

## SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEX

MAY

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SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEXMAYM  
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<u>DTG</u>	<u>ADDEE/CLASSIFICATION/SUBJECT</u>
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79-311044Z	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> PERSONNEL STRENGTHS IN RVN

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A  
YM  
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YM  
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\* denotes late entry

~~1. CG III MAF 070001Z MAY 70 (TS)~~

~~FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON~~

~~FORCE PLANNING (U) - ACTION OFFICERS VISIT MACH 5 9~~

B. 2. CG III MAF 101343Z MAY 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 FORCE PLANNING (U) - SHORT FUZE REDEPLOYMENT

B. 3. CG III MAF 120840Z MAY 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
 FOR LTGEN ZAIS INFO MGEN DOLVIN FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 FORCE PLANNING (U) - PROPOSE REDEPLOYMENT OF ENGRBN/BRIDGE/FORCERECON

B. 4. CG III MAF 140550Z MAY 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
 FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 FORCE PLANNING (U) - REDEPLOYMENT OF ENGRBN/BRIDGE/CO/FORCERECON

~~5. CG III MAF 101344Z MAY 70 (TS)~~

~~FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON~~

~~FORCE PLANNING (U) READDRESSAL OF GEN ABRAMS MSG REDEPLOYMENT E/ENGRBN~~

B. 6. CG III MAF 191353Z MAY 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
 FOR BGEN HOUGHTON FROM BGEN DULACKI  
 COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT, ICTZ (U)

B. 7. CG III MAF 231344Z MAY 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 WIEU

B. 8. CG III MAF 311044Z MAY 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 PERSONNEL STRENGTHS IN RVN (ROT OF ENGR BN, RECON CO AND BRIDGE CO

- A-1. CG III MAF 132330Z MAY 70 (U)  
FOR COL THURMAN FROM BGEN DULACKI  
THANK YOU MSG
- A-2. CG III MAF 130820Z MAY 70 (S) *gp-4*  
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL (S)
- A-3. CG III MAF 131346Z MAY 70 (S) *gp-4*  
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL
- A-4. CG III MAF 151124Z MAY 70 (U)  
FOR MGEN DOLVIN FROM BGEN DULACKI  
ICF/C&CI FUNDS
- A-5. CG III MAF 170211Z MAY 70 (S) *gp-4*  
FOR MGEN HARDIN INFO MGEN THRASH FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
RETENTION OF M-21 ARRESTING GEAR
- A-6. CG III MAF 191352Z MAY 70 (S) *gp-4*  
FM ADMIN III MAF TO CG FMFPAC  
COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS), ICTZ (U)
- A-7. ADMIN III MAF 200619Z MAY 70 (C) *gp-4*  
FOR BGEN HOUGHTON FROM BGEN DULACKI  
RETROGRADE OF M-6 BRIDGING
- A-8. CG III MAF 220730Z MAY 70 (S) *gp-4*  
FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LTGEN ZAIS AND MGEN WIDDECKE FROM LTGEN  
MCCUTCHEON - LE BAC (2) INCIDENT
- A-9. CG III MAF 221310Z MAY 70 (S) *gp-4*  
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
LEBAC (2) INCIDENT -READDRESSAL OF CG III MAF 220730Z
- A-10. CG III MAF 270325Z MAY 70 (C) *gp-4*  
FOR VADM WEISNER FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON LOOK FORWARD  
TO SEEING YOU
- A-11. CG III MAF 280512Z MAY 70 (S) *gp-4*  
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN HOUGHTON FROM BGEN DULACKI  
OFFICER REPLACEMENTS AND REQUIREMENTS
- A-12. CG III MAF 301518Z (C) *gp-4*  
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
VISIT OF ADM HYLAND

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

OTAZ YUN RUMLMFA0045 1210534-AAAA--RUMHMA.

ZNY AAAAA

O 010534Z MAY 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RYHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

E

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET/LINDIS/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/FOR LT GEN  
BASE FROM LT GEN MCCUTCHEON

FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. (TS) ON ACTION OFFICER LEVEL, THIS COMMAND WAS NOTIFIED BY MACV BY SECURE PHONE OF FOLLOWING JCS PLANNING PROPOSALS CONCERNING PROPOSED REDEPLOYMENTS:

A. CURRENT PLANNING INDICATES THAT 29.4K USMC REDEPLOYMENT FIGURE IS TENTATIVELY FIRM, TO BE COMPLETED NLT 15 OCT 1970.

B. PROVISIONAL SERVICE BATTALION ROLL-UP TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED TO BE COMPLETED NLT 1 JAN 1971.

C. MAB TO BE REDEPLOYED OUT OF COUNTRY NLT 1 MAY 1971.

2. (TS) IN RELATION TO ABOVE JCS PLANNING, MACV ACTION OFFICER QUIRIED III MAF ACTION OFFICER ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. DOES III MAF CONSIDER 29.4K REDEPLOYMENT FIGURE, 1.2K ROLL-UP FORCE, .6K TRANSITIONAL FORCE, AND 11.4K REMAINING (MAB AN

CAO) MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL SPACES (TOTAL 13.2K) FIRM, OR

PAGE TWO RUMLMFA0045 TOP SECRET/SPECAT/MCEO  
IS READJUSTMENT REQUIRED?

B. CAN RLT BE REDEPLOYED WITH ONLY A THREE WEEK STAND-DOWN PERIOD?

C. HOW MUCH STAND-DOWN TIME IS REQUIRED TO REDEPLOY A MAG?

D. CAN THE ROLL-UP FORCE COMPLETE ITS OPERATIONS BY 1 JAN 1971?

E. WHAT CONFLICTS DOES III MAF ENVISION IN THE SIMULTANEOUS REDEPLOYMENT OF A MAB AND ARMY DIVISION FROM I CORPS (MAR/APR 1971)?

3. (TS) III MAF ACTION OFFICERS WILL DEPART FOR MACV HQS THIS DATE TO DISCUSS AND PROVIDE GENERAL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY MACV ACTION OFFICER. NO PROBLEMS OR CHANGES IN PLANNING ARE ENVISIONED.

4. (TS) MACV INDICATES THAT RCS MUST BE PROVIDED WITH COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS NLT 4MAY 1970.

WARM REGARDS.

G-4

E

0045

"MCEO"

SPECAT

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

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05

SECRET

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

OTTZYUW RUMLMPA0308 1221325-TTTT--R UHHFMA.

ZNY TTTT

O 021325Z MAY 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN HC CUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS) FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG III MAF 010534Z MAY 70 (TS/LINDIS/SPECAT/MCEO)

B. JCS 271845Z APR 70 (NOTAL)

C. CINCPAC 290430Z APR 70 (NOTAL)

1. (TS) AS INDICATED IN REF A, III MAF ACTION OFFICERS VISITED SAIGON AND DISCUSSED WITH MACV ACTION OFFICERS FUTURE REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND SIGHTED REFS B AND C. BELOW INFORMATION IS FORWARDED AS PROVIDED FROM ACTION OFFICER VISIT.

2. (TS) REF B GENERALLY CONTAINS SECDEF GUIDANCE FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF 150K PACKAGE ON FOLLOWING BASIS:

A. REDEPLOYMENT OF NOT LESS THAN 50K PERSONNEL SPACES BY 15 OCT 1970 WITH REDEPLOYMENT OF NOT LESS THAN 10K ADDITIONAL SPACES BY 31 DEC 1970.

B. REDEPLOYMENT OF REMAINING 90K SPACES FOR REDUCED U.S.

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA0308 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT/MCEO FORCES CEILING NOT TO EXCEED 284K IN-COUNTRY BY 31 MAY 1971.

C. CINCPAC COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO JCS MLT 10 MAY 1970.

D. PRIMARY CONSIDERATION FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES WILL BE PROGRESS OF VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM.

E. IMPLIED ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS WERE FUNDING, MOVEMENT OF FORCES, AND LOGISTIC ROLL-UP.

F. MOVEMENT CONFERENCE TO BE SCHEDULED AFTER

1 JUN 1970.

3. (TS) REF C GENERALLY ADDRESSED ARMY LOGISTICAL ROLL-UP AND WAS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO MARINE CORPS PROBLEMS.

4. (TS) USING MACV RECOMMENDED TERM INCREMENT VICE PHASE, TENTATIVE MACV PLANS INDICATE FOLLOWING REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE: INCREMENT FOUR

(1 DIV BASE, 2 RLT)	USMC (III MAF - MAB)	29.4
	USN (SPT)	9.0
	USAF (ELMS)	2.0
(1 BDE)	USA (BDE, ELMS, SPT)	7.9
	MISC	1.7
		50.0

"MCEO"

SPECAT

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

02

13

25 TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"MCEO"

PAGE THREE RUMLP#0308 T O P S E C R E T / I N D I S / S P E C A T / M C E O  
COMPLETION NLT 15 OCT 1970

## INCREMENT FIVE

(1 BDE)	USMC (ROLL-UP)	1.2
	USA (BDE, SPT)	6.3
	USN (SPT)	1.5
	MISC	1.0
		10.0

COMPLETION NLT 1 JAN 1971

## INCREMENT SIX

(1 RLT)	USMC (MAB PLUS CAG)	11.4
	USN (SPT)	6.1
(3 DIV BASE, 3 BDE)	USA	72.5
		90.0

COMPLETION NLT 1 MAY 1971

5. (TS) MACV ENVISIONS CURRENT REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING SCHEDULE:  
5 MAY 1970 - MACV REDEPLOYMENT COMMENTS/GENERAL PLAN TO CINCPAC.  
10 MAY 1970 - CINCPAC COMMENTS TO JCS.  
1 JUN 1970 - JCS COMMENTS TO SECDEF, COMUSMACV ASSESSMENT WITH IN-COUNTRY COMMANDERS.

PAGE FOUR RUMLP#0308 T O P S E C R E T / I N D I S / S P E C A T / M C E O  
15 JUN 1970 - SECDEF DECISIONS.

1 JUL 1970 - CINCPAC MOVEMENT CONFERENCE.

6. (TS) INITIAL MACV THOUGHTS FOR INCREMENT FOUR VISUALIZED REDEPLOYMENT OF MARCOR ELEMENTS OVER 10 TO 16 WEEK PERIOD WITH ALL 29.4K SPACES OUT-OF-COUNTRY BY 15 OCT 70. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO RETAIN MAXIMUM COMBAT POWER IN-COUNTRY LONGEST POSSIBLE, FIRST RLT WOULD NOT COMMENCE STANDDOWN UNTIL 1 SEP 70 AND SECOND RLT UNTIL 22 SEP 70. WHILE CONCURRING WITH DESIRE FOR RETENTION OF COMBAT CAPABILITY, IIX MAF ACTION OFFICERS INDICATED LATE STANDOWN AND REDEPLOYMENT OF RLT'S NOT FEASIBLE IN LIGHT OF FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

A. RLT'S WILL REQUIRE COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AS LONG AS THEY ARE ON LINE, THUS PHASEOUT MUST BE BALANCED.

B. AVAILABILITY OF NAVY AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING WILL NOT PERMIT HOLDING MAJOR REDEPLOYMENTS FOR 1SEP-15 OCT TIME FRAME.

C. NECESSITY TO RETAIN TACTICAL INTEGRITY OF MARINE UNITS WITH T/E EQUIPMENT AND RELATED SUPPLIES DURING REDEPLOYMENT.

D. REQUIREMENT FOR MAJORITY NAVY AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING VICE NSTE/MARITIME SHIPPING DUE NATURE OF CARGO AND LOADING FACILITY

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SPECAT

"MCEO"  
TOP SECRET (53)

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"MCEO"

PAGE FIVE RUMLPAG0308 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT/MCEO  
LIMITATIONS.

- E. PROBABLE WEATHER HAZARDS DURING EARLY OCTOBER.
- F. REQUIREMENT TO BEGIN LOGISTIC ROLL-UP FORCE OPERATIONS EARLY IN ORDER TO COMPLETE BY 1 JAN 71.
- G. REDEPLOYMENT OF MARINE AIR ASSETS MUST BE IN RELATION TO SUPPORT OF RLTS AND AVAILABILITY OF LPH SHIPPING.
- H. FIRST MAW HEAD QUARTERS AND CERTAIN SUPPORT SQUADRONS WILL REDEPLOY TO IWAKUNI WHICH HAS LIMITED OFFLOADING CAPABILITIES.
- I. (TS) COUNTER PROPOSAL BY III MAF ACTION OFFICERS BASED UPON ESTIMATE OF BEST AVAILABILITY OF AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING WAS TO COMMENCE STANDDOWN OF FIRST RLTS ON 15 JUL 70 TO BE FOLLOWED BY SECOND RLTS ON 1 SEP 70. COMBAT SUPPORT/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT/WING HQ/DIV HQ TO BE REDEPLOYED AS SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE WITHIN 15 JUL-15 OCT TIME FRAME CONSISTENT WITH RLTS SUPPORT. EARLIEST CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CONDUCTING CINCPAC MOVEMENT CONFERENCE PRIOR TO 15 JUNE 1970.
- J. (TS) WITH REGARD TO INCREMENT SIX, III MAF ACTION OFFICERS ADVISED THAT MAW REDEPLOYMENT WOULD REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY FOUR WEEKS USE OF DANANG FACILITIES FREE OF AMERICAN DIVISION

PAGE SIX RUMLPAG0308 T O P S E C R E T/LINDIS/SPECAT/MCEO  
REDEPLOYMENT TRAFFIC.

- 9. (TS) REQUEST YOUR VIEWS, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO AVAILABILITY OF SHIPPING TO SUPPORT REDEPLOYMENTS.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4.

BT

0308

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES  
NNNN

SPECAT

"MCEO"  
TOP SECRET (53)

MCEO

UNCLAS E F T O DNRVNA 0300 102 1526-EEEE - R UNVNA.

O 021526Z MAY 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMVNA/CG IMAFAC

BT

UNCLAS E F T O/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN BUSE  
FROM LTGEN MC CUTCHECK (DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS)  
ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTS OF THE MY LAI INCIDENT

1. I WAS ASKED BY LTGEN ZAIS TO GIVE MY ASSESSMENT OF THE  
EFFECTS OF THE MY LAI INCIDENT. MY COMMENTS WERE INCORPORATED  
INTO LTGEN ZAIS' RESPONSE TO GEN ABRAMS, WHICH IS QUOTED AS  
FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

O 010829Z MAY 70

FM LTGEN ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS DNG RVN

TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN

BT

UNCLAS E F T O DNG 995 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF THE MY LAI INCIDENT

REF: NSC MAC 5563, 261101Z APR 70

1. SENIOR COMMANDERS IN NORTHERN, CENTRAL, AND SOUTHERN B

PAGE TWO RUMVNA0300 UNCLAS E F T O/MCRO

CORPS WERE QUERIED, WITH THE FOLLOWING RESULTS.

A. NORTHERN I CORPS. NUMEROUS CONVERSATIONS WITH EN-  
LISTED MEN AND OFFICERS INDICATE THAT THE PUBLICITY ASSOCIATED  
WITH THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS HAD NO EFFECT ON TROOP MORALE,  
MORALE AND ATTITUDE OF COMMANDERS, PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF  
GROUND OPERATIONS, OR TROOP ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE  
POPULATION.

B. CENTRAL I CORPS. THERE HAS BEEN NO ADVERSE EFFECT  
ON MORALE OF GROUND COMBAT TROOPS, WHERE TROOPS ARE IN IN-  
TENSIVE AND CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH VIETNAMESE IN AREAS OF  
UNION OR QUESTIONABLE LOYALTY, THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT  
MARINES HAVE A GENERAL FEELING OF SYMPATHY FOR THE AMERICANS  
INVOLVED IN THE MY LAI INCIDENT AND BELIEVE THAT THE INCIDENT  
COULD POSSIBLY BE JUSTIFIED RATIONALLY. NO CHANGE IN MORALE  
OR ATTITUDE OF COMMANDERS IS EVIDENT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF  
SOME NEWLY ARRIVED JUNIOR LEADERS WHO APPEAR SOMEWHAT UN-  
CERTAIN AND WORRIED ABOUT THE TRUE DEFINITION OF "ATROCITY".  
NO APPRECIABLE IMPACT ON THEIR PERFORMANCE IS APPARENT. THERE  
WAS NO CHANGE IN THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF GROUND  
OPERATIONS OR THE SUPPORT OF BATTLES APPROVED BY AND

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02

13

26 (54)  
MCEO

"MCEO"

PAGE THREE RIMLMPA0309 UNCLAS E F T O/MCEO  
 AWARENESS OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, MORE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF TARGETS FOR FIRE CLEARANCE, AND MORE STRESS ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS PRISONER HANDLING, SEARCH PROCEDURES, AND PERSONAL RESPONSE DURING TRAINING PERIODS. EXCEPT AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, THERE IS NO INDICATION OF A CHANGE IN TROOPS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE POPULATION.

C. SOUTHERN I CORPS. LITTLE EVIDENCE WAS FOUND THAT THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS HAD A PRONOUNCED EFFECT ON TROOP MORALE, PARTICULARLY AMONG GROUND COMBAT SOLDIERS. THERE IS A GENERAL RELUCTANCE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ALLEGED INCIDENT OCCURRED, AND THOSE SOLDIERS INTERVIEWED DO NOT IDENTIFY WITH THE SOLDIERS WHO WERE INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT. HOWEVER, THE NORMAL FRUSTRATIONS OF CONDUCTING COMBAT OPERATIONS IN AN AREA WHERE THE ENEMY IS NOT EASILY IDENTIFIED HAVE BEEN COMPOUNDED BY THE PROGRESSIVELY MORE STRINGENT INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, WHICH HAVE NECESSARILY EVOLVED AS THE WAR MOVED BACK INTO ITS COUNTERINSURGENCY PHASES IN THE AMERICAN TAOI. SOME SOLDIERS FEEL THAT THE ENEMY IS GETTING MORE THAN AN EVEN BREAK.

THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS HAD A MORE PRONOUNCED IMPACT ON

PAGE FOUR RIMLMPA0309 UNCLAS E F T O/MCEO  
 THE GROUND COMBAT COMMANDERS THAN ON ANY OTHER GROUP. AMONG THE LOWER LEVEL GROUND COMMANDERS THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF CONCERN WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING LATER CONDEMNED FOR DECISIONS THEY TOOK IN GOOD FAITH IN A COMBAT SITUATION. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT PUBLICITY ADVERSE TO THE ARMY WILL HAVE A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON JUNIOR OFFICER RETENTION. IN GENERAL, JUNIOR OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS INDICATED THAT THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS INTENSIFIED THEIR AWARENESS REGARDING THEIR PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ASSURING THAT THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE NOT VIOLATED. SENIOR COMMANDERS AND SENIOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AS A GROUP EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE WAY SOLDIERS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED WERE APPARENTLY CONDEMNED PRIOR TO A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION. THEY EXPRESSED A FEELING OF INSECURITY BASED ON WHAT WAS FELT TO BE OVER-REACTION BY THE ARMY IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESSURES OF POLITICIANS AND THOSE VOCAL ELEMENTS WHO CONDEMN THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM FOR ANY NUMBER OF REASONS.

WITH REGARD TO THE PLANNING AND CONDUCTING OF GROUND OPERATIONS, THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS RESULTED IN SENIOR COM-

(54)  
 "MCEO"

**MCEO**  
 PAGE FIVE RUMLPAB3 UNCLAS E F T O/MCEO  
 COMMANDERS PLACING ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS ON THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. EVERY EFFORT IS MADE TO AVOID INJURIES TO INNOCENT CIVILIANS WHILE PROSECUTING AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC, VCI, AND THE NVA. OPERATIONS ARE STILL PLANNED AND CONDUCTED WHEREVER NECESSARY TO FACILITATE PACIFICATION. SENIOR COMMANDERS ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE MY LAI INCIDENT AND THE REQUIREMENT TO EXERCISE TIGHT CONTROL OVER THE APPLICATION OF COMBAT POWER IN PROXIMITY TO POPULATED AREAS. MY LAI HAS NOT BASICALLY CHANGED HOW OR WHERE COMBAT UNITS OPERATE; RATHER IT HAS MADE SENIOR COMMANDERS MORE AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES RESULTING FROM THE INDISCRIMINATE USE OF FIREPOWER. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE JUNIOR LEADERS HAVE DEVELOPED A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO COMBAT OPERATIONS WITH AN ATTENDANT REDUCTION IN AGGRESSIVENESS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO PRESS AN ENGAGEMENT IN A POPULATED AREA WHERE SUPPORTING FIRES WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE.

THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS HAD NO NOTICEABLE EFFECT ON TROOP ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE POPULACE LIVING IN AREAS WHERE THE ORIENTATION OF THEIR LOYALTY IS UNKNOWN, MIXED, OR IN FAVOR OF THE ENEMY. COMBAT TROOPS VIEW ANY PERSON OUTSIDE

PAGE SIX RUMLPAB309 UNCLAS E F T O/MCEO  
 AN RD AREA WITH SUSPICION. THEY REALIZE THAT THE RURAL POPULACE MAY BE LOYAL TO THE ENEMY BY CIRCUMSTANCE RATHER THAN BY CONVICTION AND THAT THEY RESPOND TO WHOEVER CONTROLS THE AREA. SOLDIERS CONTINUE TO BEFRIEND CHILDREN AND THE AGED, AND THIS DEMONSTRATED KINDNESS IS USUALLY RECIPROCATED, HOWEVER, SOLDIERS OPERATING IN HEAVILY BOOBY-TRAPPED AREAS FEEL INTENSE RESENTMENT TOWARDS THE VIETNAMESE POPULATION BECAUSE OF THE FRUSTRATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH FIGHTING AN UNSEEN ENEMY APPARENTLY HARBORED BY THE LOCAL POPULACE.

ONE PERCEIVABLE PHENOMENON WHICH WELL COULD HAVE BEEN A DIRECT OUTGROWTH OF THE MY LAI INVESTIGATIONS IS THE GREATER NUMBER AND MAGNITUDE OF EMOTIONAL REACTIONS BY VIETNAMESE TO CASUALTIES CAUSED BY US FIREPOWER, EQUIPMENT, OR VEHICLES ON THE LOCAL POPULACE. SOME DEMONSTRATIONS OR COMPLAINTS HAVE BEEN LEGIMATE, BUT THE INCREASE AND VITUPERATIVE NATURE OF THESE PROTESTS HAVE BEEN NOTICEABLE.

THE VARIOUS REACTIONS GENERATED BY THE MY LAI AFFAIR WERE DEPENDENT ON SUCH VARIABLES AS A MAN'S JOB, EDUCATION, RANK, AND AREA OF OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, AN INTERESTING NOTE WAS THE FACT THAT THE ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE MEN OF THE MY LAI

PAGE SEVEN RUMLPAB309 UNCLAS E F T O/MCEO  
 COMPANY (COMPANY C, 1/20 INFANTRY) WERE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS THOSE OF THE MEN IN OTHER INFANTRY COMPANIES INTERVIEWED THROUGHOUT THE DIVISION.

ENCLOSURE

BT

0302

57  
**MCEO**

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		021326Z MAY 70	
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. / OF COPIES REC'D	
			021326Z		3	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I			[Signature]	MY LAI INCIDENT
	DCG					
	C/S	I	5-3-70		(M)	REMARKS
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	Y	5/3		CG	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAF					
	CHAP					
	PAO					
	FLC COMPT					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	DPI-16					
	HQ CMDY					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RT&E					
	REPRO					
	FLC SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	CAF MED					
	SIC					
	EMBARK					
	SGT MAJ					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

UNCLASSIFIED (B-17)

021326Z MAY 70 RUMLMFA 0309 122 1326-EEEE-R UNKFMFA.  
ZNY EEEEE

O 021326Z MAY 70  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMLMFA/CG FMFPAC  
BT

UNCLAS E F T O/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN BUSE  
FROM LTGEN MC CUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS)  
ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTS OF THE MY LAI INCIDENT

1. I WAS ASKED BY LTGEN ZAIS TO GIVE MY ASSESSMENT OF THE  
EFFECTS OF THE MY LAI INCIDENT. MY COMMENTS WERE INCORPORATED  
INTO LTGEN ZAIS' RESPONSE TO GEN ABRAMS, WHICH IS QUOTED AS  
FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

O 010825Z MAY 70  
FM LTGEN ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS DNG RVN  
TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SGN RVN  
BT

UNCLAS E F T O DNG 995 EYES ONLY  
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF THE MY LAI INCIDENT  
REF: MSG MAC 5563, 261101Z APR 70  
1. SENIOR COMMANDERS IN NORTHERN, CENTRAL, AND SOUTHERN 8

PAGE TWO RUMLMFA0309 UNCLAS E F T O/MCEO  
CORPS WERE QUERIED, WITH THE FOLLOWING RESULTS.

