

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

HEADQUARTERS

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
 MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM
 FPO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 96602

SEE FILES

HEADQUARTERS III MACV

0252067

11 AUG 1967

Memorandum for: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 (Attention: Deputy for CORDS)

Subject: MACV Corps Revolutionary Development Overview, July 1967

Ref: (a) COMMUSMACV msg 260535Z/Dec 66 (Conf NOFORN 54520) from Porter and
 Westmoreland
 (b) COMMUSMACV msg 220935Z/Mar 67 (Unclass 09619) from MACRES

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the subject report is submitted herewith.

2. GENERAL COMMENTS

a. RD Workers and Military

(1) All provinces in ICTZ reported significant if uneven progress in the RD program. During July continuous USMC/ARVN operations in Quang Tri and Thua Thien, coupled with Task Force Oregon and ARVN operations in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai improved the environments in which the RD teams must work. The morale of both RD cadre and hamlet populations showed a marked improvement. Shortages of roofing continued to inhibit construction programs. Except for Quang Nam, all provinces rated their programs behind schedules. Quang Ngai and DaNang prophesied completion of their programs by the end of the year. Thus Thien and Quang Tin were less sanguine.

(2) VC initiated incidents against RD teams increased by four during July to a total of 24. Eight of these were rated as attacks with the remainder classified as harassments. There were also 24 incidents directed against sector and sub-sector headquarters during the month, evenly divided between harassments and attacks. The number of such attacks in June was 14 and in May 21. Significant increases in the number of civilians abducted and assassinated during the month were recorded. One hundred fifty-five assassinations took place, 104 of them in Thua Thien. During June a total of 59 were assassinated as against 81 in May. There were 102 abductions, Thua Thien again leading the way with 55. Comparable figures for June were 56 and for May 77. Listed among the assassinations were four hamlet chiefs, one inter-family chief, fourteen refugees, two combat youth and one river patrol force cadre. The total number of VC-initiated incidents during the month was 310 as against 292 during May.

(3) The improvement noted in the two preceding months in the performance of the RD teams continued. Quang Tri reported less absenteeism

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals:
 Declassified after 12 years.

NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

and throughout ICTZ there were fewer RD deserters. Generally credited for this continuation of progress were improved security; greater interest in the RD program being exhibited by GVN officials from province chief on down to hamlet/village council members; improved PsyOps effort, especially in Quang Tri; and the greater availability of commodities, except for roofing. That the people themselves are responding was amply demonstrated in Quang Ngai. During July RD workers recruited and trained 348 RD youth in six hamlets, captured four members of the VC infrastructure, conducted propaganda courses for 1,032 people in seven hamlets. In addition, 1,817 people attended anti-illiteracy classes conducted by the RD workers in 19 hamlets. RD workers there induced seven VC to return to the GVN. Two hundred thirty non-funded self-help projects were initiated during the month and ninety-one funded self-help projects begun.

(4) Although no RD teams completed training in Vung Tau in July, recruiting of trainees continued. Particularly notable was the recruitment of 109 new trainees in Quang Tri. In May, Quang Tri had been unable to recruit any, in June their total was 103.

(5) As of the end of July, a total of 51 New Life Hamlets had completed more than 70% of the required criteria. Of these, five were in Quang Tri, ten in Thua Thien, eleven in Quang Nam, thirteen in Quang Tin and twelve in Quang Ngai. In addition, 20 consolidated hamlets reported completion of 100% of the required criteria as follows: two each in Thua Thien and Quang Nam, one in Quang Tin, and fifteen in Quang Ngai. As a result, four teams in Thua Thien were moved to the second-semester hamlets, with an additional three ready to move as soon as hamlet security fences are installed. Thirteen RD teams moved to their second-semester hamlets in Quang Ngai. Inasmuch as most of these second-semester hamlets are in close proximity to the completed hamlets, no problems of security are currently anticipated.

