

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEXOCTOBER INCOMING

OCTOBER	DTG	ORIGINATOR/CLASSIFICATION/SUBJECT
	82-030103	ADMIN FMFPAC INFO II MAF COMMANDS (S) <i>gp-4</i> STRENGTH PROJECTION OF III MAF ON 15OCT70
	83-030346	ADMIN FMFPAC (S) <i>gp-4</i> COMMAND & STAFF STRUCTURE IN SEASIA
	84-052133	ADMIN FMFPAC (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING (RELOCATION OF MAF HQ)
	85-052234	COMUSMACV TO DIST. LIST (TS) <i>gp-4 declassified</i> OPERATION "TINWARE"
	86-070335	CG XXIV CORPS INFO CO 377TH TFW (C) <i>gp- not shown</i> SONIC BOOM IN VICINITY DA NANG
	87-090002	ADMIN FMFPAC TO CG III MAF INFO CMC (S) <i>gp-4</i> TRANSFER OF EXCESS FACILITIES
	88-090644	C/S COMUSMACV TO DIST. LIST (TS) <i>declassified</i> OCTOBER COMMANDER'S WIEU
	89-090654	CG XXIV CORPS TO I CORPS COMMANDS (TS) <i>gp- not shown</i> ARC LIGHT OPERATIONS
	90-091033	C/S MACV TO MAJOR COMPONENT CMDRS (U) COMMAND & STAFF PHOTOGRAPH
	91-120120	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>gp-4</i> MACHINE ORIENTED PROGRAM OF INDIVIDUAL WPNS
	92-130032	COMNAVFORV (C) <i>gp-3</i> COMSEC/CG'S MEDEVAC OF SEABEE
	93-170005	CO DNG SPT CMD (C) <i>gp- not shown</i> DAMAGE TO MARINE AIR AMMUNITION ITEMS
	94-190705	CG FIRST MARDIV (C) <i>gp-4</i> DRUG ABUSE
	95-191015	CG 2D ROKMCBDE (U) CONGRATULATORY MSG
	96-191036	COMUSMACV TO DIST LIST (TS) <i>gp-4</i> REDUCTIONS IN KEY OFFICER STRUCTURE IN RVN
	97-192004	CGFMFPAC (U) MARINE CORPS BIRTHDAY CEREMONIES

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEXOCTOBER INCOMING

OCTOBER	<u>DTG</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR/CLASSIFICATION/SUBJECT</u>
	98- 201305	COMNAVFORV (U) CONGRATULATORY MSG
	99- 210400	DCG USARV LONG BINH (U) CONGRATULATORY MSG
	100- 230246	CG FMFPAC TO III MAF/OKI/HAWAII CMDS INFO III MAF (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING
	101- 242231	CG FMFPAC TO CG FIRST MARDIV INFO III MAF (C) <i>Gp-4</i> WEAPONS CONTROL PROCEDURES
	102- 252114	CG FMFPAC TO CMC INFO CG III MAF (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING (RELOCATION OF III MAF TO OKI)
	103- 260840	C/S XXIV CORPS (U) VISIT OF MR. JON STEINBERG
OCTOBER	104- 271031	CG USARV (C) <i>Gp-4</i> COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT
	105- 280901	COMUSMACV TO DISTR. LIST (C) <i>Gp-4</i> VISIT OF MR. JON STEINBERG
	106- 290938	COMUSMACV TO CINCPAC INFO DIST. LIST (C) <i>Gp-4</i> VISIT OF MR. JON STEINBERG
	107- 310852	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>Gp-4</i> PFC ROBERT T. CANFIELD 226 70 28
	108- 310853	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>Gp-4</i> SPECIAL EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PRT (MALARIA)

OCTOBER

SECRET

TOD: 030735Z OCT

PETSZYUW RUHHFMA0278 2760103-SSSS--RUMUMPA.

ZNY SSSSS

RUMUMPA -T- CG FIRST MARDIV

-T- CG FIRST MAW

P 030103Z OCT 70

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

INFO ZEN/CG FMFPAC ZFF-1

RUMLLVA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMLNMA/CG FIRST MAW

RUMUMPA/CG FORLOGCOMD

BT

SECRET PERSONAL FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON INFO
 MAJGEN ARMSTRONG, MAJGEN WIDDECKE AND BGEN PADALINO
 FROM MAJGEN ADAMS //N05314// AM 006 RPT AM 006
 STRENGTH PROJECTION OF III MAF ON 15OCT 70

A. CG III MAF 290611Z SEP 70 (TS) (SPECAT)

1. (S) BASED ON THE CONTENT OF REF A IT APPEARS WE
 ARE IN AGREEMENT ON ACTIONS NECESSARY TO ARRIVE AT THE
 IN-COUNTRY CEILING ON 15OCT 70. WITH CURTAILMENT OF
 INPUT, WEST PAC REASSIGNMENTS, EARLY MOVEMENT OF LATE
 OCTOBER RTD'S AND FURTHER KEYSTONE ROBIN ALPHA
 DEPLOYMENTS WE WILL MEET THE 15OCT 70 CEILING CONSTRAINTS
 OVERALL FOR III MAF FORCES, ALBEIT ALL COMMANDS MAY

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0278 SECRET PERSONAL FOR
 NOT BE AT OR BELOW THEIR INDIVIDUAL MANNING LEVELS.

2. THE REPLACEMENT PIPELINE TO III MAF COMMANDS WILL
 BE LIMITED DURING THE PERIOD 1-15OCT. AS INDICATED BELOW
 WITH NO INPUT DURING THE PERIOD A SHORTAGE OF 864 WILL
 EXIST ON 15OCT 70. WE WILL HOWEVER PROVIDE SOME REPLACEMENTS
 TO ALLEVIATE SKILL SHORTAGES AND DEGRADE THE 864
 SHORTAGES. UPON ARRIVING AT THE CEILING ON 15OCT THE
 REPLACEMENT PIPELINE WILL BE MONITORED CLOSELY TO INSURE
 WE REMAIN BELOW THE CEILING.

3. TOTAL RVN STRENGTH PROJECTION

ON ROLLS 30SEP	29292
FCS/ROBIN LOSSES 1-15OCT	3037
CAS/ADMIN LOSSES 1-15OCT	480
REASG 1-15OCT	1626
PROJ ON ROLLS 15OCT	24149
AUTH 15OCT	25013 (INCL SU I FIRST ANGLICO)
	864

SHORTAGE

THE ABOVE FIGURES ARE PROJECTIONS AND CHANGES IN ANY
 ONE OF THE FIGURES WILL NECESSARILY RESULT IN REVISION
 OF THE OTHERS.

PAGE 1 OF 2

COPY 2 OF 5 COPIES

03
 FMFPAC-GEN 2100 (3/69)
 0101-V04-668

03
SECRET

82

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUHFMA0278 S E C R E T PERSONAL FOR
4. (S) THE IMBALANCE OF CERTAIN SKILLS THROUGHOUT WESTPAC
BROUGHT ON BY "KEYSTONE ROBIN ALPHA" IS APPARENT AT THIS
AND HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. WE APPRECIATE THE EFFORTS OF
IN-COUNTRY COMMANDS IN PROVIDING DATA TO US AND IN
VERIFYING DATA AVAILABLE HERE. REASG WITHIN WESTPAC AND
CONUS INPUT SHOULD GREATLY RELIEVE THIS PROBLEM BY END
NOV. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0278

PAGE 2 OF 2

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NNNN

SECRET

82

MCEO

TOR: 03 0504Z OCT 70

PZTAZYUW RUMHFMAD311 2768346-AAAA--RUMUMPA.
ZNY AAAAA
RUMUMPA -T- CS III MAF
P 030346Z OCT 70
FM ADMIN FMFPAC
TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
BT

SECRET

SPECAT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LEGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM
NAJSEN ADAMS. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER
DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY. //NOO000//
COMMAND AND STAFF STRUCTURE IN SEASIA (U)

A. CNO 302114Z/SEP70 (S) (READDRESSED BY ADMIN
CINCPACFLT 020332Z/SEP70) (PASEP)

EXCLUSIVE

1. (S) REF A QUOTED A MEMO FROM SEC DEF WHICH
EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT THE VARIOUS HEADQUARTERS
WITHIN MACV ARE NOT BEING REDUCED IN PROPORTION TO
THE REDEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR FORCES FROM RVN. REF A
ELABORATES ON THIS TO INDICATE THAT SEC DEF CONCERN
INCLUDES CORPS LEVEL HEADQUARTERS, HEADQUARTERS OF
COMPONENT COMMANDS, SUPPORT COMMANDS, AND FIELD
FORCES.

2. (S) WHILE III MAF HAS BEEN REDUCED TO APPROXIMATELY
1/3 THE STRENGTH AUTHORIZED IN PROGRAM 6 AND ITS RESPON-

PAGE TWO RUMHFMAD311 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
SIBILITIES IN MR-1 HAVE BEEN REDUCED, THE SPAN OF TASKS
ASSIGNED BY MACV DIRECTIVE 10-11 TO III MAF AS AN
AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE AND UNI-SERVICE COMMAND HAS
NOT BEEN DIMINISHED SIGNIFICANTLY. ACCORDINGLY, IT
IS CONSIDERED THAT THE REDUCTIONS MADE IN HEAD-
QUARTERS III MAF, AS WELL AS THE REDUCTIONS MADE IN
HEADQUARTERS 1ST MAR DIV (-)(REIN) AND 1ST MAW AND
THE DEACTIVATION OF THE CAF, DO REFLECT APPROPRIATE
REDUCTIONS TO THE VARIOUS MARINE HEADQUARTERS IN
RVN.

3. (U) REQUEST YOU APPRISE GEN JONES OF THE CONTENTS
OF REF A DURING HIS VISIT TO YOUR HQ.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0311

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

03

7/6/70

83

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

TOR: 052240Z OCT 70

PTTZYUW RUHFM0530 2782133-AAAA-RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 052133Z OCT 70

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T //N03010//

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR-LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MGEN ADAMS.
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG III MAF 010813Z/OCT 70 (TS)

B. CG FMFPAC 250332Z/SEP 70 (TS)

C. CG FMFPAC 261916Z/AUG 70 (TS)

1. (TS) REF A CONCURRED IN CONTENTS OF REF B. THE CHANGES PROPOSED IN PAR 4 OF REF A WILL BE INCLUDED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS IN THE MSG TO CMC PROPOSED IN REF C AND MODIFIED BY REF B.

2. (TS) PENDING FINAL APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSAL TO RELOCATE HQ III MAF TO OKINAWA, THE STAFF HERE IS ADDRESSING THE SPECIFICS RELATING TO MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, ADMININSTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS, AND COMMUNICATION SUPPORT CITED IN PAR 2 AND 3 OF REF A.

PAGE TWO RUHFM0530 T O P S E C R E T/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO
YOU WILL BE ADVISED BEFORE ANY FINAL DETERMINATION IS MADE CONCERNING THESE MATTERS.