A. NORTHERN I CORPS. NUMEROUS CONVERSATIONS WITH EN-  
LISTED MEN AND OFFICERS INDICATE THAT THE PUBLICITY ASSOCIATED  
WITH THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS HAD NO EFFECT ON TROOP MORALE,  
MORALE AND ATTITUDE OF COMMANDERS, PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF  
GROUND OPERATIONS, OR TROOP ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE  
POPULATION.

B. CENTRAL I CORPS. THERE HAS BEEN NO ADVERSE EFFECT  
ON MORALE OF GROUND COMBAT TROOPS, WHERE TROOPS ARE IN IN-  
TIMATE AND CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH VIETNAMESE IN AREAS OF  
UNKNOWN OR QUESTIONABLE LOYALTY. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT  
MARINES HAVE A GENERAL FEELING OF SYMPATHY FOR THE AMERICANS  
INVOLVED IN THE MY LAI INCIDENT AND BELIEVE THAT THE INCIDENT  
COULD POSSIBLY BE JUSTIFIED RATIONALLY. NO CHANGE IN MORALE  
OR ATTITUDE OF COMMANDERS IS EVIDENT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF  
SOME NEWLY ARRIVED JUNIOR LEADERS WHO APPEAR SOMEWHAT UN-  
CERTAIN AND WONDER ABOUT THE TRUE DEFINITION OF "ATROCITY".  
NO MEASURABLE IMPACT ON THEIR PERFORMANCE IS APPARENT. THERE  
HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF GROUND  
OPERATIONS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF GREATER EMPHASIS ON AND

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

(B-17)  
"MCEO"

MCEO

PAGE THREE RUMLPAG0309 UNCLAS E F T O/MCEO  
 AWARENESS OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, MORE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF TARGETS FOR FIRE CLEARANCE, AND MORE STRESS ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS PRISONER HANDLING, SEARCH PROCEDURES, AND PERSONAL RESPONSE DURING TRAINING PERIODS. EXCEPT AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, THERE IS NO INDICATION OF A CHANGE IN TROOPS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE POPULATION.

C. SOUTHERN I CORPS. LITTLE EVIDENCE WAS FOUND THAT THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS HAD A PRONOUNCED EFFECT ON TROOP MORALE, PARTICULARLY AMONG GROUND COMBAT SOLDIERS. THERE IS A GENERAL RELUCTANCE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ALLEGED INCIDENT OCCURRED, AND THOSE SOLDIERS INTERVIEWED DO NOT IDENTIFY WITH THE SOLDIERS WHO WERE INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT. HOWEVER, THE NORMAL FRUSTRATIONS OF CONDUCTING COMBAT OPERATIONS IN AN AREA WHERE THE ENEMY IS NOT EASILY IDENTIFIED HAVE BEEN COMPOUNDED BY THE PROGRESSIVELY MORE STRINGENT INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, WHICH HAVE NECESSARILY EVOLVED AS THE WAR MOVED BACK INTO IT'S COUNTERINSURGENCY PHASES IN THE AMERICAL TAOI. SOME SOLDIERS FEEL THAT THE ENEMY IS GETTING MORE THAN AN EVEN BREAK.

THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS HAD A MORE PRONOUNCED IMPACT ON

PAGE FOUR RUMLPAG0309 UNCLAS E F T O/MCEO  
 THE GROUND COMBAT COMMANDERS THAN ON ANY OTHER GROUP. AMONG THE LOWER LEVEL GROUND COMMANDERS THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF CONCERN WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING LATER CONDEMNED FOR DECISIONS THEY TOOK IN GOOD FAITH IN A COMBAT SITUATION. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT PUBLICITY ADVERSE TO THE ARMY WILL HAVE A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON JUNIOR OFFICER RETENTION. IN GENERAL, JUNIOR OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS INDICATED THAT THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS INTENSIFIED THEIR AWARENESS REGARDING THEIR PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ASSURING THAT THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE NOT VIOLATED. SENIOR COMMANDERS AND SENIOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AS A GROUP EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE WAY SOLDIERS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED WERE APPARENTLY CONDEMNED PRIOR TO A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION. THEY EXPRESSED A FEELING OF INSECURITY BASED ON WHAT WAS FELT TO BE OVER-REACTION BY THE ARMY IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESSURES OF POLITICIANS AND THOSE VOCAL ELEMENTS WHO CONDEMN THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM FOR ANY NUMBER OF REASONS.

WITH REGARD TO THE PLANNING AND CONDUCTING OF GROUND OPERATIONS, THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS RESULTED IN SENIOR COM-

B-17  
 MCEO

MCEO  
 PAGE FIVE RUMLPAG0309 UNCLAS E F T O/MCEO  
 COMMANDERS PLACING ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS ON THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. EVERY EFFORT IS MADE TO AVOID INJURIES TO INNOCENT CIVILIANS WHILE PROSECUTING AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC, VCI, AND THE NVA. OPERATIONS ARE STILL PLANNED AND CONDUCTED WHEREVER NECESSARY TO FACILITATE PACIFICATION. SENIOR COMMANDERS ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE MY LAI INCIDENT AND THE REQUIREMENT TO EXERCISE TIGHT CONTROL OVER THE APPLICATION OF COMBAT POWER IN PROXIMITY TO POPULATED AREAS. MY LAI HAS NOT BASICALLY CHANGED HOW OR WHERE COMBAT UNITS OPERATE; RATHER IT HAS MADE SENIOR COMMANDERS MORE AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES RESULTING FROM THE INDISCRIMINATE USE OF FIREPOWER. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE JUNIOR LEADERS HAVE DEVELOPED A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO COMBAT OPERATIONS WITH AN ATTENDANT REDUCTION IN AGGRESSIVENESS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO PRESS AN ENGAGEMENT IN A POPULATED AREA WHERE SUPPORTING FIRES WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE.

THE MY LAI INCIDENT HAS HAD NO NOTICEABLE EFFECT ON TROOP ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE POPULACE LIVING IN AREAS WHERE THE ORIENTATION OF THEIR LOYALTY IS UNKNOWN, MIXED, OR IN FAVOR OF THE ENEMY. COMBAT TROOPS VIEW ANY PERSON OUTSIDE

PAGE SIX RUMLPAG0309 UNCLAS E F T O/MCEO  
 AN RD AREA WITH SUSPICION. THEY REALIZE THAT THE RURAL POPULACE MAY BE LOYAL TO THE ENEMY BY CIRCUMSTANCE RATHER THAN BY CONVICTION AND THAT THEY RESPOND TO WHOEVER CONTROLS THE AREA. SOLDIERS CONTINUE TO BEFRIEND CHILDREN AND THE AGED, AND THIS DEMONSTRATED KINDNESS IS USUALLY RECIPROCATED. HOWEVER, SOLDIERS OPERATING IN HEAVILY BOOBY-TRAPPED AREAS FEEL INTENSE RESENTMENT TOWARDS THE VIETNAMESE POPULATION BECAUSE OF THE FRUSTRATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH FIGHTING AN UNSEEN ENEMY APPARENTLY HARBORED BY THE LOCAL POPULACE.

ONE PERCEIVABLE PHENOMENON WHICH WELL COULD HAVE BEEN A DIRECT OUTGROWTH OF THE MY LAI INVESTIGATIONS IS THE GREATER NUMBER AND MAGNITUDE OF EMOTIONAL REACTIONS BY VIETNAMESE TO CASUALTIES CAUSED BY US FIREPOWER, EQUIPMENT, OR VEHICLES ON THE LOCAL POPULACE. SOME DEMONSTRATIONS OR COMPLAINTS HAVE BEEN LEGIMATE. BUT THE INCREASE AND VITUPERATIVE NATURE OF THESE PROTESTS HAVE BEEN NOTICEABLE.

THE VARIOUS REACTIONS GENERATED BY THE MY LAI AFFAIR WERE DEPENDENT ON SUCH VARIABLES AS A MAN'S JOB, EDUCATION, RANK, AND AREA OF OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, AN INTERESTING NOTE WAS THE FACT THAT THE ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE MEN OF THE MY LAI

PAGE SEVEN RUMLPAG0309 UNCLAS E F T O/MCEO  
 COMPANY (COMPANY C, 1/20 INFANTRY) WERE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS THOSE OF THE MEN IN OTHER INFANTRY COMPANIES INTERVIEWED THROUGHOUT THE DIVISION.

UNQUOTE  
 BT

0309

B-17  
 MCEO

**CONFIDENTIAL**

M

PTTCZYUW RUMLEPA0557 1241317-CCCC--RUHFMA.  
ZNY CCCCC *1126/174*  
P 241317Z MAY 72  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
BT

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
INTERROGATION ASSISTANCE FOR U. S. ARMY III CTZ OPERATIONS  
1. THREE 1ST MARDIV MARINES, PROFICIENT IN CAMBODIAN LANGUAGE,  
COMMENCED INDEFINITE TAD WITH 1ST US CAV DIV, PHUOC VINH, 3 MAY  
1972 AT REQUEST OF COMUSMACV.

2. MARINES WERE REQUESTED 3 MAY AND ARRIVED PHUOC VINH 3 MAY.  
MARINES ARE:

A. 1STLT A.J. CORMIER 010 09 62/0250/2503 USMCR  
HQ CO, HQ BN, 1ST MARDIV

B. SSGT R.E. SYMAN 193 05 64/0251 HQ CO, HQ BN, 1ST MARDIV

C. SSGT M.J. DESARE 139 43 86/0251 HQ CO, HQ BN, 1ST MARDIV

3. COMUSMACV REPORTEDLY PLEASED AT PROMPT RESPONSE AND I UNDER-  
STAND THE THREE MARINES CONSTITUTE SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF TOTAL  
ALLIED CAMBODIAN LANGUAGE CAPABILITY IN THAT AREA.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0537

4 MAY 1972 15 01

*041317Z MAY 72*

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FMFPAC-GEN 2100/1 (3/69)  
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**CONFIDENTIAL**

MAY

(55)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

*(Handwritten initials)*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		5 MAY 70	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 1 OF 4 COPIES REC'D.	
			0413172 MAY 70			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					INTERROGATION & ASSISTANCE FOR U.S. ARMY III CTZ OPERATIONS
	DCG					
	C/S	I	5-5-70		<i>(initials)</i>	REMARKS
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					Section _____ Signature _____
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	ADJ					
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	NJA					
	OPANAL					
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	PSYOPS					
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	SEC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

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B-18

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PTTCZYUW RUMLEPA0587 1241317-CCCC--RUHFMA.  
ZNY CCCCC *1126/124*  
P 041317Z MAY 70  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT  
C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
INTERROGATION ASSISTANCE FOR U. S. ARMY III CTZ OPERATIONS  
1. THREE 1ST MARDIV MARINES, PROFICIENT IN CAMBODIAN LANGUAGE,  
COMMENCED INDEFINITE TAD WITH 1ST US CAV DIV, PHUOC VINH, 3 MAY  
1970 AT REQUEST OF COMUSMACV.  
2. MARINES WERE REQUESTED 3 MAY AND ARRIVED PHUOC VINH 3 MAY.  
MARINES ARE:  
A. 1STLT A.J. CORMIER 010 09 62/0250/2502 USMC  
HQ CO, HQ BN, 1ST MARDIV  
B. SSGT R.E. SYNAN 193 05 64/0251 HQ CO, HQ BN, 1ST MARDIV  
C. SSGT M.J. DEBARE 139 43 86/0251 HQ CO, HQ BN, 1ST MARDIV  
3. COMUSMACV REPORTEDLY PLEASED AT PROMPT RESPONSE AND I UNDER-  
STAND THE THREE MARINES CONSTITUTE SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF TOTAL  
ALLIED CAMBODIAN LANGUAGE CAPABILITY IN THAT AREA.  
WARM REGARDS.

4 MAY 10 15 07

GP-4  
BT  
0537

*041317Z MAY 70*

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PP RUHFMA  
 DE RUMLMPA 0845 126090A  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 060904Z MAY 70  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L //,03800//  
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 INTERROGATION ASSISTANCE FOR U.S. ARMY III CORPS OPNS  
 A. MY 041317Z MAY 70

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE STATUS OF MARINE INTERROGATORS IN SUPPORT OF U.S. ARMY OPNS IN III CORPS/CAMBODIA REPORTED IN REF A:

A. THE ITT PERSONNEL ARE ATTACHED TO THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV AND CURRENTLY REPRESENT THE TOTAL CAMBODIAN SPEAKING ASSETS AVAILABLE TO 1ST AIR CAV DIV.

B. LT CORMIER IS WITH THE ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 1ST AIR CAV IN CAMBODIA AND IS CONDUCTING REQUIRED LIAISON WITH CAMBODIAN PROVINCE CHIEFS.

C. SSGT'S DESARE AND SYNAN ARE PRESENTLY LOCATED AT THE LOC AN CHIEU HOI CENTER IN NORTHWEST TAY NINH PROVINCE WHICH IS BEING USED AS A DETENTION CENTER. SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL LATE SUNDAY THE TWO SSGTS HAVE SCREENED 528 PERSONNEL AS OF LATE TUESDAY AFTERNOON (5MAY).

WARM REGRADS

GP -4

BT

0845

**CONFIDENTIAL**

P 060130Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG XXIV CORPS  
 ZEM

S E C R E T

FOR LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON

A. CG XXIV CORPS 190435Z APR 70

1. RECEIPT OF REF A IS ACKNOWLEDGED. THE SUBJECT OF COMSEC/OPSEC IS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO ME AND I HAVE BROUGHT THIS TO THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF ALL SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS.

2. CERTAIN LOGISTIC DEFICIENCIES PRECLUDE TOTAL IMPLEMENTATION OF NESTOR ASSETS WITH THEIR ASSOCIATED RADIO EQUIPMENTS. THESE DEFICIENCIES ARE WELL KNOWN IN USMC CHANNELS AND ARE RECEIVING THE UTMOST ATTENTION.

3. THE FOLLOWING AREAS HAVE BEEN ISOLATED AND ARE RECEIVING IMMEDIATE ATTENTION:

A. USE OF PROPER RADIO TELEPHONE PROCEDURE.

B. NESTOR UTILIZATION ON MORE TACTICAL CIRCUITS

C. CORRECT USE OF AUTHORIZED NUMERICAL CODES ON ALL UNCOVERED CIRCUITS.

D. OPERATOR ACCEPTANCE OF NESTOR EQUIPMENT AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF TACTICAL OPERATION COMPROMISES BY LACK OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY.

4. AS AN IMMEDIATE STEP TOWARD IMPROVEMENT, THOSE NESTOR ASSETS OF REDEPLOYED UNITS IN PHASE III HAVE BEEN REDISTRIBUTED TO THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE TO COVER CIRCUITS PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED IN AN UNSECURE MODE. A REQUEST FOR AN INCREASE IN THE ALLOWANCE OF WHEEL CODES HAS BEEN APPROVED WHICH WILL IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITY TO REDUCE EXPLOITATION BY THE ENEMY OF OUR UNCOVERED COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS.

5. I HAVE FURTHER DIRECTED THAT THE MANAGEMENT OF NESTOR IMPLEMENTATION BE ORGANIZED TOWARD ACTUAL UTILIZATION RATHER THAN A LOGISTIC APPRAISAL OF ASSETS AVAILABLE.

6. COMMAND ATTENTION AND METHODS FOR DETERMINING COMSEC/OPSEC EFFICIENCY WILL BE CONTINUALLY EXERCISED TOWARD IMPROVEMENT IN ALL AREAS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
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(56)

P 060250Z

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

INFO CG FMFPAC

CG XXIV CORPS

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L/EYES ONLY FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LTGEN  
BUSE AND LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHION

MARINE BILLET, DEPUTY COMMANDER, XXIV CORPS

1. SUBSEQUENT TO OUR CONVERSATION AT THE QUARTERLY  
REVIEW HERE IN I CORPS ON 30 APRIL I REQUESTED INFOR-  
MATION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMANDANT INTENDED TO  
REPLACE MGEN BOWMAN AT THE COMPLETION OF HIS TOUR THIS  
SUMMER.

2. HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT THE COMMANDANT DOES NOT  
REPEAT NOT INTEND TO REPLACE HIM WHEN HE COMPLETES HIS  
TOUR AS DEPUTY CG, XXIV CORPS.

3. THE MARINE CORPS HAS NO OBJECTION THEREFORE TO THE  
ARMY FILLING THAT BILLET. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

(SSO NOTE - DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

150

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

06

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(57)

**HEADQUARTERS**  
**III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 06 MAY 70	
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE P 060130Z MAY 70		COPY NO 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					DOMSEC/OPSEC
	DCG					
	C/S	I	5-6-70		(W)	REMARK.
	DC/S	I	5/7		Y	
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
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	AWARDS					
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	SBC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

**DISPOSITION**

RETAIN FOR \_\_\_ MONTHS

DESTROY AFTER ROUTING

RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION

SECTION	SIGNATURE

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

*HAS BEEN SENT*

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

**SECRET**

*(B-19)*

P 050130Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG XXIV CORPS  
 ZEM

S E C R E T

FOR LT GEN ZAIS FROM LT GEN MCCUTCHEON

A. CG XXIV CORPS 190436Z APR 70

1. RECEIPT OF REF A IS ACKNOWLEDGED. THE SUBJECT OF COMSEC/OPSEC IS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO ME AND I HAVE BROUGHT THIS TO THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF ALL SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS.

2. CERTAIN LOGISTIC DEFICIENCIES PRECLUDE TOTAL IMPLEMENTATION OF NESTOR ASSETS WITH THEIR ASSOCIATED RADIO EQUIPMENTS. THESE DEFICIENCIES ARE WELL KNOWN IN USMC CHANNELS AND ARE RECEIVING THE UTMOST ATTENTION.

3. THE FOLLOWING AREAS HAVE BEEN ISOLATED AND ARE RECEIVING IMMEDIATE ATTENTION:

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B. NESTOR UTILIZATION ON MORE TACTICAL CIRCUITS

C. CORRECT USE OF AUTHORIZED NUMERICAL CODES ON ALL UNCOVERED CIRCUITS.

D. OPERATOR ACCEPTANCE OF NESTOR EQUIPMENT AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF TACTICAL OPERATION COMPROMISES BY LACK OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY.

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6. COMMAND ATTENTION AND METHODS FOR DETERMINING COMMSEC/OPSEC EFFICIENCY WILL BE CONTINUALLY EXERCISED TOWARD IMPROVEMENT IN ALL AREAS. WARM REGARDS.

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ADDY 2 RE 4 COPIES

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SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF		DATE 06 MAY 70					
					SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 060250Z MAY 70		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES RECD.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	DEPUTY COMMANDER XXIV CORPS BILLET					
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	CG						REMARKS DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.					
	DCG											
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Section	Signature											
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	G-5						DECLASSIFIED					
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	TCC											
	SGT MAJ											

P 060250Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 INFO CG FMFPAC  
 CG XXIV CORPS  
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L/EYES ONLY FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LT GEN  
 BUSE AND LT GEN ZAIS FROM LT GEN MCCUTCHEON  
 MARINE BILLET, DEPUTY COMMANDER, XXIV CORPS

1. SUBSEQUENT TO OUR CONVERSATION AT THE QUARTERLY  
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 TOUR AS DEPUTY CG, XXIV CORPS.
3. THE MARINE CORPS HAS NO OBJECTION THEREFORE TO THE  
 ARMY FILLING THAT BILLET. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

(SSO NOTE 7 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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(B-20)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		7 MAY '70	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 1 OF 4 COPIES REC'D.	
			018904Z May 70			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					INTERROGATION ASSISTANCE FOR U.S. ARMY III CORPS OPNS
	DCG					
	C/S	I	5-7-70		MD	REMARKS
	DC/S					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					Section _____ Signature _____
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	F	5/9		LY	21 (B-21)
	G-1					
	G-2	F	1st Copy			
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT&E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PP RUHFMA  
 DE RUMMPA 0845 1260904  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 P 060904Z MAY 70  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L // 03800//  
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 INTERROGATION ASSISTANCE FOR U.S. ARMY III CORPS OPNS

A. MY 041317Z MAY 70

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE STATUS OF MARINE INTERROGATORS IN SUPPORT  
 OF U.S. ARMY OPNS IN III CORPS/CAMBODIA REPORTED IN REF A:

A. THE ITT PERSONNEL ARE ATTACHED TO THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV AND  
 CURRENTLY REPRESENT THE TOTAL CAMBODIAN SPEAKING ASSETS AVAILABLE  
 TO 1ST AIR CAV DIV.

B. LT CORMIER IS WITH THE ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 1ST AIR CAV  
 IN CAMBODIA AND IS CONDUCTING REQUIRED LIAISON WITH CAMBODIAN  
 PROVINCE CHIEFS.

C. SSGT 'S DESARE AND SYNAN ARE PRESENTLY LOCATED AT THE LOC AN  
 CHIEU HOI CENTER IN NORTHWEST TAY NINH PROVINCE WHICH IS BEING  
 USED AS A DETENTION CENTER. SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL LATE SUNDAY THE  
 TWO SSGTS HAVE SCREENED 528 PERSONNEL AS OF LATE TUESDAY  
 AFTERNOON (5MAY).

WARM REGRADS

CP

BT

0845

**CONFIDENTIAL**

B-21

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

PP RUMHFWA  
DE RUMLMPA 1066 1270804  
ZNY AAAAA  
P 070804Z MAY 70  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMHFWA/CG FMFPAC  
BT

MCEO

T O P S E C R E T / I N D I S / S P E C A T / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y /  
FOR LT GEN BUSE FROM LT GEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING NORMAL  
DUTY HOURS)

FORCE PLANNING (U)

- A. COMUSMACV 060000Z MAY 70
- B. CG III MAF 021020Z MAY 70
- 1. (U) III MAF ACTION OFFICERS VISITED MACV J-3 THIS DATE TO DISCUSS REF A. BELOW INFORMATION IS FORWARDED AS PROVIDED FROM ACTION OFFICERS VISIT.
- 2. (TS) REF A REFLECTS GEN ABRAMS DESIRE TO RETAIN U.S. MARINE FORCES IN ICZ LONGEST POSSIBLE TIME. HE APPARENTLY BELIEVES U.S. ACTIONS IN CAMBODIA WILL RELIEVE PRESSURE IN III AND IV CORPS AND ALLOW REDUCING FORCES IN THE SOUTH WHEREAS I CORPS WILL BECOME MOST CRITICAL.
- 3. (TS) ALTERNATIVE ALPHA IN REF A IS A STRETCH-OUT OF THE INITIAL MARINE REDEPLOYMENT TIME PERIOD INDICATED IN REF B.

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA 1066 T O P S E C R E T / I N D I S / S P E C A T / M C E O  
IT VISUALIZES REDEPLOYMENT OF ONLY ABOUT 20K MARCOR PERSONNEL BY 15 OCT 70 WITH THE ADDITIONAL 9.4K, INCLUDING ONE RLT, BY 1 JAN 71. REMAINING MAF AND ROLL-UP FORCE TO BE REDEPLOYED BY 1 MAY 71. THIS PLAN STAYS WITHIN SECDEF GUIDELINES. REDEPLOYMENT DATE OF MAF HQ TO BE DETERMINED BY MARINE CORPS BUT WOULD BE PRIOR TO 1 JAN 71.

