

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Antitank Battalion  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3:RRT:tjs  
5750  
5 June 1966


From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Chronology


Ref: (a) DivO 5750.2  
(b) DivO 3480.1

Encl: (1) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

  
ROBERT E. HARRIS

Declassified by the Director of  
Marine Corps History and Museums  
in accordance with the provisions  
of CMO ltr Ser 003D323/233035 of  
21 Feb 1979

 Signature Date 7/11/97

101 A T BN

17 June 1966

Tab (10) to appendix A to enclosure (1) to  
CG, 1ST MarDiv ltr Ser: 00152-66 of 2 June 66.

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5 June 1966

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1. 1st Antitank Battalion (-), 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

a. Location: Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam

b. Period Covered by Report: 1 - 31 May 1966

c. Name/Rank of Commanding Officer, Staff and Chief Subordinates:

|                       |                    |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| (1) Maj. R. E. HARRIS | Commanding Officer |
| Maj. A. J. EAGAN      | Executive Officer  |
| SgtMaj C. C. DOBBS    | SgtMajor           |

(2) Executive Staff

|                        |              |
|------------------------|--------------|
| 2nd Lt. D. W. MANIFOLD | S-1/Adjutant |
| 1st Lt. F. S. ROE      | S-2          |
| Maj. A. J. EAGAN       | S-3          |
| 1st Lt. T. F. DEMPSEY  | S-4          |

(3) Special Staff

|                           |                              |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1st Lt. K. S. HENDRICKSON | Supply Officer               |
| 1st Lt. D. B. SHIKER      | Comm-Elect Officer           |
| 1st Lt. J. M. KELLY       | Motor Transport Officer      |
| CWO E. A. ANASZEWICZ      | Ordnance/Maintenance Officer |

(4) Subordinate Commanders

Capt. W. F. SNYDER - Company Commander, H&S Company  
Capt. G. R. VAN HORN - Company Commander, Company A  
Capt. J. E. FELKER - Company Commander, Company B  
Capt. J. W. SCHROEDER - Company Commander, Company C

2. Commander's Narrative Summary of Significant Events

a. At the beginning of the reporting period LtCol W. MOORE was commanding the 1st Antitank Battalion. Company A, reinforced with two platoon from Company B, 1st Antitank Battalion, was in direct support of the Chu Lai Defense Command and the 1st Marines. Company B (-) was attached to Regimental Landing Team - 5. Company C was in direct support of the 7th Marines.

b. On 1 May, this Battalion commenced operational planning to support the 7th Marines in Operation MONTGOMERY, based on information contained in reference (a). An operational brief, "Concept of Antitank Support", was prepared and submitted to the Commanding Officer, 7th Marines to assist him in planning and coordinating Ontos support. See reference (b).

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5 June 1966

c. Liaison with the Commanding Officer, 7th Marines and Staff indicated that Ontos support for Operation MONTGOMERY would exceed the number organic to Company C, their direct support AT Company. To fill this requirement, two platoons from Company A were placed OPCON Company C for the duration of the operation. The 7th Marine Regimental Frag Order initially task organized the 1st Antitank Battalion (-) as a subordinate command for this operation.

d. Based on the guidance received from the 7th Marines, this Battalion prepared Fragmentary Order 301/1-66. However, prior to its issuance the 7th Marines published a change to their task organization, listing Company C, 1st AT Bn vice the 1st AT Bn (-). Consequently, the order was not issued. It is included in this Command Chronology as reference (c) for the information of higher headquarters.

e. Company C reinforced with two platoons from Company A, participated in Operation MONTGOMERY in direct support of the 7th Marines. See references (d), (e) and (f).

f. On 2 May, Maj J. J. KEEFE, the Battalion S-4, was transferred to the 1st Marines. 1st Lt. T. F. DEMPSEY was assigned as S-4. See references (g) and (h).

g. On 7 May, the 1st Platoon, Company B, which had been attached to BLT-1/5 since July 1965 CHOP this Battalion. The platoon was attached to Company A (Rein) pending the arrival of Headquarters, Company B from Okinawa. See reference (i).

h. On 14 May, MSgt D. W. MANIFOLD was assigned as Battalion S-1. See reference (j).

i. On 14 May, 1st Lt. J. A. LANE, the Battalion S-2, was transferred to the 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Sgt J. J. KU was assigned as S-2. See references (j) and (k).

j. During the period 20-22 May, Company C participated in Operation MORGAN in direct support of the 7th Marines. See references (d) and (l).

k. On 24 May, LtCol Walter MOORE, the Battalion Commander, was reassigned as Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines. Maj. Robert E. HARRIS, the Battalion Executive Officer, assumed command of this Battalion. Maj. A. J. EAGAN was assigned as Battalion Executive Officer, retaining the position of S-3 as an additional duty. See references (m), (n) and (o).

l. On 24 May, 1st Lt. F. S. ROE was assigned as Battalion S-2 vice Sgt KU. See reference (o).

m. During the period 24-29 May Company C participated in Operation MOBILE in direct support of the 7th Marines. A 1st Antitank Battalion reconnaissance team was attached to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Command Group during this operation. Its mission was to reconnoiter

ENCLOSURE (1)

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the new 1/7 sector of the 7th Marines TAOR to determine Ontos trafficability and employment in the area. See references (d), (p) and (q).

n. On 27 May, Headquarters, Company B, which had been attached to BLT-5 since 1 March 1966, CHOP this Battalion. For the first time since May 1965 this Battalion had administrative and operational control of its three organic antitank companies. Company B rejoined its two organic platoons from Company A. The 3rd Platoon, Company B is presently attached to BLT-3/5 on SLF duty. See references (r) and (2).

o. On 27 May, MSgt MANIFOLD, the Battalion S-1/Adjutant was promoted to the rank of Second Lieutenant. See reference (t).

p. On 29 May, Company A was placed in direct support of the 5th Marines. Company B was placed in direct support of the Chu Lai Defense Command by the Commanding Officer's verbal order.

q. During the reporting period units of this Battalion participated in three major operations and escorted in excess of thirty convoys outside the 1st Marine Division TAOR.

### 3. Detailed Description of Significant Events

a. The following Marines of this Command were awarded the Purple Heart Medal for wounds received in combat operations in the Republic of Vietnam:

#### Company A

PFC R. L. POTTS, 2099103  
ICpl J. L. BRADSHAW, 2098748

#### Company C

Sgt R. L. WILLIAMS, 1885850  
PFC E. P. LENSEIGNIE, 2129132  
PFC J. P. PRICE, 2113934

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5 June 1966

Appendix 1 (List of References) to 1st Antitank Battalion Command Chronology  
(May 1966)

1. The following references apply to paragraph 2 (Commander's Narrative Summary of Significant Events) of this Command Chronology.