3. (TS) YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROPOSAL CONCERNING III MAF OPERATIONS ON OKINAWA IS APPRECIATED.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0530

"MCEO"

NNNN

III MAF 21

05

COPY 2 OF 21 COPIES

21

TOP SECRET

33

94

O 052234Z ZYH ZFF-6 ZFF-3
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON VIETNAM
 TO CG USARV LONG BINH
 COMNAVFORV SAIGON
 CDR 7TH AF TAN SON NHUT
 CG III MAF DANANG
 INFO AMERICAN AMBASSADOR SAIGON
 ZFM

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS MAC 13016 EYES ONLY
 EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG MC CAFFREY, VADM KING, GEN CLAY,
 LTG MCINTYRE AND AMB BUNDR FROM GEN ABRAMS.

1. (IS) BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE "TINWARE". ONLY REPEAT ONLY KEY
 PERSONNEL ON A NEED TO KNOW BASIS ARE AUTHORIZED ADVANCED
 NOTIFICATION. CRITERION TO BE USED IS WHETHER INDIVIDUAL RE

QUIRES INFORMATION TO INSURE EFFECTIVE EXECUTION. MAINTAIN
 LIST OF INDIVIDUALS HAVING ADVANCED KNOWLEDGE. PROVIDE LIST
 TO MACV WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. NOTIFY
 THIS HEADQUARTERS IMMEDIATELY OF ANY SECURITY VIOLATION IN
 CONNECTION WITH THIS OPERATION. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT BY BACK-
 CHANNEL.

2. THIS MSG REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED UPON PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

139
 0052

THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY

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~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

05

22

34

0 273335Z ZVN 27F-4 27F-1
 FM LTG SUTHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DNG RVN
 TO LTG MCCUTCHEN CG III MAF DNG RVN
 ZEN/COL PERRY CO 37TH TFW DNG RVN
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L DNG 2351 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT : SONIC BOOMS VICINITY DA NANG

1. (C) AT APPROXIMATELY 3700 HOURS ON THE MORNING OF 7 OCTOBER 1970, SEVEN SONIC BOOMS WERE CAUSED BY JET AIRCRAFT FLYING IN THE DA NANG AREA. THE VIETNAMESE, INCLUDING SENIOR MEMBERS OF HEADQUARTERS I CORPS/MR I, WERE CONVINCED THAT THESE SOUNDS WERE IMPACTING ENEMY ROCKETS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE VIETNAMESE FARMER IN HIS RICE PADDY, WITH NO KNOWLEDGE WHATSOEVER OF THE SONIC BOOM PHENOMENON, THOUGHT THE SAME.
2. (C) AS I CONSIDER SONIC BOOMS TO BE CAUSING SERIOUS ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE PEOPLE, I REQUEST THAT YOU TAKE STEPS TO PREVENT FURTHER OCCURRENCES IN POPULATED AREAS.
3. (C) I CAN SEE NO REASON WHY AIRCRAFT MUST FLY AT THE SPEED OF SOUND WHILE NOT ENGAGED IN COMBAT. IF THERE IS A LOGICAL NEED FOR DOING SO, I WOULD APPRECIATE AN EXPLANATION. OTHERWISE, I AM CERTAIN THAT I WILL RECEIVE YOUR COOPERATION.

SSO NOTE : DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

150
 0001

COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES

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CONFIDENTIAL

07

03

35

86

SECRET

TOR : 090049Z OCT 70

RTIAZYUW RUHHFMA0983 2820002-AAAA--RUEOFIA RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

R 090002Z OCT 70

FM ADMIN FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

INFO RUEOFIA/CMC

BT

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON INFO
 GEN CHAPMAN FROM MGEN ADAMS //NO0000//
 TRANSFER OF EXCESS FACILITIES (U)

A. CG III MAF 021344Z OCT 70 (S)

B. COMUSMACV 071536Z SEP 70 (U)

C. CMC 161415Z MAY 70 (C)

D. CINCPAC 080016Z MAY 70 (U) (PASEP)

E. COMUSMACV 240301Z SEP 70 (U)

QM (C) YOUR AWARENESS OF A POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION
 AND DESIRE FOR FIRM POSITION AS OUTLINED REF A IS
 APPRECIATED.

2. (U) THE RECENT MODIFICATIONS TO MACV DIRECTIVE
 735-3 AS SET FORTH IN REF B, ALTHOUGH VIEWED WITH
 CONCERN, DO NOT PRECLUDE APPLICATION OF THE GUIDANCE
 PROVIDED BY REFS C AND D.

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0983 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 3. (U) IT IS OUR BELIEF, AND CONCURRED IN BY COGNIZANT
 STAFF OFFICERS AT HQMC, THAT THE BEST APPROACH IN THIS
 SITUATION IS TO COMPLY WITH MACV DIRECTIVE 753.3; I.E.,
 WHEN YOU DESIRE TO MOVE OR REMOVE C-E EQUIP OR
 INSTALLATIONS, REQUEST APPROVAL AS STATED IN PAR. 1 REF E.

4. (S) ALTHOUGH MACV OBJECTIONS TO THE REMOVAL OF
 EQUIP ARE ENVISIONED, THERE MAY BE INSTANCES WHEREBY
 THE APPLICATION OF THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY PAR 4 A. 2. REF C
 RELATING TO IN-KIND REPLACEMENT MAY PROVE HIGHLY
 BENEFICIAL, PARTICULARLY DURING THIS PERIOD OF AUSTERE
 FUNDING. NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF REF C
 SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN, PARTICULARLY IN CASES WHICH
 INVOLVE BULKY ITEMS OF EQUIP WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPOSED
 TO PROLONGED CONTINUOUS USAGE UNDER ADVERSE CONDITIONS.

5. (U) INSTANCES WHICH CANNOT BE RESOLVED WITHIN THE
 FRAMEWORK OF REFS B AND C SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THIS
 HQ FOR RESOLUTION AS OUTLINED REF D. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

0983

FMFPAC-GEN (10/3/70)
 0101-V04-6603

SECRET

87

O 090644Z ZYH ZFFA ZFFI

FM MG POLVIN, COFS MACV SAIGON VIETNAM
 TO GEN CLAY CDR 7AF TAN SON NHUT VIETNAM
 LTG COLLINS CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG VIETNAM
 LTG DAVISON CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH VIETNAM
 LTG MCCAFFREY DCG USARV LONG BINH VIETNAM
 LTG SUTHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG VIETNAM
 LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG VIETNAM
 VADM KING COMNAVFORV SAIGON VIETNAM
 MG MCCOWN CG DMAC CAN THO VIETNAM
 COL HEALY CO 5SFGA NHA TRANG VIETNAM
 ZFM

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MAC 13375 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: OCTOBER COMMANDER'S WIEU (U)

1. (C) THE OCTOBER COMMANDER'S WIEU WILL BE HELD 24 OCTOBER 1970, COMMENCING 0900 HOURS. ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE INVITED.
2. (U) REQUEST THAT THE DEPCORDS OF THE MR'S ALSO ATTEND THE WIEU.
3. (U) WIEU ATTENDEES ARE INVITED TO LUNCHEON AT THE MACV COMMAND MESS.
4. (C) SESSIONS EXPECTED TO TERMINATE ON OR ABOUT 1530 HOURS, 24 OCTOBER 1970.
5. (U) RSVP REPEAT RSVP MACV 3151, 3044 OR 4958 NLT 20 OCTOBER 1970.
6. (U) DECLASSIFY EFFECTIVE 30 OCTOBER 1970.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HRS

300

0021

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

09

06

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(88)

O 090954Z ZFF-4 ZFF-1
 FM LTG SUTHERLAND CG, XXIV CORPS
 TO LTG MC CUTCHEON CG, II MAF
 MGEN MILLOY CG, AMERICAL DIV
 MGEN HENNESSEY CG, 101ST ABN DIV (AMBL)
 ZFN/BGEN JACKSON DSA, MR I
 ZFN/BGEN HILL CG, 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV (MECH)
 ZFM

TOP SECRET DNG 2360 CLOSE HOLD EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: ARC LIGHT OPERATIONS (U)

1. (TS) GEN ABRAMS HAS SHIFTED THE ENTIRE ARC LIGHT EFFORT TO THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL AREA OF LAOS. HE INTENDS TO CAUSE MAXIMUM DISRUPTION OF THE ENEMY'S SUPPLY LINES DURING THE DRY SEASON IN LAOS. THIS SHIFT IN PRIORITY WILL BRING IN-COUNTRY ARC LIGHT STRIKES TO A HALT EXCEPT IN THE EVENT OF TACTICAL EMERGENCIES THAT CAN BE ALLEVIATED ONLY BY THE APPLICATION OF ARC LIGHT.
 2. (S) I BELIEVE THE PRESENT ARC LIGHT TARGETING SYSTEM SHOULD CONTINUE TO FUNCTION. I WILL CONTINUE TO BRING HIGHLY LUCRATIVE ARC LIGHT TARGETS TO THE ATTENTION OF MACV, AND SHOULD STRIKE BY ARC LIGHT PROVE INFEASIBLE AT THE TIME, I WILL ASSIST YOU IN OBTAINING ANOTHER FIRE SUPPORT MEANS WITH WHICH TO ATTACK THE TARGET.
- SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

175
0007

THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTIBILITY.

COPY 3 OF 5 .

NNNN

TOP SECRET

09

09

54

89

O 201377 ZYX ZEE-4 ZEE-1
FM MSG BOLVIN COFS MACV SAIGON VIETNAM
TO GEN CLAY CDR 7AF TAN SON NHUT VIETNAM
LTC MCCAFFREY DCG USARV LONG BINH VIETNAM
LTC MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG VIETNAM
VADM KING COMNAVFORV SAIGON VIETNAM
ZYX

UNCLAS F F T O FOUO MAC 133370EYES ONLY
SUBJECT: COMMAND AND STAFF PHOTOGRAPH

1. A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE MACV COMMAND GROUP, STAFF AND COMPONENT COMMANDERS WILL BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE COMMANDERS WIFU AT 2045 HOURS, 24 OCTOBER 1970 IN THE J3 CONFERENCE ROOM (1333).
 2. REQUEST YOU ARRIVE PRIOR TO THE ABOVE TIME TO BE INCLUDED IN THE PICTURE.
- WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
150
0033

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UNCLASSIFIED

09

10

33

(90)

CONFIDENTIAL

TOR: 120211Z OCT 70

DE RUMULVA AAAA 1233 285 2120

ZNY AAAAA

R C -I- CG III MAF

-I- CG FMFPAC

P 120120Z OCT 70

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUMUMPA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

H

C O N F I D E N T I A L //SPECAT// NO0000 //

FOR LIGEN JONES INFO LIGEN MCCUM CHEON FROM MAJGEN W LDECKE
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

1. (C) THIS DATE I HAVE SIGNED AN UNCLASSIFIED REPORT TO CMC VIA FMFPAC, COPY TO III MAF, OUTLINING A MACHINE ORIENTED PROGRAM OF INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CONTROL THAT HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY INSTALLED WITHIN THIS DIVISION. BASICALLY, THIS PROGRAM PROVIDES FOR CENTRALIZED SERIAL CONTROL FOR ALL INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS WITHIN THIS DIVISION TO BE MAINTAINED AND MANAGED AT THIS HEADQUARTERS.
2. (C) THE BENEFITS DERIVED SO FAR ARE HIGHLY GRAFIFYING. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE NOW ABLE TO IDENTIFY QUICKLY OWNERSHIP OF INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS REPORTED FOUND AS WELL AS THOSE REPORTED LOST.
3. (C) THE REPORT WITH APPROPRIATE ENCLOSURE EXPLAINING THE PROGRAM WILL BE HAND CARRIED BY COL J. J. HOLICKY, JR. THE DIVISION SUPPLY OFFICER, WHO ROTATES ON 15 OCTOBER 1970. HE IS SCHEDULED FOR A DEBRIEFING AT YOUR HEADQUARTERS ON OR ABOUT 19 OCTOBER 1970.