4. (TS) ALTERNATIVE BRAVO OF REF A IS EVEN FURTHER EXTENSION OF MARINE CORPS FORCES IN-COUNTRY WITH ONLY 10.6K REDEPLOYED BY 1 JAN 71. REMAINING 31.2K CONSISTING OF AT LEAST TWO RLT'S AND MAF HQ TO BE OUT OF COUNTRY BY 1 MAY 71. THE ROLL-UP FORCE IS INCLUDED IN THE 31.2K FIGURE, HOWEVER, MY ACTION OFFICERS WERE ASSURED BY MACV THIS COULD BE ADJUSTED TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT ROLL-UP SPACES EXTENDED AFTER 1 MAY 71 TO ABOUT 1 JUL 71. WE WILL CLOSELY ANALYZE LOGISTICAL AND SECURITY PROBLEMS BEFORE DETERMINING WHAT PERSONNEL ADJUSTMENTS WILL BE REQUIRED. ATTENDANT TO ALTERNATIVE B IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT 1ST AIR CAV DIV AND III MAF REDEPLOYMENT WILL BE SIMULTANEOUS WITH BOTH COMMANDS REQUIRING LPM SHIPPING AT THE SAME TIME. ON A BRIGHTER SIDE, 23D INF DIV (AMERICAL) WILL PROBABLY REDEPLOY ONLY PERSONNEL, TURNING OVER THE EQUIPMENT AND CERTAIN LOGISTI-

MCEO

SPECAT

III MAF 200/

07

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

08

04

SECRET

159

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

MCEO

PAGE THREE RUMLNPA1066 T O P S E C R E T / I N D I S / S P E C A T / M C E O  
CAL SUPPORT STORAGE IN-COUNTRY, THUS ALLEVIATING DANANG PORT  
REQUIREMENTS.

5. (S) MY ACTION OFFICERS ARE NOW PREPARING RECOMMENDED  
TROOP LISTS TO FIT EACH OF THE ALTERNATES IN REF A. THESE WILL  
BE PROVIDED TO YOU AT THEIR EARLIEST AVAILABILITY.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT  
1066

"MCEO"

1066018

SPECAT

(S)

P 090515Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O FOUO EYES ONLY FOR MGEN DOLVIN COFS MACV  
FROM LT GEN MCCUTCHEON

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE - SON MY, OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

A. YR 071100Z MAY 70 MAC 5206 FOUO EYES ONLY

B. MY 080804Z MAY 70

1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, CG 1ST MARDIV (PARENT UNIT)  
HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO ARRANGE PRESENCE PFC ROYD AND  
CAPT MERRILL, DEFENSE COUNCIL, AT AMERICAL DIV HDQTRS  
0900H 13 MAY.

2. REF B APPLIES.

3. WARM REGARDS.

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
120

COPY 2 OF 4

COPIE

NNNN

UNCLAS/EFTO

09

05

15

(60)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF	DATE 10 May 70
					SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 101343Z	COPY NO. <u>4</u> OF <u>4</u> COPIES REC'D
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					Force Planning (U)
	DCG					
	C/S					
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S					
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3				<i>Have copy #3</i>	
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
	DENT					
	ENGR					
	FOODS					
	FSEO					
	HQ CMT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT & E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

REMARKS:

DISPOSITION:

Retain for \_\_\_\_\_ months.

Destroy after routing.

Section	Signature

REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.

The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.

2

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TOP SECRET

(B-2)

TOP SECRET

ICEO

SPECAT

PTTAZYUW RUMLWPA 1612 1301343-AAAA--RUHFMMA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 101343Z MAY 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

BT

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / L I M D I S / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y / F O R L T G E N B U S E F R O M L T G E N M C C U T C H E O N F O R C E P L A N N I N G ( U )

A. PHONECON BETWEEN LT COL QUINN, FMFPAC AND MAJOR R. J. JOHNSON, III MAF 091030H MAY 70

B. PHONECON BETWEEN LT COL QUINN, FMFPAC AND MAJOR R. J. JOHNSON, III MAF 100830H MAY 70

1. (TS) ACTION OFFICERS PHONECON AT 082130H MAY 70 BETWEEN MACV J3-03 AND THIS COMMAND INDICATED THAT "SECDEF/CJCS" QUERIEDK COMUSMACV CONCERNING POSSIBILITY OF SHORT FUZE REDEPLOYMENT OF T O K E N U. S. F O R C E .

2. (TS) THIS CONFIRMS REFS A AND B DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING MACV QUERY ON AVAILABILITY OF NAVY SHIPPING AND III MAF UNITS TO FORM REDEPLOYMENT PACKAGE LATE MAY/EARLY JUNE.

3. (TS) AT 092200H MAY 70 A PHONECON WAS RECEIVED FROM MACV J3 ACTION OFFICER INDICATING THAT COMUSMACV DID NOT INTEND TO OFFER

P A G E T W O R U M L W P A 1 6 1 2 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / L I M D I S / M C E O A N Y U N I T S F O R E A R L Y R E D E P L O Y M E N T I N R E S P O N S E T O T H E " S E C D E F / C J C S " R E Q U E S T A N D T H A T P L A N N I N G F O R T H I S A C T I O N S H O U L D B E T E R M I N A T E D .

4. (TS) IT HAD BEEN MY INTENTION TO PROPOSE, WITH YOUR CONCURRENCE, REDEPLOYMENT OF 9TH ENGR BN (-), 1ST BRIDGE CO (-), AND 3D FORCE RECON CO TO MEET THE COMUSMACV REQUEST. IN VIEW OF INEFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF SHIPPING REPRESENTED BY THE ARG ROTATION IN EARLY JUNE, I WOULD STILL LIKE TO PROPOSE THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THESE UNITS IN THE IMMEDIATE TIME FRAME. IF YOU CONCUR, I WILL MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL TO XXIV CORPS AND COMUSMACV.

5. (TS) PROPOSED REDEPLOYMENTS:

UNIT	PERSONNEL	SPACES	STANDDOWN
9TH ENGR BN (-)	877		20 MAY 70
1ST BRIDGE CO (-)	135		15 MAY 70
3D FORCE RECON CO	154		IN CADRE STATUS

STANDDOWN DATE FOR 1ST BRIDGE CO CRITICAL IN VIEW OF PREPARATIONS NECESSARY FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF EQUIPMENT.

6. (U) REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS EARLIEST.

W A R N R E G A R D S .

GP-4

BT

SPECAT

ICEO

(B-2)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			CG III MAF		10 MAY 70	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. OF COPIES RECD.	
			091701Z MAY 70			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					AWARD IN THE CASE OF MAJ. MICHAEL H. ALEXANDER FR28 985 USAF
	DCG					
	C/S	D		5/10	B	REMARKS
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP. CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	X	5/10		C. Y.	
	G-1					
	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
	CAP					
	CHAP					
	CIB					
	COMP					
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	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
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	PSYOPS					
	RDT&E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED.O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

B-23

UNCLASSIFIED

PTTEZYUW RUMLP1470 1291701-EEEE--R UHHFMA.

ZNY EEEEE

P 091701Z MAY 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR BGEN HOUGHTON FROM BGEN DULACKI

AWARD IN THE CASE OF MAJOR MICHAEL H. ALEXANDER

FR2C 985, USAF

1. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR TELECON QUERY, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IN THE SUBJ NAMED CASE.

A. RECOMMENDATION FOR NCM FOR PERIOD 24 APR 67 TO 5 MAY 67 SUBMITTED BY MGEN TOMPKINS, DEPCG III MAF ON 1 SEP 68.

B. THE ABOVE RECOMMENDATION WAS FORWARDED TO COMMANDER SEVENTH AIR FORCE FOR COMMENT ON 16 SEP 68.

C. ON 26 NOV 68, HQS SEVENTH AIR FORCE FORWARDED THE RECOMMENDATION TO HQS USAF WASHINGTON, D. C. REQUESTING REVIEW AND COMMENTS AND OTHER DATA WITH THE REQUEST THAT THE RECOMMENDATION BE RETURNED TO SEVENTH AIR FORCE FOR FURTHER PROCESSING.

D. ON 5 JAN 69 HQS III MAF FORWARDED A LETTER TO THE

PAC 552 700 2240  
HAS BEEN SENT  
ORIG: C/S (10)M  
REL: C/S

PAGE TWO RUMLP1470 UNCLAS E F T O

COMMANDER SEVENTH AIR FORCE POINTING OUT THAT A REPLY TO THE REQUEST FOR COMMENTS IN THE CASE OF THE AWARD RECOMMENDATION HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED AND REQUESTED INFORMATION AS TO WHEN A REPLY COULD BE EXPECTED.

E. THERE IS NO RECORD IN THIS HQS OF A REPLY HAVING BEEN RECEIVED EITHER FROM THE SEVENTH AIR FORCE OR HQS USAF, EITHER TO THE AWARD RECOMMENDATION OR TO THE LETTER REQUESTING INFORMATION CONCERNING ITS STATUS.

F. ON 29 APR 70, THE III MAF LIAISON OFFICER TO SEVENTH AIR FORCE WAS REQUESTED TO DETERMINE THE STATUS OF THIS AWARD RECOMMENDATION AT SEVENTH AIR FORCE.

2. WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFO WHEN AVAILABLE.

3. WARM REGARDS.

BT

1470

091701Z MAY 70

(B-23)

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

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			100108			
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	SGT MAJ					

24

(B-24)

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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PTICZYUW RUMLMPIA1478 130108-CCCC--RUHFMA RUMLMHA RUMLLUA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 130108Z MAY 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

RUMLLUA/CG FIRST MARDIV

ZEN/CG FORLOSOMD

BT

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

C O N F I D E N T I A L/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN BUSE INFO MGEN  
THRASH, MGEN WIDDECKE AND BGEN PADALINO FROM LIGEN  
MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
COLONEL ASSIGNMENTS

A. CG FMFPAC MSG 062245Z MAY 70 (C)

1. REF A PROVIDED THE TENTATIVE SLATING OF COLONELS TO BE ASSIGNED TO IN-COUNTRY COMMANDS DURING THE SUMMER MONTHS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED.
2. GENERALS THRASH AND WIDDECKE CONCUR IN THE ASSIGNMENTS INDICATED. PADALINO WILL COMMENT SEPARATELY.
3. IN THE CASE OF III MAF, THERE ARE TWO PROBLEM AREAS:
  - A. COL DZIALO DEPARTS IN JUNE. IT WOULD BE ADVI-

PAGE TWO RUMLMPIA1478 C O N F I D E N T I A L/SPECAT  
SABLE TO ASSIGN A RELIEF WHO HAS SOME INTELLIGENCE  
EXPERIENCE. THE ONLY CANDIDATE IS COL F. J. HUNT SCHE-  
DULED FOR 1STMARDIV. I RECOMMEND THAT HE BE ASSIGNED TO  
III MAF AND THAT IN HIS PLACE SMITH OR HATCH BE ASSIGNED  
TO THE 1STMARDIV. WIDDECKE CONCURS.

B. I REQUIRE A SENIOR AND EXPERIENCED GROUND OFFICER  
AS THE G-3. SINCE LUDDEN, A NAVAL AVIATOR, WILL BE ASSIGNED  
AS ASSISTANT G-3, THE GROUND OFFICER WOULD HAVE TO BE SENIOR  
TO HIM. NONE OF THE COLONELS NOW SLATED FOR III MAF FIT THE  
REQUIREMENTS. SIMILARLY, NONE OF THE COLONELS SLATED FOR  
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SHOULD, THEREFORE, REMAIN IN THE DIVISION. TWO OF THE  
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HAFFEY. I UNDERSTAND JOSLYN IS SCHEDULED FOR THE JOB OF  
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THAT LEAVES ONLY HAFFEY. I BELIEVE HE WOULD MAKE AN IDEAL  
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PAGE THREE RUMLMPIA1478 C O N F I D E N T I A L/SPECAT  
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DIVISION IN PLACE OF HUNT.  
WARM REGARDS.

SPECAT

FMR 2100/1 (3/69)  
010104-6601

BT

1478 Com 105 5

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(B-24)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PTTCZYUW RUMLMPIA1478 1320108-CCCC--RUHHFMA RUMLMHA RUMLLUA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 1320108Z MAY 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW

RUMLLUA/CG FIRST MARDIV

ZEN/CG FORLOGSCOMD

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE INFO MGEN  
THRASH, MGEN WIDDECKE AND BGEN PADALINO FROM LTGEN  
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WARM REGARDS.

FMFPAC GEN 2100/1 (3/69)

0104-6601

BT

1478

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

SPECAT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

TOP SECRET

MCEO

SPECAT

PTAZ YIV RUM LPA 1612 1301343-AAAA--RUHFMMA.  
ZNY AAAAA  
P 101343Z MAY 70  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC

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B U S E F R O M L T G E N M C C U F O R E O N  
F O R C E P L A N N I N G ( U )

- A. PHONECON BETWEEN LTCOL QUINN, FMFPAC AND MAJOR R. J. JOHNSON, III MAF 091030H MAY 70
- B. PHONECON BETWEEN LTCOL QUINN, FMFPAC AND MAJOR R. J. JOHNSON, III MAF 100230H MAY 70
- 1. (TS) ACTION OFFICERS PHONECON AT 082130H MAY 70 BETWEEN MACV J3-03 AND THIS COMMAND INDICATED THAT "SECDEF/CJCS" QUERIEDK COMUSMACV CONCERNING POSSIBILITY OF SHORT FUZE REDEPLOYMENT OF TROOP U.S. FORCE.
- 2. (TS) THIS CONFIRMS REFS A AND B DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING MACV QUERY ON AVAILABILITY OF NAVY SHIPPING AND III MAF UNITS TO FORM REDEPLOYMENT PACKAGE LATE MAY/EARLY JUNE.
- 3. (TS) AT 092200H MAY 70 A PHONECON WAS RECEIVED FROM MACV J3 ACTION OFFICER INDICATING THAT COMUSMACV DID NOT INTEND TO OFFER

PAGE TWO RUM LPA 1612 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / L I M D I S / M C E O  
ANY UNITS FOR EARLY REDEPLOYMENT IN RESPONSE TO THE "SECDEF/CJCS" REQUEST AND THAT PLANNING FOR THIS ACTION SHOULD BE TERMINATED.

4. (TS) IT HAD BEEN MY INTENTION TO PROPOSE, WITH YOUR CONCURRENCE, REDEPLOYMENT OF 3RD ENGR BN (-), 1ST BRIDGE CO (-), AND 3D FORCE RECON CO TO MEET THE COMUSMACV REQUEST. IN VIEW OF INEFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF SHIPPING REPRESENTED BY THE ARG ROTATION IN EARLY JUNE, I WOULD STILL LIKE TO PROPOSE THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THESE UNITS IN THE IMMEDIATE TIME FRAME. IF YOU CONCUR, I WILL MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL TO XXIV CORPS AND COMUSMACV.

5. (TS) PROPOSED REDEPLOYMENTS:

UNIT	PERSONNEL	SPACES	STANDDOWN
3RD ENGR BN (-)	877		20 MAY 70
1ST BRIDGE CO (-)	135		15 MAY 70
3D FORCE RECON CO	154		IN CADRE STATUS

STANDDOWN DATE FOR 1ST BRIDGE CO CRITICAL IN VIEW OF PREPARATIONS NECESSARY FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF EQUIPMENT.

6. (U) REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS EARLIEST.  
VARN REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT

SPECAT

MCEO

III MAF

10

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13

43

TOP SECRET

(62)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TOP SECRET

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAP	DATE 12 MAY 70
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 0 120042Z MAY 70		COPY NO. OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					FORCE PLANNING
	DCG					
	C/S					REMARKS: DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					Section
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.A. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	S/S					
	G-1					3
	G-2					
	G-3					Copy # 2 Force Planning folder COPY OF 4 COPIES HAS BEEN SENT
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	POSTAL					
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	RDT & E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SIC					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

TOP SECRET

(B-3)

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM: <b>CG III MAF</b>		DATE: <b>12 MAY 70</b>	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <b>0 120810Z MAY 70</b>		COPY NO: <b>3</b> OF <b>4</b> COPIES REC'D			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	REMARKS	
			IN	OUT				
	CG					FORCE PLANNING		
	DCG							
	C/S	<b>I</b>		<b>5/12</b>	<b>J</b>		DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.	
	DC/S	<b>I</b>		<b>5/13</b>				
	DCS PLANS							
	DEP CORDS							
	DSA ICTZ							
	S/S	<b>J</b>		<b>5/13</b>	<b>EG</b>			
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	MTO							
	NJA							
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	SPL SERV							
	SUPPLY							
	FORMED O							
	SIC							
	TCC							
	SGT MAJ							

DISPOSITION:

Retain for \_\_\_ months.

Destroy after routing.

Section	Signature

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**TOP SECRET**  
B-3

O 120340Z ZYH ZFF-3 ZFF-6

FM CG III MAF

TO CG XXIV CORPS

INFO COMUSMACV

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T/LIMDIS/SPECAT/EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN ZAIS INFO

MAJGEN DOLVIN FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON

FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISCUSSIONS WITH CG FMFPAC CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE NAVY AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING RETURNING TO CONUS 30 MAY-10 JUN 70, IT IS MY INTENTION, WITH YOUR CONCURRENCE, TO PROPOSE TO COMUSMACV REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 9TH ENGR BN (-), 1ST BRIDGE CO (-) AND 3RD FORCE RECON CO. THESE UNITS REQUIRE MORE SHIPPING SQUARE FOOTAGE THAN AN RLT AND THEIR REDEPLOYMENT AT THIS TIME WILL PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBILITY IN FUTURE REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULING AND REDUCE POSSIBLE SHIPPING SHORTFALLS. NONE OF THESE UNITS ARE CONSIDERED CRITICAL TO III MAF OPERATIONS.

2. PROPOSED REDEPLOYMENTS:

UNIT	PERSONNEL	SPACES	STANDDOWN
9TH ENGR BN (-)	377		20 MAY 70
1ST BRIDGE CO (-)	135		15 MAY 70
3RD FORCE RECON CO	154		IN CADRE STATUS

STANDDDDOWN DATE FOR 1ST BRIDGE CO IS CRITICAL IN VIEW OF PREPARATION NECESSARY FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF EQUIPMENT.

4. TENTATIVELY PLANNED NAVY SHIPPING TO MOVE ABOVE UNITS INCLUDES ONE LST SCHEDULED RVN DEPARTURE 30 MAY 70 AND PHIBRON-9 CONSISTING OF LPH, LPD, LSD SCHEDULED RVN DEPARTURE 10 JUN 70.

5. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS EARLIEST.

WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS.

GP-4

300

TOP SECRET

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NNNN

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O 120840Z ZYH ZFF-3 ZFF-6  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG XXIV CORPS  
 INFO COMUSMACV  
 ZEM

TOP SECRET/LIMDIS/SPECAT/EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN ZAIS INFO  
 MAJGEN DELVIN FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISCUSSIONS WITH CG FMFPAC CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE NAVY AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING RETURNING TO CONUS 0 MAY-10 JUN 70, IT IS MY INTENTION, WITH YOUR CONCURRENCE, TO PROPOSE TO COMUSMACV REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 9TH ENGR BN (-), 1ST BRIDGE CO (-) AND 3RD FORCE RECON CO. THESE UNITS REQUIRE MORE SHIPPING SQUARE FOOTAGE THAN AN RLTC AND THEIR REDEPLOYMENT AT THIS TIME WILL PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBILITY IN FUTURE REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULING AND REDUCE POSSIBLE SHIPPING SHORTFALLS. NONE OF THESE UNITS ARE CONSIDERED CRITICAL TO III MAF OPERATIONS.

2. PROPOSED REDEPLOYMENTS:

UNIT	PERSONNEL SPACES	STANDDOWN
TH ENGR BN (-)	877	20 MAY 70
1ST BRIDGE CO (-)	135	15 MAY 70
3RD FORCE RECON CO	154	IN CADRE STATUS

STANDDOWN DATE FOR 1ST BRIDGE CO IS CRITICAL IN VIEW OF PREPARATION NECESSARY FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF EQUIPMENT.

4. TENTATIVELY PLANNED NAVY SHIPPING TO MOVE ABOVE UNITS INCLUDES ONE LST SCHEDULED RVN DEPARTURE 30 MAY 70 AND PHIBRON-9 CONSISTING OF LPH, LPD, LSD SCHEDULED RVN DEPARTURE 10 JUN 70.

TM REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS EARLIEST.

WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS.

GP 4  
 300

TOP SECRET

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08

40

(63)

**SECRET****SPECAT**

PTTSZYUW RUMLMPA1989 1330820-SSSS- R UHFMA.  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 130820Z MAY 70  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN  
 MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
 CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL (S)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

P 120151Z MAY 70  
 FM COMNAVFORV  
 TO CG III MAF

BT

SECRET  
 PERSONAL FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM ZUMWALT  
 CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL (S)  
 A. CG III MAF 130309Z MAR 70  
 B. CG USARV 030915Z APR 70  
 C. BUMED 132200Z MAR 70  
 D. COMSEVENTHFLT 180708Z MAR 70

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA1989 SECRET/SPECAT

E. CG III MAF 240951Z APR 70  
 F. COMNAVFORV 290814Z APR 70  
 G. COMNAVFORV 030821Z MAY 70  
 H. CG III MAF 300818Z APR 70  
 I. COMUSMACV 260957Z APR 70  
 J. COMUSMACV 101234Z MAY 70  
 K. CG III MAF 100214Z MAY 70

1. (S) AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT SERIES OF MESSAGES INDICATING  
 CONCERN ABOUT THE CLOSURE OF THE NSA DANANG HOSPITAL, I HAVE  
 JUST REVIEWED THE AREAS IN QUESTION WHICH ARE ENUMERATED BELOW.  
 (A) PROBLEM: REF A. CG III MAF EXPRESSED CONCURRENCE IN DEPARTURE OF  
 REPOSE AND REDUCTION/CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL SUBJECT TO THREE  
 PROVISIONS

(1) ADDITIONAL HOSPITAL BEDS

(2) ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL MEDICAL SKILLS

(3) TRANSITION OF SANCTUARY TO DANANG AREA AND MINIMUM

ABSENCES. SOLUTION: ACTION WAS TAKEN TO SATISFY 1 AND 2 ABOVE BY REF B  
 AND C. ITEM 3 WAS ADDRESSED BY REF D AND STATED IT WAS FELT THAT  
 THE SANCTUARY COULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SATISFACTORY SUPPORT TO I  
 CORP PERSONNEL WITHOUT ALTERING HERE ESTABLISHED OPERATIONS

FMFPAC-GEN 2100/3 (3/69)  
 0101-V04-6603

COPY 4 OF 4

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08

SPECAT

**SECRET**

(64)

**SECRET**

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUMMPA1989 S E C R E T / SPECAT  
SCHEDULING PROCEDURES.

(B) PROBLEM: REF E TWELVE OPERATING ROOMS BARELY ADEQUATE AFTER CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL, AND DURING ABSENCE OF SANCTUARY REDUCTION TO 9 UNACCEPTABLE. SOLUTION: REF F ADDRESSED THE AVAILABLE OPERATING ROOMS AND STATED THAT WITH ADDITION ANESTHESIOLOGISTS REQUESTED BY REF G A TOTAL OF 15 OPERATING ROOMS WOULD BE AVAILABLE DURING NORMAL CONDITIONS AND A MINIMUM OF 12 WOULD BE AVAILABLE DURING SANCTUARY RAV.

(C) PROBLEM: REF H AS A RESULT OF DELAY IN PHASE IV REDUCTIONS AND THE STATEMENT CONTAINED IN REF (D) THAT HOSPITALIZATION WAS A COMPONENT RESPONSIBILITY, THERE WOULD BE A SHORTAGE OF HOSPITAL BEDS AND OPERATING ROOMS. SOLUTION REF J STATES THAT JOINT UTILIZATION OF ALL U.S. FORCES MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES IS DIRECTED. THUS JOINT UTILIZATION WILL SATISFY THE BED AND O.R. REQUIREMENT.

D. PROBLEM: REF (K), CLINICAL AND LAB SERVICES ARE BEYOND THE COMBINED EQUIPMENT/PERSONNEL CAPABILITIES OF THE 95TH EVAC, FIRST MED BATTALION, AND SANCTUARY AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED. SOLUTION: THE EQUIPMENT/PERSONNEL LOAN IS NOW BEING ADDRESSED BY MY STAFF AND AUTHORITY FOR LOAN IS BEING REQUESTED.

2. (C) I HAVE PRESENTED THE PROBLEMS RAISED AND

PAGE FOUR RUMMPA1989 S E C R E T / SPECAT

SOLUTIONS PROVIDED WHICH IN MY OPINION WILL ADEQUATELY PROVIDE FOR ANY CONTINGENCY. IN ADDITION IN THE CASE OF D ABOVE I FEEL THAT, IF THESE SERVICES ARE NOT NORMALLY PROVIDED FOR BY OUR COMBAT MEDICAL BATTALION, OUR ARMY EVACUATION HOSPITALS AND OUR HOSPITAL SHIPS, THEY MAY FALL IN THE CATEGORY OF NICE TO HAVE RATHER THAN ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL. (I.E., ANNUAL PHYSICALS ARE WAIVED IN-COUNTRY EXCEPT FOR FLAG OFFICERS AND AVIATORS.) NEVERTHELESS, I WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION TO REQUEST THE LOAN.

