

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEXAUGUST INCOMING

<u>DTG</u>	<u>SENDER/CLASSIFICATION/SUBJECT</u>
1- 030245	CG XXIV CORPS TO CG III MAF (ACTING) (S) <i>gp - Not at all</i> REDISPOSITION OF FORCES IN QDSZ UPON REDEPLOYMENT
2- 032049	CG FMFPAC (TS) FORCE PLANNING - COMMAND "LINES", BGEN DWYER RESPON- <i>gp-4</i> SIBILITIES, ETC.
3- 032106	CG MCB CAMPEN (S) TO CG FIRST MARDIV INFO CG III MAF <i>gp-4</i> GYSGT VORGEAS
4- 030950	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>gp-4</i> REDEPLOYMENT OF FIRSTMARDIV HQBN
5- 052207	CG FMFPAC TO CG FIRST MARDIV INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>gp-4</i> REALIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL OF HQBN
6- 060255	CG XXIV CORPS TO CG III MAF (TS) <i>gp-4</i> APPRAISAL OF ALLIED EFFORT IN SVN
7- 062215	CMC TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING - RAMIFICATIONS OF REDEPLOYMENT SLIPPAGES
8- 070151	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING - THANK FOR INFO
9- 070614	COMSEVENTHFLT (C) <i>gp-4</i> HMCM REED REASSIGNMENT
10- 082214	CG FMFPAC TO CMC INFO CG III MAF (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING - MISSION OF MAB
11- 092202	CG FMFPAC (TS) REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING - (READ OF CINCPAC 070347) <i>gp-4</i>
12- 100925	DEPDIR FOR OPNS J-3 HQ USEUCOM (U) HAPPY BIRTHDAY
13- 112035	ADMIN FMFPAC (TS) <i>gp-3</i> REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (READD COMUSMACV 091032)
14- 112036	ADMIN FMFPAC (TS) <i>gp-3</i> REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (READD JCS 081807)
15- 112037	ADMIN FMFPAC (TS) <i>gp-4</i> REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (READD CINCPAC 092223)
16- 120115	CG FIRST MARDIV (TS) <i>gp-4</i> REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING - DISPOSITION OF CCS CAPABILITIES

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEXINCOMING AUGUST

<u>DTG</u>	<u>SENDER/CLASSIFICATION/SUBJECT</u>
17- 132052	ADMIN FMFPAC INFO CMC (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING - CONCURRENCE IN 130854Z (III MAF)
18- 132115	ADMIN FMFPAC (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> REDEPLOYMENT PERSONNEL CRITERIA - MODIFICATIONS
19- 141304	CG FIRST MARDIV (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING - ALTERNATIVE FOR DESIRED FORCE BALANCE
20- 150200	CG FIRST MARDIV (S) <i>Gp-4</i> REVISED PERSONNEL CRITERIA
21- 150242	ADMIN FMFPAC (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> SLF OPERATIONS (PROTECTED)
22- 150630	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>Gp-4</i> EMER LV CASE OF PVT HERROD
23- 152242	CG FMFPAC TO CG I MAF INFO CG III MAF <i>Gp-4</i> SLF EMPLOYMENT (PROTECTED)
24- 162037	CG FMFPAC (C) THIRD MARDIV MEMORIAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL <i>Gp-4</i>
25- 180135	CG FIRST MARDIV (C) <i>Gp-4</i> HANOI BROADCAST RELATIVE TO ANTI-WAR PROTEST
26- 180850	CG FIRST MARDIV (S) <i>Gp-4</i> UNUSUAL INCIDENT REPORT - FRIENDLY ON FRIENDLY FIRE
27- 201928	CG FMFPAC TO CG FIRST MARDIV INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>Gp-4</i> 3/7 MORTAR INCIDENT
28- 202220	CG MCB CAMPEN TO CG FIRST MARDIV INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>Gp-4</i> GYSGT VORGEAS
29- 211210	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>Gp-4</i> ADDITIONAL INFO ON UNUSUAL INCIDENT REPORT
30- 220408	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> CINCPAC VISIT
31- 222330	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>Gp-4</i> BURIED EQUIPMENT INVESTIGATION
32- 232135	CG FMFPAC TO CG FIRST MARDIV INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>Gp-4</i> DECLASSIFICATION OF HAMLET 4 SON THANG INCIDENT CORRES.

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEXAUGUST INCOMING

	<u>DTG</u>	<u>SENDER/CLASSIFICATION/SUBJECT</u>
AUGUST	33-241322	COMUSMACV (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING - ASSUMPTIONS ON TRADE-OFFS
AUGUST	34-250257	CG FMFPAC TO CG THIRD MAW INFO CG III MAF (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING - TO ALERT RE: REDEPLOYMENT MODIFICATIONS
AUGUST	35-250414	CINCPAC (U) CINCPAC VISIT - THANK
AUGUST	36-251953	CMC TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING - MISSION OF MAB
AUGUST	37-*240820	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>gp-4</i> DECLASSIFICATION OF CORRES RE: HAMLET SON THANG #4
AUGUST	38-261916	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING - III MAF TASKS/MISSIONS UPON RELOC.
AUGUST	<i>NIF 39</i> -261918	CG FMFPAC (C) <del><i>gp-4</i></del> MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4
AUGUST	40*261917	CG FMFPAC (S) <i>gp-4</i> REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING - PASSED TO BGEN DOEHLER
AUGUST	41-280414	ADMIN FMFPAC (C) <i>gp-4</i> RACIAL PROBLEMS
AUGUST	42-290810	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>gp-4</i> GYSGT VORGEAS
AUGUST	43-290812	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>gp-4</i> FRIENDLY ON FRIENDLY FIRE
AUGUST	44-290814	CG FIRST MARDIV (C) <i>gp-4</i> CASE OF PFC SAMUEL G. GREEN, JR. (CONGRINT)
AUGUST	45-291453	CMC TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (TS) <i>gp-4</i> REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING - ORGN GRADE & MOS BREAKDOWN
AUGUST	46-300800	CG 1ST MAW TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>gp-4</i> MAG-13 INCIDENTS
AUGUST	47-310505	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG III MAF (C) <i>gp-4</i> MESSAGE FROM CONGR. STOKES TO CAPT. HARGROVE

\* Received subsequent to prior entries

0 01000Z 17H 177-1 177-4  
TO NS ARMSTRONG ACT CG III MAF DNG RVN  
ZEM

S E C R E T DNG 1846 EYES ONLY

AT 1600 HOURS, 27 JULY I SHOWED GENERAL  
MCCHICHEON MY CONCEPT OF HOW FORCES SHOULD BE  
REPOSITIONED IN QDSZ UPON REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 7TH  
MARINES. GENERAL MCCHICHEON ASKED FOR AN OVER-  
LAY OF THIS PLAN FOR STUDY. THE OVERLAY WAS  
PASSED TO III MAF STAFF THE NEXT MORNING.

AS URGENT FACILITIES TURN-OVER AND DIS-  
POSAL ACTIONS HINGE ON MY DECISIONS AS TO HOW  
FORCES WILL BE DISPOSED, REQUEST BY TOMORROW  
YOUR VIEWS ON MY PLAN AS SHOWN TO GENERAL  
MCCHICHEON.

PLAN FOR LOCATING FORCES WILL FACILITATE  
OBTAINING FIRM COMMITMENTS FROM I CORPS TO TAKE  
OVER KEY FACILITIES IN QDSZ.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY  
100

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THIS MSG REQUIRE ACCOUNTABILTY  
COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

SECRET

03

02

45  
①

**TOP SECRET**

VV PAC225,VV WING008,VV DIV026 TOR: 03/2155Z AUG 70  
 VV PAC225

PITAZYUW RUHFMA0280 2152049-AAAA--RUMLMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

FLC-T-CG III MAF

FLC-T-CG FIRST MAW

FLC-T-CG FIRST MARDIV

P 032049Z AUG 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

INFO RUMLMPA/CG FIRST MAW

RUMLMPA/CG FIRST MARDIV

ZEN/CG I MEF

ZEN/CG FIFTH MEB

RUMLMPA/CG FLC

BT

**TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 INFO MGEN ARMSTRONG, MGEN WIDDECKE, MGEN WILSON,  
 BGEN DWYER AND BGEN PADALINO FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE  
 CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//  
 FORCE PLANNING (U)**

A. CG III MAF 222356Z/JUL 70 (TS) (SPECAT)

B. CG FMFPAC 071801Z/JUL 70 (TS) (SPECAT)

C. CMC 061345Z/FEB 70 (TS) (SPECAT)

1. (TS) REF A PROPOSES SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR TRANSI-  
 TION FROM III MAF TO 3D MAB WHICH WAS DISCUSSED AT HQ  
 III MAF ON 14 JULY 1970 RELATIVE TO AGENDA ITEMS POSED

PAGE TWO RUHFMA0280 **TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 IN REF B.**

2. (TS) FOLLOWING COMMENTS PERTAIN:

A. MAINTAINING A SMALL 1ST MARDIV (FWD) AND 1ST  
 MAW (FWD), SUBSEQUENT TO THE REDEPLOYMENT OF 1ST MAR  
 DIV/1ST MAW "FLAGS" FROM RVN, COULD CONCEIVABLY TEND  
 TO OBSCURE THE COMMAND LINES DURING THE RELOCATION.  
 UPON REDEPLOYMENT OF 1ST MARDIV/1ST MAW, COMMAND OF  
 THOSE ELEMENTS REMAINING IN RVN SHOULD PASS TO THE  
 SENIOR MARINE COMMANDER IN RVN TO AVOID ANY IMPLICATION  
 THAT OPCON MIGHT BE EXERCISED FROM "OUT OF COUNTRY."  
 THE REQUIREMENT TO RETAIN A SMALL DIVISION AND WING  
 REAR ECHELON IS UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED. HOWEVER,  
 TO PRECLUDE ANY MISINTERPRETATION BY THE PRESS, SUGGEST  
 REMAINING ELEMENTS BE IDENTIFIED, FOR EXAMPLE, AS DET  
 HQ BN 1ST MARDIV AND DET MWNG+1, 1ST MAW.

B. CG 5TH MEB IS PRESENTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR EXECUTION  
 OF THE 82 SERIES CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR SOUTH AMERICA  
 AND CUBA. I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT THIS DESIGNATION  
 CONTINUE SO THAT ROSS DWYER WILL HAVE COMMAND AT ALL  
 TIMES OF FMFPAC FORCES AT CAMP PENDLETON UNTIL CHUCK ARRIVES.

PG 1 OF 2

032049Z AUG 70

03  
 III MAF 2100/4

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MCEO  
 49  
 TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUHKFMA0280 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 ADDITIONALLY, ROSS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO ME FOR ALL ASPECTS OF  
 DEACTIVATIONS, REDEPLOYMENTS, AND REDESIGNATIONS FOR  
 ALL UNITS RELOCATING TO CAMP PENDLETON. THEREFORE, I  
 DON'T THINK IT ADVISABLE THAT 5TH MEB BE REDESIGNATED AS  
 1ST MARDIV (REAR) OR THAT ROSS BE DUAL-HATTED AS ADC  
 1ST MARDIV (REAR). HOWEVER, TO FACILITATE RELOCATION OF  
 THE 1ST MARINE DIV, I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO DIRECT LIAISON  
 BEING ESTABLISHED BETWEEN CHUCK AND ROSS ON THOSE  
 MATTERS PERTAINING TO RELOCATION OF THE DIVISION.

C. PAR 4.B. OF REF A NOTES "INCLUSION OF THE  
 LOGISTIC ROLL-UP FORCE IN THE PROV SERV BN TO EFFECT  
 PERSONNEL ECONOMIES." BASED UPON MY RECENT BRIEFING  
 AT FLC, I AM ASSUMING THAT YOU PLAN TO HAVE THE LOGISTIC  
 SUPPORT GROUP WHICH PROVIDES LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO 3D  
 MAB AND THE LOGISTIC ROLL-UP FORCE (TITLED PROV SERV BN  
 DANANG BY APPROVAL CONTAINED IN REF C) GROUPED  
 TOGETHER UNDER PROV SERV BN DANANG TO SAVE OVERHEAD.  
 WHILE NO OBJECTION IS MADE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE  
 GROUPMENT OF THESE TWO UNITS, MY CONCERN IS THAT  
 EACH MUST REMAIN CLEARLY IDENTIFIED SINCE EACH HAS A

PAGE FOUR RUHKFMA0280 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 DIFFERENT MISSION. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0230

PG 2 OF 2

032049Z AUG 70

MCEO

SECRET

SPECAT

P 032106Z JUL 70  
FM CG MCB CAMPEN  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
INFO CMC  
CG FMFPAC  
CG III MAF  
BT

EXCLUSIVE

SECRET SPECAT MCEO EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WIDDECKE INFO  
LTGEN JONES, LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, MAJGEN E.E. ANDERSON FM  
MAJGEN ROBERTSON DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
GYSGT VOREGAS

A. YOUR 302355Z JUL 70

1. PER YOUR REQUEST OF REF A. GYSGT VOREGAS HOSPITALIZED  
30 JUL 70 DIAGNOSIS KIDNEY STONES. UNDER SEDATION PRECLUDING  
THE OBTAINING OF SWORN STATEMENT.

2. ANTICIPATE ONE WEEK DELAY IN OBTAINING REQUESTED  
STATEMENT. WILL KEEP ADVISED.

3. YOUR 302355Z JUL REFERS TO MY 290552Z SHOULD READ  
290052Z JUL 70. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

03

COPY 4 OF 4 COPIES

21

MCEO

06

3

**SECRET** "MCEO"

VV DIV 335, PAC 334

TOR: 037125Z AUG 70

ORZFCZC 035PITAZYLW RUMLLA 0316 215 795 J-AAAA --RUHHPA RUMLMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

FLC-T-MAF

FLC-T-PAC

P 03795Z AUG 70

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUMLMPA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

SECRET/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES/INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/DELIVER DURING  
WORKING HOURS

A. CG 1ST MARDIV 220101Z JUL 70 (SPECAT)

B. CG III MAF 22235Z JUL 70 (SPECAT)

1. (S) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO INFORM YOU OF THE  
CURRENT PLANS FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE DIVISION'S HEADQUARTERS  
BATTALION, HOW THESE PLANS ADVERSELY IMPACT ON THE DIVISION'S  
COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITIES, AND TO DISCUSS WHAT IS PLANNED  
TO DO ABOUT IT. THESE MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED WITH LTGEN  
MCCUTCHEON PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE AND HE GAVE HIS GENERAL APPROVAL  
TO THE APPROACH OUTLINED HEREIN.

2. (S) AS BACKGROUND INFORMATION, THE 1 JULY AUTHORIZED ALLOW-  
ANCE OF THE DIVISION, INCLUDING OUT OF COUNTRY NONEFFECTIVE  
ALLOWANCE (OCNE), IS 1,132 OFFICERS AND 23,835 ENLISTED, FOR A

PAGE TWO RUMLLA 0316 SECRET SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/  
TOTAL OF 25,027. ON 15 OCTOBER 1970, THE TOTAL AUTHORIZED  
ALLOWANCE, INCLUDING OCNE, WILL BE 644 OFFICERS AND 11,172  
ENLISTED, FOR A TOTAL OF 11,816. FURTHER, THE CURRENT MANNING  
LEVEL OF HEADQUARTERS BATTALION IS 239 OFFICERS AND 1,273 ENLISTED,  
FOR A TOTAL OF 1,432. THE ACTUAL ON-ROLLS STRENGTH TOTALS 1,398.  
THIS OVERAGE OF 416 IS PRIMARILY RELATED TO THE SCAMP PLATOON  
AND VALID REQUIREMENTS IN COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS  
FUNCTIONS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT FIELDS SUCH AS LOCAL SECURITY AND  
THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE'S ACTIVITIES. IN THIS REGARD, AS SET  
FORTH IN REFERENCE A, STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO REDUCE ALL HEAD-  
QUARTERS UNITS TO THEIR ABSOLUTE HARD-CORE REQUIREMENTS.

3. (S) CURRENT REDEPLOYMENT DIRECTIVES/PLANS PROVIDE FOR A DRAW-  
DOWN ON HEADQUARTERS BATTALION AS FOLLOWS:

A. FIRST ELEMENT: DEPARTING ABOUT 19 AUGUST, RESULTING IN  
A MANNING LEVEL TOTALING 1,315 AND AN ON-ROLLS STRENGTH OF 1,231.

B. SECOND ELEMENT: DEPARTING ABOUT 26 SEPTEMBER, RESULTING  
IN A MANNING LEVEL OF 514, INCLUDING 26 IN THE SCAMP PLATOON.  
THIS FIGURE OF 514 REPRESENTS APPROXIMATELY 35 PERCENT OF THE  
ORIGINAL MANNING LEVEL OR 27 PERCENT OF THE 1 JULY ON-ROLL  
STRENGTH.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

COPY 4 OF 4 COPIES

"MCEO"

FMFPAC-GE 2200/3 (3/)  
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03

09

50 SECRET

4

SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE THREE RUMLLA 3316 SECRET SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/

4. (S) IN REVIEWING HOW SUCH DRASTIC REDUCTIONS WERE PLANNED, I FIND THAT THEY WERE PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF THE FOLLOWING:

A. AN INITIAL REQUIREMENT TO REACH A DIVISION WIDE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH, INCLUDING COCNE, OF 11,816 BY 15 OCTOBER.

B. A REQUIREMENT/DESIRE TO RETAIN WITHIN THE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AS MANY TACTICAL UNITS AS POSSIBLE, AS EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT THE ENGINEER CAPABILITY HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED THIS MONTH.

C. A CHANGE IN REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPT FOR MARINE FORCES. ORIGINAL PLANNING PROVIDED FOR A REDUCTION TO A MAB SIZE FORCE IN ONE INCREMENT ON 15 OCTOBER (INCREMENT 4). HOWEVER, THIS WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGED TO SPREAD THE REDUCTION OVER THE PERIOD 15 OCTOBER - 1 JANUARY (INCREMENTS 4 AND 5). THE RETENTION OF AN ADDITIONAL RLT AND MAJOR AVIATION UNITS BEYOND 15 OCTOBER WHILE REMAINING WITHIN STRINGENT CEILINGS PRECLUDED RETENTION OF ALL BUT A MINIMAL HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT.

5. (S) IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THE PLANNING FACTORS DISCUSSED ABOVE ARE VALID. HOWEVER, AS CITED ABOVE, THE SITUATION HAS NOT DEVELOPED AS INITIALLY CONCEIVED. AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCE B, THE BRIGADE WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR GROUND AND AIR OPERA-

PAGE FOUR RUMLLA 3316 SECRET SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/

TIONS ON "ABOUT 15 NOVEMBER 1970" AS OPPOSED TO "EARLY THIS SUMMER" AS ORIGINALLY BELIEVED DURING THE PLANNING STAGE. INSOFAR AS CAN BE DETERMINED NOW, THE DIVISION'S TAOR, ITS TASKS, AND ITS OVERALL FUNCTIONS WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY ANY SIGNIFICANT DEGREE UNTIL THE BRIGADE ACTUALLY ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS; THE ARVN/VIETNAMESE MARINE BRIGADE, UNDER CURRENT PLANS, WILL NOT ASSUME A TAOR UPON THE STAND-DOWN AND SUBSEQUENT DEPARTURE OF RLT-7. TO THE CONTRARY, THESE UNITS WILL MERELY BE LOCATED IN THE AREA OF THE 5TH MARINES AND 7TH MARINES, TAKING OVER SOME OF THEIR FACILITIES, BUT NOT THEIR TAORS.

6. (S) IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE ABOVE, THE TWO-MONTHS PERIOD OF 15 SEPTEMBER, WHEN THE SECOND ELEMENT OF HEADQUARTERS BATTALION STANDS DOWN, TO 15 NOVEMBER IS CRITICAL IN THAT THE DIVISION'S FUNDAMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES WILL REMAIN ESSENTIALLY THE SAME, BUT WITH INADEQUATE, OR, AT BEST, MARGINAL, COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES.

7. (S) ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS THAT, TO DATE, NO DEFINITE WORD HAS BEEN PROMULGATED RELATIVE TO THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE DIVISION (-) SUBSEQUENT TO 15 OCTOBER. AS A RESULT, IT IS MANDATORY THAT WE RETAIN AN ADEQUATE COMMAND AND CONTROL MECHANISM BEYOND THAT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

"MCEO"

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE FIVE RUMLLCA 0316 SECRET SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/  
DATE.

8. (S) DURING THE PERIOD 15 SEPTEMBER - 15 NOVEMBER, DIVISION HEADQUARTERS WILL HAVE A REQUIREMENT FOR A TOTAL OF 832 OFFICERS AND MEN VERSUS A MANNING LEVEL OF 514. TO MEET THE 832 ACTUAL STRENGTH REQUIREMENT, IT IS PLANNED TO USE THE FOLLOWING RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE DIVISION WITHOUT ANY REQUIREMENT TO REQUEST CHANGES IN MANNING LEVELS OR REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULES:

MANNING LEVEL:	483
MANNING LEVEL SCAMP PLATOON:	26
COCKE ALLOWANCE:	132
OTHER PERSONNEL WITHIN APPROVED AND ACTUAL DIVISION STRENGTH:	136
TOTAL:	832

THE 176 PERSONNEL CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE AUTHORIZED CEILINGS OF THE DIVISION AND FROM THE PERSONNEL ACTUALLY ASSIGNED WITH ONLY SLIGHT DETRIMENT TO OTHER DIVISION UNITS, AS THIS REPRESENTS LESS THAN TWO PERCENT OF THE TOTAL DIVISION AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AND ACTUAL PERSONNEL WHO WILL BE AVAILABLE.

9. (S) I SINCERELY BELIEVE THAT THE ABOVE APPROACH IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED. THE DIVISION CAN CONTINUE TO

PAGE SIX RUMLLCA 0316 SECRET SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/  
PERFORM ITS CURRENT MISSION WITHOUT RESORTING TO MARGINAL CAPABILITIES. NO REQUESTED CHANGES IN THE REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITS OR SHIPPING SCHEDULES ARE INVOLVED; NO REDUCTIONS IN TAORS OR TASKS ARE REQUIRED. IN BRIEF, BY MAKING THESE ADJUSTMENTS WITHIN AUTHORIZED CEILINGS, THE DIVISION WILL HAVE A HEADQUARTERS WHICH IS STILL ALSTERE BUT YET ADEQUATELY STRUCTURED AND MANNED FOR THE TASK AT HAND.