- Ref: (a) CG, 1stMarDiv msg 301334Z  
(b) "Concept of Antitank Support"  
(c) 1st AT Bn Frag Order 301/1-66  
(d) Company C Command Chronology  
(e) Company A Command Chronology  
(f) After Action Report; Operation MONTGOMERY  
(g) Division Special Order #138-66  
(h) Battalion Special Order #38-66  
(i) 1st AT Bn OPSTAT #001 of 7 May 1966  
(j) Battalion Special Order 43-66  
(k) Division Special Order 131-66  
(l) After Action Report; Operation MORGAN  
(m) Division Special Order 165-66  
(n) Division Special Order 166-66  
(o) Battalion Special Order 46-66  
(p) After Action Report; Operation MOBILE  
(q) Report submitted to Commanding Officer, 1st AT Bn: Reconnaissance of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines TAOR  
(r) Company B Command Chronology  
(s) 1st AT Bn SITREP # 37 of 28 May 1966  
(t) ALMAR 18

5750  
5 June 1966

Appendix 2 (Documentation) to 1st Antitank Battalion Command Chronology  
(May 1966)

1. Documentation for the 1st Antitank Battalion Command Chronology for the period 1 - 31 May 1966 is provided by the TABS to this appendix.

TAB

- A - Company A Command Chronology
- ✓ B - Company B (-) Command Chronology (27-31 May) [See Map for Map - 29 May]
- ✓ C - Company C Company Chronology
- ✓ D - "Concept of Antitank Support"
- ✓ E - 1st AT Bn Frag Order 301/1-66
- ✓ F - After Action Report; Operation MONTGOMERY
- ✓ G - After Action Report; Operation MORGAN
- ✓ H - After Action Report; Operation MOBILE
- ✓ I - Report Submitted to the Commanding Officer, 1st AT Bn: Reconnaissance of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines T4OR
- ✓ J - 1st AT Bn SITREP #37 of 28 May 1966

COMPANY A  
1st Antitank Battalion  
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
APO San Francisco, California 96602

WJH:wan  
3500  
30 May 66

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 1st Antitank Battalion

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) BnO 3430.1

Encl: (1) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosure (1) is submitted.

G. R. VANHORN

U.S. 1st ATB

20 May 66

## COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

### 1. Organization Data, including attachments.

a. At the beginning of the reporting period the company was located at Chu Lai, Viet Nam. At that time the company was composed of Company Headquarters and four Ontos platoons. On 8 May 1966 joined the 1st platoon, CoB, 1st ATBn from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. No attachments.

b. Period Covered: - 1May - 31May66

c. Name/Rank of Commanding Officer: - Captain G. R. VANHORN

d. Average monthly strength during period.

|          | USMC | NAVY |
|----------|------|------|
| OFFICERS | 5    | 0    |
| ENLISTED | 115  | 1    |

### 2. Sequential listing of significant events as they related to:

a. Personnel: the personnel situation remained the same during the reporting period.

b. Operations: the 2nd, 3rd and 4th platoons participated in operation "MONTGOMERY" period of 6 - 12May66.

(1) The Company Headquarters with the 2nd&3rd platoons were in direct support of the Chu Lai Defense Command during the reporting period.

## DETAIL CHRONOLOGY

11May66 Company Headquarters and two Ontos platoons were in D/S of the Chu Lai Defense Command. They remained in same during the reporting period. The 4th platoon remained in support of the 2ndBn, 5th Marines. The 5th platoon remained in support of the 1stBn, 5th Marines.

6May66 2nd, 3rd and 4th platoons participated in operation "MONTGOMERY".

8May66 PFC POTTS and LCpl BRADSHAW of the 1st Platoon Company A, 1st Antitank Battalion received shell fragment wounds during a Viet Cong mortar attack on Hill 69.

Joined from BSCo, 1stBn, 5th Marines, 1st platoon, Company B, 1st Antitank Battalion.

25May66 Pvt COX of the 5th Platoon, Company A, 1st Antitank Battalion received accidental self-inflicted gunshot wound, right foot when loading pistol in a defensive position.

ENCLOSURE (1)

COMPANY B  
1st Antitank Battalion  
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

JEF/jak  
3000  
2 June 1966

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 1st Antitank Battalion (Attn: S-3)  
Subj: Command Chronology  
Ref: (a) DivO 3450.1

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following report is submitted:

(a) Organization Data: 1 headquarters section, 2 Ontos platoons

(1) Location: Chu Lai Defense Command

(2) Period covered by report: 27 - 31 May 1966

(3) Name/rank of Commanding Officer: J. E. FELKER, Captain

(b) Commanding Officer's narrative of significant events:

27 May 66 - Returned to operational control of 1st ATBN  
Joined 1st and 2nd platoons; 3rd platoon on SLP with  
LT 3/5

29 May 66 - Assigned to Chu Lai Defense Command

J. E. FELKER

27 May 66, 1st ATBN

27 May 66

Tab B

COMPANY "C"  
1st Antitank Battalion  
1st Marine Division (Rein), 11th  
San Francisco, California 96011

JJG/rdb  
JL20  
2 June 1966

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 1st Antitank Battalion (Rein: 3-3)  
Subj: Command Chronology  
Ref: (a) EnO 348.01  
Encl: (1) Command Chronology  
1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosure (1) is submitted.

J. W. SORCEDAR

100-100-100

100-100-100

100-100-100

## COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

### Organizational Data

#### 1. Locations

- a. Company Headquarters RT 534021
- b. 1st Platoon RT 584010
- c. 2nd Platoon RT 534021
- d. 3rd Platoon RT 542990

#### 2. Period Covered by Report 1 May 1966 through 31 May 1966.

#### 3. Principal Personnel

- |                            |                                 |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Commanding Officer         | Captain J. W. SCHROEDER         |
| First Sergeant             | First Sergeant L. L. SANDERSON  |
| Platoon Commander, 1st Plt | First Lieutenant L. T. SCHMIDT  |
| Platoon Commander, 2nd Plt | First Lieutenant L. J. CONNOLLY |
| Platoon Commander, 3rd Plt | First Lieutenant D. R. WEST     |

#### 4. Narrative of Significant Events

2 May 1966 through 14 May 1966 Company "C" (-) (Bn) with two Onco platoons from Company "A" (A-2 and B-2) become OIC of the 7th Marine Regiment for Operation "MONTGOMERY". See the Montgomery After Action Report.

16 May 1966 0730-1100 Major R. E. HARRIS, Executive Officer, 1st Anti-tank Battalion made a tour of the Company "C" area and the Onco Platoon area.

16 May 1966 1500-1730 after normal weekly conferences, Major A. J. MADAN, S-3, 1st Anti-tank Battalion, attended planning conferences in preparation for Operation "MORGAN".

