

DECLASSIFIED

5/MCD/lab  
Ser: 00669 66

6 JUN 1966

[REDACTED] (unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

**UNCLASSIFIED** SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG, 1st MarDiv ltr 3:HIST:jgr over 5750  
Ser: 00135-66 dtd 25May66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology, 1-30Apr66 (U)

1. Forwarded.

  
M. C. DALBY  
By direction

232 474

704 10 3480

Hist PR  
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

66 5175

Copy 1 of 7 Copies

3C/htp

3480/

Ser: 0061666

28 May 1966

NOFORN

**FIRST ENDORSEMENT** on CG, 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology  
for April, 1966

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology, 1-30 April 1966 (U)

1. Forwarded.

2. This endorsement is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of the  
basic correspondence.

*J. R. Chaisson*  
J. R. CHAISSON  
By direction

NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

6-2  
Endorse

5 copies  
orig + 4

UNCLASSIFIED

COPY 1 OF 7 COPIES  
661376

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

  
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

3:HIET:jgr  
5750

25 MAY 1966

SEC: 00125-66

From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO5D)  
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology, 1-30 April 1966 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2

Encls: (1) 1st Marine Division Command Chronology for 1-30 April 1966 (S)

1. Enclosure (1), the Command Chronology for the period 1-30 April 1966, is forwarded in compliance with reference (a).

2. Appended as supporting documents, are the Command Chronologies of subordinate units. For details of their activities during the period, see the appropriate unit Command Chronologies.

3. The classification of this letter is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon separation from enclosure (1).

  
LEWIS J. FIELDS

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

Page one of one

  
UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

**SECRET**

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1-30 April 1966

Division Commander:

Major General L.J. FIELDS

Location:

Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam

Strength on 30 April 1966:

USMC:	644 Officers	11746 Enlisted
USN:	107 Officers	662 Enlisted
TOTAL:	751	12408

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. The Division organization during the month of April was as set forth below. Units detached from, or joining, the Division are so indicated.

1st Marine Division (Reinforced)

Hq Bn (-) (Rein)

Hq Bn (-)

1st Dental Co, FMF

1st IT (joined 19 Apr 66)

2nd SSCT

7th CIT

9th ITT (joined 10 Apr 66)

Constr Plat, Radio Relay Constr Co, 7th Comm Bn, FMF (joined 10 Apr 66)

Det, 3rd ITT

1st Mar (-) (Rein)

3rd Bn, 1st Mar

2nd Bn, 4th Mar (detached 14 Apr 66)

2nd Bn, 5th Mar (joined 13 Apr 66)

7th Mar

1st Bn, 7th Mar

2nd Bn, 7th Mar

3rd Bn, 7th Mar

11th Mar (-) (Rein)

1st Bn (-), 11th Mar

3rd Bn, 11th Mar

4th Bn (-) (Rein), 11th Mar

4th Bn (-), 11th Mar

3rd 155mm Gun Btry, FMF

Plat, 3rd 8" How Btry, FMF

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

**SECRET**

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (1)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

Page 1 of 21

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3rd 8" How Btry Group  
 3rd 8" How Btry (SP) (-), FMF  
 Btry K, 4th Bn, 11th Mar  
 Plat, 3rd 155mm Gun Btry, FMF

1st Recon Bn (-) (Rein)  
 1st Recon Bn (-)  
 1st Force Recon Co, FMF (joined 28 Apr 66)

1st Tk Bn (-)

1st AT Bn (-)

1st Engr Bn (-) (Rein)  
 1st Engr Bn (-)  
 Det, 1st Bridge Co, FMF (joined 26 Apr 66)

1st SP Bn (-)

1st MT Bn (-) (Arrived in Vietnam 3 Apr 66)

1st Med Bn (-)

1st Hosp Co, FMF

3rd AmTrac Bn (-), FMF

7th MT Bn, FMF

CHU LAI Defense Command

Task Force XRAY (Activated 27 Apr 66)  
 HQ, Task Force XRAY

2. Listed below are the names and ranks of the Division Commander, Division General and Special Staff Officers, and subordinate unit commanders. For a listing of subordinate unit staffs, see the appropriate Command Chronology.

DIVISION COMMANDER

MAJ GEN L.J. FIELDS

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER

BGEN W.A. STILES (FROM TAD TO 9TH MAB 15 APR 66)

SERGEANT MAJOR  
 CHIEF OF STAFF  
 DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF  
 STAFF SECRETARY

SGTMAJ J.H. MYRICK  
 COL G.H. WEST  
 COL O.F. PEATROSS (1-30 Apr 66)  
 CAPT G.E. THOMPSON

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1  
 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2  
 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3  
 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4  
 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5  
 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, COMPTROLLER

ADJUTANT

AIR OFFICER  
 ARTILLERY OFFICER  
 BAND OFFICER  
 CHAPLAIN  
 COMM-ELECTRONICS OFFICER  
 DIVISION CLUBS OFFICER  
 DIVISION EXCHANGE OFFICER  
 EMBARKATION OFFICER

ENGINEER OFFICER  
 FIELD HISTORIAN  
 FOOD SERVICES OFFICER  
 INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER  
 INSPECTOR  
 LEGAL OFFICER  
 MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER  
 NAVAL GUNFIRE OFFICER  
 ORDNANCE OFFICER  
 PHOTOGRAPHIC OFFICER  
 POSTAL OFFICER  
 PROTOCOL OFFICER  
 PROVOST MARSHAL  
 REPRODUCTIVE OFFICER  
 SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER

SUPPLY OFFICER  
 SURGEON  
 TANK OFFICER

COL W.F. FRY  
 COL J.J. O'DONNELL  
 COL L.H. WILSON  
 COL. W.R. BENNETT  
 MAJ J.S. REEDY (To 5 Apr 66)  
 COL L.N. CASEY (From 6 Apr 66)  
 COL E.H. HUFFEY (To 31 Mar 66)  
 MAJ S.A. HUGUENIN (From 1 Apr 66)  
 MAJ B.C. SIMMS (To 26 Apr 66)  
 MAJ C.P. MOROCCO (From 27 Apr 66)  
 COL E.C. KICKLIGHTER  
 COL P.H. HAHN  
 2DLT H.L. BENTLEY  
 CAPT J.L. WISSING, USN  
 COL J.T. BRADSHAW  
 MAJ M.P. FENNESSY  
 CAPT F. SCIALDOE Jr.  
 MAJ R.E. MOSS (To 31 Mar 66)  
 MAJ H.R. ANKER (From 1 Apr 66)  
 LTCOL R. ELY  
 LTCOL R.B. CROSSMAN  
 MAJ J.S. HARRIS  
 1STLT W.L. FASLER  
 COL L.N. CASEY  
 COL G.P. BLACKBURN  
 LTCOL J.J. DOWD  
 LCDR W.S. RILEY  
 LTCOL E. RAGSDALE  
 CWO R.L. CHAPEL  
 CWO H.E. FUNK  
 MAJ L.E. WOOD  
 MAJ G.E. BATTLETT  
 2DLT D.A. ZEPPEL JOHN  
 MAJ R.E. MALDEN (To 25 Apr 66)  
 CAPT G.W. HEAL (From 26 Apr 66)  
 COL L.E. BAUGHMAN  
 CAPT J.F. ADAMS, USN  
 LTCOL A.W. SNELL

#### UNIT COMMANDERS

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION  
 1ST DENTAL CO, FMF  
 1ST MARINES  
   3D BN, 1ST MARINES  
   2D BN, 4TH MARINES (DETACHED TO  
     3D MARDIV 14Apr66)  
   2D BN, 5TH MARINES (JOINED 13APR66)

LTCOL N. DIMOND  
 CAPT F.S. WOZNIAK, USN  
 COL B.B. MITCHELL  
 LTCOL J.R. YOUNG  
 LTCOL P.X. KELLEY  
 LTCOL R.H. USKURAIT

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

7TH MARINES  
   1ST BN, 7TH MARINES  
   2ND BN, 7TH MARINES  
   3D BN, 7TH MARINES  
 11TH MARINES  
   1ST BN, 11TH MARINES  
   3D BN, 11TH MARINES  
   4TH BN, 11TH MARINES  
 1ST RECON BN  
 1ST TANK BN  
 1ST ANTI-TANK BN  
 1ST ENGINEER BN  
 1ST SHORE PARTY BN  
 1ST MOTOR TRANSPORT BN  
 1ST MEDICAL BN  
 3D AMTRAC BN, FMF  
 7TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BN, FMF  
 1ST HOSPITAL CO, FMF  
 CHU LAI DEFENSE COMMAND  
 TASK FORCE XRAY (ACTIVATED 27APR66)

COL E.H. HAFLEY (FROM 1APR66)  
 LTCOL J.P. KELLY (TO 25APR66)  
 LTCOL F.S. WOOD (FROM 26APR66)  
 LTCOL L.N. UTTER  
 LTCOL C.H. BODLEY  
 COL P.H. HAHN  
 LTCOL W.C. OLSEN (TD 29MAR66)  
 LTCOL J.C. GASSER (FROM 30MAR66)  
 LTCOL P.B. WATSON (TO 31MAR66)  
 LTCOL J.P. O'CONNEL (FROM 1APR66)  
 LTCOL J.F. CROWLEY  
 LTCOL A.J. SULLIVAN  
 LTCOL A.W. SNELL  
 LTCOL W. MOORE  
 LTCOL J.R. AICHELE  
 LTCOL R.T. TAYLOR  
 LTCOL J.J. ROOTHOFF  
 CDR R.H. MITCHELL, USN  
 LTCOL R.E. CAMPBELL  
 MAJ L.A. BONIN  
 CDR P.M. ROBERTS  
 COL J.P. TREADWELL  
 BGDN W.A. STILES

SECRET

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION1. Personnel Strengths

UNCLASSIFIED

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	
31 March	253	2524	57	331	3165
30 April	644	11746	107	662	13159

The increase in strength during the month of April was due to the shift of ADCON of units in the Chu Lai Combat Base from the 3d Marine Division to the 1st Marine Division. The shift of ADCON occurred on 1 April 1966 and mainly consisted of former 1st Marine Division units that deployed to Vietnam during the past ten months. OPCON of these units shifted on 29 March 1966.

2. Replacement and Rotation of Personnela. Replacement

During the month of April, the 1st Marine Division received 21 officers and 891 enlisted replacements. These replacements for the most part were distributed proportionately to all organizations of the Division consistent with appropriate grade and MOS.

b. Rotation

A total of 17 officers and 544 enlisted personnel completed their overseas tour during April 1966 and were rotated.

3. Discipline, Law and Order

a. Offense Reports processed by the 1st Marine Division Provost Marshal for the Chu Lai Combat Base during the month of April 1966 were as follows:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Off Limits	58
Drunk and Disorderly Conduct	2
Weapons Violation	4
Assault	1
Miscellaneous	19
	<u>TOTAL 84</u>

b. Captives processed through the Chu Lai Collection Point during the month of April 1966.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

<u>Status</u>	<u>Number</u>
VCC	9
VCS	103
Civilian	<u>56</u>
	TOTAL 168

4. Casualties and Graves Registration

a. The following casualties were sustained by units ADCON 1st Marine Division during the month of April 1966.

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>INJ/ILL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Officers		1		1
Enlisted	<u>13</u>	<u>159</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>190</u>
TOTAL	13	160	18	191

b. The remains of all personal KIA were transferred to Tan Son Nhut Mortuary, Saigon for disposition.

5. Morale and Personnel Servicesa. Division Clubs

(1) During the month of April 1966, 33 Clubs opened throughout the Division and became fully operational. Plans have been formulated to bring the total number of Clubs under the control of the 1st Marine Division to 48. Total sales during the month amounted to \$67,585.70.

(2) Personnel assigned to Division Clubs.

(a) Full time basis

Officers	2
Enlisted	<u>13</u>
	TOTAL 15

(b) additional duty basis as unit club managers and assistant managers.

Enlisted	78
----------	----

b. Post Exchange

(1) Six branch exchanges were opened throughout the Division during the month of April 1966. Gross sales for the month amounted to \$152,120.73.



## (2) Personnel assigned to Division Post Exchange System.

Officers	1
Enlisted	28
TOTAL	29

UNCLASSIFIED  
UNCLASSIFIEDc. Division Band

The 1st Marine Division Band and Drum and Bugle Corps performed at the following functions during the month of April 1966:

<u>Function</u>	<u>Number</u>
Marine Military Formations	4
Other Military Formations	1
Military Concerts	11
Civic Action Events	7*

\*Approximately 250 persons attended each event.

6. Personnel Proceduresa. Rotation Tour Dates

Upon assumption of ADCON of ground units located in the Chu Lai Combat Base, a plan to spread rotation tour dates between Division organizations was implemented. Essentially the plan consists of spreading incoming personnel on a proportionate basis throughout the Division consistent with grade and MOS requirements. In order to compensate for immediate losses in a specific organization, personnel would be reassigned from other organizations with various RTD's to maintain a proportionate strength in each unit. Personnel reassigned would come from those units that have a disproportionate share of personnel with the same RTD. The spreading of RTD's by intra-Division transfers will of necessity be a continuing program so long as organized units are deployed from CONUS to WESTPAC.

7. Miscellaneousa. Voluntary Extension of Overseas Tour

The following number of personnel voluntarily extended their overseas tours during the month of April 1966:

<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
1	88

Total voluntary extension of overseas tour since deployment of 1st Marine Division during August 1965.

<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
6	165

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

b. Reenlistment and Extension Summary

The following personnel reenlisted or extended during April 1966:

	<u>First Term</u>	<u>Career</u>	<u>Total</u>
Reenlistments	14	20	34
Extensions	7	3	10

c. Distinguished Visitors

The following distinguished visitors visited this Command on the dates indicated:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Billet</u>	<u>Plus Party of</u>
4Apr66	Mr. F. A. BARTINO	Asst. General Counsel for Manpower, SECDEF	
4Apr66	Mr. Leon WHEELLESS	Directorate for Civilian Personnel under Asst. SECDEF for Manpower	
4Apr66	BGen William BERG USAF	Deputy Asst. Secretary for Military Policy for the Air Force	1
4Apr66	The Honorable Cyrus R. VANCE	Deputy Secretary of Defense	2
4Apr66	The Honorable Paul R. IGNATIUS	Asst. Sec Def (Installations and Logistics)	2
4Apr66	Mr. Robert KOMER	Spec Asst. to the President on Revolutionary Development	
4Apr66	Senator Gale W. MCGEE	D-Wyoming	1
4Apr66	Mr. Frank WISNER	aide to Ambassador Porter, Dep US Ambassador to RVN	
4Apr66	LtGen L. W. WALT USMC	CG III MAF	1
4Apr66	MajGen K. B. MCCUTCHEON USMC	CG, 1st MAW	1
4Apr66	RADM T. R. WESCHLER USN	Cdr, Naval Support Act., Danang	1
5Apr66	MajGen Hoang Xuan Lam	CG, 2d ARVN Division	5
5Apr66	Dr. Bui Hohan	Quang Ngai Province Chief	42
5Apr66	Col B. B. JONES USA	Sr. U. S. Advisor, Quang Ngai Province	2
6-7Apr66	BGen R. R. Van STOCKUM USMC	CG IMAC (Fwd)	4
12Apr66	Rep. Samuel S. STRATTON (D-N.Y.)	Chairman, Spec. Sub-Com of the House Armed Svc Committee	
12Apr66	Rep. Lloyd V. HICKS (D-Wash)	Mbr "	
12Apr66	Rep. Charles E. CHAMBERLAIN (R-Mich)	Mbr "	
12Apr66	Rep. Robert T. STAFFORD (R-Vt)	Mbr "	
12Apr66	Rep. Robert L. LEGGETT (D-Calif)	Mbr "	
12Apr66	BGen William C. THRASH USMC	Observer from HQMC	
12Apr66	BGen William K. JONES USMC	Observer from COMUSMACV	

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Billet</u>	<u>Plus Party of</u>
12Apr66	Col Frank R. BURGET USA	OCIL Escort Officer	
19Apr66	Col QUIREY USA	Dep Director COC MACV	
21Apr66	Col SCUDDER USA	Protocol Branch MACV	
21Apr66	LtCol Arther P. LOMBARDI USA	MACV	1
26Apr66	BGen Donald H. MCGOVERN USA	MACV J-1 (PX Business)	1
27Apr66	LtGen L. W. WALT USMC	CG III MAF	
29Apr66	LtCol Denys WOOD British Army	Spec. Attaché -Saigon	
29Apr66	Wing Cmdr Peter BRITTON RAF	Spec. Attaché -Saigon	
29Apr66	Cmdr Alan HENSHER Royal Navy	Spec. Attaché -Saigon	
29Apr66	Col ROMENS USA	Chief Military Attaché Liaison Office	

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE

1. GENERAL: During this period the G-2 Section fulfilled its responsibilities by providing intelligence support in all functional areas to the Commanding General, his staff, and subordinate units of the 1st Marine Division while engaged in combat operations in the Republic of Vietnam. A daily briefing schedule was maintained to provide the latest intelligence available for the use of the above listed persons and agencies. An ambitious liaison program was carried out as a portion of the complex collection effort required to obtain information on the activities of the Viet Cong insurgents. Specialized support was provided in the following areas: air observation missions in support of Division and III MAF requirements; counterintelligence support for all units; interrogator translator support both at the collection point and in the field in support of operations; interpreter support both in the monitoring of ARVN interpreters and translation of captured documents at the division level; Special Communications Intelligence support as required both in the CP and in the field, and Photo Imagery Interpretation support. Intelligence support to the targeting effort of the Division both with conventional means of attack and the Arc Light Program was also provided during the period.

2. Chronology of events during the reporting period.

a. Intelligence estimate prepared to support Operation Iowa conducted 8-9 April by the 1st Marines.

b. Intelligence estimate prepared to support Operation Nevada conducted 12-17 April by the 7th Marines.

c. Provided intelligence back-up support and over-all coordination of Task Force Delta Operation which was conducted by US and ARVN Special Forces during the period 14 to 29 April. All reporting to III MAF on this operation was handled by the G-2.

d. The 1st Interpreter Team and the 9th Interrogation-Translation Teams reported to the 1st Marine Division.

e. Intelligence estimate prepared to support Operation Hot Springs conducted 21-23 April by the 7th Marines.

f. Intelligence estimate prepared to support Operation Wyoming conducted 26-30 April by the 1st Marines.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. During the reporting period four major operations were conducted; Operations IOWA, NEVADA, HOT SPRINGS, and WYOMING. Each was successful in its own right but only HOT SPRINGS, which was conceived and ordered executed in a matter of hours, produced significant enemy losses. As in past operations of comparable success, HOT SPRINGS again points to the need for immediate responsiveness to hard intelligence and immediate exploitation of Viet Cong activity. In view of the fleeting nature of VC targets, development of a sense of urgency in this respect has been stressed at all levels of command in order to increase the frequency of operations which inflict heavy casualties on the VC/NVA forces. The following sub-paragraphs briefly summarize operations conducted during April.

a. Operation: IOWA

(1) Duration - 081000H April to 091200H April

(2) Location - QUANG TIN PROVINCE, BT 3518, BT 4118, BT 4112, BT 3512

(3) Type - Search and Destroy

(4) Forces Assigned: 1st Marines (-)  
 2d Bn (-), 4th Marines  
 3d Bn (-), 4th Marines  
 A Co, 1st Engr Bn  
 A Co, 1st AT Bn  
 1st Bn (-), 11th Marines  
 3d 8" How Btry (SP)  
 2d Bn, 6th Regt, 2d ARVN Div  
 926 RF Co

(5) Mission - 1st Marines (-) (Rein) conducts search and destroy operations to locate, fix and destroy the VC forces and his installations located in the area of operation.

(6) Concept of Operation - 3/1 (-) (minus two companies) executes a heliborne assault into LZ Wren (BT 372125) and executes a search and destroy operation generally northeast and links up with 2/4 on hill 54. 2/4 (-) (minus two companies) moves by vehicle to hill 54 (BT 396145) and establishes blocking positions. On D+1 3/1 and 2/4 conduct search and destroy operation from hill 54 to LZ Wren where 3/1 is extracted. 2/4 continues to the northeast and is extracted by vehicle

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

from hill 54. One ARVN infantry battalion establishes blocking positions from BT 378175 along the north bank of the Vin An River to where it intersects the Batoc River and then south along the western bank of the Batoc to BT 360140. One RF Co establishes a blocking position vic BT 3816.

- (7) Results: Enemy - VC WIA (POSS) 1  
Friendly - Heat Casualty 1

b. Operation NEVADA

- (1) Duration- 12-17 April 1966
- (2) Location- Son Tinh District (Batangan Peninsula),  
QUANG NGAI PROVINCE (BS 7484).
- (3) Type - Search and Destroy
- (4) Forces assigned: 7th Marines (-) (Rein)  
1st Bn (-), 7th Marines (3 companies)  
2d Bn (-), 7th Marines (3 companies)  
3d Bn (-), 11th Marines  
Engineer Company (-)  
Reconnaissance Company (-)  
Antitank Company (-)  
2d ARVN Division Command Group  
1st VMC Battalion  
5th Airborne Battalion  
37th Ranger Battalion  
4th APC Troop  
2d Div Reconnaissance Company
- (5) Mission - U.S. Marine Corps and ARVN forces were assigned the mission of conducting a search and destroy operation in eastern Son Tinh District.
- (6) Concept of Operation - Two Marine battalions execute helicopter assaults into the operation area while two ARVN battalions enter via surface means. The attack progressed from west to east, from Highway #1 to the tip of the Batangan Peninsula.
- (7) Results: Enemy - KIA 40, KBA 40 (POSS), VCC 5, VCS 81  
Weapons captured 14
- (8) Remarks - On the evening of D-Day (12 April) it was reported by agents that two Americans and many ARVN were held prisoner by the VC in a cave located on Batangan Peninsula at (BS 774848).

SECRET

Action was immediately initiated to attempt to locate and liberate the POWs. On 13 April a USMC battalion was helo-lifted into the indicated area and search operations began. The POWs were not located.

c. Operation HOT SPRINGS

- (1) Duration - 21-23 April 1966
- (2) Location - Quang Ngai Province (BS 5284, BS 5884, BS 5280, BS 5880)
- (3) Type - Search and Destroy
- (4) Forces Assigned - 7th Marines (-) (Rein)
  - 2d Bn (-), 7th Marines (2 companies)
  - 3d Bn (-), 7th Marines (2 companies)
  - 3d Bn (-) (Rein), 11th Marines
  - 3d Bn (-), 1st Marines (2 companies)-Reserve
  - 2d ARVN Division Command Group
  - 1st VNMV Battalion
  - 5th Airborne Battalion
- (5) Mission - USMC and ARVN forces attack and destroy enemy located in general area bounded by coordinates 5285, 5884, 5280 and 5880.
- (6) Concept of Operation-D-Day Was 21 April 1966. At 0400 a coordinated air and artillery preparation was begun. It extended until L-Hour (0900). Two battalions (one USMC and one VNMV battalion) executed heliborne assaults at L-Hour, each followed by an additional USMC battalion and ARVN battalion. On the afternoon of D-Day, the reserve USMC battalion was landed by helicopter in the eastern end of the objective area as a blocking force.

(7) Results:

Enemy - KIA		KIA (POSS)		KBA		KBA (POSS)		VCC Wpns Captured	
By USMC	94	5				1	23	(6 crew served)	
By RVN	207	5		16	15	20	90	(16 crew served)	
Total	301	10		16	15	21	113		

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Friendly - KIA WIA

USMC 5 30

RVN 7 44

Total 12 74

- (8) Remarks - On the night of 20 April, CG 2d ARVN Division informed CG 1st Marine Division that a defector had provided information which located the regimental headquarters and three battalions of the 1st VC Regiment. Further that the defector had been taken to the area in question and had pointed out their locations from the air. The defector stated that each battalion had approximately 300 men, 40% of whom were recruits. The troops supposedly remained inside huts within the hamlets and were allowed outside for a two hour period between 1900-2100 for exercise daily. CG 1st MarDiv accompanied by his G-3 and COs 7th and 11th Marines flew to Quang Ngai to confer with CG 2d ARVN Division during the evening of 20 April and there formulated a plan of attack on the hamlets for the following morning.

d. Operation WYOMING

- (1) Duration - 260730H - 301930H April 1966
- (2) Location - Quang Tin Province; USMC BT 2612, BT 4411, BT 3403, BT 3321. ARVN BT 3015, BT 2817, BT 4217, BT 3627.
- (3) Type - Search and Destroy
- (4) Forces assigned - 1st Marines (-) (Rein)  
 3d Bn (-), 1st Marines (2 companies)  
 2d Bn (-), 5th Marines (2 companies)  
 Co H, 2d Bn, 5th Marines (Reserve)  
 1st Bn (-), 11th Marines  
 Co A, 1st AT Bn  
 Co A (-), 1st Engr Bn  
 Co D (-), 1st Recon Bn  
 Plt, Co A, 1st Tank Bn  
 6th Infantry Regt (-) (ARVN)  
 1st Bn, 6th Regt  
 3d Bn, 6th Regt  
 One RF Company
- (5) Mission - 1st Marines (-) (Rein), in conjunction with ARVN forces, conducts search and destroy operations in the northeast portion of Ly Tin District.

UNCLASSIFIED



SECRET

- (6) Concept of Operation - 3d Bn, 1st Marines (minus 2 companies) executes heliborne assault into LZ HAWK (BT 320140), and commences search and destroy operations on an axis of advance generally southwest within assigned zone. Immediately on completion of 3d Bn, 1st Marines lift, the 2d Bn, 5th Marines (minus 2 companies) executes a heliborne assault into LZ EAGLE (BT 335182), and commences search and destroy operations on an axis of advance generally southwest in assigned zone.

## (7) Results:

Enemy - KIA KLA (POSS) KBA KBA (POSS) VCC

By USMC 11 10 2

Weapons Captured WLA WLA (POSS) VCS

3 2 10 5

Friendly - KIA WLA

2 28 24 Non-battle casualties (23 heat casualties).

TRAINING

1. The need for marksmanship training, familiarization firing and zeroing of weapons precipitated reconnaissance and planning for ranges at the Chu Lai Combat Base. Engineers are presently evaluating the tentative sites and, upon completion of this evaluation and approval by the Base Development Board, construction will commence.
2. The Division Land Mine Warfare School has been reinstituted with the first class slated to convene in mid-May.
3. Quotas for Vietnamese Language School, Embarkation School and other Okinawa-based schools have been obtained for Division personnel.

REGIONAL/POPULAR FORCES PROGRAM

1. In consonance with the expressed interest of higher headquarters and the requirement to have local forces which are capable of maintaining pacified areas, command interest in expansion of the RF/PF Program has been expressed and action initiated after liaison with CG 2d ARVN Division to ensure Marine personnel are adequately trained prior to participation in the program and to increase and improve recruitment of indigenous personnel. DivO 04900.1 of 20 April 1966 outlined PF program and provided subordinate unit commanders with required guidance for full implementation.

UNCLASSIFIED  
Enclosure (1)

SECRET

COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

1. General. During this reporting period, communication-electronics activities of this Headquarters centered around consolidation and continued improvement of communication-electronics facilities of the Chu Lai Combat Base following the deployment of the Division Headquarters to Chu Lai late in the last reporting period. Designation of the CG, 1st MarDiv (Rein), FMF as the Chu Lai Installation Coordinator resulted in expansion of the responsibilities of this office to include coordination with U. S. Navy, 1st MAW units and other activities located within the area designated as the Chu Lai Installation.

2. Communication-Electronics Facilities

a. Division Communication Center Installation. An installation team of four civilian personnel from NAVSEEC, Washington D. C., augmented by a civilian electronics technician from SRF, Subic Bay, R. P., supervised the installation of fixed plant teletype and control facilities in the Division Communication Center. At the end of the reporting period, receipt and installation of equipment was virtually complete, with only technical and quality control effort and training of operational and maintenance personnel required to complete the Communication Center installation.

b. AN/MTC-1 Switchboard Installation. Progress continues on the installation of the Switchboard, AN/MTC-1, received at the end of the reporting period. When this is accomplished, the switchboard will provide the Division Headquarters and Chu Lai Installation with adequate and reliable telephone locals and trunking facilities resulting in significant improvement over the temporary tactical switchboard facilities currently installed. Related to this specific improvement was the continuing coordination, promulgation of appropriate directives, and consolidation of effort and assets to improve the Telephone Cable System throughout the Chu Lai Installation.

c. MARS Station. Coordination and technical assistance, in conjunction with the Division Special Services Officer, which resulted in opening of the Division Military Affiliate (MARS) Radio Station. Pending installation of phone patch facilities, only messages are presently processed by the MARS Station.

3. Operational Communications

a. Continuing liaison with U. S. Army advisors and Special Forces units and Navy activities for the purpose of coordinating, collecting and exchanging communication-electronics information.

b. Operational support to Division units involved in operations IOWA, INDIAN, NEVADA, HOT SPRINGS and WYOMING.

Page 16 of 24

Enclosure (1)  
UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

c. Promulgation of a comprehensive Communication-Electronics Operating Instruction (CEOI).

d. Reproduction and distribution of Operations and Numeral Codes and Authentication Systems to Division elements.

e. Completion of communication planning for the Chu Lai Defense Command.

f. A continuing program of contingency planning, highlighted by assignment of Division CEO personnel to the staff of CG, Task Force Kray. Although the planned operation (PIKE) was postponed indefinitely after only two days, considerable planning information was compiled and is being retained for immediate implementation.

g. Continued preliminary planning incident to the pending introduction of a ROK Marine Brigade into the Chu Lai THOR.

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure (1)

FIRE SUPPORT AND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

1. Significant Events. Operations of major significance for the month of April were: NEVADA (12-17 April), IOWA (8-9 April), HOT SPRINGS (21-23 April), and WYOMING (26-30 April). All operations except HOT SPRINGS were supported by all 3 Supporting Arms. Artillery units were displaced beyond the 1st Marine Division RAOR as required to support the above operations. Accordingly, the supported infantry units were able to make maximum use of supporting arms. Operations beyond the RAOR were characterized by the bulk of Fire Support Coordination being accomplished by the FSCC of the regiment conducting the operation. The operations also had repeated examples of coordination at the very lowest level in the form of direct conversation between FAC(A)s, FACs and forward observers.

2. Problem Areas. No major problem areas were uncovered. Operations are characterized by a high density of air activity, which has required close monitoring of air support nets to ensure safety and reduce mutual interference. VNAF support for ARVN units, operating in conjunction with Marine units, is not under control of the Marine Close Air Support System. Lack of communications with VNAF aircraft poses a potential safety hazard.

3. New Developments. No new developments have been introduced and practiced fire support coordination procedures have been working satisfactorily.

UNCLASSIFIED

LOGISTICS

1. The major logistic activity during this period was directed toward Headquarters elements of many separate Battalions resuming Supply/Logistical support of their subordinate units. Command Post construction or relocation for most Division units was necessary. This action has resulted in more positive logistical control and coordination. Division tentage, water trailer, and refrigerator assets were redistributed to provide an equitable allotment of these assets.
2. Plans were formulated and logistics coordinated for the reception of a ROK Brigade as part of the build-up of the Chu Lai Combat Base. Further plans for logistic support of potentially besieged Special Forces Camps were also formulated.
3. A plan to provide convoy security with attendant Engineer, Air, and other supporting arms elements was approved for operation of motor convoys both internal and external to the Chu Lai Combat Base. This plan was incorporated into 1st Marine Division Administrative Plan 301-66 as Annex G.
4. Effort has been directed toward implementing the MILCON Program. Division Order 11010.1 and Chu Lai Installation Coordinator Instruction Order 11010.1 were published establishing Base Development Boards for 1st Marine Division and Chu Lai Combat Base.
5. Significant developments in the Supply field:
  - a. All units were directed to turn in all Class II Type I mount-out material, less individual equipment, to FLSG-BRAVO.
  - b. CRITIPAK shipments continue to provide essential items on a timely basis.
  - c. A program for the handling and shipping of personal effects by Third Force Service Regiment has been initiated.
  - d. Division Bulletin 4440 was published covering instructions for the inventory and monthly updating of controlled items.
  - e. Division Order 4400.17 concerning Supply Support of Ground Delivered Nuclear Weapons was published.
6. Phase II of this Division's deployment from Okinawa to Vietnam was completed. The offloading of BMT 2/5 upon their arrival in RVN 13 April 1966 was coordinated.
7. The Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force announced new munitions and equipment for testing in Vietnam. Particularly significant are the increased range artillery munitions. This requirement for additional range was demonstrated on Operations UTAH, TEXAS, INDIANA, NEVADA, and HOT SPRINGS where approximately 70% of targets engaged required the use of maximum powder charges.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

8. Unusual tube wear has been detected in two 155mm gun tubes belonging to this Command. These tubes are expected to become unserviceable within the next month, having fired only 500 rounds each. Normal tube life is expected to be 700 rounds for supercharge and 2,700 rounds for normal charges. In view of the above, weekly measurement and inspection of tube wear is being conducted.

9. The 1st Marine Division Food Services Section relieved the III MAF Food Services Section at the FLSG-BRAVO ration issue point on 1 April 1966.

10. Information sheets concerning problems of mess sanitation and food preparation were published by the Division Food Services Section. 5000 sets of disposable mess gear were field tested by this Division and found to be very satisfactory. Adoption has been recommended.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CIVIC ACTION OPERATIONS1. Narrative Summary

## a. 1-30 April 1966

Through the month of April Civic Action continued to progress rapidly. Responsibility for coordination of all Civic Action was delegated to the Commanding General for the Chu Lai Combat Area. A seminar was conducted which was attended by representatives of all units. Results of the seminar were most rewarding. The plan for assignment of Civic Action projects was discussed and will be published in the near future. Ground breaking ceremonies were conducted for the Ly Tin District High School, which is being constructed under the supervision of MAG-12. The ceremonies were attended by: Brigadier General CARL, AWC, 1st Marine Air Wing; Commanding Officer, MAG-12; Deputy Province Chief of Quang Tin; and District Chief of Ly Tin. County Fair was conducted on 12 April and was accompanied by Civil Affairs Officer for Ly Tin District. Band concerts were held at four locations and for two school graduation exercises. The band was received with enthusiasm everywhere it performed. Small Vietnamese flags were passed out to all the children at one of these concerts. At one band concert the Village Chief lauded the success of the pacification program. He used the band as an illustration of Vietnamese/American cooperation. First Medical Battalion continues to promote outstanding medical treatment for Vietnamese persons. A ward has been established to facilitate medical care. Contacts with Government of South Vietnam Officials were conducted on a daily basis. These contacts proved to be most beneficial to the Civil Affairs program. Self-improvement projects continue to be emphasized by the Civic Action teams. These include construction of new wells, expansion of pig farms, road construction, shopping markets, etc. Mr. MARIAN, Mr. THOMAS and Mr. PERIMAN, representatives of Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office, and Mr. SHIENBAUM and Mr. YOUNG of USAID visited the Chu Lai Combat Area.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

A TOTAL RECAP OF CIVIC ACTION FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL IS AS FOLLOWS:

Medical Treatment	16224
Dental Treatment	206
Medical Training	117
Clothing Distribution	90 Lbs
Food Distribution	9900 Lbs
Soap	821 Bars
Money Donated	\$382.00
Persons Fed	3035
Wells Dug	15
Other Construction	12
Students Supported	502
English Language	15/217
Vocational Training	75
Children Medical Evacuation	79
Adults Medical Evacuation	20
Schools Repaired	7
Buildings Constructed	2
School Supported	2

Page 22 of 24

Enclosure (1)

UNCLASSIFIED



SECRET

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS1. Narrative Summary:

a. General: Significant psychological operations during the month of April consisted of support for three regimental search and destroy operations, and psychological operations on the islands of Hoa Vinh Thanh, Ky Hoa and Ky Xuan. Two new taped broadcasts, three new leaflets, and two new posters were developed during the month.

b. Operation NEVADA: Operation NEVADA was a 7th Marines search and destroy operation in Quang Ngai Province, 12-17 April 1966. Operation NEVADA was supported by leaflet drops and broadcasts from a U-10 aircraft. Leaflets and broadcasts explaining Marine presence and appealing for civilian cooperation were disseminated simultaneously with Marine movement through populated areas. In areas through which Marines had moved, but no longer occupied, leaflets and broadcasts were used to counter enemy propaganda by announcing that ARVN and US will continue to fight; that friendly resources are boundless; and that as a result of the operation, friendly forces had come a step closer to final victory. Safe conduct passes were dropped. Leaflets and broadcasts of Chieu Hoi appeals were directed at the enemy. After the operation, an aerial broadcast announced enemy casualties and the over-all success of the operation. In the course of the operation there were 398,000 leaflets dropped and nine hours of broadcasting conducted.

c. Operation HOT SPRINGS: Operation HOT SPRINGS was a 7th Marines search and destroy operation in Quang Ngai Province 21-23 April 1966. Psychological operations during Operation HOT SPRINGS consisted of the same themes used in Operation NEVADA, programmed in like manner with extra emphasis on Chieu Hoi appeals. 89,000 leaflets were dropped and nine hours of broadcasting were conducted. A Chieu Hoi rallier who surrendered on the first day of the operation from the First VC Regiment, reported that his unit was in an extremely low state of morale. He indicated a willingness to make a taped broadcast, appealing to his comrades to rally, and expressing confidence in the Chieu Hoi program and the GVN. This was done. The recording was broadcast from a U-10 aircraft on the morning following his being apprehended. The 244th Psychological Operations Company was requested to photograph the large number of captured weapons at the Seventh Marines Command Post. The photographs were used for a poster exploiting the success of the operation. After the operation, the Division Psychological Operations Officer contacted the Second ARVN Division G-5 Advisor, the Quang Ngai Sector G-5 Advisor, and the Quang Ngai JUSPAO Representative for coordination of further exploitation of low VC morale in the [REDACTED] broadcasts and leaflets exploiting the poor VC conditions, [REDACTED] the chance to rally commenced 25 April and continued daily until 30 April.

UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS**SECRET**

d. Operation WYOMING: Operation WYOMING was a 1st Marines search and destroy operation in Quang Tin Province, 26-30 April 1966. Operation WYOMING was supported by leaflets and broadcasts similar to those previously described. U-10 missions were flown on 26, 28 and 29 April. 395,000 leaflets were dropped and 5 hours of broadcasting were conducted. Troops were given leaflets for hand dissemination in order to achieve a partial face-to-face effect. These leaflets explained the purpose of Marine presence. Troops were provided with English translations of the leaflets they carried so that they would better understand their mission pertaining to psychological operations.

e. Ky Hoa and Ky Xuan Islands: The Division Band held concerts on Ky Hoa and Ky Xuan Islands. District Headquarters was asked to provide speakers in order to give the occasion some pro-GVN direction. The Village Chief of Ky Xuan introduced the band and spoke on the success of the pacification program. RVN flags were passed to children. Division Photo personnel were instructed to photograph the event in order that a leaflet could be produced for dissemination in the less pacified areas nearby. The leaflet was produced by Detachment Two, 244th Psychological Operations Company, Quang Ngai. On 27 April, motion pictures were shown in Hoa An Hamlet on Ky Xuan, for the purpose of stimulating interest in the Armed Forces and showing the people how the Armed Forces benefit them. Three hundred copies of Huong Que farm magazines, with articles of interest to fisherman, were distributed to those in attendance. A similar program was planned for Ky Hoa in early May. One hundred and seventy-five posters were sent to Ky Xuan. The posters explained the value of good health and sanitation practices.

f. Hoa Vinh Thanh Island: Fifty thousand leaflets were dropped on Hoa Vinh Thanh Island on 15 April. These leaflets explained the purpose of Marine presence. An aerial broadcast was conducted on the same date, appealing for civilian cooperation. On 16 April, 30,000 safe conduct passes and 50,000 leaflets explaining the Chieu Hoi program were dropped while instructions for the use of the passes were broadcast from the air. On 19 April a broadcast was conducted over Hoa Vinh Thanh which placed the blame on the VC for civilian injuries and property damage which resulted from combat operations. A similar broadcast was conducted on 28 April. On 29 April, 50,000 leaflets were dropped on Hoa Vinh Thanh. These leaflets showed photographs of the 16 April band concerts on Ky Hoa and Ky Xuan Islands and were utilized in order to give credence to the fact that Americans are in the Republic of Viet Nam for the good of the people.

g. Psychological operations themes developed during the month of April:

(1) An aerial broadcast was developed to cause the people to hold the VC responsible for property damage which occurred as a result of combat involving Marines.

(2) An aerial broadcast using the voice of a rallier from the First VC Regiment was recorded. The broadcast was to express confidence in the GVN/USMC and encourage defections.

(3) Two leaflets and two posters were developed to be used in the exploitation of future operations to protect rice harvesting.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Enclosure (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS  
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

APPENDIX A

1. ✓ Photographs: See photographic data sheet, Tab (1) *filed sep*
2. ✓ Situation Reports: See Tab (2) *filed sep*
3. ✓ Operational messages: See Tab (3) *includes op 301-66*

4. Logistics Documents:

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DOCUMENTS</u>
✓ LOGSUM Report 29 March to 5 April	CG 1st MARDIV LTR SER: 079-66 7 April 66
✓ Disposable Moss Gear Report	CG 1st MARDIV LTR 10110 of 29 April 66
✓ Food Services Information Sheet	Food Services Coordinator LTR of 6 Apr 66
✓ CLASS II MOUNT OUT MATERIAL	CG 1st MARDIV MSG 060948Z
✓ Supply Support of Ground Delivered	
✓ Nuclear Weapons	DIVISION ORDER 4400.17 8 April 66
✓ Division Base Development Board	DIVISION ORDER 11010.1 18 April 66
✓ Administrative Order 301-66 to accompany Operation Order 301-66	
✓ Report of Unusual Tube Wear 155mm	CG 1st MARDIV MSG 200520Z

5. Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Documents:

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DOCUMENTS</u>
Band Concert Announcement	Leaflet
Rice Harvest Protection Operations	Leaflet
Rice Harvest Protection Operations	Poster
Rice Harvest Protection Operations	Poster

6. Subordinate Units Command Chronologies:

a. ✓ Headquarters Bn	Tab (4)
b. ✓ 1st Marines	Tab (5)
c. ✓ 7th Marines	Tab (6)
d. ✓ 11th Marines	Tab (7)
e. ✓ 1st Reconnaissance Bn	Tab (8)
f. ✓ 1st Tank Bn	Tab (9)
g. ✓ 1st Antitank Bn	Tab (10)
h. ✓ 1st Engineer Bn	Tab (11)
i. ✓ 1st Shore Party Bn	Tab (12)
j. ✓ 1st Motor Transport Bn	Tab (13)
k. ✓ 1st Medical Bn	Tab (14)
l. ✓ 1st Hospital Co, FMF	Tab (15)
m. ✓ 3d Amphibian Tractor Bn	Tab (16)
n. ✓ 7th Motor Transport Bn	Tab (17)
o. ✓ CHU LMI Defense Command	Tab (18)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

PAGE ONE OF ONE

APPENDIX A

LOWGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET NOFORN DISSEM SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS

ORIGINATOR & DTG

Encl

1- III MAF/I CORPS COORDINATOR FRAG ORDER 04-03

CG III MAF/I CORPS  
COORDINATOR, 031532Z APR66  
COMUSMACV, 270850Z APR66

2- ARTILLERY SUPPORT OF ISOLATED CIDG CAMPS

CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR RELIEF OF BESEIGED

3- SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS

4- CIVIL DISTURBANCES

5- III MAF/I CORPS COORDINATOR FRAG ORDER 04-03

CG III MAF, 030718Z APR66  
COMUSMACV, 030602Z APR66

CG III MAF/I CORPS

COORDINATOR, 041330Z APR66

CG III MAF, 040332Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 040939Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 050850Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 051005Z APR66

CG III MAF, 030736Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 060820Z APR66

CG III MAF, 060838Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 070140Z APR66

CG III MAF, 080434Z APR66

CG III MAF, 071512Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 081135Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 080856Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 080607Z APR66

COMUSMACV, 071325Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 110020Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 110100Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 100351Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 111034Z APR66

CG III MAF, 110646Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 120230Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 111036Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 130916Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 121315Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 120620Z APR66

CTG 76.6, 122002Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 121316Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 130257Z APR66

CG 9TH MAB, 140045Z APR66

BLT 2/5, 131140Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 140201Z APR66

CG III MAF, 131358Z APR66

1ST MARINES, 132250Z APR66

CG III MAF, 140100Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 141124Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 140830Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 150101Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 151150Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 151151Z APR66

CG 1ST MARDIV, 170532Z APR66

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS  
TAB 3 APPENDIX A

NOFORN DISSEM

6- OPN ORANGE ALERT CONTINGENCY FORCE

7- TASK ORGANIZATION

8- TASK ORGANIZATION

9- FRAG ORDER

10- SECURITY OF HYDRO SURVOPS

11- MOVEMENT OF UNITS FROM CHU LAI TO PHU BAI

12- RELATIONS WITH VN MILITARY

13- MOVREP 1ST MT BN

14- EMERGENCY EVACUATION

15- III MAF PHASE I

16- CHU LAI DEFENSE COMMAND

17- FRAG ORDER

18- DEBARK OF BLT 2/5

19- CIVIL DISTURBANCES

20- OPERATION NEVADA

21- REDESIGNATION OF CO B 7TH MT BN

22- FRAG ORDER

23- CANCELLATION OF FRAG ORDER

24- EMERGENCY EVACUATION

25- CONST PLT 7TH COMM BN

26- REPORT OF CP LOCATIONS

27- OPCON 2/5

28- CHU LAI TAOR DEFENSE

29- MOVREP HQBN 1ST MARDIV

30- BLT 2/5 MOVT SITREP NR 2

31- FRAG ORDER #1-66

32- FRAG ORDER #1-66

33- EGEN STILES MOVEREP

34- OPCON BLT 2/5

35- MOVEMENT 2/4

36- FRAG ORDER 04-13

37- MISSION ASSIGNMENT

38- OPCON/ADCON BLT 2/5

39- MOVREP 2/4

40- ADCON 2/5

41- SEARCHLIGHT, 18 INCHES

42- INCR [REDACTED] WITIES DURING NEW MOON

43- PHASE [REDACTED]

44- ARTY PRE-POSITIONING

45- CHU LAI DEFENSE COMMAND

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10

Page 1 of 2

DECLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS*One*

- 45 USE OF CS IN CAVES
- 46 REPORT OF MORTAR FIRE, AN TAN BRIDGE AREA
- 47 VEHICLE SECURITY ON HWY #1
- 48 SUMMARY OF PF OPERATIONS PD 7-11 APR 66
- 49 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT [Rc]
- 50 FIRE SPT DURING NEW MOON PHASE
- 51 REFERENCE 1ST MARDIV OP O 301-66
- 52 PERS STATUS RPT 15 APR 66
- 53 OPERATION HOT SPRING
- 54 ROK MARINE BRIGADE RECEPTION PLAN
- 55 SUPPORT OF ROK MARINE BRIGADE
- 56 SUPPORT OF ROK FORCES
- 57 MACV CT-MANDERS CONFERENCE
- 58 FRAG ORDER #3-66
- 59 DEPLOYMENT OF 1ST MARINES
- 60 INCREASED ALERT ACTIVITIES
- 61 MOVREP 1ST MT-FMF
- 62 OPERATION HOT SPRINGS
- 63 TRANSFER OF OPCON
- 64 OPERATION HOT SPRINGS
- 65 OPERATION ORDER 24-04
- 66 MOVREP TF X-RAY
- 67 OPERATION HOT SPRINGS
- 68 OPCON 1ST FORCE RECON CO
- 69 TROOP DISPOSITIONS
- 70 MOVREP 7TH CIT (-)
- 71 DET, 1ST BRIDGE CO, FMF
- 72 SHIFT OF ADCON TO 1ST MARDIV
- 73 TF X-RAY
- 74 OPCON 1ST FORCE RECON CO
- 75 ENGR BN IN CHU LAI DURING MAY 66
- 76 9TH ENGR BN 9 MAY
- 77 REINFORCEMENT OF PHU BAI
- 78 SECURITY CONDITIONS
- 79 TRANSFER 3RD MARDIV UNITS
- 80 OPERATIONS IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE
- 81 CANCELLATION OF FRAG ORDER #3-66
- 82 OPERATION ORDER 301-66

[Appendix D, JFPR 301-66 (See Tab 4)]

Added to 82

Annex C to OpO 301-66

Added to

Op Plan 302-66 (GOLDEN Fleece), 17 Apr 66  
Pl OpO 301-66, 18 Apr 66DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10

Page 2 of 2

CG 1ST MARDIV, 170009Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 170939Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 170145Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 160413Z APR 66  
CG III MAF, 080602Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 180750Z APR 66  
7TH MARINES, 180615Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 200628Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 210031Z APR 66  
CG III MAF, 220422Z APR 66  
CG III MAF, 221332Z APR 66  
CG FMFPAC, 190423Z APR 66  
CG III MAF, 220308Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 230743Z APR 66  
1ST MARINES, 231300Z APR 66  
CHU LAI INSTALL COORD  
231427Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 240836Z APR 66  
CG III MAF, 230756Z APR 66  
CG III MAF, 250154Z APR 66  
CG FMFPAC, 231830Z APR 66  
CG III MAF, 250842Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 270710Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 270113Z APR 66  
CG 3RD MARDIV, 280530Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 270711Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 271130Z APR 66  
CG III MAF, 270724Z APR 66  
CG FMFPAC, 290039Z APR 66  
1ST MARINES, 290210Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 290232Z APR 66  
ADMINS FMFPAC, 290520Z APR 66  
ADMINS FMFPAC, 291051Z APR 66  
CG III MAF, 290350Z APR 66  
CG III MAF/I CORPS COORD  
291352Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 290642Z APR 66  
CG III MAF, 300816Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 300840Z APR 66  
CG 1ST MARDIV, 660752Z APR 66 010800 H

010800 Apr 66


SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

TAB 3 APPENDIX A

NOFORN DISSEM

**UNCLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED



BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
CMD CHR
BRIEF
POST

IZ 031532Z  
 FM CG III MAF/I CORPS COORDINATOR  
 TO III MAF  
 RUMSAG/6252 TFW DANANG  
 ZEN/SNA 1ST COASTAL GROUP  
 CN/NAV ADV DET  
 JUMFCF/CTG 115.3  
 ZEN/NAV SUP ACT DANANG  
 INFO 30TH NCR  
 RUMSAG/620TH TAC CON SQD DANANG  
 RUMSAG/CHIEF AFAT 5 DANANG  
 RUMSVD/CO I CORPS ADV GRP  
 BT

10R/ 0316 1/ OCN 923

S E C R E T NOFORN  
 III MAF/I CORPS COORDINATOR FRAG ORDER 04-03 (U)  
 1. SITUATION. LOCAL UNREST IN DANANG HAS REACHED POINT WHERE GOVT  
 TROOPS ARE EXPECTED TO TAKE AGGRESSIVE ACTION TO RESTORE LAWFUL  
 AUTHORITY. ANTICIPATE ARRIVAL OF GVN REINFORCEMENTS VIA AIRLIFT  
 (AIR VIETNAM AND VNAF) TO DANANG THIS DATE. TROOPS MAY BE FURTHER  
 DEPLOYED BY HELO (RVNAF) FROM DANANG AIRFIELD TO DESIGNATED  
 POSITIONS THROUGHOUT CITY.  
 2. MISSION. US FORCES IN I CORPS WILL BE ALERT FOR MILITARY ACTION  
 BETWEEN GOVT AND DISSIDENT FORCES AND WILL TAKE ALL POSSIBLE  
 ACTION TO AVOID CONFRONTATION BETWEEN VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN OR MILITARY

CG III MAF/I CORPS COORDINATOR  
 IDIV 2100/3 (1-65)

031532Z/APR 66

UNCLASSIFIED

Copy 12

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO RUMSMF 505 S E C R E T NOFORN  
ELEMENTS AND US FORCES.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT. UPON INITIATION OF REINFORCEMENT OF LOCAL VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND POSSIBLE ONSET OF INTERNAL CONFLICT ALL AMERICAN TROOPS WILL BE CONFINED TO THEIR BILLETTS OR DUTY STATIONS; ALL VEHICLES WILL REMAIN OFF ROADS EXCEPT FOR MATTERS OF UTMOST OPERATIONAL EMERGENCY; ALL PORT OPERATIONS WILL BE SUSPENDED. CONSTRUCTION ON AIRBASE MAY CONTINUE UNLESS CIVILIAN WORKERS BECOME UNCOOPERATIVE OR HOSTILE.

