE PROVINCE CHIEF'S HOUSE FOR LUNCH, HOSTED BY MR. NGUYEN KHANH, THE DEPUTY FOR ADMINISTRATION.

B. AFTER LUNCH, AT ABOUT 1330 HOURS, THE PARTY WAS TAKEN TO THE WATERFRONT WHERE THEY BOARDED BOATS FOR TRANSFER TO XUYEN LONG ISLAND. AT XUYEN LONG, THEY WERE BRIEFED BY THE OIC ON THE HISTORY AND THE PLANS FOR DEVELOPEMNT OF XUYEN LONG AS A REFUGEE SETTLEMENT. THIS BRIEFING WAS FOLLOWED BY A WALKING TOUR OF THE TWO REFUGEE HAMLETS, ESCORTED BY THE VILLAGE CHIEF AND RF COMPANY COMMANDER. IN THIS AREA, SIR ROBERT TALKED WITH THE HAMLET CHIEF, CHIEF OF VILLAGE POLICE, PSDF PERSONNEL AND WITH A FEW OF THE REFUGEES.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

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FM CG III MAF

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SECRET/EYES ONLY/FOR NGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
SECTION TWO

VISIT OF SIR ROBERT THOMPSON

C. AT ABOUT 1430 HOURS, THE PARTY AGAIN BOARDED THE BOATS AND TRAVELED TO CAM NAM ISLAND, WHERE ONE OF THE PROVINCE'S MOST DEVELOPED VILLAGE AREAS IS LOCATED. HERE HE MET AND TALKED WITH THE DISTRICT CHIEF, VILLAGE CHIEF AND HAMLET OFFICIALS. HE WAS SHOWN SEVERAL OF THE VILLAGE SELF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, THE PSDF, RF UNITS AND VARIOUS FAMILY PROJECTS.

D. THE TOUR OF CAM NAM WAS COMPLETED SOONER THAN EXPECTED SO THE PARTY REQUESTED TO VISIT THE PROVINCE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS COORDINATION CENTER (PIOCC). UPON COMPLETION OF THIS VISIT, AT ABOUT 1630 HOURS, THE PARTY RETURNED TO THE AIR FIELD AND DEPARTED FOR DAKANG.

E. ALTHOUGH SIR ROBERT AND MR. PALMER SHOWED INTEREST IN THE PACIFICATION ASPECTS OF PROVINCE PROGRAMS, THEY APPEARED TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN THE ENEMY SITUATION; SPECIFICALLY: CURRENT STATUS OF NVA/VC/VCI ELEMENTS, VCI ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH, VCI REPLACEMENT PROBLEMS, VCI SUPPLY AND PERSONNEL PROBLEMS, ATTACKS AGAINST GVN VILLAGE/HAMLET GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES, VALIDATION OF VCI ELIMINATIONS, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL POLICE.

5. DINNER, CG, III MAF 9 NOV 1969. FOLLOWING A DINNER PARTY HOSTED BY LTGEN NICKERSON, SIR ROBERT MADE A SHORT BUT VERY DRAMATIC SPEECH WHICH ADDRESSED KEY ISSUES OF THE TIMES. THIS ADDRESS HIGHLIGHTED HIS IMPRESSIONS AND OUTLOOKS MORE VIVIDLY THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE EVENT OF THE TRIP. HIS MAIN POINTS WERE:

A. HIS GENERAL APPROBATION WITH U. S. CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND PRAISE FOR THE DEDICATION AND BRAVERY OF OUR TROOPS.

B. ACCEPTANCE, IN ESSENCE, OF THE DOMINO THEORY. HE STRESSED THAT PROOF OF THE PUDDING IS OBTAINED BY ASKING ONE OF THE DOMINCES. SIR ROBERT SAID ASIAN LEADERS FEAR COMMUNISM MUCH MORE THAN THEY ARE ABLE TO ADMIT PUBLICLY.

C. PRAISE FOR PRESIDENT NIXON'S SPEECH SAYING IT WOULD GO DOWN AS ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT SPEECHES AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT HAS MADE THIS CENTURY.

D. OUR NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS WAR IS NO LONGER A MILITARY ONE BUT RATHER A PSYCHOLOGICAL BATTLE FOR THE THOUGHTS AND MINDS OF THE PEOPLE. WE MUST REALIZE THE POWER OF THE MIND AND INSURE IT IS APPLIED MOST EFFECTIVELY IN OUR BEHALF.

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E. IN TERMS OF NATIONAL COMMITMENT, HE TOOK ISSUE WITH GEORGE BALL ON THE RELATIVE PRECEDENCE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. (MR. BALL'S RECENT LETTER TO THE EDITOR IN TIME MAGAZINE) STATES VIETNAM SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE FUNDAMENTAL U. S. INTEREST. STATED HE INTENDED TO PERSONALLY TELL BALL WHEN THEY NEXT MET.

F. ACKNOWLEDGED FRANCE'S PIQUE AND RESULTANT LACK OF SUPPORT FOR U. S. BUT STRESSED EUROPEAN SUPPORT IN REAL CRISES.

G. EXPRESSED NO DOUBT OF NVA/VC DEFEAT IN MAJOR OFFENSIVE BUT AGAIN QUESTIONED U. S. PUBLIC'S WILLINGNESS TO PSYCHOLOGICALLY ACCEPT THE IMPACT OF RENEWED HEAVY FIGHTING. HE STRESSED THIS POINT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING HIS TRIP. HIS PREOCCUPATION WITH OBTAINING MANY DIFFERENT VIEWS OF ENEMY INTENTIONS, SEEMED TO REFLECT HIS SEARCH FOR INFORMATION ON WHICH TO POSTULATE A PICTURE OF THE COMING MONTHS.

6. XXIV CORPS, 10 NOV 1969. BURMA ROAD SPENT A FULL DAY IN THE FIELD. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MGEN WHEELER WHO REPORTED HE SEEMED TO THOROUGHLY ENJOY HIS VISIT AND WAS FAVORABLY IMPRESSED WITH WHAT HE SAW AND HEARD.

A. MAJOR AREAS OF INTEREST:

(1) THE PACIFICATION PICTURE, NOT FROM THE STATISTICAL BRIEF, BUT FROM VISITS TO THE HAMLETS AND VILLAGES. A COMPARISON OF THE PRE-TET PICTURE WITH THE SITUATION TODAY.

(2) AN EVALUATION OF THE ARVN AND THEIR CAPABILITY TO WITHSTAND A DIVISION SIZE ATTACK FROM THE DMZ.

(3) THE INTENTIONS OF THE ENEMY IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

(4) THE RECOVERY OF HUE CITY SINCE TET OF 68 TO INCLUDE HUE UNIVERSITY.

SSG NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

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TO COMUSMACV

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SECRET/EYES ONLY/FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
SECTION THREE

VISIT OF SIR ROBERT THOMPSON

B. PERTINENT QUESTIONS:

(1) BURMA ROAD ASKED 3 OR 4 QUESTIONS WHEREVER HE STOPPED TO VISIT. MOST OF THE TIME THEY APPEARED TO BE ASKED IN AN EFFORT TO SHOW INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT RATHER THAN SEEKING INFORMATION, A FEW WERE MORE PURPOSEFUL AND POINTED.

(2) WHAT IS THE ENEMY CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO DO? ANSWER: HE IS SEEKING RICE AND FOOD. HE IS ATTEMPTING TO REBUILD HIS CADRES AND INFRASTRUCTURE.

(3) SHOULD THE ENEMY ATTEMPT A MAJOR OFFENSIVE ACROSS THE DMZ, AT WHAT STRENGTH IS HE CAPABLE OF CROSSING IN, AND FOR HOW LONG COULD HE SUSTAIN A PENETRATION? THIS QUESTION WAS ASKED OF COL GIAI AT FSB CARROLL. ANSWER: HE COULD ATTACK WITH UP TO A DIVISION. HE COULD NOT SUSTAIN HIS ATTACK FOR MORE THAN TEN DAYS.

(4) HAVE YOU ENCOUNTERED A RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF AGENCIES AT DISTRICT LEVEL TO SHARE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION? (ASKED BY MR. PALMER OF THE PSA). ANSWER: YES, OUR DIACC'S HAVE SOME PROBLEMS, BUT THEY ARE DIFFERENT AT EACH DISTRICT. THEY REFLECT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DISTRICT CHIEF.

(5) IS THERE ANY EFFORT TO ASSIST AND WORK WITH THE MONTAGNARDS? (ASKED BY MR. PALMER OF THE ESCORT OFFICER). ANSWER: YES, THEY HAVE A MINORITIES GROUP HERE IN HUE. THE CHIEU HOI ADVISOR WORKS WITH THEM. THEY HAVE A SCHOOL FOR THE MONTIGNARD CHILDREN.

(6) IS THE UNIVERSITY OF HUE FULLY OPERATIONAL? DOCTOR CHAU DISCUSSED THE OPERATION OF THE UNIVERSITY IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AND PROVIDED A GUIDED TOUR OF ALL THE FACILITIES, TO INCLUDE SEVERAL CLASSES IN SESSION. BURMA ROAD EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE UNIVERSITY.

C. ANY IMPRESSIONS VISITS MAY HAVE TENDERED.

(1) BURMA ROAD CREATED QUITE AN IMPRESSION ON COL HTHAN, PROVINCE CHIEF, AND DOCTOR CHAU, PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY. BOTH KNEW HIS BACKGROUND WELL AND WERE FAMILIAR WITH HIS WRITINGS. COL THAN DISCUSSED HIS THOUGHTS OF THE WAR WITH BURMA ROAD DURING LUNCH.

(2) BURMA ROAD SAID THE MARKED PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION IN THE AREA WAS OBVIOUS. HE APPEARED TO BE VERY FAVORABLY IMPRESSED WITH THE FOUR RECENTLY CAPTURED 120MM MORTARS IN FRONT OF THE FIRST ARVN REGIMENT'S CP AT NANCY. HE OBSERVED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE TEMPORARY SET-BACK IN THE PROGRESS OF PACIFICATION, BUT NO GENERAL REGRESSION.

(3) BURMA ROAD WAS HIGHLY IMPRESSED WITH THE PROGRESS AT HUE UNIVERSITY.

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D. OVERALL: BURMA ROAD AND MR. PALMER FOUND THEIR XXIV COPPS VISIT INTERESTING AND PRODUCTIVE. BURMA ROAD HAS ESTABLISHED AN EXCELLENT RAPPORT WITH THE VIETNAMESE. BOTH COL THAN AND DOCTOR CHAU WERE VERY INTERESTED IN HIS COMMENTS AND ANXIOUS TO SHOW HIM EVERY COURTESY.

E. BURMA ROAD, IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH GEN ZAIS STATED THAT HE WAS ASTOUNDED AT THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE SINCE HIS VISIT MORE THAN A YEAR AGO. HE WAS MOST COMPLIMENTARY ON THE SUCCESSES WHICH HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE ELIMINATION OF THE VC INFRA-STRUCTURE, AND WAS IMPRESSED WITH COL THAN AND THE WORK HE IS DOING.

7. AMERICAL DIVISION, 11 NOV 1969. UPON ARRIVAL AT THE AMERICAL DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, BURMA ROAD WAS MET BY EGEN COCKSEY. THE G-2, G-3 AND G-5 DISCUSSED RECENT EVENTS WITHIN THE AMERICAL TAOR.

A. SIR ROBERT ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

(1) REFERENCE RICE AND FOOD CACHES: HOW WAS IT STORED, FOR LONG TERM STORAGE FOR A YEAR OR MORE? ANSWER: THE CACHES WERE FOUND IN 55 GALLOW DRUMS, IN BASKETS WRAPPED IN PLASTIC AND DID NOT APPEAR TO BE FOR LONG TERM STORAGE.

(2) ASKED STRENGTH OF ENEMY UNITS AND PER CENT OF NVA IN VC UNITS? ANSWER: HE WAS GIVEN LATEST OB HOLDINGS OF ENEMY STRENGTHS AND TOLD THAT VERY FEW LF UNITS HAVE NVA BUT MF UNITS CONTAIN A LARGE PER CENT OF NVA, UP TO 90 PER CENT IN SOME UNITS.

(3) HAS THE SECURITY OF ANY DISTRICTS BEEN COMPLETELY TURNED OVER TO RF/PF? ANSWER: NO.

B. SIR ROBERT THEN VISITED THE 2D ARVN DIVISION WHERE HE WAS GREETED BY EGEN TOAN AND RECEIVED AN INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS BRIEFING. HE ASKED NO QUESTIONS.

C. AT QUANG NGAI PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS, HE WAS GREETED BY COL KHUEN, PC, AND MR. DILLERY, PSA. HE WAS BRIEFED BY COL KHUEN.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

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FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

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SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
FINAL SECTION OF FOUR  
VISIT OF SIR ROBERT THOMPSON

(1) WHAT PER CENT OF PERSONNEL IN VC UNITS OPERATING IN YOUR AREA ARE NVA? ANSWER: APPROXIMATELY 60 PER CENT IN MAIN FORCE UNITS AND NONE IN LOCAL FORCE UNITS. (III MAF NOTE: CURRENT ENEMY OB THIS HQ INDICATES 40 PERCENT NVA IN VC MAIN FORCE UNITS; 30 PER CENT NVA IN VC LOCAL FORCE UNITS).

(2) HOW MUCH AMMUNITION DO THE COASTAL ENEMY UNITS HAVE? DO THEY HAVE ENOUGH? ANSWER: THE UNITS ARMED WITH THE CHICOM FAMILY OF WEAPONS APPEAR TO HAVE PLENTY OF AMMUNITION BUT THOSE ARMED WITH OTHER TYPES OF WEAPONS NEVER HAVE ENOUGH AMMUNITION.

(3) WHAT ARE THE STRENGTHS OF RF/PF UNITS? ANSWER: 95 PER CENT. IS IT DIFFICULT TO RECRUIT FOR RF/PF UNITS? ANSWER: NO.

D.. DO YOU HAVE MUCH SELECTED TERRORISM SUCH AS ASSASSINATION OF ELECTED OR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS? ANSWER: NO THREE CASES IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS.

E. DO YOU KNOW THE LOCATION OF THE VC PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS AND THE NAMES OF THE VC PROVINCE OFFICIALS? ANSWER: CCL KHIEU INDICATED THE VC PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS MOVED FREQUENTLY AND HE KNEW ITS GENERAL LOCATION. HE SAID HE KNEW TWO OF THE OFFICIAL'S NAMES.

F. THE PROVINCE CHIEF AND PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR ACCOMPANIED SIR ROBERT TO PHU VINH INFANTRY COMPANY INTENSIFIED PACIFICATION PROGRAM (ICIPP) HAMLET WHERE HE WAS MET BY CCL WHITTINGTON, CO, 198TH INF BDE, AND LT CL WAGNER, CO 5TH BATTALION, 46TH INFANTRY AND WAS BRIEFED ON THE CONCEPT AND STATUS OF THE ICIPP. HE WALKED AROUND AND LOOKED AT THE ENTIRE HAMLET.

G. SIR ROBERT WAS THEN TAKEN TO THE 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE WHERE HE HAD LUNCH WITH CCL HOFFMAN AND WAS GIVEN A SHORT BRIEFING BY THE BRIGADE STAFF. NO QUESTIONS WERE ASKED AFTER THE BRIEFING.

H. SIR ROBERT WAS MET AT THE NEW LIFE HAMLET EAST OF FSB 411 BY LTCOL STOTTLE, CO, 3D BATTALION, 1ST INFANTRY. HE WAS SHOWN THROUGH THE HAMLET BY COL KHIEU. HE WALKED THROUGH MANY OF THE HOUSES AND OBSERVED THE PEOPLE.

I. SIR ROBERT RETURNED TO THE AMERICAN DIVISION HEADQUARTERS WHERE HE DISCUSSED THE VC/NVA LOGISTICS SYSTEM WITH MEMBERS OF THE G-2 OB SECTION. HIS PARTICULAR INTEREST WAS THE ORGANIZATION, STRENGTHS AND METHODS OF OPERATION OF TRANSPORTATION UNITS WHICH TRANSPORT SUPPLIES FROM POINT OF ORIGIN TO NVA DIVISIONAL UNITS.

37(4)

37(7)

J. BURIA ROAD COMMENTED THAT THE RF/PF UNITS WERE MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE NOW THAN HE HAD NOTED ON HIS PREVIOUS TRIPS. HE WAS QUITE IMPRESSED BY THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RF AND PF AND STATED THAT HE THINKS THAT THESE UNITS REFLECT THE OVERALL INCREASED STRENGTH OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND THEIR ABILITY TO RESIST THE ENEMY. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT FOR THE NVA UNITS TO MOVE AROUND THE WAY THEY DO THEY MUST HAVE VERY FLEXIBLE LINES OF COMMUNICATION OR MULTIPLE AND ALTERNATE LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

K. SIR ROBERT EXPRESSED PLEASURE WITH HIS VISIT TO THE AMERICAL DIVISION AND DEPARTED CHU LAI AIR BASE AT 1650 HOURS.

8. SUMMARY. SIR ROBERT RECEIVED AND TRANSMITTED A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION DURING HIS BRIEF VISIT. HE UNDERSTANDS THE WAR AS FEW OTHERS DO. IN MY OPINION, HE WILL REPORT OBJECTIVELY, FACTUALLY, AND GENERALLY SYMPATHETICALLY TO OUR CHOSEN COURSES OF ACTION.

9. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

GP-4

900



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37(8)

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 17 NOV 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 171405Z NOV 69		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D.	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
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	CG	A				CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN ZAIS INFO GEN ABRAMS AND COL OSTEEEN FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
	DCG			11/19	B	
	C/S	H				REMARKS
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	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.
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(39)

R 171405Z ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG XXIV CORPS  
INFC COMUSMACV  
YSQKODC/FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)  
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L / EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN ZAIS INFO  
GEN ABRAMS AND COL OSTEEN FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. CG XXIV CORPS 161130Z NOV 69

1. I READ WITH GREAT INTEREST THE VERY FINE REPORT  
SUBMITTED BY COL OSTEEN. THE ACTION DESCRIBED IN THE  
REPORT WAS CONDUCTED IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER BY ALL  
OFFICERS AND MEN CONCERNED. OBVIOUSLY, OUTSTANDING  
LEADERSHIP MARKED THE CONTACT FROM START TO FINISH AND  
THE RESULTS OF THIS LEADERSHIP SHOWED IN THE MINIMUM  
DAMAGE THAT WAS INCURRED BY OUR TROOPS WITH MAXIMUM  
DAMAGE IMPOSED UPON THE ENEMY.

2. I BELIEVE COL OSTEEN'S ANALYSIS OF THE LESSONS  
LEARNED IN THIS PARTICULAR ENGAGEMENT BROUGHT OUT THAT  
HIS WELL TRAINED TROOPS WERE PHYSICALLY AND MENTALLY  
READY FOR COMBAT AND HAD THE FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN  
THE OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP WHICH WAS PROVIDED THEM.  
PLEASE GIVE A WELL DONE TO COL OSTEEN AND TO HIS TROOPS.

3. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
233

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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				SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 181354Z NOV 69		COPY NO 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
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ZNY SSSSS

P 181354Z NOV 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RHNFMA/CS FMFPAC

BT

S E C R E T / SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN  
NICKERSON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

VISIT OF SIR ROBERT THOMPSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS SENT TO MACV AND IS PASSED  
FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

QUOTE:

O 170557Z ZYM ZFF-A

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

S E C R E T / EYES ONLY / FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

SECTION ONE

VISIT OF SIR ROBERT THOMPSON

A. COMUSMACV CITE 14352 DTG 050957Z NOV 69

1. FOL SUBMITTED IAU REF A.

2. GENERAL BURMA ROAD'S VISIT TO ICTZ COMMENCED 090845H  
AND WAS TERMINATED 111700H NOV. DURING THIS PERIOD HE  
VISITED, DINED, AND TOURED WITH ALL LEVELS OF MILITARY  
AND CIVILIAN LEADERS. HIS ITINERARY EXPOSED HIM TO A  
MINIMUM OF BRIEFINGS, A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF DISCUSSIONS,  
AND MUCH INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION. HE COULD BE  
CHARACTERIZED AS POLITELY INQUISITIVE, EXCEPTIONALLY  
WELL INFORMED, AND THOROUGHLY INTERESTED IN EVERY FACET  
OF HIS TRAVELS.3. III MAF HQS. DURING AN UPDATE BRIEFING, BURMA ROAD  
ASKED MANY PENETRATING QUESTIONS AND FREQUENTLY INTER-  
RUPTED THE BRIEFER TO PURSUE A PARTICULAR POINT.A. QUESTION ON VALIDITY OF ENEMY INFILTRATION AND  
LOGISTICS STATISTICS? ANSWER: CG III MAF COMMENTED ON  
THE DIFFICULTIES CONNECTED WITH ACCURATELY ASSESSING THESE  
TWO FACTORS. ADMITTED WE MAY NOT BE READING EVERYTHING,  
BUT STATS DO HAVE CAPABILITY TO RAPIDLY SENSE MAJOR TRENDS.B. QUESTION ABOUT VC FOOD STARVAGE METHODS? ANSWER:  
MULTIPLE LAYERS OF MATERIAL, SPECIAL CONTAINERS, WATER-  
PROOF CACHES, SOME PRE-COOKED RICE, AND OTHER METHODS OF  
FOOD PRESERVATION WERE EXPLAINED IN GREAT DETAIL BY G-2.C. QUESTION: WHAT IS ULTIMATE PURPOSE OF SAPPER  
ATTACKS? ANSWER: USING MINIMUM FORCES TO CAUSE MAXIMUM  
CASUALTIES; ECONOMY OF FORCE TACTICS THAT LIMIT UTILI-  
ZATION OF OVERWHELMING U. S. FIREPOWER BY STEALTH AND  
CLOSE PROXIMITY MANEUVER.D. QUESTION: WHAT IS EFFECTIVE STRENGTH OF AVERAGE  
NVA/VC BN? ANSWER: ICTZ AVERAGE IS APPROXIMATELY 300.  
NORTHERN UNITS ARE LARGER AND BETTER EQUIPPED THAN THOSE  
IN SOUTH DUE TO NVA UNIT ROTATION POLICY NEAR DMZ.  
OVERALL, LESS THAN A YEAR AGO.E. QUESTION ON QUALITY OF ENEMY LEADERSHIP AND STATE  
OF TRAINING? ANSWER: ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE SINCE 1966.  
SAPPERS, OVERALL, NOT AS PROFESSIONAL, OR AS EFFECTIVE,

SECRET

BUT STILL VERY MUCH IN EXISTENCE. MORE POW'S ARE OFFICERS AND SENIOR OFFICERS. INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS HAVE LESS SERVICE AND TRAINING. NO DEMORALIZATION BY POW HAS CAUSED SOME DEFECTION IN THE RANKS.

