

III MAF PERINTREP #46-69 thru

46-69, 9-16 Nov 69. Dtd 18 Nov 69. (S&C 917 964 #2)
47-69, 16-22 Nov 69. Dtd 25 Nov 69. (S&C 917 962 #2)
48-69, 23-29 Nov 69; Dtd 2 Dec 69. (S&C 918 534 #2)
49-69, 30 Nov - 6 Dec 69. Dtd 9 Dec 69. (S&C 918 889 #2)
50-69, 7 - 13 Dec 69. 16 Dec 69. (S&C 918 390 #2)
51-69, 14-20 Dec 69. Dtd 23 Dec 69. (S&C, NO number)

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NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

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
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CMA
 18 November 1969



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HQ III MAF, G-2
DANANG, RVN
18 November 1969
Ser: 0126969

PERINTREP 46-69

Period covered: 090001H - 162400H November 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, ND 48-13
ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. Indicators of enemy activity showed a general increase last week. Enemy initiated ground incidents totaled 239, an increase of 16 from the previous reporting period. KIA's rose sharply to 1,234, an increase of 736 over the 498 reported last week. This is the highest number of KIA's reported since the week of 16 August when 1,305 were reported. The number of PW's and detainees also increased, with ARVN accounting for 127 and FVMAF for 21 for a total of 148. Enemy incoming declined during the reporting period, down 196 to a total of 432. This is the second lowest total of incoming rounds reported since the week of 9 August registered a total of 349. The exception is the week of 25 October when 333 rounds were coming. The number of Hoi Chanhs rose to 124, up 17 from last week's total.

Despite the increase in enemy initiated activity of the past week, VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities continued to reflect the same policy and tactics of the past several months. Reports continue to relate enemy preparations for intensified civil and military proselyting and assassination of GVN officials during the recently initiated "Winter-Spring" Campaign.

a. QUANG TRI (P). Action in QUANG TRI Province was scattered and light early in the week, with little of significance to report. As the week progressed, however, the tempo increased in intensity. Events were confined to the area northwest of CAM LC.

What eventually developed into a series of related contacts that were to last for several days, involving TF 1/61 Mechanized, 2/501st Infantry and 1/2 ARVN, began on the morning of the 11th. D/1/11 in night defensive positions seven kilometers northwest of CAM LC (YD 077638), engaged an unknown size enemy force with small arms, M-79's and artillery. Following the enemy withdrawal as the day progressed, D Company again made contact and was joined by C/1-61st Mechanized in pursuing the enemy, while B Company was established as a blocking force to the rear. Sporadic contact continued through the afternoon.

On the 12th, TF 1/61, while searching the area of the previous day's contacts received fire from an estimated battalion (-) eight kilometers northwest of CAM LC (YD 053630). During the ensuing action,

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two helicopters were shot down. On 13 November, 2/501st and 1/2 ARVN moved into the area and continued the sweep. Total enemy casualties for the action were 183 killed and two PW's captured with moderate friendly casualties. The PW's stated that they were members of the 2d Battalion, 27th Regiment and it is probable that this unit was involved in this series of contacts since the 11th.

In other actions in the province, on 13 November, the Yard Fueller YD6-76 experienced an underwater explosion while anchored in CUA VIET Cove and sank (YD 333696). The attack was probably carried off by elements of the 126th Naval Sapper Regiment, which has been active in this area for sometime.

Attacks by fire were extremely light during the early part of the week, with no incoming reported on the 11th of November. Activity resumed on the 12th and 13th, and on the 14th, total incoming in QUANG TRI Province rose to 183 rounds. The most significant attacks were against 5/2 ARVN. While operating 10 kilometers north of Camp CARROLL, the 5/2 received 89 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in negative casualties. On the evening of the 14th, this same unit in night defensive positions in the same area received 50 more rounds of 82mm fire resulting in light casualties.

b. THUA THIEN (P). THUA THIEN Province remained relatively quiet during the past week. On 13 November, the DANANG-HUE Railroad was mined for the 24th time this year, as the engine and two cars of a five car northbound armored train were derailed by the explosion of a command detonated mine. The engine was destroyed and six persons were wounded (AT 835978).

Mass graves containing the bodies of victims of the 1968 HUE Tet offensive continue to be uncovered throughout the area east of HUE and north of PHU BAI. Combined groups of PF, RF and RD cadre from the THUA THIEN Sector continue to search the area. The number of bodies discovered to date now totals 230.

c. QUANG NAM (P). Enemy initiated activity decreased in QUANG NAM Province from that of the preceding week, while the rising tempo of friendly initiated action resulted in substantial numbers of KIA's, PW's and the possible discovery of the base camp of a major headquarters in the QUE SON Mountains.

One of the most successful aspects of the week involved a series of artillery fire missions called in on small groups of enemy mainly in the QUE SON region of the province. In all, 10 separate fire missions during the week resulted in more than 74 enemy killed and no friendly casualties.

Throughout the week, there were scattered contacts made by platoon and company size friendly units. In six actions divided equally between US and RF/PF units, more than 50 enemy were killed and 25 captured.

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These actions occurred in the vicinity of ANTENNA Valley. The largest single action of the week, occurred on 12 November, when elements of the 14th, 20th, and 23d RF Groups, along with the 14th Coastal Surveillance Group, six kilometers southwest of HOI AN (BT 125514) made contact with an estimated VC company resulting in 71 enemy killed and 58 PW's captured with light friendly casualties. The enemy was fleeing from elements of the 2d ROK Marine Brigade, engaged in Operation VICTORY DRAGON on northern BARRIER ISLAND.

There was one significant attack by fire on 11 November when five 140mm rockets impacted in the vicinity of the 1st Marine Division CP (AT 965758) causing negligible damage and casualties.

The most significant event of the week in QUANG NAM occurred on 11 November when a squad size patrol from B/1/7 Marines found a cave complex nine kilometers northwest of QUE SON (AT 965417) containing 1,700 pounds of rice, extensive amounts of printing and reproduction materials, documents and miscellaneous equipment indicating that this is a major headquarters, probably subordinate to Front 4. Assessment of items found in this cache continues. Updated information will be included in next report.

On the 15th of November, DONG KHUONG Village (BT 082556) received eight 82mm mortar rounds, four B-40 rockets and small arms fire followed by a ground assault. There was moderate friendly casualties and extensive property damage. The attacking unit was probably from the Q.81 Battalion.

d. QUANG TIN (P). Significant activity in QUANG TIN Province declined last week, with only two attacks by fire and eight small contacts registered. On 8 November, 4/5 ARVN, while on a search and clear operation eight kilometers southeast of QUE SON (BT 104317) received small arms fire, M-79 grenades and 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from an estimated enemy platoon. The ARVN suffering light casualties, returned fire with organic weapons and air strikes. Then, on the 12th, an RF company eight kilometers west of THANG BINH (BT 267433) received 40 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and RPG-2 fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in no damage and negative casualties. Friendly initiated contacts dominated the week's activity, and were scattered generally throughout the northeastern quadrant of the province. These sharp contacts, consisting of predominantly small arms fire against small groups of VC, resulted in over 40 enemy KIA, with very light friendly casualties.

On 11 November, D Company, 2/1 Infantry on a search and clear operation eight kilometers west northwest of THON HAI (BT 176275) discovered 3,000 pounds of unpolished locally grown rice hidden in a haystack. The cache was evacuated to FSB HAWK HILL. On the same day, 200 meters away (BT 178275) D/2-1st discovered another cache, consisting of 2,000 pounds of rice. Then, on 15 November, C/2-1st Infantry found 4,800 pounds of rice six kilometers northwest of THON HAI (BT 190270). The rice was evacuated for distribution to the local population.

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e. QUANG NGAI (P). Action in QUANG NGAI Province increased over previous levels last week, characterized by intensive contacts and the discovery of significant caches of rice and ordnance. There were eight ground contacts and five caches uncovered. The attacks against refugee and population centers which occurred earlier this Fall have not been continued, as the enemy seems to be concentrating his efforts against US and ARVN forces operating in the province.

On 9 November, CAP 1-4-5 eight kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 739793) received 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Then on the 14th, a CAP 1-4-6 patrol eight kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 714776) was hit by small arms fire, grenades, RPG's and satchel charges with light casualties.

The remainder of the week's action was again characterized by meeting engagements against small groups of VC. On the 10th, a cache was located when A company, 1-52d Infantry, on a search and clear operation nine kilometers southwest of BINH SON (BS 522875) discovered more than 2,000 pounds of rice and corn. The grain was believed to be locally grown and was evacuated to LZ STINSON. Then on the 11th, C Company 3/1 eight kilometers southwest of FSB 411 (BS 460706) found an arms cache consisting of recoilless rifle, mortar and small arms ammunition and several dud 250 pound bombs, all of which were destroyed in place.

On the 12th, a mine sweeping operation including B/4-21st Infantry and E Troop, 1st Cavalry was ambushed 18 kilometers south of FSB DEBBIE (BS 908955). A reaction force, air strike, and artillery were called in support. The ambush was probably set by elements of the 93d Battalion, 2d VC Regiment whose mission is reported as ambushing convoys along Highway 1 in northern BINH DINH (P) at the start of the Winter-Spring Campaign.

In the most significant contact of the week, 4/4 ARVN made heavy contact with an unknown size enemy force six kilometers northwest of MO DUC (BS 688587) and engaged with organic weapons, artillery and air strike. The results were 32 enemy killed, and a substantial amount of ammunition captured, including 82mm mortar, B-40 and 57mm RR rounds, and grenades. The enemy unit was probably an element of the 38th LF Battalion.

A recent influx of prisoners from the 2d Battalion, 2d Regiment, captured by elements of the Americal Division continues to indicate elements of that regiment are operating in the QUANG NGAI/BINH DINH border area. Their mission is to conduct attacks against bridges, harass rural pacification efforts and interdict lines of communication.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. Action in ICTZ was characterized by an increase in activity in Local Force and Main Force units, while the NVA was noticeably absent from action except for the area south of the DMZ.

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On FR

TO:

Periodic Intelligence Report #46-69, 18 Nov 69.

9-16 Nov 69

REF:

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The increase in activity, especially the numerous sightings of small groups of enemy moving about during daylight hours is an indication that the Winter-Spring Campaign is being stepped-up. This can be expected to include attacks by fire, sapper attacks and efforts to cut LOC's.

Captured documents have revealed an increased emphasis being placed upon attacks on RVN cadre, pacification and security teams, increased guerrilla activities, and attempts to accelerate civilian discontent.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased from 223 to 239 for the week of 9-15 November. These incidents consisted of seven ground attacks (one of which was company size or larger and six platoon size or smaller), two ambushes, seven attacks by fire, 108 harassing fire incidents, 82 mining and booby trap incidents, two hamlet harassment incidents, four assassination incidents, no espionage incidents, three kidnapping incidents, 20 propaganda incidents and four sabotage incidents.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air defense. AA fire increased from 63 to 96 incidents for the reporting period and 19 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 9-15 November.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Expendeds</u>
82mm Mortar	292
60mm Mortar	92
Unk Cal Mortar	43
140mm Rocket	5
Total	432

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

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(1) The following significant enemy caches were captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 9-15 November 1969.

(a) 15 November: H/2-7th Infantry, 196th Brigade, captured a rice cache in the vicinity of QUE SON (BT 065389) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
4,000 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

This cache was found in a village and was not buried. Some was in drying pans, the rest in earthen jars. All was usable and was evacuated.

(b) 15 November: C/2-1st Infantry captured a rice cache in the vicinity of THON HAI (BT 190270) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
4,800 LBS	Native Grown	Rice

The rice was evacuated for distribution to the local population. No further information was available.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 9-15 November.

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, Rocket Ammunition

<u>Type</u>	<u>Amount</u>
82mm Mortar	133
81mm Mortar	2
60mm Mortar	89
155mm Artillery	11
105mm Artillery	8
75mm RR	1
57mm RR	<u>7</u>
Total	251

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	248
Crew-served Weapons	33

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 9-15 November.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
09 Nov	(AT 945634)	100	I/3/1
09 Nov	(AT 907620)	50	I/3/1
09 Nov	(AT 906617)	1,000	I/3/1
09 Nov	(AT 924642)	660	174th ARVN
09 Nov	(BT 056201)	880	C/5th SFGA
10 Nov	(BT 018398)	350	L/3/7
10 Nov	(BT 087437)	100	E/2/7
10 Nov	(AT 910494)	2,000	M/3/5
10 Nov	(BT 088468)	25	E/2/7
11 Nov	(BT 079595)	25	CAP 2-3-1
11 Nov	(AT 965417)	1,700	B/1/7
11 Nov	(BT 178275)	2,000	D/2/1
11 Nov	(AT 936224)	200	C/4/31
11 Nov	(BT 176275)	3,000	D/2/1
11 Nov	(BS 522785)	1,000	A/1/52
11 Nov	(YD 528398)	90	A/3/187
11 Nov	(YD 528398)	60 (Food)	A/3/187
12 Nov	(AT 889807)	200	L/3/26
12 Nov	(BS 542893)	200	H/17 Cav
12 Nov	(BS 454753)	750	C/3/1
13 Nov	(AT 979437)	250	A/1/7
13 Nov	(AT 979437)	500	A/1/7
13 Nov	(BT 028388)	100	L/3/7
13 Nov	(BT 077307)	50	B/3/21
13 Nov	(BT 195286)	2,000	A/2/1
13 Nov	(BS 673964)	100	CAP 1-3-3
13 Nov	(YD 939-17)	99	2/54 ARVN
14 Nov	(AT 918703)	100	D/1/20
14 Nov	(BT 091289)	50	A/3/21
14 Nov	(BS 610477)	300 (Food)	D/4/3
15 Nov	(BT 065389)	4,000	H/2/7
15 Nov	(AT 956395)	30 (Salt)	C/1/7
15 Nov	(BT 082302)	500	C/3/21
15 Nov	(BT 190270)	4,800	C/2/1
15 Nov	(BT 065299)	250	D/3/21
15 Nov	(BT 064300)	400	D/3/21
15 Nov	(YD 941187)	55	RCN/1/327
	Total Rice	27,584	
	Total Food	360	
	Total Salt	30	

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA.

Structures Destroyed	211	Structures Damaged	56
Bunkers Destroyed	126	Bunkers Damaged	6
Secondary Explosions	25	Secondary Fires	25
Boats Damaged	1		

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3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

- a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.
- b. Negative
- c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ increased in comparison to the previous week. There were 1,234 KIA's, 145 VC PW'S, three NVA PW's and 124 Hoi Chanhs.
- e. Morale. No change.
- f. - g. Negative
- h. Terrain. No change.
- i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	<u>QUANG TRI</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature				
High	90	90	87	90
Low	65	68	68	71
Rainfall (total)	1.26	.42	.54	.93
Winds (knots)	5	6	4	6
Visibility (miles)	6	7	9	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 15-21 November 1969

(a) General. Northeasterly winds are expected to continue during the coming week. No changes in monsoon or tropical storm activity are expected to effect the weather during the period.

(b) ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the period is cloudy with ceilings at 1,500-2,500 feet. A cold front is expected to enter ICTZ early in the period bringing rain and shower activity throughout the area. Precipitation in ICTZ will be approximately two to three inches with isolated instances of three to five inches.

- j. - l. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

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a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/F-MAF by attacks by fire and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Conduct terrorism against selective GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following courses of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to five infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(3) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU RAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with the equivalent of up to six infantry regiments supported by three rocket battalions and four sapper battalions.

(5) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with six infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and two artillery battalions.

(6) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and two artillery battalions.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to five infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

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h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Continuing shortages of food and medical supplies coupled with sickness and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.


J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE

ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS,
AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z.

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 46-69 AS OF 152400H NOVEMBER 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

I CORPS						DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL					
NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA					
NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST		
UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH		
CONFIRMED UNITS													
MR-hq	1	650				1	650			1	650		
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue								1	855	1	855		
Front HQ's	2	750				2	750	1	UNK	3	750		
Div HQ's	2	565				2	565	1	580	3	1,145		
Regt HQ's	10	2,960	2	535		12	3,495	16	7,480	28	10,975		
Bn's-Maneuver	38	9,105	13	2,105	3	655	54	11,865	44	18,455	98	30,320	
Bn's-Support	16	4,130	2	370	1	195	19	4,695	10	2,480	29	7,175	
Separate Co's	1	130			31	2,225	32	2,355	1		32	2,360	
TOTAL CONFIRMED		18,290		3,010			3,075		24,375		29,850		54,225
PROBABLE UNITS													
Front HQ's													
Div HQ's													
Regt HQ's													
Bn's-Maneuver	3	830	1	350	1	190	5	1,370	1	455	6	1,825	
Bn's-Support	5	1,335					5	1,335	4	1,145	9	2,480	
Separate Co's	1	90			2	150	3	240			3	240	
TOTAL PROBABLE		2,255		350			340		2,945		1,885		4,830
POSSIBLE UNITS													
MR TT-HQ (FWD)									1	150	1	150	
Front HQ's													
Div HQ's									1	350	1	350	
Regt HQ's									2	800	2	1,800	
Bn's-Maneuver													
Bn's-Support	1	300					1	300	17	4,950	18	5,250	
Separate Co's									3	440	3	440	
TOTAL POSSIBLE										6,690		6,990	
		20,845	3,360		3,415		27,620		38,425				66,045

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		<u>NVA</u>	<u>MF/VC</u>	<u>LF/VC</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
<u>QUANG TRI</u>	Confirmed	3,110		35	3,145
	Probable	345			345
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,455		35	3,490
<u>THUA THIEN</u>	Confirmed	3,350		475	3,825
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,350		475	3,825
<u>QUANG NAM</u>	Confirmed	5,030	1,180	550	6,760
	Probable	1,005	350		1,355
	Possible	300			300
	TOTAL	6,335	1,530	550	8,415
<u>QUANG TIN</u>	Confirmed	2,665	625	650	3,940
	Probable	380		265	645
	Possible				
	TOTAL	3,045	625	915	4,585
<u>QUANG NGAI</u>	Confirmed	4,135	1,205	1,365	6,705
	Probable	525		75	600
	Possible				
	TOTAL	4,660	1,205	1,440	7,305

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS

MANUEVER	<u>NVA</u>				<u>VC/MF</u>				<u>VC/LF</u>				<u>ICTZ TOTAL</u>											
	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	32	0		32	10			10	3			3	45			45	35	7		42	80	7		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3	10	7		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	38	3		41	13	1		14	3	1		4	54	5		59	36	9		45	90	14		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	6	2	1	9	1			1	1			1	8	2	1	11	2	3	10	15	10	5	11	26
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	5
RR	1			1									1			1				1				1
AT																		1	1				1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		2	3	2	1	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG RECON					1			1					1			1			1	1	1		1	1
TOTAL SUPPORT	16	5	1	22	2			2	1			1	19	5	1	25	8	4	22	34	27	9	23	59
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	54	8	1	63	15			16	4	1		5	73	10	1	84	44	13	22	79	117	23	23	163

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	<u>QUANG TRI</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>THUA THIEN</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG NAM</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG TIN</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG NGAI</u>	<u>STR</u>
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	269	Nam Hoa	50	Hoa Vang	812	Thang Binh	940	Binh Son	311
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	56	Hieu Duc	50	Tam Ky	449	Son Tinh	474
	Trieu Phong	113	Hong Dien	69	Dien Ban	1,090	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	437
	Cam Lo	150	Vinh Loc	43	Dai Loc	341	Hiep Duc	208	Nghia Hanh	336
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	251	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	279	Mo Duc	453
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	333	Hau Duc	172	Duc Pho	463
	Huong Hoa	5	Phu Vang	11	Que Son	943			Tra Bong	166
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	107	Duy Xuyen	1,065			Ba To	197
			Huong Thuy	77	Hieu Nhon	291			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	529					Son Ha	170
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	917	THUA THIEN	1,239	QUANG NAM	5,045	QUANG TIN	2,163	QUANG NGAI	3,021

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,385

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,035		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	570	Unlocated	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	575	Unlocated	XD 8723/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	C	325	Unlocated	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	C	370	Unlocated	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	C	375	Unlocated	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	

*See note #4 on page A-17

**See note #2 on page A-17

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DMZ/NVN/LACS (continued)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	300		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

YD 0565/22Apr69

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9862/17May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1675/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/18Jun69
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1267/24Sep69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1365/28Jul69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,030		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	YD 1765/13Oct69
27th Bn	NVA	C	190	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1775/7Nov69
15th Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCAT ION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,955	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Regt Hq	NVA	C	710	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 9661/5Sep69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	1,525	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,850		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YD 0309	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,570		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	215	Unlocated	YD 3300/15Jul69
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,565		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	YD 1259/11Jul69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	325	XD 9265	XD 8362/60Oct69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27 Jul68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	300	XD 8854	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,370		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 4541/16Oct69
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	YD 1943/8Sep69
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	175	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
* K-34 Arty Bn, NORTH	NVA	C	240	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	105	Vic YD 3535	YD 2540/17Sep69

*See note #3 on page A-17

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	880		
Rdgt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	270	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	260	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jun69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,410		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	330	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	160	Vic YD 6514	YD 6019/6Sep69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
* K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	350	Vic YD 3304	YD 5226/8Sep69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
* K.35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	
C.113 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 4032	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	65	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

*See note #3 on page A-17

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
Front 4	NVA	C	UNK		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	ZC 1341	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
577th Rocket Bn	NVA	C	305	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
Hai Van Engr Bn	NVA	PR	200	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	C	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102d Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103d Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	610		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	165	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	135	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2d Bn	NVA	C	155	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3d Bn	NVA	C	135	BT 1252	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,065		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	ZC 1835	ZC 1945/50Oct69
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	YC 8360	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	YC 8360	AT 8355/21Apr69
2d Bn	NVA	C	240	YC 8360	AT 8754/10May69
3d Bn	NVA	C	305	YC 8360	AT 8355/21Apr69
573d Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unlocated	
575th Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	ZC 1960	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	685		
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	175	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
R.20 Bn	MF	C	145	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	MF	C	130	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.3 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	100	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	115	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	45	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	3,955		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	648		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	AT 9226	
1st Bn	NVA	C	160	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	175	AT 9226	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	175	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	175	BT 1623	BT 2340/12Aug69
72nd Bn	LF	C	175	BT 1917	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	195	BT 2113	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	190	BT 2217	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 3304	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	250	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4213	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	75	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
38th Bn	LF	C	190	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	290	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	125	BS 4677	BS 5279/20Oct69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	165	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	680		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	150	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4386	BS 4786/13Sep69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69
C.17 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	55	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	59	BS 7555	BS 7559/17Oct69
C.120 Co	LF	C	45	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	65	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 5596	
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,615		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	870		
Regt Hq	MF	C	345	BS 7825	BS 6076/26Sep68
93rd Bn	MF	C	180	BS 7825	BS 8331/13Aug69
95th Bn	MF	C	180	BS 7825	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	165	BS 7825	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 4741	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 5542	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 4543	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6546	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST</u> <u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>BINH DINH PROVINCE *</u> <u>CURRENT</u> <u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE</u> <u>LAST CONTACT</u>
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,700		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	520	BR 7363	
8th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 5950	
9th Bn	NVA	C	300	BR 5929	

*See note #1 on page A-17

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1. Significant GOR changes during the period 080002H to 132400H November 1969.

a. No significant changes.

b. Summary Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVA-LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to IC72.

9. Subordinate/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAP PERIODIC REP 44-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS, AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 46-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P). No significant reports.

2. THUA THIEN (P)

a. PW, Sgt Tran CHIEU, 2d Co, K.4 Bn, 5th Regt, captured while hiding in a tunnel on 15 Oct 1969 vicinity (YD 975165) (Interr Rpt 15 Oct 69) stated the following concerning the K.4 Bn: strength - 350 men, location - (YC 9197). The mission of the K.4A at the present time is: collecting rice in the lowlands and coordinating with special action units in harassing Popular Forces and RD Groups. PW also stated that he infiltrated into RVN during September 1968 with the 303d Infiltration Group, strength 400 men. The group arrived in THUA THIEN (P) in December 1968 and 180 men were transferred to the K.4 Bn. Reported personality: Bn CO-HUONG.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holds the K.4 Bn vicinity (YD 8400) with a strength of 330 men but files carry no personality for the K.4 Bn known as HUONG. All information rated (F-3) with the exception of the personality which is rated (F-6).)

b. Returnee, 2dLt Nguyen Van LUNG, XO C.2/K.4 Bn, 5th Regt, rallied 1 Nov 1969 vicinity (YD 944121) (CIEC Interr Rpt 76-69) and stated that his infiltration unit of 30 men left NVN in March 1966 and traveled south adding personnel as they traveled and arrived in RVN in May 1966 with a total strength of 98 men. Thirty men were assigned to the K.4 Bn, 5th Regt. Rallier gave the last known location of the K.4 as follows: 2d and 3d Co's vicinity (YD 9398); 1st and 4th Co's vicinity (YD 8601). The composition of the 5th Worksite (5th Regt) is 1st and 2d Sapper Bn's, K.10 Bn, K.32 Arty Bn, K.439 (AKA Thu Do) Bn. The composition of the K.4 Bn, 5th Regt is four companies, C.1 - C.4 with a strength of 300 men. Reported personalities: Bn CO-THONG, XO-HAY, PO-VI, APO-CHUNG, CofS-KY.

(G-2 COMMENT: Composition of the 5th Regt given by Source agrees with III MAF OOB holdings. III MAF carries the K.4 Bn with a strength of 330 men. The personalities given by Source are new to OOB files with the exception of the C.2, K.4 Bn CO-THONG and PO-VI. All information rated (F-3).)

3. QUANG NAM (P)

a. PW, SrLt Nguyen Van LE, 1st Co, 69th Replacement Bn, Front 4, Co PO, captured on 1 Nov 1969 three kilometers southwest of DAI LOC (D) HQ (AT 885547) (040325Z Nov 69 Init Interr Rpt, 081546Z Nov 69 First MARDIV Supp Interr Rpt 1st IT 10-11-69) stated that the present mission of the battalion was to maintain security along the line of communication from XUYEN HIEP (V) (BT 010490) to TI KE (H) (AT 798355) until 15 Oct 1969.

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In addition, the battalion was to train new troops and collect rice. The company was located vicinity (AT 990416). This area has been occupied since early August 1969, and is spread out in this location under a light jungle cover. The other companies of the battalion were located as follows: 2d Co (AT 9745) (14 Oct 69); 4th Co vicinity Hamlet #3, SON PHUC (V) (AT 8939); 5th Co with the Bn HQ (BT 0245). The battalion composition: 1st and 2d Co's were training companies; 3d Co was a convalescent company; 4th Co was an infiltration company; 5th Co is Commo-Liaison Co including HQ and Bn HQ, plus troops from other units of Front 4. The Bn HQ had a rear service element that controls the collection of rice. Rice is collected from XUYEN TRA (V) (BT 060490); SON TRUNG (V) (BT 020390); XUYEN HIEP (V) (BT 010490); XUYEN TRUONG (V) (BT 027520). The battalion medical resources were comprised of two male Corpsmen per company, and two male nurses with the Bn HQ. The medical personnel were supplied with Quinine, B1 and B12 Vitamins, bandages and small amounts of Iodine. Morale was low due to the hardships of living conditions and the small amount of food rations. Each man receives one can of rice and one-half can of corn per day. Their diet is supplemented with wild vegetables, salt, dry fish and bamboo sprouts, when available. The PW's attended the Staff Asst PO Training Course in NVN from January 1961 through July 1962. The PW infiltrated south with 25 graduates of the Staff Political Officer's Course. There was no infiltration group number. The party left XUAN MAI (C) by truck arriving in VIH (C) on 17 Jul 1962 via Route 1. Movement continued on foot over unknown routes through NGHE AN (P), HA TINH (P), QUANG BINH (P) and the TRUONG SON Mountain Range into LAOS, arriving in LAOS on approximately 26 Jul 1962. The group made frequent stops while traveling through central and lower LAOS and finally arrived in RVN at KONTUM (D) in March 1963. The group moved to GIA LAI (P) and farmed until August 1964. In late August 1964, the PW moved to DAI LOC (D), QUANG NAM (P). Each of the 25 man group was assigned to a district as they passed through them on the way to QUANG NAM (P). The PW further stated that the 1st Co had suffered six killed and two wounded from are light strikes in August 1969. The battalion had received 200 replacements since August 1969 and they were forwarded to other units in Front 4. Reported personalities: Bn CO-SrCapt Nguyen PHONG, XO-Capt Nguyen HAI, PO-SrCapt Nguyen HUU, APO-SrLt Le TUONG; 1st Co Cmdr-SrLt Nguyen Van GIANG, XO-WO Nguyen TRAM, APO-WO Nguyen XO. The LBN for battalion is 5400 AP THAI, LBN for the 1st Co is 4040A AP THAI.

(G-2 COMMENT: The location given for his unit is in keeping with locations that were previously stated by other sources. The names and locations of the rice pick-up points have been previously reported. All personalities and LBN's were reported for the first time. This is the first detailed report on this unit. All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, SrLt Pham Duong CAM, Co Cmdr, C.1 Co, 130th Transportation Bn (Rear Services), Front 4, captured 23 Oct 1969 four kilometers northwest of AN HOA Combat Base (AT 813497) (271429Z Oct 69 CG First MARDIV Init Interr Rpt, 081702Z Nov 69, CG First MARDIV, Supp Interr Rpt 1st 01-11-69) stated that the mission of his battalion was to produce corn and vegetables

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and transport rice and ammunition. The PW's company was to buy salt from the PHU THUAN Market (AT 896530), future mission unknown. The 130th Transportation Bn HQ, currently located one day's walk west of the 1st Co's location vicinity (ZC 003616) (18 Oct 69). Possible location of the battalion headquarters is vicinity (YC 969605) (18 Oct 69). The area occupied by the 1st Co was well concealed by dense jungle. The PW further explained that the battalion was composed of four companies, designated 1 through 4. Each company had a strength of approximately 40 men. The companies were supplemented with additional montagnard coolie laborers when needed for specific missions. The battalion has a support section, medical section, production section and transportation platoon. The PW stated that the men each received one-half a can of rice per day along with corn, salt, bamboo shoots, and wild vegetables. Frequency of rice collection parties was controlled by Front 4 Rear Services Section. Salt was obtained from PHU THUAN Market (AT 896530), rice was obtained from HA NHA Market vicinity (AT 802565) and the PHU THUAN Market. The DONG GIANG (VC) (D) included the area from (ZC 2070) south to (ZC 2050) west to (YC 9550), north to (YC 9570). The VC District had an AKA of "B2 Production Area". When ammunition was transported it was relayed from company to company within the battalion. Each company was responsible for one section of the transportation route. The PW described his past activities with communist forces as beginning with the VIET MINH in January 1954, traveling to NVN in December 1954. The PW served in the NVA until August 1961. In June 1965, the PW returned to QUANG NAM (P) with a civilian cadre group of 10 men. The PW walked from THANH HOA (P) NVN, to QUANG NAM (P) RVN via LAOS, to THUA THIEN (P) then to an area designated as "TAM COI" Mountain located two days walk west of the ONG THU Slope (ZC 1651) arriving 4 Aug 1965. The PW could not remember dates during infiltration through LAOS and RVN. The PW joined a coolie labor force in QUANG DA Special Zone in September 1965. Reported personalities: 130th Transportation Battalion CO-Do Tron TRA (returned to LAOS in September 1969), XO-SrLt VE (Montagnard), PO-SrCapt Nguyen TAN, APO-SrLt DU (Montagnard), another APO-SrLt GIA; 1st Co XO-Lt Nguyen Xuan DUOC, PO-SrLt TA (Montagnard), APO-Lt AN (Montagnard); 2d Co CO-SrLt CUU, XO-Lt HANH, PO-SrLt BANH (Montagnard); 3d Co CO-SrLt CU, XO-Lt KHE, PO-SrLt HOP (Montagnard), APO-Lt HAM (Montagnard); 4th Co CO-SrLt THAI, XO-Lt Mai MOT, PO-SrLt DANG (Montagnard), APO-Lt NHIEM (Montagnard). The battalion also held an AKA of "TRUONG SON" Bn, and the 1st Co had an LEN of P68060 AP THAI.

(G-2 COMMENT: The market places mentioned in this report have been previously reported. The PW's information presents a detailed example of one element of the Rear Service Staff, Front 4. It is interesting here to note that of all the personalities listed, all political officers and APO's are listed as Montagnards. This would be beneficial to this unit in recruiting laborers in their operating area which is populated mainly by Montagnards. The personalities and LEN were all listed for the first time. The AKA, TRUONG SON, has been used by some units from different areas previously. All information rated (F-3).)

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4. QUANG NAM (P). No significant reports.

5. QUANG NAM (P). Col Chan, Cpl Dean Quang PHAN, Production Unit, Quartermaster Section, Rear Service Agency, 21st Regt, 2d NVA Div, who defected on 11 Sep 1969 to PHUOC HOA (V) Office six kilometers west northwest of TIEU PHUOC (BT 0614) (11th ITT Rpt dtd 27 Oct 69) stated that the strength of the Production Unit was seven men; Quartermaster Section, 10 men, Rear Service Agency, 30 men. The location of the Production Unit is vicinity (AT 94064), Hamlet 8, PHUONG LANH (V), 15 kilometers southeast of TIEU PHUOC with a mission to produce rice for the 21st Regt. Village includes two dispensaries; CK.120 14 kilometers southwest of TIEU PHUOC (AT 94015); 1-5 dispensary, 11 kilometers northwest of TIEU PHUOC (AT 94010). Subject stated that the 21st Regt had three agencies designated as Staff, Political, and Rear Service. The Rear Service Agency is divided into three sections, designated as Medical, Political, and Quartermaster. The 21st Regt code name is K.55, and the 21st Regt is a part of the 2d NVA Div. Reported personalities: Rear Service Agency Chief-10; Medical Section Chief-10; Armor Section Chief-10; Quartermaster Section Chief-10; Production Unit Leader-Tran Due NVA.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is a report of the Rear Service Agency of the 21st Regt, located in the area of TIEU PHUOC (P). Previous reports indicated that the Rear Service Agency was located in QUANG NAM (P) even after the report of its location in the area of TIEU PHUOC (P) in May 1969. The personalities and the code name for the first time. The K.55 is identified as the code name for the 21st Regt. All information rated (F-3).)

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 46-69

1. GENERAL. Reported counterintelligence related VC/VCI activities during the reporting period reflected no significant change, in doctrine or tactics, from the previous week.

Sabotage activity included the damage and subsequent sinking of a U.S. Navy YOC and continuation of activities against the Hue-Danang Railway.

Terrorism registered a slight increase over that of the previous week.

Miscellaneous reports of possible significance concern the use of enemy underwater sappers, counterfeiting of U.S. currency, and enemy activities regarding the possible use of marijuana.

Significant items were derived from captured documents. A considerable number of these documents from various locales in NICTZ confirm previous assessments that the VC have been actively engaged in redevelopment/reestablishment of infrastructure elements in the lowland areas of Quang Tri, and Thua Thien provinces.

Additionally, the seizure of a large batch of outgoing enemy personal mail, apparently destined for distribution within NVN and Quang Tri Province, contains data relating to operating conditions, personal hardships and deprivation of food experienced in the Quang Tri-Northern Thua Thien area. These personal letters generally dated between May-Sep 69 remained undelivered. The general content of the mail is such that it may have been considered too demoralizing for home consumption. Captured documents continue to reflect enemy self-admissions that the disparity between enemy design and accomplishment is ever widening in ICTZ, especially his effort to disrupt the GVN pacification program.

2. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. Few reports of enemy intelligence gathering activities were received during the past week and is interpreted as failure to detect such activity, rather than a lack thereof.

Reports continue to reflect enemy collection of biographical data regarding selected individuals and units, usually government officials and functionaries, security personnel, and pacification cadre. Such data may be intended for use in preparation of personnel and/or unit target lists in furtherance of enemy efforts to disrupt/destroy the pacification program and the effectiveness of the local government apparatus to protect, influence, and control the populace.

Additionally, reports continue to reflect enemy emphasis on covert penetration of US/GVN installations for intelligence/information gathering purposes.

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Details of reported enemy intelligence gathering activities during the past week are as follows:

a. Thua Thien.

(1) On 6 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On the night of 3 November 1969, one VC company of the K-4A Battalion entered Xuan Lai (H) (YD 962061) and Phuoc My (H) (YD 960049), Loc An (V), Phu Loc District. They reconnoitered the area surrounding Truoi Bridge vicinity (YD 968063) and questioned residents concerning US troop strength and deployment in the Truoi Bridge area. (Ref: 204th MID AVII Rpt #XXIV-310-69 dtd 6Nov69) (Eval: F-6).

(2) A Hoi Chanh reported that his unit, the H1 Armed Reconnaissance Battalion of the Hue City Committee, was located vicinity (YD 6015), (YD 6110), and the Huong Tra mountains as of 5 November 1969. The main mission of the unit was to collect information on government cadre in the Huong Thuy area for purposes of harrassment, kidnapping or assassination. (Ref: 1st ARVN Div CIEC Initial Interrogation Rpt #79-69 dtd 5 Nov69).

b. Quang Nam. A US MI source reported the following information on 10 November 1969:

Since 9 November 1969, a squad composed of eight men (3 guerrillas and five NVA soldiers) has been assigned the mission of watching the Ha Dong bridge (AT 991641) and the RD forces in the New Life hamlet (AT 987623) below Hill 55.

The squad is an element of a platoon (nfi), composed of over 30 men, located in the area of Gian Lai (AT 977608).

At present the squad is located vicinity Quang Dong (3) (H) (AT 993624). Squad members normally work as farmers, during the day, in the same area. The only known weapons belonging to the men of the squad are various small arms and binoculars.

Two men of the squad are known as Kha (nfi) and Vo MUA (nfi). (Ref: 3CIT-IR-148-69 dtd 11Nov69) (Eval: F-3).

c. Quang Tin. On 3 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

An unidentified reconnaissance unit was located vicinity (BT 225015) on 1 November. This unit had been formed recently. Its mission is to infiltrate US/GVN installations to collect information. The unit consisted of 20 men and 40 women. These personnel were trained in Phuoc Chau (u) and were to be sent to installations around Tam Ky and Chu Lai in the near

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future (nfi). (Ref: Det D, 1st Bn, 525th MI Gp Rpt #1/A/CX/0249/69 dtd 5 Nov 69) (Eval: P-6).

3. SABOTAGE. Three incidents related to enemy sabotage activity were reported in ICTZ during the past week. Railroad track and a Hue-Danang Railway train was damaged in southern Thua Thien (P). A U.S. Navy YOG was damaged and subsequently sank near the mouth of the Cua Viet River in Quang Tri (P).

Details of reported enemy sabotage activities of the past week are as follows:

a. Quang Tri. On 13 November 1969, vicinity (YD 333696), a yard fueler, YOG-76, received an underwater explosion while anchored in a cove. APMI's 125 and 155 were alongside. YOG caught fire from first explosion and had a secondary explosion. The fire was extinguished, however, the ship capsized and sank. Two (2) personnel were wounded. Suspect enemy underwater mining as cause of initial explosion. (Ref: XXIV Spot Report to III MAF COC dtg 130520H Nov 69).

b. Thua Thien.

(1) At approximately 1005 on 13 November 1969, a five armored car train proceeding north on the Hue-Danang Railway was derailed by a ~~command~~ detonated mine vicinity (AT 835976). The engine and approximately 12 ~~meters~~ of track were destroyed. Three Vietnamese, including the engineer of the train and two ARVN soldiers were wounded. (Ref: Spot Report from 1st MarDiv to III MAF COC, dtd 132141H Nov 69).

(2) On the night of 13 November 1969, 24 meters of railroad track was destroyed by an unknown type enemy mine vicinity (YD 815184). (Ref: III MAF Force Engineer Loc Incident Report of 141400 Nov 69).

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Reports of VC/VCI political and propaganda activities of the past week generally reflected the same policy and themes as emphasized over the past several weeks. Noteworthy, are the repeated references of enemy propagandists to the "successes" of anti-pacification efforts and the discoveries of numerous directives concerning stringent population control measures instituted by the VC/VCI in enemy controlled areas. These measures reveal the recognition by the enemy of the overall effectiveness of the GVN pacification program and the great obstacle it poses to any hopes of enemy success.

Details of enemy political and propaganda activities reported during the past week are as follows:

a. Quang Tri.

(1) On 31 October 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

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A meeting of VC cadre was held on 31 October, in Ha Thanh resettlement area, vicinity (YD 220675), Cam Lo (D). The purpose of the meeting was to assign stay-behind communists their positions. These positions were established in preparation for the coming political struggle. The assigned positions are as follows (asterisk denotes man in charge):

*Bui thi Thi - Cell member

Tran thi Nay - Cell member

Gui thi Nay - Cell member

Bui Tham - Cell member

*Nguyen Nghi - Liaison and Military Cell leader

Bui Ve - Cell member in charge of Liaison

Le thi Nghi - Cell member, liaison activities

Nguyen thi Bang - Cell member in charge of military propaganda activities

*Bui Den - Communications Cell leader

Buil Thuong - Cell member

Truong thi Thi - Cell member

*Bui Thanh - Supply cell leader

Tran thi Chan - cell member

Bui Tuyen - Liaison cell leader

*Nguyen Hiep - Communications team chief for communications between Ha Thanh resettlement area, Ha Thuong (nfi), and Loc Son (YD 165705)

Nguyen thi Em - Team member

Nguyen Lac - Supply team chief

(Ref: Det A, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt #1/B/AX/0612/69 dtd 5Nov69)

(2) On 6 November 1969 a US MI source reported the following information:

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On 2 and 3 November 1969, the H.99 Company (nfi) with an estimated strength of 100 men moved to the areas of Phuoc Dien vicinity (YD 473486), and Dien Khanh vicinity (YD 495505). The men of the unit mingled with the villagers of the areas upon reaching their location. The intentions of the unit were to move to the coastal area to collect rice for the troops during the rainy season and agitate the people to struggle against the government. (Ref: Det A, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp msg 060915Z msg Nov 69) (Eval: F-6).

(3) On 10 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 7 November 1969, the VC Hai Lang District, Village and Hamlet cadre group moved from the Ba Long area to deploy in Thuong Nguyen (V) vicinity (YD 367436). The group, estimated to be 30 men, had recently returned from Ha Tinh Province (CNA), North Vietnam, where they had recently attended classes on military and political training, sponsored by the National Liberation Front. The classes ended on 25 October 1969. The training was primarily concerned with methods of appealing to the South Vietnamese people in order that they might revolt against the Government during, and subsequent to, the general attack of South Vietnam which is to take place sometime in November 1969. (Ref: Det A, 1st Bn., 525th MI Gp Rpt #1/B/AX/0620/69 dtd 10Nov69) (Eval: C-6).

b. Thua Thien.

(1) On 6 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 2 November 1969, one VC platoon entered Phuoc Tuong (H) vicinity (YD 119621), Loc Tri (V), Phu Loc (D) to buy rice and pigs. The VC told the residents they would return to free them from the Vietnamese puppet government and that the VC and residents would then be able to live together in harmony. (Ref: XXIV Corps, G-2 Rpt #XXIV-310-69 dtd 6Nov69) (Eval: F-6).

(2) On 11 November 1969, approximately one VC platoon entered Loc An (V) vicinity (YD 959059), stole foodstuffs from the people, distributed leaflets, wounded the village chief and withdrew. (Ref: PSA/PSD CORDS THUA THIEN; Rpt R-24/11121500).

(3) Approximately one VC platoon entered Xuan Hoi hamlet vicinity (YD 935080) and stole rice from the people. When the VC withdrew they left numerous leaflets (nfi) (Ref: PSA/PSD CORDS THUA THIEN; Rpt R-13/11081120).

c. Quang Nam.

(1) The below National Liberation Front order was handwritten and distributed to the residents of Thai Cam (H) (AT 987624), Than Son (V),

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Dien Ban (D) on the night of 25 October 1969 by an unknown number of VC.

SPECIAL ORDER FOR DIEN BAN DISTRICT

1. Villagers are not to move to the new village constructed by the enemy (Americans).
2. No one will cut wood to help the Americans construct a refugee camp.
3. Don't give information to the pacification committee. Don't let the Americans into your homes.
4. Don't work in the American camp.
5. From 6 o'clock in the evening to 7 o'clock in the morning, all villagers must stay at home and not go out.
6. Right now all villagers must move to another area. Don't stay in this region. If anybody stays in this area, our Liberation Front won't assume responsibility for them. (Ref: CG, 1stMarDiv, ltr 46/GMG/pr dtd 2Nov69)

(2) The following message was delivered to the residents of Thai Cam (H) (AT 987624), Than Son (V), Dien Ban (D) on the night of 28 October 1969. Documents of similar content were found scattered vicinity (AT 934832) on 11 November 1969.

BILL OF INDICTMENT

More than ten years ago the American Imperialists stole our country and their lackeys sold our country and schemed to change South Vietnam into a new Colony for Americans.

But our people, with a tradition for uniting in struggle and with the oath of dying before becoming slaves, stand determined against the enemy and are forcing them down the road of defeat.

However, with their stubbornness, the usurpers of our country, and their lackeys who sold out the country, have used blood and fire to put down the patriotic movements of our people.

They terrorize and slaughter, torture and jail millions of people, destroy hamlets and crops and have caused a lot of misery and mourning among our people. Their atrocities are multiplying. God will not forgive them.

Some people help them knowingly, others to get into their good graces, some are fooled, others are forced, but all sell cheaply their consciences in exchange for dollars and bind tightly their destinies with those of the usurpers and the sellers of our country. They have committed many atrocities against our people and the revolution.

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To show our humane attitude toward these people who have erred, the National Liberation Front has announced a clemency policy for those who repent and severely punish those stubborn ones, such as:

Phan Quang Dang
 Nguyen Quang Hoach
 Nguyen Cu
 Truong Nho

These persons have committed many atrocities against the people. The Front has, on numerous occasions, called upon friendly families to advise them, but they are still stubborn and continue down the road to atrocities.

Now, based on the policies of the Front, based on the desires of the people, and based on their record of atrocities, the People's Revolutionary Committee of Quang Nam - Danang, has decided to punish them and force them to pay for their crimes before the people. Their sentence will be carried out. Therefore, we announce their crimes.

The Action Cell

(Ref: CG, 1stMarDiv ltr 46/GMG/pr dtd 2Nov69)

(3) At approximately 0712 on 9 November, a CAP 2-4-5 patrol spotted a small wooden box floating in the river at (BT 167573), 2 kilometers west of Hoi An. The box was retrieved and found to contain 1 VC flag and a packet of VC propaganda (nfi). (Ref: CAP Daily Opns Summary 091600-101600 Nov69)

(4) At approximately 1630 on 9 November 1969, a CAP 2-7-2 patrol spotted two VN women drop two packets of papers by a trail vicinity (BT 029621), six kilometers north of Dien Ban. The patrol detained the VN and recovered the packets which were VC propaganda leaflets (nfi). The two VN and the propaganda leaflets were turned over to district officials who confirmed the VN women to be members of the Hoa Chau (V) guerrilla force. (Ref: CAP Daily Opns Summary 091600-101600 Nov69)

(5) On 11 November 1969, numerous VC assassination/conviction and VC propaganda notices were found scattered in vicinity (AT 934832). The following are literal translations of these documents:

ANTI-WAR ACTIONS ARE BEST MEANS TO YOUR SURVIVAL

U. S. Marines of the 1st Regiment!

During the days of your encampment in the barren and sultry

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Northwestern part of Quang Nam-Danang area you have been passing tense and long hours with death and danger.

Because of the U. S. Government's warlike policy, you must live far from your families. Many a time, on the order of the cruel U.S. Officers, you have committed atrocities against the Vietnamese people who want nothing but peace and by no means have any grudge against the U.S. people.

Being aware of the unjust nature of the Vietnam war, you have built up anti-war movements in your bases at Con Khe, Don Trang and Ham Xe where whole companies refused to go on operations and demanded their return home. Your mutinies resulted in forcing the U.S. commanders to cancel combat orders, thus saving you from a useless death.

By giving such contributions to the cause of peace, you deserved to be seen as valiant boys of the peace-loving U.S. people.

Go ahead and oppose the war under various forms.

Only when the war ends, you will be able to return home to enjoy, again, a comfortable life beside your loved ones.

The Vietnamese people greatly appreciate your honorable deeds and wish you be back home in a very short time.

(NOTE: This propaganda was printed in English.)

STRICT ORDER

For the purpose of supporting our revolutionary authorities of all levels and of opposing all the activities of the puppet organizations, the People's Revolutionary Committee in Quang Da demand that:

(a) Puppet organizations such as family groups, hamlets, village headquarters, RD teams and self-defense groups be immediately and completely disbanded and discontinued.

(b) All deceitful elections be suspended.

Any violation will be strictly punished.

March 5, 1969

People's Revolutionary Committee
Quang Da Province

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****STRICT ORDER**

To maintain the security of the collective and to protect the people's life and property, this is the command of the People's Liberation Force at Quang Nam-Danang:

ORDER

(a) Severe punishment will be applied to those who make an attack on the collective's security. Such as, illegal meetings, exciting the people, stealing, passing unofficial rumor, destroying public property or making troubles for officials at their duties.

(b) Speculation, illegal storage, and raising prices that affect the people's standard of living are prohibited.

(c) All personnel, officers, soldiers, and officials who belong to the false government must report themselves to any level official of the revolutionary government.

(d) Those who still keep papers, documents, equipment or any type of weapons received from the false government must submit them to the revolutionary government as soon as possible.

(e) Those who do not carry out this order will be punished severely.

November 11, 1969

Command of the People's Revolution
Quang Nam - Danang

TO: THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE NATIONAL POLICE AND PUPPET
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN QUANG NAM AND DANANG

Our widely known victory shortly after Tet 1969 has brought the American aggressors and the government of Thieu, Ky and Huong to a greater failure. It is determined that the American Imperialists be driven out of South Vietnam and the Saigon government overthrown. Our people's struggle against aggression will eventually be successful.

The Front's policy concerning the puppet troops, national police and government officials has been made clear. They have been warned many times by the Quang Nam-Danang Liberation Front. Many of them have turned against the Americans and have sided with the people. But so far there are still a number of these officials who continue to be lackeys of the aggressors and traitors doing things against the national interests.

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Brothers and Sisters! You should look at the examples of those who are stubborn and you will find out what happened to them during our attacks at Hoi An, Danang and throughout the province. Quickly stop your crimes and take part in the liberation and unification of our country. What you must do now is:

- Quit your job and move to another place and make a living in a peaceful manner.
- Support, directly or indirectly, any act of patriotism.
- Contact the front through family, friends, and trustful individuals for assignments.
- Help the Liberation Front in getting rid of the cruel government officials trying to undermine our revolution.
- Secretly conduct proselyting.

The sacred and historical hour has come. You must make the decision of your fate. The People's Liberation Front is waiting for you and welcomes patriotic people. Those who are disobedient and continue to be supporters of the enemy will be strictly punished.

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT
Quang Nam - ~~Danang~~

(Ref: 5th CI Team Rpt 117/69 of 11Nov69)

(6) Information from the National Police Directorate General indicates the VC are attempting to create an organization named the "Vietnam Unification Independence Neutralization and Peace Front". The suspected purpose of this organization is to act as a front to facilitate popular participation in communist activity similar to the "Liberation Farmers' Association", the "Women's Liberation Association" and the "Youth's Liberation Association".

(Ref: FCZIO PERINTREP 46-69 (060001H to 122400H Nov69 referencing NILO Hoi An PERINTREP 46-69)

d. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 6 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 17 October, the Son Tinh VC District Committee held a meeting in the eastern region to discuss the plan of the Staff Section, VC MR-5.

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The Plan was a message from the MR-5 Headquarters and was numbered 1289/TB/QK5.

The message stated that all VC military and administrative cadre were responsible to construct various agencies and offices in hamlets, villages and cities, of the VC controlled areas, mixed controlled (contested) areas and GVN controlled areas. This task should be accomplished prior to the last days of November 1969. In addition, the VC MR-5 also directed low level offices to accomplish the following:

(a) The local district armed forces are to combine with task units (nfi) and village guerrilla units to attack various ARVN or US outposts.

(b) Try to kill, assassinate, or kidnap the GVN hard core cadre and whoever works/worked for the GVN and exert efforts to lower ARVN morale.

(c) The district propaganda armed force units should lead and combine with provincial propaganda armed force units to accomplish the following tasks:

Give English leaflets and use loudspeakers to appeal to US soldiers to contribute to the anti-war movement in the US and ask the US Government to retreat.

Give leaflets and use loudspeakers to appeal to VC cadre and the population to trust the victory of the VC at the Paris Peace talks and the anti-war movement in the US.

Propagandize the US and GVN to yield to the VC and agree to talks with the NLF.

Propagandize that the anti-war movement in the US is increasing and communist countries in the world criticize the US action and ask the US to withdraw. For that reason the NLF did not agree to the US suggestion that the GVN and NLF agree to negotiations.

All VC provincial units should send members to attend a training course for two months, concerning the handling of improved rockets (nfi).

The VC reinforced units, district and village guerrillas, were responsible for attacking ARVN or US outposts.

Provincial MF units and inter-region units were responsible

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for attacking GVN main positions and cities. These units should not use strength but rockets, such as 122mm or 140mm and improved rockets (nfi). (Ref: Det D, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/B/DX/1398/69 dtd 7Nov69) (Eval: F-3)

(2) On 7 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 3 November 1969, a VC provincial **special** task group traveled to Duc Pho (D), and was met by the Duc Pho District VC Committee at Dong Ban (H) (BS 750330), Ba Quang (V), Ba To (D). The group consisted of 16 personnel including female cadre. The members of the group were also members of various sections (nfi) or provincial committees. Some of them had recently returned from North Vietnam after having graduated from an unspecified course (nfi).

Nguyen Tam, the C-22 Company Commander and an unknown number of members traveled with the above-mentioned personnel.

The group and the Duc Pho VC District Committee discussed the following:

(a) During the period 10 November to 10 December 1969, various activities (nfi) will be concentrated in Duc Pho (D) through the use of three-pronged attacks in mountainous and low-land areas of which the most important of these activities would be troop and enemy troop proselyting.

(b) In the troop and enemy troop proselyting tasks, the VC expected that there should be many ARVN defectors, soldiers separated from their units and deserters from GVN local forces, RDC, National Police and the People's Self-Defense Forces.

(c) The VC also plan to produce many VC political struggle cadre who would be required to have perfect knowledge of the politics of the Revolution and legal or illegal methods of carrying out the political struggle. The use of legal or illegal tactics would be dependent upon the situation and the area (nfi). These tasks would be specifically directed toward female youths who would be trained in methods of motivating US soldiers to develop a strong anti-war movement within units. To accomplish this mission, the female youth would be given leaflets written in English, to hand US soldiers or drop them in areas where the US troops are concentrated and/or operating.

After meeting and combining with the district cadre, the special group was divided into three sub-groups. The mission which the group was assigned was to begin on 10 November 1969 and end on 10 December 1969.

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MR-5 and MZ-Tay Nguyen (nfi) consisted of three divisions which were organized into a Corps or Brigades. During the Winter-Spring offensive, the mountain area would be the object of the most severe attacks while the political struggle would be concentrated in the plains area.

(Ref: Det D, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/B/DX/1409/69 dtd 8Nov69)

(Eval: F-3)

(3) On 8 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 27 October 1969, the Son Tinh VC District Sub-committee held a political training course in the Song Gian river area (BS 390800) (AKA: Dong Dien rice field area), Ha Lam (V), Son Ha (D). Teaching the course were two instructors; Nguyen Dau, member of the Son Tinh VC District Sub-committee and Tran Doan, member of the Son Tay VC Village Committee. Attending were 60 residents from the Doi Dien area vicinity (BS 440770), the Hoa area vicinity (BS 430770) and the Tan An area vicinity (BS 443789).

The course was held to regain the people's confidence and propagandize political subjects in order to keep the people from worrying. They propagandized the revolutionary policy and told the people to organize food support programs. The VC told the people they would protect their property and cattle from damages while they moved to the VC controlled area. They informed the people that if they forgot anything, their children could return for it. The VC told the people they would build a VC refugee camp in the VC controlled area where the residents could live temporarily. The resident families were to be issued three days supplies for moving to the VC controlled area. (Ref: Det D, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/B/DX/1417/69 dtd 10Nov69) (Eval: C-3)

(4) On 9 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 22 October 1969, the VC Quang Ngai Province Psychological Warfare Battalion was divided into small groups (nfi) to operate directly with VC sapper units in penetrating GVN cities, villages and refugee camps in Quang Ngai (P). The mission of the Psychological Warfare personnel was to propagandize the people and urge young men to defect to the VC. If a young man defected, the VC promised to help the members of his family in the event they were forced to remain in a GVN controlled area (nfi). The Psychological Warfare personnel were also increasing their proselytizing activities within the GVN Popular Self-Defense Forces. (Ref: Det D, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/B/EX/0251/69 dtd 10Nov69) (Eval: F-6)

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5. TERROR. Reported acts of terrorism remained at a low level, increasing slightly from the previous week. Attempted intimidation by terror continues to be directed at village and hamlet level administrators and functionaries, security elements and pacification personnel. Limited attacks and attacks by fire were directed against refugee and resettlement communities as a means of forcing people away from government controlled areas. As in the past, this type activity continues to be unsuccessful. Additionally, such activities have tended to further alienate the people's feelings regarding the VC and unquestionably has swayed many noncommitted/neutralist elements to the side of the government.

Details of terrorist activity conducted in ICTZ during the past week are listed in Appendix 1.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Quang Nam.

(1) On 4 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following:

During the night of 3 November, VCI personalities, Le Ngo and Dang Cong Nhon, led a group of 18 men into Thach Nhon (H) (AT 946717), Hoa Thinh (V). This group came as a show of force to demonstrate to the people that the VC can control the hamlet whenever they desire and to demand from each family or house, 20 kilos of rice and other foodstuffs. They told the people that they would return to pick up the supplies in three or four days. The goods would be picked up at each house. They also asked the people, "What means of transportation do the US forces use when coming from and going to their positions?" "What routes do the night patrols take and where are ambushes set up?" (Ref: 1st CIT CIR 214-69 dtd 6Nov69)

(2) A US MI source reported that as of 11 November 1969, an unidentified force of 200 men, having moved from Da Hoa vicinity (AT 964579), was dispersed at Quang Loc Dong, vicinity (BT 061608) and (BT 067617), and Phon Ho vicinity (BT 065625) and (BT 063630), Dien Ban (D), Quang Nam (P). One element of the force planned to collaborate with the Q.82 Dien Ban local force in attacks on outposts at Tu Cau vicinity (BT 017676), Than Quyt vicinity (BT 040630), and Vien Dien vicinity (BT 056575). The other part of the force planned to collaborate with guerrillas of Thanh Minh and Thanh Thuy in the destruction of the resettlement camp in Thanh Thuy (V) vicinity (BT 090645). VC legal agents inserted into the camp planned to aid the attack (nfi). (Ref: CO, Det C, 1st Bn (P), 525th MI Gp; Rpt # 1/A/AX/0594/69, dtd 12Nov69) (Eval: F-3).

(3) On 10 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

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The 44th Quang Da Front (Front 4) has ordered all MF and LF units to attack US/GVN outposts on the Quang Da battlefield. Attacks were planned for moonless nights between 10 and 20 November 1969. The Hoa Hieu Local Force is responsible for the Hieu Duc District Headquarters, Tuy Loan District business quarter. To support city penetration agents in launching assassination/sabotage activities against US/GVN establishments, all artillery units will shell Danang and Marble Mountain airbases. A large offensive was planned for early December 1969, after a period of recuperation and receiving of replacements. The attacks are aimed at annihilation and destruction of material to hamper the Vietnamization of the war. Subordinate units have been tasked with collecting money and food in support of this offensive. (Ref: CO, Det C, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/A/AX/0585/69) (Eval: C-3)

b. Quang Tin.

(1) On 4 November 1969, elements of the Americal Division, while operating in the vicinity of (BT 154253) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Official letter, dated 26 October 1969, from an unidentified individual, to Hao and Co (nfi), informs them that in accordance with orders from the Region (possibly Region 5) Party Committee, they were to continue making counterfeit US currency in order to keep their customers (possibly dealers who knowingly use it) supplied until further instructions (possibly from Region 5 Party Committee) were received. An all-out plan would be formulated (possibly by Region 5 Party Committee) to disrupt the enemy. Hao and Co had to limit the amount of US currency counterfeited to \$100US per day. The author also instructed Hao and Co to find a market for the merchandise "Z" (possibly marijuana) which would be provided to them by K (possibly Region 5 Party Committee). (Ref: CDEC LOG NO. 11-1557-69 dated 12Nov69) (Eval: B-3)

(2) On 4 November 1969, elements of the Americal Division, while operating vicinity of (BT 154253) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Official letter, dated 27 October 1969, from an unspecified individual to Hao and Co, reveals that a large amount of merchandise "Z" would be provided to Hao and Co. The author informs Hao and Co that the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) troops were in Hamlets 6 and 8 (nfi), Hoc Thap and Doi Chay areas, and Ky Que and Ky Son Villages (possibly Tam Ky (D), Quang Tin Province, Military Region 5). The

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corridor from Phuoc Tien to Phuoc Thanh Village was blocked, and the author had to use the corridor from Phuoc Lam Village to Duyen Yen Village to proceed to Ngoc Ly Hamlet. The author finally relates that the base camps of the agencies of an unspecified province (possibly Quang Tin Province) were subject to intensive enemy attacks and had to be moved other areas. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO. 11-1557-69 dtd 12Nov69) (Eval: B-3)

c. Quang Ngai.

(1) A VC rallier of 19 October 1969, stated that on 30 September 1969, one platoon of H 16 company received orders to be under the operational control of the 83rd Bn temporarily. Subject also stated that seven (7) men in the H 16 company had just completed training in underwater sapper tactics, and would be employed for supporting other units. Subject has heard of upcoming coordinated attacks possibly in late November and early December 1969 (nfi). (Ref: 11th ITT Rpt No. Q 3-11-69 dtd 6 Nov 69) (Unrated)

(2) An interrogation report of a VC Returnee, Phan van Trung (AKA: Thanh Co), of 21 October 1969, at Mo Duc (D), Quang Ngai (P), disclosed the following information:

Source stated that he was a Senior Lieutenant Cryptographer of the Special Mission Group of MR-5.

In August 1969, source stated that he read a directive from the Quang Ngai Unit to Duc Pho (D) and Mo Duc (D) which revealed the future activities of MR-5 forces as follows:

During October 1969 to November 1969, D-1 Campaign period.

(a) Main Force Units:

Consolidate units in rear bases
Receive replacements
Study and training
Store food (6 month supply)

(b) Local units:

Increase traffic sabotage
Attack pacification program and move people back to VC controlled areas.
Develop guerrilla warfare
Take guerrillas to reinforce local units

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Organize the ranks of the people
 Prepare the people, ideologically, for the
 political struggle.

(Ref: Staff IFF Coordinator, G-2 III MAF Rpt #165-69 dtd 6Nov69)

(3) On 6 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 4 November, a VC Proselyting Plan was placed into effect and contained the following points:

(a) All youths between the ages of 13 and 25 would be required to join the VC and act as a soldier of the village, hamlet, district or provincial main forces. Anyone who joined the army would be congratulated and his family would receive good treatment by the VC.

(b) Any person who did not volunteer to join the army would be forced to act as a laborer for six months to one year in the jungle area.

(c) Any person who refused to work as a laborer would be sent to a prison.

(d) Older personnel would remain at home and would provide a warning system for the VC in case of an ARVN/US operation.

(e) Any person who had a relative who was an ARVN soldier should obtain a picture of that person, in uniform, so that they would not be detained when questioned by ARVN operational troops.

(f) Guerrilla troops were not to fire upon US troops as that would cause the US to call in gun ships and artillery which would cause destruction to cattle and crops.

(g) Three platoons had been established in each district with the responsibility to ambush US/ARVN troops. They would cause enemy forces to be delayed while booby traps, mines, punji stake pits and explosives could be placed in the area, before they retreated, which would cause casualties to the US/ARVN troops as they tried to follow. (Ref: Det D, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/B/DX/1397/69 dtd 7Nov69) (Eval: F-3)

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(4) VC entered Tho Lao (H) vicinity (BS 798379) on 10 November 1969, burned one medicine cabinet in the local dispensary and a number of documents (nfi).
(Ref: PSA/PSD CORDS QUANG NGAI: Report R-17/11111135)

d. Military Region 4. On 7 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

From 21-25 October 1969, Military Region 4 conducted a meeting at an unknown location in Ha Tinh Province, North Vietnam. The purpose of the meeting was to outline plans of higher Headquarters and low level installations of Military Region 4 for the forthcoming Winter-Spring Campaign. Participants at the meeting included Military Region 4 cadre, provincial, district, village and hamlet cadre, and approximately 300 soldiers from Military Region 4. The meeting was held to outline ways by which the overthrow of the Government of South Vietnam could be accomplished by the end of 1969. The following resolutions were reached and the requirements for execution thereof, were levied upon the various cadre, as follows:

(a) The formation of transportation labor groups for the purpose of transporting weapons, ammunition, and rations from storage areas in My Ta (CNA), Vinh Linh Special Zone, and the Thuy Can area (CNA), into the Khe Sanh area to supply 7th Front and B-5 Front.

(b) The formation of volunteer ambulance cadre groups to infiltrate SVN in early November 1969.

(c) Organization and training of stay-behind cadre who have an understanding of the political aims of NVN.

(d) The organization of elements to infiltrate the RVN Government agencies, and act as contacts between communist cadre and the local populace of South Vietnam and as contacts between the NVA military forces and the local populace (SVN). These elements will penetrate their targets during the attack phase of the Winter-Spring Campaign.

(e) District, village and hamlet cadre will recruit and train new cadre. Special emphasis will be given to the recruitment of youths from 10 to 15 years of age.

(f) Organization of North Vietnamese Youth Groups for accelerated training and infiltration into the Tri-Thien area for the purpose of influencing and recruiting the local youths and to aid in their training.

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(g) The formation of an organization to receive residents of SVN who want to go to NVN when the general attack begins.

(Ref: Det A, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/B/AX/0617/69 dtd 8Nov69)

(Eval: C-6)

APPENDIX

1 - Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 46-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Tri	4Nov69 (Late Entry)	(YD 348496)	VC entered the Phuoc Mon Resettlement area in Hai Phu (V) and assassinated Mr. Tran Van Bac, Chief of 29th RD Team, one woman and two children.
	12Nov69	(YD 230677)	Three (3) VC entered the home of Truong Quang Thuc (age: 50) and kidnapped him. Thuc was formerly a member of the communist party, until 1960. Presently he is chairman of the village self help project. Local officials believe that the VC captured him to instruct political indoctrination course.
Thua Thien	10Nov69	(YD 363102)	An unknown number of VC entered the house of Nguyen Thi Tho, led her to vicinity (YD 359510), where they assassinated her. Preliminary investigation revealed that she was the girlfriend of the assistant group leader of the 20th RD Team.
Quang Nam	26Oct69 (Late Entry)	(AT 987624)	On the night of 26 October 1969, an unknown number of VC entered Thai Cam (H) and tore down a tent that had been erected for some refugees. The VC booby trapped the tent by planting an M-26 grenade in its folds. One VN civilian was killed and two wounded when they attempted to reerect the tent.
	30Oct69 (Late Entry)	(BT 033507)	VC entered the Xuyen Hiep refugee area and assassinated a commissioner (nfi) of the local village committee.

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Nam	3Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BT 027638)	A civilian lambretta detonated a VC mine, killing the driver.
	5Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BT 130466)	VC entered Huong Hoa (H) and kidnapped eleven (11) civilians.
	6Nov69 (Late Entry)	(AT 904817)	One civilian was killed and another wounded as a result of VC sniper fire in Quang Nam (H).
	9Nov69	(BT 014719)	An unknown size plastic explosive device exploded in the house of the police security commissioner of Hoa Chau (V), approximately 500 meters south of Hoa Vang (D) Headquarters, resulting in the wife and two children of the commissioner being slightly wounded.
	9Nov69	(BT 161550)	The VC shelled Xuyen Long Refugee Camp with an unknown number of B-40 rockets, wounding five civilians.
	9Nov69	(BT 029740)	VC blew up the home of village committee commissioner, wounding two civilians (nfi).
	9Nov69	(BT 101517)	One civilian was killed and one wounded, in Phuoc My (H), by a VC mine.
	12Nov69	(ZC 175547)	Two VC in green uniforms entered Tinh Dong Tay (H) and killed two Vietnamese civilians. One of the civilians was the father of a PF stationed at Thuong Duc (D) Headquarters.

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Nam	12Nov69	(AT 945576)	A commissioner, of the local land reform sub-committee of Giao-Ia (H), was wounded by VC sniper fire.
	13Nov69	(AT 908576)	An unknown number of VC entered the home of a National Policeman at Aing Hai (H) and attempted to abduct him. The abduction failed. In fleeing the house, the VC dropped a grenade that exploded and wounded two of the Policeman's children.
	15Nov69	(BT 082556)	Dong Khuong (V) received eight rounds of 82mm mortar fire, four rounds of B-40 rocket fire and a ground attack by an estimated squad of VC, resulting in two civilians being killed and 15 civilians wounded. Three houses were destroyed as a result of the attack.
Quang Ngai	8Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BS 665727)	One VC platoon infiltrated Ngoc Dien (H) and made contact with the local PSDF. One local civilian was killed and two wounded as a result of the contact.
	9Nov69	(BS 627724)	The VC shelled the vicinity of Chan Hong School with an unknown number of B-40 rockets. There were negative casualties or damages.
	9Nov69	(BS 717664)	VC entered Kien Khuong (H) and assassinated the hamlet chief's father.
	9Nov69	(BS 363872)	VC entered Dai-An (H) and destroyed two houses (nfi).
	10Nov69	(BS 391511)	VC abducted two civilians as they were cutting wood.

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Ngai	13Nov69	(BS 648718)	VC fired three rounds of B-40 rockets at a technical school. All rounds missed, but did destroy one civilian home in the vicinity of the school.
	13Nov69	(BS 673787)	VC infiltrated Son Quang Refugee Camp and threw grenades, killing three civilians and wounding five.
	13Nov69	(BS 604874)	CAP 1-3-10 was informed by a hamlet chief that several armed VC attempted to collect rice from the villagers. A patrol sent to investigate heard a shot as it approached the area. The patrol found one Vietnamese civilian dead and was told by the villagers that the VC shot him for unknown reasons.

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ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 46-69

1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY

a. There were 59 long range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 9-15 November 1969. These long range patrols reported 71 sightings and 11 contacts totaling 714 enemy. Six hundred forty-four of the 714 enemy were observed within a ten kilometer radius of An Hoa. The contacts and air and artillery missions called by the patrols resulted in 95 enemy KIA.

b. Ranger Team, Killer 11, from the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) at 152300H in the vicinity of YD 142745 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 15 enemy KIA with no friendly casualties.

c. Patrols from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division observed 644 enemy during the reporting period. These observations were made within a 10 kilometer radius of An Hoa. Artillery fire missions called by the patrols resulted in 68 enemy KIA.

d. Americal Division Ranger Teams observed only 13 enemy during the reporting period, but three contacts resulted in eight enemy KIA.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY.

a. In the U.S. DMZ area 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) sensors detected 85 targets during this reporting period. Seventy-five fire missions consisting of 568 rounds of artillery were called in response. On 12 and 13 November 1969 sensors located in the vicinity of XD 920677 indicated almost continuous movement. A VR on 13 November 1969 confirmed heavy trail activity and installation of what appeared to be new land lines leading into the Dong Khi complex located at XD 925655. Sensor activations continued at a high rate during the remainder of this reporting period indicating a possible buildup in this area.

b. Sensors monitored by the 101st Airborne Division (AM) in the DMZ detected 63 targets during the reporting period. Three hundred ninety-eight rounds of artillery were fired in response. Bomb damage assessment was unobserved.

c. During this reporting period sensors located in the Duel Blade II area out of the DMZ detected 96 targets. Seven hundred nine rounds of artillery were fired in response. Sensors located at XD 657534, XD 804-421, XD 764654, XD 735597, and XD 918676 were the most active during this reporting period.

d. In the 1st Marine Division area line sensors located in the 26th

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Marines TAOR were extremely active. This activity is believed to indicate substantial rice gathering operations are still in progress by the enemy. RF sensors in the 7th Marines TAOR were also active during the reporting period. Both line sensors and RF sensors combined detected 43 targets. Bomb damage assessment confirmed three enemy KIA, three enemy WIA, and one sampan sunk as a direct result of sensor detections during the reporting period. A reconnaissance of the area in the vicinity of AT 881808 on 15 November after a fire mission in response to a line sensor detection found scattered rice, blood trails, and drag marks.

e. Americal Division sensors detected 20 targets during this reporting period and fired 14 missions. The enemy activity was concentrated on the main supply and infiltration routes. The sensors located on the approaches to the Fire Support Bases and Installations were inactive. Overall sensor activity in the Americal TAOR decreased slightly this reporting period. Sensor detected movement on the supply routes throughout the TAOR continues at a reduced rate while movement detected in the coastal plain area was minimal.

f. Tight Jaw

(1) The 1st ARVN Division sensors detected 18 targets and fired 14 missions in response. Bomb damage assessment was unobserved. Sensor detected activity decreased toward the end of the reporting period in comparison to the beginning of the period.

(2) The 2d ARVN Division sensors detected five targets and fired five missions in response. On 9 November 1969 sensors located at BS 552-633 detected a platoon size unit. An artillery fire mission was called resulting in two enemy KIA.

(3) The 51st ARVN Regiment sensors detected one target during the reporting period. This occurred on 13 November 1969 in the vicinity of AT 994604. An artillery fire mission was called resulting in two enemy KIA.

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ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO III MAF PERINTREP 46-69

A. REGISTERED MAIL

DIR, NSA	3	NILO HUE, BOX 9, AT-3, APO 96258	1
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1	NILO QUANG TRI, BOX 16, AT-19,	
CMC (ABQ)	2	APO 96495	1
CG FMFPAC	2		
CG USAFV	1		
CG I FFORCEV	5		
CG II FFORCEV	1		
CG 25TH INF DIV	1		
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1		
CG MCDEC	1		
CG 5TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CAL	6		
CG 4TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CAL	1		
CG 3RD MAW	2		
CO 5TH SFG (AEN)	2		
CO "B" 5TH USSF GROUP (AEN)	5		
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1		
CO MCB 3	1		
CO MCB 6	1		
CO MCB 7	1		
CO MCB 8	1		
CO MCB 10	1		
CO MCB 11	1		
CO MCB 53	1		
CO MCB 58	1		
CO MCB 62	1		
CO MCB 71	1		
CO MCB 133	1		
CO USS REPOSE	1		
CO USS SANCTUARY	1		
CO MHTG-30, MCAF, SANTA ANA,			
CALIF 92709	1		
DSA II CORPS	1		
CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GRP,			
7TH FLEET	1		
CMDR, 19TH CI TM, CAMPEN, CAL	1		
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1		
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1		
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2		
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1		
CTF 76	1		
CO USASSD ACSI DA (ATTN DOD SPEC-			
REP) MACV APO SF 96222	4		
HQ, 12TH TAC FTR WING (ATTN ARMY			
GRD LIAISON OFF) APO SF 96326	1		
NILO CHU LAI, NAVAL ADVISOR, BOX			
210, NSAD FPO 96696	1		
NILO, HOI AN, DRAWER 18, ADVISORY			
TEAM 15, APO 96349	1		

B. BY COURIER

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232) (CIED)	2
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2
CICV	2
CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN	10
CG 1ST MARDIV DNG RVN	40
CG 3D MARDIV DGH RVN	26
CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN	30
CG 101ST AEN DIV (AM) CEA RVN	20
CG 1ST MAW DNG RVN	30
CG 2D BDE ROKMC HAN RVN	7
CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CG USASUPCOM DNG RVN	1
CG 173D AVN BDE	2
CG FORLOG CMD DNG RVN	5
CG 1ST LOG CMD LEN	2
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHL RVN	3
CO 30 NCR	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GRP (AEN)	17
CO 1ST CAG	1
CO 3RD CAG	1
CO 4TH CAG	1
CO 1ST BN, 525TH MI DET	25
CO 517TH MI DET	1
CO MCB 40	1
CO MCB 121	1
CO 4TH PSYOP GRP	1
DSA I CORPS	11
CMDR, 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SGN RVN	3
COMNAVFORV	1
COMNAVSPACT DNG RVN	2
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2
OSA/EMB SGN RVN	1
DET B, 1ST MIBARS	1
CLB	1

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CTG 76.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTF 115	1
7TH AIR FORCE (IGS) BDOC	1
45TH ENGR GRP	1
620TH TCS APO 96203	1
366TH AIR SEC SQD, USAF	2
620TH TSC	1
SPO-SEC CMD QHN RVN	1

C. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (WITHIN HQ, III MAF)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP Cofs, PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	43
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (C/O G-3)	2
2D ROKMC BDE LIAISON OFFICER	1
PSYOPS	5
1ST RADIO BN	11
HORN DASC	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO	1

D. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

CO 1ST MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 3RD MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 2ND CAG	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
HQ 212TH CMBT AVN BN	6
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
CTG 115.1	1
CCN	1
USNAD	1
DIR CAP	1
7TH PSYOP BN	1
1ST FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
3RD FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
CO MCB 74	1

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NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

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MEF 0130069

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X-ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE
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B-FOR COMPLIANCE
C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE

OF _____
D-FOR COMMENT
E-FOR RECOMMENDATION

F-FOR CONCURRENCE
G-FOR INFORMATION
H-RETURN TO _____
I- _____
J-DISPOSITION _____

DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS

(AGENCY HAVING PRIMARY INTEREST COMPLETE)

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P.R. to Dist after Routing

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE		INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
		IN	OUT		
					COMMANDANT
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
					G-3
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
					JOINT CONTROL
					COUNSEL
					WOMEN MATRONS
					STAFF DENTAL
					STAFF MEDICAL
					STAFF CHAPLAIN
					CLASSIFIED FILES

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
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SOUTH VIETNAM

**Periodic
Intelligence
Report 4**

UNITED STATES MARINES
UNITED STATES ARMY



GROUP - 4
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HQ III MAF, G-2
 DANANG, RVN
 25 November 1969
 Ser: 0130069

PERINTREP 47-69

Period covered: 160001H - 222400H November 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, ND 48-13
 ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. Most indicators of enemy activity registered increases last week. Incoming rounds for ICTZ totaled 537, an increase of 105 rounds from last week. There was a decline in KIA's however, with the total dropping by 63 to 1171. This is still the second highest number of KIA's registered since the week ending 23 August 1969. Enemy initiated ground incidents showed a corresponding decline with a decrease of 34, down to 205 for the week. There was a sharp increase in the numbers of PW's, up by 107 for a total of 255; ARVN forces accounted for 236 while FwMAF took 19. This is the highest number of PW's recorded since the week of 21 December 1968, when 312 were captured. A corresponding rise in the number of Hoi Chanhs was noticed as well, an increase of 163 for a new total of 287, the highest on record.

Reported VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities reflected continued adherence to the tactics of the past several months. No significant change in the scope or intensity of reported activities was discernible, however major difficulties regarding implementation of enemy plans continued to be revealed.