B. ALL UNITS.

(1) BE ALERT FOR INITIATION OF CONFLICT AND REPORT ANY INCIDENTS BY FLASH CALL TO PARCHMENT COC.

(2) ON ORDER, CONFINED ALL TROOPS TO BILLETTS OR DUTY STATIONS.

(3) ON ORDER, RESTRICT ALL VEHICLES FROM PUBLIC ROADS EXCEPT FOR MATTERS OF URGENT OPERATIONAL NATURE.

(4) TAKE ALL PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT US LIVES AND INSTALLATIONS USING MINIMUM NECESSARY FORCE.

(5) REEMPHASIZE TO ALL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENT FOR MAINTENANCE OF STRONG DISCIPLINE AND SELF-CONTROL TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT.

(6) IN NO WAY IMPEDE, DELAY, OR ASSIST MOVEMENT OF VIETNAMESE

PAGE THREE RUMSMF 505 S E C R E T NOFORN  
ARMED FORCES.

C. CO 6252 IFW. REPORT BY FLASH MSG TO PARCHMENT COC ANY ARRIVALS DANANG AIR BASE OF GVN TROOPS.

D. THIS ORDER FOR PLANNING AND ALERT UPON RECEIPT AND FOR EXECUTION BY FLASH MSG FROM THIS HQ.

GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST



P 30r. MAR66  
 FM CG III MAF  
 INFO ZEN/CG TMIRD MARBCV  
 RUABQI/CG FIRST MAGDIV  
 RUMSVD/CO I CORPSIADV GRP  
 P 270850Z  
 ONM COMUSMACV  
 TO CG IIIICAF  
 INFO CO WITH SFG  
 RT

TCR:03/06202/CCN636

COMM NOTE: LATE DELIVERY  
 RECEIVED BY COUR

ENC R E INPOYUT FROM MWCCOC.  
 SUBJ: ARTILLERY SUPPORT OF ISOLATED CIDG CAMPS  
 REF: A. COMUSMACV CITE 07760 DTG 110800Z MAR 66  
 B. COMUSMACV CITE 08094 DTG 1:1140Z MAR (NOTAL)  
 1. REFS A AND B EXPRESS COMUSMACV'S CONCERN ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF REMOTEN CIDG CAMPS. ON CEPEATED INSTANCES TIMELY REACTION IN THE FORM OF AICN STRIKES HAS BEEN THE DECIDING FACTOR IN THE SUCCESSFUL REPULSE OF VCE ASSAULTS ON THESE CAMPS. WHEN WEATERN PRECLUDES SUCH DECISIVE AIR SUPPORT, THE NEED FOR ANTER-NAL FIRE SUPPORT FROM ANOTHER SOURCE BACOMES CRITICAL.

COMUSMACV

270850Z/APR66

C 3

LDIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

copy 12

End 2



PAGE 2NRUMNF 159 S E C R E T  
 2. COMUSMACV IS AWARE THAT III MAFHAS GAGENALLY PREPARED PLANS FOR THE RELIEF AND/OR REINFORCEMENT OF CAMP VU- NERABPE TO VC/NVA ATTACK, AND THAT THESE PLANS INCLUDE APPROPRIATE AIR SUPPORT, NTO AUGMENT, AND IN FOUL WEATHER LARGELY REPLACE THE EXTERNAL FIRE SUPPORT DELIVERED IN THE PAST PRIMARILY BY AIR. HE DESIRES THAT WE LOOK TO THE INNOVATIVE UTILIZATION OF HELICOPTER

BORNE ARTILLERY ASSETS.

3. IN THIS RESPECT, HE PERCEIVES A CONCEPT WHICH WOULD LIFT 105MM HOWITZER ARTILLERY INTO POS

TION AREAS FROM WHICH FIRE CAN BE DELIVERED IN SUPPORT OF A CAMP UNDER ATTACK. ARTILLERY UNITS, FROM BATTERY TO BATTAL IN SIZE AS APPROPRIATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ONLY THAT AMOUNT OF INFANTRY REQUIRED FOR PROTECTION

ON FROM ENEMY

BY SMALL ARMS FIRE

4. E, COULD BE INTRODUCED INTO PREVIOUSLY RECON- NOITERED AREAS BEYOND NORMAL AMBUSH RANGE OF THE VC/NVA

FORCES

ASSAULTING THE CAMP. THIS ARTILLERY COULD THEN BRING DEFENSIVE FIRES TO BEAR ON THE VC/NVA, THUS PROVIDING CRUCIAL SUPPORT WITHOUT INCURRING THE HAZARD

ASSOCIATED WITH INTRODUCTION OF REINFORCEMENTS INTO THE

IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF A BESIEGED CAMP. ARTILLERY FORWARD OBSERVERS EQUIPPED WITH SUITABLE RADIOS, ASSIGNED FREQUENCIES, CALL SIGNS, ETC. SHOULD, UNDER THIS CONCEPT, BE

PAVE 3 RUMSMP 159 F E C R E T

A NORMAL PART OF EACH CAMP'S COMPLEMENT. THIS FUNCTION COULD BE

PERFORMED BY TRAINING SPEC FORCES PERSONNEL ASSIGNED AS ADVISORS

TO THE CAMP DEFENDERS.

4. COMUSMACV WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE FEASIBILITY OF THIS CONCEPT IN THE I CTZWMH

REQUEST THAT YOU MAKE A

STUDY TO THIS EFFECT AND FORWARD YOUR FINDINGS TO THIS HEADQUARTERS ASAP. DIRECT LIAISON WITH CO, 5TH SFG AIN. IF YOUR FINDINGS ARE FAVORABLE, IT IS THE INTENTION OF COMUSMACV TO INSTITUTE SIMILAR CONTINGENCY PLANS THROUGHOUT II AND III

CTZ'S.


3. FOR CO, 5TH SFG. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS AS APPROPRIATE.

GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

FM CG III MAF  
TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV  
ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
ZEN/CG FIRST MAF  
INFO RUMSVD/1 CORPS ADV GRU  
BT



BURN	HOLD	G-1	G-2	LNO	PER SUM	WK SUM	CMD CHR	BRIEF	POST
Q									

SECRET

CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR RELIEF OF BESEIGED SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS

A. COMUSMACV 2606:5Z

1. REFERENCE A DIRECTED CG 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP ABN TO PREPARE CAMP STUDIES OF SPECIFIED FORCES CAMPS WITH A VIEW TOWARD ASSISTING COMMANDERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR THE RELIEF OF CAMPS THAT MAY COME UNDER SIEGE. NONE OF THE CAMPS LISTED IN REFERENCE A ARE LOCATED IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. THE HEADQUARTERS HAS, BY REFERENCE B, DIRECTED SIMILAR STUDIES BE CONDUCTED WITHIN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE BY CG I CORPS ADVISORY

CG TWO RUMSMF 491 SECRET

GROUP, FURTHER THAT THESE STUDIES BE DELIVERED TO APPROPRIATE MARINE DIVISION COMMANDERS. THIS ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO ASSIST DIVISION COMMANDERS IN EXPEDITING CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

2. FOR CG 1ST MARINE DIVISION

A. DEVELOP BOTH UNILATERAL AND COMBINED CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR THE RELIEF OF THE FOLLOWING CIDG CAMPS:

KHAM DUC

TIEN PHUOC

HA THANH

TRA BONG

BA TO

GIA VUC

B. DIRECT LIAISON WITH CG 2D ARVN DIVISION AND CG I CORPS ADV GRU AUTHORIZED.

3. FOR CG 3D MARDIV

DEVELOP BOTH UNILATERAL AND COMBINED CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR THE RELIEF OF THE FOLLOWING CIDG CAMPS:

THUONG DUC

KHE SANH

B. DIRECT LIAISON WITH CG 1ST ARVN DIVISION, CG QUANG NAM SPECIAL

PAGE THREE RUMSMF 491 SECRET

SECTION, AND CG I CORPS ADVISORY GROUP AUTHORIZED.

4. FOR CT 1ST MAF, PROVIDE PLANNING SUPPORT AS REQUESTED BY CG 1ST MARINE DIVISION AND CG 3D MARINE DIVISION.

5. DIRECT LIAISON PARTICIPATING UNITS AUTHORIZED.

GP-4

BT

CG III MAF

030718Z APR 66


G-5

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



7	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUP
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

0 04 APRIL 66

FM CG III MAF  
TO III MAF  
RUMSAG/6252 TFW DANANG  
RUMSVD/SNA FIRST COASTAL GROUP  
RUMSBB/NAV ADV DET  
RUMFCR/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT THREE  
ZEN/NAV SUP ACT DANANG  
ZEN/30TH NCR  
RUMSAG/620TH IAC CON SQD DANANG  
RUMSAG/CHIEF AFAT 5 DANANG  
RUMSDV/CO I CORPS ADV GRP  
P 030602Z

TOR/04/0733-1080

FM COMUSMACV  
TO CG III MAF  
USARV  
7TH AF  
COMNAVFORV  
CG I FFORCEV  
CG II FFORCEV  
CG IV CTE  
INFO CINCPAC

BT  
SECRET 10529 FROM MACJ321 SECT 1 OF 2  
SUBJ: CIVIL DISTURBANCES (U)

1. (S) GENERAL:

A. CURRENT POLITICAL UNREST IN RVN HAS LET TO THE GATHERING OF CIVILIAN OR QUASI-CIVILAIN CROWDS IN POPULATIN CENTERS. THESE CROWDS, SOMETIMES BORDERING ON MOBS, HAVE ON SOME OCCASIONS BECOME ANTAGONISTIC TOWARD THE U.S. AND HAVE THREATENED TO ENTER U.S. INSTALLATIONS. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT SOME LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS MAY BE SEEKING AN INCIDENT IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES CAN BE SHOWN IN AN UNFAVORABLE

I CG III MAF 030602Z APR 66

S/S

UNCLASSIFIED

LDIV 2100/3 (1-65)

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 282D S E C R E T  
 LIGHT. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR  
 ACTIONS BY U.S./FWMAF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE EVENT MOB  
 VIOLENCE IS DIRECTED AGAINST U.S./FWMAF PERSONNEL OR PROPERTY.

2. (C) DEFINITIONS:

A. U.S. PERSONNEL ARE DEFINED AS MEMBERS OF THE ARMED  
 FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. CITIZENS WHO ARE CIVILIAN  
 EMPLOYEES OF, OR UNDER CONTRACT TO, THE U.S. ARMED FORCES, U.S.  
 MEMBERS OR EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT AND AFFILIATED  
 AGENCIES, AND U.S. MERCHANT SEAMEN.

B. FWMAF PERSONNEL ARE DEFINED AS MEMBERS, MILITARY AND  
 CIVILIAN, OF THE ARMED FORCES OF COUNTRIES PROVIDING FREE WORLD  
 MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

C. U.S./FWMAF PROPERTY IS DEFINED AS INSTALLATIONS,  
 EQUIPMENT OR MATERIAL BELONGING TO OR UTILIZED EXCLUSIVELY BY  
 THE PERSONNEL LISTED IN PARAGRAPHS 2A & B ABOVE.

D. CRITICAL MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ARE DEFINED AS ANY  
 OF THE FOLLOWING WHICH ARE CRITICAL TO THE WAR EFFORT: TROOP  
 UNIT AREAS, AIRFIELDS AND PORTS, MAJOR HEADQUARTERS, SUPPLY  
 AND LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS, COMMUNICATIONS CENTERS. EXAMPLES  
 OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS WHICH ARE NOT REPEAT NOT NECESSARILY

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 282D S E C R E T  
 CRITICAL ARE THOSE OFFICES AND INSTALLATIONS NOT CRITICAL TO  
 THE WAR EFFORT WHICH CAN BE SAFELY EVACUATED SUCH AS: SEPARATE  
 BILLETTS, R&R CENTERS, OTHER RECREATIONAL FACILITIES, POST  
 EXCHANGES, AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES.

3. (S) POLICY - GENERAL:

A. US/FWMAF PERSONNEL DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO  
 ENFORCE U.S. OR GVN LAWS UPON VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

B. US/FWMAF PERSONNEL DO HAVE THE SAME RIGHT AS  
 VIETNAMESE UNDER VIETNAMESE LAW TO PROTECT U.S. LIVES AND  
 PROPERTY. THUS ONE MAY DEFEND HIMSELF OR OTHER US OR VN AGAINST  
 LOOTING, ATTACK IN ASSEMBLAGE, OR ROBBERY. THE ACTS OF AN  
 INDIVIDUAL TAKEN IN DEFENSE OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY ARE RE-  
 STRICTED TO THOSE ACTS THAT ARE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT TO  
 AVOID THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ATTACK AND ARE TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY  
 WITH THE ATTACK.

C. THE SECURITY OF US/FWMAF PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY  
 IN VIETNAM IS FIRST THE RESPONSIBILITY OF GVN. US/FWMAF SELF-  
 HELP WILL BE EMPLOYED ONLY WHERE VN POLICE OR MILITARY PRO-  
 TECTION IS UNAVAILABLE OR INEFFECTIVE. WHERE PRACTICAL, RE-  
 COURSE TO VN NATIONAL POLICE OR VN MILITARY PROTECTION WILL BE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 4 RUMS-11 282D S E C R E T

ATTEMPTED BEFORE US/FWMAF SELF-HELP WILL BE EMPLOYED. IF SUCH VN PROTECTION IS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, NOT AVAILABLE OR NOT EFFECTIVE, US/FWMAF PERSONNEL MAY ACT AS SUBSEQUENTLY INDICATED.

D. WHERE PRACTICAL, THE SENIOR US/FWMAF MILITARY PERSON OR RESPONSIBLE CIVILIAN PERSON PRESENT IN THE INSTALLATION OR PROPERTY UNDER ATTACK WILL PROMPTLY INFORM THE LOCAL US COMMANDER OF THE NATURE OF THE ATTACK, THE PROPERTY THREATENED, AND WHETHER IT APPEARS US/FWMAF LIVES ARE ENDANGERED. THE LOCAL US COMMANDER WILL DETERMINE WHETHER THE PROPERTY WILL BE ABANDONED, BASED UPON THE DEFINITION OF CRITICAL MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN 2E ABOVE, WITHOUT FURTHER RESISTANCE OR THE DEGREE OF RESISTANCE TO BE EMPLOYED.

4. (S) POLICY - USE OF FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE.

A. US/FWMAF LIVES OR CRITICAL MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ENDANGERED: REASONABLE FORCE, MEASURED TO MEET THE DEGREE OF VIOLENCE OF THE ATTACK, WILL BE USED TO PROTECT US/FWMAF LIVES OR CRITICAL MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ENDANGERED BY CIVIL DISTURBANCES. RESISTANCE WILL, AS APPROPRIATE AND AVAILABLE UNDER ALL ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES, BE GRADUATED FROM THE INTERPOSITION OF BARRIERS AND BARBED WIRE, SHOW OF FORCE BY THE APPEARANCE

TCAVCSMGE 5 RUM

A 282D S E C R E T

OF AN ARMED GUARD, HOSES, USE SMOKE AND TEAR GAS, WARNING SHOTS, AND FINALLY, AND ONLY WHEN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, FIRING UPON THE ATTACKERS. WHEN POSSIBLE FIRING SHOULD BE DIRECTED AT IDENTIFIABLE RIGELAEADERS AND SHOULD BE AIMED TO STOP THE ATTACK RATHER THAN TO KILL.

B. US/FWMAF NON-CRITICAL OR NON-MILITARY INSTALLATIONS: US/FWMAF FORCES WILL NOT BE CALLED UPON TO PROTECT NON-CRITICAL OR NONMILITARY INSTALLATIONS EXCEPT FOR THE TIME REQUIRED TO EVACUATE ALL PERSONS FROM THE INSTALLATION. IN SUCH CASES GUIDANCE IN PARAGRAPH 4A WILL APPLY.

C. US/FWMAF MILITARY PROPERTY NOT ON AN INSTALLATION: ALL REASONABLE FORCE WILL BE USED TO PROTECT US MILITARY PROPERTY NOT ON AN INSTALLATION. THE MOST PROBABLE SITUATION WHICH MAY OCCUR OFF AN INSTALLATION IS WHEN US MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE IN A VEHICLE AND THE VEHICLE IS THREATENED. IN THIS CASE, THE PROPERTY ITSELF MAY NOT BE OF SUCH VALUE AS TO WARRANT KILLING, BUT THE LIVES OF THE PASSENGERS WOULD COME UNDER THE GUIDELINES OF 4A ABOVE. THE SENIOR RESPONSIBLE PERSON PRESENT WILL DETERMINE THE DEGREE OF FORCE WHICH PROTECTION OF THE PROPERTY WARRANTS.

GP-4

BT

A


UNCLASSIFIED

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>BURN</u>
<u>HOLD</u>
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
CMD CHR
BRIEF
POST



Z 041220Z  
FM CG III MAF/I CORPS COORDINATOR  
TO III MAF  
ZEN/NAV ADV DET  
RUMSVD/I CORPS ADV GRU  
RUMSAG/6252 TFW DANANG  
RUMSVD/SNA 1ST COASTAL GROUP  
RUMFCF/CTG 115.3  
INFO ZEN/NAVSUPPACT DANANG  
ZEN/30TH NCR  
RUMSAG/620TH TAC CON SQD DANANG  
RUMSAG/CHIEF AFAT 5 DANANG  
BT

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

SECRET NOFORN  
III MAF/I CORPS COORDINATOR FRAG ORDER 04-03 (U)  
A. CG III MAF/I CORPS COORDINATOR 031532Z (S)  
B. COMUSMACV 030602Z (PASEP)  
1. EXECUTE REF A.  
2. PARAGRAPH 3B3 OF REF A IS CHANGED IN THAT NO VEHICLES  
WILL BE USED ON PUBLIC ROADS FOR ANY REASON UNLESS PERMISSION  
IS OBTAINED FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS.  
3. REF B CONTAINS GUIDANCE FOR US/FWMAF MILITARY PERSONNEL  
AND WILL BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH.  
GP-4  
BT

CG III MAF/I CORPS COORDINATOR 041220Z APR 66

FSCG

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED


End #5

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CIR
	BRIEF
	POST



,)33(06.272-::02(4,::1 96,

;VV MFE015

ZNY SSSSS

O 040332Z

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FIRST MARDIV

INFO CG THIRD MARDIV

CG FIRST MAW

BT

S E C R E T

OPN ORANGE ALERT CONTINGENCY FORCE

A. CG III MAF 030714Z

1. STAND DOWN BN CMD GRU PLUS TWO COMPANY ALERTED BY REF A.

GP-4

BT

CG III MAF

040332Z APR 66

G-3

COPY

04140

UNCLASSIFIED


NNNN

WDIV 2100/3 (1-65)

Encl #6

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



2	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

R 040939Z

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO ZEN/CG III MAF

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

-TASK ORGANIZATION

A. FORCE ORDER 3121.1B

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A THE FOLLOWING INFO IS HEREWITH SUBMITTED:

A. ORGANIZATION (AS OF 4APR66)

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

HU BN (REIN)

HU BN

1ST DENTAL CO (-)

PAGE TWO RUMSMB 353E C O N F I D E N T I A L

1ST HTSPITAL CO (-)

7TH CIT (-)

DET 3D ITT

2D SSC TM

1ST MARINES (-) (REIN)

HU CO (-) 1ST MARINES

3D BN 1ST MARINES

2D BN 4TH MARINES

DET HQ CO 1ST BN 4TH MARINES

7TH MARINES

HU CO 7TH MARINES

1ST BN 7TH MARINES

2D BN (-) 7TH MARINES

3D BN 7TH MARINES

CHU LAI DEFENCE COMMAND

DET HU CO 2D BN 7TH MARINES

CO E 2D BN 7TH MARINES

CO F 2D BN 7TH MARINES

11TH MARINES (-) (REIN)

HU BTRY (-)

CG FIRST MARDIV

040939Z APR 66

G-3

1-3

UNCLASSIFIED



CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE TH

EE RUMSMB 353E [REDACTED]  
 1ST BN (-) (REIN)  
 HQ BTRY (-)  
 BTRY C  
 BTRY G 12TH MARINES  
 BTRY H 12TH MARINES  
 3RD BN  
 4TH BN (-) (REIN)  
 HQ BTRY  
 BTRY M  
 3RD 155MM GUN BTRY (-)  
 PLT 3D 8" HTW BTRY  
 3RD 8" HTW BTRY GRP  
 3D 8" HTW BTRY (-)  
 BTRY K  
 PLT 3D 155MM GUN BTRY  
 1ST RECON BN (-)  
 HWGS CO (-)  
 CO A (-)  
 CO C  
 CO D

PAGE FOUR RUMSMB 353E [REDACTED]

1ST AT BN (-)  
 HWGS CO (-)  
 CO A (-)  
 CO C  
 1ST TK BN (-)  
 HWGS CO (-)  
 CO A (-)  
 CO B  
 1ST MT BN (-)  
 HWGS CO (-)  
 CO A (-)  
 CO C  
 1ST ENGR BN (-)  
 HQ CO (-)  
 SPT CO (-)  
 CO A (-)  
 CO C  
 1ST MED BN (-)  
 HWGS CO (-)  
 CO A (-)

UNCLASSIFIED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE FIVE RUMSMB 353E [REDACTED]

CO C  
CO D  
1ST SP BN (-)  
HWGS CO (-)  
CO A (-)  
CO C  
3RD AMTRAC BN (-)  
HWGS CO (-)  
CO A  
7TH MT BN (-)

B. LOCATION: CHU LAI COMBAT BASE

C. PERSONNEL: AS OF 2APR66

USMC  
OFF/ENL  
623/10,751

USN  
OFF/ENL  
84/594

TOTAL  
12,052


GP-11  
BT

3-3  
UNCLASSIFIED

1DIV 2100/4 (2-65)

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



Q

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	END CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

R 050850Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/CG XII MAF

BT

CONFIDENTIAL  
-TASK ORGANIZATION

A. NY 040939Z

1. REF A REFERS

A. DELETE FIRST HTSP CO (-) FROM HUBN (REIN)

B. ADD FIRST HTSP CO (-) BELOW SEVENTH MT BN (-) IN PAR 1.A.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

050850Z APR 66

UNCLASSIFIED


ADIV 2100/4 (2-65)

Encl #8

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	BURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	HOLD
<input type="checkbox"/>	G-1/G-4
<input type="checkbox"/>	G-2
<input type="checkbox"/>	LNO
<input type="checkbox"/>	PER SUM
<input type="checkbox"/>	WK SUM
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	CMD CHR
<input type="checkbox"/>	BRIEF
<input type="checkbox"/>	POST

P 051005Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
TO ZEN/FIRST MARINES  
ZEN/SEVENTH MARINES  
INFO RUMNAW/FIRST MAW  
RUMFCR/NCBB/USS MAURY

BT

SECRET

FRAG ORDER

A. CG III MAF 150520Z MAR PASEP

B. CG III MAF 030736Z PASEP

1. FIRST MARDIV PROVIDES SECURITY FOR NAV AID BEACH TEAMS IAW REF A AND B.

2. SEVENTH MARINES: CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ONE FIRE TEAM FOR SECURITY.

3. FIRST MARINES: CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ONE RADIO OPERATOR AND ONE AN/PRC 47 FOR COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT OF SECURITY ELEMENT.

GP-4

BT

1DIV 2100/5 (1-65) DIV REIN


051005Z APR 60

UNCLAS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



7	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
Q	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 05 APR 66  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
INFO 5825/1ST MARINES  
63LS/7TH MARINES  
P 030736Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
FIRST MAW  
USS MAURY (AGS-16)  
THIRD MARDIV  
MAG 36  
BT

SECRET

SECURITY OF HYDRO SURVOPS

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 310650Z MAR (NOTAL)

B. CG III MAF 190520Z MAR (PASEP)

1. REF A REQUESTS GUIDANCE FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENT FOR USS MAURY HYDRO SURVOPS. REF B PROVIDES.

2. FOR CG 1ST MARDIV: REQUEST YOU CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY REQUIREMENT FOR USS MAURY HYDRO SURVOPS.

EM FOR ALL: DIRLAUTH FOR SECURITY AND SUPPORT

4. FOR USS MAURY: REQUEST YOUR REP CONTACT CG 1ST MARDIV FOR DETAILS OF YOUR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN


LDIV 2100/3 (1-65)

030736Z APR

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 260820Z

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/III MAFINFO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
ZEN/FIRST MARINES  
ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN  
BT

S E C R E T

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 030600Z

B. ADMINO FIRST MARDIV 010730Z NOV 65

C. FIRST MAR 280250Z MAR

- MVMT OF UNITS FROM CHU LAI TO PHU BAI

1. REF A REQUESTED BTRY H TWELFTH MAR AND FIRST PLT CO A FIRST ENGR BN BE CHOPPED TO OPCON THIRD MARDIV.

2. RECORDS THIS HQ INDICATE FIRST PLT CO A FIRST ENGR BN ENTERED VN AS SUPPORTING ELEMENT BLT ONE SLANT THREE.

3. FIRST PLT (-) CO B THIRD ENGR BN PRESENTLY ATTACHED CO A FIRST

PAGE 2 RUMSMC 536 S E C R E T

ENGR BN AND CONSISTING ONE OFF AND NINETEEN ENL WILL BE RETURNED TO THIRD MARDIV. TWO SQUADS THIS PLAT DEPARTED WITH FIRST BN (-) FOURTH MARINES ON 13 MARCH.

4. RELATED SUBJECT.

A. ON 13 MARCH CMD GRP AND TWO RIFLE COMPANIES OF FIRST BN FOURTH MARINES DEPLOYED FROM HQ CO FIRST MARINES TO HUE PHU BAI TAOR. ON DEPARTURE FROM CHU LAI, FOUR VN INTERPRETERS WERE PROVIDED AS SUPPORT. REQUEST RETURN OF VN INTERPRETERS TO THIS CMD.

D. REF C REQUESTED RETURN OF CERTAIN COMM EQUIP BELONGING TO THIRD BN FIRST MAR

5. REQUEST ISSUE INST TO CHOP ADCON BTRY H TWELFTH MARINES TO THIRD MARDIV. FURTHER REQUEST TRANSFER INST FOR FIRST PLT CO B THIRD ENGR BN IN TOTO.

GP-4

BT

1DIV 0606/0606-01 MARDIV REIN

060820Z APR

UNCLASSIFIED

BURN
<u>HOLD</u>
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WV SUM
MD GHB
POST



EQHEVHSGZIMKAT

VV ME414  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 060838Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
CG THIRD MARDIV  
CG FIRST MAF  
BT

ADVANCE ROUTED TO

S/SEC \_\_\_\_\_  
(SIGNATURE & TIME)

ACTION \_\_\_\_\_ SECTION \_\_\_\_\_  
(SIGNATURE & TIME)

SECRET LIMDIS  
RELATIONS WITH VN MILITARY (U)

1. THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM COMUSMACV.  
2. THE RECENT VIETNAMESE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AMONG MANY OTHER SUBJECTS HAVE EXPRESSED RESENTMENT OVER US POLICIES IN VIETNAM AND REQUESTED THAT "THEY BE TREATED AS PARTNERS AND NOT DICTATED TO". WHILE AN ISOLATED INCIDENT, TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER INFORMATION IT SEEMS TO REFLECT A LATENT CONCERN AMONG THE VIETNAMESE OVER THE OVERWHELMING ROLE PLAYED BY FREE WORLD FORCES IN MILITARY OPERATIONS. ALL COMMANDERS MUST GIVE THIS AREA THEIR

PAGE TWO RUMSMF SECRET LIMDIS  
PERSONAL ATTENTION.

3. OPERATIONS IN VN POSE A CHALLENGE GREATER THAN ANY THAT COMMANDERS HAVE FACED IN PAST WARS. THE ABSENCE OF AN OVERALL ALLIED COMMAND STRUCTURE AND THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONAL COORDINATION UNDER WHICH US/FWMA FORCES MUST OPERATE REQUIRES KEEN APPRAISAL AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES. AFTER INITIAL RELIEF OVER RECEIVING REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE FREE WORLD, IT IS NATURAL THAT THE VN WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY SENSITIVE TO THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR AND RESENT BEING BYPASSED OR SEEMINGLY IGNORED WHEN OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED IN AREAS FOR WHICH THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE. IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE, ALL COMMANDERS MUST BE EVER ALERT TO POLITICAL DIVERGENT INFLUENCES. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO ENSURE THAT THE VC PROPAGANDIST CANNOT USE AN INCIDENT TO DISRUPT THE PRESENT CLOSE US/ARVN RELATIONSHIP

4. A. IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT COMMANDERS REVIEW THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH VN MILITARY TO ENSURE CLOSE WORKING RELATIONS WITH THEIR VN COUNTERPARTS. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT ACTION 3 5-(3, 95 ONLY TO INCLUDE THE RVNAF IN PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS BUT THAT RVNAF COMMANDERS BE ENCOURAGED TO CONTRIBUTE 194CES TO THE OPERATION. IMPORTANCE OF CONDUCTING COMBINED OPERATIONS MUST BE STRESSED. THE

CG III MAF

COPY  
060838Z APR 66

(102)  
63

LDIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 12

UNCLASSIFIED

LIMDIS

PAGE THREE RUMSOF S E C R A T LIMDIS  
 FACT THAT THIS IS A VN WAR AND THAT US FORCES ARE HERE ONLY TO ASSIST  
 MUST BE CONTINUALLY STRESSED AT ALL LEVELS IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND.  
 IT IS JUST AS IMPORTANT FOR THE COMPANY OR BATTERY COMMANDER TO  
 WORK CLOSELY WITH THE DISTRICT CHIEF AS THE US DIVISION CMDR TO  
 WORK WITH ARVN DIVISION COUNTERPART.

B. IN MANY CASES, DUE TO THE NEED FOR SECURITY, IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT  
 PLANS WHICH ARE COVERED WITH VN COMMANDER WILL BE GENERAL IN NATURE  
 HOWEVER IT IS FELT THAT GENERAL CONFERENCES OUTLINING THE FACT THAT  
 A US UNIT WILL BE OPERATING IN AN AREA AND ASKING ARVN FOR A CON-  
 TRIBUTION OF TROOPS IN ORDER TO MAKE IT A COMBINED OPERATION SHOULD  
 GO FAR TOWARD GENERATING AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL TRUST AND COO-  
 PERATION.

CP-4

PC

LDIV 2100/3 (1-65)


UNCLASSIFIED

(2-2)



UNCLASSIFIED

1ST MT BN MOVEMENT REPORT



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 070140Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO AIG SIX ZERO  
INFO ZEN/FIRST MT BN  
RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC  
RUMSMF/CG III MAF  
BT

CONFIDENTIAL. PPP MOVREP 040001Z5 CO FIRST MTBN, 01//  
ORG BN FIRST MTBN (MINUS) (REIN), 02//  
ARR P CHU LAI RVN, 030200Z5 03//  
CHG SFT 030400Z7 USS VERNON COUNTY, TO CHU LAI RVN, ADMIN  
TO CHU LAI, 4//  
CFN 040001Z5, 030200Z5, 030400Z7, 05//END  
GP-4  
BT

CG FIRST MA RDIV


070140Z APR 66

UNCLASSIFIED

G-5

1DIV 2100/4 (2-65)

UNCLASSIFIED



Z 080434Z  
FM CG III MAF  
ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
ZEN/CG FIRST MAF  
ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV  
RQMNA/COMNAVSUPACT DANANG  
ZEN/CO FLC  
ZEN/OICC RVNHDANANG  
ZEN/1ST BNH9TH MAR  
INFO RQMSMA/COMUSMACV  
RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC (M006)  
RUMSVD/CO I CORPS ADV GRU  
BT

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

## EMERGENCY EVACUATION (U)

A. CG III MAF 071542Z (S), FRAG OPLANH04-67 PHASE I

1. THIS IS PHASE II OF EMERGENCY EVAC PLAN. OBJECTIVE IS TO BROADEN SAFE HAVEN AREA ESTABLISHED BY PHASE I, REF A, AND TO REDUCE BLOCKY TO PASSAGE OF EVACREES TO EVAC POINTS WITHIN SAFE HAVEN AREA, AND TO EVAC AMERICANS FROM I CORPS HQ.

2. MISSION. III MAF INTERJECTS ARMORED MOBILE FORCE FROM THE NORTHWEST SECTOR FORMING A BLOCK TO SOUTH GENERALLY ALONG DAI LO QUANG TRUNG STREET AND FROM THE INTERSECTION OF DAI LO QUANG

PAGE TWO RUMSMF 679

LIRUNG AND HD KHAI DINH NORTH TO THE BAI DE TOURANE, PREPARED TO SEND PATROLS THROUGHOUT DANANG CITY TO INSURE SAFE PASSAGE TO EVACUEES.

## 3. EXECUTION.

## A. THIRD MARDIV.

(1) CONTINUE MSNH ASSIGNED PHASE I.

(2) UPON EXECUTION PHASE I, ALERT AND PREPOSITION REQUIRED COMBAT FORCES TO BROADEN SAFE HAVEN AREA IN NORTHEASTERN SECTOR OF DANANG CITY.

(3) ON ORDER, LAUNCH ARMORED MOBILE FORCE SUFFICIENT TO ACCOMPLISH BLOCK TO SOUTH AND WEST AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 2 ABOVE.

(4) WHEN BLOCK IS ESTABLISHED, MAINTAIN ADEQUATE RESERVE MOBILE FORCES TO SEND HARMED HAND/ OR ARMORED PATROLS OUT FROM THE BLOCK POSITION TO GUARANTEE SAFE PASSAGE OF EVACUEES TO THE SAFE HAVEN AREA.

(5) BE PREP, ON ORDER, ASSUME OPCON 1ST BN 9TH MAR.

## B. 1ST BN 9TH MAR.

(1) CONTINUE WITH VERBAL DIRECTIVES ISSUED THIS SUBJECT.

(2) BE PREP FOR RPOT CONTROL ACTIVITIES AND/OR COMBAT MISSIONS.

(3) ON ORDER, BLOCK ALL ENTRANCES/EXITS OF DANANG AIR BASE.

(4) BE PREPARED TO COMMIT FORCE TO I CORPS HQ TO ASSIST AND

COPY NR 13

080434Z APR 66

(1-2)

COC

CG III MAF

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE RUMSMF 679 S E C R E T  
PROTECT EVACUEES.

(5) ON ORDER, CHOP OPCON CG THIRD MARDIV.  
FMAW.

(1) CONTINUE MISSION ASSIGNED PHASE I.

(2) RPG REQUIRED AIRCRAFT FOR RCA.

(3) BE PREPARED TO BLOCKHAIRFIELD RUN-6 -8-8, 65 73 76 ; 1  
)-84:4-15.

(4) BE PREP TO PROVIDE A/CHON STATION TO COUNTER VNAPHAIR ACTIVITIES.

(5) PROVIDE A/CHOPPED WITH AERPAL PA SYSTEMS FOR REQUIRED  
ANNOUNCEMENTS.

(6) COORDINATE WITH 5TH AIR COMMANDO SQDNHTO OBTAIN HU-12 AIRCRAFT  
CONFUGURZDHFOR AERPAL BROADCAST.

D. NAVSUPACT.

(1) CONTINUE MISSION ASSIGNED PHASE I.

E. FLC.

(1) CONTINUE MISSION ASSIGNED PHASE I.

F. RESERVE. FPRS: MARDPV.

(1) PLACE ONE IN BNPHON ONE HOUR ALERT PREPARED FOR RIOT CONTROL/  
-: AND/ORHCOMBET MISSION IN DANANG CPTV.

(2) ON ORDER, MOVE RESERVE FORCE BY SURFACE CONVOY VIA RTE 1 OR

PAGE FOURHRQMSHF 679 S E C R E T

BY AIRHTO DANANG AREA, CHOPPING OPCON 3D MARDPV ON ARR 3D MARDPV  
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.

(\*) BE PREP ENTER 3DH MARDPV TACTICAL NETS ON CHOP.

(4) RECONSTITUTE RESERVE IF COMMITTED.

G. COORD INSTN.

(1) PHASE I COORD INSTRUCTIONS APPLY.

(2) EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO ASSURE VNHPeople THAT III MAF  
OBJECTIVE IS TO EVACHAMERICAN AND THAT III MAF DESIRES NO BLOOD-  
SHED. ABOVE ALL,

III MAF MISSION IS NOT DESIGNED TO INTERFERE  
WITH INTERNAL STRUGGLE OF VN PEOPLE.

(3) EFF FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT, EXECUTION ON ORDER.

GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

(2)

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHM
	BRIEF
	FOOT


IKXT 000318Z  
F CG III MAF  
TO OICC MA DANANG

ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV

Z 071542Z

FM CG III MAF  
TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
ZEN/CG FIRST MAF  
ZEN/CO FLC  
RUMNNA/CMD NAVSUPPACT DANANG  
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC (M009)  
RUMSVD/CO I CORPS ADV GRU  
BT

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS



SECRET IN O F O R N  
III MAF OPLANH2A-07  
EMERGENCY EVACUATION (U)

A. AMS, FAR EAST, DANANG, VIETNAM, SHEET 6659 III 1:50,070  
MISSION: III MAF IN COORDINATION WITH NAVSUPPACT ESTABLISHES BN(-)  
FORCE IN NORTHEASTERN SECTION OF DANANG CITY. SEALS OFF SAFE HAVEN  
AREA TO NORTH. PROVIDES PROTECTION FOR U.S. PERSONNEL WITHIN SAFE  
HAVEN AREA AND EVACUATES THESE PERSONNEL TO DANANG EAST OR MAF  
BY HELICOPTER AND/OR ASSAULT LANDING CRAFT.  
EXECUTION:

COPY NR 13

071542Z APR 66

CG III MAF

UNCLASSIFIED

841 S E C R E T NOFORN

PROVISION

(1) PLACE BN CMDHGRP AND TWO REIN RIFLE COS ON ONE HOUR ALERT PREP FOR RIOT CONTROL AND EVACUATION ACTIVITIES IN NORTHEASTERN SECTION OF DANANG CPT.

(2) ESTABLISH, WITH MINIMUM OF ONE RIFLE CO, SAFZ HAVENHAREA NORTH OF DUONG LY THUONG KIET STREET (BT 030795) TO (BT 035795), BLOCKPNG TO SOUTH, EST BLOCK TO WEST FROM (BT 030780) NORTH ALONG 03 GRIDLINE.

(3) ESTABLISH CMDHPOST AND RESERVE RPFLE CO ON EASTERN BANK OF SON HAN VIC GS 0419.

(4) ESTABLISH HLZ VIC (BT 034798). IF EMERGENCY DPCTATES, HLZ VIC (BT 033792) WILL BE SEIZED AND USED.

(5) ESTABLISH LANDPNG SITE FOR LANDPNG CRAFT VIC (BT 035798).

(6) ESTABLISH SMALL CRAFT LANDING SITE AND HLZ VICHCP LOCATION ON EASTERN BANK ON SONG HAN.

(1) REINFORCE EVACUATION FORCE WITH COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS AS REQUIRED.

B. FMAW

(1) PROVIDE EVAC FACILITY AT MMAF.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
NATIONALS

PAGE THREE RUMSMF 841 S E C R E T NOFORN

(2) PROVIDE MAX AVAILABLE HELO TO POSITION 3D MARDPV FORCE AND TO EVACUATE US PERSONNEL FROM HLZ'S ESTABLISHED BY 3D MARDPV FORCE IN NORTHEASTERN SECTION DANANG.

(3) EVAC US PERSONNEL TO HLZ'S ON EASTERN BANK SONG HAN HOR TO MMAF AS SITUATION DPCTATES.

(4) PROVIDE FPXEDHWING AND ARMED HELO SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

C. NSA

(1) PROVIDE MAX AVAIL LANDING CRAFT TO SUPPORT EVACUATION FROM SHORE TO SHORE POINTS EST BY 3D MARDIV EVAC FORCE.

D. FLC

(1) PROVIDE MATERIAL AND PERSONNEL ASSISTANCE AS REQD BY FMAW TO EST EVAC FACILITY AT MMAF.

E. COORDHINSR.

(1) EFFHFOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT, EXECUTION OR ORDER.

(2) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

(3) USE MINIMUM FORCE REQD CONSISTANT WITH SITUATION.

(4) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPLY.

(5) KEEP THIS HQ INFORMED UTILIZING NORMAL REPORTING PROCEDURES. SITREPS HOURLY UNTIL SITUATION STABILIZES.

(6) PERSONNEL TO BE EVACUATED WILL BE NOTIFIED THROUGH ARMED

PAGE FOUR RUMSMF 841 S E C R E T NOFORN

FORCES RADIO STATION, COMMAND TELEPHONE NETWORK HAND BY MSG.

EVACUEES WILL MOVE BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS TO THE NORTHEASTERN SECTION OF THE CITY VICINITY OF THE 1ST CORPS OFFICERS MESS.

GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ADVANCE ROUTED TO

S/SEC.

(SIGNATURE &amp; TIME)

ACTION

SECTION

(SIGNATURE &amp; TIME)

CHANGE OF MISSION



	BU
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	FOR SUM
	WKS SUM
	CMD GRP
	BRIEF
	POST

00 825

PP 5825 0079

DE DX10 749 09811535

ZNY CCCCC

P 081135Z

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO 5825/FIRST MARINES

0079/SEVENTH MARINES

ZEN/CHU LAI DEFENSE CMD

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

A. DIVO 023332.1

B. MY 300950Z MAR

1. REF A APPLIES

2. FOR FIRST MARINES. EFFECTIVE 091200H APR ASSIGN CMD GRP AND TWO RIFLE COMPANIES OPCON CO CHU LAI DEFENSE CMD.

3. FOR SEVENTH MARINES. EFFECTIVE 091200H APR REF B CANCELLED. RESUME OPCON ELEMENTS ASSIGNED.

GP-4


BT

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 16

UNCLASSIFIED

O P 080816Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO SEVENTH MARINES  
FIRST MARINES  
INFO CG III MAF  
CG THIRD MARDIV  
CG FIRST MAF  
ELEVENTH MARINES  
FIRST MT BN  
BT



BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
MD CHR
BRIEF
POST

## FRAG ORDER

- A. CG III MAF 071542Z NOTAL
- B. CG III MAF 080316Z NOTAL
- C. CG III MAF 080434Z NOTAL
- 1. MAPS: AMS. FAR EAST, DANANG, VIETNAM. SHEET 6659 III 1:50,000
- 2. MISSION: III MAF IN COORDINATION WITH NAVSPTACT ESTABLISHES BN MINUS FORCE IN NORTHEASTERN SECTION OF DANANG CITY. SEALS OFF SAFE HAVEN AREA TO NORTH. PROVIDES PROTECTION FOR U.S. PERSONNEL WITHIN SAFE HAVEN AREA AND EVACUATES THESE PERSONNEL TO DANANG

PAGE TWO DXIU 001

EAST OR MAF BY HELICOPTER AN/EE AND/OR ASSAULT LANDING CRAFT.  
3. EXECUTION: LAW REF A FIRST MARDIV IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE RESERVE FORCES. INITIALLY ONE BN TO DANANG AREA. RECONSTITUTIONG RESERVE IF COMMITTED. REF B AND C ASSIGN TASKS TO THIRD MARDIV, FMAW, FLC AND NSA, AND REQUIRES FIRST MARDIV TO PLACE ONE INF BN ON ONE HOUR ALERT PREPARED FOR RIOT CONTROL AND/OR COMBAT MISSION IN DANANG CITY.

A. SEVENTH MARINES: ON ORDER PLACE ON BN ON ONE HOUR ALERT PREPARED FOR RIOT CONTROL AND/OR COMBAT MISSION IN DANANG CITY. DESIGNATE BN AND IFCEE AND INFORM THIS HQ ASAP. BE PREPARED FOR

ROAD OR AIR MOVEMENT TO DANANG CITY.

B. FIRST MARINES: ON COMMITMENT OF BN FROM SEVENTH MARINES PLACE ON BN ON ONE HOUR ALERT PREPARED FOR RIOT CONTROL AND/OR COMBAT MISSION IN DANANG CITY. BE PREPARED FOR EITHER ROAD OR AIR MOVEMENT. DESIGNATE BN ON ORDER THIS HQ.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. PRESCRIBED LOAD IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADMIN ORDER E301-66

B. RESUPPLY THROUGH FLSSG-ALPHA, DANANG.

GP-4


BT

MARDIV

COPY NR 13

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
CMD CHR
BRIEF
POST

P 080607Z

FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TO RUMGUAR/NAHR/USC GEORGE CLYMER  
 RUMFCR/NEOT/USC TULASE  
 RUMFCR/NZSJ/USC COLONIAL  
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 ZEN/ELSG BRAVO

INFO RUMSMF/CG III MAF  
 RUMFLV/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUAEG/CTF SEVEN NINE  
 RUMFCR/COMPHIEROM THREE  
 RUMSMF/FLC  
 RUAEG/CG NINTH MAB  
 RUMSMF/COMNAVEUPACT DAWANG  
 RUMNNA/COMNAVEUPACT CHU LAI  
 ET

CONFIDENTIAL

-DEEARK OF ELT TWO SLANT FIVE

A. CG III MAF 052310Z NOTAL

B. FMFPACO P4600.1F

1. ALL SHIP ADDEES PASS TO CG EMBARKED TROOPS FOR ACTION. KEEP FOR INFO.

2. REF A CHARGED CG FIRST MARDIV WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY TO COORDINATE DEEARK OF ELT TWO SLANT FIVE. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE DEEARK FOL INSTRUCTION APPLY.