F. QUESTION: WHAT PRIMARILY DICTATES THE ENEMY'S CYCLES BETWEEN OFFENSES? ANSWER: WEATHER AND THE SUPPLY LINE FACTORS. HE MUST BUILD UP STOCKS PERIODICALLY AND REPLACE BOTH MEN AND MATERIAL AFTER HEAVY ACTIONS. FEB, MAY, AND AUG WERE CLEARED AS PEAK MONTHS IN PREVIOUS YEARS.

G. QUESTION: SHORT OF ENEMY'S CROSSING THE DMZ, JUST HOW MUCH TROUBLE CAN HE GIVE YOU? WHAT IS HIS CAPABILITY TO INFLICT MAY U. S. CASUALTIES? ANSWER: HE CAN CONTAIN HIM BUT HE MAY CAUSE A LOT OF DAMAGE IF HE CHOOSES TO COMMIT ALL OF HIS FORCES. THEY ARE HERE NOW IF HE DECIDES IT WILL BE TO HIS ADVANTAGE. HE COULDN'T LAST MORE THAN TWO OR POSSIBLY THREE WEEKS.

H. SIR ROBERT COMMENTED ON HIS CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY TO STOP THE ENEMY BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE U. S. PUBLIC'S REACTION TO SUSTAINED HEAVY LOSSES. HE PROBED FOR OPINIONS ON THE ENEMY'S INTENTIONS WHICH RESULTED IN A DISCUSSION OF POSSIBILITIES.

4. PSA, QUANG BIN PROVINCE, 9 NOV 69. THE PARTY ARRIVED AT HOI AN BY USMC HELICOPTERS AT 1120 AS SCHEDULED. THEY WERE MET AT THE HELO PAD BY LTCOL QUAN, DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR PACIFICATION, LEGOL HUNG, DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR SECURITY, AND MR. PARKER, PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR. COL LE TRI TIN, THE PROVINCE CHIEF, BEING ILL, WAS NOT ABLE TO RECEIVE THE VISITORS AT ANY TIME DURING THE VISIT.

A. THE OFFICIALS WERE TAKEN TO PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS WHERE LTCOL QUAN PRESENTED A TEN MINUTE BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY SITUATION AND ON THE STATUS OF PACIFICATION. UPON COMPLETION OF THE BRIEFING THE PARTY WAS TAKEN TO THE PROVINCE CHIEF'S HOUSE FOR LUNCH, HOSTED BY MR. NGUYEN KHANH, THE DEPUTY FOR ADMINISTRATION.

B. AFTER LUNCH, AT ABOUT 1330 HOURS, THE PARTY WAS TAKEN TO THE WATERFRONT WHERE THEY BOARDED BOATS FOR TRANSFER TO XUYEN LONG ISLAND. AT XUYEN LONG, THEY WERE BRIEFED BY THE OIC ON THE HISTORY AND THE PLANS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF XUYEN LONG AS A REFUGEE SETTLEMENT. THIS BRIEFING WAS FOLLOWED BY A WALKING TOUR OF THE TWO REFUGEE HAMLETS, ESCORTED BY THE VILLAGE CHIEF AND RF COMPANY COMMANDER. IN THIS AREA, SIR ROBERT TALKED WITH THE HAMLET CHIEF, CHIEF OF VILLAGE POLICE, PSDF PERSONNEL AND WITH A FEW OF THE REFUGEES.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

GP-4

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PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

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SECRET

C. AT ABOUT 1430 HOURS, THE PARTY AGAIN BOARDED THE BOATS AND TRAVELED TO CAM NAM ISLAND, WHERE ONE OF THE PROVINCE'S MOST DEVELOPED VILLAGE AREAS IS LOCATED. HERE HE MET AND TALKED WITH THE DISTRICT CHIEF, VILLAGE CHIEF AND HAMLET OFFICIALS. HE WAS SHOWN SEVERAL OF THE VILLAGE SELF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, THE PSDF, RF UNITS AND VARIOUS FAMILY PROJECTS.

D. THE TOUR OF CAM NAM WAS COMPLETED SOONER THAN EXPECTED SO THE PARTY REQUESTED TO VISIT THE PROVINCE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS COORDINATION CENTER (PIOCC). UPON COMPLETION OF THIS VISIT, AT ABOUT 1630 HOURS, THE PARTY RETURNED TO THE AIR FIELD AND DEPARTED FOR DANANG.

E. ALTHOUGH SIR ROBERT AND MR. PALMER SHOWED INTEREST IN THE PACIFICATION ASPECTS OF PROVINCE PROGRAMS, THEY APPEARED TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN THE ENEMY SITUATION; SPECIFICALLY: CURRENT STATUS OF NVA/VC/VCI ELEMENTS, VCI ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH, VCI REPLACEMENT PROBLEMS, VCI SUPPLY AND PERSONNEL PROBLEMS, ATTACKS AGAINST GVN VILLAGE/HAMLET GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES, VALIDATION OF VCI ELIMINATIONS, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL POLICE.

5. DINNER, CG, III MAF 9 NOV 1969. FOLLOWING A DINNER PARTY HOSTED BY LTGEN NICKERSON, SIR ROBERT MADE A SHORT BUT VERY DRAMATIC SPEECH WHICH ADDRESSED KEY ISSUES OF THE TIMES. THIS ADDRESS HIGHLIGHTED HIS IMPRESSIONS AND OUTLOOKS MORE VIVIDLY THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE EVENT OF THE TRIP. HIS MAIN POINTS WERE:

A. HIS GENERAL APPROBATION WITH U. S. CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND PRAISE FOR THE DEDICATION AND BRAVERY OF OUR TROOPS.

B. ACCEPTANCE, IN ESSENCE, OF THE DOMINO THEORY. HE STRESSED THAT PROOF OF THE PUDDING IS OBTAINED BY ASKING ONE OF THE DOMINOES. SIR ROBERT SAID ASIAN LEADERS FEAR COMMUNISM MUCH MORE THAN THEY ARE ABLE TO ADMIT PUBLICLY.

C. PRAISE FOR PRESIDENT NIXON'S SPEECH SAYING IT WOULD GO DOWN AS ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT SPEECHES AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT HAS MADE THIS CENTURY.

D. OUR NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS WAR IS NO LONGER A MILITARY ONE BUT RATHER A PSYCHOLOGICAL BATTLE FOR THE THOUGHTS AND MINDS OF THE PEOPLE. WE MUST REALIZE THE POWER OF THE MIND AND INSURE IT IS APPLIED MOST EFFECTIVELY IN OUR BEHALF.

E. IN TERMS OF NATIONAL COMMITMENT, HE TOOK ISSUE WITH GEORGE BALL ON THE RELATIVE PRECEDENCE OF SOUTH

PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES

SECRET

VIETNAM. (MR. BALL'S RECENT LETTER TO THE EDITOR IN TIME MAGAZINE) STATES VIETNAM SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE FUNDAMENTAL U. S. INTEREST. STATED HE INTENDED TO PERSONALLY TELL BALL WHEN THEY NEXT MET.

F. ACKNOWLEDGED FRANCE'S PIQUE AND RESULTANT LACK OF SUPPORT FOR U. S. BUT STRESSED EUROPEAN SUPPORT IN REAL CRISES.

G. EXPRESSED NO DOUBT OF NVA/VC DEFEAT IN MAJOR OFFENSIVE BUT AGAIN QUESTIONED U. S. PUBLIC'S WILLINGNESS TO PSYCHOLOGICALLY ACCEPT THE IMPACT OF RENEUED HEAVY FIGHTING. HE STRESSED THIS POINT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING HIS TRIP. HIS PREOCCUPATION WITH OBTAINING MANY DIFFERENT VIEWS OF ENEMY INTENTIONS, SEEMED TO REFLECT HIS SEARCH FOR INFORMATION ON WHICH TO POSTULATE A PICTURE OF THE COMING MONTHS.

G. XXIV CORPS, 10 NOV 1969. BURMA ROAD SPENT A FULL DAY IN THE FIELD. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MGEN WHEELER WHO REPORTED HE SEEMED TO THOROUGHLY ENJOY HIS VISIT AND WAS FAVORABLY IMPRESSED WITH WHAT HE SAW AND HEARD.

A. MAJOR AREAS OF INTEREST:

(1) THE PACIFICATION PICTURE, NOT FROM THE STATISTICAL BRIEF, BUT FROM VISITS TO THE HAMLETS AND VILLAGES. A COMPARISON OF THE PRE-TET PICTURE WITH THE SITUATION TODAY.

(2) AN EVALUATION OF THE ARVN AND THEIR CAPABILITY TO WITHSTAND A DIVISION SIZE ATTACK FROM THE DMZ.

(3) THE INTENTIONS OF THE ENEMY IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

(4) THE RECOVERY OF HUE CITY SINCE TET OF 68 TO INCLUDE HUE UNIVERSITY.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

GP-4

BDQ.

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

**SECRET****B. PERTINENT QUESTIONS:**

(1) BURMA ROAD ASKED 3 OR 4 QUESTIONS WHEREVER HE STOPPED TO VISIT. MOST OF THE TIME THEY APPEARED TO BE ASKED IN AN EFFORT TO SHOW INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT RATHER THAN SEEKING INFORMATION, A FEW WERE MORE PURPOSEFUL AND POINTED.

(2) WHAT IS THE ENEMY CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO DO? ANSWER: HE IS SEEKING RICE AND FOOD. HE IS ATTEMPTING TO REBUILD HIS CADRES AND INFRASTRUCTURE.

(3) SHOULD THE ENEMY ATTEMPT A MAJOR OFFENSIVE ACROSS THE DMZ, AT WHAT STRENGTH IS HE CAPABLE OF CROSSING IN, AND FOR HOW LONG COULD HE SUSTAIN A PENETRATION? THIS QUESTION WAS ASKED OF COL GIAI AT FSB CARROLL). ANSWER: HE COULD ATTACK WITH UP TO A DIVISION. HE COULD NOT SUSTAIN HIS ATTACK FOR MORE THAN TEN DAYS.

(4) HAVE YOU ENCOUNTERED A RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF AGENCIES AT DISTRICT LEVEL TO SHARE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION? (ASKED BY MR. PALMER OF THE PSA). ANSWER: YES, OUR DIACC'S HAVE SOME PROBLEMS, BUT THEY ARE DIFFERENT AT EACH DISTRICT. THEY REFLECT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DISTRICT CHIEF.

(5) IS THERE ANY EFFORT TO ASSIST AND WORK WITH THE MONTAGNARDS? (ASKED BY MR. PALMER OF THE ESCORT OFFICER). ANSWER: YES, THEY HAVE A MINORITIES GROUP HERE IN HUE. THE CHIEU HOI ADVISOR WORKS WITH THEM. THEY HAVE A SCHOOL FOR THE MONTIGNARD CHILDREN.

(6) IS THE UNIVERSITY OF HUE FULLY OPERATIONAL? DOCTOR CHAU DISCUSSED THE OPERATION OF THE UNIVERSITY IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AND PROVIDED A GUIDED TOUR OF ALL THE FACILITIES, TO INCLUDE SEVERAL CLASSES IN SESSION. BURMA ROAD EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE UNIVERSITY.

**C. ANY IMPRESSIONS VISITS MAY HAVE TENDERED.**

(1) BURMA ROAD CREATED QUITE AN IMPRESSION ON COL HTHAN, PROVINCE CHIEF, AND DOCTOR CHAU, PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY. BOTH KNEW HIS BACKGROUND WELL AND WERE FAMILIAR WITH HIS WRITINGS. COL THAN DISCUSSED HIS THOUGHTS OF THE WAR WITH BURMA ROAD DURING LUNCH.

(2) BURMA ROAD SAID THE MARKED PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION IN THE AREA WAS OBVIOUS. HE APPEARED TO BE VERY FAVORABLY IMPRESSED WITH THE FOUR RECENTLY CAPTURED 120MM MORTARS IN FRONT OF THE FIRST ARVN REGIMENT'S CP AT NANCY. HE OBSERVED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE TEMPORARY SET-BACK IN THE PROGRESS OF PACIFICATION, BUT NO GENERAL REGRESSION.

(3) BURMA ROAD WAS HIGHLY IMPRESSED WITH THE PROGRESS AT HUE UNIVERSITY.

PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

SECRET

D. OVERALL: BURMA ROAD AND MR. PALMER FOUND THEIR XXIV CORPS VISIT INTERESTING AND PRODUCTIVE. HE OBVIOUSLY HAS ESTABLISHED AN EXCELLENT RAPPORT WITH THE VIETNAMESE. BOTH COL THAN AND DOCTOR CHAU WERE VERY INTERESTED IN HIS COMMENTS AND ANXIOUS TO SHOW HIM EVERY COURTESY.

E. BURMA ROAD, IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH GEN ZAIS STATED THAT HE WAS ASTOUNDED AT THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE SINCE HIS VISIT MORE THAN A YEAR AGO. HE WAS MOST COMPLIMENTARY ON THE SUCCESSES WHICH HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE ELIMINATION OF THE VC INFRA-STRUCTURE, AND WAS IMPRESSED WITH COL THAN AND THE WORK HE IS DOING.

7. AMERICAL DIVISION, 11 NOV 1969. UPON ARRIVAL AT THE AMERICAL DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, BURMA ROAD WAS MET BY BGEN COOKSEY. THE G-2, G-3 AND G-5 DISCUSSED RECENT EVENTS WITHIN THE AMERICAL TAOR.

A. SIR ROBERT ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

(1) REFERENCE RICE AND FOOD CACHES: HOW WAS IT STORED, FOR LONG TERM STORAGE FOR A YEAR OR MORE? ANSWER: THE CACHES WERE FOUND IN 55 GALLON DRUMS, IN BASKETS WRAPPED IN PLASTIC AND DID NOT APPEAR TO BE FOR LONG TERM STORAGE.

(2) ASKED, STRENGTH OF ENEMY UNITS AND PER CENT OF NVA IN VC UNITS? ANSWER: HE WAS GIVEN LATEST CB HOLDINGS OF ENEMY STRENGTHS AND TOLD THAT VERY FEW IF UNITS HAVE NVA BUT MF UNITS CONTAIN A LARGE PER CENT OF NVA, UP TO 90 PER CENT IN SOME UNITS.

(3) HAS THE SECURITY OF ANY DISTRICTS BEEN COMPLETELY TURNED OVER TO RF/PF? ANSWER: NO.

B. SIR ROBERT THEN VISITED THE 2D ARVN DIVISION WHERE HE WAS GREETED BY BGEN TOAN AND RECEIVED AN INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS BRIEFING. HE ASKED NO QUESTIONS.

C. AT QUANG NGAI PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS, HE WAS GREETED BY COL KHIEN, PC, AND MR. DILLERY, PSA. HE WAS BRIEFED BY COL KHIEN.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

UNQUOTE:

GP-4

BT

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COBIBERY/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 19 NOV 1969
					SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 191349Z NOV 69	COPY NO. 2 OF 3 COPIES REC'D
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
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	CG					SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
	DCG				B	
	C/S					REMARKS: DISPOSITION: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.
	DC/S					
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	G-3					EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY HAS BEEN SENT
	G-4					
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	G-6					
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	AWARDS					
	CAP					TOP SECRET
	CHAP					
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**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

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ZNY TTTT

P 191349Z NOV 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN BUSE FROM LIGEN  
NICKERSON, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING  
HOURS)

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR III MAF HEADQUARTERS

1. ON SUNDAY LAST, THE 16TH OF NOVEMBER, GENERAL ABRAMS  
WAS BRIEFED BY HIS STAFF ON THE AMALGAMATION PLAN WHICH  
WE HAD SENT FORWARD. HIS STAFF RECOMMENDED THAT A MARINE  
LIGEN REMAIN IN COMMAND OF III MAF, AN ARMY BRIGADIER  
GENERAL BE CHIEF OF STAFF AND THE DEPUTY BE AN ARMY MAJOR  
GENERAL VICE MARINE AS WE HAD RECOMMENDED. THE STAFF ALSO  
RECOMMENDED TO GENERAL ABRAMS THAT THE AMALGAMATION BE  
DEFERRED UNTIL 15 JANUARY 1970. ONE FURTHER RECOMMENDA-  
TION CONSIDERED THE NAMING OF THE HEADQUARTERS. HIS  
STAFF RECOMMENDED THE AMALGAMATED STAFF BE CALLED III  
FFV. GENERAL ABRAMS ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY COMMENTS  
AFTER THE BRIEFING AND THERE WERE NONE. AT THIS POINT,

PAGE TWO RHMMFA2263 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC  
HE STATED HE WAS NOT GOING TO MAKE A DECISION AT THIS  
TIME. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE TOO MANY UNCER-  
TAINITIES CONCERNING WITHDRAWALS; TOO MANY UNCERTAINTIES  
CONCERNING THE DMZ; TOO MANY UNCERTAINTIES CONCERNING ENEMY  
INTENTIONS DURING THE NEXT TET, ETC. ACCORDINGLY, HIS  
DECISION WAS TO NOT CHANGE THE STATUS QUO AT THIS TIME.  
HE ALSO STATED THAT HE WOULD ABSORB ANY CRITICISM THAT  
MIGHT OCCUR AS A RESULT OF HIS HAVING AN EXTRA HEADQUARTERS.  
2. HAD THE AMALGAMATION TAKEN PLACE COL PATTON, NOW G-2 OF  
XXIV CORPS WOULD HAVE BECOME G-2 OF III MAF. HOWEVER, INASMUCH  
AS THE AMALGAMATION IS NOT TO TAKE PLACE, MEL ZAIS HAS ASKED  
TO KEEP PATTON AND WE HAVE AGREED TO THIS. WE ASKED MACV TO  
PROVIDE US COL DZIALO FROM HIS STAFF TO SERVE AS THE III MAF  
G-2 AND HE HAS VERBALLY AGREED. WE ARE FOLLOWING THIS  
VERBAL AGREEMENT BY MESSAGE. WHEN MACV OFFICIALLY CONCURS,  
WE WILL NEED ORDERS FOR DZIALO AND WILL SUBMIT SUCH A REQUEST  
TO YOU. WE WILL ALSO HAVE TO REPLACE DZIALO. WE WILL NEED  
YOUR HELP.  
3. YOU RECALL THAT ED WHEELER IS BEING TRANSFERRED 15 DECEMBER  
FROM XXIV CORPS AND CHUCK BAILEY HAS LEFT XXIV CORPS AS OF

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET 43(1)

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA2263 T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCFD  
YESTERDAY. MEL ZAIS HAS AGREED TO NOT ASK FOR A MGEN TO  
REPLACE ED WHEELER BUT HE HAS ASKED FOR A COLONEL TO REPLACE  
CHUCK BAILEY AND I HAVE AGREED. I WILL SEE WHAT I CAN  
COME UP WITH FROM MY STAFF FOR THIS BILLET AND WILL KEEP  
YOU ADVISED.

4. INASMUCH AS I WILL NOT BE GETTING AN ARMY BRIGADIER  
GENERAL AS MY CHIEF OF STAFF NOW, I INTEND TO MOVE LEO  
DULACKI UP. I NEED A MARINE BRIGADIER GENERAL TO REPLACE  
HIM AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE HIM AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE  
DATE. ANY ASSISTANCE YOU CAN GIVE ME IN THIS REGARD  
WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. I COULD USE LENNY FRIBORG.

5. LEW WALT IS DOWN AT SAIGON TODAY. PRIOR TO LEW'S  
DEPARTURE THIS MORNING, WE GAVE HIM A BRIEFING ON THIS  
PROPOSED AMALGAMATION PLAN AND HE IS UP-TO-DATE ON IT.  
THE PRESIDENT TODAY ASKED TO SEE LEW, SO LEW WILL BE GOING  
BACK DOWN IN THE MORNING FOR A 1000 MEETING.

6. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2263

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

LIMDIS

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 9-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 20 NOV 69
					SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 200654Z NOV 69	COPY NO. OF COPIES REC'D
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
	DCG					
	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	OSA ICTZ					
	S/S					
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	SGT. MAJ					

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 ORIG G-3  
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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
**EXCLUSIVE**

FOR  
**LIMDIS 44**

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

LIMDIS TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OTTIZYUW RHMMAFA2337 3240654-TTTT--RUMHFMA.

ZNY TTTT

O 200654Z NOV 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T / L I M D I S / S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM  
LTGEN NICKERSON/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING NORMAL  
WORKING HOURS)

SECTION ONE OF TWO

SUBJECT: MACV REDEPLOYMENT PLANS (U)

1. (TS/LD) III MAF G-3 ATTENDED MEETING AT HQS MACV ON 19 NOV 69  
IN REGARD TO MACV PLANS FOR FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS. PURPOSE OF  
MEETING WAS TO PRESENT TO FORCE COMMANDERS AND COMPONENT COMMANDERS  
REPRESENTATIVES PREVIEW OF BRIEFING WHICH WILL BE GIVEN TO COMMANDERS  
AT 22 NOV 69 VIEU.