Despite concerted emphasis on the propaganda exploitation of anti-war dissent in the U.S.; the rising prices of commodities in RVN particularly food; travel restrictions; military conscription; and various war damages; enemy plans to instigate widespread dissent and political struggles against the GVN have failed to materialize.

Captured documents, PW and rallier reports continue to reveal the effectiveness of GVN/Allied security and pacification programs in limiting the operational range of VCI cadre and their access to the populace, thereby denying the material and political support the enemy must obtain to accomplish his planned objectives.

Liberation Radio, in an unusual admission of growing difficulties recently revealed that the pacification program in conjunction with other "demagogic tricks" such as "strengthened PSYWAR, open-arms, surrender motivating efforts, and organized spy networks have caused and are causing our people and cadre many new difficulties in their

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daily life, tasks, and combat". Although VC forces were said to have "continually defeated the enemy's pacification operations," the broadcast in effect, warned the people to prepare for a prolonged struggle.

a. QUANG TRI (P). Action in QUANG TRI Province was light last week, confined to the area south of the DMZ and north of DONG HA - CAM LO segment of Route 9. There were three attacks by fire in this area early in the week, directed against 1/5 Mechanized Brigade and ARVN units.

Ground action was sporadic and light; however, interrogation of PW's taken substantiates the presence of the 27th Regiment operating in the area, with one battalion at a time rotating south of the DMZ for periods of about one month. Friendly initiated contacts between the 16th and 19th of November, all in the area north of Route 9, resulted in five PW's, two from the 27th Regiment, two from the 31st Regiment and one from the CAM LO District Armed Unit. Sweeps of the area have uncovered bunkers, a cache of 440X82mm mortar rounds and other ordnance, 55 enemy bodies killed previously, and involved contacts in which a total of an additional 16 enemy were KIA. Other actions resulted in one US helicopter shot down by automatic weapons fire (YD 110700) on the 16th, while three ARVN APC's from 2/7 ACAT hit mines (approximately seven kilometers northwest of DONG HA) on 18 November.

b. THUA THIEN (P). There was no significant activity reported in THUA THIEN Province during the past week, which lends credence to PW and returnee interrogations indicating that enemy forces in the area are remaining out of contact, concentrating on gathering rice, organizing the VC Infrastructure and reconnoitering ARVN and US operations in the area.

Another attempt to mine the DANANG-HUE Railroad was thwarted last week when two Vietnamese boys reported finding a rail mine (ZD 0701) on 14 November. The device, consisting of 12-15 pounds of C-4 in a sandbag, was subsequently disarmed by EOD personnel.

Documents captured by the 101st Airborne Division have added further evidence that the K.4C Battalion, 4th Regiment is located in the TROUI Mountain area of PHU LOC District (YC 9496). In a 66 page notebook kept by a member of the battalion from 13 February 1968 to early November 1969, an entry dated 31 October 1969 revealed the location of the battalion and graphically described the near combat ineffectiveness of the unit due to hunger, sickness, continual combat failure, and the results of ambushes and artillery. In addition, it states that the unit's morale has deteriorated, as has the effectiveness of its unit commanders. While further intelligence is required to confirm this information, this document suggests that the capability of the K.4C Battalion to conduct successful combat operations at the present time may be quite limited.

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c. QUANG NAM (P). Friendly initiated activity dominated the action in QUANG NAM Province during the past week. Activity continued in the QUE SON Mountains, as elements of the 7th Marines on 20 November discovered large caches of rice, ordnance, and a hospital identified as the 78th Hospital, Front 4, in caves eight kilometers northwest of QUE SON (AT 961 394). Two caves contained weapons and ordnance while the third included the hospital and associated medical equipment. The major items captured included five late model Soviet flame-throwers, a 12.7mm AA gun, 425 rounds of mortar, RR and RPG ammunition, over 40,000 rounds of .50 caliber and 7.62 ammunition and 800 pounds of rice, probably belonging to the 36th NVA Regiment. Early in the reporting period ARVN and RF units engaged enemy forces south of HOI AN, registering large numbers of KIA's and PW's. On 16 November the 1st/23d RF Group engaged an unknown size enemy force six kilometers south of HOI AN (BT 145505) resulting in 62 enemy KIA and 45 PW's, probably from the V.25 MF Battalion. On the 17th, the 161st RF Company and 3/17th ACAT contacted another unknown size enemy force nine kilometers south of HOI AN (BT 140480). The engagement netted 37 VC KIA's and 42 PW's, again probably from the V.25 MF Battalion. During the same period, on 17 November, elements of the 3d ROKMC Battalion discovered 20 bodies (BT 190491) killed by artillery approximately two days previous.

Interrogation of PW's indicates that the enemy may be planning to conduct more active and larger scale operations in the lowlands than he has in the recent past. A PW (BT 143480) from the V.25 MF Battalion stated that the future mission of his unit was to combine with the R.20 MF Battalion for future attacks on HOI AN and DIEN BAN, while another prisoner, a sergeant from the 703d Communication Battalion stated that the 3d Infantry Battalion, QUANG DA Special Zone, had been deactivated and its elements used as replacements for III VC District Forces, DIEN BAN local force units, and the 36th NVA Infantry Regiment. Another PW captured eight kilometers south of HOI AN (BT 170485) claimed to be from the T.89 Main Force Sapper Battalion which he stated had moved to the lowlands to operate in conjunction with local force units.

In scattered friendly initiated actions located generally north of AN HOA throughout the week, 76 enemy were killed in nine separate actions with negligible friendly casualties or damage.

d. QUANG TIN (P). Action in QUANG TIN Province, particularly in the eastern THANG BINH/BARRIER ISLAND area, has resulted in a substantial number of enemy kills and PW's. In addition, reports indicating that the enemy is suffering from lack of food and medical supplies verify the success of the aggressive search and clear operations being carried out. ARVN operation LIEN KET 531, being conducted in an area seven kilometers northeast of THANG BINH has resulted in over 510 KIA's and 100 PW's, with negligible friendly casualties. The increased movement of enemy forces in the lowlands is attributed to rice gathering operations as the enemy attempts to build his stockpiles for future operations. This effort has gained increased importance as friendly forces have captured over 13 tons of rice in the area during the past week. Eastward movement of units towards the lowlands has

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been sighted in QUANG TIN, as was the case in QUANG NAM Province. PW interrogations and statements of Hoi Chanhs indicate that the 70th Main Force Battalion, 72d Local Force Battalion and 76th Local Force Sapper Battalion are moving from the piedmont and are returning to their normal AO's in the coastal lowlands of THANG BINH and BARRIER ISLAND.

The remaining action in QUANG TIN Province was primarily friendly initiated with ARVN, RF and PF units engaging small enemy units focused mostly in an area five to ten kilometers west-southwest of TAM KY. This action resulted in over 80 enemy KIA's with very light friendly casualties.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). The pattern of successful friendly initiated contacts and the discovery of large caches of rice was evident also in QUANG NGAI Province this week. In numerous widely scattered incidents, ARVN, RF and PF units killed more than 80 enemy, while US units located over 21 tons of rice. The largest amount, being collected over a period of several days (11 kilometers southeast of MO BUC), amounted to 15 tons. Increased numbers of Hoi Chanhs and PW's indicate that the shortage of food and the success of friendly search and clear operations may be having an adverse effect on the enemy's morale. Initial interrogation indicates that many of the PW's were on rice gathering missions when captured.

Reports this past week also indicated that the 2d NVA Regiment has moved into northern BINH DINH Province to participate in attacks which are part of the Winter-Spring offensive, but will return to QUANG NGAI near the end of the year. PW's from the 3d NVA Division have now stated that the entire 3d Division Headquarters, and its supporting elements as well, have also moved south across the border into BINH DINH Province.

The pattern of reinforcement of local force units continues in QUANG NGAI Province. Reports from a variety of sources have given some evidence of a build-up of the 48th Local Force Battalion by the C.21 Sapper Company, 506th Sapper Company and the 81st Local Force Company in the SON TINH District in preparation for an attack on QUANG NGAI City in the future.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. Activity in ICTZ during the past week was characterized by friendly initiated contacts and meeting engagements principally between ARVN, RF, and PF units and varying sized enemy elements. It is significant that major NVA units are remaining out of contact with the exception of the area south of the DMZ in northern QUANG TRI Province. It is most probable that they are preparing for later phases of the Winter-Spring Campaign, while the brunt of the current action is being taken by local and main force units.

Meanwhile the enemy's loss of large caches of rice, ordnance and other supplies in QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN Provinces during the past week will probably have an adverse effect on the scope and intensity of enemy activities during coming weeks.

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On the other hand, if the enemy has planned to use this material during later phases of the Winter-Spring Campaign, he may be forced to undertake an increased logistics effort to replace these losses or be forced to cancel or reduce some of his future operations.

In any event, in the absence of positive indications of stepped-up operations in the very near future, it is estimated that major NVA/VC units will continue to regroup and retrain during the coming week while efforts to gather and stockpile rice continue. At the same time, with the exception of the DMZ, enemy contacts most likely will be with VC units presently operating in the coastal lowlands.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased from 223 to 239 for the week of 16-22 November. These incidents consisted of four ground attacks (none of which was company size or larger and four platoon size or smaller), three ambushes, eight attacks by fire, 106 harassing fire incidents, 49 mining and booby trap incidents, four hamlet harassment incidents, six assassination incidents, no espionage incidents, four kidnapping incidents, 17 propaganda incidents and four sabotage incidents.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. - g. Negative
- h. Air Defense. AA fire decreased from 96 to 78 incidents for the reporting period and 22 aircraft sustained hits.
- i. - j. Negative
- k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 16-22 November.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Expendeds</u>
82mm Mortar	395
81mm Mortar	5
60mm Mortar	127
Unk Cal Mortar	3
140mm Rocket	2
122mm Rocket	5
	<u>537</u>

- l. - q. Negative
- r. Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.

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s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant enemy caches were captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 16-22 November 1969:

(a) 18 November: A/3-21st Infantry, 196th Brigade, captured a rice cache near QUE SON (BT 099315) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
20,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This cache was found stored in urns and in the walls of huts. All the rice was usable and was evacuated to NUI LOC SON for distribution to refugees.

(b) 19 November: D/1-20th Infantry, 11th Brigade, captured a rice cache in the vicinity of DUC PHO (BS 795458) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
43,520 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This cache was found under floors of huts and buried in the sand. The rice was stored in 55 gallon barrels, baskets, bins and plastic bags. All the rice was usable and evacuated to LZ BRONCO to await future distribution.

(c) 19 November: C/1/7 Marines captured a rice cache in the vicinity of (AT 961392) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
5,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

(d) 20 November: C/1/7 Marines captured an ordnance cache in the vicinity of (AT 961391) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
182 EA	USSR	82mm Mortar Rounds
11 EA	USSR	60mm Mortar Rounds

This cache was found in a cave in good condition. All the ordnance was destroyed due to lack of available transportation.

(e) 20 November: B/1/7 Marines captured a weapons cache in the vicinity of (AT 961394) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
4 EA	USSR	Flame-throwers

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This cache was found in a cave in usable condition. All of the flame-throwers were forwarded to the Regimental Headquarters.

(f) 20 November: D/1-52 Infantry, 198th Brigade, captured a rice cache vicinity (BS 565802) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
6,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This cache was found hidden in hedgerows and stored in six 55 gallon barrels, 24 bags and eight baskets. All of the rice was in good condition and was evacuated to SON TINH District Headquarters.

(g) 20 November: C/1/7 Marines captured a weapons and ordnance cache in the vicinity of (AT 961391) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
1 EA	USSR	12.7 AA MG
1 EA	USSR	122mm Mortar Round
3 EA	USSR	AK-47's
3 EA	USSR	SKS's
69 EA	USSR	RPG Rounds
132 EA	USSR	82mm Mortar Rounds
2 EA	USSR	75mm RR Rounds
38,556 EA	USSR	7.62mm Rounds
860 EA	USSR	.50 Cal Rounds

This cache was found in a cave in good condition. The contents of this cache were forwarded to Regimental Headquarters.

(h) 21 November: C/1/7 Marines captured a weapons and ordnance cache in the vicinity of (AT 962392) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
20 EA	USSR	AK-47's
96 EA	CHICOM	Grenades
100 EA	USSR	82mm Mortar Rounds

This cache was found in a cave in usable condition. The weapons were evacuated to the Regimental Headquarters and the ammunition was destroyed.

(i) 21 November: C/1/7 Marines captured a weapons and ordnance cache in the vicinity of (AT 962392) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
1 EA	USSR	Flame-thrower

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
5 EA	USSR	AK-47's
90 EA	USSR	RPG Rounds
3 EA	USSR	82mm Mortar Rounds
11 EA	USSR	60mm Mortar Rounds
756 EA	USSR	7.62mm Rounds

This cache was found in a cave in usable condition and evacuated to the Regimental Headquarters.

(j) 21 November: B/1/7 Marines captured a weapons and ordnance cache in the vicinity of (AT 965391) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
20 EA	USSR	AK-47's
1 EA	USSR	RPG-7's
19 EA	USSR	RPG Rounds
3,150 EA	CHICOM	Grenades
32 EA	USSR	82mm Mortar Rounds
65 EA	USSR	60mm Mortar Rounds

This cache was found in a cave in usable condition. The weapons were evacuated to the Regimental Headquarters and the ammunition was destroyed.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 16-22 November:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, Rocket Ammunition

<u>Type</u>	<u>Amount</u>
82mm Mortar	610
60mm Mortar	169
155mm Artillery	2
105mm Artillery	2
140mm Rocket	2
122mm Rocket	3
75mm RR	2
57mm RR	1
TOTAL	<u>791</u>

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	343
Crew-Served Weapons	25

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 16-22 November:

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
16 Nov	(BT 093472)	2,500	F/2/7
16 Nov	(BT 065303)	800	D/3/21
16 Nov	(BS 328667)	1,100	A-104
16 Nov	(YC 943991)	660	L/54
17 Nov	(BT 097315)	350	A/3/21
17 Nov	(BT 098317)	1,000	A/3/21
17 Nov	(BS 454796)	90	D/1/52
17 Nov	(BS 455795)	1,200	D/1/52
17 Nov	(AT 850482)	1,675	D/1/5
17 Nov	(AT 802544)	1,625	F/2/5
17 Nov	(BT 125417)	3,600	H/2/7
18 Nov	(AT 984604)	15	K/3/1
18 Nov	(BT 095475)	50	F/2/7
18 Nov	(AT 827533)	325	F/2/5
18 Nov	(AT 827533)	1,000 (Food)	F/2/5
18 Nov	(AT 829538)	2,200	A/1/5
18 Nov	(BT 098316)	1,000	A/3/21
18 Nov	(BT 099315)	20,000	A/3/21
18 Nov	(BS 511822)	500	RCN/1/52
19 Nov	(AT 961392)	4,500	C/1/7
19 Nov	(BS 513817)	700	A/1/52
19 Nov	(BS 560803)	800	D/2/52
19 Nov	(BS 795458)	43,520	D/1/20
20 Nov	(AT 961394)	100	B/1/7
20 Nov	(AT 961394)	25 (Salt)	B/1/7
20 Nov	(AT 878520)	550	H&S/2/5
20 Nov	(AT 961691)	700	C/1/7
20 Nov	(BT 099319)	3,500	C/3/21
20 Nov	(BS 565802)	6,000	D/1/52
21 Nov	(BS 663991)	125	CAP 1-3-3
21 Nov	(AT 851514)	600	D/1/5
21 Nov	(AT 915496)	400	L/3/5
21 Nov	(AT 965394)	1,300	B/1/7
21 Nov	(AT 988334)	1,200	K/2/7
21 Nov	(BT 095323)	1,800	B/3/21
21 Nov	(BS 588842)	50	198th Bde, H/17 Cav
21 Nov	(BS 461768)	800	D/3/1
21 Nov	(BS 461768)	40 (Salt)	D/3/1
21 Nov	(BS 582578)	2,200	L/4 ARVN
22 Nov	(AT 879526)	100	H&S/2/5
22 Nov	(AT 879526)	50 (Tobacco)	H&S/2/5
22 Nov	(AT 915496)	1,800	L/3/5
22 Nov	(AT 932674)	175	D/1/26
22 Nov	(AT 930180)	100	L/3/5
22 Nov	(BT 100368)	2,000	E/2/7
	Total Rice	111,710	
	Total Food	1,000	
	Total Salt	40	
	Total Tobacco	50	

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t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	101	Structures Damaged	43
Bunkers Destroyed	46	Bunkers Damaged	4
Secondary Explosions	23	Secondary Fires	31
Bridges Damaged	1		

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ decreased in comparison to the previous week. There were 1,171 KIA's, 249 VC PW's, six NVA PW's, and 237 Hoi Chanh's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	<u>QUANG TRI</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature				
High	85	88	85	86
Low	64	66	72	72
Rainfall (total)	3.11	3.08	1.45	.83
Winds (knots)	7	9	7	8
Visibility (miles)	6	6	8	7

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 22-28 November 1969

(a) General. Northeasterly winds are expected to continue over the Republic of Vietnam throughout the week. Periodic surges in the flow will keep poor weather over most of the area.

(b) ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the period is cloudy with ceilings ranging from 500 to 2,500 feet. Winds will occasionally gust as high as 30 knots during the week. Precipitation in ICTZ will be approximately one to three inches with isolated instances of three to five inches.

j. - l. Negative

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4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire, limited ground attacks and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone, with emphasis on the pacification effort.

b. Conduct terrorism against selected GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following courses of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to four infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(3) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with the equivalent of up to six infantry regiments supported by three rocket battalions and four sapper battalions.

(5) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with six infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and two artillery battalions.

(6) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of four infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and two artillery battalions.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to four infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

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g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's, and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Continuing shortages of food and medical supplies coupled with sickness and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.



J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE

ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS,
AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z.

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 47-69 AS OF 222400H NOVEMBER 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

I CORPS						DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL				
NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA				
NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	
UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-hq	1	650				1	650			1	650	
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue								1	855	1	855	
Front HQ's	2	750				2	750	1	UNK	3	750	
Div HQ's	2	565				2	565	1	580	3	1,145	
Regt HQ's	10	2,960	2	535		12	3,495	16	7,480	28	10,975	
Bn's-Maneuver	38	9,105	13	2,105	3	655	54	11,865	44	18,455	98	30,320
Bn's-Support	16	4,130	2	370	1	195	19	4,695	10	2,480	29	7,175
Separate Co's	1	130			31	2,225	32	2,355	1		32	2,360
TOTAL CONFIRMED		18,290		3,010		3,075	24,375		29,850		54,225	
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's								1	285	1	285	
Bn's-Maneuver	3	830	1	350	1	190	5	1,370	1	455	6	1,825
Bn's-Support	5	1,335					5	1,335	4	1,145	9	2,480
Separate Co's	1	90			2	150	3	240			3	240
TOTAL PROBABLE		2,255		350		340	2,945		1,885		4,830	
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD)								1	150	1	150	
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's								1	350	1	350	
Regt HQ's								2	800	2	1,800	
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support	1	300					1	300	17	4,950	18	5,250
Separate Co's								3	440	3	440	
TOTAL POSSIBLE									6,690		6,990	

20,845

3,360

3,415

27,620

38,425

66,045

See note #4 on page A-17

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		<u>NVA</u>	<u>MF/VC</u>	<u>LF/VC</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
<u>QUANG TRI</u>	Confirmed	3,110		35	3,145
	Probable	345			345
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,455</u>		<u>35</u>	<u>3,490</u>
<u>THUA THIEN</u>	Confirmed	3,350		475	3,825
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,350</u>		<u>475</u>	<u>3,825</u>
<u>QUANG NAM</u>	Confirmed	5,030	1,180	550	6,760
	Probable	1,005	350		1,355
	Possible	300			300
	TOTAL	<u>6,335</u>	<u>1,530</u>	<u>550</u>	<u>8,415</u>
<u>QUANG TIN</u>	Confirmed	2,665	625	650	3,940
	Probable	380		265	645
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,045</u>	<u>625</u>	<u>915</u>	<u>4,585</u>
<u>QUANG NGAI</u>	Confirmed	4,135	1,205	1,365	6,705
	Probable	525		15	540
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>4,660</u>	<u>1,205</u>	<u>1,440</u>	<u>7,305</u>

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by Type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

I CORPS																DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS				
MANUEVER	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL											
	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	32	0		32	10			10	3			3	45			45	35	7		42	80	7		87
SAPPER		3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	1	2		3		7		17
TOTAL																								
MANUEVER	38	3		41	13	1		14	3	1		4	54	5		59	36	9		45	90	14		104
COMBAT																								
SUPPORT																								
ARTY	6	2	1	9	1			1	1			1	8	2	1	11	2	3	10	15	10	5	11	26
MORT	1			1												1	1			1				2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	5
RR	1			1									1			1				1				1
AT																			1	1			1	1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		2	3	2	1	2	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1								1
TOTAL	16	5	1	22	2			2	1			1	19	5		24	8		22	30	27	9	23	59
SUPPORT																								
TOTAL																								
MANUEVER																								
SUPPORT	54	8	1	63	15			16	4	1		5	73	10	1	84	44	13	22	79	117	23	23	163

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	<u>QUANG TRI</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>THUA THIEN</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG NAM</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG TIN</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG NGAI</u>	<u>STR</u>
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	269	Nam Hoa	50	Hoa Vang	812	Thang Binh	940	Binh Son	311
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	56	Hieu Duc	50	Tam Ky	449	Son Tinh	474
	Trien Phong	113	Hong Dien	69	Dien Ban	1,090	Ly Tin	115	Tu Nghia	437
	Cam Lo	150	Vinh Loc	43	Dai Loc	341	Hiep Duc	208	Nghia Hanh	336
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	251	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	279	Mo Duc	453
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	333	Hau Duc	172	Duc Pho	463
	Huong Hoa	5	Phu Vang	11	Que Son	943			Tra Bong	166
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	107	Duy Xuyen	1,065			Ba To	197
			Huong Thuy	77	Hieu Nhon	291			Minh Long	14
			Phong Dien	529					Son Ha	170
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	917	THUA THIEN	1,239	QUANG NAM	5,045	QUANG TIN	2,163	QUANG NGAI	3,021

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,385

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6. Order of Battle listing.

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th AT Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,035		
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	570	Unlocated	XD 8337/18Jun69
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,645		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	575	Unlocated	XD 8723/3Jul69
4th Bn	NVA	C	325	Unlocated	XD 8754/26Jun69
5th Bn	NVA	C	370	Unlocated	XD 8632/29Jun69
6th Bn	NVA	C	375	Unlocated	XD 8754/26Jun69
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	

*See note #4 on page A-17

**See note #2 on page A-17

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DMZ/NVN/IACS (continued)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
4th Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300		
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH Special Zone	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	300		
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,200	BA 611	
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	285	BA 611	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	315	BA 611	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
17th Sig Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
19th DKZ Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	

YD 0565/22Apr69

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,715		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	405	Unloc N of DMZ	
1st Bn	NVA	C	400	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0363/21Apr69
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	455	Unloc N of DMZ	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc N of DMZ	YD 0566/22May69
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,805		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	410	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9963/17May69
4th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 9862/17May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	XD 8826/15Jun68
6th Bn	NVA	C	465	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,800		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	435	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
7th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
8th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
9th Bn	NVA	C	455	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	
138th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	505	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	455	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1675/24Oct68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	
270th Regt	NVA	C	1,785		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	YD 2474/8Jun69
4th Bn	NVA	C	485	Vic YD 1782	YD 1873/16May69
5th Bn	NVA	C	465	Vic YD 1782	
6th Bn	NVA	C	435	Vic YD 1782	YD 1970/18Jun69
27th Regt	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0562/27Mar69
1st Bn	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1267/24Sep69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	350	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1365/28Jul69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0463/1May69
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,030		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	YD 1765/13Oct69
27th Bn	NVA	C	190	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 1775/7Nov69
15th Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0264/7Jun69

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,955	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Regt Hq	NVA	C	710	VINH LINH Special Zone	
1st Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	XD 9661/5Sep69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	375	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 0063/7Aug69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500	VINH LINH Special Zone	
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH Special Zone	YD 2167/17Jun69
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH Special Zone	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ	NVA	C	1,525	Unlocated	
Tri-Thien-Hue MR HQ (FWD)	NVA	PO	150	Unlocated	
6th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,850		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YD 0309	YD 3011/13May69
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	YD 6823/23Aug68
9th Regt	NVA	C	1,880		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 9716/3Jun68
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	480	Unlocated	
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4594/14Apr69
29th Regt	NVA	C	1,940		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	640	BA 611	YC 4094/15Jun69
7th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
8th Bn	NVA	C	400	BA 611	YC 3298/20May69
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	BA 611	
803rd Regt	NVA	C	1,570		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4517/19May68
1st Bn	NVA	C	415	Unlocated	YD 5521/22May68
2nd Bn	NVA	C	440	Unlocated	YD 2763/4Mar68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	215	Unlocated	YD 3300/15Jul69
812th Regt (-)	NVA	C	1,400		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	
4th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4339/15Aug68
5th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	YD 4368/29Aug68

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
246th Regt	NVA	C	1,565		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	YD 1259/11Jul69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	325	XD 9265	XD 8362/60Oct69
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	XD 8637/27 Jul68
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	300	XD 8854	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049	
7th Front	NVA	C	1,370		
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	YD 4541/16Oct69
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	YD 1943/8Sep69
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	YD 1726/20Jul69
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	175	YD 3339	YD 2630/25Jul69
* K-34 Arty Bn. MRTTH	NVA	C	240	Vic YD 2730	
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	105	Vic YD 3535	YD 2540/17Sep69

*See note #3 on page A-17

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
TRI-THIEN-HUE Mil Region					
4th Regt	NVA	C	880		
Rdgt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	270	Vic ZC 1597	ZD 1901/19Jun69
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	260	Vic YC 9694	YD 9704/17Jun69
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,410		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	Vic PHU VANG/3Jul68
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	330	Vic YD 7900	YC 6375/12May69
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	160	Vic YD 6514	YD 6019/6Sep69
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	YD 9716/31Jun68
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	YD 6920/17Jul69
*K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	YD 4339/15Aug68
806th Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	350	Vic YD 3304	YD 5226/8Sep69
K.12 Sapper Bn, 6th Regt	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	YD 3507/13May69
*K.35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	
C.113 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 4032	YD 5041/25Mar68
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	YD 6234/13Sep68
C.115 Co	LF	C	65	Vic YD 6623	YD 6655/19Mar68
C.116 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 8420	YD 8321/29Sep68
Phu Loc Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	ZD 1401/8Jan69

*See note #3 on page A-17

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE					
<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
Front 4	NVA	C	UNK		
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	ZC 1341	
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Vic Base Area 112	
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	Vic AT 9656	
577th Rocket Bn	NVA	C	305	AT 8042	
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	
Hai Van Engr Bn	NVA	PR	200	AT 8686	AT 9192/25Feb69
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	C	90	AT 8990	
31st Regt	NVA	C	1,005		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	AT 8964/11Apr69
102d Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
103d Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	AT 9774/12Aug69
36th Regt	NVA	C	610		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	165	AT 9737	BT 0450/10Dec68
1st Bn	NVA	C	135	AT 9737	BT 0170/23Feb69
2d Bn	NVA	C	155	AT 9737	AT 9353/6Aug68
3d Bn	NVA	C	135	BT 1252	BT 0458/10Dec68
90th Regt	NVA	C	1,065		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	ZC 1835	ZC 1945/50Oct69
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1835	AT 8550/13Aug69
141st Regt	NVA	C	1,155		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	365	YC 8360	AT 8355/21Apr69
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	YC 8360	AT 8355/21Apr69
2d Bn	NVA	C	240	YC 8360	AT 8754/10May69
3d Bn	NVA	C	305	YC 8360	AT 8355/21Apr69
573d Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	Unlocated	
575th Rocket Bn	NVA	PR	300	ZC 1960	

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	685		
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
40th Bn	MF	C	175	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
60th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	AT 9925/12Aug69
90th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	BT 2514/25Sep68
R.20 Bn	MF	C	145	BT 0763	BT 1066/12Aug69
V.25 Bn	MF	C	130	BT 1851	BT 1752/10May69
D.3 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	BT 0458/10Dec68
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	100	AT 9856	AT 9967/12May69
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	AT 8747/17Jun69
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752	BT 0465/23Feb69
Q.81 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1053	
Q.82 Co	LF	C	115	BT 0059	
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057	
Q.84 Co	LF	C	45	AT 9069	AT 9870/23Feb69
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536	

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	
2nd NVA Div*	NVA	C	3,955		
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 0939/27May67
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	BT 1823/5Jun68
GK.32 AT Bn (75mm RR)	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	AT 9221/14Jun68
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	AT 8016/7Dec67
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BT 1322/11Jun69
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	BS 2444/20Oct67
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	648		BT 0409/24Sep68
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	AT 9226	
1st Bn	NVA	C	160	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
2nd Bn	NVA	C	175	AT 9226	BT 0232/4Jun68
3rd Bn	NVA	C	175	AT 9226	AT 9925/12Aug69
70th Bn	MF	C	175	BT 1623	BT 2340/12Aug69
72nd Bn	LF	C	175	BT 1917	BT 2331/8Jun69
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	195	BT 2113	BT 2208/31May68
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	190	BT 2217	BT 3127/12May69
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 3304	BT 2331/8Jun69
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	250	BT 3001	
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4213	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	65	BT 4801	BT 4801/7Feb68
V.15 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1735	BT 3021/23Apr68
V.18 Co	LF	PR	75	BT 2315	
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212	

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
38th Bn	LF	C	190	BS 6858	BS 7060/11May69
48th Bn	LF	C	290	BS 7180	BS 6474/15Jun69
120th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 3975	BS 6169/25Feb69
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	125	BS 4677	BS 5279/20Oct69
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	165	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	680		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	
60th Bn	NVA	C	150	BS 4386	AT 8439/27Feb69
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	AT 8550/11Sep68
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4386	BS 4786/13Sep69
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167	BS 6566/25Feb69
C.17 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7562	BS 5373/9Nov67
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566	BS 6567/28Dec67
C.219 Co	LF	C	55	BS 8137	BS 8344/9Jun68
T.20 Co	LF	C	65	BS 7080	BS 6573/1Feb68
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491	BS 6092/17Nov68
C.19 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7555	BS 7559/17Oct69
C.120 Co	LF	C	45	BS 8537	
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270	
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568	
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	PR	75	BS 6689	
81st Co	LF	C	65	BS 5676	BS 6474/15Jun69
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172	BS 6568/23Aug68
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674	BS 6474/15Jun69
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 5596	
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090	BS 6092/16Dec68

*See note #2 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI (P) (continued)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
3rd NVA Div*	NVA	C	5,615		
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	BS 2550/17Jul68
2nd VC Regt	MF	C	870		
Regt Hq	MF	C	345	BS 7825	BS 6076/26Aug69
93rd Bn	MF	C	180	BS 7825	BS 8331/13Aug69
95th Bn	MF	C	180	BS 7825	BS 8234/22Jun69
97th Bn	MF	C	165	BS 7825	BS 6076/26Sep68
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980		
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 4741	BS 5262/27May69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 5542	BS 6337/13Aug69
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 4543	BS 6337/13Aug69
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6546	BS 5262/27May69
90th Engr Bn, 3d Div	NVA	C	325	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	BS 8512/28May68
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	BS 8069/2Jan68
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	BS 6337/13Aug69

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UNIT

18th NVA Regt
Regt Hq
8th Bn
9th Bn

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>
NVA	C
NVA	C
NVA	C
NVA	C

<u>EST</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
	1,700
	520
	440
	300

BINH DINH PROVINCE *

CURRENT
PROBABLE LOCATION

BR 7363
BR 5950
BR 5929

LOCATION/DATE
LAST CONTACT

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*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 150001H TO 222400H November 1969.

a. No significant changes.

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVA LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in NVN and LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

9. Subordinate/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter box numbers (LEN), armament, and personalities listing.

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF PERINTREP 44-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS, AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 47-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P). PW, PFC Lu Van NINH (AKA Tran Van MINH) 2d Co, 2d Bn, 27th Regt, captured 11 Nov 69 eight kilometers northwest of CAM LO (YD 059634) (11th ITT Rpt 122-69 171426Z Nov 69) stated that the strength of the 2d Co was 71 men and that the location of the company was (YD 066654), while the 2d Bn was located in the SEN THUEY (V), LE THUNG (D), QUANG BINH (P), NVN. NINH also stated the 2d Company's mission was to attack High Point 137 (YD 066654) and CON THO Hill, 500 meters west of High Point 137. He further stated that the morale in his unit was very low because everyone feared death. The source revealed the following LBN's: 2d Bn, 1st Co - 94040 XB, 2d Co - 94038 XB, 3d Co - 94039 XB, 4th Co - 94040 XB. The PW stated that the 2d Bn left QUANG BINH (P) in early Jul 69, entered VINH LINH Special Zone 1 Nov 69, crossed the BEN HAI River 6 Nov 69 and proceeded to High Point 137 arriving on 8 Nov 69. Source stated the 2d Co received three KIA and 12 WIA by air and artillery strikes 7 Nov 69 and four WIA by air strikes 11 Nov 69. Reported personalities: 2d Bn CO-Nguyen The DAT, PO-TUAN, CofS-HUNG; 2d Co Cmdr-Nguyen Van GIANG, XO-Nguyen Van TINH, PO-Nau Van TINH, APO-YEN.

(G-2 COMMENT: The PW was captured in the known AO of the 27th Regt. The revealed LBN's do not correlate with III MAF OOB holdings; however, a PW from the 1st Bn, 27th Regt captured at (YD 126675) 24 Sep 69 stated the LBN for the 1st Bn was 94032 XB which is a good indication that the LBN series for the 27th Regt could have possibly been changed. All information rated (F-3).)

2. THUA THIEN (P).

a. PW, Cpl Hoang Van HOE of the HUE City Armed Recon Bn was captured on 5 Nov 69, 10 kilometers south of HUE (YD 758128) (Trans ARVN Rpt, 070230Z Nov 69). Subject and five others went to LA KHE (H) vicinity (YD 752262) to collect rice. The group was spotted and fired upon by an ARVN element. HOE was wounded but hid until the following day when he was captured by PF's from the 110th Plt. The PW infiltrated from NVN in Nov 67 with a group of 100 men and arrived in RVN during Feb 68. Organization and strength of the HUE City Armed Recon Bn consists of approximately 30 VC and 20 NVA. There are three companies in the battalion as follows: H-1 (20 men), H-2 (15 men), H-3 (15 men); however, in Dec 68, all of the men from H-3 Co were killed leaving the battalion with only two companies with approximately 35 men. 600-hundred replacements have been requested, but to date the unit has received no replacements. The primary mission of the unit is to operate in the lowlands destroying and harassing RD groups and ARVN forces. The secondary mission is to lead NVA forces to attack FWMAF. The unit also has another current mission of reconnaissance in the lowlands to determine whether they are safe for other units to enter in order to collect and buy rice. The PW stated that the 439th Infantry Bn consisting of 350 men, has

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four companies, is subordinate to the 5th Regt, and replaced K-4 Bn, 5th Regt, located in the MU NU Mountains vicinity (YC 4293). Replacement took place due to high casualties and sickness in the K-4 Bn. Subject stated K-4 Bn was disbanded at the time with remaining able body troops being reassigned to other units. The PW also stated that on 1 Nov 69, the 439th Bn moved to a western area (possibly BA 611) with a mission of collecting rice. Reported personalities: 5th Regt CO-Col MOT; 439th Bn CO-DINH; HUE City Armed Recon Bn CO-Maj HAI, XO-Capt PHONG; H-2 CO-Lt ANH. The source stated the morale of the Hue City Armed Recon Bn was low due to lack of food. Sickness in the form of malaria and yellow fever is widespread among the men. According to this PW, units of the 5th Regt are the 439th Infantry Bn, Chi Thua I, now located in western area collecting rice, and Chi Thua II Sapper Bns, K-32 Artillery Bn and two rear service and economic sections. Other units are unknown to this source.

(G-2 COMMENT: The strength, composition, and personalities of the 439th Bn as stated by the PW correlate with those held in III MAF OOB Files. Due to information ascertained from recent documents, PW's, and ralliers, the K-4 Bn is believed to still be in existence and not disbanded as was stated by HOE. The 439th Bn is believed to be used as a transportation/rice collection unit. All information rated (F-3).)

b. Rallier, Sgt Nguyen Xuan THANH, Staff Headquarters, 7th Front rallied on 6 Nov 69 14 kilometers southeast of QUANG TRI City vicinity (YD 431436) (Ref-1st ARVN Div Translation Rpt 060800H Nov 69). THANH, while en route with Capt THOA (Cadre of 7th Front War Office) to Base Area K8 vicinity (YD 413446) slipped behind and hid in a villager's house overnight. The next morning he turned himself in to the HAI LANG Sub-Sector five kilometers northwest of HUE (YD 431436). The rallier stated that the 7th Front consists of the following: the K-20 (AKA K-10) and K-11 Sapper Bns, K-8, K-14 Infantry Bns, K-34 Arty Bn, K-12 Transportation Bn, C-40 AA Co, C-17 Close Guard Co, C-18 Signal Co, C-23 Recon Co and one unknown engineer company. THANH also stated the 7th Front had an NCO school in operation and in November, two additional regiments will be added to the 7th Front to prepare for attacks in THUA THIEN (P) during the Winter-Spring Campaign. The K-8 Infantry Bn and K-10 Sapper Bn are responsible for harassing the QUANG TRI area from 1 Nov 69 until the Winter-Spring Campaign opens. The NVA are opening a road for vehicles (YD 0308-YD 1813) which will be completed prior to Dec 69 in order to support the Winter-Spring Campaign in the QUANG TRI area. The subject also stated that at present NVA vehicles are supplying weapons and food to the battle area and unloading in the AVAO area (YD 0308). Reported personalities: 7th Front Cadre-JrCol Sung LAM, Deputy-Col THANH, PO-LtCol Le Huu NGHIA, Deputy CofS-Maj THOT.

(G-2 COMMENT: The composition of the 7th Front as stated by this PW agrees with III MAF OOB holdings with the exception of C-40 AA Co which is new to III MAF OOB Files. Personalities mentioned are carried by III MAF OOB with the exception of Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj THOT. All information rated (F-3).)

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3. QUANG NAM (P).

a. Hoi Chanhs SrSgt Nguyen Van VIHN and Sgt Tong Ngoc THANH who both rallied 12 Nov 69 vicinity (AT 957435) approximately two and one-half kilometers northeast of LZ IKE stated they were from the 2d Co, 577th Arty Bn. Both stated the present mission of the unit was to prepare to launch a rocket attack on AN HOA Air Base, and NUOC MAN (NVA designation) Air Base (possibly DANANG Air Base). Both Hoi Chanhs gave identical statements pertaining to infiltration. Their infiltration group was designated "135". The group departed THANH HOA (P) in May 67. They arrived in LAOS in early Jul 67 via NGHE AN (P), HA THINH (P) and QUANG BINH (P). The unit entered RVN in QUANG TRI (P) in Jul 67. The unit was known as the 573d Bn, 68th Artillery Regiment (AKA 1st Bn, 68B Artillery Regt). The 68th Artillery Regiment was later redesignated the 577th Bn, Front 4 after arrival in RVN. At present the 577th Bn is split into two parts. The Battalion Headquarters and half of the battalion consisting of six platoons were located vicinity "TI SE" (NVA designation) (AT 814286) approximately four and one-half kilometers northwest of LZ GIMLET. The other half of the unit is located vicinity HILL 530 (NVA designation) (ZC 155476) approximately five and one-half kilometers south of THUONG DUC Special Forces Camp. VIHN stated the 36th Regt and the 78th Hospital were located vicinity of his place of rally. However, THANH stated the 60th Regt (AKA 90th Regt) and the 81st Hospital were located vicinity (ZC 155476). The Hoi Chanh stated Front 4 Headquarters and headquarters elements of 70A, 70B, and 70C were located vicinity (ZC 193349). He also added that the 36th Regt and Unit 91 (AKA 3d Sapper Bn) were located vicinity of his place of rally. THANH further stated that the units he had named were presently in a state of mass confusion and if FWMAF would attack at the present time they would inflict heavy casualties on VC/NVA forces.

(G-2 COMMENT: Infiltration data by these Hoi Chanhs has been previously reported. The redesignation of the artillery regiment has also been previously reported and evaluated. The locations given for the other enemy units was in general accordance with III MAF OOB holdings with the exception of the hospital units which have been mentioned in general locations. The rocket battalion has been previously reported as having six companies. This possibly indicates the strength of this unit as far higher than present estimates (305 men). The 577th Rocket Bn was previously believed to have been targeted against AN HOA. The current probable location of the unit indicates a constant threat against this base. All information rated (F-3).)

b. Hoi Chanh, Vo Cong ANH, Corpsman Leader, Village Medical Group A70, LOC THANH (V), DUC DUC (D), QUANG NAM (P), who rallied 1 Nov 69 vicinity (AT 845519) approximately six kilometers north of AN HOA (141431Z Nov 69 CG 1st MarDiv Supp Interr Rpt 1st IT 22-11-69, 060906Z Nov 69, CG 1st Mar Div 13th ITT 10-11-69) stated that 69 percent of all WIA die en route to aid stations; however, none have died after reaching the aid stations since May 69. The casualties were evacuated in hammocks to the aid stations. Serious cases are evacuated to Aid Station B-2 located vicinity (AT 8043).

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ANH further stated that at his level of medical aid there is no anesthetic, blood plasma, or laboratory facilities available. There were medical supplies available for purchase at PHU THUAN Market vicinity (AT 875515). A resupply mission was sent there once a month. The Hoi Chanh further stated that there was within his medical group stethoscopes, scalpels, hypodermic needles, thermometers, sutures, bandages, scissors, and syringes. They were also equipped with Vitamin B1, B12, C10 to 20 vials (2cc), paludermia, psamocis, and 20 to 100 tablets used for malaria treatment. Civilians are treated primarily with herb medicines only. There is a VC provincial hospital located in the mountains west of the village of LOC THANH (NFI). The Hoi Chanh stated there was a "Hospital A76" for military personnel located vicinity (ZC 185475) (May 69).

(G-2 COMMENT: Information concerning the PHU THUAN Market has been previously reported as being an important and commonly used shopping center for the enemy in QUANG NAM Province. (F-1). All other information rated (F-3).)

c. PW, Nguyen Thanh NAM, 3d Co, Q.83 Bn, captured 1 Nov 69 vicinity (AT 854548) (101721Z Nov 69 CG 1st MarDiv Supp-Interr Rpt 13th ITT 18-11-69) stated the 1st and 3d Co's of the Q.83 Bn were located vicinity MY HOA (1) (H) (AT 855548), LOC TAN (V), DAI LOC (D) (27 Oct 69). The PW had hearsay information from a conversation between the CO, SrLt Nguyen MOL, and XO, SrLt, Nguyen THUAN that the Q.83 Bn was to combine with the 577th Rocket Bn for a rocket/ground assault on DAI LOC (D) Headquarters sometime during Nov 69. The PO, SrLt Le Van AN told the PW that the battalion is setting up a base area in NGOC KINH (H) vicinity (ZC 195543). The battalion left for NGOC KINH (H) on 27 Oct 69. NAM stated the battalion was composed of two infantry companies designated 1st and 3d. The 1st Co had a strength of 90 men while the 3d Co had 20 men. They were armed with AK's, CKC's, and one 82mm mortar. One mortar company designated the 2d Co had 20 men. The infantry companies had a total of two B-40's, one B-41, and three CHICOM grenades per man. The headquarters group consisted of four men. The unit is presently 80 percent NVA. The PW stated morale was low due to lack of food and constant separation from home and family. Each man was given one and one-half cans of rice a day with vegetables. The PO told the men that FWMAF are in RVN only to exploit and conquer. The PO further stated that three US PW's would be released in Oct-Nov 69 as a sign of fairness of the NLF. The PW heard from his battalion CO that the 575th and 577th Rocket Bn's were located vicinity (ZC 2050) (Aug 69). The K.600 Transportation Unit was located vicinity MY HOA (1) (H) (AT 857546) (Aug 69). NLF

(G-2 COMMENT: The strength given by this PW is much higher than currently held by OOB as is the percentage of NVA. However, reported armament is below that held for this unit. Personalities were mentioned for the first time. There have been previous reports of elements of the 577th Rocket Bn near the western DAI LOC (D) border on the ONG THU Slope. The reported location for the Q.83 Co would place this unit close to THUONG DUC Special Forces Camp. OOB presently carries this unit as a local force company.

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Statement concerning the release of three US PW's coincides with the recent release of three US PW's near TAM KY, QUANG TIN (P). All information rated (F-3).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). PW, Quang HUNG, 3d Co, 3d Bn, 31st Regt, 2d NVA Div (AKA 3d Bn, 3d NVA Regt) captured 12 Nov 69 (BT 142486) (SA QNAM Sector HOI AN RVN msg 141055Z Nov 69) stated that on 4 Nov 69 the 3d Bn was located vicinity (BT 110330) and had a strength of 480 men. The mission of the entire 31st Regt has been to attend political training during this time. The regimental CO and the CO of the 1st Bn, 3d NVA Regt plus eight men from their recon unit have been living in Hamlet 3, BINH HOA (V) (BT 1747) formulating plans for future battles (NFI). Source located the 1st Bn at (BT 090350) and the 2d Bn, 3d NVA Regt at KY QUE (V) (BT 264136). HUNG gave the following LBN's: 2d NVA Div - 117.TL; 31st (AKA 3d) NVA Regt - 5357 Ap Nam 3; 1st Bn, 31st (AKA 3d Regt - 5316 Ap Nam 3; 2d Bn, 31st (AKA 3d) Regt - 5314 Ap Nam 3; and 3d Bn, 31st (AKA 3d) Regt - 5317 Ap Nam 3. He also gave the following AKA's: 1st Bn, 31st (3d) Regt - Song Hong (Red River); 2d Bn, 31st (3d) Regt - Song Thao. Also the 2d NVA Div has a code number of 430 and the 31st Regt (AKA 3d NVA Regt) has a code number of E.3. The PW stated that he was drafted and assigned to 5th Co, 4th Bn, 147th Regt which was located in the jungle of HAI BAC (P). He received four months of infantry training and his entire battalion practiced sapper tactics prior to leaving NVN. The 4th Bn began infiltrating on 29 Nov 68 with 560 men and kept the same unit designation until reaching RVN. They left HAI BAC (P) by train traveling to HANH HOA (P) at which time they debarked and began the march on foot through NGHE AN (P), HA THINH (P), QUANG BINH (P) where they entered LAOS. The group entered the north end of the A SHAU Valley, passing into QUANG NAM (P) and arriving at their ultimate destination in QUE SON (D), on 29 Jan 69. Source stated SrCol KICH (ex-CG of 2d NVA Div) was now Chief of Staff of Front 4, QUANG DA Special Zone.

(G-2 COMMENT: In relation to the above stated locations of the 1st Bn and 3d Bn, an AO report (CG Americal Div msg 191250Z Nov 69) mentioned a sighting of three large masonry buildings at (BT 125358) on 19 Nov 69. Americal Division reported that information obtained from captured documents states that this complex is a VC machine shop which manufactures mines, bayonets, and ammunition. The information given by the prisoner tends to confirm other reports regarding the location of units, personalities, and LBN's. The subject was very knowledgeable and informative. All information rated (F-3).)

5. QUANG NGAI (P)

a. PW, Pvt Vu Van THINH, 4th Co, 1st Bn, unknown regiment, unknown division, captured 13 Nov 69 (BS 838412) (CG Americal msg 161020Z Nov 69) stated the strength of his company was about 40 men, and was located two nights' walk to the west of place of capture as of 4 Nov 69. The unit's mission was to attack allied units. PW stated 60 percent of his company

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has malaria, and stated that each member of his unit gets one can of rice per day and some wild vegetables. PW left NINH BINH (D), NVN with the 517th Battalion which had a strength of 800 men on 7 Mar 69 and passed through LAOS into RVN traveling on foot. THINH's unit entered RVN in May 69 and arrived in QUANG NGAI (P) in Aug 69. Sixty men of the group were assigned to the 1st Bn. The distribution of the rest was unknown. The 4th Co was armed with two 82mm mortars, two unknown type RR's, two B-40's, two B-41's, and two MG's.

(G-2 COMMENT: Subject is probably from 93d Bn (AKA 1st Bn) 2d MF Regt, 3d NVA Division, which is located at (BS 7825) as of 25 Oct 69, with a strength of 180 men. The infiltration group was designated 517 and has been reported to have left NVN in Mar 69 and arrived in RVN in Jun 69. The 4th Co, 93d Bn is a weapons company with a strength of approximately 60 men. Armament is consistent with previous information (F-2). All other information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, Pvt Phan Xuan THANH, 3d Co, K-2 Bn, Pho Dong Regt, 3d NVA Div, captured 13 Nov 69 (BS 838412) (CG Americal msg 161250Z Nov 69) stated his unit was located in CO BAN-BA KHAN area on 28 Oct 69 and on the same date his regiment had moved to BINH DINH (P) with the mission of engaging and destroying Allied Forces. PW's infiltration group, 818, with a strength of 650 men, left NVN from HAI DUONG (P) to HANOI City, HA DONG (P) to VINH City arriving on 20 Feb 69 by train. THANH then travelled through QUANG BINH (P), LAOS, QUANG NAM (P) and finally to QUANG NGAI (P) on foot. The unit arrived with a total of 430 men; 220 men were lost to malaria and desertion. Two-hundred-thirty men were assigned to the 2d MF Regt and 200 men went to the QUANG NGAI Provincial Unit. The PW admitted to having once been a sergeant, but was demoted to private as a result of having shot himself to stay out of the infantry. He was transferred to a rear services unit, and has not been in contact with his unit since the end of Oct 69. Subject knew little tactical information.

(G-2 COMMENT: The 95th Bn, 2d MF Regt is located at (BS 7825) as of 25 Oct 69 with a strength of 180. K-2 Bn is an AKA for 95th Bn and Pho Dong is an AKA for the 2d MF Regt. A Hoi Chanh from the 2d MF Regt who rallied on 12 May 69 was also from the 818th Infiltration Group, and gave information which coincides with that given by THANH (F-2). The group cadre guides the groups down to RVN, then the majority of the cadre return to NVN for another group (F-2). All other information rated (F-3).)

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 47-69**

1. **GENERAL.** Reported VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities reflected the continuation of emphasis on efforts to disrupt/destroy the GVN pacification program and concurrent intensification of efforts to incite political struggles and demonstrations against the GVN. No indications of success were registered in either endeavor.

Sabotage and terrorist activities remained at extremely low levels and reflected no significant changes from the previous week.

Miscellaneous reports of possible significance concern alleged enemy intentions to use counterfeit 500 piastre notes in the vicinity of Hue; immediate enemy military, political, and military proselyting missions in Phu Loc (D), Thua Thien (P); organization and mission of enemy armed propaganda detachments in Quang Nam (P); missions of the Quang Nam Province Unit, subsequent to the Fall Campaign; and activities of youth groups in Que Son (D), Quang Nam (P).

Captured documents, PW and rallier reports continue to reveal the effectiveness of GVN/Allied security and pacification programs in limiting the operational range of VCI cadre and their access to the populace, thereby denying the material and political support the enemy must obtain to accomplish his planned objectives.

Liberation radio, in an unusual admission of growing difficulties recently revealed that the pacification program in conjunction with other "demagogic tricks" such as "strengthened psywar, open-arms, surrender motivating efforts, and organized spy networks have caused and are causing our people and cadre many new difficulties in their daily life, tasks and combat". Although VC forces were said to have "continually defeated the enemy's pacification operations", the broadcast, in effect, warned the people to prepare for a prolonged struggle.

2. **INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.** Although no enemy intelligence gathering activities of specific counterintelligence interest were reported during the past week, various captured documents continue to reveal the importance that the VC/VCI associate with acquiring legal documentation for personnel and the proselyting of personnel with placement, access, and documentation to perform both selected and general surreptitious tasks in GVN/Allied controlled areas and organizations.

3. **SABOTAGE.** Reported incidents related to enemy sabotage activities in ICTZ remained at a low level and were oriented primarily against

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selected lines of communication.

Details of reported sabotage activities of the past week are as follows:

a. Quang Tri

At approximately 0200 on 14 November 1969, a culvert in Highway 1 vicinity (YD 222653) was blown by an estimated squad of VC. Culvert sustained 60% damage (nfi). (Ref: PSA, Quang Tri (P) msg 141500 Nov69)

b. Thua Thien

(1) At approximately 2000 on 17 November 1969, the VC blew up an electric pole vicinity Dong Tien (H) (YD 815181), Thuy Phuong (V), Huong Thuy (D). Damage to the pole was estimated to be 30 per cent (nfi). (Ref: PSA/PSD CORDS Thua Thien (P) Rpt # R-33/11191540)

(2) At approximately 1530 on 14 October 1969, acting on information from villagers, CACO 3-5 personnel located an explosive device on a section of railroad track vicinity (ZD 066013), two kilometers NW of Phu Loc. The apparatus was composed of 15 pounds of C-4 wired to two flashlight batteries. EOD was notified and destroyed the charge. (Ref: CAP Daily Opn Summary 141600-151600 Nov69)

c. Quang Ngai

At approximately 0530 on 19 November 1969, bridge vicinity (BS 815395) was damaged by approximately three (3) suspected VC sappers using 150 pounds of explosive. North abutment completely destroyed, 20% of bridge destroyed. (Ref: Americal TOC Spot Rpt #76, DTG 191155 Nov69)

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Enemy political and propaganda activities reported in ICTZ during the past week reflected concerted enemy emphasis on concurrently attempting to disrupt/destroy the GVN pacification program and intensification of efforts to foment dissent, demonstrations and political struggles against the GVN. No indications of success were registered in either endeavor.

Propaganda themes concentrated on anti-war dissent in the U.S.; rising prices of commodities in SVN, particularly food; travel restrictions; military conscription; various war inflicted damages and grievances; and the people's desire for peace.

Details of enemy political and propaganda activities reported during the past week are as follows:

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(1) On 16 November 1969 elements of the 1st Marine Division while operating vicinity (AT 951588) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Directive, dated Oct 69, prepared for the signature of Kuan QUYNH, Assistant Political Officer of Unit 75 (probably Dien Ban District Unit, Quang Da Special Zone, Military Region 5), addressed to subordinate units, instructs addressees to initiate an emulation movement aimed at intensifying the elimination of tyrants (RVN officials) to gain control of the population during the forthcoming TD (possibly 1969 Fall-Winter) Campaign.

The document emphasizes that the annihilation of enemy village administrative personnel, pacification cadre, and People's Self-Defense Forces must be considered a main mission of village units and local force companies during the "TD" Campaign. "If proven a success, it will considerably strengthen our (VC) struggle in a future political solution (of the VN war)." (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-1992-69) (Eval: B-3)

(2) On 16 November 1969, the local National Police discovered a quantity of VC propaganda leaflets vicinity of Cam Ha (V) (BT 126572), Hieu Nhon (D).

The documents translated, read as follows:

The Vietnamese youth and students warmly welcome the American students who come out against NIXON's aggressive war in Vietnam. (Ref: PSA/PSD/CORDS Quang Nam (P) Rpt # R-56/11171724)

(3) The following is a full translation of a directive published by the Area 1 (Hoa Vang (D), QDSZ) Party Committee. Document was captured vicinity Hoa Loc (V), Hoa Vang (D), on 7 November 1969.

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Party Committee
Area 1
No _____

Directive

Subject/Increase the Political Struggle Activities

Parallel with the armed forces activities, the political struggle movement in the area has some changes. The struggle opposing pacification and protesting protection was previously maintained. The people's pride has a firm foundation.

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However the previous political struggle movement had many weaknesses: the struggle opposing the attempts of urgent pacification, the struggle of bailing out the people, and the struggle of attacking the enemy's movement were not strong. The spearhead of the political struggle was stopped before the difficult situation began, and it was kept from the people. The leadership of all the committees' ranks has not been increased to the appropriate level.

The political situation at the present time is very advantageous for us. The enemy is puzzled and has profound internal contradiction. Defeatism is spreading through their ranks. The troops and the puppet government long for peace. They are tired of war. They believe that THIEU and KY are whiling away their time. The people of all social classes in the cities are encouraged. They believe in and participate in the movement. Their political views lean toward the Provisional Revolutionary Government in the South. The above situation has given us the ability to step up the political struggle to achieve a large victory in the future.

In order to develop the above advantages, the Party's Current Affairs Committee has planned to increase the leadership at all levels, to make the political struggle movement reach a higher plateau in the future, aiming at defeating all of the enemy's plans from now until 20 December.

I. Mission Requirements: The struggle is aimed at destroying this oppression and holding the people and to lead them back to their old villages, to keep them away from pacification, to protect the life of the people, to protect the production, to maintain the law and everyday affairs of the people.

The mission in regards to Hoa Loc (V) and Hoa Hiep (V) together with the armed activity plan is the plan to lead the people in the struggle against pacification, the struggle to return the people to their old villages to live (according to the plan of returning the people to their old area), to oppose all forms of oppression, screaming denunciation against Communism, destruction of villages and hamlets council organizations, and the pacification program. To be determined to oppose the plan of pacification and concurrently to lead the people in the struggle to request the 4th, 5th, and 6th Groups of Hoa Loc (V) and Thuy Tu (H) of Hoa Hiep (V) to return to their old areas. When the armed forces start, the enemy's morale will be demoralized. We must lead the masses to struggle and to request them to return to their old villages. (We must force the enemy to agree to let the people go back to their area and to maintain their legal status.) In regards to Hoa Vinh (V), the main purpose of the struggle is to oppose the enemy's attempt to trick the people, to organize the education for the masses, and to maintain a stable situation. The people of the hamlet must not move away, nor let the enemy take them away.

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II. In order to realize the above requests, and to establish a firm law for the people, the Current Affairs plan is:

(1) To organize and lead a continuous struggle against the enemy's pacification program, to infiltrate posts, district seats, cities and combine with the enemy's military proselyting attack, requesting the enemy to satisfy future requirements of the people from now until 20 December 1969 (NLF anniversary (Founding)).

Page 2

a) Contents of the struggle penetrating the posts and pacification teams:

As for the ARVN: When the Americans withdraw, peace will return. Be happy as you will enjoy the peace, and you will be together with your families. The people will be glad also, as they want to return to their old villages in order to restore their lives and their lands. They do not want anyone to disturb their lives, and the people request you do not obey the tyrants and carry out their pacification plan, destroying their land agricultural produce. Let the people live in peace and rebuild their lives. The people request you do not shell the villages or rice paddies, you do not spray chemical poison destroying their agricultural produce, and to let the people go to and from their villages and to travel along the rivers and ferries freely. As for the Americans and South Korean troops, the people in South Vietnam are happy that you are going home to see your parents, wives and children again. The peace is going to rebuild. The Americans and South Koreans are going to go home. The Vietnamese people want to reestablish their lives. We request that during the forthcoming days, the Americans do not drop bombs, shell the villages, spray chemical poison destroying the agricultural produce, and let the people freely travel, work, fish and be authorized to go back to their old villages. We request you help save the starving families.

b) Formation of the Struggle: Continuously organize to reach all of the posts and pacification teams. Each person should go and complain frequently to these posts and teams. The main objectives are to motivate and convince these posts and teams when you arrive. Use reason to incite their sentiments, but avoid trouble that is disadvantageous. In this way we can create a legal position for the people in their struggle to return to their old villages, to work and travel freely on the rivers.

Don't be satisfied when the enemy uses their calming methods and hollow promises. In order to stop the struggle movement of the masses, we have to force the enemy into a concrete settlement.

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Depending on the situation at the Committee level, if they lead well they can guarantee that this struggle movement can have effective results, can break the enemy's pacification plan and concurrently spread out the people, and can build up the movement.

Upon receipt of this directive, the Committee levels must study it carefully, criticize the previous leadership, and organize the activities. Report the deploying plan and result of each phase to the Current Affairs Committee.

18Sept69

TM/TV

/s/ HUNG

(Ref: 7IT DTC 1stMarDiv Readout No 7th IT 39-11-69 dtd 14Nov69)

b. Quang Ngai

(1) On 14 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

As of 12 November 1969 the VC planned to open their Winter-Spring 69-70 Campaign with activities primarily directed toward creating favorable conditions for turning the Vietnamese people against the GVN, to include inciting the people to revolt against the GVN under the pretext of support for former General Duong Van MINH, which would eventually lead to a communist government in South Vietnam. The Winter-Spring Campaign was planned to be in two phases: the first from 1-25 Nov 69 and the second from 25 Nov to 25 Dec 69. Additionally, planned activities included intensive mortar attacks on airports and on ARVN/Allied Force units; increased ground attacks on GVN/Allied installations; increased attacks on public facilities within the cities, and increased assassinations of GVN national cadre. (Ref: Det D, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/C/EX/0099/69 dtd 14Nov69) (Eval: F-3)

(2) On 16 November 1969, an unknown number of VC entered Chau O Market, Binh Tuyen (V) (BT 475872) and distributed leaflets to the residents (nfi). (Ref: PSA/CORDS/PSD Rpt # R-22/11191140)

5. TERROR. Reported acts of terrorism continued at essentially the same low level as the previous week and reflected no significant change in tactics.

Details of terrorist activity conducted in ICTZ during the past week are listed in Appendix 1.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Thua Thien

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(1) On 9 November 1969, elements of the US Army 101st Airborne Division while operating vicinity (ZC 082977) removed a document from an enemy KIA which disclosed the following:

Directive, number 18/T-69, precedence (VC) FLASH, (VC) TOP SECRET, dated 1 Nov 69, with the signature block of Le CUONG for T-69 (possibly Phu Loc Party Committee, Thua Thien Province, Tri-Thien Region), outlines the immediate military, political, and military proselyting tasks to be carried out by subordinate party committees.

The document reveals that the anti-war movement is in full bloom in the United States. On 15 Oct 69, large scale demonstrations were staged by the American people to demand the entire withdrawal of US troops from SVN. Peace movements have been initiated throughout the world in support of our (VC) war resistance for national salvation. The enemy (US Government) will be compelled to push the de-Americanization of the SVN war and accelerate the withdrawal of US troops from SVN.

The confusion of the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) continues to grow. US servicemen awaiting their return home are no longer enthusiastic in the implementation of their missions, and Puppet (RVNAF) troops are demoralized, especially since US troops are being withdrawn. The morale of the enemy (GVN) administrative personnel is undermined by the defeats sustained (by the FWMAF/RVNAF), and some of them seek to make amends for their past anti-revolutionary actions.

The situation may evolve quickly in our favor. We are to urgently take advantage of present and future opportunities to inflict heavier defeats on the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) and promote the movement of the masses. We must improve political leadership. We are to make our personnel fully realize that we are on our way to a (decisive) victory, and that the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) will not recover from his situation of despair, although he will in the future intensify his military attacks, psychological and Chieu Hoi operations, and intelligence activities.

We (VC) are to overcome all hardships to make great strikes in the military, political, and military proselyting fields. To attain the above goal, T-69 will initiate one climaxing stage for overall attacks on the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) from GO/VX to AUAU/VX (possibly code for date), in implementation of the resolutions adopted by higher party committees.

In the military field, we are to kill the most loyal cadre of the (RVN) pacification teams and Self-Defense Forces. We are to annihilate (RVN) administrative and intelligence personnel; launch

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widespread attacks on enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) troops and cut off their routes of communication; and deliver retaliatory blows to the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) troops stationed in the areas recently pacified (by the GVN). Of primary importance is the expansion of guerrilla warfare to counter the (RVN) accelerated pacification program. Our forces in the border area (possibly of Phu Loc District) are to hold fast to their areas of responsibility to disrupt the operations conducted by enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) Special Forces, and to protect our corridors, logistic facilities, and base camps.

In the political field, we are to motivate the population to participate in the political struggles which will be promoted. The main slogans at present are: A halt to tax increase; better living conditions; and end of search-and-destroy operations. Political struggles will be later turned into anti-war struggles to demand the total withdrawal of US troops from SVN, the end of the SVN war, and overthrow of the Puppet Government (GVN). Seminars will be held in populated areas to instigate the population to rise up.

In the military proselyting field, we are to direct our military proselyting thrusts at the Puppet troops in the areas from which the US troops have withdrawn. We must incite troop revolts and increase the desertion and defection rate in the Puppet Army to accelerate its collapse.

We are further to focus our efforts on the procurement of food provisions and to take special measures to protect our funds, because a change in the enemy's (RVN) currency is expected.

The document finally instructs that (VC) revolutionary committees are to be immediately formed in enemy (GVN) controlled areas for the promotion of mass uprisings, because events (possibly RVN coup d'etats) may occur.

Envelope, number 27/T-69, precedence (VC) FLASH, classification (VC) TOP SECRET, dated 3 Nov 69, was addressed (possibly from Phu Loc District Unit Headquarters) to HV8. (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-1644-69) (Eval: B-3)

(2) On 9 November 1969, while operating vicinity (ZC 082977) elements of the US Army 101st Airborne Division removed a document from an enemy KIA which disclosed the following information:

Notebook, with entries made during October and November 1969, maintained by an individual of an unspecified district (possibly Phu Loc (D) Unit, Thua Thien Province, Tri-Thien Military Region), contains political lessons, resolutions, and activity plans.

In an undated entry, the document states that 17 staff members of (Phu Loc District) Headquarters have attended a recent

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political reorientation course designed to familiarize them with the future mission of the district. During November 1969, each village (of Phu Loc (D)) should increase its guerrilla strength by two squads to one platoon, and should initiate two to three combat actions. In addition, each village should conduct a seven-day training course for its guerrillas. The primary mission to be performed during November 1969 is to thwart the enemy's (RVN) pacification plan within the district. Whenever possible, the villagers should be instigated to overthrow the Puppet (RVN) administrations and establish people's administrations. Also, an average of 50 to 100 families of Puppet servicemen or civil servants should be contacted for proselyting purposes.

Final notes (undated) contain a resolution adopted by (Phu Loc) District Party Committee, which stipulates the tasks to be performed by subordinate units and villages during November 1969. These include the following:

(1) Continual attacks should be launched against tyrants (RVN local administrators) and against enemy ambush elements, especially US units which have recently arrived (in Phu Loc District). These attacks should be conducted by small elements which infiltrate deep inside the enemy areas. Each village should annihilate one enemy squad, assassinate three to five tyrants, and destroy one vehicle. Special Action units (of District) should coordinate with villages to harass strategic hamlets and disband the (RVN) inter-family organizations, especially in the Ban Phu Mon area. The number of secret guerrillas of the district should be increased to 150 members. Each village should also recruit three to ten youths and dispatch them to the district as replacements.

(2) Each village should have under its control five to seven in place agents (VC fifth columnists in RVNAF ranks). During the reported month, the entire district should fulfill criteria prescribed by (Tri-Thien) Region by purchasing and requisitioning a quantity of 80 metric tons (of rice). The amount of rice to be purchased should be 20 metric tons; and the amount of salt, eight metric tons. The District Economy Section should coordinate with various villages to ship 30 metric tons (of rice) to the jungle (unspecified). (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-1680-69) (Eval: B-3)

(3) On 18 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

The Hue City Headquarters Front has received 1,000,000\$SVN in counterfeit 500\$SVN bills. The Finance and Economy sections subordinate to the Hue City Committee will be issued an unknown amount of counterfeit money to purchase supplies and food, gain prestige among poor people by distributing money to them, and at the same time undermine the economy of the GVN.

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The counterfeit bills are blue in color and were printed in North Vietnam. The bills are rougher and less stiff than bills printed by the GVN. (Ref: Det B, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/B/CX/1225/69 dtd 18Nov69) (Eval: B-3)

b. Quang Nam

(1) On 5 November 1969, elements of the US Army Americal Division while operating vicinity (AT 944283) discovered enemy documents which revealed the following information:

(1) Circular, dated 30 Sep 69, signed by Nguyen chi CONG, Current Affairs Committee, District Youth Group HB.120 (possibly Que Son (D), Quang Nam Province), addressed to various village Youth Group Chapters, stated they they were to submit reports on their group activities to the District Youth Group no later than 8 Oct 69, and that the addressees were to accomplish the following missions:

Consolidate the executive committees of all Group Chapters.

Improve the ideology of youths and indoctrinate them on the criteria for Four-Good-Quality Group members.

Be prepared to attend a meeting to be conducted by the District Youth Group on 20 Oct 69.

Document also stipulates that each village is to provide the District with seven to ten youths as replacements, and to have a force of 15 to 20 guerrillas.

(2) Plan of activity, date 19 Oct 69, signed by Xuan HONG, Current Affairs Committee, HB.120 (possibly Que Son (D), Quang Nam Province), pertains to the criteria for Four-Good-Quality Group Chapters and members, and the recruitment of Vanguard Youths, with emphasis placed on recruiting female youths.

Document also comments that a number of Group members were demoralized and passive. Some of them shirked their duty and defected to the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF). (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-1729-69) (Eval: B-3)

(2) On 7 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 4 November 1969, a VC, ten-man, squad moved into the resettlement hamlet vicinity (BT 138462) and forced ten families to move to Xuan My (2) (H) vicinity (BT 1147). These families had moved from Xuan My (2) (H) two years ago to get away from the VC. The VC told the rest of the people not to work on the "Hill" (Baldy)

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because they were going to mortar the "Hill" and did not want the people to get hurt.

For the past two weeks the VC have been reconnoitering the area around Baldy at night. They have advanced up to the wire to observe fortifications and sentry procedures.
(Ref: 1st CIT CIR 218-69 dtd 15Nov69) (Eval: B-2)

III MAF SCI COMMENT: In another report of this incident, it was indicated that two of the families returned to the resettlement hamlet a few days after being moved to Xuan My (2). The reason the VC did not interfere with them returning, according to the report, was that they only wanted to demonstrate their ability to gain access to and control people, even in close proximity to GVN/Allied troop concentrations.

(3) On 16 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 12 November 1969, the VC in Dien Ban District Group organized a young sapper cell, led by THANH. The mission of the cell is to assassinate or abduct ARVN soldiers operating along the highway between Hoi An and Dien Ban. (Ref: Advisory Team #15, Quang Nam (P) INTSUM #318 period 150601H to 160600H Nov69) (Eval: DB C-3) (S2 F-3))

(4) On 16 November 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division while operating vicinity (AT 951588) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Directive, number 27/DQ, dated 20 Sep 69, signed by Nguyen ngoc LAM, Commanding Officer, Unit 70b (Chief, Political Staff Section, Quang Da Special Zone, Military Region 5), gives instructions for the organization of armed propaganda detachments, in order to meet urgent requirements dictated by the critical situation of the general offensive and uprising. Document brings out the following main points:

Organization and missions of armed propaganda detachments.

The characteristics and methods of operation and leadership.

Document stipulates that each district, city or local company is required to activate from one to three detachments, depending on the special situation of each locality. Each detachment consists of three to five men. Each spearhead sapper battalion or each infantry D (possibly battalion) is required to activate from three to five detachments.

The primary missions of these detachments are to proceed to populated areas under enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) control to spread propaganda on Party policy, and the victories of friendly (VC) units

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to instigate a hatred of the enemy among local inhabitants. These detachments must also annihilate tyrants (possibly meaning RVN officials) and destroy the local administration to accelerate the movement in designated areas. The primary zones of action of these detachments are the heavily populated areas, bus terminals, railway stations and those portions of lines of communication utilized by many travelers. (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-2003-69) (Eval: B-3)

(5) On 16 November 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division while operating vicinity (AT 951588) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Directive, dated 25 Sep 69, signed illegibly for Headquarters, Front 4, (AKA) Unit 44 (AKA Front 4, Quang Da Special Zone, Military Region 5), addressed to subordinate district, city and area units, pertains to the development of the guerrilla warfare movement throughout the Special Zone.

All village units were directed to send their cadre to two refresher courses to be held on 5 and 20 Oct (69). They should report to a newly (constructed) politico-military training school of the Front (4). Regarding political and military training for guerrillas, document directs that all members of guerrilla units must be trained on politics, guerrilla tactics, and how to produce ammunition and mines. Two training phases would be conducted, each lasting 10 days. To be successful in conducting training on sapper-engineer techniques for these guerrillas, Front (4) should send the cadre of D87 and Hai Van (Engineer Battalion) to Area 1 (possibly Area 1, Hoa Vang (D)); the cadre of D8 to Area 2 (possibly Area 2, Hoa Vang (D)); the cadre of the 91st (Sapper) Battalion to Duy Xuyen District; and the cadre of the 3rd Precinct (Unit, Da Nang City) to Area 3 (possibly Area 3, Hoa Vang (D)).

Document finally directs that the district units must forward their reports on the personnel strength of village units in the "white" (meaning areas already pacified by FVMAF/RVNAF) areas to Front 4 immediately. These district units were also requested to inform the Front of the number of replacements needed by village units in the "white" areas. (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-2039-69) (Eval: B-3)

(6) On 16 November 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division while operating vicinity (AT 951588) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Plan, classified (VC) Secret, number 190/BV, dated 19 Sep 69, signed by Mai THUAN for the Commanding Officer, Unit 70B (Chief, Political Staff Section, Quang Da Special Zone, Military Region 5)

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outlines security regulations to cope with the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) intelligence activity and psychological warfare, in particular the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program. The document indicates that political indoctrination sessions should be repeatedly conducted to heighten political awareness and a sense of responsibility to protect the Party and the (VC) Army. All personnel are required to strictly observe security regulations, and to properly handle classified documents in order to avoid their being captured by the enemy. Training sessions must be conducted to study directives on security maintenance by the Central Military Affairs Committee (possibly of COSVN) and Military Region (5) Party Committee.

Document stipulates that those comrades in charge of security should foster a close coordination with those personnel in the propaganda and training, and organization (sections) to solve their related matters. (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-2021-69) (Eval: B-3)

(7) On 19 November 1969, a three man sapper unit commanded by XUONG was located along Highway 1 from (BT 046614, 047610). The unit's mission is to assassinate GVN cadre and soldiers (nfi). (Ref: Advisory Team 15, Quang Nam (P) INTSUM 323 for the period 200601H to 210600H Nov69) (Eval: (DB NP C-2; S2 F-3)

c. Quang Tin

On 5 October 1969, elements of the PRU, Quang Tin Province while operating in Thang Sinh District, Quang Tin Province discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Document describing the exaggerated successes accomplished during the Fall Campaign (12-20 Aug69) and also outlined the future missions of the Quang Nam (GVN: Quang Tin) Province Unit as follows:

Annihilate the enemy (RVNAF) oppressive forces in order to consolidate friendly control over the populace.

Be prepared to attack the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) mobile forces and disrupt his pacification program.

Destroy his war materials, particularly armored vehicles and aircraft.

Activate village guerrilla B's (possibly platoons).

Store sufficient foodstuffs for four months.

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It was also disclosed that the main difficulty encountered by (Quang Nam Province Unit) in the past was the serious shortage of cadre, weapons and ammunition. (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-1875-69)

d. Quang Ngai

(1) On 7 November 1969, elements of the US Army Americal Division operating vicinity (BS 930250) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Circular, dated 4 Sep 69, signed by Duy HUNG, Command Committee, Unit 145 (possibly Duc Pho District Unit, Quang Ngai Province, Military Region 5), addressed to all subordinate units and agencies, states that in accordance with the decision of the People's Revolutionary Committee, (Quang Ngai) Province, they are to use the names of areas which were given by the People's Revolutionary Committee, Quang Ngai Province or were used in the first resistance against (the French). Under no circumstances are they to use the names given by the Puppet (GVN) Government.

Resolution, dated 15 Sep 69, prepared for the signature of Huu LANG, Commanding Officer, Unit 145, addressed to all subordinate units, provides an assessment of the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) defeats in 1969, and outlines the following missions in accordance with a directive of the Command Committee, Unit 130 (Quang Ngai Province Unit, Military Region 5):

(1) Continue conducting repeated attacks and uprisings in order to destroy strategic hamlets and villages, disorganize the "Puppet" (RVNAF) forces, and inflict heavy losses in personnel and war materials to the US forces.

(2) Promote the local guerrilla warfare and expand our (VC) control of cities and towns.

(3) Conduct advanced military training and improve the ideology of cadre and troops.

(4) Construct combat hamlets and villages and maintain control of the liberated areas.

Document also stipulates that Pho Thanh Village Unit is to activate a guerrilla B (platoon) consisting of 24 personnel, and recruit 130 hamlet guerrillas, 50 secret guerrillas, 250 militiamen, and 50 youths. In addition, it is also to activate one sapper A (squad), three engineer cells, one reconnaissance cell, one weapons and ammunition production cell, and two antiaircraft cells. (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-1750-69) (Eval: B-3)

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(2) On 11 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 7 November 1969, the Son Tinh District VC Committee held a conference vicinity of Suot La stream (BS 412816), Tra Nam (V), Tra Bong (D). Attending the conference were:

Nguyen HUONG - Son Tinh District Secretary
CHAU - Son Tinh District Economics Committee Chairman
Le PHONG - District Committee Member
Truong dinh TRONG - District Committee Member
Pham THAU - Chairman of the Son Ha District VC Committee

The purpose of the conference was to determine a secure area for the residents of western Son Tinh District and a safe place for VC cadre to live in order to avoid airstrikes and ARVN operations. The following areas were approved for the building of refugee camps and living areas for residents and VC cadre:

Dong Dien ricefield (BS 395800) to the Ta Bac stream vicinity (BS 372808) was to be used as refugee camps where residents would build homes and plant crops.

Luoi Cay mountain vicinity (BS 390787) and Nuoc mountain vicinity (BS 404780) would be used by VC cadre, as the area provided a secure place from ARVN operations.

(Ref: Det D, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/B/DX/1422/69 dtd 11Nov69)
(Eval: F-6)

APPENDIX

I. Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Tri	13Nov69 (Late Entry)	(YD 320529)	At approximately 2100, three (3) VC entered Nhan Bieu (H), Trieu-Thuong (V), Mai Linh (D) and abducted Mrs. Pham Thi CHAT, a VN civilian.
	15Nov69 (Late Entry)	(YD 095524)	An unknown number of individuals entered home of Tran GIONG and shot him in the head while he was sleeping. GIONG was a member of Cam Nghia (V) council. K-54 pistol shells were found at the scene.
Quang Nam	16Nov69	(BT 034778)	At approximately 2040 a 2½ ton truck belonging to the 11th Marines while returning VN club employees to Danang City received several rounds of SAF from an unknown location. Truck was in vicinity of German Hospital Ship, HELGOLAND. Only injury was sustained by the driver who was reportedly hospitalized with glass fragments in his eyes.
	17Nov69	(BT 016349)	At approximately 0230, an unknown number of VC entered Lanh Thuong (H), Son Lanh (V), Que Son (D) and destroyed nine (9) civilian homes (nfi).
	17Nov69	(BT 030583)	At approximately 1900, a civilian resident of Bang An Tay (H), Vinh Hao (V), Dien Ban (D) was killed by detonating a VC mine placed at the gate of his home (nfi).

