

1. CG FMFPAC 060322Z NOV 70 (TS) *gp-1*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FR LTGEN JONES  
TEXT OF ADM MCCAIN'S MSG RE SPECIAL COMBAT APPLE OPERATIONS
2. CG FMFPAC 070231Z NOV 70 *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN  
JONES - RECOMMENDED TROOP LIST FOR INCREMENT V
3. CMC 071930Z NOV 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONE INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FR GEN CHAPMAN  
FORCE PLANNING (U) - RETENTION OF MAB IN THE TSF
4. CG FMFPAC 072213Z NOV 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
III MAF HEADQUARTERS ON OKINAWA
5. CMC 121455Z NOV 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM GEN CHAPMAN  
FORCE PLANNING (U)
6. CG FIRST MARDIV 140610Z NOV 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE  
FORCE PLANNING (U)
7. CG FMFPAC 142239Z NOV 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE PERSONAL FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN JONES  
VMCJ EMPLOYMENT (U)
8. CG FMFPAC 182039Z NOV 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN JONES  
SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)
9. CG FMFPAC 182151Z NOV 70 (TS) *gp-3*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN JONES  
SOUTHEASR ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)
10. CG FMFPAC 212231Z NOV 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WILSON INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN JONES  
FORCE PLANNING (U)
11. CG I MAF 242250Z NOV 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN  
WILSON - FORCE PLANNING (U) III MAF ON OKINAWA
- ~~12. CG FMFPAC 282219Z NOV 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES  
SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U) - FORCE PLANNING~~
13. CG FMFPAC 282219Z NOV 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES  
SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U) - FORCE PLANNING
14. ADMIN FMFPAC 022248Z DEC 70 (TS) *gp-4*  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUBIC BAY LIAISON SECTION (U)  
III MAF ON OKINAWA

MESSAGE READDRESSAL

III MAY 5000/1 6/67

FROM:

TO: CG III MAF

INFO:

CG FIRST MAW

CCN

PRECEDENCE:

PRIORITY

DTG

0612542

DRAFTED BY:

CONCURRED BY H. MILLER C/S

RELEASED BY

C. ROMANO, StaffSec.

READDRESSAL OF:

ORIGINATOR:

DTG:

MONTH: CG FMFPAC

YEAR:

CLASSIFICATION:

060322Z

NOV

70

TOPSECRET/SPEAK/EXCLUSIVE

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL COMBAT OPERATIONS

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE			FROM FMFPAC		DATE 06Nov70
X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 06022Z		COPY NO. 1 OF 4 COPIES REC'D
			SUBJECT SPECIAL COMBAT OPERATIONS		
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL
			IN	OUT	
2	CG	Z			<i>[Signature]</i>
	DCG				
1	C/S	Z	11-6-70		<i>[Signature]</i>
3	DC/S	Z	11/1		<i>[Signature]</i>
	DCS PLANS				
	DEP CORDS				
	DSA ICTZ				
	S/S	X	11-6	11-6	<i>[Signature]</i>
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	G-3	A	<i>Res Copy</i>		
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	G-5				
	G-6				
	ADJ				
	AWARDS				
	CAP				
	CHAP				
	CIB				
	COMP				
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	SGT. MAJ				

REMARKS:

DISPOSITION:

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Destroy after routing.

Section	Signature

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*Readdress to Wing ASAP*

*[Signature]*

*Copy #2 CG's File 6 Nov 70*

*Readdressed this date to Wing.*

*V. Brown*  
*B. P. Buechel*

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

TOP SECRET 060332Z NOV 70

SPECIAL

PLIAZYUW RUHHFMA0520 310032Z-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 060322Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

B

TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LI GEN MCCUA CHEON FROM LI GEN JONES. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY. //NO0000//

1. (1S) FOLLOWING IS EXC OF ADM MCCAIN'S 040240Z NOV 1970 TO GEN ABRAMS, INFO ADM MOORER, GEN HYLAND, GEN NAZZARO, GEN HOLLOWAY, GEN CLAY, LI GEN CORCORAN, AND MYSELF.

QUOTE:

SPECIAL COMBAT APPLE OPERATIONS (U)

A. JCS 14777/052020Z NOV 70 (NOAL)

1. REF A DIRECTED THAT COMBAT APPLE ORBIT (CRACK 8F 708) BE FLOWN IN THE GULF OF TONKIN IN SUPPORT OF URGENT SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS. DATES AND TIMES SPECIFIED ARE AS FOLLOWS: (ALL DATES/TIMES ARE GOLF REPEAT GOLF TIME.)

7 NOV	-	1800G-0600G	8 NOV
9 NOV	-	0600G-1800G	

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0520 TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR

11 NOV	-	0600G-1800G	
13 NOV	-	0600G-1800G	
14 NOV	-	1800G-0600G	15 NOV
16 NOV	-	0600G-1800G	
18 NOV	-	0600G-1800G	
20 NOV	-	0600G-1800G	
21 NOV	-	1800G-0600G	22 NOV

2. WITH EXCEPTION OF 7, 8, AND 21 NOV DATES, ORBIT TIMES FALL WITHIN PERIOD WHEN F-77 IS SCHEDULED TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE GOLF DURING NOVEMBER. ACCORDINGLY, NO F 77 EARCAP WILL BE AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR THE COMBAT APPLE PLATFORM ON THOSE DATES.

3. REQUEST YOU ADVISE WHICH SHORE-BASED FIGHTER AND TANKER RESOURCES CAN BE DIVERTED TO PROVIDE EARCAP SUPPORT ON DATES AND TIMES SPECIFIED WITH LEAST IMPACT UPON COMBAT OPERATIONS

72152

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL

EXCLUSIVE

IN RVN AND LAOS. IT HAS BEEN CALCULATED THAT USAF FORCES WILL REQUIRE EIGHT F-4 AND FOUR KC-135 SORTIES PER MISSION, AND THAT MARINES WOULD REQUIRE TWELVE F-4 AND SIX KC-130 SORTIES PER MISSION. UPON RECEIPT OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION, CINCPAC WILL TASK THE APPROPRIATE COMMAND TO PERFORM THE MISSION. AF 77 WILL

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA0020 : O P S E C R E T : SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR PROVIDE NORMAL BARCAP SUPPORT ON THE 7-8 NOV AND 21 NOV DATES 4. IN THE TASKING MESSAGE, CINCPAC INTENDS TO REQUEST THAT PIRAZ BE POSITIONED TO PROVIDE OPTIMUM SUPPORT TO BARCAP AND COMBAT APPLY AND WILL ALSO REQUEST CINCSPAC TO PROVIDE RADIO RELAY SUPPORT. REQUEST PACFLT/PACAF COMMENT ON REQUIREMENT FOR OTHER SUPPORT SUCH AS BIG LOOK IN THE GOA DURING COMBAT APPLY/BARCAP OPERATIONS.

5. TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE LEAD TIME TO FORCES TASKED FOR MISSION, REQUEST EXPEDITIOUS REPLY BY FLASH MESSAGE.

UNQUOTE:

2. WARM REGARDS.

GP-1

BT

0520

POSC 202

NNNN



TOP SECRET

SPECIAL

"MCEO"

EXCLUSIVE

TOR 070322Z NOV 70  
OIAZYUW RUHFMA063 3110231-AAAA--RUEOFIA RUMUMPA.  
ZNY AAAAA  
O 070231Z NOV 70  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO RUEOFIA/CMC  
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF  
B

TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CAPMAN INFO  
LIGEN MCCW CHEON FROM LIGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS  
EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS. //N00000//

- A. CG III MAF 022329Z NOV 70 (LS)
1. (LS) REF A PROVIDES KEI H'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, RECOMMENDED AROOP LISA FOR INCREMENT VI AND THE RESULTING MAB.
  2. (LS) FULLY APPRECIATE AND ENDORSE KEI H'S RATIONALE IN SUPPORT OF A MAB ORGANIZATION WITH NO FIXED WING ASSETS FOR THE TWO MONTH PERIOD (I.E., 1 MAY 10 30 JUN 1971). HOWEVER, SHOULD A MAB BE REQUIRED IN THE 1 SF (TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT FORCE), CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT A BALANCED FORCE BE REPRESENTED.
  3. (LS) THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE, INTEND TO ADVISE KEI H THAT INCREMENT VI AROOP LISA

PAGE TWO RUHFMA063 TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO  
CONTAINED REF A IS ACCEPTABLE UNDER PRESENT PARAMETERS.  
WILL ALSO ADVISE THAT KEI H SPECIFY TO COMUSMACV THAT  
A 10.8 MAB WHICH INCLUDES AN A-4 AND AN A-6 SQUADRON WOULD  
BE REQUIRED IF MAB TO REMAIN AS PART OF 1 SF THROUGH FY 72.  
4. (U) YOUR COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED EAR

IE SINCE  
KEI H MUST RESPOND COMUSMACV BY COB 9 NOV 1970 RVN  
TIME. VERY RESPECTFULLY AND WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

B

063

"MCEO"

NNNN

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 4 OF 4 COPIES

TOP SECRET

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CMC		DATE 072070					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 0719308		COPY NO. OF COPIES RECD.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
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	CG					FORCE PLANNING (7)  REMARKS:  DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.  <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.	Section	Signature		
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*Copy # 1 Force Planning File*

3

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE ROUT

OTTAZYUW RUEOFIA2129 3111930-AAAA--RUHHFMA.

ZNY AAAAA ZFF-1  
RUHHFMA-T-RUMUMPA  
O 071930Z NOV 70  
FM CMC

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF  
BT

T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / E X C L U S I V E FOR LTGEN JONES INFO  
LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM GEN CHAPMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
FORCE PLANNING (U) 5000

MCEU

A. CG III MAF 052325Z NOV 70 (TS)

B. CG FMFPAC 070231Z NOV 70 (TS)

1. (TS) AS YOU KNOW, JCS NOW CONSIDERING RETENTION OF MAB IN THE  
ISF IN LIEU OF AN ARMY BRIGADE. WHILE JCS RECOMMENDATION IS  
EXPECTED SHORTLY, THE DECISION MAY NOT BE FORTHCOMING IN NEAR  
FUTURE. FORCE PLANNING SHOULD THEREFORE INCLUDE ACTION REQUIRED  
BY DECISION TO RETAIN MAB BEYOND END FY. 1971.

2. (TS) IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE ON-GOING ACTION, AND BECAUSE THERE  
IS NO ASSURANCE THAT ENEMY SITUATION COULD NOT CHANGE IN MAY-  
JUNE PERIOD, DESIRE THAT FIXED WING ASSETS BE INCLUDED IN PROPOSED  
MAB STRUCTURE TO PROVIDE BALANCED FORCE IN THE EVENT THAT DECISION  
IS MADE EITHER NOW OR LATER TO RETAIN THE MAB. KEITH SHOULD

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA2129 T O P S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M C E U  
THEREFORE INCLUDE AN A-4 AND AN A-6 SQUADRON IN THE PROPOSED  
MAB.

3. (TS) NOTWITHSTANDING COMUSMACV'S DESIRE THAT FORCE PLANNING  
BE SUCH THAT UNNECESSARY TROOP LIST CHANGES WILL BE PRECLUDED AT  
A LATER DATE, TROOP LIST CHANGES MAY BE REQUIRED IN THAT THE SIZE  
AND COMPOSITION OF MAB REQUIRED BY DECISION ON ACTION OUTLINED IN  
PARAGRAPH 1 HAVE NOT BEEN DETERMINED.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2129

071930Z NOV 70

NNNN

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-67)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM <b>CG 71024</b>		DATE <b>8 NOV 1970</b>					
					SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <b>07212X NOV 1970</b>		COPY NO. OF <b>4</b> COPIES RECD.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT <b>III MAR H.Q. on SCHEDULE</b>						
			IN	OUT								
	CG					REMARKS: DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <table border="1" style="width: 100%; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.			Section	Signature		
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*COPY # 1 FORCE PLANNING FILE*

4

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

PTTTZYUW KUHMFMA0751 3112213-TTTT--RUMUMPA.