2. (TS/LD) BRIEFING WAS INTRODUCED BY M. ACV J-3 WHO, AFTER HIS  
INTRODUCTION, DEPARTED. GIST OF J-3 REMARKS AS FOLLOWS:

A. A NEW ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN RVN WAS MADE; PREVIOUS  
ASSESSMENT 5 WEEKS AGO CONCLUDED NO POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL REDE-  
PLOYMENTS. LATEST ASSESSMENT CONCLUDED THAT, ON BASIS OF ENEMY  
SITUATION, THERE SHOULD NOT BE ADDITIONAL REDEPLOYMENTS DURING FIRST

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA2337 T O P S E C R E T / L I M D I S / S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE FOR  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FEW MONTHS OF 1970. HOWEVER, THE POLITICAL PRESSURES ARE SUCH  
THAT ADDITIONAL REDEPLOYMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE.

B. ASSUMPTION IS THAT A 35,000 REDEPLOYMENT PACKAGE WILL  
BE ANNOUNCED IN EARLY DECEMBER TO BE COMPLETED IN APRIL. HOW-  
EVER, PENTAGON IS THINKING OF A FIGURE HIGHER THAN 35,000.

C. NSSM-36 HAS SERVED AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR EXAMINATION  
OF POSSIBLE FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS.

D. COMUSMACV HAS RECEIVED GUIDANCE FROM CJCS BASED ON  
SECDEF MEMO CONCERNING LONG RANGE OUTLOOK FOR RVN. INSTEAD OF  
RESIDUAL FORCE OF ABOUT 285,000 SHOULD NOW START THINKING OF  
250,000 OR AS LOW AS 190,000. NO PROSPECT OF SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGETS IN  
FUTURE; SHOULD START THINKING OF DRAWING DOWN TO  
MAAG ONLY WITHIN TWO YEARS; NO LONGER VALID, IN LONGER RANGE,  
TO PLAN ON PROVIDING A LOT OF COMBAT SUPPORT TO RVNAF. THE  
TERM "RESIDUAL FORCE". NO LONGER A GOOD TERM AND WILL BE  
REPLACED BY "U.S. FORCES". PREVIOUSLY, VIETNAMIZATION WAS CONSTRUED  
TO MEAN RVN CAPABILITY TO HANDLE "INTERNAL THREAT";  
NOW IS EXTENDED TO MEAN "EXTERNAL THREAT" AS WELL. WILL  
PROBABLY DRAW DOWN TO 190K-260K BY JULY, 1971 AND TO MAAG

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

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44 (1)  
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMFA2337 T O P S E C R E T/LIMDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY ALONE BY JULY 1973.

E. IN VIEW OF PARAGRAPH D. ABOVE, COMUSMACV WAS TO HAVE MEETING LATER THAT DAY IN REGARD TO DRAWING UP NEW PLANS FOR WHAT WE WANT RVNAF TO LOOK LIKE IF IT IS TO BE FULLY SELF-SUFFICIENT. EXAMINATION WILL INVOLVE RVNAF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES, TOE'S, WEAPONS, INCREASING OR DECREASING NUMBERS AND TYPES OF UNITS, ETC., MACV REQUIRED TO SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS TO JCS SOONEST (PROBABLY MID-DECEMBER) FOR SUBMISSION TO SECDEF BY 31 JAN 1970.

3. (TS/LIMDIS) SUMMARY OF BRIEFING BY J-3 ACTION OFFICER AS FOLLOWS:

A. ASSESSMENT. THE FUTURE IS UNCERTAIN. THE KEY TO WHAT HAPPENS NEXT IN RVN STILL LIES WITH ENEMY. IT NOW APPEARS HE IS SIMULTANEOUSLY PREPARING TWO STRATEGIC OPTIONS. FIRST, TO INCREASE OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY EARLY IN 1970. SECOND, TO CONTINUE THE WAR AT A GENERALLY LOW LEVEL OF ACTIVITY, PUNCTUATED BY OCCASIONAL HIGH POINTS. IN CONJUNCTION WITH EITHER, HE CAN INCREASE TERRORISM, PROPAGANDA, AND POSSIBLY TRY TO DISRUPT GVN PACIFICATION PROGRAMS. THE AMBIGUITY SURROUNDING THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS REMAINS, AND THE SITUATION AS YET

PAGE FOUR RHMMFA2337 T O P S E C R E T/LIMDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY DOES NOT PROVIDE A SOUND BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS ON FURTHER U.S. TROOP REDEPLOYMENTS.

B. PHASE 3 REDEPLOYMENTS WERE CONSIDERED IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF APPROXIMATELY 200,000 FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS NECESSARY TO REDUCE TO APPROXIMATELY 283,000 SUPPORT LEVEL.

C. SEVERAL FACTORS INFLUENCED MACV THINKING. FIRST, ON 15 OCT 69 CJCS REQUESTED VIEWS ON A SECDEF PROPOSAL TO REDEPLOY 100,000 TROOPS IN FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1970 SPECULATING THAT GREATER FLEXIBILITY COULD BE OBTAINED BY SCHEDULING REDEPLOYMENTS AROUND WHAT WAS DESCRIBED AS THE "TROOP TURBULENCE DURING TET". ON 21 OCT MACV RESPONDED THAT SUCH AN INCREASE ALLOWED VIRTUALLY NO FLEXIBILITY; IT ABANDONED THE "CUT AND TRY" APPROACH; IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO TRY TO SCHEDULE AROUND A POSSIBLE ENEMY SPRING OFFENSIVE. ON 22 OCT, CJCS INDICATED THAT SECDEF MAY WISH TO DISCUSS PHASE 3 REDEPLOYMENTS SOMETIME EARLY IN DECEMBER. CINCPAC FOLLOWED CJCS MESSAGE WITH ITS OWN REQUEST FOR PHASE 3 RECOMMENDATIONS BY 24 NOV. ON 13 NOV CINCPAC REITERATED HIS REQUEST FOR MACV RECOMMENDATIONS ON A PHASE 3 FORCE PACKAGE FOR CINCPAC PLANNING PURPOSES. AS A CONSEQUENCE, MACV HAS BEEN EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES AT THE

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFA2337 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

100,000 AND 200,000 LEVELS AS A FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH SPECIFIC REDOMMENDATIONS FOR PHASE 3 COULD BE MADE.

D. TWO BROAD ALTERNATIVES WERE CONSIDERED. FIRST ALTERNATIVE, FOLLOWS SCHEME LAID OUT IN ORIGINAL NSSM-36 PLAN, I.E., ADDITIONAL ARMY TROOPS COULD BE REDEPLOYED UNTILL THE ARMY SUPPORT LEVEL, WHICH REMAINS AFTER PHASE 6, IS REACHED, THEN TAKE OUT THE REST OF THE MARINES. THIS WOULD MEAN TAKING OUT 12 BRIGADE FORCES AND THREE DIVISION BASES.

E. IN THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE, THE PROCESS IS REVERSED. ALL THE MARINES AND SOME ARMY FORCES WOULD REDEPLOY IN THE NEXT 100,000. THIS WOULD INVOLVE ONLY EIGHT BRIGADES AND TWO DIVISION BASES. HOWEVER, UNDER THIS OPTION NINE USMC FIGHTER/ATTACK SQUADRONS WOULD ALSO BE REDEPLOYED.

F. THE FOLLOWING WERE GIVEN AS ADVANTAGES OF THE MARINE HEAVY OPTION:

- (1) DELAYS DRAWDOWN ON GROUND COMBAT FORCES BY SAVING FOUR BRIGADES AND ONE DIVISION BASE.
- (2) FACILITATES READJUSTMENT OF COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN I CORPS, I.E., AMALGAMATION OF XXIV CORPS AND III MAF.
- (3) FACILITATES CLOSING NSA DANANG.

PAGE SIX RHMMAFA2337 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

(4) APPEASES CRITICS WHO HAVE CRITICIZED EXCESSIVE TACAIR STRENGTH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

(5) ELIMINATES DUPLICATIONS OF TWO SERVICES, I.E., USA AND USMC SERVICES HEADQUARTERS AND LOGISTIC SYSTEMS.

(6) ASSISTS IN RECONSTITUTING PACOM RESERVE.

G. THE FOLLOWING WERE GIVEN AS DISADVANTAGES TO MARINE HEAVY OPTION:

- (1) EARLY DRAWDOWN ON TACAIR.
- (2) EARLY REQUIREMENT FOR USARV TO RELIEVE NSA DANANG.
- (3) MAY REQUIRE IN-COUNTRY DEPLOYMENTS TO COUNTER ENEMY.
- (4) UNCERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON GVN LEADERS IN ICTZ.
- (5) ROKMC SUPPORT A PROBLEM.
- (6) POTENTIAL SERVICE PROBLEM BY "TAKING OUT THE VOLUNTEERS" AND REPLACING WITH "DRAFTEES".

H. THE MACV PREFERRED OPTION ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE FACTORS IS THE MARINE HEAVY PACKAGE.

I. THE FIRST INCREMENT OF 35,000 WOULD CONSIST OF AN ARMY DIVISION (1ST INFANTRY DIVISION) FOLLOWED BY RLT-26 OR AN ARMY GP-4

BT

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

TOP SECRET

OTTTZYUW RHMMAFA2338 3240654-TTTT--RUMHMA.  
 ZNY TTTT  
 O 200654Z NOV 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE  
 FROM LTGEN WICKERSON/ MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING  
 NORMAL WORKING HOURS) SECTION TWO OF TWO  
 BRIGADE. ON BASIS OF ENEMY SITUATION, MACV PREFERS TO GO WITH  
 RLT-26. THE SECOND INCREMENT OF ABOUT 27,000 WOULD CONSIST OF  
 TWO RLT'S, A BRIGADE AND SERVICE SUPPORT. FINALLY, IN THE  
 THIRD INCREMENT, THE REST OF THE MARINES WOULD REDEPLOY AND  
 THERE WOULD BE A TRANSFER OF NECESSARY PORTIONS OF NSA DANANG  
 TO THE ARMY.

J. RECOMMENDATIONS BY MACV STAFF TO COMUSMACV AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) APPROVE ASSESSMENT, UPDATE AND FORWARD TO CJCS AND CINCPCAC.
- (2) MARINE HEAVY OPTION BE ADOPTED FOR FURTHER PLANNING.
- (3) PHASE 3 REPLY TO CINCPCAC TO CONSIST OF 35,000 PACKAGE FOR PLANNING BUT NO RECOMMENDATION AS TO TIMING.

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA2338 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

4. (TS/LD) IN DISCUSSIONS AFTER BRIEFING, BRIEFER INDICATED THAT COMUSMACV PERSONALLY FAVORS THE MARINE HEAVY OPTION AND THE 35,000 FIRST INCREMENT PACKAGE CONTAINING RLT-26; THE OVER-RIDING FACTOR WAS THE LOSS OF 8 BRIGADES VERSAS 12 BRIGADES; BELIEVES, IF HE IS REQUIRED TO REDEPLOY 100,000, THE OPTION WHICH RETAINS THE MOST COMBAT FORCES MUST BE ACCEPTED. ACKNOWLEDGED DRAWDOWN ON TACAIR BUT ESTIMATE REMAINING AIR FORCE SQUADRONS HAVE A SURGE CAPABILITY TO MAKE UP 80 PERCENT OF DIFFERENCE. BRIEFER STATED THE DRASTIC DEPARTURE FROM NSSM-36 WAS DUE TO FACT THAT ENEMY SITUATION HAS NOT PROGRESSED AS FAVORABLY AS WAS EXPECTED AND, THEREFORE, IN EFFECT, PHASE 6 WAS FLIP-FLOPPED WITH PHASES 3 4 AND 5 TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF BRIGADE FORCES REMAINING. IN ADDITION, SINCE RESIDUAL FORCE WILL CHANGE IN MAKE-UP, I.E., LESS EMPHASIS ON U.S. COMBAT SUPPORT, REQUIRE MAXIMUM COMBAT FORCES.
5. (TS/LD) BRIEFER INDICATED COMMANDERS WOULD BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT AT VIEU BUT COMUSMACV HOPED COMMENTS WOULD NOT INVOLVE POLITICAL/SERVICE MATTERS. REALIZES FINAL DECISION WILL BE MADE AT JCS LEVEL AND WOULD PREFER LATTER TO THRASH OUT SERVICE POLITICS; WOULD HOPE HIS COMMANDERS, AS HE, APPROACH THE PROBLEM FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A FIELD COMMANDER

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

44(4)

III MAF 2100/4

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA2338 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT  
 EXCLUSIVE FOR /MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 ONLY. UNDERSTANDS USMC DESIRE TO "KEEP FLAG IN-COUNTRY" BUT  
 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ARE OVER-RIDING.  
 6. (TS/LD) COMUSMACV REPORTEDLY INTENDS TO FORWARD HIS RECOM-  
 MENDATIONS ON THE 35,000 PACKAGE TO CINCPAC ON 23 NOV 1969, THE  
 DAY AFTER VIEW; IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THERE IS SOME SLIGHT  
 POSSIBILITY THAT HE MIGHT CHANGE HIS MIND ON INCLUDING RLT-26  
 IN FIRST INCREMENT. HOWEVER, IT FURTHER APPEARS THAT HE  
 BELIEVES THE MARINE HEAVY OPTION IS THE MOST PRACTICAL SOLUTION  
 AND THAT ANY SERVICE RAMIFICATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED  
 AT JCS LEVEL.

GP-4

BT

2338

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 19 NOV '69					
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ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN OUT		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
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	DCS PLANS					<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p><b>DISPOSITION</b></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td>SECTION</td> <td>SIGNATURE</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> </div> <p>ORIG ENGR (FEO) REL CG <i>Handwritten note</i> <b>HAS BEEN SENT</b></p> <p><b>EXCLUSIVE FOR</b></p>	SECTION	SIGNATURE		
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SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**SECRET**

(41)

**SECRET**

PTTSZYUW RHMMFA2183 3230422-SSSS--RUHFMA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 190422 NOV 69

FM CG III MAF  
TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
BUTLER BUILDINGS

A. YR 131949Z NOV 69

1. (S) I WILL KEEP YOU UP TO DATE ON THE PROGRESS BEING MADE TO OBTAIN BUTLER BLDGS FOR RETROGRADE. COMUSMACV HAS APPROVED DISMANTLING OF SIXTEEN MORE BLDGS IN FL5G BRAVO AREA AT DONG HA. THIS MAKES A TOTAL OF THIRTY THREE AUTHORIZED SO FAR. THERE ARE FOUR MORE BLDGS OCCUPIED BY CBMU 301 WHICH WILL BE REQUESTED WHEN NSA DECLARES THEM EXCESS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

2. (S) IN THE MEANTIME I HAVE EIGHTY TWO MORE FROM THE ELEVENTH ENGR BN FORMED AS A DETACHMENT AND ATTACHED TO FL5G-B TO CONTINUE DISMANTLING BUILDINGS AND PREPARING THEM FOR SHIPMENT. I WILL KEEP THEM ON THIS UNTIL ALL AVAILABLE BLDGS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND DISMANTLED.

3. (S) XXIV CORPS HAS STATED A REQMT FOR ALL FACILITIES

PAGE TWO RHMMFA2183 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR AT QUANG TRI, ALTHOUGH I EXPECT THAT AS UNITS SETTLE IN. SOME EXCESS BLDGS WILL BECOME AVAILABLE. I WILL KEEP AN EYE ON THIS AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE IN I CORPS AS DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2183

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41(1)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

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			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 191350Z NOV 69		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D.	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		20/11		ASSIGNMENT OF G-2 TO III MAF HEADQUARTERS
	DCG	I		11/20		
	C/S	I				REMARKS
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION:  <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					Section _____ Signature _____
	S/S	I	11/20		copy	
	G-1					<p><i>Well be readdressed to int per for info</i></p> <p>COPY <u>2</u> OF <u>4</u> COPIES</p> <p><b>HAS BEEN SENT</b></p> <p>(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)</p> <p><i>43</i></p>
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*Ref (a)*

P 191350Z ZFF-4 ZFF-1  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN  
NICKERSON

ASSIGNMENT OF G-2 TO III MAF HEADQUARTERS

A. TELCON BETWEEN BGEN DOOLEY AND BGEN JASKILKA OF  
19 NOV 1969

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING  
THAT YOU HAVE AGREED TO MAKE COL DZIALO AVAILABLE TO MY  
HEADQUARTERS TO SERVE AS G-2. THIS ACTION ON YOUR PART  
IS GREATLY APPRECIATED.

2. I WILL REQUEST A SUITABLE  
RELIEF FOR DZIALO.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

070



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42/11

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

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	CG					SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
	DCG					
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	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
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DISPOSITION:

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**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

PTITZYUW RHMAFA2375 3241322-TTTT--RUHMFMA.  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 201322Z NOV 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R L I G E N B U S E F R O M  
 LTGEN NICKERSON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
 PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR III MAF HEADQUARTERS  
 A. CG III MAF 191349Z NOV 69  
 1. IN REREADING THE HAS BEEN SENT OF REF A THIS  
 MORNING, I'M NOT EXACTLY SURE THAT I HAVE COMMUNI-  
 CATED TO YOU MY SENSE OF URGENCY ON THE BRIGADIER  
 GENERAL REPLACEMENT FOR G-3. MY CONCERN, OF  
 COURSE, IS THAT THE G-3 REPLACEMENT ARRIVE IN TIME  
 FOR LEO TO MOVE UP TO THE CHIEF'S JOB SO THAT  
 GEORGE CAN RETURN TO THE STATES SOMEWHERE NEAR THE  
 NORMAL EXPIRATION OF HIS TOUR.  
 2. TODAY IS THE 20TH OF NOVEMBER AND GEORGE'S  
 NORMAL RTD WOULD BE 7 DECEMBER. I THINK THAT WE  
 SHOULD TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO ALLOW HIM TO RETURN  
 HOME PRIOR TO CHRISTMAS. IF THIS IS DONE, IT

PAGE TWO RHMAFA2375 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R  
 MEANS THAT THE NEW G-3 SHOULD BE ON BOARD FOR AT LEAST  
 FIVE DAYS PRIOR TO GEORGE'S DEPARTURE DATE AND PREFER-  
 ABLY TEN SO THAT LEO CAN HAVE A FEW DAYS WITH GEORGE.  
 THAT WOULD MEAN THAT THE RELIEF SHOULD GET OUT HERE  
 ABOUT THE 10TH OF DECEMBER OR THEREABOUTS. INCIDENTALLY  
 GEORGE HAS NEVER COMMENTED ON THIS MATTER ONE WAY OR THE  
 OTHER AND IS PERFECTLY WILLING TO STAY AS LONG AS NEEDED.  
 WHILE I APPRECIATE THIS, I BELIEVE THAT THE MARINE CORPS  
 SHOULD EXERT SOME EXTRA EFFORT AND INSURE THAT HIS  
 RELIEF ARRIVES SOMEWHERE AROUND THE 10TH OF DECEMBER.  
 AND THAT'S NOT FAR OFF.  
 3. IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFERENCE A, I REQUESTED HELP FOR  
 A RELIEF FOR DZIALO. I DON'T REALLY HAVE A SUITABLE  
 RELIEF OUT HERE FOR DZIALO. I HAD CONSIDERED RAINFORTH  
 BUT MACV (AND I) PREFER THAT HE STAY IN HIS PRESENT JOB.  
 JOHN CANTON'S NORMAL RTD WOULD BE ABOUT THE 21ST OF  
 DECEMBER. HE, TOO, HAS NEVER COMMENTED ON HIS RETURN  
 EXCEPT TO SAY THAT HE IS WILLING TO STAY HERE AS LONG  
 AS NECESSARY. I APPRECIATE THIS ALSO BUT WOULD LIKE FOR  
 HIM TO BE ABLE TO BE DETACHED BY 21 DECEMBER. ACCORDINGLY

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA2375 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 I AM REQUESTING THAT YOU PROVIDE A RELIEF FOR DZIALO THAT  
 WOULD MEET MACV'S REQUIREMENTS AND MY TIMING. DZIALO  
 SHOULD BE HERE ABOUT 10 DECEMBER WHICH MEANS HIS RE-  
 LIEF SHOULD BE ON BOARD AT MACV BY 5 DECEMBER. SO ONLY  
 15 DAYS REMAIN.

4. SAM JASKILKA HAS ADVISED THAT MACV J-2 HAS STATED  
 THAT COL CHARLES STEPHENSON (3D MARDIV G-2) WOULD BE  
 SATISFACTORY AND ACCEPTABLE. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY, TO SUBMIT,  
 WOULD BE GRIFF MOODY. HOWEVER I WOULD THINK THAT IT WOULD BE LESS  
 TRAUMATIC FOR BILL JONES TO LOSE STEPHENSON THAN MOODY.  
 INASMUCH AS MACV HAS COME UP WITH STEPHENSON'S NAME,  
 THAT MAY BE THE BEST SOLUTION FOR ALL CONCERNED.

5. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2375

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 20 NOV 69					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 200014Z NOV 69		COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
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PTTCZYUW RHMAFA2284 3240014-CCCC--RUHFMA.  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 200014Z NOV 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM  
 LTGEN NICKERSON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

ASSIGNMENT OF G-2 TO III MAF HEADQUARTERS

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS SENT TO COMUSMACV AND IS  
 PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

P 191350Z NOV 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV

C O N F I D E N T I A L/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN  
 NICKERSON

ASSIGNMENT OF G-2 TO III MAF HEADQUARTERS

A. TELECON BETWEEN BGEN DOOLEY AND BGEN JASKILKA OF  
 19 NOV 1969

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT  
 YOU HAVE AGREED TO MAKE COL DZIALO AVAILABLE TO MY HEAD-

PAGE TWO RHMAFA2284 C O N F I D E N T I A L/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 QUARTERS TO SERVE AS G-2. THIS ACTION ON YOUR PART IS  
 GREATLY APPRECIATED.