GP-4

BT

0316

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

"MCEO"

SECRET

(4)

MCEO

SECRET

SPECAT

M  
 PTIAZYUW RUMHFNAGG16 2172207-AAAA--RUMLMFA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 RUMLMFA -I- CG FIRST MARDIV  
 P 052207Z AUG 79  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMLMFA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 INFO RUMLMFA/CG III MAF  
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WIDDECKE,  
 INFO LTJEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTJEN JONES. MARINE CORPS  
 EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//  
 REALIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL OF HQ BN

- A. CG FIRST MARDIV 030950Z AUG79 (S) (MCEO)
- (S) I CONCUR IN THE RATIONALE PRESENTED IN REFERENCE  
 A AS TO THE NEED FOR AN ADEQUATELY STAFFED COMMAND  
 AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION FOR THE DIVISION AFTER  
 COMPLETION OF THE CURRENT WITHDRAWAL INCREMENT. THE  
 PLAN YOU PROPOSE APPEARS WORKABLE.
  - (S) IN FURTHERANCE OF OUR MUTUAL CONCERN, IMPLEMENTA-  
 TION OF SUCH A PLAN MUST HAVE MINIMAL EFFECT ON THE  
 NECESSARY STAFFING OF RIFLE COMPANIES AS NEAR MANNING  
 LEVEL AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT  
 0616

SPECAT

SECRET

NNNN

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

*Copy 4 of 4*

22

MCF 07 (5)

LTCGRLA19DA713AB122

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ZZ YARLKG

DE YSOXGL 8001 2180257

ZNY MMHSH

Z 800100Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1

FM LTR SUTHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DNG RVN  
TO LTR MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DNG RVN

MG MILLOY CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN

SG BERRY ACT CG 181ST ABN DIV (AMBL) CEE RVN

ZEN/SG HILL CG, 101ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) QTR RVN

ZEN/SG JACKSON DSA I CORPS DNG RVN

ZEN/MR FIRFER DEP CORDS, I MR DNG RVN

ZEM

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: APPRAISAL OF ALLIED EFFORT IN SVN (C)

1. (TS) AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SVN IS BEING CONDUCTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINATION OF REDEPLOYMENTS DURING THE OCT-DEC PERIOD AND TO ASSIST IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE ULTIMATE COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION OF THE TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT FORCE. IT IS ESSENTIAL THEREFORE THAT THE ASSESSMENT BE COMPREHENSIVE.

2. (TS) YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THE COMPILATION OF DATA FOR THE ASSESSMENT IS SOLICITED. SPECIFICALLY DESIRED ARE YOUR VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO THE FOLLOWING AS APPROPRIATE TO YOUR GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY:

A. APPRAISAL OF VIETNAMESE AND FVMAF MILITARY AND VIETNAMESE PARAMILITARY PERFORMANCE, AND PROGRESS IN PACIFICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT.

B. APPRAISAL OF US ADVISORY EFFORTS.

C. ATTITUDE OF THE VIETNAMESE POPULACE (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) TOWARDS VIETNAMIZATION AND THE GVN.

D. CRITICAL PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAMIZATION.

E. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT THEM.

F. US UNITS (BRIGADE SIZE) THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY REDEPLOYMENT DURING THE TIME PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION.

3. (S) REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS INCLUDE AN APPRAISAL OF THE EFFECTS AND BENEFITS OF THE CAMBODIAN CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS AND CURRENT SUMMERSOONS.

4. (U) REQUEST RECEIPT OF YOUR VIEWS ON THE FOREGOING AND ON ANY RELATED ISSUES BY 8 AUGUST. GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

360

8001

06

02

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

VV PAC228  
 RTIAZYUW RUEOFIA2030 2182215-AAAA--RUHFMA RUMLMPA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 R 062215Z AUG 70  
 FM CMC

06 AUG 70 2312Z

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 INFO RUMLMPA/CG THIRD MAF  
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 FOR LTGEN JONES, INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, FROM LTGEN VAN RYZIN  
 FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. PHONECON LTGEN JONES/LTGEN VAN RYZIN 5 AUG 70  
 B. JCS 042349Z AUG 70 (NOTAL)

1. (U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR REQUEST IN REF A, FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS PROVIDE THE INFORMATION REQUESTED.
2. (TS) REF B REQUESTED CINCPAC COMMENTS ON ARMY MANPOWER SHORTFALLS TO SUPPORT JCS ALTERNATIVES A AND B, AND THE FEASIBILITY AND IMPACT, IN-COUNTRY AND IN-PACOM, OF DELAYING TO 1 JUN-30 JUN 71, THE MARINE REDEPLOYMENT OF 12.6K NOW SCHEDULED FOR 1-30 APR 71.
3. (TS) IN DEVELOPING THE JCS PAPER, NOW IN THE BUFF STAGE, FOUR ALTERNATIVES WERE CONSIDERED INCLUDING THE RETENTION OF 12.6K TIL 1-30 JUN 71. THE JOINT STAFF WAS INFORMED ONLY THAT SEVERE PERSONNEL TURBULENCE AND REDUCED READINESS IN MARINE

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA2030 T O P S E C R E T  
 CORPS UNITS ELSEWHERE PRECLUDED ACCEPTANCE OF THE DELAYED REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 12.6K. WE DID NOT PROVIDE THE JOINT STAFF OR OTHER SERVICES WITH THE BASIS FOR THIS REASONING WHICH THE STAFF PROVIDED AS FOLLOWS:

- A. IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN DELAYED REDEPLOYMENT OF THE MAB, ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED:
- (1) INCREASE RECRUIT INPUT BY 3,000 TO 5,000 IN THE SEPTEMBER-FEBRUARY TIME FRAME. IF SUFFICIENT VOLUNTEERS CAN BE OBTAINED.
  - (2) MODIFY PLANNED EARLY RELEASE, DELETING CERTAIN SKILLS FROM THE PROGRAM, AND:
    - (A) DEPLOY SOME MARINES IN SPECIFIC SKILLS TO WESTPAC WITH AS LITTLE AS FOUR MONTHS TO EAS.
    - (B) RETURN SOME MARINES IN SPECIFIC SKILLS TO WESTPAC WITH AS LITTLE AS 12 MONTHS SINCE COMPLETION OF THEIR LAST TOUR.
    - (3) DRAW DOWN MANNING LEVELS OF NON-RUN UNITS IN WESTPAC.
    - (4) DEGRADE CONUS MANNING LEVELS IN CERTAIN SKILLS.
- B. OTHER ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO PROVIDE THE

PG 1 OF 2

062215Z AUG 70

06 III MAR 100/1

COPY 2 OF 22 COPIES

"MCEO"  
TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**PAGE THREE RUEOFIA2030 **T O P S E C R E T**NEEDED DEPLOYABLES ARE: (A) *EXTEND LT HAMILTON FOR DURATION, AND*

(1) CHANGE DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA IN PHASE IV DEPLOYMENTS NOW UNDERWAY AND/OR IN THE PLANNED DECEMBER REDEPLOYMENTS IN ORDER TO PRESERVE MORE DEPLOYABLES IN UNITS REMAINING IN RVN; SPECIFICALLY, ATTEMPT TO CONFIGURE THE LAST MAB WITH JUNE 1971 AND LATER RTD'S. THIS WILL RESULT IN A FURTHER DEGRADATION IN CONUS FMF UNITS THROUGH END FY 71.

(2) EXTEND WESTPAC TOURS FOR ALL PERSONNEL IN THE MAB, UNTIL COMPLETION OF ITS REDEPLOYMENT.

(3) EXTEND WESTPAC TOUR LENGTH TO 13 MONTHS OR 1 APRIL 1971, EFFECTING A ONE TIME, ONE-MONTH SAVING OF DEPLOYABLES.

4. (IS) AS THE JCS PAPER NOW STANDS, TWO ALTERNATIVE PLANS ARE PROPOSED TO THE SECDEF. BOTH OF THESE PLANS INCLUDE MARINE REDEPLOYMENTS AS PRESENTLY SCHEDULED. THE DELAYED DEPLOYMENT OF 12.6K HAS BEEN DISCARDED FROM THE PAPER. THEREFORE, SUGGEST YOU REPLY TO CINCPAC IN THE SAME LANGUAGE WE GAVE JOINT STAFF, I.E., THAT THE DELAYED DEPLOYMENT OF THE 12.6K FORCE WOULD CAUSE SEVERE PERSONNEL TURBULENCE, REDUCED READINESS IN MARINE CORPS UNITS ELSEWHERE IN PACOM AND CONUS, AS WELL AS ATTENDANT COST INCREASES.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2030

PG 2 OF 2

062215Z AUG 70

**TOP SECRET**

VV PAC 230  
 RTIAZYUW RUHFMA0736 2190151-AAAA--RUMMPA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 RUMMPA -T- CG III MAF  
 R 070151Z AUG 70  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMMPA/CG III MAF  
 BT

**T O P S E C R E T.** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJ GEN ARMSTRONG  
 FROM LT GEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER  
 DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//  
 FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. ADMIN III MAF 061544Z AUG 70 (TS) (SPECAT) MCEO  
 1. (U) I APPRECIATE RECEIVING THE INFORMATION YOU  
 PROVIDED IN REF A RELATIVE TO YOUR ACTION OFFICERS'  
 VISIT TO MACV-13. THE INFORMATION IS MOST HELPFUL  
 TO US.  
 2. (TS) THE NEW REDEPLOYMENT ALTERNATIVES WILL BE  
 DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. WILL KEEP YOU  
 ADVISED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0736

070151Z AUG 70

III MAR 21 1974

COPY 1 OF 1 COPIES

**TOP SECRET**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PTTCZYUW RUHJSPA0767 7190614-CCCC--RUPLFA.  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 070614Z AUG 70  
FM COMSEVENTHFLT  
TO RUHLMPA/III NAF  
BT

7 Aug 70 00 14z

(5)

C O N F I D E N T I A L //NO0000//

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM WEISNER

1. THE RECENT VISIT OF HQCM REED WAS MOST SUCCESSFUL AND REWARDING. PLEASE EXTEND MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION TO HIM FOR A JOB WELL DONE.
2. IT HAS COME TO MY ATTENTION THAT CHIEF REED WILL BE DETACHED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IT IS MY HOPE TO BE ABLE TO ADD HIM TO MY STAFF TO CONTINUE A DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION PROGRAM WITHIN THE SEVENTH FLEET.
3. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT VERY MUCH IF YOU WOULD SEND CHIEF REED TAD AT MY EXPENSE TO YOKOSUKA TO ARRIVE 12 AUG FOR AN INTERVIEW WITH ME PERSONALLY. IT IS REALIZED THAT CHIEF REED IS COMPLETING AN UN-ACCOMPANIED TOUR. IF YOU SU ANY GREAT DIFFICULTY OR OBSTACLES IN ACCOMPLISHING THIS TRANSFER, YOUR VIEWS WOULD BE APPRECIATED.
4. YOUR CONTRIBUTION OF CHIEF REED'S SERVICES TO PERMIT US THIS TRIAL EVALUATION WAS GREATLY APPRECIATED. ALL BEST WISHES.

GP-4

BT

#0767

NNNN

IN 04259/219-70

/ACK

070614Z aug 70

3 83

07

06

14

FMFPAC GEN 2100/1 (3 69)  
0101-104-8601

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(9)

TOP SECRET

P 082214Z AUG 70  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUECFIA/CMC  
 INFO RUMLNPA/CG III MAF

BT

TOP SECRET. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN,  
 INFO LT GEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LT GEN JONES. MARINE  
 CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

//NO0000//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG III MAF 010827Z AUG 70 (TS) (SPECAT)

B. CG FMFPAC 250425Z JUL 70 (TS) (SPECAT)

C. CG FMFPAC 070058Z/AUG 70 (TS) (SPECAT) (PASEP)

1. (TS) AT PRESENT 3D MAB HAS NOT YET BEEN ASSIGNED A  
 MISSION BY CG XXIV CORPS. THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS  
 FROM XXIV CORPS, HOWEVER, THAT 3D MAB WILL REMAIN IN  
 THE DANANG VITAL AREA AND BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS  
 SECURITY TO INCLUDE THE ROCKET BELT.

2. (TS) TO MEET THIS BASICALLY DEFENSIVE MISSION, III MAF  
 NOW EMPLOYS FOUR INFANTRY BATTALIONS (I.E., 1/1, 2/1,

PAGE TWO RUMLNPA1080 TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MCE0  
 3/1, AND 1/5), THE 1ST MP BN, AND LOCAL SECURITY FORCES.  
 ABOUT 15,000 PERSONNEL WHO PRESENTLY CONTRIBUTE TO  
 LOCAL SECURITY WILL HAVE DEPARTED BY 31 DEC 70 ALONG  
 WITH THE 1ST MP BN AND 1/5, LEAVING 3D MAB WITH ONLY  
 THREE INFANTRY BATTALIONS OF THE 1ST MARINES.

3. (TS) AS A CONSEQUENCE, KEITH IS VERY MUCH CONCERNED,  
 AS AM I, ABOUT THE CAPABILITY OF 3D MAB TO PERFORM THE  
 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS HE ANTICIPATES WILL ULTIMATELY BE  
 LEVIED BY XXIV CORPS.

4. (TS) TO THIS END, KEITH HAS PROPOSED A REORGANIZATION  
 OF 3D MAB WHICH WILL "BEEF UP" THE INFANTRY STRENGTH.  
 SPECIFICALLY, HIS PROPOSAL WOULD:

A. RETAIN AN ADDITIONAL INFANTRY BATTALION GIVING  
 3D MAB A TOTAL OF FOUR.

B. DELETE THE FOLLOWING TO ACCOMMODATE RETENTION  
 OF AN ADDITIONAL INFANTRY BATTALION WITHIN THE  
 CONSTRAINT OF 10.8K:

(1) 3D 8" HOW BTRY, 1ST 175MM GUN BTRY, CO C  
 (REIN), 1ST TANK BATTALION, AND EITHER VMA-311 OR VMA (AW)-  
 225 ALL OF WHICH ARE NOT CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO THE SECURITY

PG 1 OF 3

082214Z AUG 70

III MAF 21

COPY 2 OF 22 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHFM1080 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
MISSION. ATTENDANT TO DELETION OF A FIXED WING  
SQUADRON (EITHER THE A-4 OR A-6) WILL BE CONCOMITANT  
REDUCTIONS IN ITS SHARE OF HAMS, MABS, AND HQ MAG-11.  
TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF FORCE ARTILLERY, THE 12  
UNMANNED TOWED 155MM HOWITZERS NOW CARRIED IN HQ  
BTRY, 11TH MARINES, WILL BE RETAINED.

(2) TWO HUNDRED (200) SPACES IN THE .6K CAG  
REDUCING THE CAG TO .4K. THE 200 CAG SPACES RECOVERED  
WILL BE RETAINED AS CUPPS SO NO DEGRADATION IN THIS  
PROGRAM WILL OCCUR.

5. (TS) KEITH POINTS OUT THAT INFORMAL LIAISON WITH XXIV  
CORPS AND 7TH AIR FORCE PLUS MACV'S REQUEST TO DELETE  
THE AVIATION UNITS FROM THE INCREMENT 4 TROOP LIST  
INDICATE THAT RETENTION OF FIXED WING AIRCRAFT IN 3D MAB  
MIGHT BE FAVORED. HOWEVER, HE CONSIDERS IT PROPITIOUS  
TO PROPOSE THE REORGANIZED MAB (NOTED ABOVE) BECAUSE IT  
CAN PERFORM THE MISSION ANTICIPATED, AND ALSO BECAUSE  
IT WILL SERVE TO FORCE A DECISION ON THE LONG OVERDUE  
ASSIGNMENT OF A MISSION TO 3D MAB.

6. (TS) I CONCUR IN KEITH'S COURSE OF ACTION AS WELL AS

PAGE FOUR RUMHFM1080 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
IN HIS PROPOSED REORGANIZATION. ALSO, I INTEND TO  
CONCUR IN HIS DECISION WHEN MADE AS TO RETENTION OF  
EITHER THE A-4 OR A-6 SQUADRON SHOULD THAT BECOME  
NECESSARY. HOWEVER, I DO THINK IT POSSIBLE THAT  
COMUSMACV, BECAUSE OF THE PAUCITY OF FIXED WING  
ASSETS WHICH WILL EXIST IN MR 1 AFTER 31 DEC 70, MIGHT  
AGREE TO THE ADDITION OF ANOTHER INFANTRY BATTALION TO  
3D MAB IN ADDITION TO RETENTION OF THE A-4 AND A-6  
SQUADRONS. THIS WOULD RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN THE  
10.8K PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED FOR 3D MAB WITH OTHER  
SERVICES MAKING UP THE DEFICIT. THIS, OF COURSE, IS BASED  
ON THE PREMISE THAT XXIV CORPS WILL BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE  
THE INFANTRY UNITS SO THAT A FOURTH BATTALION IN 3D MAB  
IS IN FACT NECESSARY.

7. (TS) A BALANCED AIR-GROUND TEAM REPRESENTED BY 3D  
MAB AFTER 31 DEC 1970 CONTINUES TO BE OF CONCERN TO ME.  
THERE IS STILL NO SCHEDULED REDEPLOYMENT DATE FOR  
VMFA-314 AND HMN-262 WHICH COMUSMACV REQUESTED BE  
DELETED FROM THE INCREMENT 4 TROOP LIST AT THE EXPENSE OF  
OTHER SERVICE SPACES. WE ARE ASSUMING THAT THESE UNITS

PG 2 OF 3

082214Z AUG 70

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMFMA10886 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC  
 WILL LEAVE BETWEEN 16 OCT AND 31 DEC 1970 (AS NOTED IN  
 REF B); HOWEVER, SINCE INCREMENT 5 REDEPLOYMENTS HAVE  
 NOT YET BEEN ADDRESSED, THIS ASSUMPTION REMAINS  
 SPECULATIVE. SHOULD MACV PRESS FOR RETENTION OF  
 VMFA-314 AND HMM-262 AS WELL AS THE TWO FIXED WING  
 SQUADRONS PRESENTLY STRUCTURED AS PART OF 3D MAB IN THE  
 POST 31 DEC 1970 TIME PERIOD, THEN AN AIR-GROUND  
 IMBALANCE WOULD EXIST WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A RECLAMA.  
 THIS, OF COURSE, PRESUPPOSES THAT REF (C) AND ITS  
 REFERENCED TRAFFIC DOES NOT PREVAIL, AND THERE ARE NO  
 DELAYS IN SCHEDULED REDEPLOYMENTS. APPARENTLY, THE  
 SITUATION WHICH GENERATED REF (C) WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR  
 KEITH TO STRUCTURE HIS MAB TO MEET THE MISSION THROUGH  
 ADD-ONS RATHER THAN TRADE-OFFS BUT IT DOES PRESENT MAN-  
 POWER AND BUDGETARY TURBULENCE BY KEEPING UNPRO-  
 GRAMMED UNITS IN COUNTRY.  
 S. (U) I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS CONCERNING  
 THE ABOVE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

10886

PG 3 OF 3

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

282214Z AUG 70

TOP SECRET

III MAF 2100/4

TOP SECRET  
SPECAT

PTTZYUW RUHHFMAI159 221220Z-AAAA--RUMLMPA.  
RUMLMPA -T- CG III MAF  
ZNY AAAAA  
P 092202Z AUG 70  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF  
BT

"MCEO"

"EXCLUSIVE"

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
FROM LTGEN JONES, MARINE CORPS, EYES ONLY, DELIVER  
DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//

REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF (CINCPAC 070347Z/AUG 70)  
TO JCS, INFO COMUSMACV, CINCSARPAC, CINCPACFLT,  
CINCPACAF AND CGFMFPAC WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR  
INFORMATION.

QUOTE:

REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

- A. JCSM 266-70 OF 2 JUN 1970
- B. JCS 6652/042349Z AUG 70
- C. JCS 6709/052102Z AUG 70
- D. COMUSMACV 1398/061445Z AUG 70

1. (IS) REF A FORWARDED TO THE SECDEF TWO ALTERNATIVES FOR  
REDUCING U.S. AUTHORIZED SPACES IN RVN BY 150,000 BY 1 MAY

PAGE TWO RUHHFMAI159 TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
1971. REF B REQUESTED CINCPAC COMMENTS ON A COURSE OF ACTION  
SIMILAR TO ALTERNATIVE B OF REF A, AND ON THE FEASIBILITY OF  
DELAYING UNTIL 1-30 JUN 71 12,600 USMC SPACES NOW SCHEDULED  
FOR REDEPLOYMENT 1-30 APRIL 71. REF C AMPLIFIES AIR SORTIE  
GUIDANCE OF REF B. REF D IS COMUSMACV'S RESPONSE TO REF B AND C.  
2. (IS) GENERAL. CINCPAC COMMENTS ON ALTERNATIVES A AND B  
CONTAINED IN APPENDIX C, REF A REMAIN VALID. SINCE THE  
BUDGET AND MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS CITED IN REF B APPARENTLY  
WILL PRECLUDE THE ADOPTION OF ALTERNATIVE A, THIS MESSAGE  
PROPOSES AN ALTERNATIVE C AND FORWARDS ADDITIONAL COMMENTS  
ON ALTERNATIVE B.  
3. (IS) ALTERNATIVE C PROPOSED: BELOW IS A MODIFICATION OF  
JCS ALTERNATIVE B AND PROVIDES FOR A 50-40-60 PACKAGE.  
UNDER THIS PLAN 40.0 THOUSAND SPACES WOULD BE REDEPLOYED  
DURING THE PERIOD 15 OCTOBER - 31 DECEMBER 70 FOLLOWING THE  
CURRENT 50.0 THOUSAND INCREMENT TO BE COMPLETED BY 15 OCT  
70. THE REMAINING 60.0 THOUSAND SPACES WOULD BE REDEPLOYED  
DURING THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY - 1 MAY 71. THIS PLAN HAS THE  
ADVANTAGE OVER ALTERNATIVE B OF RETAINING MAXIMUM COMBAT  
POWER FOR A LONGER PERIOD, WHILE CONCURRENTLY REDUCING ARMY

SPECAT

09 III MAF 21/74

COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"MCFO"  
"EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1159 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
SPACES, THEREBY ALLEVIATING THE MANPOWER PROBLEM TO SOME  
DEGREE.

SERVICE	REDEPLOYMENT SPACES (THOUSANDS)	FORCES REMAINING (THOUSANDS)
1 JUL - 15 OCT 70		
USA	18.18	291.4
USN	8.8	19.3
USAF	4.5	49.3
USMC	18.6	24.0
TOTALS	50.0	384.0
15 OCT - 31 DEC 70		
USA	38.1	253.3
USN	1.3	18.0
USAF	0.6	43.7
USMC	0.0	24.0
TOTALS	40.0	344.0
1 JAN - 1 MAY 71		
USA	43.0	210.3
USN	6.0	12.0
USAF	0.2	48.5

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA1159 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

USMC	10.8	13.2
TOTALS	60.0	284.0
1 MAY - 30 JUN 71		
USA	9.9	200.4
USN	0.4	11.6
USAF	0.0	48.5
USMC	12.6	0.6
TOTALS	22.9	261.1

SPECAT

THIS FIGURE INCLUDES THE 2900 SPACES HELD, PENDING  
RESOLUTION OF AIR ACTIVITY LEVEL.