ZNY TTTTT

RUAADAJA -T- MCAS (H) FUTEMA

P 072213Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

RUAADAJA/DEPCOMMARCORBASESPAC (FWD)

RUAADAJA/MCAS (H) FUTEMA

INFO RUEOFIA/CMC

RUAADAJA/CG I MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T //NO4000//

III MAF HEADQUARTERS ON OKINAWA

A. CG FMFPAC 171746Z/SEP70 (TS) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) REF A REQ DEPCOMMARCORBASESPAC (FWD) SUBMIT A COST/TIME SCHEDULE FOR CONVERSION OF BLDG 428 MCAS (H), FUTEMA FROM ITS PRESENT CONFIGURATION INTO A HQ BLDG TO ACCOMMODATE A MAF STAFF AND REQ CG III MAF PROVIDE APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATION DURING THE STUDY TO PROVIDE FOR III MAF DESIRES IN THE CONFIGURATION ALTERATIONS. CG III MAF RECOMMENDED THAT MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, AS WELL AS THE EXACT NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FOR III MAF BY THE HOST COMMAND, BE DETERMINED SO THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE III MAF

PAGE TWO KUHMFMA0751 T O P S E C R E T

STAFF, BOTH IN TERMS OF ORGANIZATION AND SECTION STRENGTH, CAN BE FIXED AS A BASIS FOR THE PLANNED CONFIGURATION OF THE III MAF HQ BLDG AT FUTEMA, OR ELSEWHERE, SHOULD THAT SITE NOT PROVE FEASIBLE. ADDITIONALLY, CG III MAF HAS CONCURRED THAT FUTEMA IS THE BEST SITE ON OKINAWA FOR LOCATING III MAF AS FAR AS AVAILABILITY OF OFFICE SPACE, BILLETING, ETC AND STATED THAT BLDG 428 (SNCO BKS) AND BLDG 403 (LIBRARY, MARS STATION AND JUDO RM) ARE LOCATED ADJACENT TO EACH OTHER AND APPEAR TO HAVE SUFFICIENT FLOOR SPACE TO ACCOMMODATE ALL HQ ROOMS EXCEPT POSSIBLY SLF HQ. CG III MAF HAS ALSO PROPOSED THAT CG III MAF OCCUPY QTRS AT CAMP COURTNEY NOW OCCUPIED BY CG I MAF/CG

3D MARDIV AND THAT THE "EAGLES NEST" LOCATED AT FUTEMA BE MODIFIED TO MAKE IT SUITABLE FOR GEN OFFICER QTRS IF III MAF C/S WERE TO BE BGEN. THIS HQ HAS PROPOSED MISSION, TASKS AND T/O FOR HQ III MAF ON OKINAWA. ADDITIONALLY, IT HAS BEEN RECOMMENDED THAT HQ III MAF BE SATELLITED ON A HOST COMMAND ON OKINAWA AND THAT COMMAND WILL BE TASKED TO PROVIDE FOR INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS AND THAT ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY III MAF TASKING

PAGE THREE KUHMFMA0751 T O P S E C R E T  
ITS SUBORDINATE COMMANDS TO PROVIDE AUGMENTATION TO THE HOST COMMAND.

2. (TS) IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT APPROVAL WILL BE GIVEN TO MOVE HQ III MAF TO OKINAWA UPON REDEPLOYMENT FROM RVN. BASED ON PRESENT PLANS THIS MOVE WILL OCCUR SOMETIME IN APRIL. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THERE ARE SOME QUESTIONS WHICH REMAIN UNANSWERED AT THIS TIME AND THAT PROBLEMS EXIST WHICH MUST BE SOLVED. HOWEVER, SINCE IT IS EXPECTED THAT THIRTY TO SIXTY DAYS WILL

8 Nov 70 00 47z

**TOP SECRET**

BE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN AUTHORIZATION AND FUNDING FOR BUILDING MODIFICATIONS, DEPENDING ON FUNDING REQUIRED. IT IS NECESSARY THAT PLANNING FOR THIS MOVE PROCEED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE BASED ON VARIOUS ASSUMPTIONS. THESE ARE THAT:

A. THE MISSIONS, TASKS AND T/O FOR HQ III MAF ON OKINAWA, AS PROPOSED BY THIS HQ WILL BE APPROVED.

B. THE REQUIRED COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED. (ACTION HAS ALREADY BEEN INITIATED TO PROVIDE AUTOVON AND AUTOSEVCOM TERMINALS FOR HQ III MAF AT FUTEMA). ADDITIONALLY, AUGMENTING COMMUNICATION SUPPORT WILL BE FURNISHED BY III MAF TASKING SUBORDINATE COMMANDS TO PROVIDE NECESSARY PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT TO MCAS (H), FUTEMA.

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA0751 T O P S E C R E T

C. MCAS (H), FUTEMA WILL BE THE HOST COMMAND ON WHICH HQ III MAF WILL BE SATELLITED AND, AS SUCH, WILL PROVIDE OR ARRANGE FOR ALL ADMINISTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS TO INCLUDE:

- (1) PERSONNEL RECORD KEEPING
- (2) DISBURSING
- (3) MEDICAL/DENTAL
- (4) LEGAL
- (5) SPECIAL SERVICES
- (6) LOGISTIC SUPPORT (SUPPLY/MAINTENANCE)
- (7) CHAPLAIN SERVICES
- (8) POSTAL
- (9) OTHERS AS MAY BE IDENTIFIED FOR III MAF TO ACCOM-

PLISH ITS PROPOSED MISSION/TASKS.

4. (TS) SEVERAL OF THE FUNCTIONS OUTLINED IN PAR 3.C ABOVE WILL HAVE BEEN CONSOLIDATED BY MCAS (H), FUTEMA WITH MCB CAMP BUTLER AT THE TIME THE III MAF MOVE IS EXECUTED. ADDITIONALLY, OTHERS WILL BE IN THE PLANNING PHASE. ALTHOUGH THERE SHOULD BE NO FORESEEABLE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE III MAF MOVE AND CONSOLIDATION ACTIONS UNDERWAY, PROVIDING THE REQUIRED SUPPORT FOR III MAF MUST NOW BE A CONSIDERATION.

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA0751 T O P S E C R E T

5. (TS) FOR DEPCOMMARCORBASESPAC (FWD): IN LIEU OF THE COST/TIME SCHEDULE REQUESTED BY REF A, REQUEST SUBMIT A FACILITIES SPECIAL PROJECT FOR THE CONVERSION OF BLDG 428, MCAS (H), FUTEMA FROM ITS PRESENT CONFIGURATION INTO A HQ BLDG TO ACCOMMODATE A MAF STAFF. INCLUDE BLDG 403 AT MCAS (H), FUTEMA IF THAT SPACE IS REQUIRED. HOWEVER, IF THAT BLDG IS UTILIZED, INFUKM THIS HQ AS TO THE NEW LOCATIONS FOR THE FUNCTIONS NOW PERFORMED THEREIN. ADDITIONALLY, SINCE THE PROPOSED T/O FOR III MAF PROVIDES FOR A BGEN C/S, REQUEST A SEPARATE FACILITIES SPECIAL PROJECT BE SUBMITTED FOR THE CONVERSION OF THE "EAGLES NEST" AT FUTEMA TO MAKE IT SUITABLE FOR GEN OFFICERS QTRS.

6. (TS) FOR CG III MAF: IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR III MAF DESIRES IN THE CONFIGURATION OF THE NEW HQ BLDG REQUEST THAT APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATION BE PROVIDED TO DEPCOMMARCORBASESPAC (FWD) DURING THE PREPARATION OF THE PROJECT.

GP-4

BT

0751

UNCLASSIFIED

IN 04301/312-70

1ACK

MESSAGE READDRESSAL

III NA: 5000/1-6/67

130531Z Nov

DTG

130531Z NOV

FROM:

DRAFTED BY:

CG III MAF

A. I. LOCKE CPL

INFO:

CONCURRED BY

CG FIRST MAW

CG FIRST MARDIV

CG FORLOGCOMD

INFO:

CCN

PRECEDENCE:

RELEASED BY

PRIORITY

A. I. BUSSELL Admin As

CAPT. STP SEC SECTION

READDRESSAL OF

ORIGINATOR:

DTG:

CMC

121455Z

MONTH:

YEAR:

CLASSIFICATION:

NOV

70

TOP SECRET / ~~SECRET~~ / EXCLUSIVE

SUBJECT:

FORCE PLANNING (U)

5

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM [REDACTED] CMC		DATE 12/10/70	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 1221488		COPY NO. OF 4 COPIES RECD.			
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT	REMARKS	
			IN	OUT				
	CG					FORCE PLANNING	DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.	
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	DEP CORDS							
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**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

R 121455Z NOV 70  
FM CMC  
TO CG FMFPAC  
INFO CG III MAF  
E

EXCLUSIVE

MCEO

TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LI GEN - ONE'S INFO LI GEN  
MCCW CHEON FROM GEN CHAPMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
//NO2005321//  
FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG, FMFPAC 222104Z OCT 70 (1S) (SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE) (MCEO);

1. (1S) 1H PROPOSALS AS CITED IN REF A WITH RESPECT TO THE  
RELOCATION OF III MAF HEADQUARTERS TO OKINAWA AND THE ASSOCIATED  
MISSION, TASKS, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND I/O HAVE BEEN REVIEWED  
AND ARE GENERALLY CONCURRED IN, SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS.

A. THE STATEMENT OF MISSION AND ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS IS  
APPROVED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PARA 3E. ALSO CONSIDER WITH THE  
RECOMMENDED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND THE PROPOSAL NOT TO  
ACTIVATE THE M&S COMPANY WHICH SUPPORTS THE MAF.

B. HQ III MAF I/O

(1) THE FUNDAMENTAL EXCEPTION TO THE PROPOSALS SURFACED

PAGE TWO RUEODIA2993 TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE

IN REF A CONCERNS THE I/O. AS YOU KNOW THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR  
A MAF HEADQUARTERS IN THE POM-72 BASELINE MARINE CORPS. STRUCTURE  
AND MANPOWER FOR THIS ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE ACCOMMODATED  
WITHIN PRESENTLY PLANNED STRUCTURE/MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS. THEREFORE,  
IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE I/O AND MANNING OF THE III MAF  
STAFF WILL BE AT THE EXPENSE OF FMFPAC SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS.  
WITHIN THIS CONDITION OF AUSTERITY AND IN LINE WITH CMC'S DESIRE  
TO STREAMLINE THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE WITHIN THE MARINE  
CORPS, AND ACHIEVE A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN THESE HEADQUARTERS  
AND THE FIGHTING ELEMENTS, WE ENVISION THE III MAF STAFF TO CONSIST  
OF A TOTAL OF 114 SPACE VICE THE 200 AS PROPOSED. IN THIS REGARD  
III MAF WILL OF NECESSITY HAVE TO RELY ON SUBORDINATE COMMANDS FOR  
CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AND SUPPORT SUCH AS INFORMATIONAL,  
LEGAL, HEADQUARTERS COMMAND AND FSS.

(2) WITH RESPECT TO MANNING THE III MAF STAFF ON OKINAWA,  
THE MAJORITY OF PERSONNEL CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO I MAF HEADQUARTERS  
WILL BE UTILIZED AND ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO SATISFY GRADE AND MOS  
DEFICIENCIES WILL BE ASSIGNED BY THIS HQ.

(3) IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING, THE PROVISION FOR MAU  
STAFFS SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE III MAF I/O. THESE

PAGE 1 OF 2

121455Z NOV 70

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUEOFIA2993 TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE  
STAFFS SHOULD BE MANNED ON AN AS REQUIRED BASIS FROM ASSETS OF  
III MAF'S SUBORDINATE COMMANDS.

(4) IN REGARD TO THE SUBJECT LIAISON SECTION WE CONCUR  
WITH THE ESSENTIALITY OF THE SECTION. IT IS RECOMMENDED HOWEVER  
THAT YOU EXAMINE THE FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF TRANSFERRING  
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE LIAISON SECTION TO CG CAMP BUELER. SHOULD  
THIS BE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, IT WOULD PRECLUDE FURTHER INROADS  
ON THE STRUCTURE AND MANPOWER OF THE OPERATING FORCES.