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Nam	18Nov69	(AT 959689)	At approximately 1500, an unknown number of VC entered Bo Ban (H), Hoa Hung (V), Hieu Duc (D) and shot to death one (1) civilian, Tran DIEU (nfi).
	19Nov69	(BT 150539)	Vietnamese civilians while cutting bamboo on the southern end of Xuyen Long Island detonated a booby-trapped 81mm mortar round killing two (2) VN civilians and wounding one (1).
	19Nov69	(BT 147538)	Vietnamese civilians while cutting bamboo on southern end of Xuyen Long Island detonated a booby-trapped 81mm mortar round resulting in three (3) VN civilians being killed and two (2) being wounded.
Quang Tin	19Nov69	(BT 444096)	At approximately 0345 an estimated seven (7) to eight (8) VC destroyed a school house and medical building using satchel charges. There were negative casualties.
Quang Ngai	15Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BS 606873)	At approximately 1000, an unknown number of VC entered Binh Lien (V), Binh Son (D), killed Pham DUONG and abducted Doan QUOT. Both men were members of the People's Self Defense Force (nfi).
	15Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BS 608876)	CAP 1-3-10 reported that the hamlet chief of Lien Tre (3) was killed by the VC and an estimated three (3) VN male civilians were kidnapped. Villagers claimed there were 25 to 35 VC in the village at the time.

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Ngai	16Nov69	(BS 767471)	At approximately 2000, an unknown number of VC entered Thach Tru (H), Duc My (V), Mo Duc (D) and killed Tran CHUNG, a VN civilian (nfi).
	16Nov69	(BS 737520)	At approximately 2000, an unknown number of VC entered Thiet Truong (H), Duc Vinh (V), Mo Duc (D) and abducted six (6) VN civilians (nfi).
	19Nov69	(BS 617654)	At approximately 2115, an unknown number of VC sappers attacked Phu Bien (3) Refugee Camp defended by PF 108 and 116. VC fired several rounds of BL40 rockets and threw an unknown number of hand grenades into houses resulting in the wounding of six (6) VN civilians.

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 47-69**

1. **GENERAL.** Reported VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities reflected the continuation of emphasis on efforts to disrupt/destroy the GVN pacification program and concurrent intensification of efforts to incite political struggles and demonstrations against the GVN. No indications of success were registered in either endeavor.

Sabotage and terrorist activities remained at extremely low levels and reflected no significant changes from the previous week.

Miscellaneous reports of possible significance concern alleged enemy intentions to use counterfeit 500 piastre notes in the vicinity of Hue; immediate enemy military, political, and military proselyting missions in Phu Loc (D), Thua Thien (P); organization and mission of enemy armed propaganda detachments in Quang Nam (P); missions of the Quang Nam Province Unit, subsequent to the Fall Campaign; and activities of youth groups in Que Son (D), Quang Nam (P).

Captured documents, PW and rallier reports continue to reveal the effectiveness of GVN/Allied security and pacification programs in limiting the operational range of VCI cadre and their access to the populace, thereby denying the material and political support the enemy must obtain to accomplish his planned objectives.

Liberation radio, in an unusual admission of growing difficulties recently revealed that the pacification program in conjunction with other "demagogic tricks" such as "strengthened psywar, open-arms, surrender motivating efforts, and organized spy networks have caused and are causing our people and cadre many new difficulties in their daily life, tasks and combat". Although VC forces were said to have "continually defeated the enemy's pacification operations", the broadcast, in effect, warned the people to prepare for a prolonged struggle.

2. **INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.** Although no enemy intelligence gathering activities of specific counterintelligence interest were reported during the past week, various captured documents continue to reveal the importance that the VC/VCI associate with acquiring legal documentation for personnel and the proselyting of personnel with placement, access, and documentation to perform both selected and general surreptitious tasks in GVN/Allied controlled areas and organizations.

3. **SABOTAGE.** Reported incidents related to enemy sabotage activities in ICTZ remained at a low level and were oriented primarily against

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selected lines of communication.

Details of reported sabotage activities of the past week are as follows:

a. Quang Tri

At approximately 0200 on 14 November 1969, a culvert in Highway 1 vicinity (YD 222653) was blown by an estimated squad of VC. Culvert sustained 60% damage (nfi). (Ref: FSA, Quang Tri (P) msg 141500 Nov69)

b. Thua Thien

(1) At approximately 2000 on 17 November 1969, the VC blew up an electric pole vicinity Dong Tien (H) (YD 815181), Thuy Phuong (V), Huong Thuy (D). Damage to the pole was estimated to be 30 per cent (nfi). (Ref: PSA/PSD CORDS Thua Thien (P) Rpt # R-33/11191540)

(2) At approximately 1530 on 14 October 1969, acting on information from villagers, CACO 3-5 personnel located an explosive device on a section of railroad track vicinity (ZD 066013), two kilometers NW of Phu Loc. The apparatus was composed of 15 pounds of C-4 wired to two flashlight batteries. EOD was notified and destroyed the charge. (Ref: CAP Daily Opn Summary 141600-151600 Nov69)

c. Quang Ngai

At approximately 0530 on 19 November 1969, bridge vicinity (BS 815395) was damaged by approximately three (3) suspected VC sappers using 150 pounds of explosive. North abutment completely destroyed, 20% of bridge destroyed. (Ref: Americal TOC Spot Rpt #76, DTG 191155 Nov69)

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Enemy political and propaganda activities reported in ICTZ during the past week reflected concerted enemy emphasis on concurrently attempting to disrupt/destroy the GVN pacification program and intensification of efforts to foment dissent, demonstrations and political struggles against the GVN. No indications of success were registered in either endeavor.

Propaganda themes concentrated on anti-war dissent in the U.S.; rising prices of commodities in SVN, particularly food; travel restrictions; military conscription; various war inflicted damages and grievances; and the people's desire for peace.

Details of enemy political and propaganda activities reported during the past week are as follows:

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a. Quang Nam

(1) On 16 November 1969 elements of the 1st Marine Division while operating vicinity (AT 951588) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Directive, dated Oct 69, prepared for the signature of Xuan QUYNH, Assistant Political Officer of Unit 75 (probably Dien Ban District Unit, Quang Da Special Zone, Military Region 5), addressed to subordinate units, instructs addressees to initiate an emulation movement aimed at intensifying the elimination of tyrants (RVN officials) to gain control of the population during the forthcoming TD (possibly 1969 Fall-Winter) Campaign.

The document emphasizes that the annihilation of enemy village administrative personnel, pacification cadre, and People's Self-Defense Forces must be considered a main mission of village units and local force companies during the "TD" Campaign. "If proven a success, it will considerably strengthen our (VC) struggle in a future political solution (of the VN war)." (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-1992-69) (Eval: B-3)

(2) On 16 November 1969, the local National Police discovered a quantity of VC propaganda leaflets vicinity of Cam Ha (V) (BT 126572), Hieu Nhon (D).

The documents translated, read as follows:

The Vietnamese youth and students warmly welcome the American students who come out against NIXON's aggressive war in Vietnam. (Ref: PSA/PSD/CORDS Quang Nam (P) Rpt # R-56/11171724)

(3) The following is a full translation of a directive published by the Area 1 (Hoa Vang (D), QDSZ) Party Committee. Document was captured vicinity Hoa Loc (V), Hoa Vang (D), on 7 November 1969.

Page 1

Party Committee
Area 1
No _____

Directive

Subject/Increase the Political Struggle Activities

Parallel with the armed forces activities, the political struggle movement in the area has some changes. The struggle opposing pacification and protesting protection was previously maintained. The people's pride has a firm foundation.

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However the previous political struggle movement had many weaknesses: the struggle opposing the attempts of urgent pacification, the struggle of bailing out the people, and the struggle of attacking the enemy's movement were not strong. The spearhead of the political struggle was stopped before the difficult situation began, and it was kept from the people. The leadership of all the committees' ranks has not been increased to the appropriate level.

The political situation at the present time is very advantageous for us. The enemy is puzzled and has profound internal contradiction. Defeatism is spreading through their ranks. The troops and the puppet government long for peace. They are tired of war. They believe that THIEU and KY are whiling away their time. The people of all social classes in the cities are encouraged. They believe in and participate in the movement. Their political views lean toward the Provisional Revolutionary Government in the South. The above situation has given us the ability to step up the political struggle to achieve a large victory in the future.

In order to develop the above advantages, the Party's Current Affairs Committee has planned to increase the leadership at all levels, to make the political struggle movement reach a higher plateau in the future, aiming at defeating all of the enemy's plans from now until 20 December.

I. Mission Requirements: The struggle is aimed at destroying this oppression and holding the people and to lead them back to their old villages, to keep them away from pacification, to protect the life of the people, to protect the production, to maintain the law and everyday affairs of the people.

The mission in regards to Hoa Loc (V) and Hoa Hiep (V) together with the armed activity plan is the plan to lead the people in the struggle against pacification, the struggle to return the people to their old villages to live (according to the plan of returning the people to their old area), to oppose all forms of oppression, screaming denunciation against Communism, destruction of villages and hamlets council organizations, and the pacification program. To be determined to oppose the plan of pacification and concurrently to lead the people in the struggle to request the 4th, 5th, and 6th Groups of Hoa Loc (V) and Thuy Tu (H) of Hoa Hiep (V) to return to their old areas. When the armed forces start, the enemy's morale will be demoralized. We must lead the masses to struggle and to request them to return to their old villages. (We must force the enemy to agree to let the people go back to their area and to maintain their legal status.) In regards to Hoa Vinh (V), the main purpose of the struggle is to oppose the enemy's attempt to trick the people, to organize the education for the masses, and to maintain a stable situation. The people of the hamlet must not move away, nor let the enemy take them away.

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II. In order to realize the above requests, and to establish a firm law for the people, the Current Affairs plan is:

(1) To organize and lead a continuous struggle against the enemy's pacification program, to infiltrate posts, district seats, cities and combine with the enemy's military proselyting attack, requesting the enemy to satisfy future requirements of the people from now until 20 December 1969 (NLF anniversary (Founding)).

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a) Contents of the struggle penetrating the posts and pacification teams:

As for the ARVN: When the Americans withdraw, peace will return. Be happy as you will enjoy the peace, and you will be together with your families. The people will be glad also, as they want to return to their old villages in order to restore their lives and their lands. They do not want anyone to disturb their lives, and the people request you do not obey the tyrants and carry out their pacification plan, destroying their land agricultural produce. Let the people live in peace and rebuild their lives. The people request you do not shell the villages or rice paddies, you do not spray chemical poison destroying their agricultural produce, and to let the people go to and from their villages and to travel along the rivers and ferries freely. As for the Americans and South Korean troops, the people in South Vietnam are happy that you are going home to see your parents, wives and children again. The peace is going to rebuild. The Americans and South Koreans are going to go home. The Vietnamese people want to reestablish their lives. We request that during the forthcoming days, the Americans do not drop bombs, shell the villages, spray chemical poison destroying the agricultural produce, and let the people freely travel, work, fish and be authorized to go back to their old villages. We request you help save the starving families.

b) Formation of the Struggle: Continuously organize to reach all of the posts and pacification teams. Each person should go and complain frequently to these posts and teams. The main objectives are to motivate and convince these posts and teams when you arrive. Use reason to incite their sentiments, but avoid trouble that is disadvantageous. In this way we can create a legal position for the people in their struggle to return to their old villages, to work and travel freely on the rivers.

Don't be satisfied when the enemy uses their calming methods and hollow promises. In order to stop the struggle movement of the masses, we have to force the enemy into a concrete settlement.

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Depending on the situation at the Committee level, if they lead well they can guarantee that this struggle movement can have effective results, can break the enemy's pacification plan and concurrently spread out the people, and can build up the movement.

Upon receipt of this directive, the Committee levels must study it carefully, criticize the previous leadership, and organize the activities. Report the deploying plan and result of each phase to the Current Affairs Committee.

18Sept69

TM/TV

/s/ HUNG

(Ref: 7IT DTC 1stMarDiv Readout No 7th IT 39-11-69 dtd 14Nov69)

b. Quang Ngai

(1) On 14 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

As of 12 November 1969 the VC planned to open their Winter-Spring 69-70 Campaign with activities primarily directed toward creating favorable conditions for turning the Vietnamese people against the GVN, to include inciting the people to revolt against the GVN under the pretext of support for former General Duong Van MINH, which would eventually lead to a communist government in South Vietnam. The Winter-Spring Campaign was planned to be in two phases: the first from 1-25 Nov 69 and the second from 25 Nov to 25 Dec 69. Additionally, planned activities included intensive mortar attacks on airports and on ARVN/Allied Force units; increased ground attacks on GVN/Allied installations; increased attacks on public facilities within the cities, and increased assassinations of GVN national cadre. (Ref: Det D, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/C/EX/0099/69 dtd 14Nov69) (Eval: F-3)

(2) On 16 November 1969, an unknown number of VC entered Chau O Market, Binh Tuyen (V) (BT 475872) and distributed leaflets to the residents (nfi). (Ref: PSA/CORDS/PSD Rpt # R-22/11191140)

5. TERROR. Reported acts of terrorism continued at essentially the same low level as the previous week and reflected no significant change in tactics.

Details of terrorist activity conducted in ICTZ during the past week are listed in Appendix 1.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Thua Thien

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(1) On 9 November 1969, elements of the US Army 101st Airborne Division while operating vicinity (ZC 082977) removed a document from an enemy KIA which disclosed the following:

Directive, number 18/T-69, precedence (VC) FLASH, (VC) TOP SECRET, dated 1 Nov 69, with the signature block of Le CUONG for T-69 (possibly Phu Loc Party Committee, Thua Thien Province, Tri-Thien Region), outlines the immediate military, political, and military proselyting tasks to be carried out by subordinate party committees.

The document reveals that the anti-war movement is in full bloom in the United States. On 15 Oct 69, large scale demonstrations were staged by the American people to demand the entire withdrawal of US troops from SVN. Peace movements have been initiated throughout the world in support of our (VC) war resistance for national salvation. The enemy (US Government) will be compelled to push the de-Americanization of the SVN war and accelerate the withdrawal of US troops from SVN.

The confusion of the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) continues to grow. US servicemen awaiting their return home are no longer enthusiastic in the implementation of their missions, and Puppet (RVNAF) troops are demoralized, especially since US troops are being withdrawn. The morale of the enemy (GVN) administrative personnel is undermined by the defeats sustained (by the FWMAF/RVNAF), and some of them seek to make amends for their past anti-revolutionary actions.

The situation may evolve quickly in our favor. We are to urgently take advantage of present and future opportunities to inflict heavier defeats on the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) and promote the movement of the masses. We must improve political leadership. We are to make our personnel fully realize that we are on our way to a (decisive) victory, and that the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) will not recover from his situation of despair, although he will in the future intensify his military attacks, psychological and Chieu Hoi operations, and intelligence activities.

We (VC) are to overcome all hardships to make great strikes in the military, political, and military proselyting fields. To attain the above goal, T-69 will initiate one climaxing stage for overall attacks on the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) from GO/VX to AUAU/VX (possibly code for date), in implementation of the resolutions adopted by higher party committees.

In the military field, we are to kill the most loyal cadre of the (RVN) pacification teams and Self-Defense Forces. We are to annihilate (RVN) administrative and intelligence personnel; launch

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widespread attacks on enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) troops and cut off their routes of communication; and deliver retaliatory blows to the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) troops stationed in the areas recently pacified (by the GVN). Of primary importance is the expansion of guerrilla warfare to counter the (RVN) accelerated pacification program. Our forces in the border area (possibly of Phu Loc District) are to hold fast to their areas of responsibility to disrupt the operations conducted by enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) Special Forces, and to protect our corridors, logistic facilities, and base camps.

In the political field, we are to motivate the population to participate in the political struggles which will be promoted. The main slogans at present are: A halt to tax increase; better living conditions; and end of search-and-destroy operations. Political struggles will be later turned into anti-war struggles to demand the total withdrawal of US troops from SVN, the end of the SVN war, and overthrow of the Puppet Government (GVN). Seminars will be held in populated areas to instigate the population to rise up.

In the military proselyting field, we are to direct our military proselyting thrusts at the Puppet troops in the areas from which the US troops have withdrawn. We must incite troop revolts and increase the desertion and defection rate in the Puppet Army to accelerate its collapse.

We are further to focus our efforts on the procurement of food provisions and to take special measures to protect our funds, because a change in the enemy's (RVN) currency is expected.

The document finally instructs that (VC) revolutionary committees are to be immediately formed in enemy (GVN) controlled areas for the promotion of mass uprisings, because events (possibly RVN coup d'etats) may occur.

Envelope, number 27/T-69, precedence (VC) FLASH, classification (VC) TOP SECRET, dated 3 Nov 69, was addressed (possibly from Phu Loc District Unit Headquarters) to HV8. (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-1644-69) (Eval: B-3)

(2) On 9 November 1969, while operating vicinity (ZC 082977) elements of the US Army 101st Airborne Division removed a document from an enemy KIA which disclosed the following information:

Notebook, with entries made during October and November 1969, maintained by an individual of an unspecified district (possibly Phu Loc (D) Unit, Thua Thien Province, Tri-Thien Military Region), contains political lessons, resolutions, and activity plans.

In an undated entry, the document states that 17 staff members of (Phu Loc District) Headquarters have attended a recent

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political reorientation course designed to familiarize them with the future mission of the district. During November 1969, each village (of Phu Loc (D)) should increase its guerrilla strength by two squads to one platoon, and should initiate two to three combat actions. In addition, each village should conduct a seven-day training course for its guerrillas. The primary mission to be performed during November 1969 is to thwart the enemy's (RVN) pacification plan within the district. Whenever possible, the villagers should be instigated to overthrow the Puppet (RVN) administrations and establish people's administrations. Also, an average of 50 to 100 families of Puppet servicemen or civil servants should be contacted for proselyting purposes.

Final notes (undated) contain a resolution adopted by (Phu Loc) District Party Committee, which stipulates the tasks to be performed by subordinate units and villages during November 1969. These include the following:

(1) Continual attacks should be launched against tyrants (RVN local administrators) and against enemy ambush elements, especially US units which have recently arrived (in Phu Loc District). These attacks should be conducted by small elements which infiltrate deep inside the enemy areas. Each village should annihilate one enemy squad, assassinate three to five tyrants, and destroy one vehicle. Special Action units (of District) should coordinate with villages to harass strategic hamlets and disband the (RVN) inter-family organizations, especially in the Ban Phu Mon area. The number of secret guerrillas of the district should be increased to 150 members. Each village should also recruit three to ten youths and dispatch them to the district as replacements.

(2) Each village should have under its control five to seven in place agents (VC fifth columnists in RVNAF ranks). During the reported month, the entire district should fulfill criteria prescribed by (Tri-Thien) Region by purchasing and requisitioning a quantity of 80 metric tons (of rice). The amount of rice to be purchased should be 20 metric tons; and the amount of salt, eight metric tons. The District Economy Section should coordinate with various villages to ship 30 metric tons (of rice) to the jungle (unspecified). (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-1680-69) (Eval: B-3)

(3) On 18 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

The Hue City Headquarters Front has received 1,000,000\$SVN in counterfeit 500\$SVN bills. The Finance and Economy sections subordinate to the Hue City Committee will be issued an unknown amount of counterfeit money to purchase supplies and food, gain prestige among poor people by distributing money to them, and at the same time undermine the economy of the GVN.

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The counterfeit bills are blue in color and were printed in North Vietnam. The bills are rougher and less stiff than bills printed by the GVN. (Ref: Det B, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/B/CX/1225/69 dtd 18Nov69) (Eval: B-3)

b. Quang Nam

(1) On 5 November 1969, elements of the US Army Americal Division while operating vicinity (AT 944283) discovered enemy documents which revealed the following information:

(1) Circular, dated 30 Sep 69, signed by Nguyen chi CONG, Current Affairs Committee, District Youth Group HB.120 (possibly Que Son (D), Quang Nam Province), addressed to various village Youth Group Chapters, stated they they were to submit reports on their group activities to the District Youth Group no later than 8 Oct 69, and that the addressees were to accomplish the following missions:

Consolidate the executive committees of all Group Chapters.

Improve the ideology of youths and indoctrinate them on the criteria for Four-Good-Quality Group members.

Be prepared to attend a meeting to be conducted by the District Youth Group on 20 Oct 69.

Document also stipulates that each village is to provide the District with seven to ten youths as replacements, and to have a force of 15 to 20 guerrillas.

(2) Plan of activity, date 19 Oct 69, signed by Xuan HONG, Current Affairs Committee, HB.120 (possibly Que Son (D), Quang Nam Province), pertains to the criteria for Four-Good-Quality Group Chapters and members, and the recruitment of Vanguard Youths, with emphasis placed on recruiting female youths.

Document also comments that a number of Group members were demoralized and passive. Some of them shirked their duty and defected to the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF). (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-1729-69) (Eval: B-3)

(2) On 7 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 4 November 1969, a VC, ten-man, squad moved into the resettlement hamlet vicinity (BT 138462) and forced ten families to move to Xuan My (2) (H) vicinity (BT 1147). These families had moved from Xuan My (2) (H) two years ago to get away from the VC. The VC told the rest of the people not to work on the "Hill" (Baldy)

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because they were going to mortar the "Hill" and did not want the people to get hurt.

For the past two weeks the VC have been reconnoitering the area around Baldy at night. They have advanced up to the wire to observe fortifications and sentry procedures.
(Ref: 1st CIT CIR 218-69 dtd 15Nov69) (Eval: B-2)

III MAF SCI COMMENT: In another report of this incident, it was indicated that two of the families returned to the resettlement hamlet a few days after being moved to Xuan My (2). The reason the VC did not interfere with them returning, according to the report, was that they only wanted to demonstrate their ability to gain access to and control people, even in close proximity to GVN/Allied troop concentrations.

(3) On 16 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 12 November 1969, the VC in Dien Ban District Group organized a young sapper cell, led by THANH. The mission of the cell is to assassinate or abduct ARVN soldiers operating along the highway between Hoi An and Dien Ban. (Ref: Advisory Team #15, Quang Nam (P) INTSUM #318 period 150601H to 160600H Nov69) (Eval: DB C-3) (S2 F-3))

(4) On 16 November 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division while operating vicinity (AT 951588) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Directive, number 27/DQ, dated 20 Sep 69, signed by Nguyen ngoc LAM, Commanding Officer, Unit 70b (Chief, Political Staff Section, Quang Da Special Zone, Military Region 5), gives instructions for the organization of armed propaganda detachments, in order to meet urgent requirements dictated by the critical situation of the general offensive and uprising. Document brings out the following main points:

Organization and missions of armed propaganda detachments.

The characteristics and methods of operation and leadership.

Document stipulates that each district, city or local company is required to activate from one to three detachments, depending on the special situation of each locality. Each detachment consists of three to five men. Each spearhead sapper battalion or each infantry D (possibly battalion) is required to activate from three to five detachments.

The primary missions of these detachments are to proceed to populated areas under enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) control to spread propaganda on Party policy, and the victories of friendly (VC) units

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to instigate a hatred of the enemy among local inhabitants. These detachments must also annihilate tyrants (possibly meaning RVN officials) and destroy the local administration to accelerate the movement in designated areas. The primary zones of action of these detachments are the heavily populated areas, bus terminals, railway stations and those portions of lines of communication utilized by many travelers. (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-2003-69) (Eval: B-3)

(5) On 16 November 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division while operating vicinity (AT 951588) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Directive, dated 25 Sep 69, signed illegibly for Headquarters, Front 4, (AKA) Unit 44 (AKA Front 4, Quang Da Special Zone, Military Region 5), addressed to subordinate district, city and area units, pertains to the development of the guerrilla warfare movement throughout the Special Zone.

All village units were directed to send their cadre to two refresher courses to be held on 5 and 20 Oct (69). They should report to a newly (constructed) politico-military training school of the Front (4). Regarding political and military training for guerrillas, document directs that all members of guerrilla units must be trained on politics, guerrilla tactics, and how to produce ammunition and mines. Two training phases would be conducted, each lasting 10 days. To be successful in conducting training on sapper-engineer techniques for these guerrillas, Front (4) should send the cadre of D87 and Hai Van (Engineer Battalion) to Area 1 (possibly Area 1, Hoa Vang (D)); the cadre of D8 to Area 2 (possibly Area 2, Hoa Vang (D)); the cadre of the 91st (Sapper) Battalion to Duy Xuyen District; and the cadre of the 3rd Precinct (Unit, Da Nang City) to Area 3 (possibly Area 3, Hoa Vang (D)).

Document finally directs that the district units must forward their reports on the personnel strength of village units in the "white" (meaning areas already pacified by FVMAF/RVNAF) areas to Front 4 immediately. These district units were also requested to inform the Front of the number of replacements needed by village units in the "white" areas. (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-2039-69) (Eval: B-3)

(6) On 16 November 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division while operating vicinity (AT 951588) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Plan, classified (VC) Secret, number 190/BV, dated 19 Sep 69, signed by Mai THUAN for the Commanding Officer, Unit 70B (Chief, Political Staff Section, Quang Da Special Zone, Military Region 5)

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outlines security regulations to cope with the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) intelligence activity and psychological warfare, in particular the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program. The document indicates that political indoctrination sessions should be repeatedly conducted to heighten political awareness and a sense of responsibility to protect the Party and the (VC) Army. All personnel are required to strictly observe security regulations, and to properly handle classified documents in order to avoid their being captured by the enemy. Training sessions must be conducted to study directives on security maintenance by the Central Military Affairs Committee (possibly of COSVN) and Military Region (5) Party Committee.

Document stipulates that those comrades in charge of security should foster a close coordination with those personnel in the propaganda and training, and organization (sections) to solve their related matters. (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-2021-69) (Eval: B-3)

(7) On 19 November 1969, a three man sapper unit commanded by XUONG was located along Highway 1 from (BT 046614, 047610). The unit's mission is to assassinate GVN cadre and soldiers (nfi). (Ref: Advisory Team 15, Quang Nam (P) INTSUM 323 for the period 200601H to 210600H Nov69) (Eval: (DB NP C-2; S2 F-3)

c. Quang Tin

On 5 October 1969, elements of the PRU, Quang Tin Province while operating in Thang Sinh District, Quang Tin Province discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Document describing the exaggerated successes accomplished during the Fall Campaign (12-20 Aug69) and also outlined the future missions of the Quang Nam (GVN: Quang Tin) Province Unit as follows:

Annihilate the enemy (RVNAF) oppressive forces in order to consolidate friendly control over the populace.

Be prepared to attack the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) mobile forces and disrupt his pacification program.

Destroy his war materials, particularly armored vehicles and aircraft.

Activate village guerrilla B's (possibly platoons).

Store sufficient foodstuffs for four months.

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It was also disclosed that the main difficulty encountered by (Quang Nam Province Unit) in the past was the serious shortage of cadre, weapons and ammunition. (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-1875-69)

d. Quang Ngai

(1) On 7 November 1969, elements of the US Army Americal Division operating vicinity (BS 930250) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Circular, dated 4 Sep 69, signed by Duy HUNG, Command Committee, Unit 145 (possibly Duc Pho District Unit, Quang Ngai Province, Military Region 5), addressed to all subordinate units and agencies, states that in accordance with the decision of the People's Revolutionary Committee, (Quang Ngai) Province, they are to use the names of areas which were given by the People's Revolutionary Committee, Quang Ngai Province or were used in the first resistance against (the French). Under no circumstances are they to use the names given by the Puppet (GVN) Government.

Resolution, dated 15 Sep 69, prepared for the signature of Huu LANG, Commanding Officer, Unit 145, addressed to all subordinate units, provides an assessment of the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) defeats in 1969, and outlines the following missions in accordance with a directive of the Command Committee, Unit 130 (Quang Ngai Province Unit, Military Region 5):

(1) Continue conducting repeated attacks and uprisings in order to destroy strategic hamlets and villages, disorganize the "Puppet" (RVNAF) forces, and inflict heavy losses in personnel and war materials to the US forces.

(2) Promote the local guerrilla warfare and expand our (VC) control of cities and towns.

(3) Conduct advanced military training and improve the ideology of cadre and troops.

(4) Construct combat hamlets and villages and maintain control of the liberated areas.

Document also stipulates that Pho Thanh Village Unit is to activate a guerrilla B (platoon) consisting of 24 personnel, and recruit 130 hamlet guerrillas, 50 secret guerrillas, 250 militiamen, and 50 youths. In addition, it is also to activate one sapper A (squad), three engineer cells, one reconnaissance cell, one weapons and ammunition production cell, and two antiaircraft cells. (Ref: CDEC Log No 11-1750-69) (Eval: B-3)

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(2) On 11 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 7 November 1969, the Son Tinh District VC Committee held a conference vicinity of Suot La stream (BS 412816), Tra Nam (V), Tra Bong (D). Attending the conference were:

Nguyen HUONG - Son Tinh District Secretary
CHAU - Son Tinh District Economics Committee Chairman
Le PHONG - District Committee Member
Truong dinh TRONG - District Committee Member
Pham THAU - Chairman of the Son Ha District VC Committee

The purpose of the conference was to determine a secure area for the residents of western Son Tinh District and a safe place for VC cadre to live in order to avoid airstrikes and ARVN operations. The following areas were approved for the building of refugee camps and living areas for residents and VC cadre:

Dong Dien ricefield (BS 395800) to the Ta Bac stream vicinity (BS 372808) was to be used as refugee camps where residents would build homes and plant crops.

Luoi Cay mountain vicinity (BS 390787) and Nuoc mountain vicinity (BS 404780) would be used by VC cadre, as the area provided a secure place from ARVN operations.
(Ref: Det D, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/B/DX/1422/69 dtd 11Nov69)
(Eval: F-6)

APPENDIX

I. Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Tri	13Nov69 (Late Entry)	(YD 320529)	At approximately 2100, three (3) VC entered Nhan Bieu (H), Trieu-Thuong (V), Mai Linh (D) and abducted Mrs. Pham Thi CHAT, a VN civilian.
	15Nov69 (Late Entry)	(YD 095524)	An unknown number of individuals entered home of Tran GIONG and shot him in the head while he was sleeping. GIONG was a member of Cam Nghia (V) council. K-54 pistol shells were found at the scene.
Quang Nam	16Nov69	(BT 034778)	At approximately 2040 a 2½ ton truck belonging to the 11th Marines while returning VN club employees to Danang City received several rounds of SAF from an unknown location. Truck was in vicinity of German Hospital Ship, HELGOLAND. Only injury was sustained by the driver who was reportedly hospitalized with glass fragments in his eyes.
	17Nov69	(BT 016349)	At approximately 0230, an unknown number of VC entered Lanh Thuong (H), Son Lanh (V), Que Son (D) and destroyed nine (9) civilian homes (nfi).
	17Nov69	(BT 030583)	At approximately 1900, a civilian resident of Bang An Tay (H), Vinh Hao (V), Dien Ban (D) was killed by detonating a VC mine placed at the gate of his home (nfi).

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Nam	18Nov69	(AT 959689)	At approximately 1500, an unknown number of VC entered Bo Ban (H), Hoa Hung (V), Hieu Duc (D) and shot to death one (1) civilian, Tran DIEU (nfi).
	19Nov69	(BT 150539)	Vietnamese civilians while cutting bamboo on the southern end of Xuyen Long Island detonated a booby-trapped 81mm mortar round killing two (2) VN civilians and wounding one (1).
	19Nov69	(BT 147538)	Vietnamese civilians while cutting bamboo on southern end of Xuyen Long Island detonated a booby-trapped 81mm mortar round resulting in three (3) VN civilians being killed and two (2) being wounded.
Quang Tin	19Nov69	(BT 444096)	At approximately 0345 an estimated seven (7) to eight (8) VC destroyed a school house and medical building using satchel charges. There were negative casualties.
Quang Ngai	15Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BS 606873)	At approximately 1000, an unknown number of VC entered Binh Lien (V), Binh Son (D), killed Pham DUONG and abducted Doan QUOI. Both men were members of the People's Self Defense Force (nfi).
	15Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BS 608876)	CAP 1-3-10 reported that the hamlet chief of Lien Tre (3) was killed by the VC and an estimated three (3) VN male civilians were kidnapped. Villagers claimed there were 25 to 35 VC in the village at the time.

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Ngai	16Nov69	(BS 767471)	At approximately 2000, an unknown number of VC entered Thach Tru (H), Duc My (V), Mo Duc (D) and killed Tran CHUNG, a VN civilian (nfi).
	16Nov69	(BS 737520)	At approximately 2000, an unknown number of VC entered Thiet Truong (H), Duc Vinh (V), Mo Duc (D) and abducted six (6) VN civilians (nfi).
	19Nov69	(BS 617654)	At approximately 2115, an unknown number of VC sappers attacked Phu Bien (3) Refugee Camp defended by FF 108 and 116. VC fired several rounds of B40 rockets and threw an unknown number of hand grenades into houses resulting in the wounding of six (6) VN civilians.

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 47-69****1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY.**

a. There were 54 long range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 16-22 November 1969. These long range patrols reported 69 sightings and two contacts totaling approximately 650 enemy. Of this total, approximately 600 enemy were observed in the An Hoa and Que Son Mountain area of Quang Nam Province by teams from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion. The contacts and air and artillery strikes called by patrol teams resulted in 83 enemy KIA during the reporting period.

b. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion patrols operating in the vicinity of An Hoa and the Que Son Mountains continued to observe significant numbers of enemy during this reporting period. Over 600 enemy were observed in these areas moving in no discernible pattern. Artillery fire missions resulted in 76 enemy KIA for the reporting period.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY.

a. In the U. S. DMZ area the 101st Airborne Division (AM) sensors detected 39 targets during this reporting period. Two hundred seventy-seven rounds of artillery were fired in response resulting in negative BDA. Sensors located at XD 9167 were active during this reporting period.

b. Sensors monitored by the 101st Airborne Division (AM) out of the DMZ detected 73 targets which were responded to with 123 rounds of artillery. BDA was unobserved. Active sensors were located at XD 8950, XD 7765, and XD 7460.

c. Radio frequency and line sensors in the 1st Marine Division AO detected 45 targets which were responded to with 37 fire missions consisting of 203 mortar rounds, 196 artillery rounds and nine 106mm recoilless rifle rounds. BDA resulted in four VC KIA and the capture of two pounds of TNT, 7 Chicom grenades, and four M-79 rounds. Significant enemy movement continued this reporting period in the 26th Marines AO through the Danang Anti-Infiltration System. The majority of the movement occurs between 1900 and 0130.

d. Americal Division radio frequency and line sensors detected 38 targets during this reporting period. Twenty-six fire missions were called resulting in one VC killed by artillery in the vicinity of BT 131078. On 18 November 1969 D/1-46th Infantry, reacting to sensor detections, engaged an unknown number of enemy in the vicinity of Duc Pho resulting in four enemy KIA, two enemy captured in action, three individual weapons captured, and two Chicom grenades destroyed.

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ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO III MAF PERINTREP 47-69

A. REGISTERED MAIL

DIR, NSA	3	NILO HUE, BOX 9, AT-3, APO 96258	1
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1	NILO QUANG TRI, BOX 16, AT-19,	
CMC (ABQ)	2	APO 96495	1
CG FMFPAC	2		
CG USARV	1		
CG I FFORCEV	5		
CG II FFORCEV	1		
CG 25TH INF DIV	1		
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1		
CG MCDEC	1		
CG 5TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CAL	6		
CG 4TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CAL	1		
CG 3RD MAW	2		
CO 5TH SFG (AEN)	2		
CO "B" 5TH USSF GROUP (AEN)	5		
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1		
CO MCB 3	1		
CO MCB 6	1		
CO MCB 8	1		
CO MCB 10	1		
CO MCB 53	1		
CO MCB 58	1		
CO MCB 62	1		
CO MCB 71	1		
CO MCB 133	1		
CO USS REPOSE	1		
CO USS SANCTUARY	1		
CO MHTG-30, MCAF, SANTA ANA,			
CALIF 92709	1		
DSA II CORPS	1		
CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GRP,			
7TH FLEET	1		
CMDR, 13TH CI TM, CAMPEN, CAL	1		
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1		
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1		
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2		
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1		
CTF 76	1		
CO USASSD ACSI DA (ATTN DOD SPEC-			
REP) MACV APO SF 96222	4		
HQ, 12TH TAC FTR WING (ATTN ARMY			
GRD LIAISON OFF) APO SF 96326	1		
NILO CHU LAI, NAVAL ADVISOR, BOX			
230, NSAD FPO 96696	1		
NILO, HOI AN, DRAWER 18, ADVISORY			
TEAM 15, APO 96349	1		

B. BY COURIER

COMUSMACV (MACV J-232) (CIIED)	2
COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4
COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2
COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2
CICV	2
CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN	10
CG 1ST MARDIV DNG RVN	40
CG 3D MARDIV DGH RVN	26
CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN	30
CG 101ST AEN DIV (AM) CEA RVN	20
CG 1ST MAW DNG RVN	30
CG 2D BDE ROKMC HAN RVN	7
CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CG USASUPCOM DNG RVN	1
CG 173D AVN BDE	2
CG FORLOG CMD DNG RVN	5
CG 1ST LOG CMD LEN	2
CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CG 9TH MAB	1
CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHL RVN	3
CO 30 NCR	1
CO "C" 5TH USSF GRP (AEN)	17
CO 1ST CAG	1
CO 3RD CAG	1
CO 4TH CAG	1
CO 1ST BN, 525TH MI DET	25
CO 517TH MI DET	1
CO MCB 40	1
CO MCB 121	1
CO 4TH PSYOP GRP	1
DSA I CORPS	11
CMDR, 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SGN RVN	3
COMNAVFORV	1
COMNAVSUPACT DNG RVN	2
GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2
OSA/EMB SGN RVN	1
DET B, 1ST MIBARS	1
CIB	1

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CO MCB 7 CHL RVN	1
CTG 76.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTF 115	1
7TH AIR FORCE (IGS) BDCG	1
45TH ENGR GRP	1
620TH TCS APO 96203	1
366TH AIR SEC SQD, USAF	2
620TH TSC	1
SPO-SEC CMD QHN RVN	1

C. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (WITHIN HQ, III MAF)

FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP CofS, PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	43
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (C/O G-3)	2
2D ROKMC BDE LIAISON OFFICER	1
PSYOPS	5
1ST RADIO BN	11
HORN DASC	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO	1

D. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

CO 1ST MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 3RD MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 2ND CAG	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
HQ 212TH CMBT AVN BN	6
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
CTG 115.1	1
CCN	1
USNAD	1
DIR CAP	1
7TH PSYOP BN	1
1ST FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
3RD FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
CO MCB 74	1

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ROUTING SHEET (5511)
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ROUTING—Use numbers to show order of routing

OPERATION CODE

X-ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE
AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET

A-FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION

B-FOR COMPLIANCE

C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE

OF

D-FOR COMMENT

E-FOR RECOMMENDATION

F-FOR CONCURRENCE

G-FOR INFORMATION

H-RETURN TO

I-

J-DISPOSITION

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE		INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
		IN	OUT		
					COMMANDANT
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2 <i>RR</i>
					G-3
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
					JOINT CONTROL
					WOMEN MARINES
					STAFF DENTAL
					STAFF MEDICAL
					STAFF CHAPLAIN
					CLASSIFIED FILES

19 12/11 12/15

PERMANENT RETENTION
Report Destruction to HQ Classified Files Sect. (Code ABQ)

DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS
(AGENCY HAVING PRIMARY INTEREST COMPLETE)

REQUEST FOR PERMANENT RETENTION (COPY) (BUCKTAG COPY)

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DESTROY AFTER ROUTING (No record or information value)

RETAIN BUCKTAG COPY PERMANENTLY IN FILE (Will be screened for further disposition when due for retirement and transferred to Federal Records Center unless otherwise indicated.)

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(If no distribution indicated, extra copies will be destroyed after 30 days.)

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
ACTION OFFICE:

REMARKS (Entries to be signed and dated. For lengthy comments attach separate page and indicate "Bucktag Comment Attached." Do not assign separate Control Number to Bucktag Comments.)

*P.R. to Hist after Sailing*RETURN TO ABQ
UPON COMPLETION OF ROUTINGDO NOT DETACH—THIS FORM IS A PERMANENT
PART OF THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH IT IS
ATTACHEDMATERIAL
ATTACHED IS**CONFIDENTIAL**

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CNC
 2 December 1969



GROUP - 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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HQ III MAF, G-2
 DANANG, RVN
 2 December 1969
 Ser: 0131769

PERINTREP 48-69

Period covered: 230001H - 292400H November 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, ND 48-13
 ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. There were significant reductions in most indicators of enemy activity during the past week. Incoming totaled 135 rounds, a sharp decline from the 537 recorded last week; a new low total. The previous low was 194 rounds during the week ending 4 January 1969. The number of enemy initiated ground incidents followed the trend by dropping to 141, a decrease of 64 and the lowest number recorded since the week of 26 October 1968 when there were 140 recorded. The low level of activity continued to be reflected in the number of KIA's, 549, less than one-half of last week's total of 1,171. Prisoners of war statistics experienced the greatest decline, dropping from 255 to 41 (24 FWMAF, 17 ARVN). The number of Hoi Chanhs continued to rise, however, with a new high of 295 established.

No significant changes in VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities were reported during the past week. Captured documents, rallier and PW reports of the past week continue to reveal increasing evidence that the enemy is experiencing acute difficulties generated primarily by the VCI's increasing inability to procure the materiel and political support required from the South Vietnamese people. Aside from various reports mentioning enemy preparations for possible increased military activity during the period 19-23 December and large scale offensive efforts during TET '70 in conjunction with intensified political and proselyting activities, VC/VCI emphasis continues to be focused primarily on anti-pacification policies and tactics and the collection of food and provisions. Despite continued failure by the enemy to generate any success relative to his plans of promoting widespread anti-GVN dissent and military desertions or defections, the threat, nevertheless, remains as long as VCI elements remain organized and popular frustrations generated by the war provide circumstances favorable to enemy exploitation.

a. QUANG TRI (P). Action in QUANG TRI Province was light and scattered during the past week. There was one attack by fire on the 26th when DONG HA Combat Base received six unknown type rockets resulting in negative casualties or damage. On the 23d, 10 kilometers south of BA LONG (YD 187-306), a company of the 1st ARVN Division made contact with an estimated enemy platoon, probably an element of the 7th Front. The heaviest contact of the week occurred on the 27th, eight kilometers northwest of CAM LO

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(YD 061643), when C/1-61st Infantry supported by B-1/61 and A-1/11 contacted an unknown size enemy force probably elements of the 27th NVA Regiment. The action resulted in 23 enemy killed.

Several agent reports have revealed that the enemy may be attempting to build up his forces in northern QUANG TRI Province. One report indicates that on 16 November, the 54th Regiment, 320th NVA Division with a strength of approximately 1,300 personnel moved into an area eight kilometers north of GIO LINH (YD 214818 - YD 232816) and is planning to conduct future operations within this province. It is possible that this report refers to the 52d Regiment of the 320th Division which operated in the DMZ in 1968 because the 54th Regiment is not currently held in III MAF Order of Battle. Another agent report indicates that the 304th NVA Division is located in the western DMZ area vicinity (XD 676673) with an estimated strength of 2,500 men. This figure, however, would indicate a regimental sized unit. Both the 9th and 24B Regiments have operated in the DMZ and western QUANG TRI Province. Another agent report has revealed that on 21 November the 5th Battalion, 812th Regiment, 324B NVA Division moved from vicinity (YD 042258) to vicinity (YD 288332) to attack a military base in HAI LANG District, QUANG TRI Province. This is the first indication of elements other than the 6th Battalion of the 812th Regiment operating in the 7th Front area since 1968.

b. THUA THIEN (P). There was no significant activity reported in THUA THIEN Province during the reporting period. The enemy appears to be avoiding contact, and is probably attempting to rest and refit his units in preparation for possible future operations.

c. QUANG NAM (P). QUANG NAM Province was relatively quiet this week with action limited primarily to friendly initiated contacts against small groups of enemy in the southeastern corner of the province. The ROKMC continued search and clear operations on BARRIER Island southeast of HOI AN, where two meeting engagements with possible elements of the V.25 MF Battalion resulted in 10 VC killed with no friendly casualties. In the lowlands north and east of AN HOA (AT 842455), artillery fire missions and patrolling accounted for 83 enemy KIA, probably elements of the LF units known to be operating in the area. The 1/7 Marines, continuing operations in the QUE SON Mountains, uncovered a complex on 27 and 28 November, eight kilometers northwest of QUE SON (AT 967390). The complex, consisting of caves, huts and bunkers is in the same area as the recently discovered installation believed to be the 78th Hospital. Items found included two cases of surgical instruments, an operating table and other items indicating that this find is probably also part of the 78th Hospital. Translations of documents captured in the area during the past and prior weeks have identified the following additional enemy units. The Q.78th Dispensary (AKA DUY XUYEN District Dispensary); 21st AA Company, 36th Regiment; Political Section, Area Schools, Front 4; 69th Replacement Battalion; 1st Company (AKA 6th Co), 2d Bn, 36th Regt; 2d Co, 222d Trans Bn, 220th Trans Regiment; 2d Company, 160th Trans Bn; and C.25 (Flamethrower Company), 36th Regiment. Caches of rice continue to be uncovered as the 2/7 Marines on 26 and 28 November discovered a total of 7,000 pounds buried in baskets along a trail six kilometers east of QUE SON vicinity (BT 100360). A light probe with small arms fire and grenades by an estimated 10 enemy against M/3/1 Marines in night defensive positions 11 kilometers south of the DANANG Airbase (AT 988632) occurred on 27 November. The company returned fire with

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organic weapons and the enemy withdrew leaving five dead, possibly from LF units. Also on the 27th, the 80th PF Platoon in night defensive positions in AI NGHAI Hamlet (AT 921577) received five 82mm mortar rounds resulting in two civilians killed and 13 PF's and civilians wounded. The Q.83 LF Company is reported as having an 82mm mortar and may have been involved in the attack.

d. QUANG TIN (P). Eastern QUANG TIN Province was the scene of numerous contacts between ARVN and RF units and small groups of enemy, generally west of TAM KY (BT 320215). In seven separate contacts throughout the week, ARVN Cavalry units, RF, and PF units accounted for over 45 enemy with negligible friendly casualties. The enemy units were probably elements of the 3d NVA Regiment or LF and MF units known to be operating in the area. The heavier contacts included an engagement between the 238th and 928th RF Companies 10 kilometers southwest of TAM KY (BT 230164) with possible elements of the 2d Battalion, 3d NVA Regiment resulting in 17 enemy KIA. The 21st ARVN Ranger Battalion ambushed an USEF seven kilometers southeast of QUE SON (BT 092305) on the 27th, again possibly elements of the 3d Regiment or the V.15 LF Company, with 12 enemy KIA and no friendly casualties reported.

Other actions throughout the week included an incident on 26 November when an estimated enemy squad destroyed 10 houses in a hamlet four kilometers south of TAM KY (BT 339179). This tends to confirm reports that squad sized elements of the 409th Sapper Battalion are operating in the TAM KY Area. Earlier in the week, the TIEN PHUOC MSF Company was ambushed by an estimated platoon on 25 November, seven kilometers northeast of TIEN PHUOC (BT 167168). It is possible that the ambush was set by an element of the 3d NVA Regiment.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Action in QUANG NGAI was very light, with no significant events reported after the 25th. The several friendly initiated contacts resulted in 20 enemy KIA with negligible friendly casualties. ARVN and PF units accounted for 15 while elements of the 1-52d Infantry killed five while on a clear and search mission eight kilometers southwest of BINH SON (BS 542865) on 13 November. The following day 2/6th ARVN operating in the same general location contacted an USEF accounting for another five. Both actions involved possible elements of the 21st Regiment. Contact with a probable element of the 38th LF Battalion was established on the 25th when the 13th PF Platoon ambushed an USEF 10 kilometers northwest of MO DUC (BS 666632) resulting in five VC KIA and no friendly casualties.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. Enemy initiated activity in ICTZ was limited to several attacks by fire and light ground probes, probably as a result of the adverse weather conditions which prevailed over the area. Friendly initiated activity, in which ARVN and RF/PF units are playing a major role, seems to be keeping the enemy off balance in the coastal lowlands of SICTZ. This may have thwarted any immediate plans for stepping up action during his planned Winter-Spring Offensive. The enemy seems to be concentrating on gathering and storing rice, and avoiding contact with ARVN and FVMAF while attempting to regroup and prepare for future actions. Except for activity in northern QUANG TRI Province and central QUANG TIN Province, there has been no contact with NVA forces. The MF/LF units continue to bear the brunt of

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the action while the regular NVA forces remain out of contact.

There are few indications in I Corps at the present time which point to an early renewal by the enemy of major offensive actions. Therefore, it is estimated that enemy initiated activity will continue at the present low level during the coming week.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents decreased from 205 to 141 for the week of 23-29 November. These incidents consisted of two ground attacks (one of which was company size or larger and one platoon size or smaller), one ambush, two attacks by fire, 73 harassing fire incidents, 45 mining and booby trap incidents, two hamlet harassment incidents, three assassination incidents, no espionage incidents, three kidnapping incidents, nine propaganda incidents and one sabotage incidents

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire decreased from 85 to 49 incidents for the reporting period and seven aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 23-29 November.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Expendeds</u>
82mm Mortar	47
81mm Mortar	2
60mm Mortar	57
Unk Cal Mortar	28
122mm Rocket	1
	<u>135</u>

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week 23-29 November.

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t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed	18	Structures Damaged	2
Bunkers Destroyed	9	Secondary Fires	8
Secondary Explosions	11		

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ decreased in comparison to the previous week. There were 549 KIA's, 27 VC PW's, 14 NVA PW's, and 295 Hoi Chanh's.

e. Morale. No change.

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No change.

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

Temperature	<u>QUANG TRI</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature				
High	80	74	77	78
Low	60	60	66	63
Rainfall (total)	3.76	4.78	3.24	5.06
Winds (knots)	11	10	7	9
Visibility (miles)	5	4	6	5

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 29 November - 4 December 1969

(a) General. The moderate increase in the basic northeasterly flow is expected to diminish after the middle of the week. Thereafter, coastal wind will return to a more normal 10-15 knots.

(b) ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the period is generally cloudy with intermittent rain and fog. Precipitation in ICTZ will be approximately one to three inches with isolated instances of four to five inches.

j. - l. Negative

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(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, Rocket Ammunition

<u>Type</u>	<u>Amount</u>
120mm Mortar	57
82mm Mortar	148
81mm Moratr	50
60mm Mortar	20
155mm Artillery	2
105mm Artillery	8
106mm RR	1
	<u>286</u>

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	150
Crew-Served Weapons	46

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 23-29 November:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
22 Nov	(YD 904108)	50	CAP 3-1-3
23 Nov	(AT 943329)	15 (Salt)	L/3/7
23 Nov	(AU 820047)	450	G/2/26
23 Nov	(AT 981379)	75	K/3/7
23 Nov	(AT 963238)	700	RCN/4/31
23 Nov	(BS 445758)	1,150	D/3/1
24 Nov	(AT 887814)	80	L/3/26
25 Nov	(BT 131408)	500	H/2/7
25 Nov	(BS 453761)	3,900	D/3/1
26 Nov	(BT 098359)	3,000	H/2/7
27 Nov	(BT 056448)	1,000	H/2/7
27 Nov	(BT 023397)	1,000	M/3/7
28 Nov	(YD 862242)	40	CAP 3-3-2
29 Nov	(BT 100360)	700	F/2/7
29 Nov	(BT 194260)	2,340	C/2/1
29 Nov	(BS 392653)	210	C/3/1
29 Nov	(BS 900207)	300	RCN/4/21
29 Nov	(BS 897208)	400	RCN/4/21
29 Nov	(BT 162252)	500	D/2/1
29 Nov	(BT 153246)	300	F/8th Cav
29 Nov	(BT 185225)	6,000	C/2/1
29 Nov	(AT 966394)	90	B/1/7
29 Nov	(BT 092457)	3,000	G/2/7
29 Nov	(BS 875295)	30	C/4/21
	Total Rice	<u>24,415</u>	
	Total Salt	15	

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4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire, limited ground attacks and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone, with emphasis on the pacification effort.

b. Conduct terrorism against selected GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following courses of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to four infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(3) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with the equivalent of up to six infantry regiments supported by three rocket battalions and four sapper battalions.

(5) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with five infantry battalions, three sapper battalions and two artillery battalions.

(6) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of three infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one artillery battalions.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment (+) at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to four infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

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g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

1. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's, and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Continuing shortages of food and medical supplies coupled with sickness and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.



J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE

ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS,
AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY

ANNEX E - DECEMBER WEATHER BRIEF

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z.

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 48-69 AS OF 292400H NOVEMBER 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL		
NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA				
NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	
UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>												
MR-hq	1	650				1	650			1	650	
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue								1	855	1	855	
Front HQ's	2	750				2	750	1	UNK	3	750	
Div HQ's	2	565				2	565	1	580	3	1,145	
Regt HQ's	11	3,340	1	190		12	3,530	16	7,885	28	11,415	
Bn's-Maneuver	41	9,720	10	1,665	3	620	54	12,005	44	18,610	98	30,645
Bn's-Support	18	4,725	2	370	1	195	21	5,290	10	2,480	29	7,770
Separate Co's	1	130			32	2,315	34	2,445			34	2,445
TOTAL CONFIRMED		19,880		2,225		3,130	25,235		30,410		55,645	
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's								1	400	1	400	
Bn's-Maneuver	3	830	1	350	1	190	5	1,370	1	450	6	1,820
Bn's-Support	4	1,035					4	1,035	4	1,130	8	2,165
Separate Co's	1	90			1	75	2	165			2	165
TOTAL PROBABLE		1,955		350		265	2,570		1,980		4,550	
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>												
MR TT-HQ (FWD*)								1	150	1	150	
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's								1	350	1	350	
Regt HQ's								2	800	2	800	
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support								17	4,950	17	4,950	
Separate Co's									440	3	440	
TOTAL POSSIBLE									6,690		6,290	
21,835		2,575		3,395		27,805		39,080		66,885		

21,835

2,575

3,395

27,805

39,080

66,885

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		<u>NVA</u>	<u>MF/VC</u>	<u>LF/VC</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,110		35	3,145
	Probable	345			345
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,455</u>		<u>35</u>	<u>3,490</u>
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,350		475	3,825
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,350</u>		<u>475</u>	<u>3,825</u>
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	5,660	1,275	555	7,490
	Probable	705	350		1,055
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>6,365</u>	<u>1,625</u>	<u>555</u>	<u>8,545</u>
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,755	615	700	4,070
	Probable	380		265	645
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,135</u>	<u>615</u>	<u>965</u>	<u>4,715</u>
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	5,005	335	1,365	6,705
	Probable	525			525
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>5,530</u>	<u>335</u>	<u>1,365</u>	<u>7,230</u>

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

I CORPS

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS

MANEUVER	<u>NVA</u>				<u>VC/MF</u>				<u>VC/LF</u>				<u>ICTZ TOTAL</u>											
	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	35	0		35	7			7	3			3	45			45	41	1		42	86	1		87
SAPPER	6	3		9	3	1		4		1		1	9	5		14	3	0		3	12	5		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	41	3		44	10	1		11	3	1		4	54	5		59	44	1		45	98	6		104
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	8	1		9	1			1	1			1	10	1		11	2	3	7	12	12	4	7	23
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	2			2									2			2	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	5
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																	1			1	1			1
ENGR	2			2									2			2	1		2	3	3		2	5
TRANS	1	1		2									1	1		2	2		1	3	3	1	1	5
SIG	2	1		3									2	1		3	1		2	3	3	1	2	6
MED	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		3	4	2	1	3	6
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1								
TOTAL SUPPORT	18	4		22	2			2	1			1	21	4		25	10	4	17	31	31	8	17	56
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	59	7		66	12	1		13	4	1		5	75	9		84	54	5	17	76	129	14	17	160

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	<u>QUANG TRI</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>THUA THIEN</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG NAM</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG TIN</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG NGAI</u>	<u>STR</u>
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	221	Nam Hoa	50	Hoa Vang	812	Thang Binh	870	Binh Son	318
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	56	Hieu Duc	38	Tam Ky	442	Son Tinh	380
	Trieu Phong	113	Hong Dien	69	Dien Ban	1,090	Ly Tin	168	Tu Nghia	429
	Cam Lo	85	Vinh Loc	43	Dai Loc	332	Hiep Duc	117	Nghia Hanh	336
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	230	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	289	Mo Duc	435
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	295	Hau Duc	187	Duc Pho	523
	Huong Hoa	8	Phu Vang	11	Que Son	969			Tra Bong	166
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	97	Duy Xuyen	1,060			Ba To	115
			Huong Thuy	71	Hieu Nhon	279			Minh Long	77
			Phong Dien	528					Son Ha	200
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	807	THUA THIEN	1,201		4,995		2,073		2,979

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,055

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6. Order of Battle listing

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
12th AT Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,035			
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	21Jul68	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	21Jul68	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	21Jul68	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	21Jul68	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	21Jul68	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	21Jul68	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	570	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8337/18Jun69(P)
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,925			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	575	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8723/3Jul69(P)
4th Bn	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8754/26Jun69(P)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8632/29Jun69(P)
6th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8754/26Jun69(P)
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	XD 8440/5Apr68(P)
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	XD 8440/5Apr68(P)

*See note #4 on page A-17

**See note #2 on page A-17

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300			
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,300			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH SZ	6Mar69	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	6Mar69	
4th Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	6Mar69	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300			
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	XD 8241/8Feb68(P)
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,300	BA 611		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	400	BA 611	6Jun69	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	300	BA 611	6Jun69	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	300	BA 611	6Jun69	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	300	BA 611	6Jun69	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
17th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
19th DKZ Bn (122mm Rkt)	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	YD 0565/22Apr69(P)
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	
1st Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	YD 0363/21Apr69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	450	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	YD 0566/22May69(P)
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 9963/17May69(P)
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 9862/17May69(P)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 8826/15Jun68(P)
6th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 8435/2Jun68(H)
7th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
8th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
9th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
138th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	
1st Bn	NVA	C	450	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	450	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	YD 1675/24Oct68(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	450	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	
270th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	YD 2474/8Jun69(P)
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	YD 1873/16May69(P)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	
6th Bn	NVA	C	450	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	YD 1970/18Jun69(P)
27th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,155			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 0562/27Mar69(D)
1st Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 1267/24Sep69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	165	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 0563/16Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 0463/1May69(P)
31st Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	790			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	20Dec68	YD 1667/19Nov69(P)
27th Bn	NVA	C	190	VINH LINH SZ	21May69	YD 0970/18Nov69(P)
15th Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	6Jul69	YD 0264/7Jun69(P)

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,955			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	710	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	
1st Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	YD 9661/5Sep69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	375	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	YD 0063/7Aug69(D)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH SZ	20Jun69	YD 2167/17Jun69(P)
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	YD 2664/17Jan69(P)
Tri-Thien-Hue MR Hq	NVA	C	1,675	Unlocated	20Dec68	
6th Regt (-) (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YD 0309	11Oct69	YD 3011/13May69(D)
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	11Oct69	YD 1813/1 Oct69(H)
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	11Oct69	YD 6823/23Aug68(C)
9th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 9716/3Jun68(C)
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	4Jul69	YC 5097/30Mar69(D)
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 4594/14Apr69(C)
29th Regt (325C Div)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	BA 611	6Jun69	YC 4094/15Jun69(C)
7th Bn	NVA	C	450	BA 611	6Jun69	YC 3298/20May69(P)
8th Bn	NVA	C	450	BA 611	6Jun69	YC 3298/20May69(P)
9th Bn	NVA	C	450	BA 611	17Aug69	YC 3298/23Jul69(P)
803rd Regt (324B Div)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 4517/19May68(C)
1st Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 5521/22May68(C)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 2763/4Mar68(C)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	15Oct69	YD 3300/15Jul69(C)
812th Regt (-) (324B Div)	NVA	C	1,400			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	16May69	
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	16May69	YD 4339/15Aug68(C)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	16May69	YD 4368/29Aug68(C)

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
246th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,565			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	14Mar69	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	14Mar69	YD 1259/11Jul69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	325	XD 9265	14Mar69	XD 8362/60Oct69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	14Mar69	XD 8637/27Jul68(P)
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	300	XD 8854	12Jul69	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049		
7th Front (MRTTH)	NVA	C	1,350			
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	17Apr69	YD 4541/16Oct69(C)
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	16May69	YD 3040/16May69(P)
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	6Jun69	YD 1943/8Sep69(P)
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	6Jun69	YD 3837/27Oct69(P)
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	175	YD 3339	6Jun69	YD 1931/6Nov69(H)
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	105	Vic YD 3535	6Jul69	YD 3141/16Oct69(P)
*K-34 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	240	Vic YD 2730	14Jun69	YD 3537/20Sep69(P)

*See note #3 on page A-17

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
TRI-THIEN-HUE MILITARY REGION						
4th Regt	NVA	C	880			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	12Jun68	ZC 0893/19Jun69(P)
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	270	Vic ZC 1597	12Jun68	ZD 1901/19Jun69(P)
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	260	Vic YC 9694	12Jun68	ZC 0993/17Jul69(P)
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,410			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	15Aug69	YC 6382/20Mar69(P)
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	330	Vic YD 7900	15Feb69	YC 9197/15Oct69(P)
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	160	Vic YD 6514	15Feb69	YD 4503/15Oct69(P)
#439th Bn	NVA (PEND)		400	Vic YD 7500	5Nov69	YD 9399/ 9Nov69(D)
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	15Aug69	YC 5982/20Jul69(H)
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	15Feb69	YC 6682/20Jul69(H)
*K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	20Mar69	YC 5879/20Mar69(P)
6th Regt (-)						
806th Bn	NVA	C	350	Vic YD 3304	19Jun69	YD 5226/8Sep69(P)
K.12 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	20Jun69	YD 3507/13May69(P)
*K-35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	18Sep69	YD 6713/12Aug69(P)
C.113 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 4032	1Jan68	YD 5339/10Nov69(P)
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	1Jan68	YD 6234/13Sep68(C)
C.115 Co	LF	C	65	Vic YD 6623	1Jan68	YD 6625/3Jan69(P)
C.116 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 8420	1Jan68	YD 7706/19Sep69(P)
PHU LOC Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	1Jan68	AU 8208/20Oct69(H)

Pending, however, not accepted in OOB holdings by MACV. Not included in totals.

*See note #3 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	QUANG NAM PROVINCE		EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
			EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION		
Front L	NVA	C	UNK			
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	ZC 1341	12Oct69	ZC 1966/11Nov69(P)
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Unlocated	25May69	ZC 1329/17Nov69(P)
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	AT 9656		
577th Rocket Bn	NVA	C	300	AT 8042	7Jun69	ZC 1942/20Nov69(HC)
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	4Aug69	AT 9937/14Sep69(HC)
Hai Van Engr/Sapper	NVA	PR	200	AT 8686	11Apr69	AT 8289/12Sep69(HC)
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	C	90	AT 8990		AT 8789/10Sep69(P)
31st Regt, 341st NVA Div	NVA	C	1,005			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 8770	24Jun69	AT 8964/11Apr69(C)
102nd Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 8770	24Jun69	ZC 2040/20Oct69(P)
103rd Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 8770	24Jun69	BT 1133/12Nov69(P)
36th Regt, 308th NVA Div	NVA	C	610			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	165	AT 9737	14Sep69	AT 9738/14Sep69(P)
1st Bn	NVA	C	135	AT 9737	14Sep69	AT 9956/4Sep69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	155	AT 9737	14Sep69	BT 1452/17Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	135	BT 1252	27Sep69	AT 9739/7Oct69(P)
90th Regt, 324B NVA Div	NVA	C	1,065			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1835	23Jul69	ZC 1636/12Oct69(P)
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	ZC 1835	23Jul69	ZC 1639/23Nov69(P)
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1835	23Jul69	ZC 2042/20Oct69(P)
9th Bn	NVA	C	50	ZC 1835	23Jul69	AT 9939/7Nov69(P)
*141st Regt, 312th NVA Div	NVA	C	1,190			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YC 8360	14Nov69	AT 8355/21Apr69(C)
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	YC 8360	14Nov69	ZC 1860/22Sep69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	YC 8360	14Nov69	ZC 1958/1Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	YC 8360	14Nov69	AT 8769/12Sep69(HC)
573rd Rocket Bn	NVA	C	300	Unlocated	14Oct69	
575th Rocket Bn	NVA	C	300	ZC 1960	15Oct69	ZC 2060/31Oct69(P)

* A detachment of 141st, reportedly consisting of 20-30 men from each Battalion, remains in the eastern portion of Base Area 127 (ZC 1861). Their mission is to provide security, gather rice and maintain the Regiments base camps in anticipation of the 141st Regiments return in the Spring of 1970 to participate in the Spring Offensive.

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
1st Regt, 2nd Div	MF	C	685			
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 7930	12 Sep 69	AT 8030/30 Oct 69 (P)
40th Bn	MF	C	175	AT 7930	12 Sep 69	ZC 1925/20 Oct 69 (P)
60th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	12 Sep 69	AT 8830/13 Sep 69 (P)
90th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	12 Sep 69	ZC 1926/30 Sep 69 (HC)
R.20 Bn	MF	C	145	BT 0763	14 Jun 69	BT 0964/16 Oct 69 (C)
V.25 Bn	MF	C	125	BT 1851	16 Jun 69	BT 2050/12 Nov 69 (P)
D.3 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	21 Aug 69	AT 9954/3 Nov 69 (HC)
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	AT 9856	10 May 69	BT 1648/17 Nov 69 (P)
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	10 Jun 69	AT 9842/14 Nov 69 (P)
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	12 Sep 69	AT 8589/12 Sep 69 (HC)
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752		BT 1350/16 Nov 69 (P)
Q.81 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1053		BT 0548/12 Nov 69 (P)
Q.82 Co	LF	C	115	BT 0059		BT 0158/18 Oct 69 (P)
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057		AT 8558/1 Nov 69 (P)
Q.84 Co	LF	C	50	AT 9069		ZC 2165/31 Oct 69 (P)
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536		AT 9938/19 Oct 69 (HC)
#10th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	400	BT 0342		BT 0441/6 Nov 69 (HC)

Pending, however, not accepted in OOB holdings by MACV. Not included in totals.

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	20Nov68	
*2nd NVA Div	NVA	C	4,045			
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	22Aug69	AT 9815/12Nov69(P)
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	20May69	BT 0939/27May67(C)
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	22May69	AT 9629/14Aug69(P)
GK.32 AT Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	20May69	AT 9221/14Jun68(C)
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	23May69	AT 9134/4Oct69(P)
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	20May69	ZC 0343/21Sep69(P)
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	22May69	BT 1047/19Dec67(P)
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	20May69	BT 2318/13Nov68(P)
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	24May69	BS 2444/20Oct67(C)
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	740			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	BT 0008	20Nov69	BT 0019/13Sep69(HC)
1st Bn	NVA	C	200	BT 0935	20Nov69	BT 0935/12Nov69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	200	BT 2611	20Nov69	BT 2613/4Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	200	BT 1234	20Nov69	BT 1133/12Nov69(P)
70th Bn	MF	C	165	BT 2348	16Oct69	BT 2045/13Nov69(HC)
72nd Bn	LF	C	160	BT 2937	15Oct69	BT 2937/13Nov69(HC)
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	195	BT 2113	17Oct69	BT 2425/19Oct69(HC)
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	180	BT 2938	17Oct69	BT 2939/13Nov69(HC)
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 3304	17Oct69	BT 3304/29Sep69(HC)
78th Arty Bn	MF	C	250	BT 3001	3Feb69	BT 3121/28Jan68(P)
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4213		BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	85	BT 4801		BT 2908/24Feb69
V.15 Co	LF	C	70	BT 1735		BT 2737/23Nov69
V.18 Co	LF	PR	75	BT 2315		
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212		BT 1819/17Oct69
C.9 Co	LF	C	50	BT 2045		BT 2144/19Nov69

* Total reflects 1st MF Regt and 3rd NVA Regt strengths only.

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
38th Bn	LF	C	170	BS 6858	8May69	BS 6657/13Nov69(C&P)
48th Bn	LF	C	290	BS 7180	24Jun69	BS 7182/3Nov69(P)
120th Bn	MF	C	210	BS 3975	29Jan69	BS 6169/25Feb69(C)
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	20Jul69	BS 6528/11Nov69(HC)
406th Sapper Bn	MF	C	125	BS 4677	11Aug69	BS 5279/20Oct69(C&P)
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	165	BS 5676	17Jun69	BS 4770/22Aug69(P)
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	680			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	17May69	BT 9409/11Sep69(P)
60th Bn	NVA	C	150	BS 4386	17May69	AT 8439/27Feb69(C)
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	17May69	BS 4878/25Oct69(P)
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4386	17May69	BS 4786/13Sep69(C&P)
21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167		BS 6566/25Feb69(C)
C.17 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7562		BS 5373/9Nov69(C)
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566		BS 6567/28Dec67(C)
C.219 Co	LF	C	50	BS 8137		BS 7839/15Aug69(C&P)
T.20 Co	LF	C	55	BS 7080		BS 6573/1Feb68(C)
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491		BS 6887/16Jul69(P)
C.19 Co	LF	C	45	BS 7555		BS 7559/17Oct69(C&P)
C.120 Co	LF	C	45	BS 8537		BS 8137/15Aug69(C&P)
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270		BS 6567/24Aug68(C&P)
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568		
*K.51 Wpns Co	LF	C	40	BS 6689		BS 6887/16Jul69(P)
81st Co	LF	C	65	BS 5676		BS 5668/11Sep69(P)
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172		BS 6571/29Jun69(C&P)
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674		BS 6571/29Jun69(C&P)
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 5596		BS 6091/11Sep69(C&P)
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090		BS 6887/16Jul69(P)

* See note #7 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE (continued)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
*3rd NVA Div	NVA	C	4,160			
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 3147	23Apr69	BS 2550/17Jul68(C)
2nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	870			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	345	BS 8020	8Nov69	BS 6076/26Sep68(C)
93rd Bn	NVA	C	180	BS 8020	8Nov69	BS 7624/13Nov69(P)
95th Bn	NVA	C	180	BS 8020	8Nov69	BS 8636/26Aug69(P)
97th Bn	NVA	C	165	BS 8020	8Nov69	BS 7508/4Nov69(C&P)
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 4741	25Oct69	BS 5030/20Oct69(P)
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 5542	25Oct69	BS 6337/13Aug69(C)
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 4543	25Oct69	BS 6337/13Aug69(C)
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6546	25Oct69	BS 6831/17Aug69(P)
90th Engr Bn	NVA	C	325	BS 6337	15Aug69	BS 6337/13Aug69(C)
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 6337	15Aug69	BS 6337/13Aug69(C)
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 6337	15Aug69	BS 6337/13Aug69(C)
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 3147	23Apr69	BS 3050/20Jul69(P)
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 3147	23Apr69	BS 8069/2Jan68(C)
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 6337	15Aug69	BS 6337/13Aug69(C)

*Totals of the 3rd NVA Div do not include the 18th Regt as it operates in Binh Dinh (P).

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BINH DINH PROVINCE*

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,260			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	520	BR 7363		
8th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 5950		
9th Bn	NVA	C	300	BR 5929		

*See note #1 on page A-17

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 220001H to 292400H November 1969.

a. A review of information from varified sources has dictated the moves of the folloing enemy units to their present locations within Quang Tin (P). 31st NVA Regiment Hq (BT0008), 1stBn,3rd NVA Regt (BT 0935), 2ndBn,3rd NVA Regt (BT 2611), 3rdBn,3rd NVA Regt (BT 1234), 70th MF Bn (BT 2348), 72nd LF Bn (BT 2937) and the 76th LF Sapper Bn (BT 2938).

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2,3, and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

5. Under the column "Location/date last contact" the information is based upon the following codes:
(P) Prisoner of War, (D) Document, (H or HC) Hoi Chanh, (C) Contact.

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9. Subordination/operational control, "also-known-as" names (AKA), letter Box Numbers (LBN), Armament, and Personalities listing.

NORTHERN I CORPS/DMZ/LAOS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
<u>B-5 Front</u>	DMZ Front			Chief of the Rear Service Staff Dept B-5 Front; Hoang KHUE
12th AT Bn			18x7.62mm LMG	
13th Arty Bn			12x60mm Mort 6xHMG 3x82mm Mort 50xLMG/SMG 12x120mm Mort	
14th AA Bn				CO-Luu Wan MAN
15th Engr Bn				CO-Capt LOI XO-SrLt TAI
16th Signal Bn				
17th Trans Bn				
19th Medical Bn				

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UNIT

AKA

LBN

ARMAMENT

PERSONALITIES

304th NVA Div

"Cua Cao" Div; Vin Quang
Group

5x82mm Mort
3x75mm RR
9xLMG
5xHMG

CO-SrCol Hoang KIEN
XO-Maj HIEN
PO-Col CAM
APO-LtCol Tham Xuan KINH

Div Hq

14th AA Bn

15th Engr Bn

16th Sig Bn

18th Med Bn

19th Trans Bn

20th Sap Bn

13741 US

9x82mm Mort
9x60mm Mort
?xB-40

CO-Capt Ha Van CU
XO-SrLt Vu Van LOC
PO-Capt Bui Dinh TU
APO-SrLt Nguyen Trung TU
CO-LtCol TROUNG
PO-LtCol Le Dang DUY
CofS-SrCapt THO
XO-Maj HUYNH
CO-Nguyen Huu TOAN
XO-Dac Duy NHAT
CofS-Capt A
APO-SrLt Dang XUAN

9th Regt

U-1; U-9; E-9; D-9; F-9
Song Lo Regt 1; 1st Regt;
Trung Doan Thiep; K-27

1st Bn

T-1; D-1

13634 IS (?)
13653 US
13638 US

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NORTHERN ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
2nd Bn	T-2; D-2	13639 IS (?) 13642 US		CO-SrCapt Huynh Ngoc SON XO-Capt DUAN PO-SrCapt TUI APO-THANH
3rd Bn	T-3; D-3	13644 IS (?) 13644 US		PO-Maj TAM
24B Regt	57th Regt; 2nd Regt; U-2; Yen Tu; E-2; 24th Regt			CO-Maj Tran TRAI XO-NGUYEN PO-Maj Le TAM
4th Bn				
5th Bn		13675 US 13676 US		XO-1stLt CHUONG
6th Bn		13678 US		
66th Regt	U-3; U-66; 4th Regt;			CO-LtCol Ding Dinh HO XO- PO-LtCol Tran TRAC
7th Bn	T-7	13696 US (?)		CO-Capt TANH XO- PO-Capt NHI
8th Bn	T-8	13701 US		CO-Le Van TAN XO-1stLt NGOAN PO-JrCapt HIEN
9th Bn	T-9	13706 US (?)		CO-SrCapt HAND XO-Capt TRUNG PO-SrCapt TUY APO-PHUC CofS-Capt KHANG

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UNIT

AKA

LEN

ARMAMENT

PERSONALITIES

325th Div, B-5 Front

Nong Truong Tam Div;
308th Div

CO-Col BINH
XO-LtCol KHEN
PO-LtCol THAT

14th AA Bn

?x12.7mm AA HMG

15th Trng Bn

16th Med Bn

17th Sig Bn

18th Engr Bn

19th DKZ Bn

?x122mm Rkt

20th Trans Bn

D.20 Bn

18046 XP

CO-Capt Dang Van CO
XO-1stLt Do Van THOA
PO-JrCapt Tran Xuan THU
APO-1stLt LUAN

21st Conval Bn

25th Sapper Co

26th Recon Co

27th Cadre Co

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
36th Regt	Doan Hong Vu; 1st Regt; 95th Regt	18409 RT		CO-Maj Pham HUNG
1st Bn	D-1; K-1		29xB-40, B-41 6x DKZ 57mm RR 3x82mm Mort 6x60mm Mort	CO-SrCapt TRUC PO-Capt NHAN
2nd Bn	D-2; K-2			
3rd Bn	D-3; K-3	92902		CO-LtCol Minh DANG
88th Regt	7003B; F-88; Quyet Thang	62332 18439 TQ		CO-LtCol Do LUONG XO-Maj Nguyen Hung CUONG PO-Maj DUC CofS-LtCol TRUC
4th Bn	D-4; Z-4			CO-Capt MY XO-1stLt LONG PO-Capt TRI
5th Bn		31278 US		
6th Bn				
102nd Regt	Me Cong; 1001; 7001; Thu Do (?); Dist 70			CO-LtCol LUC XO-Maj THAN PO-LtCol HIEN APO-Maj SUU

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
7th Bn	Bn 71			
8th Bn	Bn 73			CO-Capt TAN
9th Bn	Bn 75			CO-Capt LOAN XO-Capt NGHI PO-Capt TAI APO-1st Lt HAI
138th Regt, <u>B-5 Front</u>	Bach Dang Regt; 24 Indep Regt; 132nd Regt	30119 US		CO-HOAI XO-HO PO-DU APO-LANG Cofs-LUAN
1st Bn		30516	?xLMG ?xB-40, B-41 ?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x12.7mm HMG ?x57mm RR	CO-KHAC XO-DUNG PO-NGOT
2nd Bn	Hau Loc (V), Hong Ha (D)	30521		CO-SrLt TAM XO-SrLt TAM
3rd Bn		30526 XB		CO-Capt HO XO-MAN PO-NGOT
246th Regt	246Z Regt; F-6; F-4			CO-Maj CHU XO-TIEP PO-Maj LONG

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
1st Bn	H-1; U-1; Phai Khat; K-1	93976 OK 93977 OK 93978 OK 93979 OK		CO-Capt Mac Tinh DANG XO-Maj Van TU PO-Dap THAI
2nd Bn	H-2; U-2	93978 OK		
3rd Bn	H-3; U-3			
270th Regt, <u>B-5 Front</u>	Quang Tri, E-270; 270th Battle Group; 32nd Regt	32549 XB		CO-LtCol Hoang Van DUON XO-Maj Tran Duc MINH APO-Capt LAM
4th Bn	268th Inf Bn; D47; 47th Regt; 47th Bn	32548 XB 32553 XB (?) 32549 XB		CO-TUAN XO-THIEN PO-Maj Nguyen Duy DUC APO-KHANH
5th Bn	310th Inf	32558 XB(?)		CO-SrCapt Duon Xuan HAI
6th Bn		31400 XB(?)	6x82mm Mort	CO-Capt TUONG PO-LINH
27th Regt, <u>B-5 Front</u>	Kien Giang; Phan Rang; 271st Regt; K-27	93900 OK		CO-Maj THAT PO-Maj Nguyen Trong TAN APO-Maj LU
1st Bn		93901 OK		
2nd Bn	43rd Bn, Nghe An (P) Main Forces; K-2	93906 OK		PO-JrCapt Nguyen Van TUAN

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
3rd Bn	44th Bn, Ha Tinh (P) Main Forces; PR 12	93911 OK	4x82mm Mort 2xLMG 2x57mm RR (DKZ) 8xB-40	CO-1stLt Vo Xuan THAN XO-JrCapt Nguyen Duc DONG
78th Arty Regt, <u>B-5 Front</u>	E.78			
10th Bn	D.10			
11th Bn	D.11			
12th Bn	D.12			
84th Arty Regt, <u>B-5 Front</u>	"Van An" Regt		?x140mm Rkt ?x120mm Mort ?xB-41 ?x122mm Rkt	CO-Maj Ta VAN XO-Maj CO PC-Maj DU
2nd Bn	Thong Nhat; 33rd Bn(?) K-33	54279 RT (?)		
3rd Bn	Ha Tinh	54283 RT (?)		
4th Bn	Ha Dong	54289 RT (?) 54290 RT (?)	?x140mm Rkt ?x102mm Rkt ?x120mm Mort	CO-Capt HA XO-Le MAN PC-Lt Le Van THIEN APO-Phac THAM CofS-VAN

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UNIT

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ARMAMENT

PERSONALITIES

164th Arty Regt,
B-5 Front

1st Bn

2nd Bn

D-2

CO-Nguyen Phuc TRUNG

3rd Bn

1st Bn, 204th Arty
Regt, B-5 Front

K-1 Bn; K.33 Bn

CO-SrCapt LIEN
XO-Capt LONG
PO-SrCapt CUONG
CofS-HUU

675B Arty Regt,
B-5 Front

E675B

Regt Hq

1st Bn

D85 Bn

6x85mm How

2nd Bn

D74/1 Bn

6x122mm Gun

3rd Bn

D74/2 Bn

6x122mm Gun

NVA Sap Combat Grp,
126th Naval Sapper Regt,
B-5 Front

1A, 4007, 4002

CO-Thanh Van MINH
XO-NO
PO-SrLtCol KHANH
APO-SrCapt THAI
Rear Services-Capt THUOC
Medical Officer-SrLt THAI

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UNIT

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ARMAMENT

PERSONALITIES

1st Co

2nd Co

3rd Co

4th Co

33rd Sapper Bn

Kontum; 33

94154 XB
94155 XB
94156 XB
94157 XB
94158 XB
94159 XB

800mm Mort
16xB-40
3xB-41

Co Cmdr-Capt Duy TINH

PO-SrLt Nguyen Xuan THU

Co Cmdr-SrLt CHE
XO-SrLt CHINH
PO-Lt TRI

CO-Capt Thai Ba QUYEN
XO-Capt THO
PO-Capt NGON
APO-Capt CHUONG
CofS-1stLt Tran XUOC

31st Regt, B-5 Front

Doan 31; Song Hong Grp;
31st Group, Bach Dang;
Song Hong Regt
H-30; 30-H; Cam Lo LF Co; 41367
K-9 41368

C.9 LF Co

C.10 LF Co

4001; 5th Co; Gio Linh 41369
Co; K.400 Local Force 41370
Co; T.10 Co; Gio Le Co;
K.10

800mm Mort
2xB-40
6xBAR

CO-Le Mong HUNG
DCofS-Nguyen Duc MIEN

CO-Thai Tang NGO
XO-VAN
PO-CHAM

CO-1stLt DAM

C.11 NVA Sapper Co K-11

CO-TINH

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UNIT

27th Indep Bn, 31st
Regt

15th Bn, 31st Regt

AKA

27th Support Bn; K-1: 2nd 31728 KT
Bn; 7th Ind Bn; Tay
Ninh Bn; Cam Lo Bn;
70th Indep Bn; 27th
Regt; Song Giang(?);
D27 Co (COWL-ZOX)

LEN

94081 OK

ARMAMENT

?xB-40
?x120mm Mort
?xLMG
?x60mm Mort

PERSONALITIES

CO-Capt DIEN
XO-2ndLt Nguyen Van DAK
PO-HAT
APO-WO Duong Dinh PHO
CofS-XUAN

CO-CUU

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UNIT
MRTTH, MR-IV
MRTTH HQ

AKA

Northern Front; Northern
Sub-Region; North Div HQ
Phan Khu Bac; Di Hai; Tri
Di Hai Thien Sector; K-500;

LEN

H-700 Bac Do
BQ 20 FM

ARMAMENT

PERSONALITIES

CG-MajGen Le Chuong (AKA
Le Truong TIN)
XO-Col Bui SINH (AKA DUNG SINH)
FGPO-MajGen BAY
FGAPO-Gen VAN
CofS-Maj MINH

General Staff

K.400

Operations Section
Military Intelligence
Section

41000 FM

KC.10

KC.1

KC.2

Signal Section
Personnel Section
Crypto Section
Sapper Section
Engineer Section
Artillery Section
Training Section

KC.3

KC.4

KC.5

KC.6

KC.7

KC.8

KC.9

Political Staff

K.300

Cadre Affairs Section
Organization Section
Propaganda Section
Security Guard Section

41001 FM

KP.12

KP.1

KP.2

KP.3

KP.4

Military Proselyting
Section

K.300B

41003 FM

KO.16

Rear Services Staff

K.200

41002 FM

KJ.14

Plans Section

KJ.1

ACofS-LtCol THAI CON

Sec.Chief-LtCol Nguyen THOA

Sec.Chief-Maj NGOC

Sec.Chief-LtCol Hoang THANH

Sec.Chief-

Sec.Chief-

Sec.Chief-

Sec.Chief-

Sec.Chief-LtCol Trung KIEN

Sec.Chief-LtCol Nguyen Thai CAN

ACofS-DOAN SUU

Sec.Chief

Sec.Chief

Sec.Chief

Sec.Chief-SrCapt TRAN CUC

ACofS-Maj VU QUAN

ACofS-Maj KHAM

Sec.Chief-1st Lt DANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
Quartermaster Section		KJ.2		Ac.Chief-1stLt Tong Viet PHU
Ordnance Section		KJ.3		Sec.Chief-Capt NGUNG
Medical Section		KJ.4		Sec.Chief-SrCapt Vinh VAN BINH
Finance Section		KJ.5		Sec.Chief-
Political Section		KJ.6		Sec.Chief-
<u>Militia Section</u>	K.100	KZ.18		ACofS-LtCol Tong Ho TRINH
MRTTH HQ (FWD)		TBQ 20 FM		CC- rCol Nguyen Khu NGUYEN AsstCdr/CofS-Col Nguyen Thi POFC-Col Kuan TRA
1st Front, <u>MRTTH</u>	Quang Tri Lib. Front; 9th Front; Doan 7; AD.49	BEQ		CO-Col Sung LAM XO-LtCol Vu BINH PO-SrCol Vu THANG APO-LtCol Le Kha PHIEU CofS-LtCol Nguyen Van THU
<u>STAFF SECTION</u>		ELC2		ACofs- Sec.Chief-SrCapt Phan Van HY Sec.Chief-JrCapt TOAN Sec.Chief-VU Sec.Chief-Capt DUONG Sec.Chief-Nguyen Ngoc THO Sec.Chief-TAM Sec.Chief-MANH
Plans Sec.				
Intelligence Sec.				
Mapper Sec.				
Finance Sec.				
Personnel Sec.				
Training Sec.				
Signal Sec.				
<u>POLITICAL SECTION</u>		B2FC		ACofS-Maj TOAN
<u>PROSELYTING SECTION</u>		B3FC		ACofS-Capt TUNG Cmndr-1stLt TE Cmndr-1stLt HIEU
Propaganda Sec.				
Reorientation Sec.				

