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# PROVINCE REPORTS: QUANG NAM (U)

## FOR 1968

*Jack P  
Status*

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FROM: MACCORDS, VN

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
 MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
 APO 96337

GES:jeg  
 13 February 1968

To : Office of the Deputy Ambassador, American Embassy, Saigon  
 Via: Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, ICTZ  
 (ATTN: CORDS Joint Staff)

Ref: (a) Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USAID/OSA Directive Number 4-67

PROVINCE REPORT  
 (RCS-MACCORDS-07-67)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (03)

Period Ending 31 January 1968

1. STATUS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN (C/NF)

As anticipated, the implementation of the 1968 Revolutionary Development Program was delayed (behind schedule) pending completion of the Vietnamese Lunar New Year festivities. Only three of the 30 RD Teams actually moved to 1968 hamlets prior to TET. However, all 1968 pacification planning has been completed and Provincial officials are ready to initiate the 1968 program during February.

Without resurrecting all the well known cliches about the harmful effect a lack of territorial security has on pacification, it should be noted that the present widespread confrontation with Viet Cong and NVA forces will have a deleterious overall impact on revolutionary development during the early stages of the program in Quang Nam Province. Hopefully, the present Viet Cong offensive will be short lived and the Provincial GVN/MACCORDS Team can make real and lasting progress during 1968. The team is cautiously optimistic about 1968 prospects, primarily because the team believes the approach is correct, the planning has been thorough and the staffs are highly dedicated to the mission.

The assignment of the Republic of Korea 2nd Marine Brigade to a TAOR, including two of the three districts where the major thrust of the Province's 1968 revolutionary Development activities will occur, represents a unique challenge to the MACCORDS Team. Close coordination with the ROK Marines was established by Quang Nam MACCORDS representatives prior to the Brigade's move from Quang Ngai Province. Through this close cooperation, the Quang Nam team hopes to develop a coordinated approach to territorial security in Dien Ban and Hieu Nhon Districts and to continue to expand the civic action programs originated and successfully pursued by elements of the First Marine Division previously assigned to this area.

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53

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2. PROJECT TAKEOFF (U)

The 1968 Project Takeoff objectives have been received and project managers were assigned for each item. The February report will contain more specific data pertaining to each objective area.

3. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICALa. General (C/NF)

The popular topic of discussion prior to the recent major VC/NVA attacks, concerned the rumor pertaining to the possible establishment of a "coalition government" in I Corps. Government and political leaders generally voice open opposition to any form of a coalition or recognition of any part of the communist efforts. General opinion expresses a fear that any form of coexistence with the communists will only be a prelude to eventual communist domination. Concern has also been expressed that the Central Province will become a "buffer zone" as part of any peace settlements attempted in the near future. These rumors have resulted in reports that some wealthy citizens are planning to liquidate their holdings in this area and move south to Saigon. It is the general consensus of the officials and local dignitaries, that few people actually have done this. However, these same people have said they too would move their families to Saigon if a "buffer zone" arrangement were to be created. One official, Mr. LE DINH CHIEU (Province Administration Service Chief), stated that the populace in general was well informed and was closely following current events. He believes that the people will not allow a coexistence atmosphere to develop.

b. VIS (C)

Eight PSYWAR Teams consisting of Provincial and District assets (VIS, Chieu Hoi, APT and ARVN 102nd PSYWAR Company) were formed to conduct the Annual TET Chieu Hoi appeal throughout the Province. These teams were transported to each district in a well-coordinated schedule of operations. During the latter part of the month, VIS efforts were directed towards preparation for TET celebrations by constructing banners and posters and making loudspeaker tapes and news bulletins.

The VIS Chief (Mr. NGUYEN THE SUNG) attended a DGIP conference in Saigon. Plans for the new year were discussed as follows:

(1) National VIS efforts will be aimed against the potentially harmful affects of recent "coalition government" rumors. It is believed that recent news coverage of the peaceful coexistence with communism is harmful to the war effort. Plans call for destruction of this rumor.

(2) Provincial newspapers will be evaluated during the month; those that are determined to be sub-standard will be discontinued.

(3) An increased program of training district, village and hamlet

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VIS officials will highlight the 1968 efforts. Additional cadre will be hired for hamlet level VIS work; there are none at present.

c. Election Activities (U)

Candidates for the lower house seat vacated by the assassination of BUI QUANG SAN have not been selected to date. Instructions from Saigon for preparation of the voter registration lists have been received by province.

d. Minorities, Political and Religious Groups (U)

The "Battlefield Commission", a heterogeneous inter-province group, has continued to react as a non-biased, popular assistant to government goals. Besides the festival, commemorative activities of such a civic group, they were the primary civic action organization within Hoi An after the initial devastation of the VC/NVA TET campaign. They distributed food, clothing and necessities to the homeless and refugees under the guidance of the Province Social Welfare Service.

4. SECURITY

a. General (C)

The security situation in Quang Nam Province deteriorated during the month of January. There were over 175 enemy initiated incidents reported during the month as opposed to 61 in December. Increased NVA actions during the first part of the month, with Main Force VC units participating, indicates the enemy was able to resupply his forces during the New Year Truce and commence carrying out his pre-TET campaigns. The most significant enemy actions commenced with a well coordinated attack on 26 different locations during the night of 2-3 January and culminated in the nation-wide attack of 29-30 January (still in progress). Pacification efforts obviously suffered a set-back. However, pacification efforts by GVN organizations normally experience a decline during the first month and a half due to pre-TET holidays. Lines of communications and freedom of the population to conduct normal functions were temporarily disrupted during the first week of the month and again as a result of the major enemy activities during the last three days of the month.

b. Enemy Situation (C)

During the month of January, the following Enemy Order of Battle was carried in Province:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>AREA OF OPERATION</u> |
|-------------|-------------|--------------------------|
| 2d NVA Div  | NVA         | Que Son & Duc Duc Dists  |
| 3d NVA Regt | NVA         | Que Son & Duc Duc Dists  |

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| <u>UNIT</u>        | <u>TYPE</u>    | <u>AREA OF OPERATION</u>           |
|--------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|
| 21st NVA Regt      | NVA            | Que Son & Duc Duc Dists            |
| 31st NVA Regt      | NVA            | Dai Loc & Hieu Duc Dists           |
| 68B NVA Arty Regt  | NVA            | Que Son & Duc Duc Dists            |
| 368B NVA Arty Regt | NVA            | Thuong Duc & Hieu Duc Dists        |
| R.20Bn             | VC Local Force | Dai Loc/Dien Ban/Hieu Nhon Dists   |
| V.25 Bn            | "              | Duy Xuyen/Dien Ban/Hieu Nhon Dists |
| 105 Bn             | "              | Que Son Dist                       |
| 402D Bn            | "              | Hieu Duc Dist                      |
| Q.12 Co            | "              | Hieu Nhon Dist                     |
| Q.13 Co            | "              | Duy Xuyen Dist                     |
| Q.14 Co            | "              | Dai Loc Dist                       |
| Q.15 Co            | "              | Dien Ban Dist                      |
| Q.16 Co            | "              | Hoa Vang Dist                      |

Significant enemy activities during the month included:

(1) During the night of 2-3 January, the enemy launched 26 separate, apparently coordinated attacks in Province, engaging 7 of 9 districts. USMC CAP S-1 (Hieu Nhon District) was overrun by an estimated company sized unit resulting in total destruction of the position, 9 USMC KIA, 1 USN KIA, 19 PF KIA, 4 USMC WIA, (?) PF WIA, and 5 PF MIA; enemy casualties are unknown due to lack of contact until daylight (the bridge to the CAP was destroyed). The 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cav was hit by rockets and ground attack by elements of the 2nd NVA Division which resulted in light friendly casualties and heavy enemy casualties (figures not released). The ARVN artillery and RF positions at Hon Bang, Duy Xuyen District was overrun by the V.25 VC Battalion; artillery VT fire from all available artillery units in range prevented the VC from occupying the position and possibly using the guns against friendly forces; friendly casualties were 24 KIA and 29 WIA; enemy losses were 102 KIA(c) and many individual weapons. Hieu Duc District Headquarters compound was overrun by sappers resulting in destruction or extensive damage of all buildings, no US casualties, light ARVN casualties. Danang airfield was rocketed. These were the most significant actions though there were many less dramatic attacks throughout the night. These attacks followed closely the captured plans reported last month concerning a large-scale attack.

(2) On 4 January, CAP Q-2 in Hoa Vang District successfully repelled an estimated VC Company attack killing 9 VC(c).

(3) On 7 January, elements of the 59th RF Battalion were attacked at BINH KY "Peace" Hamlet and CO MAN Hamlet, Hoa Vang District resulting in 3 RF KIA, 10 WIA and 50 houses destroyed at the newly erected "Peace" Hamlet.

(4) On 7 January the PHUOC TRACH Bridge (181588) in Hieu Nhon District was destroyed by VC. Force Logistics Command at Red Beach area near Danang received unknown number of rockets resulting in 26 USMC WIA and 19 buildings damaged.

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4

56

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(5) On 13 January, in mid-afternoon, USMC CAP S-2, Hieu Nhon District, was ambushed by an estimated 40-50 VC resulting in no friendly casualties and 10 VC KIA(c).

(6) On 15 January a company of the 4th Bn, 51st ARVN Regt was ambushed in daylight while moving from Duy Xuyen District Headquarters to Nam Phuoc outpost. A second company received heavy fire while attempting to relieve the ambush. At the same time, the remaining elements of the 4th Bn, 51st ARVN Regt located at Hon Bang Artillery Outpost received heavy mortar fire. Total results were friendly: 15 KIA, 35 WIA. A reaction force from Province (Sector) Headquarters made contact with the enemy ambush and killed an estimated 40.

(7) During night of 21-22 January, an ambush from the 14th Coastal Group (Junk Fleet) was itself ambushed at Cam An Village, Hieu Nhon District by an estimated 100 VC; results were 2 KIA and 5 WIA friendly and unknown enemy casualties.

(8) On 23 January, a combined NFFF and PRU daylight combat recon was made on Thang Long Island. Over 20 bunkers and dwellings were destroyed, medical supplies and foodstuffs were captured. While retracting, the unit was attacked from the shore resulting in 1 US Advisor KIA, 2 NV WIA and unknown enemy casualties.

(9) During the night of 23-24 January, an estimated VC company attacked a PF Platoon at Nui Loc Son, Hoa Vang District resulting in 3 PF KIA, 2 PF WIA and 24 PF MIA, 10 weapons lost; enemy casualties were 5 KIA(c) and 1 POW.

(10) The 3rd Bn, 2nd ROKMC Brigade located in new positions in Duy Xuyen District received a mortar attack on 27 January, resulting in 4 USMC WIA and 2 ROKMC WIA.

(11) Commencing the night of 29-30 January, NVA and VC forces launched a Province-wide attack in conjunction with the nation-wide TET Campaign. Eight of nine districts reported enemy action the first night. The attack on Hoi An (Province Capital) was concentrated in the NE portion of the city against the ARVN artillery and engineer compounds. The 102nd ARVN Engineer Battalion (-) took the brunt of the attack that continued through the end of the month. An estimated 2-3 enemy battalions were involved in the attack. The Engineer Battalion successfully held where FWMAF's committed as reaction units did not significantly influence this particularly valiant action. Friendly casualties as of mid-day 31 January were: 58 KIA and 102 WIA; enemy casualties were 378 KIA(c), 6 POW, 80 Political Cadre Prisoners, 108 laborers detained, 18 crew-served weapons and 137 individual weapons captured. The NVA/VC campaign is still in progress and casualties on both sides are mounting. Destruction of civilian dwellings is extensive; civilian casualty figures are estimated as moderate (figures unavailable).

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c. Infrastructure (C)

The District Intelligence and Operational Coordination Center (DIOCC) in 9 districts and the Province Intelligence Coordination Center (PICC) in Hoi An are the focal points for the ICEX efforts in the Province. The PICC became fully operational in January with a small Administration Section, an Order of Battle Section, a Political/Economic Section and a Collation, Evaluation and Dissemination Section (15 people total). All VN, US and ROK intelligence is processed through the PICC. Perishable intelligence production and dissemination are plagued by lack of timeliness (receiving, translating and reporting).

The most significant infrastructure break during the month was the capture of 80 political cadre that were following the attack on 29-30 January, allegedly to become the NLF government when the Province Headquarters was captured. Interrogation and processing is presently underway.

d. Friendly Situation (C)

During January, the following ARVN, RF and PF units were in direct support of RD efforts in Province:

| <u>UNIT</u>             | <u>GENERAL LOCATION</u>                     |
|-------------------------|---|
| 51st ARVN Regt (4 Bn's) | Hoa Vang, Dien Ban, and Hieu Nhon Districts |
| 59th RF Bn (4 Co's)     | Hoa Vang District (8 villages)              |
| 369 RF Company          | Duc Duc District, Xuyen Thu Village         |
| 466 "                   | Hieu Duc District, Hoa Nuh Village          |
| 704 "                   | Thuong Duc District, Loc Binh Village       |
| 743 "                   | Que Son District, Son Xuan Village          |
| 35 PF Platoon           | Hoa Vang District, Hoa Chai Village         |
| 36 "                    | Hoa Vang District, Hoa Thai Village         |
| 57 "                    | Hoa Vang District, Hoa Thai Village         |
| 20 "                    | Dien Ban District, Vinh Phuoc Village       |
| 21 "                    | Dien Ban District, Vinh Phuoc Village       |
| 22 "                    | Dien Ban District, Vinh Xuong Village       |
| 23 "                    | Dien Ban District, Vinh Xuong Village       |
| 8 "                     | Hieu Nhon District, Cam Nam Village         |
| 9 "                     | Hieu Nhon District, Cam Nam Village         |
| 10 "                    | Hieu Nhon District, Cam Ha Village          |
| 129 "                   | Hieu Duc District, Hoa Nong Village         |
| 82 "                    | Dai Loc District, Loc An Village            |
| 63 "                    | Duy Xuyen District, Xuyen Kieu Village      |
| 64 "                    | Duy Xuyen District, Xuyen Kieu Village      |
| 74 "                    | Duy Xuyen District, Xuyen Chan Village      |
| 117 "                   | Duc Duc District, Xuyen Chau Village        |
| 105 "                   | Que Son District, Son Xuan Village          |
| 115 "                   | Que Son District, Son Chan Village          |
| 140 "                   | Thuong Duc District, Loc Binh Village       |

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6

58

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(1) ARVN, RF and PF Operations

Combined operations utilizing all Province (Sector) military resources were conducted as follows:

| <u>NAME AND DATE</u>          | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>UNITS INVOLVED</u>                | <u>RESULTS</u>  |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| PHI PHUNG - 66<br>(3 Jan 68)  | DUY XUYEN       | 1/51, 4/51, 2/4 APC & 5 RF Companies | 2 VC KIA(c), neg fr cas   |
| PHI PHUNG - 67<br>(5 Jan 68)  | HIEU NHON       | 1/51 & 1 RF Company                  | unk enemy cas, 1 fr KIA<br>6 fr WIA                                     |
| PHI PHUNG - 68<br>(7 Jan 68)  | DIEN BAN        | 1/51, 2/4 APC & 1 RF Co              | Unk en cas, Neg fr Cas  |
| PHI PHUNG - 69<br>(12 Jan 68) | HIEU NHON       | 1/51 & 2/4 APC                       | Unk en cas, Neg fr cas  |
| PHI PHUNG - 70<br>(17 Jan 68) | DUY XUYEN       | 4/51 & 3 RF Companies                | 13 VC KIA(c), 7 fr KIA,<br>1 VCC, 15 boats destroyed<br>5 boats damaged |
| PHI PHUNG - 71<br>(20 Jan 68) | CONVOY SECURITY | 1/51, 4/51 & 2/4 APC                 | Negative  |
| OPN 7-68<br>(24 Jan 68)       | DIEN BAN        | 3/51                                 | Unk en cas, 3 fr WIA  |
| PHI PHUNG - 72<br>(27 Jan 68) | HIEU NHON       | 1/51 & 2/4 APC                       | Unk en cas, 2 fr KIA,<br>3 fr WIA                                       |

(2) US/FWMAF Operations

(a) 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cav continued operation WALLAWA-WHEELER in the Que Son Valley area; statistics not available.

(b) USMC units continued inter-TAOR operations; statistics not available.

(3) Major Redeployments

(a) As a result of the major attack on Hoa Bang outpost of 3 January 1968, 4/51 moved into the area to assume security in western Duy Xuyen.

(b) The 39th Ranger Battalion replaced 2/5 USMC at An Hoa, Duc Duc District. 2/5 moved to new locations in Thua Thien Province. This replacement significantly reduces the combat-power in An Hoa. One USMC Infantry Company from 3/7 USMC is assigned to the airfield at An Hoa. The industrial complex

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at An Hoa is now considered to be extremely susceptible to major attacks by VC/NVA units known to be in that area.

(c) The 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cav was replaced by the 3rd Brigade, 4th Inf Division in the Que Son District area. This replacement results in a slight decrease in mobility and firepower located in that area.

(d) The 2nd ROKMC Brigade continued to close on their new TAOR in Dien Ban and Hieu Nhon Districts. As each battalion moved in from Quang Ngai Province, the ROK TAOR expanded. Local clearing and familiarization operations were conducted. The major contribution thus far to the military situation has been the excellent, highly responsive artillery support rendered by the ROK Artillery Battalion.

(e) The Quang Da Special Zone (QDSZ) was deactivated during the first half of the month. Colonel NGUYEN DUY HINH, Commander QDSZ, was transferred to I Corps to assume duties as deputy to General LAM for RD and RF/PF. The military forces of QDSZ have been assigned to the Province Chief as Sector Commander.

The relocations, operations and statistics pertaining to the pre-TET campaign conducted by the enemy will be covered in the February report.

#### 5. ECONOMICS

##### a. General (U)

The standard of living within AP DOI MOI continued to show improvement during the first half of the month. Local trade continued to thrive and there appeared to be plenty of money in circulation. There is no evidence that the American presence has made any appreciable impact detrimental to the local economy. Restrictions imposed on US forces prevent any mass exchange. Some bartering has been noted with ROK Marines and local tradespeople. Incidents have been reported where ROK Marines have utilized MPC to purchase goods and services. The Province Chief and General KIM, CG, 2nd ROKMC Brigade, have cooperated to prevent further abuse of this. The nation-wide pre-TET Campaign conducted by the enemy will certainly influence the economic gains thus far achieved. It is too early to determine significant aspects of this other than the rationing of rice, kerosene and gasoline imposed by this provincial government.

##### b. Material Resources and Transportation (U)

No significant changes to the availability and movement of resources within province were detected during the month except as a result of the enemy action commenced on 29 January.

#### 6. PROVINCIAL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION

##### a. RD Teams (C)

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Provincial plans to complete 41 AP DOI MOI in 1968 are firm and only await the end of the TET holidays to initiate action. Plans to relocate RD Teams changed several times during the first weeks of the month; three teams were inserted on 18-19 January and the remainder will be relocated after TET. Several teams were subdivided into 10-12 man units and assigned to support the security of other teams (Teams 20 and 26 provided seven groups to Teams 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 28). Team 14 will be subdivided in a similar manner after TET. This subdivision is considered to be harmful to the overall effectiveness of the Team's integrity. However, the RD Advisors were informed that Saigon had approved this method of initiating RDPG recruiting and training.

Enemy activities during 2-3 January resulted in 10 teams reporting contact. Total casualties were 2 KIA and 6 WIA. During the nation-wide VC/NVA attacks of 29-31 January, contact was made with only 24 of the 30 teams in province. Results will be reported in the February report.

RD Teams 20 and 26 attended a province training course pertaining to hamlet security, training of RDPG and methods to be utilized to influence youth.

Formal inspections conducted by I Corps RD Officials and Province RD Control Group officials indicate the RD Teams are in good shape with high morale. Several teams voiced concern over land and housing available to their families in their 1968 sites. The Province Chief stated that plans were in process to provide RD Team families with land after each team became operational in their new locations.

b. Static Census Grievance (C)

A reduction of individual interviews occurred in January; 8,519 people were interviewed this month as opposed to 10,047 in December. Increased VC activities, annual conferences and pre-TET preparations contributed to this reduction. The map section of the Province SCG Center completed hamlet-village boundary identification on the 1:25,000 map sheets. This information will be transposed to new aerial photographs of each hamlet which are being collected now. The hamlet folder system initiated some months ago is progressing very well. District, village and hamlet studies have been completed or are in process now for ROK units, USMC CAP units and any units desiring the information for tactical operations. This information will allow pre-studies without compromising the SCG cadre located in the target areas.

c. Self Defense Forces (RDPG) (C)

The RDPG program within province continues to illustrate the reluctance, inexperience and lack of training found in similar programs concerning self defense in the past (combat youth, hamlet self defense, etc). The goals and theories involved are considered sound; however, the implementation is slow and cautious. RD Teams are responsible for initiating the program at hamlet level; the hamleteers have expressed doubt as to some of their qualifications due to the youth of the cadre and often the village, district and even Province

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

9

61

## CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

appear reluctant to issue weapons to the groups once they are formed.

The following RDPC locations, strengths and armament are:

| <u>DISTRICT</u> | <u>VILLAGE</u> | <u>HAMLET</u>   | <u>COORDINATES</u> | <u>STRENGTH</u> | <u>WPNS ISSUED</u> |
|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| HOA VANG        | Hoa Da         | Liem Lac        | BT022684           | 69              | 11                 |
|                 |                | Lo Giang        | BT025705           | 69              | 11                 |
|                 | Hoa Phuoc      | Mieu Dong       | BT015584           | 47              | 11                 |
|                 |                | Giang Nam       | BT027657           | 69              | 0                  |
|                 | Hoa Phuoc      | Qua Giang       | BT016667           | 40              | 0                  |
|                 | Hoa Da         | Con Dau         | BT035725           | 36              | 33                 |
|                 | Hoa Chau       | Phuong Nam      | BT005703           | 60              | 0                  |
|                 | Hoa Thanh      | An Ngai Tay     | AT907783           | 40              | 33                 |
|                 | Hoa Chau       | Cam Nam         | BT016707           | 30              | 11                 |
|                 |                | Quan Chau       | BT006679           | 35              | 0                  |
| HIEU NHON       | Cam Nam        | Xuyen Trung     | BT148567           | 19              | 0                  |
|                 | Cam Ha         | Thanh Nam       | BT113575           | 80              | 0                  |
|                 | Cam Nam        | Thanh Nam       | BT167560           | 28              | 0                  |
|                 | Cam Chau       | Thanh Nam       | BT162569           | 68              | 0                  |
|                 | Cam Nam        | Ha Trung        | BT160560           | 48              | 0                  |
| DIEN BAN        | Vinh Xuong     | Bong Lai        | BT055575           | 23              | 0                  |
|                 | Vinh Phuoc     | Dong Khuong     | BT077556           | 55              | 0                  |
| HIEU DUC        | Hoa Hung       | Tuy Loan        | AT942698           | 30              | 11                 |
| DUY XUYEN       | Xuyen My       | Long Xuyen      | BT095526           | 59              | 33                 |
|                 | Xuyen Kieu     | Tra Kieu Thuong | BT037510           | 47              | 0                  |
| QUE SON         | Son Xuan       | Xuan Thuong     | BT068336           | 36              | 11                 |
|                 | Son Thanh      | Cang Dong       | BT058354           | 20              | 0                  |
| DUC DUC         | Xuyen Tho      | Phu Da          | AT866488           | 21              | 0                  |
| DAI LOC         | Loc An         | Phiem Ai        | AT985567           | 14              | 0                  |
| THUONG DUC      | Hoa Chau       | Quan Chau       | BT006679           | 35              | 0                  |

d. Technical Cadre (C/NF)

There is still a very significant lack of trained technical cadre in the districts. Agriculture and Refugee cadre are direly needed at district and even village and hamlet levels to continue the programs initiated by RD Teams, Civic Action Teams, etc. Provincial technical cadre personnel are generally capable individuals with few exceptions. The most successful cadre operations in 1967 were accomplished by the various agricultural technicians (animal husbandry, agricultural services, irrigation, etc). The least successful were the refugee and Chieu Hoi services. The major weakness in the technical cadre (service chiefs) system is that they are Saigon-oriented and tend to identify only with their ministers in Saigon. The Province Chief is limited in his control over the personnel while he is absolutely responsible for their programs in his Province.

e. Police (C)

There has been a noticeable increase in the efforts and accomplishments of the National Police (NP) during January. An energetic program of

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screening and identification has been initiated throughout province, particularly in the major towns. Areas are cordoned off prior to the expiration of curfew and a house-to-house search is conducted which requires occupants to be positively identified. Resources control operations have undergone re-evaluation; there are ten static and two mobile check points in operation at present. Plans are being made to establish two more check points (Duy Xuyen District), strengthen existing check-points and to initiate an extensive waterways control system. Repairs have been completed on the Rehabilitation Center damaged in the 14 July VC raid on the jail. There are now 549 prisoners in the center; 31 have been sentenced to a year or more; 30 sentenced to less than a year; and, 488 have not been brought to trial.

Police activities account for the arrest of 11 draft-dodgers; 50 VC suspects; 5 illegal residents, and 89 miscellaneous arrests.

Police casualties prior to 29 January were: 1 KIA and 3 WIA. (The February report will cover police activities during the pre-TET Campaign).

The 104th and 109th NPF Campaign's continue to operate in the province on assignments of security and operations from AI VAN pass in the north to support of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Inf Division in the south. During a combined PRU-NPF operation in Hieu Nhon District on 23 January, the PRU-Advisor (Sgt W. A. Polchow) was KIA. No other casualties were reported. Mr. R. Utter, NPF Advisor was recalled to the States on emergency leave during the last week of the month. His contributions to the NPF program have significantly increased their effectiveness, emphasizing the need for an advisor in the field.

#### 7. PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION (C/NF)

Lt Col LE TRI TIN's staff has accomplished its Provincial duties extremely well under the circumstances of poor security, excessive administrative requirements from higher echelons and lack of professional training among the majority of its members. Lt Col TIN has continued to exhibit organizational and civil operations abilities uncommon to the average career ARVN officer. Mr. TAO, Deputy Province Chief for Administration is a competent and professional administrator who continues to gain respect from his contemporaries and advisors alike. Major BUI KHAC CAO, Deputy Province Chief for Security has been extremely effective in his aggressive leadership of Sector military forces. The single weakness in Provincial government continues to be the ministerial control and bureaucratic "bottleneck" attendant to the centralized government system of Saigon. Provincial responsibilities are often thwarted by the centralization of decision-making reserved by the various ministers. The Provincial Government Officials desire to accomplish their tasks, but are often hindered by the system.

No changes in other areas are noted.

#### 8. USAID/USPAO SECTION (U)

No questions received from higher echelons during January.

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9. REQUIRED ACTIONS (U)a. Project Takeoff Required Actions


These will be covered in the February 1968 report after a careful assessment of the Quang Nam RD Program.

b. Other Required Action

None that has not been previously listed in the November and December 1967 reports.

10 Incl

- (1) Comments of Province  
Deputy Senior Advisor
- (2-10) District Senior Advisors'  
Reports



L. DUANE FUCKETT  
Province Senior Advisor  
Quang Nam Province

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12

64

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COMMENTS OF DEPUTY PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
(Enclosure (1) to RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

The Deputy Province Senior Advisor, LTC Thomas F. Jenkins, was seriously wounded on 30 January 1968 during the VC/NVA attack on Hoi An. He is presently aboard the hospital ship USS Repose and is not available to Append Comments to the Province Report.

It is anticipated that LTC Jenkins will resume his duties as Deputy Province Senior Advisor in the near future.

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65

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DIEN BAN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JANUARY 1968  
 (Enclosure (2) to RGS-MACCORDS - 07-67)

1. Status of Pacification. (C)

There has been little change in the status of pacification within the district since last months report. However, the arrival of the 2nd Republic of Korea Marine Brigade (2nd ROKMC Brig) will undoubtedly influence future pacification efforts. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd ROKMC Brig commenced operations within the southern portion of the district in mid-month. Lt Col KIM, CO 2nd Bn, made definite and progressive plans for support of the pacification efforts in district and his battalion commenced to familiarize themselves with the terrain and significant aspects of problem areas. The attitude of the 2nd Bn gave promise to our efforts, unfortunately Brigade TAOR changes required the 2nd Bn to move south to Duy Xuyen District. The relief battalion has not arrived in district to date.

The attacks of 3 and 30 January 1968, further disrupted pacification efforts and will undoubtedly result in a loss of the little momentum attained thus far.

2. Factors Influencing Pacification. (C)

The continuing lack of sufficient security forces within the pacification target areas still remains the most significant problem. The final disposition of ROK units has not been firmly established.

3. Special Problems and Recommendations. (C)

The most pressing problem within the district at the present time is the attainment of sufficient security to facilitate insertion of programmed RD Teams into their respective hamlets for the 1968 RD Plan. I recommend that the ROK units be assigned to areas in such a manner as to compliment the planned positioning of elements of the 51st ARVN Regiment in support of RD and to improve day and night security in the populated areas of the district.

4. District Chief. (U)

Major HOANG TRUNG.

WILLIAM A. JORDAN *WJC*  
 MAJ INF  
 District Senior Advisor

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66

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DAI LOC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JANUARY 1968  
 (Enclosure (3) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. Status of Pacification. (C)

District pacification efforts remain unchanged during the month of January. The degree of control exercised by the GVN during the day and the night has not changed from previous reporting periods.

The anticipation of a large-scale enemy attack directed against the district headquarters and the USMC Battalion positions within the district have prompted a continuous "alert" posture during the month. Team and district defensive facilities were improved by the construction of two bunkers and strengthening the tactical wire.

2. Factors Influencing Pacification. (C)

A distinct lack of interest with respect for accomplishing civic action of any kind continues to prevail within the district. Refugee welfare program implementation has not improved and continues to reflect the attitude that refugee assistance is primarily an American responsibility.

3. Special Problems. (U)

Refugee resettlement continues to be the most pressing problem. Plans have been discussed and programs devised, but the implementation has yet to be started.

4. District Chief. (U)

Captain TRAN QUOC DONG.

JAMES P. WHITAKER *WJ*  
 CPT INF  
 District Senior Advisor

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67

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THUONG DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JANUARY 1968  
(Enclosure (4) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. Status of Pacification. (C)

The pacification program within the district is apparently maintaining its momentum. Continued use of District Imprest Funds has enabled this district to show tangible results in a broad spectrum of projects. The GVN controls approximately 70% of the populated district area during the day and approximately 30% at night.

2. Factors Influencing Pacification. (C)

Highway 14 to Dai Loc District was reopened during the month by reconstructing the bridges and conducting company-sized operations along its route East. Military convoys have utilized the road and attendant economic progress has accompanied the new trade route.

The use of the District Imprest Fund has been a definite asset to the sorely needed public welfare projects. This inconjunction with the recently established "Progress Planning Meetings" held monthly by local leaders have created an enthusiastic popular support of pacification efforts. The RD Team continues to be a prime contributor to pacification efforts as well as a definite asset to security.

Pacification assets include RD Team #25 (Mr. CAT, Team Leader); 704 EF Co; CIDG Company (Lt HO TANG DZU); and, USSF Tm A-109 (Captain W. KING).

3. Special Problems. (C)

Plans are underway to relocate the CIDG Company and the USSF Team to another area. Pacification is entirely dependent upon security forces. If these units are moved it is strongly recommended that a military unit of comparable size be provided to maintain pacification efforts. Movement without replacement of this combat power is hazzardors to all programs presently underway.

4. District Chief. (U)

Captain NGUYEN DINH KAHN.

FRANK J. COLANTUNO *WJ*  
CPT INF  
District Senior Advisor

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68

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DUC DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JANUARY 1968

(Enclosure (5) to RCS-RECORDS - 01-67)

1. Status of Pacification. (C)

There has been no significant change in the overall status of pacification within Duc Duc District since the last report. This district is composed of 11 villages and 49 hamlets. Twelve of these hamlets are under GVN control, while the remaining 37 hamlets are either under VC control or classified as contested areas.

2. Factors Influencing Pacification. (C)

The District Officials support the pacification efforts as a result of military advisory and civic action suggestions. The activities of the RD Team have been most successful in their efforts to raise the standard of living, especially in the Phu Ma (2) Hamlet RD program (Market Place, School, Pagoda, 12 Wells, etc). District RF and PF units conduct search and clear operations frequently to help broaden the sphere of GVN influence.

The 5th Platoon, 29th CA Company, operating in An Hoa continues to support military operations as well as numerous civic action projects. A very successful Children's Party was conducted last month for 6000 children from Nong Son and the areas adjacent to District Headquarters. Medcap's conducted by FVMAF units, District Team, CA Platoon and MHD (German Team) treated over 4000 cases this month.

3. Special Problems. (C)

The security atmosphere of the An Hoa Industrial Complex was weakened when the 2nd Bn, 5th Mar Regt was replaced by a Company (rein) of the 3rd Bn, 7th Mar Regt and a Ranger Battalion (ARVN). The USMC unit has coordinated artillery fire plans with all major facilities, but the relative combat power is considerably less than before.

4. District Chief. (U)

Captain DANG VAN TRIEM

JONATHAN F. REGEL *JFR*  
 CPT ARTY  
 District Senior Advisor

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69

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DUY XUYEN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JANUARY 1968  
(Enclosure (6) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

(U) At present there is not a District Advisory Team in Duy Xuyen District.

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70

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HOA VANG DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JANUARY 1968  
(Enclosure (7) to RCS-11ACCORDS - 01-67)

1. Status of Pacification. (C)

Due primarily to the successive holidays, Christmas, New Years and Tet, during late December and January, there has been no significant change in pacification within Hoa Vang. The program has remained basically static with the exception of the points listed in paragraph 2 below. However it is expected that the impetus will be regained after Tet.

2. Factors Influencing Pacification. (C)

The District Chief fell ill during the last two weeks of January, allowing pacification; this relates to the ever-present problem of subordinates having no authority in the absence of the commander. Two combined force operations in the Marble Mountain Area, involving U.S. and Vietnamese forces, thoroughly searched it. With the exception of an attack on a CAP in Lo Giang (ATO27704) VC activity was confined to sniping and mining incidents. A new agriculture advisor from the Philippines, with outstanding qualifications and many plans, should inject some much needed vitality into the agricultural development program in the District.

3. Special Problems. (C/NF)

The factors surrounding the serious refugee problem have been discussed in the November and December 1967 reports; that problem still exists unabated. The problem of the 59th RF Battalion Commander as discussed in the November and December reports also still exists. An additional problem area exists in the military organization and relationship between Quang Nam Province, Danang Special Sector and Hoa Vang Sub-Sector. Because of the location of Hoa Vang District around Danang, certain security responsibilities in the district have been delegated to the Danang Special Sector Commander. This apparently gives him authority, without consulting with either the Quang Nam Province Chief or the Hoa Vang District Chief, to conduct operations within Hoa Vang. It also apparently gives him the authority to countermand the orders of the District Chief in any matter, civil or military, if he feels that the security of Danang is involved. I feel that, because of this relationship: 1) on occasion, security of both Danang and Hoa Vang has been lessened, 2) U.S. and Vietnamese lives have been endangered, 3) the Province and District Chief's authority has been infringed upon, thereby lessening their effectiveness, and 4) activities and decisions have taken place with no thought as to the consequences to the populace of Hoa Vang District. I would recommend clarifying the organizational relationship and making the Hoa Vang District Chief subject only to one commander. If that commander is to be the Quang Nam Province Chief, I recommend that all activities involving Hoa Vang District be coordinated through the Province Chief, with the District Chief. Regardless of who is designated, the other

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71

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must coordinate activities in Hoa Vang before U.S. and Vietnamese lives are lost.

4. District Chief. (U)

Major MAI XUAN HAU

JAMES A. SWENSON *JS*  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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HIEU DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JANUARY 1968  
(Enclosure (8) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. Status of Pacification. (C)

There has been a general break down in pacification throughout the District during January 1968. The single most significant event was the sapper attack on District Headquarters on 3 January. This attack was followed by a general build up in VC activity throughout the area. As this build up occurred the GVN and US personnel were required to spend more of their time and material in strictly military activities as opposed to pacification activities. The VC/NVA attacks that began on 29 January have reduced the pacification level to a degree that can not yet be determined.

2. Factors influencing Pacification. (C)

The level of pacification in Hieu Duc decreased more in January 1968 than any other one month since June 1967. This decrease was throughout the District rather than in just isolated hamlets or villages. The CAP program remained excellent.

3. Special Problems. (C)

The special problem during January 1968 was the increased build up in VC/NVA activity. The GVN forces were incapable of providing adequate protection to the civilian population, which resulted in a decrease in the level of pacification. Until such time as there is an adequate build up of Free World Military Forces in this District to effectively control the hostile forces and protect the civilian population, I am afraid that pacification efforts will remain temporary and short lived. The lack of motivation by the civilian population in supplying intelligence to FWMF is just one indication of their reduced faith in the ability of GVN to provide them protection from VC/NVA.

4. District Chief. (U)

Captain NGUEYN VAN THUAN.

JAMES A. LOLLIS *MLL*  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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73

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QUE SON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JANUARY 1968  
(Enclosure (9) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. Status of Pacification. (U)

Que Son District is sub-divided into three political and geographical zones: Zone I bordering the Eastern 1/3 of the District to include the Moc Bai Vital Area along Highway 1; Zone II is the critical zone contingent to the District Headquarters; Zone III includes the western villages of the District approximately west of the BT01 grid line.

2. Factors Influencing Pacification. (C)

In Zone I, there has been no significant change in the government's control because of the possibility of frequent attacks or harassment at night. The road can still be mined and sniper fire can be received on both major roads in the Zone. The rest of this zone is fully VC controlled. Pacification in this zone has been hindered by the presence of the enemy and the change in the US Combat units in this area. Zone II is under government control. The absence of a District Chief hindered the pacification of this zone until one was appointed mid January 1968. This condition, coupled with the fact that there has been a change in US combat units in the area, the pacification efforts were slowed down initially but are expected to increase in the next month. Enemy activities are stronger toward the periphery of Zone II and VC guerrilla activities may be encountered. In spite of these conditions the local populace are sympathetic to the GVN. This is evidenced in the informant network which exists in Zone II among the civilians. Zone III is under VC control in its entirety.

3. Special Problems. (C)

US forces had been working aggressively to the west of District Headquarters until the change was made. These operations were influential in improving the pacification of Que Son District. Presently, there is a lull. No significant efforts have been evidenced by the GVN largely because of the lack of a District Chief. In the two hamlets where RD cadre teams are working progress remains very slow. Reports were that these individuals will be leaving soon. With the road being opened to Baldy, the pacification efforts are expected to increase.

4. District Chief. (U)

*[Signature]*  
FRANKLIN L. DONAHOE  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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74

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HIEU NHON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JANUARY 1968  
(Enclosure (10) to RCS-MAGCORDS - 01-67)

1. Status of Pacification. (C)

The pacification efforts within the district suffered several set-backs during the month as a result of the attacks on 3 January and 29-31 January 1968. During the attack of 3 January, Combined Action Platoon Sierra 1 (CAP S-1) was overrun and destroyed by an estimated 2-3 VC/NVA Companies. The An My and Tan Thanh bridges on Highway 538 were destroyed and the road breached in several places. Pre-TET enemy activities were topped-off by the major province wide attacks of 29-31 January 1968. Damage to civilian housing areas was heavy and many thousands are homeless. District efforts to house and feed these refugees continues.

Positive aspects of the pacification efforts resulted in the completion of a USMC Civic Action small bridge project in Thanh Tay Hamlet, utilizing the District Imprest Fund; the installation of two television sets within the hamlets (most enthusiastically received); and the reopening of Highway 538 through the temporary repair of both bridges by the 117th Floating Bridge Company, 10th Engineer Group (ARVN) and the Provincial Public Works section.

The arrival of the 2nd ROK Marine Brigade offers potential pacification support to this district once the TAOR's are firmly established for each unit. The District Chief has established a friendly and cooperative base with the ROK units operating in the District.

2. Factors Influencing Pacification. (C)

Efforts to counter VC infrastructure operations continue to gain momentum as the priority project towards pacification. The installation of the TV sets within hamlets offers a significant potential for anti-VC propaganda and pro-GVN exploitation. (Reception is excellent; contrary to initial expectations by higher headquarters). CAP S-3 was completed during the month, providing the district with the much needed security that enhances pacification efforts. Local RF and PF units are assigned to static positions, thereby restricting their abilities to conduct operations lasting more than a single day; they must return to their assigned night defensive positions.

Seven RD Teams have completed sufficient portions of their programs to qualify five to six hamlets as New Life Hamlets under the 1967 RD Plan. Two teams are in the remaining hamlet endeavoring to complete it prior to their programmed relocation to 1968 plan positions. RDPG have been established in each hamlet but weapons have not been issued to date.

Medcap's by the ARVN, GVN and MHD (German) Teams continues to highlight public health efforts in the district. Supply efforts for refugee camps have shown a definite increase during the month.

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75

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3. Special Problems. (C)

The inability of friendly forces to interdict the movement of VC units from Duy Xuyen District from the south into Hieu Nhon District continues to plague security efforts.

4. District Chief. (U)

Captain VO VAN SANG.

JOHN A BERRY *JA*  
MAJ. INF  
District Senior Advisor

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76

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
 MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
 APO 96337

AJP:jsg  
 02 March 1968

TO : Office of the Deputy Ambassador, American Embassy, Saigon  
 VIA : Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, ICTZ  
 (ATTN: CORDS Joint Staff)

REF : (a) Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USAID/OSA Directive Number 4-67

PROVINCE REPORT  
 (RCS-MACCORDS-07-67)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (03)

Period Ending 29 February 1968

1. STATUS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN (C/NF)

Measurable implementation of the 1968 Revolutionary Development Program in Quang Nam Province has yet to begin. Hampered by a continuing lack of security and the absence, dislocation and loss of personnel following the VC Tet offensive, GVN officials and US advisors have been unable to draw specific revisions to the original campaign plan. If a modified program emerges by mid-March, work in the 1968 hamlets should begin by 1 April.

Extensive damage in previously secure hamlets of HOA VANG, DIEN BAN and HIEU NHON Districts will make necessary the return of RD teams to salvage projects completed under last year's programs. GVN and US personnel recognize that enemy activity in these areas has both disrupted and retarded the overall pacification effort. At the same time, responsible province officials have displayed resourcefulness and resilience in the wake of recent attacks, and share with their American advisors the belief that progress will be possible in 1968 once the pacification initiative is regained.

The Chairman of the RD Council has taken a first step toward restoring prestige to Government efforts in the countryside. On 25 February a survey was begun of all 1966 and 1967 Ap Doi Moi to determine what specific assistance must be rendered hamlets whose material and psychological gains have been dissipated as a result of the Tet attacks. On 2 March the District Chiefs of HOA VANG, DIEN BAN and HIEU NHON also presented their recommendations to the Province Chief and CO, 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN). Within two weeks, selected cadre teams will receive three month, six month or one year assignments for the revitalization of such hamlets, making necessary a redeployment of remaining RD teams in 1968 areas.

2. PROJECT TAKEOFF

a. (U) General. Pending receipt of revised instructions for Project TAKEOFF reporting, progress on all but two items of the 1968 action programs (I and II) will continue to be discussed in appropriate sections of this report. Sub-programs I-3 (refugees) and II-2 (Chieu-Hoi) will be treated in this paragraph.

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b. (C) Refugee Activities. Tenuous security conditions and an extraordinary refugee influx following the Tet offensive have precluded action on any of items a. through e. of sub-program II-3. Basic care for temporary refugees, as suggested in item f., has been extended for the nearly 23,000 refugees (2000 families) generated by military activity during February. In sharp contrast to his predecessors, the new Refugee Service Chief, Mr. LE VAN THAI, has displayed considerable enthusiasm in the first month of his assignment. Yet transportation shortages, apathetic district cadre and the withdrawal of Quang Nam's Mobile Registration Team have made effective action by the Refugee Service impossible. The People's Relief Committee has secured financial support from Hoi An business leaders, but FVMAF and civilian advisors have been responsible for almost all construction in behalf of new refugees.

The permanent resettlement of 250 families from the area of the 2nd ROK Marine Brigade CP to Tan Tay camp, HIEU NHON District, is the only such project undertaken this month. New refugees in HOI AN are reluctant to return to rural hamlets under present security conditions, thus aggravating shortages of shelter and land in the province capital.

c. (C) Chieu Hoi Activities. In line with the goals of item a., sub-program II-2, psyops appeals have been modified to emphasize Government interest in NVA and recently recruited VC returnees. Thirty Hoi Chanh were received in the province during February.

Program activity has been weakened by the prolonged absence of Quang Nam's TCN Chieu Hoi advisor. His duties have been assumed by the USMC Kit Carson Scout advisor, who has received little cooperation from the Chieu Hoi Chief, Mr. BUI TAN VINH.

### 3. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL

a. (C/NF) General. While the decisive actions of province officials in restoring order immediately after the Tet offensive have won the praise and support of disparate political factions and party adherents in HOI AN, there is widespread fear that security in all parts of the province will deteriorate even further. Universal discouragement over the HUE situation has led some political leaders and literate townspeople to charge that Allied reaction to all Tet attacks was unduly delayed. At the same time, speculation on secret US/VC talks has decreased, and charges of bad faith against the GVN have faded since the Province Chief made good his pledge to arm a civil militia in HOI AN.

