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HEADQUARTERS  
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM  
FPO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 96602

*at last  
Miller*  
*1st CTZ*

Memorandum for: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
(Attention: Deputy for CORDS)

Subject: MACV Corps Revolutionary Development Overview, June 1967

Ref: (a) COMMUSMACV msg 260535Z/Dec 66 (Conf NOFORN 54520) from Porter  
and Westmoreland  
(b) COMMUSMACV msg 220935Z/Mar 67 (Unclas 09619) from MACRDS

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the subject report is submitted herewith.

2. GENERAL COMMENTS

a. RD Workers and Military

(1) The overall progress in the RD program noted in May continued space in June. Quang Tri, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai reported greater forward strides than in any preceding month. The principal reason for this general improvement was the improved security situation as increased FVMAF/ARVN military activity kept the VC forces off balance. Temporary shortages of building commodities prevented even greater progress in most provinces and were partially responsible for the falling behind of the program in DaNang City. Also contributing to lack of greater progress in DaNang were administrative problems.

(2) VC-initiated incidents dropped slightly throughout the Corps area with 289 occurring in June as against 292 during May. There were fewer attacks against RD teams with 20 recorded in June as opposed to 25 in May. Significantly, no team in Quang Tri was attacked. Attacks against district headquarters were primarily harrassing in nature, consisting of mortar or small arms fire. There were 14 such attacks during this reporting period compared to 21 in May. Assassinations and abductions of civilians fell off substantially, the totals being 59 and 56 respectively. During May 81 civilians were assassinated and 77 abducted.

(3) Improvement was once more noted in the performance of the RD teams. As a result of the improved security situation they were able to apply themselves to RD activities. Thus, the RD program gained impetus and generated increased enthusiasm on the part of the workers and better cooperation from the inhabitants. Quang Ngai reported that in a series of propaganda courses attended by 537 inhabitants of four hamlets, 16 active VC supporters were identified.

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(4) Indicative of the improved morale in Quang Tri was the fact that during May it was impossible to recruit any RD workers; during June 103 were recruited, 61 of whom were sent to Vung Tau.

(5) Seven RD teams completed training at Vung Tau in June. As a result, 117 teams were working in place and an additional 16 teams will be recruited during the balance of the year.

(6) It should be noted that these forward strides were made because of the improvement in the security situation -- additional ARVN battalions were assigned to direct support of RD while FVMAF kept the pressure constantly on the large NVA/VC units throughout ICTZ. Whether these gains can be held as the RD teams and their security move on to new locations is problematical, particularly since there is a paucity of volunteers for RD Youth Defense Forces in many RD hamlets nearing completion.

b. Political

(1) During June the political situation in ICTZ was almost completely dominated by the forthcoming Presidential and Upper-House elections. Locally, political groups engaged in behind-the-scene maneuverings and the renewing of old alliances in an effort to improve their positions. The continuing competition between Thieu and Ky in the race for the presidency was a source of great concern, particularly for the military who felt caught between two leaders. The 11th-hour decision by Ky to withdraw from the race and to run instead as Thieu's vice-presidential candidate appears to have stopped a damaging split in the military.

(2) On June 17 VNQDD throughout Region I celebrated Yen Bay Day. In several provinces different factions vied for attendance of members; in DaNang, three different factions held ceremonies. Otherwise, activity was generally low key until the last ten days of the month when the Upper House Election law was promulgated. Then a flurry of meetings and visits among various leaders began taking place as lists were formed. Only Ha Thuc Ky, Revolutionary Dai Viet leader, and Tran Huong Thon (whose list was eliminated by the CA) represent Region I in the presidential race. However, nine senatorial lists have representatives of regional VNQDD and at least four lists have local Dai Viets. Several lists contain representatives of local religious groups, several retired generals from the area, and other assorted notables and politicians.

(3) Rumors persisted in Region I that several officials were soon to be replaced. However, by the end of the month, particularly with the renewed Thieu-Ky alliance, much of the talk stopped. Only Police officials, particularly Revolutionary Dai Viets, now appear to face possible removal. The DaNang Police Chief was reassigned; however, no local political significance was attached to the change.

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(4) Of some concern were the machinations of the various factions of the VNQDD in resisting disciplinary actions by the Province Chiefs in Quang Nam and Quang Tin. Thus far they have only taken the form of veiled threats to disrupt the RD program. But as the political campaign progresses, it is reasonable to expect more positive reaction by them. There is the strong likelihood that as the tempo of interest in the elections by province officials increases, the RD program will probably slow down.

