

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEX

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SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEX

MARCHMARCH

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15- 250917Z	CG XXIV CORPS TO CTF SEVEN SEVEN INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>gp-4</i> CTF SEVEN SEVEN VISIT TO DANANG
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MARCHMARCH

~~TOP SECRET~~

001110Z RUMLMHAB115 070015Z TTTT--RUMLMPA-
ZNY TTTT

0710015Z MAR 70
FM CG FIRST MAW
TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~
PERSONAL FOR LTJEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN TRASH
FORCE PLANNING (U)

- A. 7H AF TSN AB 090701Z MAR 70 (S)
- (TS) DURING CG FMFPAC VISIT TO RVNA 25 FEB 70, HE REQUESTED THAT THE WING TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE AVIATION ELEMENT OF THE POST PHASE IV MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE (MAB) WITH THE VIEW OF PLACING ALL AVIATION ELEMENTS IN ONE COMPOSITE MAG. THIS COMMAND BELIEVES STRONGLY IN THE TWO MAG CONCEPT IF OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCE IS ENVISIONED FROM TWO SEPARATE AIRFIELDS. THIS CONCEPT WAS PRESENTED TO CG FMFPAC DURING HIS VISIT.
 - (TS) THE SITING OF ALL AVIATION ELEMENTS OF THE MAB AT ONE LOCATION WOULD REDUCE MANY OF THE PROBLEMS ENVISIONED WITH THE COMPOSITE MAG, HOWEVER, IN PRELIMINARY INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AIR FORCE, AND REF A, THEY ARE OPPOSED UNALTERABLY TO OPERATING HELICOPTERS OUT OF DANANG, AND THIS AVENUE APPEARS CLOSED - AT LEAST ON MY LEVEL.

PAGE TWO RUMLMHAB115 ~~TOP SECRET~~

3. (TS) BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT OPERATION OF ALL AVIATION ELEMENTS FROM DANANG WILL NOT BE PERMITTED IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE SINGLE COMPOSITE MARINE AIR GROUP, IF REQUIRED, SHOULD BE ORGANIZED AND LOCATED AS FOLLOWS:

- | | |
|------------------------|--------|
| H&MS (FIXED WING) | DANANG |
| SUB UNITS H&MS (HEL O) | MMAF |
| MABS | DANANG |
| SUB UNIT MABS | MMAF |
| VMA(AW) | DANANG |
| VMA | DANANG |
| MMH | MMAF |
| BNL (REINF) | MMAF |
| DET MMH | MMAF |
| DET VMO | DANANG |
| MABS(-) | DANANG |
| DASC | |
| ASRT | |

SBC FILES
HEADQUARTERS III MAF
12207

THIS COMPOSITE GROUP COMPRISES THE AVIATION ELEMENT OF THE 19.8X MAB AND SHOULD BE ORGANIZED AROUND MAG-11 AUGMENTED WITH ALL BUT THE ENTIRE MAG-16 H&MS AND MABS. EXTENSIVE MAINTENANCE, STAFF AND

11 08 15

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE THREE RUMLMH0113 T O P S E C R E T
 HOUSEKEEPING AUGMENTATION IS REQUIRED AT EACH SITE DUE TO THE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT MISSIONS/TASKS, AND OPERATIONAL EXPERTISE REQUIRED. EACH H&MS IS SPECIFICALLY ORGANIZED AND EQUIPPED TO SUPPORT EITHER FIXED OR ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT; THE IMA SECTION OF A TACTICAL SQUADRON PROVIDES PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION ONLY WITH ALL EQUIPMENT PROVIDED BY THE H&MS. THE IMA OF A HELICOPTER SQUADRON OR OF A FIXED WING SQUADRON IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH A H&MS OF AN UNLIKE AIRCRAFT GROUP. ADDITIONALLY THE AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE SECTION WITHIN EACH H&MS MUST REMAIN INTACT WITH THOSE ASSOCIATED GROUP SUPPLY FUNCTIONS INTEGRAL TO 3M.

4. (TS) ESSENTIALLY, THE COMPLETE SUPPORT ELEMENTS, LESS CERTAIN SECURITY AND BASE OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS, OF TWO MAGS ARE REQUIRED TO ADEQUATELY SUPPORT THE COMPOSITE MAG CONCEPT FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME ENVISIONED. OF THE TWO CONCEPTS, I.E. COMPOSITE VS SEPARATE GROUPS, THE COMPOSITE MAG IS THE LEAST DESIRABLE. THE ONLY SAVINGS REALIZED IS IN GROUP COMMAND PERSONNEL. INITIAL ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT A PERSONNEL SAVINGS OF 2 MA'S, 9 AG'S AND 35 ENLISTED MIGHT BE REALIZED BY COMBINING ELEMENTS OF BOTH GROUP HEADQUARTERS. THE IMPACT OF THIS SAVINGS, HOWEVER, IS DIMINISHED IN THAT PROBLEMS OF COMMAND AND CONTR'L, SPAN OF SUPERVISION, AND

PAGE FOUR RUMLMH0113 T O P S E C R E T

COMMUNICATIONS WILL REQUIRE PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION. ADDITIONAL

SIMILAR PROBLEMS ARE ANTICIPATED AT THE H&MS AND MABS LEVEL WITH THE SUB-UNIT OF EACH SQUADRON LOCATED AT THE HELO ELEMENT. COMMAND ELEMENTS OF THE H&MS AND MABS SUB UNITS ARE STILL REQUIRED FOR SUPERVISION. SPAN OF CONTR'L PROBLEMS AT BOTH GROUP AND SQUADRON LEVEL (H&MS AND MABS) ARE MULTIPLIED DUE TO SIZE AND LOCATIONS; COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY DIFFICULTIES ARE COMPOUNDED.

5. (TS) ADMITTEDLY, THE AVIATION ELEMENT OF A BRIGADE IS BY DOCTRINE A SINGLE COMPOSITE MAG, TASK ORGANIZED FOR THE ASSIGNED MISSION. IT IS BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS DOCTRINE ENVISIONED EMPLOYMENTS OF SHORT DURATION AND/OR OPERATIONS FROM A SINGLE SITE, FOLLOWED BY EITHER RAPID EXPANSION OF FORCES TO DIVISION/WING SIZE, OR WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRIGADE. SUCH IS NOT THE CASE HERE. WITH PLANNED EMPLOYMENT OF ONE YEAR DURATION AND TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS OF DIFFERENT TYPES FROM TWO SEPARATE LOCATIONS, TWO SEPARATE MAGS ARE CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL FOR SUPPLY/MAINTENANCE/AVIONICS SUPPORT, TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND COMMAND AND CONTR'L. AN ADDITIONAL BENEFIT IS GAINED FROM THIS CONCEPT IN THAT, FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES, IN-COUNTRY FORCES COULD BE RAPIDLY AND EASILY REINFORCED

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

110815Z MAR 70

HEADQUARTERS III MAF

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

PTTIZYUW RUMHMAI 33 S 0702 001-TITI --RUE OFIA RUMHMAI

ZNY TITIT
P 112001Z MAR 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUE OFIA/OC
INFO RUMLPFA/CG III MAF
RUMLPFA/CG FLC
BT

PAGE CHECKED UPON RECEIPT
DATE 12 MAR 70 III MAF SAC
E. J. ... 3597 S.C.
(SIGNATURE)

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAFFMAN INFO
LTGEN MCCUTCHEON AND BGEN PADALINO FROM LTGEN BUSE
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //NO0000//
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

LOGISTIC CONCEPT FOR PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT (S)
1. (TS) SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE, I PROPOSE TO EMPL OY
THE FOLLOWING GENERAL LOGISTIC CONCEPT IN ESTABLISHING
SPECIFIC PLANNING GUIDELINES FOR THE MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES AND
EQUIP DURING THE IMPENDING PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT OF MARINE
CORPS FORCES FROM RVN.