District VIS cadre report that in the countryside, as in the province capital, a second enemy offensive is fully expected. Until territorial security is decisively improved, no amount of Government propaganda can be expected to allay popular fear that VC claims of imminent political takeover will be made good.

b. (C) VIS. The VIS Chief, Mr. NGUYEN THE SUNG, has complained that support for psychological operations has all but disappeared since the Tet

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offensive. Disrupted transportation between SAIGON and DA NANG precludes direct Ministry support, and materials on hand in the province are inadequate. The lack of television receivers has denied the population of Quang Nam access to the principal source of timely propaganda in this crucial period.

c. (U) Election Activities. Neither faction of the VNQDD Party has selected a candidate for the Lower House seat previously held by BUI QUANG SAN. The election date has not been fixed, though the three month deadline specified in the Constitution is approaching rapidly.

d. (C) Minorities, Political and Religious Groups. Leaders of the Ky Bo and VHK factions of the VNQDD Party agree that public opinion has solidified against the brutality and timing of the enemy attacks. The two factions claim to be cooperating more fully as a result of the crisis, though neither group has specified what developments such cooperation might bring.

#### 4. SECURITY

a. (C) General. The enemy's Tet offensive (30 January to 9 February) resulted in drastic, although perhaps only temporary, deterioration of security in Quang Nam Province. ARVN, US and FWMF units, normally providing security to rural areas, were committed to the defense of Danang, Hoi An and their own bases. The pacified areas of Hoa Vang, Hieu Duc and northern Dien Ban Districts became major battlefields as the enemy moved on Danang and was blocked. Many civilian lives were lost and much property damaged. VC/NVA forces occupied a portion of Hoi An, Cam Nam Island, and a suburban area of Danang; many structures were demolished by friendly fire in efforts to eject the enemy. Duy Xuyen District Headquarters was abandoned to the enemy; the District Chief and staff moved to the town of Tra Kieu; the District Headquarters destroyed by friendly artillery. Lines of communication were blocked and routine activities of the population disrupted. By 10 February, the attack had been blunted, and enemy forces began their withdrawal to base areas. The GVN, which conducted itself well throughout the attack period, reasserted control. A semblance of normalcy returned. Curfew and other restrictions continued in force, however, as a further enemy offensive was threatened.

b. (C) Enemy Situation. Enemy order of battle in Quang Nam Province during February was as follows:

| <u>UNIT</u>   | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>AREA OF OPERATION</u>                        |
|---|-------------|---|
| 2d NVA Division<br>(1st VC Regt)<br>(3rd NVA Regt)<br>(21st NVA Regt) | NVA         | Que Son/Duc Luc/Dien Ban/Hoa Vang/<br>Hieu Nhon |
| 31st NVA Regiment   | NVA         | Hieu Duc/Dai Loc/Hoa Vang                       |

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| <u>UNIT</u>           | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>AREA OF OPERATION</u>                  |
|-----------------------|-------------|---|
| 68B NVA Arty Regt     | NVA         | Que Son/Duc Duc/Dien Ban                  |
| 368B NVA Arty Regt    | NVA         | Thuong Duc/Hieu Duc/Hoa Vang/<br>Dien Ban |
| R20 Battalion         | VC Local    | Dai Loc/Dien Ban/Hoa Vang/<br>Hieu Duc    |
| V25 Battalion         | VC Local    | Hieu Nhon/Dien Ban/Duy Xuyen              |
| 402d Sapper Battalion | VC Local    | Hieu Duc/Hoa Vang                         |
| 105 Battalion         | VC Local    | Que Son                                   |
| Q12 Company           | VC Local    | Hieu Nhon                                 |
| Q13 Company           | VC Local    | Duy Xuyen                                 |
| Q14 Company           | VC Local    | Dai Loc                                   |
| Q15 Company           | VC Local    | Dien Ban                                  |
| Q16 Company           | VC Local    | Hoa Vang                                  |

Significant enemy activity during February was, of course, related to the Tet offensive. Highlights were as follows:

(1) The offensive commenced nationwide the morning of 30 January with the rocketing of Danang Air Base, major ground attacks on Danang and Hoi An, and limited ground and mortar attacks elsewhere in Quang Nam Province. Danang area targets were the I Corps Headquarters compound, Marble Mountain air facility and the Trinh Minh Bridge. The attack failed; the enemy suffered heavy losses, including 80 captured. The initial attack on Hoi An was chronicled in last month's report. The enemy occupied the northeast corner of the city until the morning of 1 February, withdrew, and was pursued by ROK Marine forces.

(2) Danang Air Base was again rocketed on 31 January and 2 February. Damage was light and the base remained fully operational.

(3) On the morning of 31 January, Duy Xuyen District Headquarters received a full scale ground attack. VT fire on the compound repelled the attackers, inflicting heavy casualties. Later that day, the District Chief, apparently feeling his position untenable, withdrew to the perimeter of the 4th Battalion, 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN) at Tra Kieu. The district headquarters was destroyed by friendly artillery. ROK Marine elements subsequently reoccupied the area.

(4) On 3 February, units of the 2d NVA Division, long active in Que Son and southern Duc Duc Districts, as well as in Quang Tin Province, moved north and made contact with ARVN and US forces near Thanh Quit in Dien Ban District. The contact was broken and the NVA forces evaded to the southwest.

(5) The 2d NVA Division forces continued to move north. On 6 February, they joined with units of the 31st NVA Regiment to attack the 51st ARVN Regiment CP, the 4th Battalion/51st Regiment, US Marine positions and Combined Action Platoons in Hoa Vang and Hieu Duc Districts. The 4th Battalion/51st Regiment, was nearly overrun; the attackers suffered heavy casualties in the attempt.

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(6) Also on 6 February, other elements of the 2d NVA Division made a second attempt to take Hoi An. The attack again came from the east and was again stopped by the defense of the 102nd ARVN Engineer Battalion. This second attack was of shorter duration and far less successful in penetrating the city than the previous one.

(7) On 8 February, CAP E-4, just south of Danang, was attacked by forces from the 1st VC Regiment, 2nd Division. ARVN and USMC units, strongly reinforced by elements of the Americal Division, repelled this attack. Heavy supporting arms fired on enemy positions and routes of withdrawal resulting in over 400 enemy KIA. This marked the end of the attacks.

(8) Americal Division forces, blocking routes of withdrawal, contacted retreating 2nd Division units on 10 February in the Phu Ke region of Dien Ban District, killing over 200.

(9) From 10 February, the bulk of enemy forces appeared to withdraw to mountain base areas to resupply and reconstitute themselves.

(10) A company of the 31st NVA Regiment ambushed a Special Forces/CIDG convoy bound for THUONG DUC District west of DAI LOC District on the afternoon of 25 February. One US soldier and 6 CIDG were killed; the attackers lost 15 confirmed KIA and 9 probable.

The enemy is expected to limit offensive operations to rocket and mortar attacks and small scale ground/attacks against targets of opportunity, while devoting himself to resupply, recruitment and training in preparation for another major effort.

c. (C) Infrastructure. Operations against the infrastructure were neglected as resources were committed to the collection of tactical intelligence. All PIGC facilities and files remained intact, though information on the infrastructure situation is not current. Delays in transmission of DIOCC reports since early February have made province-wide assessment impossible.

d. (C) Friendly Situation. Quang Nam Sector conducted 9 named operations during February, all relatively minor. They resulted in 22 enemy KIA and the capture of 10 VC and 4 weapons. Friendly casualties were 6 KIA and 28 WIA. Among the wounded was Major BUI KHAC CAO, Deputy Province Chief for Security.

1st Marine Division, Americal Division and 2nd ROK Marine Brigade forces conducted operations in response to the enemy's Tet offensive. Specific casualty totals are not yet available.

There were a number of changes in friendly force deployment during February. The 4th Battalion/51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN) returned to the Hung Quang I area from Tra Kieu. Two companies of the 39th Ranger Battalion were withdrawn from Duc Duc District and returned to the control of the 1st Ranger Group, Danang. On 22 February, the 27th US Marine Regiment, newly

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arrived in country, assumed responsibility for TAOR's formerly occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 3rd US Marines and the 3rd Battalion, 5th US Marines. Finally, on 26 February, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade replaced the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division in Que Son and southern Duc Duc Districts.

Forces in direct support of revolutionary development are unchanged since January.

#### 5. ECONOMICS

a. (C) General. Two major pressures against retail price stability developed during February. First, the Tet offensive, by disrupting transportation, dislocating large numbers of people and restricting access to village markets unbalanced the supply of rice. Government rationing procedures and price controls were implemented immediately in HOI AN and all districts. Where ration rice has been diverted to the black market, it has sold at approximately twice the normal price per 35 pound bag. A second factor which threatens long range price stability is the poor rice harvest forecast for this spring. Because of exceptionally light monsoon rains, yields will be reduced by 40%-50%, compared to the same period in 1967.

Rumors of VC purchasing at greatly inflated black market prices have aroused suspicion that the enemy is passing counterfeit money to meet his food and material needs.

b. (U) Material Resources and Transportation. The movement of traffic by road into Quang Nam Province was reduced to 10% of normal volume in the two weeks following the Tet offensive. It has since risen to approximately 20% of normal and will not increase until official restrictions on travel are modified. Movement of emergency food supplies to the districts has been accomplished principally by air. Demand for construction materials is being met from stocks on hand and through irregular convoy and commercial truck shipments from DA NANG.

#### 6. PROVINCIAL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION

a. (C) RD Cadre Teams. Despite the efforts of GVN officials and US advisors, full control of all RD cadre in Quang Nam Province has not yet been restored. Since 30 January, RD cadre teams have sustained 21 enemy attacks, suffering 14 KIA, 20 WIA and 1 captured. Enemy casualties in these attacks were 17 KIA and 44 captured. In the initial wave of attacks (30 January), Team 12 at CON DAU Hamlet, HOA VANG District, was responsible for the capture of 40 VC who had penetrated the hamlet.

At mid-month the continuing enemy threat obliged the Province Chief to evacuate three cadre teams and the civilian populace from Cam Nam Island, HIEU NHON District. While these teams were assigned security missions in HOI AN, a fourth team was moved to assist in refugee relief activities for the Cam Nam refugees. A quantity of clothing and toilet articles earmarked for use in 1968 New Life Hamlets was released for distribution to the refugees. Of the seven teams redeployed after the Tet attacks, two have returned to

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their previous locations; two others operate by day in their original hamlets and provide security for HOA VANG District Headquarters at night. All other teams are located as they were before the enemy offensive.

On 1 February the US team in Quang Nam was given full advisory responsibility for the 125 personnel comprising the RD Teams in DA NANG city.

b. (C) PICC Activity. Full resumption of PICC operations after the Tet offensive was delayed by holiday absences, especially that of the Center's senior Vietnamese officer. The Province Chief gave personal attention to the problem, visiting the Center twice and appointing an interim director. Experience during the attacks underlines the need for a separate PICC radio communication net. Existing district circuits were preempted by operational messages, leading to nearly complete breakdown of SCG, DIOCC and RD communications.

c. (C) Self-Defense Forces (RDFG). No changes reported in February.

d. (C) Technical Cadre. Absenteeism and poor security have severely limited the effectiveness of technical cadre at the district level. Cadre working in the province capital have been equally preoccupied with personal security measures.

d. (C) Police. Police activity in Quang Nam during February was devoted almost exclusively to enforcement of emergency security regulations. Four National Police officers were killed in enemy attacks, twenty were wounded and two captured.

In HOI AN strict family census checks were carried out in connection with identification and draft offenses. From the 2842 families checked, 1074 persons - all males between the ages of 15 and 18 - were issued temporary identification cards. In the same period 12 arrests were made for draft evasion and 150 VCS were detained. There was little Resources Control activity as traffic restrictions through the province have been in effect all month.

NPFF personnel engaged in defending police and other provincial facilities. Patrols were established to enforce curfew provisions and to set night ambushes around HOI AN. This activity prevented NPFF from participating in military sweep and search operations. Two platoons (70 men) of the Quang Nam NPFF were dispatched to HUE at the end of the month.

#### 7. (C/NF) PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION

In organizing resources and personnel to meet Tet offensive emergencies, Province Chief LTC LE TRI TIN fully justified the longstanding confidence of US advisors in Quang Nam. Despite the absence of the Deputy Province Chief for Security, LTC TIN employed the forces under his command to maximum advantage; his preoccupation with military matters placed additional responsibility for civil needs on the Deputy Province Chief for Administration, Mr. NGUYEN TAO. With the assistance of Youth Service Chief NGUYEN BAO, Mr.

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TAO coordinated the emergency civil committee which maintained Government responsiveness in the face of an overwhelming refugee influx.

A militia was formed of civil servants in HOI AN under the direction of the Education Service Chief, Mr. HOANG HUU HA. Additional security measures were taken by the National Police Chief, Mr. NGUYEN DAI TOAN, and Chief of the Internal Security Service, Mr. HOANG TU QUY, both of whom maintained surveillance of suspected infrastructure during the crisis period in HOI AN.

In accordance the Central Government's policy of rapid return to normalcy, elementary and secondary schools were reopened in Quang Nam Province by the last week of February, considerably ahead of other provinces and well in advance of dates considered by the Ministry of Education.

The performance of district officials was less uniformly creditable. While five of the province's nine District Chiefs received special commendation from their US advisors for prompt remedial action after the Tet attacks, at least one - Captain TRAN QUOC DONG of DAI LOC District - has also been accused of diverting commodities for personal gain.

8. (U) USAID/JUSPAO

No questions requiring response have been received during February.

9. REQUIRED ACTIONS

a. Project TAKEOFF Required Actions

(1) (C) (Ref: Subprogram I-1 a.,c.,d.,f.) Military advisory efforts in Quang Nam Province have been seriously hampered by the absence of an experienced RF/PF Advisor during January and February. The officer previously responsible for these duties has been assigned lengthy TDY at HQ, USARV Advisors School, and no interim replacement has been designated. If this province is to meet Project TAKEOFF goals for upgrading the effectiveness of RVNAF components, the immediate assignment of an RF/PF advisor to Quang Nam Sector is imperative.

(2) (U) (Ref: Sub-program II-5 a.) Repeated requests through various channels, including the Province Report of December 1967, for an immediate allotment of at least thirty television receivers to Quang Nam Province have failed to stimulate satisfactory responses or action. At a time when the highest command and management echelons have urged rapid and professional response to enemy psychological operations in the countryside, delays in meeting clearly articulated needs are as discouraging to field operations as they are detrimental to field programs.

(3) (U) (Ref: Sub-program II-5 d.) The need for a second Cultural Drama Team (Van Tac Vu) in Quang Nam Province was outlined by the Province Senior Advisor in correspondence to JUSPAO/Saigon as early as September 1967. Quang Nam's single Cultural Drama Team is unable to carry out the ambitious psychological operations needed to combat either enemy propaganda

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generated since the Tet offensive or the resulting popular fear of welcoming RD cadre teams into 1968 New Life Hamlets. Positive action on this longstanding request will greatly increase the possibility that 1968 RD programs will in fact mold apathy into commitment.

(4) (U) (Ref: Sub-program III-6) As suggested in this province's required actions for November 1967, national mobilization has led to a shortage of competent personnel to work in all fields of GVN and US military and civilian programs. The predicament of MACCORDS Quang Nam is surely paralleled in many provinces; in giving full support to GVN policy, no deferments for local employees have been requested, leaving the MACCORDS staff with only two inexperienced interpreters. Because the problem will increase as mobilization continues, it is suggested that the large pool of CORDS technical talent at the Saigon level develop an emergency program for the training of non-draftable local personnel as interpreter/translators. Were special curricula, training aids and guidance rushed to regional or provincial training sites without administrative delay, CORDS could make a significant contribution to the short and long-term skilled personnel requirements of the nation.

(5) (U) (Ref: Sub-programs IV-4 d., IV-5c.) No responses to required actions submitted in the Quang Nam Province Report for November have been received. Neither have comments been made on any needs outlined in Item c of any District Senior Advisor Reports since that report was made mandatory. It is hoped that all required actions and other suggestions have received the attention of relevant CORDS officers and that replies will be forwarded.


b. Other Required Actions

(1) (U) Four critical positions remain vacant on the CORDS Quang Nam staff. A National Police Field Forces Advisor is needed immediately if the enthusiastic response generated by Mr. Robert Utter is to be maintained in his absence. No less pressing are the requirements for two Assistant Area Development Officers to serve respectively as District Representative and Assistant NLD Officer. A refugee advisor to replace Mr. Thomas B. Killeen is also needed. Given the lead times necessary for individual agency personnel requests, it is suggested that the responsible coordinators look to personnel resources presently within the MACCORDS structure in a determined effort to alleviate the chronic manpower shortage in Quang Nam Province.

10 Incl

(1) Comments of Deputy  
Province Senior Advisor


(2-10) District Senior Advisors'  
Reports

  
L. DUANE PUCKETT  
Province Senior Advisor  
Quang Nam Province

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COMMENTS OF DEPUTY PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
(Enclosure (1) to RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

A civil/military balance in the Province Report was achieved by my comments in paragraph 4 of the report, and the eight attached reports from the District Senior Advisors.



THOMAS F. JENKINS  
LTC INF  
Deputy Province Senior Advisor

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DAI LOC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1968  
(Enclosure (2) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The breakdown in pacification experienced in the province through late January and early February affected Dai Loc District, though not as severely as some of the neighboring districts. Material damage inflicted by the VC included 99 refugee dwellings, and 22 permanent dwellings destroyed. Considerable psywar efforts were employed by the VC following the Tet offensive, including the use of loudspeaker systems on four successive nights.

Another incident affecting the pacification effort was the relocation of "M" Company, 3/7 USMC. Formerly located on Hill 52 (ZC 218558), "M" Company was pulled back to Hill 65, leaving CAP C-4 as the westernmost outpost between Dai Loc and Thuong Duc Districts.


2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

A self-help project for improving the district dispensary, initiated by HM2 H. B. Welter, corpsman for CACO C, has met with considerable success. Initially working by himself, HM2 Welter has done an outstanding job, and has received much needed assistance from a grateful populace once the benefits of the project were understood.

3. (C) Special Problems

There are indications that certain GVN officials are involved in the selling of refugee commodities; the refugees state that they have received but a small percent of the commodities delivered to the district. An investigation will be made and its results forwarded for proper action.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain TRAN QUOC DONG

  
JAMES P. WHITAKER  
CPT INF  
District Senior Advisor

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DIEN BAN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1968  
(Enclosure #3 to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C/NF) Status of Pacification

Pacification efforts in Dien Ban suffered a minor setback as a result of the Viet Cong Tet offensive, however the prior status can be again attained if allied forces operating in Dien Ban maintain their current initiative.

Popular fear of ROK Marines must be overcome; for pacification to succeed, the people must be convinced that the protection of civilian life, property and aspirations is a primary mission of allied military forces.

*Dien Ban  
Feb 68*

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

→ Enemy propaganda in the wake of the Tet offensive has capitalized on the people's fears of ROK Marine troops. All friendly units operating in the district must counter these propaganda efforts by giving immediate assistance to the population in reconstruction programs.

3. (C/NF) Special Problems

The most pressing problem in Dien Ban is that of advancing pacification efforts beyond their pre-Tet levels. The presence of ARVN troops in TAOR's presently assigned to ROK forces would contribute greatly to village security and assure broader popular support of friendly military activities. ROK units in turn could concentrate their efforts on external security for the heavily populated areas of Dien Ban.

4. (U) District Chief: Major HOANG TRUNG

*William A. Jordan*  
WILLIAM A. JORDAN  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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DUC DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1968  
(Enclosure (4) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been no change in the overall pacification status within the district during the past month.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

The 5th Platoon, 29th CA Company was removed from the area early in the month. Indications are that there will be no replacement unit coming into the district anytime soon. This platoon was extremely active in the area and their loss will be sorely felt. The sub-sector advisory group is moving in the direction of replacing them as much as possible.

The 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, arrived in the area on the 12th of February. At the present time this unit does not have an RD support oriented mission, so its presence has not directly aided our programs to any great degree. Should its mission change, it would be of considerable value to the pacification effort.

3. (C) Special Problems

The security of the An Hoa Industrial Complex has been further weakened by the departure of the Ranger Battalion stationed there. The An Hoa security force presently consists of one USMC company (rein), and one platoon from the 593rd RF Company, 59th RF Battalion. The remainder of this RF Company, 55 men, is the defense force for District Headquarters.

The road from Duc Duc to Danang remains closed and this fact is causing considerable resupply problems for the Vietnamese here. One example: The price of 45 Kilos (100 lbs) of rice in Duc Duc has risen from approximately 1200 piasters on 1 February to approximately 1600 piasters at the present time. According to the District Chief, the normal price for the same quantity of rice is approximately 800 piasters. This rise in food costs can only get worse unless the road is reopened soon.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain DANG VAN TRIEM

*Bernard W. Gratzner*  
BERNARD W. GRATZER  
MAJ ARTY  
District Senior Advisor

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DUY XUYEN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1968  
(Enclosure (5) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

There is presently no advisory team assigned to Duy Xuyen District.

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HIEU DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1968  
(Enclosure (6) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been a significant decline in the status of pacification during the month of February. Only in the villages of Hoa Phu and Hoa Loc has there remained a degree of pacification which allows the population to pursue at all normal means of earning a living.


2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Due both to enemy and friendly action; there has been a significant reduction in pacification activity throughout the District.

3. (C) Special Problems

The primary problem of pacification has been increased VC/NVA action, especially south of the main east-west river in the District. Because of repeated attacks, Duong Lam Peace Hamlet has been completely vacant since 28 February 1968. The martial law and curfew which followed the recent attacks here worked a considerable hardship on the local population. Closing of the schools has left the young population open throughout the day to contact by the VC/NVA. The curfew has precluded a large part of the population from their normal means of earning a living. This has resulted in considerable hardship on the people, especially those in refugee camps. The failure of the Free World Military Forces to provide protection from the VC/NVA is of course recognized by the people. The slowness with which local GVN officials react to the needs of the people has been especially obvious during February.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain NUYGEN VAN THUAN

  
JAMES A. LOLLIS  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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HIEU NHON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1968  
(Enclosure (7) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The pacification effort in Hieu Nhon District received a major setback as a result of VC/NVA Tet offensive. The fragile feeling of security which had developed since District Headquarters was overrun in September 1967, was completely shattered by the two multi-battalion attacks on Hoi An of 30 January and 6 February 1968. The destruction of over 650 homes in the district - in great majority the result of friendly artillery, air strikes and ground fire - is one element of this setback in pacification. Another more important element is the delay in the 1968 RD Plan resulting from the enemy offensive. All RD Teams have been ordered to return to their 1967 locations until further notice; it will be several weeks, if not several months, before they can move to their 1968 locations, provided the enemy does not launch another major offensive in this area. The GVN's decision to bomb Cam Nam island, comprised entirely of three Ap Doi Moi's from the 1967 RD Plan, has further alienated an important segment of the GVN oriented population. (In fairness, it must be said that this bombing helped to drive an NVA force which was threatening the province capital from the island.) As a result of the VC/NVA attacks, 92 civilians were killed and 121 wounded. One village chief was assassinated. On the military side, seven PF were killed, five wounded; five RD Cadre were killed, two wounded; there were no RF casualties. As a counterbalance to the disruption of the GVN's pacification program, the successful defense of Hoi An - due in large measure to the fighting ability of two ARVN battalions - has enhanced the government's prestige among the inhabitants of Hoi An and has increased the morale of RVNAF soldiers.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

The enemy retains the capability to strike anywhere in the District with units of battalion size or larger. ROK forces now have two companies stationed around Hoi An, one at District Headquarters, and elements of another located to protect the Brigade CP and two battalion CP's in northern and western Hieu Nhon. RF/PF units are assigned the mission of static security. These units can be used to conduct operations provided the operation terminates in time to permit return to positions by nightfall.

MEDCAP programs are conducted regularly by GVN and German Malteser Health Service Teams.

The refugee population has increased by approximately 2,300 as a result of sweep operations conducted by ROK forces north of Hoi An. The GVN District and Refugee Service officials have responded well to the problem, providing tents, blankets and food to the new refugees. During the month of March, new refugees will be moved to a resettlement camp.

3. (C) Special Problems

The greatest problem in the pacification of Hieu Nhon District remains the

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inability of the friendly forces to interdict the movement of enemy units from Duy Xuyen District which lies to the south. The assignment of a River Assault Group to control the river and minimum of one battalion to the area south of Hoi An is considered the minimum essential step toward solving this problem.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain VO VAN SANG



JOHN A. BERRY  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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HOA VANG DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1968  
(Enclosure (8) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification suffered a serious, but not irrecoverable, setback due to the VC Tet offensive. Of the 85 hamlets within the District, only 11 sustained damage. About 680 houses were destroyed and 3600 refugees generated; steps have been taken to begin an immediate rebuilding program. Tenant U.S. units have donated building materials in many cases, and a coordinated civic action program has been promulgated to rebuild and relieve the refugee problem. The District Chief took steps to collect money, food and clothing from the Vietnamese population less hard hit. It is significant to note that no resettlement hamlets were attacked during the offensive. As support for the VC becomes more critical around the Hung Quang I area, these hamlets may be targeted by the VC.


2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Tenant U.S. units within the District are most anxious to assist in pacification. This is being very closely controlled to ensure that those areas requiring assistance receive the right kind, and that the less needy areas contribute material and physical assistance to the areas harder hit. There has been some withdrawal of RD Teams and pacification efforts in outlying areas. Attempts are being made to reestablish control before the vacuum is filled by VC.

3. (C/NF) Special Problems

I strongly reiterate the problems listed in the November, December and January reports regarding: (a) the 59th Battalion Commander, (b) the long term refugee rehabilitation problem unique within this District, and (c) the overlapping control of Hoa Vang District by Quang Nam Province and Danang Special Sector. There has been no apparent attempt to resolve these problems and, with each passing day, they are becoming aggravated.

4. (U) District Chief: Major MAI XUAN HAU

  
JAMES A. SWENSON  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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QUE SON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1968  
 (Enclosure (9) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

There has been no significant change in the status of pacification within the District since last month's report. However, the arrival of the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Infantry, 196th Brigade, has exerted great influence on the pacification efforts in this area. Since its arrival in Que Son in mid-February, many plans have been made and some initiated in the areas of joint American-Vietnamese operations, S-5 activities (school, hospital, refugees, etc.), MEDCAP, and security of the District. Many of these efforts require long range implementation, but the ground work is beginning to make a favorable impression.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

The inability to secure Highway 105 from BT0636 to BT1545 in Zone I has created an avenue through which the enemy can employ many command-detonated mines. Between the period 18-26 February, a total of five vehicles has been lost on this road, 11 Americans WIA and 3 Americans KIA. People have become reluctant to use this road for any length for fear of mines. Plans are being devised by the District Chief and the Battalion Commander 2-1st Infantry, for increasing ambushes and patrolling in this vital area as well as for clearing the area approximately 300 meters on each side of the road.


Another change in US combat units operating in Zone II of the District slowed the pacification effort considerably. However, some progress is evident in this area. The local populace remains sympathetic to the GVN and this is exploited through the civilian informant network.

Zone III is still under VC control.

3. (C) Special Problems

At present the largest problem is that of security of Highway 105; measures are being taken to find a solution. Building a Permanent Refugee Reception Center has been a problem. Prior to the Tet Holiday period, progress was relatively smooth; from that time until 20 February, little or nothing had been done. The two RD hamlets are still progressing very slowly.

4. (U) District Chief: 1/Lieutenant NGUYEN CONG CHINH

  
 FRANKLIN L. DONAHOE  
 MAJ INF  
 District Senior Advisor

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THUONG DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1968  
(Enclosure (10) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification within the District has declined slightly within the last 60 days. An expanded area of responsibility resulting from the movement of U.S. Marine elements from adjacent areas, and a lack of adequate troops for security are the causes. GVN is able to control approximately 75% of the populated areas by day and an estimated 25% of the populated areas by night.

Steps have been taken to continue previously reported advances in the RD and pacification programs. Completed projects and available materials for new projects have impressed the local population and have resulted in a general desire and willingness of the population to work as needed.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification


Repairs on the District air strip, main bridge and the renovation of a small school, along with expansion of refugee housing have generated much local interest and support. Volunteer village labor for needed public works has increased. Local leaders appear to have taken an even greater interest in the pacification program. Changes and improvements are taking place at a rapid rate. The local RD Cadre Team #25 has been redeployed. Their contribution to the District while here was commendable. Two Hoi Chanh's were reported this month and approximately 10 VC were killed in action. Increased patrolling and ambushes within the District area, as well as VC activity, are felt to be the reasons for this increase in enemy KIA. Military units and local officials involved actively in pacification include:

|                      |                    |
|----------------------|--------------------|
| CO                   | - 704th RF Company |
| Captain Wm. King, CO | - USSF A-109 Team  |
| 1LT Dzu, CO          | - CIDG Camp        |

3. (C) Special Problems

The most pressing problem in the pacification of Thuong Duc is the lack of sufficient troops for increased operations and security.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain NGUYEN DINH KHAM

  
F. J. COLANTUNO  
CPT INF  
District Senior Advisor

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
 MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
 APO 96337

AJP:jsg  
 31 March 1968

TO : Office of the Deputy Ambassador, American Embassy, Saigon  
 VIA : Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, ICTZ  
 (ATTN: CORDS Joint Staff)

REF : (a) Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USAID/OSA Directive Number 4-67

PROVINCE REPORT  
 (RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (03)

Period Ending 31 March 1968

1. (C/NF) STATUS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Though no substantial improvement in territorial security developed during March, decisive steps were taken to restore Government presence in the priority RD Districts of Quang Nam Province. In accordance with the recently modified 1968 RD Plan, 31 of the Province's 34 cadre teams have become operational in DIEN BAN, HIEU NHON and HOA VANG Districts. The total number of 1968 Ap Doi Moi was reduced from 41 to 26, allowing eight cadre teams to remain in those 1967 hamlets most seriously affected by the Tet offensive, or to operate as small security units. Due largely to the enthusiastic efforts of the Province Chief and RD Cadre Group Commander, team redeployment was fully accomplished by the third week of March. Special psychological operations, motivational lectures and district RD Council meetings accompanied the insertion of teams in DIEN BAN and HIEU NHON Districts.

ARVN and RF/FF units have assumed a security role in support of the cadre teams, though the continuing presence of sizeable enemy forces in the province could make necessary the withdrawal of direct military support at any time. The Province Chief, LTC LE TRI TIN, has held discussions with the Commanding General, 2nd ROK Marine Brigade, regarding the use of ROK rifle companies for cadre team support in DIEN BAN District in one of two ways. ROK units could assume some duties presently the responsibility of RF units, freeing Vietnamese troops for security operations in the RD area, or could themselves provide security for Ap Doi Moi. Though enemy activity in Quang Nam has been extremely limited during March, permanent restoration of Government presence in the countryside will unquestionably depend upon prudent deployment of such friendly forces as are available.

2. PROJECT TAKEOFF

a. (U) General. Pending receipt of revised instructions for Project TAKEOFF reporting, progress on all items except sub-program I-3 (refugees) and II-2 (Chieu Hoi) will be discussed in other paragraphs of this report.

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b. (C) Refugee Relief Activities. Temporary relief payments amounting to VM 3,288,150 were distributed to 7307 refugees in DUC-DUC District. Mr. LE VAN THAI, Refugee Relief Chief, has arranged similar payment programs in three other districts, making use of a mobile registration team to meet Government obligations flagrantly neglected by his predecessors.

No death, injury or damage claims related to the Tet offensive have been paid in March, though the district name lists through which payments will be controlled are nearly complete.

c. (C) Chieu Hoi Activities. With the return of the province's Chieu Hoi Advisor from home leave, program activity has been restored to its pre-Tet pace. There were 39 Hoi Chanh received from all districts during the month; 19 of the returnees were military personnel and the remainder identified themselves as political cadre. Psychological operations in support of the Chieu Hoi program have stressed Government interest in the welfare of returnees and their integration into national life. Employment of Hoi Chanh in non-sensitive positions by friendly military units has lent credibility to the current psyops campaign; the high number of returnees volunteering each month for Kit Carson Scout training suggests that additional FWMAF programs for direct action against the enemy could reduce unemployment among Hoi Chanh while increasing Vietnamese participation in the business of national recovery.

### 3. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL

a. (C/NF) General. The absence of major communist offensive activity during March has allowed farmers, merchants and civil servants to resume full work schedules. Rumors of a second offensive continue, and citizens in unprotected areas cannot openly cooperate with GVN officials for fear of enemy reprisals. There is concern among inhabitants of DUC DUC, THUONG DUC and QUE SON Districts that insecure highways and the general lack of security will lead to more rice shortages and higher black market food prices. This situation has sustained popular resentment against the enemy attacks in districts having no secure road link with the province capital or DA NANG.

In discussing the course of the war, some GVN district officials have advocated an offensive against North Vietnam; one ARVN officer favors the use of nuclear weapons in addition to a full scale land invasion. A labor leader in HOI AN agreed that such moves would bolster the morale and confidence of the South Vietnamese people, who have yet to recover from the psychological impact of the Tet attacks.

b. (U) VIS. Utilizing all available assets, VIS has supported the GVN recovery program with psychological operations designed to:

1. Encourage young men and veterans to volunteer for military service;
2. Support the establishment of self-defense groups;
3. Publicize the achievements of the local People's Relief Committee;
4. Exploit communist failure to stimulate a general uprising at Tet.

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One television receiver was shipped to each of six districts during March, though the security situation has precluded immediate installation in already constructed public viewing areas.

Twenty VIS employees were inducted into military service this month. The resulting manpower shortage will especially limit VIS maintenance and repair capabilities, as the province's only repair technician was among those drafted.

c. (U) Election Activities. All scheduled village and hamlet elections for Quang Nam have been postponed indefinitely. Neither has a date been fixed for a special election to fill the seat of assassinated Lower House delegate BUI QUANG SAN.

d. (C/NF) Minorities, Political and Religious Groups. Relief items collected by the AFL-CIO were distributed on 24 March in a special ceremony at the CVT labor union headquarters in HOI AN. The CVT, which initiated its own program of Tet aggression relief, has become a focal point for the planning of anti-communist front activity in Quang Nam and DA NANG. The union's chief delegate in HOI AN, known professionally as VU THUY, is not anxious to identify local front initiatives with those already begun in SAIGON. According to THUY, the proposed local front will attract not only CVT members but also VNQDD party adherents of both factions, Dai Viet Party members, Catholics, Buddhists and farmers' representatives from all districts. The policies of the new front have yet to be articulated either to the public or to the Province Chief; THUY has alleged that province officials are blocking his attempts to hold an initial rally in HOI AN.

#### 4. SECURITY

a. (C) General. As communist forces in Quang Nam Province attempted to regroup, recruit, and assimilate newly infiltrated men and equipment, many fewer enemy-initiated incidents were counted in March than during previous months. At the same time, substantial contact was reported by friendly forces in search operations. Units of the 1st US Marine Division killed 162 NVA-VC in HIEU DUC District during Operation WORTH, while elements of the Americal Division killed 340 in two contacts south of HOI AN; There were indications late in the month that the enemy had recovered from his Tet losses and was preparing for a renewed offensive.

b. (C) Enemy Situation. The enemy order of battle in province continues to include all units reported last month. Substantial new infiltration of men and material has taken place; air reconnaissance observed a new road leading into Quang Nam from the ASHAU region of THUA THIEN Province. While no new major units have been positively identified, PW interrogation disclosed that the enemy has formed a new control authority, designated Special Zone 44, in the province. Elements under its control are believed to include the 368B Artillery Regiment, 31st NVA Regiment, 68th Artillery Regiment (-), and 402d Sapper Battalion. Special Zone 44 probably also has responsibility for province and district-level tactical activities in Quang Nam.

The most important enemy actions during March were as follows:

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1. On the night of 3-4 March a major 122mm rocket attack was launched against Marble Mountain air facility (35 rounds), 7th USMC Communications Battalion (20 rounds), and Force Logistics Command (11 rounds). FLC received 5 rounds at 0711 hours; this was the first substantiated daylight 122mm rocket attack in province. Supporting attacks hit targets in DIEN BAN, DUC DUC and HIEU DUC Districts. At DUC DUC, 24 were killed and 84 wounded (the great majority civilians), and 150 houses were destroyed. The attack was directed specifically at civilians residing in the vicinity of District Headquarters, rather than at the district's military forces.

2. CAP B-1 in HIEU DUC District was attacked by an estimated NVA company on 6 March, with a repeat attack the following night. US Marines suffered 5 KIA, and the enemy lost 18 men plus weapons and ammunition.

3. On 9 March, mortars hit friendly outposts in the vicinity of QUE SON District Headquarters. Two RF soldiers and 5 civilians were killed, 4 RF and 4 civilians wounded, and 34 houses destroyed.

4. Also on 9 March, 8 were killed, including 7 Americans, when command detonated mines destroyed a US Marine Jeep and 3/4 ton truck on Highway 538 east of HIEU NHON District Headquarters. Though this stretch of highway has been the scene of many previous mining incidents, this was the first since the establishment of CAP D-7 in the vicinity.

5. On 18 March a command-detonated mine destroyed a US Marine LVT carrying ammunition along Highway 14 in southern DIEN BAN District. One Korean Marine was killed; 4 US Marines and 24 ROK Marines were wounded. The 2d ROK Marine Brigade postponed an operation as a result of the incident.

6. RD Cadre Team #19, located in DIEN BAN District, was attacked on the morning of 23 March. Two cadre were killed and three wounded.

7. A number of minor enemy contacts took place in HOA VANG District during the month - harassments, ambushes, mortar attacks and small scale ground attacks, most involving units of the 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN). On 30 March, HQ 3/51 Regiment, with elements of the 27th US Marine Regiment, received a heavy mortar attack. Three were killed and 24 wounded.

8. Finally, also on 30 March, the 7th Company, 2d Battalion, 2d ROK Marine Brigade was ambushed along Highway 537 between DUY XUYEN District Headquarters and NAM PHUOC Village. Preliminary reports indicated 16 ROK Marines killed. The 4th Battalion, 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN) was ambushed at the same site in January of this year, as was a DUY XUYEN PF platoon in November 1967.

Enemy forces, recovered and reconstituted after sustaining severe casualties in the Tet offensive, are capable of launching a new series of attacks either by fire or on the ground. Given the enemy's avowed goal of occupying QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces, HUE is considered his prime objective. It is expected that attacks in this province will complement the major attacks in QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN, and that heavy fire attacks against DA NANG area

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facilities and ground attacks on targets of opportunity in outlying areas will be part of any new offensive.

c. (C) Infrastructure. On 18 March a DIOCC became operational at THUONG DUC District, bringing the province total to eight centers; only DUY XUYEN District now lacks a center and MACV Advisory Team.

The Province Chief appointed a Vietnamese Phung Hoang (Phoenix) Committee at mid-month. Its most immediate support requirement is for a separate radio net to accommodate RD, SCG, National Police and PRU reporting on Phung Hoang activities.

d. (C) Friendly Situation. Quang Nam Sector conducted six operations in March, three of which brought significant results. Operation PHI PHUONG 81 in DIEN BAN District resulted in 3 friendly KIA, 5 VC KIA, 1 VCC and 3 weapons captured. PHI PHUONG 82 in HIEU NHON District brought no friendly casualties, 2 VC KIA and 6 VCS. In DIEN BAN and HOA VANG Districts, PHI PHUONG 83 resulted in 2 friendly WIA, 5 VC KIA and 11 VCS.

Of the four major operations conducted by the 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN), only Operation HUNG QUANG 1/8 in HOA VANG District had significant results. There were no friendly casualties, 5 VC KIA and 2 VCS; in addition a small number of NVA weapons were captured, 1000 kilos of rice confiscated and 18 bunkers/tunnels destroyed.

The 1st US Marine Division conducted Operations ROCK and WORTH during March, with the following results:

Operation ROCK, 4-10 March, in DAI LOC and DUC DUC Districts;

| <u>Friendly</u> | <u>Enemy</u>  |
|-----------------|---------------|
| 3 KIA           | 34 VC KIA (C) |
| 23 WIA          | 1 NVA KIA (C) |

Operation WORTH, 13-26 March, in HIEU DUC District;

| <u>Friendly</u> | <u>Enemy</u>         |
|-----------------|----------------------|
| 24 KIA          | 160 NVA KIA (C)      |
| 68 WIA          | 2 VC KIA (C)         |
|                 | 2 POW                |
|                 | 8 Ind Weapons        |
|                 | 2 Detainees          |
|                 | 88 Bunkers destroyed |

Two major operations were conducted by the 2nd ROK Marine Brigade in HIEU NHON and DIEN BAN Districts; the results of these operations have yet to be reported.

The 196th LIB and 1st Brigade/1st Cavalry continued Operation WHEELER-WALLOWA in the Que Son Valley. On 22 March, the 196th LIB reported 12 friendly WIA, 122 VC/NVA KIA (C), 22 individual weapons and 18 crew-served weapons captured, along with 9 RPG-7 and numerous B-41 rocket rounds. 1/1 Cavalry killed 118 VC-NVA on 21 March; friendly casualties are not yet known.

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The following ARVN and RF/PF forces are in direct support of RD:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>DISTRICT</u> | <u>VILLAGE</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u> |
|-------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------------|
| 1/51 ARVN   | HIEU NHON       | HOI AN         | 152471             |
| 2/51        | HOA VANG        | YEN NE         | 987687             |
| 3/51        | HOA VANG        | BOY TONG       | 052702             |
| 4/51        | HOA VANG        | VIEM TAY       | 017647             |

Assignment of RF/PF units to specific RD team areas has not yet been made.

#### 5. ECONOMICS

a. (C/NF) General. Retail price stability has been temporarily restored through emergency shipments of rice, salt and nuoc mam to remote districts. While food and fuel continue to be available in areas close to HOI AN or DA NANG, districts such as DUC DUC, QUE SON and THUONG DUC must depend upon irregular convoys or aircraft. When such transportation is interrupted, rice prices rise to three or four times the Government authorized level. As reported previously, rice yields from the present harvest are expected to be 40%-50% lower than in the same period of 1967.

Activity at the An Hoa Industrial Complex, DUC DUC District, has been seriously slowed since the highway to DA NANG was closed. Shortages of food and fuel oil threaten to halt operations at this vital center of refugee employment; US aircraft carried supplies to the Complex during March, but cannot match the volume of goods previously moved by land.

Illegal sale of C-ration canned goods and rice in DIEN BAN District was reported early in March. In an attempt to halt any possible flow of field rations to enemy personnel, all FVMAF units in the province have been advised to institute strict control over black market activity near military installations.

b. (U) Material Resources and Transportation. Road traffic in Quang Nam Province rose to 80% of the pre-Tet level after official travel restrictions were lifted in March. There is a shortage of gravel for use in public works and other construction projects in HOI AN; this shortage will continue until south-bound truck traffic increases from HIEU DUC District, the principal gravel source in the province.

#### 6. PROVINCIAL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION

a. (C) RD Cadre Teams. Revisions in the 1968 RD Plan have not made necessary any change in the basic strategy of deploying teams along National Route 1. Recognizing the need to interdict new enemy lines of communication as quickly as possible, the Province Chief, RD Cadre Group Commander and US advisors established a timetable for the insertion of all teams by 20 March. At BO MUNG Village in the central district of DIEN BAN, a program of music and speeches preceded an ARVN sweep of the new RD area. US advisors spent the night with four cadre teams in 1968 hamlets and coordinated reaction plans among team leaders and adjacent USMC CAP units.

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Support for RD teams by GVN district officials has reflected the Province Chief's personal enthusiasm for restoring Government prestige in rural areas. The DIEN BAN District Chief, Maj HOANG TRUNG, called a meeting of the District RD Council on 23 March to discuss immediate hamlet projects with team leaders, RD Group Headquarters personnel and US advisors. Similar meetings are scheduled on a twice monthly basis in all three RD Districts; in addition, the Province Chief has announced he will visit 1967 and 1968 Ap Doi Moi at least three times a week in the coming months. In other moves to strengthen cadre morale and defensive capabilities, (a) the Province Chief has authorized construction of shelters for cadre dependents in 1968 Ap Doi Moi, specifying that the shelters be turned over to hamlet officials as each team completes its work; (b) US District Senior Advisors have agreed to provide emergency ammunition to cadre teams in the event direct supply from the province capital is interrupted; and (c) the allotment of weapons to cadre has been increased: eventually each team will have 3 Claymore mines and each cadre one grenade in addition to the normal arms issue. US District Senior Advisors have recommended that RD cadre be prohibited from using captured enemy weapons; such a move would reduce the chance of friendly troops mistaking the identity of team members.

One cadre in each district has been assigned duty in the three DIOCC's whose intelligence coordination activities directly affect team operations. These cadre who remain members of their original teams, began special intelligence and psyops training the last week of March.

b. (C) Static Census Grievance. While US advisors doubt that many SCG cadre remain overnight in hamlets, the quality of reports is consistently high. Overall efficiency has been improved by reducing personnel from 350 to 277 and by implementing a more realistic pay scale. Training for 47 new cadre was begun in March.

SCG cadre have been assigned to all DIOCC's now in operation, and fill eight positions in the PICC/Phung Hoang program.

c. (U) Self-Defense Forces (RDPG). No changes reported in March.

d. (NF) Technical Cadre. The newly decreed centralization of GVN civil administration is not expected to improve measurably the performance of technical cadre at province or district level. Though technical service chiefs and their staffs will come more directly under the supervision of the Province Chief and District Chiefs, the new system does nothing to alleviate the basic problems of inexperience, low salaries and insufficient training.

Recognizing the need to supplement the efforts of technical cadre in the districts, MACCORDS advisors have drawn upon the resources of the 2nd AA Generalist Platoon, 29th Civil Affairs Company, for assistance in implementing unfunded self-help projects. Beginning in February, 29th CA personnel undertook a comprehensive review of all project submittals, and have since instituted a system of rapid appraisal, inspection and technical assistance for groups proposing self-help projects. During March, 36 projects in six districts were submitted, and half these were acted upon directly by 29th CA personnel. In upgrading the planning and construction skills of district cadre and village officials, the 2d AA Platoon extends the pacification initiative both in and beyond the priority RD areas of Quang Nam.

