

VIETNAM, VOLUME I
MILITARY - NATION BUILDING

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Vietnam Feature Service
(TCB-043)

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One out of nine...

SOUTH VIETNAM'S ARMED FORCES

The Republic of Vietnam, now fully mobilized for the first time in two decades of warfare, has trained one out of every nine citizens to fight the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army. With 1,045,500 uniformed servicemen recently augmented by nearly as many civilian home-defense recruits, 11.7 percent of the population bears arms.

South Vietnamese national, territorial and paramilitary troops, strongly reinforced as a result of a 1968 general mobilization call, today represent six percent of the country's 17,400,000 people. On a proportionate population basis, these full-time warriors -- excluding the unpaid civilians trained and armed to protect their home villages -- constitute a force three and a half times the size of the United States' standing military establishment. If the United States had six percent of its population in uniform, it would have 12 million instead of 3.4 million servicemen.

The Republic's 1,045,500 uniformed men are due to be increased by another 71,000 soldiers, 8,000 sailors and 10,000 policemen before the end of 1969. Already they make up nearly 63 percent of all forces opposing the communists in Vietnam. And casualties, a prime barometer of activity, indicate the degree of combat responsibility assumed by the South Vietnamese forces. They are carrying a burden of the fighting so heavy that they have lost twice as many men killed in the past 15 months as have all the allied forces put together -- forces from six free world nations totaling nearly 625,000 men. According to President Nguyen Van Thieu, from January 1968 through March 1969 the South Vietnamese troops lost 39,307 to the allies' 19,433 men killed. Since 1960 the Vietnamese armed forces have lost 108,500 men killed in action.

"We have made great sacrifices," said President Thieu on April 19 as he marked the 14th anniversary of the Vietnamese Air Force. A professional army man with the rank of lieutenant general, the commander-in-chief added: "We will continue to make even greater sacrifices."

Roster of Forces

The nation's armed forces include:

- * The regular 10 infantry divisions and three independent regiments of the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) totaling 384,000 men;

- * More than 46,000 elite striking forces like the three brigades of the Airborne Division, the 20 battalions of the Rangers, the 9,500 Marines, and the few but highly trained men of the Vietnamese Special Forces;

- * The territorial or militia troops, including 218,000 Regional Forces (RF) and 173,000 Popular Forces (PF) for a total of 391,000 men;

- * A Navy of more than 21,000 men, including 11 percent officers and 27 percent petty officers;

- * An Air Force of 18 squadrons, including two jet squadrons (to be increased to at least four), some 400 aircraft and 21,000 men, including more than 1,000 pilots;

- * Paramilitary troops totaling 182,500 men, including more than 79,000 National Police, 45,000 CIDG troops (tough combat patrol specialists -- Montagnards, Vietnamese, Khmers and Nung Chinese -- of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, led by the Special Forces), 4,000 former Viet Cong in Armed Propaganda Teams, 1,500 former Viet Cong serving as Kit Carson Scouts for U.S. Marines, 46,000 armed Revolutionary Development (RD) team members, and 7,000 Truong Son team members doing similar RD work in hamlets of the Central Highlands.

Also, while not listed as members of the armed forces, there is today an important adjunct in urban neighborhoods and rural hamlets:

- * People's Civil Self-Defense Forces of about one million youths, women, veterans and older men, organized since May 1968 to defend their own communities, with some 800,000 already trained and with weapons already issued to them on the basis of one submachine gun, rifle, carbine or shotgun to every three members.

New Aggressiveness

The communists' Tet offensive of February 1968 marked a turning point for the armed forces in terms of morale, manpower and equipment. During the lunar new year holiday the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army hurled 84,000 troops against the South Vietnamese and their allies, and Hanoi assured its troops that ARVN units would desert to them in droves. But not a single squad went over to the enemy, and the communists lost half their attacking force (20,300 to the South Vietnamese, 18,581 to the Americans and the rest to other allied forces). The ARVN went over to the offensive in mid-year and has not lost the initiative since then. Amid a rare burst of public praise for their showing against the heaviest attacks the enemy could mount, the regulars of the ARVN division and the "Ruff Puffs" of the RF companies and PF platoons experienced a soaring of morale unequalled in the army's 20-year history.

The Tet offensive spurred the Saigon government to new action. The National Assembly in mid-June answered President Thieu's call for general mobilization by lowering the minimum and raising the maximum draft ages. It passed a law inducting men from 18 to 38 into military service and ordering youths of 17 and older men from 39 through 43 into civil defense duty. The primary goal was to augment army strength by 268,000 recruits before December 1968, a 33 percent increase (excluding casualties suffered during the mobilization period). The quota was met well before the deadline, with 220,000 inducted before the summer was out. Of them, 161,000 chose their branch of service by volunteering for induction.

At the same time, with the help of its foreign allies, the Saigon government embarked on an extensive program to upgrade the weapons and equipment of its fighting forces, as well as a program of fringe benefits for servicemen to improve morale. Delivery of fast-firing M-16 rifles to ARVN units, for instance, was such a stimulus to the Vietnamese soldiers' aggressiveness that it was immediately reflected in enemy casualty rates. Viet Cong facing ARVN units armed with M-16s left more of their dead on the battlefield than neighboring communist forces opposing ARVN units that had not yet received their M-16 issue. Said one Green Beret on a front near the Cambodian border: "Give a Vietnamese soldier an M-16 and you make a tiger out of him!"

Increased aggressiveness is shown in current battlefield statistics. Each day now the ARVN mounts from 40 to 60 battalion-size or larger operations, and the

"kill ratio" has improved from 1:2.9 in 1965 to one ARVN killed for every 5.9 of the enemy slain today. The daily battalions-in-combat statistics also are significant. During 1967 an average of 101 ARVN battalions were engaged in combat operations each day. The number rose 16 percent during 1968 to 118 battalions. Weekly tactical sorties by the Vietnamese Air Force, which now flies one out of every five missions throughout the country, rose from 2,242 in 1967 to 3,510 during the first 11 weeks of 1969. Vietnamese Navy missions rose from 2,428 per week in early 1968 to 2,860 in the same period of 1969.

Similarly, defense expenditures budgeted by the Saigon government in 1967 totaled 53,000 million piasters (US\$450 million), rose to 75,000 million piasters in 1968 and had to be supplemented before the year was out. In 1969 they will total at least 95,000 million piasters. Much of the current increase is due to mobilization of additional manpower, but much is necessitated by morale-building programs and a heavier sustained rate of combat operations.

Army Organization

What makes the South Vietnamese armed forces so different from the usual military aggregation is the fact that the military is responsible not only for the defense of the nation, but for much of its civil administration as well. The regular divisions of the ARVN are striking forces coming under the direction of the general officer commanding each of the four Corps Tactical Zones into which South Vietnam is divided. But in addition to his military functions, each corps commander is responsible for civil administration within his CTZ. The Regional Forces companies come under the tactical command of the chief of each of the 44 provinces, who is usually an ARVN lieutenant colonel or colonel, yet that province chief also is responsible for civil administration within his province. The Popular Forces, usually in static defense near each platoon's home village, recently have come under the direct supervision of the village chief, a civilian elected to head the committee administering the routine civil life of the village. But his military commissioner is a PF officer, and in practice both RF and PF units are deployed and led in local operations by the district chief. District chiefs are ARVN captains or occasionally majors, and they are responsible through channels for RF/PF actions and civil activities within their 243 districts. While neither province chiefs nor district chiefs deploy the regular ARVN divisions within their jurisdictions -- for company-grade and field-grade officers do not make troop dispositions for a general officer's command -- they do coordinate their RF/PF operations with the local ARVN commander, often can "borrow" ARVN elements for

their offensive requirements, and occasionally take part in massive cordon operations involving all regular, territorial and paramilitary forces in the area. It is doubtful a civilian province chief could achieve such smooth-working arrangements.

Within each CTZ there is a dual command structure. The principal military channel goes from corps commander to division and regiment. A second channel goes from corps commander through the province chiefs to district chiefs. Each channel has its own prerogatives and forces. In recent years there has been a trend away from concentration of all civil power in corps headquarters, with province chiefs now being appointed by Saigon rather than by the corps commanders and with central government ministries communicating directly with province chiefs. Most villages and hamlets now elect their own chiefs and administrative bodies, so province and district chiefs have advisory, coordinating and occasionally veto functions in the villages rather than administrative tasks. But some 291 military officers from general to captain stationed at corps, province and district headquarters still bear heavy responsibility for the day-to-day activities and the general well-being of their jurisdictions.

This dual civil-military responsibility evolved from the necessity of martial law in a country at war, and continued even after popular elections were held under the Second Republic because it was found that in a society so long at war it was inevitable that the best manpower resources, the best leaders and administrators, were in uniform. Cabinet ministers, city mayors and a number of other government officials have had to be recruited from the ranks of the military. One of the advantages is that officers experienced in the dual system develop a comprehensive grasp of the war in its total military, political and psychological compass.

By their votes at the polls the people of South Vietnam have endorsed this military administration. (While a so-called "peace" candidate ran well in the 1967 presidential elections, he lost to the military slate of Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu and Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky.) Much of this acceptance of military administration by the country's majority seems to stem from the fact that the army has built a tradition of civic responsibility, a reputation for bringing relative stability out of chaos in order to permit the government to govern. After the 1954 Geneva Agreement partitioning Vietnam at the 17th parallel, it was the army that prevented the South from falling into

petty warlord fiefdoms. Its first fight as the official Army of the Republic of Vietnam was against the bandit fiefdom of the Binh Xuyen gang, and later it defeated the independent armies of the Hoa Hao sect, bringing that community of three million Delta residents into cooperative loyalty to the Saigon government. It was the army that prevented the subsequent Viet Cong insurrection from sweeping the country. The army toppled a mandarin dictatorship that was losing the war in 1963. The army took over direct administration of the government in 1965, ending a period of revolving-door regimes in Saigon that had brought political chaos to the country. And it was the army that in 1967 voluntarily gave up total power in favor of an elected, constitutional republic, an act almost unprecedented in modern history.

The Army Grows

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam was created on May 23, 1948 (now celebrated as Armed Forces Day) by Decree of Bao Dai, who had earlier abdicated as Emperor but retained power as chief of state until Ngo Dinh Diem's election to the presidency of the First Republic. From a small, polygot force of fewer than 100,000 men -- some units tracing their lineage back to Vietnamese units operating as part of the French Union Forces and some created by Bao Dai's decree -- the ARVN in the past score of years has developed into a modern, well-trained and aggressive army of professional soldiers.

Today the Republic's armed forces are headed by the Minister of Defense, General Nguyen Van Vy. Under him comes the Joint General Staff, headed by General Cao Van Vien. In addition to Vien's Army Command, the JGS includes Rear Admiral Tran Van Chon's Navy Command, Major General Tran Van Minh's Air Force Command, a Logistics Command and a Political Warfare Command. Also directly under the JGS is the National Strategic Reserve, comprising such elite units as Major General Du Quoc Dong's Airborne Division, Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang's Marines and some of the 20 Ranger battalions. Most Ranger battalions, however, come directly under CTZ commanders. The crucial Saigon-Gia Dinh area is controlled by a special Capital Military District under Major General Nguyen Van Minh, a former Delta division commander with a reputation for combat success. The Special Forces, with headquarters at Nha Trang, are commanded by Major General Doan Van Quang.

The regular ARVN divisions are triangular, normally having three regiments plus a cavalry squadron and two artillery battalions, or about 10,000 men. Each regiment has three battalions and each battalion three companies. Recently, support elements -- engineers, transport, ordnance, logistics -- were brought into a division support command in a more modern organizational structure for each division. The 10 regular ARVN divisions as well as ARVN's three independent regiments are deployed under CTZ commanders as follows:

* In Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam's I CTZ (known as Eye Corps), embracing the five northern provinces, there are the First Division at Hue, the Second Division at Quang Ngai, the 51st Independent Regiment at Hoi An and the 54th Independent Regiment at Tam Ky.

* In Major General Lu Mong Lan's II CTZ, covering the central coast and the Central Highlands, there are the 22nd Division at Qui Nhon, the 23rd Division at Ban Me Thuot and the 42nd Independent Regiment north of Kontum.

* In Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri's III CTZ surrounding Saigon there are the Fifth Division at Phu Loi, the 18th Division at Xuan Loc and the 25th Division at Duc Hoa.

* In Major General Nguyen Van Minh's IV CTZ, in the populous Mekong Delta, there are the Seventh Division at My Tho, the Ninth Division at Sadec and the 21st Division at Bac Lieu.

Notable Units

The First Division, guarding the two northern provinces just below the Demilitarized Zone, has been judged by General Creighton W. Abrams, the U.S. forces commander, as one of the finest divisions to take the field of battle. U.S. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird recently awarded this division the Presidential Unit Citation for sustained bravery in action during engagements in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. It is no coincidence that the First Division is commanded by a man considered by friend and foe alike as the best division commander in Vietnam, 39-year-old Major General Ngo Quang Truong. And this elite division includes an elite company, the Hac Bao,

the Black Panther assault company that stopped an entire North Vietnamese battalion on the Hue airfield during the Tet offensive and later emerged victorious from a 72-hour battle against overwhelming NVA forces with 19 of its 240 men alive.

From that Tet battle in the Hue Citadel, where the First Division successfully tackled two NVA divisions, through October 10, 1968, the division's men killed 12,661 NVA and VC troops, took 2,571 prisoners and picked up 5,622 weapons. In that period the division lost 1,600 killed, 6,675 wounded and 238 weapons. According to Colonel John A. Hoefling of the Second Brigade, 101st U.S. Airborne, the division which shares responsibility with General Truong for defense of Hue and surrounding areas of Thua Thien province: "I have never seen a division as sharp as the First ARVN Infantry Division, and I have been in two wars. They could handle any task given them, now or in the future, if provided with proper artillery and helicopter support."

But the ARVN is not all the First Division. No army ever is as good as its best units, and the ARVN has its 25th Division as well as its First Division. Until last year, by the candid acknowledgement of a JGS general at Saigon's Camp Tran Hung Dao, the 25th was "the worst division ever to enter any battlefield east of Suez." Working out of Duc Hoa in Hau Nghia province west of Saigon and extending into Long An province south of the capital, the 25th operated like most divisions operated in the Orient during the 1930's: it shunned combat to conserve resources. In the warlord days of pre-Pacific War China and neighboring states, a division commander would put himself out of a job if he spent his manpower and equipment resources in combat. The 25th ARVN Infantry Division therefore carried out the traditional role of preparing and holding strong fortified positions near major population centers and road routes, but did not commit troops to offensive patrolling except at the stern and insistent direction of higher headquarters. And as the 25th improved its intelligence network, learning more about enemy dispositions, it improved its ability to march its troops in the opposite direction. Thus month after month the 25th would find itself on the bottom of the list of divisions rated by the number of enemy contacts per operation. But with the wholesale housecleaning launched by General Thieu after his election to the presidency came the inevitable sacking of the mandarin general commanding the 25th Division, despite his political and social connections. In January 1968

Brigadier General Nguyen Xuan Thinh took command with the announcement that "I am cultivating aggressiveness." And with the new command there did come a new sense of aggressiveness on the part of 25th Division troopers. Launching joint operations with their "brother" division in the area, the 25th U.S. Infantry Division from Hawaii, the men of the 25th ARVN Division showed what capable soldiers can do when given capable leadership. Today the 25th stands firm in blocking position across a major enemy infiltration route from the Cambodian border to Saigon. It is pulling its weight there in Hau Nghia, and is conducting an important pacification operation in Long An as well. But it has a long way to go before it matches the effectiveness of the First Division.

Elite Units

The First, largest of all ARVN divisions (five infantry regiments and two cavalry squadrons), is not the only Vietnamese unit to collect commendations and awards. Another is the Marines, which trace their history back to the French Marine Commando Companies used in river assaults. Originally part of the Navy, the 9,500 Marines became a separate command under the JGS in 1963 and now are part of the strategic defense of Saigon's Capital Military District. Another elite force is the Airborne Division. Also part of the strategic reserve, they have seen action in the Demilitarized Zone, in Saigon during the 1968 Tet offensive, at the embattled Citadel of Hue, and in nearly every major struggle of the war. Now they are in the Tay Ninh area blocking any potential eastward movement of four North Vietnamese Army divisions, including the dangerous Ninh NVA, poised in a threat to Saigon. Other famed units include Colonel Tran Ba Di's tough Ninth Division in the Delta, and the Second Division at Quang Ngai. And there are the Rangers. The 42nd Ranger Battalion, for instance, has received unit citations for bravery from two U.S. Presidents.

The Rangers were organized in 1960. That year every fourth company in the regular ARVN divisions was designated a Ranger company and given special training in order to create a quick reaction force to counter Viet Cong guerrilla moves. Eighty-six companies were thus created, and now are operating in 20 battalions. Originally the Rangers were assigned to province chiefs for local operations, but later were placed directly under corps commanders to operate over wider areas. As a primary reaction force, better trained and equipped and more mobile than the regular ARVN

battalions, the Rangers have been involved in almost every major battle of the war.

As the Viet Cong threat grew in intensity from 1957 on, the need developed for counter-insurgency troops which could meet the guerrilla in his own jungle and swamp lairs. The Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB), the Vietnamese Special forces were created and patterned after the U.S. Special Forces, adopting their distinctive green berets. Assisted by a handful of U.S. Special Forces advisers, the LLDB command the CIDG companies -- 45,000 specially trained warriors, most of them minority-group tribesmen from the jungled mountains -- now manning small, scattered border outposts along the infiltration trails and deep inside the uncultivated backcountry.

The Vietnamese troops suffering the heaviest casualties and inflicting the most casualties on the enemy in proportion to their numbers are the "Ruff Puffs," the laudatory title unofficially given the 391,000 militiamen of the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces. The RF operate in 123-man companies under the province chiefs, though often led on operations by district chiefs. The PF are organized into 35-man platoons for local village and hamlet security. Originally the Ruff Puffs were regarded as guard troops. Armed mainly with Garands and carbines, the RF guarded provincial facilities and bridges, cleared roads and conducted minor operations within their home provinces while the PF manned guard compounds and the perimeters of their home villages. As the first line of community defenders they often were the first target of any attacking force. No longer are they in static defense positions, however. Now better armed, the RF does much the same work as company-size units from the regular ARVN divisions, going on extended operations against Viet Cong forces, doing village pacification work, joining in combined operations with allied forces, and utilizing the helicopter and artillery support services of the big divisions. The PF, also much better armed as a result of a US\$200-million militia modernization program, still maintain static defense posts but also send out roving patrols to meet the enemy before he reaches the PF perimeter. Although not as well trained, armed or paid as the regular ARVN divisions, the Ruff Puffs are recruiting food men, for a number of draft-age youths enlist in the RF so they can stay in their home provinces, or in the PF so they can live with their families in compounds near their own villages.

The Paramilitary

Statisticians list the National Police as paramilitary forces (without listing U.S. police in comparative military establishment figures) because in Vietnam the police are in the front rank of initial reaction forces. Usually the police are the first to be informed of a Viet Cong raid and the first to rush to the scene. In provincial towns the traveler recognizes the police station by the green and white jeep parked in front, usually with one or two bullet holes in the windshield.

The Police Special Branch is the core of Operation Phung Hoang, a nationwide pooling of intelligence data to flush out the VCI, the Viet Cong infrastructure. The VCI are the leadership elements who run the communist political apparatus, control the guerrilla bands, collect taxes, order assassinations, set up front organizations, draft men and women as soldiers, guerrillas and laborers, disseminate propaganda and direct terror campaigns. About 80,000 cadres originally were estimated to hold VCI jobs. In the first 11 months of a campaign that jumped off at the beginning of 1968, Operation Phung Hoang resulted in 13,404 of these cadres being rooted out of their underground positions in the communists' shadow government. Under Phung Hoang the National Police and other government intelligence agents man district centers which collect data on the VCI, check information against files and dossiers, and where warranted, arrange for operations. These operations may be as small as the sending of a lone policeman on his bicycle to arrest a man identified by VCI defectors as a hamlet tax collector for the communists. Or the operation can be so large that it entails the deployment of two or three battalions of troops for a week-long sweep and screening mission covering an entire district. Without the local knowledge of the policemen engaged in these sweeps, many more of the VCI would slip through the cordons.

One tribute to the effectiveness of the National Police is the fact that enemy attacks in both urban and rural areas usually are directed first against police headquarters and sub-stations. During February 1968, at the height of the communists' Tet offensive, 239 policemen were killed and 298 wounded. Last year 827 of the 79,000 National Police died defending their posts. Now 10,000 new policemen are being recruited.

Viet Cong who have turned their backs on communism

and rallied to the government's side under the Chieu Hoi (open arms) program are engaged in a number of paramilitary activities. More than 104,000 have defected since the program started, and most are in the regular ARVN divisions. But about 4,000 are in Armed Propaganda Teams. These APT men go back into enemy-controlled or contested areas to proselytize their former Viet Cong comrades and generally spread the word about how life in government-controlled areas compares with life under VC rule. Another 1,500 former Viet Cong are serving as Kit Carson Scouts for the U.S. Marines in the northern provinces, helping in pacification and village development programs, identifying the VCI, passing on knowledge of terrain, people, guerrilla fighting methods and booby trap techniques. Some former VC have joined such specialized groups as the PRU (Provincial Reconnaissance Units), whose stock-in-trade is using terror against Viet Cong terrorists.

Important paramilitary forces who have received more than their share of Viet Cong attacks are the 46,000 Revolutionary Development and the 7,000 Truong Son members, the men (and a few women) in black pajamas who help villagers recreate local democratic government in newly pacified areas. Lightly armed, they provide hamlet defense until the people can be motivated, trained and armed to protect their own communities.

While RD teams, some working in 59-man units and others in 39-man units, have been teaching self-defense methods to villagers for some years, the program to build hamlet-level civilian home protection units did not begin to snowball until after the communists' Tet offensive. The general mobilization decree helped, for it called for drafting 17-year-old boys and men from 39 to 43 into civil self-defense units. In most cases the draft was not necessary, for young boys and older men were quick to volunteer in order to have a voice in their local unit's organization. And in many units the teen-age girls and women, who are not subject to the draft, volunteered in such numbers that they constitute the majority of the members of their People's Civil Self-Defense Force. Since the Tet offensive about one million PCSDF members have been recruited across the country, not only in the hamlets, but in urban neighborhoods as well, to provide an alert force and anti-infiltration screen. In Hue, for instance, there are 18,000 civilians standing guard in eight-hour shifts, each guard passing his weapon to the man or woman who relieves him. Hue, so badly damaged in the Tet offensive, may be attacked again. But thanks to the People's Civil

Self Defense Forces, never again will it be attacked by surprise.

The ARVN Soldier

The average Vietnamese soldier is young -- 19 to 24 years old -- with little more than a rural education. Of peasant stock, he is small, with a thin, lithe build, but surprisingly muscular, and he can tote a 30-Kilo pack for hours without fatigue. He usually is an experienced combat veteran, for in Vietnam soldiers sign up for the duration. (Technically, the original draft period was four years but few able-bodied men have been released since 1965. After the Tet offensive the government officially made the period of service equal to the duration of the war.) He has received 12 weeks of basic training (cut to nine weeks during the general mobilization drive of 1968) but often has received advanced training in division camps, including taekwondo, the Korean Karate or unarmed combat course. Properly led, he develops an elan and a fighting spirit under the most difficult combat conditions. He must be at home in Delta rice paddies, mountain rain forests and city streets. He must fight often, and in his less hectic hours he is expected to help the rural people build a new life. He must guard long stretches of road and railroad and canals, thousands of bridges, thousands of hamlets and government facilities. For this, if he is a private with no dependents, he earns 3,000 piasters a month (US\$25). Ruff Puffs earn less, but they are closer to home than the ARVN regular, who may be sent to serve in any of South Vietnam's 44 provinces. Men with dependents and elite troops -- those wearing the jaunty berets (green for Special Forces, red for paratroops, black for armored troops, maroon for Rangers) -- earn more. But the average pay of the soldier remains low because of the inflationary impact that general raises to more than a million soldiers would have on the nation's strained war economy.

After Tet the government accelerated a morale-building program to improve the soldier's fringe benefits. It started a post exchange and commissary system so soldiers can buy food and other items at cheaper than market prices. The leave system was extended and improved, even to providing truck transportation for home-bound soldiers. Families. Families may now visit their uniformed relatives because of the addition of visiting facilities to base encampment. A program to build more adequate housing for soldiers' dependents was launched with an eventual goal of 340,000

units. And an Inspector General's Office was created to listen to and investigate soldiers' gripes. One result was that the desertion rate between 1966 and 1968 was cut in half, to about 9.5 per 1,000. (Only a handful of men have ever deserted to the enemy, but in any peasant society where war is prolonged, the planting and harvest seasons have always lured men from the battlefields. Most usually return to their units when their families' crops are in, or enlist in the local Ruff Puffs. Regular leave schedules and more accurate reporting of unit rolls have done much to curb such practices.)

Promotions do not come easily in the ARVN. A colonel may command a division, as the popular Tran Ba Di does in the Ninth. Regiments are given to lieutenant colonels and sometimes majors. Captains often command battalions. Rank is tight, but there have been programs inaugurated recently to give merit promotions in the field, especially in raising promising young noncommissioned officers to company-grade officer level. But most promotions still are based more on seniority than merit, and a number are across-the-board promotions of one grade for all enlisted ranks ordered by the government to celebrate, for instance, a new national holiday. During 1969 additional promotions will be given officers, noncoms and enlisted men in July, October and December, with first priority being given men with more than two years of service who have been passed over once by the Promotion Council.

Two years ago extra efforts were made to upgrade the training of officers and noncoms. The Thu Duc Officers School was expanded and the curriculum improved. Special command and staff schools were inaugurated for field-grade officers at Dalat, with attendance a prerequisite for promotion. The Dalat Military Academy later this year will graduate its first class of 90 students with four years of education. Since its founding in 1948 it has had only nine-month and two-year courses, and the expanded curriculum is considered a major step in providing the army with an educated corps of professionally trained young officers. Ranking officers now are being given advanced command training at the newly established National Defense College in Saigon. Key officers continue to be sent to advanced schools in the United States such as the infantry course at Fort Benning and the command and general staff schools at Fort Leavenworth. More than 8,000 officers and men have received training in U.S. military schools since 1957. But most ARVN officers have been developed in the hard furnace of actual combat, and in 20 years a number have become extremely proficient.

ARVN officers also have had to learn to be adaptable. Trained in conventional warfare tactics to meet World War II or Korea War situations, first by the French and then by the Americans, they had to adapt to the communists' guerrilla warfare. And then, from the start of the big unit war in mid-1965, they had to adapt to the mobile warfare in which the helicopter has revolutionized tactics.

In a typical small-unit operation, one of scores going on across the country simultaneously, the Hau Nghia province chief in Bao Trai, an ARVN colonel, learns from the National Police sub-station that a column of Viet Cong has been seen filing down a country road eight kilometers west of Bao Trai. The province chief has already sent his RF companies to various district chiefs for local operations or pacification campaigns, so he calls 25th ARVN Infantry Division headquarters at Duc Hoa and borrows a platoon of the 25th encamped near Bao Trai. Then, through his Senior Province Adviser, a U.S. Army colonel, he contacts 25th U.S. Infantry Division headquarters at Cu Chi and borrows the helicopters needed to lift the ARVN platoon to the scene of the intelligence report. Troops and choppers converge quickly on the province chief's helipad, the choppers roar off at treetop level and land the troops in fields adjacent to the road. Results: one Viet Cong killed, one wounded, seven suspects rounded up, one ARVN wounded.

Or the operation can be as big as the classic "soft cordon" operation conducted last September to rid Viet Cong troops and the VC infrastructure from Vinh Loc island east of Hue. The 10-day operation utilized every regular military, territorial, paramilitary, naval, police, psychological warfare and intelligence capability in the area. A combined S-3 military operations command was set up including the province chief's security staff, the 54th Regiment of the First ARVN Division, the Second Brigade of the 101st U.S. Airborne Division, the Vinh Loc district chief and his military, intelligence and advisory personnel. Results: the VCI shattered, 116 VCI captured, 154 VC soldiers killed, 254 captured, 56 VC rallied to the government's side, and 12,000 Vinh Loc refugees returned to their now-pacified hamlets. Friendly casualties: One APT member and one policeman killed; seven ARVN, two Ruff Puffs, two U.S. Army and one U.S. Navy man wounded; two island residents wounded; three grass huts destroyed.

New Equipment

Improved leadership has done much to boost ARVN morale

ARVN officers also have had to learn to be adaptable. Trained in conventional warfare tactics to meet World War II or Korea War situations, first by the French and then by the Americans, they had to adapt to the communists' guerrilla warfare. And then, from the start of the big unit war in mid-1965, they had to adapt to the mobile warfare in which the helicopter has revolutionized tactics.

In a typical small-unit operation, one of scores going on across the country simultaneously, the Hau Nghia province chief in Bao Trai, an ARVN colonel, learns from the National Police sub-station that a column of Viet Cong has been seen filing down a country road eight kilometers west of Bao Trai. The province chief has already sent his RF companies to various district chiefs for local operations or pacification campaigns, so he calls 25th ARVN Infantry Division headquarters at Duc Hoa and borrows a platoon of the 25th encamped near Bao Trai. Then, through his Senior Province Adviser, a U.S. Army colonel, he contacts 25th U.S. Infantry Division headquarters at Cu Chi and borrows the helicopters needed to lift the ARVN platoon to the scene of the intelligence report. Troops and choppers converge quickly on the province chief's helipad, the choppers roar off at treetop level and land the troops in fields adjacent to the road. Results: one Viet Cong killed, one wounded, seven suspects rounded up, one ARVN wounded.

Or the operation can be as big as the classis "soft cordon" operation conducted last September to rid Viet Cong troops and the VC infrastructure from Vinh Loc island east of Hue. The 10-day operation utilized every regular military, territorial, paramilitary, naval, police, psychological warfare and intelligence capability in the area. A combined S-3 military operations command was set up including the province chief's security staff, the 54th Regiment of the First ARVN Division, the Second Brigade of the 101st U.S. Airborne Division, the Vinh Loc district chief and his military, intelligence and advisory personnel. Results: the VCI shattered, 116 VCI captured, 154 VC soldiers killed, 254 captured, 56 VC rallied to the government's side, and 12,000 Vinh Loc refugees returned to their now-pacified hamlets. Friendly casualties: One APT member and one policeman killed; seven ARVN, two Ruff Puffs, two U.S. Army and one U.S. Navy man wounded; two island residents wounded; three grass huts destroyed.

New Equipment

Improved leadership has done much to boost ARVN morale

and proficiency, but one of the greatest spurs to aggressiveness has been the reoutfitting of the armed forces with modern weapons. Morale had been badly shaken when the North Vietnamese in 1965 and 1966 began equipping their infiltrating troops with weapons the South Vietnamese could not match -- modern Soviet-design automatic weapons, including the RPD light machine gun, the AK-47 assault rifle, and the armor-busting B-40 and B-41 rocket launchers. But then the United States offered to re-equip the ARVN with a newer family of U.S. weapons. In addition to the prized M-16 rifle, these included LAW anti-tank rockets, the useful M-79 grenade launcher and the M-60 light machine gun. Initially issued to regular ARVN divisions, these weapons now are being given the Ruff Puffs, with completion of the rearming program expected by the end 1969. Some 350 Mobile Advisory Teams of U.S. officers and noncom specialists have been assigned to help upgrade the Ruff Puffs through training in battle tactics, weapons use, and improved security.

In artillery, the number of battalions is being doubled and newer pieces, such as the light M-102 howitzer of 105mm size, are being introduced. In the Airborne Division, for example, a third artillery battalion is being formed, giving each brigade of the division its own mobile artillery support. Before 1968 the division had only a single artillery battalion.

At the start of 1968 the ARVN possessed only 600 APCs (Armored Personnel Carriers) but by the end of 1969 it will have 1,500. The 10 armored cavalry squadrons also have some older M-41 tanks.

The communications capability of ARVN units is being improved. The newer PRC-25 model pack radio has replaced the PRC-10, with an increase in range from 15 to 40 kilometers. And improved command radio and teletype nets have been installed.

The Navy has received 25 new gunboats costing US\$7,700,000, designed especially for Delta patrols, and will increase its personnel to 29,000 before the year is out. Minesweepers, Swift boats and a wide variety of riverine craft are being rapidly turned over to the Vietnamese Navy by the Americans. Soon the Navy will assume complete operational responsibility for river and canal patrolling in the Ha Tien area, including the Vien Te Canal. The Navy already has taken over responsibility for nearly all the coastal patrolling in the Fourth Coastal Zone, which embraces the Gulf of Thailand waters around Phu Quoc Island, and the inshore waters southward to the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula.

The Air Force has been given a far greater capacity to airlift troops. It now flies some 100 helicopters, and a new fleet of 300 turbo-powered UH-14 helicopter transports and gunships has been ordered at a cost of US\$83 million. Already some of the new and improved Hueys have been delivered to the 211th Helicopter Squadron at Binh Thuy. Recently a fleet of old but reliable C-119 transports was turned over to the VNAF to boost its strategic mobility. Versatile little A-37 jet attack bombers and F-5 jet Freedom Fighters have been delivered to the VNAF, and more are programmed over the next two years. The VNAF is slated to receive 60 of the A-37s at a cost of US\$18 million. Some 1,500 pilots will be trained in America on newer jet fighters and helicopters.

A major impetus to increased ARVN offensive operations has been improved mobility. Now able to call on transport planes and helicopters for troop airlift, and now assured of good communications and artillery support, field commanders order combat sweeps, enveloping maneuvers and direct assaults that would have been unthinkable in 1965 and 1966. Today even militia companies and platoons can be tactically deployed by helicopter, and are being so deployed, in ever increasing numbers. The Viet Cong's ability to pick the site of battle has been shattered.

Some Deficiencies

But the areas in which the ARVN has made the most improvement -- firepower and mobility -- are still the areas of its greatest weaknesses. The ARVN is quite capable of fighting and defeating the 20,000 main force Viet Cong troops and the 70,000 local force VC guerrillas in the country. In open combat on a designated battlefield the ARVN could defeat the 110,000 North Vietnamese Army regulars now in the South, despite their modern Chinese and Soviet-bloc weapons. But with the ARVN's basic responsibility for territorial defense that the NVA does not have, and with the NVA's proclivity for regrouping in inaccessible sanctuaries, it would be a formidable task for the ARVN to drive the NVA back to Hanoi. It could not conceivably do so without the helicopter, jet-strike, artillery, communications and logistics support now provided by U.S. forces. An ARVN division is a potent force, but even in the case of the First Division one of the factors making it an elite unit is its ability to call in helicopter and artillery support from the neighboring 101st U.S. Airborne

Division. Because the average ARVN division, particularly since the war became a big unit war in mid-1965, has been able to rely on its ally's artillery, air strike and transport capabilities, it has not yet developed its own such capabilities to a point that would make it self-sufficient on a modern battlefield. Even when the 300 new helicopters all have been added to the present fleet of 100 choppers, the entire Vietnamese Air Force still will have fewer helicopters than the First U.S. Air Cavalry Division's 425. (There are about 3,000 helicopters assigned to all U.S. forces in Vietnam.) Even when the 60 new jet attack bombers are added to the 40 fighter jets now in action, the VNAF's jet capability still will be little better than that of a single U.S. carrier sailing off the Vietnamese coast with its 75 to 80 jets aboard. And the average American division has about twice the number of howitzers and mortars available to an ARVN division.

One way to help make up this deficiency is a plan announced on March 23 by U.S. Defense Secretary Laird, and that is to hand over the equipment of disbanding U.S. units to ARVN units remaining in the field. The first such turnover took place that March weekend near Can Tho, in the Delta. The Sixth Battalion of the 77th Artillery, attached to the Ninth U.S. Infantry Division, disbanded, sent a number of its men on normal rotation back to the U.S. and assigned the remainder to other U.S. outfits in Vietnam. Although the battalion was inactivated, overall U.S. troop strength was not lowered. After spending two months in training ARVN artillerymen to use its 105mm howitzers, the Sixth, in its last formal act as a battalion in service, turned over its 18 105mm howitzers, trucks, radios, ammunition and repair equipment to the South Vietnamese. Brigadier General Nguyen Huu Hanh, commander of Special Zone 44, accepted the weapons and equipment on behalf of the newly activated 213th Artillery Battalion of the 21st ARVN Infantry Division. The 21st, with 12,000 men backstopped by Ruff Puffs, protects an area including 2,100,000 residents of six Delta provinces, an estimated 35,000 of whom are armed Viet Cong.

In the next few months another U.S. artillery battalion as well as transportation, engineer and maintenance units -- some 2,500 men -- will disband and transfer their equipment to ARVN forces. This program, says Secretary Laird, will help in "modernizing the forces of the South Vietnamese on a realistic basis."

The ARVN, once a loose force of diverse troops left to their fate by the retreating French, has developed during 20 years of bitter fighting into an effective, highly

motivated army, and in recent years it has been equipped to fight a modern war. Its improvement particularly since the Tet offensive has been exceptional, and that improvement continues month by month. Australia's Army Minister P. R. Lynch, reporting to the House of Representatives in Canberra after a 1969 Tet anniversary tour of Vietnam's battlefields, said: "In the past 12 months the ARVN forces have become better equipped than ever before. Their officer training programs are of a high quality. The Vietnamese Army has grown considerably in strength and in operational efficacy."

It is noteworthy that this assessment, like those of many other observers of the Vietnam scene, stresses that the time of the Tet offensive was the turning point. The communists may have won propaganda advances around the world when they launched that offensive, but in Vietnam they lost the battle. And more and more the repercussions to the Tet offensive indicate they may have lost the war with that attack during a sacred holiday season. For that was the time when the government and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam turned the corner. Now both are viable, strong and growing more efficient as they gain more confidence with each passing month.

The Saigon government, backed by an army that has proved itself capable of defeating the heaviest blows the enemy could hurl against it, seems destined to continue to gain strength until no neighbor again will dare to send invading troops across its borders.

Keith

HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 3d Marines, Marine #22
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96601

2/LVS/tam
5800
15 September 1965

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, 3d Marines
Subj: Civil Affairs/Civic Action Report #7; submission of

Ref: (a) ForceO 5800.2
(b) Div(Fwd)O 5800.2

Encl: *ref this cy*
(1) 3dMarDiv Addendum
(2) "E" Company Civil Affairs/Civic Action Report
(3) "F" Company Civil Affairs/Civic Action Report
(4) "G" Company Civil Affairs/Civic Action Report
(5) "H" Company Civil Affairs/Civic Action Report
(6) Invitation from Mr. Nam, village chief of Hoa Thanh, to LtCol D. A. CLEMENT, Battalion Commander, and Captain SILVA, Battalion S-2 Officer
(7) Invitation from Mr. Lu, village chief of Hoa Loo, to LtCol D. A. CLEMENT, Battalion Commander, and Captain SILVA, Battalion S-2 Officer
(8) Pictures of Children's Tet (Mid-Autumn Festival)
(9) Distribution of milk to Phu Thuong Orphanage
(10) Refugees at abandoned Catholic Church
(11) Sick Call at New Life Hamlet
(12) Newspaper clipping from the Observer dated 8 August 1965
(13) Newspaper clipping from the Triad dated 10 September 1965

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted for the reporting period of 27 August - 12 September 1965.

D. A. CLEMENT

Steno

*File Vietnam
Civic Action*

(F)

PERIODIC CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION REPORT

Periodic Civil Affairs/Civic Action Report #7

Period Covered: 27 August 1965 to 12 September 1965

Map: SHEET 6659 III SERIES L701 TOURANE

Note: Only those portions of the basic format in which new or changing information has been observed will be included in this report.

1.. This unit is operating in Hoa Vang District of Quangnam Province, in the area of Hoa Khanh, Hoa Thanh, Hoa Hien, Hoa Vinh, Hoa Lao villages and Phu Thuong hamlet of Hoa Loc village of Hieu Duc District. The following is a list of patrols conducted during the reporting period.

2. Governmental.

c. District Government.

(1) Captain SILVA, Battalion S-2, discussed with the District Advisor the requirement for security of Phouc Thanh hamlet of Hoa Khanh New Life Hamlet on 29 August 1965. Mr. Thanh, village chief of Hoa Khanh, is presently compiling a list of eligible males over 30 years of age for the formation of a Popular Forces platoon for the New Life Hamlet.

(2) Captain SILVA, on 11 September 1965, discussed civic action and security of Phouc Thanh New Life Hamlet and the 2nd Battalion, 3d Marines TACR with Lieutenant Hucner, I Corps Civic Action Company Commander; Lieutenant Theisen, I Corps Civil Affairs Advisor; and Father Van of Phouc Thanh Hamlet at the 2/3 CP. Results of the meeting are as follows:

(a) Briefing of I Corps plans for New Life Hamlet

(b) Coordinate lines were laid for future assistance to New Life Hamlet.

d. Village Government.

(1) Captain SILVA discussed relocation of refugees from Hoa Ninh with Mr. Gian, village chief of Hoa Ninh, to safer areas. (See enclosure 10)

(2) Sector policeman of Hoa Lac recovered an item (Ladies Elgin Wrist Watch) previously lost by a marine. A reward of 400 piastres was given by the marine to the villager who turned it into the police.

f. Political Intelligence.

(1) Mr. Lu, the village chief of Hoa Lac, is under investigation by the district chief. Mr. Lu has previously disobeyed the district chief's orders twice and is suspected of consorting with four women (one of which has been with the Viet Cong for the past seven months). The National Police and district officials are cognizant of Mr. Lu's activities.

(2) Intelligence information has been received from all village chiefs, the sector policeman, the Hoa Thanh policeman, and the Hoa Thanh Popular Forces platoon Commander. All information was passed on through appropriate intelligence channels.

1. Public Health.

(1) On 27 August 1965, Dr. ZIMKO held a successful operation on an 52 year old woman from the hamlet of An Ngai Tay. The woman had a tumor growth on her knee. The growth was removed, and the woman is doing very well. The family expressed much gratitude for the operation.

(2) Dr. ZIMKO held sick call on 27 August 1965 at the New Life Hamlet (See enclosure 11). Approximately 120 people were treated for minor ailments.

(3) The Le My Medical Center continues to treat approximately 120

(F)

people daily for minor ailments during this reporting period.

(a) A new medical service was recently added at the Le My Medical Center. A dentist from C Med holds dental call each Friday for the villagers. This type of added medical assistance has brought much favorable comment from the villagers. Approximately 30 were treated during dental call.

(4) On 6 September 1965, three nurse trainees (one male and two females) trained at the Le My Medical Center under the supervision of Dr. ZEMKO, Battalion Surgeon, took their examination in nursing which leads to a certificate qualifying them as nurse helpers.

(5) Future and present plans for the training of nurse helpers at Le My Medical Center are as follows:

(a) Commenced training two female trainees from Hoa Thanh (names - Ko Ba and Ko Hien) on 2 September 1965.

(b) Commenced training two female trainees from Hoa Vinh (names - Le Thi Ne and Ko Loan).

(c) October plans include two female trainees from Hoa Hiep and two female trainees from Hoa Lac. Upon completion of training at the Le My Medical Center (four to five weeks) arrangements are made with the District Health Chief for their examination.

(6) Arrangements were made with the District Health Chief for the acquisition of a Public Nursing Manual for use in conjunction with training at the Le My Medical Center.

j. Public Welfare.

(1) On September 1965, "8" Howitzers were firing a mission in the Kim Liem area (coordinates 928861). A short round landed in the village destroying some huts and injuring approximately 25 villagers. The next day representatives from the "8" Howitzer Battery paid a visit to the hamlet to see what they could do to rectify the damage from the short round. Sick call was held on two days for injured villagers. The marines from the battery assisted the villagers in the reconstruction of their homes.

(2) Captain SILVA discussed with the district chief on 3 September 1965 the requirement for additional mosquito spraying in Kiem Liem Hamlet.

(3) On 2 September 1965 Captain SILVA conducted a survey of all villages within the 2/3 TAOR relating to:

(a) Schools, teachers and school children

(b) Medical facilities, personnel and availability of trained personnel within villages

(c) Security of villages This coupled with a previous survey

relative to the availability of midwives, blacksmiths, carpenters, will be submitted as soon as compiled on paper.

k. Public Education.