A. 1ST MARDIV AND 1ST MAW UNITS SCHEDULED FOR REDEPLOY-
MENT DURING PHASE IV WILL REDEPLOY WITH ALL ON-HAND SERVICE-
ABLE AND UNSERVICEABLE REPAIRABLE T/E-T/A ALL QUANCES, ALL
INDIVIDUAL EQUIP AND WEAPONS, AUTH MEDICAL AND DENTAL

PAGE TWO RUMHFMAGGEEY T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCL FOR MCEO
ALL QUANCES AND ALL ON-HAND OP STOCKS LESS CLASS 1, III (BULK/
DRUMMED), V(V) AND V(A) MATERIEL AND LESS SPECIAL SOUTH EAST
ASIA CLOTHING NOT IN THE HANDS OF TR OOPS.

B. ALL SPECIAL ALL QUANCE (T/E P-4962 AND T/E P-4970)
EQUIP ASSETS HELD BY REDEPLOYING 1ST MARDIV AND 1ST MAW UNITS,
FLC END ITEM MAINTENANCE FLOAT ASSETS AND FLC END ITEM STOCK
ASSETS WILL BE SCREENED/REDISTRIBUTED BY CG III MAF TO FILL
T/E AND CLASS VII MOWQA DEFICIENCIES OF THE FOLLOWING UNITS
(IN THE PRIORITY SHOWN BELOW): POST-PHASE IV MAB, 3D MARDIV (-),
1ST MAW (REAR), 3D FSR, 1ST MAW UNITS REDEPLOYING TO OKI AND
JAPAN DURING PHASE IV, 1ST MARINE BRIGADE, 1ST MARDIV UNITS
REDEPLOYING TO MIDPAC DURING PHASE IV, 1ST MARDIV AND 1ST MAW
UNITS REDEPLOYING TO EASTPAC DURING PHASE IV, 5TH MEB, 3D MAW,
5TH FSR AND FORCE TR OOPS FMFPAC. ALL SPECIAL ALL QUANCE, END
ITEM MAINTENANCE FLOAT AND END ITEM STOCK EQUIP ASSETS EXCESS
TO REQ OF AFOREMENTIONED UNITS WILL BE PREPARED FOR SHIP-
MENT AND STAGED BY THE HOLDING UNITS. THESE EXCESS EQUIP
ASSETS WILL BE REYR GRADED TO CONUS FOR RETURN TO STOCKS SYSTEM
ON REDEPLOYING OR OPPORTUNE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPPING AND
NETS.

PAGE ONE OF THREE

112001Z MAR 70

"MCEO"
//

COPY 4 OF 4 COPIES

012 Mar
TOP SECRET

III MAF 710074

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUMHFMAL336 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCL FOR RUCED

C. FLT 15 DAYS AFTER START OF PHASE IV (MAY 15) BE DIRECTED TO URGE REPLENISHMENT FUNDS AND EXPENDITURE FOR PURSUIT TO THE OBJECTIVE (RUC) ON ALL MARINE CORPS AND OTHER ARMED FORCES EXCEPT DPTI COMBATABLES AND COMMERCIAL VEHICLES REMAIN PART OF. UPON ACTIVATION OF THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP (LSG) TO SUPPORT THE POST-PHASE IV MAB, FLC WILL CEASE ALL OTHER REPLENISHMENT FUNDS AND UNITS WILL BEGIN REQUISITIONING FROM FLC ON A FILL OR PASS TO 3D FSR BASIS ON MARCORPS SOURCE CODED ITEMS. LATE IN PHASE IV, ALL UNIT REQUISITIONS WILL BE SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO 3D FSR, AND FLC WILL BEGIN ROLL-UP ACTIVITIES. AT THIS TIME, ALL FLC ON-HAND OP STOCKS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO FILL HONOR REQR OF THE FOLLOWING UNITS (IN PRIORITY SHOWN BELOW): POST-PHASE IV MAB, 3D MARDIV (1), 1ST MAR (REAR), 3D FSR, 1ST MAF UNITS REDEPLOYING TO OKI AND JAPAN DURING PHASE IV, 1ST MARDIV UNITS REDEPLOYING TO WESTPAC DURING PHASE IV, 1ST MARDIV AND 1ST MAF UNITS REDEPLOYING TO EASTPAC DURING PHASE IV, PAXXT SERV BN 5TH MGS AND 5TH FSR.

D. NON-IAM GARRISON PROPERTY/NON-TECHNICAL COLLATERAL EQUIP ASSETS HELD BY UNITS REDEPLOYING DURING PHASE IV WILL BE SCREENED BY CG III MAF AGAINST POST-PHASE IV MAB:

PAGE FOUR RUMHFMAL336 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCL FOR RUCED
MARCORPSES WESTPAC, MCAF KANEONE AND COMCOMWEST ALL RANCOR DEFICIENCIES, IN THAT ORDER OF PRIORITY, AND REDISTRIBUTED ACCORDINGLY. ALL GARRISON PROPERTY AND COLLATERAL EQUIP ASSETS EXCESS TO REQR OF WESTPAC UNITS LISTED ABOVE WILL BE MADE AVAIL FOR FURTHER REDISTRIBUTION WITHIN THE MARINE CORPS AS COM MAY DIRECT.

E. ALL FLC SHOP STORES ASSETS WILL BE TURNED-OVER TO THE POST PHASE IV MAB LSG FOR SUPPORT OF FORCES REMAINING IN-COUNTRY.

F. SECONDARY DEPOT REPARABLES WILL BE REDISTRIBUTED TO SATISFY EXISTING WESTPAC REQR/DEFICIENCIES. IN VIEW OF SHORT TIME FRAMES ENVISIONED FOR PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT AUTHORITY BE GRANTED TO RETURN EXCESS SECONDARY DEPOT REPARABLES DIRECTLY TO MCEC EASTSON WITHOUT PRIOR REPORTING TO MCAF PHILA.

2. (TS) IF THE CONCEPT OUTLINED IN PAR 1, ABOVE IS APPROVED AND TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS, I PROPOSE TO EMBARK THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF TROOPS AND RETROGRADE CAR GO ON AVAIL AMPHIBIOUS/SHIPPING UTILIZING ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT LOADING TECHNIQUES IN ORDER TO PRESERVE MAXIMUM UNIT INTEGRITY. REMAINING PERSONNEL WOULD BE AIRLIFTED TO CONUS, MAKING MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF EXISTING MAC
PAGE TWO OF THREE 112001Z MAR 70

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"MCEO"

PAGE FIVE RUN/HNA 1336 T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L F O R M C E O
CHANNEL/SAAM AIRCRAFT. THE REMAINING CARGO WILL BE OFFERED TO
MSTS.

3. (U) YOUR CONCURRENCE/COMMENTS ON THE CONCEPT OUTLINED
IN PAR 1 AND 2 ABOVE IS REQUESTED. WARM REGARDS,

GP-4
BT

1336

PAGE THREE OF THREE

112001Z MAR 70

"MCEO"

SPECAT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

PTTZYUW RUMLMPA2666 27313 HEADQUARTERS RUHHFMA.
ZNY TTTT

COMMUNICATION CENTER
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

P 151526Z MAR 70
FM CG FORLOGCOMD
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
BT

DESTROY BY BURNING
SPECAT

TOD 151502Z MAR 70

T O P S E C R E T M C E O FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO LTGEN
MCCUTCHEON FROM BGEN PADALINO //NO0000//
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

LOGISTIC CONCEPT FOR PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENTS (S)

A. CG FMFPAC 112001Z MAR 70 (TS)

1. (U) REF A HAS BEEN REVIEWED. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS
ARE FORWARDED FOR CONSIDERATION:

2. (TS) RE PAR 1A.

A. ASSETS TO BE REDEPLOYED ARE STATED FOR 1ST MARDIV AND
1ST MAW. RCMD GUIDANCE FOR FLC AND III MAF UNITS BE THE
SAME AFTER T/E REQMTS OF ROLL UP AND RESIDUAL FORCES
SATISFIED.

