

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEXAUGUST OUTGOING

AUGUST

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2- 030800	CG XXIV CORPS INFO CG FIRST MAW/CG FIRST MARDIV(S) <i>(gp-4)</i> REDISPOSITION OF FORCES, QUANG NAM PROVINCE
3- 051323	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>(gp-4)</i> FORCE PLANNING - MAB ADD-ONS
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5- 061544	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING - SHORTFALLS ARMY PERSONNEL
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7- 090030	CG XXIV CORPS (TS) <i>gp-4</i> APPRAISAL OF ALLIED EFFORT IN SVN
8- 100031	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>gp-4</i> APPRAISAL OF ALLIED EFFORT IN SVN (READ XXIV CORPS 060255)
9- 110921	HCMC REED REASSIGNMENT <i>gp-4</i> COMSEVENTHFLT (C)
10- 130854	CG FMFPAC INFO CMC (TS) <i>gp-4</i> KEYSTONE ROBIN FORCE PLANNING
11- 180540	COMUSMACV INFO CMC/CGFMFPAC/CG XXIV CORPS (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING - STRETCHOUT OF MARINE REDEPLOYMENT
12- 200606	CG FMFPAC (C) <i>gp-4</i> THIRD MARINE DIVISION MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
13- 201301	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>gp-4</i> CINCPAC VISIT
14- 221600	COMUSMACV INFO CMC/CG FMFPAC/CG XXIV CORPS (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING - INTERIM MEASURES
15- 250615	CG FMFPAC INFO CMC (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING (READ COMUSMACV 241322)
16- 282258	CG FMFPAC INFO CMC (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING (READ COMUSMCAV 280426)

AUGUST

AUGUST

AUGUST

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEX

AUGUST OUTGOING

<u>DTG</u>	<u>ADDEE/CLASSIFICATION/SUBJECT</u>
17- 300017	CG FMFPAC (C) <i>Gp-4</i> MACV BILLETS/WIEU RPT
18- 310156	CG FMFPAC INFO CMC (C) <i>Gp-4</i> VISIT OF HON EGIL KROGH

AUGUST

AUGUST

AUGUST

TOP SECRET

**"MCEO"**

SPECAT

VV PAC#892

PTTZYUW RUMLMPA4766 2 130827-FAAA--RUHFMA.

TOP: 01/1521Z AUG 70

ZNY AAAAA

P 010827Z AUG 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

**"EXCLUSIVE"**

T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS//NO3100//

FORCE PLANNING - 3D MAB

A. CG III MAF LTR SER 00038070 DID 2 JUN 70 (IS)

B. CG XXIV CORPS 150320Z JUN 70 (S) (PASEP)

1. REF A PROVIDED PLANNING DATA FOR KEYSTONE ROBIN REDEPLOYMENTS TO INCLUDE UNIT DESIGNATIONS AND STRENGTHS TO REMAIN IN COUNTRY AS 3D MAB DURING PERIOD 1 JAN -

1 MAY 70

2. MAB PLANNING IN REF A WAS BASED ON EARLIER CGFMFPAC/CMC PREFERENCES FOR 10.8K MAB PLUS .6K CAG AND 1.2K ROLL-UP FORCE. COMPOSITION OF MAB WAS BASED ON PROVISION OF ALL AROUND BALANCED FORCE CAPABLE OF OPERATING ANYWHERE IN I MR BUT NOT PROVIDING AIR FIELD DEFENSE.

3. REF B AND EXPRESSIONS FROM XXIV CORPS STRONGLY INDICATE

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA4766 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO  
3D MAB WILL REMAIN IN DANANG AREA AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFENSE OF VITAL AREA AND ROCKET BELT. TO DATE, HOWEVER, NO EXPLICIT STATEMENT OF MAB MISSION HAS BEEN RECEIVED.

4. TO MEET DANANG VITAL AREA/ROCKET BELT DEFENSE MISSION, III MAF NOW EMPLOYS FOUR INF BNS, AN MP BN, AND LOCAL SECURITY/REACTION FORCES PROVIDED BY ALL UNITS IN AREA. IN THE MAB ONLY THREE INF BNS AND NO MP BN WILL BE LEFT. ADDITIONALLY, ABOUT 15,000 PERSONNEL WHO NOW CONTRIBUTE TO LOCAL SECURITY IN THE AREA WILL HAVE DEPARTED.

5. IN VIEW THESE CONSIDERATIONS, IT APPEARS HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO BEEF UP INFANTRY STRENGTH OF MAB BY A FOURTH BN. THERE IS NO WAY TO GET THIS BN WITHIN 12.6K WITHOUT GIVING UP SOMETHING. A CLOSE REVIEW OF MAB STRUCTURE INDICATES IT IS HEAVY ON LONG RANGE ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT FOR DANANG AREA MISSION. ALSO TANKS WOULD BE OF LITTLE VALUE IN THIS AO.

6. I THEREFORE INTEND TO PROPOSE AS THE PREFERRED MAB STRUCTURE FOUR INF BNS AND ONE FIXED WING SQDN. I AM STUDYING WHETHER THE A-4 OR THE A-6 WILL GIVE ME THE MOST RETURN. TO GAIN PROGRAM SPACES FOR THE 4TH INF BN, I WILL DELETE THE OTHER FIXED WING SQDN AND ITS SHARE OF H&MS/MABS, MAB-11 HQ.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

01  
III MAF 2100/4

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**"MCEO"**  
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

**"MCEO"**

SPECAT

**"EXCLUSIVE"**

PAGE THREE RUMMPA4766 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO  
 THE 175MM GUN BTRY, THE 155MM-SP HOW BTRY, AND THE TANK CO,  
 AND WILL REDUCE 2D CAG TO 400. THE 200 CAG SPACES RECOUPED  
 WILL BE RETAINED AS CUPPS, SO NO DEGRADATION IN THIS PROGRAM  
 WILL OCCUR. AS A HEDGE ON LONG RANGE ARTY, I WILL RETAIN  
 THE UNMANNED TOWED 155MM HOWS NOW IN HQ BTRY 11TH MAR.  
 7. INFORMAL LIAISON WITH XXIV CORPS AND 7TH AF AND OUR  
 EXPERIENCE WITH MACV IN INCREMENT 4 INDICATES THEY MAY  
 FAVOR RETENTION OF FW AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER BELIEVE WE SHOULD  
 LEAD WITH 4 BN OPTION BECAUSE IT IS WHAT WE NEED TO DO OUR  
 JOB AND SECONDLY IT WILL FORCE A DECISION ON MAB MISSION  
 OR PROVISION OF OTHER FORCES FOR VITAL AREA SECURITY. WE  
 WILL BE PREPARED TO FALL BACK ON TWO SQDN MAB IF NECESSARY.  
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

4766

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**"MCEO"**NNNN  
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TOP SECRET

O 030300Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
 FM ADMIN CG III MAF  
 TO CG XXIV CORPS  
 INFO CG FIRST MAW  
 CG FIRST MARDIV  
 ZEM

SECRET EYES ONLY/FOR LTGEN SUTHERLAND INFO FOR MGEN  
 WIDDECYE FROM MGEN ARMSTRONG/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS//N03000//  
 REDISPOSITION OF FORCES, QUANG NAM PROVINCE

1. I HAVE REVIEWED THE OVERLAY PROVIDED BY COL LEE LAST WEEK WHICH  
 INDICATES:

A. ASSUMPTION BY THE 5TH MARINES OF THE PRESENT AO'S OF  
 BOTH THE 5TH AND 7TH MARINES.

B. EXPANSION OF THE ROKMC AO TO THE NORTH AND TO THE  
 SOUTH

C. MOVEMENT OF 2D BN 5TH MARINES TO LZ BALDY.

D. TRANSFER OF AN HOA, ROSS AND RYDER TO ARVN AND  
 COLLOCATION OF 2/5 AND ARVN AT BALDY.

2. WE BELIEVE THIS IS A WORKABLE SOLUTION ALTHOUGH  
 NOT AS DESIRABLE AS THE ARVN ASSUMING AN AO ON THEIR  
 OWN AS WAS PROPOSED BY THE I CORPS STAFF AT YOUR HQ ON  
 20 JUL 70.

3. IN THE REDISPOSITION, THE FOLLOWING SHOULD ALSO  
 BE CONSIDERED:

A. THE RESULTING 5TH MARINES AO IS VERY LARGE AND IT WILL  
 NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR TWO USMC BNS TO PHYSICALLY CONTROL  
 THIS MUCH TERRAIN. THEREFORE IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT  
 MUCH OF THE AREA WILL HAVE TO BE COVERED BY RECON, AERIAL  
 OBSERVATION, OR THE ARVN.

B. THE EARLY TRANSFER OF AN HOA, ROSS AND RYDER TO THE  
 ARVN IS NECESSARY FOR SMOOTH REDEPLOYMENT AND REPOSITIONING.  
 ADDITIONALLY, IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE FOR LZ BALDY TO BE  
 TRANSFERRED TO THE ARVN WITH 2/5 REMAINING AS A TENANT,  
 THEREBY FACILITATING ULTIMATE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 5TH  
 MARINES.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

400

0001

COPY 3 / 4

SECRET

NNNN

03

08

00

(2)

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

PTTSZYUW RUHLMPA0663 2171323-9555--RUHNFMA.

ZNY AAAA

P 051323Z AUG 70

FM ADMIN IIX MAF

TO RUHNFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN HOUGHTON FROM BGEN MILLER/ MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS//N03106//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. JCS 042349Z AUG 70 (TS) (NOTAL)

B. CINCPAC 050413Z AUG 70 (TS) (NOTAL)

1. INFORMAL CONTACT WITH ACTION OFFICER ON MACV-JS STAFF INDICATES INFORMATION CONTAINED REFS A AND B, WHICH WE DO NOT HOLD, MAY HAVE CONSIDERABLE IMPACT ON MARCOR FORCE PLANNING. OUR ACTION OFFICERS WILL VISIT SAIGON TOMORROW FOR MORE INFORMATION BUT PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT MAB MAY BE REQUIRED TO REMAIN IN-COUNTRY UNTIL 1 JUL 71 OR LATER. ADDITIONALLY, UNITS WITHHELD BY MACV FROM INCREMENT FOUR (VINFA, NMM, MAC-4, RADIO BN) MAY NOT REDEPLOY IN INCREMENT FIVE AS NOW THOUGHT, BUT MAY BE HELD AS MAB ADD-ONS.

2. SUGGEST YOU OBTAIN REFS IF YOU DO NOT ALREADY HOLD. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED AS THINGS DEVELOP.

GP-4

BT

0663

TOD; 051355Z AUG 70

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE

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051323Z AUG 70

NNNN

"MCEO"

III MAF 2100/4

05

COPY 2 OF 13 COPIES

TO SECRET 3

23

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

VV PAC#897

TOO: 06/1719Z AUG 70

OTTAZYUW RUMLNPA0812 2181544-AAAA--RUMNFMA.

