

NOVEMBER

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEXNOVEMBER INCOMING

NOVEMBER	DTG	ORIGINATOR/CLASSIFICATION/SUBJECT
	109-022017	CG FMFPAC (S) <i>Gp-4</i> VMCJ EMPLOYMENT
	110-030812	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>Gp-4</i> REQUEST FOR OFFICER TRANSFER
	111-030904	COMUSMACV TO DIST. LIST (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING (EARLY PLANNING FOR INCREMENT SIX)
	112-042243	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> SEASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING
	113-060322	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>Gp-1</i> SPECIAL COMBAT APPLE OPERATIONS
NOVEMBER	114-061008	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>Gp-4</i> SKULKERS
	115-070045	CG FMFPAC TO CMC INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>Gp-4</i> REQUEST FOR OFFICER TRANSFER
	116-070231	CG FMFPAC TO CMC INFO CG III MAF (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> MAB ORGANIZATION
	117-071930	CMC TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> MAB IN LIEU OF ARMY BDE
	118-072213	CG FMFPAC TO CG III MAF INFO UNITS IN WESTPAC (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> III MAF HQ ON OKINAWA
	119-072221	CG FMFPAC TO CG III MAF INFO CMC (C) <i>Gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING (PREFERRED MAB STRUCTURE)
	120-080730	COMNAVFORV (U) MARINE CORPS BIRTHDAY GREETING
NOVEMBER	121-090615	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>Gp-4</i> CAPT M. I. AVELLINO
	122-090706	C/S MACV (U) M.C. BIRTHDAY GREETING (READD OF MSG FROM JGS VN)
	123-091026	C/S MACV TO DIST. LIST (U) <i>Declassified</i> NOV COMMANDERS' WIEU
	124-091650	DIR J-3 OJCS TO CMC/CG III MAF (U) ANNIVERSARY MSG

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEXNOVEMBER INCOMING

NOVEMBER	DTG	ORIGINATOR/CLASSIFICATION/SUBJECT
125-	101439	CMC TO CG FIRST MAW INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>gp-4</i> CH-53 TROOP CAPACITY
126-	102151	CG FMFPAC TO CMC/CG III MAF (C) <i>gp - not shown</i> SUSPENSION OF OFFICERS' SECURITY CLEARANCE
127-	102330	CG SEVENTH AF (U) ANNIVERSARY MSG
128-	121445	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>gp-4</i> REQUEST FOR OFFICER TRANSFER
129-	121455	CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (TS) <i>gp-4</i> RELOCATION OF MAF HQ
130-	130247	CG FMFPAC TO DIST LIST (U) ACTS OF VIOLENCE
131-	130720	CG FIRST MAR TO CMC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>gp-4</i> CH-53 TROOP CAPACITY
132-	131049	COMUSMACV TO DIST LIST (C) <i>gp - not shown</i> VNAF AIR SUPPORT
133-	140131	CG FMFPAC TO CMC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>gp-4</i> OFFICER TRANSFER
134-	140610	CG FIRST MARDIV (TS) <i>gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING (MAB CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - GND)
135-	141122	COMUSMACV TO CG III MAF (U) CHANGE OF COMMAND
136-	142239	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>gp-4</i> VMCJ EMPLOYMENT
137-	142241	CG FMFPAC TO CMC INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>gp-3</i> VMCJ EMPLOYMENT
138-	150245	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>gp-4</i> ERRONEOUS CASUALTY REPORT
139-	151128	CINFO MACV TO DIST LIST (C) <i>gp - not shown</i> POT PARTY AT FSR AIRES
140-	162045	CG FMFPAC TO CMC INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>gp-4</i> USE OF FMFPAC FLAGSHIP

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEXNOVEMBER INCOMING

NOVEMBER	DTG	ORIGINATOR/CLASSIFICATION/SUBJECT
	141-172148	CG FMFPAC (U) CHANGE OF COMMAND
	142-181918	CMC TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (U) CHANGE OF COMMAND
	143-182039	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> SEA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (READD CINCPAC 152207)
	144-182151	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>Gp-3</i> SEA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (READD CJCS 141504)
	145-191608	CMC TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (U) USE OF FMFPAC FLAGSHIP
	146-200325	CG FMFPAC TO CG I MAF/INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>Gp-4</i> PAKISTAN CYCLONE EMERGENCY DIDASTER RELIEF
NOVEMBER	147-202305	CMC (U) U-1500 PAYDIRT
	148-212231	CG FMFPAC TO CG I MAF INFO CG III MAF (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING (SPACE REQ)
	149-221648	C/S MACV TO DIST LIST (C) <i>Gp - Not above</i> CONFRESSIONAL STAFF DELEGATION VISIT
	150-231811	CMC TO CG FIRST MAW INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>Gp-4</i> CH-53 CENTERLINE SEATS
	151-240258	CG FMFPAC TO CG FIRST MAEDIV INFO CG III MAF (C) <i>Gp-4</i> RIFLE COMPANY STRENGTH
	152-241324	CMC TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>Gp-3</i> VMCJ-1 EMPLOYMENT
	153-241428	COMSEVENTHFLT (C) <i>Gp-4</i> INVITATION TO BRIEF & LUNCH
	154-242250	CG I MAF TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> FORCE PLANNING (CHANGE IN LOCATION)
NOVEMBER	155-250925	CG XXIV CORPS TO DIST LIST (C) <i>Gp-4</i> AIRCRAFT ENGINE FAILURES
	156-260135	CG XXIV CORPS TO COMUSMACV INFO DIST LIST (S) <i>Gp-4</i> VNAF AIR SUPPORT

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE INDEXNOVEMBER INCOMING

<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR/CLASSIFICATION/SUBJECT</u>
NOVEMBER	157-260854	COMSEVENTHFLT (C) <i>Gp-4</i> GET WELL WISHES
	158-270330	CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>Gp-4</i> MAINTAINING RIFLE COMPANY STRENGTHS
	159-281111	AC/S J-4 COMUSMACV TO USARV INFO CG III MAF (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> TRANSFER OF CL V LOG SPT FROM USMC TO USARV
NOVEMBER	160-282219	CG FMFPAC (TS) <i>Gp-4</i> SEA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (READD CINUSARPAC 262117)
NOVEMBER	161-292122	CG FMFPAC TO CG FIRST MAW (REAR) INFO CG III MAF (S) <i>Gp-3</i> VMCJ EMPLOYMENT
NOVEMBER		
NOVEMBER		

MCEO SECRET

SPECIAL

PTIAZYUJ RUMUNPA/CG 111 MAF
ZNY AAAAA
P 022017Z NOV 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMUNPA/CG 111 MAF
E

"EXCLUSIVE"

SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LA GEN HOOCH CHERN FROM
LT GEN JONES MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS //NOOOO//

- VMCJ EMPLOYMENT (U)
- A. CG 111 MAF 241142Z/00 70 (S) (SPECIAL) (MCEO)
- B. 7M AF 241142Z/00 70 (S) (PAGE 2)
- C. SSO MACV 261022Z/00 70 (S) (NOALY)
- D. CG FMFPAC 312237Z/00 70 (S)

1. (S) APPRECIATE INFORMATION FORWARDED BY RE-
REFERENCE (A) CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE TASKING OF VMCJ-
1 TO SUPPORT LAOS AIRBORNE SUPPORT EFFORT. 7M
AIR FORCE AND MACV HAVE SURFACED THIS SUBJECT IN
GENERAL SERVICE TRAFFIC CREF B AND C. MY RESPONSE
TO BOTH IS CONTAINED IN REF D.
2. (S) WITH REGARD TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF EA-G'S
ABOARD CVA'S, WE HAD PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED THE

PAGE TWO RUMUNPA/CG 111 MAF
SUBJECT WITH FACILITIES AND IT WAS DETERMINED IM-
PRACTICAL NOW TO OPERATE FROM THESE DECKS FOR
VARIED REASONS (LACK OF EA-GA PECULIAR SUPPORT
AND SPACE PROBLEMS, PILOT CARRIER QUALIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS, CVA FORCE LEVELS). AS YOU ARE AWARE,
ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL ASPECTS OF REDEPLOYING
THE EA-G'S IS THE FACT THE PRIORITY OF EFFORT FOR
EA-GA PECULIAR EQUIPMENT AND PARTS HAS BEEN SHIFTED
TO PWLAN IN ORDER TO SUPPORT A FORWARDING EA-GA
DEPLOYMENT. IN VIEW OF THESE AND OTHER CONSID-
ERATIONS, I COULD NOT SUPPORT THE REDEPLOYMENT
OF EA-GA'S AS SUGGESTED BY 7M AF/MACV.

3. (S) AS YOU CAN SEE BY REF (D), WE'VE ASSESSED
THE EA-GA'S LACK OF CURRENT CAPABILITY TO INTER-
CEPT (OR JAM) CERTAIN HA-3/AAA ASSOCIATED ACQUISITION
RADARS (SPOONRE SA/KHTEPES). 7M-AIR FORCE
IS BASING THEIR CURRENT ASSESSMENT LARGELY ON THE
INTRODUCTION OF THESE RADARS INTO SAC BOMBING AREAS.
NAVY ELIN AIRCRAFT, WITH MULTIPLE CREW POSITIONS AND CAPABILITY
TO INTERCEPT THESE ACQUISITION RADARS AS WELL AS

022017Z NOV 70

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02
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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SECRET
MCEO

109

MCEO

SECRET

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUNNETHADSSG SECRE MCEO
FANSONG RADAR'S OPERATING IN DUMMY TEST MODES, ARE
ELYING IN THE AREA. ADDITIONAL AND JOINT ASKING
OF NAVY ELIM AIRCRAFT AND/OR EE-66 NECESSARY IS WE THINK
THE MOST REASONABLE SOLUTION TO THE AIR FORCE
REQUIREMENT. WARM REGARDS

SP-4

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MCEO

109

MCEO
7 SLC: AT-TMFPAC
-I- CG III MAF

SPECAT

P 030812Z NOV 70
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO RUMUMPA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE

//S E C R E T//SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY EXCLUSIVE FOR
LTJEN JONES INFO LTJEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKER
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY.
REQUEST FOR OFFICER TRANSFER

A. CMC LTR AOIC-12 JR 5671 OF 6SEP70.
1. (S) IT IS REQUESTED THAT FIRST LIEUTENANT FRANCIS A.
DIELL 016 72 07/0322 USMC BE REASSIGNED TO A CONUS COMMAND
AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE. LIEUTENANT DIELL'S
PERFORMANCE IN THIS COMMAND HAS BEEN TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY
AND HAS RESULTED IN THE REASSIGNMENT FOR CAUSE FROM TWO
BILLETS: COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND REGIMENTAL S-3
WATCH OFFICER. HIS RELIEF AS COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER
WAS RECORDED IN A SUBSTANDARD FITNESS REPORT SUBMITTED
EARLIER FOR PERIOD 5 JULY TO 2 AUGUST, 1970. AN
UNSATISFACTORY FITNESS REPORT COVERING THE PERIOD 25-29

PAGE TWO RUMULVA2212 S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE FOR:

SEPTEMBER AND RECORDING HIS REASSIGNMENT FROM THE 5TH
MARINES AND A BELOW AVERAGE REPORT COVERING THE PERIOD
1-31 OCTOBER 1970 AND REFLECTING HIS FAILINGS WHILE
ASSIGNED TO THE S-4 SECTION, HEADQUARTERS BATTALION HAVE
BEEN AIR MAILED WITH MY COVERING LETTER TO YOUR
HEADQUARTERS THIS DATE. THE INTENT OF MY LETTER AND
TWO FITNESS REPORTS ATTACHED THERETO IS TO HAVE THIS OFFICER'S
CASE BROUGHT BEFORE THE OFFICER'S PERFORMANCE BOARD
ADDRESSED IN REFERENCE A.
2. (S) LIEUTENANT DIELL HAS MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR BY
HIS UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE, HIS CONDUCT, AND HIS
DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS REGIMENTAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, S-1, AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THIS DIVISION THAT HE IS DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE STANDARDS
OF PERFORMANCE, DISCIPLINE, AND LOYALTY THAT IS EXPECTED OF A MARINE
OFFICER. HE HAS REPEATEDLY STATED THAT HE CANNOT AND WILL NOT
ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF HIS RANK, THAT HE HAS NO DESIRE
TO BE A MARINE OFFICER, AND THAT HE WOULD WELCOME SEPARATION.
HE IS EXTREMELY IMMATURE, SERIOUSLY LACKING IN JUDGEMENT,
AND IS A NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON HIS CONTEMPORARIES AND HIS

PAGE 1 OF 2

030812Z NOV 70

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SECRET 12

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MCEO

(110) 1

MCEO

PAGE THREE RUMULVA0212 S E C R E T SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 EXCLUSIVE FOR:

SUBORDINATES. HE CANNOT BE TRUSTED IN A POSITION OF
 LEADERSHIP OR RESPONSIBILITY AND CANNOT PERFORM ANY USEFUL
 FUNCTION IN THIS COMMAND. THE TWO FITNESS REPORTS AIR
 MAILED THIS DATE PROVIDE AMPLIFYING DETAILS.

3. (S) YOUR ASSISTANCE IN EXPEDITING LIEUTENANT DIEHL'S
 REASSIGNMENT WILL BE APPRECIATED.

BEST REGARDS.

GF-4

BT

4212

PAGE 2 OF 2

030812Z NOV 70

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MCEO

110

0 04Z ZYM ZFF3 Z 6
 FM JER ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON VIETNAM
 TO GEN CLAY CDR 7AF TAINH NHUT VIETNAM
 LTC MCCAFFREY DCG USARV LONG BINH VIETNAM
 LTC MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG VIETNAM
 ADM KING COMNAVFORV SAIGON VIETNAM
 INFO LTC COLLINS CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG VIETNAM
 LTC DAVISON CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH VIETNAM
 LTC SUTHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG VIETNAM
 MG MCCOWN CG I MAC CAN THO VIETNAM
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T L I M E I S M A C I A C S T R I C T L Y
 S U B J E C T : F O R C E P L A N N I N G (U)

1. (TS) EARLY PLANNING FOR INCREMENT SIX REDEPLOYMENTS IS ESSENTIAL DUE TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF TROOP SPACES INVOLVED AND THE ASSOCIATED LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS. IN THIS LIGHT, MACV HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO FURNISH CINCPAC A DETAILED TROOP LIST OF THE 60,000 SPACES IN INCREMENT SIX BY 16 NOVEMBER 1970.

2. (TS) THE INCREMENT SIX REDEPLOYMENT FORCE PACKAGE WILL CONSIST OF THE FOLLOWING:

COMPONENT	ORGANIZATION	TOTAL SPACE REDUCTIONS
USA	4 MANEUVER BDE'S, COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS	41.0
USN	SUPPORT ELEMENTS	6.8
USAF	SUPPORT ELEMENTS	.7
USMC	1 BTL AND ASSOCIATED AIR SUPPORT	10.4
	TOTAL	60.0

3. (TS) A PROPOSAL BEING CONSIDERED BY JCS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A US MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE (MARB) IN THE USE IN LIEU OF AN ARMY BRIGADE AND ITS ASSOCIATED SUPPORT WOULD, IF APPROVED, REQUIRE THAT THE INCREMENT SIX TROOP LIST BE MODIFIED. IN THAT EVENT THE INCREMENT SIX FORCE PACKAGE WOULD CONSIST OF THE FOLLOWING:

COMPONENT	SPACE REDUCTIONS
USA	42.3
USN	5.5
USAF	.2
USMC	10.7
TOTAL	60.0

4. (TS) FOR PLANNING PURPOSES REQUEST YOU PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING BY 03 NOV 70:

A. DETAILED TROOP LISTS TO INCLUDE BIC, FRY UNIT, AUTHORIZED STRENGTH, MR LOCATION AND FUNCTION (COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT, OR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT). AUTHORIZED STRENGTH WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT CONTAINED IN DOD DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM 10. INDICATE BY ASTERISK NEXT TO STRENGTH FIGURES INSTANCES WHERE THESE FIGURES REPRESENT A DRAWDOWN IN AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF A UNIT REMAINING IN-COUNTRY.

B. AS A SEPARATE PARAGRAPH THE NECESSARY CHANGES IN THE TROOP LISTS TO MEET SPACE REDUCTION REQUIREMENTS IN PARA 2 ABOVE WITH THE SAME DETAIL AS REQUIRED BY PARA 4A ABOVE.

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C. PROPOSED STANDDOWN DATES FOR EACH MAJOR COMBAT UNIT, I.E., BRIGADE, BATTALION, AVIATION COMPANY, SEPARATE ARTILLERY BATTALIONS, ETC.

D. STATEMENT OF IMPACT.

5. (TS) GUIDELINES:

A. COMMANDERS ARE AUTHORIZED TO BRIEF SELECTED MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFFS ON A CLOSE-HOLD BASIS RELATIVE TO THIS REDEPLOYMENT ACTION; HOWEVER, NOTIFICATION OF THE UNIT'S TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED WILL NOT BE MADE AT THIS TIME. A FINAL DECISION REGARDING THE SPECIFIC COMPOSITION OF INCREMENT SIX IS NOT PLANNED UNTIL PUBLICATION OF TROOP LISTS AS AN APPENDIX TO ANNEX A, OPLAN 1133.

B. IN COMPOSING THE TROOP LISTS, CLOSE ATTENTION MUST BE GIVEN THOSE UNITS TO BE RETAINED IN THE THE AND APPROPRIATE COM PLANS TO PRECLUDE UNNECESSARY TROOP LIST CHANGES AT A LATER DATE.

C. COMBAT UNITS ARE TO REMAIN OPERATIONAL AS LONG IN THE PERIOD AS PERMITTED BY ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS. PROPOSED STANDDOWN DATES SHOULD BE BASED ON A MAXIMUM LOGISTICAL EFFORT AND ESTABLISHED BY BACKWARD PLANNING FROM 30 APR 71. A MAXIMUM OF 60 DAYS FROM STANDDOWN TO INITIAL UNIT REDEPLOYMENT IS AUTHORIZED. UNIT REDEPLOYMENT WILL BE PHASED INCREMENTALLY; HOWEVER, DURING THE PERIOD 1 JAN - 75 FEB 71, REDEPLOYMENTS ARE TO BE MINIMAL TO PROVIDE A PERIOD OF STRENGTH AND STABILITY KEYED TO TET 1971.

SSO NOTE: DELIVERED DURING DUTY HOURS
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THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNT ABILITY

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TOP SECRET

111-2

TOP SECRET

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PAGE CHECKED UPON RECEIPT

TOR: 042343Z NOV 70 III MAF S&C
C4 July 59T

PIIAZYUW RUHHFMA0378 308243-AAAA-RUMUMPA.

(SIGNATURE)

ZNY AAAAA
P 042243Z NOV 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

SPECIAL 'EXCLUSIVE'

TOP SECRET / SPECIAL / EXCLUSIVE FOR LIAISON MCCUICHEON
FROM LIAISON JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//

1. (1S) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF CINCPAC 030400Z NOV 70
(1S) TO JCS, INFO COMUSMACV, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT,
CINCPACAF, CG FMFPAC WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR INFO-
MATION.

QUOTE:

SOUTH EAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

A. JCS 4849/3 02219Z OCT 70 PASEP

1. (1S) RES A REQUESTED CINCPAC COMMENTS ON AN ALTERNATIVE TO CURRENT REDEPLOYMENT PLANS, WHICH WOULD RETAIN IN THE RVN THROUGH FY 72 A MAB OF ABOUT 12,700 IN LIEU OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE UNITS OF EQUIVALENT STRENGTH.
2. (1S) PLANNING FOR THE FORCE STRUCTURE REMAINING IN THE RVN AFTER 1 JUL 71 IS AT AN ADVANCED STAGE, HAS BEEN BASED

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0378 TOP SECRET. SPECIAL MCEO
FM CURRENT JCS AUTHORIZED SPACE CEILINGS, AND IS DESIGNED
TO MEET THE SHORT FALL IN RVNAF CAPABILITIES DURING THE
PERIOD JUL 71 TO JUL 73 AS COMPARED TO REQUIREMENTS.
3. (1S) ACCELERATED REDEPLOYMENTS ARE CREATING PROBLEMS
IN THE ORDERLY PLANNING CYCLE, RESULTING IN VETERANIZATION,
SCHEDULING PLANS, BASE TURNS, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF
THE MONEY WORTH OF U.S. COMBAT OPERATIONS BEING ADVERSELY
AFFECTED. FURTHER, WITH PLANS FOR REDEPLOYMENTS AND
RESIDUAL FORCES NEARING FINALIZATION, ANY ADDITIONAL
CHANGES WILL IMPACT SEVERELY ON LOGISTIC PLANNING.
4. (1S) RETENTION OF THE MAB IN THE RVN DURING FY 72
WOULD PRECLUDE COMPLETE RECONSIDERATION OF THE PACOM USMC
STRATEGIC RESERVE, IN THAT ONLY 1 2/3 DIVISION-WING TEAMS WOULD
BE RECONSIDERED RATHER THAN THE TWO TEAMS CURRENTLY PRO-
GRAMMED. ADDITIONALLY, MANPOWER AND BUDGET CONSTRAINTS,
COULD BE EXPECTED TO FURTHER DEGRADE THE SIZE EFFEC-
TIVENESS OF THE 1 2/3 DIVISION-WING TEAM. CONSIDERING
US FORCES REDUCTIONS IN HAILAND AND DOREA AS WELL AS
IN THE RVN, THE EARLY RECONSIDERATION OF THE PACOM STRATEGIC USMC
RESERVE AS A QUICK REACTION FORCE IS ESSENTIAL IN LIGHT

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PAGE THREE RUHHFMA0378 TOP SECRET. SPECIAL MCEO
OF THE ALTERNATIVE HOSTILITIES THROUGHOUT THE PACOM.

5. (1S) THE USMC AIR SQUADRONS PROPOSED IN THE ALTERNATIVE OF REF A WOULD NOT REPLACE AIR FORCE SQUADRONS ON PRIMARY MISSION AS PROVISION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO USMC

III MAF-2100/4

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TOP SECRET

(112)

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

GROUND FORCES. THEREFORE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT USMC & ACAIR WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN AN OUT-OF-COUNTRY ROLE.

6. (1S) SSIN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, A FORCE STRUCTURE IN THE RVN BASED ON CURRENTLY PLANNED AUTHORIZATIONS IS PREFERRED AND RECOMMENDED.

UNQUOTE:

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

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TOR: 060636210070

SPECIAL

PTIAZYUW RUHHFMA0520 3100322-AAAA--RUMUMPA.
ZNY AAAAA
P 060322Z NOV 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LI GEN MCCUI CHEON
FROM LI GEN JONES. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
ONLY. //NO0000//

1. (US) FOLLOWING IS EXC OF ADM MCCAIN'S 040240Z
NOV 1970 TO GEN ABRAMS, INFO ADM MOORER, GEN
HYLAND, GEN NAZZARO, GEN HOLLOWAY, GEN CLAY,
LI GEN CORCORAN, AND MYSELF.

QUOTE:

SPECIAL COMBAT APPLE OPERATIONS (U)

A. JCS 14777/032020Z NOV 70 (NOAL)

1. REF A DIRECTED THAT COMBAT APPLE ORBIT (CRACK 8F 708)
BE FLOWN IN THE GULF OF TONKIN IN SUPPORT OF URGENT SPECIAL
REQUIREMENT. DATES AND TIMES SPECIFIED ARE AS FOLLOWS:
(ALL DATES/TIMES ARE GOLF REPEAL GOLF TIME.)

7 NOV - 1800G-0600G 8 NOV
9 NOV - 0600G-1800G

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0520 TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR

11 NOV - 0600G-1800G
13 NOV - 0600G-1800G
14 NOV - 1800G-0600G 15 NOV
16 NOV - 0600G-1800G
18 NOV - 0600G-1800G
20 NOV - 0600G-1800G
21 NOV - 1800G-0600G 22 NOV

2. WITH EXCEPTION OF 7, 8, AND 21 NOV DATES, ORBIT TIMES FALL
WITHIN PERIOD WHEN AF-77 IS SCHEDULED TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE
GOLF DURING NOVEMBER. ACCORDINGLY, NO AF 77 EARCAP WILL BE
AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR THE COMBAT APPLE PLATFORM
ON THOSE DATES.

3. REQUEST YOU ADVISE WHICH SHORE-BASED FIGHTER AND TANKER
RESOURCES CAN BE DIVERTED TO PROVIDE EARCAP SUPPORT ON DATES
AND TIMES SPECIFIED WITH LEAST IMPACT UPON COMBAT OPERATIONS

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22 TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

SPECIAL

EXCLUSIVE

IN RVN AND LAOS. IT HAS BEEN CALCULATED THAT USAF FORCES WILL REQUIRE EIGHT F-4 AND FOUR KC-130 SORTIES PER MISSION, AND THAT MARINES WOULD REQUIRE TWELVE F-4 AND SIX KC-130 SORTIES PER MISSION. UPON RECEIPT OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION, CINCPAC WILL TASK THE APPROPRIATE COMMAND TO PERFORM THE MISSION. AF 77 WILL

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA020 TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR PROVIDE NORMAL BARCAP SUPPORT ON THE 7-8 NOV AND 21 NOV DATES 4. IN THE TASKING MESSAGE, CINCPAC INTENDS TO REQUEST THAT PIRAZ BE POSITIONED TO PROVIDE OPTIMUM SUPPORT TO BARCAP AND COMBAT APPLY AND WILL ALSO REQUEST CINCSPAC TO PROVIDE RADIO RELAY SUPPORT. REQUEST PACFLT/PACAF COMMENT ON REQUIREMENT FOR OTHER SUPPORT SUCH AS BIG LOOK IN THE GOA DURING COMBAT APPLY/ BARCAP OPERATIONS. 5. TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE LEAD TIME TO FORCES TASKED FOR MISSION, REQUEST EXPEDITIOUS REPLY BY FLASH MESSAGE.