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e. (C/NF) Police. National Police activity during March has been largely directed to improving defensive positions in HOI AN and the district towns. Resources control operations have not reached pre-Tet levels, though 1000 kilos of rice and 8500 liters of gasoline were seized during March; 100 draft evaders and 115 VC suspects were apprehended. One resources control checkpoint was destroyed by enemy action.

The effectiveness of National Police operations in the districts is undercut by absenteeism and inadequate facilities. In DUY XUYEN District, the National Police station was completely levelled by friendly artillery when enemy forces overran the District Headquarters. The new National Police Commissioner, Mr. DINH QUANG MINH, has taken a special interest in upgrading National Police effectiveness outside the province capital, and travelled to every district of the province with the US PSD and PSB advisors shortly after his arrival.

The presence of a Korean Marine squad in the National Police compound at HOI AN has created embarrassment among province officials. Designated a training unit, the ROK squad has devoted considerable time to constructing bunker facilities for Commissioner MINH and his family. Senior National Police officers feel the Korean assistance reflects adversely on their own competence in the eyes of the people.

Police Field Forces activity remains below pre-Tet levels; no replacement for Quang Nam's PFF Advisor has been provided.

#### 7. (C/NF) PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION

It is the opinion of the Province Chief that the new decree divesting Corps Commanders of Government Delegate responsibilities may generate new administrative problems even as it resolves old political difficulties. After this month, I Corps province chiefs, all of whom are ARVN officers subordinate to General LAM, will incur a second direct responsibility to the President. A conflict developed initially when General LAM said he would refuse permission to the province chiefs to attend an orientation meeting in Saigon on 5 April. He claimed that the continuing threat of enemy attacks during the dark of the moon required the presence of Sector Commanders (province chiefs) in their areas of responsibility. Lam later relented and said he would permit the province chiefs to attend the 5 April Saigon conference. In light of extremely inadequate GVN telecommunications between ICTZ and SAIGON, an official such as the Prime Minister may find it necessary to visit the northern provinces each month to discuss civil administration problems. For these reasons LTC TIN favors the appointment of civilians to serve as province chiefs alongside ARVN Sector Commanders. In the interim a civilian Government Delegate might be appointed in each Corps to channel guidance and orders between the capital and the provinces.

#### 8. (U) USAID/JUSPAO.

No questions requiring response have been received during March.

#### 9. REQUIRED ACTIONS


- (1) (U) (Ref: Sub-programs IV-4d., IV-5c) As noted in this section of

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the Province Report for February 1968, no responses to required actions submitted in November 1967 have been received. In accordance with Paragraph 9 of Appendix 1 to Annex A of Ref (a), this province restates its request that responses be forwarded at the earliest possible time.

Since the institution of the MACCORDS Field Reporting System late in 1967, Saigon level responses to province required actions have become increasingly rare. While the responses of CORDS/III MAF to province requests are rapid, articulate and encouraging, the material and personnel resources necessary for meaningful action are often beyond the reach of Corps level staffs. It is suggested that matters referred by Corps to Saigon for consideration or study be given more than nominal priority attention. The Required Actions section has in the past been one of the few effective communications links between the provinces and Saigon, and must continue to carry two way traffic at a time when the extraordinary demand for information from the field all but obscures the value of the Province Report as a basis for management support.



L. DUANE PUCKETT  
Province Senior Advisor  
Quang Nam Province

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
- (1) Comments of Deputy Province Senior Advisor
- (2-10) District Senior Advisors' Reports
- (11) Periodic Reports Pertaining to Pacification  
(RCS-MACCORDS-02.1-67)

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COMMENTS OF DEPUTY PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
(Enclosure (1) to RCS-MACCORDS 01-67)

A civil/military balance in the Province Report was achieved by my comments in paragraph 4 of the report, and the eight attached reports from the District Senior Advisors.



THOMAS F. JENKINS  
LTC  
INF  
Deputy Province Senior Advisor

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DAI LOC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MARCH 1968

(Enclosure (2) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The relocation of USMC forces mentioned in the February report has reduced the amount of geographical control exercised by GVN. Approximately 50% of the populated areas are controlled by day, 35% by night. The relocation of the USMC company formerly on Hill 52 has opened the western portion of the valley to VC supply sources, and the enemy is free to move with little or no fear or interdiction.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

The renovation of the District Dispensary continues as the foremost self help project, both in magnitude and impact. Planned projects include the construction of a school and market place to serve Loc My Village, and particularly the refugee hamlet of Tam Hoa.

3. (C/NF) Special Problems

The pressing problem continues to be the lethargic attitude demonstrated by GVN officials towards civic action projects and refugee affairs.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain TRAN QUOC DONG

*James P. Whitaker*  
JAMES P. WHITAKER  
CPT INF  
District Senior Advisor

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DIEN BAN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MARCH 1968  
(Enclosure (3) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

With the insertion of additional RD Teams which brings the total to fifteen teams in the District, we anticipate the pacification efforts will greatly improve. The need for immediate efforts to establish hamlet defenses has been stressed to the teams. Particularly important is the need for the establishment of protective barriers around the hamlets. Most of the teams appear highly motivated and anxious to begin work in their respective hamlets.

2. (C/NF) Factors Influencing Pacification

Constant VC harassment to the secure areas does much to instill fear and anxiety in the people. The lack of forces operating in Dien Ban District contributes to the ease with which the VC harassing forces can move at will in the District.

It should be noted that the pacification program in Hoa Vang District was supported by at least three Battalions at all times, while Dien Ban District is attempting the same efforts with the support of only one ARVN Battalion, two understrenght RF Companies, and twelve PF Platoons. Both RF Companies are minus one Platoon which have additional missions not related to the support of pacification.

ROK Marine forces stationed in the District have contributed little to the pacification effort since their arrival in the District. The few operations that the ROKMC's have attempted have all been in the secure area along the major communication arteries, and not in the area which the VC normally use for staging and resupply.

3. (C) Special Problems

The most pressing problem now is the lack of sufficient forces to prevent constant VC harassment to the RD Teams and to the populace in the secure area. All forces operating in the District should be directed to conduct operations in those areas which the VC is known to utilize for staging, resupply, and fire support bases. Closer coordination is recommended between the sub-sector and Sector in planning of combat operations in the support of the 1968 RD program.

4. (U) District Chief: Major HOANG TRUNG

*William A. Jordan*  
WILLIAM A. JORDAN  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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DUC DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MARCH 1968  
(Enclosure (4) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

There has been no significant change in the pacification status within the district during the month of March 1968.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

There was a mortar attack on several hamlets near District Headquarters at 0115 hours, 4 March 1968. Approximately 40 civilians were killed, 75 were wounded, and approximately 40 houses burned. The attitude of the civilians was generally good under the circumstances; houses were being rebuilt by the next morning. If anything, the terrorist attack strengthened rather than weakened the civilians' determination to resist.

The 4th Battalion, 31st Inf, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, was removed from the district on 9 March 1968. They were a definite asset to our pacification program and their assistance will be missed.

The one RD team which had been working in Duc Duc has been withdrawn. There is presently no RD team scheduled to replace it in 1968.

The Province Refugee Relief Team arrived in the district 23 March and began paying refugee relief allowances. Morale among the refugees rose accordingly. Altogether some 4 million piasters will be given out to the refugees.

The construction of a Reception Center for refugees at Duc Duc Headquarters is progressing smoothly and the center should be open by the middle of April at the latest.

3. (C) Special Problems

As noted in last month's report, the security forces in this area have been drastically reduced during the past few months. Despite rumors of additional troops being moved into the area, no definite information has been received as of this date.

Transportation of goods and commodities into Duc Duc District remained the prime problem in March. Presently all building materials, food, ect., must be airlifted into the area. Construction at the An Hoa Industrial Complex has all but ceased. A new hospital being built jointly by the German Malteser Health Service and the An Hoa Industrial Complex is within one month of being completed but work has stopped for lack of materials, which are ready for shipment in Danang. All parties to the transportation problem agree that the road to Danang must be opened to allow convoys to enter Duc Duc, but the road remains closed.

## 4. (U) District Chief: Captain DANG VAN TRIEM

*Bernard W. Gratzner*  
BERNARD W. GRATZER  
MAJ ARTY  
District Senior Advisor

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DUY XUYEN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MARCH 1968  
(Enclosure (5) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

There is presently no advisory team assigned to Duy Xuyen District.

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HIEU DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MARCH 1968  
(Enclosure (6) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The failure of the VC/NVA to continue pressure following the Tet Offensive has enabled the GVN and FWMAF to begin again measures aimed at pacification. The lack of VC/NVA action in this district during March, coupled with more vigorous action by the local GVN military forces, has at least shown the population that they have not been deserted by Free World Forces. Unfortunately the improvement in pacification during March is due primarily to lack of enemy action. Since there has been no increase in the number of FWMAF in the District, I feel that to a considerable degree it is completely within the capability of the enemy to reduce the pacification level to that of early February.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

The only RD Team assigned to this District was pulled out during March. The increased visits by representatives of the 29th Civil Affairs Company and CORDS personnel have been a major aid in demonstrating to the people our continued desire to assist them.

The Peace Hamlet of Dong Lam remains partly destroyed and completely vacant following the Tet offensive.

MEDCAP programs have remained effective during the month with the normal favorable results.


The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Engineer Battalion and the six CAPs of this District continue to be the primary agents in the pacification business in the District. The limited personnel and material resources of GVN severely limits their ability to be active in pacification.

3. (C) Special Problems

The main problem of this District is the shortage of GVN military forces. The withdrawal of the only RD Team and the replacement of an ARVN rifle company with an understrength RF company (370th) certainly has not improved the GVN position.

During the first part of this month, the restrictions on travel made it difficult for the people to obtain adequate amounts of rice at fairly reasonable prices. Fortunately this situation is less critical as the month ends.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain NGUYEN VAN THUAN

  
JAMES A. LOLLIS  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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HIEU NHON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MARCH 1968  
(Enclosure (7) to RGS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Generally pacification in Hieu Nhon District continued to improve during March and at the time of this report can be said to be closely approaching the pre-Tet standards. Moreover, it appears that the Tet Offensive and the actions that occurred at that time have somewhat strengthened the backbone of the ARVN units (though not so much with the RF/PF) in this area; ability to withstand a second offensive of the same general size and nature seems to be better than at the Tet period. Also heartening has been the enthusiastic response of the District Chief to the new recruiting program. Many police type operations have been conducted during March for the specific purpose of collecting young men of draft age. Many have been collected (exact figures unknown). Not only will this eventually provide a larger and stronger army, an important factor for the future, but also it appears to have had, in conjunction with other austerity measures, a "stiffening" effect upon the local populace; a realization seems to be growing that the GVN "means business." People in GVN areas may not be as "happy" as before but they have more faith and respect in their government. These factors should be extremely important in the months to come.

Thus far the positive side alone has been presented and a few notes of caution are in order. While the general reaction of the GVN and the people to the Tet offensive has been encouraging, the tangible effects of this response will be seen only over an extended period of time. Meanwhile, though improved in attitude, the District in fact remains quite vulnerable to enemy forces. It is essential at this critical time, if intangible improvements are to crystallize into viable successes, that maximum security be maintained. FWMF must be kept close at hand. It is even more essential that district security be improved by continued and increasing operations in Xuyen Long, Barrier Island, Cam Thanh and in those areas north and northeast of the District Headquarters. Meanwhile this district will do all it can to train, equip, recruit and generally improve its own forces while extending GVN influence throughout its territory. What is needed is time to capitalize on the improved attitude of the Vietnamese military and the civilians. In this sense today is just as critical a period as was the January/February period.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

A number of the positive, specific factors affecting pacification in Hieu Nhon were mentioned in the general analysis above. Other factors include the recent (18 March) positioning of all seven RD Teams in their 1968 locations, and the steady progress of the building program at Thanh Tay Refugee Camp for 2500 or so refugees received during the Tet Offensive period. As of 27 March the first 50 frames were up, roofing under way, materials and money flowing smoothly, and all necessary land obtained and cleared. Moving the Hoi An bus station outside the city contributed to a steady increase in the number and effectiveness of population and resources control operations by the local RF/PF forces and police units under the direction of the District Chief. A "crash" rewards program emphasizing mines and booby traps has had some success

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throughout the district; between 20 and 27 March, two weapons were turned in and rewards paid.

On the negative side, in addition to the factors mentioned in para. 1, training, logistics and personnel strength of RF and PF units in the district remains poor; advisory action is underway to rectify this. Intelligence collection in the district is weak due to the decision to use the RF intelligence squad in a defensive role at the District Headquarters rather than in its intended role.

3. (C) Most Critical Problem

The paucity of distant security operations by allied and ARVN forces. (See paragraph 1, Status of Pacification).

4. District Chief: Captain VO VAN SANG

*W. Fontaine Bell*  
W. FONTAINE BELL  
CPT USMC  
District Senior Advisor

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HOA VANG DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MARCH 1968  
(Enclosure (8) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

During the month of March pacification within Hoa Vang made some recovery. The refugee population of the District still remains a great problem but, perhaps because of the post-Tet emphasis on Tet offensive refugees, it appears that all the refugees within the District will benefit. There has been a slight loosening of the restrictive attitude among the Vietnamese regarding getting materials out to where they are needed. Security for the District appears to be as good or slightly better than before the Tet offensive. In some cases Vietnamese officials are overly cautious about getting into areas that are, in fact, fairly secure. I speak here of civilian officials at Provincial and District level. Sub-Sector officials have acted in an outstanding manner in this regard.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

The establishment of a working refugee reception center at Hoa Khanh Village should assist in recording, assisting and resettling refugees within the District, if the momentum of the project can be maintained and extended. A basic problem is the lack of personnel permanently assigned to run this center. I fear that when a new hot spot develops the personnel used to run the Refugee Center will be pulled away. There has been a greater degree of coordination in civic action performed by tenant US units than ever before. This is due to the efforts of the Deputy District Advisor for CORDS. This coordination should greatly enhance the assistance provided to the population.

3. (C) Special Problems

The 59th RF Battalion Commander has been replaced; this should correct the problems outlined in previous reports. Other problems previously outlined still exist.

4. (U) District Chief: Major MAI XUAN HAU

JAMES A. SWENSON

MAJ

INF

District Senior Advisor

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QUE SON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MARCH 1968  
(Enclosure (9) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification within the District has made little progress since last month's report. The District Chief has activated a civic action program among his RF and PF units. This manouevre has a two-fold purpose: (1) to reorient the RF and PF units toward their additional responsibility to the people in the District and (2) to work in a similar fashion as that of the American-Vietnamese program. Joint military operations have added to the pacification effort in Que Son as has the system of rewards for caches, mines, booby traps, etc.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

The District Chief has assigned the two RF Companies and one PF Company the mission of supporting and sponsoring the three New Life Hamlets. One of these is the Refugee Reception Centre and the other two are temporary refugee resettlement hamlets. The Refugee Reception Centre has made progress within the last two weeks, but the Temporary refugee resettlement hamlets are still in the planning stage.

Joint military operations have improved the security situation somewhat. These operations have evolved from simple day/night patrols and ambushes to full time operational patrol bases. Presently, there are two of these bases in Zone II, and they are functioning with few problems. The key to success in this program is the creation of a sense of security for the local populace. Future plans call for moving the people back to fertile land around these bases during the daytime to farm their crops. Eventually new hamlets can be built close by.


Civic action by the 2-1st Infantry has assisted in the pacification program. This extends from MEDCAPS to bringing in food to victims of VC attacks, to the formulation of an awards system to pay for caches, mines, booby traps and ammunition. The local populace has assisted in this program so well that Highway 105 has had very few mining incidents this month as opposed to last.

Zone III is still under VC control even though American units have been working in it extensively.

3. (U) Special Problems

Even though pacification plans have been devised and some put into operation, the pace at which these plans move is critically slow. Frequently there is adequate support for a program, but the initiative to begin work is lacking in the people.

4. (U) District Chief: 1LT NGUYEN CONG CHINH

  
FRANKLIN L. ZONAHOE  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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THUONG DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MARCH 1968  
(Enclosure (10) to RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Due to the influx of an additional CIDG element into the areas vacated by the USMC within the boundary of this district, pacification efforts have made a slight increase. There still remains a definite need for more troops to secure and pacify this area.

GVN is able to control approximately 65% of the populated areas by day and an estimated 25% of the populated areas by night. A decrease in daytime control is noted based on the recent convoy ambushes which have taken place between here and Dai Loc District.

The pacification program continues to meet with general popular support. The current tactical situation has only slightly affected projects under way. Materials are on hand and a number of new projects will begin shortly.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

It is felt that close contact with the local leaders (Village and Hamlet) as well as constructive assistance on public welfare projects has aided the pacification effort.

A new DIOCC was established at District Headquarters during March. It is felt that this office will have a definite beneficial impact on the pacification program.

Active support of all local leaders continues; the main difficulties lie in slow responses to needs of the District as a whole.

Two NVA Chieu Hoi's were reported this month and approximately 20 local VC supporters are presently being held. In spite of increased VC ambush activity, the continuation of heavy patrolling and local operations by friendly elements has been beneficial.


Military Units or local Officials involved in pacification:

CO., 734th RF Company  
Cap Wm. King, CO USSF A-109 Team  
1LT DZU, CIDG Camp CO.

3. (C) Special Problems

Most pressing problem in pacification of this location is the need for more troops for increased operations and security.

4. (U) District Chief: GPT NGUYEN DINH KHAM

  
F. J. COLANTUNO

CPT INF

District Senior Advisor

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PERIODIC REPORTS PERTAINING TO PACIFICATION (RCS-1)  
 NOT SPECIFICALLY LISTED IN MACV DIR ACTIVE 335-15 AND JOINT

| CONTROL SYMBOL   | SUBJECT   | PREPARING AGENCIES                                      |   |
|------------------|---|---|---|
| None             | Budgetary forecast - Military Support of Pacification | District and Province Senior Advisors                   | I |
| None             | Psyops Reports  | Sector Psywar Advisor                                   | I |
| None             | MMCAP Report  | District and Sector Med Spec Adv                        | I |
| MACCOMS 03.41-67 | TAMS Ledger Card                                      | District and Province Senior Advisor                    | I |
| MACCOMS 03.42-67 | TAMS Response Card                                    | District and Province Senior Advisor                    | I |
| MACCOMS 03.43-67 | TAMS Updating Form                                    | Ho MACV to District and Prov Senior Advisors for Update | I |
| MACCOMS 03.44-67 | TAMS Province Annex                                   | Province Senior Advisor                                 | I |
| MACJ-OIR-C1      | Short Title- PLU (U)                                  | ICM Prov COORD w/Input from SIA                         | I |
| MACJ-OIR-C1      | Consol ICM elim Rpt                                   | ICM Prov COORD w/Input from SIA                         | I |
| MACJ-213         | Short Title - RITZ (U)                                | SIA   | I |
| MACJ-213         | Short Title - CORRAL (U)                              | SIA   | I |

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| CONTROL SYMBOL | SUBJECT                           | PREPARING AGENCY                                | REQUIRING DIRECTIVE                        | FLIGHT CATEGORY | SECURITY CLASS |
|----------------|-----------------------------------|---|--|-----------------|----------------|
| MACJ-213       | INTSUM (U)                        | SIA   | MACV Dir 381-21                            | D               | C              |
| MACJ-213       | VC InCountry Recruitment (U)      | SIA   | SIGR-U-UPL-01184                           | M               | C              |
|                | Summary for PO's                  | SIA   | MSG MACV-ICIC 5294<br>LT 6040207           | W               | unclas         |
|                | Preliminary Interrogation Report  | SIA   | MACV Dir 381-4                             | As directed     | C              |
|                | Specific Intell Req Coll Program  | SIA   | MACV Dir 381-16                            | As required     | C-S            |
|                | ARVN Order of Battle Report       | QMS G-3 to I Corps G-3                          | I Corps Dir 335-2<br>T.M. Unclas cite 8182 | M               | C              |
|                | ARVN Order of Battle Report       | QMS G-3 to I Corps G-3                          | I Corps Dir 335-2<br>T.M. Unclas cite 8182 | V               | C              |
|                | Operations Summary                | QMS G-3 to I Corps G-3                          | I Corps Dir 335-2                          | D               | C              |
|                | Maneuver Bns                      | QMS G-3 to I Corps G-3                          | I Corps Dir 335-2                          | D               | C              |
|                | Outpost Inspection Report         | Subsectors to QMS S-3 to I                      | I Corps Dir 335-5                          | Q               | C              |
|                | Gold Report (Operations)          | Subsectors, 51st Regt<br>QMS S-3 to I Corps G-3 | I Corps Dir 335-5                          | As Required     | C              |
|                | Lead Report (SITREP OPNS)         | Subsectors, 51st Regt<br>QMS S-3 to I Corps G-3 | I Corps Dir 335-2                          | As Required     | C              |
|                | Zinc Report (Convoy)              | Subsectors, 51st Regt<br>QMS S-3 to I Corps G-3 | I Corps Dir 335-2                          | As Required     | C              |
|                | Mercury Report (Aircraft Request) | 51st Regt<br>QMS S-3 to I Corps G-3             | I Corps Dir 335-2                          | As Required     | C              |

CONTROL SYMBOL

SUBJECT

PREPARING AGENCY

REQUIRING DIRECTIVE

FREQUENCY

SOTY CLASS

Small Unit Action Report  
(RAP)Subsector, 51st Regt  
QMS S-3 to I Corps G-3

I Corps Dir 335-2

W

C

County Fair Operations

QMS S-3 to I Corps G-3

I Corps Dir 335-2

M

C

ARVN Evaluation  
(Stars Report)51st Regt  
QMS S-3 to I Corps G-3

I Corps Ltr dated 9 Mar 68

M

C

MACJ3-22.1

SAR-AFMS Operational  
Statistics Report51st Regt  
QMS S-3 to I Corps G-3

MACV Dir 335-13

M

C-NOFORN

MACJ3-22.2

SAR-AFMS Quarterly  
Effectiveness Report51st Regt  
QMS S-3 to I Corps G-3

MACV Dir 335-13

Q

C-NOFORN

Food Supplement Report

All Sectors

Ltr MACV-ICRF, Hq ICAG,  
26 Dec 67 subj: RF/PF  
Reports

Q

Telephone

RF/RE/MTT Report

All Sectors

Ltr MACV-ICRF, Hq ICAG,  
26 Dec 67 subj: RF/PF  
Reports

M

C

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
 MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
 APO 96337

AJP:jsg  
 2 May 1968

TO : Office of the Deputy Ambassador, American Embassy, Saigon

VIA : Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, ICTZ  
 (ATTN: CORDS Joint Staff)

REF : (a) Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USAID/OSA Directive Number 4-67

PROVINCE REPORT

(RCS-MACCORDS -01-67)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (03)Period Ending 30 April 19681. (C/NF) STATUS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Proceeding without the benefit of firm ministry-level guidance on modifying the Revolutionary Development Program, province officials have deployed Quang Nam's thirty cadre teams almost exactly in accordance with the pre-Tet 1968 RD Plan. While cadre team presence has already improved the security of a few hamlets along National Route 1 in DIEN BAN District, no team is yet prepared to withstand the major enemy attacks which most local Vietnamese believe are imminent. Because teams are still occupied with basic problems of hamlet security, implementation of the 1968 Plan continues behind schedule.

The political and military developments of March and April have only partly affected pacification efforts in Quang Nam. No measurable changes have followed the centralization of civil administration decreed in Saigon; political factionalism has not decreased in response to calls for unified support of national recovery programs; Government presence in the countryside has not expanded beyond the limited areas occupied by friendly military units. At the same time, American peace initiatives have drawn nearly uniform reactions from GVN officials and private citizens in the province; there is a general concern for preserving the territorial and political integrity of the present Government in whatever negotiations are finally held with North Vietnam.

If significant progress in revolutionary development is to be registered in the summer months, ministry guidance must emphasize improvements in two areas. First, all activities relating to hamlet security must receive priority support; intelligence programs especially require simplification and command emphasis. Second, the present haphazard psychological operations offered in support of cadre teams must be decisively improved. Delays in providing the tools for publicizing Government programs - television and Van Tac Vu teams - in Quang Nam and other provinces can no longer be countenanced. The success of the 1968 Plan will be determined as much by Saigon's ability to emphasize and support its most important programs as by the enthusiasm of the cadre

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teams who implement it.

## 2. PROJECT TAKEOFF

a. (U) General. Pending receipt of revised instructions for Project TAKEOFF reporting, progress on all items except sub-programs I-3 (refugees) and II-2 (Chieu Hoi) will be discussed in other paragraphs of this report.

b. (U) Refugee Relief Activities. Reconstruction materials have been issued to 560 families whose houses were damaged or destroyed during the Tet offensive. The focus of recovery activity during April was HIEU NHON District; distribution of materials in HOA VANG District did not begin until the last day of the month, though Tet-related damages there are fully as great as in the province capital. Requests by the HOA VANG District Chief, Major MAI XUAN HAU, that a permanent office of the Refugee Relief Service be established in the district have brought no response from GVN refugee officials, despite the fact that HOA VANG counts more refugees than any district of any province in Vietnam.

c. (C) Chieu Hoi Activities. There were 34 returnees in Quang Nam during April, including 20 military and 14 political cadre. Together with 40 other Hoi Chanh, they began a 15-day political reorientation course which included an address by the Province Chief, LTC LE TRI TIN, on the role of returnees in national recovery.

In addition to normal psyops activities, the province's Armed Propaganda Teams participated in joint operations with ARVN and US Army units in DUC DUC, QUE SON and DUY XUYEN Districts. The operations netted a small cache of enemy weapons and rice, and led to the identification of several VC sympathizers.

## 3. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL

a. (C/NF) General. President Johnson's speech of 31 March and subsequent US peace initiatives have aroused fears among political and labor leaders in HOI AN that the GVN will not be adequately represented in negotiations and may be obliged to accept an unfavorable settlement, possibly ceding the two northernmost provinces to the communists. Despite early hopes that the limited bombing pause would create a beneficial atmosphere for talks, officials in HIEU NHON and HIEU DUC Districts now report the people do not expect peace to come quickly. Officials in all districts agree that only solidarity, strength and resolve at the highest levels can bring a settlement which will be acceptable to the Government.

Anti-communist sentiment in Quang Nam has yet to be consolidated and exploited. All political factions in HOI AN do not endorse or sympathize with the National Salvation Front, but no alternative front movement has grown beyond the planning stage. Political rivalry has also impeded large scale arming of civilians in response to post-Tet Government initiatives; the Province Chief is understandably reluctant to give arms to one or another VNQDD faction when both have made clear their resentment of his administration.

b. (U) VIS. Mr. TON THAT THO assumed duties as VIS Chief during April,

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replacing Mr. NGUYEN THI SUNG. The new Chief, who held similar positions in DA NANG and NHA TRANG, has initiated two major psyops campaigns. The first is designed to support RD cadre teams beginning work in 1968 hamlets. The second program, known as the "Rise Up for Victory" campaign, emphasizes three themes: ARVN victories following the Tet offensive; GVN policy toward any future peace talks; and the people's self-defense program and national mobilization decrees.

c. (U) Election Activities. There was no election activity during April and no plans for resuming village-hamlet elections were announced. The seat of Lower House Delegate BUI QUANG SAN remains vacant.

d. (U) Minorities, Political and Religious Groups. A resolution was issued at the end of April in the name of the people and VNQDD party of Quang Nam on the subject of peace talks between North and South Vietnam. Identifying the National Liberation Front as "the blood child of North Vietnam" and "henchman of Red China," the VNQDD stated its strong support of direct negotiations between the governments of the north and south. While affirming the gratitude of the Vietnamese people toward the United States, the VNQDD declared itself absolutely against any American peace plan which would compromise the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam.

#### 4. SECURITY

a. (C) General. Enemy-initiated incidents in Quang Nam Province continued at a low level through April. There was one major attack by fire on 3 April when the 7th US Marine Regiment Headquarters and elements of the 2nd ROK Marine Brigade were hit with mortars and 122mm rockets. The enemy made no significant ground attack, concentrating instead on rice harvesting, resupply and training for newly infiltrated and recruited men. In response to these activities, USMC and US Army units launched operations in DUC DUC and DAI LOC Districts, protecting harvested rice and uncovering a number of weapons caches and enemy food supplies.

Work on the enemy road leading from ASHAU VALLEY into Quang Nam continued despite friendly air strikes. To date, 17 kilometers of all-weather road have been completed and an additional 20 kilometers are already cleared.

A large number of reports received late in the month indicate enemy plans for a new offensive. Most of these reports link the start of the offensive to a day of special significance to the communists; among possible dates are 7 May (fall of DIEN BIEN PHU), 19 May (HO CHI MINH's Birthday), and 22 May (anniversary of North Vietnam's independence).

b. (C) Enemy Situation. The enemy order of battle in Quang Nam continues to include all units reported last month. An NVA PW taken by the 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN) during Operation HUNG QUANG 1/20 claimed to be from the 3d Battalion, Quang Da Province Force. He stated that his battalion was composed of local recruits and cadre, such as himself, who had been drawn from the 31/341 Regiment. On 11 April a Hoi Chanh from DUC DUC District reported that a 3d Sapper Battalion (iVA) had been recently infiltrated and placed under Military Region 5. Because the personalities he associated with Military Region 5 agree with current order of battle holdings on Group 44 (Quang Da Province),

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the Hoi Chanh and PW may well be from the same unit.

PW, Hoi Chanh and agent reports continue to indicate that VC district companies have been upgraded to battalions of two companies each. Friendly forces made no contact with 2d NVA Division combat units during the month, and it is likely that the majority of the Division was located in base areas near the Loation border.

The most important enemy actions during April were as follows:

1. On the morning of 3 April, the enemy fired approximately 240 rounds of 82mm mortar and over 50 rounds of 122mm rocket against ROK Marine artillery and rifle company positions near DIEN BAN District Headquarters and against the 7th US Marine Regimental CP on Hill #55 in western DIEN BAN. The attacks were probably conducted by the 1st Battalion, 68B Rocket Regiment. Casualties and damage were extremely light.

2. At approximately the same time, HOI AN received a light probing attack from the east. Outpost bunkers were hit with small arms, mortar and B40 rocket fire. Friendly casualties were light. Under cover of this attack, VC entered the HOI AN Civil Service compound, murdered a child, kidnapped a National Policeman and six youths, and destroyed ten houses.

3. RD Team #27 immediately north of HOI AN was attacked by east 2 VC squads during daylight on the morning of 15 April. One RD cadre was killed, three wounded and two weapons lost.

4. DAI LOC District DAP's and PF Platoons received a mortar and ground attack from an estimated VC company on 20 April, just after midnight. Three US Marines and one PF were wounded. Two civilian dwellings were burned.

5. On 20, 21, and 24 April, terrorists struck in DANANG with satchel charges and grenades. On 20 April, a large satchel charge was detonated in a house known to be a gathering place for local officials, killing or wounding twenty. The following night, the house of a Naval Support Activity employee was the target of another satchel charge. On 24 April, a grenade was thrown into a coffee shop owned by a former police chief of DANANG.

6. The enemy continued his efforts to interdict lines of communication in the province. Most notable were minings on Highway 538 between HOI AN and DIEN BAN and a daylight ambush on National Route 1 north of DIEN BAN. On 3 April a command-detonated 1000 lb charge killed two US Marines, wounded six and severely damaged two trucks. On 8 April another command-detonated mine destroyed a ROK Marine five-ton truck, killing one and wounding one. At 1615 hours on 4 April, a US Marine convoy from CACO Delta (DIEN BAN) was ambushed by a VC squad on National Route 1 just north of the VIEN DIEN Bridge. One US Marine was wounded and a truck damaged.

The enemy is fully capable of launching new attacks, both by fire and on the ground. DANANG, perhaps more than HUE, appears now to be his major objective. Known enemy dispositions and estimated capabilities do not portend

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an offensive of the magnitude of the Tet attacks. A major offensive would necessarily involve the commitment of the 2d NVA Division to a critical area such as DANANG or the Quang Nam delta. This Division has remained in its mountain base areas, successfully avoiding contact with friendly forces. Attacks by fire against DANANG area facilities and ground attacks on targets of opportunity in outlying areas are highly probable at any time.

c. (C) Infrastructure. On 21 April the HIEU NHON DIOCC conducted a cordon-and-search operation in THANH NAM refugee camp. Over 900 persons were photographed and identified despite enemy threats against Vietnamese and US DIOCC personnel.

During the month the Province Chief ordered the integration of the Provincial Intelligence Coordinating Center (PICC) and the Sector S-2 Staff. He used as his reason for this unilateral action the visit of LTC TUNG from the Saigon PHUNG HOANG Committee. Reportedly, LTC TUNG observed that the PICC had not yet attracted many customers for its product and questioned the reason for separating the PICC from the S-2. The Province Chief subsequently decided to combine the two operations in the interest of maximum utilization of personnel. This will probably improve the collection and dissemination of tactical intelligence, but could be detrimental to the processing of PHEONIX information. The advisory staff will be constantly alert for any indication of problems caused by the recent merger.

d. (C) Friendly Situation. Quang Nam Sector conducted four operations during April, two of which brought significant results. Operation PHI PHUNG 88, in DIEN BAN District, resulted in 3 VC KIA and 7 VCS detained. PHI PHUNG 89, also in DIEN BAN District, brought 1 VCC and 4 VCS, with no friendly casualties.

Of the seven major operations conducted by the 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN), three produced notable results. Operation HUNG QUANG 1/16 in DIEN BAN District brought 1 friendly KIA, 2 Friendly WIA, 3 enemy KIA, 1 VCC and 14 VCS. Operation HUNG QUANG 1/23 in HOA VANG District resulted in 3 friendly KIA and 8 VC KIA.

In the PHU KY area of DIEN BAN District, Operation HUNG QUANG 1/20 was conducted between 18-21 April. HUNG QUANG 1/20, the most significant operation involving ARVN troops in the past six months, resulted in 102 confirmed VC KIA, 200 probable VC KIA, 11 VCC and 2 VC detained. In addition 22 weapons were captured and 2377 hand grenades, 100 B-40 rockets and 26 mines were destroyed. An enemy grenade factory was demolished and 11,800 kilos of rice seized. Friendly casualties were 22 KIA and 78 WIA.

One major operation conducted by USMC units during the month. In DAI LOC District, Operation JASPER SQUARE (8-14 April) brought 54 enemy KIA, 2 VCC, 6 detainees and 10 individual weapons captured. On the friendly side, 6 were killed and 28 wounded.

The 198th Light Infantry Brigade has replaced the 196th Light Infantry Brigade in QUE SON District. Forces in direct support of revolutionary development are unchanged since March.

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5. ECONOMICS

a. (U) General. Yields from the recently completed rice harvest reflect the drought conditions of the past six months. Fewer than 27,000 metric tons of rice were collected, approximately 40% less than in the same period last year. Even with bumper harvests, Quang Nam is never able to produce adequate rice for its population; good yields reported from IV CTZ this spring are expected to compensate for the poor local harvest, and no rice shortage is anticipated in Quang Nam markets.

b. (U) Material Resources and Transportation. Road traffic in Quang Nam Province has reached approximately 90% of the pre-Tet level. The continuing threat of minings along Highway 538 between DIEN BAN District Headquarters and HOI AN has cut traffic between the two points in half, though commercial trucks and busses are able to meet market and passenger demands on most days.

6. PROVINCIAL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION

a. (C/NF) RD Cadre Teams. During the first full month of work in 1968 hamlets, Quang Nam's thirty RD teams have not carried their program beyond the first of its eleven phases. Inadequate territorial security obliges most teams to leave their hamlets after dark to sleep in USMC CAP compounds or other camps close to designated reaction forces. GVN officials and US advisors have continued their efforts to boost cadre morale in two ways: the Province Chief has addressed meetings of District RD Councils in DIEN BAN, HOA VANG and HIEU NHON; US advisors have remained overnight in some hamlets to observe security and ambush operations with the RD Control Group Commander and cadre team leaders.

There has been difficulty arranging reaction plans among cadre teams and FWMAF in the three priority RD districts of the province. Until such units as the 2d ROK Marine Brigade lend more than moral support to the 1968 RD Plan, cadre teams and hamlet dwellers will be reluctant to remain overnight in unprotected areas.

A further morale problem followed the desertion of 25 members of Team 25 from their assigned hamlet in DIEN BAN District. After turning in their weapons, the cadre returned to defend their home hamlet in THUONG DUC District; US Advisors report that members of other teams are considering similar defections to home villages. The RD Cadre Group Commander has begun visiting the teams in question and has made it clear that severe disciplinary measures will follow any new desertions.

b. (C) Static Census Grievance. Though the volume of highlight and intelligence reports dropped slightly in April, intelligence reports have been more widely disseminated than during the previous month. The new US SCG Advisor has outlined a program for improving source evaluation, terminology and detail in such reports, though the lack of competent interpreter/translators makes rapid progress unlikely.

c. (C/NF) Self-Defense Forces (RDPG). The last reliable strength count of RDPG in Quang Nam Province was made in December 1967. US advisors have urged GVN officials to initiate a new count in May even though no significant number of people has been armed since Tet. Continuing friction between the

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Province Chief and the VNQDD party will probably delay the distribution of arms in HOI AN for some time.

d. (NF) Technical Cadre. The performance of technical cadre in recovery operations has not been measurably better than in the pre-Tet period. Despite enthusiastic leadership in the Province Recovery Committee and Refugee Relief Service, implementation of recovery programs outside HIEU NHON District is only beginning. The recent reorganization of GVN civil administration has not improved the responsiveness of district-level cadre even though the Province Chief has continued to press all district chiefs for improvements in local government services. As national mobilization reduces the availability of even incompetent cadre, military personnel may be obliged to supplement the efforts of civil servants in such critical areas as refugee relief.

Delays in implementing long range projects, such as the introduction of IR-8 rice, are due as much to poor management as to unskilled cadre. IR-8 yields on Quang Nam's first fifteen test plots, for instance, were barely twice as large as regular seed yields. This disappointing result reflects the Agriculture Service's refusal to accept US-TCN technical advice at any level. Intra-Service rivalry also figured in the results as province administrators denied one another the cooperation necessary for planning and supporting IR-8 field trials.

e. (C/NF) Police. Quang Nam's new National Police Commissioner, Mr. DINH QUANG MINH, has initiated weekly staff meetings in HOI AN at which new policies are announced and officers' grievances answered. A matter of repeated discussion in April has been the conduct of Military Police attached to the 2d ROK Marine Brigade. In support of the Brigade's "sisterhood" ceremonies in villages of HIEU NHON and DIEN BAN Districts, Korean MP's routinely assume population and traffic control activities normally handled by Vietnamese civilian police. National Police personnel consider this a public indictment of their competence and are concerned that Korean interference will undermine the authority of Vietnamese police in the eyes of the people.

Resources control checkpoint operations have increased with the removal of post-Tet traffic restrictions on province roads. One illegal checkpoint bypass was exposed and over 1000 kilos of rice were confiscated along with 300 containers of contraband drugs.

The province's two National Police Field Forces companies will move to a camp several kilometers outside HOI AN during May; this will further remove them from US advisory assistance, now available only through the regular National Police advisor in the province capital. NFFF activity will not return to pre-Tet levels until an American advisor is assigned to the units.

#### 7. (C/NF) PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION

There have been indications during April that GVN province officials plan to take an increasing number of independent actions without consulting US advisers. Whatever the motivation for this new assertiveness, American advisers in Quang Nam are encouraged that no serious misunderstandings have yet developed with their counterparts.

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8. (U) USAID/JUSPAO

No questions requiring response have been received during April.

9. REQUIRED ACTIONSa. Project TAKEOFF Actions

1. (C) (Ref: Sub-Program II-4g) The failure of MORD to authorize the release of barrier materials for cadre teams in 1968 hamlets has obliged the Province Chief to request action directly from Saigon. US Advisors in Danang are aware of the situation and have initiated action through their channels. As this is a problem affecting the RD effort in all provinces, it is urged that ministry-level advisors press for an immediate solution.

2. (U) (Ref: Sub-Program II-5A) Requests for the immediate allocation of thirty television receivers were made in the Quang Nam Province Reports of December 1967 and February 1968. A response dated 8 April indicates that 25 sets were approved by DGIP and that "shipment of this allocation was completed on 22 January 1968." To date none of the sets have been received; neither has any notification of shipping ever been given. It is urgently requested that CORDS/POD/Saigon make a swift and thorough investigation of the shipping transaction and inform this province of documents, personalities and means of transportation involved.

3. (U) (Ref: Sub-Program II-5d) Project TAKEOFF and Project RECOVERY guidance have stressed the importance of psychological operations in asserting GVN presence in the countryside. In the absence of an adequate number of television receivers, the only high impact psyops support of TAKEOFF and RECOVERY programs has been provided by Quang Nam's single Van Tac Vu Team. The need for a second team was outlined in this province's required actions of February 1968, and endorsed by CORDS/POD/III MAF. Without response or justification, CORDS/POD/Saigon has begun withdrawal of all Van Tac Vu personnel from Quang Nam. Such a move will unquestionably jeopardize the success of all revolutionary development recovery efforts in 1968, a consequence for which there are few acceptable explanations. Immediate advisory pressure for restoration of a full-strength Van Tac Vu Team to Quang Nam Province is imperative.

b. Other Actions

1. (U) In a response to this province's required action for assignment of a National Police Field Forces Advisor (February 1968), MACCORDS/MSD/PER indicated that a concurred nominee for the position was scheduled to arrive in ICTZ on 20 April. As no advisor has appeared in Quang Nam to date, it is requested that appropriate CORDS divisions reexamine the original request with an eye to immediate action.

2. (U) This province fully endorses required action 9a submitted by THUA THIEN Province and required action 9a submitted by QUANG TIN Province in their Province Reports of March 1968. The question of reporting requirements levied by Saigon is overdue for examination by the highest management and command

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levels within the MACCORDS organization. The Staff Study of Field Reports prepared by DFC/III MAF for ACoFS/CORDS/Saigon (dated 12 March 1968) is an excellent reference for any reconsideration of the scope and worth of all present reports, particularly as they affect the attention of field personnel to their advisory duties and the morale of regional and province teams. The overwhelming demand for information from the field suggests either inadequate use of material provided in the Province Report and Field Program Reports, or deficiencies in the design of the reports themselves. Further delays in a serious reassessment of reporting requirements will have a direct bearing upon the success of field operations; until the volume of reports is decisively and permanently reduced, no province can credibly claim that its advisory team has adequate time to pursue its primary mission.



L. DUANE FOCKETT  
Province Senior Advisor  
Quang Nam Province

8 Incl  
(1-8) District Senior Advisors' Reports

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DAI LOC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR APRIL 1968  
(Enclosure (1) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The month of April has been characterized by an increased number of VC incidents, targeted primarily against refugee hamlets and Popular Forces night defensive positions; in addition the District Headquarters compound received a mortar attack on 20 April.

The rice harvest in district has been completed, and it is believed that VC initiated incidents will continue, increasing both in number and magnitude. VC tax collection points are reported to have been established in the western part of district, along Route #14 between CAP 2-2-4 and Hill 52. The absence of friendly elements in that area (previously discussed in February and March reports) precludes the interdiction of such activities.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

The clearing of underbrush on both sides of Route #14, between CAP 2-2-2 and Hill 55, in eastern Dai Loc/western Dien Ban, has decisively reduced the ability of the VC to ambush vehicular traffic. Hence, single vehicles are now permitted between the two points, a condition which has not existed since last October.

3. (C) Special Problems

The absence of the District Chief, Captain TRAN QUOC DONG, during most of April has hindered efforts in that his subordinates are reluctant to act in his absence. The construction of a new house in Danang, and reported illness are the reasons for the District Chief's absence.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain TRAN QUOC DONG

*Kenneth E. Short*  
KENNETH E. SHORT  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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DIEN BAN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR APRIL 1968  
(Enclosure (2) to RGS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. Status of Pacification (C)

The recently arrived RD teams are settling into their respective hamlets, and thus far appear to have devoted most of their attention to the first three of the eleven point criteria. The teams are also directing some time and effort to hamlet defenses. The pacification efforts appear to be improving, though greater efforts could be made if security improved the areas outside those presently controlled by GVN.

2. (C/NF) Factors Influencing Pacification

Constant VC harrassment to the secure areas continues to be a major problem. The attack against teams 17 and 18 during the month, in which the VC fired approximately sixty mortar rounds into the hamlet before their ground attack commenced, is but one indication of what the VC are capable of accomplishing.

The enemy will most likely continue to conduct these small scale attacks against the RD teams and other outposts until all of the available military units in this district commence a concerted effort to increase night patrols and ambushes; this is especially true of the ROKMC. There are insufficient RF and PF forces available in the district either to protect the controlled area or to conduct extensive patrol and ambush operations in the uncontrolled areas. Immediate assistance is needed from other units operating in the district.

3. (C/NF) Special Problems

Immediate artillery support from the ROKMC is the most pressing problem this month. During the VC attack on teams 17 and 18, requests for artillery were made to the ROKMC; it was three and one half hours from the time of the request to the firing of the first round. The ROKMC gave the excuse that they also had a unit in contact, but it should be noted that the ROKMC has some twenty four tubes of artillery, all of which could not possibly have been in use to support one company size unit. This is but one instance of the problem. There have been many others in the past and will most probably be others in the future unless the ROKMC gives some consideration to the other units they are responsible for supporting with artillery. The problem could be solved if the ROKMC would allocate a small number of their tubes to the support of other forces in the district, retaining the others for support of organic units.

4. (U) District Chief: Major HOANG TRUNG

*William A. Jordan*  
WILLIAM A. JORDAN  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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DUC DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR APRIL 1968  
(Enclosure (3) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been no significant change in the overall status of pacification within the district during the past month. Of the 49 hamlets within DUC DUC District, 12 are considered under GVN control; 32 are considered under VC control; and five are considered to be contested hamlets.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Company "K", 3/7 US Marines, conducted a rice harvesting operation north of the THU BON River in the AT8448 grid area on 7 and 8 April. Accompanying forces included the 593rd RF Company, and the 122nd, 124th, and 125th PF Platoons. Unfortunately the rice had already been harvested when the friendly forces arrived in the area. Consequently, the refugee workers brought back an assortment of commodities to include bamboo, corn, bananas and coconuts.