ZNY AAAAA

O 061544Z AUG 70

FM ADMIN III MAF

TO RUMNFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E FOR: LTGEN JONES FROM MGEN ARMSTRONG/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS FORCE PLANNING //N03100//

A. JCS 011751Z AUG 70 (TS)

B. JCS 042349Z AUG 70 (TS)

C. CINCPAC 050415Z AUG 70 (TS)

1. ON 6 AUG 70, ACTION OFFICERS FROM G-3, III MAF VISITED MACV-J3 RELATIVE TO KEYSTONE ROBIN REDEPLOYMENTS AND RECEIVED INFORMATION RELATIVE TO REFS A, B, AND C AS FOLLOWS:

A. REFS INDICATED JCS KEYSTONE ROBIN ALTERNATE A (50-10-90) NO LONGER FEASIBLE DUE SHORTFALLS ARMY PERSONNEL AND WOULD EVEN BE DIFFICULT TO EXECUTE ALTERNATE B (50-40-60) WITHOUT SLIPPING THE USMC MAB FROM 1-30 APR 71 TO 1-30 JUN 71. THE IMPACT OF SUCH A CHANGE WAS DESIRED BY CINCPAC.

B. MACV IS LOOKING VERY CLOSELY AT THE ARMY PERSONNEL PROBLEMS AND IS CONSIDERING HAVING THE ARMY PICK UP 2900 SPACES IN INCREMENT

PAGE TWO RUMLNPA0812 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E FOR/M C E O 4 FROM THE MARCOR AS WELL AS ALL SPACES IN INCREMENT 5 (WHICH MAY NOW BE 40K RATHER THAN 10K). THE MARCOR SPACES WITHHELD FROM INCREMENTS 4 AND 5 WOULD REDEPLOY IN INCREMENT 6 (PROBABLY NOT STARTING EARLIER THAN MID FEB). THE IMPACTS OF THESE CHANGES WERE DESIRED BY MACV.

2. MACV-J3 HAD DRAWN UP AN IMPACT STATEMENT RELATIVE TO THE MAB WHICH WITH MINOR CHANGES, APPEARED GENERALLY SATISFACTORY. AN IMPACT STATEMENT WAS PREPARED ON THE INCREMENTS 4 AND 5 STRETCHOUT BY THE III MAF AND J-3 ACTION OFFICERS. MACV-J3 ADVISED THAT THESE STRETCHOUTS WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FROM THE MATERIAL, SHIPPING, AND PERSONNEL VIEWPOINTS, AND COULD PROBABLY HAVE SERIOUS BUDGETARY IMPACTS AT THE FMFPAC AND CMC LEVELS.

3. IF USMC INCREMENT 4 AND 5 STRETCHOUTS ARE APPROVED, MOST OF THE INCREMENT 4 WITHHOLDS WOULD HAVE TO BE IN COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (INCLUDING HEADQUARTERS) UNITS IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE INCREMENT 5 STRETCHOUT. THE INCREMENT 5 STRETCHOUT WOULD ALSO MEAN THAT THE MAF, DIVISION, WING AND FLC HEADQUARTERS WOULD BE DELAYED IN THEIR REDEPLOYMENTS AND THE MAB WOULD NOT BE FORMED UNTIL MAR OR APR 71.

4. ADDITIONAL RELATED COMMENTS MADE BY J-3 PLANNERS INDICATED:

~~HEADQUARTERS II MAF~~  
1220  
06

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

III MAF 210

COPY 2 OF 15 COPIES

"MCEO"  
44  
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE THREE RUMLNPA0812 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCL FOR/M C E O

A. THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT USMC FORCES (POSSIBLY THE MAB) WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT FORCE (TSF). THIS FORCE (260K) WILL REDUCE AT A RATE OF ABOUT 10K PER MONTH DOWN TO THE PERMANENT MAAG OF 44K OVER TWO YEARS. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION THAT THE TSF SHOULD CONTAIN ALL SERVICES.

B. MACV HAS NO PREFERENCES ON WHAT TYPE UNITS III MAF RETAINS IN THE 2.9K INCREMENT 4 WITHHOLD.

C. MACV IS RECONSIDERING FORCES REQUIRED IN I MR AFTER 1 MAY 71. ORIGINALLY THEY WERE CONSIDERING 4 BRIGADES, NOW ARE THINKING OF SEVEN (3 FROM 101ST, 1/5, MAB, AND 2 FROM AMERICAL).

D. MACV PLANNERS ADMIT THIS IS AN ARMY PROBLEM BUT ONE WHICH THE ARMY CAN ONLY SOLVE BY LARGER REDEPLOYMENTS, HENCE THE MARCOR FORCES ARE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN IN-COUNTRY STRENGTHS.

E. MACV HAS BEEN PERMITTED FLEXIBILITY IN HIS TAC FIGHTER SORTIE RATES (14,000 VICE 10,000), THUS TAC FIGHTER SQUADRONS DO NOT AT THIS TIME APPEAR TO BE A PROBLEM.

F. ON THE BUDGET SIDE, THE MACV PLANNERS INDICATED THE MARCOR WILL RECOUP \$199M IN FY 71 ON INCREMENT 4 OVER PROGRAMMED OUTLAYS WHILE THE ARMY WILL REALIZE ABOUT A \$28 DEFICIT.

G. THE MACV PLANNER INDICATED THE ARMY HAS ABOUT THREE SETS OF

PAGE FOUR RUMLNPA0812 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCL FOR/M C E O

EQUIPMENT PER UNIT AND EXPECTS TO HAVE SERIOUS DIFFICULTY IN PROCESSING SUCH AN AMOUNT FOR VIETNAMIZATION. USARV IS APPARENTLY STILL WORKING ON KEYSTONE BLUEJAY EQUIPMENT.

H. MACV PLANNERS INDICATED THAT THEY EXPECT TO HAVE A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF UNOCCUPIED BASES WHICH THEY WILL BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE SECURITY ON FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME BEFORE TURN-OVER AND THE BASES CANNOT BE RAZED. THEY EXPECT NEARLY ALL THE IN-COUNTRY FORCES WILL BE TIED DOWN ON BASE SECURITY.

I. THE 2.9K WITHHOLD OF USMC SPACES IN INCREMENT 4 RESULTS FROM THE UNRESOLVED ARMY/AIR FORCE 2.9K OPTION. APPARENTLY THE ARMY WILL GET THEIR 2.9K NOW AND THE OPTION WILL CONTINUE, WITH POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF AN ADDITIONAL 2.9K ARMY OR THE 2.9K AIR FORCE.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

BT

0812

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SAC FILES  
 HEADQUARTERS AT MAF

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

O 061000Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1  
 FM ADMIN III MAF  
 TO CG FIRST MARD IV  
 INFO CG FIRST MAF  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY FOR MGEN WIDDECKE INFO MGEN  
 ARMSTRONG FROM MGEN ARMSTRONG  
 APPRAISAL OF ALLIED EFFORT IN SVN (U)  
 1. THE BELOW MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED FROM LTGEN SUHERLAND  
 AND IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. QUOTE

Z 060255Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1  
 FM LTG SUHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DNG RVN  
 TO LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DNG RVN  
 MG MILLOY CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN  
 BG BERRY ACT CG 101ST ABND IV (AMBL) CEE RVN  
 ZEN/BG HILL CG, 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) 3TR RVN  
 ZEN/BG JACKSON DSA I CORPS DNG RVN  
 ZEN/MR FIRFER DEP CORDS, I MR DNG RVN  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T SENSITIVE EYES ONLY  
 SUBJECT: APPRAISAL OF ALLIED EFFORT IN SVN (U)  
 1. (TS) AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SVN  
 IS BEING CONDUCTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINATION OF  
 REDEPLOYMENTS DURING THE OCT-DEC PERIOD AND TO ASSIST  
 IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE ULTIMATE COMPOSITION AND  
 DISPOSITION OF THE TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT FORCE. IT IS  
 ESSENTIAL THEREFORE THAT THE ASSESSMENT BE COMPREHENSIVE.  
 2. (TS) YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THE COMPILATION OF DATA FOR  
 THE ASSESSMENT IS SOLICITED. SPECIFICALLY DESIRED ARE  
 YOUR VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO THE FOLLOWING AS APPROPRIATE  
 TO YOUR GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY:  
 A. APPRAISAL OF VIETNAMESE AND RMAF MILITARY AND  
 VIETNAMESE PARAMILITARY PERFORMANCE, AND PROGRESS IN  
 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT.  
 B. APPRAISAL OF US ADVISORY EFFORTS.  
 C. ATTITUDE OF THE VIETNAMESE POPULACE (MILITARY  
 AND CIVILIAN) TOWARD SVIETNAMIZATION AND THE GVN.  
 D. CRITICAL PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAMIZATION.  
 E. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE  
 ABOUT THEM.  
 F. US UNITS (BRIGADE SIZE) THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED  
 FOR EARLY REDEPLOYMENT DURING THE TIME PERIOD UNDER CON-  
 sideration.  
 3. (S) REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS INCLUDE AN APPRAISAL OF  
 THE EFFECTS AND BENEFITS OF THE CAMBODIAN CROSS-BORDER  
 OPERATIONS AND CURRENT SUMMER SCENS.  
 4. (U) REQUEST RECEIPT OF YOUR VIEWS ON THE FOREGOING  
 AND ON ANY RELATED ISSUES BY 8 AUGUST. UNQUOTE  
 2. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS AND COMMENTS IN SUFFICIENT  
 TIME FOR THIS HEADQUARTERS TO REPLY TO LTGEN SUHERLAND'S  
 MESSAGE. WARM REGARDS.  
 SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

GP-4

420

0001

(4)

MCEO

SECRET

PTTSZYUW RUMLPFA1124 2201213-SSSS--RUHNFNA.

ZNY SSSSS

P 081213Z AUG 76

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHNFNA/CG 7MFPAC

BT

S E C R E T/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE

FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON//R03000//

COMBINED OPNS WEST OF THOUNG DUC (U)

A. MY 270800Z JUL 76 (TS) (SPECAT)

1. REF A PROVIDED DETAILS ON PLANNED COMBINED OPERATIONS WEST OF THOUNG DUC AND SOME OF MY RESERVATIONS CONCERNING SAME.

2. OUR PORTION OF THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN, PICKENS FOREST, COMMENCED 16 JULY. VN PORTION, NAMED VU NINH-12, COMMENCED 31 JULY. VC HAD INITIAL DIFFICULTY CLEARING OBSTACLES FROM LZ'S. USMC RADFAC AND RECON TEAMS ASSISTED AND ZONES WERE CLEARED. THIS, AND OTHER FACTORS, CAUSED VN TIME SCHEDULE TO SLIP SEVERAL DAYS.

3. AS VN VACATE TWO FSB'S, WIDDECKE WILL MOVE ONE COMPANY INTO EACH TO COVER FOR EVENTUAL RETURN OF VN. THESE TWO ARE FSB HATCHET (ZC 016410) AND FSB SCIMITAR

PAGE TWO RUMLPFA1124 S E C R E T/SPECAT/MCEO/EXCLUSIVE FOR (ZC 075409).