19 May 1966 Onco from the 1st and 3rd platoons participated in a Tank/Infantry rehearsal with the Reconnaissance Company, 2nd ARVN Force gung Regt.

20 May 1966 through 21 May 1966 as a company in joint Marine/ARVN combination search and destroy sweep with a Company B at the conclusion. Code name Operation "MORGAN". See the After-Action report for details.

23 May 1966 attended planning conference for Operation "PRIDE" Joint Marine/ARVN search and destroy mission.

24 May 1966 through 29 May 1966 Company "C" OPCON 7th Marine Regiment for Operation "MOBILE". See After-Action report for details.

28 May 1966 Battalion Commander Major R. E. BARTON issued the below citations Purple Hearts at a Company formation for wounds received during Operation "MONTGOMERY".

Sergeant P. L. WILLIAMS 1665050/0353 USMC

Private First Class E. P. LESLIGER 2129132/0353 USMC

Private First Class J. P. PRICE 2117934/0353 USMC

#### 5. Addition Comments

a. During the month of May, Company "C" escorted 27 convoys outside the Chu Lai Enclave and participated in three major operations with the 7th Marine Regiment which placed Company "C", 1st Antitank Battalion under Operational Control of the 7th Marine Regiment 22 days of the 31 days in the month of May.

J. W. SCHROEDER

SECRET

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1st Antitank Bn \_\_\_\_\_  
Cin Ltr, RVN  
021330H Apr 1966

Concept of Antitank Support

Ref: (a) CG, 1st MarDiv 301334Z

Time Zone: H

1st ANTITANK BATTALION  
S & C LOG NO. 0027-66  
COPY \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_

1. MISSION. Co. C, First Antitank Battalion is attached by reference (a) to 7th Marines (-)(Rein) for Operation HUNGUAI.
2. CONCEPT. Preliminary planning indicates anticipated use of Ontos in two different missions during the operation; support of artillery elements moving with AMVH forces on D-1, and (on order) overland movement on D-day to establish a blocking position and/or provide direct fire support to infantry (see overlay). To best provide the desired support, Co. C has been reinforced with one additional AF platoon from this battalion. Additionally, the battalion will provide a liaison team to be located with Tanks and Aptracs in the vicinity of the Regimental Command Post, a logistics contact team to be located at the ISA, and a reinforced rifle squad, to be located initially with the logistics team. These teams will provide their own communications between each other and the AF Bn Command Post. The following coordinating details are furnished:

a. Composition of Liaison Team.

| <u>Personnel</u> |    | <u>Equipment</u> |
|------------------|----|------------------|
| CO, 1st AIBn     | 1  | 2 - M22          |
| S-3              | 1  | 1 - M/ASC 36     |
| LnO              | 1  | 1 - M/ASC 83     |
| CommO            | 1  |                  |
| Others           | 7  |                  |
| Total            | 11 |                  |

b. Composition of Logistics Contact Team.

| <u>Personnel</u> |   | <u>Equipment</u> |
|------------------|---|------------------|
| S-4, 1st ATRn    | 1 | 1 - truck, 135   |
| Others           | 3 | 1 - truck, 137   |
| Total            | 4 | 1 - wrecker, 152 |

SECRET

c. Reconnaissance development of (Info).

(1) 1-1

AT Company (HQ and 4 platoons), 1st Battalion teams proceed in convoy with Regimental Recon Group. One AT platoon and its liaison officer remain with command group. Rest of AT teams and one AT platoon proceed to B3. AT Company (-) (HQ and 2 platoons) in direct support 3/11 for move to artillery firing positions.


(2) 1-2

One AT platoon remain B3 3/11. AT Company (HQ and 3 platoons) conduct mechanized sweep to blocking positions in vicinity Hai Han (GS 5370) as a main objective. It is recommended that this Company be reinforced with a minimum of two squads of infantry, one of which may be a clearing team, and an artillery platoon. The possibility of obtaining augmentation by Landing Helicopter Carriers is being explored through liaison with the Sector Advisor to 2nd MAF Division.


1/22/68

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps


Commanding



D-1 BLACK  
D DAY BLUE



ARVN  
ARTY  
ATCo (-)



130.7.54 114.16  
7-2-6

SECRET

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1st AT Bn  
Chu Lai, RVN  
04110H Apr 1966

Fragmentary Order 301/1-66

Ref: (a) 1st AT Bn OpOrder 301-66  
(b) 7th Mar OpOrder 329-66 (To be issued)  
(c) BnO P2000.1 (Communication Electronics SOP)  
(d) DivO O2000.2 (CEOI)

Time Zone: H

1st ANTITANK BATTALION  
S & C LOG NO. 0026-66  
COPY 1 OF 5

Task Organization.

1st Antitank Battalion (-)  
H&S Co (-)

LtCol MOORE

Co "C" (-)(Rein) 1st AT Bn  
1st Plt Co C  
2d Plt Co C  
2d Plt Co A  
4th Plt Co A

Capt SCHROEDER

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. Annex A (Intelligence).

b. Friendly forces.

- (1) 2d ARVN Division on D-1 attacks west in assigned TAOR, clears firing positions for artillery and conducts search and destroy operations.
- (2) 7th Marines (-)(Rein) on D-Day lands in LZ's to be announced and attacks northwest in assigned TAOR.
- (3) 3/11 (-)(Rein) DS 7th Mar (-)(Rein).
- (4) 1st TK Bn (-) DS 7th Mar (-)(Rein) on D-Day attacks Southwest from Binh Sohn in Tank/Infantry/LVT column.
- (5) SLF remains off shore available for employment.

c. Attachments and detachments.

- (1) On D-day, on order, 1st Antitank Battalion (-) will be reinforced with one (1) rifle platoon and one (1) Engineer Demolition/ Mine Clearing Team.

2. MISSION.

1st Antitank Battalion DS 7th Marines (-)(Rein)

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation.

One platoon convoy and firing position security on D-2; Company Command group and two platoons DS 3/11 on D-1; Company (-)(Rein) attacks west to phase line Dog on D-day. See Annex B (Operation Overlay). Overall concept of Ontos employment is subject to change as the enemy situation develops.

b. Co C (-)(Rein)

- (1) On D-2, provide convoy and firing position security to 3/11 (-)(Rein), with one platoon.
- (2) On D-1, provide convoy security to remaining elements of 7th Mar (-)(Rein); on arrival objective area, provide DS to 3/11 (-)(Rein), with two platoons. One platoon to remain vicinity Regimental CP; one platoon to remain vicinity LSA.
- (3) On D-Day, on order, with three platoons and attachments, attack on assigned axis of advance to phase line Dog; prepare to support infantry by fire. One platoon to remain DS 3/11 (-)(Rein).
- (4) Prepare to perform other DS missions in addition to, or in lieu of those assigned.

c. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) D-Day: 8 May 1966.