(1) Construction of a school in Hoang Phouc Hamlet, Hoa Vinh village commenced on 3 September 1965. "G" Company hauled approximately three tons of bricks for the school house.

(2) Construction of a school in An Nghi Dong Hamlet, Hoa Thanh village commenced on 11 September 1965.

(3) On 3 September 1965 at the Le My school (Hoa Lao village), LtCol D. A. CLEMENT, Battalion Commander, met with the Parents - Teachers Association (to use familiar terminology), to discuss matters of importance relative to education. One result was the agreement with USMC representatives to meet with this group at a later date to discuss school needs.

m. Labor.

(1) Arrangements were made with the people of Hoa Khanh and Hoa Hiep to run land lines from their village headquarters to the 2/3 CP for use in emergency reporting.

3. Economic.

a. Commerce and Industry. The market place in Hoa Lao has expanded by two more stands.

b. Food and Agriculture. This battalion arranged for the Political Action Team in Hoa Lao to pick up 30 bags of cement for the construction of a rice bin in Hoa Lao. This is a PAT project. This bin will be used for storage during the harvest season.

4. Special Interest.

a. On 3 September 1965, Mr Mai-Van-Le, Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Hue, visited Le My accompanied by two student representatives, one from Saigon and one from Hue. They were interested in seeing the conditions in Le My in order to report their findings to the student bodies. They indicated that one reason for the student's interest was a desire on the part of students to come to Le My and to provide assistance. They seemed cordial and friendly on the surface, at least.

b. Resume of children's Tet

(1) Hoa Lao village - At 1000, 11 September 1965, the children's Tet commenced with singing and games by the children. About 400 children were in attendance. LtCol CLEMENT, Battalion Commander; and Captain SILVA, Battalion S-2; SgtMaj GARDNER; Dr. ZELKO, Battalion Surgeon; Lt PIERRA, Company "E" Civil Affairs Officer; and Sgt TOMASZEK, Battalion Civil Affairs NCO, and the marines of "E" Company witnessed the festivities as guests of the village chief, Mr. Lu. The aforementioned personnel were also invited

to the noon meal by Mr. Lu.

(2) Hoa Vinh - At 1500, 11 September 1965, the children's Tet commenced with games. LtCol CLEMENT; Captain Silva; Captain Hopkins, Battalion 3-4; Captain MOSES, Commanding Officer "G" Company; Lt. KRIZAN, "G" Company Civil Affairs Officer; SgtMaj GARDNER; Lt OSTER, Battalion Civil Affairs Officer; and Sgt THASSENK were in attendance at the invitation of Mr. Toa, village chief. Numerous newsmen from Division and civilian sources plus Leatherneck magazine covered the event. Mr. Toa expressed gratitude to the marines and to LtCol CLEMENT for their help since coming to Vietnam. 400 children participated.

(3) Hoa Thanh - At 1600, 11 September 1965, the festivities began. Numerous games were held - a highlight was a foot race between four boys. Guests in attendance were LtCol CLEMENT, SgtMaj GARDNER, Captain SILVA, Lt. OSTER, and Sgt. THASSENK. When LtCol CLEMENT walked to the honored guests section the speaker said "Welcome Colonel, Sir" and the children responded with "Hurrah for the Colonel". Leatherneck magazine covered this village also. About 500 children participated.

(4) Hoa Niep - Maj Castalana attended the festival at this village. He was very warmly greeted as the Battalion representative for 2/3. About 1200 children were in attendance.

(5) Hoa Khanh - This village was handled by 7th Engineer Battalion.

(6) Phu Thong Hamlet - Maj HUTT, Battalion Executive Officer, attended the festivities in this hamlet as the battalion representative. Other guests were Father BENJAMIN, Battalion Chaplain; Lt BENTLEY, "F" Company Commanding Officer; Lt. FAYR, "F" Company Platoon Commander; and "F" Company marines. About 300 children were present. Attending for a brief time to pay respects and to say hello to the children and wish them a happy day were LtCol CLEMENT and SgtMaj GARDNER.

Enough candy, doughnuts and cake were distributed for all of the 3100 children in our TACR.

c. Mr. Nixon and party, General WALT and General McCushing visited the Le My area on 4 September 1965. The party was briefed by LtCol CLEMENT and were escorted to observe the activities of the Le My Medical Center, Hoa Lac Market Place, Hoa Lac School and Village Chief's headquarters. Mr. Nixon was presented with a small Vietnamese flag and an earthenware jar by Mr. Lu, village chief of Hoa Lac. Mr. Nixon commented that he was impressed by the battalion's Civic Action program and noted progress in the area since his last visit to the Danang area last year.

d. See enclosures (12) and (13).



DoD GEN-20
DA Pam 360-518
NAVPER 15214
AFP 190-3-3
NAVMC 2608

22



Know Your Enemy:
THE VIET CONG



ARMED FORCES INFORMATION AND EDUCATION • DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(E)





Viet Cong Means Trouble

Literally translated, the phrase Viet Cong (VC) means Vietnamese Communist, and those who are Viet Cong employ the whole Communist arsenal of deceit and violence. A Viet Cong is a man, woman, or child—a tough fighter, with words or weapons, for what he is taught to call the “liberation” of South Vietnam—the Republic of Vietnam. Viet Cong also applies to the military and civilian components of the “Front” (the

National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, or NLF SVN). To its deuded followers the Front is the government they serve—but to the vast majority of South Vietnamese it is an instrument of terror and oppression manipulated by the Communists of North Vietnam.

The Viet Cong, the Communist “Liberation Army” within the Republic of Vietnam, has expanded its





numbers enormously, despite increasingly heavy casualties. Its so-called main force has grown from about 10,000 men in 1960 to over 65,000. Several regiments of the North Vietnamese Army have been sent by Hanoi into South Vietnam as part of the Communist buildup of forces in the south. As befits "regulars," many are armed with late-model imported weapons and wear uniforms, helmets of wicker or steel, and even scarves for unit identification. From isolated companies their formations have grown to battalions and regiments.

The strength of the Viet Cong guerrillas has not increased as rapidly. The estimated more than 100,000 guerrillas and militia, mostly based in the vicinity of their home villages and hamlets, are essential to the success of the main force and to the whole Viet Cong effort. Better armed and trained than before, the irregulars still wear the "calico noir," the traditional black pajamas of the Vietnamese peasant (worn also by the regulars as fatigue uniforms). They guide, support, reinforce, and provide recruits for the "liberation" movement. They also make possible the rule of the Communist Party in the countryside, enforcing the dictates of the local puppet Front organizations.

There are substantial areas in which the Front is the only effective government. It operates schools and hospitals, clothing factories and arsenals. Millions of Vietnamese support the Front out of friendship or fear, most often the latter. Due largely to the militia and the secret agents of the Party, an estimated one-fourth of the people of South Vietnam pay taxes to the Front, even though they may also pay taxes to the legitimate Government. This is an impressive record for a shadow government.

Initial Resources

What makes the Viet Cong and their way of warfare so significant is that they started with so little in material assets, although they had a belief in a well-proven doctrine (of subversion), a thorough knowledge of its tactics, and the moral support of their fellow Communists throughout the world. They had no industrial capacity. They had no substantial armed forces, only a few thousand experienced guerrillas, and perhaps 100,000 supporters—mostly in remote areas seldom visited by Government representatives.

On the other hand, the Viet Cong had hidden stores of weapons and ammunition left over from the war against the French. They had many trained and dedicated Communists to provide leadership, and access to the resources of the Communist regime in the North.





Finally, the Vietnamese Communists—North and South—were united in their determination to use whatever means were necessary to bring the whole country under Communist domination. Without massive U.S. and free world support, South Vietnam might already have been added to the list of lost countries.

As in conventional wars, each side expanded its armed might after the war had started. When it became obvious that the Republic of Vietnam in the South could not be taken without military force, Hanoi began sending a growing stream of infiltrators, arms, and supplies into South Vietnam by land and sea. The infiltrators were trained in the North to assume key positions of leadership. Communist China and other Communist countries have supplied weapons and ammunition, primarily through North Vietnam, the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), whose fight for freedom we support, have increased their numbers and improved their equipment at a pace far greater than have the Viet Cong. However, while the Front was experiencing its greatest growth, in 1963 and 1964, the free Government of South Vietnam was undergoing great political stress and frequent changes of administration. These factors have undoubtedly facilitated the growth of the Front, but they have not stunted the growth of the RVNAF, nor shaken their determination to resist Communist aggression and preserve the freedom and independence of the country.

The success of an unconventional army and a shadow government build up by Communist direction, largely from the people and the resources of a state they seek to destroy, is cause for concern. We must understand the reasons for this, and learn how to defeat such attacks, or they will be repeated again and again. The Viet Cong fighting man is not "10 feet tall," either figuratively or literally, being actually on the average only five feet three inches in height. Nor is he an incredible fanatic—many thousands of Viet Cong desert or go over to the side of the Government every year. His effectiveness cannot be attributed entirely to the outside support he receives—the RVNAF have received far more assistance from abroad.

Yet the Viet Cong has developed into a kind of fighting man who is capable of waging an unconventional war under conditions that would seem hopeless to the average orthodox soldier. To understand the Viet Cong and his way of warfare one must first know something of his country and his background.

The Growth of the Viet Cong

Roughly 40 years ago, the Communists under Ho Chi Minh, now president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North, began planning their campaign to take over Southeast Asia. Their first step in Vietnam was to seek to seize the leadership in the opposition to French rule. Vietnam was a part of French Indochina at the time. When the Japanese moved in after the fall of France in 1940, dominating the French and occupying all of Indochina, Communists and nationalists alike believed that the time for Vietnamese independence was near. Under Communist leadership and later Communist control, a coalition independence force was formed. This was the Viet Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam), which launched an eight-year struggle against the French soon after they returned in 1945.

Like the later Viet Cong, the Viet Minh grew from a modest start—but they became larger and much more formidable than the Viet Cong are today. By mid-1954 the Viet Minh had nearly 160,000 regulars and perhaps an equal number of militia. The French, stunned by defeats in conventional battles such as that at Dien Bien Phu and unable to solve the problems of the



new kind of war waged by the Viet Minh, were ready to negotiate. At an international conference in Geneva in the summer of 1954, presided over by representatives of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, war-torn Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel. The northern half, controlled by Communists, became the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam; the free southern half became the independent Republic of Vietnam.

Under the terms of the armistice agreement, Communists and anti-Communists were given an opportunity to move to whichever half of the divided country they preferred. Nearly a million from the North were able to move south to freedom during the brief period allowed. Some 90,000 people, mostly men and boys of the Viet Minh army, or future recruits, went north. Tens of thousands of Communists and sizable stocks of arms and ammunition were left in the South to assure an ultimate Communist takeover.



The 17th parallel was not intended to be a permanent "political or territorial boundary." The delegates at Geneva agreed on a "free general election by secret ballot" to be held throughout Vietnam at the end of two years. This would allow the people to decide for themselves their political future, and it would reunify the country. The Communists in the more populous North, with their police state control, were confident of winning the election. The election was not held because the South doubted the possibility of an honest vote in the North and because the election would not have been held under proper international supervision.

Hanoi Adopts Stronger Measures

After 1956 the Communists began to prepare for a stronger effort in the South. This meant reorganizing and expanding their personnel there, both military and

political, for the struggle to achieve a "political solution." Such a solution, which the Communists would still welcome, means replacing the strongly anti-Communist Government with a controlled neutralist coalition. Occasional assassinations and other acts of terrorism seemed necessary and proper, but initially the main emphasis had been on a campaign of subversion and propaganda to undermine the legal Government. It is difficult to say how much their decision to act more vigorously and openly was influenced by the impatient Communists in the South and how much by their comrades in the North who were alarmed and embarrassed by the obvious contrast between the prosperity of the South and their own impoverished dictatorship.

Viet Cong terrorism was intensified in 1958, and by the end of that year the Viet Cong had an armed force of more than 2,000 regulars supplemented by militia. In 1959 it was decided that the political struggle

must be aided by a major armed effort. Open warfare began in 1960, with the overrunning of an RVNAF regimental headquarters at Trang Sup on 20 January.

Hanoi Creates a Screen

The Lao Dong (Communist) Party of Vietnam held its Third Congress in Hanoi in September 1960. Attended by Party representatives from all over Vietnam, the Congress acted to establish the appearance of a local rebellion in the South, while at the same time simplifying and formalizing control of it.

To give the whole Viet Cong operation the necessary appearance of being a true struggle for liberation by an oppressed people, to impart the illusion of legitimacy to actions taken and about to be taken, and to represent the movement in public activities, the Communists decided to set up a "National Liberation Front."

Hanoi's Political-Military Machine

The Communist regime in Hanoi directs, controls, and supplies the entire Viet Cong political and military effort to conquer the Republic of Vietnam. All control—political and military—comes ultimately from the Central Committee of North Vietnam's Lao Dong (Communist) Party, which maps out broad strategy. The Reunification Commission of the Northern government controls the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, and the Military High Command in the North is responsible for the military training of the men who infiltrate into the South. In addition, a central Intelligence organization in Hanoi—the Central Research Agency—maintains an elaborate intelligence network in South Vietnam and directs the extensive undercover activities of the Viet Cong.

The two Communist administrative headquarters in the South, inherited from the Viet Minh, have been merged into the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). This central "brain" coordinates all Communist activity in the South and all relations with the highest Communist Party and government echelons in North Vietnam.

In South Vietnam itself, the Communists have created a show of legitimacy through the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. At the national headquarters level, the Front has a central committee and presidium, which take their orders from the control committee of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)—the Communist Party in South Vietnam.

In December 1960, a group of individuals claiming to represent virtually all walks of life and all major ethnic and religious groups of South Vietnam met in the forest northwest of Saigon. There they announced the formation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, a shadow government, which faithfully issued the manifestoes already decreed by the Communist Party Congress in September.

Another act of Communist deception was the creation of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) in the South. The object of this was to screen the extent of Communist domination of the Front and make it appear that the Front is composed of several organizations. The original members of the PRP were all Communists, but qualifications for admission were made less strict than for the PRP's counterpart in the North—the Lao Dong Party.

The Front's national central committee sets policy and also is responsible for planning and organization building. The next level in the Communist-dominated Front hierarchy consists of the 3 interzone headquarters, which determine *agitprop* (persuasion and propaganda) policy guidance and which are responsible for political indoctrination and training. Under the interzone headquarters are 7 zone headquarters, which are their sub-offices.

Next in the Front's structure are the approximately 30 provincial committees—its chief operating units.



*Prisoner is Viet
National Front
VC prisoner*

These committees direct the "liberation associations" the Communists use to spread their indoctrination and propaganda and to gain the often-unwitting support of the South Vietnamese people. The committees, of course, also transmit to subordinate levels the orders sent down from the central committee. In addition—and this is a major role for the provincial-level Communists—they assign military duties to the Viet Cong units operating in their provinces.

The Front's committees and cells in South Vietnam's districts, towns, and villages make up the largest part of the Communist spiderweb spread like an evil shadow over the land. In the "liberated," or Viet Cong-dominated areas of South Vietnam, they are in the open, free of Government interference as they carry out their so-called political struggle, recruit and train men for their local Viet Cong units, and carry out the military or guerrilla tasks they are assigned.

In the areas controlled by the legitimate Government, of course, the Communists and grass-level front members must remain under cover and work in secret in their efforts to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Since the Communists are using the National Liberation Front to camouflage their anti-Government activities, their People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party organization parallels the Front structure, and that Communist apparatus keeps a tight control on the Front from the top-level central committee to at least the provincial level.

The military arm is completely integrated into the Front structure from the very top to the lowest level, with military representatives found at all organizational levels of the Front. Since the Vietnamese Communists consider the war in South Vietnam to be primarily a political struggle, the primary duty of the Viet Cong military forces is to support that political aggression being conducted by the Communists in the name of the National Movement to Liberate South Vietnam.

A 64-page Front indoctrination booklet on the organization of its armed forces declared that organization must conform to political lines; that the Liberation Army (Viet Cong) is a fighting army and therefore must be highly centralized with inferiors obeying superiors—there must be discipline; and that the army's political tasks are fundamental, maintaining unity between cadres and men, and between the army and the people.

The booklet pointed out that these three principles insure that military action is subordinated to political




action, that the army is united, and that the people are closely united with the army.

To insure continuous political orientation of the army and maintain political control over the army's officer corps, political officers, or commissars, are assigned to all Viet Cong units. They are the political watchdogs and indoctrinators of the Front's Liberation Army.

The Viet Cong, the so-called Liberation Army, in South Vietnam is about one half of the total Communist armed forces in all Vietnam. The other half comprises North Vietnam's People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN).


The Viet Cong forces consist of two basic elements, the paramilitary, and the full military. The paramilitary Viet Cong is generally a local civilian who is a part-time soldier or guerrilla, whose military duties do not take him far from his community. In addition, he is not highly indoctrinated politically.

The Front's name for its paramilitary force was originally the Popular Army. However, since this force is engaged almost exclusively in guerrilla warfare, the name has been expanded to Guerrilla Popular Army (GPA). At the hamlet level, the GPA unit is either



a cell, a half-squad, or a squad—3, 6, or 12 men. The GPA unit at the village level (a village consists of several hamlets), is the platoon, made up of 3 or 4 squads—36 to 48 men. There are two basic classes of GPA members. The first is the village guerrilla, frequently an older man, who is generally used as a

village defender. He has little training and is armed with scanty or primitive weapons. The second is the combat guerrilla, who is younger and better trained and armed. He is frequently called upon to aid guerrilla mobile columns or full military units in their operations in the vicinity of his village or hamlet. The combat



guerrilla units also serve as manpower pools for the Viet Cong's full military units.

The Viet Cong's full military element also is divided into two types—the Regional Forces and the Main Force. They are not set up or operated like orthodox army units. Their units are self-contained, not uni-

formed, and rely primarily on guerrilla tactics. Since they are dependent for much of their logistical support on local populations, their commanders can't simply forward supply requisitions to a depot. Instead, when they need weapons, ammunition, or other military hardware they attack a Government base or unit and try to capture what they want.

The Regional Forces, also called Territorials or Regionals, are units established by Front district committees, which provide their leadership and direct their activities. A Regional Force operates pretty much in one general area.

The elite units of the so-called Liberation Army are the battalions of the Main Force. They have acquired the name of "Hard Hats" because of the metal or fiberboard helmets that distinguish them from the Regional Forces and the paramilitary guerrillas. These battalions are directed by the Front committees at the provincial level and range farther afield in their military operations than do the units of the Regional Forces. As members of the Main Force, the "Hard Hat" Viet Cong don't have to perform non-military work, such as producing food or transporting supplies. By the end of 1965 there were over 65,000 of these Hard Hats fighting in South Vietnam.

This organization seems cumbersome and the chain of command indirect and slow, in contrast to orthodox military practice of establishing a direct military chain of command from top to bottom. However, the Viet Cong's political and military structure conforms to the classic Communist pattern of strong central authority at the top and operations at lower level decentralized, with Communist Party control over the government at all levels, and political control over the military at all levels.

The Cadre—How He Operates

Although few, except those immediately affected, realized the war was on in the late 1950's and early 1960's, those who were the victims of the savage campaigns of terrorism, assassination, and kidnapping in rural Vietnam were well aware of it. So too were the thousands of cadres—trained, dedicated, hard-core Communist leaders and military officers—who fanned out in the countryside to win support for the insurgent forces. A cadre's role can be described as a combination priest, policeman, and propagandist. He is the Party and the Front in the countryside hamlets and villages. How they operate is graphically described by one of them, Captain Lam.



People to people Solidarity
and support
have

Ho Chi Minh
City
Vietnam

"We seek to do three things. The first is to drive a wedge between the people and their government—to make the people hate their government, and the Americans. Our second objective is to get people to join our (VC) armed forces. The third is to persuade them to increase their production of food, and give the increase to us.

"Our cadre go into each village to study the situation and the people. Once they know the people and their problems, our cadre can explain how these problems are the fault of the government, and how the people can achieve their ambitions by following us. In this way we make the people hate their government, and can destroy the government in their village. Then we guide them in forming their own government (under our control) and in organizing their own armed forces, which of course are our auxiliaries.

"Of course we cannot do this right away in those villages and districts where the government is strong. There we concentrate on educating people politically to hate their government, and on forming both open and secret organizations which can support us, or embarrass the government. Every little bit helps. Any voluntary action of the people, from organized protests to simply slowing down on work ordered by the government, is a clear gain for us.

"Our cadre live in the village, or, if this is not safe, very close by. They appeal to the ideals, the patriotism, and the emotions of each individual according to his situation, and try to recruit him for the cause. If a person is arrested by government forces we try to contact him as soon as he is released, sympathize with him, arouse his hatred of the government, and recruit him. Many times we bring hungry, tired troops into a village so that the people may see how we are suffering for them, and arouse their sympathy. We try in every possible way to create hatred for the government and the Americans, to separate the people from the government and to make them see that we are their only hope."

Today, with the increase in Viet Cong forces, more emphasis is placed on terror and murder ("destroying the village government") and less on persuasion. Organizing and involving everyone possible in a maximum effort, coupled with incessant propaganda, is still emphasized as essential to Viet Cong success.

The Diversity of the Viet Cong

The nearly half million men and women who make up the civil and military components of the Viet Cong army and its shadow government, the National Front, are as diverse and divergent in origin and in motivation as those of any army and government anywhere. Perhaps the most important thing that sets them apart from their fellow Vietnamese is the way in which they are incessantly told, and caused to repeat, the reasons for everything they do, including supporting the Viet Cong. The best illustrations of their diversity, and their common knowledge, is found in some of their own statements.

Consider the story of Captain Lam. One of the real "hard core," the backbone of the movement, he took advantage of the Government's Chieu Hoi program which welcomes the return to loyalty of those misled by the Communists.

"I left my village in Central Vietnam in 1947, when I was eighteen years old, to join the Viet Minh. Two years later, because they said that all leaders in the struggle against the French should, I joined the Communist Party. As its Political Officer, I went North with my company in 1954, after the division of the country.

"In 1960, I was promoted to Senior Captain, and

ordered to go to help liberate the South. After nearly six months' travelling I reached my destination and became at first a political member of the Province Committee and later a District Commissar [Secretary of the District Committee]. We were very successful in organizing and expanding the Viet Cong, but after two years, and the change in governments, I began to see the real difference between the way the people live in the North and the way they would live in the South if it were not for this war. I lost my faith in the Communist claim that we were fighting for the people, and decided that the only right thing was to join the forces of the Republic of Vietnam, so I did."

By way of contrast, consider the words of Sergeant Vo Anh Long, a 31-year-old squad leader in a main force battalion: "I was a farmer until May 1960. The Government controlled my village, but the Viet Cong used to come at night and collect taxes. They would tell us, and we believed them, that they were good men who loved and wanted to defend the poor people like us, that they struggled and sacrificed even their lives to give rights to the poor people.

"Finally they told me, and five other young men, that if we stayed in the village the Government would take us away for the army, but that if we came with

VIET CONG OATH OF HONOR

1. I swear I am prepared to sacrifice all for Vietnam. I will fight to my last breath against imperialism, colonialism, Vietnamese traitors, and aggression in order to make Vietnam independent, democratic and united.

2. I swear to obey absolutely all orders from my commanders, executing them wholeheartedly, promptly, and accurately.

3. I swear to fight firmly for the people without complaint and without becoming discouraged even if life is hard or dangerous. I will go forward in combat without fear, will never retreat regardless of suffering involved.

4. I swear to learn to fight better and shape myself into a true revolutionary soldier battling the invading American imperialists and their servants, seeking to make Vietnam democratic, wealthy, and strong.

5. I swear to preserve organizational secrecy, and to keep secret my unit's plans, the name of my unit commander, and all secrets of other revolutionary units.

6. I swear if taken by the enemy I will not reveal any information even under inhuman torture. I will remain faithful to the Revolution and not be bribed by the enemy.

7. I swear in the name of unity to love my friends in my unit as myself, to work cooperatively with them in combat and at all other times.

8. I swear to maintain and protect my weapons, ensuring they are never damaged or captured by the enemy.

9. I swear that in my relationships with the people I will do three things and eschew three things. I will respect, protect, and help the people; I will not steal from, threaten, nor inconvenience the people. I will do all things to win their confidence.

10. I swear to indulge in self-criticism, to be a model soldier of the Revolution, and never to harm either the Liberation Army or Vietnam.

them for a week of training we could become local guerrillas and defend our village. We went with them, but then they told me that because of my ability I must go to a long training course. We marched for months to reach the training camp, where I studied for six months and then was graduated as a squad leader.

"I soon realized that the life of a Viet Cong was hard, but the cadre kept emphasizing that we were living gloriously, that we must be prepared to die splendidly. Although I knew that I had been fooled, I accepted this. We studied and had self-criticism sessions almost every day. Each of us belonged to a three-man cell, so that every man was watched by two others.

"I stayed with them for four years, fighting in many battles. Eventually I could no longer stand being away from my family, and so I ran away and joined the Government side."

A few more statements further illustrate the diversity.

"My uncle told me that I must join the district force, because otherwise the Viet Cong might burn down my mother's house."

"I was farming in the North, but last year when I was 20 the PAVN [People's Army of (North) Vietnam] drafted me, gave me six weeks' training, asked my group if it would not help to liberate the South, and marched us down here. Now I am in a transportation unit and have to carry 32 kilos of rice for 12 miles every day. I want to go home."

"I did not want to become a soldier but the Viet Cong came and took me. Then I was ashamed to desert, because it would disgrace my comrades in the cell. But I used to get drunk and sleep too late, and after I was criticized several times and did not reform I was banished from my unit."

"I am from North Vietnam. I was an officer of the PAVN. I was ordered to come to the South, so of course I came."

"I was a village guerrilla. The Viet Cong hamlet chief told me I must watch for the Government troops. One night the district force came and attacked the Government outpost. I had to help them. After the battle they gave me a gun, and said that now I must fight to save my life. When a RVNAF company came I tried to hide but they found me."

Viet Cong Discipline

Scholar or street urchin, professional officer or farm boy, they all tell the same story of relentless indoctrination—of discipline playing on every human emotion, constantly applied. The soldier is required to memorize basic codes of conduct (a 10-point oath of honor and a 12-point code of discipline) which put him in the position of a hero, a patriot, a friend, and protector of the people. He is never allowed to forget this role. Perhaps the most effective reminder is his unit's daily indoctrination and self-criticism session. In this, his indoctrination is continued and reinforced, his supposed motives are reviewed and discussed by the group, and he is told by his leader what his future actions will be. After this, he must explain his reactions, and he must publicly confess and criticize his own shortcomings and weaknesses in thought and deed.

After every fight there is an almost immediate critique, with no holds barred, which gives every man a chance to let off steam. It also lets the cadre know what his men are thinking. This contributes to the effectiveness of the constant surveillance program, maintained primarily through the cell system (usually three-man) which is applied to every possible unit.


Appeals to the mind and the heart are the principal

VIET CONG CODE OF DISCIPLINE

1. I will obey the orders from my superiors under all circumstances.
2. I will never take anything from the people, not even a needle or thread.
3. I will not put group property to my own use.
4. I will return that which is borrowed, make restitution for things damaged.
5. I will be polite to people, respect and love them.
6. I will be fair and just in buying and selling.
7. When staying in people's houses I will treat them as I would my own house.
8. I will follow the slogan: All things of the people and for the people.
9. I will keep unit secrets absolutely and will never disclose information even to closest friends or relatives.
10. I will encourage the people to struggle and support the Revolution.
11. I will be alert to spies and will report all suspicious persons to my superiors.
12. I will remain close to the people and maintain their affection and love.

way in which the Viet Cong seeks to control its members. Regular units employ standard forms of military courtesy, and strict obedience is always expected, but emphasis is placed on making compliance with regulations appear to be voluntary. For those who fail in their duty, if such normal punishments as public criticism,

extra duty, and brief confinement do not bring reform, the penalty is often discharge, in terms that make the man feel a traitor and an outcast from the human race. The fear of corporal punishment or death seems to be of less importance although either may be visited on the individual or his relatives.





Tactical Planning and Doctrine ●

It has been said that the Viet Cong soldier probably is told the reason for everything that he does more frequently and in greater detail than any other soldier in the world. Almost certainly he is required to explain the reasons for his actions more than any other soldier. Every proposed action is discussed from all angles before it is taken—and by everyone concerned except the targets and the innocent bystanders. Concerning the bystanders, one Viet Cong commented on the bombing of the U. S. Embassy, "If a few people get killed from a blast it is a risk of the war. . . . The Front is the benefactor of all the people."

Captain Lam's description of what happens after action against an RVNAF outpost is recommended

shows the almost incredible effort to make sure that everyone "gets the word" and performs his assigned duties.

"After studying the proposal, I report it to the head of the Provincial Military Affairs Committee. He then studies it from all points of view, considering especially the political effects, and the relative capabilities of our forces and those of the RVNAF. If he approves of the proposed operation he presents it to the Secretary of the Provincial Committee of the Party. The Secretary studies it and if he thinks it sound he calls a meeting of the whole Party Committee to study, discuss, and perhaps approve the proposal.

"Once the proposal is approved by the Party Com-

Freedom) During (last year...



mittee, the Military Affairs Committee divides the preliminary tasks among its three staffs. The Military Staff sends a reconnaissance unit to study the objective from a military point of view, and to prepare a sandtable mock-up. The Political Staff sends a cadre to contact the civilians in the area, to learn their reaction to the [proposed] attack. It also studies the morale of the troops to see if they are mentally and emotionally prepared. If they are not, the Political Staff must take the necessary measures to prepare them. The Rear Services [logistics] Staff finds out if the civilians can furnish the necessary food and labor, including that needed for removal of the dead and of any booty.

"When all this is done, the Military Affairs Committee holds another meeting. This will be attended by the leaders of all the units that will be involved in the attack. If the majority of the Committee believes that the attack should be made, they report to another meeting of the Provincial Party Committee, which again reviews the proposed problem and the solution and per-

haps directs some additional action. The Party Committee will approve the attack only if all conditions—political, military, and logistic—appear favorable.

"After this is accomplished all units begin practicing for the attack, either on a sandtable or an actual stake-and-string replica of the target. This practice will take from five days to a month, depending on the difficulty of the target, until every man knows just what he is supposed to do, how he is supposed to do it, and when. Every detail of the action will be planned out, including when and where the main force units will meet the local force and militia units. The militia are always necessary to guide the troops and to provide laborers to carry supplies, to carry off the booty and our dead, if any. We always try to carry away all our dead, to give them proper burial, which will comfort their families and strengthen the morale of the rest."

Such detailed preparation seems fantastic, but account after account bears it out. Any planned operation, whether an attack, an ambush, or a raid on a hamlet, is planned and rehearsed in great detail—and then often called off at the last moment when some factor has changed.

Viet Cong tactical doctrine is explicit. It is summarized in four words: Four Fast, One Slow. This means Fast Advance, Fast Assault, Fast Clearance of the Battlefield, and Fast Withdrawal—all based on Slow Preparation.

There it little that is new or unusual in Viet Cong tactical doctrine, once the basic principle of careful, thorough preparation for any contingency, followed by swift action, is grasped. Attacks on strongpoints almost always feature maximum use of explosives on a primary and a secondary objective, usually mutually supporting, and a careful deployment of forces to intercept or ambush any reinforcements that may be brought in. In several recent battles there have been indications of deliberate efforts to entice and ambush helicopter-borne troops.

In the past the Viet Cong have usually sought to avoid defensive combat unless they had the battlefield so organized that it was essentially an ambush. Nevertheless they carefully prepare for defense, with alternate and switch positions, in case they do decide to make a stand. Frequently these positions are incorporated into existing dikes separating rice fields so that emplacements seem to be merely breaks in the walls, and even trenches look like canals. Where the water level will permit, especially in the so-called secret base areas,

elaborate tunnels are often constructed, both for cover and for concealment from ground and air forces. Like the Japanese in World War II, the Viet Cong are tireless diggers.

Controlled land mines, buried in highways and detonated when a Government target is over them, have long been a favorite and an economical Viet Cong method of destroying or at least discouraging their opponents. Occasionally nonmilitary targets are mined, usually by mistake or for some specific political or psychological purpose, such as warning uncooperative civilians. Homemade booby traps, ranging from simple deadfalls and "spike-boards" to explosive foot-mines are often used in preparing for a battle or an ambush, being placed in the covered areas the ambushes would naturally seek.

Like the elaborate trench-works often seen, the hundreds of booby traps around "liberated," meaning Viet-Cong-controlled, villages have some value if a Viet Cong unit decides to fight there. Their most important function, really, is to implicate the civilians in anti-Government actions. Government forces are likely to treat them as Viet Cong. The villagers fully anticipate this, so they feel forced to support the Viet Cong as their only hope. Secondarily, the trenches and the dug-outs do provide protection for the civilians if the community is bombed or shelled by Government forces. Even though these attacks are provoked by the Viet Cong, the people are often grateful to these same provocateurs for "helping us to protect ourselves."

The Viet Cong's emphasis on carefully planned, discussed, and rehearsed actions has its disadvantages. If such an action fails, if losses are heavier than expected or not in proportion to benefits achieved, there is a corresponding drop in morale and combat effectiveness. An unexpected serious attack by Republic of Vietnam forces, especially when the resistance is unsuccessful, indicates poor planning by Viet Cong leaders and seriously impairs effectiveness for weeks or months, longer than the actual damage inflicted would warrant. Only a quick, successful counteraction can overcome this effect.

Viet Cong "Persuasion"

Much is said about the Viet Cong use of terror, which seems to be increasing. This is natural as the pace of the war steps up and support requirements grow faster than voluntary contributions. Taxes have been raised repeatedly in some areas. "Draftees" must fill in as voluntary recruiting proves inadequate. Terror-punishment

seems to produce the fastest results, but it eventually reacts against those who use it unless they succeed in seizing complete power. Today, in many areas, the Viet Cong are faced with the administrative problems that afflict any government in time of war—and are losing voluntary support as a result.

The Viet Cong have, from the beginning, made every effort to secure the support of members of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces as well as the support of the civilians. Generally similar tactics have been used, emphasizing always the benefits to the individual and the high moral and patriotic worth of such a shift in allegiance. "Serve your country against the American imperialists," they say. "Don't be fooled because the Americans are more clever than the French; the Americans' motives are the same, but they use you as puppets."

The general preference for the "soft-sell" does not keep the Communists from killing, often by torture, whole garrisons of small posts they overwhelm when it seems appropriate to punish determined resistance or to frighten others in the area. Not infrequently one or two leaders will be brutally murdered as an example to the others. The dependents of the men may meet the same fate. Threats of reprisals against families are sometimes used as well.

Within the last 6 years the Viet Cong's *Binh Van* program—"proselyting," as they call it—has become a major program. A favored practice is the use of girls and women, speaking as sisters or mothers, to serenade small garrisons, calling to them to save their precious lives for their families' sake, and imploring them to have mercy on civilians. None of these programs has had noticeable success. Homesickness has been a major cause of desertion in the RVNAF, and this has plagued the Viet Cong as well.

Prisoners, to the Viet Cong, are objects to be exploited, primarily for political and psychological purposes. Thus, prisoners are often held—and treated as well as could be expected by the standards of an Asian guerrilla army—for two or three months' reeducation and then, if not notoriously anti-Communist or brutal, released. There have been instances in which American prisoners were held for some six months, exhibited in villages and hamlets, put under pressure to get them to sign documents that could be used for worldwide propaganda, and then released. One American prisoner was reported executed in June 1965 in reprisal for the execution of a Viet Cong terrorist.



● Viet Cong Capabilities and Liabilities

In little more than five years the Viet Cong armed forces have grown from an essentially guerrilla army to one that includes regiments of uniformed, well-equipped, highly foot-mobile regulars capable of engaging in conventional operations of limited duration. Concurrently, their civil organization has grown from a mere shadow to one of considerable substance, which in some provinces collects almost four times as much taxes as does the Republic of South Vietnam. The Communist Party, under its cover name of the People's Revolutionary Party, has expanded the control it exercises on behalf of North Vietnam—the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Substantial quantities of portable war materials have been brought into South

Vietnam by land and sea, as well as 8,000 to 10,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in the year 1964 alone. The Communist buildup in the South is continuing.

As Viet Cong resources and capabilities have grown, so have their liabilities. They have been forced to draft teenagers directly into their regular units. They have felt obliged to redouble their rates of taxation and increase their other demands on the civilians in areas under their influence. Logistics requirements for food as well as weapons have greatly increased. Even regular units spent much of their time in producing their own food until 1964, a practice which increased air surveillance may render unprofitable.

Most significant, and most dangerous for both sides,

the Viet Cong pretense of being truly a South Vietnam "people's army" is rapidly being destroyed by the introduction on a growing scale of North Vietnamese forces and equipment—and by their own stepped-up actions as well. If this effort to achieve a quick victory fails, as our increasing support of the free Vietnamese is intended to assure, they say they are quite prepared to continue for 10 or 20 years if necessary and possible.

The war in Vietnam "is a different kind of war," said President Johnson on July 28, 1965. "There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Vietnam, at times with understandable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own Government. But we must not let this mask the central

fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Vietnam and it is spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism."

The Viet Cong is a tough enemy, but no tougher than his opponents. He is not a superman, nor is he invincible. It is impossible to predict how long it will take, but the Republic of Vietnam and the United States are committed to stopping his aggression.

Our military effort in Vietnam is an essential element in achieving the objectives of freedom, peace, and progress in that war-torn country which has fought so long and valiantly for those goals.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington

March 8, 1966

KNOW YOUR ENEMY: THE VIET CONG (DoD Gen-20)—
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By Order of the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force:

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Army: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-4 requirement for TROOP TOPICS.

Air Force: X: One for every six active duty military members.

Marine Corps: MARCORPS: Table 4, plus 7000-140 (5)
7130/7150/7352/7587 (1)



*Vietnam
Quang
Trung - fought
at Dien Bien Phu*



III. MAF CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY

When the first marine ground elements landed in the Republic of Vietnam last March 8th, we anticipated that we would be called upon to wage two types of operations: Military operations directed against the organized communist armed forces, and Civic Action operations directed toward the Rural civilians in an attempt to win them over to the cause of western democracy.

Insofar as our Civic Action Program is concerned, when we first landed the objectives of these operations were to build the respect, confidence and loyalty of the Vietnamese villagers for their legally constituted government, and to gain their confidence and cooperation. These are still the objectives of our Civic Action Operations although they have now been integrated with the government of Vietnam's rural construction program as will be explained later.

The basic governmental unit in rural Vietnam is the hamlet, which is basically a collection families, varying in size from 800 persons to 1,000. These hamlets are organized into villages, which are in turn organized into districts. You could perhaps liken a hamlet to a town in the United States, a village to a township, and a district to a United States county. The districts are organized into provinces, which would be similar to a state in the United States. The provinces are loosely organized into four regions, and from the region you go to the Central Government at Saigon. Each hamlet, village, district and province is governed by an officer referred to as a "Chief". The region does not normally become too involved in civilian affairs, the usual line of authority going directly from the province to the central government. In the I Corps Tactical Zone, however, or the 1st region as it is called, where the Marine forces are located, General Thi is both the Commanding General of the military forces and the Senior government delegate and has interested himself very much in the civilian administration of government, so that in many instances, the effective line of authority in this region does go from province to region and then to the central government.

The military organization of the Republic of Vietnam somewhat parallels the civilian organization. The Vietnamese high command is located at the seat of the central government in Saigon. From the high command you go to the region, which is called Corps Tactical Zone. You then go to the province which is referred to as a Sector, and then to the district, which is referred to as a sub-sector. There is no military organization at the village and hamlet levels.

It has been our experience that when our units first move into a rural area, the village and hamlet governments will have long since been destroyed by the Viet Cong. We must, therefore, deal with the local district chief until such time as the village and hamlet government have been reestablished. Insofar as policy matters are concerned, however, it has been our experience that we must at all times deal directly with the province chief, because it is the province chief who has effective control over all civilian governmental services.

When Marine forces first enter an area, they immediately attempt to determine what the villager's needs are. They do this through the local chiefs. It has been our experience that the villagers' needs fall consistently into three general categories: Medical, Individual assistance and public improvements.

We have been meeting the Medical needs with our medical assistance teams which are built around the U.S. Navy Corpsmen which are organic to all Marine

units. Perhaps I should progress slightly at this point to explain that under our Civic Action program, every Marine and Sailor is a civic action officer. We do not have specialists attached to our units doing civic action work - every member of III MAF performs his regular military function plus his civic action function. This is why our medical assistance teams are based upon corpsmen attached to our units, rather than specialized teams organized especially for this purpose. We also utilize the local chief in our medical assistance team and any Vietnamese rural health worker who might be in the area. The basic guidelines of our medical assistance program are:

First, to utilize and train Vietnamese villagers to the maximum extent possible. For example, we are presently providing medical assistance at over 115 different locations throughout our three positions or enclaves, and in each of these we ask the local chief to provide a volunteer who wants to be trained as a health worker. In most cases, we get such a volunteer to work with us.

Our second basic guideline follows from the first - we keep the level of service down to that which the government of Vietnam will be able to provide when we move on, so as not to create a vacuum or embarrass the Vietnamese villagers requiring treatment more sophisticated than a basic corpsman can normally provide to the next higher level of government for treatment although our medical personnel on the spot could provide the required treatment. We do this, of course, because it is the Vietnamese Government which we are attempting to sell to the villagers, not our capability to provide services.

The third basic guideline is to maintain a tight control over the medicines dispensed in order to minimize the opportunity for their getting into the hands of the Viet Cong or onto the black market. We do this by dispensing a pill-a-day. For example, if a person has a ailment requiring a pill a day over a five day period, we will orally administer this first pill the first day and have that villager return each day until he has taken all of the necessary medicine. This not only enables us to maintain a tight control over the medicines which we are dispensing, but it also increases the contacts between the villagers and their local chief who is with our Medical Assistance Team, and this is very important to our ultimate goal.

We have three primary sources for our Individual Assistance Program. The first of these is Project Handclasp, which is the old Navy - Marine Corps people to people program whereby private donors can contribute commodities and the Navy and Marine Corps will transport these commodities overseas on a space available basis. The second major source is the Catholic Relief Services, which makes available to Marine Forces the farm commodities which Congress has made available to distribution throughout the world. Catholic Relief Services neither requests nor gets any recognition for its participation in this program, and the commodities are, of course, distributed without regard to religious affiliation or lack thereof. The third principle source is the CARE Self-Help Kit program. This program got started last Fall when the American Legion started making donations to CARE in order that CARE could make available to Marine Forces the Self-Help Kits which enable the villagers to help themselves. These kits are purchased on the local market in the Republic of Vietnam or in the local area and are designed to meet the specific needs of specific villagers. They are wood working kits, blacksmith kits, resettlers kits, sewing kits, school kits, midwifery kits, - all designed to meet specific needs. This has been a most encouraging program and one which the villagers really appreciate. We have, therefore, been encouraging other persons and organizations to support this program and just recently the U. S. Marine Corps Reserve has contributed more than \$100,000 to this portion of our Civic Action Program.

The basic guidelines of our Individual Assistance Program are that we will distribute these commodities only at the request of the local chief, and then we distribute them through his offices. This policy necessitates, of course, very close relations between Marines in the field and the local chiefs in order that we may be able to demonstrate to the chief the things which might be of help to

Cooperative American Relief Everywhere

Perhaps the most important members of this council, in light of its mission, are the representatives of the Commanding General of I Corps who is, you will recall, also the Senior Civilian authority in the region. These representatives are the Chief of Staff of I Corps, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Rural Construction, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Psychological Warfare.

The U. S. members of the council are the Regional Director of US AID, the Foreign AID Agency, the Senior Field Representative of JUSPAO, the News - Psychological Warfare Agency, the Commanding Officer and G-5 Advisor of the I Corps MACV Advisory Group, and the III MAF Political Advisor Representing the Ambassador. General WALT has assigned three Officers to the council: The Deputy Commanding General of III MAF, Major General MCCUTCHEON, who also is the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, the Assistant Division Commander of the 3rd Marine Division, Brigadier General ENGLISH, and his Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, who is responsible for the Marine Civic Action and Psychological Warfare operations.