B. CLASS IV IS NOT EXCLUDED FROM RETURN WITH REDEPLOYMENT
UNITS. ECONOMY OF EMBARK OF BULKY FIELD FORT AND
CONSTRUCTION MATL IS DOUBTFUL. RCMD THAT CLASS IV NOT BE

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA2666 **T O P S E C R E T M C E O**
RETROGRADED.

3. (TS) RE PAR 1B. ORGANIC ASSETS OF FLC AND
III MAF UNITS ARE NOT MENTIONED. RCMD SAME AS PAR
2 ABOVE.

4. (TS) RE PAR 1C. PARA STATED FLC WILL CEASE
REPLENISHMENT BUYS AND ZERO OUT RO OF MC SOURCE
CODED ITEMS WITH EXCEPTIONS. ALSO RECOMMEND
DECREASE RO AND BUYING OF IN-COUNTRY SOURCE CODED
ITEMS AS SOON AS PHASE IV COMMENCES.

5. (TS) RE PAR 1C. PARA STATED MO/MOA WOULD BE
ASSEMBLED FOR POST PHASE IV MAB. MO/MOA NOT
NORMALLY HELD BY UNITS IN COMBAT. CONSIDER
ROTATION OF STOCKS ESSENTIAL. RCMD ONE TIME AUTH
FOR UNITS TO HOLD ADDITIONAL 30 OR 60 DAY OP
STOCK QTY'S AND RECONSTITUTION OF MO/MOA BLOCK FOR
THIS MAB AT OKI OR CONUS.

6. (TS) REF A VERY HELPFUL. ADVANCE INFO APPRECIATED.
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2666

SPECAT

HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO
ACT/COG	NRW															
INFO/COORD			15						13							26

COPY 4 OF 4
1ST FSR. 2100 4 (10 67)

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

3

P 170400Z EFF-1
FM CG FIRST MAW
TO CG III MAF

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/NCED

PERSONAL FOR LIGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN THRASH
FORCE PLANNING (U)

TOP SECRET

A. CG III MAF 130000Z MAR 70 (TS)

DR
3/10 / *1106*
ck

1. AS REQUESTED BY REF A, THE POSSIBILITY OF HOUSING BOTH FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT OF THE MAW AVIATION ELEMENT IN THE PRESENT MAG-11 OPERATING AREA HAS BEEN INVESTIGATED. THERE IS ADEQUATE RAMP AND REVEINMENT SPACES TO ACCOMMODATE ALL AIRCRAFT IN THE NUMBERS CURRENTLY ENVIIONED.
2. WHILE THIS RAMP/REVEINMENT AREA IS LARGE ENOUGH TO HOUSE AND PROTECT BOTH HELICOPTERS AND FIXED WING, IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO PERMIT HELICOPTER OPERATIONS OF ANY SCOPE. TAXIWAY AND REVEINMENT DESIGN AND MEASUREMENTS ARE SUCH THAT EACH TYPE HELICOPTERS WOULD HAVE TO BE SHUT DOWN ON THE TAXIWAY; THE CH-46 AND CH-53 WOULD REQUIRE BLADE FOLDING BEFORE BEING TOWED INTO THE PARKING AREAS. FOR THE LARGER AIRCRAFT, THIS TOWING OPERATION, BOTH INTO AND OUT OF THE REVEINMENTS, WOULD BE CONDUCTED IN VERY CLOSE QUARTERS AND WOULD RESULT IN CONGESTION. COMBINED OPERATIONS FROM THE SAME AREA WOULD CREATE MUTUAL PROBLEMS: FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE (FOD) FOR FIXED WING DUE TO HELO DOWN WASH, AND AIR-TAXI DIFFICULTIES DUE TO JET BLAST FOR THE UNIC/AHIC.
3. DATA AS CONDUCTED APPROX 53,200 TAKE OFF AND LANDING OPERATIONS IN DECEMBER, 53,400 IN JANUARY AND 46,700 IN FEBRUARY, IT IS DOUBTFUL IF THESE FIGURES WILL DECREASE BY MUCH IN THE COMING MONTHS. IT IS ALSO DOUBTFUL IF THIS HEAVY TRAFFIC COULD ACCOMMODATE HELICOPTER OPERATIONS FROM EITHER THE WEST RUNWAY OR TAXIWAY. THEREFORE A LANDING ZONE, POSSIBLY TO THE NORTH OF THE EXISTING MAG-11 RAMP AREA, WITH AN ACCESS THROUGH WHERE THE TWO NORTH-EASTERN-MOST SOFT COVERED REVEINMENTS NOW STAND, WOULD BE REQUIRED.
4. IF A COMPOSITE GROUP IS A NECESSITY, I FULLY CONCUR IN THE SINGLE SITE CONCEPT. THE DESIGN OF THE MAG-11 AREA WOULD, HOWEVER, SERIOUSLY DEGRADE IF NOT PROHIBIT ANY DEGREE OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS. AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE, THE FEASIBILITY OF UTILIZING THE SUPPORT GROUP AREAS, IE: H&MS-17 AND MARINE AIR FREIGHT RAMP AREAS, FOR HELICOPTERS HAS BEEN STUDIED. WITH MINIMUM CONSTRUCTION (EXPEDITIONARY REVEINMENTS) THESE AREAS WOULD BE SATISFACTORY FOR HELO OPERATIONS HOWEVER THE SAME TRAFFIC CONTROL/LANDING-TAKEOFF AREA PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MAG-11 AREA ARE APPLICABLE TO THIS AREA.
5. IN VIEW OF CG FMFPAC INTEREST IN THIS SUBJECT AS EXPRESSED DURING HIS LAST VISIT (MY 00P10Z MAR 70 APPLIES), IT IS REQUESTED THAT THESE CONSIDERATIONS AND YOUR DECISION/RECOMMENDATION BE PASSED TO HIM BY YOUR HEADQUARTERS.

KART REGARDS

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
700

17 04 00

(4)

SECRET

4 of 6

PTTSZYUW RUMUGKD3341 0770030-SSSS--RUMLMPA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 180030Z MAR 70 ZFF-1

FM COMNAVFORV

TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

ACT G-1
Dist STAFF (24)

BT

SECRET

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM ZUMALT

REQUIREMENT FOR THE NAM-O BRIDGE (S)

1. (S) I HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY MACV TO MAKE KNOWN MY FUNDING REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS THROUGH SEPTEMBER. I AM ALSO UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO ELIMINATE ALL BUT THE HARD REQUIREMENTS IN THE MILCON AREA. ONE PROJECT FOR WHICH A HARD REQUIREMENT IS NOT CLEAR AT THE PRESENT TIME IS THE NAM-O BRIDGE. THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN PLACED IN BOTH THE ARMY'S AND NAVY'S MILCON PROGRAM AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE PAST. PREZENTLY MACV SAYS IT IS IN THE NAVY'S PROGRAM IF THE REQUIREMENT STILL EXISTS.
2. (S) SINCE OUR FUTURE FUNDING OUTLOOK SHOWS A SIZEABLE SHORTFALL OF FUNDS, I AM LOOKING CLOSELY AT EACH PROJECT TO DETERMINE IF SOME FEAS CAN BE DEvised TO CUT COSTS OR SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT BY ALTERNATIVE MEANS.
3. (S) LOOKING TO THE FUTURE I QUESTION WHETHER THE NAM-O BRIDGE IS A DEFINITE REQUIREMENT, OR WHETHER YOUR FORCES WILL ENJOY ITS BENEFIT. PAGE TWO RUMUGKD3341 SECRET
I AM INCLINED TO RECOMMEND THAT THIS PROJECT BE PLACED INTO THE ARMY'S MILCON PROGRAM. IF THEY JUDGE IT TO BE A HARD REQUIREMENT. HOWEVER, IF YOU BELIEVE A DEFINITE FUTURE REQUIREMENT FOR THE BRIDGE FOR YOUR FORCES DOES EXIST AND AN APPROPRIATE BENEFIT WILL BE OBTAINED BY OURSELVES IN RELATION TO THE EXPECTED COST (APPROX \$2.2 MILLION) THEN I WILL INCLUDE THE BRIDGE IN MY FUTURE PROGRAM.
4. (S) AT THE PRESENT TIME THE BRIDGE DESIGN HAS COMMENCED AND IS EXPECTED TO BE SUFFICIENTLY COMPLETE TO PERMIT CONSTRUCTION TO BEGIN IN AUGUST 1970. CONSTRUCTION IS ESTIMATED TO TAKE APPROXIMATELY 12 MONTHS.
5. (U) PLEASE ADVISE YOUR EVALUATION OF THIS REQUIREMENT IN LIGHT OF OUR AUSTERE FUNDING SITUATION.
6. (U) BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3341