b. Political

(1) Politically Region I was dominated by the coming presidential and Upper House elections. Interest was keen, though apparently not as high as in Saigon, which has thus far held the spotlight. Probably the most significant thing about the elections were the things which have not happened. All during the month rumors were rampant that there would be wide-reaching changes in personnel not sympathetic to the Thieu/Ky bid. So far this has not happened. Only in Quang Tri were three Revolutionary Dai Viet officials replaced, and these can be legitimately traced to incompetence in two of the three cases. The third was relieved for refusing to fire an incompetent subordinate. Another related incident was the death of a DaNang school teacher while giving examinations in Nha Trang. Initially, some Revolutionary Dai Viet leaders tried to make the death appear politically related, however, this idea was largely discredited. So far at least, direct GVN intervention or attempts to control the outcome of the election seems generally lacking.

(2) The political parties in each province continued to compete with each other and with other party factions for local control. The influence and

GROUP-2

Downgraded 1000 years later/1983

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

COST

Copies

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

potential the parties have in ICTZ was clearly demonstrated in Quang Nam province when one of the two VNQDD factions took issue with the Duc Duc district chief. Invited into attending a supposed VNQDD holiday celebration, he soon found that it was in fact a prearranged demonstration against him. The district chief was confronted with a list of his alleged crimes and forcibly held at the site for approximately five hours during which time both he personally and his official position were abused. To secure the district chief's release and prevent his RF troops from using force to rescue him, the province chief sent his deputy for security, the province police chief, and a VNQDD Central Committee member to talk with the demonstrators. The end result was that the district chief was transferred.

(3) A similar, though less serious or dramatic incident occurred in Quang Ngai. The generally well thought of Binh Son district chief, possibly a Revolutionary Dai Viet, ran afoul of the local VNQDD leadership. They demanded and obtained his removal.

(4) Buddhists intentions vis-a-vis the coming elections continued to be obscure. Local leaders seemed to waiver between boycott and support of some presidential and Upper House lists. Generally, leaders were reluctant to support any presidential candidate strongly because they seem sure that Thieu/Ky will win. Also, local leaders appear to differ with the An Quang pagoda group concerning whom to support. The most significant fact is that opting for a struggle does not seem possible due to a lack of popular support.

3. PSYCHOLOGICAL

a. Once again there was a gradual lessening of tension throughout ICTZ. With but few exceptions, the enemy tended to avoid large-unit engagements with PWMAF. Witnessing the constant pressure being exerted by ARVN, USMC, and Task Force Oregon, the morale of the population was raised and confidence restored to a level unwitnessed since the upsurge of VC action in early April.

b. VIS showed spotty improvement in support of RD programs with progress noted in Quang Tri and Quang Nam; however, it swung into high gear behind the forthcoming elections, proving once more that direct pressure from Saigon is the sine qua non of VIS activity.

c. The primary achievement of the reporting period was a four-day PsyOps conference in DaNang. In attendance were ICTZ PsyOps field representatives and JUSPAO and CORDS Division heads from Saigon, with the ICTZ group producing a program paper which served as a basis for discussion. Problem areas and projected programs were discussed in detail. The upshot was a far better comprehension on both sides of program requirements and the availability of resources for programming.

d. On the negative side, local GVN/PsyOps inaction and slowness in assistance to refugees produced a bad psychological atmosphere among the uprooted.

- 8 -

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

e. The rocket attack on the DaNang Air Base and the throwing of two grenades into a restaurant in Hué provided the VC with a psychological advantage. In essence, the reactions were that the people have complete confidence in the ability of FWMAP to overcome the VC in large-unit encounters but are less confident in our ability to cope with individual terroristic and long-range tactical attacks.

f. VC threats to kill anyone who participates in the forthcoming elections were, on the other hand, being largely discounted: they made the same threats prior to the CA and village/hamlet elections.

4. ECONOMICS

Once again prices throughout ICTZ remained steady with only seasonal fluctuations occurring. Nevertheless, the high cost of living in relation to income continued to be a gnawing source of dissatisfaction.