The council has established committees to work in the areas where the principal rural construction problems are encountered. These committees consist of representatives of all Vietnamese and U. S. Agencies with any capability in the area in question, and again each committee has the primary mission of determining the Government of Vietnam's plans in its area of activities, and then assisting that government in resolving the problem it faces.

The principal committees which the council has formed include the following:

The Psy-War Committee consisting of the I Corps Deputy Chief for Psychological Warfare, the Senior Field Representative of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, the I Corps MACV Psy-War Advisor, and the III MAF G-5.

The Public Health Committee which consists of the Senior Military Surgeon of I Corps, the Senior Civilian Surgeon in the 1st Region, and the Senior Surgeon of the Da Nang City Hospital from the Government of Vietnam. The U.S. representatives on this committee include the Medical Advisor of the US AID Agency, the Medical Advisor on the I Corps MACV Staff, the Senior Surgeon of the U. S. Air Forces Operating in I Corps Tactical Zone and the Senior Surgeon of the U.S. Army Special Forces operating in the Corps Zone. III MAF has three representatives on this committee: the Force Surgeon, the Commanding Officer of the U.S. Navy Station Hospital at Da Nang, and the Medical Advisor on the G-5 Section Staff.

The Education Committee which has been established at the express request of the Commanding General of I Corps. He wants this committee to expand greatly the number of English Language Teaching Facilities throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone and to increase the number of English Language Library Facilities. This committee is also coordinating III MAF's program of getting all school children located behind its units outlying positions in school by next Fall. This committee includes the ARVN Deputy Chief of Staff for Rural Construction, the Regional Director of US AID, the Senior Field Representative of JUSPAO, the I Corps MACV G-5 Advisor, and the III MAF Assistant Chief of Staff G-5.

The Public Safety Committee which concerns itself with the development of those Vietnamese Forces which can destroy the Viet Cong Infrastructure, protect the Vietnamese Infrastructure, and provide public security in areas where Viet Cong organized military forces have been destroyed or driven out. Included on this committee are the I Corps Director of Security, the Public Safety Division Officer of US AID, the I Corps MACV Advisor for Popular Forces and Regional Forces, and the III MAF Assistant Operations Officer responsible for working with the Regional and Popular Forces.

The Port of Da Nang Committee which is charged with the mission of improving the port facilities of Da Nang and of increasing the efficient use of existing port facilities by all users thereof. This committee consists of the Commander of the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, the US AID Logistics Officer, the U.S. Base Development Officer, the I Corps Economics Inspector, the Vietnamese Port Director, the ARVN Commanding Officer of the I Corps Area Logistics Command and a representative of the Vietnamese Port Labor Union.

The commodities distribution committee which is charged with the mission of overseeing the distribution of all commodities which are received in I Corps tactical zone. This committee ensures that there is an equitable distribution of these commodities to all needy vietnamese throughout the entire I Corps tactical zone. Included on this committee are the operations officer of US aid, the III MAF chaplain and assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, the I Corps MACV G-5 adviser, the DaNang Representatives of Catholic Relief Services and Care, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for rural construction and the ARVN Chief of Civic Action.

There is also a roads committee consisting of engineers of all U.S. and Vietnamese agencies operating in the I Corps tactical zone charged with the mission of marshalling all assets available for properly maintaining the road system throughout the I Corps tactical zone.

Following these developments last fall, we have now taken a new look at our Civic Action Program and have organized it into four phases.

Phase I is a tactical phase and occurs in all military operations which are being conducted in populated areas.

The objectives of phase I civic action is to get the civilians out of the field of battle to an area where they can be relatively well protected from combat injuries. During this time a preliminary screening of the villagers is made in order to attempt to detect the communist agents, and a psychological indoctrination is given in an attempt to explain what the government of Vietnam is doing for the villagers throughout the country, why third country forces such as III MAF are here helping the government of Vietnam, and why it is necessary to fight or conduct operations in their hamlet. We also demonstrate the concern of the government of Vietnam for the welfare of the individual villager by providing them with immediate medical assistance, and feeding them.

We always attempt to use ARVN civil affairs teams for phase I civil action because they can, of course, do a more efficient job than we, and because it is their government which we are attempting to sell to the villagers. We do, however, have a self-supporting capability because we conduct phase I civic action operations in every instance where we have to conduct military operations in populated areas.

Phase I civic action occurs in two types of operations. One is a so-called sweeping operation where we depart from our established position for the purpose of destroying a known or suspected viet Cong military force. At the conclusion of these operations, we withdraw our forces to their established positions. The other is a clearing operation where we are moving our outlying positions further out in order to open a new area for the vietnamese forces to move into and start their pacification or rural construction program.

In the latter operations, we enter Phase 2 civic action operations immediately upon conclusion of the military operations.

The emphasis during Phase 2 civic action operations is on developing those vietnamese forces which can destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure and protect the vietnamese infrastructure. During this period of time the government of Vietnam will take a census of the villagers, determine their specific needs, and make detailed plans for rural construction of the area. Concurrently, however, Rural construction plans are initiated, usually by some element of III MAF supported by the other U.S. agencies. These plans are initiated, however pursuant to the direction of the local chiefs. In other words, our medical assistance, individual assistance and public improvement assistance programs are now dovetailed neatly into overall rural construction programs of the Vietnamese Government so that there is a minimum of wasted effort and motion in the long range goal of completely eradicating the communistic forces and influence from the country.

Phase 3 civic action commences as soon after phase 2 operations as possible. It depends upon the restoration of security to the area and is that

his villagers. The basic guideline is that we maintain a tight control over the commodities distribution in order, again, to minimize the opportunity for their getting into the Black-Market or into the hands of the Viet Cong.

The basic guidelines of our public improvements assistance program are to select projects with short completion times, the results of which can be easily seen by the villagers. In other words, this is a high impact program. We also always use the local chief's judgement on the selection of these projects and the priorities to be followed in connection with them.

The projects upon which we have been requested to work have fallen into a fairly consistent pattern, however. One of the first things which we are routinely called upon to provide are roads and bridges into the villages in order to reopen the routes of communication into the population centers which the Viet Cong invariably destroy. Another thing that we are normally requested to do is to assist in the repairing of public buildings destroyed by the Viet Cong as they withdraw from an area. We are also very often called upon to assist in preparing building sites for new construction, the building of wells, latrines, showers and most recently, school playground facilities.

III MAF's Civic Action Program was developing very successfully under these principles, but three things occurred last summer to cause General WALT to re-examine the basic guidelines of the program in order to determine if it couldn't be made even more effective.

In the first place, we discovered that our units were conducting many small unit patrols and ambushes from the same base camp in order to provide area stability. This meant that we could be of more assistance than the initial help we were providing.

Then General WALT was appointed Senior Advisor to the Commanding General of the ARVN I Corps. This increased the scope of his responsibilities from the three Marine enclaves to the entire I Corps Tactical Zone.

And all of the leaders of the U. S. Agencies Operating in the I Corps Tactical Zone began to recognize a need for closer coordination and cooperation between their respective agencies.

As a result of these developments, General WALT caused a detailed study of the government of Vietnam's Rural Construction Program.

Rural construction is a word of art applied to that program whereby the civilian governmental control and services are being re-established throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The government's plan is set forth in the CHIEN THANG Plan and consists of two basic phases: phase I being the security restoration phase and phase II being the development phase. The first phase is broken into two sub-phases, however, so, for all practical purposes, we have a three phase program.

Phase I is the clearing phase, during which the purpose is to destroy or drive off all organized Viet Cong Military Units. This is actually the only phase which you can tell when it starts and ends. The other two phases tend to merge into each other so as to be indistinguishable insofar as chronology is concerned.

Phase II is the securing phase, during which the purpose is to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure and to protect the new vietnamese infrastructure. It should be noted that the term INFRASTRUCTURE as it is used in the Republic of Vietnam has come to mean personnel rather than physical structures as it usually is used. Other purposes are to protect key installations and routes of communications and to provide public security and maintain law and order.

Phase III, or the development phase, is the phase during which civilian governmental services are being re-established.

At this time General WALT also caused a study to be made of the over-all U. S. assistance effort in the Republic of Vietnam.

This assistance effort is centralized in the U. S. Mission Council which is located in Saigon. The council is headed, of course, by our U. S. Ambassador, and includes the following officers:

The director of the U. S. Agency for International Development, commonly referred to as USAID, which is the agency which administers the foreign AID program within the Republic of Vietnam.

The Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. This officer commands not only the U. S. Tactical Units in country, but also the Military Advisory Teams located throughout the country.

The director of the Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office, commonly referred to as JUSPAO. This is the old U. S. Information Service into which has been given responsibility not only for dissemination of U. S. News and Information throughout the Republic of Vietnam, but also for the conduct of the Psychological Warfare Program against the Communist Forces.

Insofar as we are concerned in the I Corps Tactical Zone, there is a regional director of US AID in Da Nang who is responsible for the administration of foreign aid throughout the Corps Zone. He has a staff of technicians with him consisting of experts in such fields as agriculture, education, civil engineering, public safety, etc.. In each of the provinces, there is also a US AID province representative directly responsible for the administration of Foreign Aid within his province.

Insofar as the military is concerned, III MAF, of course, is the Country Tactical Military Unit in the I Corps Tactical Zone. In addition to III MAF, however, there is a sizeable advisory staff. The ARVN I Corps, of course, operates in this Corps Zone and there is an advisory staff located at the Corps Headquarters in Da Nang. Insofar as civic action and rural construction are concerned, we deal with the Commanding Officer of this Advisory Group and the G-5 advisor. The 1st ARVN Division operates in the two northern provinces of I Corps Tactical Zone, the 2nd ARVN Division operates in the southern two provinces, and the 51st ARVN Regiment operates in the middle province. There is an advisory staff with each of these units, and we deal with the senior advisor and G-5 advisor of each of those.

There is also a Military Advisory Team in each province or sector, and we deal with the Senior Advisor and S-5 Advisor of those teams. And in each district or sub-sector where Marines are operating, there is also an advisory military staff working with the sub-sector Commander. We deal with the Senior Advisor of this team in civic action and rural construction.

Insofar as JUSPAO, or the News - Psychological Warfare Agency is concerned, there is a Senior Field Representative located at Da Nang, and one field representative in the two northern provinces. There is also the Vietnamese American Association in Da Nang, which is an English Library and English Language Teaching Facility administered by JUSPAO.

Representing the Ambassador in the I Corps Tactical Zone is the U. S. Consul from Hue who has been assigned directly to General WALT's Staff as his Political Advisor.

Also operating within the I Corps Tactical Zone and very important to the success of our Civic Action/Rural Construction Program are the various U. S. Social Welfare Agencies such as CARE and Catholic Relief Services.

As a result of these studies and discussions with the other leaders of U. S. Agencies, General WALT caused the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council to be formed.

Before we consider the organization of this council, however, we should probably look at its mission.

The first mission is really the most important: To determine the Government of Vietnam plans for rural construction in the I Corps Tactical Zone. This council has not been formed to determine what should be done - it has been formed for the purpose of determining what the Government of Vietnam plans and, once having determined this, the other missions follow.

To facilitate the coordination of rural construction in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

To determine the requirements for cooperation and support between the U. S. agencies operating within the I Corps Tactical Zone and to recommend methods of information between all such agencies.

phase during which we transfer functions to the vietnamese civilian authorities. This phase is characterized by a gradual withdrawal of U.S. supervisory personnel.


Phase 4 civic action occurs after all functions have been transferred to the vietnamese civilian authorities and consists of the usual military good neighbor relations which occur in all situations where we are living side by side with civilian communities.

This gives you some idea as to the role of our civic action program in the republic of Vietnam, how that program has developed here, how it has been integrated into the overall government of Vietnam rural construction plan, and how all of the U.S. agencies and the government of Vietnam are cooperating in an effort to achieve a speedy victory in the I Corps tactical zone. Do you have any questions?

OBJECTIVES

- (1) TO BUILD THE RESPECT, CONFIDENCE
AND LOYALTY OF THE VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE FOR THEIR LEGALLY
CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT.
- (2) TO GAIN THE CONFIDENCE AND
COOPERATION OF THE VIETNAMESE
VILLAGERS.

ORGANIZATION OF US ASSISTANCE EFFORT



ALSO: US SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATION

G.V.N.

RURAL CONSTRUCTION PLAN

PHASE I: SUB-PHASE 1: CLEARING:

DESTROY OR DRIVE OFF ORGANIZED
V.C. MILITARY FORCES


PHASE I: SUB PHASE 2: SECURING:

- (1) DESTROY V.C. INFRASTRUCTURE
- (2) PROTECT G.V.N. INFRASTRUCTURE
- (3) PROVIDE PUBLIC SECURITY,
MAINTAIN LAW & ORDER
- (4) PROTECT KEY INSTALLATIONS AND
AXES OF COMMUNICATIONS

PHASE II: DEVELOPMENT

ESTABLISH CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTAL
SERVICES

RURAL CONSTRUCTION CIVIC ACTION
ORGANIZATION- I CTZ



MISSION

- (1) DETERMINE GVN PLANS FOR RURAL CONSTRUCTION IN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.
- (2) FACILITATE THE COORDINATION OF RURAL CONSTRUCTION IN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.
- (3) DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS FOR COOPERATION AND SUPPORT BETWEEN THE U.S. AGENCIES OPERATING WITHIN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE AND TO RECOMMEND METHODS OF PROCEDURE TO MEET THOSE REQUIREMENTS.
- (4) SERV AS A FORUM FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN ALL SUCH AGENCIES.

COMMITTEES

(1) PSY WAR

- (A) I CORPS
- (B) JUSPAO
- (C) MACV
- (D) III MAF

(3) EDUCATION

- (A) I CORPS
- (B) USOM
- (C) JUSPAO

(2) PUBLIC HEALTH

- (A) I CORPS
- (B) 1ST REGION
- (C) DANANG
- (D) USOM
- (E) MACV
- (F) III MAF
- (G) USAF
- (H) USA SPECIAL FORCES

(4) PUBLIC SAFETY

- (A) I CORPS
- (B) MACV
- (C) USOM
- (D) III MAF

(5) AGRICULTURE

(6) LOGISTICS

- (A) ROAD SYSTEM
- (B) PORT FACILITIES
- (C) TRANSPORTATION

PHASES OF RURAL CONSTRUCTION/CIVIC ACTION

PHASE I TACTICAL

A. OCCURS IN ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS

B. OBJECTIVES:

- (1) GET CIVILIANS TO PROTECTED AREA
- (2) PRELIMINARY SCREENING TO DETECT V.C.
- (3) PSYCHOLOGICAL INDOCTRINATION
 - (a) WHAT GVN DOING FOR VILLAGERS
 - (b) WHY 3d COUNTRY! FORCES HELPING GVN
 - (c) WHY HAVE TO FIGHT IN THEIR HAMLET
- (4) DEMONSTRATE CONCERN OF GVN FOR THEIR INDIVIDUAL WELFARE
 - (a) IMMEDIATE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
 - (b) FOOD

C. PERSONNEL:

- (1) USE ARVN WHEN POSSIBLE
- (2) III MAF SELF-SUPPORTING CAPABILITY

PHASE II: SECURING BEGIN RURAL CONSTRUCTION

- (a) EMPHASIS ON DEVELOPING LOCAL FORCES TO DESTROY V.C.
- (b) GVN TAKES CENSUS, MAKES DETAILED PLANS
- (c) RURAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS INITIATED
 - (1) USUALLY BY US MISSION AGENCY
 - (2) ALWAYS PURSUANT TO GVN DIRECTION

DETERMINE VILLAGERS NEEDS:

- (1) DONE IMMEDIATELY
- (2) DONE THROUGH LOCAL CHIEFS

GENERAL CATEGORIES OF NEEDS:

- (1) MEDICAL
- (2) INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE ITEMS
- (3) PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE

(1) PERSONNEL:

- (A) U.S. NAVY CORPSMEN ORGANIC TO
ALL USMC UNITS
- (B) LOCAL CHIEFS
- (C) GVN HEALTH PERSONNEL

(2) BASIC GUIDELINES:

- (A) UTILIZE AND TRAIN GVN PERSONNEL
- (B) KEEP SERVICE TO LEVEL GVN CAN
PROVIDE
- (C) MAINTAIN TIGHT CONTROL OVER
MEDICINES

INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE ITEMS

(A) SOURCES:

- (1) PROJECT HANDCLASP
- (2) CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES
- (3) CARE (AMERICAN LEGION-
USMCR)

(B) BASIC GUIDLINES:

- (1) DONE ON REQUEST OF LOCAL
CHIEF
- (2) DONE THROUGH LOCAL CHIEF
- (3) MAINTAIN TIGHT CONTROL OVER
SUPPLIES

PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS ASSISTANCE

(A) BASIC GUIDELINES

(1) SELECT PROJECTS

- (A) WITH SHORT COMPLETION TIME.
- (B) WHICH CAN BE EASILY SEEN.

(2) USE LOCAL CHIEF'S JUDGEMENT ON
PROJECTS AND PRIORITIES

(B) REPRESENTATIVE PROJECTS

- (1) ROADS
- (2) BRIDGES
- (3) REPAIR PUBLIC BUILDINGS
- (4) PREPARE BUILDING SITES
- (5) WELLS
- (6) LATRINES OR HEADS
- (7) SHOWERS
- (8) SCHOOL PLAYGROUND FACILITIES

PHASE III: TRANSFER FUNCTIONS TO GVN


- (A) BEGINS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
- (B) CHARACTERIZED BY GRADUAL
WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. SUPERVISORY
PERSONNEL

PHASE IV; COMMUNITY RELATIONS

OCCURS AFTER GVN AGENCIES HAVE
ASSUMED FULL OPERATIONAL
CONTROL

INDICIA OF PROGRESS

1. VIET CONG ACTIVITY
2. POPULATION GROWTH
3. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
4. SCHOOLS
5. POPULAR FORCE
6. ATTITUDES
7. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
8. AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY
9. SELF-HELP PROJECT



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MGEN MCCUTCHEON

Memorandum

TO : Distribution List

DATE: 15 FEB 1967

FROM : Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Small Unit Action Pamphlet and CAC Articles

Encl: (1) Background Information, Captain F. J. West, Jr., USMCR
NIE (2) "Small Unit Action in Vietnam - Summer 1966"
(3) "The CAC as a Catalyst"
(4) "Something of Significance"

1. Enclosures (1) through (4) are forwarded for your information and retention.

2. The Commandant has directed distribution of Captain WEST's writings to government and DOD officials and all general officers/selectees in the Washington/Quantico area.

3. Enclosure (2) is being distributed to all Marine Corps units (Distribution List "DA").

E. P. Chapman, Jr.
E. P. CHAPMAN, JR.

DISTRIBUTION:

All General Officers/General Officer selectees, Washington/Quantico area



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



BACKGROUND INFORMATION, CAPTAIN FRANCIS J. WEST, JR., USMCR

The author of these pieces, Captain Francis J. West, Jr., USMCR, is currently a graduate student at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. In a four-month tour of temporary active duty in Vietnam this past summer, he participated in a wide variety of firefights, patrols, and civic action efforts, mainly at the squad, platoon, and company level. Short narrative accounts of what he experienced have now been published in the enclosed historical reference pamphlet, Small Unit Action in Vietnam, Summer 1966. The intent of this pamphlet, which will receive wide distribution within the Marine Corps, is to provide enlisted Marines and junior officers a concise and highly readable picture of Vietnam action with emphasis on lessons learned.

Recently, during his Christmas vacation from the Woodrow Wilson School, Captain West again voluntarily returned to active duty to serve in Vietnam. The result of his observations of the work of Marine Combined Action Companies is the enclosed paper, "The CAC as a Catalyst," and its accompanying report, "Something of Significance," which he prepared at the request of Lieutenant General Walt, the Commander of the III Marine Amphibious Force. The study and article, presented as a III MAF position paper, have been circulated, at General Westmoreland's direction, amongst the senior American commanders in Vietnam.

Enclosure (1)

The CAC As A Catalyst

by

Captain Francis J. West, Jr., USMCR

In 1965-66 the Combined Action Company concept was an experiment to determine whether a Marine squad living in a village with a platoon of Popular Forces could provide security for the village and improve the combat effectiveness of the PFs. The concept, tested in different areas under diverse conditions, has proven sound. In the 54 villages where the CACs have been established for several months, the morale of the villagers and the confidence of the PFs have risen markedly. Sub-sector advisors, USAID personnel, and other outside observers who have had occasion to observe those villages over long lengths of time have commented on the noticeable change. Conversely, the number of Viet Cong-initiated incidents in CAC areas has decreased. In many instances, the Viet Cong have sharply contested the arrival of a Marine CAC squad in a village. In those cases, savage firefights have raged intermittently on the small-unit level over a two- or three-month period--and sometimes longer-- until the CAC finally has beaten down the enemy in a series of clashes.

The basic mission of the CAC -- to provide village security and bolster the PFs -- has met with success. (With local variances, the concept is being tried and expanded in other Corps areas.) It is a slow, hard process which makes no claims at being the panacea for the entire Vietnam pacification program. But it has met the test of time, and grown stronger as it matured.

With the enemy seeming reluctant to offer open challenge after being shattered in every large conflict during the past year, 1967 will see increased emphasis upon revolutionary development at the grass roots level. Inherent within the CAC program are potentialities which bear direct relation to revolutionary development. These ramifications to the primary mission of CAC do not reflect paper ideals turned out by an administrative hierarchy; they have grown naturally from the interest of the individual Marines within a CAC and their feelings about the welfare of the PFs and villagers.

The 12 Marine volunteers of a CAC platoon who operate within a village have sound tactical sense, discipline, and enthusiasm for their job-- otherwise they are rejected in the screening interviews. They provide that essential ingredient most RDC and PF and village leaders are glad to see: fast

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(c)

rifles. After they have worked in a village for several months, however, they are accepted by the people in a manner which is best described as patriarchial; and they respond in kind. The firefights die down but that is no sure indication of pacification. The Marines become restive. They sense there is much more they can do. Yet while goaded by the desire to help, they are handicapped by lack of knowledge.

Various American agencies --USAID, OSA, MACV advisors, Marine Civic Action officers, Army Civil Affairs officers, etc.-- have this knowledge. They are the experts who have the projects, the materials, the plans. But these agencies do not have the people to staff programs at a village level.

Properly used and supervised, CAC can become a catalyst of development at the village level. Where there are Revolutionary Development Cadres, it can aid and support them. Where there are no RDC teams, it can work to help the PFs and hamlet chiefs and elders bring about change and progress. CAC is an interim program to assist the Vietnamese. It is not designed to displace the village leadership or replace the RDC program. More importantly, on the ground level it has not worked out that way. Quite the contrary is true. Village chiefs and Revolutionary Development Cadre leaders have been quick to use the CAC units in their support.

It would seem that CAC could be the natural medium at the village level for coordination and control of various programs. A dozen Marines can run a close check on four or five hamlets on a day-to-day basis. Taught to look for certain indications, or to follow given steps, CAC Marines could provide definite impetus to projects, and specific information concerning them. Given guidelines, the Marine CAC Commander could help mark the measure of progress of specific programs and the effectiveness of the village or cadre leaders. Above all, the CAC Marines would follow through --they would be there, in the same village, day after day, month after month, for one to two years. They provide a basis for security, honesty, determination, and continuity.

In the author's opinion, three steps need to be taken to raise the active role of the CAC to its level of potential: education, coordination, and cooperation. Education is needed to alert the Marines and the PFs and/or RDC to the programs available to their village and the methods of implementation. The Army Civil Affairs Company and the Vietnamese provincial aid organizations have a wealth of knowledge and might be the primary, although not the only, teachers. Coordination is obviously necessary between MACV, OCO, the Vietnamese military, and the Marine Amphibious Force at corps level for clearance and at province level for implementation. (The gathering of ideas for specific programs utilizing the CAC organization

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would come from the various agencies, the province, district, and village chiefs, and the Marines, PFs, and RDC themselves.) Cooperation, to belabor the obvious, would be vital at all levels, particularly the lowest. Encouragingly, it is from the grassroots that cooperation and progress between CAC Marines and other interested agencies and the Vietnamese have sprung; and it is upon that working level of cooperation and progress, observed in many villages, that this report is based.

Enclosure (3)

Something of Significance

by

Captain Francis J. West, Jr., USMCR

Introduction

The author, recalled to active duty at his own request while on leave from Princeton University, has been conducting a study and writing narratives concerning small-unit combat for seven months. During that time, he spent several weeks operating with Combined Action Company L-1, located at Fort Page, near the Song Tra Bong River, some 8 miles southwest of the Chu Lai airfield. He stayed at the fort in July and August, and again in December and January, participating in the patrols and watching the Marines and PFs work together. In some cases, inductive reasoning is more meaningful than statistical analysis. It is for that reason that the first-hand narrative tracing the development of one Combined Action Company is presented. Fort Page was singled out for attention not because it was a "show" CAC singular in a spectacular way; rather, the author selected it for his study over half a year ago precisely because it was ordinary and untouched by any fame or unusual attention. Its story could be that of a score of other CACs.

I

The Beginnings

No one was sure at first, not in the early summer of 1966. Binh Nghia village was a battleground, hardly a pacified area. The district chief of Binh Son (in Quang Ngai Province) estimated 750 young men from that village had joined the main-force VC units during the past several years. Two independent VC companies and one full battalion were roaming the district. Of the 4,575 persons in the village, 122 families were known VC sympathizers. So the decision by the Marine regiment to

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establish a Combined Action Company in Binh Nghia was not made without an acknowledgement of the hazards involved; still, something had to be done. The morale of the local PF platoon was low and ebbing fast. They had been hit by the VC so often that their confidence was shattered. The enemy held the offensive and controlled the actions of the people. Marine patrols and ambushes made contact often, killing enemy soldiers and disrupting the movements of large forces, but that alone was not enough. The villagers still scurried about with averted eyes and the PFs clung to the shallow safety of their fort.

Twelve Marines from Charlie Company, 7th Marines, were selected to go to the fort and work with the PFs. The Marines chosen had compassion and understanding as well as sound tactical sense. Their primary mission was to raise the fighting spirit and ability of the 28 PFs who stayed at the fort. Originally, the Marines were commanded by a Corporal Beebe, who took things nice and easy, getting his feet on the ground and allowing the PFs to become accustomed to sharing watches and making short patrols with the Marines. When Corporal Beebe rotated home in late June, Staff Sergeant Joseph Sullivan replaced him and the presence of Marines had been generally accepted by the villagers and the PFs. Sullivan thought the time had come to remove the fear the PFs had of night contact with the VC and to show the villagers that darkness did not have to be a time of dread.

II

Night Skirmishes

The village was a two-mile-long complex of six hamlets, bordered to the south by a wide river and to the north by a large expanse of sand dunes. At night the VC from main force units moved in and out freely, either crossing the river or infiltrating in across the dunes to collect taxes, take out rice, or just to visit their families. Over a platoon of guerrillas never left the local area. The enemy groups varied in size from two to 200. Sullivan set out to stalk them.

His technique was simple and relied upon total integration. Using only his own men and the PFs at the fort, he would send out three, and sometimes four, patrols and ambushes a night. Charlie Company was willing to send him more Marines any time he wanted, but he never asked. He wanted to show the PFs that his men needed and relied on them.

The patrols were small, generally not more than three Marines and three or four PFs. They were extremely well armed. Each Marine carried an M-14 modified with bipods, four to six grenades, three or four hundred rounds with a liberal mix of tracers, and one or two LAAWs. The patrols never knew whether

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they would hit a VC courier or a company.

At first, the PFs were badly frightened at the idea of hunting the VC in the dark, but the Marines taught and trained them by example, taking the point, setting the pace, demanding night discipline, and throwing out sharp full volumes of fire when engaged. The enemy, not used to encountering such tactics, was thrown off balance. The PFs on the other hand were showing marked improvement. Their attitude and spirit of cooperation were improving. Confidence, like fear, is infectious, especially when it derives from success, and the PFs were beginning to succeed.

Determined to check this new, aggressive unit, the enemy gathered a sizeable force. They struck at the fort in strength in early July, only to be ambushed from behind as they crossed a paddy. In the ensuing fight, the Marines lost their first KIA, for whom the fort was subsequently named. The VC, however, were routed and lost face. The PFs became more confident.

In mid-July, the VC tried again, their determination reflecting the effectiveness of the CAC. This time they attacked a force of five Marines and three PFs who were lying in ambush along the northern bank of the Song Tra Bong River. The VC attempted to hit the force from the rear, crawling close in along the paddy dikes which stretched for 200 meters to the rear of the ambush party. A PF posted on rear lookout saw the enemy and alerted Sullivan who was patrol leader that night. Sullivan had his force wriggle about to face the enemy. They then held fire until the VC were within 50 meters. When he did give the order to cut loose the effect was devastating. The VC were trapped with nowhere to go. By using bipods, the friendly fire was delivered in grazing arcs which not only cut down the enemy on the dikes but also raked clean the treeline on the far side of the paddies. At the edge of that treeline the VC leaders had clustered to watch and direct the attack. The sudden concentrated fire of the Marines and PFs caught them standing erect. The final tally of the night action (which lasted less than eight minutes) stood at 31 enemy dead, including a company commander and a platoon commander. The Marines and PFs took no casualties.

The villagers were dumbfounded and the PFs could hardly believe it themselves. The enemy force had passed through the hamlets of My Hue (1) and (3) before the attack. They said they would destroy the Marines and PFs. The bodies brought back to the various hamlets and moved across the river for burial did not include one PF.

The fight was, of course, exceptional because of its size. Throughout the summer, however, firefights in the dark were

Enclosure (4)

the rule. The fort averaged 11 kills a week. If a night went by without a contact, Sullivan and his PF counterpart, Mr. Phuc, would kid their troops about taking it easy.

"What were you people doing - picking daises?", Sullivan would say. "I didn't hear a round fired all night long."

The PFs became more aggressive. Trails where they would balk previously, they now traveled freely. They watched the Marines care for their weapons, and followed suit. They began to conduct night patrols alone. Being familiar with the habits of their enemy and buoyed by their growing prestige among their families and relatives and friends in the village, they sought out members of the local VC infrastructure. By late July, the number of VC captured within the village rose markedly, so that it was a rare day when a prisoner was not brought in by the PFs. Marines had become great favorites in the village, and knew literally hundreds of the villagers and children by name. The CAC did not bring peace to Binh Nghia in 90 days, however.

III

The Battle for Binh Nghia

There had been many warnings but little solid information. Supposedly there was an informer in the fort and the VC planned to attack in overwhelming strength. These rumors were common throughout the late summer. With no facts or real clues to work on, Sullivan continued his patrolling as usual, although he and Mr. Phuc said they were convinced the fort harbored an enemy within.

The blow fell shortly after midnight on 15 September. Six of the 12 Marines and 16 of the 28 PFs were out on ambush or village patrol. A squad of VC gained entrance to the fort through a post whose guard mysteriously disappeared. Outside, the 21st VC company attacked from two different directions. PFC Theilepape, the Marine on radio watch in the machine gun bunker, sprayed the area with automatic fire, preventing the enemy from overrunning the fort. At the same time, he called for illumination and reinforcements. The battle raged at close range for 15 minutes before the enemy were driven from the fort. The Marine relief column pushed them back across the river. Before the firing ended, the six Marines in the fort were casualties, and it was the PFs who had held firm on their own, throwing rocks and using fists and rifle butts when they ran out of ammunition. Sergeant Sullivan and Mr. Phuc died that night but the idea and the cooperation they had fostered didn't. The six CAC Marines who reached the fort after the fight set out with the PFs to fight again the next night. They refused flatly the offer of relief or the temporary emplacement of a

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Marine platoon in Binh Nghia. It was their village and they would protect it, and they preferred to do so by working with each other. "The way I figured it, I had a score to settle," Corporal Larry Wingrove said. "The PFs felt the same way. Hell, this is our village, it's why we're here."

They split up and started out to patrol the hamlets early on the night of 16 September. That same night, the Viet Cong company came back, only this time they too entered the village. Thinking they would receive no interference from the PFs and Marines at the fort, they boldly walked straight down the street leading to the market place in the main hamlet of Binh Yen Noi (3).

Walking up the street from the fort were Corporal Wingrove, Lance Corporal Fleming, and three PFs. It was barely dusk. The PF in the lead almost collided with a VC standing in the shadow of a house. The VC broke and ran for cover. The PF yelled "VC - VC," then shot and killed him. The PF had time to snatch a French machine gun from the body before the VC recovered from their surprise and opened fire. Bullets snapped toward the CAC patrol from all directions. The five men flopped down in a rough star formation and the duel began. The fight would rage until dawn. Fleming, carrying a PRC-25, called for reinforcements from the fort, and for illumination from the 81s. The PFs, with excellent sense for movement in the shadows, identified targets for Wingrove, who popped his M-79 as fast as he could load.

Another combined squad from the fort reached the patrol in less than 10 minutes and flares began bursting regularly overhead. The VC tried to work their way back to the river and get across under cover of the rear guard, but an old lady at whose house Wingrove had eaten a few times ran from her house and pointed out to the corporal the spot where the VC rear guard was lurking. Some Marines and PFs crawled around the flank while the rest laid down a base of fire and the rear guard position was blasted away in a hail of grenades.

The Marines and PFs, now numbering almost a platoon, gained the bank of the river as the VC neared mid-stream. The CACs swept the river with streams of tracers and fired over a dozen LAAWs. From everywhere the people came; even while the firing was still going on, they gathered to watch and talk in amazement.

"You would have thought it was daytime out there," a Marine said. "It was incredible."

That night the VC lost 10 in the village itself and an undetermined number on the waterway. There were no CAC casualties.

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Two nights later (September 18th) the enemy tried again. This time a VC squad made the tactical blunder of attempting to ambush a CAC patrol head on. Their own flank was turned and two who had climbed trees for better vantage points were toppled to the ground while their comrades fled.

IV.

Acceptance

In the past four months there have been no VC-initiated incidents in Binh Nghia village. As a result, the combat actions have slowed considerably. The CACs have struck at the enemy only three times since on land, although there have been several shoot-outs against targets on the river. From a variety of sources and reports, the district chief and his subsector advisor estimate that there are less than 12 active guerrillas left in the six hamlets.

But (although it might be tautological even to mention it) force of arms can control the actions of a people while their inclinations and beliefs lie elsewhere. The rapport between the people of Binh Nghia and the CAC Marines has been building, slowly and steadily. Each Marine has three or four close friends among the families of the PFs or of other villagers and many meals are taken within the hamlets at the insistence of these friends. On six occasions in the past two months, Marines on night patrols passing by certain houses have received information about VC activities whispered through windows in broken English. In addition, the PFs and village leaders supply much intelligence.

Living with the Marines at the fort is a 10-year-old orphan (naturally nicknamed Joe). Wingrove found him in a state of miserable existence and promptly adopted him in an ad-hoc fashion, quipping to his fellow Marines: "What else could I do? He followed me home, honest." Joe now attends school regularly and the CAC unit plans to send him to Binh Son to continue his education next year. In his present status, he is the envy of all his friends. "He only has one problem--," laughed one Marine, "with 12 pappasans he has to do his homework and fly right and the PFs check with his teacher so he can't pull a fast one on us."

The CAC acts as a clearing-house for all military movements within the village complex. The Marines and Vietnamese plan their patrols and plot their on-call illumination missions together. No Marine forces enter the area without checking with the CAC first. Medevacs and fire support are available. The Marines are convinced these are very important factors contributing to the high morale of the PFs. Any villager requiring swift aid is also transported by helicopter.

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More and more the CAC at Fort Page is filling the role of a catalytic agent around and through which many various agencies may plan, coordinate, and control their programs. Marine Civic Action tools and kits are given to the village chief with the cognizance of the CAC. The subsector advisor brings planned USAID projects to the attention of the Marines and he also includes their sergeant in any meetings he has with the village officials.

During the fall, two 59-man Revolutionary Development Cadres moved into two of the village's six hamlets. Their arrival in no way impeded the work of the CAC. The cadre leaders took to checking in with the CAC Commander, Sergeant James White, to settle military matters as if it were the most natural procedure to follow. For certain checks and visits, the village police chief got into the habit of requesting a combined PF/Marine escort where before he would only take national police.

How solidly established the CAC at Fort Page had become in Binh Nghia was graphically demonstrated at a village fair held during the last week of December. The village chief and the police chief planned the fair in order to draw the villagers together, holding their attention by games and songs while working to inspire a solidarity of feeling against the Viet Cong. The village chief invited the CAC Marines to come, not as guests, but as participants.

In the market place of the hamlet of Binh Yen Noi (3), a wooden stage had been erected. There were two benches set in front of the stage and behind them sat thousands of villagers, packed in tight to watch the entertainment. The PF who was acting as master of ceremonies began by introducing the village chief, the police chief and the two cadre leaders, each of whom gave a short, impassioned speech. Then a fifth leader was called, and it was Sergeant White's turn to get up and talk, with everyone applauding his presence, if not his oration, which was very short indeed. After a number of villagers had sung songs or acted out skits before a most appreciative audience, Corporals Larry Melton and Wingrove and a brave PF named Mui mounted the stage to moan and mimic some of the latest rock-and-roll records, to the accompaniment of much hooting and laughter. When the fair quieted toward midnight, those Marines in attendance gathered some PFs and RDC militia and faded into the darkness to relieve others on watch or patrol.

V

Conclusion

There is no real conclusion to this story, not yet anyway. The Marines, and the PFs, and the RDC militia, will be going on patrol in Binh Nghia village tonight, and tomorrow night,

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and the night after that. The task is not finished, but it is well started and gaining momentum. Sergeant White and his men believe they will work themselves right out of their job within a year.

In answer to a pointed question, ^{Corporal} Corporal Wingrove replied; "I stay here because I feel I'm doing something."

That "something" has taken various forms at Fort Page. Primarily the CAC has provided security for the village. Not the Marines alone -- the PFs and the Marines together. The actions on 15 and 16 September conclusively proved the fighting mettle of the PFs. The Marines have established a rapport with the villagers which, slicing through apathy and fear, is fresh and positive on both sides. By easy stages, the CAC at Fort Page has grown into a coordinating channel for various agencies to check relating to the specific projects and programs in Binh Nghia.

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NOTE:

If the author believed the struggle and achievements described herein were aberrations, he would have hesitated to write this narrative. So before he did, he traveled to 10 other CACs, selected at random throughout I Corps. He spent some time at each, questioning the men closely on a series of points relating to tactics, cooperation with and from the Vietnamese, and coordination with other agencies and Marine units. The striking similarity of the responses convinced him that the story of Fort Page was a fitting subject for an inductive study of a Combined Action Company.

Enclosure (4)

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96243

Ser No 1858
4 March 1966

MACPD


SUBJECT: National Psychological Operations Plan

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached National Psychological Operations Plan has been approved by the US Mission Council, is therefore the basic statement of PsyOps guidance, and is applicable to all US elements.
2. All psychological operations conducted by addressees should be carried out within the framework of the policy enunciated by the National PsyOps Plan.
3. Guidelines for Psychological Operators, attached to the National PsyOps Plan, is for immediate use by all personnel whose duties involve PsyOps. The guidelines are being reproduced in pocket-sized card format and will be issued to addressees when available.
4. Thematic lines of approach to Priority Tasks in the National PsyOps Plan, also attached, provides examples of various lines of persuasion to achieve the priority tasks.
5. Publication of this same plan by RVN civilian and military PsyOps agencies is expected in the immediate future. It is therefore appropriate and recommended that PsyOps advisors bring this plan to the attention of their counterparts and suggest that Vietnamese and US action plans to carry out the priority tasks be closely coordinated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as


HOWARD D. SCHULZE
Major, AGC
Asst AG

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4 March 1966

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NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN
PROPOSED FOR VIETNAM

JUSPAO
Office of the Director
December 1965

I.

Psychological Operations cannot live up to their full potential unless committed to the offensive. Only on the offensive can propaganda choose its own battleground: saturating the atmosphere with its own arguments; it need not contend with those of the enemy and in so doing take a chance on reinforcing their impact.

To achieve maximum momentum, a psychological offensive must be total and concentrated; all psychological activities must be synchronized and meshed into a single, driving effort. It thus depends for effectiveness on central direction, clear and simple channels of command, flawless coordination, sharp focus and severe limitation to the smallest possible number of the simplest possible themes - themes that can be disseminated and repeated by the least skilled operator and the least sophisticated communicator. A psychological offensive in Vietnam, therefore, requires the integration of all Vietnamese and U. S. capabilities, both civilian and military.

While a maximum of technical capabilities is desirable, it is not essential. Clear and simple approaches to elemental emotions and reasoning, endlessly repeated, can spread like wildfire if made to key communicators, individuals or groups. The means by which elemental emotions and basic reasoning can be affected, rarely change. They are restricted to ordinary, natural, human, obvious words. Attempts to devise original or sophisticated solutions may doom the effort.

II.

The opportunity for taking the psychological offensive in Vietnam is promising. The essential elements for success are given:

1. Prime Minister Ky's emphasis on the revolutionary nature of his administration lends itself to the suggestion that the Republic of Vietnam and its government are turning into a magnetic hope and are on the way to finding Vietnamese solutions to Vietnamese problems -- solutions which will satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people and which are more attractive than alien communist blandishments.

2. The American military build-up and U.S. policy as promulgated by President Johnson - "as much as it takes for as long as it takes" - project power and determination sufficient to allow for the indispensable claim that Free Vietnam will inevitably win, that there is advantage to siding with the stronger battalions of the Republic and the United States.

3. There are, finally, continuing indications that the Viet Cong keep alienating the population by actions which they can no longer avoid taking. Communist doctrine according to which the success of revolutionary warfare depends upon the VOLUNTARY support of the people thus lends itself to persuading the hard core of the Viet Cong that all hopes for victory are doomed. The so-called revolution has not caught fire: and the conscripts on which the Viet Cong cadres must increasingly rely, find it increasingly difficult to stand up under and against the firepower of U.S. and Vietnamese aircraft and artillery. Rarely has an enemy been as vulnerable psychologically as are the Viet Cong today.

III.

A psychological offensive in Vietnam must aim at the achievement of the following objectives:

1. To impress upon the Vietnamese people that Free Vietnam will inevitably win its struggle against aggression and subversion, and that they would be best advised to support, wherever possible actively, the ultimate victor.

2. Conversely, to impress upon the Viet Cong that they cannot expect to impose their will upon a government and a people whose struggle for peace, security and independence is supported by the might of the United States and other Free World nations.

3. To create hope that the social revolution proceeding in Free Vietnam will produce a dynamic nation responsive to the will and aspirations of the people, and capable of finding Vietnamese solutions to Vietnamese problems; and to commit ever-growing numbers of the Vietnamese people to active, personal, emotional identification with the Republic's quest for peace, humanity, social justice and a vital national identity.

4. Conversely, to make the people aware of the truth that North Vietnam and the Viet Cong offer nothing but alien schemes which are oppressive and reactionary, have failed wherever tried, and are, in fact, merely the instrumentalities of an international conspiracy and of Red Chinese imperialism; and to inspire the people with contempt for the Viet Cong who expose the nation to death, destruction, misery and oppression, and who oppose the creation of a truly Vietnamese social order and the preservation of Vietnamese values and traditions.

IV.

TARGET AUDIENCES encompass four broad groups:

1. the foundation corps of those upon whom the accomplishment of national and psychological objectives depends, primarily opinion leaders on all levels who are capable of carrying the message to the people;
2. the majority public whose opposition or support will determine the outcome of the conflict: city dwellers and peasants, intelligentsia, students and youth, organized labor, refugees and women, religious, ethnic and regional groups, people subject to VC control but not committed to communism;
3. the enemy camp within Free Vietnam: sympathizers, soft-core and hard-core Viet Cong;
4. the decision-making cadres in Hanoi and the people of North Vietnam.

V.

A systematic effort to define the tasks which ideally should be accomplished to achieve the basic psychological objectives with regard to each major target audience established 97 specific categories. As this number is far too great for realistic consideration within the framework of a national psychological offensive -- the success of which depends upon limitation to the smallest possible number of the simplest possible themes -- priority was assigned to those tasks which are either applicable to all or most audiences or which are so closely related to others as to permit amalgamation while retaining those which, though only applicable to specific audiences, appeared to be indispensable to achieving the objective of the offensive.