4. (TS) IMPACTS AND RISKS OF ADOPTING ALTERNATIVES B OR C  
A. ACCELERATED REDUCTION OF COMBAT FORCES WILL REDUCE  
THE FLEXIBILITY OF COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD AND REQUIRE  
EARLY RE-DISPOSITION OF RVNAF TO SECURE THE POPULATION IN  
THOSE AREAS FROM WHICH U.S. FORCES HAVE BEEN REDEPLOYED.  
THIS MAY NECESSARILY REQUIRE A REDUCTION OF RVNAF OPERATINGS  
IN CAMBODIA, PROVIDING THE ENEMY WITH A GREATER CAPABILITY  
FOR RECONSTITUTING HIS SANCTUARIES AND RESULTING IN AN INCREASED  
THREAT TO VIETNAMIZATION AND TO CAMBODIA IN THE LONGER TERM.  
B. ACCELERATED REDEPLOYMENTS WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"MCEO"

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA 1159 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 PROGRESS IN VIETNAMIZATION BY REQUIRING THE RVNAF TO  
 ASSUME RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROSECUTION OF THE WAR  
 AT A RATE GREATER THAN PLANNED FOR UNDER ALTERNATIVE A.  
 C. INHERENT IN BOTH ALTERNATIVES IS A REDUCTION IN  
 THE SORTIE RATE. THERE WILL BE SERIOUS CUMULATIVE EFFECTS  
 OF REDUCING OUR AIR CAPABILITY, AND ACCELERATING REDEPLOY-  
 MENTS OF COMBAT FORCES AT A TIME WHEN REQUIREMENTS HAVE  
 BEEN INCREASED BY VIRTUE OF OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA. BY  
 THINNING OUT RESOURCES AT TOO RAPID A RATE, AND AT A TIME  
 WHEN REDUCTIONS IN USAF TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN THAILAND ARE  
 ANTICIPATED, THE ENEMY WILL BE AFFORDED MORE OPPORTUNITIES  
 FOR INITIATIVES IN RVN AND CAMBODIA.

D. LOGISTICS. EITHER ALTERNATIVE B OR C CAN BE  
 SUPPORTED LOGISTICALLY; HOWEVER, SOME PROBLEMS ARE  
 ANTICIPATED IN THE LOC CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM AND IN THE  
 TRANSFER OF FACILITIES. DETAILED IMPACT STATEMENTS ON THE  
 LOC CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM IN RESPONSE TO SECDEF 221544Z JUL  
 70 AND JCS 23723Z JUL 70 WILL BE PROVIDED ON 13 AUG 70.  
 THE TIME ESTIMATES CONTAINED IN PARA 9 REF D FOR  
 TRANSFERRING FACILITIES AND TRAINING ARVN PERSONNEL APPEAR

PAGE SIX RUHHFMA 1159 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 EXTREMELY OPTIMISTIC IN VIEW OF THE INDEFINITE ARVN  
 STATIONING PLANS.

5. (TS) DELAY OF USMC REDEPLOYMENTS IS FEASIBLE, ALTHOUGH  
 SOME DEGRADATION OF ARG/SLF REACTION TIME IS ANTICIPATED.  
 THE MOVEMENT OF 12,633 SPACES DURING THE 33-DAY PERIOD  
 1-31 JUN 71 (AS PROPOSED IN REF B) WILL SEVERELY TAX LOAD-  
 ING FACILITIES; THEREFORE CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO  
 EXTENDING THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THESE SPACES OVER THE PERIOD  
 15 APR - 30 JUN 71.

6. (TS) CONCLUSIONS:

A. THE ADOPTION OF EITHER ALTERNATIVE B OR C WILL  
 INVOLVE SIGNIFICANT RISKS, AND WILL IMPACT ADVERSELY ON  
 PROGRESS IN VIETNAMIZATION.

B. ALTERNATIVE C (PARA 3 ABOVE) IS RESPONSIVE TO THE  
 GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REF 3.

7. (U) IF SELECTION OF COURSE OF ACTION IS LIMITED TO  
 ALTERNATIVES B AND C, RECOMMEND THAT ALTERNATIVE C BE  
 ADOPTED.

UNQUOTE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1159

SPECAT

P. 180925Z ZFF-1

FM HQ BROWN DEPDIR FOR OPNS J-3 HQ USEDCOM STUTTGART  
GERMANY

TO LGEN K B MCCUTCHEON CG IITNAT (DANANG) FPO SANFRAN  
ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O VNN2697 EYES ONLY

HAPPY BIRTHDAY!! KEPT THINKING I'D BE OUT TO JOIN YOU  
SOON, BUT NOW LOOKS LIKE ALL THE GOOD JOBS HAVE BEEN SEVED  
UP.

I'LL BE RELIEVED HERE ABOUT 23 SEPTEMBER AND REPORT TO  
EL TORO ABOUT 28 OCT.

HOPE YOU FIND TIME TO CELEBRATE YOUR BIRTHDAY.  
WARMEST REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

100

8083

NNNN

UNCLAS/EFTO

10

09

25 (12)

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

PTTZYUW RUHFMA1340 2232035-TTTT--RUMLMPA.

ZNY TTTT

P 112035Z AUG 70

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN MCCUTCHEON  
FROM LIGEN JONES MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER  
DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//

REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF (COMUSMACV 091032Z/AUG  
70) TO CINCPAC INFO JCS, CINCSARPAC, CINCPACFLT,  
CINCPACAF AND CG FMFPAC, WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR  
INFORMATION. PLEASE PROTECT SOURCE.

QUOTE:

SUBJECT: REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

REF: A. JCS 266-70, 2 JUN 1970 (TS)

B. JCS 6652/042349Z AUG 70 (TS)

C. MACV 39535/061445Z AUG 70 (TS)

D. CINCPAC 070347Z AUG 70 (TS)

E. JCS 6993/081807Z AUG 70 (TS)

F. CINCPAC 032112Z AUG 70 (U)

SPECAT

PAGE 2 RUHFMA 1340 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

1. (TS) REF A FORWARDED TO SECDEF ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR  
REDUCING 150,000 US PERSONNEL SPACES IN RVN BY 1 MAY 1971. REF B  
REQUESTED CINCPAC COMMENTS ON A COURSE OF ACTION SIMILAR TO  
ALTERNATIVE B OF REF A. REF C PROVIDED ADDITIONAL MACV COMMENTS  
ON JCS ALTERNATIVE B AND PROPOSED AN ALTERNATIVE C IN LIEU  
THEREOF. REF D PROVIDED CINCPAC COMMENTS ON JCS ALTERNATIVE B  
AND SUPPORTED THE MACV PROPOSAL. REF E REQUESTED CONCURRENCE OR  
COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAL THAT 2900 USAF SPACES BE SUBSTITUTED FOR  
ARMY SPACES IN INCREMENT 4 AND REQUESTS MACV POSITION ON ALTERNA-  
TIVE B MODIFIED TO CONSIST OF THREE INCREMENTS OF ABOUT 50,000  
EACH SHOULD SUFFICIENT ARMY PERSONNEL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO  
SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL. REF F REQUESTS REPLY TO ARRIVE MLT 090800W  
AUG 70.

2. (TS) A REDUCTION IN AIR ACTIVITY LEVEL BELOW THAT CONSIDERED  
ESSENTIAL CONCURRENT WITH A LARGE REDUCTION IN GROUND COMBAT  
POWER CONSTITUTES A DANGEROUS AND UNACCEPTABLE RISK. THE MACV  
POSITION ON AIR SORTIE RATES IS THAT THEY BE SUSTAINED AT CURRENTLY  
AUTHORIZED LEVELS. TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED USAF AIR  
ACTIVITY LEVEL OF 14,000 IAC AIR SORTIES, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT  
THE 2900 SPACES SHOWN IN INCREMENT 4 OF REFERENCES C AND D REMAIN

III MAF 210/4

COPY 2 20 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"MCEO"

"EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 1340 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
AS STATED.

3. (TS) ADOPTION OF JCS ALTERNATIVE B MODIFIED TO THREE INCREMENTS OF 50,00 EACH WOULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF A MINIMUM OF THREE BRIGADE MONTHS FROM THAT PROPOSED IN ALTERNATIVE C, REGARDLESS OF POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENT IN US ARMY MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS. THE MACV POSITION IN FAVOR OF ALTERNATIVE A AS LISTED IN APPENDIX D OF REF A WAS BASED PRIMARILY UPON THE RETENTION OF SUFFICIENT FORCES TO PROVIDE FOR CONTINUED PROGRESS IN VIETNAMIZATION. ALTERNATIVE C AS DEPICTED IN REFS C AND D, WAS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF TROOPS FOR THE LONGEST PERIOD TO CONTINUE AS MANY VIETNAMIZATION TASKS AS POSSIBLE. WITH RESPECT TO THE MARINES, THE USMC SPACE REDEPLOYMENTS AS OUTLINED IN ALTERNATIVE C OF REFS C AND D ARE PREFERRED. BOTH ALTERNATIVES B AND C ACCELERATE US REDEPLOYMENTS TO THE POINT OF INTRODUCING SERIOUS RISKS TO THE VIETNAMIZATION PROCESS.

4. (TS) SHOULD THE END CY-1970 ARMY AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF 256.0 THOUSAND MATERIALIZE AS INDICATED IN REF E

S CONSIDERED THAT THE ARMY REDEPLOYMENT FIGURE FOR THE PERIOD 15 OCT-31 DEC 70 OF ALTERNATIVE C SHOULD BE REDUCED AND THE FORCES REMAINING FIGURE BE INCREASED ACCORDINGLY. IN SUMMARY, SHOULD ALTERNATIVE A NOT BE

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 1340 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
SUPPORTABLE DUE TO BUDGETARY AND MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS, ALTERNATIVE C, MODIFIED AS INDICATED, IS PREFERRED.

UNQUOTE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

BT

1340

SPECAT

NNNN

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

MCEO

PTTAZYUW RUHHFMA1341 2232036-AAAA--RUMLMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 112036Z AUG 70

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LIGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000// REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

EXCLUSIVE

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF (JCS 081807Z AUG 70) TO CINCPAC, INFO COMUSMACV, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF AND CG FMFPAC, WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR INFORMATION. PLEASE PROTECT SOURCE.

QUOTE:

SUBJ: REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

REFS: A. JCSM-266-70 B. JCS 6652/042349Z AUG 70. C. JCS 6709/052102Z AUG 70. D. MACV 30835/061445Z AUG 70. E. CINCPAC 070347Z AUG 70.

1. (TS) REFERENCE A PROVIDED PLANS FOR REDEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES FROM RVN DURING FY 71. REFERENCE B REQUESTED INPUT FOR A REPORT TO SECDEF ON ALTERNATIVE REDEPLOYMENT PLANS. REFER-

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1341 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO ENCE C PROVIDED AMPLICATION OF ASSUMPTIONS ON AIR SORTIE LEVELS FOR USE IN PREPARING THE JCS REPORT. REFERENCE D PROVIDED COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF COMUSMACV. REFERENCE E PROVIDED CINCPAC RESPONSE TO REFERENCE A.

2. (TS) THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS AND QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AS REFERENCES D AND E AND WERE CONSIDERED IN JOINT AND SERVICE STAFF ACTIONS TO PREPARE THE JCS REPORT TO SECDEF:

A. REFERENCES D AND E PROVIDED ARMY AND AIR FORCE FIGURES UNDER INCREMENT FOUR WHICH ASSUMED THE 2,900 SPACES REMAINING TO BE IDENTIFIED TO COMPLETE THE 50,000 PACKAGE WOULD BE ARMY SPACES. FOR CONSISTENCY IN THE JCS REPORT, IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE FIGURES IN INCREMENT FOUR OF REFERENCES D AND E BE MODIFIED TO SHOW 15,200 ARMY SPACES AND 7,400 AIR FORCE SPACES, AND TO MAKE RELATED CHANGES IN STRENGTH REMAINING IN-COUNTRY IN ALL INCREMENTS.

B. IN VIEW OF THE ALTERNATIVES NOW BEING CONSIDERED FOR THE REPORT BY THE JCS, YOUR JUDGMENT ON ONE FURTHER ASPECT OF FORCE COMPOSITON WOULD BE HELPFUL. IF SUFFICIENT ARMY PERSONNEL WERE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT AN ARMY AUTHORIZATION OF 256,000 THROUGH 31 DEC 70 AND 225,000 THROUGH 30 APR 71, WOULD YOU STILL DESIRE

SPECAT

11 III MAF 210/4

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"MCEO"  
"EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1341 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
THE SOLUTION INVOLVING DELAYS IN MARINE CORPS REDEPLOYMENTS  
PRESENTED IN REFERENCES D AND E, OR WOULD YOU PREFER A SOLUTION  
SIMILAR TO ALTERNATIVE B OF REFERENCE A, WHICH INCLUDED MARINE  
REDEPLOYMENTS AS CURRENTLY PLANNED, MODIFIED TO CONSIST OF THREE  
INCREMENTS OF ABOUT 50,000 EACH?  
3. (U) REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE OR COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAL IN  
PARAGRAPH 2A AND YOUR RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION IN PARAGRAPH  
2B NLT 101200 AUG 70, WASHINGTON TIME.  
UNQUOTE.

WARM REGARDS  
GP-3  
BT  
1341

NNNN

SPECAT

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

"MCEO"

PTIAZYUW RUHFMA1342 2232037-AAAA--RUMLMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 112037Z AUG 70

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
FROM LTGEN JONES, MARINE CORPS. EYES ONLY. DELIVER

DURING WORKING HOURS. //N00000//

REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF (CINCPAC 092223Z/AUG 70)  
TO JCS, INFO CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF,  
COMUSMACV AND CG FMFPAC WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR  
INFORMATION. PLEASE PROTECT SOURCE

QUOTE:

REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

A. JCSM 266-70, 2JUN 70

B. CINCPAC 082112Z AUG 70

C. JCS 6993/031807Z AUG 70

D. COMUSMACV 40427/091032Z AUG 70

E. CJCS 071006Z AUG 70

1. (TS) REF B PROVIDED CINCPAC COMMENTS ON REDEPLOYMENT

PAGE TWO RUHFMA1342 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
ALTERNATIVE B OR REF A AND PROPOSED NEW ALTERNATIVE C.REF C REQUESTS COMMENTS OR CONCURRENCE ON PROPOSAL THAT  
2,900 USAF SPACES BE SUBSTITUTED FOR ARMY SPACES IN  
REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT 4, AND REQUESTS CINCPAC POSITION ON  
A MODIFIED ALTERNATIVE B OF REF A CONSISTING OF THREE  
INCREMENTS OF 50, (0 EACH, IF THE ARMY COULD MEET THE  
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS. REF D IS COMUSMACV'S RESPONSE TO  
THE PROPOSAL. REF E DIRECTS CINCPAC NOT TO REDUCE CURRENT  
SORTIE LEVELS UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED.2. (TS) THE CONSIDERATION FOR SUBSTITUTING 2,900 ARMY  
SPACES FOR USAF SPACES IN INCREMENT FOUR IS NECESSARILY  
TIED TO A DECISION ON SORTIE RATES. REF E INDICATES THAT  
NO SUCH DECISION HAS BEEN MADE. THE CINCPAC RECOMMENDATION  
TO MAINTAIN SORTIE RATES AT THE CURRENT LEVEL REMAINS FIRM  
AS REITERATED IN REF B.3. (TS) IN VIEW OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, PARTICULARLY IN  
MR I, AND THE IMPACT ON THE ARMY MANPOWER PROBLEM IF THE  
DECISION ON SORTIE RATES RESULTS IN THE ARMY HAVING TO  
RETAIN 2,900 ADDITIONAL SPACES, RECOMMEND THAT THE PROPOSAL  
TO DELAY THE USMC SPACES AS SHOWN IN REF B (ALTERNATIVE C)

SPECAT

11  
111 MF 200/4

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TOP SECRET 37

TOP SECRET

"EXCLUSIVE"

"MCEO"

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1342 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
BE ADOPTED.  
UNQUOTE.  
WARM REGARDS  
GP-4  
BT  
1342

NNNN

SPECAT

TOP SECRET

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE ROUTE "EXCLUSIVE"

CITAZYUW RUMLLUA1442 2240115-AAAA--RUMLMPA.  
ZNY AAAAA  
FLC -I- MAF  
O 120115Z AUG 70  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF  
BT

"MCEO"

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L / E X C L U S I V E F O R L T G E N M C C U T C H E O N  
F R O M M A J G E N I D D E C K E / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y / D E L I V E R D U R I N G  
W O R K I N G H O U R S

REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

- A. CG III MAF LTR SER 00033070 DID 2JUN70
- B. CG FIRST MARDIV 030950Z AUG 70 (S)
- C. CG FMFPAC 092207Z AUG 70 (S)
- D. CG FMFPAC 092202Z AUG 70 (TS)
- E. CG III MAF 221559Z JUL 70 (TS)

1. (TS) REF A ESTABLISHED ALTERNATIVE ALPHA, THE PLAN THAT IS PRESENTLY IN EFFECT UNDER WHICH INCREMENT IV UNITS ARE NOW BEING REDEPLOYED AND UNDER WHICH INCREMENT V UNITS ARE SCHEDULED TO REDEPLOY SUBSEQUENT TO 15 OCT. THIS PLAN STIPULATES THAT TWO RLT'S WILL REMAIN IN-COUNTRY AFTER 15 OCT 70 WITH ALL UNITS AND HEAD-QUARTERS ELEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT CRITICAL TO A TWO RLT OPERATION TO BE REDEPLOYED PRIOR TO 15 OCT 70. THE PLAN FURTHER STATES THAT ONLY

PAGE TWO RUMLLUA1442 T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R  
M I N I M A L H E A D Q U A R T E R S E L E M E N T S W I L L B E R E Q U I R E D A F T E R 15 OCT 70 T O  
P R O V I D E A P P R O X I M A T E L Y S I X T Y - D A Y S U P P O R T F O R F I R S T D I V I S I O N F L A G  
I N - C O U N T R Y D U R I N G T H E C O U R S E O F I N C R E M E N T V R E D E P L O Y M E N T S .

2. (TS) DEFICIENCIES IN THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITIES, EVEN FOR A SIXTY-DAY PERIOD, RESULTING FROM THE PRESENTLY SCHEDULED REDEPLOYMENT OF THE DIVISION'S HEADQUARTERS BATTALION (-) WERE IDENTIFIED IN REF B. PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY HQ BN PERSONNEL INCREASE WERE APPROVED BY REF C WITH ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN ADEQUATELY STAFFED COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION FOR THE DIVISION AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF INCREMENT IV.

3. (TS) REF D PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION A CINCPAC PROPOSAL TO DELETE ALL MARINE SPACES FROM INCREMENT IV. THIS WOULD CAUSE THE DIVISION (MINUS) TO REMAIN IN-COUNTRY UNTIL THE 1 JANUARY - 1 MAY 1971 TIME PERIOD. THIS PROPOSAL IS RADICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE PREMISES UPON WHICH THE PRESENTLY PLANNED INCREMENT IV AND INCREMENT V WITHDRAWAL WERE BASED. THEREFORE, NOT ONLY MUST THE CANCELLATION OF THE INCREMENT V DIVISION PACKAGE BE EVALUATED, BUT ALSO THE INCREMENT IV WITHDRAWALS MUST BE REEXAMINED TO INSURE THAT NECESSARY SKILLS AND UNITS REMAIN IN-COUNTRY.

SPECIAL

111 M 210

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TOP SECRET

(116)

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE ROUTE

"MCFD"

PAGE THREE RUMLLUA1442 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
4. (TS) THE IMPACT OF THE CINCPAC PROPOSAL IF IT IS APPROVED AND  
IMPLEMENTED WILL BE CONCENTRATED IN THREE MAJOR AREAS: OPERATIONS;  
LOGISTICS; AND PERSONNEL:

A. IMPACT ON OPERATIONS. AS SET FORTH ABOVE, PRESENTLY PLANNED  
INCREMENT IV WITHDRAWALS WERE PREDICATED ON THE FORMATION OF TWO  
RLTS ON 15 OCT, RL1-1 TO FORM THE GROUND ELEMENT OF 3D MAW AND RL1-2  
TO STANDDOWN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AND REDEPLOY IN INCREMENT V. CON-  
TINUED OPERATIONS BY THE DIVISION (MINUS) FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD  
PRESUMEDLY WITH THE SAME MISSIONS AND AREAS OF OPERATION AS AT  
PRESENT, WERE NOT PLANNED NOR CONTEMPLATED. TO PROVIDE FOR THIS  
CONTINUANCE, A MORE ADEQUATE COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMBAT SUPPORT,  
AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CAPABILITY IS REQUIRED.

B. IMPACT ON LOGISTICS. EFFICIENT LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF A DIVISION  
(MINUS) FOR AN EXTENDED DURATION IS STRONGLY DEPENDENT UPON THE  
RETENTION OF AN ENGINEER AND MOTOR-TRANSPORT CAPABILITY MORE ADEQUATE  
THAN CAN BE PROVIDED BY THE PRESENTLY PLANNED SEPARATE COMPANIES.  
FURTHER, IN COMPLIANCE WITH PMPAC DIRECTIVES THE MAJORITY OF  
THE OUTSTANDING REQUISITIONS OF THIS DIVISION SCHEDULED TO STANDDOWN  
BY 10 SEP TO HAVE BEEN CANCELLED. IF ANY OF THESE UNITS REMAIN IN-  
COUNTRY THEY WILL RECEIVE DEFERRED DELIVERY AND CAN EXPECT TO

PAGE FOUR RUMLLUA1442 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
EXPERIENCE SEVERE SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES.

C. IMPACT ON PERSONNEL. DELAYED REDEPLOYMENT OF DIVISION UNITS  
WOULD CREATE SEVERE PERSONNEL TURBULENCE. THE PERSONNEL PIPELINE  
WOULD NEED TO BE REEXAMINED IMMEDIATELY NOT ONLY TO SUSTAIN THE  
DIVISION (MINUS) THROUGH THE EXTENDED PERIOD BUT ALSO TO REFLECT  
THE CHANGED REQUIREMENTS IN SKILLS AND GRADES. AS AN EXAMPLE,  
DELAY IN THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE DIVISION STAFF REQUIRES RE-  
EXAMINATION OF THE COLONEL REQUIREMENTS STATED IN REF E. SHORTFALL  
OF COLONELS FOR KEY BILLETTS IS NOT SUITABLE FOR THE EXPANDED  
TIME SPAN ASSOCIATED WITH DELAYED REDEPLOYMENT.