The 4th Bn, 31st Inf, 196th Lt Inf Bde, conducted a rice harvesting operation in the Antenna Valley area from Tuesday, 9 April to Saturday, 13 April. Accompanying units included the 369th and 707th RF Companies. Coordination with the District headquarters, the DIOCC, and the field units throughout the entire operation was outstanding. Approximately 45 tons of rice was gathered as a result of the operation.

An elementary school is being constructed at THANH MY Refugee Hamlet, Xuyen Thu Village, by the local population.

Work is progressing rapidly on the Refugee Reception Center. Coordination is constantly being made to insure that supplies for the center are on hand at all times. Materials for the eight stall latrines have been purchased from Mr. CAN from the AN HOA Industrial Complex.

Constant repair work is being accomplished within the THANH MY Refugee Hamlet dispensary.

3. (C) Special Problems

The road from DUC DUC District to DANANG is still closed and is causing considerable resupply problems throughout the district. If more military forces were assigned to DUC DUC District, the security atmosphere of the An Hoa Industrial Complex, as well as the security of the road, would definitely be strengthened.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain DANG VAN TRIEM

*Bernard W. Gratzner*  
BERNARD W. GRATZER  
MAJ ARTY  
District Senior Advisor

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DUY XUYEN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR APRIL 1968  
(Enclosure (4) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

There is presently no advisory team assigned to Duy Xuyen District.

On April 1, 1968, the advisory team was notified that the VC had captured the town of DUY XUYEN, approximately 10 kilometers from the district headquarters at THACH HANH. The VC had also captured the town of THACH HANH, approximately 10 kilometers from DUY XUYEN. The VC had also captured the town of THACH HANH, approximately 10 kilometers from DUY XUYEN.

The VC had also captured the town of THACH HANH, approximately 10 kilometers from DUY XUYEN. The VC had also captured the town of THACH HANH, approximately 10 kilometers from DUY XUYEN. The VC had also captured the town of THACH HANH, approximately 10 kilometers from DUY XUYEN.

All elements of the VC had been captured. The VC had also captured the town of THACH HANH, approximately 10 kilometers from DUY XUYEN. The VC had also captured the town of THACH HANH, approximately 10 kilometers from DUY XUYEN. The VC had also captured the town of THACH HANH, approximately 10 kilometers from DUY XUYEN.

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The road from DUY XUYEN to THACH HANH is still closed and is of little use. The VC had also captured the town of THACH HANH, approximately 10 kilometers from DUY XUYEN. The VC had also captured the town of THACH HANH, approximately 10 kilometers from DUY XUYEN. The VC had also captured the town of THACH HANH, approximately 10 kilometers from DUY XUYEN.

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HIEU DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR APRIL 1968  
(Enclosure (5) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been no significant change in the pacification status during April 1968.


2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

There has been considerable interest by US units in civic action programs throughout the District. However the failure of village and district officials to involve themselves in these programs has led to several cases in which available materials have not been put to any relevant use.

2/13th US Marine Artillery Battalion, commanded by LTC PHILLIPS has assumed civic action responsibility for TUY LOAN Hamlet, the largest hamlet in this District.

3. (C) Special Problems

The main problem continues to be the shortage of friendly military personnel throughout the district. This is especially significant when it is realized that 50% of the PF are armed with marginally effective weapons, and are hampered by inadequate and unreliable communications.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain NGUYEN VAN THUAN

JAMES A. LOLLIS  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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HIEU NHON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR APRIL 1968  
(Enclosure (6) to RCS-MACCORDS -01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Near Highway 538 and the city of HOI AN, pacification has progressed slightly since the previous report; this is due primarily to the effort and enthusiasm of the District Chief. In all other areas (generally more than 300 meters either side of Highway 538 and HOI AN City) pacification has regressed sharply as evidenced by: increasingly heavy casualties from mines and booby traps (particularly to the east of Hoi An); the successful ambush of RD Team 27 during early April on the outskirts of Hoi An; the destruction by mine of a USMC tank less than 100 meters north of District Headquarters in mid-April; and the successful destruction of a bridge on Highway 538. (along with one USMC vehicle) between Hoi An and Phuoc Trach at the end of April. All of the above incidents indicate that the enemy is moving freely and in increasing numbers throughout all areas that are not physically occupied by FWMAF or Vietnamese troops. It is interesting however that though the enemy appears to be moving and operating freely throughout the district, there are also indications that his presence is not respected or desired by the local populace. There have been numerous instances of enemy weapons turned in by civilians during April. In one case a farmer walked from a fairly remote area (Son Pho (1) Hamlet, Cam Chau Village) to volunteer the information that CAP-7 had killed six VC during a night firefight and to thank the CAP personnel for their actions. Just as this report was being prepared a civilian entered the District Headquarters and pointed out two 105mm shells used as mines in the adjacent area.

2. (C/NF) Factors Influencing Pacification

There are a number of positive factors which have had a bearing on the pacification effort. Most important is a new cordon-and-search operation technique that was developed by the district Vietnamese S-2 in conjunction with the US Army intelligence advisor. The operation is very similar in nature to the USMC County Fair operations; plans are eventually to register and photograph the entire population of HIEU NHON using this technique. As a result of just one of these operations the VC have made threats of assassination against the advisory team and DIOCC personnel. Another important factor relates to civic action. During April the District Chief appointed one of his officers to function as civic action coordinator for all FWMAF and RVN civic action performed in HIEU NHON. Successful "Golden Fleece" operations were held in early April to protect rice harvesters. Refugee housing construction is proceeding exceptionally well for the Tet and post-Tet refugees. A USMC mobile training team has commenced an excellent on-the-job training program for all HIEU NHON PF platoons. Finally, the Hieu Nhon Advisory Team is scheduled to be reinserted at District Headquarters within the next several days.

One negative factor, however, is offsetting all of the improvements noted above. This is the inability of FWMAF and RVN troops to deny freedom of movement to the enemy in areas not physically occupied. Friendly troops, particularly ROK units are just not moving adequately throughout their TAOR's. If this could be corrected it is highly probable that the minings, booby trappings

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and other incidents would cease immediately. The enemy forces in this area are not extremely large, but with the freedom of movement allowed they are extremely effective.

3. (C/NF) Special Problems

a. The failure of ROK (and to some extent RVN) security forces to operate continuously and effectively within their TAOR's.

b. Revolutionary Development Teams have not yet received authorized defensive materials.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain VO VAN SANG

*W. Fontaine Bell*  
W. FONTAINE BELL  
CPT USMC  
District Senior Advisor

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HOA VANG DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR APRIL 1968  
(Enclosure (7) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

During the month of April pacification within HOA VANG made some progress. GVN expanded control back into areas that were in contention during the Tet offensive. As before, there are only about 14% of the hamlets within HOA VANG which district officials and advisory team personnel now cannot visit without special security arrangements. Late in April, commodity distribution and payments here began for victims of the Tet aggression. Needless to say, the impact of immediate response was lost by GVN. The primary blame, I feel, lies with provincial level officials. Because of the delays, much of the enthusiasm and interest has tapered off at District.


2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

Significant progress was made in the coordination of Civic Action Areas of Responsibility (CAOR) of tenant US units within the district. This will result in greater coverage of the district and equitable distribution of civic action areas of responsibility according to resource availability rather than tactical areas of responsibility. For example, Marine Air Wing has many more resources for CA than do the tactical units of First Marine Division. Therefore Marine Air Wing was given greater areas of civic action responsibility than the 1st Marine Division, considering relative size. This has already resulted in improved coverage within the district.

3. (U) Special Problems

The refugee problem outlined in November, December and January reports still exists unrelieved. With the present emphasis on Tet aggression victims, the refugees again take a back seat. With reference to the 59th RF Battalion command problem, difficulties have ceased since the assignment of a new commander, and a tremendous improvement in the performance of the battalion is clearly evident.

4. (U) District Chief: Major MAI XUAN HAU



JAMES A SWENSON  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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QUE SON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR APRIL 1968  
(Enclosure (8) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The pacification status within the district has deteriorated slightly since the last reporting period. The area under control of the GVN by day and night remains unchanged.

2. (C/NF) Factors Influencing Pacification

The joint military operations conducted during the month to protect the civilian population were less than successful. The district officers and officials were unable to control the civilians, and to a lesser extent, their own troops. This resulted in mass looting and burning in the VC areas where the rice cutting was supposed to be done. Also, as a result of this, the 2/1 Infantry, 196th Brigade, has refused to conduct any more operations of this type with the district.

Civic Action by the 2/1 Infantry continued to be very good during the first half of the month, but naturally declined when the 2/1 Infantry was relieved by the 1/20 Infantry, 198 Brigade. Improvements are expected as the 1/20 Infantry becomes more familiar with its environment.

District officials still seem to lack real initiative towards programs involved in pacification.

3. (C/NF) Special Problems

The lack of strong control by the District Chief and his officers over their troops as evidenced by the rice cutting operation could lead to some very serious problems in the pacification program of the district.

4. (U) District Chief: 1LT NGUYEN CONG CHINH

FRANKLIN L. BONAHOE  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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THUONG DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR APRIL 1968  
 (Enclosure (9) to RCS-MACCOIDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The pacification effort has improved and continually meets with general support. However, approximately 25% of the population is controlled by GVN at night as opposed to an estimated 65% by day.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

CIDG operations in and around the district TAOR were extremely helpful in denying the recently harvested rice crop to the Viet Cong.

The new DIOCC is progressing rapidly and already provides some accurate intelligence information.

Considerable interest has been generated among highlanders of the district by proposed contracts for baskets and crossbows to be sold in Hoi An or Danang.

Military unit commanders involved in pacification include:

CO, 704th RF Company

CPT F. D. Newman, CO, USSF, Tm A-109

3. Special Problems (C)

GVN control over the district population will not increase to any great degree until additional friendly troops are assigned to Thuong Duc.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain NGUYEN DINH KHAM

DAVID T. JONES  
 CPT INF  
 District Senior Advisor

District Senior Advisor

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
 MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
 APO 96337

AJP:jsg  
 1 June 1968

TO : Office of the Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, Saigon  
 VIA : Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor ICTZ  
 REF : (a) Joint MACV/JUSMAG/USAID/OSA Directive Number 4-67

PROVINCE REPORT  
 (RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (03)

Period Ending 31 May 1968

1. (C/NF) STATUS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Implementation of the 1968 RD Plan in Quang Nam Province remains behind schedule. The deterioration of security throughout the province, day and night terrorist attacks against cadre teams, and delays in delivery of barrier materials have not allowed Quang Nam's 30 teams to move beyond the first criterion in any 1968 hamlet. Because previously designated reaction forces in the priority RD districts of HOA VANG, DIEN BAN and HIEU MEON have been redeployed or, as in the case of ROK Marine units, have proved unwilling to leave their bases after dark, the majority of cadre teams do not remain overnight in assigned hamlets. Despite the prolonged and unauthorized absence of the RD Group Commander, US advisors have continued their efforts to boost cadre morale through overnight visits to teams. At the same time it is clear that without decisive improvements in territorial security, progress in the 1968 program will not equal or exceed that of the previous year.

Enemy gains at the beginning of May were both tactical and psychological. In addition to harassing attacks by ground and fire in the province capital, communist local force units struck at isolated targets such as the An Hoa Industrial Complex, and temporarily occupied all the populated areas of THUONG DUC District except for a few square kilometers surrounding District Headquarters. RD hamlets were specifically the target of enemy attacks; 19 enemy initiated incidents involved RD cadre teams in May - a greater number than was registered during the period of the Tet offensive. The RD Cadre Operations compound and Province Senior Advisor's residence in HOI AN were also the targets of unsuccessful sapper raids. Each move was accompanied by intensive psychological operations designed to undermine popular confidence in RV/MAR strength and to publicize a new Alliance of Democratic and Popular Forces for Peace.

At mid-May, US and ARVN forces had made gains in countering at least the tactical offensive. For the first time, a sustained friendly operation

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was conducted in PHU KY Island, DIEN BAN District, an area long suspected to be the VC QUANG DA Province Headquarters. Operations in PHU KY, which falls within the ROK forces' TAOR, have long been considered essential to the security of both HOI AN and DANANG but have never been undertaken by Korean units. In assuming the job of clearing this major VC staging area, US and ARVN troops immediately reduced enemy capability to launch attacks against previously threatened targets in the Quang Nam delta.

Enemy psychological operations increased dramatically during May. Deprived of adequate personnel and equipment, GVN psyops agencies have not been able to neutralize fears generated by intensive propaganda in the priority RD Districts. Probably the most successful enemy campaign has been that of discrediting ROK forces in Quang Nam. VC claims of Korean brutality and mockery of Korean efforts in behalf of revolutionary development have found a receptive audience in DIEN BAN and HIEU NHON Districts, and suggest that the employment and attitude of ROK units must be significantly changed if their impact on the RD effort is ever to become a positive one.

2. ~~PROJECT SAKDOFF~~

Cont. p3

a. Category I Programs

i. (C) Sub-Program I-2, PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Activities. At a meeting held 3 May in DANANG, Quang Nam Province was designated to implement a pilot program for more efficient elimination of VC infrastructure. With RD cadre teams acting as the principal agents in apprehending VCI, agencies such as the Special Police and Static Census Grievance Office will pool information on suspected individuals for the use of RD Control Group Headquarters and, ultimately, of cadre at the hamlet level. Though the PHOENIX program was officially promulgated some time ago, no specific guidance for its implementation emerged until the 3 May meeting. At that time, US advisors emphasized that members of the People's Revolutionary Party, rather than ML cadre, are now the primary targets for elimination. All interrogations, infrastructure lists and blacklists prepared by DIOCC and PIOC personnel will reflect this new emphasis.

ii. (C/NF) Sub-Program I-4, Prevent Regression. The Province Chief, LTC LE TRI TIN, has indicated that <sup>more</sup> emphasis will be placed on the arming of RDPG after May. Whatever the level at which this decision was made, it does not significantly change the situation of self-defense forces in the province. Political rivalry, principally between VNQDD party factions and the province government, has discouraged the arming of civilians for well over a year. At the same time, a civilian Security Committee is planned for the province capital; two officers have been designated for a week of training in SAIGON, and after their return will operate outside the control of the National Police Commissioner in HOI AN.

b. Category II Programs

i. (C) Sub-Program II-1, Improve Effectiveness of National Police. Following the arrival of a new US advisor to the province's National Police Field forces, one company moved to a strategically situated compound outside

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HOI AN. It was suggested during May that a detachment of NPF personnel be assigned a static security mission at the HOI AN PICC; US advisors have objected strongly to this violation of the new SOP, and have to date successfully stalled it.

An important innovation made outside the Project TAKEOFF program during May is a special National Police report on treatment of suspicious wounds. Its format provides for identification of wounded Vietnamese seeking aid from Free World medical facilities, most of which have not in the past reported suspicious wounds to the police for immediate investigation.

ii. (C/NF) Sub-Program II-9, Support GVN Anti-Corruption Campaign. The District Chief of DAI LOC, Cpt TRAN QUOC DONG, was relieved of his duties at the end of May. Of known corrupt officials in Quang Nam, Cpt DONG has long been considered by US advisors as the prime candidate for removal. It is greatly to the credit of the Province Chief, LTC LE TRI TIN, that action was taken against a corrupt official whose removal may deepen the animosity between local political factions and the province government.

### 3. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL

a. (C/NF) General. Slow progress in the Paris peace talks has reduced the anxiety of Government officials and military officers in HOI AN who had previously feared a hasty settlement and abrupt withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam. Looking ahead to the US Presidential elections, however, the same officials and officers seem certain that a Kennedy or McCarthy victory will bring an end to American support for the present Government. Political leaders in the province capital interpret developments in Paris differently: the head of the VNQDD Youth Group (VHK faction) claims that young intellectuals in the cities and peasants in all districts feel the communists have gained control of the talks and that there is no longer hope for a quick settlement. There is universal objection to the lack of South Vietnamese representation in the talks.

Enemy propaganda, most of which has been directed at RVNAF units, RD teams and refugee camps during May, has called for support of a new South Vietnamese nationalist movement. Probably because the NLF has been too closely identified with the Hanoi government since Tet, the Alliance of Popular and Democratic Forces for Peace has been designated the rallying point for those South Vietnamese nationalists tired of prolonged war, GVN corruption and Korean brutality. Though no overt meetings of the new Alliance have been held in Quang Nam, it has been announced in the press that Professor HAO has agreed to lead the movement in HUE. This has led to speculation among political leaders, teachers and students in HOI AN that, as with the NLF at its formation, the new Alliance may attract non-communist nationalists who are dissatisfied with the Saigon government.

b. (C) VIS. Members of the VNQDD party and CVT labor union have strongly criticized the failure of VIS to respond quickly or specifically to enemy loudspeaker broadcasts in the province capital. Having seen 15 local VIS employees drafted during May, however, these critics admit that manpower shortage is principally to blame.

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The Weapons Reward Program has had special success in HIEU MHON District, where over 80 enemy weapons and explosives were turned in during May.

d. (C) Minorities, Political and Religious Groups. In celebrations marking Buddha's birthday at Long Tuyen Pagoda in HOI AN, bonzes appealed to the congregation to act in a spirit of unity to strengthen the physical and spiritual stance of the South in the face of new Viet Cong challenges. The speeches and exceptional cordiality of the bonzes toward visiting Government delegates led the Deputy Province Chief for Administration, Mr NGUYEN TAO, to remark that relations between the province government and Quang Nam Buddhist Assembly have improved significantly since Tet.

#### 4. SECURITY

a. (C) General. Enemy activity in Quang Nam increased during the month with province-wide attacks and harassment launched on 5 May and again on 22 May. Infiltration increased, as did activity along the enemy road leading southeast into Quang Nam from the ASHAU Valley. By forcing the evacuation of KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp in QUANG TIN Province and interdicting movement from the Special Forces Camp in THUONG DUC District, the enemy also gained uncontested use of Highway 14 as a north-south communication route. US Marine Forces made contact with a newly infiltrated regiment in the eastern Quang Nam delta as other friendly operations searched out the enemy in his base areas, inhibiting preparations for more substantial attacks against targets in Quang Nam and DA NANG.

b. (C) Enemy Situation. The enemy order of battle includes all units reported last month; in addition, the presence of the 3rd NVA Sapper Battalion has been confirmed. Prisoners captured by US Marine forces during Operation ALLEN BROOK indicate that a 36th NVA Regiment has also been infiltrated into Quang Nam. This unit reportedly left North Vietnam in early February, worked on the ASHAU-Quang Nam road for six weeks, and reached the Quang Nam delta about 12 May. The 2nd NVA Division remained well south of Quang Nam during the month; US forces made substantial contact with Division elements at KHAM DUC and in THIANG BINH District of QUANG TIN Province.

The enemy initiated a coordinated campaign of ground and fire attacks, harassment and terrorism throughout the province on 5 May. DA NANG area targets were rocketed; MARBLE MOUNTAIN received mortars; 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN), 59th RF Battalion, CAP and RD positions in the HUNG QUANG I area, and a number of refugee camps sustained mortar and ground attacks. HOI AN received mortar fire followed by a probe from the north directed against the PSA house and RD Cadre Operations compound. Serious incidents continued until 11 May but, except in THUONG DUC District, concentrated ground activity did not follow any of the attacks. On 22 May a smaller wave of ground and fire attacks was launched in the province; as on 5 May, large numbers of refugees were abducted from camps after their homes had been damaged or destroyed. Though minor by comparison to the Tet offensive, this month's attacks demonstrate a continuing enemy capability to strike anywhere at any time.

THUONG DUC District Headquarters and Special Forces camp, first hit in the general attack of 5 May, were under siege for nearly three weeks. The

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camp received over 1000 mortar rounds as VC forces occupied surrounding hamlets, refugee settlements and the airstrip. There was no concerted effort to overrun the camp, as had been the case at KHAM DUC; the enemy was apparently content to restrict Special Forces operations at THUONG DUC while moving men, supplies and equipment through the area unimpeded. The neighboring districts of DAI LOC and DUC DUC were also priority targets during this period.

Without assistance from the 2nd NVA Division, it is doubtful that the enemy forces now in province are capable of launching a major attack against DA NANG. Communist forces have been denied free use of the PHU KY Island base area and no longer have easy access to HAPPY VALLEY in HIEU DUC District, usually mentioned as the staging point for an all-out effort against DA NANG. The enemy will most probably continue attacks by fire, limited ground attacks against isolated outposts, and acts of terrorism and harassment in the next month.

c. (C) Infrastructure. Important advances against the infrastructure were made in HOI AN and in DAI LOC District during May. Following a terrorist incident in the province capital on 4 May, 77 Viet Cong suspects were arrested; among those captured were 12 sappers, 4 guerrillas, 3 intelligence cadre and a 3-man assassination team. At the MACV Advisory Team quarters in DAI LOC on 15 May, a PF soldier was apprehended after detonating an explosive charge; another explosion occurred on 24 May in the office of the district S-4. Some 50 VCS have since been arrested, including a member of the DIOCC staff who represented the district S-2 officer.

c. (C) Friendly Situation. All eight operations conducted by Quang Nam Sector during May were relatively minor. At the same time, units of the 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN) accounted for 294 enemy KIA in the PHU KY Island area during Operation HUNG QUANG I-38 between 17-25 May; an estimated 100 enemy were KBA. Immediately after the operation, B-52 strikes initiated a campaign to destroy permanently the enemy bunker complexes and support facilities of PHU KY Island. Units of the 1st US Marine Division launched Operation ALLEN BROOK in the same area, and by 28 May had killed 199 VC and 419 NVA soldiers. Elements of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and 1st Brigade, 1st Cav continued Operation WHEELER-WALLOMA in the QUE SON Valley and in the area of DUY XUYEN District adjacent to PHU KY Island.

In response to greatly increased enemy activity in THUONG DUC, HIEU DUC and DAI LOC Districts, US Marine units initiated Operation MANDELKNE THURST on 19 May, and had accounted for 87 VC and 76 NVA KIA by month's end.

The following changes in disposition of ARVN forces directly supporting RD were implemented in May:

| <u>UNIT</u>   | <u>DISTRICT</u> | <u>STATION</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u> |
|---------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------------|
| 1/51 Inf Regt | HOA VANG        | YEN NE         | AT 984687          |
| 2/51 Inf Regt | HIEU NHON       | HOI AN         | BT 158568          |

5. ECONOMICS

a. (U) General. Following a poor spring harvest, the price of locally

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produced rice has risen to 28 picasters per kilo in markets of the province capital and district towns. At the same time, adequate quantities of rice are available everywhere except in THUONG DUC and DUC DUC Districts, which have been isolated from normal sources of supply by continuing enemy action. Retail prices and availability of other food and consumer items have remained constant since mid-March.

b. (U) Material Resources and Transportation. Road traffic in Quang Nam Province continues at approximately 90% of the pre-Tet level on those routes which remain open. Sustained mining and ambush activity along Highway 538 between DIEN BAN District Headquarters and HOI AN has discouraged all but essential traffic between the two points. In DUC DUC and THUONG DUC Districts road travel is impossible and will not resume until security is decisively improved and major bridge repairs are undertaken. Because air transportation to the two districts is extremely limited, construction materials are all but unavailable in local markets.

## 6. REQUIRED ACTIONS

### a. Project TAKEOFF Actions

1. (C) Experience since Tet has shown that the great majority of Vietnamese civilians in Quang Nam Province continue to live in fear of renewed enemy attacks. This is due in large part to the intensive and timely propaganda generated by VC information cadre. Despite the best US advisory efforts, the VIS program in its present state is unequal to the task of discrediting enemy threats and claims even in areas where GVN control is allegedly greatest. The deficiencies are numerous - personnel shortages, inadequate radio and television receivers, absence of a full-time Van Tac Vu team, to mention a few. Because similar difficulties have been reported in other Corps areas, and because the political content of enemy propaganda is more potentially damaging during the period of the Paris talks, it is urged that Project TAKEOFF Sub-Program II-5, "Revitalize Pacification Payops," be designated a Category I program. The success of other top priority programs suggests that the command emphasis and close monitoring accorded them have clarified program objectives, cleared channels of communication and supply, and increased Ministry level response to critical needs. Until friendly psychological operations are decisively upgraded, the success of all related programs will continue to stand in jeopardy.

### b. Other Actions

1. (U) By contrast to the achievements of Allied combat units and civic action teams, the work of COMUSMACV agencies in Vietnam is rarely publicized in the US or foreign (including Vietnamese) press. Because the focus of pacification activity is not in Saigon or even in regional capitals, many interested reporters are deprived of information which could measurably counteract the growing wave of adverse publicity on American assistance efforts. It is suggested that a full-time COMUSMACV information officer be appointed for each Corps area and that he be charged with the responsibility of keeping reporters abreast of pacification progress in the field. Such a move could

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result not only in more factual reportage, but also in an increased awareness among press and media representatives that programs now reported incidentally are often worthy of front page attention.

9 Incl  
(1-9) Dist3rdv Reports

*Frank W. Dixon*  
FRANK W. DIXON  
LTC ARTY  
Acting Province Senior Advisor

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DAI LOC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MAY 1968  
(Enclosure (1) to RCS-1ACCPDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

GVN control in the District has been more seriously challenged this month as a result of an upsurge in VC activities. In addition to numerous mortar attacks on District Headquarters, three refugee camps were totally or partially destroyed. For the first time mortar attacks occurred during daylight hours. Two GVN employees were victims of VC assassination squads. However, VC infrastructure has suffered a serious setback by the apprehension of approximately fifty VC and VC suspects by the National Police. Among those arrested were a number who occupied GVN positions.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Pacification has been advanced by the National Police arrests this month, and by an increased number of PF daytime activities. At least four psychological operations campaigns have been conducted in the district this month. In addition, a water well improvement survey is nearing completion; this project would greatly increase the district's water supply. However, pacification is still influenced by the attitude of numerous GVN officials who are not overly zealous.

3. (C) Problem Areas

There are two main problems hampering pacification in the district. The first is a less-than-enthusiastic approach to problems by the District Chief and some of his officials. This includes recurring and unexplained absences. The second problem is a lack of adequate RF/PF units in the district to step from the defensive to the offensive, especially at night. At the present time we do not have enough units adequately to protect all GVN hamlets. This problem will be somewhat alleviated with the return in two months of an RF company now in the Province Training Center.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain TRAN QUOC LONG

*Reviewed - S.P.G.*  
KENNETH E. SHORT  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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DIEN BAN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MAY 1968  
(Enclosure (2) to RCS-ACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

RD Teams are still in the process of constructing hamlet defenses and devoting the majority of their time and efforts to implementing the first three of the eleven point criteria. Lack of security continues to hamper the overall pacification program.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Viet Cong initiated incidents have increased during the month of May. Commencing with the attack on DIEN BAN District Headquarters on 5 May the VC have constantly harrassed RF/PF and RD outposts and hamlets. The VC increased mortar attacks during the month; District Headquarters and artillery positions have been under mortar attacks ten times during May. The VC also resorted to mortaring friendly hamlets; on 14 May the enemy fired sixteen rounds of mortar into the hamlet at BT068577 wounding 12 members of RD Team 17 and five PF soldiers of QM 24 platoon. VC activities continued until an operation was launched in the PHU KY Island area during the latter part of the month. VC activities declined greatly after the operation was launched; this illustrates the need for continuing operations in the areas not controlled by the GVN. These operations will greatly enhance pacification efforts in the GVN controlled area.

3. (C) Special Problems and Recommendations

Lack of security in the hamlets selected for the 1968 RD program continues to be the greatest problem. This problem will not be as great with the planned operations in the PHU KY Island area being conducted to destroy VC positions on the island. If friendly forces cannot be maintained on the island after the next operation, I strongly recommend the continued use of B-52 strikes in the area to destroy VC forces attempting to rebuild positions there.

4. (U) District Chief: Major HOANG TRUNG

*William A. Jordan*  
WILLIAM A. JORDAN  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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DUC DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MAY 1968  
 (Enclosure (3) to RCS-ACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been a slight decline in the pacification status of the district during the past month. This is due to stepped up operations by the enemy aimed at forcing refugees to return to VC controlled territory.

2. (C) Factors Influencing PacificationA. Unfavorable

a. Attacks on PHU DA, THANH MY, and MAU CHANH hamlets on 5 May resulted in over 200 families homeless. Six civilians were killed and forty wounded.

b. Construction of the PHU DA Dispensary has not started. Materials have been delivered and are causing a storage problem. The civilian construction company from HOI AN has not notified us of any expected starting date.

c. The Viet Cong have been conducting extensive psychological operations in the area, aimed at convincing the people the GVN cannot or will not provide them security, and that they should return to VC controlled areas. Several requests submitted by this headquarters through US Marine channels for loudspeaker teams, in order to provide a response, have gone unanswered.

d. The attack by VC on AN HOA Industrial Complex on 27 May was the first such attack directly against the Complex. Sixteen vehicles of various sizes were completely destroyed, and the water pumping station was partially damaged. Concurrently, the hamlet of MY SON, containing mostly Industrial Complex employees, was hit by mortars, rockets, and ground attack, resulting in sixteen houses totally destroyed. Again the enemy objective was to convince people the GVN is not capable of providing security for them.

B. Favorable

a. The water pipe line is nearly completed and will provide potable water to PHU DA and THANH MY refugee camps, the Refugee Reception Center, and District Headquarters. The attack by the VC on the water pumping station would seem to indicate their objection to this project.

b. Announcement of the impending arrival of two CIDG companies, with US Special Forces advisors, has done much to bolster the sagging morale at this location. Their operations in this area will greatly enhance the security situation here.

3. (U) Special Problems

The problems encountered with transportation of commodities into the district have resulted in a gradual increase in prices. The opening of the road

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from DUC DUC to DANANG has been further complicated by the accidental burning of Liberty Bridge on 24 May 1968. No new completion date on the bridge has been announced.

In addition to the two major attacks on 5 May and 27 May, this area has received several other minor, harassing attacks, directed primarily at the refugee camps. These attacks have resulted in many families being left without homes. Sufficient reports have been submitted, followed up by requisitions, to Province Headquarters. As of this date, there has been no delivery of any building materials, no payment of any relief allowance, and no distribution of the other items normally issued in these situations, e.g., paper blankets, cooking pots, and items of clothing.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain DANG VAN TRIEM

BERNARD W. CRATZER  
MAJ ARTY  
District Senior Advisor

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DUY XUYEN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MAY 1968  
(Enclosure (4) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

There is presently no advisory team assigned to Duy Xuyen District

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HIEU DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MAY 1968  
(Enclosure (5) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-87)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

There has been no significant change in the level of pacification in this District during the past month. At best this can only be considered a negative accomplishment since there has been considerable effort on the US side to improve the level, and there has been less significant enemy activity than in past months.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. The primary factor influencing the level of pacification remains the same -- security. The ability of the enemy to conduct small attacks against the hamlets of this district remains unchanged and I have no reason to believe that the citizens of these hamlets are unaware of this. The fact that GVN officials from Village Chiefs to Policemen cannot safely remain in their homes at night indicates to the people the actual level of pacification.

b. The apathy of the RF/PF soldiers is a prime factor in the loss of pacification momentum. These personnel rarely engage in any type of action which improves the security of the area. Their almost complete failure to make even a show of working either with or for the local people in civic action programs does not go unnoticed. The RF/PF devote the majority of their efforts to improving their station in life either legally or otherwise. Unfortunately their status as armed militarymen gives them a special status outside of the laws of their communities. Simply stated, they lack a sense of civic responsibility.

c. The National Police assigned to this district rarely engage in any type of anti-VC action. During daylight they only manage to operate one or two check points for resources control in the entire district. They are either unwilling or unable to control blackmarket activities. Their lack of response to the requirements of the District Chief is a primary problem.

d. There is still a lack of action by the District Chief and other VN officials in the Civic Action Program. Even in those projects where construction materials are on the ground waiting to be used there is either little or delayed action. In fact the attitude seems to be that since the Americans obtained and delivered the materials, Americans should continue these projects through the construction phase to completion. Frankly many of the US units with civic action responsibility in this district are becoming disgusted.

3. (C) Special Problems

The greatest problem is the propensity of GVN officials to pass responsibility to the US side. If this District Chief and other local GVN officials

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were receiving pressure from Province to show results in the many aspects of pacification, I believe that there would be a marked change fairly quickly. My experience here has been that the local officials, both military and civilian, respond best to matters receiving interest at Province level. This would not only result in improvement in the status of pacification, but would probably lead the local population to believe that their government is responsible both to and for them. This would be a major improvement over the existing situation.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain NGUYEN VAN THUAN

JAMES A. LOLLIS  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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HIEU NHON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MAY 1968  
(Enclosure (6) to RCS-ACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification status in HIEU NHON during May remained basically unchanged in spite of several discouraging harassing attacks by the VC against GVN activities and personnel: THANH TAY Refugee Camp attacked on 5 May, simultaneous attacks upon GVN personnel in Hoi An; CAM CHAU Refugee Camp and HIEUC TRACH RD Team (#05) attacked on 8 May; HIEU NHON District Headquarters attacked by fire on 8 May; CAM CHAU Refugee Camp attacked again on 22 May. Basically, these attacks are considered to be part of VC attempts to influence the Paris peace talks, yet the VC suffered significant losses in these actions. Therefore, although the VC had some successes, the attacks cannot be considered indicative of any general regression of pacification. In general terms, it is this officer's opinion that military and civil pacification has changed little throughout the month, with few real losses and few real gains.

One encouraging factor during May has been the response of the local populace to the District's new reward program. In the last 30 days the following items were turned in: 157mm round, 2 Bangalore torpedoes, 1 satchel charge, 2 25lb shaped charges (floating mines), 19 grenades, one 50lb box mine, two 105mm rounds booby trapped, four 105mm rounds, one 155mm round, two 82mm mortar rounds, one 60mm mortar round and two LAW anti-tank rockets.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

The major factor influencing pacification during May were the partially successful VC attacks mentioned above. The following positive factors have helped neutralize these enemy successes:

- a. The district's rapid and effective response to the problems caused by the VC attacks.
- b. A USMC mobile training team program to train PF platoons (two platoons received two weeks of training each during May).
- c. Numerous highly successful "reaction" operations of a police nature in response to intelligence and/or established enemy contacts. These operations which reached a peak during May, are having a very positive effect upon the elimination of infrastructure.
- d. Reinsertion of MACV Advisory Team at HIEU NHON District Headquarters.
- e. Continuing successful engagements east of HIEU NHON District Headquarters by CAP's 5 and 7.

3. (C) Special Problems

- a. Rebuilding of TAN THANH floating bridge (destroyed by VC in early May)

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at BT179588. There seems to be an unwarranted delay on this project. The absence of the bridge is detrimental both to military activities and to the economy of the area.

b. Security of Highway 538 east of the district headquarters.

c. Requirement for a major (regimental size) engineer supported operation into CAM THANH Island in order to clear and hold this area. Meanwhile the area is entirely unsafe for any troop movement because of mines and booby traps, and should not be entered at all.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain VO VAN SANG.

*W. Fontaine Bell*  
W. FONTAINE BELL  
CPT USMC  
District Senior Advisor

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HOA VANG DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MAY 1968  
 (Enclosure (7) to RCS-RECORDS - 01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

During the month of May there was some progress in pacification in Hoa Vang. GVN is slowly distributing the money and commodities that should have been quickly distributed after the TET offensive. There are over 550 people whose homes were less than 100% destroyed who have not received any money or commodities, and this will not have been accomplished by 1 June 1968.


2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

The enemy has continued to harass with mortars and rockets throughout the month. There have been two assassinations and one attempted assassination of village and hamlet officials.

3. (U) Special Problems

The District was recently allocated the use of the Chinese Agricultural Technical Mission (CATM) Team, a group of Chinese agricultural experts. Because of some of their experiences in Hue and other areas, they desired to restrict their operations to only one area, in this case Hoa Vang District. Additionally, they wanted to work primarily with district rather than province officials, since prior experience showed province agricultural officials to be too unresponsive to their requirements and too dictatorial in their wants. The program of working at district level was highly acceptable to MACCORDS officials at province and district and to the District Chief, but due in part to a personality conflict, the province Agriculture Chief is on the point of rejecting their offer, which will result in their recall from this district. This would be a tragedy, as what they are attempting to show and teach could benefit the entire province, increasing food production and expanding the knowledge of advanced agricultural techniques in this district and, eventually, in adjacent districts. This deserves immediate attention, since a new contract is being considered in late June or early July. The District Chief is most emphatic in his desire that the team stay and work in the district, and will write a letter to the Province Chief to this effect.

4. (U) District Chief: Major MAI XUAN HAU

  
 JAMES A. SWENSON  
 MAJ INF  
 District Senior Advisor

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QUE SON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MAY 1968  
 (Enclosure (3) to RGS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The status of pacification within the district remains weak. Little or no effort has been exerted by the Vietnamese officials to improve this situation. All areas under the control of the GVN remain unchanged.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification:

The reluctance of district officials to put some type of government personnel outside the immediate periphery of the district town has allowed the enemy freedom of movement in most areas. Complacency has set in where military operations are concerned (both offensive and defensive) and the psychological operations conducted were targeted toward hamlets that are within a seven hundred (700) meters radius of District Headquarters, in stead of the contested or VC controlled hamlets.

Additionally, because of another change in the American units found in Que Son, civic action programs have come to a standstill. GVN officials have not sponsored or completed a civic action program in two months. Their last program, that of assisting with construction in three New Life Hamlets, never got off the ground.

3. (C) Special Problems:

The lack of strong control by the District Chief is a very big problem. This, coupled with a desire not to accept advice or develop any initiative, is the principal problem in Que Son.

4. (U) District Chief: First Lieutenant NGUYEN CONG CHINH

*Franklin L. Demahoe*

FRANKLIN L. DEMAHOE

MAJ INF

District Senior Advisor

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THUONG DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MAY 1968  
(Enclosure (9) to RCS-RECORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification here has suffered a serious setback during this month due to enemy ground and mortar attacks.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

The enemy has clearly shown the people of Thuong Duc the inability of local forces to protect them. Since 4 May, the enemy has daily mortared the district area almost at will. On five separate occasions, 50% of the population fell under enemy control with no friendly opposition.

Local confidence in the Regional/Popular Forces has been reduced drastically and open contempt is frequent.

Current attitudes of those personnel not in the areas seized by the enemy appears to be quite favorable in spite of the present situation.

Materials for three RD projects as well as Popular Force housing has remained in storage since the first of the month.

3. (C) Special Problems

This district needs additional friendly forces to secure the populated areas.

Food for the 3,700 new refugees as a result of enemy activity has been too slow in reaching this location.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain NGUYEN DINH KHAM

DAVID T. JONES  
CPT INF  
District Senior Advisor

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
 MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
 APO 96337

Date: 30 June 1968  
 AJP:jsg

TO : Office of the Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, Saigon  
 VIA : Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor ICTZ  
 REF : (a) Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USAID/OSA Directive Number 4-67  
 (b) MACCORDS Notice Number 68-319 dated 18 April 1968

PROVINCE REPORT  
 (RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (03)

Period Ending 30 June 1968

1. (C/NF) STATUS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN

While implementation of the 1968 Revolutionary Development Plan remains behind schedule in Quang Nam Province, decreased enemy activity during June has permitted cadre teams to focus efforts on the first three criteria of their program more consistently than in any month since Tet. Enemy initiated incidents involving RD teams dropped to barely a quarter of the number recorded in May, even though friendly units in the priority districts of HOA VANG, DIEM BAN and HIEU NHON were conducting offensive operations in other areas. Cadre morale has improved substantially as a result. No cadre were killed during June and only four were wounded; however, many teams still abandon their assigned hamlets at night when reaction forces are absent from the RD area.

ARVN and US forces continued their aggressive campaign against VC/NVA strongholds and base areas, and successfully inhibited new province-wide enemy attacks such as took place twice in May. Liberty Road, a vital north-south line of communication linking the An Hoa Industrial Complex to sources of supply in DA NANG, was opened for the first time in five months by US Marine troops. Republic of Korea Marine forces operated outside the principal areas of enemy concentration.

VC and NVA troops, while avoiding contact with friendly forces, continued to infiltrate personnel and equipment into unpatrolled areas, pointing to the need for continued offensive tactics by all Allied units. Unless an aggressive approach to improving territorial security is maintained, economic development initiatives and efforts against the infrastructure will have no lasting effect in the countryside. In this light, the proposed security barrier around the city of DA NANG seems a dangerously counterproductive measure. Construction and manning of the barrier will not only deprive RD areas of vital human and material resources, but will also encourage the static defensive psychology which recent COMUSMACV directives have identified as a prime obstacle

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to pacification. Without adequate friendly forces operating continually in areas outside the new barrier, gains made in June, the first month of full scale pacification activity in Quang Nam since Tet, stand to be completely undone at the enemy's whim.

## 2. PROJECT TAKEOFF

a. (C) Sub-Program I-1, Improve and Expand Territorial Security. Quang Nam's fifth Mobile Advisory Team arrived in June and will join teams already placed in QUE SON, HIEU NHON and DUC DUC Districts. The MAT presently advising RF/PF units in MOC BAI Vital Area has had special success in arranging joint operations with US forces. In the first month of MAT training, MOC BAI forces killed more enemy soldiers than all other RF/PF units in Quang Nam combined. At the end of May, MOC BAI troops accounted for more enemy KIA than did RF/PF units in all but two military sectors in South Vietnam.

b. (C/NF) Sub-Program I-2, PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Activities. As a first step in implementing this province's pilot program for more efficient elimination of VC infrastructure, US advisors have encouraged contacts and discussions among RD Control Group, Census Grievance and Special Police personnel. Of GVN agencies participating in the PHUNG HOANG Program, Census Grievance continues to provide the greatest volume of information leading to actual arrests. If RD cadre are to assume the leading role in apprehending infrastructure at the hamlet level as specified in the pilot plan, differences among participating agencies must be resolved to increase the free exchange of data.

An intelligence training course for RD cadre assigned to DIOCC's and hamlet teams was begun by the RD Control Group Intelligence Chief during the last week of June. One sign of increasing cooperation among Government intelligence agencies was the participation of Military Security Service personnel as instructors in the course.

## 3. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL

a. (C/NF) General. Political leaders in the province capital have expressed impatience and indignation over recent rocket attacks against Saigon, and have again advocated more aggressive action against the enemy, including an invasion of North Vietnam. The same leaders admit to considerable frustration over lack of progress in the peace talks and lack of South Vietnamese representation in Paris.

Outside of political circles, civilians in HOI AN supported Government programs with slightly more enthusiasm during June than in past months. Self defense and first aid training courses were well attended, and rumors of renewed attacks against the province capital decreased.

Continuing enemy harassment and terrorism outside the province capital have prevented the Government side from regaining the psychological advantage lost since Tet. Enemy propaganda describing the evacuation of KHAM DUC and KHE SAN as major defeats for American forces have found a wide audience

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in DUC DUC District, and have led military and civil officials in DUY XUYEN District to call for another aggressive US or ARVN operation in the Quang Nam delta. Reportedly, the people of DUY XUYEN do not believe that ROK forces could conduct such a campaign successfully.

b. (U) VIS. A special psyops delegation, including the VIS and Chieu Hoi Chiefs and representatives of the 102nd Psywar Company, gave intensive briefings to military and civil officials in four districts of the province during June. For many village and hamlet chiefs, these briefings provided the first current information on the military and political situation since Tet; the goals of the Paris talks were also explained, and local administrators were instructed to disseminate all information at the village and hamlet level as quickly as possible.

Ten new television sets were received in Quang Nam during the month. The present lull in enemy activity has allowed distribution and installation of the sets to proceed on schedule. A program of local news and entertainment continues to be broadcast twice monthly through the AFVN television facility in DA NANG.

c. (C/NF) Minorities, Political and Religious Groups. Enemy loudspeaker broadcasts continue to call for support of the Alliance of Popular Democratic Peace Forces, though political leaders in HOI AN by now dismiss the Alliance as a propaganda exercise. Of more immediate interest has been the formation of the Social Revolutionary People's Union, for which local support was organized at a closed meeting in HOI AN the last week of June. Members of the Cam Lao party, many of whom are officers of the Military Security Service, have reportedly joined with Quang Nam's small Dai Viet party to back the new Union. Opponents of the movement, principally VNQDD party leaders, disclaim any sympathy or support for the Union, describing it as a grouping of Catholics and opportunists who seek the favor of President Thieu. According to QDD members, the new Union is directly a response to the National Salvation Front, whose strong loyalty to Vice President Ky would prevent a merging of the two groups as suggested in the Saigon press.

#### 4. SECURITY

a. (C) General. Enemy activity in Quang Nam decreased substantially in June; there were no coordinated province-wide attacks such as those of 5 and 22-May. Operations by ARVN, US and Free World forces not only accounted for heavy enemy casualties, but also denied the Viet Cong and NVA use of normal base areas. Though acts of terrorism and harassment continued at the usual pace, the enemy was kept off balance and prevented from launching offensive operations.

b. (C) Enemy Situation. The enemy's order of battle includes all units reported last month. In addition, the presence in Quang Nam of the entire 36th NVA Regiment, first contacted by US Marines in the PHU KY area during May, has been confirmed. Formerly the 1st Battalion, 3rd NVA Regiment, it was renumbered and assigned to VC Quang Da Province control in late 1967. Prisoner interrogations and captured documents indicate the possibility of additional newly infiltrated North Vietnamese units in province, among them

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the 38th Regiment and a flamethrower company. The 2d NVA Division remains to the south in QUANG TIN Province.