This process resulted in the definition of 11 Priority Tasks: six applicable to all target groups, three to the Viet Cong and one each to minority groups and to the people of North Vietnam.

THE VIET CONG

1. Make the Viet Cong fully conscious of the fact that they have alienated the people and cannot avoid to alienate them further; that they violate the principles of revolutionary warfare by relying on terror as a substitute for popular support; that communist doctrine itself presages their defeat because it holds that the success of revolutionary warfare depends on the voluntary support of the people; and that they are, therefore, conducting an isolated, futile struggle against the massing and inexhaustible firepower of Free Vietnam, the United States and Free Vietnam's other supporters.

2. Persuade the Viet Cong, particularly the soft core, to defect to Free Vietnam where they will be received with open arms and given the opportunity to reintegrate themselves into a truly revolutionary society.

3. Make the Viet Cong fully aware of the fact that they are agents of a foreign power which threatens the peace for its own imperialist ends, is willing to fight to the last Vietnamese, and is, therefore, unwilling to permit negotiation of a genuine peace.

MINORITIES

Persuade them that the government respects their identity, beliefs and traditions, will improve their situation together with that of all peoples and groups united in the Republic, and will assure equality -- permitting no religious, ethnic or regional group a position of partisan privilege.

NORTH VIETNAM

Make the people of North Vietnam aware that their leaders subject them to terrible dangers by continuing aggression against their brethren in the South.

VI.

PRIORITY TASKS

ALL AUDIENCES

1. Persuade them that the victory of Free Vietnam is inevitable because its military capabilities supported by the United States and many other nations doom insurgency and aggression.
2. Persuade them that the fastest way to end the war and achieve peace and security is to support Free Vietnam and oppose the Viet Cong.
3. Convince them that the fledgling Republic of Vietnam reflects the natural and naturally imperfect process of historical change and development toward a distinctly Vietnamese but modern revolutionary society, offers to each Vietnamese opportunity to advance within and to influence the course of the revolution, and thus represents the only true and realistic hope for the achievement of national and personal aspirations.
4. Make them fully aware that the Viet Cong are instruments of a foreign power, Red China.
5. Convince them that the American presence in Vietnam is a consequence of the external aggression against Free Vietnam by a COMMON enemy, is decisive but supplementary to Free Vietnam's effort, and that the United States will withdraw its armed forces from Vietnam when the threat to Vietnamese independence has been overcome.
6. Convince them that there will be no compromise with appeasement and "neutralism" which the enemy systematically exploits as instruments for the achievement of his own imperialist objectives.

VII.

The key to conducting a psychological offensive is the integration of all available Psychological Warfare capabilities and their concentration on a single objective -- the offensive itself. None of the priority tasks which have been defined suggests departures from accepted lines; most have in fact been previously codified in Vietnamese and JUSPAO Directives. All an offensive requires is a saturation effort focusing on a severely limited number of potentially effective and simple approaches. However, such an effort can only be initiated and maintained if all Psychological Warfare capabilities which can be brought to bear -- Vietnamese as well as American, military as well as civilian -- are committed to carrying it out.

It is, therefore, essential that the Minister of Psychological Warfare, the Chief of the General Political Warfare Department, the U.S. Minister for Information (Director, JUSPAO) and the Commanding General, USMACV, each in his individual capacity and operating through his normal organizational channels, serve as the agency responsible for the execution of this plan.

It is essential, furthermore, that Action Plans be closely coordinated -- especially those concerned with the themes required to carry out the eleven Priority Tasks. These themes should be defined as lines of thought rather than slogans in order to leave to operators in the field maximum flexibility and room to maneuver, though within frameworks defined sharply enough to guarantee focus and direction.

NOTE: Guidelines for Operators to be ~~issued~~ issued in conjunction with this Directive are attached.

GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATORS

Psychological Objectives

1. Psychological Operations are both a key instrumentality of statecraft and a major military weapons system. Correctly and vigorously employed, they can achieve or help to achieve political and military objectives.

The national objectives of Free Vietnam and the American objectives in Vietnam are

(a) to secure peace, independence and security for the Vietnamese people by defeating the externally supported insurgents, and

(b) to build the political, ideological, economic and social strength required to rally the people in support of Free Vietnam's revolutionary struggle for national identity and social justice.

Psychological Operations in Vietnam aim at committing all Vietnamese to support these objectives militantly.

2. Psychological Operations must, therefore, be designed

(a) to impress upon the Vietnamese people that Free Vietnam will inevitably win its struggle against aggression and subversion, and that they will be best advised to support, wherever possible actively, the ultimate victor;

(b) conversely, to impress upon the Viet Cong that they cannot expect to impose their will upon a nation whose struggle for peace, security and independence is supported by the might of the United States and other Free World nations;

(c) to create hope that the social revolution proceeding in Free Vietnam will produce a dynamic nation responsive to the will and aspirations of the people and capable of finding Vietnamese solutions to Vietnamese problems; and to commit ever-growing numbers of the Vietnamese people to active, personal, emotional identification with the Republic's quest for peace, humanity, social justice and a vital national identity;

(d) conversely, to make the people aware of the truth that North Vietnam and the Viet Cong offer nothing but alien schemes

which are oppressive and reactionary, have failed wherever tried, and are, in fact, merely the instrumentalities of an international conspiracy and of Red Chinese imperialism; and to inspire the people with contempt for the Viet Cong who expose the nation to death, destruction, misery and terror, and who oppose the creation of a truly Vietnamese social order and the preservation of Vietnamese values and traditions.

Priority Tasks

In order to achieve these PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES we must persuade

1. All Audiences

- (a) that the victory of Free Vietnam is inevitable because its military capabilities supported by the United States and many other nations doom insurgency and aggression;
- (b) that the fastest way to end the war and achieve peace and security is to support Free Vietnam and oppose the Viet Cong;
- (c) that the fledgling Republic of Vietnam reflects the natural and naturally imperfect process of historical change and development toward a distinctly Vietnamese but modern revolutionary society,
 - offers to each Vietnamese opportunity to advance within and to influence the course of the revolution,
 - and thus represents the only true and realistic hope for the achievement of national and personal aspirations;
- (d) that the Viet Cong are instruments of a foreign power, Red China;
- (e) that the American presence in Vietnam is a consequence of the external aggression against Free Vietnam by a common enemy, is decisive but supplementary to Free Vietnam's effort, and that the United States will withdraw its armed forces from Vietnam when the threat to Vietnamese independence has been overcome;
- (f) that there will be no compromise with appeasement and "neutralism" which the enemy exploits as instruments for the achievement of his own imperialist objectives;

2. Minorities

(g) that Free Vietnam respects their identity, beliefs and traditions, will improve their situation together with that of all groups and peoples united in the Republic, and will assure equality - permitting no religious, ethnic or regional group positions of partisan privilege;

3. The Viet Cong

(h) that they have alienated the people and cannot avoid to alienate them further,

that they violate the principles of revolutionary warfare by relying on terror as a substitute for popular support,

that communist doctrine itself presages their defeat because it holds that the success of revolutionary warfare depends on the VOLUNTARY support of the people,

and that they are, therefore, conducting an isolated, futile struggle against the massing and inexhaustible firepower of Vietnam, the United States and Free Vietnam's other supporters;

(i) particularly the soft core, to defect to Free Vietnam where they will be received with open arms and given the opportunity to reintegrate themselves into a truly revolutionary society;

(j) that they are agents of a foreign power which threatens the peace for its own imperialist ends, is willing to fight to the last Vietnamese, and is, therefore, unwilling to permit negotiation of a genuine peace;

4. The People of North Vietnam

(k) that their leaders subject them to terrible dangers by continuing aggression against their brethren in the South.

Priority Target Audiences

1. The most important target audience are individuals of all kinds met face to face.

2. Key target groups:

(a) Opinion Makers and Key Communicators:

Village chiefs, members of village councils, officers of village social organizations - potentially capable of influencing up to 80% of the population;

THEMATIC LINES OF APPROACH TO PRIORITY TASKS

Successful propaganda and psychological operations depend on limitation - limitation to the smallest possible number of the most effective and simple themes that can be devised. It is, however, equally true that the mere repetition of slogans can result in boring one's audience. This is not to say that the constant repetition of simple slogans is without merit. In fact, as the Communists prove, the very opposite can be true. It is to say that the same basic theme can be projected in numbers of ways depending on conditions, audiences and local circumstances.

There are many ways in which to make the same point. It is, however, essential that they make the same point if they are to have an impact. The following is an attempt to suggest some of the ways to achieve our priority tasks. This attempt did not aim at either comprehensiveness or exclusivity. It merely tries to indicate lines of thought that may prove to be useful. Needless to add that their effectiveness depends greatly on their sensitive adaptation to Vietnamese terms. x

A deliberate effort was made, however, to delineate each priority task sharply enough to secure focus and direction while leaving to the operator in the field maximum flexibility.

In a way, the suggestions for the implementation of the tasks are primarily examples.

x This sentence only for U.S. version of the paper.

THEMATIC LINES OF APPROACH TO PRIORITY TASK ONE:

Persuade ALL AUDIENCES that the victory of free Vietnam is inevitable because its military capabilities supported by the United States and many other nations doom insurgency and aggression.

1. The FLAT statement of the incontrovertible truth that free Vietnam's victory is inevitable, certain beyond the shadow of a doubt, a foregone conclusion; that the Viet Cong have lost; and that North Vietnam has no earthly chance to change this situation, is a powerful theme by itself. Constantly repeated, its impact does not necessarily depend on spelling out reasons. However, reasons can reinforce the basic statement and are in themselves strong themes.

a. The armed forces of free Vietnam, strong by themselves and daily growing in firepower and mobility, have the support of that inexhaustible power of the United States which neither the Viet Cong nor any communist nation can hope to match. America is "mighty beyond description" (President Johnson, 13 January 1966).

b. The determination of the United States to provide "as much as it takes for as long as it takes" to secure the freedom of Vietnam, and to "stay (in Vietnam) until aggression is stopped" (President Johnson), is unalterable and decisive.

c. One of the reasons why the United States is confident that free Vietnam will prevail and grow into a dynamic, prosperous, and distinctly Vietnamese nation, is that America was once in the same situation: a small population, a fledgling revolutionary state, emerging from colonial rule. Fighting and working hard, it created a distinctly American society and became a great modern nation.

d. Or take the example of free Vietnam's ally, Korea. The Korean people, like the Vietnamese, were attacked by their Northern fellow-countrymen who, like the Vietnamese of the North, had fallen victim to Communist oppressors. In Korea, as in Vietnam, the aggressors were supported by imperialist Red China. The Republic of Korea, like the Republic of Vietnam, received military and economic aid from the Free World. Americans and other free men fought and died to preserve the independence of Korea. Korea won the war against aggression; and in recognition of the help they received from other free people,

Koreas today fight to help save Vietnam from aggression. Red China failed in Korea as it will fail in Vietnam.

e. The Free World provides decisive support for free Vietnam while Red China is merely prepared to fight to the last North Vietnamese and to the last Viet Cong.

f. The people of Vietnam need not take their government's word that the Viet Cong are beaten - the Viet Cong have lost by their own standard of measure. The leaders of the Viet Cong claim that they represent a "people's revolution", but this so-called revolution has not caught fire; nowhere have the people risen under its flag - the Viet Cong are no more than a tiny minority led and misled by ruthless gangsters trained in the techniques of "revolutionary warfare". Communist doctrine on "revolutionary warfare" states clearly that so called wars of liberation depend for success on the voluntary support of the population, that without such voluntary support revolutionary warfare must fail. Yet the Viet Cong have alienated the people and know it. Instead of the voluntary support which they failed to engender, they rely on terror to take the people's rice, money and youth to prolong a struggle they know - from their own books to be futile.

g. Free Vietnam fights for freedom and peace against power intent on denying both. The fight for freedom and peace has been and will continue to be the cause of all men of good will - the cause which, despite adversities and setbacks, has always triumphed, always keeps moving forward. Free Vietnam, therefore, rides the wave of the future which is bound to overwhelm the dark forces of oppression and Communist imperialism.

2. In order to illustrate convincingly that the victory of free Vietnam is inevitable, military news, both successes and setbacks, must be put into their correct perspective - which is always the context of the war as a whole. The significance of a battle depends on the extent to which it affects the course of the war.

a. To make a success meaningful to people, it must be related to their own terms of reference. A villager near Nha Trang is not necessarily interested in the stark facts of a victory in the Delta. But there are aspects to each victory in which he may be interested and which can bring its significance home to him. Was it achieved because of information on the Viet Cong which a villager provided to save his hamlet from being turned into a Viet Cong stronghold and subsequent destruction? Did the success demonstrate specific Viet Cong weaknesses or proof of government strength which show that it is safer to side with the ultimate victor, the government? Did it yield Viet Cong documents which may expose entire Communist infra-structures? Can the story be told in human interest terms which will make it meaningful even though it took place many miles away?

b. Occasional setbacks are, of course, unavoidable. But no tactical setback can possibly affect the ultimate outcome of the struggle. The Free World lost many engagements, men, ships and planes in World War II yet forced all its enemies to surrender unconditionally.

3. There is more than one way to achieve national objectives. If the objectives of free Vietnam - freedom, peace, security - can be achieved by negotiations, then there will be negotiations to achieve them. But there will be no compromise with that fraudulent type of neutralism which appeases instead of laying a sound basis for peace and security. The right of the Vietnamese people to live as they please and to create their own revolutionary society is not negotiable.

PRIORITY TASK TWO:

Persuade ALL AUDIENCES that the fastest way to end the war and achieve peace and security is to support free Vietnam and oppose the Viet Cong.

1. The best way to help achieve peace and security is to support the government of free Vietnam. Free Vietnam will win the war in any event. The only question is how long it will take to achieve victory and to secure peace. It follows that people who long for peace and security are best advised to support the government. As free Vietnam's determination to defeat the Viet Cong and to stop aggression is unshakeable, its resources limitless (because it can count on the United States), the outcome is certain beyond the shadow of a doubt; the Viet Cong cannot win and impose their kind of peace. To help the Viet Cong merely means to prolong the war, death and suffering, uselessly.

2. The means to speed the achievement of peace and security is to help free Vietnam and its allies find and rout the Viet Cong who, hard pressed as they are now, resort increasingly to fighting and hiding behind old men, women and children, who by their very presence endanger the lives of the innocent. Everything should be done not to let the Viet Cong drag out their losing struggle and endanger the people by fighting desperate rear guard actions in their midst.

3. (To gain the confidence of an audience, it is necessary to convince that audience that its problems are known and understood. If one asks an audience for action which may be dangerous, that audience will want to know that the dangers are appreciated, that the appeal is not made by people who are either ignorant or callous. Otherwise it will disregard the appeal.)

We know it is difficult, often dangerous and sometimes impossible to resist terrorists, but it IS possible to shorten the war and the suffering it causes by courageously choosing sides and taking action against the terrorists. For instance, the smallest bit of information on the whereabouts of Viet Cong units, headquarters and leaders can lead to the annihilation of the enemy - possibly far away from one's home - and prevent danger to innocent lives.

4. It is safer, certainly for the long run, to support the government than to support the Viet Cong. The government is stronger than the Viet Cong and will win. It is always wiser to side with the stronger battalions and the ultimate winner. It is a mistake to help losers - one compromises oneself (unless one cannot help doing what one does) for nothing; it will not change the outcome of the war by one iota.

5. Not everybody is or can be a hero; nobody expects that, But everybody must realize that nobody gets anything for nothing. Peace and freedom to live as one pleases, must always be earned and often fought for. People who long for peace and the freedom to live as they please, must - to the extent they can - contribute to defeating aggressors and oppressors. This is a fundamental rule of life.

PRIORITY TASK THREE:

Convince ALL AUDIENCES that the Republic of Vietnam reflects the natural and naturally imperfect process of historical change and development toward a distinctly Vietnamese but modern revolutionary society, offers to each Vietnamese opportunity to advance within and to influence the course of the revolution, and thus represents the only true and realistic hope for the achievement of national and personal aspirations.

1. The Republic represents the real Vietnamese revolution. It aims at the creation of democracy: the right of every citizen to live as he pleases without harming the rights of others; the right of every citizen to participate in government and to shape the future as he thinks it should be shaped. It tries to find Vietnamese solutions to Vietnamese problems - solutions based on Vietnamese traditions but pointing into a better future. Communism, on the other hand, represents reaction. It forces people, gun in hand, to conform with alien teachings. It preaches permanent war to extend the rule of Communist bosses; it opposes peace, freedom, national independence and the natural right of people to live as they please. It has failed everywhere to produce happiness and prosperity. This is why it rules by the gun. Its rule represents the iron hand of the past: of masters over slaves.

2. Free Vietnam is young as nations go. It is evolving from colonialism and resists the new colonialism of Red China, spear-headed by Hanoi. Its shifts and adjustments reflect the normal historical process of a young, vigorous but naturally imperfect nation in the throes of revolutionary change and development. Change means opportunity. Opportunity means hope and progress.

3. Free Vietnam needs its citizens and relies on them. It offers them opportunity to participate in the revolution, to advance within it, and to influence its course toward a modern but distinctly Vietnamese nation.

4. It is the calculated policy of the Viet Cong to hold back the real revolution because they know that Communism can never gain power in a dynamic, free, prosperous society.

They try to achieve this goal by continuing a futile war to drain Vietnam's resources, both human and material. They are not, and have never been, ~~interested~~ in the welfare of the people; they are only interested in power for themselves and their Red Chinese masters. The defeat of the Viet Cong will free Vietnam's dynamics and resources for the creation of truly revolutionary progress and of prosperity.

5. However, despite the effort which free Vietnam must make to achieve peace and security for its people, it is already well on the way to lay a sound foundation for the welfare of the people, for progress and prosperity. Land reform is in the process of being carried out. The Rural Construction program will bring security to an ever-increasing number of people. Schools are being built. A democratic constitution is being drafted and will be submitted to the people for their approval. Plans are prepared to gain maximum advantage from the Mekong River Development Project and the Southeast Asia Bank to build Vietnamese prosperity. A giant industrial complex is growing at Cam Ranh Bay to provide wealth and employment the moment it will no longer be needed for military purposes.

(It is imperative that the people be informed on all achievements and plans for progress of the government. This information must be kept up to date at all times. The Ministry of Psychological Warfare and USAID will make it available to all personnel concerned with communication. It should be kept on file and used constantly. The Viet Cong are unable to match it. For)

6. The government builds; the Viet Cong destroy.

PRIORITY TASK FOUR:

Make ALL AUDIENCES fully aware that the Viet Cong are instruments of a foreign power, Red China.

1. The cadres who exercise effective control over the Viet-Cong (and their front organization, the so-called National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam) are willing agents of a foreign power which has never ceased to covet Vietnam since the people of Vietnam drove its armies from Vietnam's soil centuries ago: China. Most of the Viet Cong rank and file have been duped into the service of Red Chinese imperialism - by lies and false promises. But both cadres and rank and file represent an alien organization which tries to impose an alien system upon the Vietnamese people in the interest of their alien masters. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Viet Cong are traitors - traitors to a nation with ancient culture and traditions and values of its own. It follows that the Viet Cong do not and cannot offer to the Vietnamese people what all Vietnamese need and want: Vietnamese solutions to Vietnamese problems.

2. The Viet Cong, their leaders wittingly, most of the rank and file out of ignorance and deceived by the lies of Communist bosses, serve alien masters and an alien cause. It is dishonorable to betray one's country, to fight and kill fellow-countrymen who serve the nation, and to get involved in murdering innocent people - women and children. So it is the duty of Vietnamese families concerned with their good name, the duty of parents and grandparents, to explain to their young ones who serve with the Viet Cong, that they dishonor their families and besmirch their good name and that only by returning to the nation can they restore the family's honor and make it possible for their parents to, once again, carry their heads high.

PRIORITY TASK FIVE:

Convince ALL AUDIENCES that the American presence in Vietnam is a consequence of the external aggression against free Vietnam by a common enemy, is decisive but supplementary to free Vietnam's effort, and that the United States will withdraw its armed forces from Vietnam when the threat to Vietnamese independence has been overcome.

1. The United States is helping free Vietnam because free Vietnam is under attack by a common enemy, imperialist Communism, which has designs on all free nations. To allow one free nation to succumb to communist aggression might jeopardize the security of all free nations, if not the cause of freedom itself.

2. When the threat to free Vietnam's security and independence has been overcome, the United States will withdraw its armed forces from Vietnam. The United States does not need any of Vietnam's resources and wealth. It has the most modern and powerful military establishment in the world, including long-range weapons and nuclear submarines - therefore, it does not need or want any military bases in Vietnam. More than that, the United States is a power opposed to colonialism in any shape and form. It has helped many nations to emerge from colonialism and to obtain and preserve their independence - while Communist imperialism colonized and enslaved many countries which had been independent for centuries. The United States itself liberated itself from colonialism and has never forgotten it; it is THE anti-colonialist power of our time.

3. The U.S. military build-up in Vietnam has but one purpose: to achieve the level of combined Free World strength which is needed to make the aggressors agree to the kind of peace the people of Vietnam want.

PRIORITY TASK SIX:

Convince ALL AUDIENCES that there will be no compromise with appeasement and "neutralism" which the enemy systematically exploits as instruments for the achievement of his own imperialist ends.

1. Free Vietnam and the United States want peace - an end to aggression, an end to terror - but peace, to be meaningful, must put an end to the evil deeds which North Vietnam and the Viet Cong have been committing against the people and will, given the chance, continue to commit. Peace, to be true, must secure the freedom of the Vietnamese to find Vietnamese solutions to Vietnamese problems and to live the way they want, not in a straight jacket of communist making. Under no circumstances, therefore, will free Vietnam or any of the nations supporting free Vietnam compromise with that deceptive type of neutralism which appeases instead of laying a sound basis for peace and which the communists can, therefore, so easily exploit for their own ends. The voice of the appeaser may sound sweet but is never concerned with the welfare of the people; more often than not it is merely a front behind which the enemy hides to strike again. Vietnam and the United States are determined to devote "as much as it takes for as long as it takes" to achieve a settlement which will bring true peace and security to the people of Vietnam.

2. Free Vietnam did not want war. The United States did not want war. The war was forced upon them by communist aggressors. There would be no war if it were not for the Viet Cong, for North Vietnam, for Red China. Only the Viet Cong, North Vietnam, Red China can stop it - by ending aggression, terror, murder, by ceasing to make the people suffer. Until they do, Vietnam must and will stand fast, ready to defend country and people by force of arms, ready to negotiate a durable peace - but never willing to accept a sham peace that would give to the aggressor what he could not win by force of arms.

PRIORITY TASK SEVEN:

Persuade religious and ethnic MINORITIES that free Vietnam respects their identity, beliefs and traditions, will improve their situation together with that of all peoples and groups united in the Republic, and will assure equality - permitting no religious, ethnic or regional group a position of partisan privilege.

1. Vietnam is at war. This war has been forced upon it. If the Communists win it, nobody will be free to live as he wishes. No group will be permitted to have an identity of its own. No group will be permitted to maintain its traditions. All religions will be persecuted or suppressed. Everybody will be told to live in the way Communism prescribes. Therefore, all Vietnamese, majority groups as well as minority groups, have one interest in common: to defeat the Viet Cong in order to save freedom, everybody's freedom.

2. Free Vietnam respects all religious beliefs and traditions. It welcomes the participation of all religious groups in the great social revolution on which the nation has embarked. The Republic guarantees that all religious groups have the right to equality with any other; no religious group will be allowed to gain a position of partisan privilege. Therefore, as it is Communist doctrine and policy, and thus Viet Cong doctrine and policy, to suppress all religions, this is the time to fight the common enemy.

3. Free Vietnam respects the culture and traditions and understands the special problems of all ethnic minorities. Their interests lie with the Republic which will improve their situation together with that of all the other people united in the Republic. For it is Communist doctrine and policy, and thus Viet Cong doctrine and policy, to put an end to all ethnic identities (though they may pay lip service to ethnic autonomy until they assume indisputable power). Therefore, this is the time to fight the common enemy.

PRIORITY TASK EIGHT:

Make the VIET CONG fully conscious of the fact that they have alienated the people and cannot avoid to alienate them further;

that they violate the principles of revolutionary warfare by relying on terror as a substitute for popular support;

that communist doctrine itself presages their defeat because it holds that the success of revolutionary warfare depends on the VOLUNTARY support of the people;

and that they are, therefore, conducting an isolated, futile struggle against the massing and inexhaustible firepower of free Vietnam, the United States and free Vietnam's other supporters.

1. Speaking to the Viet Cong: you have lost whatever popular support you may have had. See how the people fear and hate you, even despise you; open your eyes and see how you defile your own principles of a people's revolution by forcing them, gun in hand, the coward's way, to give in to you, to surrender their rice, their money, their sons. Aren't you supposed to be "the fish" who live and swim in "the water" of the people, in water that willingly, lovingly accommodates you? The fact is that after years of futile struggle, you must abuse and terrorize the people more and more because you can rely on them less and less. That is not the way of revolutionaries; it is the way of murderers. The so-called people's revolution of which your leaders speak never did catch fire, never did win the hearts of the people because it never was a genuine revolution, because it always was the spearhead of an alien imperialism, always designed to foist the dictatorship of a small minority on the majority. This is why you fight for a lost cause -- the people know it, and in your hearts you must know it too.

2. Your leaders deceive you. They know you fight a losing battle for a lost cause because they know - Communist doctrine tells them - that wars of so-called "liberation" cannot be won unless the people support it, support you, VOLUNTARILY. They know the people despise Viet Cong

oppression which denies them the dignity all true Vietnamese cherish. They know that you unwittingly serve a foreign master, Red China, which uses you as cannon fodder for its own imperialist purposes. Being communists, your leaders do not care whether you live or die and rot away in unmarked graves as long as you prolong the war and, by prolonging it, prevent or delay the emergence of free Vietnam as a strong and prosperous nation - for all communists know that communism can never prevail over the prosperity which only free nations can create. Therefore, return to the people, to free Vietnam which will receive you with open arms, give you good treatment and the opportunity to become again a part of the free Vietnamese society and to play a constructive role in Vietnam's genuine revolution.

The place of the true revolutionary is WITH his people.

3. Isolated from the people whom you alienated, without sincere allies, you are lost and fight a futile battle which you can never hope to win against the massive, massing and inexhaustible military power of free Vietnam, the United States and a host of other free nations. You are doomed in a senseless struggle against enormous firepower that you can never hope to match, against thousands and thousands of the fastest and most heavily armed airplanes ever designed and built; you will never again know any real rest or peace of mind until you return to your people and government, for you are being hunted by superior and still growing forces. The only choice open to you is death or return to the cause of people and nation; death or life.

PRIORITY TASK NINE:

Persuade the VIET CONG, particularly the soft core, to defect to free Vietnam where they will be received with open arms and given the opportunity to reintegrate themselves into a truly revolutionary society.

1. You are not fighting for a worthy cause. If you think you do, then you have been deceived. You are not fighting for a better future, for the welfare of your families, for your people, for your country - you are fighting for the benefit of a small group of traitors who sold out to Red China; who know that they cannot win; but who are perfectly willing to go on fighting until the last of you molder in an unmarked grave. If you continue fighting and obeying the orders of treacherous leaders, you will certainly be killed - and what then about your wives, children and parents?

2. There is an alternative to death, one single alternative, an honorable alternative: free Vietnam's Chieu Hoi policy. Many of your cadres and comrades - so and so many last year, so and so many last month, so and so many last week, so and so many yesterday - recognized the impossibility of success and the falseness of the so-called war of liberation, waged in fact in the interests of an alien power, and returned to country and government. They have been received with open arms, treated well, been given assistance and the opportunity to rejoin their families and to reintegrate themselves into the revolutionary society of free Vietnam.

The time has come to choose: life or death; return or an unmarked grave.

PRIORITY TASK TEN:

Make the VIET CONG fully aware of the fact that they are agents of a foreign power which threatens the peace for its own imperialist ends, is willing to fight to the last Vietnamese, and is, therefore, unwilling to permit negotiation of a genuine peace.

1. Have you ever asked yourself what positive good could possibly come from this bloody war which your leaders have unleashed upon your fellow-citizens and which your leaders could end at will? From the murderous crimes they commit and make you commit, from the misery they inflict on people who merely want to live in peace and freedom, on old people like your own parents, on innocent children? If they wanted peace, progress, prosperity, they could have all that if they participated into the effort of the government, supported by aid from the Free World, to create a dynamic, revolutionary society in which everybody can find his proper place, which would permit everybody to enjoy life in peace and security together with justice, dignity and prosperity. What could not the wealth which must be poured into the war effort, do for you, for your family, for your country? What could not be accomplished by all the human efforts which must be diverted to fighting this murderous war?

But this is what Communism wants: misery - because it knows that it cannot prevail and impose its dictatorship when people are happy. This is what North Vietnam wants for South Vietnam - because it knows that it will never be able to rule all of Vietnam when people are happy. This is what Red China wants: a maximum of misery everywhere in Asia - because it knows that it will never be able to expand into Southeast Asia while the people of Southeast Asia are happy. Communism, Red Chinese imperialism can only fish in troubled waters. This is why they trouble the waters.

Happiness can be yours and Vietnam's if it were not for your leaders who put Communism and the imperial interests of Red China before the interests of the people of Vietnam - including yours.

2. You have been duped into serving a foreign master, Red China, and into killing your Vietnamese brethren for the Chinese Communists who

are ready to fight to the last Vietnamese, ready to fight to YOUR death. Red China and its puppets, Hanoi and your leaders want to continue the slaughter for their own ends which are not the ends of the people, not your ends, and thus are unwilling to negotiate a genuine peace. Red China has, as China always had, imperialist ambitions in Vietnam and is opposed to the creation of a genuinely free, of a genuinely Vietnamese society. Free Vietnam seeks Vietnamese solutions to Vietnamese problems. Disown the alien cause you serve and return - return to participate in the true revolution: a revolution of Vietnamese, for Vietnamese, by Vietnamese. Return home.

PRIORITY TASK ELEVEN:

Make the people of NORTH VIETNAM aware that their leaders subject them to terrible dangers by continuing aggression against their brethren in the South.


1. Your leaders are subjecting you to terrible dangers by continuing their futile war against free Vietnam. Not only must you face retaliatory action from the powerful air forces of free Vietnam and the United States, your leaders' dangerous adventure against the South invites increasing domination of your country by Red Chinese imperialism. For as your leaders prolong the war, send increasing numbers of troops and masses of material to fight free Vietnam, and thus waste your substance, North Vietnam will become increasingly dependent on Chinese assistance, and Chinese assistance means, as Vietnamese history proved time and again, Chinese control.

2. We know that it is hard for people subjected to communist dictatorship to make their wishes known and their justified demands felt. But there are things people can do to advise dictators that they are fed up with adventurous policies such as conducting a war against free Vietnam and risking the lives of thousands of North Vietnamese soldiers; inviting retaliation and the destruction of the substance which the people of North Vietnam have created with their labor; and incurring for the people of North Vietnam the hardships and dangers which are the inevitable result of waging and senselessly prolonging unjust wars. Many of these things can be done without taking much of a chance:

- people can gradually slow down the work which is required to produce the resources needed to prolong the war. They can gradually retain for their own use more and more of the food which the dictators need to supply the ever-increasing numbers of men they plan to infiltrate into free Vietnam. In this way they will not only provide better for

their families but take a long step toward ending the war which causes the danger to them - senseless danger because Hanoi and its Viet Cong tools can no longer hope to win it anyhow.

- people can advise their husbands and sons who are compelled to infiltrate free Vietnam, to use the safe conduct passes which are dropped from the air and to accept the refuge which free Vietnam offers to them. In this way they will not only help them to stay alive and, one day, rejoin their families but also to shorten the war and hasten the reunion. The alternative to making use of safe conduct passes and free Vietnam's offer to treat them well, is death; no PAVN unit stands a chance against the superior firepower of free Vietnam and its allies and their total domination of the air.



OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS OPERATIONAL MEMORANDUM NO. 34-66

February 8, 1966

To : All Regional Directors, Provincial Representatives and
Technical Divisions

From : *for Samuel V. Wilson* Samuel V. Wilson, Associate Director for Field Operations

Subject: CADRE: Transmittal of Revised Statute on RC Cadre
(Arrete 137) and Related Documents.

During the series of regional meetings on cadre led by General Thang between January 26 and February 1, handouts of five of the attached six translations of GVN material on Rural Construction Cadres were supplied to attending personnel of USAID, the Embassy, JUSPAO and MACV. We are now giving a regular distribution to those significant documents together with No. 6, the statement which General Thang made to the Vietnamese personnel at each meeting. These documents are briefly discussed below:

1. Arrete No. 137 ND/XDNT, 26 Jan. 1966. This Special Statute on Rural Construction Cadre replaces Decree 2164, 10 Dec. 1965, (O.P.O. Operational Memo 151-65). Substantive changes or additions to Decree 2164, by Article Number are:
2-1 "People's Action" replaces "Armed Propaganda Inter-Team". Help to rural population is emphasized.
4. Inter-Team Chief and Deputy positions are eliminated.
6. In pre-conditions for cadre selection, upper age limit is dropped and rigid requirement that one must never have been terminated for disciplinary reasons is eliminated.
9. Basic salary scale is incorporated by transfer from General Decree 1900.
10. Position allowance of Team Chief is raised from 800\$ to 1000\$ monthly.
11. Provision is added for a cost of living allowance on province-by-province basis. Provisions for per diem and family allowance are deliberately omitted as these will not be supported by OSA.
15. Position of "Provincial Chief of Rural Construction Cadre" is identified and added to the Cadre Promotion Committee.

Certain other provisions are eliminated such as former article 10 on having to refund certain salary upon quitting. All concerned agree the revisions are improvements.

(A)

2. Chart, Tentative Rural Construction Cadre Control Organization.
This provides for the establishment of an organization of at least 15 members in every province for the purpose of controlling and directing cadre operations. Its leader will report to the Province Chief, and will coordinate with the Deputy or Chief of Provincial Rural Construction via the Rural Construction Council. The leader will be appointed by the Ministry of Rural Construction based on nominations of the Provincial Promotion Committee for Cadre.
3. Chart, Rural Construction Cadre Group, (Interim organization).
This reflects a recent (25 Jan. 1966) joint US-GVN agreement on the size and make-up of this organization. It is stressed that the formal organization is established to facilitate programming, administration and the scheduling of training. The actual mix of Specialist and PAT members for work in a specific village or hamlet will be as deemed necessary by the Province/District Chief concerned.
4. Rural Construction Cadre Authorization, Jan. 28, 1966.
This is a province by province listing of the number of Vietnamese cadres authorized for attendance at the Vung Tau National training center for the ten-week course beginning 21 Feb. 1966. Total 1966 quotas have not yet been developed. The Minister of Rural Construction has promised to issue additional quotas at least two months in advance of each class starting this year (total of 4).
5. Postal Message form used to transmit cadre quotas for training
at Vung Tau for the 21 Feb. course. Certain restrictions are listed in this message, and one of them, the 2nd, is discussed herein. This requirement, to send at least one fourth of existing transferees from the GAMO, Rural Political, or NLH programs, is intended to cause minimum interference with on-going programs, but to get all these cadres to the National Training Center this year. Not stated in the Postal Message, but explained orally by Minister Thang to all Province Chiefs, is an upper limit that prohibits more than 50% of any cadre group sent for the first course being made up of former GAMO, Rural Political and NLH cadres. These restrictions do not take cognizance of the fact that some provinces have a large number of such untrained cadres, but only a small quota for attendance at the National Training Center. For this reason, advisors are requested to interpret the 2nd restriction as follows: The quota for attendance at the 21 Feb. course at Vung Tau will be comprised to the extent possible of at least 25% but no more than 50% of existing GAMO, Rural Political or NLH cadres.

6. Cadre Developments and Plans - Briefing statement made by Rural Construction Minister Thang at orientation conference held in all regions between January 26 and February 1, 1966.

Attachments (6)

Copies to: - OPO Hdqs Staff
- USOM Technical Divisions
- Embassy/OSA
POL
SLO
- JUSPAO
- MAC-V J-33

IASAY/ntt

20 January 1966

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
No. 137 ND/XDNT

SPECIAL STATUTE ON RURAL CONSTRUCTION CADRE

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Considering the Convention of June 19th, 1965;

Considering Decision # 3-QLVNCH/QD of June 14th, 1965, establishing the National Leadership Committee and determining the composition of this Committee;

Considering Decree # 1-a/CT/LDQG/SL of June 19th, 1965 and Decree # 121/CT/LDQG/SL of October 5th, 1965 establishing the Composition of the Central Executive Committee;

Considering Arrete # 739-VN of June 25th, 1954 and other supplementary documents establishing the statute for non career personnel;

Considering Arrete # 1900-UBHP/CT of November 11th, 1965 determining the general statute for cadres in all branches of activity;

Considering the Government's service requirement

A R R E T E S

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 1. A special statute is hereby established for Rural Construction Cadres.

ARTICLE 2. Rural Construction Cadres must have self defense capability in order to carry out their responsibilities, the principal ones of which are:

1. People's Action

- a. Carry on activities among the people to help the rural population in the area being pacified and to meet various urgent needs in the fields of social welfare, health and education.
- b. Detect and destroy the political/military infrastructure of the Viet Cong in rural areas.
- c. Explain government pacification policy.
- d. Study the area projected for pacification
- e. Organize and train a people's self defense force.

(A)

2. Census Grievance

- a. Survey and classify the people in the area being pacified.
- b. Keep track of the thinking and activities of the friendly and enemy infrastructure; gather information and report about the genuine aspirations of the rural people.

3. Civil Affairs

- a. Temporarily undertake the village/hamlet administration if necessary during the transition period; strengthen existing village/hamlet governments.
- b. Urge the people to organize themselves into groups for the purpose of operating on a regular basis.
- c. Urge the people to assist the government in organizing the election of administrative committees and villages' councils.

4. New Life Development

- a. Guide and teach the people to avail themselves of the social and economic benefits offered by the government, through such means as:
 - 1. Self-help projects in which government agencies provide the materials and the people contribute their labor.
 - 2. Economic development projects, such as road improvement, markets, etc.
- b. Bring in direct government assistance, such as help from technicians, improved seeds, fertilizer, etc.
- c. Assist in providing social services, such as schools, clinics, etc.

ARTICLE 3. The basic unit of the rural construction cadre is the Rural Construction Cadre Group.

The Rural Construction Cadre Group is headed by a Group Leader and assisted by a Deputy Group Leader and, in principle, may consist of the following elements:

- | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------|
| a. Leadership | d. Civil Affairs |
| b. People's Action | e. New Life Development |
| c. Census Grievance | |

In addition, the Group can be strengthened by a number of technical service cadre, or by other special cadre, as required. A document from the Ministry will define details of the organization and duties of each group of rural construction cadres.

ARTICLE 4. There will be only one single category for Rural Construction Cadres. These cadres can occupy the following different positions:

- Team Member
- Team Deputy Chief
- Team Chief
- Group Deputy Chief (May act as Inter-Team Chief)
- Group Chief

CHAPTER II
RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

ARTICLE 5. The recruitment of Rural Construction Cadres shall be carried out as follows:

1. If an applicant meets the requirements of Article 6 below, he will be considered as temporarily selected and will have to attend a training course at the National Training Center for Rural Construction Cadres (TTHL/CBXDN/TU).

2. His official appointment will be effective only after graduation from the National Training Center.

ARTICLE 6. To be considered a temporary selectee, an applicant must meet the following conditions:

1. Be a Vietnamese citizen.
2. Be entitled to civil rights, and of good behavior.
3. Be at least 17 years of age.
4. Have performed his military service, or have legal standing with regard to his military obligations.
5. Be of adequate physical condition.
6. Pledge himself to work as a rural construction cadre for at least two years.

ARTICLE 7. An applicant is temporarily selected at the province level by a committee for recruitment and then will be sent to the National Training Center. Official appointment, which takes place after the training period, will be carried out by the Ministry of Rural Construction. The appointee will be assigned back to the province where he was temporarily selected previously.

ARTICLE 8. Should any trainee, during the period of his training, prove to be incapable or unqualified, he shall be sent back to his province upon the decision of the Director National Training Center for Rural Construction Cadres.

CHAPTER III
SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES

ARTICLE 9. The scale of basic salaries for the Rural Construction Cadres is as follows:

Step 1	2500\$/month	Step 7	3700\$/month
2	2700\$/ "	8	3900\$/ "
3	2900\$/ "	9	4100\$/ "
4	3100\$/ "	10	4300\$/ "
5	3300\$/ "	11	4500\$/ "
6	3500\$/ "		

ARTICLE 10. Monthly position allowance for RCC are as follows:

Team Deputy Chief	500\$
Team Chief	1000\$
Group Deputy Chief	1500\$
Group Chief	2000\$

ARTICLE 11. Cost of living allowances may be authorized, as appropriate. The amount of the allowance will be determined by the Minister of Rural Construction on a province by province basis, and will be reviewed quarterly.

CHAPTER IV
PROMOTION - AWARD AND SANCTION

ARTICLE 12. The minimum requirement to obtain a salary step increase is one year. The maximum waiting period for a step increase is three years.

ARTICLE 13. Provincial Promotion Committees may recommend salary step increases and promotions up to the rank of Groups Deputy Chief. Such recommendation will be within the personnel and position authorization established by the Minister of Rural Construction. Appointments to the maximum steps or positions will be by the Province Chief.

ARTICLE 14. Recommendations for the position of Rural Construction Cadre Group Chief will be made by the Province Promotion Committee. Appointment authority rests with the Minister of Rural Construction.

ARTICLE 15. The promotion committee at province level is composed of:

- Province Chief	Chairman
- Permanent Bureau Chief of the Provincial Rural Construction Council	Member
- Provincial Chief of Rural Construction Cadre	"
- District Chief in the operational area of the group	"
- Group Chief of concerned cadres	"

ARTICLE 16. All cadres who have accomplished notable deeds may receive from the province chief the following awards:

- Award Certificate
- Award Diploma
- Citation
- Honorary Diploma
- Rural Construction Order of Merit

In addition to the above, cadres may receive cash and or other donations.

ARTICLE 17. With regard to cadres committing slight misdeeds the Chief of Province has the right to directly warn and criticize them, with registration of a demerit in their individual dossiers.

ARTICLE 18. With respect to cadres committing serious misdemeanors, the Province Chief will summon a disciplinary council, the composition of which will be as described in Article 15. The council can propose to the Minister of Rural Construction the withholding of a promotion for a 2-year period, a one or two step demotion, provisional release for 1 to 3 months without pay, or dismissal without severance allowances, and with prohibition against rehire in any capacity whatever.

CHAPTER V

HOSPITALIZATION, MEDICAL TREATMENT, DEATH AND CAPTURE PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 19. The cadres and their family members (husbands, wives, children) will be admitted to government medical facilities. If admitted to a hospital, they will be authorized treatment equivalent to Civil Service Class B.

ARTICLE 20. Female cadres and wives of cadres will be admitted to a maternity as Civil Service Class B.

ARTICLE 21. Cadres who becomes ill or are wounded while on duty will be admitted to the most suitable medical facility and have their medical expenses paid by the Province which will, in turn, be reimbursed by the Central government.

ARTICLE 22. After treatment in a hospital for a normal illness, cadres will be allowed a maximum of 7 days sick leave upon recommendation by a government physician.

ARTICLE 23. If a cadre become ill while performing his duties he will be allowed a maximum of 29 days sick leave upon recommendation by a government medical committee. If a cadre is wounded in the line of duty, a maximum of three months leave may be authorized upon recommendation by a government medical committee.

ARTICLE 24. If a cadre is killed or dies his family survivors will be allowed 3000 piastres for funeral expenses plus 12 months pay.

ARTICLE 25. A cadre missing in action or captured will have his salary paid to his family survivors for up to 12 months.

ARTICLE 26. If a cadre is dismissed from service for other than disciplinary reasons he will receive a special allowance on the basis of 15 days pay for each year of service. A partial year of service amounting to 6 months will be counted as a full year. A cadre who resigns of his own volition is not entitled to severance pay.

CHAPTER VI
SPECIAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 27. During their period of service all Rural Construction Cadres are granted draft deferment.