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UNITAKALENARMAMENTPERSONALITIESREAR SERVICE SECTIONK-8 Bn, 7th Front808th Bn; 8th Bn; 2nd
Prov Forces; 9th Indep
Bn; Le Hong Phong Bn;
Chu Luc

E4 FQ

41344 FQ
41345 FQ
41346 FQ
41347 FQ
41348 FQ12x60mm Mort
4x82mm Mort
2x75mm RR
2xLMG
48xB-40
12xB-41

ACofS-Maj KHAM

CO-Capt Nguyen Duc HONG
XO-Capt KHICH
PO-Capt THANH
APO-SrLt XICH
CofS-SrLt Nguyen Thoc NHONK-14 Bn, 7th Front814th Bn; H-14; K-7;
Bat Nhat; K-641349 FQ
41350 FQ
41351 FQ
41352 FQ
41353 FQ3x57mm RR
1xB-40
2xLMG
2x81mm Mort
2x57mm RRCO-SrCapt XOE
XO-Capt XUONG
PO-Capt NONG
APO-
CofS-SrLt Tran Thien DUC10th Sapper Bn,
7th FrontK.20 Bn; 10th Group;
30th Sapper Group; Quang
Tri Sapper Unit41354 FQ
41355 FQ
41356 FQ
41357 FQ
41358 FQ?xB-40
?xAK-47CO-Capt Van DAU
XO-SrLt Ho Van THUOC
PO-CHINH

K-11 Sapper Bn, 7th Front

K-34 Arty Bn, 7th Front.
MRTTH18x122mm Pkt
6x122mm RLCO-Capt Vu Ban CAM
XO-BAO
CofS-DAT
PO-Vu Van TIEN
CO-TRACH
XO-TUAN
PO-TO
CofS-CHAT

812th Regt, 324B Div

Thu Bon; 2nd Regt; Cong 41399 FQ(?)
Truong; "1 May" Regt; 4th 31610 RT
Regt Song Thu Bon; Ba Vi 31611 RT
Song Gua; Thuan Doc Lap; 31612 RT
Co Dong (Mobile) Regt; 31613 RT
Song Huong Regt; 53rd 31614 RT
Regt; Cua Thuan Regt; Nui 31615 RT
Ba Vi; Thu Bon River 31617 RT
Regt; Cong Truong 7; 7th 31618 RT
Regt; D82; Doan 2; AD.35 31619 RT?x82mm Mort
?x75mm RR
?x60mm Mort
?x57mm RR
?x12.7mm AA MG
?xLMGCO-LtCol Tong Sy GUY
PO-THUONG
APO-Bui Van NANG
XO-Maj Minh LONG
CofS-Maj Nguyen The DAO

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REF

ARMAMENT

PERSONALITIES

4th Bn

K-4 Bn; Cuu Long Bn;
K-18

31620 RT
31621 RT
31622 RT
31623 RT
31624 RT

CO-Capt PHUC
XO-JrCapt ANH
PO-Capt TRAM
APO-1stLt TUYEN
CofS-Lt BINH

5th Bn

K-5 Bn; Cong Huong Bn;
Tuyen 4; T-4; 4 Ba Vi;
D-4; K-16

31625 RT
31626 RT
31627 RT
31628 RT
31629 RT

CO-Nguyen Van PHONG
XO-
PO-2ndLt Nguyen Van BICH

6th Bn

K-6 Bn; D-6 Bn; Thu Boi;
Cuu Long Bn; Tuyen 6; 6th
Ba Vi Bn; K-8

31630 RT
31631 RT
31632 RT
31633 RT
31634 RT

CO-Capt Cao BA
XO-Nguyen Xuan BOA
PO-BAI

4th Regt, MRT

4th Regt, 4th Bn

41410 RT
41418 RT
41420 RT
41425 RT

CO-Maj Tran Huu CHU
PO-Maj Tran Van VUNG
DepPO-Maj Nguyen Tien
THUONG
APO-Capt Nguyen Nho TUC
XO-Maj Nguyen Van UC
CofS-Trung NGUYEN

K4B Bn

802nd Bn; K.2; Van Troi
Bn; 2nd Bn; H.400

41166 RT
41167 FH
41168 FH
41169 FH
41170 FH

4x81mm Mort
12x60mm Mort
2x57mm RR
6x3.5" RL
10xB-40
6xAA HMG

CO-Capt Nguyen SONG
XO-SrLt PHUNG
PO-Capt FO

K4C Bn

4th Bn, 4th Regt; 4th Bn, 41522 RT
4th Regt; 822nd Bn; H.402 41523 FT

2x82mm Mort

CO-Capt Nguyen Van TUAT
XO-1stLt Tran Van BOI
PO-Capt Nguyen Van KHANH
APO-Ap TRANG
CofS-1stLt THANG

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ARMAMENT

PERSONALITIES

5th Regt, MRTTH

22nd Regt; AD.25; Doan 5; 41270 FH
5th Worksite; Hue City 41271 FH
Unit; 95th Regt 41272 FH

K4 Bn

804th Bn; VO 74; Cao Van 41435 FH
Grp; Sung Lo; Q.3 41436 FH
41437 FH
41438 FH
41439 FH
41288 FH
41289 FH
41290 FH
41290A FH
41290B FH

1x82mm Mort
6x60mm Mort
1x30Cal MG
20xRPD
6xB-40
10xB-41

CO-LtCol Tran Than MOT
XO-SrCapt BINH
PO-LtCol VAN
CofS-Mai LU
CO-Maj Tran Dinh CHUONG
XO-1stLt TAM
PO-Capt Nguyen Van HAY
APO-SrLt MAI
CofS-HUU

K10 Bn

810th Bn; 3rd Bn (?) Q.4 41440 FH
41441 FH
41442 FH
41443 FH
41444 FH
41291 FH
41292 FH
41293 FH
41293A FH
41293B FH

3x81mm Mort
2x82mm Mort
6x60mm Mort
3xRR

CO-SrCapt Le Van BAU
XO-Capt Nguyen Van NU
PO-Capt Nguyen Van DUY
CofS-SrLt Do Quoc HUU
APO-SrLt Nguyen Huo LU

Chi Thua 1 Sap Bn

K-1; K-21 (THO) 41283 FH
41284 FH
41285 FH
41285A FH
41285B FH

CO-Maj THO
XO-HIEN
PO-VU
APO-Le Ngoc DIEP

Chi Thua 2 Sap Bn

K.2; K.21 (VU) 41286 FH
41287 FH
41287A FH
41287B FH
41287C FH

CO-Nguyen Van VU
XO-THIN
PO-HIEN
APO-CAO

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ARMAMENT

PERSONALITY

K.32 Arty Bn, 5th
Regt, MRTH

1st Bn, 84th Arty Regt;
QE.02; D.832

41502 FQ
41294 FH
41295 FH
41296 FH
41296A FH
41296B FH

CO-THICH
PO-Pham Ngoc BI
APO-Capt Le Van VU
XO-Nguyen Quang DA
CofS-Vu Binh AN

6th Regt, MRTH

Cong Truong 6; 6th Work-
site; Ham Tu; AD.26;
Doan 6

41300 FE
41316 FE
41317 FE
41318 FE
41319 FE
41320 FE
41321 FE
41322 FE
41323 FE
41324 FE
41325 FE

CO-Maj Huynh AN
XO-Maj Nguyen Quang KHANH
(AKA Nguyen Quoc KHANH)
PO-Maj Nguyen Quang CAM
APO-SrCapt Tran THO
CofS-Capt Hong Kim THO
CofPolit Sec-Man Huong
Huu AN

800th Bn

K.1; 1st Bn (?); L.1

1520
Q 40700 ST
41301 FE
41302 FE
41303 FE
41304 FE
41305 FE

9x82mm Mort
8x60mm Mort
3x57mm RR
8x3.5" RL
9xB-40
6xLMG
4x75mm RR

CO-Capt DIEN
XO-Capt Tran Minh DUONG
PO-Capt Nguyen Van THANE
APO-SrLt Pham DUYET
CofS-SrLt Nguyen Ke VAY

802nd Bn

K.2; 1st Bn, 9th Regt

43920 FE
41306 FE
41307 FE
41308 FE
41309 FE
41310 FE

4x82mm Mort
2x57mm RR
3xHMG
?xLMG
?xB-40

CO-Capt Vo Dai AN
XO-SrLt Do Dinh PHUNG
PO-Capt Nguyen Huu DAM
APO-SrLt Le Duc LOG
CofS-SrLt Duong Quang TUOI

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806th Bn

2nd Infil Bn; K.6; Le
Loi; D.10; 3rd (?); 80.T
Bn41311 FE
41312 FE
41313 FE
41314 FE
41315 FE3x81mm Mort
6x60mm Mort
3x75mm RR
3x57mm RR
3xHMG
12xB-40
4x3.5" RLCO-Nguyen Thong VAN
XO-SrLt Pham Quang LOC
PO-SrLt Pham Quang VINH
CofS-SrLt Hoang CHUC

K.12 Sapper Bn

812th Group 12; Dac Cong
12CO-SrLt Dang Viet HONG
XO-
PO-Capt Tran Ba QUAT
APO-SrLt Ho Van BA
APO-SrLt Van The HANG

K35 Arty Bn, MRTTH, 6th Regt

41112 FM

9th Regt, MRTTH

Doan 9; AD.79 FR; Thang
Long41390 FR
41391 FR
41392 FR
41393 FR
41394 FR
41395 FR
41396 FR
41397 FR
41398 FR
41399 FRCO-Maj Dang Thong DE
PO-LtCol Phan KY
APO-Capt Bui Van DAO
XO-Maj Nguyen Tu TY
CofS/XO-Maj Le Van A
CofPolit Sec-Maj Ha Duc
DUC

K.10 Bn

Dong Do; T.902; F.801 FR;
816th Bn; 416th Bn; 3d
Bn, 9th Regt41406 FR
41407 FR
41408 FR
41409 FR
41410 FRCO-Bang NAU
PO-Capt Tran Xuan VU
APO-SrLt Pham Tien KHANG
XO-SrLt Thai BAY
CofS-SrLt Bui Manh TIEN

K.18 Bn

Dong Ha; T.903; F.802 FR;
818th Bn; 418th Bn; 2d
Bn, 9th Regt41411 FR
41412 FR
41413 FR
41414 FR
41415 FRCO-SrCapt Dang Huy MICH
PO-SrCapt Van VU
APO-SrLt Le Huy CAY
XO-Ho Ba NHUAN
CofS-SrLt Nguyen Kim THANHCONFIDENTIAL
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ARMAMENT

PERSONALITIES

K.15 Bn

815th Bn; 415th Bn; 1st
Bn, 9th Regt; Q-6; F.800
FR

41416 FH
41297 FH
41298 FH
41299A FH
41299B FH
41400 FR
41401 FR
41402 FR
41403 FR
41404 FR
41405 FR

2xB-40/B-41

CO-Capt HO
1st XO-SrLt Vu Duc HAO
XO-SrLt Vu Ngoc TRINH
PO-SrCapt Pham Dinh DINH
APO-Capt Pham Huu KY
CofS-SrLt Vu Ngoc THAO

29th Regt, 325
Div, MRTTH

Ken Giang; Ba Na; 3rd
Regt; Song Lo Regt; Doan
8; AD.68

32868 RT
32706 RT
32722 RT
32723 RT
32724 RT
32725 RT
32726 RT
32727 RT
32728 RT
32729 RT
32730 RT
32731 RT

8x82mm Mort

CO-Maj Chau HOAT/LAGOL
Tran SIKCH
XO-SrCapt Nguyen HOAN
PO-SrCapt Vo DUOC
APO-Maj CAY
CofS-SrCapt Dan HANH

7th Bn

K-7; 1st; D-1; D-7

32707 RT
32708 RT
32709 RT
32710 RT
32711 RT

4x82mm Mort
4xHMG
8x60mm Mort

XO-SrLt Nguyen TRAM
XO-SrLt Le Van HA
PO-Nguyen DAO

8th Bn

K-8; 2nd; D-2; D-8;
Duc Lap Bn

32712 RT
32713 RT
32714 RT
32715 RT
32716 RT

4x82mm Mort
4xHMG

CO-Capt HANG
XO-Capt CAN
PO-Capt HANH

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ARMAMENT

PERSONALITY

9th Bn

K-9; 3rd; D-3; B-9

32717 RT
32718 RT
32719 RT
32720 RT
32721 RT

CO-Capt Nguyen Van TH
XO-Capt CHONG
PO-CANH

803rd Regt, 324B
Div, MRTTH

Cuu Long; 1st Regt; Cong
Truong 21; Song Huong;
Cua Tung; Tam Dao; Cong
Truong 1/5(?); 41st Regt;
K-14B Regt; Phan Thiet
Regt; Doan 1

31551 RT
31552 RT
31553 RT
31554 RT
31555 RT
31556 RT
31557 RT
31558 RT
31559 RT

?x82mm Mort
?x75mm RR
?x60mm Mort
?x12.7mm AA
?xIMG

CO-Maj Lau Quang MA
XO-Capt Mau DUYEN
PO-Maj DAM
APO-Capt Le Van DAO
CofS-

1st Bn

T-1 Bn; K-1 Bn; Tam Dao
1; Song Lam; Song Huong;
C-1

31560 RT
31561 RT
31562 RT
31563 RT
31564 RT

CO-Capt Bui Khac HUY
XO-Capt Tran PHUOC
PO-Nguyen Dinh CU
APO-1stLt Le Man CHAU

2nd Bn

T-2 Bn; K-2 Bn; Thu Bon;
Song Huong 2; Tam Dao 2;
C-2

31565 RT
31566 RT
31567 RT
31568 RT
31569 RT

CO-Capt DUC
XO-
PO-SrLt XE
APO-SrLt NAM
CofS-SrLt SUU

3rd Bn

T-3 Bn; K-3 Bn; Tam Dao
3; Song Cuong 3; C-3

31570 RT
31571 RT
31572 RT
31573 RT
31574 RT

CO-HO
XO-KINH
PO-DUC
APO-THUY
CofS-Do Xam CHI

65th Arty Regt, MRTTH

Doan 12; AD.30

CO-TAN
XO-
PO-NGHIEP

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITY</u>
K-40 Arty Bn	K-50; QE.06; D.850		?x85mm Field Gun	
K-41 Arty Bn	QE.07		?x122mm How	
K-42 AAA Bn	QE.08		37mm AAA Gun	
K-43 AAA Bn	QE.09		23mm AAA Gun	
H-99 Co	5th Co; Hai Lang 5 Co; Hai Lang Co; Vinh Ling Co		1xLMG	CO-Vo BA XO-Tran BUN PO-DUNG
C.113 Co	Armed Co of Phong Dien District; P.14; D.1; X.11; V.35; H.23; KQ.10; AK-5	41426 FM	1X81mm Mort 2X60mm Mort 12XSMG	CO-LANH XO-LAI PO-THAN APO-Tran Van THUAN
C.114 Co	D-3; P.15; Quang Dien LF Co; V.40; H.25; KQ.20; AK.7; H.319	1847 Bac Ha 41427 FM	2X60mm Mort 4XB-40	CO-MUNG XO-HOA PO-HA
C.115 Co	D-2; X-3; K-5; Huong Tra LF Co; P.16; KQ.30; AK-9	41428 FM	2XHMG 2X60mm Mort ?XSMG	CO-LE XO-LUA PO-HUNG
C.116 Co	D-4; X-4; P.17; Huong Thuy LF Co; KQ.40; V.50; H.29; AK.12; C.268 Co; C.216 Co	41429 FM	2X60mm Mort ?XHMG	CO-Nguyen Huu LUYEN XO-Tran Viet HUNG PO-NGACH

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>

Phu Loc Armed Bn	K-3, V-6		3X60mm Mort 3XB-40	CO-Nguyen NGUYEN XO-Phan CHANG PO-Nguyen XUAN

SOUTHERN I CORPS/BINH DINH (P)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
Military Region 5	BTL/K.5; H.800/H-55; F-550; Co Hoa; H-601; F-102 KW; Thon An 620	20100 GM 21900 GM Bac Hien		CO-MGen Hoang Van THAI XO-LtCol Nguyen CHANH (AKA BINH) PO- APO-LtCol Tran KHUE CofS-Col Le TRUC
Front 4, <u>MR-5</u>	Unit 70; Group 44; K-44	P6400; 6700 Ap Thai		CO-BGen Le BINH XO-Col HOE PO-THUAN CofS-SrCol KICH APO-PHUOC

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LRN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
70A, <u>Front 4</u>	Military Staff	P6407; 6707 AP Thai		CO-HUNG XO-Phan EM PO-Capt KHANH
70B, <u>Front 4</u>	Political Section Staff	P6414; 0714 AP Tnai		CO-LtCol Bui DU XO- PO-
70C, <u>Front 4</u>	Rear Service Staff	P6425; 6725 AP Thai		CO-Tran Dinh TRUC XO-YEN
1st Comm Bn, <u>Front 4</u>	703C	P6460; 6760 AP Thai		CO-Maj Ha Van CAU XO-Capt Van XUAN PO-Maj CHINH
42nd Recon Bn, Front 4	19th Bn	P.6513 AP Thai		CO-Capt Tan PHAT XO-SrLt Duc MINH PO-Tranh TRIEU APO-1stLt CAN C/S-CHINH
1st Flamethrower Co <u>Front 4</u>		1888 AP Tnai	40XLP050 Chicom	CO-1stLt HAI XO- PO-1stLt CANG
HAI VAN Engr Bn	1st Engr Bn; Cuu Long Bn	6780 AP Thai (SVN) 2380 QT (NVN)	1x82mm Mort 2x60mm Mort 6xB-40 1xB-41 3xRPD LMG's	CO-Capt CHU XO-Capt DINH PO-DINH APO-Pham Van DUYEN
C-31st Ind Co	Doc Lap Co, Q.55 Co	8302 GD	2X82mm Mort 2X60mm Mort 3X60 30Cal MG's	CO-Pham Van LOI XO-Nguyen Quy Truong PO-Nguyen Van MINH

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ARMAMENT

PERSONALITIES

31st NVA Inf Regt,
341st Div, Front 4

P25 Regt; Unit 5550;
Infil Grp 150C; Song
Huong Regt (Red River);
31st Worksite

3134 KT
P6270
6670 Ap Thai
31457
3459 KT

9x12.7mm AA Guns
6x82mm Mort
75mm RR

CO-LtCol HUNG
XO-Maj SA
PO-LTC Ho Quang DAM
APO-Maj Nguyen Chung TAN
CofS-SrCapt NGOC

102nd Bn

F.8 Bn; D.8 Bn; D.2 Bn;
150B; 150C; 8th Bn

6687 Ap Thai
P6287
31349
31349 KT
6627 Ap Thai
Ap Thai 7566

4x82mm Mort
9x60mm Mort
?xB-40
?xB-41

CO-THANH
XO-SrLt DO
PO-Tran Minh SON
CofS-SrLt Le Dinh THUC
APO-Lt DAT

103rd Bn

F.9 Bn; 3rd Bn; D.9 Bn;
D.3 Bn; F.9 Bn; 150A;
9th Bn; K.9 Bn; C.9 Bn

P6292
6692 Ap Thai
3459

4x82mm Mort
9x60mm Mort
?xB-40
?xB-41
?x12.7mm AA Gun

CO-Capt TRINH
XO-Phan Van EM
PO-Capt NAM
CofS-Capt CHINH

36th NVA Inf Regt,
308th Div, Front 4

Unit 1016; Unit 9530
Song Nong Regt; D.304;
E.36; Group 6

?x82mm Mort
?x60mm Mort
6x75mm RR
?x12.7mm AA Guns

CO-LtCol Do PHAM
XO-Maj SOAN
PO-LtCol Nguyen THANG
APO-Maj SANG
CofS-DUONG

1st Bn

Unit 9531; D.1 Bn

6217 Ap Thai
6933 Ap Bac
62205 IS

?x82mm Mort
?x60mm Mort
?xRPG-2
?xRPG-7
?x7.62mm LMG
?x12.7mm AA Guns

CO-SrCapt Nguyen MINH
XO-JUNK
PO-Nguyen MINH
CofS-SrLt HAI

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ARMAMENT

PERSONALITIES

2nd Bn

Unit 9533; Unit 1016A;
D.2 Bn; K.2 Bn

6218 Ap Thai
6938 Ap Bac
62201 Ap Bac

?x82mm Mort
?x60mm Mort
?xB-40
?xB-41
?x12.7mm AA Gun

CO-SrCapt CHUONG
XO-SrLt SON
PO-Capt HOA

3rd Bn

D.3; K.12; Replacement
No 2006

6219 Ap Thai
6943 Ap Bac
62210 XP

?x82mm Mort
?x60mm Mort
?xB-40
?xB-41

CO-SrCapt NHUY
XO-DUNG
PO-SrCapt DINH
APO-SrLt MIEN

90th Regt

3rd Regt; Cuu Long Regt;
Danang Grp; Doan 3;
AD.10; Cong Truong 63;
Cua Viet; Nui Quyet;
60th Regt; 38th Regt

41.210 FL
41.211 FL
41.212 FL
41.213 FL
41.214 FL
41.215 FL
41.216 FL
41.217 FL
41.218 FL

?x82mm Mort
3xUnk mm RR
3x120mm Mort

CO-LTC THUOC
XO-Capt DANG
PO-HOA
APO-HA
ACofS-Lt CHUONG

7th Bn

K.7 Bn; 17th Bn;
D.7 Bn; T.7 Bn;
Nui Quyet Bn

41.219 FL
31650 XB
41.220 FL
41.221 FL
41.222 FL
41.223 FL

3x82mm Mort
3x60mm Mort
6xB-40
6xB-41

CO-Capt Hong Ba LANG
XO-Lt LOC
PO-Lt XUAN
APO-UNK

8th Bn

K.8 Bn; 18th Bn; K.38
Bn; D.8 Bn; 108th Bn

41.224 FL
31655 XB
41.225 FL
41.226 FL
41.227 FL
41.228 FL

3x82mm Mort
3x60mm Mort
9xB-40
3xB-41

CO-SrCapt PHUOC
XO-Capt NHI
PO-SrCapt DOT
APO-Capt NAM

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
9th Bn	K.9 Bn; 19th Bn; D.9 Bn; Nui Quyet Bn; B.19	41.229 FL 31660 XB 41.230 FL 41.231 FL 41.232 FL 41.233 FL	3x82mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 3xB-40 5xB-41 2x7.62mm MG	CO-SrCapt THUY XO-SrLt THUY PO-Capt Phau Thanh THUYEN APO-Lt CHUONG CofS-Lt TAN
R.20 Bn	Quang Nam Indep Bn; Doc Lap Bn; Hai Cang 20; B-20; Viet Dung; 70th Bn; 1st Bn; F.5 Bn; Q.90 Bn	6788 Ap Thai 21341 GM Ba Ha 190 Viet Dung	4x81mm Mort 6x60mm Mort 7x75mm RR 7xB-40 7xB-41	CO-SrCapt THONG XO-MY PO-BA CofS-BA APO-BE
V.25 Bn	Lam Bn; 5th Bn; R.25 Bn; 2nd Bn; B.25 Bn; Q.92 Bn; 2nd Indep Bn of Quang Da	2116 Quang Da 192 Viet Dung P6493 6793 Ap Thai A4192 and Dung A44T.193	4x81mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 7x82mm Mort 7x75mm RR 8xB-40 4xB-41	CO-Capt Tran BINH XO-Nguyen LUONG PO-Tran NINH APO-Le HIEU
D.7 Bn	F.7 Bn; 1st Bn; D.3 Bn; 101st Bn	P6498 6798 Ap Thai Q.80 Anh Dung	5x82mm Mort 5x60mm Mort 7xB-40 7xB-41	CO-Capt THOM XO-Capt KHOI PO-Capt TRANG

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
T.89 Sapper Bn	402nd Sapper Bn; YH.9; Tien Lua Bn	P6454 6754 Ap Thai 370 Thanh Khiet	6x81mm Mort 1x82mm Mort 18xB-40 2xHMG	CO-SrCapt NGOC XO-SrLt TO PO-Capt Tran Kim HUNG CofS-1stLt NAM
3rd Sapper Bn	103rd Sapper Bn; Lam Son Bn; Q.91 Bn; B-47 Sapper Bn; 710 Bn	P6475 6775 Ap Thai 63148 IS (NVN)	6x82mm Mort 5x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-SrCapt Nguyen Van XO-UNK PO-SrCapt Nguyen LOI CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van BACH Adj-Duong Van THAT
<u>141st Regt, 312th Div, Front 4</u>	1st Regt; 3008 Group	7523 VR (NVN)	?x82mm Mort ?x81mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?x12.7mm AA Gun ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Maj NGUYEN XO-Capt DUONG PO-Maj HAO
1st Bn	Pho Thong Bn; K.1 Bn		?x82mm Mort ?x75mm RR ?xB-40 ?x12.7mm Tripod Mounted AA Gun	CO-Capt Nguyen Van CON XO- PO-Capt SAM
2nd Bn			?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?x57mm RR ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CO-Capt MAO XO-HUU PO-SrLt DIEU
3rd Bn		7425 (NVN) 74222 CS (NVN)	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41 ?x75mm RR	CO-Capt CANH XO-1stLt HAY PO-SrLt UONG CofS-Lt Doan Van MIA

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UNIT

AAA

LPN

ARMAMENT

PERSONALITIES

573rd Rocket Bn

?xl22mm Rocket
Launchers

CO-SrCapt Do Nguyen VAN
XO-Capt DAY
FO-SrCapt Cao Van THOI
APO-Capt Nguyen BINH
ADM-SrLt HONG
CofS-SrLt IV

575th Rocket Bn

?xl22mm Rocket
Launchers

CO-THUC
XO-THU
FO-Unk
APO-Capt Nguyen The D'CC
CofS-GIAC

T.87 Sapper Bn

Truong Son Bn; 2nd Sap P6470
Bn; HH (Hoa Hieu) 6770 Ap Thai

3 X 82mm Mort
3 X 60mm Mort
3 X B-40's
B-41's

CO-NGON
XO-CAN
FO-LIEN

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UNIT

577 Rkt Bn, Front 4

AKA

130th Bn; 134th
Infil Grp;

LBN

6620 Ap Hoa
54387 HT

ARMAMENT

1BX122mm Rkt
Launchers
6XB-40's
6XB-41's
?x140mm RL

PERSONALITIES

CO- Nguyen Thanh THUAN
XO-Capt Dang Van THUONG
PO-Capt To Duc LUC *
CofS- KHAM
APO-DOAN

2nd NVA Div, MR-5

Thon An 520; Su Dong
2; Ham Tu 2; 620th
Div; Agricultural
Site #2; Chi Lang;
Ta-310; Nam Hai; Nong
Truong 2

20601 GM
20925 GM
Tay An
H.4500 Ap Nam
42.40 HK
41910 KP
117.TL
2062 Nam Hai

CO-BrigGen Le THACH/KIET
XO-BrigGen Hoang Minh
DAC/SON
PO-BrigGen VIET/CHUONG

GK.37 Trans Bn

GK.38 Medical Bn

5060 Ap Nam C

CO-Pham Ngoc HOANG

CO-Capt Nguyen Van TU
XO-1stLt Nguyen Van HIEU
PO-Capt Le Hong HAI

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
GK.30 Signal Bn	RQ.20/A Bn; RQ.20; V-107 RQ. 20/B Bn; Nam Tu 2/C	1803/CH Hai Cang 20 HT 20605 GM Tay An		CO-TUNG XO- PO- APO-Nguyen Ba CHU
GK.31 AA Bn	195th AA Bn; 519 AA Bn; 38th AA Bn; Xuong 111; 19th Bn; RQ.21		17x12.7mm AA	CO-Capt Huong Quy PHAN XO-Tran Van THIEN PO-QUANG
GK.32 RR Bn	RQ.22	Hai Cang 20	12x75mm RR	CO-SrCapt THUYLET XO-Nguyen KHUAN PO-TRUONG CofS-SrLt Vo Ngoc HANH
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	RQ.33; RQ.23; RQ.330; 7th Bn	1828/CN Hai Cang 20; 60620 GM Tay An; 22861 GH Hai Cang 20 Tay An; 22631 GH Hai Cang 20 Thu An	6x120mm Mort 18x82mm Mort 81mm Mort	CO-Le Van CAN XO-Nguyen KINH
GK.35 Sapper Bn	D-10 Sapper Bn/T-10 10th Sapper Bn	5053 AP Nam Tu	9xB-41 Rkt	CO-Nguyen Tien VINH XO-CAO PO-Nguyen Duc DUC
GK.40 Engr Bn	RQ.24	GM 20039 Tay An Nam Hai		CO-Nguyen Ngoc DONG XO-Nguyen Viet THO PO-Ngoc PHUOC

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
1st VC Regt, 2nd Div	Cuong Truong 1; H-800; 108th Regt; Cuu Long Regt; Steel Regt	6000-6199 H 4600 AP NAM 5101 AP NAM		CO-LtCol Chan Khoi DUC XO-LtCol Chu An TAN PO-
40th Bn	Thanh Mai; Bach Dong Bn; 80th Bn; Nam Hai; 3rd Bn; Phi Doi 2007 Bau Bang	5645 Quang Trung St.	.30 Cal MG 60mm Mort 81mm Mort 75mm RR 12.7 mm MG	CO-LOC XO-Nguyen Van TJAN
60th Bn	Thanh Ha; T.112; 1st Bn; Ap Bac; 2006 Phong Hai; Bong Trang (?) Binh Gia	20735 C.T. An Giang	81mm Mort 60mm Mort 57mm RR 82mm Mort 12.7mm MG	CO-SON XO-CHAT PO-MINH
90th Bn	Thanh Truc; Xuyen Son Bn; 51st Bn; 33rd Bn; Phi Doi 2008; Thuan Minh; Song Hong (?) Phong Bien	HT 20100		CO-SANG XO-ANH PO-CHU
21st NVA Regt, 2nd Div	Bach Ma; Worksite 21; 36th; A-21; Cong Truong 21; 2nd Regt; 36th Regt; Cong Truong (?) AN LONG; H 213; V-50; K-55; Unit 451; Unit 710; E2	HT 20648 GM An Binh; 880 Nam Ban; H.4880 Ha Bien; H 4700 AP NAM 2; 5201 AP NAM 6604 Long Thanh; J.4700	17x81mm Mort 7x75mm RR 7x60mm Mort 2x82mm Mort 4x82mm RR 1x57mm RR	CO-TIEP XO-Nguyen TIEP PO-Capt CHIEN CofS-CHAU APO-Maj DAN
60th Bn	11th Workshop; 1st Bn; 11th Bn; 4th Bn; Dong Hai			CO-Le PHONG XO- Lt Nguyen Dinh PEUNG PO-Capt Nguyen Duc HO APO-Nguyen Van TINH

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UNIT	AKA	LEN	ARMAMENT	PERSONALITIES
70th Bn	135th Bn; 2nd Bn; 72nd Bn (?); 22nd Bn; 5th Bn	J.4770	5xLMG 2xHMG 5xB-41 4x82mm Mort 2x82mm RR 2x12.7mm MG	CO-Nguyen Van THU XO-It Nguyen Van CUOC PO-Mai Xuan GIEN APO-Capt TUNG
80th Bn	3rd Bn; 75th Bn (?); Workshop 33; Phi Truong Long Chau; 33rd Bn; 6th Bn	J.4780	?x60mm Mort ?xB-41 ?xB-40	CO-1stLt BONG XO-QUANG PO-SrCapt ANH
3rd NVA Regt	64th Regt; Bac Ha; Worksite 3; Factory 10; 46th Regt; 51st Regt; Nam Ha; 323rd Regt (?); Ap Nam 31st Regt; 33d Regt; Lien Gia 33	HT 5503; 5357 Ap Nam 3 HT 20801 GM An Binh; H.4810 Ap Nam IT 4880; HT 4241; HT 4842; HT 4849; HT 5317; Ap Nam 3 (?) 5301 Ap Nam H 4800 Ap Nam 3 20728 GM An Binh; H.4860 Ha Mai	3x82mm Mort 3x57mm RR	CO-NGHIEM XO-Nguyen THANH PO-BINH CofS-Bui Thien Cac
1st Bn	X1; Xuong Mot; Ha Mai; Xuong (Bn) 7; CT3; Binh Minh; K-1 64th Bn; K-7; D7; Song Hong (Red River)	20837 GM; An Binh; H.4870 Ha Hai 5316 Ap Nam 3		CO-Capt THANH XO- PO-Lt DUC
2nd Bn	Binh Minh; X-2; K-2; 74th Bn; Xuong Hai; Ha Hai; Xuong (Bn) 8; K-8; Binh Da; D8; Song Lo			CO-Capt Luong Van KHAO XO-SrLt Luu Van HACH PO-SrLt Dao Van SO
3rd Bn	Binh Thien; Mao Chu; K-3; 84th Bn; X-3; Q.56; Nguyen Trai; 103rd Bn; Xuong (Bn) Ba; Ha Bien; Xuong (Bn); K-9; D9; Song Thao	HT 20648 GM An Binh; 880 Nam Ban; H.4880 Ha Bien; HT 5317 5317 Ap Nam 3	2x120mm Mort 6x75mm RR 6x82mm Mort 3x50 cal HMG	CO-Maj Tran Van HIEN XO- CHAI PO- HOA

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
3rd NVA Div, <u>MR-5</u>	Nong Truong 3; Thon An 510; 610th Div; Office Command; Front A-1; Inter-Prov 10; Yellow Star Div; (Sao Vang); Ham Tu 3; Nam Hai; Phi Truong 10; Unit 490; Liem Tinh 10; Pho Bac; NT3; Unit 491; X40	Hon Thu 2110 GM; 20845 GMT 10 Airfield 10		CO-Ho Sv LOC XO-SON PO-SONG APO-TOAN CofS-TAN
90th Engr Bn	40th Sapper Bn	PH 5082 Ap Dan PH 5081 Ap Dan 5555 Ap Dan	3xB-40 1xB-41	CO-THU XO-Pham Hong KHI PO-DUNG APO-PHU
200th AA Bn	D-518 Infiltration Group	1535; 1534; 10th Airport	12x12.7 AA MG's 18x1MG	CO-SrCapt LIEM XO-KUYET PO-SrCapt Tran DAU CofS-SrLt Nguyen Van TY Asst PO-Capt MO
300th Arty Bn	513 Infiltration Group; Xcm 30; 499th Arty Bn; 400 Bn; Don VI 499th, Phan Doan 300; X-30, Unit 499, K.13; 30th Rkt Bn	1538	3x120mm Mort 4x82mm Mort 3x75mm RR ?x140mm Rkt ?x122mm Rkt 6x60mm Mort ?x57mm RR	CO-JrCapt Lam Duy HIEM XO-JrCapt HAU PO-JrCapt HUU
500th Trans Bn	Inter-Det 500; 50th Bn	1544		CO-CU XO-DO PO-HI Asst PO-DUONG
551st Signal Bn	D-16; Unit 551; Unit 02; D-80	20800 KG		CO-Doan NGHANH XO-Lt HIEN PO-SrCapt DIEU

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UNIT

600th Medical Bn

2nd VC Regt, 3d Div

93rd Bn

95th Bn

97th Bn

AKA

Inter-Det 600;
60th Field Hospital Bn

LEN

1548

ARMAMENT

2x82mm Mort
2x57mm RR
2xB-41
3xB-40
6x7.62 HMG

PERSONALITIES

CO-
XO-
PO-

CO-Pham Ngoc LY
XO-HOANG
PO-Mai Van HA
CofS-TRI

Quyet Chien; Worksite II; 21.100
Song Ba; Tron Phuoc 600; 21.141
Hong Hai; Lien Gia; Song 21.142
Hong; 1st Regt; 8th Regt; 21.143
96th Regt; 193 GP; 511 21.144
Regt; Lien Gia #2; 11th 21.145
Regt, Pho Dong; Sao Vang; 21.146
Unit 511 21.147
21.148
21.149

PH 5100 Ap Dau
546 Ap Dau

707th Infil Group; Chi
Ba (Three Sister); H-21
Bn; 93rd Gp; Piti Truong; 6240
104th Bn; 1st Bn; KHU1; 21.120
K1; D1

2x82mm Mort
2xB-41
4xB-40
2x7.62 HMG
2x57mm RR
1xM-79

CO-Dang DOAN
XO-BONG
PO-DI

705th Infil Group; Chi
Nam; H-58; Ba Minh
Thong Rang 260; Xom Hai;
2d Bn; KHU2; K2

21310 GM

2x57mm RR
3x60mm Mort
1xMG
3xB-40
4xB-41
1xM-79

CO-HOA
XO-AN
PO-TRUNG
CofS-LUONG

703rd Infil Group;
207th Bn; Chi Bay; H-21; 6340 TL(old)
H-25; Xom 3; 307th Bn; 21.140 GM
3d Bn; KHU3; K3 21.143

4x60mm Mort
5xB-40
6xB-41

CO-Vu Van BINH
XO-BINH/HOA?
PO-QANH/HOA?

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
18th NVA Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Thang; 12th Regt (1965); 803rd Infil Group; Anh Ba; Song Giang; Lien Gia 4; Unit 519; Soa Mai (Morning Star); Song Day; Tinh 3; Song Danh; 1st Regt(?); Lien Gia Bon	7173 DS 21155 GM 21150- 21199 157; 21 AG Unit 519		CO-Duong Minh NGO XO-HONG PO-Le HC APO-VOI CofS-DIEU
8th Bn	803K Infil Group; Inter- Unit 5; District 12; Lieu Doi 5; Huyen 32; Lien Doi 5; H-32; H-8; Unit 523; 5th Bn	211670 21171 Unit 523		CO-CUONG XO-THUAN PO-THANH CofS-LUONG
9th Bn	H-9; H-33; Huyen 33; Lien Doi 6; Unit 525; 6th Bn	21172- 21176 Unit 525		CO-TUY XO-QUANG PO-ANH CofS-HOANG
22nd NVA Regt, 3d Div	Quyet Tam; 209th Infil Group; Code No 527; Cong Doan; Song Hong (Labor Union); Song Ba; 3rd Regt; E-101(?); 6th Regt; Lien Gia Sau; Cong Truong 3; Worksite 3; Unit 527; Pho Nam Regt; Lien Gia 6	21141 VM Binh Dinh (P); 1010 Phi Truong 10; PH5200 Ap Than 21175- 21199		CO-YHUAN XO-CO PO-HUNG CofS-BAI APO-SAO

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
7th Bn	1st Bn; 517th Bn; Inter Group		1x57mm RR 5x82mm Mort 5xB-41 5x12.7mm AA Gun	CO-1stLt Tran Van DUYEN XO-Pham Con TUYEN PO-HAN CofS-Capt KHOI
8th Bn	2nd Bn; Bn 516; Xom Tam	21225 GM Phi Truong 10	4x82mm Mort 1x57mm RR 4x12.7mm MG 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-DUNG XO- PO- Capt THIEN CofS-Capt THANH
9th Bn	3rd Bn; Bn 514; Inter Group 9; Xom Chin; K-3	4739/TA	4xB-40 4xB-41 2x82mm Mort 4x60mm Mort	CO-NANG XO-Capt THANH PO-Capt QUY
120th Bn	Q-20; T-20; 20th Bn; 21st Bn; X-20; Tong Doan 20; V.3 Bn	20135	1x81mm Mort 3x60mm Mort 3x57mm RR 3x75mm RR 5xMG	CO-HAI XO-HIEP PO-Nguyen DAN
406th Sapper Bn	409B Bn; Don Vi 406; Tang Son	4141 Ap Bac	1x60mm Mort 7XB-40 7xB-41 1xRR 2x82mm Mort	CO-Pham SU XO-DUNG PO-Dung Quang HUAN APO-TU
107th Arty Bn	270th Bn; 2nd 12.7mm AA Bn; D.107th Bn; Mountain Gun Bn; GK.31 AA Bn; Unit 743	777 Tran Quoc Tuan	5x12.7mm AA 18xSMG 1x75mm RR 6x82mm Mort 7x140mm Rkt	CO-Nguyen HONG XO-CHI PO-FY CofS-Capt CHI Adj- Lt SIU S1-BO S4-1stLt Ong HANH

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
9th Sapper Bn	2nd Bn	1088	2x60mm Mort 2xB-40	CO-Maj Vu Van QUANG XO-Mui Van THIET PO-Mai Van TRUONG
38th Bn	Cong Ty 38; 803rd Bn; 83rd Bn; Thi Xa 38; D-3; Unit 133; Nghiep Doan 8; X.13; Black Tiger Bn; Unit 740; Anh Ba Tu	2048 NQ Ba Bao	2x30 Cal LMG 1x82mm Mort 2x57mm RR 8xB-40 8xB-41 4x60mm Mort 2x81mm Mort 2x57mm RR 3x60mm Mort 3xLMG 2x82mm Mort 1x75mm RR ?xB-40 3xM-79	CO-Le Tan TU XO-TAM PO-Nguyen RUA CofS-Luong Van NAY APO-HAI CofS-SANG CO-TAN XO-JUA PO-LANH APO-LONG CofS-SANG
48th Bn	408th Bn(?); 84th Bn; Cong Ty 84; Song Ba; Nghiep Doan 4; Cong Ty 48; 4th Labor Union; 48th Worksite; 2nd Bn(?); K.48 Bn; Don VI 130; X.13; Unit 741			
70th Bn	35th Bn; Phi Doi 2009; Ouu Song; Truong Son 70; Inter-Mountain White Tiger Bn; F-07; 103 Oanh Gia(?); Bong Trang	20647	3x81mm Mort 4x60mm Mort 4x57mm RR 5xLMG 12xB-40 RL	CO-CHUA XO-LY PO-SON

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UNIT

72nd Bn

AKA

X.72; R.13; H.68; 33rd Bn;
Truong Son; Chu Dung; 103rd;
300; 305 GP; Hoi Chang 15;
X-22 An Khe (506)

LBN

21993
Hanh 21445
GM
25010

ARMAMENT

2X82mm Mort
2X81mm Mort
6X60mm Mort
3X57mm RR
2X12.7mm AA
MG's
15XB-40 RL
6XB-41 RL

PERSONALITIES

CO-Nguyen Van CAN
XO-Nguyen Van IL
PO-KHANH

74th Bn

V.20; V.74; 75th

1X60mm Mort
1XLMG
3X57mm RR

CO-DUC/QUANG (?)
XO-THAI/Yeu THANH
PO-QUYET

76th Sapper Bn

K.55; C.75; Flying Tiger 21;
V.16 Bn; X-16

1X60mm Mort
4XB-40 RL
3XB-41 RL

CO-TIEN
XO-VINH
PO-KUM

78th Arty Bn

X-78; Xuong 78; 78 DKB;
F-78

6X122mm RL
5X82mm Mort
2X57mm RR
?XB-41 RL

CO-THONG
XO-XAM
PO-TOI

81st Co

Worksite 81; Code No T120;
D.1; D.81; X.81; T.760;
85th Bn; Bac Son Binh; Unit
742; 81st Bn

778 GM Tran
Ducc Suan

1X60mm Mort
3XB-40's
1XB-41's

CO-Hyinh Tan THANH
XO-Ngo Van BOM
PO-Nguyen Ngoc NHAN
AsstPO-PHANG

409th Sapper Bn

Cong Ty; D-68; X-409; Bach
Son Worksite; X-20; 575th
Bn; A-58; 409A Bn; K-5
Sapper Bn; Sapper R-5; 307th
Bn; Bac Hien

20142 GM
20144 GM
Bac Hien
1291 KW Bac
Hien; Ba Hoa;
X2424; 20142
GM; 4116 A-12
Bac Tien

?X81mm Mort
7X60mm Mort
3X57mm RR

CO-Ngo DAN
XO-SAM
PO-1stLt QUYET

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LFN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
V.14 Co	A.14 Co; 113th Co; K.53 Co; 14th Co; NK.108; A.19	2230	1xLMG	CO-LAM XO-Nguyen PHUONG PO-THANH
V.15 Co	K.51; 107; FC 14; A.10; D.21; Thang Binh Co; B.104		1x60mm Mort	CO-Duy An HO XO-CAO PO-DUC
C.17 Co	Mo Duc Co			CO-Nguyen DIEP XO-Lt PHUOC PO-NQI
V.18 Co				CO-Nguyen Thi THANH XO- PO
C.18 Co	Nghia Hanh LF Co		1x60mm Mort 4xSMG	CO-TAM XO-BINH PO-BAY
C.19 Co	C.19B (?) (Possible)		3x57mm RR 4xB-40 2x60mm Mort 2xLMG	CO-Le Van CHING XO-Le Van THANH PO-MAU
T.20 Co	C.20; Son Tinh Dong Co; V.20; C-137		1x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG	CO-KHANG XO- PO-THANH
P.31 Co	T.19 Co; D.31 Co; T-31 Co		2xB-40	CO-DUC XO-PHUOC PO-MANH APO-NAM
C.74 Co			1x60mm Mort 1x30Cal MG 2xB-41; 2xB-40	CO-GIO (or GIAO) XO-THUOC PO-NAM
C.75 Co	Unit 139; C-16 Co; 506 LF Co		6xM-79 2xB- ?xB-40 1xMG 1x60mm Mort	CO-Nguyen LUONG XO-XU PO-NAM

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LEN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
C.120 Co	Unit 145		6xThompson SMG 3xMAT-49 SMG 2xB-40	CC-QUANG XC-TU PC-
C.7 Co	Unit 139; C.16 Co; 506 LF Co		1xLMG 1x60mm Mort 6xM-79	O-DA XC-XU PC-NAM
Q.80 Co, <u>Front 4</u>	Hoi An Co; X.62 Co; 72 Co; Q.12 Co; 44th Bn; F.12 Co	180 Anh Dung	?x82mm Mort ?x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CC-Tran BUA XC-Bua THAI PC-HIEM
Q.81 Co, <u>Front 4</u>	Duy Xuyen Co; H.52; 103rd Co; 73rd Co; Q.13 Co; Q.13B	181 Anh Dung 2103	3x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort ?xB-40 ?xB-41	CC-Nguyen Dinh BEN XC-Nguyen THIEM PC-Nguyen HOA
Q.82 Co, <u>Front 4</u>	Dien Ban Co; H.40 Co; X.55 Co; 104th Co; X.65; Q.15 Co	182 Anh Dung 133 Tuong Lai 21335 GM Ba Ha	2x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort ?xRPG-2 ?xRPG-7	CC-HOANG XC-Tan Chung NGO PC-Mai Phuoc KIEM
Q.83 Co, <u>Front 4</u>	Q.14 Co; H.42 Co; X.64 Co; 74th Co; Dai Loc Co	183 Anh Dung 21334 GM Ba Ha	2x60mm Mort 2x81mm Mort 2xB-40 2xB-41	CC-Nguyen CHAU XC-Nguyen Quang HUNG PC-Le Long PHUNG Adj-Nguyen Thanh NAM
Q.84 Co, <u>Front 4</u>	Q.16 Co; X.66 Co; X.17 Co; Hoa Vang Co	184 Anh Dung 21336 GM Ba Ha	2x81mm Mort 2x60mm Mort 6xB-40	CC-Hoang Minh NGHIEM XC-DONG PC-AI
21st Sapper Co	T-21, H-40	22422	2xLMG 2x60mm Mort	CC-Ho Khanh DU XC-Ha Thanh LIEM PC-Nguyen Van HU

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AKA</u>	<u>LBN</u> <u>LBN</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>PERSONALITIES</u>
105th Co	Que Son Independent Co	2184	2x81mm Mort 4x60mm Mort 2x57mm RR 2xB-40 2xB-41	CO-1stLt Nguyen HANH XO-2ndLt CA PO-Nguyen UT
C.219 Co	Duc Pho Co; Anh Hai		2x60mm Mort 1xLMG 2xB-40 18xSMG	CO-Nguyen Thanh CAM XO-Pham BUOI PO-CAU
706th Co	C.73; A.16; BK.110; K-43 2002		2x60mm Mort 1x57mm RR 6xLMG	CO-Nguyen THANH XO-Pham PHUONG PO-Pham KEAI
K.51 Wpns Co	C.51 Wpns Co		2x60mm Mort 1x57mm RR 1x81mm Mort	CO-Le Quang VINH XO- PO-Bui Anh THAI
506 "A" Sapper Co	Unit 506			CO-Xo Duc BA XO-VINH PO-DUONG
506 "B" Sapper Co	H-42	Hon Thu 21618 M	?xSMG ?xB-40	CO-LIEU XO-KY PO-DO/HONG/ANH
95A Sapper Co	C95A Sapper Co		1xB-40 1xB-41 1x60mm Mort 1xM-79	CO-Le HOA XO-TUYEN PO-HIEP APO-Nguyen SO
95B Sapper Co	C95B Sapper Co		2xB-40 1x57mm RR 1x60mm Mort	CO-2ndLt Pham Tan HOAI XO-Met Phong Hong MINH PO-Asp Le Duy KHANH APO-CAY

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS, AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 48-69

1. QUANG TRI (P). PW, PFC Le Van DONG, 8th Co, 27th Bn, 31st Regt, captured 18 Nov 69 (YD 096706) (517th MID Rpt 61-69) stated the strength of the 8th Co was 55 men and its location was (YD 173609) while the 27th Bn was located vicinity (YD 115853) and the 31st Regt Headquarters was located vicinity (YD 090885). DONG also stated there was a K-15 Infantry Co in the 31st Regt and it was located at (YD 170666). According to this subject the mission of the 8th Co was to attack PF and RF forces at (YD 173609) from 7-18 Nov 69. Source revealed the 8th Co was 94230 XB. DONG stated the 8th Co crossed the BEN HAI River by boats at (YD 140780) on 6 Nov 69. DONG also stated he trained with the 5th Bn, 22d Training Group in Mar 69 and joined the 8th Co in June 69. Reported personalities: 8th Co Cmdr-NHUNG, XO-SINH, PO-QUAN, APO-HUONG.

(G-2 COMMENT: Reported personalities and the revealed LBN correlates with III MAF OOB holdings. All information rated (F-3).)

2. THUA THIEN (P). No significant reports.

3. QUANG NAM (P). Hoi Chanh, Le Van ANH, soldier/guard, assigned to Dispensary No. 78, Front 4, who rallied on 17 Nov 69 to Coastal Group 14 at an unspecified location along the CUA DAI River (SA QUANG NAM Sector HOI AN RVN msg 220715Z Nov 69, Initial Interr Rpt No. 112-69, 11th ITT HOI AN) stated that he had deserted his unit (Security Section) on 8 Oct 69 and rallied because he feared being forcibly returned to his unit. The last known location of the 78th Dispensary was vicinity (AT 977384) (8 Oct 59) and its mission was to treat the sick and wounded VC/NVA of the Q.81 LF Bn, V.25 MF Bn, 19th Recon Bn, and the 36th Regt. The 78th Dispensary consisted of approximately 20 tents above ground and 10 caverns underground. A radio station manned by six men atop HILL 953 vicinity (AT 969385) gave the alarm in case of air attack. If such occurred, all personnel would take cover in the caves. The Security Section was composed of members of the 36th Regt. There were four NVA doctors at the hospital, four additional physicians and an unknown number of medics and RVN nurses. Prior to May 69 the dispensary had a capacity of 300 patients, and in Oct 69 held 160 WIA and sick. The Hoi Chanh stated that many men desired to Chieu Hoi but feared the GVN soldiers. Their PO told them that if they rallied, information would be extracted from them and then they would be put to death. Their food ration was one and one-half cans of rice per day with some salt, but no meat. Reported personalities: 78th Dispensary CO-SrCapt Le Ngoc DINH, XO-Hoang KAM (Surgeon), PO-1stLt Ngoc AM. Physicians were Nguyen Van NHAT and Nguyen Van NGHE.

(G-2 COMMENT: Last week, elements of the 7th Marine Regiment found what is believed to be the 78th Hospital in the Q'VE SON Mountains vicinity (AT 961394) (20 Nov 69). The personalities were new with the exception of the CO, Le DINH, who has been identified previously in captured documents. All information rated (F-2).)

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b. Hoi Chanh, Sgt Quach Van KHA (AKA Vu THONG) District III, DANANG City, QUANG DA Special Zone, who rallied on 1 Oct 69 vicinity (BT 046614) (CG III MAF DNG msg 150006Z Nov 69, CG 1st MARDIV msg 212335Z Nov 69, Supp Interrog Rpt 1st IT 39-11-69(NVA/Returnee)) has given information concerning the forthcoming Winter Offensive in 1969 and early 1970. The Hoi Chanh stated that since Jul 69 NVA units have withdrawn to LAOS or to isolated jungle areas to supply and reinforce. All local force units have been supplied with NVA replacements and units are now 80 percent NVA. Transportation units, rear service, and labor pools will supply the bulk of the troop additions to local force units. The firepower of the local force units has been increased by phasing out the SKS and increasing the number of AK weapons. Recruits from local areas will replace NVA soldiers in non-combat roles in the rear areas. To prevent desertions and ralliers, the NVA combat units will conduct 10 days of intensive training and political indoctrination. Security will be tightened within the cells. Also, the proselyting sections via the wives and families will try to induce ARVN officers to desert to the VC/NVA. The Hoi Chanh stated all of these plans were to be implemented by Aug 69, and that the Winter-Spring Offensive will begin with VC/NVA initiated small scale encounters designed to keep FVMAF away from the base areas. The VC/NVA will repair and construct two main roads for the purpose of moving heavy artillery primarily into QUANG NAM (P). According to the Hoi Chanh the heavy artillery will consist of 37mm, 100mm, 105mm, and 275mm guns. These guns were to be towed by tracked vehicles identified as being "CCCL41's and CCCL14's. Additionally, Front 4 has four multi-tube rocket launchers in their base area. Phase 1 of the Winter-Spring Campaign started on 1 Nov 69 and involves the resupply, refitting and replacement previously mentioned. Phase 2 will commence 1 Jan 70, characterized by large scale operations against FVMAF and the massing of units for Phase 3. Phase 3 will commence on 1 Feb 70 and will continue through Apr 70. The primary targets for Phase 3 will be HUE, DANANG, HOI AN City, TAM KY City, and SAIGON. Prep fires will be conducted by artillery, rockets and mortars. The Hoi Chanh stated that the 36th Regt would assault MARBLE MOUNTAIN and move up the peninsula across the HAN River Bridge (BT 040760), into DANANG City. The 90th Regt would assault the 51st ARVN Regt and move into the city via QL-1. Local force VC and elements of the 2d NVA Division will secure the western area. Unknown elements of the Northern Wing will act as a blocking force in the HAI VAN Pass area. All bridges will be destroyed, cutting off any overland reinforcement. The Hoi Chanh believed that Front 4 had enough 12.7mm AA machine guns to preclude any reinforcement by air. The Hoi Chanh also stated that if the attacks on DANANG fail, all forces will regroup in the HON TAU and DAI LOC (P) Mountains initially and then move back to their normal base areas.

(G-2 COMMENT: Much of the Hoi Chanh's information concerning the Winter-Spring Offensive has been previously reported by other PW's and Hoi Chanh's (F-3). The use of artillery pieces of the caliber reported by the Hoi Chanh in QUANG NAM or other provinces in I Corps is considered improbable in the near future (F-5).)

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4. QUANG TIN (P).

a. PW, Nguyen Van QUAT, PFC, 2d Plt, 2d Co, 70th MF Bn, captured seven kilometers west southwest of TIEN PHUOC (BT 037126) on 20 Nov 69 (5th SFGA Interrog Rpt(SF-130-69)) stated that the battalion headquarters was located at (BT 1949) on 20 Nov 69 and that the 2d Co was located in BINH TRI (V) Hamlet #8 vicinity (BT 1947). QUAT stated that the 70th Bn's strength was 250 personnel and that the battalion had four subordinate companies designated 1 through 4 with the 4th Co being a heavy weapons company. Their present mission is "to protect the rice harvest from being destroyed by GVN troops." The future mission is "to launch night attacks against strategic hamlets in the HA NAM (CNA) area and the CHO DUOC Market Place (BT 174465) between 20 Nov 69 and 4 Dec 69. QUAT stated that the 70th Bn had an average daily diet of rice with salt, fish (preserved), vegetables, and meat (once every fortnight). Specific caches were unknown to the source; however, he related that members of the unit picked up their food from BINH GIANG (V) (BT 1747), HA NAM (D), and a place referred to as K-7 (NFI). QUAT was drafted in Sep 68 and assigned to the 12th Co, 709th Bn, 238th Regt during basic training which lasted for seven months. Subsequent to this, he was assigned to Infiltration Group 709 with a strength of 500 men. Leaving NVN on 27 Jul 69 they arrived in QUANG NAM (P) on 29 Sep 69. After a few days rest they were split up and sent to their respective units. Subject did not state what other units received replacements from this infiltration group. Reported personalities: 70th Bn CO-1stLt Nguyen Van ANH, XO-2dLt Nguyen Van MINH, PO-1stLt Ha Van QUAN. The infiltration group commander was Capt DOA.

(G-2 COMMENT: The stated location of the battalion CP is very close to III MAF holdings (BT 2348). Also, the CO and PO of the 2d Co have been mentioned previously as holding the same positions. The infiltration group number is new. The source was able to give information only on his unit and was not knowledgeable of other units or companies within his battalion. The diet given by the PW indicates that the food shortage that is affecting many other units in I Corps is not affecting the 70th Bn (F-2). The information he gave was accurate, consistent, and is rated (F-2) with the exception of the infiltration data which is rated (F-6).)

b. The following information has been derived from enemy documents captured on 24 Oct 69 (as reported by 2d ARVN Inf Div) vicinity (BT 197229) by elements of the 196th Brigade, Americal Division, and concerns training material on the manufacture and employment of gas mortar shells: "At the beginning of the battle, we should fire from 15 to 20 chemical mortar shells or from five to eight chemical bangalore torpedos as the enemy's position, then we fire explosive ammunition to annihilate the enemy positions later. If we fire chemical ammunition at the enemy positions two or three times in one night, enemy soldiers in the positions will not be able to fire against us or will fire inaccurately. Chemical ammunitions can also be used in shellings against the enemy. Our province used them in the attacks on THON TIEN Post, PHUOC LAM (D) in 1968, and in the QUAN RUONG and DONG CHAI battles. First, we fire a volley of ordinary mortar

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shells to force them to wear protective masks. This will make them unable to stay in the fortifications for a long period of time. So, they will be forced to leave their fortifications. We then fire ordinary explosive ammunition to annihilate them. We can inflict heavier losses upon the enemy using this method. In applying this method of attack we killed 60 enemy in the QUANG RUONG battle. Fifteen or 20 minutes after firing chemical ammunition, we can use our firepower to oppress the enemy soldiers and create favorable conditions for our infantry troops to assault them. However, in order to ensure success and to keep our troops from being affected by these chemicals, we must have them wear protective masks during the assault."

(G-2 COMMENT: This is not the first report of the enemy possessing chemical munitions and enemy employment of CS munitions on the battlefield has been reported previously. Although the type of "gas" is not specified in this report, it is our opinion that CS is probably inferred, due to previous reports (F-3).)

5. QUANG NGAI (P).

a. Returnee, SrLt Phan Van TRUNG, Cryptographer of the Special Mission Group of MR-5, QUANG NGAI (P), who rallied on 21 Oct 69 at THACH TRU OP (BS 7647), MO DUC (D), seven kilometers southwest of MO DUC (III MAP SITTC Rpt 6 Nov 69) stated that his unit's strength was 33 men including seven officers and that his unit was located at DUC LUONG (V), MO DUC (D) and PHO LOI (V) (BS 802467), DUC PHO (D), eight kilometers north of DUC PHO. The group headquarters was located at AN THO (H), (BS 812455) eight kilometers north northeast of DUC PHO, with a mission to observe the US and ARVN Navies along the coast, reporting the situation directly to the Department of the Navy, NVN, and to receive ships carrying infiltration weapons from the north. Since Dec 66, the Special Mission Unit of QUANG NGAI operated along the coast of QUANG NGAI (P). In July 1969, a directive from MR-5 established four Special Mission Units to report the seashore situation and wait for the infiltration ship. Transporting weapons from the north to the south by ship was more advantageous because it was faster and more weapons could be carried than by overland modes. A Skeleton Cadre with a 15 watt radio station and crypto personnel were sent from MR-5 to the provincial units to establish four units, one each in QUANG NAM, QUANG NGAI, BINH DINH and KHANH HOA Province. The mission group was commanded by a SrCapt at the provincial level. Each unit consisted of 20 men. In Aug 69 subject read a directive from QUANG NGAI Unit which was addressed to the DUC PHO and MO DUC (D)'s which revealed the future activities of MR-5 forces during the D-1 Campaign period, Oct 69 to Nov 69. The new campaign, D-2, would commence after Nov 69 and will be more active than the campaign of Tet 68 in order to gain a military victory needed to support the Paris Peace Talks. The prime objectives are QUANG NAM and DANANG, with QUANG NGAI a secondary objective. Codes and LBN's of the Special Mission Group, MR-5 at QUANG NGAI (P) are as follows: Cover Number-H-44; LBN-743 Tran Quoc Tuan; Cover Number of Correspondent-VK-15; Cover Number for Special Mission Group MR-5 used by Navy Department in NVN-HB-18.

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The times of contact with NVN Navy Department was daily from 1030H to 1100H (NVN time); daily contact with MR-5 was 0930H (NVN time); daily contact with the QUANG NGAI Provincial Unit was between 1000H and 1600H (NVN time). Activity Reports: to MR-5 every 10 days; to NVN Navy Department every two days. He stated that after Ho Chi MINH's death on 3 Sep 69, most of the cadre were doubtful and demoralized. Subject had worked at the Crypto Section of the NVA Headquarters located at Hung Vuong Street in HANOI, NVN where he prepared secret coded documents for infiltration groups. In Nov 63, he moved to XUAN MAI, HA SONG (P), and in Feb 64 he regrouped in eastern QUANG TIN (P). Subject separated from the group and reported to MR-5 Headquarters. He heard others were assigned to the 1st Worksite of Agricultural Site #2. Reported personalities: MR-5 Provincial Cadre of QUANG NGAI Province and the Special Mission Group of QUANG NGAI (P); MR-5 Commander was MajG3n Nguyen DON (AKA BA); in 1966 DON went north. Subject has seen two signatures for DON's replacement, AN and CHAU. The Chief of Staff was SrCol QUAN who replaced SrCol TRUC during "Monkey Tet" (1968). QUAN is now commander of the 2d Division. Assistant Chief of Staff-LtCol LIEN; Political Chief SrCol MAI; Comm Chief is LtCol Minh SON who replaced CHU in 1964; Regional Party Committee Crypto Chief-Maj HOA (AKA THUONG); (other personalities of lesser importance were given).

(G-2 COMMENT: The use of ships to infiltrate arms has been reported previously and reports coincide with the date given by the returnee. At 0040 on 15 Jul 67, Market Time Patrol boats forced a 98 foot steel-hulled trawler aground vicinity (BS 777821) on BATANGAN Peninsula in QUANG NGAI (P). The trawler was taken under fire by Korean Marine artillery, and early in the morning Korean Marines boarded the vessel. The trawler contained some 1,200 weapons and substantial amount of ammunition and explosives. The trawler was salvaged by Navy units and towed to CHU LAI (A-1). The information on the Special Mission Group meeting vessels corroborated with the statements of returnee Huynh CU, Chief of Military Training Division, MR-5, who defected to SON TRUNG Post (BS 5976), SON TINH (D), QUANG NGAI (P), on 24 Mar 67 (F-2). Information on MR-5 Cadre and Provincial Unit, QUANG NGAI, is in keeping with previously reported information as is the information on the poor morale of the communists in RVN after Ho Chi MINH's death (F-2). The 1st Worksite of Agricultural Site 2 is the AKA for 1st Regiment, 2d NVA Division (F-1).)

b. PW, PFC Bu Duc MAI, 18th Engr Co, captured 13 Nov 69 (BS 838412) (CG Americal msg 161300Z Nov 69) stated his unit strength was 60 men, and located (BS 697365), seven kilometers southeast of LZ SAN JUAN HILL, with the mission to lay mines on Highway One and destroy APC's. PW stated that he departed NVN in Feb 69 with Infiltration Group 511 but caught malaria and was left at an aid station upon reaching QUANG NAM (P). After one month the PW and 10 others joined Engineer Company (NFI). The 18th Company's weapons consisted of four B-41's and 30 to 40 mines. The commander of the infiltration group was CHI.

(G-2 COMMENT: 18th Engineer Co is an AKA for 180th Engineer Co which is subordinate to 2d Regt, 3d NVA Div. The 2d Regt CP is held (BS 8020) 18 kilometers south of DUC PHO (8 Nov 69) (F-2). Infiltration Group 511 and CHI are unidentified (F-6).)

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 48-69**

1. **GENERAL.** No significant change in tactics, scope, or intensity of VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities were reported during the past week.

Terrorist and sabotage activities remained at low levels.

Political and propaganda activities continue to be oriented toward fomenting dissent, political struggles, and demonstrations against the GVN coupled with intensified military proselyting activities.

Detection and apprehension of individuals involved in enemy covert intelligence collection and related activities reveals at least limited enemy success in this endeavor.

Miscellaneous reports of possible significance, included in this report, concern enemy plans to expend on-hand RVN currency in anticipation of devaluation and issuance of new currency by the GVN; use of RVN currency for bribery, in penetration efforts against ARVN and Self-defense installations; proselyting plans for November in the Danang area; adverse enemy morale problems resulting from censorship of personal letters; a VC meeting in Quang Tri (P) concerned with increasing attacks to bring peace to Vietnam; counter-pacification problems in Quang Ngai (P); sending teenagers from Quang Ngai (P) to NVN to attend an unspecified course; and enemy logistical and support problems generated by GVN pacification activities in Quang Ngai (P).

Captured documents, rallier and PW reports of the past week continue to reveal increasing evidence that the enemy is experiencing acute difficulties generated primarily by the VCI's increasing inability to procure the material and political support required from the South Vietnamese people.

There are various reports mentioning enemy preparations for possible increased military activity during the period 19-23 December and large scale offensive efforts during TET '70. In conjunction with intensified political and proselyting activities, VC/VCI emphasis continues to be focused primarily on anti-pacification policies and tactics and the collection of food and provisions.

VCI neutralizations have increased significantly since August. The three southern provinces of ICTZ stood 1st, 2nd and 5th, respectively in country-wide VCI neutralizations for both September and October. Although validated figures are not yet available for November, they appear to follow the same trend.

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Despite failure by the enemy to generate any success relative to his seemingly grandiose plans of promoting widespread anti-GVN dissent and military desertions or defections; the threat, nevertheless, will continue as long as VCI elements remain organized and popular frustrations generated by the war provide circumstances favorable to enemy exploitation.

2. ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES. Recent reports of detection and apprehension of agents and witting supporters, some of whom included members of selected GVN pacification and security elements, engaged in various enemy covert intelligence collection and related activities, reveal at least limited enemy success in this endeavor.

Conversely, the detection and subsequent apprehension of these individuals reflects the high professionalism and steadily increasing capability of GVN/RVNAF investigative agencies to detect, identify, follow through and apprehend the individuals concerned.

The classification attached to reports containing details of this type activity usually preclude inclusion in this reporting medium. Such reports receive limited distribution consistent with the "need to know" criteria and mention is made here only for the purpose of emphasizing the need for continuous and effective implementation of active, passive, and denial countermeasures in combatting this threat on which the enemy places high priority.

No specific VC/VCI intelligence gathering activities were reported during the past week that could be included in this report.

3. SABOTAGE. Enemy sabotage related activities reported during the past week, consisted of one minor incident, as follows:

At approximately 260300H November 1969, a culvert, vicinity of (YD 220636), approximately three (3) kilometers northwest of Dong Ha, Quang Tri (P), was destroyed by an undetermined type mine. (Ref: III MAF Force Engineer's Spot Rpt to III MAF COC dtd 261120H Nov69)

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. Enemy political and propaganda activities reported during the past week reflected continued enemy emphasis on efforts to foment dissent, political struggles and demonstrations against the GVN coupled with intensified military proselyting activities.

Details of enemy political and propaganda activities reported during the past week, are as follows:

a. Quang Tri

On 26 November 1969, approximately 500 propaganda leaflets were found scattered along a road from vicinity (YD 219638) to (YD 223634) (nfi). (Ref: PSA, Quang Tri Province, msg 261730 Nov69)

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b. Thua Thien

(1) A US MI source reported that on 15 November 1969, approximately 20 personnel of the 5th and 6th worksites were deployed vicinity (YD 358300) for the purpose of listening to the VOA radio station for news about anti-war demonstrations in the USA. A political officer of an unidentified antiaircraft company and a battalion commander of the 5th worksite stated the political and tactical intentions of the new North Vietnam leaders to be as follows: Groups of personnel are being organized to infiltrate South Vietnam. Party cadre members trained in the Son Tay political and military camp will infiltrate the Tri-Thien area. These cadre have the capability to establish and develop sub-party committees in villages and hamlets. They intend to use the Tri-Thien area as a target to construct a model communist government system. The effort to organize party committees in villages and hamlets has been given high importance. The NVN will campaign to the people of the villages and hamlets because they are the "Composition of the Revolution". The initiation of vigorous battles throughout the Tri-Thien area, beginning on 20 December 1969, will accomplish the "1st Point of the Program" (nfi).
(Ref: Det B, 1st MI Bn, 525th MI Gp Rep # 1/B/CX/1139/69 dtd 25Nov69) (Eval: C-3).

(2) On 15 November 1969, elements of the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division operating vicinity of (YD 847021) discovered enemy documents containing the following information:

Directive with envelope, number 96/BV, dated 20 October 1969, signed illegibly for B17-V2 (possible element of Hue City Party Committee, Thua Thien Province), addressed to the military proselyting sections of various subordinate districts, notifies them that the morale of US and Puppet (RVNAF) personnel was gravely affected by the anti-war moratorium in the US on 15 October 1969. With the prospect of another US anti-war moratorium scheduled for 14 and 15 November 1969, the enemy's morale is likely to run even lower. Thus, all addressees should now intensify their proselyting actions by disseminating information on US anti-war movements to as many US and Puppet personnel as possible. Such actions may result in a deepening of defeatism and development of an anti-war attitude among the enemy ranks. The envelope indicates that this copy was addressed to H3 (nfi).
(Ref: CDEC Doc Log No: 11-2126-69 dtd 22Nov69) (Eval: B-3)

A letter with envelope, dated 30 October, signed by Ngoc Phuong of VQ5 (Huong Thuy District Unit, Thua Thien Province) Military Proselyting Section, addressed to Tam of L5 (Huong Loc Village), instructs the latter to initiate an intensive military proselyting campaign during the coming rainy season. Activities to be performed during this campaign are as follows:

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Military proselyting elements should coordinate with combat units in a joint effort to disintegrate People's Self-Defense organizations and to incite Regional and Popular Force personnel to desert in mass.

(VC) fifth columnists should be planted in enemy (RVN) ranks, especially in Regional Force, Popular Force and Civil Defense units.

Extensive propaganda activities should be directed at various strata of the population as well as (RVNAF) servicemen's dependents. The latter should be urged to incite their husbands and children to desert (from the RVNAF). Also, Puppet (RVN) personnel should be assured that once they joined the (VC) ranks they would be authorized to go to NVN for training or for assignment to various jobs.

A letter with envelope, number 30/VT3, classified (VC) Top Secret dated 3 November 1969, signed by Su (possibly of an agency of Hue City Party Committee), addressed to Nga of VQ5 (Huong Thuy District Unit, Thua Thien Province) contains a reproduction of a COSVN message concerning political activities to be implemented throughout SVN to support the US anti-war moratoriums. This message reads in part as follows:

"According to (NVN) Politburo, we should immediately start preparations for broad movement among the masses aimed at supporting the American people's anti-war moratorium, as the latter is asking for a complete withdrawal of US troops from SVN. Elements to be motivated to take part in this campaign are students, youths, workers, Buddhists, and potential opponents of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem Government, such as Tran Ngoc Lieng (a well-known lawyer in Saigon). Actions to be taken during this campaign are seminars, protest demonstrations, and sending petitions (to RVN authorities). In conjunction, US and Puppet personnel should be instigated to ask for an end to the war and prompt withdrawal of US troops. The press (in Saigon) should also be urged to disseminate news and write articles favorable to US anti-war movements. (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No: 11-2127-69 dtd 22Nov69) (Eval: B-3)

A letter, dated 1 November 1969, signed by Phap, forwarded to Ngoc Phuong, Military Proselyting Section (possibly of the Tri-Thien Military Region) in care of VQ 5 (Huong Thuy District Unit, Thua Thien Province) states that in October 1969 Phap, in compliance with directives by the region (possibly Tri-Thien Region) and Y20 (possibly Hue City Unit) sent a directive concerning military proselyting operations for the rainy season (campaign). Recently, the US declared the withdrawal of 35,000 troops, including the 3rd (US) Marine Division in Tri-Thien (Region). Therefore, most of the US troops here are awaiting departure (from SVN) and dislike going on operations. Moreover, the American people have fought hard for the withdrawal of

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their troops. This situation has had a direct impact on (US) officers and enlisted men. The withdrawal would create great confusion among the Puppet (RVNAF) troops, because they have to proceed to the front line to replace the US troops. There are more US troops in Huong Thuy District (Thua Thien Province) than any other district. Consequently, when the US withdraws, it will have a strong influence on personnel of the Puppet (RVN) administration. The author also relates that the Hai Thuy (area) is flooded for the time being and many difficulties have been encountered. Phap also kept his superiors informed of the difficulties of the Military Proselyting (Section) of (Huong Thuy) District, and recommends that the addressee exert greater efforts to perform his job while waiting for a solution from higher headquarters (nfi). The author finally requests the whereabouts of the Chief of Nam Hoa District (possibly for military proselyting action). (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No: 11-2386-69 dtd 25Nov69)(Eval: B-3)

c. Quang Nam

A US MI source reported that from 2200 until 2400 hours, 16 November 1969, approximately one VC platoon (30 men) entered Van Duong #1 (H) vicinity (AT 911798), Hoa Vinh (V), Hoa Vang (D). The platoon divided into groups of 4 or 5 and attempted to persuade villagers to convince their relatives working for the ARVN, to return to Van Duong #1 (H) and to join the VC. The VC left Van Duong #1 (H) moving northwest. (Ref: 3CIT-IR-150-69 dtd 20Nov69) (Eval: F-6)

d. Quang Ngai

(1) On 16 November 1969, elements of the U.S. Army Americal Division operating vicinity of (BS 470703) captured a document containing the following information:

A directive, dated 29 September 1969, prepared for the signature of Ba Sinh (possibly Commanding Officer, Quang Ngai Province Unit MR-5), provides instructions governing the conduct of political struggles and motivation of the masses to break loose from the enemy (GVN) administrative machinery.