UNQUOTE:
2. WARM REGARDS.

GP-1
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CONFIDENTIAL

028 AAAA

RLG -T- CG FMFFAC
RLG -T- CG III MAF
P 061008Z NOV 70
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO RUMUMPA/CG FMFFAC
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L // N01600//
SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES INFO
LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN WIDORCKE. DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS ONLY.

SKULKER

FM CG FMFFAC MSG 310102Z OCT 70 (NOTAL)

1. (C) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE PROPOSED MESSAGE ON THE SUBJECT OF SKULKER'S CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A. YOUR MESSAGE IS AN EXCELLENT, STRAIGHTFORWARD, AND APPROPRIATE ADDRESSAL OF A MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM THAT REQUIRES POSITIVE EXPRESSION AT ALL ECHELONS OF COMMAND. WITH TWO MINOR CHANGES IN WORDING AND THE INTRODUCTION OF ONE ADDITIONAL THOUGHT, THE SPECIFIC WORDING IS ALSO CONCURRED IN. FURTHER, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE MESSAGE BE ISSUED AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE.

2. (C) THE PROPOSED WORD CHANGES ARE SET FORTH BELOW AND ARE ALL KEYED

PAGE TWO RUMULVA0540 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY, PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN WIDORCKE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY.

LINE REMOVAL OF THOSE PHRASES WHICH MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED AS AN ATTEMPT TO EXERT COMMAND INFLUENCE ON COURTS-MARTIAL AND SUBORDINATE CONVENING AUTHORITIES.

PARAGRAPH 1: LAST LINE, DELETE ALL AFTER WORD "THAT" SUBSTITUTING THEREFOR THE WORDS "PROMPT AND APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINARY OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST THEM".

PARAGRAPH 3: THIRD LINE, DELETE WORD "ERADICATION" AND SUBSTITUTE THEREFOR THE WORDS "APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINARY OR ADMINISTRATIVE DISPOSITION."

PARAGRAPH 4: COMMENCING IN LINE TWO, DELETE ALL AFTER THE WORD "TO" SUBSTITUTING THEREFOR THE WORDS, "EFFECT SPEEDY AND APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINARY OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION THAT WILL ENSURE THAT JUSTICE IS DONE AND SOCIETY IS PROTECTED."

3. (C) THE ADDITIONAL THOUGHT RECOMMENDED FOR INCORPORATION IN THE PROPOSED MESSAGE CONCERNS FIXING RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR FAILURE TO PROPERLY TRAIN AND SUPERVISE SUBORDINATES AND FOR FAILURE TO TAKE EVERY REASONABLE AND REALISTIC MEASURE TO DETECT AND PREVENT THE INTENDED ASSAULT. THE MORAL, PROFESSIONAL, AND

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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MCEO

PAGE THREE RUMULVA 0540 C O N F I D E N T I A L

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE.
DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS ONLY.

SOMETIMES LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTS OF SKULKERS RESIDES, IN PART, WITH THE OFFICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS WHO HAVE FAILED TO ACCEPT AND EXERCISE THEIR TOTAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND WHO, BY OMISSION OR COMMISSION, ALLOW SKULKING INCIDENTS TO BE FORMULATED AND CONSUMMATED. TOO OFTEN THIS RESPONSIBILITY IS IGNORED IN THE INVESTIGATION AND/OR RESOLUTION OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE WITH THE RESULT THAT THE RESPONSIBLE LEADERS GO UNPUNISHED. IN ADDITION, ADHERENCE TO A POLICY OF PROPERLY FIXING COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY WILL ACT TO MOTIVATE OTHER OFFICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS TOWARD IMPROVED PERFORMANCE AND CLOSER ADHERANCE TO THE LEADERSHIP REQUIRED OF COMMAND. TO ACCOMMODATE THIS PHILOSOPHY, RECOMMEND AN ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH 7, IN SUBSTANCE AS FOLLOWS, BUT NOT NECESSARILY TO BE READ OR POSTED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF YOUR MESSAGE.

"7. WHILE THIS MESSAGE IS KEYED TO THE IDENTIFICATION AND PUNISHMENT OF SKULKERS IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT PROMPT AND APPROPRIATE ACTION BE TAKEN TO FIX RESPONSIBILITY ON THOSE OFFICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITHIN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, IMMEDIATELY SENIOR TO THE SKULKERS, WHO FAIL TO PROPERLY TRAIN AND SUPERVISE THEIR SUBORDINATES

PAGE FOUR RUMULVA 0540 C O N F I D E N T I A L

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE.
DELIVER DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS ONLY.

WHO FAIL TO TAKE EVERY REASONABLE AND REALISTIC MEASURE TO DETECT AND PREVENT THE INTENDED ASSAULT."

4. (U) STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN WITHIN THIS DIVISION TO INSURE THAT RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE APPROPRIATELY FIXED WITHIN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IN ALL MATTERS WHERE FAILURE TO PROPERLY LEAD RESULTS IN DEATH OR INJURY TO MARINES, OTHER SERVICE PERSONNEL, OR CIVILIANS. THIS POLICY WILL CONTINUE TO BE EMPHASIZED AND IS EXPECTED TO PRODUCE MEASURABLE RESULTS. BEST REGARDS.

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SPECIAL

SECRET

TOR: 070420Z NOV 70

PTIAZYUW RUMKFA0640 3110040-AAAA-RUEOFIA RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA
RUMUMPA-I-CG FIRSI MARDIV
P 070040Z NOV 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEOFIA/CMC
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
RUMUMPA/CG FIRSI MARDIV
ZEM/CG MCB CAMP BULLER
BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

SECRET: SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN ANDERSON INFO LI GEN MCCUM CHEON, MAJGEN WUDECKE AND BGEN BATHROW FROM LI GEN - ONE S. REQUEST FOR OFFICER TRANSFER

A. CMC 09223Z/001 70 (U)
1. FOLLOWING IS THE ITEM OF CG FIRSI MARDIV 030812Z/NOV 70 (SPECIAL) TO CG FMFPAC INFO CG III MAF WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR INFO
QUOTE:

A. CMC LIR AGIC-WJR-20/1 OF 8SEP70
1. (S) IT IS REQUESTED THAT FIRSI LIEUTENANT FRANCIS A. DIELI 016 72 07/03 02 USMC BE REASSIGNED TO A CONUS COMMAND AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE. LIEUTENANT DIELI'S

PAGE TWO RUMKFA0640 SECRET: SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO PERFORMANCE IN HIS COMMAND HAS BEEN TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY AND HAS RESULTED IN THE REASSIGNMENT FOR CAUSE FROM TWO BILLETTS: COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND REGIMENTAL S-3 WATCH OFFICER. HIS RELIEF AS COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER WAS RECORDED IN A SUBSTANDARD FITNESS REPORT SUBMITTED EARLIER FOR PERIOD 5 JULY TO 3 AUGUST 1970. AN UNSATISFACTORY FITNESS REPORT COVERING THE PERIOD 26-29 SEPTEMBER AND RECORDING HIS REASSIGNMENT FROM THE 5TH MARINES AND A BELOW AVERAGE REPORT COVERING THE PERIOD 1-31 OCTOBER 1970 AND REFLECTING HIS FAILINGS WHILE ASSIGNED TO THE S-4 SECTION, HEAD QUARTERS BATTALION HAVE BEEN AIR MAILED WITH MY COVERING LETTER TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS THIS DATE. THE INTENT OF MY LETTER AND TWO FITNESS REPORTS ATTACHED HERETO IS TO HAVE THIS OFFICER'S CASE BROUGHT BEFORE THE OFFICER'S PERFORMANCE BOARD ADDRESSED IN REFERENCE A.

SECRET

2. (S) LIEUTENANT DIELI HAS MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR BY DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS REGIMENTAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF

Page 1 of 2

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

Handwritten markings: 07, 00, and other scribbles.

MCEO

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MCEO

SPECIAL

SECRET

"EXCLUSIVE"

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA0640 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO
 THIS DIVISION THAT HE IS DIABOLICALLY OPPOSED TO THE STANDARDS
 OF PERFORMANCE, DISCIPLINE, AND LOYALTY THAT IS EXPECTED OF A MARINE
 OFFICER. HE HAS REPEATEDLY SAID THAT HE CANNOT AND WILL NOT
 ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF HIS RANK, THAT HE HAS NO DESIRE
 TO BE A MARINE OFFICER, AND THAT HE WOULD WELCOME SEPARATION.
 HE IS EXTREMELY IMMATURE, SERIOUSLY LACKING IN JUDGEMENT,
 AND IS A NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON HIS CONTEMPORARIES AND HIS
 SUBORDINATES. HE CANNOT BE TRUSTED IN A POSITION OF
 LEADERSHIP OR RESPONSIBILITY AND CANNOT PERFORM ANY USEFUL
 FUNCTION IN HIS COMMAND. THE TWO FITNESS REPORTS AIR
 MAILED THIS DATE PROVIDE AMPLIFYING DETAILIFYING DETAILS.
 3. (S) YOUR ASSISTANCE IN EXPEDITING LIEUTENANT DIELI'S
 REASSIGNMENT WILL BE APPRECIATED.
 BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

UNQUOTE.

- 2. (U) LIEUTENANT DIELI'S ORDERS TO 20-MAN CONTAINED IN REF A, R1D
 23DEC70. FIREPS REFERED TO IN PAR 1 OF QUOTED MSG NOT YET
 RECEIVED AT THIS HQ. WILL EXPEDITE FORWARDING TO HQMC.
- 3. (U) I AM ISSUING IMMEDIATE TRANSFER ORDERS FOR SNM TO REPORT

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA0640 S E C R E T SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO
 TO CG MCB CAMP BULIER FOR DUTY WHILE AWAITING YOUR ACTIONS.
 4. (C) STRONGLY RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE TRANSFER CONSIDER AND
 THAT OFFICER PERFORMANCE BOARD ACTION FOLLOW EXPEDITIOUSLY.
 WARM REGARDS

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SECRET

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MCEO

TOP SECRET

MCEO

SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE

TOR 070322Z NOV 70
OIAZYUW RUMHFMAG 3 3110231-AAAA--RUEOFIA RUMUMPA.
ZNY AAAAA
O 070231Z NOV 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEOFIA/CMC
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

TOP SECRET & SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CAPMAN INFO
LI GEN MCCW CHEON FROM LI GEN JONES. MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS. //NO0000//

- A. CG III MAF 02325Z NOV 70 (U.S.)
- 1. (S) REF A PROVIDES KEITH'S ASSESSMENT OF THE
SITUATION, RECOMMENDED PROPLIS FOR INCREMENT VI
AND THE RESULIAN MAB.
- 2. (S) FULLY APPRECIATE AND ENDORSE KEITH'S RATIONALE
IN SUPPORT OF A MAB ORGANIZATION WITH NO FIXED WING
ASSETS FOR THE TWO MONTH PERIOD (I.E., 1 MAY 10 30 JUN
1971). HOWEVER, SHOULD A MAB BE REQUIRED IN THE A SF
(TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT FORCE), CONSIDER IT NECESSARY & HAVE A
BALANCED FORCE BE REPRESENTED.
- 3. (S) THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE,
INTEND TO ADVISE KEITH & HAVE INCREMENT VI PROPLIS

PAGE TWO RUMHFMAG 3 TOP SECRET & EXCLUSIVE FOR/MCEO
CONTAINED REF A IS ACCEPTABLE UNDER PRESENT PARAMETERS.
WILL ALSO ADVISE THAT KEITH SPECIFY 10 COMUSMACV & HAVE
A 10.8 MAB WHICH INCLUDES AN A-4 AND AN A-6 SQUADRON WOULD
BE REQUIRED IF MAB TO REMAIN AS PART OF A SF THROUGH FY 72.
4. (U) YOUR COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED EARLY SINCE

KEITH MUST RESPOND COMUSMACV BY COB 9 NOV 1970 RVN
TIME. VERY RESPECTFULLY AND WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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MCEO

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TOP SECRET

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE ROUT

OTTAZYUW RUEOFIA2129 3111930-AAAA--RUHFMA.

ZNY AAAAA ZFF-1

RUHFMA-T-RUMUMPA

O 071930Z NOV 70

FM CMC

TO RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

BT

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES INFO
LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM GEN CHAPMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
FORCE PLANNING (U) 5000

MCEO

A. CG III MAF 052325Z NOV 70 (TS)

B. CG FMFPAC 070231Z NOV 70 (TS)

1. (TS) AS YOU KNOW, JCS NOW CONSIDERING RETENTION OF MAB IN THE
TSF IN LIEU OF AN ARMY BRIGADE. WHILE JCS RECOMMENDATION IS
EXPECTED SHORTLY, THE DECISION MAY NOT BE FORTHCOMING IN NEAR
FUTURE. FORCE PLANNING SHOULD THEREFORE INCLUDE ACTION REQUIRED
BY DECISION TO RETAIN MAB BEYOND END FY. 1971.

2. (TS) IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE ON-GOING ACTION, AND BECAUSE THERE
IS NO ASSURANCE THAT ENEMY SITUATION COULD NOT CHANGE IN MAY-
JUNE PERIOD, DESIRE THAT FIXED WING ASSETS BE INCLUDED IN PROPOSED
MAB STRUCTURE TO PROVIDE BALANCED FORCE IN THE EVENT THAT DECISION
IS MADE EITHER NOW OR LATER TO RETAIN THE MAB. KEITH SHOULD

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA2129 TOP SECRET/SPECAT/MCEO
THEREFORE INCLUDE AN A-4 AND AN A-6 SQUADRON IN THE PROPOSED
MAB.

3. (TS) NOTWITHSTANDING COMUSMACV'S DESIRE THAT FORCE PLANNING
BE SUCH THAT UNNECESSARY TROOP LIST CHANGES WILL BE PRECLUDED AT
A LATER DATE, TROOP LIST CHANGES MAY BE REQUIRED IN THAT THE SIZE
AND COMPOSITION OF MAB REQUIRED BY DECISION ON ACTION OUTLINED IN
PARAGRAPH 1 HAVE NOT BEEN DETERMINED.

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

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071930Z NOV 70

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III MAF 2100/4

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PTTTZYUW RUMHFMA0751 3112213-TTTT--RUMUMPA.

ZNY TTTT

RUADAJA -I- MCAS (H) FUTEMA

P 072213Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

RUADAJA/DEPCOMMARCORBASESPAC (FWD)

RUADAJA/MCAS (H) FUTEMA

INFO RUEOFIA/CMC

RUADAJA/CG I MAF

BT

TOP SECRET//NO4000//

III MAF HEADQUARTERS ON OKINAWA

A. CG FMFPAC 171746Z/SEP70 (TS) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) REF A REQ DEPCOMMARCORBASESPAC (FWD) SUBMIT A COST/TIME SCHEDULE FOR CONVERSION OF BLDG 428 MCAS (H), FUTEMA FROM ITS PRESENT CONFIGURATION INTO A HQ BLDG TO ACCOMMODATE A MAF STAFF AND REQ CG III MAF PROVIDE APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATION DURING THE STUDY TO PROVIDE FOR III MAF DESIRES IN THE CONFIGURATION ALTERATIONS. CG III MAF RECOMMENDED THAT MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, AS WELL AS THE EXACT NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FOR III MAF BY THE HOST COMMAND, BE DETERMINED SO THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE III MAF

PAGE TWO RUMHFMA0751 TOP SECRET
STAFF, BOTH IN TERMS OF ORGANIZATION AND SECTION STRENGTH, CAN BE FIXED AS A BASIS FOR THE PLANNED CONFIGURATION OF THE III MAF HQ BLDG AT FUTEMA, OR ELSEWHERE, SHOULD THAT SITE NOT PROVE FEASIBLE. ADDITIONALLY, CG III MAF HAS CONCURRED THAT FUTEMA IS THE BEST SITE ON OKINAWA FOR LOCATING III MAF AS FAR AS AVAILABILITY OF OFFICE SPACE, BILLETING, ETC AND STATED THAT BLDG 428 (SNCO BKS) AND BLDG 403 (LIBRARY, MARS STATION AND JUDO RM) ARE LOCATED ADJACENT TO EACH OTHER AND APPEAR TO HAVE SUFFICIENT FLOOR SPACE TO ACCOMMODATE ALL HQ ROOMS EXCEPT POSSIBLY SLF HQ. CG III MAF HAS ALSO PROPOSED THAT CG III MAF OCCUPY QTRS AT CAMP COURTNEY NOW OCCUPIED BY CG I MAF/CG 3D MARDIV AND THAT THE "EAGLES NEST" LOCATED AT FUTEMA BE MODIFIED TO MAKE IT SUITABLE FOR GEN OFFICER QTRS IF III MAF C/S WERE TO BE BGEN. THIS HQ HAS PROPOSED MISSION, TASKS AND T/O FOR HQ III MAF ON OKINAWA. ADDITIONALLY, IT HAS BEEN RECOMMENDED THAT HQ III MAF BE SATELLITED ON A HOST COMMAND ON OKINAWA AND THAT COMMAND WILL BE TASKED TO PROVIDE FOR INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS AND THAT ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY III MAF TASKING

PAGE THREE RUMHFMA0751 TOP SECRET
ITS SUBORDINATE COMMANDS TO PROVIDE AUGMENTATION TO THE HOST COMMAND.

2. (TS) IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT APPROVAL WILL BE GIVEN TO MOVE HQ III MAF TO OKINAWA UPON REDEPLOYMENT FROM RVN. BASED ON PRESENT PLANS THIS MOVE WILL OCCUR SOMETIME IN APRIL. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THERE ARE SOME QUESTIONS WHICH REMAIN UNANSWERED AT THIS TIME AND THAT PROBLEMS EXIST WHICH MUST BE SOLVED. HOWEVER, SINCE IT IS EXPECTED THAT THIRTY TO SIXTY DAYS WILL

III MAF 2100/4

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

BE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN AUTHORIZATION AND FUNDING FOR BUILDING MODIFICATIONS, DEPENDING ON FUNDING REQUIRED, IT IS NECESSARY THAT PLANNING FOR THIS MOVE PROCEED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE BASED ON VARIOUS ASSUMPTIONS. THESE ARE THAT:

A. THE MISSIONS, TASKS AND T/O FOR HQ III MAF ON OKINAWA, AS PROPOSED BY THIS HQ WILL BE APPROVED.

B. THE REQUIRED COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED. (ACTION HAS ALREADY BEEN INITIATED TO PROVIDE AUTOVON AND AUTOSEVOCOM TERMINALS FOR HQ III MAF AT FUTEMA). ADDITIONALLY, AUGMENTING COMMUNICATION SUPPORT WILL BE FURNISHED BY III MAF TASKING SUBORDINATE COMMANDS TO PROVIDE NECESSARY PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT TO MCAS (H), FUTEMA.

PAGE FOUR RUHFMA0751 T O P S E C R E T

C. MCAS (H), FUTEMA WILL BE THE HOST COMMAND ON WHICH HQ III MAF WILL BE SATELLITED AND, AS SUCH, WILL PROVIDE OR ARRANGE FOR ALL ADMINISTRATIVE AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS TO INCLUDE:

- (1) PERSONNEL RECORD KEEPING
- (2) DISBURSING
- (3) MEDICAL/DENTAL
- (4) LEGAL
- (5) SPECIAL SERVICES
- (6) LOGISTIC SUPPORT (SUPPLY/MAINTENANCE)
- (7) CHAPLAIN SERVICES
- (8) POSTAL
- (9) OTHERS AS MAY BE IDENTIFIED FOR III MAF TO ACCOM-

PLISH ITS PROPOSED MISSION/TASKS.

4. (TS) SEVERAL OF THE FUNCTIONS OUTLINED IN PAR 3.C ABOVE WILL HAVE BEEN CONSOLIDATED BY MCAS (H), FUTEMA WITH MCB CAMP BUTLER AT THE TIME THE III MAF MOVE IS EXECUTED. ADDITIONALLY, OTHERS WILL BE IN THE PLANNING PHASE. ALTHOUGH THERE SHOULD BE NO FORESEEABLE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE III MAF MOVE AND CONSOLIDATION ACTIONS UNDERWAY, PROVIDING THE REQUIRED SUPPORT FOR III MAF MUST NOW BE A CONSIDERATION.

PAGE FIVE RUHFMA0751 T O P S E C R E T

5. (TS) FOR DEPCOMMARCORBASESPAC (FWD): IN LIEU OF THE COST/TIME SCHEDULE REQUESTED BY REF A, REQUEST SUBMIT A FACILITIES SPECIAL PROJECT FOR THE CONVERSION OF BLDG 428, MCAS (H), FUTEMA FROM ITS PRESENT CONFIGURATION INTO A HQ BLDG TO ACCOMMODATE A MAF STAFF. INCLUDE BLDG 403 AT MCAS (H), FUTEMA IF THAT SPACE IS REQUIRED. HOWEVER, IF THAT BLDG IS UTILIZED, INFORM THIS HQ AS TO THE NEW LOCATIONS FOR THE FUNCTIONS NOW PERFORMED THEREIN. ADDITIONALLY, SINCE THE PROPOSED T/O FOR III MAF PROVIDES FOR A BGEN C/S, REQUEST A SEPARATE FACILITIES SPECIAL PROJECT BE SUBMITTED FOR THE CONVERSION OF THE "EAGLES NEST" AT FUTEMA TO MAKE IT SUITABLE FOR GEN OFFICERS QTRS.

6. (TS) FOR CG III MAF: IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR III MAF DESIRES IN THE CONFIGURATION OF THE NEW HQ BLDG REQUEST THAT APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATION BE PROVIDED TO DEPCOMMARCORBASESPAC (FWD) DURING THE PREPARATION OF THE PROJECT.

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OITAZYUW RUMHMA#753 311222I-AAAA--RUEOFIA RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

O 072221Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TOR: 072233Z NOV 70

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

INFO RUEOFIA/CMC

BT

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING EAKING HOURS. //NO3000//

A. CG III MAF 052325Z NOV70 (TS/SPECAT/MCEO)

B. CMC 071930Z NOV70(TS/SPECAT/MCEO)

1. (C) YOUR REF A, REF B PERTAINS. WARM REGARDS.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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MCEO 1

(119) /

8 Nov 70 09 05

RTTUZYUW RUMUGKA0055 3120729-UUUU--RUMUMPA.

ZNR UUUUU
R 080730Z NOV 70
FM COMNAVFORV
TO CG III MAF
BT

~~ACT~~ (5)
R

UNCLAS

PERSONAL FOR LG MC CUTCHEDA FROM KING
MARINE CORPS BIRTHDAY

1. IN SINCERELY REGRET NOT BEING ABLE TO ATTEND YOUR CEREMONY
CELEBRATING THE 195TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE USMC ON 10 NOV.
HOWEVER, RADM ADAMSON WILL ATTEND AND REPRESENT NAVFORV.
2. PLEASE ACCEPT MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS ON THIS
NOTEWORTHY OCCASION. I CAN THINK OF NO BETTER PLACE TO
CELEBRATE THIS ANNIVERSARY AND SUCCESSES OF THE USMC THAN
ON THE BATTLEFIELDS OF VIETNAM. YOUR FINE FIGHTING UNITS
HAVE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE CAUSE FOR PEACE IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA. THE MANY CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE CORPS WILL LONG BE REMEMBERED.
3. WARM REGARDS

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IN 04536/312-70 /ACK

080730Z Nov 70

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(120)

MCEO

SPECIAL

EXCLUSIVE

TOR 090714Z NOV 70

RUMULVA0822 313061Z-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

RLC -I- CG FMFPAC

RLC -I- CG III MAF

P 090615Z NOV 70

FM CG FIRSI MERDIV

TO RUMUMPA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL/SPECIAL/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/
EXCLUSIVE FOR LIAISON JONES INFO LIAISON MCCUM CHEON FROM
MCEN WIDDECKE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

A. CG, FIRSI MERDIV 020102Z SEP 70 (C) (SPECIAL)

B. CG, FMFPAC 042136Z OCT 70 (U) (NOIAL)

1. REFERENCE A REPORTED THE RELIEF OF CAPTAIN M. I. AVELLINO
AS DIVISION EXCHANGE OFFICER PENDING COMPLETION OF AN NAVAL
INVESTIGATION SERVICE INVESTIGATION CONCERNING CHARGES THAT HE
ILLEGALLY REMOVED CONSIDERABLE QUANTITIES OF MERCHANDISE FROM THE
EXCHANGE AT MARINE CORPS SUPPLY ACTIVITY, PHILADELPHIA WHILE
ASSIGNED AS EXCHANGE OFFICER AT THAT ACTIVITY. REFERENCE A
FURTHER STATED THAT RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO CAPTAIN AVELLINO'S
DISPOSITION WOULD BE SUBMITTED AT A LATER DATE.

2. THE INVESTIGATION, INCLUDING A POLYGRAPH TEST ADMINISTERED
AT CAPTAIN AVELLINO'S REQUEST, HAS EXONERATED CAPTAIN AVELLINO.