NNNN

IN 11652/077-70

/ACK

186030 * MAR 70

18

COPY 90 FOR [unclear]

SECRET (S)
30

O 180444Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1
FM LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS ITCZ DNG
TO LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DNG
ZEM

SECRET

S E C R E T DNG 643 EYES ONLY FOR LTG MCCUTCHEON

1. I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR SEVENTEEN MARCH MESSAGE REGARDING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF UNITS. THE ARRANGEMENTS YOU PROPOSE ARE COMPLETELY ACCEPTABLE TO ME AND I ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL TAKE PARTICULAR CARE THAT YOUR WISHES WITH REGARD TO OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH III MAF UNITS ARE FULLY CARRIED OUT.

2. YOUR MILITARY POLICE COMPANY IS ALREADY WORKING WITH OUR PROVOST MARSHAL. THE CORPS G-3 IS WORKING WITH GENERAL MILLER AND COLONEL METZGER TO PREPARE A LETTER G

TOP
3/10

INSTRUCTION PERTAINING TO
OPCON OF THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE AS REFLECTED IN YOUR MESSAGE.

3. I ENJOYED MY VISIT WITH ED WHEELER'S DIVISION YESTERDAY, AND I APPRECIATE YOUR TAKING THE TIME TO ACCOMPANY ME.

4. WARM REGARDS.

Op-4
SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
250

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

NNNN

SECRET

18

04

44

6

DISCLOSURE SHEET

Orig: CG FME PAC

DTG: 18 1948Z MAR 70

Cite Nrs: _____

CGN: PAC# 013

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Signature	Rank/SerNo	Date/Time	Activity
<i>James E. [Signature]</i>	SSgt / 2101313	18/2315Z MAR 70	COMM CEN

3. I hereby acknowledge receipt of copy or copies of subject message as indicated below:

Copy Number	Signature	Date/Time	Section/Act.
Copy 1-3 of 3 Copies	<i>[Diagonal line]</i>	<i>[Diagonal line]</i>	III MAF S/C
Copy of Copies			
Copy of Copies			
Copy of Copies			
Residue			III MAF S/C

18 1948Z MAR 70
 (Date/Time/Group - Month - Yr)

TOP SECRET

SPECAT "EXCLUSIVE" MCEO

TOR: 18/2115Z MAR 70

VV PAC018
VITAZYUW RUHNFMA2217 0771948-AAAA--RUEOFIA RUMLMFA.
ZNY AAAAA
P 181948Z MAR 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEOFIA/CMC
INFO RUMLMFA/CG III MAF

BT
TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN BUSE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//
FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. (TS) I HAVE JUST RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM KEITH MCCUTCHEON (WHICH IS QUOTED BELOW) IN WHICH HE CITES HIS CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESIDUAL RLt WHOSE SOLE MISSION WOULD BE DEFENSE OF THE DANANG VITAL AREA AND RECOMMENDS A 9.4K MAB AS A RESIDUAL FORCE TO PRECLUDE ASSIGNMENT OF A SOLELY DEFENSIVE MISSION.
2. (TS) I HAVE PROVIDED YOU WITH OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITION OF A 8.9K, 9.4K, AND 10.8K MAB. HOWEVER, I DO CONSIDER THAT OUR AIR/GROUND CAPABILITY IS BEST REPRESENTED BY A 10.8K MAB AND, AS A MINIMUM,

PAGE TWO RUHNFMA2217 TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
A 9.4K MAB.

QUOTE:

FORCE PLANNING (U)

- A. CG III MAF 120206Z FEB 70 (TS/SPECAT/MCEO)
- B. CG III MAF 201352Z FEB 70 (TS/SPECAT/MCEO)
- C. CG III MAF 230656Z FEB 70 (TS/SPECAT/MCEO)

1. REF A WAS THE RECOMMENDED TROOP LIST FOR A 9.4K MAB. REF B MODIFIED REF A TO INCREASE THE DET, RADIO BN AND REF C FORWARDED THE REQUIRED TRADE OFF.

2. I AM CONCERNED AT INDICATIONS THAT THE MARINE CORPS FORCE REMAINING AFTER PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENTS MAY BE USED PRIMARILY TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR FIXED INSTALLATIONS IN THE DANANG AREA.

A. USARV REPS CHAIRED A MEETING TO DISCUSS DEFENSE OF THE DANANG VITAL AREA ON 15MAR70. DURING DISCUSSION IT BECAME APPARENT THAT USARV PLANS TO REINFORCE THE DANANG AREA WITH ONLY ONE COMPANY FOR SECURITY FUNCTIONS. WHEN THE INADEQUACY OF THIS FORCE WAS POINTED OUT BY XXIV CORPS REPS, THEY WERE REMINDED BY USARV REPS THAT A MARINE RLt WOULD BE IN THE AREA.

"EXCLUSIVE"

Pg 1-2 "MCEO"

SPECAT

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

18

19

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(7)

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

MCEO

PAGE THREE RUHNFMA2217 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

B. III MAF REP WAS QUESTIONED REGARDING REDEPLOYMENT PLANS FOR THE 1ST MP BN NOW GUARDING DANANG AIR BASE.

C. PLANS AND INITIATIVES FOR RVNAF ASSUMPTION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DANANG AIR FIELD WERE REJECTED LOCALLY AND HAVE BEEN AT THE JCS LEVEL FOR OVER ONE MONTH WITH LITTLE SIGN OF MOVEMENT.

D. CG, I CORPS HAS STATED THAT HE IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE ESSO PLANT OR THE I CORPS BRIDGE IN ITS ENTIRETY DUE TO A SHORTAGE OF RF/PF FORCES.

3. EMPLOYMENT OF MARINES SOLELY IN A STATIC SECURITY ROLE WOULD SUPPORT MACV POSITION THAT RLTI IS ONLY MARINE CORPS FORCE REQUIRED SINCE HELICOPTER MOBILITY WOULD BE UNNECESSARY AND NEED FOR SUPPORTING ARMS (INCLUDING AIR) GREATLY REDUCED. APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH A FORCE STRUCTURE WOULD NOT BE IN BEST INTEREST OF MARINE CORPS AND WOULD ERODE STATUS AS AN INTEGRAL AIR/GROUND TEAM OF COMBINED ARMS.

4. I REALIZE THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS BASED ON STAFF DISCUSSIONS AND THAT CG XXIV CORPS HAS NOT ONLY NOT MADE A DECISION IN THAT REGARD BUT PROBABLY HAS NOT EVEN CONSIDERED THIS PROBLEM. HOWEVER, LOCAL SECURITY WILL BE A

PAGE FOUR RUHNFMA2217 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
PROBLEM AFTER PHASE IV AND I WANTED TO ALERT YOU TO WHAT COULD BE THE XXIV CORPS SOLUTION TO THAT PROBLEM, I.E., THE USE OF THE MARINE RLTI PRIMARILY FOR LOCAL SECURITY. IF THAT IS THE DEVELOPMENT, WE MAY WANT TO START THINKING NOW ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY OF KEEPING ANY FORCE LESS THAN 9.4K AFTER PHASE IV.

