


CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222



MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: GVN 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

1. Attached is the English translation of the GVN 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. The Plan includes the basic Guidelines published by the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) and eighteen supporting annexes, which contain input from the ministries chiefly responsible for the program involved. The Plan, with annexes, has been approved by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the entire Cabinet, and thus supersedes any earlier ministerial directive in conflict with it.
2. Since this is a translation of a Vietnamese document, the English may be somewhat stilted in certain portions. We have left the translation as literal as possible, consistent with adequate communication of the policies involved. In the event differences are found to exist between the two versions (Vietnamese and English), the Vietnamese version will of course prevail.
3. Some of the annexes are not yet complete (e. g. Land Reform), as the necessary data were not available at the time of publication. However, as missing data are received, or as new policies or procedures are formulated, or old ones changed, amendments will be published and distributed. If clarification of any points of policy or procedures or more definitive guidance is required, you are encouraged to submit proposals to the ACofS, CORDS, MACV.
4. The Pacification and Development Plan and the Combined Campaign Plan, AB 145, complement one another. The Pacification and Development Plan is, however, the authoritative document on pacification policies and where minor variations occur, the Pacification and Development Plan governs.
5. Provision has been made, as in 1969, for the Province Chief and

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
 SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
 INCLOSURE(S)

CONFIDENTIAL

IDA 71-131 393

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: GVN 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

the Province Senior Advisor to sign the Province Plan jointly. This joint signing illustrates the importance of the Plan and the coordinated GVN US effort called for in its execution.

6. This document will be regarded as guidance, directive in nature to advisory personnel at all echelons. While it is a GVN document, it has been thoroughly coordinated with MACV. I strongly indorse the GVN 1970 Pacification and Development Plan and request your full support in its implementation.



CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS
General, United States Army
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
See Attached Sheet

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
INCLOSURE(S)

2

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION LIST

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Number of Copies</u>
JCS	10
CoISA	2
CSAF	2
CNO	2
CMC	2
DIA	2
CINCSTRIKE	2
Cmdt, ICAF	1
Cmdt, Nat'l War College	5
Cmdt, Army War College	5
CDC, Ft. Belvoir	5
USMA	5
USNA	5
USAFA	5
Mil Hist	1
Civil Affairs School, Ft. Gordon	5
CG, USCONARC	1
OSD/ISA VN Desk	3
USA JFK CEN SPWAR	3
Cmdt, USCG	1
White House	3
AID, Wash DC	15
USIA	3
CIA, Wash, DC	5
Department of State	3
Foreign Service Institute	5
VN Trn Center, Wash DC	20
COMUSMACV	1
Dep. to COMUSMACV	1
Dep. to COMUSMACV CORDS	10
Chief of Staff	1
SJS	1
J-1	1
J-2	1
J-3	1
J-4	3
J-5	1
J-6	1
CORDS	1
AG	72
MACOI	1
MACPD	1
MACT	1

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Number of Copies</u>
MACDC	1
MACFWMA	1
MACMA-AL	5
MAC SOG	1
MACIG	1
MACSA	1
SJA	1
CG, USARV	34
Commander, 7th AF	3
COMNAVFORV	3
CG, III MAF/SA I CORPS	65
CG, I FFORCEV/SA II CORPS	65
CG, II FORCEV/SA III CORPS	71
CG, XXIV CORPS	3
CG, DMAC	67
CG, CMAC	1
MACV Comptroller	1
Province Senior Advisor (3 ea)	132
Municipal Senior Advisors (3 ea)	12
SCAG	3
District Senior Advisors	252
525th MI Gp	1
SA Abn Gp	1
Railroad Security Advisory Det, APO 96243	1
TMA	1
DCA-SAM	1
5th SF Gp (Abn)	5
AF Adv Gp	2
American Embassy, Saigon	5
JUSPAO	5
USAID	15
CINCUSARPAC	5
CINCPACAF	5
CINCPACFLT	2
CG, FMFPAC	2
USASAPAC	1
COMSEVENTH FLT	1
COMUSMAC THAI	1
COMUS KOREA	1
Cmdr, 13th AF	1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1970 Pacification and Development Plan

Annexes

Territorial Security	I
Protection of People from Terrorism	II
People's Self Defense Force	III
Local Administration	IV
Greater National Unity	V
Brighter Life for War Victims	VI
People's Information	VII
Prosperity for All	VIII
National Police	IX
RD Cadre	X
Village Self Development	XI
Province/Municipal Council Development	XII
Province/Municipal Development	XIII
Land Reform	XIV
Development of Ethnic Groups	XV
Urban Programs	XVI
Youth Programs	XVII
Preparation of Plans, Reports, and Briefings	XVIII

CONFIDENTIAL

PLAN

PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT

1970

- Refs: 1) The President's guidance on Pacification and Development Policy for 1970, #270 dtd 1 September 1969 (Limited distribution)
- 2) The 1969 P&D Plan, CPDC, and subsequent related documents

1. GENERAL

In 1969, with military victories on every battlefield, the 1969 P&D Plan was initiated as a continuation of the 1968 Accelerated Pacification Campaign. We have expanded the territory that we control by bringing security to over 90% of the people nationwide, and of special note is that 50% of the people live in complete security in A and B hamlets.

In 1970, based on the advantages gained above, we will vigorously push our attacks into the communist based areas and exploit their weakness to eliminate them completely from pacified areas, and thus create an advantageous milieu so we can increase the quality of life in the future. At the same time, we must bring a new vitality to our people in a framework of total security, so that the people can build and develop a free and prosperous society.

The expansion of a basic level of security to nearly all the people now provides the opportunity for us to strengthen the quality of that security and to concentrate on getting all the people actively involved in the national struggle.

This work must begin in the cities, villages and hamlets where the people live and work. Mobilizing the people against the enemy and in support of the Government is the first, most vital task of every commander, every official and every cadre. It is also the task of those private individuals and groups, such as the PSDF. All people must understand their mission, their private responsibility, and support the government. The role of the province is to provide such coordination and guidance in implementing government programs as is needed to gain the support of the people. The Central Government has the mission of planning, motivating and supporting all local efforts. The purpose is to motivate the people to cast their ballots for the perpetuation of the Constitution and the Republic of Vietnam, in the elections to be organized in the coming phase.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

In order to complete the enemy's defeat and build a free, prosperous and secure nation, we continue coordinating every element of our country according to the following principles which should guide our work:

a. - Employment of the 5 guiding principles:

- (1) Pacification and development must unite to become one. *integration*

We cannot say that one of these tasks is the main task, or that the other is an auxiliary task. It is impossible only to do pacification and to forget development, and to do the reverse is equally impossible. Pacification and development must be implemented simultaneously, whether in the cities, the province capitals, the district capitals, the various municipal sub-divisions; or in the capital itself.

- (2) The Village is the Target of the P&D plan; The hamlet is the unit in which the plan is implemented. *decentralize base*

The village is the traditional community in Vietnamese society and it is our basic governmental unit. It has an elected body and its own budget and resources. The village is growing in its role of linking the people to the government. Thus the prerogatives and responsibilities of the village administration have been increased in order to satisfy the people's requirements.

The village chief has greater authority than before in order that he can manage both pacification and development tasks. The village administrative committee and the village council have additional powers in establishing and managing the village budget, and in exercising operational control over the Popular Forces, National Police and RD Cadre.

- (3) Pacification and development is a long-range continuing task.

If pacification is a transition phase then construction and development are long-range tasks, with the essence being that it is necessary to solve the most basic and urgent requirements first in order that the long-range tasks can be accomplished thereafter. *Progress Priority + perseverance*

- (4) The main principle is the spirit of community cooperation. *Community cooperation*

Pacification and development includes many factors that fall within the responsibility of many separate agencies. These factors must be combined to become the basis of a common effort on the part of every agency which serves the people. Thus it is necessary to place proper emphasis on the participation of the people in order to achieve the close coordination of effort to implement this plan, so as to achieve the maximum results. The spirit of community cooperation is manifested in 3 relationships: among the people, between the people and the government, and among the various governmental agencies.

CONFIDENTIAL

(5) Every task program must be practical. *practical*

Every project must stem from the people's interests and must be in close accordance with the capability and understanding of the people to implement it. These programs must not be thought of as being only material values, but must take into account the psychological and spiritual aspects as understood through the collective political life of a common community. These projects must also be consistent with the democratic policies of our national community.

b. - Employment of the 5 operational principles:

Five operational principles of the 1969 P&D Plan will continue to apply to the 1970 P&D Plan.

(1) Important geographic areas are the proper targets for P&D, and must be improved in quality.

Hamlets and villages targeted in the 1969 P&D Plan had to meet the following standards: *not a target priority*

- /* - dense population
- /* - adjacent to important political centers
- /* - adjacent to important economic installations

The above must continue to be improved according to the following decisive standards: 1) effective security 2) effective administration, 3) effective law and order.

In 1970, the level of security of villages and hamlets will be raised, along with all business districts, urban fringes, and important progress and development be accomplished in all fields.

(2) The people must place proper emphasis on the various aspects of political struggle and self development. *pol. mobilization*

Because of their military reverses, the communists are presently trying every means of propaganda, deceit, and clandestine terror to force the people into, or to establish, various organizations, so they can claim that they control the people and buy a real political and administrative infrastructure in South Vietnam. However, after the Tet offensive, the people saw the true face of the communists. We must exploit this psychological fact. Pacification and development must emphasize political mobilization to heighten the self defense spirit and the understanding of why one is anti-communist and anti-terrorist. Thus the people, both town and country, must actively participate in development activities for their villages, hamlets or cities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The people themselves must assist the democratic process by participating in appropriate meetings, where they can make their requirements known and help realize whatever is in their best interest through the local self development programs.

(3) Establish the hamlet where the people are; do not move the people to establish the hamlet.

We emphasize not only increasing the secure population, but also the expansion of territory that we control by vigorously pushing the return-to-village campaign.

In the 1970 Plan, pacification and development efforts will follow the following priorities:

Priority 1: Raise C hamlets to the A or B category in order to obtain the objective of guaranteeing effective security for 90% of the population. This means 90% of the population must be living in A or B hamlets.

Priority 2: The remaining C hamlets must be continually consolidated to prevent their backsliding to a D category.

Priority 3: Raise the remaining DEV hamlets to Category C.

(4) The people implement; the Government assists; the Cadre guide.

The people are the prime movers in accomplishing every task in their interest, with the help of the government and the technical guidance of the cadre. Cadre of the various branches will operate on a coordinated and permanent basis at the various hamlets and villages, or phuongs and khoms according to their respective missions, and under the rules and regulations promulgated by their respective ministries.

Every cadre is a census grievance cadre (responsible for determining the people's aspirations), as well as a propaganda cadre. The role entrusted to the RD cadre is a political one, with the mission of helping the people to organize themselves and providing guidance rather than the former paramilitary role.

(5) We must reinforce management procedures.

At every level the work program must be clearly phased. The systems for review, reporting and inspections, as well as the organization of various agencies responsible for implementation of the plan, must be clearly delineated and perfected in order to have management, command, and close coordination among all echelons and agencies. A scientific method of evaluating villages and hamlets has been employed in order that our measurement of pacification and development progress in the villages and hamlets will avoid the pitfalls of inaccurate reporting.

Employing both the five guiding principles and the five

CONFIDENTIAL

operational principles above, the pacification and development plan for 1970 includes the basic PRINCIPLE OF COMMUNITY COOPERATION and the EIGHT OBJECTIVES, aimed at achieving a smooth continuation of the 1969 effort; but with renewed energy in order to:

- eliminate the remaining communist political and military strength.
- provide effective security for 100% of the people.
- increase quality in the performance of our main tasks.
- build and develop the rural areas, cities and areas bordering them.
- vigorously inculcate the local community development spirit.

2. CONCEPT - One Principle and Eight Objectives.

a. One Principle:

In 1969 we employed the principle of community cooperation as the basic tenet for all national activities. This principle is realized through three relationships: cooperation among the people, between the people and government, and among the various government agencies.

In 1970 we will expand these relationships. We will reemphasize the bond between the city people and their rural compatriots, between the soldiers and the people who support them, and between the citizens and the officials who serve them. It must be assured that all government organizations support one another enthusiastically, with a sense of responsibility for serving the interests of the people.

Within the spirit of unity, all the people of South Vietnam, together with their government, will succeed brilliantly in the struggle to protect the Fatherland and to restore peace and prosperity.

b. Eight Objectives:

The eight objectives of the 1970 Plan are a rational extension of the eight objectives employed in 1969. These eight objectives continue to be implemented according to the principle of community cooperation, the main objective of which is to restore peace, freedom and social justice.

(1) Territorial Security: (See Annex I)

Security is a prerequisite to insure that social, economic and political development progresses rapidly and yields good results.

Therefore, we must combine to the maximum the efforts and activities of our various armed forces: the Regular Forces, Regional Forces, Popular Forces, People's Self Defense Forces, and National Police, in order to insure effective security for 100% of the people; that is to say, 100% of the people must be in A, B, C hamlets with a minimum of 90% of the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

people enjoying complete security in the A and B hamlets.

Enemy attacks, shellings, terrorism and sabotage actions must be reduced by at least 50%, compared to 1969, in those areas which are undergoing pacification, and 75% in those areas which are completely secure.

Curfew hours should be reduced according to the local situation (from 2400 hours to 0500 hours) or else done away with. Restricted areas, both inland and coastal, will be reduced in number to help normalize life for the people.

Insure the safety of traffic on important highways and waterways. A minimum number of checkpoints will be maintained, and only those that are truly essential in stopping the flow of communist supplies or the infiltration of weapons into the cities.

The National Police will be expanded and their quality increased in order to help the local governments maintain law and order in both rural and urban areas.

(2) Protection of the People Against Terrorism: (Annex II)

Neutralize the VC Infrastructure and expand the rule of law and order. All local forces must cooperate closely with the people in neutralization of the enemy infrastructure in order to insure a peaceful, happy life for every man. Increase the pressure with sharp attacks on the enemy infrastructure by the effective use of the Phung Hoang organizations at every level. Improve the leadership, organization, and procedures of the Phung Hoang committee at each level. Establish a modern system for filing and exploitation of documents for close followup of communist cadre.

Actively improve rehabilitation and detention so that the law is applied with impartiality and humanity for every citizen. Prevent arrests of the innocent and illegal detention, both of which are very harmful to the people. Establish a rehabilitation program so that offenders will soon be able to take their place in society as useful citizens.

Male citizens from 15 years old up will be issued an identification card. This method will limit the movement of enemy cadre and protect the innocent.

(3) People's Self Defense: (Annex III)

Perfect the organization, training and equipment of the People's Self Defense Forces in order to increase their capability of protecting the villages and hamlets, and to discharge their responsibility of helping to identify the VC infrastructure. Place emphasis on the political education of the PSD members so they have an unshakable nationalist spirit and will actively participate in community development and local self help and development.

CONFIDENTIAL

We must expedite retraining, and then issue adequate equipment and weapons to encourage the PSD Forces to discharge their mission.

Organization and motivation of the support elements of PSD Forces must be vigorously implemented on a continuous basis.

(4) Local Administration: (Annex IV)

We must develop a local administration with the capability of self management in the administrative, economic and financial spheres consistent with the viewpoint that "the people do, the people reap the benefits."

Complete the election of 100% of village, hamlet, municipal, and provincial councils. Provide replacements of village and hamlet officials to bring them up to strength, especially information, land reform and technical cadre. Every position must be filled by an official who is both capable and possessed with a sense of responsibility to help the people participate in their government. Review personnel as to quality and send them to training classes to correct deficiencies.

Complete the training of village and hamlet officials with respect to both the technical aspects and political warfare.

Improve work procedures in order to properly serve the people and create a genuine spirit of community cooperation in the villages and hamlets. The people are encouraged in their freedom to make and implement local decisions in public meetings. The people's rights, equality before the law, and a spirit of equality must all be applied across the board to the ethnic minorities. Government officials must give special attention to the prerogatives of ethnic minorities.

People's organizations, private companies, and all other non-governmental organizations must be given the opportunity and means to participate in the common effort to improve our national, political and economic life.

Province, district, and village chiefs are the main officials responsible for motivating the people to build a democratic life.

The responsibility of the deputy province chief for administration will be increased to enable him to help local village and hamlet administrations to operate more effectively. Pay special attention to development tasks for provinces, villages and hamlets. A political objective of the government is to push strongly and rapidly the concept of strength of local administration organizations. Along with this objective, programs are being established to increase tax revenues of villages, and increase the authority of villages to spend tax revenues for village development projects.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**(5) Greater National Unity: (Annex V)**

Rally 40,000 Hoi Chanh. Continue vigorous implementation of the Chieu Hoi program. Place greater emphasis on quality, i. e., on the rallying of high and middle ranking enemy cadre to our ranks. Help them to reassimilate with the national life. The program for retraining in 1970 must be effective and train adequate numbers. Information and psychological warfare activities must support the Chieu Hoi program. Both provincial and district Chieu Hoi centers must reinforce their capability for receiving Hoi Chanh. Pay special attention to receiving, retraining, and employment of Hoi Chanh. Initiate special Chieu Hoi campaigns to pull in high ranking enemy cadre and entire enemy units. Persuade them to return to the nationalist ranks and guarantee them a useful position in society.

Every Hoi Chanh must be issued an ID card within two months from the time he reaches the Chieu Hoi center, in order to expedite his return to a normal life.

Getting enemy cadre and soldiers to return is only the first small step. We must emphasize training them, use them according to their capabilities and help them return to a normal life within the national community.

(6) Brighter Life for War Victims: (Annex VI)

A bright security picture permits us to increase our efforts at improving the life of war victims, helping the unfortunate people to a complete return to a brighter life.

Employ such emergency measures as are effective to encourage temporary resettles to return to secure areas so they can participate in local economic development. People temporarily settled outside of camps will receive monetary assistance, after which their names will be deleted from the refugee rolls and they will be encouraged to return to a normal life. Temporary camps established over six months ago must be organized so as to have the characteristics of a local community and eventually become a local community no different from any other. They will then be regarded as any other hamlet, and will rapidly receive such assistance from the various ministries as is authorized for any similar community.

Establish an equitable social welfare and recovery program, and use such special methods as are necessary to rehabilitate crippled civilians, wounded soldiers, as well as widows and orphans, in order that these people can continue a normal and useful life.

CONFIDENTIAL

(7) People's Information: (Annex VII)

Establish an effective information system based on the close coordination between government agencies and between the various people's organizations. Local commanders at various levels must directly lead the information program. Information cadre must be trained and assigned in adequate strength in order to assist province and village chiefs in giving wide dissemination to government policy. Every information means must be exploited to the maximum with great skill according to the local situation.

Soldiers, cadre and officials must actively participate in political study practice sessions in order to thoroughly understand government policy through the various collective discussion sessions. They must effectively explain the government programs so the people will participate.

Information activity must aim at educating the people regarding both the rights and duties of a citizen. There must also be technical guidance to help the people raise their standard of living and improve the local economy. Give direct support to motivating the people to participate in local development in every field. All topics related to development must be sufficiently advertised by information bulletins, public meetings, and other appropriate methods in order to encourage the people to active genuine participation in creating opportunities by which the people can realize their aspirations.

Every ministry is responsible to organize information campaigns designed to let the people clearly understand their program and activity, and to appeal to the people to participate in the ministry's program. According to the same idea, every province chief, district chief, mayor or village chief must organize campaigns to motivate the people to participate in government programs established to serve the people.

(8) Prosperity for All: (Annex VIII)

During 1970 we must continue to build on the achievements of the previous plan, advancing steadily from our previous economic and political successes. We must convince the people of the worth of our pacification and development policy. They should understand that from this policy we will begin to enjoy a brighter life as the result of much work and much blood from our soldiers, citizens, cadre, and officials from every social class over many years.

Given the wealth of national resources in this country, and the vast energy of its people, we can create a national community with happiness, prosperity and security for all.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

In 1970 we cannot expect to complete every development project, but we can pave the way for long-range tasks and encourage the people to participate in, and benefit from, every program in their determination to progress towards prosperity for all.

This objective aims at bringing a brighter, happier life for everybody through the following programs.

(a) Program to Help the Rural People:

Include the following:

- (1) With the national policy of Land Reform, continue the distribution of expropriated land and implement the program "Land to the Tiller" in order to increase the area under cultivation and thus increase the production of rice and secondary crops.
- (2) The development of agriculture and fishing industries includes technical guidance for farmers and fishermen to enable them to increase their productivity and thus raise their income.
- (3) Expand services rendered by the Agriculture Development Bank and establish rural banks at district level in order to expand the rural program.
- (4) Help the farmers and the fishermen to expand their people's cooperative groups and help them to improve both operations and organization so as to increase their present efficiency.
- (5) Improve the distribution system, boost trade, and improve supply by eliminating useless economic restrictions and thus facilitating the transport of goods.

(b) The Program to Develop the Community Spirit in the Urban People:

The heavily populated urban areas will be given special emphasis in this program, and efforts will be made to improve the quality of life in these areas, as is explained in Annex XVI: The Urban Program. This includes:

- (1) Conduct development programs, particularly in the poorer or fringe areas of the cities.
- (2) Establish community organizations (special offices) to support both urban individuals and groups in the improvement of their lives. Give assistance to such organizations as cooperatives, Chambers of Commerce, Parent-Student Associations, etc., in order to eliminate the isolation and selfish living that characterizes urban life.
- (3) Improve public services, develop low-cost housing, and hold down the cost of living in urban areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Social Improvement Programs in the Fields of Health, Education and Community Living:

- (1) Regarding health, provide for the people's health, especially for mothers and young children and assist the physical rehabilitation of the crippled in joint military/civilian medical institutions. Employ various mobile public health groups that come to the village, district, or urban dispensary.
- (2) Regarding education, enforce universal education, establish public schools, and improve the education program, especially regarding quality. Place emphasis on the improvement of elementary and secondary education so as to give the young children an adequate general education. This will help the children develop socially and become good citizens, with both social sensitivity and a strong spirit. Develop adult education in the municipalities just as in the rural areas in order to assist people either privately or publicly employed, or cadre or soldiers alike, to continue widening their cultural horizons as well as improving technical knowledge.
- (3) Regarding community activities: The local government will provide assistance, guidance, and skilled help both in province and village self development programs. They will assist people's cooperative groups as well as provide public associations to establish community centers, urban and rural, in order to furnish necessary services for the local people. For example, there could be adult education centers, sports centers, entertainment centers, youth meeting centers, and so forth.

In summary, we must work so as to have all the people increase productivity so that all are self sufficient in at least foodstuffs, and to create advantageous conditions for increasingly rich local community life and activities.

(d) Special Programs:

Besides the above eight objectives, the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan still places special emphasis on various supplementary programs which will be closely interwoven with the eight basic objectives. Following are some of the programs aimed at increasing our expansion and development efforts:

- National Police (Annex IX)
- RD Cadre (Annex X)
- Village Self Development (Annex XI)
- Provincial and Municipal Development (Annex XIII)
- Land Reform (Annex XIV)
- Development of Ethnic Minorities (Annex XV)
- Urban Programs (Annex XVI)
- Youth Programs (Annex XVII)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

In 1970 one type of program will be newly established to provide basic financial support to assist the Province and Municipal Councils in improving development of local projects aimed at expanding our common development efforts. This program is the Province and Municipal Council Self Development Program (Annex XII).

This program is similar to the village and provincial self development program of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan, but it is richly supplemented and creates an opportunity for the councils of the prefecture, provinces and municipalities to participate in the use of funds in order to implement development projects in the public interest, through community assemblies. These should reflect the aspirations of the majority of the local people, and these meetings thus are the vehicles to realize these aspirations.

Therefore, the Provincial Municipal Council Self Development program can only be implemented after the Provincial and Municipal Councils have been elected on a constituency basis.

In the poor areas the government will supply a higher percentage of financial assistance than the local area does, but the more prosperous areas that need less government assistance will provide a higher percentage of their own revenues. Our concern with development of the urban areas as well as the areas bordering them, will insure that the benefits of pacification and development will be spread equitably for people in every walk of life, urban as well as rural.

3. EXECUTION:

The year of 1968 was one of military contests; 1969, the year we expanded security, and in 1970 all the existing resources will be used for political and economic development in order to push forward our victory and expand the area under our control.

The ultimate objective is to restore effective security for all of our people and to create favorable conditions for every class of people to advance to a more prosperous and brighter life.

a. Area Security:

- (1) A strategic concept for the national security program, aimed at providing protection for the population already in secure areas, extending security to people not yet living in secured areas, neutralizing the enemy found among the people, and eliminating armed enemy units from the country. The concept is not dependent upon FWMAF and allows for the transition from military to civilian control, with the ultimate objective of providing effective security for the entire population of RVN.

CONFIDENTIAL

Security responsibility for an area is assigned to a single individual. The principles of Area Security are based upon a technique of defining that area of responsibility assigned to a Province Chief/Sector Commander, or an RVNAF Commander.

- (2) This plan provides for the transition from the present security system to a security system that ultimately will not require the current level of participation by combat forces of FWMAF. RVNAF and FWMAF will continue to conduct combined or unilateral operations to meet enemy formations and reduce selected base areas. As major enemy formations are withdrawn or forced to withdraw to North Vietnam, Pacification and Development goals are met, and the combat effectiveness of RVNAF improves, the requirements for FWMAF units should be reduced. Where necessary, combat support and service support will continue to be provided to RVNAF by FWMAF.
- (3) All military effort should be closely coordinated with emphasis on cooperation by all elements of RVNAF and FWMAF. This coordination and cooperation is essential to insure success of the government Pacification and Development Program. Psychological operations and civic action must be carefully coordinated with military operations to gain support of the civilian population; to cause their participation in national programs, including Chieu Hoi and Phung Hoang; to show them that the government of Vietnam is fighting for their welfare, and to destroy enemy morale thus persuading the enemy to rally to the GVN.
- (4) Refer to Annex I for details.

b. Priorities:

Priorities for the 1970 Pacification and Development effort are determined as follows:

Priority 1: The upgrading of C hamlets to A and B to insure effective security for 90% of the population, which means 90% are in A and B hamlets to include people living in cities.

In order to evaluate the results obtained, the following three standards must be met before the population can be regarded as A or B population:

- (1) Decisive Standard #1: Effective Security:
 - The PF must have full authorized strength and be capable of defending the hamlet.
 - Organization, training and arming of the combat PSDF elements must be completed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- Organization and training of the support PSDF (women, elderly people and youngsters) must continue to be trained and organized.
- Eliminate entirely the VCI.

(2) Decisive Standard #2: Effective Administration -

- In villages having a number of A and B hamlets prior to 31 October 1969 and newly upgraded A and B hamlets prior to 31 December 1969, as well as in both old and new A and B hamlets themselves, elections must be completed and the officials and personnel assigned as authorized by the new TO&E.
- All the village and hamlet officials must have been trained and be operating effectively and permanently in their posts.
- The following types of cadres must have completed their training and be operating effectively:
 - Village and hamlet information cadre;
 - Village and hamlet Chieu Hoi cadre;
 - Village Technical Cadre;
 - Village Land Reform, Agricultural and Fishing Development Commissioner.

(3) Decisive Standard #3: Law and Order is Enforced-

In villages with a number of A and B hamlets to include the old and new (old, 31 Oct; new, 31 Dec):

- The National Police must be present and operating effectively.
- The important point is not only to complete organization and to have the officials present, but also to complete their training and to have these officials operating effectively in the three following fields: 1) Security, 2) Administration, and 3) Law enforcement and preservation of order.

Priority 2: Continue consolidating the remaining weak C hamlets, upgrading them to strong Cs and preventing them from backsliding to D.

Priority 3: Upgrade D, E and V hamlets to C.

Regarding the second and third priorities, the following criteria should be applied:

CONFIDENTIAL

Security: In the old C hamlets (upgraded prior to 31 October 1969), and part of the new ones (upgraded to C after October 1969), the PF must have its full strength and must be capable of defending the hamlet.

In the remaining hamlets upgraded to C security rating in November and December 1969, the PF must be present in full authorized strength.

In the old C hamlets (upgraded to C prior to October 1969), and part of the new ones (upgraded to C after October 1969), the organization, training and arming of combat PSDF elements must be completed. The organization and adequate training of support PSDF elements must also be continued.

In the remaining hamlets upgraded to C after October 1969, the organization and training of both combat and support elements of PSDF must be completed by the end of 1970.

In the old C hamlets (upgraded to C prior to October 1969), and part of the new C hamlets, the elections of governments must be completed and officials and personnel assigned as authorized by the new TO&E in compliance with Decree #045 dated 1 April 1969, and Circular 093 dated 2 June 1969. Although the training of the officials and personnel could not be 100% completed a certain number of key personnel must be trained in accordance with the following priorities: The Information and Chieu Hoi Cadre and the Land Reform Commissioner are the priority cadre trained, present in the village, and operating effectively.

Local governments of the remaining new C hamlets where there are provisional village administrative committees, and hamlets with appointed Management Boards, must be elected prior to the end of 1970.

The reelections of village councils whose terms of office expire at the end of 1969 and during 1970, must be held in a spirit of democracy. The electoral laws must be disseminated widely. Electoral campaigning must be conducted freely in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution of 1 April 1967, and existing laws, so that more candidates can run in the elections and the villagers can choose the elite, capable and honest elements for the local administrative machinery in order to strengthen the administration and promote effective assistance to the population.

c. Phasing:

The 1970 PD Plan is divided into three phases:

Phase 1 - From 1 Jan to 30 June 1970.

Phase 2 - From 1 July to 31 October 1970.

Supplementary Phase - The last two months of the year will be a link between the 1970 and the 1971 Plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALd. Tasking:

- (1) The ministries in their areas of responsibility will, in coordination with the CPDCC, prepare guidance, assign missions, supervise and control the appropriate local authorities, so that the CTZ PDCs can properly and carefully implement the plan according to the attached Annexes.
- (2) The CTZ PDCs will further subdivide goals determined by the CPDC to set goals for the prefectures, provinces and cities, and follow-up, supervise and control the implementation of the plans to insure good results.

The goals assigned to the prefecture, provinces and cities must be reported to the CPDC by the CTZ PDCs no later than 1 December 1969, for review and approval.

- (3) The province/municipal PDCs will prepare their plans and submit them to the CTZ PDCs and the CPDC not later than 1 December 1969 (see Annex XVIII).

e. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) The Pacification and Development Program is an integrated, comprehensive, national policy which is broken down into separate fields of activities, with the various ministries each assigned a portion of the responsibility. However, the ministries and other government agencies must actively strive for close coordination with one another. They must heighten the spirit of Community Cooperation in order that these responsibilities and separate missions will combine to become one community responsibility.

The CPDC/CC is the agency responsible for coordinating these tasks.

- (2) Ministerial Responsibilities for Implementation of the Plan are as follows:

Objective I

Responsible Ministry: Ministry of Defense

Participating Ministries: Ministries of Interior, Information, Revolutionary Development, Open Arms, Ethnic Development.

Interested Ministries: Ministries of Justice, Education, Economy, Finance, Land Reform, Agriculture and Fishery Development, Public Works, Communications and Post, Health, Social Welfare, Labor, War Veterans, Foreign Affairs.

CONFIDENTIALObjective II

Responsible Ministry: CPHPO

Participating Ministries: Ministries of Interior, Information, Defense, Justice, Revolutionary Development, Open Arms, Social Welfare, Ethnic Development.

Interested Ministries: Ministries of Education, Economy, Finance, Land Reform, Agriculture and Fishery Development, Public Works, Communications and Post, Health, Labor, War Veterans, Foreign Affairs.

Objective III

Responsible Ministry: Ministry of Interior

Participating Ministries: Ministries of Defense, Information, Revolutionary Development, Ethnic Development.

Interested Ministries: Ministries of Justice, Open Arms, Social Welfare, Education, Economy, Finance, Land Reform, Agriculture and Fishery Development, Public Works, Communications and Post, Health, Labor, War Veterans, Foreign Affairs.

Objective IV

Responsible Ministry: Ministry of Interior

Participating Ministries: Ministries of Defense, Information, Revolutionary Development, Open Arms, Finance, Social Welfare; Ethnic Development.

Interested Ministries: Ministries of Justice, Education, Economy, Land Reform, Agriculture and Fishery Development, Public Works, Communications and Post, Health, Labor, War Veterans, Foreign Affairs.

Objective V

Responsible Ministry: Ministry of Open Arms

Participating Ministries: Ministries of Defense, Information, Interior, Social Welfare, Revolutionary Development, Ethnic Development, Land Reform, Agriculture and Fishery Development, Public Works.

Interested Ministries: Ministries of Justice, Education, Economy, Finance, Communications and Post, Health, Labor, War Veterans, Foreign Affairs.

Objective VI

Responsible Ministry: Ministry of Social Welfare

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Participating Ministries: Ministries of Interior, Information, Revolutionary Development, Defense, Open Arms, Land Reform, Agriculture and Fishery Development, Ethnic Development, Education, Economy, Public Works, Health, War Veterans.

Interested Ministries: Ministries of Justice, Finance, Communications and Post, Labor, Foreign Affairs.

Objective VII

Responsible Ministry: Ministry of Information

Participating Ministries: Ministries of Social Welfare, Interior, Revolutionary Development, Defense, Open Arms, Land Reform, Agriculture and Fishery Development, Ethnic Development, Justice, Education, Economy, Finance, Public Works, Communications and Post, Health, Labor, War Veterans, Foreign Affairs.

Objective VIII

Responsible Ministry: Central Pacification and Development Council

Participating Ministries: Ministries of Interior, Revolutionary Development, Information, Social Welfare, Education, Economy, Finance, Land Reform, Agriculture and Fishery Development, Public Works, Health, Ethnic Development, Labor, Defense.

Interested Ministries: Ministries of Open Arms, Justice, Communications and Post, War Veterans, Foreign Affairs.

- (3) The CTZ PDCs and the province/municipal PDCs must play an active role in local pacification and development, insuring that implementation is comprehensive, not neglecting some areas by concentrating on too narrow a spectrum, and orchestrated so as to create a pacification effort that is interrelated and mutually supporting throughout the land.
- (4) The DTAs will support all the activities of the prefectures, provinces and cities according to their capabilities, and in accordance with the directives issued by the appropriate CTZ PDCs.

IV. SPECIAL DIRECTIONS:

- (1) The "decisive standards" for evaluation of hamlets and important tasks that must be accomplished as stipulated by Articles 4, 6 and 8 of Instruction #939-PTT dated 1 July 1969, pertaining to the 1969 Special PD Plan, by the President of the RVN, must be properly observed and executed.
- (2) The Pacification and Development of cities and the vicinities of the Capital must be stepped up following special standards reserved for those areas (See Annex XVI).

CONFIDENTIAL

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX I

TERRITORIAL SECURITY

1. (U) GENERAL:

This annex outlines the role of Military Forces in providing sustained, credible territorial security throughout RVN and establishes associated responsibilities.

2. (U) OBJECTIVES: RVNAF, assisted by FWMAF, and in conjunction with civil elements, provides security to the population throughout RVN, thus providing an environment in which other Pacification and Development (PD) Programs can be safely and successfully implemented.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept.

(1) Area Security. RVNAF, assisted by FWMAF, conducts operations to create and maintain a state of stability and security required for the success of the GVN PD program. This program is to be carried out in accordance with the principles set forth in the area security concept. See Appendix I (Area Security Principles).

(2) Security Goals and Responsibilities.

(a) The primary task of the PD program is to provide sustained territorial security not only in new areas that have been selected for pacification, but also in those areas already under government protection. The 1970 security goal is to provide a B level of security to 90 percent of the population and at least a C level to 100 percent.

(b) The primary forces tasked with responsibility for territorial security are the Regional Forces (RF) and the Popular Forces (PF). RF will replace, on a selective basis, regular force units assigned to pacification and static territorial security missions within the consolidation zones and secure areas.

(c) Sector commanders responsibilities include:

- 1 Maintaining and improving the security in secure areas.
- 2 Maintaining and improving security in the consolidation zone.
- 3 Maintaining strength of RF/PF at 100% of that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

authorized with first priority going to maintaining combat elements strength and second priority to headquarters elements strength.

- (d) The integrated village defense plan will provide for a coordinated village/hamlet defense system capable of reducing losses or of delaying the enemy long enough for reinforcement. This plan, as set forth in JGS Memo 2664, dated 3 July 1969, will be established and implemented by the Village Chief in cooperation with the Village Deputy Chief/Military Security and the assistance of military commanders stationed at or operating in nearby villages. The sub-sector commander is responsible for guidance in establishment of defense plans, reviewing and approving plans, and supporting the implementation of village defense plans.

- (3) Rules of Engagement. Special care and precaution will be exercised in the conduct of military operations in populated areas including populated areas in the clearing and border surveillance zones. Emphasis will be placed on minimizing noncombatant casualties and destruction of civil property through restraints placed on indirect and aerial fire support.

b. Tasks.

(1) RVNAF Regular Forces.

- (a) Conduct operations in the clearing zones to prevent enemy incursions into the consolidation zones and secure areas, thereby permitting security to be constantly improved.
- (b) Conduct sustained, coordinated, mobile operations, unilaterally or combined, with FWMAF against VC/NVA forces, base areas and logistics systems located in clearing zones. See Annex L (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas) and Annex M (Procedures for Coordination of RVNAF and FWMAF Operations) to AB 145.
- (c) Coordinate and provide artillery support, and request other available fire support if needed, for RF and PF and other pacification forces (PSDF, NP, RDC, PRU and APT).
- (d) Maintain ready reaction forces in the clearing zone to support the RF/PF and other pacification forces against hostile forces in the consolidation zone and secure areas upon request of the Province Chief/Sector Commander. This is not intended to preclude the commitment of any regular force which may happen to be within the consolidation zone or secure area at the time.

CONFIDENTIAL

- (e) Conduct operations with pacification forces, and such other forces as may be committed against enemy guerrillas in accordance with provincial plans.
- (f) Conduct border and coastal surveillance against enemy infiltration.
- (g) Establish and maintain coordination with GVN officials in adjacent consolidation zones or secure areas. See Annex N (Procedures for Coordination of ARVN Tactical Forces and GVN Province Forces) to AB 145.
- (h) Provide security for key installations and LOC as directed by the CTZ commander.

(2) FWMAF.

Assist RVNAF by:

- (a) Conducting operations in the clearing zones to prevent enemy main force incursions into the consolidation zones and secure areas, thereby permitting security to be constantly improved.
- (b) Conducting sustained, coordinated, operations, unilaterally or combined with RVNAF, against VC/NVA forces, base areas, and logistics systems located in clearing zones. See Annex L (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas) and Annex M (Procedures for Coordination of RVNAF and FWMAF Operations) to AB 145.
- (c) Coordinating and providing artillery, air and other fire support for RF/PF and other pacification forces (PSDF, NP, RDC, PRU and APT), when RVNAF support is not available.
- (d) Maintaining ready reaction forces in the clearing zone to support the RF/PF and other pacification forces against hostile forces in the consolidation zone and secure areas upon request of the Province Chief/Sector Commander when RVNAF are not available or not sufficient for the purpose.
- (e) Conducting combined operations with pacification forces, and such other forces as may be committed against enemy guerrillas in accordance with provincial plans.
- (f) Conducting border and coastal surveillance against enemy infiltration.
- (g) Establishing and maintaining coordination with GVN officials in adjacent consolidation zones or secure areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) Regional Forces.

- (a) Conduct operations to maintain and improve security in consolidation zones, to support the PF in the secure areas, and to prevent incursions by enemy forces into the secure areas. Coordinate with ARVN or FWMAF units when necessary. See Annex N (Procedures for Coordination of ARVN Tactical Forces and GVN Province Forces) to AB 145.
- (b) Assume the PF's responsibility for protecting the population in a village/hamlet where the PF are inadequate.
- (c) Maintain ready reaction forces for employment when PF or other pacification forces are endangered.
- (d) Provide security for important installations and main highways/waterways within the consolidation zones. See Annex J (Restoration and Protection of LOC) to AB 145.
- (e) Assist the RD Cadres and PF in the organization and training of the PSDF.

(4) Popular Forces.

Under the direction and control of the Village Chief:

- (a) Provide security for villages/hamlets to include population, resources, LOC's and static installations. Assist the NP to maintain law and order in those villages where police are present but inadequate.
- (b) Conduct operations with emphasis on patrolling and ambushes in areas between hamlets and create a short range defensive perimeter for the village/hamlet as planned by the Village Chief.
- (c) Be prepared to reinforce RD groups and PSDF, if they are attacked by a superior force.
- (d) Replace the RF, if RF is not available, in the protection of LOC's and important installations.
- (e) Assist the RD Cadres in the organization and training of PSDF. In hamlets where no RD groups are available, the PF will be responsible for organizing and training PSDF under the command of the Village Commissioner for Military Affairs, or Hamlet Special Assistant for Military Affairs. See Annex III (People's Self Defense Force) to the 1970 P&D Plan.

- (5) National Police. The prime responsibility of the National Police is to establish and maintain law and order in secure areas and consolidation zones, and to assist the PF in

CONFIDENTIAL

providing security in the secure areas. For other National Police tasks see Annex C (Military Participation in the Neutralization of Enemy Infrastructure), Annex F (Military Participation in Resources Denial), and Annex G (Military Participation in Civilian Detainee Programs) to AB 145, and Annex IX (National Police) to the 1970 PD Plan.

- (b) People's Self Defense Force (PSDF)
 - (a) Assist territorial security forces, who have primary responsibility for security, and the NP in the defense of the village/hamlet.
 - (b) Assist in efforts to deter enemy terrorist and sabotage activity.
 - (c) Assist in the Phung Hoang/Phoenix Program in accordance with Annex C (Military Participation in the Neutralization of the Enemy Infrastructure) to AB 145 and Annex II (Protection of the People from Terrorism) to the 1970 PD Plan.

c. Responsibilities.

- (1) CTZ/Corps Commander.
 - (a) Guide and coordinate the military activities of subordinate units with the CTZ territorial security plan.
 - (b) Establish priorities relating to the use of military resources in the CTZ providing military support to the provincial and municipal pacification and development plans within the region.
 - (c) Coordinate with FWMAF Commanders in developing FWMAF military plans in support of CTZ territorial security plans.
- (2) DTA/Division Commander-Special Tactical Zone Commander.
 - (a) Direct offensive operations in accordance with the local situation, sector proposals or corps directives. The main effort of divisions aim at enemy regular units and their bases and at preventing an incursion into consolidation zones and secure areas.
 - (b) Provide support to units of the division placed under sector operational control.
 - (c) As directed by Corps, coordinate with sector to ensure combat operations support of the province territorial security plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- (d) Coordinate with sectors for the protection of designated vital installations determined by the CTZ.
- (3) Sector Commander.
- (a) Plan and implement the territorial security plan of the Province PD plan. Province will develop a single Pacification and Development Plan as prescribed in the National Pacification and Development Plan. See Appendix 2 (Responsibilities for Preparation of Territorial Security Plans).
 - (b) Direct the activities of and support for RF/PF and other pacification forces assigned to the sector.
 - (c) Submit requests to Corps concerning need for additional forces to provide territorial security when existing forces are inadequate.
- (4) Sub-Sector Commander.
- (a) Assist the Sector Commander (Province Chief) to prepare and implement the province territorial security plan and the province PD plan.
 - (b) Direct operations of the RF, and other pacification forces under sub-sector control in support of the integrated village defense plans.
 - (c) Maintain a sub-sector reaction force to support endangered villages/hamlets.
 - (d) Supervise, encourage and direct subordinate units in military participation in pacification programs.
 - (e) Recommend to sector, military operations to directly or indirectly support the Province PD campaigns in accordance with the situation.
 - (f) Assist the Village Chief in preparation of the integrated village defense plan, provide guidance and planning for coordinated artillery and air support.
- (5) Free World Military Assistance Forces. FWMAF commanders will assist the RVNAF in the provision of territorial security when requirements exceed RVNAF means. Supporting operations must comply with the operational concepts stipulated in the basic plan and with the mutual agreements between FWMAF Commanders and the CTZ Commander concerned. Responsibilities include:
- (a) Coordinate with the Corps Commanders to determine procedures and the type of assistance, the areas, and the control measures necessary for coordination of territorial security plans.

CONFIDENTIAL

- (b) Provide territorial security support based on agreement between the Province Chiefs and the Province Senior Advisors, utilizing FWMAF resources in the provinces when requirements exceed RVNAF capabilities.
 - (c) Coordinate with other FWMAF concerning provision of territorial security.
 - (d) COMNAVFORV, in coordination with CTZ and Province Senior Advisors, will serve as an advisor for the Vietnamese Navy commander concerning activities which can support territorial security.
4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:
- a. RVNAF/FWMAF. See Annex P (Logistics) to AB 145.
 - b. PSDF issue and maintenance support of Class V items will be provided by the sector A&DSL company.
5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:
- a. Signal. See Annex Q (Communications-Electronics) to AB 145.
 - b. Military and Civil command relations will be observed.
 - c. Command of GVN civil and paramilitary elements will remain with local commanders during combined operations.

Appendices:

1. Area Security Principles.
2. Responsibilities for Preparation of Territorial Security Plans.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 1 (Area Security Principles) to Annex I (Territorial Security) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan.

1. (U) PURPOSE. This appendix describes the principles and application of Area Security and provides guidance to commanders for planning and implementation.

2. (C) GENERAL. In his efforts to achieve political control of RVN, the enemy attempts to demonstrate that the GVN is not capable of governing the country or of providing credible security to the people. His offensive operations and the resultant reaction operations by friendly forces produce adverse effects on security of the people. The most effective way of assuring security of the Vietnamese people is to keep enemy forces away from them and by neutralizing the VC infrastructure. Without the VCI, enemy main forces cannot obtain intelligence, manpower, or food, prepare the battlefield or move.

- a. Providing security to the Vietnamese people is the major objective of RVNAF/FWMAF. The security principles and their application, are based upon lessons learned in the past and provide specific techniques for providing the desired level of security.
- b. If the VC cease their insurgency, and NVA forces withdraw to North Vietnam, the objective will be achieved, even though North Vietnam may still constitute a threat to RVN.
- c. The enemy threat in RVN falls into two broad categories:
 - (1) VC/NVA main forces, often located in remote areas, or entering RVN from safe havens across the border.
 - (2) VC local forces and guerrilla units, special action groups and the VCI, located closer to and often intermingled with the people.
- d. In some areas, the people are reluctant to associate with the GVN for fear of retaliation by the enemy. Civil officials often become the target of enemy terrorism and assassination and thus are reluctant to carry on the business of government. Some police hesitate to conduct operations against the VCI because they fear retaliation, and local security forces, under the threat of terrorism, often accommodate to, rather than resist the enemy. See TAB A.

3. (C) CONCEPT. An effective national security program must include measures to assure security to individuals and groups at all levels, from the local household to an entire geographical/political subdivision, against both internal and external threats.

- a. The component parts of a security system, listed below, must be fully coordinated under a single authority, to be effective.
 - (1) Adequate forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- (2) Responsive command and control.
 - (3) Internal and external intelligence.
 - (4) Long range surveillance.
 - (5) Tactical control measures, such as boundaries, barriers, warning systems, phasing, etc.
 - (6) Effective communications.
- b. The meaning of security varies, depending upon what is perceived to be the threat.
- (1) The Vietnamese villager fears military forces of both sides, since their operations constitute a threat to the safety of him and his family. He fears friendly artillery and air as much as he fears enemy mortars and rockets.
 - (2) Military commanders frequently judge security as it relates to the safety of their units, rather than to the population in the area. For example, a battalion commander may feel that he is providing security to the people simply by being in the area. Frequently, however, the mere presence of a military unit within an area provokes an enemy attack.
 - (3) The diagram at TAB A (Perception of Threats) illustrates the variance in the meaning of security. It also illustrates that security involves not only safety against physical violence but protection against political, economic and psychological threats as well.
- c. To be effective, security must be continuous. Manning outposts and patrolling during the day, but retiring to static defense positions at night will not achieve effective security and often produces undesired results. The enemy, who moves mostly under cover of darkness, will enter the village to carry out retaliation against the people, after the security forces depart.
- d. The provision of security throughout RVN requires the accomplishment of five inter-related tasks:
- (1) Maintaining continuous and permanent security for people living in secure areas.
 - (2) Extending security to people outside the secure areas.
 - (3) Neutralizing local force, guerrillas and VCI units or individual found among the people.
 - (4) Forcing the withdrawal of NVA forces to North Vietnam, by both military and political actions.
 - (5) Creating a security system that is not dependent on the continued presence of FWMAF.

CONFIDENTIAL

e. To accomplish these tasks, it is necessary to delineate those areas in which friendly forces concentrate their operations:

- (1) Focus upon securing the population; Secure Areas and Consolidation Zones.
- (2) Focus against enemy main forces - Clearing Zones.
- (3) Focus against enemy intrusions and infiltration - Border Surveillance Zones.

See TAB B (Area Security Definitions)

4. (C) **PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS.** Area Security aims at meeting the enemy challenge by providing sustained, credible security for the people, and is designed to:

- a. Provide security at the present level of hostilities, as well as meet the requirements of a post-hostilities environment.
- b. Provide a framework for reducing FWMAF combat forces, as RVNAF capabilities improve.
- c. Allow military forces to meet VC/NVA forces in the areas of lowest population density, without detracting from the major objective of assuring the protection of all the Vietnamese people.

5. (C) **DETERMINATION OF AREAS.** The actual delineation of the four types of areas will be made by the Province Chiefs/Sector Commander in coordination with the tactical Commanders, based on the definitions contained in TAB B (Area Security Definitions). They are most familiar with local conditions such as enemy activity, routes and base areas, population density, LOC, terrain ethnic groupings, etc., to make the best possible judgement. Initial recommendations will be included in the Territorial Security Annex to the Province PD Plan; submitted for approval to the CORPS/CTZ Commander and integrated into the overall CTZ Area Security Plan to assure appropriate inter-relationships on a CTZ-wide basis. These delineations must be reviewed constantly, and altered to reflect the dynamics of the campaign of expanding security to cover new areas and population. Updated overlays will be forwarded whenever there is significant adjustment of zones.

6. (C) **APPLICATION.**

- a. **Secure Areas.** The principle task is to maintain and improve existing security. Operations will concentrate on protecting the resident population within the boundary of the secure area.
 - (1) The secure area is the hub from which expansion of security radiates. Local government is functioning and the GVN is improving services and self-help programs.
 - (2) Police operations will concentrate on maintaining law and order, neutralizing the VCI and controlling terrorism.
 - (3) Popular Forces, People's Self Defense Forces, and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

National Police, in a coordinated effort under the control of the Village Chief, will maintain security and law and order in secure areas with the support of the Regional Forces.

- (4) Police, PF and PSDF will not normally be utilized beyond the boundary of their assigned secure area.
 - (5) Friendly military forces, resident in the secure area, protect their own installations. They may assist in protecting key non-military installations if the local police forces are not adequate. However, protection of non-military installations should be assumed by the police or civilian self-defense units, as soon as possible.
 - (6) Security of areas contiguous to the secure area will be improved through saturation patrolling, ambush and offensive operations by both regular and territorial forces. As the level of security improves, the territorial forces will gradually assume complete responsibility, as the regular forces move further out into the consolidation or clearing zones.
 - (7) The secure area does not expand from within. Rather, as security conditions within a portion of the consolidation zone reaches the required level, that portion is assimilated into and becomes part of the secure area.
- b. Consolidation Zones. The principal tasks to be accomplished within this zone are to provide an outer belt of protection for the secure area and to raise the level of security to that which exists within the secure area.
- (1) The purpose of the outer belt of protection is to detect and engage enemy forces at a distance from the secure area. This is best accomplished by conducting continuous around-the-clock, intensive patrol and ambush operations, and maintaining strong, highly mobile reaction forces. RF, supported by PF, NP, PSDF and regular forces as necessary are employed in this outer belt.
 - (2) Within the zone, police type operations are employed to raise the level of security. Police and territorial forces assisted by regular forces, as required, provide hamlet and village security. They also conduct intensive small unit patrol and ambush operations to detect and engage any enemy units which may have penetrated the outer belt of protection. In addition, they seek out and neutralize the VCI, uncover weapon and ammunition caches, and mortar and rocket emplacements.
 - (3) Resources and population control is conducted, movement of personnel and commodities is under strict control and subject to continuous check. During darkness, a selective curfew is rigidly enforced.
 - (4) Assimilation of portions of the consolidation zone into the

CONFIDENTIAL

secure area will occur when the level of security within that portion is determined by province officials to fall within the prescribed definition for designation as a secure area.

- c. **Clearing Zones.** Operations in this zone concentrate on VC/NVA main forces to prevent their intruding into consolidation zones. Rules of engagement for the clearing zone must emphasize that civilians are not unnecessarily exposed to friendly fires. The objective is to separate the population from the enemy in order to facilitate establishment of effective security.
- (1) Regular forces of RVNAF, assisted by FWMAF, operate within this zone to engage or drive the enemy there from and to prevent enemy forces from entering consolidation zones.
 - (2) Neutralization of enemy base areas will be conducted in accordance with the priorities contained in Annex L (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas) to AB 145. Isolated bases, located in areas of low population density, can best be controlled by conducting operations to prevent enemy egress or reinforcement. As long as the enemy is prevented from leaving such bases, he is effectively kept from reaching people. Continuous surveillance, patrolling and ambushes, and air and artillery strikes will be employed to keep the enemy confined in his base area.
 - (3) Enemy base areas located closer to major population areas constitute a different type of threat. Friendly operations will concentrate on effectively neutralizing these base areas or forcing the enemy to abandon them, and thus increase the distance between the enemy and the population. Methods employed will vary and are best left to the judgement of the commander in whose AO the base area is located.
 - (4) As the enemy threat is reduced or neutralized, and base areas are abandoned or isolated, the newly cleared area will be added to the consolidation zone. The province chief must have adequate resources to insure that he can hold and govern the newly cleared area. Refugees and original inhabitants of the area should be encouraged to return and resettle. Coordination for transfer of the newly cleared area to the consolidation zone from ARVN responsibility to Province responsibility will be made under the authority of the Corps/CTZ commander.
- d. **Border Surveillance Zone.** In most provinces this zone is located between the national border and the clearing zone. DTA/STZ commanders are responsible for this zone. The primary task here is to detect, engage and deter enemy forces attempting to infiltrate RVN. Operations conducted herein will be closely coordinated with CIDG forces.

7. (C) **COMMAND AND CONTROL.** The commander charged with responsibility for a specific area must be provided adequate resources and authority commensurate with that responsibility. Assignment of

CONFIDENTIAL

I-1-5

CONFIDENTIAL

primary responsibility will be as follows. The Corps/CTZ commander is responsible for assuring that adequate resources are assigned in each case.

- a. Secure Area and Consolidation Zones - Province Chief/Sector Commander.
- b. Clearing and Border Surveillance Zones - DTA or STZ Commanders as designated by the Corps/CTZ Commander.
- c. Annex N (Procedures for Coordination of ARVN Tactical Forces and GVN Province Forces) to AB 145 is applicable.
- d. TAB C illustrates the organization for Area Security.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB B (Area Security Definitions) to Appendix 1 (Area Security Principles) to Annex I (Territorial Security) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan


1. Area Security. A strategic concept for the national security program, aimed at providing protection for the population already in secure areas, extending security to people not yet living in secured areas, neutralizing the enemy found among the people, and eliminating armed enemy units from the country. The concept is not dependent upon FW-MAF and allows for the transition from military to civilian control, with the ultimate objective of providing effective security for the entire population of RVN. Security responsibility for an area is assigned to a single individual. The Principles of Area Security are based upon a technique of defining that area of responsibility assigned to a Province Chief/ Sector Commander, or an RVNAF commander.
2. Secure Area. A populated area where the normal functions of local government are conducted under the control of the Province Chief. There is freedom of day and night movement, no imminent attack by enemy formations and only occasional acts of terrorism and indirect fire attacks can be expected. The great majority of precincts and hamlets have an A or B rating under the HES.
3. Consolidation Zone. The transitional area, under the Province Chief's control, between the Secure Area and the Clearing Zone in which intensive pacification is being undertaken. Population and resources control is thorough and night curfew is strictly enforced. Attacks by enemy formations are not imminent, but frequent acts of terrorism and indirect fire attack may be expected. A purpose of the zone is to prevent the enemy forces from reaching the Secure Area. The predominate number of hamlets in the consolidation zone will have a HES rating of C.
4. Clearing Zone. The contested area under the ARVN Division or other tactical unit commander's control, that is divided into TAOR's assigned to tactical units, in which mobile operations to neutralize enemy forces and base areas are conducted. It contains friendly operational bases and includes unpopulated and VC controlled areas. Selected areas in the clearing zone may be transferred to the control of the Province Chief and be occupied by territorial forces in preparation for inclusion in the consolidation zone. The Province Chief retains responsibility for all civil functions in the clearing zone.
5. Border Surveillance Zone. The area contiguous to the national borders of RVN. Tactical commanders have the responsibility for the detection of enemy buildup and reinforcement security. The Border Surveillance Zone would be included within TAOR's.

CONFIDENTIAL

I-1-B-1

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB B (Area Security Definitions) to Appendix I (Area Security Principles) to Annex I (Territorial Security) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan.




I-1-B-2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB C (Organization for Area Security) to Appendix 1 (Area Security Principles) to Annex I (Territorial Security) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan.



≡ GVN

▨ US

- Command / Control
- - - Close Support
- · · · · Technical Control
- · · · · Constant Communication

PIOCC and DIOCC - Completely interrelated Intelligence and Operation Coordination centers, should encompass TOC

- ▨ Clearing & Operations Zone
- ▨ Secure & Consolidation Zones

I - I - C - I

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 2 (Responsibilities For Preparation Of Territorial Security Plans) to Annex I (Territorial Security) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

1. (U) PURPOSE. This appendix outlines courses of action and determines responsibilities and procedures for formulating the sector military plan for providing territorial security. It includes security for secure areas and consolidation zones. The province PD plan will contain a Territorial Security Annex as prescribed in Annex XVIII of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan.

2. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. CTZ:

- (1) Gives Corps-wide guidance for formulating plans for the provision of territorial security.
- (2) Reviews and approves the sector Territorial Security Annex of the Province PD Plan.
- (3) Submits those plans to the JGS (Office of the Deputy Chief of JGS and J-3) and the CPDC for final approval by 15 December 1969.
- (4) Reviews and comments upon the situation for each quarter and submits reports to JGS/J-3.

b. DTA/Division/Special Zone:

- (1) Reports to the CTZ the division's capability of participating in Province/Sector territorial security plans with regular forces.
- (2) Assists in preparing Corps campaign plans for provision of territorial security, when requested.

c. Division Senior Advisor or Special Tactical Zone Senior Advisor: Assist and advises on matters pertaining to provisions of territorial security.

d. Sector:

- (1) Formulates the plans for provision of territorial security assisted by the province senior advisor.
- (2) Submits the plan to CTZ for approval and forwards two copies to Deputy Chief JGS and JGS J-3.
- (3) Submits all changes to the plan to the CTZ for examination and approval.

e. Province Senior Advisor:

- (1) Assists the sector commander in formulating plans for the provision of territorial security.

CONFIDENTIAL

1-2-1

CONFIDENTIAL

- (2) Establishes liaison with FWMAF commanders and ARVN unit advisors in the province to insure close coordination in the implementation of the plan.
3. (C) PROCEDURES FOR FORMULATING PLANS.
 - a. The preparation of the Sector Security Plan will be based on the enemy situation, organic territorial security forces, Regular Forces approved by the CTZ for support, and the Province PD Plan. The format for the Sector Security Plan is outlined in TAB A.
 - b. The plan will contain 5 overlays, scale: 1:100,000
 - (1) Overlay showing disposition of enemy forces, enemy infiltration routes and base areas.
 - (2) Overlay showing disposition of Regional forces, Regular Forces and FWMAF.
 - (3) Overlay showing delineations of the security areas (secure area, consolidation zone, clearing zone, and border surveillance zone).
 - (4) Overlay showing outposts and disposition and coverage of all organic and support artillery by weapon type.
 - (5) Overlay showing the security condition of LOCs designated in Annex J (Restoration and Protection of Rail, Road, and water LOC) to AB 145.
 - c. The overlay showing the security areas will be enclosed with the list of hamlets in those areas. The format for the hamlet list is outlined in TAB B. Significant changes to overlay and to the list of hamlets will be posted as necessary.
 - d. Reports on territorial security progress during the month will be sent to the appropriate CTZ by the 10th of the following month.

Incl

1. TAB A - Format of the Sector Security Plan.
2. TAB B - Format of the Hamlet Lists.

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB A (Format of Sector Security Plan) to Appendix 2 (Sector Security Plan) to Annex I (Territorial Security) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

1970 Sector Security Plan

Sector

Sector Location

Date Month Year 1970

Reference - 1970 Combined Campaign Plan. AB 145

1970 Provincial PD Plan

Map scale: 1:100,000

1. SITUATION.

- a. Description of weather and terrain
- b. Enemy situation. Appendix A (Intelligence)
- c. Organization of Sector forces:
 - (1) Territorial forces: Appendix B (Regular and Regional Forces Deployment Overlay)
 - (a) Regional Forces
 - (b) Popular Forces
 - (2) Other Pacification Forces
 - (a) People's Self-Defense Forces
 - (b) National Police Forces
 - (c) RD/Son Thon RD Cadre Forces
 - (d) Armed Propaganda Teams
 - (e) Provincial Reconnaissance Units
 - (3) Reinforcing Regular Forces, that have been approved of and placed under the control of the Sector by the Corps Tactical Zone. Appendix B (Regular and Regional Forces Deployment Overlay).
 - (4) The FWMAF and RVNAF units stationed in the Sector's territory. Appendix B (Regular and Regional Forces Deployment Overlay).

2. MISSION: (Outline the territorial security missions aimed at

CONFIDENTIAL

1-2-A-1

CONFIDENTIAL

maintaining and improving security, protecting resources, and participating in the Provincial PD Plan).

3. EXECUTION:

- a. Concept: (Establish guidelines for continued improvement of security in accordance with the phases of the Provincial PD Plan. Outline the Plan's purpose, objectives as assigned in paragraph 4d (1) of the basic plan AB 145, and the force employment concept).
- b. Tasks: (Define the responsibilities of each commander, to include the Village Chief, each organic or attached unit including the other Pacification Forces and Regular Forces stationed in the Sector).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: (Outline the logistics system and maintenance of military equipment for organic and attached units including Pacification Forces. Prescribe the training and logistic requirements).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: (Outline the chain of command and lines of communications between the territorial commanders and various units and the sector communication system).

APPENDICES:

- A. Intelligence (with overlay)
- B. Regular and Regional Forces Deployment Overlay
- C. Hamlet List
- D. Security Areas Overlay
- E. Fire Support & Outpost Overlay
- F. LOC Security Overlay

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB B (List of Hamlets) to Appendix 2 (Sector Security Plan) to Annex I (Territorial Security) of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

1. List of hamlets in secure areas.
 - a. List the hamlets in secure areas by order in each District-Village.
 - b. Location of the hamlets: ID No. - coordinate (6 figures)
 - c. Hamlet security condition: A, B or C
 - d. Hamlet defense forces.
 - (1) Popular Force: Unit designation of the platoon or squad
 - (2) National Police: Strength
 - (3) People's Self-Defense: Number of armed members
 - (4) RD Cadre and/or Son-Thon Revolutionary Development Cadres: (Group, team or cell (strength))
 - (5) Regional Force: If any.

2. List of hamlets in consolidation zones.
 - a. List the hamlets in consolidation zones by order in each District-Village.
 - b. Location of the hamlets: ID No. - coordinate (6 figures)
 - c. Hamlet security condition: C - D - E or V
 - d. Hamlet defense forces.
 - (1) Regional Force: Unit designation of the Inter - Company - Company-Platoon
 - (2) Popular Force: Unit designation (Platoons)
 - (3) National Police: Strength
 - (4) People's Self-Defense: Number of armed members
 - (5) RD Cadre and/or Son-Thon Revolutionary Development Cadres: Group - Team or cell (strength)
 - (6) Regular Force: If any

3. List of hamlets in clearing zones (if any)

CONFIDENTIAL

I-2-B-1

CONFIDENTIAL

- a. List the hamlets in clearing zones by order in each District-Village
 - b. Location of the hamlet: ID No. - coordinate (6 figures)
 - c. Hamlet security condition:
 - d. Hamlet defense forces: Unit designation
4. List of hamlets established as follows:
- Areas (secure, consolidated or clearing)

District	Village	Name of Hamlet	Order No.	Coordinate	Security Condition	Protection forces						
						National Police	People's Self Defense	Cadres	Revol. Dev.	Popular Force	Regional Force	Regular Force
X	A	_____	_____	_____	A							
		_____	_____	_____	B							
		_____	_____	_____	B							
		_____	_____	_____	B							
Y	C	_____	_____	_____	B							
		_____	_____	_____								
		_____	_____	_____								
	P	_____	_____	_____								

SAMPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX II

PROTECTION OF THE PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM1. GENERAL.

Decree 280-a TT/SL, 1 July 1968 of the President of the Republic of Vietnam, promulgated the Phung Hoang Plan, with the aim of centralizing and coordinating the efforts of the military and civilian agencies engaged in carrying out the national policy to destroy VCI organizations in cities and rural areas in South Vietnam.

The principal operational element within the PHUNG HOANG organization is the National Police. The military forces are responsible for providing support to the National Police until the latter have sufficient capability to perform their missions. The National Police may receive support from other forces and resources.

The Phung Hoang Plan was officially put into operation in July 1968. From that time, the organizational structure from central to local levels has been established and has successfully operated with close coordination among concerned agencies to create firm belief in our final victory.

2. OBJECTIVE.a. General.

In 1970 the objective is to neutralize 1800 category A and B VCI each month. This goal can be modified at the suggestion of CTZ commanders. CTZ commanders will assign monthly targets to Provinces (see sample format attached).

b. Goals:

During Phase I of the 1970 Campaign, known and identified VCI are the primary target. Also during Phase I, it will be a goal to identify at least 30% of those cadre who are estimated to exist but are not yet identified. They will be the primary target during Phase II. Target selection will be appropriately mixed, taking into consideration PIOCC/DIOCC capabilities, so as to effect maximum destruction of the VCI at all levels of its organization. This concept will be applied in lieu of random targeting of specific individuals, who can rapidly be replaced by the VCI. Application of this targeting concept should insure that numerical monthly goals are achieved by each province. It should be understood, however, that captured VCI are not neutralized unless sentenced and incarcerated for a realistic period of time.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALc. Disposition of Apprehended VCI:

Apprehended VCI who are civil detainees should be rapidly and equitably screened and processed through Province and Autonomous City Security Committees for a detention decision. In order to avoid a backlog of cases, localities must hand over 2/3 of VCI arrested each month to the Security Committee for trial.

In accordance with the Ministry of Interior's Classification-Sentencing Guidelines (MOI Circulars #757/BNV/CT/A-13/M dated 21 Mar 69 and #2212/BNV/CT/A-13/M dated 20 Aug 69), all civil detainees are categorized and will be sentenced as follows:

(1) VCI include only Class A and B elements. The local Security Committee will sentence Class A offenders to an automatic minimum detention sentence of 2 years. Class B offenders will be sentenced to detention for a minimum of from one year to a maximum of 2 years. Upon expiration, sentences may be extended by the local Security Committee.

(2) All other civil suspect detainees are not VCI, but may be VC supporters or perform activities beneficial to the VC. This category, Class C, will be treated with clemency and may be released outright or sentenced to a maximum of 1 year detention, with possible extensions of sentences.

(3) All sentenced VCI (Class A and B) will be immediately transferred out of Province detention centers to National Correction Centers of Con Son, Tan Hiep, or Thu Duc for rehabilitation, without waiting for approval of sentence by the Ministry of Interior. Class C sentenced offenders will remain at Province.

(4) The ABC classification system is for use only by the local Security Committees in matching positions and functions of civil offenders to the sentences.

(a) Class A: (minimum 2 year detention sentence)

1 Full or probationary members of the Communist Party (People's Revolutionary Party), at any echelon from national through hamlet level and holding any position.

2 All elements who have command and operational functions.

Communist organizations from central to village and hamlet level include:

a In the Communist Party (People's Revolutionary Party) organization and affiliated organizations:

secretaries, deputy secretaries, secretaries general, deputy secretaries general, committee members, section chiefs, deputy section chiefs, sub-section chiefs, and deputy sub-section chiefs...

b In the Communist provisional puppet government system:

chairmen, vice chairmen, secretaries general, committee members, section chiefs, deputy section chiefs, sub-section chiefs, and deputy sub-section chiefs...

CONFIDENTIAL

All committee members, even committee members of sections and sub-sections in the communist puppet government system or Committee members in the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and all affiliated organizations such as People's Liberation Committees, and Liberation Youth Associations, Liberation Women's Associations, Liberation Farmers' Associations, and Liberation Workers' Associations, etc., from central through hamlet level are the command and management echelon and are grouped as Class A.

(b) Class B: (minimum from 1 to 2 years detention sentence)

Class B includes those elements who do not exercise any command function or significant position in the communist ranks, but are VCI cadres, at any echelon from central to hamlet level. A cadre is defined as a trained individual capable of assuming command and of training others. A cadre is also defined as a voluntary member of any section or sub-section or an element of communist infrastructure, or of any communist affiliated organization, who performs his function or activity regularly as part of the adversary organization or performs the duties assigned by them.

The two types of cadre above are the chief targets on which the Phung Hoang Plan must concentrate effort to eliminate.

(c) Class C: (maximum detention sentence of 1 year)

Class C includes all other elements, not belonging to Class A and B noted above, but who have engaged in activities beneficial to the communists; these elements do not hold any executive position, nor do they perform any VCI cadre function. These elements may be operating for the communists either voluntarily or involuntarily.

3. MISSIONS:

Phung Hoang activities aim to eliminate VCI Cadres not only during wartime but are long-lasting and continue during peace time. The RVN government conceives that, unless this program operates continuously even in the post-war period, there will be no possibility of long-lasting peace, since subversion will probably be conducted by VCI cadres living among the people.

In order to achieve their goals in 1970, Phung Hoang Committees from central to local levels will elicit experiences, shortcomings, and good points of 1969 to amend and improve 1970 operations.

The 1970 Phung Hoang Plan includes following tasks:

a. Improve the organization:

(1) Improve the leadership organization and methods of operation of Phung Hoang Committees from central to district, and increase efforts and efficiency.

(2) Implement the policy clearly defined in the Standard Operating Procedures No. 3.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) Be precise in the determination of objectives according to the guide-book "Specific VC Infrastructure Objectives" (The Blue Book).

(4) Establish in the National Police an automatic system to control and maintain VC infrastructure documents by computers. Directorate General of National Police has responsibility for maintaining and updating documents on the VCI.

b. Popularize the Phung Hoang Plan.

The Phung Hoang Plan will be continuously popularized among the people in order that the people will be drawn to the nationalist side to destroy VCI. Only under such circumstances will VCI cadres be split from the people, and detection of VCI made easier.

c. Test the Phung Hoang Plan at village and hamlet levels:

The Phung Hoang activities will be conducted in villages and hamlets by village and hamlet officials to destroy VCI in rural areas. These officials have full ability to effectively serve the program since they are adept in local infra-structure organization. This expansion of activities, if successful, may lead to authorization for formation of village and hamlet Phung Hoang Committees.

d. Training.

CTZ training operations will be conducted continuously. As soon as CTZ Phung Hoang personnel have been adequately trained Central Phung Hoang Committee will establish a Central Training Center with the coordination of all four CTZ Training Boards. The Central Training Center will organize Refresher Training Courses for officials serving in all Phung Hoang Committees throughout the country.

e. Law and Equity.

To gain the support of the people for the government in the task of eliminating the VCI, all Phung Hoang personnel must be aware of the policy of the GVN to treat the people and detainees in a fair, correct and humane manner. While executing duties such as screening, investigating suspects, and established procedures to prosecute detainees in the Courts, cadres at all levels will not take advantage of their authority in disregard of the law. Such acts would lessen the support of the people for the task of eliminating the VCI. During implementing of the 1970 PHUNG HOANG Plan, emphasis will be placed on the following:

- (1) Cooperation and coordination with village officials in the execution of operations in their villages, and notification of village officials of the disposition of village detainees.
- (2) Rapid and equitable screening and release of innocent civilians, with a minimum of discomfort and dislocation.
- (3) Better dossiers for targeting and apprehension and better evidence and reliable intelligence for just convictions of VCI in accordance with the guidance of MOI Circular #2212 dated 20 August 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4) Expeditious interrogation and investigation of offenders within 30 days, adherence to the ABC Classification-Sentencing Guidelines, and weekly (or more frequent) local Security Committee hearings.

(5) Notification to all echelons, agencies and individuals concerned as to the whereabouts and disposition of detainees for more effective accountability and tracking.

4. EXECUTION.

a. Concept:

(1) The implementation of the 1970 Phung Hoang Plan assigns district as the basic operational organization. However, District Chief (Phung Hoang Center Chief) has the duties of consolidating the organization, maintaining and developing the performances of the past year as well as extending the program to villages and hamlets. Effectively use the following assets:

- (a) Village and Hamlet officials.
- (b) Chiefs of Village and Hamlet Peoples Self-Defense Groups.
- (c) RDC Inter-Group Leaders, Group Leaders, and Team Leaders.
- (d) Chiefs of Hoi Chanh Armed-Propaganda Teams.
- (e) PF Platoon Leaders.

These Village and Hamlet officials and para military units can effectively and actively participate in the implementation of the Phung Hoang Plan at the village and hamlet.

(2) Chief of DIOCC, Chairman of CTZ and province Phung Hoang Committees will coordinate and employ Psy-War Information Cadres, Civic Action Cadres of CTZ, province, and district to implement the popularization plan and the Phung Hoang Plan.

b. Organization.

(1) The Phung Hoang Committee organization from central to local levels remains unchanged. However, Phung Hoang Committees of all levels will have to strictly apply the guidebook "Standard Operating Procedures No. 3" in order to improve the organization, to improve operational techniques and raise efficiency.

(2) Phung Hoang Committees of all levels will organize seminar sessions to study and popularize the Phung Hoang Plan, and guide each concerned agency and personnel to understand their assigned duties to properly implement the plan.

(3) CTZ and province will regularly organize inspection tours and training courses to guide the organization and management, and to correct shortcomings in the implementation of the plan.

(4) CTZ and province will regularly organize general meetings to discuss

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

the plan, point out good points and shortcomings in order to better the organization and methods of operation to properly carry out the government policy.

c. Duty Assignment.

(1) Central Phung Hoang Committee Standing Board:

(a) Regularly follow-up the activities of Phung Hoang Committees of all levels in the implementation of the plan.

(b) Study lists of VCI to be eliminated recommended by CTZ Phung Hoang Committees.

(c) Disseminate and exchange intelligence information.

(d) Follow-up VCI operational capabilities in order to establish programs of activities and reaction measures to be applied by each locality to eliminate VCI.

(e) Closely coordinate with cadres and central agency members to draft out an appropriate activity program for a long lasting attack on VCI throughout the country.

(f) Coordinate with the Ministry of Information, General Office of Political Warfare, General Directorate of National Police, etc., to popularize the Phung Hoang Plan.