5. (TS) THE FOLLOWING UNITS AND SPACES ARE RECOMMENDED FOR  
DELETION FROM PLANNED INCREMENT IV WITHDRAWALS IN ORDER TO  
ACHIEVE A PROPER FORCE BALANCE FOR THE DIVISION (MINUS):

UNIT	SPACES
HEADQUARTERS BATTALION	473
ST MP BATTALION	582
(M&S CO, 2 COMPANIES)	
1ST ENGINEER BATTALION	477
(M&S CO, SUPPORT CO & LETTER CO)	
LITWARRINES	128

SPECAT

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE ROUTE

"EXCLUSIVE"  
"MCEO"

PAGE FIVE RUMLLUA 1442 T O P S E C R E T SPCAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 (HQ BTRY)  
 RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION 131  
 (H&S CO)  
 1ST MT BATTALION 55  
 (H&S CO)  
 TOTAL 1561

6. (TS) INASMUCH AS THE CINCPAC PROPOSAL DOES NOT ADDRESS FORCE  
 ADD-ONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSED STRETCH-OUT OF MARINE  
 REDEPLOYMENTS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT RESTRUCTURING WOULD HAVE TO BE  
 ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN PRESENT FORCE LEVEL CONSTRAINTS. SUBSTITUTIONS  
 IN THE INCREMENT IV TROOP LIST TO MEET THE 1561 SPACES LISTED ABOVE  
 ARE NOMINATED AS FOLLOWS, UNLESS SPACES CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FROM  
 OTHER ELEMENTS OF III MAF:

UNIT	SPACES
ONE INFANTRY BATTALION	1157
ONE 105MM HOW BTRY	131
1ST 175MM GUN BTRY	153
CO C, FIRST TANK BATTALION	120
TOTAL	1566

7. (TS) WHILE THE ABOVE ADJUSTMENTS WOULD PERMIT THE DIVISION

PAGE SIX RUMLLUA 1442 T O P S E C R E T SPCAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 (MINUS) TO FUNCTION FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD IN A RELATIVELY EFFECTIVE  
 AND EFFICIENT MANNER, THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE CINCPAC PROPOSAL FAR  
 OUTWEIGH THE LIMITED SHORT TERM RELIEF PROVIDED MACV. IN ANY CASE  
 INSOMUCH AS INCREMENT IV REDEPLOYMENTS ARE PRESENTLY PROCEEDING,  
 EARLY DECISIONS ARE URGENTLY REQUIRED ELSE THE DIVISION BE LEFT IN  
 AN IRRETRIEVABLY UNBALANCED POSTURE. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4  
 ET  
 1442

NNNN

SPECAT

**TOP SECRET**

VV PAC239  
 PITAZYUW RUHFMMA1735 2252052-AAAA--RUMMPA RUEOFIA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 P 132052Z AUG 70  
 FM ADMIN FMFPAC  
 TO RUMMPA/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUEOFIA/CMC

13AUG70 2229Z

BT  
 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM MGEN ADAMS MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS //NOOOOO//  
 FORCE PLANNING (U)  
 A. CG III MAF 130854Z/AUG 70 (IS/SPECAT)  
 1. CONCUR, FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS  
 AND PROPOSALS CONTAINED PAR 4 AND 5, REF A.  
 WARM REGARDS.  
 GP-4  
 BT  
 1735

132052Z AUG 70

NNNN

13  
III MAF 210074

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52  
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PTTZYUW RUHFMA1738 2252115-AAAA--RUMLMPA RUMLMHA RUMLLUA  
RUEOFIA.  
ZNY AAAAA  
RUMLMPA -T- RUMLMHA  
RUMLMPA -T- RUMLLUA  
P 132115Z AUG 70  
FM ADMIN FMFPAC  
TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF  
RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAW  
RUMLLUA/CG FIRST MAR DIV  
RUMLMPA/FORLOGCOMD  
INFO RUEOFIA/CMC  
ZEN/CG THIRD MAR DIV  
ZEN/CG FIRST MAW (REAR)  
BT

"MCEO"  
"EXCLUSIVE"

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON,  
MGEN ARMSTRONG, MGEN WIDDECKE, BGEN PADALINO, INFO  
MGEN ANDERSON, BGEN CONLEY AND BGEN FRIBOURG, FROM  
MGEN ADAMS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING  
WORKING HOURS. //NOOOOO//  
REDEPLOYMENT PERSONNEL CRITERIA  
A. ADMIN FMFPAC 130229Z AUG70 (S) (NOTAL)  
B. ADMIN FMFPAC 131815Z AUG70 (U) (NOTAL)  
1. IMPENDING CHANGES TO REDEPLOYMENT PLANS COUPLED  
WITH CURRENT AND PROJECTED SHORTAGES OF PERSONNEL

PAGE TWO RUHFMA1738 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
AVAILABLE FOR ASSIGNMENT TO WESTPAC HAVE NECESSITATED  
CMC TO DIRECT SUBSTANTIAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE  
PERSONNEL CRITERIA FOR THOSE INVOLVED IN KEYSTONE  
ROBIN (ALPHA) REDEPLOYMENTS. REF A AND B IMPLEMENT  
THESE MODIFICATIONS.

2. A CHANGE IN PERSONNEL CRITERIA OF THIS MAGNITUDE  
PRESENTS OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES FROM A MORALE POINT OF  
VIEW AND WILL NO DOUBT GENERATE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL  
TURBULENCE AS RELATES TO READJUSTMENT OF PERSONNEL  
ACTIONS COMPLETED IN ANTICIPATION OF MOVEMENTS IN THE  
NEAR TIME FRAME. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SHORTAGE OF  
AVAILABLE DEPLOYABLE PERSONNEL, HOWEVER, DEMAND THAT  
PROMPT AND CLOSE ATTENTION BE GIVEN TO THE CAREFUL AND  
COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE CHANGES. THE READINESS  
OF ALL UNITS IN WESTPAC RELATES DIRECTLY TO THE ABILITY  
OF EACH COMMAND TO ACCURATELY IDENTIFY AND RETAIN ALL  
THOSE PERSONNEL WHO NO LONGER MEET THE REDEPLOYMENT  
CRITERIA. THE FACT THAT SUCH PERSONNEL MAY NOT BE  
NEEDED IN THE IMMEDIATE UNIT INVOLVED IS NOT MATERIAL;  
THEY WILL BE NEEDED IN WESTPAC. TRANSFERS WHERE

"MCEO"

PAGE THREE RUHFMA1738 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
APPROPRIATE WILL BE DIRECTED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

111 MAF 2100/4

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

FLC -T- III MAF  
 FLC -T- FIRST MAF VV WING053  
 OTTASYUW RUMLLUA1875 2261304-AAAA--RUMLMFA RUMLMHA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 O 141304Z AUG 70  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TO RUMLMFA/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUMLMHA/CG FIRST MAF  
 BT

14AUG70 9706Z

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 INFO MGEN ARMSTRONG FR MGEN WIDDECKE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.  
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.  
 REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

- A. CG FMFPAC 092202Z AUG70 (TS/SPECAT)  
 B. CG III MAF 130855Z AUG70 (TS/SPECAT)  
 1. (TS) REF A PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION A CINCPAC PROPOSAL TO  
 DELETE ALL MARINE SPACES FROM INCREMENT V. REF B ADDRESSES THE  
 IMPACT OF REF A AND RECOMMENDS THE DELETION OF CERTAIN UNITS/  
 SPACES FROM INCREMENT IV IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A PROPER FORCE  
 BALANCE FOR THE DIVISION (MINUS) THAT WILL REMAIN IN-COUNTRY  
 SUBSEQUENT TO 15OCT70. THE NET RESULT OF THAT RECOMMENDATION  
 AFTER ADJUSTMENT IS AN INCREASE OF 1736 IN-COUNTRY SPACES.  
 2. (TS) IF THE PROPOSED INCREASE IS NOT APPROVED AT THE COMUSMACV  
 OR WASHINGTON LEVEL AN ALTERNATE AND POSSIBLY PREFERABLE SOLUTION

PAGE TWO RUMLLUA1875 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

- TO ACHIEVING THE DESIRED FORCE BALANCE WOULD BE TO ACTIVATE A  
 BRIGADE SPECIFICALLY TAILORED TO THE MISSION, ENVIRONMENT AND  
 FORCES AT HAND. ACTIVATION WOULD OCCUR ON 12OCT70 CONCURRENT  
 WITH THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE LAST ELEMENTS OF INCREMENT IV.  
 3. (TS) THIS BRIGADE WOULD CONTAIN SIX INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND IT  
 IS ENVISAGED THAT IT WOULD BE TASK ORGANIZED AND DISPOSED AS  
 FOLLOWS:

- A. A BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS SUPPORTED BY HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, COM-  
 MUNICATIONS SUPPORT COMPANY, MP DET, SCAMP DET, CIT, IT AND IIT  
 UNITS.  
 B. RLI-1 WITH FOUR BATTALIONS AND ASSIGNED AN AO THAT WOULD AP-  
 PROXIMATE THE AO PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE FIRST MARINES AND THE  
 THIRD BATTALION, FIFTH MARINES.  
 C. ONE REINFORCED BATTALION BASED AT LZ BALDY WITH AN AO THAT  
 ENCOMPASSES THE MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE QUE SON MOUNTAINS AND THE AO  
 CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE FIRST BATTALION, SEVENTH MARINES.  
 D. ONE BATTALION DESIGNATED AS THE BRIGADE RESERVE WITH AN AO  
 THAT CORRESPONDS TO THAT NOW ASSIGNED TO THE FIRST BATTALION,  
 FIFTH MARINES, WITH THE ADDITIONAL MISSION OF PROVIDING TACTICAL  
 DEFENSE TO THE DANANG VITAL AREA.

PG 1 OF 3

141304Z AUG 70

III MAF 2100/4

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TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUMLLUA1875 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

E. AN ARTILLERY GROUP THAT PROVIDES FOR A GROUP HEADQUARTERS; ONE REINFORCED LIGHT ARTILLERY BATTALION CONSISTING OF FIVE 105MM BATTERIES AND ONE 107MM BATTERY; AND FIVE SEPARATE BATTERIES TO INCLUDE TWO 155MM SP BATTERIES, ONE 8-INCH HOW BATTERY, ONE 105MM BATTERY, AND ONE 107MM MORTAR BATTERY. THREE OF THESE SEPARATE BATTERIES WOULD BE TASK ORGANIZED TO SUPPORT THE BALDY BATTALION.

F. MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION (REIN) CONSISTING OF BOTH FORCE AND DIVISION MOTOR TRANSPORT UNITS.

G. RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION (MINUS).

H. ENGINEER BATTALION (MINUS).

I. MEDICAL BATTALION (MINUS).

4. (TS) THE PROPOSED BRIGADE STRUCTURE WILL RESULT IN A NET SAVINGS IN EXCESS OF 700 SPACES FROM THE TOTAL OF 12,382 SPACES REQUIRED FOR THE DIVISION (MINUS) STRUCTURED WITHOUT THE 175MM GUN BATTERY AND ONE TANK COMPANY. THESE SAVINGS WOULD ACCRUE FROM THE DELETION OF THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS BATTALION; THE FIFTH MARINES REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS COMPANY; THE HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, FIRST MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION; A NET REDUCTION OF APPROXIMATELY 120 SPACES FROM THE ARTILLERY UNITS; AND ADDITIONAL BUT YET PRECISELY UNIDENTIFIED SAVINGS FROM WITHIN THE HEADQUARTERS

PAGE FOUR RUMLLUA1875 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ELEMENTS OF THE COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS.

5. (TS) THE PROPOSED STRUCTURE WOULD PROVIDE FOR AN EFFECTIVE COMBAT AND CONTROL CAPABILITY AND ADEQUATE COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT.

A. THE MAB HEADQUARTERS WOULD BE DIRECTING ONE INFANTRY REGIMENT AND TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS. THIS IS WELL WITHIN ITS SPAN OF CONTROL.

B. THE RLI WOULD BE DIRECTING FOUR BATTALIONS. THIS IS ALSO WELL WITHIN ITS CAPABILITIES. IN THE VIETNAMESE ENVIRONMENT MARINE INFANTRY REGIMENTS HAVE FREQUENTLY DIRECTED FIVE OR EVEN SIX INFANTRY BATTALIONS.

C. THE ARTILLERY GROUPMENT IS EASILY FEASIBLE UNDER LOCAL CONDITIONS WHEREIN BATTERIES DO LITTLE DISPLACEMENT AND ARE INTEGRATED INTO A WELL-SURVEYED, MUTUALLY-SUPPORTING SYSTEM. AS RECENTLY AS LAST SPRING 11TH MARINES OPERATED FIVE BATTALIONS AND FIVE SEPARATE BATTERIES.

ALTHOUGH THE BRIGADE IS TAILORED TO THE LOCAL SITUATION SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY HAS BEEN PRESERVED TO PERMIT FURTHER TASK ORGANIZING TO MEET SPECIFIC CONTINGENCIES IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT MAJOR DISPLACEMENTS ARE REQUIRED.

PG 2 OF 3

141304Z AUG 70

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RUMLLUA1875 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

6. (TS) REQUEST YOUR APPROVAL OF THE CONCEPT SET FORTH HEREIN  
AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT A DETAILED BRIEFING AT YOUR CON-  
VENIENCE.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1875

PG 3 OF 3

?L1304Z AUG 70

NNNN

(19)

SECRET

"EXCLUSIVE"

PTTZYUW RUMLLUA1928 2270200-AAAA--RUMLMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

FLC-T-MAF

P 150200Z AUG 70

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MGEN WIDDECKE.  
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS//N0000//

REVISED PERSONNEL CRITERIA (U)

A. ADMIN FMFPAC 130229Z AUG 70

B. ADMIN III MAF 060920Z AUG 70

1. (S) THERE IS NO PRECISE WAY OF REDICTING THE IMPACT OF THE REVISED PERSONNEL CRITERIA SET FORTH I REFERENCE A UPON THE MARINES INVOLVED. I FORESEE, HOWEVER, THAT IT MAYBE SIGNIFICANT BOTH IN ITS SCOPE AND IN ITS EFFECT ON THE INDIVIDUAL. MY MOST IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS ITS EFFECT UPON EMBARKATION UNIT 7, A SMALL PART OF WHICH HAS ALREADY DEPARTED. AN EXAMINATION OF THE 1400 MARINES IN THIS UNIT REVEALS THAT 512, INCLUDING 30 WHO HAVE ALREADY DEPARTED RVN, ARE NOT ELIGIBLE UNDER THE NEW CRITERIA. USING THESE FIGURES AS A BASIS, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT ABOUT THIRTY PERCENT OF THE NEARLY 10,000 DIVISION SPACES INVOLVED IN INCREMENT IV WILL NO LONGER BE ELIGIBLE FOR REDE-

PAGE TWO RUMLLUA1928 S E C R E T /SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR PLOYMENT. WHILE THE ABOVE MAY INDICATE THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS CHANGE, IT DOES NOT REVEAL THE POTENTIAL REACTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL MARINE WHO IS NO LONGER ELIGIBLE. IN UNCLASSIFIED FORM, SUCH AS REFERENCE B AND THE 14 AUGUST ISSUE OF THE SEA TIGER, WE HAVE CAREFULLY SPELLED OUT THE ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR INCREMENT IN PERSONNEL. THOSE ROTATING AND OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE WERE AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR RELAD. IN THE CASE OF EMBARK UNIT 7, KEY-STONE ROBIN PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO SURFACE LIFT OR AIRCRAFT, EVEN TO THE XTENT OF HAVING BEEN PROVIDED SEAT DATES. THOSE MARINES WITH DECEMBER 1970, JANUARY AND FEBRUARY 1971 RTD'S MUST NOW BE TOLD THAT THEY ARE NOT ELIGIBLE TO ROTATE OR TO BE RELAD. REGARDLESS OF HOW WE ULTIMATELY TRY TO EXPLAIN THE NECESSITY OF THIS CHANGE TO THE DISAPPOINTED MARINE, IT WILL BE HARD FOR HIM TO ACCEPT IT. I BELIEVE THAT HIS MORALE AND FAITH IN THE MARINE CORPS WILL BE ALTERED ACCORDINGLY.

2. IT IS ENCUMBENT UPON US TO TAKE EVERY POSSIBLE ACTION TO REDUCE THIS FORESEEABLE ADVERSE IMPACT. SPECIFICALLY, I RECOMMEND A STRONG TROOP INFORMATION PROGRAM BASED UPON A REVISION OF REFERENCE (B) SO AS TO REFLECT IN UNCLASSIFIED FORM THE NEW INCREMENT IV CRITERIA. ADDITIONALLY, THE INFORMATION

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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150200Z AUG 70

FMFPAC-GEN 290315-29  
0101-V04-6603

"EXCLUSIVE"

02

SECRET

20

**SECRET****"EXCLUSIVE"**

PAGE THREE RUMLLUA1928 S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 PRESENTED IN THE SEA TIGER SHOULD BE CORRECTED, EITHER IN THE  
 NEXT ISSUE OR IN A SPECIAL EDITION. UPON RECEIPT OF A DECLASSIFIED  
 VERSION, THIS HEADQUARTERS IS PREPARED TO HAVE COMMANDERS CON-  
 DUCT AN EXTENSIVE TROOP INFORMATION PROGRAM REACHING THE LOWEST  
 LEVEL. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4  
 BT  
 1928

TOR: 150313Z AUG 70

NNNN

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

150200Z AUG 70

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**"EXCLUSIVE"****SECRET**

(20)

TOP SECRET

"EXCLUSIVE"

"MCEO"

OTTAZYUW RUHFMA1940 2270242-AAAA--RUMLMPA.  
ZNY AAAAA

FLC -T- CG III MAF  
O P 150242Z AUG 70  
FM ADMIN FMFPAC  
TO ZEN/CG I MEF  
INFO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT  
T O P S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJ GEN WILSON, INFO  
LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJ GEN ADAMS. MARINE CORPS  
EYES ONLY. DELIVERY DURING WORKING HOURS. //N00000//  
SLF OPERATIONS (U) (PLEASE PROTECT OUR SOURCE)  
A. CG FMFPAC 120123Z AUG 70 (TS/SPECAT) (NOTAL)  
B. COMNAVFORV 130050Z/AUG 70 (S)  
C. CINCPACFLT 090037Z OCT 69 (S) (PASEP)  
D. CINCPAC 102042Z OCT 69 (S) (PASEP)

1. (TS) THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM VADM KING TO  
ADM HYLAND AND VADM WEISNER, INFO ADM ZUMWALT  
AND RADM RUBEL, IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:  
QUOTE

A. NY 130050Z AUG 70  
1. (S) THE PROPOSAL ADVANCED IN REF A MAY BE UNPOPULAR  
FROM A PUBLIC RELATIONS STANDPOINT, BUT I HAVE NO DOUBT

PAGE TWO RUHFMA1940 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
IT IS MILITARILY SOUND. THE FACT IS WE FACE A SIGNIFICANT  
ENEMY THREAT. OUR EFFORTS TO GET IN-COUNTRY AUGMENTA-  
TION OF TROOPS FOR SEAFLOAT AO HAVE THUS FAR NOT BEEN  
FRUITFUL. WE NEED ASSISTANCE, AND IT SEEMS TO ME THE  
SLF COULD PROVIDE IT IF THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS DO NOT  
KILL THE CONCEPT.

2. (S) I EXPLAINED THE BARE BONES OF REF A TO ACTING  
COMUSMACV GEN ROSSON IN ADVANCE. HE IS QUITE  
SYMPATHETIC TO THE IDEA, AND SUGGESTED THE EMPHASIS IN  
REF A ON VIETNAMESE NAVY PARTICIPATION AS A MEANS OF  
IMPROVING PALATABILITY. HE WILL NOT COMMIT HIMSELF,  
HOWEVER, UNTIL HE CAN SEE A MORE DETAILED CONCEPT  
WHICH I HOPE WILL RESULT FROM FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS  
AT SEVENTH FLEET SKED CONFERENCE.

3. (U) WARM REGARDS.  
UNQUOTE

2. (TS) IN REF (A) CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED THAT THE  
DISTINCTION BETWEEN AMPHIBIOUS AND RIVERINE DOCTRINE  
BE PRESERVED. ON REVIEWING THE FOREGOING CONCEPT, I  
AM DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE MILITARY SOUNDNESS OF

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

"MCEO"  
150242Z AUG 70

"EXCLUSIVE"

III MAF 2/00/4

COPY 2 OF 02 COPIES

TO SECRET

(21)

TOP SECRET

"EXCLUSIVE"

"MCEO"

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1940 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 COMMITTING THE SLF IN RIVERINE ASSAULT OPERATIONS UNDER  
 OPCOM OF A NAVAL COMMANDER AGAINST BASE CAMPS, SHOPS,  
 AND SAFE AREAS IN THE DENSE U MINH FOREST WITHOUT CLOSE  
 AIR SUPPORT; WHERE THE OPERATIONS OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SHIPS  
 ARE SEVERELY LIMITED BY THE SHALLOW OFFSHORE GRADIENT;  
 WHERE THERE ARE FEW POSITIONS FOR ARTILLERY; AND WHERE  
 GROUND TRAFFICABILITY IS NEXT TO NIL. OUR PREVIOUS  
 EXPERIENCES IN SIMILAR AREAS (OPERATIONS JACKSTAY AND  
 DECKHOUSE V) WERE VERY EXPENSIVE IN MEN AND MATERIALS  
 WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT PAYOFF.

3. (TS) THE ROLE OF THE SLF AS A PART OF PACOM RESERVE REQUIRES  
 THAT CINCPAC APPROVE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ITS EMPLOY-  
 MENT. LIKEWISE, CINCPACFLT HAS PREDICATED HIS PLANNING  
 FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARG/SLF'S, SINCE THEIR  
 RECONSTITUTION FROM OUT OF COUNTRY RESOURCES, ON THE  
 ASSUMPTION THAT THEIR REINSERTION INTO SVN WILL REQUIRE  
 JCS APPROVAL (REF C). CINCPAC HAS APPROVED THAT  
 ASSUMPTION (REF D).

4. (TS) ACCORDINGLY, BASED UPON THE INFORMATION AVAIL-  
 ABLE AT THIS HEADQUARTERS, I BELIEVE THAT THE CONCEPT

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA1940 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 PROPOSED BY COMNAVFORV AS OUTLINED IN REF B IS OF  
 QUESTIONABLE MILITARY WORTH; IS ILL-ADVISED AT THIS TIME  
 WITH REDEPLOYMENT UNDERWAY; AND, WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE  
 IN TODAY'S POLITICAL CLIMATE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1940

TOR: 150415Z AUG 70

NNNN

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

"EXCLUSIVE"

"MCEO"

150242Z AUG 70

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECAT

"MCEO"  
"EXCLUSIVE"

PTIAZYUW RUMLLUA1959 1270630-AAAA7-RUMLMPA.  
ZNY AAAAA  
FLC-T-PAC  
FLC-T-MAF  
P 150630Z AUG 70  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
TO RUMLMPA/CG FMFPAC  
RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

TOR: 150910Z AUG 70

TOD PAC: 150935Z AUG 70

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L //SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FORLTIGEN JONES,  
LTIGEN MCCUTCHEON/FROM MGEN WIDDECKE. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY,  
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

EMERGENCY LEAVE; CASE OF PVT R. D. HERROD

1. (C) ON 14 AUGUST THIS HEADQUARTERS RECEIVED A REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY LEAVE SUBMITTED BY PRIVATE RANDELL D. HERROD. THE REASON GIVEN WAS THE DEATH OF HIS PATERNAL GRANDFATHER AS CONFIRMED BY RED CROSS MESSAGE. SERVICES WERE SCHEDULED FOR 12 AUGUST.
2. (C) PRIVATE HERROD IS PRESENTLY CONFINED IN THE US ARMY, VIETNAM INSTALLATION STOCKADE, DAWANG, AWAITING TRIAL ON CHARGES ALLEGING THE PREMEDITATED MURDER OF 16 VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS.