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1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions and activities. It emphasizes that this is essential for ensuring transparency and accountability in the organization's operations.

2. The second part of the document outlines the various methods and tools used to collect and analyze data. It highlights the need for consistent and reliable data collection processes to support effective decision-making.

3. The third part of the document focuses on the role of technology in data management and analysis. It discusses how modern software solutions can streamline data collection, storage, and reporting, thereby improving efficiency and accuracy.

4. The fourth part of the document addresses the challenges associated with data security and privacy. It stresses the importance of implementing robust security measures to protect sensitive information from unauthorized access and breaches.

5. The fifth part of the document discusses the importance of data quality and integrity. It notes that high-quality data is crucial for generating accurate insights and making informed business decisions.

6. The sixth part of the document explores the role of data in strategic planning and performance management. It explains how data-driven insights can help organizations identify trends, set goals, and track progress effectively.

7. The seventh part of the document concludes by summarizing the key points discussed and emphasizing the overall importance of data in driving organizational success.

8. The final part of the document provides a brief overview of the document's structure and content, serving as a quick reference for readers.

- [REDACTED]
- (2) All vehicles, tracked or wheeled, will be hardened with sandbags before departing the Combat Base.
  - (3) Carry deep water fording kits for all Ontos.
  - (4) Be prepared to destroy Ontos if capture is imminent; destruction will not be carried out without specific authorization from Commanding Officer, First Antitank Battalion (-).
  - (5) All personnel will be alert for anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.
  - (6) SITREPS will be submitted to this Headquarters at 0600, 1200, 1800 and 2400 daily. SPCTREPS as contacts occur.
  - (7) Annex B, Operation Overlay.
  - (8) Ontos will not proceed or fire beyond phase line Dog, except on authenticated order.
  - (9) Hill Nui Tran BS 515780 is occupied by friendly troops. It will not be fired upon except on authenticated order.
  - (10) Unclassified code name of Operation: MONTGOMERY.

h. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Supply.

(1) General.

- (a) FLSG-B provides all classes of supply.
- (b) The LSA will be established in vicinity Quang Nai Airfield, coord (BS 610719) by LtCO on D-Day.
- (c) The S-4 will provide a representative in the LSA to receive organic weapons and equipment of casualties.

(2) Prescribed loads.

- (a) Class I - 4 MEC's will fuel per individual.

- (b) Class II - Combat essential as prescribed by unit commanders.
- (c) Class III - Vehicles full, 5 gal. fuel cans mounted on vehicles.
- (d) Class IV - As required.
- (e) Class V - Basic Allowance.
- (f) Water - 2 canteens per individual. Two bottles purification tablets per man. 2 five gallon cans per vehicle.
- c. Distribution.
- (1) Prescribed loads sustain units on D-Day.
  - (2) Unit distribution on D-1 using helicopters in direct support of units requesting supplies.
- d. Resupply.
- (1) Resupply will be requested through Battalion S-4.
  - (2) Requests for morning resupply will be submitted by 1930 the night before. Requests for evening resupply will be submitted by 1430 if the tactical situation permits. Normal resupply ceases at dark.
- e. Captured material.
- (1) Captured material will be evacuated to the 7th Marine CP and turned over to the Intelligence Officer.
- f. Salvage. The Battalion S-4 will be kept informed of all material requiring salvage. When practicable all such material will be returned to the ISA. No materials of potential use to the enemy will be left abandoned or unguarded.
- g. Transportation of supplies.
- (1) By truck/air from FLSG-B.

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- [REDACTED]
- (2) Eight (8) Helicopters will be assigned to the LSA for direct support of each Battalion.(Infantry Battalion).

h. Medical.

- (1) The Company C Corpsman will support that Company in the objective area.
- (2) Casualties who need further medical treatment will be helicopter lifted to collecting points in the objective area and will be evacuated to 1st Medical Battalion at Chu Lai.

i. Personnel.

- (1) Unit Commanders will submit a six line impression to Battalion Headquarters (original and two) of participants in the operation, prior to 1600, 4 May 1966.
- (2) Unit Commanders will provide Battalion (forward) with any changes in personnel status prior to 0645 daily (report will cover period 0600-0559 daily).
- (3) In the event of casualties, Unit Commanders will inform Battalion S-1 immediately by the most expeditious means of all the facts.
- (4) The Battalion Medical representative at Medical Battalion will be designated by the Battalion Medical Officer. He will be responsible for informing the Battalion S-1 of all 1st Antitank Battalion casualties received at 1st Medical Battalion.
- (5) The Battalion S-1 will be responsible to insure that all casualties are reported to the Division CCRC as soon as information is relayed from the Battalion Medical representative at 1st Medical Battalion. In addition, the Battalion S-1 will insure that the required combat casualty forms are submitted by the Unit Commander at least 10 hours after the casualty has occurred.
- (6) When discussing or reporting casualties the following casualty reporting codes will be utilized:

(a) Battle casualty evacuated.

(b) Killed in action.

(c) Dead of wounds.

(d) Non-Battle, evacuated.

j. Miscellaneous.

(1) No leaves other than emergency leave will be granted.

(2) Decorations and Medals - Recommendations for decorations, medals and awards will be forwarded to this Headquarters within 5 days upon return to encampment.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. See reference (d).

(1) Commanding Officer Company C will maintain the capability of monitoring the Battalion Command Net at all times.

(2) Air panels will be kept available to mark front line positions. VS-4/u (red panels) on odd days and VS-6/u (yellow panels) on even days.

b. Command posts.

(1) 1st AT Bn (-): BS 660757.

(2) Subordinate units report command post locations.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.

WALTER MOORE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

ANNEXES:

A - Intelligence

B - Operation Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Special

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Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies  
1st AT Bn  
Chu Lai, RVN  
O411COH Apr 1966

Annex A (Intelligence) to Fragmentary Order 301/1-66

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6656 I, II; 6756  
III, IV

Time Zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. Composition. Recent intelligence reports indicate that enemy forces in the area of operations consist of both local force and main force units. Local forces are known to have NVN advisors. Main force units consist of both regular Viet Cong and NVA forces. Elements of the 1st VC Regiment are believed to be regrouping in the area following Operation HOT SPRINGS.
- b. Strength and disposition. See Appendix 1 (Enemy Disposition Overlay).
- c. Combat Efficiency. Status of training is reported to be good to excellent for main force units. However, the large number of crew served and individual weapons captured during Operation HOT SPRINGS indicated that absence of leaders seriously affects efficiency. Also there are indications that untrained replacements are being integrated into the structure.
- d. Arms and Armament. Latest information and captured weapons continue to indicate that the VC are armed with a cross-section of U.S., ChiCom, and Soviet Bloc small arms, automatic weapons, and ordnance. Local Force and Main Force units are known to possess a 60mm/81mm mortar and 57mm/75mm recoilless rifle support capability. Also a number of 12.7mm and modified .50 cal. machine guns are in their inventory. However, due to losses in Operation HOT SPRINGS the number of enemy major caliber weapons may be depleted in the area of operations.
- e. Reinforcements. The enemy could possibly be reinforced by the 18th NVA Regiment which is reported to be proceeding northward from Binh Dinh Province.