ARTICLE 28. Three types of previously existing cadres -- New Life Hamlet Cadres, Mobile Administrative Cadres, and Rural Political Cadres -- are merged into Rural Construction Cadres in accordance with the transitional provisions stated in the subsequent articles.

ARTICLE 29. New Life Hamlet Cadres

1. From Nov. 1, 1965, all existing New Life Hamlet cadres, if volunteering and fulfilling the requirements stated in Article 6, will temporarily receive Step 1 salaries and will be sent to the National Training Center for Rural Construction Cadres.

2. New Life Hamlet Cadres who do not fulfill all requirements stated in Article 29/1 will be released after completion of their present service contract.

3. Team members must be graduated from the basic training course at the National Training Center for Rural Construction Cadres to be considered as official team members. Otherwise they will be released after completion of their present service contract.

ARTICLE 30. Mobile Administrative Cadre (ie. GANO)

1. From Nov. 1, 1965 all existing Mobile Administrative Cadres, if volunteering and fulfilling all requirements stated in Article 6, will temporarily receive Step 1 salaries and will be sent to the National Training Center for Rural Construction Cadres. If the amount of the new salary (and allowances) is less than the current salary (and allowances) the cadres concerned will receive the difference until graduation from their training course. If their present salary is higher than the new salary scale they will continue to receive their present salary until graduation from their training course.

2. All Mobile Administrative Cadres who do not fulfill the requirements stated in Article 30/1 will be released after completion of their present service contract.

3. Team members should graduate from the basic course given at the National Training Center for Rural Construction Cadres to be considered as official team members. Otherwise, they will be released, right after the training course.

ARTICLE 31. Rural Political Cadres

1. From November 1, 1965, Rural Political Cadres, if volunteering and fulfilling all requirements stated in Article 6, will temporarily receive the Step 1 salary and will eventually be sent to the National Training Center for Rural Construction Cadres. If the total amount of the new salary and allowances is less than the current salary and allowances, the cadres concerned will receive the difference.

2. Rural Political Cadres who do not fulfill the requirements stated in Article 31/1 will be released after completion of their present service contract.

3. Hamlet and village level cadre must graduate from the basic course given at the National Training Center for Rural Construction Cadres to be considered officially as team members. Otherwise, they will be released after completion of their present service contract.

4. Cadres at the district level, as well as instructors of Rural Political Cadre and cadres at the province level, must undertake training designed for Rural Construction Leaders.

These cadres who do not obtain the required score in these courses will be placed in lower positions. It will be mandatory that the cadres accept the lower position or be dismissed.

ARTICLE 32. No cadre will be released for failure to attend a training course until he has been afforded the opportunity to do so.


ARTICLE 33. This Arrête will be applied with retroactive effect back to November 1, 1965. Decree # 2146 of 12/10/65 is hereby repealed.

ARTICLE 34. Commissioners General, Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners are charged, each to that which concerns him, with the execution of the present Arrête.

Saigon, January 26, 1966
Air Vice Marshal NGUYEN CAO KY
Chairman, Central Executive Council

/ntt

TENTATIVE ORGANIZATION
of a
RURAL CONSTRUCTION CADRE CONTROL ORGANIZATION
(15 Members)




REMARKS: The above is the tentative minimum organization of a Provincial Rural Construction Cadre Control Organization.

Provinces which have large numbers of Rural Construction Cadre and have an on-going Rural Construction Program can request reinforcement of the Control Organization.

An arrete to officially establish the Provincial Rural Construction Cadre Control Organization will be issued. Provinces are requested to submit suggestions to the Ministry for consideration prior to February 15, 1966.

January 26, 1966

RURAL CONSTRUCTION CADRE GROUP
(Interim Organization)



RECAPITULATION

a.	Rural Construction Cadre Group Chief -----	1
b.	Deputy Rural Construction Cadre Group Chief -----	2
c.	Assistant for PSYWAR, Group Staff -----	1
d.	Assistant for Intelligence and Liaison, Group Staff -----	1
e.	Health Members, Group Staff -----	3
f.	People's Action Team Members -----	33
g.	Census Grievance Team Members -----	6
h.	Civil Affairs Team Members -----	6
i.	New Life Development Team Members -----	6
	TOTAL	<u>59</u>

* Concurrently serves as Inter-Team Chief.

January 26, 1966

(A)

January 28, 1966

RURAL CONSTRUCTION CADRE AUTHORIZATIONS
FOR THE VUNG TAU TEN WEEK COURSE BEGINNING 21 FEBRUARY 1966

<u>Province</u>	<u>Groups</u>	<u>Cadres</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>Groups</u>	<u>Cadres</u>
1. Quang Tri	1	59	18. Binh Tuy	1	59
2. Thua Thien	2	118	19. Long Khanh	1	59
3. Quang Nam	4	236	21. Phuoc Long	1	59
3A. Da Nang			22. Binh Long	1	59
4. Quang Tin	1	59	23. Binh Duong	4	236
5. Quang Ngai	2	118	24. Tay Ninh	2	118
REGION I TOTAL	10	590	25. Hau Nghia	3	177
6. Kontum	1	59	26. Gia Dinh	3	177
7. Binh Dinh	4	236	26A Saigon		
8. Pleiku	2	118	27. Bien Hoa	4	236
9. Phu Bon			28. Phuoc Tuy	1	59
10. Phu Yen	2	118	28A Vung Tau		
11. Darlac	1	59	30. Long An	4	236
12. Khanh Hoa	2	118	REGION III TOTAL	25	1475
12A Cam Ranh	1	59	29. Go Cong	2	118
13. Ninh Thuan	1	59	31. Kien Tuong	2	118
14. Tuyen Duc	1	59	32. Kien Phong	1	59
15. Quang Duc	1	59	33. Dinh Tuong	2	118
16. Lam Dong	1	59	34. Kien Hoa	1	59
17. Binh Thuan	1	59	35. Vinh Binh	1	59
REGION II TOTAL	18	1062	36. Vinh Long	2	118
			37. An Giang	4	236
			38. Kien Giang	2	118
			39. Chuong Thien	1	59
			40. Phong Dinh	2	118
			41. Ba Xuyen	2	118
			42. An Xuyen	2	118
			43. Bac Lieu	2	118
			44. Chau Doc	2	118
			REGION IV TOTAL	28	1652

NOTES:

1. A 59-Member Group will consist of: a. One Group Chief (1); b. Two Deputy Group Chiefs (2); c. A Group Staff of 5 made up of 3 Medics, 1 psywar and 1 intelligence specialist (5); d. Three PAT teams of 11 members each (33); e. A Census Grievance Team (6); f. A Civil Affairs team (6); and g. A New Life Development Team (6).
2. Course of instruction is now scheduled for 10 weeks. Possibility exists that those receiving specialist training (Census Grievance, Civil Affairs and New Life Development) may be extended up to 4 weeks.
3. The Minister of Rural Construction is urging that at least 25% of the 1st class quota may be filled by existing New Life Hamlet, Rural Administrative or Rural Political Cadre, and that at least 35% be filled from new recruits.

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM
- - -
CENTRAL RURAL CONSTRUCTION COUNCIL

- -
SECRETARIAT GENERAL
-

Text No.... /XDNT/4/BD

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION
1/26/66

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILLING CADRE AUTHORIZATIONS

APO 3527, January, 1966

POSTAL MESSAGE

Central Rural Construction Council

To :

Rural Construction Council of . . Province

For Info: - CTZ Rural Construction Council
- DTA Rural Construction Council

Please be advised of the following:

1st: This Central has allowed your province to forward by mid-February 1966 to the National Training Center for Rural Construction Cadres at Vung Tau ... (number) ... cadres to be trained and formed into groups of RC cadres working for your province.

2nd: At least 1/4 of cadres to be sent for the training must be composed of your provincial Rural Political Cadres, Mobile Administrative Cadres and NLH Construction Cadres who are being provisionally transferred to the Rural Construction Category.

3rd: At least 1/3 of cadres to be sent for the training as mentioned in item 1 must be newly recruited.

4th: No female cadre is admissible to this first 1966 training course.

5th: The number of cadres to be sent from every province for the training must be sufficient to form one or several groups.

6th: Trainees will be brought to the Training Center by mid-February 1966.

7th: The year 1966 is the transitional period of the Rural Construction Category, and the minimum organization of Rural Construction Cadre groups is thereby defined in the enclosed attachment III. - The End -

Brigadier General: Commissioner
for Rural Construction
concurrently Secretary General of the
Central Rural Construction Council

PO/TS/kl

(A)

2/2/66

CADRE DEVELOPMENT & PLANS

Briefing statement made by Rural Construction Minister Thang at orientation conferences held in all regions between January 26 and February 1, 1966.

Cadre is a problem which has involved difficulties and given rise to some confusion at the Ministry as well as in the majority of provinces. To straighten out the situation the Central Government takes pleasure in explaining the following points:

1. Salaries and Allowances

The special statute on Rural Construction Cadres was at first not independent of the general Statute covering all types of cadres. But a number of provisions in the general statute are irrelevant to the present R.C. Cadre operation. Consequently the Brigadier General, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee (Prime Minister) has authorized that the Statute on R.C. Cadres be re-issued separately -- that it need not be based on the general statute.

The new statute provides for Rural Construction Cadre to receive benefits in case they are sick, wounded, missing or killed in action. Aside from this, they will receive their basic salaries, salary step increases for length of service, and position allowances.

Thus after being converted to the status of R.C. Cadres, New Life Hamlet cadres will receive a basic salary of VN\$2,500 and will be sent to Vung Tau to undergo training.

The Rural Political Cadres also will receive a basic salary of VN\$2,500 after being converted to R.C. Cadres. Only the cadres holding the function of instructors and those at the district and province levels will continue to receive their old salaries, that is

- VN\$4,400 for cadres holding the function of instructors and cadres at the district level.
- VN\$4,900 for cadres at the province level.

A number of these cadres will be used to form the Group Control Staff for the province and the Panel of Instructors for the Vung Tau National Training Center for Rural Construction Cadres. The balance will be sent to Vung Tau to undergo training.

The Mobile Administrative Cadres also will receive a basic salary of VN\$2,500 after being converted into the R.C. Cadre group. Only the cadres holding the function of Team Leader upwards will continue to receive their old salaries, that is

- VN\$3,300 for Team Leader
- VN\$3,850 for Inter-Team Deputy Leader
- VN\$4,950 for Inter-Team Leader
- VN\$5,500 for Group Deputy Leader
- VN\$6,600 for Group Leader

(A)

A number of these cadres will also be used in the provincial Group Control Staff and the Panel of Instructors at the National Training Center. The balance will be sent to Vung Tau for training.

Should any New Life Hamlet, Mobile Administrative or Rural Political cadres turn down bids for the above mentioned positions and training course, they are to be released effective the first day of the next month.

Until they are assigned to new positions in the Group Control Staff or the Panel of Instructors or are graduated from the training course, reconverted Rural Political and Mobile Administrative cadres will continue to receive salaries as stated above. They will receive new salaries only when and if they are given new duties. Should they fail to accept these salaries, they shall be considered as having given up the job and shall be released effective the first day of the next month.

Each province will forward two copies of its list of reconverted New Life Hamlet, Mobile Administrative and Rural Political cadres to the Rural Construction Ministry, and one copy to its representative of the American Embassy's Agency in the province. This should be done prior to February 15, 1966 so that the Agency can take care of all cadre salaries starting April 1, 1966.

The new statute incorporating the above provisions will be made public in a very near future. I would like to turn over to you a copy of the new statute bearing Arrete Number 137 which was signed by General Ky on January 26, 1966.

2. How to organize cadre groups

From late February 1966, the Ministry will train at the Vung Tau National Training Center 69 R.C. Cadre Groups which are to be allocated among provinces in accordance with (the table of authorizations).

The year 1966 is a transitional period of the Rural Construction Cadre. After accumulating experience from many places, the Ministry has decided for the time being to organize and train at the National Training Center interim some 69 groups involving 59 cadres per group. The break-down is as follows:

1 Group Chief	1
1 Group Deputy Chief for People's Action	1
1 Group Deputy Chief for Construction	1
1 Group Staff	5
3 People's Action Teams	33
1 Civil Affairs Team	6
1 Census Grievance Team	6
1 New Life Development Team	6
	<u>59</u>

To speed up the Pacification Program in the provinces, the Rural Political, Mobile Administrative, and New Life Hamlet cadres who have just been converted into the R.C. Cadre Group will, while they are waiting to be sent to Vung Tau for training, be organized into Construction Inter-Teams by the Province Chiefs. A Construction Inter-Team will be comprised of

- 1 Group Deputy Chief for Construction and
- 3 Teams of Civil Affairs, Census Grievance and New Life Development, respectively, a total of 19 cadre personnel.

These inter-teams will either

- a. be used to strengthen the existing People's Action Team (ex-P.A.T.),
- b. independently operate in the relatively secure areas, or
- c. be used to supplement friendly armed units (Regular, Regional and popular Forces) so as to operate in the localities where there is not an adequate number of People's Action inter-teams, or where such organization has not yet come into being.

Provinces should try to skillfully and flexibly organize the existing categories of cadres in keeping with the above spirit, so as to exploit the cadres' potentialities, and enhance the individual's worthy deeds and loyalty. A gradual conversion is recommended so as to minimize the interruption of pacification work now underway and to avoid sowing dissension in the cadre ranks.

The Province Chiefs should each set up a committee to choose from among the existing cadres the elements possessed of good past records to assume the leadership of the Group. The Rural Political cadres and the Mobile Administrative cadres who held the function of leaders and who have just been reconverted, will be thus assigned to one of the following:

- the Provincial R.C. Cadre Group Control Staff, upon the Province's recommendation.

- the Panel of Instructors of the Vung Tau National Training Center in accordance with the concerned cadre's desire, and upon the Ministry's and the Province's approval.

- they also may be assigned as Group Deputy Chief for Construction inter-teams upon the province's recommendation while they are waiting to be sent to Vung Tau for training.

The other Rural Political and Mobile Administrative cadres will be made members of the teams which are to be sent to the National Training Center or are to operate in some locality while they are waiting to be sent to the Center.

The Group Leaders to be sent to the National Training Center will be selected for the time being by provinces from among existing and newly recruited cadres. Their official positions will be effective only after their graduation from the National Training Center for Rural Construction Cadres.

The Ministry is planning to administer 4 training courses in 1966. The first one will enroll 69 groups. Therefore all present New Life Hamlet, Mobile Administrative, and Rural Political cadres who have been converted by provinces, should be divided into 4 shifts, each of which will participate in a training course in turn, so that by the end of 1966 all reconverted R.C. cadres will have received training.

Furthermore I request that

- a. the cadres you are going to send to the National Training Center be individuals of ample ability and good health, and be at least 17 years of age, so as not to be eliminated by the Center right at the beginning.
 - b. a number of cadres should be held in reserve so as to be available to replace those who may be eliminated.
 - c. only male cadres should be recruited for this course.
 - d. at least 1/3 should be newly recruited, and 1/4 be composed of New Life Hamlet, Mobile Administrative or Rural Political cadres who have just been temporarily reconverted.
 - e. recruitment should be concentrated in districts located in the national priority areas or priority areas of the zone or province.
 - f. from Feb. 15, 1966 on cadre should be ready to be sent to the National Training Center.
3. Truong Son Cadres (Montagnards)

With regard to Truong Son cadre groups, you are requested to keep intact their organization so that some time later the Central Government may work out appropriate changes. Provinces which have Truong Son cadres are authorized to recruit Rural Construction Cadre groups to send to the National Training Center.

4. Provincial Rural Construction Cadre Control Staff

From Feb. 1, 1966 each province will organize or re-organize a provincial Rural Construction Cadre Control Staff whose minimum personnel is 15. This number of personnel will be selected by the province from among the existing cadres or from newly recruited ones.

5. Instructors

The Panel of Instructors of the National Training Center will be strengthened by about 150 instructors so that the school can assume responsibility for training in three additional areas: People's Action, Civil Affairs and New Life Development. I request you to give positive support by recommending to the Rural Construction Ministry a number of experienced and or potentially able instructor cadres. Lt. Col. Tran Ngoc Chau is dealing with this problem.

I request that following this talk the chiefs of province come together with the Representatives of the American Embassy, USOM, MACV for their respective provinces to promote a mutual understanding. Afterwards a joint Vietnamese-American meeting will be held to iron out any differences in views. As a result, we hope that, from to-day on, cadre will no longer be a confusing problem.

VIETNAM, VOLUME I
MILITARY - NATION BUILDING

<u>DOCUMENT</u>	<u>TAB</u>
Synopsis of the Ngu Hoanh Son Campaign, 1965 (C)	A
Development of Agriculture in Region I (Jan 66)	B
Description of Rural Reconstruction, 1966	C
III MAF Memorandum, subj: Adequacy of Regional and Popular Forces Authorization (S)	D
JUSPAO Memorandum No. 18, subj: Questions and Answers Related to the Vietnam Situation, 14 Mar 1966	E
Mao Tse-Tung's Statement on the Three Stages of a Protracted War (S - Nofofn)	F
Speculated Strategy of North Vietnam, 1966 (S - Nofofn)	G
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Significant Contact w/NVA in Northern MR 1 May - Sep 1970	I
COSVN Directive 27 (S)	J

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

052200H Nov 70

From: Chief of Staff

To: CG

I concur that it is most obvious that the enemy has a well planned and coordinated effort between their political and military programs/objectives.

Although I am sure many people could come up with many reasons why we shouldn't make this kind of info public, but in my opinion, this is the kind of information that should be feed to the press the world over and if necessary let the press photograph the actual documents so that some of the people could see that this concerted effort is not a myth in the minds of those military alarmist, as ~~these~~^{we} are called by some of our citizens.

Very respectfully,


T. H. MILLER (J)

2ADM/reg
3800
6 November 1970

MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
To: Commanding General

There is no question about the fact that Madame BINH's 8-point plan was intended to be a coordinated diplomatic, political, and military effort. Thanks to our direct support intelligence unit, we and the U. S. negotiators in Paris knew before the plan was tabled that its real purposes were to:

Gain international support for the Communists' position.

Incite antiwar sentiment in the U. S. prior to the November elections.

Incite antiwar and anti-GVN sentiment in South Vietnam.

At the same time, the Communists were concerned about the adverse effects of a communist-sponsored peace proposal on the fighting spirit of their troops. They advised their cadre to report the effect of public opinion on the NVA/VC troops in order that countermeasures could be taken, if necessary.

I believe that captured documents more than "suggest" such a coordinated offensive exists. There is no reason why such documents cannot be exploited, and they should be.

Hanoi is in sad shape. Her own leaders acknowledge the loss of hundreds of thousands of men. Cross border operations deprived NVA/VC forces in South Vietnam of large stocks of food, military supplies, and close in sanctuaries. Overthrow of the Sihanouk government severed her relatively easy, sea and overland supply route to forces in South Vietnam.

She is facing an enlarged war in Laos and Cambodia. General PAO's irregulars are currently holding their own in the western Plaine des Jarres. Lon NOL's forces in Cambodia have the potential of tying down substantial NVA forces (estimated physically fit males age 15-49, 815,000; average number reaching military age (18) annually, 77,000).

The November elections in the U. S. cannot be interpreted as resulting in more support for the NVA/VC cause.

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3800
6 November 1970

I believe Communist leaders in Hanoi realize they must accept a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam, even if only for the purpose of pursuing protracted warfare. I believe they recognize that, if they do not secure an internationally sanctioned political foothold in South Vietnam, they are in danger of losing everything.

Naturally, the Communists want the best possible terms under any negotiated settlement. For this reason, they will continue infiltration to launch offensives in Cambodia and to continue to test the stamina of ARVN units in South Vietnam.

However, I also believe the communist star has not been so low in Quang Nam since 1965. The enemy is almost bereft of regular NVA units, his Main Force units are understrength and disorganized, and significant penetration of the VCI is occurring. We should pour it to him on all fronts - as he is so fond of saying, by "political, military and proselyting activity".


Very respectfully,

F. J. Hunt
F. J. HUNT

MD
11-7-70

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COSVN DIRECTIVE 27

(SNF) SIR, THE "DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE" INITIATED BY
MADAME BINH ON 17 SEPTEMBER 1970 IN PARIS IS BEING IMPLE-
MENTED BY THE VC/NVA IN THE FIELD. THE CONTENTS OF RECENT
MESSAGES AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS SUGGEST THAT THE 8-POINT
PEACE PLAN IS PART OF A COORDINATED DIPLOMATIC-POLITICAL-
MILITARY EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE ENEMY. COSVN DIRECTIVE
27, DATED 28 AUGUST 1970, REVEALS THAT THE LAO DONG PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEE INSTRUCTED THE PRG DELEGATION IN PARIS
TO LAUNCH A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE. THE PURPOSE OF THE OF-
FENSIVE IS TO "EXPOSE U.S. LIES AND TO ISOLATE THE U.S.
AND THE THIEU-KY-KHIEM GOVERNMENT TO A GREATER EXTENT."
THE OFFENSIVE WILL "FORCE THE US/GVN TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS
NEGOTIATIONS."

(SNF) THE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE CENTERS ON THE NEW 8-POINT
PLAN PRESENTED BY MADAME BINH IN PARIS ON 17 SEPTEMBER 1970.
THIS PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO "TILT THE BALANCE OF POWER:
MILITARY, POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC." CADRE ARE REMINDED THAT

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VICTORY IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE DETERMINED ON THE BATTLE-

FIELD, NOT AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE, BUT THEY ARE CAUTIONED

NOT TO "UNDERESTIMATE THE POWER OF DIPLOMATIC ATTACK."

(SNF) THE PURPOSES OF THE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE ARE DIVIDED

INTO FOUR CATEGORIES:

1. EXPOSE THE FALSE U.S. POSITION ON PEACE ISSUES.
2. MOTIVATE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE MASSES TO DEMAND AN END
TO WAR, THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES, THE OVERTHROW
OF THE THIEU-KY GOVERNMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
PROVISONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT.
3. WEAKEN THE U.S. AND GVN POSITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO
PAVE THE WAY FOR THE FORMATION OF A THIRD FORCE IN
SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICS.
4. HEIGHTEN THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT IN THE U.S. FORCING THE
GOVERNMENT TO SETTLE THE WAR ON VC/DRV TERMS.

THESE GOALS APPEAR IN SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT TERMS IN SEVERAL LOWER

LEVEL COMMUNIST DOCUMENTS AND IN RECENT MESSAGES TO VC/NVA FORCES

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IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS.

(SNF) SIR, TO FULFILL THE TASKS OF THE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE, DIRECTIVE 27 OUTLINES POLITICAL, MILITARY, TROOP PROSELYTING ACTIVITIES, OR THE FAMILIAR 3-PRONGED STRATEGY.

(SNF) THE POLITICAL TASKS INVOLVE THE ENTIRE INFRASTRUCTURE IN A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO GIVE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE DISSEMINATION OF MADAME BINH'S 8-POINT PLAN. EACH RELIGIOUS, BOURGEOIS AND INTELLECTUAL LEADER IS TO BE GIVEN A COPY OF THE PROPOSAL; EVERYONE IS ENCOURAGED TO LISTEN TO LIBERATION RADIO FOR NEWS OF THE PEACE PROPOSAL; AND DEMONSTRATIONS ARE TO BE ORGANIZED CALLING FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THIEU-KY-KHIEM.

(SNF) THESE POLITICAL TASKS ARE TO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY MILITARY EFFORTS TO INCLUDE: COORDINATED ATTACKS ON U.S./GVN FORCES TO INFLICT HEAVY CASUALTIES; THUS STRENGTHENING THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT IN THE U.S. AND BUILDING ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT AMONG U.S. TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THIS EFFORT IS EXPECTED TO FORCE THE U.S. TO PROMISE WITHDRAWAL BY 30 JUNE 71, OR IF SOME U.S. TROOPS REMAIN, THEY ARE RESTRICTED TO DEFINED

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BY AUTHORITY OF <i>16 FOR US MACV</i>	
Date <i>15 OCT 67</i>	

AREAS. ONE DOCUMENT CALLS FOR REGROUPING AREAS FOR BOTH SIDES, WHILE ANOTHER SUGGESTS THAT ONLY ALLIED FORCES WILL BE RESTRICTED TO DEFINED AREAS, POSSIBLY CAN RANH, DA NANG, SAIGON, AND CAN THO.

(SNF) IN ADDITION TO ATTACKS ON U.S./GVN FORCES, THE VC/NVA ARE TO ACCELERATE HOSTILITIES IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA.

(SNF) THE TROOP PROSELYTING TASKS INCLUDE URGING DESERTION AMONG ARVN TROOPS UNDER ATTACK; AND ENCOURAGING FAMILIES TO CALL THEIR MALE MEMBERS HOME, TO JOIN THE PEOPLE IN THEIR DEMAND FOR PEACE, AND THE OVERTHROW OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTH.

(SNF) THE 3-PRONGED OFFENSIVE IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE COMPLETED IN A DEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME, BUT "IN STEPS COORDINATED WITH CHANGES IN THE BALANCE OF FORCES BETWEEN THE ENEMY AND OURSELVES, WHICH WILL TURN THE SITUATION IN OUR FAVOR."

(SNF) THE EXTRAORDINARY AMOUNT OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON THE PRG PROPOSAL NOW BEING PASSED TO COMMUNIST TROOPS IN THE FIELD SUGGESTS THAT OTHER STEPS WILL BE TAKEN IN SUPPORT OF

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DATE 24 OCT 1970

THE "DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE". DIRECTIVE 27 AND THE IMPLEMENT-
ING DOCUMENTS SUGGEST THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE NOT RIGIDLY AT-
TACHED TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE 8-POINT PROPOSAL. THERE IS A
SUGGESTION, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT U.S. WITHDRAWAL CAN BE IMPE-
MENTED IN VARIOUS WAYS. PRESIDENT NIXON'S 5-POINT PLAN OF
7-OCTOBER MAY INVITE ADDITIONAL COUNTER-PROPOSALS BY THE
COMMUNISTS IN PARIS.

(SNF) COSVN DIRECTIVE 27 PRESENTS A SHORT-TERM PROGRAM
DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE U.S. AND IN SOUTH
VIETNAM. IT DOES NOT SUGGEST ANY DEPARTURE FROM THE STRATEGY
SET DOWN IN COSVN RESOLUTIONS 9 AND 14 ADOPTED IN 1969. THE
DIRECTIVE CLEARLY STATES THAT IT IN NO WAY CONTRADICTS ALLEGED
COSVN DIRECTIVE 20 WHICH CALLS FOR A HIGHPOINT OR SERIES OF
HIGHPOINTS THIS FALL. DIRECTIVE 27 IS NOT A MAJOR POLICY
STATEMENT, AND IT IS PROBABLY DESIGNED FOR INTERNAL PARTY USE
IN EXPLAINING THE PEACE PROPOSAL, WHILE MAINTAINING A FIGHTING
MOORALE AMONG VC/NVA TROOPS. EVEN IF HANOI HAS DECIDED TO
NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY, IT DOES NOT WANT THEIR TROOPS IN THE FIELD

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TO RELAX THEIR AGGRESSIVE POSTURE.

(SNF) THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF THE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE IS
PUBLIC OPINION IN THE U.S. AND IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND IT MAY
WELL BE MODIFIED FOLLOWING THE U.S. ELECTIONS ON NOVEMBER 3.

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(J)

NORTHERN MR-1 BRIEF ITEM

IN RESPONSE TO THE GENERAL'S QUESTION CONCERNING SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES IN NORTHERN MR1 DURING THE PERIOD OF MAY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1970, THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN COMPLIED.

① ON 5 AND 10 MAY THE 3D ARVN REGIMENT MADE CONTACT WITH ELEMENTS OF THE 126TH NAVAL SAPPER REGIMENT, RESULTING IN 48 ENEMY KIA. BOTH CONTACTS TOOK PLACE IN THE OCEAN VIEW AREA (YD 288 751). ADDITIONALLY ON 5 MAY THE 3D ARVN REGIMENT FOUND SEVERAL WATER MINES AND MECHANICAL TIMERS ALONG WITH 900 POUNDS OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES. THE DISRUPTION OF WATER TRAFFIC ON THE CUA VIET RIVER IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 126TH NAVAL SAPPER REGIMENT AND IT IS SUSPECTED THE FORCE CONTACTED ON 5 MAY, HAD THE MISSION OF MINING A PORTION OF THE CUA VIET RIVER.

② IN EARLY JUNE, THE 66TH NVA REGIMENT SUFFERED 125 KIA AS A RESULT OF CONTACT WITH USS. AND ARVN FORCES IN THE TUN TAVERN AREA OF WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. AS A RESULT OF CASUALTIES THE 66TH REGIMENT WAS TO BE REPLACED BY THE 9TH REGIMENT OF THE 304TH DIVISION. HOWEVER, THE 66TH REGIMENT REMAINS IN SOUTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE AND ITS PRIMARY MISSION IS LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. SINCE JUNE PWs REPORT THAT THE 66TH REGIMENT HAS SUFFERED CONTINUING CASUALTIES FROM ALLIED AIR STRIKES, HOWEVER, EXACT FIGURES HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN.

③ ON 8 JULY, THE LEAD BATTALION OF THE 9TH NVA REGIMENT, INFILTRATING QUANG TRI PROVINCE, MADE CONTACT WITH ARVN AND U. S. FORCES IN THE VICINITY OF LANG VEI (XD 8036). THE 8 JULY CONTACT ACCOUNTED FOR 400 NVA KIA OUT OF A TOTAL BATTALION STRENGTH BELIEVED TO BE APPROXIMATELY 500 MEN. ALLIED FORCES SUFFERED 40 KILLED IN THIS ACTION.

(4) ON 1 JULY ELEMENTS OF THE K-8 BATTALION, 7TH FRONT AND ELEMENTS OF THE 4TH AND 6TH BATTALIONS, OF THE 812TH REGIMENT CONDUCTED ATTACKS ON HAMLETS AND ALLIED POSITIONS IN THE LOWLANDS OF HAI LANG DISTRICT. THE ENEMY THRUST WAS MET BY THE 121ST AND 122D RF COMPANIES, WHO ACCOUNTED FOR 102 ENEMY KIAs, 4 PWs AND 8 CREW SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE 16 KIA AND 34 WOUNDED.

ACCORDING TO PWs CAPTURED IN THIS ACTION THE NVA GOAL WAS TO LIBERATE THE HAI LANG AREA AND REBUILD THE VCI NETWORK IN AN EFFORT TO GAIN CONTROL OF LOWLANDS IN THE NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES.

THE FOUR SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS DURING THE PERIOD ACCOUNTED FOR 675 NVA KIA, 4 PWs, MISCELLANEOUS WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT CAPTURED. REPORTEDLY, THE ALLIES SUFFERED APPROXIMATELY 102 CASUALTIES. THESE CONTACTS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF BOTH THE 9TH AND 66TH REGIMENTS AND REDUCED THE COMBAT EFFICIENCY OF THE 812TH NVA REGIMENT.

(5) Late June. Elms of 270th NVA Regt.
About 50 contacted west of Gio Linh.
ARVN killed 41 + captured 2. Captured
18 SA + 9 crew served plus destroy all
other but one. One of dead for inventory of
weapons on him + ARVN could account for
all but one.

A SUMMARY HISTORY OF MACV

Formal United States military assistance to what had been French Indo-China was initiated on 23 December 1950 by the signing of the Pentalateral Agreement. This was a multinational Mutual Defense Assistance Treaty for Indo-China, with France and the associated states of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The US committed itself to furnish military material and equipment to combat the spread of Communism in SEASIA by means of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). The Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indo-China, was established to administer the transfer of equipment to the French and through them to the indigenous forces of the area. From 1950 until February 1955, MAAG Indo-China was primarily a small logistic group.

On 13 March 1954 the Viet Minh attack on Dien Bien Phu began, and on 7 May the French surrendered. The Geneva negotiations which were in progress at the time resulted in a cease fire on 21 July. As a result, Vietnam was then divided at the 17th parallel. Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was established in the North while Ngo Dinh Diem, who had been appointed Prime Minister on 7 July, retained administrative control of the South Vietnamese Government.

After Geneva, the French immediately began to withdraw their combat forces and, at the same time, MAAG Indo-China was split into MAAG Vietnam (MAAGV) and MAAG Cambodia. MAAGV's mission was to assist the Vietnamese Government in raising the military capabilities of its armed forces through planning for, developing, and administering the Military Assistance Program (MAP). The Geneva accords limited the size of MAAGV to 342 officers and men. In February 1955 the JCS gave MAAGV the additional mission of training the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) under the overall direction of the French high command in South Vietnam. On 12 February 1955, LTG John W. O'Daniel became Chief of MAAGV and assumed responsibility for the training mission.

Because MAAGV was closely associated with the French in training, but not in MDAP logistical support, and because of an acute shortage of personnel to accomplish the training assignment, a separate Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM) to the RVNAF was established under the direction of the Chief, MAAGV. TRIM was a tri-country organization, consisting of personnel from France, Vietnam, and the US. TRIM's mission was to assist

the GVN in the organization and development of sound, effective armed forces. This program encompassed improvement of the RVNAF command and staff organization and procedures; all planning, operational, and logistic activities of the RVNAF; and the training of all units and individuals. TRIM consisted of two echelons; a staff that advised the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and the Arms and Services Directorates; and a group of advisors that assisted and advised subordinate headquarters, units, schools, training centers, agencies, and installations of the RVNAF. TRIM's goal was the full development, as soon as possible, of combat infantry divisions capable of providing protection to the people, by both maintaining internal security and by providing a blocking or counteracting force against external attack. To accomplish this, TRIM adopted a twofold training objective: by 1 January 1956 to organize and train an army consisting of light triangular divisions with supporting arms and services; and to expand that army into a well-disciplined, highly trained ground force of all arms and services. Aiding TRIM in accomplishing its training missions were US mobile training teams, consisting of MAAGV personnel and technical service teams assigned to Vietnam on a TDY basis.

On 26 October 1955, President Diem proclaimed Vietnam a republic under his presidency. French army advisors withdrew from TRIM on 28 April 1956, at which time TRIM was terminated, leaving MAAGV solely responsible for training the Vietnamese Army. The French did, however, retain training missions for the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force until May of 1957, at which time they completed their withdrawal from Vietnam.

In 1959, Viet Minh "Regroupees," those who had fled north after the Geneva Accords, began to reinfiltate into South Vietnam to join the "stay behind" cadre and form the "steel frame" of the insurgent organization which had become known as the Viet Cong (VC), controlled from Hanoi. Increased insurgent activity caused the US to pledge increased military aid to RVN, a pledge made by President Eisenhower on 5 May 1960. In December 1960 the political arm of the VC, the National Liberation Front (NLF), announced its existence and a full scale insurgency was launched.

In June 1961, the US agreed to increase MAAGV beyond the 658-man level which had been approved by the International Control Commission toward the end of 1960. In August and September there was a marked increase in guerrilla incidents and the GVN announced its decision to increase RVNAF to 200,000 men. In October GVN formally charged North Vietnam with external support of the hostilities, demanding an ICC investigation. The following

month President Kennedy announced his decision to bolster the RVNAF, but specified that his decision did not include the commitment of US combat forces. Consequently, on 11 December 1961, two Army helicopter companies arrived in RVN to support ARVN operations. By the end of 1961, US strength in RVN was slightly more than 4,000 men, consisting of advisors (who had been first introduced to field duty in June), staff officers of the MAAGV headquarters, and support units.

In February 1962 President Diem launched his Strategic Hamlet Program. At the same time the first Special Forces "A" Detachment was deployed to Darlac Province, to assist in security and pacification. On 8 February the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was officially established as a specified joint command under CINCPAC, with General Paul D. Harkins as commander. The appointment of a commander in the grade of general clearly marked the beginning of an expanded US military role in RVN.

In February 1962 COMUSMACV established a Special Warfare Branch in the J3 Section of his Joint Staff. In May, USMACV and the Combined Studies Division (CSD) of the US Mission agreed that activities of the US Army Special Forces should be fully coordinated, especially those involving Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). As a result, in July, DOD directed the US Army to assume responsibility for the CSD supported CIDG. This placed under COMUSMACV that portion of the counterinsurgency effort previously directed by the US Mission. These actions underscored the collection of military operations under COMUSMACV and economic operations under USAID. To reduce duplication in the countrywide efforts of military and civilian agencies, the US Mission Council was organized. This war coordinating body under the ambassador, which included representation by all US agencies in Vietnam, provided a forum through which the US Ambassador was able to issue policy.

During 1962 the limited successes achieved by the RVNAF, with US advisory assistance, against the VC, created an air of cautious optimism. This, however, was dashed when political upheavals, centered around militant Buddhist elements, culminated in the 2 November 1963 overthrow of the Diem regime.

The period November 1963 to March 1965 was one of many changes--changes in organization commanders, US commitment, US ambassadors, enemy capability, and the Vietnamese government. A reevaluation of the enemy threat during this period led to a shift in emphasis from advice to combat

support and greater US unilateral involvement. In June 1964, MAAGV and MACV HQ were consolidated, and shortly thereafter General William C. Westmoreland replaced General Harkins as COMUSMACV. On 23 June President Johnson named General Maxwell D. Taylor to succeed Henry Cabot Lodge as US Ambassador to Vietnam. On 20 July US Army, Vietnam (USARV) was established with General Westmoreland as commander.

On 2 and 4 August 1964, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin were attacked by North Vietnamese PT-boats. In retaliation for the unprovoked attacks, the US launched its first air strikes against North Vietnam.

Throughout 1964 and into 1965, the VC made significant gains, both political and military, and signs that this trend would continue were clear. Added to this was the infiltration of NVA major units into SVN which began early in 1965. The RVNAF were suffering heavy losses and the VC successes were so extensive that they had effectively stopped GVN pacification efforts almost everywhere. Although the RVNAF were not without some successes, they failed to make lasting inroads into any VC-controlled areas. The VC political organization continued to receive its policy and strategic direction from Hanoi. The VC's main efforts in early 1965 were aimed at isolating the Highlands (II CTZ) in order to establish a strong military and political base there, improving infiltration routes from North Vietnam and Laos, and continuing its buildup of men and supplies for a summer offensive. Concurrently, the VC concentrated on cutting GVN lines of communication.

The US responded to the increasing enemy challenge in Vietnam with a series of major decisions, significantly deepening the US military involvement. On 7 February 1965 the VC attacked the US compound at Pleiku, and on 10 February they blew up the enlisted quarters at Qui Nhon. Then the US buildup started in earnest with the dispatch of troops necessary for the security of US installations, which the RVNAF and the National Police were no longer able to provide effectively. The first US tactical units to close RVN were USMC air defense units which arrived in Da Nang in February 1965, followed on 8 March by USMC infantry units to provide security for the Da Nang Airbase. Then the USA 173d Abn Bde arrived in the Saigon/Bien Hoa area on 5 May. By the end of the year there were one Marine division, two Army divisions, two separate USA airborne brigades, and numerous USMC and USA aviation and support units deployed in-country. Deployment of elements of the 25th Inf Div began toward the end of the year.

Concurrent with the troop buildup the US advisory effort was also expanded. The joint advisory effort expansion included an increase of advisory teams at

subsector level, the establishment of a Political Warfare (POLWAR) Directorate on the USMACV staff, and an expansion of the intelligence field. More naval advisors were assigned to the Vietnamese River Assault Group (RAG) and to the Coastal Surveillance Force. Additional USAF advisors were assigned to newly-activated Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) squadrons. There were no significant changes in the USMC advisory role during 1965.

In 1965 the first tactical commitment of Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) was effected with the arrival in RVN of the 1st Bn, Royal Australian Regiment on 8 June. It was followed on 21 July by a battery of New Zealand artillery. The ROK Capital Infantry Division, and a ROK Marine brigade followed and were completely deployed by 8 November.

No combined command structure was established in Vietnam; therefore, mutual support and cooperation, rather than direct command lines, became the order of the day among US forces, FWMAF, and RVNAF. With minor exceptions COMUSMACV only exercised operational control of US forces in-country while CINCPAC exercised operational control of out-of-country forces.

The buildup continued throughout 1966 as MACV pursued the dual counter-insurgency mission of attempting to provide security through the conduct of conventional and counter guerrilla operations on the one hand, while at the same time assisting in building a viable, independent, democratic nation on the other. On 1 April 1966, the broad command structure of MACV was completed with establishment of 7th Air Force (7AF) and Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV) as air and naval component commands. Commander 7AF also served as Deputy COMUSMACV for Air; COMUSMACV continued his additional duties as CG, USARV. By the end of 1966 Army units in-country included four infantry divisions, one cavalry division (Air Mobile), two airborne brigades, two light infantry brigades, one armored cavalry regiment, one aviation brigade, and various combat support and service units. USMC units under CG, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) included two Marine Divisions, one Marine Air Wing (MAW) and one Force Logistic Command. US Navy and Coast Guard strength was about 23,000 USN and 450 USCG personnel, stationed throughout the country participating in coastal, inland waterway and support operations. 7AF consisted of one air group, four tactical fighter wings and supporting units. US strength totaled about 388,000 personnel. FWMAF strength had risen to two ROK infantry divisions, one Australian Task Force (ATF), one New Zealand artillery battery, and the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG). FWMAF totaled about 52,000 personnel.

Two significant organizational changes occurred in 1967. First, the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), a joint USA/USN organization, established the first continuous US presence in the Mekong Delta region. Second, field pacification programs were consolidated. Since 1966 three principal agencies, coordinated only at mission level, had been conducting separate pacification programs. These were the Office of Civil Operations of the American Embassy, USAID operating under the Embassy, and the Revolutionary Development Directorate of MACV. On 11 May the Office of Civil Operations and the Revolutionary Development Directorate were combined into the Directorate for Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) under COMUSMACV. All field operations supporting pacification were placed under the operational control of CORDS. Concurrently, Ambassador Robert W. Komer was assigned as Deputy COMUSMACV for CORDS to supervise the program.

Force increases in 1967 included an additional USA light infantry brigade and the balance of the 101st Abn Div, as well as many support and combat support units. Additionally, on 25 September the AMERICAL Division was activated from US units already in-country. FWMAF were augmented with the arrival of Thailand's "Queen's Cobra" regiment on 21 September.

By the end of 1967, US strength in RVN was 500,000 and FWMAF strength was about 60,000.

The war at the beginning of 1968 was essentially a continuation of the major battles on the periphery (Song Be, Loc Ninh, Dak To) of late 1967. In late January the enemy moved in strength on the Marine Combat Base at Khe Sanh and then, on 30 January, launched his countrywide Tet Offensive. Despite an announced truce he launched assaults against 27 of the Republic's 44 province capitals, 5 of its 6 autonomous cities, 58 of 245 district towns and 50 hamlets. In only two cities, Hue and Saigon, did fighting last more than a few hours or days as the enemy was pushed back. The Tet Offensive was extremely costly to the enemy. By the end of February he had lost 55,000 killed (2/3 of the total 1967 figure) and 13,000 weapons. At Khe Sanh, during an 11 week seige, Marine and ARVN defenders resisted and threw back all NVA attacks. The key to success at Khe Sanh was airpower--both logistical and tactical support. For 77 days Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft provided close-in support, averaging a sortie almost every four minutes.

On 17 February US forces in Vietnam were bolstered by the arrival of USMC Regimental Landing Team 27 and then, on the 21st, by the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. On 9 February MACV Forward, under the initial command of DEPCOMUSMACV General Creighton W. Abrams, was established at Hue-Phu Bai, to control operations in northern I Corps. On 10 March MACV FWD was redesignated Provisional Corps Vietnam, and then later the XXIV Corps.

Operation PEGASUS/LAMSON 207, utilizing the 1st Cav Div and three ARVN battalions, was launched on 1 April to relieve Khe Sanh by land. This operation was shortly thereafter followed by Operation DELAWARE, a helo assault into the A Shau Valley of Thua Thien Province. In the other three corps, Allied actions were of a smaller scale but unrelenting pressure was put on the enemy.