During June the enemy attempted to avoid contact with friendly troops while infiltrating new personnel and equipment, procuring supplies and moving them to secure areas. Friendly operations continued in PHU KY, DIEN BAN District, a traditional base and staging area for attacks in the Quang Nam delta. US Marines swept the LOC HIEP base area west of PHU KY and the mountain base areas of the 31st and 368B Regiments in HIEU DUC and DAI LOC Districts. A large number of arms and ammunition caches were seized, which included quantities of 122mm and 140mm rockets, B40 rockets and mortar rounds. Enemy supply traffic was detected in DUC DUC District west of the THU BON/TINH YEN River, and along waterways south of HOI AN. Agent reports, air reconnaissance and airborne sensors indicated heavy movement along infiltration routes in western THUONG DUC District. Apparently many replacements have reached the Quang Nam delta; the 1st Marine Division renewed contact with the 2d Battalion, 36th Regiment, which had suffered almost total casualties in MAY.

Significant acts of terrorism and harassment included the daylight murder of the deputy chief of HOA LUONG Village, HIEU DUC District, and attacks on the THAN CHIEM refugee camp in DIEN BAN District. This camp was recently established to house refugees generated by operations in PHU KY. On 13 June, a Viet Cong platoon entered the camp and burned its 25 tents. The tents were replaced on 15 June; the same night the VC returned, burned 12 tents and scattered the refugees.

The enemy mounted only one rocket attack during June, hitting MARBLE MOUNTAIN air facility with seven 122mm rounds on the 27th of the month. Two Americans were killed and six wounded. In addition, one building was destroyed and three helicopters were damaged.

In past years the enemy has avoided friendly operations and withdrawn at least some forces to mountain areas for rest, recuperation and training during the months of June, July and August. Scattered reports that NVA units will withdraw entirely from the Republic of Vietnam during this period are considered highly doubtful; most probably, enemy activity will be limited to attacks by fire, small ground attacks against isolated outposts, and terrorist strikes during the next month.

c. (C) Friendly Situation. Quang Nam Sector conducted four operations during June, two of which brought significant results. Operation PHI PHUNG 106-107 in DUY XUYEN District resulted in 37 VC KIA and one friendly KIA. In operation HUNG QUANG 1/43 conducted in the PHU KY area, the 51st ARVN Regiment reported 14 VC killed by infantry, 297 killed by air and artillery, with only 4 friendly KIA.

The 2d ROK Marine Brigade initiated Operation DRAGON PALACE on 2 June in northern DIEN BAN District. To date the operation has claimed 142 VC KIA; 22 were killed on the friendly side. US Marine units continued Operation ALLEN BROOK in the PHU KY area, and Operation MARMELUKE THRUST in THUONG DUC, HIEU DUC and DAI LOC Districts; 165 VC were killed in ALLEN BROOK, and MARMELUKE THRUST claimed 501 enemy lives.

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5. ECONOMICS

a. (U) General. Rice prices remained stable in June despite the fact that locally produced rice is no longer available in some district markets. American rice, which is in ample supply, now sells at 8 to 10 piasters less per kilo than local rice.

b. (U) Material Resources and Transportation. The opening of Liberty Road between DA NANG and DUC DUC District has already eased critical shortages of material at the An Hoa Industrial Complex and in district markets. Road security is still marginal, however, as only one US Marine company is responsible for protecting traffic from minings and ambush. Transportation to highland areas remains extremely difficult, with the result that food and consumer items are generally twice as expensive in THUONG DUC District as in the province capital. Road traffic in other districts is at approximately the pre-Tet level; mining and sniper incidents continue in QUE SON, DUY XUYEN and DIEN BAN Districts.

6. REQUIRED ACTIONSa. Project TAKEOFF Actions

1. (C) (Ref. Sub-Program II-1) Of the 1,200 detainees now occupying the provincial rehabilitation center in HOI AN, 650 are able bodied males of fighting age. Within this group, 350 have been identified as infrastructure cadre or members of local force guerrilla units, and have been scheduled for removal to centers in CON SON and QUANG TIN for over three months. As was shown on 14 July 1967, when enemy forces freed over 1000 prisoners in HOI AN, heavy concentrations of detainees pose a serious threat to the security of the province capital and surrounding districts. It is urgently requested that at least 360 detainees be moved to other centers before 15 July, and that another 300 be removed by the end of the month.

2. (U) (Ref. Sub-Program II-5) US financial support for Quang Nam's provincial radio station will be permanently withdrawn on the last day of June. Though no GVN funding will be made available for future operations, local VIS employees have volunteered to continue broadcasting five hours each day in the interest of providing Quang Nam listeners with news and information not included in the programs of VTVN Da Nang. The VIS Chief and his US advisor have been frustrated in their attempts to secure even small replacement parts such as crystals for station broadcast equipment.

In a letter to the Hoi An station director (#1637, VTVN, 3/IQ dated 30 May 1968), the Director General of Radio Broadcasting in Saigon indicated that at least spare parts would continue to be supplied to the local station. At the same time, CORDS/POD, in response to field support requests (#1126-68 of 12 June and #1226-68 of 21 June) indicates that VTVN and the Ministry of Information plan to phase-out all provincial stations which are not self-supporting. The responses state further that the Ministry "...could reactivate this station if they wanted to, however they feel it is not necessary since Hoi An lies within the reception area of Radio Da Nang."

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Because the Hoi An station is self-supporting except in its requests for a few spare parts not sold locally, and because Radio Da Nang does not provide adequate province news, it is requested that JUSPAO exert pressure for continued Ministry support of the few equipment requests originating in a province which CORDS/POD itself has designated a "psyops priority area."

3. (C) (Ref. Sub-Program I-1) Initial issue and replacement of equipment for Mobile Advisory Teams has been inadequate for accomplishment of their mission. The five MAT's deployed in this province currently have on hand three of their ten authorized vehicles, none of their five RC 292 Antennas, and twelve of their 25 authorized lensatic compasses. The advisor kits issued them were short an average of 90 individual items per kit. The vehicles and antennas are critical to the security and effective functioning of the teams. Action is urgently requested to effect issue of these items as soon as possible.

b. Other Actions

1. (U) The pressing personnel requirements of Quang Nam Province, last outlined in the Province Report of February 1968, have yet to be resolved. In its response to the February required action, CORDS/MSD/PER made reference to a staffing pattern which is neither up to date nor an adequate reflection of the real personnel needs of this province. As confirmed by a CORDS/USAID personnel study conducted in June by LTC ELLIOT of CORDS/RAD, there is an immediate need for two Assistant Area Development Officers to serve as Deputy District Senior Advisors in Quang Nam. Action on the February request suggests that priority needs will not be met until the present staffing pattern is modified. For this reason it is recommended that CORDS/MSD/PER and the personnel sections of participating agencies give immediate attention to the findings of LTC ELLIOT's study, and that two Assistant Area Development Officers be assigned to Quang Nam in time to lend their efforts to the present year's pacification program.

*Warren E. Parker*  
WARREN E. PARKER  
Province Senior Advisor

9 Incl  
(1-9) District Senior Advisors' Reports

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DAI LOC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JUNE 1968  
(Enclosure (1) to RCS - MACCORDS-01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

Pacification during the month of June has definitely taken strides forward. While much of the District is still contested after dark, both the lull in VC activities and corresponding upsurge of GVN activities are signs of progress.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

The principal factor influencing pacification this month was the replacement of the old District Chief by his former assistant. By his attitude, example, and direction, the new District Chief has given pacification efforts a much needed boost. He is interested in making immediate improvements and does not hesitate to go to remote areas of the district.

The proximity of large scale USMC operations has hindered VC activities. Only minor probes of RF/PF positions took place, and District Headquarters was not mortared at all in June compared with almost a dozen times during May. Three combined PF/USMC operations were held, the first such operations in months. RF/PF offensive operations were stepped up, and vast improvements made in local defenses. For the first time, PF training is being directed by a district-published master training schedule.

Civilian attitudes have improved, as evidenced in two hamlets where the population freely gave labor and assistance to PF platoons for strengthening of local defenses.

Co-ordination for all MEDCAP activity in the district has been effected between USMC, CAP units, MACV Advisors and Vietnamese agencies. The groundwork for a number of new school self-help projects was laid by a meeting of principals, advisors, and district administrators.

Psychological operations were utilized more this month than before. A VIS propaganda team broadcast in the district. On three separate occasions schools were visited by US propaganda teams, movies were shown, and refreshments, leaflets and toys distributed. An air-drop of pamphlets was arranged to capitalize on two Hoi Chanh received during the month.

3. (C) Problem Areas

The biggest problem in the district remains the lack of sufficient RF/PF troops to carry out the dual missions of hamlet security and night offensive operations. This problem will be greatly alleviated when the 117th RF Company presently training in Hoa Cam, returns to the district in late August.

4. (U) District Chief: First Lieutenant NGUYEN VAN HAO

*Kenneth E. Short*  
KENNETH E. SHORT  
Major Infantry  
District Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL- NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

DIEN BAN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JUNE 1968  
(Enclosure (2) to RGS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

Pacification in Dien Ban District has progressed over the last reporting period. The greatest effort of the RD teams is in improving hamlet defenses and implementing the first three of the eleven point criteria.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

During the first ten days of June, when ARVN forces were operating in the Phu Ky island area, the VC were not active in the District. Upon termination of the operation in Phu Ky, the VC attacked a refugee camp and destroyed its tents by burning. Two days later the VC returned to the camp and kidnapped approximately sixty people.

During the next ten days of the reporting period, the VC initiated five incidents ranging from mortar and B-40 attacks at Thanh Quit to sniping along Highway #1.

During the remaining reporting period a ROKMC operation in the north-eastern section of the district resulted in two VC initiated incidents; sniping at Thanh Quit and booby trapping in an area near the Vinh Ha PF Platoon position.

On 22 June, an air strike in the vicinity of Tan My resulted in six civilians KIA, 4 civilians WIA, eight houses 100% destroyed and ten houses 50% destroyed.

3. (C) Special Problems and Recommendations

Lack of security in the GVN controlled area continues to be the greatest problem. During the two periods indicated above, when ARVN and ROKMC forces were operating in the district, VC initiated incidents were greatly reduced, indicating a need for more operations in the area adjacent to that under GVN control. Closer coordination among units operating within the district is required to preclude accidents such as that resulting from the air strike described above.

4. (U) District Chief: Major HOANG TRUNG

*Dale A Rossander*  
DALE A ROSSANDER  
CPT INF  
District Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

DUC DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JUNE 1968  
(Enclosure (3) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

There has been no significant change in the pacification status of Duc Duc District during the month of June 1968. Of the 49 hamlets within the district, 12 are under GVN control.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

The portion of Liberty Road within Duc Duc District was reopened on 10 June 1968 by the US Marines at An Hoa. Although critically short of personnel the Marines are committed to keep the road open, and they have accomplished this every day to date. Convoys are moving over the road daily and many needed materials and commodities will be received shortly.

The movement of CIDG forces to the Nong Son area has enabled the District Headquarters to transfer one RF Company from Nong Son to An Hoa. This move, completed on 25 June 1968, will improve the security situation considerably and should eventually result in an improved pacification status.

3. (C) Special Problems

In order to insure the security of Liberty road, the US Marines at An Hoa have established a platoon sized outpost midway along the road to Dai Loc District (AT 907503). The District Chief agreed to commit one PF Platoon to reinforce this outpost. Although the outpost is considered absolutely necessary for the security of the road, it is creating extreme hardships on the one US Marine Company at An Hoa. The existence of the outpost leaves only two Marine Platoons and one RF platoon for security of the An Hoa Marine Base.

4. (U) District Chief: Major DANG VAN TRIEM

*Bernard W. Gratzler*  
BERNARD W. GRATZER  
MAJ ARTY  
District Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

DUY XUYEN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR MAY 1968  
(Enclosure (4) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

There is presently no advisory team assigned to Duy Xuyen District.

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HIEU DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JUNE 1968  
(Enclosure (5) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The security and safety of the population where RF/PF personnel are presently located remains unsatisfactory. Four of the six villages within the district remain insecure despite the presence of RF/PF personnel and day and night patrolling activity. VC local and main force units continue to show an ability to harass GVN installations and to propagandize the population. Reaction by RF/PF forces is slow and usually ineffective.

The two northern villages (Hoa Loc and Hoa Phu) generally exhibit strong independent attitudes and their population willingly cooperates with GVN activities. Many civilians are armed and join the RF/PF in night patrolling activities. These two villages offer no refuge or cooperation to VC infiltrators.

In hamlets where RF/PF do not carry out daily activities, the population willingly cooperates with VC forces, which periodically propagandize or carry out show-of-force activities. The VC do not have to harass or terrorize the population to obtain information or cooperation. The monthly/semi-monthly RF/PF operations into these areas are not sufficient to achieve GVN control nor to instill confidence in the population that the government is worthy of their support.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Citizens of most hamlets are aware that the enemy can continue to conduct small attacks against GVN installations, terrorize the population and propagandize. GVN officials and policemen cannot safely remain in their homes at night, even within the most secure villages, indicating a lack of RF/PF capability.

RF/PF soldiers are apathetic to civic action programs and rarely participate in these activities.

The National Police at district level rarely engage in targeting and eliminating VC infrastructure, many refuse to control even flagrant blackmarket activities within the District. US Marine Corps road blocks frequently find weapons, grenades and black-market materials in Vietnamese trucks which have just passed through National Police road blocks.

Hamlet and Village officials continue to request US military personnel to build and finish projects officially labeled "self-help". Most local officials demand that at least skilled laborers such as masons be paid by US sources even on these same self-help projects.

This district does not have a Vietnamese agricultural cadre. This expert should and must be in residence at the District Headquarters so that improved rice and vegetables may be planted by local farmers under proper supervision.

3. (C) Special Problems

GVN agencies at district level cannot agree on population figures for hamlets or villages, nor for that matter, the exact location of population


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centers within the district. National Police, Census Grievance and District Administration Office personnel each have different tabulations on this important data.

Census Grievance in Hieu Duc has agents in only fourteen of twenty-four active hamlets within the district, and therefore cannot react to popular aspirations or gather useful information. There continues to be too much willingness on behalf of GVN officials to pass the responsibility of pacification to US Marine Corps, US Civil Affairs and US advisory personnel.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain NGUYEN VAN THUAN

  
HARRY R. HAWKINS  
MAJ                      ARTY  
District Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

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HIEU NHON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JUNE 1968  
(Enclosure (6) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

Pacification in Hieu Nhon has moved ahead somewhat during June as compared to May. The aggressiveness and capability of District RF and FF units seem to be improving; this, together with an increasing number of district security operations during the month, has contributed to an improvement in military security. The enemy does, however retain the capability of launching large unit (battalion and regiment) attacks; this is likely to remain the situation until a major clear and hold operation is conducted in Cam Thanh Island and until the ROKMC begins genuinely to patrol and control its TAOR. District administrative and nation-building efforts seem to be also moving ahead with few difficulties except as noted in the paragraphs below. The motivating factor behind most of these gains is the drive and perseverance of the District Chief.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Additional positive factors not mentioned above include: The institution during June of monthly civic action coordinating meetings at which all military agencies or units performing civic action in Hieu Nhon meet with the nine village chiefs to discuss problems and projects; the establishment of a Combined Action Company Headquarters at Hieu Nhon to control and coordinate all combined action units in the district; the continuing successful efforts of the USMC Combined Action Program Mobile Training Team in training PF platoons; the apparently increased desire of PRU personnel to move into contested areas for interdiction and reconnaissance missions; repair by the people of Phuoc Trach Hamlet and RD Team #05 of the engineer bridge at Phuoc Trach (destroyed by VC in early May); and, finally, the fine aggressive and professional job being performed by CAP S-1, S-2 and S-3.

On the negative side, there has been a certain movement away from the post Tet intensity of war effort. Additionally, it seems apparent that the relative peacefulness of the past several months is to a large degree deceptive. It seems quite probable that enemy forces in this area are holding back intentionally until such time as their resources and strength have been significantly increased.

3. Special Problems (C)

- a. The enemy's complete freedom of action and movement on Cam Thanh Island.
- b. The extremely poor system of artillery fire coordination and clearance among ROKs, Vietnamese forces and MACV resulting in ridiculous delays (a delay of more than 1½ hours is not uncommon.)
- c. Rebuilding of refugee homes destroyed by VC during April (at Thanh Tay and Con Chai camps) is moving very slowly - apparently due to foot dragging by the Saigon ministry.

4. (U) District Chief: Major VO VAN SANG

*W. Fontaine Bell*  
W. FONTAINE BELL  
CPT USMC  
District Senior Advisor

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CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

HOA VANG DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JUNE 1968  
 (Enclosure (7) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

During the month of June pacification within Hoa Vang District has continued at a slow but steady pace. VC actions against the GVN have been limited to one attempted assassination of the assistant Village Chief of Hoa Long and the burning of a small number of refugee houses in Hoa Lac. A rocket attack was directed against the USMC FLC area. These incidents have had little effect on the overall status of the pacification effort.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. One USA Mobile Advisory Team has been assigned to the District. The District Chief has directed his staff to co-operate with the team to the fullest in formulating a two phase program of RF/PF training and up-grading. Full implementation of the program is scheduled to commence during the first week of July.

b. One PRU element consisting of 18 men has been assigned to the District and stationed at District Headquarters. The fact that this team remains under province control makes their effectiveness at this location questionable. Their highly desirable capability of providing immediate reaction to perishable intelligence is lost.


c. Increased publication of the weapons reward program during June was accompanied by a considerable increase in the turn-in of such material, with the result that insufficient funds were on hand to effect prompt payment. Sufficient back-up should be maintained at the lowest level and be readily available.

d. The District currently has 1,500 trained members of the PSDG. Approximately 345 weapons have been issued with 212 more to be issued during the first week of July.

3. (C) Special Problems

Construction of a 500 meter wide barrier which when completed will surround the city of Danang and, with the exception of two northern-most hamlets, the entire district of Hoa Vang, has begun. Small portions of two other districts will be included inside the barrier - Dien Ban and Hieu Duc. In that this barrier will provide an effective political, economic and military boundary it can be anticipated that the included district areas inside the barrier will become increasingly aligned with Hoa Vang. Problems of support for the affected hamlets can be expected unless clear-cut lines of responsibility are drawn by GVN.

4. (U) District Chief: Major MAI XUAN HAU

  
 FREDERICK ELFERS  
 FSO-5

District Senior Advisor

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CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

QUE SON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JUNE 1968  
(Enclosure (8) to RCS-MACCORDS - 01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

There has been little change in the pacification status of the district during this reporting period. Progress is being made in the area of tactics, RD hamlets and civil affairs.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

The number of joint Vietnamese/American military operations has increased, as well as single Vietnamese operations, and both have been highly successful. Much of this increase can be credited to the addition of one RF company to the district's forces and to a change in the American unit.


Barrier materials for RD hamlets are being distributed to Phuoc Duc, Thuan An, and Cang Tay hamlets. This will serve to upgrade the security situation of these hamlets and of the district as a whole.

Psychological operations, MEDCAP and work with refugees have increased during the last month. All have had a tremendous impact on the population.

3. (C) Special Problems

The slowness with which GVN officials move to alleviate or to prevent problems is a major problem. This is compounded by the reluctance of district forces to work alone or in their assigned area of responsibility. These two problems, when combined, become the principal obstacle to pacification efforts in the District. Getting the support of the people in an attempt to stop minings along the main road is a further problem which has yet to be solved despite many constructive attempts.

4. (U) District Chief: First Lieutenant NGUYEN CONG CHINH

  
FRANKLIN L. DONAHOE  
Major Infantry  
District Senior Advisor

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THUONG DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JUNE 1968  
(Enclosure (9) to RCS-RECORDS - 01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Again as in the previous month, pacification in this district has deteriorated considerably. Plans are being made to evacuate two hamlets previously rated secure in order to bring their civilian inhabitants under better GVN control.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification.

The population of this district had been suffering from a lack of food due to VC taxation and a poor harvest. Last month the villagers were restricted to their hamlets due to the tactical situation, and large operations. This month the population has been severely restricted due to the presence of friendly forces in the area; large tracts of cultivated land have been destroyed by these same friendly forces. In addition, food relief for the district has been delayed and inadequate. Consequently, despite a concentrated CA/PSYOPS program, GVN and US Military Forces appear to the people to be the cause of their problems.

A counter-intelligence team from Headquarters III MAF operated in Thuong Duc for a period of three weeks. Results of their operation indicate that those people living in areas not controlled by local forces at night are being effectively terrorized by local guerrilla forces.

Despite the current situation and the fact that no subsidized foodstuffs have arrived in more than two months, the local Montagnards began rapid construction of a two room school.

Local Regional/Popular Forces have conducted several large scale operations in a highly ineffective and unprofessional manner thereby producing negligible results.

The combination of continued enemy actions in this district and minor incidents occurring as a result of friendly operations are daily alienating the populace of the district.

3. (C) Special Problems

District leaders, including village chiefs, are not cooperating with the District Chief in his pacification efforts. Local military forces desperately require more officers.

4. (U) District Chief: Major NGUYEN DINH KHAM

*David T. Jones*  
DAVID T. JONES  
CPT INF  
District Senior Advisor

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
 MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
 APO 96337

Date: 31 July 1968  
 AJP:ajp

TO : Office of the Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, Saigon  
 VIA : Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor ICTZ  
 REF : (a) Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USAID/OSA Directive Number 4-67  
 (b) MACCORDS Notice Number 68-319 dated 18 April 1968

PROVINCE REPORT  
 (RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (03)

Period Ending 31 July 1968

1. (C/NF) STATUS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Continuing insecurity and the proximity of the monsoon season make it likely that the 1968 Revolutionary Development Plan will be completed in Quang Nam Province by the end of the year. While pacification activity gained slightly in momentum during July, increased attacks against refugee camps, RD teams and the Da Nang barrier suggest that, without decisive improvements in territorial security, even limited progress stands again to be neutralized or reversed.

In response to the most recent attacks and in anticipation of the renewed province-wide offensive predicted by intelligence analysts, Vietnamese and American military units have given first priority to efforts at interdicting a buildup of enemy forces, especially through air and artillery strikes, and to operations in known VC-NVA rest and staging areas. With the assistance of six Mobile Advisory Teams, Quang Nam Sector has made an impressive attempt at improving the morale and efficiency of RF/PF units in the province, and encouraged local unit participation in combined operations with conventional forces during July. Republic of Korea forces, on the other hand, have made a far less aggressive effort at improving the security of vital RD hamlets in DIEN BAN and HIEU NHON Districts, which fall into the ROK Marine area of responsibility.

Morale among RD teams is reportedly high, though the enthusiasm of individual cadre is not shared by the Group Commander, who refuses to visit and supervise teams except at the direct order of the Province Chief. Because enemy activity is virtually unchecked in DIEN BAN, teams in that district have come under increasingly frequent and daring attack, often in daylight and once within barely 100 meters of a ROK Marine command post. Under such conditions, few teams in DIEN BAN remain overnight in assigned hamlets, moving instead to USMC CAP units or, together with most hamlet dwellers, to less exposed areas near the district town. Those teams which do remain in hamlets after dark have

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Note  
RDC developed a successful strategy of coordinating ambushes with neighboring teams. Choosing a different location each night, the combined team forces derive an advantage from their greater number and from their ability to surprise the enemy. US advisors are now considering adoption of this tactic for use by all teams in areas where reaction forces are frequently absent or unresponsive to calls for help.

It became obvious during July that a serious divergence exists between real and reported accomplishments under the 1968 Plan. Calendar time and unverified statistics are dangerously inadequate criteria upon which to justify a redistribution of RD teams; yet, as in 1967, GVN officials at the ministry and province levels are presently planning to move cadre from hamlets in which their work is far from completed. At least in this province, whatever psychological and material impact the teams may have generated since Tet is not sufficiently strong to survive their departure. For this reason US advisors in Quang Nam are actively discouraging plans for the premature withdrawal of cadre teams from areas which recent events prove are far from pacified.

## 2. PROJECT TAKEOFF

a. (C) Sub-Program I-1, Improve and Expand Territorial Security. Quang Nam Province has been authorized 2 additional Regional Forces companies and 5 more Popular Forces platoons for the present fiscal year. DIEN BAN District and the 1/14 RF Group will each receive a company, and the new PF platoons will be assigned to DIEN BAN, DUY XUYEN, HIEU DUC, HIEU NHON and THUONG DUC Districts. At present, 105 enlisted men are undergoing basic training at the HOA CAM Training Center, and will eventually form another company for the 1/14 RF Group.

b. (C) Sub-Program I-2, Press Attack on VC Infrastructure. PHUNG HOANG activities in Quang Nam increasingly reflect the personal attention and enthusiasm of the Province Chief, LTC LE TRI TIN. While awaiting specific Saigon directives for implementation of the approved PHUNG HOANG program, participating agencies met weekly during July to report to and receive instructions from the Province Chief. Based on intelligence received from the PHUNG HOANG committee, an operation against the infrastructure was launched in HOA VANG District with excellent results.

c. (C/NF) Sub-Program I-4, Prevent Regression. A current list of hamlet self-defense forces is attached as Enclosure (10) to this report. US advisors consider the list, which was compiled by the Quang Nam Census-Grievance Office, to be reasonably accurate. An older list prepared by the province Youth Service is still in use by some officials, but plainly exaggerates the numerical strength of self-defense forces. US advisors estimate that between 800 and 900 weapons are now in the hands of these forces, though the province government has not made available any accurate list of their type or distribution.

Political considerations continue to delay widespread arming of self-defense groups, though weapons familiarization classes are regularly held in the priority RD districts of HIEU NHON, DIEN BAN and HOA VANG. Unfortunately, only one firing range in the province has been opened to self-defense trainees, and most civilians have been obliged to travel by truck to DA NANG for firing practice. If RDPG and ~~other civilian groups~~ are to acquire a decisive self-defense capability, firing ranges will have to be constructed in all districts except HOA VANG.

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d. (C) Sub-Program II-2, Chieu Hoi Activities. Since the opening of Quang Nam's Chieu Hoi Center over a year ago, Hoi Chanh have rarely remained in the building overnight. To discourage the free movement of returnees in the province capital after dark, and to improve the security posture of the Center, a program for upgrading its defenses was initiated in July. Like the refugee camps and hamlets which surround it, the Center is extremely vulnerable to attack from the unprotected southern and western approaches to HOI AN. If adequate barrier materials and weapons are made available, and if TCN and US advisors receive counter-part support for the defense plan, the Center could become an effective outpost for the protection of the province capital. (See Paragraph 6, a, 1.)

e. (C) Sub-Program II-4, Expand and Improve RD Cadre Program. Drawing upon RD cadre resources, US advisors formed an amateur cultural drama team during the last week of July. Though the size and program of the team vary with each performance, it has drawn large audiences in HIEU NHON District, and is expected to attract enough additional volunteers to become a primary psyops vehicle in all RD hamlets.

Cultural cadre from each RD team gathered in HOI AN on 31 July to begin a three-day literacy training workshop. Arranged in cooperation with the CORDS Education Office and Quang Nam Elementary Education Service, the workshop will instruct cadre in simple techniques of teaching reading and writing to illiterate adults.

f. (C) Sub-Program II-9, Support the GVN Anti-Corruption Campaign. New district chiefs, both ARVN majors, were installed at DAI LOC and DUY XUYEN Districts during July. The two districts have a long history of dishonest administration and in the past have been the scene of violent confrontations between political factions, popular demonstrations against incumbent chiefs, and kangaroo court indictments of corrupt officials. Perhaps for this reason the Province Chief has refrained from speculating on the performance of either new appointee.

### 3. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL

a. (C/NF) General. Quang Nam's two surviving Lower House delegates, Messrs. PHAN THIEP and PHAN MAT, arrived for extended visits early in the month, and have travelled to all districts of the province at least once. In talks with US advisors, the delegates described their constituents as gravely concerned that US negotiators in Paris will agree to a coalition government for South Vietnam. According to THIEP and MAT, the recent Honolulu summit talks were too brief and too general to dispel fears that political pressure in the United States will oblige President Johnson or his successor to end the war before the communists are decisively defeated. A similar view was expressed by Mr. VU HONG KHANH, National Chairman of the VNQDD party, who visited HOI AN at mid-month. Mr. KHANH observed that pacification programs are not progressing rapidly enough to justify continued American sacrifices in Vietnam, and argued that unless better results are achieved in these programs soon, the government and people of the United States will be discouraged from meeting their commitments in Southeast Asia.

Increased VC activity during July revived rumors that a new offensive will be directed against HOI AN and targets in DIEN BAN District. Enemy psychological operations in refugee camps and New Life Hamlets, where abductions and assassinations have already discouraged all but the very old and very young from remaining

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after dark, continue to emphasize anti-American and anti-Korean themes.

b. (U) VIS. For the first time in three months, a Van Tac Vu team was made available to VIS in Quang Nam, and gave daylight performances in two contested hamlets of HIEU NHON District. Recently received television sets were installed in DUC DUC and THUONG DUC Districts; the three receivers remaining to be distributed will be placed in DUY XUYEN and QUE SON Districts early in August, giving each district of the province at least one receiver for public viewing.

c. (U) Election Activities. A by-election has been scheduled for 8 September, and province officials expect there will be over ten candidates for Quang Nam's vacant Lower House seat in the National Assembly. At month's end only three candidates had registered, among them Mr. TRUONG DINH DAM (VU THUY), Chairman of the Quang Nam-Da Nang CVT labor union.

d. (U) Minorities, Political and Religious Groups. A special public appeal program was initiated in July by the Quang Nam chapter of the Greater Union Forces, a loose alliance of Catholic anti-communists with which no organized political party in the province openly claims a formal relationship. The program, carried out largely through roadsigns in English and Vietnamese, is designed to discourage US withdrawal from Vietnam and to express popular rejection of any coalition government for South Vietnam.

#### 4. SECURITY

a. (C) General. Enemy activity in Quang Nam increased during the month with province-wide general attacks and harassment launched between 22 and 25 July. Ground and fire attacks during daylight hours against friendly units constructing the Da Nang barrier indicate that the enemy considers the barrier a serious threat to his freedom of movement in the Quang Nam delta. Supply and reconnaissance operations by ARVN, US and Free World forces continued to inflict heavy casualties and to deny the enemy use of his normal base areas.

b. (C) Enemy Situation. The enemy's order of battle includes all units reported last month. In addition, the presence of the 3d Quang Da Battalion has been confirmed. Formerly the 1st Battalion, 3d NVA Regiment, it was re-numbered and assigned to VC Quang Da Province control in late 1967. Prisoners have confirmed that the 38th Regiment consists of the R-20, V-25 and 3d Quang Da Battalion, with newly infiltrated troops bringing these units up to strength.

During July the enemy attempted to avoid contact with friendly troops while conducting intensive supply and reconnaissance operations. Groups of 20 to 60 sampans were sighted and destroyed on the rivers south of HOI AN on six different occasions, revealing the magnitude of the enemy's supply activities. Agent reports revealed that the enemy is resupplying not only for an offensive, but also for the monsoon season. Friendly air and artillery interdiction have made resupply difficult and costly for communist forces in terms of equipment destroyed.

Increased terrorism was evidenced by the murder of the GVN chief of VINH XUAN Village, DIEN BAN District, and by the abduction of 13 civilians during

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the month. RD cadre casualties in July were 9 KIA and 28 WIA; the National Police reported 2 officers murdered.

Between 22 and 25 July, the enemy launched major rocket attacks against DA NANG Air Base, MARBLE MOUNTAIN Air Facility, and Force Logistics Command at RED BEACH. At the same time there were mortar attacks throughout the province, apparently in support of company-size ground attacks against refugee camps. Interdiction and mining of friendly lines of communication increased almost three-fold during this period. While the three-day attacks appeared to be coordinated, prisoners indicated only the involvement of VC district forces, with no participation by province forces.

Continued attacks by fire, small unit ground attacks and terrorist activities are expected during August until the enemy completes movement of supplies to forward areas. Attacks on the scale of Tet will depend upon the enemy's ability adequately to supply and move the 2d NVA Division north into staging areas in Quang Nam. If friendly operations do not disrupt his plans, the enemy can be ready for such attacks by mid-August.

c. (C) Friendly Situation. Quang Nam Sector conducted four operations during June in HIEU NHON and DUY XUYEN Districts. Operations PHI PHUNG 108-111 accounted for 6 VC KIA, 4 VC captured and 15 VCS detained. In addition, 6 bunkers, 5 sampans and 16 mines were destroyed, and 2,000 kilos of rice confiscated. In Operation HUNG QUANG I-51, the 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN) reported 24 VC KIA and 137 KBA.

The 2d ROK Marine Brigade terminated Operation DRAGON PALACE early in the month; 261 VC were killed in the operation and 8 were captured.

US Marine units continued Operation ALLEN BROOK in the PHU KY area of DIEN BAN District, and Operation MARMELUKE THRUST in THUONG DUC, HIEU DUC and DAI LOC Districts. To date, 353 VC and 596 NVA have been killed in ALLEN BROOK; 496 VC and 613 NVA were killed in MARMELUKE THRUST by the end of the month.

## 5. ECONOMICS

a. (C/NF) General. Food prices in district markets rose by 5-10% during July, probably a reflection of the general hoarding which accompanies rumors of imminent enemy attacks. Black market activity continued at a high rate in DIEN BAN and HOA VANG Districts, where Korean forces continue to sell field rations and luxury items. Such activity has more than economic consequences; the HOA VANG District Senior Advisor reported in June that a Korean Marine had seriously wounded an RD cadre who had tried to discourage the roadside hawking of PX merchandise.

Other economic difficulties in HOA VANG include exploitation of refugees in the district's overcrowded camps by unscrupulous merchants and contractors. The activities of Mrs. BICH CHI, a Chinese dealer in scrap materials and salvaged rubbish from US military units, are typical. Mrs. CHI, who operates a private fleet of trucks in the HOA CAM area, is able to collect and resell rubbish which refugees could otherwise procure free for constructing and improving their houses. A special investigation made by Quang Nam's Lower House delegates revealed that refugees, deprived of this source of materials and income, are obliged to sell Government-distributed construction commodities for cash in order to stay alive.

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b. (U) Material Resources and Transportation. Airlifts and the regular movement of convoys from DA NANG have relieved the critical food and commodity shortages of DUC DUC and THUONG DUC Districts. Food prices in those areas have returned to normal, though continuing enemy ambush and mining activity threatens to interrupt the flow of goods at any time.

## 6. REQUIRED ACTIONS

### a. Project TAKEOFF Actions

1. (C) (Ref. Sub-Program II-2) Removal of Quang Nam's Chieu Hoi Service Chief, Mr. EUI TAN VINH, is considered an essential and overdue step in revitalizing Chieu Hoi operations in the province. During his visit of 12 April with former Chieu Hoi Minister PHONG, Mr. Ogden WILLIAMS assured TON and US advisors in Quang Nam that Mr. VINH's removal had been approved and arranged. As Mr. VINH is still in office, it is requested that the circumstances of his tenure be examined and that pressure be exerted for his immediate removal in favor of a competent, honest official.

### b. Other Actions

1. (U) During the week of 21-27 July, over 30 reporters travelled by air to DUC DUC District from DA NANG to interview and photograph members of a USMC CAP team. The District Senior Advisor received extremely short notice of the group's arrival, and the Province Senior Advisor and CORDS psychops advisor were not informed at all. In the course of their stay, the reporters learned that nearby PHU DA Hamlet had come under heavy enemy attack the previous night. Without notifying US advisors at district or province level, a group of the same reporters returned to DUC DUC the following day and gave detailed coverage to the PHU DA incident.

Whether or not accredited reporters are free to cover such stories without first notifying US advisors in the locality concerned, such notification is at very least a courtesy which should be extended to officers already busy caring for the victims of newsworthy attacks. Equally important, US province and district advisors bear responsibility for the safety of reporters and other visitors to insecure areas, and can hardly discharge this responsibility if field trips are not coordinated in advance. It is strongly suggested that those officers in DA NANG concerned with press relations make a conscientious effort to consult with the Province Senior Advisor well in advance of any future visits to any part of Quang Nam Province by any representatives of the news media.

2. (U) On the morning of 24 July, in the wake of a series of enemy ground and fire attacks in the vicinity of the province capital, US advisors twice alerted officers in DA NANG to the danger of landing civilian aircraft in HOI AN. At approximately 0700, an RB Operations officer telephoned the ROIC to request cancellation of Air America's A-1 courier flight. At 0705, the Province Senior Advisor personally instructed the CORDS duty officer in DA NANG to arrange cancellation of the same flight. Shortly after 0800, an Air America Porter landed at HOI AN, fortunately without incident, carrying two passengers.

Whatever the delays or counterinstructions which allowed the aircraft to depart against the advice of responsible officers in HOI AN and DA NANG, a grave

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risk to lives and property was unnecessarily taken. It is therefore urged that procedures for transmitting and reacting to emergency information be comprehensively reviewed and widely publicized, and that province personnel be advised of any ways in which they can assist regional headquarters in forestalling such potentially disastrous communications breakdowns.

3. (U) As noted in required actions of February and June 1968, personnel shortages have long threatened to undermine the success of advisory efforts in Quang Nam Province. With the departure of three more CORDS officers at the end of July and the temporary absence of four others anticipated in August, the province team is and will continue to be calamitously below minimum effective strength. While aware that personnel shortages are a national problem, and that numerous studies and proposals have been made to find a solution, Quang Nam's skeleton staff is today charged with implementing and reporting on a program vastly beyond its manpower resources. For this reason it is required that (a) two Assistant Area Development Officers be assigned to this province before 10 August, or that (b) special arrangements be made for temporary assistance in the research, drafting and clerical preparation of any CORDS reports levied after that date.



WARREN E. PARKER

Province Senior Advisor

- 10 Encl  
 (1-9) District Senior Advisors' Reports  
 (10) Disposition of Self-Defense Forces

*106 mgs - prob exp ROK*

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DAI LOC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JULY 1968  
 (Enclosure (1) to RCS-ACCORDS-01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

Pacification in the district has advanced again this month, and GVN control has remained about the same. Only a few VC initiated incidents were noted, all during the last week of the month and almost all directed against US Marines, rather than against Vietnamese positions.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

The positive efforts and excellent attitude of the acting District Chief, 1/Lt HAO, have greatly assisted the work of the US advisory team. Popular Forces platoons have continued construction and strengthening of defenses for improved hamlet protection. The extent to which this is interfering with the VC is pointed up by the enemy's determined efforts to destroy some of the platoons, notably at NGHIA TRUNG outpost.

Normal MEDCAP and psyops activity continued this month. Construction on self-help projects also continued, and three new projects - two schools and a well - were initiated. The 3d Bn/7th US Marine Regiment, has continued to assist in civic action projects. Local officials involved in such projects are most cooperative.

3. (C) Problem Areas

Further advances in pacification are still hindered by improper use of the Regional Forces company in DAI LOC. This is soon to be corrected, as we have received word that the present commander is to be replaced. Next month the district's second RF company, presently in training, will return.

4. (U) District Chief: Major NGUYEN VAN KE

*Kenneth E. Short*  
 KENNETH E. SHORT  
 Major Infantry  
 District Senior Advisor

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DIEN BAN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JULY 1968  
(Enclosure (2) to RCS-11ACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been a slight decline in the pacification status of DIEN BAN District during this reporting period; this is due to stepped up enemy activity within the area.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Viet Cong initiated incidents increased during the month of July to a total of 24. The incident most damaging to the pacification effort was the assassination of Mr. KIEN LAI, Village Chief of VIENH XUAN. RD Team 10 was attacked on 4 July; 1 cadre was killed and 3 were wounded. On 15 July, RD Team 16 was hit, with 1 cadre wounded. On 23 July, 3 members of RD Team 10 were killed and 3 wounded in a mine explosion. In a daylight attack launched throughout the district on 23 July, 3 PF soldiers were killed and 7 were wounded.

3. (C/NF) Problem Areas

Lack of security in the GVN controlled area continues to be the greatest problem of DIEN BAN District. Unless the ROK Marines begin active patrolling and operations in outlying areas, pacification in DIEN BAN will progress no further than it has. This is demonstrated by the daylight attack of enemy forces on 23 July. If the ROK Marines will not operate actively within their TACR, another unit must be assigned to provide the outer ring of security which is needed if pacification efforts are to move forward toward national goals.

4. (U) District Chief: Major HOANG TRUNG

*Dale A. Rossander*  
DALE A. ROSSANDER  
Captain Infantry  
District Senior Advisor

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DUC DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JULY 1968  
 (Enclosure (3) to RCS-RECORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been an overall improvement in the pacification status of the district during the month of July. DUC DUC District has 49 hamlets; of these, the GVN controls 12.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

## a. Unfavorable

1. There has been a lack of interest on the part of the District Chief in new refugees generated by US Marine operations during July. On 16 July, 39 detainees/refugees were received, and another 50 were received on 21 July. To date, the District Chief has given no assistance of any type to these refugees, stating that they are from VC controlled areas to which they will probably return as soon as possible. He feels that he has never received proper support from Province Headquarters in HOI AN, and has lost enthusiasm for assisting the refugees. I cannot entirely disagree with his claim of lack of support.

2. Two confirmed and one suspected incidents of US Marine artillery being fired incorrectly occurred in July, resulting in 8 civilians killed, 11 wounded, and 11 homes completely destroyed. The first incident occurred on 12 July and was reported to HOI AN the same day; no assistance has been received yet.

3. On 24 July the Viet Cong attacked and completely destroyed the hamlet of THU BON in the village of XUYEN PHU. The apparent inability of district forces to defend the hamlet is a cause of some concern to the local populace.

## b. Favorable

1. Liberty Road to DANANG remained open throughout the month, and much-needed supplies and building materials began arriving on a regular basis.

2. The movement of CIDG forces to NONG SON has been completed and their presence there is expected to improve the security of the area. The CIDG troops are apparently being well received by the local people; this factor had been of some concern to district officials.

3. Increased operations by US Marines in the district have resulted in many KIA's and an improved security situation. At this writing, the 5th Regiment of the 1st Marine Division is moving permanently into AN HOA, and will operate extensively in the area.

3. (C) Problem Areas

The most pressing problem encountered during July was the District Chief's loss of enthusiasm. He was wounded by mortar fire on 24 July, was treated by the US Marines at AN HOA, but was not evacuated. He is in considerable pain from mortar fragments still in his body. He has sent requests to the Province Chief to go to DANANG for further medical treatment, but has not received so much as a reply from

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Province Headquarters; he has been very deeply hurt by this turn of events.

4. (U) District Chief: Major DANG VAN TRIEM

*Bernard W. Gratzner*  
BERNARD W. GRATZER  
Major Artillery  
District Senior Advisor

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DUY XUYEN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JULY 1968  
(Enclosure (4) to RGS-11ACCORDS-01-67)

1. (U) There is presently no advisory team assigned to DUY XUYEN District.
2. (U) District Chief: Major CAO DIEM

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HLEU DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JULY 1968  
(Enclosure (5) to RCS-114CCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been a slight improvement in the level of pacification in this district during the month of July, despite the rocketing incidents which have occurred. Agent reports concerning VC activity within the district have decreased and combat patrols, though they have not increased, have turned up less evidence of VC presence. This is not to say that VC infrastructure has been reduced.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. There still appears to be a lack of security within the hamlets. This is evidenced by the fact that in some cases the village and hamlet chiefs do not sleep in the hamlet at night. There are insufficient numbers of Popular Forces personnel within the district adequately to secure the hamlets. This should be alleviated, as the District Chief has recently been given the authority to recruit one additional PF platoon.

b. The RF/PF still lack interest in civic improvement or in the security of the area in which they operate. In a few instances some effort has gone into improving security, but for the most part the VC easily enter hamlets where RF/PF are located.

c. There is still evidence that local nationals are housing and supplying the VC and failing to report this to GVN officials. This is partly because of a fear for their lives and partly because of the pro-VC attitude of the people.

d. The National Police assigned to the district continue to work in a completely unsatisfactory manner. They are rarely seen on the main roads conducting road block operations. This is left almost entirely to USMC personnel working in the area. The District Chief seems to have little control over the actions of the National Police.

e. The civic action program has expanded somewhat and more emphasis is being placed on it by the District Chief. Control of materials has in the past been a problem, but with the initiation of a new control procedure this should be eliminated.

f. There is no RD cadre team working in this district. Much work could be done by such a team, and the pacification program could be bettered if one were present.

3. (C/NE) Problem Areas

The greatest single problem in pacification within the district is the sluggishness of actions by GVN officials. In addition, US personnel are too often approached for help which is actually available through GVN channels. Finally, several instances of improper action on the part of FVMAF personnel operating in the area have worsened relations in the district, though it is too soon at this time to determine the effect of this on the overall pacification effort.

4. (U) District Chief: Captain NGUYEN VAN THUAN

HARRY R. HAWKINS  
Major Artillery  
District Senior Advisor

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HIEU NHON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JULY 1968  
(Enclosure (6) to RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification in HIEU NHON has regressed slightly this month due to increasing concern over large scale enemy attacks and to the resulting emphasis upon defensive preparations by military and civil agencies alike. Also contributing to this decline was the fairly successful VC harassing attack against HOI AN and vicinity the night of 23-24 July, during which 54 refugee homes were destroyed and several refugees murdered. Only the increasingly aggressive offensive efforts of district security forces during the month (including four operations deep into XUYEN LONG Island), and the continued fine work of district administrators, prevented the month from being a very poor one.

Intelligence collection efforts during July seem to have been much more productive than in the past. It is this officer's opinion that an increase in timely large scale operations by ARVN and FMAF units based on such intelligence could completely solve the security problem (and thus the pacification problem) noted above.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Additional positive factors not mentioned above include: an increasing tendency of district staff officers to get out and visit their subordinate units (RF companies, PF platoons) by day and night; establishment of a joint TOC (VII, ROK, MACV, CAP) at HIEU NHON District Headquarters; the outstanding work of CAP units S-1, S-2 and S-3; a notable increase in the aggressiveness and offensive capabilities of district RF units; the complete reconstruction of the TAN THANH Bridge (BT 179589) by the 102d Engineers; and finally, clearing of the minefield behind the HIEU NHON compound, which will permit construction of the new District Headquarters to begin immediately (a definite psychological and practical advance).