PAGE TWO RUMLLUA1959 C O N F I D E N T I A L //SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR THIS TRIA IS NOW SCHEDULED TO COMMENCE ON 19 AUGUST 000PM PRIVATE HERROD IS REPRESENTED BY FUR CIVILIAN ATTORNEYS WHO ARE SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN VIETNAM ON 16 AUGUST 1970. THREE WITNESSES ARE BEING BROUGHT TO VIETNAM FROM CONUS AT THE REQUEST OF THE DEFENSE. A MILITARY JUDGE FROM NAVMARJUDACT SUBIC BAY WILL SIT AT THE TRIAL. THIS TRIAL HAS BEEN DELAYED ONCE ON DEFENSE REQUEST.

3. (C) PRIVATE HERROD CLAIMS THAT HIS GRANDFATHER STOOD IN LOCO PARENTIS. HOWEVER, HIS SERVICE RECORD BOOK INDICATES THAT BOTH HIS PARENTS ARE LIVING. CONVERSELY, HIS GRANDFATHER IS NOT LISTED IN ANY DOCUMENT CONTAINED IN HIS SERVICE RECORD. THE RED CROSS MESSAGE ADVISING OF THE GRANDFATHER'S DEATH INCLUDES A STATEMENT FROM HERROD'S STEPMOTHER TO THE EFFECT THAT HE WAS VERY CLOSE TO HIS GRANDFATHER AND SPENT ALL SUMMERS WITH HIM. A SECOND RED CROSS MESSAGE ADVISES THAT THE RELATIONSHIP WAS CLOSE BUT NOT LOCO PARENTIS.

4. (C) AFTER CONSIDERING ALL OF THE ABOVE FACTORS, PRIVATE HERROD'S REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY LEAVE WAS DENIED. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE

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150630Z AUG 70

FMFPAC-GEN (004-3/69)  
0101-Y04-6601

15

06

SPECAT

CONFIDENTIAL

22

SECRET "MCEO"

VV PAC243  
PITAZYUW RUKHFMA2075 2272242-AAAA--RUEOFIA RUMLMPA.  
ZNY AAAAA  
P 152242Z AUG 70  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO ZEN/CG I MEF  
INFO RUEOFIA/CMC  
RUMLMPA/CG III NAF  
BT

TOR: 16/0030Z AUG 70

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WILSON, INFO GEN CHAPMAN AND LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN JONES, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY, DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NOOOOO//

SLF EMPLOYMENT (U) (PLEASE PROTECT OUR SOURCE)  
1. (S) THE FOLLOWING MSG FROM ADM HYLAND TO VADM KING INFO ADM ZUMWALT AND VADM WEISNER IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

A. COMNAVFORV 130030Z AUG 70  
B. COMNAFORV 131028Z AUG 70

1. (S) MILITARY ADVANTAGES OF YOUR PROPOSAL TO USE ARG/SLF TO HELP CLEAN UP ENEMY THREAT IN VICINITY SEA FLOAT/SOLID ANCHOR ARE OBVIOUS. HOWEVER I MUST SAY THAT GENERAL REACTION IN MY STAFF AND AT FMFPAC IS STRONG FEELING THAT POLITICALLY IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. ADM MCCAIN IS OFF ISLAND AT PRESENT BUT HIS STAFF HAS SAME REACTION ONLY STRONGER. IT WOULD INVOLVE RE-INSERTING TROOPS WHO HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM VIETNAM AND EVERYONE HERE HAS STRONGEST FIRST REACTION THAT HIGHEST AUTHORITY COULD NOT PERMIT THIS IN PRESENT CLIMATE AT HOME. DESPITE THE FACT THAT CURRENT IN-COUNTRY CEILING WOULD NOT BE EXCEEDED IT WOULD PROBABLY BE RECEIVED AS AN ESCALATION OF THE WAR.  
2. (S) I HAVE ALSO ENCOUNTERED CONSIDERABLE COOLNESS ON PART OF MARINES WHO HAVE SO FAR NOT BEEN ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE CONCEPT. THEIR RESERVATIONS MOSTLY CONCERNED WITH LACK OF AIR SUPPORT AND OPERATIONS WITH VIETNAMESE NAVY.  
3. (S) NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABOVE I THINK IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE YOU OR YOUR REPS KICK IT AROUND AT SEVENTHFLT SKED CONFERENCE. LET'S DEVELOP MORE FULLY WHAT IF ANY RESERVATIONS THE MARINES WHO MIGHT PARTICIPATE HAVE, AND EXPLORE ALL THE PROBLEMS,

CONSIDERING ONE ARG/SLF NOW STANDING DOWN.  
UNQUOTE

2. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP+4

BT

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15  
FMFPAC-GEN 100/3 (3/6)  
0101-V04-6603

22

"MCEO"  
SECRET  
23

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAC NR 246

TOR 170009Z AUG 1970

PTTCZYUW R UHNFNA2183 2282037-CCCC--R UMLMPA.

Z NY CCCCC

P 162037Z AUG 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO R UMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM  
 LTGEN JONES, DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS //NE0000//  
 THIRD MARINE DIVISION MEMORIAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL (U)  
 A. FMFPAC CHIEF OF STAFF TELECON WITH III MAF DEPUTY  
 CHIEF OF STAFF OF 5 AUG 70

B. CG III MAF 081105Z AUG 70

1. (C) REF (A) DISCUSSED THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION  
 MEMORIAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL FUND BALANCE NOTING  
 THAT FUNDS WOULD BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF MEDICAL  
 CARE FOR CHILDREN AND FOR NO OTHER PURPOSE.
2. (U) REF (B) ADDRESSES THE PROBLEMS ARISING AS A  
 RESULT OF THAT DECISION AND REQUESTS LATITUDE IN THE  
 USE OF THESE FUNDS.
3. (C) I REGRET THAT THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION MEMORIAL  
 CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL CANNOT BE COMPLETED AS WAS  
 ORIGINALLY INTENDED, AND ALSO REALIZE THAT THE PRESENT

PAGE TWO R UHNFNA2183 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 FACILITY MUST BE PUT TO EFFECTIVE USE AS DECIDED BY  
 FUTURE III MAF/GVN NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS UNDERSTOOD  
 THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE FACILITY MAY REQUIRE ADDITIONAL  
 USMC EXPENDITURES.

4. (C) AT THE SAME TIME, A MORAL OBLIGATION EXISTS TO  
 SATISFY THE DONORS TO THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION  
 MEMORIAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL FUND WHO CONTRIBUTED  
 MONEY AND MATERIAL FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF PRO-  
 VIDING MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAMESE CHILDREN.  
 THAT OBLIGATION IS WHAT DICTATES THAT THE BALANCE OF  
 THIS FUND WOULD BE UTILIZED FOR THE ABOVE CITED  
 PURPOSES RATHER THAN FOR COMPLETING CONSTRUCTION ON  
 THE FACILITY IF THE FINISHED PRODUCT IS NOT GOING TO  
 BE USED FOR THE PURPOSES ORIGINALLY PLANNED.

5. (C) IF NEGOTIATIONS PROVE THAT THE GVN REFUSES TO  
 ACCEPT THE PRESENT FACILITY AS IT NOW EXISTS AND IF THE  
 MARINE CORPS IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FUNDS  
 TO COMPLETE THE CONSTRUCTION IN ORDER TO AVOID  
 ABANDONMENT, EVERY EFFORT MUST BE TAKEN TO USE FUNDS  
 PROVIDED BY SOME SOURCE OTHER THAN THE THIRD MARINE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

16  
 FMFPAC GEN 00/1 (69)  
 0101-V04-6601

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

24

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE RUHHFNA2183 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
DIVISION MEMORIAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL FUND.

6. (U) ONE EXAMPLE MAY BE THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE CIVIC ACTION FUND ESTABLISHED BY MCO 5710.4, SINCE ITS PURPOSE IS TO WIN THE CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE THROUGH A CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM THAT PROVIDES FOOD, TOOLS, AND OTHER NECESSITIES, THE REQUIRED CONSTRUCTION WOULD APPEAR TO MEET THE CRITERIA.

7. (U) LATEST HQMC FIGURES REVEAL THAT AS OF 30 JUN 70 THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE CIVIC ACTION FUND CONSISTED OF AN UNEXPENDED BALANCE OF \$34,858.42.

8. (C) REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS/INFORMATION CONCERNING:

A. THE UTILIZATION OF FUNDS FROM THE U.S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE CIVIC ACTION FUND TO COMPLETE THE FACILITY IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO THE GVN.

B. THE ESTIMATED COST OF FINISHING THIS FACILITY IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO THE GVN.

C. PROPOSED LETTER REPLYING TO INQUIRIES RECEIVED FROM DONORS TO THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION MEMORIAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL.

PAGE FOUR RUHHFNA2183 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
D. LISTING OF DONORS WHO CONTRIBUTED IN EXCESS OF \$100.00 CASH OR EQUIPMENT TO THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION MEMORIAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL.

E. DONATION OF THIRD MARINE DIVISION MEMORIAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL FUND BALANCE TO THE WRC HAO KHANH CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL.

9. (U) REQUEST REPLY NLT 24 AUG 70.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

2183

NNNN

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(24)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

OFFICE OF RUMLLUA2268 2300135-AAAA--RUMLNPA RKNHPT  
ZNY AAAAA  
O 180135Z AUG 70  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
TO RUHFMMA/CG FMFPAC  
INFO RUMLNPA/CG III MAF  
BT

SPECAT

"MCEO"  
"EXCLUSIVE"

C O N F I D E N T I A L /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES  
INFO EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE  
MARINE CORPS EYES NLY DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
HANOI BROADCAST RELATIVE TO ALLEGED FIRST MARINES ANTI-WAR PROTEST  
ON 21 JUN 70

- A. FBIS SAIGON 150250Z AUG70
- 1. REF (A) REPORTED A HANOI BROADCAST WHICH STATED THAT ON THE MORNING OF 21 JUNE 1970, ABOUT 800 USMC OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION'S FIRST MARINE REGIMENT STAGED AN ANTI-WAR PROTEST BY REFUSING TO TAKE PART IN AN AIRMOBILE HOP-UP OPERATION; REMAINED MOTIONLESS AND STRUGGLED AGAINST THEIR COMMANDERS; REFUSED TO DIE FOR NOTHING AND DEMANDED THAT THEY BE SENT HOME.
- 2. LET ME ASSURE YOU AT THE OUTSET THAT THE BROADCAST WAS FALSE IN ITS ENTIRETY. EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF ALL DIVISION RECORDS DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE REVEAL THAT THERE SIMPLY HAVE NOT BEEN ANY ANTI-

PAGE TWO RUMLLUA2268 C O N F I D E N T I A L /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCL FOR

WAR PROTESTS, CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN OFFICERS AND ENLISTED OR ASSOCIATED ACTS OF VIOLENCE IN THIS DIVISION. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE WIDE DISTRIBUTION OF REF (A) AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR ADVERSE PUBLICITY, I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT YOU BE APPRISED OF THE FACTS REGARDING THE FIRST MARINE'S ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD IN QUESTION, AS WELL AS ONE INP DENT ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD WHICH MIGHT HAVE A BEARING ON THE HANOI BROADCAST.

3. DURING THE PERIOD 18-23 JUNE 70, COMPANIES K & L PLUS A BN COMD GROUP OF THE FIRST MARINES PARTICIPATED IN RECONNAISSANCE ON FORCE OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF ELEPHANT VALLEY, ABOUT 14 MILES NORTHWEST OF DANANG CITY. THE OPERATION INVOLVED A TOTAL FORCE COMMITMENT OF 550 OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE REGIMENT. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THIS MULTICOMPANY OPERATION, THE PERIOD WAS CHARACTERIZED BY ROUTINE SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS WITHIN THE FIRST MARINE'S TAOR.

4. OF INTEREST, HOWEVER, IS A FIRST MARINE'S POST OPERATION REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 18-23 JUNE WHICH REPORTED THE REFUSAL OF THREE ATTACHED ARVN INTERPRETERS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELEPHANT VALLEY OPERATION. THESE THREE VIETNAMESE WERE OFFICIALLY REPORTED AWOL BY THE FIRST MARINES ON 22 JUNE. UPON RECEIPT OF REFERENCE, I

SPECAT

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IMMEDIATE  
AIR FORCE ROUTE  
01

FMFPAC EN 210 (3/69)  
0101-V0000001

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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CONFIDENTIAL

MCEO

EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUMLUARSSS C O N F I D E N T I A L /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCL FOR DIRECTED AN INQUIRY BE MADE INTO THE INTERPRETERS' ACTIONS AND THE FOLLOWING WAS REVEALED:

A. SSGT VU NANH NUNG (108165), SSGT CONG PHAN THANH (069244), AND SSGT NGUYEN DINH PHAM (148319) EXPRESSED FEAR OF PARTICIPATING IN THE OPERATION AND, REPORTEDLY, ALSO EXPRESSED DISLIKE OF THE 3RD BN S-2 CHIEF (A MARINE NCO). THEY HAD REPORTED ON 16 JUNE 70 ALONG WITH ALL OTHER ARVN INTERPRETERS, KIT CARSON SCOUT (KCS), FOR BRIEFING ON IMPENDING OPERATIONS AND THE EQUIPMENT CHECK. ON 17 JUNE, A KCS REPORTED TO THE BN S-2 CHIEF THAT THE ARVN INTERPRETERS FROM INDIA COMPANY HAD URGED THE KCS NOT TO GO ON THE OPERATION AS THEY WOULD GET HURT. THE S-2 CHIEF SINGLED OUT THE RESPONSIBLE INTERPRETER AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO STOP HIS EFFORTS TOWARD AGITATING THE KCS. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 17 JUNE ALL ARVN INTERPRETERS AND THE KCS WERE PRESENT FOR REHEARSAL OF THE HELO TEAMS.

B. DURING THE EVENING OF 17 JUNE THE BN S-2 CHIEF ONCE MORE RECEIVED WORD THAT CERTAIN ARVN INTERPRETERS STILL DID NOT WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OPERATION AND WERE ATTEMPTING TO COERCE THE KCS INTO NOT PARTICIPATING. ONCE AGAIN THE S-2 CHIEF TALKED FORCEFULLY TO THE ARVN INTERPRETERS INVOLVED AND THE SITUATION

PAGE FOUR RUMLUARSSS C O N F I D E N T I A L /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCL FOR SEEMED TO BE RESOLVED.

C. WHEN PERSONNEL REPORTED FOR HELO LIFT TO THE OPERATION AREA ON THE MORNING OF 18 JUNE 70, THE THREE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED ARVN INTERPRETERS FAILED TO REPORT TO THEIR ASSIGNED UNITS. INQUIRY AT THAT TIME REVEALED THAT THE THREE ARVN SSGTS HAD DEPARTED THE BN CP AT 0500H THAT SAME MORNING WITHOUT AUTHORITY.

S. SUBSEQUENT TO REPORTING THE ARVN AMOL STATUS, THE FIRST MARINE HEADQUARTERS WAS INFORMED THAT THE THREE ARVN SSGTS HAD BEEN RELIEVED OF DUTY WITH THAT REGIMENT AND THAT REPLACEMENT INTERPRETERS WERE BEING PROVIDED. FIRST MARINE RECORDS NEITHER INDICATE FINAL WHEREABOUTS NOR I CORPS DISCIPLINARY ACTION ON THE MISSING ARVN INTERPRETERS. AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME I PLAN TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH LTGEN LAM OR ASK LTGEN MCCUTCHON TO DO SO. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT  
2268

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SPECAT

IMMEDIATE

MCEO

PAG930  
 OTTASYUN RUMLLUA2335 2300020-AAAA--RUMLMPA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 O 180850Z AAM 70

FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TO RUMLMPA/CG FVFPAC 15AUG70 12 15Z  
 INFO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN  
 JONES, INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, FROM MGEN WIDDECKE (DELIVER  
 DURING WORKING HOURS)

UNUSUAL INCIDENT REPORT

1. (S) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO INFORM YOU OF AN INCIDENT CONCERNING MIKE COMPANY, 7TH MARINES WHICH RESULTED IN TWO KIA AND THIRTY WIA FROM MORTAR FIRE AT 1425 17AUG70 APPROXIMATELY TWO KILOMETERS SOUTHEAST OF FSB RYDER (AT 949342). BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES AND THE AMBIGUOUS NATURE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS POSSIBLE THIS INCIDENT MIGHT ATTRACT UNUSUAL PUBLIC INTEREST. THUS, I BELIEVE IT ADVISABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH AS COMPLETE A PICTURE AS POSSIBLE COMMENCING WITH THE DEPARTURE OF MIKE COMPANY (MINUS) FROM FSB RYDER AT 1230 14AUG70.
2. (S) THE COMPANY WAS UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER FIRST LIEUTENANT L. J. GOSIER WHO HAS BEEN WITH THE COMPANY FOR

PAGE TWO RUMLLUA2335 SECRET/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/  
 EXCLUSIVE FOR

SIX MONTHS AND IS A COMPETENT INFANTRY OFFICER. THE COMPANY COMMANDER REMAINED AT FSB ROSS PREPARING FOR DEPARTURE FOR DUTY IN OKINAWA.

3. (S) UPON DEPARTING RYDER AND UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 1000 16AUG70 THE COMPANY (MINUS) CONDUCTED SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH CUPP AND POPULAR FORCE UNITS TWENTY-FIVE HUNDRED METERS SOUTHEAST OF RYDER. THIS PHASE OF THE OPERATION CONCLUDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND WITH ONLY MINOR CONTACT. THE COMPANY THEN MOVED TO ITS NIGHT POSITION (AT 965338) ARRIVING AT APPROXIMATELY 1800 16AUG70 FROM WHICH IT CONDUCTED SEVERAL NIGHT AND EARLY MORNING PATROLS WITHOUT CONTACT. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY 1050 ON 17 AUG, A CH-46 RESUPPLYING THE COMPANY DREW SMALL ARMS FIRE WHILE ATTEMPTING TO LAND. TWO UH1E GUNSHIPS AND TWO OV-10'S ATTACKED THE SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITION (AT 966332) APPROXIMATELY FIVE HUNDRED METERS SOUTHEAST OF THE COMPANY'S POSITION.

4. (S) SUBSEQUENTLY, AN AO REPORTED MOVEMENT IN THE SAME VICINITY AND A TWO SQUAD PATROL CLOSED THE AREA. SEVERAL VN WERE SEEN ENTERING A CAVE, HOWEVER, ONLY ONE FEMALE WAS APPREHENDED AND RETURNED TO THE COMPANY POSITION. UPON REACHING THE COMPANY BASE THE PATROL MEMBERS MOVED INTO THEIR FIGHTING HOLES.

PG 1 OF 4

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180850Z AUG 70

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**MCEO**

PAGE THREE RUMLLUA2355 S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y /  
EXCLUSIVE FOR

5. (S) AT APPROXIMATELY 1420 WHILE THE COMPANY WAS PREPARING TO DEPART THE POSITION, LT GOSIER DIRECTED THE 60MM MORTAR SECTION TO FIRE TWENTY ROUNDS AT THE PREVIOUS SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITION AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE AGAINST SNIPERS. TWO MORTARS WERE IN POSITION APPROXIMATELY TWENTY-FIVE METERS APART. THE LEFT (NORTH-EAST) MORTAR WAS LAID ON AN AZIMUTH OF 2200 MILS AND THE RIGHT (SOUTHWEST) ON AN AZIMUTH OF 2600 MILLS. BOT TUBES WERE DIRECTED TO FIRE AT A RANGE OF 450 METERS. THE LEFT TUBE WAS TO TRAVERSE RIGHT AND THE RIGHT TUE TO TRAVERSE LEFT. THE LEFT TUBE STARTED FIRING ITS ROUNDS FIRST WITH THE ROUNDS OBSERVED IMPACTING ON TARGET. AFTER THE LEFT TUBE HAD FIRED ABOUT FIVE ROUNDS, THE RIGHT TUBE COMMENCED FIRING AND IT APPEARED THAT ONE ROUND IMPACTED NEAR THE RIGHT FLANK OF THE TARGET WITH TWO OR THREE OTHERS IMPACTING TO THE LEFT OF THE FIRST ROUND.

6. (S) AT THIS TIME A MORTAR ROUND IMPACTED APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE METERS FROM THE MORTAR POSITION IN THE DIRECTION OF THE TARGET FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY FIVE OR SIX ADDITIONAL ROUNDS INCLUDING TWO WHICH IMPACTED TO THE REAR OF THE MORTAR POSITION. AS THE FIRST ROUND IMPACTED THE PERSONNEL WHO WERE PREPARING TO MOVE OUT REPORTEDLY RAPIDLY TOOK COVER IN THEIR

PAGE FOUR RUMLLUA2355 S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y /  
EXCLUSIVE FOR

HQLES, HOWEVER, THE COMPANY SUFFERED TWO KIA; TWELVE WIA EMERGENCY; THREE WIA PRIORITY; AND FIFTEEN WIA ROUTINE. IN ADDITION, THE FEMALE DETAINEE WAS KIA.

7. (S) THE LONG AXIS OF THE IMPACT ZONE COINCIDED WITH THE LONG AXIS OF THE TARGET WITH THE ROUNDS BEING WALKED FROM RIGHT TO LEFT SIMILAR TO THE DIRECTION OF TRAVERSE OF THE RIGHT MORTAR TUBE. MOST OF THE CASUALTIES OCCURRED WITHIN THE COMPANY COMMAND GROUP, INCLUDING THE COMPANY COMMANDER IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE MORTAR PITS, WHEN ONE ROUND STRUCK VEGETATION AND DETONATED APPROXIMATELY FOUR FEET ABOVE THE GROUND. A SECOND ROUND IMPACTED BETWEEN THE MORTAR PITS AND WAS THE SECOND MOST DAMAGING ROUND AND RESULTED IN THE TWO KIA.

8. (S) MEDEVAC WAS CALLED FOR AT 1427 WITH THE FIRST HELICOPTERS ARRIVING AT 1442 AT WHICH TIME THE TWENTY-ONE MOST SERIOUS CASES WERE EVACUATED. AT 1455 THE COMMANDING OFFICER, 3D BATTALION, 7TH MARINES ARRIVED ON THE SCENE. HIS CH-46 WAS USED TO EVACUATE THE REMAINING CASUALTIES. THE EVACUATION WAS COMPLETE BY 1510.