On 1 April, in response to the directions of the President, all offensive operations against North Vietnam above the 20th Parallel were halted. A month later, on 5 May, the enemy launched his "second wave" attacks on the cities of South Vietnam. Only in Saigon was there heavy fighting, and there enemy units were decimated. On 13 May the first official conversations between the US and North Vietnam opened in Paris. During this period the enemy started to resort to terror attacks on the cities of the Republic, principally by the use of rockets. Given the continued threat to Saigon, in June MACV established the Capital Military Assistance Command and post of Senior Advisor to the Military Governor of the Capital Military District, in order to coordinate and effect joint defense of the Saigon region and Allied offensive operations there.

General William C. Westmoreland, COMUSMACV for over four years, departed Vietnam on 11 June to become Chief of Staff of the US Army. He was succeeded by General Abrams. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, until then the senior US military representative in Paris, succeeded as DEPCOMUSMACV.

General mobilization came to South Vietnam on 19 June and with this MACV accelerated programs to expand and modernize the Vietnamese Armed Forces as well as to shift a greater part of the burden of the war to them. On the US side on 5 July, our base at Khe Sanh was vacated, as all US forces started to shift to a more mobile, smaller unit type of warfare in seeking out and destroying the enemy.

The first element of the 12,000-man Thai Black Panther Division arrived at Saigon on 22 July, to replace the Thai Queen's Cobras, already in Vietnam a year. On 1 August the 1st Brigade, 5th Inf Div (Mech) arrived in Vietnam and was deployed to I Corps. On 10 September USMC RLT 27 left Vietnam after eight months of service. Twenty days later the world's only active battleship, USS New Jersey, entered combat off the DMZ. Reflecting the Allied predominance in I Corps, on 27 October the 1st Cav Div commenced shifting its location from I CTZ to Tay Ninh Province, III CTZ.

On 1 November all offensive operations against North Vietnam were halted at the order of the President. At that time US strength in RVN had reached

about 545,000 and Free World forces numbered some 62,000 personnel. Vietnamese forces numbered over 800,000 and further expansions along with modernization were being effected. MACV emphasis of effort was continuing to shift to the improvement of the Vietnamese forces while still seeking out the enemy and, in particular, destroying his remaining Local Forces and infrastructure within the republic.

Prepared by the Military History Branch, Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff,
Headquarters MACV. 21 November 1968

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TO THE RECIPIENT: Attached is a copy of an analysis of the situation made from the viewpoint of the enemy. While it may not reflect the actual views of the enemy leadership, it does set forth the situation from a new viewpoint, one which may well be useful to US commanders. It is suggested that the recipient will find it interesting as perhaps provocative. J-2 MACV would appreciate receiving from each recipient his views with respect to the substance of the paper.

The paper was prepared for the Chief of Staff of the US Army by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army. The underlined portions of the paper was done on the original b/ COMUSMACV.

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SECTION I: SPECULATED STRATEGY OF NORTH VIETNAM

1. The Goal and Strategy of North Vietnam:

a. Goal: The war in SVN has progressed over the years from phase to phase and stage to stage marked by periods of intense activity, lulls, and fluctuations of tactics in accordance with Communist doctrine, extracts of which are contained in Incl 1. Each time a new or increasing activity appears, new U.S. evaluations are made. A review of these evaluations covering years of activity clearly shows that: (1) the Communists have never changed their goal, and (2) there has been a tendency by non-Communists to underestimate the capabilities of the Communists to achieve their goal. The goal of the North Vietnamese government is the subjugation of the government, territory, and people of South Vietnam under the command, flag, and philosophy of North Vietnam. It requires complete domination of the people and the imposition of the North Vietnamese system on the people. A further review indicates that when the Communists state their objectives for achieving their goal they proceed toward these objectives in spite of delays or temporary setbacks. phase and stage to stage marked by periods of intense activity,

b. Strategy: The Communist forces have a basic strategy for victory which appears continually in their documents. The North Vietnamese strategy is to undermine the government of South Vietnam, while, at the same time, building a new government structure which supposedly is to emerge from the people. This new government structure, however, will be simply an extension of the North Vietnamese Communist government. To aid in achieving the political goal, a military force is to be built

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(Under the concepts of Gen Vo Nguyen Giap) that will engage the enemy, destroy his forces and erode the will of the people to resist.

c. The Communists have emphasized in their documents and in guidance to their people that the war will be won in the highlands of SVN. However, the Delta area of South Vietnam is not to be neglected. It has value as a support area to the envisioned Communist killing zone, the highlands.

2. Plans to attain the NVN Goal and Objectives: Basically, the Communists have a strategic plan for both the highlands--or more accurately, Military Region 5--and the Delta. The plans differ in detail but cannot be separated since neither could succeed without the other.

a. Simply stated, the strategic plan for MR 5 is to reach an "equilibrium of forces" and to launch a "strategic counter-offensive" in one or more areas. The strategy for the Delta involves several missions:

- (1) Continue guerrilla warfare and move further toward the "mobile warfare" concept.
- (2) Strengthen old and develop new revolutionary organizations in support of the general counter-offensive in the highlands.
- (3) Prepare for and work toward the general uprising.
- (4) Provide a buffer between Saigon and the theater of operations in MR 5.

b. Strategic plans call for a change from hit-and-run attacks by small mobile forces to a rapid build-up in the size of Communist forces and the "concentration of troops" and firepower, under improved command and control procedures, to attack, capture and hold important

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objectives, primarily in MR 5; and, to conduct similar operations in an arc above Saigon. The Delta area south of Saigon will continue to be an area predominated by small scale attacks and harassment.

3. Movement Toward Stated Goals: The VC were attempting to reach a balance of military power in 1965; however, the introduction of U.S. and allied combat units forced a delay, which is considered only temporary by the Communists. Apparently, Communist leaders have decided to place primary emphasis on the military aspects of the struggle and on a quick attainment of significant military gains; this does not mean they have sidetracked political activity or logistical considerations.

a. The following activities have predominated in the Delta and in MR 5 for several years:

(1) Delta:

(a) Build-up of the economic base and increase of the farmers' support of the VC. This includes the collection of money and expanding VC taxes.

(b) An economic blockade of goods in controlled areas.

(c) Recruitment of labor forces and guerrillas.

(d) An up-grading of guerrillas to local and main force category in both quantity and quality.

(e) Attempts to expand the guerrilla and main force operational areas.

(f) Creation of new and maintenance of old courier routes.

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(g) Use of the Delta base for supply and force increases in the zone between the Delta and MR 5.

(2) MR 5:

(a) A large build-up of forces and the strengthening of coordination between forces.

(b) An expansion of liberated areas.

(c) An economic blockade of government-controlled areas.

(d) Disruption of enemy forces which includes annihilation of Regional Force Units and attacks on ARVN and U.S. units.

(e) Tying down of enemy units in base areas or enclaves.

(f) Establishing MR 5 as the killing zone and the site of the "war of annihilation."

b. Command and Control:

(1) MR 5: While the growth in the number of regiments, particularly NVA, is impressive, the most significant feature is the appearance of improved command and control procedures in MR 5.

(a) At present the control of military units in MR 5 appears to be the responsibility of Hq MR 5. From analysis of past and current activity, Hq MR 5 has delegated responsibility to several subordinate Hq. These subordinate Hqs have been referred to as tactical fronts. The use of tactical Fronts is not unusual for NVA forces since they have appeared in the field periodically as far back as the Indo-China war; however, the latest developments give the appearance of becoming permanent features, i.e. Division Hqs. For example, MR 5 now contains at

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least 4 tactical Hq: Northern, Southern, MR 5 Forward, and Kontum. Each of these Hq controls from two to four regiments each, with the probability of additional regimental subordinates and local or separate battalions. The probability of additional control Hqs exists.

(b) Using Western standards the net result shows that Hq MR 5 is performing in the capacity of a field Corps Hq and each separate Front/Hq performs the mission of a Division. While the above description is simplified and other confusing factors exist, the growth of enemy forces from separate Bns in 1962/63, to Regiments in 1963/64, to multi-regimental groupings in 1964/65, to divisional groups/corps in 1965/66 is readily illustrated.

(c) TAB A is an attached current Order of Battle map for MR 5. The situation in MR 5 may be well beyond the stage indicated in this current Order of Battle. Infiltration rates of North Vietnamese personnel moving through Central Laos and across the Demilitarized Zone have been increasing significantly. Past experience illustrates that new units are often not identified in the field for periods of up to 6 months.

(d) Attached at TAB B is a projected OB for 1 June 1966. A significant increase will be noted.

(2) Delta: Activities in the Delta area of South Vietnam reflect Communist progress toward strategic goals, although the progress is not as dramatic as seen in MR 5. (This fact adds credence to the priority of the highlands in Communist strategy.) The enemy OB situation outside of MR 5 also has shown a consistent growth; however, the growth is primarily in Viet Cong forces (TAB C). It is apparent that MR 5 is under the influence of North Vietnamese forces while the Delta remains

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predominantly Viet Cong (TAB D).

(a) The control of military units in the Delta is the responsibility of the military arm of the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), or Hq Nambo. As in MR 5, responsibility has been delegated to several subordinate units of Hq Nambo. There are two known tactical Hqs in the Delta. One controls 2 regiments and probably a third, plus subordinates of separate units. The other tactical Hq control three regiments and an undetermined number of separate units. The possibility of a third tactical Hq is high.

(b) The projected OB for the Delta does not show the significant increases that are projected for MR 5. Nevertheless, some of the Delta military units will have a special mission. This mission is to establish an arc across SVN, north of Saigon to divide the country and limit the major theater of operations to MR 5. The mission is illustrated using the projected OB structure for this area of the Delta (TAB E).

c. The organization projected on the OB maps (Tabs B & E) are within VC/NVN capabilities based on force projections covered in other studies, the current infiltration rates of NVA units, and the existing logistical bases in Laos and Cambodia. Our knowledge of their command and control procedures has been obtained from captured documents and other sources. The VC/NVA capabilities to win the battle of annihilation once it is undertaken will depend on the skills demonstrated in planning and executing the campaign, and will depend on the reaction of friendly forces.

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SECTION II: SPECULATIVE ANALYSIS OF DECEMBER 1965, JANUARY AND FEBRUARY 1966 VC INITIATED INCIDENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. General:

a. Statistical Data, see Incl 2.

b. The number of VC/NVA attacks on isolated outposts increased slightly in December 1965, January and February 1966 from the same period a year ago. During that same period there was a substantial number of incidents designed to disrupt lines of communication. The overall VC strategy appeared to be one of avoiding contact with major allied forces while preparing a build-up for subsequent actions. In December the VC strategy was effective. Incidents resulted in the highest monthly friendly casualty total of the war; for the first time since July friendly weapons losses exceeded those captured; and, there were 30 percent fewer VC casualties than in November. In January and February, however, VC casualties and weapons losses were high. This is attributed to friendly initiated actions. The VC paid a 100% increase in casualties for a 50% increase in incidents while ARVN casualties remained at the same level.

c. VC incidents during the period under study have increased over those of a year ago. In February 1966, however, the percentage increase of incidents was not as high as those of the previous months.

d. Activities of a year ago in May, June and July of 1965 have a bearing on the current situation as they provide insight into VC possible courses of action this year. Early in 1965 MACV's estimates were optimistic; however, MACV later stated that "encouraging trends of the

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past few months did not carry through into May and there were some serious setbacks." In June, it was said that the "military situation in the RVN continued to worsen...the VC retained the initiative, having launched several well coordinated savage attacks in regimental strength. In doing so...(the VC) have demonstrated a professional competence in the handling of regimental or task force formations under difficult conditions. The increase in VC strength and the VC intent to destroy ARVN has been most noticeable in the highlands area." The unfavorable trend continued in July when MACV stated, "The VC again demonstrated their ability to maneuver larger forces effectively and to detach selected district towns temporarily from GVN control."

e. During the period under study, despite the increase in friendly capabilities, the VC have been able to increase their activities. A comparison with a year ago indicates an improved VC position. Thus, current activities may be a prelude to a change in tactics by the VC/NVN in order to gain the initiative.

2. Basis for Analysis:

The attached chart (Tab F) graphically portrays December 1965, January and February 1966 activities which apparently support the overall Communist strategy of winning the war in SVN. Several VC/NVA courses of action are listed below and analyzed in order to test validity, VC successes, and probability as a continued VC course of action.

3. Speculative Analysis:

a. Course of Action: Use of incidents to keep ARVN/U.S./Free World Forces off balance.*

Analysis: The VC/NVA use of this course of action throughout the entire country is reflected in the attached chart: Incidents are numerous in some areas, but dispersion is also evident. The incidents--
*Use of term incidents reflects all types of NVA/VC activity.

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road cuts and attacks on isolated outposts--are not sufficient in themselves to cause major disruptions in friendly forces. These techniques are typical and have been a continuous tactic of the whole Indo-China War, both past and present. This pattern of VC activity has not taken the initiative from friendly forces, thus, its significance to the VC, as a course of action, is adjudged as valid but of limited value.

b. Course of Action: Use incidents to pull friendly forces away from Communist base areas while concurrently expanding control.

Analysis:

(1) The type of activity reflected by current VC/NVA incidents does not necessarily relate to their desire to divert major friendly units from a given area. When these incidents are coupled to enemy force movements, however, there appears to be some relationship. For example, the northern coastal provinces are areas in which most movement occurs; they have major concentrations of main force units; they are the provinces with high incident rates, conducted for the most part by local forces and guerrillas; and, are desirable for expanded control. Thus, situations are generated which pull friendly forces into a specific area.

(2) In the Delta, the number of incidents is high but there is an absence of a massing of forces in portions of the area. Major units of friendly forces are not being pulled away from other actions (See also para f below).

(3) In the high incident areas of the II CTZ the situation is similar to the northern highlands--the VC/NVA are attempting to expand their control in the provinces of Darlac, Quang Duc and Binh Thuan. They are known to be increasing their forces in these provinces.

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Some available allied forces have gone into the area to conduct limited operations.

(4) In other provinces, Kontum, Pleiku and those adjacent to the Cambodian border, the light activity can be explained by the fact that VC/NVA control in these areas is well established and they are Communist base areas. It is unlikely that Communist forces will increase incident rates in these provinces unless they desire to draw an opponent into a province in order to ambush and destroy him.

(5) Taken all together, the number and type of incidents in a given area indicates the degree of desire on the part of the VC/NVA to expand control. Timing, phases of the moon, and seasonal factors, also play a part in the VC/NVA choice of an area in which to create an action.

(6) The employment of this course of action which couples incidents and massing of forces to expand control and pull friendly forces into an area and divert them from other areas, to include base areas, is adjudged as a valid and probable VC course of action.

c. Course of Action: Create incidents to allow a build-up of forces.

Analysis: As mentioned in the general discussion (para 1) the VC/NVA forces shifted from small scale attacks to attacks of regimental size in the May, June and July 1965 time frame. Past studies have shown that VC/NVA initiated large-scale attacks increase in intensity during the monsoon. It is a well established fact that VC/NVA forces are growing rapidly, primarily in the highlands. Thus, current activity can be related to a build-up of forces and logistic stockpiles since the use of tactics which create incidents does not deplete main forces and supplies. This course of action is adjudged as being valid and a reason for the current VC activity.

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d. Course of Action: Create incidents in the Delta due to the softness of the target.

Analysis: The number of bridges, outposts, and population totals in the Delta are greater than in other parts of SVN. The Delta has been a main manpower pool for VC forces in the Delta and in the area forming an arc across SVN to the north of Saigon. It is believed that only a small percentage of the incident rate in the Delta is related to training of guerrilla and main force replacements. The abundance of targets, the mission of creating forces, and training of local forces are related to the softness of the Delta. Other factors, such as expanding area control and denial of LOC's, appear to be also significant as a reason for the high number of incidents. However, this course is adjudged valid and its continued pursuit by the VC is considered probable.

e. Course of Action: Use incidents to: deny LOC's, isolate Saigon and urban locations from rural areas and agricultural productivity.

Analysis:

(1) This is a long standing tactic and is part of Communist guerrilla doctrine. It is achieving some success in Vietnam as government forces have had to conduct operations in rice harvesting areas to get rice into government storage. However, the cutting of LOC's between urban areas and Saigon has not cut off rice or other deliveries.

(2) There are complicating factors present on both the VC and the government side. On the one hand, the VC must allow the sale of rice if they hope to collect tax money, and also not destroy the morale of the peasant. On the other hand, the government is plagued with corruption, blackmarketing, and hoarding which causes shortages and raises prices. Recently, government officials in Saigon released a large

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quantity of rice from government controlled stocks when prices threatened to go too high.

(3) This continues to be a valid course of action for the VC. It is probable, however, that attempts to isolate urban areas could never be successful if the factors of corruption, hoarding, and blackmarketing were absent. Cutting LOC's for military and harassing ends is and will be a VC tactic in any area where the VC have even nominal control.

f. Course of Action: Create incidents to downgrade RVN pacification efforts and achieve isolated victories for propaganda purposes.

Analysis:

(1) This is another course of action related to the overall Communist program. To gain control of an area the VC must demonstrate the ability to control the movement of government forces and eliminate government authority. This course predominates in the high incident rate areas of the III and IV CTZ's (represented in red on the chart) as the only major pacification program in SVN is centered around Saigon. At times, this program has threatened VC control and has forced a VC reaction. Many incidents, however, are not strictly related to this course of action. For example, incidents are often created by the VC in an attempt to keep their logistic and communication corridors open. Both the area north and south of Saigon contain VC corridors. The influx of U.S. forces in the vicinity of these corridors has forced the VC to open new routes and increase their efforts to maintain the existing routes.

(2) This course of action is adjudged valid and partially successful. It is probable that it will continue since it is a typical Communist tactic.

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SECTION III: CONCLUSIONS

1. Relating to the Goal and Strategy (Section I):

a. The VC/NVA leaders made a judgment that equilibrium of forces was obtainable and that such equilibrium will be established early in the 1966 monsoon season. At this time, the military aspects of a protracted war would dominate the political aspects.

b. In line with theoretical doctrine, the theater of operations in which the Communists will enter the final stage of protracted warfare, (the general counter-offensive) will be limited to MR 5. Throughout the remainder of SVN the Communists will continue in stage 2 (combined guerrilla and mobile warfare) to divert U.S./Allied forces from MR 5 thus isolating the killing zone.

c. Warfare in MR 5 will be conducted primarily by NVN forces, utilizing existing VC forces as available. Command and control will be centralized to increase the coordination of operations throughout this military region. Senior command elements will be positioned in areas considered by the NVN to be safehavens.

2. Relating to Analysis of VC Initiated Incidents (Section II):

a. In a period of building and preparing for a new phase or stage of activity, guerrilla tactics predominate; but, in the long run, this is not in itself a winning strategy. Guerrilla tactics and incidents must be viewed as a subsidiary to the large-scale actions which the Communists must depend on in order to win a decisive victory.

b. The primary objectives of VC initiated small unit activities are as follows:

(1) Throughout SVN: To keep ARVN/U.S./Free World Forces off balance; create incidents to downgrade RVN pacification efforts and

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achieve isolated victories for propaganda purposes; create incidents to allow a build-up of forces.

(2) In specific areas: In MR 5 to pull friendly forces away from Communist base areas while concurrently expanding control; in the Delta to create incidents due to the softness of the target; to deny LOC's, isolate Saigon and urban locations from rural areas and agricultural productivity.

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GENERAL STATISTICAL DATA:

 (+) VC IMPROVEMENT
 (-) VC DEGRESSION

PERIOD	VC INCIDENTS	VC KIA	TOTAL CASUALTIES*		WEAPON LOSSES	
			GWN	VC	GWN	VC
Dec 64	2,504	1,813	4,117	2,316	2,111	666
65	4,106 (+)	4,076 (-)	4,427 (+)	4,592 (-)	1,728 (-)	1,158 (-)
Jan 65	2,206	2,203	3,313	2,768	1,700	711
66	3,914 (+)	2,648 (-)	2,754 (-)	3,236 (-)	935 (-)	979 (-)
Feb 65	1,982	1,564	4,114	1,873	2,454	620
66	3,100 (+)	4,727 (-)	3,587 (-)	5,235 (-)	1,076 (-)	1,219 (-)

*U.S./Free World Forces not included, and estimates are not made on VC wounded.

VC INCIDENTS -- ATTACKS

PERIOD	SMALL- SCALE	COMPANY	BN	TOTAL	TERRORISM	SABOTAGE	PROPAGANDA	ANTI-AIRCRAFT
Dec 64	81	9	6	96	1,719	318	128	243
65	32	18 (+)	7 (+)	57 (-)	2,572 (+)	442 (+)	317 (+)	918 (+)
Jan 65	57	5	1	63	1,489	272	170	212
66	42 (-)	23 (+)	5 (+)	70 (-)	2,490 (+)	312 (+)	299 (+)	743 (+)
Feb 65	73	6	3	82	1,411	267	91	131
66	50 (-)	10 (+)	9 (+)	69 (-)	1,829 (+)	201 (-)	172 (+)	829 (+)

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
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VC INCIDENTS—ATTACKS

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


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VC INCIDENTS--ATTACKS

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VC INCIDENTS - ATTACKS


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
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


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TOTAL CASUALTIES
(U.S./Free World Forces not included,
and estimates are not made on VC wounded)

VC

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


WEAPON LOSSES

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MAO TSE-TUNG'S STATEMENT ON THE THREE STAGES OF A PROTRACTED WAR

...The first stage covers the period of the enemy's strategic offense and our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's retreat. It is possible to predict the concrete situation in the three stages, but certain main trends in the war may be pointed out in the light of present conditions...The first stage...His (enemy) finances and economy are beginning to show signs of exhaustion; war-weariness is beginning to set in among his people and troops; and within the clique that is running the war, "war frustrations" are beginning to manifest themselves and pessimism about the prospects of the war is growing.

...The second stage may be termed one of strategic stalemate. At the tail end of the first stage, the enemy will be forced to fix certain terminal points to his strategic offensive owing to his shortage of troops and our firm resistance, and upon reaching them he will stop his strategic offensive and enter the stage of safeguarding his occupied areas. In this stage, our form of fighting will be primarily guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. Except for the troops engaged in frontal defence against the enemy, our forces will be switched in large numbers to the enemy's rear in comparatively dispersed dispositions, and, basing themselves on all the areas not actually occupied by the enemy and coordinating with the people's local armed forces, they will launch extensive, fierce guerrilla warfare against enemy-occupied places keeping the enemy on the move as far as possible in order to destroy him in mobile warfare. The fighting in the second stage will be ruthless,

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and the country will suffer serious devastation. By then the enemy-occupied territory as a whole will fall into three categories: first, the enemy base areas; second, our base areas for guerrilla warfare; and, third, the guerrilla areas contested by both sides. The duration of this stage will depend on the degree of change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy and on the changes in the international situation. Our tasks will then be to mobilize the whole people to unite as one man and carry on the war with unflinching perseverance, to broaden and consolidate the united front, sweep away all pessimism and ideas of compromise, promote the will to hard struggle and apply new war-time policies.

...The third stage will be the stage of the counter-offensive to recover our lost territories. In the third stage, our war will no longer be one of strategic defensive, but will turn into a strategic counter-offensive manifesting itself in strategic offensives. Our primary form of fighting will still be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will rise to importance. In the third stage guerrilla warfare will still provide strategic support by supplemented mobile and positional warfare, but it will not be the primary form as in the second stage.

...In the three stages the changes in relative strength will proceed along the following lines. In the first stage, the enemy is superior and we are inferior in strength.

...In the second stage...It should be reiterated that the change from inferiority to superiority and the completion of preparations for the counter-offensive will involve three things, namely, an increase in... strength, an increase in the enemy's difficulties, and an increase in international support.

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...Because of the unevenness in...political and economic development,
the strategic counter-offensive of the third stage will not present a
uniform and even picture throughout the country in its initial phase but
will be regional in character, rising here and subsiding there.

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EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES STAGE

This is a stage of military stalemate reached when the insurgents have succeeded in causing the security forces to disperse widely, thus robbing them of their full offensive capability.

During this stage guerrilla forces reorganize, recruit and train for the counter offensive. The strong political effort hitherto concentrated on the preparation of bases now spreads outwards into previously undisturbed country, ✓

Every village and every province in guerrilla occupied areas intensifies recruiting for the expanding territorial units. They are organized along regular lines into battalions and regiments and are subordinate to an inter-provincial military committee. The guerrilla command hopes that for the sake of prestige, the security forces will be forced to carry out counter moves. These in turn will tie down additional troops, and result in the gradual weakening of control in strongly held areas. This phase is planned to tempt part of the security forces to come to grips with the guerrillas, and corresponding evasive actions by the guerrillas aimed at exhausting them, demoralizing them and creating a sense of frustration.

While enemy forces are being ever increasingly over-extended during this stage, intense effort continues in the area chosen as being of highest strategic importance. This effort is termed the "preparation of the battlefield". The political military organization of the masses is closely coordinated, village defenses are improved, the intelligence system strengthened and military propaganda measures intensified.

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When the preparation of the battlefield is complete and government forces are fully committed on internal security operations, the guerrilla force may launch its counter-offensive in the chosen area. The guerrilla leaders may hope that the legitimate government, goaded by the strain and expense of prolonged guerrilla operations, may play into their hands at this stage by accepting a trial of strength in open battle.

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STRATEGIC COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

...In the stage of counter-offensive, there are many problems, the chief of which are the starting of the counter-offensive, the concentration of troops, mobile warfare, war of quick decision and war of annihilation.

...Whether in a counter-offensive or in an offensive, the principles with regard to these problems do not differ in their basic character. In this sense we may say that a counter-offensive is an offensive,

...Still, a counter-offensive is not exactly an offensive. The principles of the counter-offensive are applied when the enemy is on the offensive. The principles of the offensive are applied when the enemy is on the defensive. In this sense, there are certain differences between a counter-offensive and an offensive.

...Our army's experience in these five counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression" proves that the first battle in the counter-offensive is of the greatest importance for the Red Army, which is on the defensive, if it is to smash a large and powerful enemy "suppression" force. Victory or defeat in the first battle has a tremendous effect upon the entire situation, all the way to the final engagement. Hence we arrive at the following conclusions.

...First, the first battle must be won. We should strive only when positively certain that the enemy's situation, the terrain and popular support are all in our favour and not in the favour of the enemy. Otherwise we should rather fall back and carefully bide our time. There will always be opportunities; we should not rashly accept battle.

...Second, the plan for the first battle must be the prelude to, and an organic part of, the plan for the whole campaign. Without a good

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plan for the whole campaign it is absolutely impossible to fight a really good first battle. That is to say, even though victory is won in the first battle, if the battle harms rather than helps the campaign as a whole, such a victory can only be reckoned a defeat. Hence, before fighting the first battle one must have a general idea of how the second, third, fourth, and even the final battle will be fought, and consider what changes will ensue in the enemy's situation as a whole if we win, or lose, each of the succeeding battles. Although the result may not—and, in fact definitely will not—turn out exactly as we expect, we must think everything out carefully and realistically in the light of the general situation on both sides. Without a grasp of the situation as a whole, it is impossible to make any really good move on the chess-board.

...Third, one must also consider what will happen in the next strategic stage of the war. Whoever directs strategy will not be doing his duty if he occupies himself only with the counter-offensive and neglects the measures to be taken after it succeeds, or in case it fails. In a particular strategic stage, he should take into consideration the succeeding stages, or, at the very least, the following one. Even though future changes are difficult to foresee and the farther ahead one looks the more blurred things seem, a general calculation is possible and an appraisal of distant prospects is necessary. In war as well as in politics, planning only one step at a time as one goes along is a harmful way of directing matters. After each step, it is necessary to examine the ensuing concrete changes and to modify or develop one's strategic and operational plans accordingly, or otherwise one is liable to make the mistake of rushing straight ahead regardless of danger.

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However, it is absolutely essential to have a long-term plan which has been thought out in its general outline and which covers an entire strategic stage or even several strategic stages. Failure to make such a plan will lead to the mistake of hesitating and allowing oneself to be tied down, which in fact serves the enemy's strategic insight. Only when we have trained ourselves to be a head taller than the enemy will strategic victories be possible. In short, in the stage of retreat we must see ahead to the stage of the counter-offensive, in the stage of the counter-offensive we must see ahead to that of the offensive, and retreat. Not to do so but to confine ourselves to considerations of the moment is to court defeat.

...The first battle must be won. The plan for the whole campaign must be taken into account. And the strategic stage that comes next must be taken into account. These are the three principles we must never forget when we begin a counter-offensive, that is, when we fight the first battle.

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MOBILE WARFARE

...Mobile warfare or positional warfare? Our answer is mobile warfare. So long as we lack a large army or reserves of ammunition, and so long as there is only a single Red Army force to do the fighting in each base area, positional warfare is generally useless to us. For us, positional warfare is generally inapplicable in attack as well as in defense.

...The Red Army's battle lines are determined by the direction in which it is operating. As its operational direction often shifts, its battle lines are fluid. Though the main direction does not change in a given period of time, within its ambit the secondary directions may shift at any moment; when we find ourselves checked in one direction, we must turn to another. If, after a time, we find ourselves checked in the main direction too, then we must change even the main direction.

...Fluidity of battle lines leads to fluidity in the size of our base areas. Our base areas are constantly expanding and contracting, and often as one base area falls another rises. This fluidity of territory is entirely a result of the fluidity of the war.

...Fluidity in the war and in our territory produces fluidity in all fields of construction in our base areas. Construction plans covering several years are out of the question. Frequent changes of plan are all in the day's work.

...It is to our advantage to recognize this characteristic. We must base our planning on this characteristic and must not have illusions about a war of advance without any retreats, take alarm at any

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temporary fluidity of our territory or of the rear areas of our army, or endeavour to draw up detailed long-term plans. We must adapt our thinking and our work to the circumstances, be ready to sit down as well as to march on, and always have our marching rations handy. It is only by exerting ourselves in today's fluid way of life that we can secure relative stability tomorrow, and then full stability.

...Fight when you can win, move away when you can't win--this is the popular way of describing our mobile warfare today. There is no military expert anywhere in the world who approves only of fighting and never moving, though few people do as much moving as we do. We generally spend more time in moving than in fighting and would be doing well if we fought an average of one sizable battle a month. All our "moving" is for the purpose of "fighting". Nevertheless, there are times when it is inadvisable for us to fight. In the first place, it is inadvisable to fight when the force confronting us is too large; second, it is sometimes inadvisable to fight when the force confronting us, though not so large, is very close to other enemy forces; third, it is generally inadvisable to fight an enemy force that is not isolated and is strongly entrenched; fourth, it is inadvisable to continue an engagement in which there is no prospect of victory. In any one of these situations we are prepared to move away. Such moving away is both permissible and necessary. For our recognition of the necessity of moving away is based on our recognition of the necessity of fighting. Herein lies the fundamental characteristic of the Red Army's mobile warfare.

...Mobile warfare is primary, but we do not reject positional warfare where it is possible and necessary. It should be admitted that

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positional warfare should be employed for the tenacious defense of
particular key points in a containing action during the strategic
defensive, and when, during the strategic offensive, we encounter an
enemy force that is isolated and cut off from help. We have had
considerable experience in defeating the enemy by such positional
warfare; we have cracked open many enemy cities, blockhouses and
forts and broken through fairly well-fortified enemy field positions.
In future we shall increase our efforts and remedy our inadequacies
in this respect. We should by all means advocate positional attack
or defense when circumstances require and permit it. At the present
time, what we are opposed to is the general use of positional
warfare or putting it on an equal footing with mobile warfare; that
is impermissible.

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CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS

...The concentration of troops seems easy but is quite hard in practice. Everybody knows that the best way is to use a large force to defeat a small one, and yet many people fail to do so and on the contrary often divide their forces up.

...Concentration of troops, mobile warfare, war of quick decision and war of annihilation are all necessary conditions for the full achievement of this aim. And of these, concentration of troops is the first and most essential.

...Concentration of troops is necessary for the purpose of reversing the situation as between the enemy and ourselves. First, its purpose is to reverse the situation as regards advance and retreat. Previously it was the enemy who was advancing and we who were retreating; now we seek a situation in which we advance and he retreats. When we concentrate our troops and win a battle, then in that battle we gain the above purpose, and this influences the whole campaign.

...The counter-offensive is transitional between the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive, and in the nature of a prelude to the strategic offensive; it is precisely for the purpose of the counter-offensive that troops are concentrated.

...The kind of concentration of forces we advocate does not mean the abandonment of people's guerrilla warfare. To abandon small-scale guerrilla warfare and "concentrate every single rifle in the Red Army", as advocated by the Li Li-san line, has long since been proved wrong.

...It is also necessary to employ Red Army detachments for operations in secondary directions; not all the forces of the Red Army should be

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concentrated. The kind of concentration we advocate is based on the principle of guaranteeing absolute or relative superiority on the battlefield. To cope with a strong enemy or to fight on a battlefield of vital importance, we must have an absolute superior force. To cope with a weaker enemy or to fight on a battlefield of no great importance, a relatively superior force is sufficient.

...That is not to say we must have numerical superiority on every occasion. In certain circumstances, we may go into battle with a relatively or absolutely inferior force. Take the case of going into battle with a relatively inferior force when we have only a rather small Red Army force in a certain area (it is not that we have more troops and have not concentrated them). Then, in order to smash the attack of the stronger enemy in conditions where popular support, terrain and weather are greatly in our favour, it is of course necessary to concentrate the main part of our Red Army force for a surprise attack on a segment of one flank of the enemy while containing his centre and his other flank with guerrillas or small detachments, and in this way victory can be won.

...As for the argument that the concentration of a large force for action in a single battle area is subject to the limitations of terrain, roads, supplies and billeting facilities, it should be evaluated according to the circumstances.

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WAR OF ANNIHILATION

...Only by annihilating the enemy's effective strength can we smash his "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and expand our revolutionary base areas. Inflicting casualties is a means of annihilating the enemy, or otherwise there would be no sense to it. We incur losses ourselves in inflicting casualties on the enemy but we replenish ourselves by annihilating his units, thereby not only making good our losses but adding to the strength of our army. A battle in which the enemy is routed is not basically decisive in a contest with an enemy of great strength. A battle of annihilation, on the other hand, produces a great and immediate impact on any enemy. Injuring all of a man's ten divisions is not as effective as annihilating one of them.

...War of annihilation entails the concentration of superior forces and the adoption of encircling or outflanking tactics. We cannot have the former without the latter. Conditions such as popular support, favourable terrain, a vulnerable enemy force and the advantage of surprise are all indispensable for the purpose of annihilation.

...Merely routing one enemy force or permitting it to escape has meaning only if, in the battle or campaign as a whole, our main force is concentrating its operations of annihilation against another enemy force, or otherwise it is meaningless. Here the losses are justified by the gains.

...Because the enemy is still exploiting his strength and retains strategic superiority and strategic initiative, and, therefore, unless we fight campaign and battles of annihilation, we cannot effectively and speedily reduce his strength and break his superiority and initiative. We

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still have our weakness and have not yet rid ourselves of strategic inferiority and passivity, and, therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation, we cannot win time to improve our internal and international situation and alter our unfavourable position. Hence campaigns of annihilation are the means of attaining the objective of strategic attrition. In this sense war of annihilation is war of attrition. It is chiefly by using the method of attrition through annihilation that China can wage protracted war.

...On the other hand, it must be admitted that for the present we are inferior to the enemy in technical equipment and in troop training. Therefore, it is often difficult to achieve the maximum in enemy force, especially when fighting on the plains. In this connection the excessive demands of the theorists of quick victory are wrong. In every battle and employ encircling and outflanking tactics--encircle part if not all the enemy forces, capture part if not all of the encircled forces, and inflict heavy casualties on part of the encircled forces if we cannot capture them. In circumstances which are unfavourable for battles of annihilation, we should fight battles of attrition. In favourable circumstances, we should employ the principle of concentration of forces, and in unfavourable circumstances that of their dispersion.

As for the relationship of command in campaigns, we should apply the principle of centralized command in the former and that of decentralized command in the latter.

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11 April 1966

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as

Howard D. Schulze
HOWARD D. SCHULZE
Major, AGC
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JUSPAO MEMORANDUM NO. 18

MARCH 14, 1966

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELATED TO THE VIETNAM SITUATION

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APPROVED BY
DIRECTOR JUSPAO
MARCH 19, 1966

JUSPAO PLANNING OFFICE
SAIGON, VIETNAM

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Introduction

Following is a list of questions culled from recent monthly reports of the JUSPAO Field Reps, together with appropriate answers. The questions have been reworded slightly to take in several questions asked along similar lines. The answers are based primarily on official policy pronouncements, both American and Vietnamese, to reflect the official positions on various issues in the Vietnam conflict.

Question 1

Much has been said recently about "Revolutionary Development," yet few people really understand what it is. Tell us simply and briefly what is the concept of Revolutionary Development?

Answer 1

The term "Revolutionary Development" refers to that part of the war which seeks to braid together military, political, economic, social and psychological programs in order to liberate the people from VC control, restore public security, and win the commitment of the people to support a government which has shown itself worthy of their support.

Generally, Revolutionary Development operations start with the military destruction or eviction of major VC units and bases followed by continuing aggressive action to prevent their return. Meanwhile, in the "cleared" area, follow-up operations against hold-out VC elements, both militia and cadre (the VC infra-structure), accompany the restoration of civil government, the institution of political, social, and economic programs, and the establishment of meaningful communication between the people and their government. As hamlet elections and the organization of voluntary self-defense forces signal popular adherence to the GVN, further development of self-government and economic and social programs continue, establishing a "New Life" in the countryside.

Military and para-military units necessarily bear the brunt of clearing and securing operations. The Revolutionary Development cadre - assisted by police and new or existing village and hamlet self-defense forces - provide internal security, eliminate the holdouts, and bear the burden of efforts to bring self-government and material and social benefit to the people.

For 1966 the GVN has given priority of support to Revolutionary Development operations in four areas, one per Corps, while continuing, and if possible expanding, existing Revolutionary Development programs elsewhere. Priority areas are Quang Nam, Binh Dinh, and An Giang provinces and the area around Saigon-Cholon.

That success will depend on the scale and effectiveness of implementations seems clearly recognized by present GVN leaders. Actions speak louder than words, particularly to Vietnamese peasants who have heard many promises.

Question 2.

There is a war going on in Vietnam. Should not the first task be to defeat the enemy in the countryside? The Honolulu conference, instead of pressing for a military or diplomatic victory, has shifted emphasis to "revolutionary development".

Without security in the vast area of the Vietnamese countryside, is it realistic to press forward on this new front?

Answer 2.

Recently Prime Minister Ky and Chairman Thieu said: "We shall strive as we fight to bring about a true social revolution." What is this social revolution? Ky put it this way: "We must bring about a true social revolution and construct a modern society in which every man can know that he has a future; that he has respect and dignity; that he has the opportunity for himself and for his children to live in an environment where all is not disappointment, despair and dejection; that the opportunities exist for the full expression of his talents and his hopes."

Prime Minister Ky recognizes his government's weaknesses but is determined to improve the situation. He recently said: "We were deluding ourselves with the idea that our weaknesses would not be remedied while we were fighting a war. We said in the past that once the aggressor was driven from our land we would turn to our political and social defects. It has taken this country a long time to realize that we will not completely drive out the aggressor until we make a start at eliminating these political and social defects . . . We cannot use the excuse of war not to start to solve these problems."

Solving the social and economic problems of the rural population, together with the immediate restoration of security, is an essential feature of the Revolutionary Development effort. Recently President Johnson and the Vietnamese leaders agreed in Honolulu that the reforms are a key element in combating communist infiltration and aggression. As Ky and Thieu put it in a statement, "It is a military war and a war for the hearts of the people. We cannot win one without winning the other." (Also see Q&A No. 6, JUSPAO Field Memo No. 17, dated March 11, 1966.)

Question 3.

Reforms take a long time and Revolutionary Development has a long way to go. Why doesn't the US bring the Vietnam conflict to a conclusion by any means necessary so we can concentrate our efforts on the many problems of nation building?

Answer 3.

The communist aggression has already consumed enormous human and material resources. We do not wish to add to that loss anything not clearly dictated by the circumstance of communist intransigence.

The US has no intention to escalate the war. We do not want to cause unnecessary suffering to the Vietnamese people, North or South. We have tried very earnestly to bring the conflict to a conclusion by peaceful means. As you are well aware, the US suspended bombing raids on North Vietnam December 24 and continued that suspension for some 37 days as an effort to contribute to the acceptance of Hanoi and Peking of our offer of unconditional discussions. At the same time, President Johnson dispatched several high-ranking representatives to explain to a number of chiefs of state our most earnest desire to end the conflict peacefully and promptly. Unhappily, there has been no encouraging response whatsoever from Hanoi to these peaceful efforts. Instead, there have been familiar charges from Hanoi, and of course from Peking as well, that our peace offensive, despite the prolonged bombing pause, was merely a "fraud" and a "swindle" deserving no serious consideration.

Indeed, it is the sincere desire of the US to seek an honorable and just solution of the Vietnam conflict. But as Secretary Rusk pointed out, "we are not playing this hand solitaire." It is up to Hanoi. And, we continue to hope that Hanoi will see the futility of its aggression. Greater measures are not at this time required. The message should be clear enough.

We can employ greater measures but against a regime as intransigent as Hanoi, encouraged as it is by Peking, greater measures will not necessarily produce an earlier end to the conflict. It seems that the Hanoi regime will delay and delay until events clearly forecast defeat. We want no further difficulty for the South or North Vietnamese people. We will endeavor to keep such difficulties at a minimum and at the same time use enough force to prevent a successful communist aggression. (Also see Q&A No. 8, JUSPAO Field Memo No. 7, dated March 11, 1966.

Question 4.

Why does there continue to be such confusion over the character of the so-called National Liberation Front? Some people say it is a political party representing the views of a substantial segment of the Vietnamese people; some say it's an instrument of the Hanoi regime to further aggression in the South. Which of the two interpretations is correct?

Answer 4.

On the basis of massive, internationally accepted evidence, the National Liberation Front is seen not to be a political entity expressing the will of the people of South Vietnam - or any substantial element of the South Vietnamese population. The NLF is a facade fabricated by the Hanoi regime to confuse the issue and elaborate the myth of an indigenous revolt.

In a speech before the Northwestern University Alumni Association at Evanston in February, Under Secretary George Ball said:

"History is not obscure on this matter. The creation of the Front was announced by the North Vietnam Communist Party - the Lao Dong Party - in 1960, soon after the North Vietnam military leader, General Giap, announced that 'the North is the revolutionary base for the whole country.'

"The individuals proclaimed as NLF leaders are not personalities known to the South Vietnamese people - or, indeed, to many members of the Viet Cong. When Viet Cong prisoners are asked during interrogation whether they are members of the NLF, those that know, customarily reply that they owe allegiance to the Lao Dong or the Communist Party of North Vietnam. The Front then, is unmistakably what its name implies: a Communist front organization created to mask the activities of Hanoi and to further the illusion of an indigenous revolt."

Recently Secretary Rusk stated that NLF exercises "no control over the bulk of communist forces fighting in South Vietnam." It is truly a political front for Communist North Vietnam, with the communist forces fighting in the South controlled by Hanoi, not by the Viet Cong or the NLF. In answer to a question, Prime Minister Ky said the so-called NLF "did not liberate anybody . . . Some 11,000 soldiers and 22,000 civilians including innocent women and children had been murdered by the so-called liberators." According to Ky, the so-called "liberators" should be termed "assassins."

Question 5.

Why are Americans giving North Vietnam such a break by not bombing the key war centers of Hanoi and Haiphong?

Answer 5.

This question is partially found in the answer to Question 2. However, to understand better the implication of this question, it is necessary to understand the rationale of the present US posture on bombing the North. The US objective in bombing the North is not to "crush or destroy North Vietnam." As President Johnson pointed out at the Freedom House dinner in New York February 23, the US "is using only the amount of force necessary . . . There is not, and there will not be, a mindless escalation." (Also see Q&As 1 and 2, JUSPAO Field Memo No. 17, dated March 11, 1966.)

Contrary to Hanoi's charge, the US has purposely confined its bombing raids to selected military targets and communication facilities such as bridges, highways, railroads and supply routes, chiefly to lesson the danger of escalating the war, and to minimize the extent of civilian casualties. The major aim of destroying these facilities is "to weaken the will of the enemy leadership and to reduce the flow of men and material into South Vietnam."