4. ARMSTRONG'S FIXED WING HAVE EXECUTED 40 STRIKE SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF VN. HELOS HAVE LIFTED 507 PAX, 586.5 TONS CARGO, 10 ARTY PIECES, AND PROVIDED CHASE BIRDS FOR ARMY CN-34'S TO LIFT IN 6 X 155MM HOWITZERS.

5. I ANTICIPATE NOTHING SPECTACULAR FROM VU NINH-12, NOR FROM USMC OCCUPATION OF FSB'S HATCHET AND SCIMITAR. ON THE OTHER HAND PICKENS FOREST HAS PRODUCED:

78 EN KIA

296 DETAINEES

32 IWC

9 CSWC

36 CHI-COM GRENADES

1 X 500 LB BOMB

1 X 250 LB BOMB

7 CHI-COM CLAYMORES

51 RPG RDS

447 60MM RDS

437 60MM RDS

34 MINES

3-1-3

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

08

12

SECRET

MC703

6

MCEO

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMLPAT124 S E C R E T/SPECAT/MCEO/EXCLUSIVE FOR  
 OVER 200,000 RDS SMALL ARMS AMMO  
 OVER 300 LBS EXPLOSIVES  
 3.5 TONS RICE  
 14 TONS CORN  
 PLUS MISCELLANEOUS GEAR AND THE DESTRUCTION OF MULTIPLE CAVES  
 AND BUNKERS. THE COST TO USMC THUS FAR HAS BEEN  
 3 KIA  
 25 WIA(E)  
 6 WIA(M)  
 1 WIA(E) USN  
 6. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, HAVE NOT GIVEN MY MAF OPNS IN  
 SUPPORT OF VU NINH-12 A NICKNAME. INSTEAD WILL CONSIDER  
 OUR OPNS AS AN EXTENSION OF PICKENS FOREST.  
 7. GOOD TO SEE YOU LAST THURSDAY. AM BACK IN CP NOW.  
 WARM REGARDS,  
 GP-4  
 BT  
 1124

NNNN

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SECRET  
MCEO

6

O 090030Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF

TO CG XXIV CORPS

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T / N O F O R N / S E N S I T I V E / E Y E S O N L Y / S E C T I O N O N E O F T W O  
FOR LIGEN SUTHERLAND FROM LIGEN MCCUTCHEON//N03000//  
APPRAISAL OF ALLIED EFFORT OF SVN (U)

A. CG XXIV CORPS 060255Z AUG 70 (TS)

1. AS REQUESTED BY REF A THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED. SPECIFICALLY THEY ADDRESS THE PRESENT III MAF AO OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE, ALTHOUGH THE VIEWS HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED THROUGHOUT THE I MR BY SUBORDINATES, STAFF, AND MYSELF, MOST OF WHOM ARE ON THEIR SECOND TOUR IN RVN.

2. APPRAISAL OF VN, AND FWMAF MILITARY AND VN PARA MILITARY PERFORMANCE:

A. THE DENSITY OF RVNAF IS GREATER IN QUANG NAM THAN AT ANY TIME IN MY EXPERIENCE HERE, AND GREATER THAN ANY TIME IN THE PAST YEAR.

B. THE HIGH POINT CAME IN MID-JULY WITH DEPLOYMENT OF THE VNMC BRIGADE INTO BASE AREA 112. SUPPORTED BY ARVN ARTY AND UNDER OPSON OF HQ, QDSZ, THE VARIOUS RVNAF UNITS ARE PERFORMING AT AN UNPRECEDENTED LEVEL OF AGGRESSIVENESS AND COMPETENCE. THE 51ST ARVN REGIMENT IS

GOOD. IT HAS OPERATED IN THESE ENEMY BASE AREAS CONSTANTLY SINCE MID-APRIL, AGGRESSIVELY SEEKING OPPOSITION WHICH THE ENEMY HAS CHOSEN NOT TO GIVE. THIS REGIMENT'S GREATEST NEED IS FOR AN EFFECTIVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT ORGANIZATION.

C. THE FIRST RANGER GROUP IS AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE. TWO BNS OF THIS GROUP HAVE BEEN UNDER OPCON QDSZ SINCE MID-JUNE OPERATING IN BASE AREA 112.

D. THE 1ST ARMD CAVALRY BRIGADE HAS SELDOM BEEN EMPLOYED IN QUANG NAM BUT WHEN USED HAS DONE WELL.

E. THE VNMC BRIGADE ARRIVED 11 JULY AND WENT INTO BASE AREA 112 ON 14 JULY. ONLY YESTERDAY IT ACHIEVED 23 ENEMY KILLS AT A COST OF 1 WOUNDED. THE THREE BNS ARE EXPERIENCED AND HAVE GOOD LEADERSHIP. RETENTION OF THE VNMC BRIGADE IN QUANG NAM IS NOT ASSURED.

F. WHEN WELL LED THE REGIONAL FORCES ARE EFFECTIVE. POPULAR FORCES, TOO, VARY WITH THE QUANTITY OF LEADERSHIP. BOTH HAVE WORKED WELL TOWARD LOCAL SECURITY WHEN COMBINED WITH USMC CAPS AND CUPPS. WITHDRAWAL OF US COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT, AND THE VACATION OF FSB'S AND COMBAT BASES IS BOUND TO AFFECT THESE PARAMILITARY UNITS ADVERSELY.

G. THE PEOPLES SELF DEFENSE FORCE HOLDS PROMISE BUT HAS NOT YET DEMONSTRATED ANY SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO OVERALL SECURITY OF POPULATED AREAS.

3. PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT:

A. QUANG NAM PROVINCE FAILED TO ACHIEVE MOST PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT GOALS FOR PHASE I OF THE 1970 PLAN. WHILE SOME GOALS WERE RECOGNIZED AS IMPOSSIBLE OF ATTAINMENT, PROGRESS HAS BEEN DISAPPOINTINGLY SLOW EVEN WHEN MEASURED REALISTICALLY. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND RETURN TO VILLAGE PROGRAMS HAVE MADE PARTICULARLY POOR PROGRESS.

B. PROGRESS TOWARD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HAS ALSO BEEN POOR. ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN OVERALL PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE WILL BE CLOSELY RELATED TO IMPROVEMENTS IN THE REFUGEE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AREAS. RECENT INCREASED ATTENTION AND EMPHASIS ON THE RESOLUTION OF REFUGEE PROBLEMS OFFERS HOPE OF BETTER PROGRESS IN THE FUTURE. ADEQUATE SECURITY IS A PREREQUISITE TO PROGRESS IN THESE AREAS.

C. PACIFICATION, AS WELL AS THE EMPATHY OF THE VN PEOPLE FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT, IS IN DIRECT RATIO TO THE DEGREE OF SECURITY PROVIDED. ANY REGRESSION OF SECURITY WILL MAKE PROGRESS IN RESETTLING REFUGEES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE.

4. APPRAISAL OF US ADVISORY EFFORT. MY EXPERIENCE AT THE ADVISORY EFFORT HAS BEEN AT A LOWER LEVEL THAN THAT OF MY PREDECESSORS BUT I WOULD RATE ADVISORS AT ALL LEVELS AS DEDICATED AND HIGHLY COMPETENT. BUT, TO BE SUCCESSFUL, TO BE ACCEPTED, THEY MUST ADVISE, NOT COMMAND. UNFORTUNATELY, THEIR ROLE AS ADVISORS IS NOW ONE OF BEING LARGELY A COMBINED LIAISON OFFICER, LOGISTIC AGENT, AND PROPERTY SOLICITOR.

5. ATTITUDE OF THE VN POPULACE, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, TOWARD VIETNAMIZATION AND THE GVN. DESPITE ELECTION TURN-OUT AND IMPROVED RATINGS IN THE HALET EVALUATION SYSTEM, WE MUST ACCEPT THE FACT THAT A LARGE PORTION OF THE QUANG NAM PEOPLE ARE APATHETIC TOWARD THE GVN. FOR THAT MATTER THEY WOULD BE EQUALLY APATHETIC TOWARD ANY GOVERNMENT, FREE OR COMMUNIST. THEIR LIVES ARE SIMPLY DEVOTED TO EXISTING. I DOUBT THAT MANY PEOPLE, NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY BUSINESS AT A RELATIVELY HIGH LEVEL, ARE EVEN AWARE OF VIETNAMIZATION. THOSE WHO ARE AWARE OF IT ALMOST CERTAINLY CONSIDER IT A EUPHEMISM FOR U.S. WITHDRAWAL.

GP-4

988

0001

THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY

COPY 4 OF 4

7-2

O 090030Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF  
TO CG XXIV CORPS

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T / N O F O R N / S E N S I I V E / E Y E S O N L Y / F I N A L S E C T I O N  
OF TWO / FOR LTGEN SUTHERLAND FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON // N03000 //

6. CRITICAL PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAMIZATION:

A. PROGRESS IS SLOW. THERE IS LITTLE VN APPRECIATION FOR THE TIME AND SPACE FACTORS INVOLVED IN AN OPERATION, NOR OF THE LOGISTIC EFFORT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT ONE.

B. ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR BASES AND AO'S IS SLOW. THERE IS A RELUCTANCE TO TAKE AO'S AND INSISTENCE ON COLLOCATION WITH US UNITS. THE RESULT HAS BEEN THAT US UNITS CONTINUE TO HAVE DE FACTO RESPONSIBILITY FOR INSTALLATION SECURITY WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY KEEPING UP OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT THE AO.

C. LACK OF MINE DETECTOR AND OTHER EQUIPMENT IS A FACTOR, TURN-OVER OF ROAD SWEEPS HAS BEEN DELAYED, AND LAST MINUTE DISCOVERIES OF WEAPON SHORTAGE, ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, AND BOATS, HAS CAUSED OTHER POSTPONEMENTS TO BE MADE.

D. SKILL LEVELS ARE INADEQUATE TO MEET ALL NEED. GENERATORS BECOME INOPERABLE FOR EXAMPLE, DUE TO LACK OF TRAINED MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR SKILLS.

E. III MAF UNITS ARE TRAINING RVNAF PERSONNEL TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE ON GENERATORS, WATER PUMPS, ETC.

F. THE GREATEST SINGLE GVN MILITARY WEAKNESS IN QUANG NAM IS THE LACK OF QUALIFIER LEADERSHIP. THIS PROBLEM IS HIGH-LIGHTED BY THE RECENT LOSS OF THE COMMANDER, QDSZ. TO DATE HIS SUCCESSOR IS NOT NAMED, NOR DOES THE NEXT-IN-LINE HAVE THE AUTHORITY WE NORMALLY EXPECT TO BE VESTED IN AN INTERIM COMMANDER. THIS PROBLEM IS OF A PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THOSE IN THE 1ST MARDIV WHO MUST WORK WITH HIM. THE PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP EXISTS AT ALL LEVELS, BUT IN PARTICULAR AT THE HIGH AND MIDDLE ECHELONS.

