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RUMUMPA -I- CG FMFPAC

-I- CG III MAF

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FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUMUMPA/CG FMFPAC

INFO

UMUMPA/CG III MAF

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S E C R E T //NO0000//

SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN JONES INFO LT GEN MCCUA CHEON FROM
MAJ GEN WIDDECKE. DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS ON

Y.

SPECAT**EXCLUSIVE**

ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT (U)

1. (S) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO UPDATE YOU ON WHAT THE DIVISION IS DOING RELATIVE TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING FIRES AND THE IMPACT THAT CURRENT POLICIES HAVE HAD ON DIVISION OPERATIONS THIS PAST MONTH.

2. (S) ONE OF THE FIELDS WHICH WE HAVE WORKED ON FOR SEVERAL MONTHS IS IMPROVED TARGETTING FOR AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES, IMPROVED BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT BY RECONNAISSANCE UNITS, AND A MORE EFFICIENT USE OF QUICK REACTION FORCES AGAINST SMALL SIGHTINGS OF ENEMY RATHER THAN EMPLOYMENT OF MASSIVE AIR AND ARTILLERY. ONE MAJOR RESULT OF OUR EFFORTS HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF ARTILLERY ROUNDS EXPENDED ON A

PAGE TWO UMUVA0011 S E C R E T SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/
DAY-TO-DAY BASIS.

3. (S) ON 19 OCTOBER, THIS HEADQUARTERS INSTITUTED A VERY RESTRICTIVE FIRE SUPPORT PLAN WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, PROHIBITED FIRING ON PREEMPTIVE AND INTELLIGENCE TARGETS WITHIN 1000 METERS OF ANY KNOWN HABITATION. THIS RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLAN DID NOT IN ANY WAY AFFECT SUPPORT OF TROOPS IN COMBAT, THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS UNDER THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, OR THE RIGHT OF EVERY MARINE TO PROTECT HIS LIFE; ADDITIONALLY, ITS INSTITUTION REDUCED THE POTENTIAL FOR FRIENDLY OR FRIENDLY, INCLUDING, OF COURSE, FRIENDLY OR CIVILIANS.

4. (S) IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE COMPLETE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR CURRENT POLICIES ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY, BUT SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ARE POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME. DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, BEFORE THE RESTRICTIVE POLICY WAS PUT INTO EFFECT, A TOTAL OF 98,897 ROUNDS WERE FIRED FOR A DAILY AVERAGE OF

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3,196. SO FAR IN NOVEMBER 1970, FROM THE PERIOD 1 THROUGH 27 NOVEMBER, A TOTAL OF 18,584 ROUNDS HAVE BEEN FIRED FOR A DAILY AVERAGE OF 688. DESPITE THE REDUCTION IN FIRES, WE FIND THAT ARTILLERY RESPONSE HAS NOT BEEN DEGRADED BUT, IN FACT, CONTINUES TO REACT RAPIDLY TO REQUIRED MISSIONS; FOR EXAMPLE, ON 13

PAGE THREE RUMULVA0011 SECRET SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR/ NOVEMBER, ARTILLERY WAS CALLED IN WITHOUT DELAY ON ONE CONTACT THAT RESULTED IN 25 ENEMY KIA FROM MARINE ARTILLERY. THIS MISSION WAS FIRED AS THE RESULT OF A REQUEST FROM THE LOCAL FORCES IN QUE SON DISTRICT.

5. (S) ALTHOUGH THE RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLAN WAS INSTITUTED FOR THE REASONS DISCUSSED ABOVE, WE ARE ENJOYING AN OBVIOUS BONUS EFFECT. IN SEPTEMBER WE FIRED A DAILY AVERAGE OF ARTILLERY ROUNDS WORTH \$142,854. SO FAR IN NOVEMBER THE DAILY AVERAGE HAS BEEN \$33,479. IN TOTAL FIGURES THE COST IN SEPTEMBER WAS \$4,287,490. AS OF 27 NOVEMBER IT IS ESTIMATED AT \$905,530. THIS REPRESENTS A CONSIDERABLE SAVINGS IN THAT AN EQUIVALENT AMOUNT OF MONEY WILL NOT HAVE TO BE SPENT IN THE FUTURE FOR INVENTORY OR LATER USE; MOREOVER, WE ARE REALIZING THIS SAVINGS WITHOUT ANY ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE COMBAT EFFORT. BEST REGARDS.

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FM CG XXIV CORPS ENG RVN

TO RUMOMPA/CG III MAF DNG RVN

RUMULVA/CG 1ST MAR DIV ENG RVN

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FM CG XXIV CORPS ENG RVN

TO RUMHDNA/DEPCORDS I CORPS & MR 1 DNG RVN

RUMUALB/CG 23RD INF DIV CHL RVN

RUMUMJA/CG 101ST ABN DIV CEA RVN

RUMHDNB/CG 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV TECH QTR RVN

RUMHDNA/DSA USAAG I CORPS & MR 1 DNG RVN

RUMHHCT/SA 1ST ARVN LIV HUE RVN

RUMHQNI/SA 2ND ARVN DIV QNI RVN

RUMHDNA/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE DNG RVN

RUMHHAN/PSA QUANG NAM PROVINCE HOI AN RVN

RUMHHNV/PSA THUA THIEN PROVINCE HUE RVN

RUMHQNI/PSA QUANG NGAI PROVINCE QUANG NGAI RVN

RUMHUTR/PSA QUANG TRI PROVINCE QUANG TRI RVN

RUMHTKY/PSA QUANG TIN PROVINCE TAM KY RVN

RUMHDNA/SA DA NANG CITY DNG RVN

BT

S E C R E T NOFORN EXCEPT AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND SECTION I OF III
 GENERAL SUTHERLAND SENDS EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG MCCUTCHEON AND MG WIDDECKE

MR. LAZAR, MG BALWYN, MG

HENNESSEY, BG HILL, BG JACKSON, COL MUELLER, COL RAMOS, COL
 CAVANAUGH, COL CHISH, MR. WENZEL, MR. CLISHING, LTC BIRK, LTC

PAGE 2 RUMUHFA6998 S E C R E T NOFORN

STAFFORD, MR. FOWLER.

SUBJ: SHADOW SUPPLY SYSTEM (U)

1. (C) THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF THE ENEMY SHADOW SUPPLY
 SYSTEM WAS PRESENTED TO COMUSMACV AND FIELD COMMANDERS AT THE
 WIEU CONDUCTED AT MACV ON 21 NOV 70. THIS ASSESSMENT IS
 FORWARDED FOR YOUR FUTURE REFERENCE AND ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY
 DESIRE TO PROVIDE TO ASSIST IN KEEPING IT CURRENT AND ACCU-
 RATE.

2. (S) THIS IS AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ENEMY'S SHADOW SUPPLY
 SYSTEM IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO INCLUDE ITS ORGANIZATION,
 METHODS OF OPERATION, EFFECTIVENESS AND VULNERABILITIES.

OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO PRESENT A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THIS
 APPARATUS TO INSURE THAT ALL ACTIONS ARE TAKEN AND FULLY
 COORDINATED TO NEUTRALIZE AND DEFEAT THIS SYSTEM.

THE SHADOW SUPPLY SYSTEM IS DEFINED AS THE ENEMY'S METHOD
 OF SUPPORTING MILITARY UNITS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
 THROUGHOUT THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WITH FUNDS AND SUPPLIES.
 THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE IS HAVING TO COPE WITH
 INCREASING PROBLEMS IN FINANCING AND SUPPORTING MILITARY AND
 POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. ALTHOUGH MOST ENEMY WAR MATERIAL COMES

PAGE 3 RUMUHFA6998 S E C R E T NOFORN

FROM COMMUNIST BLOC COUNTRIES, THE VC/NVA ARE PRIMARILY DE-
 PENDENT UPON THE PEOPLE AND LAND OF THE SOUTH FOR OTHER

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ASSISTANCE. TO ACQUIRE THIS VITAL SUPPORT, THE ENEMY HAS BEEN FORCED TO RELY MORE HEAVILY ON HIS COVERT APPARATUS TO OBTAIN FUNDS AND SUPPLIES.

SPECIFIC AGENCIES AT EACH LEVEL OF THE ENEMY'S COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE FORM THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SHADOW SUPPLY SYSTEM. THE LAO TONG PARTY AND ITS SUBORDINATE, THE ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND HANOI EXERCISE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTROL THROUGH THE FIVE MAJOR HEADQUARTERS, IN THE REPUBLIC.