PAGE TWO RUMULVA0822 CONFIDENTIAL/SPECIAL/MCEO/
AS TO HIS DISPOSITION, CAPTAIN AVELLINO REVERTS TO EMLISHED
STATUS ON 30 NOVEMBER AND IS IN RECEIPT OF ORDERS TO FIRSI MARINE
AIRCRAFT WING FOR DUTY ON THAT DATE. REFERENCE B REFERS. BE SI
REGARDS.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

06

MCEO 15

(121)

O 090706Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4

FM MG DOLVIN COFS MACV SAIGON RVN

TO LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DANANG RVN

ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O MAC 14493 EYES ONLY

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM WAS HANDCARRIED TO MY OFFICE
AND IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

FROM: GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN, CHIEF,
JOINT GENERAL STAFF, RVNAFTO: LIEUTENANT GENERAL K. B. MCCUTCHEON,
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS,
THIRD MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, DANANG

ON THE OCCASION OF THE 195TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE CREATION OF
THE VALIANT UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, I SHOULD LIKE TO
PRESENT TO YOU AND ALL THOSE UNDER YOUR COMMAND MY BEST
WISHES FOR CONTINUED GLORY AND EVER GREATER ACHIEVEMENTS.
WE IN THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES TAKE GREAT PRIDE IN BEING
ASSOCIATED WITH YOU AND DERIVE GREAT COMFORT FROM YOUR
PRESENCE IN VIET-NAM AT THIS CRUCIAL MOMENT OF OUR NATION'S
HISTORY. WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS AND HIGHEST PROFESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION. SIGNED: CAO VAN VIEN STOPEND
UNQUOTE

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

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UNCLAS/1410

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(22)

O 091026Z ZYM ZFF-4 ZFF-1
FM MG DOLVIN COFS MACV SAIGON VIETNAM
TO GEN CLAY CDR 7AF TAN SON NHUT VIETNAM
LTG COLLINS CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG VIETNAM
LTG DAVISON CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH VIETNAM
LTG MCCAFFREY DCS USARV LONG BINH VIETNAM
LTG SUTHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG VIETNAM
LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG VIETNAM
VADM KING COMNAVFORV SAIGON VIETNAM
MG MCCOWN CG DMAC CAN THO VIETNAM
COL HEALY CO 5SFGA NHA TRANG VIETNAM
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAC 14504 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: NOVEMBER COMMANDER'S WIEU (U)

1. (C) THE NOVEMBER COMMANDER'S WIEU WILL BE HELD 21 NOVEMBER 1970, COMMENCING 0900 HOURS. ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE INVITED.
2. (U) REQUEST THAT THE DEPCORDS OF THE MR'S ALSO ATTEND THE WIEU.
3. (U) WIEU ATTENDEES ARE INVITED TO LUNCHEON HOSTED BY COMUSMACV.
4. (C) SESSIONS EXPECTED TO TERMINATE ON OR ABOUT 1300 HOURS, 21 NOVEMBER 1970, FOLLOWED BY LUNCHEON.
5. (U) RSVP REPEAT RSVP MACV 3151, 3044 OR 4958 NLT 18 NOVEMBER 1970.
6. (U) DECLASSIFY EFFECTIVE 30 NOVEMBER 1970.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

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0040

*Attendees referred by them have had to fill
in name of at (3151) at 1300 hours on 20
Nov 70*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*CG canceled attendance on 20 NOV.
did not attend !! mt*

09 10 26

P 091650Z ZFF-1 ZFF-4
 FM LGEN MELVIN ZAIS USA DIR J-3 OJCS WASH DC
 TO GEN LEONARD F CHAPMAN JR CMC WASH DC
 LGEN KEITH B MCCUTCHEON USMC CG IIII MAF RVN
 ZEM

UNCLAS E F I O EYES ONLY JCS/J-3 15027 NOV 70

ON THIS ANNIVERSARY OF ANOTHER YEAR OF GALLANT AND DEDICATED SERVICE TO OUR NATION, I TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO WISH THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS A VERY HAPPY BIRTHDAY AND OFFER MY BEST WISHES FOR CONTINUED SUCCESS. TO LEATHERNECKS EVERYWHERE, AND ESPECIALLY TO THOSE SERVING IN VIETNAM, I COMMEND YOU FOR YOUR PROFESSIONALISM AND DEVOTION TO DUTY. ONE OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF MY PROFESSIONAL CAREER HAS BEEN THE OPPORTUNPCY TO SERVE SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH MARINES. THROUGHOUT 195 YSARS OF SERVICE TO OUR NATION, YOU HAVE BEEN CALLED ON AGAIN AND AGAIN TO FIGHT ON FOREIGN BATTLE-FIELDS. IN EVERY INSTANCEBG YOU HAVE PERFORMEF IN A TRULY REMARKABLE MANNER, AND THE STORIES OF YOUR HEROISM AND SACRIFICES ARE MARKED INDELIBLY IN THE PAGES OF HISTORY. SO, TODAY, AS MEMBERS OF THE CORPS GATHER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD TO CELEBRATE THIS ILLUSTRIOUS OCCASION, I SAY A SPECIAL "WELL DONE AND THANK YOU" FOR YOUR OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTIONS TO OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE AND HERITAGE. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

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UNCLAS//E F I O

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//PERSONAL FOR//

MCEO

CONFIDENTIAL

VRTTAZYUW RUEOFIA2570 3 14 1439-AAAA--RUHMFMA.

ZNY AAAAA

RUHMFMA -I- CG III MAF

CG III MAF -I- CG FIRST MAW

R 101439Z NOV 70

FM CMC

TOR: 10/2010Z NOV 70

TO RUMUMHA/CG FIRST MAW

INFO RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //NO10050//
PERSONAL FROM MGEN HILL TO MGEN ARMSTRONG INFO LTGEN JONES,
LT GEN MCCUTCHEON.

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

CH-53 TROOP CAPACITY (U)

A. CG FIRST MAW 250245Z OCT 70 (C)

1. (C) COMMENTS OF REF A IN SUPPORT OF INCREASED CH-53
TROOP SEATING APPRECIATED. FULLY RECOGNIZE ADVANTAGE OF 60 SEAT
CONFIG WHEN SUPPORTING ROK.

2. (C) 60 TROOPS CONCENTRATION IN
A SINGLE CH-53 IS HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE DUE TO CASUALTY POTENTIAL. CAN
NOT RECOMMEND THIS LOAD EXCEPT IN EMER.

3. (C) OPTIMUM HELITEAM SIZE FOR A HE COPTERBORNE ASSAULT REMAINS
REINF. SQD. OF 18-24 COMBAT EQUIP TROOPS. INCREASE OF TROOP

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA2570 C O N F I D E N T I A L M C E O
SEATING WOULD HAVE ADVERSE EFFECT OF FUTURE FORCE LEVEL RQMTS
FOR ASSAULT SUPPORT HELOS. REPL FOR CH-46 WOULD BECOME MORE
DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY.

4. (C) IN VIEW OF ABOVE, CONSIDER INCR OF SEATING TO SUPPORT
ROK/RVN ADMIN TROOP LIFT NOT BEST INTEREST OF MARCOR. IF REQMT
IS URGENT SUGGEST SPEED BASED ON RVN SIT ONLY.

5. (U) WOULD WELCOME ANY FURTHER VIEWS IN THIS MATTER.
WARM REGARDS.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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CONFIDENTIAL**"EXCLUSIVE"****"OEO"**

TPITAZYUW RUHFMA 1047 3 142 15 1-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 10215 1Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO ZEN/CMC

RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L /SPECAT/OFFICERS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE
 FOR MAJGEN ANDERSON INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON AND MAJGEN WILSON
 FROM LTGEN JONES (DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS) //N00000//
 SUSPENSION OF RADIO BN & OFFICERS SECURITY CLEARANCE; CASE
 OF CAPT HARRY D. MCMENAMIN 097385/2510 USMC (C)

A. CG III MAF 101043Z NOV70 (C) SPECAT OEO (PASEP)

1. REF A REFERS.

2. IN VIEW OF URGENCY INDICATED IN REF A, NECESSITY
 FOR RAPID ACTION, I AM ISSUING ORDERS DIRECTING
 IMMEDIATE TRANSFER SNO TO CG THIRD MARDIV

PENDING YOUR ACTION. SINCE MCC 174

IS NOT MONITORED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS, REQUEST YOUR
CONCURRENCE.

3. STRONGLY RECOMMEND TRANSFER SNO TO APPROPRIATE

PAGE TWO RUHFMA1047 C O N F I D E N T I A L OEO EXCLUSIVE
 COMUS COMMAND TO EFFECT REVERSION ON 30NOV70 AND
 PROCESSING FOR DISCHARGE FROM THE MARCOPPS IMMEDIATELY
 THEREAFTER.
 WARM REGARDS.

"EXCLUSIVE"**"OEO"**

Copy 2 of 3
 FMFPAC-GEN 10071 (3/9)
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CONFIDENTIAL

KTTUZYUW KUMMRS4273 3140046-0000--RUMMFA.

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ZNR 00000

R 102330Z NOV 70

FM 7AF TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN

TO CG III MAF

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UNCLAS/CC

FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCCUTCHEON FROM GENERAL CLAY

PLEASE ACCEPT THE CONGRATULATIONS OF THE AIRMEN OF SEVENTH AIR FORCE ON THIS 195TH BIRTHDAY OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.

THE LONG AND PROUD RECORD OF THE CORPS IS BEING FURTHER ENHANCED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA BY THE CONTINUOUS DEMONSTRATION OF MARINE COURAGE AND COMPETENCE AT SEA, ON THE GROUND, AND IN THE AIR. THE DISCIPLINE AND SKILL OF MARINE PILOTS ARE IN THE HIGHEST TRADITION OF PROFESSIONAL AIRMEN THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING OUR CLOSE ASSOCIATION AND OFFER OUR BEST WISHES FOR THE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF THE CORPS IN ALL ITS ENDEAVORS.

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SECRET

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

ZNY AAAAA
P 121445Z NOV 78
FM CG FIRSI MAR DIV
TO RUMUMPA/CG FMCPAC
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

SECRET //SPECAT// MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //EXCLUSIVE FOR
LIGEN JONES INFO LIGEN MCCOCHEN FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE// DELIVER
DURING WORKING HOURS
REQUEST FOR OFFICER TRANSFER

A. CMC LIR A01C-10-DR-20/1 OF BSEP78
1. SO IT IS REQUESTED THAT SECOND LIEUTENANT KENNETH C.
MCCRACKEN DT12050/0502, USMC BE REASSIGNED TO A CONUS COMMAND
AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE. LIEUTENANT MCCRACKEN'S
PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY AND HE HAS BEEN RELIEVED
OF DUTIES AS A RIFLE BATTALION COMMANDER AT HIS OWN REQUEST.
HIS REQUEST AND HIS RELIEF WERE BASED SPECIFICALLY ON HIS
COMPLETE LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN HIS ABILITY TO LEAD A BATTALION
UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES BUT PARTICULARLY UNDER COMBAT CONDITIONS.
HE IS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT HE WILL CAUSE THE DEATH OR INJURY
OF THOSE UNDER HIS COMMAND AND HIS INATE FEAR ADVERSELY

PAGE TWO RUMUMPA 1156 SECRET PXXSPECAT// EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN JONES
INFO LIGEN MCCOCHEN FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS

INFLUENCES THE MAJORITY OF HIS DECISIONS AND ACTIONS. ALTHOUGH
HE WAS RELIEVED AT HIS OWN REQUEST, IT IS APPARENT FROM THE
FACTS ON HAND THAT HIS PERFORMANCE HAD DETERIORATED TO THE POINT
WHEREIN HIS BATTALION COMMANDER HAD ARRIVED AT THE SAME
CONCLUSION AND LIEUTENANT MCCRACKEN'S RELIEF FOR CAUSE WAS APPROPRIATE.

2. LIEUTENANT MCCRACKEN HAS NOT RESPONDED TO COUNSELING BY
HIS COMPANY AND BATTALION COMMANDERS AND HE EXPERIENCES DIFFICULTY
IN OBSORBING AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS. SINCE HIS RELIEF,
HE HAS BEEN CLOSELY EVALUATED ON A DAILY BASIS BY THE ASSISTANT
CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1 AND HAS BEEN CATEGORIZED AS A SOMEWHAT
LETARGIC, PASSIVE AND UNIMAGINATIVE INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS DIFFICULTY
GRASPING THE ESSENTIALS OF A SITUATION.

3. LIEUTENANT MCCRACKEN'S DEFICIENCIES HAVE BEEN RECORDED IN
AN UNSATISFACTORY FITNESS REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE COMMANDING
OFFICER, THIRD BATTALION, FIFTH MARINES FOR THE PERIOD
AUGUST - 15 OCTOBER 1978. THAT REPORT, LIEUTENANT MCCRACKEN'S
STATEMENT, THE STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, FIRSI MARINE
DIVISION RECORDING HIS INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT MCCRACKEN.

PAGE 1 OF 2

121445Z NOV 78

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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PAGE THREE RUMELVA 166 S E C R E T //SPECIAL// EXCLUSIVE FOR
 LT GEN JONES INFO LT GEN MCCracken FROM MAJ GEN W DEDRKE //DELIVER
 DURING WORKING HOURS.
 AND MY COVERING LETTER HAVE BEEN AIRMAILED TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS
 THIS DATE. THE PURPOSE OF MY LETTER IS TO HAVE THIS OFFICER'S CASE
 BROUGHT BEFORE THE OFFICER'S PERFORMANCE BOARD ADDRESSED IN
 REFERENCE A.

4. YOUR ASSISTANCE IN EXPEDITING LIEUTENANT MCCracken'S REASSIGNMENT
 WILL BE APPRECIATED. BEST REGARDS.

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PAGE 2 OF 2

121445Z NOV 70

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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TOP SECRET

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE
MCEO

R 121455Z NOV 70
FM CMC
TO CG FMFPAC
INFO CG III MAF
BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LI GEN & ONE'S INFO LI GEN
MCCUI CHEON FROM GEN CHAPMAN MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

//NO0005321//

FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG, FMFPAC 252104Z OCT 70 (US) (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE) (MCEO;)

1. (US) 14 PROPOSALS AS CITED IN REF A WITH RE SPEC TO THE
RELOCATION OF III MAF HEADQUARTERS TO OKINAWA AND THE ASSOCIATED
MISSION, TASKS, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND I/O HAVE BEEN REVIEWED
AND ARE GENERALLY CONCURRED IN, SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS.

A. THE STATEMENT OF MISSION AND ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS IS
APPROVED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PARA 3E. ALSO CONCUR WITH THE
RECOMMENDED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND THE PROPOSAL NOT TO
ACTIVATE THE H&S COMPANY WHICH SUPPORTS THE MAF.

B. HQ III MAF I/O

(1) THE FUNDAMENTAL EXCEPTION TO THE PROPOSALS SURFACED

PAGE TWO RUEODIA2993 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

IN REF A CONCERNS THE I/O. AS YOU KNOW THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR
A MAF HEADQUARTERS IN THE POM-72 BASELINE MARINE CORPS. STRUCTURE
AND MANPOWER FOR THIS ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE ACCOMMODATED
WITHIN PRESENTLY PLANNED STRUCTURE/MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS. THEREFORE,
IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE I/O AND MANNING OF THE III MAF
STAFF WILL BE AT THE EXPENSE OF FMFPAC SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS.
WITHIN THIS CONDITION OF AUSTERITY AND IN LINE WITH CMC'S DESIRE
TO STREAMLINE THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE WITHIN THE MARINE
CORPS, AND ACHIEVE A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN THESE HEADQUARTERS
AND THE FIGHTING ELEMENTS, WE ENVISION THE III MAF STAFF TO CONSIST
OF A TOTAL OF 114 SPACE VICE THE 200 AS PROPOSED. IN THIS REGARD
III MAF WILL OF NECESSITY HAVE TO RELY ON SUBORDINATE COMMANDS FOR
CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AND SUPPORT SUCH AS INFORMATIONAL,
LEGAL, HEADQUARTERS COMMAND AND FSS.

(2) WITH RESPECT TO MANNING THE III MAF STAFF ON OKINAWA,
THE MAJORITY OF PERSONNEL CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO I MAN HEADQUARTERS
WILL BE UTILIZED AND ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO SATISFY GRADE AND MOS
DEFICIENCIES WILL BE ASSIGNED BY THIS HQ.

(3) IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING, THE PROVISION FOR MAU
STAFFS SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE III MAF I/O. THESE

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III MAF 2100/4

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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUEOFIA2993 TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE
STAFFS SHOULD BE MANNED ON AN AS REQUIRED BASIS FROM ASSETS OF
III MAF'S SUBORDINATE COMMANDS.

(4) IN REGARD TO THE SUBIC BAY LIAISON SECTION WE CONCUR
WITH THE ESSENTIALITY OF THE SECTION. IT IS RECOMMENDED HOWEVER
THAT YOU EXAMINE THE FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF TRANSFERRING
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE LIAISON SECTION TO CG CAMP BULLER. SHOULD
THIS BE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, IT WOULD PRECLUDE FURTHER INROADS
ON THE STRUCTURE AND MANPOWER OF THE OPERATING FORCES.

2. (1S) YOUR COMMENTS CONCERNING THE RELOCATION OF I MAF HEAD-
QUARTERS TO CAMP PENDLETON ARE ALSO CONCURRED IN. THE I MAF
STAFF WILL PRIMARILY BE A PLANNING STAFF AND THE BILLETS DESIGNATED
FOR THE HEADQUARTERS WILL BE MANNED FROM ASSETS OF THE 1ST MARINE
DIVISION, 3D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING AND FORCE TROOPS, FMFPAC. CG,
I MAF WILL BE DOUBLE MANNED AND WILL NOT EXERCISE CONTROL OVER
EAST PAC FORCES UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE TASK ORGANIZATION FOR ASSIGNED
OPERATIONS/EXERCISES IS ACTIVATED. PRESENT PLANNING ENVISIONS THE
I MAF STAFF TO BE COMPRIMSED OF APPROXIMATELY 64 BILLETS, HOWEVER,
THIS ENTIRE SUBJECT WILL BE ADDRESSED IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

3. (1S) IN SUMMARY, AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FOREGOING, REQUEST
YOU REEVALUATE THE I/O AS PROPOSED IN REF A, AND UTILIZING I/O

PAGE FOUR RUEOFIA2993 TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE
M-4918 AS A BASIS, RESUBMIT A PROPOSED I/O FOR MAF HQ NOT
TO EXCEED 114 MARINE SPACES.

WARM REGARDS.

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PAGE 2 OF 2

121455Z NOV 70

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FM CG FMFPAC

TO AIG ONE FOUR FOUR

AIG ONE FOUR FIVE

AIG ONE FIVE ONE *ACT MAF FILE 115002*

KUHHEFAA/HEADRON FMFPAC

EMPT CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

INFO RUEOFIA/CMC

RUWJDFA/CG MCB CAMPEN

RUWJNKA/CG TWENTY NINE PALMS

RUWJGFA/COMCARWEST

BT

UNCLAS E F T O FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//NO104C//

PERSONAL FOR CG AND CD ADDRESSEES FROM LTGEN JONES

ACTS OF VIOLENCE

1. THE RECENT DEATH OF A YOUNG MARINE OF THIS COMMAND, AS THE RESULT OF A MANY-AGAINST-ONE ATTACK UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS, REQUIRES THAT ALL TRUE MARINES IDENTIFY THOSE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE REPUGNANT AND REPREHENSIBLE ACTS, SO THAT PAGE TWO KUHHEMA1214 UNCLAS E F T O PERSONAL FOR THEY CAN BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.

2. THESE ACTS ARE COMMITTED BY INDIVIDUALS/GROUPS WHO COMMIT THEIR CRIMES IN A STEALTHY AND COWARDLY MANNER. MANY AGAINST ONE, USUALLY IN DARKNESS, OR ATTACKS FROM BEHIND ARE TYPICAL CIRCUMSTANCES ASSOCIATED WITH THESE ACTIONS WHICH ARE COWARDLY, UNMANLY, AND UNIQUELY UN-MARINE LIKE. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE EXPECT THEIR MARINES TO BE A GROUP OF PROFESSIONALLY DEDICATED BRAVE MEN. THEY DO NOT EXPECT US TO CONDONE LAWLESSNESS OR PERMIT COWARDLY PRACTICES BY SOME IN OUR MIST. WE SHALL NOT.

3. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, I AM COMMITTING THIS COMMAND AND ITS RESOURCES TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE INDIVIDUALS/GROUPS. I AM CONFIDENT THAT WITH YOUR SUPPORT WE CAN IDENTIFY THEM AND SUBJECT THEM TO THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS. THEIR STRENGTH LIES IN GROUP ACTION AND THEIR ONLY DEFENSE, ANONYMITY, IS FOUNDED IN THE USE OF THREATS, INTIMIDATIONS, AND REPRISALS TO COVER THEIR COWARDICE. BECAUSE THEY THEMSELVES ARE WEAK AND WITHOUT HONOR, THEY SEEK TO STRIP MANLY CONDUCT AND VIRTUE FROM OTHERS. THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY IS NOT NEW, HAVING BEEN PRACTICED FROM TIME TO TIME THROUGHOUT HISTORY. IT HAS NEVER SUCCEEDED IN THE PAST AND WILL NOT PAGE THREE KUHHEMA1214 UNCLAS E F T O PERSONAL FOR NOW.

4. OBVIOUSLY, SUCCESS DEPENDS ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE INDIVIDUALS/GROUPS. TO COUNTER THEIR ACTIVITY I DESIRE THE IMMEDIATE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS THAT INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT NECESSARILY LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

A. WIDE AND FREQUENT PUBLICATION TO ALL MARINES OF THE COWARDLY CONTEXT IN WHICH AMBUSHES, FRAGGINGS, AND OTHER FORS

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OF WANTON, RUTHLESS VIOLENCE ARE VIEWED.

B. EDUCATION OF OUR MARINES TO THE FACT THAT THE IDENTIFICATION OF CRIMINALS IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EVERY CITIZEN; PROVIDING INFORMATION IS NOT PLAYING THE ROLE NORMALLY ATTRIBUTED TO BEING AN INFORMER. THIS TYPE OF TYRANNY CANNOT EXIST OR GROW WHERE EVERYONE EXERCISES THEIR PROPER RESPONSIBILITY.

C. OFFER SANCTUARY, PROTECTION, AND IMMEDIATE TRANSFER (INCLUDING INTER-AREA TRANSFER) TO ANY MARINE/SAILOR WHO MAKES AN IDENTIFICATION.

D. QUICK ACTION BY COMMANDERS, WHEN ATTACKERS ARE IDENTIFIED, TO EFFECT APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINARY OR ADMINISTRATIVE DISPOSITION.

E. MAKE APPEALS TO THE TIME HONORED AMERICAN VALUES OF FAIRPLAY, SPORTSMANSHIP, AND GENTLEMANLY CONDUCT IN THE INTERACTION OF OUR MARINES ONE WITH ANOTHER.

F. PUBLICATION OF THE AVAILABLE FACTS ATTENDING EACH INCIDENT AT COMPANY LEVEL FORMATIONS AND IN BASE AND UNIT NEWSPAPER, AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER THEIR OCCURRENCE.

5. IT IS FURTHER DIRECTED THAT WHEN INDIVIDUALS OR A GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS ARE FOUND GUILTY OF COMMITTING CRIMES, AS DELINEATED IN THIS MESSAGE, THE RESULTS OF THEIR COURTS-MARTIAL WILL BE PUBLISHED IN SAME MANNER AS DESCRIBED IN PAR 4.F ABOVE.

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FM CG FIRST MAW

TO RUEUFIA/CMC

INFO RUHHFMA/CG FHPAC

RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

BT

CONFIDENTIAL //NOFORN

PERSONAL FROM MGEN ARMSTRONG TO MGEN HILL INFO LTGENS MCCUTCHEON AND JONES MCEO

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

CH-53 TROOP CAPACITY (U)

A. CHC 101439Z NOV70 MCEP

1. NUMBER OF TROOPS CARRIED ON ASSAULT MISSION DEPENDS ON URGENCY OF MISSION AND HOSTILE FIRE THREAT. WE HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THE PLANNING FACTORS RELATED TO FORCE LEVEL DETERMINATIONS ETC. IN FACT WE RESTRICT CH-53 ASSAULT LOADS TO 33 U.S. MARINES EXCEPT WHERE URGENCY OR UNUSUAL SITUATION DICTATES OTHERWISE AND THE HOSTILE FIRE THREAT MAKES THE RISK REASONABLE. IN NO CASE DO WE CARRY MORE THAN 45 OF ANY NATIONALITY ON CIARAT MISSIONS (UNSECURED ZONES) EXCEPT EMERGENCY EXTRACTS. SEATING CONFIGURATION HAS NO DIRECT BEARING ON NUMBER OF TROOPS CARRIED ON ASSAULT MISSIONS AS BELTS ARE NOT A REQUIREMENT.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE LIFTS UNDER CURRENT DIRECTIVES MUST PROVIDE A SEAT BELT FOR EACH PASSENGER. ADMINISTRATIVE LIFTS BETWEEN SECURE AREAS AND BASES CONSTITUTE A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF CH-53 UTILIZATION. THE SIMPLE FACT IS WE WASTE A LOT OF FLIGHT TIME BECAUSE THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH SEATS AND BELTS TO EFFECTIVELY UTILIZE CH-53 CAPABILITY. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS OUR INABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THE ADMINISTRATIVE MOVEMENT OF UNITS AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS OUR CUSTOMERS WOULD LIKE.

3. WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT THE CH-53 IS OUR TACTICAL SUPPORT TRANSPORT FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES. THIS CONSIDERATION TOGETHER WITH THE STRINGENT FLIGHT HOUR PROGRAM RECENTLY PROMULGATED INDICATES FOR THE FUTURE THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE THE MOST EFFICIENT USE OF THE SAFE AND DEPENDABLE AIRCRAFT ON OTHER THAN ASSAULT MISSIONS. IT SEEMS IMPRUDENT TO US NOT TO INVESTIGATE THE COST AND ENGINEERING FEASIBILITY OF INSTALLING ADDITIONAL REMOVABLE SEATS TO PROVIDE AT LEAST 50 FOR ADMIN LIFTS. SUCH KITS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE ON A ONE PER AIRCRAFT BASIS. FAIL TO SEE A REAL VALID RELATIONSHIP TO FORCE LEVEL ISSUE.

4. CANNOT SAY REQUIREMENT IS URGENT. IF WE HAD IT HERE AND NOW IT WOULD REPAY INVESTMENT COST QUICKLY. MARK REBARKS.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO GEN CLAY CDR 7TH AF TAN SON NHUT

LTG COLLINS CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG

LTG DAVISON CG IIFORCEV LONG BINH

LTG MCCAFFREY DCG USARV LONG BINH

LTG SUTHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG

✓ LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG

VADM KING COMNAVFORV SAIGON

MG MCCOWN CG DMAC CAN THO

ZFM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 14665 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT:VNAF AIR SUPPORT (U)

1. (C) AN APPRAISAL OF VNAF PROGRESS IN PROVIDING AIR SUPPORT TO ALL SERVICE COMPONENTS IS REQUIRED.

ACCORDINGLY, YOUR EVALUATION OF VNAF RESPONSIVENESS TO RVNAF REQUIREMENTS IS REQUESTED. YOUR COMMENTS SHOULD ADDRESS BOTH FIXSD AND ROTARY WING EMPLOYMENT.

FIELD FORCE REPLIES SHOULD INCLUDE COMMENTS FROM THE FIELD ADVISORS. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IS YOUR EVALUATION OF PRESENT AND PLANNED VNAF BEDDOWN LOCATIONS AND FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS.

2. (U) REQUEST YOUR REPLY NOT LATER THAN 25 NOV 70. GP4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

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"EXCLUSIVE"

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ZNY AAAAA
RUMUMPA -T- CG FIRST MARDIV
P 140131Z NOV 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEOPIA/CWG
INFO RUMUMPA/CG XII MAF
RUMUMPA/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUMUMPA/CG THIRD MARDIV
BT

CONFIDENTIAL - FROM EXCLUSIVE FOR MRG AIRCRAFT INFO
LYGEN MCCRECKEN, MGEN WEDDECKE AND MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. //NOB0000//

OFFICER TRANSFER

- A. CG FIRST MARDIV 121405Z NOV70 (S) (PASEP)
- 1. (C) REF A REFERS. I AM ISSUING IMMEDIATE YEAR PER ORDERS FOR SECOND LIEUTENANT KENNETH MCCRACKEN 011 20 30/0502 USMC TO REPORT TO THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION. RTD AUG 71.
- 2. (C) STATEMENTS AND RETREPS REFERRED TO IN PAR 5 OF REF A NOT YET RECEIVED AT THIS HQ. WILL EXPEDIT FORWARDING TO HQMC.
- 3. (C) STRONGLY RECOMMEND EXPEDITIOUS SUBMISSION OF LT MCCRACKEN'S CASE TO THE OFFICER PERFORMANCE BOARD. VARM REGARDS.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
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MCEO

TOP SECRET 3180610-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA
RUMUMPA-1-CG III MAF
P 140610Z NOV 70
FM CG FIRS1 MARDIV
TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
BT

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

MCEO

TOP SECRET/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR
LTCEN MC CUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN WIDECHE. DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS ONLY.

FORCE PLANNING (U)

- A. CG III MAF 252347Z NOV 70 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (IS)
- B. III MAF OPLAN 1-70 TURNER BAY/CHARLOTTE HILL (IS LINDIS)
- C. CMC 251923Z AUG 70 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE (IS)

1. (IS) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO HYPOTHESIZE A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE GROUND ELEMENT OF THE PROJECTED 3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE. THIS HYPOTHESIS IS PREDICATED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE TRANSITION MAP WILL BE STRUCTURED TO INCLUDE AN RL OF TH

EE INFANTRY BATTALIONS, A HELICOPTER GROUP, A FIXED-WING GROUP TO INCLUDE TWO ATTACK SQUADRONS, A PROVISIONAL SERVICE BATTALION, AND SUPPORTING TROOPS TO INCLUDE A MILITARY POLICE BATTALION. IN DEVELOPING THIS CONCEPT CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS, WHICH APPEAR PRUDENT AT THIS TIME, HAVE BEEN MADE:

PAGE TWO RUMUMPA 1341 TOP SECRET/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR:

A. THE ENEMY, FACED WITH A STEADILY ERODING SITUATION IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, WILL HAVE TWO OPTIONS:

- (1) TO ATTEMPT TO HALT THE EROSION AND HOLD AN APPROXIMATELY THE PRESENT LEVEL OF EFFORT; OR
- (2) TO RISK A SIGNIFICANT INFUSION OF NEW SARENGAM FROM OUTSIDE THE PROVINCE.

B. THE RVNAF IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE WILL CONTINUE AT ESSENTIALLY THE SAME LEVEL OF FORCE, WITHOUT MAJOR

E INFORCEMENT OR MORE THAN TEMPORARY INTRODUCTION OF NEW UNITS. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RVNAF, INCLUDING THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES, WILL CONTINUE TO IMPROVE AT A MODEST BUT PERCEPTIBLE RATE.

C. FREE WORLD MILITARY FORCES IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, INCLUDING U. S. FORCES OTHER THAN U. S. MARINES, WILL DECLINE IN NUMBERS WITH NO NEW UNITS BEING INTRODUCED EXCEPT ON A SHORT-TERM BASIS UNTIL THE FINAL REDEPLOYMENT OF THE MAP.

D. A DECISION WILL NOT BE REACHED UNTIL THE ELEVENTH HOUR AS TO WHETHER THE MAF WILL REDEPLOY BY 1 JULY 1971 OR WILL REMAIN IN-COUNTRY AS PART OF THE USF.

E. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS AND THE MISSIONS AND TASKS OF THE MAF WILL BE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED THE

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140610Z NOV 70

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TOP SECRET

(13A)

TOP SECRET RUMULVA1341 O P S E C R E T / SPECIAL / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE FOR
1ST MARINE DIVISION.

2. (C) ASSUMPTION D ABOVE APPEARS REASONABLE IN LIGHT OF THE LAZINESS OF THE DECISIONS REACHED IN INCREMENT IV REDEPLOYMENTS. SIMILARLY, ASSUMPTION E APPEARS REASONABLE IN VIEW OF THE DEMONSTRATED RELUCANCE OF I CORPS TO EFFECT A PROPORTIONATE RELIEF AND REASSIGNMENT OF TACTICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY AS EARLIER REDEPLOYMENTS TOOK PLACE. THUS THERE ARE VERY VALID REASONS TO ASSUME THAT THE GROUND ELEMENTS OF THE MAB, WITH ONLY 50 PERCENT OF THE INFANTRY STRENGTH AND 42 PERCENT OF THE AGGREGATE STRENGTH OF THE PRESENT REDUCED DIVISION, MUST BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME MISSIONS AND TASKS OVER THE SAME GROUND AS THE PRESENT DIVISION FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME.

3. (C) UNTIL THE DIVISION OR MAB IS DEFINITELY RELIEVED OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE QUE SON MOUNTAINS AND VALLEY IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO OPERATE A MINIMUM OF ONE REINFORCED BATTALION IN THE AREA PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY THE 5TH MARINES, WITH ONLY THREE INFANTRY BATTALIONS AT OUR DISPOSAL THIS WOULD SEEM TO DICTATE THE FOLLOWING DISPOSITIONS:

A. ONE

REINFORCED BATTALION IN THE QUE SONS, PROBABLY BASED AT BALDY.

PAGE FOUR RUMULVA1341 O P S E C R E T / SPECIAL / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
EXCLUSIVE FOR

B. ONE REINFORCED BATTALION OPERATING WEST OF DANANG VIETAL ZONE IN THE AREA PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY 3RD BATTALION, 1ST MARINES, AND 1ST BATTALION, 5TH MARINES.

C. ONE REINFORCED BATTALION OPERATING SOUTH OF DANANG VIETAL ZONE IN THE AREA PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY 1ST AND 2D BATTALIONS, 1ST MARINES.

4. (C) FOR THESE THREE BATTALIONS TO PERFORM MOST EFFECTIVELY STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF OBJECTIVE, ECONOMY OF FORCE, MASS, AND MOVEMENT WILL BE NECESSARY. THE BATTALIONS WILL HAVE TO OPERATE IN A HIGHLY MOBILE EXPEDITIONARY MODE. IT IS ENVISIONED THAT EACH BATTALION WILL HAVE NO MORE THAN ONE BASE AREA, THAT THE BASE AREA BE MUSTERE, AND THAT THE OPTIMUM POSTURE OF THE RIFLE COMPANIES FOR EACH BATTALION WOULD BE TWO COMPANIES ENGAGED IN MOBILE OPERATIONS, ONE COMPANY POISED FOR QUICK EXPLOITATION, AND ONE COMPANY EMPLOYED IN REPAIR/MAINTENANCE AND SECURITY MISSIONS.

5. (C) IT WOULD BE EXPECTED THAT THE LA IN JUAL WOULD OPERATE IN MUCH THE SAME MANNER AS IS PRESENTLY BEING DONE BY THE 5TH MARINES. CURRENT OPERATIONS IN THE QUE SONS DEMONSTRATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPER BLEND OF RECONNAISSANCE, INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AND AIR (BOTH FIXED WING AND HELO) AGAINST THE ENEMY

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TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMULVA 1341 I O P S E C R E A Y S P E C I A L / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y
EXCLUSIVE FOR
IN HIS PRESENT STATE. THIS METHOD OF OPERATIONS IS PRESENTLY
BEING EXTENDED TO THE 1ST MARINES. CURRENTLY, IN THE 1ST MARINES
AO, A

RECON PLATOON PATROL BASE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED ON DONG DEN,
A RECON COMPANY PATROL BASE IS BEING ESTABLISHED ON CHARLIE BRIDGE,
AND A PREPOSITIONED HELICOPTER PACKAGE IS BEING CONSOLIDATED ON
HILL 37. CONCURRENTLY, FIXED RIFLE COMPANY POSITIONS ARE BEING
DISMANTLED.

6. (IS) IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT WITH A 25 PERCENT REDUCTION
IN TROOP DENSITY RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION WILL HAVE TO
SUBSTITUTE IN LARGE MEASURE FOR THE SATURATION PATROLLING TRADI-
TIONAL TO THE ROCKS BELT AND THE 1ST MARINES AO. IN VIEW OF THE
LESSENERED ENEMY CAPABILITY AND THE IMPROVED RF/PF CAPABILITY THIS
APPEARS TO BE AN ACCEPTABLE RISK. COUPLED WITH THIS REDUCED
PRESENCE IN THE POPULATED AREA WILL BE THE REQUIREMENT FOR A
CONTINUING EVALUATION OF THE CU/P/CAP DISPOSITIONS AND EFFECTIVE-
NESS AND A CAREFULLY PLANNED PHASE-OUT OF THEIR OPERATIONS PRIOR
TO THE BRIGADE'S DEPARTURE. IN THIS RESPECT A DETAILED STUDY
OF CU/P OPERATIONS IS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY.

7. (IS) AN ANCILLIARY BENEFIT LOGISTICALLY ACCRUING FROM
REDUCING THE NUMBER OF FIXED INSTALLATIONS TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM

PAGE SIX RUMULVA 1341 I O P S E C

E. A. / SPECIAL / MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE FOR

AND OPERATING IN A MOBILE EXPEDITIONARY MODE WILL BE TO FREE UP
UNNEEDED FACILITIES FOR EARLY TRANSFER OR RAZING, AS WELL AS
SPEEDING THE REIMPROVE OF AS MUCH GARRISON PROPERTY AS IS
POSSIBLE.

8. (IS) AS ADDRESSED ABOVE THIS CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS IS
DESIGNED TO OPTIMIZE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GROUND ELEMENT OF THE
MAB IN THE EVENT OF AN EXTENDED STAY AND CONTINUED RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE PRESENT AREA OF OPERATIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE EXTREME
CASE. HOWEVER, THE CONCEPT IS ADAPTABLE TO A SMALLER AO AND WILL,
BY LIGHTENING THE LOGISTIC LOAD, EXPEDITE THE EARLY DEPARTURE OF
THE BRIGADE IF SUCH EVENTUATES.

9. (IS) IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE FOREGOING CONCEPT BE APPROVED
IN PRINCIPLE FOR FURTHER PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS RESPECT
IT APPEARS PERFECTLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE GENERAL PLAN FOR ORGANI-
ZATION AND ACTIVATION OF THE MAB AND TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENT
OPERATIONS SET FORTH IN REFERENCE B. IT ALSO APPEARS TO BE IN
COMPLETE CONSONANCE WITH THE INJUNCTION CONTAINED IN REFERENCE C
TO AVOID A STATIC DEFENSIVE ROLE. BEST REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

1341

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140610Z NOV 70

NNNN

PTTEZYUW KHNSMVA3566 3181156-EEEE--RUMUNPA.
ZNY EEEEE
P 141122Z NOV 70
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMUNPA/CG III MAF DA NANG
INFO RUMUHFA/CG XXIV CORPS IA NANG
RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

14 NOV 70 12 22

BT
UNCLAS E F T O 59806 PERSONAL FOR LTG MCCUTCHEON AND
LTG SUTHERLAND. AND LTG JONES.
SUBJ: CHANGE OF COMMAND (U)
YOUR PLANS FOR A CHANGE OF COMMAND ON 2 JANUARY ARE ACCEPT-
ABLE. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR OFFICIAL CALLS BY GENERAL
ROBERTSON IN SAIGON ON THE 31ST OR 1ST.

BT
#3566
NNNN

IN 07941/318-70 /ACK

141122Z NOV-70

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TOP SECRET

SPECIAL

"MCEO"

"EXCLUSIVE"

PITAZYUW RUHHFMA 1211 3182239-AAAA--RUMUMPA.
ZNY AAAAA
P 142239Z NOV 70 TOR: 120100Z NOV 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
E

TOP SECRET/SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE. PERSONAL FOR LIGEN
MCCUMCHEON FROM LIGEN - ONE S. MARINE CORPS EYES
ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//

- VMCJ EMPLOYMENT (U)
- A. CG III MAF 091400Z NOV 70 (IS) (SPECIAL) (MCEO)
- B. CG FMFPAC 142241Z NOV 70 (S) (SPECIAL) (MCEO)
- 1. (S) I APPRECIATE THE POSITION YOU HAVE PROVIDED IN REF A AND THE RATIONALE WHICH HAS BEEN BASIC TO CONTINUED ACTION AND STUDY WE HAVE TAKEN IN THIS AREA.
- 2. (IS) BY REF B WE HAVE GONE TO THE COMMANDANT IN A POSITIVE EFFORT TO GET IMMEDIATE ACTION TO STRENGTHEN OUR CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT WHICH WOULD BE A PREREQUISITE TO THE IN-COUNTRY EAGA RE-ENTRY.
- 3. (S) IN ORDER THAT WE MAY HAVE COMPLETE EXCHANGE OF

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA 1211 TOP SECRET/SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE
PERSONAL FOR MCEO
INFORMATION AND TO ENSURE OUR BEST EFFORTS ARE BEING
MADE FOR EARLY IMPROVEMENT OF THE EAGA SUPPORTABILITY,
I PLAN TO SEND MY EWO, LT COL MCFERREW, LATE IN
NOVEMBER TO RVN, OKI AND JAPAN TO ACCOMPLISH THE
ABOVE PURPOSES.
WARM REGARDS.
GP-4
E
1211

"MCEO"

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TOP SECRET

(130)

MCE SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

PTTZYUW RUMHMA1512 3152241-AAAA-RUEOFIA RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 142241Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUEOFIA/DMC

INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN MOUTON
FROM LTGEN JOYNS/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS.//NO0000//

TOR: 15 0111 E NOV 70

VMCJ EMPLOYMENT (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 312237Z OCT 70 (S)

B. 7AF 241140Z OCT 70 (S) (PASEP)

C. SSO MACV 261028Z OCT 70 (S) (PASEP)

D. CINCPAC 262205Z OCT 70 (U) (PASEP)

E. ADMIN CINCPAC 34843Z NOV 70 (S) (PASEP)

1. (S) AS YOU HAVE NOTED FROM REF A THE FEASIBILITY OF RE-
INTRODUCTION OF THE EA-6A FROM IWAKUNI TO IN-COUNTRY HAS BEEN
ADDRESSED. KEITH AND I HAVE EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THIS POSSIBLE
REDEPLOYMENT AND I THOUGHT IT TIME TO BRING YOU UP-TO-DATE.
REFS B THRU K ESTABLISH A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

2. (S) WITH THE SHIFT OF THE MAJOR MACV AIR EFFORT TO LAOS,

SPECAT

PAGE TWO RUMHMA1512 SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR M C S O
AN EFFORT WHICH CONCENTRATES ON THE ENEMY SUPPLY LINES. A
COMPENSATE BUILD UP OF RADAR CONTROLLED AAA AND SAM SITES
CAN BE EXPECTED. 7TH AIR FORCE WOULD LIKE TO PUT 24 HOUR
ELINT COVERAGE ADJACENT TO THE THREAT AREA FOR COLLECTION AND
WARNING. CURRENT MACV SEASIA EW ASSETS APPARENTLY ARE IN-
SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT. TO PROVIDE THE EW
AIRCRAFT NEEDED, EITHER ADDITIONAL EB66'S MUST BE REDEPLOYED
OR OUR EA-6A'S BROUGHT BACK IN-COUNTRY.

3. (S) KEITH FEELS STRONGLY THAT IF WE CAN HELP WE SHOULD.
FURTHER, THAT WITH THE MARINE A6'S BACK IN THE LAOS PICTURE
WE HAVE AN ADDED INCENTIVE TO USE OUR EA-6A'S FOR SUPPORT.

4. (S) A HARD LOOK WAS TAKEN AT OUR EW REQUIREMENTS AND ASSETS
IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF THE FIRST INDICATION THAT RE-
DEPLOYMENT OF EA-6A'S WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION. AS OUR RATION-
ALE IN REF A STATES, THE EXISTING CONDITIONS RE: EQUIPMENT/
SSE/SUPPLIES, MAKE DEPLOYMENT AT THIS TIME UNDESIRABLE. HOW-
EVER, THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC, SOME
VERY EXPLOSIVE POTENTIAL SITUATIONS OF INTEREST TO 7TH FLEET,
AND THE CONTINUANCE OF VIETNAM "HOT WAR" NEEDS CITED BY KEITH,
COUPLED WITH THE PRESSING NEED FOR ECM TRAINING CAPABILITY

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

14

SECRET

(137)

MCEO

SECRET

"EXCLUSIVE"

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1512 S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
 IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC, MAKE HQMC ASSISTANCE NECESSARY IF OUR
 EA-6A CAPABILITY TO MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS IS TO BE MAINTAINED.
 AREAS IN WHICH HELP IS NECESSARY INCLUDE:

- A. PRIORITY BIT AND PIECE SUPPORT OF EA-6A PECULIAR EQUIPMENT.
- B. REPLACEMENT OF WORN OUT SSE AND TEST EQUIPMENT WITH NEW PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT.
- C. AUGMENTATION OF VMCJ-1EW DETACHMENT WITH EA-6A TRAINED PERSONNEL IN NUMBERS, GRADES, AND MOS'S TO BE DETERMINED.
- D. APPROVAL FOR RE-ENTRY OF EA-6A INTO SOUTHEAST ASIA.

5. (S) SINCE THE ABOVE OBVIOUSLY EMPHASIZES THE PRIORITY OF PACIFIC AREA REQUIREMENTS OVER THE AREAS IN WHICH CONDITIONS SHORT OF "HOT WAR" EXIST, THE EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE ABOVE PRIORITY TERMS WOULD ALLOW FMFPAC TO PROVIDE THE POSITIVE RESPONSE WHICH I FEEL THE SITUATION WARRANTS.
 VERY RESPECTFULLY AND WITH WARM REGARDS

GP-3
BT

15 12

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142214Z NOV 70

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2084

SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MCEO

(137)

MCEO

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECAT

DE RUMULVA1426 3190245-AAAA-RUMUMPA.
ZNY AAAAA
SIC -I- CG FMFPAC
PLC -I- CG III MAF
P 150245 NOV 72
FM CG FIRST MARDIV
TO RUMUMPA/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY /
EXCLUSIVE FOR

LIGEN JONES INFO LIGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MGBW WIDPECKE,
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

A. CG FMFPAC MSG 192147Z SEP72

1. CG FIRST MARDIV MSG 252135Z SEP72 (C) (SPECAT)

1. (C) REFERENCE A EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER TWO ERRONEOUS CASUALTY
REPORTS SUBMITTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS AND REQUESTED THAT AN
INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED AND THE RESULTS REPORTED TO CG FMFPAC.
REFERENCE A FURTHER REQUESTED THAT THE CASUALTY REPORTING
PROCEDURES BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE,
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BE TAKEN.

2. (C) REFERENCE B REPORTED THE INITIATION OF AN INVESTIGATION
AND PROVIDED A STATEMENT OF THE CASUALTY AND WELFARE REPORTING
PROCEDURES IN EFFECT WITHIN THIS DIVISION TO INCLUDE

PAGE TWO RUMULVA1426 CONFIDENTIAL/SPECAT/MCEO/
IMPROVEMENTS INCORPORATED TO PRECLUDE ERRORS. THAT STATEMENT
IS SUMMARIZED BELOW:

A. CASUALTY REPORTING WITHIN THE DIVISION IS CONTROLLED BY
THE CASUALTY REPORTING CONTROL CENTER WHICH IS STAFFED WITH
HIGHLY QUALIFIED AND CAREFULLY SELECTED PERSONNEL.

B. IN CASES OF WOUNDED/INJURED MARINES, IDENTIFYING DATA
IS VERIFIED WITH THE PARENT UNIT, MEDICAL FACILITY, AND
LOCATOR FILES PROVIDED BY FMFPAC AND HEADQUARTERS MARINE
CORPS, AND, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, WITH THE INJURED MARINE.
THE INITIAL REPORT IS MADE VIA TELEPHONE AND VERIFIED IN
WRITING WITHIN 24 HOURS. DIAGNOSIS, CONDITION, AND PROGNOSIS
IS OBTAINED IN WRITING FROM ATTENDING MEDICAL PERSONNEL.

C. IN CASE OF MARINES KILLED IN ACTION OR WHO HAVE DIED

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150245Z NOV 72

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
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02

MCEO

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MCEO

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"EXCLUSIVE"

OF CLINIC GATHERS THE RESULTS OF ALL LABORATORY TESTS AND THE
PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL ANALYSES MADE BY THE CLINIC AND REPORTS
WITH THE EXCELLENCE AND ACCURACY OF THE LABORATORY AND
PHYSICIAN'S QUALITY OF SERVICE. THE LABORATORY IS A PART
OF NORMAL PROCEDURES. THE LABORATORY IS A PART OF
MEDICAL AND SURGICAL SERVICES THROUGH THE USE OF MEDICAL RECORDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECAT

PAGE THREE PUBLICATIONS OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS...
OF UNLAWFUL REPORTS CONTAINING INFORMATION...
PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS...
ADVANCE FROM THE MARINE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE MEDICAL
TABLETS, UNDER THE CASE OF...
FROM THE MEDICAL AUTHORITY AND...
OF PATIENTS ON BOARD THE U.S. MARINE CORPS...
REQUESTS ARE FORGED TO THE...
SUBMITTED...
ALL CASUALTY AND...
DIVISION...
OF THE...
INCIDENTS...
MAY BE...
DISCLOSED...
OF...
CLASS...
CLASS...
CLASS...

IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED...
CLASS...
CLASS...
CLASS...

ALL INFORMATION...
CLASS...
CLASS...
CLASS...

2

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

MCEO

138

0 151123Z ZY4 ZFF-4 ZFF-1
 FM COL ROBERT W LEONARD CINCPAC MACV SGN RVN
 TO CG USARV LONG BINH PASS TO IO
 CG III MAF DA NANG PASS TO IO
 COMNAVFORV SUIGON PASS TO PAO
 CDR 7AF TAN SON NHUT PASS TO IO
 CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG PASS TO IO
 CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH PASS TO IO
 CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG PASS TO IO
 CG DMAC CAN THO PASS TO IO
 ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL MAC 14735 EYES ONLY

1. I WOULD LIKE TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO A TV NEWS SEGMENT Aired IN CONUS ON 13 NOVEMBER OVER CBS WHICH SHOWS WHAT IS DESCRIBED AS A POT PARTY AT FSB ARIES MANNED BY 1/12 CAV, 1ST CAV DIVISION.
2. THE FILM, A COPY OF WHICH IS ON THE WAY TO MACV, SHOWS A NUMBER OF SOLDIERS SWIMMING AND RESTING AT A WATER HOLE NEAR THE FSB. SOME ARE SHOWN IN THE ACT OF SMOKING MARIJUANA IN PIPES. ANOTHER SCENE SHOWS A MEDICAL AID MAN, APPARENTLY SMOKING A MARIJUANA CIGARETTE, WHO STATES THAT HE SMOKES ABOUT TWICE A DAY, AND THEN STATES, "THEN WE REALLY GET IT ON IN THE EVENING UP THERE AT THE FIRE BASE."
3. A SQUAD LEADER IS SHOWN ASSISTING HIS MEN TO INHALE MARIJUANA SMOKE WHICH IS FORCED FROM A SMOKING PIPE UP THE BARREL OF A SHOTGUN. HE THEN LETS SOME OF THE SMOKE AIM AT THE CAMERA.
4. CBS CORRESPONDENT GARY SHEPARD, WHO REPORTED THE TV SEGMENT FROM THE FSB, INTRODUCES IT BY STATING THAT, "GRASS IS AS PLENTIFUL IN VIETNAM AS C-RATIONS." HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING, "FIRE BASE ARIES IS NOT UNIQUE. WHAT'S HAPPENING HERE IS ALSO HAPPENING TO SOME EXTENT AT VIRTUALLY EVERY OTHER AMERICAN INSTALLATION IN VIETNAM. RECENT SURVEYS ESTIMATE THAT WELL OVER 50 PERCENT OF THE SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM USE MARIJUANA."
5. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO QUERIES AS YET BUT PLAN TO POINT OUT THE MATTER IS UNDER INVESTIGATION. RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION WILL BE ANNOUNCED WHEN COMPLETED. ON BACKGROUND NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION WE WILL POINT OUT THAT INCIDENTS SUCH AS THIS CAN OCCUR AND WE ARE INITIATING A NUMBER OF PROGRAMS TO ELIMINATE DRUG ABUSE IN THE COMMAND. WE WILL FURTHER POINT OUT THAT THE INCIDENCE OF DRUG ABUSE HAS HAD NO EFFECT ON COMBAT READINESS OF OUR LINE UNITS.