9. (S) UPON RECEIVING THE INITIAL RADIO REPORT OF INCOMING MORTAR FIRE FROM THE ACTING COMPANY COMMANDER COINCIDENT WITH THE REPORT THAT THE COMPANY WAS ALSO FIRING ITS MORTARS THE BATTALION COMMANDER

PG 2 OF 4

180807Z AUG 70

SECRET

**MCEO**

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

26

**MCEO**

PAGE FIVE RUALLUA2335 S E C R E T / S P E C I A T / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y /  
EXCLUSIVE FOR

IMMEDIATELY SUSPECTED A FRIENDLY OR FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT. AT THAT TIME THE ACTING COMPANY COMMANDER REPORTED THAT THE INCOMING HAD CEASED. WHEN QUESTIONED AS TO WHETHER HIS MORTARS WERE STILL FIRING THE ACTING COMPANY COMMANDER CONFIRMED THAT THEY WERE NOT. THE BATTALION COMMANDER THEN INFORMED THE COMPANY THAT HE WAS PROCEEDING TO THE SCENE AND THAT THE MORTARS WERE NOT TO BE MOVED NOR THEIR SETTINGS ALTERED.

AFTER ARRIVING AT THE SCENE THE BATTALION COMMANDER VERIFIED THAT THE SETTINGS ON BOTH MORTARS WERE CORRECT AND CONSISTENT WITH THE RANGE CARDS. HOWEVER, ONLY THE RIGHT MORTAR WAS POSITIONED FIRMLY. THE LEFT MORTAR'S BASE PLATE WAS NOT SECURE AND QUESTIONING OF THE COMPANY GUNNERY SERGEANT AND THE GUN CREWS ESTABLISHED THAT THE LEFT GUN HAD BEEN KNOCKED OVER BY AN INDIVIDUAL DIVING FOR COVER IN THE GUN PIT AT THE TIME THAT THE INCOMING WAS RECEIVED. SUPPOSEDLY, THE RIGHT TUBE HAD NOT BEEN MOVED OR RESET. IT WAS FURTHER CONTENDED BY THE GUN CREWS THAT THEY HAD NOT INTERCHANGED DATA AFTER THE INCIDENT. THE BATTALION COMMANDER IMPOUNDED THE WEAPONS AND REMAINING AMMUNITION AND CAUSED ALL ITEMS TO BE MOVED TO FSB ROSS WHERE THEY ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER.

PAGE SIX RUALLUA2335 S E C R E T / S P E C I A T / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y /  
EXCLUSIVE FOR

10. (S) EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT CRATERS DISCLOSED TWO 60MM MORTAR TAIL FIN ASSEMBLIES WITH THE SAME LOT DATA AS FOUND ON ONE UNFIRED H-E ROUND IN THE RIGHT MORTAR PIT. INTERROGATION OF THE MORTAR CREWS BROUGHT FORTH THE CONTENTION THAT TWO ROUNDS HAD BEEN LOST DURING THE MOVEMENT FROM FSB RYDER TO THE INCIDENT SITE. A CRATER ANALYSIS WAS NOT CONDUCTED ON 17 AUGUST, HOWEVER, ONE IS SCHEDULED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED ON 18 AUGUST INCIDENT TO AN UNDERWAY INVESTIGATION. A CURSORY EXAMINATION INDICATES AN EXTREMELY HIGH ANGLE OF IMPACT.

11. (S) THE BATTALION COMMANDER STATED THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY ALERT TO THE STATUS OF PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT AND COVER OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHEN HE FIRST ARRIVED ON THE SCENE. HE FOUND THE MAJORITY OF THE PERSONNEL IN PERIMETER FIGHTING HOLES, IN FLAK VESTS AND EITHER WITH THEIR HELMET ON OR IN THEIR HANDS. THE MINOR CASUALTIES IN THE LANDING ZONE WERE WITHOUT FULL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, PORTIONS OF THEIR EQUIPMENT HAD APPARENTLY BEEN REMOVED DURING THE TREATMENT OF THEIR WOUNDS. THE BATTALION COMMANDER QUESTIONED A NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AS TO THE PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT THAT WAS BEING WORN AT THE TIME THE MORTAR ROUNDS IMPACTED AND DETERMINED THAT THE COMPANY WAS PREPARING TO MOVE OUT AND AS A RESULT THE PERSONNEL HAD

BT  
2335

PG 3 OF 4

180850Z AUG 70

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET

**MCEO**

(26)

MCEO

OTTAZ YUN RUMLL UA2336 2300020-AAAA--RUHFMA RUMMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

O 180850Z AUG 70

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMMPA/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 ON FLAK VESTS AND HELMETS AND WERE EITHER IN THEIR FIGHTING HOLES  
 OR IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY GATHERING UP THEIR REMAINING EQUIPMENT.  
 12. (S) SHORTLY AFTER BEING INFORMED OF THE DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT  
 I PROCEEDED TO LZ BALDY, PICKED UP THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER AND  
 ARRIVED AT THE COMPANY POSITION AT 1615. MY OBSERVATIONS OF THE  
 PHYSICAL ASPECTS COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF THE BATTALION COMMANDER.  
 DISCUSSIONS WITH THE REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION COMMANDERS ESTABLISH  
 THAT THEIR IMMEDIATE IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE ROUNDS WERE FIRED BY  
 THE RIGHT MORTAR WITHIN THE COMPANY POSITION DESPITE THE FACT THAT  
 THE MAJORITY OF PERSONNEL QUESTIONED STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THEY  
 WERE IN FACT SUBJECTED TO A MORTAR ATTACK. IF SUCH AN ATTACK HAS  
 OCCURRED IT WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF A SERIES OF  
 HIGHLY IMPROBABLE COINCIDENT ACTIONS:  
 A. THE ENEMY FIRE WOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE BEEN INITIATED AT THE  
 PRECISE TIME THAT MIKE COMPANY'S RIGHT TUBE COMMENCED FIRING. IN

PAGE TWO RUMLL UA2336 SECRET/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/  
 EXCLUSIVE FOR

THIS REGARD, THE COMPANY DID NOT RECEIVE ENEMY MORTAR FIRE PRIOR  
 TO OR SUBSEQUENT TO THE INCIDENT IN QUESTION.

B. THE ATTACK WOULD HAVE HAD TO CONSIST OF APPROXIMATELY THE  
 SAME NUMBER OF ROUNDS FIRED BY THE RIGHT TUBE.

C. THE TRAVERSE OF THE ENEMY WEAPON WOULD HAVE HAD TO NEARLY  
 DUPLICATE THE TRAVERSE OF THE RIGHT MORTAR TUBE.

D. THE ENEMY WOULD HAVE HAD TO FIND AND FIRE THE TWO ROUNDS  
 BEARING THE EXACT LOT DATA AS FIRED BY MIKE COMPANY.

13. (S) THE ABOVE IMPRESSIONS ARE NOT MEANT TO PREJUDGE A MORE  
 FORMAL INVESTIGATION WHICH WAS INITIATED ON THE COMPANY POSITION  
 WITHIN TWENTY-FIVE MINUTES OF THE INCIDENT. I WILL INSURE AN  
 EARLY COMPLETION OF THE INVESTIGATION AND IN THE INTERIM I AM WITH-  
 HOLDING MY OPINION. I WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH ADDITIONAL DETAILS AS  
 THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.

BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2336

PG 4 OF 4

180850Z AUG 70

SECRET

MCEO

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MCEO

SECRET

VV PAC250 VV WING 181  
 PITAZYUW RUHKFMA2631 2321528-AAAA--RUMLMPA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 RUMLMPA -I- CG FIRST MARDIV  
 P 201928Z AUG 70 20AUG70 1951Z  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMLMPA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 INFO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF  
 BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN WIDDECKE INFO  
 LT GEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LT GEN JONES. MARINE CORPS  
 EYES ONLY. (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS) //N00000//  
 3/7 MORTAR INCIDENT (U)  
 A. CG FIRST MARDIV 180350Z AUG 70 (SPECAT) (S)  
 1. (S) I APPRECIATE BEING IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED OF THE  
 SUBJECT INCIDENT. NATURALLY, I VIEW IT WITH EXTREME  
 CONCERN, AS I DO OTHER FRIENDLY OR FRIENDLY INCIDENTS  
 THAT HAVE BEEN OCCURRING, AND I WISH TO DISCUSS THIS  
 MATTER WITH YOU IN DETAIL DURING MY FORTHCOMING  
 WESTPAC TRIP.

GP-4  
 BT  
 2631

SECRET

COPY 2 OF 7 COPIES

201928Z AUG 70

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

20

19

MCEB 20

27

SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

/////CORRECTED COPY/////

P 202220Z AUG 70  
FM CG MCB CAMPEN  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
INFO CMC

TOR: 21/0128Z AUG 70

CG FMFPAC  
CG III MAF

"EXCLUSIVE"

BT

SECRET / SPECAT / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY / EXCLUSIVE FOR  
MGEN WIDDECKE INFO LTGEN JONES, LTGEN MCCUTCHEON AND MGEN  
E.H. ANDERSON FROM MGEN BOWMAN / DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
SUBJ: GYSGT VORGEAS

A. MY 032106Z AUG 70 (S)

B. CG FMFPAC 242057Z JUL 70 (S) (NOTAL)

1. (S) REF A REFERS. SWORN STATEMENT OBTAINED BY CAMPEN NIS  
AGENT 18 AUG. WILL BE AIR MAILED UNDER SEPARATE COVER ASAP  
TO ACTION ADDEE.

2. (S) STATEMENT CONTAINS FIFTEEN ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING MIS-  
CONDUCT/MISMANAGEMENT OF SNCO CLUB SYSTEM.

3. (S) STATEMENT VERBOSE AND RAMBLING AND CONSIDERED TO BE  
OF LIMITED LEGAL VALUE OTHER THAN TO PERHAPS IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL  
AREAS FOR POSSIBLE INVESTIGATION.

4. (S) NIS AGENT WHO TOOK STATEMENT INDICATED SNM ADAMANT AND  
DESIRE REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY AND TO RETURN RVN. ALSO INDICATED  
HE BELIEVED SNM WHEN RELAD WILL PURSUE ALLEGATIONS THROUGH  
OTHER THAN MILITARY CHANNELS.

5. (U) REF B ADVISED THAT CMC EXTENDED SNM RELEASE DATE FROM  
30 JUN 70 TO 31 AUG 70. UODIR WILL EFFECT RELAD SNM 31 AUG 70.  
SNM IN FMCR AND AS SUCH CAN BE RECALLED IF REQUIRED.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTIONS CORRECTED BY  
ORIGINATOR

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FMFPAC-GEN 21003 (3/1)  
0101-V04-003

20

22

"MCEO"  
20 SECRET

28

MCEO

SECRET

VV DIVVY070 VV PAC941  
 PTTAZYUW RUMLLUA2786 2331210-AAAA--RUMLMPA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 FLC-T-PAC  
 FLC-T-MAF  
 P 211210Z AUG 70  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TO RUMLMPA/C G FMFPAC  
 INFO RUMLMPA/C G III MAF  
 BT

SECRET/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN  
 JONES, INFO LT GEN MCCUTCHEON, FROM M GEN WIDDECKE/DELIVER DURING  
 WORKING HOURS

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON UNUSUAL INCIDENT REPORT

A. MY 180850Z AUG 70 (SPECAT) (S)

B. YOUR 201928Z AUG 70 (SPECAT) (S)

1. THIS IS THE FIRST OF A SERIES OF SUBSEQUENT REPORTS ON THE  
 INCIDENT REPORTED BY REF (A) CONCERNING CASUALTIES SUSTAINED ON  
 17 AUGUST 70 BY M COMPANY, 7TH MARINES.

2. SUBSEQUENT TO REF (A), CPL G. C. GUYER DIED FROM WOUNDS  
 RECEIVED ON THAT OCCASION. THIS MAKES A TOTAL OF 3 KILLED AND  
 29 WOUNDED IN THE INCIDENT.

3. BASED ON CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION, IT  
 APPEARS PROBABLE THAT THE INCIDENT WAS A FRIENDLY OR FRIENDLY.  
 FINAL DETERMINATION IS SUBJECT TO THE COMPLETED FINDINGS OF THE

PAGE TWO RUMLLUA2786 SECRET/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/  
 EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 INVESTIGATION WHICH IS PROCEEDING. BASED ON THE PROBABILITY, TODAY  
 THIS HEADQUARTERS SUBMITTED KNOWN DETAILS INTO NORMAL SERIOUS  
 INCIDENT REPORTS (SIR) CHANNELS.

4. AS OF THIS DATE, NO PRESS INQUIRIES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED, NOR  
 HAS A PRESS RELEASE BEEN MADE. AM CONSIDERING RELEASING A BRIEF  
 PRESS RELEASE IN NEXT DAY OR SO TO FORESTALL ANY SUBSEQUENT  
 ALLEGED WITHOLDING OF INFORMATION. ALL OF THIS DEPENDS ON WHAT  
 INFORMATION IS DEVELOPED OR IF QUERIES ARE RECEIVED.

5. I WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH ADDITIONAL DETAILS AS  
 THE INVESTIGATION PROCEEDS, AND WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS  
 THIS INCIDENT AS WELL AS THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF FRIENDLY OR  
 FRIENDLY DURING YOUR VISIT AS INDICATED IN REF (B).

BEST REGARDS.

G-4

BT

2786

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

211210Z AUG 70

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

21

12

MCEO

29

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

VVPAC952 TOR: 02/0522Z AUG 70  
PTTAEYUN RUHNFMA2906 234040C-AAAA--RUWLNPA.  
ZNY AAAAA  
P 220406Z AUG 70  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO RUWLNPA/CG III MAF  
BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTHERON  
FROM LTGEN JONES, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER  
DURING WORKING HOURS. //NOOOOO//

CINCPAC VISIT (U)

A. CG III MAF 201301Z AUG (TS/SPECAT/MCEO)

1. (TS) APPRECIATE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN REF A, AS  
ADM MCCAIN HAD NOT SURFACED THESE THOUGHTS TO  
ME OR, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, TO HIS STAFF. I CONCUR WITH  
THOUGHTS EXPRESSED BY LTGEN LAN THAT THE THREAT IS  
FROM LAOTIAN APPROACHES VIS-A-VIS THE DMZ. ADDI-  
TIONALLY, CONCUR WITH YOU THAT EFFORTS NOW TO SEEK  
INCREASED AUTHORITY FOR ALLIED TROOPS IN THE DMZ AREA  
WOULD BE MISSPENT. THE ADMIRAL RETURNS SOON AND  
I'LL FEEL HIM OUT ON SUBJECT PRIOR TO LEAVING FOR MY  
VISIT WITH YOU.

2. (TS) ADM MCCAIN HAS ALSO VOICED TO ME HIS EXTREME

PAGE TWO RUHNFMA2906 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
CONCERN OVER THE BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL STUDY.  
CONVERSELY CMC RECENTLY TOLD ME THAT HE HAS  
CONCLUDED THAT WE WILL NOT FARE TOO BADLY. THUS  
FAR I AM UNAWARE OF ANY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
PANEL'S RECOMMENDATIONS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT  
2906

III MAF 100/4

22

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"MCEO"  
TOP SECRET

(30)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

RUMLLUA2949 234233Z-AAAA--RUMLMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 222330Z AUG 70

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUMLMPA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E F O R L T G E N J O N E S / I N F O  
 E X C L U S I V E F O R L T G E N M C C U T C H E O N F R O M M G E N W I D D E C K E / M A R I N E C O R P S  
 E Y E S O N L Y / D E L I V E R D U R I N G W O R K I N G H O U R S /

A. CG 1ST MARDIV 030310Z AUG 70 (NOTAL)

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO INFORM YOU OF AN INCIDENT WHICH I HAVE DIRECTED BE THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATED AND WHICH MAY INVOLVE OFFICERS AND SENIOR NCOs NO LONGER IN THE DIVISION BUT SERVING IN OTHER MAJOR COMMANDS.

2. IN REFERENCE A, THIS HEADQUARTERS DIRECTED THAT CANTONMENTS, FIRE SUPPORT BASES AND BILLETING, WAREHOUSING AND MESSING AREAS THROUGHOUT THE DIVISION TAOR BE POLICED TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY MEET NORMALLY ACCEPTED MARINE CORPS STANDARDS, AND FURTHER THAT THIS CLEAN-UP CAMPAIGN BE COMPLETED BY 1 SEPT 1970. THIS, OF COURSE, IS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED CONSISTENT WITH THE TACTICAL SITUATION AND LOCAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

PAGE TWO RUMLLUA2949 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E F O R

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

3. DURING THE CLEANUP CAMPAIGN OF THE 4TH BN, 11TH MARINES MAINTENANCE AREA, N HILL 34, SEVERAL RUMORS RELATIVE TO BURIED EQUIPMENT SURFACED AND APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MISCELLANEOUS REPAIR PARTS WERE FOUND BURIED IN ONE AREA; SOME OF THE QUICKLY IDENTIFIABLE PARTS ARE A FIVE HP MOTOR FOR M109, TRAVERSING MECHANISM PARTS FOR M109, M109 RADIATOR, SHROUDING FAN FOR M109, ROAD WHEEL HUB FOR M109, AND GOVERNOR CONTROL PARTS. THE PARTS WERE DISCOVERED IN TWO ADJACENT AREAS NEXT TO THE MAINTENANCE BUILDING, ONE OF THE PARTS HAD PROTECTIVE WRAPPING ON IT; ONE OTHER PART HAD A PIECE OF THE FSN TAG ATTACHED TO IT; THESE TWO

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

222330Z AUG 70

FMFPAC-GEN (13/69)  
0101-V04-6601**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

EXCLUSIVE

MCEO

PARTS WERE EVIDENTLY SERVICABLE WHEN BURIED. FROM THE PRESENT CONDITION OF THE OTHER PARTS, IT IS NOT KNOWN IF THEY WERE SERVICEABLE WHEN BURIED. IN ANOTHER LOCATION CLOSE TO THE SAME BUILDING ALSO FOUND BURIED WERE ABOUT FORTY SETS OF NEW UTILITY CLOTHING, SOME NBC GEAR (CHEMICALLY TREATED BAGS) AND SOME NEW AND OLD FOUL WEATHER GEAR. AVAILABLE INFORMATION REVEALS THAT THESE ITEMS WERE BURIED SOMETIME DURING JANUARY-FEBRUARY AND IN APRIL 1970.

4. THE EQUIPMENT WAS FOUND BURIED DUE TO THE FACT RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS AND NCOS FOLLOWED THROUGH ON RUMORS AND TOOK POSITIVE

PAGE THREE RUMLLUA2949 C O N F I D E N T I A L /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE  
FOR/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ACTION TO DETERMINE IF IN FACT THERE WAS ANY BASIS TO THEM. ADDITIONALLY, THERE ARE ALSO RUMORS IN THE BATTALION THAT TWO M109'S WERE BURIED ABOUT THREE YEARS AGO UNDER THE PRESENT MAINTENANCE BUILDING AND THAT THE BUILDING WAS BUILT IN ITS PRESENT LOCATION TO HIDE THE GUNS. THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE BATTALION IS EXCAVATING TO LOCATE THESE WEAPONS.

5. AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION, I HAVE DIRECTED THE COMMANDING OFFICER, 11TH MARINES TO CONVEENE AN INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THIS AND RELATED MATTERS. WILL ADVISE RESULTS.  
BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2949

TOR: 23/0045Z AUG 70  
TOD PAC: 23/0056Z AUG 70

NNNN

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

222330Z AUG 70

EXCLUSIVE

MCEO

FMFPAC GEN 2100/1 (3/69)  
0101-VD4-6601

**CONFIDENTIAL**

31

MCEO

SECRET

VV PAC957  
 PTTAZ YUW RUHFMAS102 2352135--AAAA--RUMLMPA RUEOFIA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 RUMLMPA -I- CG III MAF  
 -I- CG FIRST MARDIV  
 P 232135Z AUG 70 23AUG70 2306Z  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMLMPA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 INFO RUEOFIA/CMC  
 RUMLMPA/CG III MAF  
 BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WIDDECKE INFO GEN CHAPMAN,  
 LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS)  
 DECLASSIFICATION OF FIRST MARDIV CORRESPONDENCE HAMLET 4 SON  
 THANG INCIDENT

1. REVIEW OF ALL FIRST MARDIV CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO (HAMLET  
 4 SON THANG INCIDENT INDICATES THAT INITIAL CLASSIFICATION  
 JUSTIFIED BY HIGHLY SENSITIVE NATURE OF INCIDENT, TACTICAL  
 LOCATION OF INVOLVED UNITS AND PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS  
 NO LONGER NECESSARY IN VIEW OF WIDESPREAD PUBLICITY OF TRIALS OF  
 COMPANION CASES AND INTERVENING TIME. POSSIBILITY OF PREJUDICE  
 TO GOVERNMENT CASE IF ALL YOUR CORRES DECLASSIFIED AND MADE IM-  
 MEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO CIVILIAN DEFENSE COUNSEL CONSIDERED  
 REMOTE. SHOULD CURRENT TRIAL RESULT IN CONVICTION OF PVT

PAGE TWO RUHFMAS102 S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 HERROD IMMEDIATE DISCLOSURE SHOULD PRECLUDE POSSIBILITY OF  
 RAISING LEGAL ISSUE OF NON ACCESSABILITY ON APPEAL. ADVERSE  
 PUBLICITY RESULTING FROM REFUSING DEFENSE COUNSEL ACCESS TO  
 CORRESPONDENCE FOR ANY REASON WOULD ALSO BE AVOIDED. IN VIEW  
 OF THE ABOVE, I RECOMMEND THAT ALL YOUR CORRESPONDENCE ON  
 INCIDENT BE DECLASSIFIED AND MADE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO  
 CIVILIAN COUNSEL. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3102

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

23

21

MGEOS

32

0 241027 ZYH ZFF-6 ZFF-3  
 PW 020 ARRANG COMUSMACV SAIGON  
 TO LTG MCCOYTON CG III MAF DANANG  
 INFO LTG MCCAFFREY DCS USARV LONG BINH  
 LTG SUTHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DANANG  
 ZEN

T O P S E C R E T MAC 11530 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING (U)

REF: A. CG, III MAF 180540Z AUG 70 (TS) SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE (NOTAL)  
 B. CG, III MAF 221600Z AUG 70 (TS) SPECAT (NOTAL)

1. (TS) REF A PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE MARINE CORPS INCREMENT FOUR TROOP LIST. REF B PROPOSED CERTAIN CHANGES IN INCREMENT 4 WHICH ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE MACV ALTERNATIVE.
  2. (TS) BOTH OF YOUR PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED IN DETAIL AND ARE BEING FAVORABLY CONSIDERED. BY SEPARATE MESSAGE CINCPAC HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO AUTHORIZE THE ACTION YOU PROPOSED IN REF B. WITH RESPECT TO THE REMAINING PORTION OF THE REF A PROPOSAL, YOUR PLANNING SHOULD PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN US ARMY AND MARINE CORPS SPACES WILL BE APPROVED; HOWEVER, UNTIL FINAL APPROVAL IS RECEIVED FROM JCS/CINCPAC ON OUR PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE, NO ACTION OTHER THAN PLANNING CAN BE TAKEN.
  3. (U) THE NEED FOR A TIMELY APPROVAL OF YOUR PROPOSED ACTIONS IS APPRECIATED. INFORMATION WILL BE RELAYED AS IT IS RECEIVED.
- WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS

225

8843

THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTIBILITY.