G. THE ANSWER TO ALL THESE PROBLEMS IS, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, LEADERSHIP. WE ARE DOING WHAT WE CAN, AND HAVE DONE SO IN QUANG NAM FOR ALMOST FIVE AND ONE HALF YEARS, ENCOURAGING AGGRESSIVENESS, ORGANIZATION, THE ABILITY TO DELEGATE, AND TO HAVE CONFIDENCE IN SUBORDINATES. WE SHALL CONTINUE.

7. US UNITS (BRIGADE SIZE) THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY REDEPLOYMENT DURING THE TIME PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION: THE PRESENTLY PLANNED INCREMENT V REDEPLOYMENT IN THE OCT-DEC PERIOD WITH RESPECT TO III MAF (SCALING DOWN TO A MAB) IS PROPER AND PROPORTIONATE WHEN THE DESIRES OF THE US GOVERNMENT ARE BALANCED AGAINST OUR TASKS IN SVN.

8. THE CAMBODIAN CROSS-OVER OPNS AND CURRENT SUMMER OPNS.

A. THE CAMBODIAN OPN GAVE A PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST TO GVN FORCES IN QUANG NAM. DIRECT EFFECTS OF THE CROSS-OVER ON NVA/VC CAPABILITIES IN QUANG NAM ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO MEASURE. WHILE DAMAGE TO ENEMY CAN BE LOGICALLY ASSUMED, ENEMY LOC'S ENTER HERE VIA LAOS, AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT TRAFFIC HAS DIMINISHED.

B. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT GEN LAM'S CURRENT MOVEMENT INTO WESTERN QUANG NAM IS JUST NOW GETTING UNDERWAY, ANY ASSESSMENT ON THE IMPACT OF THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN OF VIETNAMIZATION IS PREMATURE AT THIS TIME.

WARM REGARDS

P 100031Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FMFPAC  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T NOFORN EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
 FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
 APPRAISAL OF ALLIED EFFORT OF SVN

1. I HAVE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM  
 SUTHERLAND FOR COMMENTS: QUOTE

Z 060255Z ZFF-4 ZFF-1  
 FM LTG SUTHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DSNG RVN  
 TO LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DNG RVN  
 MG MILLOY CG AMERICAL DIV CHL RVN  
 BG BERRY ACT CG 101ST ABN DIV (AMBL) CEE RVN  
 ZEN/BG HILL CG, IUT BDE 5THINF DIV (MECH) QTR RVN  
 ZEN/BG JACKSON DSA I CORPS DNG RVN  
 ZEN/MR FIRFER DEP CORDS, I MR DNG RVN  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: APPRAISAL OF ALLIED EFFORT IN SVN (U)

1. (TS) AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SVN  
 IS BEING CONDUCTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINATION OF  
 REDEPLOYMENTS DURING THE OCT-DEC PERIOD AND TO ASSIST  
 IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE ULTIMATE COMPOSITION AND  
 DISPOSITION OF THE TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT FORCE. IT IS  
 ESSENTIAL THEREFORE THAT THE ASSESSMENT BE COMPREHENSIVE.

2. (TS) YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THE COMPILATION OF DATA FOR  
 THE ASSESSMENT IS SOLICITED. SPECIFICALLY DESIRED ARE  
 YOUR VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO THE FOLLOWING AS APPROPRIATE  
 TO YOUR GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY:

A. APPRAISAL OF VIETNAMESE AND FWMAF MILITARY AND  
 VIETNAMESE PARAMILITARY PERFORMANCE, AND PROGRESS IN  
 PACIFICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT.

B. APPRAISAL OF US ADVISORY EFFORTS.

C. ATTITUDE OF THE VIETNAMESE POPULACE (MILITARY  
 AND CIVILIAN) TOWARDS VIETNAMIZATION AND THE GVN.

D. CRITICAL PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAMIZATION.

E. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE  
 ABOUT THEM.

F. US UNITS (BRIGADE SIZE) THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED  
 FOR EARLY REDEPLOYMENT DURING THE TIME PERIOD UNDER CON-  
 sideration.

3. (S) REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS INCLUDE AN APPRAISAL OF  
 THE EFFECTS AND BENEFITS OF THE CAMBODIAN CROSS-BORDER  
 OPERATIONS AND CURRENT SUMMER SCENES.

4. (U) REQUEST RECEIPT OF YOUR VIEWS ON THE FOREGOING  
 AND ON ANY RELATED ISSUES BY 8 AUGUST. GP-4

UNQUOTE

2. MY COMMENTS ARE PROVIDED IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE  
 IMPACT THAT THEY MAY HAVE TO COMUSMACV'S FORCE PLANNING  
 DECISIONS: QUOTE

O 090030Z ZFF-4 ZFF-1  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG XXIV CORPS

ZM

TOP SECRET/NOFORN/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY/SECTION ONE OF TWO  
FOR LTGEN SUTHERLAND FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON//N03000//  
APPRAISAL OF ALLIED EFFORT OF SVN (U)

A. CG XXIV CORPS 060255Z AUG 70 (TS)

1. AS REQUESTED BY REF A THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED. SPECIFICALLY THEY ADDRESS THE PRESENT FIMAF AO OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE, ALTHOUGH THE VIEWS HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED THROUGHOUT THE I MR BY SUBORDINATES, STAFF, AND MYSELF, MOST OF WHOM ARE ON THEIR SECOND TOUR IN RVN.

2. APPRAISAL OF VN, AND FVMAF MILITARY AND VN PARA MILITARY PERFORMANCE:

A. THE DENSITY OF RVNAF IS GREATER IN QUANG NAM THAN AT ANY TIME IN MY EXPERIENCE HERE, AND GREATER THAN ANY TIME IN THE PAST YEAR.

B. THE HIGH POINT CAME IN MID-JULY WITH DEPLOYMENT OF THE VNMC BRIGADE INTO BASE AREA 112. SUPPORTED BY ARVN ARTY AND UNDER OPSON OF HQ, QDSZ, THE VARIOUS RVNAF UNITS ARE PERFORMING AT AN UNPRECEDENTED LEVEL OF AGGRESSIVENESS AND COMPETENCE. THE 51ST ARVN REGIMENT IS

GOOD. IT HAS OPERATED IN THESE ENEMY BASE AREAS CONSTANTLY SINCE MID-APRIL, AGGRESSIVELY SEEKING OPPOSITION WHICH THE ENEMY HAS CHOSEN NOT TO GIVE. THIS REGIMENT'S GREATEST NEED IS FOR AN EFFECTIVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT ORGANIZATION.

C. THE FIRST RANGER GROUP IS AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE. TWO BNS OF THIS GROUP HAVE BEEN UNDER OPCON QDSZ SINCE MID-JUNE OPERATING IN BASE AREA 112.

D. THE 1ST ARMD CAVALRY BRIGADE HAS SELDOM BEEN EMPLOYED IN QUANG NAM BUT WHEN USED HAS DONE WELL.

E. THE VNMC BRIGADE ARRIVED 11 JULY AND WENT INTO BASE AREA 112 ON 14 JULY. ONLY YESTERDAY IT ACHIEVED 23 ENEMY KILLS AT A COST OF 1 WOUNDED. THE THREE BNS ARE EXPERIENCED AND HAVE GOOD LEADERSHIP. RETENTION OF THE VNMC BRIGADE IN QUANG NAM IS NOT ASSURED.

F. WHEN WELL LED THE REGIONAL FORCES ARE EFFECTIVE. POPULAR FORCES, TOO, VARY WITH THE QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP. BOTH HAVE WORKED WELL TOWARD LOCAL SECURITY WHEN COMBINED WITH USMC CAPS AND CUPPS. WITHDRAWAL OF US COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT, AND THE VACATION OF FSB'S AND COMBAT BASES IS BOUND TO EFFECT THESE PARAMILITARY UNITS ADVERSELY.

G. THE PEOPLES SELF DEFENSE FORCE HOLDS PROMISE BUT HAS NOT YET DEMONSTRATED ANY SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO OVERALL SECURITY OF POPULATED AREAS.

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GP-4

IN QUOTE

3. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

GP-4

P 100031Z

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T / N O F O R N E Y E S O N L Y F I N A L S E C T I O N O F T W O  
F O R L T G E N J O N E S F R O M L T G E N M C C U T C H E O N  
A P P R A I S A L O F A L L I E D E F F O R T O F S V N

PART TWO CONTINUED:

QUOTE:

O 090030Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1

FM CG III MAF

TO CG XXIV CORPS

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T / N O F O R N / S E N S I T I V E / E Y E S O N L Y / F I N A L S E C T I O N  
O F T W O / F O R L T G E N S U T H E R L A N D F R O M L T G E N M C C U T C H E O N // N 0 3 0 0 0 //

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WARM REGARDS

GP-4

UNQUOTE

3. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

GP-4

680

0002

TOP SECRET

8-4

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PTTCZYUW RUMLMPA1507 2230921-CCCC--RUHJSPA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 110921Z AUG 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHJSPA/COMSEVENTHFLT

BT

HAS BEEN SENT  
ORG C/S (5) 2734/  
REC CG 3 1523

C O N F I D E N T I A L //NO00000//

PERSONAL FOR VADM WEISNER FROM LIGEN MCCUTCHEON

A. YOUR 070614Z AUG 70 (C)

1. SORRY TO BE LATE IN REPLY BUT WAS ON R&R.
2. I HAVE MADE HMCM REED AWARE OF YOUR DESIRES TO HAVE HIM JOIN YOUR STAFF AND HE WAS FLATTERED TO BE RECOGNIZED AND CONSIDERED FOR SUCH AN ASSIGNMENT. HOWEVER, HE IS IN RECEIPT OF PCS ORDERS TO GREAT LAKES USNH, WHERE HE EXPECTS TO CONTINUE AN ACCELERATED DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION PROGRAM.
3. CHIEF REED IS ENTHUSASTIC AND ANXIOUS TO CARRY OUT HIS ORDERS TO GREAT LAKES BECAUSE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE HIS DRUG PREVENTION PROGRAM AMONG MANY YOUNG NAVY RECRUITS. IN ADDITION, AFTER COMPLETING HIS CURRENT UNACCOMPANIED TOUR HE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO BEING IN A JOB WHICH WILL ENABLE HIM TO BE WITH HIS DEPENDENTS.
4. WITH THE BACKGROUND OF HIS EXPERIENCE IN SOUTH

11 AUG 19 38

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA1507 C O N F I D E N T I A L

VIETNAM AND HIS UNIQUE CAPABILITIES, I AM SURE CHIEF REED WILL MAKE A MOST LASTING IMPRESSION ON YOUNG NAVY RECRUITS.

5. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, DO YOU STILL DESIRE TO HAVE HIM REPORT TO YOU AT YOKOSUKA? WARM REGARDS:

GP-4

BT

1507

110921Z Aug 70

NNNN

11

09

21

FMFAE GEN 2100/1 (3/69)  
3101-704-6401

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(9)

TOP SECRET

VV PAC91L  
 PTTZYUW RUMLMPA1766 2230854-TTTT--RUMHMA RUEOFIA.  
 ZNY TTTT  
 FMFPAC-T-CMC  
 P 130854Z AUG 70  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC  
 INFO RUEOFIA/CMC  
 BT

13 AUG 10 12 32

T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES INFO GEN  
 CHAPMAN FR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/DELIVER  
 DURING WORKING HOURS

A. CG FMFPAC 092202Z AUG 70 (TS/SPECAT)

B. CG III MAF 061544Z AUG 70 (TS/SPECAT)

1. REF A QUOTED CINCPAC'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO JCS RELATIVE TO KEYSTONE ROBIN FORCE PLANNING IN WHICH AN ALTERNATE C REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE WAS PROPOSED. ALTERNATE C INCLUDES SLIPPAGES OF THE III MAF INCREMENT 5 PACKAGE OF 10.6K TO INCREMENT 6 AND SLIPPAGE OF THE MAB (12.6K) FROM INCREMENT 6 TO A MAY-JUN 1971 TIME FRAME.
2. REF B IS THE REPORT OF MY ACTION OFFICERS TRIP TO SAIGON ON 6 AUG 70 DURING WHICH THESE SLIPPAGES WERE DISCUSSED. AT THAT TIME AN ADDITIONAL SLIPPAGE OF 2.9K SPACES FROM III MAF INCREMENT 4 TO INCREMENT 6 WAS BEING CONSIDERED BY MACV. AS NOTED IN REF B, A

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA1766 T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCL FOR/M C E O  
 SLIPPAGE OF THIS NATURE WOULD BE DESIRABLE IF THE INCREMENT 5  
 PACKAGE IS SLIPPED SINCE THE PACKAGE IN INCREMENT 5 WAS NOT DESIGNED  
 FOR LONG TERM OPERATIONS.

3. WHEN THE 9.6K USMC SPACES FIRST COMPRISING INCREMENT 5 WERE  
 PULLED OUT OF THE ORIGINAL 29.4K INCREMENT 4 SPACES, MACV DESIRED  
 THAT INCREMENT 5 INCLUDE AN RLT TOGETHER WITH FIXED WING AND  
 HELICOPTER SUPPORT. THIS LEFT BUT VERY FEW SPACES AVAILABLE  
 IN THE 9.6K FOR MAF, DIV, AND WING HQ ELEMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORT  
 TROOPS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT CONTINUED OPERATION OF THESE  
 HEADQUARTERS AND RELATED TASKS. ADD-ON OF AN ADDITIONAL 1.2K  
 VMFA, NMM, MACS, AND RADIO BN SPACES FROM INCREMENT 4 FURTHER  
 COMPOUNDED SUPPORT PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, SO LONG AS THE  
 PERIOD WAS KEPT SHORT DURING WHICH THE INCREMENT 5 FORCES WERE  
 RETAINED IN-COUNTRY AFTER DEPARTURE OF THE PRINCIPAL SUPPORT  
 FORCES IN INCREMENT 4, THE PLAN WAS CONSIDERED SUPPORTABLE.

4. IF THE SLIPPAGE OF THE USMC INCREMENT 5 PACKAGE AS RE-  
 COMMENDED IN REF A IS APPROVED, SOME ADJUSTMENTS IN INCREMENT  
 4 MUST BE MADE IN ORDER TO RETAIN THE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT  
 THE INCREMENT 5 FORCES FOR THE ADDITIONAL FOUR MONTH PERIOD.  
 THE FOLLOWING CHANGES ARE RECOMMENDED TO PROVIDE THIS CAPABILITY.

PG 1 OF 4

130854Z AUG 70

111 AF 210074

COPY 2 OF 08 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMLP/PA1766 T O P S E C R E T / S F E C A T / E X C L F O R / M C E O  
THESE CHANGES DO NOT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL SHIPPING OR CHANGES IN  
SHIPPING SCHEDULES.

## A. DELETE FROM INCREMENT 4:

UNIT	SPACES	FOOTNOTE	SDD
HQB(-), 1ST MARDIV	473	1	16SEP
1ST MPBN(-)	302		16SEP
1ST ENGR BN(-)	477		20AUG
HQBTRY, 11TH MAR	123		20SEP
1ST RECON BN(-)	131	2	10AUG
1ST MTBN(-)	55	3	20SEP
DET FLC	170		1OCT
DET 1ST MAW HQ	156		6AUG
DET H&MS-1	27		6AUG
DET MWCS-1	125		6AUG
H&MS-13	217		15SEP
MASS-3	139		15SEP
TOTAL	2395		

## B. ADD TO INCREMENT 4:

UNIT	SPACES	FOOTNOTE
VMFA-314	324	4

PAGE FOUR RUMLP/PA1766 T O P S E C R E T / S F E C A T / E X C L F O R / M C E O

DET H&MS-13(IMS)	58	5
1ST 175MM GUN BTRY	158	6
CO C, 1ST TK BN	129	6
TOTAL	659	

C. NET REDUCTION IN INCREMENT 4 TO BE FILLED BY OTHER SERVICES: 1736 SPACES MINIMUM.

D. IF THIS INCREASE TO POST INCREMENT 4 USMC STRENGTH IN COUNTRY IS DISALLOWED FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER AND WE ARE FORCED TO FIND EQUIVALENT TRADE OFFS, SUCH TRADE OFFS WOULD HAVE TO COME IN LARGE PART FROM TACTICAL COMBAT UNITS TO INCLUDE POSSIBLY ONE INFANTRY BATTALION OR SOME NUMBER OF COMPANIES FROM RESIDUAL BATTALIONS.

E. THE UNITS SHOWN IN PARA 4A AND 4B ARE STILL BEING SCRUTINIZED AND DO NOT REPRESENT OUR FINAL CONCLUSIONS. THEY DO REPRESENT OUR INITIAL THINKING.

## FOOTNOTES:

1. DET, HQBN 1ST MARDIV WITH 494 SPACES REMAINS IN INCREMENT 4.
2. 2 COS, 1ST RECON BN WITH 245 SPACES REMAINS IN INCREMENT 4.

PG 2 OF 4

130854Z AUG 70

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMLP1766 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / E X C L F O R / M C E O

3. CO, 1ST MT BN WITH 66 SPACES REMAINS IN INCREMENT 4.
4. LIMITATION TO 1300 USMC SORTIES PER MONTH FOR FY71 MAKES THIS SQDN EXCESS.
5. IMS FOR VMFA-314.
6. NOT CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.
9. IF YOU CONCUR WITH ABOVE, I WILL INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS ALONG THESE LINES WITH COMUSMACV.
6. WHILE THE ABOVE OUTLINES ACTIONS WE NEED TO TAKE TO IMPROVE OUR POSTURE IF THE INCREMENT 5 PACKAGE IS DELAYED, I WOULD LIKE TO REEMPHASIZE MY DEEP MISGIVINGS WITH THE WHOLE IDEA OF SLIPPING INCREMENT 3. THE IMPACT OF SUCH A PROPOSAL IF IT IS IMPLEMENTED, EVEN WITH THE ADJUSTMENTS RECOMMENDED, WOULD BE SERIOUS:
  - A. MANY OF THE UNITS WE WOULD NEED TO RETAIN IN WHOLE OR IN PART ARE BEYOND EXTRACTING FROM INCREMENT 4. OF THOSE WE CAN HOLD, IN MANY CASES REQUISITIONS HAVE BEEN CANCELLED, REAL ESTATE AND EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN OFFERED UP TO THE ARVN OR REDISTRIBUTED, STANDOWN HAS COMMENCED, THE PERSONNEL PIPELINE HAS BEEN CLOSED, AND PERSONNEL GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTED. THESE UNITS WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT BACK ON THEIR FEET AND

PAGE SIX RUMLP1766 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / E X C L F O R / M C E O  
COULD EXPECT SEVERE SUPPLY AND PERSONNEL PROBLEMS FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

- B. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS OR THE ENEMY OPPOSING III MAF, AND THE DIVISION IN PARTICULAR, WILL NOT HAVE BEEN ALTERED, YET WE WILL BE EXPECTED FOR A PERIOD OF OVER SIX MONTHS TO PRODUCE WITH TWO RLT'S AND FAR LESS SUPPORT ESSENTIALLY WHAT SEVERAL MONTHS AGO WE ACCOMPLISHED WITH FOUR RLT'S AND A FULLY REINFORCED DIVISION SUPPORT PACKAGE. THIS WILL TAX OUR UNITS TO THE UTMOST, FURTHER COMPOUNDING SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE, AND PERSONNEL PROBLEMS.
- C. DELAYED DEPLOYMENT OF UNITS WILL CREATE SEVERE PERSONNEL TURBULENCE AND CORRESPONDING MORALE PROBLEMS. THE PERSONNEL PIPELINE WILL NEED TO BE REEXAMINED IMMEDIATELY NOT ONLY TO SUSTAIN ALL UNITS THROUGH THE EXTENDED PERIOD BUT ALSO TO REFLECT THE CHANGED REQUIREMENTS IN GRADES AND SKILLS. AS AN EXAMPLE THE STRETCHOUT WILL REQUIRE A COMPLETE REEXAMINATION OF THE COLONEL REQUIREMENTS.
7. ACCORDINGLY, IF THE DELAY CAN BE AVOIDED, IT SHOULD BE BY ALL MEANS. IF IT CANNOT BE, THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS RESOLUTION OF THE MATTER AND OF MY PROPOSALS WOULD HELP

PG 3 OF 4

130854Z AUG 70

TOP SECRET

PAGE SEVEN RUMLPAT766 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C I A L / E X C L F O R M C E O  
REDUCE ATTENDANT PROBLEMS, AS INDICATED IN PARAS 4 AND 6,  
SOME UNITS ARE ALREADY STANDING DOWN.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT  
1766

PG 4 OF 4

130854Z AUG 70

GENN

8/20/71

P 130540Z ZGS ZFF-4 71-1  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 INFO CMC  
 CG FMFPAC  
 CG XXIV CORPS  
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO GEN CHAPMAN,  
 LTGEN JONES AND LTGEN SUTHERLAND FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/EYES ONLY/  
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS//03100//  
 FORCE PLANNING (C)