UNCLASSIFIED

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

- a. Determine locations, strength, identifications and combat efficiency of enemy troop concentrations.
- b. Determine location of enemy fortified positions.
- c. Determine location and description of all obstacles to tracked or wheeled vehicular movement.
- d. Report location and types of AT mines encountered.
- e. Determine location of by-passes, status of bridges, and suitability of terrain for cross-country motor movement.
- f. Report any corrections or additions to maps.
- g. Report any likely areas for fording Song Tra Khuc River.

3. COLLECTION PLAN.

- a. The following collection plan will be used in conjunction with paragraph 2 (Essential Elements of Information).

|    | Co. C | API | AO | 7th Marines | G-2 | ARVN |
|----|-------|-----|----|-------------|-----|------|
| a. | X     |     | X  | X           | X   | X    |
| b. | X     | X   | X  | X           | X   | X    |
| c. | X     |     | X  | X           | X   | X    |
| d. | X     |     |    | X           | X   | X    |
| e. | X     | X   | X  |             |     |      |
| f. | X     |     | X  | X           | X   | X    |
| g. | X     |     | X  |             |     |      |

- b. Company and platoon commanders will ensure that EEI's are disseminated to all Marines participating in Operation Montgomery. Information as collected will be passed up the chain of command to Battalion Headquarters. Evaluation of the EEI and dissemination to higher and adjacent units will be handled by the Operations Center of the 1st Antitank Battalion.

UNCLASSIFIED

4. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA AFFECTING ONTOS OPERATIONS.

- a. Weather. No change anticipated during the duration of Operation.
- b. Trafficability. See Appendix 2 (Reconnaissance Overlays).

WALTER MOORE

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Enemy Disposition Overlay
- 2 - Reconnaissance Overlays

DISTRIBUTION: Special

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1st AT Bn, May 66 - Table  
 Appendix 1 (Enemy Disposition Overlay) to Annex A  
 (Intelligence) to Fragmentary Order 301/1-66

MAP DATA


Series A'S L701

Sheet 6756 I, II, III, IV

Scale 1:50,000

LEGEND

? STRENGTH UNKNOWN




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 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

51  
 BS

MAP DATA  
 Series APS L701  
 Sheet 6756-I, II, III, IV  
 Scale 1:50,000



63  
 BS 74

Bridges at points A, B, C, D & E are not strong enough to support an Over. It may possible 1000 meters South of Bridge A-streambed could be traversed and stream forded.

Bypass possible 100 meters north of Bridge B-streambed at B is deep and steep. Bypass 30 meters to South of Bridge C stream can be forded.


Also at least 10 road cuts from 3 feet to 10 feet wide across road vicinity Bridge B. These can be bypassed or maneuvered around just to North or South of road. No moving room restricted however due to village's huts. Good area for AT mines. Remainder of route to East of point E clear.

Bypass 50 meters to South of Bridge D. Stream can be forded there-water is 2 feet to 3 feet deep. There are 2 weak bridges vicinity point E. These can be easily bypassed 100 meters to North.

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 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special

51  
76 — 85



MAP DATA

Series AMS 1701  
Sheet 6756-I, II, III, IV  
Scale 1:50,000

62  
85 — 70

From point A to point B road varies from 8 feet to 14 feet wide. From point B east it is generally 14 feet or wider.

From point C to point D there are numerous (over 30) road cuts ranging from 3 feet to 6 feet wide across road. There are over 100 fox holes, tunnels, and cave entrances along road bank between C and D. Entire length of road on overlay can be traversed by Ontos with many detours around road cuts. Visibility in village areas very restricted and also maneuvering room highly restricted. Many likely areas for AT mines. Soil adjacent to road firm and dry.

Fields of fire and visibility to North and West of Hill 37 generally good—many small clumps of trees south of river however with just have to be maneuvered around and reconnoitered by unit commanders.

WALTER MOORE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Assault Battalion  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
APO San Francisco, California 96602

3088Tetje  
3123  
2 Jun 1966

From Commanding Officer  
To Commanding Officer, 7th Marine Regiment

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report; Operation MONTGOMERY

Encls (1) After Action Report; Operation MONTGOMERY

1. While an After Action Report for the subject operation was not requested from this Headquarters, enclosure (1) is furnished for the information of your command.

ROBERT L. HARRIS

Tab F

1. Code Name. Operation MONTGOMERY (Search and Destroy Operation in conjunction with forces of the 2nd ARVN Infantry and VNMG forces).
2. Dates of Operation. 061300H through 141700H May 1966.
3. Location. Western Sea Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN, Map Sheets 8756 I, II, III, and IV series L70L.
4. Central or Command Headquarters. 7th Marine Regiment, Colonel E. H. HAFFEY Commanding.

5. Task Organization

Company G, 1st AF Bn (Rein)  
 1st Plt, Co G  
 2nd Plt, Co C  
 2nd Plt, Co A  
 2nd Plt, Co B  
 Det, Hq, 1st AF Bn  
 Det, Co G, 1st Regt Bn

Captain J. W. SCHROEDER  
 First Lieutenant E. T. SCHENK  
 First Lieutenant E. J. CONNOLLY  
 Staff Sergeant A. F. HOLMAN  
 First Lieutenant W. D. MESTER  
 First Lieutenant T. F. DEWSEY  
 Corporal R. VENTURA

6. Supporting Forces

- a. Division AG units: A very detailed trafficability study was made of Ontec routes south and north of the Song Tra Khuc into the objective area (See enclosure (2)).
  - b. Division Imagery Interpretation Unit: An excellent mosaic as well as individual photos of bridges, bypasses and barriers were provided along both routes. All material is being maintained by the Battalion GOC for future reference.
  - c. Det, Co C, 1st Engineer Battalion was included in this task organization to provide barrier destruction and to blow in the sides of tank traps for rapid penetration. In actuality, the Ontec column was not committed, so on 13 May 1966 the team blew in three of the more extensive tunnels in An My (2), BS 548742 for the ARVN forces.
  - d. Det, Hq, 1st Antitank Battalion was provided to give added depth to the resupply, maintenance and liaison for the Ontec column during its thrust north of the river. Since the Ontec thrust did not materialize their presence was not exploited.
7. Intelligence. See 1st Marine Division ISUM's for the subject period.
  8. Mission. See 7th Marine (-)(Rein) Regimental Frag Orders 10-66 and 11-66 (Operation MONTGOMERY).