Document states that at present, 13,695 people of Category A, 22,071 of Category B, 23,219 of Category C, and 9,268 others are placed under friendly (VC/NVA) control in I (possibly Quang Ngai Province) area.

In accordance with the criteria established, efforts should be made to control 5,000 additional people in Category A, 10,000 in Category B, and 15,000 of Category C. (The meanings of those categories is unknown). (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No: 11-2401-69 dtd 26Nov69) (Eval: B-3).

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(2) On 21 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 15 November, there was a VC meeting held in Bien Yen (H), (BS 522926), Binh Son (D). Residents from the hamlet and the neighboring area, approximately 300 people, attended. The speaker, Nguyen Mao, a political cadre member of Binh Son (D), talked on political status (nfi). The talk included an analysis of VC victories in South Vietnam and a discussion of the duties of the people to support the VC in their fight against the US and GVN.

He also disclosed that another NVA division, 10th Field Force (nfi), was just sent to South Vietnam to reinforce units within MR-5. (Ref: CO, Det C, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/B/BX/0825/69 dtd 21Nov69) (Eval: C-3)

(3) Documents captured on 16 November 1969, in Son Tinh (D) vicinity (BS 685827) provided the following information:

The VC launched a political campaign running from 14 November - 15 December 1969 with two planned high points; one on 14-15 November, the other on 14-15 December 1969. Their intention is to emulate the life of Ho Chi Minh. All people in VC-controlled areas will hear speeches, and attempts will be made to speak to the populace of GVN-controlled areas. GVN areas will experience an increase in political activity. (Ref: G-2 I CORPS BRIEFING MEMORANDUM dtd 26Nov69) (Unrated)

5. TERROR. Reported acts of terrorism continued at essentially the same low level as the past several weeks and reflected no significant change in tactics.

Numerous civilian deaths and injuries continue to result from enemy mines and booby trapped explosive devices and reflect a general enemy disregard for the safety of civilians who live, work, and transit areas where these devices are often placed.

Details of terrorist activities, reported in ICTZ during the past week, are listed in Appendix 1.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Quang Tri

Interrogation of a VC, captured by a PSDF unit on 18 November 1969 vicinity of (YD 330510), revealed that the K.34 Artillery Unit was located vicinity (YD 2134). Subject was told by his comrade

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named Canh that all VC/NVA organizations in SVN are supported from North Vietnam by the issuance of GVN 200 and 500 piaster notes. (Ref: SA 1st ARVN Division, HUE, RVN msg 280400Z Nov69) (Unrated)

b. Thua Thien

(1) On 15 November 1969, elements of the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division operating vicinity of (YD 847021) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Directive, number 269/VT2, dated 29 October 1969, signed by Van for VT2 (Office of the Hue City Party Committee), addressed to VQ5 (Huong Thuy District Unit), VT10 (nfi) and (Hue) Coordination and Operations Committee, reveals that, according to information supplied by "Central" (possibly COSVN), the enemy (GVN) is planning to devalue the SVN piaster in early 1970. Also, some types of (SVN) bank notes may be invalidated and replaced by new ones. Thus, the (Tri-Thien) Region Party Committee has urged all subordinate and districts to expend on an emergency basis all funds they now possess. Moreover, the population should be motivated not to set aside any money. Instead, they should purchase provisions and other goods. Items recommended to be purchased by various subordinates are poplin and khaki nylon material, mosquito nets, drugs, gold and radio receivers.

Directive, number 271/VT2, dated 29 October 1969, signed by Van for VT2 (Office of Hue City Party Committee), addressed to (possibly Hue) City Unit and VQ 5 (Huong Thuy District Unit), informs addressees of the enemy's (FWMAF/RVNAF) second pacification phase in 1969 which called for upgrading all Types C - D Hamlets into Types A-B Hamlets.

All addressees were further instructed to formulate new pacification plans and review the achievements so far attained by the enemy in the pacification field. (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No: 11-2126-69 dtd 22Nov69) (Eval: B-3)

(2) On 20 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

From 18-19 November, the Phong Dien (D) Committee conducted a meeting in the Trach Pho jungle area, vicinity (YD 498432). Approximately 30 personnel were in attendance. The purpose of the meeting was to assign orders from the Province Committee to the Village and Hamlet committees. The Thua Thien Province Committee gave the Phong Dien District Committee 2,000,000 \$SVN in blue counterfeit bills and 100 \$SVN in red counterfeit bills. The District Committee will in turn distribute to each Village Committee, approximately 300,000 \$SVN to spend before the end of December 1969. The

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money is to be used to buy food for the 6th Regiment (nfi) and to bribe ARVN and Self-Defense cadre to help the VC penetrate the ARVN and Self-Defense installations.

(Ref: Det B, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt #1/B/CX/1233/69 dtd 20Nov69)
(Eval: F-3)

c. Quang Nam

(1) On 17 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

The VC Hoa Vang District Committee and Military Proselyting Section, commanded by Nguyen Mai, held a meeting in Xuan Tra (H) vicinity (BT 064672) and discussed the following plans for the month of November 1969:

1. Increase attempts to penetrate the GVN.
2. Reorganize the VC tax structure in an effort to obtain more money in support of the military.
3. Increase sapper and assassination activities; set demolition charges and assassinate GVN village officials who are traveling alone.
4. Improve and increase VC transportation, control the people more firmly and protect VC secret cadre (nfi).

The VC also told the people that any cadre who gets good results for his actions will be cited (nfi) and sent to higher training (nfi).

Source further advised that the VC had sent 20 female cadre, under the command of Ngo Thi Am, Deputy Secretary of Military Proselyting Section, to infiltrate Danang City. The date of the meeting was not known.

(Ref: OSI Det 5003, Danang Air Base, DRAFT DDIIR 11-45 dtd 17Nov69)
(Eval: F-3)

(2) On 18 November 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division operating vicinity (AT 973606) obtained a document from an enemy PW, which contained the following information:

Three personal letters with two envelopes, dated 3 November 1969, sent by Le Khuong of H5 (Military Commo-Liaison Station, Cam Sa Area, Dien Ban (D) (QD5Z), to Que of P6464 (4th Co, 703rd AKA: C4 D26 Signal Battalion, Quang Da Special Zone) and Hai of H3 (Military Commo-Liaison Station, Dien Thai Village, Dien Ban (D),

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QDSZ), revealed the following:

Letters 1 and 2, sent to Que and Luc, report on enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) military activities in Dien Nam, Dien Ngoc, and Dien Binh Villages (Dien Ban District, QDSZ).

Letters further revealed the demoralization of the members of H5 who refused to comply with orders issued by higher headquarters. These actions were the result of the severe censorship conducted by H3 on personal letters.

Letter 3, sent to Hai, requests that Khuong be immediately issued funds and rice because H5 is critically short of these items. (Ref: CDEC Doc Log No: 11-2202-69 dtd 23Nov69) (Eval: B-3)

d. Quang Tin

On 20 November 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

A VC cadre meeting of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSVN) was held during the period 15-25 November, vicinity Dai-Don (H) (BT 110030) and (BT 150030). The instructors were from VC Quang Nam Province and 120 NLFSVN cadre were in attendance. The theme for the meeting was increasing attacks in the future to bring peace to Vietnam. The NLFSVN cadre were receiving extensive political and military training at this meeting (nfi). (Ref: Det D, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/A/CX/0263/69 dtd 21Nov69) (Eval: F-3)

e. Quang Ngai

(1) On 16 November 1969, elements of the U.S. Army Americal Division operating vicinity (BS 679810) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

A directive, precedence "Urgent", dated 26 October 1969, signed by Bui A for A1, provided an assessment of the counter-pacification activities in various villages (of Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, MR-5), and outlined counter-pacification missions for village and action units.

The document asserted that since the beginning of 1969, the enemy (GVN) had tried hard to carry out his accelerated pacification plan in the district. He put into action a very large force, applied cunning schemes, and succeeded in gaining control of a small portion of the populace in fringe areas.

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To foil the enemy program, a number of villages have had meritorious achievements. However, in general, the counter-pacification movement was still weak; the guerrilla warfare was unsteady; the strengthening of revolutionary forces did not meet the prescribed requirements; development of village and hamlet units was too slow; recruitment of replacements for the District Unit failed, the weapons equipment status of guerrilla units was very poor; and the political movement and troop proselyting activity could not keep abreast of military actions.

The directive affirms that the origin of these shortcomings remained, in the fact that cadre and members overestimated (?) the enemy's (FVMAF/HVNAF) capabilities. They did not realize the winning position of the Revolution and were afraid to stand up to an aggressive enemy.

The document urged subordinates to correct their deficiencies by conducting intensive political indoctrination and coordinated three-pronged attacks. The suppression of anti-revolutionaries was to be stepped up, and the elimination of enemy administrative personnel at village and hamlet level was to be properly carried out.

(Ref: CDEC Doc Log No: 11-2420-69 dtd 26Nov69) (Eval: B-3)

(2) On 26 November 1969, a US MI source reported that the Binh Son District Unit asked VCI to carry out VC memo 120/TC. The memo urged local authorities to choose teenagers of 14 years of age or younger to send to North Vietnam for training (nfi). A list of those teenagers was to be forwarded to the district office prior to 15 November 1969.

(Ref: Quang Ngai INTSUM No. 272 from 260600 to 280600 Nov69)
(Eval: C-2)

(3) A US MI source reported that on 20 November 1969, the Mo Duc VC District Affairs Unit held a meeting in Phuoc Dien (H) vicinity (BS 688565), Duc Thach (V), Mo Duc (D).

This was an unscheduled meeting and was called to discuss the status of various VC village guerrilla units in Mo Duc (D).

Le A (AKA: Le Vo), the district leader, was chairman of the meeting. Personnel attending the meeting included members from the District Affairs Unit, the assistant district unit leader, a political officer from the C-19th Company and twelve (12) village unit cadre.

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Le A briefed the personnel attending on the situation in the district which consisted of the following subjects:

Present status and Plans of the GVN. Due to the artillery support and air support provided by the US, the Mo Duc District Unit was under heavy pressure by the 6th ARVN Regiment. In addition, many attacks and pacification plans had been initiated in coastal villages of eastern Mo Duc (D) area, aimed at breaking the VC power and crippling the economics which provided for the VC battles by communists in southern Quang Ngai (P).

Faults of the VC. Le A indicated the following five faults of the VC:

The leaders did not accomplish their missions completely. For instance, rice which had been collected at Duc Thuan (V) (VC: Duc Phong Village), Duc Lan (GVN: Duc My Village) and Duc Luong (V) (VC: Duc Trung AKA VC Duc Minh Village), was not carried to the main cache in a timely manner as directed by the District Committee which resulted in most of the rice being burned by ARVN operational forces. In addition, the district had planned to use Duc Hoai (V) (VC: Duc Chanh Village) as a base area for the cadre (nfi), but the local VC authorities hid at Duc Thuan (V). Therefore, most of the VC cadre in the area of Duc Hoai (V) had been killed or captured during various ARVN sweep operations in October 1969.

The morale and the combat ability of the guerrillas was low, but they asked to be armed with more modern weapons instead of relying on mines and explosives (nfi).

The population still trusted the VC but the VC cadre feared the dangers (nfi) and were afraid of food and supply shortages. Therefore, the VC failed to initiate any legal or political struggles.

The VC failed to stop soldiers and local inhabitants from returning to the GVN side and failed to fight against GVN spies.

Most of the party cadre did not feel that their side would be victorious, especially since the death of President Minh and the beginning of pacification attacks by the GVN.

Plans and Requirements. VC cadre are to be assigned to attack and motivate the inhabitants to join in the political struggle. The first stage of the anti-pacification program called for surveillance of GVN pacification cadre and the rebuilding of VC hamlets and villages.

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Each village is responsible for the organization of one guerrilla platoon (nfi). The guerrilla force will be armed with K.44's containing telescopic sights. Each village is to establish a base area for storage of weapons and food. Provincial and main force units would assign personnel to work, whenever personnel shortages existed. More emphasis is to be placed on the improvement of cadre morale.

(Ref: Det D, 1stBn, 525th MI Gp Rep # 1/B/DX/1474/69 dtd 26Nov69)

(Eval: B-2)

APPENDIX

1 - Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 48-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Tri	18Nov69 (Late Entry)	(YD 317446)	At approximately 2300, an estimated 11 VC entered the house of Mai van TUNG and kidnapped him. National Police investigation reveals that TUNG was a former rice purchaser for the VC. However, since his recent visit to see his son, who is in the ARVN, TUNG has refused to help the VC.
Thua Thien	25Nov69	(YD 950195)	A Vietnamese civilian triggered a VC booby trap (nfi) resulting in one Vietnamese civilian wounded.
	26Nov69	(YD 962052)	Enemy terrorist entered An Pho Cau (H) and killed one civilian (nfi).
	26Nov69	(YD 961061)	Eight VC entered Xuan Lai (H) and assassinated the brother of the hamlet chief.
Quang Nam	21Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BT 171598)	At approximately 0950, a CAP 2-4-1 patrol called in a medevac helicopter for one (1) VN civilian and treated two (2) other injured VN civilians who had tripped a booby trapped 105/155mm round approximately three kilometers NE of Hoi An.
	26Nov69	(BT 065559)	CAP 2-3-5 while in perimeter defense position near Long Chau #3 (H), received SAF and an undetermined number of CHICOM grenades from an estimated squad of VC. Two (2) civilians, who were close by, were wounded.

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Nam	22Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BT 137551)	At approximately 1100H, 22 Nov 1969, VN civilians (nfi) detonated an undetermined type mine near Vinh Chau (3) (H), Xuyen Long Island, resulting in the deaths of three (3) VN civilians.
	18Nov69 (Late Entry)	(AT 959089)	A VC sapper cell entered Bo Ban (H), Hoa Hung (V), Hieu Duc (D) and assassinated a member (nfi) of the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS).
	24Nov69	(ZC 145538)	Six (6) VC entered Dai An (H) and abducted two (2) Vietnamese females, ages 17 yrs.
	24Nov69	(AT 952604)	Members of RD Team #9, while cooking supper at Chau Son #2 (H) were attacked by 5-6 VC with SAF, resulting in two (2) civilians, who were close by, killed and one (1) civilian wounded.
	25Nov69	(BT 042617)	VC abducted two (2) members of the PSDP.
	26Nov69	(BT 078558)	One (1) VC entered Long Chau #3 (H) and threw one (1) grenade into a house, resulting in two (2) civilians wounded.
	27Nov69	(AT 921577)	The 80th PF Platoon received 5x82mm mortar rounds from an unknown location while in NDP at Ai Nghia (H). Two (2) civilians who were in close proximity to the attack were killed and twelve civilians were wounded.

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Nam	27Nov69	(AT 917578) (AT 927578)	The 81st PF platoon, located at Dai Loc (D) Hqs and Hoan My (H) received ten (10) rounds of 82mm mortar fire from the southeast. Three (3) civilians who were in close proximity to the attack were killed and 27 were wounded.
Quang Tin	26Nov69	(BT 339179)	Villagers informed CAP 1-1-2 that approximately 20 VC had entered their hamlet on the previous night and destroyed several dwellings. A CAP patrol investigated and found 10 Vietnamese homes destroyed, two of which had been booby trapped with Chicom grenades.
Quang Ngai	20Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BS 767828)	A CAP 1-4-3 patrol called in a medevac helicopter for six (6) VN civilians who were wounded when they detonated a mine (nfi), approximately 16 kilometers NE of Quang Ngai.
	21Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BS 663718)	A VC team (nfi) infiltrated Phu My (H), Tu Chanh (V), Tu Nghia (D) and killed Mi tra TAT, a finance official for the village.
	24Nov69	(BS 573728)	One (1) Vietnamese civilian was found shot to death beside his Honda motorbike (nfi).

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ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 48-69

1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY.

a. There were 21 long range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 23 November 1969. These long range patrols reported 49 sightings totaling approximately 529 enemy. Approximately 461 of the total of 529 enemy sighted were observed by the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion teams in the 1st Marine Division AO. Air and artillery strikes called by patrol teams resulted in 39 enemy KIA and two enemy WIA during the reporting period.

b. The 1st Infantry Brigade Fifth Infantry Division (Mech) Ranger teams observed a total of approximately 60 enemy five kilometers West Southwest of Con Thien on 28 and 29 November 1969. They were engaged in constructing bunkers.

c. Once again the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion patrols operating in the vicinity of An Hoa and the Que Son Mountains continued to observe enemy movement this reporting period. Approximately 460 enemy were observed in these areas moving in no discernible pattern. Artillery fire missions called by the recon teams accounted for 39 enemy KIA and two enemy WIA during the reporting period.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY.

a. In the U.S. DMZ area sensors detected 181 targets during this reporting period. One thousand six hundred thirty-five rounds of artillery were fired in response resulting in negative BDA. Sensors located at YD 1172, YD 0869, and XD 9267 detected heavy activity during this reporting period.

b. Sensors located out of the U.S. DMZ area detected 159 targets during this reporting period. Five hundred thirty-one rounds of artillery were fired in response resulting in negative BDA. Sensors located at XD 660533 and XD 805420 were the most active during this reporting period.

c. Radio frequency and line sensors in the 1st Marine Division AO detected 58 targets during this reporting period. Forty-one fire missions were fired in response consisting of 105 rounds of 60mm and 81mm mortars, 36 rounds of artillery, and 13 rounds of 106mm recoilless rifle. The 26th Marines reported a significant decrease in the sensor activations in their TAOR. This coupled with the decrease of positive sightings and enemy contacts indicates a decrease in enemy traffic through the Danang Anti-Infiltration System during the week.

d. Sensors in the Americal AO detected 24 targets during this reporting period. Two hundred eighty-six rounds of artillery were fired in response with negative BDA. Sensor detected enemy activity was limited to squad size elements moving during the afternoon periods and concentrated in the vicinity of FSB San Juan Hill (BS 634380) and LZ Bronco (BS 812383).

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ANNEX B (DECEMBER WEATHER BRIEF) TO III MAF PERINTREP NO. 48-69

1. General

a. During the month of December, the RVN is completely under the influence of the northeast monsoon. However, compared with the May to October southwest monsoon, the northeast monsoon is relatively cool.

b. During the northeast monsoon, most frequent cloudiness and precipitation occurs on the windward slopes of the ANNAMITE CHAIN, and along the east coast of the RVN. Locations in these regions average 8-20 inches of precipitation falling during a 10 to 20 day period, and as much as 50 inches in one month and 12 inches in one day are recorded.

c. North Vietnam and the east coast of the RVN have typically poor overall weather. There are many days with light rain or drizzle, low cloudiness, and poor visibility generally referred to as "Crachin" weather.

2. Precipitation

a. The mean rainfall amounts continue to decrease over the ICTZ. Most precipitation falls as afternoon and evening showers or thunderstorms; drizzle falls from "Crachin" stratus along the coastal areas of the RVN. Showers are generally intense, but of short duration.

b. The principal factor influencing precipitation amounts is exposure to the moist wind flow. Coastal regions exposed to onshore flow, especially those backed by mountain ranges, have the majority of rainy days and the larger rainfalls.

c. The mean number of days with precipitation is 15 to 20 days. The mean precipitation amount is highest along the coast within the ICTZ. The highest mean value is 41 inches at BA NA, 30 miles south of HUE.

d. Maximum December rainfall is 20 to 30 inches from southern QUANG NGAI (P) to the DMZ.

e. Minimum precipitation amounts for the month are less than one inch along the coast in the ICTZ.

f. Maximum 24 hour rainfall varies in the ICTZ from 6-18 inches. DANANG has recorded a one day rainfall of 13 inches.

3. Cloudiness

a. In December, there is an increase in mean cloudiness, particularly below 5,000 feet in the ICTZ area.

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b. During surges of the northeast monsoon "Crachin" cloudiness, ceilings below 2,000 feet can also be expected. These early morning clouds usually break up by midmorning to become scattered to broken cumulus, with bases 3,000 to 4,000 feet during the afternoon. These may reform and lower at night.

c. Cloudiness in the ICTZ increases and reaches an annual maximum. "Crachin" stratus occurs along the coast on 3 to 7 days. Mean cloudiness is between 70% to 82% at DAVAHO. The mean number of days with total cloud cover equal to or less than 3/10 is five days along the coastal area.

4. Visibility. The poorest visibility occurs in fog and drizzle along the coast of the ICTZ during fresh surges of the northeast monsoon. In general, surface visibility is best during the afternoon and air-to-ground visibility is best between 0800 and 1100 LST; but when "Crachin" weather occurs, visibility in affected areas can be restricted throughout the day. Visibility generally increases to five miles after 1000 LST.

5. Fog

a. Fog forms during pre-dawn hours and dissipates rapidly after sunrise. It is normally light and nonpersistent except in the deeper valleys where it may form earlier and persist throughout the morning.

b. Most locations in the ICTZ observe fog on five days or less.

6. Temperatures. During December, mean maximum and minimum temperatures are at or near the annual low. In general, the decrease in temperature from November ranges from five to eight degrees Fahrenheit in the ICTZ. Mean daily maximum temperatures range from 74° to 80° F along the coastal regions while daily minimums range from 65° to 70° F.

7. Relative Humidity. During December, the mean relative humidity remains essentially the same as in November and ranges from 80% to 90%.

8. Astronomical Data. HMCT occurs 23 minutes prior to sunrise, and EECT occurs 23 minutes after sunset.

Date	Sunrise	Sunset	Moonrise	Moonset	Phase % of illumination
1	0707	1812	0031	1245	61
2	0707	1812	0122	1316	Last Otr 52
3	0707	1813	0122	1349	42
4	0708	1813	0212	1422	32
5	0709	1813	0304	1457	23
6	0710	1813	0359	1537	15
7	0711	1814	0459	1622	08
8	0711	1814	0555	1714	03

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>	<u>Phase</u>	<u>% of Illumination</u>
9	0712	1814	0713	1816	New	00
10	0713	1814	0820	1923		01
11	0714	1815	0923	2033		04
12	0715	1815	1020	2140		10
13	0715	1815	1109	2244		18
14	0716	1816	1152	2345		28
15	0716	1816	1232	0043		38
16	0717	1817	1307	0137	1st Qtr	49
17	0717	1817	1344	0137		60
18	0718	1817	1420	0229		70
19	0718	1818	1458	0324		79
20	0719	1818	1530	0422		87
21	0719	1819	1624	0516		93
22	0720	1819	1714	0613		97
23	0720	1820	1808	0708		99
24	0721	1820	1857	0759	Full	100
25	0721	1821	1928	0847		98
26	0722	1821	2026	0928		95
27	0722	1822	2123	1008		91
28	0723	1822	2227	1041		84
29	0723	1823	2315	1115		77
30	0724	1823	0001	1146		69
31	0724	1824	0056	1327		59

Add two minutes for CAU VIET and HUE; subtract one minute for CHU LAI;
subtract two minutes for SA HUYNH.

DANANG TIDES FOR DECEMBER 1969

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Height</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Height</u>
01	0012	3.8	06	0254	2.1
	0948	1.8		0906	3.1
	1924	3.6		1318	2.8
	2242	3.6		2000	4.1
02	1030	2.0	07	0336	1.8
	1906	3.6		1018	3.2
03	0112	3.3		1354	3.0
	0218	3.3		2024	4.3
	1118	2.2	08	0412	1.4
	1906	3.7		1124	3.3
04	0142	2.9		1430	3.1
	0542	3.1		2054	4.5
	1200	2.4	09	0454	1.2
	1918	3.8		1230	3.3
05	0218	2.5		1500	3.2
	0736	3.1		2130	4.6
	1242	2.6			
	1936	4.0			

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Height</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Height</u>
10	0536	1.0	20	0254	1.9
	1336	3.4		0936	3.1
	1530	3.3		1306	2.9
	2212	4.7		1948	4.3
11	0624	0.9	21	0342	1.6
	1436	3.4		1106	3.2
	1600	3.4		1330	3.1
	2254	4.7		2018	4.3
12	0706	1.0	22	0424	1.4
	1524	3.4		1236	3.3
	1700	3.4		1348	3.3
	2342	4.5		2054	4.4
13	0754	1.1	23	0506	1.3
	1606	3.5		2124	4.4
	1812	3.4	24	0542	1.2
14	0030	4.3		2154	4.4
	0842	1.3	25	0618	1.2
	1642	3.5		2222	4.3
	1954	3.4	26	0654	1.3
15	0130	4.0		2248	4.2
	0930	1.6	27	0724	1.4
	1712	3.6		2330	4.1
	2142	3.2	28	0800	1.5
16	0242	3.7		1636	3.5
	1018	1.9		1830	3.5
	1742	3.7	29	0006	3.9
	2324	2.9		0830	1.7
17	0424	3.4		1642	3.5
	1106	2.2		2012	3.4
	1812	3.8	30	0054	3.9
18	0054	2.6		0900	1.9
	0612	3.2		1654	3.6
	1148	2.5		2148	3.2
	1842	4.0	31	0200	3.4
19	0200	2.2		0930	2.1
	0800	3.1		1706	3.7
	1230	2.7		2318	2.9
	1918	4.1			

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CHU LAI TIDES FOR DECEMBER 1969

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Height</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Height</u>
01	0948	2.2	17	0330	4.6
02	0036	5.2		1100	2.9
	1018	2.4		1830	4.9
	2006	4.8	18	0112	3.7
	2312	4.7		0534	4.0
03	0024	4.7		1118	3.4
	1054	2.7		1842	5.1
	1912	4.8	19	0224	3.1
04	0142	4.2		0836	3.8
	0248	4.2		1100	3.7
	1124	3.0		1900	5.5
	1906	5.0	20	0324	2.5
05	0218	3.6		1524	5.8
	0638	3.9	21	0412	2.1
	1154	3.3		1945	6.1
	1918	5.3	22	0500	1.7
06	0300	3.0		2018	6.3
	0848	3.8	23	0536	1.5
	1206	3.7		2054	6.4
	1936	5.6	24	0612	1.4
07	0342	2.4		2118	6.4
	2006	6.0	25	0642	1.4
08	0424	1.9		2148	6.3
	2036	6.3	26	0712	1.5
09	0512	1.4		2224	6.2
	2116	6.5	27	0742	1.6
10	0600	1.1		2254	6.0
	2148	6.7	28	0806	1.8
11	0648	0.9		2330	5.7
	2230	6.7	29	0830	2.0
12	0730	1.0	30	0006	5.3
	2318	6.6		0854	2.3
13	0818	1.1		1742	4.6
14	0006	6.2		2000	4.6
	0906	1.5	31	0100	4.9
15	0100	5.8		0918	2.6
	0948	1.9		1718	4.7
16	0200	5.2		2242	4.3
	1030	2.4			
	1830	4.6			
	2300	4.3			

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HUE TIDES FOR DECEMBER 1969

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Height</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Height</u>
01	0241	3.4	16	0346	2.7
	1107	-2.5		1108	-2.6
02	0326	2.6	17	0447	2.4
	1136	-2.4		1131	1.2
03	0421	2.4		1942	2.0
	1159	1.2		2333	1.8
	2134	2.0	18	0603	2.1
	2154	2.0		1140	1.4
04	0534	2.3		1956	2.3
	1217	1.4	19	0154	1.5
	2037	2.1		0752	1.8
05	0101	1.8		1138	1.5
	0710	2.0		2021	2.5
	1231	1.5	20	0325	1.3
	2041	2.3		2054	2.7
06	0233	1.5	21	0429	-2.5
	0901	1.9		2127	2.8
	1241	1.6	22	0518	-2.7
	1953	2.5		2205	3.0
07	0339	1.2	23	0602	-2.8
	1057	1.7		2242	3.0
	1241	1.7	24	0642	-2.9
	2029	2.8		2320	3.1
08	0436	-2.6	25	0720	-2.9
	2204	3.0		2358	3.0
09	0529	-2.9	26	0758	-2.9
	2243	3.2	27	0036	3.0
10	0623	-3.4		0833	-2.8
	2327	3.4	28	0111	2.9
11	0717	-3.2		0904	-2.7
12	0015	3.4	29	0147	2.8
	0801	-3.2		0931	-2.6
13	0104	3.4	30	0223	2.6
	0904	-3.1		0954	-2.5
14	0156	3.3	31	0302	2.4
	0954	-2.9		1009	-2.4
15	0249	3.0		1847	1.8
	1036	-2.7		1957	1.8

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SA HUYNH TIDES FOR DECEMBER 1969

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Height</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Height</u>
01	0121	5.0	16	0226	4.8
	1115	1.6		1116	1.3
02	0206	4.6	17	0327	4.1
	1144	1.5		1139	1.7
03	0301	4.2		1822	3.3
	1207	1.5		2341	2.8
	2014	3.2	18	0443	3.4
	2202	3.2		1128	2.1
04	0414	3.8		1856	3.8
	1225	2.0	19	0202	2.3
	1917	3.5		0632	2.8
05	0109	2.8		1146	2.3
	0550	3.3		1901	4.3
	1239	2.2	20	0333	1.8
	1921	3.9		1934	4.7
06	0241	2.3	21	0437	1.3
	0741	3.3		2007	5.0
	1249	2.4	22	0526	1.0
	1941	4.4		2045	5.3
07	0347	1.7	23	0610	0.7
	0937	2.6		2122	5.4
	1249	2.5	24	0650	0.6
	2009	4.9		2200	5.6
08	0444	1.1	25	0728	0.6
	2044	5.4		2238	5.4
09	0537	0.5	26	0806	0.6
	2123	5.8		2316	5.4
10	0631	0.2	27	0841	0.7
	2207	5.9		2351	5.2
11	0725	0.0	28	0912	0.9
	2255	6.2	29	0027	5.0
12	0829	0.0		0939	1.1
	2344	6.1	30	0103	4.6
13	0912	0.2		1000	1.6
14	0036	5.9	31	0142	4.2
	1002	0.5		1017	1.5
15	0129	5.4		1727	2.9
	1044	0.9		2005	2.8

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ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO III MAF PERINTREP 48-69

A. REGISTERED MAIL

DIR, NSA	3	NILO HUE, BOX 9, AT-3, APO 96258	1
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1	NILO QUANG TRI, BOX 16, AT-19,	
CMC (ABQ)	2	APO 96495	1
CG FMFPAC	2		
CG USARV	1		
CG I FFORCEV	5	B. <u>BY COURIER</u>	
CG II FFORCEV	1		
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	COMUSMACV (MACV J-232) (CIIED)	2
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1	COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4
CG MCDEC	1	COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2
CG 5TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CAL	6	COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2
CG 4TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CAL	1	COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2
CG 3RD MAW	2	COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	2
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2	CICV	2
CO "B" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	5	CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN	10
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1	CG 1ST MARDIV DNG RVN	40
CO MCB 3	1	CG 3D MARDIV DGH RVN	26
CO MCB 6	1	CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN	30
CG MCRD SAN DIEGO	1	CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM) CEA RVN	20
CO MCB 8	1	CG 1ST MAW DNG RVN	30
CO MCB 10	1	CG 2D BDE ROKMC HAN RVN	7
		CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CO MCB 53	1	CG USASUPCOM DNG RVN	1
CO MCB 58	1	CG 173D AVN BDE	2
CO MCB 62	1	CG FORLOG CMD DNG RVN	5
CO MCB 71	1	CG 1ST LOG CMD LBN	2
CO MCB 133	1	CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CO USS REPOSE	1	CG 1ST MEF	1
CO USS SANCTUARY	1	CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO MHTG-30, MCAF, SANTA ANA,		CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHL RVN	3
CALIF 92709	1	CO 30 NCR	1
DSA II CORPS	1	CO "C" 5TH USSF GRP (ABN)	17
CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GRP,		CO 1ST CAG	1
7TH FLEET	1	CO 3RD CAG	1
CMDR, 13TH CI TM, CAMPEN, CAL	1	CO 4TH CAG	1
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1	CO 1ST BN, 525TH MI DET	26
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1	CO 517TH MI DET	1
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2	CO MCB 40	1
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1	CO MCB 121	1
CTF 76	1	CO 4TH PSYOP GRP	1
CO USASSD ACSI DA (ATTN DOD SPEC-		DSA I CORPS	11
REP) MACV APO SF 96222	4	CMDR, 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SGN RVN	3
HQ, 12TH TAC FTR WING (ATTN ARMY		COMNAVFORV	1
GRD LIAISON OFF) APO SF 96326	1	COMNAVSUPACT DNG RVN	2
NILO CHU LAI, NAVAL ADVISOR, BOX		GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2
210, NSAD FPO 96696	1	OSA/EMB SGN RVN	1
NILO, HOI AN, DRAWER 18, ADVISORY		DET B, 1ST MIBARS	1
TEAM 15, APO 96349	1	CIB	1

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CO MCB 7 CHL RVN	1
CTG 76.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTF 115	1
7TH AIR FORCE (IGS) BDOC	1
45TH ENGR GRP	1
620TH TCS APO 96203	1
366TH AIR SEC SQD, USAF	2
620TH TSC	1
SPO-SEC CMD QHN RVN	1

C. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (WITHIN HQ, III MAF)

CORDS/PHOENIX Division	7
FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP CofS, PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	43
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (C/O G-3)	2
2D ROKMC BDE LIAISON OFFICER	1
PSYOPS	5
1ST RADIO BN	11
HORN DASC	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO	1

D. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

CO 1ST MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 3RD MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 2ND CAG	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
HQ 212TH CMBT AVN BN	6
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
CTG 115.1	1
CCN	1
USNAD	1
DTR CAP	1
7TH PSYOP BN	1
1ST FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
3RD FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
CO MCB 74	1

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CONFIDENTIALHEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335C (REV. 3-67)

MACH. C	C918889	PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE RPT 49-69	3P	MEF 0133669	JCS CONTROL NUMBER	COPY NO. 2	2	4209C	NO. CYS	RECD.	MICFILM	CLAS.	IMO.	DA	YR
DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER	SUBJECT			PRI.	SEC.	ORIGINATOR	ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO.								
				NAVY FILE NUMBER											

ROUTING - Use numbers to show order of routing

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X-ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE
AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET
A-FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION
B-FOR COMPLIANCE
C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE
OF _____
D-FOR COMMENT
E-FOR RECOMMENDATION

F-FOR CONCURRENCE

G-FOR INFORMATION

H-RETURN TO _____

I- _____

J-DISPOSITION _____

DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS

(AGENCY HAVING PRIMARY INTEREST COMPLETE)

REQUEST FOR PERMANENT RETENTION (COPY) (BUCKTAG COPY)

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DESTROY AFTER ROUTING (No record or information value)

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DISTRIBUTE EXTRA COPIES TO _____

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RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE	INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
		IN	OUT	
				COMMANDANT
				ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
				MILITARY SECY TO CMC
				CHIEF OF STAFF
				DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
				DC/S (MANPOWER)
				DC/S (RD & S)
				DC/S (AIR)
				DC/S (ADMIN)
				SECY OF GEN STAFF
				G-1
				G-2 <i>PR</i>
				G-3 <i>AOJH</i>
				G-4
				DIRECTOR, ADMIN
				DATA SYSTEMS
				MCCC
				FISCAL
				INFORMATION
				INSPECTION
				PERSONNEL
				POLICY ANALYSIS
				RESERVE
				SUPPLY
				MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
				PROGRAMS
				LEGISLATIVE
				JOINT PLANNING GROUP
				JOINT CONTROL
				COUNSEL
				WOMEN MARINES
				STAFF DENTAL
				STAFF MEDICAL
				STAFF CHAPLAIN
				CLASSIFIED FILES

SECTION

SIGNATURE


ACTION OFFICE:

REMARKS (Entries to be signed and dated. For lengthy comments attach separate page and indicate "Bucktag Comment Attached." Do not assign separate Control Number to Bucktag Comments.)

*PR to Dist after Routing*RETURN TO ABQ
UPON COMPLETION OF ROUTINGDO NOT DETACH - THIS FORM IS A PERMANENT
PART OF THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH IT IS
ATTACHEDMATERIAL
ATTACHED IS**CONFIDENTIAL**


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9 December 1969



UNITED STATES MARINES UNITED STATES ARMY

Periodic
 Intelligence
 Report 49-69



0 25 50 Kilometers

GROUP - 4
 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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HQ III MAF, G-2
DANANG, RVN
9 December 1969
Ser: 0133669

PERINTREP 49-69

Period covered: 300001H November - 062400 December 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, ND 48-13
ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. Most indicators of enemy activity registered increases during the past week. Total incoming was 450 rounds, an increase of 315 from last week. Enemy initiated ground incidents also increased, rising to 172, an increase of 31 incidents. KIA's also registered a slight increase totaling 577 for the week. PW's increased by 75 for a weekly total of 116. Hoi Chanhs declined for the first time in several weeks, down 50 for a total of 245.

No significant change was reported in VC/VCI Counterintelligence related activities. Terrorist activity remained at a low level, consisting primarily of selective targeting designed to weaken/disrupt the pacification and security program. Reports continue to reflect VC/VCI efforts in the collection of information on selected individuals for the purpose of creating various lists, such as persons to be assassinated, proselyted, sent to thought reform camps, etc. Implementation of the intended purpose of each list would probably be conducted simultaneously with intensified or large scale enemy military activity. Priority was to be given, but not limited to, village level personalities. It should not be discounted, that this effort may be at least one of the main objectives of any future high points in enemy military activity.

a. QUANG TRI (P). Activity in QUANG TRI Province during the past week was concentrated mainly near the DMZ where NVA units continued to make their presence known in several small actions. On the 2d, a reconnaissance unit of the 3/1st ARVN operating northeast of GIO LINH engaged an unknown size enemy force. Later in the contact a reaction force received 30x82mm Mortar rounds causing negative casualties or damage. The most significant action of the week occurred on the 5th, northeast of GIO LINH, when elements of the 3/1st ARVN contacted an estimated NVA company. In the action which continued most of the day, the ARVN accounted for 35 enemy killed with negligible friendly casualties. Activity in the KHE SANH area developed on the 3d when a reconnaissance unit of the 2/17th Cavalry observed 10 NVA 20 kilometers south of KHE SANH. Gunships were called in and accounted for eight enemy KIA, possibly unidentified elements of the 324B Division. There was no other significant activity reported in the province, as NVA units continued the trend of previous weeks by avoiding major contact with friendly forces, probably

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continuing the tactic of rotating units across the DMZ to harass allied installations while continuing to prepare for the offensive predicted for later in the month.

b. THUA THIEN (P). Very little occurred in THUA THIEN Province to disturb the pattern of inactivity which has prevailed for several weeks. As is the case in QUANG TRI Province, the enemy is apparently avoiding contact as he attempts to prepare his forces for a possible upsurge in activity in the anticipated second and third phases of the proclaimed Winter-Spring Offensive. One change in the order of battle for THUA THIEN has been made, based on numerous agent reports, and information from PW's and ralliers. The K.4 Battalion, 5th NVA Regiment is now held in the TROUI Mountain Area, vicinity (YD 9397) a southeasterly move of approximately 12 kilometers.

c. QUANG NAM (P). QUANG NAM Province remained the most active area in I Corps during the past week, with activity scattered throughout the eastern lowlands. Fire missions initiated by reconnaissance teams dominated much of the week's action. The most significant of these occurred on the 5th, when a team observed seven enemy moving in the open, six kilometers north of AN HOA, vicinity (AT 853504), artillery killed five. Later in the day, the same team spotted 40 VC, five kilometers northwest of the first sighting, vicinity (AT 835543). The resulting fire mission accounted for 20 enemy dead. Earlier in the week, on the 2d, elements of the 7th Marine Regiment searching the QUE SON Mountains discovered what appears to be an enemy base camp containing 21 huts. Miscellaneous documents were found and the huts were destroyed vicinity (AT 967388). The discovery of large caches of foodstuffs continued, as U. S. and ROK Marines captured over 35,000 pounds of rice and 700 pounds of corn.

The most significant ground action occurred on the 5th, when the 37th ARVN Rangers contacted an USEF seven kilometers south of HOI AN (BT 141505). The rangers forced the enemy to the SONG LY LY River where 25 surrendered (20 NVA, five Main Force VC). Later in the day, the 21st ARVN Rangers, two and one-half kilometers to the east, (BT 166447) made contact with another USEF resulting in seven enemy KIA and 15 NVA POW's. No friendly casualties were reported in either action. Although initial reports indicated that these POW's were from the T.89 Sapper Battalion, further interrogation has revealed that some may be stragglers from other Main Force units operating in the area. To the north, patrols from FLC took two PW's in a series of small actions near the NAM O Bridge vicinity (AT 927813) one of whom has been identified as the XO of 1st Company, HAI VAN Engineer Battalion. Initial interrogations indicate that his unit was stockpiling rice in preparation for a future attack. Early on the morning of the 7th, the Marble Mountain Air Facility received 18x82mm mortar rounds in an attack by fire that caused light damage to several structures, eight helicopters and one fixed wing aircraft. No counter mortar was fired, since the 134th RF Group and a reaction force from the 1st Marines were in the area of the suspected firing point.

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The RF's fired small arms into the suspect area with unknown results. The mortar company of the R.20 Main Force Battalion is known to have 82mm mortars and was possibly involved in this action.

d. QUANG TIN (P). Several ground contacts and the finding of significant caches of food and material highlighted action in QUANG TIN Province. A long range reconnaissance patrol inserted 19 kilometers south southeast of TIEN PHUOC (BS 041965) on the 30th, was extracted a short time later when suspected enemy movement was heard near their position. Gunships were called in and engaged an estimated 50 enemy, killing 12. On the 3d, the 37th ARVN Rangers in sporadic contact with an USEF for most of the day nine kilometers southeast of QUE SON vicinity (BT 096284), killed 17 enemy. At the same time, approximately one kilometer to the northeast vicinity (BT 105293) the 1/5th ARVN contacted another USEF, killing seven. The 744th RF Company, searching an area 16 kilometers southwest of TIEN PHUOC, discovered a cache containing 500 gallons of nouc mam, 500 gallons of gasoline, 15 tons of salt, and another 15 tons of paper. In addition to the salt, total rice and other foodstuffs captured during the week amounted to over 20 tons of rice and eight tons of sweet potatoes. The caches were located in the piedmont generally west and north of TAM KY. On 2 December, seven kilometers southeast of QUE SON, a UH-1H Helicopter was downed by small arms fire as it approached an LZ vicinity (BT 091288). As the contact continued throughout the morning, a total of five UH-1H Helicopters received intense small arms and 50 caliber fire. One crashed and three were forced to land as a result of the action; however, all aircraft were recovered.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Action in QUANG NGAI Province included a number of enemy initiated contacts. On the 1st of December, 3d Company, 4/6 ARVN while in night defensive positions received a ground attack from an estimated VC Company 10 kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI (BS 723827). The company repelled the attack killing four VC while suffering light friendly casualties. A company from the 3/6th ARVN four kilometers west of FSB STINSON (BS 498821) in an ambush position on 5 December was attacked by an estimated platoon after receiving an unknown number of mortar and RPG rounds. Later on the 5th, the MINH LONG District Headquarters (BS 533520) was attacked by a VC force estimated at approximately 50 men. The enemy, using small arms, RPG's, hand grenades, and 82mm mortars breached the perimeter and entered the compound. The attack resulted in light friendly casualties, including one civilian, while one enemy body was found. The enemy are believed to be the C.18 LF Company. Then on the 6th, AN KY Hamlet (BS 761823) received 10x60mm mortar rounds followed by a ground attack resulting in light friendly casualties and 10 houses destroyed. The remainder of the week's activities resulted in several small meeting engagements and the discovery of approximately two tons of rice. The move of the 3d NVA Division and the divisional support battalions, as well as the 2d Regiment, south into BINH DINH Province was finalized this week; these changes will be reflected in III MAF COB holdings.

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f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. The situation in I Corps remained essentially unchanged during the week, as enemy forces for the most part seemed to avoid contact as they concentrated on gathering rice and presumably continued preparations for their announced upcoming offensive in late December. The tactic of rotating units across the DMZ to harass allied forces in northern I Corps Tactical Zone continued unchanged. There was a slight increase in enemy initiated activity in southern I Corps Tactical Zone, but nothing that can yet be assessed as the start of a high point in the Winter-Spring Campaign. The situation should remain relatively stable during the coming week, with the possibility of an increase in attacks by fire, with ARVN and RF units being the principal targets. The continuing finds of large quantities of rice and materiel may be having a disruptive effect on the enemy's plans for increasing his well advertised Winter-Spring Campaign.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased from 111 to 172 for the week of 30 November - 6 December. These incidents consisted of six ground attacks (one of which was company size or larger and five platoon size or smaller), eight attacks by fire, 76 harassing fire incidents, 55 mining and booby trap incidents, two hamlet harassment incidents, two assassination incidents, one espionage incident, six kidnapping incidents, 15 propaganda incidents and one sabotage incident.

- a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.
- b. Order of Battle. Annex A.
- c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.
- d. - g. Negative
- h. Air Defense. AA fire increased from 49 to 100 incidents for the reporting period and 10 aircraft sustained hits.
- i. - j. Negative
- k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 30 November - 6 December.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Expended</u>
82mm Mortar	285
60mm Mortar	127
Unk Cal Mortar	31
140mm Rocket	5
122mm Rocket	2
	<u>450</u>

- l. - q. Negative

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r. Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant enemy caches were captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 30 November - 6 December 1969:

(a) 30 November: G/2/7 Marines discovered a cache north of QUE SON (BT 093457) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
5,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This rice was unpolished and found in bags, baskets and crocks hidden under false floors, bushes and paddy dikes. All was in good condition and evacuated to LZ BALDY.

(b) 30 November: G/2/7 Marines discovered a cache north of QUE SON (BT 090461) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
5,100 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This rice was unpolished and found in vats, baskets and crocks hidden under the floors and behind huts under piles of rubbish. All was in good condition and evacuated to LZ BALDY.

(c) 4 December: The 114th RF Company captured a cache seven kilometers southeast of Hoi An (BT 204527) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
10,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice
16,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Sweet Potatoes

This cache was found in a bunker and stored in burlap bags. All was in good condition and evacuated to HOI AN.

(d) 5 December: G/2/7 Marines captured a cache 12 kilometers northwest of THANG BINH (BT 087464) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
4,400 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This rice was freshly harvested and unpolished, and buried throughout the village of HOA MY in vats and crocks. All was evacuated to PSB ROSS.

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(e) 5 December: The 744th RF Company discovered a cache 16 kilometers southwest of THIEN PHOU (AT 956066) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
500 GALS	UNK	Nouc Mam
500 GALS	UNK	Gasoline
30,000 LBS	UNK	Salt
30,000 LBS	UNK	Paper

The nouc mam and gasoline were stored in five gallon cans. No further information available.

(f) 5 December: A Hoi Chanh led G/2/5 Marines to caches six kilometers north of AN HOA (AT 851529) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
9,600 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

1,800 pounds of the rice was unpolished and stored in cans and earthenware jars. This was evacuated to AN HOA Combat Base. The remaining 7,800 pounds was unthrashed and wet, therefore destroyed.

(g) 6 December: G/2/7 Marines captured a cache four kilometers northwest of FSB BALDY (BT 092465) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
5,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This cache of unpolished rice was found buried in the ground in an open area. It was stored in 14 crocks and all in good condition. All was evacuated to FSB BALDY.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in IOTZ during the week of 16-22 November:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, Rocket Ammunition

<u>Type</u>	<u>Amount</u>
82mm Mortar	10
81mm Mortar	5
60mm Mortar	32
155mm Artillery	2
105mm Artillery	7
57mm RR	2
	<u>58</u>

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	180
Crew-Served Weapons	21

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(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 30 November - 6 December:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
30 Nov	(BT 092356)	10,100	G/2/7
30 Nov	(AT 983301)	200	I/3/7
30 Nov	(AT 830537)	1,000	F/2/5
30 Nov	(AT 830537)	700 (Food)	F/2/5
30 Nov	(BT 126413)	1,000	E/2/7
30 Nov	(BT 152252)	1,100	D/2/1
30 Nov	(BT 152252)	120	D/2/1
30 Nov	(BT 183223)	2,800	G/2/1
01 Dec	(BT 094455)	1,000	G/2/7
01 Dec	(BT 093454)	1,000	G/2/7
01 Dec	(BT 094453)	2,000	G/2/7
01 Dec	(BT 093457)	1,200	G/2/7
01 Dec	(BT 095453)	700	G/2/7
01 Dec	(BT 094455)	1,100	G/2/7
01 Dec	(BT 040655)	100	E/2/1
01 Dec	(BT 171254)	1,000	D/2/1
01 Dec	(BS 427618)	300	C/3/1
01 Dec	(BS 427618)	50 (Food)	C/3/1
02 Dec	(AT 932321)	50	L/3/7
02 Dec	(AT 847503)	500	H/2/5
02 Dec	(BT 094452)	120	G/2/7
02 Dec	(BT 093455)	500	G/2/7
02 Dec	(BT 087449)	1,500	H/2/7
02 Dec	(BT 092458)	300	G/2/7
04 Dec	(BT 204527)	10,000	114 RF Group
04 Dec	(BT 204527)	16,000 (Food)	114 RF Group
05 Dec	(BT 087464)	4,400	G/2/7
05 Dec	(AT 956066)	30,000 (Salt)	744th RF Co
06 Dec	(AT 840520)	9,600	G/2/5
06 Dec	(AT 867518)	2,500	G/2/5
06 Dec	(BT 092465)	5,000	G/2/7
06 Dec	(BT 117408)	3,500	E/2/7
06 Dec	(BT 197278)	300	A/2/1
06 Dec	(BT 197258)	2,000	B/1/1
06 Dec	(BT 193281)	4,000	A/2/1
06 Dec	(BS 558802)	100	B/1/52
06 Dec	(BT 016098)	10,000	Hau Duc SS RCN Plt
	TOTAL RICE	79,090	
	TOTAL FOOD	17,200	
	TOTAL SALT	30,000	

s. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA:

Structures Destroyed 56

Structures Damaged 22

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Bunkers Destroyed	67	Secondary Fires	26
.50 Cal Site Dest	1	AW Pen Dam	1

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

- a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.
- b. Negative
- c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.
- d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ increased in comparison to the previous week. There were 577 KIA's, 105 VC PW's, 11 NVA PW's, and 245 Hoi Chanh's.
- e. Morale. There have been negative indications received concerning the status of enemy morale in I Corps Tactical Zone with the exception of enemy units located in QUANG NAM Province and in the vicinity of the QUANG NAM/QUANG TIN border. Here the enemy appears to be suffering from severe food shortages, as the result of effective rice denial operations. PW's and Hoi Chanh's report that food shortages, lack of medicine and wide spread disease is prevalent. There has also been a noted increase in the quality of PW's and Hoi Chanh's as evidenced by the number of officers and NCO's who have either been captured or rallied. This may indicate that the more politically reliable personnel are now engaged in enemy activity which presents increased opportunities and exposure for being captured or for rallying in an effort to reduce the likelihood of less motivated personnel taking advantage of the Chieu Hoi program.
- f. - g. Negative
- h. Terrain. No change.
- i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	<u>QUANG TRI</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature				
High	85	83	82	83
Low	59	61	62	62
Rainfall (total)	.92	.40	.57	.94
Winds (knots)	5	5	4	7
Visibility (miles)	8	6	7	6

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 6-12 December 1969

(a) General. Beginning on the 7th, a weak surge in the northeast flow will deteriorate weather conditions over ICTZ.

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(b) ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the period is partly cloudy with intermittent rain and fog, and ceilings ranging from 500 to 2,000 feet by midweek. Precipitation in ICTZ will be approximately one to two and a half inches with isolated instances of three to four inches.

j. - 1. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CA ABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire, limited ground attacks and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone, with emphasis on the pacification effort.

b. Conduct terrorism against selected GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following courses of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI (P) with up to four infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(3) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by one mortar/rocket battalion.

(4) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with the equivalent of up to six infantry regiments supported by three rocket battalions and four sapper battalions.

(5) Attack the TAM KY-CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with five infantry battalions, three sapper battalions and two artillery battalions.

(6) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of three infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one artillery battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment equivalent at each location.

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d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to four infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of Route 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN and one division equivalent from LAOS.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's, and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Continuing shortages of food and medical supplies coupled with sickness and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.


J. S. CANTON

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE

ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS,
AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z.

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 49-69 AS OF 062400H DECEMBER 1969

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL		
NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA				
NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	
UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	
CONFIRMED UNITS												
MR-hq	1	650				1	650			1	650	
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue								1	855	1	855	
Front HQ's	2	750				2	750	1	UNK	3	750	
Div HQ's	1	125				1	125	1	580	2	705	
Regt HQ's	10	2,995	1	190		11	3,185	16	7,885	27	11,070	
Bn's-Maneuver	38	9,195	7	1,165	6	1,120	51	11,480	44	18,745	95	30,225
Bn's-Support	12	2,855	1	120	2	445	15	3,420	10	2,480	25	5,900
Separate Co's	1	130			37	2,560	38	2,690			38	2,690
TOTAL CONFIRMED		16,700		1,475		4,125	22,300		30,545		52,845	
PROBABLE UNITS												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's								1	400	1	400	
Bn's-Maneuver	3	830	1	350	1	190	5	1,370	1	450	6	1,820
Bn's-Support	4	1,035					4	1,035	4	1,130	8	2,165
Separate Co's	1	90			1	75	2	165			2	165
TOTAL PROBABLE		1,955		350		265	2,570		1,980		4,550	
POSSIBLE UNITS												
MR TT-HQ (FWD*								1	150	1	150	
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's								1	350	1	350	
Regt HQ's								2	800	2	800	
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support								17	4,950	17	4,950	
Separate Co's									440	3	440	
TOTAL POSSIBLE									6,690		6,690	
18,655		1,825		4,300		24,870		39,215		64,085		

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		<u>NVA</u>	<u>MF/VC</u>	<u>LF/VC</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,110		35	3,145
	Probable	345			345
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,455</u>		<u>35</u>	<u>3,490</u>
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,350		475	3,825
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,350</u>		<u>475</u>	<u>3,825</u>
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	5,660	1,275	555	7,490
	Probable	705	350		1,055
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>6,365</u>	<u>1,625</u>	<u>555</u>	<u>8,545</u>
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,755	200	1,115	4,070
	Probable	380		265	645
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,135</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>1,380</u>	<u>4,715</u>
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	1,825		1,945	3,770
	Probable	525			525
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>2,350</u>		<u>1,945</u>	<u>4,295</u>

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

I CORPS

DMZ/NVN/LAOS* ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS

MANEUVER	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL				DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	32	0		32	5			5	5			5	42			42	41	1		42	83	1		84
SAPPER	6	3		9	2	1		3	1	1		2	9	5		14	3	0		3	12	5		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	38			41	7	1		8	6	1		7	51	5		56	44	1		45	95	6		101
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	7	1		8					2			2	9	1		10	2	3	7	12	11	4	7	22
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	1			1									1			1	1	1	1	3	2	1	1	4
RR	1			1									1			1				1	1			1
AT																	1			1	1			1
ENGR	1			1									1			1	1		2	3	2		2	4
TRANS		1		1										1		1	2		1	3	2	1	1	4
SIG	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		2	3	2	1	2	5
MED		1		1										1		1	1		3	4	1	1	3	5
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1								
TOTAL SUPPORT	12	4		16	1			1	2			2	15	4		19	10	4	17	31	25	8	17	50
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	50	7		57	8	1		9	8	1		9	66	9		75	54	5	17	76	120	14	17	151

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	<u>QUANG TRI</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>THUA THIEN</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG NAM</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG TIN</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG NGAI</u>	<u>STR</u>
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	221	Nam Hoa	50	Hoa Vang	812	Thang Binh	870	Binh Son	318
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	56	Hieu Duc	38	Tam Ky	442	Son Tinh	380
	Trieu Phong	113	Hong Dien	69	Dien Ban	1,090	Ly Tin	168	Tu Nghia	429
	Cam Lo	85	Vinh Loc	43	Dai Loc	332	Hiep Duc	117	Nghia Hanh	336
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	230	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	289	Mo Duc	435
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	295	Hau Duc	187	Duc Pho	523
	Huong Hoa	8	Phu Vang	11	Que Son	969			Tra Bong	166
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	97	Duy Xuyen	1,060			Ba To	115
			Huong Thuy	71	Hieu Nhon	279			Minh Long	77
			Phong Dien	528					Son Ha	200
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	807	THUA THIEN	1,201		4,995		2,073		2,979

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,055

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6. Order of Battle listing

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
12th AT Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,035			
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	21Jul68	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	21Jul68	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	21Jul68	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	21Jul68	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	21Jul68	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	21Jul68	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	570	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8337/18Jun69(P)
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,925			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	575	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8723/3Jul69(P)
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8754/26Jun69(P)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8632/29Jun69(P)
6th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8754/26Jun69(P)
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	XD 8440/5Apr68(P)
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	XD 8440/5Apr68(P)

*See note #4 on page A-17

**See note #2 on page A-17

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300			
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,300			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH SZ	6Mar69	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	6Mar69	
4th Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	6Mar69	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300			
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	XD 8241/8Feb68(P)
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,300	BA 611		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	400	BA 611	6Jun69	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	300	BA 611	6Jun69	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	300	BA 611	6Jun69	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	300	BA 611	6Jun69	
325th Div	NVA	C	510	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
17th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
19th DKZ Bn (122mm Rkt)	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	YD 0565/22Apr69(P)
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	
1st Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	YD 0363/21Apr69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	450	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	YD 0566/22May69(P)
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 9963/17May69(P)
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 9862/17May69(P)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 8826/15Jun68(P)
6th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 8435/2Jun68(H)
7th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
8th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
9th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
138th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	
1st Bn	NVA	C	450	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	450	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	YD 1675/24Oct68(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	450	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	
270th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	YD 2474/8Jun69(P)
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	YD 1873/16May69(P)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	
6th Bn	NVA	C	450	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	YD 1970/18Jun69(P)
27th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,290			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 0562/27Mar69(D)
1st Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 1267/24Sep69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 0563/16Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 0463/1May69(P)
31st Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	790			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	20Dec68	YD 1667/19Nov69(P)
27th Bn	NVA	C	190	VINH LINH SZ	21May69	YD 0970/18Nov69(P)
15th Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	6Jul69	YD 0264/7Jun69(P)

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,955			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	710	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	
1st Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	YD 9661/5Sep69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	375	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	YD 0063/7Aug69(D)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH SZ	20Jun69	YD 2167/17Jun69(P)
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	YD 2664/17Jan69(P)
Tri-Thien-Hue MR Hq	NVA	C	1,675	Unlocated	20Dec68	
6th Regt (-) (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YD 0309	11Oct69	YD 3011/13May69(D)
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	11Oct69	YD 1813/1 Oct69(H)
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	11Oct69	YD 6823/23Aug68(C)
9th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 9716/3Jun68(C)
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	4Jul69	YC 5097/30Mar69(D)
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 4594/14Apr69(C)
29th Regt (325C Div)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	BA 611	6Jun69	YC 4094/15Jun69(C)
7th Bn	NVA	C	450	BA 611	6Jun69	YC 3298/20May69(P)
8th Bn	NVA	C	450	BA 611	6Jun69	YC 3298/20May69(P)
9th Bn	NVA	C	450	BA 611	17Aug69	YC 3298/23Jul69(P)
803rd Regt (324B Div)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 4517/19May68(C)
1st Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 5521/22May68(C)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 2763/4Mar68(C)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	15Oct69	YD 3300/15Jul69(C)
812th Regt (-) (324B Div)	NVA	C	1,400			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	16May69	
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	16May69	YD 4339/15Aug68(C)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	16May69	YD 4368/29Aug68(C)

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
246th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,565			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	14Mar69	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	14Mar69	YD 1259/11Jul69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	325	XD 9265	14Mar69	XD 8362/6Oct69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	14Mar69	XD 8637/27Jul68(P)
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	300	XD 8854	12Jul69	
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049		
7th Front (MRTTH)	NVA	C	1,350			
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	17Apr69	YD 4541/16Oct69(C)
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	16May69	YD 3040/16May69(P)
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	6Jun69	YD 1943/8Sep69(P)
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	6Jun69	YD 3837/27Oct69(P)
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	175	YD 3339	6Jun69	YD 1931/6Nov69(H)
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	105	Vic YD 3535	6Jul69	YD 3141/16Oct69(P)
*K-34 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	240	Vic YD 2730	14Jun69	YD 3537/20Sep69(P)

*See note #3 on page A-17

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
TRI-THIEN-HUE MILITARY REGION						
4th Regt	NVA	C	880			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	12Jun68	ZC 0893/19Jun69(P)
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	270	Vic ZC 1597	12Jun68	ZD 1901/19Jun69(P)
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	260	Vic YC 9694	12Jun68	ZC 0993/17Jul69(P)
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,410			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	15Aug69	YC 6382/20Mar69(P)
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	330	Vic YD 9397	6Dec69	YC 9197/15Oct69(P)
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	160	Vic YD 6514	15Feb69	YD 4503/15Oct69(P)
#439th Bn	NVA	(PEND)	400	Vic YD 7500	5Nov69	YD 9399/ 9Nov69(D)
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	15Aug69	YC 5982/20Jul69(H)
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	15Feb69	YC 6682/20Jul69(H)
*K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	20Mar69	YC 5879/20Mar69(P)
6th Regt (-)						
806th Bn	NVA	C	350	Vic YD 3304	19Jun69	YD 5226/8Sep69(P)
K.12 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	20Jun69	YD 3507/13May69(P)
*K-35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	18Sep69	YD 6713/12Aug69(P)
C.113 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 4032	1Jan68	YD 5339/10Nov69(P)
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	1Jan68	YD 6234/13Sep68(C)
C.115 Co	LF	C	65	Vic YD 6623	1Jan68	YD 6625/3Jan69(P)
C.116 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 8420	1Jan68	YD 7706/19Sep69(P)
PHU LOC Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	1Jan68	AU 8208/20Oct69(H)

Pending, however, not accepted in OOB holdings by MACV. Not included in totals.

*See note #3 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	QUANG NAM PROVINCE		EST DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
			EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION		
Front 4	NVA	C	UNK			
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	ZC 1341	12Oct69	ZC 1441/27Nov69(P)
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Unlocated	25May69	ZC 1329/17Nov69(P)
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	AT 9656		
577th Rocket Bn	NVA	C	300	AT 8042	7Jun69	ZC 1840/1Dec69(P)
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	4Aug69	AT 9937/14Sep69(HC)
Hai Van Engr/Sapper	NVA	PR	200	AT 8686	11Apr69	AT 8689/1Dec69(P)
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	C	90	AT 8990		AT 8789/10Sep69(P)
31st Regt, 341st NVA Div	NVA	C	1,005			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 3060	24Jun69	AT 8964/11Apr69(C)
102nd Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 3060	24Jun69	ZC 2040/20Oct69(P)
103rd Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 3060	24Jun69	BT 1133/12Nov69(P)
36th Regt, 308th NVA Div	NVA	C	610			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	165	AT 9737	14Sep69	AT 9739/28Nov69(P)
1st Bn	NVA	C	135	AT 9737	14Sep69	AT 9741/28Nov69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	155	AT 9737	14Sep69	AT 9640/28Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	135	BT 1252	27Sep69	AT 9738/28Nov69(P)
90th Regt, 324B NVA Div	NVA	C	1,065			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1640	23Jul69	ZC 1636/12Oct69(P)
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	ZC 1640	23Jul69	ZC 1639/23Nov69(P)
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1640	23Jul69	ZC 1542/26Nov69(P)
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1640	23Jul69	ZC 2130/2Dec69(P)
*141st Regt, 312th NVA Div	NVA	C	1,190			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YC 8360	14Nov69	AT 8355/21Apr69(C)
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	YC 8360	14Nov69	ZC 1860/22Sep69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	YC 8360	14Nov69	ZC 1958/1Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	YC 8360	14Nov69	AT 8769/12Sep69(HC)
573rd Rocket Bn	NVA	C	300	Unlocated	14Oct69	
575th Rocket Bn	NVA	C	300	ZC 1960	15Oct69	ZC 2060/31Oct69(P)

* A detachment of 141st, reportedly consisting of 20-30 men from each Battalion, remains in the eastern portion of Base Area 127 (ZC 1861). Their mission is to provide security, gather rice and maintain the Regiments base camps in anticipation of the 141st Regiments return in the Spring of 1970 to participate in the Spring Offensive.

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
1st Regt, 2nd Div	MF	C	685			
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 7930	12Sep69	AT 8030/30Oct69(P)
40th Bn	MF	C	175	AT 7930	12Sep69	ZC 1925/20Oct69(P)
60th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	12Sep69	AT 8830/13Sep69(P)
90th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 7930	12Sep69	ZC 1926/30Sep69(HC)
R.20 Bn	MF	C	115	BT 0763	14Jun69	AT 9736/28Nov69 (P)
V.25 Bn	MF	C	125	BT 1851	16Jun69	BT 2050/12Nov69(P)
D.3 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	21Aug69	AT 9954/3Nov69(HC)
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 1649	10May69	BT 1648/17Nov69(P)
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	10Jun69	AT 9842/14Nov69(P)
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	12Sep69	AT 8589/12Sep69(HC)
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752		BT 1350/16Nov69(P)
Q.81 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1053		BT 0548/12Nov69(P)
Q.82 Co	LF	C	115	BT 0059		BT 0158/18Oct69(P)
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057		AT 8558/1Nov69(P)
Q.84 Co	LF	C	50	AT 9069		ZC 2165/31Oct69(P)
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536		AT 9938/19Oct69(HC)
#10th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	400	BT 0342		BT 0441/6Nov69(HC)

#Pending acceptance in OOB holdings by MACV. Not included in totals.

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QUANG TIN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	20Nov68	
*2nd NVA Div	NVA	C	4,045			
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	22Aug69	AT 9815/12Nov69(P)
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	20May69	BT 0939/27May67(C)
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	22May69	AT 9629/14Aug69(P)
GK.32 AT Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	20May69	AT 9221/14Jun68(C)
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	23May69	AT 9134/4Oct69(P)
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	20May69	ZC 0343/21Sep69(P)
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	22May69	BT 1047/19Dec67(P)
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	20May69	BT 2318/13Nov68(P)
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	24May69	BS 2444/20Oct67(C)
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	740			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	BT 0008	20Nov69	BT 0019/13Sep69(HC)
1st Bn	NVA	C	200	BT 0935	20Nov69	BT 0935/12Nov69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	200	BT 2611	20Nov69	BT 2613/4Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	200	BT 1234	20Nov69	BT 1133/12Nov69(P)
# 70th Bn	LF	C	165	BT 2348	16Oct69	BT 2045/13Nov69(HC)
72nd Bn	LF	C	160	BT 2937	15Oct69	BT 2937/13Nov69(HC)
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	195	BT 2113	17Oct69	BT 2425/19Oct69(HC)
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	190	BT 2938	17Oct69	BT 2939/13Nov69(HC)
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 3304	17Oct69	BT 3304/29Sep69(HC)
# 78th Arty Bn	LF	C	250	BT 3001	3Feb69	BT 3121/28Jan68(P)
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4213		BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	85	BT 4801		BT 2908/24Feb69
V.15 Co	LF	C	70	BT 1735		BT 2737/23Nov69
V.18 Co	LF	PR	75	BT 2315		
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212		BT 1819/17Oct69
C.9 Co	LF	C	50	BT 2045		BT 2144/19Nov69

#See note #7 on page A-17.

* Total reflects 1st MF Regt and 3rd NVA Regt strengths only.

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	20Jul69	RS 6528/11Nov69 (HC)
38th Bn	LF	C	170	BS 6858	8May69	RS 6657/13Nov69 (C&F)
48th Bn	LF	C	290	BS 7180	24Jun69	BS 7177/14Nov69 (HC)
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	165	RS 5676	17Jun69	RS 4770/22Aug69 (P)
*120th Bn	LF	C	210	BS 3975	29Jan69	BS 6169/25Feb69 (C)
*406th Sapper Bn	LF	C	125	BS 4677	11Aug69	BS 5279/20Oct69 (C&P)
*C.16 Sapper Co	LF	C	65	BS 4770		
C.17 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7562		BS 5373/9Nov67 (C)
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566		BS 5352/5Dec69 (C)
C.19 Co	LF	C	45	BS 7555		BS 7559/17Oct69 (C&P)
T.20 Co	LF	C	55	BS 7080		BS 7177/14Nov69 (HC)
C.21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167		BS 6566/25Feb69 (C)
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491		RS 6887/16Jul69 (F)
*C.45 Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 7559		BS 7657/5Nov69 (P)
*K.51 Wpns Co	LF	C	40	BS 6689		BS 6887/16Jul69 (P)
*B.65 Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 6457		
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270		BS 6567/24Aug68 (C&P)
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568		
81st Co	LF	C	65	BS 5676		BS 5668/11Sep69 (P)
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 5596		BS 6091/11Sep69 (C&F)
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	RS 7090		BS 6887/16Jul69 (P)
C.120 Co	LF	C	45	BS 8537		BS 8137/15Aug69 (C&P)
*C.212 Co	LF	C	100	BS 5038		
C.219 Co	LF	C	50	BS 8137		BS 7839/15Aug69 (C&P)
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172		BS 6571/29Jun69 (C&F)
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674		BS 6571/29Jun69 (C&P)
21st NVA Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	680			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4386	17May69	RT 9409/11Sep69 (P)
60th Bn	NVA	C	150	BS 4386	17May69	AT 8439/27Feb69 (C)
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4386	17May69	BS 4878/25Oct69 (P)
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4386	17May69	RS 4786/13Sep69 (C&F)

*See note #6 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE (continued)

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 4741	250cto9	BS 5030/200cto9 (P)
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 5542	250ct69	BS 6337/13Augo9 (C)
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 4543	250cto9	BS 6337/13Augo9 (C)
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6546	250cto9	BS 7844/2Deco9 (P)

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BINH DINH PROVINCE*

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT</u>
*3rd NVA Div	NVA	C	4,160			
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 5504	6Dec69	BR 5090/21Oct69 (HG)
2nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	870			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	345	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 7508/3Nov69(P)
93rd Bn	NVA	C	130	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 8331/28Nov69(HG)
95th Bn	NVA	C	180	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 7508/3Nov69(P)
97th Bn	NVA	C	165	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 7508/3Nov69(P)
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,260			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	520	BR 7363		
8th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 5950		
9th Bn	NVA	C	300	BR 5929		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	C	325	BS 5504	6Dec69	BS 7508/3Nov69(H)
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 8104/28Nov69(P)
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 8109/31Oct69(P)
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 5504	6Dec69	BR 5090/21Oct69(H)
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 5504	6Dec69	BR 5090/21Oct69(H)
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 5504	6Dec69	BR 5090/21Oct69(H)

*Totals of 3d Div Units in BINH DINH do not include 22d Regt.

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 220001H to 292400H November 1969.

a. A review of information from various sources has confirmed the presence of the following local force companies in QUANG NGAI (P): C.45 Sapper Co, MO DUC (D); C.16 Sapper Co, TU NGHIA (D); B.65 Sapper Co, TU NGHIA (D); and C.212 Infantry Co, BA TO (D).

8. Explanatory Notes.

#1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2,3, and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.

#2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.

#3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.

#4. Those units within the DMZ and those in LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.

#5. Under the column "Location/date last contact" the information is based upon the following codes:
(P) Prisoner of War, (D) Document, (H or HC) Ho Chi Chanh, (C) Contact.

#6. Provincial units of QUANG NGAI (P) (120th MF Bn and 406th MF Bn) are redesignated as local force units in accordance with paragraph 3b(2), Vol 1, MACV OOB Summary dated 31 July 1969.

#7. 70th MF Bn and 78th Arty Bn have been redesignated as local force units in accordance with paragraph 3b(2), Vol 1, MACV OOB Summary dated 31 July 1969.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 49-69

1. QUANG TRI (P).

a. PW, PFC Nguyen Cong LY, K.13 Co, 31st Regt (Ind), captured 19 Nov 69 at (YD 163675) (11th ITT Rpt 186-69) stated the strength of the K.13 Co was approximately 75 men and it was located in DUY VIEN (H), VINH LAM (V), VINH LINH Special Zone vicinity (YD 140846). PW LY also stated the mission of the K.13 Co was to transport ammunition to be stored in RVN for future operations (NFI). Source revealed the morale in his company was high because they seldom encountered trouble or went on operations. Source also revealed the LBN for K.13 Co was 91437 XB, LBN for 17th Co, 27th Bn was 31380 OK and the AKA for the K.13 Co, 31st Regt was C.13 Co, Song Hong Regt. LY stated the K.13 crossed the BEN HAI River 18 Nov 69 (CNA). Subject revealed his company suffered two KIA's and one WIA 19 Nov 69. He also revealed that there was an ammunition cache buried vicinity (YD 1567). LY stated he was a member of the 17th Co, 27th Bn prior to his transfer to the K.13 Co in Jun. 69. Reported personalities: K.13 Co Cmdr-Nguyen Ngoc LOAN, XO-Pham Van XUAM, PO-Le Van TUYEN, APO-Pham Van SU.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first time the personalities and LBN's have been mentioned; however, the LBN's do fall in the same series with elements of the 31st Regt. The reported AKA's correlate with III MAF OOB holdings. All information reported rated (F-3).)

b. PW, Sgt Luong Vinh HONG, 4th Co, 2d Bn, 27th Regt, captured 16 Nov 69 vicinity (YD 055634) (1st APVN Div 280400Z Nov 69) stated that the strength of the 4th Co was approximately 80 men, and the strength of the 2d Bn was approximately 500 men. The 2d Bn CP and three infantry companies were located around HILL 161 vicinity (YD 0568) while the 4th Co was located at HILL 162 vicinity (YD 055634). HONG gave the mission of the 2d Bn as replacing the 1st Bn and operating on HILL 161 vicinity (YD 0568) to fight against allied forces and fire at aircraft. HONG further stated the AO of the 2d Bn was from the BEN HAI River vicinity (YD 0873) to the CAM LO River vicinity (YD 0859) and along HIGHWAY 1 to HILL 402 vicinity (XD 998614). According to the PW, the 4th Co was operating separately, attacking small objectives (NFI). Source revealed the 270th NVA Regt was located in the VINH LINH area near RVN. He also revealed the AKA for the 27th Regt was PHAM RANG Regt, AKA's for the 2d Bn were 43d and NGHE AN (P) Main Forces and the AKA for the 4th Co was C4. Source further revealed the LBN for the 4th Co was 94040 XB. HONG stated the 2d Bn crossed the BEN HAI River 2 Nov 69 vicinity (YD 034712), then moved to HILL 161 vicinity (YD 050680). According to HONG, the 2d Co, 2d Bn suffered 13 KIA's and 30 WIA's as a result of air strikes on 4 Nov 69 and the 4th Co suffered six KIA's as a result of air strikes on 15 Nov 69 vicinity (YD 055634). Reported personalities: 27th Regt CO-LtCol QUE, PO-LtCol SAI, APO-Maj DAC or JrCapt TRINH; 2d Bn CO-Capt HUNG, XO-JrCapt DAT, PO-JrCapt KHUONG, APO-1stLt TUAN, CofS-JrCapt PHAN, ACofS-2dLt DAI; 4th Co Cmdr-1stLt Nguyen Van NHUONG, XO-MSgt Le Huu TUC, PO-Aspirant Le Hong PHONG, APO-2dLt Qui Khac LUAN.

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(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first time the reported personalities have been mentioned except the 2d Bn XO. All AKA's correlate with III MAF OOB holdings and the LBN falls in the same series as that of the 2d Bn, 27th NVA Regt. All information rated (F-3).)

2. THUA THIEN (P)

a. PW, PFC Tran Xuan PHUC (AKA-Nguyen Van HOI) of the 23d Recon Co, 7th Front (11th ITT 193-69) was captured on 20 Nov 69 vicinity (YD 345360). The source was in a bunker awaiting nine members of the 23d Recon Co when captured. PW gave the strength of the 23d Co was 26 men organized into three platoons. The mission of the unit was to divide into two groups. Group 1, Western Group, is to recon ARVN and US unit movements in the vicinity of NUI DOC BIEN (CNA), western QUANG TRI (P). The Eastern Group is to recon ARVN and US units in the vicinity (YD 3436). Each unit is to report the results to the 7th Front by messenger. PHUC stated morale of the unit was high due to the fact that they have had no contact with US forces. Source stated that he infiltrated on 15 Mar 69 with the 436th Bn, 364th Regt, 330th NVA Div which was assigned the infiltration group number 4041, with a strength of 600 men. Reported personalities: 7th Front CO-LAM; 23d Recon Co CO-HOAC, XO-DUYEN, PO-HIEU.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holds 23d Recon Co, 7th Front as unlocated. Personalities mentioned are all new to OOB files with the exception of the CO of 7th Front-LAM. All information rated (F-3).)

b. According to an intelligence agent (ARVN Intelligence Rpt 347/BCH/ ANTB/STB) there were about 300 NVA of the K.4 Bn located in the TRUOI Mountains vicinity (YD 945976). They had two 82mm mortars, two 60mm mortars, eight B-40's and B-41's, light machine guns, and individual weapons. The source added that 50 VC from the Recon Co were attached to this battalion. During the last several weeks, one company was often ordered to divide into two groups and penetrate into TE XUA (H), and QUE CHU (V), PHU LOC (D) in order to collect rice and food from the villagers. The NVA/VC revealed to these villagers that they must store many quantities of rice and prepare the family caves for hiding. In the near future, the VC will attack in strength to liberate the people. The ARVN believe the source is reliable. Possibly, the NVA and VC are concentrating their troops in the PHU THI (D), PHU VANG (D), VINH LOC (D), and PHU LOC (D) during the winter.

(G-2 COMMENT: Armament stated in the report is the armament of the K.4 battalion. Considering strength, armament, location, and tactics III MAF OOB holds this report to be probably true rated (F-3).)

3. QUANG NAM (P)

a. An agent report from SIA QUANG NAM, HOI AN, RVN, rated (C-3/F-3) (Ref: SIA QUANG NAM Sector 290630Z Nov 69, INTSUM #331) reveals that in the QUE SON (D) villages of PHU THUA H and PHU DIEN vicinity (BT 090475 - 070460) 14 kilometers northeast of QUE SON, on 27 Nov 69, an undetermined

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number of soldiers from the 36th Regt were living and working with the local population, and did not want to return to their unit.