(g) Guide local Phung Hoang Committees to apply automatic methods to control and maintain VC infrastructure documents.

(2) Member Agencies of Central Phung Hoang Committee.

(a) Coordinate with the Central Permanent Office of the Central Phung Hoang Committee in order to make special plans and instructions for the Agencies to support the implementation of the Phung Hoang Plan in localities.

(b) Assign qualified personnel to work for Phung Hoang Plan.

(c) Organize training sessions for concerned agencies to make subordinate cadres understand and involve themselves in the implementation of the popularization plan and the Phung Hoang Plan.

(d) Actively support local Phung Hoang Committees with resources, manpower, and materials to eliminate VCI.

(3) CTZ Commander and Chairman of CTZ Phung Hoang Committee:

(a) Determine the strength of VCI to be annihilated in the CTZ in 1970 based on the number of detected and confirmed VCI in CTZ.

(b) Regularly inspect, guide and supervise the implementation of the plan; correct shortcomings, if any.

(c) Give instructions to Division Commanders to readily and actively support the plan by providing and exchanging intelligence information

CONFIDENTIAL

and providing tactical means.

(d) Recommend or organize long lasting military operations on a large scale in localities where VCI are reported to operate and assist local Phung Hoang Committees to eliminate them.

(4) Province Chief and Province Phung Hoang Committee.

(a) Consolidate, improve, and develop performances achieved last year.

(b) Make maximum use of available resources and manpower to eliminate VCI and actively support districts according to local requirements.

(c) Give instructions and control the employment of hamlet and village officials in the mission of neutralizing VCI.

(d) Study and formulate a long lasting program to be applied until the end of 1970 for the whole province, and popularize this program to the districts to carry it out.

(e) Pay special attention to extending the Phung Hoang Plan and the popularization plan to villages and hamlets.

(5) District Chief and DIOCC.

(a) Strictly execute assigned duties included in the 1970 Phung Hoang Plan promulgated by province (See Annex XVIII of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan).

(b) Study, follow-up, identify VCI in the district and report to province and CTZ so that CTZ can determine the number of VCI to be annihilated.

(c) Regularly conduct and make subordinate personnel understand thoroughly the importance of the Plan in order to insure successful implementation.

(d) Make maximum use of all available resources to include Special Police, Police Field Forces, PRU, Security Intelligence elements, Returnee Armed Propaganda Teams, Peoples Self-Defense Groups, and Village and Hamlet officials, etc., in operations in reaction to intelligence information.

(e) Extend the Phung Hoang plan to new villages and hamlets.

(f) Pay special attention to popularizing the Phung Hoang Plan to favorably affect the implementation of the plan and counter VC propaganda.

5. PLANNING. Refer to Annex XVIII.

6. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Province and District PHUNG HOANG Committees will study MOI Circular #757 to recommend classifications of VCI for the local Security Committee decisions. PHUNG HOANG Committees will coordinate with the National Police in the establishment of offender dossiers by supplying available evidence, intelligence, and information for Security Committee examinations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Province PHUNG HOANG Centers will disseminate the decisions of the local Security Committees to the appropriate DIOCCs, and will both monitor and make a log book of the disposition of all captured VCI.

b. Phung Hoang Committees throughout the country will strictly execute the policy in the Standard Operating Procedures No. 3 to improve the organization and apply the guidebook "Specific VCI Targets" (Blue Book).

c. Phung Hoang Committees of all levels will coordinate with information, psywar, civic action and other agencies to popularize the Phung Hoang Plan.

d. Phung Hoang Committees of all levels will learn from good points and shortcomings of the previous years to improve the implementation of the 1970 Plan.

7. REPORTS. Refer to Annex XVIII.

1970 NEUTRALIZATION GOALS __ CTZ

	PROVINCES			CTZ
	PROVINCE	PROVINCE	PROVINCE	TOTALS
Total Estimated VCI Strength:				
Total VCI Neutralization Goal:				
Total VCI Identified:				
Total VCI to be Identified (30%):				
Identified VCI Neutralization Goal:				
VCI Neutralization Goals at:				
VCI Region Level:				
Province Level:				
District Level:				
Village Level:				
Hamlet Level:				
Number of Villages to be brought to HES A Status by Complete Neutralization of Village VCI Cadre:				

NOTE: (1) The same neutralized VCI could satisfy more than one goal.

(2) Neutralization means sentenced (per MOI Cir 2212), rallied or killed.

CONFIDENTIAL

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX III

PEOPLES SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

1. GENERAL.

During the past two years, the Government has supported and assisted the people to organize themselves at all levels into PSDF Combat and Support Groups, and armed them in order to consolidate the rear and increase the fighting potential in the field.

These organizations have been functioning and have had the effect of:

- Protecting their families, their homes, their village/hamlet.
- Supporting other armed forces in maintaining security, protecting the lives of the people and their properties, and preserving the nation.
- Participating in community development activities and construction of village/hamlets.

2. DUTIES AND GOALS.

a. DUTIES. The essential tasks in 1970 are to constantly develop and raise the quality of PSDF by:

- Constantly developing and perfecting the organization.
- Completing the training and arming.
- Increasing the efficiency of security activities, and destroying the VC Infrastructure.
- Encouraging PSDF in:
 - Actively participating in people's welfare, primarily in self-help development projects.
 - Participating in political efforts to expand the government's policy concerning benefits of village/hamlet.
- Speeding up educational activities to form a steady national spirit for members.

b. GOALS.(1) Organization.

In 1970, the PSDF Combat Groups must be organized to complete the minimum of 1, 500, 000 members.

In addition, the PSDF Support Groups must also be organized to support the minimum of 1, 500, 000 members.

CONFIDENTIAL

III-1

CONFIDENTIAL(2) Armament.

PSDF must be additionally armed with 100,000 individual weapons. Thus, at the end of 1970, there will be 500,000 individual weapons used within PSDF.

In addition, to increase the efficiency of security activities, the firepower must be strengthened with 15,000 automatic rifles (AR) (according to the standard of one AR per 33 individual weapons). Hand grenades and defensive materials (barbed wire, iron poles, sand bags..) will also be provided in 1970. Crew served weapons are only to be issued to the members whose loyalty, anti-communist spirit, and knowledge of using are certified.

The replacement of weapons lost and repairs of damaged weapons will also be carried out correctly in 1970.

(a) Nationwide goals of the whole year of 1970 is fixed as follows:

- Number of combat members must be organized (including 1968 and 1969 goals) 1,500,000 members.
- Number of support members must be organized (including 1968 and 1969 goals) 1,500,000 members.
- Number of individual weapons must be issued (including 1968 and 1969 goals) 500,000 weapons.

(b) Phase I goals from 1 Jan 70 through 30 June 1970)

(Phase II goals will be fixed later).

	Number of Combat Members must be organized through 30 June 1970 (including 1968 and 1969 Goals)	Number of Support Members must be organized through 30 June 1970 (including 1968 & 1969 Goals)	Number of Weapons must be issued through 30 June 1970 (including 1968 and 1969 Goals)
I CTZ	237,200	224,800	92,788
II CTZ	236,000	254,400	96,644
III CTZ	482,000	390,000	142,122
IV CTZ	444,800	430,800	128,446
TOTAL	1,400,000	1,300,000	460,000

CTZ Commanders will depend on the population and the security degree of each province to fix its goals of members and weapons for each province.

CONFIDENTIAL**(3) Training.**

In 1970, the training must be complete, that means all the members organized must be trained. First priority is for military training.

Along with the military training for PSDF combat members, the technical training such as first aid, fire prevention, firefighting, sport, artistic programs, etc... for PSDF support members must be speeded-up.

Launching an active study movement to educate and form a conception of anti-communism and a firm national spirit for all PSDF members. In the political study program, a knowledge of the government structure and its duties from the highest level to the village/hamlet levels as well as the knowledge of relations between government agencies and their responsibilities, and the people's relationship and obligation to the nation and the government will be emphasized.

Discussion is an important form of training among teams and cells.

Training and re-training must be organized constantly. However, we must avoid interfering with the people's making a living.

After being trained, members must carry out the duties defined in the Instruction No. 4152/BNV/NDTV/2 dated 9 July 1969.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Execution concept. To achieve the above goals, all men from the age of 16-17 years old and from 39-50 years old fixed by the General Mobilization Law No. 003/68 must be organized into PSDF Combat groups; and people at all classes beyond the ages of joining PSDF must be encouraged to voluntarily join PSDF Support Groups. (Elder group, women support group and children group).

Women may voluntarily join PSDF Combat Groups and will be armed as male members.

In addition, in order to carry the political, information activities PSDF group leaders should designate a number of their members (may be from 6 to 15) to regularly contact cadres of all branches (information, technique, rural development, PSDF. . .) and with families and inter-families in order to collect, understand, distribute and explain the government's policies and directives to all PSDF members and the people in their village/hamlet.

b. Cadre. In 1970, there will be an average of one PSDF cadre for every two villages. In addition, there will be a number of cadres at provincial and district levels. They have responsibility to:

- (1) Help the people in organizing into PSDF group.
- (2) Help the local governments in training and arming of PSDF.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) Assist members in electing their leaders (group leaders, interteam leaders, team leaders).

(4) Guide PSDF members to perform their duties in accordance with the guideline of the movement and assist them in their normal every day lives.

(5) Carry out development plans, perfect and foster the organization.

Village/hamlet PSDF cadres must regularly function within their respective village/hamlet.

4. PREPARATION OF PLANS. (See Annex XVIII.)

5. COORDINATION.

Mayor (Saigon), Province Chiefs and Mayors must:

a. Personally coordinate closely and to obtain full use of all subordinate personnel of their own offices as well as those from technical services so as to obtain the goals mentioned above.

b. Regularly inspect to control and urge district, village and hamlet levels in carrying out the plan.

6. REPORTING. (See Annex XVIII.)

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX IV

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

1. GENERAL.

In 1969, an important reform of the village and hamlet administrative machinery was effected by Decree 045 dated 1 April 1969. Along with the satisfactory progress of pacification operations, the establishment and consolidation of administration in the infrastructure are being stepped up, but the job is still unfinished. The 1970 program is an extension of and supplement to last year's program, with particular emphasis on quality. In fact, the success of the revolution for democracy and freedom the government is striving to achieve will stem from an efficient administrative machinery and from an enthusiastic support of the masses. The requirement for building such an administration is as follows:

- Those who are directly in charge of the administration of the village and hamlet must be able and honest, elected by the people, and must have real authority to handle the administrative machinery and the organic armed forces to maintain security within their respective jurisdictions.

- They must receive training in politics and techniques, to be imbued with the national policy and awareness of the duties of serving the people.

The war has caused much suffering and destruction, therefore reconstruction and development constitute an urgent and extremely important problem.

2. DUTIES.

In order to achieve objective 4 of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan, the following two basic tasks must be performed:

- a. Build up a local administrative machinery having a democratic basis and being capable of self-management in the fields of administration, economies, and finance in conformity with the principle of decentralization of authority mentioned in Article 70 of the RVN Constitution.
- b. Create favorable conditions for the implementation of a large-scale self-development program.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept:

In a "people's war," military force is a necessary means, but the essential factor for a certain victory is the political struggle in which the masses play a key role. We are convinced that we will win over a large number of the population to the nationalist cause through the establishment of the following:

(1) A democratic system of government from its infrastructure to its superstructure.

(2) A strong and efficient administrative apparatus which concentrates its effort on serving the people's true interests.

b. Organization:

(1) Formation of local governments.

After completion of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan, some villages and hamlets still have no local governments. These may be classified into three types as follows:

(a) Villages and hamlets with population but without government or with a government living in exile.

(b) Insecure villages and hamlets whose inhabitants have temporarily evacuated their homes to secure areas.

(c) Villages and hamlets whose people have left due to difficult living conditions, to resettle in another location, with no desire to return.

For the first two types of villages and hamlets, pacification must be completed in order to have local governments working at their posts within the first quarter of 1970.

(2) Elections.

(a) The elections of prefectural, municipal and provincial councils will take place within the first half of 1970 according to procedures to be fixed by a law which will be promulgated soon.

(b) As for the elections of village councils and hamlet chiefs, it is necessary to make this distinction:

1. In villages and hamlets in which elections for a provisional government have yet to be held, or in which elections have been held but some vacancies still exist, elections must be held within a maximum of 60 days from the date of formation of the provisional government.

2. In villages and hamlets with elected governments which have been

functioning since 1967 and whose terms are expiring soon, a schedule must be drafted to permit the election to take place two weeks before the expiration of the term of office of the incumbent governments.

(3) Filling of vacancies.

Village Administrative Committees and Hamlet Managing Boards must be fully staffed in accordance with the membership authorized by Decree 045 within 30 days of the day of election of village councils and hamlet chiefs. In recruiting officials, special importance will be attached to the recruitment of Information Cadres, Land Reform Cadres, and Technical Cadres.

(4) Training.

In order to boost the output, training must be accelerated further.

For 1970, the National Training Center, Vung Tau, will have added Technical Cadres, but there will be no change regarding Province In-Service Training Centers. The training subjects taught in 1969 will be taught in 1970. Particularly in the training courses reserved for trainees from various ethnic minorities, their native dialects must be used for teaching.

(a) At Vung Tau National Training Center: Arrangements must be made to train some 9,000 newly elected village and hamlet officials and an estimated 2,500 to 2,800 Technical Cadres whose recruitment is getting under way.

(b) At Province In-Service Training Centers: Arrangements must be made to provide further training to an estimated 40,000 village and hamlet officials who are not included in the number of trainees of the Vung Tau Center. Furthermore, provincial governments should plan for the opening of refresher in-service training courses for officials who have been trained at Vung Tau in 1969.

In order to avoid possible difficulties in training, provincial governments must take care not to use training facilities for any purpose other than training.

Based on the number of officials not yet trained, the number of officials scheduled to be appointed in 1970, and those who need in-service training, a detailed training schedule must be planned including:

- Opening date.
- Closing date.

- Number of trainees for each course.
- Transportation for trainees.
- Training expenditures.

(5) Improvement of working procedures:

Working and administrative procedures must be improved to meet the requirements of the new situation. Two basic problems must be solved:

- Improvement of procedures.
- Surveying, supervision, and guidance.

(a) Improvement of procedures.

- Provinces will study and propose ways to improve current procedures.

- The Ministry of Interior will form a committee to consider the matter and issue necessary documents prescribing the enforcement of the new procedures.

(b) Surveying, supervision, and guidance:

- Entrust Deputy Province Chiefs with the tasks of surveying, supervising, and guiding village and hamlet authorities for effective work. Special emphasis will be put on province, village, and hamlet development activities. In performing this task, the Deputy Province Chief will have to make frequent visits to villages and hamlets.

1. Deputy District-Chiefs, and Province In-Service Training Managers will be directly in charge of surveying, supervising, and guiding village and hamlet authorities. Province In-Service Training managers will have to follow up village and hamlet trainees after their graduation to see whether these will apply properly what they have learned or not, and at the same time, give them further instructions.

2. Every month, Deputy Province Chiefs will hold a meeting with Deputy District Chiefs and Province In-Service Training managers to review activities, learn their strengths and weaknesses, and decide on important points for the next month.

3. MOI will step up inspections to develop honest and efficient administrative machinery at all echelons, especially at local levels.

In surveying and supervising, MOI, Provinces, and districts will pay attention to guiding Village Chiefs to exercise fully and properly their authorities, especially the operational control of armed forces, organic para-military forces, and cadres of all branches of activity.

(6) Exhortation of the masses to participate in democratic life:

Province Chiefs, District Chiefs, and Village Chiefs will be directly responsible to exhort the masses by all means so as to elicit their active participation in government affairs and local development and security efforts.

In order to be in conformity with the community development policy, all development projects must be initiated and carried out by decision of the population and maintained by them. The government will only guide and support.

(7) Re-organization of structures, and increase of manpower in the Capital, Provinces and Districts:

- (a) The Saigon city administration, provincial and municipal administrative offices will be rationally re-organized.
- (b) A list of authorized personnel will be made for the Saigon city administration, provincial, municipal and district administrative offices, and district administrative offices.
- (c) Realization of 100% of the goal of appointment of officials of Class A to the position of deputy district chief.

(8) Increase of technical assistance.

MOI will provide and modernize communications media from the central down to village and hamlet level for all civil security and administration agencies to develop a close liaison system.

(9) Increase of village self-help capacity:

To minimize the support of the national budget to village budgets, and at the same time help villages move towards financial self-sufficiency, the Ministry of Finance will coordinate with MOI to take efficient measures to guide villages to:

- (a) Make maximum exploitation of available resources to increase tax collection without having to create new taxes.
- (b) Solve difficulties causing budgetary deficits.

c. Division of tasks:

MOI will coordinate with other Ministries involved in the achievement of the foregoing objectives to provide technical assistance and issue necessary instructions to help the localities map out plans for 1970

based on the standards and policies set forth by the government. MOI has the duty to follow up, check and direct the implementation, and find proper solutions for problems encountered in the implementation of the plan so as to achieve 100% of the set objectives.

Provinces are directly responsible for working out and carrying out their plans with technical assistance from MOI.

4. PREPARATION OF PLANS. (See Annex XVIII.)

5. COORDINATION.

It is the duty of the Province Chief to draw up the plan and to direct and supervise its implementation by his subordinates. Provincial technical service chiefs are simply staff members. In performing this duty, the Province Chief himself must coordinate the activities of subordinate agencies so as to properly carry out the principle of Community Cooperation. MOI will coordinate with concerned Ministries in providing technical assistance to provinces.

6. REPORTS. (See Annex XVIII.)

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX V

GREATER NATIONAL UNITY

1. GENERAL.

a. According to the tradition of national unity, the RVN Government promulgated the Chieu Hoi Policy to save lives of Vietnamese people, and to early end the aggressive war initiated by the Communists.

b. From early 1963 (when the Chieu Hoi policy was promulgated) up to this date (20 September 1969), the Chieu Hoi program has accepted 126,247 Hoi Chanh. Particularly, in the first nine months of 1969, there were 32,867 Hoi Chanh; this number is six times higher than the total number of Hoi Chanh in 1964, and nearly double the number in 1968.

c. The Chieu Hoi program has obtained many remarkable achievements in these recent months due to the following main factors:

1. Good results achieved by the Pacification and Development Operations, from the Special Pacification Plan through the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan, Phases 1 and 2.
2. Pressure of the ARVN and allied military activities was permanently placed on Communist forces, particularly from the two phases of the Communist general offensive during Tet Mau Than (Monkey's New Year).
3. Good actions of all civilians, military and government officials in welcoming Hoi Chanh.
4. Morale of Communist troops and cadres has been extremely lowered, particularly after heavy defeat of their Tet Mau Than general offensive, and the belief in their leaders also has been weakened.
5. Communist forces have encountered many difficulties in the strength replenishment, food and weapons supply.
6. Effectiveness of the popularization of the national unity policy and the psywar offensive conducted by the Chieu Hoi Ministry in coordination with all the Vietnamese psywar agencies, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and the Allied Forces.
7. Participation of more and more people in the propaganda campaign for the Chieu Hoi policy.

d. If the situation is better and better to our side in comparing with the weakness day after day of the enemy, and if the Chieu Hoi activities are more and more effective and stronger, it is believed that the Chieu Hoi program will have more capabilities to contribute to the 1970 Pacification and Development Program for the following reasons:

1. Results of the Chieu Hoi Program will considerably increase effectiveness of the Pacification and Development Program, thus, reducing the burden of the latter program.

2. Results of the Pacification and Development Program will exercise basic pressure on the enemy, and provide more opportunities to the execution and development of the Chieu Hoi program in two fields: motivation and propaganda for the Chieu Hoi policy; and vitalization of Hoi Chanh's activities.

2. OBJECTIVES.

a. Based on the results obtained during the first nine months of 1969, the objectives of the Chieu Hoi Program in the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan are to receive 40,000 Hoi Chanh and vitalize their activities.

b. In the first phase of the plan (1 January 1970 to 30 June 1970) the target to be achieved is to receive and revitalize 25,000 Hoi Chanh, apportioned among CTZs as follows:

1.	I	CTZ	3,000	Hoi Chanh
2.	II	CTZ	3,100	"
3.	III	CTZ	5,100	"
4.	IV	CTZ	13,800	"

c. The number of Hoi Chanh to be returned by each province and city will be jointly decided by the CTZ Chieu Hoi office (representative office) in coordination with the respective CTZ Pacification and Development Council.

3. DUTIES.

a. The Chieu Hoi Program is simultaneously aimed at two objectives: decreasing the enemy potential while increasing our potential.

b. These objectives will only be achieved if the people are willing to participate directly in the implementation of the Chieu Hoi Program and the Chieu Hoi Ministry and other friendly agencies effectively perform the main tasks in the Chieu Hoi Program to include conducting propaganda and motivation, and receiving Hoi Chanh and vitalizing their activities.

1. Propaganda and motivation must be performed effectively in order to widely popularize the national unity policy as well as to induce hostile personnel to return to the national community.

2. Reception of Hoi Chanh must be made properly so as to prepare their psychology, particularly their attitude, to enable them to easily enter into the community life. In addition, the Hoi Chanh's knowledge of the enemy situation must be immediately exploited for military, security and psywar intelligence purposes.

3. Vitalization of Hoi Chanh's activities must be conducted effectively so as to make maximum use of Hoi Chanh resources in the struggle against Communism in the building of the Nation.

4. EXECUTION.

a. Propaganda and motivation.

1. Orientation:

- a. Widely publicize the national unity policy within the Chieu Hoi operational limit.
- b. Motivate people, military personnel, civil servants, governmental cadres, Hoi Chanh, and particularly the persons whose relatives are joining the Communists and induce them to call their relatives to the national just cause.
- c. Provide additional means and improve propaganda and motivation techniques in order to initiate the psychological offensive against the enemy, sow disunion among hostile people, and popularize the Chieu Hoi policy.
- d. More effort will be made in the following areas of the Chieu Hoi campaign.
 - (1) Rallying of entire units.
 - (2) Rallying of high ranking Communists.
 - (3) Rallying of Montagnard Viet Cong.
 - (4) Rallying of infiltrators from the North.
 - (5) Rallying of former Southerners returned from the North.
 - (6) Rallying of unmarried individuals between 15 and 29.
- e. More propaganda and motivation efforts are made in all provinces in I, II, and III CTZ as well as in Saigon and its suburbs.

2. Planned Tasks:

- a. Widely popularize the national unity policy both at home and abroad through the production and dissemination of movies, documents, magazines, etc.
- b. Increase propaganda and motivation efforts of all radio broadcasting units aiming at the priority areas included in the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. Main tasks of the radio broadcasting cadres are to reach and motivate the persons whose relatives are joining the Communists and induce them to call their relatives to the national cause.
- c. Improve all overt propaganda and motivation activities: The Tieng Chim Goi Dan Program (calling VC personnel to return to the national community) broadcast on Radio and Television (particularly on local radio), leaflets, air-mounted loudspeakers. After completing exploitation of the enemy situation, expedite an appeal by the Hoi Chanh to their comrades-in-arms to return immediately to the nationalist cause.
- d. After one or two weeks living at the Chieu Hoi Centers, Hoi Chanh will be encouraged to volunteer to return to their former areas of activities to popularize their experiences in the Chieu Hoi program and call other hostile persons to return to the national just cause.

e. Hoi Chanh teams (composed of Hoi Chanh officers or cadres) will have to be formed and sent to every locality, people's associations, universities, high schools, military schools, etc., to talk about the real weaknesses and political plots of the communists.

f. The program for awarding money in cash to civilians, Hoi Chanh, military personnel, and civil servants who take part in the motivation of communists to return to the national just cause will have to be continued. However, it must insure that the merit done by the awarded person is of real value so as to maintain the value of this program.

g. Open the Spring Campaign for 1970.

h. Initiate a Chieu Hoi Campaign to call single communists between 15 and 29 to return to the national just cause.

i. Organize exhibition of the achievements performed by the Chieu Hoi program.

j. Conduct press conference to introduce important Hoi Chanh to the public.

k. Support the Joint General Staff, ARVN (Department of Political Warfare) in the conduct of psywar and Chieu Hoi campaigns, such as the Nguyen Trai Campaign, against the enemy.

b. Reception of Hoi Chanh.

1. Orientation.

a. Clear up all complexes of guilt and suspicion in Hoi Chanh's minds immediately after their reception.

b. Place emphasis on the classification of Hoi Chanh.

c. Improve facilities and the administration of the Chieu Hoi Centers.

d. Improve the exploitation of information concerning the enemy situation, cross check, use and exchange this information with those of other Government agencies.

e. Improve the system for the Hoi Chanh political training.

f. Select Hoi Chanh with instructor ability to act as political lecturers with pay. Training will be coordinated with National Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau.

g. Pay attention to the defense of all the Chieu Hoi Centers against communist sabotage.

2. Planned Tasks.

a. Strictly apply the Basic Instruction on Reception No. 222/HT/CH, 15 November 1968, issued by the Prime Minister (already disseminated to the Provinces, Sectors and Provincial Chieu Hoi Services) and follow up related military and civilian agencies as well as Allied units in applying this document which covers the following areas:

- (1) Reception. Civilians, military personnel, cadres, and allied troops should warmly welcome Hoi Chanh.
- (2) Award for weapons. The award for weapons must be made in the shortest possible time based on the rates fixed by the Chieu Hoi Ministry.
- (3) Transfer of Hoi Chanh. Strictly apply current regulations which prescribe that Hoi Chanh should be brought with all means available to the appropriate provincial Hoi Chanh Center in the shortest possible time.
- (4) Screening and determination of Hoi Chanh's personal records; the determination of personnel records and screening of Hoi Chanh elements must be done carefully in order to identify the elements who disguise as Hoi Chanh to perform their underground sabotaging actions or to be exempt from the draft.
- (5) Exploitation of information concerning enemy infrastructures in order to timely furnish this information to the local Phung Hoang Committee.
- (6) Hoi Chanh used as guides in military operations: Use of Hoi Chanh as guides in operations must be made on a voluntary basis, and other procedures for employing Hoi Chanh out of their centers must be respected.
 - b. All Hoi Chanh should attend a political training course at a Chieu Hoi center (province, regional, or central level according to their rank. A training program will be provided by the Chieu Hoi Ministry, and instructors will be cadres of this Ministry, or men of letters, experienced cadres of authorized associations, military personnel and civil servants (instructors will be paid).
 - c. Establish system of classifying Hoi Chanh in order to tailor their political training.
 - (1) Youths: Could be drafted by the Communists again and therefore must have different political training than women and old persons.
 - (2) The two other types mentioned in (1) have a tendency to return to their old ways after leaving the Chieu Hoi Center and therefore need political training different from youths.
 - (3) Classification needs to be accomplished in detail in order to have data for research and estimates.
 - d. According to the budget situation, all Chieu Hoi Centers will be maintained and enlarged in order to improve their facilities and insure the defense.
 - e. Anti-communist refugees, the persons whose relatives are joining the communists, and other civilians will be encouraged to visit Chieu Hoi Centers.
 - f. Detach personnel from the National Police General Directorate to all Chieu Hoi centers on the basis of at least two police personnel for one center in order to interrogate Hoi Chanh and prepare their personal dossiers and Identity Cards.
 - g. Issue Identity Cards to Hoi Chanh within two months from the date they arrive, and prior to their departure from the Chieu Hoi centers.

h. Improve the establishment of Hoi Chanh dossiers, especially the seven-colored cards. Hoi Chanh dossiers will have to be completed within one month, and the seven-colored cards within one week, beginning the date the Hoi Chanh entered the Centers.

c. Vitalization of Hoi Chanh's activities:

1. Purposes:

a. Help Hoi Chanh so that they can promptly join the national community. However, the treatment of Hoi Chanh will have to be legitimate so as to avoid any possible jealousy by members in nationalist ranks.

b. Majority of Hoi Chanh are farmers, therefore, their training will be aimed much as agriculture, fishery, and animal husbandry techniques in accordance with the national economy development policy, in addition to the handicraft and industry training. This training will be given only to those Hoi Chanh who want it.

c. The employment of Hoi Chanh in the Armed Forces and government agencies will have to be executed in compliance with the following criteria

(1) The Hoi Chanh must be qualified in the assigned functions.

(2) The nationalist stand of the Hoi Chanh is reliable.

(3) In addition, after recruitment of Hoi Chanh, a guide plan will have to be made to help them to familiarize themselves with their newly-assigned functions as well as to avoid conflicts which often occur between them and their co-workers who are not Hoi Chanh.

d. Try to utilize Hoi Chanh in the Regional Forces and Popular Forces.

e. Attention will be paid to the updating of Hoi Chanh's status when they are resettled in rural hamlets and villages as well as in urban wards and villages. This updating has two purposes:

(1) Understand clearly the status of Hoi Chanh in order to help them when necessary.

(2) Keep an eye on the political stand of the Hoi Chanh.

f. Pay attention to leading Hoi Chanh to return to a normal and peaceful life, participating in activities of groups such as PSDF, Youth Groups, Women's Groups, or private organizations such as cooperatives and labor unions.

2. Planned tasks:

a. Vocational training.

(1) Provide training in cultivation and animal husbandry techniques to 40,000 Hoi Chanh while they are at Chieu Hoi centers, and 4,000 resettled in Chieu Hoi villages.

(2) Give training in popular skills such as carpentry, masonry, tailoring, two and four stroke motor repair, typing, driving, etc.

b. Resettlement:

(1) Convert 30 Chieu Hoi villages to normal local communities.

(2) Completely maintain eight Chieu Hoi villages (buildings, wells, roads, etc.).

- (3) Resettle an additional number of Hoi Chanh in existing villages.
- (4) Issue land titles to Hoi Chanh resettled in Chieu Hoi villages located in governmental land.
- (5) Organize agriculture and animal husbandry cooperatives at three Chieu Hoi villages which are suitable for agriculture development.
- (6) Organize handicraft cooperatives at three Chieu Hoi villages.
- (7) Push the 1969 program concerning the electrification of the 17 Chieu Hoi villages.

c. Employment:

- (1) Recruit Hoi Chanh and organize them into 15 additional Chieu Hoi armed propaganda companies so as to bring the total strength of Chieu Hoi propaganda companies to 90.
- (2) Recruit enough Hoi Chanh to act as village Chieu Hoi cadre (extend deadline for joining army).
- (3) Recruit a maximum number of Hoi Chanh into the Popular Forces and Regional Forces and employ them in the protection of hamlets, villages, and mobile activities (subject of a separate plan of the Ministry of National Defense).
- (4) Introduce Hoi Chanh to government and private factories for jobs.
- (5) Establish a system to follow up results of the employment of Hoi Chanh at government and military agencies.
- (6) Fix the manner and pursue achievement of organizing Chieu Hoi groups.
- (7) Test Hoi Chanh's specialized qualifications previously learned from the Communists.
- (8) Test military and cultural qualifications of Hoi Chanh who were commanders in the Communist forces in order to insure their interest when they perform military service.

d. Census and liaison:

Conduct the updating of status of Hoi Chanh, and make a census of Hoi Chanh resettled in rural hamlets and villages as well as in urban wards and villages through administrative channels therein (Ministries of Interior and Chieu Hoi will meet to settle details).

- (2) Establish a liaison system between the Chieu Hoi infrastructure and Hoi Chanh who are leading a normal life as other citizens.

d. Support:

1. Personnel:

- a. Recruit 1,130 village Chieu Hoi Cadres (recruit talented local inhabitants and Hoi Chanh with essential qualifications).
- b. Recruit enough personnel and cadres as authorized (1,589 persons excluding 1,130 village cadres, and 6,660 armed propaganda cadres). Regarding 85

political instructors, they will be recruited among members introduced by anti-communist parties and associations, and should have political qualification and training.

c. Rationalize the assignment of personnel and cadres to local services based on local requirements.

d. 15 officers and NCOs from the Ministry of Defense will be detached to the Chieu Hoi Branch to perform security and intelligence tasks.

2. Training:

a. The following personnel will be sent to the RD Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau for training:

(1) 5,000 armed propaganda cadres (Hoi Chanh) for the following training:

- (a) People leadership.
- (b) Politics.
- (c) Operational techniques.
- (d) Military.

(2) 1,500 Chieu Hoi personnel and cadres: They will attend the aforementioned training. However the military training will be cancelled and replaced by the administrative, personnel, and financial training.

(3) 1,130 village Chieu Hoi cadres. They will attend the aforementioned training. However, the military training will be cancelled and replaced by the Chieu Hoi technical training.

(4) 200 Chieu Hoi interrogator cadres. These cadres will be completely trained in techniques of interrogating and classifying Hoi Chanh, preparing their dossiers and laminated ID Cards, and exploiting information concerning enemy situation.

(5) 300 security and intelligence cadres. These cadres will be completely trained in security and intelligence techniques.

(6) All the above-listed personnel and cadres (8,130) will attend one-month training course.

(a) Training and refresher training to be conducted by the Chieu Hoi Ministry:

(1) One Province Service Chief training course for Deputy Province Service Chiefs and outstanding District Section Chiefs.

(2) One District Service Chief training course for outstanding personnel.

(3) One refresher training course for Province Service Chiefs and Regional Center Managers.

(4) One refresher training course for District Section Chiefs.

(5) The appointment of Province Service Chiefs and District Section Chiefs will be made based on their classification after graduation.

3. Finance: The foreign aid fund in the Chieu Hoi Budget appropriated

for the management of Chieu Hoi programs at localities will be transferred through normal procedures to the Provinces for use through RD financial procedures.

5. PREPARATION OF PLANS:

Based on the main points in this Annex and according to local situation, all Province Chieu Hoi Service are requested to compile their own Annex to be attached to the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. See Annex XVIII.

6. COORDINATION:

In order to achieve the objectives set forth for 1970 (Receive 40,000 Hoi Chanh, and vitalize their activities), the Chieu Hoi program will require coordination between the Chieu Hoi agencies, governmental and allied civilian agencies, ARVN and Allied Forces at Central and especially local levels through the command channel of all Pacification and Development Councils.

a. In order to promote propaganda and motivation (popularize Government's policies), coordination of the following agencies will be required:

1. Ministry of Information: Armed propaganda teams, printed propaganda materials, mobile information cadres.
2. Joint General Staff, ARVN (Department of Political Warfare): armed propagandas teams, printed propaganda materials, loudspeaker aircraft, radio, psywar units and cadres.
3. Ministry of Revolutionary Development and Ministry of Ethnic Minorities: coordinate activities between RD Cadres or Son Thon Cadres and armed propaganda teams.
4. MACV-JUSPAO support propaganda operations, loudspeaker aircraft, leaflet drops, special activities in Chieu Hoi operations.
5. Psywar Operations Coordinating Centers. Support propaganda and aircraft operations in tactics applicable to various corps and provinces.

b. In the reception of Hoi Chanh (apply the procedures for reception, particularly the establishment of dossiers, classification, issuance of ID Cards the entry of Hoi Chanh into Chieu Hoi Centers within two months, and exploitation of the enemy situation), coordination is required from the following agencies:

1. Ministry of Interior (General Directorate of National Police), J2/JGS.

c. In the political training of Hoi Chanh at the Chieu Hoi Centers, coordination is required from the following agencies:

1. Ministry of Information (Province Information Services).
2. Sector S-5's.
3. Anti-communist national political parties.

d. In the vocational training and employment of Hoi Chanh, coordination is required from the following agencies:

1. The Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture and Fishery Development. This Ministry will help in training 44,000 Hoi Chanh in

cultivation and animal husbandry techniques, and issuing land titles to Hoi Chanh who are resettled in Chieu Hoi villages.

2. The Ministry of Health. This Ministry will assist in testing medical qualification of Hoi Chanh who were nurses and physicians turned out by communist regime.

3. The Ministries of Education and Defense. These Ministries will assist in testing cultural and military qualification of Hoi Chanh who were commanders in the Communist Forces.

4. The Ministry of Defense. This Ministry will help in recruiting a large number of Hoi Chanh into Regional and Popular Forces.

e. In the execution of the full range of Chieu Hoi tasks at the grass-root level (particularly the updating of status of Chieu Hoi and census of Hoi Chanh resettled in rural hamlets and villages as well as in urban villages and wards), coordination is required with the following agencies:

1. The Ministry of Interior through the Administrative Committees of rural villages, and urban villages and wards.

2. The Ministries of Revolutionary Development, and Information through the hamlet and village cadres.

f. In the training and refresher training of Chieu Hoi personnel and cadres, coordination is required with the following agencies:

1. The Ministry of Revolutionary Development in the training of 8,130 personnel and cadres at RD Cadre Training Center, Vung Tau.

2. The Ministry of Interior in the administration training of local Chieu Hoi personnel and cadres in provinces.

g. In the operational management, education, and mobilization of the morale of all Hoi Chanh Armed Propaganda Teams, coordination is required from the Ministry of Interior through the Province Chiefs who have direct responsibility for the employment and management of Chieu Hoi Armed Propaganda Teams.

h. In the provision of weapons to Hoi Chanh Armed Propaganda Teams, coordination is required from the Ministry of Defense.

i. In the detachment of personnel, coordination is required from the Ministry of Defense in the detachment of officers and non-commissioned officers from that Ministry to the Chieu Hoi Branch to perform security and intelligence operations for village Chieu Hoi Cadres.

7. REPORTS.

a. A monthly report form will be disseminated by the Chieu Hoi Ministry to all Provincial Services.

b. The monthly operational report of the previous month will have to be submitted to the Chieu Hoi Ministry prior to the fifth of the following month. Copies of this report will be sent to:

- (1) Concerned province or city Pacification and Development Council.
- (2) CTZ Chieu Hoi Office.

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX VI

BRIGHTER LIFE FOR WAR VICTIMS

1. GENERAL.

a. Within the framework of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan the "Program of Improving War Victims' Welfare" is aimed first at settling the status of the 1968-1969 evacuees by continuing the task of resettling evacuees at proper localities, especially promoting the task of returning evacuees to their native villages insofar as the pacification progress will permit. Secondly, those compatriots whose properties were damaged by war (houses destroyed; relatives died, wounded, disabled; and war orphans and widows) are to receive timely aid and be assisted efficiently so that they can re-establish their normal life.

b. Those refugees returning to pacified hamlets constitute an important component of the village and hamlet infrastructure and become assets for village and hamlet development. Those war victims constitute "a medium" for the enemy to foster discontent among the people. That is why the "Program of Improving War Victims's Welfare" should be worked out and then carried out within the framework of the province PD Council actively assisted by the technical services and offices. These organizations will provide the province technical service with all special assistance necessary to enable it to control the whole territory and successfully win the people's heart.

c. This Annex specifies procedures for preparing and implementing the relief plan to improve the welfare of the following categories of war victims:

- (1) 1968-1969 anti-communist refugees temporarily resettled inside or outside of resettlement centers, (not resettled or returned to their native villages yet).
- (2) Refugees evacuated due to military operations.
- (3) People whose houses were damaged by war (20% damaged or higher).
- (4) People physically affected by war (killed, wounded, disabled).
- (5) Orphans, and widows of war victims.

2. OBJECTIVES.

During 1968, and 1969, the relief and improvement of the war victims'

welfare were not properly projected. Therefore, the aid to them is still inadequate, particularly in emergency cases and the ability to resume a normal life.

In 1970, based on the President's instructions, the government authorities must strive further to make the war victims' standard of living better. Therefore, the relief to and the improvement of their standard of living must be aimed at the following objectives:

a. In emergency cases, all efforts should be focused on providing refugees with the following:

- (1) Temporary shelters (refugee reception centers, temporary reception centers, relief centers).
- (2) Necessary food (rice, or cash in replacement, salt, milk).
- (3) Necessary commodities (mosquito nets, blankets, fabrics, clothes, medicines).
- (4) Medical care and treatment to sick and wounded refugees.

b. In normalization phase. Evacuated families and war victims are to be assisted in recovering their normal life and assuming a self-help status in the following ways:

- (1) Provide them cash money and materials for reconstruction of their houses.
- (2) Resettle them in secured areas with appropriate conditions, or return them to their native villages.
- (3) Provide vocational training, professional orientation, training in rural economic development so as to prepare them for jobs.
- (4) Conduct physical rehabilitation and vocational training for those who are found to be disabled.
- (5) War orphans and war widows should receive more efficient relief at public and private orphanages and at home under the program of war orphans and widows.

c. War victims improvement phase is included in the long term objective and the framework of the general program of social reform. However, the war refugees and war victims alike should be given a relief priority because they are unfortunate people suffering heavier losses. This relief priority should enable resettlement centers and most damaged villages and hamlets to receive adequate assistance:

- (1) Public facilities: dispensaries, medical stations, classrooms, conference halls, community centers, latrines, wells, electric generators, etc.
- (2) Social welfare centers: day nurseries, nursing homes, kindergartens, low cost-meal restaurants (The Ministry of Social Welfare will study the use of foreign aid funds to support this program).

(3) Programs for urban development and improvement of the people's welfare related to public health and sanitation under the community development procedures.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept.

(1) The following principles should be considered in any phase of improvement of the war victims standard of living:

- The people participate.
- The government coordinates.
- The cadres guide.

Through the "Local Relief Committee," "Distribution Committee" all strata of people will participate in and contribute in cash, manpower, and materials to the community development program.

The government's management and coordination not only cover the activities of government agencies, but also those of individuals and private associations in the country and abroad.

Guiding cadres include government cadres and cadres from social groups and technical organizations.

(2) Improving the war victims' standard of living is an occasion for the government to win the people's heart. Therefore, reliefs must be carried out:

- Timely (credits and facilities must be ready).
- Fairly (application of equal relief rate).
- Openly (relief procedures must be widely disseminated).

(3) War accidents can occur unexpectedly and at any time, to provide timely relief, the government should anticipate with a plan for emergency relief, in which the responsibilities of the people involved are specified in advance.

b. Implementation Procedures.

(1) For war refugees, from communists, four cases must be pointed out in order to adopt the principle as stipulated in Circular 8924/BXH/KCT/TNCS/TT, 23 September 1969, Ministry of Social Welfare.

(a) Legal anti-communist refugees bearing blue allowance slips issued in 1968 or before:

i. They should receive allowances for temporary resettlement, definite resettlement, and enjoy community development programs.

2. Resettlement allowance is distributed in two phases (1st phase: 10 metal roofing sheets, 2,500VN\$ in lieu of cement, 5,000 VN\$ for housing; 2nd phase: 6 month rice and salt ration), or if necessary, distributed in only one time.

3. When starting community development programs (after providing resettlement allowance) resettlement centers must be regionalized and people in these centers will no longer be considered as war refugees (anti-communist refugees).

(b) People temporarily resettled outside the center bearing a white control card:

1. Those people who are provided with 3 conditions will receive temporary resettlement allowance for one month (if not yet completed in 1969).

2. After receiving a 1-month temporary resettlement allowance these people's living conditions are considered as normalized as those of the ones who are provided with two conditions.

3. Refugees bearing this white control card should be encouraged to return to their pacified former hamlets in order to receive another return-home allowance (Ref: Circular 2394, 13 March 1969, Ministry of Public Health and Relief).

(c) People evacuated on and after 1 January 1969.

In order to solve the anti-communist refugees' problem, the government has adopted a policy of absolutely putting an end to all cases of moving refugees and emigrations for building hamlets. However, when ARVN units move into any hamlet for pacification, a number of people move from VC controlled areas to government controlled areas. These people are given the following:

1. Commodities as urgent assistance for a 7 day period) decided on the) spot by the PD
2. A 1-month temporary resettlement allowance) Councils.
3. Resettlement allowance) decided in ad-) vance by Mini-
4. Assistance for self-help (development)) stry of Social Welfare.

(d) Those people living in hamlets under pacification and evacuated during military operations are given:

1. Commodities as urgent assistance for a)
7-day period.)
2. 1-month temporary resettlement allow-)
ance (if the military operation is pro-)
tracted))
3. Return-home allowance) decided in advance by the Ministry of)
Social Welfare.

(2) For resettled refugees and return-home refugees: The Province PD Council must work out a plan to resettle refugees in a convenient center or return them to their villages based on the procedures and principles stipulated in Circular 1294-PThT/BDXD, 13 August 1969, supplemented by Circular 1589-PThT/BDXD, 18 September 1969, CPDC. Province PD Councils also should refer to Annex E of Combined Campaign Plan AB 145 for details of military participation in the return to village program.

Local authorities must pay attention to the following points:

(a) There are three categories of anti-communist refugees entitled to allowances for returning to their villages:

- Evacuated people with blue allowance slip.
- Evacuated people with white allowance slip.
- People evacuated in scattered groups without making any declaration to the authorities and who are not registered. These people must have refugee certificates.

(b) People should not be forced to return to their villages and can return only to areas where security is fully restored.

(c) A time limit for people to return to their villages after they are pacified must be fixed (may be three months beginning the day security is considered as fully restored).

(d) After the plan is approved by the Central Council, and the Province Pacification and Development Council is entitled to proceed with relief programs based on the prescribed relief payments scale without having to request the Central Council's further authorization.

(e) Cadres and agencies representing the Ministry of Social Welfare at local levels are responsible for supporting the plan to settle people and help them return to their villages within the ministry's competence and capabilities, as outlined in Section III, Paragraph C of Circular 1294-PThT/BDXD, 13 August 1969 referred to above.

(3) For war victims:

Must pay special attention to orphans and widows of civilians killed in the war (make a census of the number of persons who need help and request the Ministry for materials or credits support).

(a) Must simplify procedures in emergency cases. Circular 5613-BXH/KCT/NNCC/TT, 3 October 1969, Ministry of Social Welfare must be strictly applied in these cases.

(b) Must fix relief criteria through deliberation during meetings of the Local Relief Board, to settle questions brought up by people when faced with unforeseen cases.

(c) Must disseminate relief procedures, procedures for application for relief, procedures for distribution of cash and materials to districts, villages, and hamlets so that government officials and people can understand clearly these procedures.

(d) Follow up progress of relief operations at provincial level and report all details based on central council instructions for timely support of credits and materials to the people.

c. Operational programs.

(1) Phased operations:

(a) From 1 January 1970 to 30 June 1970 (Phase 1-1970 Plan)

1. Regionalize resettlement centers where people have received all 1968-1969 settlement allowances (about 400 locations).
2. Complete distribution of one month temporary settlement allowances to people living outside resettlement centers (if not yet achieved during 1969).
3. Complete resettlement of (or help them return to their villages) 200,000 evacuated people with blue allowance slip issued in 1968 or before.
4. Complete resettlement (or help them return to their villages) all 1969 evacuated people.
5. Accelerate the campaign of returning refugees to their villages and complete distribution of allowances to about 400,000 people bearing blue slips, white allowance slips, or refugee certificates.
6. Liquidate files formerly included in the Army and People Solidarity Plan.
7. Complete relief operations for 1969 war victims (including losses and damages occurred in 1969 and certified recently during the two first months of 1970).
8. Report numbers of war widows, orphans, war victims already registered and present to this ministry the plan for their relief and normalization.
9. Report results of operations conducted in 1969 (anti-communist refugees and war victims).

(b) From 1 July 1970 to 31 October 1970 (Phase II of 1970 Plan)

1. Regionalize resettlement centers where refugees have received all allowances during the first half of 1970 (about 300 centers).
2. Review achievements during the 1970 first half year (evacuated people and war victims).
3. Report results obtained during the 1970 first half year.
4. Supplement and modify the 1970 plan, if necessary, and request the transfer of credits to Phase II.

(c) From 1 November 1970 to 31 December 1970 (Supplementary Plan/1970).

1. Supplement operations to be achieved within 1970.

2. Work out plan for 1971.

(2) Regular Operations.

(a) Proceed with relief programs for evacuated people and resettle people (or help them return to their villages) and make report based on Form ADP and special form for anti-communist refugees.

(b) Establish a calendar for distribution of allowances to evacuated people, resettled people, and people who return to their villages.

(c) Report accidents (on simplified forms).

(d) Make monthly reports including losses already confirmed, relief situation, financial situation (on Form ADP).

(e) Request monthly finance (on Form NNCC/8.9).

(f) Check files already liquidated during the month and forward them to this ministry for disposition, or for justification of allocated funds.

(g) Proceed with the distribution of materials and cash based on the monthly operational calendar (war victims).

(h) Proceed with operations to normalize and improve war victims' standard of living (anti-communist refugees and war victims).

4. PREPARATION OF PLANS. See Annex XVIII.

5. OPERATIONAL COORDINATION.

The formulation of operational plans as well as the implementation of future operations must be carried out within the framework of the Province Pacification and Development Plan. Therefore, the Province PD Council is responsible for coordinating the activities of all technical agencies whose assignments are related to the improvement of war victims' standard of living, as well as for assigning duties to various technical services, such as:

- Medical treatment for wounded victims)
- Medical treatment for sick victims) Health Service
- Allowances to evacuated and resettled people, and people returning to their villages.)
- Allowances to war widows and orphans) Social Welfare Service
- Allowances to war victims) (Social Welfare Ministry of Defense)

- Vocational training for children) Social Welfare, Edu-
- Vocational training for widows) cation, Labor, War
- Vocational training for evacuated people.) Veterans Services.

- Physical rehabilitation for disabled) War victims
- victims)

- Vocational rehabilitation for disabled) Service
- victims)

- Development of rural economy) Social Welfare Service
- (Destroyed Villages and Hamlets,) cooperating with Agri-
- Resettlement Centers)) culture Service, Prov-
-) ince PD Council, Land
-) Reform

- Establishment of public facilities) Social Welfare Service
- Establishment of Social Installations) and Public Work, Re-
- Rehabilitation of Villages and Hamlets) construction Service
- Community activities) Charitable organiza-
-) tions, Associations,
-) Local CORDS Refugee
-) Advisors, Province
-) PD Council, MORD

Province PDC should encourage groups, associations and relief services to participate in the above mentioned activities.

CTZ/PD Councils are responsible for supervising and controlling the implementation of these operations.

6. REPORT. See Annex XVIII.

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX VII

PEOPLE'S INFORMATION

1. GENERAL:

a. The Information Program of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan has attempted to achieve the following two essential objectives:

- Motivate all people to respond to, and actively participate in, the Government effort to achieve the eight objectives of the PD Plan by applying the community cooperation principle.
- Popularize and explain the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan to the people, especially the rural folk, to give them a clear understanding of its crucial importance.

After one year of activity, the information effort has been reflected in the achievements of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan; the area under the control of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has been extended, thus providing security to over 90% of the total population of the country; in particular 50% of the population (in hamlets of Categories A and B) are enjoying complete security. Other outstanding performances are reflected in the people's response to and participation in village and hamlet elections, resettlement of refugees and their return from evacuation, Peoples Self-Defense Forces, the Phung Hoang Plan, the Chieu Hoi Program, etc.

b. The above result must be maintained and developed in 1970, so as to accelerate the success of the Pacification and Development Plan vigorously to its total success.

2. IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPT:

In accordance with the RVN President's directives on Pacification and Development policy for 1970, the elaboration and implementation of the information program in the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan will be based on the following fundamental concepts:

a. Information must be closely associated with education of the people. The system of information for mass education will be effective only when local leaders personally assume charge, and when the information cadres are adequately trained and deployed.

b. All information media must be used wisely depending upon the local situation and operational requirements.

c. Civil servants, government cadres, and PSDF members must participate actively in indoctrination courses so as to gain an insight into Government policy and thereby become hard-core cadres in the political mobilization of the people.

d. The Information Branch directly supports the effort of motivating the masses to get their active participation in the development of their localities in all fields.

e. The Prefect of Saigon, Mayors, and Province Chiefs are directly responsible for psychological operations in the capital, municipalities and provinces; the Saigon Information Service Chief and Province and City Information Service Chiefs are only the experts on the information staff. Village and Hamlet Chiefs are directly responsible for information activities within their respective jurisdictions as prescribed in Circular #93/TT/NV, dated 2 August 1969.

f. According to the RVN President's directives, the evaluation of the result of the job must be based on its quality rather than its quantity. In consequence, in the implementation of the information program particular attention must be paid to the selection of employees, to training, and to evaluation of the result of work by the survey method.

g. The coordination with related agencies involved in the Pacification and Development Plan must be fully implemented from Central to local levels to accelerate the support and publicity of the Pacification and Development programs to include Land Reform, Village and Hamlet Self-Development, People Self-Defense, Phung Hoang, etc., as well as to explain clearly to the people the benefits of these programs, so that they will take an active part by voluntary cooperation with the Government in the implementation of the above programs.

3. OBJECTIVES:

With the above concepts in mind, the information program in the 1970 PD Plan is developed on the following basis:

a. Motivate the people to unite them into a solid national force capable of insuring a decisive victory by the people in the political war against the Communists.

b. Intensively materialize the community spirit in the provinces to create and develop a democratic life in daily activities.

c. Build on the results of the 1969 program in order to secure success, and at the same time widely publicize and explain the Government's 1970 Pacification and Development Plan.

4. ACTIVITIES:

In order to carry out the job as dictated by the above principles and objectives, information activities will be focused on these points:

a. Emphasis of activities:

(1) Organize regular indoctrination courses for civil servants, cadres of various branches of activity, and PSDF members on politics and important events of the day so as to afford them opportunities to contribute effectively in the political struggle against the enemy.

(2) Accelerate face-to-face information activities among the masses by developing these forms of communication to include talks, group discussions, conversations, and visits (to each family and each person) in order to keep the public informed on political issues and important events, as well as to guide community activities and the realization of democracy. These face-to-face information activities must be given top priority, because of their result in depth, in quality rather than in quantity.

(3) Make maximum use of existing information equipment. Develop information activities and motivate the people to develop more information media at their various levels. We must appreciate the use of information equipment as an additional means to assist information cadres.

(4) Improve and strengthen the information facilities and personnel at provincial level and down to district, rural village and hamlet, ward and subward levels.

(5) Provide pre-service training to information personnel from the provincial level down to grass-roots level in politics, operational techniques, use and maintenance of instruments and machines.

In short, the 1970 activities will center on motivating the people to voluntarily build a genuine way of life in politics, economy, culture, and social welfare within villages, hamlets, and communities set up last year.

b. Implementation Procedures:

In order to carry out the activities mentioned in paragraph 4a above, the following methods will be used:

(1) Tasks to be performed for achieving point 4a(1):

(a) Improve and strengthen the organizational management system of study steering committees at all echelons: establishing headquarters, forming standing study Boards, editorial staffs, briefing boards, etc.

(b) Make timetables for monthly and quarterly study sessions and seminars.

(c) Coordinate with concerned ministries in drafting, printing, distributing minutes of seminars and study sessions and a guide book on theory and operating techniques for civil servants and cadres of various branches of activity.

(d) Organize periodical seminar sessions at various agencies from the central to the district level on political issues of current interest.

(e) Organize regional seminars on important topics conducted by the Central Briefing Board.

(f) Offer prizes and commendations to outstanding officials and workers in seminars and study sessions at the end of every quarter.

(2) Tasks to be performed for achieving point 4a(2):

(a) Form or strengthen in every Information Service in Saigon or in the provinces mobile Psywar Information Teams composed of Information/ Chieu Hoi Cadres, RD Cadres, and Army Psywar Cadres for regular and direct activities with the population.

(b) Improve the Central Mobile Cadre Group both in quality and quantity.

(c) Organize monthly study meeting for village, hamlet, ward, and sub-ward population with materials to be supplied either by the central or by local agencies under the direction of the central. In addition to the government doctrines and policies and important political issues of present interest, the topics will have to deal with the ways of realizing democracy such as the principles of discussion and vote by majority, the rights and obligations of citizenship to include elections, candidacy, and political struggle against the enemy in the future.

(3) Tasks to be performed for achieving point 4a(3):

(a) Repair and maintain audio-visual aids to increase their efficiency.

(b) Install more information facilities in the infrastructure such as broadcasting towers, information bulletins, public and private placards, libraries, information halls, locally financed exhibition rooms.

(c) The radio, television, movies and press agencies will carry out a special and regular program in support of the 1970 Pacification and Development effort.

(d) Increase the quantity of propaganda materials: wall posters, leaflets, slogans, photographs of current events, local press, news bulletins and films to meet operational requirements. This effort will parallel the qualitative improvement. There will be clear-cut definition of the propaganda materials to be made at the central level and those to be made at local level, and in the latter case, they will be financed by local funds or by subsidies from other agencies.

(e) Procure propaganda gifts such as Vietnamese flags, pictures of national leaders, and common objects such as hand-bags, note books, pencils, rulers, wall calendars, pocket calendars, writing-pads (on which are printed strategic and tactical slogans) for distribution to local population.

(f) Procure more publications of propaganda effect for local libraries, reading-rooms, and exhibition rooms.

(g) The central authority will publish a weekly instructional bulletin and print pocket instructional documents, songs, short plays, and poems (which may be recorded on tape or phonograph records) of propaganda impact to be distributed to local services for utilization in operations.

(h) Use forms of arts such as movies and shows, with emphasis on popular arts which are simple and wholesome and reflect the vigor of the national struggle against communism (this form of information will be combined with information activities in item 4a(2).

(4) Tasks to be performed to achieve point 4a(4):

(a) Establish a statute for ward and subward information cadres.

(b) Make a SOP on the selection and assignment for: appointment, recruitment, conversion, replacement recruitment.

(c) Make personal files for village, hamlet, ward, and sub-ward Information/Chieu Hoi Cadres: reference cards, cadre cards, pre-service or in-service training certificates, etc.

(d) Review the number of personnel in various central agencies for attachment, if necessary, to provincial services and for rational distribution of personnel to provincial and district services.

(5) Tasks to be performed for achieving point 4a(5):

(a) Continue to hold training courses at Vung Tau for Village Information/Chieu Hoi Cadres who were not trained in 1969.

(b) Open at the National Training Center of the Ministry training courses for Province Information Service and District Information Section workers in charge of training of hamlet, ward, and subward Information Cadres.

(c) Continue to hold short term training courses lasting from five to seven days at the service office for hamlet, ward, and sub-ward Information Cadres.

(d) Hold short term refresher training courses on political argumentation and techniques lasting from three to five days at the service office for all village, hamlet, ward, and sub-ward information workers.

(e) Hold in-service training courses at various repair shops for Province and District Information Service personnel and workers in charge of photography, movies, printing, use of government cars, etc. to teach them on how to operate and maintain information equipment and media.

(f) Send Information Service Chiefs and Deputy Service Chiefs for political warfare training courses held at Dalat.

c. Propaganda themes for the year:

(1) In secure areas:

(a) The success of the Republic of Vietnam in all fields: military, political, and foreign affairs.

(b) Increased combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

(c) Achievements of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan.

(d) The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan (significance and purpose of action).

(e) Neutralization of enemy infra-structures (Phung Hoang Plan).

(f) Resettlement of refugees in new hamlets and their return to their old villages.

(g) Land reform policy, development of agriculture and fishery, organization of associations and cooperatives, etc.

(h) Merge and intensively develop popular forces such as People's Self Defense Force, Farmers Groups, Women's Groups, Young Men Groups, etc.

(i) In urban districts, efforts will be made to rebuild damaged areas and to root out corruption etc.

(2) In unpacified areas:

- (a) Denunciation of communist oppression and exploitation maneuvers.
- (b) Condemnation of communist intransigence in peace talks (they continue to fight while negotiating Paris peace talk).
- (c) Appeal to VC soldiers and cadres to rally to the just cause.
- (d) Call on the population to fight courageously against the communists and to assist the authorities when our troops come to pacify their hamlets.

In addition to the main points mentioned above, other appropriate actions will be executed simultaneously depending on the evolution of the situation, provided that they help achieve the above objectives.

d. The different phases of operation.

(1) Preparatory phase from the date of promulgation of the Plan 1 November 1969 through 1 January 1970.

- From central to local agencies.

- (a) Recapitulation of the results of 1969 activities.
- (b) According to assigned tasks, perform the activities mentioned in points 4a(4) and 4a(5) and appropriate activities in other points.
- (c) On basis of this general program, each agency will devise a detailed and positive program for the whole year to be presented to the Ministry for approval in advance. In particular local agencies when planning will have to refer to Region and province plans to be in strict accordance with the needs of each locality, with endorsement of the local administrative supervisor.

(2) Phase of implementation.

From 1 January 1970 thru 31 December 1970.

- (a) The agencies should make monthly and quarterly schedules for gradual implementation.
- (b) Every month, the central and local agencies have to submit a report on their activities to the Ministry before the 25th day of the month (and a copy to the Directorate of Planning and Research). The 1969 report form is still applicable.
- (c) Recapitulate activities and review good and weak points to make corrections in time in the next phase.
- (d) The Operations Section of the Ministry of Information will keep track of the accomplishment of this program and submit a recapitulation report to the Central Pacification and Development Council before the 5th day of each month.

(e) Joint operation.

- (1) Every Directorate and Ministry has a psywar information program, the implementation of which requires the Ministry of Information's coordination and effort under the open Psywar Operations Coordinating Committee.
- (2) In addition to the national psywar operation each province and city should launch a psywar campaign with theme relative to each locality.
- (3) The local information organization (Radio, TV Stations, etc.) should contribute actively to the implementation of local programs.

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX VIII

PROSPERITY FOR ALL

1. GENERAL

1968 was a year of military contest. 1969 was a year of expansion of security. In 1970, the momentum achieved must be continued into the political and economic fields.

Our people must be convinced of the validity of our cause by actually beginning to experience the better life bought at such a cost of blood and destruction over the past years.

We must show the world that our nation has achieved manhood and we can replace our brave allies on the battlefield and we can defend ourselves. The exploitation of the natural wealth of our territory and the energy of our people can produce a happy, prosperous, and secure national community.

In the one year of 1970 we cannot achieve all the promise of our post-war plans, but we can open the road clearly, lay the foundation for the future, make the economic development machinery stronger and more efficient, and demonstrate clearly to everyone our resolve to move toward prosperity for all.

2. Our campaign of "Look Forward to a Better Life for All, 1970" must be fought in three sectors:

(1) We must assist our rural compatriots toward greater production, better organization, and development of new areas and products.

(2) We must develop the community spirit of our urban population, now 40 percent of the national community. We must try to break down the anarchy, isolation and selfishness of present urban life. We must improve our urban organization, public services and housing.

(3) We must improve the social status of our people in the fields of education, public health and community life.

In all three campaigns the focus will be on the development of stronger community spirit. The role of the government and its services will be to support and assist the citizens of the community to move toward the goals they and their elected leaders select. Decentralization of decision making and an emphasis on community participation will characterize all three programs.

The private sector will be encouraged to play the full role and make the great contribution it can.

A major effort will be made to encourage community solutions to problems and to reduce abuses, monopolies, bureaucratic sluggishness, and corruption.

3. OBJECTIVES.

a. The rural campaign will include five elements:

(1) Land Reform (MLR & AFD). Land reform includes the distribution of the remaining expropriated land and the new land to the tillers program. The land reform program is included in Annex XIV as a special annex in order to emphasize the importance of this program. It will receive priority attention from all Ministries and government officials to obtain maximum results.

(2) AGRICULTURAL AND FISHERY DEVELOPMENT (MLR & AFD). "Land to tiller" is the main objective of the Government. But after receiving a piece of land, the farmer must be actively supported in developing farming and animal husbandry. He must be provided with facilities for production in order to increase his income and raise his living standard. Therefore, the Land Reform Program must be backed up vigorously by other appropriate and efficient agricultural and fishery programs. The focus of this activity is to promote the food production to the point of self sufficiency in rice and to meet the people's requirements for protein foods such as meat and fish.

(a) Rice. The main objective is to cut down the quantity of rice imported in 1970 and possibly stop rice imports in about 1971.

The planned IR-8 rice cultivation for 1970 stands at some 500,000 Ha. with an increase of 1,000,000 MTs of paddy for 600,000 MTs of rice. In addition, a part of land abandoned and uncultivated because of the war is now recultivated along the progress of local security restorations.

(b) Animal husbandry. The production of more domestic animals is carried out through the programs of:

- Supplying needs and improving animal feeds
- Improving breeds
- Preventing animal diseases
- Training in animal husbandry

Targets fixed for 1970 include:

1. Raising "lua mien" in 10,000 Ha. to produce about 40,000 MTs to replace corn feed.

2. Importing 150,000 MTs more of corn and 45,000 MTs of supplementary feed.

3. Establishing 10 feed mills for a production of 80,000 MTs of feed for pigs and chickens.

4. Importing about four million chickens (including 200,000 chickens for reproduction and 400,000 chickens for eggs production) and about 3.4 million chickens for meat.

5. Training 1,500 Cadres and 60,000 farmers; distributing 160,000 animal husbandry reference printed materials.

(c) Fishery. The Government aims to improve the fishermen's living conditions, to increase production, and to industrialize the fishing facilities. Vast natural resources in offshore fishing are going to be tapped, and will substantially improve the lives of fishermen throughout the country. Our objective in the next two years is to increase annual production by 500,000 tons. This program includes the following objectives:

- 1 Motorizing more fishing boats.
- 2 Buying fishing motor boats of 80-120 MT.
- 3 Building and repairing fishery wharfs, ports, and markets.
- 4 Training fishermen in raising fish, operating fishing motor boats, repairing and maintaining fishing gear and boats (8 courses for fishermen, 3 courses for helmsmen and mechanics).

5 Studying the sea to seek new fishing areas with three new study boats (Kyoshin Maru 52, Huu Nghi, and one light fishing boat).

(d) In addition, low level activities supporting production are planned as follows:

1 Irrigation. The 1970 National Budget has provision for small projects such as building dams and dikes and dredging and building canals, and for other projects at low level. These can be supplemented by provinces and villages by the use of Province and Village Self Development funds as decided locally. The number of and locations where projects will be carried out will be determined after an on-the-spot assessment of local requirements.

2 Farm machinery: With the existing engineering facilities, the Directorate of Farm Machinery can support the production increase program as follows:

1,400 Ha.	<u>a</u>	Clearing jungles to extend cultivation area:	
	<u>b</u>	Ploughing and harrowing established land:	
5,000 Ha.	<u>c</u>	Transporting farm products, materials)	six
		necessary for agriculture) million
) MTS/Km

Additionally, several other activities within the agricultural mechanization program affect the farming mass directly, such as training farmers how to repair and maintain farming equipment, improve traditional farming tools, demonstration of farming equipment suitable for each locality, etc.

(3) Expand Rural Credit (ADB). The second element of our rural campaign will be expansion of rural credit

(a) Expansion of ADB Services. Conventional government loan programs administered by the ADB will be expanded by an additional VN\$2 billion. These funds will be available for loans to farmers and fishermen who have proven themselves credit-worthy. Loan programs cover the purchase of fertilizer, the purchase of irrigation pumps, the purchase of baby chicks and feed, and the purchase of large marine engines to power heavy duty fishing trawlers. ADB will increase its staff by 200 field agents to provide the administrative service required to service this increase in loan funds.

(b) Rural Banks. The number of rural banks will be increased to 25 by the end of 1970 and the ultimate goal is at least one rural bank in each district. These banks will provide a secure and profitable place for deposit of savings and will provide convenient locations for credit-worthy farmers and fishermen to get production loans.

(4) Encouragement of Farmer Organizations (MLR & AFD).

We will emphasize the economies that can be realized through cooperative efforts, especially producer's organizations. The Central Farmers Associations and village cooperatives with assistance from the Government, will initiate programs to increase the number of farmers and fishermen who benefit from their cooperative services by at least 50% in 1970. Farmer organizations will be required to have voluntary membership, elected leadership and public meetings and financial records.

(5) Improve Logistical and Marketing Systems (Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, and Directorate General of National Police). Expanded farm income is linked to marketing practices in two ways: first, more efficient marketing will permit farmers to earn more and consumers to pay less. Second, more efficient marketing will find buyers for a greater volume and variety of farm produce.

Therefore, we will strive to improve the logistical and marketing systems.

b. URBAN CAMPAIGN:

As outlined in Annex XVI, special attention will be given to the urban areas. Improvement of the economic life of the people in these areas is one of the most important elements of this special campaign. Bringing a better life to the residents of the urban areas will involve the following programs:

(1) Extension to the urban areas of the development funds which have been made available for rural areas. As indicated in Annex XVI the Village Self Development Fund will be applied to the Phuong or urban village in much the same way that it has been applied to the rural village. Elected councils will be established to direct the affairs of the urban village or Phuong, and these will have the same authority over these funds as their counterparts in the rural areas. The Province Self Development Fund (Annex XII) will also be made available for use in urban areas in the same way as it is available for use in rural areas. In those municipalities which are not a part of a regular province, special funds of this nature will be made available.

(2) Improved Organizations:

(a) Each municipal or urban area council should establish a special office to support the development of private organizations of

urban groups to improve their lives. This will include private neighborhood groups, parent teachers' association, cooperatives, chambers of commerce, etc.

The Ministry of Economy will be specially charged with studying methods to support such private organizations in their efforts to improve the economic lives of their members. This will include particular attention to the establishment of distribution channels between such groups and producers' cooperatives, support for the development of consumer cooperatives, publication of established prices in all markets and other public centers, elimination of unnecessary restrictions and check points causing greater costs, and identifying market syndicates, speculators and hoarders. The Ministry of Economy will also establish standard grades and measures to insure honesty and fair dealing by wholesalers and suppliers. Market inspectors will be required to furnish copies of their reports to phuong, village and municipal councils for review and comment.

(b) Each urban or municipal council should establish a special office for planning. This office would submit to each urban council overall plans for the development, modernization and improvement of the urban areas, to consist of zones for future growth, zones requiring immediate improvement and plans for the development of public utilities and services.

Application from provinces and municipalities for projects to carry out such development plans for urban areas will receive treatment equal to that given projects under the CPDC Province Development Fund. Such plans will be coordinated with the Director General of Reconstruction and Urban Planning of the Ministry of Public Works.

(3) Low Cost Housing: The Ministry of Public Works, Director General of Reconstruction and Urban Planning will establish a special office of assistance to the development of low-cost urban housing. This office will assist in developing programs of low-cost public housing, and of technical and credit support of low-cost private housing for urban areas. Special liaison will be established with planning offices of municipalities and urban villages with a view to identifying areas and programs for priority support. This program will be supported by the following Ministries.

- Ministry of Economy, support for import of necessary equipment and support of development of cooperatives and credit unions for housing programs.

- Ministry of RD, support from the Village Self Development funds for appropriate projects, when requested at the local level.

- Ministry of Defense, review of military-owned property in urban areas which could be released for housing projects, with report to be submitted to the CPDC. Special emphasis should be given to the relocation of military units from urban areas to occupy facilities made available by redeployment of allied forces.

- Ministry of Public Works, (with Director General of Reconstruction and Urban Planning) technical assistance to establishment of low-cost public or private housing projects and provision of appropriate public utilities.

- CPDC, support from the Province/Municipal Development Fund for appropriate public housing projects proposed by the provinces and municipalities.

(4) Ownership of property by workers, soldiers and civil servants.

Stabilize standard of living for those with fixed incomes in the face of inflation.

The government will fulfill a phased program to sell all stock in government-owned factories. There will be installment buying of work vehicles and taxis. Low-cost housing for families of workers will be implemented by concerned ministries at the same time as the project for term sale of housing to soldiers and civil servants. Reconstruction of areas ravaged during Tet of 1968 will be completed before the end of 1970.

Necessary goods will be imported without quota. Foodstuffs will be stockpiled sufficient to deal with any shortage.

Market prices will be constantly and tightly controlled. The strength of the piaster will be continuously protected and increased.

(c) SOCIAL CAMPAIGN.

The better life for citizens, both rural and urban, also must improve the social conditions in which they live. Aside from the economic situation these particularly affect their health, education and community life. These three areas will receive concentrated attention during 1970.

(1) In the health field, we will concentrate on getting health care into the home and family, and to upgrading critical areas of concern, such as rehabilitation of the handicapped and maternal and child health. During this year the government will demonstrate that its concern is not only with the soldier and the breadwinner, but with the core of the family--mother and children - as well.

(2) Concerning education. The government advocates the dispersing of authority for operation of schools, and management will pass to the local areas concerned. We can identify three major critical areas in this field, namely elementary, secondary, and adult education.

(a) Elementary education. We already have two clearly stated goals for elementary education: to provide universal, free elementary education, and to provide this education through "community schools" --- schools which develop their programs in terms of the needs and interests of children and adults in the community and which provide meaningful educational experiences.

The first goal is nearing achievement. Fifteen years ago, less than 10 percent of the elementary school age population was in schools. Today, over 80 percent of this age group is enrolled in either public or private schools. As universal education nears attainment, our thoughts should be increasingly directed to the quality of education and insuring that schools are providing the functional type of education as envisioned by the second goal above.

(b) Comprehensive Secondary education. A developing nation in time of peace needs trained middle-level manpower to support its economic development. We also must draw from this source for those to go on to the university level. Because of this, secondary education is very important in the pacification as well as the post-war development plans.

Secondary education is now available to 552,000 students. By 30 June 1970, this figure will be increased by 65,000. This plentiful source of manpower requires careful and precise training because it will determine prosperity and progress for our country's people.

(c) Adult Education. As a consequence of a lack of education offerings available to our people in past years, an under-educated, under-trained adult and adolescent population is hampered in contributing to the nation's efforts to achieve prosperity for all.

We will provide education in cities, towns and rural areas to out-of-school youth, ages thirteen and over, as well as adults, in order to let them catch up with progress, gain sufficient skills and abilities to participate in building the nation. Illiteracy must be eradicated throughout the nation.

(3) Concerning community life: To lead the citizenry to a spirit of unity, self organization, and self-management, a community life program needs to be established and executed everywhere citizens are concentrated, whether in urban or rural areas. The people who live from day-to-day will discard the selfish attitudes, dependent habits, and individual decisions, solving mutual problems in the community. Solutions, good or bad, surely will be accomplished better, missions will be more exciting and the character of democracy will be fulfilled.

4. EXECUTION.

As dictated by the Community Cooperation concept, the projects will be implemented based on the following operation slogans:

"People act, people enjoy profits, the government only guides and supports."

a. Rural Campaign.

(1) Land Reform Program: See Annex XIV.

(2) Agriculture and Fishery Development Program. MLR & AFD has responsibility and will implement as follows:

(a) Through the local services and based on legitimate aspirations of the farmers and fishermen, the central technical agency will approve for implementation projects which have acceptable technical dossiers.

(b) A new National Livestock Training Center will be placed in operation in 1970. This Center will provide intensive training courses covering all areas of swine and poultry production. It will be open to all interested persons to observe the use of new types of buildings and equipment. Students and professors of the National Agriculture Center will utilize the Center for practice training and experimentation.

(c) The MLRAFD will select farmers throughout Vietnam who will agree to cooperate with the MLRAFD in permitting their farms to be used for demonstrations. Modern methods of production will be

put into practice on these farms. Training meetings will be conducted at the provincial level to acquaint neighboring farmers with these new methods of production.

(d) Development of new and better seed varieties, and the establishment of experimental seed stations in each province.

b. Operational Coordination.

The carrying out of projects demands the coordination of concerned agencies:

- The Ministry of National Defense will detach appropriate technicians and provide draft deferment for service cadres in hamlets and villages.

- The Ministry of Information will popularize agricultural and fishery development programs.

- The Ministry of Economy will grant licenses for the import of production facilities, determine costs and consumption market for fishery and farm products.

- The local administrative organizations (Province Chiefs, District Chiefs, Village and Hamlet Officials, particularly Village Commissioner for Agriculture and Land Reform) are responsible for the implementation of programs and receive at once support and guidance from the Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture and Fishery Development.