3. GENERAL PLAN: SHIPS ETA 13 APRIL AND COMMENCE UNLOADING AT

CG FIRST MAR DIV

080607Z APR 66

EMBO 1-3

UNCLASSIFIED

Snel #18



UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO RUMSME 697 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
 ANCHORAGE UTILIZING ORGANIC LANDING CRAFT AUGMENTED BY ASSIGNED  
 LIGHTERAGE FROM COMNAVSUPACT DANANG. LVTS SWIM ASHORE TO  
 COORDINATES ET 575035 IF SURF CONDITIONS PERMIT. IF SURF  
 CONDITIONS DO NOT PERMIT LVTS SWIM TO COORDINATES ET 519117 AND  
 TRAVEL TO ASSIGNED AREA VIA TRACKED VEH. TRAIL ALONGSIDE MER.  
 TRACKED VEH TRAFFIC PROHIB ON MER.

4. FOR ELT TWO SLANT FIVE:

A. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, WHEN CHOPPED TO CG FIRST MARDIV ELT  
 TWO SLANT FIVE WILL BE DEACTIVATED. ATTACHED UNITS LESS DET 1ST  
 SP BN AND PLT THIRD AMTRAC BN WILL REVERT TO GPCOM/ADCOM OF PARENT  
 UNITS. UNTIL PLANS FOR RETURN OF DET 1ST SP BN AND PLT THIRD  
 AMTRAC BN TO CRI ARE FIRM, FIRST SP AND THIRD AMTRAC BN RESPECTIVELY  
 ASSUME COGNIZANCE OVER THESE UNITS.

E. DISPOSITION OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIP AS FOLLS:

(1) CLASS I: RETAIN 2 DAYS MCI W/FUEL BAR; TURN OVER  
 REMAINDER TO FLSC BRAVO

(2) CL II:

(A) TYPE ONE:

(1') RETAIN INITIAL T/E AND E/G ALLOWANCES

(2') TURN IN 30 DAYS M/O TO FLSC BRAVO

PAGE THREE RUMSME 697 C O N F I D E N T I A L

(C) TYPE TWO:

(1') RETAIN 30 DAY M/O INCL 1ST AND 2D ECHELON REPAIR  
 PARTS

(2') RETAIN ON HAND OPSTOCKS

(3') TURN IN 30 DAYS M/O OF BATTERIES, CLOTHING AND  
 MEDICAL TO FLSC BRAVO

(3) CLASS III: TURN IN ALL EXCEPT SPECIAL OILS AND LUBES TO  
 FLSC BRAVO

(4) CLASS IV: TURN IN TO FLSC BRAVO

(5) CLASS V: RETAIN E/A TURN IN BALANCE TO FLSC BRAVO

C. CO ELT TWO SLANT FIVE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY OF SUPPLIES AND  
 EQUIP IN STAGING AREAS. PROVIDE ONE GUARD FOR EACH CARGO CARRYING  
 VEHICLE ENROUTE TO CAMP AREAS.

D. INSURE EMBARKED LFORM IS NOT RPT NOT UNLOADED

E. DEBARK MAIN BODIES LESS SHIPS PLATOONS AND DRIVERS ON ARRIVAL.  
 2ND BN FIFTH MAR MUST BE ASHORE BY 15 APRIL THEREFORE SHIPS PLATOONS  
 MAY HAVE TO BE CONSTITUTED FROM ATTACHED UNITS.

F. TROOPS TO BE ISSUED TWENTY ROUNDS PER M-14 AND 10 ROUNDS PER  
 PISTOL PRIOR TO DEBARK. WEAPONS WILL NOT BE LOADED DURING DEBARK OR  
 ON ARRIVAL CHU LAI EXCEPT IN CASE OF EMERGENCY.

2-3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE FOUR RUMSNE 697 C O N F I D E N T I A L

G. ACTIVATE DEBARK CONTROL NET UPON ARR USING AN/PRC-10 RADIOS  
FREQ 38.9 MCS. DEBARK CONTROL CALL SIGN CORSAIR THREE NINE.

5. FOR FIRST SP ENT:

A. PROVIDE PERS AND EQUIP AT CUS HO RAMP TO UNLOAD LANDING  
CRAFT. REQUEST MOTOR TRANSPORT FROM THIS HGS (DIV MTC)

E. PROVIDE ONE AN/PRC-10 RADIO WITH OPERATOR FOR EACH DEBARK  
CONTROL. FREQ 38.9 MCS. CALL SIGN CORSAIR THREE NINE.

6. FOR FLSSG BRAVO:

A. REQUEST YOU ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY OF LCU PERSONNEL ASSIGNED  
TO ELT TWO SLANT FIVE.

E. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE REPS AT CUS HO RAMP TO ASSIST IN RECEIPT  
INVENTORY AND TURN OVER OF MOUNT OUT SUPPLIES.

7. FOR FIRST MARDIV REIN

A. PARENT UNITS PROVIDE GUIDES FOR MOVEMENT OF LIKE UNITS TO  
CAMP AREAS.

E. ELT TWO SLANT FIVE ADV PARTY REPS MEET SHIPS ON ARRIVAL TO  
BRIEF CO ON EILLETING PLANS. PROVIDE GUIDES FOR MOVEMENT 2/5 TO  
CAMP AREAS. REQUEST MOTOR TRANSPORT FOR MOVEMENT TROOPS TO CAMPS  
TO THIS HGS (DIV MTC).

8. MISCELLANEOUS:

PAGE FIVE RUMSNE 697 C O N F I D E N T I A L

A. THIS HGS WILL SUBMIT UNLOADING STATUS REPORTS FOR ALL SHIPS  
IAW REF A. TEAM EMEOS SUBMIT UNLOADING STATUS REPORT DAILY BY  
1200H IN FORMAT CONTAINED PARA 5201.4 REF E TO THIS HGS BY MOST  
EXPEDITIOUS MEANS. PHONE ICHERWOOD 39.


GP-4

ET

3-3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



9	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

O 090120Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSMB/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMNHV/CG FIRST MAW  
 ZEN/ELC  
 RUMNAW/5TH COMM BN  
 ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN  
 ZEN/NINTH MT BN  
 RUMSVD/I CORPS ADV GRU  
 ZEN/OIC NORTHERN CONSTRUCTION CORP  
 RUMNAW/FIRST FOR RECON CO  
 P 071325Z  
 FM COMUSMACV  
 TO RUMSMF/III MAF  
 ZEN/USARV  
 ZEN/7TH AF  
 ZEN/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV  
 RUMSVG/CG II FFORCEV  
 RUMSVI/SA IV CTZ  
 INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN  
 NATIONALS

SECRET NOFORN 12074 FROM MACJA

SUBJ: CIVIL DISTURBANCES (U)

REF: A. COMUSMACV MSG 10529, DTG 030602Z APR 66 SECRET

B. MACV DIRECTIVE 380-8

1. (S) THE UNSETTLED POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN RVN HAVE LED TO REZUITS BY SOME VIETNAMESE NATIONALS THAT THEY BE AFFORDED TEMPORARY "SANCTUARY," "ASYLUM," OR "PROTECTION" IN US MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

2. (U) FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS MESSAGE, "US MILITARY INSTALLATION(S)" MEANS ANY AREA (EVEN IF WITHIN A LARGER RVN

COMUSMACV

COPY 13

071325Z APR 66

(1-2)

G-5

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] RUMSMA 887D [REDACTED] E C R E T NOFORN  
 (INSTALLATION), BILLET, COMPOUND, ENCLAVE, AIRFIELD, PORT, SHIP,  
 AIRCRAFT, VEHICLE OR OTHER FACILITY UNDER TOTAL OR PARTIAL US  
 MILITARY CONTROL.

3. (S) THE FOLLOWING IS THE POLICY GUIDANCE FOR SUCH  
 REQUESTS RECEIVED FROM VIETNAMESE NATIONALS SEEKING PERSONAL  
 PROTECTION DURING PERIODS OF CIVIL DISTURBANCE.

A. AS NOTED IN THE REFERENCES, MAINTENANCE OF SECUR-  
 ITY OF ALL PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY IN RVN IS FIRST THE RESPONSI-  
 BILITY OF THE GVN. ALLOWING LOCAL NATIONALS ON A US MILITARY  
 INSTALLATION FOR THE PURPOSES OF THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY AND PRO-  
 TECTION COULD BE INTERPRETED AS EVIDENCING A LACK OF FAITH IN  
 THE GVN TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITY AND LENDING SUPPORT TO  
 THE DISSIDENTS.

B. THERE IS NO BASIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE USE  
 OF US MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AS PLACES OF POLITICAL ASYLUM.

C. GIVING REFUGE TO LOCAL NATIONALS ON A US MILITARY  
 INSTALLATION COULD CONVERT THAT INSTALLATION INTO THE OBJECT OF  
 A MOB ATTACK WHEN IT MIGHT OTHERWISE REMAIN UNMOLESTED.

D. ALLOWING LOCAL NATIONALS TO TAKE REFUGE IN US  
 MILITARY INSTALLATIONS COULD PROVIDE A COVER FOR TERRORISTS AND

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 887D [REDACTED] NOFORN  
 SABOTEURS TO INFILTRATE THE INSTALLATIONS.

A COROLLARY TO THE FOREGOING IS THE POSSIBILITY  
 OF ABUSE BY CONSPIRATORS PLANNING A COUP.

4. (S) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, VIETNAMESE NATIONALS  
WILL NOT BE AFFORDED POLITICAL ASYLUM OR SANCTUARY OR ALLOWED  
 TO ENTER AND REMAIN ON A US MILITARY INSTALLATION SOLELY FOR  
 THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY AND PROTECTION, EXCEPT THAT, WHEN RE-  
 QUIRED BY THE INTERESTS OF HUMANITY IN EXTREME OR EXCEPTIONAL  
 CASES, PROTECTION MAY BE AFFORDED IN SUCH INSTALLATIONS TO UN-  
 INVITED REFUGEES WHOSE LIVES ARE IN IMMINENT DANGER, SUCH AS  
 FROM MOB VIOLENCE. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL REFUGEES BE  
 DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INVITED TO ACCEPT US PROTECTION. PRO-  
 TECTION AND REFUGE WILL BE REFUSED TO THOSE WHO MIGHT BE FLEE-  
 ING FROM THE AUTHORITIES OF THE GVN. IN CASE REFUGEES ARE AD-  
 MITTED OR FOUND UPON A US MILITARY INSTALLATION, THEY WILL BE  
 DELIVERED TO GVN AUTHORITIES OR REMOVED FROM THE INSTALLATION  
 AS SOON AS PRACTICAL, CONSISTENT WITH THE SAFETY OF THE  
 REFUGEE.

5. (S) NONE OF THE FOREGOING SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO  
 PRECLUDE THE USE OF US MILITARY AIRCRAFT FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 887D [REDACTED] NOFORN  
 EVACUATION OF NON-VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS FROM POTENTIALLY DAN-  
 GEROUS AREAS TO PLACES OF GREATER SAFETY.

6. (U) COMMANDERS WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO  
 DISSEMINATE AND IMPLEMENT THE FOREGOING POLICY ON A NEED TO  
 KNOW BASIS.

BPW  
 BT

(2-2)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OPN NEVADA



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	<u>CMD CHR</u>
	BRIEF
	POST

0 110020Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO 0ZGA/FIRST TANK BN  
0ZGA/FIRST AT BN  
81VF/THIRD AMTRAC BN  
INFO 63LS/SEVENTH MARINES  
S825/FIRST MARINES  
BT

1. TO REINFORCE SEVENTH MARINES IN TAOR DURING OPERATION NEVADA A PROV RIFLE COMPANY IS BEING FORMED.
2. FIRST TANK BN PASS OPCON ONE PROVISIONAL RIFLE CO HQ AND ONE PROVISIONAL RIFLE PLATOON REIN TO SEVENTH MARINES EFFECTIVE 111500H APR.
3. FIRST AT BN AND THIRD AMTRAC BN PASS OPCON ONE PROVISIONAL RIFLE PLATOON REIN EACH TO SEVENTH MARINES EFFECTIVE 111500H APR.
4. REIN RIFLE PLATOONS MINIMUM FIVE ZERO PERSONNEL EACH.

PAGE TWO RUMSMB 943

5. PARENT ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDE ONE AN/PRC-6 OR AN/PRC-10, ONE FIELD TELEPHONE AND ONE HALF MILE FIELD WIRE PER PLATOON. TANK BN PROVIDE TWO FIELD TELEPHONES AND TWO RADIO SETS AN/PRC-10 FOR PROV RIFLE CO HQ.

A. PROV RIFLE CO ASSIGNED CO TAC FREQ OF 50.6 MCS/RPT 50.6 MCS

B. SEVENTH MAR ASSIGN BN TAC NET FREQ UPON CHOP OF PROV RIFLE CO.

C. PROV RIFLE CO ASSIGNED TEMPORARY CALL SIGN OF EMIGRANT PAPA.

6. DERLNAUTH ALCON.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

COPY NR 13


110020Z APR 66

UNCLASSIFIED

G-3

Incl 20

DECLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PCR SUM
	WIL SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

R 110100Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO RUECEP/CMC

INFO RUELEP/CG FMFPAC  
ZEM/SEVENTH MI BN

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

-REDESIGNATION OF COMPANY "D" SEVENTH MI BN

A. R-4644 I/O REV 1 OF 26 JAN 1966

1. REFERENCE (A) IS APPLICABLE AS OF 1 MAY 1966. ACCORDINGLY  
IT IS REQUESTED THAT SUBJECT COMPANY BE REDESIGNATED AS  
TRANSPORT COMPANY AND A REPORTING UNIT CODE NUMBER BE ASSIGNED.  
BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN


110100Z APR 66

G-1

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-1
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	VE SUM
	LAND CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

0 100351Z  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO 63LS/SEVENTH MARINES  
 INFO 5825/FIRST MARINES  
 0ZGA/ELEVENTH MARINES  
 63LS/FIRST ENGR BN  
 0ZGA/FIRST TANK BN  
 0ZGA/FIRST AT BN  
 BT

## FRAG ORDER

1. RECENT INTELLIGENCE INDICATES ROADS AND APPROACHES IN AREA BS 524936 ARE BEING MINED, NEW TRENCHES DUG IN AREA BS527939 AND GUN POSNS PREPARED NEAR BS 596924.
2. MISSION. CONDUCT FOLLOWING RECONS WITH REINFORCED UNITS.
  - A. AREA BS 524936 AND 527939. CONFIRM INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ABOVE. DESTROY ANY LOCATED MINES.
  - B. AREA BS 527939. CONFIRM INTELLIGENCE REPORT. DESTROY ANY LOCATED AA WEAPONS.

PAGE 2 DX10 883

- C. SUBMIT OVERLAY PLAN OF OPERATIONS THIS HQ SOONEST.
  3. COORDINATE MOVEMENT IN RAOR WITH LN O BINH SON. REQUESTS FOR FIRE SUPPORT WILL BE COORDINATED LN O BINH SON.
  4. SUBMIT REPORTS OF PROGRESS EVERY FOUR HOURS, FLASH REPORTS AS REQUIRED
  5. COMPLETE ABOVE MISSIONS NLT 121800H.
- GP-4  
 BT


CG FIRST MARDIV

100351Z APR 66

G3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WR SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

O 111034Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/SEVENTH MARINES  
ZEN/FIRST MARINES

INFO RUMSMF/CG III MAF  
RUMSMF/CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMNAW/CG FIRST MAW  
E/FIRST MT BN  
BT

- CANCELLATION FRAG ORDER  
A. CG FIRST MARDIV 080856Z  
1. CANCEL REF A.  
GP-4  
BT

COPY 13

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN


111034Z APR 66

G3

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	<u>CMD CHR</u>
	BRIEF
	POST

O 110646Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 ZEN/COMNAVSUPACT DANANG  
 ZEN/FLC  
 ZEN/OICC RVN DANANG  
 ZEN/FIRST BN NINTH MAR  
 RUMSVD/CO I CORPS ADV GRU  
 INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC (M008)  
 BT

S E C R E T

## - EMERGENCY EVACUATION (U)

A. CG III MAF 071542Z (S), FRAG OPLAN 04-07 PHASE I

B. CG III MAF 080430Z (S)

1. STAND DOWN FROM PREPARATIONS REQ'D BY REFS A AND B.
2. REF A AND B WILL BE RETAINED UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ARE PROMULGATED. ADDRESSEES WILL INSURE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND REFS A AND B ON REASONABLE NOTICE.
3. INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING RETURN OF MILITARY PERSONNEL TO DANANG BILLETS WILL BE ISSUED SEPARATELY.

PAGE TWO RUMSMF 142 S E C R E T

4. RESTRICTIONS ON ROAD TRAFFIC DANANG AREA AND MOVEMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CITY REMAIN IN EFFECT.

5. CONDITION YELLOW REMAINS IN EFFECT.

6. FOR COMNAVSUPACT DANANG: RESUMPTION OF PORT OPERATIONS WILL BE HANDLED BY DIRECT REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM YOUR COMMAND TO THIS HQ.

GP-4

BT

COPY NR

13

110646Z APR 66

CG III MAF

UNCLASSIFIED

G-3

UNCLASSIFIED



<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	BURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	HOLD
<input type="checkbox"/>	G-1/G-4
<input type="checkbox"/>	G-2
<input type="checkbox"/>	LNO
<input type="checkbox"/>	PER SUM
<input type="checkbox"/>	WFO
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	CMD CHR
<input type="checkbox"/>	BRIEF
<input type="checkbox"/>	POST

P 120230Z  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV (REIN)  
 TO RUWDFL/CG FORTRPS FMFPAC  
 ZEN/HQ BN FIRST MARDIV  
 INFO RUHLEP/CG FMFPAC  
 RUABCL/CG FMFPAC/I MAC (FWD)  
 RUMSNF/CG III MAF  
 BT

- CONST PLT SEVENTH COMM BN

1. FOR CG FORTRPS. CONST PLT, RAD REL AND CONST CO, SEVENTH COMM BN ARR CHU LAI 100600Z APR.
  2. FOR HQ BN FIRST MARDIV. EFFECTIVE 100600Z APR ASSUME OPCON/ADCON SUBJ PLT. PLT CONSISTS TWO OFF AND SEVEN ZERO ENL ALL USMC.
- GP-4  
 BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN


120230Z/APR66

G-3

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 25

UNCLASSIFIED



BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
CMD CHR
BRIEF
POST

R 111036Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO RUMSMB/CG 111 MAF  
ZEN/FIRST MARDIV REIN  
BT

## REPORT OF CP LOCATIONS

A. 111 MAF O 3121.1D

1. REF A APPLIES. FOLLOWING ARE CP LOCATIONS FIRST MARDIV:
- FIRST MARDIV-534097
  - H&EN (-) (REIN)-534097
  - FIRST MAR-533088
  - 3DEN FIRST MAR-524087
  - 2DEN FOURTH MAR-463072
  - SEVENTH MAR-546018

PAGE TWO RUMSMB 1005

1STEN SEVENTH MAR-585018  
2DEN SEVENTH MAR-505035  
3DEN SEVENTH MAR-537024  
CHU LAI DEFENSE COMD-533088  
ELEVENTH MAR-511039  
1STEN ELEVENTH MAR-519036  
3DEN ELEVENTH MAR-549011  
4THEN ELEVENTH MAR-554042  
1STRECON BN-565045  
1STAT BN-548047 (REAR), 512040 (FWD)  
1STIK BN-517040  
1STENGR BN-550015  
1STMED BN-532109  
1STSP BN-538100  
3DANTRAC BN-563048  
7THNT BN-528110  
1ST RTEN-550015  
1ST HOSP CO-528126

GP-4  
BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

111036Z APR 66

G3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

O 130 16Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/FIRST MARDIV  
INFO RUMSMF/CG III MAF  
RUMSMF/CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

## -OPCON SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES

A. NY 121216Z

B. NY 121315Z NOTAL

1. EFFECTIVE 140600H, SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES CHOP OPION CO FIRST MARINES

2. REF A REFERS

A. DELETE THIRD BN (-) FIRST MARINES (-CO) FROM TASK ORG.

B. ADD SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES TO TASK ORG.

3. REF B REFERS. CANCEL PARAGRAPHS 2, 3, 4 AND 5.

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

PAGE 2 RUMSMB 1160

4. FOR CHU LAI DEF CMD. BE PREPARED FOR RELIEF OF CO E FOURTH MARINES NLT 141000H APR.

5. FOR FIRST MARINES. PROVIDE RELIEF FOR CO E FOURTH MARINES NLT 141000H APR.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

130916Z/APR66


G-3 COPY

13

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED



7	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	EX SUM
	ADD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

O 121315Z  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TO 63LS/SEVENTH MARINES  
 ZEN/CHU LAI DEFENSE MD  
 02GA/FIRST TK BN  
 01VF/THIRD AMTRACBN  
 01VF/FIRST RECON BN  
 ZEN/HQBN  
 INFO 5825/FIRST MARINES  
 BT

#### CHU LAI TAOR DEFENSE —

1. SEVENTH MARINES. ON ORDER RETURN ONE BN VIA HELO FROM OPERATION NEVADA TO RESUME DEFENSE POSNS IN TAOR SECTOR OF RESPONSIBILITY.
2. CHU LAI DEFENSE CMD. ON ORDER RETURN CO M FIRST MARINES TO CO FIRST MARINES. ASSUME OPCON PROVISIONAL COMPANY THIRD AMTRAC BN.
3. THIRD AMTRAC BN. ORGANIZE PROVISIONAL RIFLE COMPANY CONSISTING CO HQ AND ONE 50 MAN PLATOON FOR DUTY WITH CHU LAI DEFENSE CMD. PROV CO TO REPORT CO CHU LAI DEF CMD ON ORDER THIS HQ.
4. FIRST TK BN AND HQ BN. ORGANIZE RIFLE PLATOON CONSISTING 50 MEN

PAGE TWO DXIU 1000 [REDACTED]  
 EACH FOR DUTY WITH PROV RIFLE COMPANY, THIRD AMTRAC BN. PLT TO REPORT ON ORDER THIS HQ.  
 5. FIRST RECON BN. ON ORDER THIS HQ ATTACH ONE COMPANY TO SEVENTH MARINES TO AUGMENT FORCES DEFENDING TAOR SECTOR OF RESPONSIBILITY.  
 6. ALL ATTACHMENTS EFFECTIVE AT TIME INDICATED FOR ESTIMATED PERIOD ONE WEEK TO TEN DAYS.

GP-4

BT


CG FIRST MARDIV

COPY NR  
 121315Z APR 66

G-3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	END CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 120620Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV (REIN)  
TO AIG SIX ZERO

INFO RUMLEP/CG FMFPAC  
RUMSNF/CG 111 MAF  
RUMSNF/SEVENTH COMB LN  
ZEN/HQ BN FIRST MARDIV  
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL, PPP NOVREP 120620Z1 CG HCEM-FIRST MARDIV, 21//

ORG GN HCEM (REIN)-FIRST MARDIV, 02//

CHG ADD 120620Z7 03//

ORG GP CONST PLAT-RADIO RELAY CONST CC-SEVENTH COMB LN, 04//

CFN 120620Z1, 100600Z7, 05//END

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN


120620Z/APR66

UNCLASSIFIED

G-3

End 29

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 122002Z  
FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT SIX  
TO RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX

INFO RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE  
RUABQL/CG FIRST MARDIV  
UABQL/CO RLT FIVE  
RUABQL/CTU SEVEN PT ZERO PT EIGHT  
ZEN/BLI TWO SLANT FIVE  
RUABQL/CG FMFPAC INAC FWD  
RUMNNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
ZEN/TG SEVEN SIX PT SIX  
BT

BLI TWO SLANT FIVE MOVT SITREP NR 2 (C)

A. CTF 76 250316Z R

1. ARR CHU LAI 130030H. COMMENCED OFLD ROLLING STOCK 0230H,  
TROOPS AT 0700H.

2. FINAL MOVT SITREP.

GP-4

BT


CTG SEVEN SIX PT SIX

122002Z APR 66

G-3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WAR SUM
	<b>SAD CHR</b>
	BRIEF
	POST

121316Z  
FM 1ST MARINE BATTAL  
TO 1ST MARINE BATTAL  
INFO 1ST MARINE BATTAL  
1ST MARINE BATTAL

1ST MARINE BATTAL

1ST MARINE BATTAL

1ST MARINE BATTAL ON ORDN. 1ST MARINES (-) (REIN) DEPARTS 1ST MAR  
ON 1ST MAR. VIA AIR LIFT PREPARED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS AS PER 1ST  
2. 1ST MAR. ORGANIZATION.

1ST MARINES (-) (REIN)

1ST CO (-)

DET HQ BN (RAD REL)

DET SEVENTH CPT

DET THIRD ITT

1ST MARINE BATTAL

13

121316Z APR 65

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED


1. UNITS SUBMIT EMBARKATION LIST DATA TO THIS HQS LATER ENSURE  
 2. UNITS INCLUDE TOTAL PERSONNEL, NUMBER OF VEHICLES BY TYPE AND WEIGHT  
 3. CUBIC FEET OF ORGANIC CARGO.  
 4. MARSHALLING AREA: CHU LAY AIR STRIP  
 5. COMMAIS AND COMM-ELEC  
 6. PERSONNEL: 111 MAR CECI  
 101 MARDEV CECI  
 30 MARLIV CECI  
 7. 11. HAS REQUESTED TO COORDINATE FREQUENTLY COMPLICATED AND  
 COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS, RADIO NETS, AUTHENTICATION, CALL  
 SIGNS, RADIO RELAY CHANNELIZATION, ETC. BETWEEN 1ST MARINES AND  
 30 MARDEV AND/OR 30 MARLIV ORGANIZATIONS IN AREA OF OPERATIONS.  
 COORDINATING DETAILS SHOULD BE RECEIVED PRIOR TO 1ST MARINES  
 DEPLOYMENT.  
 GP-4  
 BT

(2-2)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

O 130257Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/FIRST MARDIV REIC  
INFO RUMSMF/CG III MAF  
RUMSMF/CG THIRD MARDIV  
BT

FRAG ORDER NO 1-66

A. MY 121316Z

B. MY 121331Z

1. DELETE FIRST BN (-) ELEVENTH MARINES (CMD GRP AND TWO  
105 BTRYS) FROM TASK ORGANIZATION CONTAINED REF A.  
2. REVISE AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED REF B TO READ AS  
FOLLOWS:

A. PERS: 1361

B. CUFT CARGO: 2058

PAGE 2 RUMSMB 1112

C. WT CARGO: 92391 LBS

D. SFT VEH: 4024

E. WT VEH: 115979 LBS

3. ESTIMATED TWENTY-SIX C 130 A/C REQUIRED TO LIFT REVISED  
TASK ORGANIZATION.

GP-4

BT

COPY 13

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

130257Z APR 66

03


LDIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

BGEN STILES MOVED

P 140045Z  
FM CG NINTH MAB  
TO RUMSMB/CG FIRST MARDIV  
INFO RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC  
RUMSMF/CG III MAF  
BT

BGEN STILEQ SKED DEPART QTEMA 151000I APR VIA MAR KC-130 A/C.  
ETA CHU LAI 151430H.  
GP-4  
BT  
CG NINTH MAB


140045Z APR 66

UNCLASSIFIED S/S

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



0 131140Z  
FM BLT TWO SLANT FIVE  
TO RUMSVF/CG III MAF  
INFO RUMSWA/COMUSMA3V  
RUHL30/CG FMFAC3 (001)  
RUABOL/CG FMFAC3/I MAF (FWD)  
RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
RUMFUV/NWDB/ 3TF SEVEN SIX  
RUABOL/3TF SEVEN NINE  
RUABOL/CG NINTH MAB  
RUMSVF/FL3  
RUABSR/THIRD FSR  
BT

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

- 0000N BLT TWO SLANT FIVE  
1. 0400 0000N TO CG III MAF EFFECTIVE 130800H.  
GP-4  
BT

BLT 2/5

131140Z/APR66

G-3

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



✓	BLK
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD GRP
	BRIF
	POST

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000

MOVEMENT SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES  
 A. CG 1ST MAF 14 APR 66  
 B. CO THIRD MARINES 15 APR 66  
 1. RE A DIRECTOR'S ORDER OF SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES  
 COMMENCING 14 APR TO DANANG COMBAT BASE. ULTIMATE DESTINATION  
 WILL BE LATER AND NOT COVERED BASE.  
 2. EXEMPTION  
 A. AFFECT REPLY OF SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES WITH SECOND BN  
 FOURTH MARINES ASAP.

PAGE TWO RUMSND 1201

B. COMMENCING 14 APR SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES COMMENCES MOVEMENT  
 TO DANANG BY AIRLIFT.  
 C. REY D REQUESTS ADV PARTY EACH BN REPORT THU BAI COMBAT BASE  
 141000H APR FOR ORIENTATION AND PLANNING. BN PREPARED TO MOVE.  
 D. BN FOURTH MARINES IN PROCESS OF MOVEMENT. THEREFORE NO  
 REPS TO BE PROVIDED. REPS THIRD BN SEVENTH MARINES WILL BE SENT AS  
 REQUESTED. CO SEVENTH MARINES TAKE FOR ACTION. FOLLOWING STAFF REPS  
 SUGGESTED: S2, S-3, S-4, FSC, ALO.  
 FOR CO 1ST MARINES. PROVIDE REPS AS DESIRED.  
 E. FO AND LNO REPS FROM DRY & THERM. MARINES WILL ACCOMPANY MOVE  
 OF SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES.  
 F. REAR ECHELON SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES BEHIND 194 "D".  
 SO REY 7-8 194-5 1-3 26 3- SURFACE AND AIR.  
 G. UPON BN CMD GRP ELEMENT DEPARTING THU LAI, COMMAND SECOND BN  
 FOURTH MARINES WILL PASS TO CG THIRD MARINE.  
 H. ORDER OF DISPLACEMENT AS RECOMMENDED BY CO SECOND BN FOURTH  
 MARINES WILL BE CO G, BN CMD GRP, CO H, CO F, CO E AND REAR ECHELON.  
 3. CG, FIRST MARINE. PROVIDE AIRLIFT FOR MOVE TO DANANG.  
 4. THIS HQ WILL COORDINATE ALL MOVEMENTS. MARSHALLING AREA THU LAI  
 AIR FIELD.  
 GP-A  
 BT.


1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)  
 CG FIRST MARINE REIN

COPY NR 14  
 140201Z APR 66

UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

O 131358Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
CG THIRD MARDIV  
CG FIRST MAW  
INFO FLC



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	<u>CMD CHR</u>
	BRIEF
	POST

BT

**SECRET**

FRAG ORDER 04-13

A. III MAF COC 120725Z (NOTAL)

1. SITUATION: EFFECTIVE 14 APRIL 2D BN, 4TH MARINES WILL BE REPOSITIONED BY AIRLIFT TO DANANG COMBAT AREA. ULTIMATE DESTINATION WILL BE HUE-PHU BAI COMBAT AREA.

2. EXECUTION:

A. CG 1ST MARDIV:

(1) DIR 2D BN, 4TH MARINES (BN CMD GRP AND 4 COMPANIES) MOVE BY AIRLIFT TO DANANG AREA COMMENCING 14 APRIL.

PAGE TWO RUMSMF 387 **SECRET**

(2) UPON BN CMD ELEMENT DEPARTING CHU LAI CHOP OPCON/ADCON TO CG 3D MARDIV.

(3) DIRECT REAR ECHELON OF 2D BN, 4TH MARINES TO PREPARE FOR MOVE TO HUE PHU BAI BY UY/SURFACE/AIR.

B. CG 3D MARDIV:

(1) ASSUME OPCON/ADCON OF 2D BN, 4TH MAR UPON CHOP.

(2) ASSIGN 2D BN, 4TH MAR TACTICAL MISSION IN DANANG COMBAT AREA.

(3) BE PREPARED TO FURTHER MOVE 2D BN, 4TH MAR TO HUE-PHU BAI COMBAT AREA.

C. CG 1ST MAW: PROVIDE AIRLIFT FOR MOVE TO DANANG. IF ASSISTANCE REQUIRED INFORM III MAF ASAP.

D. FOR ALL DIRLAUTH

3. THIS ORDER MODIFIES REF A IN THAT 1ST MAR DIV WILL BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE HUE-PHU BAI WITH REQUESTED COMMAND GROUP AND ONE ADDITIONAL BATTALION VICE REGIMENTAL COMMAND GROUP AND TWO BATTALIONS.

GP-4

BT

CG III MAF

131358Z/ APR66


6-3  
RELAY

COPY

**SECRET**

Encl 36

UNCLASSIFIED



BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
CMD CHR
BRIEF
POST

PP 132250Z

FM FIRST MARINES  
TO SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES  
INFO CG FIRST MARDIV  
FIRST MARINES  
BT

## MISSION ASSIGNMENT

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 130916Z

B. FIRST MARINES OP ORDER 343-65

1. REF A DIRECTED YR CMD TO CHOP OPCON FIRST MARINES EFFECTIVE 140600H.

2. ASSUME MISSION AND TAOR OF SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES IAW REF B.

3. THIS ASSIGNMENT CONFIRMS VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS PREVIOUSLY ISSUED.

GP-4

BT

FIRST MARINES

132250Z/APR66

G-3

UNCLASSIFIED

IAL

UNCLASSIFIED



*And Chu hai  
130400H + comm  
offload  
SITREP*

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	W/ SUM
	NO CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

0 140100Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMSMB/CG FIRST MARDIV  
ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
ZEN/FLC  
RUMSMB/BLT TWO SLANT FIVE  
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB  
RUMSMB/FLSG BRAVO  
ZEN/FIRST FORCE RECON CO  
BT

ADVANCE ROUTED TO

S/SEC.....  
(SIGNATURE & TIME)

ACTION SECTION (SIGNATURE & TIME)


OPCON/ADCON BLT 2/5

- 1. EFFECTIVE 130800H BLT 2/5, LESS LOG SPT UNIT CHOPPED TO CG 1ST MARDIV. LOG SPT UNIT CHOPPED TO FLC.
- 2. FOR CG 1ST MARDIV:
  - A. CO B, 3D AMTRAC BN, FMF AND 2D LANDING SPT PLT JUREIN), CO B, 1ST SP BN WILL BE CHOPPED TO CG 9TH MAB UPON EMBARKATION FOR OKINAWA ABOUT 22 APR.
  - B. TRANSFER DET, 6TH PLT, 1ST FORCE RECON CO TO 1ST FORCE RECON CP, DANANG, AND CHOP OPCON TO CG 3D MARDIV UPON ITS DEPARTURE FROM CHU LAI.

GP-4  
BT

UNCLASSIFIED





EMPLOYEEN

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	<b>CMD CHR</b>
	BRIEF
	POST

1. 10/1/62  
 2. 10/1/62  
 3. 10/1/62  
 4. 10/1/62  
 5. 10/1/62  
 6. 10/1/62  
 7. 10/1/62  
 8. 10/1/62  
 9. 10/1/62  
 10. 10/1/62

[illegible]

COPY


14

UNCLASSIFIED

LDIV 2100/3 (1-65)

IAL

UNCLASSIFIED



	TURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	END CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 170837Z  
 IN 16 PERSO B  
 22 150710Z  
 INFO RUMKMP/CE 118 147  
 RUMKMP/CE 118 147  
 RUADCL/03 NIAH 118  
 BT


-ADCON SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES  
 A. NY 203607Z (C) TOTAL  
 B. NY 142142Z (C) TOTAL

1. EFFECTIVE 1400Z H. SECOND BN, FIFTH MARINES CHOP ADCON CO.  
 FIRST BN. INFORMATION OF ATTACHED WINGS IAW RET'S A AND B.

UNCLASSIFIED

Emel40

UNCLASSIFIED



<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	BURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	HOLD
<input type="checkbox"/>	G-1/G-4
<input type="checkbox"/>	G-2
<input type="checkbox"/>	LNO
<input type="checkbox"/>	PER SUM
<input type="checkbox"/>	WK SUM
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	CMD CHR
<input type="checkbox"/>	BRIEF
<input type="checkbox"/>	POST

P R 150101Z  
 FM CG FIRST MARIV REIN  
 TO RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC (221)  
 INFO RUMSNF/CG III MAF  
 RUMSNF/CG THIRD MARDIV REIN  
 ZEN/FIRST AT BN  
 BT

- SEARCHLIGHT, 18 INCH
- A. CG FMFPAC 272323Z MAR 66
- 1. REF A. AUTHORIZES ONE (1) XENON SEARCHLIGHT PER M53A3 TANK, AS THE XENON, IR SEARCHLIGHTS BECOME AVAILABLE THEY WILL SUBSEQUENTLY REPLACE THE 18 INCH SEARCHLIGHTS, WHICH BECOME EXCESS. REQUEST AUTHORITY TO INSTALL LOCALLY EXCESS 18 INCH SEARCHLIGHTS ON THE RIFLE, SELF PROPELLED, FULL TRACKED, MULTIPLE 136MM, M53A1.
- 2. THIS INCREASE IN ILLUMINATION CAPABILITY IS URGENTLY REQUIRED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS OVER TERRAIN WHERE WEIGHT FACTORS PROHIBIT UTILIZATION OF TANK SEARCHLIGHT CAPABILITIES.

BP-4

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

150101Z/APR66

ORDO

COPY

14

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
CMD CH



ADVANCE ROUTED TO:

Cmdeant.

6/SEC

(SIGNATURE &amp; TIME)

ACTION

SECTION

(SIGNATURE &amp; TIME)

151120Z  
FM CG FIRST MARINE DIV  
TO ZEN/FIRST MARINE DIV  
INFO RUMSMB/CG III MAF  
BT


INCREASED ALERT ACTIVITIES DURING NEW MOON PHASE  
A. CG III MAF 151120Z PASSEP  
B. FIRST MARINES 150620Z PASSEP (NOTAL)  
1. REF (A) DIRECTS INCREASED ALERT MEASURES AGAINST ATTACK ON VITAL AREAS DURING PERIODS OF MOONLESS NIGHTS. REF (A) IS AN EXCELLENT ANALYSIS OF THIS SUBJECT.  
2. CAPABILITY TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF REF (A) IS RECOGNIZED AS A COMPLEX MATTER WHICH WILL VARY GREATLY IN DIFFERENT SECTORS OF THE COMBAT BASE. DISPOSITION OF FORCES AVAILABLE, COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS AND DEGREE OF COMMITMENT TO OPERATIONS PAGE TWO RUMSMB 1504 C O N F I D E N T I A L ARE AMONG THE FACTORS WITH WHICH ANY DIRECTED INCREASE IN SCOPE OF FUTURE ACTIVITIES MUST BE BASED.  
3. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS INDICATES THAT EACH INFANTRY BATTALION CONDUCTS A MORE OR LESS STEADY PATTERN OF PATROLS, ABUSSES AND LISTENING POSTS. INCREASES IN ALERT POSTURE DURING MOONLESS NIGHTS MUST, OF COURSE, CONSIDER NOT ONLY THE CLEARLY TANGIBLE EVIDENCE APPARENT IN INCREASED NUMBERS OF THESE ACTIONS BEING CONDUCTED BUT ALSO MANY RELATED FACTORS TO INCLUDE SIZE OF FORCE, TIME FRAME AND DISTANCE FROM BASE INVOLVED. MORE EXTENSIVE USE OF ALL FIRES, REDUCTION IN DAY TIME OPERATIONS TO PERMIT ADDED NIGHT OPERATIONS AND VARIOUS RECEPTIVE TACTICS ARE SUGGESTED MEANS OF INCREASING OUR NIGHT ALERT POSTURE.  
4. FOR FIRST AND SEVENTH MARINES. REPORT NO LATER THAN 150800H INCREASED ALERT MEASURES BEING TAKEN TOGETHER WITH RELATED PROBLEM AREAS, IF ANY, NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO LOCAL RESOLUTION.  
5. FOR ELEVENTH MARINES. REPORT NO LATER THAN 150800H SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO CAPABILITY OF CONDUCTING PRE-PLANNED COUNTER NOTAR FIRE IN RAPID RESPONSE TO ATTACKS AGAINST THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD.  
PAGE THREE RUMSMB 1504  
6. FOR ALL, PLACE CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON NIGHT SECURITY. COMMENTS INVITED ON MEASURES TO INCREASE ALERT POSTURE.  
GP-4  
BT

1DIV 2100/4 (2-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

ARTY PRE-POSITIONING

UNCLASSIFIED



P 151151Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO RUMSME/CG III MAF  
INFO RUMSME/CG THIRD MARDIV  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MARINES  
BT

BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
CMD CHR
BRIEF
POST

1. PRIOR TO INITIATION OF OPERATION NEVADA, CG SECOND ARVN DIV HAD REQ PROVISION OF USMC 155MM HOW BTRY FOR SUPPORT OF HIS OPERATIONS TO THE WEST OF QUANG NGAI AIRFIELD. IN RESPONSE TO THIS REQ ONE TOWED TRY OF 155MM HOW DISPLACED TO POSITION ON THE AIRFIELD. TWO OF THE SIX HOWITZERS WERE PROVIDED FROM THE TWELFTH MAR, PRIME MOVERS AND SECTION PERS FOR THESE WERE PROVIDED BY ELEVENTH MAR. AMMUNITION HAD BEEN PRE-STOCKED AT QUANG NGAI.
2. THIS DEPLOYMENT OF THE 155MM HOW BTRY PROVED HIGHLY ADVANTAGEOUS WHEN REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATION NEVADA WERE DEVELOPED. THE PROXIMITY

PAGE TWO RUMSME 151151Z

THE BTRY TO THE AREA OF OPERATION SELECTED AND THE AMMUNITION ALREADY STOCKED IN THE AREA REDUCED CONSIDERABLY THE MOVEMENT AND LOGISTICS PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH PROVISION OF SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION.

3. IEV F CONTINUING ENEMY THREAT TO THE QUANG NGAI AIRFIELD AND UTILITY OF 155 HOW BTRY FOR SUPPORT OF 2ND ARVN DIV AND USMC OPERATIONS WHICH MAY BE ANTICIPATED IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA, IT IS CONSIDERED FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE TO PLACE FROM TIME TO TIME ONE FOUR PIECE 155 HOW BTRY AT QUANG NGAI AIRFIELD. SECURITY IS PROVIDED BY CG 2D ARVN DIVISION.

4. ELEVENTH MAR MINUS REIN CAPABLE OF MANNING A TOTAL OF THREE FOUR PIECE 155MM HOW BTRY, INTEND TO MAN TWO FOUR PIECE SP BATTERIES IN CHU LAI TAOR AND ONE FOUR PIECE TOWED BTRY AT QUANG NGAI AIRFIELD.

5. THE DEPLOYMENT OF ONE FOUR PIECE BATTERY WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE CURRENT THREAT DIMINISHES OR REEVALUATION OF AVERALL REQUIREMENTS DICTATES CHANGE.

GP-4  
BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

COPY NR  
151151Z APR 66


G-3

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

AL

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	<b>CMD CHR</b>
	DEMET
	POST

P 170532Z

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO 5825/FIRST MARINES  
 02GA/SEVENTH MARINES  
 ZEN/CHU LAI DEFENSE COMMAND  
 81VF/FIRST RECON BN

BT

## - CHU LAI DEFENSE CMD

A. MY 081135Z

B. MY 121315Z

C. DIVO 003300.1

1. EFFECTIVE 191000H APR REF A AND B CANCELLED.

2. REF C APPLIES.

3. FOR SEVENTH MARINES. EFFECTIVE 191000H APR ASSIGN CMD  
 GRP AND ONE RIFLE COMPANY OPCON CHU LAI DEFENSE CMD.  
 RETAIN ADCON.

4. FOR FIRST MARINES. EFFECTIVE 191000H APR ASSIGN ON  
 RIFLE COMPANY OPCON CG LAI DEFENSE CMD. RETAIN ADCON.

GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 1DIV 2100/4 (2-65)

170532Z

[REDACTED]IAL



UNCLASSIFIED

USE OF CS IN CAVES

BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
<u>CMO CHIR</u>
BRIBF
ROST

R 170009Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/FIRST MARDIV REIN  
INFO RUMSMB/CG III MAF  
BT

1. RECENT OPERATIONS INDICATE VC ARE EXCAVATING AND REUSING CAVES PREVIOUSLY SEALED BY DEMOLITIONS. TO PREVENT THIS, COMMANDERS WILL MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS TO THOROUGHLY CONTAMINATE SUCH AREAS.
2. AFTER TUNNELS ARE SEARCHED, THEY SHOULD BE DESTROYED WITH DEMOLITIONS AND/OR CONTAMINATED WITH CS-1 (POWDER). ONE EFFECTIVE WAY OF DOING THIS WITHOUT CONTAMINATING PERSONNEL IS TO PLACE A 6 OR 8 POUND BAG OF CS-1 ON A STRAND OF DETONATING CORD BETWEEN CRATERING CHARGES INSIDE THE TUNNEL. IN ONE

PAGE TWO RUMSMB 1549 [REDACTED]  
INSTANCE WHERE THIS WAS DONE, CS-1 WAS FORCED APPROXIMATELY 200 METERS THROUGH A TUNNEL, AND RESULTED IN THE TUNNEL AREAS BETWEEN CRATERING CHARGES BEING THOROUGHLY CONTAMINATED AND SEALED.

3. WHEN TIME IS LIMITED, CS GRENADES (M7A3) BLOWN INTO TUNNEL WITH "MITY MITE" BLOWERS WILL CONTAMINATE TUNNEL FOR ONE WEEK OR MORE.
4. M25A3 CS GRENADES (BASEBALL TYPE) CAN BE USED TO CONTAMINATE SMALL TUNNELS, BUNKERS, AND SPIDER HOLES. IF THESE AREAS ARE SEALED THE CONTAMINATION SHOULD LAST INDEFINITELY.

GP-4

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

170009Z APR 66

G-3


1DIV 2100/4 (2-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 45

UNCLASSIFIED

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST



P 170 3.2  
FM CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN  
TO RUMSMB/CG III MAF  
INFO ZEN/FIRST MARINES  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MARINES  
BT

**REPORT OF MORTAR FIRE, AN TAN BRIDGE AREA**

1. ON 16 APR SEVERAL REPORTS WERE RECEIVED OF ENEMY MORTAR FIRE IN THE AN TAN BRIDGE AREA OF THIS COMBAT BASE. ACTION WAS INSTITUTED TO LOCATE THE FIRING POSITIONS BY USE OF CMR. THE FIX OBTAINED WAS NOT CONSIDERED RELIABLE THEREFORE ARTILLERY OR AIR ATTACK NOT INITIATED. ALSO AN AO WAS SCRAMBLED WITH NO POSITIVE RESULTS OBTAINED.

2. AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE REPORTS CLEARING OPERATIONS WERE COMMENCED IMMEDIATELY. HOWEVER IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT ERRORS

PAGE TWO RUMSMB 1636 [REDACTED]  
ON THE PART OF SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES MAY HAVE OCCURRED.  
3. AS AMPLIFYING INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED IT BECAME MORE EVIDENT THAT A 3200 MIL ERROR ON THE PART OF THE 81 MM MORTAR PLATOON HAD OCCURRED.

4. CG FIRST MARINES AFTER A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION HAS DIRECTED THAT A FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ABOVE INCIDENT BE ORDERED.

5. I AM CONVINCED THAT NO ENEMY MORTAR ROUNDS LANDED IN THE VICINITY OF AN TAN BRIDGE AS REPORTED. HOWEVER INCREASED VIGILANCE AND CAREFUL SEARCH OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE.

GP-  
BT

COPY **14**


CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN

170939Z APR 66

GB

UNCLASSIFIED



[REDACTED] **CONFIDENTIAL****UNCLASSIFIED**

BURN
HOLD
21/67
RECEIVED
17 APR
PER SUM
WK SUM
17 APR
BRIEF
POST

P 170145Z  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 XMT FIRST MAR  
 BT

**VEHICLE SECURITY ON HWY NO. 1**

1. DURING THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THAT NEWLY ARRIVED PERSONNEL IN CHU LAI COMBAT BASE ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH HAZARDS OF VC AMBUSHES AND INTERDICTION OF CERTAIN PORTIONS OF HWY NO. 1.

2. SO THAT NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS WILL BE TAKEN BY ALL UNITS CONCERNED, THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED:

A. THE HIGHWAY NORTH OF AN TAN BRIDGE (BT 497057) IS CLOSED DAILY AT SUNSET AND DOES NOT REOPEN UNTIL SUNRISE. THE

PAGE TWO RUMSMB 1590 [REDACTED]

TACTICAL UNIT COMMANDER OCCUPYING THE AREAS WILL NOT PERMIT VEHICLES BEYOND THE BRIDGE DURING THIS PERIOD. ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE WITH LY TIN DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS TO OPEN HIGHWAY FOR PRIORITY TRAFFIC TO HILL 69 AND BEYOND IF DESIRED. ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE BY CONTACTING THE COMMANDER OF THE UNIT OCCUPYING THE AREA.

