

- A-1. CG III MAF 040551Z MAR 70 (C) ^{gp-4}
 FOR MGEN BOWMAN, MGEN THRASH, BGEN PADALINO, BGEN MILLER
 FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 HELICOPTER CONTROL
- A-2. CG III MAF 040540Z MAR 70 (S) MCEO ^(gp-4)
 EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN DRAKE INFO LTGEN BUSE, MGEN WHEELER
 FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 HAMLET 4 SON THONG (V) INCIDENT
- A-3. CG III MAF 040020Z MAR 70 (S) ^{gp-3}
 FM CG III MAF TO COMUSMACV INFO CG XXIV CORPS
 OPERATIONS OF ROK CI/CID MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ICTZ
- ~~4. CG III MAF 040740Z MAR 70 (U)
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 REQUEST MAST W/MAJ LAWRENCE B. NUGENT~~
- A-5. CG III MAF 050808Z MAR 70 (S) EYES ONLY ^{gp-4}
 FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 DEPCOMUSMACV VISIT TO ICTZ 27 FEB 70
- ~~6. CG III MAF 051216Z MAR 70 (U)
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 ITINERARY FOR VISIT 9-10 MARCH 1970~~
- ~~7. CG III MAF 070620Z MAR 70 (U) EYES ONLY
 LANDING ZONE VIOLATION
 FOR LTGEN ZAIS, MGEN RAMSEY FROM LTGEN NICKERSON~~
- A-8. ✓ CG III MAF 070631Z MAR 70 (S) EYES ONLY ^{gp-4}
 FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 WIEU MEETING 14 MARCH 1970
- ~~9. ✓ CG III MAF 071030Z MAR 70 (U)
 FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO BGEN PADALINO FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 RESERVE SWAG FOR MAJ EDWARD B. DUDA 06 20 45/0202/0202 USMCR~~
- A-10. CG III MAF 081106Z MAR 70 (C) MCEO ^{gp-4}
 FM CG III MAF TO CG FMFPAC
 GAO SURVEY OF REDEPLOYMENT PROCEDURES (U)
- A-11. ✓ CG III MAF 081442Z MAR 70 (S) EYES ONLY ^{gp-4}
 FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
 DEPCOMUSMACV VISIT TO ICTZ 6 MAR 70
- A-12. ✓ CG III MAF 100339Z MAR 70 (S) ^{gp-4}
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
 INITIAL CALLS IN CONNECTION WITH ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND
 III MAF
- A-13. ✓ CG III MAF 130858Z MAR 70 (S) ^{gp-4}
 EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
 MINIMIZING LIKELIHOOD OF CAMBODIA BORDER INCIDENTS DURING
 ASTRONAUTS VISIT TO CAMBODIA

- A-14. ✓ CG III MAF 150438Z MAR 70 (C) *gp-4*
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
DEPUTY COMMANDER
- A-15. ✓ CG III MAF 160300Z MAR 70 (S) *gp-4*
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON INFO BGEN PADALINO
REDEPLOYMENT OF 5TH 175MM GUN BTRY FROM RVN (S)
- A-16. ✓ CG III MAF 170310Z MAR (S) *gp-4*
FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
OPCON
- A-17. ✓ CG III MAF 180649Z MAR 70 (S) *gp-4*
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
OPCON - MSG TO ZAIS PASSED TO BUSE
- A-18. ✓ CG III MAF 182331Z MAR 70 (C) *gp-4*
FMFPAC FOR: COMPT; CMC FOR CODE AS-3 (*Re-add III MAF 200400 23 Feb 70*)
- A-19. ✓ CG III MAF 182332Z MAR 70 (C) *gp-4* (*Re-add FMFPAC 100214Z Mar 70*)
MONITORSHIP OF REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PHASE DOWN (GAO CASE 82807)
- A-20. ✓ CG III MAF 190129Z MAR 70 (S) *gp-4*
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
OPCON
- A-21. ✓ CG III MAF 191132Z MAR 70 (C) *gp-4*
FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
HELO CRASH AT CHU LAI
- A-22. ✓ CG III MAF 191120Z MAR 70 (S) *gp-4*
FOR MGEN THRASH, MGEN WHEELER INFO BGEN PADALINO FROM
LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
OPCON
- A-23. ✓ CG III MAF 191414Z MAR 70 (S) *gp-4*
FOR MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
ACTIVITIES IN CAMBODAA
- A-24. ✓ CG III MAF 211517Z MAR 70 (C) *gp-4*
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
MISCELLANEOUS INFO
- A-25. ✓ CG III MAF 220445Z MAR 70 (S) *gp-4*
FOR VADM ZUMWALT FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
REQUIREMENT FOR NAM O BRIDGE (S)

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEX

MARCH

<u>DTG</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE/SUBJECT/CLASSIFICATION</u>
1- 100339Z	CG FMFPAC FOR LTGEN BUSE (S) <i>Gp-4</i> INITIAL CALLS IN CONN WITH ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND III MAF
2- 130855Z	CG 1ST MAW (TS) FOR MGEN THRASH <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING
3- 130856Z	CG 1ST MAW FOR MGEN THRASH (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> SEA TDS INTERFACE
4- 130857Z	CG 1ST MAW/CG 1STMARDIV FOR MGEN THRASH <i>Gp-4</i> AND MGEN WHEELER (TS) LOGISTIC CONCEPT FOR PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT (S)
5- 130858Z	CG 1ST MAW FOR MGEN THRASH (S) <i>gp-4</i> MINIMIZING LIKLIHOOD OF CAMBODIA BORDER INCIDENTS DURING ASTRONAUTS VISIT TO CAMBODIA
6- 150437Z	CG FMFPAC FOR LTGEN BUSE (TS) <i>gp-4</i> MONTHLY MACV COMMANDERS CONFERENCE & INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE UPDATE
7- 150438Z	CG FMFPAC FOR LTGEN BUSE (C) <i>Gp-4</i> DEPUTY COMMANDER
8- 151413Z	CG 1ST MAW/CG 1ST MARDIV/CG FLRLOGCMD FOR <i>gp-4</i> MGEN THRASH, MGEN WHEELER, BGEN PADALINO (TS) MONTHLY MACV COMMANDERS CONFERENCE & INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE UPDATE
9- 160300Z	CG FMFPAC, INFO CG FORLOGCMD FOR LTGEN BUSE <i>Gp-4</i> INFO BGEN PADALINO (S) REDEPLOYMENT OF 5TH 175MM GUN BTRY FROM RVN (S)
10- 170310Z	CG XXIV CORPS FOR LTGEN ZAIS (S) <i>gp-4</i> OPCON
11- 170415Z	CG FMFPAC FOR LTGEN BUSE (TS) <i>gp-4</i> PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT OF THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE
12- 180649Z	CG FMFPAC FOR LTGEN BUSE (S) <i>Gp-4</i> OPCON
13- 181250Z	CG FMFPAC FOR LTGEN BUSE (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING
14- 190129Z	CG FMFPAC FOR LTGEN BUSE (S) <i>Gp-4</i> OPCON

MARCH

MARCH

MARCH

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEX

MARCH

<u>DTG</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE/SUBJECT/CLASSIFICATION</u>
15- 190130Z	CG FMFPAC, INFO CG 1STMAW FOR LTGEN BUSE <i>gp-4</i> INFO MGEN THRASH (TS) FORCE PLANNING
16- 191132Z	CG FMFPAC INFO CG 1STMAW (C) FOR LTGEN BUSE <i>gp-4</i> INFO MGEN THRASH (C) HELO CHRASH AT CHU LAI
17- 191120Z	CG 1STMAW, CG 1STMARDIV, INFO CG FORLOGCMD <i>gp-4</i> FOR MGEN THRASH, MGEN WHEELER INFO BGEN PADALINO (S) OPCON
18- 191414Z	CG 1STMAW FOR MGEN THRASH (S) <i>gp-4</i> ACTIVITIES IN CAMBODIA
19- 200648Z	CG FMFPAC FOR LTGEN BUSE (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING
20- 211517Z	CG FMFPAC FOR LTGEN BUSE (C) <i>(gp-4)</i> OPCON/LAM DISCUSSIONS/XXIV CORPS BRIEF
21- 220445Z	COMNAVFORV FOR VADM ZUMWALT (S) <i>gp-4</i> REQUIREMENTS FOR NAM O BRIDGE (S)
22- 230841Z	CG FMFPAC FOR LTGEN BUSE (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING
23- 230852Z	CG 1STMAW FOR MGEN THRASH (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING
24- 230942Z	CG FMFPAC FOR LTGEN BUSE (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING
25- 250619Z	CG FMFPAC FOR LTGEN BUSE (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING
26- 250744Z	CG FMFPAC FOR LTGEN BUSE (C) <i>gp-4</i> AIRCRAFT CRASH INVOLVING CG, AMERICAL DIV.
27- 262334Z	CG FMFPAC INFO CG 1STMARDIV, CG FORLOGCMD (TS) <i>gp-4</i> REDUCTION IN DOG HANDLING PERSONNEL (TS)
28- 281141Z	ACMC INFO CG FMFPAC FOR GEN WALT INFO LTGEN <i>gp-4</i> BUSE (S) ACMC WESTPAC VISIT

M
A
R
C
HM
A
R
C
HM
A
R
C
H

- A-1. CG III MAF 130855Z MAR 70 (TS) *Gp-4*
FOR MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FORCE PLANNING (U) - BOTH FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING W/MAB
- A-2. CG III MAF 150437Z MAR 70 (TS) *Gp-4*
EXCLUSIVE /MCEO/FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
MONTHLY MACV COMMANDERS CONFERENCE AND INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE UPDATE
- A-3. CG III MAF 151413Z MAR 70 (TS) *Gp-4*
FOR MGEN THRASH, MGEN WHEELER AND BGEN PADALINO FROM
LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
MONTHLY MACV COMMANDERS CONFERENCE AND INTEL ESTIMATE UPDATE
- ~~4. CG III MAF 130857Z MAR 70 (TS)
FOR MGEN THRASH AND MGEN WHEELER FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
LOGISTIC CONCEPT FOR PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT (S) READDRESSAL~~
- ~~5. CG III MAF 170415Z MAR 70 (TS)
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT OF THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE~~
- A-6. CG III MAF 181250Z MAR 70 (TS) *Gp-4*
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FORCE PLANNING (U) - CONCERN OF RLT ACTING AS DEFENSE F/DNG
- A-7. CG III MAF 190130Z MAR 70 (TS) *Gp-4*
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FORCE PLANNING (U) - COMPOSITE GROBP VICE COMPOSITE GROUP
- A-8. CG III MAF 200648Z MAR 70 (TS) *Gp-4*
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FORCE PLANNING (U) - PROBLEM AREAS F/10.8K MAB
- A-9. CG III MAF 230842Z MAR 70 (TS) *Gp-4*
FOR MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTEHEON
FORCE PLANNING (U) - DUAL SITING, COLLOCATION MAB AVIATION
- A-10. CG III MAF 230841Z MAR 70 (TS) *Gp-4*
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FORCE PLANNING (U) - FEASIBLE SPACE REDUCTIONS
- A-11. CG III MAF 230942Z MAR 70 (TS) *Gp-4*
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FORCE PLANNING (U) - COMMENTS RE FINAL BDE
- ~~12. CG III MAF 250619Z MAR 70 (TS)
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FORCE PLANNING (U) - 1000 ADDITIONAL SPACES~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CG III MAF 281141Z MAR 70 (TS)~~

~~FOR HIGH DISE FROM LEGEN MACHINERY~~

~~FORCE PLANNING (C) WAR DOG AGENDA~~

A-14. CG III MAF 281141Z MAR 70 (TS) *gp-4*

ACMC WESTPAC VISIT

POSSIBLE VISIT TO PRESIDENT OF VN

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE				OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF		DATE 04 MAR 70						
				SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 040551Z MARCH 70		COPY NO. 7 OF 13 COPIES RECD.								
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	HELICOPTER CONTROL							
			IN	OUT										
	CG	I					REMARKS DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.							
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2 13
 (A-1)

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

CONFIDENTIAL

04 1531Z ZFF-1 ZFF-4
FM CG III MAF
TO ZEN/DE UTY CG, III MAF
CG, FIRST MAW
ZEN/CG, FLC
ZEN/AC/S G-3, III MAF
ZEN

NOV
03/70 *18* *Ryd*

C O N F I D E N T I A L FOR MGEN BOWMAN, MGEN THRASH, BGEN DADALINO,
BGEN MILLER FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
HELICOPTER CONTROL

1. FOR THE SECOND TIME IN A SHORT PERIOD, NAMELY THE 7TH MARINES CHANGE OF COMMAND AND NCB'S THIS A.M., THE UNSAFE AND UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF HELICOPTER CONTROLS HAS BEEN FORCEFULLY DEMONSTRATED TO ME. AT THE VERY LEAST I CONSIDER THIS PERFORMANCE UNSAT.
2. THIS A.M. I HAD BEEN TOLD AT THE RECEPTION FOR RADMS DILLON AND HARSCHALL THAT MY HELICOPTER WAS ON THE PAD READY TO TAKE ME BACK TO III MAF. ABO UT FIFTEEN PLUS MINUTES LATER IT ARRIVED. IN THIS INTERIM CG, XXIV CORPS, CG, 1ST MARDIV, CG, AMERICAL AND OTHERS DEPARTED.
3. WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE HELO PAD NR.58 I FOUND A USMC CH46 MARKED, IN DISOBEDIENCE TO INSTRUCTIONS; AND A UH1E (NR.5) ALSO. THE USMC 1STLT CLARK WHO WAS DRIVING NR. 5 TOLD ME HE WAS WAITING FOR BGEN MORRISON, USA. I TOLD HIM TO WAIT AS DIRECTED IN THE ORDERS. HIS ATTITUDE AND APPARENT DISPLEASURE WITH MY ORDER PROMPTS ME TO ASK THAT HE BE REPRIMANDED VERBALLY FOR HIS POOR JUDGMENT.
4. FOR MGEN THRASH
AS MY WING CG WHOSE HELICOPTERS ARE INVOLVED IN THESE LIFTS I ASK YOU TO MAKE A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE HELO DIRECTION TEAM PRACTICES IN EFFECT, AND THE COMPLIANCE OF ALL REPEAT ALL GROUND AND AIR PERSONNEL CONCERNED. TELL ME SOONEST WHAT NEEDS TO BE CORRECTED TO PLACE US ON A TRULY PROFESSIONAL BASIS ONCE AGAIN.
5. I AM OBVIOUSLY NOT PLEASED BY THIS AMATEUR PERFORMANCE ON THE PART OF MARINES.

G1-4
(SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY)
300



COPI 2 OF 13 COPIES

NNNN

A-1

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 04 MAR 70					
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 040540Z MAR 70		COPY NO 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					HAMLET 4 SON THONG (V) INCIDENT				
2	DCG		3/4		TR					
1	C/S		3/4		SP					
3	DC/S		3/4		P	REMARK DISPOSITON <input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION <table border="1"> <tr> <th>SECTION</th> <th>SIGNATURE</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	SECTION	SIGNATURE		
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	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

**EXCLUSIVE
FOR
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
HAS BEEN SENT**

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE) (A-2)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

SECRET

SECRET

PTTSZYUW RHMAFA0373 0630540-SSSS--RUEOFIA RUHFMA RUMLLUA
 ZNY SSSSS
 PAC DED -I- CMC DED
 P 040540Z MAR 70
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUEOFIA/CMC
 INFO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUMLLUA/CG FIRST MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR/MGEN DRAKE INFO LTGEN
 BUSE MGEN WHEELER FROM LTGEN NICKERSON/MARINE CORPS
 EYES ONLY/ (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
 HAMLET 4 SON THONG (V) INCIDENT

- A. HQMC AC/S G-3 TELECONS W/C/S III MAF 2 MARCH
- B. HQMC AC/S G-3 TELECON W/C/S III MAF 3 MARCH
- C. CG FIRST MARDIV MSG 271020Z (SPECAT) PASEP
1. REFERENCES A AND B REQUESTED INFORMATION CONCERNING ORDERS IN EFFECT REGARDING BRIEFING OF TROOPS ON ROE PRIOR TO OPERATIONS.
2. MACV DIRECTIVE 525-3 DTD 2MARG9 DIRECTS, INTER ALIA, THE FOLLOWING QUOTE COMMANDERS WILL CONDUCT CONTINUING PROGRAMS TO EMPHASIZE BOTH THE SHORT AND LONG RANGE IMPORTANCE OF MINIMIZING NONCOMBATANT CASUALTIES. TROOP

PAGE TWO RHMAFA2373 S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR/MGEN/
 INDOCTRINATION BRIEFINGS WILL BE CONDUCTED PRIOR TO FIELD OPERATIONS WHEN PRACTICABLE. BRIEFINGS WILL INCLUDE LOCATION OF NONCOMBATANT AND FRIENDLY FORCES; MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT MUTUAL INTERFERENCE; MEASURES FOR CONTROL OF FIRE SUPPORT; RULES OF ENGAGEMENT; IDENTIFICATION AND RECOGNITION SIGNALS; EMERGENCY PROCEDURES; AND OTHER APPROPRIATE MEASURES. UNQUOTE.

3. THIS HQS AWARE OF NO FMFPAC ORDER ON ROE.
4. III MAF FORCE ORDER 3040.3A DTD 29SEP69 CONTAINS INSTRUCTIONS AND LANGUAGE IDENTICAL TO THAT CONTAINED IN MACV DIRECTIVE AS QUOTED IN PARA 2 ABOVE.
5. 1STMARDIV ORDER 1610.5 DTD 26MARG8 ESTABLISHES TRAINING PROGRAM TO MAKE ALL MEMBERS AWARE OF POLICIES CONCERNING TREATMENT OF VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS, DETAINEES AND POWS. REQUIRES DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON PRINCIPLE OF MILITARY NECESSITY AND HUMANITY, PERMITTING ONLY THAT DEGREE OF FORCE REQUIRED AND PROHIBITION OF ANY DEGREE OF VIOLENCE NOT ACTUALLY NECESSARY, EXTRACTS FROM GENEVA CONVENTION, TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS, MINIMIZING NONCOMBATANT BATTLE CASUALTIES WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON PATIENT AND COM-

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGESCOPY 1 OF 3 COPIES**SECRET**

(A-2)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RHMMFA0373 S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO/
 PASSIONATE CONDUCT IN DEALING WITH VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS,
 AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. INSTRUCTION TO BE GIVEN AS PART
 OF INITIAL ORIENTATION OF EACH MAN WHO JOINS DIVISION AND
 EVERY TWO MONTHS THEREAFTER. MACV DIRECTIVE 525-3 IS
 QUOTED IN FULL AS AN ENCLOSURE TO DIVISION ORDER.

6. PATROL IN THIS INSTANCE WAS NOT GIVEN ROE BRIEFING
 PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. PATROLS AND AMBUSHES ARE NOT NORMALLY
 CONSIDERED TO BE OPERATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DIRECT-
 IVES RELATING TO ROE BRIEFINGS PRIOR TO OPERATION.

7. INVESTIGATION INDICATES THAT IN ORAL BRIEFING GIVEN
 PATROL BY COMPANY COMMANDER LT AMBORT, LANGUAGE USED
 WAS IMPROPER SINCE IT COULD HAVE BEEN MISINTERPRETED BY
 PATROL MEMBERS AS TO PURPOSE OF PATROL ACTION. THIS
 PATROL BRIEFING IS BEING EXPLORED BY ARTICLE 32 INVESTI-
 GATION AND COULD PROVIDE BASIS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
 AGAINST LT AMBORT IN ADDITION TO THAT DESCRIBED IN REF
 C. BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCLOSURE OF CONTENTS OF
 LT AMBORT BRIEFING SINCE HIS RIGHTS COULD BE PREJUDICED.
 IN ADDITION, PREMATURE KNOWLEDGE OF THIS INFORMATION BY
 HIGHER HQS COULD RESULT IN DEFENSE CHARGES OF COMMAND

PAGE FOUR RHMMFA0373 S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO/
 INFLUENCE BEING EXERCISED.

8. HOWEVER, THE INVESTIGATION ALSO INDICATES THAT AFTER
 LT AMBORT'S BRIEFING TO PATROL, PLATOON SERGEANT CAU-
 TIONED HERROD THAT COMPANY COMMANDER MEANT THAT ONLY
 ENEMY PERSONNEL WERE TO BE KILLED. IN ADDITION, SQUAD
 LEADER CAUTIONED PATROL AGAINST SHOOTING CIVILIANS. IT
 APPEARS THAT THESE LATTER AMPLIFICATIONS WERE DEEMED
 NECESSARY BY PLATOON SERGEANT AND SQUAD LEADER BECAUSE
 OF COMPANY COMMANDER'S BRIEFING.

9. RECOMMEND EXTREME CAUTION IN THE DISCUSSION OR DIS-
 CLOSURE OF ANY FACTS DEVELOPED BY CURRENT INVESTIGATION
 IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF ALL PARTIES INVOLVED
 AND TO PRECLUDE MY LAI TYPE PUBLIC TRIAL. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0373

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 04 MAR 70	
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE P 040020Z MAR 70		COPY NO 1 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					ROK MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ICTZ
3	DCG	I		3/2	13	
2	C/S	I		3/4	5	
4	DC/S	I		3/7	10	
	DCS PLANS					REMARK:
	DEPCORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					DISPOSITION
1	S/S	X	4 May		C	
	G-1					<input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION
	G-2					
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	G-6					
	ADJ					
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	HQ CMDT					
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	SGT MAJ					

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1 4

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

SECRET

A-3

P 040002Z

FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
INFO CG XXIV CORPS
ZEM

SECRET NOFORN

MACV FOR J-2. XXIV CORPS FOR G-2.

OPERATIONS OF ROK CI/CID MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ICTZ

1. SINCE APPROXIMATELY AUGUST 1969 THE SECOND ROK MARINE CORPS BRIGADE HAS EMPLOYED CI/CID ASSETS INDEPENDENTLY THROUGHOUT ICTZ. CURRENTLY, ROK CI/CID ELEMENTS ARE LOCATED IN HUE, DANANG, CHU LAI AND QUANG NGAI.

2. THE ROKMC LIAISON OFFICER TO III MAF WAS REQUESTED ON 14 DEC 69 TO PROVIDE THIS HQS WITH DOCUMENTATION FROM THE BRIGADE CITING THE AUTHORITY WHICH PERMITS THE CI/CID TEAMS TO OPERATE OUTSIDE THE BRIGADE TAOR. A REPLY HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED.

3. CURRENTLY THERE IS NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN III MAF AND THE ROK BRIGADE CONCERNING THE EMPLOYMENT OF CI/CID TEAMS OUTSIDE THE ROK TAOR. THE ROK'S OPERATE OUTSIDE THEIR TAOR WITHOUT ADVISING III MAF OR AREA COMMANDERS. THEIR PRESENCE IS USUALLY MADE KNOWN ONLY WHEN OUR INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES UNCOVER THEM OR THEY ATTEMPT TO MAKE PURCHASES AT A PX.

4. AS FAR AS CAN BE DETERMINED THE MISSION OF THE ROK CI/CID TEAMS IS TO THWART THE NORTH KOREAN INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS TO INFILTRATE AND SUBVERT ROK NATIONALS WORKING FOR AGENCIES SUCH AS PHILCO-FORD AND PACIFIC ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS.

5. DUE TO THE SENSITIVE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE PROBLEM, REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF THE FOLLOWING:

A. AUTHORITY FOR ROK'S TO EMPLOY CI/CID TEAMS OUTSIDE ASSIGNED TAOR?

B. DEGREE OF AUTHORITY OVER SUCH PERSONNEL BY CG III MAF AND BY THE US COMMANDER IN WHOSE TAOR THEY OPERATE?

6. YOUR GUIDANCE IS REQUESTED.

CP-3

31-

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A-3

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 05 FEB 70					
			SERIAL NO / CONTROL DATE P 050808Z MAR 70		COPY NO 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D					
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1	C/S	I		3/5	7	REMARK:				
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	DCS PLANS					<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>DISPOSITION</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION</p> </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <th>SECTION</th> <th>SIGNATURE</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	SECTION	SIGNATURE		
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(A-5)

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 TO COMUSMACV
 ZNY

07/14/70

SIE C R E T/EYES ONLY FOR NGEN TO WENSEND FROM LTGEN
 NICKERSON

DEPCOMUSMACV VISIT TO ICTZ 27 FEB 70

A. COMUSMACV 301105Z MAY 1969

1. (U) LAW REF A FOLLOWING IS SUBSTANCE OF MATTERS DIS-
 CUSSED DURING SUBJECT VISIT:

2. (S) GENERAL ROSSON VISITED UNITS IN THE AMERICAL TA01
 ON 27 FEB 1970. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE CG, AMERICAL
 DIV, CG 2D ARVN DIV AND SENIOR ADVISOR 2D ARVN DIV, UPON
 HIS ARRIVAL AT THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD GENERAL ROSSON AND
 PARTY BOARDED HELOS AND DEPARTED FOR THE PF TRAINING
 CENTER LOCATED AT QUANG NGAI.

3. (S) UPON ARRIVAL AT THE TRAINING CENTER GENERAL ROSSON
 WAS BRIEFED BY CO LTC THU ON TRAINING SCHEDULES AND
 OBJECTIVES, ATTENDANCE RATES AT THE CENTER AND CURRENT
 CONSTRUCTION AND MATERIAL PROBLEMS. GEN ROSSON DISCUSSED
 THE PROBLEM OF OFFICER ROTATION FROM TRAINING CENTERS. HE
 STATED THAT HE HAS FOUND OFFICERS BEING RETAINED WITHIN
 THE TRAINING PROGRAM MUCH TOO LONG, WHICH LEADS TO A LACK
 OF FIELD AND COMMAND EXPERIENCE. IN ADDITION, GEN ROSSON
 REQUESTED THAT THE AMERICAL DIV, 2D ARVN DIV AND QUANG
 NGAI PROVINCE OFFICIALS LOOK INTO PROVIDING THE CENTER
 WITH CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE FOR
 SUCH PROJECTS AS BUNKER CONSTRUCTION. GEN ROSSON THEN
 TOURED THE TRAINING CENTER VISITING LIVING QUARTERS OF
 TRAINEES, AID STATION, TRAINING AIDS CLASS ROOMS, MESS
 HALL AND KITCHEN SUPPLY, AND ARMS ROOM AND AMMO STORAGE
 POINT.

4. (S) THE PARTY THEN FLEW TO H-10 WHERE GEN ROSSON
 OBSERVED AND WALKED THROUGH WITH ONE FIRING ORDER ON THE
 FIELD FIRING RANGE, VISITED VARIOUS CONCURRENT TRAINING
 SITES, TARGET DETECTION, ETC. UPON CONCLUSION OF THE
 TOUR, GEN ROSSON IN DEPARTING STATED THAT HE THOUGHT THE
 TRAINING CENTER WAS ACCOMPLISHING ITS MISSION AND THAT IT
 IS IMPORTANT THAT THE TRAINEES RECEIVE THE BEST OF TREAT-
 MENT AND TRAINING WHILE AT THE SCHOOL TO TURN THEM INTO
 GOOD SOLDIERS AND TO GIVE THEM A STRONG IMPRESSION OF THE
 GROWING STRENGTH OF THE GVN.

5. (S) THE PARTY THEN DEPARTED FOR LZ 411 (5000 1ST INF
 14TH BDE). FOLLOWING LUNCH GEN ROSSON TOURED LZ 411
 TALKING TO AMERICAL SOLDIERS. PRIOR TO LEAVING, THE PARTY
 DISCUSSED THE PROGRAM FOR TUNY RE-SETTLEMENT VILLAGE.
 GEN ROSSON REMARKED THAT IT WAS GOOD TO SEE THE LAND BEING
 RECLAIMED FOR HOUSING AND FARMING.

(A-5) #1

6. (D) THE PARTY THEN FLEW TO QUANG NGAI FOR A VISIT AT PROVINCE H.Q. GEN ROSSON RECEIVED A BRIEFING FROM THE DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE PROVINCE AND OBJECTIVES FOR FY 77. GEN ROSSON POSED GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE ELECTION OF VILLAGE AND HAMLET CHIEFS, ON THE PROVINCIAL PRISON, THE NUMBER OF BACKLOG CASES, AND THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH THE COUNCIL OF CASE REVIEWS IS CONVENED. THE DEP PROV CHIEF STATED THAT ALL CASES ARE BEING KEPT UP TO DATE AND THAT THERE IS NO SERIOUS BACKLOG. THE PROBLEM OF RICE PRICES WAS ALSO DISCUSSED REF. IMPORTED AND DOMESTIC RICE. AT THE CLOSE OF THE VISIT GEN ROSSON STATED THAT HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO NOTE THE PROGRESS THAT QUANG NGAI PROV HAS MADE IN ALL FIELDS.

7. (S) GENERAL ROSSON THEN DEPARTED FOR SON TINH DIST Hqs WHERE HE RECEIVED A BRIEFING BY CAPT KIM, DIST CHIEF. AFTER THE BRIEFING GEN ROSSON REQUESTED TO VISIT WITH A PF PLATOON. THE PLATOON WEAPONS (M16) WERE INSPECTED AND THE MEDIC WAS QUESTIONED AS TO HIS KNOWLEDGE OF TREATING WOUNDS AND HIS MEDICAL EQUIPMENT. GEN ROSSON ASKED THE GROUP QUESTIONS ABOUT PAY, UNIFORMS, ISSUE OF EQUIPMENT AND BENEFITS FOR THEIR FAMILIES. GEN ROSSON COMMENTED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MISSION OF THE PF AND NOTED THE MEASURABLE STRIDES THEY HAVE MADE SINCE HIS LAST VISIT.

8. (S) THE PARTY THEN DEPARTED FOR THE FORWARD CP OF THE 6TH ARVN REGT WHERE GEN ROSSON WAS BRIEFED ON THE CURRENT ENEMY SITUATION. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY GEN ROSSON, THE REGIMENTAL CO, LTCOL NGHIN, REPORTED THAT THE AVERAGE FIELD STRENGTH OF HIS BATTALIONS WAS 500-550 PER BN. GEN ROSSON STATED THAT THIS WAS AN OUTSTANDING FIELD STRENGTH FOR AN ARVN BN.

9. (S) THE PARTY THEN VISITED THE FIELD LOCATION OF THE 4TH BN 6TH REGT. ON ARRIVAL GEN ROSSON WAS BRIEFED BY THE BN CO ON OPERATIONS AND ENEMY INTELLIGENCE. GEN ROSSON THEN TOURED THE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS OF THE SECURITY COMPANY, GEN ROSSON TALKED TO SOLDIERS AND ADVISORS OF THE BN AND ASKED QUESTIONS OF A GENERAL NATURE. ON DEPARTING THE LOCATION GEN ROSSON REMARKED THAT THE BN AND REGT WERE DOING AN OUTSTANDING JOB AND WAS VERY IMPRESSIVE.

10. (S) UPON RETURN TO CHU LAI GEN ROSSON STATED THAT HIS TRIP WAS MOST BENEFICIAL AND THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE US ARVN AND GVN FORCES. HE DEPARTED CHU LAI AT 1600.

11. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

7/1

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

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(B-24) TOP SECRET

U 071058Z ZYH ZFF-4
FM CS III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
INFO CC XXIV CORPS
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND INFO LTGEN ZAIS
FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
FORCE PLANNING

A. COMUSMACV CITE 2940 DTG 251227Z MAR 70 (TS/EYES ONLY)

1. CONCUR IN THE CONCLUSIONS CONTAINED PARA 5 OF REF A AND STRONGLY ENDORSE SUPPORTING RATIONALE.

2. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ARE MADE:

A. THE ENEMY'S EFFORTS TO DEFEND HIS LAOS LOC'S AGAINST AIR INTERDICTION AND THE ALL TIME HIGH SENSOR ACTIVATIONS IN THE PANHANDLE (PARA 6.F AND 6.G OF REF A) SHOULD BE HIGHLIGHTED IN THE PARA 4 SUMMARY. THESE FACTORS ARE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE CRITICALITY OF MAINTAINING IN SEA THE POST PHASE III LEVEL OF AIR UNITS (TO INCLUDE USMC) AND THE CURRENT SORTIE RATE AS STATED IN DETAIL IN PARA 7.F. IN THIS REGARD, IN DISCUSSION THE REDUCTION OF B-52 STRIKES AND FIGHTER/ATTACK SORTIES (PARAS 5.C AND 7.F (P) (3)), THE ASSETS OF THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ADDITION TO THOSE OF THE USAF AND USN. THE INCREASED NEED TO EMPLOY LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS AND TO SUPPORT THEM BY AIR IS AN ADDITIONAL VITAL CONSIDERATION IN THIS REGARD.