SENIOR POLITICAL CADRE OF CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEES PROVIDE OVERALL POLICY GUIDANCE AND PLANNING. FINANCE AND ECONOMY SECTIONS HAVE THE MISSION OF ACQUIRING AND DISTRIBUTING FUNDS FOR ACTIVITIES WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREA, TO INCLUDE SUPPORTING VC/NVA ACTIVITIES WITH RVN PIASTERS FROM CONVERTED U. S. DOLLARS. REAR SERVICE STAFFS SUPERVISE LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS OF SUBORDINATE REAR SERVICE UNITS. THESE THREE ELEMENTS ALSO ARE FOUND AT PROVINCE, DISTRICT, AND SOME VILLAGE LEVELS THROUGHOUT THE RVN.

PAGE 4 RUMUHFA6998 S E C R E T NOFORN

THE CORE OF THE SHADOW SUPPLY SYSTEM INCLUDE LOWER ECHELONS REAR SERVICE GROUPS AND VCI STAFF FINANCE AND ECONOMY SECTIONS AND FORWARD SUPPLY COUNCILS. REAR SERVICE GROUPS FUNCTION UNDER ENEMY MILITARY REGIONS AND FRONTS AND HAVE SPECIFIC AREAS OF OPERATIONS. THE MISSION OF A REAR SERVICE GROUP IS TO RECEIVE, STORE, AND TRANSPORT MATERIAL; COLLECT TAXES; AND PURCHASE SUPPLIES.

FINANCE AND ECONOMY SECTIONS AT REGION AND SUB-REGION LEVELS PLAN AND MANAGE MANUFACTURING OF MATERIAL AND FOOD PRODUCTION. THEY ALSO ARE PRIMARY COLLECTION AND ALLOCATION AGENCIES OF MONEY AND PROVISIONS. AT DISTRICT LEVELS, THESE SECTIONS DETERMINE WHEN AND WHERE TO TAX THE POPULATION IN ORDER TO MEET FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES. FORWARD SUPPLY COUNCILS ARE SUBORDINATE TO CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEES AT ALL ECHELONS AND COORDINATE ACTIVITIES BETWEEN FINANCE AND ECONOMY SECTIONS AND REAR SERVICE GROUPS. COUNCILS AT EACH ECHELON OBTAIN PORTERS, LITTER BEARERS, AND OTHER LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL MAINLY BY EXPLOITING THE POPULATION. FORWARD SUPPLY

PAGE 5 RUMUHFA6998 S E C R E T NOFORN

COUNCILS ALSO MANAGE ENTRY AND EXIT POINTS WHERE SUPPLIES ARE PURCHASED ON THE OPEN MARKET AND CACHED NEARBY FOR FUTURE DISTRIBUTION. COUNCILS ARE STAFFED JOINTLY BY THE VCI CIVILIANS FROM FINANCE AND ECONOMY SECTIONS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM REAR SERVICE STAFFS.

MILITARY SUPPLY PROCUREMENT RANGES FROM ARMED EXTORTION AND TERRORIST TACTICS TO TAX COLLECTION AND ACTUAL FARMING. TO OPERATE AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM, NECESSARY FUNDS MUST BE AVAILABLE. THERE ARE TWO PRINCIPAL MONEY SOURCES WHICH SUSTAIN THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM: EXTERNAL FINANCING AND IN-COUNTRY TAXATION. EXTERNAL FINANCING IS PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN TRADE BANK WHICH IS SUBORDINATE

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TO THE NATIONAL BANK OF NVN. IT OBTAINS U. S. DOLLARS THROUGH FOREIGN EXCHANGE ACCOUNTS MAINTAINED IN HONG KONG, SINGAPORE, DJAKARTA, FRANCE, JAPAN, AND EGYPT. NUMEROUS CAPTURED DOCUMENTS INDICATE THAT DOLLARS ARE ACQUIRED IN 1,000, 500, 100 AND 50 DOLLAR DENOMINATIONS. U. S. BANKNOTES ARE USUALLY DISTRIBUTED BY BERSAK CELLS OF EACH FINANCE AND ECONOMY SECTION TO VC REGION AND SUB-REGION LEVELS FOR EXCHANGE TO PIASTERS ON ILLEGAL MONEY MARKETS
PAGE 6 RUMUHFA6998 S E C R E T NOFORN

LOCATED IN MAJOR CITIES SUCH AS LA NANG, SAIGON, AND BIEN HOA. SOME PIASTERS THUS OBTAINED ARE USED TO FINANCE ENEMY COMMERCIAL AND VCI ACTIVITIES, WHILE THE BULK IS FORWARDED TO HIGHER ECHELONS, PROBABLY FOR USE IN FUNDING MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE USE OF AMERICAN BANKNOTES HAS INCREASED DURING 1970. TWO EXAMPLES OF THIS ARE THE CAPTURE OF AN ENEMY CACHE CONTAINING \$5,000 IN U. S. CURRENCY IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE LAST JUNE AND ANOTHER \$22,300 IN BINH TUY PROVINCE IN MID-AUGUST.

THE ENEMY ALSO EXPLOITS THE BLACK MARKET FOR EXCHANGING CURRENCY AND GENERALLY CONDUCTS SUCH TRANSACTIONS IN URBAN AREAS WHERE CONVERTED FUNDS CAN THEN BE USED TO PURCHASE SUPPLIES. A PW CAPTURED ON 24 SEPTEMBER IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE DISCLOSED THAT THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE RECEIVED MEDICAL AND OTHER SUPPLIES THROUGH GVN OFFICIALS DEALING IN BLACK MARKET ACTIVITIES IN DA NANG. SOURCE ALSO STATED THAT ENEMY ACCESS TO THE POPULATION HAD DECREASED IN 1970, FORCING THE VC/NVA TO USE LEGAL AGENTS IN LA NANG TO BUY GOODS ON THE LOCAL BLACK MARKET AND FROM OTHER SOURCES IN THE AREA.

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FM CG XXIV CORPS DNG RVN

TO RUMHMPA/CG IIII MAF DNG RVN

RUMULVA/CG 1ST MAR DIV DNG RVN

O 270155Z NOV 70

FM CG XXIV CORPS DNG RVN

TO RUMHDNA/DEPCORPS I CORPS & MR 1 DNG RVN

RUMUALB/CG 23RD INF DIV CHL RVN

RUMUJA/CG 101ST ABN DIV CEA RVN

RUMHDNB/CG 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV MECH QTR RVN

RUMHDNA/DSA USAAG I CORPS & MR 1 DNG RVN

RUMHHCT/SA 1ST ARVN DIV HUE RVN

RUMHNI/SA 2ND ARVN DIV GNI RVN

RUMHDNA/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE DNG RVN

RUMHHAN/PSA QUANG NAM PROVINCE HOI AN RVN

RUMHHMV/PSA THUA THIEN PROVINCE HUE RVN

RUMHNI/PSA QUANG NGAI PROVINCE QUANG NGAI RVN

RUMHQTR/PSA QUANG TRI PROVINCE QUANG TRI RVN

RUMHTKY/PSA QUANG TIN PROVINCE TAM KY RVN

RUMHDNA/SA DA NANG CITY DNG RVN

BT

S E C R E T NOFORN EXCEPT AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

SECTION II OF III SECTIONS

GENERAL SUTHERLANDS SENDS EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG MCCUTCHEON

AND MG WIDDECKE

A SECOND MAJOR SOURCE OF VC FUNDS IS IN-COUNTRY TAXATION. THE MOST IMPORTANT ARE AGRICULTURE, TRANSPORTATION, AND BUSINESS TAXES. SINCE SVN HAS AN AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY, THE VC AGRICULTURE TAX PROBABLY THE MOST LUCRATIVE. RATES VARY UP TO PAGE TWO RUMUHFA6999 S E C R E T NOFORN