B. THE HIGHWAY NORTH OF THE CUTOFF TO HILL 69 (BT 470079) SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED SECURE AT ANY TIME, AND NO LESS THAN TWO VEHICLES WITH SHOTGUN RIDERS SHOULD PROCEED BEYOND THIS POINT, TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO SUCH VEHICLES, IF REQUIRED, SUGGEST PERSONNEL HAVE AT LEAST ONE FM RADIO, AND ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ALLENTOWN ON 45.8 MCS WHEN NORTH OF HILL 69.

GP-4  
 BT

**UNCLASSIFIED**

LDIV 2100/4 (2-65)  
 CG FIRST MARDIV REIN


170145Z APR 68 [REDACTED] S/S Cmel 4.7

DECLASSIFIED

IAL

UNCLASSIFIED

	BURN
	OLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST



R 160413Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO RUMSMF/CG III MAF  
INFO ZEN/FIRST MARINES  
ZEN/SEVENTH MARINES  
BT

SUMMARY OF PF OPERATIONS PD 7-14 APR 66  
A. CG III MAF LTR 48366 133/CAW/DHS DTD 4 FEB 66 SER 012266  
1. REF A APPLIES. PF ACTIVITY FIRST MAR AREA DURING PERIOD  
CONSISTED SIXTEEN SMALL UNIT INTEGRATED USMC/PF OPERATIONS  
INCLUDING SCOUTING, PATROLLING AMBUSHES. ON 11 APR 66 SECOND BN  
FOURTH MAR/PF CONDUCTED "COUNTY FAIR" OPERATION W/NEGATIVE RESULTS.  
NO MAJOR PROBLEMS. CO FIRST MAR EVALUATES PF TRNG EXCELLENT IN  
VIEW OF THE OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS.  
2. PF ACTIVITY SEVENTH MAR AREA CONSISTED OF BRIDGE DEFENSE VIC

PAGE 2 RUMSMB 1454  
ES 576964, DEFENSE OF TRUNG AN (1) AND (2), SECURITY OF BINH NGAI  
VIC ES 578984, PROVIDING GUARDS FOR VILLAGE CHIEF AND MAINTAINING  
CIVILIAN CONTROL OF BINH GIANG, JOINT USMC/PF PATROL AND AMBUSH  
ACTIVITY CONDUCTED. PF TRAINING DURING THE PERIOD PRIMARILY  
MARKSMANSHIP. CO SEVENTH MARINES EVALUATES PF PROGRESS ROUTINE.

GP-4  
BT

1DIV 2100/4 (2+65)T MARDIV REIN

16041

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 160824Z  
FM CG III MAF  
INFO CG FIRST MARDIV  
CG THIRD MARDIV

P 080802Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO COMUSMACV  
INFO CG FIRST MAF  
BT



MACV DIRECTIVE NO 95-2 INTERPRETATION OF

A. CG 1ST MAF 191424Z (PASEP)

B. MACV DIRECTIVE 95-2

1. REF A INDICATED UNCERTAINTY OF PART OF HELICOPTER CREWS IN DETERMINING LATITUDE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF REF B FOR RETURNING FIRE ON VC POSITIONS LOCATED IN VILLAGES WHICH HAVE FIRED ON MED EVAC/EMERG RESUPPLY MISSIONS.

2. UNODIR FOLLOWING INTERPRETATION WILL BE PROMULGATED FOR COMPLIANCE.

CG III MAF

080602 Z APR 66

G3 1-2

UNCLASSIFIED

1DIV 2100/4 (2-65)

Encl 49

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO RUMSMF 572 [REDACTED]

3. IT IS INTERPRETATION OF THIS HQ THAT HELO CREWS ON MED EVAC/ RESUPPLY MISSIONS MAY IMMEDIATELY RETURN FIRE RECEIVED FROM ENEMY POSITIONS IN VILLAGES WHEN FOLLOWING TWO CONDITIONS EXIST:

A. ENEMY FIRE CLEARLY PRESENTS AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO LIVES OF CREW AND

B. ENEMY FIRE COULD NOT REASONABLY OR PRUDENTLY HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY SELECTION OF ANOTHER ROUTE OR TACTIC.

3. IN CONSIDERING THE ASPECTS OF CRITERIA IN PARA 2A THIS HQ FEELS THAT ANY SA FIRE DIRECTED AT OR IN GENERAL DIRECTION OF HELO CREW CLEARLY PRESENTS AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO LIVES OF CREW.

4. IN CONSIDERING THE ASPECTS OF CRITERIA IN PARA 2B THIS HQ FEELS THAT PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ON PART OF HELO CREW OF A SPECIFIC ENEMY POSITION WOULD REASONABLY DICTATE AVOIDANCE OF THAT POSITION. HOWEVER, IN PRIOR KNOWLEDGE IS HELD BUT URGENCY OF MISSION AND OPERATING TECHNIQUES OF HELO DEMANDS THAT A MANEUVER BE EXECUTED WHICH PLACES HELO CREW UNDER FIRE FROM ENEMY POSITION IN VILLAGE, POSITION MAY BE TAKEN UNDER RETURN FIRE BY ANY SUPPORTING AIRCRAFT OR HELO CREW. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT IN ALL CASES IN INTERPRETING SUBJ DIRECTIVE AS IT APPLIES TO THE SPECIFIC SITUATION FIRE DELIVERED BY HELO CREW OR STRIKE A/C IS RETURN FIRE FOLLOWING AN INITIATING FIRE

PAGE THREE RUMSMF 572 [REDACTED]

FIRE BY ENEMY. IF HELO CREW HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AND IS MANEUVERING SO AS TO AVOID LIKELY ENEMY POSITIONS BUT IS SUDDENLY TAKEN UNDER FIRE BY AN ENEMY POSITION LOCATED IN A VILLAGE FIRE MAY BE RETURNED.

5. ONCE MED EVAC OR RESUPPLY HELO HAS MOVED OUT OF RANGE OF ENEMY POSITION SO THAT LIVES OF CREW ARE NO LONGER UNDER IMMEDIATE THREAT, ENEMY POSITION SHOULD NOT CONTINUE TO BE TAKEN UNDER FIRE UNLESS OTHER PROVISIONS OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPLY.

6. BASIC PREMISE OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS ARE TWOFOLD AND MUST ALWAYS BE KEPT FOREMOST IN MINDS OF COMBAT CREWS. FIRST, UNNECESSARY ENDANGERING OR LOSS OF LIFE ON NLK-COMBATANTS IS TO BE AVOIDED IN EVERY CASE. EACH MARINE HAS INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF PROTECTION, BUT HE MUST NOT KNOWINGLY PLACE HIMSELF IN SUCH A POSITION THAT HE WILL BE REQUIRED TO PROTECT HIMSELF AND IN DOING SO ENDANGER LIVES OF NON-COMBATANTS.


GP-4

BT

2-2'

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



①	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	<u>CMD CHR</u>
	BRIEF
	POST

P 180750Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO 0ZGA/FIRST TK BN  
0ZGA/ELEVENTH MAR  
INFO S825/FIRST MAR  
63LS/SEVENTH MAR  
BT

FIRE SPT DURING NEW MOON PHASE

- A. FIRST MAR 110620Z PASEP
- B. CG III MAF 131130Z PASEP
- C. FM 6-40

- 1. REF A AND B PROVIDE GUIDANCE WITH RESPECT TO OPERATIONS DURING NEW MOON PHASE.
- 2. FOR FIRST TK BN. EFFECTIVE 20APR FOLLOWING ADD MISSION ASSIGNED. REINFORCE H&I FIRES OF ELEVENTH MARINES AS REQUIRED.

PAGE 2 DX1U 1736

3. FOR ELEVENTH MAR.

- A. INTEGRATE FIRST TK BN FIRES IN H&I FIRE PLAN.
- B. PROVIDE SURVEY, REGISTRATION DATA, FIRE MISSIONS AND FIRE COMMANDS AS REQUIRED.

4. FOR BOTH.

- A. DIRLAUTH
- B. REF C APPLIES
- C. FIRING POSITION AREAS AS MUTUALLY AGREED
- D. PROVISION OF LN PERS AND FIRING EQUIP AS MUTUALLY AGREED

GP-4

BT


CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

180750Z APR 66

G-3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



0	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

THRU 29 MAY

P 180615Z  
FM SEVENTH MARINES  
TO ZEN/FIRSS BN SEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/SECOND BN SEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR  
INFO CG FIRST MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T

A. REFERENCE 1ST MARDIV OP O 301-66

2. BATTALIONS OF THIS REGIMENT ARE ASSIGNED 12-HOUR ALERT  
STATUS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3B(6) OF REFERENCE A,  
IN THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE:

0001 18 APRIL THRU 2400 25 APRIL - 1ST BN  
0001 26 APRIL THRU 2400 2 MAY - 2ND BN  
0001 3 MAY THRU 2400 8 MAY - 3RD BN  
0001 9 MAY THRU 2400 15 MAY - 1ST BN  
0001 16 MAY THRU 2400 22 MAY - 2ND BN  
0001 23 MAY THRU 2400 29 MAY - 3RD BN

PAGE TWO 63LS

2. BATTALIONS WILL REPORT THEIR ASSUMPTION OF ALERT STATUS  
TO COC, THIS HQ, AT THE TIME THEY ASSUME IT.

GP--4

BT

SEVENTH MARINES

180615Z/APR66

COC COPY


14

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 51

IAL

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	<b>HOLD</b>
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

R 200628Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO RUECEM/CMC  
INFO RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC (003)  
RUABQL/CG FMFPAC/I MAC (FWD)  
RUMSMF/CG III MAF  
BT

PER STATUS RPT 15 APR 66

A MCO 3000.2A

1. IAW REF A FOL RPT SUBMITTED.
2. ON-BOARD STR AND LOCATION OF UNITS.

A. HQBN (REIN)

LTCOL N. DIMOND  
(1) HQBN

USMC  
OFF ENL

148 1339

USN  
OFF ENL LOCATION

25 48

PAGE TWO RUMSMB 1944

LTCOL N. DIMOND

(145) (1262)

(9) (23) CHU LAI

(2) FIRST DENT CO

CAPT F. S. WOZNAK DC USN

(16) (25) CHU LAI

(3) SECOND SSC TM

CAPT F. L. CISEWSKI

(1) (7)

CHU LAI

(4) CONST PLT RADIO RELAY CONST

CO SEVENTH COMM BN

CAPT H. C. SCHROEDER

(2) (70)

CHU LAI

B. FIRST MARINES

COL B. B. MITCHELL

92 2131

9 106

(1) HQCO

CAPT J. R. MURPHY

(18) (210)

(3) (2) CHU LAI

(2) THIRD BN

LTCOL J. R. YOUNG

(33) (864)

(3) (52) CHU LAI

(3) SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

LTCOL R. H. USKURAIT

(41) (1057)

(3) (52) CHU LAI

C. SEVENTH MARINES

COL E. H. HAFPEY

102 2841

11 145

(1) HQCO

CAPT W. J. BROOKS

encl 52

UNCLASSIFIED

IAL

UNCLASSIFIED

## PAGE THREE RUMSMB 1944

(2) FIRST BN	(28)	(849)	(3)	(50)	CHU LAI
LTCOL J. P. KELLY					
(3) SECOND BN	(29)	(902)	(3)	(46)	CHU LAI
LTCOL L. N. UTTER					
(4) THIRD BN	(26)	(864)	(3)	(46)	CHU LAI
LTCOL C. H. BODLEY					
D. ELEVENTH MARINES					
COL P. H. HAHN	120	1764	16	35	
(1) HQBTRY					
CAPT M. N. WALL	(21)	(186)	(3)	(3)	CHU LAI
(2) FIRST BN					
LTCOL J. C. GASSER	(27)	(320)	(8)	(9)	CHU LAI
(3) THIRD BN					
LTCOL J. P. O'CONNELL	(40)	(589)	(4)	(11)	CHU LAI
(4) FOURTH BN					
LTCOL J. F. CROWLEY	(19)	(353)	(1)	(12)	CHU LAI
(5) THIRD 8" HOW BTRY					
MAJ R. L. MCDANIEL	(8)	(186)			CHU LAI
(6) THIRD 155MM GUN BTRY					
CAPT R. H. MOORE	(5)	(130)			CHU LAI

## PAGE FOUR RUMSMB 1944

E. FIRST RECON BN					
LTCOL A. J. SULLIVAN	23	332	2	24	CHU LAI
F. FIRST AT BN					
LTCOL W. MOORE	19	295	1	5	CHU LAI
G. FIRST MT BN					
LTCOL J. J. ROTHOFF	13	180	2	7	CHU LAI
H. FIRST ENGR BN					
LTCOL J. R. AICHELE	24	513	1	11	
(1) FIRST ENGR BN (-)	(24)	(499)			CHU LAI
(2) FIRST PLT (-) CO A		(14)			PHU BAI
I. FIRST MED BN					
CDR R. H. MITCHELL MC USN	3	95	28	150	CHU LAI
J. FIRST SP BN					
LTCOL R. T. TAYLOR JRM	21	299	2	23	CHU LAI
K. FIRST TK BN					
LTCOL A. W. SNELL	33	495	1	11	CHU LAI
L. THIRD AMTRAC BN					
LTCOL R. E. CAMPBELL	24	467	2	11	CHU LAI
M. SEVENTH MT BN					
MAJ L. A. BONIN	15				

UNCLASSIFIED



AL

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE FIVE RUMSMB 1944 [REDACTED]

N. FIRST HOSP CO

CDR F. M. ROBERTS MC USN

29

5

49

CHU LAI

O. FIRST MARINE DIVISION REIN 637 11125 107 632

3. COMMANDERS STATEMENT:

A. BASED ON CURRENT ORGANIZATION THIS COMMAND, CHARGEABLE ON BOARD STRENGTH IS 85 PERCENT AUTH OFFICERS AND 91 PERCENT AUTH ENLISTED PERSONNEL.

B. THE BELOW RECAP OF THOSE MOS/OCCFLDS WHICH INDICATE THE LARGEST NUMERICAL LOSSES IS FURNISHED IN ORDER TO SHOW THE MAGNITUDE OF CURRENT AND PROJECTED LOSSES THROUGH 30 JUNE 1966.

## (1) OFFICER

MOS	RANK	SHORT
0302	03/BELOW	140
0802	03/BELOW	53
3502	03/BELOW	29

## (2) ENLISTED

OCCUPATIONAL FIELD	SHORT
03	2062
08	411


GP-4  
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HOT SPRING

7	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST



O 210031Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO 02GA/FIRST TANK BN  
02GA/ FIRST AT BN  
01VF/THIRD AMTRAC BN  
INFO 63LS7SEVENTH MARINES  
5825/FIRST MARINES  
BT

1. TO REINFORCE SEVENTH MARINES IN LAOR DURING OPERATION HOT SPRINGS A PROV RIFLE COMPANY IS BEING FORMED.
2. FIRST TANK BN PASS OPCON ONE PROVISIONAL RIFLE CO HQ AND ONE PROVISIONAL RIFLE PLATOON REIN TO SEVENTH MARINES EFFECTIVE 210700H APR.
3. FIRST AT BN AND THIRD AMTRAC BN PASS OPCON ONE PROVISIONAL RIFLE PLATOON REIN EACH TO SEVENTH MARINES EFFECTIVE 210700H APR.
4. REIN RIFLE PLATOONS MINIMUM FIVE ZERO PERSONNEL EACH.
5. PARENT ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDE ONE AN/PRC-6 OR AN/PRC-10, ONE

PAGE 2 DX1U 2035  
FIELD TELEPHONE AND ONE HALF MILE FIELD WIRE PER PLATOON. TANK BN PROVIDE TWO FIELD TELEPHONES AND TWO RADIO SETS AN/PRC-10 FOR PROV RIFLE CO HQ.

- A. PROV RIFLE CO ASSIGNED CO TAC NET FREQ OF 50.6 MCS/RPT 50.6 MCS.
- B. SEVENTH MAR ASSIGN BN TACT NET FREQ UPON CHOP OF PROV RIFLE CO.
- C. PROV RIFLE CO ASSIGNED TEMPORARY CALL SIGN OF COMPUTATION PARA.
6. DIRECTIONAL ALCON.
7. THIS CONFIRMS VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED 202330H APR66

GP-4  
BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

O 210031Z/APRIL66

COPY 14

G-3

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE RUNSME 211 [REDACTED]

1. FLC

(1) PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF CL I, II AND ALL NON MAP SUPPLIES (US ITEMS), AND AN AREA SITE WITHIN CHU LAI AMMUNITION SUPPLY AREA FOR STORAGE OF KMB (-) CLASS V.

D. COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) ARRIVAL DATE OF KMB (-) AIR AND SEA LIFT ELEMENTS TO BE ANNOUNCED.

(2) EFFECTIVE FLT PLANNING ON RECEIPT AND EXECUTION ON OR:

(3) AIRFIELD CAPABILITIES; CHU LAI AFB CAN ACCEPT:

(A) 5 C-130 A/C PER HR IF LOAD IS PAX ONLY.

(B) 3 C-130 A/C PER HR IF LOAD IS MIXED PAX-PALLETIZED CARGO.

(C) 2 C-130 A/C PER HR IF LOAD IS MIXED PAX AND NON-PALLETIZED CARGO AND IF TRANSPORT IS AVAILABLE PLANE SIDE.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. CLASS I, III AND ALL NON-MAP SUPPLIES (US ITEMS) AVAILABLE ON REQUEST FROM FLC (FLSG BY ME).

5. COMMAND AND COMM-LECT.

(A) COMMUNICATIONS IN APPLICABLE 1ST MARDIV CEOL.

(B) CMD POSTS. KMB (-) AND SUBORDINATE UNITS TO BE ANNOUNCED.

GP-4


BT

2-2

UNCLASSIFIED

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED



R 220332Z  
FM CG III MAF  
INFO CG FIRST MARDIV  
FORLOGCMD  
P 190422Z  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO CG III MAF  
THIRD FORSERVREGT  
INFO CG FMFPAC/I MAC (FWD)  
BT

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

SUPPORT OF ROK MARINE BRIGADE (U)  
A. CG III MAF 130108Z (S) NOTAL  
B. COMUSMACV 140832Z (S) NOTAL  
1. FOR BOTH, REF A STATES THAT CG, III MAF HAS RECEIVED INFO THAT III MAF WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING CLASS I, III, AND 106 RR AMMO TO THE ROK MARINE BRIGADE, AND REQUESTS FUNING AND ACCOUNTING GUIDANCE.  
A. SUPPORT FOR ROK MAR BRIG, AS STATED IN REF A, WILL BE PROVIDED AS REQUIRED FROM ASSETS AVAILABLE. OBTAIN DOCUMENTATION

PAGE TWO RUMSMF 017  
FOR SUCH SUPPORT AND ADVISE THIS HQ OF REQUIREMENTS TO INCREASE STOCK LEVELS COMMENSURATE WITH INCREASE IN FORCE LEVELS.  
B. IT IS PRESENTLY UNDERSTOOD THAT SUPPORT PROVIDED FOR THE ITEMS WHICH ARE NOW PROVIDED BY ARMY WILL BE ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS, IF PROVIDED BY U.S. MARINE CORPS.  
2. FOR CG, III MAF.  
A. REQUEST YOU OBTAIN INFORMATION ON REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES FOR SUPPORT PROVIDED ROK MAR BRIG FROM COMUSMACV. ALSO OBTAIN INFO ON SUPPORT OF OTHER ITEMS AND SERVICES -- PARTICULARLY THOSE NOT COMMON TO U.S. MARINE CORPS SYSTEM.  
B. UNDER PRESENT POLICY CONSIDER SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED SHOULD PARALLEL CURRENT PROCEDURES FOR REIMBURSABLE TRANSACTION. THEREFORE, UNIT AND MAJOR COMMAND CODES NOT REQUIRED.  
C. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPOSED OVERALL CHANGES IN LOGISTIC CONCEPT FOR SUPPORT OF ROK FORCES AS SET FORTH IN REF B WILL BE PROVIDED BY SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE.  
4. FOR THIRD FSR. REQUEST YOU RENDER SUCH ASSISTANCE AS MAY BE REQUIRED BY III MAF TO ESTABLISH REQUISITE FISCAL PROCEDURES IN CONFORMANCE WITH ABOVE GUIDANCE.  
GP-4  
BT


1DIV 2100/3 (1-85)

220332Z APR 66

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

V



BORN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
END CHR
BRIEF
POST

R 220536Z

FM CG III MAF

INFO CG FIRST MARDIV

FORLOGCMD

P 190422Z

FM CG FMFPAC

TO CG III MAF

INFO CG FMFPAC/I MAC (FWD)

THIRD MARSERV REGT

BT

SUPPORT OF ROK FORCES (C)

A. COMUSMACV 088322 (S)

B. CG FMFPAC 190422Z

1. REF A OUTLINES A REVISED SUPPORT SYSTEM UNDER STUDY WHEREIN U.S. ACTIVITIES WOULD ASSUME THE GREATER PORTION OF SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ROK FORCES AND REQUESTS APPROPRIATE COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

2. THE FOLLOWING CONCEPT FOR SUPPORT OF ROK FORCES IN ICTZ IS CONSIDERED THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS IN VIEW OF THE IMPACT OF THE

PAGE TWO RUMSMF 015

ADDITIONAL ROK SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS UPON III MAF AND THE OVERALL MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS SUPPORT SYSTEM IS MINIMIZED.

A. III MAF PROVIDE CLASS II (COMMON TO UMC AND LESS COMMON ITEMS AVAILABLE THROUGH NAVSUPACT) AND CLASS V (COMMON TO USMC).

B. NAVSUPACT PROVIDE CLASS I, CLASS II (COMMON ITEMS) CLASS III, AND CWS IV. SUB-DEPOT AT CHU LAI SHOULD BE IN OPERATION BY 1 SEPT AND CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SUPPORT REQUIRED.

C. 1ST LOGCMD PROVIDE ARMY AND MAP PARTICULAR CL II AND V.

3. SUPPORT PROVIDED SHOULD BE ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS AND PROCEDURES ARRANGED IN COUNTRY. (PAR 2A AND 2 B REF B APPLY).

4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS CONCEPT FOR ALL CLASSES ON 1 SEPT WILL FACILITATE DEVELOPMENT WORKING ARRANGEMENTS TO PERMIT A PAID INCREASE IN STOCK LEVELS TO MEET ADDITIONAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

GP-4

BT

COPY 14

LDIV 2100/3 (1-65)

CG FMFPAC

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



7	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

F 220308Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG  
INFO RUMSMB/CG FIRST MARDIV  
ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMNAW/CG FIRST MAW  
RUMSVD/DEP SR ADV I CORPS  
BT

SUBJ: MACV COMMANDERS CONFERENCE (C)

REF: CG I FFORCEV 210720Z (NOTAL)

1. (C) III MAF PARTY WILL ARR NHA TRANG IN TWO AIRCRAFT  
2. (C) GROUP ONE KC-130, TAIL NO 804, ETD DANANG 0800H, ETA NHA TRANG 0910H.

A. LTJEN LEWIS W. WALT, CG III MAF

B. MAJGEN WOOD B. KYLE, CG 3D MARDIV

C. COL ARCHELAUS HAMBLIN JR, DEP SR ADV I CORPS

D. SGTMAJ MICHAEL ESPOSITO, III MAF

PAGE TWO RUMSMF 004

E. SGTMAJ NICHOLAS D. PARICE, 3D MARDIV

3. (C) GROUP TWO IN C-117 TAIL NO 216, ETD DANANG 0700H, ETA NHA TRANG 0910H.

A. MAJGEN LEWIS J. FIELDS, CG 1ST MARDIV

B. MAJGEN KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON, CG 1ST MAW

C. SGTMAJ JULIAN H. MYRICK, 1ST MARDIV

4. (C) REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED 25 APR 1966.

GP-4

BT


CG III MAF

220308Z APR 66

G-3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



O 20743Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZIN/FIRST MARDIV REIN  
INFO RUMSMF/CG III MAF  
RUMSM/CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMNA/CG FIRST MAF  
BT

BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
CMD CHR
BRIEF
POST

- FRAG ORDER NO 3-66
- A. FIRST MARDIV FRAG ORDER NO 1-66 NOTAL
  - B. III MAF 120725Z NOTAL
  - C. FIRST MARDIV OP O 301-66
    1. REF A CANCELLED.
    2. MISSION. ON ORDER FIRST MARINE DIVISION PROVIDES FORCES TO BE AIRLIFTED PREPARED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED.
      - A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
        - (1) CG III MAF REQUIRES FIRST MARDIV TO MAINTAIN ONE

PAGE TWO RUMSMB 2065 [REDACTED]  
BATTALION ON TWELVE HOUR NOTICE AS A RESERVE REACTION FORCE.  
UPON COMMITMENT OF THIS FORCE TO BE PREPARED TO FURNISH A  
REGTL HQ AND TWO BNS FOR RELEASE TO COMUSMACV.

(2) REF B REQUIRES IMMEDIATE PLANNING FOR AIR MOVEMENT  
OF REGTL CMD GRP AND TWO BNS (3 COS EACH) REINF FOR REINFORCE-  
MENT OF PHU BAI.

(3) THIS FRAG ORDER IS ISSUED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS  
OUTLINED ABOVE. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES  
WHICH WAS TRANSFERRED TO DANANG COMBAT BASE ON 15APR CONSTITUTES  
THE SECOND BN OF THE TWO SPECIFIED IN REF B.

(4) IN LIGHT OF THE DESIRABILITY OF ORGANIC BNS REMAIN-  
ING WITH PARENT HQ AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF HQ FIRST MARINES RESUM-  
ING COMMAND OF ITS ORGANIC BNS NOW LOCATED AT PHU BAI, THIRD  
BN FIRST MARINES WAS DESIGNATED AS THE DEPLOYING BN REQUIRED  
IN REF B.

B. FIRST MARINES (-)

(1) BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY REGTL HQ AND THIRD BN FIRST  
MARINES.

(2) PLAN FOR DEPARTURE CHU LAI COMBAT BASE VIA AIRCRAFT  
AS DIRECTED.

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

COPY NR 14  
230743Z APR 66

(1-3)  
G-3

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE RUMSMB 2265 [REDACTED]

(3) PLAN FOR REINFORCEMENT BY APPROPRIATE COMBAT SPT AND SERVICE SPT UNITS/ELEMENTS. SUBMIT RECOMMENDED TASK ORGANIZATIONS TO THIS HQ FOR APPROVAL.

(4) PRIORITY OF MOVEMENT WILL BE: REGIL HQS, THIRD BN, COMBAT SPT UNITS/ELEMENTS, SERV SPT UNITS/ELEMENTS.

(5) PLAN FOR THIRTY DAY DURATION IF EMPLOYED AS REINFORCEMENT AT PHU BAI.

(6) BE PREPARED FOR EMPLOYMENT AS COMUSMACV RESERVE REACTION FORCE OR AS REINFORCEMENT OF PHU BAI.

#### C. SEVENTH MARINES

(1) DESIGNATE ONE BATTALION AS TWELVE HOUR RESERVE REACTION BN. REF C. APPLIES.

(2) IN EVENT OF DEPLOYMENT OF FIRST MARINES (-), ASSUME OPCON OF SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES AND SUCH OTHER FORCES AS MAY BE DESIGNATED.

(3) PLAN FOR ASSUMPTION OF DEFENSE OR FIRST MARINES AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY WHEN THAT ORGANIZATION DEPLOYS.

#### D. COMBAT/SERVICE SPT ORGANIZATIONS.

(1) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE COMBAT/SERVICE SPT TO FIRST MARINES (-) AS REQUIRED FOR REINF OF PHU BAI.

PAGE FOUR RUMSMB 2265 [REDACTED]

(2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE COMBAT/SERVICE SPT FOR RESERVE REACTION FORCE AS REQUIRED. REF C APPLIES.

#### E. COORDINATION INSTRUCTION

(1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT, FOR EXECUTION ON ORDER.

#### 3. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

##### A. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO BE EMBARKED

###### (1) REINF PHU BAI

CLASS I - ONE DAY MCI W/FUEL BAR TRIOXANE, TWO FULL CANTEENS PER MAN

CLASS II - COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIP AS DETERMINED BY UNIT CMDRS FOR AIRLIFT

CLASS III - NONE

CLASS IV - NONE

CLASS V - B/A

###### (2) RESERVE REACTION FORCE. ADMIN ORDER 301-66

B. UPON APPROVAL BY THIS HEADQUARTERS OF TASK ORGANIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED BY FIRST MARINES, UNITS SUBMIT

1DIV 2100/31(1-65) DATA TO THIS HQ (ATT: EMBOD) AND MAINTAIN CURRENT DATA. INCLUDE TOTAL PERSONNEL, NUMBER OF VEHICLES BY TYPE,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE FIVE RUMSMB 2265 [REDACTED]  
AND WT AND CU FT OF ORGANIC CARGO NOT PRELOADED IN VEHICLES.

C. MARSHALLING AREA: CHU LAI AIRSTRIP.

4. COMMAND AND COMM-ELECT

A. REF: III MAF, FIRST MARDIV AND THIRD MARDIV JOINT.

B. FOR PHU BAI OPS. III MAF REQUESTED ALL COORDINATE FREQUENCY CONFLICTS AND COMM REQUIREMENTS, RADIO SETS, AUTHENTICATION, CALL SIGNS, RADIO RELAY CHANNELIZATION, ETC. BETWEEN FIRST MARINES AND THIRD MARDIV AND/OR THIRD MARDIV SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS IN AREA OF OPERATIONS. COORDINATING DETAILS SHOULD BE RECEIVED PRIOR TO FIRST MARINES DEPLOYMENT.

C. FOR COMUSMACV RESERVE FORCE.

(1) CALL SIGNS, FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS AND LINKUP COMM INST WILL BE PROMULGATED IN WARNING ORDER ALERTING THE RESERVE REACTION BN.

(2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE LIAISON COMM TEAMS TO ADJACENT AND HIGHER HQ IN AREA TO WHICH COMMITTED.

GP-4


BT

(3-3)

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	BURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	HOLD
<input type="checkbox"/>	G-1/G-4
<input type="checkbox"/>	G-2
<input type="checkbox"/>	LNO
<input type="checkbox"/>	PER SUM
<input type="checkbox"/>	WK SUM
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	CMD CHR
<input type="checkbox"/>	BRIEF
<input type="checkbox"/>	POST

P 231300Z  
FM FIRST MARINES  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

INFO THIRD BN FIRST MARINES

BT

-DEPLOYMENT OF FIRST MARINES  
A. YF 230743Z

1. IAW PAR 2 E (3) OF REF A, FOL TASY ORGANIZATION IS RECOMMENDED:  
1ST MARINES(-), REIN  
HQ CO, 1ST MARINES  
DET, HQ BN, 1ST MARDIV  
DET, COMM CO  
DET, CIT  
DET, ITT

PAGE TWO 5825  
3RD BATTALION, 1ST MARINES  
CO A(-), 1ST RECON BN  
CO A(-), 1ST ENGR BN  
CO A(-), 1ST MED BN  
CO A(-), 1ST SP BN  
CO A(-), 1ST AT BN  
CO A(-), 1ST TANK BN (SEATAIL)  
1ST BATTALION (-), 11TH MARINES  
HQ BTRY  
BTRY C  
BTRY K, 4TH BN, 11TH MARINES (SEATAIL)  
GP-4  
BT

14

UNCLASSIFIED


FIRST MARINES  
1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

231300Z/APR 66

P 231427Z

FM CHU LAI INSTALL COORD  
TO ZEN/INST JARDAY  
RUHNA/FAO TWELVE  
RUHNA/FAO THREE SIX  
RUHNA/FAO SEVEN  
ZEN/MASS TWO DET A  
ZEN/FLSC D  
RUHNA/ISN  
ZEN/NEE THREE  
ZEN/NEE FOUR  
ZEN/MAA 302 SIG CO, DET FOUR  
ZEN/DET 3, PERSI RADIO BN  
RUHNA/SECON LAAN BN  
INFO RUEHSE/74 WIA MAY  
BT

BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
CMD CHR
BRIEF
POST



## INCREASED ALERT ACTIVITIES

A. OVERLAY OF POSSIBLE VC/VA HEAVY MORTAR POSITIONS (COORDINATES) PASSED BY COURIER TO FIRST AND SEVENTH MARINES.

1. REF A IS AN ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE VC/VA HEAVY MORTAR POSITIONS MADE BY SEVENTH MARINES.

2. THIS BN WILL CONDUCT FREQUENT ACTUAL OUTRATER SCANS OF THESE AREAS AND WILL DIRECT APPROPRIATE UNITS TO CONDUCT GROUND INVESTIGATION OF SUSPICIOUS LOCATIONS.

3. ARTILLERY REGIMENTS WILL PLAN AND REGISTER APPROPRIATE

PAGE 2 RUHND 2015

CONCENTRATIONS IN AREAS INDICATED IN REF A PLUS OTHER AREAS AS CONSIDERED NECESSARY.

4. DURING A MORTAR ATTACK THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS APPLY:

A. ANY UNIT IN THE CHU LAI AREA RECEIVING MORTAR FIRE WILL NOTIFY BOTH INFANTRY REGIMENTS (LATEST FIRST) BY FASTEST MEANS USING "FLASH" PRECEDENCE AND WILL ADVISE COORDINATES OF IMPACT AREA.

B. INFANTRY REGIMENTS WILL IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY DIRECT SUPPORT ARTILLERY BATTALIONS OF IMPACT COORDINATES PLUS PRE-PLANNED CONCENTRATIONS CREATED FOR IMMEDIATE COASTAL BATTERY FIRES.

C. ARTILLERY REGIMENTS WILL LOCATE PRE-PLANNED SITES OF SUSPECTED FIRING POSITIONS UNABLE TO BE ATTACHED BY IMMEDIATE COASTAL BATTERY FIRES.

D. DIRECT SUPPORT ARTILLERY UNITS WILL PASS IMPACT COORDINATES TO COASTAL MORTAR RADAR.

E. INFORMATION DERIVED FROM COUNTER MORTAR RADAR WILL BE PASSED TO THE APPROPRIATE INFANTRY REGIMENT FOR ACTION

GP-4

BT


CHU LAI INSTALL COORD

231427Z/APR 66

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 60

UNCLASSIFIED



7	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 240836Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV (REIN)  
TO AIG SIX ZERO  
INFO RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC (K 004)  
RUMSNF/CG III MAF  
ZEN/HQBN FIRST MARDIV  
BT


CONFIDENTIAL, PPP MONREP 240836Z3, CG HQBN FIRST MARDIV, 01//  
ORG GM HQBN (REIN)-FIRST MARDIV, 02//  
CHG ADD 191600Z7 03//  
ORG GP FIRST IT-FME, GP NINTH IT-FME, 04//  
CFN 240836Z3, 191600Z7, 05//END  
GP-4  
BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

240836Z APR 66

G--3

UNCLASSIFIED



BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
LMD CHR
BRIEF
POST

R 230756Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMSMB/CG FIRST MARDIV  
INFO RUECEM/CHC  
RUHLBP/FMFPACH(M008)  
BT

UNCLAS E F T O

**OPERATION HOT SPRINGS**

OPERATION HOT SPRINGS WAS ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL SHORT  
DURATION ACTIONS IN WHICH THE MARINES HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN  
VIETNAM.

YOUR RESPONSE TO A RAPIDLY DEVELOPED TARGET AND THE  
RESULTING DESTRUCTION AND CAPTURE OF ENEMY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT  
WAS A HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENT.

ESPECIALLY DESERVING OF RECOGNITION WAS THE CLOSE AND EFFECTIVE  
COORDINATION BETWEEN THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION AND THE 2D  
ARVN DIVISION.

GEN WESTMORELAND HAS ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS CONGRATULATIONS.  
MY CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL CONCERNED. LTGEN WALT.

BT

CG III MAF


R 239756/1 APRIL 1966

5/5

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED



*And Chron*  
C

P 250154Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
CG THIRD MARDIV  
FIRST FORCE RECON CO

BT

S E C R E T

## - TRANSFER OF OPCON (U)

1. FOR ALL: OPCON OF FIRST FORCE RECON CO (-) WILL BE TRANSFERRED FROM CG 3D MARDIV TO CG 1ST MARDIV NOT LATER THAN 281200H.
2. FOR CG 3D MARDIV: A. ARRANGE AIR TRANS FOR 1ST FORCE RECON CO (-) FROM PRESENT LOCATION TO CHU LAI TAOR. B. UPON DEPARTURE CG 3D MARDIV AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY CHOP OPCON 1ST FORCE RECON CO (-) TO CG 1ST MARDIV. CHOP TO BE EFFECTIVE NLT 281200H.
3. FOR CG 1ST MARDIV: ASSUME OPCON 1ST FORCE RECON (-) WHEN PASSED.
4. FOR 1ST FOR RECON CO (-): BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT EXTENDED RECON OPNS PERIOD ABOUT 14 DAYS.
5. FOR ALL: DIRLAUTH.

GP-4

BT

COPY 14


CG III MAF

250154Z/APR 66

G-3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



*Cmd Chron*  
C

P 250154Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
CG THIRD MARDIV  
FIRST FORCE RECON CO

BT

SECRET

## - TRANSFER OF OPCON (U)

1. FOR ALL: OPCON OF FIRST FORCE RECON CO (-) WILL BE TRANSFERRED FROM CG 3D MARDIV TO CG 1ST MARDIV NOT LATER THAN 281200H.
2. FOR CG 3D MARDIV: A. ARRANGE AIR TRANS FOR 1ST FORCE RECON CO (-) FROM PRESENT LOCATION TO CHU LAI TAOR. B. UPON DEPARTURE CG 3D MARDIV AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY CHOP OPCON 1ST FORCE RECON CO (-) TO CG 1ST MARDIV. CHOP TO BE EFFECTIVE NLT 281200H.
3. FOR CG 1ST MARDIV: ASSUME OPCON 1ST FORCE RECON (-) WHEN PASSED.
4. FOR 1ST FOR RECON CO (-): BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT EXTENDED RECON OPNS PERIOD ABOUT 14 DAYS.
5. FOR ALL: DIRLAUTH.

GP-4

BT

COPY

14

CG III MAF


250154Z/APR 66

G-3

UNCLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	CC SUM
	CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

**HOTSPRING**

P 250504Z  
FM CG III MAF  
INFO CG 1ST MARDIV  
CG 1ST MAW

R 231830Z  
FM CG FMFPAC  
CG III MAF

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

PLEASE PASS TO ALL WHO TOOK PART MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS  
ON THE SUCCESS ACHIEVED IN HOT SPRINGS. THE SPEED OF REACTION,  
AGGRESSIVENESS AND OVERALL PROFESSIONALISM OF THE AIR GROUND  
TEAM WERE FAR MORE THAN THE VC COULD HANDLE.  
WELL DONE. LTGEN KRULAK.

BT

CG FMFPAC

231830Z APR 64

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 64

DECLASSIFIED

Ref to → COMMAND CENTER 01

UNCLASSIFIED

0 250842Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO RUMSMB/CG FIRST MARDIV  
RUNNAV/CG FIRST MAF  
ZEN/FLC  
INFO RUMSMA/CONUSMACV  
RUMGUL/CONSEVENTHFLT  
ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMNUF/CG I FFORCEV  
RUMFUV/CTF 76  
RUMFUAC/CTG 76.5  
RUABQL/CTF 79  
RUMFUAC/CTG 79.5  
BT



7	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	<u>CMD CHR</u>
	BRIEF
	POST

OPERATION ORDER 24-04 (U)

- A. III MAF/SA I CORPS INTEL EST 11-66 (DO XA) (NOTAL)  
B. CG III MAF LOI 1-66 (NOTAL)

C. CONUSMACV 221150Z APR (PASEP)  
D. CG I FFORCEV 220717Z APR (PA TOT)

1. SITUATION:

A. ENEMY

(1) THE DO XA IS AN AREA IN WHICH THE VC HAVE BEEN SUSPECTED OF OPERATING. VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE REPORTS HAVE PLACED MAJOR HEAD-

PAGE TWO RUMSMF 275

QUARTERS, TRAINING AND LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA. EXACT LOCATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN ASCERTAINED. THE AREA ENCOMPASSES APPROXIMATELY 1600 SQ KM BOUNDED BY (AT 9000) (AS 9000) (DS 3000) (BT3000).  
(2) SEE REF A. REF A IN PROCESS OF UPDATE, EST 28APR66.

B. FRIENDLY

(1) IAW PARA 1(B) REF B.

(2) IFFORCEV CONDUCTS OPERATIONS WITH 1ST AIRCAVDIV FROM THE SOUTH TO THE DO XA AREA IAW REF D.

(3) ARG/SLF CURRENTLY ON STATION IN SUPPORT OF III MAF OPERATIONS MAY BE EMPLOYED IF REQUIRED. SEE REF C.

2. MISSION:

A. COMMENCING NLT MAY66 AND FOR A PERIOD OF APPROX 14 DAYS III MASPCONDUCTS RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS WITH UP TO TWO COMPANISU, REINFORCED AS REQUIRED, IN THE DO XA AREA AND ITS NORTHERN AND EASTERN ENVIRONS. SUIC OPDWATIONS TO CONCENTRATE ON AREAS IDENTIFIED BY CURRENT DELTA TEAM OPERATIO O AS POSSIBLE AVENUES B INGRESS/EGRESS, OPERATRLNAL BASE AREAS, LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS OR MILITARY REGIONAL HEADQUARTER AREAS; PREPARE TO CONDUCT EXPLTITATION OPERATIONS IN THE DO XA AREA WITH UP TO TWO ORGANIC BATTALIONS AND THE SLF AGAINST TARGETS DEVELOPED BY THE RECONNAISSANCE

CG III MAF

250842Z APR 66

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE THREE RUMSMF 275 [REDACTED]  
 OPERATIONS OR ALAI ST TARGETS DEVELOPED IN COORDINATION WITH OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED TO THE SOUTH BY CG IFFORCEV.

## 3. EXECUTION:

## A. CG 1ST MARDIV

- (1) DEPLOY MINIMUM OF TWO RECON CO INTO DO XA AREA (AT 9000) (AS 9060) (BS 3060) (BT 3000) AND ITS NORTHERN AND EASTERN ENVIRONS AT THE CONCLUSION OF CURRENT DELTA OPERATIONS BUT NOT LATER THAN MAY 66.
- (2) SNASSUME OPCON OF 1ST FORCE RECON CO (-) WHEN PASSED (APPROX 281200H).
- (3) CONCENTRATE ON AREAS IDENTIFIED BY CURRENT DELT

MTM OPER-

ATIONS AS POSSIBLE AVENUES OF UGRESS/EGRESS, OPERATIONAL BASE AREAS, LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS OR MILITARY REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS.

- (4) UPON COMMENCEMENT RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS, ALERT EXPLOITATION FORCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO BATTALIONS. FURNISH III MAF AND PMAV STATUS.

- (5) AS OPERATIONS OF 1ST AIRCAVDIV (USA) DEVELOP CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE OF AREAS IN ICTZ CONTIGUOUS TO ROUTES OF EGRESS FROM 1ST AIRCAVDIV OPERATIONAL AREA.

- (6) COORDINATE DIRECTLY WITH 1ST AIRCAVDIV (USA) IAW REF D, PREPARED TO SEAL OFF AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES WITHDRAWING INTO 1ST

PAGE FOUR RUMSMF 275 [REDACTED]

MARDIV AREA OF OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF 1ST AIRCAVDIV OPERATIONS.

- (7) CONDUCT EXPLOITATION OPERATIONS AS TARGETS DEVELOP. NOTIFY THIS HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO COMMITMENT OF EXPLOITATION FORCE.
- (8) MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THIS HQ FOR EMPLOYMENT OF SLF AS EXPLOITATION FORCE.
- (9) FURNISH THIS HQ WITH OPERATION OVERLAY OS.

CREA EXTERIOR

TO DO XA FOR COORDINATION WITH CG, ICTZ.

## B. CG FIRST MAW:

- (1) FURNISH FIXED WING AND HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED BY CG 1ST MARDIV

- (2) 2 174,8 43178435 1815 194 3/0)985-508. 4:3 8, -:

2:15-,:3

- 2.6518-1345 3/7 76 18 1ST MARDIV.

- (3) FURNISH AIR DROP AS REQUIRED.

- (4) ON ORDER, FURNISH AIRBORNE RADIO RELAY AND/OR AIRBORNE DASC.

## C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) COORDINATE

WITH ~~AND~~ <sup>FORCES</sup> DETACHMENT ~~IN~~ <sup>FORCES</sup> SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, DANANG, FOR ACTIVITIES TO BE CONDUCTED VIC SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS IN AREA OF OPERATIONS. Dirlauth WITH "B" AND "A" DETACHMENTS AFTER INITIAL CONTACT WITH "C" DETACHMENT.

- (2) REQUEST THROUGH THIS HQ FOR REQUIREMENTS EXCEEDING ORGANIC

UNCLASSIFIED

CO [REDACTED]

PAGE FIVE RUNSMF 275 [REDACTED]  
MEANS.

(3) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPLY. (REF B)

(4) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

(5) LN WITH CTG 76.5/79.5 FOR PLANNING THROUGH III MAF.

(6) LN WITH 1ST ARVN DIV NORMAL. PARTICIPATION OF ARVN FORCES IN EXPLOITATION OPNS ENCOURAGED.

4. LOGISTICS: AS PRESCRIBED BY CG 1ST MARDIV.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS: 1

1. 19.00-19.05:

III MAF DANANG

1ST MARDIV CHU LAI

1ST MARAIRWINGKANANG

B. UPON REQUEST BY III MAF AND WHEN APPROVED BY COMUSMACV AND COMSEVE, 115, RG 76.5 COMMITS SPECIAL LANDING FORCE IN AREA TO BE DESIGNATED BY III MAF. WHEN ESTABLISHED ASHORE CONTROL OF SLF WILL BE PASSED TO III MAF.


GP-4

BT

COPY 3-3

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED



BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
CMD CHR
BRIEF
POST

P 270710Z  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO AIG SIX ZERO  
 INFO RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC (K005)  
 RUNSMF/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 BT

SECRET, PPP MOVREP 270710Z7 CG FIRST MARDIV REIN, 01//  
 ORG TF XRAY, UC CTF XRAY-FIRST MARDIV, 02//  
 CHG RTO 270125Z7 03//  
 ECT C 3 BG FIRST MARDIV REIN, 04//  
 CFN 270710Z7, 270125Z7, 05//END  
 GP-4  
 BT

COPY NR


14

UNCLASSIFIED

3G FIRST MARDIV REIN

270710Z APR 66

G-3



R 270115Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
TO 2BN/FIRST MARDIV  
FMH/FLSC-2  
RUMNAW/MAG ONE TWO  
RUMNAW/MAG THREE SIX  
INFO RUMNAW/CG FIRST MAV  
RUMNAW/FLC

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

- OPERATION HOT SPRINGS

THE REMARKABLE TEAMWORK IN REACTING TO THE SITUATION  
WHICH CREATED HOT SPRINGS AND THE VALIANT PERFORMANCE  
BY ALL HANDS EXEMPLIFIES THE STANDARD OF EXCELLENCE IN  
WHICH WE HAVE OUR BASIC PRIDE AS MARINES. WELL DONE.