2. I WILL REQUEST A SUITABLE RELIEF FOR DZIALO.  
 WARM REGARDS

GP-4

UNQUOTE

GP-4

BT

2284

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 21 NOV 69	
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE P 210623Z NOV 69		COPY NO <u>1</u> OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	<del>I</del>				ASSIGNMENT OF G-2 TO III MAF HEAD QUARTERS
	DCG	<del>I</del>	11/23			
	C/S	<del>I</del>				REMARK:
	DC/S					
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**SECRET**  
44

P 010603Z ZFF-4  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZEM

S E C R E T / EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
ASSIGNMENT OF G-2 TO III MAF HEADQUARTERS

A. CG III MAF 191350Z NOV 69

B. TELCON BETWEEN BEN DOOLEY AND BGEN JASKILKA OF  
20 NOV 1969

1. IN REFERENCE A I STATED THAT I WOULD REQUEST A  
SUITABLE RELIEF OF COL DZIALO.

2. REFERENCE B STATED THAT COL CHARLES STEPHENSON  
CURRENTLY G-2 OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION WOULD BE SATIS-  
FACTORY AND ACCEPTABLE WITH MACV. COL STEPHENSON HAS  
BEEN G-2 OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION SINCE JUNE OF THIS  
YEAR.

3. ASSUMING THAT COL STEPHENSON IS ACCEPTABLE TO YOU I  
WOULD PROPOSE THAT HE ARRIVE MACV ON 5 DEC 1969 AND COL  
DZIALO BE DETACHED ON 10 DEC 1969. WOULD YOU PLEASE  
ADVISE IF COL STEPHENSON IS ACCEPTABLE AND IF THE TIMING  
PROPOSED HEREIN IS ALSO ACCEPTABLE.

4. WARM REGARDS.  
GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
190



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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV. 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAR		23 NOV 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 2 OF 6 COPIES REC'D	
			230130Z NOV 69			
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UNCLAS E F T O

PTIEZYUW RHMMFA2648 3270100-EEEE--RUHMFMA.

ZNY EEEEE

P 200100Z NOV 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUSVDE/COMUSMACV

RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

UNCLAS E F T O/FOR GEN ABRAMS AND LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN  
NICKERSON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

III MAF MEDICAL OFFICER BRIEF ON PLAGUE CONTROL

1. THE FOLLOWING WAS BRIEFED AT MY HEADQUARTERS ON 21 NOV  
1969. IT IS CONSIDERED WORTHY OF A FEW SECONDS OF YOUR  
TIME:QUOTE. THIS BRIEFING WILL PRESENT A TECHNIQUE OF PLAGUE  
CONTROL DESIGNED TO KEEP DANANG PORT PLAGUE FREE. THIS  
SLIDE (DEPICTING A LARGE RAT, A COMB AND AN OVERSIZED  
FLEA) REFLECTS HOW WE KEEP THE PORT OF DANANG PLAGUE FREE.  
IT IS A UNIQUE METHOD THAT COULD WELL BECOME AN ACCEPTED  
STANDARD.IN EFFECT, WE DO THIS BY KEEPING A VIGOROUS, HEALTHY  
BREED OF RATS IN THE IMMEDIATE PORT AREA. WE HAVE ASSUMED  
CERTAIN FACTS:

PAGE TWO RHMMFA2648 UNCLAS E F T O

HEALTHY RATS WILL NOT TRANSMIT PLAGUE.

HEALTHY RATS HAVE NO FLEAS.

HEALTHY, VIGOROUS RATS PROTECT THEIR OWN DOMAINE AND  
PREVENT SCROUNGE FLEA INFESTED RATS FROM MOVING IN.FLEAS LEAVE SICK RATS OR LEAVE WHEN A RAT'S BODY TEMPERA-  
TURE FALLS OR RISES. (VERY SENSITIVE TO TEMPERATURE).FORTY (40) RATS ARE TRAPPED PER WEEK IN DANANG DOCK  
AREAS. THEY ARE ANESTHETIZED WITH CHLOROFORM OR ETHER AND  
ARE COMBED FOR ECTOPARASITES (FLEAS, ETC.); THE RAT IS THEN  
SACRIFICED AND A POST MORTUM EXAMINATION DONE. ORGANS ARE  
PLANTED ON SPECIAL PLAGUE MEDIA.IN THE PORT CONTROL AREA OUR HEALTHY VIGOROUS RATS  
HAVE AN ACCEPTABLE FLEA INDEX OF ZERO. (PORTS AND AREAS IN  
THE COUNTRY WITHOUT CONTROL HAVE RATS WITH FLEA INDEX OF  
40-200).WHEN OUR HEALTHY VIGOROUS RAT FLEA INDEX APPROACHES ONE -  
AFTER FLEA INSECTICIDE RESISTANCE STUDIES - THE AREA IS DUSTED  
WITH LINDANE, DDT OR DIAZONON (DEPENDING ON FLEA SUSCEPTABILITY)  
TO KEEP OUR HEALTHY, VIGOROUS RAT FLEA-FREE.

THE MORAL OF THIS TECHNIQUE IS: "PROTECT YOUR RATS AND THEY

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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UNCLAS E F T O

47

UNCLAS EFTO

PAGE THREE RHMAFA2648 UNCLAS E F T O.  
WILL PROTECT YOU". END QUOTE.  
2. WHILE EVERYTING QUOTED ABOVE HAS BASIS IN FACT, I WOULD  
HOPE THAT ART BUCHWALD WOULD NOT HEAR OF IT. WARM REGARDS.  
BT  
2648

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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UNCLAS EFTO  
47

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		24 NOV 69					
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 2 OF 3 COPIES REC'D					
			240914Z NOV 1969							
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TOP SECRET

OTITZYUW RHMNAFA2797 3230914-TTTT--RUMHMA.

ZNY TTTT

O 240914Z NOV 69

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T /LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN  
NICKERSON/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING  
HOURS)

SUBJECT: MACV REDEPLOYMENT PLANS

REF: CG III MAF 200654Z NOV 1969

1. (TS/LD) COMUSMACV'S MONTHLY WIEU MEETING FOR COMMANDERS WAS  
HELD ON 22 NOV 69. MEETING LONGER THAN USUAL AND GREATEST PORTION  
OF MEETING DEVOTED TO BRIEFING ON AND A DISCUSSION OF FURTHER  
REDEPLOYMENTS. CONTENTS OF BRIEFING WAS AS REPORTED IN REFER-  
ENCE A. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED.

2. (TS/LD) DURING THE DISCUSSION, I RAISED THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:  
A. THE MARINE HEAVY OPTION IS INCONSISTENT WITH NSSM-36  
AND NO REASONS HAD BEEN ADVANCED WHICH JUSTIFY SUCH A MAJOR  
DEVIATION FROM NSSM-36.

B. THE REASONING THAT THE MARINE HEAVY OPTION IS ADVANTAGEOUS  
TO MACV BECAUSE IT INVOLVES THE LOSS OF ONLY 8 BRIGADE FORCES  
COMPARED WITH 12 BRIGADE FORCES UNDER THE ARMY HEAVY OPTION IS  
FALLACIOUS. ASSUMING AN AVERAGE USA BRIGADE STRENGTH OF 4,000.

PAGE TWO RHMNAFA2797 T O P S E C R E T /LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

AND AN AVERAGE USMC RLT STRENGTH OF 5,000, THE DIFFERENCE BE-  
TWEEN THE TWO OPTIONS IN GROUND COMBAT POWER IS ONLY 1 2/3 USMC  
RLTS OR 2 1/2 BRIGADES. BUT IN ADDITION, THE MARINE HEAVY  
OPTION INVOLVES THE LOSS OF THE MARINE CAP PROGRAM AND NINE  
ATTACH/FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRONS TOTALLING SOME 150 AIRCRAFT,  
BOTH OF WHICH ARE IRREPLACEABLE.

C. DURING THE TACAIR DISCUSSION, GENERAL BROWN VOLUNTEERED  
THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE FMAN WOULD RESULT IN A 25 PERCENT REDUC-  
TION OF IN-COUNTRY TACAIR SORTIES. SOME OF THE OTHER FORCE  
COMMANDERS INDICATED THAT THEY ARE NOT NOW RECEIVING ALL OF THE  
TACAIR THEY REQUIRE. GENERAL ABRAMS STATED THAT WE HAVE TO LOOK  
AT ALL AIR, INCLUDING THE B-52'S; BUT I BELIEVE THAT I GOT TO  
HIM ON THE TACAIR ISSUE AND THAT MY POINT SANK IN.

D. CG II FFV COMPLAINED ABOUT LOSING THE 1ST INFANTRY  
DIVISION. I POINTED OUT THAT OVER 40 PERCENT OF THE PHASE 1 AND 2  
REDEPLOYMENTS HAVE ALREADY COME OUT OF I CORPS.

E. SHIPPING WOULD BE A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM ESPECIALLY  
SINCE THE NEW REDEPLOYMENTS WOULD INVOLVE MOVES PRIMARILY TO  
CONUS AND NOT TO OKINAWA. GENERAL BROWN AGREED THAT HE WOULD  
HAVE MASSIVE PROBLEMS JUST MOVING USAF AIRCRAFT OUT-OF-COUNTRY

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMAFA2797 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
IN A SHORT PERIOD LIKE SIX MONTHS.

F. I RAISED THE QUESTION OF ROKFORV TENURE IN VIETNAM. NO DEFINITIVE ANSWER COULD BE GIVEN EXCEPT THAT AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND GENERAL ABRAMS AGREED THEY WOULD PROBABLY BE AMONG THE LAST TO DEPART. WITH RESPECT TO THE ROK MARINES, I IMPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO MARRY UP A MARINE AIR/GROUND BRIGADE WITH THE ROKMC BRIGADE IN THE RESIDUAL FORCE. I DOUBT IF THIS SANK IN.

8. (TS/LD) GENERAL ABRAMS AND AMBASSADOR BUNKER AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT BEFORE CHRISTMAS. GENERAL ABRAMS STATED THAT WE ARE BETTER OFF THAN WE WERE JUST PRIOR TO THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE SINCE THE ARVN AND THE TERRITORIALS HAVE IMPROVED IN EFFECTIVENESS, ETC. HOWEVER, WE ARE IN THE DARK AS TO WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN THIS YEAR AND THE TET PERIOD IS EXACTLY WHEN WE NEED ALL OF OUR PRESENT FORCES. BELIEVES WE HAVE THE STRENGTH NOW TO TAKE ON THE NVA SHOULD THEY DECIDE TO COME DOWN. GENERAL ABRAMS INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT IF HE SENT A MESSAGE STATING THAT HE WOULD GO ALONG WITH A 150,000 REDEPLOYMENT DURING 1970, HE WOULD GET A CONCURRENCE BY RETURN MESSAGE. HE BELIEVED FURTHER THAT HE WOULD BE PERMITTED

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFA2797 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TO CONTROL THE TIMING OF EXODUS HOWEVER. IN THIS WAY, HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO KEEP EVERYTHING HE NOW HAS THROUGH TET (MARCH) BUT THIS WOULD MEAN THAT REDEPLOYMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPRESSED INTO THE LAST NINE MONTHS OF 1970. ABE'S DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT CAME BEFORE HE AND AMBASSADOR BUNKER MENTIONED PRESIDENT THIEU'S AGREEMENT ON 150K PLUS 65K ALREADY OUT. SEE PARA 4.C. BELOW. THE COMMENTS MAY OR MAY NOT BE RELATED. GENERAL ABRAMS RECOGNIZED THE HORRENDOUS PROBLEMS ALL SERVICES WOULD HAVE. HE STATED THAT IF THE PRESIDENT MUST MAKE ANOTHER ANNOUNCEMENT, HE MIGHT GO ALONG WITH 35,000 BUT THAT HE COULD NOT SAFELY TAKE OUT 50,000 IN THE JAN-MAR TIME FRAME. THIS WAS PART OF GIVE AND TAKE DISCUSSION AND SHOULD BE NOTED AS SOMEWHAT OUT OF CONTEXT.

4. (TS/LD) GENERAL ABRAMS AND AMBASSADOR BUNKER AGREED THAT THE SENSE OF THE MEETING WAS:

- A. CONTINUE THE "CUT AND TRY" APPROACH.
- B. DO NOT REDEPLOY ANY ADDITIONAL TROOPS AT THIS TIME; WAIT TO SEE ENEMY DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH THE TET PERIOD.
- C. IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT THIEU'S STATEMENT THAT HE COULD ACCEPT A 150,000 REDEPLOYMENT NEXT YEAR, BRIEF GENERAL VINH AND HIS STAFF AND HAVE THEM COME UP WITH A SCHEDULE FOR REDE-

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFA2797 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FLOYMENT BUILT AROUND THIEU'S 150,000. THIS IS IN ADDITION TO  
65K ALREADY OUT, OR 215K.

5. (TS/LD) FOLLOWING ARE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS THAT ARE NOT  
NECESSARILY RELATED TO THE WIEU MEETING:

A. IN VIEW OF CMC'S DESIRES TO RETAIN A USMC BRIGADE AS A  
PART OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE, I SUGGEST WE ALSO CONSIDER THE  
POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING THE CAPS AS A PART OF THE RESIDUAL  
FORCE. IN ADDITION, WE WOULD REQUIRE A ROLL-UP FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY  
3,500 PERSONNEL FOR A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY 90  
DAYS BEYOND THE DEPARTURE OF THE LAST MAJOR USMC ELEMENT.

B. IN REGARD TO THE REDEPLOYMENT OF TWO CB BATTALIONS TO  
IV CORPS, GENERALS MILDREN, CONROY OR TOWNSEND WERE UNAWARE OF  
YATES' MOVES IN THIS REGARD. GENERAL MILDREN BELIEVES YATES  
IS TWISTING SOME FACTS; HE INTENDS TO TALK WITH YATES SINCE THE  
MOVE OF THE TWO CB BATTALIONS WOULD CREATE MANY PROBLEMS FOR  
USARV. I WANT TO INFORM YOU THAT I DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM WITH  
GENERAL WALT AND TOLD HIM IF THE PROBLEM IS NOT RESOLVED IN OUR  
FAVOR I WILL NOTIFY YOU IMMEDIATELY SO THAT YOU CAN RAISE THE  
ISSUE AT CINCPAC LEVEL OR HIGHER.  
AS YOU KNOW MUCH OF THE ABOVE IS SENSITIVE. PLEASE PROTECT

PAGE SIX RHMMAFA2797 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

YOUR SOURCE: WARM REGARDS.

NICKERSON.

GP-4

BT

2797

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

48

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 24 NOV 69	
			SERIAL NO / CONTROL DATE P 240906Z NOV 69		COPY NO 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		18 NOV 69		VISIT BY DEPSEDEF TO ICTZ 18 NOV 1969
	DCG	I		11/25		
	C/S	I				REMARK
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION  <input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION
	DEPCORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					SECTION      SIGNATURE
	S/S	X	11/24			
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	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
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	FORMED O					
	S&C					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

**SECRET**

48

TO: COMUSMACV  
ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTCEN NICKERSON  
VISIT BY DEPSEDEF TO 10TZ 18 NOV 1969

1. GENERAL. DEPSEDEF AND PARTY VISITED 10TZ FROM 1800Z TO 1815Z NOV 1969. DURING HIS BRIEF VISIT, MR. PACKARD INITIALLY RECEIVED A STAFF BRIEFING AT III MAF HQ, AND THEN VISITED I CORPS HQ, VIEWED A 1ST MARDIV/FMAW STATION DISPLAY, VISITED ANU DIEM SAN HAMLET (CAP 2-7-0) AND THEN PROCEEDED TO XXIV CORPS AT 1210H. FOLLOWING LUNCH HOSTED BY LTCEN ZAKS, XXIV CORPS CONDUCTED A SHORT STAFF BRIEFING. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A VISIT TO 101ST AVN DIV (CAM) AND A TOUR OF TRUYEN NAM VILLAGE WHERE HE WAS MET BY COL THAN, THE PROVINCE CHIEF. HERE HE RECEIVED AN ORIENTATION ON PACIFICATION PROGRESS SINCE THE 1967 JET OFFENSIVE. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO FSB ANZIO AND MET THE 1ST ARVN DIV COMMANDER, MGEN TRUONG. AT 1545H HE DEPARTED PHU BAI AIRFIELD FOR THE USS CONSTELLATION.



2. SIGNIFICANT ITEMS.

A. III MAF. DISCUSSION/QUESTION:

(1) FOLLOWING CO III MAF EXPLANATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF MAF IN 10TZ AND THE IMPACT OF LOSING THE USS NEW JERSEY AND CRUISER SUPPORT, SEC PACKARD COMMENTED HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP WITH 8 INCH CRUISER AVAILABILITY.

(2) FEASIBILITY OF SOME MODIFICATION TO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN DMZ TO ENABLE SEEDING OF BEN HAI RIVER WAS DISCUSSED. NO COMMITMENT WAS MADE.

(3) QUESTION: HOW ACCURATELY HAVE WE LOCATED ENEMY UNITS IN THE DMZ? ANSWER: WITHIN 500 METERS.

(4) DEPSEDEF EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE INFANTRY COMPANY INTENSIVE PACIFICATION PLAN (CIPP) AND RECEIVED AN EXPLANATION ON THE CORRELATION BETWEEN CAP'S AND REGULAR INFANTRY COMPANIES WORKING TO DEVELOP PE CAPABILITIES.

(5) QUESTION: HOW PROFICIENT IS ARVN SENSOR MANAGEMENT? ANSWER: EXCELLENT. 1ST ARVN DIV IS AS GOOD OR BETTER THAN MOST US UNITS. 2ND ARVN REGIMENT CITED AS PRIMARY EXAMPLE.

48(1)

48(1)

(6) QUESTION: IS EQUIPMENT FOR ARVN ARRIVING ON SCHEDULE? ANSWER: YES. 11 CORPS COMBINED LOGISTIC OFFENSIVE PLAN WAS DISCUSSED.

(7) DISCUSSION OF ARVN SMALL UNIT LEADERSHIP AND TECHNICAL TRAINING PROBLEMS FOLLOWED. SEC. PACKARD INDICATED HE WAS THINKING OF COMPUTERIZING ARVN LOGISTICS SYSTEM TO IMPROVE SPARE PARTS CONTROL AND STOCKAGE.

(8) AFTER BRIEFING ON ARVN AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES AND PROJECTED STRENGTH, HE ASKED WHAT TYPE OF AIRCRAFT THEY NEEDED IF MORE WERE PROVIDED. HE SEEMED TO THINK WE NEEDED TO LOOK FURTHER AHEAD ON PROJECTING TOTAL ARVN INDEPENDENCE IN BOTH LOGISTICS AND TACTICAL AIR.

HE DISCUSSED LONG LEAD TIME FOR PILOT TRAINING. ANSWER: IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE A-37 WAS PERFORMING WELL, BUT THEIR TOTAL CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY IN HELO'S WERE VERY LIMITED. US SUPPORT WOULD BE NEEDED FOR SOME

TIME. MR. PACKARD ALLUDED TO A NEW, UNSOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT THAT MIGHT BE AVAILABLE IN LIEU OF A-37 FOR THE FUTURE. PRESUMABLY HE MEANT THE F-5.

(9) FOLLOWING A PSDF DISCUSSION OF WEAPONS ISSUED VERSUS PEOPLE TRAINED, MR. PACKARD ASKED THE TYPE AND NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL WEAPONS NEEDED. ANSWER: CARBINE IDEAL. NUMBERS WERE DISCUSSED, BUT A PAPER WAS PREPARED THAT GAVE SPECIFIC PROVINCE FIGURES, BOTH PRESENT AND PROJECTED, IN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION.

(10) MR. PACKARD ASK ABOUT PSDF WEAPONS GAINED/LOST RATIOS. ANSWER: APPROXIMATELY EQUAL.

(11) MR. PACKARD SHOWED AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN SENSOR CAPABILITY, RELIABILITY AND ITS CORRELATION WITH SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE.

8. XXIV CORPS. (BRIEFING AND DISCUSSION)

(1) DEFENSE DEF MADE A SHORT SPEECH WITH TWO MAIN PARTS. HIS FIRST POINT WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH SHOULD GIVE US TIME TO BE MORE DELIBERATE ON WITHDRAWALS AND GET THE JOB DONE PROPERLY. SECONDLY, AFTER A THOROUGH PROGRAM REVIEW, THE DEFENSE DOLLAR IS GOING TO BE SHORT. MILITARY MUST ABSORB COST IF INFLATION PLUS INCREASED PAY FOR OUR TROOPS. SIAD THERE ARE NO REAL HARD PROGRAMS IN FY 71 BUT SINCE 70 FELL SHORT, 71 WOULD HAVE TO ABSORB PART OF THE FUNDING SHORTAGES.

(2) XXIV CORPS BRIEFING FOLLOWED AND HIGHLIGHTED BEN LOU AS A MODEL OF PACIFICATION PROGRESS. BOTH 101ST ABN AND 5TH MECH DIV'S REPRESENTATIVES DISCUSSED CURRENT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON PACIFICATION EFFORTS.

(3) THE IMPACT OF 3RD ARMDIV WITHDRAWAL ON ARVN LEADERSHIP AND TO ALE WERE DISCUSSED IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROJECTIONS OF ENEMY CAPABILITY/INTENTIONS IN THE DIA AREA.

48(2)

48(2)

(4) A BRIEF ON REALIGNMENT OF XXIV CORPS TO DATE TO MEET INSTANT COMBAT AND CIZ STRESSED HIGH EFFICIENCY OF 7-1ST AVN DIV AND 5TH REGT COULD BE EMPLOYED TO MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE.