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(139)

6. ADDITIONALLY, IN RESPONSE TO 14 NOV PRESS QUERIES AT 200, THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, MR. FRIEDHEIM, SAID: "WE HAVE, AS YOU KNOW, BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT THE DRUG PROBLEM HERE IN THE DEPARTMENT FOR SOME TIME. YOU HAVE HEARD FROM ADMIRAL MACK ABOUT IT; YOU ARE AWARE OF THE DIRECTIVE THAT PROMULGATED...LAST MONTH, BY SECRETARY PACKARD ON THE SUBJECT. THE INCIDENT IN THE FILM THAT I SAW THIS MORNING IS INDICATIVE OF THE REASON WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THIS PROBLEM; IT'S A PROBLEM THAT WE SHARE WITH THE REST OF THE SOCIETY, AND WE CONTINUE TO TRY TO GET AT THAT PROBLEM. WE HAVE NOT DENIED THAT THERE IS A

PROBLEM; WE HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM IN THE ARMED SERVICES. WE DO SHARE IT WITH THE REST OF SOCIETY, BUT WE ACKNOWLEDGE IT IS A PART OF OUR PROBLEM ALSO. AND AS YOU KNOW WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO TRY TO GET AT THIS VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM BY MEDICAL STEPS AND PREVENTIVE ACTIONS AND REHABILITATIVE ACTIONS WE HAVE ENCOURAGED THE SERVICES TO CONSIDER. OTHER THAN THAT, I CAN'T REALLY COMMENT ON THIS SPECIFIC INCIDENT THAT WAS PORTRAYED IN THAT FILM. MACV WILL HAVE TO CHECK ON THAT."

7. I WOULD ASK YOU TO NOTE CLOSELY THE WORDS OF PARA 20, MACV DIRECTIVE 360-1 WHICH DEALS WITH PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, AND WHERE SUPPORT OF CORRESPONDENTS IS DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL. YOU WILL NOTE THAT SPECIFIC MENTION IS MADE THAT "LOCAL COMMANDERS ARE TO INSURE THAT VISITING CORRESPONDENTS ARE PROPERLY RECEIVED, BRIEFED, ESCORTED, AND AFFORDED WHATEVER CONVENIENCES AND SERVICES ARE REASONABLY AVAILABLE.

3. UNITS THAT ARE RECEIVING VISITS FROM THE PRESS SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE A QUALIFIED OFFICER FROM ITS OWN RESOURCES TO ESCORT THE PRESS. AN ESCORT CAN ASSIST A NEWSMAN ON A LEGITIMATE NEWS GATHERING MISSION TO GET HIS STORY. IN ADDITION, HE CAN HELP PUT A STORY IN PERSPECTIVE BY PROVIDING BALANCING MATERIAL FROM LEADERS IN CHARGE OF THE OPERATION OR INSTALLATION. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY PREVAILS FOR ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL SO THEY ARE NOT OBLIGATED TO TALK TO THE PRESS UNLESS THEY DESIRE TO DO SO. MILITARY PERSONNEL SHOULD UNDERSTAND THEIR RIGHT OF PRIVACY. CONVERSELY, THE ESCORT OFFICER CANNOT FORBID MILITARY PERSONNEL TO TALK TO THE PRESS UNLESS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS INVOLVED OR MILITARY SECURITY IS A FACTOR.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

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PTTCZYUW RUHFMA1620 3222040-0000--RUEOFIA RUMUMPA.
ZNY 00000
P 162045Z NOV 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUEOFIA/CMC
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
BT

FOR: 16 21238 NOV 70

C O N F I D E N T I A L
PERSONAL FOR GEN CHAPMAN INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON AND
MGEN ROBERTSON FROM LTGEN JONES DELIVER DURING
WORKING HOURS //N00000//

1. IT IS MY INTENTION TO COMMIT THE FMFPAC FLAGSHIP (KC-130F) TO DONN ROBERTSON'S USE AS A MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION FROM HAWAII TO DANANG. I WOULD ENVISION DONN ARRIVING IN HAWAII ON THE AFTERNOON OF SUNDAY THE 27TH AND DEPARTING ON MONDAY AT 001630 TO ARRIVE IN DANANG 000300. THIS WILL PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR HIM TO MAKE HIS OFFICIAL CALLS AND BE BRIEFED BY MY STAFF.
2. IN THIS SAME REGARD I PLAN TO PLACE THE FLAGSHIP AT KEITH MCCUTCHEON'S DISPOSAL WHILE ENROUTE FROM DANANG TO ANDREWS AFB VIA HAWAII. I UNDERSTAND KEITH

PAGE TWO RUHFMA1620 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR
DESIRES TO DEPART DANANG 001200 AND WILL ARRIVE IN
HAWAII 021100 AND DEPART FOR ANDREWS AFB 022200. BASED
ON THIS SCHEDULE HIS ETA AT ANDREWS AFB IS 031830. ALL
TIMES LOCAL.

GEN YOUR APPROVAL OF THE FOREGOING IS REQUESTED.
VRY RESPECTFULLY AND WITH WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT
1620

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16
FMFPAC-GE 2100/1 (3/69)
0101 04-660

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PTTEZYUW RUHFMA1830 3212148-EEEE--RUMUMPA RUEOFIA.
 ZNY EEEEE
 P 172148Z NOV 70
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUEOFIA/CMC
 BT
 UNCLAS/EFTO. PERSONAL FOR LIGEN MCCUTCHEON INFO
 GEN CHAPMAN FROM LIGEN JONES. //N00000//
 CHANGE OF COMM

TOR 17/2235Z

ND
 A. CG FMFPAC 162045Z NOV70 (PERS FOR)
 B. CG III MAF 160223Z NOV70 (PERS FOR)
 1. THE BASIC SCHEDULE FOR YOUR RETURN TO CONUS WHICH
 I PROPOSED IN REFERENCE (A) APPEARS TO BE IN CONSONANCE
 WITH YOUR DESIRES AS ANNOUNCED BY REFERENCE (B).
 2. I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT YOU CARRY NO MORE THAN
 SIX (6) PASSENGERS OVER AND ABOVE YOURSELF AND THE CREW.
 WHILE THE AIRCRAFT IS CAPABLE OF CARRYING MORE IT SLEEPS A MAXIMUM
 OF EIGHT AND ADDITIONAL PASSENGERS MIGHT PROVE DISRUPTIVE TO NORMAL
 INFLIGHT ROUTINES. SINCE I HAVE PLACED THE FLAGSHIP AT YOUR
 DISPOSAL DURING THE SUBJECT PERIOD, THE SELECTION OF
 PASSENGERS WILL BE AT YOUR DISCRETION.
 3. WARM REGARDS.
 BT
 1830

COPY 2 OF 4

NNNN

17

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48
 (141)

RTTEZYUW RUEOFIA4869 3221918-EEEE---RUMUMPA; gmm. 03 05
ZRY EEEEE

R 181918Z NOV 70

FM CMC

TO RUMHMA/ CG FMFPAC (ZFF-6)

INFO RUMUMPA/ CG III MAF

BT

UNCLAS E F T O // NO5060//

CG III MAF CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY DECEMBER 1970

1. REQUEST YOU OR YOUR REPRESENTATIVE ACT AS MY REPRESENTATIVE AT THE CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY AND RELAY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME :

2. FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEN. I TAKE GREAT PLEASURE IN COMMENDING YOU FOR YOUR OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP AS THE COMMANDING GENERAL, III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE. YOUR TENURE HAS BEEN A TIME OF MAJOR TRANSITION IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM CONFLICT. THE VIETAMIZATION PROGRAM IN MR I HAS RESULTED IN SUCCESSIVE MAJOR III MAF UNIT REDEPLOYMENT. MORE THAN 40 MARINE CORPS UNITS WITH CORRESPONDING SUPPORT DETACHMENTS. THEIR EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED CARGO HAVE BEEN EMBARKED AND REDEPLOYED FROM THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL AND EFFICIENT MANNER RESULTING IN A SMOOTH TRANSITION FROM
PAGE TWO RUEOFIA4869 UNCLAS E F T O

OVER 50,000 TO 25,000 MEN. WHILE IN THE MIST OF THE REDEPLOYMENT ACTIONS YOU AND YOUR MEN HAVE CONTINUED TO DENY THE ENEMY THE GAINS HE SO DESPERATELY SEEKS AND TO INFLICT LOSSES ON HIM IN PERSONNEL, WEAPONS AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES. PROJECTS PARTICULARLY SUCCESSFUL HAVE BEEN THE ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE THE REFUGEE POPULATION AND TO RESTORE ARABLE LAND TO PRODUCTIVITY AS EVIDENCED BY THE GO NOI ISLAND RESETTLEMENT PROJECT AND THE SUPPORT FOR VIETNAMIZATION THROUGH THE CAP AND CUPP EFFORTS. MY CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU AND YOUR PERSONNEL FOR A DIFFICULT JOB EXCEEDINGLY WELL DONE.

3. FOR LTGEN ROBERTSON. RECENTLY YOU COMMANDED THE FAMED FIRST MARINE DIVISION IN COMBAT AND SUBSEQUENTLY SERVED AS MY DIRECTOR MARINE CORPS RESERVE. YOU ARE UNUSUALLY QUALIFIED TO ASSUME DUTIES AS COMMANDING GENERAL III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE WITH ALL THE MYRIAD RESPONSIBILITIES INHERENT WITH THIS POSITION I AM FULLY CONFIDENT THAT UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM WILL CONTINUE TO BE ENHANCED.

4. YOU BOTH HAVE MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR CONTINUED SUCCESS.

PAGE THREE RUEOFIA4869 UNCLAS E F T O

GENERAL LEONARD F. CHAPMAN, JR., U. S. MARINE CORPS.

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS.

BT

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IN 10504/323-70

/ACK

181918Z NOV 70

18 Copy 2 of 4 19 18

(142)

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

VVPIIAZYUW RUHHFMA 09 69 3222 039 ANNA--R UMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 182039Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

"MCEO"

18Nov 22 37z

B

TOP SECRET. SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE. FOR LIGEN MCCUI CHEON FROM LIGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.; DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000/.

SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

1. (IS) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF CINCPAC 152207Z NOV 70 TO COMUSMACV INFO CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF AND CG FMFPAC, WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR INFORMATION.

QUOTE:

SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

A. JCS 5906/141204Z NOV 70 (PASEP)

1. (IS) REF A ADVISED THAT U.S. ARMY AND USMC MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS MAY CONTINUE, AND COULD PRECLUDE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CURRENTLY PLANNED END FY71 SPACE AUTHORIZATION OF 260,000 FOR U.S. FORCES IN THE RVN. CONSEQUENTLY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION BEYOND END FY71 IS REQUESTED, ALONG WITH AN UPDATED AS-

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1969 TOP SECRET SPECIAL MCEO
ASSESSMENT OF REQUIRED END FY71 IN-COUNTRY SARENGAHS.

FEASIBILITY AND IMPACT OF REDUCING U.S. FORCES IN THE RVN TO NOT GREATER THAN 250,000 BY END FY71 IS ALSO REQUESTED.

2. (C) REQUEST THAT YOUR ANALYSIS AND REASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN PARA 4, REF A, TOGETHER WITH YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, BE PROVIDED NLT 231707Z NOV, INFO CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, AND CG FMFPAC.

UNQUOTE:

2. (IS) MARINE CORPS POSITION CONTINUES TO BE THAT EVEN WITH ADDITIONAL MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY ASSETS, WHICH IS IMPROBABLE, IT WOULD MORE THAN LIKELY BE INFEASIBLE FOR US TO MAINTAIN THE MAB IN-COUNTRY PAST FY-71. CONSEQUENTLY, ARMY WILL EITHER HAVE TO DRAW DOWN IN EUROPE OR MAKE MACV TAKE SHORTAGES OUT OF THEIR HIDE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

B

1969

182039Z NOV 70

"MCEO"

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III MAF 2100/4

COPY 2 OF 4 COPIES

TOP SECRET

(143)

TOP SECRET

PITAZYUW RUHHFMA1985 3222151 AAAA RUMUNPA.
ZNY AAAAA
P 182151Z NOV 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMUNPA/CG III MAF
BT

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

MCEU

T O P S E C R E T. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM
LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING
HOURS. //N02200//

SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

1. (TS) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF JCS 141504Z NOV 70 TO CINCPAC,
INFO COMUSMACV WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR INFORMATION.

QUOTE:

SUBJ: SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

REFS: A. JCS 4845/302219Z OCT 70. B. CINCPAC 030402Z NOV 70.

1. (TS) REF A REQUESTED CINCPAC COMMENTS ON AN ALTERNATIVE TO
CURRENT REDEPLOYMENT PLANS WHICH WOULD RETAIN IN THE RVN THROUGH
FY 72 A MAB OF ABOUT 12,700 IN LIEU OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE UNITS
OF EQUIVALENT STRENGTH. REF B STATED THAT, FOR VARIOUS REASONS,
A FORCE STRUCTURE IN THE RVN BASED ON CURRENTLY PLANNED
AUTHORIZATIONS WAS PREFERRED AND RECOMMENDED.
2. (TS) AN EXAMINATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE IN REF A IN
CONJUNCTION WITH REF B REVEALED THAT:

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA1985 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT MCEU

A. THE US ARMY CANNOT SUPPORT A FORCE LEVEL IN THE RVN OF
203,300 AT END FY 71 BECAUSE OF CURRENT MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY
CONSTRAINTS WITHOUT DEGRADATION OF WORLDWIDE POSTURE AND
UNDESIRABLE INTERVALS BETWEEN SHORT TOURS, NEITHER OF WHICH
WOULD PROVIDE THE MOS BALANCE REQUIRED IN THE RVN.

B. THE US MARINE CORPS CANNOT SUPPORT A MAB IN THE RVN THROUGH
FY 72 BECAUSE OF CURRENT MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS
WITHOUT ADVERSE DRAWDOWNS ON THE CONUS-BASED FMF MANNING LEVEL
AND UNDESIRABLE REDUCTION OF ELEMENTS OF THE PLANNED USMC PACOM
RESERVE.

C. THE US ARMY COULD SUPPORT A FORCE LEVEL IN THE RVN OF
192,500 AT END FY 71 UNDER CURRENT BUDGETARY AND MANPOWER
CONSTRAINTS, ALTHOUGH SOME MOS IMBALANCES AND SHORTAGES IN COMBAT
MOS CATEGORIES WOULD PERSIST.

3. (TS) ON 7 NOV 70, THE JCS INDICATED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE THAT CURRENT REDEPLOYMENT PLANS WHICH CALL FOR AN
ALL-SERVICE AUTHORIZATION IN THE RVN OF 200,000 SPACES AT END
FY 71 PROVIDE THE MINIMUM AUTHORIZATIONS DESIRABLE IN VIEW OF
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE RVN AND THAT REQUIRED RESOURCES
SHOULD BE PROVIDED.

PAGE 1 OF 2

182151Z NOV 70

18

221

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III MAF 210074

COPY 221 COPIES

TOP SECRET

144

TOP SECRET

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA1935 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT MCLO

4. (TS) NEVERTHELESS, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT PRESENT BUDGET AND MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS MAY CONTINUE. NOTWITHSTANDING THE RATIONALE CONTAINED IN PARAS 2, 3, AND 6 OF REF B, REQUEST CINCPAC (A) REANALYZE THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION PROJECTED BEYOND END FY 71 CONSIDERING THE PROGRESS OF CRIMP, THE STATUS OF THE LOC PROGRAM, SUCCESS IN VIETNAMIZATION, CONCEPT OF US OPERATIONS, APPROPRIATE SERVICE BALANCE DURING THE COMBAT PHASE, AND OTHER ASPECTS CINCPAC DEEMS PERTINENT AND (B) PROVIDE AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF REQUIRED END FY 71 IN-COUNTRY STRENGTHS TO INCLUDE THE FEASIBILITY AND IMPACT OF REDUCING US FORCES IN THE RVN TO NOT GREATER THAN 250,000 BY END FY 71.

5. (TS) REQUEST CINCPAC PROVIDE HIS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (INCLUDING COMUSMACV VIEWS, AS APPROPRIATE) ON END FY 71 IN-COUNTRY TOTAL STRENGTHS AND SERVICE BREAKOUT BY 25 NOV 70.

UNQUOTE.

2. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-3

BT

1935

PAGE 2 OF 2

182131Z NOV 70

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(144)

TOP: 191648Z NOV 70

PITUZ YUW RUEOFIA5267 3231608-UUUU--RUHHFMA RUMUMPA.

ZNR UUUUU

RUHHFMA T RUMUMPA

P 191608Z NOV 70

FM CMC

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMNPAC

INFO RUMUMP/CG III MAF

BT

UNCLAS

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN JONES: INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON AND

MGEN ROBERTSON FROM GEN CHAPMAN. DELIVER

DURING WORKING HOURS. //00020//

A. YR 162045Z NOV 70 (C)

1. REF A APPROVED. WARM REGARDS.

BT

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MCEO CONFIDENTIAL

PTIAZYUW RUMHMA2214 220325-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 200325Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO ZEN/CG I MAF

INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

BT

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN WILSON INFO

LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000//

PAKISTAN CYCLONE EMERGENCY DISASTER RELIEF (U)

1. (C) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF JCS 192341Z/NOV70

TO CINCPAC WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR INFORMATION.

PLEASE PROTECT OUR SOURCE.

QUOTE:

SUBJ: PAKISTAN CYCLONE EMERGENCY DISASTER RELIEF (U)

1. (C) DISASTER RELIEF MATERIALS ARRIVING BY SEA AND AIRLIFT ARE BEGINNING TO BACKLOG IN CHITTAGONG AND DACCA DUE TO LACK OF VEHICLES, INCLUDING WATERCRAFT, TO EFFECT DISTRIBUTION TO ISLANDS AND OTHER OUTLYING REGIONS IN THE DISASTER AREA. WHILE STATE HAS NOT YET REQUESTED PACOM SUPPORT IN RELIEF OPERATIONS, IT APPEARS PRUDENT TO DETERMINE NOW WHAT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE IN ORDER

PAGE TWO RUMHMA2214 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O

THAT A TIMELY RESPONSE COULD BE MADE.

2. (C) THE USFPAC ARG/SLF READINESS SITUATION IS RECOGNIZED; HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE OTHER IDENTIFIABLE SUITABLE ASSETS BEYOND THOSE INCLUDED IN THE ARG. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT COULD CONCEIVABLY INVOLVE ELEMENTS OF, A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF, OR A COMPLETE GROUP.

3. (C) REQUEST COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS EARLIEST REGARDING:

A. AVAILABILITY OF ASSETS RANGING FROM SMALL BOATS SUCH AS ARMY ENGINEER ASSAULT BOATS WITH OUTBOARD MOTORS TO LST AND POSSIBLY COMPLETE ARG AND SLF AIR ASSETS TO ASSIST IN DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF MATERIALS IN AREAS RANGING FROM VIRTUALLY OPEN WATER TO THE RESTRICTED AREAS IN THE INLAND WATERWAYS OF THE MOUTHS OF THE GANGES.

B. AN ESTIMATE OF REIMBURSABLE COSTS THAT COULD BE INVOLVED FOR EACH RECOMMENDED OPTION TO INCLUDE A MODIFIED ARG/SLF PACKAGE FOR A 30 DAY PERIOD.

C. AN ESTIMATE OF RESPONSE TIMES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS INVOLVING AIR TRANSPORTABLE SMALL BOATS AS WELL AS SEALIFTED LARGER CRAFT.

D. IMPACT ON CURRENT OPERATIONS/READINESS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY RECOMMENDED OPTION OR ALTERNATIVE.

PAGE THREE RUMHMA2214 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O

UNQUOTE

2. (U) WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

2214

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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200325Z NOV

CONFIDENTIAL

25 MCEO

146

VRTIEZYUW RUEOFIA 6169 3242305-ELDE--RUHHFMA.
ZAZ EEEEE
RUHHFMA-T-F UMUMPA
RUMUMFA-T

RUMUMHA

R 202305Z NOV 70

FM CMC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
INFO RUMUMHA/CG FIRST MAW

B:
UNCLAS E F T O PERSONAL FOR LEGIY MC CUTCHEON, INFO MAJGEN ARMSTRONG
FROM MAJGEN HILL //NO0462//

U-1500 PAYMRY

A. TELCON 07 NOV 70 III MAF AMI DC/S(AIR)

B. CMC MSC 161658Z

1. FUNDING APPROVAL OF U-1500 SYSTEM FOR MARADGRPS RECEIVED
13 NOV. FUNDS TOTALING 1.98M GRANTED FOR INITIAL FY71 BUY OF
U-1500 COMPUTERS. ANTICIPATE DELIVERY OF FIRST HARDWARE SEP 71.
REQUESTING FY72 BUDGET BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE FUNDS FOR REMAINDER VV
OF BUY.

2. NEW SUEJ - WAS A RESULT OF REP A THE RQRT FOR FIRST MAW
SUPO TO ATTEND THE HQMC CONFERENCE. CONSIDERING STANDARDIZATION
OF MAW 1401 COMPUTERS HAS BEEN REEXAMINED. THE CONFERENCE IS
CHAIRED BY A DC/S(AIR) REP (AM) AND WILL DISCUSS IBM-1401
APPLICATIONS ONLY. IN VIEW OF FOREGOING, CANNOT JUSTIFY EARLY.

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA 6169 UNCLAS E F T O //NO10462//

RETURN OF FIRST MAW SUPO.

REP B PERTAINS.

MARK REGARDS.

BT

6169

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202305Z NOV 70

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(147)

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

RITAZYUW RUMHFMA2522 325223 I-AAAA--RUMUMPA.
ZNY AAAAA
R 212231Z NOV 70
FM CG FMFPAC
TO ZEN/CG I MAF
INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
BT

EXCLUSIVE

MCEC

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WILSON INFO
LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO5200//
FORCE PLANNING (U)
A. CG III MAF 200654Z NOV70 (TS) (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE)
B. CMC 121455Z NOV70 (TS) (SPECAT EXCLUSIVE) (PASEP)
1. (TS) IN VIEW OF III MAF'S RECOMMENDED REDUCTIONS
PROPOSED IN REF A, TO MEET IIA SPACE REQUIREMENTS IAW
REF B, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON LOCATING THE
MAF HEADQUARTERS AT CAMP COURTNEY VICE FUTENA. WARM
REGARDS.
GP-4
BT
2522

212231z NOV 70

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III MAF 210074

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

TOP SECRET

(142)

0 2016277 FVV ZEP-1
 1. MC DONALD CHIEF OF STAFF MACV
 TO SEN CLAY COMMANDER 7TH TAV
 LTC MCCAFFERY 2CG USARV LONG BINH
 WIRM KING COMMANDORV PHUONG
 LTC MONTGOMERY COMMANDER III WVF DA NANG
 LTC DAVISON CG II FFV LONG BINH
 LTC COLLINS CG I FFV WU TRANG
 LTC SUTHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG
 W MCCOY CG MAC CAN THO
 ZEN

C O M M E N T I A L MAC 15047 SYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DELEGATION VISIT
 (LOWENSTEIN AND MOOSE)

1. MSSSRS LOWENSTEIN AND MOOSE, CONSULTANTS TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (SSW FULBRIGHT), WILL VISIT RVN ON COMMITTEE BUSINESS 24-26 NOVEMBER 70.
2. PERTINENT PORTIONS OF SECRETATE MESSAGE CONTROL NUMBER 1000, DTG 001702Z NOV 70 ARE QUOTED FYI:

QUOTE:

PURPOSE: ON INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, MSSSRS MOOSE AND LOWENSTEIN, COMMITTEE CONSULTANTS, WILL VISIT SOUTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA IN CONNECTIONS WITH THE RECIPIENTS REQUEST FOR SUP-

PLEMNT ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FUNDS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA.

AUTHORIZATION: U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.