PAGE TWO RUMULVA 1233 C O N F I D E N T I A L //SPECAT//

4. (C) I DO NOT KNOW IF OTHER MAJOR UNITS HAVE INSTALLED SIMILAR PROGRAMS, BUT FEEL THAT THE PROCEDURES AND METHODS FOR WEAPONS CONTROL ADOPTED HERE MAY BE USEFUL FMFPAC AND MARINE CORPS WIDE. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

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1233

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

NNNN

FMFPAC-GE (2100/13/69)
0101-V04-66**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

TOR: 130117Z OCT 70

RTTCZYUR RUMUGKA0001 286032-CCCC--RUMUPA.

ZNY CCCCC

R 130032Z OCT 70 ZFF-4

FM COMNAVFORV

TO RUMUPA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

FOR LGEN MC CUTCHEDN FROM KING

COMSEC (U)

1. (CONF) IN CONNECTION WITH NAVFORV/VNM PROGRAM TO OVERCOME SERIOUS COMSEC DEFICIENCIES, I HAVE URGENT NEED FOR UP TO TEN ADDITIONAL LINGUISTS PROFICIENT IN VIETNAMESE. WE CAN QUICKLY TEACH THEM ENOUGH COMSEC TO MAKE THEM INTO USEFUL MONITORS, ENABLING US TO FIND OUT HOW MUCH INFO THE VNM IS GIVING AWAY, AND TO EXPAND OUR CURRENT TRANSEC REPORT PROGRAM.

2. (C) IT STRIKES ME THAT PAST, CURRENT OR FUTURE III MAF REDEPLOYMENTS MIGHT INCLUDE SOME LINGUISTS IN EXCESS TO USMC IMMEDIATE NEEDS WHO WOULD BE WILLING TO RETURN TO VIETNAM OR REMAIN IN-COUNTRY TO WORK ON THIS PROJECT. WE WILL FIND NAVY SPACE CEILINGS IN-COUNTRY FOR THEM. WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR PAGE TWO RUMUGKA0001 C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN EVALUATION OF THIS POSSIBILITY.

3. (U) NEW SUBJ: UNDERSTAND LUST-OFF HELI FOR WOUNDED SEABEES IN AR-1 NOW SOMETIMES PILOTED BY THREE-STAR GENERALS. THIS ONCE AGAIN DEMONSTRATES THAT THE INTER-SERVICE RELATIONSHIPS WE ENJOY ARE THE FINEST EVER SEEN.

4. (U) KINDEST REGARD.

GP-3

BT

YOOI

NNNN

IN 07546/286-70 /ACK

13 OCT 10 9:17

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

130032Z OCT 70

13

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32

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

92

7/12

C 170035Z ZYH ZFF-A ZFF-1
FM COL VANCE CG DANANG SUPCOM
TO LIG MC GUTCHEON CG III MAF
ZFM

C O N F I D E N T I A L PNG 2405 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: DAMAGE TO MARINE AIR AMMUNITION ITEMS

1. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION IS BEING UNDERTAKEN TO ELIMINATE DAMAGE TO MARINE AMMUNITION ITEMS CAUSED BY POOR HANDLING PRACTICES. SPECIAL INSTRUCTION HAS BEEN INSTITUTED REGARDING UNLOADING, LOADING, SECURING, AND MOVING AMMUNITION. I HAVE ISSUED SPECIAL ORDERS INSTRUCTING THE PORT COMMANDER TO PERMIT NO VEHICLE TO LEAVE THE PORT WITHOUT FIRST COMPLETING AN INSPECTION OF LOADING AND TIE-DOWN. I HAVE FURTHER ORDERED THAT SUCH INSPECTION WILL, IN EVERY CASE, BE CONDUCTED BY A COMMISSIONED OFFICER.
2. RESPECTFULLY.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATE

200
0301

CONFIDENTIAL

~~17 00 05~~

(93)

MCEO

RUMULVA 19 2 292705-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

RUMUMPA -T- III MAF

P 190705Z OCT 70

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L //N06000//

SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN
MCCUTCHEON FROM MGEN WIDDECKE/DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS ONLY

DRUG ABUSE (U)

A. CMC MSG 131213 OCT 70 (U)

B. MCO P1900.16 MARINE CORPS SEPARATION AND RETIREMENT
MANUAL (U)1. (C) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO REQUEST CLARIFICATION
OF THE POLICY STATEMENT ON DRUG ABUSE SET FORTH IN REFERENCE
A AND TO ASCERTAIN ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE POLICIES ON
DRUG ABUSE SET FORTH IN REFERENCE B.2. (C) PARAGRAPH 2A OF REFERENCE A STATES, IN PART, QUOTE:
THOSE WHO EXPERIMENT WITH DRUGS CAN EXPECT TO BE PUNISHED.
THOSE WHO BECOME ADDICTED WILL BE SEPARATED. IT IS CLEAR
THAT BOTH TYPES OF USER INTRODUCE UNNECESSARY OPERATIONALPAGE TWO RUMULVA1962 C O N F I D E N T I A L/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FORRISKS AS WELL AS AN UNWHOLESOME ENVIRONMENT. UNQUOTE.
THE QUOTED SENTENCES CATEGORIZE BOTH THE EXPERIMENTER AND
THE ADDICT AS USERS. PARAGRAPH 2C OF REFERENCE A CONCLUDES
WITH THE THOUGHT THAT DRUG USERS SIMPLY DO NOT FIT INTO
THE CATEGORY OF PERSONNEL THAT WILL BE RETAINED IN THE
MARINE CORPS.3. (C) PARAGRAPH 6017 OF REFERENCE B STATES IN PART, QUOTE:
A COMMANDING OFFICER OR OFFICER IN CHARGE WILL RECOMMEND
A MEMBER FOR DISCHARGE BY REASON OF UNFITNESS WHEN HE
DETERMINES THAT THE MEMBER'S MILITARY RECORD INCLUDES
ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING:D. DRUG ADDICTION, HABITUATION, OR THE UNAUTHORIZED
USE OR POSSESSION OF NARCOTICS, DANGEROUS DRUGS, MARIJUANA,
OR ANY SUBSTANCE CONSIDERED TO BE HABIT FORMING OR TO HAVE
A POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE BECAUSE OF ITS DEPRESSANT OR STIMULANT
EFFECT ON THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM OR BECAUSE OF THEIR
HALLUCINOGENIC EFFECT; ... UNQUOTE.4. (C) IT APPEARS THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFERENCES
A AND B ARE INCONSISTENT IN AT LEAST TWO AREAS: THE PUNISHMENT
VS THE SEPARATION OF THE EXPERIMENTER AND THE RETENTION VS

PG 1 OF 2

190705Z OCT 70

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SPECAT

MCEO

(94)

MCEO

PAGE THREE RUMULVA 1962 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C A T / M A R I N E C O R P S
EYES ONLY / EXCLUSIVE FOR
THE SEPARATION OF THE POSSESSOR.
5. (U) IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE ABOVE AREAS BE CLARIFIED
AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE TO INSURE STRICT
COMPLIANCE WITH BOTH REFERENCES.
BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1962

PG 2 OF 2

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

190705Z OCT 70

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

SPECAT**MCEO**

(94)

431 x 100 3
10

PP UUMSQ
DE UUMSOR 0529 2921100
ZNR UUUUU
P 191015Z OCT 70
FM CG 2ND ROX MAR BDE
TO UUMSQ/CG III MAF

BT

UNCLAS

SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

PLEASE ACCEPT MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR SELECTION AS THE
NEXT ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.
IT IS A FINE TRIBUTE FROM YOUR COMMANDANT, AND A REWARD YOU RICHLY
DESERVE FOR YOUR MANY YEARS OF SPLENDID SERVICE TO THE UNITED
STATES MARINE CORPS AND TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATES.
I AM VERY PROUD OF YOU. WITH GREAT RESPECT, B GEN LEE SENDS.

RIV
0529

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19 OCT 21 07

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(95)

PTTEZYUW RUHFM2194 2922004-EEEE--RUMUMPA.
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 192004Z OCT 70
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
 BT

UNCLAS E F T O PERSONAL FOR LIGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM
 LIGEN W. K. JONES //N05060//
 MARINE CORPS BIRTHDAY CEREMONIES
 A. CG III MAF MSG 022211Z OCT70 (U)

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT THROUGH JAY HUBBARD'S EFFORTS,
 IN RESPONSE TO REF (A), MCB CAMPEN IS IN PROCESS OF
 ASSEMBLING EIGHT PERIOD UNIFORMS FOR YOUR USE. THESE
 UNIFORMS WILL COVER FOLLOWING PERIODS: 1776, 1812,
 1836, 1846, 1862, WWI AND WWII.

2. A CMC MSG REGARDING PERTINENT SHIPPING DETAILS
 FOR THE UNIFORMS SHOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN NEXT FEW
 DAYS.

3. MY BEST WISHES FOR A SUCCESSFUL PAGEANT. WARM
 REGARDS.

BT

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P E R S O N A L F O R

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20 OCT 10 16 07Z

PTTUZYUW RUMUGKA0179 2931303-UUUU--RUMUMPA.
ZNR UUUUU
P 201305Z OCT 70 ZFF-3
FM COMNAVFORV
TO RUMUMPA/CG THIRD MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
BT

31

UNCLAS
PERSONAL FOR LT GENERAL MCCUTCHEON FROM KING
1. ON BEHALF OF NAVAL FORCES VIETNAM, PLEASE
ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR
FORTHCOMING ASSIGNMENT AS ASSISTANT COMMANDANT.
THE NEWS WAS RECEIVED WITH A GREAT DEAL OF
PLEASURE AND WITH THE CONVICTION THAT A MORE APT
SELECTION COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE. I WISH YOU
SMOOTH SAILING AND CONTINUED SUCCESS IN THAT MOST
CHALLENGING ASSIGNMENT.

2. WARM REGARDS.

LT

#0179

NANN

IN 12096/293-70 /ACK

copy 2024

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(98)

0 1207 ZYH ZFF-1
FM LTG MCCAFFREY DCG USARV LONG BINH
TO LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG VIETNAM
ZFM

UNCLAS F F I O ARV 2957 EYES ONLY
YOUR FRIENDS AT USARV ARE DELIGHTED THAT THE USMC HOLDS YOU IN THE
SAME HIGH ESTEEM THAT WE DO.
CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

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0203

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UNCLASSIFIED

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(99)

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

ZNY AAAAA
R 230240Z OCT 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO ZEN/CG THIRD MAF
ZEN/CG I MAF
ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
ZEN/CG FORTEPS FMFPAC
ZEN/CG FIRST MAF (REAR)
EEN/CG FIFTH MAB
ZEN/FIRST MABDE
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN OWENS, MGEN WILSON, BGEN HOFFMAN, BGEN CONLEY, BGEN DWYER, BGEN ARMSTRONG, INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY. // 1 Nov 70//
FORCE PLANNING (UJL)

"MCEO"

- A. CG FMFPAC 230257Z/AUG 70 (IS) (SPECAT) (NOIAL)
- B. ADMIN FMFPAC 140417Z/JUL 70 (S)
- 1. (IS) REF A, USING REF B AS A BASIS, CITED CERTAIN

PAGE TWO RUMUMPA... TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO UNITS WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY BE ADDED TO AND SOME WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY BE DELETED FROM INCREMENT IV MARINE TROOP REDEPLOYMENTS. INCREMENT IV WAS COMPLETED ON 15 OCT 1970 AND THOSE UNITS ADDED IN REF A DID DEPLOY WHILE THOSE DELETED DID NOT.