### 3. PSYCHOLOGICAL

a. There was a general lessening of psychological tensions throughout ICTZ during June.

b. A successful search-and-destroy mission by ARVN troops was exploited in Hue by an exhibit of captured weapons, including an 82-mm mortar. This helped create a more positive impression of the efforts to protect the inhabitants.

c. On June 13, the VC triggered demonstrations in four districts in Quang Nam: Dai Loc, Dien Ban, Duc Pho, and Duy Xuyen. The protests centered around allied bombing and artillery (on VC targets). Reports indicate that the demonstrations were VC contrived. VIS countered the protest marches by talking to the people and were particularly successful in Dien Ban where the demonstrations dissipated in short order.

d. The reopening by Task Force Oregon of National Highway 1 from Mo Duc to Duc Pho in Quang Ngai, closed by the VC since 1964, was seen as a major psychological victory for the GVN and Allied Forces.

e. In anticipation of the advent of Vietnamese Television in I Corps, a seminar on the installation and operation of the community television sets was conducted in DaNang for VIS and CORDS PsyOps cadre throughout the ICTZ. A Vietnamese television signal is expected during the summer.

f. VIS support of RD continued to be ineffectual.

### 4. ECONOMIC

a. Prices continued steady throughout ICTZ. Increased security made possible the movement of substantial quantities of foodstuffs into Quang Tri where, during the preceding month, prices had risen substantially because of shortages.

b. Ample stocks of rice brought reductions in retail prices both in Hue and DaNang, with indications of greater public confidence in the ability of the GVN to cope with inflation.

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**5. SECURITY**

a. In a move to improve RD security in ICTZ, the Commanding General, I Corps committed a third ARVN battalion in direct support of RD in both Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. Additionally, he directed that his explicit approval is required before a direct-support battalion is permitted to leave an RD area.

b. Adoption of the RD Campaign Headquarters concept resulted in marked improvement in the coordination of security for the RD areas. Campaign Headquarters were established and Area Chiefs named with Quang Tri having one; Thua Thien, three; Quang Nam, two; Quang Tin, one; and Quang Ngai, five RD areas.

**6. AREAS OF PROGRESS****a. Revolutionary Development**

(1) The technical training of RD workers continued with Quang Tin stressing health training, Quang Nam providing training in intelligence and land reform plus refresher courses in cooperatives and irrigation. As a result of this in-province training the technical skills of most RD workers have been substantially upgraded.

(2) Resettlement of refugees from the DMZ to Cam Lo continued smoothly, thanks to the strenuous activity of US and GVN elements, military and civilian alike. As a result of this complete coordination of effort, they were provided with temporary shelter, food, money, and by month's end, were beginning to move to their assigned 20-meter-square plots of land.

(3) The PHILCAG team began training 15 refugees in the operation of the Quang Tin saw mill during the month.

(4) Influx of Hoi Chanh continued at a high level, the bulk of the increase occurring in Quang Ngai. Intensive and sustained military operations by Task Force Oregon in the Duc Pho area were responsible for generating most of them. There was progressive improvement in the use of returnees for Inducement/PsyOps. Especially noteworthy was the discovery by an APT in Hue of an 82 mm mortar which had been used in previous attacks on the city, and a cache of ammunition. As a result of this find, 3 APT members were decorated by the Province Chief and received cash rewards in excess of 40,000 \$VN. The 244th PsyOps Company developed posters from photographs taken at the ceremonies, giving them wide distribution throughout the city. At Quang Tin, the effectiveness of using Hoi Chanh to bring in more Hoi Chanh was amply demonstrated as the wife of one rallier induced the return of four others.

(5) Agricultural loans totaling 3,124,000 \$VN were made to 629 farmers in 19 RD hamlets in Quang Tin during June. The same Province reported that most large agricultural program construction projects were completed or near completion.

(6) Construction of hamlet schools proceeded well. There was great improvement in the quality of construction as the result of the involvement of the inhabitants.