B. THE ADVANTAGES AND CAPABILITIES OF NAVAL GUNFIRE AS A SUPPORTING WEAPON, PARTICULARLY IN THE DMZ, SHOULD BE ADDRESSED. ANY DECREASE OF SHIP AVAILABILITY WOULD REQUIRE A CONCOMITANT INCREASE IN MEDIUM AND HEAVY ARTILLERY.

C. IN REGARD TO PACIFICATION PROGRESS (PARA 8.A), IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE NEW MES DEMONSTRATES THAT WHILE ICTZ IS MAINTAINING ITS UPWARD TREND IN SECURITY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IT IS LAGGING BEHIND THE OTHER CTZ'S IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. MORE DEVELOPMENT EFFORT IS NOW REQUIRED IN THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AREA IF PACIFICATION IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

D. IN SUMMARY, CONTINUED AND ACCELERATED PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVEMENT OF PACIFICATION AND VIETNAMIZATION OBJECTIVES IN ICTZ WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON A PERIOD OF STABILITY FOLLOWING PHASE III. WARM REGARDS.

CP-4

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

407

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

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A-8

P 0007 45 000-1 755-1

FM TO III MAF

TO COLIN WOV

ZEN

SECRET / EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
WIEU MEETING 14 MARCH 1970

1. SINCE XXIV CORPS WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR I
CORPS ON 9 MARCH, MEL ZAIS WILL, OF COURSE, BE PRIN-
CIPAL I CORPS ATTENDEE AT THE MONTHLY WIEU'S. I SUGGEST
IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO INVITE LTGEN MCCUTCHEON TO
ATTEND THE WIEU'S AS CG III MAF (IN A STATUS COMPARABLE
TO THAT OF ZAIS WHEN XXIV CORPS WAS SUBORDINATE TO III
MAF) AS WELL AS IN HIS CAPACITY AS A UNISERVICE FORCE
COMMANDER. WARM REGARDS.

CP-4

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HEADQUARTERS
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1/5 GEN M SCUTLIFEON *[Signature]*

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PTTCZYUW RHMMFA0793 0671106-CCCC--RUHFMA RUEOFIA.

ZNY CCCCC

RUHFMA -T- CMC

P 081106Z MAR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUEOFIA/CMC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY// //N05741//

FMFPAC FOR: COMPT; CMC; FOR CODE AS-3

GAO SURVEY OF REDEPLOYMENT PROCEDURES (U)

A. CG III MAF 200400Z FEB 70 (C)

B. CG FMFPAC 220311Z FEB 70 (C)

C. CG FMFPAC 100214Z FEB 70 (C)

1. (C) REFERENCE A ANNOUNCED VISIT OF SUBJECT REPRESENTATIVES TO THIS HQTRS, STATED SCOPE OF SURVEY TO BE CONDUCTED AND REQUESTED GUIDANCE AS TO INFORMATION TO BE MADE AVAILABLE. REF B AND C ADVISED THAT INFORMATION RELATING TO POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR REDISTRIBUTION OF MATERIEL MAY BE RELEASED FOR KEYSTONE CARDINAL AND KEYSTONE BLUE JAY, BUT FMFPAC WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION CONCERNING UNIT DESIGNATIONS, PERSONNEL STRENGTHS AND LOCATIONS.

PAGE TWO RHMMFA0793 C O N F I D E N T I A L/MCEO/
2. (C) IAW REF C ADDEES ARE ADVISED THAT GAO AUDITORS INFORMED THIS HQTRS ON 5 MAR 70 THAT SCOPE OF SURVEY AS CONTAINED IN REF C HAS BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE:

- A. REVIEW BASIS FOR DECISIONS FOR PERSONNEL REASSIGNMENT WITHIN RVN.
- B. REVIEW TRANSPORTATION UTILIZED BY REDEPLOYING UNITS.
- C. REVIEW PLAN FOR RECOVERY AND UTILIZATION OF EXCESS FACILITIES.

CP-4

BT

0793

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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(A-10)

P 08442Z
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
ZEM

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
SECTION ONE OF TWO
DEPCOMUSMACV VISIT TO ICTZ 6 MAR 70

A. COMUSMACV 301105Z MAY 1969


1. (U) IAW REF A FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED:
2. (U) LTGEN NICKERSON AND GENERAL LAM

GENERAL ROSSON ARRIVED DANANG BASE OPERATIONS 060935 MARCH AND WAS MET BY LTG NICKERSON AND BG MULLER. AFTER VISIT WITH GENERAL NICKERSON AT III MAF HEADQUARTERS, HE CALLED ON LTG LAM AT I CORPS HEADQUARTERS. FOLLOWING POLICY MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED: IN RESPONSE TO GENERAL ROSSON'S QUERY RELATIVE LENGTH OF PSDF TRAINING COURSE, GENERAL LAM EXPRESSED BELIEF SIX WEEKS COURSE WAS LONGER THAN NECESSARY FOR AMOUNT OF MILITARY TRAINING ESSENTIAL FOR PSDF MEMBER AND WAS A HARDSHIP FOR FAMILY MEN SINCE PAY DURING TRAINING WAS ONLY ONE HUNDRED PIASTERS DAILY. GENERAL LAM OBSERVED THAT UNSKILLED LABORERS IN DANANG NOW EARN BETWEEN 300 AND 500 PIASTERS DAILY. WHILE DISCUSSING PSDF GENERAL LAM SUGGESTED USE OF CATEGORY TWO ARVN PERSONNEL PAREN MINOR PHYSICAL LIMITATION PAREN IN SUPERVISORY CAPACITY WITH PSDF ELEMENTS. GENERAL ROSSON MADE NOTES ON THIS RECOMMENDATION AND INDICATED HE WOULD LOOK INTO THIS POSSIBILITY ON RETURN TO SAIGON. IN DISCUSSING PROBLEM OF OBTAINING ARVN VOLUNTEERS TO NATIONAL POLICE, GENERAL LAM RECOGNIZED THAT SOME OF THE TRANSFERS WERE OBTAINED UNDER PRESSURE AND THAT IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT A LARGE VOLUNTARY TRANSFER FROM ARVN TO NATIONAL POLICE UNTIL THE PAY OF THE LATTER WAS MORE FAVORABLE.

3. (S) DANANG SPT CMD

A. GENERAL ROSSON ARRIVED AT MAG 16 VIP PAD AT APPROXIMATELY 150 HOURS, 6 MARCH 1970, WHERE HE WAS MET BY COLONEL HOMER D. SMITH, COMMANDING OFFICER, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, DANANG. THE PARTY PROCEEDED DIRECTLY TO HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, DANANG. DURING THE TRIP TO THE HEADQUARTERS, GENERAL ROSSON INDICATED THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN A RUNDOWN ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE COMMAND AND THE STATUS OF THE ARMY TAKEOVER OF THE COMMON SUPPORT FUNCTIONS IN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.

B. AFTER LUNCH AT THE ENLISTED MEN'S MESS AT HHD, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, DANANG, GENERAL ROSSON MADE A QUICK WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION OF THE FACILITIES AND UPON DEPARTURE COMMENDED THE MESS SERGEANT AND THE COMMANDING OFFICER ON THE EXCELLENCE OF THEIR FACILITIES.



A-11 #1

C. FROM ABOUT 1255 HOURS UNTIL 1320 HOURS, GENERAL ROSSON WAS BRIEFED INFORMALLY BY COLONEL SMITH ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, DANANG TO INCLUDE THE LOCATION AND STRENGTH OF ITS ELEMENTS FROM DONG HA TO CHU LAI. IN ADDITION, COLONEL SMITH DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL THE STATUS OF THE ARMY TAKEOVER OF THE COMMON SUPPORT MISSION CURRENTLY BEING PERFORMED BY THE US NAVY. IN PARTICULAR, GENERAL ROSSON ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY ELEMENTS TAKING OVER THE OPERATION OF THE PORT AT TAN MY. HE WAS ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN THE TAKEOVER OF THE DEEP WATER PORT OPERATIONS AT DANANG TO INCLUDE THE TIMING THEREOF. COLONEL SMITH EXPLAINED TO HIM THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MOVEMENT OF THE 5TH TERMINAL COMMAND FROM QUI NHON TO DANANG. COLONEL SMITH ALSO INDICATED THAT BILLETING FOR THE PERSONNEL FROM THE 5TH TERMINAL COMMAND WOULD BE A PROBLEM IN THAT THE NSA HOSPITAL AREA, WHERE THEY ARE TO BE BILLETED, WILL NOT BE VACATED PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION, THE OPERATION OF THE POL FACILITIES IN THE DANANG AREA WAS DISCUSSED. THE DISCUSSION INCLUDED THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TAKEOVER OF THE NORTH EAST TANK FARM BY THE US AIR FORCE.

D. GENERAL ROSSON STATED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED THE INFORMATION THAT HE HAD COME FOR AND THAT HE NOW FELT HE HAD A GOOD GRASP OF THE TAKEOVER PLANS AND ITS EXECUTION TO DATE. GENERAL ROSSON AND PARTY DEPARTED THE VIP PAD AT MAG 16 AT ABOUT 1340.

4. (U) 95TH EVAC HOSPITAL

GENERAL ROSSON VISITED PATIENTS IN THE HOSPITAL FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR.

GP-4

(SSO NOTE DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

575

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A-11 #2

P 081442Z
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
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SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN TOWNSEND FROM LTGEN NICKERSON
FINAL SECTION OF TWO

DEP COMUSMACV VISIT TO ICTZ 6 MAR 70

5. (U) ICTZ NATIONAL POLICE HQ.

IN DISCUSSION WITH LTC TIEP, NATIONAL POLICE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, FOLLOWING INFORMATION DERIVED:

- A. 53 PERCENT OF ICTZ POLICE ARE AT DISTRICT OR BELOW.
- B. A VAGUE RESPONSE STATING THAT TRAINING OF VILLAGE CHIEFS AT VUNG TAU HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN VILLAGE CHIEFS AND POLICE ASSIGNED TO THE VILLAGE.
- C. THE ATTITUDE OF POLICE RECRUITED FROM ARVN IS GOOD AND THEY SEEM TO PREFER IT TO ARVN DUTY.
- D. NO DIFFICULTY WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED IF PHOENIX PROGRAM WERE MADE A PART OF SPECIAL POLICE, BUT ADDITIONAL MANPOWER WOULD PROBABLY BE NEEDED.
- E. 1970 POLICE EXPANSION PLAN HAD NOT BEEN PROMULGATED TO ICTZ REGIONAL HQ.
- F. MAIN PROBLEM IS LACK OF SUFFICIENT POLICE TO ASSIGN TO VILLAGES AND THAT SALARY PROBLEM IS NO MORE ACUTE WITH POLICE THAN OTHER GVN EMPLOYEES.
- G. PROBLEMS OF GETTING THE JOB DONE AND PROVIDING SECURITY HAS LEFT NO TIME TO IMPROVE THE POLICEMEN'S WAY AND STANDARD OF LIVING.
- H. THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION EXISTS AMONG THE RANK AND FILE OF NATIONAL POLICE BUT INSPECTION TEAMS AND INTERNAL SECURITY TEAMS ARE HARD AT WORK INVESTIGATING ALLEGATIONS. IN RESPONSE TO REDUCTION OF INCIDENTS BY FREQUENT ROTATION, LTC TIEP INDICATED HIS GENERAL POLICY OF ENSURING POLICE DID NOT REMAIN ON JOB OR LOCATION FOR LONGER THAN 4 OR 5 YEARS.

I. DEPCOMUSMACV DIRECTED DEPCORDS, III MAF TO DISCUSS WITH CG, XXIV CORPS AND OTHER ICTZ CMDRS POSSIBLE US ASSISTANCE IN CONSTRUCTING REEDED SUBSECTOR AND VILLAGE FACILITIES FOR NATIONAL POLICE.

6. (U) TERRITORIAL FORCES (IN COMPANY WITH LTGEN LAM, LTC RUMORE, DEP CHIEF TF DIV, MAJ CHUOC, CH STUDY DIV I CORPS),

A. AT CAM HA VILLAGE, DEPCOMUSMACV WAS MET BY COLONEL TIN, QUANG NAM PROVINCE CHIEF, LTC BLAKELY, PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR, AND BRIEFED BY MR. NGUYEN HOT, VILLAGE CHIEF, ON PSDF PERSONNEL STRENGTH, STATUS OF TRAINING, AND CURRENT OPERATIONS. HE THEN CIRCULATED THROUGH THE PSDF TEAM IN RANKS AND EXAMINED A NUMBER OF M-1 RIFLES AND M-2 CARBINES. HE THEN REQUESTED THE TEAM TO DEMONSTRATE A PATROL FORMATION. DEPCOMUSMACV ADDRESSED THE ASSEMBLED PSDF, COMPLIMENTING THEM ON THEIR EXCELLENT PATROL FORMATION AND CONDITION OF WEAPONS. HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR MISSION AND THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT OF THEIR CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT IN ABILITY TO PROTECT THEIR HOMES AND HAMLETS.



A-11 #3

B. AT 194TH RF COMPANY, DEPCOMUSMACV WAS BRIEFED BY THE COMPANY COMMANDER, LT TRIS, FOLLOWED BY INSPECTION OF THE COMPANY IN RANKS, EXAMINED EQUIPMENT WITH SPECIFIC EMPHASIS ON THE MAINTENANCE OF M-16 RIFLES, M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHERS, M-60 MACHINE GUN, AND FIRST AID KITS. HE COMMENTED THAT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF EXCESSIVE OIL, CONDITION OF WEAPONS WAS AS GOOD AS ANY HE HAD SEEN. DURING DISCUSSION FOLLOWING BRIEFING, LT TRIS ADVISED DEPCOMUSMACV THAT ONE OF HIS MEN WIA RECENTLY MED-EVACED BY U. S. MEDICAL PERSONNEL COULD NOT BE LOCATED AND NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS FOR HIS FAMILY TO LOCATE HIM HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL. MAJOR CARDWELL, DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISOR, STATED THAT HE IS INQUIRING INTO THIS MATTER AND FURTHER SEARCH OF U. S. MEDICAL FACILITIES IS IN PROGRESS. GEN LAM MENTIONED THAT THIS HAS HAPPENED IN A FEW PREVIOUS CASES. DEPCOMUSMACV EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN AND ADVISED THAT WE WILL CONTINUE ACTION TO LOCATE INDIVIDUAL. GEN MULLER COMMENTED THAT HE WILL DIRECT HIS MEDICAL ADVISOR TO CONDUCT FURTHER INQUIRY. DEPCOMUSMACV ADDRESSED THE COMPANY IN FORMATION, CONGRATULATING THEM ON THEIR OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENTS DURING THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS AND WISHED THEM CONTINUED SUCCESS.

C. AT 160TH PF PLATOON, DEPCOMUSMACV MET THE VILLAGE ELDERS, WAS BRIEFED BY COL TIN, QUANG NAM PROVINCE CHIEF, AND FOLLOWED A SIMILAR SEQUENCE, EXAMINING EQUIPMENT, WITNESSING DETAILED DISASSEMBLY OF WEAPONS, AND DISCUSSED PLATOON DEFENSES AND TACTICAL OPERATIONS. EXCEPT FOR EXCESSIVE OIL, WEAPONS WERE EXCELLENT. HE TALKED WITH EACH SQUAD LEADER, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR JOBS. HE CONGRATULATED THE ASSEMBLED PLATOON ON THE CONDITION OF THEIR EQUIPMENT AND EXCELLENT COMBAT RECORD.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

(SSO NOTE DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

715

"SECRET, THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY"

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

NNNN

SECRET

A-11 #4

**HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM <i>CG III MAF</i>		DATE <i>16 MAR 70</i>					
			SERIAL NO / CONTROL DATE <i>1003392 MAR 70</i>	COPY NO / OF 5 COPIES REC'D						
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					<i>Initial Call In Connection with Assumption of Command III MAF</i>				
	DCG									
	C/S	I		<i>3/11</i>	<i>D</i>	REMARK:				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> DISPOSITION <input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION </div> <table border="1" style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">SECTION</th> <th style="width: 50%;">SIGNATURE</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	SECTION	SIGNATURE		
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	S&C									
	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SECRET
(A-12)

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

DESTROY BY BURNING

PAC DE FLC NR 011-011
ZNY SSSSS
P 100339Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

PAGE CHECKED UPON RECEIPT
DATE 10 MAR 70 III MAF SA

R. J. Lutz
(SIGNATURE)

**S E C R E T / S P E C I A L / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y F O R L T G E N B U S E F R O M
L I G E N M C C U T C H E O N (D E L I V E R D U R I N G W O R K I N G H O U R S)
I N I T I A L C A L L S I N C O N N E C T I O N W I T H A S S U M P T I O N O F C O M M A N D I I I
M A F**

1. ARRIVED IN SAIGON ON 4 MARCH AND CALLED ON GENERALS ABRAMS AND ROSSON AND MGEN TOWNSEND. ATTENDED A DINNER IN MY HONOR AT GEN ABRAMS' QTRS THAT EVENING. DURING PRIVATE TALKS WITH GEN ABRAMS HE SAID HE THOUGHT HE UNDERSTOOD MARINE DOCTRINE AND RESPECTED NEED FOR IT, BUT HOPED THAT ZAIS AND I COULD WORK OUT A MODUS OPERANDI THAT WOULD ENSURE MAXIMIZING COMBAT OPERATIONS. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE DID NOT WANT OUR STAFFS TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WRANGLING OVER OPCON. I ASSURED HIM NO ONE WAS MORE INTERESTED IN PROMOTING EFFICIENCY OF OPERATIONS THAN THE MARINES. I FURTHER STATED I AGREED WITH HIM COMPLETELY, AND FURTHER THAT I DID NOT WANT TO GIVE THE PRESS THE OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY UP ANY APPARENT DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN

PAGE TWO FLC NR 011-011 S E C R E T S P E C I A L M C E O
THE TWO SERVICES.

- 2. ON 5 MARCH I CALLED ON GEN BROWN AT SEVENTH AIR FORCE, AMBASSADOR COLBY, VADM ZUNUWALT AND LTGEN SHANG.
- 3. ON 6 MARCH I CALLED ON AMBASSADOR BERRIS. HE WAS ACTING IN THE ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR BUNKER WHO WAS ON R&R. BERGER STATED: (A) THERE WAS IMPROVEMENT IN THE OVER ALL SITUATION IN VIETNAM; (B) THAT THE THIEU GOVERNMENT WAS DOING A PRETTY GOOD JOB; (C) A LOT OF IMPROVEMENT WAS REQUIRED IN THE ECONOMICS SPHERE, AND HE CITED ANTI-SMUGGLING MEASURES AS A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE; (D) WE HAD TO LET THE VIETNAMESE DO MORE AND MORE, AND THEY COULD, AND (E) HE WAS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH THE CONCEPT OF REDUCING U.S. PRESENCE IN VIETNAM AND THIS INCLUDED BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN.
- 4. I ARRIVED IN DANANG ON THE SIXTH, AND THE NEXT TWO DAYS CALLED ON LTGEN LAM, BGEN LEE, LTGEN ZAIS, AND A HALF DOZEN OTHER U.S. AND VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS. ZAIS WAS QUICK TO BRING UP THE QUESTION OF MODUS OPERANDI AGAIN, AND LEFT NO DOUBT THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN GETTING TO THE DIVISION UNITS IN PARTICULAR VIA THE SHORTEST PRACTICAL ROUTE. I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD A DOCTRINE ON THESE MATTERS

SECRET

PAGE ONE OF TWO HAS BEEN SENT 100339Z MAR 70

HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO		
ACT/COG																		
INFO/COORD																		

COPY OF 5 COPIES

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

DESTROY BY BURNING

011-011 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO
AND THAT I WAS A NEW BOY IN COUNTRY, AS HE KNEW, AND THAT
I WOULD DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT FURTHER WITH MY STAFF AND
REPORT BACK TO HIM AT AN EARLY DATE. SINCE THEN I HAVE
DISCUSSED IT BRIEFLY WITH SOME OF MY STAFF AND COMMANDERS
AND INTEND TO PURSUE IT FURTHER WITHIN THE NEXT FORTY-
EIGHT HOURS. I FEEL QUITE CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN PROTECT
THE DOCTRINE, MAINTAIN THE OPCON, BUT AT THE SAME TIME
WORK WITH A MODUS OPERANDI THAT WILL GIVE ZAIS THE INFORMA-
TION THAT HE NEEDS WHEN HE NEEDS IT IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE
THE EFFICIENCY OF COMBAT OPERATIONS WITHOUT ABROGATION
MY RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING AREA.
5. I INTEND TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOU AS FREQUENTLY AS
NECESSARY VIA THIS CHANNEL TO KEEP YOU INFORMED ON DEVEL-
OPMENTS ON THIS AND ANY OTHER SUBJECT THAT YOU SHOULD
BE AWARE OF. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

PAGE TWO OF TWO

100339Z MAR 70

~~TOD/PAC~~
~~10/0645Z MAR 70~~

SECRET

SECRET

HQ	FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																				
INFO/COORD																				

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

DESTROY BY BURNING

011-011 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO
AND THAT I WAS A NEW BOY IN COUNTRY, AS HE KNEW, AND THAT
I WOULD DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT FURTHER WITH MY STAFF AND
REPORT BACK TO HIM AT AN EARLY DATE. SINCE THEN I HAVE
DISCUSSED IT BRIEFLY WITH SOME OF MY STAFF AND COMMANDERS
AND INTEND TO PURSUE IT FURTHER WITHIN THE NEXT FORTY-
EIGHT HOURS. I FEEL QUITE CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN PROTECT
THE DOCTRINE, MAINTAIN THE OPCON, BUT AT THE SAME TIME
WORK WITH A MODUS OPERANDI THAT WILL GIVE ZAIS THE INFORMA-
TION THAT HE NEEDS WHEN HE NEEDS IT IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE
THE EFFICIENCY OF COMBAT OPERATIONS WITHOUT ABRIGATION
MY RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING AREA.
5. I INTEND TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOU AS FREQUENTLY AS
NECESSARY VIA THIS CHANNEL TO KEEP YOU INFORMED ON DEVEL-
OPMENTS ON THIS AND ANY OTHER SUBJECT THAT YOU SHOULD
BE AWARE OF. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

PAGE TWO OF TWO

100337Z MAR 74

TOD/PAC
10/0645Z MAR 74

SECRET

SECRET

HQ	FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																				
INFO/COORD																				

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

P 130859Z ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FIRST MAW
 ZEM

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR MGEN
 THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
 FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG 1STMAW MSG 110815Z MAR 70 (TS)

B. COMMANDER SEVENTH AIR FORCE MSG 093701Z MAR 70 (S)

1. I AGREE THAT IF BOTH FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT
 ARE REQUIRED IN THE AVIATION ELEMENT OF A MARINE BRIGADE,
 AND IF IT IS PLANNED TO OPERATE THEM ON TWO SEPARATE FIELDS,
 TWO AIR GROUPS SHOULD BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE MAB
 ORGANIZATION.

2. IN THE CASE UNDER CONSIDERATION, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE
 THAT SINGLE SITING IS BOTH PRACTICAL AND POSSIBLE. I
 VISUALIZE THAT ONE COMPOSITE AIR GROUP CONSISTING OF TWO
 JET SQUADRONS, ONE HMM AND ONE HML, TO INCLUDE BOTH
 SLICKS AND GUN SHIPS, PLUS A DETACHMENT OF OV10S AND CH53S PROBABLY
 CONSTITUTE THE LARGEST AIR ELEMENT THAT WOULD BE ASSIGNED
 TO THE BRIGADE, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO INVESTIGATE AND
 ANALYZE THE PRACTICABILITY OF BEDDING THIS FORCE DOWN IN
 THE PRESENT MAG-11 SPACES. FURTHER REQUEST THAT YOU
 REPORT BACK WHAT YOU CONSIDER THE MAJOR PROBLEMS WOULD
 BE AND TO IDENTIFY THE SHORT FALLS OR CONSTRAINTS THAT WOULD
 PRECLUDE MAINTAINING AND OPERATING THIS MIXED BAG OF AIR-
 CRAFT IN THE PRESENT MAG-11 SPACES. IF THE ANALYSIS
 INDICATES THAT THE PROPOSED BAG WILL NOT FIT, THEN IDEN-
 TIFY WHAT SPECIFIC NUMBERS AND MODELS OF AIRCRAFT, BOTH
 FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING, COULD BE ACCOMMODATED.

3. REF B BEARS ON THIS SUBJECT, ALTHOUGH SEVENTH AIR
 FORCE IS GOING ON RECORD REQUESTING ANY SPACES VACATED
 IN DANANG BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM, I BELIEVE THAT WE
 CAN MAKE A CASE RETAINING PART OF OUR FACILITIES SINCE
 WE WILL VACATE AND MAKE AVAILABLE OTHER FACILITIES BOTH
 AT DA NANG AND MARBLE MOUNTAIN. WARM REAGRDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

324

TOP SECRET

3/4
 0/0

13

08

55

2

P 130856Z ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FIRST MAW

ZLW

TOP SECRET

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R U S E N I M R A S H F R O M L I G E N
E C C O T C H E O N

SEA TDS INTERFACE

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

R 110249Z MAR 70

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUMIKD/CINCPAC

INFO RUMHADA/CINCPACAF

RUMNBAA/CINCPACT

RUMKW/CG FMFPAC

RUSBA/CG III MAF TIEN SA VN

RUSVBAA/7AF TSNCVN

T O P S E C R E T 11629 (JS) 7F FOR DOCC & TACC-NS

SUBJ: SEA TDS INTERFACE (U)

REF: A. MSG, CINCPAC DIG 280018Z JAN 70 (TS)

1. (TS) REFERENCE A TASKEFMACV TO COORDINATE DETAILED PLANNING
OF MAINTAINING SEA TDS INTERFACE BY RETAINING TDCC AT TACC-NS
UPON DEPLOYMENT OF MACRON FOUR.2. (TS) REFERENCE B ASKED 7AF AND CG III MAF TO PREPARE AND SUBMIT
DETAILED PLAN FOR TDCC RETENTION BY 15 APRIL 70.3. (TS) DURING A MEETING HE AT TACC-NS ON 9 MAR 70 BETWEEN
7F (TACC-NS), CG III MAF (1ST MAW AND MACV JG REPRESENTATIVES,
IT WAS REQUESTED BY BOTH AIR FORCE AND MARINE CORPS PARTICIPANTS
THAT THE TOP SECRET SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE
SEA TDS TDCC RETENTION BE REDUCED TO ALLOW WIDER RANGE OF
PLANNING ACTIVITIES, CV CONCURS WITH THE DESIRABILITY OF THIS
PROPOSAL AND THEREFOR REQUESTS THAT CINCPAC REVIEW SEA TDS
INTERFACE AND TDCC RETENTION SECURITY CLASSIFICATION IN LIGHT
OF THE NEED FOR WIDER INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

GP-4

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

396

NNNN

TOP SECRET

13

08

56

4/4

PP YMLKI YMLKV
 DE YMLKQ 3 0720856
 P 130857Z ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FIRST MAW
 CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEM

TOP SECRET

T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN THRASH AND MGEN
 WHEELER FROM LIGEN MCCUTCHEON

LOGISTIC CONCEPT FOR PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT (S)

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOU INFO:

P 112001Z MAF 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUEOFIA/CMCINFO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

RUMLMPA/CG FLC

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO

LIGEN MCCUTCHEON AND BGEN PADALINO FROM LIGEN BUSE

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //NO0000//

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

LOGISTIC CONCEPT FOR PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT (S)

1. (IS) SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE, I PROPOSE TO EMPLOY
 THE FOLLOWING GENERAL LOGISTIC CONCEPT IN ESTABLISHING
 SPECIFIC PLANNING GUIDELINES FOR THE MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES AND
 EQUIP DURING THE IMPENDING PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT OF MARINE
 CORPS FORCES FROM RVN.

A. 1ST MARDIV AND 1ST MAW UNITS SCHEDULED FOR REDEPLOY-
 MENT DURING PHASE IV WILL REDEPLOY WITH ALL ON-HAND SERVICE-
 ABLE AND UNSERVICEABLE REPARABLE T/E-T/A ALLOWANCES, ALL
 INDIVIDUAL EQUIP WEAPONS, AUTH MEDICAL AND DENTAL
 ALLOWANCES AND ALL ON-HAND OP STOCKS LESS CLASS Q, III (BULK/
 DRUMMED), V(W) AND V(A) MATERIEL AND LESS SPECIAL SOUTHEAST
 ASIA CLOTHING NOT IN THE HANDS OF TROOPS.

B. ALL SPECIAL ALLOWANCE (T/E P-4960 AND T/E P-4970)
 EQUIP ASSETS HELD BY REDEPLOYING 1ST MARDIV AND 1ST MAW UNITS,
 FLC END ITEM MAINTENANCE FLOAT ASSETS AND FLC END ITEM STOCK
 ASSETS WILL BE SCREENED/REDISTRIBUTED BY CG III MAF TO FILL
 T/E AND CLASS VII MO/MOA DEFICIENCIES OF THE FOLLOWING UNITS
 (IN THE PRIORITY SHOWN BELOW), POST-PHASE IV MAB, ED MARDIV (-),

1ST MAW (REAF), 3D FSR, 1ST MAW UNITS REDEPLOYING TO OKI AND
 JAPAN DURING IV, 1ST MARINE BRIGADE, 1ST MARDIV UNITS
 REDEPLOYING TO MIDPAC DURING PHASE IV, 1ST MARDIV AND 1ST MAW
 UNITS REDEPLOYING TO EASTPAC DURING PHASE IV, 5TH MEB, 3D MAW,
 5TH FSR AND FORCE TROOPS FMFPAC, ALL SPECIAL ALLOWANCE, END
 ITEM MAINTENANCE FLOAT AND END ITEM STOCK EQUIP ASSETS EXCESS
 TO REAR OF AFORMENTIONED UNITS WILL BE PREPARED FOR SHIP-
 MENT AND STAGED BY THE HOLDING UNITS. THESE EXCESS EQUIP
 ASSETS WILL BE RETROGRADED TO CONUS FOR RETURN TO STORES SYSTEM
 ON REDEPLOYING OR OPPORTUNE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPPING AND
 MSTS.

C. NOT 15 DAYS AFTER START OF PHASE IV, FLC WILL BE DIRECTED TO CEASE REPLENISHMENT BUYS AND ZERO OUT THE REQUISITIONING OBJECTIVE (RO) ON ALL MARINE CORPS SOURCE CODED ITEMS EXCEPT DPI CONSUMABLES AND COMMERCIAL VEHICLE REPAIR PARTS. UPON ACTIVATION OF THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP (LSG) TO SUPPORT THE POST-PHASE IV MAF, FLC WILL CEASE ALL OTHER REPLENISHMENT BUYS AND UNITS WILL BEGIN REQUISITIONING FROM FLC ON A FILL OR PASS TO 3D FSR BASIS ON MARCORPS SOURCE CODED ITEMS. LATE IN PHASE IV, ALL UNIT REQUISITIONS WILL BE SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO 3D FSR, AND FLC WILL BEGIN ROLL-UP ACTIONS. AT THIS TIME, ALL FLC ON-HAND OF STOCKS WILL BE MADE AVAL TO FILL MO/MOA REQR OF THE FOLLOWING UNITS (IN PRIORITY SHOWN BELOW): POST-PHASE IV MAB, 3D MARDIV (1), 1ST MAR (REAR), 3D FSR, 1ST MAW UNITS REDEPLOYING TO OKI AND JAPAN DURING PHASE IV, 1ST MARDIV UNITS REDEPLOYING TO MIDPAC DURING PHASE IV, 1ST MARDIV AND 1ST MAW UNITS REDEPLOYING TO EASTPAC DURING PHASE IV, PJZXT SERV BN 5TH MEB AND 5TH FSR.

D. NON-TAM GARRISON PROPERTY/NON-TECHNICAL COLLATERAL EQUIP ASSETS HELD BY UNITS REDEPLOYING DURING PHASE IV WILL BE SCREENED BY CG III MAF AGAINST POST-PHASE IV MAB4: MARCORBASES WESTPAC, MCAS KANEONE AND COMCABWEST ALLOWANCE DEFICIENCIES, IN THAT ORDER OF PRIORITY, AND REDISTRIBUTED ACCORDINGLY, ALL GARRISON PROPERTY AND COLLATERAL EQUIP ASSETS EXCESS TO REQR OF FMFPAC UNITS LISTED ABOVE WILL BE MADE AVAL FOR FURTHER REDISTRIBUTION WITHIN THE MARINE CORPS AS CMC MAY DIRECT.

E. ALL FLC SHOP STORES ASSETS WILL BE TURNED-OVER TO THE POST PHASE IV MAB LSG FOR SUPPORT OF FORCES REMAINING IN-COUNTRY.