(5) IN DISCUSSION, MR. BACKARD APPEARED TO INDICATE THAT HE WAS NOT IN FAVOR OF FURTHER ICTZ TROOP REDUCTIONS UNTIL WE SEE WHAT THE ENEMY DOES AFTER THE WEATHER IMPROVES.

(6) IN FOLLOW-ON CONVERSATION ABOUT POSSIBLE SEEDING OF THE GEN HAL-DIVER CONDUCTED DURING XXIV CORPS PORTION OF

T-19, MR. BACKARD REMAINED NONCOMMITTAL. MR. MOTHERSON, USAF, SEEMED TO BE KNOWLEDGEABLE AND FAVORABLY INCLINED TOWARDS PURSUING THE MATTER FURTHER.

3. SUMMARY: MR. BACKARD APPEARED KNOWLEDGEABLE, PERCEPTIVE, LISTENED INTENTLY, AND SEEMED ANXIOUS TO INSURE WE HAD WHAT WE NEEDED. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, HE ASKED IF WE HAD ENOUGH OF THE SPECIFIC ITEMS BEING DISCUSSED. HE IMPLIED THAT WE WOULD MAKE HASTE SLOWLY ON ANY FUTURE WITHDRAWALS AND HE CLEARLY INDICATED HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR SUCH AN APPROACH. ALTHOUGH HIS TIME HERE WAS SHORT, I BELIEVE IT WAS PROFITABLE.

4. WARM REGARDS.

CO-11

**COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES**

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

2-77

48(3)

48(3)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		24 NOV 1969					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. / OF / COPIES REC'D.					
			240916Z NOV 69		1 / 3 /					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG	I		25 Nov	N	SPECIAL/EXCLUSIVE FOR				
	DCG	J		11/25						
	C/S	I		Has Seen		REMARKS				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.				
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ					<table border="1"> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
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	SIC									
	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

EXCLUSIVE  
FOR  
HAS BEEN SENT

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

49

CONFIDENTIAL



HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 24 NOV 1969
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 241148Z NOV 69		COPY NO 2 OF 3 COPIES REC'D
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE IN OUT		INITIAL
	CG	I		28 Nov	W
	DCG	I		11 Nov	B
	C/S	I			D
	DC/S				
	DCS PLANS				
	DEPCORDS				
	DSA ICTZ				
	S/S	X		11/25	CG/4
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	TCC				
	SGT MAJ				

SUBJECT *Feedback*  
SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO

REMARK

DISPOSITION	
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<input type="checkbox"/>	DESTROY AFTER ROUTING
<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION
SECTION	SIGNATURE

ORIG: S/S  
REL: CG

EXCLUSIVE  
FOR

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN SENT  
*for you had asked that we send this info direct to you*

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

SECRET

50

**SECRET**

PTTSZYUW RHMNAFA2810 3281148--SSSS--RUEBHOA RUMHFMA.  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 FMFPAC -T- CMC  
 P 241148Z NOV 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUEBHOA/CMC  
 RUMHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAFMAN AND LTGEN BUSE  
 FROM LTGEN NICKERSON (MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY) (DELIVER  
 DURING WORKING HOURS)

A. CG FMFPAC 110015Z NOV 69 (NOTAL)  
 1. IAW REF A, FOLLOWING MESSAGE TRANSMITTED TO COMUSMACV IS FOR-  
 WARDER FOR YOUR INFORMATION:  
 QUOTE: P 240906Z ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

S E C R E T /EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON  
 VISIT BY DEPSECDEF TO ICTZ 18 NOV 1969.

1. GENERAL. DEPSECDEF AND PARTY VISITED ICTZ FROM  
 180835H TO 181545H NOV 1969. DURING HIS BRIEF VISIT,  
 MR. PACKARD INITIALLY RECEIVED A STAFF BRIEFING AT III

PAGE TWO RHMNAFA2810 S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO  
 MAF HQ, AND THEN VISITED I CORPS HQ, VIEWED A 1ST MARDIV/FMAW  
 STATIC DISPLAY, VISITED NUI BIN SAN HAMLET (CAP  
 2-7-6) AND THEN PROCEEDED TO XXIV CORPS AT 1210H.  
 FOLLOWING LUNCH HOSTED BY LTGEN ZAIS, XXIV CORPS CON-  
 DUCTED A SHORT STAFF BRIEFING. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A  
 VISIT TO CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM) AND A TOUR OF TRUYEN NAM  
 VILLAGE WHERE HE WAS MET BY COL. TRAN, THE PROVINCE CHIEF.  
 HERE HE RECEIVED AN ORIENTATION ON PACIFICATION PROGRESS  
 SINCE THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO FSB  
 ANZIO AND MET THE 1ST ARVN DIV COMMANDER, MGEN TRUONG.  
 AT 1945H HE DEPARTED PHU BAI AIRFIELD FOR THE USS CON-  
 STELLATION.

2. SIGNIFICANT ITEMS:

A. III MAF. DISCUSSION/QUESTIONS:

(1) FOLLOWING CG III MAF EXPLANATION OF THE IMPORTANCE  
 OF NGF IN ICTZ AND THE IMPACT OF LOSING THE USS NEW  
 JERSEY AND CRUISER SUPPORT, SEC PACKARD COMMENTED HE  
 MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP WITH 6 INCH CRUISER AVAILABILITY.  
 (2) FEASIBILITY OF SOME MODIFICATION TO RULES OF ENGAGE-  
 MENT IN DMZ TO ENABLE SEEDING OF BEN HAI RIVER WAS DIS-

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGESCOPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMNAFA2810 S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO  
 DISCUSSED. NO COMMITMENT WAS MADE.

(3) QUESTION: HOW ACCURATELY HAVE WE LOCATED ENEMY UNITS  
 IN THE DMZ? ANSWER: WITHIN 500 METERS.

(4) DEPSECDEF EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE INFANTRY COMPANY  
 INTENSIVE PACIFICATION PLAN (CIPP) AND RECEIVED AN EXPLANATION ON  
 THE CORRELATION BETWEEN CAP'S AND REGULAR INFANTRY COM-  
 PANIES WORKING TO DEVELOP PF CAPABILITIES.

(5) QUESTION: HOW PROFICIENT IS ARVN SENSOR MANAGEMENT?  
 ANSWER: EXCELLENT. 1ST ARVN DIV IS AS GOOD OR BETTER  
 THAN MOST US UNITS. 2ND ARVN REGIMENT CITED AS PRIMARY  
 EXAMPLE.

(6) QUESTION: IS EQUIPMENT FOR ARVNAF ARRIVING ON  
 SCHEDULE? ANSWER: YES. I CORPS COMBINED LOGISTIC  
 OFFENSIVE PLAN WAS DISCUSSED.

(7) DISCUSSION OF ARVN SMALL UNIT LEADERSHIP AND TECHNICAL  
 TRAINING PROBLEMS FOLLOWED. SEC PACKARD INDICATED  
 HE WAS THINKING OF COMPUTERIZING ARVN LOGISTICS SYSTEM  
 TO IMPROVE SPARE PARTS CONTROL AND STOCKAGE.

(8) AFTER BRIEFING ON ARVN AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES AND  
 PROJECTED STRENGTH, HE ASKED WHAT TYPE-OF AIRCRAFT THEY

PAGE FOUR RHMNAFA2810 S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO  
 NEEDED IF MORE WERE PROVIDED. HE SEEMED TO THINK WE  
 NEEDED TO LOOK FURTHER AHEAD ON PROJECTING TOTAL ARVN  
 INDEPENDENCE IN BOTH LOGISTICS AND TACTICAL AIR.

HE DISCUSSED LONG LEAD TIME FOR PILOT TRAINING. ANSWER:  
 IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE A-37 WAS PERFORMING WELL,  
 BUT THEIR TOTAL CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY IN HELO'S  
 WERE VERY LIMITED. US SUPPORT WOULD BE NEEDED FOR SOME  
 TIME. MR. PACKARD ALLUDED TO A NEW, UNSOPHISTICATED  
 AIRCRAFT THAT MIGHT BE AVAILABLE IN LIEU OF A-37 FOR  
 THE FUTURE. PRESUMABLY HE MEANT THE F-5.

(9) FOLLOWING A PSDF DISCUSSION OF WEAPONS ISSUED VERSUS  
 PEOPLE TRAINED, MR. PACKARD ASKED THE TYPE AND NUMBER OF  
 ADDITIONAL WEAPONS NEEDED. ANSWER: CARBINE IDEAL -  
 NUMBERS WERE DISCUSSED, BUT A PAPER WAS PREPARED THAT GAVE SPECIFIC  
 PROVINCE FIGURES, BOTH PRESENT AND PROJECTED, IN ANSWER TO THIS  
 QUESTION.

(10) MR. PACKARD ASK ABOUT PSDF WEAPONS GAINED/LOST  
 RATIOS. ANSWER: APPROXIMATELY EQUAL.

(11) MR. PACKARD SHOWED AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN SENSOR  
 CAPABILITY, RELIABILITY AND ITS CORRELATION WITH SIGNAL.

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

50(2)

**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFA2810 S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO  
INTELLIGENCE.

8. XXIV CORPS. (BRIEFING AND DISCUSSION)

(1) DEPSECDEF MADE A SHORT SPEECH WITH TWO MAIN PARTS. HIS FIRST POINT WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH SHOULD GIVE US TIME TO BE MORE DELIBERATE ON WITHDRAWALS AND GET THE JOB DONE PROPERLY. SECONDLY, AFTER A THOROUGH PROGRAM REVIEW, THE DEFENSE DOLLAR IS GOING TO BE SHORT. MILITARY MUST ABSORB COST IF INFLATION PLUS INCREASED PAY FOR OUR TROOPS. STAD THERE ARE NO REAL HARD PROGRAMS IN FY 71 BUT SINCE 70 FELL SHORT, 71 WOULD HAVE TO ABSORB PART OF THE FUNDING SHORTAGES.

(2) XXIV CORPS BRIEFING FOLLOWED AND HIGHLIGHTED BEN LOUC AS A MODEL OF PACIFICATION PROGRESS. BOTH 101ST AVN AND 5TH MECH DIV'S REPRESENTATIVES DISCUSSED CURRENT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON PACIFICATION EFFORTS.

(3) THE IMPACT OF 3RD ARMDIV WITHDRAWAL ON ARVN LEADERSHIP AND MORALE WAS DISCUSSED IN CONNECTION WITH VARIOUS PROJECTIONS OF ENEMY CAPABILITY/INTENTIONS IN THE DMZ AREA.

(4) A BRIEF ON REALIGNMENT OF XXIV CORPS ELEMENTS TO

PAGE SIX RHMMAFA2810 S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO  
MEET THREAT FROM LAOS AND DMZ STRESSED NOW MOBILITY OF 101ST AVN DIV AND 5TH MECH COULD BE EMPLOYED TO MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE.

(5) IN DISCUSSION, MR. PACKARD APPEARED TO INDICATE THAT HE WAS NOT IN FAVOR OF FURTHER ICTZ TROOP REDUCTIONS UNTIL WE SEE WHAT THE ENEMY DOES AFTER THE WEATHER IMPROVES.

(6) IN FOLLOW ON CONVERSATION ABOUT POSSIBLE SEEDING OF THE BEN HAI RIVER CONDUCTED DURING XXIV CORPS PORTION OF TRIP, MR. PACKARD REMAINED NONCOMMITTAL, BUT LTGEN MCPHERSON, USAF SEEMED TO BE KNOWLEDGEABLE AND FAVORABLY INCLINED TOWARDS PURSUING THE MATTER FURTHER.

3. SUMMARY. MR. PACKARD APPEARED KNOWLEDGEABLE, PERCEPTIVE, LISTENED INTENTLY, AND SEEMED ANXIOUS TO INSURE WE HAD WHAT WE NEEDED. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, HE ASKED IF WE HAD ENOUGH OF THE SPECIFIC ITEMS BEING DISCUSSED. HE IMPLIED THAT WE WOULD MAKE HASTE SLOWLY ON ANY FUTURE WITHDRAWALS AND HE CLEARLY INDICATED HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR SUCH AN APPROACH. ALTHOUGH HIS TIME HERE WAS SHORT, I BELIEVE IT WAS PROFITABLE.

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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**SECRET**

50/51

**SECRET**

PAGE SEVEN RHMNAFA2310.S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO

4. WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE.

2. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS DURING VISIT, DR. SELIN MADE SEVERAL OBSERVATIONS.

A. HE NOTED AFTER XXIV CORPS BRIEF QUOTE WELL NOW THAT THE 101ST DOESN'T HAVE ANYTHING ELSE TO DO, THEY SEEM TO BE RELATING TO PEOPLE UNQUOTE.

B. DURING INITIAL TALKS ABOUT POSSIBLE TROOP REDUCTIONS, MR. PACKARD MADE NO DIRECT COMMENT, BUT DR. SELIN INDICATED THAT HE THOUGH THAT THERE WERE ZERO CHANCES THAT ANY MORE MARINES WOULD LEAVE VIETNAM UNTIL SUMMER. I DIDN'T PURSUE THE POINT.

3. I LATER TOLD MR. PACKARD THAT WE SHOULDN'T LOSE ANY TROOPS FROM I CORPS UNTIL MARCH OR APRIL. IN EFFECT, HE UNDERSTOOD THAT I THOUGHT WE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE ENEMY MADE HIS MOVE FOLLOWING A BREAK IN THE WEATHER.

4. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2810

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		24 NOV 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
			P 241215Z NOV 69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	J		23 Nov	W	UNCLAS EFTO/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR COLBY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
	DCG	J		11/25	RB	
	C/S	J				REMARKS <i>Has Been sent</i>
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP.CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	Y		11/24	Carly	
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HAS BEEN SENT

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

UNCLASSIFIED

P 241015Z  
FM CG ITT NAF  
TO COMUSMACV (MACCORDS)  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O EYES ONLY  
FOR AMBASSADOR COLBY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

- 1. IN REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE 230630Z NOV 69, REGARDING ASSIGNMENT OF HENRY R. CUSHING AS REPLACEMENT FOR EDWARD C. DILLERY, NO INTERVIEW REQUIRED IN VIEW OF YOUR STRONG RECOMMENDATION. FRITZ CONCURS.
- 2. WARM REGARDS.

SSC NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
197



COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

HAC BEEN SENT

UNCLAS/AF TO

(1)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		25 NOV 69					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D.					
			P 250716Z NOV 69							
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG	J		26 Nov	N	FOR MGEN RAMSEY FROM LTJG NICKERSON				
	DCG	J		11/25	B					
	C/S	F				REMARKS				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION:  <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.  Return for permanent retention.				
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ					<table border="1"> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
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**CONFIDENTIAL**

050718Z FEB 69

FM CG 11TH AF

TO CG AMERICAL DIVISION

ZEN

CONFIDENTIAL FOR GEN RANNEY FROM LTJEN NICKERSON  
1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GENERAL LAM TO THE PRESIDENT OF  
THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. PLEASE  
TREAT IT AS A PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT.


QUOTE

FROM: COMMANDING GENERAL, I CORPS  
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SPECIAL OFFICE)  
INFO: THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE  
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS/REPUBLIC OF VN ARMED FORCES

MESSAGE N. 153/COT/VPTI

I CORPS HEADQUARTERS RESPECTFULLY REPORTS TO THE PRESIDENT THE EARLY  
RESULT OF OUR INVESTIGATION CONCERNING AN INCIDENT CAUSED BY  
OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY A UNIT OF THE U. S. AMERICAL DIVISION  
INFLECTED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES TO THUONG HAMLET, SON-MY VILLAGE  
SON-TINH DISTRICT, QUANG NGAI PROVINCE ON MARCH 19, 1969.  
BASED ON REPORTS MADE BY QUANG NGAI PROVINCE CHIEF DATED  
NOVEMBER 10, 1969 AND BY SON-TINH DISTRICT CHIEF DATED MARCH  
27, 1969. FOLLOWING IS THE GENERAL PROGRESS OF THE INCIDENT.

SON MY, THUONG HAMLETS AND THOSE AROUND MY LAI VAN THIEM WERE  
NOT SECURE SINCE 1964. FOR SECURITY REASONS LOCAL AUTHORITY  
HAD TO MOVE TO SON-LONG. THE WHOLE AREA WAS CONTROLLED BY VC.  
ENEMY FORCES WERE 42TH BN AND 506A CO AND 506B CO. THEY  
OPERATED IN THIS HAMLET AND THOSE AROUND IT. THE COMMUNIST  
ORGANIZED IT AS COMBAT HAMLET, WITH COMMUNICATION TRENCHES, AND  
ALSO AS AUTONOMOUS HAMLET. PROGRESS H0700H ON MARCH 19, 1969  
A RAID AGAINST SON-MY HAMLET WAS CONDUCTED BY TASK FORCE BARKER  
OF THE 11TH BRIGADE, U. S. AMERICAL DIVISION INCLUDING CHARLIE  
AND BRAVO CO OF THE 1/22, LED BY 1STLT RALLEY. U. S. FORCES  
INFORMED THE LOCAL AUTHORITY AND THE 12TH DIA CONTACT HAS BEEN  
MADE BY OPERATIONAL FORCES FROM 0700H TO 0900H, CONTINUED UNTIL  
1600H. REPORTED RESULT WAS 125 VC KIA, A NUMBER OF WEAPONS  
AND DOCUMENTS WERE CAPTURED. FRIENDLY CASUALTY WAS NOT REPORTED.



3 (1)

3 (1)

TWO WEEKS LATER RUMOR SPREAD OUT THE OPERATION CAUSED HUNDREDS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTY. LOCAL PEOPLE HAD TO BURY DEAD BODIES WHICH INCLUDED VC AND FRIENDLY. THE DISTRICT CHIEF OF SON TINH DISTRICT REPORTED TO THE PROVINCE CHIEF THAT ONE OF THE U.S. SOLDIERS STEPPED ON ENEMY MINE WHEN U. S. FORCES ENTERING THE HAMLET. HOSTILE FIRE WAS HEAVY U. S. FORCES CALLED IN ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKE AS SUPPORT WHICH INFLECTED A NUMBER OF CASUALTY TO THE ENEMY AND TO THE CIVILIANS AS WELL. THEN AFTER IN VAIN LOCAL AUTHORITY OF QUANG NGAI PROVINCE AND SON TINH DISTRICT COULD NOT COLLECT ANY MORE DETAIL CONCERNING VC AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, IN THE HAMLET. FIVE MONTHS AFTER, DURING AN OPERATION AGAINST SON-MY HAMLET CONDUCTED BY QUANG NGAI SECTOR, LED BY THE PROVINCE CHIEF, THE OPERATIONAL FORCE MET STRONG RESISTENCE FROM THE HAMLET AND COULD NOT OCCUPY THE TARGET. HOWEVER, 20 CIVILIANS FLED FROM THE HAMLET AND REPORTED AS FOLLOWS. ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT FOR OPERATION CONDUCTED BY THE U. S. FORCES IN MARCH 1968 HAD INFLECTED THE ENEMY HEAVY CASUALTIES. A NUMBER OF CIVILIANS MET THE SAME FATE. THE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA CLAIMED ALL CASUALTIES WERE CIVILIANS, BUT WHEN BURYING DEAD BODIES, PEOPLE IN THE HAMLET SAW ABOUT 20 CIVILIAN BODIES INCLUDING WOMEN, CHILDREN AND OLD MEN AMONG 50 BODIES OF COMMUNIST SOLDIERS. ON JUNE 26, 1969, A COMBINED VN-USA DELEGATION FROM SAIGON CAME OUT HERE TO SEE THE CHIEF OF QUANG NGAI PROVINCE AND SON TINH DISTRICT CHIEF. THE LATTERS EXPLAINED THAT TILCUNG AND SON-MY HAMLETS WERE STRONGLY ORGANIZED BY THE COMMUNIST SINCE 1964. MOST OF THE YOUTH IN THE HAMLET JOINED PROVINCE MAIN FORCE UNITS AND DISTRICT REGIONAL FORCE. ACCORDING TO AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE PROVINCE, RIGHT AFTER THE CONTACT, THERE WERE 100 ENEMY CASUALTIES AND A NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES THAT COULD NOT BE CONFIRMED. TO COVER UP THEIR HEAVY CASUALTIES, THE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MADE PEOPLE FEEL ANGRY AGAINST THE U. S. FORCES. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING SON MY VILLAGE BEFORE 1964. SON MY HAD ABOUT 2,000 INHABITANTS. THE HAMLET WAS PACIFIED IN OCTOBER 1969, 1500 PEOPLE JOINED THE CVN. 400 YOUTHS JOINED COMMUNIST UNITS FROM 50 TO 100 PEOPLE WORKED IN CVN CONTROLLED AREA. LAST WEEK, NOVEMBER 14, 1969 MANY U. S. REPORTERS CAME AND INTERVIEWED PEOPLE AT A SON MY VILLAGE. PERHAPS PEOPLE IN THE VILLAGE HOPED TO HAVE SOME COMPENSATION FROM THE U. S. 3(2)

THAT'S WHY THEY EXAGGERATED THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES AND HOUSES BURNED DOWN. QUANGNGAI LOCAL AUTHORITY HAS ANSWERED TO THE PRESS THAT AS A RESULT OF THE AIR SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN SON MY VILLAGE A LARGE NUMBER OF COMMUNIST SOLDIERS WERE KILLED AND A FEW CIVILIAN CASUALTIES WERE RECORDED. ABOVE ARE GENERAL POINTS CONCERNING THE INCIDENT CAUSED BY U. S. FORCES DURING OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN SON MY VILLAGE, IT IS REPORTED ACCORDINGLY TO THE PRESIDENT.

APC 4169 NOVEMBER 20, 1969  
 LTGEN HOANG XUAN LAM  
 COMMANDING GENERAL  
 I CORPS/ICTZ  
 (SIGNED AND SEALED)

UNQUOTE

SSO NOTE: DELIVERED DURING WORKING HOURS.  
 WARM REGARDS.