(7) General improvement was also noted in the performance of the Census Grievance teams, with greater numbers of aspirations/grievances reported in Quang Ngai.

b. Military

(1) Operations

(a) US battalion-size operations increased from 12 to 15, and small-unit operations decreased from 38,423 to 38,136. A breakout of enemy personnel and weapons losses is listed below:

	III MAF	ARVN	ROKMC	USSF	TOTAL
KIA (Conf)	2382	818	222	38	3460
KIA (Prob)	2567	297	92	14	2970
Detainees	2490	256	41	14	2801
NVA PW	29	0	0	0	29
VC PW	125	188	15	4	332
NVA Returnees	0	0	0	0	0
VC Returnees	23	235	12	0	270
Weapons	409	263	29	6	707

(b) III MAF has 75 Combined Action Platoons; the programmed goal remains at 114. The effectiveness of the CAPs continued to be excellent.

(c) In the 11th DTA four large operations were conducted in support of the RD Program. Six ARVN battalions were in direct support of the RD Program with three infantry battalions each located in Quang Tri and Thua Thien RD areas. Quang Da Special Zone controlled three large operations in support of RD during June. Phi Phung 27, a Quang Da Special Zone search-and-destroy operation was conducted south of the National Priority Area from 18 through 23 June. In the 12th DTA, nine large RD operations were conducted during June. Lien Ket 106, which terminated on 5 June, resulted in accumulative enemy casualties of 153 KIA, 32 POWs and 15 weapons captured.

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(d) ARVN small-unit operations increased from 3,570 in May to 3,857 in June. There were 3,202 small-unit night operations during June as compared to 3,263 during May.

(e) RF/PF units continued to support the RD Program by participating with the ARVN in large operations and by conducting small-unit operations in RD areas; 12 RF/PF units participated jointly with the ARVN in 31 separate operations during June. RF/PF units initiated and conducted 18 large operations, nine of which resulted in contacts. There were 4,891 small-unit operations conducted by RF/PF during June resulting in 92 contacts.

(2) Training

(a) During the month of June three ARVN battalions completed RD training.

(b) To date 52 RF companies have been trained by RD Mobile Training Teams. Twelve companies received such training during June.

(3) Intelligence

(a) Due to a change in reporting procedures for the CORRAL program, no report of political infrastructure members identified will be submitted until September 1967. It is estimated that 130 infrastructure members were neutralized through elimination, capture, or return to GVN control during June.

(b) A meeting attended by representatives of III MAF, CAS, ARVN, and I Corps Advisory Group was held during June to discuss command and control lines for District Intelligence/Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC's) in ICTZ. A priority list was also established for the programming of future DIOCC.

7. GVN/ARVN PERFORMANCE

a. There was slight improvement in the performance of ARVN in support of RD. Quang Tri reported a great deal of interest by ARVN battalions in performing civic action projects.

b. Increased interest in the RD program by province officials, demonstrated by frequent visits to RD teams was in large measure responsible for their improved performance.

c. The Quang Tri Province Chief, Lt. Col. Nguyen Am continued to perform in a lack-lustre fashion.

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d. Ineffectual province Public Works chiefs continued to inhibit progress in this vital area.

#### 8. PROBLEM AREAS

a. Temporary shortages of cement, combined with provincial demands during June which exceeded all previous programming, delayed construction projects. Also out-of-stock both in Saigon and ICTZ was CORDS-supplied roofing.

b. The failure of VIS to support RD activities is a continuing cause of concern, with some VIS personnel voicing the opinion that inasmuch as no MORD funds are in their budget, they are not required nor should they be expected to support RD.

c. An immediate problem that confronts RD Teams nearing completion of the minimum requirements for New Life Hamlets is the lack of volunteers for the RD Youth Defense Forces. In many instances, RD Teams could be moved to other hamlets were RD Youth Defense Forces available. The main reasons for inadequate numbers of RD Youth Defense Forces volunteers are the shortage of males between 18 and 45 years of age and the general apathy that prevails due to available employment or other commitments. It may become necessary to request additional RF/PF units to provide the required security after the RD teams and their direct-support battalions move on.

#### 9. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Continued improvement in the performance of RD teams and accomplishment of the RD program is anticipated. This, however, will depend in large part on security, the maintenance of a stable political environment, the ability to provide adequate quantities of commodities as they are needed.

b. More qualified individuals are needed to augment the US civilian staff. There is a particularly great need for education advisors, two of the assigned advisors having been medically evacuated several months ago.

c. MACCORDS is requested to intercede with MICH to bring about greater participation in the RD program by the VIS.

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