F. SECONDARY DEPOT REPARABLES WILL BE REDISTRIBUTED TO SATISFY EXISTING WESTPAC REQR/DEFICIENCIES. IN VIEW OF SHORT TIME FRAMES ENVISIONED FOR PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT AUTHORITY BE GRANTED TO RETURN EXCESS SECONDARY DEPOT REPARABLES DIRECTLY TO MCSC BARSTOW WITHOUT PRIOR REPORTING TO MCSA PHILA.

2. (IS) IF THE CONCEPT OUTLINED IN PAR 1. ABOVE IS APPROVED AND TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS, I PROPOSE TO EMBARK THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF TROOPS AND RETROGRADE CARGON ON NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS/SHIPPING UTILIZING ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT LOADING TECHNIQUES IN ORDER TO PRESERVE MAXIMUM UNIT INTEGRITY. REMAINING PERSONNEL WOULD BE AIRLIFTED TO CONUS. MAKING MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF EXISTING MAC CHANNEL/SAAM AIRCRAFT, THE REMAINING CARGO WILL BE OFFERED TO MSTIS.

3. (U) YOUR CONCURRENCE/COMMENTS ON THE CONCEPT OUTLINED IN PAR 1 AND 2 ABOVE IS REQUESTED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
UNQUOTE

2. I DESIRE TO INCLUDE THIS TOPIC AS A DISCUSSION ITEM AT MY FIRST WEEKLY COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ON MONDAY, 16 MARCH 1970 HERE AT CAMP HASKINS, WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

900

TOP SECRET

P 150258Z ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF
TO CG FIRST MAW

ZEM

SECRET

S E C R E T / SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR WGEN THRASH FROM LIGEN
MCCUTCHEONMINIMIZING LIKELIHOOD OF CAMBODIA BORDER INCIDENTS DURING
ASTRONAUTS VISIT TO CAMBODIA

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE

O 120920Z ZYH ZFF-3 ZFF-6

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON

GEN BROWN CDR 7TH AF TAN SON NHUT

LTG HILDREN DCG USAFV LONG BINH

ADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON

LTG COLLINS CG IFFV NHA TRANG

LTG EVELL CG IFFV LONG BINH

MG MCCOMB CG DMAC CAN THO

INFO LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS PHU BAI

LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG

ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 3243 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: MINIMIZING LIKELIHOOD OF CAMBODIA BORDER INCIDENTS DURING
ASTRONAUTS VISIT TO CAMBODIA1. APOLLO 12 ASTRONAUTS GORDON, JEAN, AND CONRAD WILL VISIT PHNOM
PENH, CAMBODIA DURING THE PERIOD 17-18 MARCH 1970, ON A GOOD WILL
TOUR AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT.2. ADDRESSEES ARE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION, IN SO FAR AS SECURITY
OF FORCES WILL PERMIT, TO MINIMIZE THE LIKELIHOOD OF BORDER INCIDENTS
DURING THE PERIOD OF 15-18 MARCH 1970.3. THE FOREGOING HAS ASSUMED PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE IN VIEW OF THE
REPORTS THAT STUDENT RIOTS IN PHNOM PENH ON 11 MARCH 70 CULMINATED IN
THE BURNING AND SACKING OF THE PRG EMBASSY AND THE BURNING OF THE
NVA EMBASSY. STUDENTS WERE REPORTED TO BE PROTESTING AGAINST VC
PRESENCE IN CAMBODIA AND AGAINST THE VISIT TO PHNOM PENH OF PHAN VAN CONG
THE PRIME MINISTER OF NVG.4. THE FULL MEANING OF THESE STUDENT ACTIONS IS YET TO BE DETERMINED;
HOWEVER, IT APPEARS AT THE MOMENT THAT A CHANGE MAY BE TAKING PLACE
WHICH COULD BE OF BENEFIT TO THE U.S. AND OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES.

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

(SEE NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

250

414

NNNN

13

08

58

5

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 13 MAR 70	
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE P 130858Z MAR 70		COPY NO 1 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					READDRESSAL OF GEN ABRAM'S @ 120920Z MAR 70 (ASTRONAUTS VISIT TO CAMBODIA)
	DCG					
	C/S	I		3/16	✓	REMARK:
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION <input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION
	DEPCORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					SECTION SIGNATURE
	S/S	Y	3/15		9	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
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	FSEO					
	HQ CMTD					
	INSP					
	MTO					
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	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT & E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SBC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

III MAF STAFF SECRETARY

RECEIVED THREE COPIES (2,3,4) OF
CG III MAF'S P 130858Z MAR 70

DTOR 15 _____ H MAR 70

DTOD 140725 _____ H MAR 70

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERVSE

SECRET

A-13

P-130858Z ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF
TO CG FIRST MAF

ZEM

SECRET

S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN THRASH FROM LIGEN
MCCUTCHEONMINIMIZING LIKELIHOOD OF CAMBODIA BORDER INCIDENTS DURING
ASTRONAUTS VISIT TO CAMBODIA

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE

O 120920Z ZYH ZFF-3 ZFF-6

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON

GEN BROWN CDR 7TH AF TAN SON NHUT

LTG MILDREN DCG USARV LONG BINH

ADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON

LTG COLLINS CG IFFV NHA TRANG

LTG EWELL CG IIFFV LONG BINH

MG MCCOWN CG DMAC CAN THO

INFO LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS PHU BAI

LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG

ZEM

S E C R E T MAC 3248 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: MININIZING LIKELIHOOD OF CAMBODIA BORDER INCIDENTS DURING
ASTRONAUTS VISIT TO CAMBODIA1. APOLLO 12 ASTRONAUTS GORDON, BEAN, AND CONRAD WILL VISIT PHNOM
PENH, CAMMODIA DURING THE PERIOD 17-18 MARCH 1970, ON A GOOD WILL
TOUR AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT.2. ADDRESSEES ARE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION, IN SO FAR AS SECURITY
OF FORCES WILL PERMIT, TO MINIMIZE THE LIKELIHOOD OF BORDER INCIDENTS
DURING THE PERIOD OF 15-18 MARCH 1970.3. THE FOREGOING HAS ASSUMED PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE IN VIEW OF THE
REPORTS THAT STUDENT RIOTS IN PHNOM PENH ON 11 MARCH 70 CULMINATED IN
THE BURNING AND SACKING OF THE PRG EMBASSY AND THE BURNING OF THE
NVN EMBASSY. STUDENTS WERE REPORTED TO BE PROTESTING AGAINST VC
PRESENCE IN CAMBODIA AND AGAINST THE VISIT TO PHNOM PENH OF PHAN VAN DONG
THE PRIME MINISTER OF NVN.4. THE FULL MEANING OF THESE STUDENT ACTIONS IS YET TO BE DETERMINED;
HOWEVER, IT APPEARS AT THE MOMENT THAT A CHANGE MAY BE TAKING PLACE
WHICH COULD BE OF BENEFIT TO THE U.S. AND OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES.

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

250

2/4

NNNN

SECRET

(A-13)

**HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 13 MAR 70
SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 130856Z MAR 70					COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					INADDRESSAL OF COMUSMACV'S R 110249Z MAR 70 (SEA TDS INTERFACE(U))
	DCG					
	C/S	I		7/14	T	REMARKS: DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					Section _____ Signature _____ REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					III MAF STAFF SECRETARY RECEIVED THREE COPIES (2,3,4) OF CG III MAF'S P 130856Z MAR 70 TOR 15 _____ H MAR 70 TOD 150936 _____ H MAR 70
	S/S	X	3/15		Y	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
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	NJA					
	OPANAL					
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	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
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	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

25

TOP SECRET

B-25

P 130856Z ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FIRST MAW
 ZEM

TOP SECRET

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R M G E N T H R A S H F R O M L I G E N
 M C C U T C H E O N
 S E A T D S I N T E R F A C E

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO:
 Q U O T E

R 110249Z MAR 70
 FM COMUSMACV

TO RUHDK/CINCPAC
 INFO RUHEADAC/CINCPACAF

RUHKBAA/CINCPACT

RUHKM/CG FMFPAC

RUSBA/CG III MAF TIEN SA VN

RUSVBAA/7AF TSNCVN

T O P S E C R E T 11625 (J6) 7F FOR DOCC & TACC-NF

SUBJ: SEA TDS I M E R F A C E (U)

REFS A. MSG, CINCPAC DTG 280018Z JAN 70 (TS)

1. (TS) REFERENCE A TASKEFMACV TO COORDINATE DETAILED PLANNING
 OF INTAINING SEA TDS INTERFACE BY RETAINING TDCC AT TACC-NS
 UPON DEPLOYMENT OF MACRON FOUR.

2. (TS) REFERENCE B ASKED 7AF AND CG III MAF TO PREPARE AND SUBMIT
 DETAILED PLAN FOR TDCC RETENTION BY 10 APRIL 70.

3. (TS) DURING A MEETING HE AT TACC-NS ON 9 MAR 70 BETWEEN
 7F (TACC-NS), CG III MAF (1ST MAW AND MACV J6 REPRESENTATIVES,
 IT WAS REQUESTED BY BOTH AIR FORCE AND MARINE CORPS PARTICIPANTS
 THAT THE TOP SECRET SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE
 SEA TDS TDCC RENTENTIM BE REDUCED TO ALLOW WIDER RANGE OF
 PLANING ACTIVITIES, CV CONCURS WITH THE DESIRABILITY OF THIS
 PROPOSAL AND THEREFOR REQUESTS THAT CINCPAC REVIEW SEA TDS
 INTERFACE AND TDCC RENTENTIM SECURITY CLASSIFICATION IN LIGHT
 OF THE NEED FOR WIDER INFORMATION DESSEMINATION

GP-4

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

393

2/4

NNNN

TOP SECRET

B-25

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5716 REV 1-70

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
I - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COORDINATE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAR		13 MAR 70	
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE			
			P 130855Z		1970 MAR 2 01 4 0000000000	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					FORCE PLANNING (U)
	DCG					
	C/S	I		3/15		REMARK:
	DC/S					DISPOSITION: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	Y		3/15		Section _____ Signature _____
	G-1					
	G-2					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	G-3					
	G-4	I		Hand Copy #4		Section _____ Signature _____
	G-5					
	G-6					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					Section _____ Signature _____
	CAP					
	CHAP					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	CIB					
	COMP					Section _____ Signature _____
	DENT					
	ENGR					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	FOODS					
	FSEO					Section _____ Signature _____
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	MTO					
	NJA					Section _____ Signature _____
	OPANAL					
	ORD					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	PMO					
	POSTAL					Section _____ Signature _____
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	RDT&E					
	REPRO					Section _____ Signature _____
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					Section _____ Signature _____
	SIC					
	TCC					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	SGT MAJ					

II MAR STAFF SECRETARY

RECEIVED THREE COPIES (2,3,4) OF

CG III MAR'S P 130855Z MAR 70

DTOR 15

II MAR 70

DTOD 140725H MAR 70

(SEE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

TOP SECRET

(A-1)

P 180336Z 277-1

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FIRST MAW

ZEN

T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN THRASH FROM LTCEN
MCGUTCHEON

SEA TDS INTERFACE

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

R 110249Z MAR 70

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUH140/CINCPAC

INFO RUHEADA/CINCPACAF

RUHKBAA/CINCPACT

RUHFM/CG FMFPAC

RUSBA/CG III MAF TIEN SA VN

RUSVBA/7AF TSNCVN

T O P S E C R E T 11625 (J6) 7F FOR DOCC & TACC-NF

SUBJ: SEA TDS IMERFACE (U)

REFS A: MSG, CINCPAC DTG 280018Z JAN 70 (TS)

1. (TS) REFERENCE A TASKEFMACV TO COORDINATE DETAILED PLANNING
OF INTAINING SEA TDS INTERFACE BY RETAINING TDCC AT TACC-NS
UPON DEPLOYMENT OF MACRON FOUR.

2. (TS) REFERENCE B ASKED 7AF AND CG III MAF TO PREPARE AND SUBMIT
DETAILED PLAN FOR TDCC RETENTION BY 10 APRIL 70.

3. (TS) DURING A MEETING HE AT TACC-NS ON 9 MAR 70 BETWEEN
7F (TACC-NS), CG III MAF (1ST MAW AND MACV J6 REPRESENTATIVES,
IT WAS REQUESTED BY BOTH AIR FORCE AND MARINE CORPS PARTICIPANTS
THAT THE TOP SECRET SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE
SEA TDS TDCC RETENTION BE REDUCED TO ALLOW WIDER RANGE OF
PLANNING ACTIVITIES. CV CONCURS WITH THE DESIRABILITY OF THIS
PROPOSAL AND THEREFOR REQUESTS THAT CINCPAC REVIEW SEA TDS
INTERFACE AND TDCC RETENTION SECURITY CLASSIFICATION IN LIGHT
OF THE NEED FOR WIDER INFORMATION DESSEMINATION

GP-4

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

398

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2/4

B-25

HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;"><i>CG III MARF</i></p>		DATE <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;"><i>15 MAR 70</i></p>					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;"><i>1504372 MAR 70</i></p>	COPY NO. OF COPIES REC'D						
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					Monthly MACV Commanders Conference AND INTELLIGENCE Estimate UPDATE REMARKS: <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> <p style="font-size: 0.8em; margin-top: 5px;">REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.</p> <p style="font-size: 0.8em; margin-top: 5px;">The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.</p>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
	DCG									
	C/S	I		<i>3/15</i>	<i>F</i>					
	DC/S	I		<i>3/16</i>	<i>F</i>					
	DCS PLANS									
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ									
	S/S	Y		<i>3/15</i>	<i>Y</i>					
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	G-2	I		<i>Has Copy</i>						
	G-3	I		<i>Has Copy</i>						
	G-4	I		<i>Has Copy</i>						
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	AWARDS									
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	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

TOP SECRET

A-2

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

PTTAZYUW RUMLMPA2551 02140437-0000 --RUHFMA.
ZNY AAAAA
P 150437Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT
T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR
LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS)

MONTHLY MACV COMMANDERS CONFERENCE AND INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE UPDATE

1. WAS INVITED TO ATTEND SUBJ MEETING AT MACV THIS DATE
ALONG WITH ZAIS. GEN ABRAMS SEATED ME AT TABLE WITH HIM-
SELF, ROSSON, BROWN, COLBY, AND OTHER US CORPS COMMANDERS.
REMAINING TWENTY ODD GENERALS AND HIGH RANKING CIVILIANS
SAT IN CHAIRS TO REAR OF ROOM.
2. AGENDA INCLUDED BRIEFINGS AND DISCUSSIONS ON IN AND
OUT OF COUNTRY OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT, AND
COMPARISON OF VARIOUS STATISTICS WITH PAST PERFORMANCES.
3. A SHARP ARMY CAPTAIN GAVE AN OUTSTANDING ANALYSIS ON
CURRENT CAMBODIAN UNREST. HE BELIEVES IT TO BE A COUP DE
FORCE WITH LON NOL ENDEAVORING TO OUTMANEUVER SIHANOU IN

10 MAR 70 09 24Z

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA2551 T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EFFORT TO CHANGE POLICY FROM ONE OF COVERT ASSISTANCE TO
NVN AND VC TO ONE OF OVERT NEUTRALISM SO THEY CAN SUPPORT
BOTH SIDES ECONOMICALLY AS OUT AND OUT NEUTRALS. IF HE
FAILS, US COULD BE BLAMED AS INSTIGATOR. IF HE SUCCEEDS,
COMMIES WOULD PROBABLY STILL CONTINUE THEIR COVERT ACTI-
VITIES ANYHOW AS THEY HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFRASTRUCTURE IN
CAMBODIA.

4. NAVFORV READ FROM A CAPTURED DOCUMENT WHICH STATED VC
WERE HAVING PROBLEMS BECAUSE ALLIES KEPT CHANGING TACTICS
AND TECHNIQUES. ABRAMS POINTED OUT THAT IS ABOUT AS HIGH
A COMPLIMENT ENEMY CAN PAY US AND HE URGED ALL HANDS TO
KEEP CONSTANT LOOKOUT FOR REPETITIVE PATTERNS IN OUR OPERA-
TIONS AND TO BREAK UP ROUTINE.

5. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE LISTED FOLLOWING TRENDS
FAVORABLE TO EACH SIDE:

- A. FAVORABLE TO ENEMY
 - (1) CRASH LOGISTICS PROGRAM, TO INCLUDE ROAD
BUILDING EFFORT, INCREASE IN TRAFFIC AND AAA DEFENSE OF
HIS LOCS.
 - (2) INFILTRATION

HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																			
INFO/COORD																			

TOP SECRET - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

TOP SECRET

DESTROY BY BURNING

PAGE THREE RUMMPA2551 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

- (3) INTACT COMMAND AND CONTROL APPARATUS.
- (4) SAPPER TRAINING
- (5) INCREASE IN IMPORTS, PARTICULARLY VEHICLES AND EXPLOSIVES
- (6) ACTIVITY IN DMZ, ASHAU AND DELTA
- B. FAVORABLE TO ALLIES
- (1) DECLINE IN ENEMY STRENGTH DUE TO COMBAT LOSSES, HOI CHANS, RECRUITING DIFFICULTIES.
- (2) INCREASING MORALE AND DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS FOR ENEMY.
- (3) CONTINUOUS LOSS OF CACHES BY ENEMY.
- (4) NECESSITY FOR ENEMY TO USE COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT TROOPS IN LOGISTIC ROLE.
- (5) DIFFICULTIES IN CAMBODIA.
- (6) DECLINE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY.
- (7) LOSS OF POPULATION CONTROL BY ENEMY DUE TO PACIFICATION EFFORTS.
- 6. ESTIMATE POSTULATED FOLLOWING ENEMY CAPABILITIES:
- A. LARGE SCALE GROUND ATTACKS.
- B. SMALL SCALE GROUND ATTACKS.

PAGE FOUR RUMMPA2551 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

- C. WIDESPREAD ATTACKS BY FIRE.
- D. INCREASE INFILTRATION.
- E. TERRORIST, SAPPER, HARASSING, GUERRILLA ATTACKS.
- 7. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION WERE LISTED AS:
- A. CONTINUE AT PRESENT LEVEL.
- B. STEP UP MILITARY ACTIVITY.
- C. LAUNCH MULTI-REGIMENTAL ATTACKS IN ONE AND THREE CORPS.
- D. REDUCE ACTIVITY.
- E. EXPLOIT TACIT OR EXPLICIT PEACE SETTLEMENT.
- F. CONTINUE TERRORIST, SAPPER, HARASSING AND GUERRILLA ATTACKS IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANY OF OTHER COURSES.
- 8. THE MOST PROBABLE COURSE OF ACTION WAS DEEMED TO BE A STEP UP OF ACTIVITY DURING PRESENT CAMPAIGN.
- 9. GEN ABRAMS PHILOSOPHIZED THROUGHOUT AND MADE SEVERAL POINTS:
- A. BE ALERT TO CHANGING TIMES.
- B. TIGHTEN UP ON THINGS IN GENERAL AND SPECIFICALLY NONAPPROPRIATED FUNDS, LEAVE, R&R, OUT-OF-COUNTRY AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS, ETC.
- C LN 4 AA LISTED AS:

HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																			
INFO/COORD																			

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS

FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

PAGE FIVE RUMMPA2551 ~~TOP SECRET~~/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY DESTROY BY BURNING

C. BUDGET WAS TIGHT BUT DON'T HOARD FOR A RAINY DAY
AS THERE WERE EXCESSES IN COUNTRY NOW PROBABLY SUFFICIENT TO
COVER WORST POSSIBILITIES.

D. URGED ALL HANDS TO REGARD ENEMY SYSTEM IN ITS
ENTIRETY, E.E. MAIN UNITS, GUERRILLAS, VCI, CADRE, FOOD,
LOCS, ETC. HE NEEDS IT ALL. WE NEED TO GET IT ALL.

10. NO DISCUSSION OF FUTURE PLANS. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

2551

NNNN

HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																			
INFO/ COORD																			

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

(A-2)

HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM	DATE				
					CG III MAF	15 Mar 70				
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 2 OF 3 COPIES REC'D					
			151413Z MAR 70							
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					Monthly MACV Commanders Conference and Intelligence Estimate Update				
	DCG									
	C/S	F		3/14	S	REMARKS:				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.				
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.				
1	S/S	F		3/14	Cy					
	G-1					<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
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	CAP									
	CHAP									
	CIB									
	COMP									
	DENT									
	ENGR									
	FOODS									
	FSEO									
	HQ CMDT									
	INSP									
	MTO									
	NJA									
	OPANAL									
	ORD									
	PMO									
	POSTAL									
	PROTO									
	PSYOPS									
	RDT&E									
	REPRO									
	SJA									
	SPL SERV									
	SUPPLY									
	FORMED O									
	SIC	X		16 MAR 70	Z					
	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

HAS BEEN SENT

3

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

TOP SECRET

A-3

~~TOP SECRET~~~~"MCEO" EXCLUSIVE~~

WING # 833 / DIV # 10

TOR: 15 MAR 70 10 26z

PTTTZYU RUMMPA2667 074 14 13-TTTT--R ULMHA RUMLLUA.

ZNY TTTT

P 15 14 13Z MAR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMMHA/CG FIRST MAW

RUMLLUA/CG FIRST MARDIV

ZEN/CG FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

BT

TOP SECRET/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR MGEN THRASH, MGEN WHEELER AND BGEN PADALINO FROM LTGEN

MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

MONTHLY MACV COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE AND INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

UPDATE

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

P 150437Z MAR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

TOP SECRET/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR
LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING

HOURS)

PAGE CHECKED UPON RECEIPT

DATE 16 MAR 70 III MAF S&C

C. H. Lundy 5591
(SIGNATURE)PAGE TWO RUMMPA2667 TOP SECRET/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/MCEO
MONTHLY MACV COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE AND INTELLIGENCE
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VITIES ANYHOW AS THEY HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFRASTRUCTURE IN
CAMBODIA.

P3 1-3

151413Z MAR 70

~~"EXCLUSIVE" MCEO~~

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

"MCEO" "EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA2667 TOP SECRET/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/MCEO 16:16

4. NAVFORV READ FROM A CAPTURED DOCUMENT WHICH STATED VC WERE HAVING PROBLEMS BECAUSE ALLIES KEPT CHANGING TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES. ABRAMS POINTED OUT THAT IS ABOUT AS HIGH A COMPLIMENT ENEMY CAN PAY US AND HE URGED ALL HANDS TO KEEP CONSTANT LOOKOUT FOR REPETITIVE PATTERNS IN OUR OPERATIONS AND TO BREAK UP ROUTINE.

5. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE LISTED FOLLOWING TRENDS FAVORABLE TO EACH SIDE:

A. FAVORABLE TO ENEMY

(1) CRASH LOGISTICS PROGRAM, TO INCLUDE ROAD BUILDING EFFORT, INCREASE IN TRAFFIC AND AAA DEFENSE OF HIS LOCS.

(2) INFILTRATION

(3) INTACT COMMAND AND CONTROL APPARATUS.

(4) SAPPER TRAINING

(5) INCREASE IN IMPORTS, PARTICULARLY VEHICLES AND EXPLOSIVES

(6) ACTIVITY IN DMZ, ASHAU AND DELTA

B. FAVORABLE TO ALLIES

(1) DECLINE IN ENEMY STRENGTH DUE TO COMBAT LOSSES.

PAGE FOUR RUMLMPA2667 TOP SECRET/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/MCEO HOI CHANS, RECRUITING DIFFICULTIES.

(2) INCREASING MORALE AND DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS FOR ENEMY.

(3) CONTINUOUS LOSS OF CACHES BY ENEMY.

(4) NECESSITY FOR ENEMY TO USE COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT TROOPS IN LOGISTIC ROLE.

(5) DIFFICULTIES IN CAMBODIA.

(6) DECLINE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY.

(7) LOSS OF POPULATION CONTROL BY ENEMY DUE TO PACIFICATION EFFORTS.

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A. LARGE SCALE GROUND ATTACKS.

B. SMALL SCALE GROUND ATTACKS.

C. WIDESPREAD ATTACKS BY FIRE.

D. INCREASE INFILTRATION.

E. TERRORIST, SAPPER, HARASSING, GUERRILLA ATTACKS.

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B. STEP UP MILITARY ACTIVITY.

C. LAUNCH MULTI-REGIMENTAL ATTACKS IN ONE AND THREE

Pg 2-3

151413Z MAR 70

"EXCLUSIVE" "MCEO"

TOP SECRET

"MCEO" "EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE FIVE RUMMPA2667 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E / M C E O
CORPS.

- D. REDUCE ACTIVITY.
- E. EXPLOIT TACIT OR EXPLICIT PEACE SETTLEMENT.
- F. CONTINUE TERRORIST, SAPPER, HARASSING AND GUERRILLA
ATTACKS IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANY OF OTHER COURSES.
- 8. THE MOST PROBABLE COURSE OF ACTION WAS DEEMED TO BE A
STEP UP OF ACTIVITY DURING PRESENT CAMPAIGN.
- 9. GEN ABRAMS PHILOSOPHIZED THROUGHOUT AND MADE SEVERAL
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 - A. BE ALERT TO CHANGING TIMES.
 - B. TIGHTEN UP ON THINGS IN GENERAL AND SPECIFICALLY
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FLIGHTS, ETC.
 - C. BUDGET WAS TIGHT BUT DON'T HOARD FOR A RAINY DAY
AS THERE WERE EXCESSES IN COUNTRY NOW PROBABLY SUFFICIENT TO
COVER WORST POSSIBILITIES.
 - D. URGED ALL HANDS TO REGARD ENEMY SYSTEM IN ITS
ENTIRETY, E.E. MAIN UNITS, GUERRILLAS, VCI, CADRE, FOOD,
LOGS, ETC. HE NEEDS IT ALL. WE NEED TO GET IT ALL.
- 10. NO DISCUSSION OF FUTURE PLANS. WARM REGARDS.

PAGE SIX RUMMPA2667 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E / M C E O

GP-4

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2667

PK 3-3

HAS BEEN SENT

151413Z MAR 70

NNNN

"EXCLUSIVE" "MCEO"

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM	DATE
					C6 TH MAF	15 MAR 70
					SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE	COPY NO. OF COPIES REC'D.
					1504382 MAR 70	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					DEPUTY COMMANDER
	DCG					
	C/S	I		3/15	S	REMARKS DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention. Section: _____ Signature: _____
	DC/S	I		3/16		
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	Y	3/15		CY	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3	E				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
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	OPANAL					
	ORD					
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	PSYOPS					
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	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

(A-14)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**SPECAT**

PTTCZYUW RUMLMPA2552 0740438-CCCC--RUHFMA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 150438Z MAR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E / F O R L I G E N B U S E F R O M
 L I G E N M C C U T C H E O N (D E L I V E R D U R I N G W O R K I N G H O U R S)
 D E P U T Y C O M M A N D E R

1. DECIDED TO KEEP DULACKI AS CHIEF AND MILLER AS THREE
 AND TO DESIGNATE WHEELER AS DEPUTY CG III MAF (GROUND) AND
 THRASH AS DEPUTY CG III MAF (AIR). THIS AVOIDS DISRUPTION
 OF STAFF ORGANIZATION AND PUTS NEXT SENIOR OFFICERS IN
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 DEPUTY WOULD BECOME CG III MAF ACTING. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2552

TOD 15/0856Z/PNL

NNNN

SPECAT**CONFIDENTIAL***(A-14)*

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

TOP SECRET

PTIAZYUW RUMLMPA2551 070807Z APR 70 RUHHFMA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 150437Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR
LIGEN BUSE FROM LIGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS)

MONTHLY MACV COMMANDERS CONFERENCE AND INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE UPDATE

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PAGE TWO RUMLMPA2551 **T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**
EFFORT TO CHANGE POLICY FROM ONE OF COVERT ASSISTANCE TO NVN AND VC TO ONE OF OVERT NEUTRALISM SO THEY CAN SUPPORT BOTH SIDES ECONOMICALLY AS OUT AND OUT NEUTRALS. IF HE FAILS, US COULD BE BLAMED AS INSTIGATOR. IF HE SUCCEEDS, COMMIES WOULD PROBABLY STILL CONTINUE THEIR COVERT ACTIVITIES ANYHOW AS THEY HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFRASTRUCTURE IN CAMBODIA.

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A. FAVORABLE TO ENEMY

(1) CRASH LOGISTICS PROGRAM, TO INCLUDE ROAD BUILDING EFFORT, INCREASE IN TRAFFIC AND AAA DEFENSE OF HIS LOCS.

(2) INFILTRATION

10 MAR 70 09 24Z

HQ	FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO		
ACT/COG																			
INFO/COORD					15						04							37	

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA2551 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

- (3) INTACT COMMAND AND CONTROL APPARATUS.
- (4) SAPPER TRAINING
- (5) INCREASE IN IMPORTS, PARTICULARLY VEHICLES AND EXPLOSIVES
- (6) ACTIVITY IN DMZ, ASHAU AND DELTA
- B. FAVORABLE TO ALLIES
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PAGE FOUR RUMLMPA2551 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

- C. WIDESPREAD ATTACKS BY FIRE.
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- E. TERRORIST, SAPPER, HARASSING, GUERRILLA ATTACKS.
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 - C LN 4 AA LISTED AS:

HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																			
INFO/COORD																			

TOP SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMMPA2551 T O ^{DESTROY BY BURNING} T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

C. BUDGET WAS TIGHT BUT DON'T HOARD FOR A RAINY DAY
AS THERE WERE EXCESSES IN COUNTRY NOW PROBABLY SUFFICIENT TO
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10. NO DISCUSSION OF FUTURE PLANS. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

2551

NNNN

HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																			
INFO/COORD																			

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECAT

PTTCZYUW RUMLEMPA2552 0740438-CCCC--RUHFMA.
 ZNY CCCC

P 150438Z MAR 70
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E / F O R L I G E N B U S E F R O M
 L I G E N M C C U T C H E O N (D E L I V E R D U R I N G W O R K I N G H O U R S)

DEPUTY COMMANDER

1. DECIDED TO KEEP DULACKI AS CHIEF AND MILLER AS THREE
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GP-4

BT

2552

TOD 15/0856Z/PNL

NNNN

SPECAT

*15**04**38***CONFIDENTIAL***(7)*

TOP SECRET

"MCEO" EXCLUSIVE

TOR: 15 MAR 70 10 26z

WING #833/DIV #10

PTTTZYUW RUM MPA2667 074 14 13-TTTT--RUM MHA RUM L L U A.

ZNY TTTT

P 15 14 13Z MAR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUM MHA/CG FIRST MAW

RUM L L U A/CG FIRST MARDIV

ZEN/CG FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

BT

PAGE CHECKED UPON RECEIPT

DATE 16 MAR 70 III MAF S&C

C. F. Leiby, SSGT
(SIGNATURE)

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y
FOR MGEN THRASH, MGEN WHEELER AND BGEN PADALINO FROM LTGEN
MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
MONTHLY MACV COMMANDERS CONFERENCE AND INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
UPDATE

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

P 150437Z MAR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y F O R
LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS)

PAGE TWO RUM MPA2667 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T E X C L U S I V E / M C E O
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Pg 1-3

151413Z MAR 70

"EXCLUSIVE" "MCEO" TOP SECRET

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

15 / 14 / 13

TOP SECRET "MCEO" **EXCLUSIVE**

PAGE THREE RUMMPA2667 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T ~~EXCLUSIVE~~ MCEO 11667

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PAGE FOUR RUMMPA2667 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE/MCEO HOI CHANS, RECRUITING DIFFICULTIES.

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Pg 2-3

151413Z MAR 70

EXCLUSIVE "MCEO"

TOP SECRET

"MCEO" "EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE FIVE RUMMPA2667 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E / M C E O
CORPS.

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PAGE SIX RUMMPA2667 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E / M C E O

GP-4

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2667

PG 3-3

HAS BEEN SENT

151413Z MAR 70

NNNN

"EXCLUSIVE" "MCEO"

COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

TOP SECRET

SECRET

SPECAT

PTT SZYUW RUM MPA2 752 075 03 00- SSSS--RUHFMA.
ZNY SSSSS
P 160300Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO ZEN/CG FORLOGCOMD
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM
LTGEN MCCUTCHEON INFO BGEN PADALINO.
REDER. OYMENT OF 5TH 175MM GUN BTRY FROM RVN (S)

- A. CG FMFPAC 140049Z MAR 70 (S)
- B. CG FMFPAC 142105Z MAR 70 (S)
- C. CG FMFPAC 140301Z MAR 70 (S)
- D. CG FMFPAC 280246Z FEB 70 (S)
- E. CG USARV LBN RVN 210751Z FEB 70 (C) (PASEP)
- F. CMC 121246Z FEB 70 (S)
- G. CG FORLOGCOMD 180600Z FEB 70 (S)
- H. CG III MAF 090048Z MAR 70 (S)

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MSG IS TO ANSWER REFS
A AND B TO BGEN PADALINO. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS
SUBJ WITH BGEN PADALINO AND AM TAKING THIS ACTION
SINCE THE DECISIONS IN THE SUBJ AREA WERE MADE

* 6-4 FMFPAC
ANNOTATIONS
BY BGEN BUSE
6-17
MS9

PAGE TWO RUM MPA2 752 SECRET SPECAT
BY THIS HQ.