2. (1S) YOUR COMMENTS CONCERNING THE RELOCATION OF I MAF HEAD-  
QUARTERS TO CAMP PENDLETON ARE ALSO CONCURRED IN. THE I MAF  
STAFF WILL PRIMARILY BE A PLANNING STAFF AND THE BILLET'S DESIGNATED  
FOR THE HEADQUARTERS WILL BE MANNED FROM ASSETS OF THE 1ST MARINE  
DIVISION, 3D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING AND FORCE TROOPS, FMFPAC. CG,  
I MAF WILL BE DOUBLE HAIRED AND WILL NOT EXERCISE CONTROL OVER  
EAST PAC FORCES UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE TASK ORGANIZATION FOR ASSIGNED  
OPERATIONS/EXERCISES IS ACTIVATED. PRESENT PLANNING ENVISIONS THE  
I MAF STAFF TO BE COMPRIMSED OF APPROXIMATELY 64 BILLET'S, HOWEVER,  
THIS ENTIRE SUBJECT WILL BE ADDRESSED IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

3. (1S) IN SUMMARY, AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FOREGOING, REQUEST  
YOU REEVALUATE THE A/O AS PROPOSED IN REF A, AND UTILIZING A/O

PAGE FOUR RUEOFIA2993 TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE  
M-4918 AS A BASIS, RESUBMIT A PROPOSED A/O FOR MAF HQ NOT  
TO EXCEED 114 MARINE SPACES.  
WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2993

PAGE 2 OF 2

121455Z NOV 70

NNNN

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM <b>CG VIKING WAGBY</b>		DATE <b>12-2-70</b>	
					SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <b>120410</b>		COPY NO. OF COPIES REC'D	
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	CG					<b>OPANAL/ORD</b> <b>Revised for 17th Amphibious</b> <b>(Force Planning)</b>	DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing. <hr/> Section: _____ Signature: _____ <hr/> REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4. The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this document.	
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	SGT. MAJ							

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*Copy # 1 to Force Plan file*

6

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**TOP SECRET**

ZNY AAAAA  
RUMUMPA-1-CG III MAF  
P 140610Z NOV 70  
FM CG FIRS1 MARDIV  
TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF  
EI

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR  
LIGEN MC CUI CHEON FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE. DELIVER DURING WORKING  
HOURS ONLY.

FORCE PLANNING (U)

- A. CG III MAF 082347Z NOV 70 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (IS)
- B. III MAF OPLAN 1-70 TURNER BAY/CHARLOTTE HILL (IS LINDIS)
- C. CMC 251903Z AUG 70 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (IS)

1. (IS) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO HYPOTHESE A CONCEPT  
OF OPERATIONS FOR THE GROUND ELEMENT OF THE PROJECTED 3D MARINE  
AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE. THIS HYPOTHESIS IS PREDICATED ON THE PREMISE  
THAT THE TRANSITION MAB WILL BE STRUCTURED TO INCLUDE AN RLT OF  
TH

EE INFANTRY BATTALIONS, A HELICOPTER GROUP, A FIXED-WING GROUP  
TO INCLUDE TWO ATTACK SQUADRONS, A PROVISIONAL SERVICE BATTALION,  
AND SUPPORTING TROOPS TO INCLUDE A MILITARY POLICE BATTALION. IN  
DEVELOPING THIS CONCEPT CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS, WHICH APPEAR PRUDENT  
AT THIS TIME, HAVE BEEN MADE:

PAGE TWO RUMULVA1341 TOP SECRET/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/  
EXCLUSIVE FOR

A. THE ENEMY, FACED WITH A STEADILY ERODING SITUATION IN QUANG  
NAM PROVINCE, WILL HAVE TWO OPTIONS:

- (1) TO ATTEMPT TO HALT THE EROSION AND HOLD AT APPROXI-  
MATELY THE PRESENT LEVEL OF EFFORT; OR
- (2) TO RISK A SIGNIFICANT INFUSION OF NEW STRENGTH FROM  
OUTSIDE THE PROVINCE.

B. THE RVNAF IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE WILL CONTINUE AT ESSENTI-  
ALLY THE SAME LEVEL OF FORCE, WITHOUT MAJOR

EINFORCEMENT OR MORE  
THAN TEMPORARY INTRODUCTION OF NEW UNITS. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE  
RVNAF, INCLUDING THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES, WILL CONTINUE TO  
IMPROVE AT A MODERATE BUT PRECEPTIBLE RATE.

C. FREE WORLD MILITARY FORCES IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, INCLUDING  
U. S. FORCES OTHER THAN U. S. MARINES, WILL DECLINE IN NUMBERS WITH  
NO NEW UNITS BEING INTRODUCED EXCEPT ON A SHORT-TERM BASIS UNTIL  
THE FINAL REDEPLOYMENT OF THE MAB.

D. A DECISION WILL NOT BE REACHED UNTIL THE ELEVENTH HOUR AS  
TO WHETHER THE MAB WILL REDEPLOY BY 1 JULY 1971 OR WILL REMAIN IN-  
COUNTRY AS PART OF THE ISF.

E. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS AND THE MISSIONS AND TASKS OF THE  
MAB WILL BE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED THE

(6)

EXCLUSIVE FOR  
1ST MARINE DIVISION

2. (1S) ASSUMPTION D ABOVE APPEARS REASONABLE IN LIGHT OF THE LAIENESS OF THE DECISIONS REACHED IN INCREMENT IV REDEPLOYMENTS. SIMILARLY, ASSUMPTION E APPEARS REASONABLE IN VIEW OF THE DEMONSTRATED RELUCANCE OF I CORPS TO EFFECT A PROPORTIONATE RELIEF AND REASSIGNMENT OF TACTICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY AS EARLIER REDEPLOYMENTS TOOK PLACE. THUS THERE ARE VERY VALID REASONS TO ASSUME THAT THE GROUND ELEMENTS OF THE MAB, WITH ONLY 50 PERCENT OF THE INFANTRY STRENGTH AND 42 PERCENT OF THE AGGREGATE STRENGTH OF THE PRESENT REDUCED DIVISION, MUST BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME MISSIONS AND TASKS OVER THE SAME GROUND AS THE PRESENT DIVISION FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME.

3. (1S) UNTIL THE DIVISION OR MAB IS DEFINITELY RELIEVED OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE QUE SON MOUNTAINS AND VALLEY IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO OPERATE A MINIMUM OF ONE REINFORCED BATTALION IN THE AREA PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY THE 5TH MARINES. WITH ONLY THREE INFANTRY BATTALIONS AT OUR DISPOSAL THIS WOULD SEEM TO DICTATE THE FOLLOWING DISPOSITIONS:

A. ONE

REINFORCED BATTALION IN THE QUE SONS, PROBABLY BASED AT BALDY.

PAGE FOUR RUMULVA 1341 TOP SECRET / SPECIAL / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
EXCLUSIVE FOR

B. ONE REINFORCED BATTALION OPERATING WEST OF DANANG VIETAL ZONE IN THE AREA PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY 3D BATTALION, 1ST MARINES, AND 1ST BATTALION, 5TH MARINES.

C. ONE REINFORCED BATTALION OPERATING SOUTH OF DANANG VIETAL ZONE IN THE AREA PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY 1ST AND 2D BATTALIONS, 1ST MARINES.

4. (1S) FOR THESE THREE BATTALIONS TO PERFORM MOST EFFECTIVELY STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF OBJECTIVE, ECONOMY OF FORCE, MASS, AND MOVEMENT WILL BE NECESSARY. THE BATTALIONS WILL HAVE TO OPERATE IN A HIGHLY MOBILE EXPEDITIONARY MODE. IT IS ENVISIONED THAT EACH BATTALION WILL HAVE NO MORE THAN ONE BASE AREA, THAT THE BASE AREA BE RUSTY, AND THAT THE OPTIMUM POSTURE OF THE RIFLE COMPANIES FOR EACH BATTALION WOULD BE TWO COMPANIES ENGAGED IN MOBILE OPERATIONS, ONE COMPANY POISED FOR QUICK EXPLOITATION, AND ONE COMPANY EMPLOYED IN REHABILITATION AND SECURITY MISSIONS.

5. (1S) IT WOULD BE EXPECTED THAT THE INITIAL WOULD OPERATE IN MUCH THE SAME MANNER AS IS PRESENTLY BEING DONE BY THE 5TH MARINES. CURRENT OPERATIONS IN THE QUE SONS DEMONSTRATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPER BLEND OF RECONNAISSANCE, INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AND AIR (BOTH FIXED WING AND HELO) AGAINST THE ENEMY

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE FIVE RUMUVA 1341 I O P S E C R E T / SPECIAL / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
EXCLUSIVE FOR  
IN HIS PRESENT STATE. THIS METHOD OF OPERATIONS IS PRESENTLY  
BEING EXTENDED TO THE 1ST MARINES. CURRENTLY, IN THE 1ST MARINES  
AO, A

RECON PLATOON PATROL BASE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED ON DONG DEN,  
A RECON COMPANY PATROL BASE IS BEING ESTABLISHED ON CHARLIE RIDGE,  
AND A PREPOSITIONED HELICOPTER PACKAGE IS BEING CONSIDERED ON  
HILL 37. CONCURRENTLY, FIXED RIFLE COMPANY POSITIONS ARE BEING  
DISMANTLED.

6. (TS) IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT WITH A 58 PERCENT REDUCTION  
IN TROOP DENSITY RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION WILL HAVE TO  
SUBSTITUTE IN LARGE MEASURE FOR THE SATURATION PATROLLING TRADI-  
TIONAL TO THE ROCKET HELI AND THE 1ST MARINES AO. IN VIEW OF THE  
LESSENERD ENEMY CAPABILITY AND THE IMPROVED RF/PF CAPABILITY THIS  
APPEARS TO BE AN ACCEPTABLE RISK. COUPLED WITH THIS REDUCED  
PRESENCE IN THE POPULATED AREA WILL BE THE REQUIREMENT FOR A  
CONTINUING EVALUATION OF THE CUPP/CAP DISPOSITIONS AND EFFECTIVE-  
NESS AND A CAREFULLY PLANNED PHASE-OUT OF THEIR OPERATIONS PRIOR  
TO THE BRIGADE'S DEPARTURE. IN THIS RESPECT A DETAILED STUDY  
OF CUPP OPERATIONS IS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY.

7. (TS) AN ANCILLIARY BENEFIT LOGISTICALLY ACCRUING FROM  
REDUCING THE NUMBER OF FIXED INSTALLATIONS TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM

PAGE SIX RUMUVA 1341 I O P S E C

E T / SPECIAL / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE FOR  
AND OPERATING IN A MOBILE EXPEDITIONARY MODE WILL BE TO FREE UP  
UNNEEDED FACILITIES FOR EARLY TRANSFER OR RAZING, AS WELL AS  
SPEEDING THE RETROGRADE OF AS MUCH GARRISON PROPERTY AS IS  
POSSIBLE.

8. (TS) AS ADDRESSED ABOVE THIS CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS IS  
DESIGNED TO OPTIMIZE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GROUND ELEMENT OF THE  
MAB IN THE EVENT OF AN EXTENDED STAY AND CONTINUED RESPONSIBILITY  
FOR THE PRESENT AREA OF OPERATIONS, IN OTHER WORDS, THE EXTREME  
CASE. HOWEVER, THE CONCEPT IS ADAPTABLE TO A SMALLER AO AND WILL,  
BY LIGHTENING THE LOGISTIC LOAD, EXPEDITE THE EARLY DEPARTURE OF  
THE BRIGADE IF SUCH EVENTUATES.

9. (TS) IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE FOREGOING CONCEPT BE APPROVED  
IN PRINCIPLE FOR FURTHER PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS RESPECT  
IT APPEARS PERFECTLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE GENERAL PLAN FOR ORGANI-  
ZATION AND ACTIVATION OF THE MAB AND TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENT  
OPERATIONS SET FORTH IN REFERENCE B. IT ALSO APPEARS TO BE IN  
COMPLETE CONSONANCE WITH THE INJUNCTION CONTAINED IN REFERENCE C  
TO AVOID A STATIC DEFENSIVE ROLE. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1341

PAGE 3 OF 3

140610Z NOV 70

NNNN

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM <b>CG FMFMAG</b>		DATE <b>14 APR 70</b>	
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <b>142399E</b>	COPY NO. <b>4</b> OF <b>6</b> COPIES REC'D		
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REMARKS:

DISPOSITION:

Retain for \_\_\_ months.