40 PERCENT AND ARE COMPUTED SO THAT THE TAXPAYER IS ASSESSED A PERCENTAGE OF WHAT THE VC CALCULATE HIS LAND OUGHT TO PRODUCE. RATHER THAN ACTUAL PRODUCTION. AGRICULTURAL TAXES ARE MORE OFTEN COLLECTED IN PRODUCE THAN IN CASH. FOR EXAMPLE, THE VC POLICY IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE IS THAT RICE PRODUCERS ARE SUPPOSED TO CONTRIBUTE 40 PERCENT OF THEIR CROP TO THE VC FACE A THREE MONTH SENTENCE IN A THOUGHT REFORM CAMP. WITH THE COUNTRY-WIDE EROSION OF THE VC TAX BASE AS THE RESULT OF ALLIED OPERATIONS AND THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, PORTIONS OF THE POPULATION STILL SUBJECT TO TAXATION HAVE HAD TO SHARE AN INCREASING BURDEN. TAX ACTIVITIES HAVE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY IN RECENT MONTHS, PARTIALLY THE RESULT OF UNMET QUOTAS AND ENEMY ATTEMPTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CURRENT RICE HARVEST. ANOTHER IMPORTANT SOURCE OF INCOME IS DERIVED FROM TRANSPORTATION TAXES. THIS TAX IS COLLECTED FROM ALL TYPES OF CONVEYANCES, AS WELL AS PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC. COMMERCIAL VEHICLES, PARTICULARLY BUSES AND LUMBER TRUCKS OPERATING IN ISOLATED AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, ARE THE MOST FREQUENT TARGETS. TRANSPORTATION TAXES ARE NORMALLY COLLECTED AT EDGES OF VC OCCUPIED AREAS, NEAR PROVINCE BOUNDARIES, AND ALONG MAJOR HIGHWAYS. ON 18 OCTOBER AN AGENT CONFIRMED A PREVIOUS HOI CHANH RE-

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 PORT WHICH PROVIDED INFORMATION ON VC TAXATION PROCEDURES IN
 WESTERN TAY NINH PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO SOURCES, THE VC
 HAVE ESTABLISHED TWO PERMENT TAX COLLECTION STATIONS NORTH OF
 ROUTE 13 NEAR THE RVN/ CAMBODIA BORDER. THE STATIONS ARE MANNED
 BY VC CHAU THANH DISTRICT FINANCE AND ECONOMY CADRE. CAMBODIANS
 AND VIETNAMESE WHO CROSS THE BORDER FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES ARE
 TAXED ACCORDING TO MODE OF TRAVEL AND COMMODITIES THEY HAVE FOR
 SALE. EXPLOITATION OF LEGITIMATE COMMERCIAL BUSINESSES IS
 ANOTHER SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR THE VC. COMPANIES SUBJECT TO THIS
 FORM OF EXTORTION RUN THE GAPET FROM COMMERCIAL CARRIERS TO
 MOVIE THEATERS, BARS, RESTAURANTS, AND OTHER BUSINESSES WHICH
 DEPEND UPON PUBLIC GOOD WILL. PLANTATIONS
 AND CONSTRUCTION, OIL, AND LUMBER COMPANIES FROM
 ANOTHER GROUP WHICH IS OPEN TO EXPLOITATION. CAPTURED
 DOCUMENTS HAVE INDICATED THAT LUMBER TRUCKOWNERS IN
 TUYEN DUC PROVINCE HAVE BEEN "TAXED" UP TO 1500,000 PIASTERS
 AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THEIR TRUCKS. THE
 THREAT OF FORCE OR EVEN MINOR HARASSMENT IS USUALLY
 ENOUGH TO CONVINCE OWNERS TO MAKE ACCOMMODATIONS WITH
 THE ENEMY. THIS TAKES TWO FORMS. FIRST, AND MOST WIDE-
 PAGE FOUR RUMUHFA6999 S E C R E T NOFORN

SPREAD, IS PAYMENT OF TAXES TO THE VC IN PRODUCTS OR CASH.
 THE SECOND FORM IS ALLOWING THE VC TO USE COMPANY
 ASSETS TO TRANSPORT SUPPLIES OR PERSONNEL INTO AREAS
 WHERE THEY NORMALLY ARE DENIED ACCESS. RECENTLY
 CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND AGENT REPORTS HAVE REVEALED A CLASSIC
 EXAMPLE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF VC TAXATION. IN BINH THUAN
 PROVINCE, THE VC HAVE REQUIRED ALL PROVINCE AND DISTRICT
 FINANCE AND ECONOMY CADRE TO DRAW UP A 1970 TAX ROLL OF
 BUSINESSMEN IN THEIR AREAS. THE TAX ROLL HAS TO BE USED IN
 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAX PROGRAM CALLED THE "K-T" CAM-
 PAIGN TO BE CONDUCTED FROM SEPTEMBER THROUGH NOVEMBER 1970.
 THE ENEMY DIRECTED THAT AN ALL-OUT EFFORT BE MADE TO RESOLVE
 SUPPLY SHORTAGES AND COMMITTED MAJOR RESOURCES TO THE CAMPAIGN
 TO INSURE SUCCESS. THE INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY MANIFESTED
 ITSELF IN VC INTERDICTION OF LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, ENTRY
 INTO HAMLETS BY FINANCE AND ECONOMY CADRE, USE OF MILI-
 TARY PERSONNEL TO ENFORCE COLLECTIONS, ASSASSINATION OF
 GVN FUNCTIONARIES TO REESTABLISH VC THREAT CREDIBILITY,
 AND TEMPORARY ABDUCTION OF CIVILIANS FOR TRANSPORTING
 RICE AND CORN TO CACHE SITES. THE MOST COMPLEX AND

PAGE FIVE RUMUHFA6999 S E C R E T NOFORN
 SENSITIVE ASPECT OF THE SHADOW SUPPLY SYSTEM IS
 PROCUREMENT OF FOOD AND SUPPLIES. FIRST IS THE RECEIPT
 OF GOODS RATHER THAN CASH AS TAX PAYMENTS SECOND IS
 THE USE OF INTERMEDIARY PURCHASING AGENTS WITH LEGAL
 RVN STATUS WHO CAN OBTAIN THE NECESSARY LICENSES AND
 PERMITS TO ACQUIRE AND TRANSPORT SUPPLIES. PURCHASING AGENTS
 EMPLOYED BY THE VC ALSO WORK UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF TRADE
 SHOPS WHICH SEND AGENTS TO CITIES TO PURCHASE FOOD AND SUPPLIES
 FOR RESALE TO THE VC/NVA. THE WELL-PUBLICIZED DISCOVERY IN

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JULY OF AMERICAN WHEAT FLOUR IN VC CACHES IN BINH TUY PROVINCE AS WELL AS SUBSEQUENT DISCOVERIES OF LOCALLY MANUFACTURED AND IMPORTED CLOTH IN AUGUST, ATTEST TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS SYSTEM, PARTICULARLY AROUND SAIGON. THIRD AND MOST WIDESPREAD IS PURCHASE BY PROXY IN LOCAL MARKINGS BY INDIVIDUALS AT THE REQUEST OR INSISTENCE OF VC FINANCE AND ECONOMY CADRE.

IN MK - 3, THE VC REPORTEDLY PAY TEN TO THIRTY-FIVE PERCENT OVER MARKET PRICE TO OBTAIN GOODS. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOUR HOI CHANH WHO RALLIED ON 11 OCTOBER PROVIDES AS EXAMPLE OF THIS METHOD. THE HOI CHANH, MEMBERS OF A TAX COLLECTION TEAM SUBORDINATE TO THE FINANCE AND ECONOMY

PAGE SIX KUMUHFA6999 S E C R E T NOFORN
SECTION, MK7, STATED THAT THE VC REQUIRE TRUCK DRIVERS TO PURCHASE CLOTHING, BATTERIES, SALT, RICE WHICH WERE THEN DEPOSITED IN SMALL CACHES FOR FUTURE DISTRIBUTION. DIRECT PURCHASES BY MILITARY UNITS AND VCI CADRE OR ORGANIZATIONS IS A FOURTH METHOD. THIS ACTIVITY IS COMMON-PLACE IN ISOLATED HAMLETS AND VILLAGES. FOR EXAMPLE, A DOCUMENT CAPTURED IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, DATED 30 MAY 1970, CONTAINED INSTRUCTIONS FROM A DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE THAT PROVISIONS SECTIONS OF VILLAGES WERE TO ESTABLISH STEERING COMMITTEES. THESE COMMITTEES WERE TO MOTIVATE MEMBERS OF FARMERS', FOSTER MOTHERS', AND WOMEN ASSOCIATIONS IN VARIOUS HAMLETS TO PURCHASE AND REQUISITION FOOD.