ITINERARY: STD JEM 11/22 (1045) VIA PA 341 STA TOKYO (1655) 11/23, CONNECTING WITH PA NO. 1 STD (1330) ETA HONG KONG

(0155). STD HONG KONG (1400) 11/24 VIA CY 571 ETA SAIGON (1625). STD SAIGON 11/26 (1140) VIN VII 620. STA PHNOM PENH (1120). WILL WORK OUT FURTHER TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS AFTER ARRIVAL SAIGON AND PHNOM PENH. MAY RETURN TO SAIGON AFTER PHNOM PENH BUT MUST BE IN BANGKOK 12/4 IN TIME TO BOARD JL 461 WHICH DEPARTS BANGKOK (1940) AND

ARRIVES PARIS (0355) ON 12/5. DEPARTURE DATE PARIS FOR RETURN TO US NOT YET DECIDED.

1. STAFFDSL DSSIRES BRIEFINGS ON NOVEMBER 25 AND 26 ON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECT:

- A. SITUATION IN CAMBODIA
- B. ARVN OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA
- C. ARVN ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA
- D. TRAINING OF CAMBODIANS IN VIETNAM
- E. US AIR AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA.

(FYI: BOTH MSSSRS MOOSE AND LOWENSTEIN HAVE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TOP SECRET CLEARANCES.)

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2. AMEMB SAIGON REQUESTED TO RESERVE TWO SINGLES AT HOTEL CARAVELLE 11/24-26. CONFIRM TO PERT
NOTE: IF ADDITIONAL BRIEFINGS DECIDED SAIGON THEY CAN BE SCHEDULED FOR RETURN STAY IN SAIGON FOLLOWING PHNOM PENH PORTION OF TRIP.

UNQUOTE:

3. AMEMB, SAIGON IS OPI FOR THIS VISIT, HOWEVER, IT APPEARS FROM THE MSG QUOTED ABOVE THAT MACV WILL BE TASKED WITH THE MAIN BRIEFING BURDEN. A TENTATIVE ITINERARY FOR 25 NOV HAS BEEN DRAFTED TO PROVIDE BRIEFINGS RE THE SUBJECTS LISTED ABOVE. BRIEFINGS WILL BE HELD AT MACV HQ. NO VISITS TO MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OTHER THAN HQ MACV ARE ANTICIPATED BY THE STAFFEDL AT THIS TIME.

4. IN THE EVENT THAT THE STAFFEDL DESIRES VISITS TO FIELD UNITS, THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED.

A. BOTH VISITORS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN INDIVIDUAL ESCORT OFFICER FROM THIS HQ.

B. ESCORT OFFICERS WILL ATTEND ALL BRIEFINGS RECEIVED BY STAFFEDL AND PREPARE COMPREHENSIVE REPORTS ON SUCH

BRIEFINGS.

C. ALL BRIEFINGS WILL BE LIMITED TO THOSE SUBJECTS

LISTED ABOVE AS PERTAIN TO THE HQ CONDUCTING THE BRIEFING.

D. ALL STAFFEDL QUESTIONS WILL BE ANSWERED WITHIN TOP SECRET CLEARANCE AND NSF TO KNOWN CONSTRAINTS. HOWEVER, NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL BE VOLUNTEERED.

E. STAFFEDL WILL BE PROGRAMMED TO ELIMINATE ALL DEAD TIME IN ORDER TO PREVENT STAFFEDL CONTACT WITH PERSONNEL WHOSE STATEMENTS, OPINIONS, CONDUCT OR APPEARANCE WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE MILITARY IN GENERAL AND THIS COMMAND IN PARTICULAR.

F. INDIVIDUAL COMMANDS WILL BE NOTIFIED SEPARATELY IF STAFFEDL VISIT IS PLANNED TO THEIR AREA. SUBJECTIVE ITINERARY WILL BE SENT.

5. ~~AS THE RESULTS OF THE STAFFEDL VISIT MAY WELL HAVE~~

A SIGNIFICANT BEARING ON DOD REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDS IN SUPPORT OF CAMBODIA, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT FACTUAL, ACCURATE AND FAVORABLE INFORMATION BE PROVIDED FREE OF SWEETENING OR PERSONAL OPINION.

SCC NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

SCC

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

RTTCZYUW RUEOFIA6354 3271811-CCCC--RUMFPA.

ZNY CCCCC

R 231811Z NOV 70

FM CMC

TO RUMFPA/CG FIRST MAW

INFO RUHFMA/ CG FMFPAZ

RUMFPA/ CG III MAW

BT

CONFIDENTIAL //N11050//

PERSONAL FROM MGEN HILL TO MGEN ARMSTRONG INFO LGEN JONES AND LGEN MC CUTCHEON

CH-53 CENTERLINE SEATS (U)

A. CG FIRST MAW 180720Z NOV 70

1. (U) YOUR RATIONALE IN REF A IS APPRECIATED AND THIS WILL UPDATE YOU ON OUR EFFORTS TO PROVIDE CENTERLINE SEATS.

2. (C) SIX SETS CENTERLINE SEATS ARE BEING PROCURED BY NAVAIRSYSCOM FROM SIKORSKY. FINAL PROCUREMENT ACTION EXPECTED 23 NOV.

3. (C) FOUR SETS OF AIR FORCE TYPE ARMOR ARE ALSO BEING PROCURED AT THE SAME TIME AND NAVAIRSYSCOM PLANS TO HAVE ONE SIKORSKY FIELD TEAM INSTALL BOTH THE ARMOR AND THE SEATS.

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA6354 C O N F I D E N T I A L

4. (C) CURRENT ESTIMATE IS THAT THE FIELD TEAM WILL DEPART COMUS FOR WESTPAC ABOUT 10 JAN 71.

5. (U) WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED. LHM REGARDS.

GP-4

LT

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NNNR

IN 13248/327-70 JACK

23 NOV 70 19 20

(S) 2P

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CONFIDENTIAL

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FMFPAZ GEN 2100/1 (3/69)
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CONFIDENTIAL

SPECAT

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PITAZYUW RUHHFMA2661 3280258-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

RUMUMPA -T- CG FIRST MARDIV

P 240258Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMULVA/CG FIRST MARDIV

INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L. SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN WIDDECKE
FROM LIGEN JONES. //N30000//

RIFLE COMPANY STRENGTH (U)

1. (C) AS WE BOTH KNOW THERE IS MORE TO THE STAFFING OF RIFLE COMPANIES THAN FIRST MEETS THE EYE. NONETHELESS THE STRENGTH OF THESE COMPANIES MUST BE CONSIDERED A KEY INDICATOR OF THE OVERALL COMBAT READINESS OF THE DIVISION.;
2. (C) THE COMPLEXITIES YOU FACE IN MEETING MANNING LEVEL REQUIREMENTS WITH A LARGE NONEFFECTIVE POPULATION ARE FURTHER COMPLICATED, I KNOW, BY NEEDS TO STAFF MANY BILLETS NOT RECOGNIZED IN YOUR MANNING LEVEL. UNFORTUNATELY, THE LATTER BILLET REQUIREMENTS HAV NOT BEEN REDUCED PROPORTIONALLY AS OUR IN-COUNTRY STRENGTH HAS DROPPED OFF. I AM SURE YOU ARE DOING ALL YOU CAN TO FURTHER REDUCE THESE BILLETS. WE HERE ARE CURRENTLY DEVELOPING A PROPOSAL FOR SUBMISSION TO CMC TO REDUCE

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA2661 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
THE REQUIREMENT FOR YOU TO RETAIN CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF
NONEFFECTIVES ON YOUR ROLLS (SUCH AS THOSE IN OUT-OF-COUNTRY
BRIGS AND HOSPITALS).

3. (C) WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO MAINTAIN YOUR ENLISTED OCC FLD 03 ON ROLLS STRENGTH AT OR ABOVE MANNING LEVEL (TO INCLUDE CATEGORY B BILLETS). ALTHOUGH MUCH OF THE NOVEMBER REPLACEMENT INPUT WILL BE ARRIVING LATE THIS MONTH, WE DO PROJECT YOUR STRENGTH TO BE VERY CLOSE TO MANNING LEVEL BY MONTHS'S END.

4. (C) PLEASE CONTINUE TO GIVE THIS MATTER YOUR CLOSE ATTENTION.; I WOULD WELCOME ANY COMMENT YOU MAY WISH TO PROVIDE SEPARATELY OR ON A RECURRING WEEKLY BASIS AS AN ADDITION TO YOUR AVERAGE RIFLE COMPANY STRENGTH REPORTS. WARM REGARDS.;

&D-4

BT

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240258Z NOV 70

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FMFPAC-GEN 100/100
0101-V04-601

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02

CONFIDENTIAL

(151)

MCEO

SECRET

SPECAT
SPECAT
EXCLUSIVE

P 241324Z NOV 70
FM CMC
TO CG FMFPAC
INFO CG III MAF
BT

TOR 241925Z NOV 70

SECRET S P E C A T EXCLUSIVE FROM GEN. CHAPMAN FOR LTGEN JONES
INFO LTGEN MC CUTCHEON. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER
DURING WORKING HOURS //NO 0220//
VMCJ-1 EMPLOYMENT (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 142241Z NOV 70 (S)

1. (S) SHARE YOUR CONCERN EXPRESSED IN REF A OF MAINTAINING OUR
EA-6A CAPABILITY TO MEET SPECIFIC WESTERN PACIFIC REQUIREMENTS.
PRIORITY ITEMS LISTED IN PARA 4 TO REF A ARE ADDRESSED AS FOLLOWS:
A. VMCJ-1 IS CURRENTLY RECEIVING AND WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE
HIGHEST PRIORITY RESPONSE TO BIT AND PIECE SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS
THAT CAN BE AUTHORIZED. ONE SET OF AN/ALQ-86 COMPONENTS, LESS
TUNERS AND RF AMPLIFIERS SHIPPED TO FIRST MAW(R) DURING PAST 30
DAYS. ADDITIONAL SET W/O TUNERS COULD BE PROVIDED IF REQUIRED.
ALQ-86 TUNERS ARE CRITICAL AND ASSIGNMENT OF PRIORITY TO VMCJ-1
WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE EA-6A MED DEPLOYMENT.

PAGE TWO RUEOFIA6720 SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO

B. CURRENT PRODUCTION EA-6A SSE AND ASSOCIATED TEST EQUIP
BEING DIRECTED IN SUPPORT OF MED DEPLOYMENT AND TO VMCJ-V2
REASSIGNMENT OF THIS EQUIPMENT TO VMCJ-1 WOULD DELAY SCHEDULED
MED DEPLOYMENT AND ADVERSELY IMPACT ON FLIGHT CREW AND MAINTENANCE
PERSONNEL TRAINING CAPABILITY. SELECTIVE REPLACEMENTS, WHEN
IDENTIFIED, WILL RECEIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT FROM THIS PC.

C. EXAMINATION OF TOTAL EA-6A CRITICAL SKILLS INDICATES VMCJ-1
IS SHORT CERTAIN SKILLS. HOWEVER, FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS IT
APPEARS THAT THESE RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE A-6A ASSETS
NOW IN WESTPAC. IN VIEW OF CURRENT WORLD-WIDE EA-6A COMMITMENTS,
ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL ABOVE THOSE CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED WILL BE
EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE. REQUEST YOU IDENTIFY ANY ADDI-
TIONAL EA-6A PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS BY NUMBERS, GRADE AND MOS.

D. RE-ENTRY OF EA-6A INTO SEASIA AS PART OF MARINE AIR/
GROUND TEAM IS CONSISTENT WITH INTENT FOR EMPLOYMENT OF PACOM
RESERVE AND APPROVAL IS GRANTED CONTINGENT UPON THE FOLLOWING:
(1) RE-ENTRY APPROVAL CAN BE OBTAINED THROUGH CINCPAC/JCE
CHANNELS.;

(2) TOTAL EW ELEMENT OF VMCJ-1 DEPLOYS INTACT WITH EA-6A
PECULIAR SSE.

PAGE 1 OF 2

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SECRET

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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MCEO

"EXCLUSIVE"

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PAGE THREE RUEOF1A6720 S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
:3) COLLOCATING ELEMENT AT SUITABLE LAND BASE WITH A-6A
UNIT POSSESSING ADEQUATE GSE AND SSE.
2.(S) REGRET UNABLE TO READJUST PRIORITIES MORE FAVORABLY AT
THIS TIME; HOWEVER, IF MIDDLE EAST AND/OR WESTPAC SITUATIONS
SHOULD CHANGE, PRIORITY OF EFFORT WILL BE DIRECTED TO SATISFY
WESTERN PACIFIC REQUIREMENTS. CONTINUED EMPHASIS WILL BE GIVEN
TO FULFILLING SELECTIVE AND SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS AFFECTING
COMBAT CAPABILITY OF VMCJ-1 AS RECEIVED.

WARM REGARDS

GP-3

BT

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PAGE 2 OF 2

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MCEO

(152)

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RUM60AA2085 3281428-CCCC--RUMUMPA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 241428Z NOV 70

FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF -

RUMUMHA/CG FIRST MAW
RUMHLAA/CG FIRST MARDIV

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L //NO0000//

FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, AGENS ARMSTRONG AND WILDECKE FROM WEISNER

1. I WOULD BE MOST DELIGHTED IF THE THREE OF YOU COULD JOIN ME

FOR OUR DAILY BRIZJ AND FOR LUNCH ON 27 NOV. OUR BRIEF STARTS

AT 1100 TO BE FOLLOWED BY LUNCH AT 1200. THE COMMAND SHIP WILL

BE IN THE VICINITY OF BARANG HARBOR AT THAT TIME.

2. ALL BEST WISHES.

GP-4

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IN 13719/328-70 JACK

24 NOV 70 15 41Z

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241428Z NOV 70

FMFPAC GEN (3/69)
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CONFIDENTIAL 28

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

"EXCLUSIVE"

"MCEO"

P 242250Z NOV 70
FM CG I MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
INFO CG III MAF
BT

TOP SECRET / SPECAT / EXCLUSIVE / FOR LTGEN JONES /
INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON / FROM MAJGEN WILSON / MCEO
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS
FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 212231Z NOV 70 (TS) (SPECAT) (EXCLUSIVE)

1. (TS) REF A REQUESTED COMMENT ON LOCATING THE III MAF HQ AT COURTNEY VICE FUTHERA. IN VIEW OF THE 114 SPACE LIMITATION IMPOSED ON THAT HQ.
2. (TS) SINCE THE III MAF STAFF WILL BE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME SIZE AS THE I MAF STAFF, I RECOMMEND THE MAF HQ REMAIN AT COURTNEY.
3. (TS) CG III MAF AND CG THIRD MARDIV CAN WORKOUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THEIR PERSONAL OFFICES AND QUARTERS.
4. (TS) WE ARE QUITE CROWDED WITH OFFICERS HERE AT COURTNEY. I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH BOB BARRON THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVERTING BLDG 4428 FROM BARRACKS TO EOQ. THIS IS THE BLDG WHICH OVERLOOKS HELI PAD. WE MAY PROPOSE TO PARTITION IT INTO 2 MAIN ROOMS AND INSTALL A LAVATORY IN EACH ROOM. OTHER HEAD FACILITIES REMAIN CENTRALIZED. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE 17,000 DOLLARS.
5. (TS) IN SUMMARY, RETENTION OF THE MAF AT COURTNEY IS MOST ECONOMICAL, LEAST DISRUPTIVE AND AVOIDS DUPLICATING SOME FACILITIES ALL READY IN EXISTENCE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP-4
BT

242250Z NOV 70

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III MAF 210074

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"MCEO"
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TOP SECRET
(15)

O 250925Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1
 FM LTG SUTHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DNG
 TO LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DNG
 MG BALDWIN CG 23RD INF DIV CHL
 MC HENNESSEY CG 101ST ABN DIV (AMBL) CEE
 ZEN/BG HILL CG 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV (MECH) QTR
 ZEN/BG MEYER CG XXIV CORPS ARTY DNG
 COL GREER CO 108TH ARTY GP PHB
 ZEN/LTC RADU CO 212TH AVN BN DNG
 ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L DNG 2744 EYES ONLY
 MG HENNESSEY CG 101ST PLEASE PASS TO COL GREER CO 108TH ARTY
 GP PHB

SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT ENGINE FAILURES (U)

1. (C) RECENT HIGH INCIDENTS OF AIRCRAFT ENGINE FAILURE SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY OF SABOTAGE. INCIDENTS INVOLVING TAMPERING WITH US ARMY AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN RECENT MONTHS.
 2. (C) YOU COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS SHOULD BE ENJOINED TO INSURE THROUGH FLIGHT LINE SECURITY. THE NECESSITY FOR PROPER PREFLIGHT INSPECTIONS MUST BE REITERATED TO ALL AVIATORS. WE MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO DETECT ANY ATTEMPT OF POSSIBLE SABOTAGE OF AIRCRAFT.
- GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATE

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CONFIDENTIAL

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O 250135Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1
 FM LT SUTHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG
 TO GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON
 INFO LTG COLLINS CG I FFORCEV VHA TRANG
 LTG DAVISON CG II FORCEV LONG BINH
 LTG MCCAFFREY DCG USARV LONG BINH
 LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DMG
 MG MCCOWN CG CMAC CAN THO
 ZFM

S F C R E T DMG 2746 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: VNAF AIR SUPPORT (U)

A. MY LETTER (C) SUBJ: SUPPORT FOR ARVN
 AERIAL OBSERVERS (U), 17 NOV 70.

1. (C) VNAF PROGRESS TOWARD PROVIDING
 PROGRAMMED AIR SUPPORT IS GOING ACCORDING
 TO SCHEDULE. IN PARTICULAR, FAVORABLE
 COMMENTS CONCERNING THE QUALITY AND SKILLS
 OF THE VNAF PILOTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED
 FROM THOSE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
 TRAINING OF THE 233RD AWC.

2. (C) IN MR-1 NUMEROUS SUCCESSFUL COMBAT
 ASSAULT OPERATIONS UTILIZING COMPANY SIZE
 MANEUVER ELEMENTS AND A FEW BATTALION
 SIZE UNITS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED USING ALL
 VNAF ASSETS TO INCLUDE C&C, LIFT AND
 GUNSHIP SUPPORT WITH ARVN ARTY OR VNAF
 TAC AIR PREP FOR THE COMPLETE OPERATION
 BEING CONDUCTED AND CONTROLLED BY VNAF
 ALO'S OR OBSERVERS. IN ADDITION TO SUCCESS-
 FUL COMBAT ASSAULTS VNAF IS CAPABLE OF
 CONDUCTING EAGLE FLIGHTS. AT THE PRESENT
 TIME VNAF IS FLYING SOLE FAC SUPPORT IN
 QUANG NGAI PROVINCE. THIS INCLUDES CONTROL
 OF ALL AIR STRIKES, VR AND CONVOY ESCORT
 FOR 2D ARVN DIV TROOPS IN THIS AREA.
 RESPONSIVENESS OF VNAF SUPPORT HAS SHOWN
 A STEADY IMPROVEMENT.

3. (S) THERE ARE; HOWEVER, SEVERAL AREAS
 WHICH ARE STILL DEFICIENT:

A. REF A DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM THAT
 VNAF PRESENTLY PROVIDES NO SUPPORT FOR
 ARVN AERIAL OBSERVER MISSIONS AND THERE
 ARE NO KNOWN PLANS FOR PROVIDING SUCH
 SUPPORT IN THE FUTURE. THERE IS A PRO-
 HIBITION OF ALLOWING ASSIGNED ARVN G2
 AND ARTILLERY AERIAL OBSERVERS TO FLY
 IN O-1 AIRCRAFT. THIS IS THE RESULT OF
 A VNAF REGULATION REQUIRING ALL OBSERVERS
 IN O-1 AIRCRAFT TO BE GRADUATES OF THE
 VNAF AERIAL OBSERVERS TRAINING SCHOOL.
 UNFORTUNATELY VNAF FAC'S DO NOT AGGRESS-
 IVELY PERFORM VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE
 SEEKING TARGETS, NOR COORDINATE ACTIVELY
 WITH THE GROUND COMMANDER FOR ARVN RE-

QUANG NGAI.

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B. BECAUSE OF RESTRICTIONS PLACE ON THE FLYING OF HELICOPTERS AT NIGHT, VNAF HAS A VERY LIMITED CAPABILITY FOR NIGHT OPERATIONS. IN PARTICULAR THIS POSES A PROBLEM IN MEDICAL EVACUATION OF ARVN WOUNDED. COMPOUNDING THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN THE ABSENCE OF A VNAF MEDICAL EVACUATION HELICOPTER UNIT IN MR-1. FROM 1 OCTOBER 1969 TO 26 NOVEMBER 1969 TWO UH-1H HELICOPTERS OF THE 213TH VNAF SQUADRON WERE DEDICATED TO AERO-MEDICAL EVACUATION OF ARVN CASUALTIES IN QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE. DURING THIS PERIOD THE 213TH SQUADRON EVACUATED 163 CASUALTIES. THE VNAF SQUADRON LIMITED ITS OPERATIONS TO DAYLIGHT HOURS AS REQUIRED IN RVNAF JGS MEMO NUMBER 7347, 26 NOV 69. ON 27 NOV 69 THE TWO DEDICATED VNAF AIRCRAFT WERE REASSIGNED TO HIGHER PRIORITY MISSIONS BY CG, I CORPS AND SINCE THAT DATE FLY MEDEVAC MISSIONS ONLY IF AIRCRAFT ARE AVAILABLE. AS A RESULT, US MEDICAL EVACUATION HELICOPTERS HAVE TRANSPORTED AN AVERAGE OF 3,633 VIETNAMESE PATIENTS PER MONTH.

C. THE 213TH HAS NOT REACHED FULL POTENTIAL IN THAT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT FLYABLE IS CONTINUALLY COMMITTED AND FALLS BELOW NORMAL EXPECTATIONS. IT REQUIRES MAXIMUM EFFORT TO MAKE 8-9 HELICOPTERS AVAILABLE AND OFTEN FALLS BELOW THAT NUMBER. SHORTAGE OF VNAF PILOTS, TECHNICAL PROFICIENCY OF MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL, AND INADEQUATE AVIATION LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ALL CONTRIBUTE TO THIS LOW AVAILABILITY RATE. VNAF HELICOPTER RESPONSE COULD BE MORE PREDICTABLE IF VNAF HEADQUARTERS WOULD REQUIRE A DEFINITE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT FOR OPERATIONS EACH DAY. VNAF UNITS WOULD THEN BE REQUIRED TO WORK TOWARD A STANDARD INSTEAD OF PROVIDING WHAT IS AVAI

ABLE. THE RESPONSIVENESS OF VNAF TO ARVN REQUIREMENTS WILL BE GREATLY INFLUENCED BY THE FORESIGHT, PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT ABILITY OF THE USING ARVN UNITS.

D. AT THE PRESENT TIME ARVN UNITS IN MR-1 ARE HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON US ARMY AVIATION ASSETS PROVIDED BY THE 171ST ABN DIV (AMBL), 1ST MAR DIV AND THE 23RD INF DIV. ARVN RELIES HEAVILY ON US AIR SUPPORT FOR SENSOR OPERATIONS. RECENT

156-2

EXPERIENCE IN THE 2D ARVN DIVISION HAS SHOWN THAT VNAF HELICOPTER PILOTS CAN READILY BECOME PROFICIENT IN FLYING AIR-DROP SENSOR MISSIONS WITH 8-12 HOURS TRAINING. THE CAPABILITY HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED; HOWEVER, A MAJOR SHORTCOMING CONTINUES TO BE LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN ARVN AND VNAF. VNAF CURRENTLY MEETS ONLY 50 PERCENT OF THEIR BROADCAST AND LEAFLET MISSION REQUESTS.

F. BY THE END OF FY 71 TWO VNAF A-37 SQUADRONS WILL BE ABLE TO SUPPLY 36 TAC AIR SORTIES PER DAY OR 25 SORTIES PER ARVN MANEUVER BATTALION PER MONTH. THIS DOES NOT CONSIDER SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR TERRITORIAL FORCES. FY 72 PROGRAMMED ASSETS WILL INCREASE EACH SQUADRON BY 24 AIRCRAFT, PROVIDING A CAPABILITY OF 48 SORTIES PER DAY. IN FY 72 THE TWO LIAISON SQUADRONS PROGRAMMED SHOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE 40 FAC SORTIES PER DAY.

F. DURING A TRIAL PERIOD, THE VNAF 110TH LIAISON SQUADRON HAS DEMONSTRATED THE CAPABILITY TO EMPLOY THE KA-39A CAMERAS ON THE O-1 BIRDDOG. WITH SUFFICIENT KA-39A CAMERAS, VNAF COULD SUPPORT APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF THEIR CURRENT REQUIREMENTS.

G. AS US UNITS ARE WITHDRAWN VNAF MUST BE ABLE TO DISPERSE AND PROVIDE RESPONSIVE SUPPORT TO THE ARVN DIVISION COMMANDER. THIS CAN BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY STATIONING ONE VNAF AHC AT HUE AND ONE AT QUANG NGAI IN SUPPORT OF THE 1ST AND 2D ARVN DIVISIONS RESPECTIVELY. FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS SUCH AS QUANG TRI WOULD FURTHER INSURE CLOSE SUPPORT TO THE GROUND COMMANDER.

4. (H) ADDITIONAL DETAILED INFORMATION FROM AFAT-1 AND I-BASO CONCERNING VNAF LACK OF GROUND AND AIRBORNE RADIO EQUIPMENT, AND OVERALL RESPONSIVENESS TO IMMEDIATE DIRECT REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT HAS BEEN FORWARDED THROUGH AIR FORCE CHANNELS. GP4.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATE

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THIS MESSAGE REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY

156-3

CONFIDENTIAL

PTTCZYUW RUHG0AA2321 3300854-CCCC--RUMUMPA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 260854Z NOV 70

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF _____

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM WEISNER

A. YOUR 260026Z NOV 70

1. I AM SORRY YOU ARE NOT FEELING WELL AND WISH YOU THE SPEEDIEST OF RECOVERIES. WILL BE DELIGHTED TO HAVE BGEN MILLER JOIN US.

