

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEX

APRILA
P
R
I
LA
P
R
I
LA
P
R
I
L

DTG	SENDER/ADDEE/SUBJECT/CLASSIFICATION
20- 010239Z	ADMIN FMFPAC to CG III MAF (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING
21- 011140Z	COMUSMACV TO DIST. LIST INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>gp-4</i> MILITARY OPERATIONS NEAR CAMBODIAN BORDER
22- 012217Z	ADMIN FMFPAC TO CG III MAF (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING
23- 021429	CMC TO CG FMFPAC/III MAF/THIRD MARDIV (U) FUND MANAGEMENT FOR THIRD MARDIV CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL
24- 030507Z	C/S MACV SAIGON TO DIST. LIST & CG III MAF (TS) <i>Declassified</i> APRIL COMMANDERS WIEU
25- 031405Z	CG XXIV CORPS TO C/S MACV SAIGON INFO <i>gp-4</i> COMNAVFORV & CG III MAF (TS)
26- 032211Z	CG FMFPAC TO ACMC INFO CG III MAF/THIRD MARDIV (U) FUND MANAGEMENT FOR THIRD MARDIV MEMORIAL CHILDRENS HOSPITAL
27- 040339Z	CG THIRD MARDIV TO CMC INFO CG FMFPAC/CG III MAF (U)
28- 042041Z	CG FMFPAC TO CG III MAF (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING
29- 071935Z	CG FMFPAC TO CMC INFO CG III MAF/CG FORLOGCMD (TS) <i>gp-4</i> SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR POST PHASE IV RESIDUAL FORCES (TS)
30- 072346Z	CG FMFPAC INFO CMC/CG III MAF READDL OF CINCPAC 070428Z (TS) FORCE PLANNING
31- 080009Z	CG FMFPAC TO CMC INFO CG III MAF READDL OF <i>gp-4</i> COMUSMACV 061453Z (TS) FORCE PLANNING

(2)

(2)

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEX

APRIL

A P R I L	DTG	SENDER/ADDEE/SUBJECT/CLASSIFICATION
	32- 080323Z	CG XXIV CORPS TO CG III MAF (TS) <i>gp-4</i> MAB CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
	33- 081006Z	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CMC INFO CG FMFPAC/ <i>gp-4</i> CG III MAF (S) <i>Declassified</i> HAMLET 4 SON THANG (V) RPT NO. 14
	34- 091232Z	CMC TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF(TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING
	35- 100857Z	C/S MACV SAIGON TO DIST. LIST & CG III MAF(S) <i>Declassified</i> APRIL COMMANDERS WIEU
	36- 190811Z	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CMC INFO CG FMFPAC & <i>gp-4</i> CG III MAF (S) <i>Declassified</i> HAMLET 4 SON THANG (V) RPT NO. 15
	37- 212015Z	CMC TO CG FMFPAC/CG III MAF (S) <i>gp-4</i> MARINE PARTICIPATION IN THE DELTA (S)
	38- 220607Z	READDRESSAL OF 212015Z TO CG FIRST MAF (S) <i>gp-4</i> MARINE PARTICIPATION IN THE DELTA (S)
	39- 231002Z	CG FMFPAC TO CMC INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>gp-4</i> MEDEVAC FOR MGEN WHEELER
	40- 232031Z	CMC TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>gp-4</i> MGEN WIDDECKE ARRIVAL INFO
	41- 240845Z	CG FMFPAC TO CMC INFO ADMIN FMFPAC/CG <i>gp-4</i> III MAF (S) MARINE PARTICIPATION IN THE DELTA (S)
	42- 241240Z	COMUSMACV TO DIST LIST & CG III MAF (U) VISIT BY MR. ROGER T. KELLEY, ASSTSECDEF
	43- 261429Z	COMUSMACV TO DIST. LIST INFO III MAF (U) TRIP OF HEBERT COMMITTEE
	44- 280822Z	CG FIRST MAF TO CG III MAF (C) <i>gp-4</i> TRIP OF HEBERT COMMITTEE
	45- 280903Z	CG FORLOGCMD TO CG III MAF (C) <i>gp-4</i> TRIP OF HEBERT SUBCOMMITTEE

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SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEX

APRIL

A P R I L

DTG

SENDER/ADDEE/SUBJECT/CLASSIFICATION

46-280959Z

CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG III MAF (U) *gp-4*
TRIP OF HEBERT COMMITTEE

A P R I L

A P R I L

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

W PAC739 TOR: 01/0305Z APR 70
OTTAZYUW RUHHFMA0026 09 1023 1-AAAA--R UMLMPA.
ZNY AAAAA
O 010231Z APR 70
FM ADMIN FMFPAC
TO R UMLMPA/CG III MAF
BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN MCCUTCHEON
FROM MAJ GEN ADAMS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. //N00000//
FORCE PLANNING (U)

- A. CMC 311223Z/MAR 70 (TS/SPECAT/MCEO) (NOTAL)
- B. TELCON BETWEEN C/S FMFPAC AND C/S III MAF 30MAR 70
- 1. (TS) IN REF A, AS DISCUSSED DURING REF B, YOUR OPTION II WAS NOT APPROVED AND SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED IN CONNECTION WITH XXIV CORPS REQUIREMENT TO IDENTIFY 1000 ADDITIONAL SPACES FOR PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT.
- 2. (TS) APPROVAL OF YOUR OPTION I IS AFFIRMED. IF THIS OPTION IS NOT ACCEPTED, YOUR FALL BACK OPTION III WITH PRIORITY OF REDUCTION FROM 10.8K TO 9.8K MAB IS APPROVED FOR NEGOTIATION WITH CG XXIV CORPS. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT YOU NOT OFFER UP THE ENTIRE 1000 SPACES INITIALLY BUT RATHER ONLY THAT NUMBER WHICH YOU CONSIDER FRUDENT UNDER THE

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA0026 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO CIRCUMSTANCES.

- 3. (TS) CMC ADVISES THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE SUPPORT/TRANSITIONAL NON-III MAF FORCES WILL BE ADDRESSED SEPARATELY BUT THAT THE .6K STILL REMAINS THE PREFERRED POSITION. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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01

02

"BCEO"

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

(29)

FM GEN ADAMS COMUSMACV

TO GEN BROWN CDR 7AF TAN MUN BRU.
 LTG MILDREN DOR USARV LONG BINH
 VADM ZURNALI COMNAVFORV SAIGON
 LTG COLLINS CG I FFV NHA TRANG
 LTG EWELL CG II FFV LONG BINH
 MG MCCOY CG DMAC CAN THO
 YSRKGLC/COL HEALY CG 5TH SPEC FRGS GP
 LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG
 LTG MCCUTCHEEN CG III MAF DA NANG
 ZEN

SECRET

SECRET MAC 4276 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: MILITARY OPERATIONS NEAR CAMBODIAN BORDER

REF: A. COMUSMACV DTG 230500Z DEC 69.

B. MACV DIR 555-12 DATED 28 DEC 69

C. MACV LETTER MACJ3-86 DATED 13 MAR 70, SUBJ: OFFICIAL MEETINGS BETWEEN US AND CAMBODIAN OFFICIALS (U)

D. COMUSMACV DTG 191057Z MAR 70

1. RECENT EVENTS IN CAMBODIA HAVE GENERATED QUESTIONS BY FIELD COMMANDERS AND, CONCURRENTLY, MACV IS RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION BY HIGHER AUTHORITY ON THIS SUBJECT. THIS MESSAGE CONSOLIDATES EXISTING GUIDANCE AND REPORTING PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) FOR CAMBODIA.

A. THE CURRENT SITUATION EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR CLOSE OBSERVANCE BY US FORCES OF THE ROE FOR CAMBODIA (REF A). US COMMANDERS ARE TO ENSURE THAT NO, REPEAT NO, TARGET IS ENGAGED IN CAMBODIA UNLESS FRIENDLY FORCES ARE BEING FIRED ON FROM THE TARGET AND THE TARGET IS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS VC/NVA. NO, REPEAT NO, US FORCES ARE TO MANEUVER ACROSS THE BORDER INTO CAMBODIA EXCEPT AS MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE US FORCES CONCERNED.

B. IN THOSE CASES WHERE RVNAF CROSS THE CAMBODIAN BORDER TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS, US ADVISORS AND SUPPORT ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN IMMEDIATELY. A REPORT OF SUCH INCIDENTS IS TO BE MADE TO MACV IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE B.

3. GVN/CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS. WHEN INFORMED BY RVNAF AUTHORITIES THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BETWEEN GVN AND CAMBODIAN FORCES TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA AGAINST VC/NVA ELEMENTS, MACV SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS:

A. WILL DECLINE PARTICIPATION AND REPORT ARRANGEMENTS TO MACV UTILIZING THIS CHANNEL.

B. WILL URGE THEIR RVNAF COUNTERPARTS TO EXERCISE UTMOST CARE TO AVOID INFLECTING CASUALTIES ON CAMBODIAN CIVILIAN NON-COMBATANTS.

C. ARE AUTHORIZED TO ADJUST US FORCES AND FIRES WITHIN RVN TO COVER GAPS CREATED BY RVNAF MOVES.

4. FIRE SUPPORT FOR FARK.

A. US FORCES ARE NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO RESPOND TO FARK REQUESTS FOR FIRE SUPPORT AT THIS TIME.

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(21)

B. PARAS 3B AND 3C ABOVE ARE APPLICABLE. IN THIS REGARD, US ADVISORS ARE TO DECLARE TACTICAL EMERGENCIES ONLY AFTER FRIENDLY FORCES ARE BEING FIRED ON FROM THE TARGET, WHEN THERE IS POSITIVE ASSURANCE THAT THE TARGET IS VC/RVA; AND THAT THERE IS NO DANGER TO PARK UNITS OR CAMBODIAN NON-COMBATANTS.