CPA  
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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

6

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV. 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		27 NOV 69	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. OF COPIES RECD.	
			0 270442Z NOV 69			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
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	CG	F		11/28	[initials]	UNCLAS EFTO/ FOR MGEN RAMSEY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
	DCG	F		11/28	[initials]	
	C/S	F			[initials]	REMARKS
	DC/S	F		11/29	[initials]	
	DCS PLANS					<p>HR HAS BEEN SENT</p> <p>COPY <u>2</u> OF <u>4</u> COPIES</p> <p>(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)</p> <p>(6)</p>
	DEP. CORDS					
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O 270442Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG AMERICAL DIVISION  
 ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O /FOR MGEN RAMSEY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED FOR YOUR ACTION.

QUOTE:

THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT OF PRESS RELEASE BY REUTERS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON IS QUOTED IN FULL FOR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

TROOPS OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION WERE BURNING DOWN SUSPECTED VIET CONG VILLAGES NEAR MY LAI SCENE OF THE ALLEGED U. S. MASSACRE 1968 AS RECENTLY AS LAST MONTH.

"WITHIN A MATTER OF A WEEK AT THE END OF OCTOBER, WE DESTROYED 13 VILLAGES," SAID 2ND LT. NORMAN E. CUTTRELL, 22, A PLATOON LEADER WHO ARRIVED IN VIETNAM LAST MONTH.

ACCORDING TO LTC RUSS WHITLA, THE BURNING BY ZIPPO SQUADS, NAMED AFTER THE CIGARETTE LIGHTER, AND INTENDED TO DENY THE VILLAGES TO THE VIET CONG. IT IS PART OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE.

BEFORE THE VILLAGES ARE RAZED, THE INHABITANTS ARE WARNED 24 HOURS IN ADVANCE BY LEAFLETS AND LOUD SPEAKER BROADCASTS FROM PLANES TO LEAVE THEIR HOMES. THEY ARE PLACED IN NEWLY CONSTRUCTED GOVERNMENT VILLAGES THAT ARE OFTEN ENCLOSED BY BARBED WIRE.

MEMBERS OF LT. CUTRELL'S PLATTON DESCRIBED IN DETAIL HOW THEY PERFORMED THEIR DESTRUCTION:

FIRST THE ZIPPO SQUAD; SET FIRE TO THE THATCHED DWELLINGS WITH THEIR LIGHTERS, SGT STEVE KOHRT ADDED, "WHEN WE FOUND CANDLES, SOME OF US USED CANDLES. IF WE THINK IT'S REALLY WORTH IT, WE THROW A GRENADE IN.

HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO BURN DOWN A VILLAGE?

"THAT REALLY VARIES, IT DEPENDS ON THE WIND, IT ALSO DEPENDS ON THE SIZE OF THE VILLAGE," HE SAID.

CUTTRELL ADDED, "WHAT WE TRY TO DO IS TO GET ALL OF THE PEOPLE OUT OF THE VILLAGE BEFORE WE START BURNING. BECAUSE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS, OF COURSE, THEY DON'T WANT TO GO. THAT IS THEIR HOME AND EVERYTHING.

"BUT WHAT WE DO IS GET THEM ALL OUT OF THE VILLAGE AND OUT OF SIGHT BEFORE WE BURN IT SO THEY WON'T HAVE TO STAND AND WATCH THEIR HOUSES BURN."

UNQUOTE

2. REQUEST YOUR REPORT BE SUBMITTED TO THIS HQ FOR FURTHER TRANSMITTAL BY ME TO MACV. WARM REGARDS.

CSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

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HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

*Ref. Ca.*





RUYSWISSA G O O P 3 3 R O 8 1 A L/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
YOUR DECOMB.

6. (C) FOR YOUR INFORMATION, DURING PERIODS OF ROUGH WEATHER THE  
CAUSEWAY IS REMOVED TO A SAFE WATER HAVEN AT TIEN SHA COVE. THIS  
PRACTICE WILL CONTINUE WHENEVER ROUGH SEAS THREATEN. PHICB ONE  
DET NOVEMBER HAS TAKEN CARE OF ALL MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONAL  
PROBLEMS THAT HAVE ARISEN SO FAR. OUR RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE  
TO ASSIST THEM IF REQUIRED.

7. (C) EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO MINIMIZE RISKS OF DAMAGE.  
I APPRECIATE YOUR COOPERATION. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

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P 270910Z ZFF-3 ZFF-6

FM CG III MAF

TO CG USARV

INFO CG XXIV CO-PS

ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY/SENSATIVE FOR MAJGEN MABRY

INFO BEEN SHEDD FROM BGEN DOOLEY.

TRANSITIONAL FORCE STATIONING.

A. MACV PLAN 186-69

B. YOUR 3175 OF 261230Z NOV 69 (NOTAL)


1. PLANNING REPRESENTATIVES FROM III MAF DC/S PLANS AND G-4, AND XXIV CORPS G-3 PLANS AND G-4 PLANS WILL ATTEND THE MEETING AT YOUR HEADQUARTERS AT 1300, SATURDAY 29 NOVEMBER. THESE OFFICERS WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS STATIONING OF THE RESIDUAL FORCE AS IN REF A AND B ABOVE.

2. III MAF ACTION OFFICER IS LTCOL DANA G. MEAD, DC/S PLAN DNG 5537/5565. WARM REGARDS.

CG-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAF FORM 5216 (REV. 8-69)

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	CG	I				VISIT BY ACTING DASD(CR), MR. L. HOWARD BENNETT
	DCG	I				
	C/S	I				REMARKS <i>Feedback</i>
	DC/S	I				
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP. CORDS					
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P 270752Z ZFF-4

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

UNCLAS E F T O FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

SUBJ: VISIT BY ACTING DASD (CR), MR. L. HOWARD BENNETT

1. MR. BENNETT AND PARTY OF EIGHT VISITED III MAF  
COMMANDS IN THE DANANG AREA SUNDAY 23 NOV 69 1900H  
THROUGH 1100 25 NOV 69.

2. WE PREPARED AND FOLLOWED AN ITINERARY GEARED  
SPECIFICALLY TO DESIRES STATED IN MESSAGES WHICH  
ANNOUNCED MR. BENNETT'S VISIT.

3. A MEMBER OF MY STAFF ACCOMPANIED MR. BENNETT AT ALL  
TIMES AND WAS INVITED TO MONITOR TROOP DISCUSSION  
SESSIONS AFTERNOON 24 NOV AND MORNING 25 NOV.

4. MODUS OPERANDI AND SIGNIFICANT IMPRESSIONS OF VISIT  
FOLLOW.

A. MR. BENNETT'S APPROACH IS INFORMAL, DIRECT. HE  
ELICITS CANDID RESPONSE BY TOPICAL QUESTIONS AND  
FRIENDLY MANNER. INSPIRES CONFIDENCE. CONTROLS  
DISCUSSIONS.

B. THREE DISCUSSION PERIODS HELD; TOTAL TIME ABOUT  
8 HOURS. APPROXIMATELY 162 MARINE, NAVY, AIR FORCE,  
ARMY OFFICERS AND MEN RESPONDED TO ADVANCE NOTICE OF  
VISIT. ALL RECEIVED AUDIENCE IN GROUPS OF 25-35 PER  
SESSION AND MAJORITY SPOKE. ESTIMATE 85-90 PERCENT OF  
TOTALS WERE BLACK SERVICEMEN. ABOUT 6 OFFICERS ATTENDED.

C. DISCUSSIONS WERE ORDERLY, CALM, NO EMOTIONAL  
OUTBURSTS OR RANCOR NOTED. NO INHIBITION EVIDENT.

D. NO INDICATION OF POWER GROUPS NOR MILITANT ELEMENTS  
IN ANY DISCUSSION GROUP.

E. ESSENTIALLY ALL COMPLAINTS STEMMED FROM A PERSONAL  
PROBLEM EXTRAPOLATED BY INDIVIDUAL TO GENERAL  
PROPORTIONS AND SO EXPRESSED.

9(1)

9(1)

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**F. CATEGORIES OF COMPLAINTS:**

- (1) HARASSMENT BECAUSE OF RACE.
- (2) UNJUST MILITARY PUNISHMENT BECAUSE OF RACE.
- (3) UNEQUAL PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY BECAUSE OF RACE.
- (4) INADEQUATE RESPONSE FROM SNCO AND JUNIOR OFFICER LEVELS TO VALID COMPLAINTS.
- (5) PARTIALITY TO WHITES IN CLUBS SHOWN BY WAITRESSES.
- (6) SLOW OR INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO UNIT WATCH COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS.

G. MR. BENNETT PLUS TWO OF HIS STAFF VISITED III MAF NAVAL CONFINEMENT CENTER 1500-1600 24 NOV. MR. BENNETT TALKED WITH TWO PRISONERS IN ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION CELLS. NO AFTER VISIT COMMENTS.

H. MR. BENNETT'S STAFF ONLY VISITED NAVY AND ARMY ENLISTED CLUBS IN DANANG AREA SUNDAY EVENING. ESCORT OFFICERS REPORTED ROUTINE EVENING. SCHEDULE MONDAY CLUB VISITS CANCELLED BY STAFF; LACK OF TIME.

I. EXIT BRIEFING HELD THIS HEADQUARTERS 25 NOV 69. MR. BENNETT SUMMARIZED COMPLAINTS RECEIVED. HE ADVOCATED:

- (1) SENSITIVITY TRAINING FOR MP PERSONNEL.
- (2) CONSISTENT, DEFINITIVE POLICY DISSEMINATION AND INTERPRETATION FROM TOP TO BOTTOM OF MILITARY SYSTEM ON HAIRCUTS, ORNAMENTS, AND SIGNS.
- (3) COMMAND INTERSET AND RESPONSE TO UNIT WATCH COMMITTEES.
- (4) VERTICAL AND LATERAL COMMUNICATIONS TO EXPLAIN MEANING OF SYMBOLS AND SIGNS USED BY YOUNG BLACK SERVICEMEN.
- (5) RUMOR SQUASHING BY ESTABLISHING DIALOGUE AMONG TROOPS, TROOPS AND NCOS. TROOPS AND OFFICERS.

9/21

9/21

(6) BETTER INFORMATION OR EDUCATION FOR YOUNG SERVICEMEN ON MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM.

(7) ATTENTION TO DOD HUMAN GOALS, DEFINED AND PUBLISHED RECENTLY.

5. MY ASSESSMENT OF VISIT:

A. MR. BENNETT ACHIEVED HIS PRIMARY PURPOSE, DISCUSSION WITH TROOPS.

B. NO ABNORMAL OR INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS DISCLOSED.

C. PRESENCE OF MR. BENNETT AND PARTY NOT INFLAMMATORY IN ANY WAY.

D. OVERALL EFFECT OF VISIT CONSIDERED BENEFICIAL AND CONDUCTIVE TO CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT OF RACIAL HARMONY.

6. SIGNIFICANTLY, NOT ONE COMPLAINT WAS HEARD ON FOOD, LODGING OR EQUIPMENT.

500



UNCLAS/EFTO

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

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			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 270728Z NOV 69		COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D.					
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PITCZYUW RHMMAFA3134 33 10728-CCCC--RUHNFMA.  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 270728Z NOV 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHNFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN BUSE FROM  
 LGEN NICKERSON  
 SUBJ: VISIT BY ACTING DASD (CIVIL RIGHTS), MR. L. HOWARD  
 BENNETT

1. MR. BENNETT AND PARTY OF EIGHT VISITED III MAF COM-  
 MANDS IN THE DANANG AREA SUNDAY 23 NOV 69 1900H THROUGH  
 1100H 25 NOV 69.
2. HE PREPARED AND FOLLOWED AN ITINERARY GEARED SPECIFIC-  
 ALLY TO DESIRES STATED IN MESSAGES WHICH ANNOUNCED MR.  
 BENNETT'S VISIT.
3. A MEMBER OF MY STAFF ACCOMPANIED MR. BENNETT AT ALL  
 TIMES AND WAS INVITED TO MONITOR TROOP DISCUSSION SESSIONS  
 AFTERNOON 24 NOV AND MORNING 25 NOV.
4. MODUS OPERANDI AND SIGNIFICANT IMPRESSIONS OF VISIT  
 FOLLOW.
- A. MR. BENNETT'S APPROACH IS INFORMAL, DIRECT. HE

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA3134 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 ELICITS CANDID RESPONSE BY TOPICAL QUESTIONS AND FRIENDLY  
 MANNER. INSPIRES CONFIDENCE. CONTROLS DISCUSSIONS.  
 B. THREE DISCUSSION PERIODS HELD; TOTAL TIME ABOUT 8  
 HOURS APPROXIMATELY 162 MARINE, NAVY, AIR FORCE, ARMY  
 OFFICERS AND MEN RESPONDED TO ADVANCE NOTICE OF VISIT.  
 ALL RECEIVED AUDIENCE IN GROUPS OF 25-35 PER  
 SESSION AND MAJORITY SPOKE. ESTIMATE 85-90 PER CENT OF  
 TOTAL WERE BLACK SERVICEMEN. ABOUT 6 OFFICERS  
 ATTENDED.  
 C. DISCUSSIONS WERE ORDERLY, CALM, NO EMOTIONAL  
 OUTBURSTS OR RANCOR NOTED. NO INHIBITION  
 EVIDENT.  
 D. NO INDICATION OF POWER GROUPS OR MILITANT  
 ELEMENTS IN ANY DISCUSSION GROUP.  
 E. ESSENTIALLY ALL COMPLAINTS STEMMED FROM A  
 PERSONAL PROBLEM EXTRAPOLATED BY INDIVIDUAL TO  
 GENERAL PROPORTIONS AND SO EXPRESSED.  
 F. CATEGORIES OF COMPLAINTS:

- (1) HARASSMENT BECAUSE OF RACE.
- (2) UNJUST MILITARY PUNISHMENT BECAUSE OF RACE.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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PAGE THREE RHMMFA3134 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

(3) UNEQUAL PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY BECAUSE OF RACE.

(4) INADEQUATE RESPONSE FROM SNCO AND JUNIOR OFFICER LEVELS TO VALID COMPLAINTS.

(5) PARTIALITY TO WHITES IN CLUBS SHOWN BY WAITRESSES.

(6) SLOW OR INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO UNIT WATCH COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS.

3. MR. BENNETT PLUS TWO OF HIS STAFF VISITED III MAF NAVAL CONFINEMENT CENTER 1500-1600 24 NOV. MR. BENNETT TALKED WITH TWO PRISONERS IN ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION CELLS. NO AFTER VISIT COMMENTS.

4. MR. BENNETT'S STAFF ONLY VISITED NAVY AND ARMY ENLISTED CLUBS IN DANANG AREA SUNDAY EVENING. ESCORT OFFICERS REPORTED ROUTINE EVENING. SCHEDULED MONDAY CLUB VISITS CANCELLED BY STAFF; LACK OF TIME.

5. EXIT BRIEFING HELD THIS HEADQUARTERS 25 NOV 69. MR. BENNETT SUMMARIZED COMPLAINTS RECEIVED. HE

ADVOCATED:

(1) SENSITIVITY TRAINING FOR MP PERSONNEL.

PAGE FOUR RHMMFA3134 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

(2) CONSISTENT, DEFINITIVE POLICY DISSEMINATION AND INTERPRETATION FROM TOP TO BOTTOM OF MILITARY SYSTEM ON HAIRCUTS, ORNAMENTS, AND SIGNS.

(3) COMMAND INTEREST AND RESPONSE TO UNIT WATCH COMMITTEES.

(4) VERTICAL AND LATERAL COMMUNICATIONS TO EXPLAIN MEANING OF SYMBOLS AND SIGNS USED BY YOUNG BLACK SERVICEMEN.

(5) RUMOR SQUASHING BY ESTABLISHING DIALOGUE AMONG TROOPS, TROOPS AND NCOs, TROOPS AND OFFICERS.

(6) BETTER INFORMATION OR EDUCATION FOR YOUNG SERVICEMEN ON MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM.

(7) ATTENTION TO DOD HUMAN GOALS, DEFINED AND PUBLISHED RECENTLY.

5. MY ASSESSMENT OF VISIT:

A. MR. BENNETT ACHIEVED HIS PRIMARY PURPOSE, DISCUSSION WITH TROOPS.

B. NO ABNORMAL NOR INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS DISCLOSED.

C. PRESENCE OF MR. BENNETT AND PARTY NOT INFLAMMATORY IN ANY WAY.

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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PAGE FIVE RHMMAFAS134 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 D. OVERALL EFFECT OF VISIT CONSIDERED BENEFICIAL AND  
 CONDUCTIVE TO CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT OF RACIAL HARMONY.  
 6. SIGNIFICANTLY, NOT ONE COMPLAINT WAS HEARD ON FOOD,  
 LODGING OR EQUIPMENT.

7. AT DINNER ON SUNDAY EVENING 23 NOV, MR. BENNETT  
 ASKED MY OPINION OF THE COMMANDANT'S POSITION  
 STATEMENT ON AFRO HAIRCUTS FOR MARINES. I RESPONDED  
 BY SAYING THAT IT IS NOT PROPER FOR ME TO TAKE A POSITION  
 OPPOSITE TO CMC BUT IF I HAD BEEN IN THE COMMANDANT'S POSITION  
 AT THE TIME, I DOUBT IF I WOULD HAVE MADE THE STATEMENT.  
 I BELIEVE THAT SUCH CRITERIA NEED NOT BE ESTABLISHED AND SO  
 STATED TO MR. BENNETT.

8. ENTIRE VISIT WENT SMOOTHLY. MR. BENNETT WAS ENTIRELY PLEASED  
 WITH OUR RESPONSE. WE PROVIDED WHAT HE ASKED FOR. OUR  
 TROOPS WERE CANDID AND WE HAVE ALREADY COMMENCED QUIET INQUIRY  
 IN AREAS AND UNITS SUBJECTED TO FREQUENT COMPLAINTS. WE'LL GET THE  
 FACTS AND PROCEED FROM THERE. WE'RE AWARE ACTION IS NEEDED IN  
 HUMAN RELATIONS AND PERSONAL RESPONSE FIELD AND WERE ALREADY WORKING.  
 THERE WERE NO NEW OR UNEXPECTED PATTERNS OR TYPES OF  
 COMPLAINTS. THE COMPLAINTS ARE COMING FROM A NEW

PAGE SIX RHMMAFAS134 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 GENERATION OF MARINES WITH A DRASTICALLY DIFFERENT  
 BACKGROUND; A BACKGROUND CONDITIONED BY LIVING, AS  
 A CIVILIAN, IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF MISTRUST AND  
 ECONOMIC DISTRESS FOLLOWED BY LARGE UPSURGE OF  
 CONFIDENCE WHICH IS INSTILLED IN ALL MARINES IN BOOT CAMP.  
 REALIZATION OF MANHOOD AND SENSE OF EARNED EQUALITY COMES WHEN  
 THE BLACK MARINE "CUTS THE MUSTARD" IN AN FNF UNIT  
 PARTICULARLY A COMBAT UNIT. THE LEGITIMATE DEMAND  
 FOR EQUAL TREATMENT OF ALL MARINES THEN BECOMES THE  
 REAL ISSUE AND YOU KNOW MY BELIEFS ON THAT MATTER.  
 9. WE HAVE THE PROBLEM. IT'S NOT AT ALL INSURMOUNTABLE  
 AND WE ARE SOLVING IT. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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10 (3)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 27 NOV 1969					
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 270750Z NOV 69		COPY NO 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
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	CG	I		28/11/69		SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR				
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	DCS PLANS					<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p><b>DISPOSITION</b></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION</p> </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <th>SECTION</th> <th>SIGNATURE</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> <p>ORIG: C/S REL: CG</p> <p style="font-size: 2em; text-align: center;">EXCLUSIVE FOR HAS BEEN SENT</p>	SECTION	SIGNATURE		
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FM CG III MAF

TO RUYVSYD/COMNAVFORV

INFO RUMLMFA/COM 3DNCF

BT

S E C R E T / S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R V A D M Z U M W A L T I N F O R A D M D I L L O N  
F R O M L I G E N N I C K E R S O N

P R O P O S E D R E D U C T I O N O F S E A B E E B A T T A L I O N S I N T H E I C T Z

1. JACK DILLON HAS DEBRIEFED THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING YESTERDAY TO ME AND I WANT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR THE FINE SUPPORT WHICH YOU GAVE BOTH III MAF AND THE SEABEES. I BELIEVE YOUR SUMMATION OF THE SITUATION IN WHICH YOU STATED "ALL THREE COMPONENT COMMANDERS AND A CORPS COMMANDER ARE IN OPPOSITION TO THE PROGRAM; IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR YOU (YATES) TO PUSH THE MATTER FURTHER" WAS QUITE SUCCINCT. WHILE THE PROBLEM IS NOT YET COMPLETELY SOLVED I WOULD HOPE THAT IT IS VERY NEARLY PUT TO REST.

2. I TALKED TO CARTER TOWNSEND THIS MORNING AND SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WANT TO LOOK INTO IT. IT APPEARS TO ME THAT ANY ADDITIONAL STAFFING WOULD ONLY CREATE BUSY WORK AND I SEE NO REASON FOR ANY OF US TO

11(1)

11(1)

PAGE TWO RUYVSYH3135 S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 BE INVOLVED ANY LONGER. HE SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO IT.  
 MEANWHILE I THINK IT WOULD STRENGTHEN OUR CASE IF DILLON'S  
 PAPER AND MINE WERE FORWARDED TO MACV WITH A STRONG  
 ENDORSEMENT FROM YOU. THIS WOULD MAKE IT A MATTER  
 OF RECORD WHICH I THINK IS QUITE NECESSARY.  
 3. ONCE AGAIN, MANY THANKS.

4. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		27 NOV 1969					
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ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
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	CG	I		28/11/69	W	Feedback SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR				
	DCG	I		11/28	W					
	C/S	I				REMARKS				
	DC/S	I		11/29	W					
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention. <table border="1"> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
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PTT 270752Z NOV 69 ZFF-1  
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 P 270752Z NOV 69 ZFF-1  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMLMFAZ/COM 3DNCS  
 INFO RUYVSYD/COMNAVFORV  
 BT

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C I A L / S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM DILLON INFO

WADM ZUNWALT FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

PROPOSED REDUCTION OF SEABEE BATTALIONS IN THE ICTZ

1. I WANT TO COMPLIMENT YOU ON YOUR SUCCESS IN

PRESENTING THE SEABEE/III MAF POSITION AT MACV'S

MEETING YESTERDAY CONCERNING THE ABOVE SUBJECT. I

UNDERSTAND IT WAS PRESENTED WITHOUT EMOTION, COMPLETELY

FACTUAL AND RESISTED ANY REBUTTAL. PLEASE ACCEPT MY

PERSONAL WELL DONE AND MY THANKS FOR YOUR USUAL FINE

PERFORMANCE.

2. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 28 NOV 68	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE O 272354Z NOV 68		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		28 Nov 68		ARTICLE BY MIKE NEAL WHICH APPEARED IN THE WASHINGTON EVENING STAR
	DCG	I		11/28/68		
	C/S	I				REMARKS
	DC/S	I		11/29		
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION:  <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.  Return for permanent retention.
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O 272354Z ZYH ZFF-3 ZFF-6

FM CG III MAF

O COMUSMACV

INFO CG AMERICAL DIVISION

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L / EYES ONLY FOR GEN ABRAMS FROM LTGEN  
NICKERSON INFO MAJGEN RAMSEY

SUBJ: ARTICLE BY MIKE NEAL WHICH APPEARED IN THE  
WASHINGTON EVENING STAR

A. COMUSMACV MSG CITE 15334 270240Z NOV69 (EYES ONLY)

1. REFERENCE A REFERS. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM  
MGEN RAMSEY IS QUOTED IN FULL FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

1. REFERENCE YOUR PHONE CALL AND MESSAGE TO ME REGARDING THE  
ARTICLE BY MIKE NEALE THAT APPEARED IN THE WASHINGTON EVENING  
STAR REGARDING THE BURNING OF HAMLETS IN THE MY LAI AREA.

2. I HAVE GATHERED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM THE 198TH  
BRIGADE TO INCLUDE LIEUTENANT COTTRELL WHOM MIKE NEALE  
INTERVIEWED. LIEUTENANT COTTRELL COMMANDS THE 1ST PLATOON,  
C COMPANY, 5TH BATTALION, 46TH INFANTRY.

3. NEALE CAME TO FIRE SUPPORT BASE GATOR ON SUNDAY, 23 NOVEMBER  
TO GET TROOP REACTION FROM THE MEN IN THE FIELD REGARDING THE  
REPORTS THEY MAY HAVE READ ABOUT THE MY LAI INCIDENT. HE  
TALKED TO LIEUTENANT COTTRELL AND MEMBERS OF HIS PLATOON.  
MANY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PLATOON WERE GOING ON GUARD AT THIS  
TIME SO THE SAME ONES WERE NOT PRESENT ALL THE TIME.

4. NEALE ASKED THE MEN WHAT THEY THOUGHT OF THE MY LAI STORY.  
NONE OF THEM HAD SEEN OR HEARD OF IT AT THIS TIME. NEALE  
READ THEM THE STORY. THEIR REACTION WAS THAT THEY DID NOT REPEAT  
NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY SUCH THING COULD HAPPEN IN THE UNITED  
STATES ARMED FORCES. HE THEN ASKED IF THEY HAD BEEN OPERATING IN THE  
AREA. WHEN TOLD THEY HAD, HE ASKED WHAT THEIR MISSION WAS.

5. LIEUTENANT COTTRELL WHO HAD BEEN IN COUNTRY APPROXIMATELY  
ONE MONTH EXPLAINED THAT THEIR MISSION WAS TO PACIFY THREE  
HAMLETS IN THAT AREA. IN ORDER TO PACIFY THESE HAMLETS PEOPLE  
LIVING IN MANY OF THE ADJACENT HAMLETS WERE MOVED INTO  
THE TARGET HAMLETS AND THE ABANDONED HAMLETS WERE BURNED TO DENY  
THE ENEMY THEIR USE. LIEUTENANT COTTRELL DID USE THE TERM  
"ZIPPO SQUAD" BECAUSE HE HAD HEARD THIS JARGON USED BY OTHER  
SOLDIERS. LIEUTENANT COTTRELL DID NOT BELIEVE THAT GIVING A  
CORRESPONDENT INFORMATION REGARDING WHAT HE CONSIDERED TO BE  
A ROUTINE MISSION WOULD IN ANY WAY CAUSE DIFFICULTY. HE NEVER  
REALIZED THAT THE USE OF THE WORD "ZIPPO SQUAD" MIGHT HAVE  
ANY BAD CONNOTATION.

14(1)

14(1)

6. THERE WERE A TOTAL OF 11 HAMLETS BURNED, THREE OF WHICH LIEUTENANT COTTRELL WAS INVOLVED IN BURNING. THE SIZE OF EACH HAMLET WAS APPROXIMATELY 30 DWELLINGS EXCEPT TWO HAMLETS CONSISTED OF APPROXIMATELY 60 DWELLINGS EACH. MANY OF THESE DWELLINGS HAD BEEN DESTROYED DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE WAR AND NOT TOO MANY WERE LEFT TO BE DESTROYED. THE NUMBER OF DWELLINGS BURNED IN EACH HAMLET RANGED FROM 3 TO 25 HUTS MADE OF THATCHED GRASS AND BAMBOO. A FEW MASONRY DWELLINGS IN FAIR CONDITION WERE STILL STANDING AND THEY WERE NOT DESTROYED. AT THE TIME OF THE BURNING, THERE WERE NO REPEAT NO CIVILIANS PRESENT IN THE AREA. THE DAY BEFORE ANY HAMLET WAS BURNED A PSYOP HELICOPTER WAS IN THE AREA ANNOUNCING TO THE PEOPLE TO MOVE TO THE TARGET HAMLETS FOR SECURITY. WHEN THE TROOPS MOVED INTO THE AREA, THEY FOUND APPROXIMATELY 10 ELDERLY PEOPLE WHO HAD NOT DEPARTED BECAUSE THEY WERE TOO OLD AND FEEBLE TO WALK TO THE TARGET HAMLETS. THESE PEOPLE AND THEIR BELONGINGS WERE EVACUATED TO THE TARGET HAMLETS BY THE TROOPS ON THE GROUND.

7. PRIOR TO ANY OF THESE ACTIONS, THE ENTIRE PROGRAM HAD BEEN COORDINATED BETWEEN THE BATTALION COMMANDER OF THE 5TH BATTALION, 46TH INFANTRY, LTC JULIAN F. WAGNER WHO HAS NOW ROTATED TO THE STATES, AND THE DISTRICT CHIEF OF SON TINH, CPT KHIEM. CPT KHIEM REQUESTED THAT HAMLETS IN THE AREA THAT WERE NOT TARGET HAMLETS FOR PACIFICATION BE DESTROYED TO DENY THEM TO THE ENEMY. COL WAGNER AND CPT KHIEM AGREED ON THE 11 HAMLETS IN QUESTION. PRESENT AT THE MEETINGS WHEN LTC WAGNER AND CPT KHIEM WERE MAKING PLANS FOR THE OPERATION WERE MAJ WAITE, THE SON TINH DISTRICT ADVISOR, AND CPT PHELPS, THE SON TINH LIAISON OFFICER FROM THE 5TH BATTALION, 46TH INFANTRY. BOTH MAJ WAITE AND CPT PHELPS CONFIRM THAT THE DISTRICT CHIEF REQUESTED THESE 11 HAMLETS BE DESTROYED.

8. THE FOLLOWING 11 HAMLETS WERE DESTROYED:

1. CHAU SA (4) 672796 25 OCT
2. CHAU SA (3) 673790 26 OCT
3. AN THIN (1) 693805 24 OCT
4. DAP MY (2) 697811 25 OCT
5. GIEM DIEN (1) 714803 3 NOV
6. NO NAME 712802 3 NOV
7. NO NAME 707806 3 NOV
8. VAN THIEN 703804 3 NOV
9. NO NAME 700805 3 NOV
10. NO NAME 701800 3 NOV
11. NO NAME 697803 3 NOV

14(2)

14(2)

9. DURING THE BURNING OF HAMLET NUMBER 4, AN RF COMPANY WAS PRESENT AND OPERATING WITH THE 5TH BN, 46TH INF.

10. AT HAMLET NUMBER 8, THREE VC WERE KILLED WHILE RUNNING FROM THE HAMLET.

11. ON 3 NOV DURING THE OPERATION TO BURN HAMLETS 5 THROUGH 11, THE 5TH BN, 46TH INF HIT A BOOBY TRAP KILLING 1 U.S. SOLDIER AND WOUNDING 3 OTHERS.

2. THE FOLLOWING IS THE STATEMENT OF LTCOL RUSSELL H. WHITLA, JR., USMCR, 0302, 051035, USMCR WHO IS THE JUSPAO REPRESENTATIVE IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, QUOTE: I AM THE JUSPAO REPRESENTATIVE IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO A REPORT BY REUTERS NEWS AGENCY, I AM QUOTED AS SAYING THAT AMERICAN TROOPS, USING SO CALLED ZIPPO SQUADS DELIBERATELY BURNED A VIETNAMESE DWELLING. IT IS FURTHER IMPLIED THAT I INDICATED THAT THIS IS PART OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. I DENY THAT I MADE ANY SUCH STATEMENT OR ANY STATEMENT RESEMBLING THAT. I AM NOT ACQUAINTED WITH LT NORMAN E. COTTREL ALSO QUOTED IN THE STORY. NOR HAVE I SEEN HOUSES BEING BURNED OR EVEN HEARD OF ANY SUCH INCIDENTS. I HAD NEVER HEARD THE TERM "ZIPPO SQUAD" UNTIL TODAY, WHEN I WAS INFORMED OF THE STATEMENT WHICH I SUPPOSEDLY MADE.

THE STATEMENT THAT I MADE TO REPORTERS WAS "IN AREAS OUTSIDE OF GVN CONTROL WHERE PEOPLE HAVE PREVIOUSLY ABANDONED THE HAMLETS AND MOVED TO SECURE AREAS BUILDINGS ARE SOMETIMES RAZED TO DENY THEIR USE TO THE VC" OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. UNQUOTE.

14(3)

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3. INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED TO DATE INDICATES VILLAGES WERE RAZED AS REQUESTED BY DISTRICT CHIEF AS PART OF PLANNED PROGRAM. INASMUCH AS THEY WERE NOT TARGET HAMLETS FOR PACIFICATION, THEY WERE PROGRAMED TO BE DESTROYED TO DENY THEM TO THE ENEMY. THIS CONTEXT AND THE CONTEXT OF NEAL'S STORY ARE QUITE DIFFERENT. SIMILARLY THE CONTEXT OF LTCOL WHITTA'S STATEMENT AND THE CONTEXT CONTAINED IN NEAL'S STORY ARE QUITE DIFFERENT. BOTH DISCREPANCIES DESCRIBED ABOVE ARE OF THE HALF FACT TYPE REFERRED TO BY MR. AGNEW.



4. WARM REGARDS

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY  
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14(4)

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM III MAF DNG RVN	DATE 28 NOV 69
					SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 281116Z NOV 69	COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				Feedback SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
	DCG	I		11/29	TS	
	C/S	I				REMARKS:
	DC/S	I		11/29	p	
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION:  <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
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**EXCLUSIVE  
FOR  
HAS BEEN SENT**

(47)

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

PTTZYUW RHMMAFA3264 3321110-TTTT--RUHMFMA.

ZNY TTTT

P 281110Z NOV 69

FM CG III MAF DNS RVN

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN RUSE FROM  
LTGEN NICKERSON. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

ARMY ASSUMPTION OF COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT IN ICTZ. (C)

- A. CG FMFPAC 221910Z NOV 69 (TS)
- B. CINCPACFLT 210232Z NOV 69 (TS)
- C. COMUSMACV 151330Z NOV 69 (TS)
- D. COMNAVFORV 160809Z NOV 69 (S)
- E. CG III MAF 170254Z AUG 69 (TS/LINDIS/MCEO)
- F. CG USARV 111345Z OCT 69 (S)

1. (C) REF A REQUESTED MY VIEWS ON CINCPACFLT'S PROPOSALS, CONTAINED IN REF B, REGARDING ACCELERATION OF TURNOVER COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT IN ICTZ.
2. (C) AGREE THAT THERE ARE NO MAJOR PROBLEMS FOR ME EVIDENT IN THE TURNOVER OF R&U SUPPORT AT QUANG TRI AND DONG HA FROM NAVY TO ARMY. I AM WATCHING VERY CAREFULLY THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTINUITY OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE

PAGE TWO RHMMAFA3264 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
CASE OF FACILITIES TURNED OVER TO ARVN HOWEVER, LEST  
GAPS DEVELOP IN AREAS OF MAINTENANCE TRAINING, TURN-  
OVER PROCEDURES AND POST-TURNOVER SUPPORT.

3. (TS) I AM IN ACCORD WITH MACV'S GUIDANCE IN REF C BUT CINCPACFLT'S PROPOSAL (REF B) TO CREATE SUB AREAS FOR A GRADUAL TURNOVER TO THE ARMY WHERE USMC FORCES ARE NOT ENGAGED IS NEW TO ME. THE NAVY POSITION PROPOSING A GEOGRAPHICALLY-PHASED TURNOVER FIRST CAME TO MY ATTENTION IN REF D. THE PROPOSAL HAS NOT BEEN COORDINATED WITH MY HEADQUARTERS AND WHILE SUCH A PLAN MIGHT BE CARRIED OUT SATISFACTORILY IT EMBODIES A POTENTIAL FOR SEVERAL UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES WHICH I AM RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT. AMONG THOSE ABOUT WHICH I AM MOST CONCERNED ARE: THE EROSION OF MY ABILITY TO COORDINATE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS WITH THE TACTICAL SITUATION WHERE SEVERAL SUB-AREAS ARE INVOLVED; THE TENDENCY TO CONSTRICT MANEUVER ELEMENTS TO THE AREAS WHERE THEIR SUPPORT FORCES ARE LOCATED; AND, THE PIECEMEAL SUBSTITUTION OF SEPARATE SUPPORT DETACHMENTS FOR WHAT IS NOW A VIABLE, DEPENDABLE AND

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET 4711

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE THREE RHMMAFAS264 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR WELL STRUCTURED SUPPORT FORCE.

4. (TS) CONCUR WITH BOTH EXHORTATION IN REF C CALLING FOR AN ACCELERATION IN JOINT PLANNING FOR THE TRANSFER OF SUPPORT FUNCTIONS IN ICTZ AND ADM NYLA

D'S DESIRE TO PROCEED CAREFULLY AND DELIBERATELY TOWARD SUCH A TURN-OVER. AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, I AM UNABLE TO FIND ANY BASIS WHICH WARRANTS ACCELERATION OF THE ACTUAL TURNOVER. AS POINTED OUT IN REF A IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT AS USMC FORCE REDEPLOYED THE NAVY WOULD REDUCE PROPORTIONATELY. SUCH REDUCTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN PHASES I AND II AND ARE SCHEDULED SIMILARLY FOR SUBSEQUENT PHASES. ACCELERATION OF NAVY PHASE-DOWN BEYOND PRESENT SCHEDULE SUGGEST COMMON SERVICE TURNOVER TO PROCEED NOT PROPORTIONATELY BUT INDEPENDENTLY OF USMC PHASE-DOWN. MY VIEW IS THAT PLANNING SHOULD BE ACCELERATED TO PERMIT EITHER RAPID TURNOVER OR DELIBERATE TURNOVER BASED ON REDEPLOYMENT DECISIONS AND ABILITY OF RESIDUAL FORCES TO ACCEPT THE TASKS.

5. (S) PRESENT PLANNING FOR COMMON SERVICE TURN-

PAGE FOUR RHMMAFAS264 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR OVER IS PROCEEDING ALONG FUNCTIONAL LINES E. G.

FACILITIES ENGINEERING, CONSTRUCTION, AMMUNITION, ISSA ETC. WHILE EXPANDING PLANNING ALONG GEOGRAPHICAL LINES CAN BE ACCOMMODATED I DO NOT SEE ANY ADVANTAGES TO CREATING ADDITIONAL LOGISTICS JURISDICTIONS. I ESPECIALLY DO NOT DESIRE TO FRAGMENT ICTZ INTO SUB-ZONES (FOR EXAMPLE; NORTHERN, CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN) THAT MIGHT DIMINISH CURRENT SUPPORT CAPABILITIES OR WEAKEN MY ABILITY TO SHIFT RESOURCES AS NECESSARY TO MEET UNEXPECTED OR CHANGING SITUATIONS.

6. (S) PACING FACTOR IN SHIFT OF COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT IN ICTZ APPEARS TO BE USARV'S FLAT OUT CONTENTION, SPELLED OUT IN REF F, THAT "NO USARV WILL NOT BE CAPABLE OF ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THOSE SERVICES PRESENTLY PERFORMED UNDER NAVY COGNIZANCE IN ICTZ UNTIL PHASE SIX." UNLESS USARV CAN ACCELERATE THEIR CAPABILITY TO ACCEPT TURNOVER I DO NOT ANTICIPATE A SPEED UP IN NAVY'S ABILITY TO PHASE-DOWN. THIS BELIEF UNDERSCORED BY USMACV

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RHMMAFAS3264 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 POSITION QUOTED IN REF E THAT "U. S. ARMY IS TO PLAN  
 TO TAKE OVER AND MAN ONLY THOSE FACILITIES AND  
 FUNCTIONS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT  
 TO RESIDUAL FORCES."

7. IN SUM, NAVY PHASE-DOWN IN ICYZ SHOULD PROCEED IN  
 STEP WITH CURRENTLY ESTABLISHED PHASING IN A REASONED  
 AND DELIBERATE MANNER BASED ON OPERATIONAL FACTORS  
 AND ARMY'S ABILITY TO ACCEPT ADDITIONAL LOGISTIC  
 RESPONSIBILITIES. DO NOT DESIRE INDEPENDENT OR  
 PRECIPITATE NAVY PHASE DOWN BASED ON GEOGRAPHIC OR  
 AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3264

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 9216 (REV 8-67)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			0 290125Z NOV 69		29 NOV 69	
SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 0 290125Z NOV 69			COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I		30 Nov 69		OPSECRET/EYES ONLY VIETNAMIZATION - RVNAF I&M ASPECTS AND RELATED US PLANNING (U)
	DCG	I		11/30	13	
	C/S	I				REMARKS:
	DC/S	I		12/1		DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.
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TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY/FOR MGEN SIMPSON, MGEN RAMSEY,  
MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN NICKERSON SECTION ONE OF THREE

1. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS/VIEWS ON FOLLOWING MESSAGE.  
REPLIES TO REACH THIS HEADQUARTERS NLT 021400H DEC69.

QUOTE

SUBJECT: VIETNAMIZATION - RVNAF I&M ASPECTS AND RELATED US  
PLANNING (U)

1. PURPOSE: THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO OBTAIN COMMENTS  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE BALANCE AND  
EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF IN EACH OF TWO SITUATIONS POSTULATED  
FOR THE END FY73 TIME FRAME.

2. BACKGROUND:

A. THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS UNDERTAKEN A REVIEW OF RVNAF I&M  
FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. SIGNIFICANTLY, FOR EACH OF THE SITUATIONS  
POSTULATED, THERE HAS BEEN THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL US FORCES EX-  
CEPT FOR A MAAG BY 1 JUL 73. IN SUCH A SITUATION RVNAF NEEDS  
TO BE A SELF-SUFFICIENT, BALANCED FORCE CAPABLE OF HANDLING BOTH  
THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS.

B. THE PRESENTLY PLANNED RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE THROUGH FY 72  
TOTALS APPROXIMATELY 993 THOUSAND SPACES. WHEN THE EXPANSION  
PROGRAM IS COMPLETE RVNAF WILL HAVE 12 GROUND COMBAT DIVISIONS  
BUT WILL LACK TOTAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN COMBAT AND LOGISTICAL  
SUPPORT. THE AIR FORCE WILL HAVE 40 SQUADRONS WITH LIMITED AIR  
SUPPORT CAPABILITY. THE NAVY SHOULD BE ADEQUATE FOR COASTAL  
SURVEILLANCE AND RIVERINE OPERATIONS. ABOUT 52 PERCENT OF  
THE TOTAL RVNAF FORCE WILL BE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES.

C. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THE GVN MAY EXPERIENCE DIFFICULTY  
IN ATTAINING THE PRESENT PLANNING PROJECTION OF 993 THOUSAND,  
E.G., DOWNWARD STRENGTH TREND IN ARVN MANEUVER UNITS AND PROBLEMS  
IN RECRUITMENT OF NATIONAL POLICE. MANPOWER LIMITATIONS INDI-  
CATE THE NEED FOR QUALITATIVE VICE QUANTITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS.

D. THE RVNAF SKILL BASE AND TRAINING LEAD TIME REQUIREMENTS  
MILITATE AGAINST SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN NEW SOPHISTICATED  
EQUIPMENT.

E. TO PROVIDE A SOUND AND REASONABLY SELF-SUFFICIENT FORCE,  
ADDITIONAL COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT WILL BE  
NEEDED.