The private organizations (farmers' organizations and dealers) will take on import and distribution of production facilities, transactions and consumption of fishery and farm products.

(3) Expand Rural Credit.

(a) The ADB will establish 1970 program of activity with old and new capital, re-examining requirements for borrowing and services, coordinating closely with MLRAFD.

(b) ADB will commence a broad campaign to publicize meaning and truth of rural banks. All the way down to local level, along with province and district chiefs, research of the requirements for increasing the establishment of rural banks in 1970, to provide in advance for necessary means for facilities and employees so that programs will not be hindered or slowed.

(4) Expand Rural Peoples Organizations:

(a) At this rate of growth, one-half of the farm and fishery families will be affiliated in 1970 with an organization that will

assure these producers of adequate supplies at reasonable prices. The three-year goal is for a farmer organization in every district and a sales branch in every village. Priority will be given to developing these organizations first in the newly pacified areas, second in the most productive districts, and finally in the remaining areas.

(b) In addition to having commodities available for farmers and fishermen, these organizations will train their managers at all levels in how to raise crops and livestock and to operate machinery so that they can properly advise farmers and fishermen on how to increase both their production and profits. The organizations will also extend the availability of electricity in rural areas.

(c) The farm and fishery organizations also will increase the profit their members get from the production by improving the marketing of crops, livestock and fish. Plans already drawn for the establishment of plants to process and freeze chickens and pork, to grade, process, pack and refrigerate vegetables and process and freeze fish, etc., will be implemented.

(d) The prices which farmers' organizations pay for the production inputs will be lowered. Farmers' associations and cooperatives will be assisted in the construction of fishing piers, wharfs, fish marketing buildings, ice plants, and ice holding plants, and the bulk procurement of fertilizers, pesticides, water pumps, animal feed, vaccines, shrimp traps, and fish nets.

(e) An inter-ministerial committee will be formed to review all foreign exchange licensing and all import levies with a view to increasing the supply of imported production goods at reasonable prices. DaNang will be opened as an import center for the northern provinces.

(5) Improving Marketing and Distribution Systems:

(a) In order to spread supply to the points of highest demand and to reduce the marketing costs which the farmer ultimately must bear, restrictions on the interprovincial shipment of goods will be lifted. Specifically,

The temporary restrictions on interprovincial shipment of rice and paddy will be lifted;

The Prime Minister's circular of 4 September 1969 allowing free movement of goods to Saigon will be fully implemented;

The list of strategic items necessitating strict provincial licensing and control will be cut down.

(b) All arbitrary and unjustifiable limitations on the issuance of business licenses for dealing in farm materials and products will be abolished. We intend to allow free entry into such business to increase competition and limit monopolistic business practices.

(c) Ministry of Economy: will make available information on market prices. Retail and wholesale prices from the various market centers will be published in the rural areas in order that farmers can become competitive to the maximum extent, and so that the farmers will always know what their goods are worth in the market.

AESS and NIS will distribute their price data through Ministry of Information, a morning radio program, and postings in public markets.

(d) In order to facilitate movement of goods along with insuring security on important land and water arteries, all checkpoints determined by the Corps Commanders to be unnecessary for security purposes will be eliminated. Mobile checkpoints will be strictly supervised to ensure that they operate correctly and serve a useful purpose.

(e) To encourage the development of the free market system, provincial price setting on most items will be prohibited. Price controls will be limited to wholesale prices of those items where a large volume is handled by a few dealers, such as some imported items.

(f) Middlemen who oppress both farmer and consumer by hoarding commodities will be severely punished within the law.

(g) The distribution system will be improved depending upon the security situation and condition of highways. National highway 4 will soon be open at night as well as during daylight.

b. Urban Campaign.

Execution clearly explained under "Objectives"

c. Social Welfare Campaign.

(1) Concerning health (see also Appendix 6 to Annex XIII)

(a) One manner in which we can continue to expand health care is to accelerate the joint utilization of facilities by both

military and civilians. This is an ambitious plan, unique in the world to Vietnam. We will have it fully implemented by the middle of the year. Under this new arrangement the health of our troops will continue to be protected, and the health of the average citizen will also be greatly benefited. This system should make 1300 new hospital beds available to civilians, and give them access to the services of 2,000 health personnel from the Ministry of Defense, including doctors, dentists, and pharmacists.

(b) Another novel approach which will be implemented during 1970 to bring medical care to the home and family is the formation of a National Health Corps within the Ministry of Health to be made up largely of recent graduates of our new training programs. The members of the National Health Corps will serve throughout Vietnam to bring better health to all. This Corps will be made up of all health disciplines, but the majority of them will be of a new category, the Public Health Assistant. These people will work out of district and municipal clinics in mobile teams to bring modern medicine to the home on a regular basis. In particular the National Health Corps will promote better care for children, including good nutrition habits, good follow-up practices in contagious diseases such as tuberculosis, and good community health practices to combat such ancient scourges as plague, cholera and malaria. The Corps will be responsible for providing immunizations against tuberculosis, smallpox, tetanus, diphtheria, cholera, and plague. They will also dust market places and private homes to protect against plague, spray DDT for protection against malaria, assist in identifying tubercular patients, and assist those in need of rehabilitation. One of their most important tasks will be transportation of the sick and wounded to medical treatment facilities for timely treatment. The government will strive to improve the available transportation facilities in the districts. We will continue our efforts in the hospitals, but the National Health Corps will greatly increase health care at the family our greatest need. Specific goals for the recruitment training and functioning of this Corps will be set by separate directive. The National Health Corps will work closely with other cadre at the village level, and utilize such personnel (e. g. RD Cadre) when appropriate.

(c) Maternal and child health programs will be stressed in 1970. This will largely be an information effort, stressing the importance of nutrition at the family level. The importance of adequate intake and a well-balanced diet, especially in the first four years of life, and to pregnant and nursing mothers, will be emphasized. The

National Health Corps will be a vehicle for dissemination of this information, as will pediatric centers which will continue to be developed. The Ministry of Health will continue to expand Research Clinics in Population Study, informing and assisting mothers in child spacing and the attendant benefits in lower infant and maternal death rates, and lower prematurity rates.

(d) One of our most pressing needs is in the area of rehabilitation of the crippled and blind. These people represent a considerable resource which can be productive both for themselves and for the country. During 1970, we will undertake three distinct rehabilitation programs under the National Rehabilitation Institute with emphasis on vocational training.

(1) Improve aid for the blind:

Formation of a library for the blind;

Establishment of blind rehabilitation centers at Can Tho and DaNang;

Increased job placement;

A training course for instructors for the blind.

(2) Improve aid for the blind:

Hospital physical therapy departments will be expanded;

Physical therapy training increased;

Job placement for physical therapy technicians.

(3) Improved aid to amputees.

Instruction of amputees;

Job placement of amputees;

An increase in prosthetic technician training.

(e) During 1970 we will expand our efforts in both rural and urban environmental sanitation. This is also basically an information effort in which the National Health Corps, the national media, and the schools can be invaluable.

In the rural areas the basic ingredients are:

- Improved water supply;
- Sanitary disposal of human wastes;
- The burial or burning of garbage and trash.

In the urban areas the basics of sanitation to be stressed are:

- Refuse collection and disposal;
- Ice plant sanitation;
- Food sanitation;
- Emphasis on food handler instruction courses and plant sanitation, rat and insect control, and personal hygiene.

In addition, short programs on the radio and television will educate the people on preventive dentistry.

This effort will be fully supported by the Ministries of Information and RD.

(f) Ministry of Health will have general responsibility for implementation of health programs.

(2) Concerning Education: (See also Appendix 7 to Annex XIII)

(a) Elementary education:

1. First, we must reduce the pupil-teacher ratio. The current ratio is about 60 elementary students for each teacher. Until this ratio is reduced, the quality of teaching will not reach the level deemed important for children in a democracy. As the country improves its elementary teacher education program and increases its numbers of well-prepared teachers, the next step is to reduce the pupil-teacher ratio. The long-range goal is a ratio of one teacher to 30 children. With this ratio, an elementary teacher can give each child sufficient time to discover his particular needs, interest and abilities, and to give him the day-by-day guidance he needs to develop his capabilities.

2. At least 4,000 new teachers will be trained annually beginning in 1970, and through a summer program 2,000 teachers now employed but without school diplomas will be enabled to work for diplomas. Also we strive to improve the quality of elementary teaching by new programs in the normal schools. Elementary teachers should be the best prepared of all teachers, because the first years of school determine a child's attitude toward learning, himself, and others. Teachers of young children need to help the child, his parents, and other school personnel to recognize the child's potential talents and abilities. Officials also have the important task of cultivating the children's virtue.

3. Included in the normal school program will be one year of general education for those students who do not have full secondary background. This additional year plus the two years of normal

school training should vastly improve the quality of teachers.

4. As soon as enough teachers become available, double shifts in elementary schools can be eliminated and a lengthened school day introduced for all children. As security permits and the school plant becomes a center for continuing education of all age groups in hamlets, villages, towns and cities, the length of the school day will necessarily be adjusted in terms of the total community program. Scouting and 4-T activities will be incorporated into the school program, for which time limits cannot be set.

5. As people return to their native villages and hamlets, schools must be built to provide for the school-age population. These can be simple structures, however, selected by the residents and supported by the Village or Province Development Funds when the people of the community so decide.

6. Elementary education is the foundation of learning. The period of elementary education should, therefore, provide all children with a well-rounded general education which will enable them to develop socially (as citizens with sound moral, social, and political values), emotionally and physically, as well as mentally. They should have some introduction to all main bodies of knowledge available to mankind, to some basic vocational knowledge and skill and to major social and economic goals of the nation.

7. The number of years in elementary school should be increased gradually by three years. These added years will enable children to mature more fully, thereby giving them a better chance to succeed in the highly competitive secondary school period;

- Equip them with knowledge and some skills for further job training, thereby strengthening the total manpower source;
- Prepare them more fully for their citizenship role.
- In the meantime, at the start of next year the continuous 12-year primary-secondary education system will be fixed. The first 5 years, equivalent to elementary school, will be mandatory.

8. All schools will have a Student-Parent Association. In addition, all villages or urban communities will establish a school board, consisting one half of members of the Village or Urban Council and one half of elected representatives of the Student-Parent Associations. The school board will advise the Educational Service on matters concerning the schools, will seek support for the school system from the community, and will prepare to take responsibility for the direction of school affairs and the support of school expenses by the village in 1972.

9. The Constitution mandates free, universal education. Even though there are private schools, the government must strive to provide enough teachers and facilities for elementary education. The quality of teachers is improved. Facilities are not a major constraint - a good teacher can teach effectively in almost any kind of physical setting. Older children can even help build their own classrooms.

10. Elementary schools in all cases will be assimilated into the community school concept by 1970.

(b) Secondary Education:

1. Change general high schools to comprehensive high schools. Now there are 11 of these. In the 1970-1971 school year there will be 100 additional schools.

2. A broader variety of opportunities will be offered. In addition to a general education to prepare each student for responsible citizenship, there will be specialized and/or vocational programs in Modern Literature, Classical Literature, Mathematical Science, Experimental Science, Agriculture, Technical Vocational, Business, and Home Economics.

3. Equal opportunity to attend secondary school is our ultimate goal for all children, regardless of geographic residence, sex, race, religion, or economic status.

4. As in all programs, we will encourage local initiative, including increased budget sharing by local committees, boards, associations, etc.

5. Each province will be divided into secondary school districts that will serve as the unit of educational planning and administration. Each district will have an elected school board by the end of the school year that will be legally responsible for educational development as defined by the Constitution and laws.

(c) Adult Education:

1. Every available teaching resource will be used for accomplishment of the adult education objective -- Revolutionary Development Cultural Cadre, off-duty ARVN troops, technical cadre, Chieu Hoi Cadre, and literate hamlet village civilians will receive specific training from the Ministry of Education to conduct the many phases of this vital program.

2. Many and diverse facilities which already exist will be utilized. All existing school structures are potential education

centers. Additionally, villages and hamlets have community centers or other gathering places which will be utilized at times convenient to the local population.

3. Programs will be designed to meet specific needs of the people of the region involved. Much of the curriculum content will be based on local requirements and be aimed directly at helping the people to improve their incomes and standards of living.

(d) Special Aspects.

1. In the next two years, the government will double the number of students in technical and vocational schools, and give students in these fields priority for study abroad.

2. University regulations will be issued with aim of smoothing present injustices and improve university life. A number of activities will be moved to better facilities at Thu Duc.

3. The government will develop a program for school life under the principles of practical training in the field of citizen education, helping adult students lives, self-leadership in a democratic spirit, sense of responsibility, a sense of mutual affection and assistance, dedication to serve and training in good qualities of a deserving citizenry.

(3) Community Life:

To achieve this objective, community centers will be formed, operated and financed jointly by the local community and the government.

The community center will be organized into a private people's association of civic leaders, representatives of private organizations and local government authorities. After formation and enlistment of membership, it will elect its own management and conduct its own affairs.

It will concentrate on providing services to the people of the community, acting as a social welfare center, recreation center, youth center, adult education center, and other general community programs.

While on a temporary basis, the community center might use government or other borrowed facilities, it should aim toward the development of its own facilities to clearly demonstrate its independent character. After establishment of the center, facilities there will not be used as office space by any government agency.

The community is authorized to utilize Village Self-Development or province Self Development or Provincial Development Funds to support the development of such community centers, provided that the government funds involved amount to no more than one-half of the necessary expenditures.

Community centers may be established in rural communities as well as urban.

The Ministry of Social Welfare is responsible for the detailed directives for the authorization and registration of private organizations and groupings into community centers, and the development of a program of promoting community centers, under CPDC supervision.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX IX

NATIONAL POLICE

1. GENERAL.

The Government objective in 1969 required the control of at least 90% of the general population and the provision of security at an "A" and "B" level for 50% of the population. To achieve this the NP established a large number of NP Sub-Stations in villages in which elections had been held. The National Police is an important force for the maintenance of security and public order, minimizing terrorism, and neutralizing the Communist infrastructure. In this connection, the National Police has already achieved some success. NP presence in the village was welcomed and supported by local officials and the populace who recognized that, thanks to such presence, security could be insured and laws properly observed.

In order to further exploit military and political achievements, the 1970 Government objective is to insure more effective security for 100% of the population, among whom a minimum of 90% are to be in the areas of categories A and B. Therefore, the National Police must continue to establish Village National Police Sub-Stations in all provinces, improve the organization, and reinforce the personnel strength of the existing Village National Police Sub-Stations, thus pushing forward their activities.

2. OBJECTIVES.

The National Police performs the following duties:

- a. Enforce law by maintaining security and order to protect lives and properties of the people in cities and rural areas.
- b. Coordinate with ARVN units and friendly forces to maintain tranquility by eliminating undesirable elements harmful to the national security.
- c. Encourage the rural population to cooperate closely with the National Police in promoting social activities, eradicating corrupt practices, maintaining public sanitation and public security to improve the rural standard of living.

3. EXECUTION.a. Concept.

(1) One principle: Extend and develop the prescribed 1969 Community Cooperation principle for all national activities on the threefold basis as follows:

- Cooperation among the people: Continue to explain to the people their rights and interests in the social community so they will voluntarily contribute to the development and protection of all activities of common interest.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- Cooperation between the people and the Government: Continue to motivate the local population to actively and closely participate in pacification and development activities. The local people's sincere and close cooperation with the Government will help build up democracy and a stable and better society.

- Cooperation among the Government agencies: Continue and maintain close coordination in all national efforts in order to acquire more potential and strength for the implementation of programs and activities.

(2) Use of Forces:

(a) In secure areas of Categories A and B, Popular Forces, People Self-Defense Forces, and National Police are the main forces, operating under the support of Regional Forces.

(b) In areas of categories C, D, and E Regional Forces, Popular Forces, People Self-Defense Forces, and National Police are the main forces, operating under the support of Regular Forces.

(c) In base areas and border areas, Regular Forces cooperate closely with Allied Forces for operations and control.

b. Organization:

(1) Continue to establish National Police Sub-Stations: The National Police will continue to establish Village National Police Sub-Stations in all provinces based on criteria of villages having many hamlets of categories A and B. Also, in order to control the mixed people in the Capital, Province, and City suburban areas, National Police Sub-Stations will be established in these areas in order to strengthen the security belt.

(2) Improvement of Existing National Police Sub-Stations. In 1969, the establishment of National Police Sub-Stations proceeded satisfactorily. However, because of urgent requirements, such an establishment was not too efficient. In 1970, these National Police Sub-Stations must be strengthened and improved in personnel and operations. Emphasis must be placed on the quality of operational efforts of the National Police Sub-Stations. Only after these tasks have been done can public order be maintained and law enforced efficiently in the villages.

(3) Establishment of additional Marine Police units: To support the National Police operations in Provinces and Districts having important waterways, the National Police will establish additional Marine Police units to insure security on these waterways.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4) Establishment of additional National Police Field Force: To effectively support the National Police land operations, the National Police will continue to establish additional Police Field Force units for Provinces which are short such units.

c. Division of work:

(1) Directorate General of National Police:

(a) In 1970, the Directorate General of National Police will establish a new TOE for National Police units based on the population density of each locality. Meanwhile, to make the presence of the National Police more efficient in villages, the Directorate General of National Police has planned a temporary project of increasing the personnel strength of the Village National Police Sub-Stations as follows:

1. Villages with a population of over 10,000: 18 policemen.
2. Villages with a population between 5,000 and 10,000: 12 policemen.
3. Villages with a population under 5,000: 6 policemen.

(b) To fulfill the requirement to establish NP Sub-Stations, NP personnel strength in 1970 will be increased by approximately 30,000 men. Priority will be given to recruiting candidates for service in their own localities and members of ethnic minorities for deployment in areas having their special ethnic characteristics.

(c) The National Police basic training for newly recruited personnel or military men transferred to the National Police will be assumed by training centers subordinate to the National Police Directorate General.

(d) Technical in-service training courses will be organized for National Police command level personnel.

(e) To help the National Police Sub-Stations attain a good understanding of the activities of this branch in the current period of time, the National Police Directorate General Directorates concerned with the Pacification and Development Plan will work out and complete by April 1970 a "Standard Operating Procedure" pertaining to the activities and duties of the respective Directorates at the National Police Sub-Stations.

(f) Every month, National Police Directorate General Inspection Teams will visit the National Police Sub-Stations subordinate to the CTZ National Police Directorates.

(2) CTZ National Police Directorates:

(a) Depending on local pacification situation, CTZ National Police Directorates will make studies, guide, and motivate their respective Province National Police units to expedite the establishment of new

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

National Police Sub-Stations and improvement of existing ones.

(b) Give instructions to respective Province National Police Chiefs to cooperate closely with Province Chiefs in the establishment of National Police Sub-Stations in villages within 45 days after elections in those villages. The reduction of personnel at province and district level must be carried out immediately in order to provide personnel for National Police Sub-Stations. If the reduction of personnel at province and District level is impossible due to a shortage of personnel, concerned CTZ National Police Directors can suspend the establishment of National Police Sub-Stations and forward a detailed report to the Directorate General within a week with a proposal for additional personnel.

(c) Organize special training courses for National Police Sub-Station Chiefs, with emphasis placed on the proper use of judicial police power. The training of National Police Sub-Station Chiefs will be completed in early April 1970.

(d) Organize technical in-service training for subordinate National Police command echelons in accordance with training documents issued by the National Police Directorate. This training will start by May 1970 and will be completed by the end of 1970.

(e) Every month, the CTZ National Police Directorates must organize inspection tours of the National Police Sub-Stations under their jurisdiction in order to control and guide them to properly carry out various instructions.

(3) Province National Police Headquarters.

(a) In principle, the province National Police Chief must establish a National Police Sub-Station in the village within 45 days after completion of elections. The personnel required for the establishment of National Police Sub-Stations are taken from staff personnel at province and district. In case of a serious shortage of personnel that does not permit the establishment of National Police Sub-Stations, the Province National Police Chief must forward a report to the CTZ National Police Directorate within 72 hours requesting instructions.

(b) Unavailability of headquarters is not a proper reason for refusing the assignment of National Police personnel to the village within 45 days after completion of elections. Province, District and Village Chiefs are instructed to assist the National Police within their capabilities to include the allocation of land on which National Police Sub-Station Headquarters and dwelling houses for National Policemen will be built.

(c) The Province National Police Headquarters, when recommending

CONFIDENTIAL

a nomination of National Police Sub-Station Chiefs, must choose qualified personnel of good conduct, and if possible, those who are natives or who have worked in the localities.

(d) Before assigning personnel to National Police Sub-Stations, the Province Police Headquarters must organize short-term training courses on village and hamlet administration so that these personnel can understand their duties and rights in this administrative machinery.

(e) The Province National Police Headquarters must organize bi-weekly inspection tours of their subordinate National Police Sub-Stations for guidance and supervision.

(4) National Police District Headquarters: The National Police District Headquarters must organize weekly visits to their subordinate National Police Sub-Stations in order to control, guide, and assist them in maintaining security and public order as well as enforcing law in the village.

(5) National Police Sub-Stations:

(a) The National Police Sub-Station in the village is under the Village Chief's operational command in maintaining security and public order in the village.

(b) National Police Sub-Stations must regularly conduct police activities in all hamlets except those Vietcong-controlled, so they can make contacts with hamlet chiefs and local people, and thereby understand local security situation.

4. PREPARATION OF PLANS.

Based on the duty and policy determined for the National Police in 1970, the CTZ National Police Directorates and Province National Police Headquarters must make detailed operational plans based on local situations. These plans must be forwarded to the National Police Directorate General prior to 1 December 1969 for review and approval.

For National Police input to the Province/Municipal Pacification and Development, Plan, refer to Annex XVIII.

5. COORDINATION.

a. With Armed Forces: (Regular Forces, Regional Forces, and Popular Forces). The National Police will cooperate closely with Regular Force, Regional Force, and Popular Force Units in order to exchange intelligence information, conduct operations to eliminate VCI, and participate in the common defense within the territorial security framework to minimize enemy attacks, terrorism and sabotage.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALb. Protection of the people from terrorism:

- (1) The National Police will increase the pressure and launch sharp attacks on VCI by cooperating closely with local Phung Hoang Committees to supply information and facilities to eliminate the enemy infrastructure.
- (2) Avoid indiscriminate arrests and release those determined innocent immediately after investigation confirms their innocence.
- (3) Develop and complete rapid procedures for processing detainees to comply with the government policy, Circulars and Instructions of the Directorate General of National Police.

c. With Peoples Self-Defense Force:

- (1) Peoples Self-Defense Force members are local people who can help the National Police develop the People's intelligence net and identify VCI.
- (2) Cooperate closely with this force in order to organize blocking positions during police operations for the maintenance of security in local areas.

d. With Administrative Organizations:

- (1) In order to prevent VC elements from infiltrating into the administrative machinery, the National Police must immediately warn the various administrative agencies whenever any infiltration of the above mentioned elements are discovered.
- (2) Participate in the organization of elections, cooperate closely with administrative organizations in population census and classification.
- (3) Expedite the ID Card Program for all citizens 15 and older in order to restrict the movement of VC cadres and deter them from mingling with the people, as well as to protect innocent people. Priority must be given to the densely populated urban areas.
- (4) Work out plans for issuing ID cards to those in Rehabilitation and Detention Centers with priority to those who have been given short sentences.

e. With Chieu Hoi Organizations:

- (1) Cooperate closely to prepare and implement a plan for the covert follow-up of Communist defectors permitted to return to their home villages and notify local authorities immediately of any defector's suspicious actions.
- (2) Place personnel at Chieu Hoi Centers to assist in interrogating communist defectors, discovering fake defectors and collect or collate intelligence information.

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) Process communist defectors through the new ID Card program immediately upon their arrival at Chieu Hoi Centers.

f. With Social Welfare and Relief Organizations:

(1) Place personnel at Camps containing refugees from communist-controlled areas to collect information and discover enemy agents.

(2) Process refugees through the new ID Card program immediately upon their arrival at Refugee Camps.

g. With Information Organizations:

(1) The National Police will cooperate closely with local Psyops Agencies to popularize government policies.

(2) Explain to and educate the people concerning government laws and regulations in force.

(3) Educate the people in order to develop the people's intelligence net and explain the measures to be taken against them by the Government if they collaborate with the enemy.

h. With Economic Organizations:

(1) Remove unnecessary checkpoints to facilitate the free circulation of goods and merchandise.

(2) Simplify and quicken the formalities for administrative investigations when people request to open shops, establish farmers' associations, cooperatives, etc.

6. REPORTS.

(Refer to Annex XVIII.)

CONFIDENTIAL

IX-7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX X

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE

(This Annex applies to the Son Thon Revolutionary Development Cadre. Special features of the STRDC program are explained in Annex XV, Development of Ethnic Minorities)

1. GENERAL.

In order to implement the national policy of pacification and development during 1970:

- a. The Revolutionary Development Cadre enact their political role by motivating the people to create for themselves a democratic life, and by instilling in the people an unshakeable nationalist conviction so that it is possible to insure the inevitable victory for all the people in the political struggle with the Communists.
- b. The RDC must motivate the people so as to unite their will and seize the initiative in social reform, and in raising the standard of living for their own families in the spirit of self help and self sufficiency. Under the leadership of the Village Chief, the RDC will coordinate with the village administrative committee, the hamlet management board, Popular Forces, and various other types of cadre active in the infrastructure, to push hard not only the Village Self Development program, but also to insure active participation in other government programs.

2. THE OBJECTIVES OF 1970.

In order to meet the pacification and development requirements of 1970, the RDC will emphasize the accomplishment of the following tasks under the control of the Village Chief.

- a. Win to the maximum the hearts and minds of the people.
- b. Motivate the people to take part in the Self Help Village Development program.

3. EXECUTION.

To ensure that the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan is well implemented, the RDC will be deployed and used as follows:

a. Concept.(1) Priorities of Work:

With the purpose of winning the maximum number of people to the nationalist side, the first priority for the RDC is to assist in raising the C type hamlets to the A and B categories. The second priority is to assist in the consolidation of those hamlets which have just

raised to the C category. The third priority is to assist in raising the D and E hamlets to the C category.

(2) Training of RDC.

During 1970, besides creating new cadre as replacement personnel and/or establishing the number of RDC allocated, the training of the RDC must also emphasize political and leadership aspects. Training will also include specialist or technical aspects, especially in agriculture and fishing.

The details regarding courses of instruction will be distributed to the provincial cadre control groups in time to meet requirements, and should be coordinated with the Province Chief.

(3) Points that need to be noted:

(a) The District will be responsible for ammunition resupply and medical evacuation for RD Cadre under enemy attack.

(b) If security conditions allow, RD Cadre must disperse to cell level and live with the people at night.

b. Deployment.

(1) Responsibility of Province Chief:

With the purpose of completing the important political tasks with the people, the provincial PDC will deploy one or more 30 man RDC groups (according to the population density) to the villages according to the following priorities:

Priority 1: Raising C villages to B or A villages.

Priority 2: After the C villages have sufficient cadre the remaining RDC groups will be deployed in the D and E villages in order to raise them to C category.

Priority 3: When all C, D and E villages have sufficient numbers of RD Cadre, the remaining groups will be deployed in B and A villages (one 8 man RD team to one village).

The assignment of 8-man teams to A and B villages is a new policy for 1970.

Remarks:

(a) RDC will not be deployed in those villages with population under 500.

(b) RDC groups will not be deployed in villages that do not have at least one platoon of Popular Forces, or the equivalent, in order to ensure security in the hamlets in which the RDC work.

(2) Responsibility of the Village Chief:

In those villages where RDC are deployed the Village Chief will use the RDC according to the following priorities:

- Priority 1: C hamlets
- Priority 2: D hamlets
- Priority 3: E hamlets
- Priority 4: A and B hamlets.

c. Tasking.

The RDC must be flexible in implementing their tasks in order to win the hearts and minds of the people. It may well be that tasks important to one area will be less important to another area and vice versa. According to instructions from the village chief the RDC may temporarily fill the mission of information cadre, Land Reform cadre, village administrative officials, hamlet administrative officials, health cadre, education cadre, PSDF cadre, and so forth, if these various branches do not yet have sufficient personnel and there is an urgent local requirement. If RDC fill the missions of the above cadre, it follows that they must coordinate closely with the local technical services. However, although they may have to work in the above fields, the RED still belong to the RDC group as opposed to being detached, and thus they are still under the administrative control of the RDC group leader.

The Ministry of Revolutionary Development will distribute technical guidebooks for the RD Cadre.

4. DRAFTING THE PLAN:

See Annex XVIII.

5. COORDINATION:

a. Within the parameters of information and education for the people, the provincial cadre control group leader is a member of the provincial psywar coordination committee, and at the village level the village chief will insure that the group deputy for propaganda and motivation must coordinate with village, hamlet information cadre to authorize political study practice sessions, in order that the people thoroughly understand government policy.

b. Within the framework of Phung Huong campaigns the village chief must know for sure that the intelligence cadre is coordinating closely with the village security commissioner, the hamlet assistant for security, and the supporting PF platoon. All information generated by the RDC relating to the enemy situation must be forwarded immediately to the district Phung Huong Center and reported to the provincial RDC control group. Prisoners of war, weapons, and Communist documents captured or seized by the RDC must be forwarded immediately to the Sub-Sector S2 and reported to the provincial RDC control group.

c. Regarding the PSDF, the RDC will stand ready to train the PSDF if instructed to do so by the Village Chief, and Coordinated with the Village Military Affairs Commissioner. Only the Village Chief has authority to decide which elements will train the PSDF, that is, the RDC, or the PF, or the NP, or all three forces in coordination with each other.

d. Regarding Chieu Hoi, the RDC must endeavor to pull in as many ralliers as possible. Chieu Hoi ralliers, weapons and documents will be forwarded immediately to the District Chieu Hoi Center, and information of this forwarded to the provincial RDC control group.

e. Within the field of social improvements, in order to raise the standard of living for the people, the RDC will coordinate with other related cadres according to orders received from the village chief, in order to properly implement the Village Self Development program, as well as Land Reform, and to assist in the development of agriculture and fishing industries (especially cultivation of IR-8 rice and animal husbandry).

f. The relationship between RDC and the village, hamlet is specified in Decree #045-SL/NV dated 1 April 1969, and Letter Order 2689/XD/43 dated 4 July 1969, which are still in effect: RDC are placed under the operational control of the village chief and the RDC group leader is still a political and development assistant to the village chief.

g. The utilization of RD Cadre for operations in urban areas will be set forth in Annex XVI, Urban Programs.

6. REPORTS. (See Annex XVIII, Plans and Reports.)

The provincial cadre control group uses the existing monthly report forms.

7. INSPECTION AND GUIDANCE:

The RDC control group leader, the deputy RDC control group leader, chiefs of offices, and intergroup leaders must make visits regularly and especially participate in night activities with the RDC groups.

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX XI

VILLAGE SELF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

1. GENERAL.

a. The Village Self Help Development program is more of a political program than it is a village economic development program. This program aims at organizing and uniting the rural people to help them advance towards self government, self sufficiency, and self defense through democratic institutions and in keeping with the spirit of "The people do, the people reap the benefits; the people create and the people protect that which they create."

This program is realized through development projects, planned and implemented by the rural people; therefore, the aspirations of the people must be respected. The local government gives financial and material assistance, as well as technical guidance, but the main factor is the people's contribution.

b. The Village Self Development program for 1970 is an extension of the 1969 VSD program. The strong points of the 1969 program must be retained and deficiencies must be eliminated by appropriate modifications.

Therefore, the basic principles of the 1969 Plan will be retained, but the procedures for implementation will have a few changes.

Experience gained in the tests conducted of local village development in the provinces of Ninh Thuan, Dinh Tuong, Long Khanh, Ba Xuyen, and Vinh Long in the past two years will be integrated into the 1970 VSD program, and thus the program explained in this Annex will be the sole existing program. This program will embody the best points of both former programs.

c. The projects of VSD for 1970, as in 1969, must benefit many families or the village/hamlet community as a whole, and be easy to implement, as opposed to such projects as would benefit only a few special interest groups. Thus people from all classes in the village should be motivated to participate in the program, including minority groups, refugees from Communism, Chieu Hoi returnees who are permanently resettled, and so forth.

This program must be opened wide for all people of good will, without discrimination between rich or poor, in order that both people who have property and people who can furnish labor are able to combine their capabilities and means to construct that which is in the common interest of their rural community.

d. In order to get off to a strong start in the 1970 program, it is necessary to begin considering and implementing the projects immediately. The prerequisites for success in the VSD program are the sincerity of every class of local government, and all types of cadre in supporting the plan, as well as the village and hamlet residents' determination to build a democratic, self-sufficient life.

e. The common provisions in this Annex can be applied to both the rural and urban areas. Such differences in detail as exist in applying the program in the urban, as opposed to the rural, areas will be explained in Annex XVI, Urban Programs.

This Annex (XI) will only be applied to those villages not proposed as urban areas. (See Annex XVI)

2. EXECUTION.

In comparison with 1969 the 1970 VSD program has the following differences:

a. Allocation and Use of Funds.

(1) No distinction will be made between villages with elected governments and villages with appointed governments. Every village will receive a minimum of 400,000 piasters. Villages of over 2,500 people will receive an additional 50,000 piasters for every 500 additional people.

(2) In 1970 there are only two categories of projects.

(a) Category 1: Not in excess of 100,000 piasters. This type can be approved and implemented by the village council and does not need the concurrence of higher authority. However, the village may request the province to give technical assistance if it considers this necessary.

(b) Category 2: Over 100,000 piasters. This type requires the approval of the province; however, either province or village may implement the project.

(3) Projects will not be arbitrarily divided as to category. Villages have the right to set their own priorities as between Category 1 and 2 projects.

All projects which are the result of public assemblies and discussions may be approved. The provisions which limited the use of funds for common use projects to one-third of the available funds during 1969 are hereby rescinded for 1970.

(4) In order to assist the unification of all the people without distinguishing between rich and poor, it must be understood that contributions by the people do not necessarily have to be monetary, but that some people may contribute just labor, material, or perhaps services. Furthermore, as a project benefits the entire village, the village may be flexible in the use of village funds to give further assistance to the project. In principle, the percentage furnished by the people and the percentage furnished by the government are to be equal;

however, the percentage to be furnished by the village in terms of both labor and material support of these projects will be determined by the provincial PDC. It must be flexible in making the determination of this percentage according to the local situation; that is, the capability as to manpower and resources of every village in the province must be determined after consultation with the Provincial People's Council, and be reported to the Central Government prior to 15 December 1969.

(5) We need to alert the field that the VSD program is not a permanent program and that in the following years it may be reduced. Therefore, provinces need to alert the people that they should not waste the resources of this program but, on the contrary, must protect and nourish it.

(6) Efforts will be made to solve the problems raised by agriculture credit during 1970, as agriculture credit is recognized as a high priority program for 1970.

b. The Conduct of Public Assemblies to Discuss Projects and Project Management

(1) Projects recommended by the people's groups must be forwarded to the Village Council within the first 20 days of each quarter. The number of people participating in the project must be clearly stated.

(2) The village council will set the priorities for the projects and will post in every hamlet a project list reflecting these priorities. This project list must clearly state the objectives of each project, the site where it will be implemented, the names of the participants, the expenditures involved, the contribution of each participant, and at the same time invite the people to participate in the general village meeting in order to discuss and agree on the projects.

(3) The general village meeting may be convened no earlier than three weeks and no later than four weeks after the posting of the project list.

The general meeting will be open to all village elders, common interest group representatives, and individual villagers. Recommendations to the Village Council will be determined by a majority vote of the villagers present. RD Cadre representatives should attend as observers so that they will be in a better position to assist in the implementation of those projects eventually selected by the Village Council. The Village Council has the authority to make the ultimate decision.

(4) The Special VSD Managing Board is abolished. The Village Council and the Village Administration Committee are responsible for the management of the VSD program.

The Economic and Finance Commissioner is responsible for bookkeeping, and acts as Treasurer.

(5) Projects being implemented under the 1969 VSD program should not be interrupted, but should continue smoothly into the 1970 plan. Therefore, it is necessary to explain clearly to the people that the order

to stop signing checks on 20 December 1969 in the villages is only an administrative accounting device used at the end of the year. It must be explained that all of the funds furnished the village in 1969 will be retained in the village to be used in 1969 and into 1970.

(6) The Central Government will simplify to the maximum all administrative procedures such as reporting forms, and so forth, for 1970.

(7) All taxes, such as registration taxes, production taxes, taxes for licenses, etc., will not be applied to any project of a community development nature.

(8) Phase 6 of the 1969 VSD program is rescinded for 1970. This means that villages that have completed five phases within the 1969 program do not need to go through the same phases for 1970.

3. ORGANIZATION AND TASKING.

a. Province and District

(1) Starting immediately, the provinces should make a preliminary estimate of the funds necessary to organize seminars and other courses at province, district, village and hamlet levels in order that everyone thoroughly understands the VSD program.

(2) Provinces and districts are responsible to give assistance, as well as to supervise and follow up on the progress of these projects. They are absolutely forbidden to make any decisions counter to the aspirations of the people.

(3) Province and district technical services will provide technical guidance to the villages and the people's Project Groups.

b. Village and Hamlet

The Village Council, the Village Administration Committee, the Hamlet Management Board, and the various types of cadre have, in addition to their mission of ensuring security, a duty to provide guidance to the People's Project Groups in planning and implementing development projects, and at the same time to assist the group leaders in solving all problems related to administrative procedures, accounting, and material support.

4. INSPECTION

a. In order to insure the proper implementation of these projects the Provincial Council, after the new elections, will participate in inspection teams assigned by the provincial PDC. These teams are responsible to the Province PDC.

These inspection teams have the sole purpose of preventing malfeasance or corruption of any type that could bring harm to the VSD program. Thus, they are not to be used by province and district as a means to insert themselves into the implementation of the VSD projects.

b. Inspection groups from MORD will make regular visits to the villages and hamlets to supervise and inspect the implementation of the VSD projects.

Financial Appendix

to Annex XI

---+---

1- As the new financial and accounting regulations do not authorize extension of the work scheduled or extension of expenditure-time, the Accounting Managers of the Imprest Funds of each year are only authorized to use the funds until 31 December and complete expense justification prior to 1 February of the following year.

2- In order to insure a proper execution of the budget and make this execution conform with current financial regulations, as well as to help the villages use up the fund provided for the 1969 Village Self Development Program, and based upon recommendations of MORD and the General Directorate of Budget and Foreign Aid, the following procedures are approved by the Prime Minister:

a- The Village will return to the Treasury the remaining sum of money in cash and justify the sum of money spent.

b- The Province will establish a new Imprest Fund for the new year with the money in cash left in the Imprest Fund of the previous year.

The execution procedures of the Province budget are quite simplified (the Province RD Budget has been assimilated), so, whether the above-mentioned work will be rapidly or slowly completed depends on the abilities and good-will of the personnel in charge. In particular, the two actions stated in Paragraphs a. and b. above must be urgently and simultaneously executed so that responsible personnel can use the appropriated sums of money of the new fund and return to the Treasury the remaining money in cash of the Imprest Fund of the previous year. Therefore, the village can continue to use the provided fund without wasting time to pay in the remaining money to the Treasury and then receive them again.

3- In order to help the Provinces execute these measures properly it is necessary to clearly and further explain about the execution of the two actions mentioned in paragraphs a. and b. above:

- The Accounting Manager of the Imprest Fund of the village will stop on 20 December 1969 issuing expense bills, and within the period from 20 December 1969 to 24 December 1969, the village must report to the Province the sum of money actually spent and the remaining sum of money of the fund (i. e., the remaining money in cash presently deposited at the Treasury added to the cash money still held by the Accounting Manager). The Accounting Manager must complete a report of actual expenses situation, and the remaining sums of money to be used for each project, on the form attached.

- Upon receipt of this report from the village, the Province will order the establishment of a new Imprest Fund (with the money in cash left by the Imprest Fund of the previous year) for this village under the RD Budget for 1970; a list of each sum of money appropriated for each project must be made as prescribed in column 5 of the report of the village's expenses situation so as to facilitate future justification by the Accounting Manager. At the same time, it should issue a money collect-

[Handwritten signature]
XI-1-1

ing order so that the Accounting Manager can pay in the remaining sums of money of the Imprest Fund of the previous year to the Treasury.

- The Province will issue a check accompanied by a decision to establish a new Imprest Fund for the village and forward them to the Treasury on 1 January 1970.

For his part, the Accounting Manager must contact the Treasury concerning the use of the sum of money mentioned on this check to liquidate the previous year Imprest Fund money collecting order (the sum of money mentioned on the money collecting order must agree with that mentioned on the check).

- Beginning 1 January 1970, the Accounting Manager is authorized again to issue expense bills and incur expenses until the whole year's Imprest Fund is exhausted.

Remarks: a- The current expense bill book is still used.

b- The Accounting Manager must complete the justification of the previous year Imprest Fund's sums of money which were actually spent (the sum of money in column 4 mentioned in the report) before the deadline fixed in Paragraph 1 above (i. e., prior to 1 February 1970).

4- A circular explaining the readjustment of the budget occasioned by the Province's recent establishment of new Imprest Fund for the villages for 1970 will be issued soon by the General Directorate of Budget and Foreign Aid.

5- Each PPDC and MPDC will explain these procedures to the villages and guide them in the execution of the above-prescribed procedures, so that this program can continuously proceed and achieve results as expected.

6- Upon establishment of the new village accounts, each PPDC and MPDC will certify in writing (one copy) to MORD and to the CPDC for control.

Attachment: Reporting forms to be filled out for each village.

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX XII

PROVINCE/MUNICIPAL COUNCIL DEVELOPMENT

1. PURPOSE.

The Province/Municipal Council Development Program is a political measure aiming at:

a. Opening a dialogue between the population and their representatives at provincial and municipal levels and between the latter and provincial/municipal authorities to directly contribute to the achievement of pacification objectives through encouragement of political mobilization in the anti-communist struggle.

b. Furnishing more authority to provincial/municipal councils and enhancing their prestige with the population by permitting these councils to decide on development projects initiated by themselves or by the population and to invite officials of provinces, municipalities, wards and villages to the meetings of the councils for consultation on the projects to be implemented.

2. PUBLICITY.

To meet the aspirations of the population, provincial/municipal councils should hold meetings in their respective wards, sub-wards and villages to explain clearly to the population the purposes and benefits of the program so that the latter can propose to provincial/municipal councils the projects to be carried out, if these are of public utility. There is no limitation as to their costs provided they reflect the aspirations of the population. Moreover, municipal/provincial councils should ask local information services to give wide publicity to the program so that people of all walks of life will be informed of it and propose projects to provincial/municipal councils through ward chiefs or village councils.

3. HOW TO EXAMINE PROJECTS.

Upon receipt of requests for implementation of projects, municipal/provincial councils shall have to meet immediately to examine the projects one by one as they are subject to approval by the majority of council members. However, whenever there is such a meeting, these councils should invite the representatives of provincial Pacification and Development Councils, technical agencies, representatives of different religions, political groups, student's parents, village chiefs, ward chiefs and sub-ward chiefs concerned to the meeting for consultation. Such projects as construction of schools, infirmaries etc. are approved only when appropriate technical agencies guarantee the supply of teachers or health workers so as to avoid the case of lack of personnel when the construction is completed.

4. HOW TO IMPLEMENT THE PROJECT.

All projects approved by provincial/municipal councils will be carried out by provincial Pacification and Development Councils according to the procedure of provincial/municipal development projects.

Depending on their respective capabilities, municipal/provincial Pacification and Development Councils may adopt one of these methods of implementation: State management, community development or call for bids.

5. PROCEDURES.

The procedures concerning project site inspection, checking and receiving of materials, operations, works and the drawing up of technical documents will follow the same procedures as those projects of Provincial/Municipal Development program.

6. REPORTING.

To facilitate close supervision, municipal/provincial Pacification and Development Councils should report to the Central Pacification and Development Council the details of every project after approval.

- a. Project: (brief description of the project)
- b. Location of the project:
- c. Fund of the project:
- d. Number of beneficiaries of the project.

Moreover, every month, provincial/municipal Pacification and Development Councils shall submit a report on the progress and expenditures of each project.

7. FUNDS.

To permit implementation of the above project, the Central Pacification and Development Council will provide to each province/municipality (except Saigon) a fund according to population and resources early in 1970. The funds established under this program will not be released to the Provinces and Municipalities until new elections are held in accordance with legislation now pending in the National Assembly.

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX XIII

PROVINCE/MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT

1. GENERAL:

In 1970 the Central Pacification and Development Council will continue to provide funds to the provinces and cities for implementation of the Province/ Municipal Development program. However, in order to obtain satisfactory results, the provinces and cities must carefully review their plan before forwarding their requests to the CPDC for approval and avoid the following deficiencies which were encountered during the past year:

- a. Request for many projects in excess of implementation capability.
- b. Estimated costs did not reflect current prices, thus causing a shortage of funds for implementation.
- c. Requests for changes in approved projects has caused delays.
- d. Some projects implemented under the Village Self-help Development programs duplicated by Province/Municipal Development Programs.
- e. The procedures of price inquiries, price evaluation, and approval of contracts or ordering of goods were not expeditiously carried out, thus delaying the implementation of projects.

2. PRIORITY ORDER FOR GRANTING PROJECT FUNDS:

Requests for Province/Municipal Development projects will be considered by the CPDC in the following priority:

- a. Public Works - New constructions or maintenance of village roads, inter-village roads, provincial roads, bridges, culverts, etc. . . .
- b. Agriculture
 - (1) Agricultural Hydraulics - digging, dredging of canals, construction of dams and dikes, etc....
 - (2) Animal husbandry - Purchase medicines for disease prevention and treatment.
 - (3) Agriculture - Purchase insecticides.
 - (4) Fisheries - Construction of fish markets and fish harbors.
 - (5) Technical cadres - In 1970 the Central Government will not provide additional cadres; provincial cadres in Agricultural Hydraulics, Animal Husbandry, Agricultural Affairs, Land Reform and Fisheries

recruited in 1969 will be supervised and paid by the Ministry of Land Reform, Fisheries and Agricultural Development, but they will continue to serve the Pacification and Development Program as in the past.

- c. Education - Construction of secondary schools in district towns and villages where there are many pupils, on condition that the Ministry of Education agrees to provide the teachers.
 - (1) The class-rooms in the hamlets will be selected by the people in public assemblies and will be built with Village Self-Help Development funds.
 - (2) The Ministry of Education will provide the teachers and the Central Pacification and Development Council will provide funds only for training, according to criteria as in 1969, to include:
 - (a) Training allowances for the teachers during 2 months.
 - (b) Transportation fees and training aids for the teachers.
 - (c) Allowances to the training staff for office supplies, and equipment.
- d. Rural Public Health - Construction of district and village dispensaries and maternities. The Ministry of Public Health will furnish Public Health Cadre to staff dispensaries and maternities.

3. PROJECT APPLICATION PROCEDURES.

Those provinces or cities wishing to undertake any of the above mentioned projects should make an application on the attached form to the Central Pacification and Development Council for each individual project. The application for each project should be submitted in triplicate, including a location map for each public works and irrigation project. Initial requests for top priority 1970 projects should be forwarded to the CPDC during October 1969 for subsequent review and approval in December. Projects proposed by the provinces or cities should meet all the following criteria:

- (a) They should benefit a pacification target area.
- (b) They should not be duplicated by the regular budget of a ministry.
- (c) They should meet the people's aspirations and contribute to their welfare and prosperity.
- (d) They should meet with the approval of the Provincial or City Council and the Province/Municipal Senior Advisor.
- (e) Their completion within the fiscal year should be guaranteed by the technical service.
- (f) They should obtain the pledge of the Province Chief or the Mayor to assure their security during and after their completion.

- 4. The appendices attached to this annex outline the ministerial programs for 1970 and the relationship to Province/Municipal Development.

APPLICATION FORM FOR APPROVAL OF PROVINCE OR CITY
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Province:

Project number:

Description of project (to describe concisely all technical characteristics)

The Provincial or City Council has approved of on.....

Location:

Within the national priority areas:

Within the provincial priority areas:

Out of the priority areas:

HES security level:

Estimate of recipients:

Estimate of expenditures:

Estimate of necessary materials:

Estimated required time for completion:

We affirm that this project does not duplicate any other project implemented under a different program.

Written in.....

Signature of the Chairman
of the Provincial or City Council

Signature of the Chairman of P&D
Council

Signature of the Technical
Services

Signature of the Provincial Advisor

Appendix I (Bridges and Roads) to Annex XIII (Province/Municipal Development) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

1. GENERAL.

The General Directorate of Civil Engineering is an agency of the Public Works Ministry. The function of this Directorate is to repair and build all land communication lines in the country. Up to now, this Directorate has set up:

- One Pacification and Development Bureau at the General Directorate of Civil Engineering;

- and five PD Bureaus at five Public Works Areas, namely Danang, Dalat, Nha Trang, Saigon, and Can Tho, which are in charge of follow-up of the program, supervision, and direction of civil engineering works under the Pacification and Development Program undertaken by each Province and Municipal Public Works Service.

a. Additionally, the General Directorate of Civil Engineering is responsible to do the following:

- (1) Represent the MPW at the CPDC for the pacification civil engineering program.
- (2) Supervise and direct the program.
- (3) Provide engineering equipment and machines to PW services and areas.
- (4) Solve difficulties and problems suggested by PD services and areas.
- (5) Review PD civil engineering plans and programs.

b. Public works areas are responsible to do the following:

- (1) Examine and endorse all public works documents in regard to technique;
- (2) Supervise and direct the program;
- (3) Represent the General Directorate of Civil Engineering at the CTZ/PDC to supervise, check, and receive materials and works within the scope and limit fixed by CPDC.
- (4) Provide and distribute engineering equipment and machines within the PW area's jurisdiction.

c. The Public Works Services are responsible to do the following:

- (1) Implement projects and programs with the cooperation of the provincial authorities and submit them to the province PDC for consideration.
- (2) Draw up technical documents and submit them to the competent authorities for consideration.
- (3) Establish administrative procedures for price inquiries and bidding invitations, and provide materials.
- (4) Effect all expenditures for materials and labor.
- (5) Exercise direct supervision over the work.

2. OBJECTIVES FOR 1970.

In 1970, the General Directorate of Civil Engineering will concentrate on the achievement of the following objectives:

a. Programs included in the Public Works Ministry budget.

Major repairs of national and interprovincial roads which have been reopened to traffic:

- (1) Macadamize, asphalt, and repair roads regularly.
- (2) Strengthen ferries.
- (3) Replace narrow iron bridges with capacity of less than 10 tons with wider bridges with capacity ranging from 35 tons to 45 tons so that trucks and armored cars can move easily.

b. Programs included in the Pacification and Development budget.

- (1) Repair roads and bridges constructed with PD budget since 1965 but presently in very bad condition.
- (2) Restore traffic on roads destroyed by the war which have been long closed to traffic.
- (3) Replace damaged or weakened bridges with bridges of larger capacity.

3. PROJECTS for 1970.

a. Provincial development.

Reconstruction and large scale^a repair of provincial roads, inter-village roads, and village roads through the following works:

- (1) Ballast damaged sections of roadbeds.
- (2) Wider road surfaces according to the set standard, i. e., six meters wide.
- (3) Macadamize and asphalt the whole road surface.
- (4) Reconstruct broken bridges.
- (5) Replace old and unsolid steel bridges with capacity of less than 5 tons with new 2RES steel bridges with capacity of more than 20 tons.

b. Village development.

Reconstruct, and make large scale repair of inter hamlet roads through the following works:

- Ballast and macadamize the road surface 4m wide with laterite or gravel.
- Install additional sewers, and replace wooden bridges with steel bridges.

c. Saigon outskirts, province towns, and city development.

- (1) Construct or enlarge belt roads of the urban districts in order to provide access to densely populated areas.

- (2) Install a system of sewers in the urban districts for the purpose of improving public sanitation.
- (3) Make large-scale repair and enlargement of urban roads.
- (4) Construct stone terracing to protect canal banks in urban districts from erosion.

4. CAPABILITIES.

Based on the results achieved last year, the PD Civil Engineering Program should be divided as follows:

a. Portion of the work to be undertaken by each Provincial Public Works Service.

- (1) Under direct State control.
 - (a) Macadamize and asphalt, 6 kms.
 - (b) Major repairs: ramming, patching up with stone, asphaltting, 10 kms.
 - (c) Repair steel bridges: 4 bridges.
 - (d) Building new Eiffel bridges: 5 bridges.
 - (e) Embanking and covering with gravel: 5 kms.
- b. By awarding the whole work to contractors.
 - (f) Covering with stone, and asphaltting: 10 kms.
 - (g) Installing sewers: 3,000 ms.

(2) Portion of the work undertaken by VN or allied forces engineer units.

In addition to the capabilities of municipal and provincial PW Services, the provincial and municipal government should apply to VN or US engineer units for assistance in some civil engineering works. However, technical dossiers will be made by local PW Services. The materials will be provided by provincial and municipal governments depending upon the requirements of each project.

Appendix II (Electricity) to Annex XIII (Province/Municipal Development) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

1. GENERAL.

Vietnam Electricity Company is an autonomous organization having the duty to manage electricity agencies or enterprises assigned by the Government of Vietnam. It also has the duty to set up and construct facilities exploiting electrical energy. Consequently, Vietnam Electricity Company has contributed a very important part to the GVN Pacification and Development Plan by conducting programs for increasingly developing electrical energy in Saigon area and in different localities.

2. OBJECTIVES IN 1970.

In 1970, Vietnam Electricity Company will pay particular attention to the achievement of the following objectives:

- Development and improve electric energy in Saigon area and in different localities in order to end the situation in which electric current is cut off quite often.

- Set up additional electricity services.

- Electrify crowded districts, villages, and hamlets.

3. PLAN SCHEDULED FOR 1970.

a. In Saigon area and suburbs:

- Provide electrical energy for industrial enterprises to develop our national economy.

- Set up 15KV middle voltage wires to provide electricity from the Capital to the suburbs.

- Electrify all districts, villages and hamlets adjacent to the above voltage wires.

b. In provinces:

(1) Set up additional Electricity Services in the following provinces:

Quang Tri

Phu Bon

Quang Duc

Phuoc Long

Binh Long

Long Khanh

Hau Nghia

Kien Tuong

Kien Phong

Kien Giang

Con Son

(2) Increase and develop electrical energy for Electricity Services by:

(a) Building new electric plants (with an expenditure of 24,000,000\$VN).

(b) Enlarging existing electric plants and increasing electric power.

(c) Setting up 15KV middle voltage wires to minimize the shortage of electrical energy and also to modernize existing distribution systems.

This task includes the additional establishment of 15, 200KV generators, 29, 400 KW generators, 9 voltage boosting machines with 250KVA, and 33 voltage boosting machines with 500KVA. This work also includes the establishment of 190Kms for 15KV middle voltage wires, 263 Kms for low voltage wires, and some low voltage machines with a total electric power of 43, 700KVA. The total expenditure for these tasks are 3, 361, 000\$US and 383, 150\$VN.

(3) In districts, towns, villages and hamlets. Vietnam Electricity Company will realize four rural areas to be electrified remaining in the Pacification and Development Plan and 8 areas in the electrification program of refugee centers. Moreover, Vietnam Electricity Company will help districts, villages, and hamlets develop electrification by selling, with installment payment, the machines of 30KW, and 50KW when requested.

4. PLAN FOR LONG-RANGE DEVELOPMENT BEGINNING 1970.

a. In Saigon Capital and suburbs:

(1) Set up the electric plant with 2 x 66 MW electric power at Thu-Duc.


(2) Repair the hydraulic pressure tube at the Danhim Plant and rebuild 230KV wires from Song Pha to Thu-Duc.

(3) Set up 66KV wire connecting Cho-Lon, Tan An, and My Tho (5 Kms long) and 2 transformer stations with 66/15KV and 6MVA.

b. In localities.

(1) Set up a thermo-electric plant with 33 MV in Can Tho, and establish a 66KV high voltage system in the Cuu Long Delta.

(2) Set up a 66KV high voltage wire system connecting Song Pha, Cam Ranh, and Nha Trang (90Kms long) and transformer stations to provide electric power for these centers.



Appendix III (Water Supply) to Annex XIII (Province/Municipal Development) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

1. GENERAL:

The primary and permanent mission of the Water Supply Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works is the supply of adequate water to people throughout the country, except those in Saigon Capital, from urban to local and remote areas, from High Land to Salt-Water Regions such as the Western Region of South Vietnam. In parallel with the Pacification and Development Plan, the Water Supply Directorate, in 1970, will use a great part of its authorized fund for supplying adequate water to the people in rural areas.

2. OPERATIONAL PROGRAM:

The 1970 Operational Program of the Water Supply Directorate includes the following objectives:

a. Strengthen and improve all existing water systems to increase the quantity of adequate water to be supplied to the people from urban to rural areas.

b. Continue digging more deep drinking water wells in salt-water areas to search for sound drinking water to be supplied to the people.

3. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN:

In order to implement the two aforementioned objectives, the Water Supply Directorate will do the following:

a. In Urban Areas:

(1) Continue to construct the water system in Can Tho. This program was started in 1969 and will be completed sometime in 1971.

(2) Develop water systems in Pleiku, Quang Ngai, Phan Thiet, Go Cong, and Sadec provinces, and Nha Trang City to satisfy the Water Supply requirements therein.

b. In Rural Areas:

(1) Dig deep drinking water wells in 12 locations to include Tan Phat, Long Dien, Phuoc Hai, Phuoc Tinh, Ha Tien, Tri Ton, Tinh Bien, Ba Tri, Can Giuoc, Trung Chanh, Thuan Tri, and Don Duong.

(2) Install water pumps, water pipes, build reservoirs and public-used water taps in the 12 aforementioned locations.

(3) Build new water plants to replace the old ones in four locations: O-Mon, My Luong, Binh Minh, and Tan Thach.

(4) Improve the existing water plants to increase the quantity of water to be supplied to the people in Cai Lay, Cai Be, Cho Moi, Thot Not, Tan Chau, and Ben Luc Districts.

(5) Repair all existing water systems throughout the country.

Appendix IV (Postal Service) to Annex XIII (Province/Municipal Development) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

In the development objectives of the Pacification and Development Plan, the Ministry of Communications, Post, Telegraph, and Telephone has no plan directly related to the rural people except postal service.

In 1970, attention will be paid to the extension of the postal service to the rural areas in order to effectively serve a large mass of population living in Villages and Hamlets on the communication and information field.

1. REAL SITUATION.

The present situation of the Post Administration in Vietnam is as follows:

- a. Province Towns: all Province Towns have their Post Service.
- b. District Towns: among the existing 241 Districts throughout the Republic of Vietnam territory, there are: 43 Districts with Post Offices, 147 Districts with Post stations, and 51 Districts without Post stations, that is 21.57% of District have not a Post Administration representative.
- c. Villages: There are 1,376 Village Post stations established in the 2,130 Villages censused out of a total of 2,500 Villages that is about 45% of Villages have not a postal organization.

2. PLAN PROJECTED FOR 1970.

- a. District level. The Ministry of Communications and PTT will establish 51 additional Post Stations which will be managed by private individuals.

In the present time the Government cannot establish Post Offices because the monthly expenditures for each of them amount at least to 15,000VN\$ excluding the cost for building offices or renting houses. In the future, as soon as the budget situation allows, all existing Post Stations will be gradually transformed into Post Offices. On the other side, the recruitment of a District Post Station manager is quite difficult because the present monthly wage for a manager is too low (1,500VN\$ per month). Therefore, in order to attract people attention and facilitate the recruitment of personnel, the Ministry of Communications and PTT has recommended an increase of the monthly wage of 1,500VN\$ to 3,000VN\$ for the three first years of service, and after three years of service the monthly wage of a Post Station manager will amount to 3,500VN\$.

- b. Village level: In 1970, the Ministry of Communications and PTT will establish 1124 additional Village Post Stations for the remaining Villages. Presently, Village Post Stations are managed by the Village Administrative Secretary, and incoming mails and newspapers and magazines are kept at the Village Post Station instead of being delivered to concerned individuals at their homes.

In order to improve this situation, in 1970 the Ministry of Communications and PTT will recommend an increase of the Village Post Station manager's monthly wage from 400VN\$ to 1,000VN\$ so that he can hire a man to deliver mails at home for the convenience of the

people. In addition, the Ministry of Communications and PTT will authorize Village Post Stations to sell post stamps so that this manager can be entitled to a commission based on the number of sold stamps.

It is hoped that the rural Postal Service will be improved with this 1970 program of the Ministry of Communications and PTT.

IV-1-1a

Appendix V (Construction) to Annex XIII (Province/Municipal Development) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

The role of the General Directorate of Construction in the Pacification and Development Plan covers two points:

1. Plan vital areas (rural, urban) on which the urban rehabilitation and construction work will be focused based on the following essential criteria:

- a. The density of population.
- b. Locality close to important communication axes.
- c. Locality close to military and political centers.
- d. Locality close to economic installations.

2. Support the work of constructing administrative, educational, sanitary and social facilities.

1. The program of studies and implementing city and rural planning projects for 1970.

a. 1970 First Quarter:

- (1) Search for documents related to city and rural development.
- (2) Study and examine on the spot the general situation of these vital areas on which we can focus the rehabilitation work.

b. 1970 Second Quarter:

- (1) Study planning projects based on the set forth essential criteria so as to timely solve present requirements.
- (2) Anticipate programs for future development.

c. 1970 Third Quarter:

- (1) Coordinate related agencies so as to assign responsibilities in implementing rehabilitation planning projects.
- (2) Work out programs of work based on priority order.
- (3) Amend planning projects based on realistic requirements (if any).

2. Program of Supporting Local Revolutionary Development Tasks.

a. Participate in survey and study of, and express views on, self-help projects and village and hamlet economic development projects.

b. Study the position and boundaries; provide model planning projects of ordinary works, such as school, medicine distributing station, small dispensary, market, etc.

c. Work out plans and technical documents to carry out works of technical and expenditure importance.

Appendix VI (Public Health) to Annex XIII (Municipal/Municipal Development) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

1. GENERAL.

a. Role of the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Health is responsible for the protection and development of health for the urban, suburban, and rural people through prophylactic and therapeutic measures. This Ministry has installations, specialized personnel, and facilities to perform this task.

b. Importance: The protection and development of the people's health has a special importance in both wartime and peacetime. Such an operation will contribute to the creation for every citizen of a sound body to stand against aggression and to build the nation, and especially constitutes itself at present a means to win more people's heart. This is indispensable for the anti-communist fight and freedom protection.

c. Relationship between the Health Program and the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan's One Principle and Eight Objectives:

(1) The Community Cooperation principle is an essential factor of the health program. The people's understanding and response will help the health program develop far and wide. Their support and participation will help the Health program achieve its objective soon.

(2) The government agencies' assistance also is very indispensable for providing the program with a good atmosphere and more facilities as well as for developing medical operations.

2. OBJECTIVES.

Ministry of Public Health's Objectives included in the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan.

Protect and develop the people's health by:

a. Forming, especially improving, all Mobile Health Teams based on the capabilities of Health Services so as to push ahead medical operations from Province Health Service and District Health Section down to villages and hamlets.

b. Anticipating personnel strength, instruments, medicines, and facilities for the evacuation of the injured.

c. Consolidating health installations:

(1) District: Building new installations after the standardized model for those districts which have not yet any, or have temporary installations which do not really meet all urgent and real medical demands.

- Developing and maintaining all existing installations

(2) Village: Building new installations after the standardized model for those villages which do not have any medical installations to meet urgent demands. Paying attention to villages in district with developed and stable Health Sections. Because only those consolidated Health Sections are apt to support the establishment of new installations as well as their operations in subordinate villages.

- Maintaining, developing, and providing those installations with supplementary instruments through projects under the 1970 Village Self Development Program.

(3) Hamlet:

- (a) Restoring the operation of maternity wards and dispensaries so far closed down for security reason.
- (b) Repairing and maintaining existing installations.
- (c) Installing medical chests for Hamlets considered as necessary.

d. Pushing ahead the sanitation drive. Local Health Services will increase sanitation activities since they are key factors to help the people live a long and sound life:

- (1) Clean, dry, and aerated dwelling houses.
- (2) Pure drinking water.
- (3) Hygienic latrines.

Garbage, remnants, and corpses should be buried or cremated properly.

- (4) Vaccination to prevent plague and contagious diseases.
- (5) Health education.

e. Increase of facilities for:

(1) Medical Installations: Request for more medical installations should be based on real requirements and priority order, local security situation and its prospect, as well as the operations of these installations. Therefore, the choice of location is very important.

(2) District Maternity Dispensary. (Prefabricated or built houses).

In 1970, the Ministry of Public Health will consolidate District Health Sections (District Maternity dispensaries) as starting points in support of villages and hamlets. Each administrative district will have a standard District Maternity Dispensary. The necessary credits is estimated at 4,000,000VN\$. 26 installations are planned to be built for the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan.

(3) Village Maternity Dispensary. (Pre-fabricated or build houses).

In 1970, only should those Districts with a consolidated Health Section think of building more installations at village level. However, concerned villages must have real requirements and meet the following conditions:

(a) Be a secured village with a population between 4,000 and 10,000.

(b) Be located at least three kilometers far from the medical installations (Maternity ward, medicine distributing station).

(c) Be located near important administrative centers, or economic centers, or communication axes, or inside the defense belt.

(d) Village where rural midwives, medic cadres, and laborers can be recruited. The credit is estimated at 1,500,000VN\$. 59 installations are planned to be built for the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan.

(4) Medical Chest: Medical chest will be supplied to relatively secured villages of hamlets having each more than 500 inhabitants. These villages or hamlets should be at least two kilometers far from the medical installations.

(5) Personnel: There exist in almost all administrative Districts the Health Section's activities, so the personnel strength will not be anticipated (according to the table of personnel) for newly built medical installations at district level. If, because of service requirements the Ministry of Public Health will consider the recruitment of additional personnel as is customary. However, each district newly organized installation will be provided with two additional District medic cadres for reinforcement of Mobile Health Teams. In 1970, the Ministry of Public Health only provide for funds included in this Ministry National Budget to pay right at the beginning of this year the salary for personnel such as rural midwives, medic cadres, laborers, and Hamlet medic cadre serving at newly organized installations, and at newly installed medical chests. For budgetary limitations the General Directorate of National Budget and Foreign Aid approves only a 10,000,000VN\$ to pay the personnel. In addition, the Ministry of Public Health will provide each village newly organized maternity dispensary with three personnel (one rural midwife, one medic cadre, and one laborer), and each medical chest, with one hamlet medic cadre.

(6) Facilities:

(a) Medical supplies.

1. Each District newly-organized maternity dispensary with a M. I. D. set.

2. Each village newly-organized maternity dispensary with a VH/MD set.

3. Each hamlet, with a wooden chest to contain medicines.

(b) Other equipments (wooden furniture, blanket, mosquito net, mat, kerosene, soap) will be provided by the Ministry of Public Health.

(c) Trilambrettas: CPDC plans to provide each District newly built installation with one Trilambretta for the Mobile Health Team as a means of transportation for operational purposes and evacuation of the injured.

Ministry of Public Health's other Objectives.

In addition to the medical objectives stipulated in the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. The Ministry of Public Health also has other objectives related to medical activities at:

- Province General Medical Centers and hospitals.

- Health programs such as Anti-Tuberculosis Program, mother and child protection, anti-leprosy, nutrition, anti-venereal diseases programs, etc. All these programs will indirectly support the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept:

- (1) Lay emphasis on real requirements.
- (2) Execute the plan properly and score realistic achievements.

b. Use of Personnel:

- (1) Management of personnel and duty assignment should be properly carried out.
- (2) Recruitment of additional personnel should be based on absolute necessity (including newly-built installations).

Reason: The 1970 Budget may be very limited.

Appendix VII (Education) to Annex XIII (Province/Municipal Development) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

1. GENERAL.

The Ministry of Education is responsible for developing the national culture and raising the intellectual standard of the people in the cities, suburban areas, and countryside.

This function is as important in wartime as in peacetime. It consists of turning a mere inhabitant into a sound citizen with a good social and political background in both material and moral fields.

To achieve this end, the following elements are needed:

- The response and support of the population.
- Assistance from various government agencies to facilitate the implementation of works.

2. OBJECTIVES.

a. Objectives of the 1970 PD Plan.

(1) Recruitment of Hamlet Teachers:

So far, the Ministry of Education has authorized the rural areas to recruit hamlet teachers having only an elementary education degree in cases where there are no applications meeting higher educational requirements, such as the Elementary Certificate, and having graduated from a junior high school. If the foregoing conditions must be lowered or particular exemptions must be bestowed, separate requests will be made in each individual case and submitted to the Ministry of Education for consideration.

(2) Training of Hamlet Teachers.

The expenses for the training of hamlet teachers will be covered by CPDC as in 1969. The expenses are as follows:

- Training allowances for teachers for two months.
- Transportation fees and training aids for teachers.
- Allowances for the lecturing board, office supplies, and teaching equipment.

Each Provincial Elementary Education Service will supply lecturers with a training syllabus.

(3) With regard to the salaries of hamlet teachers for 1970; the Ministry of Education will be responsible for financing as agreed at the recent Inter-Ministerial meeting (See Minutes 1052/PThT/BDXD/PT, 5 July 1969).

(4) The construction of hamlet school-rooms will depend upon decisions of the villagers under the Village Self Development program.

For the construction of high schools at district and village towns having many pupils, necessary funds will be granted by the CPDC, while the Ministry of Education will provide teachers only.

Actually, CPDC has already planned expenditures for the building of 125 classrooms for secondary schools:

(a) Priority 1: Localities where security is restored, but school facilities were heavily damaged and not yet reconstructed.

(b) Priority 2: Those areas known as insecure or having a poor population, but with numerous pupils who have not enough schools.

(c) Priority 3: For areas having a low ratio of pupils ready to enter the 1st grade of the public junior high school (under 40%), the construction conditions will be as follows:

- A building site of at least 2,000 m² must be available.

- Construction must be carried out under USAID specifications, which may be changed to a certain extent by the local construction service.

b. Long Term Objectives of the Ministry of Education.

(1) Repair and construct school facilities in the Saigon Prefecture, province capitals, district, and village towns.

(2) Establish in every province a normal school to train elementary education teachers.

(3) Recruit additional students for the intensive training course of the Faculty of Pedagogy.

(4) Continue to promote the eradication of illiteracy in both the cities and the countryside.

(5) Develop and strengthen night classes, which are now regarded as pilot ones for needy pupils.

(6) Delete from the Secondary Education Program minor living languages beginning in the 1969-1970 school year.

3. OTHER PROJECTS.

a. Turn all universal elementary schools into community ones.

b. Set up additional high schools, and transform a number of existing ones into comprehensive secondary schools.

c. Gradually eliminate useless examinations costly to the national budget.

d. Plan for the realization of a 12 consecutive year educational curriculum from elementary education through secondary education.

e. Modify the educational program, especially as regards scientific and mathematical study subjects, to meet the requirements of our present modern area.

f. See Annex VIII for further details on education development.

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX XIV

LAND REFORM

1. GENERAL.

In 1970, the Land Reform Program of the Republic of Vietnam will be centered on promoting the implementation and achievement of maximum results in making poor farmers and share croppers become small landlords in compliance with government land reform policy. It will be carried-out throughout the country on a larger scale based on the "Land-To-Tillers" Bill when it is endorsed by the Legislature and promulgated by the RVN President.

2. MISSION.

In making poor farmers and share croppers become small landlords, the operations of the Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture and Fishery Development in 1970 aim at achieving the distribution of French owned lands and expropriated lands to the poor farmers, as well as executing within the shortest time the new law concerning land reform immediately after it is promulgated. Following are the tasks scheduled for 1970:

a. Distribution of French-owned Lands and Expropriated Lands.

In early 1969, 147,210 hectares of the French-owned lands and expropriated lands have not been sold and distributed to poor farmers. The 1969 Pacification and Development Plan, planned to complete the distribution of these lands. However, the Land Reform Seminar in early June 1969 came to a conclusion that the distribution of these types of lands could not be completed in 1969 because most of the French-owned lands and expropriated lands are located in unsecure areas. The distribution of the remaining lands will be urgently continued in the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan through the following phases:

- (1) First half of 1970: 50,000 hectares.
- (2) Second half of 1970: To be determined later based on results of the first phase.

b. Adjustment of Land Illegally Occupied for Cultivation.

Governmental lands illegally occupied for cultivation are scatteringly located. However, the distribution of these lands must depend on the operational techniques. Therefore, the adjustment of 20,000 hectares of illegally-occupied land in 1970 is planned as follows:

- (1) First half of 1970 : 10,000 hectares.
- (2) Second half of 1970 : To be determined later based on results of the first phase.

c. Distribution of Land in the Land Development Centers and Resettlement Camps:

Based on the operational capabilities of the Land Services at the Land Development Centers and Resettlement Camps, the survey and distribution of this Land in II, III, and IV CTZ's is planned for 1970 as follows:

- (1) First half of 1970: 5,000 hectares.
- (2) Second half of 1970: To be determined later based on results of the first phase.

d. Montagnard Land Survey.

Decree 76-CCDD/CN, Montagnard Land Survey, was already promulgated on 15 July 1969. This task was started and is now under implementation. In 1970 The Land Agency has planned to survey 20,000 hectares of Montagnard land in nine provinces to include Binh Dinh, Dalat, Tuyen Duc, Kontum, Lam Dong, Long Khanh, Ninh Thuan, Pleiku, Darlac and Phu Bon, in which many ethnic minority people are living.

e. Making Poor Farmers Become Small Landlords in Compliance with the Governmental Land Reform Policy.

The Land Reform Bill has been passed by the House of Representatives and it will be promulgated very soon. Consequently, a program for distribution of 200,000 hectares of land to tillers in 1970 must be scheduled based on the message read by the President at the Session of Congress on 6 October 1969.

The first half of 1970 is the first phase of implementing the task. During this period, preparatory operations such as propaganda and popularization, and training of cadres should be done. Therefore, the distribution of land is carefully planned as follows:

- (1) First half of 1970: 80,000 hectares
- (2) Second half of 1970: To be determined later based on results of the first phase.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept.

(1) In order to bring early success to the Land Reform Programs, the receipt of applications from the poor farmers and the issuance of land titles to them must be performed immediately at the village level. Therefore, procedures for the issuance of land titles must be simplified, and more powers must be given to local authorities.

(2) The land reform will be really successful only when new small landlords have sufficient means for production to increase their income. All agriculture and fishery development programs should actively and effectively support the poor farmers becoming property owners.

(3) The land reform is a sharp instrument to win over the enemy in the coming political struggle period. Therefore, more coordination and active support are required from many ministries so as to achieve the maximum results in a minimum of time.

b. Organization.

Based on the above concept, the land reform implementation must be well organized at the village, province and central levels in accordance with the following division of duties:

c. Division of Work.