5. CAMBODIAN MEMBERS OF CIDG. SOME CAMBODIAN MEMBERS OF CIDG MAY CROSS OVER INTO CAMBODIA TO SUPPORT THE NEW GOVERNMENT. EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO PERSUADE THEM TO REMAIN WITH THE CIDG IN SVN. IN THE EVENT A DECISION IS MADE TO RETURN TO CAMBODIA, SUCH PERSONS ARE TO BE REQUESTED TO TURN IN THEIR WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT BEFORE DEPARTURE. USE OF FORCE IN GAINING RETURN OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT IS TO BE AVOIDED AS IT IS CONSIDERED TO BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE AT THIS TIME.

6. NOTHING CONTAINED HEREIN IS INTENDED TO PRECLUDE US PERSONNEL FROM PARTICIPATING IN OFFICIAL VISITS WITH CAMBODIAN OFFICIALS, ACCEPT CAMBODIAN HOSPITALITY, AND ENGAGE IN OTHER PROTOCOL ACTIVITIES AS SPECIFIED IN REFERENCE C AND AS DISTINGUISHED FROM MILITARY OPERATIONAL MATTERS. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT REFERENCE C IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" AND IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION, NOR WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE TO PERMIT PRESS COVERAGE OF MEETINGS HELD WITH CAMBODIANS AT OR NEAR THE BORDER.

7. REFERENCE D ISSUES PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CAMBODIA OR RELATIONSHIPS ALONG THE BORDER. THE GUIDANCE ENJOINS ALL PERSONNEL FROM DISCUSSING OR MAKING ANY COMMENTS, EITHER ON OR OFF THE RECORD, ABOUT THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION OR ANY ACTIVITIES RELATED THERETO INCLUDING RELATIONSHIPS WITH CAMBODIAN PERSONNEL ALONG THE BORDER.

8. NOTHING CONTAINED HEREIN IS TO BE CONSTRUED AS PROHIBITING US FORCES TO TAKE NECESSARY COUNTERACTIONS IN THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE AS AUTHORIZED AND DIRECTED BY REFERENCE A.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

88

THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY

COPY NR 7 OF 4 COPIES

NNNN

SECRET

21²

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

TOR 01/2330z APR 70

TPTIAZYUW RUHMFMA0151 09 12217-AAAA--R UMLMFA.
ZNY AAAAA
P 012217Z APR 70
FM ADMIN FMFPAC
TO RUMLMFA/CG III MAF
BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

T O P S E C R E T. SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCULCHEON
FROM MAJGEN ADAMS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //000000//
FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 140321Z JAN70 (TS)

1. (TS) THE OPPORTUNITY EXISTS AT THIS TIME TO DEVELOP
A POST PHASE IV TENTATIVE MANNING LEVEL WHICH CAN
PROVIDE AN ADVANCE BASIS FOR PERSONNEL/MANPOWER
PLANNING BOTH AT THIS HQ AND AT HOMC. EVEN THOUGH
A FIRM FINAL TROOP LIST HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED,
THERE IS SUFFICIENT INFO AVAILABLE UPON WHICH TO
BUILD SUCH A MANNING LEVEL NOW AND IF NECESSARY
MODIFY IT LATER.

2. (TS) REQUEST YOUR HEADQUARTERS COORDINATE THE SUB-
MISSION TO THIS HEADQUARTERS NLT 06PR 70 OF A GRADE
AND SKILL BREAKDOWN BASED GENERALLY ON FIGURES
CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A FOR THE FOLLOWING UNITS:

PAGE TWO RUHMFMA0151 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

- A. MAB HQ (390)
- B. H&MS 11 (362)
- C. DET VMO-2 (53)
- D. DET HMH-463 (88)
- E. HML-167 (297)
- F. DASC (36)
- G. DET ISI SERV BN (301)
- H. DET ISI FSR (437)
- I. 7TH ENGR BN (-) (669)
- J. COMM SPT CO 5TH COMM BN (235)

K. REINFORCING ELEMENTS OF THE FOLLOWING UNITS:

- (1) 1ST BN 11TH MARINES
- (2) BTRY A 4TH BN 11TH MARINES
- (3) 1ST 175MM GUN BTRY
- (4) CO A 1ST TANK BN

L. LOGISTIC ROLL UP FORCE (1.2K)
3. (U) THE ABOVE INCLUDES ONLY GRADES AND SKILLS FROM
THOSE UNITS NOT READILY IDENTIFIABLE BY THIS
HEADQUARTERS.

4. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0151

012217z APR 70

"MCEO"

01
111 MAR 210/4

COPY 3 OF 22 COPIES

TOP SECRET

122

O 0309RTZ ZYH ZDF-1 ZDF-4

FM MR BOLVIN, COMUSMACV, SAIGON VIETNAM
TO: SEN BROWN, CDR 11H AF, TAN SON NHUT, VIETNAM
LTG MILDREN, DCG USARV, LONG BINH, VIETNAM
LTG COLLINS, CG IFFORCEV, NHA TRANG, VIETNAM
VADM ZUMWALT, COMNAVFORV, SAIGON, VIETNAM
LTG ENELL, CG IFFORCEV, PONG BINH, VIETNAM
LTG DAVISON, HEADQUARTERS, I CORPS
LTG ZAIS, CG XXIV CORPS, PHU BAI, VIETNAM
LTC MONTICHEON, CG III MAP, DA NANG, VIETNAM
MG MCCOWN, CG DMAC, CAN THO, VIETNAM
COL NEALY, CG 55FG, NHA TRANG, VIETNAM
ZEM

TCR / 0308
4/70

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L MAC 4366 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: APRIL COMMANDERS WIED

1. (C) THE APRIL COMMANDERS WIED WILL BE HELD SATURDAY 25 APRIL 1978, COMMENCING 0900 HOURS. ALL ADDRESSEES ARE INVITED.
2. (U) COMUSMACV REQUESTS THAT THE DEPCORDS OF THE CIZ'S ALSO ATTEND THE WIED.
3. (U) COMMANDERS AND DEPCORDS ARE INVITED TO LUNCHEON BEING HOSTED BY COMUSMACV.
4. (C) SESSIONS EXPECTED TO TERMINATE ON OR ABOUT 1530 HOURS 25 APRIL 1978.
5. (C) RSVP REPEAT RSVP MACV 3044, 4958, OR 3151 NLT 23 APRIL 1978.
6. (U) DECLASSIFY EFFECTIVE 26 APRIL 1978.

SEC NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
XXIV PLSE DELIVER TO LTG DAVISON AT HQ I CORPS
250

COPY ~~3~~ OF 4 COPIES
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(24)

031400Z ZVN ZFF-3 ZFF-3
 FM LTJ COLS CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG
 TO MG BOLVIN CDEFS MACV SAIGON
 INFO LTJ CHILDREN CDE USARV LONG BINH
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVEFORV SAIGON
 LTJ MC CUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG
 ZFC

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE DNG 784 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING (H)

REFERENCE: MAC 2791 EYES ONLY, DTG 220930Z MAR 71.

1. (IS) REFERENCE REQUESTED CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO IDENTIFY 1800 ADDITIONAL SPACES FROM XXIV CORPS FORCES FOR PHASE 4 REDEPLOYMENT.
2. (IS) SHOULD THE PHASE 4 REDEPLOYMENT REQUIRE A DRAWDOWN OF ADDITIONAL SPACES FROM THIS COMMAND, RECOMMEND THAT THE SPACES BE REDEPLOYED FROM THE 1200 USMC SPACES PROPOSED BY CG III MAF FOR A LOGISTICAL ROLL-UP FORCE, WHILE RETAINING THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED AS A TEMPORARY OVERSTRENGTH, DEPENDING ON THE AVAILABILITY OF SHIPPING AND THE DATES OF COMMENCEMENT AND COMPLETION OF PHASE 4, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE ROLL-UP FORCE WILL HAVE COMPLETED ITS TASKS IN 90-120 DAYS AFTER DEPARTURE OF THE LAST PHASE 4 MARINE CORPS UNIT, THIS PROPOSAL IS FULLY ACCEPTABLE TO THIS COMMAND AND CG III MAF.
3. (IS) CONSIDERATION OF PERSONNEL REDUCTION IN THE 10,800 SPACES FOR THE MARINE AMBUSHING BRIGADE TO REMAIN IN THIS COMMAND SUBSEQUENT TO PHASE 4 REDEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN MADE BY CG III MAF. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE OFFERED:

A: THE MAG IS A CAREFULLY TRAINED FORCE WHICH HAS UNDERGONE PREVIOUS REVIEW TO MAINTAIN MINIMAL ACCEPTABLE FORCE LEVELS. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THIS WISEWISE FORCE OF COMBINED ARMS CAN NOT BE FURTHER REDUCED AND AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAIN ITS CAPABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY PERFORM MISSIONS REQUIRED BY THIS COMMAND.

B: A REDUCTION OF UP TO 500 SPACES FROM THE MAG HAS BEEN PROPOSED BY CG III MAF. CONSIDERATION, UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ROLL-UP FORCE PROPOSAL WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE AND FURTHER MARINE SPACES MUST BE IDENTIFIED, AS FOLLOWS:

(1) ELIMINATE THE FORCE ENGINEER BATTALION (4) AND REPLACE WITH A COMPANY OF COMBAT ENGINEERS.

XXIV CORPS COMMENT: THIS REDUCTION IS NOT RECOMMENDED IN VIEW OF THE CRITICAL REQUIREMENT IN THIS COMMAND FOR HEAVY ENGINEER ASSETS AND THE CONSIDERABLE BACKLOG OF APPROVED, PRIORITY ENGINEER PROJECTS PENDING START OR COMPLETION IN I CTZ. REPLACEMENT ARMY OR NAVY AID SUPPORT WOULD NOT BE READILY AVAILABLE FOR SUBSTITUTION.