UNQUOTE:

3. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2217

Pg 2-2

EXCLUSIVE

MCEO

SPECAT

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

PTTZYUW RUHFMA2518 0792131-AAAA--RUEOFIA RUMLMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 202131Z MAR 70

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO RUEOFIA/CMC

INFO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

"MCEO"

PREL CHECKED BY [RECEIPT]

DATE 21 MAR 70 III MAF S&C

C. J. Luby 559T
(SIGNATURE)

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN ADAMS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //N00000//
FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. (TS) FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF GEN ABRAMS' 201133Z MAR 70 TO ADM MCCAIN, INFO GEN HAINES, GEN NAZZARO, ADM HYLAND, AND LTGEN BUSE.

QUOTE:

SUBJ: FORCE PLANNING (U)

REF: A. MAC 3079/051202Z MAR 70 (TS)

B. CINCPAC 161234Z MAR 70 (TS)

1. (TS) REFERENCES SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A. REF A PROVIDED THE COMPOSITION OF 70.0 AND 36.0 THOUSAND FORCE PACKAGE FOR POSSIBLE PHASE 4 US REDEPLOYMENT.

B. REF B REQUESTS COMMENTS ON (1) FMFPAC RECOMMENDATION

PAGE TWO RUHFMA2518 TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE MCEO CONCERNING THE USMC PORTION OF THE 70.0 THOUSAND PACKAGE AND (2) THE IMPACT OF POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE AIRCRAFT IN THAILAND (USAF - FY 71) AND IN RVN (USMC - PHASE 4).
2. (TS) MARINE RATIONALE FOR THE PROPOSAL THAT 13,200 SPACES REMAIN IN COUNTRY AFTER PHASE 4 IS UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED. THE FIGURE OF 34,200 FOR THE MARINE PORTION OF THE 70,000 REDEPLOYMENT PACKAGE WAS USED TO SIMPLIFY COMPARISON OF THAT PACKAGE WITH THE 50,000 REDEPLOYMENT PACKAGE SUBMITTED EARLIER AND BEFORE MARINE REQUIREMENTS WERE FULLY CONSIDERED. WHEN A PHASE 4 REDEPLOYMENT IS DIRECTED, A BALANCED MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM WILL BE RETAINED AND EVERY POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO PERMIT RETENTION OF ALL 13,200 SPACES WILL BE FULLY CONSIDERED. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR RETENTION OF SPACES BY ALL SERVICES ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY CRITICAL AS REDEPLOYMENTS CONTINUE, AND ABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE REQUIREMENTS WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON THE TIMING AND SIZE OF THE PHASE 4 REDEPLOYMENT.
3. (TS) THE PROPOSED FY 71 REDUCTION OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) AIRCRAFT IN THAILAND AND THE ANTICIPATED REDUCTION OF MARINE EW AIRCRAFT DURING PHASE 4 REDEPLOYMENTS FROM RVN WOULD LIMIT CAPABILITY TO MEET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AT CURRENT

SPECAT

"MCEO"

20

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31 "EXCLUSIVE"

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMPHAE2518 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 LEVELS. ALTERNATIVES TO THIS SITUATION WERE CONSIDERED AT THE
 TIME THE THAI PACKAGES WERE DEVELOPED, AND IT WAS CONCLUDED
 THAT THE CURRENT LEVEL OF EW SUPPORT COULD ONLY BE MAINTAINED
 AT THE EXPENSE OF PRIMARY STRIKE AIRCRAFT, WHICH ARE NEEDED TO
 MEET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN AREAS NOT REQUIRING EW SUP-
 PORT. THIS SITUATION MAY, HOWEVER, BE MITIGATED IF OVERALL
 EFFORTS ARE TO BE REDUCED IN LINE WITH PROJECTED BUDGET
 LIMITATIONS ON TACTICAL AIR SORTIES.

UNQUOTE:

2. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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TOP SECRET

SECRET

"EXCLUSIVE"

PTTAZYUW RUKHFMA2519 0792132-AAAA--RUEOFIA RUMLEMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 202132Z MAR 70

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO RUEOFIA/CMC

INFO RUMLEMPA/CG III MAF

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN

INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN ADAMS MARINE CORPS

EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 110138Z/MAR 70 (TS) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ADM MCCAIN'S 161234Z/MAR 70 MSG TO GEN ABRAMS INFO GEN HAINES, GEN NAZZARO, ADM HYLAND, LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN DAVISON WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY A REITERATION OF LTGEN BUSE'S RESPONSE TO ADM MCCAIN, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PAR 5, SET FORTH IN REF A. IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT IN PAR 5, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE PAUCITY OF EW ASSETS RESULTING FROM SEA REDEPLOYMENTS IS SURFACED.

QUOTE:

FORCE PLANNING (U)

PAGE CHECKED UPON RECEIPT

DATE 21 MAR 70 III MAF S&C

MCEO

C. H. Leedy SSgt
(SIGNATURE)

PAGE TWO RUKHFMA2519 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

A. COMUSMACV 3079/081202Z MAR 70

1. (TS) REF A PROVIDED THE COMPOSITION OF 36.0 AND 70.0 FORCE PACKAGES FOR POSSIBLE PHASE IV U.S. REDEPLOYMENT.

2. (TS) DURING OUR STAFFING OF REF A WITH THE PACOM COMPONENTS DISCUSSIONS AROSE IN REGARD TO THE USMC PORTION OF THE 70.0 PACKAGE. THE MARINES FEEL THAT THE USMC FORCE (8.4) REMAINING IN-COUNTRY SUBSEQUENT TO A PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT IS UNREALISTIC FROM DOCTRINAL, OPERATIONAL, LOGISTIC, AND FINANCIAL VIEWPOINTS AND RECOMMEND REDUCTION OF THE 34.2 USMC FIGURE TO 29.4 IN THE 70.0 PACKAGE.

3. (TS) THE PRIMARY AREAS OF CONCERN CENTER ON LOGISTICS AND BALANCED MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM. BOTH THE MARINES AND MY LOGISTIC PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT AN URGENT REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR A 1.2 THOUSAND MARINE ROLL-UP FORCE TO RECOVER THE 54 MILLION DOLLAR EQUIPMENT ASSETS WHICH COULD NOT BE RETROGRADED DURING PHASE IV DUE TO INSUFFICIENT PREPARATION TIME, UNIT EMBARKATION ACTIONS, AND A SIGNIFICANT SHORTFALL IN AMPHIBIOUS AND MSTIS SHIPPING TO ACCOMPLISH A SIMULTANEOUS LIFT OF UNITS. THE MARINES ALSO BELIEVE THE RLT REMAINING MUST HAVE SOME MARINE AIR, HELICOPTERS AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR MARINE CORPS

MCEO "EXCLUSIVE"

SPECAT

TOP SECRET

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

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(A)

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHFMA2519 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
PECULIAR ITEMS. THEY ALSO DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THE COMBINED
ACTION GROUPS.

4. (TS) THE MARINE PROPOSED PACKAGE REMAINING IN COUNTRY IS
MADE UP AS FOLLOWS:

MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BDE	10,800
COMBINED ACTION GROUP	600
SUPPORT/TRANSITIONAL FORCE	600
LOGISTIC ROLL-UP FORCE	1,200
	13,200

5. (TS) THE FIRST REDEPLOYMENT FROM THAILAND REDUCED ELECTRONIC
WARFARE (E.W.) AIRCRAFT TO 18 (42 TEWS) BY 1 JUL 70. THE
PROPOSED PHASE II THAILAND REDEPLOYMENT FOR FY 71 INCLUDES
FIVE E. W. AIRCRAFT LEAVING 13 E. W. AIRCRAFT IN THAILAND, BY
END FY 71. THE EA-6A MARINE E. W. AIRCRAFT NOW APPEAR TO
BE INCLUDED IN THE PHASE IV FORCE PACKAGES. WITH ALL OF
THESE REDUCTIONS, I AM CONCERNED THAT WE WILL NOT HAVE
THE MINIMUM E. W. AIRCRAFT REQUIRED FOR THE CURRENT OPERATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF THE AIR FORCE, NAVY AND MARINES.