2. A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE CONDITION OF ALL
IN-COUNTRY M107/M110 ASSETS WAS CONDUCTED BY THIS
HQ WITH REPS FROM FORLOGCOMD, PRIOR TO THE DEPARTURE
OF 3RD ABT. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION
OF THE INVENTORY NECESSARY, PRIME FACTORS
CONSIDERED IN THE DISTRIBUTION WERE AS FOLLOWS:
A. THE REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN REF C
FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND RETENTION OF ASSETS FOR
OPERATIONAL USE.
B. THE REQUIREMENT TO SHIP FOUR M107'S WITH
SUPPORT AS DIRECTED IN REF D.
C. THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE SIX M107'S AND
TWO M110'S IN SERVICEABLE CONDITION, ALONG WITH
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT, BASIC ISSUE ITEMS, AND
OTHER ESSENTIAL FIRE CONTROL ACCESSORIES, TO
USARV IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT AND REF E.
D. THE REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN A SERVICEABLE
FLOAT OF TWO M110'S AND ONE M107 AS DIRECTED IN
REF F.

AGS 1-1-70
CG FMFPAC

NEGATIVE, CMC
SAID ANY
COMBINATION OF
109's.

16

SPECAT

COPY 4 OF 4
00

SECRET

SECRET

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUM MPA2752 S E C R E T SPECAT
E. THE FACT THAT CERTAIN WEAPONS WERE INOPERABLE
AND UNREPAIRABLE DUE PARTS SHORTAGE AND COMPLETE
LACK OF STOCK OBJECTIVE OR STOCK WEAPONS AS SET
FORTH IN REF F.

3. REF G LISTED EVERY M107 AND M110 WEAPON IN
POSSESSION OF 117 MAF TO INCLUDE THOSE TO BE TRANSFERRED
TO ARMY, AND THOSE TO BE RETURNED TO CONUS IN
CLOSED LOOP PROGRAM OR WITH 5TH 175MM GUN BTRY,
PLUS THREE TO BE USED IN COUNTRY AS MAINTENANCE
FLOAT. YOU WERE AN INFO ADDEE.

4. WE COULD NOT ASSIGN FOUR M107 WEAPONS TO
RETURNING BATTERY WITHOUT REDUCING NUMBER OF
WEAPONS IN PITS OF FIRING BATTERIES SINCE WE
HAD ALREADY REDUCED FLOAT FROM TWO TO ONE.
THERE WERE NO SPARE CANNON ASSEMBLIES ON HAND IN
FORLOGCOMD OR USA SPTOMD, DNG SO WE COULD NOT
DRAW ANY AND CONVERT A FLOAT M110 TO M107. THERE
WERE TWO RED BALL M107 CANNON ASSEMBLIES IN ARMY
HANDS BUT THESE COULD NOT BE RETROGRADED. NEITHER

APPARENTLY TRUE
AFTER ORIGINAL
FAILURE TO
MEET CMC
REQUIREMENT

PAGE FOUR RUM MPA2752 S E C R E T SPECAT
WOULD IT MAKE SENSE FOR US TO RETRO TWO AND DRAW
RED BALL ITEMS AS REPLACEMENTS.

5. I REALIZE WE DID NOT COMPLY WITH YOUR ORDER.
WE SHOULD HAVE INFORMED YOU DIRECTLY BY TELEPHONE OR
HIGH PRECEDENCE ACTION ADEE MSG THAT WE COULD NOT COM-
PLY INSTEAD OF MERELY INFORMING YOU BY AN INFO COPY OF
A MSG.

6. I WANT TO BE CERTAIN THAT ALCON ARE AWARE THAT THE
CONDITION OF THE FOUR WEAPONS ACCOMPANYING SUBJ UNIT IS
SUCH THAT AN EXCHANGE OF GUN ASSEMBLIES WILL PROBABLY
NOT PLACE THEM IN A FULLY SERVICEABLE CONDITION.
ADDITIONALLY, THESE FOUR WEAPONS HAVE BEEN REDEPLOYED
WITHOUT THEIR ASSOCIATED ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT, BASIC
ISSUE ITEMS AND OTHER ESSENTIAL FIRE CONTROL ITEMS.
SUCH EQUIPMENT WAS TURNED OVER TO ARMY AS INDICATED
IN PAR 2C.

7. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2752

NNNN

FMFPAC-GEN 2100/3 (3/69)
0101-Y04-6603

SPECAT

SECRET

**HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM <i>CG III MAF</i>		DATE <i>16 MAR 70</i>					
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE <i>1603002 MAR 70</i>	COPY NO <i>4</i> OF <i>4</i> COPIES REC'D						
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					<i>REDEPLOYMENT OF 5TH 175 mm GUN BTRY FROM RVN (S)</i>				
	DCG									
	C/S					REMARK				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> DISPOSITION <input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION </div>				
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ									
	S/S									
	G-1									
	G-2									
	G-3									
	G-4	<i>I</i>	<i>Ha</i>	<i>Copy</i>						
	G-5									
	G-6									
	ADJ					<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th style="width:50%;">SECTION</th> <th style="width:50%;">SIGNATURE</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> </div>	SECTION	SIGNATURE		
SECTION	SIGNATURE									
	AWARDS									
	CAP									
	CHAP									
	CIB									
	COMP									
	DENT									
	ENGR									
	FOODS									
	FSEO									
	HQ CMDT									
	INSP									
	MTO									
	NJA									
	OPANAL									
	ORD									
	PMO									
	POSTAL									
	PROTO									
	PSYOPS									
	RDT & E									
	REPRO									
	SJA									
	SPL SERV									
	SUPPLY									
	FORMED O									
	SBC									
	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

SECRET

A-15

SECRET

SPECAT

PTT SZ YUW RUM LMPA2752 0750300-SSSS--RUHFMA.
ZNY SSSSS
P 160300Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO ZEN/CG FORLOGCOMD
BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM
LTGEN MCCUTCHEON INFO BGEN PADALINO.

REDEPLOYMENT OF 5TH 175MM GUN BTRY FROM RVN (S)

- A. CG FMFPAC 140049Z MAR 70 (S)
- B. CG FMFPAC 142105Z MAR 70 (S)
- C. CG FMFPAC 140301Z MAR 70 (S)
- D. CG FMFPAC 280246Z FEB 70 (S)
- E. CG USARV LBN RVN 210751Z FEB 70 (C) (PASEP)
- F. CMC 121246Z FEB 70 (S)
- G. CG FORLOGCOMD 180600Z FEB 70 (S)
- H. CG III MAF 090048Z MAR 70 (S)

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MSG IS TO ANSWER REFS
A AND B TO BGEN PADALINO. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS
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SINCE THE DECISIONS IN THE SUBJ AREA WERE MADE

* E-4 FMFPAC
ANNOTATIONS
ON GEN. BUSE
COPY OF
MSG

PAGE TWO RUM LMPA2752 SECRET SPECAT
BY THIS HQ.

2. A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE CONDITION OF ALL
IN-COUNTRY M107/M110 ASSETS WAS CONDUCTED BY THIS
HQ WITH REFS FROM FORLOGCOMD, PRIOR TO THE DEPARTURE
OF SUBJ UNIT, IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION
OF THE REDISTRIBUTIONS NECESSARY. PRIME FACTORS
INFLUENCING THIS REDISTRIBUTION WERE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE LOGISTICS GUIDANCE SET FORTH IN REF C
AUTHORIZING SELECTIVE RETENTION OF ASSETS FOR
IN-COUNTRY UNITS.

} Negative; ONLY
WITH APPROVAL
OF CG FMFPAC

B. THE REQUIREMENT TO SHIP FOUR M107'S WITH
SUBJ UNIT AS SET FORTH IN REF D.

C. THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE SIX M107'S AND
TWO M110'S IN SERVICEABLE CONDITION, ALONG WITH
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT, BASIC ISSUE ITEMS, AND
OTHER ESSENTIAL FIRE CONTROL ACCESSORIES, TO
USARV IAW INFORMAL CMC AGREEMENT AND REF E.

} Negative; CMC
SAID ANY
COMBINATION OF
107'S.

D. THE REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN A SERVICEABLE
FLOAT OF TWO M110'S AND ONE M107 AS DIRECTED IN
REF F.

SPECAT

COPY 4 OF 4

SECRET
A-15

SECRET

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUM.MPA2752 S E C R E T SPECAT
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 AND UNREPAIRABLE DUE PARTS SHORTAGE AND COMPLETE
 LACK OF STOCK OBJECTIVE OR STOCK WEAPONS AS SET
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 AFTER ORIGINAL
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PAGE FOUR RUM.MPA2752 S E C R E T SPECAT
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 NOT PLACE THEM IN A FULLY SERVICEABLE CONDITION.
 ADDITIONALLY, THESE FOUR WEAPONS HAVE BEEN REDEPLOYED
 WITHOUT THEIR ASSOCIATED ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT, BASIC
 ISSUE ITEMS AND OTHER ESSENTIAL FIRE CONTROL ITEMS.
 SUCH EQUIPMENT WAS TURNED OVER TO ARMY AS INDICATED
 IN PAR 2C.

7. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2752

NNNN

SPECAT

SECRET

A-15

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 17 MARCH 70	
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE P 170310Z		COPY NO 2 OF 3 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					OPCON
	DCG					
	C/S	I		3/17	S	REMARK:
	DC/S	I		3/18	J	
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION
	DEPCORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					<input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION
	S/S	X	3/17		Cg	
	G-1					SECTION
	G-2					
	G-3	I				
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT & E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SBC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

DISPOSITION	
<input type="checkbox"/>	RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS
<input type="checkbox"/>	DESTROY AFTER ROUTING
<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION
SECTION	SIGNATURE

III MAF STAFF SECRETARY
RECEIVED TWO COPIES (2,3) OF
CG III MAF'S P 170310Z MAR 70

DTOR 17 _____ H MAR 70
DTOD 171320 _____ H MAR 70

1ST MARDIV - C. J. W.

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

SECRET

(A-16)

P 170310Z ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG XXIV CORPS
 ZEM

S E C R E T/EYES ONLY FOR LIGEN ZAIS FROM LIGEN MCCUTCHEON
 OPCON

1. I HAVE REVIEWED THE QUESTION OF OPCON OF III MAF
 UNITS AND PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:

A. THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE SHOULD BE OPCON XXIV
 CORPS. THE CAPS ARE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE FIVE ICTZ
 PROVINCES, THEY OPERATE CLOSELY WITH US/ARVN/RF/PF UNITS
 THROUGHOUT ICTZ, AND DECISIONS IN REGARD TO LOCATIONS
 AND RELOCATIONS ARE MADE JOINTLY BY GENERAL LAM AND YOUR-
 SELF.

B. I HAVE PASSED OPCON OF D CO 3D MP BN TO YOU TO
 SUPPORT AND ASSIST YOUR ARMED FORCES POLICE REQUIREMENTS.

C. OTHER UNITS OF III MAF SHOULD REMAIN UNDER MY
 OPCON. I REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT IT'S HIGHLY DESIRABLE
 FOR YOU TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH MY DIVISION AND
 AIR WING AND THAT THERE MAY BE OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS
 NECESSARY FOR ME TO ATTACH SMALL UNITS TO OTHER UNITS
 THAT YOU MAY DESIGNATE FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES. I HAVE
 DESIGNATED MGEN THRASH AS DCG(AIR) FOR III MAF AND MGEN
 WHEELER AS DCG(GROUND) FOR III MAF.

D. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOU INSTALLING COMMUNICA-
 TIONS DIRECT TO 1ST MARDIV AND 1ST MAW. I REQUEST, HOWEVER,
 THAT I BE MADE INFO ADDEE ON ANY COMMUNICATION SENT OVER
 THESE CIRCUITS. I FURTHER REQUEST THAT COMMUNICATIONS
 DIRECTLY TO MY SUBORDINATES BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PASSING
 OR REQUESTING NON-DIRECTIVE TYPE INFORMATION. ON ALL
 MATTERS THAT ARE DIRECTIVE IN NATURE OR WHICH REQUIRE A
 DECISION ON THE PART OF MY SUBORDINATES, I REQUEST THAT
 YOU DIRECT SUCH COMMUNICATIONS TO III MAF. I HAVE NO
 OBJECTION, HOWEVER, TO YOUR MAKING THE WING AND THE DIVI-
 SION INFO ADDEES AT THE SAME TIME IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE
 THE PLAN AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

E. I RECOGNIZE THAT FROM TIME TO TIME YOU MAY HAVE A
 REQUIREMENT FOR ASSISTANCE FROM III MAF IN AREAS OUTSIDE
 OF QUANG NAM AND MAY DIRECT ME TO PROVIDE CERTAIN
 RESOURCES FOR SUCH MISSIONS. IN THESE CASES I HAVE NO
 OBJECTION TO PASSING OPCON OVER SUCH UNITS TO WHOMEVER
 YOU ASSIGN FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION IN
 QUESTION. I HAVE IN MIND FOR EXAMPLE SUCH THINGS AS
 RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS OR INFANTRY UNITS THAT ARE OPERATING
 ALONG ADJACENT DIVISION BOUNDARIES IN AN OPERATION THAT
 REQUIRES CENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL. SINCE THESE
 KINDS OF OPERATIONS WILL PROBABLY BE FEW IN NUMBER I
 BELIEVE THAT WE CAN WORK THEM OUT TO OUR MUTUAL SATIS-
 FACTION ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

2. I NOTE THAT YOU HAVE INVITED THE COMMANDERS OF THE
 1ST MAW, 1STMARDIV AND COMBINED ACTION FORCE TO
 ATTEND YOUR WEEKLY COMMANDERS CONFERENCE, AND I APPRE-
 CIATE THIS. WARM REGARDS

GP-4
 550

2/3
 (A-16)

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY TOP SECRET

ZNY TTTT
P 1704 15Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

Has been sent

BT
TOP SECRET/NOFORN/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR
LTGEN BOSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS)

PHASE IV, REDEPLOYMENT OF THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LTR I SENT TO CG, XXIV CORPS
THIS DATE ON SUBJ: QUOTE

1. (S/NF) IN VIEW OF THE WIDESPREAD EMPLOYMENT OF THE
COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS THROUGHOUT IOTZ AND THE CON-
SIDERABLE CONTRIBUTION WHICH THEY ARE CONTINUING TO MAKE
TO THE OVERALL PACIFICATION EFFORT IN THESE AREAS, IT
APPEARS PRUDENT TO REVIEW PHASE IV PLANNING AS IT RELATES
TO THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE.

2. (TS/LD) ALTHOUGH NO FINAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE
REGARDING THE STRENGTH OR COMPOSITION OF THE MARINE CORPS
FORCES TO REMAIN IN RVN AFTER PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENTS ARE
COMPLETED, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT AT LEAST THREE OF THE
PAGE TWO RUM LMPA2993 TOP SECRET/NOFORN/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOUR EXISTING COMBINED ACTION GROUPS (CAG) WILL BE REDE-
PLOYED.

3. (TS/LD) THE STATUS OF THE 2D CAG IN QUANG NAM PRO-
VINCE IS UNDETERMINED. IN LATE JANUARY, COMMANDING GENER-
RAL, III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE RECOMMENDED TO COMUSMACV
THAT THIS CAG REMAIN IN-COUNTRY AT A STRENGTH OF 600 AS
AN ADD-ON TO WHATEVER OTHER MARINE CORPS FORCES REMAIN.
COMUSMACV APPROVED THIS RECOMMENDATION FOR PLANNING PUR-
POSES, BUT THE FINAL DETERMINATION APPEARS DEPENDENT ON
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MARINES AUTHORIZED FOR RVN AFTER
PHASE IV.

4. (S/NF) COMMANDING GENERAL, I CORPS IS KNOWN TO BE AN
ENTHUSIASTIC PROPONENT OF THE COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM
AND ATTRIBUTES TO THE CAPS MUCH OF THE CREDIT FOR PACI-
FICATION PROGRESS AND FAVORABLE SECURITY SITUATIONS WHICH
GENERALLY EXIST IN THEIR AREAS OF OPERATIONS. THE IMPACT
OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THESE UNITS, WHEN REQUIRED, WILL BE
SEVERE AND HIGHLY ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICALLY.

5. (S/NF) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT
UNILATERAL PLANS BE DEVELOPED, AND LATER COORDINATED WITH
PAGE THREE RUM LMPA2993 TOP SECRET/NOFORN/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
COMMANDING GENERAL, I CORPS, TO PROVIDE FOR A CONTINUING
HIGH LEVEL OF SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THESE AREAS AND
THAT COMMANDING GENERAL, XXIV CORPS SUPPORT EFFORTS TO
RETAIN AT LEAST ONE COMBINED ACTION GROUP IN I CORPS
TACTICAL ZONE. UNQUOTE

2. (U) WARM REGARDS.
GP-4
BT

SPECAT

HQ	FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG								17			04				15					
INFO/COORD																				

TOP SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

P 170510Z ZFF-1
FM CG III MAF
TO CG XXIV CORPS
ZEM

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
OPCON

1. I HAVE REVIEWED THE QUESTION OF OPCON OF III MAF
UNITS AND PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:

A. THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE SHOULD BE OPCON XXIV
CORPS. THE CAPS ARE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE FIVE ICTZ
PROVINCES, THEY OPERATE CLOSELY WITH US/ARVN/RF/PF UNITS
THROUGHOUT ICTZ, AND DECISIONS IN REGARD TO LOCATIONS
AND RELOCATIONS ARE MADE JOINTLY BY GENERAL LAM AND YOUR-
SELF.

B. I HAVE PASSED OPCON OF D CO 3D MP BN TO YOU TO
SUPPORT AND ASSIST YOUR ARMED FORCES POLICE REQUIREMENTS.

C. OTHER UNITS OF III MAF SHOULD REMAIN UNDER MY
OPCON. I REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT IT'S HIGHLY DESIRABLE
FOR YOU TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH MY DIVISION AND
AIR WING AND THAT THERE MAY BE OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS
NECESSARY FOR ME TO ATTACH SMALL UNITS TO OTHER UNITS
THAT YOU MAY DESIGNATE FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES. I HAVE
DESIGNATED MGEN THRASH AS DCG(AIR) FOR III MAF AND MGEN
WHEELER AS DCG(GROUND) FOR III MAF.

D. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOU INSTALLING COMMUNICA-
OBJECTION TO PASSING OPCON OVER SUCH UNITS TO WHOMEVER
YOU ASSIGN FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION IN
QUESTION. I HAVE IN MIND FOR EXAMPLE SUCH THINGS AS
RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS OR INFANTRY UNITS THAT ARE OPERATING
ALONG ADJACENT DIVISION BOUNDARIES IN AN OPERATION THAT
REQUIRES CENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL. SINCE THESE
KINDS OF OPERATIONS WILL PROBABLY BE FEW IN NUMBER I
BELIEVE THAT WE CAN WORK THEM OUT TO OUR MUTUAL SATIS-
FACTION ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

2. I NOTE THAT YOU HAVE INVITED THE COMMANDERS OF THE
1ST MAW, 1STMARDIV AND COMBINED ACTION FORCE TO
ATTEND YOUR WEEKLY COMMANDERS CONFERENCE, AND I APPRE-
CIATE THIS. WARM REGARDS

GP-4
550

SECRET

3/3

SECRET

NNNN

17

03

10Z

17

03

10

(10)

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				FROM <i>CG TO MAF</i>	DATE <i>18 MAR 70</i>					
				SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE <i>1806492 MAR 70</i>	COPY NO/ OF <i>3</i> COPIES REC'D					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					<i>OPCON</i>				
	DCG									
	C/S	<i>I</i>		<i>3/19</i>	<i>S</i>	REMARK:				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>DISPOSITION</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION</p> </div>				
	DEPCORDS									
	DSA ICTZ									
	S/S	<i>Y</i>	<i>3/18</i>		<i>LY</i>					
	G-1									
	G-2									
	G-3	<i>F</i>	<i>3-19-70</i>		<i>W</i>					
	G-4									
	G-5									
	G-6									
	ADJ					<table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <th>SECTION</th> <th>SIGNATURE</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	SECTION	SIGNATURE		
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	SJA									
	SPL SERV									
	SUPPLY									
	FORMED O									
	S&C									
	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SECRET

A-17

SECRET

SPECAT

"MCEO"

PTTSZYUN RUM.MPA3253 0770649- SSSS--RUHFMA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 180649Z MAR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY EXCLUSIVE
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS)

OPCON

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE I SENT TO
LTGEN ZAIS ON 17 MAR ON THE SUBJ OF OPCON OF III MAF
UNITS.

QUOTE

1. I HAVE REVIEWED THE QUESTION OF OPCON OF III MAF
UNITS AND PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:
A. THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE SHOULD BE OPCON XXIV
CORPS. THE CAPS ARE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE FIVE ICTZ
PROVINCES, THEY OPERATE CLOSELY WITH US/ARVN/RF/PF UNITS
THROUGHOUT ICTZ, AND DECISIONS IN REGARD TO LOCATIONS
AND RELOCATIONS ARE MADE JOINTLY BY GENERAL LAM AND YOUR-
SELF.

PAGE TWO RUM.MPA3253 SECRET SPECAT MCEO

B. I HAVE PASSED OPCON OF D CO 3D MP BN TO YOU TO
SUPPORT AND ASSIST YOUR ARMED FORCES POLICE REQUIREMENTS.

C. OTHER UNITS OF III MAF SHOULD REMAIN UNDER MY
OPCON. I REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT IT'S HIGHLY DESIRABLE
FOR YOU TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH MY DIVISION AND
AIR WING AND THAT THERE MAY BE OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS
NECESSARY FOR ME TO ATTACH SMALL UNITS TO OTHER UNITS
THAT YOU MAY DESIGNATE FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES. I HAVE
DESIGNATED MGEN THRASH AS DCG(AIR) FOR III MAF AND MGEN
WHEELER AS DCG(GROUND) FOR III MAF.

D. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOU INSTALLING COMMUNICA-
TIONS DIRECT TO 1STMARDIV AND 1STMAW. I REQUEST, HOWEVER,
THAT I BE MADE INFO ADDEE ON ANY COMMUNICATION SENT OVER
THESE CIRCUITS. I FURTHER REQUEST THAT COMMUNICATIONS
DIRECTLY TO MY SUBORDINATES BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PASSING
OR REQUESTING NON-DIRECTIVE TYPE INFORMATION. ON ALL
MATTERS THAT ARE DIRECTIVE IN NATURE OR WHICH REQUIRE A
DECISION ON THE PART OF MY SUBORDINATES, I REQUEST THAT
YOU DIRECT SUCH COMMUNICATIONS TO III MAF. I HAVE NO
OBJECTION, HOWEVER, TO YOUR MAKING THE WING AND DIVISION

SPECAT

"MCEO"

SECRET

A-17

SECRET

SPECAT "MCEO"

PAGE THREE RUM MPA3253 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO
 INFO ADDEES AT THE SAME TIME IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE
 THE PLAN AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

E. I RECOGNIZE THAT FROM TIME TO TIME YOU MAY HAVE A
 REQUIREMENT FOR ASSISTANCE FROM III MAF IN AREAS OUTSIDE
 OF QUANG NAM AND MAY DIRECT ME TO PROVIDE CERTAIN
 RESOURCES FOR SUCH MISSIONS. IN THESE CASES I HAVE NO
 OBJECTION TO PASSING OPCON OVER SUCH UNITS TO WHOMEVER
 YOU ASSIGN FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION IN
 QUESTION. I HAVE IN MIND FOR EXAMPLE SUCH THINGS AS
 RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS OR INFANTRY UNITS THAT OPERATING
 ALONG ADJACENT DIVISION BOUNDARIES IN AN OPERATION THAT
 REQUIRES CENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL. SINCE THESE
 KINDS OF OPERATIONS WILL PROBABLY BE FEW IN NUMBER I
 BELIEVE THAT WE CAN WORK THEM OUT TO OUR MUTUAL SATIS-
 FACTION ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

2. I NOTE THAT YOU HAVE INVITED THE COMMANDERS OF THE
 1STMAN, 1STMARDIV AND COMBINED ACTION FORCE TO ATTEND
 YOUR WEEKLY COMMANDERS CONFERENCE, AND I APPRECIATE
 THIS. WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE WARM REGARDS.

GR-4

BT

3253

NNNN

SPECAT "MCEO"

SECRET

A-17

SECRET

SPECAT

"MCEO"

PTTSZYUW RUM MPA3253 0770649- SSSS--RUHFMA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 180649Z MAR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY EXCLUSIVE
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS)

OPCON

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE I SENT TO
LTGEN ZAIS ON 17 MAR ON THE SUBJ OF OPCON OF III MAF
UNITS.

QUOTE

1. I HAVE REVIEWED THE QUESTION OF OPCON OF III MAF
UNITS AND PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:

A. THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE SHOULD BE OPCON XXIV
CORPS. THE CAPS ARE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE FIVE ICTZ
PROVINCES, THEY OPERATE CLOSELY WITH US/ARVN/RF/PF UNITS
THROUGHOUT ICTZ, AND DECISIONS IN REGARD TO LOCATIONS
AND RELOCATIONS ARE MADE JOINTLY BY GENERAL LAM AND YOUR-
SELF.

PAGE TWO RUM MPA3253 SECRET SPECAT MCEO

B. I HAVE PASSED OPCON OF D CO 3D MP BN TO YOU TO
SUPPORT AND ASSIST YOUR ARMED FORCES POLICE REQUIREMENTS.

C. OTHER UNITS OF III MAF SHOULD REMAIN UNDER MY
OPCON. I REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT IT'S HIGHLY DESIRABLE
FOR YOU TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH MY DIVISION AND
AIR WING AND THAT THERE MAY BE OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS
NECESSARY FOR ME TO ATTACH SMALL UNITS TO OTHER UNITS
THAT YOU MAY DESIGNATE FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES. I HAVE
DESIGNATED MGEN THRASH AS DCG(AIR) FOR III MAF AND MGEN
WHEELER AS DCG(GROUND) FOR III MAF.

D. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOU INSTALLING COMMUNICA-
TIONS DIRECT TO 1STMARDIV AND 1STMAW. I REQUEST, HOWEVER,
THAT I BE MADE INFO ADDEE ON ANY COMMUNICATION SENT OVER
THESE CIRCUITS. I FURTHER REQUEST THAT COMMUNICATIONS
DIRECTLY TO MY SUBORDINATES BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PASSING
OR REQUESTING NON-DIRECTIVE TYPE INFORMATION. ON ALL
MATTERS THAT ARE DIRECTIVE IN NATURE OR WHICH REQUIRE A
DECISION ON THE PART OF MY SUBORDINATES, I REQUEST THAT
YOU DIRECT SUCH COMMUNICATIONS TO III MAF. I HAVE NO
OBJECTION, HOWEVER, TO YOUR MAKING THE WING AND DIVISION

18

06

49

FMFPAC-GEN 2100/3 (3/69)
0101-V04-6603

COPY 2 OF 3

SPECAT

"MCEO"

SECRET

12

SECRET

SPECAT "MCEO

PAGE THREE RUM MPA3253 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO
 INFO ADDEES AT THE SAME TIME IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE
 THE PLAN AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

E. I RECOGNIZE THAT FROM TIME TO TIME YOU MAY HAVE A
 REQUIREMENT FOR ASSISTANCE FROM III MAF IN AREAS OUTSIDE
 OF QUANG NAM AND MAY DIRECT ME TO PROVIDE CERTAIN
 RESOURCES FOR SUCH MISSIONS. IN THESE CASES I HAVE NO
 OBJECTION TO PASSING OPCON OVER SUCH UNITS TO WHOMEVER
 YOU ASSIGN FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION IN
 QUESTION. I HAVE IN MIND FOR EXAMPLE SUCH THINGS AS
 RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS OR INFANTRY UNITS THAT OPERATING
 ALONG ADJACENT DIVISION BOUNDARIES IN AN OPERATION THAT
 REQUIRES CENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL. SINCE THESE
 KINDS OF OPERATIONS WILL PROBABLY BE FEW IN NUMBER I
 BELIEVE THAT WE CAN WORK THEM OUT TO OUR MUTUAL SATIS-
 FACTION ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

2. I NOTE THAT YOU HAVE INVITED THE COMMANDERS OF THE
 1STMAW, 1STMARDIV AND COMBINED ACTION FORCE TO ATTEND
 YOUR WEEKLY COMMANDERS CONFERENCE, AND I APPRECIATE
 THIS. WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3253

NNNN

SPECAT "MCEO

SECRET

(12)

COMM CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE DRAFT

3310

FROM CG III MAF	DTG: 181250 Z	DRAFTED: SECT: G-3 7
TO CG FMFPAC	PRECEDENCE <input type="checkbox"/> FLASH <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IMMEDIATE <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> MAIL <input type="checkbox"/>	PHONE _____ CONCURRED <i>jmj</i> Op 7 6-3 <i>(W)</i>
INFO BT	<i>KB McCutcheon</i> REL SIGNATURE <i>McCutcheon</i>	

FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER USE ONLY
 (PLEASE DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS PER LINE)
 RED BORDER FOR CLASSIFIED/EFTO MESSAGES ONLY

TOP SECRET/LIMDIS/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN

BUSE FROM LTGEN MC CUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS)

FORCE PLANNING (U)

- A. CG III MAF 120206Z FEB 70 (TS/SPECAT/MCEO)
- B. CG III MAF 201352Z FEB 70 (TS/SPECAT/MCEO)
- C. CG III MAF 230656Z FEB 70 (TS/SPECAT/MCEO)

1. REF A WAS THE RECOMMENDED TROOP LIST FOR A 9.4K MAB. REF B MODIFIED REF A TO INCREASE THE DET, RADIO BN AND REF C FORWARDED THE REQUIRED TRADE OFF.

2. I AM CONCERNED AT INDICATIONS THAT THE MARINE CORPS FORCE REMAINING AFTER PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENTS MAY BE USED PRIMARILY TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR FIXED INSTALLATIONS IN THE DANANG AREA.