(2) DELETE THE HEAVY HELICOPTER (OH-53) DETACHMENT.

XXIV CORPS COMMENT: THIS REDUCTION IN HELICOPTER CAPABILITY IS NOT RECOMMENDED IN VIEW OF THE CRITICAL REQUIREMENT FOR AVIATION ASSETS IN THIS COMMAND. THE CONTINUING DECREASES IN TROOP DENSITY WITHOUT A CORRESPONDING DECREASE IN SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS MILITATES AGAINST THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE LOSS OF ANY FURTHER HELICOPTER CAPABILITY. INCREASING SUPPORT FOR ARVN FORCES AS WELL AS EXPANDING AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING US FORCES WILL INCREASE RATHER THAN REDUCE REQUIREMENTS FOR HELICOPTER SUPPORT.

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(3) REDUCE THE DETACHMENT RADIO BATTALION TO A PLATOON OF 10 SPACES.

XXIV CORPS COMMENT: NOT RECOMMENDED. THERE IS A PRESSING NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FROM SOURCES TARGETED DIRECTLY AGAINST THE ENEMY. THIS TYPE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE PAST HAS PROVEN INVALUABLE TO THIS COMMAND AND IS EXPECTED TO BECOME INCREASINGLY CRITICAL IN THE FUTURE.

(4) DELETE THE MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT.

XXIV CORPS COMMENT: ANY REDUCTION IN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL THE DENSITY OF AIR TRAFFIC IN THIS AREA IS MAINTAINED AT CURRENT LEVELS WOULD PRESENT A FURTHER CRITICAL PROBLEM IN THE DA NANG AREA.

(5) ELIMINATE THE DETACHMENT OF THE FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY.

XXIV CORPS COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE MAF CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS IS NOT RECOMMENDED. A CRITICAL REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR MORE SURVEILLANCE ASSETS THROUGHOUT THIS COMMAND DUE TO FORCE REDUCTIONS. MARINE FORCE RECON HAS ALREADY BEEN REDUCED 50 PER CENT IN PHASE 3 AND WILL BE FURTHER REDUCED IN THE PRESENT PHASE 4 REDEPLOYMENT. ANY FURTHER REDUCTION OF THIS HIGHLY EFFECTIVE FORCE WOULD SERIOUSLY DEGRADE AN ALREADY SUB-STANDARD LEVEL OF CAPABILITY IN THIS COMMAND.

(6) DELETE THE 175MM GUN BATTERY (AT EAST RESORT).

XXIV CORPS COMMENT: THIS REDUCTION OF HEAVY ARTILLERY IS NOT RECOMMENDED DUE TO THE CRITICAL REQUIREMENT FOR LONG RANGE ARTILLERY TO SUPPORT BOTH US AND RVN FORCES IN THE QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE. IN VIEW OF THE EXPECTED INCREASED RELIANCE UPON HEAVY ARTILLERY TO MAKE UP FOR FORCES LOST TO REDEPLOYMENT IN THIS AREA, THE IMPACT OF THE LOSS OF THIS FIREPOWER WOULD BE PARTICULARLY SEVERE AND WOULD FURTHER DEGRADE THE PROTECTION OF THE DA NANG VIET AREA.

TOP SECRET

THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY

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CG		
c/s		
s/ser.	L	
Gen	W	L

PTTEZYUW RUHHFMA0390 0932201-EEEE--RUMLMPA.

ZNY EEEEE

P 032201Z APR 70

FM CG FMEPAC

TO RUEUFIA/ACMC

INFO RUMLMPA/CG III HAF

RUANAJA/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

UNCLAS E F T U //N05760//

PERSONAL FOR GEN WALT INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEIN AND

MAJGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN HUSE

FUND MANAGEMENT FOR THIRD MARDIV MEMORIAL CHILDRENS

HOSPITAL

A. ACMC 021429Z/APR70 (U)

1. THE DISCONTINUANCE OF COLLECTIONS FOR THE HOSPITAL

BY CARE, INC., NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR HERE EITHER.

THE ACTION PROPOSED IN PAR 2 OF REF (A) APPEARS MOST

PRUDENT, AND IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR

CARE/MEDICU TO TAKE OVER THE HOSPITAL WILL BE SUCCESSFUL.

WARM REGARDS

BT

#0390

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IN 02652/093-70

/ACK

032201Z APR 70

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0111

3 APR 70 607

(26)

Per. for.

PITEZYUW RUAIAJA0543 0940339-EEEE--RUMLMPA.

ZNY EEEEE

P 040339Z APR 70

~~FM CG THIRD MARDIV~~

~~TO RUEHETA/CMC~~

~~INRU RUHHFMA/CG EMERAC~~

~~RUMLMPA/CG III MAE~~ *68*

BT

UNCLAS E F T U //NO5760//

PERSONAL FOR GEN WALT AND LTGENS HUSE AND MC CUTCHEON

FROM MGEN WILSON

FUND MANAGEMENT FOR THIRD MARDIV MEMORIAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL

A. ACAC 021429Z APR 70

1. NO OBJECTION TO REINSTATEMENT OF FUND MANAGEMENT WITH CARE, INC., CONCUR WITH PLAN OF ACTION INDICATED IN REF A.

BT

#0543

NNNN

IN 02996/094-70

/ACK

4 APR 70 07 00z

040339Z APR 70

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39

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

"EXCLUSIVE"

SPECAT

DATE 5 APR 70
C. H. Leely SSgt

PTIAZYUW RUMHFA0522 0342041-AAAA-RUM.MPA.
ZNY AAAAA
P 042041Z APR 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUM.MPA/CG III MAF
BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCOY/COMBON
FROM LTGEN BUSE, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY, DELIVER
DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY /ANG6000000/
FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. (TS) I HAVE RECENTLY RETURNED TO CAMP SMITH TO FIND YOUR MESSAGE OF CONCERN AS TO PERSONNEL STAFFING OF THE MAF. YOUR THOUGHTS REGARDING THE "SHOWCASE" CONCEPT AND GENERAL OFFICER ASSIGNMENT ARE APPRECIATED AND I WILL DISCUSS THEM WITH YOU PERSONALLY DURING MY VISIT LATER IN THE MONTH.
2. (TS) WITH REGARD TO THE EFFECT OF MIXMASTER, AS YOU KNOW THE DILEMMA IN SELECTING PERSONNEL CRITERIA FOR THESE WITHDRAWALS IS ALWAYS THE NEED FOR COMPROMISE BETWEEN EQUITY OF TOUR LENGTH FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT READINESS. INDIVIDUAL EQUITY REQUIRES "MIX-MASTERING" OF PERSONNEL WHICH DIRECTLY EFFECTS UNIT

PAGE TWO RUMHFA0522 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCL FOR MCEO
 READINESS. IN THE LAST TWO REDEPLOYMENTS THE CRITERIA HAS BEEN A COMPROMISE WEIGHTED TOWARD EQUITY, AS YOU HAVE STATED THIS HAS RESULTED IN LESS THAN OPTIMUM READINESS POSTURE. WITH THIS IN MIND THE SUBJECT OF PERSONNEL CRITERIA FOR PHASE IV WAS OPENED TO HOMC SOMETIME AGO. RECENTLY THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AND MY STAFF HERE WORKED OUT A PROPOSED PLAN THAT ACCOMMODATES QUITE WELL TO EQUITY, READINESS, PERSONNEL AVAILABILITY, TRANSPORTATION AND ROTATION HUMPS. THE PLAN STRESSES ADHERENCE AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE TO AN "AS IS" STATUS FOR UNITS REMAINING IN-COUNTRY AND WILL RETAIN THEIR 12 MONTH EVEN SPREAD OF RTD'S. PERHAPS I WILL HAVE FURTHER INDICATION OF STATUS OF THIS PROPOSAL BY THE TIME OF MY VISIT, ALTHOUGH THE "SHOWCASE" CONCEPT MIGHT ENTER THE PICTURE. I HAVE A FEELING IT WILL RELATE TO A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF KEY BILLETS.

3. (TS) THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION YOU ADDRESSED OF THE DESIREABILITY OF UNITS VS. INDIVIDUAL ROTATION TO ACCOMPLISH SFL IT TOURING WILL DEPEND GREATLY ON HOW

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES
PAGE 04 OF 04 PAGES

SPECAT

20

"EXCLUSIVE"
"MCEO"
TOP SECRET (28)

TOP SECRET

MCEO

EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUXHFMA0522 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCL FOR MCEO
STRONGLY THE COMMANDANT FEELS REGARDING SPLIT TOUR
IN THE POST PHASE IV CLIMATE. WE HAVE, I BELIEVE, DONE
OUR BEST TO PROVIDE FOR INDIVIDUAL SPLIT TOUR OPPOR-
TUNITIES ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT READINESS IS NOT TOO
SERIOUSLY AFFECTED. THERE WILL BE NO SPLIT TOUR QUOTAS
ASSIGNED FOR APRIL.