The major and overriding negative factor, as mentioned in Paragraph 1 above, is the negative psychological impact resulting from the unchallenged presence of large numbers of well equipped enemy units within easy striking distance of HIEU NHON.

3. (C) Problem Areas

a. The problem of extremely slow clearance of artillery fire by ROK Marine forces remains unsolved. Thus far I have witnessed no tangible results following the coordination meetings held by Quang Nam Sector in the last 30 days; this problem was also mentioned in last month's report.

b. Rebuilding of refugee homes destroyed by VC attacks in April has still not progressed due to the unresponsiveness of the appropriate Ministry in Saigon; this problem was also mentioned in June.

c. The greatest problem, as noted above, is that ARVN and FMAF unresponsiveness to the threat of large enemy units nearby, coupled with very effective enemy propaganda, is preoccupying the people of HIEU NHON with defensive tasks, and is contributing to a general disillusionment as to the strength, ability and determination of the GVN and its allies.

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4. (U) District Chief: Major VO VAN SANG

*James B. Bell*  
W. FONTAINE BELL  
Captain USMC  
District Senior Advisor

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HOA VANG DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JULY 1968  
(Enclosure (7) to RCS-RECORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

More enemy initiated incidents were registered in HOA VANG District during July than in any period since Tet. Although the majority of actions were attacks by fire against US unit locations in and around HOA VANG, two incidents directly affecting district operations are described in Paragraph 2 below. In general, pacification within the district can be said to have advanced during the reporting period, if only slightly.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. A reinforced enemy platoon-sized ground attack on the night of 22-23 July at YEN HE Peace Hamlet resulted in damage of varying degrees to a large number of houses, and one VC cadre was killed. Though district officials think otherwise, the RD team feels the CAP unit located in the hamlet did not react adequately; this has further decreased cooperation between the two groups.

b. Following an attack by fire on MARBLE MOUNTAIN Air Facility, inaccurate counter-mortar fire landed on BINH MY Peace Hamlet. The fire was approximately 1,000 meters off target and caused 8 civilian deaths; another 72 civilians were wounded, most of them lightly. Immediate action was taken by units in the area to respond to the needs of the people, though the nature of the incident dictates that any response is inadequate.

c. A meeting between Combined Action Platoons (CAP's) and RD teams was held during the reporting period. The stated purpose was to discuss problems of mutual interest in order to further cooperative efforts. The meeting was successful, with both groups gaining an appreciation of each other's goals and specific interests.

d. The Mobile Advisory Team (MAT) completed the first phase of training four platoons in July. Because the MAT has not been issued a vehicle, it must work close to or within the District Headquarters. The MAT will not be able to perform its mission completely during August unless it receives a vehicle.

e. The Chinese Agricultural Technical Mission (CATM) Team, in cooperation with a number of district farmers, has begun a vegetable demonstration plot. It is expected that, upon completion of the plot, a large number of rice farmers will be interested in adopting the highly profitable vegetable crops.


3. (U) Special Problems

Due to the large number of US units presently located in the district, overall coordination of civic action projects is becoming increasingly difficult. Many units continue to provide excessive amounts of cement, re-bar and roofing materials to individuals, hamlets and villages without advance coordination. Units generally prefer to do this because it is faster than using COMUSMACV channels, or because newly arrived S-5's are not aware of the proper procedures. The recipients of such materials are therefore not conditioned to deal through their own governmental processes. Increased command emphasis should be placed on the need for all units to coordinate projects fully with local advisory teams.

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4. (U) District Chief: Major MAI XUAN HAU

  
FREDERICK D. ELFERS  
FSO-5  
District Senior Advisor

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QUE SON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JULY 1968  
(Enclosure (8) to RCS-MCCORDS-01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

There has been a definite increase in pacification activity within QUE SON District during July. District officials have begun work in the areas of refugee support, psyops and Vietnamese Information Service programs, self-help projects, RF/PF operations, MEDCAP and intelligence collection. Work has continued in RD hamlets and in civil affairs.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

Attention in refugee relief activities focused upon finding a means to increase the income of resettled families. Through careful planning, district officials have organized (a) a labor service to be used by US units located in QUE SON and (b) a refugee laundry service. Each service is organized on a rotational principle, and hires approximately 70 refugees each week. Hiring is handled by the US S-5, who relies on a list of recommended refugee laborers furnished by the Refugee Service Committee of the district.

Psychological operations increased to the extent that two propaganda teams were used regularly throughout the month. Not only contested hamlets, but also VC controlled hamlets were visited while US-Vietnamese forces provided security. MEDCAP operations were included in these visits, with Vietnamese nurses working alongside the US Battalion Surgeon.

VIS increased its activities by holding information programs at least four nights a week. These programs are sponsored by such district organizations as the Medical Service, National Police, S-5, S-3 and high school. The mission of keeping the population informed of recent developments in the district was accomplished more effectively during July than in previous months. The people were able to pose a great many questions directly to district officials, with extremely beneficial results.

Another area receiving additional attention was the self-help program. Though much of this attention is in the form of conversation and planning, it is noteworthy by contrast to the lack of emphasis given the self-help program previously. A well construction project is already underway.

Those activities having the most significant impact on the status of pacification were the increased RF/PF operations and intelligence collection efforts. When combined, these activities allow the populace to see local forces in action; many of the enemy's propaganda claims were deflated in July, and popular confidence in district forces was to a large extent regained. An increased number of informants provided timely intelligence which was acted upon immediately. The presence of a US Mobile Advisory Team also bolstered the morale of district forces.

3. (C) Problem Areas

Though many programs have been begun or revitalized, the hesitant attitude of district officials toward making corrections or improvements remains the most serious problem. There is no sense of expedience or commitment in making changes. Similarly, the inhabitants of QUE SON are often unwilling to participate in self-help programs, and bribery continues to be the determining factor in when projects begin.

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4. U District Chief: First Lieutenant NGUYEN CONG CHINH

*Franklin L. Donahoe*  
 FRANKLIN L. DONAHOE  
 Major Infantry  
 District Senior Advisor

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THUONG DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR JULY 1968  
(Enclosure (9) to RCS-ACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification in THUONG DUC has improved marginally during July as the district has finally recovered from the May offensive.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Despite the presence of USMC troops, Regional/Popular Forces fail to react to reliable intelligence information.

District and village officials continue to request payment for labor on self-help projects.

The local VIS office has recently become very active and is improving its facilities as well as disseminating information and propaganda more effectively.

Much local interest and participation have been generated by a program designed to improve the existing wells and road network within THUONG DUC.

The airfield has been reopened and, for the first time since April, imported food has arrived in large quantities for sale. This appears to have had an especially beneficial impact on the civilian population.

The bulk of the population living in two refugee villages which were destroyed during May has yet to receive building materials for reconstruction.

3. (C) Problem Areas

The District Chief desperately needs more qualified officers in his headquarters and RF company.

The advisory team at this location must be relocated from the Special Forces camp to the District Headquarters.

4. (U) District Chief: Major NGUYEN DINH KHAM

*David T. Jones*  
DAVID T. JONES  
Captain, Infantry  
District Senior Advisor

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DISPOSITION OF SELF-DEFENSE FORCES AS OF 31 JULY 1968  
(Enclosure (10) to RCS-RECORDS-01-67)

| TYPE FORCE            | STRENGTH | DISTRICT | VILLAGE    | HAMLET          |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|------------|-----------------|
| RDPG                  | 20 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Da     | Liem-Lac        |
| Combat Youth          | 10 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Thinh  | Thach-Nham      |
| Combat Youth          | 15 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Thinh  | Hoa-Khuong      |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 06 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Thinh  | Phuoc-Thai      |
| Combat Youth          | 20 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Thinh  | Fhu-Hoa         |
| RDPG                  | 45 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Long   |                 |
| Combat Youth          | 12 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Phuoc  | Giang-Nam       |
| RDPG                  | 24 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Phuoc  | Giang-Nam       |
| Combat Youth          | 24 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Phuoc  | Mieu-Bong       |
| RDPG                  | 52 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Khanh  | Phuoc-Thanh     |
| Combat Youth          | 28 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Khanh  | Phuoc-Quang     |
| Combat Youth          | 20 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Khanh  | Phuoc-Tan       |
| RDPG                  | 33 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Chau   | Quang-Chau      |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 32 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Minh   | Hoa-Ly          |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 37 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Minh   | Phuoc-Ly        |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 25 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Minh   | Trung-Nghia     |
| RDPG                  | 20 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Thanh  | An-Ngai         |
| RDPG                  | 10 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Thanh  | An-Ngai-Dong    |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 40 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Phat   | Nghi-An         |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 43 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Phat   | Phuoc-Tuong     |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 98 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Phat   | Hoa-An          |
| Combat Youth          | 25 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Phat   | Dong-Phuoc      |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 16 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Phat   | Dong-Phuoc      |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 63 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Cuong  | Khue-Trung      |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 40 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Cuong  | Khue-Trung 3, 4 |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 32 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Cuong  | Khue-Trung 5    |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 40 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Cuong  | Khue-Trung 2    |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 30 men   | Hoa-Vang | Hoa-Cuong  | Nai-Nam         |
| Combat Youth          | 13 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Loc    | Dai-Loc 1       |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 16 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Loc    | Dai-Loc 1       |
| Combat Youth          | 06 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Loc    | Dai-Loc 2       |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 25 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Loc    | Dai-Loc 2       |
| Combat Youth          | 02 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Loc    | Dien-Loc 1      |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 20 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Loc    | Dien-Loc 1      |
| Combat Youth          | 03 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Loc    | Dien-Loc 2      |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 23 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Loc    | Dien-Loc 2      |
| Combat Youth          | 12 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Hoa    | Phu-Coc         |
| Combat Youth          | 05 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Chau   | Khanh-Duc       |
| Combat Youth          | 03 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Thuong | Thanh-Phuoc     |
| Combat Youth          | 02 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Xuan   | Phuoc-Duc       |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 12 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Xuan   | Phuoc-Duc       |
| Combat Youth          | 06 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Xuan   | Xuan-Thuong     |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 24 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Xuan   | Xuan-Thuong     |
| Combat Youth          | 03 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Xuan   | Cang-Dong       |
| RDPG                  | 30 men   | Que-Son  | Son-Xuan   | Cang-Dong       |

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|                       |          |              |            |                   |
|-----------------------|----------|--------------|------------|-------------------|
| Combat Youth          | 06 men   | Que-Son      | Son-Thanh  | Cang-Tay 1        |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 08 men   | Que-Son      | Son-Thanh  | Cang-Tay 1        |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 24 men   | Que-Son      | Son-Thanh  | Cang-Tay 2        |
| Combat Youth          | 10 men   | Que-Son      | Son-Thanh  | Thuan-An          |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 77 men   | Que-Son      | Son-Thanh  | Thuan-An          |
| Combat Youth          | 25 men   | Que-Son      | Son-Thanh  | My-Dong           |
| Combat Youth          | 05 men   | Que-Son      | Son-Thanh  | Tam-Hoa           |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 22 men   | Que-Son      | Son-Lanh   | Lanh-Thuong       |
| Combat Youth          | 04 men   | Que-Son      | Phu-Huong  | Huong-Hoa         |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 20 men   | Que-Son      | Phu-Huong  | Huong-Hoa         |
| Combat Youth          | 07 men   | Que-Son      | Phu-Huong  | Huong-Que         |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 40 men   | Que-Son      | Phu-Huong  | Huong-Que         |
| Combat Youth          | 06 men   | Que-Son      | Phu-Huong  | Huong-Quang       |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 30 men   | Que-Son      | Phu-Huong  | Huong-Quang       |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 95 men   | Duy-Xuyen    | Xuyen-Kieu | Nam-Tra           |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 149 men  | Duy-Xuyen    | Xuyen-Hiep | Kieu-Son 1        |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 24 men   | Hieu-Nhon    | Hoi-An     | Hoi-An            |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 80 men   | Hieu-Nhon    | Hoi-An     | Tu-Le             |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 23 men   | Hieu-Nhon    | Hoi-An     | Son-Phong         |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 18 men   | Hieu-Nhon    | Hoi-An     | Trung-Gian        |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 66 men   | Hieu-Nhon    | Hoi-An     | Minh-Huong        |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 106 men  | Hieu-Nhon    | Hoi-An     | An-Hoi            |
| RDPG                  | 119 men  | Hieu-Nhon    | Hoi-An     | An-Hoi            |
| RDPG                  | 69 women | Hieu-Nhon    | Hoi-An     | An-Hoi            |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 28 men   | Hieu-Nhon    | Cam-Kim    | Vinh-Chau         |
| Combat Youth          | 06 men   | Hieu-Nhon    | Cam-Kim    | Ngoc-Thanh (camp) |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 115 men  | Hieu-Nhon    | Cam-Kim    | Ngoc-Thanh (camp) |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 58 men   | Hieu-Nhon    | Cam-Kim    | Ngoc-Thanh        |
| Civilian Self-Defense | unknown  | Hieu-Nhon    | Cam-Ha     | Thanh-Trung       |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 07 men   | Thuong-Duc   | Loc-Ninh   | Lien-Hiep         |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 12 men   | Thuong-Duc   | Loc-Ninh   | Dai-Hiep          |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 30 men   | Thuong-Duc   | Loc-Binh   | Dai-An            |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 18 men   | Thuong-Duc   | Loc-Binh   | Duc-Tay           |
| Combat Youth          | 19 men   | Thuong-Duc   | Loc-Binh   | Ha-Tan            |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 16 men   | Thuong-Duc   | Loc-Binh   | Phuoc-Bac         |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 22 men   | Thuong-Duc   | Loc-Vinh   | Dong-Phuoc        |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 08 men   | Thuong-Duc   | Loc-Vinh   | Duc-Tinh          |
| RDPG                  | 21 men   | Hieu-Duc     | Hoa-Hung   | Tuy-Loan          |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 25 men   | Hieu-Duc     | Hoa-Loc    | Tuy-Loan          |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 18 men   | Hieu-Duc     | Hoa-Loc    | Xuan-Loc          |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 12 men   | Hieu-Duc     | Hoa-Loc    | Phu-Ha            |
| Combat Youth          | 32 men   | Dien-Ban     | Vinh-Xuong | Vinh-Dien         |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 63 men   | Dien-Ban     | Vinh-Xuong | Vinh-Dien         |
| Combat Youth          | 11 men   | Dien-Ban     | Vinh-Xuong | Bong-Lai          |
| Combat Youth          | 08 men   | Dien-Ban     | Vinh-Phuoc | Dong-Khuong       |
| Combat Youth          | 12 men   | Duc-Duc      | Son-Khuong | Khuong-Binh       |
| Combat Youth          | 07 men   | Son-Phu Area | Phu-Huong  | Huong-Phu         |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 20 men   | Son-Phu Area | Phu-Huong  | Huong-Phu         |
| Combat Youth          | 07 men   | Son-Phu Area | Phu-Huong  | Huong-Que         |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 40 men   | Son-Phu Area | Phu-Huong  | Huong-Que         |
| Combat Youth          | 06 men   | Son-Phu Area | Phu-Huong  | Huong-Quang       |
| Civilian Self-Defense | 30 men   | Son-Phu Area | Phu-Huong  | Huong-Quang       |

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
 MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
 APO 96337

Date: 31 August 1968  
 AJP:ase

TO : Office of the Deputy to CCMUSMACV for GORDS, Saigon  
 VIA : Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, ICTZ  
 REF : (a) Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USAID/OEA Directive Number 4-67  
 (b) MACCORDS Notice Number 68-319 dated 18 April 1968

PROVINCE REPORT  
 (RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (03)

Period Ending 31 August 1968

1. (C/NF) OVERALL STATUS OF THE PACIFICATION EFFORT

With the resumption of coordinated enemy ground and fire attacks throughout Quang Nam Province, no progress was registered in the pacification of priority districts during August. While friendly military units and RD cadre teams successfully repelled a series of minor attacks and terrorist incidents early in the month, territorial security in DIEN BAN and HOA VANG Districts deteriorated dramatically after 22 August. Sustained attacks against ARVN installations, USMC CAP units, refugee camps and district towns signalled the beginning of a third enemy offensive which intelligence analysts expect to continue through early November.

The rapid, aggressive response of most friendly military units is credited with preventing large scale enemy penetration of DA NANG city, and with dispersing heavy concentrations of hostile forces surrounding the province capital of HOI AN. At the same time, the heavy loss of civilian life, massive destruction of property and recurring daylight attacks mounted on both sides of the DA NANG security barrier in DIEN BAN and HOA VANG Districts again allowed the enemy to discredit the effectiveness of Allied forces in the countryside, notably the 2d ROK Marine Brigade. Since 22 August, ROK forces have provided no serious challenge to the enemy attacks, and have limited their support of friendly defensive efforts almost exclusively to artillery fire missions. As a result, RD teams in DIEN BAN have been obliged to abandon their pacification activities completely and join with RF-PF units in the defense of the district town.

The tactical and psychological impact of the August attacks was less direct outside of DIEN BAN and HOA VANG Districts, and in areas protected by competent friendly units was dissipated almost immediately. The return of the 5th US Marine Regiment to DUC DUC District and the aggressive joint operations of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade with QUE SON District forces have greatly enhanced the

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security of those areas and allowed small scale pacification activities to proceed with less interference and more success than in much of the RD priority area.

The reaction of most GVN officials to the August attacks has been courageous and resourceful; by contrast to the period following the Tet offensive, normal administrative operations have not been interrupted, even in the two districts which sustained heavy damage to lines of communication and government offices. Due largely to the personal enthusiasm and continual pressure exerted by the Province Chief, LTC LE TRI TIN, district chiefs and technical service chiefs initiated recovery measures within 24 hours of the first major attacks. The province Social Welfare Service Chief, Mr. LE VAN THAI, for example, personally accompanied shipments of relief food to severely damaged BEN DA refugee camp in DIEN BAN District before enemy sappers had been completely driven from the surrounding hamlet. 10

As the attacks of February, May and August suggest, even such high standards of performance cannot generate permanent progress in pacification without corresponding gains in territorial security. Plainly, the forces charged with securing RD areas in QUANG NAM have been inadequate in number and enthusiasm. Since the arrival of BG LEE DONG HO as Commanding General of the 2d ROK Marine Brigade, there has been no appreciable change in the effectiveness of Korean units. ROK operations rarely reflect an appreciation of or dedication to the security mission of GVN and Free World Military Assistance Forces, and the response of Korean units to attacks during August gives little encouragement that their contribution to pacification in the province will ultimately be judged a positive one.

Quang Nam  
Aug 6

Cont p 3

## 2. PROJECT TAKEOFF

a. (U) Sub-Program I-3, Upgrade Refugee Care. The distribution of commodities and cash payments for Tet-related claims is 90% complete, and only small amounts of money, sheet roofing and cement remain to be carried to HIEU DUC, DUC DUC and DUY XUYEN Districts. Delivery of these final Project RECOVERY allotments was attempted during the last week of August, but hostile fire against trucks and aircraft at district receiving points obliged refugee officials to postpone distribution until security conditions improve.

In the HOA VANG district town, where over 350 houses were completely destroyed and another 100 partly damaged on 22 August, delivery of reconstruction materials has already begun. The District Chief, MAJ MAI XUAN HAU, has coordinated commodity requests closely with US district advisors, and drawn a timetable for completion of all rebuilding and repairs within 60 days of the date of destruction.

b. (U) Sub-Program III-2, Upgrade RVNAF Territorial Security Forces. Under the leadership of the Sector RF-PF Commander, LTC TRONG VAN LUONG, measurable improvements in the effectiveness of local forces were registered during August. In addition to visiting units which had not been inspected since before Tet, LTC LUONG planned and directed 8 joint operations during the month with such

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units as the 2/51 Infantry Regiment (ARVN), 1/14 RF Group and 2d Squadron/11th Cavalry. In the course of such operations, LTC LUONG gives instruction to two or more RF companies from each district concerned, stressing efficient and aggressive tactical procedures. More than once he has demonstrated great personal bravery in directing local unit commanders, and was also recommended for the Bronze Star with V device for his actions in saving the lives of 4 US Marines on 9 August. LTC LUONG has been able to impart the same aggressiveness to his company commanders, most notably in the 1/14 RF Group. Though formed barely three months ago, the unit has performed impressively in its search operations, and made contact with enemy forces in 9 of 16 such operations during August. In QUE SON District, the 321st and 743d RF Companies also received praise from US commanders for their aggressive actions in airmobile operations supported by the 2d Battalion/1st Infantry.

Though training has increased in the majority of units, classroom instruction rarely reaches six hours per week in any company. Two training teams held RD refresher courses for 4 RF companies in August, with special opening and closing ceremonies and enthusiastic support from senior staff officers at Quang Nam Sector. A seventh Mobile Advisory Team arrived during the month, and has been attached to the 706th RF Company on XUYEN LONG Island, long a staging point for enemy fire attacks against the province capital. The seven MATs are currently short one team leader and one weapons sergeant; in addition, two officers are scheduled to depart the first week in September.

c. (C) Sub-Program III-4, Improve Collection and Use of Intelligence on Enemy Guerrilla and Local Force Units. Since the assignment of Aspirant HUYNH DUOC as leader of the Sector Intelligence Platoon, the group has made a substantial contribution to the overall intelligence effort of the province. Formerly a squad leader in the 2d ARVN Division, Aspirant DUOC has regularly led the platoon on verification missions in response to agent reports from rural areas. On 6 August, the platoon assisted Sector forces following heavy contact with a VC battalion; moving into the area immediately after the battle, Aspirant DUOC's men were able to determine precisely which enemy units had been involved, and also uncovered 50 previously unseen enemy bodies.

### 3. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL

(C/NE) General. As reported by district chiefs, political leaders and technical service cadre, the newest enemy offensive has confirmed popular suspicions that existing friendly forces can no longer assure the security of district towns, RD hamlets and refugee camps. Since mid-August, when a USMC CAP unit adjacent to HIEU NHON District Headquarters was overrun, the number of civilians deserting rural hamlets for the province capital or DA NANG has increased steadily. According to the District Chairman of the VNQDD party in DIEN BAN, who himself left the district town following the attacks of 22 August, victims of the current offensive bitterly condemn Korean forces for abandoning the town to enemy terrorists. Following renewed ground and fire attacks in the area on 30 and 31 August, an estimated 2000 refugees fled over ten kilometers from DIEN BAN to HOI AN by foot. Many civil servants and military officers in the province capital itself have evacuated their families to DA NANG. US advisors have noted

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that the morale and preparedness of the few friendly units protecting HOI AN have been undermined by heavy casualties, successive nights of full alert followed by days of sweep operations, and lack of sufficient rest or equipment maintenance periods.

Enemy propaganda continues to discredit the efforts of US negotiators in Paris, but has not discussed the question of peace as related to either recent political convention in the United States. Political leaders in HOI AN have drawn little encouragement from the polemic surrounding the conventions; following a BBC report of Vice President Humphrey's acceptance speech on 31 August, the chairman of the VNQDD Youth Group (VHK faction) remarked that neither nominee has dispelled the general fear that an unacceptable settlement of the war will be imposed on the GVN.

b. (U) VIS. VIS activity during August focused on preparations for the province by-election scheduled next month. Meetings have been held in HOI AN and the district towns to explain voting procedures, and the same information has been made available in special leaflets and banners.

VIS participation in the activities of province and district People's Self-Defense Committees has included lectures on the psyops role of self-defense groups and publicity of the Self-Defense Month program announced by President THIEU.

c. (G) Election Activities. Of the eleven candidates who have registered for the by-election of 8 September, political leaders in HOI AN consider only four to be serious contenders for Quang Nam's vacant Lower House seat. Mr. TRUONG DINH DAM (VU THUY), Chairman of the Quang Nam-Da Nang CVT labor union, is most frequently mentioned as winner; Mr. BUU UNG, a civil servant, is believed to have strong support among Buddhists and voters in QUE SON District, despite his poor record as assistant district chief there; Messrs. PHAN LAI and HO CONG THUONG have received backing from the VHK faction of the VNQDD. According to the Secretary General of the Quang Nam CVT, Mr. DAM's popularity stems from a dedication to social rather than political ideals, and from the desire of union members to seat such a man alongside the province's two "partisan" delegates in the National Assembly. VNQDD Ky Bo faction members are less convinced of Mr. DAM's political neutrality, especially in light of his rumored association with that faction in the past.

Because the number of registered voters in six districts is significantly lower than at the time of the last general election, the Province Chief has monitored the preparation of new village voter lists and the distribution of voter cards and ballots with extreme care. The reduced number of voters reflects the general decline of security in the countryside, and is partly balanced by the increased number of registrants in HOI AN and in HOA VANG District.

The Sector S-3 and all district chiefs have been charged with coordinating security plans and sweep operations near polling sites; despite these precautions, the Province Chief expects that approximately 100 voters will be wounded or killed during the election week. One request for postponement of the election was denied

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by the Ministry of the Interior, though it is rumored that LtGen LAM will personally request a delay until heavy enemy activity subsides.

d. (U) Minorities, Political and Religious Groups. Province officials have endorsed a plan for VNQDD support of the by-election through surveillance of polling places in all districts. Though unarmed, party cadre will assist voters from rural areas in finding polling stations, and will report any irregularity in the conduct of the election and any security hazards to National Police representatives at district headquarters. A VNQDD representative predicted that voter turnout will be 30%-40% lower than in the last election as the threat of enemy interference is now greater.

#### 4. SECURITY

a. (C) General. Enemy activity continued to increase in Quang Nam during the month, and was highlighted by initiation of the "X-3 offensive" on 22 August. Coordinated ground attacks supported by indirect fire began in the early evening hours of that day and did not lessen in intensity until 24 August. Various sources indicate that the third general offensive consists of 5 sub-phases, X-1 through X-5, and will continue until early November. Aggressive counterattacks by ARVN and US forces may well have undermined sub-phase X-3 by forcing trapped units to fight and obliging reserve forces to stage in vulnerable areas.

b. (C) Enemy Situation. The enemy's order of battle includes all units reported last month. Documents captured in THUONG BUC raise the possibility that the 21st NVA Regiment is present in that district. Some sources have indicated that Group 44 will receive support from Military Region 5 in the form of at least two regiments to participate in the offensive. A Hoi Chanh stated further that the 38th Regiment headquarters has been disbanded and that the R-20, V-25 and 3d Quang Da Battalions are once again under the direct control of Group 44.

Though only 30%-40% of forces controlled by Group 44 have been committed to date, the remaining forces are capable of launching offensive action in 6 hours or less. Construction and repair work on Highways 614 and 14 indicate the presence of a sizeable enemy force, probably two regiments or more, in western Quang Nam. While this force could be committed to a combat role, it will probably continue the priority task of completing the roads.

Having initiated an offensive of fairly long duration, the enemy will probably attempt to inflict major damage on DA NANG city and to defeat in detail those Allied units in HIEU NHON and DIEN BAN Districts, with a final objective of occupying or destroying the province capital of HOI AN. His chances of success are slim and depend upon the strategic and tactical competence of Military Region 5 Headquarters in the employment of available reserve forces. The enemy will most probably continue interdiction of Allied lines of communication in the hope of drawing friendly reaction forces into terrain favorable to him.

c. (C) Friendly Situation. Five major operations were conducted by the 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN) in HOA VANG and DIEN BAN Districts during the period 19-26 August, resulting in 553 enemy KIA. In the HUNG QUANG II area (HIEU NHON District), elements of the same regiment killed 131 enemy soldiers during August.

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US Marine units continued Operation HAMELUXE THRUST, which has accounted for 911 NVA KIA, 748 VC KIA and 183 US KIA to date. On the morning of 20 August, a VC platoon overran USMC CAP Unit 2-4-3 in HIEU NHON District, killing 11 US personnel and 4 PF; 8 enemy died in the action.

In the village of SON TRUNG, QUE SON District, the 2/1st Infantry, Americal Division, conducted Operation HAWK NEST with 2 RF and 2 PF platoons. Over 800 pounds of rice were confiscated along with 18 81mm mortar rounds and a number of documents. In Operation WHEELER-WALLOWA, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade had killed 356 VC and captured 436 suspects by the end of August.

All district headquarters in the province have come under mortar attack during the month.

#### 5. ECONOMICS

a. (C/NF) General. Planning for rice denial operations to be carried out in HIEU DUC, HOA VANG and DIEN BAN Districts during the September harvest is nearly complete. Harvesting has already begun on a small scale without the benefit of friendly troop protection; fewer than 10 hectares of rice were cut during August, with no reported incidents of enemy interference.

Mr. PHAN THIEP, Lower House delegate from Quang Nam, has received complaints from constituents in the MOC BAI Vital Area (QUE SON District) that rice prices in local markets exceed the official ceiling. Similar reports were heard in THUONG DUC District, where US advisors have begun to document claims of price fixing on the part of the district chief.

National Police and Census Grievance sources have reported the sale of rice and canned goods by Korean troops to enemy agents in DIEN BAN, HOA VANG and DUY XUYEN Districts. The major points of sale allegedly include the VINH DIEN bus station in DIEN BAN, the HIEU BONG and CAM LE markets in HOA VANG District, and the central market of HOI AN. The Commanding General, 2d ROK Marine Brigade, is aware of these reports and has requested district officials and US advisors to provide specific information on such activity in order to initiate disciplinary action and the deportation of violators to Korea.

b. (C) Material Resources and Transportation. Enemy attacks against bridges along National Route 1 closed the road to all traffic for periods of up to three days after 22 August. Particularly in DIEN BAN District, where the VINH DIEN Bridge has received over 600 rounds of mortar fire, commercial trucks and busses linking DA NANG and HOI AN have been turned back to their points of origin by hostile fire. Except in THUONG DUC, no food shortages in district markets have yet been reported. Demands for construction materials in HOI AN are being met from local stocks. Transportation to DUC DUC District was interrupted late in the month, making delivery of refugee relief commodities impossible. Road travel to THUONG DUC is no longer possible, and district airstrip remains closed.

#### 6. REQUIRED ACTIONS

a. Project TAKEOFF Actions. None.

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b. Other Actions

(1) (U) The security of the CORDS civilian advisors' compound in HOI AN has been seriously jeopardized for over two months by the lack of a replacement part for one of the two 40kw generators which power its perimeter lights. Until a new voltage regulator is received there is no alternative to continued use of the remaining generator, for which two overhaul deadlines have already passed. CORDS/GSO/III LAF has sent several substitute parts, none of which could be adapted for use on the disabled generator. The part has now been requested from Saigon, and it is urged that responsible officers there procure and forward a replacement without further delay. Action on this request will have a direct bearing on the security of US lives and property in a province where American civilian compounds have come under heavy enemy attack twice since Tet.

9 Encl  
 (1-9) District Senior  
 Advisors' Reports

*Frank W. Dixon*  
 FRANK W. DIXON  
 LTC ARTY  
 Acting Province Senior Advisor

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DAI LOC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR AUGUST 1968  
(Enclosure (1) to RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification in the district has continued to advance. Schools have been opened on schedule and crops are being harvested. GVN control has been more effectively extended with the return of DAI LOC's second Regional Force company from the training center.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

Progress has continued thanks to the favorable attitude of the new District Chief and his influence on other district officials.

Since the opening of school, almost 2000 school kits have been distributed along with blackboards and funds for school facility improvements. MEDCAPs by local US Marine units have been expanded into two new areas while old areas continue to be visited.


Psychological warfare teams again visited the district this month, and civic action building projects are progressing satisfactorily.

3/7 US Marines and Combined Action Platoons in the district continue to assist in the pacification effort.

3. (U) Problem Areas

Security for the entire District remains a problem, as well as the lack of sufficient numbers of teachers, doctors, and other skilled personnel.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ NGUYEN VAN KE

  
KENNETH E. SHORT  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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DIEN BAN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR AUGUST 1968  
(Enclosure (2) to RCS-MAGGORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been a definite regression in the level of pacification in DIEN BAN District during the month of August. Again, as last month, this is due to the increase of enemy activity in the district.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. On 5 August 1968, a MHSWR Mobile Refugee Team headed by DENNIS MC BREEN, arrived at DIEN BAN. This team worked in KIM THANH, PHU CU and LAN SON Refugee Camps, where improvements were made in drainage and wells; plans were submitted for new latrines. Work was started to rebuild an old pagoda in the camp for use as a school house. Plans were initiated for the rebuilding of PHU CU Refugee Camp, which was destroyed on 7 November 1967. These plans had to be abandoned again because of increased VC activities in the camp area.

b. There were many Viet Cong initiated incidents in DIEN BAN during the month of August. There was major contact on 6 August when the enemy struck several areas leaving 11 civilians dead and 14 wounded. The RD teams were also hit at the same time. This attack left over 50 homes destroyed. Many smaller incidents occurred during the remainder of the month, including attacks on RD Teams, RF and PF locations, the District Headquarters and surrounding hamlets. On 23 August a large Viet Cong offensive began and is still in progress. The BEN DA Refugee Camp was destroyed leaving over 4000 refugees homeless. Many other homes have been destroyed, resulting in countless new refugees. The district town, VINH DIEN, has been mortared and has been receiving small arms fire since 23 August. The RF/PF and RD Teams of DIEN BAN have had many contacts with the enemy.


c. RD Teams throughout the district have been forced to spend the majority of their time on defensive operations rather than on pacification activities during the month of August.

3. (C) Problem Areas

a. It is clear that the overriding problem in DIEN BAN District is the lack of security for the people. A worthwhile pacification program can not be started without giving the people better security. The presence of a large and effective reaction force would greatly enhance the security of the district.

b. When security can be provided, the extended use of Mobile Refugee Teams would be very beneficial and would help eliminate many refugee problems.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ HOANG TRUNG

  
RICHARD B TIPTON  
1LT ARM  
Assistant District Advisor

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DUC DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR AUGUST 1968  
(Enclosure (3) to RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been a slight improvement in the status of pacification within DUC DUC District during the month of August 1968.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. Extensive operations by elements of the 5th US Marine Regiment have greatly increased the security of the northern portion of the district. Concurrently CIDG operations in the south have kept the VC off balance and have prevented any major enemy activity during the month. The improved security situation has allowed one CAP unit closed during the TET offensive to be scheduled for reopening, and plans have been made to open a second CAP unit soon.

b. The presence of 5th US Marine Regiment at AN HOA is continuing to have a favorable effect on the district. New jobs are being created, civic action teams are active, and civil-military relations in general are good. Isolated incidents of civilians being wounded or killed as a result of USMC operations have been dealt with effectively by Marine S5 personnel.


c. Training of PF platoons by a US Marine Mobile Training Team commenced on 26 August. Enthusiasm for the training is high and the program is being fully supported by District officials.

3. (C) Problem Areas

a. Black market supplies continue to move into the district at a heavy rate. The District Chief states that he disapproves of black market activities but will not confiscate the goods. / 26

b. There is increasing evidence that food supplies are moving through the district to the Viet Cong. Trucks carrying large shipments of food are entering the district with Marine convoys using passes signed by Vietnamese officers from HOI AN. These passes for the most part have not been countersigned by the US Province Senior Advisor, as was agreed, yet the District Chief is afraid to take any action due to the high-rank of the officer who is signing in HOI AN. / 26

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ DANG VAN TRIEM

  
 BERNARD W. GRATZER  
 MAJ ARTY  
 District Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL -- NO FORN

DUY XUYEN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR AUGUST 1968  
(Enclosure (4) to RCS-ACCORDS-01-67)

1. (U) There is presently no advisory team assigned to DU Y XUYEN District.
2. (U) District Chief: MAJ CAO DIEN

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HIEU DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR AUGUST 1968  
(Enclosure (5) to RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been little change in the level of pacification in this district during August. Increased activity by guerrillas and main force VC against RF/PF outposts has again shown the population that enemy forces can strike and hide at will without quick reaction or retaliation by GVN forces.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification


a. Despite the presence of a recently assigned PRU Team and the successful elimination of a few members of the infrastructure by USMC CIT personnel, indications lead us to believe that all captured VC cadre were replaced rapidly.

b. Inaccurate mortar and artillery fire by USMC support units and CAP elements again resulted in civilian casualties, losses of livestock and the destruction of homes. Fire missions not cleared through MACV channels have brought similar mishaps; hopefully, continuing liaison between MACV and USMC units will remedy this situation.

c. This district received two HOI CHANH during August, and propaganda exploitations of these returnees has brought renewed emphasis to the CHIEU HOI Program.

3. (U) Problem Areas

Construction of the DA MANG rocket barrier through HIEU DUC District has displaced approximately 180 families from their former dwellings. Most of these people are currently living with families in nearby hamlets within the barrier perimeter, though a few families are constructing shelters dangerously close to the barrier on the outside of the perimeter. The District Chief has been encouraged to apprise displaced families of claim procedures, and has been offered aid in forwarding claims or requests for money and materials through higher headquarters. To date, no apparent aid or relief by GVN authorities has been offered or given to any of the displaced families.

4. (U) District Chief: CPT NGUYEN VAN THUAN

HARRY R. HAWKINS  
MAJ ARTY  
District Senior Advisor

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HIEU NHON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR AUGUST 1968  
 (Enclosure (6) to RCS-MAGCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

During the month of August a new District Senior Advisor assumed command of the advisory team.

The GVN exercises effective control both day and night in a limited band extending north and south along Highway 539 several hundred meters; the eastern limit of this band is at District Headquarters (BT 163575). The western limit is the DIEN BAN District. The GVN also controls the majority of CAM NAM Island, PHUOC TRACH Hamlet and the area adjacent to Junk Fleet. The GVN exercises control over the area from District Headquarters to PHUOC TRACH during daylight hours and over about 70% of the area at night. The pacification effort within the district suffered several setbacks during the month as a result of attacks on 20, 23 and 26 August. On 20 August Combined Action Platoon S-3 was attacked and destroyed by an estimated VC/NVA Company. The TAN THANH Bridge on Highway 538 was destroyed 26 Aug. The city of Hoi An was mortared on 23 and 26 August, causing damage to personnel and property.


2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

The enemy retains his capability to strike anywhere in the district with units of battalion size or larger. The assignment of MAT Team 7 to the district will improve the training and effectiveness of RF/PT units. MEDCAPs by ARVN, GVN and German Malteser Health Service continue to spearhead public health efforts in the district. Supply efforts for refugee camps have shown a definite increase during the month.

3. (C) Problem Areas

No construction on the last 250 units at THANH TAY Refugee Camp was carried out during August. The most pressing problem in the pacification effort is the lack of security.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ VO VAN SANG

  
 JAMES B. BLACK  
 CPT INF  
 District Senior Advisor

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CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

HOA VANG DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR AUGUST 1968  
 (Enclosure (7) To RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Nation-building program continued apace with some visible progress in the training of RD Peoples Self-Defense Groups and agricultural projects until the district-wide VC/NVA attacks during the early morning hours of 23 August. Since that date the attention of the Advisory Team and district officials has focused on meeting emergency needs and reconstruction planning requirements generated by the attacks.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification


a. Miss DAO THIN DUONG was hired on August 10 as the district first 4-T worker. She will work under the supervision of the district CORDS Agricultural Advisor.

b. The HA THANH Dam, a joint GVN-USMC civic action project, was officially dedicated and put into operation at a ceremony held on August 20. Generals LAN, CUSHMAN, and YOUNGDALE, province and district officials, and representatives of the five villages affected by the dam were in attendance.

c. At 0345 hours 23 August the V-4 VC Company from the T-89 Sapper Battalion and the C-4 and C-5 Companies from what is believed to be the D-2 Bn of the 360 Rgt attacked District Headquarters and Task Force Kilo (3 USMC and 3 ARVN Ranger platoons) with small arms, mortars, and B-40 rockets. The task force had been deployed in CAM LE Hamlet (district town) at 2200 hours on 22 August in response to intelligence received at I Corps that an attack could be expected at that location. Although property damage was extensive (350 houses 100% destroyed along with the Advisory Team's office, supply room, and dispensary) friendly casualties were light. The Advisory Team had 1 KIA and 1 WIA, while the FF in the District Headquarters compound had 3 KIA and 15 WIA. Enemy losses were placed at 155 VC and NVA KIA.

d. Between 0200 and 0430 hours on 23 August, the enemy initiated the following additional attacks of note at other locations in the district: 37th Army Engineer Compound - 37 60mm mortar rounds; 1st Air Cav Helio Pad - 103 82mm mortar rounds; DAPANG Air Base - 13 122mm rocket rounds; China Beach Special Forces Camp - platoon-sized ground attack; CAM LE Bridge - reinforced platoon-size ground attack; and CAU DO Bridge - 60 rounds of mortar fire. Damage in general is believed to have been light but the enemy did inflict relatively heavy casualties at the Special Forces Camp and held the CAM LE Bridge (southern end) for ten hours.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ MAI XUAN HAU

  
 FREDERICK D. ELFERS  
 FSO-5  
 District Senior Advisor

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QUE SON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR AUGUST 1968  
(Enclosure (8) to RCS-MAGCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification activity within QUE SON District remained unchanged during August. Work in all areas was continuous yet slow; the enemy-initiated attacks on 24 and 25 August had little or no bearing on the status of pacification in the district.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Because of the increase in both friendly and enemy activities, some 723 refugees had to be resettled within the district. Efforts were made to resettle these displaced people as quickly as possible but were retarded because of the lack of food, living space and other accommodations. Assistance has been requested from the American units in the district as well as from Sector.

Militarily, the district forces have graduated to the stage where they are capable of carrying out effective large scale operations. These units have received much praise from FVMAF because of their endurance, aggressiveness and competence. The local populace has continued to gain confidence in the Regional and Popular Forces. Even the attacks and virtual annihilation of a joint Vietnamese-American outpost did not undermine this confidence.


Partial credit for this confidence can be given to the Vietnamese Information Service. VIS continually disseminates information and propaganda to the people.

The local informant program continued to be successful during August. Mining incidents have decreased because of information being received from the local population and paid informers.

3. (C) Problem Areas

Still the greatest obstacle to the pacification effort is the slowness with which district officials act and react. Secondly, with the increase of refugees, additional requirements are created for security, food and shelter. District officials can use assistance from all agencies. Thirdly, the District Chief can use most effectively an Assistant District Chief for Military Affairs.

4. (U) District Chief: 1LT NGUYEN CONG CHINH

  
FRANKLIN L. DONAHOE  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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THOUNG DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR AUGUST 1968  
(Enclosure (9) to RCS-MAACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification seems to have taken a leap forward during August. The civilian population appears to have become united to accomplish several projects.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Overt enemy activity has been negligible, and the DIOCC is getting more accurate and timely intelligence.

The local Vietnamese Information Service has been operating in an impressive and effective manner. More newspapers, magazines and movies are being made available to the civilian populace. In addition, the VIS office itself has been cleaned up and now presents an attractive and comfortable appearance.

Again as in previous months, the Regional/Popular Forces tend to avoid those areas within their TAOR suspected of having enemy units.

An indigenous CA/PSYOPS team spent five very busy days passing out literature and conducting loudspeaker broadcasts.

All US Marine elements have withdrawn from THOUNG DUC. This action has created an undesirable psychological situation with regard to security. In addition, two bridges and numerous culverts were destroyed by US Marine tracked vehicles, increasing the local drainage and transportation problems.

3. (C) Problem Areas

Regional/Popular Forces must be made to seek out and engage local guerrilla units.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ NGUYEN DINH KHAM

*David T. Jones*  
DAVID T. JONES  
CPT INF  
District Senior Advisor

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
 MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
 APO 96337

Date: 30 September 1968  
 AJP:BAK:ase

TO : Office of the Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, Saigon  
 VIA : Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, ICTZ  
 REF : (a) Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USAID/OSA Directive Number 4-67  
 (b) MACCORDS Notice Number 68-319 dated 18 April 1968  
 (c) MACCORDS-OAD/R Memorandum dated 26 August 1968

PROVINCE REPORT  
 (RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (03)

Period Ending 30 September 1968

1. (C/NF) OVERALL STATUS OF THE PACIFICATION EFFORT

Because the material and manpower resources of Quang Nam Province were diverted to reconstruction and rice denial operations during September, pacification activity did not increase in pace or effectiveness. In the priority RD districts of HOA VANG and DIEM BAN, enemy attacks begun in late August were decisively repelled by the first week of September, though not without heavy damage to civilian property. Among those killed in the clearing operation was the DIEM BAN District Chief, whose temporary replacement has undertaken relief and reconstruction activities with less enthusiasm than his dynamic colleague in neighboring HOA VANG.

As neither RF-PF nor 2d ROK Marine Brigade units are by themselves equal to the continuing enemy challenge in DIEM BAN, the Province Chief was obliged at mid-month to move the 2d Battalion/51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN) to permanent positions near the district town. This move has left one-third of the 1968 RD area without direct ARVN support; HOI AN and surrounding outposts and refugee camps in HIEU NHON District are now protected only by RF-PF units. Enemy probes and fire attacks against district towns in THONG DUC, HIEU DUC and HOA VANG further contributed to the overall decline in security. Frequent mining and ambush incidents disrupted road traffic between DA NANG and the province capital for periods of up to 12 hours through the end of the month.

Personnel changes in the Province Phung Hoang Office resulted in improved coordination among participating agencies and in an increased number of infrastructure arrests during September. Even in DIEM BAN District, where DIOCC activity was severely curtailed by enemy attacks in August, targeting efforts against the infrastructure were revived and effectively supported by a Provincial Reconnaissance Unit under operational control of the District Chief. RD cadre teams in the same area have had less success in reversing the tactical and psychological gains of the enemy. Preoccupied with cleanup activities by day and security operations by night, teams deployed along National Route 1 have all but abandoned normal pacification efforts.