A. USARV REPS CHAIRED A MEETING TO DISCUSS DEFENSE OF THE DANANG VITAL AREA ON 15 MAR 70. DURING DISCUSSION IT

18

12

TOP SECRET/LIMDIS
50

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET/LIMDIS		
PRECEDENCE ACTION IMMEDIATE INFO		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY G-3		
				PHONE 2253		
<p> BECAME APPARENT THAT ^{THAT} THE USARV PLANS ^S TO REINFORCE THE DANANG ⁷ AREA WITH ONLY ONE COMPANY FOR SECURITY FUNCTIONS. WHEN THE INADEQUACY OF THIS FORCE WAS POINTED OUT BY XXIV CORPS REPS, THEY WERE REMINDED BY USARV REPS THAT A MARINE RLT WOULD BE IN THE AREA. </p> <p> B. III MAF REP WAS QUESTIONED REGARDING REDEPLOYMENT PLANS FOR THE 1ST MP BN NOW GUARDING DANANG AIR BASE. </p> <p> C. PLANS AND INITIATIVES FOR RVNAF ASSUMPTION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DANANG AIR FIELD WERE REJECTED LOCALLY AND HAVE BEEN AT THE JGS LEVEL FOR OVER ONE MONTH WITH LITTLE SIGN OF MOVEMENT. </p> <p> D. CG, I CORPS HAS STATED THAT HE IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE ESSO PLANT OR THE I CORPS BRIDGE IN ITS ENTIRETY DUE TO A SHORTAGE OF RF/PF FORCES. </p> <p> 3. EMPLOYMENT OF MARINES SOLELY IN A STATIC SECURITY ROLE WOULD SUPPORT MACV POSITION THAT RLT IS ONLY MARINE CORPS FORCE REQUIRED SINCE HELICOPTER MOBILITY WOULD BE UNNECESSARY AND NEED FOR SUPPORTING ARMS ^(INCLUDING AIR) GREATLY REDUCED. APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH A FORCE STRUCTURE WOULD NOT BE IN BEST INTEREST OF MARINE CORPS AND WOULD ERODE POSITION ^{STATUS} AS AN INTEGRAL AIR/GROUND TEAM OF COMBINED ARMS. </p>						
CONTROL NO.		TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
			2	3		
PEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET/LIMDIS		

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET/LIMDIS		
PRECEDENCE ACTION IMMEDIATE INFO		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY G-3		
				PHONE 2253		
<p>4. I REALIZE THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS BASED ON STAFF DISCUSSIONS AND THAT CG XXIV CORPS HAS NOT ONLY NOT MADE A DECISION IN THIS REGARD BUT PROBABLY HAS NOT EVEN CONSIDERED THIS PROBLEM. HOWEVER, LOCAL SECURITY WILL BE A PROBLEM AFTER PHASE IV AND I WANTED TO ALERT YOU TO WHAT COULD BE THE XXIV CORPS SOLUTION TO THAT PROBLEM, I.E., THE USE OF THE MARINE RLT PRIMARILY FOR LOCAL SECURITY. IF THAT IS THE DEVELOPMENT, WE MAY WANT TO START THINKING NOW ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY OF KEEPING ANY FORCE LESS THAN 9.4K AFTER PHASE IV. WARM REGARDS.</p> <p>BT</p> <p>GP-4</p>						
CONTROL NO.		TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 3	NO. OF PAGES 3	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
DEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET/LIMDIS		

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		19 MAR 70					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D.					
			182331Z MAR 70							
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					FMFPAC FOR: COMPT; CMC FOR CODE AS-3				
	DCG									
	C/S					REMARKS				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.				
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ					<table border="1"> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
	S/S		3/17		7					
	G-1									
	G-2									
	G-3									
	G-4									
	G-5									
	G-6									
	ADJ									
	AWARDS									
	CAP									
	CHAP									
	CIB									
	COMP									
	DENT									
	ENGR									
	FOODS									
	FSEO									
	HQ CMDT									
	INSP									
	MTO									
	NJA									
	OPANAL									
	ORD									
	PMO									
	POSTAL									
	PROTO									
	PSYOPS									
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	REPRO									
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	SUPPLY									
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	S&C									
	TCC									
	S&T MAJ									

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

(A-18)

CONFIDENTIAL

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMMUNICATION CENTER,
HEADQUARTERS,
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND
CONFIDENTIAL
DESTROY BY BURNING

"MCEO"

NY CCCCC
R 182331Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
INFO CG FORLOGCOM
P 200400Z FEB 70 ORIG DTG -----
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
INFO CMC

BT
CONFIDENTIAL MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //N05741//
FMFPAC FOR: COMPT; CMC FOR CODE AS-3
A. SECDEF 122109Z FEB 70 (U) (NOTAL)
B. CG III MAF 152312Z FEB 70 (U) (NOTAL)
C. CG FMFPAC 100214Z FEB 70 (C) (MCEO) (NOTAL)
1. (U) REF A ANNOUNCED THE INTENT OF GAO TO CONDUCT A SURVEY OF U. S. REDEPLOYMENT FROM VIETNAM.
2. (U) DURING INITIAL CONTACTS WITH ON SITE GAO PERSONNEL MR TURNBOW WAS REQUESTED TO PROVIDE INFORMAL STATEMENTS OF THE FUNCTIONS HE EXPECTED TO ACCOMPLISH DURING HIS STAY AT III MAF AND THE INFORMATION HE DESIRED. STATEMENTS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:
QUOTE:
A. SUBJECT OF GAO REVIEW: MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES RELATING TO EXCESS MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT GENERATED FROM FORCE REDUCTIONS. BASED ON INFORMATION OBTAINED TO DATE, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT III MAF HAS BEEN ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACCOMPLISH-

PAGE TWO
ING AND/OR COORDINATING CERTAIN MATERIEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS RELATED TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF MARINE CORPS FORCES. WE BELIEVE THAT III MAF IS IN THE BEST POSITION TO PROVIDE INFORMATION REGARDING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECTS LISTED BELOW, AND TO PROVIDE STATISTICAL DATA REGARDING THESE SUBJECTS:

- (1) REDISTRIBUTION OF I/E-I/A AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE MATERIEL BETWEEN UNITS REDEPLOYING AND UNITS REMAINING IN-COUNTRY.
 - (2) TECHNICAL AND QUANTITATIVE INSPECTIONS TO ASSURE THAT UNITS REDEPLOY WITH ADEQUATE, USEABLE EQUIPMENT.
 - (3) ADJUSTMENTS IN EQUIPMENT ALLOWANCES.
 - (4) IN-COUNTRY EQUIPMENT PROPERTY.
 - (5) THE U. S. PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF THE VIETNAM ARMED FORCES.
 - (6) FRUSTRATION OF REDEPLOYING UNIT REQUESTS (OTHER THAN FLC AND 3D FSR BACKORDER CANCELLATIONS).
 - (7) DISTRIBUTION OF DEACTIVATING UNIT MATERIEL WITHIN
- RE: [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] OBTAIN INFORMATION REGARDING THE ABOVE
[REDACTED] KEYSTONE CARDINAL AND KEYSTONE BLUEJAY. WE

Copy 1 of 3

CONFIDENTIAL "MCEO"

HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO		
ACT/COG																		
INFO/COORD																		

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

DESTROY BY BURNING

PAGE THREE

WOULD ALSO LIKE TO OBTAIN INFORMATION REGARDING PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED IN KEYSTONE CARDINAL AND ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT OR MINIMIZE RECURRENCE DURING KEYSTONE BLUEJAY.

B. REQUEST THAT INFORMATION LISTED BELOW BE PROVIDED -

FOR CONSIDERATION AND USE IN THE SUBJECT REVIEW. IN THE EVENT THAT III MAF CANNOT PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION, I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THIS REQUEST IS EXPEDITIOUSLY FORWARDED TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC.

(1) INFORMATION REGARDING MARINE CORPS UNIT REDEPLOYMENT IN PHASE I, II, AND III OF THE FORCE REDUCTION, TO INCLUDE UNIT DESIGNATIONS, PERSONNEL STRENGTH, REDEPLOYMENT LOCATION, MODE OF TRANSPORTATION, AND IDENTIFICATION OF THOSE UNITS TO BE DEACTIVATED.

(2) UNIT DESIGNATIONS AND PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF MARINE CORPS UNITS REMAINING IN VIETNAM SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMPLETION OF PHASE III FORCE REDUCTION. UNQUOTE.

3. (C) AS STATED REF B, NONE OF INFORMATION REQUESTED PARA 2B ABOVE PROVIDED THUS FAR. IN THIS REGARD, REF A STIPULATES THAT STATIONING PLANS FOR BLUEJAY AND INFORMATION ON FUTURE INCREMENTAL WITHDRAWALS WILL NOT BE DISCLOSED. REF C IS MORE RE-

PAGE FOUR

STRICTIVE AND RESTRICTS RELEASE OF PERSONNEL FIGURES RELATED TO EAGLE AND CARDINAL UNLESS APPROVED BY CMC.

(U) AS INDICATED PARA 2B ABOVE GAO AUDITORS DESIRE RELEASE OF INFO PROSCRIBED BY REF A FOR BLUEJAY AND REF C FOR EAGLE AND CARDINAL. HAVE INFORMED AUDITORS THAT RELEASE NOT AUTHORIZED. THIS HQ AND ADVISED REQUEST WOULD BE FORWARDED TO FMFPAC IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 2B (1).

5. (U) REQUEST ADVISE WHICH, IF ANY INFO REQUESTED BY GAO IS AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO AUDITORS.

HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																			
INFO/COORD																			

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		19 MAR 70	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 1 OF 3 COPIES REC'D.	
			182332MH070			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					MONITORSHIP OF RVN Phase DOWN (GAO CASE 82807)
	DCG					
	C/S					REMARKS
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	X	2/17		Y	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT & E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMEDO					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

(A-19)

CONFIDENTIAL

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

DESTROY BY BURNING

CONFIDENTIAL

ZNY CCCCC
R 182332Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
INFO CG FORLGOCMD
P 100214Z MAR 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO CG III MAF
CG I MEF
DEPCOMMARCORBASESPAC (FWD)

BT
CONFIDENTIAL MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //N00000//
MONITORSHIP OF REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PHASE DOWN

- (GAO CASE 82807) (U)
- A. CMC LTR AS-3-11/MKM NO. 610 OF 3FEB70 (NOTAL)
- B. MCO 7500.3
- C. MCO 7000.7

1. (U) REF A ADDRESSES FORTHCOMING ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUBJ GAO REVIEW.
2. (C) HQMC HAS ASCERTAINED THAT GAO IS INTERESTED IN T-DAY AND ESPECIALLY IN MONITORING KEYSTONE EAGLE, KEYSTONE CARDINAL, AND KEYSTONE BLUEJAY.
3. (U) UNLESS APPROVED BY CMC, PERSONNEL FIGURES RELATING TO KEYSTONE EAGLE, KEYSTONE CARDINAL, AND KEYSTONE BLUEJAY WILL NOT RPT NOT BE RELEASED TO THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE OR TO

PAGE TWO

ANY AUDIT AGENCY EXTERNAL TO MARINE CORPS.

4. (U) IN THIS CONNECTION CMC (AS-3) SHOULD BE KEPT CONSTANTLY ADVISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFA B AND ;C.

GP-4
BT

Copy 1 of 3

CONFIDENTIAL

HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																			
INFO/COORD																			

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

(A-19)

**HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF		DATE 18 Mar 70	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 181250Z MAR 70		COPY NO. <u>1</u> OF <u>3</u> COPIES RECD.			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	REMARKS	
			IN	OUT				
	CG					FORCE PLANNING (U)		
	DCG							
	C/S							
	DC/S							
	DCS PLANS							
	DEP CORDS							
	DSA ICTZ							
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	CAP							
	CHAP							
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	DENT							
	ENGR							
	FOODS							
	FSEO							
	HQ CMDT							
	INSP							
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	PMO							
	POSTAL							
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	PSYOPS							
	RDT&E							
	REPRO							
	SJA							
	SPL SERV							
	SUPPLY							
	FORMED O							
	SIC	X	19 MAR 70					
	TCC							
	SGT MAJ							

DISPOSITION:

Retain for ___ months.

Destroy after routing.

Section	Signature

REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.

The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.

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TOP SECRET

(A-6)

TOP SECRET LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

SPECAT

"MCEO"

PAC # 74 *R*

TOD: 18/1352Z MAR 70

OTTZYUW RUMLMPA3310 0771250-TTIT--RUHFMA.

ZNY TTTT

O 181250Z MAR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR LIGEN BUSE FROM LIGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS)
FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG III MAF 120206Z FEB 70 (TS/SPECAT/MCEO)

B. CG III MAF 201352Z FEB 70 (TS/SPECAT/MCEO)

C. CG III MAF 230636Z FEB 70 (TS/SPECAT/MCEO)

1. REF A WAS THE RECOMMENDED TROOP LIST FOR A 9.4K MAB.

REF B MODIFIED REF A TO INCREASE THE DET, RADIO BN AND REF C FORWARDED THE REQUIRED TRADE OFF.

2. I AM CONCERNED AT INDICATIONS THAT THE MARINE CORPS
FORCE REMAINING AFTER PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENTS MAY BE USED
PRIMARILY TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR FIXED INSTALLATIONS IN
THE DANANG AREA.

A. USARV REPS CHAIRED A MEETING TO DISCUSS DEFENSE OF
THE DANANG VITAL AREA ON 15MAR70. DURING DISCUSSION IT
BECAME APPARENT THAT USARV PLANS TO REINFORCE THE DANANG

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA3310 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT/MCEO
AREA WITH ONLY ONE COMPANY FOR SECURITY FUNCTIONS. WHEN
THE INADEQUACY OF THIS FORCE WAS POINTED OUT BY XXIV CORPS
REPS, THEY WERE REMINDED BY USARV REPS THAT A MARINE RLT
WOULD BE IN THE AREA.

B. III MAF REP WAS QUESTIONED REGARDING REDEPLOYMENT
PLANS FOR THE 1ST MP BN NOW GUARDING DANANG AIR BASE.

C. PLANS AND INITIATIVES FOR RVNAF ASSUMPTION OF
SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DANANG AIR FIELD WERE RE-
JECTED LOCALLY AND HAVE BEEN AT THE JCS LEVEL FOR OVER
ONE MONTH WITH LITTLE SIGN OF MOVEMENT.

D. CG, I CORPS HAS STATED THAT HE IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE
SECURITY FOR THE ESSO PLANT OR THE I CORPS BRIDGE IN ITS
ENTIRETY DUE TO A SHORTAGE OF RF/PF FORCES.

3. EMPLOYMENT OF MARINES SOLELY IN A STATIC SECURITY ROLE
WOULD SUPPORT MACV POSITION THAT RLT IS ONLY MARINE CORPS
FORCE REQUIRED SINCE HELICOPTER MOBILITY WOULD BE UNNEC-
ESSARY AND NEED FOR SUPPORTING ARMS (INCLUDING AIR) GREATLY
REDUCED. APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH A FORCE STRUCTURE WOULD
NOT BE IN BEST INTEREST OF MARINE CORPS AND WOULD ERODE
STATUS AS AN INTEGRAL AIR/GROUND TEAM OF COMBINED ARMS.

Pg 1-2

SPECAT

"MCEO"

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III MAF 2100/4

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"MCEO"

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA3310 T O P . S E C R E T / L I M D I S / S P E C A T / M C E O
4. I REALIZE THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS BASED ON STAFF DISCUSSIONS AND THAT CG XXIV CORPS HAS NOT ONLY NOT MADE A DECISION IN THAT REGARD BUT PROBABLY HAS NOT EVEN CONSIDERED THIS PROBLEM. HOWEVER, LOCAL SECURITY WILL BE A PROBLEM AFTER PHASE IV AND I WANTED TO ALERT YOU TO WHAT COULD BE THE XXIV CORPS SOLUTION TO THAT PROBLEM, I.E., THE USE OF THE MARINE RLT PRIMARILY FOR LOCAL SECURITY. IF THAT IS THE DEVELOPMENT, WE MAY WANT TO START THINKING NOW ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY OF KEEPING ANY FORCE LESS THAN 9.4K AFTER PHASE IV. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3310

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pg 2-2

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(A/L)

HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

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TOP SECRET

(A-7)

TOP SECRET

SPECAT "MCEO"

ZNY TTTT
 P 190130Z MAR 70
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FMFPAC
 INFO CG FIRST MAW
 BT

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR
 LT GEN BUSE INFO MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER
 DURING WORKING HOURS)
 FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. DURING YOUR LAST VISIT TO III MAF YOU REQUESTED THAT
 IST MAW INVESTIGATE THE FEASIBILITY OF FORMING A COMPOSITE
 GROUP VICE TWO GROUPS AS THE AIR COMPONENT OF THE RESIDUAL
 BRIGADE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH THRASH AND
 MY STAFF AND HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO MAKE.
2. I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THE COMPOSITION OF AN AIR/
 GROUND TEAM SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION
 ASSIGNED AND THAT IF THE MISSION REQUIRES MORE UNITS
 OF ONE COMPONENT THAN THE OTHER THEN THEY SHOULD BE ADDED
 TO THE TROOP LIST. I HAVE NEVER BELIEVED THAT AN AIR/
 GROUND TEAM SHOULD ALWAYS BE COMPOSED OF ONE EACH

PAGE TWO RUMMPA 3433TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO
 COMPARABLE AIR AND GROUND UNITS.

3. THE OPTIMUM AIR PACKAGE FOR THE RESIDUAL BRIGADE SHOULD,
 IN MY OPINION, INCLUDE BOTH A FIXED WING GROUP AND A
 HELICOPTER GROUP OPERATING FROM SEPARATE BASES. THE PRO-
 BLEM THAT WE FACE, HOWEVER, IS ONE OF PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS
 AND CEILINGS. HENCE, I BELIEVE THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO
 INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF OPERATING BOTH GROUPS FROM
 A SINGLE SITE, NAMELY DANANG AIR BASE. OPERATING BOTH
 TYPES OF AIRCRAFT FROM A SINGLE BASE LIKE DANANG PRESENTS
 SOME PROBLEMS. I ANTICIPATE THE AIR FORCE WOULD OBJECT
 TO OUR MOVING HELICOPTERS INTO DANANG, BUT THE FACT REMAINS
 WE OPERATED BOTH FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT HERE
 IN 1965 AND WE STILL BRING TRANSIENT HELICOPTERS IN AND
 OUT AND THE VNAF HAS HELICOPTER SQUADRONS PERMANENTLY BASED
 HERE. IN ADDITION TO THIS OBJECTION, THERE ARE OPERATIONAL
 PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH A MIXED OPERATION THAT I WILL TOUCH
 ON LATER. BECAUSE THE PROBLEMS DO EXIST I WOULD PROPOSE
 KEEPING A FIXED WING AIR GROUP IN THE PRESENT MAG-11 SPACES
 ON THE FLIGHT LINE, AND MOVING THE ROTARY WING GROUP INTO
 THE AREA CURRENTLY OCCUPIED BY H2MS-17 AND MARINE AIR FREIGHT.

"MCEO"

SPECAT

TOP SECRET

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"MCEO"

PAGE THREE RUMMPA3433 TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO
THIS WILL SEPARATE THE TWO TYPES OF AIRCRAFT AND MINIMIZE
THE PROBLEMS. BOTH GROUPS WOULD BE SMALLER THAN THE CUR-
RENT GROUPS IN THE WING BECAUSE EACH WOULD ONLY HAVE THE
EQUIVALENT OF TWO AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS. COLOCATING THE
GROUPS AT DANANG WOULD REDUCE THE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
FOR BASE OPERATION AND BASE SECURITY AND SAVE SPACES OVER
THAT REQUIRED TO OPERATE FROM BOTH MARBLE MOUNTAIN AND
DANANG.

4. IF PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS AND SPACE CONSTRAINTS AT
DANANG ARE OVERRIDING, THEN IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE
TO FORM A SINGLE COMPOSITE GROUP. THIS COULD BE DONE IN
ONE OF TWO WAYS: (A) THE GROUP COULD BE SPLIT BETWEEN
THE PRESENT MAG-11 RAMP AREA AND THE H&MS-17 AREA, OR
(B) IT COULD BE CONFINED TO THE MAG-11 AREA ONLY. THE
FIRST ALTERNATIVE WOULD SPLIT THE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AND
CAUSE THE GROUP COMMANDER SPAN OF CONTROL PROBLEMS AND
THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE WOULD POSE OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
WHICH I REFERRED TO EARLIER. CH-46 AND 53 AIRCRAFT WOULD
HAVE TO FOLD THEIR BLADES ON THE TAXIWAY AND BE TOWED
INTO THE PARKING AREAS. EVEN SO, THE PARKING AREAS WOULD

PAGE FOUR RUMMPA3433 TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO
BE PRETTY CLOSE QUARTERS AND RESULT IN CONGESTION. THE
DOWNWASH FROM ROTOR BLADES PARTICULARLY OF UH1E/AHIG
HELICOPTERS WHEN BEING AIR TAXIED COULD UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSE
FOREIGN OBJECTS DAMAGE TO THE JET AIRCRAFT. SOME OF THIS
DIFFICULTY COULD BE ALLEVIATED IF SOME OF THE STRUCTURES
NOW PERMANENTLY ERECTED IN THE MAG-11 SPACES WERE REMOVED
THUS PROVIDING MORE OPERATING SPACE FOR THE HELICOPTERS.

5. FINALLY, IF WE ARE FORCED TO ACCEPT REDUCED NUMBERS
AND THE NEED FOR A STRONG RLTI IS OVERRIDING THEN IT MAY
BE NECESSARY TO RETROGRADE ALL FIXED WING AIRCRAFT AND
REDUCE THE AIR COMPONENT TO HELICOPTERS ONLY. IN THIS CASE
WE COULD OPERATE FROM EITHER MARBLE MOUNTAIN OR

DANANG. THE PROXIMITY TO THE REGIMENT WOULD FAVOR DANANG
IN MY OPINION IF WE COULD OVERCOME AIR FORCE OBJECTIONS.

6. IN SUMMARY, I FAVOR THE FOLLOWING COMPOSITION OF THE
AIR COMPONENT OF THE RESIDUAL BRIGADE WITH MY FIRST CHOICE
LISTED FIRST: (A) SEPARATE FIXED WING AND HELICOPTER
GROUPS OPERATING FROM SEPARATE SITES. (B) SEPARATE GROUPS
OPERATING FROM DANANG. (C) A COMPOSITE GROUP OPERATING
FROM DANANG. (D) A HELICOPTER GROUP OPERATING FROM A

PAGE FIVE RUMMPA3433 TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO
SINGLE SITE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

"MCEO"

SPECAT

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

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SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

SECRET

A-20

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND
DESTROY BY BURNING

SECRET

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

"MCEO"

Z NY SSSSS
P 190129Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR LTVGEN
BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
OPCON

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM ZAIS IN
RESPONSE TO MY MESSAGE TO HIM ON SUBJECT OF OPCON OF III
MAF UNITS: QUOTE

1. I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR SEVENTEEN MARCH MESSAGE
REGARDING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF UNITS. THE
ARRANGEMENTS YOU PROPOSE ARE COMPLETELY ACCEPTABLE TO ME
AND I ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL TAKE PARTICULAR CARE THAT
YOUR WISHES WITH REGARD TO OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH III MAF
UNITS ARE FULLY CARRIED OUT.

2. YOUR MILITARY POLICE COMPANY IS ALREADY WORKING WITH
OUR PROVOST MARSHAL. THE CORPSG-3 IS WORKING WITH GENERAL
MILLER AND COLONEL METZGER TO PREPARE A LETTER OF INSTRU-
CTION PERTAINING TO OPCON OF THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE AS

PAGE TWO RUM.MPA3432 SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MCEO
REFLECTED IN YOUR MESSAGE.

3. I ENJOYED MY VISIT WITH ED WHEELER'S DIVISION YESTERDAY
AND I APPRECIATE YOUR TAKING THE TIME TO ACCOMPANY ME.

4. WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

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"EXCLUSIVE"

"MCEO"

SPECAT

HQ	FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO
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SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 19 MAR 70					
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(A-21)

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TOD: 19/13482 MAR 70 *RL*

MCEO

PAC # 079, WING # 867
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DE RUM MPA 35 15 078 1132
ZNY AAAAA
P 191132Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUM MHA/CG FIRST MAW
BT

CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
(DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
HELICOPTER CRASH AT CHU LAI

- AS I REPORTED TO KENNY HOUGHTON, BY TELEPHONE, LATE WEDNESDAY MGEN RAMSEY THE CG, AMERICAL DIVISION WAS THE VICTIM OF A HELICOPTER CRASH IN CHU LAI ON TUESDAY, 17 MARCH. THIS MORNING I VISITED CHU LAI IN COMPANY WITH THRASH AND SAW RAMSEY IN THE HOSPITAL. HE SUFFERED A BADLY FRACTURED LEFT ARM AND HAD MULTIPLE BRUISES ON HIS FACE AND BODY. THE PROGNOSIS IS GOOD AND HE WILL REMAIN IN COUNTRY. HIS AIDE SUFFERED BROKEN RIBS AND BRUISES AND HIS PROGNOSIS IS ALSO GOOD. TWO OCCUPANTS WERE KILLED. I DON'T KNOW THE STATUS OF THE OTHERS BUT THEY ARE ALIVE.
- RAMSEY'S HELICOPTER WAS FLYING ABOVE THE OVERCAST AND

PAGE TWO RUM MPA 35 15 CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MCEO
REQUESTED A GCA. THE GCA PICKED HIM UP AND DIRECTED A STEER TO 090 AND THE AIRCRAFT RESPONDED. SUBSEQUENTLY, GCA ASKED THE HELICOPTER TO SQUAWK OFF. AT THIS POINT THE AIRCRAFT WAS PICKED UP ON A BEARING OF ABOUT THIRTY DEGREES FURTHER EAST. GCA THEN ASKED FOR A STEER OF 180 AND THE AIRCRAFT RESPONDED. GCA SEARCHED THE ORIGINAL AREA OF CONTACT, FOUND NO OTHER BLIPS SO THEY RETURNED TO THE NEW TRACK AND FOLLOWED IT. RADAR RETURN WAS LOST ONCE AND SO WAS COMMUNICATIONS BUT IN GENERAL THE TRACK FOLLOWED GCA DIRECTIONS. ANOTHER STEER TO 230 WAS DIRECTED AND THE AIRCRAFT RESPONDED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, GCA LOST HIM AND PRESUMED HE HAD GONE IN THE WATER. SO SAR PROCEDURES WERE INITIATED. NOTHING TURNED UP.

- RAMSEY'S AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN THE HILLS WEST OF CHU LAI, AND BECAUSE OF WEATHER CONDITIONS WAS NOT LOCATED UNTIL WEDNESDAY. IF IN FACT, HIS AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN AT THE ORIGINAL POINT WHERE GCA PICKED THEM UP IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BY FOLLOWING GCA'S DIRECTIONS HE COULD HAVE CRASHED SOMEWHERE IN THE AREA WEST OF CHU LAI BUT NOT EXACTLY WHERE HE DID.

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MCEO

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(A-21)

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DESTROY BY BURNING

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"EXCLUSIVE"

"MCEO"

PAGE THREE RUMMPA3515 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C I A L / E X C L U S I V E / M C E O
4. THRASH ORDERED AN INVESTIGATION AS SOON AS HE HEARD
THAT OUR GCA WAS INVOLVED. COL DUNWIDDIE THE CO OF THE
AIR CONTROL GROUP IS CONDUCTING THE INVESTIGATION. HE
IS KNOWLEDGEABLE IN THIS AREA AND WILL DO A THOROUGH JOB.
THRASH HAS ALSO CUT AMERICAL DIVISION INTO THE INVESTIGA-
TION AND EVERYTHING IS BEING CONDUCTED OPENLY AND ABOVE
BOARD. AS SOON AS IT IS COMPLETED GAY WILL BRIEF GENERAL
RAMSEY AND THE DIVISION STAFF ON WHAT HAPPENED OR WHAT
APPEARS TO HAVE HAPPENED AS DETERMINED BY THE INVESTIGA-
TION. WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

3515

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PG 2-2

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"MCEO"

"EXCLUSIVE"

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

P 191128Z ZFF-1 ZFF-4
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FIRST MAW
 CG FIRST MARDIV
 INFO ZEN/CG FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND
 ZEM

SECRET

SECRET EYES ONLY FOR MGEN THRASH, MGEN WHEELER INFO BGEN
 PADALINO FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
 OPCON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES ARE FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFO:
 QUOTE

FM CG III MAF
 TO CG XXIV CORPS
 SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
 OPCON

1. I HAVE REVIEWED THE QUESTION OF OPCON OF III MAF
 UNITS AND PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:

A. THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE SHOULD BE OPCON XXIV
 CORPS. THE CAPS ARE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE FIVE ICTZ
 PROVINCES, THEY OPERATE CLOSELY WITH US/ARVN/RF/PF UNITS
 THROUGHOUT ICTZ, AND DECISIONS IN REGARD TO LOCATIONS
 AND RELOCATIONS ARE MADE JOINTLY BY GENERAL LAM AND YOUR-
 SELF.

B. I HAVE PASSED OPCON OF D CO 3D MP BN TO YOU TO
 SUPPORT AND ASSIST YOUR ARMED FORCES POLICE REQUIREMENTS.

C. OTHER UNITS OF III MAF SHOULD REMAIN UNDER MY
 OPCON. I REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT IT'S HIGHLY DESIRABLE
 FOR YOU TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH MY DIVISION AND
 AIR WING AND THAT THERE MAY BE OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS
 NECESSARY FOR ME TO ATTACH SMALL UNITS TO OTHER UNITS
 THAT YOU MAY DESIGNATE FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES. I HAVE
 DESIGNATED MGEN THRASH AS DCG (AIR) FOR III MAF AND MGEN
 WHEELER AS DCG (GROUND) FOR III MAF.

D. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOU INSTALLING COMMUNICA-
 TIONS DIRECT TO 1ST MARDIV AND 1ST MAW. I REQUEST, HOW-
 EVER, THAT I BE MADE INFO ADDEE ON ANY COMMUNICATION SENT
 OVER THESE CIRCUITS. I FURTHER REQUEST THAT COMMUNICATIONS
 DIRECTLY TO MY SUBORDINATES BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PASSING
 OR REQUESTING NON-DIRECTIVE TYPE INFORMATION. ON ALL
 MATTERS THAT ARE DIRECTIVE IN NATURE OR WHICH REQUIRE A
 DECISION ON THE PART OF MY SUBORDINATES, I REQUEST THAT
 YOU DIRECT SUCH COMMUNICATIONS TO III MAF. I HAVE NO
 OBJECTION, HOWEVER, TO YOUR MAKING THE WING AND THE DIVI-
 SION INFO ADDEES AT THE SAME TIME IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE
 THE PLAN AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

#1

A-22

E. I RECOGNIZE THAT FROM TIME TO TIME YOU MAY HAVE A REQUIREMENT FOR ASSISTANCE FROM III MAF IN AREAS OUTSIDE OF QUANG NAM AND MAY DIRECT ME TO PROVIDE CERTAIN REOURCES FOR SUCH MISSIONS. IN THESE CASES I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO PASSING OPCON OVER SUCH UNITS TO WHOMEVER YOU ASSIGN FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION IN QUESTION. I HAVE IN MIND FOR EXAMPLE SUCH THINGS AS RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS OR INFANTRY UNITS THAT ARE OPERATING ALONG ADJACENT DIVISION BOUNDARIES IN AN OPERATION THAT REQUIRES CENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL. SINCE THESE KINDS OF OPERATIONS WILL PROBABLY BE FEW IN NUMBER I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN WORK THEM OUT TO OUR MUTUAL SATISFACTION ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

2. I NOTE THAT YOU HAVE INVITED THE COMMANDERS OF THE 1ST MAW, 1STMARDIV AND COMBINED ACTION FORCE TO ATTEND YOUR WEEKLY COMMANDERS CONFERENCE, AND I APPRECIATE THIS.
WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE

QUOTE

FM LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS ICTZ DNG
TO LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DNG
SECRET DNG 643 EYES ONLY FOR LTG MCCUTCHEON

1. I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR SEVENTEEN MARCH MESSAGE REGARDING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF UNITS. THE ARRANGEMENTS YOU PROPOSE ARE COMPLETELY ACCEPTABLE TO ME AND I ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL TAKE PARTICULAR CARE THAT YOUR WISHES WITH REGARD TO OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH III MAF UNITS ARE FULLY CARRIED OUT.

2. YOUR MILITARY POLICE COMPANY IS ALREADY WORKING WITH OUR PROVOST MARSHAL. THE CORPS G-3 IS WORKING WITH GENERAL MILLER AND COLONEL METZGER TO PREPARE A LETTER OF INSTRUCTION PERTAINING TO OPCOM OF THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE AS REFLECTED IN YOUR MESSAGE.

3. I ENJOYED MY VISIT WITH ED WHEELER'S DIVISION YESTERDAY, AND I APPRECIATE YOUR TAKING THE TIME TO ACCOMPANY ME.

4. WARM REGARDS, UNQUOTE WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

683

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A-22

**HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

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	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	S&C					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

DISPOSITION

RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS

DESTROY AFTER ROUTING

RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION

SECTION	SIGNATURE

ONLY 2 OF 4 COPIES

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

SECRET

(A-23)

P 193414Z ZFF-1 ZFF-4
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FIRST MAW
 ZEM

SECRET

S E C R E T EYES ONLY FOR MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
 ACTIVITIES IN CAMBODIA

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM
 COMUSMACV. QUOTE

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO MAC 3548 INTEL
2. (S) ACCORDING TO THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO
 THIS HEADQUARTERS THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT A COUP
 MAY BE UNDERWAY IN CAMBODIA. THE PRECISE NATURE IS UN-
 KNOWN.
3. (S) PENDING CLARIFICATION OF THE SITUATION AND FURTHER
 INSTRUCTIONS, ALL COMMANDS WILL ADHERE TO THE CURRENT PUB-
 LISHED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. PARTICULAR CARE WILL BE
 TAKEN TO AVOID BORDER INCIDENTS, BUT PLANNED OPERATIONS
 IN THE VICINITY OF THE BORDER NEED NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE
 CANCELLED.
4. (S) SHOULD ANY ELEMENT OF MACV BE APPROACHED BY CAM-
 BODIAN REPRESENTATIVES FOR ASSISTANCE, NO COMMITMENTS WILL
 BE MADE BUT THE DETAILS WILL BE REFERRED TO THIS HEAD-
 QUARTERS BY FLASH MESSAGE.
5. (S) YOU WILL BE KEPT INFORMED OF EVENTS AS THEY UNFOLD.
 UNQUOTE WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

193

SECRET

HAS BEEN SENT

NNNN

copy 2 of 4 copies

(A-23)

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

198129 MAR 70

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
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PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

JTG

FROM: CG III MAF

TO: CG FMFPAC

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS) OPCON

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM ZAIS IN RESPONSE TO MY MESSAGE TO HIM ON SUBJECT OF OPCON OF III MAF UNITS: QUOTE

1. I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR SEVENTEEN MARCH MESSAGE REGARDING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF UNITS. THE ARRANGEMENTS YOU PROPOSE ARE COMPLETELY ACCEPTABLE TO ME AND I ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL TAKE PARTICULAR CARE THAT YOUR WISHES WITH REGARD TO OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH III MAF UNITS ARE FULLY CARRIED OUT.