3. (S) IN SUMMARY I FEEL SUITABLE SOLUTIONS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED FOR EACH OF THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED AND MUST CONCLUDE THAT THE HOSPITAL SHOULD CLOSE ON THE 15TH OF MAY AS SCHEDULED. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR REVIEW OF THE ABOVE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS, IN THE LIGHT OF THE MUCH LARGER RISKS, THAT WE ARE TAKING, ALL THROUGH SVN TO MEET THE REDEPLOYMENT QUOTAS IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL POLICY DECISIONS.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.  
UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

1989  
FMF PAC-GEN 2100/3 (3/69)  
0101-V04-6603

SPECAT

**SECRET**

(64)

306  
**SECRET**

PTTSZYUW RUMLMPA1990 1330820-SSSS--RUMUGKD,RUMHBRA RHMSMVA  
RUHFMA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 130820Z MAY 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMUGKD/COMNAVFORV

INFO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV

RUMHBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

**SECRET**

CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL

- A. COMNAVFORV 120151Z MAY 70 (NOTAL)
- B. CINCPACFLT 052037Z JUN 70 (NOTAL)
- C. CINCPACFLT 190412Z DEC 69 (NOTAL)
- D. CINCPACFLT 022212Z MAY 70
- E. COMNAVFORV 030629Z MAY 70

1. YOUR EXCELLENT REVIEW PRESENTED IN REF A OF PROBLEMS RAISED AND SOLUTIONS PROVIDED IS APPRECIATED. I, TOO, HAVE BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL. WHILE THERE MAY BE CERTAIN ADVANTAGE FROM YOUR VIEWPOINT OF CLOSING THE HOSPITAL AT THIS TIME, I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT REGARDLESS OF ALL OTHER CON-

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ORIG: C/S (M)  
REL: CG

*Seen*

13 MAY 70 12 16

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA1990 **SECRET**

CONSIDERATIONS THE FINAL AND MOST IMPORTANT DETERMINANT IN THIS DECISION SHOULD BE WHETHER OR NOT WE BOTH ARE CONVINCED BEYOND ANY SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT OUR COMBAT TROOPS WILL RECEIVE FULL AND ADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE. WITH THIS IN MIND, I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER COMMENTS ON THIS MATTER FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

2. THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE BASIC TO ALL TURNOVER ACTIONS IN ICTZ:

A. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN MY UNDERSTANDING THAT NSA REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE KEYED TO MARINE REDUCTIONS SINCE NSA WAS ORIGINALLY INTRODUCED TO SUPPORT MARINES. AS STATED IN REF B, IT WAS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED BY ALL THAT AS MARINE FORCES WERE REDEPLOYED, THERE WOULD BE A PROPORTIONATE REDUCTION OF NAVAL PERSONNEL WITHIN ICTZ. IT WAS STATED IN REF C THAT EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF CERTAIN LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR TRANSFER TO USARV WOULD PERMIT NSA DNG; TO CONCENTRATE THE MAJORITY OF ITS EFFORT IN THE DNG/CHU LAI AREA IN SUPPORTING MARINES. ADDITIONALLY, IT WAS STATED IN REF C THAT ALL PLANNING SHOULD ULTIMATELY MEET THE APPROVAL OF III MAF, COMNAVFORV, USARV AND COMUSMACV.

16-13

130821Z MAY 70

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21

**SECRET**

(65)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMMFA 1990 S E C R E T

B. RECENT PLANNING FOR TURNOVER ACTIONS IN ICTZ HAS BEEN BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT MAJOR REDUCTIONS IN MARINE FORCES (APPROXIMATELY 30,000) WOULD TAKE PLACE DURING PHASE IV, WHICH WOULD COMMENCE MID-APR AND BE COMPLETED BY 1 JUL. THE DELAYED REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES IS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF CONCERN ON THE PART OF OUR HIGHEST AUTHORITY THAT THERE IS A CONTINUING, SUBSTANTIAL THREAT WITHIN ICTZ. THE UNALTERED FACT REMAINS THAT THE TACTICAL THREAT TO OUR FORCES IS CERTAINLY AS HIGH AS IT HAS EVER BEEN, AND I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE THE LONG STANDING NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM WHERE MEDICAL SERVICE SUPPORT IS CONCERNED.

C. AT THE VERY BASIS FOR OUR CONCERN HAS BEEN THE INSISTENCE ON THE PART OF COMUSMACV THAT MEDICAL SERVICE SUPPORT IS A COMPONENT SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY, NOT A JOINT SERVICE FUNCTION. SIMILAR CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED IN BOTH REFS D AND E, IN WHICH STIPULATIONS WERE MADE THAT CONCURRENCE WITH CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL WOULD BE PROVIDED ONLY IF ADEQUATE JOINT MEDICAL SERVICE SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE ACHIEVED. YOU WILL RECALL THAT YOU STATED THAT

PAGE FOUR RUMMFA 1990 S E C R E T

ALL CONCERNED MUST RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH SUPPORT WOULD BE CONDUCTED ON A JOINT VICE COMPONENT BASIS. THEN COMUSMACV DIRECTED JOINT UTILIZATION, BUT STATED THAT SUCH USAGE DID NOT ALTER COMPONENT SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY. THE IMPLICATION HERE SHARPLY QUESTIONS MY LONG ESTABLISHED UNDERSTANDING OF THE ULTIMATE MEANING OF RESPONSIBILITY; FOR IN THE PAST, ABOGATION OF SUCH, WHERE NAVY MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR MARINES WAS INVOLVED, HAS NEVER BEEN EVEN A REMOTE POSSIBILITY AS FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED.

3. AS TIME GOES ON, MORE AND MORE RAMIFICATIONS OF HOSPITAL CLOSURE COME TO THE FORE. I AGREE THAT IN EACH CASE A PROBLEM HAS BEEN PRESENTED WITH A SOLUTION, BUT TAKEN AS A WHOLE THEY REPRESENT A CONGLOMERATE OF PATCHWORKED ARRANGEMENTS AND NOT THE SOLIDNESS OF A NAVY TEAM SUPPORTING MARINES. 4. THERE IS AN INCONSISTENCY IN USS SANCTUARY CONSIDERATIONS THAT ALSO CONCERNS ME. ON ONE HAND IT IS STATED THAT THE ESTABLISHED SCHEDULED SHOULD FULLY EXPLOIT THE ADVANTAGE OF HER MOBILITY. YET ON THE OTHER HAND IT IS STATED THAT SHE IS AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT 110 MAF AT DNG. OBVIOUSLY BOTH CANNOT BE DONE. WE NEED THE PRESENCE OF THE SANCTUARY FROM DNG.

PC-2-

130821Z MAY 70

SECRET

65

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUM LMPA 1990 S E C R E T  
 WE WILL BE FORCED TO RELY ON THE ARMY FOR 50 PERCENT OF OUR  
 NEEDED MEDICAL SUPPORT.

5. PLEASE KNOW THAT CONCERN OVER RISKS INVOLVED IS MUTUAL.  
 SINCE PHASE IV REDEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN POSTPONED, THE RISK  
 SPECTER HAS BEEN PROLONGED. I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED, THOUGH,  
 THAT AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS IN THE SOUTH, THE ENEMY WILL  
 INTENSIFY HIS ACTIVITIES IN NCTZ. IF THIS DOES HAPPEN,  
 I THINK THAT THE MOBILITY OF THE SANCTUARY SHOULD BE  
 EXPLOITED AND THAT SHE SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHIN  
 NORTHERN ICTZ. AT THE SAME TIME I THINK WE MUST ENSURE  
 THAT ADEQUATE FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE FOR MARINES IN  
 CENTRAL ICTZ.

6. ONE FINAL POINT: CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL HAD ITS  
 GENESIS IN THE PROJECTED 1 JUL DEPARTURE OF A SUBSTANTIAL  
 MARINE FORCE, ON WHICH VIRTUALLY ALL PLANNING HAS BEEN  
 PREDICTED. AS YOU WELL KNOW, REDEPLOYMENT PLANS HAVE  
 BEEN DRASTICALLY CHANGED AND MARINE FORCES ARE NOT BEING  
 REDEPLOYED AT THIS TIME. NEVERTHELESS, PLANS FOR CLOSURE  
 OF THE HOSPITAL CONTINUE ON AN ADMINISTRATIVE SCHEDULE  
 COMPLETELY UNRELATED TO REDEPLOYMENT.

PAGE SIX RUM LMPA 1990 S E C R E T

7. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, WE STATED THAT OUR PRIMARY  
 CONCERN WAS ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR OUR COMBAT CASUALTIES.  
 AS I HAVE ALREADY SAID, WHILE IT MAY APPEAR ON THE SURFACE  
 THAT OUR PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN SOLVED, I CANNOT HELP BUT  
 HARBOR GRAVE RESERVATIONS THAT CLOSURE OF THE HOSPITAL  
 MAY CREATE AN ADVERSITY THAT COULD PROVE VERY DIFFICULT  
 INDEED FOR US TO OVERCOME ALONE. IN VIEW OF FACT THAT  
 REDEPLOYMENT QUOTAS FOR MARINES IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL  
 POLICY DECISIONS ARE NOT FIRM AND WILL NOT BE FOR SEVERAL  
 MONTHS, I AGAIN MUST RECOMMEND THAT CLOSURE OF NSAD  
 HOSPITAL BE DELAYED AT LEAST 60 DAYS. LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 SENDS.

GP-4

BT

1990

PG-3-3

130921Z MAY 70

(65) SECRET

SECRET

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

PTTAZYUW RUMLMPA2038 1331346-AAAA--RUHFMMA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 P 13134Z MAY 70  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN  
 MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
 CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO.  
 QUOTE

13085Z MAY 70

FM CG III MAF

TO COMNAVFORV

SECRET/FOR VADM ZUNWALT FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL

A. COMNAVFORV 12015Z MAY 70

B. CG III MAF 13082Z MAY 70

1. DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON SUBJ HOSPITAL AS  
 EXPRESSED IN REF A. I HAVE REVIEWED SUBJ ONCE AGAIN AND  
 HAVE REPLIED TO YOU IN REF B. I INCLUDE COMUSMACV,  
 CINCPACFLT AND CG FMFPAC AS INFO ADDRESSES SINCE THEY HAVE

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA2038 SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE  
 BEEN IN ON MY MESSAGES. WARM REGARDS; UNQUOTE WARM  
 REGARDS

GP-4

BT

2038

SPECAT

4-4

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46

SECRET

(66)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM DC III MAF		DATE 12 MAY 73	
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 0 12 MAY 73		COPY NO 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					CLOSURE OF ROAD HOSPITAL
	DCG					
	C/S	I		5/13	J	REMARK:
	DC/S	I		5/13	J	
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					<input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION
	S/S	Y	5/13		C.G.	
	G-1					SECTION
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	S&C					
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

DISPOSITION	
<input type="checkbox"/>	RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS
<input type="checkbox"/>	DESTROY AFTER ROUTING
<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION
SECTION	SIGNATURE

*Done to him*  
*Done*

*Done*  
*C*  
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**SECRET**

(B-25)

O 130858Z ZYH  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMNAVFORV  
ZEM

S E C R E T /FOR VADM ZUMWALT FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL

A. COMNAVFORV 120151Z MAY 70

B. CG III MAF 130821Z MAY 70

1. DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON SUBJ HOSPITAL AS  
EXPRESSED IN REF A. I HAVE REVIEWED SUBJ ONCE AGAIN AND  
HAVE REPLIED TO YOU IN REF B. I INCLUDED COMUSMACV,  
CINCPACFLT AND CG FMFPAC AS INFO ADDRESSEES SINCE THEY HAVE  
BEEN IN ON MY MESSAGES. WARM REGARDS  
(SSC NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

120

SECRET

This message requires accountability.

COPY 2 of 4 copies

NNNN

B-25

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM III MAF		DATE 13 MAY 70					
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 130820		COPY NO / OF 4 COPIES REC'D					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT CLASSIFIED				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					REMARK:  DISPOSITION  <input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION  <table border="1"> <tr> <th>SECTION</th> <th>SIGNATURE</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	SECTION	SIGNATURE		
SECTION	SIGNATURE									
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	C/S	I		5/14						
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS									
	DEP CORDS									
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	S&C	X	14 May 70		2					
	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**SECRET**

A-2

SECRET

SPECAT

PTTSZYUW RUMLMPA1989 1330820-SSSS--R UKHFMA.  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 130820Z MAY 70  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE FROM LT GEN  
 MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
 CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL (S)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO:  
 QUOTE

P 120151Z MAY 70  
 FM COMNAVFORV  
 TO CG III MAF

BT

SECRET  
 PERSONAL FOR LT GEN MCCUTCHEON FROM ZUMWALT  
 CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL (S)  
 A. CG III MAF 130309Z MAR 70  
 B. CG USARV 030915Z APR 70  
 C. BUMED 132200Z MAR 70  
 D. COMSEVENTHFLT 180758Z MAR 70

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA1989 SECRET/SPECAT

E. CG III MAF 240951Z APR 70  
 F. COMNAVFORV 290814Z APR 70  
 G. COMNAVFORV 030821Z MAY 70  
 H. CG III MAF 300818Z APR 70  
 I. COMUSMACV 260957Z APR 70  
 J. COMUSMACV 101234Z MAY 70  
 K. CG III MAF 100214Z MAY 70

1. (S) AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT SERIES OF MESSAGES INDICATING  
 CONCERN ABOUT THE CLOSURE OF THE NSA DANANG HOSPITAL, I HAVE  
 JUST REVIEWED THE AREAS IN QUESTION WHICH ARE ENUMERATED BELOW.  
 (A) PROBLEM: REF A. CG III MAF EXPRESSED CONCURRENCE IN DEPARTURE OF  
 REPOSE AND REDUCTION/CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL SUBJECT TO THREE  
 PROVISIONS

(1) ADDITIONAL HOSPITAL BEDS

(2) ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL MEDICAL SKILLS

(3) TRANSITION OF SANCTUARY TO DANANG AREA AND MINIMUM

ABSENCES. SOLUTION: ACTION WAS TAKEN TO SATISFY 1 AND 2 ABOVE BY REF B  
 AND C. ITEM 3 WAS ADDRESSED BY REF D AND STATED IT WAS FELT THAT  
 THE SANCTUARY COULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SATISFACTORY SUPPORT TO I  
 CORP PERSONNEL WITHOUT ALTERING HERE ESTABLISHED OPERATING/

FMFPAC-GEN 2100/3 (3/69)  
 0101-V04-6603

Copy 1 of 4

SPECAT

SECRET

(A-2)

SECRET

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUMLP A1989 S E C R E T /SPECAT  
SCHEDULING PROCEDURES.

(B) PROBLEM: REF E TWELVE OPERATING ROOMS BARELY ADEQUATE AFTER CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL, AND DURING ABSENCE OF SANCTUARY REDUCTION TO 9 UNACCEPTABLE. SOLUTION: REF F ADDRESSED THE AVAILABLE OPERATING ROOMS AND STATED THAT WITH ADDITION ANESTHESIOLOGISTS REQUESTED BY REF G A TOTAL OF 15 OPERATING ROOMS WOULD BE AVAILABLE DURING NORMAL CONDITIONS AND A MINIMUM OF 12 WOULD BE AVAILABLE DURING SANCTUARY RAV.

(C) PROBLEM: REF H AS A RESULT OF DELAY IN PHASE IV REDUCTIONS AND THE STATEMENT CONTAINED IN REF (D) THAT HOSPITALIZATION WAS A COMPONENT RESPONSIBILITY, THERE WOULD BE A SHORTAGE OF HOSPITAL BEDS AND OPERATING ROOMS. SOLUTION REF J STATES THAT JOINT UTILIZATION OF ALL U.S. FORCES MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES IS DIRECTED. THUS JOINT UTILIZATION WILL SATISFY THE BED AND O.R. REQUIREMENT.

D. PROBLEM: REF (K), CLINICAL AND LAB SERVICES ARE BEYOND THE COMBINED EQUIPMENT/PERSONNEL CAPABILITIES OF THE 95TH EVAC, FIRST MED BATTALION, AND SANCTUARY AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED. SOLUTION: THE EQUIPMENT/PERSONNEL LOAN IS NOW BEING ADDRESSED BY MY STAFF AND AUTHORITY FOR LOAN IS BEING REQUESTED.  
2. (C) I HAVE PRESENTED THE PROBLEMS RAISED AND

PAGE FOUR RUMLP A1989 S E C R E T /SPECAT  
SOLUTIONS PROVIDED WHICH IN MY OPINION WILL ADEQUATELY PROVIDE FOR ANY CONTINGENCY. IN ADDITION IN THE CASE OF D ABOVE I FEEL THAT, IF THESE SERVICES ARE NOT NORMALLY PROVIDED FOR BY OUR COMBAT MEDICAL BATTALION, OUR ARMY EVACUATION HOSPITALS AND OUR HOSPITAL SHIPS, THEY MAY FALL IN THE CATEGORY OF NICE TO HAVE RATHER THAN ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL. (I.E., ANNUAL PHYSICALS ARE WAIVED IN-COUNTRY EXCEPT FOR FLAG OFFICERS AND AVIATORS.) NEVERTHELESS, I WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION TO REQUEST THE LOAN.

3. (S) IN SUMMARY I FEEL SUITABLE SOLUTIONS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED FOR EACH OF THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED AND MUST CONCLUDE THAT THE HOSPITAL SHOULD CLOSE ON THE 15TH OF MAY AS SCHEDULED. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR REVIEW OF THE ABOVE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS, IN THE LIGHT OF THE MUCH LARGER RISKS, THAT WE ARE TAKING, ALL THROUGH SVN TO MEET THE REDEPLOYMENT QUOTAS IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL POLICY DECISIONS.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.  
UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

1989  
FMFPAC-GEN 2100/3 (3/69)  
0101-V04-6603

SPECAT

SECRET

A-2

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM III MAF		DATE 13 MAY 70	
			SERIAL NO / CONTROL DATE 131346		COPY NO 1 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT CLASSIFIED
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARK:  DISPOSITION  <input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION  SECTION      SIGNATURE
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	C/S	I		5/14	J	
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	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
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	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

**SECRET**

A-3

SECRET

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

PTTAZYUW RUMLMPA2038 1331346-AAAA--RUHHPMA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 P 131346Z MAY 70  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC

BT

SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN  
 MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
 CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE

130858Z MAY 70  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMNAVFORV  
 SECRET/FOR VADM ZUMWALT FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 CLOSURE OF NSAD HOSPITAL

A. COMNAVFORV 12015Z MAY 70  
 B. CG III MAF 13082Z MAY 70

1. DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON SUBJ HOSPITAL AS  
 EXPRESSED IN REF A. I HAVE REVIEWED SUBJ ONCE AGAIN AND  
 HAVE REPLIED TO YOU IN REF B. I INCLUDE COMUSMACV,  
 CINCPACFLT AND CG FMFPAC AS INFO ADDEES SINCE THEY HAVE

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA2038 SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE  
 BEEN IN ON MY MESSAGES. WARM REGARDS. UNQUOTE WARM  
 REGARDS

GP-4

BT

2038

1-4

SPECAT

SECRET

A-3

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-62)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 14 MAY 70	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 0 140550Z MAY 70		COPY NO. OF 4 COPIES RECD	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					FORCE PLANNING
	DCG					
	C/S					REMARKS:
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order F5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.
	S/S					
	G-1					Section _____ Signature _____
	G-2					
	G-3					4  Copy #2 Force Planning Folder
	G-4					
	G-5					COPY OF 4 COPIES HAS BEEN SENT
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	SGT MAJ					

**TOP SECRET**

(B-4)

O 140550Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

INFO CG XXIV CORPS

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS SPECAT EYES ONLY FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO  
LTGEN ZAIS FROM LTGEN MC CUTCHEON  
FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. III MAF 120840Z MAY 70 (TS/LIMDIS/EYES ONLY)

B. XXIV CORPS 130930Z MAY 70 (TS/LIMDIS/EYES ONLY)

1. REF A REFERS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISCUSSIONS WITH CG XXIV CORPS AND CG FMFPAC CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE NAVY AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING RETURNING TO CONUS 30 MAY-10 JUNE 70, AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED TO REDEPLOY THE 9TH ENGR BN (-), 1ST BRIDGE CO (-) AND 3D FORCE RECON CO. THESE UNITS REQUIRE SQUARE FOOTAGE COMPARABLE TO AN RLT AND THEIR REDEPLOYMENT AT THIS TIME WILL PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBILITY IN FUTURE REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULING AND REDUCE POSSIBLE SHIPPING SHORTFALLS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FLOAT BRIDGE REQUIREMENTS NONE OF THESE UNITS ARE CONSIDERED CRITICAL TO ICTZ OPERATIONS THE 1ST MARDIV ENGR BN, THE FORCE 7TH ENGR BN AND 1ST FORCE RECON CO REMAIN IN ICTZ PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR III MAF OPERATIONS.

2. BY REF B CG XXIV CORPS DESIRES TO RETAIN THE FLOAT BRIDGE ASSETS OF THE BRIDGE CO AND NECESSARY PERSONNEL TO FULLY EMPLOY THEM IN SUPPORT OF ICTZ OPERATIONS. ACCORDINGLY, A BRIDGE PLATOON WITH THESE ASSETS WILL BE RETAINED IN-COUNTRY.

3. PROPOSED REDEPLOYMENTS:

UNIT	PERSONNEL SPACES	STANDDOWN
9TH ENGR BN (-)	877	20 MAY 70
1ST BRIDGE CO (-)	94	15 MAY 70
3D FORCE RECON CO	154	IN CADRE STATUS

STANDDOWN DATE FOR 1ST BRIDGE CO (-) IS CRITICAL IN VIEW OF PREPARATION NECESSARY FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF FIXED BRIDGING EQUIPMENT.

4. TENTATIVELY PLANNED NAVY SHIPPING TO MOVE ABOVE UNITS INCLUDES ONE LST SCHEDULED RVN DEPARTURE 30 MAY 70 AND PHIBRON-9 CONSISTING OF LPH, LPD, LSD SCHEDULED RVN DEPARTURE 10 JUN 70.

5. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS EARLIEST. RESPECTFULLY.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS.

GP-4

420

NNNN

COPY 4 OF 4 COPIES

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM		DATE	
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			BOCW BULLACH		16 MAY 70	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE		COPY NO. 3 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
			R 192350Z MAY			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					LCSO TO COL. THAMMAN
	DCG					
	C/S					REMARKS
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES  HAS BEEN SENT
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	SGT MAJ					

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

(A-1)

R 132330Z

FM GEN DLACKI C/S III MAF DNG RVN  
TO COL THURMAN ADC 25TH INF DIV CU CHI RVN  
ZEM

5/10

UNCLAS E F T O

- 1. APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND REGARDS. YOUR SOLID SUPPORT AT XXIV CORPS IS MISSED. YOU MAY BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING THAT MY SCORCHED EARTH POLICY WAS NOT DRASTIC ENOUGH. DA IS RENEGING ON REPLACEMENT OR REIMBURSEMENT OF ANYTHING III MAF LEFT AT CAMP HORN, CLAIMING SQUATTERS RIGHTS. I EXPECT TO RECLAIM SCREENS YOU TOOK ANYDAY.
- 2. WARM REGARDS.

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

100

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED COPY 3 OF 4

E

A-1

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 15 MAY 70	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE P 151124Z MAY 70		COPY NO. 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					ICF/C&CI FUNDS
	DCG					
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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

(A-4)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

P 151124Z ZFF-3 ZFF-6

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O EYES ONLY FOR MGEN DOLVIN FROM RGEN DULACKI  
ICF/C&CI FUNDS

A. YOUR 140433Z MAY 70

B. CG III MAF LTR DTD 26 FEB 70, SAME SURJ

C. CG III MAF LTR SER 029870 DTD 10 APR 70, SAME SURJ

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH A REVIEW HAS BEEN CONDUCTED.