5. SECURITY

a. Provincial estimates of security ranged from "adequate" to "greatly improved". The addition of a third ARVN battalion in the RD areas of both Quang Tri and Thua Thien enabled ARVN to take the initiative and keep the enemy off-balance throughout the month. While there was an increase in the reports of unit movements in and around the Quang Tri RD priority area, there was no attempt for the second straight month by the VC to penetrate that area. The only contact with VC/NVA forces near that RD priority area occurred early in the month when elements of the 1st ARVN regiment, 1st Infantry Division, made contact with the 808th VC Main Force Battalion which is now predominately NVA.

b. Credit for improvement in the security situation should also go to the RD campaign headquarters concept which has resulted in greatly improved coordination of security for the RD areas.

6. AREAS OF PROGRESS

a. Revolutionary Development

(1) In-province training of RD teams continued. In Quang Tri PRU teams gave training in ambush techniques, proper use of booby traps, etc. Agricultural cadres in the same province received training in agricultural cooperatives, farmers association, land tenure, credit, and fisheries. Four weeks' training in the operation and maintenance of radio equipment was given by the Sector's signal unit to 16 RD cadre in Hué. In Quang Nam militia leaders of the RD teams were trained in security and construction workers received training in construction techniques, with actual on-the-job experience provided for them.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

NOFORN
CONFIDENTIAL

(2) In Quang Tri the digging of some 8,000 metres of irrigation canals and the construction of several dikes and dams were completed during the month. With the addition of large irrigation pumps, an estimated 1,100 hectares of rice fields, providing a second crop of rice, are being irrigated for the first time.

(3) Programmed amounts of insecticides and sprayers, shortages of which had given cause for concern earlier this year, were received in the provinces.

(4) The ICTZ CORDS Agricultural Staff held several meetings with members of the Fishermen's union. The affiliate of the Confederation of Vietnamese Workers (CVF) expressed keen interest in the possibility of forming fishery cooperatives.

(5) With the release of 900,000 \$VN, Quang Tin's long dormant Public Works program began to show signs of life. These funds will be used for the repair of National Route I and for the paving of a feeder road from Ky Nghia airport to Route I.

(6) The construction of Chieu Hoi reception centers continued generally on schedule in all but Quang Tin and DaNang, with Quang Tri, Thua Thien and Quang Ngai scheduled for completion in August and Quang Nam's in September. However, shortages of roofing may delay this construction timetable.

(7) The drop in the number of returnees, 224 in July in comparison to 270 in June, is hard to account for specifically.

(8) The first class of Hoi Chan graduated from DaNang Polytechnical School totaled 17 in all: three electricians, seven mechanics, three welders, three seamstresses and one carpenter. Their future employment has been assured, with CORDS Quang Ngai employing four and the balance finding work in DaNang with various employers.

(9) Plague and cholera immunizations continued apace during the month with Quang Tin alone accounting for more than 60,000 immunizations.

b. Military

(1) Operations

(a) U.S. Battalion-size and larger operations increased from 15 to 18 and small-unit operations increased from 38,809 to 40,864. A breakout of all enemy losses in ICTZ during the month of July is listed below:

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

	III MAF	RVNAF	ROKMC	USSF	TOTAL
KIA (Conf)	2983	1047	102	97	4229
KIA (Prob)	2192	382	88	2	2664
Detainees	1877	229	24	0	2130
PW/NVA	11	0	0	0	11
PW/VC	70	156	5	4	235
RTNEE/NVA	3	0	0	0	3
RTNEE/VC	7	190	2	14	213
Weapons	552	350	1130	22	2054

(b) III MAF has 75 Combined Action Platoons: the programmed goal remains at 114.