3123  
2 June 1966

9. Concept of Operation. See Concept of Antitank Support, 1st Antitank Battalion, Chu Lai, RVN, 081336Z, May 1966.
10. Execution.
- a. 2 May 1966. At 0700, Company C, 1st AF Bn was attached to 7th Marine Regiment for Operation MONTGOMERY.
- b. 4 May 1966. Received 7th Marine Regimental Frag Order 10-66 (Operation MONTGOMERY).
- c. 6 May 1966. (D minus 2) At 1305, 2nd platoon, Company C departed I.P. for Quang Ngai Airfield. 2nd platoon was placed in direct support of 3/11. It arrived at the west end of Quang Ngai Airfield at 1445. Ontos platoon deployed to supplement the 3/11 defensive positions.
- d. 7 May 1966. (D minus 1)
- (1) Departed I.P. at 0635 with Company Headquarters, 2nd platoon, Company A and 2nd platoon, Company B. The Ontos escorted the 7th Regimental Command Group and the Logistic Support Area convoy to Quang Ngai. Upon arrival at Quang Ngai, Company C was placed in direct support of 3/11 to reinforce local security.
  - (2) At 1150, Company Headquarters, 2nd platoon, Company A and 2nd platoon, Company B escorted the forward echelon of 3/11 during displacement to an advance firing position at An My (2) BS 546738.
  - (3) At 1600, 2nd platoon, Company C escorted the second increment of 3/11 to forward firing positions. Company C deployed its Ontos to supplement the ARVN forces assigned to provide security for the 3/11 and ARVN artillery units.
- e. 8 May 1966
- (1) B Day was delayed because of heavy rains and poor visibility.
  - (2) 0905. 2nd platoon, Company B fired 18 rounds 106mm and 203 rounds of small arms. Destroyed three covered bunkers at BS 539731.
  - (3) 0955. ARVN units manning positions on north side of perimeter received sniper fire from village at BS 537759. 2nd platoon, Company C Ontos fired 26 rounds 106mm and 800 rounds caliber .50 into village from perimeter position. Eight houses were destroyed and sniper fire ceased. Other results are unknown.

3123  
2 June 1966

- (h) 1300-1700. Escorted two ammunition and one refuelling convoy to Quang Ngai area and back with one light section of Ontos for each.

f. 9 May 1966.

- (1) 0630. 1st platoon, Company C escorted 2/7 motor convoy from Combat Base to Quang Ngai Airfield.
- (2) 1330. Company Headquarters, 1st and 2nd platoon, Company C and Det, C Company, 1st Engineer Battalion staged at Quang Ngai Airfield prepared for planned overland thrust with Company H 2/7 to the west on the north side of the Song Tra Khuc to establish blocking positions along high ground vicinity ES 535770.

- g. 10 May 1966. Remained at Quang Ngai Airfield on stand-by status. Made aerial reconnaissance of battle area in preparation for thrust north of Song Tra Khuc.

- h. 11 May 1966. No change, remained on stand-by.

i. 12 May 1966.

- (1) 0900. Attached to 3/11 to reinforce the security of firing positions.
- (2) 1650. The 2nd platoon Company A was recalled to the combat base with some of the detachments from Headquarters, 1st Antitank Battalion.

j. 14 May 1966.

- (1) 0900. 2nd platoon, Company C moved to Hui Vo (DS 62h344) to escort motor convoy back to combat base.
- (2) 1235. Company Headquarters and 2nd platoon, Company C departed Quang Ngai escorting Regimental Command Group convoy and ISA convoy. 2nd platoon, Company B escorted 3/11 convoy back to combat base.
- (3) 1400. 2nd platoon, Company C arrived at company CP. Company A
- (4) 1445. Company Headquarters arrived in company CP area. 2nd platoon, Company B was detached and returned to OIFCON.

11. Results. Three covered bunkers and eight houses destroyed.

3123  
2 June 1966

12. Administrative Matters

- a. Supplies. The logistical support area was located at the Quang Ngai Airfield. No difficulties were experienced. Internally, the lack of operational trailers prevented the platoons and company headquarters from carrying additional ammunition to resupply the Ontos without immediate LSA support.
- b. Maintenance. The Ontos company is capable of limited self-support through TAM echelon in ordnance, motor transport and Ontos repair. Communication repair was provided by the LSA. No difficulties were experienced. Communications repair support was most efficient and satisfactory.
- c. Treatment of casualties. No difficulties experienced.
- d. Transportation. Assistance was provided by the AF Battalion Headquarters. However, the battalion headquarters does not have the assets to provide the needed replacements for the disabled trailers and 3/4 ton trucks organic to this company. The 100% doctrine in this equipment is a result of non-availability of repair parts.
- e. Communications. This continues to be a major problem. Present communications equipment requires concentrated alignment and power output work. Radio work when in the immediate area for a communication check but difficulties have been encountered at even short ranges. The Battalion Communications Officer has been apprised of this matter and he has planned a follow-up test of each vehicle with bench testing.
- f. Medical Evacuation. No comments.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. No comments.

- 1b. Company's Comments. Based on the planning for WORTHUMPT, the 1st INFANTRY BATTALION activated a command and logistic group to provide additional support for Company C. In addition, Company A provided 2 platoons to reinforce Company G in order to insure accomplishment of the diverse missions. Reconnnaissance and photo coverage of the objective area, with particular emphasis on roads and terrain traversability, was extensive. The preparation for WORTHUMPT included 5-2 and 5-3 briefings which included individual crewmen and support personnel. In spite of these preparations, the decision to employ the Ontos/Infantry column on D plus 1 was not made. The attitude of all members of this Battalion was one of discouragement, and while they continue to plan for future operations with the same degree of professionalism as was displayed for WORTHUMPT, such setbacks as were experienced will certainly color their thinking. It is hoped that planned employment of the Ontos will indeed become a reality based on the preparation and abilities of this battalion.