2. YOUR MILITARY POLICE COMPANY IS ALREADY WORKING WITH OUR PROVOST MARSHAL. THE CORPS G-3 IS WORKING WITH GENERAL MILLER AND COLONEL METZGER TO PREPARE A LETTER OF INSTRUCTION PERTAINING TO OPCON OF THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE AS REFLECTED IN YOUR MESSAGE.

3. I ENJOYED MY VISIT WITH ED WHEELER'S DIVISION YESTERDAY,

DATE	TIME
19	0730
MONTH	YEAR
MAR	70
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE
	KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON COMMANDING GENERAL	2236		<i>K B M Cutcheon</i>
				TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
				KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON, CG III MAF

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

19 01

REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

29

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION PRIORITY		K. B. MCCUTCHEON, CG	2236
INFO			

AND I APPRECIATE YOUR TAKING THE TIME TO ACCOMPANY ME.]

4. WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE WARM REGARDS.

BT

GP-4

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES 2	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET	

DD FORM 173-1
NOV 62

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED

14

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

1981 302 MAR 70

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

PRIORITY

INFO

DTG

FROM: CG III MAF

TO: CG FMFPAC

INFO: CG 1STMAW

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR
LTGEN BUSE INFO MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER
DURING WORKING HOURS)

FORCE PLANNING (U)

- DURING YOUR LAST VISIT TO III MAF YOU REQUESTED THAT
1STMAW INVESTIGATE THE FEASIBILITY OF FORMING A COMPOSITE
GROUP VICE TWO GROUPS AS THE AIR COMPONENT OF THE RESIDUAL
BRIGADE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH THRASH AND
MY STAFF AND HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO MAKE.
- I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THE COMPOSITION OF AN AIR/
GROUND TEAM SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION
ASSIGNED AND THAT IF THE MISSION REQUIRES MORE ~~COMPONENTS~~
UNITS
COMPONENT
OF ONE ~~LESS~~ THAN THE OTHER THEN THEY SHOULD BE ~~BE~~ ADDED
TO THE TROOP LIST. I HAVE NEVER BELIEVED THAT AN AIR/
GROUND TEAM SHOULD ~~BE~~ *ALWAYS BE* COMPOSED OF ONE EACH
COMPARABLE AIR AND GROUND UNITS.

3. THE OPTIMUM AIR PACKAGE FOR THE RESIDUAL BRIGADE SHOULD,

DATE	TIME
18	1445
MONTH	YEAR
MAR	70
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE 2236	R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE <i>KB McCutcheon</i>
	KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON COMMANDING GENERAL			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET

REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS

DD FORM 173
NOV 65

19-01

REPLACES EDITION OF MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.

30


PPC-JRDB

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM a.d./or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET		
PRECEDENCE ACTION PRIORITY INFO		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY K, B. MCCUTCHEON CG		
				PHONE 2236		
<p> IN MY OPINION, INCLUDE BOTH A FIXED WING GROUP AND A HELICOPTER GROUP OPERATING FROM SEPARATE BASES. THE PRO- BLEM THAT WE FACE, HOWEVER, IS ONE OF PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS AND CEILINGS. HENCE, I BELIEVE THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF OPERATING BOTH GROUPS FROM A SINGLE SITE, SOMEWHERE ^{NAMELY} DANANG AIR BASE. OPERATING BOTH TYPES OF AIRCRAFT FROM A SINGLE BASE LIKE DANANG PRESENTS SOME PROBLEMS. I ANTICIPATE THE AIR FORCE WOULD OBJECT TO OUR MOVING HELICOPTERS INTO DANANG, BUT THE FACT REMAINS WE OPERATED BOTH FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT HERE IN 1965 AND WE STILL BRING TRANSIENT HELICOPTERS IN AND OUT AND THE VNAF HAS HELICOPTER SQUADRONS PERMANENTLY BASED HERE. IN ADDITION TO THIS OBJECTION, THERE ARE OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH A MIXED OPERATION THAT I WILL TOUCH ON LATER. BECAUSE THE PROBLEMS DO EXIST I WOULD PROPOSE KEEPING A FIXED WING AIR GROUP IN THE PRESENT MAG-11 SPACES ON THE FLIGHTLINE, AND MOVING THE ROTARY WING GROUP INTO THE AREA CURRENTLY OCCUPIED BY H&MS-17 ^{AND} THE MARINE AIR FREIGHT. THIS WILL SEPARATE THE TWO TYPES OF AIRCRAFT AND MINIMIZE THE PROBLEMS. BOTH GROUPS WOULD BE SMALLER THAN THE CUR- RENT GROUPS IN THE WING BECAUSE EACH WOULD ONLY HAVE THE </p>						
CONTROL NO.		TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET		

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM <small>as.d./or CONTINUATION SHEET</small>				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	
PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE		
ACTION PRIORITY					
INFO					
<p>EQUIVALENT OF TWO AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS. COLOCATING THE GROUPS AT DANANG WOULD REDUCE THE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR BASE OPERATION AND BASE SECURITY AND SAVE SPACES OVER THAT REQUIRED TO OPERATE FROM BOTH MARBLE MOUNTAIN AND DANANG.</p> <p>4. IF PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS AND SPACE CONSTRAINTS AT DANANG ARE OVERRIDING, THEN IT MIGHT BE BE POSSIBLE TO FORM A SINGLE COMPOSITE GROUP. THIS COULD BE DONE IN ONE OF TWO WAYS: (A) THE GROUP COULD BE SPLIT BETWEEN THE PRESENT MAG-11 RAMP AREA AND THE ^{H+MS}11-17 AREA, OR (B) IT COULD BE CONFINED TO THE MAG-11 AREA ONLY. THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE WOULD SPLIT THE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AND CAUSE THE GROUP COMMANDER'S SPAN OF CONTROL PROBLEMS AND THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE WOULD POSE OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS WHICH I REFERRED TO EARLIER. CH-46 AND 53 AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE TO FOLD THEIR BLADES ON THE TAXIWAY AND BE TOWED INTO THE PARKING AREAS. EVEN SO, THE PARKING AREAS WOULD BE PRETTY CLOSE QUARTERS AND RESULT IN CONGESTION. THE DOWNWASH FROM ROTOR BLADES ^{PARTICULARLY} OF UH1E/AH1G HELICOPTERS WHEN BEING AIR TAXIED ^C WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSE FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE TO THE JET AIRCRAFT. SOME OF THIS DIFFICULTY COULD BE</p>					
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 3	NO. OF PAGES 4	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
DEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM or d/ or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET		
PRECEDENCE ACTION PRIORITY INFO		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY K. B. MCCUTCHEON CG		
				PHONE 2236		
<p>ALLEVIATED IF SOME OF THE STRUCTURES NOW PERMANENTLY ERECTED IN THE MAG-11 SPACES WERE REMOVED THUS PROVIDING MORE OPERATING SPACE FOR THE HELICOPTERS.</p> <p>5. FINALLY, IF WE ARE FORCED TO ACCEPT REDUCED NUMBERS AND THE NEED FOR A STRONG RLT IS OVERRIDING THEN IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO RETROGRADE ALL FIXED WING AIRCRAFT AND REDUCE THE AIR COMPONENT TO HELICOPTERS ONLY. IN THIS CASE WE COULD OPERATE OPERATE FROM EITHER MARBLE MOUNTAIN OR DANANG. THE PROXIMITY TO THE REGIMENT WOULD FAVOR DANANG IN MY OPINION IF WE COULD OVERCOME AIR FORCE OBJECTIONS.</p> <p>6. IN SUMMARY, I FAVOR THE FOLLOWING COMPOSITION OF THE AIR COMPONENT OF THE RESIDUAL BRIGADE WITH MY FIRST CHOICE LISTED FIRST: (A) SEPARATE FIXED WING AND HELICOPTERS GROUPS OPERATING FROM SEPARATE SITES. (B) SEPARATE GROUPS OPERATING FROM THE <u>DANANG</u>. (C) A COMPOSITE GROUP OPERATING FROM THE <u>DANANG</u>. (D) A HELICOPTER GROUP OPERA- TING FROM A SINGLE SITE. WARM REGARDS.</p> <p>GP-4</p> <p>BT</p>						
CONTROL NO.		TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
			4	4		
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET		

(15)

JOINT MESSAGEFORM			<small>RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER</small>		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION					
CONFIDENTIAL					
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		
PRECEDENCE					
ACTION PRIORITY					
INFO					
<p>FROM: CG III MAF</p> <p>TO: CG FMFPAC</p> <p>INFO: CG FIRST MAW</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS) HELO CRASH AT CHU LAI</p> <p>1. AS I REPORTED TO KENNY HOUGHTON, BY TELEPHONE, LATE WEDNESDAY MGEN RAMSEY THE CG, AMERICAL DIVISION WAS THE VICTIM OF A HELO CRASH IN CHU LAI ON TUESDAY, 17 MARCH. THIS MORNING I VISITED CHU LAI IN COMPANY WITH THRASH AND SAW RAMSEY IN THE HOSPITAL. HE SUFFERED^A BADLY FRACTURED LEFT ARM AND HAD MULTIPLE BRUISES ON HIS FACE AND BODY. THE PROGNOSIS IS GOOD AND HE WILL REMAIN IN COUNTRY. HIS AIDE SUFFERED BROKEN RIBS AND BRUISES AND HIS PROGNOSIS IS ALSO GOOD. TWO OCCUPANTS WERE KILLED. I DON'T KNOW THE STATUS OF THE OTHERS BUT THEY ARE ALIVE.</p> <p>2. RAMSEY'S HELICOPTER WAS FLYING ABOVE THE OVERCAST AND REQUESTED A GCA. THE CGA PICKED HIM UP AND DIRECTED A STEER TO 090 AND THE AIRCRAFT RESPONDED. SUBSEQUENTLY,</p>					<p>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p>
				DATE	TIME
				19	1330
				MONTH	YEAR
				MAR	70
				PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
				1	1
D R A P T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE	SIGNATURE	
	KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON COMMANDING GENERAL		2236		
				TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	
				KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON, CG, III MAF	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS		
CONFIDENTIAL			19 11 32		

19 MAR 70 11 32
 3515
 19 11 32

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM <small>as of</small> CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	
PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE		
ACTION PRIORITY		K. B. MCCUTCHEON, CG	2236		
INFO					
<p>GCA ASKED THE HELO TO SQUAWK IFF. AT THIS POINT THE AIR- CRAFT WAS PICKED UP ON A BEARING OF ABOUT THIRTY DEGREES FURTHER EAST. GCA THEN ASKED FOR A STEER^{OF} 180 AND THE AIRCRAFT RESPONDED. GCA SEARCHED THE ORIGINAL AREA OF CONTACT, FOUND NO OTHER BLIPS SO THEY RETURNED TO THE NEW TRACK AND FOLLOWED IT. RADAR RETURN WAS LOST ONCE AND SO WAS COMMUNICATIONS BUT IN GENERAL THE TRACK FOLLOWED GCA DIRECTIONS. ANOTHER STEER TO 230 WAS DIRECTED AND THE AIRCRAFT RESPONDED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, GCA <input type="checkbox"/> LOST HIM AND PRESUMED HE^{HE} HAD GONE IN THE WATER SO SAR PROCEDURES WERE INITIATED. NOTHING TURNED UP.</p> <p>3. RAMSEY'S AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN THE HILLS WEST OF CHU LAI, AND BECAUSE OF WEATHER CONDITIONS WAS NOT LOCATED UNTIL WEDNESDAY. IF IN FACT, HIS AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN AT THE ORIGINAL POINT WHERE GCA PICKED THEM UP IT IS POS- SIBLE THAT BY FOLLOWING GCA'S DIRECTIONS HE COULD HAVE CRASHED SOMEWHERE IN THE AREA WEST OF CHU LAI BUT NOT EXACTLY WHERE HE DID.</p> <p>4. THRASH ORDERED AN INVESTIGATION AS SOON AS HE HEARD THAT OUR GCA WAS INVOLVED. COL DUNWIDDIE THE CO OF THE AIR CONTROL GROUP IS ^{CONDUCTING} INVOLVED IN THE INVESTIGATION. HE IS KNOWLEDGEABLE IN THIS AREA AND WILL DO A THOROUGH JOB.</p>					
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	3		
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM or, d/ or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL		
PRECEDENCE ACTION PRIORITY INFO		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY K. B. MCCUTCHEON, CG		
				PHONE 2236		
<p>THRASH HAS ALSO CUT AMERICAL DIVISION INTO THE INVESTIGA- TION AND EVERYTHING IS BEING CONDUCTED OPENLY AND ABOVE BOARD. AS SOON AS IT IS COMPLETED GAY WILL BRIEF GENERAL RAMSEY AND THE DIVISION STAFF ON WHAT HAPPENED OR WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE HAPPENED AS DETERMINED BY THE INVESTIGA- TION. WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED. WARM REGARDS.</p> <p>BT</p> <p>GP-4</p>						
CONTROL NO.		TOR/ TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
			3	3		
PEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL		

DD FORM 173-1
 NOV 62

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH WILL BE USED.

FPC-Japan

16

DIG 191120Z MAR

SECRET

PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

RELEASED BY
K. B. McCutcheon

DROPTED BY DATE
K. B. MCCUTCHEON, CG 19MAR7

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: CG FIRST MAW
CG FIRST MARDIV
~~INFO~~
INFO: CG FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR MGEN THRASH, MGEN WHEELER INFO BGEN
PADALINO FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON

OPCON

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES ARE FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

FM CG III MAF

TO CG XXIV CORPS

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON

OPCON

1. I HAVE REVIEWED THE QUESTION OF OPCON OF III MAF
UNITS AND PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:

A. THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE SHOULD BE OPCON XXIV
CORPS. THE CAPS ARE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE FIVE ICTZ
PROVINCES, THEY OPERATE CLOSELY WITH US/ARVN/RF/PF UNITS
THROUGHOUT ICTZ, AND DECISIONS IN REGARD TO LOCATIONS
AND RELOCATIONS ARE MADE JOINTLY BY GENERAL LAM AND YOUR-
SELF.

B. I HAVE PASSED OPCON OF D CO 3D MP BN TO YOU TO
SUPPORT AND ASSIST YOUR ARMED FORCES POLICE REQUIREMENTS.

C. OTHER UNITS OF III MAF SHOULD REMAIN UNDER MY
OPCON. I REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT IT'S HIGHLY DESIRABLE

TYPE WITHIN MARGINS ONLY

TYPE WITHIN MARGINS ONLY

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

DGT

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

19 11 20

(17)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FOR YOU TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH MY DIVISION AND AIR WING AND THAT THERE MAY BE OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS NECESSARY FOR ME TO ATTACH SMALL UNITS TO OTHER UNITS THAT YOU MAY DESIGNATE FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES. I HAVE DESIGNATED MGEN THRASH AS DCG (AIR) FOR III MAF AND MGEN WHEELER AS DCG (GROUND) FOR III MAF.

D. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOU INSTALLING COMMUNICATIONS DIRECT TO 1ST MARDIV AND 1ST MAW. I REQUEST, HOWEVER, THAT I BE MADE INFO ADDEE ON ANY COMMUNICATION SENT OVER THESE CIRCUITS. I FURTHER REQUEST THAT COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTLY TO MY SUBORDINATES BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PASSING OR REQUESTING NON-DIRECTIVE TYPE INFORMATION. ON ALL MATTERS THAT ARE DIRECTIVE IN NATURE OR WHICH REQUIRE A DECISION ON THE PART OF MY SUBORDINATES, I REQUEST THAT YOU DIRECT SUCH COMMUNICATIONS TO III MAF. I HAVE NO OBJECTION, HOWEVER, TO YOUR MAKING THE WING AND THE DIVISION INFO ADDEES AT THE SAME TIME IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE THE PLAN AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

E. I RECOGNIZE THAT FROM TIME TO TIME YOU MAY HAVE A REQUIREMENT FOR ASSISTANCE FROM III MAF IN AREAS OUTSIDE OF QUANG NAM AND MAY DIRECT ME TO PROVIDE CERTAIN RESOURCES FOR SUCH MISSIONS. IN THESE CASES I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO PASSING OPCON OVER SUCH UNITS TO WHOMEVER YOU ASSIGN FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION IN QUESTION. I HAVE IN MIND FOR EXAMPLE SUCH THINGS AS RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS OR INFANTRY UNITS THAT ARE OPERATING

TYPE WITHIN MARGINS ONLY

TYPE WITHIN MARGINS ONLY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

ALONG ADJACENT DIVISION BOUNDARIES IN AN OPERATION THAT REQUIRES CENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL. SINCE THESE KINDS OF OPERATIONS WILL PROBABLY BE FEW IN NUMBER I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN WORK THEM OUT TO OUR MUTUAL SATISFACTION ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

2. I NOTE THAT YOU HAVE INVITED THE COMMANDERS OF THE 1ST MAW, 1STMARDIV AND COMBINED ACTION FORCE TO ATTEND YOUR WEEKLY COMMANDERS CONFERENCE, AND I APPRECIATE THIS.

WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE

QUOTE

FM LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS ICTZ DNG

TO LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DNG

SECRET DNG 643 EYES ONLY FOR LTG MCCUTCHEON

1. I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR SEVENTEEN MARCH MESSAGE REGARDING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF UNITS. THE ARRANGEMENTS YOU PROPOSE ARE COMPLETELY ACCEPTABLE TO ME AND I ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL TAKE PARTICULAR CARE THAT YOUR WISHES WITH REGARD TO OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH III MAF UNITS ARE FULLY CARRIED OUT.

2. YOUR MILITARY POLICE COMPANY IS ALREADY WORKING WITH OUR PROVOST MARSHAL. THE CORPS G-3 IS WORKING WITH GENERAL MILLER AND COLONEL METZGER TO PREPARE A LETTER OF INSTRUCTION PERTAINING TO OPCON OF THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE AS REFLECTED IN YOUR MESSAGE.

3. I ENJOYED MY VISIT WITH ED WHEELER'S DIVISION YESTER-

TYPE WITHIN MARGINS ONLY

TYPE WITHIN MARGINS ONLY

(17)

SECRET

CLASSIFICAT'ON

DAY, AND I APPRECIATE YOUR TAKING THE TIME TO ACCOMPANY
ME.

4. WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE WARM REGARDS.

BT

GP-4

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

TYPE WITHIN MARGINS ONLY

TYPE WITHIN MARGINS ONLY

III MAF FORM 2 (S-23 (09-69)

DTG 1914147 MAR	SSN	CLASSIFICATION SECRET
PRECEDENCE PRIORITY	RELEASED BY <i>Dulacki</i>	DRAFTED BY DATE LEO J. DULACKI CS 19MAR70

FROM: CG III MAF

TO: CG FIRST MAW

XXXX
INFO: SECRET EYES ONLY FOR MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
XXXXX

ACTIVITIES IN CAMBODIA

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM COMUSMACV. QUOTE

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO MAC 3548 INTEL
 2. (S) ACCORDING TO THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THIS HEADQUARTERS THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT A COUP MAY BE UNDERWAY IN CAMBODIA. THE PRECISE NATURE IS UNKNOWN.
 3. (S) PENDING CLARIFICATION OF THE SITUATION AND FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS, ALL COMMANDS WILL ADHERE TO THE CURRENT PUBLISHED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. PARTICULAR CARE WILL BE TAKEN TO AVOID BORDER INCIDENTS, BUT PLANNED OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF THE BORDER NEED NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE CANCELLED.
 4. (S) SHOULD ANY ELEMENT OF MACV BE APPROACHED BY CAMBODIAN REPRESENTATIVES FOR ASSISTANCE, NO COMMITMENTS WILL BE MADE BUT THE DETAILS WILL BE REFERRED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS BY FLASH MESSAGE.
 5. (S) YOU WILL BE KEPT INFORMED OF EVENTS AS THEY UNFOLD.
- UNQUOTE WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

TYPE WITHIN MARGINS ONLY

TYPE WITHIN MARGINS ONLY

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

DGT

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

19

14

14

(18)

ZNY TTTT
12 00 00 02 11 00 70

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY *Doc #82*

SPECAT

TO CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
BT

TOP SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

**TOP SECRET / LINDIS / SPECAT / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY / FOR
LIGEN BUSE FROM LIGEN MCCUTCHEON**

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 140321Z JAN 70 (TS/SPECAT/MCEO)

1. REF A PROPOSED A 10.8K MAB BASED ON CMC GUIDANCE AND ADDITIONAL BASIC ASSUMPTIONS.
2. A PLANNING CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT THIS HEADQUARTERS BY MEMBERS OF MY STAFF AND THE STAFFS OF 1ST MARD IV, 1ST MAW, AND FLC ON 17 MAR 70. DURING THIS CONFERENCE SEVERAL PROBLEM AREAS DEVELOPED:
 - A. THE PROPOSED 10.8K MAB INCLUDED A HQ CO FOR SUPPORT OF THE MAB HQ. A MAB OF LESS THAN 10.8K DOES NOT POSSESS A HQ CO, CONSEQUENTLY THE ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITY IS MARGINAL AT BEST.
 - B. LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE AVIATION ELEMENT REGARDLESS OF THE SIZE OF THE MAB WILL BE SERIOUS PROBLEM WITH THE

PAGE TWO RUM LMPA3700 TOP SECRET / LINDIS / SPECAT / MCEO
LOSS OF WING SUPPORT UNITS.

3. THE ASSUMPTION CONTAINED IN PARA 2.D OF REF A THAT ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL BE EXERCISED BY YOUR HEADQUARTERS WAS DISCUSSED. AN ALTERNATIVE WAS SUGGESTED WHEREBY 3D MARD IV WOULD EXERCISE ADCON OF GROUND AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS IN A MAB OF LESS THAN 10.8K. ADDITIONALLY, CG, FMAW WOULD RETAIN ADCON OF AIR ELEMENTS REGARDLESS OF SIZE OF MAB SINCE THE AVIATION ELEMENT IS NOT CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING ITSELF LOGISTICALLY FROM WITHIN ITS OWN RESOURCES.
4. IT APPEARS THAT ABOVE ARRANGEMENT MIGHT ALLEVIATE PROBLEMS CITED IN PARA 2 ABOVE TO SOME EXTENT.
5. ADDITIONALLY, INFORMATION FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IS REQUIRED REGARDING THE FUTURE STATUS OF HQ, III MAF. SPECIFICALLY, WHETHER III MAF HQS WILL BE RELOCATED, DISESTABLISHED IN-COUNTRY, OR REDEPLOYED AND DISESTABLISHED; PROPOSED TIMING FOR WHATEVER COURSE OF ACTION IS CONTEMPLATED FOR HQS III MAF WITH RELATION TO TIMING OF REDEPLOYMENT OF WING AND DIVISION HQS; PROPOSED TIMING FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF TRANSITIONAL MAB HQS WITH RELATION TO REDEPLOYMENT OF MAF/DIVISION/WING HQS.
6. REQUEST COMMENTS/GUIDANCE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

SPECAT
TOP SECRET

HQ	FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG											06			48						
INFO/COORD					20															

Copy 3 of 3 Copies

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				<small>RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER</small>			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL				CN 3995	TO	CWO/SUPVR	
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	OUTGOING SUPVR	PR		
PRECEDENCE				21 MAR 70 15 17z			
ACTION PRIORITY				DTG 211517z MAR			
INFO							
FROM: CG III MAF						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
TO: CG FMFPAC							
CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)							
<u>MISCELLANEOUS INFO</u>							
1. LTGEN ZAIS INFORMED ME YESTERDAY THAT HE WAS DELIGHTED WITH MY MESSAGE ON OPCON. THAT HE HAD SENT A COPY OF MY MESSAGE WITH HIS REPLY TO GEN ABRAMS WITH A BRIEF NOTE AND EXPLANATION, AND IN ESSENCE SAID THE MESSAGES WERE SELF-EXPLANATORY AND THAT THE ISSUE HAD BEEN RESOLVED.							
2. AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE I WILL ACCOMPANY ZAIS SATURDAY MORNINGS TO GEN LAM'S HQ TO DISCUSS MUTUAL PROBLEMS. MGEN BOWMAN, BGEN LEE OF THE ROKMC WILL ALSO BE PRESENT. FOL- LOWING THAT DISCUSSION I WILL ATTEND GEN LAM'S WEEKLY I CORPS BRIEFING WITH ZAIS, AND THEN BGEN MULLER'S BRIEFING BY THE U.S. ARMY ADVISORS. MULLER IS THE SENIOR ARMY							
3. SUNDAY MORNINGS I WILL ATTEND THE XXIV CORPS BRIEFING. EITHER DULACKI OR MILLER WILL ACCOMPANY ME. WHEELER AND ADVISOR, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ZAIS.						DATE 21	TIME 1415
						MONTH MAR	YEAR 70
						PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 2
D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE			PHONE 2236		SIGNATURE <i>Keith B Mc Cutcheon</i>	
	KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON COMMANDING GENERAL					TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 21 CONFIDENTIAL				REGRAIDING INSTRUCTIONS 15 17 (20)			

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL		
PRECEDENCE ACTION: PRIORITY INFO		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY K. B. MCCUTCHEON, CG		
				PHONE 2236		
<p>THRASH AND THEIR THREES WILL ALSO BE PRESENT.</p> <p>4. ZAIS TOLD ME THIS MORNING MGEN RAMSEY OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION WILL BE RELIEVED OF COMMAND BECAUSE HE WILL HAVE TO BE HOSPITALIZED THREE OR FOUR WEEKS. MGEN ALBERT MILLOY, WHO CURRENTLY HAS THE FIRST DIVISION WILL ARRIVE IN I CORPS TOMORROW TO QUIETLY TAKE COMMAND OF AMERICAL. WARM REGARDS.</p> <p>BT</p> <p>GP-4</p>						
CONTROL NO.		TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
			2	2		
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL		

DD FORM 173-1
1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.

PPC-Japan

(20)

HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-49)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM <i>00 231 137</i>	DATE <i>02 10 70</i>				
					SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <i>00000 00000</i>	COPY NO. <i>2</i> OF <i>3</i> COPIES RECD.				
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					REMARKS: <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 5px;"> DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> <p>REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order F5511.4.</p> <p>The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.</p>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
	DCG									
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	DEP CORDS									
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	SGT MAJ									

Copy #1 Force Planning Folder

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

TOP SECRET

(A-8)

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND
DESTROY BY BURNING

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

ZNY TTTT
P 200648Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC

*PAC 082
HAS BEEN SENT*

**TOP SECRET / LINDIS/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY / FOR
LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
FORGE PLANNING (U)**

- A. CG FMFPAC 140321Z JAN 70 (TS/SPECAT/MCEO)
- 1. REF A PROPOSED A 10.8K MAB BASED ON CMC GUIDANCE AND ADDITIONAL BASIC ASSUMPTIONS.
- 2. A PLANNING CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT THIS HEADQUARTERS BY MEMBERS OF MY STAFF AND THE STAFFS OF 1ST MARDIV, 1ST MAW, AND FLC ON 17 MAR 70. DURING THIS CONFERENCE SEVERAL PROBLEM AREAS DEVELOPED:
 - A. THE PROPOSED 10.8K MAB INCLUDED A HQ CO FOR SUPPORT OF THE MAB HQ. A MAB OF LESS THAN 10.8K DOES NOT POSSESS A HQ CO, CONSEQUENTLY THE ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITY IS MARGINAL AT BEST.
 - B. LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE AVIATION ELEMENT REGARDLESS OF THE SIZE OF THE MAB WILL BE SERIOUS PROBLEM WITH THE

PAGE TWO RUMLMFA3700 TOP SECRET/LINDIS/SPECAT/MCEO
LOSS OF WING SUPPORT UNITS.

- 3. THE ASSUMPTION CONTAINED IN PARA 2.D OF REF A THAT ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL BE EXERCISED BY YOUR HEADQUARTERS WAS DISCUSSED. AN ALTERNATIVE WAS SUGGESTED WHEREBY 3D MARDIV WOULD EXERCISE ADCON OF GROUND AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS IN A MAB OF LESS THAN 10.8K. ADDITIONALLY, CG, FMAW WOULD RETAIN ADCON OF AIR ELEMENTS REGARDLESS OF SIZE OF MAB SINCE THE AVIATION ELEMENT IN NOT CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING ITSELF LOGISTICALLY FROM WITHIN ITS OWN RESOURCES.
- 4. IT APPEARS THAT ABOVE ARRANGEMENT MIGHT ALLEVIATE PROBLEMS CITED IN PARA 2 ABOVE TO SOME EXTENT.
- 5. ADDITIONALLY, INFORMATION FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IS REQUIRED REGARDING THE FUTURE STATUS OF HQ, III MAF. SPECIFICALLY, WHETHER III MAF HQS WILL BE RELOCATED, DISESTABLISHED IN-COUNTRY, OR REDEPLOYED AND DISESTABLISHED; PROPOSED TIMING FOR WHATEVER COURSE OF ACTION IS CONTEMPLATED FOR HQS III MAF WITH RELATION TO TIMING OF REDEPLOYMENT OF WING AND DIVISION HQS; PROPOSED TIMING FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF TRANSITIONAL MAB HQS WITH RELATION TO REDEPLOYMENT OF MAF/DIVISION/WING HQS.
- 6. REQUEST COMMENTS/GUIDANCE. WARM REGARDS.

TOP SECRET

GP-4

HQ	FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																				
INFO/COORD																				

SPECAT

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HEADQUARTERS
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 21 MAR 70					
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 211517		COPY NO. / OF 3 COPIES REC'D.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT Miscellaneous Info (U)				
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	CG					REMARKS DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention. <table border="1" style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th style="width:50%;">Section</th> <th style="width:50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
Section	Signature									
	DCG									
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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

A-24

CONFIDENTIAL

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND
DESTROY BY BURNING

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

FLC #090
PTTCZYU RUMMPA3995 08015 17-CCCC--RUMMFMA.
ZNY CCCCC

TOD: 21/1803Z MAR 70

P 2115 17Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
TO RUMMFMA/CG FMFPA C
BT

CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR
LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS)

MISCELLANEOUS INFO

1. LTGEN ZAIS INFORMED ME YESTERDAY THAT HE WAS DELIGHTED WITH MY MESSAGE ON OPCON. THAT HE HAD SENT A COPY OF MY MESSAGE WITH HIS REPLY TO GEN ABRAMS WITH A BRIEF NOTE AND EXPLANATION, AND IN ESSENCE SAID THE MESSAGES WERE SELF-EXPLANATORY AND THAT THE ISSUE HAD BEEN RESOLVED.
2. AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE I WILL ACCOMPANY ZAIS SATURDAY MORNINGS TO GEN LAM'S HQ TO DISCUSS MUTUAL PROBLEMS. MGEN BOWMAN, BGEN LEE OF THE ROKMC WILL ALSO BE PRESENT. FOLLOWING THAT DISCUSSION I WILL ATTEND GEN LAM'S WEEKLY 1 CORPS BRIEFING WITH ZAIS, AND THEN BGEN MULLER'S BRIEFING BY THE U.S. ARMY ADVISORS.
3. SUNDAY MORNINGS I WILL ATTEND THE XXIV CORPS BRIEFING.