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT A STRETCHOUT OF PREVIOUSLY PLANNED MARINE KEYSTONE ROBIN REDEPLOYMENTS, INCREMENT 5 TO 6 AND THE MAB FROM INCREMENT 6 TO A MAY-JUNE 1971 TIME FRAME, HAS BEEN APPROVED. I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT CERTAIN ADJUSTMENTS IN INCREMENT 4 NOW BE MADE TO SUPPORT THESE SLIPPAGES.
2. DURING MY ACTION OFFICERS VISIT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS ON 6 AUG, THESE SLIPPAGES WERE DISCUSSED ALONG WITH A J-3 PROPOSED DELETION OF SOME 2,900 MARINE SPACES FROM INCREMENT 4. MY ACTION OFFICERS ADVISED THE MACV J-3 PLANNERS THAT IF THE INCREMENT 45 PACKAGE WAS SLIPPED, CERTAIN COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS PROGRAMMED FOR INCREMENT 4 WOULD HAVE TO BE DELETED AND RETAINED IN COUNTRY IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE USMC INCREMENT 5 PACKAGE ALSO REMAIN IN COUNTRY SINCE THIS PACKAGE WAS NOT DESIGNED FOR LONG TERM OPERATIONS.
3. WHEN THE USMC SPACES FIRST COMPRISING INCREMENT 5 WERE PULLED OUT OF THE ORIGINAL USMC INCREMENT 4 SPACES, YOU DESIRED THAT INCREMENT 5 INCLUDE AN RLT TOGETHER WITH FIXED WING AND HELICOPTER SUPPORT. INCREMENT 5 WAS TO BE ONLY 10,000 SPACES. THIS LEFT BUT VERY FEW SPACES AVAILABE FOR MAF, DIV AND WING HQ ELEMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORT TROOPS NECESSARY FOR CONTINUED OPERATION OF TWO RLT'S, A MAW, NECESSARY HEADQUARTERS AND RELATED TASKS. ADD-ONS, AT YOUR REQUEST, OF ADDITIONAL VMFA, HMM, MACS AND RADIO BN SPACES FROM INCREMENT 4 FURTHER COMPOUNDED SUPPORT PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, SO LONG AS THE PERIOD WAS KEPT SHORT DURING WHICH THE INCREMENT 5 FORCES WERE TO BE RETAINED IN-COUNTRY AFTER DEPARTURE OF THE PRINCIPAL SUPPORT FORCES IN INCREMENT 4, THE PLAN WAS CONSIDERED SUPPORTABLE AND I CONCURRED IN IT.
4. WITH THE SLIPPAGE OF THE USMC INCREMENT 5 PACKAGE NOW APPROVED, SOME ADJUSTMENTS IN INCREMENT 4 MUST BE MADE IN ORDER TO RETAIN THE CAPABILLITY TO SUPPORT THE INCREMENT 5 FORCES FOR THE ADDITONAL FOUR MONTH PERIOD. THE FOLLOWING CHANGES ARE RECOMMENDED TO PROVIDE THIS CAPABILTY. THESE CHANGES WILL NOT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL SHIPPING OR CHANGES IN SHIPPING SCHEDULES.

A. DELETE FROM INCREMENT 4:

UNIT	SPACES	FOOTNOTE	SDD
HQBN(-), 1ST MARDIV	473	(1)	16SEP
1ST MP BN (-)	302		16SEP
1ST ENGR BN (-)	477		20AUG
HQ BTRY, 11THMAR	123		20SEP
1ST RECON BN (-)	131	(2)	10AUG
1ST MR BN (-)	55	(3)	20SEP
DET FLC	170		10OCT
DET 1ST MAW HQ	156		SAUG
DET H&HS-1	27		10OCT
DET MWCS-1	125		SAUG
H&HS-1B	217		15SEP
MASS-3	139		15SEP

18  
 TOTAL

05

40

## D. ADD TO INCREMENT 4:

UNIT	SPACES	FOOTNOTE
VMFA-314	324	(4)
DET H&MS-13(IMS)	58	(5)
1ST 175MM GUN BTRY	158	(6)
CO C, 1ST TK BN	129	(6)
5TH COMM BN (-)	176	(7)
TOTAL	845	

C. NET REDUCTIONS IN INCREMENT 4 TO BE FILLED BY OTHER SERVICES: 1550 SPACES MINIMUM.

D. IF THIS INCREASE TO POST INCREMENT 4 USMC STRENGTH IN-COUNTRY IS DISALLOWED FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER AND WE ARE FORCED TO FIND EQUIVALENT TRADE OFFS, SUCH TRADE OFFS WOULD HAVE TO COME IN LARGE PART FROM TACTICAL UNITS TO INCLUDE POSSIBILITY ONE INFANTRY BATTALION OR SOME NUMBER OF COMPANIES FROM RESIDUAL INFANTRY BATTALIONS.

## FOOTNOTES:

- (1) DET, HQBN 1ST MARDIV WITH 494 SPACES IN RESULTS INCREMENT 4.
- (2) 2 COS, 1ST RECON BN WITH 245 SPACES REMAINS IN INCREMENT 4.
- (3) CO, 1ST MT BN WITH 66 SPACES REMAINS IN INCREMENT 4.
- (4) WITH THE LIMITATION 59 1300 USMC SORTIES PER MONTH FOR FY71, THIS SQDN IS EXCESS. SORTIE RATE WITHOUT IT WILL BE .92 RO FLY 1300 PER MONTH.
- (5) INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FOR VMFA-314.
- (6) NOT CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
- (7) FOR 5TH COMM BN INCREMENT 4 TOTAL OF 426 SPACES.

5. THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS RESOLUTION OF THESE ADJUSTMENTS IS NECESSARY SINCE, AS INDICATED IN PARA 4, SOME UNITS ARE ALREADY STANDING DOWN. MY ACTION OFFICERS ARE WORKING WITH YOUR ACTION OFFICERS ON THIS PROPOSAL FOR YOUR APPROVAL.

6. GLAD TO KNOW YOU ARE BACK IN THE SADDLE.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

900

0302

THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY

COPY 4 OF 4 COPIES

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

PTTCZYUW RUMLMPA2725 2320606-CCCC--RUHHFMA.  
ZNY CCCCC  
P 200606Z AUG 70 HAS BEEN SENT 5437/232  
FM CG III MAF ORIG: 6-5  
TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC REL: 6-5 (S) H  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L P E R S O N A L F O R L T G E N J O N E S F R O M  
L T G E N M C C U T C H E O N , D E L I V E R D U R I N G W O R K I N G H O U R S // N 0 5 0 8 0 //  
T H I R D M A R I N E M E M O R I A L C H I L D R E N ' S H O S P I T A L ( U )

A. CG FMFPAC 162037Z AUG 70 (C)

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS/ INFORMATION ARE PROVIDED  
IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED IN PARA 8 OF REF A.

2. (U) PARA 8 A:

A. (U) THE APPROXIMATE UNCOMMITTED BALANCE OF THE  
USMCR CIVIC ACTION FUND IS \$20,000 PLUS AND DONATIONS RE-  
CEIVED BY CARE AFTER 30 APR 70, IAW LATEST FINANCIAL RPT  
RECEIVED FROM CARE.

B. (U) THE USMCR CIVIC ACTION FUND HAS BEEN RESERVED  
PRIMARILY FOR SUPPORT OF THE SUBJ HOSPITAL WITH EXPEND-  
ITURES TO SUPPORT OTHER CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS HELD TO A  
MINIMUM FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS.

CONFIDENTIAL 10 34

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA2725 C O N F I D E N T I A L

C. (C) IN ORDER TO CONSERVE THE HOSPITAL CONSTRUCTION  
FUND 41 VIETNAMESE EMPLOYED IN CONNECTION WITH THE  
HOSPITAL HAVE BEEN PAID, SINCE 10 JUL 70, FROM THE MCRCA FUND.  
TEN OF THESE ARE CONSTRUCTION WORKERS WHO WILL BE DIS-  
CHARGED 10 SEP 70 WHEN SEABEE SUPPORT WILL BE TERMINATED.  
THE REMAINING 31, CONSISTING OF 21 NURSES/NURSES AIDES,  
1 CLERK, 2 INTERPRETERS, 1 LABORATORY ASSISTANT AND 6  
LABORERS, ARE EMPLOYED AT THE PEDIATRIC FACILITIES OF THE  
ARMY'S 18TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL AT QUANG TRI. ESTIMATED  
MONTHLY PAYROLL FOR THESE 31 EMPLOYEES WILL BE \$3,500.  
SINCE THESE PERSONNEL ARE DIRECTLY SUPPORTING THE PED-  
IATRIC FACILITIES OF THE 18TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL, THE  
SUCCESSOR TO THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION CHILDREN'S HOS-  
PITAL (TEMPORARY), THEIR PAYROLL COULD WELL BE PAID FROM  
THE HOSPITAL FUND IAW OBLIGATION EXPRESSED IN PARA 4,  
REF A.

D. (U) THE CURRENT AVAILABLE BALANCE OF THE MCRCA FUND  
PLUS EXPECTED MONTHLY INCOME IS NOT EXPECTED TO BE SUFF-  
ICIENT TO MEET MINIMUM FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FINISH-  
ING SUBJ FACILITIES IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO THE C/N.

1-2

200606Z Aug 70

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06

FMFPAC/CG 200606Z (49)  
010-004-66

**CONFIDENTIAL**

12

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE THREE RUMLNPA2725 C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. (U) PARA 8 B: IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO MAKE A MEANINGFUL ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF FINISHING THE SUBJ FACILITIES PRIOR TO DETERMINATION OF THEIR FINAL USE. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ENVISION COMPLETING THE FACILITIES IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO THE C/N AT A COST LESS THAN AN ADDITIONAL \$50,000 OR MORE. SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL COST WILL RESULT IF THE FACILITY CANNOT UTILIZE THE ELECTRICAL POWER AND WATER SYSTEMS OF THE QUANG TRI COMBAT BASE, THE CURRENT SOURCE OF THESE UTILITIES.

4. (U) PARA 8 C: A PROPOSED LETTER REPLYING TO INQUIRIES RECEIVED FROM DONORS TO THE SUBJ HOSPITAL WILL BE FORWARDED BY MAIL.

5. (U) PARA 8 D: A LISTING OF DONORS WHO CONTRIBUTED FUNDS IN THE AMOUNT OF \$100 OR MORE OR WHO HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT DONATIONS OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE FORWARDED BY MAIL.

6. PARA 8 E:

A. (U) CONCUR THAT THE AVAILABLE BALANCE OF THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION MEMORIAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL FUND TO THE WRC'S HOA KHANH CHILDREN'S HOS-

PAGE FOUR RUMLNPA2725 C O N F I D E N T I A L

PITAL WOULD BE A SUITABLE USE FOR THE SUBJECT FUND.

B. (U) RECOMMEND THAT THE FUNDS NOT BE DONATED TO THE WRC UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE FUTURE OF THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION MEMORIAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL HAS BEEN RESOLVED.

C. (U) IN VIEW OF THE POLICY SET FORTH IN REF A AND IN ORDER TO CONSERVE THE MCRCA FUND FOR POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS, THE 31 VIETNAMESE EMPLOYEES AT THE PEDIATRIC FACILITIES OF THE 18TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL WILL BE PAID FROM THE HOSPITAL FUND INSTEAD OF THE MCRCA FUND COMMENCING WITH PAYMENT DUE 1 OCT70. HAVING UNDERTAKEN TO SUPPORT THE 18TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL IN THIS PORTION OF THE HOSPITAL PROJECT WHEN THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION REDEPLOYED, THE SUPPORT SHOULD BE CONTINUED UNTIL OTHER ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE, IF POSSIBLE, TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE FOR THE CHILDREN OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE. UPGRADING OF THE PROVINCE HOSPITAL CAPABILITIES AND INTEGRATION OF THE CURRENT 18TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL PROGRAM AND EMPLOYEES INTO THE PROVINCE HOSPITAL IS BEING EXPLORED AS A POSSIBLE MEANS OF RESOLVING THE FUTURE OF THIS ASPECT OF THE PROJECT.