5  
Enclosure (1)

3123  
2 June 1966

15. Recommendations. Utilize antitank units in a manner which exploits the inherent firepower and mobility of the Gtees.

3123  
25 May 1966

1. Code Name. Operation **WELSH**, a joint Marine/ARVN operation to conduct a combined search and destroy sweep and a County Fair operation.
2. Date of Operation. 200700Z through 221705Z May 1966.
3. Location. Quang Ngai Province, north of the Tra Bong River, from route 1 west to My Loc.
4. Control or Command Headquarters. 7th Marine Regiment, Colonel **HAVERTY**. This report submitted on activities of Company C, 1st Antitank Battalion (Captain **J.W. SCHROEDER**).
5. Task Organization
  - a. Third platoon, Lieutenant **D.S. WEST**, with elements of the 1st and 3rd platoons, Company B, 1st Antitank Battalion was attached to the Armored Task Force commanded by Captain **E. SMITH**, Company B, 1st Tank Battalion.
  - b. A heavy section of Second Platoon Company C, 1st Antitank Battalion, Lieutenant **H.J. BERNHART**, was attached to I Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines commanded by Captain **J.H. BERNHART**.
6. Intelligence. See 7th Marine **ISUR**'s pertaining to Operation **WELSH**.
7. Concept of Operation
  - a. Two armored columns were to move west from highway #1 at BG 587943 and BG 592936 and effect a link-up at BG 589910. The Gates platoon was to make the northern thrust and the tank platoon with a detachment of amphibian tractors, an ARVN Reconnaissance Company and a detachment of engineers were to make the southern thrust east along the trail.
  - b. Following the link-up, the armored column was to divide again, this time into a rapid movement force consisting of a heavy section of tanks with a dozer tank, two amphibian tractors, a heavy section of Gates, a detachment of engineers, and a platoon of the ARVN Reconnaissance Company. The rapid movement force was to move to its objective at BG 513992 as expeditiously as possible.
  - c. The remaining tracked vehicles and ARVN infantry were to make a slow sweep of the area to the objective. The sweep was to be completed by sunset of D-Day.
  - d. The remainder of the operation was to be devoted to County Fair operations.
  - e. The third day of the operation was to be a recon/retraction back to highway #1 over the same route utilized for the initial thrust.

3123  
23 May 1966

C. Execution

a. i-Day (20 May 1966)

- (1) 0500 - Third platoon departed company area for the pre-designated armored column assembly area.
- (2) 0730 - Heavy section of second platoon departed I.P. escorting I Battery, 3/11, to Binh Son position.
- (3) 0830
  - (a) Heavy section, second platoon with I Battery, 3/11 arrived at firing position BS 552827.
  - (b) 3rd platoon departed highway #1 on independent thrust to the west.
- (4) 0930 - Tank and Ontos columns linked-up at BS 559910. Tanks were unable to proceed. Lieutenant W. I. assumed command of Ontos and ARVN units. The rapid movement force was discontinued. The westward sweep with Ontos and ARVN infantry was continued to the objective area.
- (5) 1230 - Arrived at objective (BS 5512 92) and established night defense positions with Ontos and ARVN infantry to block County Fair area.

b. D plus one (21 May 1966). No change.

c. D plus two (22 May 1966).

- (1) 1000 - Column, consisting of the 3rd platoon, Company C, 1st AT in, Reconnaissance Company ARVN, 1st platoon, Company K, 3/7, and detachments from 1st Engineers, escorted approximately 500 civilians with their personal effects and livestock to Binh Son.
- (2) 1100 - ARVN Company took three VC under fire at BS 535705. Result: one VC KIA. Helo evacuated to Binh Son.

3123  
28 May 1966

- (3) 1145 - Booby trapped wire obstacle located across trail at BS 55-907. See enclosure (2). Engineers blew in place. Booby trap consisted of exposed mortar round with trip wires.
- (4) 1600 - Column reached highway #1. ARVN and civilians proceeded to Binh Son. Ontos platoon returned to Combat Base.
- (5) 1605 - Units attached to I Battery 3/11 departed firing positions for Combat Base.
- (6) 1705 - 3rd Platoon arrived at Company CP. Vehicles checked out and returned to 1/7 and 3/7 areas respectively, and assumed defensive positions.
- (7) 1730 - 2nd Platoon units arrived Company CP area. Vehicles checked out and returned to 2/7 area and assumed defensive positions.

9. Administrative Matters



- a. Supply. No difficulties.
- b. Maintenance. No difficulties.
- c. Treatment of Casualties. Following the retraction of the tank units and command group, the only medical aid immediately available was an ARVN medic who may or may not have been qualified as a corpsman. The change in the task organization when tanks became bogged down created this void. A sensible modification of the task organization at that time would have avoided this situation.
- d. Transportation. No comment.
- e. Communications. No comment.
- f. Medical Evaluation. No comment.

11. Special Tools and Techniques. No comment.

12. Recommendations. The operation demonstrate the fact that the Ontos are capable of going practically any place they are requested and needed. The use of planks for hasty bridging and TNT to blow in the edges of ditches and paddy walls would have saved considerable time during ingress and egress.

3123  
28 May 1966

TRAPPED WIRE OBSTACLE LOCATED CROSS TRAIL



HEADQUARTERS  
1st Antitank Battalion  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
PO San Francisco, California 96302

3:28Tt:js  
3123  
3 June 1966

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marine Regiment  
Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report; Operation MOBILE  
Ref: (a) DivO M80.1  
Encl: (1) After Action Report; Operation MOBILE  
1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted.

ROBERT R. HARRIS

Tab. H

3123  
3 June 1966

1. Code Name. Operation MOBILE (Search and Destroy Operation in preparation for expansion of TAOR).
2. Date of Operation. 240700H through 261700H May 1966.
3. Location. Quang Ngai Province, RVN, Map Sheets 6756 I and IV, 6757. II and III L 70L.
4. Control or Command Headquarters. 7th Marine Regiment Colonel E. H. HARTY, Commanding.

5. Task Organization

Company C, 1st AT Bn  
2nd Plt, Co C  
3rd Plt, Co C

Captain J. W. SCHROEDER  
First Lieutenant H. J. CONNOLLY  
First Lieutenant D. R. WEST

6. Supporting Forces. None.
7. Intelligence. See the 1st Marine Division ISDM's for the operational period.
8. Mission. Direct support 7th Marines.
9. Concept of Operation

- a. D Day. Early on D Day a section of Ontos escorts the Regimental Command Post from the combat base to Binh Son (BS 598919). Later, the Company Headquarters with another section of Ontos escorts a truck convoy carrying Company H, 2/7, the Regimental Reserve, from the combat base to Binh Son for insertion as blocking forces reinforced with Ontos along highway #1.
- b. On D plus one, one platoon of Ontos was to be prepared to move at first light to the mouth of the Song Tra Bong, vicinity BT 616016, to ferry into the 1/7 battle area to reinforce company defensive areas and provide security to the heavy equipment constructing a road to be used as a supply route to the planned permanent company combat bases.

10. Execution

- a. D Day 24 May 1966. Operation MOBILE was delayed 24 hours.
- b. Revised D Day 25 May 1966.
  - (1) 0600. Light section, 3rd platoon, departed I.P. escorting 7th Regimental Command Group to Binh Son.
  - (2) 0715. Convoy escorted by the 3rd platoon arrived at Binh Son.
  - (3) 1450. Heavy section of 1st platoon and company headquarters departed I.P. in convoy for Binh Son to deploy with Company H, 2/7 in blocking positions along highway #1 south of the Song Tra Bong.