6. (TS) I WOULD APPRECIATE IF YOU COULD PROVIDE ME YOUR COMMENTS.
UNQUOTE.

PAGE FOUR RUMHFMA2519 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

2. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2519

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

EXCLUSIVE

DESTROY BY BURNING

PAC #025

TOR: 21/2236Z MAR 70

PTTAZYUN RUHHFMA2669 0802 132-AAAA--RUM.MPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 212132Z MAR 70

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO CG III MAF

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FROM MGEN ADAMS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER
DURING WORKING HOURS. //N00000//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG III MAF 190130Z MAR70 (TS/MCEO)

1. (TS) REF A ADDRESSED DUAL SITING, COLLOCATION, AND
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE RESIDUAL MAB AVIATION
COMPONENT.

2. (TS) AT THE PRESENT TIME, THERE IS NO DEFINITE INFOR-
MATION ON THE MARINE CORPS FORCE LEVEL WHICH WILL
REMAIN IN COUNTRY FOLLOWING PHASE IV TROOP REDEPLOY-
MENTS. HOWEVER, ANY SPACE REDUCTION WHICH CAN BE
GAINED BY RECONFIGURATION OF THE FORCE STRUCTURE IN
THE 8.9K, 9.4K, OR 10.8K RESIDUAL MAB'S WOULD BE HIGHLY
DESIRABLE IN ANTICIPATION OF AN AUSTERE FORCE LEVEL
CEILING BEING IMPOSED RELATIVE TO POST PHASE IV IN-

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA2669 TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
COUNTRY FORCES.

3. (TS) REF A ADVANCED THE DESIRABILITY, BECAUSE OF
PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS AND CEILING, OF INVESTIGATING
THE POSSIBILITY OF SINGLE SITING BOTH GROUPS OF THE
RESIDUAL MAB AIR COMPONENT AT DANANG BECAUSE OF THE
REDUCED PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS THAT WOULD ENSUE.
IT IS CONSIDERED PRUDENT AND TIMELY, ESPECIALLY SINCE
PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT EXECUTION MAY BE COMPRESSED,
THAT THIS POSSIBILITY BE EXPLORED AND THAT THE COGNIZANT
AIR FORCE AUTHORITIES BE CONTACTED AS TO THE FEASIBILITY
OF ACCOMMODATING THE ASSETS OF THE RESIDUAL MAB
AVIATION COMPONENT AT DANANG.

4. (TS) ADDITIONALLY, IF YOU CONSIDER THAT SPACE
REDUCTION CAN BE ACHIEVED IN OTHER COMPONENTS OF
THE 8.9K, 9.4K, AND 10.8K RESIDUAL MAB'S, INFORMATION
IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE APPRECIATED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2669

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

0 00000Z ZYH ZFF6 ZFF3 *March*
 VI TO COLVIN DOPS MACV SAIGON
 TO GEN BROWN CDR TAF IAN SON NHUT
 LTG MILDREN DCG USARV LONG BINH
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON
 LTG CORCORAN CG I FFV NHA TRANG
 LTG EWELL CG II FFV LONG BINH
 LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG
 INFO LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG
 MG MCCOWN CG DMAC CAN THO
 ZEM

TOP SECRET

TOR 3/70 1236000 al

T O P S E C R E T SENSITIVE EYES ONLY MAC 2791 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING (U)

REFERENCE: MAC 1517/011052Z FEB 1970 (TS/S)

1. (TS) REFERENCE REQUESTED VIEWS AND COMMENTS ON AN OUTLINE STRATEGY FOR 1970 AND CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US REDEPLOYMENTS AFTER 15 APRIL.
2. (TS) AS A RESULT OF RESPONSES TO REFERENCE AND OTHER COMMAND AND STAFF EXCHANGES DURING RECENT WEEKS, THE MACV STAFF NOW LISTS THE FOLLOWING SPACE REDUCTIONS AS THOSE WHICH COMMANDERS CONCERNED WOULD CONSIDER FEASIBLE FOR A 50,000 SPACES PHASE 4 REDEPLOYMENT:

COMPONENT	THOUSAND SPACES
USMC (II MAF)	29.4
USN	8.0
USA (BDE, III CTZ)	5.7
USA (CMBT SVC SPT)	.6
USAF	1.4
	--
TOTAL	45.1 x

3. (TS) ALTHOUGH COMUSMACV HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT FURTHER US REDEPLOYMENTS SHOULD BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE NEXT 90 DAYS, THE MACV STAFF IS CONTINUING TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVES SHOULD A PHASE 4 REDEPLOYMENT BE DIRECTED EARLIER. IN THAT REGARD, SUFFICIENT ALTERNATIVES FOR GENERATION OF ADDITIONAL SPACES (ABOUT 5,000) FOR A POSSIBLE 50,000 SPACE PACKAGE HAVE NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED.

4. (TS) ACCORDINGLY, FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY, THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS ARE MADE USING THE FIGURES CITED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE AS A BASE:

- A. CDR TAF; DCG USARV (USA CMBT SVC SPT FORCES); AND COMNAVFORV; EACH IDENTIFY SOURCE OF 1,000 ADDITIONAL SPACES.
- B. CG I FFV; IDENTIFY 750 ADDITIONAL SPACES FROM FORCES OVER WHICH YOU HAVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL.
- C. CG II FFV; IDENTIFY 1,000 ADDITIONAL SPACES FROM FORCES OVER WHICH YOU HAVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

22

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(11)

D. CG XXIV CORPS: IDENTIFY 1,000 ADDITIONAL SPACES FROM FORCES OVER WHICH YOU HAVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL. SPECIFICALLY REQUEST CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE REDUCTION IN THE 10,500 SPACES FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE PROPOSED BY CG III MAF IN RESPONSE TO REF. ALSO, REQUEST COMMENT ON THE POSSIBILITY (AS A SEPARATE ALTERNATIVE) OF REDEPLOYING THE 1,800 USMC SPACES PROPOSED BY CG III MAF FOR A LOGISTIC ROLL-UP FORCE AND RETAINING THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED AS A TEMPORARY OVERSTRENGTH.

E. ALL: PROVIDE A STATEMENT OF IMPACT INCLUDING A RELATIVE REDEPLOYMENT PRIORITY FOR THE UNITS INVOLVED.

5. (TS) IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS REQUEST IS FOR STAFF PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY.

GP-4

SSG NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

THIS MSG REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY

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TOP SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

DE RUMLL UA3249 082 12 15
ZNY SSSSS
O 23 13 15Z MAR 70
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO RUEOFIA/CMC
INFO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
RUM.MPA/CG III MAF
BT

~~SECRET~~/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN/LTGEN BUSE/LTGEN MCCUTCHEON

FR MAJGEN WHEELER (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
HAMLET 4 SON THANG (V) REPT NO 12

1. ART 32 HEARING BEGAN 12 MAR 70 CONCLUDED 230900Z MAR 70. 14
WITN CALLED INCLUDING 3VN. HEARING IN SESSION FOR 9 SEPARATE
DAYS. EXPECT VERBATIM RECORD APPROX 700 PAGES TO BE PREPARED
ABOUT 15 APR 70.

2. APPT DEF COUNSEL FOR PFC SAMUEL G GREEN JR. NOTIFIED THAT
MR. JAMES A. CHIARA 1914 SUPERIOR BLDG, 815 SUPERIOR AVE,
CLEVELAND OHIO 44114 EXPECTS TO ACT AS CIVILIAN COUNSEL SHOULD
HIS CASE BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL. APPT DEF HAS WRITTEN MR. CHIARA
ABOUT CASE.