F. IF SHORTCOMINGS ARE TO BE CORRECTED, A HARD LOOK AT THE  
EXISTING STRUCTURE HAS TO BE TAKEN WITH A VIEW TO GENERATING MAN-  
POWER THROUGH REORGANIZATION ACTIONS AND ELIMINATION OF LOWER  
PRIORITY UNITS AND PROGRAMS.

G. DISRUPTIVE CHANGES ARE TO BE AVOIDED. CHANGES SHOULD NOT  
~~BE PROPOSED~~ JUST FOR SAKE OF CHANGE.

TOP SECRET



48(1)  
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## 3. ASSUMPTIONS:

- A. THE TWO LEVELS OF THREAT ARE ALTERNATIVELY:  
 (1) THE VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY THREAT WILL CONTINUE AT ITS CURRENT LEVEL THROUGH 1 JUL 73.  
 (2) OR, THE VC/NVA THREAT HAS DECREASED AND THE TEMPO OF THE WAR HAS SUBSIDED MARKEDLY BY 1 JUL 73.
- B. THE US OBJECTIVE IN THE RVN WILL CONTINUE AS CURRENTLY STATED.
- C. THIRD-COUNTRY FORCES WILL DECLINE TO TWO DIVISION FORCE EQUIVALENTS BY 1 JULY 73.
- D. THE POPULATION OF RVN CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT; THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAJOR POLITICAL UPHEAVALS.
- E. RVNAF CAN AND WILL PROVIDE ACCEPTABLE SECURITY FOR US/ FVMAF INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES.
- F. THE GVN MANPOWER BASE WILL SUSTAIN AN RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE OF APPROXIMATELY 1,000,000 BUT WILL STILL BE SHORT IN LEADERSHIP AND HARD SKILLS.
- G. B-52 SORTIES AND SOME OTHER OUT-OF-COUNTRY AIR SUPPORT SUCH AS THAILAND AND CARRIER BASED SORTIES WILL BE AVAILABLE.
- H. THE BASIC GOAL OF NVN AND VC COMMUNISTS REMAINS THE SAME, I.E., THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT IN RVN AND THE IMPOSITION OF A COMMUNIST REGIME.

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**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY/FOR MGEN SIMPSON, MGEN RAMSEY,  
 MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN NICKERSON SECTION TWO OF THREE  
 1. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS/VIEWS ON FOLLOWING MESSAGE.  
 REPLIES TO REACH THIS HEADQUARTERS MLT 021400H DEC 69.  
 QUOTE



4. SITUATION SCENARIO: THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO SUPPORTS  
 ASSUMPTION 3A(2):

THE TEMPO OF THE WAR HAS SUBSIDED MARKEDLY, NVA/VC MAIN  
 FORCE UNITS HAVE BEEN REDUCED IN NUMBERS, BUT SOME STILL REMAIN,  
 PRIMARILY IN THE VICINITY OF TRADITIONAL BASE AREAS IN SVN.  
 THE NVA STILL HAS SOME BASES IN CAMBODIA, AND NVA FILLERS  
 GENERALLY CONTINUE TO BE INTEGRATED INTO A REDUCED VC STRUCTURE.  
 SIGNIFICANT AREAS ARE QUITE SECURE, AND ARVN REGULAR FORCES HAVE  
 BEEN RELIEVED OF PACIFICATION MISSIONS BY TERRITORIAL AND PARA-  
 MILITARY/POLICE FORCES WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS WHERE PROGRESS HAS  
 BEEN SLOW. THE BULK OF THE REGULAR FORCES HAVE MOVED OUT TOWARD  
 THE BORDERS AND REMOTE AREAS. THE GREATER SAIGON AREA IS  
 ESSENTIALLY SECURE, AND DOES NOT REQUIRE PROTECTION BY SIGNI-  
 FICANT NUMBERS OF REGULAR FORCES. THE DISPERSAL OF REGULAR FORCES  
 TO THE PERIPHERY REQUIRES A CAPABILITY TO SHIFT SIZEABLE FORCES  
 RAPIDLY TO THREATENED AREAS. THE CAO DAI AND HOA HAO HAVE  
 RECONCILED THEIR MAJOR DIFFERENCES WITH THE GOVERNMENT; HOWEVER,  
 THE MANTAGNARD PROBLEM STILL REMAINS. KEY WATERWAYS ARE OPEN, AND  
 THE SECURITY OF MAJOR LAND LOC HAS IMPROVED 100 PERCENT. BORDER  
 SURVEILLANCE IS CONDUCTED PRIMARILY BY REGULAR FORCES AUGMENTED  
 BY SOME TERRITORIAL FORCES; NO CIDG UNITS REMAIN. IN SUM, THE  
 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS TO RVN HAVE SUBSIDED TO A DEGREE  
 WHICH HAS PERMITTED THE REDEPLOYMENT OF ESSENTIALLY ALL US FORCES  
 WITHOUT AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK. A US ADVISORY FORCE/MAAG INCLUDING  
 NSA ELEMENTS REMAINS.

5. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS: EVALUATE RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE, TOE,  
 PROGRAMS AND POLICIES; AND SUBMIT COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDED  
 CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS.

A. CONSIDER "TRADE-OFF" -- NOT EXPANSION.

B. PROVIDE RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE ORGANIZATION  
 STRUCTURE.

C. EVALUATE RVNAF TRAINING, LEADERSHIP, MORALE, RESPONSIVE-  
 NNESS, WILL-TO-FIGHT, AND SENSE OF PURPOSE.

D. CONSIDER GENERAL CONCEPTS. FOR EXAMPLE: ARE THERE RVNAF  
 UNITS OR PROGRAMS THAT ARE SIMPLY MIRROR IMAGES OF US UNITS AND  
 PROGRAMS THAT MAY NOT FIT RVNAF REQUIREMENTS?

48(3)

48(3)  
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6. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE TO BE SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED (THIS LIST IS NOT INTENDED TO LIMIT AREAS FOR STUDY BUT DOES INCLUDE SOME QUESTIONS CURRENTLY UNDER STUDY). PROPOSALS SHOULD BE MADE WITH OVERALL US OBJECTIVES IN MIND. WHILE MANY PROPOSALS WILL DEAL WITH MILITARY ORGANIZATION, PROGRAMS, AND OPERATIONS, ADDRESSEES WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADVISORY AND CORDS PROGRAMS WHICH CUT ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER THOSE PROGRAMS.

A. HOW CAN COMBAT POWER OF THE INFANTRY DIVISION BE IMPROVED?

(1) SHOULD AN ADDITIONAL RIFLE COMPANY BE ADDED TO EACH BATTALION?

(2) IS AN ADDITIONAL TRUCK COMPANY PER DIVISION NEEDED?

B. HOW CAN ARTILLERY EFFECTIVENESS BE IMPROVED?

(1) WOULD ADOPTION OF A SINGLE CALIBRE WEAPON SUCH AS THE 105MM HOWITZER BE JUSTIFIED? (CONSIDER EFFECTIVENESS, SIMPLIFIED AMMUNITION PROCEDURE, EASE OF MOVEMENT, AND COST).

(2) CAN OR SHOULD DIVISION ARTILLERY UNITS BE TAKEN FROM STATIC MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF TERRITORIAL FORCES? SHOULD BATTERIES FOR STATIC DEFENSE BE ACTIVATED? IF SO, HOW MANY IN EACH CTZ

(3) SHOULD ARVN HAVE AN 8" CAPABILITY? IF SO TO WHAT EXTENT?

(4) HOW CAN METEOROLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS BEST BE MET?

C. SHOULD ADA AWSP WEAPONS BE PROVIDED TO ARVN? IF SO, WHAT IS THE BEST LEVEL AND USE OF THESE WEAPONS?

D. SHOULD TERRITORIAL FORCES BE INCREASED, REDUCED, OR RESTRUCTURED?

E. HOW CAN TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS BEST BE SATISFIED? (NOTE: LONG-LINE COMMUNICATIONS ARE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE STUDY).

F. WHAT SHOULD BE THE ORGANIZATION FOR BORDER SECURITY?

G. WHAT IF ANY CHANGES ARE NEEDED IN HOSPITALIZATION/MEDICAL PROCEDURES, FACILITIES, AND EQUIPMENT?

H. HOW CAN IMPROVEMENTS BE MADE IN RVNAF INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, AND SECURITY CAPABILITIES? ARE ADDITIONS DELETIONS OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT NEEDED?

UNQUOTE

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 ZEM

**TOP SECRET**

T O P S E C R E T/EYES ONLY/FOR MGEN SIMPSON, MGEN RAMSEY,  
 MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN NICKERSON FINAL SECTION OF THREE  
 1. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS/VIEWS ON FOLLOWING MESSAGE.  
 REPLIES TO REACH THIS HEADQUARTERS NLT 021400H DEC 69.  
 QUOTE:



I. WHAT SHOULD BE THE RATIO OF ASSAULT HELICOPTER SQUADRONS TO INFANTRY DIVISIONS? TO THE AIRBORNE DIVISION? TO THE MARINE DIVISION?

J. WHAT SHOULD THE RVNAF SENSOR PROGRAMS LOOK LIKE?

K. WHAT CHANGES IN RVNAF STRUCTURE MANNING, ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, OR FACILITIES ARE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE COMPLETE LOGISTICAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY?

L. HOW MANY TACAIR SORTIES PER DAY SHOULD ARVN MANEUVER BATTALIONS BE PROVIDED?

M. ARE ANY CHANGES IN CONVENTIONAL NAVAL OPERATIONS NEEDED OR RECOMMENDED?

N. SHOULD THE PLANNED LEVEL OF RIVERINE OPERATIONS BE MAINTAINED OR REDUCED UNDER THE POSTULATED SITUATION?

O. HOW CAN AERIAL OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS BEST BE MET?

P. ARE THERE SHORTAGES OF AIRLIFT? IF SO, ARE THERE OPERATIONAL ALTERNATIVES?

Q. TRAINING.

(1) HOW CAN QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN ARVN, VNMC, AND RANGER BN, RF COS AND PF PLATS BEST BE MADE? CONSIDER:

(A) SELECTIVE WITHDRAWAL OF BN SIZED UNITS FROM OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS TO PERMIT AN INCREASE IN REFRESHER TRAINING.

(B) INCREASING THE LENGTH OF RF/PF REFRESHER TRAINING PROGRAMS AND HAVING MAXIMUM NUMBER OF UNITS PARTICIPATE.

(C) INTEGRATING VIETNAMESE OFFICERS AND NCO'S INTO US PLATOONS AND COMPANIES FOR ON-THE-JOB LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND INTO BN AND BRIGADE STAFFS FOR STAFF TRAINING.

(D) FORMING COMBINED US/ARVN MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS TO CONDUCT ON-THE-SPOT TRAINING DURING PERIODS OF STANDDOWN.

(E) UPGRADING QUALITY OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO ADVISORY DUTIES.

(2) ARE THERE OTHER INNOVATIVE TRAINING PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD MAXIMIZE EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF COMMANDERS, STAFFS, AND UNITS?

48(5)

48(5)

48

7. CRITICAL MISSIONS. EVALUATE RVNAF'S CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THE FOLLOWING MISSIONS OR FUNCTIONS NOW AND IN THE LIGHT OF PROGRAMMED OR SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS (PARA 5 & 6 ABOVE) IN CAPABILITY. THE EVALUATION SHOULD CONSIDER THE DEGREE (INCLUDE APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE) TO WHICH APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS OF RVNAF NOW SATISFY THE CURRENT OVERALL ALLIED EFFORT UND THE DEGREE TO WHICH THOSE ELEMENTS COULD SATISFY, WITHIN THE TIME FRAME BEING CONSIDERED, THAT SAME CURRENT TOTAL EFFORT. MISSIONS NOT PERFORMED AND NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PERFORMANCE BY RVNAF SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED. THE STATED MISSIONS MAY BE BROKEN INTO COMPONENTS IF CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE. ADDITION AND EVALUATION OF SIMILAR TYPE MISSIONS OR FUNCTIONS NOT LISTED IS REQUESTED:

- A. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
- B. BORDER SURVEILLANCE
- C. COASTAL SURVEILLANCE
- D. RECONNAISSANCE
- E. ENGAGEMENT OF ENEMY FORCES
- F. INTERDICTION
- G. ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT
- H. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT
- I. OTHER AIR SUPPORT (E.G., VISUAL AND PHOTO RECON)
- J. TACTICAL MOBILITY
- K. COMMUNICATIONS
- L. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
- M. POPULATION SECURITY
- N. LOC SECURITY
- O. INLAND WATERWAYS
- P. ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION
- Q. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
- R. MEDICAL SUPPORT
- S. AIR DEFENSE
- T. DEFOLIATION
- U. UNCONVENTION WARFARE

8. SUBMISSION:

A. ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO RESPOND TO PARAGRAPHS 5 & 6 NLT 4 DEC 69. BECAUSE OF THE TWO DISTINCTLY DIFFERENT THREAT LEVELS ASSUMED, RESPONSES SHOULD BE MADE PRIMARILY IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT LEVEL ASSUMPTION A (1)). WHERE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ALTERNATIVE LEVEL (ASSUMPTION A (2)) A MODIFIED RESPONSE IS INDICATED, SUCH ADDED RESPONSE SHOULD BE MADE WITH APPROPRIATE IDENTIFICATION.

B. ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO RESPOND TO PARAGRAPH 7 NLT 10 DEC 69.

9. BECAUSE OF THE SHORT TIME AVAILABLE FOR MACV PLANNING, THIS MESSAGE IS BEING DISPATCHED BEFORE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF COMUSMACV BEYOND THAT IN CONNECTION WITH HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH COMPONENT COMMANDERS ON 19 NOVEMBER AND WITH ALL ADDRESSEES ON 22 NOVEMBER. YOU WILL BE ADVISED ASAP OF ANY CHANGES HE MAY DIRECT WHEN ADDITIONALLY BRIEFED.

GP-4

2. WARM REGARDS

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TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS BEEN SENT  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM <b>CG III MAF</b>	DATE <b>29 NOV 69</b>
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <b>0 290126Z NOV 69</b>		COPY NO. <b>2</b> OF <b>4</b> COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY/ FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
			IN	OUT		
	CG	<i>↓</i>		<i>30 Nov 69</i>	<i>W</i>	REMARKS: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.
	DCG	<i>↓</i>		<i>11/30</i>	<i>W</i>	
	C/S	<i>↓</i>				
	DC/S	<i>I</i>		<i>11/30</i>	<i>W</i>	
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	<i>+</i>	<i>11/29</i>		<i>W</i>	
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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

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TOP SECRET

0 290126Z ZYH ZFF 1 ZFF 4  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG XXIV CORPS  
ZEM

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

A. COMUSMACV MSG CITE MAC 15353 270915Z NOV 69 (TS) EYES ONLY (971)

1. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS/VIEWS ON REFERENCE (A).  
REPLY TO REACH THIS HEADQUARTERS NLT 021400H DEC 69.
2. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY  
075



**HAS BEEN SENT**

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**TOP SECRET**

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# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 29 NOV 69				
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 0 291254Z NOV 69		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES RECD					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG	J				TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY				
	DCG	I		20 NOV 69	N	VISIT OF GENERAL ABRAMS TO ICTZ				
	C/S	I		21/30	B					
	DC/S	+		14/1	Y	REMARK:				
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.				
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.				
	S/S	+		11/30	Copy					
	G-1					<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**TOP SECRET**

O 291254Z ZYH ZFF-4

FM CG III MAF

O CG XXIV CORPS

G 1STMARDIV

CG AMERICAL DIV

CG FMAW

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T SENSITIVE EYES ONLY  
EXCLUSIVELY FOR LTGEN ZAIS, MGEN SIMPSON, MGEN RAMSEY, MGEN THRASH  
FROM LTGEN NICKERSON

VISIT OF GENERAL ABRAMS TO ICTZ

1. THIS IS A MESSAGE TO ALERT YOU OF A FORTHCOMING VISIT TO I CORPS OF GENERAL ABRAMS. GENERAL ABRAMS HAS STATED THAT HE WANTS TO SPEND A FULL DAY AT EACH OF THE 4 CORPS PRIOR TO THE 15TH OF DECEMBER. HIS PURPOSE IS TO GET A REALISTIC FEEL FOR THE SITUATION. HE IS INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING AND BEING INFORMED ON ENEMY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES, VIETNAMESE PERFORMANCE, PACIFICATION, AND THE ATTITUDES OF AMERICAN FORCES AND THEIR PERFORMANCE.
2. HE WILL ARRIVE IN I CORPS AT 1500 ON 9 DEC 69. HE WILL DEPART AT 1500 THE FOLLOWING AFTERNOON.
3. BASED ON THE ABOVE, IS IS MY PRESENT PLAN TO ASK ALL OF YOU TO JOIN ME AT III MAF HEADQUARTERS ON 9 DEC. MY MODUS OPERANDI WOULD BE FOR MY G-2 TO PROVIDE A BRIEF FOR ABOUT 20 MINUTES IN ENEMY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES. I WOULD THEN HAVE MY G-3 GIVE A 15 MINUTE BRIEF ON THE PRESENT POSTURE AND CONCEPT FOR OPERATIONS OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO REINFORCE IN I CORPS AND THEN A BRIEFING BY CORDS ON THE STATUS OF THE TERRITORIALS AND NATIONAL POLICE. SUBSEQUENT TO THIS I WOULD ASK THAT XXIV CORPS BRIEF GENERAL ABRAMS ON THE XXIV CORPS SITUATION: CAPABILITIES OF XXIV CORPS SUBSEQUENT TO THE LOSS OF THE 3DMARDIV; CAPABILITIES OF THE ARVN 1ST DIVISION AT THIS TIME; THE EFFECTS ON THE NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES SHOULD ADDITIONAL FORCES BE WITHDRAWN; PLUS ANY OTHER INFORMATION DEEMED ADVISABLE.
4. I WOULD ASK FOR A SIMILAR BRIEFING FROM ORM SIMPSON FOR THE PROVINCE OF QUANG NAM AND A SIMILAR BRIEFING FROM LLOYD RAMSEY FOR THE LOWER TWO PROVINCES. I BELIEVE THAT GENERAL ABRAMS, BY TALKING TO HIS MAJOR GROUND COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT, WILL HAVE THE BENEFIT OF YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AS IT PERTAINS TO AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE CAPABILITIES AND THEIR INTER/RELATIONSHIP.
5. I PROPOSE THAT UPON COMPLETION OF THIS WE HAVE A DINNER WITH THE GENERAL OFFICERS HERE AT MY QUARTERS AND ~~CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION~~ AS GENERAL ABRAMS SEES FIT.

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6. I WILL ASK GENERAL LAM TO GIVE A SIMILAR BRIEFING TO GENERAL ABRAMS ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING. I WOULD ASK THAT WE HAVE HIS PRINCIPAL DIVISION COMMANDERS, TRUONG AND TOAN PRESENT (OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES) AND WOULD REQUEST THAT MEL AND I ALSO BE PRESENT. SUBSEQUENT TO THIS BRIEFING, GENERAL ABRAMS WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE HIS OWN ANALYSIS OF HOW BOTH WE AND THE VIETNAMESE SEE THE SITUATION IN I CORPS: WHERE WE ARE IN AGREEMENT OR WHERE WE DIFFER.

7. ~~SUBSEQUENT TO THE BRIEFING BY GENERAL LAM I WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT WE WILL HAVE ABOUT 4 HOURS REMAINING. I WOULD THEN SUGGEST THAT HE VISIT THE AREAS OF THE 1/5, 1ST ARVN AND 101ST AIRBORNE.~~

8. ALTHOUGH I HAVE NOT BEEN SO INFORMED, I AM INCLINED TO THINK THAT THIS IS GENERAL ABRAMS WAY OF FULFILLING THE "TRY" PORTION OF THE "CUT AND TRY" PHILOSOPHY THAT HE HAS ESTABLISHED AS FAR AS WITHDRAWALS ARE CONCERNED. IT IS INCUMBEENT UPON ALL OF US TO PROVIDE HIM THE INFORMATION WHICH HE NEEDS TO HELP HIM IN DECISIONS CONCERNING WITHDRAWALS WITH WHICH HE MAY BE FACED IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD. I KNOW I HAVE YOUR FULL COOPERATION. WHEN I HAVE FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT GENERAL ABRAMS MAY REQUEST I WILL SO ADVISE YOU.

9. THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS SENSITIVE. PLEASE TREAT IT AS LIMDIS UND RESTRICT DISSEMINATION TO THOSE ON ACCESS LIST FOR FORCE REDUCTION PLANNING AND THEN ON NEED TO KNOW ONLY.

10. WARM REGARDS  
(SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY)

GP-4  
750



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COPY 2 OF 5 COPIES

HAS BEEN SENT

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**TOP SECRET**

**HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 30 NOV 69				
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 0 300656 NOV 69		COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES DESTROYED					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG	I		12/1	W	SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY				
	DCG	I		12/1	W					
	C/S	I				REMARKS:  DISPOSITION:  <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.				
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	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.				
	S/S	Y	12/1		CGW					
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TOP SECRET

OTITZYUW RHMMAFA3378 3540656-TTTT--RUMHFMA  
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 O 30065 6Z NOV 69  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T / L I N D I S / S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y /  
 F O R B G E N W I L S O N F R O M B G E N D O O L E Y  
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A. CMC 262031Z NOV 69

1. (U) REFERENCE CONTAINS CMC GUIDANCE ON FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS.
2. (TS/LO) THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE PROVIDED ON REFERENCE:
  - A. THIS HQ HAS NOT BEEN MADE PRIVY TO THE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO REMOVE 50,000 TROOPS BY MID-MARCH OR MID-APRIL TO INCLUDE 22,600 MARINES.

B. BELIEVE THE DATE IN PARAGRAPH 2.A. SHOULD READ JUNE 1971  
 VICE JUNE 1970.  
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3878

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

(A-V)