RUMNAW/FLC

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV RETN


270113Z APR-6

UNCLASSIFIED

C/S

Encl 67

**UNCLASSIFIED**



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	<b>CMD CHR</b>
	BRIEF
	POST

**ADVANCE ROUTED TO:**

S/SEC

(SIGNATURE & TIME)

W 1011 11 11

TO: 1011 11 11  
 FROM: 1011 11 11  
 SUBJECT: 1011 11 11  
 1. 1011 11 11  
 2. 1011 11 11  
 3. 1011 11 11  
 4. 1011 11 11  
 5. 1011 11 11  
 6. 1011 11 11  
 7. 1011 11 11  
 8. 1011 11 11  
 9. 1011 11 11  
 10. 1011 11 11  
 11. 1011 11 11  
 12. 1011 11 11  
 13. 1011 11 11  
 14. 1011 11 11  
 15. 1011 11 11  
 16. 1011 11 11  
 17. 1011 11 11  
 18. 1011 11 11  
 19. 1011 11 11  
 20. 1011 11 11  
 21. 1011 11 11  
 22. 1011 11 11  
 23. 1011 11 11  
 24. 1011 11 11  
 25. 1011 11 11  
 26. 1011 11 11  
 27. 1011 11 11  
 28. 1011 11 11  
 29. 1011 11 11  
 30. 1011 11 11  
 31. 1011 11 11  
 32. 1011 11 11  
 33. 1011 11 11  
 34. 1011 11 11  
 35. 1011 11 11  
 36. 1011 11 11  
 37. 1011 11 11  
 38. 1011 11 11  
 39. 1011 11 11  
 40. 1011 11 11  
 41. 1011 11 11  
 42. 1011 11 11  
 43. 1011 11 11  
 44. 1011 11 11  
 45. 1011 11 11  
 46. 1011 11 11  
 47. 1011 11 11  
 48. 1011 11 11  
 49. 1011 11 11  
 50. 1011 11 11  
 51. 1011 11 11  
 52. 1011 11 11  
 53. 1011 11 11  
 54. 1011 11 11  
 55. 1011 11 11  
 56. 1011 11 11  
 57. 1011 11 11  
 58. 1011 11 11  
 59. 1011 11 11  
 60. 1011 11 11  
 61. 1011 11 11  
 62. 1011 11 11  
 63. 1011 11 11  
 64. 1011 11 11  
 65. 1011 11 11  
 66. 1011 11 11  
 67. 1011 11 11  
 68. 1011 11 11  
 69. 1011 11 11  
 70. 1011 11 11  
 71. 1011 11 11  
 72. 1011 11 11  
 73. 1011 11 11  
 74. 1011 11 11  
 75. 1011 11 11  
 76. 1011 11 11  
 77. 1011 11 11  
 78. 1011 11 11  
 79. 1011 11 11  
 80. 1011 11 11  
 81. 1011 11 11  
 82. 1011 11 11  
 83. 1011 11 11  
 84. 1011 11 11  
 85. 1011 11 11  
 86. 1011 11 11  
 87. 1011 11 11  
 88. 1011 11 11  
 89. 1011 11 11  
 90. 1011 11 11  
 91. 1011 11 11  
 92. 1011 11 11  
 93. 1011 11 11  
 94. 1011 11 11  
 95. 1011 11 11  
 96. 1011 11 11  
 97. 1011 11 11  
 98. 1011 11 11  
 99. 1011 11 11  
 100. 1011 11 11


OPCON FIRST FORCE RECON CC  
 A. CG HIE KAF 250124Z (010101)  
 1. JAF RF / OPCON FIRST FORCE RECON CC

1. 1011 11 11  
 2. 1011 11 11  
 3. 1011 11 11  
 4. 1011 11 11  
 5. 1011 11 11  
 6. 1011 11 11  
 7. 1011 11 11  
 8. 1011 11 11  
 9. 1011 11 11  
 10. 1011 11 11  
 11. 1011 11 11  
 12. 1011 11 11  
 13. 1011 11 11  
 14. 1011 11 11  
 15. 1011 11 11  
 16. 1011 11 11  
 17. 1011 11 11  
 18. 1011 11 11  
 19. 1011 11 11  
 20. 1011 11 11  
 21. 1011 11 11  
 22. 1011 11 11  
 23. 1011 11 11  
 24. 1011 11 11  
 25. 1011 11 11  
 26. 1011 11 11  
 27. 1011 11 11  
 28. 1011 11 11  
 29. 1011 11 11  
 30. 1011 11 11  
 31. 1011 11 11  
 32. 1011 11 11  
 33. 1011 11 11  
 34. 1011 11 11  
 35. 1011 11 11  
 36. 1011 11 11  
 37. 1011 11 11  
 38. 1011 11 11  
 39. 1011 11 11  
 40. 1011 11 11  
 41. 1011 11 11  
 42. 1011 11 11  
 43. 1011 11 11  
 44. 1011 11 11  
 45. 1011 11 11  
 46. 1011 11 11  
 47. 1011 11 11  
 48. 1011 11 11  
 49. 1011 11 11  
 50. 1011 11 11  
 51. 1011 11 11  
 52. 1011 11 11  
 53. 1011 11 11  
 54. 1011 11 11  
 55. 1011 11 11  
 56. 1011 11 11  
 57. 1011 11 11  
 58. 1011 11 11  
 59. 1011 11 11  
 60. 1011 11 11  
 61. 1011 11 11  
 62. 1011 11 11  
 63. 1011 11 11  
 64. 1011 11 11  
 65. 1011 11 11  
 66. 1011 11 11  
 67. 1011 11 11  
 68. 1011 11 11  
 69. 1011 11 11  
 70. 1011 11 11  
 71. 1011 11 11  
 72. 1011 11 11  
 73. 1011 11 11  
 74. 1011 11 11  
 75. 1011 11 11  
 76. 1011 11 11  
 77. 1011 11 11  
 78. 1011 11 11  
 79. 1011 11 11  
 80. 1011 11 11  
 81. 1011 11 11  
 82. 1011 11 11  
 83. 1011 11 11  
 84. 1011 11 11  
 85. 1011 11 11  
 86. 1011 11 11  
 87. 1011 11 11  
 88. 1011 11 11  
 89. 1011 11 11  
 90. 1011 11 11  
 91. 1011 11 11  
 92. 1011 11 11  
 93. 1011 11 11  
 94. 1011 11 11  
 95. 1011 11 11  
 96. 1011 11 11  
 97. 1011 11 11  
 98. 1011 11 11  
 99. 1011 11 11  
 100. 1011 11 11

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Encl 68

UNCLASSIFIED



R 270711Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO 8PUK/FIRST MARDIV REIN  
BT

BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
CMD CHR
BRIEF
POST

BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO

### TROOP DISPOSITIONS

1. CURRENT INFORMATION INDICATES THAT 2D ROK MARINE BRIGADE (-) AND FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES WILL ENTER THE CHU LAI COMBAT BASE APPROXIMATELY MID-MAY. FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS IN MAKING REQUIRED PREPARATIONS AND TROOP DISPOSITIONS.

### 2. FOR SEVENTH MARINES.

A. 2D ROK MARINE BRIGADE (-) WILL PHASE INTO CHU LAI COMBAT BASE IN FOUR INCREMENTS. FIRST INCREMENT CONSISTS OF

PAGE 2 DXIU 2625

ADVANCE DETAILS OF INF BNS, ARTY BN, AND BRIGADE TROOPS. SECOND INCREMENT CONSISTS OF ARTY BN (-) AND ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT OF BRIGADE TROOPS. THIRD INCREMENT IS INF BN REIN. FOURTH INCREMENT IS INF BN REIN/PLUS REMAINDER OF BRIGADE TROOPS.

B. 2D ROK MARINE BRIGADE (-) WILL ASSUME ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY CURRENTLY ASSIGNED FIRST BN SEVENTH MARINES. FIRST BN SEVENTH MARINES WILL REMAIN IN AREA UNTIL RELIEF EFFECTED AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR AREA ASSUMED BY CG, 2D ROK MARINE BRIGADE.

C. UPON RELIEF, FIRST BN SEVENTH MARINES WILL REVERT TO FIRST MARDIV RESERVE AND OCCUPY CP AREA CURRENTLY USED BY THIRD BN FIRST MARINES.

D. FIRST BN SEVENTH MARINES WILL BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO CHU LAI DEFENSE COMMAND.

### 3. FOR FIRST MARINES.

A. CG, FIRST MARINES REQUESTED TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THIS HEADQUARTERS FOR RELOCATION OF THIRD BN FIRST MARINES. AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION IS PENINSULA EXTENDING AROUND GRID SQUARE 4410.

B. BE PREPARED TO DISPLACE THIRD BN FIRST MARINES HEADQUARTERS TO NEW CP ON ORDER THIS HEADQUARTERS.

C. CG FIRST MARINES BE PREPARED FOR ATTACHMENT OF FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES. FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES WILL BE ASSIGNED SECTOR OF RESPONSIBILITY CONTIGUOUS TO SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES.

GP-4

BT

GROUP NR

17 APR 1968

0.3

UNCLASSIFIED





<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	BURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	HOLD
<input type="checkbox"/>	G-1/G-4
<input type="checkbox"/>	G-2
<input type="checkbox"/>	LNO
<input type="checkbox"/>	PER SUM
<input type="checkbox"/>	WK SUM
<input type="checkbox"/>	CMD CHR
<input type="checkbox"/>	BRIEF
<input type="checkbox"/>	POST

P 271130Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDEN  
TO AIG SIA 1000  
INFO RUHLEAF CG MAFB 1000  
RUHLEAF/CG III MAF  
BT

PPF NOURDEP 271130Z DE FIRST AERIAL SQ.  
ORG GD FIFTH AIRBORNE DIVISION, IN  
CNO SET 261800Z 20-  
ORG BT SEVENTH CIG, 20-  
ORG AND 261800Z 20-  
ORG BP SEVENTH CIG, 20-  
OFF BT1130Z, 261800Z, 20-  
GP-4  
BT

32 FIRST MARDIV

271130Z APR 66

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Encl 70

UNCLASSIFIED

ADVANCE ROUTED TO  
 S/SEC. 28 APR 4 M.  
 (SIGNATURE & TIME)

ACTION SECTION (SIGNATURE & TIME)

BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
END CHR
BRIEF
POST

P 270042Z 270724Z  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO ZEN/CG FIRST NARROW  
 ZEN/7TH ENGR BN  
 INFO ZEN/1ST BRIDGE CO 7TH ENGR BN  
 BT

27/1608/ #3

G-1  
 CCN

1. DET. 1ST BRIDGE CO, FMF, 7TH ENGR BN ONOPPED OPCON CG 1ST NARROW EFF 260819H FOR ATTACHMENT TO 1ST ENGR BN.
2. DETACHMENT CONSISTS OF 4 USMC ENLISTED AND BRIDGING/FERRY EQUIPMENT PRESENTLY DEPLOYED IN CHU LAI TACON.
3. 1ST BRIDGE CO, 7TH ENGR BN REMAINS SOURCE OF SUPPLY FOR ITEMS PECULIAR TO THE BRIDGING AND ACCESSORIES.
4. PERSONNEL OF DETACHMENT WILL BE ROTATED ON REGULAR BASIS TO PARENT UNIT TO PROVIDE STABILITY AND TRAINING.
5. DETAILED LISTING OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIP OBTAINABLE THROUGH

PAGE TWO DDKE 427  
 CO 7TH ENGR BN.

6. DETACHMENT WILL BE INCREASED IN SIZE AND EQUIPMENT AS MORE ASSETS BECOME AVAILABLE.

7. DIRLAUTH.


GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 71

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	<u>CMD CHR</u>
	BRIEF
	POST

29  
mm

FM CG FMFPAC  
 TO DDIE/CS III MAF  
 DDKE/CS THIRD MARDIV  
 DDKE/CS FIRST MARDIV  
 INFO MMSB/CS FMFPAC/I MAC (FWD)  
 MMDA/CS MARCORB CAMPEN  
 MMSB/THIRD FORSERVREGT  
 MMSB/FIFTH MAB  
 DDKE/PLC  
 BT

TOR: 29/0408/532

SHIFT OF GCON TO FIRST MARDIV (U)

A. CG, III MAF 271615Z (S) NOTAL

B. CG, FMFPAC 232515Z (S)

1. CONCUR IN RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED REF A THAT I/A REMAIN  
ADCON THIRD MARDIV.

2. FURTHER CONCUR CO C, 1ST MED BN COME UNDER ADCON FIRST MARDIV.

3. ACCORDINGLY, INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REF B HEREBY VERIFIED.  
ADCON OF THOSE UNITS LISTED PAR 1A OF REF B PLUS CO C, 1ST MED  
BN SHIFT FROM THIRD MARDIV TO FIRST MARDIV EFFECTIVE 1 APR 66.

GP-4

BT

CG FMFPAC

250035Z MAR 66


62

LDIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



9

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WR SUM
	CHD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

*ST FRED*

P 290210Z  
FM FIRST MARINES  
TO CG TASK FORCE XRAY  
INFO CG FIRST MARDIV  
BT

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 270125Z

1. IAW REF A 1ST MAR REPORT TO CG TF XRAY FOR PLANNING  
EFFECTIVE 291200H APR; FOR OPERATIONS 301200H APR.

GP-4  
BT

FIRST MARINES

290210Z APR 66


G-3

COPY-14

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 280232Z

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/FIRST RECON BN

INFO RUNSMF/CG III MAF

RUNSMF/CG THIRD MARDIV

ZEN/CG IFX

BT

OPCON FIRST FORCE RECON CO

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 280530Z NOYAL

1. IAW REF A, OPCON FIRST FORCE RECON CO CHOP YO CG FIRST  
RECON BN EFFECTIVE 280030Z.

GP-4

BT

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN


290232Z APR 66

UNCLASSIFIED

G-3

Encl 74

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	<u>CMD CHR</u>
	BRIEF
	POST

P 250520Z  
 FM ADMIRAL FMFPAC  
 TO RUWDFL/CG FORIRPS FMFPAC  
 INFO RUECEN/7COC  
 RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT  
 RUWGKB/CG FMFPAC  
 RUABUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 RUWDAE/COMFIRSTFLT  
 RUWDAF/COMNAVAIRPAC  
 RUWDG/COMPHIBPAC  
 RUHSMF/CG III MAF (A005)  
 RUHSMB/CG FIRST MARDIV (0 002)  
 RUHSMF/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUWDFH/CG MARCORS CAMPEN  
 RUWDFH/CG MARCORSUPCEN DANANG  
 RUABQL/CG FMFPAC/1 MAC (FWD)  
 RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB  
 RUHUU/COMPHIBORU THREE  
 RUECEF/DUMED  
 RUECH/DUPERS  
 BT

AR 186 RPT AM 186  
 DEPLOYMENT OF NINTH ENGR BN AND FIRST MP BN (0)  
 A. CG FMFPAC 122043Z NOTAL  
 B. CINCPACFLT 270217Z NOTAL  
 C. CINCPACFLT 090731Z NOTAL  
 1. REF A STATES THAT WHEN DIRECTED FMFPAC WILL EMBARK  
 AND DEPLOY TO RVN THE NINTH ENGR BN AND FIRST MP BN.  
 REF B DIRECTS CG FMFPAC TO EMBARK THE FOLLOWING IN  
 SHIPPING ASSIGNED BY COMPHIBPAC, AS LISTED IN REF C, TO  
 CLOSE DESTINATIONS SHOWN, DURING MAY 1966:

PAGE 2 RUHLBP 4637

UNIT

ENGR BN

MP BN (-)

2. EMBARK THE SUBJECT UNITS IN SHIPPING ASSIGNED BY AND  
 COORDINATED WITH COMPHIBPAC.

GP-4

BT

ADMIRAL FMFPAC

APPROX STR

1116

554

DESTINATION

CHU LAI

DANANG


200520Z APR 66

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 55

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	BURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	HOLD
<input type="checkbox"/>	G-1/G-4
<input type="checkbox"/>	G-2
<input type="checkbox"/>	LNO
<input type="checkbox"/>	PER SUM
<input type="checkbox"/>	WK SUM
<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>CMD CHR</u>
<input type="checkbox"/>	BRIEF
<input type="checkbox"/>	POST

R 291054Z  
FM ADMINO FMFPAC  
TO RUMSMF/CGHIII MAF (A008)  
RUWDFL/3EG FORTIRPS FMFPAC  
INFO RUWDFH/CG FMFPAC  
RUMYMB/CG FIRST MARDIV (W003)  
RUWDFD/CG THIRD MAF  
RUWDFH/NINTH ENGR BN  
BT

(AM 202)

ADVANCE PARTY FOR NINTH ENGR BN (U)

1. FOR CG III MAF: NINTH ENGR BN AUTHORIZED ADVANCE PARTY OF THREE OFFICERS AND SIX ENLISTED TO DEPART WEST COAST CONQS ABOUT NINE MAY BY GOV AIR.

2. FOR CG FORTIRPS FMFPAC. REQUEST YOU ADVISE ALCON FLIGHT ITINERARY SUBJ PARTY WHEN FIRM.

GP -4

ADMINO FMFPAC


291054Z APR 66

G-3 COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



BURN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
20 CHR
ENTER
POST

P 290350Z

FM CG III MAF  
 TO RUMSMB/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 ZEN/ 1& THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMNAW/CG FIRST MAF  
 ZENN/CO FLC

BT

## REINFORCEMENT OF PHU BAI (U)

- A. IIIHMAF COC 120725Z (NOTAL)  
 B. CG PII MAF 131358Z  
 C M LOI (1-66)

1. REF A LEVIED REQUIREMENT FOR CG 1ST MARDIV TO PLAN MOVEMENT OF REGIMENTAL CMD GRQ AND TWO BNS TO HUE PHU BAI AREA AS REINFORCEMENTS. REF B MODIFIED REQUIREMENT TO A REGIMENTAL CMD GRU AND ONE BN. REF A ALSO REQUIRED CG THIRD MARDIV PLAN FOR UTILIZING TASK FORCE CMD GRU, AND BE PREPARED TO MOVE BN FROM DANANG AS TF RESERVE.

PAGE TWO RUMSMF 571

2. FOR CG 1ST MARDIV C REINFORCEMENT ALERT NO LONGER REQUIRED. ALERT REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY REF C APPLY.

3. FOR CG 3RD MARDIV: REQUIREMENT FOR TASK FORCE CMD GRU AND RESERVE BN FOR THIS MISSION CANCELLED. RETAIN 2D BN 4TH MAR IN DANANG TAOR PENDING FINAL DECISION ON OPERATION GEORGIA EXTENSION.

GP-4

BT


CG III MAF

190430Z APR 66

30PT

UNCLASSIFIED





	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	AND CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 291352Z  
 FM CG III MAF/I CORPS COORDINATOR  
 TO III MAF  
 RUMNA/COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMSVD/SNA I COASTAL ZONE  
 RUMNNA/NAVADUDET  
 RUMSAG/35TH IAC FTR WING DANANG  
 RUMNNA/30TH NCR  
 RUMSAG/AFAT-5  
 RUMSVD/I CORPS ADV GRU  
 RUMNNA/OICC RVN DANANG  
 RUMSNA/COMUSMACV

UNCLASSIFIED

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

## SECURITY CONDITIONS

A. CG III MAF/I CORPS COORD JQGPYIWZMAR66

B. ICCI 5300.1

C. COMUSMACV 121320Z (S) (NOTAL)

D. ICCI 5370.1A, SUBJ: RESPECT FOR THE LAW, PROPERTY, INSTITUTIONS, TRADITIONS AND CUSTOMS OF THE RVN

E. ICCI 1610.1, SUBJ: UNTOWARD INCIDENTS INVOLVING VIETNAMESE NATIONALS

1. REF A SET SECURITY CONDITION YELLOW FOR U. S. FORCES THROUGHOUT I

13

AF I CORPS COORDINATOR

291352Z APR 66

G-1

G-1

PAGE TWO RUMMF 604 UNCLAS E F T O  
 CORPS. REF B DESCRIBES MEASURES TO BE TAKEN FOR CONDITON YELLOW. REF  
 C DIRECTED THAT HUE AND DANANG REMAIN OFF LIMITS FOR OTHER THAN  
 OFFICIAL BUSINESS.

2. REF A REVOKED BY THIS MESSAGE. CONDITION YELLOW IS LIFTED FOR  
 I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. HOWEVER, HUE AND DANANG REMAIN OFF LIMITS  
 FOR U. S. MILITARY PERSONNEL EXCEPT ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS.
3. THE MANNER IN WHICH US MILITARY PERSONNEL DEPORT THEMSELVES IN THE  
 NEXT FEW WEEKS WILL BE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE SUCCESSFUL ACCOM-  
 PLISHMENT OF OUR MISSION AND THE ENTIRE US EFFORT IN VIETNAM. NOTHING  
 LESS THAN STRICT AND EXACT COMPLIANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT  
 OF THIS DIRECTIVE IS EXPECTED OR ACCEPTABLE.
4. ALL COMMANDERS ARE DIRECTED TO COUNSEL MEMBERS OF THEIR COMMAND  
 ON THE CONTINUING REQUIREMENT FOR DISCREET AND ORDERLY CONDUCT WHEN  
 IN PUBLIC PLACES OR IN CONTACT WITH THE VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN POPU-  
 LATION. THERE CAN BE NO RELAXATION OF THE STRICT SELF-DISCIPLINE  
 WHICH IS REQUIRED OF EVERY AMERICAN SERVICEMAN IN THE I CORPS  
 AREA FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE. COMPLIANCE WITH THE STANDARDS OF  
 CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE (D) AND (E) IS  
 ESSENTIAL. EVERY INCIDENT WHICH COULD LEAD TO INVOLVEMENT WITH THE  
 CIVILIAN POPULATION MUST BE AVOIDED. ANY TENDENCY TOWARD VIOLATIONS

PAGE THREE RUMSMF 604 UNCLAS E F T O  
 OF GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN A PUBLIC PLACE OR ANY OFFENSIVE  
 ACT BY US MILITARY PERSONNEL MUST BE POSITIVELY AND EFFECTIVELY  
 CURTAILED THROUGH APPROPRIATE PREVENTIVE AND FORCEFUL CORRECTIVE  
 ACTION.

5. MILITARY POLICE WILL RIGIDLY ENFORCE THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED  
 ON THE CITIES OF HUE AND DANANG AND PROPER STANDARDS OF CONDUCT  
 AND SHALL SUBMIT MILITARY POLICE REPORTS ON ALL OFFENDERS.

BT

2-2

SECRET

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

## Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) MAPS: Indochina and Thailand, Series L 509, Scale 1:250,000,  
Sheets NE 4811, NE 4812, ND 4816, ND 4818, NE 4913, NE 484,  
*ch 2* ~~ND 491, ND 495, ND 499, ND 4913, NC 484, NC 485, NC 486,~~  
NC 487, NC 488, NC 4810, NC 4815; ~~AMS Series L 509, Scale~~  
~~1:250,000 and AMS Series L 701, Scale 1:500,000, Sheet 6757 IV and~~

(b) 1st MarDivO 3480.1 - ~~AMS Series L 7014, Scale 1:50,000, Sheets~~  
~~6739 I, II, III and IV; 66 340 I, II, III and IV; 66 340 II.~~

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

HEA QU RTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

660775

Copy 144 of 198 copies

## 1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence), current ISUMs and PIRs.b. Friendly Forces

- (1) U. S. SEVENTH Fleet conducts naval and air operations in support of the overall campaign against the NVA and VC in Republic of Vietnam (RVN).
- (2) ~~2d Air Division~~ <sup>7th Air Force</sup> (USAF) provides air defense of RVN and supports ground action in RVN as necessary.
- (3) 3d Marine Division defends the base area, airfield, and ancillary facilities at DANANG and HUE PHU BAI and such other bases as may be established in assigned areas of responsibility; defends or participates in the defense of other selected U. S. or Government of Vietnam (GVN) critical installations as directed; conducts unilateral offensive operations within TAOR; and executes offensive operations with Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in area of responsibility and, as directed, anywhere in RVN.
- (4) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing conducts offensive and defensive tactical air operations to include close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, air superiority, air transport, search and rescue and other supplemental air support as required to assist in the overall counterinsurgency effort and is prepared to execute U. S. contingency plans as directed by CG, III MAF.
- (5) CG, I Field Forces, Vietnam (IIForceV), in coordination with CG, II ARVN Corps and CG II Field Forces, Vietnam (IIIForceV) in coordination with CG, III ARVN Corps, defends specified U.S./GVN critical installations and facilities and conducts operations against the VC.
- (6) Task Force 115 conducts anti-infiltration and interdiction operations in and over waters contiguous to RVN and on certain major inland waterways.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DDO DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

- (7) CTF 116 conducts river patrols and inshore surveillance in order to enforce curfews and prevent Viet Cong infiltration, movement and resupply along the Delta estuary coast and across the major rivers of the Mekong Delta and the Rung Sat Special Zone of the RVN.
- (8) MACV Advisory Groups provide RVNAF with combat support and advice for counterinsurgency operations against the VC and perform a logistic role between U.S. and RVNAF forces.
- (9) ARVN Forces conduct operations against the VC throughout RVN. CG, I Corps is responsible for the conduct of operations in the 11th DTA, 12th DTA and QUANG NAM Special Sector. 1st ARVN Division conducts operations in the 11th DTA which encompasses QUANG TRI and THUA TIEN Provinces; 2d ARVN Division conducts operations in the 12th DTA which encompasses QUANG NGAI and QUANG TIN Provinces. Commanding Officer, QUANG NAM Special Sector conducts offensive operations in the QUANG NAM Special Sector.
- (10) 3d PsyWar Battalion (ARVN) conducts psychological operations in ICTZ.
- (11) 244th PsyOps Company (USA) advises 3d PsyWarBn and III MAF.
- (12) Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) conducts air operations in support of ARVN forces.
- (13) Vietnamese Navy (VNN) conducts counter-infiltration operations along the SVN coast.
- (14) Force Logistic Command (FLC) provides logistic support to III MAF. Force Logistic Support Group B provides logistic support to CHU LAI TAOR.
- (15) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company executes force reconnaissance tasks as directed by CG, III MAF.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization)

2. MISSION

1st Marine Division (Rein) defends the base area, airfield and ancillary facilities at CHU LAI and such other bases as may be established in assigned area of responsibility; defends or participates in the defense of other selected U.S. or GVN critical installations as directed; conducts unilateral offensive operations within TAOR; and executes offensive operations with RVNAF in area of responsibility and as directed anywhere in RVN.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. Annex C (Concept of Operations).

b. 1st Marines/7th Marines

- (1) Establish and maintain a reconnaissance screen throughout assigned sector of TAOR.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (2) Conduct unilateral offensive operations within assigned sector of TAOR.
- (3) Conduct coordinated unilateral and combined offensive operations in Division area of responsibility as directed.
- (4) Be prepared to participate in unilateral and/or coordinated offensive operations throughout ICTZ as directed.
- (5) Occupy and defend assigned sector of TAOR. Appendix 2 (TAOR and RZ) to Annex D (Operations Overlays).
- (6) Be prepared to provide one battalion on twelve (12) hours notice as a reserve/reaction force prepared for operations throughout the I CTZ or commitment to COMUSMACV as general reserve as directed.
- (7) Be prepared to provide a regimental headquarters and one or two battalions for release to COMUSMACV upon commitment of one battalion in subparagraph (6).
- (8) Be prepared to assist in the training of, and rendering support to, Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF).
- (9) Be prepared to provide assistance to CHU LAI Defense Command as directed.
- (10) Be prepared to provide one battalion as Division Reserve as directed.

*ground recon and observation upon assigned sector and establish*  
 c. 11th Marines (-) (Rein) *preparations for infiltration of contraband.*

- (1) <sup>2d Bn</sup> 1st Bn (-) (Rein) - Direct support 1st Marines. <sup>5th</sup>
- (2) 3d Bn - Direct support 7th Marines.
- (3) 4th Bn (X) (Rein) - General support 1st Marine Division.
- (4) ~~3d Bn HowBtry Grp~~
- (4) (X) Annex E (Supporting Arms).
- (5) (6) Be prepared to provide fire support, forward observer and liaison parties to CHU LAI Defense Command for defense of CHU LAI Defense Sector.

d. CHU LAI Defense Command. Annex F (Alert Postures/Defense).

e. 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein).

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) General support.

(3) Conduct unilateral reconnaissance operations in assigned sectors of RZ. Unilateral reconnaissance operations in RZ will be conducted

UNCLASSIFIED

only after coordination with appropriate sector command (ARVN).

Exit and entry from TAOR will be coordinated with appropriate commander

responsible for sector of TAOR.

(4) *Establish ground reconnaissance and observation when operating in other coastal areas to detect preparation for infiltration of contraband.*

f. 1st Antitank Battalion (-)

(1) General support.

(2) Company A (-) (Rein) - Direct support <sup>5th</sup> 1st Marines.

(3) Company C - Direct support 7th Marines.

(4) Provide support to CHU LAI Defense Command as required.

g. 1st Tank Battalion (-)

(1) General support.

(2) Company A (-) (Rein) - Direct support <sup>5th</sup> 1st Marines.

(3) Company B - Direct support <sup>7th</sup> 7th Marines.

(4) Provide support to CHU LAI Defense Command as required.

h. 1st Engineer Battalion (-) (Rein)

(1) General support.

(2) Provide combat and deliberate engineer support as directed.

(3) Be prepared to provide one (1) company ~~(-)~~ (Rein) in direct support <sup>5th</sup> 1st Marines.

(4) Be prepared to provide one company in direct support 7th Marines.

i. Division Reserve

(1) Annex F (Alert Postures/Defense).



(2) Be prepared on twelve (12) hours notice for employment as a reserve/reaction force for operations throughout I CTZ or commitment to COMUSMACV as general reserve as directed.

j. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Annex G (Rules of Engagement).

(2) Annex H (Psychological Warfare).

(3) Defense Readiness Conditions and MACV Security Conditions. Annex F (Alert Postures/Defense).



SECRET

- (4) Reports. Reference (b).
- (5) Fire support coordination, naval gunfire and air operations. Annex E (Supporting Arms).
- (6) All matters relating to operations in I CTZ, offensive operations beyond the TAOR and RZ and coordination and cooperation between the 1st Marine Division and I Corps Advisory Teams will be referred to this Headquarters.
- (7) Maximum use will be made of Vietnamese (VN) liaison personnel during the conduct of operations in order to provide identification of friendly forces and as a means of contact with and identification of civilians.
- (8) Operations and all associated activities will be conducted in such a manner as to minimize non-combatant casualties and damage to civilian property, Annex G (Rules of Engagement) applies.
- (9) With due regard to security, close coordination will be established in sectors of responsibility with District Chiefs through direct liaison and through U.S. sector and sub-sector advisory personnel acting in their liaison role.
- (10) Contact right to left.
- (11) Appendix 5 (Ground Reconnaissance Overlay) to Annex B (Intelligence)

*LCA 3) → (12) Force assignments by Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements to the CMZ 1st Defense Command will normally be for a period of 30 days.*

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION. Administrative Order 301-66.

### 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

#### a. Command

##### (1) Command relations.

- (a) 1st Marine Division (Rein), is under the command, less operational control of CG, FMFPac and under operational control of CG, III MAF.
- (b) 1st Marine Division (Rein) exercises coordination/cooperation/liaison with 2d ARVN Division and coordination/cooperation with Senior Advisor, 12th DTA.
- (2) The basic concept underlying command relations between III MAF and ARVN forces will be one of cooperation and coordination in the mutual endeavor of both.
- (3) As a matter of U.S. policy, U.S. forces will not be placed under the command or operational control of allied commanders.

UNCLASSIFIED

However, this restriction does not preclude temporary tactical direction of U.S. forces by ARVN commanders under exceptional circumstances and by mutual agreement, or the temporary direction of ARVN forces by U.S. commanders under certain circumstances. Matters of this nature will be referred to this Headquarters.

- (4) Command Posts. Units report exact location when established and changes as they occur. *See weekly Order of Battle and CP Locations reports. Cg 7<sup>th</sup> MarDiv message to III MAF (info 1<sup>st</sup> Mar Div)*

III MAF	AT 995755
3rd MarDiv (Rein)	AT 955751
1st MAW	AT 992757
Force Logistics Command	AT 999748
1st MarDiv (Rein)	BT 534097
CHU LAI Defense Command	BT 533089
1st Marines	BT 534078
3rd Bn 1st Marines	
1st Bn 4th Marines	BT 465073
2nd Bn 4th Marines	BT 504036
7th Marines	BT
1st Bn 7th Marines	BT 586016
2nd Bn 7th Marines	BT 504035
3rd Bn 7th Marines	BT 538023
11th Marines	BT 515040 511039
1st Bn (-) (Rein)	BT 519056
3rd Bn 11th Marines	BT 549014
4th Bn (-) (Rein)	BT 441100 (effect 290800 Aug 66)
3d 155MM Gun Btry (SP)	BT 498031
3d 8" How Btry (SP)	
1st Recon Bn (-)	BT 559049
1st AT Bn (-)	
1st Tank Bn (-)	
1st Engr Bn (-)	
1st MT Bn (-)	
1st Med Bn (-)	BT 532109
1st SP Bn (-)	BT 538100
3rd AmTrac Bn (-)	
7th MT Bn (-)	
1st Hosp Co	
FLSG-B	BT 535105
2nd LAAM Bn	BT 552054
MAG-12	BT 537068
MAG-36	BT 527127
MACS-7	
Naval Support Activity	

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

Annex I (Communication-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence (issued separately)
- C - Concept of Operations
- D - Operations Overlays
- E - Supporting Arms
- F - Alert Postures/Defense (~~To be issued~~) 240800 July 66
- G - Rules of Engagement (~~To be issued~~) 180800 May 66
- H - Psychological Warfare
- I - Communication-Electronics
- J - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

S C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

660775 ch1

Copy 146 of 197 copies

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam

180800 May66

Change No. 1 to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. Make the following pen changes in Operation Order 301-66. File this Change No. 1 as pages 9/10 following page 8 of 1st Marine Division (Rein) Operation Order 301-66.

## a. Basic Order

- ✓(1) Paragraph 1.b(2) delete "2d Air Division" and substitute therefore "7th Air Force".
- ✓(2) Paragraph 3.e change to read "1st Reconnaissance Battalion (-)(Rein)".
- ✓(3) Paragraph 3.h change to read "1st Engineer Battalion (-)(Rein)".
- ✓(4) Paragraph 5.a(4) delete and substitute the following:  
5.a(4) "Command Posts. See weekly Order of Battle and CP Locations reports. CG 1st MarDiv message to III MAF (info 1st MarDiv)".
- ✓(5) Annexes. Delete (To be issued) after G - "Rules of Engagement."

## b. Annex E (Supporting Arms)

## (1) Appendix 1 (Artillery)

- ✓(a) Paragraph 3.b. delete "G and H, 12th Marines" and substitute "D and E" and 107mm Mort Btry, 2d Bn".
- ✓(b) Paragraph 3.d. delete "3d 155mm Gun Battery (-) (SP), FMF" and "Plt". Delete sub-paragraph (2), renumber (3), (4) and (5) as (2), (3) and (4).
- ✓(c) Delete paragraph 3.e and change to read "3d 155mm Gun Btry (SP), FMF. General Support."
- ✓(2) Appendix 4 (Air Support). Paragraph 1.b.(4) delete "2d Air Division" and substitute therefor "7th Air Force".

## c. Annex J (Distribution)

- (1) Add "MCB-3 1".
- (2) Delete "2d Bn 4th Mar 1".

DOWN 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

**UNCLASSIFIED**

2. Substitute the attached pages for the original pages. Destroy the original pages without report to this Headquarters.

✓ a. Annex A (Task Organization), Pages A-1 and A-2.

✓ b. Annex D (Operations Overlays), Appendix 2 (TAOR and RZ, Part I and II). Pages D-2-I and D-2-II.

3. ✓ Add Annex G (Rules of Engagement) herewith attached.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

*Posted/ck made, 15 Jan 68, dr*

**UNCLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

660775ch 2

Copy 2 of 193 copies

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
100800H June 66

Change No. 2 to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. Make the following pen changes to Operation Order 301-66. File this Change No. 2 as pages 11-13 following page 10 of 1st Marine Division (Rein) Operation Order 301-66.

## a. Basic Order

(1) Reference (a) delete and substitute the following:

✓(a) "MAPS: Indochina AMS Series L 509, Scale 1:250,000, Sheets NE 4811, NE 4812, ND 4816, ND 4818, NE 4913, NE 484, NC 485, NC 486, NC 487, NC 488, NC 4810 and NC 4815; Vietnam AMS Series L 701, Scale 1:50,000, Sheet 6757 IV and AMS Series L 7014, Scale 1:50,000, Sheets 6739 I, II, III and IV; 6639 I and 6640 II."

(2) ✓ Paragraph 3.b. delete "1st Marines" and substitute therefore "5th Marines".

(3) Paragraph 3.c.(1) delete and substitute the following:

✓3.c.(1) "2d Bn - Direct support 5th Marines."

(4) ✓ Paragraph 3.c.(3) delete "(-)".

(5) ✓ Paragraph 3.c.(4) delete sub-paragraph (4), renumber (5) and (6) as (4) and (5).

(6) ✓ Paragraph 3.f.(2) delete and substitute the following:

3.f.(2) "Company A - Direct support 5th Marines."

(7) ✓ Paragraph 3.g.(2) delete and substitute the following:

3.g.(2) "Company A - Direct support 5th Marines."

(8) ✓ Paragraph 3.h.(3) delete and substitute the following:

3.h.(3) "Be prepared to provide one company in direct support 5th Marines."

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

b. Annex B (Intelligence)

(1) Paragraph 3.a.(2) delete "1st Marines (-) (Rein)" and substitute "5th Marines (-)".

(2) Paragraph 3.a.(10) delete "1st" and substitute "3d".

c. Annex E (Supporting Arms)

(1) Appendix 1 (Artillery)

(a) ✓ Paragraph 3.b. delete and substitute the following:

3.b. "2d Battalion, 11th Marines

(1) Direct support - 5th Marines.

(2) Zone of fire - 5th Marines sector of TAOR.

(3) Be prepared to provide supporting fires, forward observers and liaison personnel to CHU LAI Defense Command for defense of CHU LAI Defense Command Sector."

(b) ✓ Paragraph 3.d. delete "(-)".

(2) ✓ Appendix 2 (Fire Support Coordination). Paragraph 3.b. delete "1st Marines" and substitute "5th Marines".

d. Annex I (Communication-Electronics)

(1) ✓ Paragraph 1.b.(5) add the following: "FLSG-B provides over counter message service to 7th Motor Transport Battalion."

(2) ✓ Paragraph 3.b.(3) change "package" to "packaged".

(3) ✓ Paragraph 3.c.(3)(a) delete and substitute the following:

3.c.(3)(a) "Relay guard for 5th Marines, 7th Marines, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and FLSG-B."

(4) ✓ Paragraph 3.c.(3)(b) delete and substitute the following:

✓ 3.c.(3)(b) "Communication guard and counter service for Headquarters Battalion, 1st Shore Party Battalion, 1st Medical Battalion, Detachment MASS-2 (DASC), MCB-3, MCB-4, 7th Communications Battalion, 1st Hospital Company and other CHU LAI organizations as directed."

(5) ✓ Paragraph 3.c.(4) delete and substitute the following:

✓ 3.c.(4) "Activate two AN/MRC-62 terminals for multichannel communications with III MAF. Be prepared to activate AN/TSC-15 terminal on III MAF Command Net."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(6) Paragraph 3.c.(7) delete and substitute the following:

✓3.c.(7) "Provide Task Force \_\_\_\_\_ with communication equipment and personnel support; further support regimental and battalion size tactical operations as directed."

(7)✓ Paragraph 3.c.(9) change "sites" to "site".

(8)✓ Paragraph 3.c.(10) insert the following:

3.c.(10) "Be prepared to activate radio and radio relay circuits as directed to support other internal CHU LAI Combat Base operations."

(9)✓ Paragraph 3.d. delete and substitute the following:

3.d. "5th Marines. Provide communications to support sector assigned and be prepared to provide communications in support of tactical operations."

(10)✓ Paragraph 3.f.(1) delete and substitute the following:

3.f.(1) "Provide communications guard and counter service for the 1st Anti-Tank Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 9th Engineer Battalion and Raymond-Morrison-Knudsen Co."

(11)✓ Paragraph 3.i. change "Activity" to "Facility".

2. Substitute the attached pages for the effective pages. Destroy the superseded pages without report to this Headquarters.

a. ✓ Annex A (Task Organization). Pages A-1 and A-2.

b. ✓ Annex D. (Operations Overlays) Appendix 2 (TAOR and RZ Part I, II, and III). Pages D-2-I, D-2-II and D-2-III. .

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

*Posted / ch. made,  
15 Jul 68*

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
190800H July 1966

Change No. 3 to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. Make the following changes to Operation Order 301-66. File this Change No. 3 as page 14 following page 13 of 1st Marine Division (Rein) Operation Order 301-66.
  - a. Basic Order.
    - ✓(1) Paragraph 3.j. add sub-paragraph (12) to read as follows:
 

"(12) Force assignments by Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements to the CHU LAI Defense Command will normally be for a period of thirty (30) days."
  2. Substitute the attached pages for the effective pages. Destroy superseded pages without report to this Headquarters.
    - a. ✓Annex A (Task Organization), Pages A-1, and A-2.
    - b. ✓Annex I (Communication-Electronics), Pages I-3, I-4, I-5 and I-6.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMP

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

660775 ch 3  
Copy 2 of 192 copies

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

291 263 #1  
CH #4

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
240800H July 1966

Change No. 4 to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. Make the following pen change in Operation Order 301-66. File this change No. 4 as page 15 of 1st Marine Division (Rein) Operation Order 301-66.

✓ a. Basic order

(1) Page 7., under Annexes:, after F change to read "Alert/Defense Postures," and delete "(to be issued)."

2. ✓ Add Annex F (Alert/Defense Postures) attached hereto.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

660775 *ch4*

Copy 2 of 198 copies

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DDO DIR 5200.10

17  
15

*Posted / ch made / 15 Jul 68 / de*

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

COC  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
060800H Aug66

Change No. 5 to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. Substitute the attached overlays as Appendix 2 (TAOR and RZ Part I, II, and III) to Annex D (Operation Overlays) to Operation Order 301-66. Superseded overlays may be destroyed without report to this Headquarters.

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

660775 *h54*


Copy *119* of *196* copies

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66



U	1
	2
	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
	8
	9
	10
	11
	12
	13
	14
	15
	16
	17
	18
	19
	20
	21
	22
	23
	24
	25
	26
	27
	28
	29
	30
	31
	32
	33
	34
	35
	36
	37
	38
	39
	40
	41
	42
	43
	44
	45
	46
	47
	48
	49
	50
	51
	52
	53
	54
	55
	56
	57
	58
	59
	60
	61
	62
	63
	64
	65
	66
	67
	68
	69
	70
	71
	72
	73
	74
	75
	76
	77
	78
	79
	80
	81
	82
	83
	84
	85
	86
	87
	88
	89
	90
	91
	92
	93
	94
	95
	96
	97
	98
	99
	100

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

19  
17  
Posted 15 Jul 67

**UNCLASSIFIED**

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Oh #6

291 263 #1

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam

Change No. 6 to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. Effective upon order, substitute the attached overlays Appendix 2 (TAOR and RZ Part I, II, III) to Annex D (Operation Overlays) to Operation Order 301-66. Superseded overlays may be destroyed without report to this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF  
CA # 6 660775  
Copy 2 of 196 copies

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

21

*Received 11/15/66*

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Ch #7

291 263 #1

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
160800H August 1966

Change No. 7 to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. Make the following pen and page changes to Appendix 4 (Air Support) to Annex E (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 301-66. File this Change No. 7 as page 23 of Basic Order.
  - a. Page E-4-4 under TABS, add "Helicopter Air/Ground Interest Areas."
  - b. Insert enclosed pages E-4-H-1 and E-4-H-2.
  - c. Renumber the below listed pages of the basic order as indicated:

Present Page	Renumber as
✓ 14	15
✓ 15	17
✓ 17	19

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

S & C FILES  
HEAL QU/RTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

660775 Ch #7  
Copy 2 of 197 copies

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

23

*Posted 15 Jul 68/du*

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CH 4 5

29/263

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
191300H August 1966

Change No. (8) to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) CG III MAF 171308Z Aug66  
(b) CG III MAF 170632Z Aug66  
(c) CG III MAF/SA I Corps 161530Z Aug66

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF  
**660775** 48  
Copy 2 of 198 copies

Time Zone: H

1. Make the following changes to Operation Order 301-66.

a. Basic Order.

(1) Para 3.b. Add new sub-paragraph (11) to read:

"(11) Maintain coastal surveillance within assigned sector and establish ground recon and observation when operating in other coastal areas to detect preparations for infiltration of contraband."

(2) Para 3.e. Add new sub-paragraph (4) to read:

"(4) Maintain coastal surveillance within Recon Zone and establish ground reconnaissance and observation when operating in other coastal areas to detect preparations for infiltration of contraband."

(3) Para 5.a.(4). Change coords to read as follows:

"11th Marines	BT 511039
3d Bn 11th Marines	BT 549014
4th Bn 11th Marines	BT 441100 (effect 290800H Aug66)
3d 155 Gun Btry (SP)	BT 498031"

b. Annex (Rules of Engagement) to Operation Order 301-66.

(1) Para 3.c. Add new sub-paragraph (4) to read:

"(4) Following measures are effective within the Market Time Area from 17th Parallel to Cambodian border:

(a) No water craft shall be taken under artillery fire, Naval gunfire, air attack, or any other armed attack unless target craft has:

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

25  
CH 8

[over]

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (1) Been certified as non-friendly by Cognizant Coastal Surveillance Center for this area. Coastal Surveillance Center can be contacted by telephone through Danang Operator to Roadrunner 39. (Div Subordinate Units coord through Div COC).
- (2) Identified itself as non-friendly by conducting offensive operations against friendly forces."

c. ✓ Annex F (Alert/Defense Postures) to Operation Order 301-66.

(1) Para 1.d.. Add new sub-paragraph (3) to read:

"(3) Maintain coastal surveillance within assigned sector and establish ground recon and observation when operating in other coastal areas to detect preparations for infiltration of contraband."

2. ✓ File this Change No. 8 as page 25 and 26 following page 24 of 1st Marine Division (Rein), Operation Order 301-66.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL STILES

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff


DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

26  
CH 8

*Posted 15 Feb 68 / dw*

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	MD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 290642Z

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR

ZEN/FIRST ENGR BN

INFO RUMSMF/CG III MAF

RUMSMF/CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

S E C R E T

- TRANSFER THIRD MARDIV UNITS

A. CG III MAF 280542Z NOTAL

B. CG III MAF 280244Z NOTAL

1. FOR ELEVENTH MAR. REF A DIRECTS DEPLOYMENT OF BTRY C  
TWELFTH MAR TO DANANG.2. FOR FIRST ENGR BN. REF B DIRECTS DEPLOYMENT FIRST PHT CO  
B THIRD ENGR BN TO CG THIRD MARDIV.3. FOR BOTH. PREPARE ABOVE UNITS FOR MOVEMENT VIA SEA  
TRANSPORT. PROVIDE UPATT, VS&PT, CALA THIS HQ ASAP. DIV TME

PAGE TWO RUMSMB 2858 S E C R E T

OFF WILL MAKE TRANS ARRANGEMENTS.

4. ABOVE UNITS WILL CHOP OPCON/ADCON CG THIRD MARDIV ON DEPARTURE  
CHU LAI COMBAT BASE.

GP-4

C; ZED XS 15 VICE 16 K

COPY NR 14

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

290642Z APR 66

G-3

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

*DH/C*

0 300816Z  
FM CG III MAF  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV

SECRET

OPERATIONS IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

A. DISCUSSION BETWEEN C/S, III MAF AND CG, 1ST MARDIV MORNING  
OF 30 APRIL 66

1. AS INDICATED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE, RECON OPERATIONS IN DO XA  
AREA SCHEDULED TO COMMENCE 1 MAY ARE DELAYED.

2. COMMENCE PLANNING IMMEDIATELY FOR OPERATIONS IN AREA  
DISCUSSED DURING REF A.

3. COMMENCE RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS THAT AREA AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE AS PRELIMINARY TO COORDINATED OPERATIONS WITH 2D ARVN DIV.

GP-4

BT

CG III MAF

COPY 14  
300816Z APR 66

G-3

LDIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 300840Z  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV (REIN)  
TO ZEN/FIRST MARDIV (REIN)  
INFO RUMSMF/CG III MAF  
RUMSMF/CG THIRD MARDIV  
RUMNAW/CG FIRST MAW  
ZEN/CG TF XRAY

BT

S E C R E T

- CANCELLATION OF FRAG ORDER NO 3-66

A. CG III MAF 290350Z NOTAL

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 230743Z NOTAL

C. CG FIRST MARDIV 250945Z NOTAL

D. FIRST MARDIV OP O 301-66

1. IAW INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REF A, REQUIREMENT FOR REINFORCE-  
MENT OF PHU BAI NOT REQUIRED. ACCORDINGLY REF B AND C CANCELLED.