4. REST ASSURED THAT IN ALL THESE STAFF
MACHINATIONS WE WILL PUSH FOR THE COURSE OF ACTION
WHICH WILL GIVE THE FORCES IN-COUNTRY THE BEST
POSSIBLE READINESS POSTURE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT
0522

*COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES*

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

MCEO

TOP SECRET

28

TOP SECRET

PTTAZYUW RUHHFMAZ307 0971935-AAAA-RUEOFIA RUMMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 071935Z APR 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUEOFIA/CMC

INFO RUMMPA/CG III MAF

RUMMPA/CG FORLOGCOWD

BT

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON AND BGEN PADALINO FROM LTGEN BUSE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //N02020// DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR POST PHASE IV RESIDUAL FORCES (TS)

A. CG FMFPAC 112021Z/MAR 70 (TS) (SPECAT)

B. CMC 262135Z/MAR 70 (TS) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE, AND UNODIR I PROPOSE TO EMPLOY THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES FOR THE DISPOSITION OF THE III MAF AND FLC SPECIAL ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE DESIGNATIONS (T/E P-4960 AND T/E P-4970) IN ADDITION TO THOSE PROCEDURES RECOMMENDED REF A AND APPROVED REF B.

A. SUBSEQUENT TO UTILIZING III MAF AND FLC SPECIAL ALLOWANCE EQUIP ASSETS TO FILL T/E DEFICIENCIES OF THE RESIDUAL MAB AND PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF SCREENING/REDISTRIBUTION ACTIONS

PAGE TWO RUHHFMAZ307 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCL FOR MCEO IAW PAR 1.B. REF A, AS MODIFIED BY PAR. 2.B. REF B, SPECIAL ALLOWANCE REQUIREMENTS OF POST PHASE IV RESIDUAL MAB AND LOGISTIC ROLL-UP FORCE WILL BE SATISFIED.

B. UPON COMPLETION ACTION RECOMMENDED PAR 1.A. ABOVE, III MAF SPECIAL ALLOWANCE P-4960 WILL BE REDESIGNATED AS RESIDUAL MAB SPECIAL ALLOWANCE T/E P-4960. FLC SPECIAL ALLOWANCE T/E P-4970 WILL BE REDESIGNATED LOGISTIC ROLL-UP FORCE SPECIAL ALLOWANCE T/E P-4970.

2. (TS) ACTIONS RECOMMENDED PAR. 1.A AND 1.B ABOVE WILL PERMIT SPECIAL ALLOWANCE REQUIREMENTS OF IN-COUNTRY RESIDUAL FORCES TO BE MET WHILE RETAINING ESSENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY.

3. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0307

SPECAT

"MCEO"

III MAF 2100/

07

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19

35 SECRET

(2A)

TOP SECRET

PAC NR045
 PTTAZIUN RUHFMA0768 0972346-AAAA--RUMLMPA RUEOFIA
 ZNY AAAAA
 P 072346Z APR 70
 FM CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUEOFIA/CMC
 RUMLMPA/CG III MAF
 (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN
 MCCUTCHEON FOR INFO FROM LTGEN BUSE
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY. //N00000//
 O 070429Z APR 70
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO CINCPAC
 INFO CINCPACFLT

TOP SECRET/0030Z APR 70

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE CHECKED UPON RECEIPT
DATE 8 APR 70 III MAF S&C

P. H. L. SSGT
(SIGNATURE)

SPECAT

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM MCCA IN INFO
 ADM HYLAND FROM LTGEN BUSE. //N00000//
 FORCE PLANNING (U)

- A. CINCPAC 051035ZAPR/70 (TS-EYES ONLY)
- B. COMUSMACV 061453ZAPR/70 (TS-SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY)
- 1. (TS) REF A REQUESTED MY CONCURRENCE/COMMENTS WITH REGARD TO COMUSMACV'S RESPONSE (REF B) TO PHASE IV FORCE PACKAGE ALTERNATIVES OF 20K, 30K AND 40K.
- 2. (TS) MY PARAMOUNT CONCERN IN CONSIDERING THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PHASE IV MARINE WITHDRAWALS HAS BEEN TO INSURE THAT WHATEVER SIZE MARINE FORCE IS LEFT IN RVN AFTER PHASE IV IS A BALANCED AND THEREFORE EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE. THE COMMENTS BELOW ARE PREMISED ON THIS RATIONALE.
- 3. (TS) SPECIFICALLY WITH REGARD TO REF B:

PAGE TWO RUHFMA0768 TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR

A. PAR 3.A. PROPOSES A USMC WITHDRAWAL OF 12.5K AS PART OF THE 20K FORCE PACKAGE. THIS SIZE WITHDRAWAL WOULD LEAVE REMAINING IN RVN A MAF CONSISTING OF ONLY TWO INFANTRY REGIMENTS SUPPORTED BY A MARINE AIRCRAFT WING TO INCLUDE A FULL COMPLEMENT OF WING LEVEL SUPPORT. I CANNOT CONCUR IN THE IMBALANCE REPRESENTED BY THIS FORCE MIX AND THEREFORE RECOMMEND NO MARINE WITHDRAWALS UNDER THE 20K FORCE PACKAGE. IN THE EVENT THE FOREGOING IS NOT ACCEPTABLE, I RECOMMEND WITHDRAWAL OF AN ARMY BDE AT 6.3K (PAR 3.D.(5) REF B) THEREBY REDUCING THE USMC SHARE OF 6.2K WHICH WOULD BE A LESSER IMBALANCE. IN THIS CASE MY RECOMMENDED 6.2K MARINE WITHDRAWAL FORCE PACKAGE WOULD CONSIST OF:

- ONE BLT
- DET REGT HQ CO
- HMM
- ENGR BN(-)
- D/S ARTY BTRY
- FORCE RECON CO
- TWO CAGS

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 20004

07

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23

46

TOP SECRET

(30)

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUHNFMA0768 TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR
DET FLC

B. PAR 3.B. PROPOSES A USMC WITHDRAWAL OF 21.9K AS PART OF THE 30K FORCE PACKAGE. THIS WOULD SERVE TO REDUCE III MAF TO ONE INFANTRY REGIMENT SUPPORTED BY A MARINE AIRCRAFT WING(-) TO INCLUDE A FULL COMPLEMENT OF WING LEVEL SUPPORT. THIS OBVIOUS FORCE IMBALANCE CANNOT BE CONCURRED IN AND I RECOMMEND, RATHER, WITHDRAWAL OF 29.4K MARINES OR AS CLOSE THERETO AS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE 30K CEILING.

C. PAR 3.C. PROPOSES WITHDRAWAL OF 29.4K MARINES AS PART OF THE 40K FORCE PACKAGE. I CONCUR IN THIS ALTERNATIVE SINCE IT PERMITS RETENTION IN RUN OF A BALANCED FORCE CONSISTING OF:

- (1) MAB-10.8K
 - ONE RLI
 - TWO ATK/FTR SQDNS
 - ONE MED AND ONE LIGHT HELO SQDN W/A DET OF HEAVY HELOS
 - ONE 175 MM BTRY AND ONE 5" HOW BTRY
 - LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP
 - (2) SUPPORT/TRANSITION FORCE - .6K
 - (3) CAG - .6K
 - (4) LOGISTIC ROLL-UP FORCE - 1.2K
- TOTAL 13.2K

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0768

Page 2 of 2 Pages

III MAF 2100/4 NNNN

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
"MCEO"

SPECAT

PITAZYUW RUMHFM 0852 0900009-AAAA--RUEOFIA RUMLMFA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 080000Z APR 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUEOFIA/CMC

INFO RUMLMFA/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T SENSITIVE SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN
INFO LTGEN MCCLITCHEON FROM LTGEN BUSE, MARINE
CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY.

//NO0000//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF GEN ABRAM'S 061453Z APR 70 TO
ADM MCCAIN, INFO GEN WHEELER, GEN HAINES, ADM
HYLAND, GEN NAZZARO AND ME, WHICH I AM PROVIDING
FOR INFORMATION. QUOTE:

SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING - RVN (U)

REFERENCES: A. MAC 3303/131133Z MAR 70 (TS) (NOTAL)

B. JCS 4615/032853Z APR 70 (TS)

C. CINCPAC 051034Z APR 70 (TS) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) REFERENCES SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A. REF A PROVIDES MACV ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AS OF

PAGE TWO RUMHFM 0852 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE SPECAT EXCL FOR MCEO
13 MARCH 1970.

B. REF B REQUESTS THE COMPOSITION AND US FORCES TO REMAIN
IN RVN FOR PHASE 4 PACKAGES OF 20,000; 30,000; AND 40,000 SPACES.
IT ALSO REQUESTS A STATEMENT OF RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH.

C. REF C REQUESTS RESPONSE TO REF B BE ADDRESSED TO PACOM
COMPONENT COMMANDERS.

2. (TS) THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO REFS B AND C.

3. (TS) THE SITUATION PERMITTING, FORCE PACKAGES WOULD CON-
TINUE EXECUTION OF THE MARINE HEAVY OPTION AND WOULD BE COMPOSED
APPROXIMATELY AS SHOWN BELOW. AN ALTERNATIVE INTRODUCING AN
ARMY BRIGADE IS DESCRIBED UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH D, REMARKS.

A. 20,000 FORCE PACKAGE:

THOUSAND SPACES

USMC	RLI (PLUS), 1 ATK/ATR SQDN	
	2 HELO SQDNS	12.5
USN	SUPPORT	3.2
USA	ELEMENTS	1.9
USAF	ELEMENTS	1.4
	TOTAL	29.8

B. 30,000 FORCE PACKAGE:

PAGE CHECKED UPON RECEIPT

DATE 8 APR 70 III MAF S&C

C. J. Lynch SS9T
(SIGNATURE)

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Page 1 of 3 Pages

08

00 SPECAT

09

"MCEO"
TOP SECRET

(3)

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

MCEO

PAGE THREE RUMHFM 0852 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EXCL FOR MCEO

USMC	III MAF (-MAB REINF)	21.9
USN	SUPPORT	5.8
USA	ELEMENTS	.9
USAF	ELEMENTS	1.4
	TOTAL	30.0

C. 40,000 FORCE PACKAGE:

USMC	III MAF (-MAB)	29.4
USN	SUPPORT	8.0
USA	ELEMENTS	.9
USAF	ELEMENTS	1.7
	TOTAL	40.0

D. REMARKS.

(1) USMC MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE (MAB) COMPOSED AS FOLLOWS:

- RLT
- 2 ATK/FTR SQDNS
- 2 HELO SQDNS
- 2 175MM HOW BRTYS
- 1 COMBINED ACTION GROUP (CAG)
- MARINE ROLL-UP FORCE

PAGE FOUR RUMHFM 0852 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EXCL FOR MCEO

(2) UNDER 30,000 PACKAGE, USMC MAB REMAINING IN RVN WOULD BE REINFORCED BY AN ADDITIONAL BLT, 2 ATK/FTR SQDNS, 2 HELO SQDNS, 1 CAG, AND OTHER COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES.