GP-4

BT

2725

-2

2006062 Aug 70

He L...

**CONFIDENTIAL**

TOP SECRET

VV PAC038  
PTIAZYUW RUMMPA2779 2521301-AAAA--RUHNFMA.

ZNY AAAAA  
P 201301Z AUG 70  
FM CG III MAF

20AUG 70 1409Z

TO RUHNFMA/CG FMFPAC  
BT

T O P S E C R E T / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY / SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR LTGEN JONES FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
CINCPAC VISIT (U)

1. ADM MCCAIN VISITED THIS AREA 19 AUG. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH LTGEN SUTHERLAND AND ME HE SHOWED US A DRAFT MESSAGE HE HAD PREPARED TO SEND TO JCS ADVOCATING INCREASED AUTHORITY FOR ALLIED TROOPS IN THE AREA OF THE DMZ. HE ASKED FOR OUR COMMENTS.
2. SUTHERLAND GENERALLY INDICATED THAT IT WAS MILITARILY DESIRABLE AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IT. I AGREED THAT IT WAS MILITARILY SOUND BUT STATED I DIDN'T THINK IT WAS OF SUFFICIENT PRIORITY AT THIS TIME TO EXPEND THE EFFORT AND TRY TO GET SOMETHING THAT WOULD PROBABLY BE TURNED DOWN ANYWAY, THAT I BELIEVED HE SHOULD SAVE HIS EFFORTS FOR SOMETHING OF GREATER IMPORTANCE LATER ON.
3. AT A LATER MEETING IN GEN LAM'S OFFICE HE ASKED

PAGE TWO RUMMPA2779 T O P S E C R E T / MCEO / SPECAT / EXCLUSIVE FOR LAM WHETHER THE ENEMY COULD MOUNT AN ATTACK THROUGH THE DMZ. LAM SAID YES THEY COULD BUT HE DIDN'T THINK THEY WOULD BECAUSE THAT WOULD BE AN OPEN VIOLATION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND THEY COULD ACCOMPLISH THE SAME THING BY COMING AROUND THROUGH LAOS.

4. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THE ADMIRAL WILL SEND THE MESSAGE OR NOT, BUT I THOUGHT YOU SHOULD BE ALERT TO THE FACT THAT HE WAS EVEN THINKING OF SUCH A MESSAGE.

5. A SEPARATE BUT RELATED ITEM. HIS MAIN CONCERN DURING THIS VISIT WAS WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN TO THE U.S. MILITARY AS A RESULT OF ALL THE ACTIONS THAT ARE BEING TAKEN BACK IN THE WASHINGTON ARENA OF WHICH THE BUDGET AND BLUE RIBBON PANEL ARE TWO OF THE MORE IMPORTANT.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4  
BT

2779

201301Z AUG 70

III MAF 0041

COPY 3 OF 13 COPIES

"MCEO"  
TO SECRET

(13)

P 221600Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 INFO CMC  
 CG FMF PAC  
 CG XX IV CORPS  
 ZEM

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ABRAMS INFO GEN CHAPMAN,  
 LTGEN JONES, AND LTGEN SUTHERLAND FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/EYES ONLY/  
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS//NO3100//  
 FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. MY 180540Z AUG 70 (TS)(SPECAT)

1. REF A PROPOSED CERTAIN ADJUSTMENTS TO REDEPLOYMENT INCREMENT  
 4 USMC TROOP LIST IN ORDER TO SUPPORT A PROBABLE SLIPPAGE OF  
 USMC INCREMENT 5. AS NOTED IN REF A, THE TIME FACTOR IS EXTREMELY  
 CRITICAL FOR CERTAIN UNITS.

2. IN ORDER TO PREPARE UNITS AND THEIR EQUIPMENT TO MEET SAILING  
 DATES AND TO MAKE USE OF THE SHIPPING THAT IS SCHEDULED, WE MUST  
 NOW EXECUTE CERTAIN OF THE ADJUSTMENTS PROPOSED IN REF A IF WE  
 ARE TO PRESERVE THE OPTION OF ADEQUATELY SUPPORTING INCREMENT 5.  
 ADDITIONALLY, WE MUST SOON DEPLOY ONE VMFA SQUADRON IF WE ARE  
 TO REALIZE ANY ECONOMIES FROM THE RECENTLY IMPOSED LIMITATIONS  
 ON SORTIE RATES.

3. I THEREFORE PROPOSE AS AN INTERIM MEASURE THAT SO MUCH OF REF A  
 AS OUTLINED BELOW  
 BE APPROVED FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION WITHOUT AWAITING A  
 DECISION ON INCREMENT 5. THESE CHANGES ARE DESIRABLE WHETHER OR  
 NOT INCREMENT 5 IS DELAYED.

A. DELETE FROM INCREMENT 4:

UNIT	SPACES	SDD
1ST ENGR BN(-)	477	20AUG
DET, 1ST MAW HQ	156	6AUG
DET, H&HS-1	27	6AUG
DET, MWCS-1	125	6AUG
TOTAL	785	

B. ADD TO INCREMENT 4:

VMFA-314	324
DET, H&HS-13(IMS)	58
1ST 175MM GUN BTRY	158
CO C, 1ST TK BN	129
5TH COMM BN(-)	116
TOTAL	785

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

360

0003

THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTIBILITY.

COPY 4 OF 4.

NNNN

TOP SECRET

22 16 00

(14)

0 250615Z ZYH ZFF-2 Z -3 ZFF-6

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FMF PAC

INFO CMC

ZEM

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY/FOR LT GEN JONES INFO GEN CHAPMAN  
FROM LT GEN MCCUTCHEON

FORCE PLANNING (U)

1. THE FOL MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM ABRAMS IS FURN  
FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE

0 241322Z ZYH ZFF-6 ZFF-3

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DANANG

INFO LTG MCCAFFREY DCG USARV LONG BINH

LTG SUTHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DANANG

ZEM

TOP SECRET MAC 11530 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: FORCE PLANNING (U)

REF: A. CG, III MAF 180540Z AUG 70 (TS) SPEC AT/EXCLUSIVE (NOTAL)

B. CG, III MAF 221600Z AUG 70 (TS) SPEC AT (NOTAL)

1. (TS) REF A PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE MARINE CORPS INCREMENT FOUR TROOP LIST. REF B PROPOSED CERTAIN CHANGES IN INCREMENT 4 WHICH ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE MACV ALTERNATIVE.
  2. (TS) BOTH OF YOUR PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED IN DETAIL AND ARE BEING FAVORABLY CONSIDERED. BY SEPARATE MESSAGE CINCPAC HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO AUTHORIZE THE ACTION YOU PROPOSED IN REF B. WITH RESPECT TO THE REMAINING PORTION OF THE REF A PROPOSAL, YOUR PLANNING SHOULD PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN US ARMY AND MARINE CORPS SPACES WILL BE APPROVED; HOWEVER, UNTIL FINAL APPROVAL IS RECEIVED FROM JCS/CINCPAC ON OUR PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE, NO ACTION OTHER THAN PLANNING CAN BE TAKEN.
  3. (U) THE NEED FOR A TIMELY APPROVAL OF YOUR PROPOSED ACTIONS IS APPRECIATED. INFORMATION WILL BE RELAYED AS IT IS RECEIVED.
- WARM REGARDS.  
UNQUOTE  
2. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

GP-4

240

0002

NNNN

THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY

COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES

TOP SECRET

29 AUG 70 01 48Z

OTTAZYUW RUMLMPA4053 2402257-AAAA--RUHHFMA RUEOFIA.

ZNY AAAAA

O 282258Z AUG 70

FM CG III MAF

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUEOFIA/CMC

BT

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES INFO GEN

CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS//NO 3100//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. MACV 280426Z AUG 1970 (TS) (GENSER)

B. MY 180540Z AUG 1970 (TS) (SPECAT)

C. MY 221600Z AUG 1970 (TS) (SPECAT)

1. REF A, QUOTED BELOW, FORWARDS PROPOSAL I SET FORTH IN REF B FOR READJUSTMENT OF INCREMENT 4 DUE TO PROBABLE SLIPPAGE OF INCREMENT 5, LESS THOSE INTERIM READJUSTMENTS RECOMMENDED IN REF C WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN APPROVED:

QUOTE

FM COMUSMACV

TO CINCPAC

INFO DCG USARV LONG BINH

PAGE TWO RUMLMPA4053 TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO

CG III MAF DANANG

CG XXIV CORPS DANANG

BT

TOP SECRET 44352 (J3)

THIS IS A KEYSTONE ROBIN MESSAGE

SUBJ: FORCE PLANNING (U)

REF: A. JCS 7544/142250Z AUG 70 (TS) (NOTAL)

B. MACV MSG, DTG 051445Z AUG 70 (TS)

C. MACV MSG, DTG 241945Z AUG 70 (TS)

D. CINCPAC MSG, DTG 260410Z AUG 70 (TS)

1. (TS) REFERENCES ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A. REF A PROVIDED E-92, ARC LIGHT, GUNSHIP AND TAC AIR SORTIE LEVELS FOR FY 71.

B. REF B PROPOSED A MACV MODIFICATION TO JCS ALTERNATIVE B- REFERRED TO AS ALTERNATIVE C- WHICH AMONG SEVERAL CHANGES RETAINED MARINE FORCES IN RVN FOR A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME THAN WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED.

C. REF C REQUESTED CINCPAC APPROVAL TO MAKE CERTAIN DELETIONS/ ADDITIONS TO THE MARINE CORPS INCREMENT FOUR TROOP LIST TO COMPENSATE FOR THE SORTIE RATE CHANGE CONTAINED IN REF A.

D. REF D APPROVED REF C AND REQUESTED OFFICIAL CHANGES TO TROOP

PG 1 OF 3

282258Z AUG 70

28

22

TOP SECRET (16)

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMLMPA4053 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO  
LISTS MLT 28 AUG 70.

2. (TS) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE THE INFORMATION REFERRED TO IN PARA 2 OF REF C. INFORMAL INFORMATION INDICATES THAT ALTERNATIVE C HAS RECEIVED FAVORABLE RESPONSE BY CINCPAC AND JCS.

3. (TS) THE LONGER PERIOD OF RETENTION OF MARINES IN RVN PROPOSED IN REF B REQUIRES ADDITIONAL COMMAND, CONTROL AND SUPPORT (CCS) ELEMENTS TO SUPPORT III MAF(-) OPERATIONS. THE REQUESTED DELETIONS/ADDITIONS PROPOSED IN REF C WILL PARTIALLY ASSIST IN OBTAINING THE NEEDED CCS ELEMENTS; HOWEVER, AN ADDITIONAL 1610 SPACES ARE REQUIRED. THESE 1610 MARINE VACATED SPACES CAN BE FILLED BY US ARMY SPACES WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN IDENTIFIED AS PART OF THE 2900 SPACE PACKAGE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING A DECISION ON THE SORTIE LEVEL CONTAINED IN REF A.

4. (S) THEREFORE, THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS TO INCREMENT FOUR TROOP LISTS ARE RECOMMENDED.