IN MK - 3, A COMPANY COMMANDER OF A SUPPLY UNIT SUBORDINATE TO THE REAR SERVICE SECTION OF SK-5 RALLIED ON 10 OCTOBER AND STATED THAT HE HAD ESTABLISHED A SUPPLY SYSTEM IN PHU GIAE DISTRICT. HE REVEALED THAT A FEMALE REAR SERVICE CADRE PURCHASED SUPPLIES FOR HIM AND DELIVERED THE GOODS TO A PRE-ARRANGED TRANSHIPMENT POINT. ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, FIVE SHIPMENTS AVERAGING 5-6 TONS HAD BEEN RECEIVED SINCE MAY 1970. THE SUPPLIES INCLUDED RICE, FLOUR, CORN,

PAGE SEVEN KUMUHFA6999 S E C R E T NOFORN
SUGAR AND FISH. A PW CAPTURED ON 17 OCTOBER SOUTHEAST OF PHUOC MINH, FITS THE DESCRIPTION OF THE FEMALE SUPPLIER. THE PW STATED THAT SHE WOULD PURCHASE THE FOODSTUFFS ON THE LOCAL MARKET AND THEN HIRE A TRUCK TO TRANSPORT THE SUPPLIES. ACCORDING TO THE WOMAN, SHE RENTED A DIFFERENT TRUCK FOR EACH SHIPMENT AND THE DRIVERS USUALLY DID NOT KNOW THEY WERE WORKING FOR THE VC UNTIL THEY ARRIVED AT THE RENDEZVOUS POINT. THESE

EXAMPLES SHOW THAT WHETHER FOR REASONS OF IDEOLOGY, COERCION, OR PROFIT, THE ENEMY IS ACQUIRING SUPPLIES FROM THE OPEN MARKET. WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO QUANTIFY AMOUNTS OBTAINED, THEY APPEAR TO BE SUBSTANTIAL. THE FINAL MANNER OF SECURING SUPPLIES IS OUTRIGHT CONFISCATION. METHODS OF CONFISCATION DIFFER AS TO THOSE FOR COLLECTING TAXES. THROUGHOUT THE REPUBLIC, CONFISCATION IS OCCASIONALLY PERPETRATED UNDER THE guise OF TAXATION, EVEN THOUGH THE PEOPLE MAY HAVE ALREADY PAID THEIR TAXES. RECEIPTS FOR CONFISCATED MATERIAL PROMISING REIMBURSEMENT IN THE FUTURE ARE SOMETIMES GIVEN, BUT PAYMENT PROBABLY NEVER FOLLOWS. FREQUENTLY, THE ENEMY WILL ENTER AN AREA DURING THE HARVEST PERIOD AND FORCE FARMERS TO GIVE WHATEVER

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IS DEMANDED. WHILE THERE IS OFTEN LITTLE LISTENING BETWEEN

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FM CG XXIV CORPS DNG RVN

TO RUMCPA/CG III MAF DNG RVN

RUMULVA/CG 1ST MAR DIV DNG RVN

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FM CG XXIV CORPS DNG RVN

TO RUMHDNA/DEPCORPS I CORPS & MR 1 LRG RVN

RUMUALB/CG 23RD INF DIV CHL RVN

RUMHJA/CG 101ST ABN DIV CEA RVN

RUMHDNB/CG 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV MECH QTR RVN

RUMHDNA/DSA USAAG I CORPS & MR 1 LRG RVN

RUMHHCT/SA 1ST ARVN DIV HUE RVN

RUMHONI/SA 2ND ARVN DIV QNI RVN

RUMHDNA/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE DNG RVN

RUMHHAN/PSA QUANG NAM PROVINCE HOI AN RVN

RUMHHMV/PSA THUA THIEN PROVINCE HUE RVN

RUMHONI/PSA QUANG NGAI PROVINCE QUANG NGAI RVN

RUMHQTR/PSA QUANG TRI PROVINCE QUANG TRI RVN

RUMHTKY/PSA QUANG TIN PROVINCE TAI KY RVN

RUMHDNA/SA DA NANG CITY DNG RVN

BT

SECRET NOFORN EXCEPT AUSTRIA AND NEW ZEALAND

SECTION III OF III SECTIONS

GENERAL SUTHERLANDS SENDS EXCLUSIVE FOR LTG MCCUTCHEON

AND MG WIDDECKE

TAXATION AND CONFISCATION AS CONDUCTED BY THE VC. THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THE ENEMY IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY RELIANT UPON THE LOCAL POPULATION AS A SOURCE OF SUPPLY. AS

AN EXAMPLE, ENEMY DIRECTIVES CAPTURED ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1970

PAGE TWO RUMUHA 6000 SECRET NOFORN

SOUTH OF LONG THANH REVEALED THAT SUB REGION 4 HAD REVISED ITS SUPPLY SYSTEM AND WOULD NO LONGER ISSUE FOOD AND SUPPLIES TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS. ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENTS, THE SUB-REGION HEADQUARTERS WOULD HENCEFORTH ALLOCATED ONLY FUNDS AND UNITS WOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PURCHASING THEIR OWN SUPPLIES. WHILE RELIANCE ON LOCAL PROCUREMENT REDUCED THE CENTRALIZED REAR SERVICE REQUIREMENT, IT PLACES A GREATER LOGISTICAL BURDEN ON THE SHADOW SUPPLY SYSTEM AND REDUCED

THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF TACTICAL FORCES WHICH MUST DEVOTE RESOURCES AND TIME TO SUPPLY ACTIVITIES. TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE, AND DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS COMPLETE THE SUPPLY CYCLE. FORWARD SUPPLY COUNCILS AT VARIOUS ECHELONS ARE NATURAL BRIDGES BETWEEN VCI FINANCE AND ECONOMY SECTIONS AND MILITARY REAR SERVICE GROUPS. THEIR BASIC RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE THE MANAGEMENT OF AN INTRICATE SYSTEM OF PICK UP, INTERMEDIATE STORAGE, AND DELIVERY OF SUPPLIES TO POLITICAL AND MILITARY ELEMENTS. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS CONFIRM THAT MANY DELIVERIES ARE MADE BY INDIVIDUALS WITH LEGAL STATUS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT BETWEEN JANUARY AND MAY 1970, TRUCKLOAD QUANTITIES OF WHEATFLOUR, CORN, SALT, MILK, SUGAR, AND SALTED

1 OF 3

020727Z DEC 70

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

PAGE THREE RUMUHFA6000 S E C R E T NOFORN
 FISH WERE DELIVERED BY INDEPENDENT TRUCK OWNERS TO ELEMENTS
 OF REAR SERVICE GROUP 84 IN SOUTHERN BINH TUY PROVINCE. THIS
 REAR SERVICE GROUP ALSO HAS ITS OWN PURCHASING AND TRUCKING SYSTEM
 WHICH REPORTEDLY OPERATES BETWEEN SAIGON AND BINH THUAN PROVINCE.
 THE ENEMY HAS ALLEGEDLY PAID UP TO 3,000,000 PIASTER PER TRUCK
 TO PROCURE PROPER PASSES AND LEGAL DOCUMENTATIONS. :: :9.9-
 LIAISON STATIONS ALSO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN PASSING SUPPLIES TO
 ENEMY UNITS. INFORMATION RECENTLY ACQUIRED BY THE SAIGON
 MUNICIPAL POLICE REVEALED DETAILS OF THE OPERATION OF A
 COMMO-LIAISON STATION ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF SAIGON. ACCORDING TO
 THE REPORT, THE STATION IS RUN BY A 55-YEAR OLD WOMAN FOR THE
 PURPOSE OF FEEDING ENEMY TROOPS AND RUNNING VC COMMO-LIAISON
 ROUTE BETWEEN HAU NGHIA PROVINCE AND SAIGON. YOUNG GIRLS,
 DISGUISED AS GRASS CUTTERS, PICK UP FOOD AND INFORMATION OF A
 DAILY BASIS FOR DELIVERY TO VC MILITARY PERSONNEL OPERATING IN
 THE VICINITY OF TAN PHU TRUNG VILLAGE. THESE EXAMPLES
 CLEARLY INDICATES THAT THE VC/NVA ARE OBTAINING SUPPLIES
 FROM LOCAL VILLAGES AND CITIES ON A SYSTEMATIC BASIS. OUR
 STUDY REVEALS THAT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM VARIES
 COUNTRY-WIDE AND IS DEPENDENT ON THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION
 PAGE FOUR RUMUHFA6000 S E C R E T NOFORN