2. ALERT REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED REF D APPLY.

GP-4

BT

33 F RST MARDIV REIN

COPY NR 14  
30 840Z APR 66

G.3

IDIV 2100/3 (1-65)

UNCLASSIFIED



291 263-

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
300800H Aug66

Change No. 9 to ~~Operation Order 301-66~~

Time Zone: H

1. Replace the present Annex J with the attached Annex. Destroy the superseded page without report to this Headquarters.
2. File this Change No. 9 as page 27 following page 26 of 1st Marine Division (Rein) Operation Order 301-66.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL STILES

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF  
660775 *cl9*  
Copy *49* of *198* copies

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

27  
*Posted 15 Feb 68*

UNCLASSIFIED

29 263 CMC

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam

Change No. 10 to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. ✓ Substitute the attached overlay for Part III (TAOR and RZ) to Annex D (Operations Overlay) to 301-66.
2. ✓ Make the following pen change to Operation Order 301-66.

a. Annex J (Distribution)

(1) Add: CLDC 2

FSCC 1

COC 2

9th Engr 1

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

660775

Copy 48 of 198 copies

ch 10

3. ✓ File this Change No. 10 as page 29 of 1st Marine Division (Rein) Operation Order 301-66.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL STILES

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

29

UNCLASSIFIED

Revised 15 Jul 66/22

CMC

29/263

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
080800H September 1966

Change No. 11 to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. ✓ Make the following pen and page changes to Appendix 4 (Air Support) to Annex E (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 301-66. File this Change No. 11 as page 31 of Basic Order.

a. ✓ Page E-4-4 under TABS, add I. Air Operations During Marginal Weather Conditions.

b. ✓ Insert enclosed pages E-4-I-1, E-4-I-2, E-4-I-3 and E-4-I-4.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Sidney J. Altman*  
SIDNEY J. ALTMAN

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

660775

Copy 48 of 197 copies

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

31

*Posted 15 Jul 68*

UNCLASSIFIED

29/263

211 263

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam

Change No. 12 to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. Replace present Annex A with attached Annex. Destroy superseded pages without report to this Headquarters.
2. File this change No. 12 as page 31 following page 30 of 1st Marine Division (Rein), Operation Order 301-66.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL NICKERSON

*Sidney J. Altman*  
 SIDNEY J. ALTMAN  
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

S & C FILES  
 HEADQUARTERS  
 1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

660775 *412*Copy 48 of 198 copies

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

P-31

UNCLASSIFIED

291 263

4016

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam

Annex A (Task Organisation) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1st Marine Division (Rein)

Major General NICKERSON

Hq Bn (Rein)

Colonel LEITNER

Hq Bn  
1st Dental Co, FMF  
7th CIT, FMF  
9th ITT, FMF  
1st IT, FMF  
2d SSC Tn, FMF  
Det 29th CA Co, USA

5th Marines (-)

Colonel WIDDECKE

Hq Co  
Det H&S Co, 2nd Bn  
1st Bn  
3rd Bn (Rein)  
3rd Bn  
Co E, 2nd Bn

7th Marines (-)

Colonel SMOODY

Hq Co  
Det H&S Co, 3rd Bn  
1st Bn  
2nd Bn (Rein)  
2nd Bn  
Co M, 3rd Bn

11th Marines (-) (Rein)

Colonel NORRIS

Hq Btry  
2d Bn  
3d Bn  
4th Bn (Rein)  
4th Bn  
Prov Btry  
3d 155mm Gun Btry, (SP), FMF  
3d 8" How Btry, (SP), FMF

CHU LAI Defense Command

Colonel CURTIS

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DDO DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

A-1  
CH-12

SECRET

1st Recon Bn

LtCol McKENON

H&S Co  
 Co A (-)  
     1st Plt  
     3rd Plt  
 Co B  
 Co C  
 Co D

1st AT Bn (-)

Major HARRIS

H&S Co  
 Co B (Rein)  
     Co B  
     2nd Plt, Co A  
 Co C

1st Engr Bn (-)

Major NEWTON

H&S Co  
 Engr Supt Co  
 Co B  
 Co C

1st MT Bn (-)

LtCol JOHNSON

H&S Co  
 Co B  
 Co C

1st Med Bn

Cmdr MITCHELL

1st SP Bn (-)

LtCol JONES

H&S Co  
 Co B  
 Co C

1st Tr Bn (-), FME

Major CLAYBORNE

H&S Co  
 Co A  
 Co B (Rein)  
     Co B  
     2nd Plt, Co C

3d AmTrac Bn, FME

Major DINSE

7th MT Bn, FME

Major BATCHELDER

1st Hosp Co, FME

Cmdr ROBERTS

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

7th Comm Bn (C), FMF

Hq Co  
RR/Const Co  
Comm Co

Major BIRD, Jr.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL NICKERSON

*Sidney J. Altman*

SIDNEY J. ALTMAN  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

A-3  
CH-12

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
190800H July 1966

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1st Marine Division (Rein)

Major General FIELDS

Hq Bn (Rein)

LtCol DIMOND

Hq Bn  
1st Dental Co, FMF  
7th CIT  
9th ITT  
1st IT  
2d SSC Tm

5th Marines (-) (Rein)

Colonel WIDDECKE

Hq Co (-)  
4th Plt (HqTm), 29th CA Co  
1st Bn  
2d Bn

7th Marines (Rein)

Colonel HAFTEY

7th Marines  
6th Plt (HqTm), 29th CA Co

11th Marines (-) (Rein)

LtCol SULLIVAN

Hq Btry (-)  
3d 155mm Gun Btry  
2d Bn (-)  
Hq Btry (-)  
Btry D  
Btry E  
107mm Mort Btry  
3d Bn  
4th Bn (Rein)  
Prov Btry  
3d 8" How Btry

CHU LAI Defense Command

Colonel MALLORY

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

A-1  
CH-3

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



SECRET

1st Recon Bn

LtCol SULLIVAN

H&S Co (-)  
 Co A (-)  
 Co B (-)  
 Co C  
 Co D

1st Tk Bn (-)

Major PALMER

H&S Co (-)  
 Co A  
 Co B

1st AT Bn (-)

Major HARRIS

H&S Co (-)  
 Co B (-)  
 Co C

1st Engr Bn (-)

LtCol AICHELE

H&S Co (-)  
 Supt Co (-)  
 Co B (-)  
 Co C

1st MT Bn (-)

Major DOERING

H&S Co (-)  
 Co B  
 Co C

1st Med Bn

Cmde MITCHELL

1st SP Bn

LtCol TAYLOR

H&S Co (-)  
 Co A (-)  
 Co B (-)  
 Co C

3d AmTrac Bn, FMF

Major DINSE

H&S Co  
 Co A  
 Co B (-)

*Superseded by CH 12, 2/10*

A-2  
 CH-3

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

7th MT Bn. FMF

Major STEPHENS

1st Hosp Co. FMF

Cdr ROBERTS

7th Comm Bn (-). FMF

Major BIRD, JR.

Hq Co  
RR/Const Co  
Comm Co (Rein)  
Comm Co  
Plat Comm Supt Co

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

*Superseded by CH-3*

A-3  
CH-3

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
100800H June 66

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1st Marine Division (Rein)

Major General FIELDS

Hq Bn (Rein)

LtCol DIMOND

Hq Bn  
1st Dental Co (-)  
Radio Relay and Const Co 7th Comm Bn  
7th CIT  
9th ITT  
1st IT  
2d SSC Tm

5th Marines (-)

Colonel WIDDECKE

Hq Co (-)  
1st Bn  
2d Bn

7th Marines

Colonel HAFLEY

Hq Co  
1st Bn  
2d Bn  
3d Bn

11th Marines (-) (Rein)

Colonel HAHN

Hq Btry (-)  
3d 155mm Gun Btry (SP), FMF  
2d Bn  
3d Bn  
4th Bn (Rein)  
3d 8" How Btry (SP), FMF

CHU LAI Defense Command

Colonel TREADWELL

1st Recon Bn (Rein)

LtCol SULLIVAN

Det, 1st For Recon Co

1st AT Bn

Major HARRIS

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
(DOD DIR 5200.10

A-1  
Ch 2

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

1st Tk Bn, FMF

Major BURNETTE

1st Engr Bn (Rein)

LtCol AICHELE

Det, 1st Bridge Co, FMF

1st MI Bn

Major DOERING

1st Med Bn

Cmdr MITCHELL

1st SP Bn

LtCol TAYLOR

3d AmTrac Bn, FMF

Major DINSE

7th MI Bn, FMF

LtCol BONIN

1st Hospital Co, FMF

Cmdr ROBERTS

Division Reserve

\_\_ Bn, \_\_ Mar

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

*Delete 190800 Jul 66*

A-2  
Ch 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam

180800

MAY 1966

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zones: H

1st Marine Division (Rein)

Major General FIELDS

HqBn (-) (Rein)

LtCol DIMOND

HqBn (-)

1st DentCo (-)

Const Plt 7th Comm Bn

7th CIT

9th ITT

1st IT

2nd SSC Tm

1st Marines (-)

Colonel MITCHELL

HqCo (-) 1st Marines

3rd Bn 1st Marines

1st Bn 5th Marines

2nd Bn 5th Marines

7th Marines

Colonel HAFLEY

HqCo 7th Marines

1st Bn

2nd Bn

3rd Bn

11th Marines (-) (Rein)

Colonel HAHN

Hq Btry (-)

3rd 155mm Gun Btry (SP), FMF

1st Bn (-) (Rein)

3rd Bn

4th Bn (-) (Rein)

4th Bn (-)

3rd 8" Btry (SP), FMF

CHU LAI Defense Command

Colonel TREADWELL

1st Recon Bn (-) (Rein)

LtCol SULLIVAN

H&amp;SCo (-)

Co A (-) (Rein)

Co C

Co D

Det. 1st For Recon Co

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DFR 5200.10

A-1 (Ch 1)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

1st ATBn (-)

H&SCo (-)  
Co A (Rein)  
Co C

LtCol MOORE

1st TcBn (-)

H&SCo (-)  
Co A (Rein)  
Co B (Rein)

LtCol SNELL

1st EngrBn (-) (Rein)

HqCo (-)  
Spt Co (-)  
Co A (-) (Rein)  
Co C  
Det 1st Bridge Co

LtCol AICHELE

1st MTBn (-)

H&SCo (-)  
Co A (-) (Rein)  
Co C

LtCol ROTHOFF

1st MedBn (-)

H&SCo (-)  
Co A (-) (Rein)  
Co C  
Co D

Cmdr MITCHELL

1st SPBn (-)

H&SCo (-)  
Co A (-) (Rein)  
Co C

LtCol TAYLOR

3d AmTracBn (-)

H&SCo (-)  
Co A (Rein)

LtCol CAMPBELL

7th MTBn. FMF

LtCol BONIN

1st HospCo (-). FMF

Cmdr ROBERTS

Division Reserve

Bn, Marines

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

A-2 (Ch 1)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
 010800H Apr66

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

(All attachments and detachments effective on order)

1st Marine Division (Rein)

Major General FIELDS

HqBn (Rein)

LtCol DIMOND

HqBn

1st DentCo (-)

7th CIT (-)

Det, 3rd ITT

2nd SSC Tm

Const Plt 7th Comm Bn

1st Marines (-)

Colonel MITCHELL

HqCo (-) 1st Marines

3rd Bn 1st Marines

2nd Bn 4th Marines

7th Marines

Colonel HAFLEY

HqCo 7th Marines

1st Bn

2nd Bn

3rd Bn

11th Marines (-) (Rein)

Colonel HAHN

Hq Btry (-)

1st Bn (-) (Rein)

3rd Bn

4th Bn (-) (Rein)

4th Bn (-)

3rd 155mm Gun Btry (-) (SP), FMF

3rd 8" BtryGrp

3rd 8" Btry (-) (SP), FMF

Btry K

CHU LAI Defense Command

Colonel TREADWELL

1st ReconBn (-)

LtCol SULLIVAN

H&SCo (-)

Co A (-) (Rein)

Co C

Co D

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

1st ATBn (-)

LtCol MOORE

H&SCo (-)  
Co A (-)  
Co C

1st TkbN (-)

LtCol SNELL

H&SCo (-)  
Co A (-)  
Co B

1st EngrBn(-)

LtCol AICHELE

HqCo (-)  
Spt Co (-)  
Co A (-)  
Co C

1st MTBn (-)

LtCol ROTHOFF

H&SCo (-)  
Co A (-)  
Co C

1st MedBn (-)

Cmdr MITCHELL

H&SCo (-)  
Co A (-)  
Co C  
Co D

1st SPBn (-)

LtCol TAYLOR

H&SCo (-)  
Co A (-)  
Co C

3rd AmTracBn (-)

LtCol CAMPBELL

H&SCo (-)  
Co A

7th MTBn (-), FMF

Major BONIN

1st HospCo (-), FMF

Cmdr ROBERTS

Division Reserve

Bn, Marines

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

Gordon H. West

Colonel U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

UNCLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
040900H Apr 66

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) Map Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6656 I and II, 6657 I and II, 6756 I, II, III and IV  
(b) DivO P3800.1F  
(c) DivO 3840.1  
(d) ForceO 3820.2

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

660791

Time Zones: H

Copy 2 of 174 copies

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION. Refer to current 1st and 3d Marine Division and III Marine Amphibious Force Intelligence Summaries and to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate).

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

- a. Will the enemy attack the CHU LAI TAOR and the Vital Area contained therein? If so, when? Where? In what strength? With what units?
- b. Will the enemy use reinforcements in an attack on the CHU LAI TAOR? If so, when? In what strength? With what units?
- c. Will the enemy employ artillery, heavy mortars, and/or recoilless rifles in support of an attack against the CHU LAI TAOR? If so, what caliber and type of weapon? Where will gun positions be located? What method of fire control will be employed?
- d. Other Required Information.
  - (1) What is the current disposition, subordination and combat effectiveness of the 1st and 2nd VC Regiments?
  - (2) What dispositions will the enemy employ in and nearby the CHU LAI TAOR?
  - (3) What will be the enemy response to the introduction of the 1st Marine Division Headquarters into the CHU LAI TAOR?
  - (4) Will the enemy employ sabotage and/or suicide attacks against the CHU LAI TAOR and the Vital Area contained therein?
  - (5) What are the locations of camps, rest areas, training areas, special cultivation areas, supply points, and weapons ammunition storage areas in the 1st Marine Division Area of Responsibility? (Special attention: Military Region V Headquarters, 1st VC Regiment Headquarters and DO IA complex).
  - (6) What methods and techniques does the enemy employ to gain access to friendly positions and/or installations? (Special attention: Infiltration of individuals or units by covert means, to include the use of tunnels).

291 264

UNCLASSIFIED

B-1

291 264  
Hw Encl (82)

SECRET

- (7) What methods and techniques does the enemy employ in tactical communications? What radio and telephonic equipment does the enemy employ? (Special attention: Warning signals, signals to break contact; signals to open fire; use of drums, bugles, whistles, flares, smoke, lights and the use of carrier pigeons).
- (8) What is the enemy reaction to our defenses and what counter-measures does he employ against ground reconnaissance, surveillance and detection devices and techniques?
- (9) What land routes does the enemy use for infiltration of personnel and material into QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI provinces? (Special attention: Way stations, supply points and the movements of Transportation Battalions).
- (10) What effect will the removal of General THI have on the stability of the RVN governmental structure in the 1st Marine Division Area of Responsibility?
- (11) What is the enemy's infra-red capability?
- (12) What are the enemy's tactics and techniques for withdrawal from action and for retrograde movements?
- (13) What are the enemy's tactics and doctrine for employment of anti-aircraft units? (Special attention: Manner of employment for air defense role in areas proximate to tactical headquarters).
- (14) Will the NV Air Force's offensive air capability be employed separately or in support of NVA and VC units in RVN?
- (15) What is the enemy's organization for sea-borne infiltration in the 1st Marine Division Coastal Area of Responsibility? (Special attention: Units involved, types of craft and techniques of employment).
- (16) What water-borne transportation craft and techniques does the enemy use for infiltration into the 1st Marine Division Area of Responsibility on rivers and streams? (Special attention: SONG TRA BONG, SONG TRU KHUC, SONG VE rivers? Where are the transshipment points?)
- (17) What is the current status of VC control of human and material resources in the 1st Marine Division Area of Responsibility? (Special attention: Area between CHU LAI TAOR and the SONG CAU DAI river).
- (18) What installations in the CHU LAI TAOR have been penetrated by VC agents, to what extent, and at what levels? (Special attention: RMK Construction Company, CHU LAI New Life Hamlet, and CHU LAI Base indigenous labor force).

B-2

UNCLASSIFIED

(19) When are the rice harvests in QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces?

(20) Are VC/NVA units currently located in II CTZ entering QUANG NGAI Province? If so, what number? What units? Where?

### 3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.

#### a. Orders to Subordinate Units.

##### (1) All Units.

- (a) Report as is obtained information answering intelligence requirements stated in paragraph 2 above (Essential Elements of Information).
- (b) Report planned reconnaissance operations in RZ to this Headquarters (G-2) a minimum of 24 hours prior to execution.
- (c) Report location of Observation Posts to this Headquarters (G-2).
- (d) Maximum utilization will be made of Ground Surveillance Radar (AN/TPS 21) and Seismic Intrusion Devices (PSRI) particularly during periods of reduced visibility.
- (e) Section IV of reference (b).
- (f) Unilateral reconnaissance operations in the RZ will be coordinated with appropriate Sector Command (ARVN).

(2) 1st Marines (-) (Rein). Establish and maintain a reconnaissance screen in assigned sector of TAOR.

(3) 7th Marines. Establish and maintain a reconnaissance screen in assigned sector of TAOR.

(4) 11th Marines (-).

- (a) On order conduct reconnaissance by fire.
- (b) Conduct counter-mortar radar surveillance. Report radar site locations to this Headquarters (G-2).
- (c) Deploy Air Observers as directed by Section IV of reference (b).

(5) CHU LAI Defense Command. Coordinate all reconnaissance/security patrols outside of CHU LAI Defense Command Defense Sector with Defense Sector Commander concerned.

(6) 1st Reconnaissance Battalion.

- (a) Conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ. Coordinate operations with 1st and 7th Marines.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

(b) Submit requirements for preplanned air support to Division Air Officer.

(c) Annexes G (Rules of Engagement) and E (Supporting Arms).

- (7) 1st Engineer Battalion (-). Be prepared to conduct Engineer Road and Bridge Reconnaissance on order.
- (8) 1st Tank Battalion (-). Be prepared to provide technical Intelligence/Reconnaissance Teams on order to assist in preparation of Tank Going Maps and Overlays.
- (9) 1st Anti-Tank Battalion (-). Be prepared to provide technical Intelligence/Reconnaissance Teams on order to assist in preparation of Ontos Going Maps and Overlays.
- (10) 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (-). Be prepared to provide technical Intelligence/Reconnaissance Teams on order to assist in preparation of LVT Going Maps and Overlays.

b. Request to higher, adjacent, and supporting units. See Annex 6 (Request to Higher, Adjacent and Supporting Units).

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AND CAPTURED MATERIEL.  
See Section VIII of reference (b).

5. MAPS, CHARTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.

a. Maps and Charts.

- (1) The standard tactical map for operations in Vietnam is: Map Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L701. The following sheets are required for the CHU LAI TACH:

6656 I, II  
6657 I, II  
6756 I, II, III, IV

- (2) Map sheets providing coverage of QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI provinces with overlap on north, south and west also in L701 Series 1:50,000 scale are as follows:

6659 II, III  
6658 I, II, III, IV  
6657 I, II, III, IV  
6656 I, II, III, IV  
6655 I, II, III, IV  
6754 I, IV  
6854 IV  
6855 III, IV  
6755 I, II, III, IV  
6756 I, II, III, IV  
6757 II, III, IV  
6556 I, II, III, IV  
6557 I, II, III, IV

UNCLASSIFIED

- (3) Map requirements for operations outside of the CHU LAI TAOR will be published in orders issued for the specific operation.

(4) Requisition and Distribution

- (a) See reference (c).

- (5) Map Corrections. All units will maintain a record of map corrections. Such corrections should be reported to this headquarters (G-2) as encountered. Whenever a unit is relieved of its sector of the TAOR, the record of map corrections and any additional geographic information will be turned over to the relieving unit.

b. Photographs.

- (1) See reference (b).

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. See Appendix 4 (Counterintelligence).

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

- a. Submit standard intelligence reports as prescribed in Section XII of reference (b) and as amplified below.
- b. Submit information copy to this headquarters (G-2) of all spot reports containing information of possible intelligence value.
- c. Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)
- (1) Reporting Period. The reporting period for daily intelligence summaries submitted to this headquarters (G-2) will be ~~0900~~ to ~~0900~~.
- (2) Submission. Separate Battalions and Regiments will submit daily ~~intelligence~~ or courier delivered intelligence summaries to arrive at this headquarters (G-2) by ~~1100~~ daily. Spot reports between ~~0900~~ and ~~1500~~ for inclusion as late reports.
- (3) Format. INTSUMs will be prepared in accordance with reference (d).
- d. Patrol reports will be consolidated and summarized and reported to this headquarters (G-2) by spot reports.
- e. Special Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR's). SICR's are promulgated by COMUSMACV to direct the MACV collection effort of specific tactical and technical intelligence requirements. Copies of SICR requirements levied upon the 1st Marine Division by III MAF will be forwarded to subordinate units for their collection effort. Collection of information responsive to SICR's must be made in a timely fashion.

8. AUXILIARY AGENCIES

- a. Agencies Coordinated and Supervised by the Intelligence Section.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (1) Division Air Observation Unit. Provide aerial observation support in accordance with the provisions of Section IV of reference (b).
- (2) Detachment 3d Interrogation-Translation Team.
  - (a) Location: Division Collection Point.
  - (b) Support available:
    1. Utilizing assigned interpreters provide captive interrogation and document translation and other support as directed to the 1st Marine Division. See Section VII and VIII of reference (b).
    2. Requests for ITT support for specific operations should be addressed to this Headquarters (G-2) and upon approval will be directly coordinated by the Detachment Commander and the requesting unit S-2.
- (3) 7th Counterintelligence Team.
  - (a) Location: Division Command Post.
  - (b) Support available:
    1. 7th CIT provides counterintelligence support to the 1st Marine Division.
    2. Requests for counterintelligence support should be directed to this Headquarters (G-2) and upon approval will be directly coordinated by the Staff Counterintelligence Officer and the requesting unit.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
 GORDON H. WEST  
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:

1. Intelligence Estimate
2. Tactical Study of Weather and Terrain
3. Communications Reconnaissance (To be issued) (Limited Distribution)
4. Counterintelligence
5. Ground Reconnaissance Overlay (To be issued)
6. Request to Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting Units (To be issued)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

B-6

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr 66

UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L701, 1:50,000 VIETNAM Sheets: 6554 I, IV; 6555 I, II, III, IV; 6557 I, II, III, IV; 6654 I, IV; 6655 I, II, III, IV; 6656 I, II, III, IV; 6657 I, II, III, IV; 6658 I, II, III, IV; 6754 I, IV; 6755 I, II, III, IV; 6756 I, II, III, IV; 6757 II, III, IV; 6854 IV; 6855 III.

Time Zone: H

1. MISSION.

- a. Basic mission. 1st Marine Division defends the base area, airfield and ancillary facilities at Chu Lai and such other bases as may be established in assigned area of responsibility; defends or participates in the defense of other selected U.S. or GVN critical installations as directed; conducts unilateral offensive operations within TAOR; and executes offensive operations with the RVNAF in area of responsibility and as directed anywhere in RVN.
- b. Previous decisions. None.
- c. Purpose of this estimate. To determine the effects of the characteristics of the area of operations and enemy capabilities on the accomplishment of missions.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS.

- a. Weather. (Refer to Appendix 2, Tactical study of weather and terrain, to Annex B, Intelligence, to 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-66).
- b. Terrain. (Refer to Appendix 2, Tactical study of weather and terrain, to Annex B, Intelligence, to 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-66).
- c. Hydrography. (Refer to Appendix 2, Tactical study of weather and terrain, to Annex B, Intelligence, to 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-66).
- d. Politics.
  - (1) General.
    - (a) The central government relies upon the provincial administration to carry out national policy at the local level. To the majority of Vietnamese, outside the few urban centers, the provincial administration is the embodiment of government, and they tend to judge the character of the central administration by the success or failure of the provincial officials.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

B-1-1

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (b) Each province is headed by a province chief, appointed by the Chief of State. Since about 1960 nearly all province chiefs have been military officers. The province chief is responsible for the enforcement of national laws, but in recognition of the diversified cultural attitudes and ethnic composition of the provinces, he is given considerable latitude in adapting the application of the laws to local conditions. He has supervisory authority over services of the central government agencies operating in his province, and he is responsible for the maintenance of order and security.
- (c) Below the provincial level the administrative subdivisions have relatively little autonomy. The districts are headed by district chiefs appointed by the central government upon the recommendation of the province chief.

(2) The Political Situation in Quang Tin Province.

- (a) Facts are somewhat difficult to obtain on the complex and confusing Quang Tin political situation. Different Vietnamese sources often have given incomplete and conflicting information, and American officials in the province have relatively little to add to the picture. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of probably fairly accurate information is available on various aspects of Quang Tin politics.
- (b) VNQDD: The Nationalist Party of Vietnam (VNQDD) is strong in Quang Tin and seems to have a great deal of genuine popular support. It claims 5,000 members in the province, over 95 percent of whom are adherents of the younger faction; it has at least four members on the province Council; and according to the local VNQDD Chief, Nguyen Toai, the party has 200 full-time cadre in the province. Moreover, the party provides a majority of the PAT cadre, and it operates a U. S. financed intelligence net.
  1. In August 1965, the VNQDD held a government approved mass meeting in Tam Ky which American observers report was attended by well over 5,000 people. This was more evidence for the widespread belief that the party is popular as well as powerful. Mr. Toai, who is also a provincial council member and the head of the intelligence net, and the province chief explains this popularity by the fact that the party "went into the jungle" to fight actively against the Diem regime.

B-1-2

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

2. In other provinces there has been trouble when one of the political parties gained an inordinate amount of influence in the PAT Program. However, thus far this has not been the case in Quang Tin. This is probably because the PAT Control Committee is evenly balanced among VNQDD Members, people belonging to no political party, and Dai Viets, although the Dai Viet party has only a few dozen members and negligible influence in the province.
  3. The American financed VNQDD intelligence net is called Advanced Political Action Team (APA). With 74 paid, full time cadre, it collects intelligence on the VC, mostly from the 5,000 party members, and turns it over to province authorities. These teams are not armed, and are used strictly for intelligence purposes. Americans and Vietnamese agree that this operation is now providing very useful intelligence and is causing no trouble, although at first some people considered it both useless and troublesome.
  4. Mr. Toai reports that the VNQDD in Quang Tin accepts no direction from party authorities in Saigon and will not do so until the party is able to unite on the national level. He stresses that the party has achieved nearly complete unity in Quang Tin, and the few dissident members are old and of little consequence, and factional strife is not serious. The Province Chief agrees with this assessment, but Americans in the province suspect that the intra-party dispute may still be an important factor in party affairs.
- (c) Province Council. The Province Council also appears to be fairly active and influential in Quang Tin. It holds monthly meetings, mostly concerned with economic matters, and cooperates closely with the provincial government. The Province Chief says he finds the council genuinely useful.
1. The council is dominated by the VNQDD, but the extent of this domination is uncertain. According to three council members, one a VNQDD, one a Buddhist, and one a Catholic, the nine members are broken down as follows:

VNQDD. . . . .	4
Buddhist . . . . .	2
Cao Dai. . . . .	2
Catholic . . . . .	1

The Province Chief, however, says that seven of the Council members are VNQDD, and a National Police report lists five members as VNQDD.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET(d) Political Action Teams.

1. Aside from the ARVN, Regional and Popular Forces, the province maintains eleven 40-man Political Action Teams (PATs). The Province Chief and other Vietnamese officials, as well as Americans, have high praise for the PATs and consider them, for their size, the most useful Vietnamese units in the field. The problem of competition with RF/PF for recruits seems to be under control; though it occasionally comes up, it does not upset those whom it concerns. Domination of the PATs by the Buddhist VNQDD has not caused any trouble.

- (e) Area and Population Control. The province is able to claim only about 10 square kilometers -- the city of Tam Ky and eight nearby hamlets (out of 426) -- as fully secured. Even the Marine TAOR at Chu Lai, which is in no danger of being overrun by the VC, still contains large elements of hostile population and it is subject to continuing infiltration and small unit harassment. The GVN does not even attempt to challenge VC control of the large mountain area and its 15,000 Montagnards.

Wuang Tin's population of 354,400 is divided by province officials as follows:

Secured. . . . .	37,185
Undergoing Pacification. . . . .	53,955
Cleared. . . . .	73,273
VC Control . . . . .	79,487
Control by Neither Side. . . . .	10,500

The fact that VC main force units no longer operate in the area east of Route #1 is often cited as evidence of the progress made in the past three months.

(3) The Political Situation in Quang Ngai Province.

- (a) The political situation is relatively favorable to the GVN. Intra-party rivalry between factions of the VNQDD, noted early in 1965, has subsided and no new incidents have been reported in the last five months. Government prestige appears to be rising, especially in newly cleared and pacified areas. There is no evidence of religious strife.

B-1-4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (b) The estimated total population of Quang Ngai Province is 650,300. Of this population, about 254,000 are living in GVN controlled, secure areas and 34,000 in areas now undergoing pacification. About 113,300 are in areas considered clear of VC and 248,200, or over 38% of the people, are living in VC controlled areas. About 555,000 people occupy the coastal lowland area. The remainder includes about 78,000 Montagnards and ethnic Vietnamese in the valleys leading into and through the mountains that make up the western part of the province.
- (c) During the latter part of December 1965, the province pacification and resettlement program, "Return to the Native Village" was seriously threatened by strong VC attacks. Some 10,000 to 15,000 resettled or returned persons fled temporarily from fringe areas to those deeper inside GVN control. The GVN-USA reaction was notably effective and most of these people have returned home again. The VC are still numerous and probably will continue strong efforts to destroy the "Return to the Village Campaign", which has already laid the ground work for solving half of the refugee problem by returning 50,000 refugees to their home villages.
1. The province continues to seek to encourage resettlement and return to homes in liberated areas by ensuring that GVN-USA support there is at least comparable to that accorded to refugees.
  2. At Duc-Hai, most of the population fled over to GVN protected areas when the VC attacked. This despite a long residence under VC control and only a brief period under GVN control and reconstruction. In the same area, of two hundred prisoners who had been VC, only seven did not flee to the GVN side for protection when the VC attacked.
  3. Five districts can be reached only by air and neither province nor AID have any independent airlift capability. Consequently, province receives inadequate information from districts and the districts receive little guidance except by radio from province, and negligible material support. What air transport can be had is infrequent, unscheduled and minimal. Additionally, surface transportation is limited by floods and VC sabotage of bridges and roads.

B-1-5

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Adequate direction, guidance and support for the district and lower echelons of administration will be unattainable until more adequate transport of officials and material is arranged. As an interim measure, the U. S. Embassy representative has recently provided considerable personal aid transport to isolated districts -- most of which do not see an official from province for months on end. Accordingly, district officials tend to be ineffective.

e. Economics.

(1) General.

- (a) The Geneva settlement deprived South Vietnam of a large share of Vietnam's resources. Virtually all mineral resources fell under Vietminh control as a result of the Armistice. There is little production of capital goods in South Vietnam as compared to North Vietnam. The production of consumer goods is limited to soap, matches, cigarettes, wood products, lacquerware, alcohol, ice, salt and other small manufactured products. South Vietnam must import almost all of its fuel. Its primary resources are agricultural, i.e., rice and rubber.
- (b) The Vietnamese economy is in a period of transition. Vietnam is moving from a colonial economy controlled by the French, to a reconstructed economy under Vietnamese control and institutions. In early 1955 following the dissolution of the French dominated Indochina economic system, a new, purely Vietnamese central bank was established. Throughout the year a number of French economic institutions were taken over by the Vietnamese. However, a high percentage of the economy is still influenced or controlled by French or other non-Vietnamese interests, such as the Chinese.
- (c) Vietnam's economic position has, in real terms, not changed appreciably in the past year or two. The area continues to produce a more than adequate food supply, but remains dependent upon large scale foreign aid to finance imports and to support military expenditures. Governmental economic policies and programs have thus far had little effect on the domestic economy. Economic conditions are not critical but provide little stimulus to popular support for the national government.

B-1-6

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (d) Rice, rubber and other exports earn approximately \$95,000,000 a year, which pays roughly for only one-third of Vietnam's imports. United States aid is now the major source of foreign exchange for the country.

(2) Economy in Quang Tin Province.

- (a) Quang Tin is not economically well endowed by nature. It never has been and probably never will be overly prosperous. The war, bringing refugees, lower production, and disrupted lines of communication, has made a bad situation much worse. Nevertheless, there is no widespread starvation or total economic collapse.
- (b) Rice: Province rice stocks were totally exhausted in late September and were not replenished until late October 1965, when an LST brought in 300 tons by way of Chu Lai. The rice supply situation for Quang Tin, always a net importer of rice, remains precarious. This scarcity has naturally led to a black market; the official price is 16 \$VN per kilo in Tam Ky and much higher elsewhere.
- (c) Commodities: Throughout the month of September 1965, there was no cement or tin roofing in the province. Although this situation was relieved by a large shipment in October 1965, such shortages are by no means unusual for Quang Tin. The AID Province Representative states that he has received only 3,000 bags of cement since May while he could easily find use for 2,000 bags per month. As of early November, there were only about 100 bags of cement on hand, although the supply of tin roofing was adequate for the time.
- (d) Other commodities are also very difficult to find. Lumber, for example, is extremely scarce because the VC control nearly all of the wooded areas. The price has doubled in recent months and continues to rise. Diesel oil is also in critically short supply, because of transportation difficulties, and even the province offices are sometimes without electricity because there is nothing with which to run the generators.
- (e) Large amounts of Quang Tin's supplies come in by air. The Tam Ky airstrip is presently adequate in good weather, and AID plans to cover it with asphalt to improve its all weather capability. It is subject to occasional mortar attacks, however, and small arms fire at planes landing or taking off is not uncommon.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (f) Shipping through the port at Chu Lai is presently the most effective way of getting large quantities of bulk commodities into Quang Tin. Moving such supplies from Chu Lai to Tam Ky and elsewhere in the province, however, is both difficult and dangerous. The road is poor even without VC interdiction, trucks are in short supply, and elaborate precautions must be made against ambushes. A decaying roadbed and abandoned rolling stock are the only visible indications that there was a railroad in Quang Tin.

(3) Economy in Quang Ngai Province.

- (a) The principal economic activity of the people of Quang Ngai is agriculture. Quang Ngai City, with an estimated population of 12,500 is the only town of commercial significance. The province must import some rice to feed its population. The rice growing area is along the Song Tra Khuc and Song Ve and along the coast. Tea and fruit are the only revenue producing crops.
- (b) In Quang Ngai Province, inflation continues to be a major problem. At present, prices are high and are continuing to rise, although slowly. American aid and a fairly successful rice harvest have improved the amount of goods available, but prices have not reflected the increase in supplies. Trade has been stimulated by a rise in employment and by the importation of consumer goods.

f. Sociology.

(1) General.

- (a) Of the estimated 24,300,000 persons comprising the total population of Vietnam, the overwhelming majority (approximately 95%) are primarily of Mongoloid stock. Of this category, the Vietnamese constitute the principal element, numbering an estimated 21,500,000 persons, or 88.5% of the total population. Other Mongoloid peoples are the Chinese numbering about 850,000 persons, or about 3% of the total population, and diverse Mongoloid tribal minorities principally the Thai, Muong, Mao, Man and Tibeto-Burmans, together totalling about 872,000 persons and constituting more than 3% of the total population. With the exception of the Chinese and possibly the Tibeto-Burmans who are essentially classic Mongoloids, all of these ethnic groups are of composite racial origin, believed to represent a combination of primary, classic Mongoloid traits dominant to those derived from an Indo-Australoid and/or Indonesian source.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (b) The Indonesians, or as they are alternatively called, Proto-Malays, are a composite, subracial group in which Mongoloid, Negroid, and Caucasoid elements are discernible. The Indonesian physical type is best represented in contemporary Vietnam by an estimated 700,000 mountain dwelling tribal groups, popularly and improperly known as "Moy", a derogatory term meaning "savage" in Vietnamese. Some 35,000 Cham, remnants of the ancient Indianized Kingdom of Champa, also belong to the Indonesian, or Proto-Malay sub-racial classification and the small group of modern, immigrant Malays (about 25,000), though racially very mixed, are basically also of Proto-Malay origin.
- (c) Other distinctive groups living in Vietnam include some 400,000 Cambodians -- a people of doubtful physical classification -- linked in part to Veddoide and Indo-Australoids and at the same time having undetermined affinities with the Proto-Malays. Of the 4,000 Indians and Pakistani Nationals, residing in Vietnam, those from Southern India are largely Dravidians and have certain racial affinities with the Cambodians while others from Northern India belong chiefly to the Caucasoid stock. The Caucasoid race is also represented in Vietnam by about 10,000 Europeans, the majority of whom are of French Nationality. The classic or primary Caucasoid stock did not make its appearance in Vietnam before the 16th Century with the arrival of European missionaries and traders.
- (d) No ethnic group has remained racially separate in Vietnam; miscegenation has occurred at all periods of history and among all groups. For the most part this has given rise to a population which, although physically composite, is unaware of its hybrid ancestry. Two groups are exceptions; the Eurasians and the Sino-Vietnamese, or Minh Huong. Both are a product of recent history and both are conscious of their mixed racial origin.
- (e) Since the middle of the 19th century, with the advent of the French colonization and subsequent improvement in communications and in control of the virulent highland malaria, there has been increasing upland settlement by the Vietnamese. Before independence, French restriction on Vietnamese highland settlement limited the number of Vietnamese living above the traditional highwater mark of a few hundred feet to no more than a few thousand. As petty functionaries, merchants, or plantation workers, they centered around French founded urban centers such as Cao Ban in North Viet-

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

nam or Ban Me Thuot, Pleiku, Dalat and surrounding towns in the Pays Montagnards du Sud, the mountainous area of Central Vietnam. After independence, Vietnamese settlement of the highlands, of the RVN jumped from an estimated 46,000 or 47,000 in 1953 to more than 83,000 in 1955, and the number is steadily increasing under a government resettlement program. Northern refugees and southerners displaced during the hostilities, who have been resettled in the highlands, account for some of this increase. Although Vietnamese administrative and military personnel, merchants, and plantation owners apparently form the bulk of the new settlers.

(2) Physical Characteristics.

- (a) The typical Vietnamese is short, slim, of slight body build, and shows his Mongoloid heritage through a number of distinctive and readily observable traits. Nonetheless, the variation of secondary racial blendings from north to south has created definite regional types which are apparent even to the casual observer. The North Vietnamese, or Tonkinese as the French formerly called them, and the inhabitants of the Central Vietnamese provinces, are characteristically taller, heavier, more robust, and show a greater dominance of classic Mongoloid traits than the remainder of the Vietnamese population. The Vietnamese of Central Vietnam south of the Porte d'Annam are distinctively shorter and more fragile looking than the northern type, although the dominance of Mongoloid traits is not much less than in the North. In South Vietnam, however, where miscegenation with the Cambodians (Khmer) took place in past centuries, there is a marked diminution of Mongoloid traits with a corresponding increase in Cambodian physical traits such as, notably, a higher incidence of wavy hair and straight eyes, darker skin tones, a rounding of facial contours, and stockiness of body build.
- (b) The fact that the Vietnamese incorporate something of all the other racial elements represented in the total population of Vietnam makes it difficult on the basis of physical criteria alone to distinguish accurately members of the Vietnamese group from those of the many minority groups.

B-1-10

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

- (c) The average male Vietnamese is slightly over five feet tall. In the North the average male is a little taller, although even here about one-third of the men must be classified as short. Vietnamese females average about four inches less in height than the male counterparts.
- (d) The average Vietnamese, men and women, although well proportioned, are slim, small boned and of slight body build; their fingers and toes, wrists, ankles and waists appear particularly slender. Vietnamese country people and coolies are often well-muscled, especially their lower limbs, and characteristically give an impression of considerable robustness foreign to white collar workers of upper class Vietnamese. Obesity is extremely rare among the Vietnamese especially the males. Among the women of South Vietnam, however, there is a noticeable incidence of plumpness.
- (e) The Vietnamese skin color varies greatly, ranging from the yellowish-white pigmentation of the typical Chinese, through olive and pale browns to deep browns. About 75% have skin colors of a warm, olive brown of medium intensity. The darker extremes are more common to South Vietnam; the yellowish-white shades are more frequent among the North Vietnamese. Tanning of exposed skin surfaces by a tropical sun, especially in South Vietnam, makes Vietnamese skin color appear darker than is the true color.
- (f) Vietnamese hair color is black, ranging from coarse and straight to wavy or slightly curly. The latter form is a Cambodian and Indonesian legacy and is present among almost one-third of the Vietnamese. Head hair is profuse, but facial and body hair is customarily scant.
- (g) The Vietnamese face is characteristically short and broad. The oblique eye form is present in nearly half and the "Mongoloid" eye fold, in about three quarters. Eye color is universally dark brown to near black. The nasal profile is straight in the majority of persons, concave in about one fourth of the population. Cheek bones are prominent in about three quarters of the population. The occurrence of the specifically Mongoloid tooth form, the so called "shovel shaped" incisor, is frequent.

B-1-11

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET(3) Religion.(a) General.

1. Approximately 80% of the population subscribe at least nominally to Buddhism, but the number of practicing Buddhists responsive to the voice of the hierarchy is considerably smaller. These include most of the ethnic Vietnamese and the Chinese, who adhere to the Mahayana ("Greater Vehicle") School introduced from China, as well as the Khmers (Cambodians), who adhere to the Theravada School (called Hinayana, or "Lesser Vehicle", by Mahayana adherents) that prevails in Cambodia and several other Southeast Asian countries. Despite the large percentage of Buddhists, the religious situation in South Vietnam differs markedly from that in neighboring Buddhist countries like Cambodia and Laos, where Theravada Buddhism is the state religion and acts as a cohesive force. Buddhism in South Vietnam receives no overt state support. As practiced in Vietnam, moreover, Mahayana Buddhism has traditionally been loosely organized, lacking the centrally administered, hierarchical, monastic establishment characteristic of neighboring Theravada Buddhist countries, and doctrinally heavily mixed with elements of Confucianism and Taoism borrowed from China and with local animistic beliefs.
2. The South Vietnamese Buddhist movement was ostensibly united for the first time in January 1964, when the Unified Buddhist Association of Vietnam (UBA) was created. Although nominally a religious organization, the UBA acts as a quasi-political pressure group whose ultimate aim apparently is to control the government. There are divisions within the movement, however, based principally on the regional origins of the leading Mahayana Bonzes (priests) and on their differing approaches towards political involvement and towards the Catholics. One faction is headed by Thich Tri Quang, Secretary General of the High Clerical Council of the Buddhist Hierarchy, the nominally supreme body of the UBA, and supported by bonzes from central Vietnam. This faction has strong anti-Catholic tendencies. The other principal faction headed by Thich Tam Chau, Chairman of the Institute for the Propagation of the Buddhist Faith, the Executive arm of the UBA.

UNCLASSIFIED

B-1-12

Chau is supported by refugee bonzes from North Vietnam and is less vehemently anti-Catholic.

- UNCLASSIFIED
3. Roman Catholicism is the second most important organized religion in South Vietnam. Its estimated 1.5 million adherents make up almost 10% of the country's population. There are five archdioceses; Saigon, Hue, Kontum, Qui Nhon, and Vinh Long, each headed by an archbishop. Saigon and Hue are the most significant from the point of view of prestige and numerical size.
  4. Under former President Diem, himself a Catholic, the Catholics were informally favored in governmental assignments, and there were legal restrictions on certain organized Buddhist activities from which Christian missions were exempt. This partiality, although far less extensive than some Buddhist leaders claimed, created a sense of grievance which led to the Buddhist crisis in May 1963, finally culminating in the military overthrow of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime the following November. Following the coup, Catholic influence waned, and Catholic leaders became increasingly concerned about the status of the church. Strongly anti-Communist, the Catholics have feared that the Buddhists in general are not firmly committed to the anti Viet Cong struggle and are dangerously infiltrated by Communist and Neutralist-minded elements. Catholic-Buddhist friction is partly responsible for the unstable political situation in South Vietnam which has existed since mid-1963.
  5. The Christians other than Roman Catholic are some 75,000 Protestants, mostly members of the Evangelical Church of Vietnam. Although most are Vietnamese living in rural areas, some are from tribal groups, principally Jarai and Rhade in the central plateau area, where Protestant missionaries have long been active.

B-1-13

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET(4) Religion in Quang Tin Province.

- (a) Buddhists: The Buddhists are by far the strongest religious group in Quang Tin. However, the Secretary-General of the Quang Tin Buddhist Association only claims 20,000 faithful in the province. (This figure seems incredibly low, but when questioned the source maintained it was correct. Perhaps he referred only to pagoda-goers in areas not under VC control). Politically, the Buddhists have been quiet in the past year, with no anti-government or anti-Catholic demonstrations.
- (b) Catholics: There are about 8,000 Catholics in the province, 4,000 of whom are in the city of Tam Ky. The leading priest in Quang Tin makes the oft-heard allegation of VC in the pagodas, accuses the Province Chief, a Buddhist, of favoring the Buddhists, and characterizes Catholic-Buddhist relations as "very bad".
- (c) Cao Dai: The Cao Dai, a religious sect, with 5,000 adherents, are stronger than usual for Central Vietnam. Moreover, with two members on the Province Council, they seem to have an unusual amount of political influence.

(5) Religion in Quang Ngai Province.

- (a) The religious situation in Quang Ngai is similar to the rest of Vietnam as previously described.

(6) Structure of the Society: Community and Family

- (a) Vietnamese society, as mentioned before, is undergoing change from its traditional social order and stratification based on Confucianism. Where the previous social differentiation was drawn chiefly on the basis of intellectual achievement, social class lines today are increasingly influenced by economic consideration. The present social hierarchy may be classified essentially into three classes: upper, middle, and lower. The present socio-economic upper class is composed of the top echelon of the government bureaucracy, higher ranking military officers, landowners, wealthy businessmen, professional people, and intellectuals. The relatively new middle class consists of the lower army echelons, the government bureaucracy, and the small businesses. The vast majority of the people, almost 90 percent, are in the lower class comprised chiefly of peasants, artisans, and urban wage laborers.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (b) Social mobility is not a well recognized characteristic of Vietnamese society, but no class or caste lines are strong enough to prevent a man with ability and good fortune from reaching the highest class. Membership in the upper class usually requires a combination of two of the following qualifications: wealth, "family", education, and economic or intellectual ability and achievement. An exception to these prerequisites may be army officers for whom ability and personal loyalty are important considerations for advancement.
- (c) The changing patterns of living are serving to break down the traditional way of life, but the Vietnamese social structure is still primarily rooted in the village and the family. The traditional form of village government, the council of notables, still exists in rural communities. Each village is governed by this council composed of the oldest and most intelligent men in the community. The president of the council of notables is the most important man in the village and he has great influence with the village inhabitants.
- (d) Although its relative importance has decreased somewhat, the family still remains the most important mooring for the individual. Many of the most important social institutions in Vietnamese life are centered on family action. The Vietnamese make a family affair of earning their livelihood, of conducting religious rites, of raising and educating children, and of taking care of the sick and the aged. Consequently, the majority of the Vietnamese people owe loyalty to the family and not to the state, church, or any set of abstract principles.
- (e) The organization of the family is based upon the patrilineal lineage or "ho". The "ho" includes all male descendants having the same great-great grandfather. This large clan of relatives is closely knit. They usually live close to one another because Vietnamese are strongly attached to their native villages and leave only under great pressure. The head of each "ho" is responsible for the maintenance of a genealogical chart to record births and deaths of all members.

B-1-15

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET(7) Health and Sanitation.

- (a) Health and sanitation conditions are generally poor throughout the country despite government effort to improve them. One of the factors which contributes to this situation is the strong influence of Vietnamese tradition. According to Vietnamese traditional attitudes, illness was considered to be a result of the workings of evil spirits. Vietnamese thought ill health was caused by the entrance of evil spirits into the body. It was believed that magic formulas and traditional rites performed by sorcerers, shamans, and village priests could cure people by driving the evil spirits from the body. Medical knowledge based upon the biological sciences was virtually unknown and surgical operation was frowned upon and avoided. These beliefs in spirits and traditional remedies have developed in most Vietnamese a resignation to pain and effects of disease, a situation that Western therapy might correct. Despite such traditional beliefs and resignation, however, modern medical practice has gained a ready acceptance among those exposed to Western influence. The introduction of new medical techniques and knowledge by the French has contributed greatly to understanding and appreciation of Western medical practices.
- (b) Another cause of the health problem, is a very poor diet. The daily meals of the average person are usually inadequate in quantity and particularly deficient in proteins, vitamins, and minerals. Dietary deficiencies are of decisive importance in the susceptibility of the Vietnamese to such diseases as rickets and beriberi, and to the lowering of his resistance to infections and diseases. Rice is the principal staple for the Vietnamese, with almost 90 per cent of the food outlay going toward its purchase. Rice is generally supplemented by vegetables and nuoc-nam (a fish sauce), and occasionally by meat. The consumption of vegetables is largely dictated by necessity and not by choice. As the income of the Vietnamese increases, he expands and balances his diet with more fish, meat, fruits, and vegetables.
- (c) Due to the total indifference with which many Vietnamese regard commonly accepted rules of sanitation, poor sanitation is another major cause of the serious health problem. The average village has no regular system for disposing of garbage and human excreta except for its collection and use as fertilizer.