2. THIS COMMAND DOES NOT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL FUNDS. REFS B  
AND C APPLY.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

075

2 4

NNNN

UNCLASIFIED

(A-4)

TOP SECRET

PITAZYUW RUMLNPA25 93 1361314-AAAA--R UHHFMA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 161314Z MAY 76

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN  
 MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
 FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE

151657Z MAY 76

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DANANG

INFO LTG ZAIS CG XXIV CORPS DANANG

TOP SECRET MAC 6637 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING (U)

REF: III MAF 140550Z MAY 1976 (TS)

1. (TS) REFERENCE PROPOSED UNITS FOR REDEPLOYMENT IN ORDER  
 TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AVAILABLE SHIPPING RETURNING TO CONUS  
 30 MAY - 10 JUNE 76.

2. (TS) IN VIEW OF ON-GOING OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT VIET-

PAGE TWO RUMLNPA25 93 TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY  
 NAM, TO INCLUDE CRITICAL OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA, IT IS  
 ESSENTIAL THAT MACV RETAIN AN OPERATIONAL POSTURE CON-  
 MENSURATE WITH THE SITUATION. THEREFORE, I DO NOT INTEND  
 TO REDEPLOY ANY UNITS PRIOR TO AN ASSESSMENT OF THE OVER-  
 ALL SITUATION, ABOUT 15 JUNE. AT THAT TIME I AM COMMITTED  
 TO MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS ON REDEPLOYMENTS FOR THE  
 REMAINDER OF 1976. UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

25 93

NNNN

16

13

14

SECRET

PTTSZYUW RUMLMPA2622 1370207-SSSS--RUSQSN RUMLMHA.  
IZNY SSSSS  
P 170211Z MAY 70  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUSQSN/CG SEVENTH AIR FORCE  
INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW  
BT

15939/137

HAS BEEN SENT  
ORIG - C/S  
REL - CG

SECRET//NO13430//  
FOR MGEN HARDIN INFO MGEN THCASH FROM LTGEN  
MCCUTCHEON

(10) L

17 MAY 10 11 09

- RETENTION OF M-21 ARRESTING GEAR
- A. TAF TSN AFLD RVN 090940Z MAY 70
1. IN REPLY TO REF A, M-21 ARRESTING GAAR. PRESENTLY INSTALLED AT DANANG WILL PROBABLY BE AVAILABLE IN ITS PRESENT STATUS FOR THE NEXT 12 MONTHS.
  2. THIS EQUIPMENT IS PART OF A MARINE AIR GROUP'S BASIC ALLOWANCE AND REPRESENTS PART OF OUR EXPEDITIONARY READINESS. IT SHOULD THEREFORE BE REDEPLOYED WITH THE MAG.
  3. IN VIEW OF THE ANTICIPATED LEAD TIME AVAILABLE TO YOU, RECOMMEND YOU TAKE STEPS NOW TO PROCURE

PAGA TWO RUMLMPA2622 SECRET  
LIKE EQUIPMENT FROM SOURCE.

4. CROSS DECK PENDANTS AND REEL TAPES ARE HIGH USAGE ITEMS AND SHOULD BE PROCURED IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES. OUR RECORDS INDICATE APPROXIMATELY 500 ARRESTMENTS PER TAPE AND 30-50 PER CROSS DECK PENDANT.
5. SHOULD PROCUREMENT EFFORTS REQUIRE TIME IN EXCESS OF EVENTUAL NEED I WOULD BE HAPPY TO RECONSIDER YOUR REQUEST. ESTIMATED REQUIREMENT FOR CREW TRAINING IS 90 DAYS OJT. TWO CREWS OF 12 EACH CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR 24 HOURS OPERATION OF ARRESTING GEAR NOW IN PLACE AT DANANG PLUS 5 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL AND ONE NCOIC. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT

170211Z MAY 70

2622

COPY 8 OF 11 COPIES

02

11

SECRET

68

PTTEZYUW RUMLMFA2667 13 70623-EEEE--RUMLLUA RUMLMHA RUMLMHA  
RUMHBPM RUMLBPA RUMHONB RUMLMFA.

ZNY EEEEE

RUMLLUA-T-CG FIRST MARDIV  
RUMLLUA-T-SEVENTH ENGR BN  
RUMLLUA-T-NINTH ENGR BN  
RUMLLUA-T-THIRD MP BN  
RUMLMHA-T-CG FIRST NAV  
RUMLMHA-T-FIRST MP BN  
RUMLMHA-T-SUBUNIT ONE  
RUMLMHA-T-FIRST CAG  
RUMHBPM-T-SECOND CAG  
RUMLBPA-T-THIRD CAG  
RUMHONB-T-FOURTH CAG  
RUMLMFA-T-FIFTH COMM BN  
RUMLMFA-T-FIRST RADIO BN

P 170623Z MAY 70

FM CG III MAF  
TO ZEN/III MAF  
RUMLMFA/CAF  
INFO RUMLMFA/CG XXIV CORPS

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

TEMPORARY ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

1. DURING MY TEMPORARY ABSENCE FROM III MAF HQTRS DURING THE PERIOD  
18-22 MAY 70, MGEN THRASH, CG, 1ST MAW WILL ASSUME ADDITIONAL AS CG,  
III MAF, ACTING. LT GEN MCCLECHEON

BT

2667

11932/139

HAS BEEN SENT  
ORIG. C/S  
REL. CG (10) L

17 MAY 70  
83

170623Z MAY 70

17

06

23

(69)

PTTEZYUW RUMLMFA2783 1372255-EEEE--RUHHFMA RUEOFIA RHMSMVA  
RUMLMFA RUMLMHA.  
ZNY EEEEE  
P 172330Z MAY 70  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUHHFMA/CG RMFPAC  
INFO RUEOFIA/CMC  
RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV  
RUMLMFA/CG XXIV CORPS  
RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW  
BT

15133/138  
HAS BEEN SENT  
ORIG C/S  
REL CG  
Dist STAFF

///CORR COPY///

UNCLAS E F T O  
CMC FOR CODE AC  
LOCATION OF GENERAL OFFICER  
A. MCO 5200.13 (NOTAL)  
1. REF A REFERS. LT GEN K.B. MCCUTCHEON, CG III MAF  
DEPARTS AT 180730H MAY 70 FOR HONG KONG ON LEAVE DURING  
PERIOD 18-22 MAY 70.  
2. CG 1ST MAW ASSIGNED ADDITIONAL DUTY AS CG, III MAF  
ACTING DURING ABSENCE.  
BT

2783

COMMNOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION CORR BY COMMCTR.

172330Z MAY 70

19 MAY 70 212

NNNN

17

6 23

30

**HEADQUARTERS**  
**III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE				FROM		DATE	
X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE				CG III MAF		18 MAY 70	
				SERIAL NO / CONTROL DATE		COPY NO OF // COPIES REC'D	
		7702112 MAY 70					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	
			IN	OUT			
	CG					RETENTION OF M-21 ARRESTING GEAR	
	DCG						
	C/S	I		5/17	T	REMARK:	
	DC/S						
	DCS PLANS					<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p align="center"><b>DISPOSITION</b></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION</p> </div>	
	DEPCORDS						
	DSA ICTZ						
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	G-5						
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	ADJ					(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)	
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	HQ CMDT						
	INSP						
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	SGT MAJ						

Copy to CG's personal file.

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

**SECRET**

A-5

SECRET

PTTSZYUW RUMLEPA2622 1370207-SSSS--RUSQSN RUMLMHA.  
IZNY SSSSS  
P 170211Z MAY 70  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUSQSN/CG SEVENTH AIR FORCE  
INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAF  
BT

11939/137

HAS BEEN SENT  
ORIG - C/S  
REL - CG

SECRET//N013430//  
FOR MGEN HARDIN INFO MGEN THCASH FROM LIGEN  
MCCUTCHEON

(10) L

17 MAY 10 10 49

- RETENTION OF M-21 ARRESTING GEAR
- A. 7AF TSN AFLD RVN 090940Z MAY 70
  1. IN REPLY TO REF A, M-21 ARRESTING GAAR PRESENTLY INSTALLED AT DANANG WILL PROBABLY BE AVAILABLE IN ITS PRESENT STATUS FOR THE NEXT 12 MONTHS.
  2. THIS EQUIPMENT IS PART OF A MARINE AIR GROUP'S BASIC ALLOWANCE AND REPRESENTS PART OF OUR EXPEDITIONARY READINESS. IT SHOULD THEREFORE BE REDEPLOYED WITH THE MAG.
  3. IN VIEW OF THE ANTICIPATED LEAD TIME AVAILABLE TO YOU, RECOMMEND YOU TAKE STEPS NOW TO PROCURE

PAGA TWO RUMLEPA2622 SECRET  
LIKE EQUIPMENT FROM SOURCE.

4. CROSS DECK PENDANTS AND REEL TAPES ARE HIGH USAGE ITEMS AND SHOULD BE PROCURED IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES. OUR RECORDS INDICATE APPROXIMATELY 500 ARRESTMENTS PER TAPE AND 30-50 PER CROSS DECK PENDANT.
5. SHOULD PROCUREMENT EFFORTS REQUIRE TIME IN EXCESS OF EVENTUAL NEED I WOULD BE HAPPY TO RECONSIDER YOUR REQUEST. ESTIMATED REQUIREMENT FOR CREW TRAINING IS 90 DAYS OJT. TWO CREWS OF 12 EACH CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR 24 HOURS OPERATION OF ARRESTING GEAR NOW IN PLACE AT DANANG PLUS 5 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL AND 0

E NCOIC. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2622

170211Z MAY 70

COPY 6 OF 7 COPIES

SECRET

(A-5)

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM ADMIN III MAF		DATE 191353Z May 70	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 191353Z		COPY NO. 1 of 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I			<i>[Handwritten Initial]</i>	COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT ICTZ (U)
	DCG					
	C/S	I		5/20	<i>[Handwritten Initial]</i>	
	DC/S	I		5/20	<i>[Handwritten Initial]</i>	
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
1	S/S	I	5/20	5-24	<i>[Handwritten Initial]</i>	
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	PROTO					
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	SPL SERV					
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	FORMED O					
	SIC	X	<i>20 MAY 70</i>		<i>[Handwritten Initial]</i>	
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

REMARKS:

DISPOSITION:

Retain for \_\_\_\_\_ months.

Destroy after routing.

Section	Signature

REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.

The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.

*[Handwritten Signature]*

*[Handwritten Signature]*

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**TOP SECRET**

(B-6)

TOP SECRET

MCEO

SPECAT

PAGE 639

PTTZYUW RUMLNPA3110 1391352-AAAA--RUHHFMA. TOD: 19/1637Z MAY 70

ZNY AAAAA

P 191353Z MAY 70

FM ADMIN III MAF

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T / L I N D I S / S P E C A T / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y /  
 FOR BGEN HOUGHTON FROM BGEN DULACKI (DELIVER DURING  
 WORKING HOURS).

COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT, ICTZ (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 06224Z JUN 69 (S)

B. CINCPACFLT 190412Z DEC 69 (TS)

1. (C) LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE TO HONG KONG, REQUESTED THAT THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECT MATTER BE SUBMITTED TO GEN BUSE FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING GUIDANCE.

2. (TS) THE NAVY'S PREVIOUSLY STATED POSITION THAT THE NAVY WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE MARINE CORPS AS LONG AS MARINAS WERE IN RVN IS, IN FACT, IN CONTRADICTION OF THE NAVY'S PRESENT PLAN TO RELINQUISH THIS RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ARMY ON 1 JULY 70 DESPITE CHANGES IN REDEPLOYMENT PLANS.

PAGE CHECKED UPON RECEIPT

DATE 20 MAY 70 III MAF S&amp;C

*C. H. Leedy SSGT*

PAGE TWO RUMLNPA3110 T O P S E C R E T / L I N D I S / S P E C A T / M C E O

3. (TS) AS YOU WILL RECALL, REF A CITES ADM HYLAND'S POSITION AS FOLLOWS: "THERE SHOULD BE NO PREMATURE TURN OVER OF NSA RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE ARMY. NSA REDUCTION SHOULD BE KEYS TO MARINE CORPS REDUCTIONS SINCE NSA WAS INITIALLY INTRODUCED FOR THIS PURPOSE."

4. (TS) ADM HYLAND ALSO STATED IN REF B THAT STEPS TO MINIMIZE THE IMPACT OF FINAL THERNOVER AND FACILITATE NAVY ROLL-UP OPERATIONS "MUST NOT OVERRIDE THE DESIRABILITY OF SEEING THROUGH TO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONCLUSION, THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT TASKS THAT HAVE BEEN SUPERBLY ACCOMPLISHED IN ICTZ BY THE NAVY/MARINE CORPS TEAM."

5. (TS) RADM COMBS, IN HIS PERSONAL LETTER OF 13 JUN 69 TO LTGEN NICKERSON STATED "YOU AND YOUR MARINES ARE THE ONLY REASON THAT THE NAVY IS IN DANANG AND WE WILL DO OUR DAMNDEST TO SUPPORT YOU ALL THE WAY DOWN THE LINE."

6. (TS) DURING LTGEN BUSE'S RECENT VISIT, HE REFERRED TO A COMMENT BY ADM HYLAND THAT REAFFIRMED THE POSITION OF CONTINUED NAVY SUPPORT TO THE MARINE CORPS IN RVN.

7. (TS) IN SPITE OF THE FOREGOING POLICY STATEMENTS, COMNAVFORV IS PURSUING AN INDEPENDENT COURSE OF ACTION.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 2100/4

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MCEO  
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

MCEO

SPECAT

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PAGE THREE RUMLP3110 T O P S E C R E T / L I N D I S / S P E C A T / M C E O  
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 PONSIBILITY ON THE BASIS OF A PLAN WHICH HAD ENVISIONED  
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 BEING PRESENTED WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI - I.E., SUPPORT IS  
 TO BE RELINQUISHED BY THE NAVY AND ASSUMED BY THE ARMY.

8. (TS) I CAN SEE ONLY TWO BASES UPON WHICH TO PROTEST  
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 WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ARMY IS INCAPABLE OF  
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 EVEN THOUGH THERE HAS BEEN NO OFFICIAL STATEMENT IN THIS  
 REGARD. IN EFFECT, THE NAVY IS ABROGATING ITS STATED  
 RESPONSIBILITIES.

9. (TS) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE A DETERMINATION IS REQUESTED AS  
 TO EXACTLY WHAT IS THE NAVY'S PRESENT POLICY ON SUPPORT OF  
 THE MARINE CORPS IN RVN.

PAGE FOUR RUMLP3110 T O P S E C R E T / L I N D I S / S P E C A T / M C E O

10. (TS) IF COMNAVFORV'S PRESENT POSITION IN THIS MATTER  
 HAS OFFICIAL SANCTION THEN THE ONLY COURSE OF ACTION  
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 TURNOVER OF SUPPORT TO THE ARMY THROUGH CLOSE STAFF  
 COORDINATION AND COOPERATION WITH NAVFORV AND USARV,  
 WHILE MAINTAINING A VARY EYE FOR FUNCTIONS THAT MAY LEAD  
 TO SLIP THROUGH THE CRACKS. YOUR GUIDANCE IN THIS MATTER  
 IS REQUESTED.

11. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3110

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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111 MAF 2100/4

MCEO  
 TOP SECRET

**SECRET**  
**"MCEO"**

PAR#629  
 PITSZYUW RUMLEMPA3109 1391352-SSSS--RUHHFMA.  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 191352Z MAY 70  
 FM ADMIN III MAF  
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

TOD: 19/1629Z MAY 70

**S E C R E T //NO4000// MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**  
**COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS), ICTZ (U)**

A. CG III MAF 080237Z MAY 70

B. COMUSMACV 110141Z MAY 70

C. CG III MAF 100116Z MAY 70

1. (S) REF A POINTED OUT THAT CHANGES TO PHASE IV PLANNING ALONG WITH INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY IN ICTZ SUGGEST THAT A REVIEW OF COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT TURN-OVER IS URGENTLY REQUIRED, AND REQUESTED THAT TURN-OVER ACTIONS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLETED BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING ASSESSMENT OF RECENT FORCE PLANNING CHANGES AND GUIDANCE. REF B IS COMUSMACV RESPONSE TO REF A WHICH SCHEDULED AN ACTION OFFICER CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS PROBLEM AREAS. REF C REQUESTED ADVISE RELATIVE TO CURRENT/FUTURE STATUS OF NAVY LOGISTIC SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITY TO MARINE COMBAT FORCES IN VIETNAM.

PAGE TWO RUMLEMPA3109 **S E C R E T MCEO**

2. (C) ACTION OFFICER MEETING, REF B, WAS ATTENDED BY REPS OF ALL COMMANDS CONCERNED, AND SERVED TO ESTAB A COMMUNICATIONS RAPPORT AMONG ALL CONCERNED. THE MAIN THRUST OF THE MEETING WAS THAT THERE HAS BEEN LACK OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE NAVY AND THE ARMY RELATIVE TO THE SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE OF SERV WHICH NSAD PROVIDES THE MARINE CORPS AND THAT PLANNING COORDINATION ACCOMPLISHED TO DATE HAS BEEN DONE IN ISOLATION OF THE MARINE CORPS. AS A RESULT, A SERIES OF FUNCTIONAL WORKING LEVEL CONFERENCES INVOLVING NAVY, ARMY AND MARINE CORPS ARE SCHED FOR THIS WEEK IN THE DANANG AREA TO INSURE THAT ALL MARINE CORPS SPT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED FOR DUR AND FOL TURNOVER ACTIONS.

3. (S) HIGHLIGHTS OF THE MEETING WERE:

A. NO INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEMS ARE EXISTENT AT THIS TIME IN ARMY SUPPLY REPEAT SUPPLY SPT TAKEOVER.

B. ARMY POSITION WAS THAT THEY CAN PROVIDE ALL SERVICES PRESENTLY PROVIDED BY NSAD IF ISSA'S BETWEEN MARINE CORPS AND ARMY SPELL OUT REQUIREMENTS IN DETAIL.

C. ALL SERVICES COVERED IN ISSA'S WILL BE PROVIDED ON

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

FMFPAC-GEN 2100/3 (3/69)  
 0101-Y04-603

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 13

**"MCEO"**  
**SECRET**

52

(71)

SECRET

"MCEO"

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA3109 S E C R E T MCEO  
 A NON-REIMBURSABLE BASIS BUT REQUESTS FOR SERV WILL BE MEASURED AGAINST ESTAB MACV AND USARV STANDARDS.  
 D. IF COVERED IN ISSA'S, ARMY WILL SERVICE AND PROBABLY REPLACE EQUIP PROVIDED THE MARINE CORPS BY THE NAVY. THERE IS SOME QUESTION, HOWEVER, IF ARMY WILL REPAIR EQUIP FURNISHED AND INSTALLED BY THE MARINE CORPS. MARINE CORPS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REPLACE THIS EQUIP WHEN IT IS NO LONGER ECONOMICALLY REPAIRABLE.  
 E. AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING, III MAF REPS REITERATED POSITION THAT TURNOVER ACTIONS SHOULD BE POSTPONED BECAUSE:

(1) ORIGINAL PREMISE THAT MAJORITY OF MARINE COMBAT FORCES WOULD BE DEPLOYED FROM VIETNAM BY 1 JULY NO LONGER VALID.

(2) THE THREAT IN I CORPS REMAINS HIGH AND RISK OF SPT DIMINUTION SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AT THIS TIME.

(3) IT HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD THAT NAVY PHASE-DOWN IN I CORPS WOULD PARALLEL MARINE CORPS PHASE-DOWN. AS IT STANDS NOW, NAVY WILL PHASE DOWN INDEPENDENT OF MARINE CORPS.

PAGE FOUR RUMLMPA3109 S E C R E T MCEO

(4) NSAD WAS ESTABLISHED FOR EXPRESS PURPOSE OF SUPPORTING MARINES IN I CORPS; THAT SUPPORT SHOULD CONTINUE AS LONG AS MARINE COMBAT FORCES REMAIN.

F. NAVY POSITION IN EFFECT WAS THAT PHASE DOWN ACTIONS HAD PROCEEDED TO SUCH A POINT THAT MOMENTUM COULD NOT BE STOPPED.

4. (S) IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE III MAF POSITION STATED ABOVE IS VALID ONLY IF NAVFORV HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPPORT MARINE CORPS FORCES IN VIETNAM. IF NAVFORV DOES NOT HAVE THAT RESPONSIBILITY, THEN THE ONLY BASIS FOR III MAF OBJECTION TO TAKEOVER BY THE ARMY IS POSITIVE EVIDENCE OF ARMY'S INABILITY TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT. TO DATE, THERE IS NO SUCH EVIDENCE. THE ARMY UNEQUIVOCALLY STATES THAT MARINES WILL BE PROVIDED ADEQUATE SUPPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH MACV STANDARDS AS LONG AS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS ARE MADE KNOWN AND PROVIDED FOR IN APPROPRIATE ISSA'S. THE ARMY AFFIRMS THAT THEY HAVE THE ASSETS TO DO SO IN SPITE OF A MAF POPULATION NOT ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATED.

5. (S) FUNCTIONAL CONFERENCES REFERRED TO IN PAR 2 HAVE BEEN IN SESSION YESTERDAY AND TODAY. NO SPECI-

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

"MCEO"

SECRET

(71)

**SECRET****"MCEO"**

PAGE FIVE RUMLMPA3109 S E C R E T MCEO  
 FIC PROBLEM AREAS HAVE BEEN UNCOVERED OTHER THAN THE  
 SHEER MAGNITUDE OF MAKING CERTAIN EVERYTHING IS PROVIDED  
 FOR, I.E. DENSITIES, SQUARE FOOTAGES. INFORMATION WILL  
 BE FORWARDED AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. IT MAY DEVELOP  
 THAT THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM AREAS. ADDITIONAL  
 USMC FUNDING REQUIREMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED ASAP.

GP-4

BT

3109

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

**"MCEO"**

FMFPAC-GEN 2100/3 (3/69)  
 0101-V04-6603

NNNN

**SECRET**

(71)

TOP SECRET

MCEO

SPECAT

PRG/633

PTTAZYUW RUMLMPA3110 139 1352-AAAA--RUHFMA. TOD: 19/1637Z MAY 70

ZNY AAAAA

P 191353Z MAY 70

FM ADMIN III MAF  
TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

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T O P S E C R E T/LIMDIS/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/  
FOR BGEN HOUGHTON FROM BGEN DULACKI (DELIVER DURING CHECKED UPON RECEIPT  
WORKING HOURS). DATE 20 May 70 III MAF S&C

COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT, ICTZ (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 062246Z JUN 69 (S)

B. CINCPACFLT 190412Z DEC 69 (TS)

*C. G. Yully Ssgt*  
(SIGNATURE)

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PAGE TWO RUMLMPA3110 T O P S E C R E T/LIMDIS/SPECAT/MCEO

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

MCEO

111 MAF 2100

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

"MCFN"

SPECAT

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PAGE THREE RUMLMPA3110 T O P S E C R E T / L I M D I S / S P E C A T / M C E O  
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PAGE FOUR RUMLMPA3110 T O P S E C R E T / L I M D I S / S P E C A T / M C E O

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11. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3110

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

"MCEO"

**HEADQUARTERS**  
**III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM ADMIN III MAF		DATE 19May70	
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	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SBC	X	20 MAY 70			
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

DISPOSITION	
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<input type="checkbox"/>	DESTROY AFTER ROUTING
<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION
SECTION	SIGNATURE

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

**SECRET**  
(A-6)

**"MCEO"**

PAC#629  
 PTT SZ YUW RUM LMPA 3109 1391352-SSSS--RUHHFMA.  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 191352Z MAY 70  
 FM ADMIN III MAF  
 TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

S E C R E T //NOFORN// MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS), ICTZ (U)  
 A. CG III MAF 080237Z MAY 70  
 B. COMUSMACV 110141Z MAY 70  
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PAGE TWO RUM LMPA 3109 S E C R E T MCEO

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 TO DATE HAS BEEN DONE IN ISOLATION OF THE MARINE CORPS.  
 AS A RESULT, A SERIES OF FUNCTIONAL WORKING LEVEL CON-  
 FERENCES INVOLVING NAVY, ARMY AND MARINE CORPS ARE SCHED  
 FOR THIS WEEK IN THE DANANG AREA TO INSURE THAT ALL MARINE  
 CORPS SPT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED FOR DUR AND FOL  
 TURNOVER ACTIONS.