(G-2 COMMENT: There have been reports of NVA deserters banding together and attacking VC/NVA transportation units to obtain rice. This group of soldiers from the 36th Regt could be such a group. This report serves as an indication of the poor condition of the 36th Regt. The combat effectiveness and the morale of this unit is undoubtedly at a low level due to recent operations by elements of the 7th Marines and the effectiveness of the rice denial campaigns. (F-2).)

b. Hoi Chanh, Cpl Bui Van BINH, Comm-Liaison section, Unit 1, battalion Headquarters, Northern Wing Headquarters Front 4, who rallied on 27 November 1969 vicinity (AT 899819) four and a half kilometers southwest of the Nam O Bridge (Ref: OG, 1st Marine Division Init Inter Rpt 301558Z November 1969, and CG, 1st Marine Division Supp Inter Rpt 020456Z November 1969), stated he was a member of a 21-man recon unit performing surveillance on Hill 190 (AT 886823) and gathering rice for the Battalion. The Battalion's mission is to attack pacification effort by proselyting, propaganda, and by ambushing pacification cadre in HOA LOC, HOA VINH, and HOA THANH village. He believes that the future mission is to attack PF, RF and RD units during the TET Holidays. Infiltration: BINH was assigned to the 30th Battalion, "THU DO" Regt which departed NVN in Mar 69 and arrived in RVN in June 1969. He did not know the infiltration group number. After arrival in RVN, 20 men were assigned from his company to the Northern Wing Hq. The remainder of his Company (number unknown) was divided between the T.87th Sapper Battalion and the Hai Van Engr Battalion. The last known locations of Northern Wing units were: Unit 1, Battalion Headquarters, and Independent Doc Lap Co - vicinity (AT 812817) (23 November 1969). AKA's given were: Unit 1 Headquarters, AKA: Region 1 and Region Troop Unit 1; Northern Wing, AKA: Northern Wing Regt and Canh Bac (V) HOA HANG (D) Regt). The Hoi Chanh stated that about one month before he rallied (27 October 1969) he was caught in a B-52 strike vicinity (AT 8908). The units within the strike area were the T.87th Sapper Bn, Hai Van Engr Battalion and the A1 (General Staff) of the Northern Wing. On 22 November 1969 the Medical Officer was KIA and both the Battalion C.O. and P.O. were MIA while on an operation in vicinity HOA VINH (V) (AT 902795). Morale of the unit is low due to the constant fear of death and the lack of food and medical supplies. BINH also noted that the troops were still upset by Ho Chi MINH's death. They do not believe Radio Hanoi's reports that the U.S. is withdrawing, or their P.O. when he tells them that the NVA is winning the war. He stated that the 304th, 308th and 312th NVA Divisions plan to attack DONG HA, QUANG TRI and HUE Cities during TET, then return to NVN and regroup for another attack (Hearsay).

(G-2 COMMENT: Information concerning units caught in the B-52 strike were recorded for the first time (F-3); however, records at this Headquarters confirm the date and general location of the B-52 strike (A-1). Info on the three Divisions is reported for the first time (F-6). This is the first report of AKA's (F-6). Independent Doc Lap Co, AKA: P.31st NVA Independent Co.

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c. PW, Nguyen Hong TIEN/AKA: THANH XUAN 4th Co., 577th Arty Battalion who was captured 1 December 1969/BT 004478 approximately 800 meters north of FSB Pony, (Reference: 030815Z December 1969. SA QUANG NAM Sect. HOI AN RVN. Initial Interr. Rpt.) stated he had been away from his unit since September 1969 and did not know his unit's location. The PW was with 19 other men who went on a rice gathering mission in XUYEN TRA (V) an unidentified ARVN unit operating in the area prevented them from returning. The rice gathering party was forced to stay at a rest station in the HOI TAN Mountains. Having to collect rice for themselves, he was captured in the vicinity of XUYEN TRA (V). The P.W. stated that one of the men in the group had been given \$24,000VN piastres which was used to buy food for the 20 men. The PW stated he infiltrated with the 502d. infiltration group leaving NVN in March 1969 and arriving in RVN July 1969. The P.W. stated the 577th Arty Battalion was composed of 7 companies designated K.1 - K.7 and a Battalion Headquarters section which included 1 recon Plt., and 1 communication Plt. companies 1 thru 4 are rocket firing batteries, consisting of 2 Plt's. Each Plt has 2 DKB's. These "Guns" as the P.W. called them were rarely used because of their bulk. The rounds are rigged to a bamboo triangle and "lobbed". The K.5 is a mortar Co. with 2X120mm mortars, and 2X82mm mortars. the K.6 & K.7 are HMG companies with 130 men (2 Plts) each. Each Plt has 2X12.7mm HMG's. The recon Plt. is composed of 20 men. Personalities: C.O. - SRCAPT. NGO DANG IAN; X.O. - CAPT. THU; P.O. - QUE. 301

(G-2 COMMENT: The 120mm mortar capability is reported for the first time but is rated (F-2). Recent indications in ICTZ may mean that we will see employment of the 120mm mortar in the future however, employment of this mortar on a wide scale is doubtful at this time.

d. Hoi Chanh, senior Captain, Tran 72/AKA: TRAN CONG HOA/AKA NGOC THANH, political officer of the 2d Battalion, 36th Regiment, who rallied on 21 November 1969 at XUYEN TRUNG (V), BUI XUYEN (D), QUANG NAM (P) vicinity (BT 032511) approximately 3 1/2 kms west of DIU XUYEN (D) Headquarters (241015Z November 1969, SA QUANG NAM sector, ARVN translation. Interr. Rpt., 11th ITT Rpt. 187-69, 28 November 1969), joined the NVA/Viet Minh Forces in 1953. He was born in DIEN BAN (D) QUANG NAM (P) but was sent to NVN near the close of the French-Indo China War where he remained until 1968. Capt BE departed NVN in February 1968 with the 36th Regt and arrived in ONG THU SLOPE area (1647) in May. Hoi Chanh was appointed PO of the 2nd Battalion 36th Regt. in July of 68 replacing a man named Le Hong HAI in that position. Capt BE stated that in July 1969 he was relieved of his duties as PO on the grounds that he was undisciplined. He was replaced by HAI and told to await reassignment orders from front 4. Capt BE had no duties from then until he rallied. He stated that he had rallied because of what he considered unfair treatment and his general **disillusionment** with the war. According to him he realized that the NVA propaganda was false. He expected to find liberated areas but instead found cadre and **guerrillas** hiding in fear and the population attempting to move to GVN areas. In the opinion of the Hoi Chanh the NVA does not have a cause to fight for and are therefore at a psychological disadvantage. He also feels that the NVA are

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no match for the mechanized, scientific strength of the U.S. and GVN. On the organization of the 36th Regt, the Hoi Chanh stated the Regt was composed of 4 Battalions, a Headquarter's section, and a rear services section. The Regiment had a strength of 1500 men but 213 of them were sick. The 4th Battalion was established in July 1969 and has an estimated strength of 150 men, and was known to be armed only with AK-47's. The 4th Battalion was commanded by Capt. MAI, former X.O., 3/36; X.O. - SR. Lt. NGUYEN NGOC KY; P.O. - Capt. HOE, - A.P.O. - SR.Lt. HAI. The mission of the 4th Battalion is to train and instruct the cadre of the other Battalion's. The 36th Regt. Headquarters maintains base camps in vicinity (AT 965390); 1/36 (AT 970410); 2/36 (AT 965384); and 3/36 (AT 965400). Currently the Regt is training to be able to fulfill the will of Ho Chi MINH. From 1-8 Nov 69 all soldiers were well-schooled in the thoughts and will of Pres. HO, so they will be able to bear hardships in the future. The Regt issued 30,000 piastres in 500 piastre notes to each Battalion so they could obtain food for use in the future campaign. This money came from NVN for the purpose of buying the Hoi Chanh stated that NVN deals in foreign currency in order to buy materials in Hong Kong. Also, NVN purchases U.S. dollars for use in buying supplies for the VC in RVN. The Hoi Chanh further stated that in October 1969 front 4 issued a directive to the Regt instructing them to send 200 healthy men to the district forces of TUYEN XUYEN and DIEN BAN. 50 men from the 2/36, and 15 men from the 3/36. Additionally, there were 15 men taken from each of the regimental support companies. All of these men were transferred on 15 October 1969. The VC/NVA plan to launch attacks on cities and districts in order to achieve end of the year goals and to support the Paris peace talks. The NVN want the American people to press for troop withdrawals. The attacks will commemorate three NVA/VC holidays 20 December 1969 - founding of the NLF; 22 December 1969 - founding of the NVN people's army, and 28 December 1969 - establishment of 308th NVA Division. The Hoi Chanh stated the VC/GVN Forces should cut the supply/Comm lines in order to destroy the plans of the VC/NVA. These areas are vicinity XUYEN TRA, hamlet 1 (BT 065470). Northwest of R.R. in XUYEN TRA vicinity (BT 074474); Southeast of LOC CPHU SON vicinity (BT 005475); Hoa BINH vicinity (BT 030470); and LOC SON vicinity (AT 810480).

(G-2 COMMENTS: This Hoi Chanh has divulged a wealth of information that generally confirming intelligence already held on the 36th Regiment. He has furnished some new info, the most significant of which is the info on the 4th Battalion which is the first detailed info on this Battalion (F-1) information concerning the transferring of NVA personnel from other NVA units to LF/MF units has been reported before and tends to confirm this information. (F-2). The possibility of the 36th Regt. preparing for an attack in the near future is considered doubtful (F-4). Currently, the Regt is displaced from their base camps as a result of operations by the 7th Marine Regt., and, coupled with the sickness and critical food shortage, is probably not combat effectiveness. All other info reported by the Hoi Chanh rated (F-2).

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e. A document captured in QUANG NAM (P) (AT 960391) has provided information on the employment of chemical agents retrieved from FVMAF/RVNAF dud ammunition (Ref: CDEC Bulletin #26,620, 27 November 1969). The information was contained in a directive signed by VO BAY, Chief of the Chemical Section, Unit 502 (possibly Military Staff Dept, Headquarters, MR-5), and describes steps to be taken in removing the explosive charge from their 81 and 82mm mortar rounds, catapult bombs and ChiCom Grenades, and replacing the charge with the chemical agents retrieved from our dud ammunition. Enough of the explosive charge will be retained, however, in order that a fragmenting shrapnel as well as chemical affect will take place, producing even greater casualties.

(G-2 COMMENT: Other documents have been captured in recent weeks in QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN Provinces that relate to the employment of chemical munitions by the enemy. This could indicate an increase in use of chemical agents against FVMAF/RVNAF in future attacks during the Winter-Spring Offensive.

4. QUANG TIN (P)

a. Hoi Chanh, PHAM MINH HUAN, SrSgt, B.45th Sapper Co, who rallied on 1 December 1969 (BT 232188) (SA QUANG TIN sector TAM KY RVN msg 030 505Z Dec 69) stated that his unit had a strength of 27 men and was located vicinity (BT 135101). Their mission is to attack DOI DOAT Outpost (BT 113119) and Nong Phu Outpost (BT 136149) in December 1969 or January 1970. The B.45th Company has rehearsed with sand tables and are now practicing the attacks using mock-up's of the objective area. The C.7 LF Co is located in the same area as the B.45th. On 15 November 1969 the B.45th Co found 32 unopened cases of C-Rations buried vicinity (BT 133077) and distributed the rations to other units, including the e.7 Company.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first mention of a B.45th Sapper Company operating in QUANG TIN (P). All information rated (F-6).)

b. A 1st CIT agent report (C-2) (Ref: CIT CIP 241-69, 28 November 1969), reveals that 200 NVA of the V.25th Battalion are waiting along the Blue Line from (BT 1036) to (BT 122370). They will move north after the operation (friendly) presently underway in over.

(G-2 COMMENT: The V.25th MF Battalion is presently held (BT 1851) Six kilometers south of Hoi An. It is probably true that they have moved to the area reported by the agent and will return to their normal AO upon cessation of friendly operations in that area. All information rated (F-2).)

5. QUANG NGAI (P)

a. Returnee, BUI TINH, V-20th LF Co, SON TINH (D), rallied on 26 November 1969 to SON MY (V) (BS 732782) (Ref: 2d ARVN Div QUANG NGAI msg 281240Z Nov 69). He gave his unit strength at 40 men but stated that only 25 were present for duty (NFI). TINH located his unit at (BS 693807)

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and stated that the V-20th Company had the mission of attacking Refugee Camps in the SON QUANG (V) area of BINH SON (D) in order to move the people back to VC-controlled areas. The Hoi Chanh also stated that on the night of 13 November 1969, the V-20th Company and two companies from the 48th Local Force Battalion attacked MY LAI (H) (BS 716787). According to the source the 48th Battalion suffered 10 KIA's and 7 WIA's in this action. Future mission: To attack SON MY (V) and SON HAI (V), BINH SON (D) (NFI). The V-20th Company is armed with 1X81mm mortar, 1X60mm mortar, 1XB-40 Launcher, 1XB-41 launcher, and 3XBAR's. Personalities: C.O. - TAN; X.O. - NGHIEM; Asst P.O. - PHUOC.

(G-2 COMMENT: V-20th Company is AKA T-20th LF Company. This is the first contact with this Company since 1 February 1968. Weaponry reported by the Hoi Chanh is greater than that previously held but is rated (F-2). Personalities are reported for the first time (F-6). On the night of 13 November (140220H), CAP 1-4-6 (BS 714776) received an attack by fire followed by a ground attack, resulting in 6 VC KIA, 1 IWC, 9 ChiCom Grenades and 4 B40 rounds captured. Therefore, statements concerning the attack on 13 November at MY LAI OP are rated (F-2). Other information gained from the Returnee coincides with current holdings (F-1)).

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 49-69

1. GENERAL. Reported VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities of the past week reflect the continuation of concerted enemy emphasis on attaining the support and political alignment of large segments of the populace and, in conjunction with large scale attacks force the demise of the THIEU-KY government, create a peace cabinet receptive to the idea of negotiating with the PRG, and demand the withdrawal of US troops. Reported dates for such attacks range from 20 December 1969 through TET 1970.

Terrorist activity remained at a low level, consisting primarily of selective targetting designed to weaken/disrupt the pacification and security program.

Reports continue to reflect VC/VCI efforts in the collection of personalia on selected individuals for the purpose of creating various lists, such as persons to be assassinated, proselyted, sent to thought reform camps, etc. Implementation of the intended purpose of each list would probably be conducted simultaneous to intensified or large scale enemy military activity. Priority was to be given, but not limited to, village level personalities. It should not be discounted, that this effort may be at least one of the main objectives of any future high points in enemy military activity.

Captured enemy documents indicate that enemy troops are being encouraged, by promises of various awards, to provide extra effort in the killing of "tyrants" (usually refers to GVN officials, functionaries, and their supporters) in order to disrupt the GVN ability to control the populace.

In a possible attempt to exploit adverse publicity associated with an alleged US massacre of civilians in Quang Ngai (P), one report indicated that various injured, crippled, and disfigured individuals would be sent to Quang Ngai City as beggars, with the inference that they were the unfortunate result of US/ARVN atrocities.

Miscellaneous reports of possible significance, included in this report, concern a planned raid against Thuy Lap Refugee Camp, Quang Dien (D), Thua Thien (P); missions of the Hoa Vang (D), Quang Nam (P), VCI cadre during the Autumn/Winter Campaign; collection of supplies and re-establishment of commo-liaison routes in Thua Thien (P) preparatory to large scale attacks; status and reorganization of enemy cadre and troops in Tu Nghia (D), Quang Ngai (P); and a meeting of the South Central Office to announce a new public policy.

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2. ESPIONAGE. Reports continue to reflect VC/VCI efforts in the collection of data on selected individuals for the purpose of creating lists of personnel to be assassinated, proselyted, sent to thought reform camps, etc.

Two reports of espionage related VC/VCI activities received during the past week concerned enemy use of relatively large groups of girls in Danang and Hoi An City, Quang Nam (P) to elicit intelligence data from US personnel and attempt to promote anti-war sentiment.

An additional report of possible significance concerned the operation of an enemy intelligence net in Quang Ngai City.

Details of reported VC/VCI espionage related activities are as follows:

a. Quang Nam

(1) On 1 December 1969, a US MI source reported that 75 young girls under 20 years of age had recently completed a propaganda/proselyting training course at the Phu Chanh Secret Zone (nfi).

Fifty of the girls have been ordered to infiltrate into Danang City. The remaining 25 are to infiltrate into Hoi An City.

Their mission is to fraternize with American personnel under the guise of prostitutes and/or peddlers in order to obtain information concerning troop positions, movement, etc., and attempt to foster anti-war feelings among U.S. personnel.

(Ref: US NISO Danang Rpt No. 12-69-02, dtd 4Dec69) (Eval: F-3)

(2) On 3 December 1969, a GVN source reported that a group of young VC females from the ages of 17 to 21 recently completed a VC school for Proselyting Cadre (nfi). The females in this contingent have been ordered to infiltrate Danang City and Allied military installations in the environs of Danang. They are to fraternize with American GI's gaining as much information as possible concerning U.S. deployment, strategy, military complexes, supplies, etc. The female proselyting cadre are also to study the areas around Danang City for vulnerable targets of sapper operations. Fifteen girls have already infiltrated Danang.

(Ref: OSI Det 5003, Danang AB, DRAFT DDIR 12-8 dtd 3Dec69) (Eval: F-2)

b. Quang Ngai

(1) A US MI source reported that on 22 November 1969, a VC plan in the form of a written document was published by the Quang Ngai

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Provincial Political Section. The document was being circulated to District Headquarters at Lang Boung (H) vicinity (BS 374371), Ba Tra (V), Ba To (D). Information contained in the document is substantially as follows:

GVN officials. Personalia was to be collected on the histories of GVN hamlet and village officials, to include information concerning the parents of these officials and occupation. Village level cadre were to be given a higher priority than those at District or higher level.

Political Party Members. Information was to be collected concerning the membership of any GVN political party. Persons who belonged to political organizations that were anti-VC should be reported, relatives who were members of the VC should be included in the report. Special attention was to be given to those political members who could possibly be indoctrinated to become supporters of the VC.

Religious Activities. Information was to be collected on members of religious activities. Positions, age and residence must be reported.

Intelligence and Security Members. Data was to be collected on all GVN intelligence agents and security members. Both GVN and Allied intelligence agencies should be included.

Village security members would be instructed by District Security Personnel on methods of collecting information prior to execution of plan. Information should be reported by 10 December 1969. District security sections were required to forward information collected to the Provincial Security Section by the 14th of December 1969.

All reported information would be forwarded to a court which had been elected. The court would pass sentence on the individuals reported. Once the sentence was passed, the decision would be sent to the District Security Office for execution by a task group (nfi). Persons found guilty of a crime against the VC would be assassinated or captured and sent to a thought reform camp.

(Ref: Det D, 1stMIbn, 525th MI Gp, Quang Ngai Rpt #1/B/DX/1527/69 dtd 2Dec69) (Eval: C-3)

(2) A US MI source reported that on 23 November 1969 an order had recently been sent from Nguyen NHAM, in charge of the Quang Ngai VC Provincial Security Section to several provincial security cadre members (nfi), who were responsible for handling several city intelligence nets (nfi). The information was acquired at Ngoc Da (H) vicinity (BS 630550), Nghia Thuan (V), Nghia Hanh (D).

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CONFIDENTIALTask Requirements:

Collect full details on personal histories, positions, salary, home address, family status and political affiliation of ARVN soldiers, GVN officials, and National Police members and officers residing in Quang Ngai City.

Obtain detailed information on strength, commanders, armament and defensive systems of any ARVN unit, National Police forces and PRU units in Quang Ngai City.

Obtain home address of any interpreters (nfi), DIA and CIA agents (nfi), or ARVN spies.

Determine any anti-VC activities of religious and political parties.

Methods of Executing these Tasks:

The VC had at least five (5) intelligence nets (nfi) in Quang Ngai City. Three (3) of these nets were main lines (nfi), as follows:

1. Hong Ha Ago (students of Kim Thong and Bo De high schools).
 2. Tran Quoc Tuan A20 (students of Tran Quoc Tuan high schools).
 3. N.D. A26 (Alias A30) (motorcycle and lambretta drivers (nfi)).
- The three (3) nets were controlled by Lt. Quang DAN, in charge of the Southern Quang Ngai Branch Security Section. The remaining two (2) nets were handled by Cao Thuan LUWH (nfi).

Reporting and Communications System.

Information was recorded on two (2) sides of an onion skin paper with blue ink. The report was rolled very small, wrapped with nylon, and transferred to agent handlers through letter drops (nfi) or females who served as couriers (nfi). In addition, the VC started to develop an intelligence net in August 1969 utilizing several students (school year 1968-69). They did not attain good results, however, because many students were not aware of the techniques of political struggle. They only followed what their parents explained (nfi). In order to execute the plan, the VC attempted to exploit several locations (nfi) with N.D. A26 consisting of lambretta and motorcycle drivers. (Ref: Det D, 1stMIEN, 525th MI Gp, Quang Ngai Rpt # 1/B/DX/1501/69 dtd 1Dec69) (Eval: F-3)

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3. SABOTAGE. Enemy sabotage related activities, reported during the past week, consisted of one minor incident, as follows:

At approximately 0800 on 25 November 1969, the VC set off an explosive charge in an irrigation ditch (nfi) four (4) kilometers west of Dong Ha, Quang Tri Province.

(Ref: I Corps MSS Daily Rpt 260800H to 270800H Nov69)

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES. Numerous reports indicate concerted VC/VCI intentions to solicit the support and political alignment of large segments of the populace and, in conjunction with large scale attacks, force the demise of the THIEU-KY government, create a "peace cabinet" receptive to the idea of negotiating with the PRG, and demand the withdrawal of US troops. Reported dates for such attacks range from 20 December through TET 1970.

Enemy troops are being exhorted to provide extra effort in the killing of "tyrants" (GVN officials, functionaries, and their supporters) to improve the VC political position by disrupting the GVN capability of controlling the populace.

In a possible attempt to exploit adverse publicity regarding an alleged US massacre of civilians in Quang Ngai (P), one report indicated that various injured, crippled, and disfigured individuals would be sent to Quang Ngai City as beggars, with the inference that they were the unfortunate result of US/ARVN atrocities.

Details of VC/VCI political and propaganda activities of the past week are as follows:

a. Quang Tri

(1) On 13 November 1969, an unknown number of VC cut 200 meters of wire (nfi) in back of Nhi Trung (H) vicinity (YD 272723), Gio My (V), Gio Linh (D) and left two (2) types of propaganda leaflets (nfi) upon departure.

(Ref: XXIV Corps INTSUM 335-69 for period 010001H to 012400H Dec69)

(2) On 14 November 1969 an estimated VC squad left about 500 propaganda leaflets (nfi) in the vicinity of (YD 220640) and (YD 222653) near Cam Xuan (V), Dong Ha (D).

(Ref: XXIV Corps INTSUM 335-69 for period 010001H to 012400H Dec69)

(3) On 25 November 1969, elements of the 1/5th US Mech Div operating in the vicinity of (YD 057631) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

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A leaflet published by the (VC) Liberation Army, Northern Quang Tri (P), tells RVNAF troops to surrender and annihilate US troops or (GVN) officials. Annotation on the lower part of a picture on the reverse side indicates that the soldiers of the 2nd (RVNAF) Infantry Regiment (POW's in Tan Van battle on 17 May 1969) are well treated by the populace in Northern Quang Tri (P).
(Ref: CDEC Doc Log No. 12-1205-69 dtd 4Dec69) (Eval: B-5)

b. Thua Thien

In MRTTH, interrogations of a VC prisoner captured 10 October 1969, and a HOI CHANH who rallied during the same month revealed the existence of an Autumn Resolution promulgated by the Hue Viet Cong Municipal Committee in late July. The resolution called for a "self-help policy", whereby the VC, not relying on the NVA, would attack the GVN pacification program. VC armed units would concentrate on the RF/PF Revolutionary Development Cadre and the People's Self-Defense Forces, while avoiding contact with the ARVN. The VC do not consider themselves strong enough to stop the ARVN operations. During ARVN sweeps the VC are to hide or leave the area of operations, then return after the operation is concluded. Concurrently with armed actions, the VC cadre are to mobilize public opinion against the present government policies in an attempt to force the adoption of a new "Peace Cabinet" which would be receptive to dealing with the PRG. A newspaper, the "Flag of Liberations" is to be created to propagandize the founding of the PRG and VC victories collected from "other battlefields".
(Ref: COMUSMACV msg 040642Z Dec69) (Unrated)

c. Quang Nam

(1) The following is a full translation of a captured enemy document captured on 16 November 1969 in vicinity of (AT 951588) by an element of the 1st Marine Division:

Unit 75
(possibly Dien Ban District Unit (AKA: Q82),
Quang Da Special Zone, Military Region 5)

Directive concerning the initiation of an emulation movement during TD (possibly 1969 Fall-Winter Campaign to suppress tyrants)

Comrade Binh, please give this directive to Brother Quynh so that he can make 40 copies of it and forward them to all villages and concentrated units.

Signature (illegible)

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To the Party Committee and village units
and concentrated companies of Unit 75.

Executing the directives of the Commander of Unit 70B (Political Staff Section, QDSZ, MR-5) and Commander of Unit 75 (possibly Dien Ban District Unit, QDSZ, MR-5), the Command Committee and the Coordination and Operations Committee of Unit 75 decided to initiate a large-scale movement for the suppression of tyrants. The purposes of the movement is to break the oppressive control, win over the people, support the political struggle during the forthcoming TD, and to meet the requirements of the common movement in our district.

Our mission in the forthcoming TD campaign will be very important. We are valiant and loyal soldiers, should respond to the Party's appeal, and prove worthy of the confidence of our compatriots.

Assault soldiers should always maintain their assault position, overcome hardships and difficulties, and disregard the fierceness of combat. Don't fear sacrifices! Deeply penetrate enemy areas in order to kill local administrative personnel who left their posts, pacification personnel, and especially enemy officials.

Outstanding valiant soldiers should be ready to die for the fatherland and try to win every battle. Unit 75 forwards this directive to all village units and concentrated companies, in the hope that they will fully understand that killing tyrants in this campaign is to display loyalty to the party and do their duty toward the people.

Unit 75 orders that units (blank) in the TD Campaign kill (blank) tyrants, (blank) pacification cadre, (blank) fleeing local administrative personnel, and (blank) self-defense agents.

Party committees of various units should realize the importance of the movement and motivate their men to enthusiastically accomplish their missions for the common interests of the people. Unit 75 repeats, all comrades who want to become "Assault Heroes" should try to kill two tyrants. In addition, all cadre who have gained the title "Assault Hero", should try to verify the title.

After receiving this directive, the Command Committee and Party Committee of village units and various companies of the local force, should strive to accomplish this mission well. It is essential that the mission be considered most important. If completed successfully, it will considerably strengthen our struggle in a future political solution (of the Vietnam War).

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For the Unit 75
 Assistant Political Officer of the District
 Unit

/s/ XUAN QUYNH

The Emulation Section of Unit 75
 is in charge of initiating the movement
 of killing tyrants and winning over the
 people.

Cao Thang

(Ref: CDEC Doc Log No. 11-1992-69 dtd 28Nov69) (Eval: B-3)

(2) A VC rallier of 21 November 1969 identified himself as the assistant political officer of the 2nd Bn, 36th Regiment and stated that the enemy will not concentrate his forces as he did in 1967 and 1968 because of a lack of supplies and support from the population in the lowlands. During December 1969, the enemy will attack cities and districts in order to achieve end-of-year's goal (nfi) and to support the Paris peace talks. He further stated that 20 December, the founding of the NLF; 22 December, the establishment of the North Vietnam People's Army; and 23 December, establishment of the 308th NVA division are special commemorative days for the enemy and are considered likely times for attacks.

(Ref: J-2 MACV DISUM 339-69 for 040600 to 050600H Dec69) (Unrated)

(3) A US MI source reported that on 24 November 1969, approximately 100 personnel of the Q.81 Co commanded by CAM deployed in Duy Xuyen District vicinity (BT 136533). Unit intentions were to spread propaganda to local residents and tell these residents that the unit was capable of operations against ARVN and Allied operations.

(Ref: CO Det C, 1stMIBn (P) 525th MI Gp Rpt #1/B/BX/0838/69 dtd 28Nov69) (Eval: C-3)

(4) A US MI source reported that on the night of 27 November 1969 a VC political team led by Hung VAN, entered the homes of people living in Thai Lai hamlet vicinity (AT 925729), Khe Lam hamlet vicinity (AT 919766), Thach Nham (H) vicinity (AT 947715) and Van Duong #1 (H) vicinity (AT 905805); and propagandized the following:

This year a ground attack will be aimed at US/ARVN positions in Danang City which will be a key step in the overthrow of the THIEU-KY Government. The VC solicited the people to store up foodstuffs to support the attack and to celebrate when the victory is gained. The VC stated that the offensive will be as intense as the 1968 TET, however, this time with the 100% support of the people they will win a great

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victory. The VC further stated they were awaiting fresh troops from Hanoi. The VC political team departed the area, but promised to return within a few days.

(Ref: OSI Det 5003 Danang AB, DRAFT DDIIR 11-71 dtd 29Nov69) (Eval: F-3)

(5) A VC returnee who rallied on 1 December 1969, vicinity (AT 844495), stated that he was a former member of the Dai Khuong (H) guerrilla unit. The unit's mission was to provide hamlet security and prevent the villagers from going to GVN controlled areas.

(Ref: CG 1stMarDiv msg 050815Z Dec69) (Unrated)

d. Quang Ngai

(1) A US MI source reported on 30 November 1969 that the VC are forming many new political organizations, fronts and parties with the purpose of infiltrating the GVN and insisting upon opposition to US forces in Vietnam. After formation of these organizations, the VC will urge the people to join these organizations. The VC will also organize armed civilian units to fight the Americans and annihilate people who help the Americans and the Saigon Government. The new fronts being organized are:

"The Peace Union Front of Vietnam" (Mat Tran Thong-Nhat Hoa-Binh Vietnam).

"The Coalition Front" (Mat Tran Lien-Hiep Hanh-Dong).

"The People's Revolutionary Front" (Mat Tran Nhan Dan Cach-Mang).

"The Revolutionary Struggle Force" (Lui Luong Tranh-Thu Cach-Mang).

"The United Union Peace Front" (Mat Tran Lien-Minh Thong Nhat Hoa-Binh).

"The People's National Union Peace Front" (Mat Tran Lien-Minh Dan-Toc Can Chu Hoa-Binh).

"The Neutral Front for Our American Friends" (Mat Tran Trung-Hoa Than My).

Several members of the "The Neutral Front for our American Friends" are: Dung, But, Nguyen Viet Tuet, and Nguyen Toan. Dung is a secretary of the Vietnam National Party and he participated in this front before coming to Quang Ngai (P). But is a principal of a school in Binh Son (D). (Ref: Det D, 1stMIBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/A/EX/0265/69 dtd 30Nov69) (Eval: F-3)

(2) A US MI source reported on 30 November 1969 that the VC are planning to organize study courses for the formation of refugee receiving committees at the village level throughout Quang Ngai (P). These committees will receive refugees who return to live in VC controlled areas (nfi), and use these refugees to identify GVN cadre personnel. The VC party members will infiltrate into GVN controlled areas under the guise

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of refugees. Once inside GVN controlled areas, the committee members will have the following missions:

- (1) To urge the people to return to live in VC controlled areas.
- (2) To urge the people to support the VC political struggle by requesting the immediate withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam.
- (3) To eliminate the puppet government established by the US in South Vietnam.
(Ref: Det D, 1stMIBn, 525th MI Gp, Rpt # 1/A/EX/0263/69 dtd 30Nov69)
(Eval: C-2)

(3) On 2 December, a VC guerrilla squad infiltrated Ha Nhai (H) vicinity (BS 609766) and distributed leaflets saying the South Vietnamese soldiers should surrender and that the people must stay away from Allied Combat bases.
(Ref: PSA/PSD CORDS Quang Ngai Rpt # R-29/12031625)

(4) A US MI source reported that on 30 November 1969, an unidentified VC city committee sapper unit, with a strength of approximately 20 personnel, 6 of whom were females, was deployed in the vicinity of Xuan Pho (H) (BS 598740). They were repairing secret bunkers (nfi) at the above location. Their mission was to propagandize (nfi) and collect information in Quang Ngai City beginning 2 December 1969.
(Ref: Det D, 1stMIBn, 525th MI Gp Quang Ngai Rpt # 1/R/DX/1518/1969 dtd 1Dec69) (Eval: C-3)

(5) A US MI source reported on 4 November 1969, that a sector agent, Mrs Huynh Thi SUONG, age 38, a native of Kim Ghiao (H), Pho Long (V) Duc Pho (D) is a political struggle cadre of Quang Ngai City Unit. On 1 December 1969 she held an indoctrination course at Phu Son vicinity (BS 580702). Participants were disabled people. She asked those people to go to Quang Ngai City to make their living acting as beggars, maids etc. Purpose of that action is to let the families of GVN personnel know the brutality of ARVN and U.S. troops.
(Ref: Quang Ngai Daily Intsum 278 from 040600 to 050600 Dec69) (Eval: C-2)

5. TERROR. Reported acts of terrorism during the past week continued at essentially the same low level. Twelve incidents were reported, resulting in six (6) civilians killed, seven (7) wounded, nine (9) abducted, and ten (10) dwellings destroyed/damaged. Incidents continue to reflect selective targetting of GVN administrators, functionaries, their relatives and supporters.

Details of terrorist activities are listed in Appendix 1.

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6. MISCELLANEOUS.a. Thua Thien

(1) A US MI source reported that the headquarters of the Tri-Thien-Hue Front convened a meeting on 22 November 1969 in the area of Ngu Ho Mountain vicinity (YC 750760) to discuss the present situation and make plans for the next period (nfi). The meeting was attended by 10 personnel of the Tri-Thien-Front Headquarters and the Hue City Party Committee. Among them were Colonel Ha Long, Colonel Than Trong Mot and General Hoang Van Thai. Thai had returned from a meeting in NVN. The outcome and decisions of the meeting were as follows:

The present situation is not favorable to the general attack plan (nfi), since the commo-liaison routes to the plains areas were cut off and the cadre were forced to disperse. Main Forces will assist local forces in raiding populous areas for the collection of supplies. Concurrently, they will purge and terrorize the "reactionary elements" (nfi). When sufficient supplies are collected and commo-liaison routes to the plains areas are re-established, large-scale attacks will be started. Recon units will make terrain and road studies on vehicular routes in Thua Thien Province. They do not intend to destroy the roads into the A Shau Valley because they will be useful to move supplies from Laos to Thua Thien Province in vehicles.

(Ref: Det B 1stMIBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt #1/B/CX/1251/69 dtd 28Nov69)

(Eval: B-2)

(2) A US MI source reported that between the hours of 2200 and 2400 on 24 November 1969, a meeting of cadre from Quang Lo (V) AKA: Quang Thai (V), Quang Dien (D) was held in an uninhabited plains area in Dong Ho Phong Lai vicinity (ID 695395). Twenty cadre attended the meeting. Among them were the following: Tran Phu AKA: Ha, Assistant Secretary of Quang Thai (V); Tran Song, Chairman of the Village People's Revolutionary Council; and Tran Khuan, Chairman of Quang Thai (V). The purpose of the meeting was to distribute orders from higher headquarters (nfi). The cadre discussed the fact that they had not been able to carry out previous orders from headquarters because US and ARVN forces were too strong. They criticized themselves for the failure of their attack on Thuy Lap Refugee Camp again to avenge their loss (nfi), convince the people to believe in them, and to "push those people who are stubborn". The district committee ordered these cadre to use the present time to collect supplies.

(Ref: Det B, 1stMIBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt #1/B/CX/1253/69 dtd 29Nov69)

(Eval: F-3)

(3) A US MI source reported that on 30 November 1969 six (6)

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VC led by a VCI entered Dai Hoi (H) Huong Dien (D) vicinity (YD 585455) to organize the infrastructure (nfi) and make a list of the goods at the hamlet market.

(Ref: PSA/PSD CORDS Thua Thien Rpt # R-22/12011500) (Unrated)

b. Quang Nam

(1) A VC PW, formerly a member of the Hoa Vang (D) Forward Section (probably Forward Supply Section), captured on 8 November 1969 vicinity (AT 9760), stated that the present mission of the Hoa Vang (D) Forward Section was to recruit laborers to transport rice and evacuate wounded personnel to hospitals during the Autumn/Winter Campaign.

On 30 October 1969, source attended a meeting of all district cadre, presided over by Nguyen Ba TUNG, to discuss the Autumn/Winter Campaign and the mission of each section. Missions were as follows:

a. Security Section: Compile a black list of GVN officials to facilitate the killing or capturing of such individuals.

b. Military and Proselyting Section: Appeal to GVN officials to help the VC induce people to give food and help bury the dead.

c. Medical Section: Prepare more First Aid stations and buy more medical supplies.

d. Organization Section: Distribute booklet titled "Duty of a Party Member in the Autumn/Winter Campaign".

e. Commo-Liaison Section: Recruit legal agents in order to move messages rapidly.

f. Propaganda Section: Display more flags.
(Ref: Interrogation Report, 7th IF, Hoi An 02-11-69) (Unrated)

(2) A US MI source reported that at approximately 2400 hours on 22 November 1969, one (1) platoon of VC/NVA entered Xom Lang (SH) vicinity (AT 935825), and Xom Con (SH) vicinity (AT 933816), to collect rice taxes. Twelve (12) members of the platoon were armed and the remaining twenty (20) served as bearers to carry the rice.

The platoon entered the hamlet from the direction of the Mieu Na Islands vicinity (AT 922320) and departed in the same direction at 0300. In excess of 100 ang (roughly 200 lbs) of rice were carried away by the VC.

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Six (6) or seven (7) members of the platoon were recognized as former residents of Xuan Thieu (H) who joined the VC. Two (2) of the VC were identified as Ngo Van CO and Pham CHU.
(Ref: 5th CIT Rpt 120/69 dtd 26Nov69) (Eval: C-3)

(3) An NVA returnee, who was formerly a commo-liaison runner for Hqs, Unit 1 Bn (Area 1, Hoa Vang District) North Wing, Front 44, rallied on 27 November 1969 vicinity (AT 899819) stated that the battalion was assigned to resist pacification efforts through proselyting and propaganda activities and the ambushing of pacification cadre in Hoa Loc (V) vicinity (AT 885822), Hoa Vinh (V) vicinity (AT 905795) and Hoa Thanh (V) vicinity (AT 905765). Source was last attached to a 21-man recon unit, which was to perform surveillance of Hill 190 and collect rice for the battalion.
(Ref: 15th ITT Rpt # 06-11-69) (Unrated)

(4) On 28 November 1969, a US MI source reported that in order to achieve party objectives in the coming Spring 1970 Campaign, the Q84 LF company has received the following directives and passed them to local guerrilla units:

(a) Units must push forward through the use of guerrilla warfare.

(b) Mass organizations must be developed to the fullest extent to expedite the rising struggle and political movement.

(c) All tyrants must be annihilated.

(d) Units should strive to break the enemy's oppressive control of the population by destroying its pacification programs.

(e) Units should take the initiative and enlarge their area of operations.

(f) Units must effectively counter GVN sweep operations and enemy espionage efforts, so that the rear areas can be consolidated under VC control.

(g) GVN Chieu Hoi and psychological warfare programs must be emasculated.

(h) Units must develop Revolutionary Youth and People's Groups to improve the production of food and supplies.

In order to implement the above directives, Q.84 has been ordered to combine with guerrillas at Hoa Hung vicinity (AT 945690)

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and Hoa Luong vicinity (AT 950660). The unit was planning to launch surprise attacks against isolated outposts in Hieu Duc (D), ambush RD teams, and destroy all resettlement camps within the pacification areas (nfi). These measures would enable NVA units to operate during the first part of December (nfi).
(Ref: Det C, 1stMIBn (P) 525th MI Gp Rpt # 1/A/AX/0621/69 dtd 28Nov69)
(Eval: C-3)

(5) A US MI source reported on 2 December 1969 that the following three (3) individuals are members of a VC sapper cell which recently held a meeting at Ap Nam South (H) AKA: Dong Hai (H) vicinity (BT 073713):

a. Le thi XUAN, daughter of Mr Le THOAN, is a native of Dong Hai (H), previously reported to have taken VC/VCS to My Khe (V).

b. Huynh TO, son of Mr Huynh DUONG, is a native of Dong Hai (H) previously reported to have guided VC/VCS to My Khe (V).

c. Huynh DUY, son of Huynh BON, is a native of Dong Hai (H) also previously reported to have aided VC/VCS to infiltrate My Khe (V).

On their return to My Khe (V) (District III, Danang City) vicinity (BT 057775) they transported explosives (nfi) and detonators. They will attempt to plant these explosives in public and local offices in District III from this date (2 December) to the 18th of December 1969.
(Ref: OSI Det 5003, Danang AB, DRAFT DDIIR 12-7 dtd 3Dec69)(Eval: F-3)

c. Quang Ngai

(1) A US MI source reported that on 22 November 1969 the VC moved several important Tu Nghia (D) agencies to the Ruong Can Area vicinity (BS 460690), Son Ha (D).

Present status of the cadre. Following the Mau Thuan TET (1968), Tu Nghia (D) had a higher number of political cadre than any other district in the province. Tu Nghia (D) had approximately 200 cadre members with 100 of them covering the eastern part of the district. Since mid-1969, however, the total number of cadre members has dropped to its present total of forty. Ten of the current members had the ability to remain in the action area (nfi) while the remaining thirty had moved to western Tu Nghia (D). The total number of district cadre was down because of the following factors:

In April 1969, approximately one hundred members were captured by US and ARVN operations. Later (nfi), twenty more were also captured.

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Approximately thirty were wounded or defected.

Approximately ten wounded members were recently sent to a hospital (nfi).

The preceding analysis of the current status of the Tu Nghia VC (D) cadre was presented at a party conference held on 17 November 1969 (GVN Soldiers Day) by Nguyen BING, the commander of the Tu Nghia District Unit.

A Reorganization Plan. In order to win victories and influence the people, the VC leadership recently decided to proceed with the following plans commencing December 1969 (nfi):

All village guerrillas would be reassigned to the District Unit so that the District Unit might maintain its strength in spite of desertions and defections. Emphasis would be placed on combining the Tu Quang and Tu Thuan village guerrillas with the city unit (nfi) so that the city unit can remain organized.

The rebuilding of village LF committees will be temporarily delayed (nfi) in order to select members for a task group which would be supported by the district forces (nfi). Hamlet and village level cadre members with relatives who are ARVN or GVN officials will be allowed to live in the GVN controlled area or in the Nui Tron outpost area vicinity (BS 517778) in order to recruit their relatives and to collect information on the status of the GVN.

An attempt will be made to reorganize political operations in villages of Tu Nghia (D). Emphasis will be placed on troop proselyting missions.

The VC were preparing to conduct an offensive in the entire region (nfi) during December 1969.
(Ref: Det D, 1stMIBn, 525th MI Gp Rpt #1/B/DX/1490/69 dtd29Nov69) (Eval: F-6)

(2) On 2 December 1969, a VC operational team (nfi), led by Cao PHUOC, entered homes in Ngoc Thach (H) vicinity (BS 660747) forcing the people to contribute money (nfi).
(Ref: PSA/PSD CORDS, Quang Ngai Rpt # R-29/12031625) (Unrated)

APPENDIX

I - Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 49-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Thua Thien	30Nov69	(YD 967065)	An unknown number of VC entered An Lai (H) and abducted one female civilian, 30 years of age. The VC left an indictment accusing her as a servant of the imperialists and distributed numerous leaflets (nfi) before withdrawing.
	1Dec69	(YD 810198)	The VC infiltrated Xuan-Lai (H) and kidnapped Nguyen thi Hue, wife of an ARVN soldier, and left a note saying that she had been working with self-defense soldiers and was sentenced to death.
	1Dec69	(YD 965061)	Twelve (12) VC entered Thon-Xuan-Lai (H) and kidnapped the hamlet chief's sister (nfi).
	4Dec69	(YD 821187)	An unknown size enemy force entered Thuy Phuong (V) and assassinated the village chief.
Quang Nam	26Nov69 (Late Entry)	(CNA)	VC threw a grenade in the direction of a US CAP team and the 22nd PF platoon in an area 2 km southeast of Dien Ban. As a result, two (2) civilians were killed.
	3Dec69	(AT 849393)	The 707th RF Company and the 115th PF platoon, while in perimeter defense of Khuong Binh #1 (H), received twelve (12) rounds of 82mm mortar fire, resulting in one (1) civilian killed and two (2) civilians wounded.

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Ngai	25Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BS 573728)	Unknown number of VC entered Tu Thinh (V) and killed one (1) civilian (nfi).
	29Nov69 (Late Entry)	(BS 698637)	VC entered Phu My (H), took 5,000 piasters from the villagers and abducted four (4) children (nfi).
	29Nov69 (Late Entry)	(CNA)	One (1) VC squad infiltrated An Lac (H), Tu Hien (V), assassinated the hamlet chief and kidnapped one civilian (nfi).
	30Nov69	(BS 735735)	VC abducted one hamlet security chief from Go Phu (H) (nfi).
	1Dec69	(BS 645748)	One (1) unidentified man stabbed Mr. Le Trong, a policeman of Son Hoa NP sub-station. He was seriously injured.
	6Dec69	(BS 761823)	PF platoon 69, while guarding An Ky (H), received ten (10) rounds of 60mm mortar fire, resulting in four (4) civilians wounded and ten (10) homes destroyed.

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ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 49-69

1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY.

a. There were 59 long range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 30 November 1969. These long range patrols reported 83 sightings totaling approximately 1100 enemy. Recon team contacts and air and artillery strikes called in response to enemy sightings resulted in 107 enemy KIA and three enemy WIA during the reporting period.

b. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion teams patrolling in the 1st Marine Division AO observed approximately 850 enemy during the reporting period. Artillery fire missions called by the teams resulted in 95 enemy KIA and three enemy WIA. The majority of the enemy sightings occurred in the Que Son Mountain - An Hoa area. The enemy were moving in no discernible pattern.

c. The Americal Division Ranger teams observed approximately 208 enemy during this reporting period. Action taken as a result of the Ranger team sightings resulted in 12 enemy KIA. One large sighting of 100-150 enemy was reported by Ranger team OREGON on 4 December 1969 in the vicinity of BS 655463. Artillery was called with unknown results.

d. The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company inserted two teams along the southern boundary of Base Area 112 on 30 November 1969. One of the teams was engaged by five enemy immediately after being inserted. Aerial observers also reported considerable enemy movement in the surrounding areas. As a result the team was extracted and reinserted into a different LZ in the same recon zone on 1 December 1969. Once again the team was engaged immediately by five to 10 enemy necessitating the team's extraction. On 2 December 1969 the second team was extracted after being engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Enemy casualties were undetermined.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY.

a. In the 101st Airborne Division (AM) DMZ area sensors detected 26 targets during this reporting period. One hundred sixty-six rounds of 175mm artillery were fired in response with negative BDA. Significant sensor detections occurred in the vicinity of XD 9167 and XD 9868.

b. Sensors located out of the DMZ in the 101st Airborne Division (AM) area detected 55 targets during this reporting period. Two hundred ninety-two rounds of artillery and 12 rounds of 81mm mortar were fired in response. Sensors located in the Cam Lo Valley (XD 8660), XD 9160, and XD 8041 detected significant activity this reporting period.

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c. Radio and line sensors in the 1st Marine Division AO detected 20 targets this reporting period. Thirteen fire missions consisting of 118 rounds of artillery, 95 rounds of 81mm mortar, and nine rounds of 90mm were called. BDA revealed one enemy KIA on 2 December 1969 at AT 961593. During this reporting period there was a noticeable decrease of all sensor activity. Movement through the Danang Anti-Infiltration System has decreased significantly with the end of the rice harvest.

d. Sensors in the Americal Division AO detected 19 targets this reporting period. Fourteen fire missions consisting of 169 rounds of artillery were fired in response. BDA revealed three enemy killed by artillery in the vicinity of BS 657376. Sensor activity continues at a low level.

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CO MCB 7 CHL RVN	1
CTG 76.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTF 115	1
7TH AIR FORCE (IGS) BDOC	1
45TH ENGR GRP	1
620TH TCS APO 96203	1
366TH AIR SEC SQD, USAF	2
620TH TSC	1
SPO-SEC CMD QHN RVN	1

C. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (WITHIN HQ, III MAF)

CORDS/PHOENIX Division	7
FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP Cofs, PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	43
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (C/O G-3)	2
2D ROKMC BDE LIAISON OFFICER	1
PSYOPS	3
1ST RADIO BN	1
HORN DASC	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO	1

D. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

CO 1ST MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 3RD MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 2ND CAG	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
HQ 212TH CMBT AVN BN	6
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
CTG 115.1	1
CCN	1
USNAD	1
DIR CAP	1
7TH PSYOP BN	1
1ST FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
3RD FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
CO MCB 74	1

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					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
					G-3
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MAINTENANCE ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
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
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16 Dec 69

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HQ III MAF, G-2
DANANG, RVN
16 December 1969
Ser: 0135869

PERINTREP 50-69

Period covered: 070001H - 132400H December 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 40-16, ND 48-13
ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. There was no consistent trend established by indicators of enemy activity during the past week. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased by 60 for a total of 232, while enemy KIA's also increased, up 139 for a new total of 716, the highest total in three weeks.

Other indicators registered declines, with total incoming at 284, down 166 from last week. PW's dropped to 71, a decrease of 45, and Hoi Chanh were at the lowest level since the week ending 18 November, with 181, a drop of 64.

VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities of the past week continue to reflect no significant change in policy or tactics.

Terrorist activity remained at essentially the same level as the previous week and continued to be oriented primarily at disruption of village and hamlet level pacification and security assets.

a. QUANG TRI (P). The trend of light scattered activity established during the past several weeks in QUANG TRI Province continued during the reporting period. Early in the week, a small contact by a company of the 1/1st ARVN, 15 kilometers south of QUANG TRI City (YD 305388) resulted in seven enemy killed. On 7 December, the CUA VIET Naval Facility (YD 340-700) was hit by five 140mm rockets, causing negative casualties or damage. Action then moved south to the THUA THIEN border area as elements of the 4/1st ARVN accounted for 34 enemy KIA in several contacts. On the 8th, in a meeting engagement with an unknown size enemy force 12 kilometers southeast of BA LONG (YD 238313), that battalion's 1st Company killed 20 NVA and discovered a complex of 25 bunkers and 21 huts. On the following day, the 3d Company contacted an estimated VC platoon nine kilometers southeast of BA LONG, killing five. An hour later, the same unit accounted for nine more VC killed, one and one-half kilometers to the southeast. On 13 December, 4/1st ARVN searching an area three kilometers west of LZ BARBARA (YD 300333) contacted an unknown size enemy force, resulting in eight enemy killed and a cache of mixed ordnance captured.

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In other events during the week, on 12 December the 3/2 ARVN was hit by 34 rounds of 82mm mortar fire nine kilometers west of CAM LO (YD 045614), and Route 1 was interdicted four kilometers north of DONG HA (YD 220640) when a culvert was blown up by a TNT charge.

The continuing lack of concerted activity in QUANG TRI Province seems to indicate that the enemy is deliberately avoiding contact as he continues his reconnaissance and surveillance of allied installations, and strengthens and prepares his units for a possible upcoming offensive.

b. THUA THIEN (P). THUA THIEN Province remained relatively quiet except for several small and widely-scattered actions involving CAP teams. The most significant of these included an attack on the 7th, when 20 VC entered a hamlet six kilometers northwest of PHU LOC (ZD 143-007) and fired small arms and RPG's into an area they believed occupied by CAP 3-2-5. The fire killed one villager as well as one of the VC attackers. On the 8th, a squad of seven VC employing RPG's and satchel charges attacked THUY DUONG Village Headquarters (YD 793192) five and one-half kilometers southeast of HUE wounding four persons. Again, on the 8th, CAP 3-5-2 found three tons of rice in NAM PHO CAT Hamlet 12 kilometers southeast of PHU BAI (YD 962048). The rice was hidden throughout the hamlet on rooftops and in sandbags piled to look like bunkers. The rice was turned over to the District Headquarters.

c. QUANG NAM (P). The pattern of light scattered action during the past week was evident again in QUANG NAM Province as allied forces continued to disrupt the enemy's rice gathering and other logistics associated activities.

Starting out the week, elements of the 2d ROKMC Brigade, approximately nine kilometers southwest of HOI AN (BT 090503) on clear and search missions, accounted for 39 enemy killed. The team effort of reconnaissance elements and artillery also accounted for substantial numbers of the enemy throughout the week, as 62 were killed in five separate sightings by elements of the 11th Marines.

On 11 December, elements of the 2/7 Marines observed a well-dispersed unknown size enemy force moving seven kilometers west northwest of THANG BINH (BT 083432). The enemy were engaged with organic weapons supported by air strikes and artillery. As the action evolved, another unknown size enemy force was observed and engaged four kilometers to the northwest. Total enemy losses amounted to 41 killed with no friendly casualties reported.

Also on the 11th, DANANG Air Base was hit by eight 140mm rockets causing minor material damage and negative friendly casualties. Counter rocket fire resulted in five secondary explosions (AT 978678 - 960689).

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The enemy unit involved was probably an element of the 577th Rocket Battalion.

In an enemy-initiated contact on the 11th, an unknown size enemy force, probably local guerrillas, attacked AH DONG Hamlet two kilometers east of AN HOA Combat Base (AT 899470) destroying six houses and damaging nine.

The remainder of the week's action consisted of scattered ambushes and meeting engagements with small groups of enemy, and the capture of more than seven tons of rice in several different caches.

d. QUANG TIN (P). This week's action in QUANG TIN Province was characterized by several attacks by fire and harassing attacks against small outposts, headquarters and hamlets.

TAM KY (BT 300230) was hit twice by 122mm rockets, five on 7 December resulting in light casualties and five houses destroyed, and again on the 8th, when three more rockets impacted near the QUANG TIN Provincial Headquarters, wounding three civilians. Also, on the 8th, GO DAI Outpost (BT 152314) received an attack by fire consisting of four 122mm rockets, 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, six 60mm mortar rounds (CS gas), and five 75mm recoilles rifle rounds. One bunker was destroyed and negative friendly casualties were reported. This attack was probably launched by the 74th Heavy Weapons Battalion. Then on the 9th, an unknown size enemy force damaged five bunkers and inflicted light casualties in a hand grenade attack on the THANG BINH PSDF Outpost near HIGHWAY 1 (BT 209374). One significant rice find was recorded when 4/5 ARVN on a clear and search and clear mission eight and one-half kilometers north northeast of TIEN PHUOC (BT 207203) found four tons of rice in three camouflaged bunkers.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). The discovery of several caches of foodstuffs and equipment and scattered ambushes and meeting engagements with small groups of enemy dominated most of the week's activities in QUANG NGAI Province. Then, on the 13th of December, C and D Companies of the 1/1st Cavalry engaged an enemy force in a day-long engagement seven kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI (BS 7377). The action started when a helicopter drew small arms fire. Gunships and artillery fired into the suspected location, and a company size reaction force was inserted to sweep the area engaging an estimated enemy company. C/1/1st Cavalry was inserted to assist D Company, and when contact was finally broken late in the day there were 53 enemy dead while the Cavalry units suffered three WIA.

In other actions during the week, on 8 December, the BA TO CIDG engaged an estimated 15 VC, nine kilometers northwest of BA TO (BS 483-378), killing one. In addition, a number of military structures, two

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tons of rice and one ton of salt were found in the area and destroyed.

The acquisition of rice by allied forces is continuing to create problems for the enemy. PW reports reflect low morale and shortages of food in most units in QUANG NGAI, as is the case throughout I Corps.

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. The enemy situation in I Corps followed the trend of the last several weeks, characterized by scattered ground contacts and attacks by fire. The stated enemy objectives include gathering force and preparing for an upcoming offensive. There is a gradual change in the time frame mentioned by PW's and ralliers when referring to the dates of the offensive, with the late December commemorative dates being less frequently mentioned, and late January/early February celebration of Tet beginning to receive more attention. This may indicate that allied operations have created greater problems than the enemy had anticipated, disrupting his logistics and possibly causing a postponement of his announced schedule for the Winter-Spring Campaign.

Action during the coming week will probably follow established trends of attacks by fire and harassment of local security forces. There may well be an upsurge in enemy offensive activity near the end of the week, characterized by attacks by fire and possible sapper attacks, as the series of anniversary dates established as high points of the current Winter-Spring Campaign approaches.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents increased from 172 to 230 for the week of 7-13 December 1969. These incidents consisted of two ground attacks (both of which were platoon size or smaller), five attacks by fire, 119 harassing fire incidents, 74 mining and booby trap incidents, 13 hamlet harassment incidents, two assassination incidents, no espionage incidents, two kidnapping incidents, 12 propaganda incidents, and one sabotage incident.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire decreased from 100 to 65 incidents for the reporting period and 24 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

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k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 7-13 December 1969:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Expended</u>
Unk Cal Mortar	4
60mm Mortar	98
81mm Mortar	1
82mm Mortar	143
122mm Rocket	30
140mm Rocket	8
Total	284

l. - q. Negative

r. Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.

s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant enemy caches were captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 7-13 December 1969:

(a) 8 December: CAP Team 3-5-2 discovered a cache 12 kilometers southeast of PHU BAI (YD 962048) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
6,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

The rice was found on rooftops and in sandbags stacked like bunkers. The rice was turned over to District authorities.

(b) 8 December: 1/4-1 ARVN discovered a cache 12 kilometers southeast of BA LONG (YD 238313) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
1 EA	USSR	60mm Mortar
100 EA	USSR	82mm Mortar Rounds
40 EA	UNK	RPG Rounds
6 EA	USSR	AK-47 Rifles

This cache was found in a complex of 25 bunkers and 21 huts. All was evacuated to 1st ARVN at HUE.

(c) 13 December: 2/4-1 ARVN discovered a cache in the vicinity of (YD 300333) as indicated below:

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
20 EA	UNK	Anti-Tank Mines
600 EA	USSR	60/82mm Mortar Rounds

This cache was destroyed. No further information was available.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 7-13 December 1969:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, Rocket Ammunition

<u>Type</u>	<u>Amount</u>
82mm Mortar	390
81mm Mortar	6
60mm Mortar	255
155mm Artillery	1
105mm Artillery	9
140mm Rocket	2
122mm Rocket	<u>1</u>
Total	664

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	235
Crew-Served Weapons	19

(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 7-13 December 1969:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
07 Dec	(BT 156203)	600	B/2/1
07 Dec	(BS 619408)	50	D/4/3
08 Dec	(YD 962043)	6,000	CAP 3-5-2
08 Dec	(BT 099459)	2,000	G/2/7
08 Dec	(BT 061482)	120	6th Co, ROKMC
08 Dec	(BS 588841)	30	B/1/52
08 Dec	(BS 621045)	30 Food	D/4/3
08 Dec	(BS 483378)	4,000	C/5th SFGA
08 Dec	(BS 483378)	2,000 Salt	C/5th SFGA
09 Dec	(AT 993337)	600	4/3/7
10 Dec	(YD 878239)	100	PF (UNK)
10 Dec	(BS 722793)	4,000	CAP 1-4-5
10 Dec	(BT 133408)	1,500	F/2/7
10 Dec	(BS 457703)	300	A/3/1

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
11 Dec	(YD 144145)	44	3/2 ARVN
11 Dec	(YD 873238)	25	CAP 3-3-3
11 Dec	(YD 588403)	200	B/1/501
11 Dec	(BT 089385)	600	F/2/7
11 Dec	(BT 092485)	220	R Co, ROKMC
11 Dec	(BT 088500)	110	7th Co, ROKMC
11 Dec	(BT 197230)	3,400	B/2/1
11 Dec	(BS 459697)	2,000	B/3/1
11 Dec	(YD 792176)	30	CAP 3-1-7
12 Dec	(AT 911385)	300	I/3/7
12 Dec	(AT 989625)	150	M/3/1
12 Dec	(BS 712788)	400	C/1/1 Cav
12 Dec	(BS 623829)	500	CAP 1-4-1
13 Dec	(AT 866626)	75	A/1/5
	TOTAL RICE	27,354	
	TOTAL FOOD	30	
	TOTAL SALT	2,000	

s. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA.

Structures Destroyed	51	Structures Damaged	19
Bunkers Destroyed	30	Bunkers Damaged	2
Secondary Fires	8	Trucks Damaged	2

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ increased in comparison to the previous week. There were 716 KIA's, 66 VC PW's, five NVA PW's, and 181 Hoi Chanh's.

e. Morale. No Change.

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No Change.

i. Weather

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(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	<u>QUANG TRI</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature				
High	85	83	82	83
Low	59	63	60	64
Rainfall (total)	1.05	4.04	1.15	3.00
Winds (knots)	7	9	6	8
Visibility (miles)	6	5	7	6

Weather Outlook for the Period 13-20 December 1969

(a) General. An increase in the northeast flow over the South China Sea and the Republic of Vietnam is expected to begin early in the week. This new surge will again cause deteriorating weather and gusty surface winds.

(b) ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the period is cloudy with occasional surface winds gusting to 35 knots and scattered showers. A gradual improvement is expected toward the end of the week. Precipitation in ICTZ will be approximately one to three inches with isolated instances of four to five inches.

j. - l. Negative4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire, limited ground attacks and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone, with emphasis on the pacification effort.

b. In conjunction with capability a. above, conduct terrorism against selected GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following courses of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

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(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI Province with up to four infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(3) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by two mortar/rocket battalions.

(4) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with the equivalent of up to five infantry regiments supported by four sapper battalions and three rocket battalions.

(5) Attack the TAM KY/CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with two infantry regiments (+) supported by three sapper battalions and two artillery battalions.

(6) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of three infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one artillery battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment equivalent at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to four infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of ROUTE 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.

g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from NVN either across the DMZ or via the Laotian Panhandle.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

i. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's, and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attacks.

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(2) Continuing shortages of food and medical supplies coupled with sickness and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.



J. S. CANTON
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE

ANNEX E - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS,
AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z.

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 50-69 AS OF 132400H DECEMBER 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

I CORPS								DMZ/NVN/LAOS*		COMBINED TOTAL		
NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA				
NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	
UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>												
MR-hq	1	650				1	650			1	650	
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue								1	855	1	855	
Front HQ's	2	750				2	750	1	UNK	3	750	
Div HQ's	1	125				1	125	1	580	2	705	
Regt HQ's	10	2,995	1	190		11	3,185	16	7,885	27	11,070	
Bn's-Maneuver	38	9,195	7	1,165	6	1,120	51	11,480	44	18,745	95	30,225
Bn's-Support	12	2,855	1	120	2	445	15	3,420	10	2,480	25	5,900
Separate Co's	1	130			37	2,560	38	2,690			38	2,690
<u>TOTAL CONFIRMED</u>		<u>16,700</u>		<u>1,475</u>			<u>22,300</u>		<u>30,545</u>		<u>52,845</u>	
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>												
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's												
Regt HQ's								1	400	1	400	
Bn's-Maneuver	3	830	1	350	1	190	5	1,370	1	450	6	1,820
Bn's-Support	4	1,035					4	1,035	4	1,130	8	2,165
Separate Co's	1	90			1	75	2	165			2	165
<u>TOTAL PROBABLE</u>		<u>1,955</u>		<u>350</u>			<u>2,570</u>		<u>1,980</u>		<u>4,550</u>	
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>												
MR TT-HQ (FWD*)								1	150	1	150	
Front HQ's												
Div HQ's								1	350	1	350	
Regt HQ's								2	800	2	800	
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support								17	4,950	17	4,950	
Separate Co's									440	3	440	
<u>TOTAL POSSIBLE</u>									<u>6,690</u>		<u>6,690</u>	
		18,655			1,825			4,300			24,870	
											39,215	
											64,085	

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		<u>NVA</u>	<u>MF/VC</u>	<u>LF/VC</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,110		35	3,145
	Probable	345			345
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,455</u>		<u>35</u>	<u>3,490</u>
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,350		475	3,825
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,350</u>		<u>475</u>	<u>3,825</u>
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	5,660	1,275	555	7,490
	Probable	705	350		1,055
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>6,365</u>	<u>1,625</u>	<u>555</u>	<u>8,545</u>
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,755	200	1,115	4,070
	Probable	380		265	645
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,135</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>1,380</u>	<u>4,715</u>
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	1,825		1,945	3,770
	Probable	525			525
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>2,350</u>		<u>1,945</u>	<u>4,295</u>

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by type. C = Confirmed; PR = Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

I CORPS

DMZ/NVN/LAOS* ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS

MANEUVER	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL											
	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	32	0		32	5			5	5			5	12			12	41	1		42	83	1		84
SAPPER	6	3		9	2	1		3	1	1		2	9	5		14	3	0		3	12	5		17
TOTAL MANEUVER	38			41	7	1		8	6	1		7	51	5		56	44	1		45	95	6		101
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	7	1		8					2			2	9	1		10	2	2	7	11	11	4	7	22
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			2				2
AAA	1			1									1			1	1	1	1	3	2	1	1	4
RR	1			1									1			1				1				1
AT																	1			1				1
ENGR	1			1									1			1	1		2	3	2		2	4
TRANS		1		1										1		1	2		1	3	2	1	1	4
SIG	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		2	3	2	1	2	5
MED		1		1										1		1	1		3	4	1	1	3	5
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1								
TOTAL SUPPORT	12	4		16	1			1	2			2	15	4		19	10	4	17	31	25	8	17	50
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	50	7		57	8	1		9	8	1		9	66	9		75	54	5	17	76	120	14	17	151

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	<u>QUANG TRI</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>THUA THIEN</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG NAM</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG TIN</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG NGAI</u>	<u>STR</u>
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	221	Nam Hoa	50	Hoa Vang	812	Thang Binh	870	Binh Son	318
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	56	Hieu Duc	38	Tam Ky	442	Son Tinh	380
	Trieu Phong	113	Hong Dien	69	Dien Ban	1,090	Ly Tin	168	Tu Nghia	429
	Cam Lo	85	Vinh Loc	43	Dai Loc	332	Hiep Duc	117	Nghia Hanh	336
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	230	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	289	Mo Duc	435
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	295	Hau Duc	187	Duc Pho	523
	Huong Hoa	8	Phu Vang	11	Que Son	969			Tra Bong	166
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	97	Duy Xuyen	1,060			Ba To	115
			Huong Thuy	71	Hieu Nhon	279			Minh Long	77
			Phong Dien	528					Son Ha	200
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	807	THUA THIEN	1,201		4,995		2,073		2,979

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,055

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6. Order of Battle listing

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT ***</u>
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
12th AT Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,035			
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	21Jul68	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	21Jul68	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	21Jul68	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	21Jul68	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	21Jul68	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	21Jul68	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	570	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8337/18Jun69(P)
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,925			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	575	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8723/3Jul69(P)
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8754/26Jun69(P)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8632/29Jun69(P)
6th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8754/26Jun69(P)
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	XD 8440/5Apr68(P)
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	XD 8440/5Apr68(P)

*See note #4 on page A-17

**See note #2 on page A-17

***See Note #5 on page A-17

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DMZ/NVN/LACS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT *
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300			
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,300			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH SZ	6Mar69	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	6Mar69	
4th Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	6Mar69	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300			
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	XD 8241/8Feb68(P)
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,300	BA 611		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	400	BA 611	6Jun69	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	300	BA 611	6Jun69	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	300	BA 611	6Jun69	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	300	BA 611	6Jun69	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
17th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
19th DKZ Bn (122mm Rkt)	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	YD 0565/22Apr69(P)
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	

*See Note #5 on page A-17

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT *
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	
1st Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	YD 0363/21Apr69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	450	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	YD 0566/22May69(P)
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 9963/17May69(P)
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 9862/17May69(P)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 8826/15Jun68(P)
6th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 8435/2Jun68(H)
7th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
8th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
9th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
138th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	
1st Bn	NVA	C	450	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	450	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	YD 1675/24Oct68(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	450	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	
270th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	YD 2474/8Jun69(P)
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	YD 1873/16May69(P)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	
6th Bn	NVA	C	450	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	YD 1970/18Jun69(P)
27th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,290			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 0562/27Mar69(D)
1st Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 1267/24Sep69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 0563/16Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 0463/1May69(P)
31st Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	790			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	20Dec68	YD 1667/19Nov69(P)
27th Bn	NVA	C	190	VINH LINH SZ	21May69	YD 0970/18Nov69(P)
15th Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	6Jul69	YD 0264/7Jun69(P)

*See note #5 on page A-17

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT *
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,955			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	710	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	
1st Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	YD 9661/5Sep69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	375	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	YD 0063/7Aug69(D)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH SZ	20Jun69	YD 2167/17Jun69(P)
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	YD 2664/17Jan69(P)
Tri-Thien-Hue MR Hq	NVA	C	1,675	Unlocated	20Dec68	
6th Regt (-) (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YD 0309	11Oct69	YD 3011/13May69(D)
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	11Oct69	YD 1813/1 Oct69(H)
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	11Oct69	YD 6823/23Aug68(C)
9th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 9716/3Jun68(C)
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	4Jul69	YC 5097/30Mar69(D)
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 4594/14Apr69(C)
29th Regt (325C Div)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	BA 611	6Jun69	YC 4094/15Jun69(C)
7th Bn	NVA	C	450	BA 611	6Jun69	YC 3298/20May69(P)
8th Bn	NVA	C	450	BA 611	6Jun69	YC 3298/20May69(P)
9th Bn	NVA	C	450	BA 611	17Aug69	YC 3298/23Jul69(P)
803rd Regt (324B Div)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 4517/19May68(C)
1st Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 5521/22May68(C)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 2763/4Mar68(C)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	15Oct69	YD 3300/15Jul69(C)
812th Regt (-) (324B Div)	NVA	C	1,400			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	16May69	
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	16May69	YD 4339/15Aug68(C)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	16May69	YD 4368/29Aug68(C)

*See note #5 on page A-17

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT **</u>
246th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,565			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	14Mar69	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	14Mar69	YD 1259/11Jul69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	325	XD 9265	14Mar69	XD 8362/60Oct69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	14Mar69	XD 8637/27Jul68(P)
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	300	XD 8854	12Jul69	XD 8860/19Jun69(D)
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049		
7th Front (MRTTH)	NVA	C	1,350			
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	17Apr69	YD 4541/16Oct69(C)
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	16May69	YD 3040/16May69(P)
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	6Jun69	YD 3436/28Nov69(P)
K-14 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	6Jun69	YD 3837/27Oct69(P)
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	175	YD 3339	6Jun69	YD 1931/6Nov69(H)
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	105	Vic YD 3535	6Jul69	YD 3141/16Oct69(P)
*K-34 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	240	Vic YD 2730	14Jun69	YD 3537/20Sep69(P)

*See note #3 on page A-17
 ** See note #5 on page A-17

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT **
TRI-THIEN-HUE MILITARY REGION						
4th Regt	NVA	C	880			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	12Jun68	ZC 0893/19Jun69(P)
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	270	Vic ZC 1597	12Jun68	ZD 1901/19Jun69(P)
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	260	Vic YC 9694	12Jun68	ZC 0993/17Jul69(P)
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,410			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	15Aug69	YC 6382/20Mar69(P)
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	330	Vic YC 9397	6Dec69	YC 9197/15Oct69(P)
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	160	Vic YD 6514	15Feb69	YD 4503/15Oct69(P)
#439th Bn	NVA (PEND)		400	Vic YD 7500	5Nov69	YD 9399/ 9Nov69(D)
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	15Aug69	YC 5982/20Jul69(H)
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	15Feb69	YC 6682/20Jul69(H)
*K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	20Mar69	YC 5879/20Mar69(P)
6th Regt (-)						
806th Bn	NVA	C	350	Vic YD 3304	19Jun69	YD 5226/8Sep69(P)
K.12 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	20Jun69	YD 3507/13May69(P)
*K-35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	18Sep69	YD 6713/12Aug69(P)
C.113 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 4032	1Jan68	YD 5339/10Nov69(P)
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	1Jan68	YD 6234/13Sep68(C)
C.115 Co	LF	C	65	Vic YD 6623	1Jan68	YD 6625/3Jan69(P)
C.116 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 8420	1Jan68	YD 7706/19Sep69(P)
PHU LOC Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	1Jan68	AU 8208/20Oct69(H)

Pending, however, not accepted in OOB holdings by MACV. Not included in totals.

*See note #3 on page A-17
 ** See note #5 on page A-17

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT **
Front 4	NVA	C	UNK			
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	ZC 1341	12Oct69	ZC 1441/27Nov69(P)
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Unlocated	25May69	AT 9949/10Dec69 (P)
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	AT 9656		
577th Rocket Bn	NVA	C	300	AT 8042	7Jun69	ZC 1939/1Dec69 (P)
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	4Aug69	AT 9937/14Sep69(HC)
Hai Van Engr/Sapper	NVA	PR	200	AT 8686	11Apr69	AT 8689/1Dec69(P)
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	C	90	AT 8990		AT 8789/10Sep69(P)
31st Regt, 341st NVA Div	NVA	C	1,005			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 3060	24Jun69	AT 8964/11Apr69(C)
102nd Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 3060	24Jun69	ZC 2065/20Oct69(HC)
103rd Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 3060	24Jun69	BT 1133/12Nov69(P)
36th Regt, 308th NVA Div	NVA	C	610			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	165	AT 9737	14Sep69	AT 9739/28Nov69(P)
1st Bn	NVA	C	135	AT 9737	14Sep69	AT 9741/28Nov69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	155	AT 9737	14Sep69	AT 9640/28Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	135	BT 1252	27Sep69	AT 9738/28Nov69(P)
90th Regt, 324B NVA Div	NVA	C	1,065			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1640	23Jul69	ZC 1035/2Dec69(P)
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	ZC 1640	23Jul69	ZC 1035/2Dec69(P)
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1640	23Jul69	ZC 1035/2Dec69(P)
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1640	23Jul69	AT 7929/2Dec69(P)
*141st Regt, 312th NVA Div	NVA	C	1,190			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YC 8360	14Nov69	AT 8355/21Apr69(C)
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	YC 8360	14Nov69	ZC 2059/2Nov69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	YC 8360	14Nov69	ZC 1857/2Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	YC 8360	14Nov69	AT 8769/12Sep69(HC)
573rd Rocket Bn	NVA	C	300	Unlocated	14Oct69	
575th Rocket Bn	NVA	C	300	ZC 1960	15Oct69	ZC 2060/31Oct69(P)

* A detachment of 141st, reportedly consisting of 20-30 men from each Battalion, remains in the eastern portion of Base Area 127 (ZC 1861). Their mission is to provide security, gather rice and maintain the Regiments base camps in anticipation of the 141st Regiments return in the Spring of 1970 to participate in the Spring Offensive.

**See note #5 on page A-17

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT *
** 1st Regt, 2nd Div	MF	C	685			
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 8323	12Dec69	AT 8323/6Dec69 (P)
40th Bn	MF	C	175	AT 8323	12Dec69	ZC 1925/20Oct69(P)
60th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 8323	12Dec69	AT 8830/13Sep69(P)
90th Bn	MF	C	160	AT 8323	12Dec69	ZC 1926/30Sep69(HC)
R.20 Bn	MF	C	145	BT 0763	14Jun69	AT 9736/28Nov69 (P)
V.25 Bn	MF	C	125	BT 1851	16Jun69	BT 2050/12Nov69(P)
D.3 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	21Aug69	AT 9954/3Nov69(HC)
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 1649	10May69	BT 1648/17Nov69(P)
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	10Jun69	AT 9842/14Nov69(P)
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	12 Sep69	AT 8589/12Sep69(HC)
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752		BT 1350/16Nov69(P)
Q.81 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1053		BT 0548/12Nov69(P)
Q.82 Co	LF	C	115	BT 0059		BT 0158/18Oct69(P)
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057		AT 8558/1Nov69(P)
Q.84 Co	LF	C	50	AT 9069		ZC 2165/31Oct69(P)
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536		AT 9938/19Oct69(HC)
*** 490th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	400	ZC 1930	18Nov69	ZC 1832/10Dec69(P)

*See note #5 on page A-17

**See 7.a. on page A-17

***See 7.b. on page A-17

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CONFIDENTIALQUANG TIN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT**</u>
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	20Nov68	
*2nd NVA Div	NVA	C	4,045			
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	22Aug69	AT 9815/12Nov69(P)
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	20May69	BT 0939/27May67(C)
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	22May69	AT 9629/14Aug69(P)
GK.32 AT Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	20May69	AT 9221/14Jun68(C)
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	23May69	AT 9134/4Oct69(P)
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	20May69	ZC 0343/21Sep69(P)
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	22May69	BT 1047/19Dec67(P)
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	20May69	BT 2318/13Nov68(P)
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	24May69	BS 2444/20Oct67(C)
3rd (AKA 31st) Regt, 2nd Div	NVA	C	740			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	BT 0008	20Nov69	BT 0019/13Sep69(HC)
1st Bn	NVA	C	200	BT 0935	20Nov69	BT 0935/12Nov69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	200	BT 2611	20Nov69	BT 2613/4Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	200	BT 1234	20Nov69	BT 1133/12Nov69(P)
70th Bn	LF	C	165	BT 2348	16Oct69	BT 0930/22Nov69(P)
72nd Bn	LF	C	160	BT 2937	15Oct69	BT 2937/13Nov69(HC)
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	195	BT 2113	17Oct69	BT 2425/19Oct69(HC)
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	190	BT 2938	17Oct69	BT 2939/13Nov69(HC)
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 3304	17Oct69	BS 4287/11Dec69(P)
78th Arty Bn	LF	C	250	BT 3001	3Feb69	BT 3121/28Jan68(P)
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 4213		BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	85	BT 4801		BT 2908/24Feb69
V.15 Co	LF	C	70	BT 1735		BT 2737/23Nov69
V.18 Co	LF	PR	75	BT 2315		
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212		BT 1819/17Oct69
C.9 Co	LF	C	50	BT 2045		BT 2144/19Nov69

* Total reflects 1st MF Regt and 3rd NVA Regt strengths only. 21st NVA Regiment included in QUANG NGAI totals.
 ** See note #5 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT*</u>
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	20Jun69	RS 6528/11Nov69 (HC)
38th Bn	LF	C	170	BS 6858	8May69	BS 7585/7Dec69 (P)
48th Bn	LF	C	290	BS 7180	24Jun69	BS 7177/14Nov69 (HC)
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	165	BS 5676	17Jun69	RS 4770/22Aug69 (P)
120th Bn	LF	C	210	BS 3975	29Jan69	BS 6169/25Feb69 (C)
406th Sapper Bn	LF	C	125	BS 4677	11Aug69	BS 5279/20Oct69 (C&P)
C.16 Sapper Co	LF	C	65	BS 4770		
C.17 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7562		RS 5373/9Nov67 (C)
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566		RS 5352/5Dec69 (C)
C.19 Co	LF	C	45	BS 7555		RS 7559/17Oct69 (C&P)
T.20 Co	LF	C	55	BS 7080		RS 7177/14Nov69 (HC)
C.21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167		RS 6566/25Feb69 (C)
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491		RS 6887/16Jun69 (P)
C.45 Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 7559		BS 7657/5Nov69 (P)
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	C	40	BS 6689		BS 6887/16Jun69 (P)
B.65 Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 6457		BS 7369/6Dec69 (P)
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270		BS 6567/24Aug69 (C&P)
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568		
81st Co	LF	C	65	BS 5676		RS 5668/11Sep69 (P)
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 5596		BS 6091/11Sep69 (C&P)
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090		BS 6887/16Jun69 (P)
C.120 Co	LF	C	45	BS 8537		RS 8137/15Aug69 (C&P)
C.212 Co	LF	C	100	BS 5038		
C.219 Co	LF	C	50	BS 8137		RS 7839/15Aug69 (C&P)
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172		RS 6571/29Jun69 (C&P)
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674		RS 6571/29Jun69 (C&P)
** 21st NVA Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	680			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4053	12Dec69	BS 6557/7Dec69 (P)
60th Bn	NVA	C	150	BS 4053	12Dec69	BS 6557/7Dec69 (P)
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4358	12Dec69	BS 6557/7Dec69 (P)
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4358	12Dec69	BS 6557/7Dec69 (P)

* See note #5 on page A-17

** See note 7.a. on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE (continued)

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT *</u>
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 4741	25Octo9	BS 5030/20Octo9 (P)
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 5542	25Octo9	BS 6337/13Augo9 (C)
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 4543	25Octo9	BS 0337/13Augo9 (C)
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6546	25Octo9	BS 7844/2Deco9 (P)

*See note #5 on page A-17

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BINH DINH PROVINCE*

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST</u> <u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT</u> <u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC</u> <u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE</u> <u>LAST CONTACT *</u>
**3rd NVA Div	NVA	C	4,160			
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 5504	6Dec69	BR 5090/21Oct69 (HC)
2nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	870			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	345	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 7508/3Nov69 (P)
93rd Bn	NVA	C	180	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 8331/28Nov69 (HC)
95th Bn	NVA	C	180	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 7508/3Nov69 (P)
97th Bn	NVA	C	165	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 7508/3Nov69 (P)
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,260			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	520	BR 7363		
8th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 5950		
9th Bn	NVA	C	300	BR 5929		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	C	325	BS 5504	6Dec69	BS 7508/3Nov69 (H)
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 8104/28Nov69 (P)
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 8109/31Oct69 (P)
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 5504	6Dec69	BR 5090/21Oct69 (H)
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 5504	6Dec69	BR 5090/21Oct69 (H)
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 5504	6Dec69	BR 5090/21Oct69 (H)

*See note #5 on page A-17

**Totals of 3d Div Units in Binh Dinh do not include 22d Regt.

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 070001H to 132400H December 1969.

a. A review of information from various sources has dictated the moves of the following enemy units to their present locations within QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces. QUANG TIN Province: 1st MF Regt, 2d NVA Div (AT 8323); QUANG NGAI Province: 21st NVA Regt HQ and 60th Bn (BS 4053); 70th and 80th Bn's - (BS 4358).

b. Pending acceptance in OOB holdings by MACV. Designation and location of the 10th Sapper Bn changed based on recent PW statements. The 10th Sapper Bn will be carried as an AKA for the 490th Sapper Bn. The strength is not included in the totals.