2. ALL BEST WISHES.

GP-4

BT

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IN 14670/330-70 JACK

26 Nov 10 10 02z

260854 Z NOV 70

FORM AC-61N 1 (3/69)

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RUMULVA2533 33 10330-AAAA--RUMUNPA.

ZNY AAAAA

RUMUNPA-T-CG FMFPAC

RUMUNPA-T-CG III MAF

P 270330Z NOV 70

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUMUNPA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMUNPA/CG III MAF

BT

S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y / E X C L U S I V E F O R
LTGEN JONES INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MGEN
WIDDECKE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY.

A. CG FMFPAC MSG 240258Z NOV70 (C) SPECAT

1. REFERENCE A ADDRESSED THE LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MAINTAINING RIFLE COMPANY STRENGTHS AT AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL AND OUTLINED THE STEPS BEING TAKEN BY YOUR STAFF TO ASSIST THE DIVISION IN OUR EFFORTS TO KEEP THESE COMPANIES AT MAXIMUM POSSIBLE STRENGTH. THE UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT EVIDENCED IN THE REFERENCE AND THE CONTINUING ASSISTANCE THAT YOU AND YOUR STAFF HAVE PROVIDED IN PERSONNEL MATTERS ARE APPRECIATED.
2. AS A MATTER OF INTEREST THE STAFF HERE HAD BEEN WORKING ON A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO YOU SUMMARIZING CERTAIN PERSONNEL PROBLEM AREAS AND SETTING FORTH RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS. HOWEVER, AS A RESULT OF INFORMATION PROVIDED INFORMALLY BY YOUR STAFF CONCERNING FORTHCOMING PROJECTED IOPUT, MY PROPOSED MESSAGE HAS

PAGE TWO RUMULVA2533 S E C R E T / S P E C A T / M A R I N E C O R P S E Y E S O N L Y /
EXCLUSIVE FOR

- BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AND HAS BEEN SHELVED. HOWEVER, CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THAT MESSAGE WERE DIRECTLY RELATED TO RIFLE COMPANY STATUS AND ARE PROVIDED AT THIS TIME FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
3. THE PRIMARY CAUSES FOR THE REDUCTION IN THE ON-ROLLS AND EFFECTIVE STRENGTHS HAVE BEEN THE REDUCED INPUT DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF NOVEMBER AND THE CONTINUING NON-EFFECTIVE POPULATION. THE RECENT SURGE IN IN-PUT WHICH SHOULD SEE THE DIVISION APPROACH MANNING LEVEL BY END NOVEMBER WILL DO MUCH TO MOVE THE ON-ROLLS STRENGTH OF EACH COMPANY TOWARDS THE 200 MAN LEVEL AND THE EFFECTIVE STRENGTH PROPORTIONATELY UPWARD.
 4. AS PART OF OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS WE ARE AGAIN REVIEWING THE PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT AND EMPLOYMENT PROCEDURES WITHIN THE DIVISION WITH EMPHASIS ON THE HEADQUARTERS BATTALION AND THE INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS TO ENSURE THAT EVERY POSSIBLE MAN IS ASSIGNED TO THE RIFLE COMPANIES AND THE FIRING BATTERIES.
 5. COMMENCING 27 NOVEMBER THE AVERAGE WEEKLY RIFLE COMPANY STRENGTH REPORT WILL BE EXPANDED TO PROVIDE AN ESTIMATE OF OUR LOSSES AND GAINS IN OCCUPATIONAL FIELD 03 AND PROVIDE A PROJECTION OF FUTURE TRENDS IN RIFLE COMPANY STRENGTHS. IT

PAGE 1 OF 2
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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270330Z NOV 70

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MCEO

PAGE THREE RUMULVA2585 S E C R E T/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/
EXCLUSIVE FOR
IS BELIEVED THAT THIS DATA WILL PROVIDE YOUR STAFF WITH MORE
TIMELY INFORMATION AS TO PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS AND WILL KEEP
YOU INFORMED AS TO OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS KEEPING OUR RIFLE COMPANIES
AT THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE STRENGTH. BEST REGARDS.

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270330Z NOV 70

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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O 281111Z ZYH ZFF-3 ZFF-6

FM MG MAPLES ACOFS JA COMUSMACV SAIGON VIETNAM
 TO MG WOOLWINE ADCG-MAT USARV LBN RVN
 INFO LTG MC CUTCHSON CG III MAF DNG RVN
 MG FUSON DCSLOG USARPAC HAWAII
 ZEM

T O P S E C R E T MAC 15300 EYSS ONLY

SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF CLASS V (W) LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FROM
 USMC TO USURV (U)

REF: A. BC ARV 3372 240315Z NOV 70

B. MACV MSG DTG 271127Z NOV 70

1. (C) YOUR BACK CHANNEL, REAFFIRMING SUPPORT PLANNING OF ONE REGIMENTAL LANDING TSAM, (RLT) CITES PROBLEMS OF SUPPORT ON 1 JANUARY BASE DATE. I AGREE THAT USURV CANNOT BE TASKED TO DO THE IMPOSSIBLE.
 2. (TS) REF B GIVES TENTATIVE STANDDOWN DATES FOR MARINS UNITS IN INCREMENT SIX. COMBAT UNITS OF THE REDEPLOYING RLT STANDDOWN FROM 15 FEB TO 24 MAR. FORCE LOGISTICS PHASSDOWN OF 809 TROOPS FROM CURRENT 3000 OCCURS AFTER 11 MAR.
 3. (TS) SINCE USURV ADMIN PLAN 2-70 PLANS SUPPORT OF ONE RLT UND ROKMC BDE, AN IMPLEMENTATION DATE OF 15 FEB APPSARS REASONABLE. REMAINING USMC LOG FORCES COULD ASSIST IN TRANSITIONAL PSRIOD POST TET 71 - 3 APR, WHEN LAST USMC UNITS IN INCREMENT SIX REDEPLOY.
 4. (C) DETAILED PLANNING, INCLUDING REMAINING WEAPONS, DISPOSITION OF SXCESSSS, ISSA, RATES, INVSNTORY, AND TURN-OVER OF USP 2, REQUIRES CLOSE COORDINATION OF III MAF UND USURV, WITH CONSIDSRATION OF ARVN PLANS FOR ASP 1.
- WARMNREGARDS.
 GP-4

SSO NOTE : DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

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TOP SECRET

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(159)

TOP SECRET

MCEC

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PITAZYUW RUHHFMA3226 3322219-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

P 282219Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

ZEN/CG I MAF

BT.

TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR, LTGEN MCCUTCHEON, MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. (SECTION I OF V)

//NO0000//

SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

1. (TS) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF CINCPAC 262117Z NOV 70 (TS) TO JCS, INFO COMUSMACV, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CG FMFPAC, ADMIN CINCPAC WHICH I AM PROVIDING FOR INFORMATION.

QUOTE:

SOUTHEAST ASIA REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

A. JCS 5906/141504Z NOV 70 (PASEP)

1. (TS) REF A ADVISED THAT CURRENT BUDGET AND MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS COULD PRECLUDE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 260,200 U.S. FORCE LEVEL CURRENTLY PLANNED FOR THE RVN, AND REQUEST-

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA3226 TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC ED (1) A RE-ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN THE RVN BEYOND THE END OF FY71, AND (2) AN ASSESSMENT OF THE REQUIRED END FY71 IN COUNTRY STRENGTHS, TO INCLUDE COMMENTS ON THE FEASIBILITY AND IMPACT OF REDUCING U.S. FORCES IN THE RVN TO NOT GREATER THAN 250,000 BY END FY71.

2. (TS) GENERAL. THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE RVN IS PROJECTED BEYOND END FY71 WHEREVER POSSIBLE, AND CONSIDERS THE PROGRESS OF GRIMP, THE STATUS OF THE LOC PROGRAM,

AND PROGRESS IN VIETNAMIZATION, WHERE APPLICABLE.

IT PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR THE REQUESTED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND THE MINIMUM END FY71 U.S. FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCOMPLISHING U.S. PRIORITY GOALS IN THE RVN.

3. (TS) ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.

A. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(1) THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF NORTH VIETNAM IN INDOCHINA REMAIN BASICALLY UNCHANGED. THE PRIMARY AIM OF HANOI IS THE REUNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM UNDER ITS CONTROL. THE LONG TERM GOAL IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OVER LAOS AND CAMBODIA, BUT THIS REMAINS SUBORDINATE TO THE PRIMARY AIM OF REUNIFICATION.

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III MAF 100/4

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TOP SECRET

(160)

TOP SECRET

"MCEO"

EXCLUSIVE SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3226 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O

(2) THE ENEMY IS FACED WITH NEW PROBLEMS HE HAS NOT ENCOUNTERED IN THE LAST DECADE. AT THE PRESENT TIME, LAOS IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO HANOI, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE SUPPLY CORRIDOR THROUGH THE LAO PANHANDLE. THIS IS CURRENTLY THE ONLY FEASIBLE ROUTE AVAILABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS FOR MOVING MEN AND SUPPLIES TO CAMBODIA AND THE COSVN AREA OF SOUTH VIETNAM. HANOI HAS BEEN FORCED TO EXPAND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF KOMPONG SOM, DISRUPTION OF LOC'S BY THE CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO CAMBODIA, AND THE CRITICAL NEED TO RESUPPLY ITS FORCES IN THE SOUTH. IN CAMBODIA, THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN MARCH OBLIGED THE ENEMY TO REASSESS THE SITUATION AND REORIENT HIS EFFORTS TO REPLACE VITAL SUPPLY LINES. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, HE ELECTED TO DIVERT MAIN FORCE UNITS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM, FURTHER LIMITING HIS OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE COSVN AREA OF THE REPUBLIC. THE ENEMY'S FUTURE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IN SOUTHERN INDOCHINA IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO HIS ABILITY TO SOLVE THE SEVERE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH HE NOW FACES.

(3) DESPITE HIS MANY UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS, THE ENEMY

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA3226 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O

IS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN A LIMITED CAPABILITY FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. HE WILL PROBABLY RETAIN THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT LIMITED GROUND ATTACKS IN SELECTED AREAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, AND LAOS. DESPITE INCREASING MANPOWER DEMANDS, THE ENEMY RETAINS THE CAPABILITY TO INFILTRATE PERSONNEL INTO THE SOUTH AND HAS INCREASED INFILTRATION INTO THE COSVN AREA. THE VC/NVA WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT SAPPER, TERRORIST, AND GUERRILLA ATTACKS ON POPULATED AREAS IN THE RVN AND WILL PROBABLY STEP-UP ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN HIS VIETNAMESE INFRASTRUCTURE TO CARRY OUT POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. INCREASED ENEMY EMPHASIS WILL PROBABLY BE GIVEN TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE IN CAMBODIA. THE DEPLOYMENT OF SEVERAL SAPPER UNITS INTO CAMBODIA SINCE APRIL SUGGESTS THAT THE ENEMY WILL INCREASE THIS TYPE ACTIVITY IN THE FUTURE. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT HANOI WILL CONTINUE ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE U.S. RESOLVE AND GVN EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH

PROTRACTED STRUGGLE;

(4) CONSIDERING THE ENEMY'S CURRENT PROBLEMS, CAPABILITIES, AND OPTIONS, THE FOLLOWING TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE ARE ANTICIPATED:

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PAGE FIVE RUHHFMA3226 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O

(A) NVA IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE ITS STRATEGY OF PROTRACTED WARFARE IN SOUTH VIETNAM UTILIZING GUERRILLA AND LOCAL FORCES TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENCE IN POPULATED AREAS.; INCREASED EMPHASIS WILL BE GIVEN TO COUNTER PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES AND THE STRENGTHENING OF GUERRILLA AND SAPPER FORCES. THE ENEMY WILL CONTINUE TO UTILIZE LIMITED GROUND ATTACKS BY FIRE TO COUNTER PACIFICATION AND CAUSE ALLIED CASUALTIES WITH A MINIMUM OF EXPOSURE OF HIS OWN PERSONNEL.

(B) IN CAMBODIA, THE SHORT TERM MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF NVN ARE PROBABLY TO SECURE A SUPPLY CORRIDOR IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE COUNTRY AND TO NEUTRALIZE FANK INTERFERENCE WITH REESTABLISHMENT OF LOC'S AND BASE AREAS. TO CONTAIN FANK IN THE POPULATION CENTERS AND THUS ACHIEVE GREATER SECURITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THE VC/VVA WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE THEIR CURRENT ATTACKS AGAINST SMALL URBAN AREAS AROUND PHNOM PENH AND CITIES LOCATED ON KEY ROAD AND WATER ROUTES. THE COMMUNISTS ARE ALSO LIKELY TO EXPAND THEIR WAR EFFORTS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES, BOTH TO OBTAIN CONTROL OVER THE RICH GROWING AREA AND TO FORCE THE FANK TO SPREAD

PAGE SIX RUHHFMA3226 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
MORE THINLY, INCREASING ITS VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK.

(C) IN THE LONG TERM, COMMUNIST STRATEGY WILL DEPEND IN PART ON THE SUCCESS OF CURRENT LOGISTICAL EFFORTS IN THE LAO PANHANDLE AND THE PACE OF U.S. WITHDRAWALS. UNLESS ENEMY FORCES ARE RESUPPLIED IN THE SOUTH THEIR ABILITY TO CONDUCT SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS THE EFFECT OF INCREASED COMMUNIST ACTIVITY ON U.S. WITHDRAWALS. LIMITED ENEMY MILITARY PRESSURE WHICH WOULD NOT SERIOUSLY THREATEN THE SAFETY OF REMAINING U.S. FORCES WOULD MOST LIKELY NOT AFFECT THE PACE OF U.S. WITHDRAWALS. HOWEVER, A MAJOR INCREASE IN ACTIVITY MAY WELL SLOW DOWN OR HALT REDEPLOYMENT. THEREFORE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT ENEMY MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE LONG TERM WILL PROBABLY BE DESIGNED TO CONTRIBUTE TO HIS COUNTER-PACIFICATION EFFORTS AND WILL BE TAILORED TO THE ACCELERATED WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES. HOWEVER, ONCE THE WITHDRAWALS ARE COMPLETED AND IF NORTH VIETNAM SUCCEEDS IN RESOLVING ITS LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTH, ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY MIGHT WELL INCREASE IN SCOPE AND INTENSITY.

B. ALLIED SITUATION BY MILITARY REGIONS.

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TOP SECRET

PITAZYUW RUMHFM 3229 33222 19-AAAA--RUMUMPA.
 ZNY. AAAAAA
 P 2822 19Z NOV 70
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG I MAF
 BT

SPECAT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON,
 MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //NO0000// SECTION II OF V

(1) MR I. OPERATIONS IN MR I IN SUPPORT OF THE SUMMER
 CAMPAIGN WERE NOT COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL IN ELIMINATING ENEMY
 MAIN FORCE UNITS; HOWEVER, THE ENEMY HAS WITHDRAWN TO THE
 WESTERN PORTION OF THE REGION AND HIS ACCESS TO THE POPULATION
 CENTERS HAS BEEN RESTRICTED. ALLIED EFFORTS TO CONTROL AND
 PROTECT NATURAL RESOURCES WITH PRIORITY GIVEN TO RICE DENIAL
 OPERATIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL. SECURITY OF THE LOCAL RICE HARVEST
 WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY TERRITORIAL FORCES WHILE REGULAR UNITS
 PROVIDED SECURITY IN CONTESTED AREAS. THERE HAS BEEN IMPROVE-
 MENT IN THE ABILITY OF TERRITORIAL FORCES TO CARRY OUT THEIR
 RESPONSIBILITIES IN IMPLEMENTING THE AREA SECURITY CONCEPT,
 BUT AS IN OTHER REGIONS, THESE FORCES HAVE LEADERSHIP AND
 DESERTION PROBLEMS. SHOULD THE ENEMY ELECT TO INITIATE

PAGE TWO RUMHFM 3229 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
 LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS, RVNAF DOES NOT CURRENTLY POSSESS
 THE CAPABILITY TO COMBAT THE THREAT WITHOUT ASSISTANCE
 FROM THE U.S./FMFPAC.

(2) MR II. DURING THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN FOURTEEN KNOWN
 OR SUSPECTED ENEMY BASE AREAS WERE TARGETED AND ELEVEN WERE
 ATTACKED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF SUCCESS. THIS CAMPAIGN DID
 NOT COMPLETELY IDENTIFY AND DISRUPT INFILTRATION ROUTES AND
 LOC'S FROM THE TARGET AREAS. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN VC
 MR VI AND THE HIGHLANDS. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN RECENT
 IMPROVEMENT DUE IN PART TO REPLACEMENT OF THE MR II COMMANDER,
 THERE WAS A GENERAL LACK OF AGGRESSIVE SPIRIT ON THE PART
 OF ARVN AND ROK FORCES. THE INAUGURATION OF LOCK-ON OPERATIONS,
 TARGETING FRIENDLY FORCES AGAINST SPECIFIC ENEMY UNITS, AND
 CORPS-WIDE EMPHASIS ON TRAINING AND SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS
 SHOULD ACHIEVE IMPROVED RESULTS. TERRITORIAL FORCE GROWTH
 HAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED RVNAF MR II CAPABILITIES. IT
 HAS BEEN NECESSARY IN SOME CASES TO USE REGULAR FORCES TO AUGMENT
 TERRITORIAL FORCES IN SECURE AREAS AND CONSOLIDATION ZONES AT
 THE EXPENSE OF OPERATIONS IN THE CLEARING ZONES. THE ON-GOING
 REDEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT IN THE

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"MC"

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PAGE THREE RUHFMA3229 T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R M C E O
 VACATED AREAS UNTIL REMAINING U.S./RVN FORCES ARE REALIGNED
 AND AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY ADJUSTED TO COVER THESE AREAS.

(3) MR III. THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN GOALS OF ATTRITION
 AGAINST ENEMY FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE WERE GENERALLY
 ATTAINED. THE ENEMY'S DETERMINATION TO DISRUPT THE PACIFI-
 CATION PROGRAM PERSISTED IN SPITE OF THE SUPPLY PROBLEMS
 WHICH HINDERED HIS OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. EFFORTS BY THE
 ENEMY ALONG THIS LINE WERE DISRUPTED, WHICH CAN BE ATTRIBUTED
 TO HIS MOVEMENT DEEPER INTO CAMBODIA AND THE U.S./RVNAF
 CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS. WITH THE REDUCED LEVEL OF ACTIVITY,
 RVNAF PROGRESSIVELY ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE CONDUCT
 OF THE INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS OVER LARGER AREAS. FLEXIBILITY
 WAS ASSURED BY THE PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL U.S. AND FW FORCES
 WITHIN MR III FOR REINFORCEMENT, IF NECESSARY. TERRITORIAL
 FORCES HAVE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURING LARGER
 AREAS AROUND SOME POPULATION CENTERS AND LOC'S, THUS FREEING
 REGULAR UNITS FOR OPERATIONS IN BASE AREAS, INTERDICTION
 EFFORTS, AND CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA. THE
 INCREASE IN RVNAF CAPABILITY AND THE PLANNED REALIGNMENTS
 TO COMPENSATE FOR U.S. REDEPLOYMENTS, COUPLED WITH THE THUS-

PAGE FOUR RUHFMA3229 T O P S E C R E T S P E C I A L E X C L U S I V E F O R M C E O
 FAR STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN MR III TERRITORIAL FORCES ARE EXPECTED
 TO OFFSET ANY ADVERSE EFFECT OF THE U.S. REDEPLOYMENTS PLANNED
 FROM MR III DURING THE REMAINDER OF THIS FISCAL YEAR. AS IN
 OTHER MR'S, RVNAF DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO COMBAT THE
 THREAT IN RVN CONCURRENT WITH OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA WITHOUT
 U.S./FW FORCES PRESENCE IN-COUNTRY.

(4) MR IV. SUSTAINED GVN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MR IV AND IN
 CAMBODIA HAVE INFLICTED SIGNIFICANT LOSSES ON THE ENEMY AND HE
 HAS ELECTED TO DISPERSE INTO SMALLER ELEMENTS UNTIL HIS
 MAIN FORCE THREAT CAN BE REMOUNTED. THERE HAS BEEN IMPROVEMENT
 IN THE MR III TERRITORIAL FORCES WHICH HAS ALLOWED SOME REGULAR
 FORCES TO CONCENTRATE ON BASE AREAS, CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS,
 AND MAINTAIN A POSTURE TO REACT TO ATTACKS AGAINST POPULATION
 CENTERS. HOWEVER, AS IN OTHER MR'S THE EXPANSION OF THE
 TERRITORIAL FORCES HAS RESULTED IN AN OFFICER SHORTAGE.
 C. THE LOC PROGRAM. THE LOC PROGRAM HAS BEEN UNDER
 CONTINUOUS REVIEW SINCE MARCH 1970 RESULTING IN DEFERRAL OF
 441 KM OF ROADS. THE REDUCED LOC PROGRAM DIRECTED BY OSD
 ON 14 SEPTEMBER 1970 IS CONSIDERED THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL
 TO FACILITATE ATTAINMENT OF MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND PACIFICATION

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"MCEO" EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT

PAGE FIVE RUMHFMA3229 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O GOALS. RVNAF ENGINEER UNITS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR 485 KM; AND ADDITIONAL WORK SWITCHED FROM U.S. TROOPS TO RVNAF WOULD CAUSE A SCHEDULE SLIPPAGE, SINCE NEW WORK WOULD NOT BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE END OF 1974. FUNDS ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL WORK FOR EXECUTION BY CONTRACT ABOUT 600 KM OF ROADS ARE ASSIGNED TO U.S. TROOPS FOR COMPLETION AFTER 1970. THE MAJOR EFFORT WILL BE CONCENTRATED ON UPGRADING ROADS IN THE DENSELY POPULATED DELTA AND IN COMPLETING QL-20, THE IMPORTANT CONNECTION BETWEEN SAIGON AND THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE RVN. NINE REINFORCED ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS (9,000-MEN), WILL BE REQUIRED DURING CY71; TO ENABLE COMPLETION OF THESE 600 KM BY MID-1972. INDIVIDUAL BATTALIONS WILL BE RELEASED UPON COMPLETING ASSIGNED WORK. DEPENDING UPON CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT TWO BATTALIONS MIGHT BE RELEASED FOR REDEPLOYMENT IN LATE 1971. THE ALLOCATION OF AN ADDITIONAL \$15 MILLION AND DOD'S APPROVAL TO EXTEND THE CPAF CONTRACT ACCORDINGLY WOULD PERMIT THE CONSTRUCTION OF 40 KM OF LIL-27 BY CONTRACTOR IN LIEU OF TROOP EFFORT. THIS WOULD BE TRADE-OFF IN FUNDING, BUT WOULD RELEASE ONE REINFORCED ENGINEER BATTALION.

PAGE SIX RUMHFMA3229 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O D. IMPACT OF REDUCED TACAIR: B-52 SORTIES. COMMENCING 14 AUG 70, TACAIR SORTIES WERE LIMITED TO THE OVERALL MONTHLY TOTAL OF 14,000. RVNAF IMPROVEMENT IS NOTED IN THE NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT AND SQUADRONS AS WELL AS AN INCREASED EFFICIENCY IN THE CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS; HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF USAF CAPABILITY AS UNITS REDEPLOY. VNAF AIRCRAFT DO NOT HAVE THE ORDNANCE CAPACITY, THE AIR REFUELING CAPABILITY, NOR THE OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY OF USAF AIRCRAFT. THESE CAPABILITIES ARE NECESSARY FOR ALL WEATHER OPERATIONS IN-COUNTRY AND INTERDICTION MISSIONS IN LAOS/CAMBODIA. SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH MAY IMPINGE ON THE TACAIR SUPPORT CIRCUMSTANCE ARE: AN INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY; AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SORTIES REQUIRED FOR THE INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN IN LVAOS; OR A FURTHER DRAWDOWN ON THE TOTAL AVAILABLE U.S./RVNAF TACAIR ASSETS. THE NUMBER OF B-52 STRIKES PER DAY HAS REMAINED THE SAME SINCE THE SORTIES REDUCTION WENT INTO EFFECT; HOWEVER, THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT PER STRIKE. PRIOR TO 17 AUGUST, SOME STRIKES WERE MADE UP OF SIX AIRCRAFT, AND SOME CONSISTED OF THREE AIRCRAFT. ALL STRIKES ARE NOW MADE UP OF THREE AIRCRAFT.