PAGE TWO RUMMPA3995 CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR/
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EITHER DULACKI OR MILLER WILL ACCOMPANY ME. WHEELER AND THRASH AND THEIR THREES WILL ALSO BE PRESENT.
4. ZAIS TOLD ME THIS MORNING MGEN RAMSEY OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION WILL BE RELIEVED OF COMMAND BECAUSE HE WILL HAVE TO BE HOSPITALIZED THREE OR FOUR WEEKS. MGEN ALBERT MILLOY, WHO CURRENTLY HAS THE FIRST DIVISION WILL ARRIVE IN 1 CORPS TOMMORROW TO QUIETLY TAKE COMMAND OF AMERICAL. WARM REGARDS.
GP 4

///HAS BEEN SENT///

SPECAT

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

HQ FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																			
INFO/COORD																			

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE					
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		27 MAR 73					
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE		COPY NO OF COPIES REC'D					
			P 220/157 MAR 73		2 OF 4					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					REQUIREMENT FOR MAIN O BRIDGE				
	DCG									
	C/S	I		3/23	D	REMARK: DISPOSITION <input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION <table border="1"> <tr> <th>SECTION</th> <th>SIGNATURE</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	SECTION	SIGNATURE		
SECTION	SIGNATURE									
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COPIES OF 4 COPIES

HAS BEEN SET

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

SECRET

A-25

P 220445Z ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF
 TO COMNAVFORV
 ZEM

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR VADM ZUMWALT FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
 REQUIREMENT FOR NAM O BRIDGE (S)

A. YOUR MSG 180030Z MAR 70 (S)

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE NAM O BRIDGE IS PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO REF A.
2. THE NAM O BRIDGE IS A DEFINITE REQUIREMENT. THE EXTENT TO WHICH MARINE FORCES WILL BENEFIT FROM THE BRIDGE IS UNPREDICTABLE SINCE MUCH DEPENDS ON HOW THE CORPS COMMANDER WILL EMPLOY THE REMAINING MARINE FORCES IN THE FUTURE. HOWEVER, THE BRIDGE WILL BE VITAL TO THE US FORCES IN ICIZ AS WELL AS TO THE ARVN FORCES SINCE QL-1 IS THE ONLY LAND LOC LINKING THE NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES WITH THE DANANG AREA. THE BRIDGE IS ALSO OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FROM AN ECONOMIC STANDPOINT.
2. NOW THAT THE ARMY HAS ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR I CORPS, THE NAM O BRIDGE SHOULD BE OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO THEM AND I BELIEVE THE ARMY SHOULD INCLUDE IT IN THEIR MILCON. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF ITS IMPORTANCE, IF IT IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ARMY PROGRAM, I BELIEVE IT SHOULD REMAIN IN THE NAVY PROGRAM. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

(SSG NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

240

SECRET

NNNN

THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

A-25

III MAF FORM 2 (S-)-23 (09-69)

DTG 22 04 45 Z MAR	SSN	CLASSIFICATION SECRET
PRECEDENCE PRIORITY	RELEASED BY <i>KB McCutcheon</i>	DRAFTED BY DATE LEO J. DULACKI 21 MAR 70

FROM: CG III MAF

TO: COMNAVFORV

INFO: SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR VADM ZUMWALT FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
XXXXX

REQUIREMENT FOR NAM O BRIDGE (S)

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TYPE WITHIN MARGINS ONLY

TYPE WITHIN MARGINS ONLY

GP-4

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

22 04 45

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES	DGT	CLASSIFICATION SECRET
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(21)

RESERVED FOR COMBINATION

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

PRIORITY

INFO

DTG

2308412
MAR 70

FROM: CG III MAF

TO: CG FMFPAC

TOP SECRET/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN

MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

220930Z MAR 70
FM MG DOLVIN COFS MACV SAIGON
TO GEN BROWN CMDR 7AF TAN SON NHUT
LTG MILDREN DGC USARV LONG BINH
VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON
LTG CORCORAN CG I FFV NHA TRANG
LTG EWELL CG II FFV LONG BINH
LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG

INFO LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG
MG MCCOWN CG DMAC CAN THO

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY MAC 2791 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING (U)

REFERENCE: MAC 1517/011052Z FEB 1970 (TS/S)

1. (TS) REFERENCE REQUESTED VIEWS AND COMMENTS ON AN OUT-LINE STRATEGY FOR 1970 AND CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US REDEPLOYMENTS AFTER 15 APRIL.

2. (TS) AS A RESULT OF RESPONSES TO REFERENCE AND OTHER

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DATE	TIME
23	1430
MONTH	YEAR
MAR	70
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	3

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE
2236

RELEASEE

SIGNATURE

Keith B. McCutcheon

KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON
COMMANDING GENERAL

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

C/S

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET

23

08

REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS

41

(22)

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM <small>and/or CONTINUATION SHEET</small>				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET															
PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE																
ACTION PRIORITY		K. B. MCCUTCHEON, CG	2236																
INFO																			
<p>COMMAND AND STAFF EXCHANGES DURING RECENT WEEKS, THE MACV STAFF NOW LISTS THE FOLLOWING SPACE REDUCTIONS AS THOSE WHICH COMMANDERS CONCERNED WOULD CONSIDER FEASIBLE FOR A 50,000 SPACES PHASE 4 REDEPLOYMENT:</p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align: left; border-bottom: 1px dashed black;">COMPONENT</th> <th style="text-align: right; border-bottom: 1px dashed black;">THOUSAND SPACES</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>USMC (II MAF)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">29.4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USN</td> <td style="text-align: right;">8.0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USA (BDE, III CTZ)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">5.7</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USA (CMBT SVC SPT)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">.6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USAF</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1.4</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: left;">TOTAL</td> <td style="text-align: right;">45.1</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>3. (TS) ALTHOUGH COMUSMACV HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT FURTHER US REDEPLOYMENTS SHOULD BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE NEXT 90 DAYS, THE MACV STAFF IS CONTINUING TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVES SHOULD A PHASE 4 REDEPLOYMENT BE DIRECTED EARLIER. IN THAT REGARD, SUFFICIENT ALTERNATIVES FOR GENERATION OF ADDITIONAL SPACES (ABOUT 5,000) FOR A POSSIBLE 50,000 SPACE PACKAGE HAVE NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED.</p> <p>4. (TS) ACCORDINGLY, FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY, THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS ARE MADE USING THE FIGURES CITED IN PARA-</p>						COMPONENT	THOUSAND SPACES	USMC (II MAF)	29.4	USN	8.0	USA (BDE, III CTZ)	5.7	USA (CMBT SVC SPT)	.6	USAF	1.4	TOTAL	45.1
COMPONENT	THOUSAND SPACES																		
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TOTAL	45.1																		
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS														
		2	3																
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET															

(22)

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM <small>or, if CONTINUATION SHEET</small>				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	
PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE		
ACTION PRIORITY			K. B. MCCUTCHEON, CG		2236
INFO					
<p>GRAPH 2 ABOVE AS A BASE: 7</p> <p>A. CMDR 7AF: DCG USARV (USA CMBT SVC SPT FORCES): AND COMNAVFORV: EACH IDENTIFY SOURCE OF 1,000 ADDITIONAL SPACES.</p> <p>B. CG I FFV: IDENTIFY 750 ADDITIONAL SPACES FROM FORCES OVER WHICH YOU HAVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL.</p> <p>C. CG II FFV: IDENTIFY 1,000 ADDITIONAL SPACES FROM FORCES OVER WHICH YOU HAVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL.</p> <p>D. CG XXIV CORPS: IDENTIFY 1,000 ADDITIONAL SPACES FROM FORCES OVER WHICH YOU HAVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL. SPECIFICALLY REQUEST CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE REDUCTION IN THE 10,800 SPACES FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE PROPOSED BY CG III MAF IN RESPONSE TO REF. ALSO, REQUEST COMMENT ON THE POSSIBILITY (AS A SEPARATE ALTERNATIVE) OF REDEPLOYING THE 1,200 USMC SPACES PROPOSED BY CG III MAF FOR A LOGISTIC ROLL-UP FORCE AND RETAINING THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED AS A TEMPORARY OVERSTRENGTH.</p> <p>E. ALL: PROVIDE A STATEMENT OF IMPACT INCLUDING A RELATIVE REDEPLOYMENT PRIORITY FOR THE UNITS INVOLVED.</p> <p>5. (TS) IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS REQUEST IS FOR STAFF PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY. UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.</p> <p>BT</p> <p>GP-4</p>					
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3	3		
P&GRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	

(22)

RESERVED FOR COMSEC/COMINT/CRYPTO

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
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PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO

DTG

230842Z MAR 70

FROM: CG III MAF

TO: CG FIRST MAW

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TOP SECRET/EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR MGEN
THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. FOLLOWING PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

212132Z MAR 70

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO CG III MAF

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM
MGEN ADAMS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS. //N00000//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG III MAF 190130Z MAR70 (TS/MCEO)

1. (TS) REF A ADDRESSED DUAL SITING, COLLOCATION, AND
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE RESIDUAL MAB AVIATION
COMPONENT.

2. (TS) AT THE PRESENT TIME, THERE IS NO DEFINITE INFOR-
MATION ON THE MARINE CORPS FORCE LEVEL WHICH WILL REMAIN

DATE	TIME
23	1445
MONTH	YEAR
MAR	70
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	2

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TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE
2288

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S
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R

SIGNATURE

Dulacki

LEO J. DULACKI
CHIEF OF STAFF

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

915

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

23 TOP SECRET

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

08 42

(23)

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	
PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY	
ACTION PRIORITY				LEO J. DULACKI, C/S	
INFO				PHONE 2288	
<p>IN COUNTRY FOLLOWING PHASE IV TROOP REDEPLOYMENTS, HOWEVER, ANY SPACE REDUCTION WHICH CAN BE GAINED BY RECONFIGURATION OF THE FORCE STRUCTURE IN THE 8.9K, 9.4K, OR 10.8K RESIDUAL MAB'S WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE IN ANTICIPATION OF AN AUSTERE FORCE LEVEL CEILING BEING IMPOSED RELATIVE TO POST PHASE IV IN-COUNTRY FORCES.</p> <p>3. (TS) REF A ADVANCED THE DESIRABILITY, BECAUSE OF PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS AND CEILING, OF INVESTIGATING THE POSSIBILITY OF SINGLE SITING BOTH GROUPS OF THE RESIDUAL MAB AIR COMPONENT AT DANANG BECAUSE OF THE REDUCED PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS THAT WOULD ENSUE. IT IS CONSIDERED PRUDENT AND TIMELY, ESPECIALLY SINCE PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT EXECUTION MAY BE COMPRESSED, THAT THIS POSSIBILITY BE EXPLORED AND THAT THE COGNIZANT AIR FORCE AUTHORITIES BE CONTACTED AS TO THE FEASIBILITY OF ACCOMMODATING THE ASSETS OF THE RESIDUAL MAB AVIATION COMPONENT AT DANANG.</p> <p>4. (TS) ADDITIONALLY, IF YOU CONSIDER THAT SPACE REDUCTION CAN BE ACHIEVED IN OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE 8.9K, 9.4K, AND 10.8K RESIDUAL MAB'S, INFORMATION IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE APPRECIATED. WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS. BT GP-4</p>					
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2		
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	

JOINT MESSAGEFORM		RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATIONS USE		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				
TOP SECRET				
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	
PRECEDENCE				
ACTION PRIORITY				
INFO		DTG		
FROM: CG III MAF TO: CG FMFPAC TOP SECRET/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS) <u>FORCE PLANNING (U)</u> A. CG FILE LTR 3/CCB/6LS SER. 000270 OF 22 54470 (75)			SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
1. WHEN I LEFT HQS GEN CHAPMAN DISCUSSED WITH ME THE SUBJ OF THE FINAL BDE IN RVN AND MADE THE OBSERVATION THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE A SHOWCASE OUTFIT SINCE EVERYBODY WOULD BE WATCHING IT CLOSELY. HE INDICATED THAT IT MIGHT EVEN BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE A BOARD AT HQS TO SELECT PERSONNEL TO BE ASSIGNED TO IT. AT THE TIME I OFFERED THE SUGGESTION THAT PERHAPS THE PEOPLE WERE ALREADY HERE IN WESTPAC OR ON ORDERS TO GO. 2. ALTHOUGH I HAVE BEEN HERE ONLY TWO WEEKS, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT NO BOARD BE CONVENED AT HQS TO SELECT PER- SONNEL FOR THE FINAL BDE. EXCEPT FOR PERSONNEL FILLING BILLETS ON THE BDE STAFF I RECOMMEND THAT PERSONNEL TRANS- FERS BETWEEN UNITS BE HELD TO THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM. THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN QUITE A BIT OF MIXMASTERING IN MAF UNITS			DATE	
			22	TIME
			2100	MONTH
			MAR	YEAR
		PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	
		1	5	
D R A P T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE	
	KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON COMMANDING GENERAL	2236		
		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		REGRAIDING INSTRUCTIONS		
TOP SECRET 23		09 42		

2309422
MAR 70

DD FORM 173 NOV 68

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 53 WHICH WILL BE USED

PPC-JAPAN

(24)

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM or CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	
PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PAGE NO.
ACTION PRIORITY		K. B. MCCUTCHEON, CG	2236
INFO			

DURING PREVIOUS WITHDRAWAL PHASES, AND IT HAS HAD SOME ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE UNITS, PARTICULARLY ON AVIATION. THIS IMPACT HAS BEEN GREATEST WHEN THE MIXMASTER OCCURRED OVER A SHORT TIME FRAME AND SIMULTANEOUS WITH REDEPLOYMENT. IN AN ATTEMPT TO AVERT SUCH A SITUATION DURING PHASE IV WE ARE DESIGNATING SPECIFIC UNITS AT THIS TIME THAT WOULD REMAIN AND WILL COMMENCE TO MOVE MINIMUM KEY PERSONNEL AT AN ORDERLY PACE INTO THESE UNITS. GRANTED, WE DO NOT KNOW THE SIZE OF THE FINAL BDE BUT WE ARE IDENTIFYING UNITS ON THE BASIS OF THE LARGEST POSSIBLE ONE AS THAT WOULD REPRESENT THE MAXIMUM PROBLEM.

3. I REALIZE THAT IT WILL APPEAR DESIRABLE TO LET PERSONNEL GO HOME WHO HAVE BEEN OUT HERE ELEVEN, TEN, NINE OR EVEN EIGHT MONTHS, AND TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THOSE WHO HAVE ONLY BEEN HERE ONE, TWO, THREE OR FOUR MONTHS. I RECOMMEND THIS BE LOOKED AT VERY CAREFULLY AS THERE IS BOUND TO BE A TWOFOLD ADVERSE IMPACT ON WESTPAC UNITS. FIRST, THERE WOULD BE A MIXMASTERING AT A TIME WHEN TEAM WORK, COHESIVENESS, AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS ARE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE, AND SECONDLY, THERE WOULD BE A PERSONNEL ROTATION PROBLEM DOWNSTREAM, THE EXACT TIME DEPENDING ON HOW

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	5		
REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	

DD FORM 173-1 NOV 62

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.

100-1000

24

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
 01.3/02 CONTINUATION SHEET

TOP SECRET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY
ACTION PRIORITY		K. B. MCCUTCHEON, CG
INFO		2236

MANY MONTHS WERE CUT OFF THE OVERSEAS TOURS OF PERSONNEL PRESENTLY DEPLOYED HERE IN VN.

4. I KNOW THAT IT IS ALSO THE COMMANDANT'S DESIRE TO GET AS MANY PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE SOME DUTY IN VN. FOR THIS REASON IT WILL APPEAR DESIRABLE TO ROTATE PERSONNEL FROM JAPAN AND OKINAWA INTO RVN AND VICE VERSA. THIS ACTION WOULD CRFATE ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FOR THE REMAINING BDE WITH THE RESULT OF DECREASED EFFICIENCY AND IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY TRUE IF IT WAS IMPLEMENTED ON A MIXMASTERED BDE. RATHER THAN RESORTING TO INDIVIDUAL ROTATION I WOULD RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO ROTATING UNITS OF COMPANY, BATTERY OR SQUADRON SIZE. AS I HAVE INDICATED PREVIOUSLY IN A MESSAGE ON THIS SAME SUBJ ASSIGNING ADCON OF GROUND AND AIR UNITS OF THE BDE TO THE WESTPAC DIVISION AND WING WOULD FURTHER FACILITATE THE DESIRED TEAM WORK AND COHESIVENESS.

5. I WOULD NOW LIKE TO COMMENT ON THE QUESTION OF GENERAL OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS:

A. CONLEY IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN APRIL, SPANJER WILL LEAVE. I THINK IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO HAVE CONLEY REMAIN IN VN AFTER THE WING FLAG DEPARTS TO INSURE THAT ALL

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 3	NO. OF PAGES 5	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
PEGRAING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	

DD FORM 173-1
NOV 68

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 59 WHICH WILL BE USED.

PRC-Japan

24

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM or, if of CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	
PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY	
ACTION PRIORITY				K. B. MCCUTCHEON, CO 2236	
INFO					
<p>NECESSARY ROLL UP ACTIONS ARE COMPLETED. THRASH OR HIS RELIEF COULD DEPART AT A TIME, YET TO BE DESIGNATED, FOR JAPAN AND ESTABLISH THE WING CP THERE. AT THIS TIME FIRST WING REAR, AS NOW CONSTITUTED, WOULD DISAPPEAR ALTHOUGH FROM A PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW A REAR WOULD REMAIN IN VN WITH THE AWC. IF THE WING CP MOVES TO JAPAN PRIOR TO JOHNSON'S RTD, JOHNSON COULD REMAIN AS AN AWC, AND ASSIST THE WING COMMANDER IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA. IF THE WING CP MOVES AFTER JOHNSON'S RTD, THEN EITHER JOHNSON SHOULD BE EXTENDED OR A RELIEF WOULD BE REQUIRED. UPON COMPLETION OF THE WING REDEPLOYMENT IT MAYBE DESIRABLE ON A PERMANENT BASIS TO HAVE TWO AWCS ANYHOW - ONE IN JAPAN AND ONE IN OKINAWA. IF NOT, THEN PERHAPS CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO POSTING THE AWC IN THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCALE WHERE THE WING COMMANDER IS NOT.</p> <p>B. WHEELER OR HIS RELIEF AND DOEHLER SHOULD BOTH RETURN TO CONUS WITH THE DIVISION. THEY NEED NOT GO TOGETHER, AND THE EXACT TIMING OF EACH CAN BE WORKED OUT LATER. BUT, AS IN THE CASE OF THE WING, I BELIEVE THAT DOEHLER SHOULD BE THE LAST TO GO. I BELIEVE THAT DOEHLER SHOULD REMAIN IN COUNTRY LONGER AND INSURE THAT THE</p>					
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		4	5		
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	

DD FORM 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH WILL BE USED.

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM at d/of CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	
PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE		
ACTION PRIORITY		K. B. MCCUTCHEON, CG	2236		
INFO					
<p>DIVISION ROLL UP ACTIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.</p> <p><i>ALTHOUGH REF. A RECOMMENDED A Colonel as Commander</i></p> <p><i>OF ROLL-UP FORCE I BELIEVE</i></p> <p>C. PADALINO SHOULD REMAIN FOR HIS FULL TOUR AND TAKE CHARGE OF THE FLC ROLL UP UNIT. HOPEFULLY HIS RTD WILL COINCIDE WITH THE COMPLETION OF THE ROLL UP.</p> <p>D. DULACKI IS DUE TO ROTATE IN JUNE. IF A RELIEF COULD COME SOONER AS BDE COMMANDER DESIGNEE, HE COULD BEGIN ORGANIZING HIS STAFF AND MAKE PREPARATIONS TO TAKE OVER IN A SMOOTH AND EFFICIENT MANNER WITH NO LOSS OF TEMPO OR LET-DOWN IN COMBAT READINESS. I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT DULACKI'S RELIEF BE SENIOR TO PADALINO SO THAT WHETHER THE LOGISTIC ROLL UP FORCE IS PART OF THE BDE OR NOT THE BDE COMMANDER WOULD BE THE SENIOR MARINE IN I CORPS. IF THIS COURSE WERE ADOPTED TOM MILLER WOULD MOVE UP TO BE MY CHIEF OF STAFF UPON DETACHMENT OF DULACKI.</p> <p>E. IF A RELIEF IS NOT TO BE SENT OUT FOR DULACKI THEN WE COULD ASSIGN TOM MILLER AS PROSPECTIVE BDE COMMANDER, AND LET HIM START ORGANIZING THE STAFF, ETC. HIS G-3 SLOT WOULD BE TAKEN BY HIS DEPUTY, COLONEL WILKERSON. MILLER, OF COURSE, IS JUNIOR TO PADALINO SO IF THIS COURSE WERE FOLLOWED, I RECOMMEND THAT THE BDE AND THE FLC ROLL UP FORCES BE CONSIDERED AS TWO SEPARATE ENTITIES WITH MILLER AS THE TACTICAL COMMANDER REPORTING TO XXIV CORPS. WARM REGARDS.</p> <p>BT GP-4</p>					
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		5	5		
PEGRAING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
				TOP SECRET	

HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM III MAR		DATE 23 Mar 70			
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 2308A2Z		COPY NO. 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					FORCE PLANNING REMARKS: <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 5px;"> DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order F5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.	Section	Signature		
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9

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

TOP SECRET

A-9

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

"EXCLUSIVE"

ZNY PTTAZYUW RUMLMFA4352 0820842-AAAA--RUHMFMA.

P 230842Z MAR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

BT

T O P S E C R E T/EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 FOR MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
 FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. FOLLOWING PROVIDED FOR YOU INFO:

QUOTE

212132Z MAR 70

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO CG III MAF

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM
 MGEN ADAMS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING
 HOURS. //N00000//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG III MAF 190130Z MAR 70 (TS/MCEO)

1. (TS) REF A ADDRESSED DUAL SITING, COLLOCATION, AND
 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE RESIDUAL MAB AVIATION
 COMPONENT.

PAGE TWO RUMLMFA4352 T O P S E C R E T/EXCLUSIVE/MCEO

2. (TS) AT THE PRESENT TIME, THERE IS NO DEFINITE INFOR-
 MATION ON THE MARINE CORPS FORCE LEVEL WHICH WILL REMAIN
 IN COUNTRY FOLLOWING PHASE IV TROOP REDEPLOYMENTS. HOWEVER,
 ANY SPACE REDUCTION WHICH CAN BE GAINED BY RECONFIGURATION
 OF THE FORCE STRUCTURE IN THE 8.9K, 9.4K, OR 10.8K RESIDUAL
 MAB'S WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE IN ANTICIPATION OF AN
 AUSTERE FORCE LEVEL CEILING BEING IMPOSED RELATIVE TO POST
 PHASE IV IN-COUNTRY FORCES.

3. (TS) REF A ADVANCED THE DESIRABILITY, BECAUSE OF PER-
 SONNEL CONSTRAINTS AND CEILING, OF INVESTIGATING THE POS-
 SIBILITY OF SINGLE SITING BOTH GROUPS OF THE RESIDUAL MAB
 AIR COMPONENT AT DANANG BECAUSE OF THE REDUCED PERSONNEL
 REQUIREMENTS THAT WOULD ENSUE. IT IS CONSIDERED PRUDENT
 AND TIMELY, ESPECIALLY SINCE PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT EXECU-
 TION MAY BE COMPRESSED, THAT THIS POSSIBILITY BE EXPLORED
 AND THAT THE COGNIZANT AIR FORCE AUTHORITIES BE CONTACTED
 AS TO THE FEASIBILITY OF ACCOMODATING THE ASSETS OF THE
 RESIDUAL MAB AVIATION COMPONENT AT DANANG.

4. (TS) ADDITIONALLY, IF YOU CONSIDER THAT SPACE RE-
 DUCION CAN BE ACHIEVED IN OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE 8.9K,

"EXCLUSIVE"

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

(A-9)

TOP SECRET

MCEO

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE THREE RUM L M P A 4352 T O P S E C R E T / EXCLUSIVE / MCEO
9.4K, AND 10.8K RESIDUAL MAB'S, INFORMATION IN THIS RE-
CARD WOULD BE APPRECIATED. WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE. WARM
REGARDS.

CP-4

BT

4352

NNNN

EXCLUSIVE

MCEO
TOP SECRET

(A-9)


HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM III MAF		DATE 23 Mar 70			
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 230841Z		COPY NO. 2 OF 3 COPIES RECD.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
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	CG					FORCE PLANNING REMARKS: <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> <p>REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.</p> <p>The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.</p>	Section	Signature		
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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

TOP SECRET

A-10

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

PITAZYUW RUMLMPA4351 0820841-AAAA--RUHHFMA:

ZNY AAAAA

P 230841Z MAR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

MCEO

T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS) FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

220930Z MAR 70

FM CG DOLVIN COFS MACV SAIGON

TO GEN BROWN CDR 7AF TAN SON NHUT

LTG MILDREN DGC USARV LONG BINH

VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON

LTG CORCORAN CG I FFV NHA TRANG

LTG EWELL CG II FFV LONG BINH

LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG

INFO LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG

MG MCCOWN CG DMAC CAN THO

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY MAC 2791 EYES ONLY

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA4351 T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE

SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING (U)

REFERENCE: MAC 1517/011052Z FEB 1970 (TS/S)

1. (TS) REFERENCE REQUESTED VIEWS AND COMMENTS ON AN OUT-LINE STRATEGY FOR 1970 AND CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US REDEPLOYMENTS AFTER 15 APRIL.

2. (TS) AS A RESULT OF RESPONSES TO REFERENCE AND OTHER COMMAND AND STAFF EXCHANGES DURING RECENT WEEKS, THE MACV STAFF NOW LISTS THE FOLLOWING SPACE REDUCTIONS AS THOSE WHICH COMMANDERS CONCERNED WOULD CONSIDER FEASIBLE FOR A 50,000 SPACES PHASE 4 REDEPLOYMENT:

COMPONENT THOUSAND SPACES

USMC (II MAF) 29.4

USN 8.0

USA (BDE, III CTZ) 5.7

USA (CMBT SVC SPT) .6

USAF 1.4

TOTAL 45.1

3. (TS) ALTHOUGH COMUSMACV HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT FURTHER US REDEPLOYMENTS SHOULD BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE NEXT 90 DAYS, THE MACV STAFF IS CONTINUING

EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

"MCEO"

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA4351 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE
TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVES SHOULD A PHASE 4 REDEPLOYMENT BE DIR-
ECTED EARLIER. IN THAT REGARD, SUFFICIENT ALTERNATIVES FOR
GENERATION OF ADDITIONAL SPACES (ABOUT 5,000) FOR A POSSIBLE
50,000 SPACE PACKAGE HAVE NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED.

4. (TS) ACCORDINGLY, FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY, THE FOL-
LOWING REQUESTS ARE MADE USING THE FIGURES CITED IN PARA-
GRAPH 2 ABOVE AS A BASE:

A. CMDR 7AF: DCG USARV (USA CMBT SVC SPT FORCES): AND
COMNAVFORV: EACH IDENTIFY SOURCE OF 1,000 ADDITIONAL SPACES.

B. CG I FFV: IDENTIFY 750 ADDITIONAL SPACES FROM FORCES
OVER WHICH YOU HAVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

C. CG II FFV: IDENTIFY 1,000 ADDITIONAL SPACES FROM
FORCES OVER WHICH YOU HAVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

D. CG XXIV CORPS: IDENTIFY 1,000 ADDITIONAL SPACES
FROM FORCES OVER WHICH YOU HAVE OPERATIONAL CONTROL. SPECI-
FICALLY REQUEST CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE REDUCTION IN THE
10,800 SPACES FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE PROPOSED BY CG
III MAF IN RESPONSE TO REF. ALSO, REQUEST COMMENT ON THE
POSSIBILITY (AS A SEPARATE ALTERNATIVE) OF REDEPLOYING THE
1,200 USMC SPACE PROPOSED BY CG III MAF FOR A LOGISTIC

PAGE FOUR RUMLMPA4351 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE
ROLL-UP FORCE AND RETAINING THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED AS A
TEMPORARY OVERSTRENGTH.

E. ALL: PROVIDE A STATEMENT OF IMPACT INCLUDING A
RELATIVE REDEPLOYMENT PRIORITY FOR THE UNITS INVOLVED.

5. (TS) IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS REQUEST IS FOR STAFF
PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY. UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

CP-4

BT

4351

NNNN

"MCEO"

"EXCLUSIVE"

SPECAT

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

///CORRECTED COPY///

TOD: 24/0601Z MAR 70

PAC#186

P 230942Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC
BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

TOP SECRET /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR LIGEN BUSE FROM LIGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG FLC LIR 3/CCB/GLS SER. 000270 OF 22 JAN 70 (YS)
1. WHEN I LEFT HQS GEN CHAPMAN DISCUSSED WITH ME THE SUBJ OF THE FINAL BDE IN RVN AND MADE THE OBSERVATION THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE A SHOWCASE OUTFIT SINCE EVERYBODY WOULD BE WATCHING IT CLOSELY. HE INDICATED THAT IT MIGHT EVEN BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE A BOARD AT HQS TO SELECT PERSONNEL TO BE ASSIGNED TO IT. AT THE TIME I OFFERED THE SUGGESTION THAT PERHAPS THE PEOPLE WERE ALREADY HERE IN WESTPAC OR ON ORDERS TO GO.
2. ALTHOUGH I HAVE BEEN HERE ONLY TWO WEEKS, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT NO BOARD BE CONVENED AT HQS TO SELECT PERSONNEL FOR THE FINAL BDE. EXCEPT FOR PERSONNEL FILLING BILLETS ON THE BDE STAFF I RECOMMEND THAT PERSONNEL TRANSFERS BETWEEN UNITS BE HELD TO THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM. THERE

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA436I TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MCEO HAS ALREADY BEEN QUITE A BIT OF MIXMASTERING IN MAF UNITS DURING PREVIOUS WITHDRAWAL PHASES, AND IT HAS HAD SOME ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE UNITS, PARTICULARLY ON AVIATION. THIS IMPACT HAS BEEN GREATEST WHEN THE MIXMASTER OCCURRED OVER A SHORT TIME FRAME AND SIMULTANEOUS WITH REDEPLOYMENT. IN AN ATTEMPT TO AVERT SUCH A SITUATION DURING PHASE IV WE ARE DESIGNATING SPECIFIC UNITS AT THIS TIME THAT WOULD REMAIN AND WILL COMMENCE TO MOVE MINIMUM KEY PERSONNEL AT AN ORDERLY PACE INTO THESE UNITS. GRANTED, WE DO NOT KNOW THE SIZE OF THE FINAL BDE BUT WE ARE IDENTIFYING UNITS ON THE BASIS OF THE LARGEST POSSIBLE ONE AS THAT WOULD REPRESENT THE MAXIMUM PROBLEM.

3. I REALIZE THAT IT WILL APPEAR DESIRABLE TO LET PERSONNEL GO HOME WHO HAVE BEEN OUT HERE ELEVEN, TEN, NINE OR EVEN EIGHT MONTHS, AND TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THOSE WHO HAVE ONLY BEEN HERE ONE, TWO, THREE OR FOUR MONTHS. I RECOMMEND THIS BE LOOKED AT VERY CAREFULLY AS THERE IS BOUND TO BE A TWOFOLD ADVERSE IMPACT ON WESTPAC UNITS. FIRST, THERE WOULD BE A MIXMASTERING AT A TIME WHEN TEAM WORK, COHESIVENESS, AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS ARE OF VITAL

PG 1-3

"MCEO"

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

(A/IV)

TOP SECRET

"MCEO" EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA4361 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E / M C E O
 IMPORTANCE, AND SECONDLY, THERE WOULD BE A PERSONNEL ROTATION PROBLEM DOWNSTREAM, THE EXACT TIME DEPENDING ON HOW MANY MONTHS WERE CUT OFF THE OVERSEAS TOURS OF PERSONNEL PRESENTLY DEPLOYED HERE IN VN.

4. I KNOW THAT IT IS ALSO THE COMMANDANT'S DESIRE TO GET AS MANY PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE SOME DUTY IN VN. FOR THIS REASON IT WILL APPEAR DESIRABLE TO ROTATE PERSONNEL FROM JAPAN AND OKINAWA INTO RVN AND VICE VERSA. THIS ACTION WOULD CREATE ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FOR THE REMAINING BDE WITH THE RESULT OF DECREASED EFFICIENCY AND IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY TRUE IF IT WAS IMPLEMENTED ON A MIXMASTERED BDE. RATHER THAN RESORTING TO INDIVIDUAL ROTATION I WOULD RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO ROTATING UNITS OF COMPANY, BATTERY OR SQUADRON SIZE. AS I HAVE INDICATED PREVIOUSLY IN A MESSAGE ON THIS SAME SUBJ ASSIGNING ADCON OF GROUND AND AIR UNITS OF THE BDE TO THE WESTPAC DIVISION AND WING WOULD FURTHER FACILITATE THE DESIRED TEAM WORK AND COHESIVENESS.

5. I WOULD NOW LIKE TO COMMENT ON THE QUESTION OF GENERAL OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS:

PAGE FOUR RUMLMPA4361 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E / M C E O

A. CONLEY IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN APRIL, SPANJER WILL LEAVE. I THINK IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO HAVE CONLEY REMAIN IN VN AFTER THE WING FLAG DEPARTS TO INSURE THAT ALL NECESSARY ROLL UP ACTIONS ARE COMPLETED. THRASH OR HIS RELIEF COULD DEPART AT A TIME, YET TO BE DESIGNATED, FOR JAPAN AND ESTABLISH THE WING CP THERE. AT THIS TIME FIRST WING REAR, AS NOW CONSTITUTED, WOULD DISAPPEAR ALTHOUGH FROM A PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW A REAR WOULD REMAIN IN VN WITH THE AWC. IF THE WING CP MOVES TO JAPAN PRIOR TO JOHNSON'S RTD, JOHNSON COULD REMAIN AS A AWC, AND ASSIST THE WING COMMANDER IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA. IF THE WING CP MOVES AFTER JOHNSON'S RTD, THEN EITHER JOHNSON SHOULD BE EXTENDED OR A RELIEF WOULD BE REQUIRED. UPON COMPLETION OF THE WING REDEPLOYMENT IT MAYBE DESIRABLE ON A PERMANENT BASIS TO HAVE TWO AWCs ANYHOW - ONE IN JAPAN AND ONE IN OKINAWA. IF NOT, THEN PERHAPS CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO POSTING THE AWC IN THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCALE WERE THE WING COMMANDER IS NOT.