3. NEWS RELEASE WILL BE MADE ADVISING END ART 32 AND OTHER FACTS
PAR 1 ABOVE.

GP-4

BT

3249

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UNCLASSIFIED
By authority of
cg 1st Mardiv Div, 240820Z Aug 70

FMFPAC-GEN 2100/3 (3/69)
0101-V04-6603

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"EXCLUSIVE"

SPECAT
15

~~SECRET~~

(12)

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RUMHJPHA0614 0830113 RUML-CCCC--RUMLMHA.
PTTCZYUW RUMHJPHA0614 0830113-CCCC-- RUMLMHA RUMLMHA.
ZNY CCCCC ZYD RUMGSHH
P 240122Z MAR 70

24 MAR 70 03 42

7

COG Proto
Dist STAFF
(24)

FM GTF SEVEN SEVEN
TO RUMHBP/CG XXIV CORPS, DANANG AB RVN
INFO RUMLMHA/CG III MAF
RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FOR LT GEN ZAIS, INFO LT GEN MCCUTCHEON AND MAJ GEN THRASH
FROM BARDSHAR

1. (C) PROPOSE TO VISIT DANANG ON 31 MARCH AND RUN. ORIENTATION VISIT TO XXIV CORPS, III MAF, FIRST MAW, MONKEY MOUNTAIN COMPLEX, VQ-1 DET AND USA 32 ARE DESIRED. YOUR SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL VISITS/CALLS WOULD BE APPRECIATED.
2. (C) I PROPOSE TO ARRIVE DANANG 310930H6 MAR VIA CIA FROM YANKEE STATION AND DEPART AM 1 APRIL ON COMPLETION OF SCHEDULE. LCDR LANING, CIC OFFICER, LT ESBECK, AEW OFFICER AND LTJG HARRIS, MY AIDE, WILL ACCOMPANY.
3. (U) IF THE ABOVE IS INCONVENIENT AT THIS TIME, I CAN ADJUST OR RESCHEDULE.
4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

#0614

NNNN

IN 16944/083-70 /ACK SD

240122Z MAR 70

24

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CONFIDENTIAL

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

DESTROY BY BURNING

Downgraded to
By authority of

"EXCLUSIVE"

TOP: 24/0905 2 MAR 70

ZCZC929
PTTCZYUW RUMLMHA0090 0830900-CCCC--RUMLMPA.
ZNY CCCCC
P 2 40900Z MAR 70
FM CG FIRST MAW
TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L /MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN THRASH
SUBJ: CRASH OF CG AMERICAL DIVISIONS UH-1H IN VICINITY OF
CHU LAI AIR BASE ON 17 MARCH 1970

1. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT CRASH HAS BEEN COMPLETED. THE REPORT IS CURRENTLY BEING WRITTEN. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE FINAL REPORT WILL BE COMPLETED WITHIN TWO WEEKS.
2. A COMPLETE BRIEFING BY COLONEL DUNWIDDIE, SENIOR MEMBER OF THE BOARD, HAS ASSURED ME OF THE FOLLOWING FACTS:
 - A. THAT THE RADAR AND IFF EQUIPMENT UTILIZED TO CONTROL MAJ GEN RAMSEYS AIRCRAFT WERE IN GOOD WORKING ORDER AND HAD BEEN PROPERLY CERTIFIED BY THE USAF ON 11 MARCH 1970.
 - B. THAT BOTH CONTROLLERS WERE WELL EXPERIENCED AND LICENSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH FAA REGULATIONS AND OPNAV REQUIREMENTS.
 - C. THAT THE PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY CHU LAI APPROACH CONTROL WERE SOUND AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING REGULATIONS.

PAGE TWO RUMLMHA0090 C O N F I D E N T I A L /MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

- D. THAT THE CRASH WAS NOT THE RESULT OF NEGLIGENCE BY ANY MEMBER OF THE NAVAL SERVICE.
3. THE FINAL WRITTEN REPORT WILL BE COMPLETED UPON RECEIPT OF CERTAIN REQUIRED INFORMATION FROM THE ARMY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIVE TEAM.
4. ALL INFORMATION OBTAINED BY FMAW INVESTIGATIVE BOARD HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE ARMY INVESTIGATIVE TEAM.
5. THE FINAL WRITTEN REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED TO CG III MAF AND A COPY SENT TO CG AMERICAL DIVISION.

GP-4
BT
0090

Copy 2 of 3 copies

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HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO
ACT/COG			24						09						00	
INFO/COORD																

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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CG NOTE:

AIDE - CANCEL MY DINNER

w/THRASH & BARDSHAW ON 31st

OTTCZYUM RUFHBP69MR 0040926-CCCC--RUF-LMPA.

ZNY CCCCC

O 250917Z MAR 70

FM CG XXIV CORPS DNG

TO RUFJPHA/ CTF SEVEN SEVEN

INFO RUF-LMPA/ CG III MAF DNG

RUF-LMHA/ CG 1ST MAW DNG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR: VADM BARDSHOW, INFO LT GEN MCCUTCHEON, MAJ GEN THRASH

FROM: LT GEN ZAIS

MG THRASH HAS REQUESTED TO HOST YOUR VISIT AND HE IS PREPARING

AN ITINERARY WHICH WILL INCLUDE A VISIT W/ME AT 310945H. A

COPY OF THIS ITINERARY WILL BE SENT TO YOU PRIOR TO YOUR

DEPARTURE FOR DA NANG.

GP-4

BT

#6908

NNNN

IN 18225/084-70

/ACK

COG-Proto
Dist STAFF

(24)

25 MAR 70

250917Z MAR 70

2-6

FM PAC GEN 2100/1 (3/69)
010-704-6601

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17

CONFIDENTIAL

(15)

TOP SECRET

P 270141Z MAR 70
 FM ADMIN FMFPAC
 TO RUMMPA/CG III MAF
 BT

T O P S E C R E T, SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCGUTCHEON
 FROM MAJ GEN ADAMS, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //NO0000//
FORCE PLANNING (U)

- A. CG III MAF 200648Z/MAR70 (TS) (SPECAT-MCEO)
 B. CG III MAF 211234Z/JAN70 (TS) (SPECAT-MCEO)
 C. CG III MAF 120206Z/FEB70 (TS) (SPECAT-MCEO)
 1. (TS) REF A CITED THE MARGINAL ADMIN CAPABILITY OF
 A POST PHASE IV MAB LACKING A HQ CO AND PROPOSED PAS-
 SING ADDON OF THE GROUND AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS
 OF A LESS THAN 10.8K MAB TO CG 3D MARDIV AND RETENTION
 OF ADDON OF THE AVIATION ELEMENT BY 1ST MAW REGARDLESS
 OF MAB SIZE. REF A FURTHER REQUESTED COMMENTS/GUIDANCE
 REGARDING FUTURE STATUS OF HQ III MAF.
 2. (TS) ADMINISTRATIVE DEFICIENCIES ASSOCIATED WITH
 THE LACK OF A HQ CO IN THE MAB OF LESS THAN 10.8K ARE
 RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, AS INDICATED IN REFS B AND C,

PAGE TWO RUMHFMA3240 **T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 THE MAB HQ, UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WOULD
 SATELLITE ON A SUBORDINATE HQ FOR ADMIN/LOG SUPPORT
 AND SECURITY. THIS ARRANGEMENT, WHILE NOT TOTALLY
 SATISFACTORY, IS NOT CRITICAL TO THE PROBLEM OF WHICH
 HQ HAS ADDON OF THE MAB OR ITS SUBORDINATE UNITS.
 3. (TS) THE ADDON ARRANGEMENT PROPOSED IN REF A MAY
 SHORTEN THE ADMIN/LOG CHAIN FROM THE IN-COUNTRY
 VIEWPOINT. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD CREATE A PROBLEM IN
 COORDINATING DIVERSE SUPPORT FROM THREE DIFFERENT
 COMMANDS (I.E., 3D MARDIV (OKINAWA), 1ST MAW (JAPAN),
 AND 3D FSR (OKINAWA)) AS WELL AS PERSONNEL SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM
 CONUS. RETENTION OF COMMAND LESS OPCON BY CG FMFPAC
 WOULD PRECLUDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS PROBLEM.
 FURTHER, EVER SINCE THE DELETION OF THE NAVAL COMPONENT
 COMMANDER'S FUNCTION FROM CG III MAF, THIS HEAD-
 QUARTERS HAS SERVED AS A DEFACTO COMPONENT COMMANDER
 FOR MARINES IN RYN TO PARALLEL THE IN-COUNTRY COMPO-
 NENT COMMANDERS FOR OTHER SERVICES. RETENTION OF
 COMMAND LESS OPCON BY THIS HEADQUARTERS WOULD
 CONTINUE THAT RELATIONSHIP. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS

PAGE 1 OF 2

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270141Z MAR 70

27

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41

III MAF 2100/4

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TOP SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

DESTROY BY BURNING

TOR: 28/0325Z Mar '70

VV PAC035

OTT AZYUN RUHFMA 3393 08 70202-AAAA --RUMLMFA.