FROM THE POPULACE AND LIMITS IMPOSED BY ALLIED MILITARY
 PRESENCE. THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS SYSTEM IS REVEALED BY THE
 ABILITY OF THE ENEMY TO PROCURE IMPORTED U.S. SUPPLIES FROM
 URBAN SOURCES. THE GVN MINISTRU OF ECONOMY SELLS SUCH PRO-
 DUCTS TO PRIVATELY OWNED AND APPROVED JOBBERS FOR A
 PROFIT. JOBBERS RESELL THESE ITEMS INTO THE RETAIL MARKET
 WITHOUT AND GVN RESTRICTION OR CHECKS MADE AS TO FINAL
 DESTINATION OF GOODS. TO TRANSPORT THESE GOODS OUT OF
 SAIGON. THE JOBBER PERELY HAS TO APPLY FOR A PERMIT FROM
 THE MINISTRU OF ECONOMY, WHICH OFTEN GRANTS APPROVAL WITH-
 OUT QUESTIONS, AS AN EXAMPLE, US FORCES OPERATING IN BINH
 TUY PROVINCE IN JULY CAPTURED 66 TONS OF WHEAT FLOUR WHICH
 WERE STORED IN EIGHT DIFFERENT VC CACHE SITES. ALL FLOUR
 SACKS WERE INSCRIBED WITH THE SAME PURCHASE AUTHORIZATION
 NUMBER AND HAD BEEN IMPORTED INTO SOUTH VIETNAM BY USAID.
 THE FLOUR WAS APPARENTLY BEING SHIPPED FROM SAIGON TO
 PHAN THIET IN BINH THUAN PROVINCE WHICH IT WAS DIVERTED FOR
 ENEMY USE. WHEN GVN JUDICIAL POLICE ATTEMPTED TO REVIEW
 RECORDS CONCERNING SOME OF THESE DELIVERIES WITH THE MINISTRY
 PAGE FIVE RUMUHFA6000 S E C R E T NOFORN

OF ECONOMY, THEY WERE TOLD THE RECORDS HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY
 FIRE. IT APPEARS THAT THESE COMMODITIES REACHED VC HANDS
 THROUGH CORRUPTION OR COLLUSION BETWEEN JOBBERS, RETAILER,
 TRUCKERS, AND POSSIBLY SOME GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL OFFICIALS.
 THIS REVIEW OF THE SHADOW SUPPLY SYSTEM, ITS ORGANIZATION,
 AND METHODS OF OPERATIONS SHOWS THAT IT HAS SEVERAL VULNER-
 ABILITIES. ACCESS TO THE POPULATION WHICH PERMITS TAXATION OF
 THE POPULACE AND OBLIVIOUS SMALL-SCALE PURCHASE OF REQUIRED
 ITEMS REMAIN THE KEY TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS TYPE SUPPLY
 SYSTEM. ALLIED OPERATIONS AND PACIFICATION EFFORTS HAVE ERODED

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SECRET/NOFORN

ENEMY CAPABILITIES IN THIS RESPECT AND CONTINUED PROGRESS SHOULD FURTHER RESTRICT THE ENEMY'S FREEDOM AND ABILITY TO PURCHASE OR CONFISCATE SUPPLIES. THE VC PROCUREMENT OF SUPPLIES IN LARGE QUANTITIES FROM URBAN CENTER OFFERS THE GREATEST POTENTIAL FOR ALLIED EXPLOITATION. THE NEUTRALIZATION OF ILLEGAL MONEY MARKETS, PSEUDO-LEGITIMATE VC COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES, AND SOURCES OF SUPPLY WOULD DEAL A SEVERE BLOW TO THE ENTIRE SYSTEM. EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST THESE ACTIVITIES IS GREATLY DEPENDENT UPON INCREASE GVN EFFORTS. A MORE VIGOROUS APPLICATION OF EXISTING GVN LAWS PROHIBITING CURRENCY MANIPULATION AND BLACK-MARKET TRADING WOULD

PAGE SIX KUMUHFA6000 S E C R E T NOFORN
ALSO ASSIST IN NEUTRALIZING THE SYSTEM. PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE THAT THE GVN WOULD TAKE EFFECTIVE AND QUICK ACTIONS TO PUNISH ALL OFFENDERS AS WELL AS THOSE PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO CONDONE OR PROTECT THE SYSTEM WOULD DEMONSTRATE THE LONG-RANGE DISADVANTAGES OF COOPERATION WITH THE VC AND PUT GREATER PRESSURE ON THE SUPPLY APPARATUS. THE SHADOW SUPPLY SYSTEM IS ALSO VULNERABLE FROM WITHIN. THE ORGANIZATION IS HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON VCI CADRE MANNING FINANCE AND ECONOMIC SECTIONS AND FORWARD SUPPLY COUNCILS AND INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN BRIBED OR COERCED INTO COOPERATING WITH THE ENEMY. TIMELY EXPLOITATION OF INFORMATION FURNISHED BY HO CHANGS, RALLIERS, AND VCI DEFECTORS LEAVES THE SYSTEM SUSCEPTIBLE TO ALLIED COUNTERMEASURES. THE SYSTEM REMAINS VULNERABLE TO ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FORWARD SUPPLY COUNCILS IS DEPENDENT UPON THE ABILITY TO USE COMMO-LIAISON ROUTES AND STATIONS AND TO MAINTAIN SECURE STORAGE SITES. ROUTE INTERDICTION AND DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY CACHES HAS CONTRIBUTED TO LOCALIZED SUPPLY SHORTAGES. CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON SUCH OPERATION WILL FURTHER LIMIT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS VITAL LINK IN THE ENEMY'S SUPPLY SYSTEM. IN CONCLUSION, THE SHADOW SUPPLY SYSTEM WHICH HAS BEEN DEVELOPED OVER AT LEAST TWO DECADES NOW CONSTITUTES A COMPLEX AND

PAGE SEVEN KUMUHFA6000 S E C R E T NOFORN
WELL-ORGANIZED APPARATUS WHICH IS ATTEMPTING TO PROVIDE REVENUES AND RESOURCES TO SUPPORT CURRENT ENEMY ENDEAVORS. INCREASED ENEMY EMPHASIS HAS BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD SELF-SUFFICIENCY MEASURES, INCREASED TAX COLLECTIONS EFFORTS, AND A MUCH HEAVIER RELIANCE ON "LEGAL" SOURCE OF FOOD AND SUPPLIES. DEMANDS ON THE VC SUPPLY SYSTEM HAVE REACHED A CRITICAL LEVEL, AND THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF HIS EFFORT DURING THE CURRENT HARVEST WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT

IMPACT ON FUTURE ACTIVITIES. THEREFORE, THE SYSTEM NOW IS MORE VULNERABLE THAN EVER BEFORE TO INTENSIFIED PACIFICATION EFFORTS.

WHILE THE MAJOR IMPETUS MUST COME FROM THE GVN, FREE WORLD ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE CAN MATERIALLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEFEAT OF THE ENEMY'S SHADOW SUPPLY SYSTEM.

3. (U) ADDRESSEES MAY MAKE LIMITED DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE AS REQUIRED ON A NEED TO KNOW BASIS.

GP-1

BT

#6211

NNNN

IN 00767/336-70

/ACK

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020727Z DEC 70

SECRET/NOFORN

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT

P 022247Z DEC 70
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO RUMOMPA/CG III MAF
 INFO RUEOFIA/CNC

B

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR L. GEN MCCUM CHEON
 INFO GEN CHAPMAN FROM L. GEN JONES. //N00000//
 FORCE PLANNING (U)

A. CG III MAF 231425Z NOV 79 (AS/SPECAT)

1. (C) CONCUR REF A. APPRECIATE INFO CONTAINED THEREIN.
 WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

B

0370

Copy 2 of 4

FMFPAC-GEN 2100/1 (3/69)
 0101-V04-6601

O 070529Z ZYH ZFF-4 ZFF-1

FM BG VANDE HEY ACTING COPS MACV SAIGON
TO GEN CLAY CDR 7AF TAN SON NHUT
LTG COLLINS CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
LTG DAVISON CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH
LTG MCCAFFREY DCG USARV LONG BINH
LTG SUTHERLAND CG XXIV CORPS DA NANG
LTG MCCUTCHEON CG III MAF DA NANG
VADM KING COMNAVFORV SAIGON
MG MCCOWN CG DMAC CAN THO
COL HEALY CO 5SFGA NHA TRANG
ZEM

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MAC 15523 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: DECEMBER COMMANDER'S WIEU (U)

1. (C) UNLESS THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN THE ENEMY SITUATION DURING THE REMAINDER OF THIS MONTH, THE NEXT COMMANDER'S WIEU WILL BE SCHEDULED IN MID JANUARY. PARTICIPANTS WILL BE NOTIFIED OF DATE AND TIME OF MEETING.