B. WHEELER OR HIS RELIEF AND DOEWLER SHOULD BOTH RETURN TO CONUS WITH THE DIVISION. THEY NEED NOT GO TO-

PG 2-3

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET

"MCEO" "EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE FIVE RUMMPA4361 T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MCEO
 GETHER, AND THE EXACT TIMING OF EACH CAN BE WORKED OUT
 LATER. BUT, AS IN THE CASE OF THE WING, I BELIEVE THAT
 DOEHLER SHOULD BE THE LAST TO GO. I BELIEVE THAT DOEHLER
 SHOULD REMAIN IN COUNTRY LONGER AND INSURE THAT THE
 DIVISION ROLL UP ACTIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.

C. PADALINO SHOULD REMAIN FOR HIS FULL TOUR AND TAKE
 CHARGE OF THE FLC ROLL UP UNIT. HOPEFULLY HIS RTD WILL
 COINCIDE WITH THE COMPLETION OF THE ROLL UP.

D. DULACKI IS DUE TO ROTATE IN JUNE. IF A RELIEF
 COULD COME SOONER AS BDE COMMANDER DESIGNEE, HE COULD BEGIN
 ORGANIZING HIS STAFF AND MAKE PREPARATIONS TO TAKE OVER IN
 A SMOOTH AND EFFICIENT MANNER WITH NO LOSS OF TEMPO OR LET-
 DOWN IN COMBAT READINESS. I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT DULACKI'S
 RELIEF BE SENIOR TO PADALINO SO THAT WHETHER THE LOGISTIC
 ROLL UP FORCE IS PART OF THE BDE OR NOT THE BDE COMMANDER
 WOULD BE THE SENIOR MARINE IN I CORPS. IF THIS COURSE WERE
 ADOPTED TOM MILLER WOULD MOVE UP TO BE MY CHIEF OF STAFF
 UPON DETACHMENT OF DULACKI.

E. IF A RELIEF IS NOT TO BE SENT OUT FOR DULACKI THEN
 WE COULD ASSIGN TOM MILLER AS PROSPECTIVE BDE COMMANDER, AND

PAGE SIX RUMMPA4361 T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MCEO
 LET HIM START ORGANIZING THE STAFF, ETC. HIS G-3 SLOT WOULD
 BE TAKEN BY HIS DEPUTY, COLONEL WILKERSON. MILLER, OF COURSE,
 IS JUNIOR TO PADALINO SO IF THIS COURSE WERE FOLLOWED, I
 RECOMMEND THAT THE BDE AND THE FLC ROLL UP FORCES BE CON-
 sidered AS TWO SEPARATE ENTITIES WITH MILLER AS THE TACTICAL
 COMMANDER REPORTING TO XXIV CORPS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

4361

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COMM NOTE: MESSAGE CORRECTED THROUGHOUT BY
 COMMUNICATION CENTER.

PG 3-3

NNNN

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET

**HEADQUARTERS
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 25 Mar 70					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 250744Z MAR 70		COPY NO. / OF 3 COPIES RECD.					
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CONFIDENTIAL

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

DESTROY BY BURNING

TOD: 25/1047Z MAR 70

PAC DE FLC 112
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P 250744Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
TO RUHNFMA/CG FMFPAC
BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
(DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

AIRCRAFT CRASH INVOLVING CG, AMERICAL DIVISION
1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PRELIMINARY REPORT PROVIDED
ME BY THRASH REGARDING THE SUBJECT ACCIDENT.

QUOTE

1. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT CRASH
HAS BEEN COMPLETED. THE REPORT IS CURRENTLY BEING WRITTEN.
IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE FINAL REPORT WILL BE COMPLETED
WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

2. A COMPLETE BRIEFING BY COLONEL DUNWIDDIE, SENIOR MEMBER
OF THE BOARD, HAS ASSURED ME OF THE FOLLOWING FACTS:

A. THAT THE RADAR AND IFF EQUIPMENT UTILIZED TO CON-
TROL MAJGEN RAMSEY'S AIRCRAFT WERE IN GOOD WORKING ORDER
AND HAD BEEN PROPERLY CERTIFIED BY THE USAF ON 11 MARCH

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA4804 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E / M C E O
1970.

B. THAT BOTH CONTROLLERS WERE WELL EXPERIENCED AND
LICENSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH FAA REGULATIONS AND OPNAV
REQUIREMENTS.

C. THAT THE PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY CHU LAI APPROACH
CONTROL WERE SOUND AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING REGU-
LATIONS.

D. THAT THE CRASH WAS NOT THE RESULT OF NEGLIGENCE
BY ANY MEMBER OF THE NAVAL SERVICE.

3. THE FINAL WRITTEN REPORT WILL BE COMPLETED UPON RECEIPT
OF CERTAIN REQUIRED INFORMATION FROM THE ARMY ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATIVE TEAM.

4. ALL INFORMATION OBTAINED BY FMAW INVESTIGATIVE BOARD
HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE ARMY INVESTIGATIVE TEAM.

5. THE FINAL WRITTEN REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED TO CG III
MAF AND A COPY SENT TO CG AMERICAL DIVISION.

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS.

G-4

BT

4804

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

NO	FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO
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INFO/COORD																	

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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SUBSEQUENT PAGES TO III MAF FORM 21-5 (11-68)
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE
DRAFT

— DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS & SPACES PER LINE —

TOP SECRET

2
CONSIDERED VIABLE IN THE ANTICIPATED POST PHASE IV ENVIRONMENT
IN ICTZ AND RETAINING THE ADVANTAGES AND CAPABILITIES ENUMER-
ATED IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF REF B.

B. AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED IN PARA 6 OF REF B, THE LOGISTIC
ROLL UP FORCE IS A TEMPORARY ADD ON TO POST PHASE IV MARINE
CORPS FORCES IN RVN AND IS REQUIRED TO INSURE ORDERLY RETRO-
GRADE OF MARINE CORPS SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL REMAIN
AFTER PHASE IV IS COMPLETED. DEPENDING ON THE AVAILABILITY OF
SHIPPING AND THE DATES OF COMMENCEMENT AND COMPLETION OF PHASE
IV, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE LOGISTIC ROLL UP FORCE WILL HAVE
COMPLETED ITS TASKS IN 90-120 DAYS AFTER DEPARTURE OF THE LAST
MARINE CORPS PHASE IV UNIT. ACCORDINGLY, AS OPTION I, THIS
HEADQUARTERS INTERPOSES NO OBJECTION TO REDEPLOYMENT OF 1200
SPACES DURING PHASE IV AS PROPOSED IN REF A PROVIDED THE PER-
SONNEL ARE RETAINED IN COUNTRY FOR UP TO 120 DAYS. IF THIS

TEMPORARY OVERAGE IS NOT APPROVED, THE PROPOSAL SET
FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING SUBPARAGRAPH IS RECOMMENDED.

C. OPTION II: RATHER THAN REDUCE THE COMBAT POWER OF THE
MAB APPRECIABLY, THIS HEADQUARTERS PROPOSES ELIMINATING THE
COMBINED ACTION GROUP AT A SAVING OF 600 SPACES. THE REMAINING
400 OF THE 1000 SPACES REQUIRED MUST BE OBTAINED AT THE DIRECT

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SUBSEQUENT PAGES TO III MAF FORM 21-5 (11-68)
 OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE
 DRAFT

— DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS & SPACES PER LINE —

TOP SECRET

EXPENSE OF THE MAB. REDUCTION OF THE ENGINEER CAPABILITY BY SUBSTITUTING A COMPANY OF COMBAT ENGINEERS FOR THE HEAVIER FORCE ENGINEERS IN THE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENT OF THE MAB IS ACCEPTABLE. ENGINEER STRENGTH WOULD BE REDUCED BY 400 TO 269.

3. OPTION III: AS A FALLBACK POSITION NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED TO JOINT OR ARMY CHANNELS AT THIS TIME, THE FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS IN ORDER OF PRIORITY IN 10.8K MAB ARE PROPOSED IN THE EVENT.

OPTIONS I AND II ARE UNACCEPTABLE:

<u>PRIORITY.</u>	<u>ACTION</u>	<u>SPACE REDUCTION</u>
1.	DELETE ENGR BN (-) (REPLACE WITH DIV ENGR CO 161)	508
2.	REDUCE DET HQ BTRY ARTY REGT	12
3.	DELETE DET HMH-463	88
4.	REDUCE HQ MAB	85
5.	DELETE HQ CO MAB (ASSUMES COLLOCATION WITH GROUND OR AIR ELEMENT)	85
6.	REDUCE DET RAD BN	51
7.	DELETE 175MM GUN BTRY	<u>171</u>
TOTAL REDUCTION		1000

4. AS A NEW BUT RELATED MATTER, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SUPPORT/TRANSITIONAL FORCE BE REEXAMINED. PROGRAM 9 CONTAINS 766 NON-III MAF SPACES AND 600

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

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SUBSEQUENT PAGES TO III MAF FORM 21-5 (11-68)
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE
DRAFT

— DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS & SPACES PER LINE —

TOP SECRET

WILL REMAIN AFTER PHASE IV. IF THIS FORCE WERE REDUCED PROPORTIONATELY WITH III MAF PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENTS, APPROXIMATELY 568 SPACES WOULD LEAVE RVN. A SAVING OF EVEN 400 SPACES WOULD NEGATE THE NECESSITY TO DRAWDOWN THE MAB AS DISCUSSED IN OPTION II.

5. ADOPTION OF OPTION I WOULD HAVE NO FORESEEABLE IMPACT ON EITHER THE MAB OR OPERATIONS IN RVN. OPTION II REMOVES THE LAST VESTIGES OF THE COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM WITH CONSEQUENT SLOWING, IF NOT REVERSAL, OF PACIFICATION PROGRESS IN SOME AREAS OF QUANG NAM. THE REDUCED HEAVY ENGINEERING CAPABILITY IN THE MAB IS SIGNIFICANT ONLY IF THERE IS NO NAVY MCB AVAILABLE. OPTION III ON THE OTHER HAND DRAWS DOWN ON MAB HEAD-QUARTERS TO THE EXTENT THAT COLLOCATION WITH THE AIR AND/OR GROUND ELEMENT IS MANDATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITY IS MARGINAL AT BEST. THE LOSS OF THE 175MM GUN BATTERY DEPRIVES THE MAB OF SOME LONG RANGE FIRE SUPPORT, BUT TWO FIXED WING SQUADRONS (INCLUDING ONE A-6) ARE STILL AVAILABLE TO FULFILL THAT NEED UNDER MOST CONDITIONS.

6. FOLLOWING REDEPLOYMENT PRIORITIES ARE PLANNED, BUT SUBJECT TO CHANGE DUE TO SHIPPING AVAILABILITY:

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SUBSEQUENT PAGES TO III MAF FORM 21-5 (11-68)
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE
DRAFT

— DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS & SPACES PER LINE —

TOP SECRET

MAJOR UNIT PRIORITY FOR REDEPLOYMENT

3D FORCE RECON CO

VMCJ-1

9TH ENGR BN

VMA(AW) 242

RLT-5

DET CAF

DET HQ BN, 1ST MARDIV

1ST BRIDGE CO (-)

3D MP BN

DET 7TH ENGR BN

DET FLC

11TH MT BN

MWSG-17

MWCG-18

MWHG-1

HMH-161

HMH-463

~~6~~ VMFA-115

VMFA-314

DET CAF

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SUBSEQUENT PAGES TO III MAF FORM 21-5 (11-68)
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE
DRAFT

— DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS & SPACES PER LINE —

TOP SECRET

- RLT-7
- 5TH COMM BN (-)
- HQ III MAF
- 1ST MED BN (-)
- 1ST MP BN (-)
- VMFA-122
- H&MS-13
- MABS-13
- RAD BN (-)
- 3D 175MM GUN BTRY
- 1ST MT BN
- HQ BN (-) 1ST MARDIV
- 1ST FORCE RECON CO
- HMM-263
- HMM-364
- HML-167
- VMO-2 (-)
- 3D 8" HOW BTRY F
- DET FLC
- DET 11TH MT BN

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SUBSEQUENT PAGES TO III MAP FORM 21-5 (11-68)
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED/EFTO SMOOTH MESSAGE
DRAFT

— DOUBLE SPACE-MAXIMUM 65 CHARACTERS & SPACES PER LINE —

TOP SECRET

7. IN SUMMARY IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT IN RESPONSE TO REF A,
OPTIONS I AND II BE SUBMITTED TO CG, XXIV CORPS TOGETHER WITH
THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6. IT IS FURTHER RECOM-
MENDED THAT OPTION III BE APPROVED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES WITHIN
THE MARINE CORPS AND THAT THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE
SUPPORT/TRANSITIONAL FORCE BE REEXAMINED FOR POSSIBLE SUB-
STITUTION IN OPTION II OR III.

8. REQUEST COMMENT/APPROVAL OF ABOVE PROPOSALS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

DESTROY BY BURNING

TOD: 25/1047Z MAR 70

PAC DE FLC 112

PTTZYUW RUMLNPA4804 0840744-AAAC--RUHFFMA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 250744Z MAR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

EXCLUSIVE

CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
(DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

AIRCRAFT CRASH INVOLVING CG, AMERICAL DIVISION

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PRELIMINARY REPORT PROVIDED
ME BY THRASH REGARDING THE SUBJECT ACCIDENT.
QUOTE

1. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT CRASH
HAS BEEN COMPLETED. THE REPORT IS CURRENTLY BEING WRITTEN.
IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE FINAL REPORT WILL BE COMPLETED
WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

2. A COMPLETE BRIEFING BY COLONEL DUNWIDDIE, SENIOR MEMBER
OF THE BOARD, HAS ASSURED ME OF THE FOLLOWING FACTS:

A. THAT THE RADAR AND IFF EQUIPMENT UTILIZED TO CON-
TROL MAJGEN RAMSEY'S AIRCRAFT WERE IN GOOD WORKING ORDER
AND HAD BEEN PROPERLY CERTIFIED BY THE USAF ON 11 MARCH

PAGE TWO RUMLNPA4804 CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MCEO
1970.

B. THAT BOTH CONTROLLERS WERE WELL EXPERIENCED AND
LICENSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH FAA REGULATIONS AND OPNAV
REQUIREMENTS.

C. THAT THE PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY CHU LAI APPROACH
CONTROL WERE SOUND AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING REGU-
LATIONS.

D. THAT THE CRASH WAS NOT THE RESULT OF NEGLIGENCE
BY ANY MEMBER OF THE NAVAL SERVICE.

3. THE FINAL WRITTEN REPORT WILL BE COMPLETED UPON RECEIPT
OF CERTAIN REQUIRED INFORMATION FROM THE ARMY ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATIVE TEAM.

4. ALL INFORMATION OBTAINED BY PMAW INVESTIGATIVE BOARD
HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE ARMY INVESTIGATIVE TEAM.

5. THE FINAL WRITTEN REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED TO CG III
MAF AND A COPY SENT TO CG AMERICAL DIVISION.

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS.

G-4

BT

4804

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

NO	FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO
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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND
DESTROY BY BURNING

SPECAT

PAC#122, DIV#058

TOD: 27/0030Z MAR 70

PTIAZYUW RUMLPAS135 0852334-AAAA--RUHNFMA RUMLLUA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 262334Z MAR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHNFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMLLUA/CG FIRST MARDIV

ZEN/CG FORLOGCOMD

BT

T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FOR LTGEN BUSH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON

1. PRESENT REDUCTION IN DOG HANDLING PERSONNEL COUPLED WITH
PENDING PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT INDICATES NECESSITY TO BEGIN
REDUCTION OF IN COUNTRY MARINE CORPS WAR DOG ASSETS.
CURRENT STATUS OF DOGS AND HANDLERS IS:

A. SENTRY DOGS - 54; HANDLERS - 34.

B. SCOUT DOGS - 67; HANDLERS - 37.

C. MINE AND BOOBY TRAP (MBT) DOGS - 14; HANDLERS - 18.

2. PRIMARY CONSIDERATION CONCERNING DISPOSITION OF WAR DOGS
IS THAT THEY WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO LEAVE COUNTRY DUE TO
RVN COMMUNICABLE DISEASE.

3. CURRENT INFORMATION INDICATES 14 ADDITIONAL MBT DOGS AND 30
MARINE CORPS SUPPORT PERSONNEL WILL ARRIVE RVN ABOUT 1 JUN 70

PAGE TWO RUMLPAS135 T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT/MCLO
COMPLETING TOTAL PACKAGE OF 28 DOGS AND 48 SUPPORT PERSONNEL IN
MBT DOG TEAM PROGRAM.

4. PROPOSED MAB INCLUDES 121 SPACES FOR MF COMPANY. TENTATIVE
PLANS WOULD ALLOCATE 10 SENTRY, 10 SCOUT AND 28 MBT DOGS TO MAB
WITH 70 HANDLERS ASSIGNED TO MF CO.

5. RECOMMEND ACTION BE INITIATED TO TURN OVER SURPLUS DOGS TO
ARMY FORCES REMAINING RVN STARTING 1 MAY 70 AND/OR ARVN REQUIRE-
MENT BE DETERMINED.

6. REQUEST COMMENT/APPROVAL.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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6135

///Eas Baen Sent///

Copy 3 of 4 Copies

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HQ FLC	C/S	Y/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPY	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LOG	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																			
INFO/COORD																			

TOP SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

(27)

HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM	DATE	
					CG III MAR	28MAR70	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO.	OF	COPIES REC'D
			281141		1	1	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT		ACMC WESTPAC VISIT	
	CG						
	DCG						
	C/S	I		3/29	J		
	DC/S	I		3/29	P		
	DCS PLANS						
	DEP CORDS						
	DSA ICTZ						
1	S/S	I	3/29		C 9		
	G-1						
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	G-5						
	G-6						
	ADJ						
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	TCC						
	SGT MAJ						

REMARKS:

DISPOSITION:

Retain for ___ months.

Destroy after routing.

Section	Signature

REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.

The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

TOP SECRET

A-14

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COMMUNICATION CENTER
HEADQUARTERS
FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND

DESTROY BY BURNING

PTISZYUW RUMMPA6525 0871141-SSSS--RUEOFIA RUHFMA.
ZNY SSSSS
FMFPAC-T-CMC
P 281141Z MAR 70
FM CG III MAF
TO RUEOFIA/ACMC
INFO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT
SECRET SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY EXCLUSIVE FOR
GEN WALT INFO LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
ACMC WESTPAC VISIT

1. SPENT AFTERNOON WITH GEN LAM. HE JUST RETURNED
FROM SAIGON AND TOLD ME THAT IF GEN WALT WOULD LIKE
TO SEE THE PRESIDENT ON HIS VISIT NEXT MONTH THAT
HE THOUGHT HE COULD ARRANGE IT. I TOLD HIM YOU
WERE NOT SCHEDULED FOR SAIGON THIS TRIP BUT WOULD
LET YOU KNOW.

2. IF YOU DESIRE THIS LAID ON PLEASE ADVISE.
UNQUOTE. RESPECTFULLY YOURS.

GP-4

BT

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NO	FLC	C/S	S/S	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	G-5	COMPT	ADJ	CEO	T/E	LDC	LEGAL	MED	TRNG	DISBO			
ACT/COG																				
INFO/COORD																				

(A-14)

SECRET

PRIORITY
PRIORITY

CG III MAF

281141

ACMC

INFO: CG FMFPAC

SECRET/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR
 GEN WALT ~~INFO~~ LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON
 ACMC WESTPAC VISIT

1. SPENT AFTERNOON WITH GEN LAM. HE JUST RETURNED FROM SAIGON AND TOLD ME THAT IF GEN WALT WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE PRESIDENT ON HIS VISIT NEXT MONTH THAT HE THOUGHT HE COULD ARRANGE IT. I TOLD HIM YOU WERE NOT SCHEDULED FOR SAIGON THIS TRIP BUT WOULD LET YOU KNOW.
 2. IF YOU DESIRE THIS LAID ON PLEASE ADVISE.
- UNQUOTE. RESPECTFULLY YOURS.

BT

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2236
 KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON
 COMMANDING GENERAL

SECRET

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(28)

P 020045Z ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG XXIV CORPS
 ZEM

TOP SECRET

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / E Y E S O N L Y / F O R L I G E N Z A I S F R O M L I G E N
 MCCUTCHEON
 FORCE PLANNING

A. MACV 220930Z MAR 70 (TS/EYES ONLY) MAC 2781

B. CG III MAF 070857Z FEB 70 (TS/EYES ONLY)

1. REF A REQUESTS THAT CG, XXIV CORPS IDENTIFY 1000 ADDITIONAL SPACES FROM FORCES UNDER HIS OPCON FOR PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT. STATEMENT OF IMPACT AND RELATIVE PRIORITY OF UNITS FOR REDEPLOYMENT ALSO DESIRED WITH SPECIFIC COMMENT ON POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING 10.8K MAB AND/OR REDEPLOYING 1200 LOGISTIC ROLL UP FORCE SPACES, BUT RETAINING PERSONNEL IN COUNTRY AS TEMPORARY OVERSTRENGTH.

2. THE LOGISTIC ROLL UP FORCE IS A TEMPORARY ADD ON TO POST PHASE IV MARINE FORCES AND IS REQUIRED TO ENSURE ORDERLY RETROGRADE OF MARINE CORPS SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL REMAIN AFTER PHASE IV IS COMPLETED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE PROPOSED FORCE HAS NO ORGAINC SECURITY UNIT AND MUST RELY ON OTHER FORCES TO PROVIDE SECURITY UNTIL RETROGRADE OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IS COMPLETED. DEPENDING ON THE AVAILABILITY OF SHIPPING AND THE DATES OF COMMENCEMENT AND COMPLETION OF PHASE IV IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE LOGISTIC ROLL UP FORCE WILL HAVE COMPLETED ITS TASKS IN 90-120 DAYS AFTER DEPARTURE OF THE LAST MARINE CORPS PHASE IV UNIT. ACCORDINGLY, AS OPTION 1, THIS HEADQUARTERS INTERPOSES NO OBJECTION TO REDEPLOYMENT OF 1200 SPACES DURING PHASE IV AS PROPOSED REF A PROVIDED THE PERSONNEL ARE RETAINED IN COUNTRY AS 1200 FOR THE PROGRAM STRENGTH FOR UP TO 120 DAYS POST PHASE FOUR.

3. A. IF TEMPORARY OVERAGE IN PARA 2 IS NOT APPROVED, UP TO 750 SPACES COULD BE TAKEN FROM THE MAB AS FOLLOWS (OPTION II):

(1) ELIMINATE THE FORCE ENGINEER BATTALION (-) AND REPLACE WITH A COMPANY OF COMBAT ENGINEERS.

(2) DELETE THE HEAVY HELICOPTER (CH-53) DETACHMENT.

(3) REDUCE THE DETACHMENT RADIO BATTALION TO A TOTAL OF 85 SPACES.

(4) DELETE THE MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT.

(5) ELIMINATE THE DETACHMENT OF THE FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY.

B. IF MORE THAN 750 SPACES MUST BE REDUCED, THE 175MM GUN BATTERY (6 GUNS) COULD BE REMOVED FROM THE TASK ORGANIZATION OF THE MAB WITH AN ADDITIONAL SAVING OF 171 SPACES.

4. A. ADOPTION OF OPTION I WOULD HAVE NO FORESEEABLE IMPACT ON EITHER THE MAB OR OPERATIONS IN RVN. IN REGARD TO OPTION II, THE MAB CAPABILITIES AS SET FORTH TO COMUSMACV IN REF B, WOULD BE REDUCED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) LOSS OF THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT ORGANIC TO THE FORCE ENGINEERS WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT ONLY IF ARMY ENGINEER OR NAVY MCB SUPPORT IS NOT AVAILABLE.

(2) NO HEAVY HELICOPTER LIFT WITHIN THE MAB.

(3) MINIMAL SUPPORT FROM THE RADIO BATTALION.

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(4) THE CAPABILITY TO CONTROL HELICOPTERS UNDER ALL WEATHER CONDITIONS IS REMOVED.

(5) THE MAB LOSES THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT LONG RANGE RECON PATROLS.

B. THE IMPACT OF LOSS OF THE 175MM GUN BATTERY WOULD BE PARTICULARLY SEVER FOR U.S. AS WELL AS ARVN FORCES OPERATING IN THE AO. THIS BATTERY SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE REDUCTION ONLY AS A LAST RESORT.

5. THE UNCERTAINTY OF TIMING FOR PHASE IV AND ATTENDANT VARIABLE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING AVAILABILITY RENDERS INFEASIBLE AT THIS TIME THE FROMATION OF A DETAILED TIME PHASED REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE. IN GENERAL TERMS IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT ONE RLT, MOST LIKELY RLT-5, AND ONE FIXED WING ATTACK SQUADRON WOULD REDEPLOY RELATIVELY EARLY IN PHASE IV. THE BULK OF THE FMAW (INCLUDING THE REDEPLOYING FIXED WING SQUADRONS) AND ITS HEADQUARTERS WOULD DEPART NEXT FOLLOWED BY RLT-7 WITH THE III MAF AND 1ST MARDIV HEADQUARTERS.

6. AS A NEW BUT RELATED ITEM, ONGOING PLANNING FOR MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE ASSUMES THIS UNISERVICE FORCE OF COMBINED ARMS WILL BE TASKED TO EXECUTE MISSIONS AND TASKS AS DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV AND WILL BE UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CG, XXIV CORPS. THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ENVISAGES THAT THE MAB WILL USUALLY OPERATE IN AREAS ADJACENT TO THE DANANG VITAL AREA, BUT WILL RETAIN THE CAPABILITY TO RELOCATE TO ANY AREA IN ICIZ FOR OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE THOSE SUPPORTED EXCLUSIVELY BY HELICOPTER FOR LIMITED DURATION. THE MAB IS TRAINED FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT, BUT MIGHT REQUIRE CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS AND REINFORCEMENTS PRIOR TO EXECUTING AN OPPOSED LANDING. AIR ELEMENTS WILL OPERATE FROM DANANG AIRFIELD AND POSSIBLY MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENT IS STRUCTURED TO PERMIT RAPID EXPANSION OF THE MAB BY ONE OR MORE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES IF SO DIRECTED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY. THE CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT ASSUMES THAT DELIVERY OF ALL CLASSES OF SUPPLY WILL BE MADE BY THE MAB LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP ON SURFACE LOC'S TO ORGANIC ACCOUNTS IN THE DANANG AREA. DELIVERY TO MORE DISTANT AREAS OR BY OTHER MEANS WILL LIKELY REQUIRE SOME SUPPORT FROM SOURCES EXTERNAL TO THE BRIGADE. SUPPORT FOR SUCH SERVICES AS POST EXCHANGE, SPECIAL SERVICES, FIRE PROTECTION, BRIG OPERATIONS AND MEDICAL AND DENTAL SERVICES WILL REQUIRE ARMY ASSISTANCE.

7. REQUEST APPROVAL FOR PLANNING PURPOSES OF MISSION, CONCEPT AND AREA OF OPERATIONS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 6.
WARM REGARDS.

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THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY

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TOP SECRET

P 020713Z ZFF-1
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CG FIRST MAF
 CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEM

S E C R E T / EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN THRASH AND MGEN WHEELER FROM
 LTGEN MCCUTCHEON

MILITARY OPERATIONS NEAR CAMBODIAN BORDER

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

SUB: MILITARY OPERATIONS NEAR CAMBODIAN BORDER

REF: A. COMUSMACV DIG 230806Z DEC 69.

B. MACV DIR 335-12 DATED 20 DEC 69

C. MACV LETTER MACJ3-06 DATED 13 MAR 70, SUBJ: OFFICIAL
 MEETINGS BETWEEN US AND CAMBODIAN OFFICIALS (U)

D. COMUSMACV DIG 191057Z MAR 70

1. RECENT EVENTS IN CAMBODIA HAVE GENERATED QUESTIONS BY FIELD
 COMMANDERS AND, CONCURRENTLY, MACV IS RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR
 INFORMATION BY HIGHER AUTHORITY ON THIS SUBJECT. THIS MESSAGE
 CONSOLIDATES EXISTING GUIDANCE AND REPORTING PROCEDURES TO BE
 FOLLOWED ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) FOR CAMBODIA.

A. THE CURRENT SITUATION EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR CLOSE OBSER-
 VANCE BY US FORCES OF THE ROE FOR CAMBODIA (REF A). US COMMANDERS
 ARE TO ENSURE THAT NO, REPEAT NO, TARGET IS ENGAGED IN CAMBODIA
 UNLESS FRIENDLY FORCES ARE BEING FIRED ON FROM THE TARGET AND THE
 TARGET IS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS VC/NVA. NO, REPEAT NO, US FORCES
 ARE TO MANEUVER ACROSS THE BORDER INTO CAMBODIA EXCEPT AS MAY BE
 NECESSARY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE US FORCES CONCERNED.

B. IN THOSE CASES WHERE RVMAF CROSS THE CAMBODIAN BORDER TO
 CONDUCT OPERATIONS, US ADVISORS AND SUPPORT ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN
 IMMEDIATELY. A REPORT OF SUCH INCIDENTS IS TO BE MADE TO MACV IN
 ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE B.

3. GVN/CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS, WHEN INFORMED BY RVNAF AUTHORITIES
 THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BETWEEN GVN AND CAMBODIAN FORCES
 TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA AGAINST VC/NVA ELEMENTS, MACV
 SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS:

A. WILL DECLINE PARTICIPATION AND REPORT ARRANGEMENTS TO MACV
 UTILIZING THIS CHANNEL.

B. WILL URGE THEIR RVMAF COUNTERPARTS TO EXERCISE UTMOST CARE
 TO AVOID INFLECTING CASUALTIES ON CAMBODIAN CIVILIAN NON-COMBATANTS.

C. ARE AUTHORIZED TO ADJUST US FORCES AND FIRES WITHIN RVN TO
 COVER GAPS CREATED BY RVNAF MOVES.

4. FIRE SUPPORT FOR FARK.

A. US FORCES ARE NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO RESPOND TO FARK REQUESTS
 FOR FIRE SUPPORT AT THIS TIME.

B. PARA 3B AND 3C ABOVE ARE APPLICABLE. IN THIS REGARD, US
 ADVISORS ARE TO DECLARE TACTICAL EMERGENCIES ONLY AFTER FRIENDLY
 FORCES ARE BEING FIRED ON FROM THE TARGET; WHEN THERE IS POSITIVE
 ASSURANCE THAT THE TARGET IS VC/NVA; AND THAT THERE IS NO DANGER TO
 FARK UNITS OR CAMBODIAN NON-COMBATANTS.

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5. CAMBODIAN MEMBERS OF CIDG. SOME CAMBODIAN MEMBERS OF CIDG MAY CROSS OVER INTO CAMBODIA TO SUPPORT THE NEW GOVERNMENT. EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO PERSUADE THEM TO REMAIN WITH THE CIDG IM SVN. IN THE EVENT A DECISION IS MADE TO RETURN TO CAMBODIA, SUCH PERSONS ARE TO BE REQUESTED TO TURN IN THEIR WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT BEFORE DEPARTURE. USE OF FORCE IN GAINING RETURN OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT IS TO BE AVOIDED AS IT IS CONSIDERED TO BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE AT THIS TIME.

6. NOTHING CONTAINED HEREIN IS INTENDED TO PRECLUDE US PERSONNEL FROM PARTICIPATING IN OFFICIAL VISITS WITH CAMBODIAN OFFICIALS, ACCEPT CAMBODIAN HOSPITALITY, AND ENGAGE IN OTHER PROTOCOL ACTIVITIES AS SPECIFIED IN REFERENCE C AND AS DISTINGUISHED FROM MILITARY OPERATIONAL MATTERS. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT REFERENCE C IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" AND IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION, NOR WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE TO PERMIT PRESS COVERAGE OF MEETINGS HELD WITH CAMBODIANS AT OR NEAR THE BORDER.

7. REFERENCE D ISSUES PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CAMBODIA OR RELATIONSHIPS ALONG THE BORDER. THE GUIDANCE ENJOINS ALL PERSONNEL FROM DISCUSSING OR MAKING ANY COMMENTS, EITHER ON OR OFF THE RECORD, ABOUT THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION OR ANY ACTIVITIES RELATED THERETO INCLUDING RELATIONSHIPS WITH CAMBODIAN PERSONNEL ALONG THE BORDER.

8. NOTHING CONTAINED HEREIN IS TO BE CONSTRUED AS PROHIBITING US FORCES TO TAKE NECESSARY COUNTERACTIONS IN THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE AS AUTHORIZED AND DIRECTED BY REFERENCE A.

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS

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(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

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HA BEEN SENT

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SECRET