2. (S) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO APPRISE YOU OF FUTURE REDEPLOYMENT PLANS OF MARINE FORCES FROM RVN.

3. (IS) NO MARINES ARE SCHEDULED TO REDEPLOY DURING INCREMENT V (16 OCT - 31 DEC 70). DURING INCREMENT VI (1 JAN - 30 APR 70), 12.4K MARINES ARE SCHEDULED FOR REDEPLOYMENT. CURRENT PLANNING, HOWEVER, ENVISIONS THAT THE BULK OF THIS 12.4K WILL REDEPLOY DURING THE PERIOD MARCH AND APRIL 1970. DURING THIS TIME FRAME, IT IS PRESENTLY PLANNED THAT FLC WILL BE DEACTIVATED IN RVN, AND THE FLAGS OF THE 1ST MARDIV AND 1ST MAF AND A MAJOR PORTION OF THE REMAINDER OF THEIR HEADQUARTERS' UNITS WILL BE RELOCATED TO CAMP PENDLETON AND IWAKUNI RESPECTIVELY.

4. (IS) THE TROOP LIST REFLECTING THE UNITS THAT WILL

PAGE 1 OF 3

23

02

230248Z OCT 70

46

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUHHFMADDDDD TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 COMPRISE INCREMENT VI IS BEING PREPARED. I DO NOT
 ANTICIPATE AT THIS TROOP LIST WILL BE FIRM UNTIL
 SOMETIME IN DEC AS THE COMPOSITION OF THE RESIDUAL
 FORCE HAS NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED.

3. (TS) CURRENT PLANNING PROVIDES FOR THE RESIDUAL
 FORCE TO REMAIN IN RVN UNTIL 30 JUN 71. HOWEVER, I
 WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE 30 JUNE DATE IS A
 PLANNING DATE AND HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY APPROVED.
 6. (U) I WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP YOU INFORMED AS
 PLANNING GUIDANCE BECOMES AVAILABLE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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PAGE 2 OF 2

230248Z OCT 70

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL**EXCLUSIVE**

PTTAZYUW RUHHFMA2688 2972231-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

RUMUMPA -T- CG FIRST MARDIV

P 242231Z OCT 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG FIRST MARDIV

TOR: 24OCT70 2309Z

INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN WIDDECKE,
INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, FROM LTGEN JONES. //N00000//

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

WEAPONS CONTROL PROCEDURES

A. YOUR 120120Z OCT70 (C) SPECAT:

1. COL JOE HOLICKY DID A FINE JOB DEBRIEFING AND LEFT THE STAFF HERE WITH SOME SOLID FOOD FOR THOUGHT.
2. A SPECIAL BRIEFING WAS HELD FOR G-4, SUPPLY AND ORDNANCE REPS ON THE DETAILS OF THE WEAPONS CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIBED IN YOUR SPECAT (REF A). ALL CONCERNED WERE IMPRESSED WITH THE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND APPARENTLY EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES YOU HAVE INSTITUTED IN THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION AND WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR FMFPAC AND MARINE CORPS WIDE APPLICATION, AS OUR ENDORSEMENT TO CMC WILL INDICATE.
3. PLEASE EXPRESS MY PERSONAL THANKS TO ALL WHO PARTICIPATED

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA2866 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
IN DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING THIS SYSTEM.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

242231Z OCT 70

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COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

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FMFPAC-GE 100
0101-V04**24****22****31**
CONFIDENTIAL

(101)

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL

RITAZ YUV RUMHMA2910 2902114-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA
R 252114Z OCT 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO ZEN/CMC
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

EXCLUSIVE

TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN
INFO LIGEN MCCOM CHRON. FROM LIGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//
SECTION ONE OF TWO
FORCE PLANNING (U)

MCEO

A. CINCPACFLT 031904Z/JUL 70 (C) (S) (SPECIAL) (PASEP)
1. (C) (S) IN ANTICIPATION OF ULTIMATE APPROVAL BEING
GIVEN TO RELOCATION OF HQ III MAF TO OAHINA, I HAVE
PROPOSED HEREIN MISSION, TASKS, AND A/O FOR HQ III MAF
ON OAHINA. CG III MAF HAS CONCURRED IN THE PROPOSAL AND
HAS INDICATED THAT IT SHOULD PROVIDE A SATISFACTORY BASIS
FOR OVERALL OPERATION OF III MAF ON OAHINA. THE BASIS FOR
THIS PROPOSAL IS MARINE CORPS TABLE OF ORGANIZATION NUMBER
M-4918, FORCE HEADQUARTERS MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE. IT
IS PLANNED THAT THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, EMPLOYMENT,

PAGE TWO RUMHMA2910 TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE
FOR MCEO

ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, INTELLIGENCE,
AS WELL AS THE CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION, RE-
SPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS PRESCRIBED IN TABLE OF
ORGANIZATION M-4918, WOULD APPLY TO HQ III MAF.
2. (C) (S) HQ III MAF MISSION. TO EXERCISE OPERATIONAL
CONTROL OF ASSIGNED FORCES NORMALLY CONSISTING OF THE
3D MARINE DIVISION (-) GREEN, THE 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT
WING, 3D FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT (-) AND OTHER FORCE
COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS
AS MAY BE ASSIGNED.
3. (C) (S) HQ III MAF TASKS
A. AS OF 70, CARRY OUT SUCH TASKS AS IS ASSIGN-
ED BY COMSEVCOM.
B. PROVIDE HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS TO COMMAND DE-
PLOYED MAR AMPHIBIOUS BRIG (MAB) AND BE PREPARED TO
PROVIDE A MAB HEADQUARTERS WITHIN REQUIREMENT.
C. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH COMNAVBASE-
SUBIC FOR MATTER CONCERNING AIR MAINTENANCE AND USE
OF THE SELF CAMP.
D. COORDINATE, CONTROL, AND SUPERVISE THE CONDUCT

25

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III MAF COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA2910 O P S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE
 FOR MCEO
 OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (MAP) TRAINING FOR
 PACOM MAP COUNTRIES CONDUCTED BY MARINE UNITS ON OAHN-
 AWA AND JAPAN.

4. (TS) HQ III MAF I/O

A. I/O AS SPECIFIED IN TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
 NUMBER M-4918 WITH FORCE COMMANDER SECTION MODIFIED
 AS INDICATED BELOW TO PROVIDE FOR A LIEUTENANT GENERAL,
 MINOR ADJUSTMENTS IN CERTAIN STAFF SECTIONS, AND THE
 ADDITION OF HQ ELEMENTS FOR THE MAU (SLF) AND A LIAISON
 SECTION:

(CHANGES INDICATED BY \$)

LINE	BILL# DESCRIPTION	RANK	MOS	NA	AG	EM
1	\$FORCE COMMANDER SECTION					
2	\$FORCE COMMANDER	SL GEN	9903			1
3	AIDE	\$MAJ	9910			1
4	AIDE	\$CAPT	9910	1		
5	\$SERGEANT MAJOR	\$SGT MAJ	99999			1
6	\$FOOD SERVICES TECHNICIAN	\$MSGT	9338-			1
7	\$COOK SPECIALIST	\$SGT	93372			1
8	\$SILENOGRAPHER	\$SGT	90142			1

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA2910 O P S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE
 FOR MCEO

\$8A	MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR	SGT	3031			1
\$8B	COOK SPECIALIST	CPL	3372			1
\$8C				1	2	6
\$24A	REPORTS STATISTICS MAN	LCPL	0141			1
\$25				1	2	4
\$95A	MOTOR TRANS OFFICER	CAPT	3001			1
\$99				2	3	4
\$23	ASSISTANT/AVIONICS OFF	\$MAJ	6202	1		
\$24	ASSISTANT/ELECTRONICS OFF	MAJ	9900			1
\$124A	ASSISTANT PLANS/OPS OFF	LCPL	2002			1
\$28				1	3	3
\$39	FORCE ENGR OFF	SE COL	51502			1
\$141	DELETE					
\$44						1 2
\$161	DELETE					
\$162	DELETE					
\$163	DELETE					
\$164	DELETE					
\$165	DELETE					
\$167	ORDNANCE OFF	\$MAJ	2002			1

PAGE FOUR OF FIVE

252114Z OCT 70

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA2910 TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

199	ORGANIZATION TOTAL			10 475 103
(ADD	FOLLOWING SECTIONS STARTING WITH LINE (R 200)			
200	HQ MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIA (SLF)			
201	MARINE AMPHIB UNIA COMDR. SECT			
202	COMMANDING OFFICER	COL	9910	1
203	S-1 SECTION			
204	S-1/ADJ	LT	0130	1
205	ADMIN MAN/DRIVER	CPL	0141	1
206	INTELLIGENCE SECTION			
207	INTELLIGENCE OFFICER	MAJ	0202	1
208	IMAGERY INTERP	SSGT	0241	1
209	OPERATIONS SECTION			
210	OPERATIONS OFFICER	L COL	0302	1
211	FSG/ASSI OPNS OFFICER	MAJ	0302	1
212	AIR OBSERVER	LT	0305	1
213	OPNS CHIEF	GYSGT	9711	1
214	ADMIN MAN	CPL	0141	1
215	LOGISTICS SECTION			
216	LOG OFFICER	LI COL	0402	1
217	SUPPLY/ADMIN CHIEF	MSGT	3001	1

PAGE SIX RUHHFMA2910 TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO

218	EMBARK CHIEF	GYSGT	0431	1
219	ADMIN MAN	CPL	0141	1
220	COMM SECTION			
221	COMM OFFICER	MAJ	2502	1
222	COMM CHIEF	SSGT	2539	1
223	RAD OPN	CPL	2533	2
224	RAD OPN	L CPL	2533	2
225	TOTAL /1			16 24
226	SUBIC BAY LIAISON SECTION			
227	LIAISON OFFICER	MAJ	9910	1
228	ADMIN MAN	SGT	0141	1
229	ADMIN/SUPPLY MAN	SGT	3041	1
230	MAIL CLERK	CPL	0161	1
231	COOK	CPL	3371	1
232	TOTAL			1 4
233	OVERALL ORGANIZATION TOTAL			10 64 131

NOTE: /1 8 OFF AND 12 ENL FOR A MAU HQ STAFF AS INDICATED. HOWEVER, SINCE AT PRESENT, AND FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THERE IS ONLY A REQUIREMENT FOR ONE MAU (SLF) HQ (BASED UPON ONE LPH IN WESTPAC), THE 8

GP-4
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2910

PAGE THREE OF FIVE

202114Z OCT 70

(104)

TOP SECRET

RTIAZYUW RUMHMA2915 2982114-AAAA-RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

R 222114Z OCT 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO ZEN/CMC

INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

B

TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CHAPMAN
INFO LIGEN MCCUMCHON. FROM LIGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//
FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS

ADDITIONAL OFF AN/ 12 ADDITIONAL EML (20 TOTAL) ARE TO
BE RETAINED AS A CONTINGENCY FOR MANNING A SECOND MAU
(SLF) HQ STAFF IF REQUIRED. THESE 20 SPACES ARE TO
BE USED TO SUPPLEMENT OTHER III MAF STAFF SECTIONS
WHEN SECOND MAU (SLF) HQ STAFF NOT REQUIRED.
(PRESENT LINES 200-209 OF I/O M-4916 WILL BECOME LINES
234-242 RESPECTIVELY.)