COPY 3 OF 4.

NNNN

TOP SECRET

24

13

22

TOP SECRET  
MCEO

////CORRECTED COPY////

PTTAYUW RUMFMAS195 237025Z-AAAA--RUMKPA. TOR: 25/0601Z AUG 70  
ZNY AAAAA

P 250637Z AUG 70  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO ZEN/CG THIRD MAF  
ZEN/CG I MEF  
ZEN/CG FORTIERS FMFPAC  
ZEN/CG FIFTH MEB  
INFO RUMKPA/CG III MAF  
BT

SPECAT  
"EXCLUSIVE"

T O P S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN OWENS, MGEN WILSON, BGEN HOFFMAN, BGEN DWYER, INFO LTGEN MCCUIPHEON FROM LTGEN JONES, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NOOOOO//  
FORCE PLANNING (U)

- 1. ADMIN FMFPAC 140417Z JUL 70 (S)
- 2. (TS) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO ALERT YOU TO SOME VERY LIKELY CHANGES IN MARINE REDEPLOYMENTS FROM VIETNAM.
- 3. (TS) REF A ADVISED THAT COMMAND OF CERTAIN UNITS WOULD BE PASSED TO YOU DURING INCREMENT IV (KEYSTONE ROBIN (ALFA) - 1 JUL 70 - 15 OCT 70). NEGOTIATIONS NOW

PAGE TWO RUMFMAS195 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO UNDERWAY INDICATE A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT SOME UNITS INCLUDED IN REF A WILL NOT REDEPLOY UNTIL A LATER DATE AND OTHERS NOT INCLUDED IN REF A WILL REDEPLOY BEFORE 15 OCTOBER 70. BECAUSE OF THE IMPACT ON YOUR PLANS, I WANT TO ALERT YOU IN ADVANCE OF THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT. REQUEST YOU TREAT THE INFORMATION ACCORDINGLY.

3. (TS) THE FOLLOWING IS NOT A CHANGE TO REF A BUT USES REF A TO INDICATE CHANGES WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE:

(A) DELETE THE FOLLOWING FROM REF A:

UNIT	RECEIVING CMD
DET, 1ST MAW HQ	CG I MEF
DET, MWCS-1	CG I MEF
MASS-3 (-)	CG 3D MAW
DET, HANDHS-1	CG I MEF
HANDHS-18 (-)	CG I MEF
HQ BN (-), 1ST MARDIV	CG 5TH MEB
HQ BTRY (-), 11TH MAR	CG 5TH MEB
1ST ENGR BN (-)	CG 5TH MEB
1ST RECON BU(-)	CG 5TH MEB

PG 1 OF 2

250257Z AUG 70

25

COPY 2 OF 02

"MCEO"  
TOP SECRET  
34

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE THREE RUMHFNAS 195 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

1ST MP BN (-)	CG 5TH MEB
DET 5TH COMM BN	CG 5TH MEB
1ST MI BN (-)	CG 5TH MEB

(B) ADD THE FOLLOWING TO REF (A):

UNIT	RECEIVING CMD
UNFA-314	CG 3D NAV
DET HANDMS-13 (INS)	CG 3D NAV
1ST 175 MM GUN BTRY	CG FORTRPS
CG C, 1ST TANK BN	CG 5TH MEB
5TH COMM BN (-)	CG 5TH MEB
DET, HQ BN 1ST MARDIV	CG 5TH MEB
2 COS, 1ST RECON BN	CG 5TH MEB
CG, 1ST MI BN	CG 5TH MEB

4. (TS) THE SUM OF THESE PROPOSED ACTIONS IS THAT ABOUT 1500 LESS MARINES THAN WE HAD PLANNED WILL REDEPLOY FROM RVN BEFORE 15 OCT 70. UNFORTUNATELY, THESE AND OTHER ACTIONS UNDERWAY WILL HAVE SERIOUS IMPACT ON OUR ALREADY TURBULENT PERSONNEL SITUATION. I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED AS MUCH IN ADVANCE AS I CAN. WARM REGARDS, GP-4

BT  
3195

COMM NOTE: DATE-TIME-GROUP CORRECTED BY ORIG. MESSAGE PREVIOUSLY DISTRIBUTED UNDER DTG 250247Z AUG 70.

Pg 2 OF 2

250257Z AUG 70

"MCEO"  
TOP SECRET

(134)

PTTEZYUN RUHHHOA3239 2370359-EEEE--RUMLMFA.

ZNY EEEEE  
P 250414Z AUG 70  
FM CINCPAC

TO RUMLMFA/CG III MAF  
INFO RHMVA/COMUSMACV  
RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

⑤ H 3

25 AUG 10 07 37Z

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM ADMIRAL MCCAIN

1. MY VISIT TO III MAF, WAS A HIGH POINT IN MY TRIP TO MR 1. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT YOUR MARINES ARE PROUD PROFESSIONALS IN EVERY SENSE OF THE WORD; PURSUING THEIR TASKS WITH DETERMINATION AND SELFLESS DEDICATION. I COMMEND EACH AND EVERY ONE OF THEM FOR THE OUTSTANDING JOB THEY ARE DOING.

2. PLEASE CONVEY MY COMMENDATIONS TO GEN FIDDICKE FOR HIS VERY LUCID BRIEFING ON 1ST MARDIV OPERATIONS FROM THE VANTAGE POINT OF HILL 425. ALSO, COMMEND YOUR PILOT FOR THE STIRRING RETURN TRIP TO DANANG; I THOROUGHLY ENJOYED IT.

3. YOUR EXCEPTIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR THIS DEMANDING ASSIGNMENT ARE AMPLY DEMONSTRATED IN THE CONTINUED OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OF THE MARINE FORCES IN THIS VITAL MILITARY REGION.

4. WARM REGARDS.

BT

#3239

NNNN

IN 16844/237-70

/ACK

250414 Z AUG 70

25

04

14

35

TOP SECRET

MCEO

SECRET

PAC NR 960 TOR: 252253Z AUG 70  
RTTZYUW RUEOFIA8287 2371953-AAAA--RUHFMA RUMLMPA.  
ZNY AAAAA  
RUHFMA -I- RUMLMPA (CG III MAF)  
R 251953Z AUG 70  
FM CMC  
TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
INFO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF  
BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN  
MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN VAN RYZ IN  
FORCE PLANNING //N000532 I//

- A. CG FMFPAC 082214Z AUG 1970 (TS) (SPECAT MCEO)
- B. CG FMFPAC 140321Z JAN 1970 (TS) (SPECAT MCEO)
- C. CMC 261220Z JAN 1970 (TS) (SPECAT MCEO)

- 1. (TS) AS YOU KNOW ALTERNATIVE C HAS NOW BEEN ACCEPTED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES AS IT RELATES TO FUTURE REDEPLOYMENTS. IN LIGHT OF THE PROJECTED REDEPLOYMENT TIME TABLE, I THINK IT ADVISABLE TO SURFACE THE ISSUE OF AN ASSIGNED MISSION FOR 3D MAB AT A TIME DEEMED APPROPRIATE TO KEITH.
- 2. (TS) IN REGARD TO A DANANG SECURITY MISSION FOR THE MAB, FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW POINT A STATIC DEFENSIVE ROLE SHOULD BE AVOIDED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. WE SHOULD NOT REORGANIZE THE RESIDUAL MAB IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO MAKE STATIC DEFENSE ITS

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA8287 T O P S E C R E T MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
LOGICAL MISSION. IN SHORT, CMC FAVORS RETAINING THE BALLANCED MAB  
RECOMMENDED IN REF B AND CONCURRED IN BY REF C.

3. (U) WARM REGARDS  
GP-4  
BT  
8287

"MCEO"

NNNN

25

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

53  
TOP SECRET  
(36)

CONFIDENTIAL

"MCEO"

"EXCLUSIVE"

PAC NR 918  
 OTTZYUW RUMLLUA3100 236020-AAAA--RUMMFA RUHMFMA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 O 240820Z AUG 70  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TO RUMMFA/CG FMFPAC  
 RUMMFA/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUHMFMA/CMC  
 BT

SPECAT

CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES, LTGEN MCCUTCHEON INFO FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN/FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.  
 DECLASSIFICATION OF CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING HAMLET 4 SON THANG INCIDENT

- A. CG FMFPAC 232155Z AUG 70
- B. CG FIRST MARDIV 262322Z FEB 70 (S)
- C. CG III MAF 290820Z FEB 70 (S)
- D. CG III MAF 272230Z FEB 70 (S)
- E. CG FIRST MARDIV 270731Z FEB 70 (S)
- F. CG FIRST MARDIV 271020Z FEB 70 (S)
- G. CMC 271425Z FEB 70 (S)
- H. CG FIRST MARDIV 280610Z FEB 70 (S)
- I. CG FIRST MARDIV 010435Z MAR 70 (S)

PAGE TWO RUMLLUA3100 CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCL FOR

- J. CG FIRST MARDIV 020330Z MAR 70 (S)
- K. CG FIRST MARDIV 030250Z MAR 70 (S)
- L. CG FIRST MARDIV 031435Z MAR 70 (S)
- M. CG III MAF 040540Z MAR 70 (S)
- N. CG FIRST MARDIV 042930Z MAR 70 (S)
- O. CG FIRST MARDIV 051450Z MAR 70 (S)
- P. CG FIRST MARDIV 061520Z MAR 70 (S)
- Q. CG FIRST MARDIV 080230Z MAR 70 (S)
- R. CG FIRST MARDIV 120925Z MAR 70 (S)
- S. CG FIRST MARDIV 130830Z MAR 70 (S)
- T. CG FIRST MARDIV 231315Z MAR 70 (S)
- U. CG FIRST MARDIV 310340Z MAR 70 (S)
- V. CG FIRS MARDIV 081006Z APR 70 (S)
- W. CG FIRST MARDIV 190811Z APR 70 (S)
- X. CG FIRST MARDIV 090550Z MAY 70 (S)
- Y. CG FIRST MARDIV 110629Z MAY 70 (S)
- Z. CG FIRST MARDIV 150935Z MAY 70 (S)
- AA. CG FIRST MARDIV 252555Z MAY 70 (S)
- BB. CMC 201824Z MAY 70 (S)
- CC. CG FIRST MARDIV 220540Z MAY 70 (S)

"MCEO"

PAGE 1 OF 2

FMFPAC-GE 100/1 (S)

COPY OF 4 COPIES

24

08

20

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE RUMLLUA3105 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C I A L / M A R I N E C O R P S  
EYES ONLY/EXCL FOR

DD. CG FIRST MARDIV 260700Z MAY 70 (S)  
EE. CG FIRST MARDIV 280146Z MAY 70 (S)  
FF. CG FIRST MARDIV 290900Z MAY 70 (S)  
GG. CG FIRST MARDIV 310400Z MAY 70 (S)  
HH. CG FIRST MARDIV 030625Z JUN 70 (S)  
II. CG FIRST MARDIV 070935Z JUN 70 (S)  
JJ. CG FIRST MARDIV 140216Z JUN 70 (S)  
KK. CG FIRST MARDIV 150630Z AUG 70 (C)

FOR ALL:

1. REFERENCE A RECOMMENDED THAT ALL MY CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE SON THANG INCIDENT BE DECLASSIFIED AND MADE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO CIVILIAN COUNSEL.
2. THE MILITARY JUDGE IN U.S. V HERROD HAS REQUESTED AND RECEIVED REFERENCES B THROUGH KK. HAVING REVIEWED THESE REFERENCES I NOW REQUESTS THAT REFERENCES B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, W, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, DD, II, JJ, AND KK (REPRESENTING 30 OF THE 37 REFERENCES) BE DOWNGRADED SO THAT CIVILIAN DEFENSE COUNSEL MAY HAVE ACCESS TO THOSE MESSAGES AND MAKE SUCH USE OF THEM AS THEY DESIRE IN THE DEFENSE OF PRIVATE HERROD. THE DEFENSE COUNSEL HAS OBTAINED A STAY IN THE TRIAL PRIOR TO PRESENTING HIS OPENING STATEMENT AWAITING ACTION ON THE MILITARY JUDGE'S REQUEST.

PAGE FOUR RUMLLUA3105 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C I A L / M A R I N E C O R P S  
EYES ONLY/EXCL FOR

IT IS MY RECOMMENDATION THAT ALL 37 REFERENCES BE DOWNGRADED SO AS TO MAKE THE COMPLETE FILE AVAILABLE TO THE COURT.

3. IN CONSONANCE WITH REFERENCE A AND AS ORIGINATOR, ALL CG 1ST MARINE DIVISION MESSAGES ARE DOWNGRADED THIS DATE TO UNCLASSIFIED. THESE ARE REFERENCES B, E, F, H, I, J, K, L, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, AA, CC, DD, EE, FF, GG, HH, II, JJ, AND KK.
4. FOR CG FMFPAC. REQUEST REFERENCE A BE DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED AND THAT ALL CAVEATS BE REMOVED. FURTHER RECOMMEND THAT CMC BE REQUESTED TO DOWNGRADE REFERENCES G AND BS TO UNCLASSIFIED AND ALL CAVEATS BE REMOVED.
5. FOR CG III MAF. REQUEST REFERENCES C, D, AND M BE DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED AND THAT ALL CAVEATS BE REMOVED.
6. FOR ALL. IMMEDIATELY AFTER NOTICE IS RECEIVED THAT THE REQUESTED DECLASSIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN EFFECTED, THE COMPLETE DECLASSIFIED FILE, INCLUDING THIS MESSAGE, WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE COURT SO AS TO BE AVAILABLE TO CIVILIAN DEFENSE COUNSEL. LISEN MCCUTCHEON HAS PROPOSED ACTIONS. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3105

PAGE 2 OF 2

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

REF ID: A66666  
FORM 100-1 (3/69)  
0101-104-6601

**CONFIDENTIAL**

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MCEO

PTTZYUW RUHHPWAS387 2381916-AAAA--RUMLMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 261916Z AUG 78

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCOUCHIEON  
FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER  
DURING WORKING HOURS. //N63012//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. (TS) I AM CONSIDERING SENDING THE BELOW QUOTED  
MESSAGE TO CMC AND AM FORWARDING IT IN ADVANCE OF  
MY VISIT 3-4 SEPT FOR REVIEW BY YOU AND YOUR STAFF.  
I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS  
AND WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU DURING MY  
VISIT. MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

QUOTE:

1. (TS) IN ANTICIPATION OF ULTIMATE APPROVAL BEING  
GIVEN TO RELOCATION OF HQ III MAF TO OKINAWA, I HAVE  
PROPOSED HEREIN MISSION, TASKS, AND T/O FOR HQ III MAF  
ON OKINAWA. THE BASIS FOR THIS PROPOSAL IS MARINE  
CORPS TABLE OF ORGANIZATION NUMBER M-4918, FORCE

PAGE TWO RUHHPWAS387 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

HEADQUARTERS MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. IT IS  
PLANNED THAT THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, EMPLOYMENT,  
ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, INTELLIGENCE,  
AS WELL AS THE CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION,  
RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS PRESCRIBED IN TABLE OF  
ORGANIZATION M-4918, WOULD APPLY TO HQ III MAF.

2. (TS) HQ III MAF MISSION. TO EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL  
OF ASSIGNED FORCES NORMALLY CONSISTING OF THE 3D  
MARINE DIVISION (-)(REIN), THE 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING,  
3D FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT (-) AND OTHER FORCE COMBAT,  
COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS AS  
MAY BE ASSIGNED.

3. (TS) HQ III MAF TASKS

A. AS CTF 79, CARRY OUT SUCH TASKING AS IS ASSIGNED  
BY CONSEQUENTFLT.

B. PROVIDE HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS TO COMMAND  
DEPLOYED SPECIAL LANDING FORCES AND BE PREPARED TO  
PROVIDE A NEB HEADQUARTERS WHEN REQUIRED.

C. ESTABLISHED AND MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH  
COMNAVBASESUBIC FOR MATTERS CONCERNING THE MAINT-

MCEO

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

261916Z AUG 78

EXCLUSIVE

III MAF 2100

COPY 2 OF 19 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

MCEO

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3387 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

NANCE AND USE OF THE SLF CAMP, SUBIC.

D. COORDINATE, CONTROL, AND SUPERVISE THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (MAP) TRAINING FOR PACON MAP COUNTRIES CONDUCTED BY MARINE UNITS ON OKINAWA AND JAPAN.

4. (TS) HQ III MAF T/O

A. T/O AS SPECIFIED IN TABLE OF ORGANIZATION NUMBER M-4918 WITH FORCE COMMANDER SECTION MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS TO PROVIDE FOR A LIEUTENANT GENERAL: (CHANGES INDICATED BY \$)

LINE	BILLET DESCRIPTION	RANK	MOS
1	\$ FORCE COMMANDER SECTION		
2	\$ FORCE COMMANDER	\$ LGEN	9903
3	AIDE	\$ MAJ	9910
4	AIDE	\$ CAPT	9910
5	\$ SERGEANT MAJOR	\$ SGTMAJ	\$ 9999
6	\$ FOOD SERVICES TECHNICIAN	\$ MSGT	\$ 3382
7	\$ COOK SPECIALIST	SGT	\$ 3372
8	\$ STENOGRAPHER	\$ SGT	\$ 0142

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA3387 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

\$ 8A \$ MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR \$ SGT \$ 3931  
\$ 8B \$ COOK SPECIALIST \$ SGT \$ 3372

B. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT III MAF WILL BE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE. IT IS ENVISIONED THAT THESE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE LESS THAN THE TOTALS REFLECTED IN TABLE OF ORGANIZATION NUMBER M-4918.

5. (TS) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

A. COMMAND LESS OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF HQ III MAF AND MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS WILL BE RETAINED BY CG FMFPAC.

B. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF, AS TF 79, WILL BE EXERCISED BY COMSEVENTHFLT.

C. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF UNITS ASSIGNED TO III MAF WILL BE EXERCISED BY CG III MAF.

UNQUOTE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3387

EXCLUSIVE

MCEO

TOR: 26/2120Z AUG 70

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

261916Z AUG 70

NNNN

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS CG  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE *W.D. Dault*  
III MAF FORM 5216 (REV 6-69)

**SECRET**

OPERATION CODE X- ORIGINATOR A- ACTION/COGNIZANCE C- COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I- INFORMATION S- SIGNATURE			FROM FMFPAC		DATE 26Aug70	
			SERIAL NO/CONTROL DATE 261917Z		COPY NO 2 OF 4 COPIES REC'D	
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT
			IN	OUT		
	CG					Redeployment Planning (U)
	DCG					
	C/S					REMARK
	DC/S					
	DCS PLANS					DISPOSITION
	DEP CORDS					
	DSA ICTZ					<input type="checkbox"/> RETAIN FOR ___ MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY AFTER ROUTING <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FOR PERMANENT RETENTION
	S/S					
	G-1					SECTION
	G-2					
	G-3					SIGNATURE
	G-4					
	G-5					
	G-6					
	ADJ					<i>See last</i> Care this copy to BGen Doehler. His signature is at top. Pl keep or a receipt. <i>fy</i>
	AWARDS					
	CAP					SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
	CHAP					
	CIB					USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE
	COMP					
	DENT					SECRET
	ENGR					
	FOODS					40
	FSEO					
	HQ CMDT					DECLASSIFIED
	INSP					
	MTO					
	NJA					
	OPANAL					
	ORD					
	PMO					
	POSTAL					
	PROTO					
	PSYOPS					
	RDT & E					
	REPRO					
	SJA					
	SPL SERV					
	SUPPLY					
	FORMED O					
	SBC					
	TCC					
	SOT MAJ					

26

19

SECRET

40

**CONFIDENTIAL****"MCEO"**

RTIAZYUW RUHFMA3389 2381918-AAAA--RUMMPA RUEOFIA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 R 261918Z AUG 70  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO RUMMPA/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUEOFIA/CMC  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, INFO  
 GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES  
 ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS //N00000//  
 MACV DIRECTIVE 95-4 OF 15AUG70 (U)  
 1. (C) MANY THANKS FOR THE ADVANCE COPY OF SUBJECT  
 DIRECTIVE AND COPY OF YOUR LETTER TO CMC. THE  
 PRESENT AND FUTURE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CLEAR AND  
 DECISIVE DOCUMENT, THE NEED FOR RESOLUTION PRIOR  
 TO THE ARRIVAL OF GENERAL CLAY, AND THE MAGNITUDE  
 OF YOUR EFFORTS IN ACHIEVING YOUR GOAL ARE FULLY  
 APPRECIATED BY ME AND BY MY STAFF. PLEASE ACCEPT  
 OUR SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3389

TOR: 27/2048Z AUG 70

NNNN

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE

261918Z AUG 70

**"MCEO"**FMFPAC GEN 100/1 3/70  
0101-V04-66**CONFIDENTIAL**

40

**CONFIDENTIAL**

VV WING203  
 RTTCZYUW RUHHFMA3649 2400414-CCCC--RUMLMPA.  
 ZNY CCCCC

FLC -T- CG III MAF  
 -T- CG FIRST MAW

R 280414Z AUG 70  
 FM ADMIN FMFPAC  
 TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF  
 RUMLMPA/CG FIRST MAW  
 BT

28AUG70 0710Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON AND MGEN  
 ARMSTRONG FROM MAJGEN ADAMS //N00000//

- A. CG III MAF 260645Z AUG70 NOTAL (MCE O)
- B. CG FIRST MAW 210906Z AUG70 NOTAL (MCE O)
- C. CG FIRST MAW 240015Z AUG70 NOTAL (MCE O)

1. (C) IT IS NOTED THAT INCIDENTS REPORTED REF A ARE LATE  
 ENTRIES; THAT ALL ARE FROM MAG-13; AND THAT AT LEAST TWO ITEMS  
 CAN BE IDENTIFIED WITH GYSGT FEDRICK'S LETTER DISCUSSED IN REFS  
 B AND C. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THERE VERY WELL MAY HAVE  
 BEEN ATTEMPTS TO COVER UP RACIAL PROBLEMS OR AT LEAST TO TEND TO  
 IGNORE THEM.