3. (S) HIGHLIGHTS OF THE MEETING WERE:

- A. NO INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEMS ARE EXISTENT AT THIS TIME  
 IN ARMY SUPPLY REPEAT SUPPLY SPT TAKEOVER.
- B. ARMY POSITION WAS THAT THEY CAN PROVIDE ALL SERVICES  
 PRESENTLY PROVIDED BY NSAD IF ISSA'S BETWEEN MARINE CORPS  
 AND ARMY SPELL OUT REQUIREMENTS IN DETAIL.
- C. ALL SERVICES COVERED IN ISSA'S WILL BE PROVIDED ON

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

*Copy 1 of 4 copies*

**"MCEO"**  
 UNCLASSIFIED  
 A-6

"MCEO"

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA3109 S E C R E T MCEO  
 A NON-REIMBURSABLE BASIS BUT REQUESTS FOR SERV WILL BE MEASURED AGAINST ESTAB MACV AND USARV STANDARDS.  
 D. IF COVERED IN ISSA'S, ARMY WILL SERVICE AND PROBABLY REPLACE EQUIP PROVIDED THE MARINE CORPS BY THE NAVY. THERE IS SOME QUESTION, HOWEVER, IF ARMY WILL REPAIR EQUIP FURNISHED AND INSTALLED BY THE MARINE CORPS. MARINE CORPS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REPLACE THIS EQUIP WHEN IT IS NO LONGER ECONOMICALLY REPAIRABLE.  
 E. AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING, III MAF REPS REITERATED POSITION THAT TURNOVER ACTIONS SHOULD BE POSTPONED BECAUSE:  
 (1) ORIGINAL PREMISE THAT MAJORITY OF MARINE COMBAT FORCES WOULD BE DEPLOYED FROM VIETNAM BY 1 JULY NO LONGER VALID.  
 (2) THE THREAT IN I CORPS REMAINS HIGH AND RISK OF SPT DIMINUTION SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AT THIS TIME.  
 (3) IT HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD THAT NAVY PHASE-DOWN IN I CORPS WOULD PARALLEL MARINE CORPS PHASE-DOWN. AS IT STANDS NOW, NAVY WILL PHASE DOWN INDEPENDENT OF MARINE CORPS.

PAGE FOUR RUMLMPA3109 S E C R E T MCEO  
 (4) NSAD WAS ESTABLISHED FOR EXPRESS PURPOSE OF SUPPORTING MARINES IN I CORPS; THAT SUPPORT SHOULD CONTINUE AS LONG AS MARINE COMBAT FORCES REMAIN.  
 F. NAVY POSITION IN EFFECT WAS THAT PHASE DOWN ACTIONS HAD PROCEEDED TO SUCH A POINT THAT MOMENTUM COULD NOT BE STOPPED.  
 4. (S) IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE III MAF POSITION STATED ABOVE IS VALID ONLY IF NAVFORV HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPPORT MARINE CORPS FORCES IN VIETNAM. IF NAVFORV DOES NOT HAVE THAT RESPONSIBILITY, THEN THE ONLY BASIS FOR III MAF OBJECTION TO TAKEOVER BY THE ARMY IS POSITIVE EVIDENCE OF ARMY'S INABILITY TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT. TO DATE, THERE IS NO SUCH EVIDENCE, THE ARMY UNEQUIVOCALLY STATES THAT MARINES WILL BE PROVIDED ADEQUATE SUPPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH MACV STANDARDS AS LONG AS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS ARE MADE KNOWN AND PROVIDED FOR IN APPROPRIATE ISSA'S. THE ARMY AFFIRMS THAT THEY HAVE THE ASSETS TO DO SO IN SPITE OF A MAF POPULATION NOT ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATED.  
 5. (S) FUNCTIONAL CONFERENCES REFERRED TO IN PAR 2 HAVE BEEN IN SESSION YESTERDAY AND TODAY. NO SPECI-

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

FMF PAC-GEN 2100/3 (3/69)  
 0101-V04-6603

"MCEO"  
 UNCLASSIFIED  
 A-6

~~SECRET~~

"MCEO"

PAGE FIVE RUMLMPA3109 S E C R E T MCEO  
FIC PROBLEM AREAS HAVE BEEN UNCOVERED OTHER THAN THE  
SHEER MAGNITUDE OF MAKING CERTAIN EVERYTHING IS PROVIDED  
FOR, I.E. DENSITIES, SQUARE FOOTAGES. INFORMATION WILL  
BE FORWARDED AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. IT MAY DEVELOP  
THAT THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM AREAS. ADDITIONAL  
USMC FUNDING REQUIREMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED ASAP.

GP-4

BT

3109

//////HAS BEEN SENT//////

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

FMFPAC-GEN 2100/3 (3/69)  
0101-V04-6603

"MCEO"  
UNCLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

(A-6)

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

## CONFIDENTIAL

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM ADMIN III MAF		DATE 20MAY70	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 200619Z		COPY NO. 1 OF 4 COPIES RECD.	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				RETROGRADE OF M-6 BRIDGING
	DCG					
	C/S	I		5/20		
	DC/S	I		5/20		
	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					
	S/S	I	5/20	5-24	24	
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	G-6					
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REMARKS

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## STAFF SECRETARY III MAF

### MEMORANDUM

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 III MAF 200619Z (Spec'd)  
 TO G-3 & G-4 for  
 info.

(A-7)

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*for*

7

(A-7)

SGT MAJ

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

MCEO

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECAT

PITAZYUW RUMLMFAS170 1400619-AAAA--RUHNFMA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 200619Z MAY 70

FMADMIN III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

EXCLUSIVE

CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN HOUGHTON FROM BGEN DULACKI MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

RETROGRADE OF M-6 BRIDGING

A. ADMIN FMFPAC 200603Z MAY 70 (C)

B. ADMIN III MAF 191310Z MAY 70 (C)

C. CG III MAF 161314Z MAY 70 (US)

1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, WE BELIEVE THAT REF B CONCERNING RETROGRADING OF FIXED BRIDGING IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH COMUSMACV'S POLICY SET FORTH IN REF C. COMUSMACV POLICY REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO UNITS; IN ADDITION, MY DISCUSSIONS WITH DEP J-3 MACV IN SAIGON IN REGARD TO OUR ORIGINAL REQUEST REVOLVED ONLY AROUND UNITS. RETROGRADE OF FIXED BRIDGING IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICIES REGARDING EXCESS EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL SINCE THESE THREE BRIDGES ARE EXCESS TO BRIDGE COMPANY T/E. DO NOT

PAGE TWO RUMLMFAS170C CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT/MCEO BELIEVE IT NECESSARY OR ADVISABLE TO QUERY MACV THIS REGARD. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3170

SPECAT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1-4

MCEO

(A-7)

MCEO

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECAT

PITAZYUM RUMLMFA3170 1400619-AAAA-R UHMFMA.  
ZNY AAAAA  
P 200619Z MAY 70  
FMADMIN III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC  
BT

EXCLUSIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E FOR BGEN HOUGHTON FROM  
BGEN DULACKI MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING  
WORKING HOURS)

- RETROGRADE OF M-6 BRIDGING
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PAGE TWO RUMLMFA3170: C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T / M C E O  
BELIEVE IT NECESSARY OR ADVISABLE TO QUERY MACV THIS  
REGARD. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT  
3170

SPECAT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

20

2-4  
06

MCEO  
19

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION / COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 22 May 70	
			SERIAL NO / CONTROL DATE 221310Z		COPY NO / OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT LE BAC (2) INCIDENT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					REMARK:  DISPOSITION  <input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION  SECTION      SIGNATURE
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	DCS PLANS					
	DEP CORDS					
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SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

**SECRET**

(A-9)

SECRET

"EXCLUSIVE"

PAC#616

TOD: 22/1615Z MAY 70

PITAZYUW RUMMPA3565 1421310-AAAA--RUMHMA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 221310Z MAY 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

SPECAT

SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
(DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

LEBAC (2) INCIDENT

1. THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

P 220730Z

FM CG III MAF

TO COMUSMACV

INFO CG XXIV CORPS

CG FIRST MARDIV

ZEM

SECRET

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LTGEN ZAIS  
AND MGEN WIDDECKE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON

LE BAC (2) INCIDENT

A. CG III MAF 131241Z MAY 70

PAGE TWO RUMMPA3565 SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR  
1. REF A IS A SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT CONCERNING THE ALLEGED  
DEATH OF APPROXIMATELY 30 CIVILIANS ON 15 APRIL DURING  
OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF LE BAC (2). THE FOLLOWING  
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IN AMPLIFICATION OF  
REF A.

2. ON 15 APRIL 1970, COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 5TH MARINES  
ENGAGED IN HOSTILE CONTACT IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO LE BAC  
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KILLED BY SMALL ARMS FIRE. THE DIVISION'S INVESTIGATION  
COMMENCED ON 17 APRIL AND AS OF THIS DATE HAS REVEALED  
THE FOLLOWING:

A. CHIEF OF DUY XUYEN DISTRICT HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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"EXCLUSIVE"

SECRET

A-9

SECRET

"EXCLUSIVE"

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUMMPA3565 S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR THE INCIDENT, ADDING THAT: LE BAC (2) IS NOT UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL; NO GVN REPRESENTATIVE LOCATED THEREIN; IS IN FREE FIRE ZONE; CONSIDERED IN THE VIET CONG CONTROLLED TERRITORY; VILLAGE A VIET CONG REST HAVEN.

B. THE DISTRICT CHIEF OF DUC DUC DISTRICT, AS WELL AS THE CHIEF OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE, HAD RECEIVED NO REPORTS OR COMPLAINTS OF THE INCIDENT.

C. ACCORDING TO VIETNAMESE IN THE AREA, MOST OF THE VILLAGERS HAD MOVED TO REFUGEE CENTERS OR TO DANANG CITY, BETWEEN 16 APRIL AND 13 MAY.

D. OF 25 INHABITANTS REMAINING IN LE BAC (2) VILLAGE, ONLY THREE WOULD TALK TO AN INVESTIGATING TEAM ON 13 MAY 1970. THEY REPORTED THAT APPROXIMATELY 30 VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS HAD BEEN KILLED, PREDOMINANTLY BY AIR STRIKES DURING THE BATTLE ACTION BETWEEN U.S. MARINES AND VIET CONG. THEY ALL STATED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WISH THE MARINES WOULD REMAIN NEAR THE VILLAGE TO PROTECT THEM FROM THE VIET CONG.

3. DURING THE TIME THE INVESTIGATING TEAM WAS IN THE VILLAGE ON 13 MAY 1970, MARINE RIFLE COMPANIES OPERATING

PAGE FOUR RUMMPA3565 S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR ADJACENT TO LE BAC (2), IN CONJUNCTION WITH VIETNAMESE REGIONAL FORCES, DETAINED 24 PERSONS (LATER IDENTIFIED AS 20 ENEMY MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND THE REMAINDER AS COMMO LIAISON PERSONNEL OR CIVIL DEFENDANTS), CAPTURED ONE .50 CALIBER MACHINE GUN, TWO INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, AND NUMEROUS MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

F. FROM INTERROGATION OF VIETNAMESE RESIDING IN LE BAC (2) IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME DEATHS ON 15 APRIL 1970 AS A RESULT OF THE HOSTILE ACTION IN AND AROUND LE BAC (2). IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ASCERTAIN HOW MANY HAD DIED, NOR WAS ANY EVIDENCE FOUND TO SUBSTANTIATE THE VIET CONG ALLEGATION OF MURDER AS NOTED IN PARAGRAPH 3.

3. SUBSEQUENTLY, ALLEGATIONS WERE MADE BY THE VIET CONG AND SET FORTH IN A NEWS RELEASE ON 12 MAY BY THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (UPI), AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE: VIET CONG TODAY ACCUSED TROOPS OF THE U.S. FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT OF MURDERING 38 SOUTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS, INCLUDING 13 CHILDREN, IN A RAID ON A VILLAGE OF APRIL 15. THE VIET CONG CHARGE WAS QUOTED BY THE VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY IN A

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES  
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"EXCLUSIVE"  
SECRET

(A-9)

SECRET

"EXCLUSIVE"

SPECAT

PAGE FIVE RUMLNPA3565 S E C R E T / SPECAT / EXCLUSIVE FOR BROADCAST HEARD IN TOKYO. THE MARINES BURNED HOUSES AND ROBBED THE PEOPLE OF LE BAC IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE. UNQUOTE.

4. SUBSEQUENT TO THE HANOI BROADCAST, SEVERAL INQUIRIES WERE RECEIVED FROM THE PRESS IN REGARD TO THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED THEREIN. THESE PRESS QUERIES WERE ANSWERED BY THE 1ST MARDIV PAO AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE "AN ALLEGATION OF THIS TYPE HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND HAS BEEN UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR APPROXIMATELY FOUR WEEKS. A FIREFIGHT BETWEEN MARINES AND VIET CONG DID OCCUR IN THIS AREA ON 15 APRIL 1970. NO SUBSTANTIATION OF THE ALLEGATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, HOWEVER, THE INVESTIGATION IS STILL IN PROGRESS". UNQUOTE.

5. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL QUERIES HAVE BEEN SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED FROM THE PRESS WITH REPLIES MADE THERETO:

A. WHERE DID THE ALLEGATIONS COME FROM? RESPONSE: ON 16 APRIL 1970 A GROUP OF VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS, CLAIMING TO BE FROM LE BAC (2), APPROACHED A MARINE OBSERVATION POST ON HILL 119, LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 17 MILES SOUTHWEST OF DANANG. THE VIETNAMESE REPORTED THAT A NUMBER OF VILLAGERS HAD BEEN KILLED AS A RESULT OF THE ACTION BETWEEN

PAGE SIX RUMLNPA3565 S E C R E T / SPECAT / EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE AND VIET CONG FORCES ON 15 APRIL 1970. 1ST MARINE DIVISION INVESTIGATION COMMENCED THE FOLLOWING DAY, 17 APRIL 1970. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE VIET CONG, IN A RADIO BROADCAST RECEIVED IN JAPAN ON 12 MAY 1970, ALLEGED THAT U.S. MARINES HAD MURDERED 38 VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS. THIS BROADCAST WAS MONITORED BY UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (UPI) AND SUBSEQUENTLY REPORTED IN A NEWS STORY.

B. ACTUAL DATE INVESTIGATION STARTED? RESPONSE: THE INVESTIGATION COMMENCED ON 17 APRIL 1970. MARINES WHO HAD OCCUPIED THE OBSERVATION POST ON HILL 119 AND MARINES FROM THE UNIT INVOLVED IN THE 15 APRIL 1970 OPERATION AROUND LE BAC (2) WERE INTERVIEWED. THE DISTRICT CHIEFS OF QUY XUYEN AND DUC DUC DISTRICTS WERE ALSO QUESTIONED. THE INVESTIGATING TEAM VISITED LE BAC (2) AND INTERVIEWED SEVERAL VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS OF THE VILLAGE. THEY REAFFIRMED THAT A NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE HAD BEEN KILLED ON 15 APRIL 1970 DURING THE ENGAGEMENT FROUGHT IN THEIR AREA BETWEEN U.S. MARINES AND VIET CONG.

C. HAVE CHARGES BEEN PLACED AGAINST ANYONE? IF SO, WHO? RESPONSE: THE INVESTIGATION HAS FOUND THAT A NUMBER

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES  
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"EXCLUSIVE"

SECRET

(A-9)

SECRET

"EXCLUSIVE"

SPECAT

PAGE SEVEN RUM MPA3565 S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR OF VIETNAMESE HAD BEEN KILLED AS A RESULT OF THE HOSTILE ACTION OF 15 APRIL 1970. IT COULD NOT BE ASCERTAINED WHETHER THE DEATHS WERE A RESULT OF MARINE OR VIET CONG FIRE. NO INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED TO SUBSTANTIATE THE ALLEGATIONS BROADCAST BY THE VIET CONG ON 12 MAY 1970. NO CHARGES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT AGAINST ANYONE.

6. CIVILIAN CORRESPONDENTS BOB SULLIVAN OF UPI AND JAY SHARBUTT OF AP HAVE INDICATED TO THE 1ST MARDIV PAO THAT THEY DESIRE TO VISIT LE BAC (2) AND REQUESTED TRANSPORTATION AND SECURITY. CORRESPONDENTS WERE ADVISED THAT THE AREA IS CONSIDERED HOSTILE AND THAT MARINE SECURITY IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR THEIR PROTECTION; THEY HAVE NOT FURTHER PURSUED THEIR REQUEST.

7. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT ADDITIONAL QUERIES CONCERNING THIS INCIDENT WILL BE MADE BY THE PRESS. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

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3565

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PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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"EXCLUSIVE"

SECRET

(A-9)

~~SECRET~~**EXCLUSIVE**

PAC#616

TOD: 22/1615Z MAY 70

PITAZYUW RUM LMPA3565 1421310-AAAA--RUHFMA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 221310Z MAY 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

SPECAT

SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
(DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

LEBAC (2) INCIDENT

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PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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22

13 EXCLUSIVE SECRET

74

~~SECRET~~~~"EXCLUSIVE"~~

SPECAT

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D. OF 25 INHABITANTS REMAINING IN LE BAC (2) VILLAGE, ONLY THREE WOULD TALK TO AN INVESTIGATING TEAM ON 13 MAY 1970. THEY REPORTED THAT APPROXIMATELY 30 VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS HAD BEEN KILLED, PREDOMINANTLY BY AIR STRIKES DURING THE BATTLE ACTION BETWEEN U.S. MARINES AND VIET CONG. THEY ALL STATED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WISH THE MARINES WOULD REMAIN NEAR THE VILLAGE TO PROTECT THEM FROM THE VIET CONG.

3. DURING THE TIME THE INVESTIGATING TEAM WAS IN THE VILLAGE ON 13 MAY 1970, MARINE RIFLE COMPANIES OPERATING

PAGE FOUR RUMMPA3565 S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR ADJACENT TO LE BAC (2), IN CONJUNCTION WITH VIETNAMESE REGIONAL FORCES, DETAINED 24 PERSONS (LATER IDENTIFIED AS 20 ENEMY MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND THE REMAINDER AS COMMO LIAISON PERSONNEL OR CIVIL DEFENDANTS), CAPTURED ONE .50 CALIBER MACHINE GUN, TWO INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, AND NUMEROUS MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

F. FROM INTERROGATION OF VIETNAMESE RESIDING IN LE BAC (2) IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME DEATHS ON 15 APRIL 1970 AS A RESULT OF THE HOSTILE ACTION IN AND AROUND LE BAC (2). IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ASCERTAIN HOW MANY HAD DIED, NOR WAS ANY EVIDENCE FOUND TO SUBSTANTIATE THE VIET CONG ALLEGATION OF MURDER AS NOTED IN PARAGRAPH 3.

3. SUBSEQUENTLY, ALLEGATIONS WERE MADE BY THE VIET CONG AND SET FORTH IN A NEWS RELEASE ON 12 MAY BY THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (UPI), AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE: VIET CONG TODAY ACCUSED TROOPS OF THE U.S. FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT OF MURDERING 38 SOUTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS, INCLUDING 13 CHILDREN, IN A RAID ON A VILLAGE OF APRIL 15. THE VIET CONG CHARGE WAS QUOTED BY THE VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY IN A

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES  
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~~"EXCLUSIVE"~~  
~~SECRET~~

SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT

PAGE FIVE RUMLMPA3565 S E C R E T / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E F O R B R O A D C A S T H E A R D I N T O K Y O . T H E M A R I N E S B U R N E D H O U S E S A N D R O B B E D T H E P E O P L E O F L E B A C I N Q U A N G N A M P R O V I N C E . U N - Q U O T E .

4. SUBSEQUENT TO THE HANOI BROADCAST, SEVERAL INQUIRIES WERE RECEIVED FROM THE PRESS IN REGARD TO THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED THEREIN. THESE PRESS QUERIES WERE ANSWERED BY THE 1ST MARDIV PAO AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE "AN ALLEGATION OF THIS TYPE HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND HAS BEEN UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR APPROXIMATELY FOUR WEEKS. A FIREFIGHT BETWEEN MARINES AND VIET CONG DID OCCUR IN THIS AREA ON 15 APRIL 1970.

NO SUBSTANTIATION OF THE ALLEGATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, HOWEVER, THE INVESTIGATION IS STILL IN PROGRESS". UNQUOTE.

5. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL QUERIES HAVE BEEN SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED FROM THE PRESS WITH REPLIES MADE THERETO:

A. WHERE DID THE ALLEGATIONS COME FROM? RESPONSE:

ON 16 APRIL 1970 A GROUP OF VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS, CLAIMING TO BE FROM LE BAC (2), APPROACHED A MARINE OBSERVATION POST ON HILL 119, LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 17 MILES SOUTHWEST OF DANANG. THE VIETNAMESE REPORTED THAT A NUMBER OF VILLAGERS HAD BEEN KILLED AS A RESULT OF THE ACTION BETWEEN

PAGE SIX RUMLMPA3565 S E C R E T / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E F O R M A R I N E A N D V I E T C O N G F O R C E S O N 1 5 A P R I L 1 9 7 0 . 1 S T M A R I N E D I V I S I O N I N V E S T I G A T I O N C O M M E N C E D T H E F O L L O W I N G D A Y , 1 7 A P R I L 1 9 7 0 . S U B S E Q U E N T L Y , T H E V I E T C O N G , I N A R A D I O B R O A D - C A S T R E C E I V E D I N J A P A N O N 1 2 M A Y 1 9 7 0 , A L L E G E D T H A T U . S . M A R I N E S H A D M U R D E R E D 3 8 V I E T N A M E S E C I V I L I A N S . T H I S B R O A D - C A S T W A S M O N I T O R E D B Y U N I T E D P R E S S I N T E R N A T I O N A L ( U P I ) A N D S U B S E Q U E N T L Y R E P O R T E D I N A N E W S S T O R Y .

B. ACTUAL DATE INVESTIGATION STARTED? RESPONSE:

THE INVESTIGATION COMMENCED ON 17 APRIL 1970. MARINES WHO HAD OCCUPIED THE OBSERVATION POST ON HILL 119 AND MARINES FROM THE UNIT INVOLVED IN THE 15 APRIL 1970 OPERATION AROUND LE BAC (2) WERE INTERVIEWED. THE DISTRICT CHIEFS OF DUY XUYEN AND DUC DUC DISTRICTS WERE ALSO QUESTIONED. THE INVESTIGATING TEAM VISITED LE BAC (2) AND INTERVIEWED SEVERAL VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS OF THE VILLAGE. THEY REAFFIRMED THAT A NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE HAD BEEN KILLED ON 15 APRIL 1970 DURING THE ENGAGEMENT FROUGHT IN THEIR AREA BETWEEN U.S. MARINES AND VIET CONG.

C. HAVE CHARGES BEEN PLACED AGAINST ANYONE? IF SO, WHO? RESPONSE: THE INVESTIGATION HAS FOUND THAT A NUMBER

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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EXCLUSIVE

SECRET

~~SECRET~~~~"EXCLUSIVE"~~

SPECAT

PAGE SEVEN RUMMPA3565 S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR  
OF VIETNAMESE HAD BEEN KILLED AS A RESULT OF THE HOSTILE  
ACTION OF 15 APRIL 1970. IT COULD NOT BE ASCERTAINED  
WHETHER THE DEATHS WERE A RESULT OF MARINE OR VIET CONG  
FIRE. NO INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED TO SUBSTANTIATE THE  
ALLEGATIONS BROADCAST BY THE VIET CONG ON 12 MAY 1970.  
NO CHARGES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT AGAINST ANYONE.

6. CIVILIAN CORRESPONDENTS BOB SULLIVAN OF UPI AND JAY  
SHARBUTT OF AP HAVE INDICATED TO THE 1ST MARDIV PAO THAT  
THEY DESIRE TO VISIT LE BAC (2) AND REQUESTED TRANSPORTA-  
TION AND SECURITY. CORRESPONDENTS WERE ADVISED THAT THE  
AREA IS CONSIDERED HOSTILE AND THAT MARINE SECURITY IS  
NOT AVAILABLE FOR THEIR PROTECTION; THEY HAVE NOT FURTHER  
PURSUED THEIR REQUEST.

7. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT ADDITIONAL QUERIES CONCERNING  
THIS INCIDENT WILL BE MADE BY THE PRESS. WILL KEEP YOU  
ADVISED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

3565

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PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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FMFPAC-GEN 2100/3 (3/69)  
0101-Y04-6603

(74)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION / COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 22 MAY 70	
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE P 220730Z MAY 70		COPY NO 2 OF 5 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	<del>B</del>				LE BAC INCIDENT
	DCG					REMARK:
	C/S	I		5/22		
	DC/S	J		5/23		
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					<input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION
	S/S	X	5/22		C. Y	
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	G-2					
	G-3					
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					
	AWARDS					
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*cc: CV files*

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SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

**SECRET**

(A-8)

P 220730Z

FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 INFO CG XXIV CORPS  
 CG FIRST MARDIV  
 ZEM

SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LTGEN ZAIS  
 AND MGEN WIDDECKE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 LE BAC (2) INCIDENT

A. CG III MAF 131241Z MAY 70

1. REF A IS A SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT CONCERNING THE ALLEGED DEATH OF APPROXIMATELY 30 CIVILIANS ON 15 APRIL DURING OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF LE BAC (2). THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IN AMPLIFICATION OF REF A.

2. ON 15 APRIL 1970, COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 5TH MARINES ENGAGED IN HOSTILE CONTACT IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO LE BAC (2). THE OPERATIONS WERE SUPPORTED BY FIXED WING, COBRA AND OV-10 AIRCRAFT. THERE WERE NINE KNOWN ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION BY FRIENDLY GROUND UNITS AND THREE KNOWN ENEMY KILLED BY AIR STRIKES REPORTED BY COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 5TH MARINES. ON 16 APRIL APPROXIMATELY 6 RESIDENTS OF LE BAC (2) APPROACHED MARINES ON HILL 119, LOCATED ABOUT 3,000 METERS SOUTHWEST OF LE BAC (2), CARRYING THE BODIES OF THREE CHILDREN AND TWO MEN. THE VILLAGERS CLAIMED THERE WERE MORE DEAD IN THE VILLAGE THAT HAD BEEN KILLED BY SMALL ARMS FIRE. THE DIVISION'S INVESTIGATION COMMENCED ON 17 APRIL AND AS OF THIS DATE HAS REVEALED THE FOLLOWING:

A. CHIEF OF DUY XUYEN DISTRICT HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT, ADDING THAT: LE BAC (2) IS NOT UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL; NO GVN REPRESENTATIVE LOCATED THEREIN; IS IN FREE FIRE ZONE; CONSIDERED IN THE VIET CONG CONTROLLED TERRITORY; VILLAGE A VIET CONG REST HAVEN.

B. THE DISTRICT CHIEF OF DUC DUC DISTRICT, AS WELL AS THE CHIEF OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE, HAD RECEIVED NO REPORTS OR COMPLAINTS OF THE INCIDENT.

C. ACCORDING TO VIETNAMESE IN THE AREA, MOST OF THE VILLAGERS HAD MOVED TO REFUGEE CENTERS OR TO DANANG CITY, BETWEEN 16 APRIL AND 13 MAY.

D. OF 25 INHABITANTS REMAINING IN LE BAC (2) VILLAGE, ONLY THREE WOULD TALK TO AN INVESTIGATING TEAM ON 13 MAY 1970. THEY REPORTED THAT APPROXIMATELY 30 VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS HAD BEEN KILLED, PREDOMINANTLY BY AIR STRIKES DURING THE BATTLE ACTION BETWEEN U.S. MARINES AND VIET CONG. THEY ALL STATED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WISH THE MARINES WOULD REMAIN NEAR THE VILLAGE TO PROTECT THEM FROM THE VIET

CG III

(A-8)<sup>#1</sup>

E. DURING THE TIME THE INVESTIGATING TEAM WAS IN THE VILLAGE ON 13 MAY 1970, MARINE RIFLE COMPANIES OPERATING ADJACENT TO LE BAC (2), IN CONJUNCTION WITH VIETNAMESE REGIONAL FORCES, DETAINED 24 PERSONS (LATER IDENTIFIED AS 20 ENEMY MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND THE REMAINDERS AS COMMO LIAISON PERSONNEL OR CIVIL DEFENDANTS), CAPTURED ONE .50 CALIBER MACHINE GUN, TWO INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, AND NUMEROUS MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

F. FROM INTERROGATION OF VIETNAMESE RESIDING IN LE BAC (2) IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME DEATHS ON 15 APRIL 1970 AS A RESULT OF THE HOSTILE ACTION IN AND AROUND LE BAC (2). IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ASCERTAIN HOW MANY HAD DIED, NOR WAS ANY EVIDENCE FOUND TO SUBSTANTIATE THE VIET CONG ALLEGATION OF MURDER AS NOTED IN PARAGRAPH 3.

3. SUBSEQUENTLY, ALLEGATIONS WERE MADE BY THE VIET CONG AND SET FORTH IN A NEWS RELEASE ON 12 MAY BY THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (UPI), AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE: VIET CONG TODAY ACCUSED TROOPS OF THE U.S. FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT OF MURDERING 8 SOUTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS, INCLUDING 13 CHILDREN, IN A RAID ON A VILLAGE OF APRIL 15. THE VIET CONG CHARGE WAS QUOTED BY THE VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY IN A BROADCAST HEARD IN TOKYO. THE MARINES BURNED HOUSES AND ROBBED THE PEOPLE OF LE BAC IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE. UNQUOTE.

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

GP-4

700

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SECRET

NNNN

(A-8) #2

P 220730Z  
 FM-03 III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 INFO CG XXIV CORPS  
 CG FIRST MARDIV  
 ZEM

SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO LTGEN ZAIS  
 AND MGEN WIDDECKE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 LE PAC (2) INCIDENT

4. SUBSEQUENT TO THE HANOI BROADCAST, SEVERAL INQUIRIES WERE RECEIVED FROM THE PRESS IN REGARD TO THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED THEREIN. THESE PRESS QUERIES WERE ANSWERED BY THE 1ST MARDIV PAO AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE "AN ALLEGATION OF THIS TYPE HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND HAS BEEN UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR APPROXIMATELY FOUR WEEKS. A FIREFIGHT BETWEEN MARINES AND VIET CONG DID OCCUR IN THIS AREA ON 15 APRIL 1970. NO SUBSTANTIATION OF THE ALLEGATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, HOWEVER, THE INVESTIGATION IS STILL IN PROGRESS". UNQUOTE.

5. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL QUERIES HAVE BEEN SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED FROM THE PRESS WITH REPLIES MADE THERE TO:

A. WHERE DID THE ALLEGATIONS COME FROM? RESPONSE:  
 ON 16 APRIL 1970 A GROUP OF VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS, CLAIMING TO BE FROM LE PAC (2), APPROACHED A MARINE OBSERVATION POST ON HILL 119, LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 17 MILES SOUTHWEST OF DANANG. THE VIETNAMESE REPORTED THAT A NUMBER OF VILLAGERS HAD BEEN KILLED AS A RESULT OF THE ACTION BETWEEN MARINE AND VIET CONG FORCES ON 15 APRIL 1970. 1ST MARINE DIVISION INVESTIGATION COMMENCED THE FOLLOWING DAY, 17 APRIL 1970. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE VIET CONG, IN A RADIO BROADCAST RECEIVED IN JAPAN ON 12 MAY 1970, ALLEGED THAT U.S. MARINES HAD MURDERED 38 VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS. THIS BROADCAST WAS MONITORED BY UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (UPI) AND SUBSEQUENTLY REPORTED IN A NEWS STORY.

B. ACTUAL DATE INVESTIGATION STARTED? RESPONSE:  
 THE INVESTIGATION COMMENCED ON 17 APRIL 1970. MARINES WHO HAD OCCUPIED THE OBSERVATION POST ON HILL 119 AND MARINES FROM THE UNIT INVOLVED IN THE 15 APRIL 1970 OPERATION AROUND LE PAC (2) WERE INTERVIEWED. THE DISTRICT CHIEFS OF DUY XUYEN AND DUC DUC DISTRICTS WERE ALSO QUESTIONED. THE INVESTIGATING TEAM VISITED LE PAC (2) AND INTERVIEWED SEVERAL VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS OF THE VILLAGE. THEY REAFFIRMED THAT A NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE HAD BEEN KILLED ON 15 APRIL 1970 DURING THE ENGAGEMENT FOUGHT IN THEIR AREA BETWEEN U.S. MARINES AND VIET CONG.

A-8 #3

C. HAVE CHARGES BEEN PLACED AGAINST ANYONE? IF SO, WHO? RESPONSE: THE INVESTIGATION HAS FOUND THAT A NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE HAD BEEN KILLED AS A RESULT OF THE HOSTILE ACTION OF 15 APRIL 1970. IT COULD NOT BE ASCERTAINED WHETHER THE DEATHS WERE A RESULT OF MARINE OR VIET CONG FIRE. NO INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED TO SUBSTANTIATE THE ALLEGATIONS BROADCAST BY THE VIET CONG ON 12 MAY 1970. NO CHARGES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT AGAINST ANYONE.

6. CIVILIAN CORRESPONDENTS BOB SULLIVAN OF UPI AND JAY SHARRUIT OF AP HAVE INDICATED TO THE 1ST MARDIV PAO THAT THEY DESIRE TO VISIT LE PAC (2) AND REQUESTED TRANSPORTATION AND SECURITY. CORRESPONDENTS WERE ADVISED THAT THE AREA IS CONSIDERED HOSTILE AND THAT MARINE SECURITY IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR THEIR PROTECTION; THEY HAVE NOT FURTHER PURSUED THE IR REQUEST.

7. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT ADDITIONAL QUERIES CONCERNING THIS INCIDENT WILL BE MADE BY THE PRESS. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED. WARM REGARDS.

(SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

GP-4  
600

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SECRET

A-8 #4

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM CG III MAF		DATE 23 MAY 1970			
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 231344		COPY NO: 1 OF 4 COPIES REC'D					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					COMMANDER INTELLIGENCE (MACV) UPDATE 23MAY 1970				
	DCG									
	C/S	I		5/24	J	REMARKS: DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <table border="1" style="width: 100%; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.A.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.	Section	Signature		
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	DC/S	I		5/25	J					
	DCS PLANS									
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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**TOP SECRET**

B-7

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

ZCZC PAC649  
 PP RUHFMA  
 DE RUALMPA3751 1431344  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 231344Z MAY 70  
 FM CG III VAF  
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

TOD: 25/029Z MAY 70

SPECAT "EXCLUSIVE"

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCLEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
 WIEU

1. THE MAY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE UPDATE FOR COMMANDER'S WAS HELD AT MACV 23 MAY. AMBASSADORS BUNKER, BERGER AND COLBY WERE PRESENT IN ADDITION TO GENERAL'S ABRAMS, ROSSON AND BROWN PLUS COMPONENT AND FIELD FORCE COMMANDERS PLUS KEY MACV STAFF OFFICERS.
2. THE AGENDA INCLUDED PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS ON IN AND OUT OF COUNTRY OPERATIONS, CAMBODIA, PACIFICATION AND A FORCE STRUCTURE UPDATE.
3. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST WAS THE WRAP-UP ON EVENTS IN CAMBODIA. THE BRIEFER SUMMARIZED ENEMY REACTIONS TO INCLUDE:
  - A. THE 559TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP WILL REMAIN IN PLACE VICINITY TCHEPONE DURING RAINY SEASON;
  - B. SEVERAL AAA UNITS WILL REMAIN INSTEAD OF DEPLOYING NORTH;
  - C. AN EXPANSION OF THE LOGISTICS CORRIDOR IN SOUTHERN LAOS AND

PAGE TWO RUALMPA3751 TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCL/MCEO  
 CAMBODIA TO INCLUDE USE OF THE SEKONG-MEKONG RIVER SYSTEM;

D. DELAY IN INFILTRATION DUE TO DISRUPTION OF FACILITIES AND SYSTEM;

E. RELOCATION OF UNITS AND MAJOR HEADQUARTERS DEEPER INTO CAMBODIA; AND

F. DEPLOYMENT OF MIGS FROM CHINA TO HANOI FOR FIRST TIME THIS YEAR.

4. THE J-2 BRIEFER LISTED RESULTANT ENEMY CAPABILITIES TO INCLUDE (A) LAUNCH LARGE SCALE ATTACKS IN I & II CORPS, (B) KEEP LAOS LOG OPEN, AND (C) A REDUCED CAPABILITY IN COSVN AREA. AS FAR AS I CORPS IS CONCERNED IT WAS CONCLUDED THE ENEMY COULD LAUNCH A LARGE SCALE ATTACK. HE HAD SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES AND HE COULD AND PROBABLY WOULD CONTINUE ATTACKS BY FIRE AND TERRORISM. THESE CONCLUSIONS COINCIDE WITH MY OWN ESTIMATE.

5. THE XXIV CORPS G-2 PUT ON A SHORT PRESENTATION ON CAPITALIZING ON INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OF ENEMY PLANS IN ORDER TO DISRUPT SAME AND MINIMIZE EFFECTS. PRESENTATION WAS MOST COMPLIMENTARY OF 1ST RADIO BN.

6. AFTER REGULAR MEETING ABRAMS ASKED ROSSON, MILDREN, ZAIS, DAVISON, COYAN, MCCOYAN, COLLINS, BROWN, KING AND ME TO HIS OFFICE. PURPOSE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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III MAF 2100/4

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET

(B-7)

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE THREE RUMLPAS 371 TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXLC/MCEO  
 WAS TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY NEXT PHASE REDEPLOYMENTS. HE PRESENTED NO  
 NEW INFORMATION BUT ACKNOWLEDGED IT WAS A BIG PROBLEM AND THEY HAD  
 TO GET ON WITH IT. HE VISUALIZES, NOT STARTING UNTIL ABOUT 1 SEPT.  
 STAFF IS BUSILY WORKING ON TROOP LISTS FOR TWO OPTIONS, ONE MARINE  
 HEAVY AND ONE ARMY HEAVY. I SENSE GENERAL FEELING IS TO FAVOR ARMY  
 HEAVY AND TO RETAIN MAX MARINE UNITS IN I CORPS BECAUSE OF ENEMY  
 THREAT. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, EXPLORING PROBABILITIES OF GETTING  
 RVNAF UNITS EQUIVALENT TO DIVISION STRENGTH TO I CORPS. CANDIDATES  
 INCLUDE AIRBORNE DIVISION AND MARINE DIVISION OR BRIGADES OF EACH.  
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

371

NNNN

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

"MCEO"

111 MAF 2100/4

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TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM <i>CG FMFPAC CH III MAF</i>	DATE 31 May 70				
					SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 311044Z	COPY NO. OF 4 COPIES REC'D				
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
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	CG					REMARKS: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.	Section	Signature		
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	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

8

*msg to CG FOLDER*

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**TOP SECRET**

*B-8*

MCEO

"EXCLUSIVE"

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

PTTZYUW RUMLPAS 001 01000-AAAA--RUMFVA.  
ZNY AAAAA  
P 311000Z MAY 70  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC

BT  
TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE FROM LT GEN  
MCCUTCHEN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS IN RVN (LD)

- A. CG FMFPAC 231000Z MAY 70
- B. JCS 9471/210000Z MAY 70

1. REFERENCE A SUGGESTED THAT THE COMMENTS CONTAINED  
IN REFERENCE B MIGHT PROVIDE US WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO  
REOPEN THE RECOMMENDATION FOR THE MOVEMENT OF THE 9TH  
ENGR BN, RECON CO AND BRIDGE CO BY AMPHIB SHIPPING IN  
EARLY JUNE. I DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH GEN ABRAMS  
DURING THE LAST WEEK AND DID NOT RECEIVE A FAVORABLE  
RESPONSE. IT APPEARS THAT HE WILL NOT NOMINATE ANY UNITS  
FOR EARLY REDEPLOYMENT UNLESS FORCED TO DO SO.

WARM REGARDS  
GP-4  
BT  
5001

"MCEO"

NNNN

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1 of 4

MCEO

(B.I.)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

RTTCZYUW RUMMPA4267 1470316-CCCC--RUHJSPA.  
ZNY CCCCC  
R 270325Z MAY 70  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUHJSPA/COMSEVENTHFLT  
BT

7782-147

*Has Been Sent  
Drafted - CG  
Rel. - CG (10)*

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
FOR VICE ADMIRAL WEISNER FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
CINCPACFLT VISIT

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 260130Z  
DELIGHTED TO HAVE YOU ACCOMPANY ADM HYLAND. LOOK  
FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN DANANG CW 30 MAY.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT  
4267

270325Z MAY 70

27 MAY 70 287

NNNN

**CONFIDENTIAL**

27

03

25

(15)

MCEO

SECRET

SPECAT

FTTAZYUW RUMLMPA4454 14505 12-AAAA--RUMHMA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 P 280512Z MAY 70  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC

"EXCLUSIVE"

BT

SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/FOR BGEN HOUGHTON  
 FROM BGEN DULACKI (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)

OFFICER REPLACEMENT PROJECTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

A. CG, III MAF LTR 10/PG 5500 OF 16 FEB 70 (S) AND

CG, III MAF LTR 10/PG 5500 OF 27 MAR 70 (S)

B. CG, FMFPAC LTR 14/8YZ 5321 OF 22 APR 70

C. MY 101142Z MAY 70 (C)

1. THIS MESSAGE CONCERNS OFFICER PERSONNEL SHORTAGES  
 PROJECTED FOR III MAF HEADQUARTERS AND ADMINISTRATIVELY  
 ATTACHED UNITS AND DESCRIBES THE IMPENDING ISSUE OF  
 SUSTAINING MARINE PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION OF THE XXIV  
 CORPS HEADQUARTERS.

2. THE III MAF HEADQUARTERS WAS REDUCED TO ITS PRESENT  
 SIZE IN ANTICIPATION OF EARLY REDEPLOYMENT OF SIGNIFICANT U. S.  
 MARINE FORCES FROM RVN AND EARLY DEACTIVATION OR RELOCATION  
 OUTSIDE RVN OF THIS HEADQUARTERS.

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA4454 SECRET/SPECAT/MCEO/EXCLUSIVE

3. ASSUMPTION OF III MAF'S 10TZ RESPONSIBILITIES BY  
 XXIV CORPS COMMENCED CONCURRENTLY WITH THE III MAF  
 HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS. SELECTED III MAF  
 MARINES WERE ASSIGNED TO THE XXIV CORPS STAFF TO AUGMENT IT  
 DURING THE TRANSITION PHASE. THE MARINE AUGMENTATION  
 OF XXIV CORPS STAFF, EXCEPT FOR TWO BULLETS CITED IN  
 REFERENCE (A), WAS PROVIDED UNDER A NO-REPLACEMENT  
 VERBAL UNDERSTANDING ENTERED INTO PRIOR TO TRANSITION  
 OF 10TZ RESPONSIBILITIES TO XXIV CORPS.

4. THE DELAY IN REDEPLOYMENT ACTION DICTATES CONTINUED  
 FUNCTIONING OF III MAF HEADQUARTERS AND, BECAUSE OF THE  
 CONTINUED PRESENCE OF A SIGNIFICANT USMC FORCE IN 10TZ,  
 IT IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE MARINE CORPS AND A  
 VALID OBLIGATION TO SUSTAIN SOME AUGMENTATION OF THE XXIV  
 CORPS STAFF.

5. THE MINIMAL SIZE OF THE III MAF HEADQUARTERS NEGATES OUR  
 ABILITY TO SAFELY TOLERATE UNDERLAP. SIMULTANEOUSLY THE  
 TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF SIGNIFICANT PERSONNEL INPUT TO III  
 MAF COMMANDS HAS ESSENTIALLY ELIMINATED THE CAPABILITIES OF  
 THOSE COMMANDS TO RESPOND TO PERSONNEL LEVIES FOR III MAF  
 HEADQUARTERS NEEDS.

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

28

05 SECRET MCF 102

SPECAT

MCF 102

(76)

MCEO

4454 S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M C E O / E X C L U S I V E

A. DURING JUNE AND JULY, THE CAF HEADQUARTERS AND GAG'S WILL LOSE 15 OFFICERS BY ROTATION. PLANNING DATA AND DIRECTED TRANSFERS IN HAND ACCOUNT FOR 5 OF THE 15 SCHEDULED VACANCIES.

B. THE 5TH COMMUNICATIONS BATTALION WILL ROTATE 7 OFFICERS DURING JUNE AND JULY. PLANNING DATA IN HAND ACCOUNTS FOR 1 OF THE 7 SCHEDULED VACANCIES.

C. TWO OFFICERS IN THE 5TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE TEAM WILL ROTATE DURING JULY AND REQUIRE REPLACEMENT.

12. THE OFFICER NEEDS OF THIS HEADQUARTERS AND ATTACHED UNITS BASED ON T/O LINE BILLETTS FOR THE MONTHS OF JUNE AND JULY TOTAL

43. WE HAVE PLANNING DATA ON A TOTAL OF 19 OFFICERS DURING THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME WHO CAN BE APPLIED TO FILL CITED BILLETTS.

3 ADDITIONAL PLANNED JUNE/JULY INPUTS ARE FOR ITT, SPL S1 BILLET AND AN EARLY AUG ROTATEE.

13. THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF MAJOR MARINE CORPS UNITS IN 10TZ HAS PROMPTED CG, XXIV CORPS TO REQUEST THAT CERTAIN MARINE AUGMENTATION BILLETTS BE SUSTAINED. NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY WITH XXIV

CORPS NOW TO DETERMINE WHICH BILLETTS CURRENTLY FILLED BY III MAF MARINES MUST BE SUSTAINED. TWO SUCH BILLETTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND CONTINUED PRESENCE OF MARINES IN THESE BILLETTS

PAGE SIX RUMLPAA454 S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M C E O / E X C L U S I V E

IS CONSIDERED A VALID OBLIGATION RELATED TO OUR PRESENCE IN 10TZ. THE BILLETTS ARE:

A. DEPUTY C/S, XXIV CORPS, VACATED BY COL M. M. COOK JR. 15 MAY 70

B. LIAISON OFFICER TO THE ROK MARINE BRIGADE; INCUMBENT, LTCOL

G. F. ROGERS, JR., WILL BE DETACHED 28 JUNE 70.

14. PLANNING ACTION TO REPLACE COLONEL COOK IS UNDERWAY.

RELIEF FOR LTCOL ROGERS AND T/O RECOGNITION ROKMC OFF/ENL LIAISON BILLETTS WERE REQUESTED IN REF C.

15. ACTION TO REQUEST T/O MODIFICATION REFLECTING THE DEP C/S, XXIV CORPS BILLET PLUS XXIV CORPS LONG TERM AUGMENTATION WILL BE INITIATED EARLIEST.

16. IN SUMMARY, ALL AVAILABLE INFO INDICATES THAT WE WILL CONTINUE FUNCTIONING AS THE SENIOR MARINE CORPS STAFF IN RVN. OUR PERSONNEL ASSETS ARE MINIMAL FOR, BY PLAN, NO EXCESS WAS ALLOWED IN OUR T/O. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE ABILITY OF III MAF COMMANDS TO RESPOND TO PERSONNEL LEVIES FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS ESSENTIALLY DISAPPEARED BECAUSE OF SIMILAR OFFICER STRENGTH PROBLEMS.

17. THE MANNING AUTHORIZATIONS IN REFERENCE (B) ARE ADEQUATE FOR THIS HEADQUARTERS AND ATTACHED UNITS BUT WILL NOT COVER THE FORTHCOMING REQUEST FOR SUSTAINED AUGMENTATION OF XXIV CORPS.

SPECAT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET MCEO

(76)

MCEO

6. SERIOUS PERSONNEL SHORTAGES AND UNDERLAPS WILL OCCUR STARTING IN JUNE UNLESS TIMELY INPUT OVER THAT CURRENTLY KNOWN TO THIS HEADQUARTERS IS GENERATED.