(3) USA ELEMENTS TENTATIVELY INCLUDE THREE AIRPLANE COMPANIES.

(4) USAF ELEMENTS INCLUDE 2 TACTICAL AIRLIFT SQUADRONS.

(5) IF INDICATED BY THE SITUATION, A PRIMARY ALTERNATIVE TO PROVIDE FOR RETENTION OF MORE US MARINE COMBAT POWER IN I CTZ WOULD BE TO REDEPLOY AN ARMY BRIGADE. THAT BRIGADE, WITH SUPPORT, WOULD PERMIT REDUCING USMC SPACES SHOWN ABOVE BY ABOUT 6.3 THOUSAND SPACES. SUCH ACTION WOULD ALLOW RETENTION IN RVN OF THE BULK OF AN RLT PLUS OTHER COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS.

4. (TS) MAJOR US COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES REMAINING AFTER PHASE 4 WOULD BE:

	20,000 PACKAGE	30,000 PACKAGE	40,000 PACKAGE
COMBAT DIVISIONS	5 1/3	4 2/3	4 2/3
SEP BDE/MAB	4	5 (1)	5
ARMD CAV REGT	1	1	1
SEP ARMD CAV SQDN	3	3	3

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Page 2 of 5 Pages

SPECAT

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA 0852 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EXCL FOR MCEO

SEP ARTY BNS	24	24	24
HELO SQDNS/COS (2)	66	65	63
SEP AIR CAV SQDNS	3	3	3
ATK/FTR SQDNS (3)	23	22	20
AIRLIFT SQDNS (4)	11	11	11
RECON SQDNS	5	5	5

NOTES:

- (1) RLT WITH USMC MAB REINFORCED.
- (2) INCLUDES 61 USA HELO COS, BALANCE ARE USMC HELO SQDNS.
- (3) DOES NOT INCLUDE TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS BASED IN THAILAND OR 2 CVA'S ON STATION.
- (4) INCLUDES 3 C-130 SQDNS FORM 834TH AIR DIV.
- (5) (TS) THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH DECISION AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS AT THIS TIME ARE COVERED IN REF A. EVENTS IN CAMBODIA AND ENEMY ACTIONS IN LAOS AND RVN SINCE DISPATCH OF THAT ASSESSMENT HAVE MAGNIFIED THOSE RISKS AND PLACED ADDED IMPORTANCE ON MAINTENANCE OF FLEXIBILITY TO REACT TO THE OPTIONS OPEN TO THE ENEMY. THE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH THE SPECIFIC PACKAGES UNDER CONSIDERATION IS ESSENTIALLY A MATTER OF DEGREE RELATED TO THE SIZESGF THE INDIVIDUAL PACKAGE

PAGE SIX RUHHFMA 0852 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EXCL FOR MCEO AND, ALTERNATIVELY, THE AREA FROM WHICH FORCES WOULD BE REDEPLOYED. REDEPLOYMENT OF USMC FORCES FROM I CTZ WOULD REQUIRE REPLACEMENT BY RVNAF IN THAT RELATIVELY HIGH THREAT AREA; SUCH REPLACEMENT WOULD DRAW DOWN THE GENERAL RESERVE AND REDUCE CAPABILITY FOR REINFORCING OTHER AREAS SUCH AS NORTHERN I CTZ AND IV CTZ. SIMILARILY, ALTERNATIVE REDEPLOYMENT OF AN US ARMY BRIGADE (PROBABLY COMING FROM III CTZ) WOULD REDUCE THE CAPABILITY OF US FORCES TO FILL GAPS LEFT BY MOVEMENT OF RVNAF GENERAL RESERVE REINFORCEMENTS TO OTHER AREAS.

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0852

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Page 3 of 3 Pages

NNNN

SPECAT

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET

O 050323Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1
 FM LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS
 TO LTG MORTIMERON CG III MAF
 CEM

TOP SECRET

I U P S E C R E T SENSITIVE DNG B13 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE (MAB) CONCEPT OF
 OPERATIONS

REFERENCES: A. CG III MAF 020045Z MAR 70 (TS/SPECAT/EYES ONLY),

SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING

B. XXIV CORPS 031405Z APR 70 (TS/SENSITIVE/EYES
 ONLY) DNG 784, SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING

1. REF A IDENTIFIES III MAF OPTIONS FOR 1000 ADDITIONAL
 SPACES FOR PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT AND ADDRESSES CONCEPT OF
 OPERATIONS FOR THE MAB. REF B FORWARDS XXIV CORPS REC-
 OMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS TO MACV REGARDING YOUR SPACE OPTIONS.
 2. YOUR COMMENTS REGARDING MAB COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, MISSION,
 CONCEPT AND AREA OF OPERATIONS ARE VALID FOR PLANNING PURPOSES
 SUBJECT TO MODIFICATIONS IMPOSED BY APPROACHING AND FUTURE
 REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT DECISIONS AND THE CURRENT SITUATION
 IN IGIZ AT THE TIME. I DO NOT VISUALIZE ANY CONDITIONS
 REQUIRING THE EXECUTION OF AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT THEREFORE THIS
 CAPABILITY CAN BE TAILORED ACCORDINGLY. MY STAFF WILL MAINTAIN
 CLOSE COORDINATION WITH YOUR OPERATIONS/PLANNING ELEMENTS AS
 MORE DEFINITE INFORMATION AND/OR PLANS ARE DEVELOPED.

WARM REGARDS

GP +

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

ZSS THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY

COPY NR2 OF 4 COPIES

TOP SECRET

08

03

23

32

~~SECRET~~

SPECAT

DE RUMLLUA1106 09810061
ZNY SSSSS
O 081006Z APR 70
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO RUEOFIA/CMC
INFO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC (K-013)
RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

"EXCLUSIVE"

BT
~~SECRET~~ /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN/LTGEN BUSE/
LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN WHEELER/MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)
HAMLET 4 SON THANG (V) REPT NO 14
A. MY 060840Z APR 70
1. REF A ADVISED ENTRANCE MR HOWARD P. TROCKMAN, EVANSVILLE, INO., CIV COUNSEL PRO THOMAS R. BOYD 251 26 70, ONE OF FIVE ACCUSED SUBJ CASE. PLANS TO REPRESENT BOYD IF CASE REFERRED TO GCM.
2. HEARING IN ART 32 INVESTIGATION OF CHG AGAINST 1STLT L.R. AMBORT 010 67 23 USMC WILL COMMENCE 04APR 70 AT LZ BALDY. EXPECT TWO FULL DAYS TESTIMONY PLUS TWO PARTIAL DAYS RESULT WITH NONAVAILABILITY. SHOULD CONCLUDE 14APR 70.

PAGE TWO RUMLLUA1106 S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/WCEO
3. FATHER LT AMBORT, MR LOUIS AMBORT, 101 SO. PLAZA DR, LITTLE ROCK, ARK., HAS REQ NON-LAWYER COMBAT EXPERIENCED FIELD GRADE OFF TO ASSIST IN DEF OF SON. CO SEVENTH MAR GRANTED PERMISSION FOR SUCH OFF TO ASSIST AT ART 32, HOWEVER, LT AMBORT AND APPT LAWYER DEF COUNSEL SUBSEQUENTLY DECLINED THIS ASSIST FOR ART 32 BUT STATED SUCH ASSIST DESIRED SHOULD CASE BE REFERRED TO COURT-MARTIAL.
INFO ON THIS MATTER IS PROVIDED SINCE FATHER SEEMED VERY INSISTENT AND INDICATED HE WOULD GO TO CONGRESSMAN, IF NECESSARY, ON THIS ISSUE. HE MAY NOT AGREE WITH DECIS MADE BY SON.
4. PREPARATION RECORD ART 32 FIVE ACCUSED PROCEEDING ON SCHEDULE. COMPLETION 15APR 70.

GP-4
BT

1106

"EXCLUSIVE"

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED
By authority of
CG, 1st MARDIV, 7mg, 04082000, 70
FMFPAC-GEN/110/3/070
0101-V04-6600

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08

10

SPECAT 06

~~SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

VV PAC052
HTAZYUV RUEOFIA2981 0991232-AAAA--RUHMFMA RUMLNPA.
ZNY AAAAA
RUHMFMA-T-GUNLMFA
R 091232Z APR 70
FM CMC
TO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUMLNPA/CG III MAF
BT

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET//NOFORN// SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE
INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN VAN RYZIN (MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY)

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 250203Z MAR 70 (TS) (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE) (MCEO)

1. (TS) REFERENCE A ADDRESSED AMONG OTHER THINGS THE
POSSIBILITY OF REEXAMINING THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF
THE SUPPORT TRANSITION FORCE. UNDERLYING THIS RECOMEN-
DATION WAS THE INFERENCE THAT ANY SAVINGS THAT MIGHT
ACCURE BY REDUCING THESE NON III MAF PROGRAM S SPACES
COULD CONCEIVABLY BE RE-CAPTURED AS III MAF SPACES,
THEREBY NEGATING THE NECESSITY TO DRAWDOWN ON THE STRUC-
TURE OF THE RESIDUAL MAF FORCES.