8. Explanatory Notes

- #1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.
- #2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.
- #3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.
- #4. Those units within the DMZ and those in LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.
- #5. Under the column "Location/date last contact", the information is based upon the following codes: (P) = Prisoner of war; (D) = Document; (H or HC) = Hoi Chanh; (C) = Contact.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 50-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P). PW, Pvt Phung Ba THUONG, K.16 Infantry Company, 31st Regiment (Ind), captured 19 November 1969 vicinity (YD 163675) (11th ITT Rpt 191-69) stated that the strength of the K.16 Company was 45 men and was located in VINH CHAP (V), VINH LINH (D), NVN. PW THUONG also stated that the mission of the K.16 Company was to transport rice to the K.13 Artillery Company which was operating south of the BEN HAI River (CNA). The mission of the subordinate battalions in the 31st Regiment was to infiltrate into RVN in the southwestern area of CON THIEN to conduct counter operations (NFI). Source revealed that the AKA for the 31st Regiment was E 31 Song Hong Regiment and the LBN for the K.16 Company was 94138 XB. Reported personalities: 31st Regiment CO-PHU, XO-HU'NG, PO-LOI, APO-TU, Cofs-LAM; K.16 Company Cmdr-LUC, XO-CHAC, PO-THUY.

(G-2 COMMENT: This is the first PW from the K.16 Company, 31st Regiment. III MAF OOB holdings carry a 13th Reconnaissance Company subordinate to the 31st Regiment. This is the first time that the 13th Company has been referred to as an artillery company. All information reported rated (F-6).)

2. THUA THIEN (P). No significant reports.

3. QUANG NAM (P).

a. Hoi Chanh, PFC Le Van DIEU, 4th Co, 10th Independent Bn, rallied 6 Nov 1969 (BT 041412) six and one-half kilometers north of QUE SON (Ref: CG 1st MARDIV 221544Z Nov 1969, 7th ITT 081529Z Dec 1969, and ARVN Interrogation Report 332-69 of 3 Dec 1969) when he was discovered after his rice gathering party was ambushed in the X'YEN TRA (V) area (BT 060490). He gave the location of his battalion as in the vicinity of the southeastern corner of Base Area 112 (ZC 184321), and stated that the battalion was composed of four companies: 1st Co (possibly reconnaissance), 2d Co (Wpns), 3d Co (Sapper), 4th Co (Infantry), and a seven-man battalion section. His company had a strength of 100 men and was composed of three platoons. The future mission of the unit was to attack DAI LOC (D) in the coming weeks with assets of the 3d Co. He further reported that the morale of the unit was very low due to mixed feelings about the war and homesickness. Twenty soldiers of the company had Beri-beri, and at present there were 75 cases of malaria. The soldiers of the unit received one and one-half cans of rice per day during the last three months with no meat or food. The soldiers were questioning the reason for the food shortage but no explanation had been given. The battalion was equipped with AK's, SKS's, B-40's, and an unknown number of LMG's, and had communications equipment which consisted of four Soviet-made radios (unknown type) resembling PRC-25's and four Chicom B-600 field telephones (NFI). Reported personalities: Bn CO-SrCapt Dau Van HAM, XO-MUOE, PO-MINH; 4th Co CO-Lt TAM. LBN's: YS67412 and YS 63411.

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(G-2 COMMENT: The location given for the 10th Independent Bn (AKA 10th Sapper Bn) is in the vicinity of the recent re-location of this battalion, based on this Hoi Chanh's statements and two PW's from this battalion (F-2). The personalities are recorded for the first time with the exception of the Bn CO-SrCapt HAM who he held in that capacity (F-1). The LBN presently held for the 10th Sapper Bn is 6915 AP THAI; YS63411 and YS67412 are reported for the first time (F-6). The items of communications equipment are reported also for the first time (F-3).)

b. PW, SrSgt Nguyen Duong (AKA Phuong HA) 3d Co, 703d Signal Bn, Front 4, was captured on 18 Nov 1969 in the vicinity of (AT 973606) two kilometers southeast of HILL 55 (Ref: ARVN Interrogation Report 348-69; 7th ITT Report 25-12-69 of 7 Dec 1969). The PW believed that all Main Force units were moving back into their base areas for reorganization and political reorientation. In contrast to this statement, he revealed that the Local Force units are stepping up harassment and disruption of GVN pacification efforts. The Local Force and Guerrilla units are trying to keep the FVMAF's from seizing any more land. In order to support this effort, the D.3 Bn was ordered to break down into small groups and to operate in various villages of DIEN BAN (D). It was not known if the D.3 Bn will completely break down. Also, the V.25 Bn is to operate in the vicinity of HOI AN City. The PW additionally stated that the 36th Regiment was to operate in DIEN BAN (D). On 15 Nov 1969, the PW operated in the vicinity of (BT 070622) carrying messages and it was in this location that he observed a number of soldiers of the 577th Artillery Unit. The PW's unit, the 703d Bn, maintains a base area in DAI LOC (D) (AT 835470), and is composed of three companies, designated 1 through 3. The 3d Co has a strength of 60 men and is presently attached to the Southern Wing. The PW, being a message and letter carrier, had detailed knowledge of the flow of correspondence in the northeastern area of the province. He stated that all correspondence from the 3d District Unit of DANANG City, the Q.82d DIEN BAN (D) Unit, and the Q.86th Unit of HOA VANG (D) was concentrated at Station H-5 in Hamlet (3), DIEN NGOC (V) (BT 070622). The personnel of H-5 would bring the correspondence to Station H3B at HA NONG DUOI (H) (BT 003598), from there it was taken to Station H3A located in Hamlet (1), DIEN THAI (V) (AT 983560). Returning correspondence would come back the same route in the opposite direction. Additional stations were Station H-2 in Hamlet (3), XIYEN THANH (V) (AT 950511), Station H-4 in XUYEN THAI (V) (BT 1254), and Station H2B in XIYEN THAI (V) (BT 0352). The PW did express limited knowledge concerning the Southern Wing Headquarters, Front 4, but was unsure of its location because he had never been there. He knew the Southern Wing had numerical cover designations of P.50, Z.100, and T.15. P.50 had been used since August 1969. The Southern Wing was commanded by SrCol THANH (AKA PHUONG), XO-Col MAI. The Signal Bn was commanded by CHUA (hearsay), and had LBN's of 6760 AP THAI and P.6460.

(G-2 COMMENT: The information concerning the composition of the battalion is in general agreement with current OOB holdings (F-2).

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LEN 6760 AP THAI and the Signal Bn CO (CHUA) have been previously reported (F-1). The information concerning the D.3 NVA Infantry Bn is reported for the first time, but is received amid other reports of changes involving NVA and Main Force units (F-3). Elements of the 577th Rocket Bn have been previously reported in the area indicated by the PW (F-2). The information concerning the Southern Wing has also been reported previously (F-2).)

4. QUANG TIN (P). PW, Tran Cong TUAN, Cpl, GK-33, 2d Agricultural Site (AKA 2d NVA Div) who was captured 12 Nov 1969 at (BT 123512) XUYEN TAN (V) (7th ITT Report 11-12-69 of 4 Dec 1969) did not know his unit's strength or location due to his absence from that unit since September of 1968. He was very well informed, however, in regards to units of the 2d NVA Div through close acquaintances. He stated that as of the date of his captured that the 1st Regt, 2d NVA Div was operating in the TIEN PHUOC (D) area. The 3d Regt Headquarters was located at the foot of DOI DUNG Mountain, TIEN LAM (V) (BT 008216) on 7 Oct 1969. The 1st Bn, 3d NVA Regt was located (BT 065270) and the 2d Bn at Hamlet (3) PHUOC LAM (V) (BT 194157) on 5 Nov 1969. On that date, TUAN went to the CHO BA Market (BT 167495) BINH HOA (V), THANG BINH (D) to meet a friend named TEO, a soldier, and DUC, who was the Recon Plt Leader of the reconnaissance element of the 3d Regt. Through conversation with the above two individuals, it was learned that the 3d NVA Regt presently has two elements preparing for operations that are scheduled for the end of 1969 and the beginning of 1970. One of these elements will be commanded by Capt HAI of the 3d Regt, 2d NVA Div, position and personality unknown, and OANH, the 7th Bn (AKA 1st Bn) CO, also unknown. Source heard various reconnaissance people and medics say that they are preparing for a battle at HUONG AN NUI GUA (BT 130455) and the ONG MEO Canyon, THANG BINH (D). The other element of the 3d Regt, 2d Div is preparing to attack vehicular traffic on the highway from TAM KY to TIEN PHUOC. TUAN stated that the living conditions of the people in the communist groups is very bad, and that the war becomes more and more desperate and both cadre and soldiers have a great feeling of insecurity. They want to return north but are afraid of capture while returning. Most of them do not understand the GVN Chieu Hoi Program. They think that the Chieu Hoi Program is a policy of the government to dispose of all soldiers and returnees. Subject stated he met more than 130 men who deserted living in vicinity (AT 927432). Some deserters stay in areas such as TY XE and PHUOC LANH (NFI).

(G-2 COMMENT: Information regarding the 3d NVA Regt and its subordinate battalions including personalities are reported for this first time. The predicted attacks in northern QUANG TIN Province have been mentioned previously and are quite possible.

5. QUANG NGAI (P). No significant reports.

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ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 50-69

1. GENERAL. VC/VCI counterintelligence related activities continue to reflect no significant change in policy or tactics.

Terrorist activity, including late reports of incidents occurring during the previous week, revealed a slight increase in terrorist activity these past two weeks. Targeting continues to be oriented primarily at disruption of village and hamlet level pacification and security assets.

Reports of the past week disclosed the enemy's plans for intensification of political struggle activities and military and civilian proselyting through concerted propaganda exploitation of popular frustrations generated by the war. The intensified military proselyting is reportedly to occur between Christmas Day and New Years Day, directed not only toward RVNAF forces, but Allied forces as well.

Hoping to arouse widespread anti-American sentiment and demands for immediate US troop withdrawals, enemy propagandists have launched a campaign attempting to exploit the alleged US forces massacre of civilians at Son My Village, Quang Ngai Province on 16 March 1968.

2. ESPIONAGE. No reports of enemy espionage and/or related activities in ICTZ were received during the past week.

3. SABOTAGE. Reported enemy sabotage and/or related activities in ICTZ during the past week consisted of one incident, as follows:

At approximately 1520 on 1 December 1969, members of the 1st MP Battalion, manning a bunker located 100 meters west of the north end of Cam Lee bridge, vicinity (BT 014718), Quang Nam (P), experienced unknown type explosion inside their bunker. Results were one (1) USMC KIA and three (3) USMC WIA. The explosive device was believed to have been placed inside the bunker by three (3) VN school boys, ages approximately 13-14, who were chased away from the bunker, approximately fifteen minutes prior to the explosion. (Ref: Advisory Team 15, Quang Nam (P) INTSUM 338 period 050601 to 060600 Dec 69)

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. A document originated by COSVN and captured in III CTZ was applicable to all of SVN and indicated that the enemy has resigned themselves to the fact that the US will proceed with the "Vietnamization" of the war, at least through 1970.

In this same regard, various reports reflect continuation of long range enemy strategy directed toward eventual implementation of their goals. These reports include the sending of various cadre, soldiers,

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and children to North Vietnam for training and eventual return to the South for various key positions. Training mentioned includes political indoctrination, economics, finance, banking, agriculture, security and administration.

Enemy plans revealed in captured documents indicate intentions to intensify military proselyting activities during Christmas and New Years Day through the use of leaflets, banners, slogans, and even Christmas trees (possibly trees with slogans/banners attached). Such activities were to be directed at both Allied and GVN troops. Simultaneously, the enemy appears to be attempting to implement a hate campaign against Americans. Propaganda themes alluding to massacres of civilians, killing innocent people, causing prices to become excessively high and destruction of crops and forests by defoliation.

Numerous agent reports have recently indicated propaganda efforts aimed at soliciting material and logistics support from the people for VC/NVA troops who would reportedly be moving into the plains and lowland areas from the mountains during December.

Details of reported enemy political and propaganda activities of the past week are as follows:

a. South Vietnam. On 21 November 1969, elements of the 1st ATF while operating vicinity (YS 438868) (III CTZ) obtained an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Message, dated 3 August 1969, sent from R (COSVN), concerning the US strategy in the peace negotiations. The message reads in part as follows: "From November until the end of 1970, whether we agree to withdraw our forces or not, the Americans will unilaterally withdraw 200,000 to 300,000 troops from SVN. But, when it is necessary, this plan (for withdrawing) their troops from Danang, Phu Bai, An Khe, Qui Nhon, Phu Cat, Pleiku, Long Binh, Cat Lai, Saigon, and Can Tho might be changed. In late 1970, after pulling their 200,000 to 300,000 troops from SVN, the Americans will not unilaterally withdraw any more men. They will maintain the THIEU-KY government until we agree to negotiate with the THIEU-KY clique, either in Paris or in other countries. At the end of 1970, the Americans will withdraw their remaining forces under one of the following circumstances:

(1) We agree to pull our NVA troops from SVN and Laos when a secret or official agreement is signed.

(2) When the Americans feel that the Puppet (RVNAF) is capable of confronting our forces alone". (Ref: COMUSMACV msg 281540Z Nov 69) (Unrated)

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b. Thua Thien.

(1) A US MI source reported that on 2 December 1969, 70 personnel of the C.1114 Company, commanded by THIEU, Phong Dien District Unit commander, and LAU, the District Political Officer, along with 30 cadre of unidentified armed units commanded by NGOC, TON, HA and LY, deployed in Truong Cau (H) vicinity (YD 608346). The mission of the 30 cadre was to propagandize the people so that they would contribute food and warm clothing for the NVA regular forces who are expected to come into the area. (Ref: Det B, 1st MI Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt #1/B/CX/1283/69, dtd 6 Dec 69) (Eval: F-6).

(2) A US MI source reported that on 3 December 1969, approximately one VC squad entered Hoa Mau (H) vicinity (ZC 092997) and stole foodstuffs from the people, and upon withdrawing they distributed a number of propaganda leaflets (nfi). (Ref: PSA/PSD CORDS THUA THIEN Rpt #R-14/12051045). (Unrated).

(3) A US MI source reported that as of 8 December 1969, one 25-man VC/NVA unit led by Tran Nghia was operating in the area of Phu Bai I (H) vicinity (YD 903115) and Phu Bai II (H) vicinity (YD 910108), Thuy Phu (V). The unit is comprised of five (5) well armed five (5) man teams who live in well concealed bunkers vicinity (YD 895092). Several members of the unit are identified as Le CHUONG, Le LANG, Le THIEN and Le thi THE (nfi). This unit often travels to the hamlets of Phu Bai I and Phu Bai II utilizing trails which pass vicinity (YD 895114) and (YD 915108) to collect rice and food supplies and spread propaganda. The unit requested the residents of the two (2) hamlets to buy and store food supplies for the VC and informed the residents that all American soldiers would soon leave Vietnam and return to the USA, whereupon a coalition government would be formed in South Vietnam which would include the VC. (Ref: 204th MID, AVII, Rpt #XXIV-342-1-69, dtd 8 Dec 69) (Eval: F-6).

c. Quang Nam.

(1) On 14 November 1969, elements of the 1st ROK Marine Brigade operating in the vicinity of (BT 012590) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Propaganda leaflet, in the form of a letter, dated 11 November 1969, unsigned, alleged to have been prepared by a group of traders and industrialists from Hoi An (City, Quang Da Special Zone, Region 5), stating that they support the reconciliation for peace. This letter was addressed to unidentified individuals (possibly to the residents of Hoi An City) and calls upon these individuals to rise up against the GVN tax increase and to seek a reconciliation for peace.

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(Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1190-69, dtd 4 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

(2) In Front 4 a rallier, (Captain Tran BE) of 20 November 1969 identified himself as the Political Officer, 2nd Battalion, 36th NVA Regiment, Front 4. The source stated that in October, Front 4 issued a directive instructing the 36th Regiment to choose 200 healthy men from the rank of Sgt to Pvt to send to the district forces of Duy Xuyen and Dien Ban District. Ninety were transferred on 15 October 1969. The source further stated that since last December the VC have been taking cadre from the Provincial Party Committee down to the Village Party Committee level and sending them to school in North Vietnam. The schooling encompasses the following areas: economics, finance, banking, agriculture, security and administration. Children ages 12-17 of the cadre from province to village level are also sent to North Vietnam for communist indoctrination. Other sources have reported on personnel training in North Vietnam for eventual return to RVN as agents of the North. This reported training is another step in strengthening the VCI in order to have a strong, viable base for a possible future political settlement and supplements the previously reported "purification" of the VCI. The augmentation of district forces with NVA elements is another indicator of an attempt to transform the present conflict into a peoples guerrilla war and along with the reported training, indicates that while the NVA/VC are preparing for a possible future political settlement, they are continuing with military plans which will give the impression of a never ending war. (Ref: J-2 MACV DISUM 345-69 from 100600 to 110600 Dec 69) (Unrated).

(3) On 27 November 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division while operating vicinity (AT 878524) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Letter, dated 10 Nov 1969, from Van LUAT of LBN 6714 Ap Thai (Political Staff Section, Front 4 (QDSZ), sent to THAO and KIM, suggests that addressees gather military proselyting cells of Area B (nfi) to plan for military proselyting activities to be conducted on Christmas Day and New Year's Day. Specifically, addressees should set up four or five information stations decorated with posters and Christmas trees in Area B where the enemy usually conducts search and sweep operations.

LUAT further suggests addressees to come to each village to guide local cadre in conducting propaganda and military proselyting activities. (Ref: CDEC Log No 12-1141-69) (Eval: B-3).

(4) On 27 November 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division while operating vicinity (AT 878524) discovered an enemy document

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which disclosed the following information:

Directive, undated, signed by Tran ngoc TRAC for the Commanding Officer, LBN 6414 Ap Thai aka Unit 70B (Political Staff Section, Front 4, QDSZ, MR 5), sent to Q.83 Anh Dung (possibly Dai Loc (D) Unit, QDSZ), concerns the performance of military and enemy proselyting missions during Christmas and the 1970 New Year's Day.

Document states that after suffering successive defeats, the Americans are being forced to pull out of SVN. They will very slowly withdraw from SVN while implementing their plan for de-Americanisation of the war.

The withdrawal of US troops and the worldwide anti-war movement seriously affected the morale of the Americans and their puppets (RVNAF). They expressed anti-war feelings and hope for restoration of peace. Christmas and the 1970 New Year's Day, therefore, are favorable opportunities for friendly (VC/NVA) cadre to perform military and enemy proselyting.

Document continues that upon receiving this directive, subordinate units were to prepare immediately for this military proselyting mission. They were to deploy military proselyting personnel and prepare leaflets and posters in English and Vietnamese. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1341-69, dtd 7 Dec 1969). (Eval: B-3).

(5) A US MI source reported that on 4 December 1969, approximately 200 NVA from the 9th Bn (AKA: 103rd NVA Bn), 31st NVA Regiment, were deployed in the vicinity of Khuong My #2 (H) (AT 914692) and Khuong My #3 (H) (AT 915678). The mission of this unit is to propagandize the people (nfi). They are awaiting orders to conduct a ground attack which will be in conjunction with a general uprising, as occurred in 1968. They advised the people to dig more underground trenches.

Source believed that their true intent was to launch rockets into military targets and Danang AB. No date was indicated regarding when the anticipated attack was to occur. (Ref: OSI DET 5003, Rpt #12-12, dtd 5 Dec 69) (Eval: F-3).

(6) A US MI source reported that on 5 December 1969 a VC political meeting was held in vicinity (AT 914818), some 415 meters east northeast of Quang Nam (1) (H), Hoa Loc (V). Tran Van DANG, secretary of the VC district level committee presided over the meeting. Approximately 30 individuals attended the meeting, all members of VC

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village and district political committees. Discussion centered on enhancing the political struggle against GVN/US forces. Village and district level political cadre must re-initiate the political programs of the PRG/NLF, encouraging civilian and military proselyting of GVN/ARVN cadre. VC cadre and sympathizers must increase their efforts to collect food and supplies to support Main Force VC/NVA military units for the coming Spring Campaign, to be known as the Revolutionary Spring Campaign. (Ref: OSI DET 5003, Danang AB, DRAFT DDIER 10-20, dtd 8 Dec 69) (Eval: F-2).

(7) A US MI source reported that at approximately 0100 hours, 7 December 1969, twenty (20) armed VC and North Vietnamese soldiers entered Nui Kim Son (H) vicinity (BT 074704), Hoa Long (V), via the market place vicinity (BT 072703). Six (6) men entered the home of Huynh SAI and Huynh thi DAY, and gathered the family in one room. They stayed inside the house approximately fifteen (15) minutes during which time they spoke of being People's Revolutionary Party members who had come to Nui Kim Son to fight the Marines and ARVN forces (nfi) and talk to the people. They boasted that they had just left Huynh Ba TRINH's (Hoa Hai Village Chief) store vicinity (BT 072703) and would return again (nfi) in hopes of finding him. The six men, four of whom spoke in a North Vietnamese dialect and two in the local dialect then departed the house. Outside the SAI home they joined with others who were deployed along Route #538, from vicinity (BT 072702) to (BT 072703) and proceeded to move south along Route #538. (Ref: 5 CIT, Rpt #126/69, dtd 8 Dec 69). (Unrated).

d. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 30 November 1969, elements of the US Army Americal Division operating in the vicinity (BS 511866) discovered two (2) documents containing the following information:

A resolution, dated 22 August 1969, signed by Minh FUC for H.13 (possibly Military Proselyting Section, Binh Son (D), Quang Ngai (P), Region 5), concerns the performance of military proselyting missions.

The document states that in conjunction with the conduct of military and political activities, military proselyting tasks must be performed successively from October to December 1969 to destroy the morale of the enemy (GVN) local and para-military forces.

Specifically, in September and October 1969, or the 2nd climaxing phase of activities, efforts should be made to plant agents in 30% of the enemy para-military units and 50% in his People's Self Defense organizations, and activate one B (platoon) of (assault) youths

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in each of the following ten villages: Binh Chau, Binh Hiep, Binh Long, Binh Chanh, Binh Thanh, Binh Tri, Binh Thoi, Binh Chuong, Binh Nguyen, and Binh Thuan (Binh Son (D), Quang Ngai (P)).

Then during the 3rd phase of activities, military proselyting cadre should seek a way to proselyte the puppet (RVNAF) officers and American troops by means of proselyting letters, posters and leaflets.

The military proselyting cadre in charge should promote the people's political struggle movement and kindle troop revolts in the puppet (RVNAF) units.

The document further reveals that during the 2nd and 3rd climaxing phases of activities, each of the above villages should conduct one or two attacks to kill 10 to 20 enemy troops, kill two or three tyrants, and employ 50 to 100 key cadre to bring the hamlet and village military proselyting movement to the next higher step.

The second document, a letter dated 8 November (1969), from Tri to Tuc and cadre of (possibly Binh Son) district Party Committee, (Quang Ngai (P)), asks addressees to prepare a plan for conducting military actions, speeding up political struggles and military proselyting activities.

Tri also suggests that addressees prepare for the recruitment of party members, performance of finance-economy tasks, and report on results obtained in the destruction of GVN administrative machinery and control of the people in Binh Trung (V) (Binh Son District).

TRI further asks addressee to send him biographical data on all cadre and members of villages prior to 30 November (1969). (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 1201618-69, dtd 10 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

(2) On 30 November 1969 elements of the US Army Americal Division operating in the vicinity (BS 511866) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Circular, number 120/VP/TOC, dated 11 November 1969, signed by Vo KY for HQ3.VII (possibly Organization Section, Binh Son (D)) pertains to the selection of teenagers below 14 years of age to send to North Vietnam for training. Subordinate villages were requested to submit a list of the prospective students to HQ3.VII prior to 15 November 1969 for approval before being sent to the Province (Organization Agency). The village (organization) agencies were instructed to select the prospective students carefully, using the basic criterion that they be children of cadre, soldiers, or war victims. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1517-69, dtd 9 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

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(3) A US MI source reported on 1 December 1969, that Military Region 5 recently issued a "Common Order" to hamlet, village, district, and province level VC under its jurisdiction. The order stated in substance that every village will select 100 "good men" to maintain files and records of GVN cadre who were accepting bribes, involved in extra-marital love affairs, gambled, stole property from the people and who worked for US forces (nfi). The files will also contain the following information:

Dates of US airstrikes that kill innocent people and destroy their homes.

Locations of US forces.

Date and place US and Korean forces stole food and property from the people.

The order also stated that the files will be detailed and all files will be sent to the Provincial office by December 1969 and then to the VC Central Office (nfi) not later than 20 December 1969. The VC will use these files to propagandize people to denounce and oppose US and ARVN forces. The VC will also contact religious groups and political organizations (nfi) to urge them to set up a movement to oppose US forces in South Vietnam for the following reasons:

US forces kill innocent people.

US forces have caused prices in South Vietnam to become excessively high.

US forces have destroyed many crops and forests by defoliation. (Ref: Det D, 1st MI Bn., 525th MI Gp, Rpt #1/A/EX/0270/69, dtd 2 Dec 69) (Eval: F-3).

5. TERROR. Acts of terrorism reported during the past week, including late reports of incidents occurring during the previous week, revealed an increase in terrorist activity during each of the past two weeks: Thirty-three (33) incidents were reported, resulting in twenty-seven (27) civilians killed, forty-eight (48) wounded, one (1) abducted, and thirty-six (36) dwellings destroyed/damaged. Included, were fourteen (14) late reports consisting of sixteen (16) civilians killed, nine (9) wounded, no abductions, and twenty-five (25) dwellings destroyed/damaged. Targetting continued to reflect enemy efforts to disrupt, destroy, intimidate, and/or discredit village and hamlet level pacification and security assets. Details of terrorist activities are listed in Appendix 1.

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6. MISCELLANEOUS.a. Thua Thien.

(1) A US MI source reported that during the period 27-29 November 1969, approximately 60 personnel attended a meeting convened by the Regional Committee of the Southern Thua Thien Front. The meeting was held at the Van Linh mountain pass vicinity (YD 980800). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss plans and problems of the Southern Thua Thien Front. It was attended by village, district, provincial, regional committee members, and high-ranking officers of the 4th and 5th Regiments. The results of the meeting were as follows: The situation in Phu Vang, Phu Thu, Huong Thuy, Vinh Loc and Phu Loc Districts is unfavorable due to increased pacification efforts of the GVN. Main Force and Regular Force units have been prevented from moving into the plains areas because commo-liaison lines have often been cut. All levels of personnel in Thua Thien (P) have been ordered to improve their situation by performance on the battlefield during the month of December 1969. The 4th Regiment was assigned to operate in Phu Thu and Phu Loc districts. The 5th Regiment was assigned to operate in Huong Thuy and Phu Vang districts. Attacks will be made on populous areas in order to collect food, supplies, money, and to recruit troops. Attacks on main troop concentrations will be avoided. Isolated posts will be shelled in order to confuse ARVN forces (nfi). (Ref: DET B, 1st MI BN., 525th MI GP, Rpt #1/B/CX/1279/69, dtd 6 Dec 69). (Eval: B-2).

(2) A US MI source reported that during 29-30 November 1969, there was a meeting of the Quang Dien (D) Committee vicinity (YD 586398). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the economic situation in Quang Dien (D) and how it would have to be accelerated during the months of December 1969 and January 1970. Nguyen HTT said that although village cadre had been making a great effort to fulfill their economic mission, the ARVN units in the area had disrupted most of their accomplishments. During the next two (2) months, the village and hamlet cadre will have to accelerate the economic situation by appealing to families to have their children follow the VC to buy rice, and send cadre to GVN hamlets and villages as stay behind agents. HUY ordered village cadre to assign personnel to conduct liaison with District economic organizations to receive money. HUY did not mention it publicly, but the District Committee has 200,000 VN in brand new 500\$VN bills. (Ref: DET B, 1st MI BN., 525th MI GP, Rpt. #1/B/CX/1276/69, dtd 5 Dec 69). (Eval: F-3).

(3) On 4 December 1969, a US MI source reported the following information:

On 3 December, approximately 50 personnel of an Intelligence/

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Reconnaissance Company of the Hue City Committee Front were deployed vicinity (YD 6515). This company was part of an Intelligence/Reconnaissance Battalion that the Hue City Committee formed in November 1969. There is a commo-liaison route from Huong Tra to the above mentioned location. The mission of the company is to defend the commo-liaison route and operate in inhabited areas so that more commo-liaison routes can be formed. The routes are to extend from the Huong Tra mountain area to the plains area for main and regional forces to use during the Winter-Spring campaign. (Ref: Det B, 1st MI Bn., 525th MI Gp Rpt #1/B/CX/1278/69 dtd 5 Dec 69) (Eval: C-6).

Quang Nam.

(1) A US MI source report of 1 December 1969 stated that the VC of Quang Da Special Zone had ordered VC agencies to establish Young Boys Associations in GVN controlled areas. The mission of the Young Boys Association is to study and learn about the Revolution, resist American troops, collect information, ammunition, and lay mines and explosives to sabotage US and GVN units. (Ref: Hieu Duc DIOCC Rpt #2175, dtd 5 Dec 69) (Eval: C-3).

(2) On 4 December 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division operating in the vicinity (AT 957592) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Plan, incomplete and unsigned, prepared by an (unidentified) individual of Unit Ah6, (Dien Van (V), Dien Ban District, QDSZ), outlines the following missions to be carried out during the period 25 October to 25 November 1969: Instill a firm determination among (VC) cadre and combatants to defeat the (FWMAF/RVNAF) Chieu Hoi program; activate one A (possibly squad) of guerrillas for each hamlet with three secret guerrilla teams; promote guerrilla warfare with the participation of the young and old; and conduct political indoctrination courses. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1529-69, dtd 9 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

(3) A US MI source reported that on 7 December 1969, approximately 20 VC of the Q.84th Local Force Company were located vicinity (AT 947715), Thach Nham (H), (AT 925729) Thai Lai (H) and (AT 919766) Khe Lam (H). The VC were dressed in black uniforms similar to RD cadre attire. Their mission was to recruit South Vietnamese to act as informers and guides for the Main Force VC/NVA troops infiltrating the area in preparation for the Winter Campaign. (Ref: OSI DET 5003, Rpt #12-19, dtd 8 Dec 69) (Eval: F-3).

c. Quang Ngai.

(1) A US MI source reported that on 26 November 1969, the

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137th VC Agency issued an order to the Son Trung (AKA: Tinh) VC Guerrilla Unit at Phuoc Loc (H) vicinity (BS 553770), Son Loc (V), Son Tinh (D). Significant extracts of the order are as follows:

(a) The VC have attempted to execute the following three (3) missions in Son Tinh (D) since September 1969:

Recapture three (3) GVN pacification base areas in Eastern Son Tinh (D) beginning in September 1969.

Conduct legal and illegal demonstrations (nfi),

Destroy the Tra Khuc Bridge and infiltrate Quang Ngai City.

(b) The new orders. Currently they were ordered to attempt to accomplish the following tasks:

Between 1 and 29 December 1969, VC cadre members would try to induce relatives of soldiers in ARVN units to join anti-war demonstrations (nfi) and carry out troop proselyting missions against RF and PF members.

Guerrilla units (nfi) in eastern Son Tinh (D) would be strengthened by other guerrilla units (nfi) in western Son Tinh (D) in order to harass GVN pacification areas (nfi) in eastern Son Tinh (D) and re-occupy the coastal area.

(c) Kidnap and assassinate GVN officials and destroy Highway 1 between Binh Son and (other area not specified). Destroy various refugee camps (nfi). (Ref: DET D, 1st MI BN., 525th MI Gp, Rpt #1/B/OX/1515/69, dtd 2 Dec 1969) (Eval: C-3).

(2) A US MI source reported that on 27 November 1969, the Quang Ngai Provincial Committee held an unscheduled meeting in the vicinity of Lang Chui (H), (BS 380390), Ba Tra (V), Ba To (D). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the "X23" high stage of the offensive that was to take place in South Vietnam. Present at the meeting were Bui Tan HONG, a Provincial Committee member and chairman of the meeting; Hong VAN, assistant chairman of the Provincial Liberation Front; Dinh OANH, Provincial Military Committee member and in charge of the four Montagnard Districts; Nguyen thi CHAU (AKA: KY), Provincial Woman Committee member; CAO, Provincial troop Proselyting member; Dinh MAI, Provincial Committee member in charge of Ba To (D); and an unidentified North Vietnamese cadreman.

The main purpose of the meeting was to discuss the "X-23" high stage of the offensive which was to begin during the first part of December 1969 (nfi). This offensive was to be conducted throughout

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South Vietnam and would announce a VC-SVNRPG (nfi). Bui Tan HONG stated that the "main mission" of the "X-23" high stage was troop proselyting activities (nfi). The VC planned to execute this offensive at all costs (nfi). (Ref: DET D, 1st MI BN, Quang Ngai, Rpt #1/B/DX/1517/69, dtd 1 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

(3) On 30 November 1969, elements of the US Army Americal Division operating in the vicinity (BS 511866) discovered a document containing the following information:

Circular, number 140/VP, dated 18 July 1969, signed by Thanh Hai for T.866 (Military Proselyting Section, Quang Ngai Province, Region 5), contains the criteria for proselyting work to be attained during the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd phase of actions from August 1969 to December 1969. The proselyting mission consists of planting secret agents in the RVNAF units and para-military forces and persuading them to turn their weapons against the CVN. Efforts should also be focused on proselyting US servicemen to keep troops stationary and renounce combat. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1649-69, dtd 11 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

(4) On 30 November 1969 elements of the US Americal Division operating in the vicinity of (BS 511866) discovered an enemy document which disclosed the following information:

Circular, number 275/VP, dated 26 October 1969, signed by Thanh Tri for HOI VII (possibly Party Current Affairs Committee, eastern area, Binh Son District, Region 5), addressed to various C (Village Party Chapters) and HO9, directs addressees to motivate members of the Women's Associations to increase their propaganda efforts among the villagers to ensure the success of the (1970) Tet fund drive for guerrillas. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1546-69, 10 December 1969) (Eval: B-3).

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 50-69

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Thua Thien	5Dec69 (Late Entry)	(CNA)	VC fired three (3) B-40 rocket rounds into a refugee camp (nfi) in Phu Loc (D), resulting in one (1) civilian killed and one house destroyed.
	5Dec69 (Late Entry)	(YD 625306)	Approximately eight (8) VC entered An Lo (H) and damaged one (1) house (nfi).
	7Dec69	(ZD 143007)	Villagers reported to CAP 3-2-5 that 20 VC entered Nuoc Ngat (H) and fired SA and RPG's into an area they thought was occupied by the CAP, resulting in one (1) civilian (nfi) killed.
	8Dec69	(YD 798192)	Seven (7) VC employing RPGs and satchel charges attacked Thuy Duong (V) Headquarters, wounding one (1) civilian.
Quang Nam	3Dec69 (Late Entry)	(AT 830930)	VC attacked Khuong Thuong (H) killing two (2) civilians (nfi).
	3Dec69 (Late Entry)	(BT 030507)	Xuyen Hiep Refugee Camp received VC mortar fire, resulting in one (1) civilian killed and another wounded.
	5Dec69 (Late Entry)	(ZC 130555)	One (1) Vietnamese civilian while working in a rice paddy near Hoang Phuoc Bac #1 (H) was assassinated by two (2) VC. This individual had previously given information (nfi) to the Thuong Duc S-2.

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Nam	6Dec69 (Late Entry)	(AT 889479)	A VC mortar attack on Xuyen Phu (V) resulted in three (3) civilians killed, one (1) wounded and 22 homes destroyed.
	7Dec69	(BT 065715)	At approximately 0230 hours, two VC abducted Huynh DU from his home. While departing the area, the VC were heard to say they were looking for a "Mr. CHIM" (nfi) who had previously been captured by them but had escaped. DU, a fisherman all his life, lived until 1967 in Thanh Thuy (V), at which time he moved to Hoa Long (V). The move to Hoa Long (V) was predicated by DU's son, Huynh LIN, allegedly a former Viet Cong who rallied to GVN forces in 1967. DU's eldest son, Huynh LUONG, is a member of the 2nd ARVN Division.
	7Dec69	(BT 065587)	VC mortar fire wounded two (2) civilians of Vinh Xuong (V) (nfi).
	7Dec69	(BT 062590)	One B-40 rocket round received in the vicinity of the 27th PF Platoon's night defensive position at Dong Luy Tay (H) resulted in one (1) civilian killed and two (2) wounded.
	7Dec69	(BT 063589)	CAP 2-3-6 dispatched a patrol to aid Vietnamese civilians who had reportedly walked into a VC ambush. The patrol found two (2) civilians killed and three (3) wounded.

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
	9Dec69	(CNA)	Two (2) unidentified Vietnamese threw an M-26 grenade into the passenger section of a jeep being driven by a U.S. Army captain on Bach Dang Street, Danang City at 2015. The captain jumped clear of the jeep, which continued on approximately 100 meters and came to rest in the Danang River. The captain suffered only minor bruises and abrasions.
	10Dec69	(BT 115475)	Three rounds of mortar fire were received in the vicinity of the 143rd PF Platoon's defensive position at Xuan My #2(H). The hamlet chief was killed.
	10Dec69	(BT 133447)	Two (2) PPs of the 147th PF Platoon, while walking along Route #535 near Xuan Lu #3 (H), received fire from an unknown number of VC. One (1) civilian who was nearby was wounded.
	11Dec69	(AT 899472)	The 116th RF Company while in perimeter defense at My Son #1 (H) received SAF and AWF from an unknown size enemy force, resulting in the destruction of three (3) houses.
	11Dec69	(BT 165571)	An unknown size enemy force entered Thanh Nam (H) and threw two (2) grenades inside a house, wounding five (5) civilians. The house was destroyed.
Quang Tin	7Dec69	(BT 266186)	An USEF fired one (1) M-79 round at a CAP unit while a number of civilians were in the vicinity. One (1) civilian was wounded.
	7Dec69	(BT 210224)	VC fired five (5) 122mm rockets into the vicinity of (BT 210224), resulting in five (5) civilians wounded and two (2) houses destroyed.

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Tin	8Dec69	(BT 300280)	CAP 1-1-7, acting on information received from villagers, discovered that an unknown type of SFD had been detonated in the office of the hamlet chief of Vinh Binh (H). The hamlet chief and one (1) other civilian were wounded. A further check disclosed the presence of an AT mine rigged as a booby trap in the same office.
	8Dec69	(BT 307218)	The VC fired three (3) rounds of 122mm rocket fire into Tam Ky City, wounding three (3) civilians.
	8Dec69	(BT 310230)	Tam Ky City received five (5) rounds of 122mm rocket fire, resulting in five (5) civilians wounded and five (5) houses destroyed.
Quang Ngai	5Dec69 (Late Entry)	(BS 533520)	A VC force of approximately fifty (50) men attacked the Minh Long (D) Headquarters with small arms, RPGs, hand grenades and 82mm mortars, killing one (1) civilian and wounding four (4).
	5Dec69 (Late Entry)	(BS 769568)	Three (3) local civilians were killed by an unknown type VC mine. They were natives of Dam Thuy Nam (H).
	5Dec69 (Late Entry)	(BS 665778)	VC entered Tra Son (H) and assassinated one (1) member of the Census Grievance Cadre (nfi).
	6Dec69 (Late Entry)	(BS 715758)	VC entered An Dao (H) and wounded one (1) civilian (nfi).
	6Dec69 (Late Entry)	(BS 804381)	VC threw a satchel charge into a PF's house, resulting in two (2) children wounded. The house was 50% destroyed.

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Ngai	6Dec69 (Late Entry)	(BS 720650)	VC fired six (6) rounds of 60mm mortar fire into the 101st PF Platoon's position. One village official (nfi) was killed.
	6Dec69 (Late Entry)	(BS 648657)	VC fired two (2) rounds of 60mm mortar fire into the 98th PF Platoon's position, killing one (1) civilian (nfi).
	6Dec69 (Late Entry)	(BS 618845)	VC killed a civilian (nfi).
	7Dec69	(BS 795406)	A three (3) wheeled vehicle while traveling on Highway QL-1, was destroyed by an undetermined type explosive device. Four (4) civilians were killed.
	8Dec69	(BS 769533)	A Vietnamese female civilian was wounded when she stepped on a VC mine.
	10Dec69	(BS 759822)	Civilians detonated an undetermined type mine, resulting in two (2) killed and eight (8) wounded.

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ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 50-69

1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY.

a. There were 43 long range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 7 December 1969. These long range patrols reported 57 sightings totaling approximately 476 enemy. Recon team contacts and air and artillery strikes called in response to enemy sightings resulted in 57 enemy KIA during the reporting period.

b. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion teams patrolling the 1st Marine Division AO observed approximately 458 enemy during the reporting period. Artillery fire missions called by the teams resulted in 45 enemy KIA. The majority of the enemy sightings occurred in the Que Son Mountain - An Hoa area. The enemy were moving in no discernible pattern.

c. The 3rd Force Reconnaissance Company on 13 December 1969 attempted insert into the A Shau Valley. Upon entering recon zone the insert helo received 12.7mm fire from vicinity YC 439971. The helo crashed and burned. The helo crew and recon team members were extracted with minor injuries.

d. Weather hampered long range reconnaissance operations during this reporting period. The 101st Airborne Division (AM) Ranger teams operated in the A Shau and Da Krong Valley areas without significant enemy sightings or contacts. The 1st Infantry Brigade 5th Infantry Division (Mech) Ranger teams operating near the DMZ in the vicinity of Con Thien also had no significant sightings or contacts.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY.

a. In the 101st Airborne Division (AM) DMZ area sensors detected 33 targets during this reporting period. Two hundred twenty-two rounds of 175mm and 20 rounds of eight inch artillery were fired in response with negative BDA. The region north of the Rockpile has indicated heavy sensor detected activity this reporting period.

b. Sensors located out of the DMZ in the 101st Airborne Division (AM) area detected 54 targets this reporting period. One hundred ninety-five rounds of 175mm, eight rounds of eight inch, 32 rounds of 105mm, and 11 rounds of 155mm artillery and four rounds of 81mm mortar were fired in response with negative BDA. Sensors located in the Khe Sanh area were extremely active this reporting period.

c. In the 1st Infantry Brigade 5th Infantry Division (Mech) DMZ area sensors detected 92 targets this reporting period. Two hundred sixty-seven rounds of 175mm, 286 rounds of eight inch, 54 rounds of 155mm, and 180 rounds of 105mm artillery were fired in response with negative BDA.

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d. Sensors located out of the DMZ in the 1st Infantry Brigade 5th Infantry Division (Mech) area detected nine targets this reporting period. Sixteen rounds of 175mm, 62 rounds of 155mm, and 228 rounds of 105mm artillery were fired in response with negative BDA.

e. Radio frequency and line sensors in the 1st Marine Division AO detected 29 targets this reporting period. Sixteen fire missions consisting of 179 rounds of artillery, 135 rounds of 81mm mortar, and eight rounds of 90mm were called. Enemy activity during this reporting period remained at a low level.

f. Sensors in the Americal Division AO detected 37 targets this reporting period. Twenty fire missions consisting of 195 rounds of artillery were fired in response. Reacting to sensor detections, B 1/6 Infantry assaulted into the area (vicinity BT 415079) after a VR had spotted four personnel. Three personnel were detained. Sensor activity increased in all sensor fields this reporting period.

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CO MCB 7 CHL RVN	1
CTG 76.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTF 115	1
7TH AIR FORCE (IGS) EDOC	1
45TH ENGR GRP	1
620TH TCS APO 96203	1
366TH AIR SEC SQD, USAF	2
620TH TSC	1
SPO-SEC CMD QHN RVN	1

C. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (WITHIN HQ, III MAF)

CORDS/PHOENIX Division	7
FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP CofS, PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	43
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (C/O G-3)	2
2D ROKMC HDE LIAISON OFFICER	1
PSYOPS	5
1ST RADIO BN	11
HORN DASC	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO	1
FORCE PMO	

D. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

CO 1ST MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 3RD MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 2ND CAG	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO 7TH COMM BN	1
HQ 212TH CMBT AVN BN	6
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
CTG 115.1	1
CCN	1
USNAD	1
DIR CAP	1
7TH PSYOP BN	1
1ST FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
3RD FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
CO MCB 74	1

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
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23 December 1969



GROUP - 4
 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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HQ III MAF, G-2
 DANANG, RVN
 23 December 1969
 Ser: 0139069

PERINTREP 51-69

Period covered: 140001H - 202400H December 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet WE 40-16, ND 48-13
 ND 48-4, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. Indications of enemy activity declined sharply last week, reflecting the generally quiet conditions which prevailed over ICTZ. There were 124 enemy initiated incidents, the lowest one-week total recorded by III MAF since January of 1967. Enemy KIA's were down to 494, a decrease of 222 from last week. Incoming declined to 170, and there was a total of 62 PW's taken (seven NVA and 55 VC), nine less than last week. Hoi Chanhs also decreased from 181 to 113, a drop of 68. There was a substantial increase in the amount of rice captured, with 40 tons recorded, an increase of 21 tons over last week's total.

VC/VCi counterintelligence related activities followed the pattern of the past several weeks. Reported enemy terrorist activity dropped to an extremely low level from the moderately low levels of the previous weeks. Emphasis on food collection and soliciting of political, financial, materiel, and physical support from the people continues to occupy most of the VC/VCi cadre's time.

Reports continue to indicate enemy efforts to solicit popular participation for a general uprising in conjunction with a planned large scale, all-out offensive. Other reports continue to reflect efforts toward long-range goals and preparations for a prolonged struggle. While the latter of these two indicators is more consistent with enemy capabilities, too many captured documents, rallier, PW and source reports reflect enemy intentions of a large scale offensive, for it not to have some degree of validity. In the event such an effort failed, the enemy would then most likely pursue the alternate course of a protracted struggle in conjunction with a so-called people's guerrilla war.

a. QUANG TRI (P). Action in QUANG TRI Province was extremely light during the reporting period, concentrated in the northeastern quadrant of the province. On 13 December 12 kilometers north northeast of QUANG TRI City (YD 403633) the 911th RF Company on a search operation engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in seven enemy killed and six PW's

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captured. Initial interrogation has identified three of the PW's as the Political Officer, Executive Officer, and Medical Officer of the C.59 LF Company. This is the first significant ground contact in the northern lowlands in over six months and may indicate that local forces are expanding their strength in QUANG TRI Province. In a contact on 15 December, an ARVN reconnaissance squad was fired upon by an unknown size enemy force near the DMZ. The reconnaissance squad and a reaction force engaged the enemy resulting in 20 KIA and no friendly casualties. A search of the area uncovered a substantial cache of munitions and several weapons.

On the 17th, a company of the 1/77 Armor received five to eight rounds of 140mm rocket fire, five kilometers south of CON THIEN (YD 135-645) resulting in negative casualties or damage. The attacks were renewed on the 19th when the same location was hit by four more 140mm rockets, again resulting in negative casualties or damage. Then, on the night of the 19th, a platoon from 1/01st was ambushed by an estimated enemy platoon three kilometers west southwest of CUA VIET (YD 303683), resulting in moderate friendly casualties.

The enemy continues to repeat his prior patterns of activity as he attempts to harass friendly forces with attacks by fire in the central and eastern DMZ area while continuing reconnaissance activities and increased logistics movement in western QUANG TRI Province.

b. THUA THIEN (P). Overt enemy action was again almost non-existent in THUA THIEN Province, a trend that has lasted through much of the Fall.

There are increasing signs of logistical movement in the western portion of the province, indicating that the enemy may soon attempt large scale resupply of units with materiel from stockpiles in base areas along the Laotian border.

c. QUANG NAM (P). Activity in QUANG NAM Province was at a very low level during most of the week. Although the enemy is continuing his rice gathering efforts, they seems to have dropped off in intensity. This may be partially attributed to the fact that the major seasonal rice harvest has been completed in the area. However, allied forces continued to find significant caches of rice throughout the southeastern quadrant of QUANG NAM, generally in the lowlands surrounding the QUE SON Mountains. The largest cache was uncovered on 16 December when elements of the 2d ROKMC Brigade discovered 13 tons of rice in an underground bunker complex 10 kilometers southwest of HOI AN (BT 071479).

Other actions during the week were restricted to meeting engagements and artillery fire mission against small groups of the enemy.

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A significant indicator of probable increased enemy activity appeared late in the week on the 19th, when elements of the 26th Marines sighted approximately 150 enemy moving seven kilometers southwest of the 1st Marine Division CP (AT 906715). They were engaged by artillery with unknown results. During the same time frame, a CAP team and PF platoon ambushed a group of five VC to the southwest killing four and capturing one, identified as being from the 31st Regiment, Front 4. It is believed that these men were guides sent to lead the main force. Then, on the evening of the 20th, an agent reported (F-2) another 100 NVA dispersed in the same general area as the sighting of the 150 man force the previous night. It should be noted that the 31st NVA Regiment has long been targeted against the 1st Marine Division CP.

d. QUANG TIN (P). The pattern of light activity including scattered attacks by fire and contacts with small groups of enemy continued in QUANG TIN Province as elsewhere in ICTZ.

On the 14th, while on a search and clear mission 13 kilometers west southwest of HAWK HILL (BT 112308) a company from the 1/1 Cavalry received heavy RR fire and RPG rounds resulting in light friendly casualties and damage. On the same day, A/3-21st discovered a cache of three tons of rice five kilometers southeast of QUE SON (BT 063305) and the 1/5 ARVN 11 kilometers southeast of AN HOA (BT 195445) engaged an unknown size enemy force killing five enemy with no friendly casualties. Another six tons of rice were discovered by elements of the 21st Infantry approximately five kilometers southeast of QUE SON (BT 0603) in two separate caches on 15 December.

There are indications that the enemy considers northeastern QUANG NGAI Province as a major source of supply for rice which may increase in importance as the DUY XUYEN/QUE SON/THANG BINH areas to the north become increasingly under friendly control.

e. QUANG NGAI (P). Activity in QUANG NGAI Province was almost a copy of last week's events, as sporadic meeting engagements accounted for small tolls of enemy dead and negligible friendly casualties.

On the 14th, the 6th ARVN Reconnaissance Company contacted an unknown size enemy force 11 kilometers northeast of QUANG NGAI City (BS 730829) resulting in four enemy killed and light friendly casualties. The following day, another ARVN contact 10 kilometers northeast of HA THANH (BS 493756) resulted in seven enemy killed with light friendly casualties.

On 16 December, an RF Company engaged an unknown size enemy force six kilometers southeast of MO DUC (BS 767508) killing five of the enemy with no friendly casualties, while later in the week on the 19th, 2/4

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ARVN accounted for eight more kills in a meeting engagement four and one-half kilometers northeast of MO DUC (BS 763573).

f. ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. The low level of activity recorded in ICTZ during the past week should not be interpreted as a major change in the enemy's avowed determination to press forward with his Winter-Spring Campaign. However, his continued heavy rice losses in SICTZ may have caused him to scale down his efforts and to adjust his future tactical plans. The increased enemy movement late in the week in QUANG NAM Province indicates that we can still expect an effort on his part to create a high point of offensive action to accomplish the second phase of his campaign. Increased activity in base areas along the Laotian border are indicative of imminent attempts to conduct large scale logistics movements to aid units in ICTZ in preparation for the final phase of the current, but as yet ineffective offensive. Continued substantial VCI neutralizations and failure to implement announced offensives indicate that the enemy is experiencing considerable difficulty in achieving his desired high points of offensive action as aggressive allied operations keep him off balance. The coming week should see a continuation of the sporadic activity that has characterized the last several reporting periods, including a good possibility of increased attacks by fire and sapper attacks.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD. Enemy initiated ground incidents decreased from 230 to 123 for the week of 14-20 December 1969. These incidents consisted of four attacks by fire, 60 harassing fire incidents, 41 mining and booby trap incidents, two hamlet harassment incidents, no assassination incidents, no espionage incidents, no kidnapping incidents, 14 propaganda incidents, and two sabotage incidents.

a. Strengths and Dispositions. Annex A.

b. Order of Battle. Annex A.

c. Reserves and Reinforcements. Annex A.

d. - g. Negative

h. Air Defense. AA fire decreased from 65 to 57 incidents for the reporting period and 20 aircraft sustained hits.

i. - j. Negative

k. Artillery, Rockets, Mortars. The following is a compilation of incoming fire reported in ICTZ during the week of 14-20 December 1969:

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<u>Type</u>	<u>Extended</u>
Unk Cal Mortar	17
60mm Mortar	36
82mm Mortar	110
122mm Rocket	4
140mm Rocket	3
Total	170

1. - q. Negativer. Reconnaissance and Sensor Activity. Annex D.s. Captured Enemy Caches

(1) The following significant enemy caches were captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 14-20 December 1969:

(a) 14 December: G/2/5 Marines discovered a cache seven kilometers west of LIBERTY Bridge (AT 874513) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
6,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This rice cache was located on high ground around a village and was in 15 earthen vats buried in the ground. The rice was evacuated to AN HOA.

(b) 14 December: The 2d ROKMC Brigade captured a grouping of caches nine kilometers southwest of HOI AN (BT 070485 - 092479) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
7,200 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This rice cache was found in clay pots buried in the ground. No further information was available on this cache.

(c) 14 December: A/3-21st of the 196th Brigade, five kilometers southeast of QUE SON (BT 003305) discovered a cache as indicated below:

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
6,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This rice was lying loose in the false floor of a hut. The rice was evacuated to LZ CENTER.

(d) 15 December: A/3-21st, 196th Brigade discovered a cache five kilometers southeast of QUE SON (BT 063303) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
6,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This rice was stored in the false floor of a hut. The rice was evacuated to HOI LOC for distribution.

(e) 15 December: 2/5 Marines found a cache seven kilometers southwest of LIBERTY Bridge (AT 866508) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
4,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This rice was unhusked and stored in 20 earthen jars buried in the ground around a hut. The rice was evacuated to AN HOA for disposition.

(f) 15 December: The 2d Battalion, 2d ROKMC Brigade found two co-located caches nine kilometers southwest of HOI AN (BT 072431) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
10,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This rice was stored in earthen jars buried in the ground. The rice will be given to the Civic Action Program.

(g) 10 December: The 2d Battalion, 2d ROKMC Brigade captured a cache 10 kilometers southwest of HOI AN (BT 071479) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
26,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

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This rice was stored in concrete jars and found in an underground bunker complex. The rice was evacuated to 2d Battalion Service Company for distribution through the Civic Action Program.

(h) 18 December: B/2/1, 196th Brigade discovered a cache nine kilometers east southeast of QUE SON (BT 129338) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
2,000 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

This rice was found inside a hut stored in bamboo baskets and was evacuated to HAWK HILL.

(i) 18 December: F/2/7 Marines found a cache six kilometers west of THANG BINH (BT 113416) as indicated below:

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
2,100 LBS	Locally Grown	Rice

The rice was packed in bags and vats buried along a tree line. The rice was evacuated to LZ ROSS.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy weapons and ammunition captured by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 14-20 December 1969:

(a) Captured Mortar, Artillery, Rocket Ammunition

<u>Type</u>	<u>Amount</u>
60mm Mortar	544
82mm Mortar	356
122mm Rocket	4
105mm Artillery	4
175mm Artillery	1
57mm Recoilless Rifle	1
106mm Recoilless Rifle	1
Total	911

(b) Individual and Crew-Served Weapons Captured

Individual Weapons	158
Crew-Served Weapons	5

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(3) Captured Food Supplies. The following amounts of rice (unless otherwise indicated) were captured or destroyed by friendly forces in ICTZ during the week of 14-20 December 1969:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
14 Dec	(YD 589399)	300	B/1/501
14 Dec	(YD 515414)	1,100	921 RF Co
14 Dec	(BT 063305)	6,000	A/3/21
14 Dec	(BT 019400)	40	C/1/7
14 Dec	(AT 874513)	6,000	G/2/5
15 Dec	(BS 613364)	2,200	C/5th SFGA
15 Dec	(BS 592283)	22	C/5th SFGA
15 Dec	(BS 592283)	11 Salt	C/5th SFGA
15 Dec	(BT 095322)	1,700	B/2/1
15 Dec	(BT 259122)	440	A/1/46
15 Dec	(BT 070337)	400	A/3/21
15 Dec	(BT 253122)	200	A/1/46
15 Dec	(BT 063303)	6,000	A/3/21
15 Dec	(BS 923159)	950	B/4/21
15 Dec	(BS 926165)	200	B/4/21
15 Dec	(BS 926165)	300	B/4/21
15 Dec	(AT 866508)	4,000	G/2/5
15 Dec	(YD 625385)	300	RCM/1/501
16 Dec	(AT 827536)	30	G/2/5
16 Dec	(AT 946379)	20	L/3/7
16 Dec	(BT 260094)	90	B/1/46
16 Dec	(BT 071479)	26,000	2d Bn ROKMC Bde
17 Dec	(BT 081548)	7,200	5th Co ROKMC
17 Dec	(BT 072481)	10,000	2d Bn ROKMC Bde
17 Dec	(BS 633445)	100	B/4/3
17 Dec	(YD 683256)	75	CAP 3-4-4
18 Dec	(BT 227190)	220	928 RF Co
18 Dec	(BT 113416)	2,100	F/2/7
18 Dec	(AT 851502)	500	H&S/2/5
18 Dec	(BT 031388)	700	C/1/7
18 Dec	(BT 129338)	2,000	B/2/1
19 Dec	(AT 851502)	550	H&S/2/5
19 Dec	(AT 998378)	90 Salt	B/1/7
19 Dec	(BT 265087)	50	B/1/46
20 Dec	(AT 983340)	50	B/1/7
20 Dec	(BS 410794)	50	B/1/52
20 Dec	(BS 508728)	20	C/3/1
20 Dec	(BS 778830)	60	C/5/46

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount (lbs)</u>	<u>Capturing Unit</u>
20 Dec	(BS 778830)	60 Food	C/5/46
	TOTAL RICE	79,967	
	TOTAL FOOD	60	
	TOTAL SALT	101	

t. Bomb Damage Assessment. The following is the reported 1st MAW in-country BDA.

Structures Destroyed	25	Structures Damaged	14
Bunkers Destroyed	12	Bunkers Damaged	5
Secondary Fires	6		

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

a. Enemy Identification/Organization. Annex A.

b. Negative

c. Enemy Personalities. Annex A.

d. Enemy Casualties/Losses. Enemy losses in ICTZ decreased in comparison to the previous week. There were 494 KIA's, 55 VC PW's, seven NVA PW's, and 113 Hoi Chanh's.

e. Morale. No Change.

f. - g. Negative

h. Terrain. No Change.

i. Weather

(1) Recap of Weather for Reporting Period

	<u>QUANG TRI</u>	<u>PHU BAI</u>	<u>DANANG</u>	<u>CHU LAI</u>
Temperature				
High	75	77	78	76
Low	61	62	67	64
Rainfall (total)	1.54	3.35	.87	10.50
Winds (knots)	5	7	5	9
Visibility (miles)	6	5	5	4

(2) Weather Outlook for the Period 20-26 December 1969

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(a) General. The moderate northeasterly flow will persist over the Republic of Vietnam.

(b) ICTZ Forecast. The forecast for the period is light to moderate precipitation with winds occasionally gusting to 30 knots. Precipitation in ICTZ will be approximately one to three inches with isolated instances of four to six inches.

j. - 1. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Annex C.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. Based upon a continuing evaluation of the enemy situation and the present disposition of enemy forces within the ICTZ, the enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption are considered to be:

a. Continue to maintain pressure on ARVN/FWMAF by attacks by fire, limited ground attacks and light to moderate sapper attacks directed against targets within the I Corps Tactical Zone, with emphasis on the pacification effort.

b. In conjunction with capability a. above, conduct terrorism against selected GVN and ARVN personnel and continue extensive political, propaganda and proselyting activity to discredit and weaken the GVN and to increase the influence and prestige of the NLF's Revolutionary Committees and Provisional Revolutionary Government.

c. Expand present operations within the ICTZ by adopting the following courses of action in one or more of the following geographical locations/areas:

(1) Attack installations in northern QUANG TRI Province with up to four infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

(2) Attack QUANG TRI City with up to two to three infantry battalions, two sapper battalions and one mortar/rocket battalion.

(3) Conduct limited attacks in the HUE/PHU BAI area with elements of two infantry regiments, supported by two mortar/rocket battalions.

(4) Attack installations within the DANANG TAOR with the equivalent of up to five infantry regiments supported by four sapper battalions and three rocket battalions.

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(5) Attack the TAM KY/CHU LAI Combat Base Complex with two infantry regiments (+) supported by three sapper battalions and two artillery battalions.

(6) Attack QUANG NGAI City with the equivalent of three infantry regiments, supported by two sapper battalions and one artillery battalion.

(7) Attack QUANG NGAI City, MO DUC and DUC PHO simultaneously with an infantry regiment equivalent at each location.

d. Defend on present position just north of the central and eastern portions of the DMZ with up to four infantry regiments supported by two sapper units and three artillery regiments.

e. Defend elsewhere in ICTZ (south of ROUTE 9), including VC/NVA base areas with forces locally available.

f. Withdraw into the mountain and forested areas of western I Corps and/or LAOS or North VIETNAM.


g. Reinforce the forces presently in ICTZ with two to three divisions from North VIETNAM either across the DMZ or via the Laotian Panhandle.

h. Employ SSM's from NVN and/or border areas; employ limited air and/or naval forces from NVN or surrounding areas; employ possible armor units from the area immediately north of the DMZ and/or border areas.

1. Vulnerabilities

(1) Enemy forces, LOC's, and surface installations are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attacks.

(2) Continuing shortages of food and medical supplies coupled with sickness and austere living conditions have increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations.


E. W. DZIALO
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEX A - ORDER OF BATTLE

ANNEX B - SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

ANNEX C - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

ANNEX D - RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z.

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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO III MAF PERINTREF 51-69 AS OF 202400 DECEMBER 1969.

1. Refer to paragraph 8 for explanatory notes pertaining to Annex A.
2. Estimated enemy strength.

I CORPS						DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				COMBINED TOTAL		
NVA		VC/MAIN FORCE		VC/LOCAL FORCE		ICTZ TOTAL		NVA				
NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	NO.	EST	
UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	UNITS	STRENGTH	
<u>CONFIRMED UNITS</u>												
MR-Hq	1	650				1	650			1	650	
MR-Tri-Thien-Hue								1	855	1	855	
Front Hq's	2	750				2	750	1	UNK	3	750	
Div Hq's	1	125				1	125	1	580	2	705	
Regt Hq's	10	2995	1	190		11	3185	16	7885	27	11,070	
Bn's-Maneuver	39	9595	7	1430	6	1,120	52	12,145	44	18,745	96	30,890
Bn's-Support	12	2855	1	120	2	445	15	3420	10	2,480	25	5,900
Separate Co's	1	130			38	2580	39	2710			39	2710
TOTAL CONFIRMED		17,100		1740		4,145	22,985		30,545		53,530	
<u>PROBABLE UNITS</u>												
Front Hq's												
Div Hq's												
Regt Hq's								1	400	1	400	
Bn's-Maneuver	3	830	1	350	1	190	5	1,370	1	450	6	1,820
Bn's-Support	4	1,035					4	1,035	4	1,130	8	2,165
Separate Co's	1	90			1	75	2	165			2	165
TOTAL PROBABLE		1,955		350		265	2,570		1,980		4,550	
<u>POSSIBLE UNITS</u>												
MR TT-HQ (FWD*)								1	150	1	150	
Front Hq's												
Div Hq's								1	350	1	350	
Regt Hq's								2	800	2	800	
Bn's-Maneuver												
Bn's-Support								17	4,950	17	4,950	
Separate Co's								3	440	3	440	
TOTAL POSSIBLE									6,690		6,690	
19,055		2,090		4,410		25,555		39,215		64,770		

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3. Enemy Strength (Regular) by Province.

		<u>NVA</u>	<u>MF/VC</u>	<u>LF/VC</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
QUANG TRI	Confirmed	3,110		55	3,165
	Probable	345			345
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,455</u>		<u>55</u>	<u>3,510</u>
THUA THIEN	Confirmed	3,350		475	3,825
	Probable				
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,350</u>		<u>475</u>	<u>3,825</u>
QUANG NAM	Confirmed	6,060	590	555	7,205
	Probable	705	350		1,055
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>6,765</u>	<u>940</u>	<u>555</u>	<u>8,260</u>
QUANG TIN	Confirmed	2,755	1,150	1,115	5,020
	Probable	380		265	645
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>3,135</u>	<u>1,150</u>	<u>1,380</u>	<u>5,665</u>
QUANG NGAI	Confirmed	1,825		1,945	3,770
	Probable	525			525
	Possible				
	TOTAL	<u>2,350</u>		<u>1,945</u>	<u>4,295</u>

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4. Number of NVA/VC Battalions by type. C = Confirmed; PR - Probable; PO = Possible; TOT = Total

I CORPS

DMZ/NVN/LAOS* ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS

MANEUVER	NVA				VC/MF				VC/LF				ICTZ TOTAL				DMZ/NVN/LAOS*				ICTZ/DMZ/LAOS			
	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT	C	PR	PO	TOT
INFANTRY	32	0		32	5			5	5			5	42			42	41	1		42	83	1		84
SAPPER	7	3		10	2	1		3	1	1		2	10	5		15	3	0		3	13	5		18
TOTAL MANEUVER	39	3		42	7	1		8	6	1		7	52	5		57	44	1		45	96	6		102
COMBAT SUPPORT																								
ARTY	7	1		8					2			2	9	1		10	2	3	7	12	11	4	7	22
MORT	1			1									1			1	1			1	2			2
AAA	1			1									1			1	1	1	1	3	2	1	1	4
RR	1			1									1			1					1			1
AT																	1			1	1			1
ENGR	1			1									1			1	1		2	3	2		2	4
TRANS		1		1										1		1	2		1	3	2	1	1	4
SIG	1	1		2									1	1		2	1		2	3	2	1	2	5
MED		1		1										1		1	1		3	4	1	1	3	5
TRNG																			1	1			1	1
RECON					1			1					1			1								
TOTAL SUPPORT	12	4		16	1			1	2			2	15	4		19	10	4	17	31	25	8	17	50
TOTAL MANEUVER SUPPORT	51	7		58	8	1		9	8	1		9	67	9		76	54	5	17	76	121	14	17	152

*See note #4 on page A-17

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5. Estimated Guerrilla Force Strength.

	<u>QUANG TRI</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>THUA THIEN</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG NAM</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG TIN</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>QUANG NGAI</u>	<u>STR</u>
DISTRICT	Hai Lang	221	Nam Hoa	50	Hoa Vang	812	Thang Binh	870	Binh Son	318
	Mai Linh	77	Huong Tra	56	Hieu Duc	38	Tam Ky	442	Son Tinh	380
	Trieu Phong	113	Hong Dien	69	Dien Ban	1,090	Ly Tin	168	Tu Nghia	429
	Cam Lo	85	Vinh Loc	43	Dai Loc	332	Hiep Duc	117	Nghia Hanh	336
	Gio Linh	195	Phu Loc	230	Thuong Duc	120	Tien Phuoc	289	Mo Duc	435
	Trung Luong	40	Quang Dien	46	Duc Duc	295	Hau Duc	187	Duc Pho	523
	Huong Hoa	8	Phu Vang	11	Que Son	969			Tra Bong	166
	Dong Ha	68	Phu Thu	97	Duy Xuyen	1,060			Ba To	115
			Huong Thuy	71	Hieu Nhon	279			Minh Long	77
			Phong Dien	528					Son Ha	200
TOTAL	QUANG TRI	807	THUA THIEN	1,201		4,995		2,073		2,979

TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR ICTZ - 12,055

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6. Order of Battle listing

DMZ/NVN/LAOS*

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT ***</u>
B-5 Front	NVA	C	UNK	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
12th AT Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
13th Arty Bn (120mm Mort)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
17th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
19th Med Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	20Dec68	
304th Div**	NVA	C	10,035			
Div Hq	NVA	C	580	Unlocated	21Jul68	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	230	Unlocated	21Jul68	
15th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	21Jul68	
16th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	200	Unlocated	21Jul68	
18th Med Bn	NVA	PO	250	Unlocated	21Jul68	
19th Trans Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unlocated	21Jul68	
20th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	570	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8337/18Jun69(P)
24th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,925			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	575	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8723/3Jul69(P)
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8754/26Jun69(P)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8632/29Jun69(P)
6th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	19Oct69	XD 8754/26Jun69(P)
66th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	2,000			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	
7th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	XD 8440/5Apr68(P)
8th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	
9th Bn	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	21Jul68	XD 8440/5Apr68(P)

*See note #1 on page A-17

**See note #2 on page A-17

***See Note #5 on page A-17

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT *
78th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300			
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
10th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
11th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
12th Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	1,300			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH SZ	6Mar69	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	6Mar69	
4th Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	6Mar69	
164th Arty Regt	NVA	PO	1,300			
Regt Hq	NVA	PO	400	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
1st Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
2nd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
3rd Bn	NVA	PO	300	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	
675B Arty Regt	NVA	PR	1,300	BA 611		
Regt Hq	NVA	PR	400	BA 611	6Jun69	
1st Bn	NVA	PR	300	BA 611	6Jun69	
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	300	BA 611	6Jun69	
3rd Bn	NVA	PR	300	BA 611	6Jun69	
325th Div	NVA	C	8,510	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
Div Hq	NVA	PO	350	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
14th AA Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
15th Trng Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
16th Med Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
17th Signal Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
18th Engr Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
19th DKZ Bn (122mm Rkt)	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
20th Trans Bn	NVA	C	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
21st Conval Bn	NVA	PO	300	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
25th Sapper Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
26th Recon Co	NVA	PO	120	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	
27th Cadre Co	NVA	PO	200	Unloc N of DMZ	11May69	

XD 8241/8Feb68(P)

YD 0565/22Apr69(P)

*See Note #5 on page A-17

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT *
36th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	
1st Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	YD 0363/21Apr69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	PR	450	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	
3rd Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc N of DMZ	16Jun69	YD 0566/22May69(P)
88th Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 9963/17May69(P)
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 9862/17May69(P)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 8826/15Jun68(P)
6th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
102nd Regt, 325th Div	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	XD 8435/2Jun68(H)
7th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
8th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
9th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unloc LAOS/N of DMZ	21Oct68	
138th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	
1st Bn	NVA	C	450	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	
2nd Bn	NVA	C	450	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	YD 1675/24Oct68(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	450	VINH LINH SZ	20Nov68	
270th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	YD 2474/8Jun69(P)
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	YD 1873/16May69(P)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	
6th Bn	NVA	C	450	Vic YD 1782	20Nov68	YD 1970/18Jun69(P)
27th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,290			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 0562/27Mar69(D)
1st Bn	NVA	C	280	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 1267/24Sep69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	300	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 0563/16Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	310	VINH LINH SZ	27Apr69	YD 0463/1May69(P)
31st Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	790			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	Vic YD 1186	20Dec68	YD 1667/19Nov69(P)
27th Bn	NVA	C	190	VINH LINH SZ	21May69	YD 0970/18Nov69(P)
15th Bn	NVA	C	200	VINH LINH SZ	6Jul69	YD 0264/7Jun69(P)

*See note #5 on page A-17

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DMZ/NVN/LAOS (continued)

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT *
9th Regt, 304th Div	NVA	C	1,955			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	710	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	
1st Bn	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	YD 9661/5Sep69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	375	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	YD 0063/7Aug69(D)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	500	VINH LINH SZ	19Oct69	
33rd Sapper Bn (Indep)	NVA	C	370	VINH LINH SZ	20Jun69	YD 2167/17Jun69(P)
126th Naval Sapper Regt	NVA	C	340	VINH LINH SZ	21Oct68	YD 2664/17Jan69(P)
Tri-Thien-Hue MR Hq	NVA	C	1,675	Unlocated	20Dec68	
6th Regt (-) (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YD 0309	11Oct69	YD 3011/13May69(D)
800th Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	11Oct69	YD 1813/1 Oct69(H)
802nd Bn	NVA	C	420	YD 0309	11Oct69	YD 6823/23Aug68(C)
9th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 9716/3Jun68(C)
K-15 Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	
K-16 Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	4Jul69	YC 5097/30Mar69(D)
K-18 Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 4594/14Apr69(C)
29th Regt (325C Div)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	BA 611	6Jun69	YC 4094/15Jun69(C)
7th Bn	NVA	C	450	BA 611	6Jun69	YC 3298/20May69(P)
8th Bn	NVA	C	450	BA 611	6Jun69	YC 3298/20May69(P)
9th Bn	NVA	C	450	BA 611	17Aug69	YC 3298/23Jul69(P)
803rd Regt (324B Div)	NVA	C	1,850			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 4517/19May68(C)
1st Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 5521/22May68(C)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	2Nov68	YD 2763/4Mar68(C)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	15Oct69	YD 3300/15Jul69(C)
812th Regt (-) (324B Div)	NVA	C	1,400			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Unlocated	16May69	
4th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	16May69	YD 4339/15Aug68(C)
5th Bn	NVA	C	450	Unlocated	16May69	YD 4368/29Aug68(C)

*See note #5 on page A-17

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QUANG TRI PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT **</u>
246th Regt (Indep)	NVA	C	1,565			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	565	XD 9265	14Mar69	
1st Bn	NVA	C	305	XD 9265	14Mar69	YD 1259/11Jul69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	325	XD 9265	14Mar69	XD 8362/60Oct69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	370	XD 9265	14Mar69	XD 8637/27Jul68(P)
2nd Bn, 84th Arty Regt	NVA	C	300	XD 8854	12Jul69	XD 8860/19Jun69(D)
H.99 Co	LF	C	35	Vic YD 5049		
C.59 Co	LF	C	20	Vic YD 2445		YD 4063/13Dec69(P)
7th Front (MRTH)	NVA	C	1,350			
Front Hq	NVA	C	400	Unlocated	17Apr69	YD 4541/16Oct69(C)
6th Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YD 3538	16May69	YD 3040/16May69(P)
K-8 Bn	NVA	C	275	YD 3639	6Jun69	YD 3436/28Nov69(P)
K-11 Bn	NVA	C	145	YD 3832	6Jun69	YD 3837/27Oct69(P)
10th Sapper Bn	NVA	C	175	YD 3339	6Jun69	YD 1931/6Nov69(H)
K-11 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	105	Vic YD 3535	6Jul69	YD 3141/16Oct69(P)
*K-34 Arty Bn, MRTH	NVA	C	240	Vic YD 2730	14Jun69	YD 3537/20Sep69(P)

*See note #3 on page A-17

** See note #5 on page A-17

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THUA THIEN PROVINCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT **</u>
TRI-THIEN-HUE MILITARY REGION						
4th Regt	NVA	C	880			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	Vic ZC 0794	12Jun68	ZC 0893/19Jun69(P)
K.4B Bn	NVA	C	270	Vic ZC 1597	12Jun68	ZD 1901/19Jun69(P)
K.4C Bn	NVA	C	260	Vic YC 9694	12Jun68	ZC 0993/17Jul69(P)
5th Regt	NVA	C	1,410			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	500	Vic YC 6282	15Aug69	YC 6382/20Mar69(P)
K.4 Bn	NVA	C	330	Vic YC 9397	6Dec69	YC 9397/5Dec69 (P)
K.10 Bn	NVA	C	160	Vic YD 6514	15Feb69	YD 4503/15Oct69(P)
#439th Bn	NVA (PEND)		400	Vic YD 7500	5Nov69	YD 9399/ 9Nov69(D)
CHI THUA 1 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	250	Vic YC 6282	15Aug69	YC 5982/20Jul69(H)
CHI THUA 2 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	170	Vic YC 6586	15Feb69	YC 6682/20Jul69(H)
*K-32 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	300	Vic YC 7291	20Mar69	YC 5879/20Mar69(P)
6th Regt (-)						
806th Bn	NVA	C	350	Vic YD 3304	19Jun69	YD 5226/8Sep69(P)
K.12 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	260	Vic YD 1813	20Jun69	YD 3507/13May69(P)
*K-35 Arty Bn, MRTTH	NVA	C	150	Vic YD 5815	18Sep69	YD 6713/12Aug69(P)
C.113 Co	LF	C	70	Vic YD 4032	1Jan68	YD 5339/10Nov69(P)
C.114 Co	LF	C	60	Vic YD 6530	1Jan68	YD 6234/13Sep68(C)
C.115 Co	LF	C	65	Vic YD 6623	1Jan68	YD 6625/3Jan69(P)
C.116 Co	LF	C	50	Vic YD 8420	1Jan68	YD 7706/19Sep69(P)
PHU LOC Armed Bn	LF	C	230	Vic ZD 1304	1Jan68	AU 8208/20Oct69(H)

Pending, however, not accepted in OOB holdings by MACV. Not included in totals.