2. DECLASSIFY EFFECTIVE 31 JANUARY 1971.

WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

100

0004

7/10/11

ZUFVU

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

07

03

29

(165)

MCEO

For File

104

CONFIDENTIAL

TOR 080018Z NOV 70

PITAZYUW RUHHFMA0757 3112238-AAAA--RUMUMPA.

ZNY AAAAAA

P 072238Z NOV 70

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUMUMPA/CGIII 047

BT

CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL FOR LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM
 LTGEN JONES. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER
 DURING WORKING HOURS. //002200//
 CONUS BOUND TRANSPORTATION (C)

1. (C) I WOULD LIKE TO RECOMMEND TO YOU THE
 FOLLOWING SCHEDULE FOR YOUR USE OF CAPSULE AND THE
 COMMAND KC-130 TO TAKE YOU FROM DANANG TO WASHINGTON.
 I PRESENTLY PLAN TO HAVE THE FLAGSHIP DEPART HERE
 WITH DONN ROBERTSON AT 1145 ON 29DEC70 LOCAL TO ARRIVE
 AT DANANG AT 1532 LOCAL ON 30DEC70. THE RETURN
 FLIGHT WOULD THEN ORIGINATE AT DANANG AT 1200 ON
 31JAN71, SPENDING THE PERIOD 021100 JAN TO 022200 JAN71
 HERE IN HAWAII FOR YOUR PPC CALLS AND CREW REST.
 THE FINAL LEG FOR WASHINGTON WOULD BEGIN AT 022200
 JAN71 WITH YOUR EXPECTED ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON AT
 1832 3JAN71.

$$\begin{array}{r} 28-12 \\ 29-24 \\ 30-16 \\ \hline 52 \\ -24 \\ \hline 28 \\ -6 \\ \hline 22 \end{array}$$

PAGE TWO RUHHFMA0757 C O N F I D E N T I A L PERSONAL FOR MCEO
 2. WARM REGARDS,

GP-4

BT

0757

COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES

$$\begin{array}{r} 28 \\ 18 \\ \hline 16 \\ 34 \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{r} 18 \\ 11 \\ \hline 29 \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{r} 6 \\ 11 \\ \hline 17 \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{r} 13 \\ 14 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 18 \\ 16 \\ \hline 34 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 2-12 \\ 11 \\ \hline -1 \\ +6 \\ \hline 24 \end{array}$$

NNNN
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MCEO

EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT

CONFIDENTIAL

RITAZ YU RUMFYA 0944 342 03 09-AAAA--RUMOMPA RUMILVA.

ZNY AAAAA

RUMOMPA-I-CG FIR ST MARD IV

R 080300Z DEC 70

FM ADMIN EMPAC

TO CG III MAF

CG FIR ST MARD IV

E

TOR: 080446Z DEC 70

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN MCCUTCHEON
AND GEN VIDECKE FROM GEN ADAMS //N02000//

ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT (U)

A. CG FIR ST MARD IV 010535Z DEC 70 (S) SPECAT

B. CG III MAF 221247Z DEC 70 (C) SPECAT

1. (C) ADOPTION OF THE ARTILLERY CONCEPTS DESCRIBED
IN REF A AND ITS ATTENDANT BENEFITS I.E., SAVING OF
LIVES, REDUCTION OF COSTS AND THE BONUS EFFECT PARTIC-
ULARIZED IN REF B ARE ESPECIALLY NOTeworthy. THE
PEACE AND QUIET IN THE VILLES WILL ATTEST TO PACIFICA-
TION PROGRAM SUCCESS TO DATE, AND WILL ENHANCE FUTURE
ENDEAVORS.

2. (U) PLEASE EXPRESS MY PRIDE AND CONVEY A WELL DONE
TO YOUR MARINES FOR AGAIN DEMONSTRATING INITIATIVE AND
PROFESSIONALISM IN MEETING OUR GOALS. WARM REGARDS AND
CONTINUED SUCCESS.

GP-A

E

0944

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MCEO 9

1167

MCEO

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECAT

RUMULVA0827 342035Z-AAAA--RUMOMPA.

ZNY AAAAA

RUMOMPA-T-CG FMFPAC

-T-CG III MAF

P 080850Z DEC 70

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUMOMPA/CG FMFPAC

INFO RUMOMPA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L //NO0302//

SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES

INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE. DELIVER

DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY.

FIRST MARINE DIVISION GROUND SAFETY PROGRAM

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 210535Z DEC 70 (S) SPECAT)

1. (C) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE YOU WITH AN UPDATE OF THE STATUS OF, AND THE DISCERNABLE TRENDS IN TROOP SAFETY RESULTING FROM THE DIVISION GROUND SAFETY PROGRAM. THE STATUS AND TRENDS HAVE BEEN EVALUATED UTILIZING THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:

A. COMPUTING ACCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES ON A PER THOUSAND MAN BASIS TO REFLECT CHANGING STRENGTH LEVELS.

B. ENSURING POSITIVE AND UNIFORM IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF THE FULL SPECTRUM OF GROUND ACCIDENTS

PAGE TWO RUMULVA0827 C O N F I D E N T I A L/SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCL FOR

INTO SIX IDENTIFIABLE CATEGORIES.

(1) SMALL ARMS (MISAPPLICATION OF FRIENDLY FIRE FROM RIFLES, PISTOLS AND M-79'S)

(2) SUPPORTING ARMS (MISAPPLICATION OF FRIENDLY FIRE FROM AIR, ARTILLERY AND CREW-SERVED WEAPONS)

(3) ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES

(4) EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

(5) MOTOR VEHICLE

(6) OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL

THE CATEGORIES ARE SELF-EXPLANATORY EXCEPT OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL. THE OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY REFLECTS THOSE ACCIDENTS THAT DO NOT FALL INTO THE OTHER CATEGORIES, E.G., DROWNINGS, BROKEN LEGS, SERIOUS SPRAINS, SUICIDES, ANIMAL AND SERPENT BITES.

C. ENSURING COMPLETE INFORMATION BY DEVELOPING BOTH THE NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS AND THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES FOR EACH ACCIDENT.

2. (C) THE DATA BASE FOR 1970 FIGURES IN THIS MESSAGE IS SOUND. SOME OF THE 1969 FIGURES ARE RECONSTRUCTED BUT ARE BASED ON THE BEST DATA AVAILABLE. ONLY MARINE AND NAVY

CONFIDENTIAL

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

COPY 2 OF 4

MCEO

PAGE THREE RUMULVA0827C O N F I D E N T I A L /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY/EXCL FOR

CASUALTIES ARE REFLECTED IN THE FIGURES FOR BOTH YEARS;
RECORDS OF VIETNAMESE CASUALTIES ARE KEPT SEPARATELY. ALL
FIGURES ARE AS OF 30NOV70. THE FIGURES FOR 1969 ARE FOR
THE ENTIRE YEAR.

3. (C) A SUMMARY OF THE STATUS AND TREND FOR EACH
CATEGORY FOLLOWS:

A. SMALL ARMS ACCIDENTS: THE SMALL ARMS ACCIDENT RATE
FOR 1970 IS .404; THE 1969 RATE WAS .368. THE 1970 RATE
EXCEEDS THAT OF 1969, BUT THE TREND FOR THE LAST THREE
MONTHS HAS BEEN STEADILY DOWNWARD WITH RATES OF .365,
.320, AND .160 RESPECTIVELY.

B. SMALL ARMS CASUALTIES: THE SMALL ARMS CASUALTY RATE
FOR 1970 IS .461; 5 3 1969 RATE WAS .330. THE TREND HAS
BEEN DOWNWARD FOR THE LAST THREE MONTHS WITH RATES OF
.243, .160, AND .080 RESPECTIVELY.