B. THE M&S COMPANY WHICH SUPPORTS A MAF HQ (I/O
M-4919) WILL NOT BE ACQUIRED DUE TO MARINE CORPS
CEILING CONSTRAINTS ON OKINAWA. HQ III MAF WILL BE
SATELLITED ON A HOSI COMMAND ON OKINAWA. AN I&M
COMMAND WILL BE TASKED TO PROVIDE FOR INTERNAL

PAGE TWO RUMHMA2915 TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE
FOR MCEO

ADMINISTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS. REQUIRED
ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED
BY III MAF TASKING ITS SUBORDINATE COMMANDS TO PROVIDE
AUGMENTATION TO THE HOSI COMMAND COMMUNICATION FACILITY.

5. (IS) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

A. COMMAND LESS OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF HQ III MAF
AND MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS WILL BE RETAINED BY
CG FMFPAC.

B. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF III MAF, AS IF-79,
WILL BE EXERCISED BY COMSEVENMFLP.

C. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF UNITS ASSIGNED TO III
MAF WILL BE EXERCISED BY CG III MAF.

6. (IS) I MAF. UPON RELOCATION OF HQ III MAF TO
OKINAWA, IT IS PLANNED TO RELOCATE HQ I MAF TO CAMP
PENDLETON AS PROPOSED IN PAR 1, REF A. I MAF WOULD
THEN EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE FIRST MARINE
DIVISION (-) (REIN), THIRD MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, AND
OTHER FORCE COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT, AND COMBAT
SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS AS MAY BE ASSIGNED. OPERATIONAL
CONTROL OF THE 1ST FORCE SERVICE REGIMENTS (-) WOULD

PAGE FOUR OF FIVE

222114Z OCT 70

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHFM2912 1 0 P S E C R E I SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE
FOR MCEO

BE EXERCISED BY I MAF ONLY WHEN PLANNING FOR AND
CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, IT
IS PLANNED THAT CG I MAF WOULD BE EITHER CG ISI
WARDIV OR CG 3D MAW, WHOEVER IS SENIOR.

7. (U) YOUR COMMENTS CONCERNING THE PROPOSALS CON-
TAINED HEREIN WOULD BE APPRECIATED. VERY RESPECTFULLY
AND WITH WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2915

PAGE FIVE OF FIVE

232114Z OCT 70

NNNN

O 260840Z ZYH ZFF-3 ZFF-6

FM RG HIXON COFS XXI CORPS DNG

TO MAJOR GENERAL DOLDIN COFS MACV SON

INFO ZEN/LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DNG

MAJOR GENERAL WENNESSEY CG 101ST ARN DIV CEE

MAJOR GENERAL MILLOY VC AMERICAL DIV CHL

ZEN/BRIGADIER GENERAL HILL CG 1ST BDE, 5TH INF DIV AIR
ZEM

UNCLAS F I O DNG 0803 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: VISIT OF MR. JOY STEINBERG

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF THE VISIT OF MR. STEINBERG, STAFF MEMBER OF SENATOR GOOD'S SUB-COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY.

2. ALL MAJOR COMMANDS IN MILITARY REGION 1 WERE VISITED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE. THE VISIT TO III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE WAS CANCELLED DUE TO RESCHEDULING PROBLEMS CAUSED BY MR. STEINBERG'S LATE ARRIVAL IN MILITARY REGION 1.

3. PRIOR TO DEPARTING TO VISIT UNITS IN MILITARY REGION 2, MR. STEINBERG INDICATED THAT HE WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS MADE IN MILITARY REGION 1 IN HIS REPORT TO THE SENATE SUB-COMMITTEE.

A. DRUGS OF ALL TYPES ARE AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT MILITARY REGION 1 IN GREAT QUANTITIES AND AT LOW COST.

B. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO COMPLETELY CUT OFF THE SOURCE OF DRUGS.

C. MILITARY OFFICIALS DO NOT RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS A DRUG PROBLEM IN MILITARY REGION 1; COMPLETELY ACCURATE STATISTICS ARE NOT AVAILABLE SINCE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS CAN ONLY PROVIDE DATA ON USERS APPREHENDED WHICH DOESN'T REFLECT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ACTUAL USERS. MEDICAL PERSONNEL ARE ATTEMPTING TO GATHER MORE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT FIGURES THROUGH USE OF QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEWS.

D. MILITARY OFFICIALS IN MILITARY REGION 1 ARE ATTEMPTING TO REDUCE THE DRUG USAGE PROBLEM USING THREE BASIC APPROACHES:

(1) EDUCATION: LECTURES ARE GIVEN AT COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS TO NEWLY ARRIVED PERSONNEL. SIMILAR LECTURES ARE ALSO GIVEN AT COMPANY LEVEL. OFFICERS AND SENIOR NCO'S RECEIVE TRAINING ON METHODS OF DETECTING USERS AND IN LOCATING DRUGS.

(2) AMNESTY: THE AMNESTY PROGRAM WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A VALUABLE TOOL IN ENCOURAGING USERS TO QUIT THE HABIT.

(3) ENFORCEMENT: MR. STEINBERG ALSO COMPLEMENTED MILITARY AND SECURITY POLICE EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE FLOW OF DRUGS IN MILITARY REGION 1. OF PARTICULAR NOTE, ACCORDING TO MR. STEINBERG, WERE THE EFFORTS OF THE COMBINED DRUG SUPPRESSION TEAM DIRECTED TOWARD DETECTING THE PUSHERS OF DRUGS. MR. STEINBERG FEELS, HOWEVER, THAT THE BILL PROPOSED BY THE SENATE SUB-COMMITTEE HE IS REPRESENTING IS NECESSARY TO ASSIST THE MILITARY IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING ADDICTED DRUG USERS FROM THE SERVICE.

E. MR. STEINBERG INDICATED THAT HE WAS MOST IMPRESSED WITH THE PROGRAM OF THE MEDICAL DIVISION. THIS PROGRAM IS CONDUCTED BY FOUR LIEUTENANT COLONELS CONSISTING OF THE SURGEON, STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, DEPUTY MARSHAL AND CHAPLAIN. THEY CONDUCT CLASSES AT THE COMBAT TRAINING CENTER, FIRE BASES AND OTHER LOCATIONS UPON REQUEST. SINCE THE START OF THE PROGRAM ON 7 SEPTEMBER 1970 FORTY-NINE CLASSES HAVE BEEN HELD. LOWER RANKING EM ARE BRIEFED ON THE HAZARDS OF DRUG AND MARIJUANA USE WHILE OFFICERS AND SENIOR NCO'S ARE INSTRUCTED ON METHODS OF DETECTING USERS. OF THE APPROXIMATELY FORTY-SIX HUNDRED MEN RECEIVING THIS INSTRUCT IN EIGHTY-SEVEN HAVE

4. DURING THE BRIEFING MR. STEINBERG PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON DRUG ABUSE, MUCH OF WHICH HE HAD GAINED DURING VISIT TO VIETNAM.

A. THE GREAT MAJORITY OF PEOPLE WHO USE DRUGS IN THE MILITARY DO SO WITHOUT EVER BEING DISCOVERED AND RECEIVE NO MEDICAL ATTENTION. WHEN THEY ARE THROWN LOOSE ON SOCIETY, THEY FIND THAT IT COSTS \$100.00 PER DAY TO FEED A DRUG HABIT THAT COST 50000\$ IN VIETNAM. THIS CAUSES THEM TO TURN CRIME TO FINANCE THEIR HABIT. IN ORDER TO PAY THIS \$100 PER DAY MANY MUST DAILY STEAL PROPERTY WORTH \$300. IN PHILADELPHIA THERE ARE AN AVERAGE OF 14 VIETNAM VETERANS PER MONTH WHO LOCK UP TO 15 ARRESTS EACH WHILE TRYING TO FINANCE THEIR HABIT. RESEARCH REVEALS THAT THEY HAD BECOME ADDICTED IN THE MILITARY AND HAD NOT BEEN CONVICTED OR FOR ANY MILITARY OR CIVILIAN OFFENSE PRIOR TO DISCHARGE NOR HAD THEY BEEN IDENTIFIED AS USERS.

2. HEROIN USAGE IN MILITARY REGION 1 IS ON THIS INCREASE. NO ONE IS SURE AS TO WHY. SOME COMMANDERS SPECULATE THAT TROOPS WHO ARE BEING TRANSFERRED TO MILITARY REGION 1 FROM STAFF BORN UNITS IN THE SOUTH BRING IT WITH THEM.

ONE VIAL OF HEROIN BOUGHT IN SAIGON FOR \$3.00 WAS FOUND TO BE 95 PER CENT PURE. THE LOWEST PURITY RATE FOR HEROIN AVAILABLE IN VIETNAM IS 93 PER CENT WHILE IN THE US IT AVERAGES 4 - 6 PER CENT PURE.

HEROIN WHICH WOULD COST \$20.00 AN OUNCE IN VIETNAM WOULD BE WORTH \$40,000 IN THE UNITED STATES.

C. THERE HAS BEEN A DRASTIC UPSURGE IN DRUG OVERDOSE INCIDENTS. DURING THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY TO 31 JULY 1970 THERE WERE 14 DEATHS IN VIETNAM ATTRIBUTED TO OVERDOSES. IN SEPTEMBER AT THE HOSPITAL IN CAM BANG BAY THERE WERE 58 ADMISSIONS FOR OVERDOSE WITH 7 RESULTANT DEATHS. FROM 1-15 OCTOBER THERE WERE 35 DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS REPORTED IN VIETNAM. IT IS BELIEVED THAT MOST OF THESE OVERDOSES OCCUR BECAUSE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE USE DRUGS IN THE UNITED STATES ARE UNAWARE OF THE HIGH QUALITY (PURITY) OF THE DRUGS THEY ARE ABLE TO OBTAIN IN VIETNAM. BY USING THE SAME AMOUNT THAT THEY DID IN THE STATES THEY GIVE THEMSELVES A LETHAL OVERDOSE.

D. THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF TIME REQUIRED TO REHABILITATE AN ADDICT IS 18 TO 24 MONTHS. SUCH TREATMENT FACILITIES AS HILL TOP HOUSE IN NEW YORK AND CAUDENZIA HOUSE IN PHILADELPHIA WHICH ARE RUN BY FORMER ADDICTS WHO CLOSELY SCREEN APPLICANTS FOR SINCERITY AND DEDICATION TO DROPPING THE HABIT REPORT A HIGH DEGREE OF SUCCESS.