*See note #3 on page A-17
 # See note #5 on page A-17

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	QUANG NAM PROVINCE		EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT **
			EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION		
Front 4	NVA	C	UNK			
Front Hq	NVA	C	350	ZC 1341	12Oct69	ZC 1441/27Nov69(P)
1st Comm Bn	NVA	PR	415	Unlocated	25May69	AT 9949/10Dec69 (P)
1st Flamethrower Co	NVA	C	130	AT 9656		
577th Rocket Bn	NVA	C	300	AT 8042	7Jun69	ZC 1939/1Dec69 (P)
42nd Recon Bn	MF	C	120	AT 9341	4Aug69	AT 9937/14Sep69(HC)
Hai Van Engr/Sapper	NVA	PR	200	AT 8686	11Apr69	AT 8689/1Dec69(P)
C-31st Ind Co	NVA	C	90	AT 8990		AT 8789/10Sep69(P)
31st Regt, 341st NVA Div	NVA	C	1,005			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	350	AT 3060	24Jun69	AT 8964/11Apr69(C)
102nd Bn	NVA	C	335	AT 3060	24Jun69	ZC 1269/14Dec69 (HC)
103rd Bn	NVA	C	320	AT 3060	24Jun69	BT 1133/12Nov69(P)
36th Regt, 308th NVA Div	NVA	C	610			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	165	AT 9737	14Sep69	AT 9739/28Nov69 (P)
1st Bn	NVA	C	135	AT 9737	14Sep69	AT 9741/28Nov69 (P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	155	AT 9737	14Sep69	AT 9740/6Dec69 (P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	135	BT 1252	27Sep69	AT 9738/28Nov69(P)
90th Regt, 324B NVA Div	NVA	C	1,065			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	195	ZC 1640	23Jul69	ZC 1748/15Dec69
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	ZC 1640	23Jul69	ZC 1035/2Dec69(P)
8th Bn	NVA	C	355	ZC 1640	23Jul69	ZC 1636/15Dec69(P)
9th Bn	NVA	C	260	ZC 1640	23Jul69	AT 7929/2Dec69(P)
*141st Regt, 312th NVA Div	NVA	C	1,190			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	400	YC 8360	14Nov69	AT 8355/21Apr69(C)
1st Bn	NVA	C	245	YC 8360	14Nov69	ZC 2059/2Nov69 (P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	240	YC 8360	14Nov69	ZC 1857/2Nov69 (P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	305	YC 8360	14Nov69	AT 8769/12Sep69(HC)
573rd Rocket Bn	NVA	C	300	Unlocated	14Oct69	
575th Rocket Bn	NVA	C	300	ZC 1960	15Oct69	ZC 2060/31Oct69(P)

* A detachment of 141st, reportedly consisting of 20-30 men from each Battalion, remains in the eastern portion of Base Area 127 (ZC 1861). Their mission is to provide security, gather rice and maintain the Regiments base camps in anticipation of the 141st Regiments return in the Spring of 1970 to participate in the Spring Offensive.

**See note #5 on page A-17

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QUANG NAM PROVINCE (continued)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT *</u>
R.20 Bn	MF	C	145	BT 0763	14Jun69	AT 9736/28Nov69 (P)
V.25 Bn	MF	C	125	BT 1851	16Jun69	BT 2050/12Nov69(P)
D.3 Bn	NVA	C	250	AT 9856	21Aug69	AT 9954/3Nov69(HC)
T.89 Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 1649	10May69	BT 1648/17Nov69(P)
3rd Sapper Bn	NVA	C	180	AT 9639	10Jun69	AT 9842/14Nov69(P)
T.87 Sapper Bn	MF	PR	350	AT 8589	12 Sep69	AT 8589/12Sep69(HC)
Q.80 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1752		BT 1350/16Nov69(P)
Q.81 Co	LF	C	75	BT 1053		BT 0548/12Nov69(P)
Q.82 Co	LF	C	115	BT 3059		BT 0158/18Oct69(P)
Q.83 Co	LF	C	110	AT 9057		AT 8558/1Nov69(P)
Q.84 Co	LF	C	50	AT 9069		ZC 2165/31Oct69(P)
105th Co	LF	C	130	BT 0536		AT 9938/19Oct69(HC)
490th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	400	ZC 1930	18Nov69	ZC 1832/10Dec69(P)

*See note #5 on page A-17

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT**</u>
Military Region 5 (Hq)	NVA	C	650	Unlocated	20Nov68	
*2nd NVA Div	NVA	C	4,045			
Div Hq	NVA	C	125	BS 1198	22Aug69	AT 9815/12Nov69(P)
GK.30 Signal Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	20May69	BT 0939/27May67(C)
GK.31 AA Bn	NVA	C	190	Unlocated	22May69	AT 9629/14Aug69(P)
GK.32 AT Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	20May69	AT 9221/14Jun68(C)
GK.33 Mortar Bn (120mm)	NVA	C	250	Unlocated	23May69	AT 9134/4Oct69(P)
GK.35 Sapper Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	20May69	ZC 0343/21Sep69(P)
GK.37 Trans Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	200	Unlocated	22May69	BT 1047/19Dec67(P)
GK.38 Medical Bn, 2nd Div	NVA	PR	180	Unlocated	20May69	BT 2318/13Nov68(P)
GK.40 Engr Bn	NVA	C	200	Unlocated	24May69	BS 2444/20Oct69(C)
1st Regt, 2d Div	MF	C	950			
Regt Hq	MF	C	190	AT 8323	12Dec69	AT 8323/6Dec69(P)
40th Bn	MF	C	255	AT 8323	12Dec69	ZC 1925/20Oct69(P)
60th Bn	MF	C	250	AT 8323	12Dec69	AT 8830/13Sep69(P)
90th Bn	MF	C	255	AT 8323	12Dec69	ZC 1926/30Sep69(HC)
3d (AKA 31st) Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	740			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	140	BT 0008	20Nov69	BT 0019/13Sep69(HC)
1st Bn	NVA	C	200	BT 0935	20Nov69	BT 0935/12Nov69(P)
2nd Bn	NVA	C	200	BT 2611	20Nov69	BT 2613/4Nov69(P)
3rd Bn	NVA	C	200	BT 1234	20Nov69	BT 1133/12Nov69(P)
70th Bn	LF	C	165	BT 2348	22Nov69	BT 0930/22Nov69(P)
72nd Bn	LF	C	160	BT 2937	22Nov69	BT 2937/13Nov69(HC)
74th Heavy Wpns Bn	LF	C	195	BT 2113	17Oct69	BT 2425/19Oct69(HC)
76th Sapper Bn	LF	PR	190	BT 2938	22Nov69	BT 2939/13Nov69(HC)
409th Sapper Bn	MF	C	200	BT 3304	17Oct69	BS 4287/11Dec69(P)
78th Arty Bn	LF	C	250	BT 3001	3Feb69	BT 3121/28Jan68(P)
706th Co	LF	C	85	BT 2913	18Dec69	BT 4212/25Mar68
V.14 Co	LF	C	85	BT 4801		BT 2908/24Feb69
V.15 Co	LF	C	70	BT 1735		BT 2737/23Nov69
V.18 Co	LF	PR	75	BT 2315		
C.7 Co	LF	C	55	BT 1212		BT 1810/7Dec69(HC)
C.9 Co	LF	C	50	BT 2045		BT 2044/25Nov69(HC)

* Total reflects 1st MF Regt and 3d NVA Regt strengths only. 21st NVA Regiment included in QUANG TRI totals.
 ** See note #5 on page A-17

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QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION	EPIC DATE	LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT*
9th Sapper Bn	NVA	PR	525	BS 6436	20Jul69	RS 6528/11Nov69 (HC)
38th Bn	LF	C	170	BS 6858	8May69	BS 7585/7Dec69 (P)
48th Bn	LF	C	290	BS 7180	24Jun69	BS 7177/14Nov69 (HC)
107th Arty Bn	NVA	C	165	BS 5676	17Jun69	BS 4770/22Aug69 (P)
120th Bn	LF	C	210	BS 3975	29Jan69	BS 6169/25Feb69 (C)
406th Sapper Bn	LF	C	125	BS 4677	11Aug69	BS 5279/20Oct69 (C&P)
C.16 Sapper Co	LF	C	65	BS 4770		
C.17 Co	LF	C	50	BS 7562		RS 5373/9Nov67 (C)
C.18 Co	LF	C	85	BS 6566		BS 5352/5Dec69 (C)
C.19 Co	LF	C	45	BS 7555		BS 7559/17Oct69 (C&P)
T.20 Co	LF	C	55	BS 7080		BS 7177/14Nov69 (HC)
C.21st Sapper Co	LF	C	75	BS 6167		BS 6566/25Feb69 (C)
P.31 Co	LF	C	40	BS 6491		BS 6887/16Jul69 (P)
C.45 Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 7559		BS 7657/5Nov69 (P)
K.51 Wpns Co	LF	C	40	BS 6689		BS 6887/16Jul69 (P)
C.65 Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 6457		BS 7369/6Dec69 (P)
C.74 Co	LF	C	95	BS 7270		BS 6567/24Aug68 (C&P)
C.75 Co	LF	C	90	BS 7568		
81st Co	LF	C	65	BS 5676		RS 5668/11Sep69 (P)
95A Sapper Co	LF	C	40	BS 5596		BS 6091/11Sep69 (C&P)
95B Sapper Co	LF	C	55	BS 7090		BS 6887/16Jul69 (P)
C.120 Co	LF	C	45	BS 8537		RS 8137/15Aug69 (C&P)
C.212 Co	LF	C	100	BS 5038		
C.219 Co	LF	C	50	BS 8137		RS 7839/15Aug69 (C&P)
506A Sapper Co	LF	C	30	BS 5172		RS 6571/29Jun69 (C&P)
506B Sapper Co	LF	C	45	BS 5674		RS 6571/29Jun69 (C&P)
21st NVA Regt, 2d Div	NVA	C	680			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	155	BS 4053	12Dec69	BS 6557/7Dec69 (P)
60th Bn	NVA	C	150	BS 4053	12Dec69	BS 6557/7Dec69 (P)
70th Bn	NVA	C	170	BS 4358	12Dec69	BS 6557/7Dec69 (P)
80th Bn	NVA	C	205	BS 4358	12Dec69	BS 6557/7Dec69 (P)

* See next page on page A-17

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QU. NGAI PROVINCE (continued)

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT *</u>
22nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	980			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	175	BS 4741	25Octo9	BS 5030/20Octo9 (P)
7th Bn	NVA	C	255	BS 5542	25Octo9	BS 6337/13Augo9 (C)
8th Bn	NVA	C	270	BS 4543	25Octo9	BS 6337/13Augo9 (C)
9th Bn	NVA	C	280	BS 6546	25Octo9	BS 7844/2Deco9 (P)

*See note #5 on page A-17

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BINH DINH PROVINCE*

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>	<u>CURRENT PROBABLE LOCATION</u>	<u>EPIC DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION/DATE LAST CONTACT *</u>
**3rd NVA Div	NVA	C	4,160			
Div Hq	NVA	C	440	BS 5504	6Dec69	BR 5090/21Oct69 (HC)
2nd NVA Regt	NVA	C	870			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	345	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 7508/3Nov69 (P)
93rd Bn	NVA	C	180	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 8331/28Nov69 (HC)
95th Bn	NVA	C	180	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 7508/3Nov69 (P)
97th Bn	NVA	C	165	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 7508/3Nov69 (P)
18th NVA Regt	NVA	C	1,260			
Regt Hq	NVA	C	520	BR 7363		
8th Bn	NVA	C	440	BR 5950		
9th Bn	NVA	C	300	BR 5929		
90th Engr Bn	NVA	C	325	BS 5504	6Dec69	BS 7508/3Nov69 (H)
200th AA Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 8104/28Nov69 (P)
300th Arty Bn	NVA	C	245	BS 7910	6Dec69	BS 8109/31Oct69 (P)
500th Trans Bn	NVA	C	350	BS 5504	6Dec69	BR 5090/21Oct69 (H)
551st Signal Bn	NVA	C	400	BS 5504	6Dec69	BR 5090/21Oct69 (H)
600th Medical Bn	NVA	C	200	BS 5504	6Dec69	BR 5090/21Oct69 (H)

*See note #5 on page A-17

**Totals of 3d Div Units in Binh Dinh do not include 22d Regt.

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7. Significant OOB changes during the period 140001H to 202400H December 1969

a. Three PW's captured in QUANG TRI Province have identified their unit as the C.59 LF (AKA Trieu Phong District Force). Base on information from these PW's, the C.59 LF Co was picked up by III MAF OOB.

8. Explanatory Notes

- #1. BINH DINH (P) is not included in the strength computations in paragraph 2, 3, and 4. DMZ/NVN/LAOS is not included in paragraph 3.
- #2. Division strength is an estimate of the total division operating strength and is not necessarily the sum total of the accepted subordinate units.
- #3. Units listed in paragraph 6 of Annex A are listed strictly by province, and do not necessarily reflect subordination or operational control. Paragraph 9 will list the parent organization and the headquarters currently believed to have operational control over the unit. The headquarters believed to be exercising direct operational control over the unit is underscored.
- #4. Those units within the DMZ and those in LAOS in close enough proximity to pose a significant tactical threat to ICTZ.
- #5. Under the column "Location/date last contact", the information is based upon the following codes: (P) = Prisoner of war; (D) = Document; (H or HC) = Hoi Chanh; (C) = Contact.

9. Subordinate/Operational Control "also-known-as" names (AKA, letter box numbers (LBN), armament, and personalities listing:

a. This paragraph of Annex A is published on a monthly basis. See III MAF PERINTREP 48-69 for the latest listing.

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INTERROGATION REPORTS, AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) TO III MAF PERINTREP 51-69.

1. QUANG TRI (P). No significant reports.

2. THUA THIEN (P)

a. PW, Lt Phan Van DAN, 5th Co, 11th Sapper Bn, captured 13 Oct 1969 nine kilometers south of Camp CARROLL (YD 134450) (11th ITT Rpt 197-69) stated that the strength of the K.11 Sapper Bn was approximately 240 men. Present location of the 5th Co is KHE TRAI vicinity (YD 275415). PW DAN also stated that the mission of the K.11 Sapper Bn was to attack PW units in HAI LE (V) and HAI PHU (V) because these units will hinder future operations in the HAI LANG Delta. The morale of the battalion is very low due to immature leadership and tactical command, also lack of food and medicine causing illnesses with very few replacements. The few replacements that are received are mostly NVN youths (16-18 years old) fulfilling their military obligation and are not familiar with sapper tactics. Reported personalities: 7th Front CO-SrCol LAM, XO-SrCol THOA, PO-SrCol SINH, APO-SrCol NGHIA, CofS-SrCol TOM; K.11 Sapper Bn CO-None, XO-Capt BAO, PO-SrCapt DAU, APO-Lt THANG, CofS-Lt DAT.

(G-2 COMMENT: The following reported personalities correspond to those held by III MAF OOB: 7th Front CO-SrCol LAM; K.11 Sapper Bn XO-Capt BAO, CofS-Lt DAT. The remaining reported personalities are new to OOB files. All information rated (F-3).)

b. PW, Sgt Cao Viet NGHIA, C.24 Engineer Co, 7th Front (SA 1st ARVN Div msg 150200Z Dec 1969) was captured on 9 Dec 1969 21 kilometers south of QUANG TRI City (YD 232311) when ambushed and wounded by ARVN forces. The C.24 Engineer Co presently has a strength of 22 men located in a base area in the vicinity of (YD 3340). The mission of the unit is to lay mines on HIGHWAY 1 from HAI TRUONG (H) (YD 460400) to HAI THO (H) (YD 342466). Reported personalities: 7th Front CO-LAM, XO-THOA, PO-NGHIA; C.24 Engineer Co CO-DIEN. This PW stated that the composition of the 7th Front included the K.8 and K.14 Infantry Bn's, the K.10 and K.11 Sapper Bn's, C.12 Transportation Co, C.18 Signal Co, K.34 Artillery Bn, and the 88th Hospital.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF OOB holds the C.24 Engineer Co, 7th Front as unlocated. The personalities mentioned are new to OOB files except 7th Front CO-LAM and XO-THOA reported for the second time. All information rated (F-3).)

3. QUANG NAM (P)

a. A document captured 27 Nov 1969 five and one-half kilometers northwest of AN HOA Combat Base (AT 878524) revealed information indicat-

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ing the enemy course of action through the Christmas and New Year period. The enemy directive stated the holiday period was a favorable time for military and enemy proselyting. Leaflets and posters were to be prepared in English and Vietnamese. All subordinate units were to comply with this and prepare for the proselyting mission immediately.

(G-2 COMMENT: This document comes at a very timely period showing the obvious contempt and utter disregard for the annual cease fires, and truces occasionally agreed to by the VC/NVA. The GVN has stated that RVNAF will observe a cease fire during Christmas of 1969.

b. PW, PFC Tran Manh CUONG (AKA Tran Van LONG), 3d Co, 703d Communications Bn, Front 4 was captured 3 Dec 1969 approximately four and one-half kilometers southwest of HOI AN City (BT 120520) (CO USAAC ICTZ 160840Z Dec 1969). This PW had little tactical information because he had been a deserter since Feb 1969. The PW stated that his infiltration began with Group 1040 in May of 1968 from HAI DUONG (P), NVN and proceeded through LAOS and entered RVN by way of THUA THIEN (P) in Aug 1968. The PW reveals that he was assigned to the 703d Communications Bn located on the ONG THU Slope (ZC 180490). He reports that he laid communication wire and trained in being a wireman in the unit until he contracted malaria. The PW was forced to work even after contracting malaria and he deserted in Feb 1969. The PW went to LOC THUAN (V), DUY XUYEN (V) (AT 969343) where he lived with the villagers and seven other deserters. In Jun 1969, the PW and seven deserters went to the village of THI XE (CNA) where they were captured by the VC. After approximately three days, the PW and five other men escaped and fled to XUYEN TAN (V), DUY XUYEN (V) (BT 120520). They remained in this location until 3 Dec 1969 when they were captured by ARVN Rangers. He further stated that he was told by a soldier on an infiltration route that 20 deserters returned to NVN daily.

(G-2 COMMENT: An agent report from the QUE SON District in the latter part of Nov 1969 indicated that an unspecified number of soldiers from the 30th Regt were living in villages in the QUE SON (D) and did not want to return to their units. (Ref: III MAF PERINTREP 49-09 of 9 Dec 1969). Other reports of deserters banding together in QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces have also been received. All information rated (F-3).)

c. PW, Cpl Nguyen Van ANH, 3d Co, D.89 Sapper Bn, Front 4, was captured 5 Dec 1969 approximately two and one-half kilometers north of FSB BALDY (BT 138480) (CO USAAG ICTZ 160835Z Dec 1969). This PW had limited knowledge of his unit. The PW was a part of Infiltration Group 1058, 441st Bn. The group crossed through LAOS and entered RVN via KONTUM (P) in late Feb 1969. The group then proceeded to the ONG THU Slope. The PW contracted malaria, and was returned to LAOS. In late May 1969, he returned to RVN and the HON TAU Mountain area. He was assigned to the 09th Replacement Bn vicinity (AT 962495) and trained in sapper tactics. The PW stated that he again contracted malaria and was

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taken to Hospital 78 in Sept 1969. The PW joined the D.89 Sapper Bn in late Sept 1969 and went on four rice gathering operations near THON BON (H), XUYEN TRA (V) vicinity (BT 070475), DUY XUYEN (D). One-thousand kilos of rice was brought from the BA REN Bridge, vicinity (BT 102511) by three boats manned by civilians. According to the PW, the rice producing area of XUYEN TRA also supplies the units D2, D3, 91 LAM SON Battalions, and QUANG HAI Battalion. The PW further revealed the D.89 Battalion moved to SON TRUNG (V), QUE SON (D) vicinity (BT 050395) where they remained until late Oct 1969. In order to avoid a sweep of the area by FWMAF, the battalion attempted to return to their "CAI KHE Base" in vicinity (AT 962495) but their move was aborted because of the presence of U. S. troops. The PW then explains the battalion tried to reach XUYEN THO, vicinity (BT 195535), DUY XUYEN (D) but again met FWMAF elements. On 14-15 Nov 1969, the battalion reached PHU PHONG (V), QUE SON (D) vicinity (BT 138480). On 17 Nov 1969, they were attacked by tanks and were captured by ARVN forces. The PW described the morale of his unit as being very low due to the scarcity of food. The desertion rate is high. The PO tells the men the Chieu Hoi Program is a farce and they will be mistreated if they rally to the GVN.

(G-2 COMMENTS: Despite the limited knowledge concerning composition of this unit this PW provides a detailed route explaining how the T.89 came into this particular area, vicinity (BT 1649). The designation "D.89" has been previously mentioned in captured documents. The "ARVN Tanks" possibly refer to elements of the 1st Armored Brigade (ARVN) which have been recently operating in this area. The XUYEN TRA Area is a well known rice collection point. The unit's mentioned are held as AKA's for the following units; D2 - V.25 Main Force Battalion; D3 - D.3 NVA Infantry Battalion; 91st NAM SON Battalion (OOB holds 91st LAM SON/AKA: 3d Sapper Bn, and QUANG HAI Battalion as unknown). All information noted. (R-2).)

d. Hoi Chanh, PFC, Tran Van HIEN/AKA; Nguyen Van DIEN/AKA: Nguyen Van BUOI, 8th Company, 8th Battalion, 31st Regiment, rallied on 14 Dec 1969 approximately four and one-half kilometers southeast of HIEU DUC (D) Headquarters, (AT 925695). (SIA QUANG NAM Sector HOI AN RVN, 161350Z Dec 1969). The Hoi Chanh stated that as of 14 Dec his former unit was in vicinity (ZC 120690). The unit was to undergo political training from approximately 18-28 Dec 1969. The Hoi Chanh heard that the regiment would participate in an attack on an unknown area when the political training ended. The Hoi Chanh had been with the regiment since Feb 1969 when it began its infiltration from NVN. The Hoi Chanh stated that the regiment was composed of two battalions designated "eight and nine." There are 10 special companies designated as follows: C16-60mm mortar Co; C17-DKZ 75mm RR; C18-Information Co; C19-Internal Security Co; C20-Dispensary; C21-12.7mm AA Co; C22-Evacuation Co; C23-Recon Co; C25-Infantry Co; C26-Transportation Co. The 8th Battalion's strength is 100 men. There are four companies designated 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th.

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Each company has three platoons but they did not break down into squads because of a shortage of personnel. The Hoi Chanh further stated that all of the soldiers are hungry and confused. They want to Chieu Hoi but the political officer tells them that the ARVN will kill them. The PO further tells them that the Americans will depart the RVN in December 1969 but the soldiers don't believe him any more. Reported personalities: Regt CO-SrCol XUNG, PO-SrCol DAM, APO-SrCol TANH, C/S-NGOC; 8th Bn, 31st Regt CO-Capt LUY (KIA in Jun 1969), CO is now SrCapt THANH; XO-Lt DO, PO-SrCapt SON (KIA at DAI LOC (D) while collecting rice), APO-RON. This Hoi Chanh stated that he was a Catholic and had tried unsuccessfully to avoid being drafted in NVN. Twice during infiltration he deserted but was captured and kept under close guard, threatened with beatings and given political lectures. The Hoi Chanh left a rice gathering party of five men to rally to the ARVN.

(G-2 COMMENTS: The location of this Hoi Chanh's former unit is far from the present OOB holdings (F-6). The area where he rallied has been frequently used by the regiment for it's rice gathering operations. The mission of the unit as well as the current events of this unit is in keeping with other units in Front 4. Designations for the battalions have been previously mentioned as AKA's for the battalions (F-2). The designations and specialities of the regimental support companies is somewhat different from those held by OOB with the exception of the medical, AA, and Recon Companies (F-3). The personalities agree with previously reported information. All other information rated (F-3).)

e. PW, SrLt Nguyen Van TICH, Subsistence Sub Section, QM, 70C, Front 4, captured 27 Nov 1969 approximately four and one-half kilometers southwest of DAI LOC (D) Headquarters (AT 898524) (CG First MARDIV, 091538Z Dec 69). The PW stated the present mission of the section was to provide food and support for the units subordinate to Front 4. The present location of the 70C Rear Service elements as of Sept 69 was vicinity (2C 1338). The PW stated that rice procurement will be increased in the month of Dec 1969 for subordinate units of Front 4. The units will launch simultaneous attacks on 1 Jan 1970 against Danang, Hill 65 and the AN HOA Combat Base. The units participating in this attack will be the 36th Regiment, 490th Sapper Battalion, 89th Sapper Battalion, 1st and 2d Independent Infantry Battalions and the 3d Sapper Battalion. The 31st and 141st Regiments were to attack Hill 65, the 38th Regiment AKA: 90th Regiment, 91st Sapper Battalion, and 577th Rocket Battalion to attack the AN HOA Combat Base. The PW gave the designations and AKA's of the command elements of Front 4 as: 70A, Front 4 - the Military Staff Section, 70B-Political Staff Section, 70C, Front 4- Rear Service Staff. The Rear Service element has subordinate to it the following sections; the QM, Armory, Medical, Transportation, Finance, Admin, Planning and Political Sections. The QM Section is further composed of the Subsistence Sub Section, Food Support Sub Section, Clothing, Accounting Sub Section and one Transportation Platoon. The command of Front 4 has three subordinate commands which are; the Northern Wing composed of the 573d

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Rocket Battalion, 1st Independent Sapper Company and 2d Independent Infantry Company, the Central Wing composed of the 31st Regiment and the 575th Artillery Battalion, the Southern Wing composed of the 38th Regiment (AKA: 90th Regiment), 141st Regiment, 36th Regiment, 577th Rocket Battalion, 140th Transportation Battalion, 150th and 160th Transportation Battalions, 91st, 3d and 490th Sapper Battalions, 1st and 2d Infantry Battalions, 26th Comm Battalion and the Q76-Q78-Q80-Q81 Hospital/Medical Laboratory. The PW had hearsay information on rice caches that amounted to approximately six tons. Three caches were located in the vicinity (AT 848546) and one rice cache consisting of approximately two and one-half tons was located in the vicinity (AT 900558) as of Nov 1969. The PW stated that units designated "K" units are transportation units and are assigned to the following areas; K625-DAI LOC (D), K650-DUY XUYEN (D), K600-HOA VANG (D) and the K800-DIEN BAN (D). The Subsistence Section receives receipts for rice picked up and delivered. The PW expressed the opinion that rice gathering has been difficult in the DAI LOC (D) since 1 Nov 1969.

(G-2 COMMENTS: Information as to composition and disposition of enemy units within Front 4 is within general agreement with COB with the following exceptions. There is no previous mention of the 1st and 2d Independent Sapper and Infantry Companies. The 91st Sapper Battalion is carried by COB as an AKA for the 3d Sapper Battalion and the 141st Regiment has always been regarded as being within the Central Wing. The units designated "K" have been previously reported. The PW's information regarding the often predicted offensive varies with information previously received (F-6). The 90th Regiment and the 490th Sapper Battalion have been targeted in the past against unknown locations in the DAI LOC (D). Information concerning the subordination of the hospital units is newly reported with the exception of the Q78 Hospital which was believed discovered in late Nov 1969 in the QUE SON Mountains by elements of the seventh Marine Regiment. All other information rated (F-6).)

f. PW, PFC Nguyen Van QUYEN, Headquarters Section, 8th Battalion, 60th Regiment, Front 4, captured 26 Nov 1969 approximately nine kilometers northwest of HIEU DUC (D) Headquarters (AT 847479)(CG First MARDIV 141623Z Dec 1969, Supp Interr Rpt 1st ITT 34-12-69). The PW stated he was attached to the Transportation Platoon of the Headquarters Section of the battalion and had the mission of collecting rice for the Headquarters Section for future operations of the battalion in the "B" Zone of DAI LOC (D) that were to take place after the GVN TET cease fire. The 8th Battalion will counter sweep FVMAF operations. Currently the 8th Battalion CP was located in the vicinity (ZC 1437) (12 Nov 1969). The companies of the battalion were located approximately one hour apart. This area has been occupied since Mar 1969. The PW stated that the battalion had four companies but did not know any more information about them. The PW had been with the unit since Dec 1968. In Mar 1969, the present base camp was built. On 25 Mar 1969, the battalion moved out for operations in DAI LOC District. The PW and two other men remained behind to guard

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the camp. The PW explained that the morale in the battalion was low due to the lack of food. The troops know that the NVA cannot win the war, and do not pay any attention to what the cadre tell them. Each man is given a half can of rice a day plus some vegetables, with salt, but, there is no meat. The resupply route normally followed is from the PHU THUAN Market vicinity (AT 8651), cross river at vicinity (AT 870507), wouthwest by trail to DOI CHE Mountains vicinity (AT 8048) through Hill 530 (ZC 187403) to base camp. The PW also stated that two sets of green utilities/fatigues were issued inially and two more sets issued in QUANG BINH (P), NVN, at the start of infiltration. The PW stated that he had only seen green and brown uniforms worn in RVN, and that the green uniforms are worn by all NVA. There was no distinction of uniforms worn by other units in regards to color of clothing. The PW added he had never observed VC/NVA units wearing FMMAF/ARVN uniforms. Reported personalities: Regt CO-THUOC, XO-DANG; 8th Bn CO-NINU, XO-NHI, PO-TUYEN, APO-LOC.

(G-2 COMMENT: The designation of "60th Regt" is known AKA for the 90th Regiment. The location of this unit is within close proximity of where OOB currently holds the regiment less the 9th Battalion (9th Battalion currently located vicinity (AT 7929). The mission of this battalion is within keeping of that stated by other PW/Hoi Chanh's (F-2). The morale problem appears to be indicative of Front 4 units due to lack of food. All personalities were previously reported with the exception of NINU, and LOC. All other information rated (F-2).)

4. QUANG TIN (P)

a. Hoi Chanh, Cpl Nguyen Van A, 17th Trans Company, 1st Regiment Headquarters, 2d Division, who rallied on 8 Dec 1969 vicinity (AT 810560) (SA QUANG NAM Sector, HOI AN msg 120915 Dec 69) gave his unit strength as 80 men and located it at (ZC 205260) as of 30 Oct 69. The unit's mission was to transport rice. Source also gave the following information on other units within the 1st Regiment. The 1st Regiment is composed of three infantry battalions and 10 special companies (subordinate to the 1st Regiment). Each infantry battalion has five companies and each company has three platoons of approximately 25 men. Companies 1, 2, and 3 of each battalion are infantry companies, the 4th company of each battalion is a heavy weapons company, and the 5th company in each battalion is the battalion headquarters company. The 10 companies subordinate to the regiment are used in general support as required. The company's are; T-1-Information, T-2-Recon, T-3-Internal Security, T-4-Engr, T-5-Heavy Machine Gun, T-6-82mm mortar, T-7-DK-75, T-8-Transportation, T-9-Medical and T-10-Surgical. LEN for 1st Regiment - 53001 AP NAM. Reported personalities: 1st Regt CO-Maj LAP, PO-Maj NGUYEN, C/S-Capt XANG; T-1 Co CO-Lt DUONG; T-2 CO-Lt TIN; T-8 CO-Capt DUONG, PO-Nguyen VAN.

(G-2 COMMENT: Most information on the 1st Regiment coincides with III MAF holdings. Personalities mentioned for the first time except for Regiment CO and PO (F-3). LEN recorded for first time (F-6). All other information rated (F-3).)

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b. PW, Le HUYEN, Civ, Entertainment Subparty of 5th Region, captured 24 Nov 1969 (BT 208464) (CO USAAG ICTZ msg 130900Z Dec 69) infiltrated with 60 Civ Cadre Jan 1969. The group was divided into 20 man sections: 1, 2 and 3, seven medical doctors, nine medical specialists, three film technicians, and subject comprised group one. This group arrived in QUANG NAM (P) 1 Apr 1968. On 10 May 1968, PW moved to LAM LO (H), SON DONG (V), SON TIN (D), QUANG NGAI (P) and began to gain experience and collect background material for a proposed historical film on the Liberation of RVN. In Apr 1969, he directed a dramatic troupe of approximately 18 people in the TRA BONG (D) Mountains, QUANG NGAI (P). Background: In Jan 1946 Le HUYEN joined the Viet Minh as a comic entertainer in propaganda plays. After requesting and subsequently passing the cinema examinations, he studied the Russian language at a local language laboratory in preparation for foreign study. He departed for MOSCOW in Jul 1960. His 15 day journey carried him through CHINA and SIBERIA by train. He and four other North VIETNAMESE students studied at the MOSCOW Institute of Cinematography for the next four years, graduating in Jul 1964, and returning to North VIETNAM, where he drafted movies and directed a theatrical troupe until he began infiltration south.

(G-2 COMMENT: Judging from the professional and technical background of source the enemy has a definite appreciation for the value of public relations. It is believed that the films produced were probably intended both for foreign and local viewing to establish world wide recognition of the Communist Cause. All information rated (F-3).)

c. Hoi Chanh, SrSgt Pham Minh HUAN, B.45 Sapper Company who rallied at CHARO Out Post (BT 232188) on 1 Dec 1969 (SA QUAN TIN Sector, TAM KY msg 031925Z Dec 1969), stated that the B.45 Sapper Company AKA/8 SONG TIEN, has a strength of 27 men, located vicinity (BT 135101) on 28 Nov 1969, with the mission of attacking DOI DOAT Outpost vicinity (BT 113119) and NONG PHA Outpost vicinity (BT 136149) in Dec 1969 or Jan 1970. Source further stated B.45 Sapper Company will be assisted in the attacks by an unknown sapper unit of VC QUANG NAM (P). He further stated that B.45 has reconnoitered NONG PHU and DOI DOAT Outpost and rehearsed with sand tables, and were practicing the attacks with the aid of mock-ups of the objective area. The B.45 Company consists of a Headquarters Group, and three Sapper Squads. Strength: Headquarters-five men, 1st sqd-seven men, 3d sqd-eight men (incl one sick man who is also the only NVA in Co). HUAN related that the C.7 Company was located (BT 165095) on 27 Nov 1969 and that it had a strength of 35 men. The name of C.7's Company Commander is PHUC. B.45 Company had received 400 Angs (5,304.4 lbs) of rice which was distributed to other units (unknown) and C.7 Company on 15 Nov.

(G-2 COMMENT: III MAF does not currently hold the B.45 LF Sapper Company in the OOB. However, MACV carries a B.45 Sapper Platoon which is probably the same unit. According to the reported strength, it is believed that this unit is platoon size. All information rated (F-3).)

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5. QUANG NGAI (P). PW, Nguyen Duc NHUT, Staff Asst for WIA and dead soldiers Section of the 45th Sapper Co of MO DUC District, was captured on 4 Nov 1969 in the vicinity of (BS 766573) four kilometers east north-east of MO DUC (CG III MAF 150122Z Dec 1969) and stated that the 45th Co had a strength of 38 men and was located in the villages of DUC LUONG (BS 675570); DUC HOAI (BS 735575); and DUC PHUOC (BS 738575), all in MO DUC (D). Their mission is to raid refugee camps located in MO DUC (D). The 19th Co, with a strength of 50 men, also operates with the 45th Co and is located with the 45th Co. PW also mentions the 82mm Mortar Squad which operates in MO DUC (D) (NFI). At the end of Oct 1969, after studying the last will and testament of Ho Chi MINH, the entire MO DUC District Unit decided that the district Main Force and Guerilla forces were to make a resolution to follow Ho Chi MINH's advice in actively concentrating their capabilities in raiding the pacification units and outposts in order to win the people and to break the FVMAF's plan of moving the people to ARVN and Americal resettlement areas. The 45th Co planned an immediate scheme to raid the resettlement hamlets of VINH THUAN (V) and DUC VINH (V) (BS 7354) one kilometer southwest of MO DUC, and to study enemy activities and situation in MO DUC District seat in order to discover a way to penetrate, subvert, demoralize and terrorize the people's spirit, causing them doubt in the protective capabilities of the GVN authorities, and to persuade them to move into the VC-controlled areas. The 45th Co's morale is very low. The 45th Co carries an LBN of 67 A and the 19th Co has an LBN of 67 B. The 45th Co holds one B-41 and two B-40's with shape charges and explosives. The 19th Co has one 60mm mortar, one 30 caliber Machine Gun and six BAR's. Reported personalities: 45th Co CO-Lt MAI, XO-VAN, PO-AN, Adj-THANH; 19th Co CO-DUC, Adj-THIET. The 45th Co has divided its forces into two groups; one is a combat group which receives rice from the people. The other group is at DUC PHUOC (V) (BS 752549) and DUC PHUNG (V) (BS 739665) to produce agricultueal products. Recently, this unit harvested about 100 ang (13,000 pounds) of rice which is stored at MINH TAN #1 Hamlet (BS 755595).

(G-2 COMMENT: The 45th Co is identified as the C.45th LF Sapper Co, MO DUC (D), and is located at (BS 7559) with a strength of 40 men (F-1). The C.45th Co was first identified in the attack on NUI DEP OP (BS 708-606), on 17 Nov 1968 (F-1). The 19th Co is identified as the C.19 LF Co MO DUC (D), located at (BS 7555) with a strength of 45 men (F-1). This is the first report on LBN's 67A and 67B (F-6). Weapons are in keeping with III MAF OOB holdings (F-2). The future mission of the company falls in with the assigned missions of the QUANG NGAI Provincial units on their planned attacks on pacification areas which are scheduled for the Winter-Spring Campaign. (F-2).)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAF PERINTREP 51-69

1. GENERAL. Reported VC/VCI counterintelligence activities followed the pattern of the past several weeks.

Terrorist activity dropped to an extremely low-level from the moderately low-levels of the two previous weeks.

Efforts to collect food and solicit political, financial, materiel, and physical support from the people continues to occupy most of the VC/VCI cadres' time.

Reports continue to indicate enemy efforts to establish his revolutionary governmental structure parallel to that of the GVN and to solicit popular participation for a general uprising in conjunction with a planned large scale offensive. Other reports continue to reflect efforts directed toward long-range goals and preparations for a prolonged struggle.

A document captured in southern I CTZ on 12 December 1969, referring to an addendum to COSVN's Resolution 9, reflects on attempts to obviate the significant threat posed by further "Vietnamization" of the war through a large scale offensive and indicates that a cease-fire can be accepted only when the Americans agree to withdraw their troops from SVN, a coalition government is formed, and we (VC) are stronger than the enemy (RVN) in various aspects (nfi). In the event a large scale offensive failed to propagate these preconditions, the enemy would then pursue a protracted struggle probably in conjunction with a so-called people's guerrilla war.

Miscellaneous reports of possible significance concern the following:

- a. Disclosure of enemy plans to compile assassination rosters and use of false documentation to penetrate GVN controlled areas in Dien Ban (D), Quang Nam (P).
- b. Alleged routes to be used for infiltrating weapons into Danang.
- c. Enemy security countermeasures of a VC unit in Quang Tri (P).
- d. Enemy missions for the 4th quarter of 1969 in Quang Tin (P).
- e. Enemy measures designed to obviate impending famine in Tien Phuoc (D), Quang Tin (P).
- f. Enemy missions of a VC unit in Son Tinh (D), Quang Ngai (P).

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g. Enemy financial and economic activities and problems in Duc Pho (D), Quang Ngai (P).

h. Enemy missions in Duc Pho (D), Quang Ngai (P) during period October thru December 1969.

i. Further reference to the existence of VC Que Tien District in northern Quang Tin (P).

2. ESPIONAGE. No reports of enemy espionage and/or related activities in ICTZ were received during the past week.

3. SABOTAGE. Reported enemy sabotage and/or related activities in ICTZ during the past week consisted of one incident, as follows:

A US MI source reported that at approximately 0130 on 12 December 1969, the enemy blew a culvert on Highway 1 approximately 3 kms northwest of Dong Ha, Quang Tri (P). (Ref: COMUSMACV msg 130923Z Dec69)

4. POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA. VC/VCI political and propaganda activities reflect enemy efforts to expand and strengthen his revolutionary governmental structure parallel to that of the GVN and solicit popular participation and support for a general uprising in conjunction with a planned large scale offensive. In the event a large scale offensive fails to attain the desired position of political strength, US troops are not withdrawn, and a coalition cannot be implemented; preparation is continuing to conduct a protracted struggle.

Propaganda leaflets recently found in the vicinity of Dong Ha, Quang Tri (P), contained appeals for GVN troops and officials to rally to the VC, "Afro-Americans" to refuse to participate in the war, and leaflets with pictures publicizing anti-war dissent in the U.S.

Details of reported enemy political and propaganda activities of the past week are as follows:

a. Quang Tri.

(1) There were two (2) PW's captured on 111500H December 1969 vicinity (YD 415620) by the RF's. They stated that the Trieu Phong (D) Party Committee and Unit is located vicinity (YD 240450). The mission of the district is to build up the VCI in the lowlands and try to reactivate village and hamlet committees. In August 1969, sources heard from district cadre that all units must be ready for the next offensive, 1969-1970. Two axes will be used for the offensive, one from the north and one from the west. On 11 December 1969, the district leader went to Front 7 for a conference. The mission of the special unit medical teams is to set up dispensaries in the lowlands to support the next offensive. (Ref: G-2 I CORPS MEMORANDUM, dtd 13Dec69) (Unrated)

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(2) A US MI source reported that on 12 December 1969, the enemy scattered approximately 5,000 propaganda leaflets along QL 1 from vicinity (YD 219635) to (YD 219640). The leaflets are of a type seen previously, calling for GVN soldiers and officials to rally to the VC cause. (Ref: PSA Quang Tri Province msg 121215Z Dec69)

(3) On 17 December 1969 at approximately 2100H an unknown number of enemy scattered propaganda leaflets along QL 1 from vicinity (YD 220638) to vicinity (YD 220640).

There were six (6) different types of leaflets. One is directed to "Afro-Americans", one is a poem supposedly written by an American serviceman, and three capitalize on the anti-war movement in the U.S. Four of the six leaflets carry pictures of the anti-war demonstrators.

The leaflets were printed on good quality newsprint, the reproduction of the photographs was very good, and the English used was excellent. (Ref: PSA Quang Tri Province msg 180915Z Dec69)

(4) A US MI source reported that at approximately 2300H on 19 December 1969 the enemy scattered approximately 1,000 propaganda leaflets vicinity (YD 214606) (nfi).

b. Thua Thien.

A US MI source reported that on 10 December 1969, a meeting of approximately 30 personnel of the Phu Loc District Committee and cadre of the 4th Worksite was convened at Truoi Mountain, vicinity (YC 965950). Participants in the meeting were district administrative cadre, VC village cadre, and cadre and commanders of the 4th Worksite. The results and decisions of the meeting were as follows:

Pham Van DONG and Vo Nguyen GIAP have decreed that the Winter-Spring offensive will extend from the present time until March 1970. A summer campaign will be instigated after March 1970. The efforts of guerrilla forces should not be wasted. The long range struggle must be continued in order to reach the last goal. Main Force units must increase their harrassment, sabotage, and ambushes along Highway 1. They must assassinate and kidnap people who are reactionary. VC cadre must become members of political parties and religious groups and will attempt to cause disagreement and splits among their members. The Paris Peace talks will be fruitless because the Americans are too stubborn. Large scale attacks will be realized when VC forces have a good grip on all situations. Targets will be populous areas. No further details are known concerning the above information.

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(Ref: DET B, 1st MI BN, 525th MI GP, Rpt #1/B/CX/1311/69, dtd 15 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

c. Quang Nam.

(1) On 1 December 1969, elements of the US Americal Division operating in the vicinity (BT 133043) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Circular, number 332/CT, dated 14 November 1969, prepared for the signature of Tran Dinh HIEU, Commander of Unit 123 (Quang Nam Province Unit, Military Region 5), forwarded to subordinate units, instructs them to conduct political reorientation sessions for subordinate personnel. The testament of Chairman Ho Chi MINH (deceased) was to be studied. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1854-69, dtd 15 Dec 69), (Eval: B-3).

(2) A US MI source reported that as of 9 December 1969, it was learned that Front 4, Quang Nam (P) had ended a training session for penetration agents and propaganda cadre which had taken place approximately two weeks ago. Young men and women, twenty years of age or younger, received English language training. These individuals have infiltrated Danang and Hoi An cities and were to attempt to obtain jobs in clubs, restaurants and bars near US and ARVN installations. (Ref: CO, DETACHMENT C, 1st MI BN, (P) 525th MI GP, Rpt No: 1/B/BX/0857/69, dtd 12 Dec 69) (Eval: C-6).

(3) A US MI source reported that at 2300 hours on 11 December 1969 the VC conducted a meeting at Ba Tung (H) vicinity (BT 043697). The meeting was attended by local villagers. The leaders of the meeting (nfi) enjoined the people to fully support the National Liberation Front (NLF), to make NLF flags to display on holidays, and to contribute monetarily through the collection of taxes in order to support the political programs of the NLF. The Hanoi Government has recently issued new paper currency which the villagers will be required to use in place of the GVN currency. At the meeting the VC leaders propagandized that victory is near for the NLF, and soon North and South Vietnam will be united under the NLF/PRG. GVN currency is no longer worth anything, as can be attested by the recent increase in taxes. The people will be required to exchange their GVN money for the new Hanoi currency which will be the monetary basis for both South and North Vietnam. The legal exchange rate will be one (1) Hanoi piaster for twenty-five (25) GVN piasters. A number of the villagers believed the VC propaganda that the GVN piaster is worthless, and they exchanged their money for North Vietnamese currency. (Ref: OSI, DET 5003, Danang AB, Rpt #DRAFT DDITR 12-32, dtd 15 Dec 69) (Eval: F-2).

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(4) On 12 December 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division operating in the vicinity (BT J30619) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Directive, number 15/CT, dated 20 September 1969, prepared for the signature of Duc HONG (for Security Section, Dien Ban District, QDSZ, MR-5), provides instruction governing the conduct of investigation of the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) situation, development of friendly (VC/NVA) forces, assassination of tyrants, and conduct of political struggles in the city outskirts.

Document states that after suffering successive defeats in both tactical and strategic fields, the enemy was compelled to de-escalate the war. But he still strives to intensify military, political, pacification, psywar, and espionage activities in an attempt to strengthen the Puppet (RVNAF) Army and Puppet (GVN) Administration and "Americanize" the Vietnam war.

Therefore, to disrupt the enemy activities in district seats, towns, and cities, security elements must investigate the enemy administrative organization, the US and Puppet intelligence organizations, and reactionary religious and political parties.

In the city outskirts, male and female youths must be grouped into organizations and trained to investigate the enemy situation and activities. In friendly liberated areas, more armed security elements must be activated and the people must be taught to practice counterespionage, perform military proselyting, and help friendly local elements assassinate tyrants. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-2146-69, dtd 19 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

(5) A US MI source reported that civilians were forced to attend a VC meeting held at Tu Cau #4 (H) vicinity (BT 048649) about 10km Southeast of Danang AB on the evening of 15 December 1969. The meeting lasted 30 minutes and was presided over by Huynh Duc THAO, Huynh THONG and Tran TU, all VCI from eastern Hoa Vang (D). The VC propagandized that within coming months a coalition government between the present government and the NLF would be formed and elections held. They cautioned against voting for any Government or American lackeys. They told the people to support the NLF and consult hamlet political cadre before voting. (Ref: OSI DET 5003, Danang AB, DRAFT DDIER 12-34, dtd 16 Dec 69) (Eval: F-3).

d. Quang Ngai.

(1) A US MI source reported that on 3 December 1969, the Son Tinh and Tu Nghia VC District Committees held a joint meeting at the

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house of Mrs. Kiem in Hung-Nhuong (H) vicinity (BS 470778), Son-Dong (V), Son-Tinh (D). Twenty-five (25) people attended the meeting including:

HAI; Son Tinh VC (D) Secretary and chairman of the meeting.

Do thi SON; Son Tinh VC (D) female cadre and clerk.

CAN; Tu Nghia VC (D) committee member.

Ha SON; Son Tinh VC (D) Unit (AKA: 137th Unit) leader.

TINH; Nghia Lam VC (V) Secretary.

Le thi MINH; VC hamlet female cadre.

Mrs. CUA; Tinh-Minh VC Village Female Association Secretary.

The meeting was opened at 2130 hours by HAI who gave a brief summary of the general situation in Vietnam and in the rest of the world (nfi). He then spoke about how "strong" attacks by US and ARVN forces had caused many troubles for the VC. Inhabitants of Nghia Thang (V), and Nghia Ky (V) were hiding from the US/ARVN sweep operations at Tinh Dong (V), and were being protected by VC Liberation Forces. The VC Provincial Committee directed the Son Tinh and Tu Nghia District Committees to hold an inter-district meeting in order to decide on methods which would be taken to regain the villages and villagers. The VC planned to use manpower resources in areas still under VC control to prepare for the "general uprising campaign" which would consist of food-supply, military and political struggles (nfi). The details of the plan were explained by CAN as follows:

(1) At least 200 of the 500 laborers who were brought together during November 1969 and who had moved to Tinh Dong (V), from Son Tinh (D), and Tu Nghia (D), should be concentrated into one area.

(2) Each villager would be required to save between 6 and 18 kilograms of husked rice to be given to VC soldiers during the general uprising. Each family should receive enough money from the VC to buy between 15 and 30 kilos of husked rice in GVN controlled areas at \$140 VNP per kilo.

(3) All VC hamlet female cadre members should be ready to appeal to local inhabitants to buy fresh food, such as sugar, milk, vegetables, fish and meat in GVN controlled areas in order to supply VC troops when they deploy in the area.

(4) Each family should prepare medicine and a 5 day supply of dried food (nfi) to be used during the general uprising. The four

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above tasks should be completed between 1 December and 10 December 1969.

CAN stated that the laborers would be ready to go on 10 December 1969 (nfi).

HAI stated that the political struggle would be conducted in the following manner:

(1) Inter-reconnaissance units (nfi) would be organized to take charge of female liberation members.

(2) Local inhabitants would establish contact with and appeal to relatives who are ARVN soldiers or GVN cadre to defect, desert, or separate themselves from the side of the government in some other manner (nfi).

(3) Legal anti-government demonstrations would be conducted on a continuous but geographically scattered basis.

(4) Support would be given to Buddhist and other anti-war movements in the armed forces, national police and political parties. The above mentioned political tasks would be started on 7 December 1969.

In the Tinh Dong areas vicinity (BS 470778) the VC established a "population treatment section" which was responsible to appeal to people living in GVN areas to move to VC controlled areas and was responsible for the treatment of those who did make such a move. HAI said that all those who moved into the VC controlled areas would receive good treatment, even those who were enemies of the VC. The Son Tinh-Tu Nghia VC Inter-District Population Treatment Section was led by HAI; CAN was assistant chief.

Regarding the military struggle, Ha SON promised that the VC troops would show their true ability to protect the population and their loyalty to the revolutionary liberation cause. Ha SON admitted however, that the VC units were understrength, that the war was going badly, and that faults were being resolved. Finally, all those present at the meeting promised to gain victories during the 4th Winter-Spring (1969-1970) Campaign. (Ref: DET D, 1st MI BN, 525th MI GP, Quang Ngai, Rpt #1/B/DX/1555/69, dtd 10 Dec 69) (Eval: F-3).

(2) A US MI source reported that a meeting of the Quang Ngai VC Provincial Committee was held on 6 December 1969 vicinity Ha Thuong (H) (BS 390450). Present at the meeting were:

Tran Duc OANH; Chairman of the Provincial Front.

Nguyen LUONG; (AKA: MOT), a Provincial Party member in charge of re-constructing installations (nfi).

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Nguyen Thanh TAM; a military cadre in charge of troop-proselyting and intelligence operations.

Tran thi BINH; member of the Provincial Female Executive Committee.

NHUONG; a political and religious-proselyting cadre member.

Nguyen BAO (nfi).

TUONG; a regional political proselyting cadre member.

Nguyen LUONG; a member of the Provincial Forward Front Section.

The chairman of the meeting, Tran Duc OANH, led the meeting participants in a discussion. A large number of well trained cadre members were considered necessary for stopping the flow of refugees from VC controlled areas into GVN controlled areas and for establishing the revolutionary government. Although each of the villages had liberation governments, such as regional administration committees and liberation committees, 3/4's of the villages did not have sufficient numbers of cadre members. Tran Duc OANH felt that during the cease-fire period (nfi), the required number of cadre members would be needed to conduct the GVN refugee acceptance mission (nfi). In order to fulfill this requirement 2,500 cadre would be sent to Quang Ngai (P) from North Vietnam and 1,000 cadre who were born in Quang Ngai (P) would return to Quang Ngai from North Vietnam. The VC planned to assign 50 cadre to each Vietnamese village and 20 cadre to each Montagnard village. All cadre must be trustworthy members of the Revolutionary Party. Cadre members would be trained at projected training centers in Lang Rao vicinity (BS 370580) and Nuoc Lac vicinity (BS 390450). At the present time due to unforeseen circumstances (nfi) the VC were forced to use mobile training centers. Tran Duc OANH said that prior to 15 December 1969, the Provincial Office was required to:

Institute a survey (nfi) of the population in VC controlled areas.

Compile a list of GVN cadre members (including their grades or titles).

Conduct checks of local political duties (especially the People's Revolutionary Party and Can-Lao Party) to determine membership and party activities.

Conduct similar checks on religious organizations, ARVN forces, National Police, RF, PF, and the PSDF.

The VC planned to install underground cadre in GVN ranks as follows:

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Through false defections.

By changing legal living areas (nfi).

By motivating youths to penetrate high schools.

This plan was originally proposed in 1968 but the VC had not been able to apply it. Tran Duc OANH said that the plan would be put into effect during the Winter-Spring (1969-1970) Campaign. It was also mentioned at the meeting that North Vietnam plans to send three (3) well-armed (nfi) divisions advised by Communist Chinese cadre to South Vietnam to support the aims of the VC at the Paris Peace talks. Tran Duc OANH stated that the three divisions were currently on the move. Although the VC did not have enough strength to launch large scale attacks during last year's T&T, they felt that they would try to gain victories during the Winter-Spring (1969-1970) Campaign. (Ref: DET D, 1st MI BN, 525th MI GP, Rpt #1/B/DX/1577/69, dtd 12 Dec 69) (Eval: C-2).

III MAF SCI COMMENT: Although this report contains the originating unit's evaluation of C-2, that portion relating to the infiltration of three (3) NVN divisions advised by Chinese Communist cadre is considered highly improbable.

(3) On 12 December 1969, elements of the 173rd US Airborne Brigade operating vicinity of (BS 919158) in I CTZ discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Notebook, entries dated from 15 August to 19 November 1969, by an unspecified individual (possibly member of Pho Chau Village Party Committee, Duc Pho District), records routine activities (of a local village party committee) in tax collection, farm production and construction of combat hamlets.

An entry, undated (possibly made before the end of September 1969), pertains to the study of the addendum of Resolution number 9 adopted by COSVN. It reads in part as follows:

"The primary concern of the Nixon administration is to settle the SVN war as soon as possible, because Asia, militarily, has recently become an area of little interest to the Americans. The primary objectives of the Americans are the Near East, Middle East, and Europe. The SVN war has frustrated the world-wide strategy of the Americans and has politically isolated the Americans in all parts of the world. The Americans have brought the SVN war to its apex, and now have to de-escalate it because they realize that they are unable to win a military victory.

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"On our (NFI/SVN/NVN) part, we have made great strides in the military, political, and diplomatic fields, but we have failed to decisively turn the tide of the SVN war in our favor.

The Americans will not relinquish their schemes to compel NVN to pull out its troops in response to the withdrawal of US troops from SVN, to establish a pro-American government in SVN and to support the Puppet (RVN) government in future political competition with us. It is indicated that the Americans will give annual economic aid of 2.5 billion US dollars (to the RVN government) in the postwar period for the implementation of their neo-colonialism in SVN.

In the days ahead, the Americans will consolidate the Puppet Government, modernize the Puppet Army, expedite the de-Americanization of the SVN war, and intensify their military operations throughout SVN so that they can de-escalate the war from a strong position. Their plan has various vital weaknesses. The de-escalation of the war will put the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) in an awkward defensive position and will affect the morale of the enemy troops. It will also accelerate the collapse of the puppet government because the Puppet Army will not be able to effectively replace the US troops.

The Americans have little chance of recovering from their situation of despair and will follow one of these alternatives:

(1) They will end the SVN war quickly, with a political solution contrary to their aims, if we are successful in our (upcoming) military operations. In this event, there will be an extremely complex period when the enemy (Americans and GVN) will seek to weaken us militarily and politically.

(2) They will prolong the war to create favorable conditions for their future political competition with us, if we are unsuccessful in our (upcoming) military operations.

The enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) will continue to carry out its clear-and-hold strategy, expedite its accelerated pacification program, and consolidate the (RVN) administrative organizations (in the rural areas). In conjunction, the Americans will gradually withdraw their troops from SVN to alleviate the anti-war movement in the United States.

Our immediate missions are to bring our general offensive and uprising to its culminate phase to attain a decisive victory. We are to compel the Americans to withdraw their troops from SVN quickly and to end their war of aggression in SVN."

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"To do so, we are to inflict casualties on the US troops; destroy an important part of the Puppet Army to frustrate the de-Americanization of the SVN war; disintegrate the (RVN) administrative infrastructure; develop our revolutionary organizations; and compel the Americans to establish a coalition government in SVN.

Our primary objectives will be the (RVN) urban areas.

We are determined to win a decisive victory in the shortest period of time, but we are also determined to carry out a protracted war if necessary.

A cease fire will only be accepted by us if the following conditions are fulfilled:

- (1) The Americans agree to withdraw (all) their troops from SVN.
- (2) A coalition government is formed.
- (3) We are stronger than the enemy (RVN) in various aspects.

Presently, we have not yet won the support of the non-aligned people. Our mass uprisings are weak. Consequently, we are to continue our military attacks to develop our revolutionary organizations in order to generate a general mass up-rising aimed at overthrowing the Thieu-Ky government and founding a coalition government. This coalition government may be formed after we have seized control of the (RVN) administrative infrastructure. We will accept a ceasefire only when we are sure to win in our political competition with the enemy (RVN)."

Subsequent entry, undated, contains notes taken from a Resolution adopted by the (possibly Duc Pho) District Party Committee. The Resolution states that the primary objectives of the D Campaign (possibly 1969 Winter Campaign) are to annihilate an important part of the 11th Brigade, US Americal Division; cut off routes of communications; and expand guerrilla warfare. Intensive attacks are to be conducted on the local district seat and (RVN) resettlement centers. Concurrently, efforts should be made to disrupt the (RVN) administrative grip at village and hamlet levels and to defeat the (ARVN) accelerated pacification program.

Entry, dated 4 December 1969, reveals that in the construction of combat hamlets, 1,870 spikes were planted in Hung Long (H) and 2,900 spikes in Chau Me (H). (RefL CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1972-69, dtd 16 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

(4) A US MI source reported the following information on 12 December 1969 (Date of information - 30 Nov 69):

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The VC implemented a plan in Son Ha (D) concerning the people guerrilla self defense force with the intention of developing the guerrilla population into an infrastructure at hamlet and village level.

According to a VC district propaganda-training section chief, the plan is to improve the instruction, increase the people's support for a prolonged struggle and form a strong infrastructure to promote anti-GVN/RD programs.

The plan is to be carried out according to the security situation of each area. In VC controlled areas there will be no change. In disputed areas (GVN controlled), local guerrillas will be sent to act as spies. Relatives of ARVN soldiers will no longer be used to collect intelligence. At each hamlet, the plan is designed to motivate and arm from 12 to 15 guerrillas during the first training period (nfi) and 20 or 21 during the second training period (nfi). Each village is assigned to activate and arm 30 to 36 guerrillas for the first training period (nfi) and 40 to 60 during the second training period (nfi). All guerrillas will be armed with homemade weapons (nfi). This VC plan is now in effect and they hope that it will be completed by the end of the year, to increase the VC effectiveness during the 1970 struggles (nfi). It is also reported that full time guerrillas at district level are being reassigned to main force units. Many cadre and soldiers of the main force units will be used as commanders at hamlet and village level units, while the hamlet and village level cadre take a six (6) week course in political studies. (Ref: DET D, 1st MI BN, 525th MI GP, Rpt #1/B/DX/1585/69, dtd 15 Dec 69) (Eval: B-2)

5. TERROR. Reported enemy terrorist activities dropped to an extremely low level from the moderately low level of the previous two weeks. No specific pattern or trends were discernible.

Six (6) incidents were reported, resulting in seven (7) civilians killed, four (4) wounded, no abductions, and three (3) dwellings destroyed/damaged. Included were three (3) late reports consisting of two (2) civilians killed and one (1) dwelling destroyed/damaged.

Details of terrorist activity are listed in Appendix 1.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Quang Nam.

(1) On 12 December 1969, elements of the 1st Marine Division operating in the vicinity (BT 030619) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

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Circular, number 17/TB, classified (VC) SECRET, dated 10 September 1969, signed by Phan Nien for B19 (possibly Security Section, Dien Ban District), reveals the following:

(a) The enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) knew that we had compiled rosters of tyrants and hostile administrative personnel to be assassinated when a peace solution (for the SVN war) goes into effect. To carry out this plan, we selected youths aged 12 to 20 and sent them to our liberated (VC controlled) areas for training. Meanwhile, we have sent a number of youths to enemy controlled areas to study English for the purpose of contacting the Americans and collecting information.

(b) The enemy also knew that we made a new type of false identification cards in order to penetrate his towns and cities. He therefore checks carefully both the old and new types of identification cards. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-2093-69, dtd 18 Dec 60) (Eval: B-3).

(2) A US MI source reported on 12 December 1969, that the Viet Cong (VC) intended to infiltrate weapons into Danang by two routes in preparation for the forthcoming Winter/Spring Campaign. The first infiltration route was from the Hieu Duc area vicinity (AT 945670), to Da Son (H) vicinity (AT 964365), to Hoa Khanh vicinity (AT 960763), and finally to Thanh Khe (H) vicinity (AT 985781), just west of Danang (nfi). The second infiltration route was from Hoa Cuong (H) vicinity (BT 032745), Hoa Vang (D), to the 1st District, Danang, (nfi). (Ref: MSS/CT-1, 1st MI BN (P), 525th MI GP, Danang) (Eval: F-6).

b. Quang Tin.

(1) On 1 December 1969, elements of the US Americal Division operating in the vicinity of (BT 133043) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Directive, dated 17 September 1969, prepared by the Command Committee of Unit 109 (probably Tien Phuoc District Unit, Quang Tin Province, MR-5), addressed to subordinate units, states that Military Region 5 as well as Quang Nam Province were facing a serious supply problem. In a number of areas, the population decreased due to the enemy's (FWMAF/RVNAF) pacification program. The agricultural production was hindered and the collection of taxes was adversely affected. The production for self-support of subordinate units did not meet the requirements. To cope with this problem, the military region headquarters ordered all subordinate units to grow an emergency crop to try to curb an impending famine. Cadre and members were instructed to prepare for the implementation of the order. In addition to regular production obligations, every member was ordered to work nine days a month from October to December 1969 so that by early 1970, each individual can provide food for himself for one month.

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In the meantime, combat duties and military training should not be neglected. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1845-69, dtd 15 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

(2) On 1 December 1969, elements of the US Americal Division operating in the vicinity (BT 133043) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Directive, dated 24 September 1969, signed illegibly by Commanding Officer, Unit 123A (Military Staff Section, Quang Tin Province, MR-5), addressed to two D's (battalions) of the (Quang Tin) Province Unit, districts, cities and (Liberation) Front Committees, pertains to missions to be carried out during the last three months of 1969 as follows:

(a) One-third of personnel strength should be employed to operate constantly (nfi).

(b) The remaining two-thirds of the unit's strength should undergo military and political training from 40 to 60 days.

(c) Simultaneously with these activities, efforts should be made to obtain ammunition and foodstuffs sufficient for immediate and future requirements. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1800-69, dtd 13 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

(3) The 2nd ROK Marine Brigade discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Circular, number 145/TB, dated 30 September 1969, signed by Pham Thanh TOAN, Commanding Officer, Unit 113 (possibly Thang Binh District Unit, Quang Tin Province, MR-5), outlines the missions to be carried out to counter enemy (FVMAF/RVNAF) espionage activities.

Document reveals that since the beginning of August (69), the enemy greatly intensified his espionage activities by employing teenagers as informants and attempting to infiltrate personnel into our (VC) forces, particularly into sapper units. In addition, the enemy also expedited his pacification program with emphasis placed on the lowland areas and areas adjacent to towns and cities. The enemy's goals are to isolate friendly units and cut off our sources of supply.

In order to cope with these schemes, all subordinate units of Unit 113 are to (1) heighten vigilance of cadre and troops to withstand

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enemy propaganda and Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) activities; (2) devote greater efforts to the maintenance of security; and (3) be careful when recruiting personnel, particularly enemy deserters or surrenderers. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1694-69, dtd 12 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

c. Quang Ngai.

(1) On 12 December 1969, elements of the 173rd US Army Airborne Brigade, operating vicinity of (BS 917158) in southern I CTZ discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Extracts of a resolution, classified (VC) SECRET, dated 12 October 1969, prepared for the signature of Quang TUYEN, Secretary Executive Committee, Duc Pho District Party Headquarters, outlines the following missions to be carried out during the period 10 October to (to the end of) December 1969:

Exploit recent successes by intensifying three-pronged attacks.

Conduct repeated attacks everywhere in order to destroy as much of the enemy's (FWMAF/RVNAF) potential force and war materials as possible.

Instigate the people to participate in insurgent operations in order to annihilate tyrants (possibly meaning RVN officials) and to destroy the local administration.

Disintegrate the (RVN) People's Self Defense Force.

Exert all efforts to keep the local inhabitants from leaving.

Thwart the enemy's accelerated pacification program and his de-Americanization (of the Vietnam war).

Intensify guerrilla warfare.

Protect crops from enemy pillage.

Increase the purchase of food and collection of taxes.

Strengthen our (VC) forces in all three areas and consolidate the (VC) liberated areas.

As far as military proselyting is concerned, each village is required to have five personnel, including one village Party member

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in charge. (VC) Secret agents should be planted in (RVNAF) Regional Forces, and Republic (RVNAF) servicemen should be positioned in local areas. Letters should be sent to the officers of the three headquarters of three C (companies) located respectively at Tra Cau, Da Heo, and Nuoc Man (areas).

Document also stipulates that (approximately) 485 category A (healthy adult civilian laborers should be recruited by 13 different villages of Duc Pho District to carry weapons, ammunition, and food (for VC troops) for a 30 day period.

All villages of Duc Pho District are required to recruit 72 village guerrillas and 215 hamlet guerrillas during the aforementioned period.

Regarding a food collection program, document indicates that this program will be implemented in four phases as follows:

Phase 1 - from 15 Sept to 31 Oct 69

Phase 2 - from 11 Nov to 30 Nov 69

Phase 3 - from 11 Dec to 31 Dec 69

Phase 4 - from 1 Jan to 31 Jan 70

(Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1992-69, dtd 17 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

(2) On 12 December 1969, elements of the 173rd US Army Airborne Brigade, operating vicinity of (BS 917158) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Directive, number 101/VFTV, dated 22 October 1969, signed by Do Tien CUA for E51 (possibly Current Affairs Committee, Duc Pho District), pertains to the intensification of financial and economic activities in 1969-1970 Winter-Spring Campaign.

Document first outlines the weakness displayed in financial and economic activities conducted from the beginning of 1969. Weaknesses included poor farm production, insufficient trading business, corruption in tax collection, improper preservation of provisions, and interruption of transportation lines.

In regard to forthcoming financial and economic activities, the document relates the difficulties caused by the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) military and pacification activities, and natural disasters. It instructs subordinate villages to coordinate with adjacent units and

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agencies to intensify farm production and the requisition and purchase of provisions. These are the main objectives to be attained by the villages during the 1969-1970 Winter-Spring Campaign. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1983-69, dtd 16 Dec 69) (Eval: B-3).

(3) A US MI source reported that on 3 December 1969, the 80th VC City force unit (nfi) with an estimated strength of 30 personnel, commanded by THANH, who had recently been assigned from MR-5, and Nguyen QUA, a squad leader, were located in the vicinity of Hung Nhuong (H) vicinity (BS 457773) Son Don (V), Son Tinh (D). They were given instructions to determine any US intelligence activities (nfi) and take counter action. They were also instructed to collect any photographs and statements concerning the US mass slaying and to collect, recruit, and motivate any person who was present during the slayings. They also were instructed to remain close to Chieu Hoi centers and attempt to capture any person who had defected to the GVN. (Ref: DET D, 1st MI BN, 525th MI GP, Rpt #1/B/DX/1546/69, dtd 5 Dec 69) (Eval: C-6).

(4) On 1 December 1969, elements of the US Americal Division operating in the vicinity (BT 133043) discovered an enemy document containing the following information:

Two mission orders, numbered 555 and 735, dated 14 September 1969 and 20 November 1969, signed by Huynh Quang Phat, Commanding Officer of Unit 123 (Political Section, Quang Tin Province Unit, MR-5), authorized Tran Thuy, cadre of Unit 123B, to proceed to villages of Tam Ky, Tien Phuoc, Thang Binh and Que Tien Districts, and units in the province for an unspecified military mission, from 14 September to 31 October 1969 and from 20 November to 25 December 1969. (Ref: CDEC DOC LOG NO: 12-1790-69, dtd 13 December 1969) (Eval: B-3).

III MAF COMMENT: Fourth report concerning existence of VC Que Tien (D), Quang Tin (P). Previous reports contained in III MAF PERINTREPs 34, 37, and 40-69.

APPENDIX

I-Terrorist Incidents in ICTZ

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Ngai	15Dec69	(BS 783434)	At approximately 2015, PF Platoon 815 received nine (9) rounds of 82mm mortar fire while in night defensive position (nfi). Two children in the vicinity were wounded.

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE) TO III MAP PERINTREP 51-69****TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ICTZ**

<u>Province</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Incident</u>
Quang Tri	15Dec69	(YD 094523)	At approximately 0800, a member of the Cam Nghia Village council received minor wounds when he detonated a booby trapped grenade rigged in a doorway of the village meeting hall.
Thua Thien	16Dec69	(YD 535338)	At approximately 2330H, the 150th PF platoon engaged an unknown size enemy force. Enemy returned small arms fire and RPG rounds. Two (2) of the RPG rounds impacted in the Con San Refugee Camp, Phong Nguyen (V), Phong Dien (D), killing five (5) civilians and wounding one (1). Two homes sustained 50 percent damage (nfi).
Quang Tin	12Dec69 (Late Entry)	(BT 332188)	At approximately 2215, fifteen (15) VC conducted a hit and run attack using satchel charges on Ky Bich Village Headquarters. The enemy force partially destroyed the Village Chief's office building before fleeing in an unknown direction. There were negative casualties.
Quang Ngai	12Dec69 (Late Entry)	(BS 604860)	VC killed one (1) civilian (nfi) during a raid (nfi).
	13Dec69 (Late Entry)	(BS 746780)	One (1) civilian female was killed by a booby trapped hand grenade (nfi).

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ANNEX D (RECONNAISSANCE AND SENSOR ACTIVITY) TO III MAF PERINTREP 51-69

1. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY.

a. There were 34 long range reconnaissance patrols deployed throughout ICTZ during the week of 14 December 1969. These long range patrols reported 29 sightings totaling approximately 293 enemy. Recon team contacts and air and artillery strikes called in response to enemy sightings resulted in 50 enemy KIA during this reporting period.

b. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion teams patrolling the 1st Marine Division AO observed approximately 216 enemy during the reporting period. Artillery fire missions called by the teams resulted in 37 enemy KIA. The majority of the enemy sightings occurred in the Que Son Mountain - An Hoa area. The enemy were moving in no discernible pattern.

c. The 3rd Force Reconnaissance Company on 20 December 1969 inserted 2 teams in the A Shau Valley area. They reported negative sightings or contacts for that day.

d. The Americal Division Ranger teams observed approximately 73 enemy during the reporting period. Artillery fire missions called by the teams resulted in 13 enemy KIA.

e. Weather hampered long range reconnaissance operations during this reporting period. The 101st Airborne Division (AM) Ranger teams operated in the Da Krong River Valley area without significant enemy sightings or contacts. The 1st Infantry Brigade 5th Infantry Division (Mech) Ranger teams operating near the DMZ in the vicinity of Con Thien also had no significant sightings or contacts.

2. SENSOR ACTIVITY.

a. In the 101st Airborne Division (AM) DMZ area sensors detected 7 targets during this reporting period. Fifty-six rounds of 175mm artillery were fired in response with negative BDA. Sensors located north of the Rockpile indicated a reduction in enemy activity during this reporting period.

b. Sensors located out of the DMZ in the 101st Airborne Division (AM) area detected 164 targets during this reporting period. Two hundred ninety-seven rounds of 175mm, eight rounds of eight inch, 63 rounds of 155mm, and 34 rounds of 105mm artillery were fired in response. BDA revealed negative results. Sensors located in the Western Defile area were extremely active during this reporting period.

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c. Radio frequency and line sensors in the 1st Marine Division AO detected 43 targets during this reporting period. Forty-two fire missions consisting of 222 rounds of mortar and 127 rounds of artillery were called. As a result of sensor activations 14 rounds of 81mm mortar were fired vicinity AT 911691 at 152155H December 1969. A sweep of the area resulted in one 35mm CS grenade launcher cartridge being found. On 200015H December 1969, 13 rounds of 81mm mortar were fired vicinity AT 906708 resulting in one secondary explosion. Sensors in the 1st Marine Division AO showed a continued low level of enemy activity this reporting period.

d. Sensors in the Americal Division AO detected 30 targets this reporting period. Twenty-six fire missions consisting of 319 rounds of artillery were fired in response. During this reporting period reacting to P-SID activations, B 1/52 Infantry from a night ambush position killed 4 VC. Also during this reporting period units of the 4/3 Infantry discovered three graves in the kill zone of a sensor string in the vicinity of BT 655761. Sensor activity remained extremely active in all sensor fields this reporting period.

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ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) TO III MAF PERINTREP 51-69

A. REGISTERED MAIL

DIR, NSA	3	NILO HUE, BOX 9, AT-3, APO 96258	1
DIR, AIR UNIV LIB AUL (SE)69-69	1	NILO QUANG TRI, BOX 16, AT-19,	
CMC (ABQ)	2	APO 96495	1
CG FMFPAC	2		
CG USARV	1		
CG I FFORCEV	5	B. <u>BY COURIER</u>	
CG II FFORCEV	1		
CG 25TH INF DIV	1	COMUSMACV (MACV J-232) (CITED)	2
CG 1ST AUSTRALIAN TF	1	COMUSMACV (MAC SOG)	4
CG MCDEC	1	COMUSMACV (MACV 233)	2
CG 5TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CAL	6	COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-21)	2
CG 4TH MARDIV, CAMPEN, CAL	1	COMUSMACV (MACJ 234-22)	2
CG 3RD MAW	2	COMUSMACV (MACJ 231-6)	4
CO 5TH SFG (ABN)	2	CICV	2
CO "B" 5TH USSF GROUP (ABN)	5	CG XXIV CORPS PHB RVN	16
CO 18TH ENGR BDE	1	CG 1ST MARDIV DNG RVN	40
CO MCB 3	1	CG 3D MARDIV DGH RVN	26
CO MCB 6	1	CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN	30
CG MCRD SAN DIEGO	1	CG 101ST ABN DIV (AM) CEA RVN	20
CO MCB 8	1	CG 1ST MAW DNG RVN	29
CO MCB 10	1	CG 2D BDE ROKMC HAN RVN	7
		CG 1ST INF DIV	1
CO MCB 53	1	CG USASUPCOM DNG RVN	1
CO MCB 58	1	CG 173D AVN BDE	2
CO MCB 62	1	CG FORLOG CMD DNG RVN	5
CO MCB 71	1	CG 1ST LOG CMD LEN	2
CO MCB 133	1	CG FMFPAC (FWD)	1
CO USS REPOSE	1	CG 1ST MEF	1
CO USS SANCTUARY	1	CG MCB CAMP BUTLER	1
CO MHTG-30, MCAF, SANTA ANA,		CO 16TH CMBT AVN GRP CHL RVN	3
CALIF 92709	1	CO 30 NCR	1
DSA II CORPS	1	CO "C" 5TH USSF GRP (ABN)	17
CMDR, CRUISER DESTROYER GRP,		CO 1ST CAG	1
7TH FLEET	1	CO 3RD CAG	1
CMDR, 13TH CI TM, CAMPEN, CAL	1	CO 4TH CAG	1
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	1	CO 1ST BN, 525TH MI DET	26
388TH TFW (DCOK)	1	CO 517TH MI DET	1
GLO, 37TH TFW (DCOI)	2	CO MCB 40	1
8TH TFW (DCOK)	1	CO MCB 121	1
CTF 76	1	CO 4TH PSYOP GRP	1
CO USASSD ACSI DA (ATTN DOD SPEC-		DSA I CORPS	11
REP) MACV APO SF 96222	4	CMDR, 7TH AIR FORCE J-2 SGN RVN	3
HQ, 12TH TAC FTR WING (ATTN ARMY		COMNAVFORV	1
GRD LIAISON OFF) APO SF 96326	1	COMNAVSUPACT DNG RVN	2
NILO CHU LAI, NAVAL ADVISOR, BOX		GLO, 366TH TFW (DCOI)	2
210, NSAD FPO 96696	1	OSA/EMB SGN RVN	5
NILO, HOI AN, DRAWER 18, ADVISORY		DET B, 1ST MIBARS	1
TEAM 15, APO 96349	1	CIB	1

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CO MCB 7 CHL RVN	1
CTG 76.4	1
CTG 76.5	1
CTG 79.5	1
CTF 115	1
7TH AIR FORCE (IGS) HDOC	1
45TH ENGR GRP	1
620TH TCS APO 96203	1
366TH AIR SEC SQD, USAF	2
620TH TSC	1
SPO-SEC CMD QHN RVN	1

C. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (WITHIN HQ, III MAF)

CORDS/PHOENIX Division	7
FORCE S & C	1
STAFF SECRETARY	3
DEP CofS, PLANS	2
G-1	1
G-2	43
G-3	3
G-4	1
G-6	1
FORCE SURGEON	1
FORCE ENGINEER	1
OPS ANALYSIS	1
AMERICAL LIAISON OFFICER (C/O G-3)	2
2D ROKMC BDE LIAISON OFFICER	1
PSYOPS	5
1ST RADIO BN	11
HORN DASC	2
29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS CO	1
FORCE PMC	

D. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

CO 1ST MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 3RD MP BN DNG RVN	1
CO 2ND CAG	1
CO 5TH COMM BN	1
CO MAG 16	1
HQ 212TH CMBT AVN BN	6
RAILWAY SECURITY	1
CTG 115.1	1
CCN	1
USNAD	1
DIR CAP	1
7TH PSYOP BN	1
1ST FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
3RD FORCE RECON COMPANY	1
CO MCB 74	1

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