3123

3 June 1966

- (4) 1530. Convoy arrived Binh Son, vicinity BS 598919.
- (5) 1600. Truck convoy with Company H, 2/7 and one platoon of Ontos proceeded south to Lien Tri (1), BS 870623. Upon arrival, the infantry debarked and proceeded with Ontos overland to blocking position vicinity BS 632895. Company headquarters remained in vicinity of the Regimental Command Post as liaison.
- (6) 1845. Infantry/Ontos force reached blocking position and established defenses for the night.

e. D plus one 26 May 1966.

- (1) 1130. Company H, 2/7, and Ontos returned along trail to Highway #1, vicinity (BS 870623), for pick-up by truck convoy.
- (2) 1530. AF Battalion liaison team with 1/7 reported that the roads in 1/7 area were trafficable to Ontos.
- (3) 1700. Infantry embarked aboard trucks and headed north to combat base.
- (4) 1730. As the truck convoy carrying Company H, 2/7 passed through Binh Son, a heavy section of Ontos was reassigned to the skeleton 7th Marines forward command post for security. The Company C Headquarters and 7th Marine Regimental command post joined the convoy and returned to the Chu Lai combat base to assume a two hour stand-by status until the completion of the operation.

d. D plus two 27 May 1966. No change. CO, Co C flew with Colonel HANNAY, Command Officer, 7th Marine Regiment, on a reconnaissance of the operational area. The flight verified that the area is trafficable for Ontos. However, 1/7 did not desire the platoon on stand-by.

e. D plus three 28 May 1966. No change.

f. D plus four 29 May 1966.

- (1) The heavy section of Ontos attached to the 7th Marines forward command post departed the Binh Son area at 1545 escorting the convoy back to the combat base. The heavy section was released at 1600.

(2) 1630. Operation MOBILE terminated.

11. Administrative Matters.

- a. Supplies. No difficulties experienced.
- b. Maintenance. No difficulties experienced.
- c. Treatment of Casualties. No difficulties experienced.
- d. Transportation. No difficulties experienced.
- e. Communication. No significant difficulties experienced; communication to infantry AM/PAC-25's with AM/PAC-10 was adequate.
- f. Medical Evaluation. No comment

12. Results. None.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. No comments.

14. Commander's Comment. The inclusion of a reconnaissance team from this battalion with 1/7 significantly increased our knowledge of trafficability and fields of fire in that battalion's sector of the Regimental TACR. Greater benefits would have accrued had Ontos been permitted to operate in the sector.

15. Recommendations. Utilize Ontos for reconnaissance-in-force missions. Continue to utilize reconnaissance teams from this Battalion when operating in new sectors of responsibility.

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Antitank Battalion  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3:RRT:tjs  
30 May 1966

From: S-3A

To: Commanding Officer

Subj: Reconnaissance of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines TAOR

Encl: (1) Reconnaissance Report

1. The following report is based on a reconnaissance conducted during the period 25-28 May 1966. The 1st AT Bn (-) Recon Team was part of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Command Group for Operation MOBILE, a four day search and destroy operation. The operation also had as a concurrent objective the reconnaissance and establishing of company combat bases in the Battalion TAOR.

2. The Recon Team established a bivouac on Hill 40 (BS 664985) with the 1/7 Command Group. This position has now been permanently established as the DELTA Combat Base.

3. The following areas were visited by the Recon Team.

- a. ALFA Combat Base (BT 623004)
- b. BRAVO Combat Base (BS 700975)
- c. Tentative 1/7 Command Post (BT 645004)

4. The Recon Team returned from Operation MOBILE with the Command Group. A tactical foot march was conducted from BS 661983 to BT 619013.

5. The results of the reconnaissance are contained in enclosure (1). Unless otherwise stated, all comments are the results of personal observation by members of the reconnaissance team.

R. R. TIMBERG

## RECONNAISSANCE REPORT

1. General. The area of interest has diverse characteristics. Trafficability is fair to poor throughout. Most of the key terrain is terraced to the extent that engineer support would be required for the Ontos to move freely. The main road through the area runs south from the river at BT 619013. It has been graded as far as the Hill 40 complex. It is generally good although there are several soft spots in the Tan Hy area. Excellent firing positions are afforded by the key terrain features. Most of the rice paddies will be traversable if no significant rainfall is received during the summer months. The present rainy period has had an adverse effect on cross-country Ontos movement. However drainage is good in the area and it is to be expected that trafficability will improve rapidly.

2. ALFA Combat Base (BT 623004).

The major limitation to Ontos employment in the area is poor fields of fire and restriction to movement. Both sides of the road as far south as BT 627006 are lined with trees, brush and dwellings. Observation is severely restricted in this area. The hills are very difficult to ascend even on foot and are covered with dense brush and boulders.

3. BRAVO Combat Base (BS 700975)

This combat base is located on dominant terrain. The access road runs from BS 665978 and is believed to be fair for Ontos movement. It was not thoroughly reconned. 1/7 plans to improve it in the near future.


Firing positions on this hill offer excellent observation and fields of fire, especially to the southwest. With engineer support, trafficability will be fair to the southwest. Poor trafficability conditions exist to the west and northwest due to terracing and erosion. If maintenance and resupply problems can be overcome, it is felt that Ontos can be profitably employed in this area.

4. DELTA Combat Base. (BS 664985)

This is the prime Ontos area in the 1/7 TAOR. The Hill 40 complex offers excellent firing positions for Ontos, especially on the eastern slope. Observation and fields of fire are also excellent. During the dry season cross-country trafficability will be good throughout the area east of the road. West of the road condition for Ontos movement are poor because of terrain, brush and difficult slopes. A road is presently being graded up Hill 40.


5. Tentative Battalion Command Post (BT 645004)

This is also dominant terrain and Ontos can be employed well here. Observation, fields of fire and avenues of approach are considered good to excellent. Trafficability in the area is contingent upon the amount of precipitation received. A significant amount of rainfall will restrict the Ontos to the road as is the case throughout the entire TAOR.



MAPS: Sheet 6757 II  
Series 1701 and  
Sheet 6756 I  
Series 1701  
29 May 1966  
R. E. TIMBERG

**Trees & Heavy Secondary Growth**



**KEY**

1-ALFA Combat Base-trafficability restricted to road-poor fields of fire because of heavy vegetation and terrain features.

2-DELTA Combat Base-excellent observation and fields of fire from eastern slope.

3-BRAVO Combat Base-excellent observation and fields of fire from southwest and southern

4-IWI-Plt Cdr reported this area trafficable to Ontos.

5-Good Ontos trafficability during dry season.

6-Poor trafficability-extreme terrains and difficult grades.

7-Good trafficability during dry season.

8-Poor trafficability due to heavy isolated vegetation and irregular terrain.

9-Fair trafficability if significant Engineer support provided.

10-This area not physically reconmed but believed poor for Ontos employment from map study and knowledge of adjacent terrain.