Secretary Rusk has aptly said: "There is no doubt that the bombing has impaired their ability to reinforce and to supply their effort in South Vietnam . . . If what they do has to be done at five miles an hour instead of forty miles an hour, that is of some significance. If ammunition dumps are destroyed in North Vietnam and ammunition explodes in those dumps instead of on our men in South Vietnam, that is a matter of some difference."

We are constantly pointing out the better life that awaits the North if they will end their aggression against the South. We are deliberately keeping the door open to them by sparing Hanoi and Haiphong from destruction. Secretary McNamara believes that "the present pattern of bombing is the most efficient application (of force)." However, he said that the major industrial centers and harbors in North Vietnam are not "sanctuaries." They are not exempt from bombing should communist provocations dictate.

Question 6.

We have heard from some well known commentators that the war in South Vietnam is essentially an indigenous revolt. US government and GVN spokesmen have said that it is an external aggression from the North. Which of these interpretations is correct?

Answer 6.

The evidence on the true character of the Vietnam war is voluminous. Regular North Vietnamese forces are fighting in South Vietnam and are directed by the Hanoi regime. The North Vietnamese regime systematically created the Viet Cong forces; it provides their equipment; it mounted the guerrilla war - and it controls that war from Hanoi on a day-to-day basis. At the time when Vietnam was divided in the settlement of 1954, the Communist regime in Hanoi never intended that South Vietnam should develop in freedom. Many Communists fighting with the Viet Minh army were directed to stay in the South, to cache their arms and to do everything possible to undermine the South Vietnamese government. Others - 80,000 in all - were ordered to the North for training in the North Vietnamese army. The rulers of the North resorted to guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam only when the success of the South Vietnam government persuaded them that they could not achieve their designs by subversion alone.

In 1960, the Lao Dong Party - the Communist Party in North Vietnam - created the National Liberation Front to provide a political facade for the conduct of an active guerrilla war. The Hanoi regime began to infiltrate across the demarcation line the disciplined Communists whom the Party had ordered North at the time of the settlement. In the intervening period since 1954, those men had been trained in the arts of proselytizing, sabotage and subversion. Now they were ordered to conscript young men from the villages by persuasion or force and to form cadres around which guerrilla units could be built.

Beginning over a year ago, Hanoi apparently exhausted its reservoir of Southerners. Since then, the greater number of men infiltrated into the South have been native-born North Vietnamese.

These facts make it clear beyond question that the war in South Vietnam is not an indigenous revolt. It is a cynical and systematic aggression by the North Vietnamese regime against the people of the South. It is one further chapter in the long and brutal chronicle of Communist efforts to extend the periphery of Communist power by force and terror.

Question 7.

However, the VC and Hanoi continue to insist that they are the proponents of international law and conventions and that they are fighting for a return to the solution proposed in the Geneva Accords. Who is right?

Answer 7.

The Republic of Vietnam and its Free World Allies are right and this right is incontestable!

A February 1966 US State Department statement defines the legal basis of American actions in Vietnam. Following is the abbreviated text of that statement:

"The Republic of Vietnam is the victim of an armed attack from the North. The US and a number of other countries have responded to South Vietnam's request for assistance in meeting this aggression.

"Together we are engaged in collective self-defense. The right of self-defense is basic under international law. This right is recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

"There is also a basis for US actions in Vietnam by virtue of Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO). The SEATO Treaty constitutes an agreement that Vietnam is covered by the provision of Article IV, even though the Republic of Vietnam has not been a party to the treaty. The US considers that the armed attack on the Republic of Vietnam has brought into play the obligations of the US under Article IV of the SEATO Treaty.

"This is an obligation which rests upon each party to the treaty individually. It exists regardless of the actions of other parties to the treaty and is not dependent upon any collective decision upon them unanimously or otherwise.

"Thus our actions in Vietnam are in fulfillment of obligations undertaken in the SEATO Treaty and are in exercise of the right of collective self-defense inherent under international law and recognized by the Charter of the UN."

The repeated assertion by the Hanoi and Peking regimes of their being adherents of the Geneva Accords is baseless. Their massive abuse of the letter and spirit of the Accords is fully documented as a deliberate attempt to cloak a subversive conspiracy in the mantle of legality.

NOTE: For further discussion of this question by international lawyers, see Q&A No. 4 of JUSPAO Field Memorandum No. 11, dated December 27, 1965.

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Question 8.

Why doesn't the Vietnamese government do something to control inflation, and enforce the ban on hiking prices?

Answer 8.

The present inflation in Vietnam is essentially a classic type of inflation caused by the pressure of demand against supply. It is a subject with complex ramifications. Instead of discussing theoretical economics with the Vietnamese, perhaps it is more profitable to point out the fact that the Viet Cong contribute much to inflation, because they deliberately constrict and prevent the movement of goods to the nation's markets. The VC not only force the costly war upon the Vietnamese government and people, but also deliberately wage economic warfare for the purpose of disrupting the national economy, thus imposing inflation upon the people.

The Vietnamese government, with US support, is doing something to reduce inflationary pressures: it is supplying the market and the people with increasing quantities of goods, thereby alleviating the shortages which cause prices to rise. However, it is impossible to eliminate completely the effects of the VC attack on the economy until the VC are forced to abandon their desperation struggle.

Speaking of national problems facing Vietnam today, Prime Minister Ky elaborated the following point:

"We are making progress. In some areas progress is slow. In some areas it is barely visible. In others, it is encouraging. We are faced with a battle against the increase in the cost of living, with shortages of certain basic goods, with a faltering in the rate of increase in productivity, and the strains upon our distribution system. Our economic problems are many and are intricate. They sometimes create despair and often frustration. But they can and will be solved."

According to the local Saigon press, prices of cement, pork, rice, sugar, condensed milk, clothing, and other items are falling, because of government measures to bring prices of basic commodities down to a reasonable level. The Vietnamese government is aware of the problem of inflation and is earnestly attempting to improve the situation. At a press conference March 7, Economic Minister Au Truong Thanh announced that a multi-phased plan has been conceived to cope with inflation and hiking prices. He also disclosed that he'll channel "illegal profits" of blackmarketeers and manipulators to alleviating the hardships suffered by the common people.

For a further discussion of the inflation problem, also see JUSPAO Guidance No. 14, dated 9 February 1966.

(E)

Question 9.

Why isn't there greater emphasis on sending deserving Vietnamese students to the US for study?

Answer 9.

Indeed, there is greater emphasis on sending Vietnamese students to study in the U.S. Last year 16 Vietnamese high school students went to the US under State Department auspices; this year 60 high school students will spend their last year of high school in the US.

Last year 10 Vietnamese graduate students went to the US for advanced studies under State Department auspices; this year the number is expected to be 20.

One must bear in mind that each Vietnamese student, especially if he is within the draft age, must fulfill his military service obligations required by the GVN Ministry of Defense. Every student going to the US for study must first be cleared by the Ministry of Defense, which rightfully controls the exit of students within the draft age. No student is to go abroad for the purpose of evading the draft.

In addition to State Department exchange of persons program, USAID/Vietnam also sponsors training programs in the US for Vietnamese, especially those who will, upon their return, contribute to the economic betterment of their country. In each case, US agencies are working very closely with the Vietnamese Government to allow a greater number of students going to the US, consistent with military requirements of Vietnam at the present time.

Question 10.

How can you Americans expect to win the war when the Vietnamese government does not have the will or the perseverance or the capability to fight the communist forces directed by Hanoi? The Saigon government cannot be compared in any way with the Hanoi regime in this respect. The expansion of American troops will not win the war when the GVN does not seem to shoulder the major responsibility.

Answer 10.

There is no question that the Vietnamese government is shouldering the major burden in the war against communist aggression. It has been fighting the Japanese, French and Viet Cong for over 20 years. Thousands of Vietnamese soldiers have died in the defense of their country.

Speaking of will and perseverance, Prime Minister Ky made it clear at the recent Honolulu conference when he said: "We have had to fight external aggression from a base weakened by corruption, disappointment and mismanagement. But we have the quality of perseverance and the capacity to accept suffering. We are willing to fight a protracted war so long as we feel that victory can be attained. We are just as persevering as North Vietnam. If we were not, we could not have survived. And we have survived in the face of many disadvantages, military as well as psychological."

The expansion of US troops in South Vietnam is not to substitute US effort for Vietnamese effort in the war. President Johnson has clearly underlined the guiding principle of US aid to the Republic of Vietnam as "we are there to help the people and their government to help themselves. We are not there to substitute our effort for theirs, but to supplement their own brave, gallant and continuing effort of defending themselves. Our determination is built on their determination. The US would never undertake the sacrifice of these efforts required if its help were not wanted and requested."

The Vietnamese government, with US and allied support, is attempting to win the military war and the war for the hearts of the people at the same time. In the military field, the Vietnamese armed forces are building up steadily. Some 70,000 troops will be added by the end of 1966, making a total of about 670,000. Through its revolutionary development program, the Vietnamese government has instituted new measures to solve economic and social problems and to offer hope to its people. These are essential elements in combating communist infiltration and subversion just as are combat troops necessary to defend their country against external aggression.

Question 11.

Some critics say the Vietnamese government has not demonstrated any concern for the people's welfare and has not done anything for the people. How do you expect the Vietnamese people, especially the peasants, to support such a government and not the Viet Cong who promised them a brighter future?

Answer 11.

You must remember that the Vietnamese government has been at war with the communists directed by Hanoi for some years. It must necessarily devote a greater portion of its energy to the prosecution of the war. But it has not neglected the welfare of the people. At the recent Honolulu conference, Prime Minister Ky made this point quite clear, when he said:

"For the peasant, who has always been forgotten in our society: We have instituted a land reform program. Since September of last year we have made landowners of some 227,000 families who formerly worked on the land they themselves had cleared or reclaimed but didn't own. We have turned 3,200 farm hands into farmers who own their own land.

"We are putting into effect a rural electrification program. Thousands and thousands of Vietnamese have never seen an electric light. Thousands and thousands work 16, 18 hours a day, earning little more than enough to feed and barely clothe themselves and their families. Electricity will not make them prosperous overnight but will lighten their burden.

"We are encouraging the establishment of agricultural cooperatives as one step in seeing that the peasant gets a fair price for his products. For both rural and urban workers we have instituted a plan whereby the little businessman or individual tradesman can own the tools of his trade by buying them at low prices and paying for them in installments.

"We have embarked on a low-cost housing program for low-salaried personnel. In only seven months we have built 500 classrooms to receive 30,000 more children. Five dispensaries and five medical centers have been completed.

"With these, and other programs, we hope to give concrete evidence to the Vietnamese citizen that his government is serious in its determination to bring about social justice."

Question 12.

We understand there is a big disparity of views between the GVN and the US Government in dealing with the communists. The US wants to end the Vietnam conflict by negotiations, while the Vietnamese government wants a complete military victory over the communists. Is this true?

Answer 12.

In a recent press conference, Prime Minister Ky made this point very clear. He said emphatically "there is no difference in the US and Vietnamese approaches to war or peace in the Vietnam problem." He indicated that the US role was to promote negotiations for peace and that the role of Vietnam was to step up the military efforts as a means towards that peace. "For a long time," said Ky, "some people had tried to show that there was this so-called 'difference' but in reality there was no difference on the positions as well as on the final goal of the US and Vietnamese governments. The common goal is to defeat the communists and to bring back peace to Vietnam."

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
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G-3 Section
23 Jan 1966

SECRET
AGENDA SUBJECT: Adequacy of Regional and Popular Forces Authorization

Encl: (1) Comparative pay scale ARVN/RF/PF
(2) Proposed pay scale for Rural Construction Group

1. FACTS:

a. The Commandant of the Marine Corps questions the adequacy of RF/PF force authorization in the I Corps military structure.

b. Present authorized, assigned, and present for duty strengths for RF/PF in I Corps are as follows:

	AUTH	ASSIGNED	PRESENT FOR DUTY
Regional Forces	18484	17958	15095
Popular Forces	28986	23013	20111
Total	47470	40971	35206

c. Authorized strength is derived at the national level by the Vietnamese government with U. S. advice and counsel. The GVN employs ARVN, RF, PF with complementing missions.

d. ARVN operate throughout I Corps area with the following missions:

(1) Destroy or drive off organized VC military forces during the clearing phase and conduct operations to prevent them from returning to the area.

(2) Harass VC secret bases and lines of communications.

(3) Control national ground borders

(4) Provide elements of the general reserve, Corps reserve, division reserve, or the sector and sub-sector reserve.

e. Regional Forces are employed within the province/sector with the following missions:

(1) From the beginning of the securing sub-phase of an area, until it is relieved by the Popular Force or the National Police.

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- (a) Destroy VC infrastructure.
- (b) Provide public security and assist in maintaining law and order.
- (c) Protect GVN infrastructure.
- (d) Defend key installations and protect lines of communications within the pacification area.
- (2) Protect lines of communications and defend key installations not located within the pacification area.
- (3) Elements of sector and sub-sector reserve.

e. Secondary Missions

- (1) To assist ARVN during the securing sub-phase of an area; destroy or drive off organized VC military forces from the area and conduct operations to prevent them from returning to the area.
- (2) To assist ARVN harass VC secret bases and lines of communications.

f. Popular Forces are composed of rifle platoons and squads that provide the village with organized troops for pacification, defense, and security roles. The four primary missions of the Popular Forces are:

- (1) Destroy VC infrastructure.
- (2) Provide public security and assist in maintaining law and order.
- (3) Protect GVN infrastructure.
- (4) Defend key installations and axis of communications within the village.

g. Other paramilitary organizations competing for manpower are the Peoples Action Teams, Civilian Irregular Defense Group, and National Police. Total strength of these three organizations in I Corps is approximately 15,000 men.

h. The population of I Corps is approximately 2½ million people. Total strength of military and paramilitary organizations is approximately 87,000. About one-third of the population supports the VC or is controlled by the VC.

2. DISCUSSION

a. VN citizens of military age may be drafted into the ARVN or may serve in RF to satisfy military requirements. Service in the Popular Forces remains voluntary and recruitment is closed to those age groups eligible for ARVN.



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Strength for the three primary forces are established at the national level with consideration to ARVN fulfilling Corps and national requirements, RF province requirements, and PF the village and hamlet requirements.

b. Strength requirements for Popular Forces can be computed more specifically than for the other forces. The formula for computing Popular Forces strength is one platoon (38 men) per village and one squad (11 men) per hamlet. Presently there are an authorized 625 platoons and 476 squads as compared with 485 villages and 2368 hamlets in the I Corps area.

c. The present figures balance out to about one squad per hamlet. It can be argued that grouping these same squads into a platoon also satisfies the requirement for the village. However, III MAF's position is that the force requirement should be programmed in strict compliance with the formula. That is, program a platoon for each village in addition to a squad for each hamlet. This would change our force requirements for PF to 485 platoons and 2368 squads or approximately 1274 platoons throughout I Corps. This would change the PF authorized figure to 47,412 or an increase of 18,426. This would bring the total RF/PF requirements up to 65897 as opposed to the present authorization of 47,470.

d. A PF authorization of 47,412 presupposes government control of all villages and hamlets within I Corps. As an immediate objective, this figure is thus unrealistic. III MAF considers present authorized figures of 28,986 a reasonably attainable goal during 1966 and the figure of 47,412 as an attainable goal perhaps by 1968.

e. In discussing force requirements for the Popular Forces, consideration must be given to the future of Peoples Action Teams, the PF's greatest competitor for manpower. Since 1 December 1965, this force has come under the Ministry of Rural Construction and plans for employment have been altered. Present plans are to integrate the PAT into the new 80 man Rural Construction Group. Organization and strength remains the same but the name has changed from Peoples Action Team to Armed Propaganda Team. The Armed Propaganda Team comprises half of the Rural Construction Group, the other components being a four member Group Command Staff and three teams of twelve members each; Survey Team, Civil Affairs Team, and New Life Development Team.

f. The movement of the PAT into the Rural Construction Program is in consonance with III MAF recommendations. This change leads to another projection of related force requirements. The concept of employment of the Rural Construction Group is that this 80 man group can pacify a hamlet in three months. Thus 250 Rural Construction Groups or a force of 20,000 would be required to pacify all of the remaining hamlets in I Corps in approximately two years. This estimate is based on the fact there are 2368 hamlets in I Corps and approximately 545 are considered pacified. The Rural Construction Force of 20,000 is considered an optimistic goal for the

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year 1966 since only about 5,000 are presently available in the some 125 PAT now in existence in I Corps. Another condition is that PAT (Armed Propaganda Team) strength would remain necessarily constant in an area until a like number of cadre could be recruited, at which time recruiting would continue on an equitable basis for PAT and cadre.

g. The point is stressed that the buildup of the Rural Construction Groups must be closely coordinated with the ability of USMC/ARVN to clear areas for rural construction. At the same time creation of the Rural Construction Group does not reduce the requirement for Popular Forces but accentuates this requirement. The Rural Construction Group will not be able to move from a hamlet after three months unless an adequate Popular Force is available to provide security. Thus III MAF estimates on Popular Force requirements remain as previously stated.

h. The proposed pay and allowance scale for the Rural Construction Group (see enclosure 2) is sufficiently liberal to give hope that this force goal will be eventually attainable. At the same time this pay scale could be detrimental to recruitment for ARVN/RP/PF. This illustrates the necessity for concurrent effort to bring all of these pay scales into balance. Obviously difficulty will continue to be encountered in recruiting Popular Forces unless action is taken to improve the pay and benefits available to this force. (See enclosure 1).

3. SUMMARY

a. Present authorized strength of 18484 RF appears adequate and attainable in 1966.

b. The present authorized figure of 28986 PF does not adhere to the formula of a platoon for each village and a separate squad for each hamlet. Application of this formula would result in a Popular Force authorization of 47,412. The goal of 47,412 can perhaps be attained by the end of calendar year 1967. The present authorized allowance of 28986 appears reasonable and attainable in calendar year 1966.

c. Based on the number of hamlets in I Corps remaining to be pacified, a Rural Construction Group total figure of 20,000 (250 Groups) is considered an adequate and attainable goal.

Pay Comparison of RF-PF-ARVN

Monthly Pay

	<u>PF</u>	<u>RF</u>	<u>ARVN</u>
Plat Ldr			
2nd Lt (3 yrs Svc-Wife and 2 Children)			
Base Pay incl longevity)	1500	4050	4430
Command Allowance	500		
High Cost of Living Allowance*			
Zone 1	----	2660	2660
Zone 2	----	2250	2250
Family Allowance	----	850	850
TOTAL:			
Zone 1	2000	7560	7949
Zone 2	2000	7150	6530
Sqd Ldr			
Sgt I (4yrs Svc-Wife and 5 Children)			
Base Pay (incl Longevity)	1600	1772	1898
Command Allowance	300	----	----
High Cost of Living Allowance*			
Zone 1	----	3920	3920
Zone 2	----	3300	3300
Family Allowance	----	1600	1600
TOTAL:			
Zone 1	1900	7292	7418
Zone 2	1900	6672	6798
Pvt (1yr Svc-Wife and 2 Children)			
Base Pay	1400	1100	1100
High Cost of Living Allowance*			
Zone 1	----	1495	1995
Zone 2	----	1263	1688
Family Allowance	----	476	638
TOTAL:			
Zone 1	1400	3071	3733
Zone 2	1400	2839	3426
Pvt (1yr Svc-No Wife)			
Base Pay	1400	1100	1100
High Cost of Living Allowance*			
Zone 1	----	787	1050
Zone 2	----	675	900
TOTAL:			
Zone 1	1400	1887	2150
Zone 2	1400	1775	2000

* For the High Cost of Living Allowance, the Republic of Vietnam is divided into two zones, Zone 1 is basically the highlands, and Zone 2 the rest of the country,

ENCLOSURE (1)

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SCALE OF BASIC MONTHLY SALARIES FOR RURAL CONSTRUCTION GROUP

Step 1	2500 VN
Step 2	2700 VN
Step 3	2900 VN
Step 4	3100 VN
Step 5	3300 VN
Step 6	3500 VN
Step 7	3700 VN
Step 8	3900 VN
Step 9	4100 VN
Step 10	4300 VN
Step 11	4500 VN

FAMILY ALLOWANCE

Wife	525 VN
Each child (up to 5 children)	450 VN
All other children	200 VN

GVN CONCEPTS OF RURAL CONSTRUCTION

D. Ellsberg

21 February 1966

[This paper attempts only to express premises and ideas -- not always explicit in GVN official documents -- that form an underlying rationale of current GVN planning for rural construction: in particular for the "securing" phase. It does not provide a critique of this approach; nor discuss all the factors that bear on the adequacy and probable effectiveness of current programs; nor consider alternative approaches.]

Goals and Challenge

In a recent address, Prime Minister Ky described the aims of the rural construction process as succinctly as they have ever been stated:

"Our viewpoint is not only to root out the Viet Cong from the rural areas but also to root ourselves in the rural areas and this not only for some time, but forever."

To liberate the rural areas from Communist domination, by isolating and destroying the influence of the Communist political apparatus along with its guerrilla/terrorist backing; to restore public security, law and order; to extend the effective authority of the GVN; to create a social order of security, freedom, social justice and economic improvement that the rural people themselves will willingly and vigorously defend against Communist attempts at disruption: these are all goals of rural construction.

They can be achieved only by a process in which the people come to participate actively, along with the military, police and officials. The people must come to engage willingly in their own self-defense, self-help and self-government, in ways that isolate the Communists and make the people steadily less vulnerable to the Communist threats or appeals.

(C)

Winning this participation in turn demands new attitudes, competence and political awareness from the representatives of government -- soldiers, cadre, police and officials -- and a new relationship between the Government of Vietnam and its people: a relationship of mutual confidence and understanding, communication, mutual responsibility and support. It demands local government that comes from, thinks like, and is responsive to the majority of the population. And it demands the promise, steadily being fulfilled, of a new and better society.

These are ambitious aims. Such changes, carried to their end, would amount at the same time to military victory, political transformation and social revolution: and no one of these can be achieved in a major way without the other two. (Fortunately, they need not be achieved everywhere at once, nor does major progress demand full success in any one direction.)

As Prime Minister Ky has stated in a more recent speech, the non-military goals are ends in themselves:

"The war for the hearts of the people is more than a military tactic. It is a moral principle. For this we are trying to bring about a true social revolution. We are instituting a program for a better society."²

Yet if these political, economic and social changes were not at the same time essential to the winning of the internal war there would be strong argument for postponing them till the demands of the military campaign had been met. In the past, that argument has often prevailed. In Prime Minister Ky's words:

"We were deluding ourselves with the idea that our weaknesses could not be remedied while we were fighting a war. We said that once the aggressor was driven from our land we would turn to our own political and social defects.

It has taken this country a long time to realize that we will not completely drive out the aggressor until we make a start at eliminating these political and social defects. We must be indestructible, not vulnerable." 2

The foundation of current GVN thinking on rural construction is that these non-military measures are vital to success in the internal war; that military operations alone, while essential, can bring only temporary and provisional security to the countryside; that the revolutionary social and political changes are essential to achieving thorough and lasting security.

Why should this be? Why is so complex a strategy demanded? A large part of the answer lies in the bonds of mutual support between the Communist guerrillas and the Communist political apparatus elaborately embedded among the rural people. The familiar fish-and-water-analogy tends to conceal the crucial role of this political organization. The Communist guerrilla fish does not swim in an unorganized sea of people, whose support reflects spontaneous sympathy. Support for the guerrillas -- information, shelter, food, money, recruits -- is organized by a hierarchical network of disciplined agents built up over years from local people of the area, often more stable in membership than the corresponding GVN structure. In turn, the threat of guerrilla terrorism protects this "infrastructure" of informers and sympathizers and enforces the rule of Communist officials over many rural people of South Vietnam who do not want to live under Communism. To break this rule to shatter the organization, and to ensure that it cannot return are primary goals of the campaign against the Communists. The rural construction process -- in all its military, police, political, social, economic dimensions -- is designed to achieve them.

Phases of Rural Construction

The general strategy and intent of rural construction are not new. If current plans succeed better than past programs, it will be by better implementation, guided by past experience and failures and by a better understanding of the coherence of the program in all its aspects.

The functions of rural construction overlap in time but correspond roughly to three phases: "clearing," "securing" and "development."

The "clearing" process "aims at annihilating or chasing VC military local forces and main forces from the areas expected to be reconstructed."³ Its purpose -- along with the later military operations on the periphery of the zone -- is to lift the threat of guerrilla terrorism from the people of the area for a prolonged period, long enough for the work of later phases to proceed and take effect.

Primary emphasis is on small unit activity to saturate the area over an extended period of time, using day and night patrols, raids, hamlet searches, and ambushes, with larger unit operations to exploit intelligence gathered. Earlier -- prior to rural construction proper in the given area -- and then simultaneously in neighboring areas, regular and regional forces must have weakened and disrupted Communist ability to resist militarily the clearing process by less prolonged "search and destroy" operations against Viet Cong forces.¹⁴

Operations in this phase are predominantly military, aimed at Communist military forces. However, National Police, accompanying the troops into the area, should play an important role in

interrogation, gathering intelligence and developing intelligence nets; while correct troop behavior and simple military civic action must (in contrast to past performance) prepare public attitudes favorably for later government activity.

Efforts at rural construction in the recent past have commonly aborted at this first stage. Occupied in static defense and in contending with the growing Communist main force threat, troops have rarely been employed in the past two years in the sustained saturation tactics essential to "clearing." The presence of Free World military forces should now make RVNAF units available for this vital mission.

The second phase, "securing," aims at producing fundamental and lasting improvements in the security of the countryside and governmental authority over it. While regular and regional forces operate on the periphery of the zone and in neighboring areas to prevent VC units from returning, and small-unit operations continue within the area, the work of this period is predominantly non-military: political, police, psychological, economic, social. The targets are the Viet Cong political agents among the people, and the rural population themselves.

There are three main tasks: First, to discover and to destroy the influence of the Communist network of informers, propagandists and officials (whose customary guerrilla back-up force -- protecting them, enforcing their influence, and in turn supported by them -- has been at least temporarily inactivated by the "clearing" process). Second, to replace Communist or ineffective authority with democratic and effective local government, responsive both to the wishes of the rural people and to national authority. Third,

to motivate and organize the people to defend themselves and to resist the return of Communist influence.

The tactics of this phase, most complex of the three, will be discussed in the next section.

The third phase, "developing," is a "nation-building" process with no foreseeable end, in which social, economic and political activities continuously strengthen and improve the effectiveness of local government, bring increasing social justice, and better the conditions of life.

Such achievements where security permits -- and this includes the cities -- are instrumental to progress in the non-secure zones undergoing "clearing" or "securing," for they demonstrate visibly to people in those areas the benefits of living in a peaceful area under the authority of the GVN. It is by GVN performance in secure areas (and similarly, by GVN treatment of "its own": its pay and support to officials and soldiers, including injured and veterans, and their dependents) that GVN promises in insecure areas will be judged. As Prime Minister Ky has frequently pointed out, the GVN has in the past commonly failed this simple test of credibility.

Winning the People: The Securing Phase

The purpose of the securing period, summarized by the GVN Directive on Rural Construction Policies, is to:

"destroy VC political and military infrastructures, and concurrently consolidate or reconstruct our infrastructures; also, to liberate the people from Communist domination, help the people realize a sense of duty and rise up at will to preserve the restored security." 3

If anything is new in the spirit of the current GVN approach to rural construction, it is an increased understanding that the goals above cannot be reached by a mechanical process that is applied to the people or done for the people. It is essential to win the voluntary, active involvement of the rural people in their own self-defense, self-help and self government. The Directive on Rural Construction Policies emphasizes:

"Rural reconstruction is a work which the military, the people and the administrative officials must unite to accomplish. The most important and decisive factor for victory is the People. The missions of the military and administrative officials are only to help and direct the people, to motivate the people to realize the necessity and importance of rural reconstruction work, to assume this work and consider this work as that of the People, beneficial to the People and initiated by the People."3

At the same time, current plans reflect a new awareness of the difficulties of bringing about this active participation of the people, despite widespread antipathy to Communism. Their resistance to involvement reflects skepticism, apathy and fear, all rooted deep in bitter experience. These people have seen many government promises broken over the years: promises to remain, to protect them, to bring welfare benefits and social justice. They have seen Communist guerrilla presence outlast several pacification programs, many province chiefs and countless cadre. To such people, the participation that an effective rural construction program requires seems not only unrewarding but dangerous.

(c)

What is it that is demanded of them?

They must identify to local GVN officials the VC agents in their midst: the informers, the committee members, the tax collectors, recruiters, propagandists, the links to the guerrillas. They must report and resist the attempts of these agents to reenter, or even to operate "peacefully." They must pass on information about VC guerrilla movements and Communist activities. They must take active part in organizations and cooperative activities that exclude and isolate the Communists. Many of them must take up arms, train and be prepared to use them against VC intruders, while the rest prepare to cooperate in hamlet defense. Some must accept leadership posts in this continuing struggle.

Each one of these actions they take at the risk of their lives. For in taking such acts they begin visibly to choose sides; they begin to forego the relative safety of passivity and neutrality and expose themselves as active opponents of the Communists. By these acts they are committed; for they face death, if Communist guerrillas and agents should regain their strength. And no government can guarantee that the Communists will never return -- as they have, in the past -- because that depends heavily on the performance of the villager and his neighbors themselves, as well as on continued government support, which has never before been reliable.

Past "pacification" programs have failed in part because the risks seemed too great -- they were, in fact, great -- and

the rewards too small, too unlikely or distant, for the rural people to make the necessary commitment. They remained uncommitted, "neutral," doing only what they were told and that in a manner that could not stamp them as determined foes of the Communists. The programs failed, and the risks of resistance became still greater. There cannot be many more chances.

Prime Minister Ky has pointed to a fundamental defect of past efforts:

"We have had to fight external aggression from a base weakened by corruption, disappointment and mismanagement ... We were dying for a cause but we saw little evidence that that cause was worth laying down our lives for."²

If the people are now to choose the GVN side decisively, they must be shown it offers something they really believe in. Security that will still be there tomorrow. A just and honest local government they feel is theirs, that hears and acts on their needs. Greater social justice and a better life. A national government that deserves their loyal support, for which they feel they ought to accept some risk: a government represented by soldiers and police who feel and act as protectors of the people, and honest officials who feel and act as servants of the people.

The Rural Construction Cadre Group

The crucial tasks of the securing phase are thus to eliminate the VC control apparatus in the hamlets, dissolve the barriers of cynicism, indifference and apprehension left by past, failed, pacification campaigns, and to convince the people that it is

necessary and worthwhile for them to stake their lives by joining in the work of rural construction. Neither hand-outs nor government-imposed controls can do this. Nor can these tasks of persuasion, demonstration, police work and organization be carried out effectively by the sort of "cadres" generally available in the past: too often, lowly-paid, poorly trained, unmotivated functionaries from distant cities, uncoordinated, unsupervised and unarmed, afraid to stay in their assigned hamlets overnight. In effect, these frail resources reflected peacetime notions of the task of carrying on the work of government in the countryside: not the difficulties and dangers of combatting a large armed political conspiracy.

At the heart of recent planning for pacification is the concept of a new breed of cadre: adequately trained and paid, educated in the political aspects of their conduct and mission, coordinating essential specialties within a single team, armed for their own defense, working in their home districts and living in assigned hamlets day and night.

A standard Rural Reconstruction Cadre Group -- though numbers are flexible and would be tailored to local requirements -- will consist of leadership and staff (7), a People's Action Team (34), Census Grievance team (6), Civil Affairs team (6) and New Life Development team (6).⁵ The tasks of these elements are mutually supporting.^{5, 6} The group will be recruited from the district when it is to work, trained at National Training Centers in both common subjects (including weapons handling) and specialties, and returned to the command of their District Chief and Province Chief.

The team will move into an assigned hamlet as a unit, as soon as military clearing operations have made this possible. It provides from the beginning an armed government presence remaining in and around the hamlet capable of protecting themselves and helping to protect the people. All cadres will have been trained in the importance of their working manner and attitude in winning the people's confidence.

In the course of living with the villagers, working with them by day and talking to them at night, the People's Action team can find, and capture or drive out, the more obvious VC in the hamlet, and prevent VC efforts to return. The Census/Grievance team acts as a group of intelligence specialists who, by individual private interviews (required of all family groups, thus reducing the risk of retaliation for informers) gather data for a census, seek to discover in detail in detail (in conjunction with National Police) the identity of VC, VC-connected families and sympathizers; and learn the felt needs and grievances of the people on a continuing basis to guide the development work and improve local administration.

All cadres will be given an understanding of government pacification policies and the political goals of the struggle, to be passed on to the people (in particular, by the People's Action team). Meanwhile the Civil Affairs elements temporarily take over, if necessary, the village/hamlet administration, or assist existing governments. They urge the people to organize into groups to cooperate on a regular basis; a network of leadership, responsibilities and shared actions should evolve

to tie the hamlet together. Eventually, the team assists in organizing the election of a hamlet chief, administrative committees and villages' councils.

The New Life Development team shows the people the social and economic benefits the government offers, providing materials for self-help projects, organizing economic development projects such as road improvement and markets, bringing in technicians, improved seed and fertilizer, and assisting in providing social services such as schools and clinics.

By all these activities, the cadre are to establish continuing communication between the hamlet/village people and the provincial national government authorities. And they are to guide the people toward a new rural life, one they will feel impelled to defend by their own efforts. Roughly speaking, each step described above is prerequisite to the following ones, and together they lead to the central target of the securing process: the willingness of the local people to participate energetically in their own defense. When this point has been reached, the People's Action Team organizes and trains a people's self defense force, to prepare the people to protect themselves and to resist renewed VC demands for taxes, information, supplies, or recruits, mine-laying labor and silence.

The Rural Construction Cadre Group will stay in a hamlet, living in it day and night, until their fundamental tasks are completed; they might normally spend a year in a single village of three to five hamlets. There is no mechanical set of criteria that can define a hamlet as "pacified" or "secured"

(C)

in the desired sense. But there are some benchmarks relevant to the question of when an area is ready to move to the "New Life Development" phase.

In the rough order of their practical accomplishment, these minimum standards are:

1. Area cleared and defended: VC regular, guerrilla and local forces have been annihilated or chased from the area, and military forces are capable of defending the area and destroying any returning enemy units.
2. All people of the area interrogated, the interviews revealing, along with census data, their loyalty, their aspirations and complaints, and their support or criticism of hamlet officials and Communal Administrative Committees.
3. VC political organization identified and destroyed.
4. Self-help and development projects: A number of public health, educational, social and agricultural works have been done to satisfy temporarily immediate requirements of the people and to serve as foundation for development of the new future life.
5. Democratic local government established: hamlet chiefs and Communal People's Committees elected, and trained, qualified Communal Administrative Committees and Hamlet Officials in place.
6. People's self-defense active: the people having willingly organized into anti-Communist self defense groups of various categories and having organized self defense forces and Popular Force units.

Conclusion

This paper has set out the basic goals of the rural construction task. The particular process planned by the GVN and outlined above represents one possible approach to those goals. Whether this approach will be implemented as planned;

whether the concepts will prove feasible and sound; whether the scale of the effort -- size of forces, length and quality of training, supervisory and control efforts, numbers of cadre groups -- will be adequate for significant progress; all this remains to be seen. Past experience warns that a great deal depends on the understanding and acceptance at all levels of authority of the basic aims and concepts, and particularly on low-level implementation that is faithful to the spirit of the approach. Neither of these is assured at present.

Whether the goals of the "clearing" and "securing" periods, in particular, have been achieved in a fundamental sense can be revealed only in the spirit and behavior of the people and their officials. If the goals have been met -- if military forces, National Police and the Rural Reconstruction Cadre have succeeded in their missions -- the rural people will have come to believe that the GVN does mean to help them achieve a "new rural life," that they are not second-class citizens, that the government truly is, in Prime Minister Ky's words, "determined to do something for the rural areas, the areas which constitute the main and basic part of our nation."² They will have discovered a government that actually seeks out and listens to their needs, desires and grievances, and responds to them; they will feel that they have a part and voice in public affairs. Freed from the threat of large Communist units and the surveillance and coercion of Communist agents within, given the tools of self-defense and encouraged to govern themselves, they will have found a cause worthy of accepting the risks

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of commitment. They will do what is needed to protect their
freedom.

SOURCES

1. Prime Minister Ky's address to Armed Forces Congress, January 15, 1966.
2. Prime Minister Ky's statement at Conference of Vietnamese and US Officials, Honolulu Hawaii, February 7, 1966
3. Directive on Rural Reconstruction Policies, Central Rural Reconstruction Committee, Instruction No. 1535, 11 December, 1965.
4. RVNAF Joint General Staff Directive AB 140 December 1965
5. Special Statute on Rural Construction Cadre, Central Executive Committee Decree No. 137, 26 January 1966.
6. Temporary Directions Regarding the Organization and Administration of Rural Construction Cadres, Ministry of Rural Construction, 21 December 1965.

SLO:ELLSBERG;bjf

DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE IN REGION IINTRODUCTION

Eighty percent or more of the population of Region I, and eighty percent or more of the cultivated land, lies within 15 to 20 miles of the seacoast. It seems quite possible that this area may be cleared, secured, and pacified during the next eighteen months. There is thus the possibility that some form of trade or peace may be achieved. In either case, we should be thinking about an accelerated program of agricultural development.

It is generally recognized that, in order to win the peace in the Republic of Vietnam, it will be necessary for the GVN to win the support and participation of the rural population.

Traditionally Region I has been a food-deficit area. This need not be so in the future. The ratio of land and water resources to agricultural production is favorable. Agricultural production and rural income can be greatly increased through more efficient use of water and fertilizer, through crop diversification, through improved seed, and by the development of small family-sized livestock and poultry programs. The basic groundwork for improvement has been laid. As the security situation improves, development will occur at a rapid rate provided there is a reasonably effective program of GVN and foreign technical assistance.

1. BACKGROUND OF USOM ASSISTANCE1a. Institutional Development

Agricultural improvement in South Vietnam dates from 1955, following the Geneva Convention of 1954. The French Government had contributed the basic institutional framework but little more. The school of agriculture and school of veterinary medicine were at Hanoi, and few South Vietnamese had attended it. The GVN of 1955 provided for the conventional technical services at the Saigon level with their sector extensions at the province level. These included agriculture (agronomy and horticulture), animal production and forestry.

Although USOM had been represented since 1950, it got into an earnest program of institution building in South Vietnam in 1955.

a. Agricultural Schools

One of the first and most far-reaching USOM activities was to aid the GVN in setting up technical agricultural schools at Bao-Loc, Hue and Can Tho. Of 162 positions requiring technical training in the Ministry of Agriculture sectors in the I Corps area, 124 are filled by graduates of these schools. Although they leave much to be desired, the schools provide a source of personnel with fairly good technical orientation and an open mind, and this has permitted the development and expansion of the Ministry of Agriculture to where it is today.

b. Agricultural Research

USOM contributed the idea and guidance for the establishment of the National Agricultural Research Service, which could have been of more value to the I Corps area had some of the field stations been located here. However, the effort has been of great value, anyway. Over 30 improved crop varieties developed either in the United States or with USOM assistance in other countries have been tested and proven adaptable to South Vietnam. The increased yield of the new varieties is as much as 250 percent of traditional types in some cases.

c. Seed Multiplication and Distribution

The National Seed Board was established as a companion facility. As a variety is proven, it is put into multiplication by contract farmers, then sent to the provinces where it is multiplied again, then put into mass distribution.

d. Animal Production

Hogs were in such short supply in Central Vietnam in 1956 that a national decree was enacted prohibiting killing animals under 40 kg in weight. A similar decree prohibited killing cattle under 10 years of age unless they were sick or maimed.

A bacteriological and diagnostic laboratory, established with USOM assistance, began turning out adequate quantities of vaccines for most common animal diseases, including rinderpest and hog cholera, by 1958.

Over 6000 American type hogs were brought into the Delta region between 1955 and 1960, and in 1953-64, over 16,000 of their offspring were brought into the I Corps area. Although pork has been relatively high since the disruption of Highway 1 in November 1964, there are no slaughter restrictions today nor any critical shortage of pork, this in spite of a tremendous increase in urban population and the military boom.

e. Fisheries

A national fisheries service was established in 1957 with USOM assistance. Fish production increased five-fold, from 52,000 tons to 255,000 tons, between 1955 and 1962. This was accomplished primarily by making small, diesel engines available to fishermen for their junks. Fishermen are penalized now by a restriction placed on their movement by the GVN military for security purposes.

f. Extension

The Agricultural Extension Service was organized in 1955, and by 1963 there were officers in all provinces in the corps area. This was one of the leading agencies to bring agricultural improvement to the farmer.

L-T (L-H) clubs were organized throughout the corps area, attracting tremendous support from village leaders.

Home economics work was introduced in Thua Thien Province. This group has sponsored a large number of good and lasting community self-help projects.

g. Rural Credit and Cooperatives

The National Agricultural Credit Office (NACO) was established in 1957. In 1962 this agency made loans to 193,000 farmers in Vietnam, aggregating 560 million piasters.

The Central Committee for Farmers' Associations was established in 1958 and associations function in every province of the corps area today, all doubling as cooperatives.

2. The Advent of Pacification

a. Plant Protection

The Plant Protection Service was the first element of the USOM counterinsurgency program to be implemented. There was a drastic need for the service not being met. The need was recognized by the majority of the farming population. It was tangible and results were spectacular. All the benefits went directly to the farmer. It has been exceedingly successful, to the extent that it has become thoroughly institutionalized and perhaps taken for granted. Plant protection teams were trained and equipped, and they sprayed everybody's crops infested by insects. And this was accompanied by a crash extension education and demonstration campaign.

b. Fertilizer

It was decided in 1962 to include fertilizer in the pacification program. Although 130,000 tons of chemical fertilizer were brought into Vietnam in 1961 through the USOM commodity import program, it was all sold around Saigon and the Delta. In 1963, USOM donated 34,000 tons of high analysis fertilizer to CVN Lowlands farmers. About half of it went to the I Corps area. This was their first taste of chemical fertilizer. It was distributed through the Agricultural Extension Service, which did an outstanding job of education in the process.

Farmers bought 19,000 tons in 1964 and over 20,000 tons in 1965. This was handled by the Farmers Association and partially financed by NACO. This amount was less than half the estimated demand from the secure area.

Chemical fertilizer is unquestionably the most sought after of all rural area pacification items. Almost without fail, fertilizer is the first item requested by farmers in new clear-and-hold villages. It is no doubt the most important factor that can be added to the rural economy.

c. Pig-Corn Program

In 1962-63, a project was launched to help marginal farmers get into the hog business in a small way. NACO would finance the purchase of three improved pigs (offspring of the 6,000 imported American type) and enough corn (U.S. surplus) to raise them to eight months of age. The farmer would sell the two barrows to pay off the loan and keep the gilt to raise pigs. This put him in a different category as a farmer. It made him a capitalist and provided him with a continuing enterprise. A total of 16,300 pigs of improved breeding were brought into the I Corps area in 1963-64. The program broke down with the disruption of overland transportation from Saigon in November 1964. Although 8,000 tons of corn were brought into the region in 1965, it is suspected that very little will reach the pig pens. The demand for human consumption is too great.

The program was popular and successful while it lasted. The VC propagandized against it. It resulted in introducing a sufficient number of improved hogs to provide a fair base for an upgrading program. Pork production in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces has doubled in three years. The record in Da Nang is almost as good, while the other three provinces have made less progress.

d. Young Farmers Clubs

In 1963-64, the Quang Nam Extension Service organized 95 Young Farmers clubs with a total membership of 5,600. They held monthly meetings, discussing agricultural improvement and the like, and they maintained central depositories of agricultural literature. This organization was greatly disliked by the VC, who finally succeeded in breaking it up by kidnapping three provincial agricultural workers assisting the program.

e. Self-Help

The Home Demonstration clubs in Thua Thien Province and the H-T clubs throughout the region have, almost without exception, sponsored one or more community service self-help projects in every hamlet where they were represented.

The provincial home demonstration workers were (and still are) assisted in the hamlets by trained voluntary leaders (non-salaried). The hamlet H-T club projects were guided by village elders as sponsors.