(1) Work to be done by village:

(a) In villages with Village Administrative Committees, the Agriculture and Land Reform Commissioner of the Village Administrative Committee is responsible to motivate and guide poor farmers to make applications for land. Village Chiefs will certify all applications, and preside over meetings of the Land Distribution Committees in order to consider poor farmers' applications and make decisions for the distribution of land to farmers;

(b) In villages with much land to be distributed (designated by the Land General Directorate) the Village Chief additionally will be assigned a Village Land Correspondent in order to assist the Agriculture and Land Reform Commissioner;

(c) In villages with provisional administrative committees, the finance commissioner will replace the Agriculture and Land Reform Commissioner;

(d) In the three aforementioned cases, RDC teams will assign some cadres to the Village Administrative Committee to assist the Agriculture and Land Reform Commissioner (or Finance Commissioner) and the Village Land Correspondent to receive applications from poor farmers, coordinate operations such as conducting

propaganda, and give guidance and information to poor farmers who are living in this village but tilling land in another one;

(e) Village Information Cadres will help to widely popularize, by all forms of information, the Land Reform Law as dictated in the plan of the Province Land Reform Popularization Committee. Particularly, village information cadres will help understand the reactions of the people and VC propaganda activities among the poor farmers;

(f) On receipt of land titles, village chiefs together with the Village Agriculture and Land Reform Commissioner, Village Land Correspondents and RD Cadres should immediately distribute them to concerned poor farmers;

(g) Village Agricultural Affairs Committees will determine the average productivity of land in villages.

(2) Work to be Done by Province:

Province Chiefs are responsible to carry out supporting tasks, and coordinate activities to help the Land Reform Program achieve success.

(a) The Province Chief must instruct Deputy District Chiefs to follow up and provide support insuring security for the tasks being carried out in the District;

(b) The Province Land Service will push and follow up the program, and also provide support for the Village Land Distribution Committees in all fields;

(c) The Province Information Service and JUSPAO manage information activities as scheduled to encourage the tillers to submit applications for the purchase of land;

(d) Provincial authorities will have Village Land Distribution Committees formed at the Villages where the tasks are in progress, and form a Province Land Distribution Committee to consider the cases which could not be settled by the Village Land Distribution Committee;

(e) The Province Chief and the Land Service Chief will do their best to distribute immediately those land titles still on hand at the Province or at the Service Headquarters. This year, those land titles which will be forwarded by Central authorities to provinces must be distributed immediately to concerned tillers (except for the case when Central Authorities want to attend the land titles distribution ceremony at the locality, after timely notification to the concerned Province).

(3) To be Done by CTZ:

The representatives of the Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture and Fishery Development at the CTZ PDC do the following:

- (a) Follow the Land Reform tasks being carried out in the zone;
- (b) Make recommended distribution of means and personnel to those Provinces where heavy land reform tasks should be done;
- (c) Understand and solve the problems which hinder the land distribution tasks;
- (d) Regularly contact the Province Chief and Province CORDS to promote the land reform tasks;
- (e) If necessary, help the Province Land Reform Popularization Committee promote the popularization and propaganda programs;
- (f) Report to the Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture and Fishery Development the operational progress and difficulties and problems so that this Ministry can solve them immediately.

(4) Tasks to be Done by Central Agencies:

- (a) The Ministry of Interior will instruct the Province Chiefs to assume the responsibility of carrying out the land reform tasks in their localities;
- (b) The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Revolutionary Development will coordinate with the Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture and Fishery Development to expedite the popularization of the Land Reform Program by printing leaflets and posters, organizing radio broadcasts and TV shows, as well as spreading, in all forms, pertinent information to townfolk and country-folk.
- (c) The Ministry of Defense will coordinate with the Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture and Fishery Development to do the following:
 - 1- Settle detached technical personnel requirements;
 - 2- Satisfy requirements for aerial photographs of villages and hamlets;
 - 3- Agree to the use and supply of U. T. M. grid military maps;

- 4- Instruct the Geography Directorate to supply aerial photos to the Land General Directorate, when requested;
- 5- Instruct the Political Warfare General Department to make the Armed Forces aware of the Land Reform Program and train our soldiers for this task.

(d) The Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture and Fishery Development will establish a committee for timely fixing of the paddy cost so as to appropriately indemnify landowners.

(e) The Ministry of Revolutionary Development will instruct the Province RDC Control Groups to energetically support the Land Reform Program by wholeheartedly helping the Village and Hamlet officials in performing their land reform tasks as stipulated in the paragraph entitled "Tasks to be Done by Village."

(f) The Ministry for Development of Ethnic Minorities must set in order the legal status of the tillage boundaries in the Montagnard Villages. This is a technical task that the Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture and Fishery Development must do in its program of land survey for the Highlander compatriots.

4. PREPARATION OF PLANS. See Annex XVIII.

5. COORDINATION.

In the implementation of the Land Reform Program, it is necessary to coordinate closely with the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Revolutionary Development, and Ministry for Development of Ethnic Minorities as indicated in paragraph 3 above.

6. REPORTS. See Annex XVIII.

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX XV

DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC MINORITIES

1. GENERAL.

From antiquity to modern times the Highlands with their perilous mountain ranges have traditionally provided many places for the training, recruiting and equipping of soldiers who then went forth to perform many brilliant feats in our nation's history. But at the same time, these mountainous regions have provided impregnable redoubt for guerrillas, spies and international smuggling.

Control of the Highlands and the treacherous mountainous regions is absolutely essential to both national defense and pacification and development.

To reach this objective necessitates winning the cooperation of the Montagnards.

The some one million Montagnards are a vital force to be used in local security and intelligence as well as in pacification and the restoration of peace and tranquility.

We must mobilize this bloc of people.

The plan for developing the Highlanders has the exclusive objective of solving the many differences existing in language, culture, and customs between the Montagnards themselves, not to mention the differences between the Montagnards and the lowland Vietnamese.

In other words, this is not a special plan designed for the highlands, but it is only a recommended outline aiming to guide the executors of the plan to flexibly implement the program according to the special human and geographic factors of Montagnard areas in order to make the program more effective and achieve maximum results.

a. Community Cooperation Principle.

The threefold Community Cooperation principle is as follows:

- Cooperation among the people.
- Cooperation between the people and government;
- Cooperation among government agencies.

This threefold Community Cooperation principle must be strictly and properly applied in the highlands.

b. Sense of Community.

The Community Cooperation principle requires a sense of community.

The cooperation among people, among groups of people, and among tribes of ethnic minorities whose dialects, cultures, standards of living, traditions, and customs are different from one another should be carried out in such a way that a community cooperation can be eventually developed.

Following are three suggested basic operational principles which aim to develop this sense of community.

(1) Apply equally all plans initiated by the Government for all localities.

(2) Make maximum use of existing ethnic minority personnel involved in pacification and development programs, paramilitary organizations or units, administrative or technical agencies in provinces and districts.

(3) Respect the Second Republic Constitution and apply Decree Law 33/67, 29 August 1967. The Montagnard Pacification and Development Program should be carried out based on the special statute for the ethnic minorities promulgated in Decree Law 33/67, 29 August 1967, and the Second Republic Constitution particularly Articles 2 and 24 pertaining to ethnic minorities.

2. MISSION.

Implement the Montagnard Affairs Policy in the highlands, insure the continuity and development of the plans under execution in the highlands, promote the reconstruction of Montagnard villages and hamlets, strengthen the Montagnard administrative machinery, and step up the distribution of land and make montgnard farmers owners of their lands.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept. Make maximum use of STRDC Groups, ethnic minority officials and cadres in the pacification, reconstruction, and development of montagnard villages and hamlets. Properly and logically assign ethnic minority commanders to guide their compatriots through the intermediary of their national leaders, i. e., the local talented, virtuous, and venerable persons. Flexibly apply the criteria of the programs, according to local situations and conditions. Understand and accept that the difference in languages and cultures is a fact to be taken into account while solving ethnic minority problems.

b. Organization.

(1) Central Level.

(a) The Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) has the Minister for Development of Ethnic Minorities as a permanent member.

(b) The Central Pacification and Development Coordinating Center (CPDCC).

The Assistant to the Minister for DEM, in charge of plans is MDEM representative at this CPDCC.

(2) CTZ Level.

The Directors of I, II and III CTZ DEM Directorates are members of respective CTZ PD Council.

(3) Province Level.

The DEM Service Chief is a member of the Province PD Council (in 24 provinces only).

(4) Son Thon RD Cadres.

In 24 Provinces where our ethnic minority compatriots are residing there are 108 STRDC Groups including 7,078 cadres, who are operating under the direct command of respective local STRDC Managing Boards. The DEM Service Chief is responsible for the STRDC Managing Board activities in general.

(5) Montagnard Vocational Training Center.

Pleiku Truong Son Training Center will be reorganized into Montagnard Vocational Training Center.

c. Fundamental points.

(1) Security.

(a) Study a way to more effectively use minority people for intelligence information collection.

(b) The National Police will recruit local ethnic minority people and assign them to montagnard village or enlist them into police field forces to operate in localities.

(c) Equip the ethnic minority People's Self-Defense Groups with weapons.

(d) Study means to establish air and artillery support systems and rapid reinforcement for the villages and hamlets.

(e) Use highland Regional Forces units to destroy enemy supply systems, communication-liaison network, exterminate guerrilla teams, and conduct reconnaissance patrol operations and determine enemy regular units' operational locations.

(2) Village and Hamlet Administration.

(a) Concentrate efforts to carry out elections in montagnard villages and hamlets, training and support to montagnard village and hamlet officials.

(b) Promote self-development in the framework of present Self-Development programs.

(c) Determine the extent of tillable lands for montagnard villages and hamlets. Expedite the land distribution program, grant land ownership to make montagnard farmers owners of their lands.

(d) Protect the highlanders' farming lands.

(e) Simplify administrative procedures in order to prevent trouble and corruption which may discourage honest ethnic minority people.

(3) Son Thon Revolutionary Development Cadres. (See also Annex X)

(a) The Son Thon RDC group will be composed of 70 members to include its command committee (composed of 6 cadres) and 2 teams (32 cadres).

(b) The Province Chief will coordinate with the MDEC for the deployment of Son Thon RDC.

(c) The proper use of Son Thon RED groups means to assist the inhabitants of montagnard villages and hamlets to organize the defense of their villages and hamlets themselves, guide them in their elections, develop political activities, strengthen the administration of montagnard villages and hamlets and to step up the self-help development.

(d) To promote effectiveness Son Thon RDC groups should operate with their full strength (2 teams) at one place. One team (32 men) may work independently in one area only in those circumstances in which its command section is well trained and qualified for the job.

(e) Under no circumstance should a Son Thon RDC group be used in a montagnard village/hamlet without proper support by the RVNAF.

(f) The Son Thon RDC can be considered as a reserve source of manpower for the montagnard village/hamlet in localities where there is a scarcity of cadre personnel.

(4) Information.

(a) Conduct a study for a training and guidance program for the regional command cadres, administrative and technical officials, experts, STRD Cadres, military commanders, and security agents of district, village and hamlet levels in order to unify their thoughts, consolidate their positions, and most important, standardize the operational methods of the subordinate ranks who are in direct contact with the mass.

(b) Exploit to the maximum the Banmethuot and Pleiku radio broadcasting programs for local highlanders.

(c) The information and propaganda program in the highlands must be practical and candid in pointing out tasks already accomplished and tasks in progress by and for ethnic minorities.

(d) The press, pictures, letters and other information-propaganda media should be fully employed so as to reinforce the radio and TV program.

(e) Recruit local highlanders as Information and Propaganda Cadres for each locality.

(5) Anti-communist refugees and war victims.

(a) Avoid forcing ethnic minorities to return to their native places or to resettle in other localities unless by order or with approval of the Pacification and Development Council. This order or approval, if any, must be executed in conformity with instructions in force.

(b) The settlement, resettlement, or return to native village of the Montagnard people must be planned carefully, with special attention paid to security. Guidance and support to the people concerning cultivation and planting must be scheduled in order to help them quickly become self-sufficient. The special instructions concerning this problem must be respected.

(c) The principle of bringing security to the people and not bringing the people to a secure area must be followed.

(6) Development.

(a) Montagnard agriculture:

Help the Montagnard people escape from their primitive agriculture by teaching them methods of protecting and planting woods, considering climatic changes to extend cultivation areas, encourage the planting of fruit-trees of the temperate zone like peaches, pears, plums, and apples, construct small dams to hold water, and build fish ponds.

(b) Education:

Aiming at practical objectives, education is based on the diffusion of popular and technical knowledge, and improvement of Banmethuot Normal School to form ethnic minority teachers in order to fulfill the educational requirements in the Montagnard hamlets.

(c) Health and Sanitation:

Conduct special training courses in order to form Montagnard medics, health technicians, and rural midwives to be assigned in Montagnard hamlet health programs, and popularize general sanitation principles among Montagnard hamlet inhabitants.

(d) House-keeping:

Recruit and form a number of Montagnard social technicians to instruct and guide the Montagnard women in their task of house-keeping, cooking, child care, sewing, etc.

(7) TRAINING.

The training of Ethnic Minority Cadres in general, and montagnard village and hamlet officials in particular, should be divided into two phases:

(a) Preliminary Training Phase.

Training would be held in localities (provinces or Montagnard Vocational Training Center) aimed at guiding and helping the students acquire knowledge in a familiar surrounding with familiar instructors.

(b) Main Training Phase:

As soon as the preliminary training in provinces or Montagnard Vocational Training Center is completed, these graduated cadres and officials will come back to their respective Montagnard villages and hamlets to practice their newly acquired knowledge. After a period of time, according to their personal qualifications, particularly their knowledge in the Vietnamese language, these cadres and officials may be sent to the National Training Center, Vung Tau or other centers for further training.

(c) Instructors.

Concerned ministries are requested to provide a minimum number of instructors to assume training duties at Montagnard Vocational Training Center. Qualified STRD Cadres and former instructors may be sent for refresher training at NTC, Vung Tau and will be assigned to work in the teaching board of the Montagnard Vocational Training Center or in-province training courses.

4. COORDINATION.

a. Central level.

Concerned ministries will coordinate with MDEM to implement the following main operations in the ethnic minority development program:

- | | |
|---|--|
| (1) Formation of ethnic minority RF units | Ministry of Defense |
| (2) Recruitment of ethnic minority personnel for National Police, Police Field Force units. | Ministry of Interior, DGNP |
| (3) Development of elementary, general and technical secondary education. | Ministry of Education |
| (4) Development of Montagnard public health | Ministry of Health |
| (5) Organization of land survey, agricultural credit, and Cooperatives. | Ministry of Land Reform, and Agriculture and Fishery Development |
| (6) Popularization of the Montagnard Economy Development Program. | Ministry of Information |
| (7) Agricultural and animal husbandry training. | Ministry of Education |
| (8) Anti-communist refugees | Ministry of Social Welfare |
| (9) Village and Hamlet Self-Development Program | Ministry of Revolutionary Development |
| (10) Training of village and hamlet officials | Ministries of Interior and Revolutionary Development |
| (11) Popularization of the training program for cadres and administrative personnel. | Ministry of Information |

b. Local level.

Within the framework of the Pacification and Development Plan, CTZ representatives of concerned ministries and provincial technical service chiefs will follow-up, support and assist in the implementation of this plan according to means and resources available at the local level.

(1) CTZ level.

CTZ Commanders will study and deploy military supporting units (Regular Forces, Regional Forces, Popular Forces) according to local requirements or recommendations of provincial local government, initiate main operations and supporting measures for implementation of the plan.

(2) Province/Sector level.

Province Chiefs/Sector Chiefs, concurrently Chairmen of Provincial Pacification and Development Councils, are responsible for the implementation of the plan with the coordination of technical service chiefs and representatives of the concerned ministries in the localities.

(3) District/Sub-Sector level.

District Chiefs, Sub-Sector Chiefs and members of Provincial Pacification and Development Council with the coordination of technical section chiefs, will draft the implementation plan, remedy defects, make recommendations and report to Provincial Pacification and Development Council their problem areas, if any.

c. Ministry for Development of Ethnic Minorities:

(1) Manage the STRDC Groups which are deployed to the provinces and are operationally placed under the DEM Services and Province STRDC Managing Boards.

(2) Direct and manage the Pleiku Montagnard Vocational Training Center, including the planning of the training program.

(3) Plan and supervise the training of all categories of cadres, Montagnard officials and get jobs for them in governmental agencies, military organizations, associations, companies, and private enterprises, especially organizations in the Highlands.

(4) Advise and support the ministries and directorates of the government to establish projects and carry out programs relating to the Montagnard people, according to their customs, traditions and their life concept.

(5) Follow up and estimate the results of the pacification and development operations in the Highlands, and report to the Central Pacification and Development Council with remedial recommendations or suggestions for improvement (if any).

5. REPORTS. See Annex XVIII

Appendix 1, Decree Law 33/67, 29 August 1967.

Appendix 1 (Decree Law 33/67, 29 August 1967) to Annex XV (Development of Ethnic Minorities) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Doan-Phuc

NATIONAL DIRECTORY

OFFICE OF CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN OF NATIONAL DIRECTORY

No. 33/67

- Considering the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam dated 4/1/1967 especially Articles 2, 24, 97 and 98;

- Considering Decision #3-QLVNCH/QD dated 6/14/1965 supplemented by Decision # 7-QLVNCH/QD dated 6/6/1966 of Armed Forces Council of the Republic of Vietnam establishing and fixing the composition of the National Directory;

- Considering Decree # 1-a/LDQG/SL dated 6/19/65 and following documents fixing the composition of Central Executive Committee;

- Considering the petition of minority representatives throughout the country attending the Minority Tribes Convention on 6/25-26/1967 in Pleiku;

- Considering recommendations of Central Executive Committee;

After the National Directory has discussed and voted;

DECREES

Art. 1. - It is now enacted a statute stipulating special rights of the minorities on the basis defined in Art. 2 and 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam;

Art. 2. -

1/- The Minority Tribes Council will be set up according to Art. 97, 98 of the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam to advise the Government on matters regarding the minorities.

2/- The agency especially in charge of the Minorities is raised to the rank of ministry of the Government.

Art. 3. -

1/- According to their qualifications the minority civil servants benefit from the following assistance:

- Assignment to positions corresponding to abilities and good will of the individual.

- Generous conditions at promotion, entry to regular official roll, in-service-training etc...

2/- According to requirements and recommendations of the agency responsible for the minorities mentioned in Art. 2 above the

Government will hold special courses to train minority staffers and officials in Administration, Justice, Education.

Art. 4. -

1/- To cope with the present war situation, in the Highlands the Government will develop according to the security requirements in the area, in every sector, local forces made up of voluntary minority youths and commanded by minority workers formed in National Training Centers.

2/- The minority youths, depending on their education capabilities, will be dispensed from diploma requisites for entry to Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers Schools of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

3/- Minority Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers will be selected and assigned to positions of command corresponding to the abilities and good will of the individual.

4/- Children of minority servicemen, civil servants, families whose members killed in action will be admitted to Schools of Highlander Junior N. C. O. and Dead Soldiers' Children.

Art. 5. -

1/- The highlander's land ownership is respected. A decree on land reforms for the highlanders will be enacted.

2/- An agricultural survey and development office for the minorities will be set up.

3/- Depending on the local situation and requirements the Government will give special support to highlander assistance program to improve farming, breeding technique, develop handicraft, commerce, industries etc... and open roads in the highlands to promote traffic.

Art. 6. - Depending on the local situation and true status, the Government will carry out minority living improvement program aimed at the following criteria:

1/- Set up additional dispensaries, maternities, medical stations, mobile health groups, expand other health facilities, support them with medicines, staffers to take care of people health and simultaneously press forward the education of minorities on sanitation and health.

2/- The Government will open schools to train health workers of various levels to take care of the minorities' health.

3/- In case of natural disasters, fires, relocations from communism, depending on the requirements, the offices in charge of the minorities plan special and effective relief program to help the minorities attain early self help status.

4/- The offices in charge of the minorities survey and approach the charitable institutions to set up additional orphanages in their areas.

Art. 7. -

1/- In the general development program, the Government will open more secondary, elementary schools, build boarding schools to accommodate all minority students.

2/- Encourage and grant more scholarships to minority students to enable them to attend universities, secondary schools, professional schools at home and abroad.

3/- At examination for degree or entry to technical schools, depending on the level and branch, the minority children will benefit from special help: reduction of degree requisites, reservation of a number of admissions or exemption from examination, increase of points to pass them.

4/- At elementary education the highlander dialect will be taught along with the Vietnamese program. The dialect program will attach importance to customs, habits of the tribes.

5/- The future Tribal Council surveys and recommends to the Government:

- Establishment of Ethnological Museum to preserve and develop the ancient civilization of the minority tribes.
- Establishment of Tribal Research Institute to assist the Government to draw up minority living development plan.
- Planning of minority compulsory education program.

Art. 8. -

1/- The village, district, province customary courts restored by Decree 6/65 dated 7/22/1965 will be maintained and upon recommendation of the Minority Council the Government will set up more of them in areas where they do not exist yet.

2/- The unwritten laws of the minorities will be collected and conserved.

Art. 9. -

The measures stipulated in this Decree aim mainly at helping the minorities to early catch up the general progress of the people. As the living standards of the various tribes are not even, to attain the above aim, the ministries and technical services will cooperate closely with the agencies in charge of the minorities mentioned in Art. 2 to study programs, plans, take measures, apply and set firm implementation deadline in strict consistence with the real situation of the area and level of the tribes.

Art. 10. -

The Chairman of Central Executive Committee, Secretaries General, Secretaries, Under-Secretaries, Special Commissioners, Special Commissioner of Highlander Affairs are charged each as to that which concerns him with the execution of this Decree.

This Decree will be published in the Gazette of the Republic of Vietnam.

Saigon, Aug. 29, 1967

Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu

TRUE COPY

Printed signature

XV-1-4

Appendix 1 (Decree Law 33/67, 29 August 1967) to Annex XV (Development of Ethnic Minorities) to 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Doan-Phuc

NATIONAL DIRECTORY

OFFICE OF CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN OF NATIONAL DIRECTORY

No. 33/67

- Considering the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam dated 1/1/67;

- Considering Decision No. 3-QLVNCH/QD dated 6/14/1965 supplemented by Decision # 7-QLVNCH/QD dated 6/6/1966 of the Armed Forces Council of the Republic of Vietnam establishing and fixing the composition of the National Directory:

- Considering Decree # 001-a/QT/LDQG/SL dated 6/19/1965 and following documents fixing the composition of the Central Executive Committee;

- Considering Ordinance # 57 dated 10/22/1965 stipulating land reforms;

- Considering recommendation of Chairman of Central Executive Committee;

After the National Directory has discussed and voted;

D E C R E E S

Art. 1. - It is now confirmed the ownership of the highlanders over the lands where they have settled.

Art. 2. - The highlanders are to be given ownership over the lands they are cultivating in rotation.

A decree of the Ministry of Agriculture will fix the maximum area of rotation cultivation land to each family.

Art. 3. - In each "Buon" or highlander village, after required technical work is completed Land Registry will be set up and free ownership titles issued to the highlanders.

Art. 4. - The Chairman of Central Executive Committee is responsible for the carrying out of this decree.

This decree will be published in the Gazette of the Republic of Vietnam.

Saigon, 8/29/1967

Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu

Printed signature

TRUE COPY

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX XVI

URBAN PROGRAMS

1. - GENERAL.a- Foreword:

(1) During both 1968 and 1969, the various pacification and development plans emphasized winning ground and people, both of which aimed at winning the rural areas. Therefore, those areas enjoying relative security such as the capital, autonomous cities, province towns, and district towns alike, were all given only secondary efforts.

(2) In 1970 the P&D Plan will be implemented simultaneously and evenly throughout the nation in order to guarantee complete security for a minimum of 90 percent of the total population. Therefore, the heavily populated urban areas are a main objective of the P&D Plan.

(3) The principle of community cooperation embodied in both the 1969 and 1970 P&D Plans is the basic principle in both urban and rural areas. However, in the general plan for the whole country it is certain that some measures that can be applied effectively in the rural areas are not appropriate to the urban areas, because in the cities we have to face many special problems.

(4) Annex XVI of the 1970 P&D Plan is enclosed to guide all of the various pacification and development councils in the employment of special measures appropriate to urban communities because presently, 40 percent of our total population are living in communities of 20,000 or more people.

b- Definition: Urban Community

(1) Urban communities are concentrations of people of 20,000 or more, living in one or more villages or hamlets to include around cities, or province towns or district towns, with the following special characteristics:

(a) High population density, houses close together, and it is possible that several families will be under one roof.

(b) The majority of people live by business, industry, or some form of wage.

(c) There are many shops and restaurants displaying signs in front.

(d) There is regular presence of National Police activities,

and usually at least one gas station.

(2) The Prefecture of Saigon, as well as the autonomous cities of Hue, Da Nang, Cam Ranh, Dalat, and Vung Tau are naturally urban communities.

c- Employment:

(1) Besides the Mayor of the Prefecture and mayors of municipalities, all province chiefs will also forward to the Ministry of Interior through the CTZ PDC, ultimately informing the CPDC, a roster of all villages that meet the criteria of an "urban community." These criteria will be based on the special characteristics described under the paragraph on Definition.

This roster, together with recommendations, must be sent to the Central Government prior to 15 December 1969.

(2) After proposals establishing "urban communities" are approved, the contents of this Annex will be applied in urban communities in every instance possible. The contents of this Annex are supplementary to the 1970 P&D Plan which is applicable to communities throughout the country.

2.- CONCEPT

a- The Principle of Community Cooperation

(1) The principle of community cooperation needs to be applied equitably throughout the nation, in the urban areas as well as the rural. The basis of this principle is to develop the spirit of community cooperation for all the people, from the inter-family groups to the khoms and phuongs, and ultimately to the urban community, in order to motivate the people throughout the country to actively participate in our common tasks.

(2) Presently, the situation in our country is changing from a military contest to more of a political contest which means that the political arena is replacing the battlefield, and thus the spirit of community cooperation of all our people must perforce be stimulated to a high level, especially in the populous urban communities. The spirit of cooperation must be realized through strong expressions of "loyalty of the people to the Constitution," in order that the people do not become prey to plots to weaken them or to create insurrection.

(3) We must understand that the urban community is an important entity

because there is a higher population density than in the rural villages and hamlets, and because of differences of origin, occupation, class, and intellectual standards. The urban communities lack the collectiveness of the rural communities, but instead of a collective relationship, people in urban communities tend to have narrower and more personal relationships such as cultural relationships, economics, religion, relationships in a union, associations, etc. Therefore, the development of the spirit of the community cooperation must be built on the basis of such relationships, for example, occupational, formal associations, cultural, religious associations, etc., in order to supplement the collective spirit in the khom's and phuong's.

(4) Another factor which needs to be emphasized is that the spirit of community cooperation in urban areas can only be developed rapidly by the implementation of those tasks which are clearly in the public interest as opposed to tasks based on the private interests of various organizations or groups, or for that matter, based on a local geographic interest.

(5) Besides the above, we need to emphasize the creation of a broadly based and highly developed democratic life in the urban communities so that every citizen is encouraged to active participation in the local decision making process regarding self defense, self management, self help, and self development, just as people in the rural areas. Therefore, development tasks in the urban areas require an enthusiastic spirit on the part of the people participating in these tasks and this basic enthusiasm is more important and more deserving of emphasis than are the administrative procedures or the overt merits of organization projects or tasks.

b- Eight Objectives:

(1) Security.

The problem with security is just as important in the urban areas as it is in the rural areas, because the population concentrations in these urban areas will play an important part in determining whether or not we bring total security to 90 percent of the total population during 1970. If appropriate security measures are used, it is possibly easier to maintain security in the urban areas than it is in the rural areas.

Urban defense plans include:

- Active defense measures
- Self defense measures
- Measures to protect life and property
- Internal security measures.

(a) Active Defense Measures:

(1) It is necessary to establish a common multi-faceted active defense plan for every urban community in order that every military force, paramilitary force, and civil force located in the community is properly coordinated with one another under the unified command of a single headquarters.

Mayors of the prefecture and municipalities, and province chiefs, must issue instructions to place responsibility for the drafting of this plan. They must assign a general commander and practice the plan so as to finally promulgate a plan which is effective whenever there is evidence that the enemy will soon attack. This plan needs to be coordinated with the Sector and commanders of both RVNAF and FWMF units located in adjacent areas, in order to reinforce the defense plan.

(2) The active defense plan must place special emphasis on giving a high priority to the protection of certain important points, for example, important government administrative or logistical installations, radio stations, generators, industrial plants, medical installations, etc. At the same time, special instructions should be issued regarding civil defense tasks and internal security.

(b) Civil Defense Measures (or Self Defense):

Defense is an element of the common action defense of the urban community. It includes measures as to the tasks to which all the people must actively contribute in the planning for their common defense such as:

- (1) Establish obstacles, secret family tunnels,
- (2) Military and civil alert systems,
- (3) Fire fighting, first aid, and medical evacuation,
- (4) Information and intelligence tasks, in order to reduce false rumors that can only cause confusion among the people.

(c) Measures to Protect Life and Property:

These are special measures included in the active defense plan related to the employment of effective combat principles and necessary measures to restrict to the maximum, loss of property, life or any damage to the economy or society as the result of the war. The instructions contained in BD No. 300/4/TTM/53/KH dated 19 June 1969, by the JGS/GS, must be applied.

(d) Internal Security Measures:

(1) Internal security is a most important factor in ensuring routine security, as well as security in crisis situations arising in urban communities. The National Police is the primary agency

responsible for internal security. In times of peace the National Police are under the operational control of urban administrative commanders, and in times of crisis the National Police will be placed under the direct unified command of the headquarters commanding the entire defense plan.

(2) In implementing their security tasks the police, uniformed as well as Special Branch and Police Field Forces, must coordinate closely with other defense forces such as the Main Forces, Regional Forces, Popular Forces, and especially the PSDF, in order that their operations will contribute effectively to the common defense plan.

(3) The main unalterable mission of the National Police is still to enforce the law and maintain public order and security, to control the people and resources so as to effectively prevent infiltration into the urban areas by any elements dangerous to the common security, to eliminate corruption, cowboys, gangsters and to prevent any organizations from supplying the enemy.

(2) Phung Hoang:

(a) Phung Hoang campaigns must be pushed hard in every aspect in the urban communities.

(b) Existing Phung Hoang organizations in incorporated urban communities such as the Prefecture and the autonomous cities, are directly subordinate to the CTZ Phung Hoang organization.

(c) Provincial or district Phung Hoang committees will be directly responsible for the implementation of Phung Hoang tasks in provinces, districts, and those urban communities which are not yet incorporated, by coordinating the activities of village, hamlet governments in these urban communities.

(d) There must be close coordination of Phung Hoang tasks between areas bordering the prefecture and autonomous cities with neighboring provinces.

(3) People's Self Defense:

(a) A high priority must be placed on increasing the efficiency of PSD groups in the urban communities so that they can be entrusted with security measures of prime importance (patrolling, guard duty, alarms, intelligence, and so forth) in coordination with the military units located in the area, according to the coordinating instructions contained in the common defense plan.

(b) We must encourage the organization of "mobile self defense inter-teams" in order to have a rapid reaction capability when confronted with a sudden change in the situation. These inter-teams need special training in the various training centers and will be employed as a reserve reaction force in the nearby communities.

(c) It is necessary to complete organization, training, equipping, of both the combat elements and the support elements of the PSDF, as well as to refine management procedures for PSD so that they may effectively participate in all pacification and development tasks for 1970. Such tasks include:

- 1- Assist in local security to include phuongs and khoms.
- 2- Increase political activities and motivation.
- 3- Provide guidance and participation in community development.
- 4- Participate in social tasks (relief work, such as during fires or other disasters).

(d) Regarding Phuong Huong tasks, the PSD groups must encourage Phuong Huong activities and regularly observe the interfamily groups in order to keep track of reactionaries, cowboys, gansters, and suspected VCI living in the phuong's and khom's.

(e) PSD plays a main role in youth and information tasks. They should provide guidance in physical training for the young, sports competition with prizes to enhance competition, and help encourage the information program by giving wide dissemination of information, use of the radio station, dissemination of leaflets, slogans, etc.

(f) As part of the community development program aimed at improving the people's life, the Self Defense groups must hold the initiative and initiate popular movements to improve the city, establish order, as well as to make any aesthetic and sanitation improvements in order to increase the people's trust and enhance their pride.

(g) Competitive campaigns between various Self Defense groups in the phuongs and khoms should be initiated in every field, both military and civil. Such competition can also be more broadly based, for example, between PSD groups of different urban communities may compete with one another in order to create an atmosphere charged with enthusiasm, and thus increase their efforts in the spirit of community cooperation, at the same time creating local pride.

(4) Local Administration:

(a) The war situation extending as it has to every area throughout nearly a quarter of a century, has caused a large displacement of the population, resulting in a great increase in the numbers living in cities to enjoy relative security or economic advantages. This fact necessitates some practical administrative re-organization so as to be appropriate to the changed population distribution and also to create the necessary legal conditions for local authorities to implement pacification and development tasks in urban areas. Local areas must remain flexible in carrying out the urban program with the existing organization during the time lag awaiting reorganization decisions of the Ministry of Interior.

1- Urban development cadre groups must also be studied as to the

best organization by which they can assist the local urban governments in obtaining rapid and good results in the pacification and development program.

2- The main factor in urban development tasks is to encourage the organization of formal associations and private organizations to include occupational organizations, youth organizations, sports associations, parent-student associations, women's associations, charitable associations, cooperatives, worker's organizations, business associations, industrial and agricultural associations, etc.

3- It is necessary to note that these organizations and associations can only assist development of strictly the community citizenry, not the requirements of political parties or religious sects.

(b) Popular groups in the urban areas should be encouraged to establish a "community center." This center must be established by the people with the guidance and financial support of the local government, and with contributions of resources and services by the people and other formal organizations. This center will be used as a place for meetings and greater assemblies of the urban community, or it can be used on a rotating basis for private meetings of various associations, in order that they may discuss the common interests of both their locality and the country as a whole. Both Village Self Development and Provincial Council Self Development funds may be used, if the people so desire, to finance construction of the "community centers," except that the portion financed by the government will not exceed one-half of the total construction costs. The Ministry of Social Welfare will draft a model plan to be used nationwide. After completion of construction, the new members joining the center will elect a management board to execute center business. Similarly, public centers may be established in the rural villages or urban phuongs.

Public centers may not be used as government offices or placed under the authority of the local government.

(5) Chieu Hoi:

(a) Coordinate closely with Phung Hoang's and Information in order to enlist the cooperation of families with VC relatives in getting them to return to the Nationalist side and ensure the security of the returnees. Vigorously initiate large-scale Chieu Hoi campaigns in the urban areas.

(b) Organize a warm public reception for the returnees. Help the returnees to rapidly reintegrate with the community and return to a normal life.

(c) Give proper management and follow-up so as to discover Communist infiltrators posing as genuine returnees, and at the same time properly utilize the capabilities of genuine returnees throughout the spectrum of pacification and development tasks.

(6) War Victims:

(a) Programs related to the Ministry of Social Welfare are applicable to the rural areas as well as the urban areas (see Annexes VI and VIII).

(b) Points to be noted:

1- Endeavor to prevent the growth of slum areas stemming from the refugee situation, in order to prevent major problems in the future rebuilding and beautification of the urban areas.

2- Use appropriate measures to improve the life of refugees by renovating their housing areas, improving public sanitation facilities, health facilities, and other conveniences necessary to an advanced society. At the same time take active measures to assist the refugees in normalizing their lives as rapidly as possible.

3- Motivate local communities to furnish financial support for refugees in order that the refugee program may develop on the broad base of the social community more than on the narrow base of local government, by maximum use of charitable organizations, goodwill youth groups, school programs for social work, and other local groups. Stimulate a movement in which people compete to help war victims so that the majority of people can give expression to their concern for those who have fallen into misfortune.

4- Expedite completion of programs to acquire housing sites for war victims in order to get housing for these victims and to rapidly dispense with the areas for refugees temporarily resettled, so we can erase completely all such vestiges from urban refugee areas.

(7) Information:

(a) Information tasks can be carried out with relatively greater ease in urban areas than they can in rural areas.

(b) In order to have an information program that is suitable and effective in the urban areas it is necessary to accurately assess the intellectual standard and peculiarities of the urban audience. In other respects the information program will be conducted in accordance with Annex VII.

(8) Economic:3. EXECUTION:a- CPDC.

(1) The CPDC is responsible for the execution of this entire program.

(2) The CPDC Coordination Center must coordinate, guide and control the execution.

b- Ministry of Interior:

Based on the reports of prefecture, provinces and municipalities and the ideas of the various CTZs regarding the organization and establishment of incorporated urban communities throughout the nation, the Ministry of Interior will promulgate appropriate administrative regulations in order to create advantageous legal conditions for the execution of this program.

c- Ministry of Social Welfare:

The Ministry of Social Welfare issues instructions for the establishment and management of the urban community's public centers according to the spirit of paragraph (e), Objective 4, in this program.

d- National Police:

Establish and reinforce National Police stations in the phuongs and reserve priority to phuongs in the areas bordering large municipalities.

e- Ministry of Revolutionary Development:

(1) Promulgate cadre regulations and organize urban pacification and development cadre with the capability equal to the intellectual level of their urban targets in order to effectively carry out all the objectives of the 1970 P&D Plan in the urban communities. In the urban communities as in the rural, the political factors are the most important. The standards for deployment and organization of cadre groups, teams, and cells will be applied for the phuongs the same as for the villages, the urban cadre will not operate in a single phuong in units larger than an 8-man team.

(2) Issue Self Development funds according to the criteria stipulated in Appendix I to this Annex, and at the same time issue necessary instructions for the management and use of these funds.

f- All Ministries:

(1) Issue instructions for the urban communities to effectively achieve those objectives falling within the purview of a particular ministry, and assign sufficient personnel to the phuongs following the criteria stipulated for rural villages and hamlets in Circulars of the Ministry of Interior.

(2) Guide, supervise and control the execution.

g- CTZs:

Give guidance, supervise and control the execution as well as submit reports.

h- Mayors of municipalities and the prefecture, province chiefs:

Implement the program, make reports and submit appropriate recommendations for the implementation of the program as appropriate to the local situation.

Appendix 1 (Self Development Program - Urban Areas) to Annex XVI
(Urban Programs) to the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

Implementation of the Self Help Development Program.

a. The Village Self Development program procedures will be applied to the urban communities under 50,000 people as stipulated in Annex XI. In urban communities over 50,000, including the Capital (Saigon) and the autonomous cities (Hue, Da Nang, Cam Ranh, Dalat, Vung Tau), and urban villages, there will be a few changes in the techniques of applying the village self development program in these areas, because of the special characteristics of these areas and particularly special problems in political mobilization. Except as noted below, however, the provisions of Annex XII will apply to the urban areas.

b. The essence and object of the urban self development program is still political. The main objective of the Self Help Development program is to develop a community spirit by encouraging the establishment and development of various private and public community organizations such as Parent-Student organizations, youth organizations, inter-family groups, livestock cooperatives, PSDF, women's groups, and so forth. This program will be implemented only upon recommendation of project groups with a minimum of 50 members, and for projects which are in the public interest.

c. In order to bring the maximum benefits, we need to divide the development fund into many small projects in order that the benefits will be spread evenly to meet the requirements for the whole area, especially in the poor phuongs, khoms and hamlets. This is more valuable to society than conducting a few large projects which serve the interest of only a few.

Therefore, only category one projects (under 100,000\$VN) may be approved for urban areas.

d. In order to guarantee the maximum participation of the people in these goodwill projects, the councils of the prefecture, city or village need to organize public assemblies at the lower levels such as phuong, khoms, in order that they can discuss the merits of each project and

make an appropriate decision. After this, the councils of the prefecture, municipality or village will review and make the decisions on the project, and the funds for implementation will be furnished immediately according to the criteria stipulated in Annex XI.

e. The Ministry of Revolutionary Development will be responsible for the distribution of funds for the municipalities and urban areas. The furnishing of funds mentioned above will follow the principles applied in the formula stipulated in Annex XI. As for those larger urban areas, this formula can be applied with a higher degree of flexibility in order to meet the requirements for political mobilization in such areas.

f. Other aspects of the urban Self Help Development program are spelled out in Annex XI and in other instructions from the Ministry of Revolutionary Development as to the implementation of this program.

g. We need to distinguish between the Self Development program for urban areas, and the provincial and municipal development programs (Annex XIII). The Provincial Municipal Council program is reserved especially for those Councils elected by the people. (Annex XII).

h. The forms used to implement the urban development plan are used in a flexible manner similar to those forms that are used in the village Self Development program as explained in Annex XI.

i. The CPDC will issue a separate directive giving further instructions on the application of this program to Saigon.

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX XVII

YOUTH PROGRAM

1. GENERAL:

a. The majority of people are youth who symbolize the masses, and who are always active and ascendant. Youths have proved themselves to be eager in contributing more to the building of the country today.

b. The authorities should understand youth in order to guide, educate, lead, and give them a good chance to properly develop their abilities. The ultimate objective is to turn them into qualified and intellectual leaders of the future with firm nationalist stand and spirit of loyal social service.

The Community Cooperation Principle in the Pacification and Development Plan has been disseminated throughout society.

c. In 1970 the government will create an atmosphere and situation so that the people can organize their own youth groups based on local concepts and features. The government will guide and support associations to organize infrastructure for activities along with presently existing Student Councils so that all can develop and expand together more strongly to begin to serve rural areas and help unite youth everywhere.

d. The concept for organizing youth units is that upon entering school, all Vietnamese citizens must be guided to join youth groups and associations following the manner of Inter-National Scout movement.

- Children, between 6 and 11 (Elementary education)
- Youngsters, between 12 and 16 (Secondary education)
- Youths, between 17 and 24 (Higher education)
- Adults, between 25 and 49 (advanced studies)
- Oldsters, between 50 and older.

e. The essential policy is to forge citizens for the future, guide them to perform social services, and train them in military skills to defend the country in peace or war. This policy is applicable to all ages.

f. All resources are provided by youth organizations and private people. The authorities contribute only limited financial support from the village development fund and the budget of the General Directorate of Youth. All operations will be conducted according to community development procedures.

2. OBJECTIVES:

a. Implement the program for development of the future of young people in order to train and educate them, and develop sense of discipline, initiative and sense of responsibility in social service through youth military training and sport organizations.

b. Provide technical and multi-purposed vocational training to the unlucky youths who cannot further their studies in university or higher levels.

c. Lead male and female youth into nation building activities such as community development, relief, health, sanitation, and anti-illiteracy.

d. Make a census of and legalize all youth sport organizations throughout the country - Military Scout Boys, Boy Scouts, Youth Associations, self defense teams, etc.

e. Organize social building youth groups (male and female).

f. Create national professional sport teams for participation in international sport movements.

3. CONCEPT OF EXECUTION:

In 1970, all sport and youth activities will be aimed at improving all existing youth organizations and groups, launching youth movements for social building, and grouping youths in military form to enhance their sense of discipline and thereby charge them with anti-corruption and anti-Communist responsibilities.

a. Youth: Youths may be organized into village, district, urban, and provincial groups. All liaison and co-ordination among them are established by their own leaders of the same level. Liaison and coordination between the province youth group and Ministries or the Central Pacification and Development Council will be established at any time such coordination is required or major problems must be solved.

b. Youth Elders: They are elected to head units: cell, team, section, group, village, district, province, and urban groups. The elders are to coordinate with the local youth service officials such as village and ward Commissioners for Culture and Social Welfare, district Youth Section Chiefs, province Youth Service Chiefs, PSDF, RD Cadre, etc.

c. Village Council, Province Council and Religious and Political Groups:

These organizations support, guide, encourage and motivate youth organizations to hold elections in their localities.

At the village council's proposal, province and municipal Administrative Bureau can legalize the status of local youth organizations.

d. Village councils, province and municipal councils, political and religious groups, and notables and personalities of good will are components of an advisory council. This council guides the local youth organizations to determine and establish their own activities and programs.

Neither advisory council nor youth officials control, issue orders to, or command youth groups.

The activities of these organizations follow the way of self-determination.

Support all nation building activities of youth groups such as weekend camping, social welfare and relief, community activity programs, local defense, and rural development, etc.

e. Each rural hamlet, ward and quarter will be encouraged and guided to approve the building of a youth house to serve as a center for leadership and activities such as a meeting and entertainment house, and as a training facility for sports, physical training, and many other useful activities.

f. Village councils should motivate youths to take part in village operations such as defense, village development, sport information, and education.

g. Each ministry of the government should, according to its concerned professional area, pay attention to youth development, re-establish the importance of youth from hamlet through central levels, and make plans for support of youth organizations where appropriate.

h. Our principle is to encourage local authorities to conduct seminars and make hamlet operational plans, submit them to village, village to district, district to province, and province to central authorities. Central authorities review submitted plans only so as to support and unify the method of implementing the plan, and do not become deeply involved in the internal affairs of the organization.

4. LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATED EXECUTION.

Every young person from 12 to 24 years of age should be a member of a youth sport organization which provides youths with responsibility for the collective survival of the nation and society (hamlets and villages) in which they are living.

The Peoples Self-Defense Force includes almost all youths of all ages. This force must willingly cooperate with youth elders in youth activities and other operations.

a. Ministry of Education:

Each person must be educated to prepare for the assumption of responsibilities, and burdens.

- (1) The Ministry of Education has the mission to prepare youths for the implementation of the aforementioned objective in two fields: study and leisure time. Study to become a useful person, and use leisure time to contribute to the development of the country and other useful jobs in the locality.
- (2) Guidance: Enter mandatory sports, physical training and self-defense into the annual education program. Each existing public or private school and any school to be built in the future should have at least a gymnastic ground, a basket-ball field, a volley-ball field, a ping-pong room and a reading and movie room.

Support the formation of a youth association which includes painting, techniques, culture, music, variety shows, etc.

Coordinate with the Ministry of Labor to control and organize all parentless and homeless children into a Labor Children Union in order to help them and build their future.

b. Ministries of Health and Social Welfare:

War has caused many changes in the society, causing youths to be confused, commit undesirable acts, and lead a fast life with many desires.

- (1) Responsibility: The Ministry of Social Welfare has the responsibility for providing advantageous circumstances and conditions for all debauched and astray children to return to normal life and do useful jobs. In addition, this Ministry should also work out entertainment and social programs for those children.

- (2) Guidance: Coordinate with the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Interior and the Directorate General of Youth to:

- Organize and train hamlet and village personnel in social welfare operations;

- Prepare a program for training college students to become social welfare, relief and health cadres and specialists. The Ministry of Social Welfare sponsors and urges the implementation of this program.

c. Ministries of Land Reform, and Labor:

- (1) Mission: The Ministry of Labor has the mission to guide and train poorly educated youths and drop outs, and establish 50 vocational training centers for these youths in provinces and cities throughout the country, especially important agriculture, fishery, and small industry centers.

(2) Guidance:

- Provide vocational training to students who leave school early;
- Make arrangements with private factories and contractors to admit youths for vocational and commercial apprenticeship.
- Establish model youth industries.

d. Ministry of Information:

It is necessary for youth to clearly understand all of the activities and vicissitudes of the country. The government should clearly understand the aspirations of youth to contribute to the national future.

(1) Responsibility: All circumstances and news must be exploited in order to widely publicize the sacrifice and achievement of youth in the society.

(2) Guidance:

- Widely publicize all activities of youth;
- Use all information facilities available to widely publicize the community concept and unification in national activities so as to impress people of all strata, regardless of religious belief, political affiliation, race, or local dialect. Despite these differences, they still have the same objective: to build a unified nation through a unified youth.
- Fix in youth sufficient ideals to overcome problems and difficulties in attaining the nation's goals.
- Publish youth magazines and books, encourage publication of printed matter with the aim of developing an industrious spirit, a spirit of cooperation, useful service of youths to society, and patriotism;
- Prepare an education program to train and admit youths to the press, information, etc.
- Guide the provinces to organize a youth social construction operation once a month.

e. Ministry of Revolutionary Development:

All RD Cadres should remember that success will come to them only when they can win the sympathy of, and provide their support to the youth in their operational areas. Through discussions and understanding of local youth, RD Cadres can work out a realistic and efficient development program.

(1) Responsibilities: Train, educate, and guide youths to exploit all their physical and mental abilities, then use them in local pacification and development.

(2) Urge boys and girls from 6 years old to actively participate in the local community in aspects of economies, social welfare, politics, security, etc.

(3) Guidance:

- Turn out hamlet and village youth cadres. This program is aimed at turning out a number of youth cadres who are qualified for assuming responsibilities of older persons. These youth cadres will be future leaders of hamlets, villages and of the country.

- Assist local authorities to organize and use youth in the building of the society, build youth houses and youth councils.

- Assist local authorities to develop a youth plan and a community development plan to increase family income and upgrade occupational abilities.

- Lay the foundation for education and training.

f. Ministry of Defense:

Defense of the country and the people is the responsibility of devoted, powerful and earnest youths when they are properly trained and led. Youths are well fortified to defend the country.

(1) Responsibilities: Coordinate with the Ministry of Education and Directorate General of Youth to establish regulations for military training of youths from elementary school to university levels with the aim of making youths available for using weapons to fight enemies when necessary, and to make them eager to perform military service when they become of age. In addition, the Ministry of Defense will also prepare a military program suitable for youths (male and female), and prepare leaders for all activities of society.

(2) Objective: Males and females from 12 to 25 years old (at 17, they can attend the university, three years for courses in administration, five years for medicine).

(3) Guidance:

- Work out a military training plan and program for students from elementary to university levels; prepare youth of all ages to enter the military service.

- Vitalize training organization for primary and secondary schools, and coordinate education and military programs for all years.

- Prepare youths for military service at the time they leave school or arrive at military service age.

- Maintain and exploit personal dossier of each youth from the date he begins attending school;

- Study and gradually move military installations out of civilian areas, return sport and youth facilities to youth;

- Continue to strengthen the Army Youth organization now operating successfully.

g. Village Council and Hamlet Management Board.

As an element of the community, youths should join social organizations to develop economy, society, and education, and enter into the national life by protecting the survival of the hamlet and village.

(1) Responsibility: Village chiefs and Phuong chiefs are the officials to whom it is most important to have knowledge of the aspirations and tendencies of youths. These officials have the mission of consulting and coordinating all village activities, and helping youths to clearly understand all village plans or projects in order to motivate them to contribute to village community development operations.

(2) Objective: Every class of national youth. Organize 90% of youths into national youth organizations. Guide elections of youth elders, help youth elders in liaison with government agencies when required.

- Coordinate establishment of village sport facilities;

- Form Village Youth Councils to lead all youth activities in villages, and coordinate with central authorities;

- Initiate activity movement to develop virtues and abilities of females as they can be used in developing the country.

- Establish a progressive rural program so that youths will stay in the countryside when highly educated and their talents will not be lost to other pursuits.

- Organize youth meetings to develop responsibility, and contribution and exploitation of special skills and techniques. Motivate youth to support missions of the authorities.

- Sponsor sport organizations and frequently organize sport contests among friendly teams;

- Organize and encourage all hamlet self-defense organizations to train youths to be qualified for defending themselves, their hamlets, and village.

5. INSPECTION REPORT:

a. Periodic reports to be submitted through normal administrative channels.

b. Casual reports to be submitted directly to Directorate General of Youth for solution.

c. Visits and inspection will be made twice a year by central level, monthly by province, level, weekly by district level, and daily by village level.

Every Minister will pay attention to youth activities whenever he makes visit to rural areas.

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ANNEX XVIII

PLANS, REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS

1. - GENERAL :

This Annex specifies responsibilities and procedures for drafting Pacification and Development Plans, reporting operational progress, and carrying out periodical inspections.

1969 reporting procedures are still applicable.

2. - PROVINCE PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN :

a- Plan: Content of Plan includes the following points:

(1) Pacification and Development objectives for Phase 1 (first half of 1970), as assigned by the CTZ PDC.

(2) Concept on the use of all available resources in the Province to achieve these objectives.

The text of this Plan should be simple. The Plan should be supported by charts and overlays indicating the situation at the initiation of the Plan and the situation at the completion of the Plan (See Appendix 1, and sample plan distributed separately as Appendix 3).

Instructions related to the planning for subsequent phases will be issued later.

b- Annexes: Details of each program in the Province Pacification and Development Plan will be covered in nine Annexes. Each Annex to the Province Plan will include a full discussion of the techniques and procedures that the responsible elements of the Province Pacification and Development Council will utilize to reach the stated objectives. The required overlays and charts should support this discussion. The Province Service Chief representing the Ministry which has been assigned the basic responsibility for the particular objective will prepare the appropriate Annex to the Province Plan as decided by the Ministry.

(1) Annex 1: Territorial Security.

The content of this Annex will be as prescribed in Appendix 2, Annex 1 of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. The Sector Security Plan will be Annex I of the Province Pacification and Development Plan, and will also be submitted to JGS as a separate document.

(2) Annex 2: Protection of the People from Terrorism.

This Annex has a 1/100,000 scale overlay with disposition of PRU units, Police Field Force units, and Special Police units, and locations of Liberation Committees.

(3) Annex 3: People's Self Defense.

This Annex has a chart presenting the organization, armament, and training of PSDF members carried out by Villages.

(4) Annex 4: Local Administration.

This Annex includes schedules for elections, recruitment, and training of Village and Hamlet Officials, accompanied with a 1/100,000 scale overlay showing the deployment of RDC Groups.

(5) Annex 5: Greater National Unity.

This Annex is a statement listing planned political and cultural training courses for Hoi Chanh, calendars of these courses, recommendations for the use of Hoi Chanh, and techniques of settling Hoi Chanh in Phase I.

(6) Annex 6: A Brighter Life for War Victims.

This Annex includes a chart with the number of persons to be resettled or helped to return to their villages in Phase I.

(7) Annex 7: People's Information.

This Annex includes a chart with schedules for recruitment and training of Information Cadres.

(8) Annex 8: Prosperity for All.

This Annex includes Province Development projects, plans for improvement of main LOCs, elimination of check points and restrictions. The narrative should refer as appropriate to the overlay in Annex 1 which shows LOCs.

(9) Annex 9: Land Reform.

This Annex includes a 1/100,000 scale overlay showing the land to be re-distributed to the people in Phase I of 1970.

3. - REPORTS.

Reporting is carried out based on 1969 procedures.

4. - INSPECTIONS.

The inspection is carried out based on 1969 procedures.

5. - BRIEFINGS.

Overlays and charts presented together with the Province and Village Plans will be reproduced in graphic form and updated monthly. They will then be used for any briefings, along with other necessary briefing aids.

Briefings by Villages will be based on the Village Management Handbook which is going to be distributed.

5. - RESPONSIBILITIES.

Province and City PD Councils are responsible for cooperating with the PSA to elaborate Province and City PD Plans and present them to CTZ PDC and CPDC prior to 1 December 1969. These plans must have the PSA's signature for approval.

CTZ PD Councils are responsible for commenting on Province Plans and organizing meetings for CPDC to review these Plans.

ANNEX XVIII

APPENDIX 1

1970 Pacification and Development Plan for Province of...

References: - CPDC's 1970 PD Plan, and AB 145 Plan.

1. - Situation:

General presentation on a chart of the situation of:

- a- The enemy.
- b- Friendly forces in the province.

2. - Duties:

Briefly discuss outstanding pacification problems to be resolved and objectives to be achieved in Phase 70/1 (from January through the end of June 1970).

3. - Execution:

Briefly discuss general plans for using and deploying all resources now available in the province for achieving the objectives mentioned in paragraph 2.

Date.....1969

Province Senior Advisor

Chief of Province
Concurrently Sector Commander

Enclosures:

9 Annexes.


Remarks: Explanation of points already covered in the Annexes should not be spelled out in this plan. The basic plan should be concise and should emphasize outstanding pacification problems in the province as well as the disposition of manpower and other resources involved in solving these outstanding pacification problems.

APPENDIX 2 (Signs and Symbols) to Annex XVIII (Preparation of Province Pacification Plan and Monthly Status Report) to 1970 PACIFICATION GUIDELINES

SIGNS AND SYMBOLS

Standard signs and symbols are used in the overlays. Symbols will be in black ink, except as indicated below:

+++++		National Boundary
—————		Province Boundary
- - - - -		District Boundary
—————	(BLUE)	Road essential to pacification plan.
—————	(AMBER)	Road, Secure Day Only
—————	(RED)	Road, Insecure
—————	(RED)	
===== ===== =====	(AMBER)	Road, Planned for Securing to Day Security
===== ===== =====	(AMBER) (BLUE)	Road, Planned for Securing to Day & Night Security
===== ===== =====	(BLUE)	Waterway, essential to pacification plan
===== ===== =====	(AMBER)	Waterway, Secure Day only
===== ===== =====	(RED)	Waterway, Insecure
===== ===== =====	(RED) (AMBER)	Waterway, Planned for Securing to Day Security
===== ===== =====	(AMBER) (BLUE)	Waterway, Planned for Securing to Day and Night Security
+ + + + +		Railroad Section, Operational
+ + + + +	(RED)	Railroad Section, Not Operational
+ + + + +	(BLUE)	Railroad Section, Planned to be Operational
	(BLUE)	Secure Area
	(AMBER)	Consolidation Zone
	(AMBER)	Border Surveillance Zone
	(NO SYMBOL)	Cleaving Zone
	(RED)	VC, NVA Base Area
	(GREEN)	Land Reform



Unpopulated Area

• (RED) Location of Village Liberation Committee


○ (RED) Location of District Liberation Committee

⊙ (RED) Location of Province Liberation Committee

▲ Existing Platoon-size Operating Base

▬ Existing Company-size Operating Base

T Existing Tower




Planned for 1970



To be Abolished in 1970



ARVN Battalion, PF Platoon & RF Company involved in current territorial security (Unit Number is indicated on the right).



Pacification Resources, Present - Planned

Black - Forces

Blue - Centers, Camps, etc.

- ie XDNT 14 = RD Cadre
- CBTS 13 = Son Thon Cadre
- HVC (Blue) Chieu Hoi Center

Standard Abbreviation Table for Pacification Resources Symbols

- CBTS - Son Thon Cadre
- CBTT - Information Cadre
- CLQ - ARVN
- CSDC - National Police Field Force
- CSDG - Police Special Branch
- CSGC - Marine Police
- CSQG - National Police
- DHDB - District Intelligence Operational Control Center

DHDB-HQ - Province Intelligence Operational Control
Center

DPQ - Regional Force

DTLCT- Refugee Camp

HCV - Chieu Hoi

NDTV - Peoples Self Defense Force

NG - Popular Force

QC - Military Police

TTST - Provincial Reconnaissance Unit

VTTT - Armed Propaganda Team

XDNT - RD Cadre

CONFIDENTIAL

*SECRET - c/s/mt
Waller*

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
CENTRAL PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

GUIDELINES

PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN
1969

UNCLASSIFIED BY 60320 JRS/STP
DATE 08-14-2001

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

COPY NO. OF COPIES
15 DECEMBER 1968


[Redacted area]

CONFIDENTIAL

IDA 71-131 237

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222



MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

21 December 1968

SUBJECT: GVN 1969 Pacification and Development Plan

1. Attached is the English translation of the GVN 1969 Pacification and Development Plan. The Plan includes the basic Guidelines published by the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) and supporting annexes prepared by the ministries and approved by the CPDC.
2. Since this is a translation of a Vietnamese document, you will find the English somewhat stilted in certain portions. We have left the translation as literal as possible, consistent with adequate communication of the policies involved.
3. Certain annexes of the Plan are stronger than others, but all are, we believe, adequate. The weaknesses that exist are largely traceable to the fact that this is the first time the GVN has ever tried to pull all the elements of pacification together. The importance of having comprehensive guidance on pacification has been overriding. If you desire clarification of any points of policy or procedure or if you feel more definitive guidance is required on either the US or GVN side, you are encouraged to contact the ACofS, CORDS, MACV.
4. I hope US Senior Commanders and tactical unit advisors will take particular interest in the guidance concerning the conduct of military operations in support of pacification in Annex I. This annex is in accord with AB-144 and clarifies the relationship of different types of military operations to the Pacification Campaign.
5. These Guidelines and AB-144 complement one another. The Guidelines are the authoritative document on pacification policies and where minor variations occur the Guidelines govern.
6. Provision has been made for the Province Senior Advisor to sign the Province Plan jointly with the Province Chief. This joint signing illustrates the importance of the Plan and the coordinated, US/GVN effort put forth in its preparation and called for in its execution.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
 FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: GVN 1969 Pacification and Development Plan

7. This document will be regarded as guidance, directive in nature, to US Advisory personnel at all echelons. While it is a GVN document, it has been thoroughly coordinated with MACCORDS. I strongly indorse the GVN 1969 Pacification and Development Plan and request your full support in its implementation.



W. E. COLBY
DEPCORDS/MACV

DISTRIBUTION:
See Attached Sheet

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION LISTNUMBER OF COPIESDistribution

JCS	-10
CINCPAC	-5
Dept. of State	-3
OSD/ISA VN Desk	-1
USAJFK Cen SPWAR	-3
American Embassy, Saigon	-10
USPAO	-2
USAID	-4
VN Trgn Center, Wash D.C.	-1
COMUSMACV	-1
Dep to COMUSMACV CORDS	-2
Chief of Staff	-1
SJS	-1
J-1	-1
J-2	-1
J-3	-3
J-4	-1
J-5	-1
J-6	-1
CORDS	-36
COC	-6
AG	-1
MACOI	-1
MACPD	-1
MACT	-1
MACDC	-1
MACFWMA	-10
MACMA	-6
MACSOG	-1
MACIC	-1
MACSA	-1
CG, USARV	-4
Commander, 7th AF	-3
COMANVFORV	-3
CG, III MAF/SA I Corps	-15
CG, I FFORCE/SA II Corps	-15
CG, II FFORCE/SA III Corps	-21
CG, XXIV Corps	-3
SA IV Corps	-17
Province Senior Advisor	-88
District Senior Advisor	-281

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM **CONFIDENTIAL**
 PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
 CENTRAL PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

REFERENCE: The President's Directive 267, 10 October 1968.
 Directive 4306, 19 October 1968 of the Central
 Pacification and Development Council.

SUBJECT: Basic Directive on the 1969 Pacification and
 Development Plan.

I. GENERAL.

In compliance with the Directive of the President of the Republic of Vietnam, an Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) was launched on 1 November 1968. This campaign is now in an intensive phase and is achieving good results. We have seized back the initiative from the enemy and have subdued them in both the military and political fields. This special campaign is now extending the Government's control to rural areas as predicted by the President, thus forming a favorable ground for driving the enemy forever out of our territory in 1969. This special campaign is scheduled to end on 31 January 1969; but the important struggle to achieve the final victory will be just beginning. Many of our people are still under the Communist yoke, and the invaders are still present in our land, ready to attack again, if we cannot create a strong popular posture against the enemy. During 1969, we are determined to destroy the supporting structures the enemy has created among the people by the use of violence and terrorism.

If we plan carefully and cooperate closely at every level to develop the good points and apply intelligently the knowledge and experience gained from the APC, we will surely attain our expected target.

Owing to repeated military victories of ARVN and Allied Forces, the enemy has been obliged to change tactics. He has shifted from military efforts to political ones and is attempting to expand his political and guerilla machinery in order to control the rural areas. He is making a maximum use of political potential in order to support his "fight while negotiating" strategem. In reality, his effort is superficial and weak. The continued success achieved by the APC has proved our strength and the enemy's weakness. We are winning and we must go on winning.

In this situation, our essential task, which we are more than capable of carrying out, is to act quickly to liberate the people from the coercion and control of the enemy. The 1969 Pacification and Development policy is thus a continuation and extension of the APC.

The people will play a vital part in the implementation of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan. The village is the basic community of the people, so the people will participate actively in the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan within the operational scope of their village. By focusing on the village rather than the hamlet we can better employ our resources and at the same time build and strengthen the local government and ensure a lasting success.

IDA 71-

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 3
 DOWNGRADED AT 12-YEAR INTERVAL
 NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

In the extension of the special campaign to the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan, we must deploy the Regional Forces (RF), Popular Forces (PF) and RD Cadres in as many villages as possible where there are contested hamlets or VC controlled hamlets (Hamlet Category D, E, or V). Thus each village becomes a pacification target, and every effort will be concentrated in the disputed hamlets or VC controlled hamlets if we have additional reinforcements and resources.

The selection of the target village will be based on the previous directive of the President about the geographically important areas. These efforts, the president ordered, must focus on the population density, the main lines of communication, and the politically and economically important areas. The objective is to improve the situation in villages containing hamlets of Category D or E and a great number of VC controlled hamlets based on the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) in order to reclassify these hamlets to Category C by the end of 1969.

In addition to the programs which are being carried out in the villages having contested or VC controlled hamlets, we must also conduct cordon and search operations in these areas and destroy enemy communication systems. The CTZ must conduct large-scale operations to sweep the enemy from detached forces to maintain security and protect the previously pacified areas in order that these areas may not fall again into the enemy's control. ARVN units will participate in the Psywar, Open Arms, Phoenix (Phung Hoang) and Civic Action Programs. We must pay special attention to neutralizing the enemy infrastructure, including support and local guerilla organizations, and destroy their Liberation Committees if any. This form of activity is a continuation and substantial extension of the APC.

The 1969 Pacification and Development Plan will consist of a basic principle (the Community Spirit principle) and the following eight Objectives:

1. Use local security forces, reaction forces, and police forces at the hamlet and village level to control and secure 90% of the population; extend the national sovereignty throughout the country.
2. Eliminate 33,000 Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) under the Phoenix Program and other joint operations conducted by Police and Army units.
3. Establish local governments in all villages throughout the country; elect Village Administrative Committees and Hamlet Managing Boards at all secured hamlets and villages; and organize a large training program for village and hamlet officials.
4. Involve additional people in the People's Self-Defense organization to bring it up to 2,000,000 members, and arm 400,000 members for guard, surveillance, and patrol duties.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Rally 20, 000 returnees.
6. Decrease the number of refugees to less than 1, 000, 000 and resettle at least 300, 000 persons.
7. Increase the information and propaganda effort by the training and proper use of Village Information Members and Hamlet Information Deputies.
8. Encourage the rural economy and increase rice production from 5, 000, 000 to 6, 000, 000 tons.

II. ONE PRINCIPLE AND EIGHT OBJECTIVES.**A. ONE PRINCIPLE.**

We are now stronger than we have ever been, and the enemy is at his weakest period. Presently, our resources, ready to be used in the Pacification Program are larger than ever before. However, we may repeat the same mistakes of the past if we do not learn and apply the important Principle of the Community Spirit. The pacification program involves many factors. Each of them is the responsibility of an individual government organization. These factors must be united, thus combining the cooperative effort of all agencies. In the past, ministries and agencies tended to operate separately and did not pay adequate attention to the people. We therefore could not bring about maximum pressure on the enemy and obtain participation from the people, even though we had tried our best.

We should work together against our common enemy. We are determined to strictly adhere to the Community Spirit Principle and closely coordinate our efforts to obtain maximum results.

The Community Spirit Principle must originate with the people; every effort of the Government must be developed based on that principle, while carrying out any program or operation.

The Community Spirit Principle must work on a three-fold basis: cooperation among the people, cooperation between the people and the Government, and cooperation among Government organizations. Only then can the Government be more powerful and stable; then the people will realize that they are involved and will cooperate with the Government to defeat the common enemy.

B. EIGHT OBJECTIVES.

These eight objectives support each other. The achievement of these objectives, following the one Principle, is essential to reach the common objective, which is to drive out the enemy and prevent his coming back.

1. Bring security to 90% of the population by the end of 1969, and extend national sovereignty throughout the country.

The security factor is the most important in the pacification process. RF and PF are our territorial security forces. They must conduct active patrols and be determined to defend the people living in the hamlets and villages, mostly at night when enemy activities are more intense. As these forces are being increased both in quality and quantity, they will help us defend the rural people more efficiently. Moreover, they will be able to perform other tasks pertaining to the Pacification and Development Program.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Province and District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers must provide adequate information for territorial security operations, and simultaneously support and develop close links with security elements in the villages.

The National Police (NP) duty is to maintain security and public order in the hamlets and villages. In 1969, at least 50% of the NP forces must be deployed from the district level downward.

70% of the population are now living in relatively secure areas. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign is expected to liberate an additional large number of people from the enemy's tyranny. Security protection for 90% of the population is the first of the eight objectives to be achieved in 1969.

If we correctly apply the Community Spirit Principle we will be supported by the whole population in achieving the said objective.

2. Eliminate 33,000 VCI by the end of 1969.

The Phoenix (Phung Hoang) Campaign is achieving realistic results. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign will easily eliminate 9,000 VCI in three months. The elimination of 33,000 VCI by the end of 1969 is simply an extension of the APC. In addition to this, if we correctly apply the Community Spirit Principle, the population will help us identify the VCI and thus we can eliminate them more easily.

3. Involve additional people in the People's Self Defense Groups (PSDG) to bring this strength up to 2,000,000 members.

A million PSDG members will be organized by the end of the special campaign. The objective of the 1969 campaign is to organize more members to attain the 2,000,000 members strength and to arm at least 400,000 men. To arm the people for their self defense is an important fact in the application of the Community Spirit Principle. Those who are not armed will participate in common self defense, such as fire fighting, first-aid, and other activities.

4. Establish local Government in the villages throughout the country.

The degree of importance of the village has been pointed out above. The establishment of local Government in those villages with contested hamlets and VC controlled hamlets included in the 1969 campaign framework is very necessary to realize and insure a durable and real presence of the Government in rural areas as well as the application of the Community Spirit Principle.

Organization of elections is the best way to establish local Government in areas where popularly elected administrative entities do not exist and also is a method we should use wherever we can. Only in places where the Province Chief deems it unsuitable to organize elections, would the local Government be designated. In such a case the Province Chief has to indicate the reason for his doing so.

The present hamlet and village officials as well as the potential ones will have to undergo training for improvement. Besides, qualified hamlet and village officials will have to be trained and made available for the administration, upon the enemy's withdrawal, of the villages previously controlled by the VC.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Rally 20, 000 Hoi Chanh (returnees).

Our basic concept and Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program is steadfast and the number of Hoi Chanh has increased in the past months. We can easily achieve the 5, 000 Hoi Chanh objective of the special campaign, and we must increase efforts to take advantage of this available opportunity.

The enemy's morale is being lowered while our military pressure is growing stronger. The enemy must currently take heavy losses for insignificant political victories. The use of Hoi Chanh in armed propaganda units is very successful since this encouraged more and more enemies to desert day by day. Good treatment has also attracted more and more Hoi Chanh. Besides, thanks to the correct execution of the presently operating programs, greater interest and attention by the Government leaders, and increased support and closer cooperation of the Ministries involved, we should be able to rally 400 or more Hoi Chanh per week. Thus, we expect to receive 20, 000 Hoi Chanh during the year 1969.

6. Decrease the number of refugees to less than 1, 000, 000 and resettle or return to their native places. 300, 000 people.

Presently, there are more than 1, 000, 000 refugees. The number of people who are settled or returned to their native places has been increasing and we must maintain that momentum. After this resettlement or the organization for 300, 000 people to return to their native places in 1969, the total number of refugees is expected to be less than one million at the end of the year. The Ministries involved need to be aware of the strategic value of generous assistance to these refugees because they have left the Communists to return to the National just cause. Their cooperation when they return to their previously insecure areas is very important to the rapid re-establishment of a sound and viable local government.

7. Increase the information and propaganda effort.

The Ministry of Information has the responsibility to diffuse and explain to the people the "one Principle and Eight Objectives" pointed out above. The information program must be carried out even to the rural areas. Mobile information teams must conduct under the Ministry's control frequent informational operations in the districts and villages to emphasize such themes as our determination to win, self help and self defense, the extermination of the VC infrastructure, and the rallying of Hoi Chanh, etc. Information cadre will be assigned or even to hamlets and villages to work with the appointed or elected local government. They will work under the control of the Village Administrative Committee Chairman, but must be trained, guided and supported in their operation by the Information Ministry.

8. Encourage the rural economy.

Pacification will gradually improve the local security situation and will bring prosperity to the local people. Although substantial economic expansion occurred in rural areas in 1967, like the rising price of paddy to the farmer and the increasing production of vegetables and beans etc; this expansion was set back by the TET Communist Offensive. The new programs aimed at developing "Than Nong" (TN 8) rice, increasing the production of chickens, ducks and pigs and encouraging the use of water pumps and other farming equipment have been slowed down. In spite of this, the rural economy is reviving gradually.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

In order that pacification may progress, we need to continue to revive the economy. We must have larger rice production in order to boost the farmer's income.

The roads from the rural areas to the cities must be secured and repaired. Low interest loans must be made to the rural people. The necessary farming equipment such as water pumping machines, tractors, and other engines must be available and abundant. To foster the free movement of merchandise and produce, unnecessary permits, taxes, and checkpoints should be eliminated.

III. VILLAGE CONCEPT AND AREAS OF GEOPGRAPHIC PRECEDENCE.

A. VILLAGE CONCEPT.

The village is the pacification target of 1969 just as the hamlet was in 1968. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) has been improved in order to evaluate the progress of the village and hamlet pacification program. The resources, manpower, talents and objects will be supplied to the village for the general consolidation of the hamlets in the village following the order of priority described below under B.

This concept will focus heavy responsibility on the village administration in the control of the Pacification process. The RD Cadre will be organized into 30-man Groups which will work as a whole or in smaller units in the hamlets under the control of the Village Administrative Committee Chairman. As a general principle, the groups will be moved permanently to the densely populated VC controlled or contested villages. As instructed by the Joint General Staff of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, the Popular Forces will operate under the control of the Village Administrative Committee Chairman in the areas where there is efficient village administration. The village is also given more rights and responsibilities in the management of local affairs especially in solving land tenure problems. The principle behind this concept is to reestablish the village as the basic echelon in the administration of the countryside in order to report truly the people's aspirations and receive appropriate response from the Government.

Many village governments, especially in heavily contested areas, are not really to assume the above responsibility; therefore the primary priority of 1969 will be the reinforcement and development of village government. A complete training program in village administration will be organized in each Province. Elections will be organized at a suitable time to elect able men to replace the temporary Village Administrative Committee. When the Village Government has enough capacity and experience to manage village affairs, responsibility will be transferred gradually from the district level to village level. One of the essential tasks of the Province Chief and District Chief in 1969 is to help the village in self-management.

B. AREAS OF GEOGRAPHICAL PRECEDENCE.

The President established four criteria to determine the geographical areas where pacification and development activities should be concentrated. The four criteria are as follow:

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Population density.
2. Areas near important lines of communication.
3. Areas near important political centers.
4. Areas near economic installations.

Details on the geographical areas of precedence will be given in Annex XII. With the exception of special cases, the villages included in the 1969 Plan must be within these aforementioned important geographical areas.

The designation of areas of precedence is aimed at directing our increased efforts from areas under our control to contested and enemy controlled areas. We have only a limited number of PF, RF and other resources. Therefore, we must employ our forces according to logical priorities. The general rule will be to move gradually outward from our controlled areas to eliminate the enemy from the neighboring areas. Consequently, successive areas can support one another. The expansion of efforts along the main lines of communication follows the same concept in order to destroy enemy reaction capabilities, and handle our forces in a proper manner.

There are some areas important to the country and others solely to the province. About 58% of South Vietnam's population is in areas of national precedence. About 19% is in provincial areas of precedence. Besides, according to HES, 13% of the population outside the provincial and national areas of precedence, is relatively secure. Therefore, if we develop government control over the population included in these areas of precedence while still maintaining a relative security outside these areas, the Government will attain the goal of liberating 90% of the population from Communist tyranny.