5. I CONSIDER MR. STEINBERG'S VISIT BENEFICIAL TO THIS COMMAND AND FOUND HIM TO BE SINCERE AND BY FAR THE MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE VISITOR FROM WASHINGTON REGARDING THE DRUG ABUSE PROBLEM AFFECTING SERVICEMEN IN VIETNAM.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

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27 OCT 1970 17 00

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FM CG USARV LBN

TO CG III MAF DNG

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG MCCUTCHEON
AVHEN-FO-0

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

SUBJECT: COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT (U)

A. MESSAGE 160605Z SEP 70, SUBJECT: COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT (U).
CG III MAF TO CG USARV.

B. MESSAGE 190016Z SEP 70, SUBJECT: COMMON SERVICE SUPPORT (U),
CG USARV TO CG III MAF.

1. (U) MY NORTHERN DISTRICT ENGINEER REPORTS THAT ACTION HAS BEEN
TAKEN TO CORRECT AND TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS DISCUSSED IN ABOVE REF-
ERENCE.

2. (C) THE STATUS OF THOSE PROBLEMS IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. (U) SEWAGE PUMPS. ONE OF THREE PUMPS IN THE SEWAGE
LIFT STATION IS OPERABLE, AND THE SEWAGE SYSTEM IS OPERATIONAL.
THE OTHER TWO PUMPS ARE BACK-UP PUMPS. ONE HAS BEEN REPAIRED
AND WILL BE INSTALLED ABOUT 23 OCTOBER 1970. THIRD PUMP IS

PAGE 2 RUMCAVA4573 C O N F I D E N T I A L
BEYOND REPAIR. A NEW PUMP HAS BEEN REQUISITIONED, AND IS
EXPECTED IN EARLY NOVEMBER.

B. (U) AIR CONDITIONING. WE FOUND THAT THE MAJOR PROBLEM
WITH THE MEDICAL BATTALION'S AIR CONDITIONERS SETMED FROM A
FAULTY TRANSFORMER. THIS TRANSFORMER HAS BEEN REPLACED. FOUR
5-TON AIR CONDITIONING UNITS IN THE MEDICAL BATTALION HAD FAULTY
COMPRESSOR MOTORS. THE WINDINGS IN THESE MOTORS ARE BEING
REWOUND. ALL ESSENTIAL AIR CONDITIONERS IN THE MEDICAL BATTALION
ARE OPERATIONAL.

C. (C) ELECTRICAL SERVICES. OUR FACILITIES ENGINEERING
CONTRACTOR, PHIL CO-FORD, HAS REPLACED APPROXIMATELY 600 OF THE
SECURITY LIGHTS BY USE OF LADDERS AND CLIMBERS. TO SERVICE
LIGHTS ON TALL POLES ON A CONTINUING BASIS, WE ARE MAKING A
CONTRACT CHANGE WITH PHIL CO-FORD, OUR HIGH VOLTAGE CONTRACTOR, WHO
HAS THE NECESSARY HIGH LINE EQUIPMENT TO ASSUME THE FUNCTION
OF MAINTAINING THE SECURITY LIGHTS.

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3. (U) ON 5 OCTOBER, YOUR ASSISTANT S-4 AND ENGINEER MET WITH MY NORTHERN DISTRICT ENGINEER AND REVIEWED ACTIONS TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. THEY AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO RESOLVE FACILITIES ENGINEERING PROBLEMS AT THEIR LEVEL. I TRUST THAT

PAGE 3 RUMOAVA4578 C O N F I D E N T I A L
OUR ACTIONS ARE SATISFACTORY AND RESPONSIVE TO YOUR REQUIREMENTS
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GEN WESTMORELAND C/S ARMY
 GEN RYAN C/S AIR FORCE
 ADM ZUMWALT CNO
 GEN CHAPMAN CMTI MC
 MR KELLY ASST SEC DEF FOR M & RA
 LTG MCCAFFREY DCG USARV LONG BINH VIETNAM
 GEN CLAY 7TH AF
 VADM KING NAVFORV
 LTG MCCUTCHEON III MAF
 AMB BERGER USEMB SAIGON
 ZFM

COMUSMACV

280901

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION ONE OF TWO MAC 14089 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: VISIT OF MR. JON STEINBERG

1. (U) THIS MESSAGE IS IN TWO PARTS, PART I.
2. (U) THE FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF THE VISIT OF MR. STEINBERG, STAFF MEMBER OF SENATOR DODD'S SUB COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY.
3. (C) MR. STEINBERG ARRIVED IN VIETNAM 12 OCT ON A TOURIST PASSPORT WITHOUT A RVN VISA AND WITHOUT PRIOR OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION. MR. STEINBERG POSSESSED A LETTER FROM SENATOR T.J. DODD STATING THAT HE IS A STAFF MEMBER OF THE SENATE SUB COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY. LETTER FURTHER STATED MR. STEINBERG WAS IN RVN TO INVESTIGATE DRUG ABUSE BY US SERVICEMEN.
4. (C) MR. STEINBERG WAS NOT INITIALLY ADMITTED TO RVN. HE WAS FIRST REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A VISA, WHICH HE ACCOMPLISHED WITH A TRIP TO BANGKOK.
5. (C) UPON RETURN TO RVN MR. STEINBERG WAS ADMITTED. MR. STEINBERG HAD NO OFFICIAL SPONSORSHIP UNTIL SECDEF MESSAGE 142226Z OCT 70 CONFIRMED HIS STATUS AND REQUESTED APPROPRIATE SUPPORT AND COURTESIES. NO SECURITY CLEARANCE OR EQUIVALENT GRADE WERE PROVIDED. MR. STEINBERG WAS A GUEST OF BG THOMAS, USARV SURGEON, UPON ENTRY AND SUBSEQUENTLY ARRANGED FOR BILLETING AT 3RD FIELD HOSPITAL IN SAIGON. HE APPARENTLY RECORDED SOME CONVERSATIONS DURING THIS PERIOD. HE ALSO MADE SEVERAL BUYS OF HEROIN, MARIJUANA AND OTHER DANGEROUS DRUGS WHICH HE DESIRES TO IMPORT FOR DISPLAY BY THE DODD SUB COMMITTEE. HE HAS AUTHORITY FROM THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT TO DO THIS.
6. (C) UPON APPROVAL AS AN OFFICIAL VISITOR MR. STEINBERG WAS ASSIGNED AN ESCORT OFFICER AND ALLOWED TO VISIT MAJOR UNITS IN MILITARY REGIONS I AND II. HE WAS SCHEDULED TO VISIT UNITS IN OTHER REGIONS BUT DETERMINED TO CUT VISIT SHORT AFTER A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH UNKNOWN PERSONS IN CONUS. MR. STEINBERG INDICATED HE WAS AWARE OF MR. KROGH'S VISIT TO RVN AND THE GUIDANCE SUBSEQUENTLY PROVIDED BY MR. KROGH. MR. STEINBERG WOULD NOT SAY WHAT MR. KROGH'S GUIDANCE WAS.
7. (C) BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THIS HEADQUARTERS INDICATES THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS WILL BE INCLUDED IN HIS REPORT:
 - A. DRUGS OF ALL TYPES ARE AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT RVN IN GREAT QUANTITY AND AT LOW COST.
 - B. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO COMPLETELY CUT OFF THE SOURCE OF DRUGS.
 - C. MILITARY OFFICIALS RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS A DRUG PROBLEM IN RVN.

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D. THE GREAT MAJORITY OF PEOPLE WHO USE DRUGS IN THE MILITARY DO SO WITHOUT BEING DISCOVERED AND RECEIVE NO MEDICAL ATTENTION.

E., HEROIN USAGE THROUGHOUT RVN IS ON THE INCREASE.

8. (C) STEINBERG VISITED LONG BINH ON 22 OCTOBER WHERE HE INTERVIEWED OFFICER PERSONNEL IN THE OFFICES OF THE USARV CHAPLAIN, PM AND SURGEON. HE ALSO VISITED THE 33D EVACUATION HOSPITAL WHERE HE TALKED WITH AN ARMY PSYCHIATRIST. A USARV INFORMATION OFFICER WAS PRESENT AT EACH INTERVIEW.

9. (C) DURING THE INTERVIEW WITH COL BOWEN, THE NEURO-PSYCHIATRIC CONSULTANT FOR USARV MEDCOM, COL MOCK, THE USARV IO, WAS PRESENT. STEINBERG TOLD COL MOCK THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT WAS TO GATHER INFORMATION TO BE USED IN SUPPORT OF A BILL PROPOSED BY THE 3000 SUB COMMITTEE. HE SAID IT WAS NOT HIS PURPOSE TO GATHER INFORMATION TO BE USED TO EMBARRASS THE MILITARY. HIS QUESTIONS APPEARED TO BE HONEST AND STRAIGHTFORWARD. HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT BE USED IN CONTROVERSIAL PRESS RELEASE.

10. (C) STEINBERG ASKED COL BOWEN IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY DEATHS FROM DRUG OVERDOSE IN USARV. HE WAS TOLD THAT THERE HAD BEEN MANY, BUT AT THAT TIME HE DID NOT REQUEST NOR WAS HE GIVEN SPECIFIC STATISTICS. HOWEVER, HE CALLED COL BOWEN THE FOLLOWING DAY AND ASKED FOR DEATH STATISTICS FROM DRUG OVERDOSE FOR 69 AND 70. COL BOWEN PROVIDED HIM WITH THE FOLLOWING:

A. DURING CY 1969 THERE WERE 527 HOSPITALIZED DRUG RELATED CASES OR 0.39 PERCENT OF ALL US ARMY HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS IN RVN. FROM JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER THIS YEAR 676 ARMY PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN HOSPITALIZED FOR DRUG RELATED REASONS, OR 0.74 PERCENT OF ALL ADMISSIONS.

B. IN CY 1969 THERE WERE 16 DEATHS FROM DRUG OVERDOSE IN USARV. FROM JANUARY THROUGH 18 OCTOBER THIS YEAR THERE HAVE BEEN 93 DEATHS FROM DRUG OVER DOSE, AS FOLLOWS: JANUARY THRU JULY 14; AUGUST 26; SEPTEMBER 18; OCTOBER 1 THRU OCTOBER 18 - 35 DEATHS.

11. (C) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED TO CLARIFY THE INCREASED INCIDENTS OF DRUG ABUSE DEATHS DURING THE PERIOD 1 JAN 69 (THRU 30 SEP 70 AS REPORTED TO STEINBERG BY COL BOWEN (COL BOWEN'S STATISTICS VARY SLIGHTLY FROM USARV'S OFFICIAL FIGURES):

A. DURING CY 1969 THERE WERE 16 DEATHS PROVEN BY AUTHOPSY TO HAVE RESULTED FROM DRUG ABUSE: AN AVERAGE OF 1.33 DRUG ABUSE DEATHS IER MONTH OF ARMY PERSONNEL.