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Section	Signature

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**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

MCEO

EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT

PITAZYUW RUHHFMA 1211 3182239-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 142239Z NOV 70

TOR: 120100Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

B

TOP SECRET/SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE. PERSONAL FOR LIGEN  
MCCOMCHEON FROM LIGEN - ONE S. MARINE CORPS EYES  
ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//  
VMCS EMPLOYMENT (U)

A. CG III MAF 091400Z NOV 70 (S) (SPECIAL) (MCEO)

B. CG FMFPAC 142241Z NOV 70 (S) (SPECIAL) (MCEO)

1. (S) I APPRECIATE THE POSITION YOU HAVE PROVIDED  
IN REF A AND THE RATIONALE WHICH HAS BEEN BASIC TO  
CONTINUED ACTION AND STUDY WE HAVE TAKEN IN THIS  
AREA.

2. (S) BY REF B WE HAVE GONE TO THE COMMANDANT IN  
AN URGENT EFFORT TO GET IMMEDIATE ACTION TO STRENGTHEN  
OUR CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT WHICH  
WOULD BE A PREREQUISITE TO THE IN-COUNTRY EASA  
RE-ENTRY.

3. (S) IN ORDER THAT WE MAY HAVE COMPLETE EXCHANGE OF

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA 1211 TOP SECRET/SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE  
PERSONAL FOR MCEO

INFORMATION AND TO ENSURE OUR BEST EFFORTS ARE BEING  
MADE FOR EARLY IMPROVEMENT OF THE EASA SUPPORTABILITY,  
I PLAN TO SEND MY BWO, LT COL MCFERRIN, LATE IN  
NOVEMBER TO RVN, OKI AND JAPAN TO ACCOMPLISH THE  
ABOVE PURPOSES.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

B

1211

MCEO

NNNN

MESSAGE READDRESSAL

III MAP 5000/1 6/67

DTG

191230Z NOV 70

FROM:

DRAFTED BY:

CG, III MAF  
TO:

B. L. BUSSELL

CONCURRED BY

INFO:

CCN

CG FIRST MAW  
CG FIRST M. DIV  
CG FORLOGCOMD

PRECEDENCE:

RELEASED BY:

PRIORITY

B. L. BUSSELL, CAPT

READDRESSAL OF

ADMINS, C/S SEC 2288

ORIGINATOR:

DTG

CG 22222

182039Z

MONTH:

YEAR:

CLASSIFICATION:

NOV

1970

TOPSECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR

SUBJECT:

SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM <b>CG 70718</b>		DATE <b>18 Nov 1970</b>					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <b>180078</b>		COPY NO. <b>4</b> OF <b>4</b> COPIES RECD.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT				
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	CG					SUBJECT <b>NEWS</b> <b>Southeast Asia Relocation Planning (1)</b>  REMARKS: <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 5px 0;">                     DISPOSITION:   <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months.  <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.                 </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; margin: 5px 0;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4___.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.	Section	Signature		
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**TOP SECRET**

(8)

TOP SECRET

OPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

VVPTIAZYUW RUHHFMA 09 69 3222 039-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 182039Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

"MCEO"

18Nov 22 37z

B

T O P S E C R E T. SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE. FOR LIGEN MCCUM CHEON FROM LIGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.; DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000/.

SOUTH EAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

1. (IS) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF CINCPAC 152207Z NOV 70 TO COMUSMACV INFO CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF AND CG FMFPAC, WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR INFORMATION.

QUOTE:

SOUTH EAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

A. JCS 5906/141504Z NOV 70 (PASEP)

1. (IS) REF A ADVISED THAT U.S. ARMY AND USMC MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS MAY CONTINUE, AND COULD PRECLUDE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CURRENTLY PLANNED END FY71 SPACE AND HORIZONTALIZATION OF 260,000 FOR U.S. FORCES IN THE RVN. CONSEQUENTLY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION BEYOND END FY71 IS REQUESTED, ALONG WITH AN UPDATED AS-

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA 1969 T O P S E C R E T SPECIAL MCEO

ASSESSMENT OF REQUIRED END FY71 IN-COUNTRY STRENGTHS.

FEASIBILITY AND IMPACT OF REDUCING U.S. FORCES IN THE RVN TO NOT GREATER THAN 250,000 BY END FY71 IS ALSO REQUESTED.

2. (C) REQUEST THAT YOUR ANALYSIS AND REASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN PARA 4, REF A, TOGETHER WITH YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, BE PROVIDED NL 231700Z NOV, INFO CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, AND CG FMFPAC.

UNQUOTE:

2. (TS) MARINE CORPS POSITION CONTINUES TO BE THAT EVEN WITH ADDITIONAL MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY ASSETS, WHICH IS IMPROBABLE, IT WOULD MORE THAN LIKELY BE INFEASIBLE FOR US TO MAINTAIN THE MAB IN-COUNTRY PAST FY-71. CONSEQUENTLY, ARMY WILL EITHER HAVE TO DRAW DOWN IN EUROPE OR MAKE MACV TAKE SHORTAGES OUT OF THEIR HIDE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

B

1969

182039Z NOV 70

"MCEO"

NNNN

MESSAGE READDRESSAL

III MAF 5000/1 6/67

DTG

191231Z NOV 70

FROM:

CG III MAF

DRAFTED BY:

R. L. BUSSELL

TO:

CONCURRED BY

INFO:

CG FIRST MAW  
CG FIRST MANDIV  
CG FORLOGCOMD

CCN

PRECEDENCE:

PRIORITY

RELEASED BY

B. L. BUSSELL, CAPT

READDRESSAL OF

ADMNO, C/S SEC 2288

ORIGINATOR:

CG FMFPAC

DTG:

182151Z

MONTH:

NOV.

YEAR:

1970

CLASSIFICATION:

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE

SUBJECT:

SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

9

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM <b>III MAR</b>		DATE <b>18 Nov 70</b>					
					SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <b>100000</b>		COPY NO. <b>4</b> OF <b>4</b> COPIES RECD.					
ROUTE	SECTION	CODE	DATE		INITIAL	SUBJECT						
			IN	OUT		<b>SOUTHWEST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (1)</b>						
	CG					REMARKS:  DISPOSITION: <input type="checkbox"/> Retain for ____ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.  <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; text-align: center;">Section</td> <td style="width: 50%; text-align: center;">Signature</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.   Copy # 2 CG'S FILE Copy # 1 FORCE PLANNING			Section	Signature		
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(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**TOP SECRET**

(9)

**TOP SECRET**

PTIAZYUW RUHHFMA1985 3222151-AAAA-RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 182151Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

BT

**SPECAT**

**"EXCLUSIVE"**  
**"MCEO"**

**T O P S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM  
LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING  
HOURS. //N00000//**

**SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)**

**1. (TS) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF JCS 141504Z NOV 70 TO CINCPAC,  
INFO COMUSMACV WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR INFORMATION.**

**QUOTE:**

**SUBJ: SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)**

**REFS: A. JCS 48457302219Z OCT 70. B. CINCPAC 030402Z NOV 70.**

**1. (TS) REF A REQUESTED CINCPAC COMMENTS ON AN ALTERNATIVE TO  
CURRENT REDEPLOYMENT PLANS WHICH WOULD RETAIN IN THE RVN THROUGH  
FY 72 A MAB OF ABOUT 12,700 INSTEAD OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE UNITS  
OF EQUIVALENT STRENGTH. REF B STATED THAT, FOR VARIOUS REASONS,  
A FORCE STRUCTURE IN THE RVN BASED ON CURRENTLY PLANNED  
AUTHORIZATIONS WAS PREFERRED AND RECOMMENDED.**

**2. (TS) AN EXAMINATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE IN REF A IN  
CONJUNCTION WITH REF B REVEALED THAT:**

**PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1985 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO**

**A. THE US ARMY CANNOT SUPPORT A FORCE LEVEL IN THE RVN OF  
223,300 AT END FY 71 BECAUSE OF CURRENT MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY  
CONSTRAINTS WITHOUT DEGRADATION OF WORLDWIDE POSTURE AND  
UNDESIRABLE INTERVALS BETWEEN SHORT TOURS, NEITHER OF WHICH  
WOULD PROVIDE THE MOS BALANCE REQUIRED IN THE RVN.**

**B. THE US MARINE CORPS CANNOT SUPPORT A MAB IN THE RVN THROUGH  
FY 72 BECAUSE OF CURRENT MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS  
WITHOUT ADVERSE DRAWDOWNS ON THE CONUS-BASED FMF MANNING LEVEL  
AND UNDESIRABLE REDUCTION OF ELEMENTS OF THE PLANNED USMC PACOM  
RESERVE.**

**C. THE US ARMY COULD SUPPORT A FORCE LEVEL IN THE RVN OF  
192,500 AT END FY 71 UNDER CURRENT BUDGETARY AND MANPOWER  
CONSTRAINTS, ALTHOUGH SOME MOS IMBALANCES AND SHORTAGES IN COMBAT  
MOS CATEGORIES WOULD PERSIST.**

**3. (TS) ON 7 NOV 70, THE JCS INDICATED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE THAT CURRENT REDEPLOYMENT PLANS WHICH CALL FOR AN  
ALL-SERVICE AUTHORIZATION IN THE RVN OF 260,000 SPACES AT END  
FY 71 PROVIDE THE MINIMUM AUTHORIZATIONS DESIRABLE IN VIEW OF  
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE RVN AND THAT REQUIRED RESOURCES  
SHOULD BE PROVIDED.**

**PAGE 1 OF 2**

**182151z NOV 70**

**TOP SECRET**

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1935 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT MCELO

4. (TS) NEVERTHELESS, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT PRESENT BUDGET AND MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS MAY CONTINUE. NOTWITHSTANDING THE RATIONALE CONTAINED IN PARAS 2, 3, AND 6 OF REF B, REQUEST CINCPAC (A) REANALYZE THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION PROJECTED BEYOND END FY 71 CONSIDERING THE PROGRESS OF CRIMP, THE STATUS OF THE LOC PROGRAM, SUCCESS IN VIETNAMIZATION, CONCEPT OF US OPERATIONS, APPROPRIATE SERVICE BALANCE DURING THE COMBAT PHASE, AND OTHER ASPECTS CINCPAC DEEMS PERTINENT AND (B) PROVIDE AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF REQUIRED END FY 71 IN-COUNTRY STRENGTHS TO INCLUDE THE FEASIBILITY AND IMPACT OF REDUCING US FORCES IN THE RVN TO NOT GREATER THAN 250,000 BY END FY 71.

5. (TS) REQUEST CINCPAC PROVIDE HIS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (INCLUDING COMUSMACV VIEWS, AS APPROPRIATE) ON END FY 71 IN-COUNTRY TOTAL STRENGTHS AND SERVICE BREAKOUT BY 25 NOV 70.

UNQUOTE.

2. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

BT

1935

PAGE 2 OF 2

182151Z NOV 70

NNNN

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM <b>CG JMWAVE</b>		DATE <b>22 May 70</b>					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <b>228016</b>	COPY NO. <b>4</b> OF <b>4</b> COPIES RECD.						
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			IN	OUT						
	CG					REMARKS:  DISPOSITION: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Retain for ___ months. <input type="checkbox"/> Destroy after routing.  <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Section</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Signature</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> REMARKS: This document may not be retained over night except as noted in Force Order P5511.4.  The Record of Disclosure must be signed by all persons sighting this Document.	Section	Signature		
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*Copy # 2 CG'S FILE*  
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10

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

RITAZYUW RUKHFMA2522 325223 I-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

R 212231Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO ZEN/CG I MAF

INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WILSON INFO  
LIGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LIGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS  
EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO5000//  
FORCE PLANNING (U)

"EXCLUSIVE"

"MCEO"

A. CG III MAF 200654Z NOV70 (TS) (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE)

B. CMC 121455Z NOV70 (TS) (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE) (PASEP)

1. (TS) IN VIEW OF III MAF'S RECOMMENDED REDUCTIONS  
PROPOSED IN REF A, TO MEET IIA SPACE REQUIREMENTS IAW  
REF B, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON LOCATING THE  
MAF HEADQUARTERS AT CAMP COURTNEY VICE TUTENA. WARM  
REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2522

212231Z NOV 70

NNNN

(10)

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			FROM CG I MAJ		DATE 24 Nov 70					
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE 242293 Nov 70	COPY NO. 4 OF 4 COPIES REC'D						
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11

(USE REVERSE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"  
"MCEO"

P 242250Z NOV 70

FM CG I MAF  
TO CG FMFPAC  
INFO CG III MAF

BT

TOP SECRET / SPECAT / EXCLUSIVE / FOR LTGEN JONES /  
INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON / FROM MAJGEN WILSON / MCEO  
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS  
FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 212231Z NOV 70 (TS) (SPECAT) (EXCLUSIVE)

1. (TS) REF A REQUESTED COMMENTS ON LOCATING THE III  
MAF HQ AT COURTNEY VICE FUTURE REVIEW OF THE 114  
SPACE LIMITATION IMPOSED ON THAT HQ.

2. (TS) SINCE THE III MAF STAFF WILL BE ESSENTIALLY  
THE SAME SIZE AS THE I MAF STAFF, I RECOMMEND THE  
MAF HQ REMAIN AT COURTNEY.

3. (TS) CG III MAF AND CG THIRD MAJ DIV CAN WORKOUT  
A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO  
THEIR PERSONAL OFFICES AND QUARTERS.

4. (TS) WE ARE QUITE CROWDED WITH OFFICERS HERE AT COURTNEY.  
I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH BOB BARRON THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVERTING  
BLDG 4428 FROM BARRACKS TO BQ. THIS IS THE BLDG WHICH  
OVERLOOKS HELI PAD.

WE MAY PROPOSE TO PARTITION BLDG 4428 INTO 2 MAIN ROOMS AND INSTALL  
A LAVATORY IN EACH ROOM. OTHER HEAD FACILITIES REMAIN CENTRALIZED.  
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE \$11,000 DOLLARS.

5. (TS) IN SUMMARY, RETENTION OF THE MAF AT COURTNEY  
IS MOST ECONOMICAL, LEAST DISRUPTIVE AND AVOIDS DUPLICATING  
SOME FACILITIES ALL READY IN EXISTENCE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

242250Z NOV 70

NNNN

III MAF 2100/4

COPY 4 OF 4 COPIES

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET

(14)

MESSAGE READDRESSAL

CG III MAF 5000/1 6/67

DTG

300841Z

FROM:

CG III MAF

DRAFTED BY:

CPL A. L. LOCKE S/

TO:

CONCURRED BY

SE

INFO:

CG FIRST MAW  
CG FIRST MARDIV  
CG FORLOGCOMB

CCN

PRECEDENCE:

PRIORITY

RELEASED BY:

E. L. BUSSELL, CAPT

READDRESSAL OF

CS/S ADMINAST 2207

ORIGINATOR:

CG FMFPAC

DTG

282219Z

MONTH:

NOV

YEAR:

70

CLASSIFICATION:

MCEU/

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR

SUBJECT:

SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

13

# HEADQUARTERS III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

**TOP SECRET**

III MAR FORM 5216 (REV 8-69)

X - ORIGINATOR A - ACTION/COGNIZANCE C - COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION I - INFORMATION S - SIGNATURE			OPERATION CODE		FROM <b>CG 71214</b>		DATE <b>NOV 1970</b>			
			SERIAL NO./CONTROL DATE <b>2022192</b>		COPY NO. <b>4</b> OF <b>4</b> COPIES REC'D.					
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**TOP SECRET**

13

TOP SECRET

MCEO

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

PTTAZYUW RUHHFMA3226 3322219-AAAA--RUNUMPA

ZNY AAAAA

P 282219Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

ZEN/CG I MAF

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR, LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. (SECTION I OF V)

//N00000//

SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

1. (TS) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF CINCPAC 262117Z NOV 70 (TS) TO JCS, INFO COMUSMACV, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CG FMFPAC, ADMIN CINCPAC WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR INFORMATION.

QUOTE:

SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

A. JCS 5906/141504Z NOV 70 (PASEP)

1. (TS) REF A ADVISED THAT CURRENT BUDGET AND MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS COULD PRECLUDE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 262,200 U.S. FORCE LEVEL CURRENTLY PLANNED FOR THE RVN, AND REQUEST-

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA3226 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO ED (1) A RE-ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN THE RVN BEYOND THE END OF FY71, AND (2) AN ASSESSMENT OF THE REQUIRED END FY71 IN COUNTRY STRENGTHS, TO INCLUDE COMMENTS ON THE FEASIBILITY AND IMPACT OF REDUCING U.S. FORCES IN THE RVN TO NOT GREATER THAN 250,000 BY END FY71.

2. (TS) GENERAL. THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE RVN IS PROJECTED BEYOND END FY71 WHEREVER POSSIBLE, AND CONSIDERS THE PROGRESS OF CRIMP, THE STATUS OF THE LOC PROGRAM,

AND PROGRESS IN VIETNAMIZATION, WHERE APPLICABLE.

IT PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR THE REQUESTED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND THE MINIMUM END FY71 U.S. FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCOMPLISHING U.S. PRIORITY GOALS IN THE RVN.

3. (TS) ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.

A. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(1) THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF NORTH VIETNAM IN INDOCHINA REMAIN BASICALLY UNCHANGED. THE PRIMARY AIM OF HANOI IS THE REUNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM UNDER ITS CONTROL. THE LONG TERM GOAL IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OVER LAOS AND CAMBODIA, BUT THIS REMAINS SUBORDINATE TO THE PRIMARY AIM OF REUNIFICATION.

PAGE 183

MCEO

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3226 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O

(2) THE ENEMY IS FACED WITH NEW PROBLEMS HE HAS NOT ENCOUNTERED IN THE LAST DECADE. AT THE PRESENT TIME, LAOS IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO HANOI, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE SUPPLY CORRIDOR THROUGH THE LAO PANHANDLE. THIS IS CURRENTLY THE ONLY FEASIBLE ROUTE AVAILABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS FOR MOVING MEN AND SUPPLIES TO CAMBODIA AND THE COSVN AREA OF SOUTH VIETNAM. HANOI HAS BEEN FORCED TO EXPAND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF KOMPONG SOM, DISRUPTION OF LOC'S BY THE CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO CAMBODIA, AND THE CRITICAL NEED TO RESUPPLY ITS FORCES IN THE SOUTH. IN CAMBODIA, THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN MARCH OBLIGED THE ENEMY TO REASSESS THE SITUATION AND REORIENT HIS EFFORTS TO REPLACE VITAL SUPPLY LINES. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, HE ELECTED TO DIVERT MAIN FORCE UNITS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM, FURTHER LIMITING HIS OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE COSVN AREA OF THE REPUBLIC. THE ENEMY'S FUTURE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IN SOUTHERN INDOCHINA IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO HIS ABILITY TO SOLVE THE SEVERE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH HE NOW FACES.

(3) DESPITE HIS MANY UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS, THE ENEMY

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA3226 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O

IS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN A LIMITED CAPABILITY FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. HE WILL PROBABLY RETAIN THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT LIMITED GROUND ATTACKS IN SELECTED AREAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, AND LAOS. DESPITE INCREASING MANPOWER DEMANDS, THE ENEMY RETAINS THE CAPABILITY TO INFILTRATE PERSONNEL INTO THE SOUTH AND HAS INCREASED INFILTRATION INTO THE COSVN AREA. THE VC/NVA WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT SAPPER, TERRORIST, AND GUERILLA ATTACKS ON POPULATED AREAS IN THE RVN AND WILL PROBABLY STEP-UP ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN HIS VIETNAMESE INFRASTRUCTURE TO CARRY OUT POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. INCREASED ENEMY EMPHASIS WILL PROBABLY BE GIVEN TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE IN CAMBODIA. THE DEPLOYMENT OF SEVERAL SAPPER UNITS INTO CAMBODIA SINCE APRIL SUGGESTS THAT THE ENEMY WILL INCREASE THIS TYPE ACTIVITY IN THE FUTURE. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT HANOI WILL CONTINUE ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE U.S. RESOLVE AND GVN EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH

PROTRACTED STRUGGLE.;

(4) CONSIDERING THE ENEMY'S CURRENT PROBLEMS, CAPABILITIES, AND OPTIONS, THE FOLLOWING TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE ARE ANTICIPATED:

PAGE 283

EXCLUSIVE

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA3226 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O

(A) NVA IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE ITS STRATEGY OF PROTRACTED WARFARE IN SOUTH VIETNAM UTILIZING GUERRILLA AND LOCAL FORCES TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENCE IN POPULATED AREAS.; INCREASED EMPHASIS WILL BE GIVEN TO COUNTER PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES AND THE STRENGTHENING OF GUERRILLA AND SAPPER FORCES. THE ENEMY WILL CONTINUE TO UTILIZE LIMITED GROUND ATTACKS BY FIRE TO COUNTER PACIFICATION AND CAUSE ALLIED CASUALTIES WITH A MINIMUM OF EXPOSURE OF HIS OWN PERSONNEL.

(B) IN CAMBODIA, THE SHORT TERM MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF NVN ARE PROBABLY TO SECURE A SUPPLY CORRIDOR IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE COUNTRY AND TO NEUTRALIZE FANK INTERFERENCE WITH REESTABLISHMENT OF LOC'S AND BASE AREAS. TO CONTAIN FANK IN THE POPULATION CENTERS AND THUS ACHIEVE GREATER SECURITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THE VC/NVA WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE THEIR CURRENT ATTACKS AGAINST SMALL URBAN AREAS AROUND PHNOM PENH AND CITIES LOCATED ON KEY ROAD AND WATER ROUTES. THE COMMUNISTS ARE ALSO LIKELY TO EXPAND THEIR WAR EFFORTS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES, BOTH TO OBTAIN CONTROL OVER THE RICH GROWING AREA AND TO FORCE THE FANK TO SPREAD

PAGE SIX RUHHFMA3226 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O MORE THINLY, INCREASING ITS VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK.

(C) IN THE LONG TERM, COMMUNIST STRATEGY WILL DEPEND IN PART ON THE SUCCESS OF CURRENT LOGISTICAL EFFORTS IN THE LAO PANHANDLE AND THE PACE OF U.S. WITHDRAWALS. UNLESS ENEMY FORCES ARE RESUPPLIED IN THE SOUTH THEIR ABILITY TO CONDUCT SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS THE EFFECT OF INCREASED COMMUNIST ACTIVITY ON U.S. WITHDRAWALS. LIMITED ENEMY MILITARY PRESSURE WHICH WOULD NOT SERIOUSLY THREATEN THE SAFETY OF REMAINING U.S. FORCES WOULD MOST LIKELY NOT AFFECT THE PACE OF U.S. WITHDRAWALS. HOWEVER, A MAJOR INCREASE IN ACTIVITY MAY WELL SLOW DOWN OR HALT REDEPLOYMENT. THEREFORE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT ENEMY MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE LONG TERM WILL PROBABLY BE DESIGNED TO CONTRIBUTE TO HIS COUNTER-PACIFICATION EFFORTS AND WILL BE TAILORED TO THE ACCELERATED WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES. HOWEVER, ONCE THE WITHDRAWALS ARE COMPLETED AND IF NORTH VIETNAM SUCCEEDS IN RESOLVING ITS LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTH, ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY MIGHT WELL INCREASE IN SCOPE AND INTENSITY.