C. SUPPORTING ARMS ACCIDENTS: THE SUPPORTING ARMS ACCI-
DENT RATE FOR 1970 IS .230; THE 1969 RATE WAS .508. THERE
IS A SIGNIFICANTLY FAVORABLE RATE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE
TWO YEARS, WITH A REDUCTION FOR 1970 OF ALMOST 45 PERCENT.
WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE RECENTLY INITIATED RESTRICTIVE

PAGE FOUR RUMULVA0827C O N F I D E N T I A L /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY/EXCL FOR

FIRE PLAN REPORTED TO YOU IN REFERENCE A WILL FURTHER
REDUCE THESE ACCIDENTS TO AN EVEN LOWER LEVEL.

D. SUPPORTING ARMS CASUALTIES: THE SUPPORTING ARMS
CASUALTY RATE FOR 1970 IS .710; THE 1969 RATE WAS
1.084. THIS YEAR'S RATE IS ABOUT 65 PERCENT OF LAST
YEAR'S RATE.

E. ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE ACCIDENTS: THE ACCIDENTAL
DISCHARGE ACCIDENT RATE FOR 1970 IS .520; THE 1969 RATE
WAS .728. THE TREND FOR 1970 HAS BEEN CONSTANT.

F. ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE CASUALTIES: THE ACCIDENTAL
DISCHARGE CASUALTY RATE FOR 1970 IS .510; THE 1969 RATE
WAS .778. THE 1970 RATE IS ABOUT TWO THIRDS THAT OF
THE RATE FOR LAST YEAR. THE TREND FOR THIS YEAR HAS
BEEN CONSTANT.

G. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE ACCIDENTS: THE EXPLOSIVE ORD-
NANCE ACCIDENT RATE FOR 1970 IS .723; THE 1969 RATE WAS
.565. THE TREND IS DOWNWARD WITH A .330 RATE READING
FOR OCTOBER AND A .562 RATE FOR NOVEMBER.

H. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CASUALTIES: THE EXPLOSIVE ORD-
NANCE CASUALTY RATE FOR 1970 IS .942; THE 1969 RATE WAS

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MCEO

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MCEO

PAGE FIVE RUMULVA0827 C O N F I D E N T I A L /SPECAT/MARINE
CORPS EYES ONLY/EACL FOR

.986. THERE IS NO DISCERNABLE TREND IN THIS CATEGORY.

I. MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS: THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT RATE FOR 1970 IS .639; THE 1969 RATE WAS .776. THE MONTHLY RATES ARE ERRATIC WITH A LOW OF .426 IN SEPTEMBER AND A HIGH OF .834 IN MARCH.

J. MOTOR VEHICLE CASUALTIES: THE MOTOR VEHICLE CASUALTY RATE FOR 1970 IS .485; THE 1969 RATE WAS .446. THE 1970 RATE IS NINE PERCENT LOWER THAN THAT OF 1969.

K. OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENTS: THE OCCUPATIONAL/OPERATIONAL ACCIDENT RATE FOR 1970 IS 4.837; THE 1969 RATE WAS 3.325. THERE IS A DOWNWARD TREND IN THIS CATEGORY FOR THE PAST FOUR MONTHS. THE FIGURES FOR 1969 IN THIS CATEGORY HAVE BEEN RECONSTRUCTED, BUT ARE FAIRLY SOLID.

L. OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL CASUALTIES: THE OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL CASUALTY RATE FOR 1970 IS 4.113; THE 1969 RATE WAS 3.490. SINCE MAY WE HAVE EXPERIENCED A CLASSIC DOWNWARD TREND. THE RATE FOR MAY 1970 WAS 5.410 AND THE NOVEMBER RATE WAS 3.210.

4. (C) BY COMBINING THE RATES OF ACCIDENTS FOR SMALL ARMS, SUPPORTING ARMS, ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES, EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

PAGE SIX RUMULVA0827 C O N F I D E N T I A L /SPECAT/MARINE CORPS
EYES ONLY/EACL FOR

AND MOTOR VEHICLES WE WERE ABLE TO DETERMINE OUR OVERALL RATE FOR 1970 AS 2.546; THAT RATE COMPARES FAVORABLE WITH A 2.955 RATE FOR 1969; THIS REPRESENTS A 16 PERCENT REDUCTION.

5. (C) IN LIKE MANNER THE COMBINED CASUALTY RATE FOR THE SAME CATEGORIES OF 3.228 FOR 1970 IS LESS THAN THE 3.634 FOR 1969. THIS REPRESENTS A 17 PERCENT REDUCTION.

6. (C) THE DIVISION IS MAKING POSITIVE STRIDES AND WITNESSING MEASURABLE SUCCESS IN ITS GROUND SAFETY PROGRAM. EACH ACCIDENT IS A TRAGEDY, BUT ADDITIONAL HARD WORK AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND WILL CONTINUE TO BRING THE RATES FOR ACCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES DOWN. BEST REGARDS

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MCEO

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TOP SECRET

MCEO

EXCLUSIVE

P 09035Z DEC 70

FM CG I MAF

TO CG FMFPAC

INFO CG III MAF

BT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN JONES INFO LIGEN
MCCUTCHEON FROM MGEN WILSON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY DELIVER
DURING WORKING HOURS.

PROPOSED T/O FOR HQ III MAF (U)

A. FONECON AC/S G-3 FMFPAC AND C/S I MAF OF 3 DEC 70

B. CG III MAF 200645Z NOV 70 IS SPECAT MCEO

C. T/O 4918.

1. (IS) REF A REQUESTED COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE T/O
PROPOSED IN REF B WHICH IS BASED ON THE 114 CEILING. THE FOLLOWING
COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS ARE CHANGES, ADDITIONS OR DELETIONS KEYED
TO RESPECTIVE LINE NUMBERS OF REF C.

LINE NO. CHANGE/ADDITION/DELETION

5 CHANGE TO READ SGT MAJ 9999 1 EM.

6 CHANGE TO READ FOOD SERV TECH MSGT 3382 1 EM.

7 CHANGE TO READ COOK SPECIALIST SGT 3372 1 EM.

8 CHANGE TO READ STENOGRAPHER SGT 0142 1 EM.

9A ADD MOTOR VEH OPERATOR SGT 3531 1 EM.

9B ADD COOK SPECIALIST CPL 3371 1 EM.

9C ADD TOTAL INA 2 OFF 6 EM.

10 CHANGE TO READ COLONEL 9936/7.

12-14 DELETE.

19 TOTALS 2 OFF 3 EM.

19 CHANGE TO LT COL 9912.

20 CHANGE TO MAJ 9912.

21 DELETE.

25 TOTALS 2 OFF 3 EM.

29A ADD ADMIN MAN SGT 0141 1 EM.

34-35 DELETE.

37 DELETE.

43-45 DELETE.

47-49 DELETE.

51-54 DELETE.

55A ADD OOB ANALYST SGT 0231 1 EM.

57-65 DELETE.

68A ADD CI ASST SSGT 0211 1 EM.

70 TOTAL G-2 6 OFF 14 EM.

77 REDUCE RANK TO LT COL.

78 REDUCE RANK TO MAJ.

79A ADD ASST PLANS/PROJ OFF MAJ 9912 2 OFF.

81 REDUCE RANK TO LT COL.

82-83 REDUCE RANK TO MAJ.

84A ADD NGFO LCDR 1100 R NAVY 1

87 REDUCE TO 2 EM.

87A ADD DRAFTSMAN CPL 1411 1 EM.

88 CHANGE TO READ TRAINING UNIT.

89 CHANGE TO READ ASST G3/TRNG OFF MAJ 9912 1 OFF.

89A ADD ADMIN MAN CPL 0131 1 EM.