In the relatively secure portions of the area outside the geographic areas of precedence, Province Chiefs will ensure that effective civil administration is maintained and strengthened at the local level and that self help, self defense and other pacification programs are conducted, to the extent of available resources, through the administrative structure of the Provincial and local government. In the contested and enemy controlled portions of areas outside the areas of precedence, preemptive military operations, including cordon and search operations, will be conducted to frustrate enemy efforts to assert political control and to disrupt his base areas and communication network. Localities where the enemy has established "liberation committees" will be priority targets for such operations. PSYWAR campaigns will be conducted against contested and VC controlled areas to support the Phung Hoang program and to discredit the enemy's political effort.

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. PRIORITIES OF HAMLETS.

CONFIDENTIAL

As discussed above, the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan is aimed at the village instead of the hamlet. However, pacification will be carried out in the hamlets of each village. Such operations will proceed according to the priority order of hamlets and this priority will decide the disposition of resources and efforts.

PRIORITY 1. Restore security in the remaining D and E hamlets. Other activities in these hamlets will include establishing effective local administration, attacking the VC infrastructure, organizing the Peoples's Self Defense Forces and starting small scale self-help programs. This part of the 1969 Program is thus an extension of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

PRIORITY 2. Reserved to hamlets of Category V. The activity focus here is similar to that of Priority 1. and operations will be carried out using any resources left after Priority 1. is fulfilled.

PRIORITY 3. Reserved to secure hamlets of Category B and C. Efforts should be made to destroy VC infrastructure, improve local government and carry out community development projects aimed at organizing the people and uniting all classes of people.

V. ORGANIZATION, PREPARATION OF PLANS, REPORTS AND INSPECTION.

A. ORGANIZATION.

Decree 155 SL/BDXD, dated 9 November 1968, has established the Central Development and Pacification Council (CPDC), and Decree 1245, 2 December 1968, has established the Corps and Province Pacification and Development Councils. This organization is managing the Accelerated Pacification Campaign and will manage the whole 1969 Pacification and Development Plan. The Council will examine and endorse all Province Plans and any changes to these plans during the year.

B. PREPARATION OF PLANS.

This guiding directive is intended for all members of CPDC and all Corps and Province Pacification and Development Councils. Upon receipt of this Directive, the Corps Council, if necessary, will give more instructions to the Province Councils, and the Province Councils will start preparing their plans. Though there will be no Corps Plans, the Corps Councils must direct and examine province plans in order to make sure that Corps strategy has been applied, and that the Provinces have equally endeavored in carrying out their tasks in accordance with the national or provincial areas of geographical precedence. The provinces will prepare their plans in compliance with the model fixed in Annex XIII. These plans will be submitted at the same time to CPDC and Corps Development Councils prior to 15 January 1969. By 20 January 1969, meetings will be organized at Corps with the participation of CPDC, Corps Development Councils Representatives and Province Chiefs, who together will examine the plans of each province for approval so that operations under the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan can start on 1 February 1969.

C. REPORTS AND INSPECTION.

Reports and Inspection will be carried out in accordance with the directive and models shown in Annex XIII.

CONFIDENTIAL

This directive has been signed by:

HUYNH-VAN-DAO
First Minister

TRAN-VAN-HUONG
Prime Minister

Dai-Tuong TRAN-THIEN-KHIEM
Minister of Interior

Trung-Tuong NGUYEN-VAN-VY
Minister of Defense and War Veterans

LE-VAN-THU
Minister of Justice

LE-MINH-LIEN
Minister of Education and Youth

TRAN-LU-Y
Minister of Health, Social
Welfare and Relief

AU-NGOC-HO
Minister of Economy

TON-THAT-THIEN
Minister of Information

TRUONG-THAI-TON
Minister of Land Reform and
Agriculture

LUONG-THE-SIEU
Minister of Public Works,
Communication and Transportation

PAUL-NUR
Minister of Ethnic Development

NGUYEN-NGOC-AN
Minister of Open Arms

Chuan-Tuong HOANG-VAN-LAC
Deputy Minister of Revolutionary
Development

Trung-Tuong NGUYEN-VAN-LA
Vice Chief JGS, Ministry of
Defense

Dai-Ta TRAN-VAN-HAI
Director General of National Police

ANNEX I **CONFIDENTIAL**MILITARY SUPPORT 1969 PACIFICATION
AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN (PDP)1. GENERALITIES.

a. In 1968, after continual victories of RVNAF and FWMAF units, the enemy was obliged to change his tactics. They have shifted their efforts from a military struggle to a political one, and presently they are attempting to expand their political apparatus in the hope of controlling rural areas.

In this situation, the RVNAF's main duties are to increase military efforts in order to have the necessary political strength to win the people, and extend the Government controlled areas in order to liberate the people from the communist yoke. The APC, launched from 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969, was aimed at the above mentioned goals and was at the same time laying the groundwork for the 1969 PDP.

b. Operational guidelines for the RVNAF in carrying out the Government's 1969 PDP are outlined in this Annex.

2. MISSIONS.

RVNAF coordinate with FWMAF to do the following:

a. Maintain the military initiative by conducting operations to disrupt enemy secret zones and bases, and destroy their units.

b. Assure territorial security in the areas selected for pacification and development in 1969.

c. Maintain security in the areas previously pacified.

3. CONCEPT.a. Community Spirit.

The 1969 PDP has the basic principle of "Community Spirit" and eight objectives.

According to the principles specified in the basic directive of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan concerning RVNAF, the Community Spirit Principle is illustrated as follows:

1. Cooperation among military elements.

a. Redeploy PF and RF based on the proper responsibilities specified in Paragraph 5 below, "Execution.". The PF defend hamlets while RF are mobile to conduct search and destroy missions in the enemy inter-hamlet and inter-village areas.

b. Regular forces actively support RF and PF. They conduct inter-district or inter-province operations to support PF and RF in pacification operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Regular forces reinforce PF and RF in areas where the latter cannot perform their duties alone.

d. The FWMAF will support RVNAF as specified in the Combined Campaign Plan, AB 144.

2. Cooperation among Army, people, cadre, and government.

a. Close cooperation between the Army and the cadre:

--Destroy VCI by exchanging intelligence information and providing forces to exploit the information.

--Win the people by political warfare, such as PSYWAR and civic action.

--Appeal to the enemy to rally to the government.

b. Cooperation between Army and the government:

--Establish and strengthen basic local government, participate in the village committee or hamlet governing board when appointed.

--Defend basic national institutions; actively support hamlet and village governments to obtain popular confidence in the Government.

--Support the government in the conduct of population census activities and to organize into groups.

c. Cooperation between the Army and the people:

--Actively assist in the organization of PSDF units; participate in the military training given to PSDF.

--Encourage the troops to observe good conduct and discipline; troops must be friendly to the people and defend them to win their sympathy.

The Community Spirit Principle must be practiced on a realistic and close basis. Emphasis must be put on the motivation of the people to participate in the Pacification and Development operation. The loyal and close cooperation of the local people will insure steady and lasting results for the pacification of the country.

b. Pacification.

1. RVNAF and FWMAF conduct operations to create the necessary security situation for a favorable prosecution of the Pacification and Development program.

2. First of all, we must create a secure area in which we will encourage the people to participate in the elimination of injustice, hatred, and poverty. RVNAF, National Police and armed People's Self Defense Forces will coordinate their efforts to insure the necessary security depending on the local situation and the operational zone, urban or rural. Afterwards, the people

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

will participate directly in the defense of the Government and in their self defense.

c. Security.

1. The main task of RVNAF is to assure security for the people and create a territorial security situation conducive to combating the VC guerrilla, local and main force units.

2. The principal forces in charge of territorial security under the Pacification and Development Plan are PF and RF. Regular force battalions are subject to the operational control of the Sector Commander in areas where PF and RF cannot perform their own assigned duties due to their limited capabilities.

Sector Commander is responsible for:

a. Security in areas under development.

b. Security in areas already pacified, lines of communication, national resources, important administrative installations, and densely populated areas.

3. RVNAF should exchange information and provide NP with reinforcing forces whenever requested so that NP can maintain law and order, and destroy VCI. RVNAF actively supports the organization, training and armament of PSDF so that PSDF can participate in maintaining security in the hamlet, ward, and quarter.

4. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES.

a. Control and assure security for 90 percent of the population.

The first and foremost objective of the 1969 PDP is to achieve control over 90 percent of the population of the country. In order to reach this objective, the 1969 PDP will be carried out in all villages included in the National and Provincial areas of precedence as outlined in Annex XII. Consequently, CTZs will have to study and prepare the following:

1. Forces to assure security in areas previously pacified.

2. Forces used in the 1969 Plan to assure security for the target villages.

3. Plans of support operations to be conducted either solely by ARVN Infantry Divisions or with the coordination of FWMAF.

4. Phase out the 1969 program into 2 or 3 phases and carry it out according to the availability of troops, cadre and the security situation in the Corps Tactical Zone.

b. Eliminate 33,000 VCI by the end of 1969 (Annex II).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The Corps Tactical Zone gives instructions to subordinate forces, Sector Commanders and Sub-Sector Commanders to thoroughly support the Phung Hoang Campaign. In addition to exchanging and providing information and documents, RVNAF will also provide forces in order to exploit quickly the intelligence information if requested by local authorities.

c. Organize more PSDF members to fulfill a strength of 2,000,000 and arm 400,000 members (Annex V).

The Corps Tactical Zone Commanders have been instructed to quickly develop the People's Self Defense organization to have more forces to maintain the territorial security, so that the RVNAF are free to extend the Government controlled areas. The Corps Tactical Zone will instruct its subordinate sectors to thoroughly urge and support the organizing of more PSDF members in both urban and rural areas. In addition to their regular duties, RVNAF must support RDC Groups in training People's Self Defense Forces.

d. Establish Local Governments (Annex III).

In case it is impossible to recruit capable local people for village and hamlet government organizations, the Corps Tactical Zone will instruct Province Chiefs/Sector Commanders to select RF/PF cadre to temporarily assume these positions.

e. Rally 20,000 Hoi Chanh (Annex VIII).

Political warfare organizations of the Corps Tactical Zone must give full support to Province Chieu Hoi Services to reach the prescribed goals. Besides, the Corps Tactical Zone will increase its operational efforts against enemy secret zones, bases and units to cause disturbance in enemy ranks and support the Chieu Hoi Campaign.

f. Increase Propaganda and Information Efforts (Annex X).

The CTZ will instruct the Political Warfare Cadres at all levels to make maximum efforts to conduct propaganda operations as prescribed by central authorities, and at the same time to cooperate closely with the Province Propaganda and Information Cadre within their capacity.

g. Resettle 300,000 Refugees (Annex IX).

As dictated by available means and capacity, help the resettlement of anti-communist refugees.

h. Stimulate Rural Economy (Annex XI).

Promote rural economic activity by providing improved security on LOCs.

5. Execution.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Responsibilities:

1. As CTZ Commander, the Chairman of the CTZ Pacification and Development Council (CTZ PDC) assumes the following responsibilities:

a. Coordinate with the FWMAF Field Force Commanders or the CTZ Senior Advisor, in order to work out a support plan of the FWMAF for the CTZ Pacification and Development Program.

b. Guide and coordinate the military activities of his subordinate divisions with the Pacification and Development operations within his area of responsibility.

c. Instruct subordinate divisions to provide regular force battalions to support Pacification and Development operations, dependent on local security and the needs of the Sector.

d. Distribute the Pacification and Development resources, including the RF and PF units with priority for areas of Pacification and Development precedence.

e. Instruct, guide, review, and endorse the Pacification and Development military support plans as well as the Pacification and Development Plan established by the Province/Sector.

f. Supervise, encourage and direct sectors in carrying out the Pacification and Development program.

2. DTA - Division

a. Direct offensive operations in accordance with the local situation, sector proposals or corps directives. The main efforts of division aim at enemy regular units and their bases.

b. Provide forces to sectors for pacification support in accordance with Corps plans and directives.

c. Support units of the division placed under sector operational control in respect to combat support and combat service support.

d. As directed by Corps, coordinate with sector/province to ensure that combat operations support the province pacification plan.

e. Coordinate with sectors/provinces for the protection of designated vital installations determined by the CTZ.

3. Sectors.

a. Sectors are responsible for operational support of pacification. They must coordinate with the Province Pacification and Development Council to plan for such support in conformance with the province pacification plan. Province/sector will develop a single pacification plan.

b. Direct the RF/PF units in providing security for the pacification

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

program; the main effort being focused on the priority areas for allocation of pacification resources.

- c. Submit requests to corps concerning need for regular battalions for support of pacification when RF and PF are inadequate.
- d. Submit to corps for approval the sector/province pacification plan.
- e. Guide, encourage and direct the implementation of military support for the province pacification plan as approved by the corps concerned.
- f. Sector commanders/province chiefs are responsible for the implementation of the province pacification plan.

4. Sub-Sectors.

- a. In accordance with sector directives and guidance, establish a military plan to support the pacification program.
- b. Direct operations of the local RF/PF to provide the pacification program with effective security in accordance with the sector/province plans and instructions.
- c. Carry out the approved military support plan. Attention must be given to providing security in hamlets which are in progress of construction or development, and in the AP DOI MOI which have already been completed. Hamlet officials must be protected.
- d. Supervise, encourage and direct the subordinate units in the pacification support operations.
- e. Recommend to sectors operations to directly or indirectly support the district PD campaigns in accordance with the situation.
- f. Sub-sector commanders/district chiefs are responsible for the district pacification program.

b. Use of Forces.

- 1. ARVN Regular Forces:
 - a. Undertake operations to clear areas chosen for pacification by destroying or driving out the regular, regional and local enemy forces.
 - b. Assist RF/PF and local friendly forces to provide security for areas once cleared by interdicting and destroying enemy infiltration units.
 - c. Provide a reserve capable of counter-attacking in support of friendly forces within areas of responsibility.
 - d. Undertake psychological operations focused on pacification.
 - e. Coordinate civic action activities with provincial civilian agencies.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Efforts are to be focused on activities designed to convince the people of GVN concern for their well being. Special attention is to be paid to discipline and the behavior of the troops at all levels.

f. Assist the intelligence agencies of the government in carrying out operations to destroy the VC infrastructure.

2. Regional Forces:

a. Conduct operations, within capabilities, to clear the areas selected for pacification and destroy or drive out the enemy local force units. If appropriate, coordinate with available ARVN units or with the Free World Military Assistance Forces.

b. Maintain security of areas once cleared by limiting enemy infiltration. If there are ARVN units supporting pacification, the RF will operate in the areas between the ARVN and the PF.

c. Augment the PF by protecting village and hamlet population in these areas where the PF are insufficient.

d. Supply reserve forces for counter-attacks in relief of PF platoons and RD Cadre teams, as required.

e. Protect key installations, and vital lines of communication.

f. Support civilian organizations within the province in carrying out psychological operations. Special attention is to be paid to RD Cadre and Chieu Hoi operations.

g. Support the intelligence agencies of the government in operations for the destruction of the VC infrastructure.

h. Support the National Police in operations to control material resources and the people, and to enforce the law and to maintain public order.

i. Support the RD Cadre, the PF, and National Police in the organization and training and arming of the People's Self-Defense Forces.

j. Be prepared to assume greater territorial security responsibilities upon withdrawal of ARVN units assigned to support of pacification.

3. Popular Forces:

a. Under the operational control of Village Administrative Committee, provide local security for villages and hamlets under GVN control (population, material resources, lines of communication, and fixed installations), until relieved by National Police.

b. Participate actively in pacification activities as directed.

c. Destroy VC guerrillas especially by checking their infiltration

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

into the hamlets. In this way, the PF will operate to insure security in the areas located between hamlets and will create a secure zone around villages and hamlets.

d. Support the RD Cadre Teams and the Peoples Self-Defense Forces.

e. Replace the RF in case of a lack of RF; protect main lines of communication and key installations.

f. Support the RD Cadre Teams in the organization and training of Peoples Self-Defense Forces. After training, the PF will assume the organization and training of Peoples Self-Defense Forces in the hamlets in which RD Cadre Teams are not operating.

g. Assist the various intelligence agencies of the government in destroying the VC Infrastructure.

h. Assist the National Police to control material resources and the people, and maintain public order and the respect of laws.

i. Assist the various civilian organizations in the provinces to carry out psychological operations, and particularly the Chieu Hoi activities.

j. Be prepared to assume greater territorial security responsibilities upon withdrawal of ARVN units assigned to support pacification.

6. PREPARATION OF PLANS.

a. General: All problems related to territorial security and the Pacification and Development program must be brought up in the Pacification and Development military support plan of the Sector. Territorial security operations must be all directed to the protection of the population, resources, installations, and important communication lines.

b. Responsibility.

1. The CTZ Commander will:

a. Lead and instruct subordinate sectors to establish the Pacification and Development Support Plan.

b. Examine and approve the Sector Plans.

c. Submit results to JGS/ARVN (Vice-General Chief of Staff Office - G3) prior to 30 January 1969.

2. The CTZ Senior Advisor will direct the Sector Advisor to assist the Sectors in establishing their Pacification and Development Support Plans.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. The DTA and Special Zone Commander will:

a. Report to CTZ has capabilities to provide regular forces to the Pacification and Development Support Plan of the Sector.

b. The Division Senior Advisor will assist and advise on the provision of support forces.

4. Sector Commanders will:

Establish the Sector Pacification and Development military support plan with the cooperation of the Province/Sector Advisor. This plan will be Annex I of the Province Pacification and Development Plan.

5. Province Senior Advisor will:

a. Assist Sector Commander in establishing the Pacification and Development support plan.

b. Be in charge of liaison between local FWMAF units and US Advisors of RVNAF units to provide close coordination in the execution of the plan.

c. Method of Preparing Plans:

1. The Pacification and Development military support plan is based on the enemy situation, organic facilities, reinforcing forces approved by CTZ, and on Province Pacification and Development goals.

2. The Plan must be accompanied by an overlay (scale 1/50,000) on which will be indicated the villages listed in the 1969 Pacification and Development program and the locations of the Pacification and Development supporting units (based on forms distributed by CPDC).

3. The position and types of outposts and the position of the supporting artillery units will also be fully indicated on the overlay (scale 1/50,000).

4. The key lines of communication and the security situation will also be indicated on an overlay (scale 1/50,000).

d. Forms for Plans, Reports, Overlays:

The following forms for the 1969 Pacification and Development military support plan, report and overlay will be published to the CTZs and Sectors later:

The Progress of the Pacification and Development and military support plans will be recorded from the first day to the last day of the month and forwarded to the concerned CTZ. The CTZ will send it to JGS/ARVN/J3 and CPDC on the 10th of the following month.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX II

ATTACK ON THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE (VCI)I. CONCEPT

In addition to military activities to guarantee a just and lasting peace and freedom for the country, an important task of all responsible authorities and those connected with the Phung Hoang Campaign in particular, is to concentrate all efforts on operations to collect intelligence information, and act on this information, in order to achieve our goal of rapidly destroying all elements of the Viet Cong Infrastructure that are operating in South Vietnam.

Since the plan, known as the "Phung Hoang Campaign," was established a principal concept enunciated by command echelons has been: "To defeat communism we must not only rely on military activities, but it is also necessary to undertake political activity in support of the military campaign."

Regarding this goal, the Phung Hoang plan has achieved many favorable results during the recent period, particularly the "Dong Tien Campaign" that was launched on 20 October 1968 and was successful beyond our expectations, bringing about more confidence in a final victory.

Presently, from Central to local authorities (CTZ, Province, District) all resources, personnel and material have been employed in a spirit of cooperation among government services in order to concentrate our operations on eliminating the common enemy, and so far we have achieved significant results.

As the President said, "1969 will be the decisive year...", it is necessary therefore, to maintain, strengthen and improve our operational efficiency to exceed the goals of the Dong Tien Campaign.

To this end, immediately after the Dong Tien Campaign, the Central Phung Hoang Committee together with member agencies will draw on the experience, good points and shortcomings gained from the Campaign to reorganize and strengthen the plan in order to:

- a. Consolidate, strengthen, and preserve current operational results;
- b. Improve manpower and material resources so that the plan can be more efficiently executed;
- c. Study the evolution of the situation in order to successively launch other campaigns for the purpose of eliminating the enemy infrastructure;
- d. Enlarge the area of activities of the Phung Hoang Committee by employing our hamlet and village cadre (Village Chairmen, Hamlet Chiefs, Village Security Commissioners, Hamlet Security Assistants, Village Motivation Commissioners, Assistants for Hamlet Motivation) to identify VCI for destruction in rural areas; and
- e. Depending on the development ability of the National Police, increase the NPFE strength to provide replacements and additional strength to provinces and districts so the latter can have sufficient permanent forces to operate effectively.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

As estimated, and if the situation permits, there will be one additional NPDF company assigned to each province comprised of four or more districts, because currently there is only one company per province which is insufficient to meet the requirements of all districts. Currently, the NPDF is broken down into platoons that can be reassigned to the districts but there are not enough platoons to assign to every district; each company can provide support to only three districts. These platoons, therefore, cannot be considered as District organic elements, but as mobile units operating in the whole province, according to priorities, the degree of importance of the target, and the local requirements.

II. OBJECTIVES**A. Targets**

a. The communist infrastructure must be considered as the main objective, and the political organizations which compel the population to incline towards the communists, are secondary objectives.

b. The four important communist infrastructure elements included in the objectives of the Dong Tien Campaign and enumerated below are still effective in the 1969 plan.

1. Members of the National Liberation Councils and Committees and of National Alliances for Democracy and Peace.

2. The Finance-Economy cadre of the People's Revolutionary Party.

3. All Chairmen, Deputy Chairmen, and other executive elements in the hamlets, villages, districts, provinces, of the People's Revolutionary Committees (Ex: Propaganda, Culture and Education Committee, Security Committee, Military Affairs, etc.)

4. Commo-liasion cadre.

c. The attack on the communist infrastructure must be carried out continuously and energetically everywhere in the country; nevertheless, particular attention and operational priority is intended for the following areas:

- Priority 1: Contested areas.
- Priority 2: Areas under temporary communist control.
- Priority 3: Secure areas.
- Special Priority: (For everywhere) aiming at the National Liberation Councils and Committees.

B. Goals

The minimum goal of the Phung Hoang plan is to effectively eliminate half of the existing communist infrastructure by the end of 1969 (about 33,000 VCI).

To reach this goal, each CTZ must continue its operations to attain the monthly figure presently stipulated in the Phung Hoang and Dong Tien Campaigns, and shown below:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

I CTZ	550 VCI
II CTZ	650 VCI
III CTZ	850 VCI
IV CTZ	<u>950 VCI</u>
TOTAL	3000 VCI

III. EXECUTION**A. Concept**

According to the concept of implementing the Phung Hoang Campaign, the District level (DIOCC) is considered as the basic operational structure at the local level. The district chief (DIOCC Chief) must, therefore, ensure that appropriate personnel contribute fully to the Phung Hoang Campaign.

Emphasis must be put on close coordination and clear-cut assignment of duties among all personnel, service and agency members involved.

Besides the elements determined in Phung Hoang SOP, other personnel required at the District level in order to effectively carry out the 1969 plan are as follows:

a. Village Chairmen, Village Security Commissioners, Village Motivation Commissioners, Hamlet Chiefs, Assistants for Hamlet Security, Assistants for Hamlet Motivation.

These officials are very necessary for operations to exterminate the VCI. They can operate effectively because they understand the VCI organizations in their own localities. Therefore, they must be permanent members of the District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Committee in order that they can detect VCI.

b. Hamlet and Village PSDF Group leaders, PSDF Team Leaders, RDC Intergroup leaders, RDC Group Leaders, RDC Team Leaders, Hoi Chanh Armed Propaganda Team Leaders, PF Platoon Leaders.

These paramilitary units can participate in and work effectively for the Phung Hoang Campaign in collecting intelligence information and conducting reaction operations.

c. Information Section Chiefs, Village Information Commissioners, Psywar and Civic Action Team Leaders.

These personnel also must be used and considered as members of the DIOCC to give immediate support to Psywar and Information operations.

B. Responsibilities.

a. Central Phung Hoang Plan Office (CPHPO):

- Regularly follow operations of the Phung Hoang Campaign to assure implementation of the plan at all levels.
- Outline operational requirements for all levels to carry out.
- Disseminate and exchange intelligence information.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- Follow enemy operational capabilities in order to work out programs and reaction measures to be applied by localities to neutralize the enemy.

- Coordinate closely with ministries and Central Phung Hoang Committee agency members in order to work out operational programs that suit the long range offensive against the communist infrastructure in the whole nation.

- Coordinate the study of necessary laws and legal procedures, and regulations to facilitate legal processing of VCI and communist suspects (application of MOI Directives on rehabilitation).

b. Central Phung Hoang Committee agency members:

- Coordinate with CPHPO to make plans and specific instructions for concerned agencies in order to meet requirements and support the Phung Hoang program at the local level.

- Insure proper assignment of able personnel to carry out the Phung Hoang Plan.

- Organize and manage technical training required to meet operational requirements effectively.

- Regularly supervise, follow and inspect the implementation of the plan by local concerned agencies.

- Provide local Phung Hoang Committees with manpower and material resources to conduct attacks on VCI.

c. CTZ Commanders, Chairmen of CTZ Phung Hoang Committees:

- Depending on the local situation, study and work out plans for Provinces and Districts (DIOCC) to carry out throughout the year of 1969.

- Regularly inspect, guide, and supervise the implementation of the established plan; remedy shortcomings, if any.

- Instruct and insure that Division and DTA Commanders are ready to support the plan by providing and exchanging intelligence information, and giving tactical support such as airlift, sea transportation, artillery, and combat units, if necessary.

- Recommend or conduct large scale and sustained operations in areas where VCI are reportedly operating to assist local Phung Hoang Committees to purge and eliminate VCI.

d. Province Chiefs and Province Phung Hoang Committees:

- Consolidate, improve, and sponsor the Dong Tien Campaign, and implement the successive plans.

- Make maximum use of available manpower and material resources for the attack on VCI, and actively support district requirements.

- Depending on the availability of their organic forces, such as NFFF, Special Branch, PRU, etc., deploy forces to the district (DIOCC) for performance of assigned tasks; at the same time, insure proper use of these units.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- Study and work out long term programs to be carried out for the whole province and disseminate these programs to the districts for execution.

- Follow, guide, inspect, and supervise the implementation of province plans and Central policy.

- Give instructions and control the use of officials listed in Para III A a, b, and c above.

- Pay special attention to the use of province VIS to support the districts by launching a campaign to promote favorable conditions for the plan, inspire confidence among the people, and counter enemy propaganda themes.

e. District Chief and DIOCC:

- Actively carry out his own assigned tasks in the 1969 Phung Hoang program disseminated by the Province (Annex to 1969 Pacification and Development Plan).

- Study and analyze local VC Infrastructure situation and set up an operational plan for 1969 aimed at destroying at least 50 percent of the total VC Infrastructure in the district.

- Regularly guide and train personnel and subordinate agencies to be well aware of the importance of the program so that the program will be supported more effectively.

- Remedy shortcomings to achieving progress in the Dong Tien Campaign in order to increase our potential and get better results.

- Make maximum use of all organic resources such as NPFF, Special Branch, PRU, Intelligence Security personnel, Hoi Chanh APT, People's Self Defense including officials listed in Para III Aa, b, and c above, in order to conduct reaction operations on a timely basis as intelligence information is acquired.

- Emphasize VIS activities which benefit the plan and attack the enemy propaganda themes.

C. Inspection and Training

a. Phung Hoang Committees at all levels must organize seminars to popularize the Phung Hoang program in the Pacification and Development Plan, and guide performance of duties to be achieved by each agency and all personnel so that the plan will be properly carried out.

b. CTZs and Provinces organize regular meetings to discuss the program, point out good points and shortcomings, so as to improve the organization and operational methods necessary to the proper execution of the national policy of the government,

c. CTZs and Provinces will organize several mobile training and inspection teams to operate at the district level (DIOCC), guide the organization and implementation of the plan, and simultaneously make corrections on the spot.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**IV. PREPARATION OF PLANS**

Based on the principal targets and goals included in Paragraph II A and B above, the CTZ Committees will guide the Provinces in preparing plans for local operations.

The Phung Hoang plan will be attached to the Province PD Plan as an annex, and also will need a thorough study to assure that it fits the local situation concerning:

- Deployment of forces.
- Plan for using RDC Groups, Hoi Chanh APT, etc.
- Plan for VIS/Civic Action activities.

V. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

Province and District Committees must study and apply simple and rapid measures and procedures to screen out VCI and suspects from innocent people in order to avoid a negative effect on the program.

It is necessary to organize mobile interrogation teams and Psywar/Civic Action teams which will follow military operations for an on-the-spot screening, in order to set innocent people free immediately after having heard the Psywar/Civic Action team's explanations of government policy. These teams will give help and comfort to the people as required.

The participation of Hoi Chanh, Information, Psywar/Civic Action, Village and/or Hamlet Councils, and Hoi Chanh APTs in cordon and search operations is very necessary to identify the enemy, and at the same time enable the NP to take pictures for identification and preparation of order of battle (OB).

Be kind to the population as well as to the prisoners during operations.

Captured VCI cadre must be quickly exploited and their files set up so that their cases can be tried by a court or by the Province Security Committee.

The basic rules and regulations of judicial and administrative procedure must be correctly applied (in accordance with MOI directives about rehabilitation). After investigation proves a suspect to be innocent he must be set free immediately.

All authorities in the locality having jurisdiction in the Phung Hoang campaign must be delicate in their contact with the people in order to get their help and cooperation in the extermination of VC Infrastructure.

VI. REPORTING PROCEDURES

- After plans have been completed, the provincial and CTZ Phung Hoang Committees will forward their plans to the Central Authority for review and appropriate action.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- Current reporting procedures and reporting forms being applied to the Phung Hoang Program and the special Dong Tien Campaign remain effective in 1969. The time and date of the reporting deadlines must be respected in order that the Central may establish follow-up statistics and be able to deal with the general situation in a timely fashion.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX III **CONFIDENTIAL**

1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

STRENGTHENING VILLAGE AND HAMLET GOVERNMENT

1. Role and Importance:

Increase the competence of the village and hamlet government to answer the needs of the people. The village and hamlet government on the one hand carries out the policies and programs of the government, on the other hand, satisfies the needs and the aspirations of the people. The role of the village and hamlet elected or appointed officials is to serve the people. Therefore they must be qualified in leadership in order to insure a proper use of the local resources involved in security and development programs. These officials are important elements in the realization of the community spirit principle. They are the medium between the people and the government and transmit to higher authorities the true aspirations of the people and at the same time explain and execute the programs and national policies in rural areas.

The 1969 Pacification and Development program puts much confidence in the village and hamlet officials. The Village Administrative Committee Chairman will be invested with much authority over Popular Forces, RD Cadre, and National Police operating in the village. They themselves organize, train, and direct the People's Self-Defense Forces with the support of the technical services. The village and hamlet officials will manage the expansion of the self-help program and the village government has more authority over budget planning and implementation.

2. Purpose:

Besides the strengthening of the village and hamlet administrative structure in the secure hamlets and villages, the main purpose of this program is to pacify the villages and hamlets in contested areas and government-not-yet-controlled areas. A great number of people will be liberated from the enemy yoke. Therefore, the number of village and hamlet officials will be increased. The democratic principle realized by the elections is given special attention in the establishment of the village and hamlet government. A special and active training program is to be held in order to enable the village and hamlet officials to do the following:

- Lead and motivate the people in the protection and development of the village.
- Manage effectively the village and hamlet administrative apparatus.

3. Execution:

The priority tasks to be performed in 1969 will be as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A. Establishment of Village and Hamlet Administrative Organizations in the Newly Controlled Areas.

In the conduct of the APC we are establishing our foundations in 1,116 contested hamlets or un-controlled areas. In 1969, we will occupy and control the remaining villages and hamlets.

The above rapid expansion requires a respective increase of the number of villages and hamlet officials. This increased number of village and hamlet officials is made either with administrative officials returning to the village and hamlet from exile or with new replenishments. All will receive a complete training. Pending the organization of elections and in case qualified administrative personnel cannot be found in the locality, the province and district government may temporarily appoint qualified personnel chosen from among the Regional and Popular Forces or RD Cadre.

The village and hamlet administration is built on a democratic basis. Election is a way of censusing the population and inducing the people's cooperation and participation in the pacification program.

B. Continuous Strengthening of the Village and Hamlet Governments

The village and hamlet government must have sufficient strength as determined by the basic paper concerning the table of organization. Officials with bad conduct and behavior, unqualified and ineffective ones must be replaced.

Circulars 2120, BNV/NC/19/M, 24 September 1968, 4843, BNV/NC/19, 25 September 1968, 5088 BNV/HCDP/25, 7 October 1968, 2332, BNV/HCDP/26/M, 14 October 1968, and all subsequent documents determining the essential measures for strengthening and making the village hamlet administrative structure effective must be applied continuously. MOI will send inspection teams to the villages and hamlets in order to assess local situations and recommend measures for appropriate improvement.

Elections will be organized right after security is restored. The Province and District Chiefs will assess local situations in the village and hamlet and will organize elections of lower managing organizations as soon as possible in order to create confidence of the people in the government. That is the political basis of our presence in rural areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(1) Training for the first groups of officials:

- Village Administrative Committee Chairman.
- Village Motivation Commissioner.
- Village Security Commissioner.
- Village People's Council Chairman.
- Hamlet Chief.

a) The training duration for the above mentioned officials includes:

70% in political training:

- Leadership
- Motivation of the people's participation in the protection and development of the village.

30% in administration :

- Hamlet and village management.

b) Number of students : Actually in the whole country there are :

- 2235 Village Administrative Committees
- 1109 Village People's Councils (elected)
- 9149 Hamlet Managing Boards

The total number of students will be:

2,235 x 3 = 6,705 Village Administrative Committee members
(Chairman, Motivation Commissioners, Security Commissioners)

1,109 x 1 = 1,109 Village People's Council Chairmen.

9,149 x 1 = 9,149 Hamlet Chiefs.
16,963

The above officials will be scheduled to under go training in various courses.

2) Training for the second group of officials.

- | | No. of trainees |
|---|-----------------|
| - Deputy Chairman of Village Administrative Committee : | 2,235 |

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

-Village Social Welfare Commissioners :	2, 235
-Village Agriculture Commissioners :	2, 235
-Deputy Hamlet Chiefs (if any)	
-Assistants for Hamlet Security :	9, 149
-Assistants for Hamlet Motivation :	9, 149

a) Training Duration.

- 70% of the program intended for the administrative training (village and hamlet administration)
- 30% of the program intended for the political training (leadership and Motivation of the people)
- Details pertaining to training organization, training schedule, and funds for training, etc. . . . will be published later by MOI.

4. Preparation of Plans.

A program for strengthening the Village and Hamlet Government in various provinces may include the following details:

- 1) Enumerate villages and hamlets in the province with full details about existing administration: elected government, appointed, in exile, and no government.
- 2) Enumerate villages and hamlets included in the 1969 program, elections to be held and detailed election schedules.
- 3) Make plans for recruiting hamlet and village officials (appointed, elected in every locality, training schedule, elements planned for training).
- 4) Enumerate administrative requirements of each village, hamlet included in the 1969 PDP and submit to central for estimate of support means.

5. Reporting Requirements.

All reports of village and hamlet administration include the same details as determined and used in current reports. Any change will be published later.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX IV

CONFIDENTIALNATIONAL POLICEI. Role and Importance of the National Police in the Pacification and Development Plan.

The National Police is an important force for the maintenance of security and public order and for the extermination of the Communist infrastructure. In this connection, the National Police has already achieved some success. Most of the VC stay-behind basic organizations were discovered by the National Police, which furthermore has closely associated with the Armed Forces in launching attacks to destroy the VC main-force units. Meanwhile, the National Police also is the principal force responsible for enforcing national laws. Consequently, for the government's 1969 Pacification and Development Plan, National Police activities will tie in with the principles and objectives set forth by the government as follows:

II. Principles and Objectives1 - Principle: Community Spirit.

a. Cooperate closely with friendly army units in exchanging intelligence information, conducting military operations to destroy the enemy and support the Defense Ministry's force development plan.

b. Cooperate with other friendly agencies in the Pacification and Reconstruction of villages and hamlets (registration, classification of the population, control of national resources, etc....)

c. Cooperate closely with other security units in villages and hamlets in maintaining local security and public order.

d. Cooperate with the people in all activities that serve the public interest in the area.

2 - Objectives. Control and insure security for, 90% of the population by cooperating with local security forces, Support Forces and Police Forces in villages, hamlets.

According to the Government policy, the National Police is responsible for maintaining security and public order in villages and hamlets. In 1969, at least 50% of National Police Force (uniformed police in Provinces) will be deployed at District level or below.

III. Implementation.A. Organization:

1. Establish additional National Police District Services to maintain effectively the security in villages and hamlets. Establish some 200 additional National Police Stations in villages and hamlets and vital localities throughout the country.

2. Establish additional Police Field Forces Units and River Patrol Police Forces Units. Establish in each district at least one Police Field Forces Platoon to support the activities of District Police Station in conducting military operations under the Phuong Hoang Plan. Establish additional River Patrol Police Groups and Sections in regions with important

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

waterways to support Provincial and District National Police Services in maintaining security on these waterways.

B. Strength

1. Reduce office personnel at the NP Directorates and Province Headquarters to reinforce the police levels at District and below with the overall objective of putting 50% of all personnel at District or below. Attach importance to covert activities by the Special Police Branch in order to develop an infiltration capability in the villages and hamlets.

2. Reinforce the District Police Service with one Police Field Forces Platoon: There exists at present, in some 263 Districts and 47 Provinces throughout the country, 50 Police Field Forces Companies operating at provincial level, and assigned to district level when necessary.

In 1969, in order to deploy in each district at least one platoon of Police Field Forces with a strength of 46 men each, the DGNP has decided to dissolve two special groups of Police Field Forces in CTZ I and III to reinforce the Police at district level and below. To reinforce the Districts, the DGNP will also transfer most of the policemen in the age groups 18, 19, 20 to the Police Field Forces.

C. Activities.

In the deployment of Police Forces to villages, the Police Provincial Service Chief will give priority to targeted villages included in the 1969 Province Pacification and Development Program. Besides, all Police campaigns initiated by Police Provincial Service, such as the fight against social corruption, the sanitary campaign and the traffic campaign, must reach down to the village level so that the people will have the opportunity to become acquainted with activities.

The whole question of personnel deployment from the central level downward to the sub-district level is now under consideration by DGNP. Special instructions concerning this will be issued later.

The Police unit stationed in a village will be placed under the control of the Village Administrative Committee. It will:

a. Visit at least once a week, all hamlets, except the VC-controlled hamlets, to have contact with the Hamlet Chiefs and the local population.

b. Set up in each hamlet an intelligence network made up of sympathizers, and initiate a campaign aiming at explaining to the population the importance of intelligence information on the enemy's activities in military, political and economic fields, and on the VCI. It will be publicized that bonuses will be granted to those who give good information. The population also will be reminded that those who collaborate with the enemy will be punished.

c. Work out a plan of issuing ID Cards to citizens aged 15 and above through registration of all families; all people's names will be carried on the Household Certificates within 6 months from the date the National Police Village station is set up. This will prepare for, and give support to, the Provincial Identity Teams.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

d. Closely cooperate with RD Cadre; and RF and PF. Assist the RD Cadre in training PSDF. Cooperate closely with the RF and PF in eliminating the enemy's infrastructure.

e. Cooperate with Village Information Commissioners in PSYOPS stressing the Police role in protecting the population.

f. Use existing Police Radio facilities, to reinforce, if necessary, the VHRS.

IV. Plan Preparations.

The deployment of Police forces in provinces will be shown on an overlay as an annex to the Province Pacification Development Plan.

The plan will include the following main elements:

a. Time phasing of deployment of Police forces to support the 1969 Pacification Development Plan.

b. A list of resources and manpower needed to enable Police Forces to meet the objectives of the Pacification Development Plan.

c. Support for Police Forces by VIS Psyops.

V. Report.

Use the current reporting system fixed by the DGNP. The NP contribution to the Monthly Status of Pacification Report will be as prescribed in Annex XIII to these Guidelines.

3
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX V

People's Self Defense Force

I. GENERAL

Confronting the danger of Communist aggression, our people have stood up and organized themselves into popular formations:

- To defend their own families, dwelling houses, villages, hamlets, wards and quarters.

- To assist the Armed Forces in maintaining security and public order, protecting the people's lives and property, as well as preserving the country.

- To promote community development activities for self help and improvement of villages, hamlets, wards and quarters.

In 1969, the Ministry of Interior will develop, strengthen and maintain the People's Self Defense Forces. If carefully organized and maintained, this movement will help the government in bringing all people outside the draft ages into popular formations aimed at consolidating our rear and increasing our combat potential in battlefields.

To arm the people for their self protection is an application of the principle of community spirit.

To arm the people is to create a reciprocal confidence between the people and the government. This would make the people feel interested in national affairs, thus bringing about conditions favorable to the Pacification and Development Plan.

II. OBJECTIVES

By the termination of the APC, which falls on 31 January 1969, the target membership should reach the number of 1,000,000 People's Self Defense members armed with 200,000 weapons.

In 1969 the minimum target membership should reach the number of 2,000,000 People's Self Defense members armed with at least 400,000 weapons.

The objectives set forth for each Tactical Region are as follows:

CTZ	Total Strength of PSDF	Strength of PSDF to be Trained	PSDF to be Armed with modern weapons
I CTZ	320,000	256,000	64,000
II CTZ	340,000	272,000	68,000
III CTZ (to include Saigon area)	640,000	512,000	128,000
IV CTZ	<u>700,000</u>	<u>560,000</u>	<u>140,000</u>
TOTAL	2,000,000	1,600,000	400,000

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The Commanders of CTZs will fix quotas based on the population and security of each province, and fix the criteria for the organization, training, and armament of PSDF. Besides, all citizens who, for health reasons, cannot participate directly in armed defense, will be trained in first aid, fire prevention, fire fighting etc...

III. IMPLEMENTATION

a. Concept.

To implement the above objective, it is necessary to incorporate into the ranks of PSDF all men who are of age to be brought into this formation, according to Law 003/88. All other elements of the population should be induced to join this organization on a voluntary basis.

In relatively secure hamlets (A, B) the PSDF will be trained and adequately armed in order to gradually replace the RF and PF to maintain security and public order. In insecure areas, this mission will not be trusted to the PSDF, unless the local Village Administrative Committees assure that the PSDF's degree of training proficiency, armament and the security situation allow.

b. PSDF Cadre

In 1989, in principle and according to the requirements, each city will be authorized to recruit 20 Cadre, each provincial capital five Cadre, and each district three Cadre. These Cadre will help the people in organizing their PSDF. They moreover have to guide the movement, sustain and encourage its training and armament. Besides, in the training operations, we must utilize all available human resources in localities, such as sector armed forces, RF, PF, RD Cadre, National Police.

IV. Plan Preparations.

All cities, provincial capitals, have to work out a detailed plan for the organization, training and armament of PSDF.

- Plan to initiate the PSDF.
- Plan for the utilization of human resources.
- Plan for the distribution of weapons.

V. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

a. All cities, provincial capitals must report to the Ministry on the progress of their operations weekly, biweekly and monthly, according to Radio Message 1839/E/BNV/UEQG/NDTV, 9 August 1988, Memorandum 162/ENV/NDIV, 14 October 1988 and Circular 6082/ENV/NDTV, 2 December 1988.

b. Inspection.

City mayors and province chiefs will personally make inspection tours of the districts, villages, hamlets, wards or send their delegates, to control, direct and guide all operations concerning this movement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX VI

VILLAGE SELF-HELP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

I. GENERAL

To execute the Pacification and Development Policy of 1969 promoted by the Central Pacification and Development Council, the Ministry of RD will participate actively in the pacification and development process through village development and the RD Cadre programs (set forth in Annex VI and VIII), which will be implemented according to the principle of "community spirit" and aimed at supporting effectively the 8 objectives of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan.

The Village Self-Help Development Program will apply the principle of "community spirit" through the following:

- a. Organize and guide the people in choosing, implementing, using, protecting and maintaining the construction achieved in the public interest;
- b. Strive to fulfill the people's aspirations in the village and hamlet communities;
- c. Create a favorable atmosphere for cooperation among the army, people, cadre and government.

II. OBJECTIVES

Vietnam is an agricultural country of which the basic unit is the village with its traditional self-autonomy and legal status. About 80% of the people live in villages and hamlets.

Under the influence of the war, the management of villages and hamlets has weakened, creating a situation of crisis and collapse within the rural communities and at the same time exerting a strong influence on city life.

The following are the objectives of the Village Self-Help Development Program:

- 1/ Help restore local economic conditions by increasing family incomes, and
- 2/ Augment the village budget in order to help attain village self-sufficiency.

III. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF EXECUTION:

During previous years, in many places the villagers and the village/hamlet authorities did not actually choose their projects, implement them by themselves, or control the distribution of funds and materials. The province and district authorities often infringed upon the rights of the villagers and the Hamlet Managing Boards. On the other hand, in several places the people took pride in their achievements on these projects and in the democratic spirit demonstrated in their villages and hamlets. Therefore, in 1969, the Self-Help Program will aim at increasing the achievements realized through past programs, and at the same time, creating for the villagers favorable opportunities for self-improvement within the democratic process in the villages and hamlets.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The Village Self-Help Development Program is designed for the villages according to whether they have or have not already organized their elections.

In 1969, due to restrictions of funds and materials, and the inability to carry out projects in all localities, about three-quarters of the villages having organized elections will be granted first priority for development. The remaining villages, which have already organized their elections, but are not able to be included in the plan for development, will be supported to a lesser degree with minor projects. The hamlets or villages which have not yet held elections will receive self-help projects on the same basis as in previous years.

Following the above concepts, responsibilities are as follows:

1. The Village People's Councils will take into account the villagers' aspirations in making a suitable distribution of resources reserved for development. These Councils will outline the policy for the villages and for the committees in charge of self-help program management.
2. The Chairmen of Village Administrative Committees are responsible for urging the people to take part in the implementation of projects according to village capabilities.
3. All Self-Help Projects will be chosen during public meetings convened by Village People's Councils. They will be chosen through agreement of all the people, or the majority, present in these meetings. The deliberating procedures will be guided in a document which will be disseminated later.
4. The villagers will participate in the implementation of projects by contributing in money or services.
5. The province and district authorities will provide guidance to the village officials so that they will understand completely the new concepts of self-help and technical assistance, and the authorities will avoid monopolizing the initiative and giving orders for carrying out projects. The principle, "The people act with government assistance and cadre guidance" should be strictly respected.

B. TRAINING:

Training must be organized at central as well as local levels. (See Annex V.I.)

C. OPERATIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT:

1. The documents relating to operational guidance and the details concerning village development will be disseminated later.
2. The funds allocated to the villages will be used within the village area of responsibility to carry out new projects, for the repair or development of installations and operations, and for the development of the village economy.
3. The programs are listed below, along with a general statement for village authorities to study, discuss and implement according to local circumstances and requirements.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- Education : Construction and repair of schools, build bookshelves; organization of illiteracy eradication classes.
- Health : Dispensaries, drug cabinets; repair of maternity dispensaries (if any).
- Public Works : Construction of bridges, roads, wells, ferry landings, markets, post offices.
- Small-scale Irrigation : Digging and dredging of ditches, sewers, canals, construction of dikes and dams.
- Animal Husbandry : Construction of farms, or organization of livestock raising; purchase of breeders and medicines for the protection of livestock.
- Agricultural services : Establishment of nurseries; cultivation of fruit trees or cereals; purchase of farming tools, water pumps, sprayers, seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, rice mills.
- Fisheries : Development of pisciculture or fisheries; digging of fish pools, ponds; purchase of breeding fingerlings, fishing gear (hydraulic motors, outboard motors, nets, strings, etc.)
- Youth : Soccer fields and volley ball courts.
- Information : Reading rooms, libraries.

4. In order to aggressively develop agricultural and handicraft programs in localities, and in order to improve village economic conditions in accordance with the objectives of the program, the villages are advised to use only one-third of their funds for the repair or construction of installations. The remaining funds should be reserved for the improvement of family incomes and village economy.

D. FINANCIAL PROCEDURES:

1. The village Self-Help Development Projects are divided into 2 categories:

Category 1 (including 1A and 1B) and Category 2.

All villages can be granted Self-Help Development Projects of Category 1.

Those having already organized their elections will be granted additional projects under Category 2.

a. Category 1: Minor projects costing up to VN\$150,000.- to be implemented by the villages themselves, either with government assistance or by local community efforts.

Category 1A: Projects costing not more than VN\$50,000.- Taking note of villagers' suggestions as set forth in public meetings, the Village People's Council will approve these projects and refer them to the Village Administrative Committee for execution. The minutes of these public meetings will be transmitted to the Province and District Pacification and Development Council for information.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Expenditures made on projects of Category 1A by administrative committees need not have the prior approval of their superior levels.

After completing a project, the Village Administrative Committee in question will send a report to the Provincial Pacification and Development Council with a copy sent to the District Pacification and Development Council for information. Upon receipt of this report, the Province and District Pacification and Development Councils will be responsible for inspection of the completed project and audit of all expenditures.

Category 1B: Projects from VN\$50,000 to VN\$150,000. After the villagers have held public meetings to discuss projects which meet their aspirations, the Administrative Committee will submit the required projects to the Provincial Pacification and Development Council (through the District Pacification and Development Council) for approval. The Village authorities are not authorized to expend funds before these projects are approved by the Provincial Pacification and Development Council. Immediately after the approval of a project of Category 1B, the Provincial Pacification and Development Council will forward to the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee the approval which will authorize the use of funds for the implementation of the project. Each village will be allocated a fund of VN\$400,000 for the implementation of projects of Category 1. When this fund is completely spent, the villages having organized elections may request their Provincial P & D Councils for additional allocations. The Provincial P & D Councils must check the projects implemented by the villages and their vouchers of expenditure. If every project is completed satisfactorily and if the villages are still capable of implementing additional projects, the Provincial P & D Councils may approve requests for additional funds for projects of Category 1. These funds will be taken out of the funds appropriated under Category 2 of the villages concerned.

b. Category 2: (Construction of schools, roads, dikes, sewers, market-places, livestock raising farms, etc.). This category includes projects costing above VN\$150,000. Projects in this category must always be deliberated by the villagers and submitted as proposals to the Provincial Pacification and Development Council, with one copy sent to the District Council for information. After approval of these projects, the Provincial Pacification and Development Councils will turn them over to the relevant technical services for preparation of technical documentation and other specifications, and these services will carry out the projects involved through existing RD financial procedures.

Each village will be allocated a fund of VN\$600,000.-to carry out the projects of Category 2.

2. Fund allocation procedures: After receiving the Postal Message for fund allocation from the Central Authority and after completing the training of village officials concerning the Village Development Program, the Provincial Pacification and Development Councils will establish imprest funds for the villages. These imprest funds will be managed by the Village Head Secretary, who will be accountable for a total amount of VN\$400,000. The imprest funds should be deposited into an account opened at the Treasury Office. Every month, the village authorities must consolidate and forward to the Treasury Office vouchers indicating expenditures.

To help the villages have at their disposal some means to meet miscellaneous expenses, they will be authorized to keep VN\$20,000 in cash. Expenditures above VN\$5,000 must be settled by cheque, and all cheques must be submitted to the Chairman of the People's Council and to the Village Administrative Committee for approval and for signature.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- Proximity to economic installations.
- Villages having PF and having properly organized their People's Self-Defense Forces.
- Villages having manpower and physical resource capabilities for development.

C. Criteria for fund allocations:

1. Each of the villages having not yet held elections will be granted a fund of VN\$400,000.-
2. Each of the villages in the province having already held elections are allocated VN\$1,000,000. -

D. Work sheets:

The Ministry of RD is enclosing four appendices to this annex:

1. Appendix 1 : List of villages having already held their elections. The Provincial Pacification and Development Councils will prepare lists of these villages according to their order of priority.
2. Appendix 2: Report on the present situation of the villages having already held their elections. The provincial authorities will make out a report for each village.
3. Appendix 3: List of the villages having not yet held their elections. (The report on the situation of each village not yet having organized its elections will be made according to Appendix 2).
4. Appendix 4: Work Sheets. The provinces will make proposals for the necessary allocations to the Ministry of RD, which will consider them in examining Appendices 1, 2 and 3 stated above.

Note: The provincial authorities will take into consideration the situation existing on the reporting date in order to arrive at listings of village names as well as other data required in connection with Appendices 1, 2 and 3.

V. REPORTING FORMS

All reporting forms will be sent later to the Provincial and Municipal Pacification and Development Councils.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**3. Implementing procedures:**

Upon receipt of cheques issued by provincial authorities, the villages may begin immediately the implementation of projects of Category 1A. Concerning those of Category 1B, the villages can implement them only after they are approved at the provincial level. It is absolutely prohibited to have the operations of Category 1 carried out by contractors under any form. However, local masons and carpenters can be hired to work together with the people in the villages.

To carry out the Village Self-Help Development Program successfully and avoid all misuse of funds to the detriment of the public, a committee will be created to manage operations and it will be composed as follows:

- | | |
|--|----------|
| - Chairman of the Village People's Council | Chairman |
| - Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee and Hamlet Chiefs | Members |
| - 2 Representatives of the People's Self-Defense Force | Members |
| - 1 Representative of the RD Cadre Team | Member |
| - 2 Representatives of the <u>Notables</u> | Members |

Concerning the villages which have not yet organized elections, the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee will be Chairman of the Managing Committee.

This committee will be responsible for the implementation of projects in compliance with the people's aspirations, the technical requirements and the demands of the village situation. It will take care of the procurement of materials and manage the implementation of projects. However, this managing committee may directly consult the technical services and request their technical assistance. The technical services must be ready to provide personnel and enthusiastic assistance at the request of the village officials.

The Village Administrative Committee will be charged with preparation of vouchers to justify the expenditures made during the implementation of projects.

To explain clearly to the villagers every aspect of the Village Self-Help Development Program, the Village Administrative Committee will erect outside the Village Head Office a large bulletin board recording all the projects, their locations, funds and materials supported by the government and the people's contributions in services, money and materials. The procurement of this board will be financed by the village imprest fund.

IV. PREPARATION OF PLANS

A. The Central Pacification and Development Council will put particular emphasis on development in the provinces where national priority areas have been established.

B. In villages where elections have been held, Province and Municipal Pacification and Development Councils will determine the village priority for development based on the following considerations:

- Degree of population density (populous villages).
- Proximity to main supply roads.
- Proximity to important political centers.

MINISTRY OF REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT

List of the Villages Having Already Elected
Their Popular Councils and Administrative
Committees

Province.....

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 1

Development Priority Order	Names of Villages	Number of Hamlets in each Village	Village Popula- tion	PF	Having or- ganized Popular Self- Defense	Village Admin Council in Exile	Names of Insecure Hamlets (date of reporting)	Total and names of Hamlets in the village having not yet carried out the hamlet elections
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1								
2								
3								
4								
5								
6								
7								
8								
9								
Total		Villages	Hamlets	People				

- FOOT NOTES:** (5) Now many squads or platoons has the village ?
 (6) Mention "already organized" or "not yet organized" .
 (7) Mention : "In exile" if there are any.
 (8) Mention all the names of insecure hamlets
 (9) Mention all the names of hamlets having not yet carried out their elections

Date:196

Province Chief, concurrently Chairman of the
Provincial Pacification and Development Council.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Province:
District:
Village:

Appendix 2

REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF VILLAGES HAVING CARRIED OUT THEIR ELECTIONS

From to Dec 31, 1968

- A. SUMMARY: a/ Map coordinates (village center) =
b/ Length : meters; Width: meters
c/ Existing hamlets: hamlets; families and people

Table with columns: Hamlet order, number and name, Has or has not, organized elections, Number of families, Total of people, Main occupation and %, Secondary occupation and %.

B. VARIOUS PROGRAMS (including the installations belonging to the regular ministerial or provincial budgets).

I. Education -

- A. State the total number of classrooms existing as of Dec. 31, 1968
a. High schools grades. From Grade... to Grade
b. Primary schools:
- RD Budget classrooms and teachers
- Budget of the Ministry of Culture, Education & Youth classrooms and teachers
- Provincial Budget classrooms and teachers
c. Private schools:
1. High schools classes
2. Primary schools classes
d. Illiteracy:
Number of illiterate people aged from 10 to 45 years: People

II. Health -

- a. Existing maternity dispensaries operated prior to Dec. 31, 1968. Mention the status of maternity dispensaries if any.
In good condition: [] Damaged: []
Having midwives; laborers

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Having drug dispensaries

c. Having drug cabinets

III. Public Works:

a. Communication-line network:

1. Good or bad condition; temporarily sufficient or not sufficient for use.

2. Having meters of asphalted roads

Having meters of roads paved with rock or laterite and usable for cars.

Having meters of unimproved roads (useable for three-wheel vehicles).

3. Having bridges costing more than 1 Million; bridges of less than 1 Million; ferries.

4. At present, the village has cars; three-wheeled vehicles; radio sets.

5. Has markets; water pools/wells; postoffices

6. Electrification: sites.

IV. YOUTH and INFORMATION -

The village has soccer fields; volley-ball courts;

..... basket-ball courts; information offices.

V. SMALL-SCALE IRRIGATION (for irrigation purposes)

Temporarily sufficient or not? At present, in good or bad condition?

a. Having meters of canals and ditches.

b. Having dikes, dams and sewers costing more than 1 Million;

..... dikes, dams and sewers costing less than 1 Million.

VI. ANIMAL HUSBANDRY:

a. In the village, there are families engaged in animal husbandry.

b. The village has oxen and buffaloes; pigs.

c. There are farms for the production of breeding livestock.

VII. AGRICULTURAL SERVICES:

a. There are families living on cultivation.

1. The village has about hectares of rice-planted fields.

2. The village has about hectares left uncultivated.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- b. There are families living on the cultivation of secondary crops. The village has about hectares cultivated with secondary crops.
- c. There are tractors water pumps;
..... nurseries.

VIII. FISHERIES:

- a. Having families living on river or sea fishing.
- b. Having fish ponds; fish pools; hydraulic motors.
- c. Having fish markets; port facilities.

IX. AGRICULTURAL CREDIT:

Having families receiving loans. Total of funds: VN\$

X. COOPERATIVES and FARMERS' ASSOCIATIONS:

- a. Are cooperatives established? Their names:; number of members.....
- b. Farmers' associations:; number of members:.....

C. FAMILY INCOMES:

-The village has% of well off families;% of families "having enough" to live;% of families "having not enough" to live.

D. TAXES COLLECTED BY THE VILLAGE IN 1968: VN\$**E. RELIGIONS:**

In the village, there are% of Catholics, with churches, chapels.
.....% of Buddhists, with temples
.....% of Cao daists, with..... temples
.....% of Protestants, with chapels
.....% of Hoa Hao, with temples

F. POLITICAL PARTIES AND SECTS:

At present, the following parties are operating in the village:

Party Influence: strong or slight

Party..... Influence: strong or slight

FOOT NOTES:

1. In Reports, please mention "public" or "private": schools, oxen and buffaloes, tractors.
2. Do not forget to add words or cross out inapplicable items in accordance with the village situation.
3. These reports help the Central Authority to understand the village situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST OF THE VILLAGES HAVING NOT
ORGANIZED THEIR ELECTIONS

Province

Appendix 3

Order Numbers	Names of Villages	Village Population	Villages having organized People's SD	Village economic condition	Strategic position of communication lines	Number of Hamlets in the village	Number and Names of Hamlets in the village and underline the insecure hamlets.
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1							
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
7							
Total Villages People					

- REMARKS:
- (3) Total number of people living in the village.
 - (4) Mention "already organized" or "not yet organized".
 - (5) Development in animal husbandry, agriculture services of fisheries.
 - (6) Located near districts? Near Chief Town?
Are communication lines convenient?
 - (7) Number of hamlets in the village.
 - (8) Mention the order numbers and names of hamlets in the village. Underline the insecure hamlets.

Date: 196

PROVINCE CHIEF, concurrently
Chairman of the Provincial Pacification
and Development Council

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT

WORK SHEET

Province.....

1969 SELF-HELP PROGRAM

Appendix 4

PROVINCIAL PROPOSALS				CENTRAL AUTHORITY'S APPROVAL	
	Number of Villages and Hamlets under planning	Criteria	Funds	Number of Villages & Hamlets	Funds
1. Total of villages having not yet organized their elections:.....villages		VN\$400, 000villages	VN\$.....
2. Total of villages having already organized their elections:.....villages(a)		VN\$1, 000, 000village	VN\$.....
		
		
		
		
		
		
		

Date.....196

Province Chief concurrently Chairman of the
Provincial Pacification and Development Council.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX VII

RD CADRE1. GENERAL.

a. The Pacification and Development Program for 1969 aims at expanding our controlled areas by working in as many as possible of villages and hamlets located in the contested or VC-controlled areas. Therefore, each village will become an objective for pacification and development, with emphasis focused on the contested or VC-controlled hamlets.

b. After security has been restored by PF and RF, the RD Cadre will participate in the building and organization of the village and hamlet infrastructure, as well as in the political struggle to lay the foundation for the Village Development Program.

c. To carry out successfully their assigned duties, RD Cadre will operate under the direction of the Village Administrative Committees. They must coordinate closely with the supporting PF and RF units. It is essential that they have the active participation of the people.

d. The three basic elements of our rural government structure are the Village Administrative Committees, the Hamlet Managing Boards, PF and RD Cadre. To carry out the community spirit principle, they must go through a similar training program which will provide them with a thorough understanding of the government Pacification and Development policies.

2. OBJECTIVES.

To meet the pacification and development needs in 1969, the following objectives must be reached:

a. Use all the RD Cadre abilities in order to pursue the implementation of the Special Pacification Offensive Campaign and the regular 1969 Pacification and Development Program.

b. Organize the training of the three basic elements of the village and hamlet infrastructure. (Coordination with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense/JGS.).

c. Prepare documents concerning the policies and processes to wage a political struggle in the next phase.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Maximum use of RD Cadre abilities:

(1) Reorganize the 59-man cadre groups into 30-man cadre groups in order to simplify their organization and increase the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

flexibility in their use. The reorganization process has already been determined in Memo No. 2484 XD/422 of December 5, 1968.

(2) The focus of the operations to be performed by the 30-man RD Cadre groups aims at upgrading the hamlets of Categories D, E and V at least to those of Category C by the following processes:

- a. Identify the VC infrastructure.
- b. Organize the Popular Self-Defense.
- c. Organize the election of effective local authorities.
- d. Start the implementation of Self-Help Programs.

(3) The village constitutes a unit of activity and the hamlet, a unit of construction. Therefore, a 30-man RD Cadre group will work in the village under the direction of the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee. The team will stay permanently in the village. The group leader will become the Assistant for Political Affairs and Revolutionary Development to the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee.

(4) Several 30-man RD Cadre groups can be assigned to a village if the latter has a dense population and many hamlets (Types D, E or V). After completing the hamlet construction, a 30-man RD Cadre group will be left in that village while the other teams will move to other villages.

(5) The 30-man RD Cadre groups will be assigned to a village (or hamlet) only when supported permanently by at least a PF Platoon.

(6) A 30-man RD Cadre group can be split into the smallest operational teams of 8 cadres if the security conditions in the locality concerned permit it and if a PF platoon at full strength is permanently present on the spot to provide support.

(7) District chiefs are responsible for providing ammunition and for evacuating the wounded for the 30-man RD Cadre group every time the latter is attacked by the enemy. Supplies of ammunition will be planned, moved and stored at district warehouses by the Provincial RD control group.

(8) To provide more effectiveness and help the cadre to stay near their families, the transfer of cadre to operate in their native places must be performed in conformance with the following priority order:

- native province
- native district
- native village

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(9) To assist the Provincial RD control group in the control, encouragement, inspection and training of cadre, every five 30-man RD Cadre groups are allowed to have an inter-group leader (concurrently Chief of the Mobile Training Team) and 2 mobile training instructors.

(10) RD Cadre groups must motivate the people to participate positively in activities within the framework of the principle of community spirit: among the people, and between the people and the government.

(11) Maintenance of the hamlets completed in previous years will be accomplished according to the three following procedures:

a. If 5 or 6 completed hamlets are located near each other, one 30-man RD Cadre group can be left behind for their maintenance.

b. If only 1 or 2 completed hamlets are located near the village in which the 30-man RD Cadre group is operating that group will take charge of its/their maintenance.

c. If no 30-man RD Cadre groups are working in the vicinity, maintenance of completed hamlets will be accomplished by the Hamlet Managing Boards, the Village Administrative Committees or the district authorities.

The previous process of leaving 5 cadre to maintain the completed hamlets is cancelled.

All of the above work in individual hamlets will be done under the direction of the Administrative Committee of the village of which that hamlet is a part.

(12) The 30-man RD Cadre groups will operate according to established priorities. Each of their cadre should be ready to serve as census grievance and propaganda cadre.

b. Organization of the training for the three basic elements:

(1) Villages and hamlets:

(a) In the villages and hamlets having already organized their elections, the following will be trained at the National RD Cadre Training Center, Vung Tau:

- At the village level:
- Chairmen of the Administrative Committees
 - Chairmen of the Popular Councils
 - Security Commissioners
 - Propaganda Commissioners

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

At the hamlet level: - Hamlet Chiefs

The training program will emphasize leadership and popular motivation; it will also contain simplified instruction in administration (village and hamlet management).

The following will be trained at various provincial in-service training centers:

At the village level: - Vice-Chairmen of the Administrative Committees
- All the remaining commissioners

At the hamlet level: - Security Assistants
- Propaganda Assistants

This training program will emphasize administration (village and hamlet management) and will also contain simple instruction on leadership.

(b) In the villages and hamlets not yet having organized their elections:

All village and hamlet officials will be trained at provincial in-service training centers.

(Note: The training documents for the provincial in-service training centers will be disseminated later by the Ministry of RD).

(2) Popular Forces:

PF platoon and squad leaders will go through a 6-week training course at the National RD Cadre Training Center, Vung Tau.

The training program will emphasize leadership, popular motivation, peoples's self-defense, and village development.

(3) RD Cadre:

The training of RD Cadre in 1969 will emphasize more the cadre quality rather than quantity, using newly recruited cadre to bring up the strength of existing 30-man RD Cadre groups. We plan to create few additional 30-man RD Cadre groups (priority reserved for CTZ 4). Experienced cadre should be retrained for more effectiveness (versatile cadre). We must also create leaders at all levels.

Details on the training session and their schedule will be disseminated later.

c. Documents concerning the policies and processes to wage a political struggle:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The Ministry of Revolutionary Development will coordinate with the Information Ministry, the Chieu Hoi Ministry, and the Defense Ministry - the JGS/Political Warfare General Directorate, to prepare documents for the use of RD Cadre in connection with the policies and processes to wage a political struggle in villages and hamlets.

4. PREPARATION OF PLANS.

a. The following will be prepared by the Cadre Directorate:

1. Plan for the creation of new groups in 1969.
2. Training plan.
3. All memos related to financial and supply problems for the 30-man RD Cadre groups.

b. The National RD Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau will prepare training materials, lessons and plans and submit them to the Ministry of RD for approval.

c. Provincial RD Cadre control groups:

1. Preparation of planning of expenditures is based on Appendix 1. These plans must be submitted to the Ministry of RD for approval by mid-January 1969.
2. Coordination with the PPDC Current Affairs Committee to prepare the implementation plans for the 30-man RD Cadre groups.

5. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Concerning Psyops, the Provincial RD Cadre groups should coordinate closely with the Provincial Psyops Operating Committees. At the village level, coordination between the Deputy of the 30-man RD Cadre groups and the village and hamlet information cadre, should be performed closely.

b. Within the framework of the Phung Hoang Campaign, the intelligence and research cadre of the 30-man RD Cadre groups must coordinate closely with the Hamlet Security Assistants, the Village Security Commissioners and the supporting PF Platoons. Every information report related to the Communist underground network must be communicated immediately to the district Phung Hoang Headquarters and to the Provincial RD Cadre control group for information. POWs, weapons, Communist documents captured or confiscated by RD Cadre groups should be immediately handed over to S-2/Sub-sector and to the Provincial RD Cadre control group for information.

c. Concerning Chieu Hoi, the 30-man RD Cadre groups must

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

strive to induce as many VC to rally as possible. Returnees, weapons and documents must be handed over without delay to the District Chieu Hoi Office and communicated to the Provincial RD Cadre control group for information. The cadre who have rendered meritorious services must be rewarded according to the rate fixed by the Chieu Hoi Ministry and charged to its budget.

d. Provincial RDC control group chiefs, deputies to provincial RDC control group chiefs and all their various office heads must pay frequent visits to their cadre groups operating in the field, and especially stay over night with them to share their activities.

e. The Provincial Cadre Teams should use the existing forms to prepare their monthly reports.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAPPENDIX 1

PLANNING OF EXPENDITURES FOR THE 1969 RD CADRE PROGRAM

Order Numbers	DETAILS	Planned Expenditures	Remarks
1	- Rice allowance: . For cadre: VN\$200. -x... cadres x 12 months . Rations for the cadres' wives and children: VN\$200. -x... people x 12 mos	VN\$... VN\$...	(a) Provincial teams of types: A-B: VN\$6,000. - C-D-E: VN\$9,000. - G-H: VN\$14,000. -
2	- Food expenses during additional training sessions: VN\$60. -x... cadres x 7 days	VN\$...	
3	- Expenses for training organization VN\$30. -x... cadres	VN\$...	
4	- Per diem for cadres, military men and detached government employees; (a) VN\$... x 12 mos	VN\$...	
5	- Cadre rewards	VN\$100,000. -	
6	- Hospital fees, maternity fees, death gratuities, support in case of missing (b)	VN\$1,500,000. -	(b) For Danang and Cam Ranh, allocation of only VN\$1,000,000. -
7	- Cadre team banners: VN\$3,000. x... new teams	VN\$...	
8	- Office supplies for provincial teams, repair of typewriters and duplicators VN\$10,000 x 12 mos	VN\$120,000. -	
9	- Office supplies for cadre teams: VN\$500. -x... teams x 12 mos	VN\$...	
10	- Operation of teams: VN\$700. -x... teams x 12 mos	VN\$...	
11	- POL: VN\$4,300 x... Jeep x 12 mos VN\$1,200 x... Tri x 12 mos VN\$ 700 x... Scooters x 12 mos	VN\$... VN\$... VN\$...	
12	- Funds for the repair of public vehicles VN\$20,000 x... jeep VN\$ 3,000 x... trilambretta VN\$ 2,000 x... scooters	VN\$... VN\$... VN\$...	
13	- Remuneration for Provincial Teams VN\$... x 12 mos	VN\$...	
14	- Remunerations for lecturing and training VN\$200 x 77 hrs x... sessions	VN\$...	
15	- Post-Office, telephone, electricity fees: VN\$4,000 x 12 mos	VN\$48,000. -	(c) Especially reserved for CTZ 4
16	- Purchase of outboard motor boats (c) VN\$80,000 x 1 boat	VN\$80,000. -	
17	- POL for motor boats VN\$1,500 x 1 boat x 12 mos	VN\$18,000. - VN\$.....	

ANNEX VIII **CONFIDENTIAL**

1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN
CHIEU HOI OPERATIONS

I. GENERAL.

As directed by its purpose of turning enemy into friend, the Chieu Hoi Program will be aimed simultaneously at two objectives: reducing the enemy potential and augmenting our potential.

Since the publication of the Chieu Hoi Policy in 1963 we have rallied 90,180 Hoi Chanhs. Of this number, 14,778 people returned to the national just cause in 1968 (as of November), including 10,271 Hoi Chanhs from enemy military divisions and over 4,000 other Hoi Chanhs from important enemy civilian infrastructure elements. These results indicate the efficiency of the Chieu Hoi Program in 1968 in spite of the unexpected Tet Mau Than enemy attack, the uncertain international situation, and the severe enemy measures to prevent their men from returning to the national just cause via the Chieu Hoi Program. Facing these adverse circumstances, the Chieu Hoi Ministry, the coordinated friendly services and agencies at central and local levels, and ARVN and Allied units, by increased efforts, rallied more Hoi Chanhs in October and November 1968 than in any month since May 1967.

From the above progress we can believe that the Chieu Hoi Program will contribute to the 1969 PDP on the following points.

- The results obtained by the Chieu Hoi Program will lessen the burden of the Pacification and Development Program.
- The results achieved by the Pacification and Development Program will increase basic pressure on the enemy and extend a good prospect for the development of the Chieu Hoi Program both in terms of inducement and rehabilitation of Hoi Chanhs.

II. OBJECTIVE.

The objective of the Chieu Hoi Program in the Pacification and Development Plan is to receive 20,000 Hoi Chanhs. Based on the Chieu Hoi results achieved by each CTZ in 1968, and comparing it with the current general situation, we can determine the quota of Hoi Chanhs each CTZ is expected to attain in 1969 as follows:

I CTZ	2,500 Hoi Chanhs
II CTZ	3,000 Hoi Chanhs
III CTZ	5,500 Hoi Chanhs
IV CTZ	<u>9,000</u> Hoi Chanhs
Total:	20,000 Hoi Chanhs

The quota of Hoi Chanhs to attain for each province and city in 1969 will be quoted later.

CONFIDENTIAL

III. EXECUTION.**CONFIDENTIAL**

The Chieu Hoi Program consists of three main tasks:

- Generation of Hoi Chanhs.
- Reception of Hoi Chanhs.
- Rehabilitation of Hoi Chanhs.

In order to insure good results for the program to receive 20,000 Hoi Chanhs in 1969, the following courses of action should be initiated:

- Motivate the people to participate in the Chieu Hoi Program.
- Coordinate operational services and agencies, ARVN and Allied units with operational capabilities of the Chieu Hoi Ministry.

Emphasis must be put on the reception and rehabilitation of Hoi Chanhs. These tasks will help Chieu Hoi operations to proceed effectively and suitably.

A. Motivation.

a. Objective.

- (1) Disseminate widely the National Reconciliation Policy in the Chieu Hoi field.
- (2) Motivate the people, military men, officials, cadre, Hoi Chanh, and particularly the people whose relatives are in the communist ranks, to encourage defections to the government side.
- (3) Reinforce propaganda media and improve psyops techniques for a psychological campaign against the enemy, create division among them and widely disseminate the open arms policy.

b. Scheduled operations:

- (1) Increase the efficiency of armed propaganda Hoi Chanh units and direct them towards first priority (D, E) and second priority (V) hamlets in village included in the 1939 Pacification and Development Plan.
- (2) Improve psyops activities by broadcasting the Open Arms program on TV or radio (particularly on local radio), leaflets, air-mounted loudspeaker operations. Make maximum use of the above mentioned media to encourage Hoi Chanh to call their fellows back after the enemy situation has been exploited.
- (3) Promote inducement operations and encourage families having sons with the VC to induce them to rally to our side. Armed propaganda Hoi Chanh Teams must consider this as their main task.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- (4) After one or two weeks at the open arms center, move returnees to their previous operating areas as VC to serve as volunteers to relate their experiences concerning the open arms program and call back more Hoi Chanh to our side. This procedure is proven successful. However, special measures must be taken to assure security for the Hoi Chanh themselves.
- (5) Strictly apply procedures for assigning delegations of high ranking Hoi Chanh to localities to talk about the current decline in VC strength and VC political intrigues.
- (6) Continue to call back more Hoi Chanh and reward in cash any serviceman, civil servant, cadre, people or Hoi Chanh who has achieved inducing his (her) fellows, to the government side.
- (7) Launch 1969 Tet Campaign.
- (8) Launch the campaign to record the 10,000th (Ten thousandth) Hoi Chanh.
- (9) Coordinate with the JGS/ARVN to launch psychological-Open Arms campaigns like the recent Nguyen Trai Campaign.