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"MCEO"

"EXCLUSIVE"

PTTASYUW RUMHFMA3233 332219-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

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P 282219Z NOV 80

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF

ZEN/CG I MAF

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON,
MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS SECTION III OF V

//N00000//

E. APPRAISAL OF GVN FORCES.

(1) OVERALL. THE CAMBODIA OPERATIONS ARE EXAMPLES OF
RVNAF ABILITY OF PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS. THOUGH RVNAF
CONTINUES TO IMPROVE IN EFFECTIVENESS IT CANNOT MEET THE
PRESENT AND PROJECTED OVERALL THREAT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT
U.S. AND FWMAF COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT, AND COMBAT SERVICE
SUPPORT ASSISTANCE. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN MR I AND
MR II. THIS U.S.-FWMAF SUPPORT ENABLES RVNAF TO MAINTAIN
A CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GMR
AND DISRUPT NVA/VC ACTIVITIES ALONG THE CAMBODIAN/RVN
BORDER AS WELL AS TO CONTINUE THE CONDUCT OF IN-COUNTRY
EFFORTS. RVNAF OVERALL STRENGTHS AS PROJECTED ARE ACCEPTABLE.
IT IS ESTIMATED THAT SUFFICIENT MANPOWER RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE

PAGE TWO RUMHFMA3233 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR "MCEO"
TO SUPPORT PROGRAMMED FORCE STRUCTURE INCREASES. WITH THE
NEW CONCEPTION OF DEFICIENCIES IN DEPOT, AIR/SEALIFT, AND
PORT OPERATIONS, RVNAF IS CURRENTLY SELF-SUFFICIENT IN
PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR A FORCE STRUCTURE OF AP-
PROXIMATELY 1.0 MILLION MEN. INCREASED EMPHASIS IS REQUIRED
IN MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY AREAS TO PREVENT A GRADUAL DETERIORA-
TION OF COMBAT READINESS. THE RVNAF NON-TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEM IS ALMOST VOID IN THE AREAS OF TECHNICAL ENGINEERING AND
MANAGEMENT SKILLS, LIMITED IN RELIABILITY, INADEQUATE
IN CAPACITY, AND DEFICIENT IN MIDDLE MANAGEMENT SUPERVISION
OF MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS. OF ALL PROBLEMS IN THE C-E
FIELD, THE MOST CRITICAL ARE THE ACUTE SHORTAGE OF TRAINED
TECHNICAL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL AND THE DEPENDENCE
OF THE RVNAF COMMO STRUCTURE ON U.S. MILITARY INTEGRATED
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS FOR LONG-HAUL COMMUNICATIONS THROUGHOUT
RVN. ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN TO COMPENSATE FOR THESE SEVERE
LIMITATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE PROGRESS OF THE CRIMP HAS BEEN
SATISFACTORY THUS FAR, WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. COMMUNICATIONS UNITS BASED
ON A DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE RVNAF CAPABILITY HAS INCREASED FASTER
THAN ANTICIPATED SHOULD BE CLOSELY MONITORED. ACTIVATIONS AND EXPANSION

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"MCEO"

TOP SECRET

SPECAT

MCEO

PAGE THREE RUHHFMA3230 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
 OF RVNAF UNITS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AT THE EXPENSE OF
 EXISTING UNITS. ALSO, SKILL LEVELS OF TECHNICIANS AND
 ABILITY OF LEADERS IN A GREAT MANY CASES IS BELOW THAT
 REQUIRED DUE TO LACK OF EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING. A
 COMPREHENSIVE COMBINED REVIEW OF THE RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE
 WAS INITIATED ON 27 NOVEMBER 1970 TO DETERMINE CHANGES
 REQUIRED IN THE RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE FOR FY72 AND FY73
 IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND CAPABILITIES.
 (2) ARVN. CRIMP HAS PROVIDED INCREASED ARTILLERY
 CAPABILITIES. THE PROVISION OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT TO RF/PF
 WILL FREE THE ARVN CORPS AND DIVISION ARTILLERY FOR THE SUPPORT
 OF ARVN OPERATIONS. WHERE FEASIBLE, ACTIVATIONS OF ARVN UNITS
 ARE BEING ACCELERATED; HOWEVER, EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY
 IS THE PRIMARY LIMITING FACTOR. THIS FACTOR AND TRAINING
 PROBLEMS DISCUSSED BELOW COMBINED WITH MANPOWER COMPETITION
 AMONG THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS PRECLUDE ADDITIONAL ACCELERATIONS
 IN FY71. THE ACTIVATIONS OF SOME ADMINISTRATIVE AND
 LOGISTICAL UNITS HAVE FALLEN BEHIND SCHEDULE. IT IS
 ANTICIPATED THESE UNITS WILL BE ACTIVATED IN THE SECOND
 HALF OF FY71 AFTER COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS ARE

PAGE FOUR RUHHFMA3230 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M C E O
 FILLED OUT. IN RELATION TO TRAINING OF ARVN PERSONNEL,
 PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN TRAINING BY THE JGS CENTRAL
 TRAINING COMMAND (CTC). REFRESHER TRAINING HAS SHOWN
 MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN QUALITY, ALTHOUGH THE NECESSITY TO
 PROVIDE BASIC TRAINING FOR NEW UNITS HAS CAUSED THIS IMPROVED
 REFRESHER TRAINING TO LAG FOR OTHER UNITS. OTHER
 IMPROVEMENTS ARE PLANNED FOR UPGRADING TRAINING CAPABILITIES
 AND IMPROVING TRAINING TECHNIQUES. THERE IS A CONTINUING LACK
 OF SUFFICIENT COMBAT EXPERIENCED, SKILLED ARVN CADRE AND
 INSTRUCTORS TO MANAGE AND CONDUCT TRAINING AT TRAINING
 CENTERS. THIS PROBLEM HAS A HIGH PRIORITY AT CTC. TRAINING
 OF CAMBODIAN FORCES BY ARVN HAS PLACED A FURTHER STRAIN ON THE
 ARVN TRAINING CAPABILITY. IF JGS ELECTS TO HASTEN THE
 ACTIVATION AND TRAINING OF UNITS AND PERSONNEL IN THE FACE OF
 ACCELERATED U.S. REDEPLOYMENT THERE MAY BE ADVERSE IMPACTS
 INCLUDING THE FURTHER DELAY OF REFRESHER TRAINING, CURTAILMENT
 OF CAMBODIAN TRAINING, AND THE ADDITIONAL LOAD BEING PLACED
 ON THE EXISTING LIMITED EXPERIENCED TRAINING CADRE.
 (3) VNN. IN THE PAST YEAR THE VNN HAS GROWN IN SIZE
 FROM LESS THAN 20,000 TO ITS MAXIMUM AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF

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MCEO

TOP SECRET

MCEO⁸³

TOP SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUHFMA3233 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M E O
 NEARLY 40,000. THIS RAPID GROWTH HAS LEFT THE VNN WITH
 A CRITICAL SHORTAGE OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL (E-5,
 E-6 AND O-3, O-4). NO SHORT TERM SOLUTIONS ARE SEEN FOR
 CORRECTING THESE IMBALANCES WHICH ARE CURRENTLY HAMPERING
 THE VNN IN ALL PHASES OF OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT. THE VNN
 EMPHASIS ON TRAINING HAS SHIFTED FROM QUANTITY TO QUALITY,
 BUT SHORTFALLS WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST IN OFFICER AND PETTY
 OFFICER TRAINING. LOGISTICS AND CRAFT MAINTENANCE CONTINUE
 TO BE MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS. ALTHOUGH PROGRESS HAS BEEN
 MADE, CONTINUED DELAYS IN RECEIPT OF MASF FUNDED INDUSTRIAL
 PLANT EQUIPMENT (IPE) HAVE CAUSED POSIPONEMENT OF BASE MANNING
 DATES AND THE RESULTANT ASSUMPTION OF MAINTENANCE. THIS IN
 TURN IMPACTS ON ON-THE-JOB TRAINING AND SORELY NEEDED PRACTICAL
 EXPERIENCE. PLANS ARE THEREFORE BEING MADE TO RETAIN CERTAIN
 USN AFLOAT REPAIR FACILITIES BEYOND PREVIOUSLY PLANNED
 RELEASE DATES. IF DELIVERIES OF IPE ARE RESOLVED, THE GOAL
 OF VIETNAMIZATION OF ALL SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES BY END
 OF FY72 WILL BE MET. IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD THE VNN

PAGE SIX RUHFMA3233 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR M E O
 IS PROGRESSING SLOWLY. UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE PLANNED MANNING
 LEVELS ARE ATTAINED, THE VNN WILL NOT HAVE THE BENEFIT OF AN
 ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION. COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENTS
 ARE KEEPING PACE WITH THE SCHEDULED ASSUMPTION OF OPERATIONAL
 RESPONSIBILITY, BUT COMSEC REMAINS AN AREA OF CONCERN AND IS
 RECEIVING PRIORITY ATTENTION. THE VNN SHIPYARD CAN SATISFACTORILY
 ACCOMPLISH THE PRESENT WORKLOAD BUT FACES SEVERE MANPOWER
 PROBLEMS IN ASSUMING THE ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD SUPPORTED BY
 SRF GUAM AND INHERENT IN VNN EXPANSION. ALL BROWN
 WATER COMBAT ASSETS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TURNED OVER BY
 DEC 70, ALL BLUE WATER ASSETS BY JUL 71, AND ALL LOGISTIC
 CRAFT BY JUL 72. IT IS EXPECTED THAT ALL COMBAT OPERATIONS
 WILL BE VIETNAMESE COMMANDED BY 15 JAN 71, WITH
 EXCEPTION OF MARKET TIME OUTER BARRIER. BY JUL 72 CAPABILITIES
 IN EOD, SALVAGE, HARBOR DEFENSE, MINE SWEEPING, AND SPECIAL WARFARE
 SHOULD BE REALIZED. THESE PROGRAMS ARE PACED BY THE INCREASINGLY
 ACUTE SHORTAGE OF EXPERIENCED LEADERS WHICH IS COMPENSATED FOR
 ONLY IN PART BY THE EXCELLENT NAVAL ADVISORY EFFORT.
 THE ADVISORY GROUP ITSELF HAS NOT RECEIVED SUFFICIENT ADVISORS
 PROGRAMMED THROUGH THE 32-WEEK LANGUAGE SCHOOL AND THIS PROGRAM
 BT

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MCEO⁸³

111 NNN 100/4

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TOP SECRET

(160)

TOP SECRET

PTIAZYUJ RUHFMA3231 332219-AAAA--RUMLMPA. 88
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FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG I MAF

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BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCLICHEON,
WGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS. //N32203// SECTION IV OF V SECTIONS
IS REGARDED AS CRITICAL.

(4) VNAF. OPERATIONALLY, VNAF HAS CONTINUED TO IMPROVE
IN THE AREAS OF WEAPONS DELIVERY TECHNIQUES, HELICOPTER ASSAULT,
AND TRANSPORT. THE VNAF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM IS NOW
CONTROLLING ALL VNAF OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF RVNAF AND HAS
ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL OPERATIONS IN MILITARY REGION
IV. VNAF SHOULD BE ABLE TO ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY COUNTRY-
WIDE BY THE END OF CY71. THE DASC IN MA III WILL BE TURNED OVER
IN FEB 71. COMPLETE SELK-SUFFICIENCY IN AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND
WARNING IS PROGRAMMED FOR DECEMBER 1971. IMPROVEMENT IN THE
MATERIEL AND MAINTENANCE AREA HAS CONTINUED. BETWEEN 1 DEC 70
- 1 APR 71, 9 ADDITIONAL SQDNS (5 HELICOPTER, 2 FIGHTER
AND 1 TRANSPORT AND 1 LIAISON) WILL BE ACTIVATED. OPERATIONAL

PAGE TWO RUHFMA3231 TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
READINESS DATES FOR THESE NEW SQUADRONS VARY WITH TYPE OF
EQUIPMENT, BUT THE AVERAGE IS 120 DAYS AFTER ACTIVATION.
IT IS EXPECTED THAT AS VNAF EXPANDS, THE PRESENT CORE OF
OPERATIONALLY EXPERIENCED CREW MEMBERS WILL BE SEVERELY
DILUTED BY MOVEMENT INTO NEWLY ACTIVATED UNITS. THE VNAF
REMAINS DEPENDENT ON USAF IN CERTAIN ESSENTIAL TECHNICAL
AREAS INCLUDING HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE, COMMUNICATIONS, AND
BASE CIVIL ENGINEERING. THESE FACTORS COUPLED WITH VNAF
LIMITATIONS IN NIGHT AND ALL WEATHER CAPABILITY MILITATE
AGAINST ACCELERATION OF USAF REDEPLOYMENTS IN FY71 OF 72.

(5) VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VMC). THE VMC HAS
DEMONSTRATED PROFICIENCY IN ALL PHASES OF PLANNING AND
CONDUCTING TACTICAL OPERATIONS. AT THE PRESENT THE VMC CAN
DEPLOY THREE BRIGADES. THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES WILL
NOT DEGRADE THIS CAPABILITY, BUT WILL PLACE GREATER DEMANDS ON
VNAF ASSETS, ESPECIALLY AIR SUPPORT TO VMC. PRESENT LEVELS
OF COMBAT ARE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE VMC TRAINING BASE
AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. AS IN ALL RVNAF UNITS,
DESERTIONS CAUSE SOME CONCERN BUT MEASURES TO IMPROVE DEPENDENT
WELFARE AND INCREASE CAREER MOTIVATION ARE BEING GIVEN INCREASED

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SEC IV

TOP SECRET

MCEC

SPECAT

PAGE THREE RUMHFM231 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC
 COMMAND ATTENTION IN THE VMSC TO REDUCE THIS PROBLEM.
 (6) TERRITORIAL FORCES. EFFECTIVE 1 JUL 70, RVNAF WAS
 REORGANIZED AND THE RF/PF ARE NOW PART OF ARVN. AS OF 30
 SEP, RF WAS AT 95.3 PERCENT STRENGTH AND PF AT 96 PERCENT
 STRENGTH. THE CONTINUED EXPANSION OF THESE FORCES HAS CREATED
 A SHORTAGE OF OFFICERS AND NCO'S. IN SOME REGIONS, MANPOWER
 REQUIREMENTS COULD NOT BE MET WITH VOLUNTEERS; THEREFORE,
 DESIGNATED PROVINCES WERE GRANTED PERMISSION TO DRAFT
 PERSONNEL FOR THESE ORGANIZATIONS. THE CAPABILITIES OF
 SOME TERRITORIAL FORCE UNITS HAVE INCREASED WITH THE RECEIPT
 OF NEW EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY THE M-16 RIFLE. THE ORIGINAL
 FY71 PROGRAM WAS ACCELERATED AND AN ADDITIONAL 23 RF
 COMPANIES AND 670 PF PLATOONS WERE ORGANIZED AND TRAINED IN
 FY 70. ON 1 JUN 1970, JCS BEGAN EARLY ACTIVATION OF
 THE FY71 FORCE STRUCTURE INCREASE TOTALING 76 RF COMPANIES
 AND 824 PF PLATOONS. THIS ACCELERATION WAS AIDED BY
 REDUCING THE AUTHORIZED TOE STRENGTHS OF PF PLATOONS IN
 MR IV FROM 35 TO 32 MEN, THUS PROVIDING AN ADDITIONAL 296
 PLATOONS. THIS WILL ULTIMATELY RAISE THE AUTHORIZED TOTAL OF
 TERRITORIAL FORCES TO 1,679 RF COMPANIES AND 7,335 PLATOONS.

PAGE FOUR RUMHFM231 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEC
 THE ACCELERATED ACTIVATION HAS CAUSED REFRESHER TRAINING TO
 FALL BEHIND SCHEDULE. ALTHOUGH THIS PROBLEM AREA IS NOW
 RECEIVING COMMAND EMPHASIS, IT IS DOUBTFUL IF PRESENT
 RATES OF REFRESHER TRAINING CAN OVERCOME THE BACKLOG IN
 FY71. DESERTIONS CONTINUE TO BE A MATTER OF CONCERN.

F. SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENT.

(1) THE CURRENT MAJOR ENEMY THREAT IN-COUNTRY
 IS IN MR I WHERE THE ENEMY RETAINS THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH
 LARGE SCALE ATTACKS. SHOULD HE EXERCISE THIS CAPABILITY,
 RVNAF WOULD BE SORELY PRESSED TO CONTAIN THE THREAT.
 TRANSITIONAL FORCE PLANNING MUST CONSIDER THIS CONTINUING
 THREAT AND THE SERIOUS IMPACT ON THE OVERALL VIETNAMIZATION
 PROGRAM OF A SETBACK OF RVNAF IN MR I. MR II REMAINS THE
 SECOND MAJOR IN-COUNTRY THREAT AREA. FORCE PLANNING FOR
 THIS REGION MUST PROVIDE THE ESSENTIAL U.S. COMBAT FORCES
 TO INSURE SECURITY OF CRITICAL U.S. FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS,
 AND PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS PROVIDING SUFFICIENT SUPPORT TO
 RVNAF AND RVNAF TO MEET THE THREAT. FORCE PLANNING FOR MR
 III MUST PROVIDE SECURITY FOR U.S. FACILITIES AND WELL AS A
 REINFORCING CAPABILITY FOR BOTH MR II AND MR IV.

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EXCLUSIVE

PAGE FIVE RUMHFMA3232 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO
 (2) THE CAPABILITY OF RVNAF HAS CONTINUED TO INCREASE. ACTIVATIONS AND TURNOVERS HAVE BEEN ACCELERATED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. THIS ACCELERATION AND CONTINUED PROGRESS HAS BEEN POSSIBLE DUE IN PART TO THE OPTIMISM OF GVN AND RVNAF IN THE FACE OF THE REDUCED ENEMY ACTIVITY IN-COUNTRY. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THIS LOW LEVEL OF ACTIVITY WILL CONTINUE PAST THE COMPLETION OF CURRENTLY ANNOUNCED U.S. WITHDRAWALS. U.S. FORCE PLANNING MUST THEREFORE BE SUCH THAT SUFFICIENT U.S. FORCE IS RETAINED IN ORDER THAT U.S./RVNAF/FWMAF CAN COUNTER THE ENEMY IN-COUNTRY THREAT WHILE PERMITTING RVNAF TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN

4. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. THE CONCEPT ON OPERATIONS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT FOR (TSF) HAS BEEN DEVELOPED TO PROVIDE FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF RVNAF DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD OF THE VIETNAMIZATION PROCESS. THE TSF SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TO U.S., RVN, AND FW FORCES; PROVIDES MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE AND MODERNIZE

PAGE SIX RUMHFMA3231 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MCEO PACIFICATION, CIVIC ACTION, AND GVN SECURITY PROGRAMS. TEMPORARILY INCLUDED IN THE TSF ARE UNITS SCHEDULED TO TURNOVER THEIR EQUIPMENT TO RVNAF AS PART OF THE CRIMP, AND UNITS ENGAGED IN THE LOC PROGRAM.

5. (TS) REQUIREMENTS.
 A. THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE TSF MUST BE SUCH AS TO INSURE THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE WAR EFFORT ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE GVN IN A TIMELY, EFFICIENT MANNER WITHOUT INCURRING UNACCEPTABLE RISKS TO U.S. PRIORITY GOALS IN SVN OR LONG RANGE GOALS IN SEA. THE TSF HAS BEEN DILIGENTLY TAILORED TO MEET THE THREAT AND PROVIDE FOR CONTINUED SMOOTH ASSUMPTION OF THE VIETNAMIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES, WITH THE FOL BEING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RVNAF INTO A COHESIVE, BALANCED, FIGHTING FORCE. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING FOR COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FOR RVNAF, TSF MUST BE ABLE TO REINFORCE RVNAF, IF NECESSARY, AND MUST CONTINUE SUPPORT TO FW FORCES AS PROVIDED FOR BY EXISTING AGREEMENTS.
 B. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT AND PROJECTED THREAT AND THE RVNAF CAPABILITY TO MEET THE THREAT MAKE IN MILITARILY ESSENTIAL THAT THE TSF BE COMPOSED OF A MINIMUM OF 9 BRIGADE

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PITAZYUW RUHMFMA3232 332219-AAAA--RUMUMPA.
 ZNY AAAAA
 P 282219Z NOV 70
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMUMPA/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG I MAF
 BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON,
 MGEN WILSON FROM LTGEN JONES.
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS //NO0000//
 SECTION V OF V SECTIONS
 EQUIVALENTS AS THE GROUND COMBAT FORCE. EVERY EFFORT IS BEING
 MADE TO OPTIMIZE THE DISPOSITION OF THIS MINIMAL ESSENTIAL FORCE
 TO INSURE CONTINUED PROGRESS IN VIETNAMIZATION. IN DESIGNING
 THE TSF, COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS HAVE
 BEEN TAILORED AND POSITIONED TO PROVIDE NECESSARY SUPPORT TO
 THESE COMBAT ELEMENTS, UTILIZING MINIMAL PERSONNEL AND
 FACILITIES. SELECTED COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS SUCH AS AVIATION,
 ARTILLERY, ENGINEER, AND SIGNAL UNITS WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE
 TO FVMAF AND RVNAF UNTIL RVNAF CAPABILITIES ARE DEVELOPED.
 C. ALTHOUGH THE APPROVED FORCE LEVEL FOR PLANING PURPOSES
 IS SLIGHTLY IN EXCESS OF 260 THOUSAND SPACES, EVERY EFFORT HAS
 BEEN EXPENDED TO DESIGN THE TSF WITHIN THIS FIGURE. CURRENT
 PLANNING ENVISIONS A FORCE OF 255,000 SPACES AT END FY 71 AS

PAGE TWO RUHMFMA3232 T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN
 THE MINIMUM STRENGTH NECESSARY FOR THE TSF. SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS
 HAVE BEEN REALIZED AS A RESULT OF METICULOUS TAILORING OF THE
 COMBAT SUPPORT, COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT, ADVISORY, COMMAND
 AND CONTROL SPACES, AS WELL AS IN DEBIT/CREDIT ACCOUNTS. THE
 NET EFFECT OF THESE EFFORTS SHOULD REDUCE THE ARMY STRENGTH
 REQUIREMENT TO 198,000 OF THE TOTAL 255,000 TSF FORCE. THIS
 IS CONSIDERED THE MINIMAL ESSENTIAL FORCE. IF BECAUSE OF
 MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS THE U.S. ARMY CANNOT
 UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES MEET THIS 198 THOUSAND SPACE
 REQUIREMENT THEN THE RETENTION OF A TAILORED U.S. MARINE
 FORCE (MAB) IS CONSIDERED A NECESSARY ALTERNATIVE. SUBSEQUENT
 REDUCTION IN ARMY SPACES WILL BE REALIZED DURING THE FIRST
 HALF OF FY72 AND AS A RESULT OF REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE LOC ENGINEER
 CONSTRUCTION BATTALION (899 SPACES) AND REDEPLOYMENT OF
 ONE 175MM GUN BN (565 SPACES) AND ONE ADA BN (692 SPACES),
 BOTH TRANSFERRING ASSETS TO RVNAF AS PART OF THE CRIMP.
 THE NET RESULT IS THAT THE ARMY STRENGTH REQUIREMENT WILL
 REDUCE AT LEAST 2,100 SPACES DURING THE PERIOD 1 JULY - 31
 DEC 71.
 D. THE PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED AIR ACTIVITY (SORTIES) LEVELS

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SPECAT

PTTZYUW RUHNFMA3279 333212Z-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

RUMUMPA -T- CG FIRST MAW

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FM CG FMFPAC

TO ZEN/CG 1 MAW

ZEN/CG FIRST MAW (REAR)

INFO RUMUMPA/CG III MAW

RUMUMPA/CG FIRST MAW

BT

"EXCLUSIVE"

S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN WILSON, LIGEN CONLEY,
INFO LIGEN MCCUTCHEON, MAJGEN ARMSTRONG FROM LIGEN JONES
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS//NOV2200//
VMCJ EMPLOYMENT (U)

A. CTF SEVEN SEVEN 241100Z NOV 70 (C) (PAGEP)

1. (S) I AM EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE RAPID REACTION OF YOUR
EA-6A'S TO A CONTINGENCY SITUATION. PLEASE ADD MY WELL COME TO
THAT OF VADM BARDSHAR IN REF A.

2. (S) THE SUES OF EA-6A EMPLOYMENT AND THE PERSONNEL AND
LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT THE AIRCRAFT AWAY FROM HOME
BASE HAS BEEN ADDRESSED IN A RECENT SPECAT TO GEN CHAPMAN.
GEN CHAPMAN'S RESPONSE SHARES OUR CONCERN IN MAINTAINING THE
EA-6A CAPABILITY TO MEET SPECIFIC WESTERN PACIFIC REQUIREMENTS.

PAGE TWO RUHNFMA3279 S E C R E T SPECAT MCEO

HE STATES THAT:

A. VMCJ-1 WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE HIGHEST PRIORITY RESPONSE TO
BIT AND PIECE SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS THAT CAN BE AUTHORIZED.

B. CURRENT PRODUCTION EA-6A SSE AND TEST EQUIPMENT IS BEING
DIRECTED TO VMCJ-2; HOWEVER, SELECTIVE REPLACEMENTS FOR VMCJ-1
WHEN IDENTIFIED, WILL RECEIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT FROM FOPC.

C. EXAMINATION OF TOTAL EA-6A CRITICAL SKILLS BY HENC
INDICATES VMCJ-1 IS SHORT CERTAIN SKILLS. IF URGENTLY REQUIRED
THESE RESOURCES ARE UNAVAILABLE WITHIN THE A-6A ASSETS NOW IN WEST-
PAC. REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL EA-6A PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS SHOULD
BE IDENTIFIED BY NUMBER, GRADE, AND MOS.

D. APPROVAL FOR RE-ENTRY OF EA-6A INTO SEASIA IS GRANTED
CONTINGENT UPON THE FOLLOWING:

(1) RE-ENTRY APPROVAL CAN BE OBTAINED THROUGH CINCPAC/JCS
CHANNELS.

(2) TOTAL EA ELEMENT OF VMCJ-1 DEPLOYS INTACT WITH EA-6A
PECULIAR SSE.

(3) COLLOCATING ELEMENT AT SUITABLE LAND BASE WITH A-6A UNIT
POSSESSING ADEQUATE SSE AND SSE.

3. (S) IT IS APPARENT THAT IN ORDER FOR US TO MAINTAIN AND

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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MCEO SECRET

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