ZNY AAAAA

O 280202Z MAR 70

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO RUMLMFA/CG III MAF

BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FROM MAJGEN ADAMS, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. (DELIVER
DURING WORKING HOURS) //N 00000//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. III MAF 250619Z MAR 70 (TS-MCEO)

1. (TS) REF A PROPOSES THREE OPTIONS IN RESPONSE TO
COMUSMACV REQUEST FOR IDENTIFICATION OF 1000 ADDI-
TIONAL SPACES UNDER OPCON CG XXIV CORPS FOR PHASE IV
REDEPLOYMENT.

2. (TS) OPTIONS I AND II TOGETHER WITH APPLICABLE
PORTION OF PAR 5 ARE APPROVED FOR SUBMISSION TO CG
XXIV CORPS. THE STAFF IS STUDYING OPTION III. WILL
ADVISE YOU OF MY POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT SHORTLY.

3. (TS) I CONCLR THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO REDUCE
NON-III MAF SPACES PROPORTIONALLY WITH III MAF PHASE IV
REDEPLOYMENT SO AS TO IMPROVE OPTIONS II AND III. HOW-

PAGE TWO RUHFMA 3393 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCL FOR MCEO
EVER. UNFORTUNATELY NEITHER THE RVN REQUIREMENT FOR
THESE FORCES NOR THE CRITERIA FOR THEIR REDUCTION ARE
RELATED TO THE STATUS OF III MAF. ADDITIONALLY, MOST
OF THE SPACES RELATIVE TO THESE FORCES ARE CONTROLLED
AT THE JCS/DOD LEVEL THROUGH THE OPCON CHAIN AND
SOME ARE NOT SUBJECT TO REDEPLOYMENT. THESE FACTORS
PRECLUDE MUCH INFLUENCE ON THE REDEPLOYMENT OF
THESE NON-III MAF FORCES; HOWEVER, I HAVE PASSED YOUR
CONCERN ON THIS SUBJECT TO OMC.

4. (TS) UNLESS PRESSED TO PROVIDE CG XXIV CORPS A
PRIORITY OF REDEPLOYMENT TROOP LIST, I RECOMMEND THAT
SUCH BE DEFERRED AT LEAST UNTIL HQMC RESOLVES MIDPAC/
EASTPAC BASE LOADING PROBLEMS WHICH WILL DETERMINE TO
WHAT EXTENT, IF AT ALL, KANEONE BASE LOADING DURING
PHASE IV IS DESIRABLE. THIS CONSTRAINT COUPLED WITH
AN UNCERTAIN PHASE IV COMMENCEMENT DATE AND
ATTENDANT VARIABLE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING AVAILABILITY,
SUGGESTS THAT PASSAGE OF A DETAILED UNIT REDEPLOYMENT
PRIORITY LIST TO XXIV CORPS MAY BE PREMATURE. WARM
REGARDS.

GF-J

#3393

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HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO
ACT/COG			28							02						02
INFO/ CONTINUED																

TOP SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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SECRET
SPECAT

PTTAZYUW RUEOFIA0129 0891353-AAAA--RUMLMPA RU4HFMA.
ZNY AAAAA
RU4HFMA-T-RUMLMPA
P 301353Z MAR 70
FM CMC
TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF
INFO RU4HFMA/CG FMFPAC
BT

**S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN MCCUIHEON INFO
LIGEN BUFE FROM GEN WALI "MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY"
WESTPAC VISIT (U)**

1. (S) THANK YOU FOR YOUR 281141Z. DO NOT PLAN TO GO TO
SAIGON THIS TRIP UNLESS ESPECIALLY INVITED TO DO SO.
PLEASE EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION AND THANKS TO GEN LAM.
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT
0129

SPECAT **SECRET**

HQ FLOWN	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO		
ACT/COG																	
INFO/COORD	30								01						35		

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

18

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

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FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND
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VV DIV235 VV FLC151
PAC -I-CMC DEDICATED

TOR: 31/0454Z MAR 70

OO RUEOFIA RUHHFMA RUMLMPA
DE RUMLLUA 4313 0900340
ZNY SSSSS

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

O 310340Z MAR 70
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO RUEOFIA/CMC
INFO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
RUMLMPA/CG III MAF
BT

~~SECRET~~ /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN/LIGEN BUSE/LIGEN
MCCUTCHEON FR MAJGEN WHEELER (MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY) (DELIVER
DURING WORKING HOURS)

HAMLET NO 4 SON THANG (V) REPT NO 13

- A. MACVDIR 20-4 (ENCL TO FIRST MARDIV O 1610.5)
- 1. INVES OFF ART 32 FOR PATROL MEMBERS SUBMITTED PRELIM
FINDINGS TO CN 1/7 28MAR70 SUMMARIZED AS FOL:
- A. THAT FIVE ACCUSED MURDERED SIXTEEN VIETNAMESE IN SUBJ
HAMLET ON 19FEB70
- B. THAT FIRST LT L. R. AMBORT O10 67 23 USMCR COMMITTED
THREE OFFENSES VIOL UCMJ ON WHICH DISCIPLINE SHOULD BE TAKEN
- C. CHG SHEET FWD TO CO 1/7 BY INVES OFF LISTS TWO VIOL
ART 92. SPEC 1 ALLEGES FAILURE TO REPORT INCIDENT THOUGHT TO

PAGE TWO RUMLLUA4313 ~~SECRET~~/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR (MCEO)
BE A WAR CRIME VIOL REF A. SPEC 2 ALLEGES DERELICTION PER
DUTIES BY NEGLIGENTLY FAILING TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO
MINIMIZE NONCOMBATANT CASUALTIES AMONG VIETNAMESE AND MAKING
NO EFFORT TO INSURE THAT ALL PERS IN CO WERE AWARE OF RULES
OF ENGAGEMENT. SECOND CHG ART 107 ONE SPEC ALLEGES LT AMBORT
MADE FALSE OFFICIAL STAT WITH INTENT TO DECEIVE TO CO AND
S-3 QUOTE THE KILLER IM CAPTURED ONE SKS IN EXCELLENT COND
UNQUOTE.

2. CHG AGAINST LT AMBORT FWD TO CO SEVENTH MAR FOR AC BECAUSE
CO 1/7 IS WITH TO FALSE OFFICIAL STAT. CO SEVENTH MAR CONVENED
NEW ART 32 30MAR70. APPT LT COL J. P. KING DIVISION DEPUTY SJA AS
INVEST OFF. CAPT F. G. ROUX, JR., O3 96 00/4405 USMCR WHO WAS
ASSIG DEVENSE COUNSEL LT AMBORT 24FEB70 WILL BE APPT DEF COUNSEL
AT ART 32.

3. NEWS RELEASE WILL BE MADE GIVING ONLY ESSENTIAL DETAILS OF
NEW INVES. NO MENTION WILL BE MADE OF DETAILS OF SPECIFICATIONS.

OP-4
4313

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED By authority of [signature] 0408203 Aug 70

HQ FL	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADM	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	ISOP		
ACT/COORD																		
INFO/COORD																		

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