As a result of the deterioration of territorial security in central Quang Nam during 1968, planning for the 1969 RD Program will give special emphasis to the outer defenses of DA NANG City. Though a greater concentration of forces along the DA NANG security barrier seems inevitable, the Province Chief and US advisors agree that at least half of Quang Nam's RD teams must remain deployed near lines of communication between the barrier and province capital. Because

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no new cadre teams can be formed from available or projected manpower resources, those teams positioned south of the barrier will be hard-pressed to maintain Government presence without a substantial increase in regular military support forces. Lacking assurances that such an increase is planned, province officials, political leaders and RD cadre have already expressed serious doubts concerning the stability of US commitments in I Corps during the coming year.

## 2. PRIORITY PACIFICATION PROGRAMS

a. (C) Territorial Security. Security in Quang Nam Province has deteriorated slightly since August. Enemy attempts to occupy DIEN BAN District Headquarters were blunted by aggressive NVA operations, and by 3 September, enemy units were forced to break contact and withdraw. Throughout the month attacks by fire maintained moderate pressure on THOUH DUC District Headquarters; the enemy launched intensive recoilless rifle and 82mm mortar barrages in an attempt to restrict RF-PF and CIDG forces to their compounds. Land lines of communication were interdicted throughout the month with little lasting effect. Civilian casualties in September were 55 killed, 195 wounded and 2 missing; RF-PF forces operating in support of pacification sustained 32 killed, 95 wounded and 3 missing, and themselves killed 37 enemy. Property damage outside of DIEN BAN and HOA VANG Districts was light, with 20 houses and 10 boats destroyed.

(1) (C) Enemy Situation. During the early morning hours of 21 September, an estimated 2 VC companies attacked the HOA Industrial Complex and airbase in DUC DUC District. The attack was supported by a 100 round mortar preparation and B-40 fire, and resulted in 13 friendly killed and 26 wounded. The enemy force withdrew before first light and repairs were begun immediately. On 22 September the enemy launched coordinated attacks on DA VANG, HOI AN and the district headquarters of DIEN BAN, HIEU DUC, HIEU PHON and HOA VANG. These attacks were on a much smaller scale than those of 23 August, with enemy forces limited to company size or smaller. Intelligence received during the month indicates continuing pressure against population and economic centers by local force elements in support of rice harvesting, tax collection and communist elections, while major NVA units have missions of countering friendly clearing operations. The enemy shows no willingness to risk the defeat of his major forces in detail in an all-out offensive, but can be expected to use his local forces in coordinated attacks supported by NVA units to force territorial security forces back to protect population centers, thereby reducing the areas in which GVN influence is dominant.

(2) (C/NF) Friendly Situation. Quang Nam Sector conducted six operations in September, two more than in the previous month. Operations PHI PHUNG 122 and 125 resulted in 95 VC KIA and 75 VC RWL, against friendly losses of 10 KIA and 26 WIA. Both operations were conducted in DIEN BAN District by the 2/51 Infantry Regiment, deployed there following enemy attacks in August, and by the 4/14 RF Group. Other battalions of the 51st Regiment joined NVA Ranger and USMC units operating in DIEN BAN and HOA VANG Districts. Two of these operations, HUNG QUANG I-70 and I-71, accounted for 425 enemy KIA. In Operation VICTORY DRAGON II, Korean Marine forces reported 119 enemy dead. Small unit (company size or below) actions increased in number during September, and resulted in 254 enemy killed. The results of current rice denial operations conducted by units of the US 1st Marine Division and RF-PF have yet to be reported.

The major problem of command relationships within the province has been inadequate support by ROK Marine commanders for GVN programs. The resulting

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frictions, particularly between the commander of the 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN) and Commanding General, 2d ROI Marine Brigade, led to a serious erosion of cooperative spirit during September. Together with the Province Chief, US advisors made an extraordinary effort to reduce this antagonism, and a slight improvement in ROK performance has been noted.

(3) (C) Status of RF-PF. With the departure of the 2/51 Infantry Regiment (ARVN) from LOI MI, RF-PF have assumed principal responsibility for defense of the province capital. The 1/14 RF Group was reorganized for this purpose in September, and 2 additional RF companies were assigned to the total defense force.

The 1/14 RF Group fought bravely and effectively in fierce house-to-house combat in the DIEN BAN district town early in the month. No instances of RF or PF troops abandoning their posts were reported. Two companies completed RD refresher training in September and one company, the 467th, began the course.

b. (C) Phoenix/Phung Hoang. With the appointment of a new Standing Secretary of the Province Phung Hoang Office, counter-infrastructure efforts in Quang Nam gained slight momentum. Arrests by the DIOCC and Special Police increased in HIEU NHON District, and presently average one VCI per day. RD cadre have been responsible for the elimination of 1 VC village chief, an assassination team leader and a deputy commander in September. DIEN BAN, DUC DUC, DAI LOC and HIEU DUC Districts have active FNU teams under operational control of the district chiefs, and all DIOCC's received new motorbikes during the month.

Since the removal of regular ARVN forces from the province capital, Quang Nam Sector commanders have been hesitant to release National Police Field Forces (NFFF) for joint operations with friendly units. Two squads of NFFF are presently co-located with units of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade in QUE SON District, and the Province Chief has agreed in principle that more NFFF should be dispatched to the field despite the objection of company commanders.

c. (U) Improved Local Government. A two-week administration course was completed by 36 village and hamlet officials during September. One direct result of such courses is already clear: self-help projects administered by trained officials are well planned and skillfully implemented, and there has been an overall increase in project requests during the past few months.

The Deputy Province Chief for Administration, Mr. NGUYEN TAO, formally retired after 26 years of government service and was replaced by Mr. NGUYEN XUAN, a graduate of the National Institute of Administration and former district chief in Kontum Province. Mr. TAO leaves an enviable record of efficient and honest performance, and will be remembered particularly for his leadership of the civil servants' militia and assistance to the Province Recovery Committee following the Tet offensive.

d. (C/RF) Self-Defense. The number and effectiveness of people's self-defense groups did not increase significantly during September. Only 30 of the 931 weapons newly requisitioned for the program were issued, bringing the total number of arms now in the hands of self-defense forces to just under 1000. No training of new groups was initiated, though RD cadre teams completed training of 60 new people's group personnel. Despite recent assurances of support for the immediate arming of trained groups, the First Area Logistics Command has yet to release some 500 weapons

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approved for issue by the GVN. It is likely that rivalries among and within local political parties continue to discourage officials in DA NANG from releasing large numbers of weapons in Quang Nam.

e. (C/NF) Revolutionary Development and Self-Help. Because the effectiveness of cadre teams in two of the three priority districts is severely undermined by poor security along National Route 1, the 1968 RD Plan remains far from satisfactory completion. In DIEN BAN District, team locations have become the outermost line of defense not only for RF-PF units, but also for the notoriously inactive 2d ROK Marine Brigade. In HOA VANG District, teams are understrength and poorly disciplined; during one recent hamlet inspection, US advisors found only 25 cadre present on a team rated at 48 men by the RD Control Group Headquarters. Such inaccurate statistics and unreported absences reflect the poor relationship between civilian team leaders and the inter-group leader, an ARVN aspirant who commands neither the political loyalty nor professional respect of his subordinates.

The security and performance of teams in HIEU NHON District are markedly better; cadre leaders enjoy good rapport with most friendly unit commanders and pursue intelligence and counter-infrastructure activities more easily and regularly than their colleagues in other districts. By contrast to DIEN BAN, a few self-help projects have been initiated and successfully defended by cadre in HIEU NHON.

In an effort to revive pacification activity in HOA VANG District, US advisors presented detailed briefings on the RD program to staff officers of the 1st US Marine Regiment during September. Regimental S-2 and S-5 officers have been introduced to all cadre team leaders in the district, and each battalion has agreed to assign one Marine to work exclusively with RD teams in its area of responsibility. Information on enemy order of battle, intelligence, black market activity and weapons caches will be collected daily and passed to battalion S-2 and S-5 officers, who in turn will integrate their intelligence and civic action efforts with the cadre pacification program. With US Marine assistance, cadre training in medical care, self-defense, intelligence and military tactics can be rapidly upgraded at the village level; as a first cooperative venture, RD cadre and US Marines have established an identity card checkpoint in an area serving several hamlets of HOA VANG.

A total of 270 self-help projects have been completed to date in this fiscal year. Though less than half of the 9.3 million piastres allocated for self-help has been released, projects initiated since June reflect better planning and more popular participation than was evident in the past. In the 12 projects completed during September, popular contributions in labor and materials approached one quarter million piastres in value. Seven of these projects were in Ap Doi Moi.

f. (C) Economic Revival. Erection of the DA NANG security barrier and continued military operations in all districts have further decreased the available fertile acreage farmed under GVN control. Though not all dispossessed farmers share in it, increased production resulting from the use of fertilizers, pesticides and IR-8 rice seed has almost neutralized the loss. American rice is imported from DA NANG at the rate of 3,800 tons per month; rice prices remained steady during September in all markets but those of THUONG DUC District, which cannot be supplied by road.

Over 700 tons of fish were caught and marketed during the month, an increase of fully one-third over the pre-Tet level. Further development of the fishing industry is hampered by strict waterways control measures, especially in HIEU NHON District.

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As a result there has been little increase in new boat construction; in September the increase was one half of one per cent.

g. (U) Resettlement and Care of Refugees. With the completion of Tet-related claims payments under Project RECOVERY, the Quang Nam Refugee Service has initiated a major program of resettlement and improved general services. Refugee Service cadre are presently completing smaller resettlement programs initiated by former Service chiefs, and are basing plans for the new program on fresh statistics from the field. These plans include a vocational training center in HOA VANG District for which material has already been requisitioned from the province government. The center will receive continuing financial support from the World Relief Commission, which has already compiled a list of teachers and administrators to be employed; US Navy Seabees have agreed to begin construction once materials are approved and released.

h. (C) National Reconciliation and Chicou Hoi. Hoi Chanh input continued sluggish through September, partly because the security of the Chicou Hoi Center was disproved in recent enemy attacks. Despite continued advisory efforts to upgrade the Center's defenses, its proximity to unprotected refugee camps makes it a frequent secondary target of enemy sappers. Until the lethargic Chicou Hoi Service Chief is removed, it is unlikely that adequate remedial measures will be initiated from the GVN side.

Well over half of the authorized personnel for Quang Nam's two Armed Propaganda Teams have received confirmed Ministry appointments. At the same time, substandard weapons, inadequate ammunition and lack of broadcast equipment limit the teams' effectiveness.

Funds have been allocated for the construction of four temporary reception centers at district level, and for an additional Chicou Hoi hamlet to accommodate the families of 100 Hoi Chanh. To speed construction of the reception facilities, the province Public Works Service is basing materials estimates on standard 1967 plans for school buildings, which can be easily adapted to Chicou Hoi use.

### 3. REQUIRED ACTIONS

None.

*Warren E. Parker*  
WARREN E. PARKER  
Province Senior Advisor

9 Encl.  
(1-9) District Senior Advisors' Reports

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DAI LOC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure (1) to NCS-REGCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification this month again showed progress, marred only by a few incidents.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. Positive factors include daily operations by District RF/PF forces (unheard of some months ago) in support of rice harvesting and as a means of keeping the area clear of VC troop concentrations. Both RF and PF forces have obtained more success this month (measured in VC kills, plus weapons, equipment and one prisoner captured) than in many previous months. This is attributed to the District Chief's insistence on frequent operations, and more positive leadership now exercised by the S-3 and RF commanders.

b. Six new teachers were added to district school staffs, and two self help projects should be completed next month. Both Vietnamese and US PSYOPS teams again visited the district. MEDCAPs have continued according to schedule.

c. The 3/7 US Marines conducted operations on the fringes of the district and continued to give excellent support to RF and PF forces.

d. Factors adversely influencing pacification include the VC terrorist bombing of the LOC CHAM village office, which resulted in the death of the village chief and a number of village cadre.


e. A short 81 mm round fired by the US Marines in support of a PF operation resulted in four civilians wounded.

f. On 24 September the VC mortared Hill 37, the first such incident of the month.

g. The two day flood in the first part of the month resulted in the destruction of a portion of the rice crop, and in some damage to private homes. Bridge damage was immediately repaired by Marine engineers.

3. (C) Problem Areas - Complete security for the entire District remains a major problem.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ NGUYEN VAN KE

  
KENNETH E. SHORT  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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DIEN BAN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1966  
(Enclosure (2) to RGS-1 ACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been a slight improvement in the pacification program of DIEN BAN District over the last month because of added security around the VINH DIEN (district town) area. Many home owners and schools have contacted the District Headquarters for help in reconstructing their buildings. If security could be extended beyond the VINH DIEN area, the pacification program would continue to improve. Increased enthusiasm has been shown by the German medical teams who work in this area. Close liaison has now been established with the ROK MC and an effort is being made to combine and coordinate all pacification programs.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. The largest factor responsible for the slight improvement of the pacification program in the district was the addition of the 2nd Bn of the 51st ARVN Reg, and the establishment of mobile CAP Team #5. The DSA visited all CAP Teams in the district and is now working closely with them in MEDCAP and civic action projects in the surrounding hamlets. Also, plans have been made to improve the defensive posture of these locations.

b. As a result of the VC offensive which struck in and around the town of VINH DIEN in the late part of August and early September, over 550 houses were destroyed and 300 others damaged; 22 civilians were killed. Major HOANG TRUNG, the District Chief, was killed, and his S-2 officer was seriously wounded. As district chief, Major TRUNG was highly respected and admired by the people of the district and his death definitely set the pacification program back.

3. (C/NF) Problem Areas

a. There have been several recurring incidents reported in DIEN BAN District involving ROK MC personnel selling C-rations, soda, beer and cigarettes, along with other items on the black market. A detailed investigation is being conducted and more information will be furnished at a later date.

b. At this time the Operation Center, located at the District Headquarters, has representatives from the US Marines, Vietnamese forces, ROK MC and US Advisory Team, who plan and coordinate both tactical operations and pacification programs in the district. As of this date we are unable to obtain a liaison from the 2/51 ARVN Regiment on a daily basis to insure direct coordination of all operations and programs.

c. Lack of security is still a problem in all of the outlying areas of DIEN BAN District. Many VC initiated incidents have occurred within a half mile of District Headquarters. These include several mining incidents on Highway #1, mortar and ground attacks against the new CAU LAU Bridge and the VINH DIEN Bridge, and harassing mortar and small arms fire into all surrounding hamlets.

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d. VC taxation of the people is heavy in the outlying areas of the district. Although accurate figures are not available, it is estimated that over 60% of this rice harvest has fallen into VC hands, even with the rice denial programs which were set up and carried out.

e. As security improves, the pacification program will be enlarged, but without security, pacification programs are very difficult to initiate and are very often unsuccessful.

4. (c) District Chief: CPT LUCNG NGOC MEMO

CHARLES W. PHILLIPS  
MAJ APTY  
District Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN  
DUC DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1968  
 (Enclosure (3) to HCS-11ACCORDS-01---37)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been no significant improvement in the status of pacification in DUC DUC District during the month of September, 1968.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. The 5th Regiment, 1st Marine Division continued to conduct extensive operations within the district, inflicting heavy casualties and limiting the enemy's ability to mount a sustained attack within the area.

b. Rice denial operations began on 19 September and are running smoothly. Final results will be included in next month's report. US Marine security forces have performed in an outstanding manner, with the only problems being caused by the inability of Vietnamese officials to properly organize the refugee laborers.


c. Both the US Marine Mobile Training Team and the US Army Mobile Advisory Team have conducted successful training programs with the RF/PF units in the District. The Mobile Advisory Team has moved south into the NONG SON Coal Mine area and has been well received by RF/PF units there.

d. All RF/PF units in the district were visited and inspected during the month by a member of the Advisory Team and a Vietnamese officer from the district headquarters. Increased participation by Vietnamese personnel in the preparation of the TRES report has already resulted in improvements in the administrative and logistical fields for RF/PF units.

3. (U) Problem Areas

A general lack of supplies for civic action/refugee relief projects still exists. The main problem has been transportation rather than non-availability, in spite of the fact that Liberty Road from DUC DUC to DA-NANG remained open to convoy traffic throughout the month.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ DANG VAN TRUEN

  
 BERNARD W. GRATZNER  
 MAJ USMC  
 District Senior Advisor

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DUY XUYEN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure (4) to RDS-MACCORDS-01-67)

1. (U) There is presently no advisory team assigned to DUY XUYEN District.
2. (U) District Chief: MAJ CAO DIEN

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HIEU DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure (5) to RCS-ILCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

It is felt that the level of pacification in HIEU DUC-District during the month of September 1968 decreased slightly. This determination is based on the factors listed below.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. There were no civic action or self-help projects requested or approved during the month of September 1968. There is a need for wells in certain hamlets, though no request for such projects were submitted. Likewise a request for the improvement of the market place in TUY LOAN Hamlet, submitted 7 August 1968, is still not approved. This project was to make the market place usable during the monsoon season.

b. There was no evidence of action taken to improve security of the hamlets during the month. No increase in motivation is evident on the part of the Popular Force /Regional Force personnel charged with the responsibility for security, even in the face of a possible VC offensive.

c. Due to the one (1) rain storm, which occurred during the month, some of the rice crop was damaged. Despite several attempts to get the District Chief to take action to offset the loss, no action has been taken and none is contemplated.

d. Many people have been made homeless by the Da Hang rocket barrier being constructed within the district. The District Chief was given a list of those people and advised to initiate some type action to assure them that the GVN had their interest at heart. Finally, since it was obvious nothing was being done, the Senior Advisor set up a date with the District Chief to call the responsible people together and explain to them what action would be taken. This was to lay the groundwork. To date, approximately three (3) weeks later, no further action has been taken.

e. One good point is that there have been no acts of VC terrorism carried out in the district during September 1968. Additionally, VC attacks against friendly installations within the district, as compared to previous months, declined.


f. Rice harvesting/denial operations presently being conducted are moving rather smoothly after getting off to a shaky start. The people could have been better prepared psychologically for the operation.

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3. (C) Problem Areas

Only eleven (11) Popular Force Platoons are available within the district. One (1) of these is ineffective due to all the sick and wounded being assigned to the same platoon. The District Chief is unable to recruit more due to a shortage of eligible young men in the district.

4. (U) District Chief: CPT NGUYEN-VAN-THUAN

HARRY R. HAWKINS  
MAJ USMC  
District Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

HIEU XHON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure (6) to RCS-RECORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

District pacification efforts remained unchanged during the month of September. The degree of control exercised by the GVN during the day and night has not changed from previous reporting periods. Advisory team and district defensive facilities were improved by relocation of the district headquarters, construction of new bunkers and strengthening of the tactical wire.


2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

The 2nd ROK Marine Brigade began operations within the southeastern portion of the district on or about 18 September. This increase in operations will undoubtedly influence the future pacification effort.

3. (C) Problem Areas

The continuing lack of sufficient security forces within the pacification target areas still remains the most significant problem. In an effort to decrease the number of unfavorable incidents between fishermen and operating bases located along the rivers, the District Chief has held meetings with representatives from villages and hamlets; he has set forth fishing rules and again pointed out to them the forbidden waterways.

4. (U) District Chief: HLI VO VAN SANG

  
JAMES E. BLACK  
HLI INF  
District Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

HOA VANG DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure (7) to RCS-RECORDS-01-37)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Some progress was registered in the pacification effort largely in terms of the responsiveness of District officials to the plight of the victims of the VC attack on CAM LE Hamlet of 23 August 1968.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. The District Chief convened a meeting of the District Phuong Hoang Committee on 7 September which was directed towards a general upgrading of the DIOCC to include closer coordination among the various agencies represented in the DIOCC, better integration of intelligence received there, and generally, towards fulfillment of Phuong Hoang objectives. Early signs of improvement are present, but general upgrading will require a continuous effort.

b. The recently completed four-room addition to the elementary school at AN NGAI TY Hamlet was dedicated on 14 September.

c. The GVN responded promptly to recognize the gallantry of those who participated in the defense of CAM LE Hamlet when it was attacked on 23 August, by presenting over 60 decorations to members of the PF, ARVN, USMC, and the Advisory Team on 10 September.

d. The District Chief and his staff responded immediately to assist victims of the attack on CAM LE Hamlet, and within 24 hours had emergency relief, medical assistance, and psyops personnel in the area. During the first ten days of September the District Relief Committee distributed tin, cement, and food to all the victims. The committee also distributed forty truckloads of damage, and blankets, soap, and clothing received largely from 1st Marine Air Wing Civic Action Unit. The District Chief also mobilized 300 Combat Youth to assist in clean-up, distribution and rebuilding. This fine effort demonstrates what the GVN can do when properly led and when its resources are fully mobilized.

e. The District Chief convened a meeting on 23 September of all refugee camp chiefs in the district to discuss the upcoming construction of 500 refugee houses in HOA KEAM Village. Construction is to begin 15 October.

f. Since their arrival in mid-June, ILT 5 (I-32) has trained 7 of the 31 PF platoons in District based on a two week tactics-oriented program of instruction. Team personnel have observed a relatively high level of tactical knowledge complemented by weapons proficiency in 4 of the 7 platoons trained. The remaining 3 platoons appeared to possess the same capabilities, however, poor motivation hampered their training progress. Approximately 25% of the PF in the district are not receiving their rice allowance basically because of missing or incomplete documentation. It is anticipated however, that over 95% of all eligible PF in

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
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HOL VANG will be receiving their rice allowance by payday, October 68.

g. During the period 1 September - 24 September 68, the PF/PF participated in 3 operations directed and supervised by District Headquarters. These operations were in conjunction with the National Police and were based on intelligence generated by the PF intelligence squad in the DIOCC. Losses sustained by several PF platoons during the VC offensive in late August have not been replaced. This manpower shortage, which was not favorable prior to the attack, is now critical in the case of the PF platoon at NUT KHI SON, which is presently conducting operations with a strength of 18.

h. Full utilization of the HMT Team's capabilities is not possible until the team is issued its authorized vehicles. The team has been without a vehicle since its deployment in June 68.

3. (U) District Chief: MAJ MAI KUAN HUI



FREDERICK D. ELFESS  
FSO-5 Dept of State  
District Senior Advisor

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QUE SON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure (8) to RGS-111CCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification efforts increased during the month of September. Progress can be seen in numerous areas; a direct result of many long months of continuous hard work by both the district officials and the inhabitants.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. The first outstanding maneuver accomplished through Vietnamese-American efforts was the extension of day and night No Fire Zones (NFZ) by an additional 5,000 meters (3,500 in the day and 1,500 in the night No Fire Zones). The total population added has not been determined as yet.

b. Another endeavor which began in mid-September is the reestablishment of PHU THO Village in the northeastern section of the district. This village, abandoned in 1965 because of enemy terrorist actions, is being rebuilt under strong leadership of the village and district chiefs, with security provided by elements of the 2-1st Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, RF/PT units, and the villagers. Reestablishing this hamlet will generate several other important benefits in Que Son; among them an increase in (1) area under GVN control, (2) population under GVN control, (3) capability of the Popular Forces in securing these hamlets, (4) added confidence of the villagers in the district officials and forces, and (5) a defeat of the enemy's endeavors in this area. Either a PHU THO Village No Fire Zone will be established or the present Que Son No Fire Zone will be lengthened to encompass PHU THO Village.

c. In addition to rebuilding a portion of Que Son, the people are beginning to utilize Highway 535 a great deal more than they have in the past. There is a constant flow of traffic between all of the major cities, vital areas, or other districts within this province. Successful opening of the road and fewer mining incidents can be attributed to the tactics employed by the 2-1st Infantry and to the district's RF/PT units. Closely related to this aspect of pacification is the informant program, which receives a quantity of mines, booby traps and enemy information daily. This particular area has developed well; the non-cooperative attitude of participants has given way to a full-scale information network, which includes children, adults, former enemy and people from enemy controlled areas.

d. Very significant during September was the lack of activity on the part of North Vietnamese Army forces; this has been the first month that the NVA has been so inactive in Que Son. Paralleling this notable accomplishment is the decrease in the activities of main forces and local guerrillas. These two factors have aided pacification activities in this district by allowing Revolutionary Development endeavors to be carried out with an appreciably greater amount of security.

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e. The RF/PF units have kept the enemy off-balance through roving patrols and operations geared toward eliminating VC infrastructure within the No Fire Zone. Outside this zone, joint operations with the 2-1st Infantry again have accomplished the same things, but on a larger scale. The only enemy initiated activity was an estimated two platoon-size mortar/ground attack on 8 September, and mortar attacks on 13 and 26 September. However, these attacks have not disturbed the composure of the people or the fighting forces of Que Son. If anything, they enhanced their confidence in each other.


f. This particular change can be seen in the participation of the villagers and district forces in the present rice denial operations. Although deterred by heavy rains and nonavailability of aircraft for transportation, the harvesters disregarded the enemy's sniping and continued their labor. Regional and Popular Forces reacted quickly and uncovered rice caches, guerrillas and suspects. On the first complete day of harvesting, some twelve (12) tons of rice was returned to the district for processing.

g. Exploiting these successes is the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), which propagandizes through the various agencies in the district. Also television is viewed and there are psychological operations planned on a day and night basis throughout the district.

### 3. (U) Problem Areas

Although many improvements have been made, some projects have been deemphasized or postponed. Self-help projects started months ago are still pending completion. District officials are reluctant to initiate new programs or to change portions of programs. Finally, the District Chief needs an Assistant District Chief for Military Affairs.

### 4. (U) District Chief: 1LT NGUYEN CONG CHINH.

  
FRANKLIN L. DOMINOE  
M/L INF  
District Senior Advisor

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THONG DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1968  
 (Enclosure (9) to RGS-RECORDS-01-07)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification has been at a complete standstill since the end of August and in many ways it has suffered a severe setback.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. The enemy harassed and mortared this headquarters and environs almost daily from 19 August to 20 September. These actions kept district officials inactive for the most part during the entire time frame. The local population was restricted from the fields, and in many cases the farmers neglected warnings and became casualties as a result.

b. Fortunately, the enemy did not destroy the refugee settlements as he did in May. However, the typhoon took its toll in crops, personal property and local lines of communication. The bridge linking the bulk of the population here with the airfield and the road to DAI LOC District is now barely passable to foot traffic. The District Headquarters may be an island after the next big rain unless some Engineer support arrives to repair local bridges.

c. Special Forces personnel abandoned Hill 52, thereby eliminating the last friendly outpost between here and DAI LOC. Of course the Viet Cong have taken advantage of the situation and the road tax from here to DAI LOC is now exorbitant.


d. The regional/popular forces conducted extremely few operations, and these seemed to go away from known enemy locations. It has been six months since the local military forces have had a confirmed "kill". Yet, they had their one and only contact this month since May.

e. Initial observations of the rice harvest in this district indicate that the district officials are not giving the necessary support nor providing the necessary security to assure a successful harvest.

3. (C) Problem Areas

Someone here has got to take charge and get the military forces as well as the Vietnamese civilian agencies into gear. Without a doubt, the GVN is rapidly losing any support it ever won.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ NGUEN DINH KHAM

  
 DAVID T. JONES  
 CPT INF  
 District Senior Advisor

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
 MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
 APO 96337

Date: 31 October 1968  
 BAK:ase

TO: Office of the Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, Saigon

VIA: Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, I CTZ, Da Nang

REF: (a) Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USAID/OSA Directive Number 4-67  
 (b) MACCORDS Notice Number 68-319 dated 18 April 1968  
 (c) MACCORDS-OAD/R Memorandum dated 26 August 1968

PROVINCE REPORT  
 (RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (03)

Period Ending 31 October 1968

1. (C/NF) OVERALL STATUS OF THE PACIFICATION EFFORT

The month of October in Quang Nam was characterized by a definite lull in heavy fighting with no accompanying significant strides in pacification. High winds and heavy rains disrupted land and air communications for one week. With the rains came flood conditions which further disrupted pacification and normal life in most of the Province. The three priority districts, Hieu Nhon, Hoa Vang, and Dien Ban, were also the districts hardest hit by the weather. Militarily, there was a noticeable increase in small-scale incidents, especially in the priority districts again. Ambushes, minings, and actions against communication lines were more numerous than the previous month. The only exception to the lull in heavy fighting was in Thuong Duc District, where NVA battalion-size units were finally driven back to their mountain sanctuaries. In an attempt to "show the GVN flag", VNAF helicopters were deployed to carry relief goods to the Thuong Duc population.

Plans for Operation LE LOI were finalized. Quang Nam has targeted 41 hamlets. The 1st, 5th, 7th, 26th Marine Regiment, the 11th Marine Artillery, and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade have been briefed on the plan and will work closely with their respective districts. Each of the Marine units of the 1st Marine Division has the mission to conduct at least one cordon-and-search operation on the targetted hamlets. Operations will be coordinated with the district chief and their U.S. advisors; Armed Propaganda Teams and Special Police will be used to the fullest extent. The Province Chief, LTC. LE TRI TIN, has promised to allocate the NFFF's for these operations.

On the enemy's political front, reports indicate that "the people's elected representatives" have been established in 60 to 80 hamlets. Whether using the ballot box, by show of hands, or simply naming the candidate, these representatives are all members of the People's Revolutionary Party and act as the functioning government in those hamlets. On the Hoi An political front, the local parties are undecided as to the meaning of the bombing halt and feel

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the future may be precarious -- even if peace should be finalized. With the uncertainty of the near future, the parties and factions remain unable to cooperate with each other or form any kind of united front at this time. The inability of the parties to holdly organize among themselves is not a result of a wait-and-see attitude as much as a continuing distrust for the rival groups in their own mist. This reflects the usual pattern of politics in Quang Nam Province. The situation is now confused by recurring questions on the firmness of the U.S. commitment in Vietnam.

## 2. PRIORITY PACIFICATION PROGRAMS

a. (C) Territorial Security. Security in Quang Nam Province can be said to have neither deteriorated nor improved during the month, though enemy-initiated activities were fewer and friendly operations increased in number over the previous month. Both sides were hampered by heavy rains and flooding. Land lines of communication were not, however, heavily interdicted by the enemy. The two-week closing of the road from Hoi An to Da Nang was a result of weather and the erosion of the road in five locations. Several minings were reported after the reopening, but no ambushes on Route #1 were recorded during the month. Successful defense of the Thuong Duc District Headquarters was assured in the middle of the month as the RF/PF and CIDG forces began to ferret the NVL out of the four hamlets held by the enemy. Air support, though hampered by bad weather, was credited with causing a cumulative enemy casualty of around the 130 mark at Thuong Duc. Civilian war casualties, province-wide, for the month numbered 47 killed and 138 wounded.

(1) Enemy Situation: Enemy initiated activities during the month were fewer than the previous month (with the exception of small ambushes). No district headquarters were targeted by ground units; mortaring was occasional and limited. The one exception to the apparent lull in enemy activity was the District Headquarters at Thuong Duc. The first part of the month saw a continuation of heavy enemy attacks against District. Enemy mortar and recoilless rifle fire in the surrounding mountains continued to sustain the ground offensive action of the estimated five NVL battalions. Several more undeployed enemy battalions are felt to also be in the area.

As the enemy offensive in Thuong Duc began to abate, evidence of an enemy buildup became apparent in the western part of Dien Ban District, the seat of heavy fighting in August. Forces numbering five battalions were felt to be preparing for a heavy attack in the general area. The arrival of the floods in the second half of the month seems to have thwarted the enemy and forced him to break up and retire to the higher ground in the direction of Thuong Duc. Another large scale attack by NVL units is not being precluded even though the returning clear weather has been accompanied with but minor local-force harassment. While aggressive action has been more characteristic of friendly forces than of the enemy -- with the exception of Thuong Duc -- the CLP units throughout the province have experienced no lessening of probes and attacks against them. Local VC forces continue to harass these Marine outposts as well as mine access roads to their locations.

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(2) Friendly situation: Quang Nam Sector conducted 14 operations in October, more than twice the number of the previous month. Operations HUNG QUANG 1-74, a 12-day operation, conducted in the Thuong Duc area by elements of the 51st ARVN Regiment and USMC, resulted in 61 enemy KIA and 90 enemy KBA; friendly losses during this action were 15 KIA and 90 WIA. The other sector-conducted operations, spread out over the province and more limited in scope, netted three enemy KIA and 27 VCS; ARVN losses numbered 11 WIA. Sub-sector operations, which numbered 30 company-size-and-smaller activities, netted limited kills but proved, on the whole, effective in rice denial operations. HUONG QUANG I, phase II, another 51st Regiment operation, continues to meet with commendable success in its saturation patrols south of DaNang. To date the 140 enemy KIA represents a 2 to 1 ratio over friendly losses.

The erosion of cooperative spirit between the Korean Marine commanders and GVN officials does not appear to have ameliorated during the month. The 2nd ROK Brigade continues to carry out its own operations, independently from the other Free World Forces. Proceeding without regard to the inconveniences of the heavy rains, Victory Dragon III netted 25 more enemy casualties during the month.

(3) Status of RF-PF: With the removal of 2/51 ARVN Regiment from Hoi An to Dien Ban, the defenses of the capital of Quang Nam consist entirely of RF/PF and RD teams, as well as an assortment of armed citizens under the Popular Self-Defense Force. One RF company, the 467th, underwent the RD refresher course; six companies received M-16 training. Two RF companies were formed during the month -- the 135th and the 139th -- and are presently undergoing training. Both companies are, however, short of officers. RF/PF desertion fell to a low of 44 out of 10,700, less than half the previous monthly averages. The PF special rice allotment plan is meeting with favorable response; nearly 85% of the PF families are participating.

Two more C/P units were activated during the month, bringing the total to 41 for the province. The new teams assigned to Hieu Nhon are being deployed as mobile units and will operate out of already established locations. The eighth M/T group arrived in province and will be assigned to Duy Xuyen District. Since no advisory team is presently assigned to the district, the M/T group will function in that capacity for the time being.

b. (C) PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG. The counter-infrastructure program in Quang Nam has shown remarkable progress in the past month. Arrests by the DIOCC and Special Police in Hieu Nhon District have maintained the previous month's average of one VCI per day. General Lam's "command interest" has been openly supported by the Province Chief, LTC TIN. Under the edict each district chief is given a monthly quota as the number of infrastructure that must be picked up or neutralized. Failure to meet quotas will be punished by either letters of reprimand or relief from post. It is feared that some suspects picked up and claimed by districts to be VCI are actually mere commo-liaison agents.

One National Police Field Force platoon (NFFF), detached to Duc Duc District for a combined USMC/VN cordon-and-search operations, performed

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adequately though NPTF follow-up on Special Police targets was not carried out in a manner that could be called professional. NPTF do not appear to have the necessary training or judgment for successful operations against the infrastructure. Closer coordination with U.S. advisors may in part remedy the difficulty. With the removal of regular ARVN forces from the province capital, sector commanders are reluctant to approve the release of NPTF units from their present static defensive positions in Hoi An.

Province Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) operations reported the capture of 39 VCS/VCA/VC types during the month. In Quang Nam, though PRUs are sometimes assigned to districts, under operational control of the DIOCC, permission to use the units must now first be obtained from Hoi An.

c. IMPROVEMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT. Fifty-seven more village and hamlet officials completed the two-week public administration course held in Hoi An and sponsored by COMDS/Community Development. It is clear that self-help projects administered by these trained officials -- numbering 397 throughout the province-- are better planned and more skillfully implemented.

The National Police Chief for Quang Nam Province, Mr. Dinh Quang Minh, was transferred to Saigon the last week of the month. Chief Minh's departure came after several weeks of unofficial speculation as to his future in Quang Nam. His replacement by Mr. Huynh Kinh, former deputy police chief in Quang Ngai, and also former deputy to Chief Minh in that province, should bring strength to the Hoi An police effort. Also newly arrived this month is Mr. Nguyen An Vinh, former NPTF battalion commander in Da Nang, who is to be the new Deputy Police Chief. The two new police officials have already shown initiative and active interest in both National Police and Special Police activities.

d. SELF-DEFENSE. The number and effectiveness of Popular Self-Defense groups did not increase significantly during October. Although 400 shotguns were received for distribution by AEDSL Co in Hoi An and Da Nang, only 20 weapons were actually issued during the month. Although the number of trained personnel in the people's self defense groups is almost 7000, the number who have been issued weapons is just over the 1000 mark. Possibly for this reason, incentive for serious training is lacking. Political rivalry on the part of Hoi An's contending parties and factions gives rise to the Province Chief's reticence in passing out weapons. It does not appear likely that the 15,000 recruited for the Popular Self-Defense Force will be armed in the future, even though First Area Logistics Command presently has the weapons on hand. Operation E L in Quang Nam has, as one of its aims, the training of 50 people in each upgraded hamlet and the arming of 10 of these 50. With hamlets targeted for upgrading, if the plan is to be seriously pursued, the GVN must be prepared to release around 400 weapons by early next year.

e. Revolutionary Development and Self-Help. The effectiveness of the RD teams in civic action programs was successfully borne out during the month as a result of the low level of enemy activity and the opportunity afforded by the flood to work with the people. Flooding along Route 1 hampered enemy movement to the point that RD teams were free to concentrate on hamlet civic affairs and clean-up campaigns. Unfortunately, the effects of the flood served

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to further work against a satisfactory completion of the 1968 RD Plan. The unfailingly inactive 2nd ROK Marine Brigade showed no more proclivity for taking part in pacification and civic action projects than it has in the past.

In the priority district of Hoa Vang, RD discipline and enthusiasm has shown marked improvement in the hamlets where USMC personnel have recently begun to work with cadre. Identity card check-points and first-aid courses, along with other activities, have already been established as avenues of cooperations between the cadre and the Marines. The performance of the teams in the priority district of Hieu Nhon has markedly improved. The close working relationship of the DIOCC with the Special Police in the district has been duplicated by the RD teams. Intelligence and counter-infrastructure activities by the RD cadre in Hieu Nhon have been of a much higher standard than, by contrast, in Dien Ban District, where the teams have been traditionally forced to act as frontline defense outposts. During the month, province-wide, the teams were attacked 28 times and suffered 1 KIA and 13 WIA.

A total of 296 self-help projects have been completed to date this fiscal year. The 26 projects completed this month were financed by both the people and the GVN in the respective ratio of 3:1.

f. Economic Revival. Loss of agricultural production, attributable to the creation of the Da Nang security barriers, is being made up by wider use of the new, improved IR-8 rice. At the present rate of production, and given the yield of three times that of local rice varieties, the use of IR-8 might make the province self-sufficient in several year's time. The usual import of 3,800 tons of American rice for the month was not augment above that level, even though the two weeks of heavy flooding destroyed close to 6000 tons of local rice. The vegetable crops were almost completely destroyed. Fishing input dropped 80 tons from the previous month of 700 tons. Though less food is immediately available, no plans exist for supplemental rice import. It is felt that the province can cope with the temporary shortage.

g. Resettlement and Care of Refugees. The refugee situation in Quang Nam was not seriously aggravated by the two weeks of flooding. Though close to four thousand refugees were forced to evacuate their homes on the river banks and find shelter in pagodas, schools, and churches, the refugee service distributed foods and other items, reacting quickly and commendably to the situation. The people have since returned to their homes. It was decided during the month to re-evaluate the refugee rolls and write off those families which despite being displaced people, had become relatively settled and self-sufficient. Thus this month's refugee rolls reflect a drop of 5367 families (32,248 persons). The number of refugees for whom the Refugee Service still has obligations is now 100,421. A complete field study is being made in order to tabulate a more accurate census. Those refugees having temporary status, who through their own efforts have resettled themselves, will be stricken from the rolls.

The ~~THANH HUY~~ Refugee Camp has, except for some 20 units and the dispensary, been completely dismantled. Fire and high winds destroyed half of the 150 units in the previous months; this month's floodings along with theft

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of the roofing has, for all purposes, destroyed the camp. The 272 persons still at the site are managing to survive. The rebuilding of the camp is to be financed by the GVN using CINVA-RAM Blocks.

h. National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi. Hoi Chanh input for the month totalled 20; the Chieu Hoi Center presently has charge of 50. An auto mechanic and driving course was organized in Hoi An for Males; female Hoi Chanh continue to take up sewing. Five Hoi Chanh were released for Kit Carson work and 28 were returned to their original hamlets.

The Chieu Hoi Center's defenses have not ameliorated during the month. Barrier material of all kind is needed to improve the center's defense posture. Construction of the Chieu Hoi hamlet is not progressing, partly for reasons of bad weather, but mainly because of the high cost of materials and skilled labour. The plans for the hamlet were based on material estimated for standard 1967 plans for school buildings. The cost of materials and labour have since risen by approximately 30%. Funds requested for the construction did not reflect the true extent of rising cost.

Quang Nam's nine Armed propaganda Teams have been released to the districts. Of the 148 authorized for the Province, the Ministry has confirmed 122. District teams number five members each; the rest of the APT's work in and out of Hoi An. The teams, though well motivated, have not received all the support and guidance they could beneficially use. More PSYOPS materials as well as better weapons and other military equipment would improve their effectiveness. A full-time U.S. advisor attached to the APT's would be considered useful during this period when the teams are still new and inexperienced.

*Warren E. Parker*  
WARREN E. PARKER  
PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
QUANG NAM PROVINCE

9 Encl  
1-9 Monthly district Reports

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DAI LOC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1968  
(Enclosure (1) to RCS-WAGCOWDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification this month remained about the same as the previous month.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. District conducted daily operations and obtained more VC kills than during the past months. In conjunction with USMC forces from 3/7, district forces protected friendly rice harvesting in LOC QUANG Village, a normally VC controlled area.

b. Refugee payments were continued with hundreds of families receiving assistance.

c. The district advisor's house was damaged by enemy mortaring.


d. Week-long floods of 90% of the district seriously disrupted normal life as well as destroyed much unharvested rice. Several bridges damaged by the high waters are being repaired by the Marines.

e. The pacification building program is at a standstill. Shortage of tin has precluded the completion of the four-room TRUONG AN School; the market place also suffered from this shortage. Three projects submitted four months ago remain unapproved; two projects submitted six months ago also await approval.

3. (C) Problem Areas

Security remains the district's biggest problem.

## 4. (U) District Chief: MAJ NGUYEN VAN KE

  
KENNETH E. SHORT  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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DIEN BAN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1968

(Enclosure (2) to RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

As a result of weather conditions the enemy activity in Dien Ban District was curtailed for the month of October. Pacification programs have remained about the same as last month with no major gains or set backs.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. The major factor influencing the pacification program in Dien Ban was the flood which occurred during the middle of the month. The entire district was covered with approximately three feet of water. The property damage was slight however with no individual damage evaluated greater than 30%.

b. As a result of the flood an emergency request for food and clothing for the people of Dien Ban District was initiated.

c. Intelligence reports indicated that the enemy forces are moving back into the district as the water recedes. There has been increased harassment along Highway #1 with several mining and ambush incidents.

3. (U) Problem Areas

a. The roads throughout the district are in extremely poor condition because of flood damage. Request for repair have been forwarded to III MAF.

b. No action has been taken to repair the new Cau Lau Bridge which was blown during the month of September and the old Cau Lau Bridge is in poor condition.

4. (U) District Chief: CPT LUONG NGOC THOC.

*Charles W. Phillips*  
 CHARLES W. PHILLIPS  
 MAJ ARMY  
 District Senior Advisor

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DUC DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure (3) to RGS-MAGCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been no significant change in the status of pacification in the District during October.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. Security in the district was good in spite of the temporary absence of elements of the 5th Reg. 1st Marines. No major enemy activities were directed against district forces during the month.

b. Heavy rains closed the road to Da Nang for the better part of the month. Food and building materials are being transported by air; there are no immediate problems.

c. M/T training is being well received by the two PF platoons undergoing the program.


d. The arrival of the PRU team has met with some success against the VCI. As the BTOCC becomes more experienced in the use of the unit, results should be even more gratifying.

e. Tet relief-fund supplies continued to arrive during the past month and rebuilding has already begun in some areas.

3. (U) Problem Areas

There are no problems.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ DANG VAN TRIEM

  
BERNARD W. GRATZER  
MAJ ARMY  
District Senior Advisor

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DUY XUYEN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1968  
(Enclosure (4) to RDS-MACCORDS-01-67)

1. (U) There is presently no advisory team assigned to DUY XUYEN District.
2. (U) District Chief: MAJ CAO DIEN

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HIEU DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1968  
(Enclosure (5) to RCS-REGCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been no significant improvement in the status of pacification in HIEU DUC during October.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. While the number of operations conducted by RF/PF was limited, the 1/7, 1st Marine Division conducted extensive operations which significantly hampered enemy movements.

b. Both rice harvest and denial operations were halted by the floods. Prior to the floods, some 50 tons of rice had been harvested; while reports indicated that the VC did not benefit from this harvest, close to 90% of that 50 tons was destroyed by the ensuing flood. Though little real property damage was reported, the other agricultural products of the district were also heavily destroyed. Immediate relief has been obtained with an emergency issuance to the populace of 5 tons of rice.

c. The District Chief has formulated an acceptable plan for the upgrading of 5 hamlets. The commander of the 1/7 Marines has promised support in the form of security. The timetable, to be drawn up by the district chief, should be forthcoming.

d. Civic action programs came to a halt at the direction of the district chief; he feared that all efforts would be wasted and materials destroyed due to the flood conditions.

e. There were two Hoi Chanhs during the month.

3. (C) Problem Areas


a. Apathy on the part of RF/PF is still very noticeable. Two of the RF company commanders have shown exceptional vigor, however.

b. National Police are lax and unmotivated. The change of police chief during the month may produce improvement, though none can yet be detected. Population and resource control are nil; black market operations are carried on openly and unhampered.

c. The district chief has been unable to recruit additional PF personnel as had been planned as part of the hamlet upgrading program.

d. The GAP program has not greatly improved, even with the arrival of a new commander. Night ambushes and occasional daytime patrols are the extent of GAP activities. Little training and few civic action programs exist.