B. DURING THE PERIOD 1 JAN 70 THRU 31 JUL 70, THERE WERE 14 DEATHS PROVEN BY AUTHOPSY TO HAVE RESULTED FROM DRUG ABUSE, AN AVERAGE OF TWO DRUG ABUSE DEATHS PER MONTH FOR ARMY PERSONNEL IN THE FIRST SEVEN MONTHS OF 1970.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

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 FM GEN ARRAYS COMUSMACV SAIGON VIETNAM
 TO ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC
 INFO ADM MOOPER CHIEF OF RC
 GEN WESTMORELAND C/S ARMY
 GEN RYAN C/S AIR FORCE
 ADM ZUMWALT CNO
 GEN CHAPMAN CMTI MC
 MR KELLY ASST SEC DEF FOR M & RA
 LTG MCCAFFREY DCG USARV LONG BINH VIETNAM
 GEN CLAY 7TH AF
 VADM KING NAVFORV
 LTG MCCUTCHEON III MAF
 AMB BERGER USEMB SAIGON
 ZEM

C O M F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF TWO MAC 14089 EYES ONLY
 C. DURING THE PERIOD 1 AUG 70 THROUGH 30 SEP 70, THERE WERE
 11 DEATHS PROVEN BY AUTOPSY TO HAVE RESULTED FROM DRUG ABUSE, AN
 AVERAGE OF 5.5 DRUG ABUSE DEATHS PER MONTH OF ARMY PERSONNEL IN
 AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1970. TWO OF THE AUTOPSY PROVEN DEATHS
 INCLUDED IN THIS PERIOD WERE FINALIZED 22 OCT 70.

D. DURING THE PERIOD 1 AUG 70 TO 30 SEP 70, THERE WERE 40
 DEATHS CLINICALLY DIAGNOSED OR DETERMINED BY INITIAL MEDICAL
 INTERPRETATIONS AS RESULTING FROM POSSIBLE DRUG ABUSE. IN THESE
 CASES, PHYSICIANS SUSPECTED THE CAUSE OF DEATH TO BE DRUG ABUSE, BUT
 THEY WERE NOT AUTOPSY PROVEN. TO DATE 11 OF THE AFOREMENTIONED 40
 HAVE BEEN PROVEN BY AUTOPSY.

E. IT SHOULD BE ADDED THAT THE REMAIND

E OF THE 40 CASES NOTED

ABOVE MAY NEVER BE PROVEN BY AUTOPSY. THE NUMBER OF DEATHS FROM
 SUSPECTED DRUG ABUSE DETERMINED BY CLINICAL DIAGNOSIS OR MEDICAL
 INTERPRETATION IS SIGNIFICANT IN THAT IT REFLECTS A TREND TOWARD
 GREATER DRUG USAGE IN RVN. HOWEVER, TRENDS DETERMINED FROM DEATH
 BY DRUG ABUSE FIGURES WHICH ARE AUTOPSY PROVEN MUST BE CONSIDERED
 MORE ACCURATE, AND THEREFORE MORE MEANINGFUL. MAJ
 Y OF COL BOWEN'S
 REPORTED DEATHS FROM DRUG ABUSE WERE AS A RESULT OF CLINICAL

DIAGNOSIS.

F. DRUG ABUSE ADMISSIONS TO USAMEDCOM (P) MEDICAL TREATMENT
 FACILITIES DURING CY 1969 TOTALED 525, OR AN AVERAGE OF 44 PER
 MONTH. DRUG ABUSE ADMISSION FIGURES FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY 1970
 TO 31 JULY 1970 WERE 486 OR 69 PER MONTH. FIGURES FOR THE PERIOD
 1 AUGUST 1970 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1970 WERE 190 DRUG ABUSE ADMISSIONS,
 OR AN AVERAGE OF 95 PER MONTH. THE ABOVE FIGURES MUST BE INTER-
 PRETED AS REPRESENTING A TREND OF INCREASED DRUG USAGE BY AVOY
 PERSONNEL AS INDICATED BY THE INCREASED INCIDENTS OF HOSPITALIZATION.

12. (C) WHILE THE PROBLEM HAS INCREASED RECENTLY IT HAS NOT
 INCREASED TO THE DEGREE THAT THE FOREGOING FIGURES IMPLY. PART OF
 THE APPARENT MARKED INCREASE IN DRUG ABUSE SINCE 1 AUGUST 1970 IS
 DUE TO THE FACT THAT 1 AUGUST 1970 MARKED THE DATE WHEN COMMAND
 EMPHASIS WAS STRESSED REPORTING ALL CASES OF DRUG ABUSE THROUGH
 MEDICAL CHANNELS, AND MEDICAL EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE EXACT EXTENT
 OF DRUG RELATED HOSPITALIZATIONS INCREASED.

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13. (C) PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST 1970 THERE WAS NO UNIFORM CONCERTED EFFORT TO CATEGORIZE DRUG RELATED HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS. THEREFORE, ALL DATA PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST 1970 IS RETROSPECTIVE INFORMATION, IS PROBABLY AN UNDERESTIMATE OF THE PROBLEM PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST 1970, AND SHOULD NOT BE COMPARED TO DATA SUBSEQUENT TO 1 AUGUST 1970.

14. (U) PART II

15. (C) EVERY ATTEMPT IS BEING MADE TO COMBAT THE ABUSE OF DRUGS BY AMERICAN SERVICEMEN IN VIETNAM.

16. (C) PRESENT EFFORTS IN THE AREA OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ARE BEING DIRECTED TOWARD THE ELIMINATION OF SOURCES OF THE OPIATES, DANGEROUS DRUGS AND MARIHUANA BEING SOLD THROUGHOUT RVN. JOINT INVESTIGATIVE TEAMS CONSISTING OF AMERICAN AND VIETNAMEESE PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING RAIDS ON KNOWN AND SUSPECTED DRUG DISTRIBUTORS AND DRUG TRAFFICKERS. MARIHUANA SEARCH DOGS ARE BEING USED AT POSTAL AND CUSTOMS SITES TO DETECT THE SHIPMENT AND MOVEMENT OF CANNABIS.

17. (C) ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS ON DRUG EDUCATION IS BEING MADE. COMMANDERS IN VIETNAM HAVE DEVELOPED SOUND EDUCATION PROGRAMS UTILIZING FILMS, LITERATURE, POSTERS, AND LECTURES. THE ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION NETWORK SUPPLEMENTS THIS EDUCATION ON A VIETNAM WIDE BASIS WITH DAILY DRUG ABUSE DATA AND INFORMATION.

18. (C) ANOTHER MEASURE WHICH WILL BE USED TO COMBAT DRUG ABUSE IS AN EXPANDED AERIAL MARIHUANA SEARCH OPERATION THROUGH OUT VIETNAM TO COMMENCE IN EARLY DECEMBER 1970, THE BEGINNING OF THE GROWING SEASON.

19. (C) CURRENTLY MACV HAS ORGANIZED AN EXPANDED DRUG SUPPRESSION PROGRAM. AMONG OTHER THINGS THE PROGRAM WILL INCLUDE STRONGER AND MORE COMPLETE CUSTOMS CONTROLS, A MORE EFFECTIVE COUNTRY WIDE NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIVE ORGANIZATION WILL BE FORMED, CENTRALLY CONTROLLED BY EITHER MACV OR USARV. IN ADDITION MACV IS WORKING WITH THE US EMBASSY SEEKING TO ENCOURAGE GREATER ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS BY GVN ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONCERNING ILLEGAL SALE OF DRUGS BY PHARMACIES AND STRICTER ENFORCEMENT OF NARCOTIC LAWS.

20. (C) THE COMMAND IS CURRENTLY DEVELOPING AN INFORMATION RELEASE REGARDING DEATHS FROM DRUG ABUSE. FURTHER THE INFORMATION IS BEING INCORPORATED INTO OUR COMMAND INFORMATION PROGRAM TO INSURE THAT OUR MEN ARE AWARE OF THE DEATHS AND MORE FULLY COGNIZANT OF THE DANGERS OF DRUG ABUSE. GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

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 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON VIETNAM
 TO ADM BOGAIN CINCPAC
 INFO ADM MOORE CHIEF OF JCS
 GEN WESTINGHOUSE C/S ARMY
 GEN RYAN C/S AIR FORCE
 ADM ZENALI CNO
 GEN CHAPMAN CMT MC
 MR KELLY ASSI SEC DEF FOR M & RA
 LTG MCCAFFREY DEPOGUSARV
 VADM KING COMNAVFORV
 AMB BERGER USEMB SAIGON
 LTG MCCUTCHEON III MAF
 ZEN

18/7/70

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 1413Z EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: VISIT OF JON STEINBERG
 REFERENCE PARAGRAPH 12A MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE
 REGARDING VISIT OF MR JON STEINBERG.
 THE REPORTED 676 ARMY PERSONNEL HOSPITALIZED FOR
 DRUG RELATED REASONS IN RVN IN 1970 IS CORRECTED
 TO 746 DRUG RELATED HOSPITALIZATIONS. THE
 ADDITIONAL 70 CASES, UNREPORTED IN THE EARLIER
 STATISTICS, ARE ARMY PERSONNEL WHO WERE
 HOSPITALIZED IN AN AIR FORCE HOSPITAL.

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TO RUMUMPA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III NAV

SECRET

311754Z OCT 70

"MCEO"

"EXCLUSIVE"

CONFIDENTIAL/SPECIAL/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/
EXCLUSIVE FOR LIAISON JONES, INFO LIAISON MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN
WIDDECKE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

PFC ROBERT I. CANFIELD, 226 70 28 USMC
A. CMC MSG 261932Z OCT 70 (NOIAL)
B. NISRA MEMPHIS REP OF 1500Z 70; COM: 10-12-70 NOG-NE 39-7KWA/F
(NOIAL)

1. (C) REFERENCES A AND B REFER. ON 9 OCTOBER 1970 WHILE A PATIENT IN NEURO-PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC, U. S. NAVAL HOSPITAL, MEMPHIS, MISSISSIPPI, TENN, PFC CANFIELD DISPLAYED PHOTOGRAPHS PORTRAYING HIMSELF AND OTHER UNIDENTIFIED MARINES SCALPING THE CORPSE OF AN APPARENT ORIENTAL MALE.
2. (C) HE HAD BEEN ADMITTED TO NAVAL HOSPITAL, MEMPHIS, ON 2 OCTOBER 1970. AT THAT TIME HE RECEIVED THE DIAGNOSIS OF SCHIZOPHRENIC REACTION (UNDIFFERENTIATED TYPE). HE WAS MEDEVACED FROM VIETNAM ON