2. (S) FOR THE MOST PART THE SPACES IN QUESTION PERMIT
THE MARINE CORPS TO PARTICIPATE IN JOINT STAFF ACTION

PAGE 2 RUEOFIA2981 TOP SECRET (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE) (MCEO)R
AND DEFENSE AGENCY SUPPORT MISSIONS. ANY EFFORT TO
REDUCE THESE BILLETS WOULD REQUIRE SEPARATE NEGOTIATION
WITH EACH ACTIVITY INVOLVED. IN ADDITION THE SPACES
WOULD NOT ACCURE TO III MAF, BUT WOULD BE RETAINED BY
COMUSMACV AS PART OF HIS OVERALL CEILING.

3. (TS) THEREFORE THE SUPPORT/TRANSITION FORCE SHOULD
BE CONSIDERED AS A SEPARATE AND DISTINCT ENTITY FROM
III MAF AND REGARDLESS OF ANY DETERMINATION OR FLUCTUATION
IN THE SIZE OR COMPOSITION OF THE SUPPORT/TRANSITION
FORCE THERE WOULD BE NO BENEFIT FOR III MAF.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2981

"MCEO"

"EXCLUSIVE"

SPECAT

III MAF 2004

09

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TOP SECRET

(34)

O ~~SECRET~~ ZYM ZFF-4 ZFF-1
 VA 21 2000 2000 MACV SAIGON VIETNAM
 2000 2000 2000 715 AF 100 000 000
 LIG ~~WELLS~~ CG 2000 LONG BINH VIETNAM
 LIG COLLINS CG IFFORCEV NHA TRANG VIETNAM
 WADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON VIETNAM
 LIG KWELL CG IFFORCEV LONG BINH VIETNAM
 LIG DAVIDSON HQ IFFORCEV LONG BINH VIETNAM
 LIG LAIS CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG VIETNAM
 CG 2000 CG III 2000 VIETNAM
 HQ MCCOY CG DMAC CAN THO VIETNAM
 COL HEALY CG 35FG NHA TRANG VIETNAM
 GEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAC 4112 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: APRIL COMMANDER'S VIEU

1. (C) THE APRIL COMMANDER'S VIEU IS CHANGED FROM 25 APRIL AS PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED TO SATURDAY 18 APRIL 1978, COMMENCING 1900 HOURS. ALL ADDRESSEES ARE INVITED.
2. (U) COMUSMACV REQUESTS THAT THE DEPCORDS OF THE CIZ'S ALSO ATTEND THE VIEU.
3. (U) COMMANDERS AND DEPCORDS ARE INVITED TO LUNCHEON BEING HOSTED BY COMUSMACV.
4. (C) SESSION EXPECTED TO TERMINATE ON OR ABOUT 1530 HOURS, 18 APRIL 1978.
5. (C) RSVP REPEAT RSVP MACV 3844, 4958 OR 3151 NLT 16 APRIL 1978.
6. (U) DECLASSIFY EFFECTIVE 19 APRIL 1978.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
 105

0000

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10

08

57

35

~~SECRET~~

~~SPECAT~~

EXCLUSIVE

OTTSZYUW RUMLLUA2865 1090811-SSSS--RUHFMA RUMLMPA RUEOFIA.

ZNY SSSSS

O 190811Z APR 70

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUEOFIA/CMC

INFO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

"MCEO"

~~SECRET~~ /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN/LTGEN BUSE/
LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FR MAJGEN WHEELER (MARINE CORPS EYES
ONLY) (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

HAMLET 4 SON THANG (V) REPT NO 15

REF: A. MY 310340Z MAR 70 (SPECAT)

1. RECORD ART 32 INVEST COMPLETED. WILL BE DELIVERED TO CG 1/7 20APR70. EXPECT CG 1/7 TO FWD RECORD TO CG FIRST MARDIV WITH REC FOR GCM IN CASES ALL FIVE ACCUSED. COPY INVEST WILL BE MAILED 20APR70 TO CMC (CODE A1) AND SJA FMFPAC, III MAF, AND MACV. PLAN TO ALSO MAIL COPY TO THREE CIVILIAN DEF COUNSEL ONCE CASES ARE REFERRED TO GCM. CIV COUNSEL WILL BE REQUESTED TO HOLD INFO CLOSELY SO AS NOT TO PREJUDICE TRAIL OF OTHER ACCUSED.
2. OKLA STATE SEN GENE STIPE, CIV COUNSEL FOR PVT HERROD, AND

PAGE TWO RUMLLUA2865 S E C R E T /SPECAT/MCEO/
MR. ALVIN SELF, BOX 65, CALVIN, AKLA, 74531, GRANDFATHER OF
HERROD, ARR DANANG 15APR70 DEP 18APR70. VISIT WENT
SMOOTHLY. SEN STIPE AND MR SELF VISITED WITH HERROD
SEVERAL TIMES. SEN STIPE CONSULTED WITH OTHER DEF COUNSEL,
VISITED LZ BALDY AND TALKED WITH OTHER ACCUSED AND ALL
AVAIL WITN. HAD NO COMPLAINTS UPON DEP. DID INDICATE HE
WOULD REQ DELAY IN TRAIL UNTIL JULY 70 BECAUSE OF EXTENSIVE
PREP REQ.

3. ART 32 INVEST LT AMBORT COMPLETED 15APR70. SEE REF A. PRELIM
FINDINGS INVEST OFF SUBMITTED TO CG SEVENTH MAR 19APR70
WITH REC FOR NJP BY CG ON ONE FALSE OFFICIAL STATEMENT
ONLY. EST COMPLETION ART 32 RECORD 24APR70. DO NOT INTEND
TO TAKE ANY OFFICIAL ACT ON LT AMBORT UNTIL BOTH ART 32
INVEST ARE FWD OFFICIALLY AND DECIS IS MADE AS TO REFERRAL
TO TRAIL CASES FIVE ACCUSED SUBJ INCIDENT.

GP-4

BT

2865 Downgraded to
UNCLASSIFIED
By authority of
cg, 1st Mar Div Mag, 240820 Z Aug 70

"MCEO"

Copy 2 of 3 Copies

"EXCLUSIVE"

~~SPECAT~~

~~SECRET~~ (36)

SECRET

SPECAT

PAC 057

RTIAZYUW RUEOFIA 7495 1112015-AAAA--RUHNFMA.

ZNY AAAAA

RUHNFMA -I- RUMNPA

R 212015Z APR 76

FM CMC

TO RUHNFMA/CD FMFPAC

RUMNPA/CD SEE NAF

BT

SECRET SPECAT LINDIS //05000//

FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM GEN CHAPMAN
DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS

MARINE PARTICIPATION IN THE DELTA (S)

1. (S) I HAVE BEEN INFORMALLY QUERIED BY THE NAVY AS TO POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING VAL-4 WITH A VMD TO PROVIDE FIXED WING RIVERINE AIR SUPPORT IN THE DELTA REGION.

2. (S) FOUR ALTERNATIVES FOR MAINTAINING OV-10'S IN THE DELTA APPEAR FEASIBLE:

A. MAINTAIN STATUS QUO, I.E. REPLACE VAL-4 LOSSES FROM CINUS (4TH MAW) ASSETS.

B. REPLACE VAL-4 LOSSES FROM VMD-6 ASSETS, GRADUALLY DRAWING VMD-6 DOWN TO 12 AIRCRAFT (POST RVN STRENGTH)

C. REPLACE VAL-4 WITH VMD-6 (MINUS)

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA 7495 SECRET SPECAT LINDIS

D. REPLACE VAL-4 WITH VMD-2 (MINUS) DURING INCREMENTAL REDEPLOYMENT.

3. (C) PROBABLE BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM EITHER ALTERNATIVES C OR D INCLUDE MARINE DEVELOPMENT OF A NIGHT OBSERVATION GUNSHIP, FURTHERING MARINE AIR-GROUND RIVERINE DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT, AND RETURN OF ALL OV-10'S TO MARINE CUSTODY.

4. (U) I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON ABOVE ALTERNATIVES IN ADDITION TO ANY COMMENTS YOU CONSIDER PERTINENT.

5. (U) WARM REGARDS

CP-4

BT

7495

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

MEMO

21

20 SPECAT

SECRET

SECRET

SPECAT

OTTAZYUW RUMLMFA3535 1120607-AAAA-RUMLMHA.

ZNY AAAAA

O 220607Z APR 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

R 212015Z APR 70

FM CMC

TO CG FMFPAC

CG III MAF

BT

SECRET /SPECAT/LIMDIS//05000//

FOR LTGEN BUSE AND LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM GEN CHAPMAN

DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS

MARINE PARTICIPATION IN THE DELTA (S)

1. (S) I HAVE BEEN INFORMALLY QUERIED BY THE NAVY AS TO POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING VAL -4 WITH A VMO TO PROVIDE FIXED WING RIVERINE AIR SUPPORT IN THE DELTA REGION.

2. (S) FOUR ALTERNATIVES FOR MAINTAINING OV-10'S IN THE DELTA APPEAR FEASIBLE:

A. MAINTAIN STATUS QUO, I.E. REPLACE VAL -4 LOSSES FROM CONUS (4TH MAW) ASSETS.

B. REPLACE VAL -4 LOSSES FROM VMO-6 ASSETS, GRADUALLY DRAWING VMO-6 DOWN TO 12 AIRCRAFT (POST RVN STRENGTH)

C. REPLACE VAL -4 WITH VMO-6 (MINUS)

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA/7495 SECRET SPECAT LIMDIS

D. REPLACE VAL -4 WITH VMO-2 (MINUS) DURING INCREMENTAL REDEPLOYMENT

3. (C) PROBABLE BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM EITHER ALTERNATIVES C OR D INCLUDE MARINE DEVELOPMENT OF A NIGHT OBSERVATION GUNSHIP, FURTHERING MARINE AIR-GROUND RIVERINE DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT, AND RETURN OF ALL OV-10'S TO MARINE CUSTODY.