90 TOTAL G-3 8 OFF 9 EM.

SPECAT

III MAF 2000/4

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MCEO TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

88A ADD HONOR TRANSPORT OFF CAPT 3502 1 OFF.
 88E ADD ORD WANCE MAJ 2202 1 OFF.
 99 TOTAL G-4 76 OFF 4 EM.
 106 REDUCE TO 1 EM.
 109-110 DELETE.
 116 DELETE.
 118 REDUCE TO 1 EM.
 119 TOTAL ADJ 3 OFF 2 EM.
 121 REDUCE RANK TO LT COL CHANGE MOS TO 2502.
 122 REDUCE RANK TO MAJ.
 123 CHANGE TO ASST CEO/FACILITY CONT OFF CAPT 2203 1 OFF.
 125A ADD DIGITAL SWITCH EQUIP TECH MSGT 2822 1 EM.
 128 TOTAL CE 4 OFF 4 EM.
 130-131 FOOTNOTE F.
 132A ADD CHAPLAIN SECTION.
 138 ADD FORCE CHAPLAIN CAPT 4102 1 NAVY OFF FOOTNOTE F.
 134A ADD TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT OFF CAPT 3102 1 OFF.
 137 TOTAL EMP 2 OFF 2 EM.
 139 REDUCE RANK TO LT COL CHANGE MOS TO 1302.
 140 REDUCE RANK TO LOR.
 141 DELETE.
 144 TOTAL ENGR 1 OFF 2 EM 1 NAVY OFF.
 145-133 DELETE. SERVICES PROVIDED BY CONSOLIDATED LEGAL CENTER AND PAO SECTION.
 157-159 ADD FOOTNOTE F.
 161-169 DELETE. SECTION CONSOLIDATED INTO G4 SECTION.
 174 REDUCE RANK TO LT COL CHANGE MOS TO 3002.
 175 REDUCE RANK TO MAJ CHANGE MOS TO 3060.
 180 REDUCE RANK TO MAJ CHANGE MOS TO 9910.
 181 CHANGE TO HEAD GRG SUP OFF CAPT 3002 1 OFF.
 182A ADD HQ GUNNERY SGT GYSGT 0369 1 EM.
 183-184 DELETE.
 184A ADD SUPPLY CHIEF SSGT 3041 1 EM.
 185 REDUCE TO 3 EM.
 188 TOTAL 2 OFF 9 EM.
 188A ADD SUBIC LN OFF SECTION.
 188B ADD LN OFF MAJ 9910 1 OFF.
 188C ADD MAINT SUPVR GYSGT 1169 1 EM.
 188D ADD ADMIN MAN CPL 0141 1 EM.
 188E ADD SUP MAN SGT 3041 1 EM.
 188F ADD ADMIN CLERK CPL 0161 1 EM.
 188G ADD COOK CPL 3371 1 EM.
 188H TOTAL 1 OFF 5 EM.
 193 TOTAL MAR 44 OFF 70 EM 2 NAVY OFF. ADD FOOTNOTE AS FOLLOWS: FILLED AS AN ADDITIONAL DUTY BY OCCUPANTS OF SIMILAR BILLETS IN THIRD MARDIV

"MCEO"
 "EXCLUSIVE"

SPECAT

"MCEO"

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RUMOMPA -T- CG FM/PAC

RUMOMPA -T- CG III MAF

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FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO RUMOMPA/CG FM/PAC

INFO RUMOMPA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L //NO00000//

SPECAT/MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY/EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN JONES

INFO LTGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM MAJGEN WIDDECKE. DELIVER

DURING WORKING HOURS ONLY

VISIT OF DR. CURTIS W. TARR, DIRECTOR, SELECTIVE SERVICE

1. (C) WE HAD A PLEASANT VISIT YESTERDAY WITH DR.

CURTIS W. TARR, DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE. THE

ANNOUNCED PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT WAS TO "VISIT WITH YOUNG

MEN IN MILITARY UNITS SO THAT I MIGHT HAVE A BETTER

FEEL FOR THE VICISSITUDES OF MILITARY SERVICE IN THE

COMBAT ZONE AND IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT BEFORE I MAKE MY

APPEARANCE BEFORE THE CONGRESS IN THE FORTHCOMING

SESSION WHICH WILL BE CALLED UPON TO EXTEND THE SELECTIVE

SERVICE LAW". HE WAS TO VISIT INFANTRY AND RECON-

NAISSANCE UNITS IN THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION. ACCORDINGLY,

PAGE TWO RUMULVA1294 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT/MCEO/EXCLUSIVE FOR

WE HAD PLANNED A SCHEDULE TO INCLUDE VISITS TO

RECON BN, OP 270, FSB RYDER AND CG BALDY, BUT WITH RAIN

AND RESTRICTED VISIBILITY WE SWITCHED TO THE FOUL

WEATHER PLAN.

2. (C) DR. TARR ARRIVED FROM III MAF ABOUT 1445. I

MET WITH HIM BRIEFLY, ALONG WITH THE ADC AND THE G-1,

AND GAVE HIM A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DIVISION'S EXPER-

IENCES, PRESENT STRENGTH AND POSTURE.

3. (C) ESCORTED BY THE ADC AND G-1 HE THEN PROCEEDED

TO THE RECON BN C. P. CAMP WHERE, AFTER BEING MET BY THE

CO, HE VISITED IN PRIVATE AT HIS OWN REQUEST WITH THE

MEMBERS OF A RECON TEAM. THE VISIT WAS LENGTHY AND WE

MADE NO EFFORT TO HOLD HIM TO A FIXED PRE-PLANNED

SCHEDULE. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPRESSED AND PLEASED WITH

THE INTERCHANGE HE HAD WITH THE RECON TEAM.

4. (C) JED DUVALL AND A CBS CAMERA CREW AND TERRY

WOLKERSTORFER, AN AP CORRESPONDENT, THEN INTERVIEWED

HIM. THE ATTITUDE OF THE PRESS SEEMED VERY FRIENDLY.

5. (C) THE PARTY NEXT PROCEEDED TO THE 1ST MARINES

BASE CAMP WHERE DR. TARR MET WITH A RIFLE PLATOON

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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PAGE THREE RUMULV 1094 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT/MCEO/
EXCLUSIVE FOR

STANDING BY AS A QUICK REACTION FORCE. THIS MEETING WAS HELD IN THE ENLISTED CLUB, AND HAD SOMETHING OF THE ATMOSPHERE OF A RECEPTION, WITH THE MARINES DRINKING COFFEE AND SOFT DRINKS. IT WAS LESS SATISFACTORY FROM DR. TARR'S POINT OF VIEW BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLOW THE UNFETTERED EXPRESSION OF OPINIONS WHICH HE SEEMED TO DESIRE.

6. (C) THE PARTY NEXT WENT TO THE 11TH MT BN WHERE THE COMMANDING OFFICER HAD ABOUT 30 MARINES WAITING TO MEET WITH DR. TARR IN THE ENLISTED MENS CLUB. DR. TARR QUICKLY AND TACTFULLY REDUCED THE GROUP TO 6 MARINES WITH WHOM HE THEN MET IN PRIVATE. THE VISIT WITH 11TH MT BN ENDED ABOUT 1730 AND THE PARTY PROCEEDED TOWARD XXIV CORPS BY VEHICLE.

7. (C) DR. TARR, THROUGHOUT THE VISIT, WAS FRIENDLY CANDID AND REMARKABLY PERCEPTIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE DRIVE BACK TO XXIV CORPS HE DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL THE DIFFERENCES DISTINGUISHING THE RECON MARINE, THE INFANTRY MARINE, AND THE MOTOR TRANSPORT MARINE. IN OTHER WORDS, HE PROMPTLY PUT ALL THE PEGS IN THE

PAGE FOUR RUMULV 1094 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT/MCEO/EXCLUSIVE FOR
CORRECT ROLE, AND RECOGNIZED THE SPREAD OF PROFESSIONALISM EXISTING IN A RECONNAISSANCE VIS-A-VIS A MOTOR TRANSPORT UNIT. MOREOVER, IN MY OPINION, HIS VISIT WAS MEANINGFUL BECAUSE IT GAVE HIM AN INSIGHT INTO, OR MORE LIKELY CONFIRMED A PREVIOUSLY HELD UNDERSTANDING OF, THE ATTITUDES AND ABILITIES OF YOUNG MARINES IN VIETNAM TODAY, AND HOW THESE MAY VARY FROM COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS TO THOSE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COMBAT ON A DAILY BASIS. BEST REGARDS.

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FM COMNAVFORV

TO RUMOMPA/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PERSONAL FOR LGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM KING

1. (C) DISMAYED TO HEAR OF YOUR ILLNESS. PLEASE ACCEPT MY BEST WISHES AND THOSE OF ALL USN AND USMC PERSONNEL OF NAVFORV FOR A SPEEDY RESTORATION TO FULL HEALTH, AND CONTINUED SUCCESS IN THE CORPS.

2. (U) WARMEST REGARDS.

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