PAGE TWO RUMULVA3288 CONFIDENTIAL/SPECIAL/MCEO

- 17 SEPTEMBER 1970 WITH THE SAME DIAGNOSIS. HE WAS HOSPITALIZED IN GUAM IN TRANSIT FROM 17 SEPTEMBER 1970 TO 29 SEPTEMBER 1970.
- 3 (C) ON 9 OCTOBER 1970, COMMANDING OFFICER, NAVAL HOSPITAL, REQUESTED NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, MEMPHIS, TENN, TO INVESTIGATE SUBJECT'S APPARENT ENGAGEMENT IN THE MUTILATION OF THE CORPSE.
4. (C) AN INTERVIEW WITH SUBJECT BY NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE AGENT ON 12 OCTOBER 1970 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING:
SUBJECT IDENTIFIED HIMSELF IN TWO OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS AS THE MARINE HOLDING THE DEAD BODY BY THE HAIR. HE STATED THAT HE HAD KILLED THE VICTIM IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF COMBAT ACTIVITIES SOMETIME IN JULY OR AUGUST 1970, WHILE HE WAS OPERATING WITH THE 1ST PLATOON, HOUEL COMPANY, 2ND BATTALION, 1ST MARINE REGIMENT, 1ST MARINE DIVISION, NEAR DANANG, VIETNAM. SUBSEQUENT TO THEIR ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ENEMY, THE SQUAD LOOT THE CORPSE, WHO ALLEGEDLY HAD BEEN A MEMBER OF A NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY AMBUSH PARTY, REMOVED CLOTHING, MONEY, AND IDENTIFICATION PAPERS TO TURN IN TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES, AND THEN SCALPED THE CORPSE. SUBJECT STATED THIS WAS A USUAL PRACTICE IN VIETNAM. HE DECLINED TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS WHO SCALPED THE CORPSE BUT STATED THAT THE SENIOR MAN PRESENT DURING THE INCIDENT WAS ONE SSGT GRAVES, PLATOON SERGEANT, 1ST PLATOON,

PAGE 1 OF 2

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"EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE THREE RUMULV3288 C O N F I D E N T I A L / S P E C I A L / M C E O
 HOTEL COMPANY, 2D BATTALION, 1ST MARINE REGIMENT, 1ST MARINE DIVISION.
 HE DID NOT KNOW THE NAME OF THE MAN WHO TOOK THE PICTURES,
 BUT STATED THE MAN SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE SUBJECT THE NEGATIVES.
 5. (C) DR. CHESTER OWEN MILLER, LCDR (MC), USNR, 716224, PSYCHIATRIST,
 NEURO-PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC, NAVAL HOSPITAL, MEMPHIS, MILLINGTON,
 TENN, FOUND THE SUBJECT TO BE SCHIZOPHRENIC, NOT COMPETENT TO
 STAND TRIAL AT THE PRESENT TIME FOR ANY OFFENSE COMMITTED AND
 CONSIDERED THAT SUBJECT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN PSYCHOTIC DURING
 THE INCIDENT INDICATED BY THE PHOTOGRAPHS.
 6. (C) SSGA GRAVES HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS SSGA FLOYD A. GRAVES,
 211 54 96, USMC. SSGA GRAVES ARRIVED IN VIETNAM ON 16 JULY 1970.
 FROM THAT DATE UNTIL 12 OCTOBER HE SERVED AS PLATOON SERGEANT,
 1ST PLATOON, HOTEL COMPANY, 2D BATTALION, 1ST MARINE REGIMENT.
 ON 15 OCTOBER 1970 SSGA GRAVES WAS ASSIGNED DUTIES AS PLATOON
 COMMANDER OF 1ST PLATOON WHICH ASSIGNMENT WAS CONTINUED
 TO DATE.
 7. (C) REFERENCE A DIRECTOR'S SUBMISSION OF A REPORT REGARDING THIS
 INCIDENT. THAT REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH
 RELEASE OF THIS MESSAGE. FURTHER INVESTIGATION IS BEING
 INITIATED. BEST REGARDS.

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PAGE 2 OF 2

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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ZNY AAAAA
RUCN-I - CG FMFPAC
RUC -I - CG III MAF
P 310853Z OCT 70
FM CG FIRSI MARDIV
TO RUHNFMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
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"MCEO"
"EXCLUSIVE"

SECRET/SPECIAL MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY EXCLUSIVE FOR
LIGEN JONES INFO LIGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MGE W
WIDDECKE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

A. CG III MAF LIR 16/HPP/AD OVER 6220 OF 2000 70 10 BUMED AND
SURGERY, SUBJ: SPECIAL EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REPORT.

1. (S) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE YOU WITH AN
EXPANSION OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REF A RELATIVE TO THE
MALARIA INCIDENCE THAT THE DIVISION EXPERIENCED IN SEPTEMBER AND
TO OUTLINE THE STEPS THAT ARE BEING TAKEN TO REDUCE THAT INCIDENCE
TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL.

2. (S) AS STATED IN REF A, A PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS A
CHANGE IN THE REPORTING OF PATIENTS ABOARD THE USS SANCUARY.
FOR THE PERIOD MARCH THROUGH AUGUST 1970, REPORTS PROVIDED BY THE
USS SANCUARY INDICATED THE ADMISSION DIAGNOSIS ONLY WHICH, IN
THE MAJORITY OF MALARIA CASES, WAS CITED AS FEVER OF UNKNOWN

PAGE TWO RUMULVA3289 SECRET/SPECIAL/MCEO
ORIGIN. ALTHOUGH A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF THESE CASES WERE
SUBSEQUENTLY DIAGNOSED AS MALARIA, THE CHANGED DIAGNOSES WERE
GENERALLY NOT PROVIDED TO THIS COMMAND. AS A RESULT, THE MALARIA
INCIDENCE STATISTICS PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER HAVE NOT DEPICTED THE
TOTAL PICTURE. IN SEPTEMBER, THE REPORTING PROCEDURES WERE
CORRECTED WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE USS SANCUARY AND ALL
FUTURE REPORTS WILL INCLUDE THAT HOSPITAL'S MALARIA PATIENT LOAD

3. (S) ALTHOUGH THE INCLUSION OF THE USS SANCUARY PATIENTS
WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR, THE INCREASE IN MALARIA CAN ALSO
BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE FACT THAT THE NORMAL SEASONAL PEAK IN
MALARIA INCIDENCE IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE OCCURS IN SEPTEMBER.
THE SEASONAL TREND IS DEPICTED IN THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS
FOR THE MONTHS JULY THROUGH SEPTEMBER FOR THE YEARS 1969 AND
1970:

YEAR	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	& INCREASE JULY TO SEPT
1969	141	232	669	474%
CASES/1000/MONTH	2.7	9.6	24.6	
1970	128 1/2	229 1/2	346	219%
CASES/1000/MONTH	7.0	12.9	21.5	

PAGE 1 OF 3

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

310853Z OCT 70

31
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PAGE THREE RUMULVA3289 S E C R E T /SPECAT/MCEO
 W/ CORRECTED TO INCLUDE USS SANCTUARY STATISTICS.
 AS DEPICTED ABOVE, THE INCREASE DURING THE THREE MONTH PERIOD FOR BOTH
 YEARS IS SIGNIFICANT, HOWEVER, THE PERCENTAGE OF INCREASE
 FOR 1970 IS MARKEDLY LOWER THAN THE PERCENTAGE OF INCREASE
 FOR 1969. FURTHER, THE 346 CASES IN SEPTEMBER 1970 REPRESENTS
 A 52% REDUCTION IN TOTAL MALARIA INCIDENCE WHEN COMPARED WITH
 THE 669 CASES IN SEPTEMBER 1969.

4. (S) ON THE SURFACE, THE DECREASE IN MALARIA INCIDENCE FOR
 1970 MIGHT BE ATTRIBUTED TO A REDUCTION IN DIVISION STRENGTH
 THAT OCCURRED BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 1969 (25,300) AND SEPTEMBER
 1970 (16,300); HOWEVER, IN FACT, THE TOTAL STRENGTH HAS
 LITTLE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO THE MALARIA RATE. INSTEAD, THERE
 IS A MORE DIRECT CORRELATION TO THE INTENSITY OF OPERATIONS
 IN THE QUE SON MOUNTAINS AND THEIR IMMEDIATE ENVIRONS. THAT
 AREA IS HYPERENDEMIC IN MALARIA BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF
 ENEMY FORCES POSSESSING AN EXTREMELY HIGH MALARIA RATE AND
 THE MASS OF PRIMARY VECTOR MOSQUITOES. FOR EXAMPLE, OF THE
 346 MALARIA CASES REPORTED FOR SEPTEMBER 1970, 73% (260 CASES)
 WERE ATTRIBUTED TO UNITS OPERATING IN AND NEAR THE QUE SON
 MOUNTAINS. DESPITE THE REDUCTION IN DIVISION STRENGTH IT

PAGE FOUR RUMULVA3289 S E C R E T /SPECAT/MCEO

HAS BEEN NECESSARY TACTICALLY TO MAINTAIN A SIZEABLE PRESENCE
 IN THE QUE SONS, THUS, THE NUMBER OF MAN-DAYS EXPOSURE TO
 MALARIA IN THAT HYPERENDEMIC AREA HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED SIGNIFICANTLY
 DURING THE PAST YEAR. HOWEVER, IT IS NOTED THAT NUMBER OF
 CASES OF MALARIA IN UNITS OPERATING IN THE QUE SONS DURING
 SEPTEMBER 1970 (260) REPRESENTS A REDUCTION OF 48% WHEN COMPARED
 WITH THE NUMBER OF CASES (501) IN UNITS OPERATING IN THE QUE
 SONS IN SEPTEMBER 1969.

5. (U) THE DECLINE IN THE MALARIA INCIDENCE BETWEEN 1969
 AND 1970 CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

A. INTENSIFIED COMMAND INTEREST AND ATTENTION AT ALL
 ECHELONS RELATIVE TO EACH ASPECT OF THE MALARIA PREVENTION
 PROGRAM.

B. THE FULL TIME EMPLOYMENT OF A PREVENTIVE MEDICINE
 DETACHMENT WITH THE REGIMENT WHOSE FORCES ARE COMMITTED TO
 THE QUE SON MOUNTAINS. THIS UNIT IS TASKED WITH CONDUCTING
 A CONTINUING MALARIA TRAINING PROGRAM FOR UNITS BEING COMMITTED
 TO OPERATIONS IN THE QUE SONS AND WITH CONDUCTING ENTOMOLOGICAL
 SURVEYS, MOSQUITO FOGGING, AND LARVICIDING.

C. EMPLOYMENT OF A MALARIA PREVENTION MEDICAL CONTACT

PAGE 2 OF 3

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PAGE FIVE RUMULVA3289 SECRET/SPECIAL/MCEO
 TEAM. THIS TEAM WAS FORMED IN MAY 1970 AND WORKS WITH UNITS
 DURING OPERATIONS TO OBSERVE FIRST HAND THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED
 IN MALARIA PREVENTION IN THE FIELD AND TO PROVIDE ADVICE AND
 ASSISTANCE AS NEEDED.

D. EMPLOYMENT OF A FIELD MALARIA INDOCRINATION TEAM.
 THIS TEAM CONDUCTS AN INTENSIVE MALARIA INDOCRINATION PROGRAM
 WITH EMPHASIS ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF SOUND MALARIA DISCIPLINE
 AS THE PRIMARY EFFECTIVE FORCE AGAINST MALARIA.

6. (U) IT IS HOPED THAT THE PRECEDING INFORMATION WILL PROVIDE
 ADDED INSIGHT INTO THE OVERALL MALARIA PROBLEM CONFRONTING
 THIS DIVISION AND A DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS BEING
 EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED TO REDUCE THE INCIDENCE TO A MINIMUM.
 BE ASSURED THAT WE ARE PUTTING EVERY AVAILABLE AND APPROPRIATE
 RESOURCE INTO A PREVENTION PROGRAM AND WE ARE MEETING
 WITH MEASURABLE SUCCESS. BEST REGARDS.

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PAGE 3 OF 3

300853Z OCT 70

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108