4. (U) I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON ABOVE ALTERNATIVES IN ADDITION TO ANY COMMENTS YOU CONSIDER PERTINENT.

5. (U) WARM REGARDS

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SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

VV WLC459 TOD: 23/1049Z APR 70
 OTTAZYUW RUMLMPA3721 1131002-AAAA--RUEOFIA RUHFMA.
 ZNY AAAAA
 PAC-T-CMC
 O 231002Z APR 70
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUEOFIA/CMC
 INFO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC ADMIN
 ZEN/CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO MGEN ADAMS AND
 LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN BUSE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

1. KEITH, MEDICAL OFFICERS AND I AGREE THAT ED WHEELER SHOULD
 BE MED-EVACED. EVACUATION PROBABLY WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN
 NEXT THREE DAYS. REQUEST YOU LAUNCH ED'S RELIEF ASAP. FURTHER
 DETAILS BY TELEPHONE. WARM REGARDS.

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"MCEO"
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"EXCLUSIVE"

VV PAC064 TCR: 23/2321Z APR 70
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 ZNY AAAAA
 RUHHFMA -I- RUMLMFA.
 R 232031Z APR 70
 FM CMC
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 INFO RUMLMFA/CG III MAF
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO
 LTGEN MCCUTCHEON AND MAJGEN ADAMS FROM GEN CHAPMAN
 III MAF PASS TO LTGEN BUSE
 1. (C) MAJGEN C. F. WIDDECKE 08547 USMC UNDER PCS ORDS DUE
 TO ARRIVE HNL (INTNL) 241820 (LOCAL) AND UNITED FLT 991.
 2. (U) REQ ONWARD TRANS BE ARRANGED.
 WARM REGARDS
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 ZEN/CG III MAF
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S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON AND MAJGEN ADAMS FROM LTGEN BUSE (DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS)

MARINE PARTICIPATION IN THE DELTA (S)

A. CMC 212015Z APR 70 (S) (SPECAT/LIMDIS)

B. CMC 102154Z JUL 68 (C)

1. (S) I ASSUME THAT THE REPLACEMENT OF VAL-4 WITH A VMO (MINUS) MEANS THAT THE VMO WOULD INITIALLY RELOCATE TO THE DELTA WITH 14 OV-10 AIRCRAFT SINCE THIS EQUATES TO VAL-4'S OPERATING ALLOWANCE. I ALSO ASSUME THAT OTHER SUPPORT SUCH AS BASE SECURITY, MESSING, POWER, ETC. WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED. THE DEPLOYMENT OF THIS UNIT TO THE DELTA, IS CONSIDERED SUPPORTABLE FROM A LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL STANDPOINT WITH MINOR ADJUSTMENTS FROM NORMAL SUPPORT DUE TO ANTICIPATED ORDNANCE REQUIREMENTS AND LENGTHENED PIPELINE. IN THIS REGARD, I AM CONCERNED WITH THREE AREAS. SPECIFICALLY, THESE AREAS INVOLVE THE OV-10 MISSION, INTRODUCTION OF AN AIR ONLY ELEMENT AND LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENT WHICH MAY ENSUE FROM THIS COMMITMENT.

A. IN THE CASE OF THE OV-10 MISSION, PRIMARY AND CONTINUOUS EMPHASIS CONCERNING ITS EMPLOYMENT POLICY HAS BEEN PLACED ON THE OBSERVATION VICE ATTACK ROLE FOR THE OV-10 AND, ATTENDANT THERE-TO, THE ORDNANCE DELIVERY REQUIREMENT FOR THIS AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE LIMITED TO TARGET MARKING, SUPPRESSIVE FIRES AND THE DESTRUCTION OF LIGHT, FLEETING TARGETS. AS STATED IN REF B, ANY CONNOTATION THAT IMPLIES A DIRECT STRIKE/CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ROLE FOR THE OV-10, WHICH HAS BEEN THE CASE IN THE DELTA, COULD HAVE A DELETERIOUS EFFECT ON FUTURE NAVY AND MARINE AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS BEFORE OSD. TO THIS END, I HAVE HELD CLOSE CONTROL OVER THE UTILIZATION OF THE OV-10 IN COMBAT. HOWEVER, IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE USE OF MARINE OV-10'S TO PROVIDE FIXED WING RIVERINE AIR SUPPORT IN THE DELTA MAY CONTRAVENE THE POLICY PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED BECAUSE THE AIR SUPPORT REQUIRED IS, IN FACT, ORIENTED PRIMARILY TO THE LIGHT ATTACK MISSION. ALTHOUGH EMPLOYMENT OF THE OV-10 IN THIS MANNER IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY WHEN FIXED WING STRIKE AIRCRAFT ARE NOT READILY AVAILABLE, IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE IN THE DELTA, TO HIGHLIGHT THE OBSERVATION ROLE OF THE MARINE OV-10. THIS CONDITION DOES NOT EXIST IN I CORPS.

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(41)

B. THE EMPLOYMENT OF ONLY AN AVIATION ELEMENT (VMO) TO THE DELTA ONCE AGAIN FRACTURES OUR CONCEPT OF PROVIDING ONLY A BALANCED AIR-GROUND PACKAGE. THIS POSITION HAS BEEN USED REPEATEDLY IN OUR DELIBERATIONS CONCERNING THE PHASED WITHDRAWALS IN ORDER TO RETAIN A VIABLE PACKAGE. THE INTRODUCTION NOW OF ONLY ONE PART OF THE AIR-GROUND TEAM MAY NOT BE ADVANTAGEOUS IN LIGHT OF OUR PREVIOUS POSITION. FURTHER, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THIS ORGANIZATION (VMO) MAY GROW WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE RESIDUAL MAB TO INCLUDE THE AH-1G'S IN ADDITION TO THE POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT OF THE NAVY'S RESUPPLY MISSION IN THE DELTA BY ADDING CH-46 AIRCRAFT. THIS, IN TURN, COULD DEVELOP IN-COUNTRY SPACE PROBLEMS AND CREATE A QUESTIONABLE PROLIFERATION OF THE AVIATION ELEMENT WITHOUT A COMPARABLE GROUND ELEMENT. IN ESSENCE, WE COULD DEVELOP A QUASI "SHU-FLY" ORGANIZATION.

C. FINALLY, IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE VAL-4 MISSION EXTENDS BEYOND FY-71. WHEREAS, ALL OUR PLANNING HAS BEEN BASED ON A COMPLETE MARINE WITHDRAWAL WITH THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE RESIDUAL MAB BY END OF FY-71. ACCORDINGLY, RETENTION OF A VMO (-) IN THE DELTA IS CONTRARY TO OUR STATED INTENTIONS.

2. (S) IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING, I AM NOT CONVINCED THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF A VMO TO THE DELTA WILL MATERIALLY ASSIST IN FURTHERING MARINE AIR-GROUND RIVERINE DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT IN VIEW OF THE LIMITED CAPABILITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF A VMO (MINUS) ONLY.

3. (S) IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, I SUPPORT THE REPLACEMENT OF VAL-4, OV-10 LOSSES AS WELL AS MARINE LOSSES, FROM MARINE ASSETS. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE TIMELY REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT FOR RVN UNITS, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DRAWDOWN VMO-6 INITIALLY, AND, IN TURN, TO REPLACE THESE AIRCRAFT FROM CONUS (4TH MAW) ASSETS.

4. (S) ACCORDINGLY, I RECOMMEND THAT VAL-4 AND VMO-2 OV-10 AIRCRAFT LOSSES BE REPLACED BY OV-10'S FROM VMO-6 AND THAT VMO-6'S AIRCRAFT BE REPLACED FROM CONUS ASSETS AS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST 15 OPERATING AIRCRAFT.

5. (S) I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH KEITH AND HE CONCURS EXCEPT HE RECOMMENDS THAT THE AGREEMENT BE RENEGOTIATED WITH CNO TO ESTABLISH A LIMIT ON THE DRAWDOWN OF MARINE OV-10 ASSETS.

WARM REGARDS.

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211240Z ZYH ZFF' ZFF-1
 GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON VIETNAM
 TO GEN BROWN CDR 7TH AF TAN SON NHUT VIETNAM
 LTC MILDREN DCG USARV LONG BINH VIETNAM
 LTC COLLINS CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG VIETNAM
 LTC DAVISON CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH VIETNAM
 VADM ZUMWALT COMNAVFORV SAIGON VIETNAM
 LTC ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG VIETNAM
 VADM WIEGNER COMSEVENTHFLT
 LTC MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG VIETNAM
 MG MCCORM CG DMAC CAN THO VIETNAM

ZEN
 GEN B. L. A. S. EFIO MAC 5475 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: VISIT BY MR. ROGER T. KELLEY, ASST SECY DEF (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)

1. MR. KELLEY AND PARTY WILL VISIT RVN FROM 11-17 MAY 1970. HE DESIRES MAXIMUM EXPOSURE TO COMBAT PERSONNEL AND CONDITIONS AFFECTING THEM. MR. KELLEY WANTS THE OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT SEPARATELY WITH RANDOMLY SELECTED GROUPS OF ENLISTED MEN AND JUNIOR OFFICERS. THE SIZE OF EACH GROUP SHOULD NOT EXCEED 20 PERSONS. HE WANTS TO VISIT PRIVATELY WITH THESE PEOPLE SO AS TO ALLOW FOR FREE EXCHANGE OF DIALOGUE.