4. (U) District Chief: .CPT NGUYEN VAN THIEN



HARRY R. HAWKINS

MAJ. GREY

District Senior Advisor

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HIEU NHON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1968  
(Enclosure (6) to RCG-MACORRIS-01-57)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There has been no change in the overall pacification status within the district during the past month.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. GVN Officials were quick in responding to the recent floods. Particularly impressive was the initiative and speed of the Refugee Service.

b. RD teams are continuing with the pacification program; work on self-help projects was approaching 90% completion until the recent rains. Work has now been resumed on the two largest projects: the district administration building and the district jail. Hoedaps have continued with but slight interruption.

c. The heavy rains severely hampered military operations. Those conducted consisted mainly of police, cordon and search, small unit patrols and ambushes, the latter proving to be very effective. Besides widespread but relatively minimal damages caused by the floods, 30 RT homes were entirely destroyed when the river cut through the An Hoi hamlet settlement.

d. Four district BF Companies completed M-16 training conducted by the MAT group. The two additional CAP units received during the month will be utilized in a mobile capacity, even after barrier and sand bogging materials become available.

3. (C) Problem Areas

The inability of friendly forces to interdict the enemy in Duy Xuyen District from coming into Hieu Nhon District continues to plague security efforts.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ VO VAN SANG

*James B. Black*  
JAMES B. BLACK  
MAJ USAF  
District Senior Advisor

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HOA VANG DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1968  
(Enclosure (7) to RCS-MAJ-OCFUS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

There was a marked decline in enemy-initiated incidents during the month in the District due in part to the heavy monsoon rains in the middle of the month. Although District civil operations were impaired by the rains, District-directed military operations increased over the previous month.

2. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification


a. Torrential monsoon rains severed lines of communications in the District and when the water receded many roads were left in need of extensive repairs. Damage to housing was slight.

b. The Chinese Agricultural Technical Mission (CATM) has had still another calamity strike its vegetable demonstration plot. This time defoliant killed all the vegetables shortly before they were ready for harvest. An investigation is being conducted to determine the source of the defoliation. Previous crops were lost when the vegetables were not watered for several days because of a decline in security in the area and on another occasion when a typhoon destroyed the crop. The CATM team will try again, however.

3. (U) Equipment Issues

The Mobile Advisory Team (MAT) has still not received any of its authorized vehicles.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ MAI XUAN HAU

  
FREDERICK D. ELFERS  
POB-5 Dept of State  
District Senior Advisor

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QUE SON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1968

(Enclosure (3) to RGS-MAILORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification progressed at a good pace during the past month. Rice denial operations, completion of self-help projects, and resettling of refugees were the main areas of activity.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. The very successful rice denial operations conducted by the 2/1st Infantry, district personnel, and refugees netted over 300 tons from the contested areas. Some of this rice was discovered in enemy caches. Enemy harvesting efforts, continually harassed by air supports, were conducted mainly at night.

b. Military operations conducted by the RF/FF were limited as a large part of their efforts was directed toward the support of rice denial. Given the shortages of personnel and the inclement weather conditions, the RF/FF are very much to be commended for their performance.

c. Refugee commodities and supplies were received by the district. The input of these goods, plus refugee payments, as well as the very fruitful rice operations, have greatly raised the meager comfort level of the refugees. Refugee-oriented programs, i.e. laundry service, labour service, have also been revitalized.


d. The self-help project to build the dispensary has begun to take concrete form. It is felt that the dispensary will prove to be popular amongst the people.

e. Performance of the RF/FF has been exemplary. M/T training was conducted in conjunction with the rice denial operations. The 321 RF Co. is considered the most outstanding RF unit in the district; special mention is made of 1LT TULN and 2LT NGOCK for their performances during the month.

3. (C/FF) Problem Areas

District operations are hindered by official reluctance to initiate and carry out more than one or two programs at a time. A sense of speed and urgency is lacking. Secondly, the District Chief is badly in need of a deputy for military affairs. The task is presently inadequately performed by the S2.

4. (U) District Chief: 1LT NGUYEN CONG CHINH

  
FRANKLIN L. TOMAHOE  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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THUONG DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1968

(Enclosure (9) to RCS-MAJCORES-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The pacification effort has taken a severe setback during the last reporting period as a result of intense enemy activity within the district area. However, despite the aggressive enemy maneuvers the district was able to maintain control over the bulk of the local population.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. This district has five heavily populated hamlets which include 90 per cent of all local inhabitants. Four of these hamlets were totally destroyed by US aircrafts during the tactical operations carried out against the enemy ensconced in the hamlets. The fifth hamlet suffered a damaged market place and destruction of several private shops.

b. The major bridge in this district, linking one third of the populace and the airstrip to the district administrative and business areas, is under water and damaged. This imposes a burden on the civilians as well as the military who have to resort to moving supplies and commodities across the river by boat.

c. War payments and food have been quick to arrive, offsetting in a small way the results of the month's combat losses. In addition, the Regional/Popular forces have performed in an outstanding manner in the defensive role. Offensively they still fail to be aggressive.

d. In error, the USMC Artillery fired 8-155mm artillery rounds into one hamlet, the net results of which were 15 KIA and more than 40 WIA.

e. National and Special police are weak and not equipped to handle the work resulting from recent enemy attacks. A Police Field Force Company is needed to help the district chief now, especially with the roundup of Viet Cong infrastructure.

f. The last rice harvest here was poor and the typhoon last month damaged the current rice crop. At the height of the harvest all civilians were restricted to their hamlets and when this restriction was lifted it rained for two weeks. Again, the rice crop was drastically damaged.

3. (C) Problem Areas: The enemy is still mortaring the district despite the fact there was a recent large allied operation in the environs. This district requires US or ARVN soldiers on the ground to bolster local forces.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ NGUYEN DINH KEAM

*David T. Jones*  
 DAVID T. JONES  
 O-5 INF  
 District Senior Advisor

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
 MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
 APO 96337

Date: 30 November 1968  
 BAK:ase

TO: Office of the Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, Saigon

VIA: Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, I CTZ, Da Nang

REF: (a) Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USARP/OSA Directive Number 4-67  
 (b) MACCORDS Notice Number 68-318 dated 18 April 1968  
 (c) MACCORDS-CAD/R Memorandum dated 26 August 1968

PROVINCE REPORT  
 (RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (03)

Period Ending 30 November 1968

1. (C/NF) OVERALL STATUS OF THE PACIFICATION EFFORT

The first part of November was characterized by a continuation of the previous month's fighting lull; the second half of the month saw battalion-size operations in six of the Province's nine districts. Although the CVN continued to operate efficiently and with dedication, and although the enemy was checked in his aggressive intents, pacification cannot be said to have made significant strides. Ambushes, minings, and actions against communication lines continued at the previous month's relatively high rate. The curfew hour in Hoi An remains 8 P.M.

Operation LE LOI, in which Quang Nam has 26 hamlets as primary targets, was begun during the month, and early indications suggest that overall planning has been well conceived and that the already favorable results may be expected to continue in the future. As part of the Province's Accelerated Pacification Campaign, a three-week combined USMC/ARVN cordon-and-search operation, MEADE RIVER, was begun on the 20th of November. The operation took place as two RVN battalions were being forced to retreat from an unsuccessful attempt to take Vinh Dinh Village in Dien Ban District.

On the political front, informed Vietnamese showed marked displeasure at the seemingly unilateral cessation of the bombing. The two factions of the VNQDD in Hoi An issued a joint declaration in support of President Thieu's National Day speech. Two demonstrations, also in support of the President's position, were planned by the Buddhists and Catholics in Hoi An, but the Province Chief, feeling that the enemy would exploit the situation and exaggerate the overtones of wounded national pride, cancelled the demonstrations at the last moment. The announcement of South Vietnam's plan to send a delegation to Paris was well received by the people. Despite the seeming distrust for Vice-President Ky in Quang Nam, it would appear that his presence on the delegation has mitigated the often-heard Vietnamese fear that I Corps would be partitioned or that enclaves would be formed out of the coastal cities.

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2. (C) PRIORITY PACIFICATION PROGRAMS

a. Territorial Security. Security in Quang Nam has neither improved nor deteriorated during the month of November, even though enemy-initiated activities were more numerous and battalion-size operations more extensive than during the previous month. Land lines of communication received the usual harassments by mining and ambush. Although Route 1 to Da Nang remained open to commercial and military traffic the whole of the month, numerous ambushes were reported. The presence of Operation MEADE RIVER troops along the road in DIEN BAN kept enemy actions on the road to a minimum. Seven of the nine district headquarters were subjected to their usual level of enemy probes and mortar attacks. The security situation, taken as a whole, has not changed appreciably. On the one hand, for example, LPC upgrading progressed satisfactorily, while, on the other hand, the VC attacked two "I" hamlets and three "DE" hamlets toward the latter part of the month.

(1) Enemy Situation: The lull in enemy activity was broken on the 17th of the month when six districts reported ground and mortar attacks. DIEN BAN District became the focal point as two NVA Battalions made a three day attack against Vinh Dinh and the surrounding hamlets. The Hoi An Vital Area experienced three separate mortar attacks, one of which took place in midday. Damage was light but a total of thirty civilians were wounded. Several night probes of Hoi An's defenses occurred. The still uncompleted Youth Center was inexplicably the target for two B-40 rockets; damage was light and no one was injured. It is felt that advanced elements of the two remaining regiments of the 2nd NVA Division have moved out of QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI into QUANG NAM. Enemy forces in DIEN BAN and HIEU MIEN Districts have also recently been reinforced by the mobilization of elements of the 36th NVA Regiment from the mountainous S.W. region of the Province. Total enemy initiated incidents for the month numbered 123 - more than double the previous month's.

(2) Friendly Situation: QUANG NAM Sector and the 51st ARVN Regiment conducted 31 battalion-size operations during the month with resulting enemy losses nearing the three-hundred mark. Most of these operations were prompted by the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. The 51st Regiment, coordinating with 1st Marine Division units, made a good account of itself in Operation MEADE RIVER in DIEN BAN. This giant cordon-and-search operation, which also utilized National Police Field Forces against the infrastructure, has so far succeeded in causing 292 casualties to the two targeted enemy battalions. Screening the populous in the area of operation has led to the detention and interrogation of 71 VCS. Characteristic of MEADE RIVER has been the exemplary treatment of displaced Vietnamese locals. Respect and care for their property, persons, and safety has kept resentment against the operation to a low level. Though the 2nd ROC Marine Brigade did not take part in MEADE RIVER, the Korean operation VICTORY DRAGON V continued to meet with relative success. Sector and subsector operations of less than battalion-size units showed unimpressive successes. The 39 small-unit operations for the Province netted two VC kills as against two friendly losses.

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(3) Status of RF/PF: Regional-Popular Forces are better trained and organized, and display finer spirit than in previous months. Morale is good, and the only RF shortage that remains is of radios. The chronic shortage of vehicles for the MTTs was overcome by the issuance of five new 1/4-ton trucks. Two new MTTs were deployed during the month, bringing the province total to 9 teams. The team at DUY XUYEN will work with two RF companies and 22 RF platoons. The team at HIEU DUC will work with 2 RF Companies and 5 PF platoons. The 139th RF Company returned to Hoi An from basic training and relieved the 116th RF Company for duty at DUC DUC. Five more Company Groups were activated during the month; these headquarters are all lacking both equipment and authorized personnel. Two more RF companies completed RD refresher training. There has been a general increase in the amount of unit training conducted by RFs and PFs in the Province. The noticeable high spirits of RFs may partly be results of the numerous promotions and awards given during November. General VIEN, Chief of JGS, Saigon, personally congratulated the troops on their successful routing of the NVA out of VINH BINH and also passed out awards and promotions. BG WARREN BENNETT, Deputy for Plans, III MAF, led an impressive ceremony in awarding the US Valorous Unit Award to the 703rd RF Company.

b. (C) Phoenix/Phung Hoang. The counter-infrastructure program in Quang Nam has shown good progress in the past month. The main success has been Operation MELDE RIVER in DIEN BAN District. Though the operation is still in progress, GVN authorities claim at this time over 70 VCI neutralization. More rigorous US standards will undoubtedly lessen that number somewhat, but the infrastructure in DIEN BAN has been significantly damaged. The five man DIOCC training team from the Province PHUNG HOANG Office spent two days at each District DIOCC, giving refresher training in counter-infrastructure operations and administrative handling of intelligence material.

c. Improvement of Local Government.

Two more administrative training sessions of fifteen days each were conducted in Hoi An for 128 village security officials and agriculture and welfare cadres. The popularity of the course and the better administration that results from the training amply justifies the continuation of this program.

District chiefs in THUONG DUC, HIEU DUC, and DIEN BAN were removed during the month and replaced by three recent graduates of the ARVN Administration Course. CPT LE VAN LANG, District Chief at THUONG DUC, has already given evidence of being energetic and well qualified for the demanding position. *7g*

d. Self-Defense.

Province-wide figures for Popular Self-Defense Forces are as follows:

|                        | <u>URBAN</u> | <u>RURAL</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Recruited, organized   | 4,008        | 11,495       | 15,503       |
| Trained                | 3,507        | 6,690        | 10,197       |
| Armed (weapons issued) | 1,012        | 1,196        | 2,208        |

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e. Revolutionary Development and Self-Help.

Some of the problems that often arise where RD teams operate were exemplified during the month. In HOI VIENG, where, of the three priority districts, security has been the best lately, the teams have been enjoying an outstanding working relationship with the US Marines and civic action has shown some progress. Unfortunately, the District Chief insists on regarding the teams as his own little army and has decreed that the cadre will make no arrests or detentions without prior permission from his office. The teams resent this and morale has been hurt. In DIEM BAN, the RD teams continue, for the most part, to occupy hamlets in the daytime and retire to safe havens at night. The self-help and hamlet-building concept is not possible when the teams serve, in fact, as forward warning groups. With poor security and no serious reactionary forces, the teams in DIEM BAN are understandably leary about staying in the hamlets. In HIEU HON, five of the seven teams are located in what can be thought of as "The Hoi An Belt", and perform little more than security for the city. Efforts to have the teams moved to rural hamlets have been rejected by the RD Council. While security for the Province capital is a legitimate concern, the teams should not be left in areas where the Eleven Points have been completed and no more civic action is feasible.

One problem which has existed since Tet remains unsolved and overdue. Families of cadres killed during and since the Tet Offensive have still to receive the family death benefits. RD Control Group claims Saigon has withheld approval. The arrival of the new RD Commander, LT DUOC, may bring new life into provincial RD organization. So far LT DUOC has shown a mixture of eagerness and caution.

f. Economic Revival. There has been no change during the past month.

g. Resettlement and Care of Refugees. A temporary camp was erected in northern DIEM BAN at THANH TRUNG, to house and feed the flow of displaced people effected by the MEKHE RIVER Operation. Of the 2700 people involved, 2000 have returned to their homes after processing, 700 have elected to move to GVN-controlled hamlets where they will receive roofing and foodstuffs, and 71 have been detained as VCI/VCS. The remainder of the people will be returned as soon as processing is completed and the cordon-and-search terminated.

Refugee Service officials continue to show enthusiasm and dedication. Refugee census teams were augmented by the arrival of ten more personnel from Saigon. The teams are split into four teams of four. The data obtained is presently being processed and will be used to update the IEM ADP forms. It should be stressed, however, that the Refugee Division's monthly updating requirement is not realistic. The Vietnamese staff is neither large enough nor has sufficient time to re-run the exercise in QUANG NAM's 64 camps every month.

h. National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi. Hoi Chanhs numbered 30 during the month, including 14 VC, one NVL, and 15 political cadre. Morale of the Hoi Chanhs is at a high level. The Center's defenses - long inadequate - are beginning to improve, but weapons are still needed and no source is yet in sight.

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Nine Hoi Chanh turned themselves in to the GVN under the new third-party inducement program. Payment to the third parties will be made once the verification committee is established.

*Warren E. Parker*  
WARREN E. PARKER  
Province Senior Advisor  
Quang Nam Province

9 Incl  
1-9 Monthly District Reports

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DAI LOC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure (1) to RGS-MA3000DS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The status of pacification this month remained about the same.


2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

The new Deputy District Chief for Administration arrived in Dai Loc this month and initial impressions indicate he may be an asset to the District. The self-help market place in Truong An Hamlet was completed; two VC-damaged schools were repaired and are now back in use. The people are moving ahead with planting for the new season. The newly-established weekly visits to outlying hamlets by the Vietnamese District medical personnel are proving popular. The teams are accompanied by village and hamlet chiefs and a subsector advisor. District continues offensive operations. The VC initiated a number of minor incidents against hamlets; District Headquarters was subjected to a light mortar attack.

3. (U) Problem Areas

Overall security in the District remains a problem.

## 4. (U) District Chief: MAJ NGUYEN VAN EE.



KENNETH E. SHORT  
MAJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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DIEN BAN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 1968

(Enclosure 2 to RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

With the receding of flood waters and the onset of clear weather, the enemy displayed a marked increase in activity. However, early reports on the combined USMC/ARVN operation, MEAGE RIVER, indicate that pacification in the area of operation may have favorable chance to make headway once the situation settles.


2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

The month saw numerous enemy initiated incidents involving FF, FF, RD, and CIP units. Independent FVMP elements were also harrassed by ambushes and minings. As in past months, the main lines of communication were the primary targets. The town of Vinh Dien was again the target of battalion-size enemy forces. On November 17, elements of the 36th NVA Regiment attacked with the intention of holding the town for forty-eight hours. Although able, once again, to display his continued ability to mass forces and strike at the time and place of his choosing, the enemy was at best only able to occupy but a small part of the town, and that for only a brief time. Elements of the 51st (ARVN) Regiment were mainly responsible for rousting the enemy; excellent air cover is to be credited with having greatly aided the ground operations.

3. (U) Problem Areas

a. The enemy still retains the capability to conduct small unit offensive operations as well as the ability to mass regimental size units for concentrated attacks on built-up areas.

b. Repair of the new Cau Lau Bridge is progressing slowly, apparently due to a lack of welding rods. **DIEN BAN DISTRICT**

4. (U) District Chief: CPT HOANG NGOC DU


CHARLES W. PHILLIPS  
MAJ ARMY  
District Senior Advisor

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DUC DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure 3 to RCS-RECORDS-01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

There has been no significant change in the status of pacification within the District during the month of November.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. The 116th RF Company arrived in the District during the month and, in keeping with the trend toward more mobile-type missions, has been utilized in combined operations with elements of the 5th Regiment, 1st Marine Division. Cooperation by both sides has been outstanding and results so far have been impressive.


b. On the night of 22 November, enemy units launched an attack on the An Hoa Marine Base and one of the nearby C/As. Enemy action was directed from within the confines of a friendly hamlet. Return fire by Marine elements into the hamlet resulted in 5 civilians killed and 10 wounded, plus considerable damage to buildings and personal possessions. Included among the civilians killed was the village chief's son. Despite efforts by the District Chief, there exists considerable hard feelings on the part of the people against the Marines. Ammo boxes with which to rebuild, C-rations, and clothing have been distributed; GVN payments will follow.

c. On the night of 23 November, two German medical team personnel were ambushed while driving to the An Hoa Hospital. This action resulted in one German killed and one wounded. There is reason to believe that the hostile action was not planned and came about only as a result of the German team inadvertently coming upon and surprising the enemy unit.

3. (C) Problem Areas

Inefficiency on the part of civilian officials is the major problem within the District. Village and hamlet chiefs, particularly in the An Hoa area, appear to have no regard for the welfare of their people.

4. (U) District Chief: MLJ DANG VAN TRIEM

  
BERNARD W. GRITZER  
MAJ ARMY  
District Senior Advisor

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DUY XUYEN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 1968

(Enclosure 4 to RDS-MACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) The subsector advisory team for Duy Xuyen established its camp near the District Headquarters during the month. The District Senior Advisor is MJJ Robert C. Fisher. The MMT personnel assigned to the District are also in the process of establishing themselves in Duy Xuyen. The teams are presently occupied with constructing their living quarters and improving local defensive positions.

2. (U) District Chief: MJJ CAO DIEN

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HIEU DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 1968

(Enclosure 5 to RGS-ILGCCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

As a result of the special emphasis placed on pacification by the GVN since late October and on into this month, the level of pacification throughout Hieu Duc District improved during the month of November.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. The recent placement of RF/FF platoons in four hamlets has not only served to increase security but also to block avenues of enemy approach and indirectly provide more security for neighboring hamlets.

b. The four hamlet chiefs recently appointed to the District's four APC hamlets are remaining in their hamlets 24 hours a day.

c. With the capture of nine VC-types during the month and the above mentioned improvements in security measures, it has been possible to raise the rating of two of the four APC hamlets to the "C" level.

d. The 17 November ground assault and mortar attack against the District Headquarters and surrounding hamlets was successfully repelled with the aid of the USMC. Captured documents suggested that the enemy had been instructed to succeed at all cost. Forty-three VC were killed.


e. There were no acts of overt terrorism or sabotage during the month.

f. The new District Chief appears, from his first ten days, to be a cautious person.

3. (C) Problem Areas

District officials have made no steps toward the election of the hamlet chiefs for the four APC hamlets. Popular Self-Defense Force is not being pushed in the APC hamlets. The District Chief wants to wait until the hamlets are completely secure. Following the same reasoning, the District Chief doesn't want to initiate self-help-projects in the APC hamlets at this time.

4. (U) District Chief: HOANG CONG TRUC

  
 HARRY R. HAWKINS  
 MLJ ARTY  
 District Senior Advisor

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HIEU NHON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure 6 to RCS-MLCCORDS-01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

There has been no change in the overall pacification status within the district during the month.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification


a. District officials are taking the initiative in moving ahead with the accelerated pacification campaign. The District Chief plans to upgrade three hamlets, against which operations have already been conducted. Progress against the Viet Cong infrastructure is continuing unabated, and is furnishing gratifying results.

b. The district jail - long planned and discussed - was finally completed during the month. One of the two rooms is being used as the local VES office until that service can move into its own quarters. Work on the District Administrative Building continues. The district advisory team and the MLT personnel are now living in their recently completed permanent quarters.

3. (C) Problem Areas

The Vietnamese operations officers were lax in enforcing a formal training program for the RF Companies. In several instances, no troops were available for training. It is hoped that the creation of the new Group Headquarters, programmed to command the four RF Companies, will alleviate this problem. Enemy forces continue to enjoy relative freedom of movement between Duy Xuyen District and Hieu Non.

4. (U) District Chief: MLJ VO VAN SANG

  
JAMES B. BLACK  
MLJ INF  
District Senior Advisor

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HOL VANG DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure 7 to RCS-RECORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The implementation of the accelerated pacification effort during the month served to immediately enhance the security and administration of the seven (7) hamlets involved, but the permanence of these changes remain to be seen. Enemy initiated activity increased over the previous month.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. The construction of 500 housing units at Tiop Cu refugee camp, which was to have started in October, has yet to begin; the materials have not been released by province.

b. There are presently 45 self-help projects that have been requested by hamlet and village officials and approved by district that are awaiting approval at the province level. Most of these have been pending for several months.

c. Since the destruction of the district VIS office by enemy action in August the VIS chief has been hard pressed to continue operations because of lack of office space and equipment.

d. The Sicovina Labor Union meeting hall, which has a capacity of more than 200 persons, was dedicated on November 17. Since that date, it has been in almost daily use by the labor union and other organizations.

e. A new census completed during the month sets the population of the district at 142,215 including about 35,000 refugees.

3. (U) District Chief: MAJ MAI XUAN MAU

s/Frederick D. Elfers  
T/FREDERICK D. ELPERS  
FSO-5 Dept of State  
District Senior Advisor

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QUE SON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure 3 to RGS-11000RDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The month of November showed gratifying results in pacification: (a) GVN control expanded, (b) popular interest in civil action noticeably expanded, and (c) Mobile Advisory Team work met with appreciable success.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. A new forward-moving spirit can be noticed in the attitude of the District Chief and District officials. This surge of exuberance has even filtered down to the people who are now giving outward signs of commitment to "improving the living conditions and status of Que Son".


b. Expanded GVN influence has succeeded in transforming to the Government side three hamlets previously held by the Viet Cong. In addition, two other hamlets have shown marked security improvements. Special mention should be made of the continuing good performance displayed by local RF companies and PF platoons.

c. MAT training sessions have been carried out in the field and under operation conditions and are proving well worth the effort. Beyond their primary mission, the team branches out to do civic action work in conjunction with RF/PF members.

3. (C) Problem Areas

Lack of building and construction materials hinders projects begun and proposed. The Popular Self-Defense Forces in Que Son are hampered by slow organization, training, and arming procedures.

4. (U) District Chief: CPT NGUYEN CONG CHINH

  
 FRANKLIN L. DORNOE  
 MAJ INF  
 District Senior Advisor

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THUONG DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure 9 to RCS-RECORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The overall pacification effort in this district since the end of October has improved tremendously. Pacification efforts and results seem to have taken a turn for the better.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Improvements in the District can be directly attributed to the new District Chief. He has instituted many changes, both military and civil. For the first time in eight months Regional/Popular Force ambushes are making contact with the enemy. The District as a whole enjoys better security at night. New population and resource control measures are now in effect. Several national police road blocks have already turned up many items destined for the enemy. For the most part, the District school system is now operating again, though at a reduced efficiency to be sure. Three schools are still serving as shelter for refugees generated by the October attacks. New slate boards and school equipment have been distributed.

3. (C) Problem Areas

a. The enemy still harasses the District, though on a much smaller scale than during previous months. Regional/Popular Forces are working hard to strengthen local security.

b. Twice during the past month USMC Artillery units have fired into friendly hamlets. The marines made token payments to the people for damages and casualties resulting from these incidents.

[R] c. The District needs tin and cement in order to resettle the many refugees generated by the October enemy attacks. ]

4. (U) District Chief: CPT LE VAN LANG

  
DAVID T. JONES  
CPT INF  
District Senior Advisor

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OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
 MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
 APO 96337

Date: 31 December 1968  
 BAK:ase

TO: Office of the Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, Saigon

VIA: Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, I CTZ, Da Nang

PROVINCE REPORT  
 (RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (03)

Period Ending 31 December 1968

1. (C/NF) OVERALL STATUS OF THE PACIFICATION EFFORT

Following the pattern established in previous months, pacification in QUANG NAM has again been shown to be mainly a matter of military operations. Except for the gratifying results from the PHUONG HOANG program, pacification in December continued at the modest level that has characterized 1968 in QUANG NAM Province. Pacification remains a holding action. Where government control is supported by the presence of friendly troops day and night, the area becomes relatively free of enemy influence and a viable GVN effort is not only possible but does show heartening results. On the other hand, December also demonstrated the often-heard converse: Where government troops feel unsafe and make a practice of retiring when night comes, the enemy takes control by default and pacification is discouraging at best.

The month of December saw few enemy initiated actions of a strict military nature, but, as usual, acts of terrorism, sabotage, and ambushes were frequent. In keeping with the supposed understanding with the enemy that province capitals would not be targeted, December was the first month in 1968 when HOI AN was not harassed by hostile acts of any kind. The 24-hour Christmas cease-fire was violated in DIEM BAN District where one RF was killed and by small-arms harassment fire in DUY XUYEN which killed one civilian. No friendly military reaction was initiated in either violation.

The Accelerated Pacification Campaign is proving to be a program around which GVN and allied civil and military efforts have been able to work in a coordinated manner. Operation MEADE RIVER in DIEM BAN District exemplified this cooperative spirit, and success can rightly be claimed from the point of view of VC/NVA killed and VCI neutralized. MEADE RIVER also characterized a common problem, however. Upgrading of hamlets is tenuous at best unless military forces are made available and instructed to remain in the area of concern. The western portion of MEADE RIVER has always been the scene of heavy VC/NVA forces and has traditionally been used as an important staging area for attacks on DA NANG and HOI AN. It is amply clear that the enemy is now, again, actively reestablishing his presence there. The three hamlets targeted under the APC in that area have little chance for upgrading unless friendly forces - preferably Vietnamese - are made available to reenter and assert GVN control.

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2. (C) PRIORITY PACIFICATION PROGRAMS

a. Territorial Security. Security in QUANG NAM did not change from the previous month. Small unit actions were numerous as usual, and terrorist activity was markedly increased. More minings were reported, and abductions tripled to a reported high of over 20 for the month. An expected Province-wide attack scheduled before Christmas failed to materialize. The enemy initiated no battalion-size operations. Although more than half of the APC hamlets saw hostile action during the month, those hamlets are, for the most part, the same ones that have traditionally been targeted. No pattern of special enemy emphasis against APC hamlets can be discerned. The Province situation can best be characterized by saying that personal safety remains a matter of concern everywhere.

(1) Enemy Situation: The 136 enemy initiated actions - slightly up from the previous month - were all of platoon-size or smaller units. Reports from usually reliable sources indicated that a nine-district concerted attack on the 19th or 20th of December could be expected, but no attacks took place. Large unit enemy concentrations have been confirmed in S.W. DIEM BAN District and western DUY KUYEN District, and the presence of the 21st Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division, up from QUANG TIN, has definitely been verified. VC main force units remain ready in central, western, and northwestern QUANG NAM but are presently avoiding large-scale clashes. Though enemy movements in HOA VANG District have not been numerous, the northward movement of the T-89 sapper battalion toward DA NANG should be noted.

(2) Friendly Situation: Of the twenty-six battalion-size operations conducted in QUANG NAM during December, only one produced significant results: This joint (ARVN) Ranger-US Marine operation, LE LOI/TAYLOR CORRIER, has been credited with 192 KIA in DUC DUC District. The other 25 operations netted 24 enemy KIA against six friendly losses. Small-unit actions conducted by RF/PF at sub-sectors numbered 55 for 35 enemy kills against three friendly losses. The ROK Marine operation VICTORY DRAGON continues to claim impressive but doubtful victories.

(3) Status of RF/PF: Regional and Popular Forces continue to hold their own with minimum complications or problems. Morale is good and the desertion rate for the Province is presently half the national average. The RF platoons committed to the support of the APC hamlets are, for the most part, remaining in the hamlets.

M/Ts throughout the Province have been providing M-16 training though actual issuance of the weapons is not scheduled until February. The M/T group in MOC BAI Vital Area has been plagued by a shortage of officers. Since July of 1968, only one officer has been assigned to the team and he left in December. In addition to its regular M/T duties, the team performs certain civic functions usually done by regular district advisory teams.

b. Phoenix/Puong Hoang. The Phoenix program came alive in QUANG NAM during the month of December as a result of the impetus provided by Operation MEADE RIVER and the experience gained from it. For the first time, DIOCC advisors feel optimistic about fast reaction to exploitable intelligence.

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The 1st Marine Division is coordinating closely with the QUANG BINH Phoenix staff in providing targets for battalion-size operations specifically directed against the newly formed VC liberation committees. In-as-much as most of the coordination and actual work entailed by these operations is carried out by Americans, the Vietnamese display certain reticence in performing such work as secondary interrogation and further exploitation of information thus gained. The police feel that exploitable information is usually all obtained in the field interrogation, therefore, further questioning of prisoners in NOI AM is no longer critical. It must be said, however, that interrogation in NOI AM is done in a professional manner. The large backlog of suspects works against the feasibility of giving immediate attention to detainees generated from these more recent and more frequent PHUONG HOANG operations.

The ninth DIOCC advisor was dispatched to DUY XUYEN District during the month, thereby giving Phoenix coverage throughout QUANG BINH. The Vietnamese treat LOC BINH Vital Area as a de facto district, however, and it is recommended that an American advisor be made available for duty there. The NLT group at LOC BINH already performs a few of the civic functions of a district advisory team; a Phoenix advisor might be stationed in their compound.

c. Improvement of Local Government. In line with the Ministry of Interior's interest in upgrading the quality of civil servants at all levels, a new public administration course was conducted for GVN supervisors and managers. The ten day course was attended by 25 participants, including two deputy district chiefs, two high school principals, and various technical service chiefs. The regular monthly fifteen-day hamlet and village administration course was held in NOI AM for 98 participants. As part of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, two special courses were held in DIEM BINH and HIEU DUC Districts for the APC hamlet officials of those districts.

The LOC BINH Vital Area commander, RF CPT HUYNH TRUNG TRIEM, was relieved by the Province Chief during the month as a result of documented evidence prepared by the NLT and the 196th Brigade Headquarters' M.I. CPT TRIEM was accused of selling captured rice for personal gain and of extorting "protection money" from merchants doing business with 196th Brigade personnel. The new Vital Area commander is CPT LUONG NGOC KHO.

d. Self-Defense. Province-wide figures for Popular Self-Defense Forces are as follows:

|                        | URBAN | RURAL  | TOTAL  |
|------------------------|-------|--------|--------|
| Recruited, organized   | 4,398 | 13,321 | 17,719 |
| trained                | 3,476 | 7,194  | 10,672 |
| armed (weapons issued) | 1,177 | 2,965  | 4,142  |

e. Revolutionary Development and Self-Help. At the end of the second month of the three-month Accelerated Pacification Campaign, of QUANG BINH's 26 first phase hamlets, 11 had been upgraded one security grade, and two of the 15 alternate hamlets had been similarly upgraded (three have been downgraded due to previous error in classification). The GVN has troops assigned to and working in all 26 of the primary hamlets, as well as in 12 of the 15

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alternate hamlets. The total population in these 38 hamlets numbers 38,000. Of these 38 hamlets where the GVN is involved, ten have elected hamlet governments and 28 have appointed officials. Popular Self-Defense Forces in these 38 hamlets have 1446 organized members but only 71 weapons. Of the 26 primary hamlets, 14 have had their first self-help projects approved and materials have gone out to three of these 14.

DIEN BIN District is progressing the slowest and can be used to exemplify one of the difficulties that has been manifested since the inception of the Campaign. DIEN BIN was the scene of the successful counter-infrastructure HEUDE RIVER Operation; but, of the four hamlets in the area of HEUDE RIVER, only one has been upgraded (a primary hamlet) while the other three are not likely to be upgraded until additional forces are made available. Upgrading is simply not possible in QUANG BIN without the presence of permanent security forces in the hamlets. Not that the enemy has made a concentrated effort to specifically target APC hamlets, but sector simply does not have the forces to both run operations and then leave them in the hamlets for the upgrading process to be successful.

f. Economic Revival: Planting for the 3rd Lunar Month crop has been completed with 18,000 hectares of local rice and 830 hectares of improved IR-8 rice. The official price of American rice was increased by three piasters per kg. for the long grain variety and by 4.34 piasters per kg. for the round grain. The purpose is to bring the price of American rice in line with that of the Vietnamese rice and thus encourage more local production. Whereas QUANG BIN is permitted an import of 3,800 tons of American rice per month, none was brought in for the month of December. As a year-end average the Province is producing nearly 65% of the rice it consumes. The limited experience with improved IR-8 has already shown encouraging yields.

The fishing industry continues to be hampered by war-time restrictions, but the monthly catch remains stable at 670 tons. The Province is experiencing a shortage of commercial fertilizer and in many areas none is attainable at any price.

g. Resettlement and Care of Refugees. Of vital importance to the refugee effort in QUANG BIN was the realization in December by GVN/Allied forces of the proper aspects of refugee reception and care. Operation HEUDE RIVER was carried out in a spirit of concern and with a sense of urgency for the welfare of the displaced population. Province officials have also displayed a new sense of understanding. A Refugee Service Officer has been present at the site of Operation VILLAIN HUNT in DUY XUYEN District where over 2,300 refugees have been generated and have been cared for since mid-December. For the first time, the Province made rice available from its own funds for such displaced people. In DUC DUC District, however, the 1,300 refugees generated by the joint (ARVN) Ranger/US Marine Operation LE LOI/TAYLOR COMBON are in a worse plight. The possibility of returning to their original hamlets is nil, as the commander of the Ranger group has pursued a scorch-earth policy and none of the homes remain. The refugees are presently being cared for at the refugee reception center at AN HOI.

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4. National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi. No change to report for the month of December

9 Incl  
1-9 Monthly District Reports

*Warren E. Parker*  
WARREN E. PARKER  
Province Senior Advisor  
QUANG NAM Province

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DAI LOC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1966  
(Enclosure 1 to MCS-MACCORDS-01-57)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

- a. The degree of control exercised by GVN officials, day and night, remains unchanged.
- b. The pacification effort remains unchanged.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. Military operations, day and night, conducted by RF and PF units have continued during the month. A total of 52 day operations and 423 night operations or ambushes were conducted. Fifteen contacts with VC were established resulting in 6 VC KIA and 6 RF/PF KIA and 18 RF/PF WIA. The Mobile Advisory Team (MAT) arrived in the District on 3 December 1966. Between 6 - 25 December 1966, the MAT participated in 35 operations with the RF/PF. One joint operation with 1st Bn, 7th Marines was conducted by three PF platoons. The 1/7 Marines provided security for rice harvesters in the vicinity of Liberty Bridge.

b. During the month, 137 payments, in the amount of 400,000\$VN, were made to refugees by the Provincial Refugee Service. In addition, the 29th CA Company provided plywood for work on the TRUCNG AN Hamlet School. The US Marine engineers are providing bulldozers to level the land for construction of an elementary school in LOC QUAN; construction of the school is a project being conducted by the US Marines.


c. There has been a slight increase in VC initiated activity this month as compared to last month --- the majority of this activity being concentrated in the latter part of the month.

d. The MACV Advisory Team moved into the new team house on 13 and 14 Dec. Work has been completed on the combined Army advisory, Vietnamese, and Marine TOC at the new location. Work has been progressing on strengthening the compound defenses; wire has been strung and one bunker is nearing completion.

3. (C) Problem Areas

The overall security status in the District remains as the biggest problem area.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ NGUYEN VAN KE.

  
KENNETH E. SHORT  
MAJ, IN  
District Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

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DIEN BAN DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure 2 to RCS-RECORDS-01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

During the past month there has been positive movement towards pacification in the APC hamlets.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. The District Chief has initiated action to improve his services' contributions to the status of pacification.

b. The Vietnamese Information Service has been engaged in activities in the APC hamlets.

c. Surveys have recently been conducted of the District's educational facilities.


d. The USMC has assisted in providing security for schools in the District.

e. Action has been initiated to improve the facilities of the District Headquarters.

f. Three self-help projects were completed during the month.

3. (C) Problem Areas

The improved security resulting from Operation MEADE RIVER, conducted in November in DIEN BAN, is proving to have been short-lived. Intelligence indicates recent re-infiltration of NVA battalion-size units, clearly suggesting the possibility of future large scale attacks in the District. The month saw 23 enemy-initiated attacks and six mineings along National Route #1. It would appear that the insufficient number of allied forces in DIEN BAN cannot guarantee swift progress in pacification.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ HOANG NGOC DU.

CHARLES W. PHILLIPS  
MAJ, AT  
District Senior Advisor

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DUC DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure 3 to RCS-RECORDS-01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

There has been no significant change in the status of pacification.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. Overall security increased during the month due to the large influx of US and other friendly forces into the District; however, the enemy continues to retain the capability of launching small unit operations at will.

b. Enemy activity was concentrated on propaganda and terroristic tactics: mining the road to District Headquarters; destruction of AN HOA Industrial Complex vehicles; assassination of the MY SON Hamlet Chief.

c. US and FVMLF generated 1100 refugees/detainees without providing advance notice. As a result, district and province officials were hard put to adequately cope with all necessities.

d. The DIOCC had its most successful month since its inception with a reported 40 VCI eliminated.

3. (U) Problem Areas

The district Chief has no vehicle for his own use and must rely entirely on the advisory team for all transportation. Besides the inconvenience, such a situation leads to strained relations in a very short time.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ DANG VAN TRIEM

  
BERNARD W. GRITZER  
MAJ, AF  
District Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN



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HIEU DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1968  
 (Enclosure 5 to RCS-MACCORDS 01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

There has been a marked improvement in the level of pacification. Interest on the part of the Vietnamese has increased significantly.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. Redeployment of RF/PF platoons has proven extremely valuable in interdicting enemy movement. RF/PF morale has shown great improvement and may rightly be attributed to the strong leadership shown by the new District Chief as well as to recent successes against the enemy.

b. The APC hamlet of CAM TOLI TAY was hit three times by enemy squads during the month; the hamlet is a key location for the defense of the District Headquarters and has been a traditional target. Funds for self-help projects in the four APC hamlets have been obtained but materials are difficult to get. There have been 112 people organized in Popular Self-Defense Forces in the APC hamlets but no training has been given and no weapons received. Of the 500 persons organized in the PSDF in the other hamlets, only 89 have received arms.

c. MAT training continues to be well received by the PF platoons. The Marine CAP units remain stationary despite the general concurrence on the desire to make them mobile. More planning and coordination of effort is required in order to implement the mobile concept.

3. (C) Problem Areas

a. Attempts to encourage local night-time military activity has not generated enthusiasm on the part of the District officials.

b. Emphasis on upgrading APC hamlets has distracted effort on self-help projects in the other hamlets.

4. (U) District Chief: HOANG CONG TRUC.

  
 HARRY R. HAWKINS  
 MAJ, AT  
 District Senior Advisor

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HIEU NHON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1968

(Enclosure 6 to RCS-MACCORDS-01-57)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

The situation in HIEU NHON has not appreciably changed during the month.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. The NAT group carried out training in ambush tactics for two RF companies. NAT activity has been hampered by the lack of a permanent RF group commander.

b. The 135th RF company was redeployed within the District to the THANH AN APC Hamlet to provide further security for the entire CAM HA Village area. The 135th Co., which is itself a relatively new unit, trained 40 Popular Self Defense people at THANH AN, though these local defenders have not been issued weapons.


c. A new mobile CAP unit was established on CAM NAM Island.

d. Of 15 subsector-initiated company-size operations of the month, six made contact: No friendly losses; 17 VC killed and five captured.

e. PHUONG HOANG continued to generate VCI eliminations: 3 Hoi Chanh, 7 KIA, and 24 captured.

3. (C) Problem Areas

The constant shifting of RF companies in and out of the District has a desultory effect on efforts to maintain smooth operations.

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ VO VAN SANG


RICHARD S.Y. HONG  
MAJ, IN  
District Senior Advisor

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HOA VANG DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure 7 to RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

Pacification continued to progress at a slow but steady rate during the month. A general increase in enemy activities produced short-term, but localized, set backs; for the most part, however, these were appropriately handled by timely action on the part of District officials.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. Enemy daylight activity -- previously an uncommon phenomena -- occurred throughout the District. These increased sightings and ground contacts may be caused by the increase in recent friendly night-time operations or may indicate a new sense of urgency on the part of the enemy.


b. Noticeable clashing of GVN and VC interests and forces in the APC hamlets may be indicative of modest success of the program.

c. DIOCC reaction to perishable intelligence has improved. The establishment of an effective data base on VCI has not shown satisfactory improvements and more effort is being directed to this end.

d. An enemy attack on HOA MINH Village killed the deputy village chief as well as two members of the Popular Self Defense Group; a home memorial service was arranged.

3. (U) Problem Areas: None

4. (U) District Chief: MAJ MAI XUAN HAU.



FREDERICK D. ELFERS  
FSO-5, Dept of State  
District Senior Advisor

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QUE SON DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure 8 to RGS-MAGCORDS-01-67)

1. (U) Status of Pacification

Overall status of pacification remained unchanged during the month. Effort continues but little progress can be reported in the APC hamlet upgrading scheme.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

Though hostile activity was not widespread in the District, that which did take place was by and large restricted to the APC hamlets. Both GVN and VC efforts were very noticeable there. Enemy terrorist-type activities have successfully intimidated the people and have rendered the hamlets ill-disposed to overtly supporting GVN programs such as self-help projects. The four APC hamlets within the MOC BAI Vital Area have, however, been able to see successful completion of several projects with the assistance of the 51st CA Platoon. Two successful pacification projects that are unrelated to the APC were completed during the month: the RF/PF hospital in QUE SON and a culvert-type bridge that links previously separated ends of the same village.


3. (C) Problem Areas

a. Lack of security and concomitant lack of enthusiastic participation in self-help projects on the part of the people.

b. Lack of fortification and barrier material for upgrading security in AN XUAN APC Hamlet.

c. Shortages of canteens, helmets, web gear, and aid kits for the PF platoons.

4. (U) District Chief: CPT NGUYEN CONG CHINH.



WILLIAM C. SIMPSON  
MAJ, IV  
District Senior Advisor

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THUONG DUC DISTRICT NARRATIVE REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1968  
(Enclosure 9 to RGS-MAAGCORDS-01-67)

1. (C) Status of Pacification

The pacification program appears to be moving along as planned.

2. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification

a. A MEDCAP Program was instituted coordinating Special Forces medical personnel with the District Medical Advisor in order to provide continuing care at the LOC BINH Village dispensary. The Vietnamese Information Service office was moved from its temporary location to a permanent building which is centrally located and enables the loudspeakers to be heard throughout the whole of HAI HIEP Hamlet. The Vietnamese construction engineer arrived here on 24 December 1968 to start building of a maternity ward for the THUONG DUC Dispensary.

b. Peoples' Self Defense Forces have been established. 504 men and women have been chosen, 42 of the people are receiving training three half-days a week, and 60 weapons have been received. Upon completion of their training they will in-turn train the other Self Defense Forces in a similar five week program. Defensive positions of the 135th Popular Force Platoon have been remade and are now considered adequate. The outpost defenses manned by a platoon of the 704th Regional Force Company were improved by the addition of a 60mm mortar. The refugees from the October enemy attack were paid by GVN officials. The District Chief's performance has been much more aggressive than the former chief's; it appears the village and hamlet chiefs look upon him as a man of leadership.

3. (C) Problem Areas

The enemy can shell and mount a ground attack at almost any time. On the 26th of December a 175mm artillery round landed in HA TAN Hamlet and burned 12 buildings. The change of Senior District Advisors has been accomplished without any apparent difficulties.

4. (U) District Chief: CPT LE VAN LANG.

S/Fred J. Stubbs  
T/FRED J. STUBBS  
CPT, IN  
District Senior Advisor

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