A. DELETE FROM THE MARINE CORPS TROOP LIST:

UNIT	SPACES
HQ BN(-), 1ST MAR DIV	473
1ST MP BN (-)	302
HQ BTRY, 11TH MAR	123

PAGE FOUR RUMLMPA4053 T O P S E C R E T /SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO

1ST RECON BN(-)	131
1ST MT BN(-)	55
DET, FLC	170
H&HS-18	217
MASS-3	139

TOTAL 1610

B. ADD TO THE US ARMY TROOP LIST:

UNIT	SPACES
2/3 INF BN, 199 LT INF BDE	920
7/13 FA BN	528
520 AG CO	13
USARV DEBIT/CREDIT ACT	149

TOTAL 1610

C. THE SERVICE TOTALS FOR INCREMENT FOUR AFTER ADJUSTMENT ARE SHOWN BELOW:

USA	16.8
USN	8.8
USAF	7.4
USMC	17.0
TOTAL	50.0

PG 2 OF 3

28258Z AUG 70

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMLMPA4053 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E F O R / M C E O

D. NO SPECIAL LIFT TRANSPORTATION IS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THIS ACTION. OFFICIAL CHANGES TO INCREMENT FOUR TROOP LISTS AND THE CINCPAC MOVEMENT PROGRAM WILL BE SUBMITTED UPON APPROVAL OF THE ABOVE RECOMMENDED ACTION.

3. (U) NO ACTION OTHER THAN PLANNING WILL BE TAKEN UNTIL REF B AND THE PROPOSAL IN THIS MESSAGE ARE APPROVED. GP-4  
BT UNQUOTE.

2. IN DRAFTING REF A, MACV STAFF INADVERTENTLY OMITTED 60 SPACE DIFFERENCE IN 5TH COMM BN BETWEEN REFS B AND C AND INCLUDED THESE SPACES AS ARMY ADD-ONS (I.E. 1610 VICE 1550) INSTEAD OF USMC ADD-ONS. DO NOT BELIEVE RECTIFYING THIS ERROR WORTH ATTENDANT DELAYS IN RESTAFFING AT MACV AND USARV. WOULD PREFER TO GET APPROVAL OF REF A AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO PLANNING BY ALL CONCERNED CAN PROCEED. FOR EXAMPLE, I UNDERSTAND NAVY NEEDS IMMEDIATE ANSWER AS TO WHETHER SEMINOLE (LKA-104) REQUIRED FOR MASS-3 TO AVOID MAJOR UNNECESSARY EXPENDITURES. SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE, I WILL COUNTERBALANCE MACV ERROR BY NOT MANNING 60 EXTRA IN-COUNTRY 5TH COMM BN SPACES, SO FORESEE NO PERSONNEL OR FUNDING PROBLEMS INVOLVED. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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MCEO

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FM CG III MAF

TO RUHNFMA/CG FMFPAC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T / M C E O / E X C L U S I V E F O R L T G E N  
JONES FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON

A. CG FMFPAC 261917Z AUG70 (S)

1. FURNISHED BILL DOEHLER A COPY OF REF A TODAY AT  
MONTHLY WIEU AT HQ MACV. ALSO GAVE SANITIZED VERSION  
INCORPORATING BILLETTS LISTED IN PARA TWO TO MGEN COWLES.  
HE WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE.2. I TOLD DOEHLER IF HE THOUGHT THERE WERE BILLETTS OF  
GREATER IMPORTANCE THAN THOSE LISTED TO LET ME KNOW AND  
I THOUGHT WE COULD WORK OUT COMPROMISE AS LONG AS TOTAL  
NUMBERS WERE NOT EXCEEDED. FOR EXAMPLE, HE THOUGHT A  
BILLET SHOULD BE RETAINED IN SJS AS THAT IS POINT WHERE  
ALL PAPERS MUST TRANSIT AT SOME POINT IN TIME.3. THIS MONTH'S WIEU WAS PRETTY ROUTINE BUT GEN ABRAMS  
DID HAVE COMMANDERS ASSEMBLE IN HIS OFFICE FOR SOME  
PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS. I'LL CUT YOU IN ON THESE WHENPAGE TWO RUMLMPPA4240 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T / M C E O  
YOU VISIT NEXT. WARM REGARDS.

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300017Z AUG 70

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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MCEO

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FM CG III MAF  
TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
INFO RUEOFIA/CMC  
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HAS BEEN SENT  
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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN MCCUTCHEON  
VISIT OF HON. EGIL KROGH DEP ASST TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DOMESTIC  
AFFAIRS

1. HON. EGIL KROGH VISITED III MAF HQ 290340 - 291030 FOR THE PURPOSE OF GAINING FIRSTHAND INFORMATION ON THE MAGNITUDE AND CONSEQUENCES OF DRUG ABUSE PROBLEMS OF U. S. TROOPS IN RVN. HIS VISIT TO III MAF WAS PART OF A TWO DAY VISIT TO MR-1 ARRANGED BY CG XXIV CORPS.
2. IT WAS MR. KROGH'S DESIRE THAT HE VISIT WITH SERVICEMEN OF ALL RANKS AND SERVICE BOTH REAR AREAS AND REMOTE FIRE BASES TO GET A FEEL FOR THE MAGNITUDE OF THE DRUG PROBLEM. UPON COMPLETION OF HIS VISIT TO RVN HE WILL REPORT HIS FINDINGS TO THE PRESIDENT. IT DID NOT APPEAR IN ANY WAY THAT HE WAS HERE TO FIND SUPPORT TO PROVE THAT DRUG ABUSE IS RAMPANT IN RVN.

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3. IN VIEW OF THE SHORT TIME FOR A III MAF VISIT I DECIDED TO UTILIZE THE TIME IN A BRIEFING/DISCUSSION FORMAT. AN OVERVIEW OF THE III MAF DRUG STATISTICS AS PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED TO EACH OF YOU WAS PRESENTED BY MY G-1 AND THEN THE INSPECTOR, 1ST MAINT DIVISION DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM FROM THE DIVISION LEVEL FOLLOWED BY THE DIVISION DRUG INSTRUCTOR, HM-1 KANIA, WHO GAVE AN EXCELLENT TEN MINUTE LECTURE COMPLETE WITH IMPRESSIVE TRAINING AIDS. THE MEETING WAS THEN OPENED UP AND SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WERE ADDRESSED. PORLOGCOMD AND FMAW REPRESENTATIVES WERE ALSO PRESENT.

4. MR. KROGH HAS AN EXCELLENT INSIGHT CONCERNING DRUG ABUSE. HE QUOTED FACTS AND FIGURES EASILY. HE ASKED OUR VIEWS ON LEGALIZING MARIJUANA AND READILY AGREED THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE LEGALIZED, AS HE POINTED OUT, WE ALREADY HAVE ENOUGH OF A PROBLEM WITH ALCOHOL. IT WAS AGREED BY ALL THAT SETTING ASIDE THE ILLEGALITY OF MARIJUANA POSSESSION/USE THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF MARIJUANA VS ALCOHOL LEAVES AN INSTRUCTOR/LECTURER IN AN EXTREMELY AWKWARD POSITION TO PROVE TO THE YOUNGSTER THAT MARIJUANA IS ALL BAD.

5. HE INDICATED A FINDING THAT HARD DRUGS ARE NOW COMING INTO THE SOUTHERN MR'S. SOME (RED ROCK) IS BEING BROUGHT FROM THAILAND AND SOLD TO AMERICAN SOLDIERS. HE SAID THAT SOME SERVICEMEN HAVE MISTAKENLY

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EMERGENCY (G-1)

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PAGE THREE RUMLMPA4410 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 THAT THEY CAN SNIFF HEROIN AND NOT BECOME ADDICTED. HE POINTED OUT THAT HEROIN FOUND HERE IS OVER 90 PERCENT PURE WHEREAS IN COUS THEY SELL HEROIN RATED AT 5 PERCENT. IN NYC LAST YEAR OVER 960 PEOPLE UNDER 30 YEARS OF AGE DIED OF OVERDOSE OF HARD DRUGS. IN NYC IT IS THE MAJOR CAUSE OF DEATH IN AGE GROUPS 17-30. WE AGREED THAT HARD DRUG USE IS RARE TO ALMOST NON EXISTENT IN MR-1. THE PRACTICE OF LACING OPIUM IN MARIJUANA CIGARETTES WAS BROUGHT TO LIGHT. THIS SEEMED TO BE A RECENT REAR AREA PROBLEM OF CONSEQUENCE AND COULD BECOME SERIOUS. A READILY AVAILABLE SUPPLY OF MARIJUANA IN THE REAR AREAS WAS DISCUSSED AND AGREED BY ALL TO BE FACTUAL. HOWEVER, USE IN FORWARD AREAS AND AT FSB'S HAS NOT BEEN ENCOUNTERED. NOR IS IT CONSIDERED A PROBLEM SINCE MOST REALIZE THAT THEY MUST HAVE COMPLETE CONTROL OF MITS AT ALL TIMES TO SURVIVE. MARINES DEPEND ON EACH OTHER AND MARIJUANA/ DRUG ABUSE TEND NOT TO BE TOLERATED BY ONE'S PEERS. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS.

6. HE WAS HERE TO GATHER INFORMATION TO ENABLE THE PRESIDENT TO COUNTER SOME OF THE CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES AND IRRESPONSIBLE REPORTING IN THE PRESS. HE SAID THAT LAST WEEK A VICE ADMIRAL TESTIFIED BEFORE A CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY, "IN MY OPINION ALL THE MEN AT MY LAI WERE ON DOPE." COUNTERING THIS KIND STATEMENT IN THE PRESS IS DIFFICULT AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO REPORT TO THE NATION THAT THERE ISN'T

PAGE FOUR RUMLMPA4410 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 WIDESPREAD USE OF MARIJUANA AND DANGEROUS DRUGS BY SERVICEMEN IN RVN AND THAT THERE ISN'T A DETERIORATION OF THE SERVICES. ANOTHER EXAMPLE HE GAVE OF HOW THIS PROBLEM IS BEING USED AS A POLITICAL TOOL AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION WAS "KENT STATE WAS WORTH 30 DAYS IN CAMBODIA, WE NEEDED THAT OTHER 30 DAYS."

7. MR. KROGH WAS ACCOMPANIED (ON THIS VISIT) BY MR. JOHN LEHMAN A MEMBER OF DR. KISSINGER'S STAFF.

8. MR. KROGH ASKED SPECIFICALLY IF WE KNEW OF ANY INCIDENT WHERE USE OF MARIJUANA HAD JEOPARDIZED A COMBAT MISSION. WE KNEW OF NONE AND HE SAID TO HIS KNOWLEDGE THERE HAS BEEN NO KNOWN INSTANCES IN RVN NOR HAS HE FOUND ANY EVIDENCE TO THIS EFFECT.

9. I HAVE INCLUDED THE SALIENT POINTS AND HOPE MR. KROGH CAN DEVELOP A SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM THAT WILL HELP CORRECT THIS PROBLEM.

WARM REGARDS.

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