2. THERE WILL BE NO, REPEAT NO, HONORS OR COMMAND BRIEFINGS. MR. KELLEY SHOULD BE GIVEN MAXIMUM EXPOSURE TO GROUPS OF COMBAT PERSONNEL.

3. THE VISITING PARTY WILL CONSIST OF:

MR. ROGER T. KELLEY, ASST SECY DEF (MANPOWER & RES AFF)

CG LEO E. BENADE, DEP ASST SECY (MIL PER POLICY)

MR. CARL W. CLEWLOW, DEP ASST UOCCY ((.7& 034 09)8:6)

MR. RUSSELL N. KNAUSS, GS-15, EXEC ASST TO SECY KELLEY

LTC CHARLES T. HUTZLER, MACV J1, ESCORT OFFICER

L-8 (TO BE DESIGNATED) NCO ADVISOR TO MR. KELLEY

SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO THE GROUP ARE:

A. LEADERSHIP AND MORALE IN VN ARMED FORCES.

B. TROOP REDEPLOYMENT.

C. EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMISSARIES, EXCHANGES, CLUBS, AND MESSES.

D. BLACKMARKET (TO INCLUDE MONEY ORDERS).

E. DRUG ABUSE.

F. EFFECT OF NEW MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF 1968.

G. STOCKADE - LONG BINH

H. NAVY AT SEA.

I. TENTATIVE ITINERARY WILL BE TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY.

J. OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST FOR THE VISIT IS MACV J1, PROJECT OFFICER IS LTC CHARLES T. HUTZLER, USA, MACV J13, TELEPHONE 923-2123.
 WARM REGARDS.

INFO NOTE: DELIVERY DURING DUTY HOURS

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1. THERE IS TRANSMITTED TO YOU A MESSAGE ON WHICH I
HAVE EXPRESSED MY PERSONAL VIEWS BY 4 MAY.

2. THE MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

THE TRIP OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE

Not held.

1. INFORMATION CONCERNING A PENDING VISIT OF THE HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION SUBCOMMITTEE
TO WAGON IS PROVIDED IN REF A. THE SUBCOMMITTEE
WILL BE PROVIDING CERTAIN AFTER-EFFECTS OF
THE MALI INCIDENT. DETAILS HAVE NOT YET BEEN PROVIDED.

2. I AM PREPARED TO RESPOND TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE.
I WILL GIVE THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENTS OF THE EFFECTS
OF THE MALI INCIDENT ON:

1. THE MORALE AND ATTITUDE OF COMMANDERS, ESPECIALLY
LOWER LEVEL ARMED COMBAT COMMANDERS,
PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS,
CIVILIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MILITARY POPULATION,
ESPECIALLY TOWARD MILITARY LIVES IN AREAS WHERE
THE CHARACTER OF THE MILITARY IS UNKNOWN, MIXED,
OR HOSTILE TO THE MILITARY.

2. THE EFFECT OF THE MALI INCIDENT AS USED ABOVE REFERS
TO THE EFFECT OF THE NEWS OR UNDERSTANDING OF THE INCIDENT
ON THE MILITARY WITNESS.

3. WILL YOU PROVIDE YOUR COMMENTS AND ANY OTHER
REMARKS BY 4 MAY 1968.

4. THE TRIP WILL BE TO WAGON.

5. THE TRIP WILL BE TO WAGON.

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"EXCLUSIVE"

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ZNY CCCCC

O 280822Z APR 70

FM CG FIRST MAW

TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

20 APR 10 05

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C O N F I D E N T I A L EYES ONLY/ FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEDN FROM MAJ GEN THRASH

SUBJ: TRIP OF HERBERT SUBCOMMITTEE

1. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE MY LAI INCIDENT DID NOT EFFECT MY COMMAND TO ANY APPRECIABLE DEGREE. THE NATURE OF THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING'S MISSION PRECLUDES EXTENSIVE CONTACT WITH VIETNAMESE BY THE MAJORITY OF THE MARINES IN THE COMMAND. ACCORDINGLY, INITIAL REACTION DURING THE PERIOD OF HIGHEST PUBLICITY WAS MUCH THE SAME AS WOULD HAVE OCCURRED IN A COMMAND BASED OUTSIDE OF RVN. EFFECTS WERE LIMITED TO DISCUSSION AND SPECULATION AS TO WHAT PERSONAL ACTION WOULD BE IN A SITUATION OF WHICH FEW WING MARINES HAVE FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE. THERE IS NO DISCERNIBLE RESIDUAL EFFECT ON EITHER MORALE OR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

2. THE SINGLE EXCEPTION PERTAINS TO MARINES ENGAGED IN FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING'S CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS. I HAVE SIX CIVIC ACTIONS TEAMS COMPOSED OF APPX SIXTY SIX PERSONNEL THAT FREQUENTLY GO INTO THEIR ASSIGNED CIVIC ACTION AREA AND WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH THE INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL. AS THESE MEN ARE AWARE THAT ACTIVE VC ARE NEITHER AGE NOR SEX LIMITED, THE MORALE REACTION TO THE MY LAI INCIDENT WAS NEGATIVE. THERE WAS A GENERAL FEELING OF SYMPATHY WITH THE AMERICANS INVOLVED AND SUSPICION THAT THE INCIDENT COULD BE RATIONALLY JUSTIFIED. RESIDUAL EFFECTS ON MORAL AND MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT ARE NEGLIGIBLE.

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ZNY AAAAA
P 280903Z APR 70
FM CG FORLOGCOMD
TO CG III MAF
BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y
FOR LT GEN MCCUTCHEON
TRIP OF HERBERT SUBCOMMITTEE (U)

- A. CG III MAF 272344Z APR 70
- B. CG XXIV CORPS 261422Z APR 70
- C. (C) IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST CONTAINED IN REF A THE

FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED ON REF B.
 A. THE MORALE AND ATTITUDE OF THE TROOPS AND SMALL UNIT
 COMMANDERS OF THIS COMMAND HAS NOT BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED.
 THE COMBAT PERSONNEL OF THIS COMMAND
 OPERATE IN A RELATIVELY SECURE HIGHLY POPULATED AREA WHEREIN
 CONTINUOUS EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
 AND PERSONAL RESPONSE PROGRAM. TROOPS HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THE
 PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF THESE PROGRAMS PRIOR TO AND SINCE THE
 MY LAI INCIDENT.
 B. PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF GROUND OPERATIONS HAS
 NOT CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THE MY LAI INCIDENT.

PAGE TWO RUMLNPA4364 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T / M C E O
 INCREASED ATTENTION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE TRAINING
 AND INDOCTRINATION OF COMBAT TROOPS CONCERNING RULES
 OF ENGAGEMENT, PERSONAL RESPONSE, PRISONER HANDLING,
 SEARCH PROCEDURES ETC. THESE SAME SUBJECTS ARE
 CONTINUOUSLY ADDRESSED AND CLOSELY MONITORED DURING
 ALL OPERATIONS.
 C. THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS HAD LITTLE EFFECT UPON
 THE ATTITUDE OF THE TROOPS OF THIS COMMAND TOWARD
 THE VIETNAMESE POPULATION. THE ABSENCE OF VIOLATIONS
 OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE SUCCESS OF THE
 PERSONAL RESPONSE AND CIVIL ACTION PROGRAMS HAS
 ENGENDERED A SPIRIT OF TRUST AND COOPERATION.
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P 200000Z ZFF-1
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 TO CG III MAF
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UNCLAS E F T O/EYES ONLY FOR LGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MGEN WIDDECKE
 TRIP OF HEBERT COMMITTEE

A. YOUR 272344Z APR70

B. CG XXIV CORPS 261429Z APR70

1. REF A REFERS. ASSESSMENTS PROVIDED IN ORDER LISTED IN REF B.

A. NO AFFECT NOTED ON MORALE OF GND CBT TROOPS. EVENT CONSIDERED TOO REMOTE TO IMPACT DIRECTLY ON INDIV MAR.

B. THERE HAS BEEN AN ATMOSPHERE OF UNCERTAINTY EVIDENT AMONG NEWLY ARRIVED LTS. THIS UNCERTAINTY IS ILLUSTRATED BY A QUESTION OFTEN ASKED DURING ADVANCE INDOCTRINATION TRNG, "WHAT IS AN ATROCITY". WHILE THERE IS EVIDENCE OF CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT ON THE SUBJ AT THE JUNIOR OFF LEVEL, THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN NO MEASURABLE IMPACT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF JUNIOR OFF, STAFF NCO OR NCO LEADERS.

C. THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS GENERATED CONTINUED CONCERN OVER RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. INCREASED AWARENESS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF INJURY TO CIVILIANS IMPACTS DIRECTLY BOTH ON PLANNING AND ON CLEARANCES FOR FIRE MISSIONS; AND MAY RESULT IN TARGET NOT ATTACKED FOR LACK OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OR THE REMOTE POSSIBILITY OF INJURY TO NONCOMBATANTS.

D. THERE HAS BEEN NO INDC OF A CHANGE IN TROOP ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.

2. ADDITIONAL COMMENT. THE MY LAI INCIDENT AND ATTENDANT PUBLICITY HAVE BEEN UTILIZED BY THE VC TO GIVE CREDENCE TO PROPAGANDA AIMED AT ALIENATING LOCAL POPULATION FROM THE MARINE CORPS.

3. DUE TO SHORT SUSPENSE THE ABOVE IS BASED ON INPUT FROM SELECTED STAFF OFFICERS AND COMMANDERS AND DOES NOT REFLECT WIDESPREAD EXAMINATION OR INDIVIDUAL MARINES.

4. SSO: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.

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