B. Reception.**a. Objective.**

1. Eliminate all complex of guilt and suspicion in Hoi Chanh minds.
2. Elevate Hoi Chanh team spirit and determination.
3. Improve facilities and the management of Open Arms centers.
4. Improve the processing of intelligence on the enemy situation. Check, use, and exchange information.
5. Improve Hoi Chanh training system.
6. Reinforce the protection of Open Arms Centers against enemy sabotage.

b. Projected operations:

1. Strictly coordinate with and follow the activities of military and civilian agencies and FWMAF according to their respective duty assignments as defined in Basic Directive 222/HT/CH, 15 November 1968 concerning Hoi Chanh reception promulgated by the Prime Minister (already disseminated to provinces, sectors and services of Open Arms levels) which includes:
 - Reception. Cadre, civil servants, people and all military units including FWMAF at all levels must warmly welcome reported Hoi Chanh.

3 **CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

Reward to Returnees must be granted within the shortest duration according to the rates fixed by the Ministry of Open Arms.

Transferring returnees: Transfer Hoi Chanh through established channels to provincial open arms centers rapidly and by all means available.

Careful screening of personnel: This phase must be carefully carried out to prevent false Hoi Chanh from staying behind and sabotaging the operations or others being draft deferred.

Processing enemy information: Pay special attention to exploiting enemy infrastructure information and provide this information on a timely basis to local Phung Hoang Committees.

Use Hoi Chanh as guides in our military operations: Guide service of Hoi Chanh will be on a voluntary basis. Other regulations concerning the temporary removal of Hoi Chanh from the Centers must be respected.

2. All Hoi Chanh must follow a political training course at the Center (Province, CTZ and Central according to their rank) with a program initiated by the Ministry of Open Arms. These courses will be taught by instructors assigned by the Ministry of Open Arms or by Open Arms personnel or local friendly agencies personnel.

3. Maintain and extend Open Arms Centers facilities and assure their protection.

4. Pay special attention to organizing visits to the Center for families having members with the VC, for anti-communist refugee groups and other people.

5. Complete the 1968 program concerning the establishment of temporary camps at districts to receive newly reported Hoi Chanh while waiting for transportation to provincial Open Arms center.

6. Carry out the decision of Directorate General of National Police (DGNP) to assign national policemen to Open Arms centers as -- two policemen to each center to interview, complete personal records, and establish identity cards.

C. Rehabilitation.

a. Objectives:

1. Create for Hoi Chanh suitable conditions to join the national community as soon as possible. However, the treatment of Hoi Chanh must be rational to avoid any possible envy by personnel in nationalist ranks.

2. The use of Hoi Chanh in government agencies and ARVN must be carried-out based on their ability to perform, the degree of repentance, and right attitude to insure maximum security for our agencies and at the same time to exploit the latent capacity of Hoi Chanh.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**b. Projected Operations.****1. Vocational training.**

- Organize short term vocational training and agricultural technical demonstration at Provincial Open Arms Centers.
- Organize vocational training at Central and CTZ Open Arms Centers, simultaneously send Hoi Chanh to training at Government Technical schools (Ministry of Labor, Culture and Education) and private firms.
- Introduce Hoi Chanh to a job after his graduation.

2. Resettlement.

Complete 20 Open Arms villages in the 1968 program sponsor 20 already completed villages (Open Arms villages are established to help Hoi Chanh to settle down since their native places are insecure.

In addition, the resettlement of Hoi Chanh in 1969 will be carried-out according to the following priority order:

- Priority 1: Resettle Hoi Chanh at secure hamlets.
- Priority 2: Establish hamlets for Hoi Chanh, war veterans, and refugees.
- Priority 3: Establish special hamlets for Hoi Chanh.

3. Use.

- Make national use of Hoi Chanh in different functions in the Ministry of Open Arms organizations, such as armed propaganda personnel at all levels, instructors...
- Introduce Hoi Chanh to work at friendly military, civilian and administrative services and agencies according to their capacities. Introduce to ARVN Hoi Chanh who volunteer to join the army.
- Establish a system to follow up the results of Hoi Chanh performances at the governmental or military services and agencies.

4. Liaison.

- Establish a liaison system between Open Arms services or sections and Hoi Chanh who become normal citizens.
- With a vigilant and constructive spirit applied for all citizens, Open Arms Services or Sections and local government must see the importance in searching out whether Hoi Chanh are leading a normal life through their activities in villages, hamlets, wards, or quarters. Each month, Open Arms District offices must report to the Service of Open Arms on the situation of Hoi Chanh living in the district.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**IV. PREPARATION OF PLANS.**

Based on the main points of this Annex and according to their local situation, Services for Open Arms have to draft out Annexes to the Provincial 1969 Pacification and Development Plan. See Annex XIII.

V. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

Services of Open Arms have to send their weekly report to the Ministry of Open Arms relating the receiving a Hoi Chanh with date and time. This report is completed on the form attached to Radio Message 20, 13 April 1968 and supplementary papers so that the Ministry of Open Arms can compile them on a timely basis and report to the Central Pacification and Development Council.

Report on a monthly basis the results of all Chieu Hoi activities as prescribed in the Execution Section of this Annex to the Pacification and Development Plan. This report must be submitted no later than the fifth day of the following month. Copies of the report will be submitted to:

- The Provincial, Prefecture Pacification and Development Council.
- The Chieu Hoi representative at CTZ.
- The Central Pacification and Development Council.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX IX **CONFIDENTIAL**1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN (ANTI-COMMUNIST
REFUGEE RELIEF PROGRAM)I. GENERAL.

The following types of people are considered as anti-communist refugees:

- (a) People who left relatively insecure villages and hamlets to avoid the communist pressure or influence;
- (b) People who suffered damages by VC's attacks or shellings;
- (c) People who moved away from their native land because of military operations.

The anti-communist refugees play an important role within the framework of the Pacification and Development Plans. They must be encouraged to go back to their native areas for the protection and development of their own villages and hamlets.

In order to implement the above mentioned concept, the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief is scheduled to reduce the number of refugees to less than 1,000,000 people and settle or organize a return to home of at least 300,000 refugees in 1969.

As a sequel to the refugee resettlement operation included in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief Circular 919, 20 November 1968), this Annex is designed to establish guiding principles and ways for the implementation of the anti-communist refugee relief program included in the 1969 Pacification and Development Campaign.

II OBJECTIVES.

The anti-communist refugee relief program aims at the following main goals:

- (1) Maintain the people's anti-communist spirit.
- (2) Help the people to be self-sufficient.
- (3) Reach the following short-term goals in 1969:
 - (a) Make maximum use of available manpower to settle at least 300,000 refugees;
 - (b) Reduce the number of refugees to less than 1,000,000 people by returning them to their native hamlets and villages already pacified.
 - (c) Complete the relief plan designed for the refugees of previous years, including 1968, based on the anti-communist refugee statute, prior to 30 September 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**III. EXECUTION.****(a.) General observations.**

In the past the anti-communist refugee relief program has experienced the following shortcomings:

- (1) The provinces did not aid the refugees within the period of time fixed for their temporary and permanent settlement.
- (2) They did not establish prompt and adequate refugee settlement locations with security, easy access, and future economic development potential.
- (3) Many relief locations could not utilize the "self-help development program" initiated by the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief, because of failure of local agencies to provide adequate support.
- (4) A lack of serious assistance by local government to the anti-communist refugee relief operations because they did not understand the importance of the program, although this task is part of social welfare operations. Consequently the political side and the objectives of this program were neglected since the Service of Social Welfare and Relief did not receive sufficient help to carry out the anti-communist refugee relief program.
- (5) Lack of activation, support, and control from provincial and CTZ RD Councils.
- (6) Lack of support from local friendly agencies.
- (7) The provinces were supposed to launch pacification operations in order to restore military and territorial security. Instead they have forced people from insecure areas to refugee camps. Such action not only creates dissatisfaction but also is a burden to the Government in implementing the relief program, as the number of anti-communist refugees is increasing everyday.

(b.) Execution concepts.

In order to improve these shortcomings as well as accomplish the stated objectives, following principles must be applied:

- (1) The government must pacify areas and bring security to the people instead of forcing them to come to secure areas.
- (2) Avoid moving the people from newly pacified hamlets to villages, districts or provincial capitals, except for unavoidable migration that must be reported to the Central Pacification and Development Council for study and decision.
- (3) Encourage the population of D, E, and VC hamlets in villages scheduled to be pacified in 1969 to remain in their communities.
- (4) The Service of Social Welfare and Relief should coordinate with the Service of Information and local military, civilian and administrative agencies to exhort, propagandize and launch the "return to village" campaign to encourage the people to resettle themselves at their native localities as soon as D, E, and VC hamlets are pacified.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. After returning to their native communities, the people should be encouraged to participate in the hamlet self defense operations and assume various functions in the Hamlet Managing Board or the Village Administrative Committee after election or designation based on the community spirit principles.

c. Instructions on relief operations and principles.

1. Local Services of Social Welfare and Relief must use their manpower and funds from the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief to return 300,000 refugees to their native areas prior to 30 September 1969. Priority is reserved for refugees in the temporary evacuation phase who are living inside or outside the refugee camps.

2. Continue to return the people to their native village or hamlet as soon as security is restored, as planned by the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief in Circular 919 of 20 November 1968, concerning the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

3. While waiting to return the people to their native areas, make every effort to complete the payment of refugee relief grants by the end of February 1969 (there are no resettlement subsidies) for the anti-communist refugees residing in camps.

4. Complete the census of the people living outside refugee camps as soon as possible and request relief funds from the Ministry of Public Health, Social Welfare and Relief.

5. For the people who are actually residing in newly pacified hamlets, and whose houses were not destroyed by war, it is necessary to give assistance through civic action operations and community development, and food as available, in order to help and encourage them to stay at their home areas. The people who have had their houses damaged will be helped based on provisions in Decision 226, 13 September 1968, Ministry of Public Health, Social Welfare and Relief.

6. Refugees who settle in a new place or return to their native areas are given resettlement subsidies as follows:

- Each family: 5,000VN\$

- 500grs of rice daily for each person, adult or child, for 6 months. Money can be granted based on the official price of rice at the locality, provided it has been agreed upon in advance by the Ministry of Public Health, Social Welfare and Relief.

- 2,500VN\$ (in lieu of cement).

- 10 metal roofing sheets, large size.

- For the Montagnard refugees, besides the above subsidies, each person is also provided with salt for 6 months (20 gr each day).

7. Complete lists of the villages and hamlets targeted for pacification and list the names of anti-communist refugees who will voluntarily return to their native areas; estimate requirements for manpower and materials at the locality to establish a detailed plan to be implemented within the scheduled time to return a maximum number of refugees to their native areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

8. Cut down on the establishment of the new settlement places in area A, B, and C.

9. If, in the case of ARVN or allied forces military operations, it is recommended that the people be temporarily moved from the areas affected, the related military authorities must coordinate with the local service of Social Welfare and Relief to give help, care, feed and provide transportation for the people through the period of dislocation.

10. Except for the above newly established principles, the anti-communist refugee relief program will continue to follow the current policies of the Ministry of Public Health, Social Welfare and Relief. The whole relief program for 1969, as well as necessary funds for the program, will be covered later in a Ministry of Public Health, Social Welfare and Relief directive.

IV. PREPARATION OF PLANS.

a. Based on the role, policy and objective as suggested for the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief in 1969 listed in this annex, the Services of Social Welfare and Relief will cooperate with the Province or City Pacification and Development Council and the friendly agencies in the locality to prepare a detailed plan for relief operations to be carried out in 1969. This plan will accompany the Province or City Pacification and Development Plan and will be considered as an annex (see Annex XIII).

b. In this annex, it is necessary to include the following details:

1. Define the connection between the anti-communist refugee relief program and the City or Province Pacification and Development Plan; the anti-communist refugee relief program must be considered, in this connection, as a part of the Pacification and Development Plan.

2. Plan all operations and proposals to be carried out by the anti-communist refugee relief program in 1969, such as the building of new temporary camps, new refugee camps, returning-home locations, schools, dispensaries, maternity wards, medicine chests, to carry out self help, vocational... projects.

3. Plan to bring anti-communist refugees home and estimate the number of returning-home people and the priority order of the villages and hamlets to be pacified, according to the degree of importance given by the City or Province to those areas.

4. Estimate the number of refugees from 31 January 1969 to 31 December 1969 to be assisted in settling down temporarily and permanently.

5. Define duties of local related organizations in giving support to the refugees, either for their settlement or for their returning home.

V. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

1. Reports on operational development of the anti-communist refugee relief program will be stipulated by the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief, in a separate circular.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALANNEX X
INFORMATIONI. GENERAL.

In the implementation of the 1969 PD Plan, the information plays a very important role. To contribute to this great mission, the propaganda and information efforts of the Information branch for 1969 are aimed at the two following main targets.

II. OBJECTIVES.

- Disseminate and explain to the population, particularly rural people, the decisive importance of the 1969 PD Campaign.
- Encourage and motivate the entire population to actively participate, and to cooperate with the government to achieve the tight objectives of the 1969 PD Campaign, applying the Community Spirit principle.

III. EXECUTION.A. EXECUTION CONCEPT:

Due to the importance of the 1969 PD Plan, an information plan will be implemented under the following principles:

- The plan should be considered a strategic operation of priority 1.
- The "Determined to Win" (Quyét Chien Thang) Campaign that will come to an end on 31 January 69, and will be continued by the information plan.
- It is necessary to make full use of information capabilities and resources to support the information plan.
- The plan maintains a successive and lasting character and closely follows the progress of the overall plan: "1969 PD Plan" of the Government.
- Properly apply the Community Spirit Principle, i. e., the information goal is to appropriately serve the common objectives of the PD Plan.. Hence, information services at the various levels should closely coordinate with local PD Councils to develop their information plans in line with the local PD Councils' plans.

B. INFORMATION OPERATIONS:(1) In Secure Areas:(a) Main Points of Propaganda:

- Exploit RVN military and political victories both at home and abroad.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- Praise the results of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.
- Disseminate the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan and appeal for the people's active cooperation in:
 - Destroying the VC infrastructure.
 - Building up the People's Self-Defense Forces.
 - Assisting anti-communist and refugees resettle or return them to their homes.
 - Warn the population against the communist attempts to increase terrorism, sabotage, and distorted propaganda calling for a peace cabinet, coalition government, etc.

(b) Operational Media:

Use overt media such as the press, radio, TV, mobile loudspeakers, meetings, leaflets, posters, slogans, etc.

(2) In Contested Areas, and for those "D" and "E" Hamlets Chosen for Pacification:(a) Main Points of Propaganda:

- Besides that mentioned in paragraph 1, emphasize the following:
 - Denounce communist repression and exploitation.
 - Praise the GVN's pacification efforts, which aim to liberate the population from communist domination and provide a free and progressive life for each citizen.
 - Expose the communist plot in organizing "People's Liberation Committees" through bogus elections (reference MOI Release No. 260/BTT/NHK/NCKH/KH/CT/M of 25 October 1968--campaign against VC infrastructure).
 - Call for the people's cooperation with the GVN to achieve the objectives of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan by:
 - Informing government authorities about VC underground cadre.
 - Taking part in People's Self-Defense and other security programs.
 - Acting as intermediaries and encouraging those who have relatives in the VC ranks to ask them to rally to the Government.
 - Cooperating with, or taking part in, local government.

2
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- Supporting the program to return anti-communist refugees to their homes,

- Building the Community Spirit necessary for a good hamlet, for a better family life, and for a better standard of living.

(b) Operational Media:

- In areas where RD teams have not been operating, use aerial broadcast, leaflets, etc.

- In hamlets undergoing pacification, establish information teams to coordinate with RD teams and apply the following methods:

- Collecting the people together for meetings, etc.

- Talking privately with each family.

- Persuading individuals (as per category) to support the program.

Further, employ entertainment forms such as movies, radio, etc.

C. PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND DIVISION OF WORK:

Activities are in two phases:

(1) Preparatory Phase from 10 December 1968 to 31 January 1969.

(a) At Central (Saigon) Echelon:

- Support Directorate will coordinate with the National Printing Center to publish the following:

- Study guides for information cadre on national RD policy.

- Explanatory documents on the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan stressing:

- Principle of Community Spirit.

- The Eight Objectives of the Plan.

Those documents must be printed in pocket-size booklets in 20,000 copies each.

- Two types of leaflets of 10,000,000 copies each explaining the importance of the 1969 Plan and calling on the people to contribute to the Plan in the spirit of Community Action.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 100,000/posters (see attached slogans).

The above publications must be ready for distribution to local areas by 10 January 1969.

- Training Directorate:

- Prepare training materials for local information cadre stressing:

- GVN policy.

- Information techniques (stressing practical experience).

- GVN RD policy and the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan.

- Prepare guidance for local areas to organize their own village-hamlet cadre training courses.

These tasks must be completed before 31 December 1968 so that the Information Services can institute such training programs in January 1968.

- MOPIX Directorate:

- Produce documentary film on PD in line with the objectives of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan--provide 2-3 copies for each Province IS.

- Reproduce the film "Red Wave" and furnish one copy to each Province IS.

These films must be available in the field as soon as possible.

- Support Directorate, and Accounting Service.

Make slides bearing slogans (see attachment) and distribute to Saigon and provincial cinemas before 20 January 1969 for continuous projection from 1 February 1969 until further notice.

- (b) Regional Echelon:

- Continue Actively stepping up the "Quyét Chien Thang" Campaign supporting the Special Pacification Offensive.

- Organize a conference summarizing the results of Quyét Chien Thang campaign before 25 January 1969 and report findings to MOI. Use this conference to inform cadre of this Information Plan to support the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan.

- Complete the training courses for Village Information Commissioners and Hamlet Information Assistants (with priority to villages

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

which have hamlets scheduled for pacification and to hamlets adjacent to those scheduled for pacification).

- Draw up a specific local activity schedule to include necessary equipment, supplies, etc. (send to MOI before 20 December 1968).

- Follow up receipts of needed publications, supplies, etc., from the central echelon and report MOI of problems, if any.

(2) Requirements for Actual Period of the 1969 Plan--1
February 1969 to 31 December 1969.

(a) Central (Saigon) Echelon:

- The Inspectorate, the Directorate of Research and Planning, and the Directorate of Information will send personnel to the provinces to attend the send-off ceremony of the operational teams (each service must have at least one representative from Saigon).

- Starting on the eve of 30 January 1969, all radio and TV in Saigon and in local areas must initiate this plan, read and project slogans, etc.

- The press should publicize the plan by explaining its objectives, asking the people's support, printing slogans, etc.

(b) Regional Echelon:

- Employ the press, local newsletters, fixed and mobile broadcasts.

- Employ leaflet drops (in small number over contested areas and areas scheduled for pacification).

- Employ banners and rosters (in small number at first - save most for use of mobile teams working directly in the scheduled hamlets).

- Send off Mobile Information Teams.

D. PREPARATION OF LOCAL PLANS:

- All information activities must closely follow local pacification and development plans: Mobile Information teams should thus accompany RD Teams.

- Each Mobile Information Team must consist of at least:

- 2 cadre.

- 1 Village Information Commissioner (in villages with hamlets scheduled for pacification). If village has no Commissioner, one from an adjacent village may be used.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 1 Hamlet Information Assistant from an adjacent hamlet.

- Equipment: In addition to above-cited information-propaganda material, each Mobile Information Team will have:

- 1 PA system--loudspeaker, amplifier, microphone, and tape recorder.

- 1 megaphone.

Other equipment such as MOPIX projectors and TV sets will be available for short-period use of one or two days and then taken to other hamlets.

- The operational schedule of all Mobile Information Teams will:

- Closely follow pacification and development schedule.

- In the specific field of information and in utilizing information media, Mobile Information Teams must complete the following:

- Construct information stations.

- Prepare newsletters and bulletins.

- Select hamlet information cadre.

- Train and direct hamlet information cadre.

- Provide equipment when security situation allows and equipment available.

E. REPORTING.

- Monthly reports from Province Information Services must be forwarded to MOI before the 25th of each month (one copy will be sent to the Research and Planning Directorate).

- A special form for this report will be drafted by the Research and Planning Directorate and distributed to local before 30 December 68.

- The Operations Division is responsible for implementing this schedule, consolidating the reports, and forwarding a final report to the Central Committee for Pacification and Development before the 5th of each month.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALSLOGANS**I. FOR PUBLIC PLACES:**

- 1/ We support the 1969 Rural Pacification and Development Plan.
- 2/ Let's develop villages and hamlets together to achieve Democracy, Justice, and Progress.
- 3/ Let's eradicate all underground VC.
- 4/ The national policy of Revolutionary Development will give us a secure and prosperous life.
- 5/ Join the People's Self-Defense Forces to protect your villages and hamlets.
- 6/ Promote the tradition of "community spirit" to build a prosperous countryside.
- 7/ The communists destroy and kill.
The Government of RVN reconstructs and protects.

II. AT HOMES:

- 1/ We strongly support the government of the Republic of Viet Nam.
- 2/ We do not recognize the so-called Liberation Front.
- 3/ My home does not lodge nor supply the Viet Cong.
- 4/ Let's denounce all underground VC.
- 5/ Let's participate in village and hamlet activities to improve our lives.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALANNEX XIRural Economy**I. GENERAL**

The basic objective of the 1959 Pacification and Development Plan is to provide security for 90% of the population throughout the country. However, security is not the final objective of the Pacification and Development Plan but only a necessary foundation on the way to bringing happiness and prosperity to the population. The encouragement of rural economy and increase of rice production to raise incomes and to stimulate buying power of rural people play a very important role.

II. OBJECTIVES

The Rural Economy Development Plan includes activities of various agencies of the government and is aimed at the following points:

- 1) - Increase rice production (from approximately 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 tons of paddy).
- 2) - Improve and defend roads and waterways connecting the countryside with cities.
- 3) - Increase low-interest loans to peasants.
- 4) - Procure and sell at low-price more production equipment to the peasant: mechanical pumps, tractors, boat motors, small agricultural machines, fertilizer, seeds, insecticides etc . . .
- 5) - Strengthen and develop the farmers organizations (Farmers Associations, Cooperatives, 4-T Movement etc . . .)
- 6) - Encourage the diversification of agricultural products and increase the raising of domestic animals.
- 7) - Reform the existing rice commercial system, neutralize middleman exploitation.
- 8) - Disseminate handicraft plans in which local raw materials are used, and seek markets.
- 9) - In order to promote freer movement of goods, simplify procedures regarding the establishment of retail outlets in villages and districts; facilitate the issuance of trading licenses, and abolish licenses, taxes and checkpoints which are not clearly necessary.

III. EXECUTION

(1) In order to achieve the above objectives, it is necessary to have good coordination among various Ministries and concerned agencies at central as well as local levels in the execution of Government programs.

Example:

- The Economy Ministry will coordinate with the Land Reform and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Agriculture Ministry to increase rice production by simplifying to a minimum the regulations pertaining to the importation of production means, and to control prices of these imported items.

- The Ministries of Economy, Finance, and Interior will coordinate to consider the abolishment of certain licenses and taxes, or the removal of some checkpoints when they are deemed unnecessary.

(2) Regarding the above 9th point, the Province will plan an important role because interested farmers directly contact the local authorities for documentation and because, in many cases, some limitations affecting the economy are implemented by the local authorities as required by the local situation.

Licenses for the transportation of paddy and rice from western provinces of South Vietnam to the capital or from one province to another in the IV CTZ, including Long An Province, are now abolished.

In distributing necessary items, the province should lay emphasis on the distribution of goods to hamlets and villages so rural people can buy goods easily.

In addition to promoting free enterprise by providing security, eliminating restrictions, etc., the provincial governments can play a useful role by conducting provincial development projects in the areas of precedence. The concepts and procedures for this program are discussed in Appendix 1 to this annex.

IV. PLANNING:

In preparing the Rural Economy annexes for Pacification and Development operations in local areas, the province is requested to draft its plan with the following main points:

- Additional quantity of rice that can be obtained in 1969.
- Either permits will be abolished or the procedure for issuing them will be simplified.
- The number of resource control checkpoints to be removed.
- A general plan for the development of the rural economy (Development of farmers organizations, distribution of necessary products, etc.).

Guidance on the special program for An Giang is attached to this annex as Appendix 2. That appendix is addressed primarily to the PPDC in An Giang, but may serve as useful general guidance to other provinces with full secure districts.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAPPENDIX I TO ANNEX XIPROVINCE DEVELOPMENTI. Role and Importance:

(a) In the course of pacification and development, one of the main operations is to motivate the population to participate in activities for public interest in hamlets and villages. The Village Self Help and Development Plan will play a major role in the '69 PD Plan. However, there will be other development works closely relating to pacification operations and affecting various villages or the whole province, and as a result, these development works may exceed the people's abilities within the framework of the village self help and development plan.

(b) In addition to the village self help plan, the CPDC will finance Province development projects selected and recommended by Province P&D Councils. The CPDC will examine one by one every project recommended by the Province. The projects may include village road and bridge building projects, establishments of administrative training centers, domestic animal raising, demonstration farms, and other works relating to the pacification objectives.

(c) Because these development projects are not designed for replacing regular development ones of the ministries, the CPDC will only finance them if local P&D Councils can demonstrate:

(1) The projects are aimed at achieving goals of the Pacification Program.

(2) Expenses for the projects are not provided for in the budget of the concerned ministry.

II. Operations in 1969:

(a) Expenses for province development projects relating to pacification operations will not be provided for all at the same time and on a yearly basis in the province P&D budget, but the projects will be submitted to the CPDC by PPDC and the CPDC will examine on a case by case basis. Projects can be implemented per requests of one or several villages, for common interests, or per recommendation by a technical service or a Province P&D Council when they are deemed necessary to the pacification plan, and are not planned in any other program or budget.

(b) All the recommendations concerning a project need to be turned in to the appropriate province council for consideration and agreement before the project enclosed with justification is forwarded to the CPDC.

(c) Projects forwarded by PPDC will be turned over to the appropriate ministries by CPDC for consideration and recommendation to the CPDC within 15 days. Final decisions regarding the projects will be made by the CPDC.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) After approving a project, the CPDC will directly allocate funds to the concerned province. The Province P&D Council will appoint an officer in charge of the project, who usually is the chief of the respective technical service, and will advance him necessary funds.

In order to meet the deadline for each project, it is requested that the ministries instruct its service chiefs in the provinces to aggressively carry out their respective missions, though the project is not part of their budgets.

(e) Due to the limitation of funds, the CPDC will very carefully consider all projects submitted to it. Priority should be given to the geographic areas of precedence and to projects which will bring an early return in benefits to the people. The following projects can be considered suitable if they help expedite pacification:

(1) Buildings of roads and bridges for the purpose of stimulating the rural economy.

(2) Other public works of common interest to the entire province such as; canals, dams, boat landing sites, fish markets, markets in district seats and provincial capitals, and administrative installations of districts and provinces.

(3) In building high school classrooms or setting up more projects of this kind it is necessary to coordinate all efforts with the educational services to insure that teaching and school supplies will be available.

(f) In addition to the usual engineering and cost data required by the CPDC in province applications for approval and funding of province development projects, applications from the PPDCs covering projects to be financed from CPDC resources will include the following information:

(1) The role the project will play in the achievement of the provincial pacification objectives as expressed in the Provincial Pacification and Development Plan.

(2) An estimate of the number of people benefited.

(3) The location of the project in relation to the geographic areas of precedence, in particular the National area.

(4) The implementation procedures to be utilized; i.e., delineate those portions to be executed on a contract basis, those to be executed by the technical service(s) directly, and those executed by the people to be benefited, on a self help basis.

(5) Estimated time to complete projects.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX XI**CONFIDENTIAL**AN GIANGI. GENERAL

As a relatively secure province conducting a comprehensive development program under near normal peacetime conditions, An Giang is of importance not only in its own right but as a testing area for public administration and investment techniques. Its regression, under any circumstances, would constitute a severe blow. For that reason, the entire province is included in the national geographic area of precedence. The program in An Giang must stand as a tangible demonstration as to what can be done with good planning in a province which is relatively free of enemy attack and harassment. The An Giang program will also give the technical ministries valuable experience in the conduct of rural development activities responsive to the aspirations of the people and in working directly with village administrations. In order to insure the full and coordinated participation of all ministries in the An Giang program, the CPDC will exercise direct management responsibility over the An Giang program in 1969.

II. OBJECTIVES

The fundamental objective of the program in 1969 will be to effect an orderly transition from the special pacification program, which has been under way since 1966 under MORD management, to a longer range provincial development program, focused on the village, to be supported by the various technical ministries. It is essential that this transition be accomplished without loss of momentum. It is also important that planning for 1969 be fully coordinated to ensure that programs in the various fields are consistent with one another and with the government's long-term goals in An Giang.

III. IMPLEMENTATION

In keeping with our general concept for 1969, the key echelon of government in pacification and development will be the village. The Village Administrative Committee will be given full authority to plan and administer self-help projects in the village on the basis of the aspirations of the people as expressed in open public meetings at the hamlet level. Procedures for the approval and funding of such projects will be as outlined in Annex VI Self Help and Village Improvement.

The Administrative Committee will also be responsible for the identification and basic planning of larger development projects including those which are not suitable for full implementation on a self help basis. Detailed instructions concerning the procedures for the planning and implementation of these village improvement projects are contained in the Annex VI, Self Help and Village Improvement. Still larger projects relating to pacification, which affect more than one village and are planned at the provincial level, may be submitted to the CPDC for consideration and funding. The implementation of such projects will be entrusted by CPDC to the appropriate ministry. This is covered in Annex XI, Rural Economy.

To provide the necessary staff for these new village functions and for the administration of the self help program in An Giang, the village RD Cadre teams will continue to support and assist the Village Administrative Councils as civil administration cadre.

IV. PREPARATION OF PLANS

Based on developments during 1968, the following areas of activity should be especially emphasized in 1969:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAgriculture

Drainage, land-forming, and irrigation work in preparation for expanded cultivation of TN-8 rice.

A more aggressive and generous program of agricultural credit to stimulate rice, pork, poultry, and secondary crop production.

Health

Continued improvement in village health and sanitation services, supported by a more effective intraprovincial logistics network.

Industry

The rapid expansion of food processing installations by private and cooperative organizations.

The development of improved facilities for transporting fresh and frozen produce to the Saigon and other urban markets.

An imaginative program of private investment promotion to generate the capital and management needed for the industrial sector.

Public Safety

A rapid expansion of the People's Self Defense program to establish and arm groups in every village, particularly in the border districts. Reduction of RF/PF strengths to the extent possible to permit transfer of spaces to other provinces. Significant improvement in local Police and further deployment of Police to village level under the direction of the Chairman of the Village Administration Committee.

Public Administration

Improvement of village tax assessment and collection.

A strong program of training for village and hamlet officials.

The PPDC will submit a Province Pacification Plan as prescribed in AB 144 and Annex XIII. In addition, however, the PPDC will also prepare and submit to Corps by 15 January 1969 a comprehensive rural development program following the outline provided below:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Outline Plan for Rural Development

- I. Review of Development in 1968
- II. Identification and analysis of main problem areas
- III. Plans for resolution of problems
- IV. Public investment program for 1969
 - A. Health
 - B. Education
 - C. Public Works
 - D. Agriculture (including agricultural credit)
 - E. Industry
- V. Private investment
 - A. Projects planned
 - B. Projects needed
 - C. Investment promotion efforts

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALANNEX XIIGEOGRAPHIC AREAS OF PRECEDENCEI. GENERAL.

According to the principles in the general guidelines, the villages targeted in the 1969 plan, except for special cases, should be in geographic areas of precedence.

a. Four Criteria for Selection of Target Villages

In order to ensure that pacification resources are used where they will do the most good, it is essential to select target villages using tested criteria.

The President of the Republic has suggested four criteria defining the geographic areas of precedence on which to focus the PD program. Those four criteria are:

1. Population density.
2. Proximity to LOCs.
3. Proximity to areas of political importance.
4. Proximity to important economic installations, including rice fields.

The first and foremost is population density. The purpose of pacification is to bring security to people, to gain and retain their loyalty to the GVN. Hence, resources must be concentrated where the people are.

Other criteria are lines of communication, important government centers and installations, and major economic resources. Pacification of areas where such assets are located will improve their strength and security and thus increase their value and usability. Of course, the above-mentioned installations are usually in the populated areas.

b. National and Provincial Areas of Precedence

By applying criteria in selecting target villages, resources can be distributed most logically and efficiently. There is evidence that the enemy is using the same criteria, particularly population density, in targeting his political campaign.

For these reasons, the Central Council has applied the criteria discussed above to define 28 important geographic areas of precedence. These areas will be given first priority in the allocation of management attention and new pacification resources.

In addition, the Central Council has applied the same criteria to define geographic areas of provincial precedence for each province. These areas will be accorded second priority.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The geographic areas of national and provincial precedence are shown by CTZ and Province in Appendix 1 to this annex. Appendix 2 is a listing of all villages within the areas of precedence.

Since the CTZ maps attached to this annex as Appendix 1 illustrate the geographic areas of national and provincial precedence without cartographic accuracy, provinces should refer to the village lists attached at Appendix 2 for a more precise definition of the area boundaries. The areas of precedence in all cases follow village boundaries.

II. OBJECTIVE.

The overall objective of the 1969 program is to bring security to 90 percent of the population.

The areas of national precedence include 58 percent of the population and the areas of provincial precedence an additional 19 percent. Since another 13 percent (estimated) of the people residing outside the areas are already classified as relatively secure, 90 percent of the population could be made relatively secure by gaining control over everyone living inside the areas of national and provincial precedence and by preserving security for the above-mentioned 13 percent.

III. IMPLEMENTATION.

As a general rule, all villages in areas of national and provincial precedence with D, E, or V hamlets in them will be targeted in 1969. They will receive enough pacification resources -- RF, PF, RD Cadre, National Police, and management attention -- to accomplish the pacification task. Other pacification assets, such as self help funds and weapons for PSDF, are normally in sufficient supply to be provided to all villages as required, including the secure villages.

a. Use of Territorial Security Forces

The principal pacification asset in limited supply is territorial security forces.

The number of villages in a province that can be targeted will essentially be determined by the availability of these forces, taking into account the enemy threat, the availability of friendly main force cover and the necessity of deploying RF/PF on other security missions such as security of important LOCs.

The deployment of territorial security forces in support of pacification is discussed in Annex I of these Guidelines and in AB 144. The main point to be stressed is that such forces will normally be allocated to contested and VC villages in the geographic areas of precedence in whatever strength appropriate to raise the security rating of all hamlets to at least a C security rating.

Sufficient forces including police and PSDF will, however, be retained in secure villages to prevent regression in their HES security rating below C.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ANNEX XIIGEOGRAPHIC AREAS OF PRECEDENCEI. GENERAL.

According to the principles in the general guidelines, the villages targeted in the 1969 plan, except for special cases, should be in geographic areas of precedence.

a. Four Criteria for Selection of Target Villages

In order to ensure that pacification resources are used where they will do the most good, it is essential to select target villages using tested criteria.

The President of the Republic has suggested four criteria defining the geographic areas of precedence on which to focus the PD program. Those four criteria are:

1. Population density.
2. Proximity to LOCs.
3. Proximity to areas of political importance.
4. Proximity to important economic installations, including rice fields.

The first and foremost is population density. The purpose of pacification is to bring security to people, to gain and retain their loyalty to the GVN. Hence, resources must be concentrated where the people are.

Other criteria are lines of communication, important government centers and installations, and major economic resources. Pacification of areas where such assets are located will improve their strength and security and thus increase their value and usability. Of course, the above-mentioned installations are usually in the populated areas.

b. National and Provincial Areas of Precedence

By applying criteria in selecting target villages, resources can be distributed most logically and efficiently. There is evidence that the enemy is using the same criteria, particularly population density, in targeting his political campaign.

For these reasons, the Central Council has applied the criteria discussed above to define 28 important geographic areas of precedence. These areas will be given first priority in the allocation of management attention and new pacification resources.

In addition, the Central Council has applied the same criteria to define geographic areas of provincial precedence for each province. These areas will be accorded second priority.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

The geographic areas of national and provincial precedence are shown by CTZ and Province in Appendix 1 to this annex. Appendix 2 is a listing of all villages within the areas of precedence.

Since the CTZ maps attached to this annex as Appendix 1 illustrate the geographic areas of national and provincial precedence without cartographic accuracy, provinces should refer to the village lists attached at Appendix 2 for a more precise definition of the area boundaries. The areas of precedence in all cases follow village boundaries.

II. OBJECTIVE.

The overall objective of the 1969 program is to bring security to 90 percent of the population.

The areas of national precedence include 58 percent of the population and the areas of provincial precedence an additional 19 percent. Since another 13 percent (estimated) of the people residing outside the areas are already classified as relatively secure, 90 percent of the population could be made relatively secure by gaining control over everyone living inside the areas of national and provincial precedence and by preserving security for the above-mentioned 13 percent.

III. IMPLEMENTATION.

As a general rule, all villages in areas of national and provincial precedence with D, E, or V hamlets in them will be targeted in 1969. They will receive enough pacification resources -- RF, PF, RD Cadre, National Police, and management attention -- to accomplish the pacification task. Other pacification assets, such as self help funds and weapons for PSDF, are normally in sufficient supply to be provided to all villages as required, including the secure villages.

a. Use of Territorial Security Forces

The principal pacification asset in limited supply is territorial security forces.

The number of villages in a province that can be targeted will essentially be determined by the availability of these forces, taking into account the enemy threat, the availability of friendly main force cover and the necessity of deploying RF/PF on other security missions such as security of important LOCs.

The deployment of territorial security forces in support of pacification is discussed in Annex I of these Guidelines and in AB 144. The main point to be stressed is that such forces will normally be allocated to contested and VC villages in the geographic areas of precedence in whatever strength appropriate to raise the security rating of all hamlets to at least a C security rating.

Sufficient forces including police and PSDF will, however, be retained in secure villages to prevent regression in their HES security rating below C.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

If the available territorial security forces exceed those required in the areas of precedence for the maintenance of minimum security rating of C in already secure villages and the establishment of a minimum hamlet security rating of C in the contested and VC villages, forces will be applied next to contested and VC villages outside the areas of precedence. In targeting such villages, the four criteria used in defining the areas of precedence should be applied, giving the greatest weight to population density. Within these criteria, preference should be accorded to villages adjacent to the areas of precedence; commitment of territorial security forces to isolated villages where they cannot be adequately supported or reinforced should be avoided. Clearly there will be exceptions which could be allowed when fully justified.

b. Use of RD Cadre

RD Cadre teams will be assigned only to contested villages, i. e., those with D, E, and VC hamlets, which are targeted in accordance with the above prescribed procedure. Since the cadre team, once assigned, remains permanently, all deployments should be carefully decided. As a general rule, to which there can be exceptions if sufficiently justified, RD Cadre will not be assigned outside the areas of precedence or to villages in which all hamlets are rated A, B, or C (See also Annex VII, RD Cadre). If there are enough RD Cadre in the province to satisfy these requirements within the areas of precedence as stated above, the excess will be deployed to contested and VC villages outside these areas. Again the criteria applied to determine the areas of precedence should be used to select the villages to be worked outside the areas of precedence.

c. Use of National Police

National Police will be assigned to all target villages in accordance with Annex IV.

d. Management

In the allocation of management attention, follow these points:

1. Every target village will be visited by the District Chief or his Deputy at least once weekly and by the Province Chief or his Deputy once monthly.
2. All technical service chiefs will visit each target village at least once very month.
3. The PPDC will hold a joint meeting with the Village Chiefs of all target villages at least once every three months to review progress and resolve problems.

IV. PREPARATION OF PLANS

The requirements for the inclusion of village targeting data in the Provincial Pacification Plans are as set forth in Annex XIII to these Guidelines.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix I to
Annex XII

I CORPS

Geographic Areas of Precedence




National Areas of Precedence



Provincial Areas of Precedence



Area in which civil and military actions will be undertaken to maintain existing level of security, prepare for future development, disrupt enemy political operations, and assert nation-wide GVN authority



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

II CORPS



National Areas of Precedence




Provincial Areas of Precedence



Area in which civil and military actions will be undertaken to maintain existing level of security, prepare for future development, disrupt enemy political operations, and assert nation-wide GVN authority

Geographic Areas of Precedence



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

III CORPS

Geographic Areas of Precedence




National Areas of Precedence



Provincial Areas of Precedence



Area in which civil and military actions will be undertaken to maintain existing level of security prepare for future development, disrupt enemy political operations and assert nation-wide GVN authority






CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

IV CORPS

Geographic Areas of Precedence

-  National Areas of Precedence
-  Provincial Areas of Precedence
-  Area in which civil and military actions will be undertaken to maintain existing level of security, prepare for future development, disrupt enemy political operations, and assert nation-wide GVN authority.



CONFIDENTIAL

AREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCE

I CORPS **CONFIDENTIAL**QUANG NGAI PROVINCEBinh Son District

Binh Lien
Binh Hoang
Binh Nam

Nghia Hanh District

Nghia Chanh
Nghia Hung
Nghia Khuong

Mo Duc District

Duc Hai

Son Tinh District

Son Kim

Son Trung
Son Huong
Son Long
Son Hoa
Son Thanh
Son An
Son Phu
Son Hoi
Son My
Song Quang

Tu Nghia District

Tu Binh
Tu An
Tu Hoa
Tu Hien
Tu Nguyen
Tu Thanh
Tu Chanh
Tu Duy
Tu Luong
Tu Quang
Tu Thuan

QUANG NAM PROVINCEHoa Vang District

Hoa Hiep
Hoa Vinh
Hoa Thanh
Hoa Khanh
Hoa Minh
Hoa Phat
Hoa Thinh
Hoa Tho
Hoa Cuong
Hoa Da
Hoa Chau
Hoa Phuoc
Hoa Thai
Hoa Loi

Hoa Long
Hoa Phung
Hoa Hai
Hoa Lan

Hieu Nhon District

Cam Hai
Cam Ha
Cam An
Cam Chan
Hoi An
Cam Thanh
Cam Nam
Xuyen Long

Dien Ban District

Thanh Son
Thanh Trung
Thanh Troung
Thanh Thuy
Thanh Minh
Thanh Phong
Ky Minh
Ky Ngoc
Vinh Hoa
Vinh Xuong
Vinh Xuan
Vinh Ha
Vinh Tho

CONFIDENTIAL

I CORPS (continued)
 Areas of National Precedence

CONFIDENTIAL

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

Huong Tra District

Huong Vinh
 Huong Can
 Huong Ho
 Huong So
 Huong Chu
 Huong Long
 Huong Lang

Phu Vang District

Phu Mau
 Phu Duong
 Phu Thanh
 Phu Huong
 Phu Luu
 Phu My
 Phu An
 Phu Thuong

Huong Thuy District

Thuy Duong
 Thuy Truong
 Thuy Thanh
 Thuy An
 Thuy Van
 Thuy Phuoc
 Thuy Xuan
 Thuy Bieu

CONFIDENTIAL

AREAS OF PROVINCIAL PRECEDENCE

I CORPS

CONFIDENTIALQUANG TIN PROVINCETam Ky District

Ky Binh
 Ky An
 Ky My
 Ky Ly
 Ky Anh
 Ky Phu
 Ky Huong
 Ky Long
 Ky Tinh
 Ky Nghia

Tam Ky
 Ky Hung
 Ky Trung

Tien Phouc District

Phuoc My
 Phuoc Tan
 Phuoc Hoa
 Phuoc Tien
 Phuoc An
 Phuoc Thanh
 Phuoc Ky

Ly Tin District

Ky Chanh
 Ky Hoa
 Ky Ha
 Ky Xuan
 Ky Khuong
 Ky Sonh
 Ky Lien

(Continued on page 4)

QUANG NGAI PROVINCEBinh Son District

Binh Giang
 Binh Sa
 Binh Nghia
 Binh Thang
 Binh Thanh
 Binh Khanh
 Binh Thong
 Binh Thien
 Binh Ky
 Binh Lanh
 Binh Thuy
 Binh Van
 Binh Phuong
 Binh An
 Binh Duc

Mo Duc District

Duc Phung
 Duc Quang
 Duc Hoai
 Duc Tho
 Duc Luong
 Duc Phuoc
 Duc Vinh
 Duc Thanh
 Duc Thuan
 Duc My

Nghia Hanh District

Nghia Loc
 Nghia Phuoc
 Nghia Thanh

Son Tinh District

Son Hai
 Son Chau
 Son Loc

CONFIDENTIAL

I CORPS
Areas of Provincial Precedence (Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Duc Pho District

Pho Loi
Pho Long
Pho Nghia
Pho Hung
Pho Tan
Pho Xuan
Pho Binh
Pho Phuoc
Pho Dai
Pho Thanh
Pho Trang
Pho Heip
Pho Trung
Pho Thanh
Pho Chau

QUANG TRI PROVINCE

Hai Lang District

Hai Khe
Hai An
Hai Ba
Hai Chanh
Hai Duong
Hai Kinh
Hai Lam
Hai Nhi
Hai Que
Hai Son
Hai Chanh
Hai Truong
Hai Tho
Hai Thien
Hai Vinh
Hai Xuan
Hai Thanh
Hai Van

Cam Lo District

Cam Hien Cam Hung Cam Nghia
Cam Thai Cam Chinh Cam Phu

Trien Phong District

Trien Lang
Trien Son
Trien Trung
Trien Hoa

Dong Ha District

Cam Hoa
Cam Xuan
Cam Thanh
Cam Phong
Trien Le

Gio Linh District

Gio Le
Gio Ha
Gio Hai

Mai Linh District

Trien Thuong
Hai Le
Hai Phu
Hai Thuong
Hai Qury
Hai Tri
Quang Tri

Trien Phong District

Trien Ai
Trien Giang
Trien Long
Trien Thanh
Trien Tai
Trien Thuan
Trien Dai
Trien Do
Trien Phuoc
Trien Van
Trien Trach

CONFIDENTIAL

I CORPS
Areas of Provincial Precedence (Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

THUA THIEN PROVINCEHuong Dien District

Dien Huong
Dien Mon
Dien Loc
Dien Hai
Dien My
Dien Thanh
Dien Thai
Dien Hoa

Phong Dien District

Phong Binh
Phong Hoa
Phong Loc
Phong Nguyen
Phong An
Phong Hien

Phu Thu District

Phu Xuan
Phu Ho
Phu Luong
Phu Da
Vinh Thai
Vinh Phu
Vinh Ha

Phu Loc District

Loc Bon
Loc Son
Loc An
Loc Dien
Loc Tri
Loc Thuy
Loc Tri
Loc Hai
Loc Tu

Quang Dien District

Quang Loi
Quang Phuoc
Quang Vinh
Quang Phu
Quang Tho
Quang Loc
Quang Hoa

Huong Tra District

Huong Phu
Huong Bang
Huong Xuan

Phu Vang District

Phu Tan
Phu Thuan
Phu Dien

Vinh Loc District

Vinh Xuan
Vinh Thanh
Vinh An
Vinh Hung
Vinh My
Vinh Giang
Vinh Hai
Vinh Hien

Nam Hoa District

Thuong Bang

CONFIDENTIAL

I CORPS
Areas of Provincial Precedence (Continued)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

Dien Ban District

Ky Chan
Phu Hung
Phu Tan
Phu Tho
Phu Phong
Phu Loc

Que Son District

Phu Phong
Phu Khuong
Phu Dien
Phu Thanh
Phu Hiep
Phu Tho

Duy Xuyen District

Xuyen Phuoc
Xuyen Tho
Xuyen Tan
Xuywn An
Xuyen Thai
Xuyen Quang
Xuyen My
Xuyen Chan
Xuyen Tra
Xuyen Kien
Xuyen Truong
Xuyen Hiep

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

Thang Binh District

Binh Duong
Binh Giang
Binh Trien
Binh Dao
Binh Phuc
Binh Nguyen
Binh Quy
Binh Dinh
Binh Phu
Binh Que
Binh Tu
Binh Sa

Binh Hai
Binh Trung
Binh An
Binh Nam

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCE

II CORPS

PHU YEN PROVINCE

Tuy Hoa District

Hoa Kien
Hoa Quang
Tuy Hoa
Hoa Thang
Hoa Dinh
An Chan
Hoa Tri

Hieu Xuong District

Hoa Phong
Hoa Binh
Hoa Thanh
Hoa Tan
Hoa Vinh
Hoa Hiep
Hoa Xuan

BINH THUAN PROVINCE

Ham Thuan District

Muong Man
Van Lam
Phu Hoi
Dai Nam
Tuong Phong
Phan Thiet

Thien Giao District

Tan Phu Xuan
Binh My Thuan
Tan Hung
Hoa An
Hoa Vinh
Tuy Hoa
Kim Ngoc
Lai An
Phu Long

CONFIDENTIALAREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCEII CORPSBINH DINH PROVINCEPhu My District

My Thanh
 My Hiep
 My Tai
 My Cat
 My Chanh
 My Quang
 My Hoa
 My Trinh

Binh Khe District

Binh Nghi
 Binh Phu
 Binh Thanh
 Binh Hoa
 Binh An

Phu Cat District

Cat Hanh
 Cat Tai
 Cat Minh
 Cat Khanh
 Cat Thang
 Cat Trinh
 Cat Tuong
 Cat Nhon
 Cat Hiep

Tuy Phuoc District

Phuoc An
 Phuoc Hai
 Phuoc Hau
 Phuoc Hiep
 Phuoc Hoa
 Phuoc Long
 Phuoc Loc
 Phuoc Ly
 Phuoc Nghia
 Phuoc Son
 Phuoc Quang
 Phuoc Tan
 Phuoc Thanh
 Phuoc Thuan
 Canh Thinh
 Phuoc Chau
 Phuoc Thang

An Nhon District

Phuoc Hung
 Nhon Loc
 Nhon Tho
 Nhon Hoa
 Nhon Hung
 Dap Da
 Nhon Phuoc
 Nhon An
 Nhon My
 Nhon Thanh
 Nhon Hanh
 Nhon Hau
 Nhon Khanh
 Nhon Phong

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCEII CORPSNINH THUAN PROVINCEThanh Hai DistrictVillages

Phan Rang
My Hai
Dong Hai
An Hai
Ho Hai
Khanh Hai
Tan Hai

An Phuoc DistrictVillages

Hau Phuoc
Huu Phuoc
Dai Phuoc
Phuoc Hai
Thai Son

Buu Son DistrictVillages

Phuoc Son
My Son
Tan Son
Tri Phuoc
An Son
Phu Son

KHANH HOA PROVINCEVinh Xuong District

Vinh Phuoc
Vinh Hai
Vinh Nguyen
Vinh Truong
Vinh Thai
Vinh Hiep
Vinh Thanh
Vinh Trung
Vinh Ngoc
Vinh Phuong

Cam Lam District

Suoi Hiep

Dien Khanh District

Dien Dien
Dien Son
Dien Thuy
Dien Phu
Dien An
Dien Toan
Dien Thanh
Dien Hoa
Dien Binh
Dien Lac
Dien Phuoc
Dien Loc

1 **CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

AREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCE

II CORPS

DARLAC PROVINCE

Ban Me Thuot District

Lac Giao
Cu Ebu
Ea Hneh
Cu Kplong
Chi Lang
Ea Mohar
Km Prong
Dat Ly
Char Dang
Tan Dien
Ea Adrong
Ea Kmat
Ea Puor
Duy Hoa

Lac Thien District

Lak Muan
Kim Chau Phat

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AREAS OF PROVINCIAL PRECEDENCEII CORPSBINH DINH PROVINCEHoai An District

An Tin
An Phong
An Thanh
An Duc
An Tuong

Binh Khe District

Binh Giang
Binh Tuong

Qui Nhon District

Qui Nhon

Phu My District

My Phong
My Tho
My Loi
My Loc
My Duc
My Thang
My An

Hoai Nhon District

Hoai Tan
Bong Son
Hoai Thanh
Hoai Hoa
Duc Huu
Tam Quan
Hoai Chau
Hoai Son
Hoai My
Hoai Huong
Hoai Duc
Hoai Xuan
An Hoa
An Hao

KONTUM PROVINCEKontum District

Kon Robang
Kon Kopong
Mang La
Plei Rohai
Kon Kopat
Kon Sotiu
Kon Bobanh
Kon Bieu
Plei Khocklong
Plei Khochnar
Plei Sor
Plei Klet
Plei Krong
Kontrang Monay
Kontrang Kolah

Kontum District (Continued)

Dak Wok
Chau Thanh
Phuong Hoa
Phong Quy
Tan Dien
Do Lai
Ngo Trang
Ngo Thanh
Trung Nghia
Tan Thanh
Tri Dao
Vo Dinh
Plei Broch

Dakto District

Dien Binh
Dak Ming
Dak Mong
Kon Mong
Kon Rao
Dak Mong

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAREAS OF PROVINCIAL PRECEDENCEII CORPSBINH THUAN PROVINCEHam Thuan District

Phu Sung
Phu Lam

Thien Giao District

Long Phu

Phanh Ly Chan District

Lac Tri
Hau Quach
Huu An
Tinh My
Ma Lam Cham
Gia Le

Tuy Phong District

Binh Long
Lien Huong
Phuoc The

Hai Ninh District

Hai Thuy
Hai Lac
Hai Xuan
Song Luy

Hai Long District

Thanh Hai
An Hai
Phuoc Thien Xuan
Thien Khanh
Khanh Thien

Hoa Da District

Luong Son
Cho Lau
Phan Ri Thanh
Phan Ri Cua
Thuong Van

TUYEN DUC PROVINCEDalat City District

Khu Pho	I
Khu Pho	II
Khu Pho	III
Khu Pho	IV
Khu Pho	V
Khu Pho	VI
Khu Pho	VII
Khu Pho	VIII
Khu Pho	IX
Khu Pho	X

Don Duong District

Xuan Truong
Lac Nghiep
Lac Nam
Than My
Linh Gia
Kolplagnol
Tu Tra
Loan

Duc Trong District

Hiep Thanh
Lieu Hiep
Tung Nghia
Phu Hoi
N Thoi Ha

Lac Duong District

Lat
Thai Phien
Kilplagnolha
Xuan Tho

CONFIDENTIALAREAS OF PROVINCIAL PRECEDENCEII CORPSQUANG DUC PROVINCEKhiem Duc District

Gia Nghia
 Dao Trung
 Bich Son
 Bich Ke

Kien Duc District

Kien Tin
 Kien Thanh
 Kieu Truc

Duc Lap District

Duc Minh I
 Duc Minh II

LAM DONG PROVINCEBao Lac District

Chau Lac
 Quan Lac
 Thien Lac
 Tan Lac
 Tan Phat
 Tan Thanh
 An Lac
 Tan Rai

Di Linh District

Gung Ri
 Dinh Tuc
 Dinh Trang Thg
 Da Hiep
 Di Linh
 Tan Dan
 Dinh Trang Ha

PHU YEN PROVINCESon Cau District

Xuan Tho
 Xuan Phung
 Xuan Loc
 Xuan Canh
 Xuan Thinh

Hieu Xuong District

Hoa Dong
 Hoa My

Dong Xuan District

Xuan Long
 Xuan Son

Tuy An District

An My
 An Hoa
 An Cu
 An Ninh
 An Hiep
 An Dan
 An Thach
 An Dinh

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AREAS OF PROVINCIAL PRECEDENCE

II CORPS

KHANH HOA PROVINCE

Van Ninh District

Van Phu
An Thang
Van Binh
Van Luong
Van Hung
Van Khanh
Van Long
Van Phuoc
Van Thanh

Vinh Xuan District

Vinh Ich
Vinh Luong

Dien Khanh District

Suoi Tan
Suoi Cat

Thanh Hai District

Vinh Ha

Ninh Hoa District

Ninh Phung
Ninh Quang
Ninh Binh
Ninh Hiep
Ninh Da
Ninh Giang
Ninh Phu
Ninh Ha
Ninh Than
Ninh Hung
Ninh Xuan
Ninh Loc
Ninh Dong
Ninh Diem
Ninh Hai
Ninh An
Ninh Tho

NINH THUAN PROVINCE

Du Long District

E Lam Ha
Cam Tho

DARLAC PROVINCE

Ban Me Thuot District

Quang Nhieu

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AREAS OF PROVINCIAL PRECEDENCEII CORPSPHU BON PROVINCEPhu Thien District

Pei Alang
 Plei Glung
 Plei Ksing
 Bon So OiHie
 Bon Chro Ponan
 Bin Oi Hli
 Bon Tong Se
 Bon Broai
 Plei Rngol Marin
 Plei Wong Bong
 Hau Bon
 Plei Atang A

Phu Tuc District

Son Quang
 Con Loc
 Duc My
 Son Hiep
 Son Hieu
 Ai Nu
 Son Thinh
 Duc Thinh
 Son Phu

PLEIKU PROVINCELe Trung District

Plei Grut
 Plei Boy
 Plei Klung
 Bien Ho
 Plei Brel
 Plei Koteng
 Le Chi
 Hoi Thuong
 Hoi Phu
 Bao Duc
 Pei Kodut
 Plei Blang
 Plei Gao Monang]
 Plei Roh
 Plei Ngo
 Plei Ngol
 Plei Chom Prong

Le Trung District(Cont'd)

La Son
 Plei Le Anh
 Plei Ring
 Plei Piom
 Phu Tho
 An My
 Le Cam
 Plei Brel Dor
 Phu My
 Plei Tot Tau
 Plei Kla Ngol

Thanh An District

Plei Yt
 Plei Lompang
 Bau Can
 Plei Xung Kueng
 Le Ngoc
 Gia Thien

Phu Nhon District

Plei Tott Bioc
 My Thach
 Plei Potau Nang
 Plei Kly
 Plei Chron Bo
 Unknown
 Plei Kuing Tor I
 Plei Kuing Brin

Thanh An District (Cont)

Thanh Binh
 Sung Thien
 Duc Khanh
 Duc Hung
 Thang Duc
 Plei Gao Monan

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCEIII CORPSGIA DINH PROVINCEGo Vap DistrictVillages

Thanh My Tay
 Binh Hoa
 Hanh Thuong
 Thong Tay Hoi
 An Nhon
 Thanh Loc
 An Phu Dong

Binh Chanh District

Binh Hung
 Phong Duoc
 Da Phuoc
 An Phu
 Qui Duc
 Hung Long
 Tan Tuc
 Tan Qui Tay
 An Phu Tay
 Binh Chanh
 Tan Nhat
 Tan Kien
 An Lac
 Tan Tao
 Binh Tri Dong

Nha Be DistrictVillages

Phuoc Loc Thon
 Phuoc Long Dong
 Long Duc
 Nhon Duc
 Long Kien
 Tan Qui Dong
 Tan Thuan Dong
 Phu My Tay
 Phu Xuan Hoi

Hoc Mon District

Tan Thoi Hiep
 Xuan Thoi Thuong
 Trung My Tay
 Tan Thoi Trung
 Tan Thoi Nhut
 Xuan Thoi Son
 Dung Hung Tan
 Nhi Binh
 Dong Thanh
 Thoi Tam Thon
 Tan Hiep
 Tan Thoi Nhi

Thu Duc DistrictVillages

Long Truong
 Long Thanh My
 Long Binh
 Phu Huu
 Thanh My Loi
 Binh Trung
 An Phu
 Phuoc Long
 Tang Nhon Phu
 Linh Xuan Thon
 Tam Binh
 Hiep Binh
 Linh Dong

Tan Binh District

Vinh Loc
 Binh Hung Hoa
 Tam Son Nhi
 Phu Tho Hoa
 Tan Phu
 Tan Son Hoa
 Phu Nhuan

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCEIII CORPSTAY NINH PROVINCEPhuoc Ninh DistrictVillage

Thai Binh
Tri Binh
Ninh Thuan
Thanh Dien
Thien Ngon

Khiem Hanh District

Cau Khoi
Thuan Loi
Phuoc Thanh
Ben Cui

Hieu Thien DistrictVillage

Thanh Phuoc
Hiep Thanh
Thanh Doc
Phuoc Trach
Binh Thanh
Long Thuan
Long Khanh
Long Giang
Phuoc Luu
Tien Thuan
An Thanh
Loi Thuan
Thuan Loo
Long Chu

Phu Khuong DistrictVillage

Thai Hiep Thanh
Long Thanh
Hiep Ninh
Ninh Thanh
Phuoc Hoi
Truong Hoa
Cam Giang

HAU NGHIA PROVINCEDuc Hue District

Hiep Hoa

Trang Bang District

An Hoa
An Tinh
Gia Binh
Gia Loc
Loc Giang

Cu Chi District

Tan Phu Trung
Tan An Hoi
Phuoc Vinh Minh
Phuoc Hiep
Thai My
Trung Lap

Duc Hoa District

Duc Hoa
Tan Phu Thuong
Hoa Khanh

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCEIII CORPSLONG AN PROVINCEThu Thua DistrictVillage

Binh Thanh
 Nai Binh
 Binh Phong Thanh
 Huong Tho Phu
 Loi Binh Nhon
 Khanh Hau

Rach Kien District

Phuoc Ly
 Long Dinh
 Phuoc Van
 Long Hoa
 Long Khe
 Long Trach
 Tan Trach

Can Duoc District

My Le
 Phuoc Tuy
 Tan Lan
 Tan An
 Phuoc Dong
 Tan Chanh
 Long Huu

Can Giuoc DistrictVillage

Truong Binh
 Long Thuong
 Long Phu Tay
 Tan Kim
 Phuoc Lai
 Long An
 My Loc
 Phuoc Hau
 Thuan Thanh
 Phuoc Lam
 Long Phung
 Phuoc Vinh Tay

Tan Tru District

Nhon Thanh Trung
 Que My Thanh
 My Binh

Ben Luc DistrictVillage

Long Phu
 Phuoc Loi
 Ly Yen
 Long Hiep
 Binh Duc
 Binh Nhut
 An Thanh
 Binh Chanh
 Thanh Ha
 Tan Bui
Binh Phuoc District

An Vinh Ngai
 Hoa Phu
 Binh Lap
 Binh Tam

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCE

III CORPS

LONG KHANH PROVINCE

Kiem Tan District

Village

Binh Hoa
Ben Nom
Gia Tan
Gia Kiem
Binh Loc

Xuan Loc District

Village

Xuan Loc Thoi Giao
An Loc
Dau Giay
Hung Loc
Tan Lap
Hieu Kinh

BIEN HOA PROVINCE

Cong Thanh District

Thai Hung
Binh Thanh
Tan Phu
Binh Long
Binh Phuoc
Binh Y
Tan Dinh
Loi Hoa
Binh Hoa
Tan Trieu
Thien Tan

Duc Tu District

Trang Bom
Ho Nai
Binh Truoc
Buu Long
Tam Thanh
Biu Tieng
Tan Van
Buu Hoa
Hiep Hoa
Tan Phong
Tam Hiep

Di An District

An Binh
Dong Hoa
Binh An
Tan Dong Hiep
Tan Hanh
Tan Hiep
Binh Tri
Hoa An

Tan Uyen District
Uyen Hung

BINH DUONG PROVINCE

Lai Thieu District

Vinh Phu
Phu Long
Tan Thoi
Binh Nham
Hung Dinh
An Thanh
An Son
An Phu
Binh Hoa
Thuan Giao

Phu Hoa District

Phu Hoa Dong
Trung An
Tan Hoa
Tan Thanh Dong
Binh My

Ben Cat District

Lai Hung
My Phuoc
Chanh Phu Hoa
Thoi Hoa
An Diem

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCE

III CORPS

BINH DUONG PROVINCE (CONT)

Chau Thanh District

Phu Cuong
Chanh Hiep
Phu Hoa
Binh Chuan
Tan Phuoc Khanh
Phu Huu
An My
Vinh Truong
Dinh Hoa
Tuong Binh Hiep
Tan An Xa
Tan Dinh
Hoa Loi
Phu Chanh

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAREAS OF PROVINCIAL PRECEDENCEIII CORPSHAU NGHIA PROVINCEDuc Hue DistrictVillageTan My
An NinhDuc Hoa DistrictVillageDuc Lap Thuong
Duc Lap Ha
My HanhPHUOC LONG PROVINCEPhuoc Binh District

Son Giang

BINH TUY PROVINCEHam Tan DistrictPhuoc Hoi
Binh Tan
Tan Hiep
Van My
Hiiep Hoa
Ba GiangTanh Linh DistrictHieu Tin
Huy Khiem
Duy Can
Lac TanhHoai Duc DistrictVo Dat
Sung Nhon
Vo Xu
Nghu DucLONG KHANH PROVINCEXuan Loc DistrictCam Tam
Cam My
Gia RayDinh Quan DistrictDinh-Quan
Phuong Tho
Dong Hiep
Dinh Quan**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~AREAS OF PROVINCIAL PRECEDENCEIII CORPSBIEN HOA PROVINCEDuc Tu DistrictVillage

Long Binh Tan
An Hoa Hung
Long Hung
Phuoc Tan

Tay Uyen District

Phuoc Thanh
Tan Ba

Long Thanh DistrictVillage

Tam Phuoc
Tam An
An Loi
Phuoc Loc
Long An
Long Phuoc
Thai Thien

Nhon Trach DistrictVillage

Phu Huu
Dai Phuoc
Phu Thanh
Long Tan
Phu Hoi
Phuoc Thien
Phuoc My
Phuoc Lai
Phuoc Long
Phuoc Tho
Vinh Thanh
Nhon Thanh
Phuoc Khanh

BINH DUONG PROVINCEPhu Giao District

Tan Binh
Phuoc Hoa
Vinh Hoa
Binh My
Vinh Tan

PHUOC TUY PROVINCELong Le District

Phuoc Le
Long Huong
Phu My
Long Son
Phuoc Hoa
Hoa Long

Xuyen Mcc District

Xuyen Mcc

Long Dien District

Long Dien
An Nhut
An Ngai
Tam Phuoc
Long Hai
Phuoc Tinh

Dat Do District

Phuoc Tho
Phuoc Thanh
Phuoc Hoa Long
Phuoc Hai
Hoi My
Phuoc Loi

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIALAREAS OF PROVINCIAL PRECEDENCEIII CORPSBINH LONG PROVINCEAn Loc DistrictVillage

Tan Lap Thu
 Tan Loi
 An Ninh
 Tan Phuoc
 Tanh Luong
 An Phu
 Minh Duc
 An My
 Thanh Binh

Loc Ninh DistrictVillage

Loc Thien
 Loc Ninh
 Loc Tan

Chau Thanh DistrictVillage

Hung Long

LONG AN PROVINCETan Tru District

Binh Tinh

Binh Phuoc District

Duong Xuan Hoi

GIA DINH PROVINCEQuang Xuyen District

Tan Hiep Thon

Can Gio District

Can Thanh

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCEIV CORPSAn Giang ProvinceChau Thanh DistrictVillages

My Phuoc
 My Thoi
 Phu Hoa
 Vinh Chanh
 Vinh Trach
 Binh Duc
 Hoa Binh Thanh
 Binh Hoa
 Binh Thuy
 Can Dang
 Vinh Hanh
 My Hoa Hung

Hue Duc District

Vong The
 Thoai Son
 Phu Nhuan
 Vinh Phu
 Dinh My

Thot Not DistrictVillages

Trung Nhut
 Thoi Thuan
 Tan Loc Tay
 Tan Loc Dong
 Thuan Hung
 Vinh Trinh
 Thanh Quoi
 Trung An
 Thanh An

Cho Moi DistrictVillages

Long Dien
 Kien An
 My Hoi Dong
 Nhon My
 Long Kien
 An Thanh Trung
 Hoa Binh
 My Luong
 Hoi An
 My Hiep
 Binh Phuoc Xua
 Tan My

Sa Dec ProvinceDuc Thanh District

Vinh Thoi
 Tan Thanh
 Long Hau
 Tan Phuoc
 Hoa Long
 Long Thang

Duc Ton District

Fhu Long
 Tan Nhuan Dong
 An Nhon
 Phu Huu
 An Phu Thuan

Lap Vo District

Binh Thanh Dong
 Binh Thanh Tay
 Binh Thanh Trung
 Hoi An Dong
 Dinh Yen
 Vinh Thanh
 Long Hung

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCEIV CORPSSA DEC PROVINCE (Cont)Duc Thinh DistrictVillages

Tan Khanh
 Tan Duong
 Hoa Thanh
 Tan Vinh Hoa
 Tan Phu Trung
 Binh Tien
 Tan Xuan
 An Tich
 Tan Hiep

KIEN GIANG PROVINCEKien Thanh District

My Lam
 Vinh Thanh Van
 An Hoa
 Vinh Hoa Hiep
 Minh Hoa

Kien Tan District

Tan Hiep
 Mong Tho
 Thanh Dong
 Giuc Tuong

Kien Binh District

Ban Tan Dinh

Kien An District

Dong Yen
 Tay Yen

VINH LONG PROVINCECho Lach District

Dong Phu
 Binh Hoa Phuoc

Tam Binh District

Song Phu

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCEIV CORPSVINH LONG PROVINCE (Cont)Chau Thanh DistrictVillages

Phu Quoi
 Loc Hoa
 Tan Hanh
 Tan Hoa
 Tan Ngai
 Tan An
 An Doc
 Phuoc Hau
 Long Ho
 Long My
 Long Thanh
 Long Duc
 Long Chau
 An Binh

Minh Duc DistrictVillages

Hoa Tinh
 Tan Long Hoi
 Binh Phuoc
 Hoa Hiep

Binh Minh DistrictVillages

Tan Luoc
 Tan Quoi
 Thanh Loi
 My Hoa
 Dong Thanh
 My Thuan

Vung Liem District

Trung Thanh
 Trung Hieu
 Trung Ngai
 Trung Hiep
 Hieu Phung
 Tan An Luong

VINH BINH PROVINCECang Long District

Binh Phu
 My Cam
 Dui Phuoc
 Nhi Long
 An Truong
 Phuoc Thanh
 Huyen Hoi
 Tan An

Chau Thanh District

Phu Vinh
 Da Loc
 Hoa Thuan
 Luong Hoa
 Nguyet Hoa
 Song Loc
 Thanh My
 Phuoc Hao

Cau Ngan District

Nhi Truong
 Hiep Hoa
 My Hoa

Tra Cu District

Phuoc Hung

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
AREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCE

IV CORPS

BAC LIEU PROVINCE

Vinh Loi District

Villages

Hung Hoi
 Vinh Trach
 Vinh Loi
 Long Thanh
 Hoa Binh

Gia Rai District

Villages

Phong Thanh
 Long Dien
 Vinh My
 An Trach

GO CONG PROVINCE

Hoa Dong District

Vinh Binh
 Thanh Tri
 Binh Phuc Nhi
 Thanh Nhut
 Vinh Huu
 Vinh Vien
 Dong Son
 Binh Phu Dong

Hoa Tan District

Tan Nien Tay
 Tan Phuoc
 Tan Nien Dong
 Binh Thanh Dong
 Thanh Cong Dong
 Binh Xuan
 Van Lang

Hoa Lac District

Long Thuan
 Yen Luung
 Binh Tan
 Binh An
 An Hoa
 Phuc Trung
 Tang Hoa

Hoa Binh District

Binh Long
 Binh Luong Duong

BA XUYEN PROVINCE

Ke Sach District

Dai Hai

Thuan Hoa District

Thuan Hoa
 Phu Tam
 An Ninh

Long Phu District

Truong Khanh
 Hau Thanh
 Dai Ngai
 Phu Huu
 Long Duc
 Chau Khanh
 Tan Thanh
 Tan Hung

My Xuyen District

Khanh Hung
 Tai Van
 Bai Xau
 Dai Tam
 Phu My
 Thanh Phu

CONFIDENTIALAREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCEIV CORPSBA KUYEN PROVINCE (Cont)Thanh Tri DistrictVillages

Thanh Kiet
 Thanh Tri
 Chau Hung
 Chau Thoi

KIEN HOA PROVINCEMo Cay District

Thanh Tay Tay

Giong Trom District

Phong Nam
 My Thanh
 Nhon Thanh
 Luong Quoi
 Binh Hoa
 Binh Thanh
 Tan Thanh
 Hiep Hung
 An Ngai Tay

Ham Long District

Tuong Da
 An Hiep
 Son Hoa
 My Thanh

Truc Giang District

Son Dong
 Quoi Son
 Tam Phuoc
 An Phuoc
 Phu An Hoa
 Huu Dinh
 Phuoc Thanh
 An Khanh
 Giao Long
 Phu Nhuan
 Son Dong
 Nhon Thanh

Ba Tri District

Bao Thanh
 Tan Thuy
 An Hoa Tay
 Vinh Hoa
 Phu Ngai
 Phuoc Tuy
 Phu Le
 An Duc
 An Binh Tay
 My Nhon
 Tan Kuan
 My Chanh Hoa
 My Thanh
 An Ngai Trung
 An Hiep

HONG DINH PROVINCEChau Thanh District

Tan An Phu Thu
 An Binh
 Long Tuyen
 Giai Xuan
 Tan Phu Thanh
 Thuan Duc
 Dong Phu
 Thuong Thanh
 Thanh An
 Thuong Thanh Dong

Phong Phu District

Tan Thoi

Phong Dien District

Cau Nhim
 Nhon Ai
 Nhon Nghia
 My Khanh

Thaun Nhon District

Chu Thien
 Thanh Hoa

Phung Hiep District

Dong Phuoc
 Long Thanh
 Phung Hiep

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCE

IV CORPS

DINH TUONG PROVINCE

Giao Duc District

Thanh Hung
My Loi
An Thai Trung
An Huu
Hung Thuan
Hoa Loc
An Thai Dong
My Doc Tuy
My Luong
My Duc Dong

Long Ding District

Dong Hoa
Vinh Kim
Song Thuan

Ban Long
Binh Trung
Huu Dao
Long Hung

Diem Hy
Duong Diem
Nhi Binh
Long Dinh

Cho Cao District

Song Binh
Long Binh Dien
Auan Dong
Tan Thuan Binh
Binh Phan
An Thanh Thuy
Quon Long
Binh Phuoc Nhut

Cai Lay District

Phu Nhuan Dong
Binh Phu
Cam Son

Tam Binh

Long Khanh
Thanh Hoa

My Hanh Trung
Nhi My
Tan Hoi
Nhi Qui
Phu Qui
My Long

Ben Tranh District

Tan Ly Dong
Tan Hoi Dong
Tan Huong
Tan Ly Tay
Hoa Tinh
My Tinh An
Than Cuu Nghai
Phu Kiet
Luong Hoa Lac
Tan Hiep

Cai Be District

My Thien
Hoa Khanh
Hau Thanh
Dong Hoa Hiep
Hoi Cu
My Thanh
Phu An
Hiep Duc
Auan Son
Hoi Son

Chau Thanh District

Thanh Phu
Phuoc Thanh
Tam Hiep
Long An
Binh Duc
Trung An
Dieu Hoa
Dao Thanh
Tan Long
My Phong
Tan My Chanh
Thoi Son

AREAS OF NATIONAL PRECEDENCE
IV CORPS

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAU DOC PROVINCE

Chau Phu District

Chau Phong
Vinh Nguyen
Chau Phu
Chau Giang
Hoa Loc
Khanh Hoa
Vinh Te
My Duc
Binh Thanh Dong
Hiep Xuong
Hung Nhon
Vinh Tranh Trung
Thanh My Tay
Binh Long
Binh My

An Phu District

Vinh Truong
Da Phuoc

Tan Chau District

Long Phu
Phu Vinh
Long Son
Phu Lam
Phu An
Hoa Hao

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AREAS OF PROVINCIAL PRECEDENCE

110 000000 IV CORPS

CHUONG THIEN PROVINCE

Long My District

Long Binh

Duc Long District

Vi Thanh
Hoa Luu
Vi Thuy
Vinh Tuong
Hoa An
Vinh Thuan
Vi Duc

KIEN PHONG PROVINCE

Kien Van District

Binh Hang Trung
Binh Hung Tay
Binh Thanh
Long Hiep
My Hoi
My Xuong
My Tho

Cao Lanh District

Tan Tich
Tinh Thoi
Tan Thuan Dong
Tan Thuan Tay
Hoa An
My Tra
My Ngai
An Binh
Nhi My
Tan An

KIEN TUONG PROVINCE

Kien Binh District

Thunh Hoa
Tan Hoa
Tan Binh
Nhon Ninh
Bac Hoa
Tri Phap

Chau Thanh District

Tuyen Thanh
Binh Hiep
Tan Lap
Binh Hoa Thon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AREAS OF PROVINCIAL PRECEDENCE

IV CORPS

AN XUYEN PROVINCE

Quan Long District

Tan Xuyen
Dinh Thanh
Hoa Thanh
Tan Loc

KIEN GIANG PROVINCE

Kien Thanh District

Soc Son

VINH BINH PROVINCE

Tieu Can District

Long Thoi
Tan Hoa

Cau Ngang District

My Long

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AREAS OF PROVINCIAL PRECEDENCE

IV CORPS

PHONG DINH PROVINCE

Thuan Nhon District

Tan Binh
Tan Hoa

Thuan Hoa District

My Hueng
My Thuan

BA XUYEN PROVINCE

Long Phu District

Song Phung

(Not in HES)

Ke Sach District

Ke An
An My
Thoi An Hoi
An Lac Tay
Nhon My

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX XIII

ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATION OF THE PROVINCE PACIFICATION PLAN AND REPORTS

1. PURPOSE: A single, integrated plan for the employment of all pacification resources within each province will be developed for, and monitored throughout, 1969. This annex outlines procedures for the preparation of the province pacification plan and monthly Status of Pacification Report from each province. The plan and report are the same called for in Appendix III, Annex B, of the Combined Campaign Plan, 1969, AB 144. However, the due date of 1 January 1969 specified in AB 144 has been extended to 15 January 1969.