B. ALLIED SITUATION BY MILITARY REGIONS.

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TOP SECRET

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**TOP SECRET**

PITAZYUW RUMHMA 3229 3322219-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 282219Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

ZEN/CG I MAF

BT

SPL

**T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON,  
MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000// SECTION II OF V

(1) MR I. OPERATIONS IN MR I IN SUPPORT OF THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN WERE NOT COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL IN ELIMINATING ENEMY MAIN FORCE UNITS; HOWEVER, THE ENEMY HAS WITHDRAWN TO THE WESTERN PORTION OF THE REGION AND HIS ACCESS TO THE POPULATION CENTERS HAS BEEN RESTRICTED. ALLIED EFFORTS TO CONTROL AND PROTECT NATURAL RESOURCES WITH PRIORITY GIVEN TO RICE DENIAL OPERATIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL. SECURITY OF THE LOCAL RICE HARVEST WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY TERRITORIAL FORCES WHILE REGULAR UNITS PROVIDED SECURITY IN CONTESTED AREAS. THERE HAS BEEN IMPROVEMENT IN THE ABILITY OF TERRITORIAL FORCES TO CARRY OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN IMPLEMENTING THE AREA SECURITY CONCEPT, BUT AS IN OTHER REGIONS, THESE FORCES HAVE LEADERSHIP AND DESERTION PROBLEMS. SHOULD THE ENEMY ELECT TO INITIATE

PAGE TWO RUMHMA 3229 **T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O  
LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS, RVNAF DOES NOT CURRENTLY POSSESS  
THE CAPABILITY TO COMBAT THE THREAT WITHOUT ASSISTANCE  
FROM THE U.S./FVMAF.

(2) MR II. DURING THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN FOURTEEN KNOWN OR SUSPECTED ENEMY BASE AREAS WERE TARGETED AND ELEVEN WERE ATTACKED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF SUCCESS. THIS CAMPAIGN DID NOT COMPLETELY IDENTIFY AND DISRUPT INFILTRATION ROUTES AND LOC'S FROM THE TARGET AREAS. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN VC MR VI AND THE HIGHLANDS. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN RECENT IMPROVEMENT DUE IN PART TO REPLACEMENT OF THE MR II COMMANDER, THERE WAS A GENERAL LACK OF AGGRESSIVE SPIRIT ON THE PART OF ARVN AND ROK FORCES. THE INAUGURATION OF LOCK-ON OPERATIONS, TARGETING FRIENDLY FORCES AGAINST SPECIFIC ENEMY UNITS, AND CORPS-WIDE EMPHASIS ON TRAINING AND SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS SHOULD ACHIEVE IMPROVED RESULTS. TERRITORIAL FORCE GROWTH HAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED RVNAF MR II CAPABILITIES. IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY IN SOME CASES TO USE REGULAR FORCES TO AUGMENT TERRITORIAL FORCES IN SECURE AREAS AND CONSOLIDATION ZONES AT THE EXPENSE OF OPERATIONS IN THE CLEARING ZONES. THE ON-GOING REDEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT IN THE

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MCEO

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"MCF"

"EXCLUSIVE"

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3229 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O  
VACATED AREAS UNTIL REMAINING U.S./RVN FORCES ARE REALIGNED  
AND AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY ADJUSTED TO COVER THESE AREAS.

(3) MR III. THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN GOALS OF ATTRITION  
AGAINST ENEMY FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE WERE GENERALLY  
ATTAINED. THE ENEMY'S DETERMINATION TO DISRUPT THE PACIFI-  
CATION PROGRAM PERSISTED IN SPITE OF THE SUPPLY PROBLEMS  
WHICH HINDERED HIS OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. EFFORTS BY THE  
ENEMY ALONG THIS LINE WERE DISRUPTED, WHICH CAN BE ATTRIBUTED  
TO HIS MOVEMENT DEEPER INTO CAMBODIA AND THE U.S./RVNAF  
CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS. WITH THE REDUCED LEVEL OF ACTIVITY,  
RVNAF PROGRESSIVELY ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE CONDUCT  
OF THE INDEPENDENT OPERATI KA OVER LARGER AREAS. FLEXIBILITY  
WAS ASSURED BY THE PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL U.S. AND FW FORCES  
VVVIN MR III FOR REINFORCEMENT, IF NECESSARY. TERRITORIAL  
FORCES HAVE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURING LARGER  
AREAS AROUND SOME POPULATION CENTERS AND LOC'S, THUS FREEING  
REGULAR UNITS FOR OPERATIONS IN BASE AREAS, INTERDICTION  
EFFORTS, AND CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA. THE  
INCREASE IN RVNAF CAPABILITY AND THE PLANNED REALIGNMENTS  
TO COMPENSATE FOR U.S. REDEPLOYMENTS, COUPLED WITH THE THUS-

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA3229 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O  
FOR STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN MR III TERRITORIAL FORCES ARE EXPECTED  
TO OFFSET ANY ADVERSE EFFECT OF THE U.S. REDEPLOYMENTS PLANNED  
FROM MR III DURING THE REMAINDER OF THIS FISCAL YEAR. AS IN  
OTHER MR'S, RVNAF DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO COMBAT THE  
THREAT IN RVN CONCURRENT WITH OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA WITHOUT  
U.S./FW FORCES PRESENCE IN-COUNTRY.

(4) MR IV. SUSTAINED GVN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MR IV AND IN  
CAMBODIA HAVE REPLICED SIGNIFICANT LOSSES ON THE ENEMY AND HE  
HAS ELECTED TO DISPERSE INTO SMALLER ELEMENTS UNTIL HIS  
MAIN FORCE THREAT CAN BE REMOUNTED. THERE HAS BEEN IMPROVEMENT  
IN THE MR III TERRITORIAL FORCES WHICH HAS ALLOWED SOME REGULAR  
FORCES TO CONCENTRATE ON BASE AREAS, CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS,  
AND MAINTAIN A POSTURE TO REACT TO ATTACKS AGAINST POPULATION  
CENTERS. HOWEVER, AS IN OTHER MR'S THE EXPANSION OF THE  
TERRITORIAL FORCES HAS RESULTED IN AN OFFICER SHORTAGE.

6. THE LOC PROGRAM. THE LOC PROGRAM HAS BEEN UNDER  
CONTINUOUS REVIEW SINCE MARCH 1970 RESULTING IN DEFERRAL OF  
441 KM OF ROADS. THE REDUCED LOC PROGRAM DIRECTED BY OSD  
ON 14 SEPTEMBER 1970 IS CONSIDERED THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL  
TO FACILITATE ATTAINMENT OF MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND PACIFICATION

Page 2 of 3

"MCF"

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA3229 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O GOALS. RVNAF ENGINEER UNITS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR 485 KM; AND ADDITIONAL WORK SWITCHED FROM U.S. TROOPS TO RVNAF WOULD CAUSE A SCHEDULE SLIPPAGE, SINCE NEW WORK WOULD NOT BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE END OF 1974. FUNDS ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL WORK FOR EXECUTION BY CONTRACT ABOUT 600 KM OF ROADS ARE ASSIGNED TO U.S. TROOPS FOR COMPLETION AFTER 1970. THE MAJOR EFFORT WILL BE CONCENTRATED ON UPGRADING ROADS IN THE DENSELY POPULATED DELTA AND IN COMPLETING QL-20, THE IMPORTANT CONNECTION BETWEEN SAIGON AND THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE RVN. NINE REINFORCED ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS (9,000 MEN), WILL BE REQUIRED DURING CY71; TO ENABLE COMPLETION OF THESE 600 KM BY MID-1972.; INDIVIDUAL BATTALIONS WILL BE RELEASED UPON COMPLETING ASSIGNED WORK. DEPENDING UPON CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT TWO BATTALIONS MIGHT BE RELEASED FOR REDEPLOYMENT IN LATE 1971. THE ALLOCATION OF AN ADDITIONAL \$15 MILLION AND DOD'S APPROVAL TO EXTEND THE CPAF CONTRACT ACCORDINGLY WOULD PERMIT THE CONSTRUCTION OF 40 KM OF LIL-27 BY CONTRACTOR IN LIEU OF TROOP EFFORT. THIS WOULD BE TRADE-OFF IN FUNDING, BUT WOULD RELEASE ONE REINFORCED ENGINEER BATTALION.

PAGE SIX RUHHFMA3229 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O D. IMPACT OF REDUCED TACAIR: B-52 SORTIES. COMMENCING 14 AUG 70, TACAIR SORTIES WERE LIMITED TO THE OVERALL MONTHLY TOTAL OF 14,000. RVNAF IMPROVEMENT IS NOTED IN THE NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT AND SQUADRONS AS WELL AS AN INCREASED EFFICIENCY IN THE CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS; HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF USAF CAPABILITY AS UNITS REDEPLOY. VNAF AIRCRAFT DO NOT HAVE THE ORDNANCE CAPACITY, THE AIR REFUELING CAPABILITY, NOR THE OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY OF USAF AIRCRAFT. THESE CAPABILITIES ARE NECESSARY FOR ALL WEATHER OPERATIONS IN-COUNTRY AND INTERDICTION MISSIONS IN LAOS/CAMBODIA. SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH MAY IMPINGE ON THE TACAIR SUPPORT CIRCUMSTANCE ARE: AN INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY; AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUIRED FOR THE INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN IN LVAOS; OR A FURTHER DRAWDOWN ON THE TOTAL AVAILABLE U.S./FWMAF TACAIR ASSETS. THE NUMBER OF B-52 STRIKES PER DAY HAS REMAINED THE SAME SINCE THE SORTIES REDUCTION WENT INTO EFFECT; HOWEVER, THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT PER STRIKE. PRIOR TO 17 AUGUST, SOME STRIKES WERE MADE UP OF SIX AIRCRAFT, AND SOME CONSISTED OF THREE AIRCRAFT. ALL STRIKES ARE NOW MADE UP OF THREE AIRCRAFT.

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MCEO

TOP SECRET

MCEO

EXCLUSIVE

PTTZYUW RUHHFMA3233 3322219-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 282219Z NOV 80

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

ZEN/CG I MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON,  
MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.  
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS SECTION III OF V

//N00020//

E. APPRAISAL OF GVN FORCES.

(1) OVERALL. THE CAMBODIA OPERATIONS ARE EXAMPLES OF  
RVNAF ABILITY OF PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS. THOUGH RVNAF  
CONTINUES TO IMPROVE IN EFFECTIVENESS IT CANNOT MEET THE  
PRESENT AND PROJECTED OVERALL THREAT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT  
U.S. AND FVMAF COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT, AND COMBAT SERVICE  
SUPPORT ASSISTANCE. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN MR I AND  
MR II. THIS U.S.-FVMAF SUPPORT ENABLES RVNAF TO MAINTAIN  
A CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GKR  
AND DISRUPT NVA/VC ACTIVITIES ALONG THE CAMBODIAN/RVN  
BORDER AS WELL AS TO CONTINUE THE CONDUCT OF IN-COUNTRY  
EFFORTS. RVNAF OVERALL STRENGTHS AS PROJECTED ARE ACCEPTABLE.  
IT IS ESTIMATED THAT SUFFICIENT MANPOWER RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA3233 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O  
TO SUPPORT PROGRAMMED FORCE STRUCTURE INCREASES. WITH THE  
NEW CONCEPTION OF DEFICIENCIES IN DEPOT, AIR/SEALIFT, AND  
PORT OPERATIONS, RVNAF IS CURRENTLY SELF-SUFFICIENT IN  
PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR A FORCE STRUCTURE OF AP-  
PROXIMATELY 1.0 MILLION MEN. INCREASED EMPHASIS IS REQUIRED  
IN MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY AREAS TO PREVENT A GRADUAL DETERIORA-  
TION OF COMBAT READINESS. THE RVNAF NON-TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS  
SYSTEM IS ALMOST VOID IN THE AREAS OF TECHNICAL ENGINEERING AND  
MANAGEMENT SKILLS, LIMITED IN RELIABILITY, INADEQUATE  
IN CAPACITY, AND DEFICIENT IN MIDDLE MANAGEMENT SUPERVISION  
OF MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS. OF ALL PROBLEMS IN THE C-E  
FIELD, THE MOST CRITICAL ARE THE ACUTE SHORTAGE OF TRAINED  
TECHNICAL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL AND THE DEPENDENCE  
OF THE RVNAF COMMO STRUCTURE ON U.S. MILITARY INTEGRATED  
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS FOR LONG-HAUL COMMUNICATIONS THROUGHOUT  
RVA. ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN TO COMPENSATE FOR THESE SEVERE  
LIMITATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE PROGRESS OF THE CRIMP HAS BEEN  
SATISFACTORY THUS FAR, WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. COMMUNICATIONS UNITS BASED  
ON A DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE RVNAF CAPABILITY HAS INCREASED FASTER  
THAN ANTICIPATED SHOULD BE CLOSELY MONITORED. ACTIVATIONS AND EXPANSION