The most popular community project was the public well. USOM furnished the shovels and cement and the clubs provided the labor. The buffalo wallow that had been the public water supply was dug out and curbed to provide a year-round supply of relatively improved water. Concrete-stepped river landings and wash places were second in frequency and popularity.

f. Home Garden Campaign

It was noted in 1964 that the family kitchen garden was not a traditional institution in the I Corps area. A round of training was held for 100 agricultural extension workers in the five provinces and, with 50 kg of seed, 4,000 demonstration gardens were planted. Work on a corps-wide campaign continued throughout 1965, with a goal of 100,000 gardens. Actually, the provinces acquired 9,300 kg of seed through the flood relief and rural construction budgets and from USOM. Of this amount, 4,400 kg has been planted since July. It is estimated that between 30,000 and 40,000 gardens resulted. The campaign is still in progress, although it is running about two months behind schedule.

The chief of Quang Ngai Province calls the activity his Victory Garden Campaign, tying it directly to his "Welcome Back" (clear, hold and pacify) program. He presides at most garden kit (seed plus five to 10 kg of fertilizer) distribution activities. Each seed packet bears a message from him admonishing the recipient to

grow the garden with care as a monument to victory over the VC. The packet includes a checklist on which the agricultural extension worker makes routine observations on his rounds of assistance.

There has been a noticeable increase in vegetable production in the corps area during the past year. Perhaps this could be expected with the importation of 10 tons of seed. However, the farmers did remarkably well at saving seed from the 1,000 demonstration gardens, which suggests that with extension assistance they may do a fair job of saving seed this year.

II. PROPOSAL

Following are some considerations and proposals which will influence our joint action. A three-phase program is envisaged.

Phase A

The primary objective of Phase A is to achieve pacification of the population in clear-and-hold operations. This involves establishing or re-establishing the flow of technical services from the provincial agricultural sector to the farm ("agriculture" is used in the broader, American sense to include agronomy, horticulture, animal husbandry, irrigation, farm machinery, forestry and fisheries). Farm production factors which have been tried and proven in predecessor activities, which are highly valued by the farmer and will yield quick results, will be emphasized. Among these are renewal of fertilizer sales and the distribution of genetically improved planting material, including the garden kit.

The principal figure in the activity is the village chief. In a typical situation, the chief of a clear-and-hold village is called on by the provincial agricultural sector chief who assures him of the support of the province in rehabilitating his people. An inspection of the area and a visit with the village notables reveals a food shortage. So it is decided that it would be appropriate to get good kitchen gardens started as soon as possible. The chief calls a village meeting a few days hence, and the district agricultural extension agent explains a typical garden kit (eight to ten improved varieties of seed and 25 pounds of high analysis fertilizer) and demonstrates successful methods of planting.

At this point village authorities register all who want the garden kit, taking their names and identification numbers. On a given date in the future the seed and fertilizer arrive in the village. The village authorities call a meeting and give out the seed, fertilizer and a selection of government pamphlets. Group activity is required to share hundred pound bags of fertilizer, community seedbeds and insect sprayers.

The people also want to buy fertilizer for their rice crops, which was denied them while they were under VC domination. So at a village meeting the extension agent makes a talk on the advantages of chemical fertilizer. Testimonials of satisfied users are solicited, and a Farmers Association representative takes orders for fertilizer. If he is not present, the village authorities take orders--name, identification number, area of paddyland and amount of order. Then on a given date the fertilizer arrives and the people pick it up and pay for it, or sign a note to pay two months after harvest.

These two activities, for example, put something in the hands of the rural people that they want very much. And in the process the activities give the government--village, provincial and national--the opportunity to make a promise and fulfill it. The district extension agent is resident and remains on to advise the people on improved methods of farm production.

It is proposed that Phase A activities be tied closely to military pacification priorities and activities. Also, territory secured by U.S. Special Forces must continue to receive Phase A support. Rather than refugees, as refugees are known in the lowlands, Special Forces are heavily burdened with voluntary resettlement. The Ba To, Gia Vuc, Ha Thanh, Tra Bong and Khe Sanh sites are cases in point.

Phase B

As the urgent task of pacification is achieved, the development of agricultural extension and service institutions should be undertaken. The material purposes of the institutions are, (1) disseminate technical information, (2) disseminate improved production resources, and (3) carry out community service projects.

The following districts are ready for Phase B treatment:

<u>District</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Cultivated Land (Hectares)</u>	<u>Percent under GVN Control</u>
<u>(Quang Tri Province)</u>			
Hai Lang	95,700	14,790	90
Thien Phuoc	84,700	12,320	90
Cam Lo	35,500	5,270	35
Gio Linh	34,000	6,610	75
Trung Luong	13,000	2,920	90
Huong Hoa	16,000	1,115	35
<u>(Thua Thien Province)</u>			
Quang Dien	57,400	10,800	100
Huong Dien	31,600	3,625	50
Huong Tra	56,000	7,280	90
Huong Thuy	76,000	7,400	90
Phu Vang	58,000	6,220	90
Phu Loc	52,000	5,850	10
Vinh Loc	43,000	2,040	90
Nam Hoa	10,000	532	60

1. Strengthening Farmers Associations

An effort will be made to strengthen the Farmers Associations to the extent that they may be more representative of the rural population and more responsive to its agricultural needs. There is need for creating a general awareness of this group.

a. It has been proposed that Farmers Association Cooperatives be organized in Phu Bai District, Thua Thien Province, Hua Vang and Huu Duc Districts in Quang Nam Province and Ly Tin District in Quang Tin Province.

b. It will be proposed that once the new cooperatives are organized, that they receive basic self-help assistance in building their warehouses. There is also a serious need to clear and expand the Farmers Association warehouses in Da Nang, a large proportion of which is currently occupied by ARVN.

c. It has been proposed that special training be conducted for Farmers Association representatives in selling and servicing farm accounts, thus increasing the efficiency and reach of the organization.

d. An attempt will be made to broaden the membership base of the Farmers Association cooperatives.

e. Efforts will be made to coordinate extension activities with the Farmers Association to provide it with a continuous educational program.

2. Intensify Extension Efforts

a. h-T Club work was well established throughout the region until the beginning of 1965, when security in Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces deteriorated to the point that the GVN h-T leaders could not hold meetings. Progress is still being made in Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces. In reviving this activity, a maximum effort will be made to bring out identification with the GVN, including the club ritual, flag ceremony and public service activities.

The officers and adult sponsors of all h-T clubs in the region will be given a week's special training in rural youth leadership. Continuation training will be carried on through monthly news letters.

b. Home improvement clubs will be continued in Thua Thien Province and expanded in Quang Tri, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai. Emphasis will be placed on food production and preparation for home consumption, child care, home improvement and community self-help.

c. Monthly village farm forums should be installed in all Phase B villages. Vegetable growers will be organized around Hue, Da Nang and Quang Ngai, sugarcane growers in Quang Ngai Province and swine producers in all five provinces.

d. Extension Information

A normal, complete, agricultural extension program anywhere in the world--the United States, Europe and Australia are examples--includes the following:

- Pay Wan
in Action*
- (1) Daily radio broadcasts lauding the virtues of whatever improved farm practice is being pushed (in our case, chemical fertilizer, improved seed and improved breeding stock, for example, with testimonials of satisfied users and plaudits to the source (the government)).
 - (2) Success stories in newspapers reaching every rural home.
 - (3) A direct mail education and information program that reaches each member of every farmers' organization at least once a month.

An institutional setup like this will get the information where it should go in a timely fashion. Every medium of communication listed above crosses the enemy lines. The question is, can such an effective rural communication system be developed in the I Corps area? The answer is yes. The radio stations and mimeograph machines are in the provinces. There are adequate printing facilities in the country that could be located in Da Nang or elsewhere in the area if needed.

3. Improve Farmland and Farming Methods

a. The GVN Agriculture Hydraulic Service has had a program of irrigation development underway in the region for a number of years. The biggest part of the activity has been the construction and maintenance of small earthen dams and lateral canals for seasonal distribution of irrigation water over the Lowland deltas. The dams are essentially temporary structures which are broken annually by the monsoon floods and must be repaired after the rains subside. Less than 10 percent of the 40 million piasters provided through the Rural Reconstruction program for continuing this activity in CY 1965 was actually spent. A large number of dam sites, both old and prospective, fell under enemy control during the January-August construction season. The number of irrigation engineers and controllers has been inadequate to plan and supervise construction. The immediate resumption of this activity

is essential for the economic stabilization of the rural population as the lowlands are cleared. To rehabilitate and expand the irrigation system in the territory secured in CY 1965, in each province, will require the maximum output of the Agriculture Hydraulic Service in CY 1966. However, scarcely any work will be accomplished unless the GVN engineering staff is supplemented. It is proposed that five resident irrigation engineers, 3rd Country contract, be located one in each province as technical supervisors of local design and construction.

b. Experiments carried out over the past three years have proven wind-powered, lowlift pumps effective in moving irrigation water from below-level ditches into the paddy field in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. It is proposed that 1,000 units be made available to the farmers of these two provinces in CY 1966.

c. Unit production can be greatly increased by the adoption of simple cultural practices which have proven superior to traditional farming in the region.

(1) The GVN Lowlands farmer uses static irrigation methods to impound pre-season rainfall on the crop land itself. Flow irrigation made possible by impounding and distributing stream water involves greatly different techniques which must be taught as the system is introduced. It is proposed that the provincial agriculture sector include irrigation methods in their extension programs.

(2) The effectiveness of chemical fertilizer on rice yield can be doubled by increasing the organic content of the soil. This can be done by planting crotonaria on a similar green manure crop immediately after harvesting a rice crop and turning it under as green manure before transplanting the next. Crotonaria grows very well in this region. The limiting factor is that the traditional wooden plow is incapable of turning under even a moderate growth of green manure. In 1965 the Taiwan Government gave 40 steel plows to each province, then followed up with demonstrations to prove that they would work. However, a follow-through program was not pursued by the agricultural sectors and the plows did not get into use. It is proposed that, using these 200 plows, 200 green manure demonstrations be carried out in CY 1966. Then, subject to the success of the demonstrations, it is proposed that beginning in CY 1967 a five-year campaign be launched to gain general acceptance of the steel plow and green manuring as standard in

farming operations. This will involve developing large-scale systems of manufacture and distribution of the plow and commercial production and distribution of the seed.

d. As meager as crop yields are for the region--one ninth that of commonly expected yields in the United States on the average--it is estimated that 20 percent is lost in harvesting and storage. This can be overcome by systematically testing and, with extension methods, selling the use of efficient but simple processes and machines to the farmers.

(1) The provincial agricultural extension sectors demonstrated 115 Taiwan rice threshers in 1965, which proved far superior to traditional methods in the saving of time and labor and in the reduction of waste. It is proposed that 1,000 Taiwan threshers be made available to Region I farmers in CY 1966.

(2) Taiwan farm-size rice hullers demonstrated along with the threshers proved equally successful. It is proposed that 1,000 Taiwan hullers be made available to Region I farmers in CY 1966.

(3) Region I farmers suffer significant waste in the crop drying process. Rice and other crops are spread along the road or other unfavorable locations, and there is a great loss from repeated spreading and picking up as well as from intrusions by vehicles and animals. Tests are under way to design an efficient drying floor within the means of the small farmer. Subject to results from current tests, 100 demonstrations will be launched in CY 1966, and an activity to gain general adoption of the practice will be proposed for FY 1967.

(4) Investigations of small unit grain storage will begin in CY 1966. Wide-scale demonstrations should follow in CY 1967, and the general adoption campaign should be launched in CY 1968.

4. Continue Crop Improvement

Over 30 varieties of crops developed either in the United States or with US AID assistance have been introduced to the region in the past five years proving far superior to local, traditional types. Among these are sweet potatoes, corn, peanuts, sugar cane, onions, tomatoes, sweet pepper, eggplant, cabbage and Chinese cabbage. Sufficient extension work has been accomplished to gain general acceptance of these crops.

a. It is proposed that variety performance testing be put on a systematic basis and intensified in the region.

b. It is proposed that contract multiplication and mass distribution of proven superior varieties be inaugurated.

c. It is expected that the GVN will allocate 3.2 million piasters through the Rural Construction program for the purchase of domestically produced seeds for continuation of the home garden program in CY 1966. It is proposed that \$90,000 in AID funds be provided for the importation of seed which are not produced domestically at present.

d. Selecting, harvesting and storing seed will be included in the agricultural extension program in CY 1966.

5. Continue Livestock Improvement

Livestock production in the region is largely a scavenger industry. As such, it is very important for it provides a market for farm products which would otherwise be wasted. And with the disruption of highway and rail transportation from the south, the region has been forced into self-sufficiency in livestock production.

The people hold livestock in high esteem. Any effort to assist in improving their animals is warmly received.

a. Although 6,000 U.S. type breeding swine were imported by USOM from 1954 to 1960 to upgrade hogs in the Delta, none were brought to Region I. The reasoning was that the Delta was a grain surplus area and this a grain deficit area. Approximately 16,000 descendants of the U.S. importation were brought into the region in 1963-64 through the pig-corn program. It is due to the increased efficiency of the American type hog that the region is achieving self-sufficiency in pork production.

The American type hog can be expected to reach 200 pounds weight by eight months of age on the type of feed available in the region, while a native Vietnamese pig on the same feed would reach 90 pounds at 12 months of age.

(1) The pig-corn program broke down completely in 1965 due to logistical failure. With the breakdown of Route 1, no more pigs could be brought up from the south. Corn for feed grain held too low a priority for shipment most of the year. A supply of breeding stock is needed to continue upgrading until the improved type is stabilized. It is proposed that 300 gilts and 50 boars be selected in the south and shipped to the region by special priority in CY 1966. The 300 gilts and 12 boars will be located in 12 hamlets to establish reliable sources of improved breeding stock. The remainder of the boars will be distributed throughout the region.

(2) An extension activity aimed at improving feeding methods will be launched in CY 1966. Emphasis will be placed on increasing the efficiency of farm by-products, including brewer's rice and garden waste.

(3) Efforts will be continued to increase hog production with military garbage in the Phu Bai, Da Nang and Chu Lai areas.

b. Incubation output at the Hue livestock station should be increased from 200 chicks a month in 1965 to 2000 a month in CY 1966, to supply breeding stock for all provinces. Primary emphasis will be continued on upgrading hamlet flocks by providing American breed roosters. (This is an outstanding Phase A activity, because it provides overt identification with the GVN--Rhode Island Red roosters).

c. Immunization against communicable disease, especially rinderpest and hog cholera will be continued.

Phase C

To achieve the long range objective of regional self-sufficiency in food and agricultural production, a ten-year program is proposed, beginning with planning and research in CY 1966 and advancing as military progress permits.

1. It is proposed that a modest but systematic plant breeding program be established in the region in CY 1966. Headquarters should be at Hue, although the office should supervise cooperative investigations throughout the region.

a. The Chinese Technical Agricultural Team at Hue will be encouraged to expand their activities to investigate more varieties and to conduct simple selective breeding work.

b. Work should be undertaken now to discover or develop an adequate number of rice varieties that respond favorably to fertilization and improved cultural practices in the region. The region now has no improved rice varieties.

2. Land Reform

Long-range field studies administered at the Saigon level should be initiated to describe the problem of land tenure and land needs of the rural population. These studies should propose a national land policy and a land reform program, which should be implemented as productive land for resettlement is secured and communications to it established.

A serious problem in Region I is overpopulation in the older villages along National Route 1. Bidding against one another for village-owned land, farmers pay as much as half the expected value of production for rice land rent. The solution to this problem is not to place a ceiling on rent or force the owner to sell, necessarily, but to develop fertile, underpopulated areas for resettlement. Prospective resettlement areas should be evaluated on the basis of fertility, accessibility and defensive characteristics. Then, priorities should be established for securing the area, building access roads and resettling farmers from overpopulated areas, beginning with refugees.

3. Irrigation and Land Development

After the cessation of hostilities, a regional irrigation and land development study should be made by a competent group, such as a U.S. land grant university contract team. The study should identify areas having promising agricultural potential and propose a development program. It should recommend a regional irrigation development project. This activity should be followed by implementation projects initiated by the GVN.

4. Fisheries Development

The fisheries industry of the region is severely handicapped by the restriction of movement required for military security and by the discontinuation of the importation of marine engines. These impositions are in the national interest, but it is equally in the national interest to rehabilitate and expand the industry as rapidly as security requirements permit.

a. It is proposed that a permanent regional marine fisheries laboratory be established at Da Nang in CY 1966. This should be a third country contribution.

(1) The first job of this activity should be to explore and describe the general problems of Region I fishermen. It could include, where appropriate, testing hypotheses concerning the improvement of methods and techniques.

(2) The second job is to propose a long-range fisheries development program for the region.

(3) The laboratory team should, through counterpart relations and on-the-job training, train Vietnamese replacements and turn the work over to the GVN by CY 1975.

b. The importation of marine engines should be resumed where security permits.

5. Marketing

As farm production and fishing increase, marketing facilities must be developed and improved.

- a. The influx in the Da Nang population requires the construction of slaughter facilities now. Funds are available through the Rural Construction program for this.
- b. Fish landing and marketing facilities should be constructed at Da Nang, Hoi An, Ky Ha and Quang Ngai in CY 1967, or when priorities for building materials permit.
- c. Efficient methods of transporting and handling agricultural products and fish must be developed and taught through extension activities.
- d. It is proposed that a market information program be set up, beginning in CY 1970.

6. Rural Electrification

With the introduction of rural electrification goes the obligation to make electricity safe and useful to rural people.

- a. Provisions should be made for the importation and sale of small electric motors, water pumps and home appliances.
- b. An extension specialist in rural electrification should be trained and assigned to each province to teach the use of electricity on the farm.

III. CONTRIBUTIONS

A. The GVN Effort

1. Organization

Each of the disciplines--agronomy, animal production, forestry, irrigation and fisheries--is represented from the national service level to the province. The agricultural and home economics extension service is also represented on the national and provincial levels. Each service has a staff of professionally trained personnel at the provincial level. The extension and animal production sectors reach the village through locally employed and trained agents or "cadre."

A measure of regional authority is needed for the effective functioning of the provincial sectors. A former Ministry of Rural Affairs proposed a regional representative of his office. This position should be established. A regional representative of the Ministry is needed to provide supervision of the provincial sectors, call regional meetings and sponsor regional training.

2. Budget

Each provincial sector has a regular operating budget assigned by the Saigon Service. And where they can use the money, the provincial sectors receive funds from the Rural Construction program. This is expected to amount to approximately 50 million piasters for the region in CY 1966, broken down as follows:

Personnel	10.0 million \$VN
Seed and planting material	3.2 " "
Livestock development	1.5 " "
Irrigation construction	26.0 " "
Operation and maintenance	9.3 " "

3. Personnel

a. As a rule, sector personnel are inadequately trained technically and administratively to fully discharge their responsibilities. This year they have proven patently incapable of managing GVN funds. So far they have not had sufficient contact with American counterparts for much professional improvement to result from that source.

b. The professional strength of the group is constantly eroded by the GVN military draft policy. As the young men finish their training in agricultural school they receive up to a year's deferment from military service, so they are given jobs as provincial sector chiefs. After a year or so on the job, they are drafted and replaced by a new crop of agricultural school graduates. There is a need for a national policy for the training and utilization of agricultural personnel.

It is recommended that the I Corps Command establish an agricultural section in the Civic Action (G-5) Branch. ARVN personnel with professional agricultural backgrounds can be assigned to this section and allocated as the need dictates to supervise Phase A agricultural activities.

c. The program is also hurt by the forced retirement of personnel at age 55. It is doubtful if the government can afford this luxury at this time.

d. Presently, the Ministry of Agriculture employs very few women in technical and supervisory positions, except in home economics, although women students at the technical agricultural schools receive the same training as do men. This policy should be changed. There is ample evidence that technically qualified women are capable of carrying out the work of agricultural sector personnel. The women of the home economics section of the Thua Thien

Province Extension Service supervise agricultural and hog production projects that rival any in the country, and they are accepted by the rural population on par with their male peers.

2. Professional Improvement

It is proposed that a family of in-service short courses be designed and offered at the regional and provincial levels to prepare the provincial agricultural personnel to carry out Phase A and Phase B activities. Training in these areas is needed:

- a. Indoctrination and orientation as to the role of the agricultural sector in the defense of the country.
- b. Rural youth leadership.
- c. Person-to-person and person-to-group communication--specifically, extension campaign methods.
- d. Mass communications, including farm and home radio and direct mail.
- e. Farm skills, including irrigation and cultural methods, seed production, swine production and chicken production.

B. U.S. Contributions Required

1. Seed

To support Phase A and Phase B of the proposed program requires the importation of U.S. seed at the magnitude of \$90,000 in CY 1966, \$100,000 in CY 1967, \$100,000 in CY 1968, \$50,000 in CY 1969 and \$20,000 in CY 1970.

2. Fertilizer

- a. Grant fertilizer for the support of Phase A activities is required at the rate of 2,000 tons a year for CYs 1966, 1967 and 1968.
- b. The demand for fertilizer in the cleared and secured areas in 1965 was over twice that received. The demand for 1966 could reach 60,000 tons. A strong effort will be made to schedule the arrival of the maximum quantity that can be offloaded and distributed. A strong appeal is made to grant fertilizer preferential logistical treatment. Every ton of fertilizer that gets to the farm, results in four extra tons of rice.

IV, SIGNS OF PROGRESS

The prospects for 1966-67 look very good. We should be able to hold our own and make substantial improvements on the activities now in progress. The chances of keeping up a steady arrival of fertilizer at Farmers Association capacity, up to the rainy season, appear fair. There has been a change of policy permitting the Farmers Associations to use their proceeds from fertilizer sales to improve their distribution facilities instead of turning it over to Rural Construction. So, with self-help assistance, they should be able to increase their warehouse capacity.

The provincial seed budgets for 1966 have been approved by the Rural Construction Ministry. There are some American seeds already on hand and more will be requested.

Another year's increase in improved hogs will have taken place.

Provincial, district and village leaders are taking a much more active part in the agricultural program than they did a year or more ago. There is a much greater involvement in agricultural activities by U.S. and GVN military forces. There are three U.S. military personnel actively engaged in agricultural advisory work.

Three new USOM area agricultural advisory positions have been approved, and the personnel are under recruitment. They will be located so that they render maximum assistance to the priority areas. However, these will be few in number in relation to the problems they will face and in relation to the agricultural population. Their time would not be well spent by working directly with farmers. They must devote their time to "training trainers" in order to achieve the maximum multiplying effect. They will work with and through the provincial agricultural services.

The work of these USOM agricultural specialists can be greatly enhanced if combined with the work of those members of the MACV Sector and Sub-Sector staffs, and Marine Civic Action Teams, who have some knowledge of agriculture, and have time to devote to civic action. Plans for assistance in agricultural development must be closely coordinated with tactical operations.

On the other hand, the number of IVS workers in the Corps area will decrease from five in 1964 to one in 1966. It is becoming increasingly difficult to recruit IVS workers for Vietnam.

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SYNOPSIS OF THE NGU-HOANH-SON-CAMPAIGN

INTRODUCTION:

IN SEPTEMBER 1965, QUANG NAM PROVINCE WAS DESIGNATED A SPECIAL SECTOR, REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE I CORPS COMMANDER. SIMULTANEOUSLY, LT COL TUNG, THE I CORPS DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, WAS APPOINTED PROVINCE CHIEF OF QUANG NAM.

9-VILLAGE PACIFICATION PLAN:

IMMEDIATELY UPON ASSUMPTION OF HIS DUTIES, LT COL TUNG MADE THE DECISION THAT THE RURAL CONSTRUCTION PLAN FOR THE BALANCE OF 1965 WAS AN UN-REALISTIC, UNATTAINABLE GOAL. HE THEN DRAFTED A PLAN TO PACIFY 9-VILLAGES DIRECTLY TO THE SOUTH OF THE DANANG AIRBASE. THE CHOICE OF THIS SPECIFIC AREA WAS BASED UPON SEVERAL FACTORS:

- A. THE NECESSITY TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE VITAL INSTALLATION AT DANANG AIRBASE.
- B. A REQUIREMENT TO APPLY THE "OIL SPOT" CONCEPT TO THE DANANG AREA AND MOVE SOUTHWARD TO JOIN HOI-AN.
- C. THE 9-VILLAGE AREA HISTORICALLY HAS BEEN A VC STRONGHOLD, AND ANY SUCCESS IN PACIFICATION IN THIS AREA COULD SET A PATTERN FOR FUTURE PROJECTS.

TUNG'S PLAN, DEVELOPED WITH THE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE OF THE MACV AND USAID ADVISORS, WAS A VERY DETAILED ONE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN TWO PHASES.

PHASE I - THIS INCLUDED THE PACIFICATION OF FIVE VILLAGES AND TWENTY-ONE HAMLETS IN THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE PACIFICATION AREA. POPULATION - 25,000 PLUS. THIS PHASE WAS TO BE COMPLETED INITIALLY BY 31 NOVEMBER 1965.

PHASE II - WAS A PLAN TO PACIFY 4 VILLAGES AND 19 HAMLETS TO THE EAST OF THE 5-VILLAGE PHASE. POPULATION-17,000 PLUS. THIS PLAN WAS TO COMMENCE AS SOON AS PHASE I WAS COMPLETED.

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PACIFICATION TROOPS:

TUNG MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PACIFICATION HEADQUARTERS, THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL -

A. 59TH RF BN - THIS WAS THE MAJOR UNIT IN THE PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN AND CONSISTED OF A HQ. CO AND 3 LINE COMPANIES. THE INITIAL STRENGTH OF THE LINE COMPANIES WAS APPROXIMATELY 60% OF AUTHORIZED STRENGTH.

B. 703D RF CO - THIS UNIT IS A SEPARATE COMPANY, THAT WAS ASSIGNED TO THE EFFORT SOME TWO WEEKS AFTER THE CAMPAIGN BEGAN. IT ALSO WAS AT APPROXIMATELY 50 -60% OF AUTHORIZED STRENGTH.

C. POPULAR FORCE - THE GREATEST DISCREPANCY IN TYPE FORCES WAS IN THE PF AVAILABLE FOR THE CAMPAIGN. THE PROGRAM STARTED WITH FOUR PLATOONS OF VARYING STRENGTH FOR A TOTAL OF 84 PERSONS. THIS IS ABOUT 1/7 OF WHAT IS REQUIRED.

D. PEOPLES ACTION TEAMS (PAT) - FIVE PAT PLATOONS WERE ASSIGNED TO THE CAMPAIGN, ONE PLATOON TO WORK WITH EACH OF THE FIVE RF COMPANIES. OF THE ORIGINAL FIVE, THREE WERE FROM HOA VANG DISTRICT, ONE FROM HIEM NHON DISTRICT, AND ONE FROM DIEN BAN. THESE PLATOONS ARE AUTHORIZED 40 PERSONNEL PER PLATOON, HOWEVER REPORTED WITH AN AVERAGE PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH OF 35.

E. RURAL CONSTRUCTION CADRE - 327 MOBILE ACTION CADRE (MAC) WERE ASSIGNED TO THE CAMPAIGN UPON COMPLETION OF A SPECIAL TWO WEEK TRAINING COURSE. THE CADRE WERE BROKEN DOWN INTO 11-MAN TEAMS AND ASSIGNED TO WORK IN SPECIFIC HAMLETS. A SMALL CADRE HEADQUARTERS IS BASED IN EACH VILLAGE AND THE MAIN CADRE CP IS LOCATED WITH THE CAMPAIGN CP.

F. CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAMS - FIVE TEAMS WERE ASSIGNED - ONE FOR EACH VILLAGE; WITH THE MISSION TO SUPERVISE THE CADRE WITHIN THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. EACH TEAM HAS ONE OFFICER AND TWO ENLISTED PERSONNEL.

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G. MOBILE PSYWAR/CA TEAMS - ONE SUCH TEAM IS ATTACHED FROM THE 1ST CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY. TEAM IS COMPOSED OF A TEAM LEADER, A MEDICAL SECTION (2 USMC AIDMEN AND ONE ARVN DOCTOR), AN AGRICULTURE ENGINEER SPECIALIST, A CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION OF TWO PERSONS, AND A PSYWAR SECTION CONSISTING OF A 5-MAN/WOMEN DRAMA GROUP. MISSION - PROPAGANDA - CIVIC ACTION.

H. HAMLET SURVEY TEAM - ONE 13-MAN TEAM IS ASSIGNED TO WORK AS A "SOUNDING" ELEMENT TO FERRET OUT THE FEELINGS OF THE LOCAL POPULACE. THIS IS A JUSPAO TRAINED UNIT.

I. CENSUS GRIEVANCE TEAM - ONE 3-MAN TEAM.

THE OVERALL PACIFICATION COMMANDER APPOINTED BY THE PROVINCE CHIEF, WAS A LOGICAL SOLUTION SINCE THE PACIFICATION COMMANDER WAS RESPONSIBLE DIRECTLY TO THE PROVINCE CHIEF, THE MAN WHO COULD PROVIDE HIM WITH ASSETS. IT ALSO PROVIDED A COMMANDER WHO HAD CONTROL OF ALL FORCES AND ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE AREA.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES (NOV - EARLY DEC)

A. 18 OCT 65 - THE 59TH RF BN DEPLOYED IN THE PHASE I AREA AND BEGAN SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE 5-VILLAGE AREA. THIS WAS A FIVE DAY OPERATION DESIGNED TO FORCE VC MAIN ELEMENTS OUT OF THE AREA AND FAMILIARIZE TROOPS WITH THE GROUND UPON WHICH THEY WERE TO OPERATE.

B. 20 OCT 65 - THE FIVE PAT PLATOONS REPORTED TO THE CAMPAIGN HEAD-QUARTERS IN MIEU BONG, AS DID THE FOUR PF PLATOONS.

C. 1 NOV 65 - THE 327 CADRE COMPLETED THEIR SPECIAL INDOCTRINATION COURSE AND RECEIVED CERTIFICATION FROM THE PROVINCE CHIEF. ON 2 NOV 65, THEY REPORTED INTO MIEU BONG.

D. 3 NOV 65 - THE CAMPAIGN COMMANDER ASSEMBLED KEY OFFICERS OF THE 59TH RF BN, PF PLATOON LEADERS, PAT PLATOON LEADERS, THE KEY CADREMAN, PSYWAR/CA CHIEFS, AND HAMLET AND VILLAGE CHIEFS, TO ORIENT ALL ON THE PLANS FOR ACCOMPLISHING THE PROGRAM.

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E. 4 NOV 65 - THE CADRE WAS DIVIDED INTO 11-MAN TEAMS AND ASSIGNED TO SPECIFIC HAMLETS. UPON ARRIVAL AT THE HAMLETS THE TEAMS WERE FURTHER BRIEFED BY VILLAGE AND HAMLET CHIEFS.

F. THE INITIAL VC ACTIVITY WAS CONFINED TO HARASSING TYPE ACTIONS, SMALL 3-5 GUERRILLA INTERDICTION, MINING OF ROADS AND TRAILS, AND SNIPING.

PAT PROBLEMS:

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN, PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED WITH THE PAT PLATOONS. THESE PROBLEMS WERE GENERALLY ATTRIBUTED TO TWO MAJOR AREAS (A) THE FACT THAT PAT WERE EMPLOYED AS SECURITY FORCES RATHER THEN IN THIER ROLE OF PACIFICATION CADRE, AND (B) DISCREPANCIES IN PAY PROCEDURES THAT RESULTED IN SEVERAL MEMBERS NOT BEING PAID. WHATEVER THE CAUSE, MANY PAT MEMBERS DESERTED, AND AT ONE TIME 20 DESERTED FROM ONE PLATOON AND 5-6 EACH FROM THE FOUR OTHER PLATOONS. SOME OF THESE PERSONNEL RETURNED, SUBSEQUENTLY.

PACIFICATION RESULTS (FIRST 6-7 WEEKS)

THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM MADE STEADY PROGRESS IN THE EARLY PERIOD OF THE CAMPAIGN. TEAMS IN THE HAMLETS FOUND THE POPULATION WAS CHANGING FROM AN ATTITUDE OF HOSTILITY, FEAR OR APATHY, TO A POINT WHERE THEY BECAME FRIENDLY AND APPARENTLY FELT THE GVN WAS ABLE TO PROVIDE A MEASURE OF SECURITY. IT WAS DURING THIS PERIOD THAT MANY PEOPLE BEGAN PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE RELATIVE TO VC SUSPECTS, CACHES OF WEAPONS, FOOD, DOCUMENTS AND CLOTHING, AND ASSISTED IN DESTROYING CAVES, TUNNELS AND FORTIFICATIONS.

THE CADRE THEN BEGAN DESTRUCTION OF THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE, ORGANIZED THE REMAINING PERSONS INTO AGE GROUPS, CONDUCTED ELECTIONS FOR AGE GROUPS, COMPLETED THE CENSUS OF THE ENTIRE FIVE VILLAGES AND SET UP POLICE CHECKPOINTS TO ASSIST IN POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL. PROPAGANDA EFFORTS WERE AIMED AT DESTROYING VC SIGNS AND SLOGANS AND PROMOTING THE GVN THEMES. SOME SELF-HELP PROJECTS COMMENCED SUCH AS MINOR ROAD BUILDING, CONSTRUCTION OF BRIDGES,

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CULVERTS, DIKES AND MARKET PLACES. IT WAS DECIDED AT THIS TIME TO SET A NEW DATE FOR COMPLETION OF PHASE I - 31 DEC 65.

MAJOR VIET CONG ACTIVITY -

ON 26 NOV 65, AGENTS REPORTED THAT SOME 400-ODD VC WERE TO INFILTRATE THE PACIFICATION AREA IN 3-5 MAN GROUPS TO HARASS AND TERRIFY THE POPULATION. 27 NOVEMBER AN ESTIMATED 40-MAN VC FORCE ATTACKED THE 592D RF CO IN THE VICINITY OF HOA THAI AND KILLED 3 RF SOLDIERS; 5 RF WIA, 2 CADRE KIA, 3 CADRE MIA (2 WOMEN), WEAPONS LOST, 1-60MM^M MORTAR (6ORDS), 5 RADIOS, 3 CARBINES AND 2 CAL .45 PISTOLS. MORALE OF THE CADRE AND THE POPULATION TOOK A SHARP TURN DOWNWARD, HOWEVER THE CAMPAIGN COMMANDER BY HIS PRESENCE ALONE, PERSUADED THE CADRE TO RETURN AND ORDER WAS RESTORED. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT SIGNIFICANT USMC UNITS WERE INTRODUCED INTO THE AREA TO BOLSTER SECURITY.

COMMAND CHANGES -

ALSO AT THIS TIME THE CAMPAIGN COMMANDER WAS SENT TO THE UNITED STATES TO ATTEND SCHOOL, AND THE DISTRICT CHIEF OF HOA VANG DISTRICT WAS APPOINTED COMMANDER IN ADDITION TO HIS MANY OTHER DUTIES. ALTHOUGH CAPABLE, THE TWO POSITIONS PROVED TO BE TOO MUCH FOR ONE MAN.

FURTHER PROGRESS -

IN SPITE OF VC ACTIVITY AND COMMAND PROBLEMS SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS CONTINUED TO BE MADE. MANY SCHOOLS WERE RESTORED, RESUPPLIED AND OPENED; A NEWSPAPER WAS ESTABLISHED; THE MEDCAP PROGRAM SHOWED REMARKABLE RESULTS; SANITATION CLASSES WERE CONDUCTED RESULTING IN IMPROVED CONDITIONS; MORE CONSTRUCTION WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND HAMLET CHIEFS AND HAMLET ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEES WERE ELECTED OR SELECTED.

FURTHER VC ATTACKS -

PRIOR TO CHRISTMAS (21 DEC) THE VC WITH A FORCE OF SOME 40-60 WELL ARMED TROOPS ATTACKED THE 593D RF CO IN CAM NE. THE RESULTS WERE 7 FRIENDLY KIA, 10 WIA, 5 MIA AND MANY WEAPONS, RADIOS AND EQUIPMENT LOST. RUMOR HAS

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IT THAT THE VC INFILTRATED INTO CAM NE, WERE HIDDEN BY THE LOCAL POPULACE AND ATTACKED ABOUT 0300 HOURS. CAM NE HAS LONG BEEN A SORE SPOT AND IS POPULATED WITH PEOPLE WHO ARE EITHER VC OR VC SYMPATHIZERS.

ARVN REACTION TO ATTACK -

THIS ATTACK CAUSED GENERAL THI TO TAKE DRASTIC MEASURES TO IMPROVE SECURITY. HE ORDERED THE 51ST ARVN REGIMENT INTO THE AREA AND APPOINTED THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER IN CHARGE OF ALL PACIFICATION TROOPS. ONLY THREE ELEMENTS OF THE 51ST WERE IN THE PACIFICATION AREA, THE REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS AND TWO LINE COMPANIES. THE BALANCE OF THIS FORCE (2 BNS) ARE OUT OF THE AREA ON NORMAL OPERATIONS. GEN THI ALSO ORDERED THE 39TH RANGER BN INTO THE AREA TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SECURITY.

VC ATTACK -

THE LAST VC INTERFERENCE IN THE PACIFICATION AREA OCCURRED 15 JANUARY WHEN A STRONG VC FORCE ATTACKED THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF ^{THE} AREA NEAR QUA GIANG. THIS RESULTED IN FRIENDLY - 11 KIA, 11 WIA, 17 MIA AND THE LOSS OF WEAPONS AND RADIOS. AN ESTIMATED 40 VC WERE REPORTED EITHER KILLED OR WOUNDED.

TET INACTIVITY -

IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO, DURING, AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER TET; NO PROGRESS WAS MADE. NO GROUND WAS LOST, SINCE THE VC ALSO OBSERVED TET, HOWEVER ALL PACIFICATION WAS AT A VIRTUAL STANDSTILL. MOST CADRE AND PAT ARE NOW BACK ON THE JOB AND PROGRESS SHOULD BE SIGNIFICANT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE DIRECTOR OF THE PACIFICATION PROJECT INDICATES THAT MANY SELF-HELP PROJECTS ARE UNDERWAY AND MANY MORE HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY VILLAGE AND HAMLET RESIDENTS.

PROBLEM AREAS -

THERE ARE ALWAYS PROBLEMS INHERENT TO PACIFICATION AND THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF THE 9-VILLAGE CAMPAIGN DUE TO THE MANY YEARS THIS HAS BEEN A VC STRONGHOLD. CONSIDERED TO BE THE MAJOR PROBLEMS ARE THE SIX LISTED -

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1. COMPLICATED COMMAND STRUCTURE: THIS IS A CRITICAL PROBLEM AND HAS RESULTED IN A LOSS OF THE EARLY MOMENTUM THAT WAS ENJOYED WHEN A SINGLE CAMPAIGN COMMANDER REPORTED DIRECTLY TO THE PROVINCE CHIEF. QNSS IS A COMPLICATED STRUCTURE IN ITSELF, AND BY MOVING THE 51ST REGIMENT INTO THE PACIFICATION AREA, IT HAS BEEN FURTHER COMPLICATED.

ACTION: THE ADVISORY EFFORT IS PRESENTLY DRAFTING A RECOMMENDED CHANGE TO BOTH THE QNSS COMMAND STRUCTURE AND THE 9-VILLAGE STRUCTURE.

2. SHORTAGE OF SECURITY TROOPS: FROM THE BEGINNING THE PACIFICATION EFFORT HAS BEEN PLAGUED BY A SHORTAGE IN PERSONNEL - RF, PF, PAT AND CADRE. THE RF HAS NEVER BEEN BETTER THAN 60%, PF IS PRACTICALLY NON-EXISTANT, AND THE PAT ARE CURRENTLY AT SOMETHING LESS THAN 50% OF AUTHORIZED STRENGTH.

ACTION: THE ADVISORY EFFORT IS GEARED TOWARD FILLING THE RF UNITS TO FULL STRENGTH, THE RECRUITMENT OF PF OUTSIDE OF THE 9-VILLAGE AREA, BUT WITHIN HOA VANG DISTRICT AND FILLING THE PAT UNITS. IF THIS COULD BE AFFECTED, THE TWO ARVN UNITS THE 51ST REGIMENT AND 39TH RANGER BN COULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. ARVN LINE UNITS ARE ILL-SUITED TO PACIFICATION.

3. PF PROBLEM: THE CENSUS OF THE 5-VILLAGE DISCLOSED THAT MOST RESIDENTS ARE OLD PEOPLE OR VERY YOUNG. THE PF ELIGIBLE PERSONNEL HAVE EITHER BEEN RECRUITED BY THE VC, HAVE MOVED OUT OF THE AREA TO AVOID BEING RECRUITED BY THE VC, OR THEY ARE MAIMED OR OTHERWISE INFIRM. THIS IS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM TO OVERCOME.

ACTION: NONE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO DATE. EFFORTS TO OBTAIN BETTER PAY, UNIFORMS AND ALLOWANCES FOR THE PF HAVE MET WITH COMPLACENCY. THEREFORE, EVEN IF PF ELIGIBLE PERSONS WERE AVAILABLE, THE BETTER PAID SERVICES WOULD DRAIN THEM OFF. SUPPLEMENTAL ITEMS SUCH AS BLANKETS, RICE, BULGAR, COOKING OIL, RAINCOATS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO EXISTING PF UNITS IN AN EFFORT TO

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BOLSTER MORALE AND PAY, AND AID IN RECRUITING. THIS PROBLEM IS STILL BEING WORKED ON.

4. INCREASED VC OPPOSITION: THIS PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH ACUTE, IS A SIGN OF SUCCESS IN THE AREA. AS THE PACIFICATION PROGRESSES, SO DOES THE VC HARASSMENT, INDICATING THAT THEY ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE PROGRESS.

ACTION: ADDITIONAL USMC UNITS HAVE BEEN INITIATED INTO THE AREA TO OPERATE AS SECURITY FORCES. IN ADDITION, A MAJOR EFFORT TO SECURE THE PERIMETER IS IN PROGRESS.

5. PAT-CADRE: THE CURRENT PAT AND CADRE ARE NOT ADEQUATELY TRAINED AND IN MANY CASES ARE INEPT AND VIRTUALLY USELESS.

ACTION: THE NEW 59-MAN RURAL CONSTRUCTION CADRE SHOULD ALLEVIATE THIS PROBLEM, HOWEVER THE PERIOD OF TRAINING TAKES SOME 10-14 WEEKS AT THE VUNG TAU TRAINING CENTER SO THIS WILL NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED OVERNIGHT.

6. PROVINCE CHIEF REMOVAL: IT HAS BEEN RUMORED THAT LT COL TUNG, THE QNSS PROVINCE CHIEF WILL BE REPLACED AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE. THIS IS AS A RESULT OF MANY THINGS, BUT PRIMARILY CONFINED TO THE FACT THAT TUNG IS A DYNAMIC, FORCEFUL INDIVIDUAL WHO STEPS ON MANY TOES AS HE DRIVES TO IMPLEMENT ANY PROGRAM. HE BECOMES IMPATIENT WITH PERSONS WHO CANNOT OR WILL NOT REACT AS FAST AS HE DOES. ALSO, HE IS OPPOSED BITTERLY BY THE VNQDD PARTY, MANY OF WHOM ARE MEMBERS OF HIS PROVINCIAL STAFF. TUNG HAS NOT MADE FRIENDS, AND WILL PROBABLY BE REMOVED TO SATISFY POLITICAL DISSENTS. THIS IS A PITY, FOR THIS MAN APPEARS TO BE THE RIGHT INDIVIDUAL FOR THE JOB.

ACTION: NONE. GEN THI CANNOT BE SWAYED IN AN AREA SUCH AS THIS, HOWEVER, IF IT IS TRUE THAT TUNG IS BEING RELIEVED, IT SHOULD BE SOON FOR NOT MUCH WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING THE "WAITING PERIOD".

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SUMMARY:

IN SPITE OF THE PROBLEMS, VC ACTIVITIES, TET AND HEAVY RAIN, PROGRESS HAS DEFINATELY BEEN MADE IN THE 5-VILLAGE AREA. PERSONS MAY NOW VISIT ALL OF THE HAMLETS DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS AND MANY AT NIGHT WITH A SENSE OF SECURITY. THIS WAS NOT TRUE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN IN EARLY NOVEMBER.

Prepared By:

6 February 1966

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