2. PROVINCE PACIFICATION PLAN: The Province Pacification Plan will be a single document covering all aspects of the pacification campaign in the province. It will consist of a basic province plan, plus 13 annexes covering individual components of the pacification campaign.

The province plan will present the province's 1969 pacification objectives and its concept for the integrated employment of all pacification resources in the province. Specifically, the plan outlines the enemy situation, identifies friendly civil and military resources in the province, specifies province goals and sets forth the basic concepts for achieving them. Detailed guidance on the form and content of the basic plan is provided in Appendix I.

The province plan should be simple, use a series of map overlays, and schedules, and contain a minimum of narration. The new procedures for self help, village improvement, and province development, Annexes VI and XI, eliminate the need for pre-planning on an annual province-wide basis any construction related to pacification.

The only budget plan required as a part of the province PD plan is for self help and village improvement. This is a simple arithmetic computation as described in Annex VI to these Guidelines. Other elements of the pacification program requiring Central support will be covered in the appropriate annexes to the province plan. Cost estimates should be included where feasible and appropriate. These will be analyzed by the CPDC teams during the CTZ reviews (20-31 January 1969) as part of the Province Plan. Once the plan is approved, each ministry will channel the necessary support to province through the usual channels. As an example, if it is proposed in the Refugee Annex to the province plan that a new reception center be constructed, the PPEC will include an estimate of the cost in cash and commodities. If approved during the CTZ review, the MESWR will then provide the requisite support after having reviewed total budget implications of all province plans.

Outline plans for the different component programs of the Province Pacification Plan will be covered in annexes to the province plan listed in Appendix 1. The first four of these will involve overlays, all of which will be on a scale of 1/50,000.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Annex A, "Intelligence", will be an enemy situation overlay showing enemy units, estimated strengths, location of base areas, and plots of known liberation committees. See Appendix 2 for basic symbology.

Annex B, "Pacification Targets", includes as its major component an overlay showing the areas of national and provincial precedence, villages targeted for pacification emphasis in 1969, the D, E, and VC hamlets in each target village. Attached to the overlay will be a table listing the target villages, showing population, number of hamlets by category, and the deployment of the various military and civilian forces to each village. These tables will show initial deployment as of 1 February 1969 and projected deployment in succeeding phases, if any, as of 1 April, 1 July, and 1 October 1969. A sample format is at Appendix 3. See Appendix 2 for standard symbology.

Annex C, "Military Support," will consist of three overlays:

- (1) An overlay displaying the initial and planned location, by unit identification, of ARVN, RF, PF, and other units.
- (2) An overlay showing outposts and artillery.
- (3) An overlay showing key LOCs.

See appendix 2 for standard symbology.

Annex D, "Civil Forces", is an overlay displaying the initial location of RD cadre, National Police, APT, and other civil elements. See Appendix 2 for standard symbology.

Annexes E through M are narrative in nature and should follow this basic outline:

- I. Province goal(s).
- II. Forces and resources available.
- III. Plans for utilization of resources to achieve goal(s), including phasing, if any.
- IV. Special Problems.

3. MONTHLY STATUS OF PACIFICATION REPORT. Each PPDC will submit a monthly Status of Pacification Report recording changes which have occurred in the status of pacification as of the final day of the month under review. The report will be in the form of a recapitulation table highlighting accomplishments and actual changes in locations of major military units and civil elements. When a major change is made in the province plan, an overlay (scale 1/50,000) following the format of Annex B will be submitted depicting the change. The monthly Status of Pacification Report will be submitted simultaneously to the CTZ and Central PE Councils by the tenth of each calendar month. The first report will be due to CPDC and JGS on 10 March 1969. Full instructions on the preparation of this report, including a sample

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

recapitulation table will be forwarded to CTZ and provinces in advance of that date.

Current reporting requirements issued by CPDC or the respective ministries on specific aspects of pacification will continue to be fulfilled. APC reporting requirements will be discontinued after the final reports, i.e., through 31 January 1969, have been submitted.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. CTZ Pacification and Development Councils:

- (1) Give basic corps-wide strategic guidance to PPDCs.
- (2) Examine and comment on the province plans.
- (3) Host meetings for CPDC review and approval of each province plan during the period January 20 - February 1, 1969.

b. Province Pacification and Development Councils:

- (1) Develop the province pacification plan as indicated in paragraph 2 above, in conjunction with the province senior advisor.
- (2) Submit the plan to the CTZ PD Council with two copies to the Central Pacification and Development Council not later than 15 January 1969.

c. In accordance with the Combined Campaign Plan, AB 144, the province senior advisor will assist in developing the plan and will sign that he concurs in the feasibility and general appropriateness of the plan.

Appendices:

- I - Province pacification plan outline
- II - Signs and symbols
- III - Sample recapitulation table

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 1: (Province Pacification Plan Outline)
to Annex XIII

Pacification Plan for 1969

Province/Sector _____

Date _____

Reference: A. 1969 Central Pacification and Development Council
Guidelines, Annex XIII

B. 1969 Combined Campaign Plan, AB 144

1. SITUATION:

- a. Enemy situation (Annex A, Overlay). See sample.
- b. Friendly situation (Annex C and D, overlays).

2. MISSION/OBJECTIVES:

A statement of basic objectives including provincial goals (as appropriate) in support of each of the Eight Objectives set forth in the basic guidelines. For example:

- a. Bring security to 90% of the population: Define the province goal for population to be raised to a HES security status of "C" or better by 31 December 1969. Express this in numbers of hamlets and as percentage of total population.
- b. Eliminate 33,000 VCI: State the province goal. Indicate the number of known VCI in the province.
- c. Bring the PSDF up to 2,000,000 members and arm 400,000: Indicate the present strength of PSDF in the province and the number of arms issued. State the number to be organized and the number of arms to be issued in 1969.
- d. Establish local government: Indicate the number of villages and hamlets 1) with elected government; 2) with elected governments in exile; 3) with appointed government; 4) with appointed government in exile; and 5) no government. State the number planned to be elected in 1969; the number to be appointed.
- e. Rally 20,000 Hoi Chanh: Outline major actions to be accomplished during the year. Example, double to APT from 62 to 124.
- f. Resettle 300,000 Refugees: Show estimated total number of refugees in the province, by status, as of 21 February 1969 and the objective levels for the categories.
- g. Increase information and Propaganda Effort: Show the present strength of information cadre within the province and the goals for recruitment, training, and deployment in 1969.
- h. Encourage the Rural Economy: Estimate the production of the three main agricultural commodities of the province in 1968 and state goals for 1969. Indicate number of static checkpoints in existence on 1 February and number to be eliminated in 1969. State goals for reducing administrative measures restricting the flow of trade within, and to and from, the Province.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**3. EXECUTION:****a. Concept:**

Briefly describe the rationale for selection of target villages and deployment of major assets. Show details on overlays (Annexes B, C and D). Simplified budget and programming requirements will be covered in Section 4.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Describe any special command arrangements such as control of campaign areas, if any.

b. Outline in a recapitulation sheet the plan for expanding the village/hamlet radio system to cover target villages (and hamlets in them) and to fill gaps in already relatively secure areas.

 Province/Chief

 Province Senior Advisor
 (Opinion in feasibility and general
 appropriateness of the plan)
Annexes:

- A. Intelligence (overlay)
- B. Pacification Targeting (overlay)
- C. Military Support (overlay)
- D. Civil Force (overlay)
- E. Attack on Viet Cong Infrastructure
- F. Village Government
- G. Self Defense
- H. National Police
- I. RD Cadre
- J. Self Help
- K. Chieu Hoi
- L. Refugees
- M. Rural Economy

Note: This is the same plan required by Appendix 3 to Annex B to the Combined Campaign Plan, 1969, AB 144. Where differences in detailed instructions exist, the directives contained herein take precedence.


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 2 (Signs and Symbols) TO ANNEX XII (Preparation of Province Pacification Plan and Monthly Status Report) to 1969 PACIFICATION GUIDELINES



SIGNS AND SYMBOLS

Standard signs and symbols are used in the overlays. Symbols will be in black ink, except as indicated below:

-  Province Boundary
-  District Boundary
-  Outline of Target Village (Initial)
-  ARVN Battalion, PF Platoon & RF Company involved in current territorial security (Unit Number is indicated on the right)
-  Other units
-  Hamlets in Target Villages (GVN three-digit Hamlet Serial Number is indicated above symbol)
-  RD Cadre Group (Group Designation Indicated)
-  Civil/Military Team (if any)
-  Troung Son Group (if any)
-  Future Location of RD Cadre Gp, Civ/Mil Team, Troung S. Gp
-  Chieu Hoi Center
-  Refugee Center
-  Planned Chieu Hoi and Refugee Centers
-  Enemy Units
-  Location of Enemy Base Areas
-  Location of Village Liberation Committee
-  Location of District Liberation Committee

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

	(RED)	Location of Province Liberation Committee
	(BLUE)	Road essential to pacification plan
	(AMBER)	Road, Secure Day Only
	(RED)	Road, Insecure
	(RED) (AMBER)	Road, Planned for Securing to Day Security
	(AMBER) (BLUE)	Road, Planned for Securing to Day & Night Security
	(BLUE)	Waterway, essential to pacification plan
	(AMBER)	Waterway, Secure Day only
	(RED)	Waterway, Insecure
	(RED) (AMBER)	Waterway, Planned for Securing to Day Security
	(AMBER) (BLUE)	Waterway, Planned for Securing to Day & Night Security
	(BLUE)	Secure village within Geographic Area of Precedence
	(GREEN)	Geographic Area of National Precedence
	(AMBER)	Geographic Area of Provincial Precedence
		National Police
		Existing Platoon-size Operating Base
		Existing Company-size Operating Base
		Existing Tower
		Planned for 1969
		To be Abolished in 1969

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

*Mrs. Carlson
J (FHE)
Cliff
Walker*

CENTRAL PACIFICATION
AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

Agency for International Development



1970

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.


IDA 71-1571-393

CONFIDENTIAL

C/D W/Willis

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222



S. S. S.

MACJ01R

28 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign, July -
 October 1969

1. Attached is a translation of Prime Ministerial Directive 924/PTH/T/BDXD/KH, "Implementation of 1969 Pacification and Development Plan", dated 26 June 1969, covering strategy, concepts and goals of Phase II of the 1969 Pacification and Development Campaign during the period 1 July - 31 October 1969. President Thieu has designated Phase II as the "1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign" to emphasize that it demands maximum effort to achieve the goals, which were earlier considered end-year objectives, by 31 October 1969.

2. To prevent loss of momentum, no major conceptual change has been introduced in Phase II. However, one important new feature is the attention given to raising C hamlets to A or B category. President Thieu has set raising A and B population to 50 percent of the total population (excluding Saigon) by 31 October as a principal goal - 6.6 percent increase over end-May.

3. The Prime Minister's Directive constitutes guidance to US commanders and advisors for providing support to the GVN's pacification effort. Our objective is to make maximum contribution to achievement of the goals of the "1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign".

W. E. Colby
 W. E. COLBY
 DEPCORDS/MACV

1 Incl
 as

DISTRIBUTION:
 See attached sheet

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
 SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLUDED IN IDA

71-131 195

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>DISTRIBUTION LIST</u>	<u>NUMBER OF COPIES</u>
<u>Distribution</u>	
JCS	10
CINCPAC	5
Dept. of State	3
OSD/ISA VN Desk	1
USA JFK CEN SPWAR	3
American Embassy, Saigon	10
JUSPAO	4
USAID	8
VN Trn Center, Wash DC	1
COMUSMACV	1
Dep. to COMUSMACV	1
Dep. to COMUSMACV CORDS	12
Chief of Staff	1
SJS	1
J-1	1
J-2	1
J-3	3
J-4	1
J-5	1
J-6	1
CORDS	72
COC	6
AG	1
MACOI	1
MACPD	1
MACT	1
MACDC	1
MACFWMA	10
MACMA-AL	18
MAC SOG	1
MACIG	1
MACSA	1
CG, USARV	34
Commander, 7th AF	3
COMNAVFORV	3
CG, III MAF/SA I CORPS	65
CG, I FFFORCE/SA II CORPS	65
CG, II FFFORCE/SA III CORPS	71

CONFIDENTIAL

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

104

IDA 72-131 195

CONFIDENTIALDISTRIBUTION LISTNUMBER OF COPIESDistribution (Cont'd)

CG, XXIV CORPS	3
CG, DMAC	67
Province Senior Advisor (3 ea)	132
District Senior Advisor	252
White House	3
CIA	3
AID, Wash DC	15

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Republic of Vietnam
Office of the Prime Minister
Central Pacification and
Development Council

No. 924 PThT/BDXD/KH

CIRCULAR

SUBJECT: Phase II Goals of 1969 PD Plan

REF : Cir. #142 PThT/BDXD/K dtd 15 Feb 69

Cir. #183 PThT/BDXD dtd 7 Mar 69

Message #0751/UBPH/TU dtd 30 Apr 69

Minutes of the PDCC meeting with CTZ/PDC representative on
23 May 1969

1. Phase II of the 1969 Pacification and Development Campaign will cover the four month period 1 July 1969 through 31 October 1969, emphasizing a two-fold objective for Phase II:

- a. The fulfillment or over-fulfillment of the eight objectives originally set for the 1969 campaign.
- b. The achievement of a fully secure (HES security rating of A or B) status for 50% of the hamlet population. The CTZ will assign population goals to each province.

2. To emphasize the urgency of completing 1969 goals by 31 October instead of 31 December and the special emphasis on the accelerated up-grading of C hamlets to A or B, Phase II will be referred to as the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign, or "1969 APC."

3. The "1969 APC" will focus on the following national short range priorities for the balance of this year:

- To complete the consolidation of the local government.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- To bring 100% of the population under GVN control.
- To push forward the land reform program.

4. The goals for each of the eight objectives of the 1969 APC are as shown on the annexed tables 1 - 8. It will be noted that new goals have been added in support of certain of the eight objectives to sharpen the emphasis on activities considered of primary significance under current conditions. The emphasis to be placed during the 1969 APC under each of the eight objectives will be as follows:

a. Objective 1 - Hamlet and Population Control.

- (1) Starting in early July 1969, all CTZs will deploy their available forces to occupy all target hamlets at the same time. Operations must be conducted continuously and deeply into the enemy base areas to disrupt his supply and infiltration routes and, if possible, to reduce enemy ground attacks, and attacks by fire, in secure villages and hamlets (ABC) by 50% as compared to the first semester level. The Regional Force, Popular Force and People's Self-Defense Force should cooperate to increase their ambushes and patrols to destroy the enemy infrastructure and local forces, in order to support effectively the village and hamlet development programs. The other support forces should increase their psyops and civic action activities in order to strengthen the confidence of the people, to unite more closely the people of all walks of life in the organization and consolidation of the local government, and to stimulate the rural economy more vigorously.
- (2) With regard to target hamlets, first priority will be given to bringing at least a C level of security to 90% of the population. On the basis of submissions by the Corps Commanders, the President approved a target of 1,038 D, E, and V hamlets to be raised to a HES security rating of C during the 1969 APC. The CTZ breakdowns and suggested province breakdown of these goals are shown on the annexed tables 1a and 1b respectively. CTZ recommendations for changes in the province goals are invited. D, E and V hamlets tentatively targeted by the provinces for Phase II which reach the C level prior to 1 July 1969 will be deleted from the list and the hamlet targets will be correspondingly reduced. In no case will the D, E, V hamlet

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

target exceed the number of D, E, and V hamlets in the province as of 30 June 1969. Phase I target hamlets not entered by pacification forces prior to 1 July 1969 will be added to the 1969 APC.

- (3) Second priority in the territorial security program will be accorded to the task of raising enough of the population now in a security status of C or lower to an A or B status, so that 50% of the hamlet population will be in an A or B status by 31 October 1969.
 - (a) The attached tables 1d-h show the CTZ population goals under this objective, together with a suggested province breakdown. Hamlet equivalents, based on the average population of C hamlets in each province, are included for convenience in planning. PRDC comments or recommendations on the suggested province goals are invited.
 - (b) The objective of increasing the A and B population is second in priority only to the basic 1969 goal of bringing at least a C level of security to 90% of the population. Therefore, it will have first claim to all resources in the province not essential to the 90% goal, including available ARVN forces.
 - (c) Guidance to Province and District Chiefs and Mayors on techniques to be employed in raising C (or below) hamlets to an A or B status will be distributed in the near future. It is emphasized that the Government is seeking a genuine qualitative improvement in these hamlets as a means of cementing the loyalty and active support of the population to the Central Government.
- (4) It is emphasized with regard to both sets of hamlet goals that success will be measured in numbers of people rather than numbers of hamlets. The use of hamlet equivalents in the goal formulations is designed to provide a guide in determining pacification force requirements. Once province population goals have been finally determined, the provinces will select enough hamlets to reach those goals and will inform the RPDC and the CPDC of the hamlets selected to meet both the 90% ABC and 50% AB goals. These reports are due in Corps and Saigon by 15 July 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**b. Objective 2 - Render the VCI Ineffective.**

- (1) All Province Chiefs and Mayors will take a personal interest in this campaign. The Phase I monthly VCI target (Categories A and B only) of 1,800 is continued, with the same CTZ breakdown. A new goal has been added for the 1969 APC calling for the sentencing of 5,000 VCI, as shown in Table 2. The purpose is not to convict the innocent but to expedite decisions one way or the other and establish sentences for the convicted which will effectively remove them from the war for the duration of the insurgency. National Police personnel must be fully assigned and trained and must be present at all elected villages in order to increase the police and security activities and to eliminate the enemy infrastructure. There should be measures to improve the public safety, and at the same time reduce the level of enemy terrorism to 50% as compared to the first semester.

c. Objective 3 - PSDF. It is most important that these goals be met, using women and youth as necessary (Reference letter #3451 dated 31 May 1969, MOI). It is emphasized that the PSDF recruitment goal represents members active and present for duty.**d. Objective 4 - Establishment of Village and Hamlet Government.**

- (1) All programs for the recruitment and training of village/hamlet officials set forth in the original 1969 plan remain in effect. In addition, emphasis will be placed in the 1969 APC on the staffing and training of all village/hamlet positions prescribed in MOI Decree 045, with priority to A and B hamlets. All A and B hamlets and the villages in which they are located should be fully staffed with officials by 31 October. Priorities for training will be accorded to Information, Land Reform and technical cadre, etc.
- (2) The Village Self Development program will be emphasized in the 1969 APC. Finance vouchers for these projects will be completed by 31 December 1969.
- (3) Village/hamlet election targets for the 1969 APC are as shown on Tables 4a and b. Information campaigns in support of elections should start no later than one month before the elections to insure that the people understand the issues, know the candidates and participate in the voting.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALe. Objective 5 - Chieu Hoi.

- (1) The 1969 APC Chieu Hoi goals are as shown on Table 5. Since they call for the generation of Hoi Chanh at approximately the actual Phase I rate, there should be no reason why the goals cannot be achieved.
- (2) Emphasis will be placed in the 1969 APC on the rehabilitation and useful employment of Hoi Chanh, particularly in APTs and mobile PF units.

f. Objective 6 - Refugees. The revised Phase I goals for refugees resettled or returned to their home villages were not met and it is recognized that the 1969 APC goals are also ambitious. Every effort will be made, however, to reestablish as many refugees as possible, keeping in mind that the main objective is to restore these citizens to a normal life in such a manner that they will consider themselves to have been fairly treated by their government. In particular, no effort will be made to force refugees or ex-refugees to participate in return-to-village campaigns against their will. Heavy emphasis will be placed during the campaign on the reestablishment of villages and hamlets for the refugees. A separate directive will be distributed.g. Objective 7 - Information and Propaganda.

- (1) The information goals for the 1969 APC stress the complete staffing of information cadre positions and the training of personnel, plus the use of varying techniques to explain to the people the goals of the PD program and their role in it. The emphasis in this important program should be on informing and educating the people, rather than merely on recording government successes and enemy atrocities.
- (2) All Province Chiefs and City Mayors will participate personally in planning and supervising the information programs for their own localities. An information campaign will be conducted each month in the villages and hamlets to publicize the objectives of the 1969 APC. Each province should have a plan for each monthly campaign which will be submitted to the CTZ for approval two weeks before the start of the campaign.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- (3) Two information campaigns will also be conducted at the national level, one near the beginning and the second near the end of the 1969 APC. Their objectives will be to widely propagate our achievements, to sustain popular interest in the program, and to establish favorable conditions for the pacification and development plan in the coming year.
- h. Objective 8 - Stimulate the Rural Economy. The only goal prescribed for the 1969 APC under this objective relates to the current program for the redistribution of appropriated and French-owned land. PPDCs will, however, continue to stress the several other programs contributing to this directive, including LOC improvement and security, reduction of unnecessary provincial restrictions and LOC checkpoints, the promotion of "miracle rice" production, etc.
5. The goals established above for each CTZ will be further broken down to each Province and City within the CTZ by the appropriate Ministry after discussion with the appropriate CTZ PD Council concerning the capabilities of the various Provinces and Cities.
6. Reports on the goals distributed to each Province and City should be completed by the CTZ and forwarded to the CPDC prior to 15 July 1969.

Saigon, 26 June 1969
The Prime Minister
President of the Central Pacification
and Development Council

/s/ Tran Van Huong

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 1a

HAMLET GOALS

	Hamlets Secure as of 31 Jan 69	Phase I Goal	Total After Completion of Phase I	Phase II Goals	Total After Phase II	Total of Hamlets in Country(1)	Percent Secure After Phase II
I CTZ	1,087	317	1,404	207	1,611	2,308	71.2%
II CTZ	1,932	378	2,310	249	2,559	2,991	84.2%
III CTZ	1,294	324	1,618	112	1,730	1,890	87.0%
IV CTZ	2,732	672	3,404	470	3,874	4,455	81.0%
TOTAL	7,045	1,691	8,736	1,038	9,774	11,644	81.2%

(1) According to the HES.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 1a1

D. E. V. TARGET HAMLETS BY PROVINCE

<u>I CTZ</u>		<u>II CTZ</u>		<u>III CTZ</u>		<u>IV CTZ</u>	
Quang Tri	43	Pleiku	35	Hau Nghia	5	Dinh Tuong	65
Thua Thien	51	Kontum	10	Long An	72	Go Cong	8
Quang Nam	33	Binh Dinh	75	Binh Duong	5	Kien Hoa	55
Quang Tin	40	Phu Yen	25	Binh Long	16	Kien Phong	30
Quang Ngai	40	Darlac	45	Long Khanh	7	Kien Tuong	74
		Khanh Hoa	0	Binh Tuy	2	Vinh Binh	74
		Tuyen Duc	25	Phuoc Tuy	4	Vinh Long	39
		Lam Dong	0	Tay Ninh	1	Sa Dec	24
		Binh Thuan	27			Phong Dinh	29
		Ninh Thuan	7			Chuong Thien	28
		Quang Duc	0			Bac Lieu	11
		Phu Bon	0			Chau Doc	29
						Kien Giang	26
						An Xuyen	20
						Ba Xuyen	28
TOTAL	<u>207</u>	TOTAL	<u>249</u>	TOTAL	<u>112</u>	TOTAL	<u>470</u>

GRAND TOTAL - 1,038

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 1b

POPULATION CONTROL

<u>CTZ Population</u>	<u>Population When Phase I Hamlets Upgraded</u>	<u>Population Goal for Phase II</u>	<u>Total ABC After Both Phases</u>	<u>Goal for % Population ABC as of 31 Oct 69</u>
I				
2,824,100	2,344,887	157,527	2,502,414	88.6
II				
3,100,700	2,741,747	165,585	2,907,332	93.8
III				
5,423,100	5,271,120	69,664	5,340,784	98.5
IV				
5,871,200	4,912,036	414,070	5,326,106	90.7
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL				
17,219,100	15,269,790	806,846	16,076,636	93.4

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 1c

REDUCTION OF TERRORISM

PHASE II 1969

TOTAL TERRORISM IN PHASE I

FROM 1 FEB 69 TO 31 MAY 69:

16,861 INCIDENTS

MONTHLY AVERAGE:

4,215 INCIDENTS

ESTIMATED TOTAL TERRORISM OCCURRING

IN PHASE II (REDUCTION 50%):

8,430 INCIDENTS

MONTHLY AVERAGE:

2,108 INCIDENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 1d

CORPS
SUMMARY
(as of 31 May 69)

CTZ	Current Population in A-B Status	(Pop in 000s)		Total Province Population	% of Population to be in A-B Status	Approx. Hamlet Equivalent (2)
		Population to be Up-graded	Population to be in A-B Status by 31 Oct 69			
I	1,476.5	98.1	1,574.6	2,824.1	55.7	101
II	1,390.1	219.0	1,609.1	3,100.7	51.8	277
*III (1)	1,290.5	326.8	1,617.3	3,218.2	50.4	196
IV	2,336.1	335.3	2,671.4	5,871.2	43.7	270
*National	6,493.2	979.2	7,472.4	15,014.2	50.0	844

(1)* Less Saigon

(2) Hamlet Equivalents are based on average population of the C Hamlets in each CTZ and are not the number of target hamlets. These figures will help CTZ to have an idea when they redistribute the target hamlets to each Province. This estimate is according to HES aimed at assisting the addressees to understand the population in their localities and population to be controlled in accordance with the criteria that 50% of the non-Saigon population throughout the country should be in A and B categories by 31 Oct 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 1e

PROVINCES - I.CTZ
(as of 31 May 69)

(Pop in 000s)

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>Current Population in A-B Status</u>	<u>Population to be Up-graded</u>	<u>Population to be in A-B Status by 31 Oct 69</u>	<u>Total Province Population</u>	<u>% of Population to be in A-B Status</u>	<u>Approx. Hamlet Equivalent (1)</u>
Quang Tri	133.3	25.2	158.5	297.8	53.4	48
Thua Thien	353.5	18.1	371.6	475.6	78.0	18
Quang Nam	173.5	21.5	195.0	566.5	34.5	14
Quang Tin	174.6	10.8	185.4	383.8	48.4	10
Quang Ngai	139.2	22.5	161.7	597.4	27.1	11
Hue	183.0	0	183.0	183.0	100.0	0
Da Nang	<u>319.9</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>319.9</u>	<u>319.9</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	1,476.5	98.1	1,574.6	2,824.1	55.7	101

- (1) The hamlet equivalent is based on the average population in the C hamlets in each province and not the number of target hamlets. These will help the provinces to have an idea when they formulate their own plans.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

PROVINCES - II CTZ
(as of 31 May 69)

Table 1f

PROVINCE	Current Population in A-B Status	(Pop in 000s)		Total Province Population	% of Population to be in A-B Status	Approx. Hamlet Equivalent (1)
		Population to be Up-graded	Population to be in A-B Status by 31 Oct 69			
Kontum	52.2	8.5	60.7	113.8	53.4	32
Binh Dinh	262.4	67.9	330.3	964.2	34.2	52
Pleiku	89.9	5.6	95.5	194.1	49.2	15
Phu Bon	48.1	1.2	49.3	66.3	74.4	4
Phu Yen	144.0	35.5	179.5	318.9	56.2	41
Darlac	118.5	11.3	129.8	210.4	61.8	29
Khanh Hoa	174.1	33.9	208.0	401.9	51.8	35
Ninh Thuan	97.2	16.8	114.0	177.8	64.2	13
Tuyen Duc	41.7	9.3	51.0	103.8	49.1	17
Quang Duc	14.7	2.8	17.5	33.1	52.9	6
Lam Dong	43.4	6.6	50.0	73.7	67.8	12
Binh Thuan	144.6	19.6	164.2	266.8	61.6	17
Cam Ranh	88.2	.8	89.0	90.9	98.0	1
Dalat	62.2	4.4	66.6	84.4	79.0	3
TOTAL	1,390.1	219.0	1,609.1	3,100.7	51.8	277

CONFIDENTIAL

(1) The hamlet equivalent is based on the average population in the C hamlets in each province and not the number of target hamlets. These will help the provinces to have an idea when they formulate their own plans.

CONFIDENTIAL

PROVINCES - III CTZ
(as of 31 May 69)

(Pop in 000s)

PROVINCE	Current Population in A-B Status	Population to be Up-graded	Population to be in A-B Status by 31 Oct 69	Total Province Population	% of Population to be in A-B Status	Approx. Hamlet Equivalent (1)
Binh Tuy	24.2	10.8	35.0	65.8	53.2	10
Long Khanh	76.3	11.5	87.8	140.4	62.5	11
Phuoc Long	12.4	6.2	18.6	44.4	41.8	10
Binh Long	22.6	2.5	25.1	66.4	37.9	4
Binh Duong	63.5	43.0	106.5	235.7	45.2	24
Tay Ninh	176.8	26.0	202.8	325.7	62.3	13
Hau Nghia	18.7	10.7	29.4	188.9	15.6	7
Bien Hoa	272.7	29.4	302.1	437.2	69.2	20
Phuoc Tuy	31.0	18.6	49.6	107.1	46.4	19
Long An	86.0	24.4	110.4	361.7	30.6	30
Gia Dinh	417.4	143.7	561.1	1,156.0	48.6	48
Vung Tau	88.9	0	88.9	88.9	100.0	0
TOTAL	1,290.5	326.8	1,617.3	3,218.2	50.4	196

(1) The hamlet equivalent is based on the average population in the C hamlets in each province and not the number of target hamlets.

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 1h

PROVINCES - IV CTZ
(as of 31 May 69)

(Pop in 000s)

PROVINCE	Current Population in A-B Status	Population to be Up-graded	Population to be in A-B Status by 31 Oct 69	Total Province Population	% of Population to be in A-B Status	Approx. Hamlet Equivalent (1)
Go Cong	123.8	10.7	134.5	175.5	76.5	21
Kien Tuong	2.2	6.7	8.9	42.1	21.1	10
Kien Phong	134.3	14.8	149.1	359.2	41.6	9
Dinh Tuong	176.3	42.4	218.7	536.7	40.7	39
Kien Hoa	112.1	23.6	135.7	547.8	24.8	8
Vinh Binh	65.9	37.9	103.8	404.1	25.7	41
Vinh Long	213.9	30.2	244.1	493.6	49.6	19
An Giang	533.9	1.5	535.4	548.2	97.8	1
Kien Giang	180.9	26.5	207.4	395.8	52.4	17
Chuong Thien	61.9	7.2	69.1	238.3	29.0	6
Phong Dinh	168.7	13.1	181.8	428.4	42.4	8
Ba Xuyen	135.9	31.9	167.6	380.2	44.1	28
An Xuyen	5.3	9.5	14.8	275.2	5.4	7
Bac Lieu	88.4	19.0	107.4	279.8	38.5	12

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 1h

PROVINCES - IV CTZ (Contd)
(as of 31 May 69)

(Pop in 000s)

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>Current Population in A-B Status</u>	<u>Population to be Up-graded</u>	<u>Population to be in A-B Status by 31 Oct 69</u>	<u>Total Province Population</u>	<u>% of Population to be in A-B Status</u>	<u>Approx. Hamlet Equivalent (1)</u>
Chau Doc	252.6	28.1	280.7	491.9	57.2	20
Sa Dec	80.0	32.2	112.2	274.6	40.8	14
TOTAL	2,336.1	335.3	2,671.4	5,871.2	43.7	270

- (1) The hamlet equivalent is based on the average population in the C hamlets in each province and not the number of target hamlets. These will help the provinces to have an idea when they formulate their own plans.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Table 2

CONFIDENTIALPHUNG HOANG

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>Phase I Goal</u>	<u>Estimated Results</u>	<u>Percent of Goal</u>	<u>Phase II Goal</u>	<u>Sentenced</u>
I	2,000	1,782	89	1,600	1,100
II	1,750	1,349	77	1,400	900
III	2,250	1,010	45	1,800	1,200
IV	3,000	2,571	86	2,400	1,800
TOTAL	9,000	6,712	75	7,200	5,000

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 3

PSDFPHASE II

<u>CTZ</u>		<u>Estimated as of 30 Jun 69</u>	<u>Phase II Goals</u>	<u>Estimated Total as of 31 Oct 69</u>
I	Organized	216,418	59,250	275,668
	Trained	159,053	47,400	206,453
	Equipped	69,520	11,475	80,995
II	Organized	198,977	61,500	260,477
	Trained	175,045	49,200	224,245
	Equipped	66,360	11,781	78,141
III	Organized	621,910	135,375	757,285
	Trained	436,780	108,300	545,080
	Equipped	104,280	28,880	133,160
IV	Organized	387,695	118,875	506,570
	Trained	369,122	95,100	464,222
	Equipped	75,840	23,761	99,601
TOTAL	Organized	1,425,000	375,000	1,800,000
	Trained	1,140,000	300,000	1,440,000
	Equipped	316,000	75,897	391,897

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALVILLAGE ELECTIONS

(From 1 July 69 to 31 Oct 69)

<u>CTZ</u>	Elected as of <u>31 Jan 69</u>	Elected as of <u>30 Jun 69</u>	<u>Phase II Goals</u>		Elected as of <u>31 Oct 69</u>	Total Villages (1)
			<u>Elected</u>	<u>Appointed</u>		
I	174	329	40	0	369	526
II	339	550	14	0	564	605
III	235	352	24	0	376	443
IV	398	622	22	8	644	729
	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	1,146	1,853	100	8	1,953	2,303

(1) MOI statistics as of 1 June 1969. (No figures available in HES).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 4b

HAMLET
ELECTIONS

(From 1 Jul 69 to 31 Oct 69)

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>Elected</u>		<u>Phase II Goal</u>		<u>Elected</u>	<u>Total</u>
	<u>31 Jan 69</u>	<u>30 Jun 69</u>	<u>Elected</u>	<u>Appointed</u>	<u>31 Oct 69</u>	<u>Hamlets (1)</u>
I	714	1,559	85	1	1,644	2,308
II	1,561	2,413	105	29	2,518	2,991
III	750	1,483	199	181	1,692	1,890
IV	<u>1,813</u>	<u>3,339</u>	<u>270</u>	<u>233</u>	<u>3,609</u>	<u>4,455</u>
TOTAL	4,838	8,794	659	444	9,453	11,644

(1) According to HES.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 5

CHIEU - HOI

CTZ	<u>1968 Results</u>	<u>Phase I Goal</u>	<u>Phase I Results</u>	<u>Phase II Goals</u>
I	3,059	2,000	1,736	1,600
II	1,916	2,300	1,411	1,200
III	2,813	4,300	2,346	2,000
IV	10,383	7,000	13,179	9,200
TOTAL	18,171	15,600	18,672	14,000

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 6

REFUGEE PHASE II

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>Est. Situation 30 Jun 69</u>		<u>Phase II Goals</u>		<u>Phase II Total Goals</u>	<u>Targeted Situation as of 31 Oct 69</u>	
	<u>In Camp</u>	<u>Out of Camp</u>	<u>In Camp</u>	<u>Out of Camp</u>		<u>In Camp</u>	<u>Out of Camp</u>
I	330,000	187,734	272,788	187,734	460,522	59,212	0
II	110,000	263,776	85,953	263,776	349,729	22,017	0
III	55,000	29,614	41,508	29,614	71,122	13,492	0
IV	60,000	160,000	23,258	128,468	151,726	36,492	31,532
TOTAL	<u>555,000</u>	<u>641,124</u>	<u>423,507</u>	<u>609,592</u>	<u>1,033,099</u>	<u>131,213</u>	<u>31,532</u>
		1,196,124				162,745	

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 7

INFORMATION PSYWAR

1. The Central Government will conduct two national information campaigns during the 1969 APC and each province will organize one operation a month.
2. The Province Chiefs and Mayors will hold seminars in person to explain the Pacification and Development plan in every village
 - By end of September 1969 - Accomplish seminars in 80% of villages.
 - By end of October 1969 - Accomplish seminars in 100% of villages.
3. Publicize the work progress by posters, pictures in every village and hamlet throughout the 1969 APC.
4. Appoint Information-Chieu Hoi Cadres to every village with an elected administration.
5. Complete training of Information-Chieu Hoi Cadres. Deploy 70% of trained cadres by 31 October 1969.
6. Complete installation of one TV set at the office of Village Council by 31 October 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 8

LAND REFORM
EXPROPRIATED AND FRENCH OWNED LAND
PHASE II

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>1969 APC Goal</u> <u>Hectares</u>	<u>CTZ</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>1969 APC Goal</u> <u>Hectares</u>
I	0	0	IV	An Giang	4,000
				An Xuyen	3,000
II	Ninh Thuan	1,000		Ba Xuyen	15,000
	Binh Thuan	200		Bac Lieu	9,000
	Total	1,200		Chau Doc	1,700
				Chuong Thian	7,000
III	Bien Hoa	800		Dinh Tuong	1,200
	Bien Duong	60		Go Cong	500
	Binh Tuy	70		Kien Giang	7,000
	Gia Dinh	2,300		Kien Hoa	2,000
	Hau Nghia	1,100		Kien Phong	7,000
	Long An	1,800		Kien Tuong	1,900
	Long Khanh	10		Phong Dinh	4,000
	Phuoc Tuy	130		Sa Dec	2,000
	Tay Ninh	140		Vinh Binh	4,000
	Total	6,410		Vinh Long	1,600
				Total	70,900

Grand Total 78,510 Hectares

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*clerk
Miller*

103

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. _____

JCS 2472/499-1

DISTRIBUTION A

14 July 1969

Page 2

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

PRESIDENT THIEU'S DIRECTIVE ON THE 1969
ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN (U)

The attached letter from Headquarters, USMACV, MACJOIR, dated 4 July 1969, subject as above, with its enclosure, is circulated for information.

R. C. CROMPTON

T. Q. DONALDSON IV

Joint Secretariat

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

IDA 71-131 211 ¹⁰⁴

CONFIDENTIAL
JCS 2472/499-1

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4 JUL 69

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

MACJ01R

4 July 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: ~~SEE DISTRIBUTION~~

SUBJECT: President Thieu's Directive on the 1969 Accelerated
 Pacification Campaign (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to HQ MACV memorandum,* MACJ01R, subject: 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign, July - October 1969, dated 28 June 1969.
2. (U) Attached is a translation of Presidential Directive #939/PTT on "The Special Pacification and Reconstruction Campaign 1969", dated 1 July 1969, which endorses the Prime Minister's order of 26 June 1969 (referenced above).
3. (C) The Presidential order establishes as a primary objective the consolidation and upgrading of currently secure hamlets by establishing a goal of having a minimum of 50% of the population residing in A and B hamlets by 30 October 1969. This was a secondary objective in the Prime Ministerial Directive of 26 June 1969. The goal of bringing 90% of the population under GVN control still applies, however.
4. (U) The principal thrust of the directive is toward qualitative improvement in security, administration and law and order in hamlets and villages.

RE GRANTED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
 FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

CONFIDENTIAL

* Attachment to JCS 2472/499

INCLUDED IN IDA

REF # 71-131 211

CONFIDENTIAL

MACJOIR

4 July 1969

SUBJECT: President Thieu's Directive on the 1969 Accelerated
Pacification Campaign (U)

5. (U) The Presidential Directive constitutes guidance to US commanders and advisors for providing support to the GVN pacification effort. All concerned will lend their wholehearted support toward the attainment of the goals stated therein.

1 Incl
as

W. E. Colby
W. E. COLBY
DEPCORDS/MACV

DISTRIBUTION:
See attached sheet

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALDISTRIBUTION LISTNUMBER OF COPIESDistribution

JCS	10
CINCPAC	5
Department of State	3
OSD/ISA VN Desk	1
USA JFK CEN SPWAR	3
American Embassy, Saigon	10
JUSPAO	4
USAID	8
VN Trn Center, Wash DC	1
COMUSMACV	1
Dep. to COMUSMACV	1
Dep. to COMUSMACV CORDS	12
Chief of Staff	1
SJS	1
J-1	1
J-2	1
J-3	3
J-4	1
J-5	1
J-6	1
CORDS	72
COC	6
AG	1
MACOI	1
MACPD	1
MACT	1
MACDC	1
MACFWMA	10
MACMA-AL	18
MAC SOG	1
MACIG	1
MACSA	1
CG, USARV	34
Commander, 7th AF	3
COMNAVFORV	3
CG, III MAF/SA I CORPS	65
CG, I FFORCEV/SA II CORPS	65
CG, II FFORCEV/SA III CORPS	71
CG, XXIV CORPS	3
CG, DMAC	67

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALDISTRIBUTION LISTNUMBER OF COPIESDistribution (Cont'd)

Province Senior Advisor (3 ea)	132
District Senior Advisor	252
White House	3
CIA, Wash DC	3
AID, Wash DC	15
USIA, Wash DC	3
Civil Affairs School, Ft. Gordon	1

CONFIDENTIAL

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
THE PRESIDENCY

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTIVE No. 939/PTT

on

THE SPECIAL PACIFICATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION CAMPAIGN 1969

To:

- The Prime Minister
- The Deputy Prime Minister
- The Ministers
- The Chairman of the Joint General Staff
- The Commanders of Corps Tactical Areas,
Division Tactical Zones, and Special Zones
- The Mayors, Province Chiefs, Prefects.

Article 1. - To carry out the national objectives for 1969, as far as Pacification and Reconstruction is concerned, I have decided to implement a special 4-months plan entitled "Special Pacification and Reconstruction Campaign/1969" commencing on July 1, 1969 and terminating on October 31, 1969.

In execution of the above decision, The Prime Minister has issued Circular no 924/P. Th. T/BDXD of June 26, 1969 fixing the objectives and policies to be followed by the executive levels of the said Campaign.

Article 2. - I see it is necessary however to point out my special attention to a number of criteria which I term as decisive, i. e. if some of these important criteria cannot be accomplished at 100%, I will not consider the Pacification and Reconstruction Campaign as a satisfactory success.

Article 3. - The primary objective is: On October 30, 1969, there should be in minimum 50% of the population residing in A and B hamlets.

The interpretation is: The coming 4-months special campaign aims at not only the extension of population control up to at least 90% throughout the country, but also at how to have 50% of the Country-wide population with a strong national stand, under the control, organization and guidance of an effective administrative and political system, which means that these 50% are loyal to the National Government and are determined to support the National Government.

CONFIDENTIAL

IDA 71-131-211 ^{1 cy}

CONFIDENTIAL

- In this case, these 50% should be located in A and B hamlets.
- To my knowledge, C hamlets are presently accounted higher than half of the total number of ABC hamlets. I realize that the C hamlets are not yet closely organized and consequently may be downgraded easily to D-E whenever a political event happens or when the enemy has the capability to launch a major offensive.
- That is the reason why I see it necessary to consolidate the C category and to have them upgraded to A - B, the more the better and the quicker the better. Accordingly, a number of C hamlets should be consolidated and upgraded to A - B during the coming 4 months in order to attain 50% of the countrywide population living in A and B hamlets by October 30, 1969.

Article 4.- In addition to the usual overall estimate of the results of this special 4-months campaign, I am listing hereunder a number of criterion which I consider as decisive so that I can personally estimate the upgrading of a portion of C hamlets to A and B as explained above and affirm whether or not the campaign has been a satisfactory success.

These criterion are:

- Decisive criteria 1: Efficient security

It means that in the old and new A - B hamlets

- The Popular Forces should be in full strength as projected and should be capable to defend the hamlets.
- The Popular Self Defense Forces for combat should be fully organized, trained and armed.
- The Popular Self-Defense Forces for support (women, elders, young children. . .) should be completely organized and trained.

- Decisive criteria 2: Efficient Administration

It means that in the villages with a number of old and new A-B hamlets as well as in the old and new A - B hamlets:

- The villages and hamlets should have completed their election and composition according to the new Table of Organization.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- All the Villages and Hamlets Officials should have completed their training, serve efficiently and stay permanently at their post.
- Especially, I emphasize on the 3 categories of cadres who should have absolutely completed their training and should be serving efficiently:
 - Village and Hamlet Information and Open Arms Cadres
 - Village Technical Cadres
 - Village Administrative Committee's members for Agriculture and Land Reform.
- Decisive criteria 3: Effective Enforcement of Law and Order.

It means that in the Villages with a number of old and new A - B hamlets,

- The National Police should be present and have been already in activity.

However, in regard of the 3 decisive criterion I have just enumerated, the important thing to which I pay special attention is not only the completion of organization and the presence of the officials, but also the completion of training and the efficiency of the officials' activities in the fields of security, administration and implementation of law and order.

Article 5. - In addition, in the hamlets not listed in the old and new A-B categories, i. e. in the old C hamlets (which should be consolidated further) and the new C hamlets (which means that they have been just upgraded from D - E to C during this special 4-month Campaign), I also set forth a number of criterion which I term as minimal and which should be completely accomplished by October 30, 1969.

They are:

In the Security field: In the old C hamlets and part of the new C hamlets the Popular Forces should be fully present and should be capable of protecting the hamlets. In the remaining part of the new C hamlets, the Popular Forces should be fully present before December 31, 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

In the old C hamlets and part of the new C hamlets Popular Self-Defense Forces for combat should be fully organized, fully trained and fully armed.

Popular Self-Defense Forces for Support should also be completed. In the remaining part of the new C hamlets. Popular Self-Defense Forces of all types should be completed before December 31, 69.

In the field of administration:

- In the old C hamlets and part of the new C hamlets elections should be organized and completed according to the new Table of Organization. Training would not be entirely completed, but a number of essential officials should have already been trained in priority.
- The Information Cadre and the Hamlet Administrative Committee's Member for Land Reform are the two essential priority cadres who should be present in the Hamlets who have already been trained and who have already performed efficiently. In the remaining part of the new C hamlets, the appointed Village Administrative Committee and Hamlet Administrative Committee should be replaced by the new elected Committees before December 31, 1969.
- Therefore, after October 30, 1969 there will be plans to totally upgrade the C hamlets to the AB class and the DE hamlets to the C class.

Article 6:

- I want to remind you that the 3 important programs which guarantee the success of the Pacification and Development Campaign are the Phoenix program, the Information program and the Land Reform program. The Province Chiefs themselves have the duty to implement those programs, and not the local Chief of Police, or the Chief of the Information Service or the Chief of the Land Reform Service. The Chiefs of those technical services are only staff officers of the Province Chiefs. The responsibility of preparing the plan, directing the operations of that plan, and supervising the implementation by the cadres, in brief, the responsibility for success or failure in the implementation of the Government's policy in those 3 important programs should be borne by the Province Chiefs.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALArticle 7

- In the light of my above remarks, you must have realized that I pay special attention to the Quality in this Special 4-month plan.

- We have been until today successful in the Pacification and Reconstruction domain because we have exploited our victories in all domains, especially our ~~victories~~ in the military domain which see the increasing weakness of the Communists and which enable us to expand rapidly the control of the population throughout the territory. Therefore, as of this date, in the forthcoming political warfare, the issue which decides the destiny of the nation resides in our effort to consolidate that control, in order that the people we control should entirely have a solid national stand and should totally support the national government. Everything depends on that Quality in the Pacification and Reconstruction domain I have just mentioned:

- Quality in the consolidation of the security in the Villages and Hamlets and the efficient protection of the people in those Villages and Hamlets.

- Quality in the problem of having an efficient administration in the Villages and Hamlets in order to implement all policies and programs of the Government for the interests of the people.

- Quality in the problem of implementing the law and order of the nation in the Villages and Hamlets in order to eradicate the evil officials, oppression and injustice, and to implement social justice.

- Quality in the problem of cadres, to be able to educate the people, implement the land reform, develop the Agriculture and Fishing, and from there to be able to implement the Improving of the Society.

Article 8

- The national policy of Pacification and Reconstruction decides the future of the nation; therefore it must succeed. However, in the issues essential to the success of that policy, the military support issue is the most important.

- Consequently, I want to remind that all the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam from the Joint Generals Staff, the Corps

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Tactical Areas, the Division Tactical Zones, the Special Tactical Zones should entirely and directly support the local government in the provinces.

Article 9

I believe that all of us will succeed because we have the will to succeed and because we have the means to succeed.

SAIGON, July 1, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

(?) The Republic of Vietnam is an independent constitutional republic in which an elected executive virtually is all-powerful, although a unicameral National Assembly exercises nominal legislative power. A rudimentary separate judicial branch is provided by the constitution, as yet, has not been organized. President Ngo's government, in practice, functions as a ministerial autocracy supported by personal loyalties. There is only one effective political party, the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM), directed by the President's family through an elite hard core of followers. The small, controlled, legal opposition constitutes political opposition in name only. Much more important is the illegal opposition composed of Communist guerrillas, subversives, and sympathizers together with members of various dissident politico-religious sects.

(U) Although all formerly were associated in a federation under the French, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos have taken substantially different paths since the Geneva agreements in 1954. South Vietnam broke with the French and allied herself firmly with the U.S.; Cambodia pursues a neutralist policy and has recognized Communist China; Laos currently is pro-West but is not as closely aligned with the U.S. as South Vietnam. These differences have not led to major difficulties in Vietnamese-Lao relations but Vietnamese-Cambodian relations continue strained as a result of long standing border disputes and Cambodian recognition of Communist China.

(2) (U) Economic.

In spite of increased economic stability, Vietnam continues to depend on foreign aid, the largest part of which goes to support the military establishment. United States aid still accounts for approximately 35 percent of imports and two-thirds of the budgetary revenues.

Total exports of Vietnamese rice, rubber, and other minor products pay for only approximately one-third of Vietnam's imports. United States economic aid since 1954 has kept the country on its feet financially and makes up the difference in the unfavorable import-export ration. Nearly 75 percent of US aid, however, is spent to maintain military forces for defense against possible Communist aggression, and does not benefit the economy directly.

SECRET

With US backing the currency has remained fairly stable at a somewhat inflated level. The official exchange rate is approximately 35 piasters to the US dollar and another rate of approximately 74 to 1 is available for tourists and certain businessmen.

(3) (U) Psychological

Despite its rebellion against French colonial rule, Vietnam has allowed French culture to become part of its own, and still retains closer cultural ties with France than any other Western nation. French culture and the widespread influence of Roman Catholicism, together with centuries-old pressure of Chinese civilization, are the determining factors in the psychology of the educated Vietnamese elite, the former mandarin class, who now run the Government in Western style.

The European influence is not so important for the vast majority of Vietnamese who are mostly peasants. The more lively Western ideas have not aroused them to progress. The psychological outlook of the average Vietnamese consists of static traditionalism and apathy toward progress or change. This results partly from the prevalent religions, which are Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and such hybrid beliefs as those of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects; even the many Catholics of Vietnam hold a faith colored by a background of animism and ancestor worship.

(4) (U) Subversive Factors

Low standards of living, political immaturity, illiteracy, resentment toward West as a result of the French colonial days, and the desire to become independent internationally are all factors which make South Vietnam susceptible to Communist subversion. Growing civilian and military distaste for the authoritarian practices of the Ngo regime further have facilitated the Communist cause. The present threat, however, comes from Communist guerrillas in the field, the sympathizers who support them, and their agents who have infiltrated both the Government and the various antigovernment politico-religious sects.

The originally non-Communist dissident groups (Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen, and Cao Dai), which were defeated and dispersed by the army, remain only as isolated remnants scattered throughout some of the villages. Some

SECRET

of these groups, totaling 1,100 to 1,300, have come under Communist control. Additionally, the Viet Cong has set up small armed groups in a number of villages of West Cochina China. The strength of these armed Communist cadres is estimated to be from 1,500 to 2,000.

c. (S) Armed Forces.

From a loose conglomeration of combat battalions and various supporting units under French command in 1954, and under the aegis of, and with the impetus furnished by the US MAAG, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces have evolved into a balanced defense force. This force consists of three corps, with seven infantry divisions (tailored to meet the existing situation in Vietnam, rather than "mirroring" US or other divisions) and supporting arms and services, together with small but appropriate naval and air forces. These armed forces have a US-supported strength ceiling of 150,000 (army, 140,000; navy and air, 5,000 each plus certain minor non-US-supported units) and are backed by a full-time, paramilitary civil guard (50,000) and a part-time armed village militia (50,000). These total forces have the mission of (1) maintaining internal security (eventually to become the primary mission of the civil guard and other civil security forces when those organizations reach a satisfactory state of organization, training and equipment, at which time the armed forces will become the "backup" force), and (2) providing limited initial resistance to attack from Communist North Vietnam.

Considerable progress has been made in all fields of military operations and administration, although as yet serious weaknesses still hamper the development of effective command control and staff action. The weaknesses stem primarily from an inherent inferiority complex of the bulk of the people, and from a consequent lack of knowledge and application of the principles of good leadership. Further handicaps to rapid development and effective command reaction exist within the highest levels of the armed forces. Here a cumbersome structure with divided and duplicating lines of authority is found which prevents the undue concentration of power in the hands of any one person--except the President himself.

Tactical doctrine and organization are to a large degree dictated by the highly varied terrain. Profiting from lessons of 1946-1954,

SECRET

US training guidance has emphasized aggressive, hard hitting mobile divisions with high firepower, organized to insure close mutual support. New emphasis is being placed upon mobility allied to good unit coordination and massed firepower.

US advisors must bear in mind that certain unusual (to an American) types of terrain favor guerrilla operations and require different types of offensive and defensive tactics: rice flatlands, elephant grass-covered plateaus and rolling hills, steep forested mountains, and dense jungle. The training problem is also complicated by the natural characteristics of the Vietnamese, who, though completely at home in the cities, villages, rice fields and plantations of the lowlands, avoid the jungle and are afraid of the mountains. Continued special emphasis must be placed upon training for tactical operations and administrative support in the jungle and mountain regions. The Viet Minh have learned to use such regions to their advantage; so must the South Vietnamese.

(C) In calendar year 1955, MAP training in the US and in other countries was provided for the following Vietnamese personnel:

	<u>In US</u>	<u>In Other Countries</u>
Army	1014	90
Navy	206	-
Air Force	233	42

d. (S) Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)/Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) - Vietnam.

(U) Annex D provides specific information on both MAAG-Vietnam and TERM-Vietnam to include a brief history, present organization, operational responsibilities, administration, accomplishments to date, and major unsolved problem areas.

(C) MAAG-Vietnam was designated as such on 23 Oct 1955 and is the outgrowth of MAAG-Indochina, the first increment of which arrived in Saigon on 2 August 1950 as a logistical MAAG. The Geneva Accords of 1954 resulted in the establishment of an US MAAG personnel ceiling of 342 spaces. The MAAG began to assume training responsibilities for Vietnam early

SECRET

in 1955 and this coupled with the rapid withdrawal of the French in 1955-1956 made it obvious that there was an urgent necessity to increase the size of the MAAG.

(S) In view of the personnel ceiling established on the MAAG by the Geneva Accords, a subterfuge was adopted in the form of TERM. A strength of 350 military spaces was authorized for TERM ostensibly to facilitate the processing and recovery of excesses of US equipment in Vietnam. While recovery work was accomplished, a basic purpose of TERM was to provide additional personnel to advise the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(S) The TERM directive required that it operate separately from MAAG, thereby creating organizational problems at all MAAG/TERM levels. For example, this arrangement placed the G1, G2, and G3 advisory functions in the MAAG and the G4 advisory functions under TERM, a situation which was not conducive to integrated staff planning. This major deficiency--the separation of TERM from MAAG--is presently being corrected. TERM is to be phased out and its personnel and functions will be transferred to MAAG. The new MAAG T/D to result from this integration will not be available for 30 to 90 days, but is known to have 585 personnel spaces or 7 less than the combined total of the present MAAG and TERM.

(C) In addition to purely MAAG logistical and training type functions, MAAG-Vietnam in coordination with the US Embassy and CINCPAC is responsible for the implementation of certain emergency plans for the protection and evacuation of US Nationals and US sponsored non-combatants. MAAG-Vietnam is also responsible for the implementation under CINCPAC of certain cold and hot war plans for Vietnam and mainland Southeast Asia.

(U) In the administrative field, MAAG-TERM provides certain administrative support for other US agencies and US sponsored agencies in Vietnam. In turn, the MAAG is given some administrative support by other US agencies in Saigon and by the Vietnamese Government.

(U) A major unsolved personnel problem is the rapid turnover of the majority of the US personnel assigned to MAAG/TERM. By the time they have been on their jobs long enough to have reached a high state of proficiency, they depart and their replacements must go through the same time consuming breaking-in process.

the information needed for obtaining a complete picture of military operations, administration, accounting systems were not available during the period of the following study:

at or planned consolidation of the MAAG, latest at the study group dates from 1956 to 1960. However, a consolidation of MAAG and TSM is imminent. The function of the present organization is not known at CINCPAC level. Information is lacking as to administrative organization of the MAAG and its actual restrictions, guidelines, support, etc., rendered to the MAAG, however, CINCPAC has several emergency plans for Vietnam which are to be implemented by the

MAAG-Vietnam operations. The narrative statements operations in 1959 which might reflect current activities, reports, and problems are not available. Neither are plans issued by the MAAG for CINCPAC war plans nor the degree of administrative support rendered to the MAAG by other US agencies known.

As a result of requests made by the study group, information of the additional information desired will be furnished within the next 90 days. Whether this additional information is sufficient information to complete an analysis or the areas for additional requests for material is not known. Additional information could be obtained from personnel who have been in Vietnam, since they are required to execute a mission they will not divulge information concerning the MAAG (see IC to Annex D).

MAAG Activities and Interactions.

The concept of a protracted war in Asia was practiced by the Viet Minh. The persistence and perseverance the Viet

SECRET

Minh made every effort to build a regular army while emphasizing the integration of political, economic, and military operations to win not only the war but the minds of the people. During the eight year war with the French, the Viet Minh resistance force, consisting of both guerrillas and subversives, assumed a new significance as a tool of war and as an important logistic and propaganda agency for regular military forces. Their operations, as those of other successful resistance movements have been, were based upon speed of movement, surprise, deception, undermining of enemy morale, security, winning the collaboration of the populace, timely intelligence, and detailed planning and rehearsal.

(C) It is self evident that where communists are determined to conquer the people and territory of slowly developing countries, they will employ unconventional warfare as the most suitable and least costly approach. The reasons were clearly demonstrated in Indochina where it enabled the Viet Minh to defeat the French. This form of warfare permitted the Viet Minh to retain the mobility so essential to jungle and mountain operations, facilitated the gathering of detailed, accurate, and timely intelligence information, kept the level of violence at a low enough level to preclude the active intervention of another major power, accomplished the slow attrition of the French while permitting the Viet Minh to build the regular forces necessary for the final battles, offset the serious logistics problem by the very primitiveness of transportation methods, and surmounted the manpower shortage by making political and economic operations inseparable from military operations.

(C) Subversive and guerrilla operations by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) (North Vietnam) in South Vietnam continue to be a serious threat to the peace and security of the Republic of Vietnam (RV) (South Vietnam). Countermeasures by the RV includes military - civil cooperation in pacification of the population, offensive as well as suppression operations against DRV guerrillas, local village security against guerrillas, and more stringent national laws.

(U) Resistance activities and countermeasures are discussed more fully in Annex E.

SECRET

adequate land resources are being developed rapidly. Further, light industry production is being increased to diversify the economy and to reduce import requirements. U.S. economic aid has contributed to these gains while preventing the inflation which might have vitiated the efforts necessary to achieve them.

Vietnam has been able to devote increasing attention to the kinds of activity which will promote economic development, and it has been possible to reduce American aid very substantially. Yet internal security remains tenuous, and the costs of armed forces large enough to discourage the Communists, added to the political necessity of maintaining a reasonable rate economic progress, are beyond the present capacity of the nation's economy. Vietnam still requires grant assistance to strengthen its basic economic structure and to enable it to maintain the minimum forces essential to its continued security.

2. (S) Objectives of Military Assistance in Vietnam.

The Objectives of the Military Assistance in Vietnam are to assist the Vietnamese Government in organizing, equipping and training armed forces capable of maintaining internal security and providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Cong. *when we see changed?*

3. (S) Country Contributions.

Although most of the pay and allowances of troops, the cost of arms and equipment, and training guidance is provided by the United States, the Vietnamese continue to show great willingness and energy in absorbing such training and in organizing and utilizing forces to achieve and maintain internal security. The Vietnamese contribution to the costs of its military establishment has increased from eighteen percent of defense expenditures in CY 1959 to a planned twenty-four percent in CY 1960.

4. (S) M&P Accomplishments in Vietnam.

In addition to the training conducted in Vietnam, 3,644 Vietnamese military personnel have received training in the United States up through FY 1959. An additional 726 were trained in third countries or at U.S. facilities overseas. The FY 1960 program provides for the training of 1,375

SECRET

Vietnamese military personnel in the United States and 226 in third countries. Progress has been made during the last year in equipping as well as training the Vietnamese Armed Forces. This is almost entirely attributable to the Military Assistance Program. Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces are developing into a well-organized and trained military establishment with sound, realistic plans designed to counter external aggression. MAP arms and training have enabled the regular forces of Vietnam to reduce the internal communist threat to the point where the economic growth of the country can proceed.

1 Incl:

Appendix 1 - Extract, Recapitulation of Recommendations by the Draper Committee

SECRET

ANNEX C (S)THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAMINTRODUCTION

(S) The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, with a strength of about 142,000 personnel, have evolved since 1954 from a conglomeration of units primarily at battalion level, under French military control, into a balanced, organized national defense force under Vietnamese command. The Vietnamese National Army (VNA) (1,000,000 personnel) represents the major force. A Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) (1,000 personnel, 139 aircraft) and a Vietnamese Navy (VNMN) (5,200 personnel, 10 major combat vessels) have limited reconnaissance, patrolling and communications capabilities in support of ground elements. The armed forces are completely dependent on US assistance for training and logistical support.

(U) Although the Armed Forces as such are young, they are proud and intensely proud of a long and illustrious military history, including the expulsion of the Chinese after eight centuries of occupation, the defeat of Kublai Khan's invading Chinese forces in 1420; the migration of the Vietnamese people to the south conquering the Champa and Khmer (Cambodian) Kingdoms as they expanded their nation, and in 1730, in their occupation of all the territory today known as Vietnam. Additionally, many Vietnamese saw service in the French Army during the period between the two world wars, and many Vietnamese officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers proudly wear today French decorations and medals won not only in Indochina but also in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.

(S) In addition to the regular armed forces, the Civil Security Force (CSF) (Dan Ve Doan), a force of full-time uniformed, armed personnel, and the Village Defense Corps (Dan Ve Doan), a partially armed non-uniformed village defense force, an authorized strength of 50,000 men each, assist in maintaining internal security. These latter two are presently receiving limited training and logistical support from the US MAAG.

(S) The armed forces are capable of generally maintaining internal security, and of executing delaying operations in the face of an enemy but would be incapable of prolonged, effective resistance to a full-scale invasion.

SECRET

attack by North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist military forces. In conjunction with the US MAAG, Vietnam has prepared plans for the defense of its territory, but has no known mutual defense arrangements with her neighbors in Southeast Asia.

SECTION IDEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE1. Historical

(U) The establishment of the armed forces antedates the establishment of the Republic. During the years following World War II, French concessions leading to the creation of an independent Vietnam were accompanied by corresponding agreements providing for the formation and development of the armed forces. The first contingents were created during 1949 from Vietnamese troop units already in existence--native auxiliaries to the French Union forces in Indochina--cadred by French military personnel.

(U) These Vietnamese-manned and financed armed forces were first provided for in the 3 March 1949 Accords between France and Vietnam. These Accords were further elaborated in the France-Vietnamese Military Conventions of 30 December 1949 and 3 December 1950. A series of decrees by the government of Bao Dai, who was recognized by the French as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the new State of Vietnam, provided a juridical basis for the evolving armed forces. A Ministry of National Defense headed by a Secretary of State for National Defense was established on 19 September 1949. A Vietnamese Air Force was authorized on 25 June 1951 and a Vietnamese Navy on 6 March 1952. The Marine Corps was authorized by decree of 13 October 1954.

(U) Vietnamese forces had increased to about 205,000 personnel by 1954; they consisted principally of infantry units with French officers and non-commissioned cadre. Vietnamese units fought during the Indochina War on the side of the French Union forces under command of the French Commander in Indochina. The Republic of Vietnam was not a signatory to the armistice agreement negotiated at Geneva in July 1954; however, the Vietnamese government did agree to abide by the provisions of the armistice agreement. Subsequent development of the armed forces was therefore limited by the provisions

SECRET

of the agreement, particularly those prohibiting the introduction into Vietnam of reinforcements in troops and materiel and the establishment of new military bases.

(C) French officers and cadre were withdrawn from Vietnamese units in 1955, although French advisers remained to offer training assistance until 1957. The Civil Guard was organized, also in 1955, and the Self Defense Corps was initiated, later to be authorized by decree in April 1956. The establishment of the Republic was accomplished on 26 October 1955, followed on 26 October 1956 by the promulgation of the Constitution which designated the President as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. In 1957 conscription was initiated. The present organization of the armed forces was established by government decree of 3 October 1957. (This organization, providing as it does poorly defined, conflicting and vague lines of authority, was adopted in the face of US MAAG opposition thereto.)

2. Defense organization (Figure 1)

(S) The President is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and exercises his authority through a Secretary of State for National Defense. (At present this post is held by the President, who utilizes his Special Staff as an advisory board on matters concerning the armed forces and at times as a direct command agency over individual military units.) The Secretary of State for National Defense is aided by an Assistant Secretary and by a Director of the Cabinet. The logistical services have a dual subordination: to the Secretary of State for National Defense through the Director General of Administration, Budget and Comptroller (ABC) for administrative control, and to the general staff for command control. The general staff is referred to as a Joint Staff for the Armed Forces, but in reality it is organized and functions as an army general staff with the added responsibility of supervision over the small navy and air force.

(S) The Civil Guard is subordinate to the Department of the Interior, and the Self Defense Corps is under the Office of the Secretary of State at the Presidency; both these organizations would come under the Department of National Defense in wartime. Within the Department of National Defense there is also a small (1,000 - 3,000-men) elite police investigative force

SECRET

known as the Vietnamese National Gendarmerie for special investigations and for determining disposition of captured dissidents.

3. Military manpower and morale

(S) a. Manpower

Military manpower resources, based on population estimates of 1 January 1959, are shown below:

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Total males</u>	<u>Physically fit for military service</u>
15 - 19	614,000	370,000
20 - 24	484,000	290,000
25 - 29	359,000	200,000
30 - 34	355,000	180,000
35 - 39	341,000	130,000
40 - 44	319,000	110,000
45 - 49	264,000	50,000
Total 15 - 49	2,736,000	1,360,000

Average number reaching military age (18) annually: about 110,000

(U) Personnel for the armed forces are obtained through voluntary enlistments and by conscription. The military service law enacted 29 June 1953 prescribes a continuing active and reserve obligation for all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45. Under the current conscription program, which was initiated 1 August 1957 and amended in January 1959, male citizens aged 20 and 21 are called up for an 18-months' service period.

(S) b. Morale

Morale, which was very low following the ceasefire in 1954, has risen markedly as a result of new motivation, training, and operational successes against dissidents. The government has instituted measures to improve the morale and loyalty of the armed forces and to reinforce the anti-Communist orientation of the troops through troop information and education programs supervised by the G-5 Section (psychological warfare) of the General Staff. Vietnamese soldiers have displayed a willingness to

SECRET

endure primitive living conditions and physical hardships, but are not militaristic by inclination partly because of Buddhist and Confucianist teachings. Some dissatisfaction among officers has been expressed because rewards and promotions are in some instances due to political rather than military activities. It is probable, however, that this dissatisfaction is neither widespread nor serious. Dissatisfaction has also been expressed among naval and air force personnel because of the old and poorly maintained ships and aircraft which they use.

4. Strength trends

(S) The first army elements in 1949 consisted of about 25,000 men with French officers and noncommissioned officers. Army strength increased rapidly, to 50,000 in 1950, 65,000 in 1951, and 150,000 by 1953. A small air force of about 1,345 men had also been activated by 1953. At the close of hostilities in 1954 the armed forces numbered about 205,000 men, including 1,500 navy and 3,500 air force. Following the June 1954 ceasefire, and the subsequent division of the country, Army strength decreased rapidly; desertions were high during the redeployment of troops from North Vietnam to the South. During the reorganization period, French officers and noncommissioned officers were withdrawn, and a lightly armed auxiliary force was inactivated. Army strengths have continued to decrease since that time, while navy and air force strengths have gradually increased. The armed forces as a whole, however, have remained below the 150,000-man strength supported by the US. Strengths since 1955 are shown below:

Date	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total
1955, 1 Jan	170,000	1,500	3,500	175,000
1956, 1 Jan	152,000	4,200	3,400	159,000
1957, 1 Jan	138,600	4,900	3,500	146,900
1958, 1 Jan	131,500	4,900	4,000	140,400
1959,				
January	135,500	5,000	4,600	145,100
April	132,600	5,000	4,700	132,300
July	133,500	5,100	4,600	143,400
October	132,000	5,200	4,800	142,000

SECRET

(S) In 1955 when the Civil Guard was formed, about 50,000 men were transferred to it from previous paramilitary organizations. This number was gradually reduced to about 54,000 by the end of 1956 and 50,000 by 1958. During 1959 this force remained a little below 50,000 men, varying between 46,000 and 48,000. Actual strength of the Self-Defense Corps (Village Militia) usually is between 40,000 and 50,000, although it drops occasionally a little below 40,000.

5. Economic support

(S) The economy is incapable of entirely supporting the armed forces either financially or materially, either under peacetime or war conditions. In peacetime South Vietnam can supply basic foodstuffs and limited items of clothing to its armed forces. The country has no capability for munitions production. There are no known plans for mobilization of the economy in time of war, although the coordination of the total national effort is recognized as a function of the Permanent Secretary General for National Defense.

6. Training

(U) Training is conducted under guidance of the US MAAG, along lines similar to US training methods. Since the ceasefire in July 1954, armed forces training has been marked by a gradual reorientation from French doctrine and training methods to those of the United States. Training advice was supplied by French advisers in 1954. United States participation was initiated in late 1954 through the establishment of a composite group of United States (from MAAG) and French advisers in an organization called the Training Relations Instruction Mission (TRIM). French Army personnel were gradually withdrawn during 1955 and TRIM was inactivated in April 1956; thereafter army training became solely the responsibility of the US MAAG. French training missions with the air force and navy were withdrawn in June 1957 and the US MAAG then took over these additional functions. Sizeable numbers of Vietnamese officers also have received or are receiving training in US service schools or in schools sponsored by the United States in overseas areas.

(C) In the years immediately after 1954, training suffered because of the necessity to commit armed forces units on internal security missions, 11

SECRET

and because the armed forces were undergoing extensive reorganization. Marked improvement took place after 1957, however, although training is still deficient in many aspects.

7. Logistics

(C) Responsibility for the planning and control of the procurement of supplies and equipment theoretically rests with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. He is assisted by the directors of the various logistical services including a Director of Navy Technical Service and a Director of Air Technical Service. No procurement of major items of military equipment is performed by the Vietnamese, however. The United States, through its grant-aid programs, is the source of equipment, and the determination of needs and major planning for procurement are in the main performed by U.S. military advisory personnel in Vietnam. There is some local procurement of quartermaster items and medical supplies, but Vietnam depends heavily on outside sources for such material, also.

(U) Prior to 1 June 1955 the United States supplied military equipment and financial aid of the Vietnamese forces through the medium of the French Union Forces Headquarters in Indochina. Since that time aid has been supplied directly to Vietnam through the US MAAG.

(S) Major logistical problems remaining to be solved are as follows:

(S) a. Redistribution of materiel in accordance with the new division organization.

(S) b. Sufficiency of communications equipment, to include not only tactical equipment but also fixed "long lines" wire and wireless telephone systems.

(S) c. An adequate road net, whose accomplishment is in turn hampered by shortages of engineer heavy equipment.

(S) d. The outmoded vehicles still on hand, for which components and spare parts no longer exist.

(S) e. Adequate reserve stocks which (except for ammunition) in general do not yet exist.

(S) These problems are recognized by the Vietnamese, the US MAAG, and DCS/LOG, DA. Steps are being taken to correct them, as follows:

(S) a. A redistribution of materiel consonant with the new division

SECRET

in the changeover to the new division. (For communications equipment, see b, below.) Though a major logistical problem, it can be and is being solved locally. MAAG HQ in Saigon undoubtedly receives periodic report on this subject, and can apply "pressure" as required.

(S) b. Adequate long range communications in this vast, undeveloped country is a national (not only a military) problem; it is heightened by the vulnerability of installations to sabotage and guerrilla activity. A contract was let in December 1959 for the construction of a VHF "long lines" system which should materially reduce the problem.