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TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3230 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O  
 OF RVNAF UNITS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AT THE EXPENSE OF  
 EXISTING UNITS. ALSO, SKILL LEVELS OF TECHNICIANS AND  
 ABILITY OF LEADERS IN A GREAT MANY CASES IS BELOW THAT  
 REQUIRED DUE TO LACK OF EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING. A  
 COMPREHENSIVE COMBINED REVIEW OF THE RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE  
 WAS INITIATED ON 20 NOVEMBER 1970 TO DETERMINE CHANGES  
 REQUIRED IN THE RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE FOR FY72 AND FY73  
 IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND CAPABILITIES.  
 (2) ARVN. CRIMP HAS PROVIDED INCREASED ARTILLERY  
 CAPABILITIES. THE PROVISION OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT TO RF/PF  
 WILL FREE THE ARVN CORPS AND DIVISION ARTILLERY FOR THE SUPPORT  
 OF ARVN OPERATIONS. WHERE FEASIBLE, ACTIVATIONS OF ARVN UNITS  
 ARE BEING ACCELERATED; HOWEVER, EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY  
 IS THE PRIMARY LIMITING FACTOR. THIS FACTOR AND TRAINING  
 PROBLEMS DISCUSSED BELOW COMBINED WITH MANPOWER COMPETITION  
 AMONG THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS PRECLUDE ADDITIONAL ACCELERATIONS  
 IN FY71. THE ACTIVATIONS OF SOME ADMINISTRATIVE AND  
 LOGISTICAL UNITS HAVE FALLEN BEHIND SCHEDULE. IT IS  
 ANTICIPATED THESE UNITS WILL BE ACTIVATED IN THE SECOND  
 HALF OF FY71 AFTER COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS ARE

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA3230 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O  
 FILLED OUT. IN RELATION TO TRAINING OF ARVN PERSONNEL,  
 PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN TRAINING BY THE JGS CENTRAL  
 TRAINING COMMAND (CTC). REFRESHER TRAINING HAS SHOWN  
 MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN QUALITY, ALTHOUGH THE NECESSITY TO  
 PROVIDE BASIC TRAINING FOR NEW UNITS HAS CAUSED THIS IMPROVED  
 REFRESHER TRAINING TO LAG FOR OTHER UNITS. OTHER  
 IMPROVEMENTS ARE PLANNED FOR UPGRADING TRAINING CAPABILITIES  
 AND IMPROVING TRAINING TECHNIQUES. THERE IS A CONTINUING LACK  
 OF SUFFICIENT COMBAT EXPERIENCED, SKILLED ARVN CADRE AND  
 INSTRUCTORS TO MANAGE AND CONDUCT TRAINING AT TRAINING  
 CENTERS. THIS PROBLEM HAS A HIGH PRIORITY AT CTC. TRAINING  
 OF CAMBODIAN FORCES BY ARVN HAS PLACED A FURTHER STRAIN ON THE  
 ARVN TRAINING CAPABILITY. IF JGS ELECTS TO HASTEN THE  
 ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF UNITS AND PERSONNEL IN THE FACE OF  
 ACCELERATED U.S. REDEPLOYMENT THERE MAY BE ADVERSE IMPACTS  
 INCLUDING THE FURTHER DELAY OF REFRESHER TRAINING, CURTAILMENT  
 OF CAMBODIAN TRAINING, AND THE ADDITIONAL LOAD BEING PLACED  
 ON THE EXISTING LIMITED EXPERIENCED TRAINING CADRE.  
 (3) VNN. IN THE PAST YEAR THE VNN HAS GROWN IN SIZE  
 FROM LESS THAN 20,000 TO ITS MAXIMUM AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF

023

"MCEO"

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

"MCEO"

PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA3230 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M E O  
 NEARLY 40,000. THIS RAPID GROWTH HAS LEFT THE VNN WITH  
 A CRITICAL SHORTAGE OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL (E-5,  
 E-6 AND O-3, O-4). NO SHORT TERM SOLUTIONS ARE SEEN FOR  
 CORRECTING THESE IMBALANCES WHICH ARE CURRENTLY HAMPERING  
 THE VNN IN ALL PHASES OF OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT. THE VNN  
 EMPHASIS ON TRAINING HAS SHIFTED FROM QUANTITY TO QUALITY,  
 BUT SHORTFALLS WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST IN OFFICER AND PETTY  
 OFFICER TRAINING. LOGISTICS AND CRAFT MAINTENANCE CONTINUE  
 TO BE MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS. ALTHOUGH PROGRESS HAS BEEN  
 MADE, CONTINUED DELAYS IN RECEIPT OF MASF FUNDED INDUSTRIAL  
 PLANT EQUIPMENT (IPE) HAVE CAUSED POSTPONEMENT OF BASE MANNING  
 DATES AND THE RESULTANT ASSUMPTION OF MAINTENANCE. THIS IN  
 TURN IMPACTS ON ON-THE-JOB TRAINING AND SORELY NEEDED PRACTICAL  
 EXPERIENCE. PLANS ARE THEREFORE BEING MADE TO RETAIN CERTAIN  
 USN AFLOAT REPAIR FACILITIES BEYOND PREVIOUSLY PLANNED  
 RELEASE DATES. IF DELIVERIES OF IPE ARE RESOLVED, THE GOAL  
 OF VIETNAMIZATION OF ALL SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES BY END  
 OF FY72 WILL BE MET. IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD THE VNN

PAGE SIX RUHHFMA3230 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M E O  
 IS PROGRESSING SLOWLY. UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE PLANNED MANNING  
 LEVELS ARE ATTAINED, THE VNN WILL NOT HAVE THE BENEFIT OF AN  
 ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION. COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENTS  
 ARE KEEPING PACE WITH THE SCHEDULED ASSUMPTION OF OPERATIONAL  
 RESPONSIBILITY, BUT COMSEC REMAINS AN AREA OF CONCERN AND IS  
 RECEIVING PRIORITY ATTENTION. THE VNN SHIPYARD CAN SATISFACTORILY  
 ACCOMPLISH THE PRESENT WORKLOAD BUT FACES SEVERE MANPOWER  
 PROBLEMS IN ASSUMING THE ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD SUPPORTED BY  
 SRP GUAM AND INHERENT IN VNN EXPANSION. ALL BROWN  
 WATER COMBAT ASSETS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TURNED OVER BY  
 DEC 70, ALL BLUE WATER ASSETS BY JUL 71, AND ALL LOGISTIC  
 CRAFT BY JUL 72. IT IS EXPECTED THAT ALL COMBAT OPERATIONS  
 WILL BE VIETNAMESE COMMANDED BY 15 JAN 71, WITH  
 EXCEPTION OF MARKET TIME OUTER BARRIER. BY JUL 72 CAPABILITIES  
 IN EOD, SALVAGE, HARBOR DEFENSE, MINESWEEPING, AND SPECIAL WARFARE  
 SHOULD BE REALIZED. THESE PROGRAMS ARE PACED BY THE INCREASINGLY  
 ACUTE SHORTAGE OF EXPERIENCED LEADERS WHICH IS COMPENSATED FOR  
 ONLY IN PART BY THE EXCELLENT NAVAL ADVISORY EFFORT.  
 THE ADVISORY GROUP ITSELF HAS NOT RECEIVED SUFFICIENT ADVISORS  
 PROGRAMMED THROUGH THE 32-WEEK LANGUAGE SCHOOL AND THIS PROGRAM.  
 BT

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"MCEO"

NNJN

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TOP SECRET

(13)

**TOP SECRET**

PTIAZUN/RUMHFMA3231 3322219-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA  
P 282219Z NOV 72

FM CG FMFPAC  
TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF  
ZEN/CG I MAF

BT

**TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCLITCHEON, LTGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //N32200// SECTION IV OF V SECTIONS IS REGARDED AS CRITICAL.**

(4) VNAF. OPERATIONALLY, VNAF HAS CONTINUED TO IMPROVE IN THE AREAS OF WEAPONS DELIVERY TECHNIQUES, HELICOPTER ASSAULT, AND TRANSPORT. THE VNAF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM IS NOW CONTROLLING ALL VNAF OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF RVNAF AND HAS ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL OPERATIONS IN MILITARY REGION IV. VNAF SHOULD BE ABLE TO ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY COUNTRY-WIDE BY THE END OF CY71. THE DASC IN MA III WILL BE TURNED OVER IN FEB 71. COMPLETE SELK-SUFFICIENCY IN AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING IS PROGRAMMED FOR DECEMBER 1971. IMPROVEMENT IN THE MATERIEL AND MAINTENANCE AREA HAS CONTINUED. BETWEEN 1 DEC 72 - 1 APR 71, 9 ADDITIONAL SQDNS (5 HELICOPTER, 2 FIGHTER AND 1 TRANSPORT AND 1 LIAISON) WILL BE ACTIVATED. OPERATIONAL

PAGE TWO RUMHFMA3231 **TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO** READINESS DATES FOR THESE NEW SQUADRONS VARY WITH TYPE OF EQUIPMENT, BUT THE AVERAGE IS 128 DAYS AFTER ACTIVATION. IT IS EXPECTED THAT AS VNAF EXPANDS, THE PRESENT CORE OF OPERATIONALLY EXPERIENCED CREW MEMBERS WILL BE SEVERELY DILUTED BY MOVEMENT INTO NEWLY ACTIVATED UNITS. THE VNAF REMAINS DEPENDENT ON USAF IN CERTAIN ESSENTIAL TECHNICAL AREAS INCLUDING HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE, COMMUNICATIONS, AND BASE CIVIL ENGINEERING. THESE FACTORS COUPLED WITH VNAF LIMITATIONS IN NIGHT AND ALL WEATHER CAPABILITY MILITATE AGAINST ACCELERATION OF USAF REDEPLOYMENTS IN FY71 OF 72.

(5) VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMCC). THE VNMCC HAS DEMONSTRATED PROFICIENCY IN ALL PHASES OF PLANNING AND CONDUCTING TACTICAL OPERATIONS. AT THE PRESENT THE VNMCC CAN DEPLOY THREE BRIGADES. THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES WILL NOT DEGRADE THIS CAPABILITY, BUT WILL PLACE GREATER DEMANDS ON VNAF ASSETS, ESPECIALLY AIR SUPPORT TO VNMCC. PRESENT LEVELS OF COMBAT ARE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE VNMCC TRAINING BASE AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. AS IN ALL RVNAF UNITS, DESERTIONS CAUSE SOME CONCERN BUT MEASURES TO IMPROVE DEPENDENT WELFARE AND INCREASE CAREER MOTIVATION ARE BEING GIVEN INCREASED

Page 1 of 3

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SECRET

MICELU

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUMHFMA231 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M-EO  
 COMMAND ATTENTION IN THE VMMC TO REDUCE THIS PROBLEM.  
 (6) TERRITORIAL FORCES. EFFECTIVE 1 JUL 70, RVNAF WAS  
 REORGANIZED AND THE RF/PF ARE NOW PART OF ARVN. AS OF 30  
 SEP, RF WAS AT 95.3 PERCENT STRENGTH AND PF AT 96 PERCENT  
 STRENGTH. THE CONTINUED EXPANSION OF THESE FORCES HAS CREATED  
 A SHORTAGE OF OFFICERS AND NCO'S. IN SOME REGIONS, MANPOWER  
 REQUIREMENTS COULD NOT BE MET WITH VOLUNTEERS; THEREFORE,  
 DESIGNATED PROVINCES WERE GRANTED PERMISSION TO DRAFT  
 PERSONNEL FOR THESE ORGANIZATIONS. THE CAPABILITIES OF  
 SOME TERRITORIAL FORCE UNITS HAVE INCREASED WITH THE RECEIPT  
 OF NEW EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY THE M-16 RIFLE. THE ORIGINAL  
 FY71 PROGRAM WAS ACCELERATED AND AN ADDITIONAL 23 RF  
 COMPANIES AND 670 PF PLATOONS WERE ORGANIZED AND TRAINED IN  
 FY 70. ON 1 JUN 1970, JCS BEGAN EARLY ACTIVATION OF  
 THE FY71 FORCE STRUCTURE INCREASE TOTALING 76 RF COMPANIES  
 AND 824 PF PLATOONS. THIS ACCELERATION WAS AIDED BY  
 REDUCING THE AUTHORIZED TOE STRENGTHS OF PF PLATOONS IN  
 MR IV FROM 35 TO 32 MEN, THUS PROVIDING AN ADDITIONAL 296  
 PLATOONS. THIS WILL ULTIMATELY RAISE THE AUTHORIZED TOTAL OF  
 TERRITORIAL FORCES TO 1,679 RF COMPANIES AND 7,335 PLATOONS.