(c) In the 11th DTA, eight large operations were conducted in support of the RD program. Operation Lam Son AB 142 (RD) continues to utilize six ARVN battalions in direct support of the 1967 RD program. Three infantry battalions are located in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Province RD areas respectively. Accumulative enemy dead for this operation at the end of July was 654. Lam Son 79, a 1st Division-controlled operation conducted northeast of Quang Tri on 8-9 July, yielded 193 KIA with 90 weapons captured. In Quang-Da Special Zone there were three large operations conducted in support of RD. Binh Quang 6, a search-and-destroy operation, was conducted north of Duc Duc on 12-17 July. Enemy contact was termed moderate throughout the operation resulting in VC losses of 143 KIA and 16 weapons captured. Three large operations were also conducted in the 12th DTA during July in support of the RD Program.

(d) ARVN small-unit day and night operations in ICTZ totaled 5,628 as compared to 3,570 last month, of which 3,990 were night operations. Total contacts decreased to 127 compared to 180 last month.

(e) The RF/PF continued to support the RD Program by participating with ARVN in large operations and by conducting small unit operations in RD target areas. Eighteen RF/PF units participated jointly with ARVN in RD operations during the month. There were 14,033 small-unit operations conducted by RF/PF units during the month, with 144 resulting in contact.

(2) Training

(a) During July nine RF companies completed RD MIT training bringing to 61 the number of RF companies having received this type training.

7. GVN/ARVN PERFORMANCE

(a) Once more there was slight improvement in the performance of ARVN in support of RD, showing interest in RD programs and giving evidence that they understood the import of RD to the GVN. Increasingly, GVN officials from the province down to the village/hamlet level showed greater interest in the success of the RD program and the performance of RD teams. Their frequent

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

visits had a salutary effect on the teams in general and improved the morale of the people in the hamlets.

b. With few exceptions, the performance of the Refugee chiefs in the provinces left much to be desired. Their failure to respond promptly to the needs of the refugees has created problems. In some instances they appeared to be completely disinterested.

8. PROBLEM AREAS

a. Many Chieu Hoi armed propaganda teams are not armed or being effectively utilized. Thua Thien's high returnee input (35) during the last ten days of the month was attributed to effective utilization of adequately-armed APT in joint operations with US military units.

b. Police Field Forces continued to be generally under and/or improperly utilized with but few units fully equipped. Some units are equipped to function as policemen but not as Field Forces and others, as in Quang Tin, do not even possess individual weapons. Repeated requests through both GVN and US channels have brought no results.

c. The combination of greatly increased number of refugees and a shortage of roofing makes the problem of housing these people even temporarily a difficult one. Construction projects depending upon CORDS-supplied roofing will also be delayed.

d. A lack of leadership, energy and drive by the SCR chiefs in Quang Tri, Quang Nam and Quang Tin is working as a detriment to the refugee program in ICTZ.

9. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

a. The momentum achieved in the RD program over the past three months is expected to continue, subject of course to the availability of adequate quantities of commodities, the maintenance of a reasonably stable political environment, and no deterioration in security.

b. To solve the Chieu Hoi APT problem noted (8a) above, it is recommended that MACCORDS persuade the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi and the Ministry of Defense to issue arms to deficient APT units.

c. It is recommended that the MACCORDS Public Safety Division take whatever action is necessary to resolve the problems concerning the PFF also noted (8b) above.

d. It is recommended that the MACCORDS Refugee Division intercede with the SCR in Saigon, attempting to persuade it to give special attention to ICTZ. Strong SCR chiefs are needed in the three provinces cited under problems (8d) above. Also, there must be a relaxing of the rigid and cumbersome project approval system, and chief SCR officers should get out of Saigon.

WOFD

more frequently. These officers should have the power and the desire to solve program problems on the spot.

e. The difficulties in recruitment of Hamlet Self Defense Forces noted last month continue. An inspection visit to Lang Tri by the ARVN ICTZ Chief of Current Affairs disclosed an average of ten personnel per hamlet. This number is totally inadequate. Either RF/PP personnel must be made available immediately upon completion of a NLH or a financial/food supplement program initiated as an incentive to recruitment of such forces.

R. E. CUSHMAN, Jr.