B-1-16

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Safe water supplies are practically nonexistent. The public water supply -- the stream, pond, or canal -- is often a wallow for pigs and buffaloes. Wells are in most cases contaminated by their proximity to garbage disposals, excrement deposits, and human burial grounds. Refrigeration is practically unknown in Vietnam, where spoilage of perishables is rapid. Furthermore, practically no measures are taken to protect food from insect contamination.

- (d) The prevalent diseases in South Vietnam are malaria, tuberculosis, yaws, venereal diseases, and trachoma. Malaria is of major importance only in the upland regions -- the malaria belt -- which constitutes three-fourths of the total area, but fortunately contains less than one-tenth of the population. Tuberculosis, which is caused by unsanitary living quarters, exhaustive labor, and inadequate diet, has a relatively high incidence rate. Yaws, a disease easily cured with modern drugs, has caused considerable incapacitation and disfigurement. Prior to World War II, an estimated 65 per cent of the population was plagued by yaws. Venereal diseases are also quite prevalent, and 50 per cent of the population is afflicted by syphilis in some rural areas. Trachoma is a most widespread disease; it affects four-fifths of the population. Though it rarely causes total blindness, 30 per cent of the people are estimated to suffer partial loss of vision.

(9) Tribespeople or Montagnards.

- (a) "Montagnard" is a generic French term meaning "mountaineer". The Vietnamese more frequently refer to these mountain tribespeople as "moi" which has come to mean "savage" or "barbarian", a term which the tribespeople understandably resent. Estimates of the Montagnard population range from 500,000 to 700,000, divided among four main groups (Rhade, Jarai, Bahnar and Sedang) which account for about 35 distinct ethno-linguistic sub-divisions.
- (b) The French, interested in the highlands for plantation agriculture, and wishing to preserve them from the Vietnamese, gave the Montagnards special status and administered them separately. Emperor Bao Dai preserved this status when Vietnam was granted semi-independence in 1949.
- (c) After 1954, GVN assumed control of the Montagnards and incorporated them and their territory into its centralized structure.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

In an attempt to secure the highly strategic mountain areas which lie along the borders, and thus stem the influx of guerrillas and terrorists from the North, GVN instituted a resettlement program which moved Vietnamese up from the coastal towns and settled the semi-nomadic Montagnards around newly established Vietnamese populated communities. Here it was thought, the Montagnards would be protected from the Communists while being exposed to Vietnamese influence.

- (d) The resettlement program met with early resistance from the Montagnards who were reluctant to have traditional patterns revised by outsiders. They saw the influx of strangers as a threat to the continued possession of their tribal lands. On their part, the Vietnamese treated the tribespeople as the rudest savages, thus reinforcing and enhancing a mutual antipathy that flourishes to this day.
- (e) The VC and the North Vietnamese Communists capitalized on this situation by infiltrating the Montagnards with low level medical technicians and psychological operations cadre. The VC agents married into the communities and became integral parts of them; these individuals soon became influential with a significant proportion of the Montagnards, and started a campaign among them to press for an inter-tribal autonomous Montagnard state, in line with the so-called "autonomous regions" established in North Vietnam.
- (f) It soon became apparent that the GVN resettlement program had failed to achieve its anti-Communist purpose, and in 1961 steps were taken to remedy the situation. Administrators in Montagnard areas were instructed to treat the Montagnards sympathetically, and the ARVN psychological warfare section was instructed to promote friendly relations between the Vietnamese and the tribespeople. U.S. Special Forces advisors were sent into the highlands to train and organize the Montagnards into Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). The success of U.S.-Montagnard relations and of the CIDG program only served to widen the Montagnard-Vietnamese gap. Often the U.S. personnel would leave a village after having set up a CIDG program (including arming the Montagnards and issuing supplies and communications equipment) only to learn that their Vietnamese successors had confiscated the equipment and sometimes even punished the Montagnards for possessing it. This type of activity eventually caused some anti-U.S. feeling in Montagnard communities. Difficulties culminated in the Montagnard uprising of September 1964, when Vietnamese troops were killed and U.S. Advisors held captive and threatened by Montagnards using U.S. weapons.

B-1-18

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

A high level U.S. advisor was able to restore order, and the Montagnards were offered the opportunity to meet with GVN officials for redress of their grievances. The ensuing meetings resulted in a modicum of autonomy for the Montagnards, but current reports cite still smoldering hostilities as an indication that no real solution has been achieved. Continuing GVN concern over the problem demonstrates its seriousness; the Montagnard areas must be denied to the VC if the South is ever to feel secure; but most observers feel that there must be a significant change in the attitudes of the individual Vietnamese assigned to these areas if a solution is to be reached.

### 3. ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. Composition. Based on their ultimate objective, the reunification of North and South Vietnam under a Communist regime, the Viet Cong organizational structure has been tailored to perform two functions, one immediate and the other long-range. First, it serves to formulate and implement VC strategy in the south and second, if the Viet Cong succeed, this organization would claim legitimacy as the rightful successor to the present government. This structure consists of highly compartmented overt and covert administrative, political and military components established to administer areas which the VC control or to carry out subversion in areas under government control.

- (1) The Viet Cong structure is patterned after the organizational technique used in North Vietnam and Communist China. It is characterized by dual and theoretically co-equal political and military sections and is found at all administrative and political levels beginning at the national level and extending to regional and provincial, thence to district and finally down to the village and hamlet levels. At the lower echelons, the military and political sections are often combined because of manpower limitations. The military structure of the Viet Cong is integrated completely into its political structure. At each level below the national, the military and political sections are replaced by military and political headquarters. Each political headquarters contains a military component which establishes military policy and every military headquarters has a political component that insures compliance with its policy. Therefore, the military exists to implement the policies and directives of the political arm and, in actuality, is not co-equal, but is subordinate to the political, but this can be influenced by the personalities of the commanders involved.

B-1-19

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (2) All Viet Cong activities in South Vietnam are directed and coordinated by the covert Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN). This is accomplished by translating the policies of the Lao Dong Party (North Vietnam's Communist Party) into directives, regulations and orders which are implemented by lower echelons. The VC established the overt National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) as an ostensible independent and democratic "shadow government". The Communists, in the name of the NFLSV, have promulgated several broad political and economic programs supposedly acceptable to the majority of the people in the SOUTH. A phalanx of affiliated front organizations and committees have been established down to the hamlet level to give the impression the Front embodies every significant social, ethnic, economic and religious group. In reality, the NFLSV is but a facade for the overall insurgent and subversive effort. To give the Communists a ready and explicable voice in the NFLSV, the People's Revolutionary Party was formed. It is but the southern extension of the Lao Dong Party and actually controls and manipulates the Front for the purposes of the Party. This organization and structure is strikingly similar to those utilized by the Communists in China, Czechoslovakia and Poland prior to their assumption of control in those countries. (The term "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" is basically a propaganda term intended to serve a Communist interest and has no basis in fact. Henceforth, the terms "Vietnamese Communist, Viet Cong or VC" will be substituted for "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" or associated terms in all official documents.)
- (3) The Viet Cong have divided South Vietnam into six military regions. The headquarters within each region, operating according to the policies and directives established by COSVN, controls all military and political activities within its jurisdictional area. The Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces are in Military Region V, which is also headquartered in the mountains west of this area. Military Region V also controls the VC in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Pleiku, Kontum, Binh Dinh, Phay Yen, Phu Bon Provinces.

B-1-20

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (4) Military Region V has a main base area, called the Do Xa, which was established during the Indo-China War and reactivated in 1958. It is located generally in the area centered on the point of contact of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai and Kontum Provinces. The region also has an administrative body paralleling the administrative organization of the government (the "shadow government"). The military units operating in Military Region V are attached to this administrative organization. The Military Region V political headquarters, besides establishing policy, is also responsible for liaison with Front organizations, political activities, education, propaganda, proselyting, finances and entertainment within the region. The Military Region V military headquarters contains a political staff, a military staff, and a logistical staff. The political staff insures compliance with directives issued by the political headquarters. In addition, it formulates security regulations, administers propaganda programs, recruits personnel and verifies political loyalty of cadre. The military staff plans and supervises regular operations and special missions. It is also responsible for military training and intelligence collection. The logistics staff plans and supervises the procurement of arms, equipment, medical supplies and facilities and funds. It also maintains a number of farms and workshops to provide the bulk of necessary items.
- (5) Military Region V has a number of specialized units directly subordinate to it. These units are often attached to main force units wholly or piecemeal for specific missions. Specialized units known to be subordinate to Military Region V include:
- (a) The 45th Combat Support Battalion furnishes heavy weapons and crew served weapons support to Military Region V and its subordinate military forces.
  - (b) The Nam Son, Binh Son and 303rd Transportation Battalions are responsible for the operation and maintenance of the primary lines of communications and infiltration corridors throughout Military Region V.
  - (c) The V32nd Reconnaissance Company performs specialized reconnaissance and commando-type missions for Military Region V.
  - (d) The V30th Guard Company provides physical security for the region headquarters.
  - (e) The V33 and 406th Sapper Companies perform demolitions missions for Military Region V.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (f) The V40th Anti-Aircraft Company protects the Military Region V Headquarters from air attack.
  - (g) The V31st Communications Company disseminates both official and personal mail and messages.
  - (h) The V34th Engineer Company provides specialized advice and constructs engineering projects.
  - (i) The V62nd Training School provides basic and advanced military training.
  - (j) The TB 123 Machine Shop and the TB 118 Production Section produce military equipment and food supplies.
- (6) Enemy paramilitary and military forces in Military Region V are broken down into specific types according to mission and subordination. The principle categories of VC enemy forces are regular forces and irregular forces. The regular forces are the best trained and best equipped of the VC units. Most are led by cadre trained in North Vietnam and some are regular units of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The regular forces are organized along conventional lines and adhere to standardized organizations and equipment when possible. Main force units and local force units comprise the regular forces. The main forces are directly subordinate to Military Region V and operate throughout the region. The local forces are directly subordinate to a provincial or district headquarters and operate generally within the boundaries of the province or district. The irregular forces are subordinate to the village or hamlet. They are the "part time" soldiers who often support regular forces and provide a manpower-replacement pool for the regular forces and include:
- (a) Guerrilla forces who are full time squad or platoon size forces not always based in their villages or hamlets. Their typical missions include collecting taxes, propagandizing, protecting village party members and committees and carrying out terrorism and sabotage operations.
  - (b) People's self defense forces are paramilitary forces that defend Communist controlled hamlet and village areas. These forces operate on a part time basis and remain in their home areas. They typically propagandize and build fortifications.

B-1-22

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (c) The Secret self-defense forces are clandestine organizations that perform functions in government controlled villages and hamlets similar to those performed by the self defense forces in VC controlled areas. They lead a "legal" existence during daylight and assemble at night for operations. Their missions typically involve intelligence collection, sabotage and propaganda.
- (7) Within each administrative division of South Vietnam the Viet Cong maintain a military unit for operations exclusively within that division and subordinate to that division's headquarters. The size of the force and its strength is dependent upon the degree of control the VC exercise in that area and the manpower and equipment available to them. Each military region will have at least one division or regiment. However, there are a number of VC and North Vietnamese regiments subordinate to Military Region V. The regiments which normally operate in the Quang Tin and Quang Ngai area or which have operated in these two provinces in the past include the 1st VC Regiment, the 2nd VC Regiment, the 36th Regiment of the 308th Division (NVA), the 18th Regiment of the 325th Division (NVA) and the Quyet Tam Regiment (NVA).
- (a) Viet Cong regiments are usually organized along conventional lines. The strength of the regiment varies from 1400 to 2000 including three infantry battalions of from 300-600 each, a 300 man heavy weapons support battalion (with an anti-aircraft, recoilless rifle and large caliber, indirect fire capability), and supporting companies including communications, engineer, reconnaissance and medical. The North Vietnamese regiments are similarly organized. However, they will generally have up to 3000 personnel and more standardized weapons and equipment.
- (8) The military regions are further broken down into provinces. The Viet Cong boundaries for Quang Tin and Quang Ngai approximate those of the government. However, the VC refer to Quang Tin Province as Quang Nam Province. The provincial headquarters is one of the principal policy making and policy implementing bodies in the enemy structure. This headquarters, with a staff of approximately 300, is usually located in a remote area and moves from time to time to prevent destruction. In most cases, it has radio or courier contact both with the region headquarters and the district committee.

B-1-23

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (a) The 70th Battalion, formerly organic to the 1st VC Regiment, is the unit subordinate to the Quang Tin provincial headquarters. It is generally deployed east of and adjacent to the 1st Regiment. (The VC battalions typically number 300-600 in strength. They are organized into three infantry companies of 60-130 men and a weapons support company numbering 40-100 and small communications, engineer and reconnaissance platoons.)
- (b) There are two battalions assigned to the Quang Ngai provincial headquarters, the 38th, normally operating south of Quang Ngai City near Route #1, and the 52nd, which is usually located on the Batangan Peninsula south of Chu Lai.
- (9) Within each province, there are a number of districts. There is some variance between the government and the Viet Cong districts in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. The district is apparently the key level in the VC organization. The district committee is responsible for not only consolidating VC gains but also for extending VC influence into areas under RVN control. The district committee basically contains the same elements as the higher headquarters, but on a smaller scale. The main contact between the district committee and the populace is through "agitprops" (agitators and propagandists) who are organized into "mission" or activity teams. In VC controlled areas, they conduct meetings, explain policy, advertise VC victories, and extol economic and social developments in the area. They collect information and intelligence not only on government military units, but also on political, social and economic conditions. Their information is relayed to the district committee where it is evaluated and disseminated. In areas under VC control, the district committee conducts a program of economic and social development, arrests and judges "criminals", responsible for military training at the district level and supervises the populace in the technique of camouflage, evacuation and intelligence reporting. The committee also establishes quotas for military service. Each district normally has at least one VC company subordinate to the district committee. Each company numbers from 60-130 men and includes three infantry platoons and one weapons platoon.

B-1-24

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(a) A list of the districts in Quang Tin and their assigned companies follows:

1. Thang Binh District - A-10 Company
2. Tien Phuoc District - A-13 Company
3. Hiep Duc District - A-34 and Tra Son Companies
4. Hau Duc District - Tra Ha Company
5. Tam Ky District - A-16, A-19 and A-21 Companies

(b) A list of districts in Quang Ngai and their assigned companies follows:

1. Binh Son District - T-19 Company
2. Dong Son District - T-18 Company
3. Tu Nghia District - 206 Company
4. Nghia Hanh District - 89b Company
5. Tra Bong District - 8 Company
6. Son Ha District - 614 Company
7. Minh Long District - 96 Company
8. Ba To District - C212 Company
9. Duc Pho District - C219 Company
10. Mo Duc District - C17 Company
11. Son Tinh District - T-20 Company

- (10) The villages and hamlets are the lowest levels of the Viet Cong organization. The villages are sub-divisions of the districts, and each village contains a number of hamlets, generally four to eight. When under VC control, villages and hamlets are governed by either a committee or an individual responsible for raising the number of village "militia". This militia is a part time force and is usually only partially armed. These are the irregular VC forces mentioned earlier. In all villages, the VC attempts to get the people committed to its cause by recruiting them into the various front organizations such as farmer's associations, youth and women's organizations and self defense corps. These organizations and several others similar to them comprise the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. There is normally a platoon sized unit subordinate to each village and a squad assigned to each hamlet.

UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

- (a) There are 70 villages in Quang Tin Province and 429 hamlets within those villages. The total strength of irregulars is approximately 3000.
- (b) Quang Ngai Province has 122 villages containing 490 hamlets. There are approximately 9000 irregulars in these villages and hamlets.

b. Strength and Combat Efficiency. An accurate strength assessment of the enemy forces in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces is difficult because main force units periodically deploy to adjacent provinces for operations. Personnel strength varies considerably primarily because of combat attrition, but also because the enemy utilizes local force and irregular units as manpower replacement sources for main force and North Vietnamese units. There is also a variance in combat efficiency within the same unit over a relatively short period of time because of occasional excessive personnel turnovers. This results in a variance in levels of training in the same unit because of combat success or failure and availability of food stuffs, equipment and weapons, clothing and shelter.

- (1) Within the two province areas, the enemy has a minimum of one North Vietnamese and two Viet Cong Regiments, a military region headquarters with supporting elements, one main force and three local force battalions and 19 local force companies. Additionally, there are two North Vietnamese Regiments, one Viet Cong regimental headquarters and five main or local force battalions probably located in the area or adjacent provinces. The personnel strengths for these units are as follows:

MR V Headquarters (MF)	650
45th Combat Support Battalion (MF)	500
Nam Son Transportation Battalion (MF)	700
Quyet Tam Regiment (NVA)	1500
1st Regiment Headquarters (MF)	360
60th Battalion (MF)	300
80th Battalion (MF)	UNK
90th Battalion (MF)	400
400th Battalion (Artillery) (MF)	200
195th Anti-Aircraft Battalion (NVA)	300
2d Regiment Headquarters (MF)	UNK
93rd Battalion (MF)	300
95th Battalion (MF)	500
97th Battalion (MF)	400
20th VMC Battalion (MF)	450
70th Battalion (LF)	500
38th Battalion (LF)	400
52nd Battalion (LF)	350

B-1-26

**UNCLASSIFIED**



UNCLASSIFIED

A-10th Company (LF)	150
A-13th Company (LF)	150
A-19th Company (LF)	140
A-21st Company (LF)	100
A-16th Company (LF)	120
Tra Son Company (LF)	50
Tra Ha Company (LF)	40
A-34th Company (LF)	40
Tra Bong Company (LF)	80
T-18th Company (LF)	60
C-17th Company (LF)	140
89b Company (LF)	90
96th Company (LF)	100
206th Company (LF)	100
C-212th Company (LF)	100
C-219th Company (LF)	100
614th Company (LF)	120
T-20th Company (LF)	100
T-19th Company (LF)	120
Regimental Headquarters (probable) (NVA)	200
1st Battalion (probable) (NVA)	600
2nd Battalion (probable) (NVA)	600
3rd Battalion (probable) (NVA)	600
108th Regimental Headquarters (possible)	100
94th Battalion (probable) (MF)	300
49th Battalion (probable) (MF)	500
104th Battalion (probable) (MF)	300
109th Battalion (possible)	300
307th Battalion (possible)	380
Irregulars, guerrillas, militia (Quang Tin)	3000
Irregulars, guerrillas, militia (Quang Ngai)	9000

- (2) Sufficient data is unavailable to conclusively assess the combat efficiency of most of the units in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. In the absence of definite information, the combat efficiency of these units must be assumed to be excellent. The combat efficiency of selected units and pertinent comments follows:

- (a) The 1st Regiment has undergone numerous transitions since September of 1965 primarily because of heavy combat losses. Key officer and NCO cadre have apparently remained largely the same, lending some stability and providing valuable combat experience to the regiment and its battalions. The 90th Battalion has been largely unaffected by combat attrition and it remains the most effective battalion in the regiment. Its combat efficiency is considered good to excellent. The combat efficiency of the 60th and 80th Battalions is rated as average to poor.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Both units have suffered heavy casualties twice within the past six months and have been forced to utilize untested recruits and some local force personnel as replacements. The 195th Anti-Aircraft Battalion (NVA), probably attached to the 1st Regiment is a newly infiltrated unit and has suffered no significant personnel or materiel losses. Its combat efficiency is considered good to excellent.

- (b) The 2nd VC Regiment has also suffered heavy casualties during the past six months and has undergone a significant personnel turnover. The regiment's subordinate units have been augmented by untested recruits, local force elements and some troops from North Vietnamese units. Thus, the overall level of training is probably not satisfactory. The combat efficiency of the 93rd Battalion is rated average to poor. The personnel of this battalion were reportedly inexperienced, homesick and not adapted to the hardships of a guerrilla environment. The 97th Battalion's combat efficiency is considered good to excellent. This unit has a very good combat record.
- (c) The 18th Regiment (NVA) has recently operated with the 2d Regiment and has suffered similar heavy casualties. Reports indicate this unit has not received sufficient replacements and has a significant manpower shortage. The regiment has gained much combat experience in the last six months, but has no significant successes to show for its efforts. Friendly contacts with the 18th Regiment in Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai Provinces suggest its battlefield composure is below average. The combat efficiency of the 18th Regiment is rated below average to poor.
- (d) The 36th NVA Regiment was recently engaged with friendly forces in Son Tinh District during Operation Utah and may have suffered as many as 800 casualties. Of note, during this engagement, elements of the regiment stood and fought which is uncommon for enemy units.
- c. Dispositions. Locations of enemy units must be considered tentative. The local force units and irregular forces operate within their respective provinces, districts, villages and hamlets. However, provincial battalions frequently dispatch their subordinate companies on individual missions throughout the province. Main force and North Vietnamese regiments and battalions subordinate to Military Region V are utilized throughout the region. However, most of these units in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai generally operate within a generally defined area.

B-1-28

UNCLASSIFIED

- (1) The 36th Regiment (NVA) has remained astride the Quang Tin-Quang Nam border about 20 miles west of Route #1 since late 1965. The 1st VC Regiment usually remains in or near to its extensive base areas in north-central Quang Tin Province. It did deploy into northern Quang Ngai during the spring of 1965 and remained until the early fall. The 2nd VC Regiment usually operates in southern Quang Ngai and northern Binh Dinh Provinces. The 18th Regiment (NVA) and Quyet Tam Regiment (NVA) have accompanied the 2nd Regiment since early fall of 1965 operating in the same general area. The 20th Battalion normally operates in the Montagnard inhabited, mountainous regions of western Quang Ngai and northern Kontum Provinces. Military Region V Headquarters and headquarters support elements have remained in their extensively fortified base area slightly east of the Do Xa region since the early 1960s.
- (2) Whenever possible, enemy units of regimental size and below adhere to the policy of remaining in one area no longer than 48 hours. The enemy also attempts to maintain a presence of influence in populated areas at all times, hence, units are often moved to fill vacuums. Unless deploying for specific operations, enemy companies, battalions and regiments usually remain proximate to lines of communications, base areas and within VC controlled, or, occasionally within contested areas.
- (3) The following locations of enemy units are based on the best available order of battle intelligence and are annotated when appropriate:
- |   |                             |
|---|-----------------------------|
| MR V Hqs (MF)                           | BS 1192                     |
| 45th Combat Support Bn (MF) (Note 1)    | BS 1192                     |
| Nam Son Transportation Bn (MF) (Note 2) | ZB 1097                     |
| Quyet Tam Regt (NVA) (Note 3)           | South Quang Ngai            |
| 18th Regt (NVA) (Note 4)                | North Binh Dinh             |
| 1st Regt Hqs (MF) (Note 5)              | BT 1525                     |
| 60th Bn (MF) (Note 5)                   | BT 1917                     |
| 80th Bn (MF) (Note 5)                   | BT 2220                     |
| 90th Bn (MF) (Note 5)                   | BT 2514                     |
| 400th Artillery Bn (MF) (Note 6)        | BT 3005                     |
| 195th Anti-Aircraft Bn (NVA) (Note 5)   | BT 0023                     |
| 2nd Regt Hqs (MF) (Note 7)              | UNK                         |
| 93rd Bn (MF) (Note 7)                   | UNK                         |
| 95th Bn (MF) (Note 7)                   | UNK                         |
| 97th Bn (MF) (Note 7)                   | UNK                         |
| 20th VMC Bn (MF)                        | BS 2864                     |
| 70th Bn (LF) (Note 8)                   | BT 1528 Quang Tin Province  |
| 38th Bn (LF) (Note 9)                   | BS 6653 Quang Ngai Province |
| 52nd Bn (LF) (Note 10)                  | BS 7090 Quang Ngai Province |
| A-10th Comp (LF)                        | BT 1536 Thang Binh District |
| A-13th Comp (LF)                        | BT 1017 Tien Phuoc District |

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

A-19th Comp (LF)  
 A-21st Comp (LF)  
 A-16th Comp (LF)  
 Tra Son Comp (LF)  
 Tra Ha Comp (LF)  
 A-34th Comp (LF)  
 Tra Bong Comp (LF)  
 T-18th Comp (LF)  
 C-17th Comp (LF)  
 96th Comp (LF)  
 89b Comp (LF)  
 206th Comp (LF)  
 C-212th Comp (LF)  
 C-219th Comp (LF)  
 614th Comp (LF)  
 T-20th Comp (LF)  
 T-19th Comp (LF)  
 36th Regt Hqs. (NVA) (Prob) (Note 11)  
   1st Bn (NVA) (Prob) (Note 11)  
   2nd Bn (NVA) (Prob) (Note 11)  
   3rd Bn (NVA) (Prob) (Note 11)  
 108th Regt Hqs. (Poss)  
 94th Bn (MF) (Prob) (Note 12)  
 49th Bn (MF) (Prob) (Note 13)  
 104th Bn (MF) (Prob)  
 109th Bn (Poss)  
 307th Bn (Poss)

BT 3411 Tam Ky District  
 BT 3315 Tam Ky District  
 BT 2516 Tam Ky District  
 AS 8799 Hau Duc District  
 BS 1499 Hau Duc District  
 BT 0303 Hiep Duc District  
 BT 3190 Tra Bong District  
 BS 6887 VC Dong Son District  
 BS 7055 Mo Duc District  
 BS 5053 Minh Long District  
 BS 5863 Nghia Hanh District  
 BS 5053 Minh Long District  
 BS 6136 Ba To District  
 BS 8125 Duc Pho District  
 BS 3065 Son Ha District  
 BS 5082 Son Tinh District  
 BS 5392 Binh Son District  
 BT 0030  
 BT 0130  
 BT 0131  
 BT 0030  
 BS 3999  
 BT 4000  
 UNK  
 BS 6692  
 BS 7283  
 BS 5080

Note 1. The 45th Battalion Headquarters remains proximate to MR V Headquarters, but various companies, platoons and sections are usually attached to main force units for specific operations or missions.

Note 2. The Nam Son Transportation Battalion is divided into companies and so-called "hamlets". The unit is responsible for a primary infiltration corridor and deploys each company or "hamlet" at a specific liaison or way station along the route.

Note 3. The Quyet Tam Regiment has operated in northern Binh Dinh and southern Quang Ngai since its infiltration beginning last August. The Quyet Tam Regiment, 18th Regiment and 2nd Regiment are all apparently subordinate to a divisional force structure and, thus, will probably operate in the same general area.

Note 4. The 18th Regiment has operated in northern Binh Dinh and southern Quang Ngai. Its location in north-eastern Binh Dinh was fixed through contacts by the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in early February 1966.

B-1-30

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Note 5. The 1st Regiment and its subordinate battalions were detected moving southeasterly from their base areas in late January, 1966. These locations are tentative due to friendly operations in progress in these areas.

Note 6. Numerous reports indicate the 400th Artillery Battalion may no longer be in existence. This reported location has not been up-dated since September of 1965.

Note 7. The 2d Regiment has operated in northern Binh Dinh and Southern Quang Ngai. In early February, contacts with elements of this regiment were established in north-eastern Binh Dinh Province.

Note 8. The 70th Battalion normally operates adjacent to and in conjunction with the 1st Regiment. However, it has also detached its companies for operations throughout northern Quang Tin Province.

Note 9. The 38th Battalion usually detaches its companies for operations along the axis of Route #1 in central Quang Ngai Province south of Quang Ngai City.

Note 10. The 52nd Battalion normally detaches companies and platoons to operate between Quang Ngai City and the Song Tra Song generally east of Route #1.

Note 11. The 36th Regiment (NVA) has been in contact with friendly forces once since it infiltrated. Frequent intelligence reports had fixed its general location as astride the Quang Nam-Quang Tin border west of Route #1. Because of the Operation Utah engagement with probable elements of this unit, it is suspected of now being located in northern Quang Ngai Province.

Note 12. The 94th Battalion is suspected of being a headquarters and base camp for the small scale harassing activities directed against the northern and western portions of the Chu Lai TAOR and ARVN positions near Tam Ky.

Route 13. The 49th Battalion is probably located in central Quang Tin Province.

B-1-31

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- d. Arms and Armament. Arms utilized by the enemy in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai range from large caliber, crew-served weapons to individual small arms and include mines, grenades and explosive devices, many of which are largely field expedients. The enemy is supplied with weapons primarily through battlefield recovery, local arsenals and infiltration channels from North Vietnam. The enemy has recently conducted a program to standardize the weapons system at all levels relying on a standardized family of Soviet and Chinese manufactured small arms. The bulk of the heterogeneous weapons the enemy utilizes are of French and American manufacture, with a few of Soviet, British and Czech included. As these weapons are replaced by the standardized family of arms, the older weapons are distributed to local force and irregular elements or cached for possible future use. The enemy is now emphasizing in-country arms manufacturing and supply and maintenance facilities. Specific weapons used by the enemy are broken down by artillery, anti-aircraft, mortar, flamethrower, recoilless rifle, and anti-tank, machine gun, sub-machine gun, carbine and rifle, and pistol.

- (1) Artillery. Although the Viet Cong are known to possess limited quantities of artillery pieces, there have been few instances when they have used them. The 45th Combat Support Battalion, the most logical unit in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai to be equipped with artillery pieces, reportedly has none. However, before its dissolution, the 400th Heavy Weapons Battalion reportedly had two 75mm, two 70mm and one 105mm artillery pieces. The 1st Regiment captured two 105mm howitzers from an ARVN outpost in May of 1965, but one was unusable. There is no evidence that the enemy has utilized these artillery pieces in the two province area.

- (a) 75mm Pack Howitzer. The enemy is known to have both the Japanese manufactured Model 38 and the American manufactured M116. The characteristic of the Japanese model are:

Maximum Range: 8100 meters  
 Weight: 2800 pounds  
 Rate of Fire: 8-10 rounds per minute

The characteristics of the U.S. Model are:

Maximum Range: 8800 meters  
 Weight: 1260 pounds  
 Rate of Fire: 5 rounds per minute  
 Transportability: Disassembled into eight major components for transport

B-1-32

UNCLASSIFIED

- (b) 70mm Howitzer. The enemy has the Chinese copy of the Japanese manufactured Model 92 (1932) howitzer. This gun uses semi-fixed ammunition. The characteristics are:

Maximum Range: 2797 meters  
 Weight: 470 pounds  
 Rate of Fire: 4-6 rounds per minute

- (2) Anti-Aircraft. The enemy utilizes all small arms weapons in an anti-aircraft role when feasible. Two weapons, the 12.7mm machine gun and modified .50 cal machine gun, are the primary anti-aircraft weapons. There have been incidents in February of 1966 which indicated the enemy had 37mm anti-aircraft weapons in I Corps, but this has not been confirmed. Viet Cong units have also utilized mortars in an anti-aircraft role by fusing the projectile to achieve an airburst. Each main force and North Vietnamese unit has an anti-aircraft section of varying size and strength. The 1st Regiment has been reinforced with the 195th Anti-Aircraft Battalion (NVA) with 18-12.7mm machine guns. North Vietnamese infantry battalions are known to have as many as nine of these weapons organic to them. Main force Viet Cong battalions usually have 3-6 of these weapons or modified .50 cal machine guns in their arms inventory. Local force and irregular units utilize individual small arms in a secondary anti-aircraft role.

- (a) 37mm Automatic Anti-Aircraft Gun. A Soviet manufactured light anti-aircraft gun used in all types of North Vietnamese line divisions and in the air defense forces. This gun is elevated and traversed by double hand wheels instead of by cranks and sometimes is provided with a shield. The characteristics are:

Maximum vertical range: 19,685 feet  
 Maximum horizontal range: 25,844 feet  
 Weight in firing positions: 4630 pounds  
 Rate of fire: 160-180 rounds per minute

- (b) 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun. This weapon, a standard U.S. .50 cal machine gun is modified into an anti-aircraft machine gun by mounting on a tripod of the Soviet 12.7mm DShK heavy machine gun mount. It is equipped with an AA rear sight (ring type). The tripod can be used for two firing positions: Anti-aircraft and infantry support. The characteristics are:

Maximum range: 6500 meters - 19800 feet  
 Maximum effective range: 800-1200 meters - 3240 feet  
 Weight: 83.5 pounds

B-1-33

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (3) Mortars. Down to the irregular unit level, all enemy units have mortars for indirect fire support. Each regiment and battalion has a mortar unit of varying size and strength. The main force and North Vietnamese battalions generally have 6-12 mortars. The local force battalions have 3-9 mortars. The district companies usually have one or two mortars. The larger mortars, 81mm, are found at the higher echelons while units at all levels have a quantity of 60mm mortars. The 45th Combat Support Battalion probably has in excess of 12 mortars in its inventory. The enemy probably has a quantity of 120mm mortars in the Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Province area. They have not as yet been utilized in the two province areas, nor have their numbers or their locations been pinpointed. However, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese have used 120mm mortars in Quang Nam Province and Binh Dinh Province. The most logical place for 120mm mortars would be with the 45th Combat Support Battalion or in a 120mm mortar section subordinate to Military Region V of one of the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Regiments in the area.
- (a) 120mm Mortar. The easily attached transport limber and the weight saving design of the circular baseplate make the 120mm mortar highly mobile despite its size. A caisson is available for transporting by animal draft. It breaks down into three loads for pack transport. The 120mm mortar, M-1938, is Soviet manufactured and can be fired by an adaptable trigger mechanism as well as by the conventional drop fire method. The characteristics are:
- Maximum Range: 5674 meters  
Weight in Firing Position: 606 pounds  
Rate of Fire: 15 rounds per minute
- (b) 81mm mortar. The enemy 81mm mortar is a copy of the American 81mm mortar manufactured by the Chinese, Soviets and French. The characteristics are:
- Maximum effective range: 3040 meters  
Minimum effective range: 100 meters  
Weight: 123 pounds  
Rate of Fire: 25 rounds per minute
- (c) 60mm mortar. This mortar is also a direct Chinese copy of the American manufactured 60mm mortar. Almost all the components are interchangeable. The characteristics are:
- Maximum range: 1500 meters  
Weight: 44.5 pounds  
Rate of fire: 15-20 rounds per minute
- (4) Flamethrowers. There is no information that these weapons are in service in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. However, they have been utilized in III and IV Corps and components have been captured

UNCLASSIFIED



from enemy arms caches in the central and southern parts of Vietnam. They are available to forces in the two province area. The only flamethrower identified in Vietnam is the Soviet LPO flamethrower.

- (a) LPO Flamethrower. The Soviet LPO light portable flamethrower can be identified by the three identical fuel tanks, a bipod on the flame gun and lack of a separate pressure gun. The characteristics are:

Effective range (estimated): 45-55 yds (thickened fuel)  
16-20 yds (unthickened fuel)

Duration of burst per tank (estimated): 2-3 seconds

Weight of complete assembly: 45-55 pounds (filled)  
30-35 pounds (empty)

- (5) Recoilless rifle and anti-tank. The enemy uses Chinese copies of the American manufactured 75mm and 57mm recoilless rifles. The 45th Combat Support Battalion has at least 12 recoilless rifles, in its inventory. Main force and North Vietnamese battalions generally have 3-6 recoilless rifles while local force battalions have an average of three of these weapons. Local force district companies usually have one or two recoilless rifles. The 75mm weapons are found at the weapons support battalion level and a few are found in the recoilless rifle sections of infantry regiments and battalions. The enemy normally utilizes recoilless rifles to support an attack by reducing hard fortifications. They are also used in an anti-tank role. The most common anti tank weapon is a Chinese copy of the Soviet RPG-2 anti tank grenade launcher called the B-40. This weapon is scattered through out various enemy units, but is not as common as the recoilless rifles.

- (a) 75mm Recoilless Rifle: This weapon, except for the mount, is an exact copy of the U.S. 75mm recoilless rifle M20. The Chinese produced copy is called Type 52 and is considered equal to the American model in all respects except penetration, which is inferior. The characteristics are:

Maximum Range: 6675 meters  
Effective range vs. armor (stationary): 640 meters  
Armor penetration: 3 inches at zero degrees  
Weight (with mount): 190 pounds  
Rate of fire: 10 rounds per minute

- (b) 57mm Recoilless Rifle. The Chinese manufactured Model 36 is a copy of the American 57mm recoilless rifle, differing from it in only minor respects. U.S. 57mm ammunition can be used in the Chinese rifle when it is equipped with a pointed firing pin. The characteristics are:

Effective range vs armor: 450 meters  
Armor penetration: 2.50-2.75 inches at zero degrees  
Weight (with mount): 55 pounds

SECRET

- (c) RPG-2 Anti-tank Rocket Launcher. Called the B-40 by the Viet Cong. The 40mm tube fires a 82mm projectile, which is placed outside of the gun barrel. This Soviet produced weapon is smooth bore and cannot be fired from the left shoulder because a fail/safe-type, gas escape vent is located on the right side in the area of the pistol grip. The RPG-2 has an unusually large and dangerous backblast area. This weapon is a direct descendant of the reloadable type World War II German Panzerfaust. The characteristics are:

Maximum effective range: 100 meters

Armor penetration: 6-7 inches at zero degrees

Weight: 6.06 pounds

Rate of fire: 4-6 rounds per minute

- (6) Machine gun. Enemy battalions usually have 6-9 machine guns in their inventory, probably in their machine gun sections. The local force battalions have an average of six per battalion and the local force companies and the larger irregular and guerrilla units have 2-4. The most prominent machine guns in the enemy arsenal continue to be U.S. BARs, .30 cal and .50 cal weapons. Many North Vietnamese and Viet Cong main force units are now equipped with the RPD light machine gun, which chambers the 7.62mm Chinese Type 56 cartridge. This is the machine gun member of the new family of small arms being introduced into principle enemy units. The enemy also continues to rely heavily on machine guns chambering the Soviet M1906 7.62 rimmed cartridge and the German 7.92 rifle cartridge.

- (a) RPD light machine gun (Degtyarev). This Soviet made fully automatic weapon is comparable to the American BAR. Its outstanding features are lightweight and simplicity of design. The weapon has a chromed barrel which is not of the quick change type since the gun is not designed for sustained fire. It uses the same intermediate sized 7.62mm M1943 Chinese Type 56 cartridge used in the AK assault rifle and the SKS carbine. The characteristics are:

Effective range: 800 meters

Weight: (with loaded belt and magazine) 19.4 pounds

Rate of fire: 150 rounds per minute

- (b) DPM Automatic rifle, type 53. This Chinese light machine gun is a direct copy of the Soviet Degtyarev weapon and chambers an M-43 7.62mm round. It is gas operated and air cooled and fires automatic only. The weapon is used with a drum magazine placed on the receiver and a bipod fixed to the barrel. The characteristics are:

B-1-36

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Effective range: 805 meters  
 Weight (with loaded magazine): 27 pounds  
 Theoretical rate of fire: 600 rounds per minute

- (c) Model 54 12.7mm heavy machine gun. This is a direct Chinese copy of the Soviet DshK heavy machine gun M1938/46. It can be utilized both as an anti-aircraft weapon and an infantry support weapon. When supporting infantry, the legs are folded together to form trails. The weapon is gas operated and is fed by a 50 round belt. The characteristics are:

Effective range (ground target): 3036 meters  
 Maximum rate of fire: 600 rounds per minute  
 Practical rate of fire: 125 rounds per minute  
 Weight: 75 pounds  
 Weight (w/tripod and shield): 393.2 pounds

- (d) RP-46 7.62mm automatic rifle M1946. This Soviet made weapon is a modification of the DPM previously described. This weapon is equipped with a heavy barrel and was manufactured to increase the practical rate of fire of light machine guns. The characteristics are:

Effective range: 810 plus meters  
 Practical rate of fire: 80 rounds per minute (drum)  
 Weight: 30 pounds

- (e) MG-34 7.92mm machine gun. During early World War II, this East German made weapon, was used as a heavy machine gun with rifle ammunition. The weapon is equipped with an instantaneous removable barrel and two triggers designed for two different rates of fire. The characteristics are:

Effective range: 550 meters  
 Cyclic rate of fire: 100-200 rounds per minute  
 Weight: 24 pounds  
 Weight (w/tripod): 76 1/2 pounds

- (f) Goryunov SCM 7.62mm machine gun. This gun has a set of legs provided with light wheels and can easily be converted into an anti-aircraft machine gun. The trail leg can be folded for use in narrow places such as foxholes. The weapon is gas operated and uses the M1908 7.62 rimmed cartridge. The characteristics are:

Effective range (ground targets): 1012 meters  
 Effective range (air targets): 1650 feet  
 Practical rate of fire: 300-350 rounds per minute  
 Weight: 30.4 pounds

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (7) Sub-machine gun. The enemy has a particular affinity for sub-machine guns because their characteristics lend themselves well to the tactics preferred by the VC. They provide intense firepower at close quarters and are relatively compact and easy to maintain. Sub-machine guns are found at all unit levels through local force. Guerrillas and irregulars are rarely armed with sub-machine guns. The amount of these weapons within a particular echelon and unit varies considerably. The newly infiltrated units have a preponderance of sub-machine guns as individual weapons. North Vietnamese and main force battalions are equipped with as many sub-machine guns as possible. The most common sub-machine guns in use by the enemy include American M3/M3A1 ("grease gun"), American M1928A1 ("Thompson"), French MAT 49 and the Chinese K-50, a direct copy of the Soviet PPSH K-43 model. The sub-machine gun member of the new family of weapons currently being introduced into North Vietnamese and main force units is the Chinese copy (Type 56) of the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle. Several other sub-machine guns of various nationalities including Swedish, British, Czech, German, Danish and Polish have been utilized by the Viet Cong.

- (a) AK-47 Assault Rifle (Chinese Type 56). The Soviet produced version is called the Kalashnikov assault rifle and is the basic individual weapon of the Soviet Army. The Chinese copy is called type 56 and chambers the Chinese Type 56 (Soviet M1943) 7.62mm cartridge. There are four versions of this weapon:

1. One piece machined receiver with wooden butt stock
2. One piece machined receiver with folding metal shoulder stock.
3. Multi piece machined receiver with wooden butt stock
4. Multi piece machined receiver with folding metal stock

The AK is a well built weapon and has a chrome plated bore. The AK can take a detachable knife type bayonet. The characteristics are:

Effective range (automatic): 300 meters  
 Effective range (semi-automatic): 400 meters  
 Rate of fire (automatic): 40 rounds per minute  
 Rate of fire (semi-automatic): 90-100 rds per minute  
 Weight: 10.58 pounds

- (b) K-50 sub-machine gun. The Chinese K-50 is a direct copy of the Soviet model PPSH 41. This is the most common sub-machine gun used by the Viet Cong in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. This weapon is recoil operated and has a high cyclic rate. It can be fired either automatic or semi-automatic. The weapon has been modified many times, and may either have a folding metal or wooden stock.

B-1-38

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLAS

The characteristics are:

Weight: 8.4 pounds

Cyclic rate of fire: 700-750 rounds per minute

- (c) Model 37 9mm sub-machine gun. This weapon is a direct Chinese copy of the U.S. M3A1 ("grease gun"). The weapon is recoil operated and can fire automatically only. The characteristics are:

Effective range: 50 meters

Weight: 8.8 pounds

- (d) Model 1943 PPs 7.62mm sub-machine gun. This Soviet weapon, called the "Sudayev", is a copy of the PPSH 41 or K-50 sub-machine gun. The stock is hinged and can be depressed. The weapon fires automatically, but can fire single shot by a pull of the trigger. The weapon fires from an open belt with the magazine in place. The characteristics are:

Effective range (short bursts): 200 meters

Effective range (long bursts): 100 meters

Weight (w/loaded magazine): 8.75 pounds

Weight (without loaded magazine): 6.25 pounds

Practical rate of fire: 100 rounds per minute

- (e) Carbine and rifle. The carbines and rifles carried by the enemy are about half comprised of captured weapons and half comprised of bloc, infiltrated weapons. The weapons recaptured from the enemy usually include large numbers of U.S. made M-1 and M-2 carbines, M-1 Garands and M-14 rifles. The guerrillas, irregulars and local forces are generally equipped with these older, captured weapons. The North Vietnamese and main force units are armed with the carbine member of the new small arms family, the SKS carbine, called Type 56 carbine by the Chinese, the Mossin Nagant Carbine chambering the Soviet M1908 7.62mm round and the German Mauser Model 98 Rifle chambering the German 7.92mm rifle cartridge.

- (a) SKS Carbine. Called Type 56 by the Chinese, this weapon was replaced by the AK assault rifle in the Soviet Army. This weapon is a rifle by American standards. It is air cooled, gas operated and is characterized by the bayonet which folds under the barrel. This well constructed weapon is identified by the triangular portion of the magazine extending through the lower side of the stock. The characteristics are:

Effective range: 400 meters

Maximum rate of fire: 35-40 rounds per minute

Weight (loaded): 8.84 pounds

B-1-39

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (b) Mossin-Nagant Carbine 7.62mm. This is currently the most common weapon in the enemy inventory. The Soviet version is called Model 1944 and the Chinese copy is called Type 53. The basic differences between the two are in identification markings and techniques of manufacture. The weapon is characterized by a bayonet which folds back on the right side of the barrel. This weapon is a single shot rifle loaded with a clip of five rounds. The characteristics are:

Effective range: 401 meters  
 Weight: 8.6 pounds  
 Rate of fire: 8-10 rounds per minute

- (9) Pistol. The enemy has an apparent preference for bloc produced pistols, but U.S. and French pistols have been captured. The most common American pistol used is the M1911A1 caliber .45 service pistol. Most enemy officers, NCOs and members of heavy weapons crews are armed with pistols.

- (a) Model 1927 7.65mm pistol. This Czechoslovak recoil operated pistol fires a .32 Colt automatic ammunition. The barrel is placed similarly as the barrel on the 7.65 Browning pistol and its firing mechanism is patterned after that of the small Mauser pistol. The characteristics are:

Weight (with magazine): 1.5 pounds  
 Magazine capacity: 8 rounds

- e. Recent and present activities. The current Viet Cong/NVA posture in the Quang Tin - Quang Ngai area will be developed by summarizing enemy operations and activities since August of 1965. Prior to this time, the Viet Cong had established a firm foundation favorable to the achievement of their objectives within this area. Most of western Quang Tin Province and Quang Ngai Province less the coastal lowlands were Viet Minh strongholds during the struggle against the French. When the French-Indo-Chinese War terminated in 1954, this area was largely under the influence of the Vietminh, and later their successors, the Viet Cong. The population was highly receptive to Viet Cong overtures and willingly provided manpower and materiel resources and moral support, to the extent of actively opposing pacification efforts by the RVN. The Viet Cong have even succeeded in establishing complete political hegemony over entire villages. Viet Cong educational, economic, political and sociological systems are in evidence in many parts of this area, especially in Southern Quang Ngai Province. The enemy has taken advantage of his influence by establishing an important headquarters, Military Region V in the center of this area and by maintaining an extensive and vital base, called the Do Xa War Zone in the western portion of this area, and several important lines of communications which service much of Military Region V as well as serving as vital links to enemy forces throughout central and southern Vietnam.

B-1-40

UNCLASSIFIED

AUGUST

- (1) By the beginning of August, the 1st VC Regiment, reinforced by combat support and service support elements had deployed from north central Quang Tin Province and was successfully campaigning in north central Quang Ngai Province. This unit operated in the quadrilateral area between the Song Tra Bong and Song Tra Khuc bounded by Tra Bong (BS 370880), Ha Thanh (BS 370700), Son Tinh (BS 630730) and Chau O (BS 590920). The regiment was in the final phase of a five phase plan designed to effect maximum attrition from ARVN and U.S. Forces in the area, provide support to the local Viet Cong effort and gain combat experience for newcomers to the unit. These objectives were to be accomplished through attacks, raids and ambushes. The unit, at this time was well armed, well supplied and had high morale. The 1st regiment had just successfully overrun an ARVN position at Ba Gia in the Song Tra Bong Valley, exacting heavy casualties from the post's defenders and destroying two reaction battalions from the RVN's general reserve in July. The bulk of the regiment retired eastward into the Van Tuong area (BS 700950) to briefly rest, resupply and assist local Viet Cong.
- (2) The remainder of the Quang Tin - Quang Ngai area was relatively quiet. The 70th Quang Tin Provincial Battalion, reinforced by district elements screened the 1st Regiment's move by positioning itself a little to the west and along the axis of Route #1. These elements also provided security for the 1st Regiment's vacated base areas. Concurrently with the 1st Regiment's deployment into Quang Ngai Province, the 2nd Viet Cong Regiment departed southern Quang Ngai Province and moved into the coastal areas of northern Binh Dinh Province to conduct operations. There, it was joined by the newly infiltrated 18th Regiment (NVA).
- (3) U.S. Forces detected the presence of the 1st Regiment and launched a large operation in the area on 18 August, "Starlight", surprising and surrounding the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong attempted organized resistance, but were routed and attempted to exfiltrate the battle area. Large numbers of wounded and stragglers fled south into the Batangan peninsular area (BS 780850) and other groups retreated west along the Song Tra Bong. The 60th and 80th Battalions of the regiment were decimated while the support elements and the 90th Battalion remained largely unengaged. VC casualties numbered in excess of 1,000 with at least 650 confirmed KIA.
- (4) Although the regiment was largely shattered and their campaign totally disrupted, remnants of the 1st Regiment displayed sufficient resiliency to overrun the ARVN outpost at An Hoa (BS 455874) on 31 August, only 7 days after contact was broken in the "Starlight" area.