2. (C) FOR CG FIRST MAW. REQUEST YOU REVIEW S.I.R. REPORTING  
 PROCEDURES AND ENSURE THAT SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS COMPLY WITH  
 INTENT AS WELL ON CONTENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS.

3. (C) REQUEST YOU INSURE THAT ALL ECHELONS OF YOUR COMMANDS

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA3649 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR  
 UNDERSTAND THAT THIS MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM MUST BE FACED.  
 ALL INCIDENTS MUST BE REPORTED IAW EXISTING REGULATIONS SO  
 THAT THE DATA PROVIDED CAN BE USED AT ALL ECHELONS TO  
 COMBAT THE PROBLEM. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

3649

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

280414Z AUG 70

FMFPAC GEN 2100/1 (99)  
 0101-V04-1

28 04 14 **CONFIDENTIAL**

(41)

SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

P 290810Z AUG 70  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 INFO CMC  
 CG III MAF  
 CG MCB CAMPEN

BT

SECRET/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/  
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, MGEN BOWMAN AND  
 MGEN E. E. ANDERSON FROM MGEN WIDDECKE. DELIVER DURING WORKING  
 HOURS.

A. CG MCB CAMPEN 202220Z AUG70 (SPECAT) (S)

1. (U) REFERENCE A REFERS.
2. (S) THE SWORN STATEMENT OF GYSGT VORGEAS WAS RECEIVED ON 27 AUGUST 70. THE NATURE OF THE ALLEGATIONS SET FORTH IN THE STATEMENT WARRANTS THE REOPENING AND EXPANDING OF EARLIER INVESTIGATIONS. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY TWO SEPARATE BUT COORDINATED EFFORTS. THE ALLEGED CRIMINAL ASPECTS WILL BE INVESTIGATED BY THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE. THOSE ALLEGATIONS WHICH RELATE TO THE MANAGERIAL OPERATIONS OF THE ENTIRE FIRST MARINE DIVISION CLUB SYSTEM WILL BE INVESTIGATED BY THIS COMMAND.
3. (U) AT THIS TIME I DO NOT FORESEE A REQUIREMENT TO RETAIN GYSGT VORGEAS ON ACTIVE DUTY. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

29  
 FMFPAC-GEN 100/3 (3/77)  
 0101-V04-66

08

"MCEO"  
 70  
 SECRET  
 (42)

**SECRET**

TOR: 291607Z AUG 70

PTIAZYUW RUM L U A 3 7 6 1 2 4 1 0 8 1 2 - A A A A - - R U M L M P A .

ZNY AAAAA

FLC-I-MAF

FLC-I-PAC

P 290812Z AUG 70

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUM L M P A / C G F M F P A C

INFO RUM L M P A / C G I I I M A F

BT

S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y / E X C L U S I V E F O R L I G E N J O N E S ,  
I N F O L I G E N M C C U T C H E O N , F R O M M G E N W I D D E C K E / D E L I V E R D U R I N G W O R K I N G  
H O U R S

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON UNUSUAL INCIDENT REPORT

A. MY 180850Z AUG 70 (SPECAT) (S)

B. MY 211210Z AUG 70 (SPECAT) (S)

C. MY 240725Z AUG 70 (C)

1. THIS IS MY SECOND REPORT TO YOU ON THE INCIDENT INITIALLY  
REPORTED BY REF A AND AMPLIFIED BY REF B CONCERNING CASUALTIES  
SUSTAINED FROM 60MM MORTAR FIRE ON 17 AUGUST 70 BY M COMPANY,  
7TH MARINES.

2. A PRELIMINARY, INFORMAL, JAG MANUAL INVESTIGATION COMPLETED ON  
23 AUGUST 70 REVIEWED BY CO 3D BN, 7TH MAR, BY CO 7TH MAR, AND NOW  
AT THIS HEADQUARTERS, CONTAINS ABUNDANT SUPPORTING EVIDENCE THAT  
THE INCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY MISAPPLICATION OF FRIENDLY FIRE ON OUR

PAGE TWO RUM L U A 3 7 6 1 S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y /  
EXCL FOR

OWN MARINES. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS DESIGNEDLY LIMITED  
IN SCOPE AND WAS NOT INTENDED TO FIX RESPONSIBILITY. NEVERTHELESS,  
IT DID REVEAL INDICATIONS OF IMPROPER SUPERVISION.

3. IN CONSEQUENCE, ON 24 AUGUST 70, THE CO, 3D BN, 7TH MARINES  
CONVENED A ONE-MAN, INFORMAL, JAG MANUAL INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE  
FURTHER INTO ALL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT, THE CAUSE  
OF DEATHS AND INJURIES TO U.S. PERSONNEL AND THE ONE VIETNAMESE,  
SUSTAINED ON 17 AUG 70. THIS LATTER INVESTIGATION WILL ALSO MAKE  
LINE OF DUTY/MISCONDUCT DETERMINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ALL INJURED  
MARINES, AND WILL ADDRESS ITSELF FURTHER TO SUCH DISCIPLINARY OR  
ADMINISTRATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS AS MAY APPEAR TO BE WARRANTED.

4. AS OF THIS DATE, PRESS INQUIRY INTO THE INCIDENT HAS NOT BEEN

MADE NOR HAS A PRESS RELEASE BEEN ISSUED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS. IN  
VIEW OF THE CONTINUING INVESTIGATION I HAVE DECIDED NOT TO INITIATE  
A PRESS RELEASE AT THIS TIME. DEPENDENT UPON THE RESULTS OF THE  
INVESTIGATION, IT MAY BE DESIRABLE TO RECONSIDER THIS DECISION AT  
A LATER DATE.

5. IN ADDITION TO THE INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REF C RELATIVE TO  
REQUIRED COMMAND ACTIONS TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT, ON 27  
AUG 70, ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS ON THE MATTER WERE GIVEN BY ME AT

PAGE ONE OF TWO

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FMFPAC-GEN 210/3 (3/70)  
0101-V04-6603

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SECRET  
43

SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE THREE RUMLLUA3761 S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y /  
EXCL FOR

A DIVISION COMMANDERS CONFERENCE ATTENDED BY ALL COMMANDERS IN-  
CLUDING INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AND SEPARATE BATTALION COMMANDERS.  
6. FURTHER DETAILS OF SIGNIFICANT NATURE WILL BE PROVIDED TO YOU ON  
A CONTINUING BASIS SHOULD THEY SURFACE AS A RESULT OF THE ON-GOING  
INVESTIGATION. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT  
3761

PAGE TWO OF TWO

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43

**CONFIDENTIAL**

TOR: 291615Z AUG 70

PITAZ YW RUMLL UA3762 2410814-AAAA--R UMLMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

FLC-T-MAF

FLC-T-PAC

P 290814Z AUG 70

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

INFO RUMLMPA/CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
INFO LTGEN JONES FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM BGEN HAYNES IS  
QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE:

P 282154Z AUG 70

FM CMC

TO CG FIRST MARDIV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR MGEN WIDDECKE FROM BGEN  
HAYNES MSG FR CONG STOKES TO CAPT HARGROVE (U)

1. (C) FOLLOWING INQUIRY PASSED FOR CAPTAIN  
HARGROVE COUNSEL FOR PFC SAMUEL G. GREEN JR, 254  
82 27 USMC FROM CONGRESSMAN STOKES :

PAGE TWO RUMLL UA3762 C O N F I D E N T I A L /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS  
EYES ONLY/EXCL FOR

- (A) HAVE YOU EVER SEEN OR DO YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF PFC GREEN EVER BEING HANDCUFFED OR IN LEG IRONS? IF SO GIVE SPECIFICS.
- (B) TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS GREEN EVER BEEN PLACED IN A STRAIGHT JACKET OR GAGGED?
- (C) HAS GREEN EVER BEEN PLACED ON DIMINISHED RATIONS OR REDUCED DIET? IF SO FOR HOW LONG? GIVE DATES.
- (D) WHAT WAS GREEN'S WEIGHT TODAY? REQUEST YOU WITNESS WEIGHING OF GREEN.
- (E) WERE YOU PRESENT WHEN GREEN WAS ALLEGEDLY WEIGHED BY SGT COOPER?
- (F) DOES GREEN HAVE FREE ACCESS TO WEIGH HIMSELF UNSUPERVISED AT ANY TIME HE DESIRES? HE TOLD ME THAT HE WEIGHED 164 POUNDS WHEN HE WENT ON REDUCED RATS AND WEIGHED 132 WHEN HE TALKED WITH ME ON 6 AUG 70.
- (G) WAS GREEN WEIGHED BY SGT COOPER AND WAS ANYONE ELSE PRESENT? WHAT WAS WEIGHT AT THAT TIME?
- (H) HAS GREEN BEEN ALLOWED TO CORRESPOND WITH FAMILY SINCE END OF TRIAL? IF SO HAS HE WRITTEN HIS MOTHER? IF NOT REQUEST

PAGE ONE OF TWO

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FMFPAC-GEN 1100/1 1576  
0101-V04-660

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"MCEO"  
"EXCLUSIVE"  
SPECAT  
"MCEO"  
CONFIDENTIAL

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

"EMPHATIC"

"MCEO"

PAGE THREE RUMLLUA3762 C O N F I D E N T I A L /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS  
EYES ONLY/EXCL FOR

YOU ASK GREEN TO CORRESPOND WITH MOTHER.

2. (U) REQUEST CAPT HARGROVE REPLY BY MESSAGE TO ME FOR DELIVERY TO  
CONG STOKES. UNQUOTE.

2. PFC GREEN IS PRESENTLY CONFINED IN THE U. S. ARMY, VIETNAM  
INSTALLATION STOCKADE, DANANG. HE WAS ORIGINALLY CONFINED IN THE  
III MAF CORRECTIONAL CENTER ON 23 FEBRUARY 1970. AND HE HAS REMAINED  
IN CONFINEMENT IN THE SAME FACILITY, SINCE THAT DATE.

3. PFC GREEN WAS CONVICTED OF 15 SPECIFICATIONS OF UNPREMEDITATED  
MURDER ON 15 AUGUST 1970. THE SENTENCE AWARDED BY THE COURT PROVIDED  
FOR DISHONORABLE DISCHARGE, CONFINEMENT AT HARD LABOR FOR 5 YEARS,  
TOTAL FORFEITURES AND REDUCTION TO E-1. PFC GREEN WAS REPRESENTED BY  
CAPTAIN JOHN J. HARGROVE, USMCR, A LAWYER CERTIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
ARTICLE 27(B), UCMJ.

4. IT IS NOTED THAT THE MESSAGE FROM CONGRESSMAN STOKES IS ADDRESSED  
TO CAPTAIN HARGROVE. CAPTAIN HARGROVE EXPECTS TO COMPLETE HIS REPLY  
TODAY. BEST REGARD .

GP-4

BT

3762

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PAGE TWO OF TWO

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"MCEO"

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(44)

**TOP SECRET**

PAC NR 960

TCR: 291615Z AUG 70

PTTZYUW RUEOFIA9824 2411453-AAAA--RUHHFMA RUMLMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

RUHHFMA-T-RUMLMPA

P 291453Z AUG 70

FM CMC

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MGEN ANDERSON/EYES ONLY/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY//N03120//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG III MAF 130854Z AUG70

B. CG III MAF 180540Z AUG 70

C. CG III MAF 221600Z AUG70

1. (S) REF A, B&C PROPOSED CERTAIN ADJUSTMENTS TO REEMPLOYMENT INCREMENT 4 USMC TROOP LIST THAT WOULD CHANGE THE GRADE/MOS SPREAD OF POST INCREMENT 4 MANNING LEVELS.
2. (S) ORDERS AND QUOTAS HAVE BEEN AND ARE BEING ISSUED FOR POST INCREMENT 4 REPLACEMENTS BASED ON PRESENT TROOP LIST.
3. (TS) IN ORDER TO LESSEN THE TURBULENCE OF MALDISTRIBUTION OF SKILLS ASSOCIATED WITH CHANGES TO TROOP LISTS, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL IF WE COULD BE FURNISHED FOR PLANNING

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA9824 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MGEN ANDERSON/EYES ONLY/PURPOSES.

A. A GRADE AND MOS BREAKDOWN OF THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS/DETACHMENTS LISTED IN REF A, B & C.

- |                      |             |
|----------------------|-------------|
| (1) HQ BN (-)        | (REF A & B) |
| (2) 1ST RECON BN     | (REF A & B) |
| (3) 1ST MT BN        | (REF A & B) |
| (4) DET FLC          | (REF A & B) |
| (5) DET H&MS-13(IMS) | (REF A & B) |
| (6) 5TH COMBN (-)    | (REF B)     |
| (7) 5TH COMBN (-)    | (REF C)     |

B. ADDITIONALLY, A GRADE AND MOS BREAKDOWN OF THOSE ORGANIZATIONS/DETACHMENTS INVOLVED IN FUTURE MODIFICATIONS TO APPROVED REDEPLOYMENT TROOP LISTS WOULD ASSIST MATERIALLY IN OUR PLANNING IF KNOWN AT THE TIME THEY ARE PROPOSED. OF COURSE, IF THE INFORMATION IS READILY AVAILABLE IN THE M/L DOCUMENTS WE DO NOT NEED IT.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

9824

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

MGEN

SPECAT

NNMAF 210

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TOP SECRET

(45)

**MCEO**

VV - PA6960

RTTZYUW RUMLMHA0000 2420800-AAAA--RUHHFMA RUMLMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

RUMLMPA-I-CG FMFPAC

R 300300Z AUG 70

FM CG FIRST MAW

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY PERSONAL FOR  
PERSONAL FOR MGEN ADAMS INFO LGEN MCCUTCHE ON FROM MGEN ARMSTRONG  
DEL DURING WORKING HOURS//N00000//

A. ADMIN FMFPAC 280414Z AUG 70 MCEO

B. CG III MAF 260645Z AUG 70 MCEO

C. III MAF 05830.1

D. CG FMFPAC 192002Z NOV 69 MCEO

1. CAN'T DENY THAT REPORTING HAS BEEN INCOMPLETE. MUST DENY THE  
ALLEGATION THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTS TO COVER UP RACIAL PROB-  
LEMS OR ANY TENDENCY TO IGNORE THEM. IT WAS MY SUMMARY OF MAG-13  
INCIDENTS TO CG III MAF PERSONALLY THAT CAUSED REF B TO BE A  
MAG-13 STORY. REF B INCLUDES INCIDENTS WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN  
REPORTED MORE PROMPTLY BY US AND WEREN'T AND IT ALSO INCLUDES  
INCIDENTS WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REPORTED HAD THEY NOT BEEN  
RELATED TO MAG-13. REFERENCES C AND D ARE OUR REPORTING GUIDES.

PAGE TWO RUMLMHA0000 C O N F I D E N T I A L MCEO, PERSONAL FOR  
ALTHOUGH AN INCIDENT COULD BE OF SUCH SIGNIFICANCE THAT REPORTING  
AS S.I.R. AND IN THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY REPORT WOULD BE REQUIRED  
THIS IS NOT NORMALLY THE CASE.

2. I SHOULD HAVE POINTED OUT MORE CLEARLY IN YOUR REF C THAT VISIT  
OF WING INSPECTOR AND TEAM TO MAG-13 WAS PLANNED BEFORE FEDRICK  
ISSUE RAISED BY YOUR PHONE CALL. IT WAS IN RESPONSE TO INCIDENTS  
REPORTED BY THE MAG. CO MAG-13 HAD INITIATED CORRECTIVE ACTION  
AND CHANGED A NUMBER OF PROCEDURES MAINLY RELATED TO SECURITY AND  
SUPERVISION. ADDITIONALLY, TWO BLACK MILITANTS WERE TRANSFERRED  
OUT OF MAG-13 ONE ADDITIONAL WAS GIVEN A SPECIAL COURT FOR ASSAULT  
AND ONE ACCEPTED UP IN LIEU OF COURT MARTIAL. WE HAVE IDENTIFIED  
A NUMBER OF POTENTIAL TROUBLE MAKERS BOTH BLACK AND WHITE AND  
HAVE THEM UNDER SUPERVISION. THE TOUGHEST PROBLEM IS IDENTI-  
FYING WHITE PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY NCO'S WHO PROVOKE AND HARASS  
BLACKS THUS PROVIDING FERTILE ATMOSPHERE FOR MILITANTS. FEDRICK'S  
IRRATIONAL LETTER INDICATES THAT HE IS UNDOUBTEDLY ONE OF THESE.

3. THE INSPECTOR AND HIS TEAM WILL VISIT MAG-16 NEXT AS IT APPEARS  
TO HAVE HIGHEST POTENTIAL FOR RACIAL INCIDENTS. TEAM OPERATES  
COLLECTIVELY AND INDIVIDUALLY TALKING WITH AS MANY PEOPLE AT ALL  
LEVELS AS ARE WILLING TO TALK. THEY LEARN CONSIDERABLE AND THEIR

PG 1 OF 2

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300300Z AUG 70

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**CONFIDENTIAL****MCEO**

(46)

MCEO

PAGE THREE RUMLNMA0088 C O N F I D E N T I A L MCEO, PERSONAL FOR  
 VERY PRESENCE SEEMED TO BE BENEFICIAL IN MAG-13. WE ARE FORTUNATE  
 TO HAVE A HIGH QUALITY BLACK SSGT WHO IS INDEPENDENT ENOUGH NOT  
 TO HAVE BEEN LABELED AS AN UNCLE TOM BY MOST BLACKS. THIS PROGRAM  
 IS IN ADDITION TO LEADERSHIP COUNCILS WHICH TOO OFTEN ARE BENIGN  
 IN CHARACTER OR TURN IN TO DEBATING SOCIETIES AT THE INITIATIVE  
 OF THE MILITANTS.

4. BE ASSURED THAT WE ARE FACING THIS MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM.

WARM REGARDS.

GF-4

BT

0088

PG 2 OF 2

300800Z AUG 70

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MCEO

(46)

**MCEO**

VV PAC961  
 RUMLL UA3978 2430505-AAAA--RUMLMPA.  
 ZNY AAAAA  
 RUMLMPA-I-CG III MAF  
 -I-CG FMFPAC

P 310505Z AUG 70 31AUG70 0633Z  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TO RUMLMPA/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUMLMPA/CG FMFPAC  
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E F O C L I G E N M C C U T C H E O N  
 I N F O L I G E N J O N E S F R O M M A J G E N W I D D E C K E / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y  
 ( D E L I V E R D U R I N G W O R K I N G H O U R S )

M E S S A G E F R O M C O N G R E S S M A N S T O K E S T O C A P T H A R G R O V E

A. MY 290814Z AUG 70 (C) (MCEO)

B. CMC 282154Z AUG 70 (C) (NOTAL)

1. REFERENCE A, WHICH QUOTED REFERENCE B, WAS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION.

2. IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUEST CONTAINED PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFERENCE B THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS SENT BY CAPT HARGROVE FOR DELIVERY TO CONGRESSMAN STOKES: QUOTE:

P 310223Z AUG 70  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TO CMC

PAGE TWO RUMLL UA3978 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E F O R  
 M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / P E R S O N A L F O R B E N H A Y N E S  
 M E S S A G E F R O M C O N G R E S S M A N S T O K E S T O C A P T H A R G R O V E

A. CMC 282154Z AUG 70 (C)

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUEST CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFERENCE A THE FOLLOWING IS CAPT HARGROVE'S RESPONSE FOR DELIVERY TO CONGRESSMAN STOKES QUOTE:

A. I SAW PFC GREEN HANDCUFFED TODAY 29AUG70 WHEN I VISITED HIM AT THE UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM INSTALLATION STOCKADE. THIS OCCURRED WHEN HE WAS TAKEN UNDER ESCORT BY ONE CHASER, FROM A BLOCK WHERE HE WAS CONFINED, TO THE STOCKADE AID STATION WHERE HE WAS WEIGHED. PRIOR TO THIS OCCASION, I DO NOT RECALL EVER SEEING HIM HANDCUFFED. PFC GREEN INFORMED ME ON 29AUG70 THAT HE HAD BEEN HANDCUFFED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS WHILE CONFINED IN B AND C BLOCKS, AND THAT HE SPECIFICALLY RECALLS BEING PUT IN LEG IRONS.

B. I WAS INFORMED BY PFC GREEN TODAY THAT HE HAD BEEN GAGGED AND PLACED IN A STRAIGHT JACKET ON APPROXIMATELY 6 OR 7 MAY 1970.

C. PFC GREEN INFORMED ME THAT HE HAS BEEN ON DIMINISHED RATIONS FOR A TOTAL OF 30 DAYS SINCE HE WAS CONFINED ON 23 FEBRUARY 1970. THE FIRST OCCASION WAS FROM 23 FEBRUARY 1970 TO ABOUT 12 MARCH 1970. THE

PAGE 1 OF 2

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310505Z AUG 70

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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MCEO

PAGE THREE RUMLL UA3978 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C I A L / E X C L F O R  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
 SECOND OCCASION WAS FROM ABOUT 1 APRIL 1970 TO 12 APRIL 1970.  
 D. GREEN WEIGHED 153 POUNDS, TODAY, 29 AUGUST 1970. I WITNESSED  
 THE WEIGH-IN AND THE STOCKADE DOCTOR STATED THE SCALE WAS REASONABLY  
 ACCURATE.  
 E. I WAS NOT PRESENT WHEN GREEN WAS ALLEGEDLY WEIGHED BY SERGEANT  
 COOPER.  
 F. PFC GREEN DOES NOT HAVE FREE ACCESS TO WEIGH HIMSELF AT  
 ANYTIME HE DESIRES.  
 G. I DO NOT KNOW IF GREEN WAS WEIGHED BY SERGEANT COOPER.  
 SERGEANT COOPER IS ON R&R AT THIS TIME THUS COULD NOT BE REACHED FOR  
 COMMENT. PFC GREEN STATED HE WAS WEIGHED BY SERGEANT COOPER BUT  
 COULDN'T REMEMBER IF ANYONE ELSE WAS PRESENT. GREEN ESTIMATED THE  
 WEIGH-IN TO HAVE OCCURRED IN LATE JULY OR EARLY AUGUST.  
 H. THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE BRIG STATED THAT GREEN HAS NOT  
 BEEN PREVENTED FROM WRITING HIS MOTHER. THE BRIG OFFICER FURTHER  
 INFORMED ME THAT THE MAIL FILE SHOWS THAT GREEN NEITHER SENT MAIL TO  
 HIS MOTHER NOR RECEIVED ANY MAIL FROM HIS MOTHER DURING THE MONTH OF  
 AUGUST. I ASKED GREEN TO CORRESPOND WITH HIS MOTHER. UNQUOTE.  
 3. CAPTAIN JOHN J. MARGROVE SENDS. UNQUOTE.  
 3. BEST REGARDS.

PAGE FOUR RUMLL UA3978 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C I A L / E X C L F O R /  
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

GP-4

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3978

PG 2 OF 2

3 125 05Z AUG 70

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MCEO

(47)