PAGE FOUR RUMHFMA3231 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M-EO  
 THE ACCELERATED ACTIVATION HAS CAUSED REFRESHER TRAINING TO  
 FALL BEHIND SCHEDULE. ALTHOUGH THIS PROBLEM AREA IS NOW  
 RECEIVING COMMAND EMPHASIS, IT IS DOUBTFUL IF PRESENT  
 RATES OF REFRESHER TRAINING CAN OVERCOME THE BACKLOG IN  
 FY71. DESERTIONS CONTINUE TO BE A MATTER OF CONCERN.  
 F. SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENT.

(1) THE CURRENT MAJOR ENEMY THREAT IN-COUNTRY  
 IS IN MR I WHERE THE ENEMY RETAINS THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH  
 LARGE SCALE ATTACKS. SHOULD HE EXERCISE THIS CAPABILITY,  
 RVNAF WOULD BE SORELY PRESSED TO CONTAIN THE THREAT.  
 TRANSITIONAL FORCE PLANNING MUST CONSIDER THIS CONTINUING  
 THREAT AND THE SERIOUS IMPACT ON THE OVERALL VIETNAMIZATION  
 PROGRAM OF A SETBACK OF RVNAF IN MR I. MR II REMAINS THE  
 SECOND MAJOR IN-COUNTRY THREAT AREA. FORCE PLANNING FOR  
 THIS REGION MUST PROVIDE THE ESSENTIAL U.S. COMBAT FORCES  
 TO INSURE SECURITY OF CRITICAL U.S. FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS,  
 AND PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS PROVIDING SUFFICIENT SUPPORT TO  
 RVNAF AND FVNAF TO MEET THE THREAT. FORCE PLANNING FOR MR  
 III MUST PROVIDE SECURITY FOR U.S. FACILITIES AND WELL AS A  
 REINFORCING CAPABILITY FOR BOTH MR II AND MR IV.

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PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA3232 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
 (2) THE CAPABILITY OF RVNAF HAS CONTINUED TO INCREASE. ACTIVATIONS AND TURNSOVERS HAVE BEEN ACCELERATED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. THIS ACCELERATION AND CONTINUED PROGRESS HAS BEEN POSSIBLE DUE IN PART TO THE OPTIMISM OF GVN AND RVNAF IN THE FACE OF THE REDUCED ENEMY ACTIVITY IN-COUNTRY. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THIS LOW LEVEL OF ACTIVITY WILL CONTINUE PAST THE COMPLETION OF CURRENTLY ANNOUNCED U.S. WITHDRAWALS. U.S. FORCE PLANNING MUST THEREFORE BE SUCH THAT SUFFICIENT U.S. FORCE IS RETAINED IN ORDER THAT U.S./RVNAF/FWMAF CAN COUNTER THE ENEMY IN-COUNTRY THREAT WHILE PERMITTING RVNAF TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN

4. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. THE CONCEPT ON OPERATIONS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT FOR (TSF) HAS BEEN DEVELOPED TO PROVIDE FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF RVNAF DURING THIS

CRITICAL PERIOD OF THE VIETNAMIZATION PROCESS. THE TSF SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TO U.S., RVN, AND FW FORCES; PROVIDES MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE AND MODERNIZE

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 PACIFICATION, CIVIC ACTION, AND GVN SECURITY PROGRAMS. TEMPORARILY INCLUDED IN THE TSF ARE UNITS SCHEDULED TO TURNOVER THEIR EQUIPMENT TO RVNAF AS PART OF THE CRIMP, AND UNITS ENGAGED IN THE LOC PROGRAM.

5. (IS) REQUIREMENTS.

A. THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE TSF MUST BE SUCH AS TO INSURE THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE WAR EFFORT ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE GVN IN A TIMELY, EFFICIENT MANNER WITHOUT INCURRING UNACCEPTABLE RISKS TO U.S. PRIORITY GOALS IN SVN OR LONG RANGE GOALS IN SEA. THE TSF HAS BEEN DILIGENTLY TAILORED TO MEET THE THREAT AND PROVIDE FOR CONTINUED SMOOTH ASSUMPTION OF THE VIETNAMIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES, WITH THE FOL BEING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RVNAF INTO A COHESIVE, BALANCED, FIGHTING FORCE. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING FOR COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FOR RVNAF, TSF MUST BE ABLE TO REINFORCE RVNAF, IF NECESSARY, AND MUST CONTINUE SUPPORT TO FW FORCES AS PROVIDED FOR BY EXISTING AGREEMENTS.

B. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT AND PROJECTED THREAT AND THE RVNAF CAPABILITY TO MEET THE THREAT MAKE IT MILITARILY ESSENTIAL THAT THE TSF BE COMPOSED OF A MINIMUM OF 9 BRIGADE

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ZNY AAAAA  
P 282219Z NOV 70  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF  
ZEN/CG I MAF  
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**T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON,  
MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES.  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS //NO0000//  
SECTION V OF V SECTIONS  
EQUIVALENTS AS THE GROUND COMBAT FORCE. EVERY EFFORT IS BEING  
MADE TO OPTIMIZE THE DISPOSITION OF THIS MINIMAL ESSENTIAL FORCE  
TO INSURE CONTINUED PROGRESS IN VIETNAMIZATION. IN DESIGNING  
THE TSF, COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS HAVE  
BEEN TAILORED AND POSITIONED TO PROVIDE NECESSARY SUPPORT TO  
THESE COMBAT ELEMENTS, UTILIZING MINIMAL PERSONNEL AND  
FACILITIES. SELECTED COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS SUCH AS AVIATION,  
ARTILLERY, ENGINEER, AND SIGNAL UNITS WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE  
TO FWMAF AND RVNAF UNTIL RVNAF CAPABILITES ARE DEVELOPED.  
C. ALTHOUGH THE APPROVED FORCE LEVEL FOR PLANING PURPOSES  
IS SLIGHTLY IN EXCESS OF 260 THOUSAND SPACES, EVERY EFFORT HAS  
BEEN EXPENDED TO DESIGN THE TSF WITHIN THIS FIGURE. CURRENT  
PLANNING ENVISIONS A FORCE OF 255,000 SPACES AT END FY 71 AS

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA3232 **T O P S E C R E T** SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCOE  
THE MINIMUM STRENGTH NECESSARY FOR THE TSF. SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS  
HAVE BEEN REALIZED AS A RESULT OF METICULOUS TAILORING OF THE  
COMBAT SUPPORT, COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT, ADVISORY, COMMAND  
AND CONTROL SPACES, AS WELL AS IN DEBIT/CREDIT ACCOUNTS. THE  
NET EFFECT OF THESE EFFORTS SHOULD REDUCE THE ARMY STRENGTH  
REQUIREMENT TO 198,000 OF THE TOTAL 255,000 TSF FORCE. THIS  
IS CONSIDERED THE MINIMAL ESSENTIAL FORCE. IF BECAUSE OF  
MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS THE U.S. ARMY CANNOT  
UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES MEET THIS 198 THOUSAND SPACE  
REQUIREMENT THEN THE RETENTION OF A TAILORED U.S. MARINE  
FORCE (MAB) IS CONSIDERED A NECESSARY ALTERNATIVE. SUBSEQUENT  
REDUCTION IN ARMY SPACES WILL BE REALIZED DURING THE FIRST  
HALF OF FY72 AND AS A RESULT OF REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE LOC ENGINEER  
CONSTRUCTION BATTALION (899 SPACES) AND REDEPLOYMENT OF  
ONE 175MM GUN BN (565 SPACES) AND ONE ADA BN (692 SPACES),  
BOTH TRANSFERRING ASSETS TO RVNAF AS PART OF THE CRIMP.  
THE NET RESULT IS THAT THE ARMY STRENGTH REQUIREMENT WILL  
REDUCE AT LEAST 2,100 SPACES DURING THE PERIOD 1 JULY - 31  
DEC 71.

D. THE PRESENTLY AUTHOYZED AIR ACTIVITY (SORTIES) LEVELS

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PAGE THREE RUHFMA3232 T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
WILL CONTINUE TO BE REQUIRED THROUGH AT LEAST CY 71.  
CONSEQUENTLY, THE REQUIRED USAF END FY 71 CEILING WILL APPROX-  
IMATE THE 44,750 SPACES CURRENTLY PLANNED.

3. ANALYSIS OF THE 11,600 SPACE NAVY CEILING REVEALS THAT  
THIS FORCE IS THE MINIMAL ESSENTIAL AND THEREFORE, NO SAVINGS  
OF NAVY SPACES CAN BE REALIZED.

F. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THUVRE WILL BE A REQUIREMENT FOR  
AND INCREASE IN IN USMC SPACES FROM THE CURRENT JCS APPROVED  
500 TO APPROXIMATELY 650 SPACES.

G. THE PROPOSED 250,000 SPACE CEILING FOR END FY71 IS NOT  
CONSIDERED FEASIBLE SINCE IT DOES NOT PROVIDE THE MINIMUM  
ESSENTIAL FORCES TO MEET THE ENEMY THREAT WHILE CONCURRENTLY  
INSURING PROGRESS IN THE CRIMP AND VIETNAMIZATION OVERALL,  
AS DISCUSSED ABOVE.

6. (TS) IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, A TSF STRENGTH LEVEL OF  
255,000 SPACES FOR END FY 71, WITH THE ARMY PORTION THEREOF  
BEING 198,000 SPACES, IS CONSIDERED THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL TO  
INSURE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF ON-GOING MISSIONS. FURTHER,  
THIS COURSE OF ACTION WILL RELEASE USMC FORCES IN JUNE 71  
FOR COMPLETE RECONSTITUTION OF THE PACOM USMC STRATEGIC

PAGE FOUR RUHFMA3232 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO  
RESERVE, AS CURRENTLY PLANNED. CONSIDERING THE ACTIVE  
HO TILITIES THROUGHOUT PACOM, THIS IS PARTICULARLY ESSENTIAL,  
SINCE THE ARMY'S MANPOWER PROBLEM PRECLUDES RECONSTITUTION  
OF THE USARPAC RESERVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HOWEVER, IN THE  
EVENT AN ARMY-USMC TRADE-OFF IS REQUIRED TO MEET THE 255,000  
LEVEL DUE TO MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS, AN EARLY  
DECISION WILL BE NECESSARY TO INSURE EFFICIENT TAILORING OF  
THE TSF AND TO INSURE CONTINUITY IN REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING.  
FURTHER REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES DURING FY72 MUST BE CLOSELY  
RELATED TO COMMENSURATE QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS  
IN RVNAF AND THE THEN EXISTING ENEMY SITUATION.

7. (TS) RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. THAT A TSF OF A MINIMUM OF 255,000 SPACES AT END FY 71  
BE APPROVED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

B. THAT THE U.S. ARMY STRENGTH AUTHORIZATION OF A  
MINIMUM OF 198,000 SPACES FOR END FY 71 BE APPROVED FOR  
PLANNING PURPOSES.

UNQUOTE.

VERY RESPECTFULLY AND WITH WARM REGARDS

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