7. THE PROSPECTIVE SITUATION IN THIS HEADQUARTERS IS INDICATED BY THE FOLLOWING LINE BILLETS FROM REFERENCE (A) WHICH ARE OR WILL BE VACATED IN JUNE AND JULY

LINE BILLET	T/O	T/O	T/O	GRADE MOS	INCUMBENT	DET DATE/DDV
81A DEP AC/S, G-3 (AIR)				CCL	9907 COL. N. E. HEFFERNAN	DET 25 JUNE 70
56 AC/S, G-2/SSO				CCL	9906 COL. E.W. DZIALO	DET 1 JUL 70
81 DEP AC/S, G-3				CCL	9906 HSL. WILKERSON	DDV 11 JUL 70
243 FORCE SUPPLY OFF				CCL	9908 COL. J.C. BOLLWARE	DET 17 JUL 70
111 LNO TO XXIV CORPS				LTCOL	9910 VACATED BY LTCOL J.C. GOOD	IN 22 MAY 70
201 ENGR PLANS/OPNS OFF				LTCOL	1302 VACATED BY MAJ D. P. YOUNG	24 MAY 70
91 G-3 PLANS OFF				LTCOL	9910 LTCOL T. P. CANEY	DET 19 JUN 70
87 G-3 ASS'T OPNS OFF (AIR)				LTCOL	9912 LTCOL T.W. NELSON	DET 21 JUN 70
244 ASS'T FORCE SUPPOFF				LTCOL	3002 LTCOL T.F.E. NUGENT	DET 27 JUN 70
63 COMBAT INTELL OFF				LTCOL	0202 MAJ G.A. KNUDSON	DET 3 JUL 70
150 DEP AC/S, G-6				LTCOL	2502 LTCOL R.G. DEEM	DET 4 JUL 70
51 SML SVCS/R&R OFF				LTCOL	9910 LTCOL J.M. VOSMIK	DET 20 JUL 70

PAGE FOUR RUM/MPA/054 SECRET/SPECAT/MCEO/EXCLUSIVE

24 STAFF SECRETARY	LTCOL	0130	LTCOL	F.A. CLARK	DET 22 JUL 70
99 OIC, COMBAT OPNS CONTR	MAJ	9910	VACATED BY MAJ R.A. JOHNSON	14 MAY 70	
195 FORCE EMBARK OFF	MAJ	0430	MAJ J.A. GRAYMAN	DET 19 JUN 70	
88 G-3 ASS'T OPNS OFF	MAJ	9910	MAJ J.A. HARRING	DDV 14 JUL 70	
33 PROFCOL OFF	MAJ	9910	LTCOL G.B. NEWMAN	DET 15 JUL 70	
92 G-3 ASS'T OPNS OFF	MAJ	9910	MAJ R.H. JOHNSON	DDV 17 JUL 70	
128 G-4 ASS'T OPNS OFF	MAJ	9910	MAJ H.J. MCCANN	DDV 17 JUL 70	
89 G-3 ASS'T OPNS OFF	MAJ	9912	MAJ P.A. STONE	DDV 23 JUL 70	
127 G-4 ASS'T OPNS OFF	MAJ	7557	MAJ B.H. HOGLE	DET 24 JUL 70	
59 G-2 ADMIN/INTELL OFF	CAPT	0130	CAPT W.M. MIELNICKI	DDV 3 JUL 70	
5 AIDE-DE-CAMP	CAPT	9910	CAPT J.W. HUGHES	DDV 22 JUL 70	
101 G-3 WATCH OFF	CAPT	9912	CAPT J.A. WESSSELL	DDV 23 JUL 70	

8. TOTAL OFFICER LINE BILLETS VACANT OR TO BE VACATED JUNE/JUL-24.  
9. PLANNING DATA RECEIVED TO DATE ALLOW US TO SLATE PERSONNEL FOR 13 OF THE ABOVE 25 LINE BILLETS.

10. AS OF 27 MAY, OUR TOTAL OFFICER STRENGTH IN THIS HEADQUARTERS WAS 82. THIS MEANS THAT 30 PERCENT OF OUR HEADQUARTERS STAFF OFFICER STRENGTH WILL BE DETACHED DURING JUNE AND JULY.

11. THE OFFICER PERSONNEL SITUATION IN ATTACHED UNITS ADMINISTRAYTIVELY SUPPORTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS IS ALSO POTENTIALLY UNSATISFACTORY.

SPECAT

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET MCEO

(76)

MCEO

PAGE SEVEN RUMMPA054 S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M C E O / E X C L U S I V E  
18. PROMPT ACTION TO SUPPLY THE OFFICER NEEDS SUMMARIZED  
IN PARAGRAPH 12 ABOVE, IS EARNESTLY REQUESTED.  
19. SUPPORTING DETAILS ARE BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY TO YOUR G-1.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT

4154

NNNN

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SPECAT  
MCEO

SECRET

(76)

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

ZCZC PAC649  
 PP RUHFMA  
 DE RUWMPA3731 1431344  
 ZNY TTTT  
 P 231344Z MAY 70  
 FM CG III VAF  
 TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

TOD: 23/1529Z MAY 70

SPECAT "EXCLUSIVE"

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 FOR LTGEN BUSE FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
 WIEU

1. THE MAY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE UPDATE FOR COMMANDERS WAS HELD AT VACV 23 MAY. AMBASSADORS BUNKER, BERGER AND COLBY WERE PRESENT IN ADDITION TO GENERAL'S ABRAMS, ROSSON AND BROWN PLUS COMPONENT AND FIELD FORCE COMMANDERS PLUS KEY MACV STAFF OFFICERS.
2. THE AGENDA INCLUDED PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS ON IN AND OUT OF COUNTRY OPERATIONS, CAMBODIA, PACIFICATION AND A FORCE STRUCTURE UPDATE.
3. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST WAS THE WRAP-UP ON EVENTS IN CAMBODIA. THE BRIEFER SUMMARIZED ENEMY REACTIONS TO INCLUDE:
  - A. THE 559TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP WILL REMAIN IN PLACE VICINITY TCHEPONE DURING RAINY SEASON;
  - B. SEVERAL AAA UNITS WILL REMAIN INSTEAD OF DEPLOYING NORTH;
  - C. AN EXPANSION OF THE LOGISTICS CORRIDOR IN SOUTHERN LAOS AND

PAGE TWO RUWMPA3731 TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCL/MCEO  
 CAMBODIA TO INCLUDE USE OF THE SEKONG-MEKONG RIVER SYSTEM;

- D. DELAY IN INFILTRATION DUE TO DISRUPTION OF FACILITIES AND SYSTEM;
- E. RELOCATION OF UNITS AND MAJOR HEADQUARTERS DEEPER INTO CAMBODIA; AND
- F. DEPLOYMENT OF MIGS FROM CHINA TO HANOI FOR FIRST TIME THIS YEAR.

4. THE J-2 BRIEFER LISTED RESULTANT ENEMY CAPABILITIES TO INCLUDE (A) LAUNCH LARGE SCALE ATTACKS IN I & II CORPS, (B) KEEP LAOS LOC OPEN, AND (C) A REDUCED CAPABILITY IN COSVN AREA. AS FAR AS I CORPS IS CONCERNED IT WAS CONCLUDED THE ENEMY COULD LAUNCH A LARGE SCALE ATTACK, HE HAD SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES AND HE COULD AND PROBABLY WOULD CONTINUE ATTACKS BY FIRE AND TERRORISM. THESE CONCLUSIONS COINCIDE WITH MY OWN ESTIMATE.

5. THE XXIV CORPS G-2 PUT ON A SHORT PRESENTATION ON CAPITALIZING ON INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OF ENEMY PLANS IN ORDER TO DISRUPT SAME AND MINIMIZE EFFECTS. PRESENTATION WAS MOST COMPLIMENTARY OF 1ST RADIO BN.

6. AFTER REGULAR MEETING ABRAMS ASKED ROSSON, MILDREN, ZAIS, DAVISON, COWAN, MCCOWAN, COLLINS, BROWN, KING AND ME TO HIS OFFICE. PURPOSE

III MAR

23

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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"MCEO"  
44  
SECRET

(77)

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE THREE RUMLPAB 731 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / E X L C / M C E O  
 WAS TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY NEXT PHASE REDEPLOYMENTS. HE PRESENTED NO  
 NEW INFORMATION BUT ACKNOWLEDGED IT WAS A BIG PROBLEM AND THEY HAD  
 TO GET ON WITH IT. HE VISUALIZES NOT STARTING UNTIL ABOUT 1 SEPT.  
 STAFF IS BUSILY WORKING ON TROOP LISTS FOR TWO OPTIONS, ONE MARINE  
 HEAVY AND ONE ARMY HEAVY. I SENSE GENERAL FEELING IS TO FAVOR ARMY  
 HEAVY AND TO RETAIN MAX MARINE UNITS IN I CORPS BECAUSE OF ENEMY  
 THREAT. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, EXPLORING PROBABILITIES OF GETTING  
 RYNAF UNITS EQUIVALENT TO DIVISION STRENGTH TO I CORPS. CANDIDATES  
 INCLUDE AIRBORNE DIVISION AND MARINE DIVISION OR BRIGADES OF EACH.  
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

381

NNNN

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

111 MAF 2100/4

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"MCEO"  
TOP SECRET



MCEO

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT

PTTAZYUN RUMLPAS 001 011044-AAAA--RUMHMA.  
ZNY AAAAA  
P 311044Z MAY 70  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC

BT  
TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN BUSE FROM LT GEN  
MCCURCHION MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS IN RVN (U)

- A. CG FMFPAC 231948Z MAY 70
- B. JCS 9871/210042Z MAY 70

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WARM REGARDS  
GP-4  
BT  
5001

MCEO

NNNN

TOP SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

31

4 of 4  
10

MCEO  
44

(79)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

RTTCZYUW RUMLM/PA4267 1472316-CCCC--RUHJSPA.  
ZNY CCCCC  
R 270325Z MAY 70  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUHJSPA/COMSEVENTHFLT

7782-147

*Has Been Sent  
Drafted - CG  
Rel. - CG (10)*

BT  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FOR VICE ADMIRAL WEISNER FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
CINCPACFLT VISIT  
A. COMSEVENTHFLT 260130Z  
DELIGHTED TO HAVE YOU ACCOMPANY ADM HYLAND. LOOK  
FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN DANANG CN 30 MAY.  
WARM REGARDS.

27 MAY 70 287

270325Z MAY 70

GP-4  
BT  
4267

NNNN

10

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(A-10)

HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**SECRET**

III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM CG III MAF		DATE 280512 MAY 1970	
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 280512		COPY NO 1 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG	I				OFFICER REPLACEMENT PROJECTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
	DCG					
	C/S	I	5/29			REMARK:
	DC/S	I	5/30			
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION  <input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION
	DEPCORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					SECTION      SIGNATURE
1	S/S	I	5/29		L. G.	
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	PROTO					
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	S&C	X	29 MAY 70			
	TCC					
	SGT MAJ					

11

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE

**SECRET**

(A-11)

MCEO

SPECAT

SECRET

PTTAZYUN RUMMPAAS 4 14805 12-AAAA--RUMFMA.  
ZNY AAAAA  
P 280512Z MAY 70  
FM CG 111 MAF  
TO CG FMFFAC

"EXCLUSIVE"

BT  
S E C R E T / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y / F O R B E N H O U G H T O N  
F R O M B E N D U L A C K I ( D E L I V E R D U R I N G W O R K I N G H O U R S )  
O F F I C E R R E P L A C E M E N T P R O J E C T I O N S A N D R E Q U I R E M E N T S  
A. C G , 1 1 1 M A F L T R 1 0 / P C 5 3 0 0 O F 1 6 F E B 7 0 ( S ) A N D  
C G , 1 1 1 M A F L T R 1 0 / P C 5 3 0 0 O F 2 7 M A R 7 0 ( S )  
B. C G , F M F F A C L T R 1 1 / B Y Z 5 3 2 1 O F 2 2 A P R 7 0  
C. M Y 1 0 1 1 4 2 Z M A Y 7 0 ( C )  
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O U T S I D E R V N O F T H I S H E A D Q U A R T E R S .

PAGE TWO RUMMPAAS 4 S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M C E O / E X C L U S I V E  
3. A S S U M P T I O N O F 1 1 1 M A F ' S 1 0 T Z R E S P O N S I B I L I T I E S B Y  
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D U R I N G T H E T R A N S I T I O N P H A S E . T H E M A R I N E A U G M E N T A T I O N  
O F X X I V C O R P S S T A F F , E X C E P T F O R T W O B U L L E T S C I T E D I N  
R E F E R E N C E ( A ) , W A S P R O V I D E D U N D E R A N O - R E P L A C E M E N T  
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4. T H E D E L A Y I N R E D E P L O Y M E N T A C T I O N D I C T A T E S C O N T I N U E D  
F U N C T I O N I N G O F 1 1 1 M A F H E A D Q U A R T E R S A N D , B E C A U S E O F T H E  
C O N T I N U E D P R E S E N C E O F A S I G N I F I C A N T U S M C F O R C E I N 1 0 T Z ,  
I T I S I N T H E B E S T I N T E R E S T S O F T H E M A R I N E C O R P S A N D A  
V A L I D O B L I G A T I O N T O S U S T A I N S O M E A U G M E N T A T I O N O F T H E X X I V  
C O R P S S T A F F .  
5. T H E M I N I M A L S I Z E O F T H E 1 1 1 M A F H E A D Q U A R T E R S N E G A T E S O U R  
A B I L I T Y T O S A F E L Y T O L E R A T E U N D E R L A P . S I M U L T A N E O U S L Y T H E  
T E M P O R A R Y S U S P E N S I O N O F S I G N I F I C A N T P E R S O N N E L I N P U T T O 1 1 1  
M A F C O M M A N D S H A S E S S E N T I A L L Y E L E M I N A T E D T H E C A P A B I L I T I E S O F  
T H O S E C O M M A N D S T O R E S P O N D T O P E R S O N N E L L E V I E S F O R 1 1 1 M A F  
H E A D Q U A R T E R S N E E D S .

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SPECAT  
SECRET

MCEO  
MCEO

(A-11)

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4454 S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M C E O / E X C L U S I V E

A. DURING JUNE AND JULY, THE GAF HEADQUARTERS AND GAG'S WILL LOSE 15 OFFICERS BY ROTATION. PLANNING DATA AND DIRECTED TRANSFERS IN HAND ACCOUNT FOR 5 OF THE 15 SCHEDULED VACANCIES.

B. THE 5TH COMMUNICATIONS BATTALION WILL ROTATE 7 OFFICERS DURING JUNE AND JULY. PLANNING DATA IN HAND ACCOUNTS FOR 1 OF THE 7 SCHEDULED VACANCIES.

C. TWO OFFICERS IN THE 5TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE TEAM WILL ROTATE DURING JULY AND REQUIRE REPLACEMENT.

12. THE OFFICER NEEDS OF THIS HEADQUARTERS AND ATTACHED UNITS BASED ON T/O LINE BILLET'S FOR THE MONTHS OF JUNE AND JULY TOTAL

48. WE HAVE PLANNING DATA ON A TOTAL OF 19 OFFICERS DURING THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME WHO CAN BE APPLIED TO FILL CITED BILLET'S.

3 ADDITIONAL PLANNED JUNE/JULY INPL'S ARE FOR ITT, SPL S1 BILLET AND AN EARLY AUG ROTATEE.

13. THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF MAJOR MARINE CORPS UNITS IN ICTZ HAS PROMPTED CG, XXIV CORPS TO REQUEST THAT CERTAIN MARINE AUGMENTATION BILLET'S BE SUSTAINED. NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY WITH XXIV CORPS NOW TO DETERMINE WHICH BILLET'S CURRENTLY FILLED BY III MAF MARINES MUST BE SUSTAINED. TWO SUCH BILLET'S HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND CONTINUED PRESENCE OF MARINES IN THESE BILLET'S

PAGE SIX RUMLPAR/4454 S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M C E O / E X C L U S I V E

IS CONSIDERED A VALID OBLIGATION RELATED TO OUR PRESENCE IN ICTZ. THE BILLET'S ARE:

A. DEPUTY C/S, XXIV CORPS, VACATED BY COL M. M. COOK JR. 13MAY70

B. LIAISON OFFICER TO THE ROK MARINE BRIGADE; INCUMBENT, LTCOL

G.F. ROGERS, JR., WILL BE DETACHED 28JUNE70.

14. PLANNING ACTION TO REPLACE COLONEL COOK IS UNDERWAY.

RELIEF FOR LTCOL ROGERS AND T/O RECOGNITION ROOM/OFF/ENL LIAISON BILLET'S WERE REQUESTED IN REF C.

15. ACTION TO REQUEST T/O MODIFICATION REFLECTING THE DEP C/S, XXIV CORPS BILLET PLUS XXIV CORPS LONG TERM AUGMENTATION WILL BE INITIATED EARLIEST.

16. IN SUMMARY, ALL AVAILABLE INFO INDICATES THAT WE WILL CONTINUE FUNCTIONING AS THE SENIOR MARINE CORPS STAFF IN RVN. OUR PERSONNEL ASSETS ARE MINIMAL FOR, BY PLAN, NO EXCESS WAS ALLOWED IN OUR T/O. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE ABILITY OF III MAF COMMANDS TO RESPOND TO PERSONNEL LEVIES FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS ESSENTIALLY DISAPPEARED BECAUSE OF SIMILAR OFFICER STRENGTH PROBLEMS.

17. THE MANNING AUTHORIZATIONS IN REFERENCE (B) ARE ADEQUATE FOR THIS HEADQUARTERS AND ATTACHED UNITS BUT WILL NOT COVER THE FORTHCOMING REQUEST FOR SUSTAINED AUGMENTATION OF XXIV CORPS.

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6. SERIOUS PERSONNEL SHORTAGES AND UNDERLAPS WILL OCCUR STARTING IN JUNE UNLESS TIMELY INPUT OVER THAT CURRENTLY KNOWN TO THIS HEADQUARTERS IS GENERATED.

7. THE PROSPECTIVE SITUATION IN THIS HEADQUARTERS IS INDICATED BY THE FOLLOWING LINE BILLETS FROM REFERENCE (A) WHICH ARE OR WILL BE VACATED IN JUNE AND JULY

T/O	T/O	T/O	LINE BILLET	GRADE MOS	INCUMBENT	DET DATE/DDV
			81A DEP AC/S, G-3 (AIR)	COL	9907 COL N. E. HEFFERNAN	DET 25 JUNE 70
			56 AC/S, G-2/SSO	COL	9906 COL E.W. DZIALO	DET 1 JUL 70
			81 DEP AC/S, G-3	COL	9906 H.L. WALKERSON	DDV 11 JUL 70
			245 FORCE SUPPLY OFF	COL	9908 COL J.C. BOWDRE	DET 17 JUL 70
			111 LNO TO XXIV CORPS	LTCOL	9910 VACATED BY LTCOL J.C. GOOD	IN 22 MAY 70
			201 ENGR PLANS/OPNS OFF	LTCOL	1502 VACATED BY MAJ C. P. YOUNG	24 MAY 70
			91 G-3 PLANS OFF	LTCOL	9910 LTCOL T. P. CANEY	DET 19 JUN 70
			87 G-3 ASS'T OPNS OFF (AIR)	LTCOL	9912 LTCOL T.W. NELSON	DET 21 JUN 70
			244 ASS'T FORCE SUPPOFF	LTCOL	5002 LTCOL T.F.E. NUGENT	DET 27 JUN 70
			65 COMBAT INTELL OFF	LTCOL	0202 MAJ G.A. KNIDSON	DET 3 JUL 70
			150 DEP AC/S, G-6	LTCOL	2502 LTCOL R.G. DEEM	DET 4 JUL 70
			51 SPL SVCS/R&R OFF	LTCOL	9910 LTCOL J.M. VOSAK	DET 20 JUL 70

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24	STAFF SECRETARY	LTCOL	0350	LTCOL	F.A. CLARK	DET 22 JUL 70
99	OIC, COMBAT OPNS CONTR	MAJ	9910	VACATED BY MAJ R.A. JOHNSON	14 MAY 70	
135	FORCE EMBARK OFF	MAJ	0430	MAJ J.A. CHAPMAN	DET 19 JUN 70	
88	G-3 ASS'T OPNS OFF	MAJ	9910	MAJ J.A. HARRING	DDV 14 JUL 70	
53	PROF COOL OFF	MAJ	9910	LTCOL B.B. NEWMAN	DET 15 JUL 70	
92	G-3 ASS'T OPNS OFF	MAJ	9910	MAJ R.J. JOHNSON	DDV 17 JUL 70	
128	G-4 ASS'T OPNS OFF	MAJ	9910	MAJ H.J. MCCANN	DDV 17 JUL 70	
89	G-3 ASS'T OPNS OFF	MAJ	9912	MAJ P.A. STONE	DDV 23 JUL 70	
127	G-3 ASS'T OPNS OFF	MAJ	3057	MAJ B.H. KOGUE	DET 24 JUL 70	
59	G-2 ADMIN/INTELL OFF	CAPT	0350	CAPT W.M. MIELNICKI	DDV 3 JUL 70	
5	AIDE-DE-CAMP	CAPT	9910	CAPT J.W. HUGHES	DDV 22 JUL 70	
101	G-3 WATCH OFF	CAPT	9912	CAPT J.A. WESSELL	DDV 23 JUL 70	

8. TOTAL OFFICER LINE BILLETS VACANT OR TO BE VACATED JUNE/JUL-24.  
9. PLANNING DATA RECEIVED TO DATE ALLOW US TO SLATE PERSONNEL FOR 15 OF THE ABOVE 25 LINE BILLETS

10. AS OF 27 MAY, OUR TOTAL OFFICER STRENGTH IN THIS HEADQUARTERS WAS 82. THIS MEANS THAT 30 PERCENT OF OUR HEADQUARTERS STAFF OFFICER STRENGTH WILL BE DETACHED DURING JUNE AND JULY.

11. THE OFFICER PERSONNEL SITUATION IN ATTACHED UNITS ADMINISTRATIVELY SUPPORTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS IS ALSO POTENTIALLY UNSATISFACTORY.

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PAGE SEVEN RUMLPAA/54 S E C R E T / S P E C I A L / M C E O / E X C L U S I V E  
18. PROMPT ACTION TO SUPPLY THE OFFICER NEEDS SUMMARIZED  
IN PARAGRAPH 12 ABOVE, IS EARNESTLY REQUESTED.  
19. SUPPORTING DETAILS ARE BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY TO YOUR G-1.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM	DATE				
					CG III MAF	30 May 70				
					SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE	COPY NO. 1 OF 4 COPIES REC'D.				
					301518Z					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
			IN	OUT						
	CG					VISIT OF ADM HYLAND				
	DCG									
	C/S	I	5/31			REMARKS				
	DC/S									
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for _____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. Return for permanent retention.				
	DEP CORDS									
	DSA ICTZ					<table border="1"> <tr> <th>Section</th> <th>Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	Section	Signature		
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	SPL SERV									
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	SIC	X	31 May 70							
	TCC									
	SGT MAJ									

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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

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PTTAEYUW RUMLMFA4914 1501518-AAAA--RUHNFDA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 301518Z MAY 76

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C I A L / S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN BUSBY FROM  
 MCCUTCHION MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
 VISIT OF ADM NYLAND

1. ADM NYLAND AND VADM WEISNER VISITED III MAF THIS DATE. BRIEFED THEM ON GENERAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION IN I CORPS, CURRENT OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS, SPELLING OUT OUR INTEREST IN TURNOVER OF COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT FROM NAVY TO ARMY AND OUR EFFORTS TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF OPERATIONAL NAVY SHIPPING. RADM ADAMSON FOLLOWED WITH A SHORT BRIEFING ON STATUS OF TURNOVER OF SUPPORT TO ARMY.
2. WE EMPHASIZED THAT OUR PRIMARY CONCERN WAS THAT OUR PROBLEM AREAS BE SURFACED AND IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF TURNOVER SO THAT NOTHING WAS ALLOWED TO SLIP THROUGH THE CRACKS. ALSO POINTED OUT THAT ARMY WAS MOST COOPERATIVE AND AGREED TO HELP, BUT THAT WE WERE SORRY TO LOSE THE MAGNIFICENT SUPPORT WHICH THE NAVY HAD PROVIDED US.
3. THE SUBJECT OF THE HOSPITAL NEVER CAME UP.
4. FOLLOWING LUNCHEON AT MY QUARTERS VISITED MACS-4 WHERE HE WAS

PAGE TWO RUMLMFA4914 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C I A L / S P E C I A L EXCLUSIVE  
 BRIEFED ON MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SQUADRON WITH EMPHASIS ON  
 ITS ROLE AS THE INTERFACE IN THE S. E. ASIAN COMPOSITE TACTICAL  
 AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.

5. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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