(S) Tactical communications equipment shortages are a problem of recent origin, whose urgency has become manifest with the increased guerrilla activity since January 1960, and the deployment of troops in an effort to stamp out these guerrillas. Previously, sufficient radio equipment was on hand for training, and additional equipment was given a low priority by the MAAG (AM/PRC - 10 radios, for example, had been given last priority in the FY 50 program). Deployment of units over large areas in an antiguerrilla role, however, has created an immediate demand for the TOE radio equipment (the priority of the AM/PRC - 10 radios was recently changed from last in the FY 50 program to second), which in turn will require accelerated procurement and shipment.

(S) c. All possible means are being exploited to improve the road net: USOM (ICA) is sponsoring several national and regional roadbuilding projects, with construction by civilian contractors (usually US). Additionally, Vietnamese Army engineer units and their equipment are used on other road building or improvement projects and at times to reinforce civilian projects. Nevertheless, the overall shortage of heavy equipment imposes serious delay in the accomplishment of an adequate road net.

(S) d. By 30 June 1960 all vehicles in the hands of the Vietnamese Armed Forces of US World War II manufacture will have been recently rebuilt under MAAG aegis (some in Saigon, most in Japan). This still does not overcome the fact of the age and obsolescence of this equipment and the absence of spare parts and replacement components from the supply system. The ultimate solution to this problem is now beginning to be realized, in

SECRET

the regional program, under the aegis of PACOM, under which the vehicular fleet of all US - supported armed forces in the Pacific area are being replaced by new vehicles of Japanese design and manufacture. Though not interchangeable with US vehicles, components or parts, the new Japanese vehicles will eventually provide a solution to this thorny problem.

(S) e. Gradual improvements in stock levels and in storage facilities therefor are being made.

c. Military Budget

(S) Responsibility for preparation and control of the military budget rests with the Director General of ABC (Administration, Budget, and Comptroller) in the Department of National Defense. The military budget is prepared on a calendar year basis, and is incorporated into the national budget for the approval of the National Assembly. In practice, large-scale foreign financial assistance is necessary to support the armed forces, and the military budget usually includes anticipated foreign aid support. The military budget includes expenditures for the Self Defense Corps; however, the Civil Guard is supported from the civil budget. Recent defense budgets are shown below:

South Vietnam Defense Budgets
(in millions of U.S. dollars*)

	1956	1957	1958	1959
Defense Expenditures**	199	193	172	175.6

* Shown at official exchange rate, 1 piastre equals US \$0.0207.

**Includes U.S. support to military budget, but does not include cost of U.S.-supplied equipment.

(U) Accounting for defense expenditures is the responsibility of the Director General of ABC. Some financial responsibilities are also given to the Inspector General for Military Expenditures, who is primarily concerned with the verification of credits allocated for various military expenses and of receipts for work accomplished and items furnished.

SECRET

SECTION IIARMY1. General

(C) The Vietnamese National Army (VNA) represents almost 94% of the authorized personnel strength of the armed forces and is the predominant element of the military establishment. Administrative direction for the army is furnished by the General Staff which, although nominally a joint staff for the armed forces, is staffed entirely by army officers (Figure 2). The top military commander is the Chief of the General Staff. He is assisted by the Chief of Staff, who also functions as Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army and in that capacity is, in theory, the army commander (Figure 3). In practice the Chief of the General Staff is actually the army commander, although on occasion the President exercises direct command over military units. The army is steadily improving in combat effectiveness, although lack (until recently) of qualified senior commanders, the low educational level existing throughout Vietnam, and a cumbersome and conflicting staff organization hinder rapid improvement.

2. Organization

(U) For military command and administration, the republic of Vietnam is divided into four large Military Regions (Quan Khu) (numbered 1, 2, 4, and 5), and a small Capital Military Region, which includes the immediate environs of Saigon. The four major military regions are further divided into districts (Tieu Khu) which correspond generally to the civil provinces. The highest field headquarters is the army field command (roughly equivalent to a field army), created in December 1953, which is responsible for coordination of combat training in peacetime and for direction of combat operations in time of war. Three corps headquarters, under the field command, are responsible for training and operational planning in their respective areas.

(C) The basic tactical unit is the standard infantry division, with an authorized strength of 10,450 personnel. It consists of 2 infantry regiments, 1 artillery battalion, 1 4.2" mortar battalion, 1 combat engineer (pioneer) battalion, and normal company-size supporting elements (Figure 4).

SECRET

As the result of extensive testing, the army was reorganized during 1950 into these new standard infantry divisions. The previous light divisions (authorized at 5,000 men each), field divisions (authorized at 3,100 men each), and territorial regiments were disbanded. Airborne troops are organized into an airborne group, currently of 5 airborne infantry battalions. The armor branch consists of armored cavalry regiments (approximately equivalent to US Army squadron) each containing one squadron (US troop) of M24 light tanks and two squadrons of M3 self-propelled 75-mm howitzers. Separate artillery battalions are equipped with either 105-mm howitzers or 155-mm howitzers. Tactical units are operationally subordinate to the army field command and corps. They may be temporarily placed at the disposal of military region commanders or specified commanders when they are committed to internal security operations.

(S) Two types of specialized units are now being formed for specialized operations, in the face of US MAAG opposition thereto, at the direction of the President: 75 commando companies and 3 separate infantry battalions. These units are not US supported -- but, like the civil guard, they may eventually come under the aegis of the US MAAG. They are being formed in order to intensify and improve the effectiveness of the antiguerrilla and antisubversive campaign. US MAAG objection thereto is based on the probable stripping of regular units of their best personnel and hence of their effectiveness.

(S) The commando companies are to be of 131 men each; 35 companies are to be composed of Army volunteers, and 40 of civil guard or Army Reserve volunteers. As of 25 April 1950, 7 such companies had been formed, 3 of which having already been employed in combat.

(S) The 3 separate infantry battalions are supposed to be activated by 30 June 1950.

3. Strength, composition, and disposition

(S) Authorized army personnel strength is 140,000; actual strength on 1 December 1959 was about 132,000. Combat units include 7 infantry divisions, 5 airborne infantry battalions, 1 presidential guard brigade (battalion combat team), 4 armored cavalry regiments, and 3 separate

SECRET

artillery battalions. About 27,000 troops are in the northern area (Second Military Region) just south of the demarcation line with North Vietnam. These troops include one corps headquarters, 2 infantry divisions and 1 armored cavalry regiment. About 40,000 troops are in the central mountainous plateau and the central coast east of the plateau area/(Fourth Military Region), and include 1 corps headquarters, 3 infantry divisions and 1 armored cavalry regiment. In the southern areas (First, Capital, and Fifth Military Regions) there are 55,000 troops, including the field command headquarters, 1 corps headquarters, 2 infantry divisions, the airborne group, and 2 armored cavalry regiments.

4. Training

(U) Pre-induction training is given in high schools to physically fit males 15 years of age or older. Graduates of this two-year compulsory training program do not receive any military rank, but if they are later inducted they are sent to officer candidate school.

(C) Army training is conducted according to standard training cycles similar to US training programs. The primary cycle is 32 weeks, divided into 3 phases which begin with basic infantry training and carry progressively through to division maneuvers during the last 2 weeks. A succeeding 52-week cycle includes a repetition of the first cycle and an additional 20 weeks of general training. Employment on pacification operations, however, frequently interferes with the pursuit by units of necessary training.

(C) Large-scale (up to corps size) maneuvers are conducted periodically in the relatively unpopulated plateau region (Montun, Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot, M'Drak). Division maneuvers are conducted in areas adjacent to home stations and/or near M'Drak, on the road linking Ban Me Thuot with the sea.

(C) The principal training establishment is the Quang Trung Training Center, near Saigon, which gives an 8-weeks basic training course to all recruits and advanced courses to infantry soldiers. The training is well organized and instructors are generally competent. Training in other branches of service is given at specialized training centers including several under the Thu Duc Military Schools Center. Regular officers are trained at the Military Academy at Dalat (with a four year curriculum, classes entering since 1957). They also receive further career schooling at the Thu Duc Military Schools complex, at the Command and General Staff College in Saigon, and

SECRET

in schools abroad. Large numbers of reserve officers, obligated to serve two years, are produced at the Officer Candidate School at Thu Duc. The continuing development of the schools system will make it possible to reduce the number of personnel which must be sent abroad every year for specialized and advanced training.

5. Logistics

(U) Each technical service has a central or base depot located in the vicinity of Saigon, and a field depot in each military region which is the issuing agency to divisions and other tactical organizations. (However, in the Capital, First and Fifth Military Regions, the base depots in Saigon also act as issuing agencies.) In addition to the field depots, there are depot annexes or supply points for rations, petroleum products, and ammunition in order to bring these supplies in proximity to troops. Units customarily draw supplies on the basis of requisitions submitted to issuing agencies; in addition, supply agencies utilize periodic reports from tactical units to initiate necessary supply action.

(S) In time of war, military region headquarters will, according to the situation, assume logistical responsibilities for units in their respective territories, aided by special advisers from the central logistical offices. Storage and issue operations are being patterned after US procedures, but generally the operations have not reached a satisfactory standard. The supply system is seriously hampered by lack of adequate roads and railroads, limited numbers of trained and experienced personnel, inadequate storage facilities, and equipment shortages.

6. Materiel

(S) Materiel is nearly all of US origin and World War II design and manufacture. Major exceptions are some British 25-pounder field pieces, now in reserve, and some French trucks as well as French small arms in the hands of the civil guard and Self Defense Corps. Much of the US materiel is old and worn; there is, therefore, a high repair and rebuild requirement which is complicated by lack of spare parts for equipment no longer in production. With regard to wheeled vehicles this unsatisfactory situation is being relieved by extensive rebuild (in Japan) and replacement (by new

SECRET

materiel of Japanese design and manufacture) programs conducted by PACOM on a regional basis, leading to the eventual equipping of all US-supported forces in the PACOM area with modern general purpose vehicles of Japanese origin. Much of the engineer equipment is so worn that it should be salvaged. Over half of the tactical radio and wire equipment is of World War II vintage, but, when in repair and properly maintained, is still useable. This materiel is being replaced with current US materiel, however.

(S) The quality of maintenance is poor compared to US Army standards, but is improving. The army is sufficiently organized and trained to absorb the US Military Aid Program (MAP) equipment on hand and programmed. However, the lack of full TOE equipment, plus the lack of a war reserve, other than ammunition, seriously reduces the capability of the army for sustained combat.

SECTION IIINAVY1. General

(C) The navy is a small force of limited capabilities, heavily dependent on US assistance for training and guidance as well as for ships, spare parts and other durable goods. The shortage of technical personnel, the small size of the navy, and the inexperience of naval personnel severely limit effectiveness. The navy is capable only of very limited river and coastal patrol.

2. Organization

(U) The Commander of the navy is the Naval Deputy of the Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The Naval Deputy is assisted by a naval staff, headed by a Chief of Staff, and composed of three divisions or bureaus: N-1 (Administration), N-3 (Operations), and N-4 (Logistics) (Figure 5).

(C) The shore establishments and operating forces, all directly subordinate to the Naval Deputy, consist of 6 commands: Naval Stations and Schools, which controls training, the Saigon port office, and coastal naval stations; Naval supply center, Saigon; Marine Corps Group, consisting

SECRET

existing runways at Vung Tao and Da Nang, and a new 10,000-foot concrete runway (estimated completion in March 1961) and concrete overlay of the present main runway (completion by March 1963) at Tan Son Nhut. The construction of new airfields with crushed rock and asphalt runways in the vicinity of Rach Gia and Ca Mau by the end of 1961 is under consideration.

SECTION VCOMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS

(C) Despite sincere and reasonably effective effort on the part of the US MAAG over the past 5 years, certain inherent weaknesses continue to plague the Vietnamese Armed Forces. The eradication of these weaknesses will not be an easy matter, for, far from being peculiar to the armed forces, they are national in character and stem from generations, nay, centuries. They must be recognized, understood, and continuously and seriously, yet tactfully dealt with by every MAAG officer who has any dealings whatsoever with the Vietnamese military. The ascendancy of any one of these weaknesses could well mean defeat on the field of battle for a Vietnamese unit or for the Republic--and, tragically, the Officer Corps do not yet recognize these weaknesses (despite continuous admonition by the MAAG at every level), and, consequently, do not take effective measures leading to their elimination. Some of the more critical weaknesses are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

(C) Leadership. With some encouraging exceptions, leadership on the part of leaders and commanders at all levels is generally substandard and often grossly deficient, with, consequently, ineffective command control and poor or wholly nonexistent unit effectiveness. This weakness stems from the long-standing nature of the Vietnamese people: passive, submissive, fatalistic, accustomed to being led rather than leading, pastoral and non-mechanical, and living at little more than a bare existence level. Likewise hereditary leaders by tradition engaged only in study of the classics, contemplation, writing, and relatively luxurious living, never deigning to understand, much less communicate with the common people. Coupled with this is inheritance of the traditional French Army attitude of never checking on a subordinate, for such would indicate lack of faith. The imposition of modern military organization and materiel upon such a society of necessity imposes many urgent problems which require solution before the military

SECRET

machine can be said to be effective. The Vietnamese Armed Forces today lie somewhere between the "launch point" of imposition of modern organization and materiel and the "apogee" of satisfactory effectiveness. The MAAG officer must constantly strive to guide the Vietnamese toward this apogee, by every tactful means. He must teach the Vietnamese how to exercise effective command control and command supervision; how to teach; how to inspect; how to gain the confidence of his command--in short, how to command. There has been considerable progress realized in the past several years, but the goal is still far off. It would appear that one of the best ways of teaching this important aspect of command would be for the Vietnamese officers sent to the US for schooling to spend an additional month with (observing) a US unit upon completion of their formal schooling. (Such a program has been successfully applied in MAAG Japan.) This observer training would show the Vietnamese effective leadership and command control in a unit, rather than merely telling them about it.

(C) Other major deficiencies are derivatives of the deficiency in leadership.

(C) Health, Nutrition, Sanitation. These are so basic as to require little elaboration. Military effectiveness is impaired, however, by beri-beri (100% preventable if unpolished, rather than polished, rice is eaten from time to time), malaria (controllable through weekly ingestion of a simple pill), and the various diseases associated with unsanitary conditions. All of these can be controlled within the military environment, though their control throughout the population will be much more difficult. Commanders must be taught why and how to effectively enforce appropriate preventive measures, and they must also be taught their responsibilities therein.

(C) Maintenance of Materiel. Again, this subject is so basic as to require little comment--without, however, minimizing its importance. As discussed under leadership, above, brief service with (observation of) a US unit on the part of Vietnamese officers sent to the US for schooling would show and teach the Vietnamese officer how to satisfactorily maintain and use his materiel.

SECRET

ANNEX D (S)MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP - VIETNAM (U)INTRODUCTION

(U) From the very beginning MAAG-Vietnam (and its predecessor MAAG-Indochina) has been unique among MAAGs. First of all, MAAG-Indochina was activated during combat and operated along the fringes of the battle zone in Vietnam supplying French, Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian forces which were fighting the Communists. Due to still another strange arrangement, for the first four years of its existence the MAAG provided no direct assistance to the Vietnamese at all; everything went through a middleman, the French. When the Geneva Accords ended overt hostilities, the MAAG engaged in another unusual operation - the mass evacuation of over 800,000 personnel and 200,000 tons of military equipment from North Vietnam. Since Geneva many of the MAAG logistical operations in Vietnam have been odd in that they have been conducted in the reverse of most MAAGs, that is, sending military equipment out of the country instead of bringing it in.

(C) The results of the Geneva Accords presented the MAAG with a real paradox. On the one hand its personnel ceiling was frozen at a maximum of 342 spaces. At the same time it had to assume all responsibilities from the 140,000 man French Expeditionary Corps for organizing, training, supplying, and equipping the Vietnamese Armed Forces. In addition it was responsible for the recovery and out-shipment of the tons of US MAP equipment which was scattered throughout Vietnam.

(S) To accomplish these missions without exceeding the Geneva imposed MAAG personnel ceiling, a subterfuge was adopted in the form of a separate organization called the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM). The mission of this agency was ostensibly to recover the MAP equipment. In order to stay within the Geneva Accords, it had to operate separately from the MAAG. To function with such separated organizations has in turn forced the adoption of unusual staff structures in both MAAG and TERM.

(C) Still another unusual feature is the direct communist efforts to attack MAAG/TERM itself. Since its inception, members of MAAG/TERM-Vietnam have been the targets and occasionally the victims of sporadic communist bombings, ambushes, and assassination plots.

(U) Finally, MAAG-Vietnam is unique in that it is the only US MAAG in the world where the Chief's billet is that of a Lieutenant General. This is indicative of the importance given to this critical position in Southeast Asia.

D-1

SECRET

SECTION I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND MAAG VIETNAM1.(U) Prior to Geneva.

In May 1950 Secretary Acheson made the initial announcement that the United States would grant military and economic aid to restore security and develop "genuine nationalism" in Indochina. In his announcement he made it clear that US aid would go not only to the Associated States of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam but also to France. Actually, no military assistance was given directly to the Vietnamese until 1954. The first increment of MAAG Indochina arrived in Saigon on 2 Aug 1950. On 7 Nov 50, a Provisional Detachment, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina was designated.

The MAAG to Indochina was authorized from an international standpoint on 23 December 1950, at the time of the signing of the so-called "Pentalateral Agreement." This agreement was between the US, France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for the Administration of Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina. MAAG Indochina was formally activated on 8 January 1951. It had an authorized personnel strength of 128 and was responsible for MAAG activities in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

From its inception to the signing of the Geneva Accords in July 1954, the role of MAAG Indochina was that of a logistical MAAG, responsible for assuring receipt of equipment by designated recipients, utilization of equipment for the purpose intended, and conduct of proper maintenance.

In April 1954, Lt General John W. "Iron Mike" O'Daniel was dispatched to Vietnam as Chief MAAG to obtain agreement from General Ely, the French CINC in the area for US participation in training of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. General O'Daniel obtained this agreement on 15 June 1954. He sent messages to Washington asking that more personnel be sent to Vietnam to conduct this training before a cease fire would occur with the possibility of limitations on added personnel as had happened in Korea. General O'Daniel's requests met with no substantial response.

2.(U) General Accords Effecting MAAG-Vietnam.

Neither the United States nor Vietnam signed the Geneva agreements, although the US representative, General "Beedle" Smith, took

D-2

SECRET

SECRET

note of the final conference declaration for the United States. He stated in substance that the US would abstain from any threat to modify the accords, and that it would regard any assumption of aggression in violation of the accords with grave concern and as a serious menace to international peace and security. The Geneva agreements which impact on the organization and functions of MAAG-Vietnam are:

Prohibition of the introduction of military personnel -- Introduction of troop reinforcements and additional military personnel, including instructors, except for rotation of units, admittance of individual personnel on a TDY basis, and return to Vietnam of individuals from leave or temporary duty abroad, which are allowed under defined and controlled conditions. (Article 16)

Prohibition on the introduction of military equipment -- Introduction of all types of arms, munitions, and other war materiel, including aircraft, except for piece-by-piece replacement of war materiel, arms, munitions destroyed, damaged, worn out, etc. or used up after cessation of hostilities. (Article 17)

An International Control Commission to be composed of India, Canada and Poland, with India as chairman, to be established for the purpose of ensuring observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions of the agreement. The commission to have both fixed and mobile inspection teams. (Chapter VI, Articles 28-47)

No military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in either zone; the parties shall also ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy. (Articles 18 and 19)

On 20 July 1954, official date of the signing of the Geneva Agreements, there were 342 US military personnel in Vietnam. MAAG Indochina was authorized a personnel strength of 128 plus an additional 15 officers who arrived prior to 20 July 1954 and two hundred Air Force Technicians who had been sent to Vietnam in early 1954. The State Department interpreted Article 16 as applying to US military personnel and therefore a MAAG personnel ceiling of 342 spaces was established.

3. (S) After Geneva.

(U) Immediately after the cessation of hostilities, MDAP aid to Indochina stopped abruptly. MAAG Indochina was engaged primarily with the evacuation of personnel and equipment from North Vietnam for the next ten months. Chief, MAAG Indochina was overall coordinator for US participation in the evacuation of North Vietnam which was completed in May 1955. The MAAG also

SECRET

participated in the reception of evacuees in South Vietnam as well.

Over 800,000 personnel and over 200,000 tons of military equipment were moved from the north in perhaps the greatest mass evacuation in the history of the world.

(U) The MAAG Indochina mission after Geneva was to assist the Vietnamese National Army to attain the capability of maintaining internal security. The United States had anticipated that while the Vietnamese were obtaining this capability a sizable element of the 140,000 man French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) would remain in Vietnam as a deterrent force against the Viet Minh. Therefore, 100 million dollars had been allocated by the US in FY 1955 for the support of the FEC.

(U) Though General O'Daniel had attained oral agreement from the French for US participation in the training of the Vietnamese army in June of 1954, it was not until 13 December 1954 that a formal agreement was signed between the Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Defense, General Collins, the US Special Representative, and General Ely, the French Special Representative for the establishment of a combined French - US training mission. General O'Daniel headed the mission under the overall command of the French CINC. On 27 February 1955, the mission was officially established as the "Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM)." The US TD for TRIM called for 217 spaces of the 342 authorized for MAAG Indochina. In March of 1955 there were only 68 US personnel available for assignment to TRIM. Key staff positions were held by both French and US officers. In the case of the advisory teams, if the senior were French, his associate (second in charge) was American, and vice versa. These advisory teams were to be placed with the military geographical subdivisions (Regions), the field divisions, light divisions, training centers, and schools. Members of the headquarters staff doubled in duty by additionally acting as advisors to their Vietnamese counterparts in higher headquarters and with the chiefs of the technical services.

(U) With this organization the tasks of collecting, reorganizing, re-equipping, and training of the Vietnamese Armed Forces were begun under the auspices of the US Chief, MAAG. Though the overall responsibility

D-4

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

was vested in the French CINC, he never interfered with TRIM operations.

(U) The combined aspect of the training effort was doomed to failure almost before it got under way due to the anti-French sentiments of the Vietnamese, particularly in the Hue area. With these circumstances prevailing, the French agreed with Chief MAAG that it might be better to withdraw the French advisors in the Hue area. This was done and the trend was established which can best be illustrated by the figures showing the comparative French-US officer strengths in TRIM during the first year's operations.

	<u>US Officers</u>	<u>French Officers</u>
March '55	68	209
May	121	225
July	124	108
September	125	66
November	142	58
January '56	149	53
March '56	-189	0

(U) On 13 June 1955 MAAG Cambodia was established, although MAAG Indochina continued to support MAAG Cambodia on all Navy and Air Force matters.

(U) On 28 October 1955 MAAG Indochina was officially redesignated MAAG Vietnam. By this time the rapid withdrawal of the FEC was creating major problem areas for MAAG Vietnam. First, it was rapidly depleting the strength of TRIM which was responsible for the training of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Secondly, the French were beginning to turn over the logistics installations and functions to the Vietnamese who were totally incapable of handling their own logistical system. Additionally, in the logistics field the withdrawal of the French was creating an extensive recovery, relocation and outshipment program for excess MDAP equipment resulting from termination of the war.

(U) On 18 November 1955 Lt General S. T. Williams replaced General O'Daniel as Chief, MAAG Vietnam. He was directed by Washington in December 1955 to prepare a TD for the MAAG which would supply the personnel to solve the major problems confronting that organization.

(C) Instead of increasing the MAAG Vietnam personnel ceiling, Washington adopted a subterfuge in the form of a "Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission" (TERM) with a personnel strength of 350. Ostensibly TERM was to

D-5

SECRET

SECRET

facilitate the processing of US origin excesses of equipment in Vietnam; while in fact it was a much needed across the board augmentation for MAAG. To carry the subterfuge further, it was directed that TERM operate as a separate organization directly under Chief MAAG. Chief, MAAG could interchange personnel between MAAG and TERM and it was recognized that TERM should furnish a proportionate share of the common administrative support personnel. Implementation of the directive to keep TERM as a separate organization created major organizational problems at the local level in order not to belie openly the subterfuge effort.

(C) The International Control Commission (ICC), composed of Indians, Poles, and Canadians and responsible for maintaining the provisions of the Armistice, never completely accepted TERM. It neither approved nor disapproved its introduction but maintains an almost continuous check on TERM's activities.

(C) In December 1955 a Programs Evaluation Office (PEO) was established in Laos in lieu of a MAAG which was prohibited by the Geneva Accords, thus relieving MAAG-Vietnam of responsibility for programming and inspecting the maintenance support for US MAP equipment in Laos.

(C) It is pertinent to examine in some detail the circumstances from which the tremendous logistical problems in Vietnam were derived and which in turn made the augmentation of the MAAG absolutely imperative.

(C) At the close of the Indochina war the FEC had a strength of approximately 140,000. The Vietnamese Armed Forces were at a strength of 290,000. It was agreed at the time of the signing of the MDAP agreement in December 1954 that the United States would support a Vietnamese Armed Force of approximately 100,000. By mid-1955 the FEC had reduced to roughly 35,000 and other factors, such as the failure of special representatives of the French and Vietnamese to open negotiations on the future status of the FEC in Vietnam, plus the fact that the French military budget for CY 1956 made no provisions for Indochina, indicated a questionable future for the FEC in Vietnam at best.

(C) In addition to the excesses generated by the reduction of forces, another factor further complicated the logistical picture. Prior to

D-6

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

January 1956, the French completely dominated the logistic field and had closely held the logistic support of the Vietnamese forces to the exclusion of both Vietnamese and the Americans. Despite the fact that logistical autonomy had been planned for the Vietnamese forces by January 1956, US influence on the logistic system was for the most part confined to the combined staff efforts in TRIM. In actuality, influence on logistical matters was practically nil. As a result, the Vietnamese in late 1955 were totally inexperienced and untrained to assume logistical responsibility. The limited number of US logistical advisors could do little to offset the lack of Vietnamese experience.

(C) After January 1956, the accelerated withdrawal of the French forces further aggravated an already complex situation. The French literally dumped mountains of equipment upon the Vietnamese, the majority of which were improperly packed, indiscriminately piled, often placed in outside storage, and supported by inadequate or meaningless inventory records. To add to this confusion the Vietnamese were prone to open all packages and this was not conducive to preservation. It is questionable that the Vietnamese could have handled this situation properly had they been well trained.

(C) With regard to the qualitative nature of the equipment, consideration must again be given to the contributing circumstances of the French withdrawal. The French were confronted with a rapidly deteriorating situation in North Africa which required more and more effort in terms of military personnel and equipment. Therefore, they were primarily concerned with salvaging the best equipment for their own use. With this in mind, the French were able to exploit to full advantage the agreement which authorized their removal of MAP type equipment based on proportionate input. In the face of French reluctance to allow US personnel to inventory, there was no way by which US personnel could determine the qualitative or quantitative status of equipment.

(C) Refusal of the French to allow US personnel into their installations and dumps covered their attempts to obtain the best of everything in the quantities desired for their future needs. The equipment turned

D-7

SECRET

SECRET

over to the Vietnamese was qualitatively inadequate. In most instances, it had been used prior to Indochina and had subsequently seen hard service under wartime conditions. Maintenance requirements could not be met since critical spare parts and tools were non-existent. The arrival of TERM in mid-1956 provided the beginning of the answer to this deplorable situation.

(C) Still another category of logistic problems, that created by the Geneva Armistice relative to the introduction of war materiel, has not been unduly restrictive nor a matter of major concern to date.

(C) The bilateral protocol (French-DRV) which specifically defines "arms, munitions, and war materiel" also specifies the procedures for the control of the importation and exportation of these items under the supervision and auspices of the ICC. Also prescribed are the procedures for notifying the ICC in order that credit may be obtained for items exported. French and Vietnamese positions with regard to this protocol are as follows:

(C) Upon withdrawal, the French took vast quantities of munitions, materiel, and equipment with them. Despite their responsibilities with respect to the protocol it is assumed that only a small portion of this was reported to the ICC in such a way as to obtain credit against future imports.

(C) In view of the fact that the protocol was concluded between the French and DRV, the Vietnamese Government has consistently refused to recognize its validity or openly to comply with its provisions. It is expected that the French would support this position of Vietnam in a "show-down" since it could be shown that they were remiss in complying with the provisions concerning exportation.

(C) TERM's activities also enter into this picture since they have been responsible for removal of large quantities of materiel through exportation, destruction, and scrapping. Additionally, items have been sent out of the country for repair and rebuild and then returned to Vietnam.

(S) Actually, the ARVN was never reduced to a force goal of 100,000. In light of the rapid withdrawal of the bulk of the FEC, continued Viet Minh

SECRET

SECRET

build-up, and the civil war against the dissident sect forces, MAAG Vietnam took the position that such a force goal was inadequate. With Country Team concurrence in May of 1955, MAAG proposed a 150,000 man force goal to be reached by 1 July 1956. This proposal was subsequently approved and remains in effect to date.

(C) Although the French Expeditionary Corps departed in April 1956, the French continued to train the Vietnamese Air Force and Navy until June 1957, when MAAG-Vietnam took over this task. To obtain personnel to assume this additional responsibility, 43 spaces of common administrative support type personnel (communications, commissary, FPO, medical, etc.) were transferred to the Embassy from the MAAG.

(S) Due to a new wave of communist terrorism the internal security situation in Vietnam deteriorated markedly in early 1960 and MAAG-Vietnam was augmented with three 10-man Special Forces teams to assist in training Vietnamese forces for antiguerrilla operations.

(S) TERM's mission of recovering and outshipping economically repairable US material in excess of Vietnamese needs has been virtually completed. Plans have been prepared to close out TERM and transfer its personnel spaces and logistical responsibilities to MAAG-Vietnam in the summer of 1960. ICC has been made aware of this proposal and has made no objections.

D-9

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION IIMAAG/TERM MISSION AND ORGANIZATION1. (U) MAAG Vietnam Mission.

The mission of MAAG, Vietnam, is to assist the Vietnamese Government in raising the military capabilities of its Armed Forces through planning for, developing, and administering the Military Assistance Program. A copy of the detailed terms of reference governing the MAAG Vietnam mission organization, procedures, relationships, responsibilities and functions, is included at Appendix 1.

2. (U) TERM Vietnam Mission.

The mission of TERM is to recover and outship economically repairable MDAP material excess to authorized Vietnamese Armed Forces MDAP material requirements and to dispose of salvage and scrap returned to United States control. A copy of the detailed terms of reference governing TERM Vietnam mission, concept of operation, command relationship and reporting procedures, is included at Appendix 2.

3. (U) Vietnamese Instructions on MAAG/TERM Mission and Authority.

The Headquarters of the Vietnamese Armed Forces published instructions for all Vietnamese commanders defining the authority and missions of United States MAAG/TERM-Vietnam advisors. Included in these instructions are the relationships and responsibilities of a Vietnamese organization to its U.S. MAAG/TERM advisors. A detailed copy of these instructions reproduced by MAAG Vietnam is included at Appendix 3.

4. (U) MAAG-Vietnam Staff Organization.

At Appendix 4 is the MAAG organization chart. The Chief, MAAG, is a three-star Army Billet. He retains the PIO and the advisors to the Vietnamese Secretary of Defense and C/S Armed Forces Republic of Vietnam under his immediate and direct control. Deputy Chief of MAAG for Training, a two star billet, is also Chief of the Army Section. Deputy Chief of MAAG logistics, a one star Army billet, is responsible for supervision of the administration of the command. His biggest jobs are the management of the Vietnamese military budget and operation of the temporary equipment recovery mission. The Chief

CONFIDENTIAL

of Staff, Deputy Chiefs of Staff for operations and administration, and the Assistant Chief of Staff/Staff Secretary are all Army billets and function in a normal staff manner except that there is no "J" or "G" staff. US clerical and administrative personnel in the Chief of Staff Section come from both the Army and the Navy. A Vietnamese interpreter/translator pool is also included in this section.

The Joint Services Support Division has Army, Navy and Air Force personnel which handle administrative activities, not only of the command, but of certain other US organizations in Vietnam as well. Its major activities are billeting, post office, commissary, post exchange, transportation, dispensary, communications and other administrative support operations for all headquarters and field advisory groups throughout Vietnam.

The Comptroller Division has Army, Navy and Air Force personnel and functions in a normal manner. Its biggest job is to provide assistance to Chief MAAG on Vietnamese budget matters.

Deputy Chief, MAAG, Training, is responsible for the over-all supervision of the employment of American advisors who assist in the training of the Vietnamese. He is responsible for the approval of training programs and policies and for making training visits and inspections. He executes his responsibilities primarily through the Chief, Combined Arms Training Organization (CATO), an all Army organization which handles the G1, G2, and G3 functions. CATO acts as the administrative headquarters of all the Army field advisor groups. Chief, CATO, provides field advisory groups with direction, supervision, administration, and discipline. These field advisors are broken down into small detachments all over the country, located and living with the Vietnamese units which they advise. This is true of the Navy and Air Force Divisions of MAAG and TERM as well as CATO. Insofar as Infantry is concerned, there are sufficient advisors to provide one for each regiment. Insofar as the supporting arms are concerned, there is approximately one advisor to each two battalions. In the case of the Technical Services, there are sufficient advisors for each major depot or group of technical service units. At each major Vietnamese Army Headquarters, such as a Corps or a Region (a territorial command similar to our Army areas),

D-11

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

all the Technical Services (both repair and supply types) are usually grouped in a complex near the major headquarters. One signal Corps advisor would be available to advise all signal type activities and units within this complex. The same advisor situation also applies to the other technical services. US Advisors are at all the schools, central depots, the Vietnamese Armed Forces Headquarters, and the Office of the Minister of Defense. It is through these advisor groups that the policies of Chief, MAAG, in the field of training are executed.

The Adjutant General Division of the MAAG functions in a normal manner.

The Combined Studies Division provides studies as required by Chief, MAAG.

The Navy Division advises and assists in the training, organization, logistics, and operation of the Vietnamese Navy and Marines. The Air Force Division advises and assists in the training, organization, logistics, and operation of the Vietnamese Air Force.

5. (C) MAAG-Vietnam Table of Distribution.

At Appendix 5 is the MAAG-Vietnam Joint Tables of Distribution effective 1 July 1959. It must be pointed out that this T/D is to be replaced in the very near future (30-90 days) by a new MAAG-Vietnam T/D which phases TERM into MAAG. Also included at Appendix 5 is the Joint Table of Distribution for the administrative support unit for MAAG/TERM Vietnam which in practice operates under the Joint Service Support Division of MAAG.

6. (C) TERM-Vietnam Staff Organization.

Deputy Chief, MAAG, Logistics is responsible for the overall supervision of the administrative support provided ARVN forces under MDAP, MAP, and other US programs. He is responsible for the preparation of MAAG logistical programs and budgets; for making visits and inspections to ARVN logistical installations; and for coordinating with the ICC the reporting, outshipping, sale, and/or disposal, of MDAP material excess to authorized ARVN/MDAP material requirements. He executes his responsibilities primarily through the Chief, Temporary Equipment and Recovery Mission (TERM). TERM is an all Army organization which handles the G4 functions.

CONFIDENTIAL

The TERM organization chart is at Appendix 6. Within each Technical Service branch are depot advisors to ARVN logistical depots within the Saigon area; program and budgeting officers; functional specialists; and liaison officers to the Technical Service Chiefs, ARVN.

The Plans and Operations Section prepares quarterly reports, and coordinates intra TERM actions pertaining to two or more Technical Services and inter MAAG actions a reports. One member of the Plans and Operations Section is the advisor to ARVN G4; another, a permanent member of the Deputy Chief, MAAG, Logistics Inspection Team.

TERM officers assigned to the field are attached to MAAGs CATO directed field advisor groups.

7. (C) TERM-Vietnam Table of Distribution.

At Appendix 7 is the TERM-Vietnam Joint Table of Distribution effective 1 July 1959. It must be pointed out that this table is to be replaced in the very near future (30-90 days) by a new MAAG-Vietnam T/D which phases TERM into MAAG. Also included at Appendix 7 is a Joint Table of Distribution Master Recapitulation Sheet for MAAG/TERM Vietnam.

SECRET

SECTION IV

MAAG/TERM PROBLEMS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PAST AND
FUTURE VIETNAMESE PROGRAMS1. (C) MAAG/TERM Problemsa. (C) US Internal Problems.(1) (U) Excessive Time Required for Non-Advisory Type Duties.

MAAG/TERM advisory personnel in general and particularly those in the field, spend a great amount of their duty time on such non-advisory tasks as filing, typing, driving long distances to draw supplies, supervising indigenous mess personnel (particularly on sanitation), hunting for scarce supplies which must be procured locally, waiting for the arrival of late courier aircraft, hand carrying messages because of an inadequate telephone net, and many other tasks required by simply living in Vietnam.

(2) (C) MAAG/TERM Organizational Problems. The fact that TERM must be operated separately from MAAG even though in reality it has exactly the same mission as MAAG has led to MAAG/TERM organizational problems at all levels. A "Jerry Rig" arrangement exists wherein the G4 advisory functions are under TERM and the G1, G2 and G3 advisory functions are under MAAG.

(3) (U) Rapid Turnover of the Majority of MAAG/TERM Personnel.

The rapid turnover of short tour MAAG/TERM personnel is one of the major problems of MAAG/TERM Vietnam. By the time an advisor has been with a Vietnamese unit long enough to be truly accepted by that unit, and knows what advice it needs, and even more important how to get the Vietnamese commander to accept his advice, it is time for the advisor to depart and his replacement must go through this same time consuming process.

(4) (U) Qualifications of Advisory Personnel Assigned MAAG/TERM.

Many of the US advisory personnel assigned to MAAG/TERM Vietnam are not graduates of The Military Assistance Institute, nor have they had previous MAAG experience. Thus, they have had no preparation for MAAG duties and all of their orientation and breaking-in-time must be gotten while on the job in Vietnam.

b. (C) TERM/Vietnamese Problems

The principal logistical problems of the Vietnamese Armed Forces which remain to be solved as seen by TERM are:

SECRET

All "\$" values are in thousands.

CATEGORIES and MAJOR COMPONENTS	ANNUAL PROGRAMS			
	FY 1959	FY 1960	Proposed FY 1961	
	Value	Value	Quantity	Value
Aircraft, Comp, Spares & Related Equip	-	\$ 3,696	-	-
Ships & Harbor Craft, Comp & Spares	\$ 1,033	\$ 1,246	-	\$ 3,046
Tanks, Other Veh, Weapons, Comp & Spares	\$ 1,438	\$ 16	-	\$ 2,671
Ammunition	\$ 3,782	\$ 4,183	-	\$ 5,717
Electronics & Comm Equip, Comp & Spares	\$ 2,389	\$ 1,660	-	\$ 1,539
Spare Parts	\$ 5,995	\$ 8,848	-	\$ 4,579
Other Material	\$19,569	\$13,472	-	\$15,048
Construction	\$ 466	\$ 387	-	\$ 4,667
Repair & Rehabilitation of Excess Packing, Crating, Handling & Transportation	\$ 1,608	\$ 1,382	-	\$ 462
Training	\$ 3,698	\$ 4,012	-	\$ 5,176
Other Services	\$ 5,597	\$ 5,702	-	\$ 6,340
	-	\$ 95	-	\$ 7
Data for Selected Major Items	Quantity	Quantity	Quantity	Value
AD4 Aircraft	-	25	-	-
Landing Craft Utility (LCU)	1	3	5	\$ 38
Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP)	-	-	8	\$ 97
Landing Craft (LSIL)	2	3	3	\$ 45
Landing Ship Medium (LSM)	2	1	5	\$ 660
Landing Ship Tank (LST)	-	-	1	\$ 1,219
Coastal Minesweeper (MSC)	-	-	1	\$ 18
Submarine Chaser (PC)	4	6	5	\$ 632
Trailer, Cargo, 1/4 ton, 2 wheel	-	-	2,397	\$ 553
Trailer, Cargo, 1 1/2 ton	-	-	1,008	\$ 788
Truck, Cargo, 4-6 ton	-	-	55	\$ 396
Rifle, Cal 30	9	-	-	-
Cartridge, 4.2" (M Rds)	6	4	76	\$ 1,404
Cartridge, Cal 30 (M Rds)	669	-	822	\$ 29
Cartridge, 81mm (M Rds)	20	-	-	-
Cartridge, 105mm (M Rds)	5	5	48	\$ 1,301
Cartridge, 155mm (M Rds)	-	9	67	\$ 2,817
Rocket, 3.5"	137,981	66,100	-	-
AN GRC Radio Series	94	472	169	\$ 206
AN PRC Radio Series	1,857	993	1,527	\$ 779
AN TRC 4 Radio Relay	13	1	1	\$ 8

d. FY 61 MAP Training Summary for Vietnam.

(1) CONUS and overseas training of two thousand and seven Vietnamese military personnel at a cost of approximately \$3,000,000.00.

(2) Sixty technical representatives to be sent to Vietnam - at a cost of approximately \$900,000.00.

(3) Four mobile training teams to be sent to Vietnam - at a cost of approximately \$70,000.00.

(4) FY 61 US MAAG expenses and other training costs approximately \$2,500,000.00.

SECRET

ANNEX E (S)RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES AND COUNTERMEASURES (U)CONTENTS(U)

	<u>Page</u>
SECTION I - THE VIET MINH	
1. GENERAL	E-1
2. OPERATIONS	E-1
3. ORGANIZATION	E-2
4. CURRENT RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES	E-3
SECTION II - ASPECTS OF VIET MINH SUCCESS	
1. DISADVANTAGES OF THE VIET MINH	E-8
2. ADVANTAGES OF THE VIET MINH	E-8
3. POLITICAL	E-9
4. PSYCHOLOGICAL	E-9
5. STRATEGIC	E-10
6. TACTICAL	E-11
SECTION III - MILITARY-CIVIL COUNTERMEASURES	
1. PACIFICATION	E-13
2. MILITARY-CIVIL COOPERATION	E-14
3. CURRENT PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES	E-15
4. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS	E-15
5. NEW SECURITY MEASURES	E-16
6. MILITARY TRIBUNALS	E-17
7. FUTURE MEASURES	E-18
8. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE UNITS	E-19

E.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX E (S)RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES AND COUNTERMEASURES (UNCLASSIFIED)SECTION ITHE VIET MINH1. (U) General.

When the Viet Minh regular forces launched their attacks on the French in December 1946, they believed themselves capable of quickly defeating the French forces in open battle. Their beliefs were not realized and resulted in the almost total destruction of Viet Minh forces in 1947. After this experience, Viet Minh leaders turned to the works of Mao Tse-Tung as the theoretical basis for revolutionary warfare in Asia. As a result, the later successes of the Viet Minh lay in their conception of the guerrilla army and clandestine underground.

2. (S) Operations.

Viet Minh revolutionaries, theorists as well as practitioners, from the very beginning recognized the crucial value of the guerrilla in the underdeveloped country and difficult terrain in which they were operating. Their conception of the guerrilla fighter and their refinement of guerrilla warfare beyond previous historical experience explains much of their ultimate success.

The precedent of Indochina is an important lesson on the value of the guerrilla in all phases of revolutionary war. It is likely to be long remembered in the Communist Bloc. Even though Communist Bloc countries may be increasingly able to put regular forces into the field, it is conceivable that they will find guerrilla warfare a safer and more attractive alternative. This approach would have all the advantages proved in Indochina: slow attrition of the enemy, relative immunity from countermeasures, time in which to build up regular forces for the decisive final attack, and low cost.

Viet Minh operations were based on the population. The natives were won psychologically for the revolutionary cause to the point not

SECRET

merely of acquiescence but of active participation in the struggle. The means to this end included an understanding of their political preconceptions and their social customs and needs that only intimate knowledge and a superior intelligence effort could supply. It was also essential to reduce the instinctive, traditional distrust between the population and army, and to make a recognizable effort to furnish economic aid. In the attainment of these objectives the Viet Minh guerrillas were eminently successful. In Indochina they performed the infiltration and organization that gave the Viet Minh superior intelligence. They aided in vital nonmilitary tasks such as harvesting, emergency relief, and public improvements. Such acts gained the gratitude of the natives. Their irregular status and non-uniformed appearance helped overcome the separation and suspicion that prevailed between civilians and the Army.

Viet Minh paramilitary operations were traditional to guerrilla warfare and were characterized by brief, violent actions initiated by the Viet Minh forces at a time and place of their own choosing. Their use of guerrilla tactics restricted French movements to the few available roads, continually cut their land lines of communications, and forced the utilization of large scale air support.

3. (S) Organization.

Ever since the armistice in 1954 and the formation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), communist North Vietnam has concentrated on the development of its army. In recent years the efforts have been accelerated to gain a more modern, standardized regular army, for more intensive political indoctrination of the soldiers, and for a higher degree of army participation in DRV's over-all economic effort.

During the war the Viet Minh guerrillas were a trained force with specific and detailed missions including economic assistance, psychological warfare, and paramilitary operations. Their continuing importance in the struggle for communist domination in that area of the

SECRET

world has been recognized by the DRV. Recent developments in Laos confirm the fact that guerrilla forces have once more come to occupy an important place in the military picture and are ready and available for action.

Apart from their potential military usefulness, the guerrillas have proved to be the most effective element for covert infiltration and political indoctrination in the countries bordering on the DRV. DRV emphasis continues on political warfare within North Vietnam and in the adjacent countries, side by side with the drive for a greater regular military capability. At present guerrilla units are being used consistently for both subversion and paramilitary operations.

Immediately after the armistice the wartime guerrillas were organized into a militia with a variety of civil and military functions. The militia acted, for example, as a police force and also assisted in political indoctrination. However, little attention was paid to them and they were allowed to disintegrate in some areas. In 1957, the need for internal security was again a problem and once more ex-guerrillas were the basis for reestablishing the militia.

It appears therefore that some guerrilla forces are attached to the regular army for special covert or clandestine operations while others continue to function as part of the militia. In either case, their usefulness is not likely to be lessened by the growth and modernization of the military establishment since they will be better suited to such activities and better able to escape detection than soldiers of the regular army.

4. (S) Current Resistance Activities.

The Viet Minh, now called the Viet Cong, continue to be the principal threat to internal security in South Vietnam. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam (RV), though well aware of the threat and trying to eliminate it, has not been very successful.

During 1959 the Viet Cong increased its overt or guerrilla activity. This indicates that the original DRV strategy of propaganda and

SECRET

subversion instead of terrorism and paramilitary attack has changed. The Viet Cong, however, has not given up its other activities. It has, for example, been placing heavy emphasis on "tax and loan" collections from Gia Dinh, Phuong Dinh, Vinh Long, and An Giang Provinces in South Vietnam. Also, Viet Cong propaganda has become more and more open, as evidenced by an increasing number of antigovernment leaflets and the appearance of DRV flags in villages.

Viet Cong cadres have been sent into the Nam Thai Son land development area in Kien Giang Province in South Vietnam to distribute subversive propaganda and organize sabotage of farm implements and equipment. Supposedly on the grounds that roads now being built in South Vietnam could be used as air strips in case of war, the Viet Cong has been attempting to delay construction by causing labor unrest and by sabotaging warehouses and other installations.

The RV army and the Security Forces have also been primary targets of the Viet Cong. Its agents have attempted to subvert RV Army members, particularly officers, and to lower their morale by terrorism. The terrorist attacks coincided with a propaganda campaign within the RV army calling for resistance to US military officers, who were accused of insulting trainees and of being responsible for the death of trainees during military exercises. The Viet Cong appear to have been largely unsuccessful in subverting Army personnel, mainly because RV Army security measures have been effective.

US agencies have for some time received reports of attacks planned against Americans, particularly in the Saigon area. On 8 July 1959, an attack was made on the MAAG Detachment at Bien Hoa killing two Americans. This was the first attack on a US installation since the October 1957 bombings, and the first US personnel killed since Ngo came into power in 1955. Public indignation ran high and Vietnamese staged mass protest demonstrations in Saigon. In view of the public reaction and the quick apprehension of the assassins by the RV Military Security Service, it is unlikely that the Viet Cong will make

E-4

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

further attacks against Americans until the adverse reaction to the Bien Hoa incident has been forgotten.

On 18 January 1959, the Viet Cong propaganda machine unleashed its most violent attack against the RV Government. The Viet Cong had mobilized all its propaganda resources to spread the story that on 1 December 1958 the RV Government had willfully poisoned more than 1,000 political prisoners at the Phu Loi detention camp, 33 miles north of Saigon near Thu Dau Mot. The British Consul General in Hanoi reported that this campaign was pursued with "near hysteria" and that there had been nothing to equal it within the experience of any member of the British.

The Viet Cong consider the Phu Loi propaganda campaign a success. The sheer volume of propaganda commanded the attention of the population of North Vietnam, probably reached many in South Vietnam, and aroused questions and comments in the non-Communist world. In South Vietnam many people were confused when the Government did not immediately deny the accusations. This confused and inconsistent handling of the situation failed to meet the difficult problems. But the RV Government has recently tried to correct some of its deficiencies in the handling of such incidents and has been quicker to seize opportunities to wage counterpropaganda against DRV.

The Viet Cong appears to be giving continued attention to improved organization, recruiting, training, simplifying communications, and meeting the threat posed by informers and RV counterespionage activities.

The Viet Cong, Nam Bo High Commission in March 1959 reorganized resistance zones and commands in the southern provinces, as is their policy in trying to confuse RV intelligence agencies.

The intensive recruiting program and the infiltration from North Vietnam and Cambodia have steadily increased the number of Viet Cong units in South Vietnam. The RV estimated Viet Cong strength at the end of March 59 as 1,810 persons, and at the end of June this estimate

SECRET

rose to 2,338. Current estimates place the Vietnamese Communist strength at 3000. These figures do not include those who, willingly or through coercion, supply arms, money, food, hideouts, and information.

What has made this Communist build-up appear more massive is the switch in tactics. Before 1959 the Communists had been reluctant to attack any point which was even partially protected. They would not engage any RV forces of even platoon strength and would use no more than a handful of men in any operation. But by Sep 59 the Communists began their new tactics of boldly striking with larger forces against military installations. They also no longer feared to engage RV forces in combat. By Jan 60, this new boldness carried Vietnamese Communists to a successful attack on an RV regiment at Tay Ninh.

Undoubtedly, the new Vietnamese tactics took the South Vietnamese Government by surprise. The situation, though admittedly dangerous in some areas, does not appear to have become critical enough to threaten South Vietnam's existence. What seems most needed is a calm assessment of the Communist tactics and a realization that for the South Vietnamese Government to be stampeded into irrational acts will accomplish a Communist objective-- the unbalancing of South Vietnam's Government so that it can not plan a long-range program of putting an end to insurgency.

There has been no significant independent action recently by the dissident religious sects. Although various sects continued to retain their identity, their activities were hardly distinguishable from Viet Cong groups, under whose control they appear to be operating. The strength of the Hoa Hao, religious fanatics, now consists of scattered armed groups devoted to pillage and terrorism in remote areas of Kien Giang, An Giang, and Vinh Long Provinces. In An Giang, a group of 50 Hoa Hao was reportedly engaged in "tax collections, kidnaping and intimidation." Cao Dai, another religious group, has been reported to have activities in Tay Ninh and Kien Giang Provinces, but no particular activity has been noted. In the Bay Mon Gang and other remnants of the Binh Xuyen, which is an organization of pirates and bandits, a number of leading cadres have been reduced in rank

SECRET

and replaced with hard core Viet Cong guerrillas, who have taken over the leadership.

These developments would appear to indicate that the sects have come under Viet Cong direction to such a degree that as individual organizations they no longer represent a significant threat to internal security in the south.

Viet Cong use of the Cambodian frontier as sanctuary continues to hamper the RV effort in eliminating these guerrillas in the southwest province. Bands ranging in size from a few to more than 200 have been reportedly operating across the frontier from bases in Cambodia. In March 1959, South Vietnam proposed the creation of a five-mile zone along both sides of the frontier in which security forces of both sides would have the right of "hot pursuit." The Cambodian Government did not accept the proposal. The problem remains one of many that have strained Cambodian-Vietnamese relations and have not been solved to date.

E-7

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECTION IIASPECTS OF VIET MINH SUCCESS1. (C) Disadvantages of the Viet Minh

The Viet Minh campaign demonstrated some of the weaknesses of revolutionary warfare as well as its advantages.

Particularly during the early war years, the Viet Minh effort suffered considerably from poor logistics, shortages of money and materiel, lack of trained officer cadres, and hence an inability to carry out sustained attacks.

Lack of a modern transportation system and the concomitant need for staggering numbers of coolies created a permanent shortage of manpower. This condition would have been far more severe, however, if the war needs had called for transport of POL and of large amounts of artillery ammunition. These primitive means of transport had the incidental advantage of virtual immunity to detection and destruction.

2. (C) Advantages of the Viet Minh

Some of the advantages of the Viet Minh over the French were inescapable.

The infiltrating techniques of the Viet Minh guerrillas and their familiarity with the country, terrain and people permitted much intelligence material to be obtained that the French could not hope to equal.

Racial characteristics rendered native Viet Minh guerrillas indistinguishable from peaceful inhabitants of the villages. Conversely, the French reconnaissance elements were easy targets and had no way of "merging" with the population.

The absence of fronts compelled the French to protect every installation individually and thus tie up many thousands of troops in passive security.

The scarcity of so-called strategic targets and the profusion and elusiveness of tactical targets made target acquisition an almost hopelessly difficult task for the French air force. Photo reconnaissance,

2-3

SECRET

so important to Western armies, was hampered by heavy vegetation, mountainous terrain, and frequent bad weather.

3. (S) Political

The French Government did not make the national effort required to defeat the Viet Minh. The French objective was to maintain a position of strength from which an "honorable" settlement could be negotiated.

The United States failed to recognize the limited nature of the French objective and was deluded into believing the French could and would achieve a military victory. By so believing, the United States did not take the diplomatic or military measures needed to insure victory.

The French Government failed to make the political concessions necessary to gain support of the Vietnamese. French reluctance to grant full independence to these people permitted the Communists to cloak their actions in the guise of a popular, nationalist, anticolonial movement. Many nationalists in Vietnam believed that a French victory would mean a continuation of French colonial influence, but that a Communist victory, regardless of the cost to Vietnamese personal liberties, would bring some type of national independence.

Both France and the United States failed to appreciate the extent to which the Viet Minh would be supported by the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

4. (S) Psychological

The French did not develop effective psychological or unconventional warfare programs; the Viet Minh did. Viet Minh subversive, guerrilla, and propaganda programs were highly effective, gained the support of the people, and mobilized them behind the Viet Minh in a "people's war."

One of the reasons the Viet Minh were able to advance their psychological warfare programs so adroitly may stem from the possibility that the Japanese, through their occupation of Indochina and their "Asia for Asians" theme, had created an ideal climate for the generation of an indigenous independence movement and had completely removed from the Vietnamese whatever liking existed for colonialism and the French.

SECRET

SECRET

5. (S) Strategic

The French failed to direct all their efforts toward a decisive, obtainable goal. The theater commander was given missions beyond the capabilities of his forces. He was ordered, for example, to avoid losing any ground or creating any situation in which the Communists might gain an apparent tactical success. This, combined with the failure of the French Government to provide sufficient military forces, resulted in an essentially defensive posture and gave the initiative to the Viet Minh.

After 1950, the constant threat of Chinese Communist intervention further influenced the deployment of French forces and was the major factor contributing to the development of the permanent field fortifications in North Vietnam and the "Maginot complex." Considering the threat of a Chinese Communist invasion from the north and the trend of UN operations in Korea, the French saw no alternative but to construct a series of fortifications to cover the withdrawal of their forces to port areas for evacuation.

The French did not position available military units where they could accomplish required missions. This resulted from French failure to adapt their forces to the terrain and techniques of the enemy. French forces were essentially roadbound and relied too heavily on conventional heavy equipment and support systems. Special forces and ranger-type operations were relegated to a very minor role. This was due in part to the lack of realistic planning at theater-level and in part to insufficient helicopter and inadequate airlift support.

The slow development of the Vietnam national armed forces was a direct result of French reluctance to press for the rapid expansion of indigenous forces. In 1953-54 when cadres were needed for rapid expansion, such cadres were not available.

The French in Vietnam did not adequately evaluate the actual effectiveness of the Viet Minh strategic and tactical doctrine. Viet Minh organization and supply methods enabled them to overcome the numerical superiority enjoyed by the French forces. Refusal of the Viet Minh to

SECRET

engage in combat except under favorable circumstances further frustrated French operations both real and diversionary. This Viet Minh technique reduced their ammunition requirements far below those of conventional forces. The development of "cottage arsenals" also permitted the Viet Minh to maintain guerrilla pressure on the French throughout Vietnam without dependence upon long lines of communication and supply. Clandestine storing of ammunition and other supplies in areas of intended attack allowed continuing surprise attacks by the Viet Minh without reliance upon resupply convoys.

The French Air Force was unable to inflict any sustained, major damage upon the jungle-hidden enemy despite the fact the French held complete air superiority throughout the war.

6. (S) Tactical

In general the French failed to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. They were not aggressive in finding, identifying and attacking the enemy. Instead, the French preferred to move into enemy territory, dig in, and await the counterattack. This move-up-and-dig-in attitude resulted largely from the elusiveness of the Viet Minh and the unfamiliarity of the French with the terrain. This attitude of over-caution prevailed not only at battalion level but extended into division echelons.

Although well versed in conventional tactics, the French were reluctant to alter their doctrine to fit the situation imposed by the terrain. Artillery and armor were usually confined to movement on roads and therefore could not support the infantry in cross-country movements. Because of the effectiveness of Viet Minh attacks, French commanders hesitated to move their infantry beyond support range of their roadbound armor and artillery units. This enabled the Viet Minh to outmaneuver the French repeatedly. In a few instances, the French lightened their regimental task forces for cross-country movement and conducted highly successful operations. These forces were resupplied by air for weeks at a time.

The French habitually failed to exercise proper tactical security measures during the movement of units. Units repeatedly fell

SECRET

into ambushes or were attacked by surprise from the flanks because of failure to put out points or flank guards. This violation of security resulted from the reckless attitude of the veteran French officers and NCOs who prided themselves on being able to fight their way out of any situation.

Perhaps more significant than the tactical failure of the French were the sound and successful tactical techniques of the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh constantly emphasized thorough reconnaissance and intelligence preparation for attacks, cross-country mobility, and the principles of concentration and surprise attack at the time and place of their own choosing.

E-12

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION IIIMILITARY-CIVIL COUNTERMEASURES1. (U) Pacification

At the end of 1954, President Ngo issued a military security directive which placed all insecure provinces under military authority. Provinces in zones which were to be cleared of Viet Minh forces were included in those to be administered by the military. The Presidential directive also provided for the phasing out of military authority as civilian administrators became available and capable. (This was carried out harmoniously and effectively later.) The operational doctrine for the take-over of zones evacuated by the Viet Minh was known as "pacification." US and French officers in the combined Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM), under the US Chief of MAAG, advised the RV on pacification operations.

The first pacification campaign used military forces of about brigade strength. The second had forces about the strength of a corps. Essentially, these operations were march-ins by the troops and the establishment of free government in the areas used as combat zones of the eight-year war. Roads and railroads needed rehabilitation. Bridges, schools, hospitals, and markets had to be rebuilt. The population needed medical care and, in many places, food and clothing. Armed bands were still in the area and farms and villages needed protection. Troops for these campaigns were given special training in courtesy towards the civilians (including how to answer communist propaganda), in disbursing of aid, in construction, and in administrative procedures. As a result of good planning, training, and operations by the military, effective government and security were quickly established in the pacification areas. Much of the war-torn economy was rehabilitated, and many of the communist organizations left behind were revealed by the population. A great many hidden caches of arms and equipment were seized.

Similar pacification measures were taken in actions against rebellious sect forces in the western regions and in the jungle-foothill regions north of Saigon. The latter operation experimented with building a force around a small Army cadre (used for central administration and for patrols into

SECRET

the further reaches of the jungle), and making use of civil police forces and civilian administrative teams. The operation was not wholly successful and had to be strengthened eventually with Army troops.

2. (U) Military-Civil Cooperation

During the pacification campaigns, the RV Army learned to work closely with two notable civilian organizations. The organizations were "Operation Brotherhood" of the International Jaycees and the Vietnamese Government's "Civic Action."

"Operation Brotherhood" was originally staffed by Filipino volunteer doctors, dentists, and nurses, who establishes a large clinic to treat refugees in the Saigon-Cholon area. They entered Camau with Army pacification forces. Later, small field teams of Filipino doctors and nurses went out into the countryside with Vietnamese Army patrols to give inoculations and teach public health measures. Eventually, medical personnel of many other nations of the free world joined the Operation Brotherhood effort. They trained Vietnamese as hospital aides, taught first-aid, sanitation, and food preparation to the villagers, and guided community development in addition to performing medical services.

"Civic Action" was established as a civilian organization to bring public administration to the villages of RV. It was placed under the Ministry of Defense initially for support and for coordinated operations with the Army in pacification work. Civil service employees of all Ministries were asked to volunteer. Teams of four men would enter a village, enlist the help of villagers in building a community house (for meetings of village elders, a first-aid clinic, and an information room where news of the government was posted), a school house, and a public market. The team would then give on-the-job training to volunteer villagers in teaching, village administration, first-aid, sanitation, public works (wells, street drainage, pit latrines, etc.) and agricultural methods. Once the local villagers were trained, the Civic Action team would move on to another village. These teams moved in right after the Army patrols. A number of these unarmed civilians were killed by dissident guerrillas. The Civic Action organization was later placed directly under the

SECRET

President to permit full participation of all Ministries in its operations.

3. (U) Current Pacification Activities

The Vietnamese Army has continued the civil activities it commenced during the pacification campaigns. Its major work is in the High Plateau areas building and improving roads and bridges, bringing government administration to the nomad tribes of the mountains and jungle, and assisting pioneer settlers build new communities. Much of the current activity centers around small outposts established in the more remote areas paralleling the RV borders with Laos and Cambodia. Rough roads are constructed to these outposts, the jungle cleared for farming, and security established to protect the new communities. The new communities are attracting hardy pioneers to virgin lands that they will be willing to protect, adding new security to borders that have long been vulnerable to Viet Minh cross-country tactics.

4. (S) Offensive Operations

In early February 1959, the RV Army Psychological Warfare Directorate completed "Operation Nguyen Trai." This program had an overt and covert action plan. Mass rallies were held and Self-Defense Corps and Civil Guard training in psychological warfare was instituted. RV agents, posing as Viet Cong members, distributed anti-government leaflets, and conducted terrorist activities to confuse and demoralize the Viet Cong and to force local officials to act against the Viet Cong.

In March 1959, the RV launched an all-out offensive against Viet Cong guerrilla forces reportedly regrouping in "Resistance Zone D" (which includes parts of Phuoc Thanh, Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, and Phuoc Long Provinces). For the first time the RV Air Force took offensive action against dissident forces. The results were not decisive since the guerrillas succeeded in evading RV forces, who were hampered by the thick jungle and forest. RV forces did capture a number of bases containing equipment and items of logistic support. RV elements were ordered to remain in this area and try to build roads through the jungle, thereby opening it up and lessening the danger of renewed Viet Cong activity there.

SECRET

Creation in February 1959 of the new Province of Phuoc Thanh, composed of large areas of forest and jungle which had long served as shelter for Viet Cong groups, was in part designed to tighten security. The new province was created from portions of Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, Phuoc Long, and Binh Duong Provinces. The Government is establishing agricultural development centers in this area. By benefiting the people and the national economy, agricultural development in itself could be a more effective weapon against the Viet Cong than police action alone.

5. (S) New Security Measures

A plan for pacification of the southwestern provinces was put into effect in April 59 with the creation of a new Government Delegation to the Southern Provinces (Southern Delegation) with headquarters at Can Tho. The Southern Delegation has jurisdiction over the 12 provinces lying south and west of Saigon. The Chief of the 5th Military Region was given extraordinary powers bordering on martial law, including control over all military units and operations in the western provinces and indirect control over all administrative offices.

The plan includes the formation of special security units. Each of these units consists of approximately 30 men, organized into two elements: one for intelligence operations, the other for armed attack. These units operate as mobile teams, moving from one trouble area to another. This method of operation is designed to eliminate a major problem that has beset the Self-Defense Corps. The Self-Defense Corps is usually composed of local inhabitants, and is particularly vulnerable to local Viet Cong subversion and control through the Viet Cong terrorizing parents and relatives of its members.

Although the plan itself is sound, the actual operation has been impeded by administrative and operational difficulties. The Director of the National Police and Surete Service is not in complete agreement with the plan and resents other authority over special security units and has failed to furnish the necessary and promised logistical and financial support.

SECRET

6. (S) Military Tribunals

From the tenor of Viet Cong propaganda, the RV decree 10/59 has caused some fear in Viet Cong ranks. Decree 10/59, approved by the National Assembly on Apr 1959 provides for the creation of Special Military Tribunals and sets forth the penalties for crimes aimed at destroying or abusing external or internal national security. The decree provides for three Special Military Tribunals--one in Saigon, for the southern provinces; in Banmethout for the central Vietnam highlands; and in Hue for the central Vietnam lowlands. Additional courts may be created by decree. The basic decree appears to be a modified form of martial law. In his request to the National assembly to pass the decree, President Ngo stated that the reasons for the creation of the Special Courts were: the nation was facing its worst security situation since the Republic of Vietnam was created in 1955; Viet Cong members were tried under a variety of old French laws which tended to draw cases out for as long as two or three years; and the Viet Cong could continue operating because it was too difficult to obtain the firm and exacting proof required to convict them under the old laws.

Decree 10/59 is in use and its effectiveness was substantiated in a report that in Kien Phong Province six Viet Cong members were tried by a Military Tribunal. Three of the six were sentenced to death, two to life imprisonment, and one to 20 years at hard labor. Two Viet Cong members were tried at Tay Ninh for assassination, one was sentenced to death, and the other to life imprisonment at hard labor.

In the continued search for more effective measures, President Ngo reportedly instructed the National Revolutionary Movement and the director of the RV intelligence service to organize mobile teams which could handle the Viet Cong terrorists, who could not be dealt with through normal, judicial procedures for lack of concrete proof. These teams were to be composed of members of the Civil Guard, Police, Surete, and possibly Army representatives and would be organized and controlled by the province chiefs in coordination with the regional military commanders. They would meet Viet Cong tactics with Viet Cong tactics in order to accomplish

SECRET

their goal. The present status of such "terrorist teams" is not known. It seems unlikely that the President would go to such extremes, although the Intelligence Director has frequently resorted to similar unsavory measures.

7. (C) Future Measures

RV countermeasures are becoming increasingly effective in controlling Viet Cong activities although much remains to be done. Although warranted by the increase in Viet Cong activity the severe nature of the countermeasures undertaken or under consideration by RV nevertheless raise certain problems. The solution to internal security problems can be made easier only if the peasants feel protected and not persecuted, particularly since Viet Cong terrorist bands must rely to a large extent on the voluntary or involuntary support of the peasantry. If the new measures are to be effective not only in controlling the Viet Cong but also in instilling confidence into the populace, they must be carried out wisely and judiciously at the top and on the local level. The use of Cambodian territory as a "privileged sanctuary" by Viet Cong and other dissidents must also be stopped before South Vietnam can hope to eliminate internal security difficulties.

8. (S) Unconventional Warfare and Psychological Warfare Units

The 1st Observation Group, RV Army, with an authorized strength of 305 constitutes the Vietnamese Special Forces organization. The group has a limited capability to assist in maintaining internal security and to provide resistance to external attack. Plans are underway to provide a ten man US Special Forces team to conduct anti-guerrilla and PSYWAR training for 35 selected Vietnamese Civil Guard personnel in early 1960.

ANNEX FGLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ARVN	- Armed Forces of Vietnam (French)
CINCPAC	- Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
DLF	- Development Loan Fund
DRV	- Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
ECA	- Economic Cooperation Administration
FEC	- French Expeditionary Corps
FOA	- Foreign Operations Administration
GVN	- Government of Vietnam
ICA	- International Cooperation Administration
ICC	- International Control Commission
LOTS	- Logistical Over - The - Shore Operations
OSP	- Offshore Procurement Program
PACOM	- Pacific Command
PEO	- Programs Evaluation Office
MAAG	- Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP	- Military Assistance Program
MDAP	- Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MSA	- Mutual Security Administration
MSP	- Mutual Security Program
NRM	- National Revolutionary Movement
RV	- Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
TCA	- Technical Cooperation Administration
TERM	- Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission
TRIM	- Training Relations Instruction Mission
USOM	- United States Operations Mission
VNA	- Vietnamese National Army
VNAF	- Vietnamese Air Force
VN	- Vietnamese Navy
WPP	- Weapons Production Program
CATO	- Combined Arms Training Organization

ANNEX G

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Appraisal of Southeast Asia by 1965 (U). ACSI, DA, Proj A-5883. 15 Apr 59. C-18135.142.
Includes an appraisal of the South Vietnam position in Southeast Asia in 1965. Limited value.
2. Area Study: Southeast Asia; Burma, Thailand, Vietnam. U.S. Army Civil Affairs School. 1959. N-18702.1.
Includes some background and history which was useful for this study.
3. Army Fiscal Year 1961 Military Assistance Training Program (MAP) (U). Department of the Army. 15 Sep 59. C-17067.11.
4. Army Intelligence Digest (U). ACSI, DA, Proj 4831. 15 Feb 60. S-17092.2. Vietnam.
5. Civic Activities of the Military, Southeast Asia. Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, (Anderson-Southeast Asia Subcommittee of the Draper Committee). 13 Mar 59. N-18622.
Discusses the Republic of Vietnam Army Civil Assistance program which was assisted by the Philippine Economic Development Corps (EDCOR).
6. A Cold War Program for Defense. OSD Memo (Lansdale). Sep 57.
A discussion and conclusions of the author regarding measures the DOD and the military services can take to gain maximum effectiveness of personnel in the cold war and specifically to counter resistance activities.
7. Command Digest. U.S. Pacific Command. May 60. S-16082.7.
Provides dollar program data for Vietnam for FY 60-61 and total military assistance provided Vietnam 1950-1960. Includes progress made toward achieving specific MAP goals.
8. Communist Insurgency in South Vietnam (U). In: USARPAC Intelligence Bulletin (U). Apr 60. S-17579.80, p. 20.
9. Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee Report). Volumes I, II and III. 17 Aug 59. S/N-18681.1-A,B,C.
A very thorough, comprehensive review, analysis, and evaluation of the MAP program from which specific recommendations for improvement were made. This represents probably the best collation of MAP information available today.
10. Doctrine and Tactics of Revolutionary Warfare: The Viet Minh in Indochina (U). Rand Corporation, RM 2395. S-17074.443.
Excellent source of information covering the history of the Viet Minh, their tactics, principles, and doctrine, from 1950-58. Describes the evolution of guerrilla units into a regular force.
11. The Effective Use of Overseas U.S. Military Forces in International Relations vis-a-vis Certain Selected Areas in SE-Asia and Japan. Air War College Thesis by Colonel Wallace P. Grubbs. Jun 58. N-16952.24.

12. Five Years of Progress in South Vietnam(U). In: USARPAC Intelligence Bulletin(U). Mar 60. S-17579.79, p. 48.
13. Implications of Increased Political Role of the Armed Forces in Southeast Asia(U). In: USARPAC Intelligence Bulletin(U). Dec 59. S-17579.76, p. 77.
14. Internal Security in South Vietnam(U). In: USARPAC Intelligence Bulletin(U). Oct-Nov 59. S-17579.75, p. 27.
15. MAAG Vietnam - Manacled by Geneva(U). U.S. Army War College Student Study by Colonel Norman H. Bykerk. 19 Mar 58. S-18545.47.
A comprehensive study of the history, development and status of MAAG-Vietnam as of 1957 or 1958. This officer was Chief of Staff to the Chief, MAAG and is able to give a very authoritative presentation of information, background, and his views for the future.
16. Military Assistance Basic Planning Document (BPD). Depts of State and Defense. 31 Mar 60. S-17067.17.
Provides order of magnitude dollar guidelines for military assistance to various areas and countries. Also provides the Mutual Security Program objectives for all areas and countries.
17. Military Assistance Manual. Dept of Defense. 15 May 60. N-17067.18.
DOD implementation of certain Draper Committee recommendations concerning the development of budgetary requirements for the annual MAP. Details responsibilities to each level of authority.
18. Military Assistance Program, Information and Guidance. DA, DN, DAF, Jan 1960. N-17067.12.
Comprehensive coverage of the MAP. Includes the Mutual Security Program, administration of the MAP, Army, Navy and Air Force implementation of the MA Program, and various supporting appendices to include the Mutual Security Act of 1954, DOD, and departmental directives governing MAP.
19. National Intelligence Survey - Vietnam. Central Intelligence Survey. Current. S/C-17568-C.
20. North Vietnam - Five Years of Progress(U). In: USARPAC Intelligence Bulletin(U). Feb 60. S-17579.78.
21. Pacific Command Intelligence Estimate - Non-Bloc Countries. ACSI, Pacific Command. 16 Nov 59. S-18578.2, p. 115.
Includes an intelligence estimate on the Republic of Vietnam as of 1958. Information contained in Annex C of this study is later data on military forces.
22. Pacification in Vietnam. OSD Memo (Lansdale). 16 Jul 58.
An eyewitness account of the civil-military program for pacification and resettlement in the Republic of Vietnam following the Geneva Agreement.
23. Program Deviation to FY 1959 Army MA Training Program for Vietnam(U). MAAG, Vietnam. 25 Feb 59. C-17067.15.
24. Psychological Warfare Area Handbook for Vietnam, Human Relations Area Files, Inc. Jun 57. S-18158.14.

25. Reasons for the French Failure in Indo-China(U). In: USARPAC Intelligence Bulletin(U). Sep 59. S-17579.74, p. 61.

26. Republic of Vietnam Country Report. The Military Assistance Institute. 15 Jan 59. P 540.4Rep.

27. Republic of Vietnam Station Report. The Military Assistance Institute. 15 Oct 59. P 540.4 Republic of Vietnam.

Excellent reference for country conditions, servants, military procedures, housing, etc which would be of interest to personnel to be assigned to the country.

ADDENDA:

28. Far East portion of the Mutual Security Program, fiscal year 1961 estimates, prepared by DOD and ICA. S-18532.2-H

Provides both general and detailed information on the Mutual Security Program for Vietnam (pages 176-197). Gives considerable coverage to the ICA aspects. Arrived too late to be completely integrated with this study. It is of great value to personnel assigned to MAAG-Vietnam.

29. World Wide Summary Statements of the Mutual Security Program, fiscal year 1961 estimates, prepared by DOD and ICA. S-18532.2-G

Provides general and specific information on the Mutual Security Program for FY 61 to include methods for programming; military assistance, defense support, development loan funds, technical cooperation and other programs. Arrived too late to be completely integrated with the study. Of value to personnel assigned to MAAG or Mission duty.

30. Non-Regional Programs of the Mutual Security Program, fiscal year 1961 estimates, prepared by DOD and ICA. S-18532.2-F

Provides Mutual Security Program information on such subjects as administrative expenses, interregional program expenses, modernization, MAP owned property, and special assistance programs. Arrived too late to be completely integrated with the study. Of value to personnel assigned to MAAG or Mission duty.