B-1-41

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~SEPTEMBER

- (1) The 1st Regiment, considerably reduced in strength, moved back into its base areas in north central Quang Tin Province during September following a route 10 kms inland of and parallel to Route #1. After returning to its home areas, the battalions of the 1st Regiment rested briefly, then commenced an extensive recruiting and training program to reconstitute their depleted formations. Weapons and equipment were refurbished, and food stuffs, ammunition and equipment were stockpiled, all in preparation for future operations. The regiment remained combat ineffective throughout the month. The shattered 60th Battalion moved to the Phuoc Chau area (BT 005095) and the equally shattered 80th Battalion moved into an area south of Hill 159 (BT 277155). The 90th Battalion, considered the Regiment's best remained in Southern Ly Tin District. This unit was not hurt in the "Star-light" engagement.
- (2) The 45th Battalion probably accompanied the 606th Battalion into the Phuoc Chau area and then continued into the area of Military Region V Headquarters (BS 110920) reverting to control of MR V. This battalion had recently been formed from elements of other units, largely the 400th Artillery Battalion, and was tailored as a heavy weapons support element, subordinate to MR V, but often attached wholly or piecemeal to main force units.
- (3) The wounded and stragglers from "Starlight" who had exfiltrated south, were concentrated in the heavily fortified Cape Batangan area along with local force elements. They were attacked on 7 September by a large combined USMC-ARVN Force, in operation "Piranha". The operational area was bounded by (BS 670750) (BS 680850) (BS 760880) (BS 780810). Friendly forces encountered several heavily fortified platoon and company positions, and numerous caves, bunkers and tunnels. The Viet Cong lost 167 KIA, 21 captured and 109 weapons as a result of "Piranha."
- (4) Overall Viet Cong activities in the two province area increased during September. While the main force units remained in base areas, local force elements conducted operations primarily designed to maintain VC influence and interdict lines of communications. Harassment, anti-aircraft fire and mining accounted for nearly 75% of the total incidents. Enemy attacks declined by 33%. In Quang Tin Province, one quarter of the incidents were minings, with the majority of these occurring within a three mile radius of Hill 159. (BT 277155).

B-1-42

UNCLASSIFIED



- (5) The VC conducted several attacks against para-military outposts in Quang Ngai Province. The largest effort was conducted against three RF/PF posts in Nghia Hanh District on 26 September which resulted in substantial enemy losses including 48 KIA. The Son My Outpost in eastern Son Tinh District was the target of 50% of the harassing mortar fire incidents.
- (6) Viet Cong activity directed against the Chu Lai complex was small scale and harassing in nature during the month.

OCTOBER

- (1) VC initiated activity increased sharply during the latter part of October both in frequency and tempo. There were six attacks in Quang Tin, all occurring during the last two weeks of the month and a total of twelve attacks in Quang Ngai, eleven of which occurred in late October. The low level of VC activity during early October can be attributed to their pre-occupation with the rice harvest which was largely completed by mid month. The increase in Quang Ngai was due to the concerted effort by provincial and district elements to maintain VC influence in the area since the 1st and 2nd Regiments had both left the province. This economy of force tactic had been successfully used by the VC many times previously. Harassing fire incidents continued to increase, especially anti-aircraft fire. Bridge sabotage increased in Quang Tin, while road sabotage correspondingly decreased, probably because the heavy rainfall impaired bridge repair attempts more than road repairs.
- (2) Enemy personnel losses decreased significantly during the month. By the end of October, VC strength in Quang Tin had increased 15% from September. The VC in both provinces conducted extensive recruiting and training. More weapons were provided to local guerrilla elements, some of whom previously, had but one weapon for every three men.
- (3) The major action during the month was the VC raid against the Chu Lai airfield. A few minutes past midnight on 28 October, an 11 member VC demolitions squad penetrated the complex and destroyed or damaged eight A-4 aircraft parked at the northern edge of the airstrip. This raid coincided almost to the minute with a similar raid against the Marble Mountain Air Facility in the Da Nang TACR. The entire enemy force was killed or captured, but the VC had achieved a significant propaganda and psychological gain at a proportionately minimal cost, which was their apparent objective.
- (4) The 1st VC Regiment remained in its extensive base areas during October conducting no significant offensive operations. The 60th Battalion deployed eastward into Thang Binh District (BT 115270) joining the 70th Battalion. There were no significant troop movements in Quang Ngai Province.

SECRET

The Viet Cong Quang Ngai Provincial Headquarters moved into the mountainous Nui Dan Den area of Western Son Tinh District (BS 4383) probably to avoid friendly pressure in the Batangan area, their former headquarters. Nui Da Den has been a VC base area for some time and was utilized by the Vietminh as early as 1951.

- (5) The majority of VC activity in northern Quang Ngai occurred in the Nui Da Den area and the coastal strip of eastern Binh Son and Son Tinh Districts. In Southern Quang Ngai, considerable enemy activity was centered in the Sa Huynh area (BS 9322) of Southern Duc Pho District.

NOVEMBER

- (1) The Viet Cong effort in the two province area dramatically increased in intensity and magnitude during November. The enemy launched two regimental sized attacks, one each in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai and deployed major elements of two and possibly three regiments into Southern Quang Ngai. There was a decrease in small scale activity, in Quang Tin, but Quang Ngai experienced a significant increase in the same category primarily involving isolated RF/PF outposts south of the Song Tra Khuc. Commensurate with this intense activity, enemy casualties increased by nearly 1,000 from October and the VC lost several heavy caliber, crew served weapons and important items of ordnance and communications equipment. Late October's relatively high rate of VC activity continued to mid-November and then sharply increased.
- (2) Documents captured in Southern Quang Ngai indicated the VC had programmed two regimental attacks, only 18 hours apart for 17 November. The concepts of both were similar, attack and seizure of an isolated ARVN outpost and subsequent ambush and destruction of the reinforcing reaction force. The striking feature of this plan was that one outpost was located in Northern Quang Tin at Hiep Duc (AT 9124) and the other in Southern Quang Ngai at Van Ly (BS 714438), a distance of 80 miles. (The attacks were apparently intended to divide the assets of the 2nd ARVN Div and destroy them piecemeal. This would have been the most ambitious undertaking yet by the VC in the two province area and, if successful, would have been a major victory. However, the VC delayed the Quang Ngai attack probably because it had been compromised.
- (3) The attack at Hiep Duc was a two pronged effort involving the 1st Regiment reinforced by heavy automatic and indirect fire weapons elements, the 70th Battalion and local force elements. In a diversionary attack, an estimated VC battalion overran an RF Company outpost just north of Tam Ky, and then broke contact before dawn. Meanwhile to the northwest near Hiep Duc, the enemy had successfully sealed the battlefield to the north with Quang Nam province forces, to the east with the 70th Battalion and to the south and west with assault and ambush forces.

UNCLASSIFIED

The 90th Battalion overran Hiep Duc early on the 17th, destroying the district town and killing most of the defenders. It immediately withdrew to the southeast and the 60th, 80th and elements of the 45th Battalions remained in ambush positions on the high ground surrounding the avenues of approach into Hiep Duc. The ARVN reaction force was supported by numerous effective airstrikes and avoided the ambush areas as it deployed into the Hiep Duc Area. In the subsequent two-week operation, the VC were driven from the area losing 363 KIA and 86 weapons.

- (4) Largely utilizing recently infiltrated forces from Binh Dinh Province, the VC launched a regimental size attack against the 37th Rangers and an RF Company at Thach Tri (BS 7746) on 22 November. The enemy force included elements from the 9th Battalion of the 18th Regiment (NVA), possibly elements from the Quyet Tam Regiment, elements from the 2nd VC Regiment, heavy weapons support detachments from the 45th Battalion, and several local force units utilized primarily in support roles such as scouts, guides and porters. There were several indications that the VC underestimated the post's defenses. The actual assault was launched at first light, a very uncommon VC tactic. The VC also positioned their 75mm Recoilless Rifles near the outer tactical wire. Alerted by the captured documents, the Rangers were in prepared and strengthened positions, but still required intensive air support and naval gunfire to break repeated VC assaults. When it was apparent that their attempt to force the position had failed, the VC withdrew through the valley southwest of Thach Tru (BS 7043), leaving 225 KIA and 84 weapons behind.
- (5) Significant contact during November was also made near Viet An (BT 018270) during the last two weeks and at the large VC base area near Vinh Tuy (BS 453838) on 13 November.
- (6) Evidence gathered later indicated the enemy began deploying NVA elements in the Quang Tin - Quang Nam border area during November. The 36th Regiment of the 308th NVA Division moved into Que Son District, just north of Quang Tin and the 195th AA Battalion also of the 308th NVA Division joined the 1st Regiment, adding 18 12.7mm AA guns to its arsenal.

#### DECEMBER

- (1) Increased VC/NVA strength made itself felt in the Quang Tin-Quang Ngai area during December as the enemy launched and sustained a steady, if sporadic, offensive which achieved a large measure of success in Southern Quang Ngai Province. A major friendly operation in Northern Quang Tin, "Harvest Moon" apparently kept enemy forces sufficiently off balance to prevent a general offensive in this area.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

However, as December ended, the enemy could count substantial gains in the two province area: The VC held two district towns, Minh Long (BS 526503), which they overran on 29 December, and Hiep Duc, which the ARVN abandoned in early December; they had successfully interdicted lines of communications throughout Southern Quang Ngai Province and they had overrun several outposts exacting high attrition from the defenders, especially in Southern Quang Ngai. These victories gave the enemy virtual control of Quang Ngai south of the Song Tra Khuc and demoralized ARVN and government supporters in this area.

- (2) The 1st Regiment was on the verge of attacking key government installations in Northern Quang Tin and Southern Quang Nam Provinces in early December when operation "Harvest Moon" pre-empted their plans. The significance of the operation was that USMC and ARVN Forces, supported by numerous air strikes and four B-52 raids, successfully penetrated the extensive base area of the 1st Regiment and Quang Tin local VC elements which had been exclusive enemy territory for a number of months. The operation was generally conducted in the area enclosed by Que Son (BT 030335), Hiep Duc, Tien Phuoc (BT 100160) and Thang Binh (BT 170415). The operation was initiated in the early afternoon of 8 December when the 70th Battalion ambushed and routed the 11th Rangers (ARVN) enroute to the objective area (BT 0934). The following day, elements of the 1st Regiment destroyed an ARVN Battalion (BT 123330). The VC also contested the helicopter assault by F/2/1 (USMC) on 10 December (BT 084324). However, they were eventually overwhelmed by subsequent reinforcements and numerous air strikes. The VC exfiltrated the area to the west and south, when possible, with only rear guard elements and scattered small units opposing friendly forces who conducted methodical searches of the area and exploited the B-52 strikes uncovering and destroying numerous logistical complexes. The final significant action of the operation occurred on 18 December when an enemy force of 400, largely the 80th Battalion attacked 2/7 (USMC) at Ky Phy (BT 2122) as the Marines moved toward Route #1. The attack was repulsed at high cost to the enemy. "Harvest Moon" resulted in 454 confirmed VC killed, 636 possibly killed, 78 VC captured, 100 possibly wounded and 3 ralliers. The enemy's equipment losses were substantial including 95 individual weapons, 13 crew served weapons, 45 tons of rice, 11 tons of tea, 3500 meters and 40 bolts of cloth, 600 complete uniforms, 4 AN/PRC 10 radios and 5000 meters of communications wire.
- (3) Although "Harvest Moon" crippled enemy capabilities in Northern Quang Tin, the VC and PAVN activities continued nearly unabated throughout the rest of the two province area. The VC reached new highs in levels of activity in all categories during December. The frequency and magnitude rate of enemy operations during the month was highest of 1965.

B-1-46

UNCLASSIFIED

- (4) As December ended, the enemy had deployed sizeable forces at the flanks of the two province area with two regiments in Northern Quang Tin (1st VC and 36th NVA) and possibly three regiments in Southern Quang Ngai (2nd VC, 18th NVA and possibly Quyet Tam) and was steadily applying pressure inward.

# JANUARY

- (1) Enemy activity abated somewhat in the two province area from December, although still maintaining a relatively high level. The decrease in activity in Quang Tin can be attributed to the recuperation process of the 1st Regiment after operation "Harvest Moon" and in Quang Ngai to the deployment south into Binh Dinh Province of the 18th Regiment (NVA) and probably the Quyet Tam Regiment beginning in mid month.
- (2) The 1st Regiment and supporting elements reoccupied the "Harvest Moon" operational area after withdrawal of friendly elements and for the second time in five months, underwent a rebuilding program to bring the units back to an acceptable manpower and material strength level. The unit had to resort to upgrading local and guerrilla forces to meet personnel requirements. The 36th NVA Regiment was not contacted by friendly forces during January but was the subject of numerous intelligence reports fixing its location astride the Quang Tin - Quang Nam border west and north of Que Son. The most significant enemy attack in Quang Tin occurred on 19 January when a VC force of unknown size mortared a refugee center in Tam Ky and overran a nearby new life village.
- (3) VC initiated activity remained very light in the vicinity of the Chu Lai TAOR throughout the month. The largest enemy effort was a 30-man attack against a reinforced squad from B/1/4 (USMC) in an ambush position (BT 458143) on 27 January. Evidence continued to accumulate that the 94th Battalion, generally located at (BT 4000), had the mission of harassing USMC and ARVN outposts near Chu Lai, and served as the headquarters and base camp for enemy forces participating in this task.
- (4) The ~~VC~~ NVA campaign in Southern Quang Ngai continued into January but decreased toward the end of the month as sizeable enemy forces moved southward into Binh Dinh. In a series of attacks in early January, the enemy overran ARVN outposts guarding the vital Cong Hoa Bridge south of Quang Ngai City and temporarily seized control of the bridge itself. The VC also again attacked an outpost near the Son Ha District Town. VC activity in Quang Ngai reached its pinnacle on 17 January when the enemy initiated three separate incidents. The VC overran an observation post of a government outpost defended by an RF Company, five miles southwest of Quang Ngai City and attacked the outpost itself.

SECRET

Later in the day, the enemy delivered 20-25 rounds of mortar fire against the 2nd ARVN Division Headquarters in Quang Ngai City while nearby Son Tinh District town was simultaneously subjected to a light probing attack. Enemy activity shifted northward to the Tra Bong Valley when reports were received of a regimental sized buildup in the area (BS 4186). On 28 January, the VC overran an outpost south of the Song Tra Bong (BS 405874) and then ambushed a company sized reaction force with an estimated battalion, causing 50% casualties to the friendly force.

f. Time and Space.

- (1) General. For the purposes of this estimate, the time and space computations must be based on a minimal number of assumptions. Setting aside the numerous possibilities and variables associated with time and space considerations, the enemy is assessed the maximum practical capability for speed of movement, of 25 miles per 24 hour period. This capability should be considered a general constant applicable to all types of enemy units involved, terrain considerations, weather conditions, tactical mission of the enemy unit, and similar factors.

g. Logistical Considerations.

- (1) General. The enemy logistical system is considered rudimentary by western standards, but it has proven equal to the task of supporting positional warfare albeit over relatively short periods of time. The system has also proven capable of sustaining a protracted insurgency while simultaneously providing steadily increasing numbers of fully equipped personnel from bases in North Vietnam many miles away. Usually lacking modern equipment, the enemy relies heavily on expedients to maintain his logistical system.
- (2) Base areas. The base area concept is fundamental to the enemy logistical system. Among the base areas inherited by the Viet Cong from the Vietminh was the Do Xa area which is generally centered on the point of contact of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai and Kontum Provinces including the headquarters area of Military Region V (BS 110920). In addition, to these relatively secure areas which contain stockpiles and some fabrication facilities, both Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces have supply installations for support of provincial forces. The district commands also maintain supply installations for their forces. Supplies in significant amounts are also hidden by natives in villages and hamlets controlled by the VC. The main force and North Vietnamese units subordinate to MR V, with the exception of the 1st Regiment, generally do not maintain supply facilities. They

UNCLASSIFIED

utilize those of other VC commands and activities when necessary.

(3) Lines of Communication and Infiltration. The infiltration of men and materiel is perhaps the most efficient and sophisticated in the enemy logistical system. The areas and routes used by the VC and NVA for infiltration and supply are difficult to detect because of natural and artificial camouflage. The infiltration routes are studded with bases, supply depots and liaison checkpoints. Movement along this overland network is managed by VC liaison personnel who control the operation from bases enroute and checkpoints, most of which have VC armed protection. Security measures during the infiltration process are very stringent. Infiltrators are not allowed to talk to their guides or station cadre or keep diaries. Inquiries as to locations, destinations or local information are prohibited. The infiltration structure is compartmentalized so that compromise of one way station or segment of the route will not necessarily result in the compromise of the entire route. The Nam Son Transportation Battalion is primarily involved in maintenance of the infiltration route transiting Quang Tin Province near Route #14.

(a) Transportation. Although the VC rely almost entirely on human porters for any overland movement of supplies, they are quick to take advantage of any means of transportation consistent with security. Reports have been received of the VC using oxen or buffalo drawn carts, commandeered vehicles, and even elephants in some of the remote areas. Motorized transportation is frequently in areas under firm VC control. Any land route or waterway, however rudimentary or developed, is an actual or potential Viet Cong line of communication.

(b) Land Routes. Points of entry for personnel infiltration lie primarily in northwestern South Vietnam. Movement is across and around the western end of the DMZ. The infiltration has occurred primarily into and through Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces to the Do Xa Base Area. From there, dispersion throughout South Vietnam takes place over the most suitable, usually hinterland, distributary routes. The infiltrators usually carry specialized medical, ordnance and signal items not locally available. These personnel routes have not been used to any appreciable extent for the infiltration of bulk quantities of weapons, ammunition or other war material. The principal means of introducing bulky or heavy military materiel into South Vietnam has been via sea infiltration from North Vietnam.

(c) Sea Routes. There are few sea infiltration routes terminating in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. The only suspected developed sea infiltration point is located on the Batangan in eastern Binh Son District of Quang Ngai Province. The sea infiltration system originates in the North Vietnamese panhandle.

SECRET

Tiger Island located near the DMZ has served as an important way station. Boats from the south have transloaded cargoes from North Vietnamese craft at Tiger Island and at sea. Later these boats have joined RVN fishing fleets and passed safely through movement controls. Since 1965, ports in the Tonkin Delta near Haiphong have been used more frequently as departure points for boats carrying supplies to the Viet Cong. In some instances, larger craft have passed north of Hainan Island before turning south. Smaller craft from the south rendezvous with these boats 100 to 200 miles off the RVN coast and then return clandestinely to shore.

- (d) River Routes. Many estuaries and related canals and tidal waters along the RVN coast serve as infiltration points, both for local and off shore feeder traffic. Most Viet Cong movement on waterways occurs at night. There is no evidence of river infiltration in Quang Tin Province, primarily because of a lack of suitable rivers. There is evidence of a limited amount of infiltration on the waterways of Quang Ngai Province, such as near Song Tra Bong.
- (4) Estimated Enemy Requirements. The enemy requirements will be broken down by U.S. Designated classes of supply. Estimates will also be determined of the amount of material of each class each individual in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Province requires to enable the enemy to sustain his current level of intensity. The enemy strength figure utilized includes all confirmed, probable and possible forces operating in the two province area plus the irregular and guerrilla elements and the 36th (NVA), 18th (NVA), Quyet Tam (NVA) and 2nd (VC) Regiments. Thus, the strength figure of 27,248 allows for variances which would tend to either raise or lower this figure.
- (a) Class I. The enemy is considered to require 2 1/2 pounds per day per man of Class I supplies to maintain the current level of operations. Based on this factor, the enemy's daily class I needs are computed to be 68,120 pounds or 34.6 tons. All food requirements for the Viet Cong are satisfied from in-country sources. Prior to June 1965, the VC military units were required to furnish their own subsistence for a period of four months per year, with the other eight months subsistence provided by the rear echelons to the units. From June 1963 to June 1964 the RVN required the units to be entirely self sufficient either through production, local purchases, pilferage or capture. Since June 1964, combat units provide only 50% of their own subsistence with the remaining 50% being furnished by rear services. Local production in Quang Tin Province is not considered sufficient to sustain the civilian populace, Vietnamese military requirements and VC and NVA units operating in the area. Quang Tin has been an importer of Class I primarily because of enemy success in securing sufficient rice for themselves. However, operations during the rice harvest of late 1965 denied the enemy his required rice supply. Quang Ngai Province has not had to import rice as of this time.

UNCLASSIFIED



Enemy forces in the agriculturally poor central highlands to the south have drawn from Quang Ngai's harvest. The basic ration for the Vietnamese soldier is about 1 1/2 pounds of rice per day supplemented by fish, pork, manioc, maize and sweet potatoes.

- (b) Class II. North Vietnamese forces require 1 pound per man per day and Viet Cong 1/2 pound per man per day of class two supplies to sustain the present level of operations. Based on the strength factors of 6500 North Vietnamese and 20,748 Viet Cong in the two province area, the enemy requires 16,874 pounds or 8.43 tons per day of class II supplies. Weapons are the primary class II items of external or out of country required by enemy forces. Although the initial arms and ammunition of the Viet Cong came from hidden caches, the VC became dependent upon locally captured weapons during their early period of development. In early 1961, the VC began to augment their in-country procurement through the introduction of U.S., French and Japanese weapons from North Vietnam. As the stockpiles of these weapons were depleted from the VC and their strength increased, North Vietnam was forced to introduce Bloc weapons by various means. Although no accurate estimate can be made on the extent of weapons infiltration, it should be noted that there appears to be no shortage of weapons in enemy units. Also, it is estimated a minimum of 60% of the irregulars are armed. Enemy external requirements have amounted to roughly 12-15% of total requirements. However, this figure may have increased to 20-25% with the accelerated personnel infiltration.
- (c) Class III. POL requirements for the enemy in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai are considered minimal and are filled from in-country resources. The primary need for POL is for motorized junks, generators at command posts and limited vehicular movement.
- (d) Class V. North Vietnamese forces require 1 pound per man per day and Viet Cong require 1/4 pound per man per day of Class V to sustain the current level of intensity. Based on the breakdown between NVA and VC forces, the enemy's total requirement is computed at 7018 pounds or 3.5 tons per day in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. This figure represents the absolute minimum because a factor of 1-15 pounds per man per day for enemy support and heavy weapons units was not considered. There is no valid estimate on the extent of ammunition infiltration into RVN from external sources. DIA estimates that the basic load for a Viet Cong infantry battalion armed with Bloc weapons is approximately 7.9 tons. Computations for NVA forces indicate that one third of each battalion engages in combat every tenth day, each element expending one third of its share of the battalion's basic load. This amounts to the pound per day per man consumption figure mentioned previously. From these figures Viet Cong engagement frequencies and expenditure rates may be approximated.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (e) Other Class II and Class IV Supplies. The VC requirement for other Class II supplies (chemical, engineer, medical, ordnance, quartermaster and signal) and for Class IV supplies (fortifications and other building materials) are primarily procured from in country resources. It is estimated the enemy in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai requires 1000 pounds or .5 ton per day to sustain his present level of operations.
1. Medical. A well organized but complicated enemy medical system capable of operating efficiently within the existing limitations of insufficient technical personnel and inadequate medical facilities currently support enemy activity. Trained personnel as required and available are assigned or attached to military, political or civic action programs. Facilities are not fixed and the utmost use is made of hasty field medical services, native medicinals and field expedient materiel. The medical system can maintain a reasonable level of medical care for the military and also for the civilian sick and wounded. In addition, medical care has proved to be an effective propaganda device for the VC. Medical equipment and supplies from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Communist China have been captured in the RVN, but most medical supplies required by the enemy are locally available.
2. Communications. The VC are formalizing a radio communication system based on stable net structures which can be characterized as relatively secure, highly mobile, simple, multi-purpose and growing in sophistication. Heavy reliance is placed upon radio and couriers, while wire is rarely used. VC communications personnel are carefully selected, above average in intelligence and loyal, and receive higher pay than other troops. The communication system serves political, propaganda, military and intelligence activities in a variety of net arrangements. The VC are currently operating 100 (about) radio stations within the RVN or near its borders. Additionally, message formats have been improved and stable net structures have been established. Low power and short transmission times are also characteristic of the system, with CW the prevalent type of emission.
- (5) Conclusions.
- (a) To maintain their current level of activity in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces, the enemy consumes 45.6 tons of supplies per day. However, as long as the supply infiltration system from North Vietnam can freely transit Cambodia and Laos, the infiltration system is considered capable of supplying out of country requirements.

UNCLASSIFIED

While the Viet Cong logistical system is austere by western standards, it is capable of supporting in-country forces indefinitely at the current level of activity. Current enemy forces should be capable of engaging in intensified activity at frequent intervals for the foreseeable future and maintaining the present level of activity indefinitely, based on their present and projected logistical capabilities.

h. Personnel Considerations.

- (1) General. Personnel factors affecting the enemy situation are difficult to assess since South Vietnam has had no enumerative national census and reliable demographic data is lacking. The percentages and estimates cited below are, of necessity, approximations. The enemy personnel situation is fluid and contingent upon the local and tactical situation and, in some measure, on the theater and strategic situation.
- (2) Ethnic Factors. The enemy effort has been directed toward achieving the support of ethnic Vietnamese and the various ethnic tribesmen inhabiting the highlands of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Province. Although homogeneity between the Vietnamese and Montagnards is lacking, both will be considered generically for purposes of this paragraph of the estimate. (See sub-paragraph f., Sociology, to Paragraph 2. Characteristics of the Area of Operations).
- (3) Availability of personnel with special skills. Because the population of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces is largely unskilled and agrarian in nature, local availability of personnel with special skills is considered minimal. Government trained personnel are imported from other areas of South Vietnam for utilization in the two-province area. The VNAF contains most of these personnel. The enemy utilizes personnel from North Vietnam to satisfy their requirement for personnel with special skills.
- (4) Replacement Potential. When the Viet Cong initiated their infiltration program from the north to support the increasing insurgency in South Vietnam, they relied on personnel native to the south who had gone north after the 1954 Geneva Treaty. These personnel were largely assigned to their home areas in the South. Attrition reduced this manpower resource to the degree that it is no longer considered significant. As the war intensified, the Viet Cong increasingly drew upon native northerners to join their ranks and, beginning in early 1965, North Vietnamese Army units regularly entered South Vietnam.

SECRET

Throughout the course of the insurgency, the enemy has recruited locally for military, paramilitary, and political units.

- (a) Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Replacement Potential. The maximum total population figure available to the enemy in the two province area is computed as follows: The total population of the two province area is 1,006,153 (Quang Tin 355,849 and Quang Ngai 650,304). For purposes of this estimate, this figure includes the military, paramilitary and militia force local to the area (CIDG, PF, RF and National Police). The remaining total of 722,292 are considered under enemy control, under neither enemy nor government control or are in areas currently undergoing pacification. The national average of population comprising the civilian labor force and also the average between the ages of 15 and 44 is approximately 45% of the population. This, 325,031 fall in this category and are considered suitable for utilization by the Viet Cong (143,129 Quang Tin and Quang Ngai 181,903). There are presently an estimated 15,316 locals of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces already in enemy units (Quang Tin 4552 and Quang Ngai 10,764). This figure includes local force and guerrilla units and 25% of main force units which are estimated to be locally recruited.
- (b) Conclusions. From the above computations, a total of 309,716 (Quang Tin 138,577 and Quang Ngai 171,139) comprise the potentially available manpower pool for enemy forces in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. This figure represents a maximum personnel availability total and must be considered tentative because of the imprecision of the base data used in the computations. If the estimate errs, it errs high since the entire population not actually under government control was considered available to the enemy, since the total numbers of RF, PF, CIDG, and National Police in the area were not considered separately and since the total numbers already actively in enemy units is probably higher than the figures quoted. While it appears that the VC recruiting program in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces has been successful in providing replacements from local resources, recent increases in the number of ralliers indicates that the VC are experiencing difficulty in motivating personnel toward military service. It is known that the VC have impressed large numbers of the local population into porter service. No information is available on the degree of success of this program.

B-1-54

UNCLASSIFIED

i. Reinforcements. See sub-paragraph a, Enumeration, to paragraph 4, Enemy Capabilities, to this study.)

j. Peculiarities and Weaknesses.

(1) Weaknesses. The weaknesses of the enemy are largely attributable to his transitory nature and the relatively primitive equipment and weapons he must use.

- (a) The enemy has a vulnerable logistical system. He is susceptible to food control measures since his food procurement is entirely from South Vietnam. He is dependent on a long, intricate and clandestine infiltration system for most war materials. Reliance on human and animal transport limits the size and quantity of war materials deliverable at a given time. The enemy logistical system is unable to provide sufficient logistical support for a sustained offensive or defensive operation involving significant numbers of forces.
- (b) The command and coordination structure of the enemy is relatively tenuous and undeveloped. Primarily because of limited communications facilities, the enemy has not demonstrated the capability of coordinated action over a large area. However, the enemy is engaged in an intensive program to improve his command and control structure, and it is expected that this capability will be strengthened.
- (c) The enemy is tactically inflexible and is largely unable to react to rapid, unexpected developments in the tactical situation. This weakness stems from the enemy's insistence on minutely planned and carefully rehearsed operations. Deviations from a plan are difficult because of the rigidity of the system.
- (d) The enemy is vulnerable to sustained combat and aggressive pursuit partly because of his inflexibility and partly because he does not have the requisite logistical support for large scale mobile warfare.
- (e) The enemy has difficulty in massing because friendly air mobility provides the means to rapidly bring combat power to bear.
- (f) The mobility of the enemy is adequate for relatively low level offensive operations but it is insufficient for large size, decisive operations.
- (g) The enemy is usually at a disadvantage in fire power to friendly forces because of limited supplies of heavy caliber weapons and ammunition.

**SECRET**

- (h) The enemy is susceptible to psychological warfare operations since his morale is adversely affected by deprivation, hardships, constant moving, constant bombardment and harassment and recent heavy attrition.
- (i) The enemy has no offensive or defensive air support.
- (j) The enemy has no armor and consequently lacks the fire power and shock action of armor in his attack formation.

k. Assistance from neighboring forces.

- (1) General. The help which enemy forces in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces can receive from enemy forces outside the area of operations other than reinforcements is primarily logistical, although enemy operations in contiguous areas can influence the tactical situation in the two province area.
- (a) Logistical. Enemy forces in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai rely in large measure on North Vietnam for the supply of weapons, ammunition and materiel. This aid is vital to their war effort since in-country resources are largely captured weapons and equipment. The enemy can also receive food stuffs from neighboring areas. The coastal areas of northeastern Binh Dinh Province and the delta of eastern Quang Nam Province are rich rice producing areas and surpluses from this area can be provided to enemy forces in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. The integrity of the enemy's extensive out of country infiltration system is dependent upon North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao control of the Laotian panhandle where the routes are located. This assistance from neighboring forces is essential to the enemy.
- (b) Operational. Enemy activities in the contiguous Vietnamese provinces and in the adjacent Laotian panhandle influence the tactical situation in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin. One of the most vital enemy functions, as mentioned above, is to keep in-country and out of country supply system operational. Neighboring enemy forces have also interdicted lines of communications servicing Quang Tin-Quang Ngai, especially coastal Route #1 and the paralleling railroad. The enemy forces in Quang Nam Province have established control over Route #14 which transits western Quang Tin and enemy forces in Kontim Province control Route #74 which services southern Quang Ngai Province west of Thach Tru. Recent enemy activities in northern Binh Dinh have influenced the tactical situation in Quang Ngai.

B-1-56

**UNCLASSIFIED**

The pattern of enemy activity and movements in this area suggest that the enemy is treating southern Quang Ngai and northeastern Binh Dinh as an integral tactical area although the RVN government has established a Corps boundary along the provincial boundary.

- (c) Conclusion. Since Quang Tin and Quang Ngai are but two of the 11 provinces within Military Region V operational and administrative control, enemy forces in the two province area can receive personnel and materiel assistance from the MR V area with a minimum of difficulty.

1. Other Factors.

(1) North Vietnamese Air.

- (a) Although it has not as yet been utilized, it is conceivable the enemy forces in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces could be supported by aircraft from North Vietnamese airfields. The aircraft with the requisite range to conduct operations in this area include Bat (TU-2), Beagle (IL-28) and Beast (IL-10) bombers and Fresco (MIG-17), Fagot (MIG-15) and Farmer (MIG-19) fighter and ground support aircraft.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Enumeration.

(1) Attack.

- (a) The enemy can attack the Chu Lai TAOR with one confirmed regiment, three confirmed battalions and 10 confirmed companies with a total attacking strength of 4059. The attack can be coordinated by MR V Headquarters. The enemy could possibly employ in his attack the following unconfirmed units: One regiment and one regimental headquarters and five battalions increasing the total attacking strength to 7439.
- (b) In conjunction with or independently of the above capability, the enemy can also:
1. Employ suicide and/or demolitions units against vital installations within the TAOR including aircraft parking areas, POL storage areas, ammunition supply points and command and control areas;
  2. Interdict lines of communications within the two province area at a time and place of his choosing with any combination of forces located in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

3. Conduct low-level offensive operations including harassment, sabotage, raids, ambushes, terrorism, propaganda and agitation at a time and place of his choosing with any combination of forces located in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces; and
4. As a counter-reconnaissance or deceptive measure, evade significant contact with superior friendly forces in order to protect the integrity of his force, and to destroy smaller friendly forces distant from reinforcing units, particularly during periods of low visibility.

(2) Reinforce.

- (a) The enemy can reinforce his attack against the Chu Lai TAOR within 48 hours after commencing movement or from a distance of 50 miles from Chu Lai with the following units: four confirmed battalions, one unconfirmed battalion and ten confirmed companies. Total reinforcing strength is 4820.
- (b) The enemy can reinforce his attack capabilities 4a(1)(b)1, 4a(1)(b)2, 4a(1)(b)3 and 4a(1)(b)4 with any combination of forces not initially committed from Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces.

(3) Defend.

- (a) The enemy can defend his vital installations, tactical positions, and controlled areas immediately with the forces locally available and within 24 hours with all units within a 25 mile radius of the defensive position.
- (4) Continue to improve his force structure in preparation of higher level operations in Phase III conventional warfare by infiltrating new units from North Vietnam and upgrading local forces and main force units.

b. Analysis and discussion. The evidence considered in the analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities includes the factors which favor or militate against their adoption by the enemy. Each capability as enumerated in the preceeding paragraph is discussed specifically.

(1) Attack.

- (a) Adoption of this capability would offer the enemy the opportunity for a decisive victory with the attendant psychological and political advantages.

B-1-58

UNCLASSIFIED



However, execution of this capability would probably result in prohibitive casualties and would be unlikely to succeed, thus dealing the enemy a significant psychological and political setback. The enemy does not have the requisite fire support nor the requisite logistical base to sustain such an operation. His reluctance to mass large numbers of forces further militates against execution of this capability.

(b) These related capabilities will be discussed individually below:

1. This capability offers the enemy an opportunity for a local victory with a potential high propaganda advantage at a minimal risk to the integrity of his forces. In conjunction with an attack, execution of this capability enhances the possibility of a successful attack.
2. This capability is a preferred VC tactic since it results in maximum damage to friendly capabilities at a minimum cost to the enemy in personnel and material resources. Most of the lines of communications are either relatively lightly defended or undefended. Adoption of this capability gives the enemy the advantage of surprise and the choice of objectives. It allows the enemy time for planning, training and rehearsals prior to the attack. There are no factors which militate against this capability.
3. Indications which favor this capability are the enemy knowledge of the terrain including avenues of approach, routes of withdrawal and ambush sites, the Viet Cong knowledge of the local populace, the enemy capability to keep targets under surveillance at close range, the availability of relatively secure bases from which to operate, the enemy awareness that actions of this nature tend to erode friendly manpower, morale and material resources. At present, there are no factors that militate against this capability.
4. This is a basic enemy tactic. It is a successful economy of force tactic providing the enemy the opportunity to inflict maximum damage on friendly forces at the lowest cost while the enemy is least vulnerable to friendly air superiority, fire support, mobility and rapid reinforcement. There are no factors which militate against execution of this capability at the present time.

SECRET(2) Reinforce.

- (a) The factors favoring the adoption of this capability are the same as those favoring the attack against the Chu Lai enclave. Indications which militate against execution of this capability are those listed in the attack capability plus the fact that utilizing these forces would denude the remainder of the two province area of enemy forces thereby resulting in a potential loss of enemy influence in the vacated areas.
- (b) The indication which favors execution of this capability is that it increases the probability of a successful attack. Factors militating against the adoption of this capability include those listed under the attack capability plus the fact that utilizing these forces would denude the areas which they vacated thereby possibly resulting in the loss of VC influence in those areas.

(3) Defend.

- (a) Indications which favor adoption of this capability are the enemy knowledge of the terrain, the enemy capability to keep opposing forces under close surveillance, the enemy prerogative of selecting the battle area and the protection of vital areas necessary to sustain the enemy's war effort. Indications which militate against adoption of this capability are the reluctance of the Viet Cong to mass forces and stand and fight, except under conditions of his choosing, the limited supporting arms capability of the enemy and the enemy awareness of friendly mobility and fire support and reinforcement capabilities.
- (4) This is a necessary capability for the enemy to adopt if he is to sustain and intensify his current level of operations. It is dependent on the infiltration system to provide the necessary manpower and material resources to accomplish this upgrading and increased strength.

5. CONCLUSIONS.a. Relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities.

- (1) The enemy will probably adopt a combination of capabilities 4a(1)(b)1, 4a(1)(b)2, 4a(1)(b)3, 4a(1)(b)4 and 4a(1)(4).
- (2) The next likely capability the enemy will probably execute is either capability 4a(2)(b) or 4a(3)(a) or both.

B-1-60

UNCLASSIFIED

- (3) The least likely capability the enemy will probably adopt is capability 4a(1)(a) and its reinforcing capability 4a(2)(a).

b. Effect of enemy capabilities on the commander's mission.

- (1) The enemy's capabilities in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces enable the enemy to pose a limited threat to the integrity of the Chu Lai base area, airfield and ancillary facilities, to oppose offensive operations of the 1st Marine Division within the TAOR in limited strength, to oppose offensive operations within the RAOR in increased, but still not significant strength, to oppose offensive operations outside the TAOR and RAOR with significant strength and to temporarily control areas outside the TAOR and RAOR but within Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

TABS:

- A - Province and District Capitals, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces
- B - VC Political Infrastructure
- C - Integrated Structure of the Viet Cong Political/Military Organization
- D - Viet Cong Political/Military Headquarters
- E - Type Military Region Military Headquarters
- F - Organization of Military Affairs Section in the District
- G - Typical VC Organization of a Village
- Type VC Regiment
- I - North Vietnamese Army Infantry Regiment/Infantry Division
- J - Type VC Battalion/Type VC Infantry Company
- K - Approximate Locations of Enemy Logistical Installations
- L - Infiltration Routes and Way Stations in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces

B 1-61

UNCLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

DOWNLOADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
1st Lt, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

~~Annex A~~ (Province and District Capitals, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces)  
to Appendix C (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to 1st  
Marine Division Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

QUANG TIN PROVINCEProvince Capital

Tam Ky

Locations

BT 308 228

Districts

Ly Tin

BT 460 089

Tam Ky

BT 308 228

Tien Phuoc

BT 100 160

Thang Binh

BT 414 170

Hau Duc

BS 020 955

Hiep Duc

AT 914 245

QUANG NGAI PROVINCEProvince Capital

Quang Ngai City

Locations

BS 645 735

Districts

Duc Pho

BS 800 380

Son Tinh

BS 630 760

Minh Long

BS 526 503

Ba To

BS 570 340

Mo Duc

BS 720 495

Binh Son

BS 605 925

Tu Nghia

BS 668 679

Nghia Hanh

BS 611 655

Tra Bong

BS 370 879

Son Ha

BS 380 649

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex "J" (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

B-1-A-1

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr 66

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Tab B (VC Political Infrastructure) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)  
to Annex B (Intelligence) to 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-66.

Time Zone: H

VC POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

Quang Tin Province Committee (Cover: Di Hai, Cau Ti, Le Xa)	AT 915045
Que Son District Committee (Cover: Hieu Nam, 601, H-53)	AT 800266
Thang Binh District Committee (Cover: Hieu Nam 602)	BT 115260
Tam Ky District Committee (Cover: Hieu Nam 604)	BT 362055 (Ly Tin Area)
Tan Phuoc District Committee (Cover: Hieu Nam 603)	BT 050100
Tra Son District Committee	AT 850978
Tra Ha District Committee	BS 125940

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Quang Ngai Province Committee (Cover: Co Ly)	BS 475547 (Be Ruong Area)
Binh Son District Committee (Cover: Nong Truong Quang Binh C.5)	BS 415805
Dong Son District Committee (Cover: 251)	BS 685865 (Nui Phuong Hoang)
Tay Son District Committee (Cover: 255)	UNK
Tu Nghia District Committee (Cover: C.16)	BS 455750
Nghia Hanh District Committee (Cover: C.18)	BS 585430

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YR  
DOD DIR 5200.10

**UNCLASSIFIED**

B - 1 - B - 1

SECRETVC POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (Continued)

Mo Duc District Committee  
(Cover: Nong Truong Quang Nghiep, C.20)

BS 668470 (Nui Lon Area)

Duc Pho District Committee  
(Cover: Quang Duc Agricultural Site, C.22)

BS 795315 (Liet Son Mountain Area)

Tra Bong District Committee  
(Cover: C.4)

BS 180810 (Tra Hoa Area)

Son Ha District Committee  
(Cover: Nong Truong Quang Tay, C.25)

BS 220657 (Chut Cat Area)

Minh Long District Committee

BS 529440 (Long Giang Area)


Ba To District Committee  
(Cover: Nong Truong Quang Nam, C.19)

BS 468370

Area 6 District Committee  
(Cover: C.33)

BS 380360 (Nuoc Lay Area)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS



GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex "J" (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

B - 1 - B - 2


SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr 66

Time Zone: H

Tab C (Integrated Structure of the Viet Cong Political/Military Organization) to  
Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to 1st Marine Division Op Order  
301-66.



Integrated Structure of the Viet Cong Political/Military Organization

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex "J" (Distribution) to Operation Order  
301-66


B - 1 - C - 1

UNCLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVAL  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr 66

Tab D (Viet Cong Political/Military Headquarters) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-66.  
Time Zone: H



BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex "J" (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

B - 1 - D - 1

UNCLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED


DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVIEW  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

1st Marine Division (Rein), PFC  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010600H Apr 66

Tab E (Type Military Region Military Headquarters) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-66.

Time Zone: H

TYPE MILITARY REGION MILITARY HEADQUARTERS



BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex "J" (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DECLASSIFIED

B-1-E-1

UNCLASSIFIED


DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

1st Marine Division (Rein), PMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr 66

Tab F (Organization of a Military Affairs Section in the District) to  
Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to 1st Marine  
Division Operation Order 301-66.

Time Zone: H

Organization of Military Affairs Section in the District



B - 1 - F - 1

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex "J" (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

3-1-66

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED


DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr 66

Tab G (Typical VC Organization of a Village) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)  
to Annex B (Intelligence) to 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-66.

Time Zone: H

Typical VC Organization of a Village



UNCLASSIFIED

B - 1 G - 1

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex "J" (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

B-1-G-2

UNCLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr 66

Tab H (Type VC Regiment) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B  
(Intelligence) to 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-66.

Time Zone: H

TYPE VC REGIMENT



DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

B - 1 - H - 1

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

BY ORDER OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*John H. West*

GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex "J" (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

B-1-5-2

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED


DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr 66

Tab I (North Vietnamese Army Infantry Regiment/Infantry Division) to Appendix 1  
(Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to 1st Marine Division Operation  
Order 301-66.

NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY  
INFANTRY REGIMENT/INFANTRY DIVISION (U)

Time Zone: H



PERSONNEL\*

Officers	155
EM	2,925

RPG-2 RL (AT)	81
57mm RR	27
75mm RR	9

WEAPONS

7.62mm Pistol	155*
7.62mm Carbine	2,590*
7.62mm Rifle	
7.62mm SMG	
7.62mm LMG	81
7.62mm HMG	36
12.7mm HMG	9
14.5mm HMG	
60mm Mortar	18
82mm Mortar	27
120mm Mortar	9

VEHICLES\*


Cargo 6 x 6 or 4 x 4	15
Utility 1/4 ton	11
Motorcycle	

SIGNAL

702 Handi-talkie
71B Walkie-talkie
102E
103

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

\*Unconfirmed





DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex "J" (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

B-1-I-2

UNCLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr 66

Tab J (Type VC Battalion-Type VC Infantry Company) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)  
to Annex B (Intelligence) to 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-66.

Time Zone: H



DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

B - 1 - J - 1

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex "J" (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

B-1-J-2

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr 66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

Tab K (Approximate Locations of Enemy Logistical Installations) to Appendix 1  
(Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to 1st Marine Division Operation  
Order 301-66.

Time Zone: H

APPROXIMATE LOCATIONS OF ENEMY LOGISTICAL INSTALLATIONS

Dong Co Guerrilla Trng	BT 405 014
Phong Dong Cadre Trng Center	BT 173 016
Trng Camp (15 day course)	BT 144 006
Phuoc Cam (10 day guer trng)	BT 150 287
Xuan Binh Local Trng Area	BT 310 028
Xa Ky Savh Dist Trng Center	BT 360 015
Xa Ky Yen Dist Trng Center	BS 429 940
Tu My Dist Trng Center	BT 365 008
Thon 5 Phuoc Long Recruit Trng Center	BT 113 237
Thon 1 Phuoc Cam Recruit Firing Range	BT 100 238
Unknown Trng Center	BS 492 532
VC Base Area, Vinh Tuy	BS 491 831
VC Base Camp (large VC secret base, 3 camps):	BS 436 455
Du Nan Camp, Regt Level Military Camp, Exchange Camp (Area receives men from NVN and departure point for troops to north of RVN)	
Tien Phuoc Dist General Purpose Agency	BT 167 035
(VC camps, recruit trng center, weapons warehouse w/2000 weapons to equip recruits, plus AA LMG and two cannons, General Vicinity has long been VC base area).	
VC Prison Camp Tinh Trung	BS 428 965
Quang Ngai Prov CP Tan An Thon Mountain	BS 447 746
Quang Ngai Prov CP Ho San	BS 455 806
Trng Area, 108th Regt	BS 140 972
VC Cache Security Area	BS 266 857

B - 1 - K - 1

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

VC Aid Station	BS 449 753
Secret VC Installation	BS 427 825
Secret VC Installation	BS 524 622, BS 518 586, BS 416 827
Trng Area for Military and Admin Cadre from Nghia Binh and Minh Long Dist.	BS 508 565
Resupply Area	BT 209 201
Female Trng Center	BT 145 145
Prov and District Main Force Trng Center	BS 366 657
Aid Station	BS 388 827
T30 Hospital	BS 397 283
Quang Ngai Hospital	BS 361 810
Weapons Storage Tunnel	BS 492 756
Female Medical Trng Area	BT 119 198
VC Camp	BT 153 234
VC Camp	BT 117 266
UHF Radio	BS 420 930
Weapons Storage Shelter	BT 243 175
Arms and Weapons Depot	BT 236 652
Equipment and Fuel Storage Depot	BS 368 747
Rice Storage Area	BT 119 296
Supply Depot	BT 298 142
VC Trng Area	BS 509 777
VC Secret Area (Dispensary, trng huts, POW huts, production department, equipment department, ordnance department, signal depot)	BT 130 267, BT 150 278, BT 150 286
Arms and Weapons Base	BT 184 173
Dist Agency	BT 243 173
VC Hospital	BS 516 679
Ho Be Machine Shop	BS 380 613

B-1-X-2

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Ammo and Weapons Storage	BT 189 205
Paddy Depots	BT 177 258, BT 168 263
Da Vich Secret Base	BS 205 855
Phi Troung K-55 Engineer Shop	BT 300 019
Phi Troung K-54 Engineer Shop	BT 206 098
VC Trng Area	BT 132 291
Food Cache	BT 149 340
Civilian Reform Camp	BS 377 797
Da Song Secret Area (Provincial Committee Quang Ngai Prov)	
General Area: BS 473 693, BS 487 707, BS 476 672,	BS 506 681
VC Rest Area, Safe Area, Staging Area	
General Area: BS 420 800, BS 490 800, BS 420 850,	BS 490 850
VC Area	BS 199 899
POW Compound	BS 341 819
POW Compound	BS 422 841
38th Bn Hospital	BS 412 651
Supply and Rice Cache	BT 185 115
Supply Cache	BT 378 050, BT 138 044
Training Camp	BT 297 141
Supply Dump	BT 234 118
VC Detention Camp with five shelters	BT 166 217
VC Training Camp	BT 176 241
Supply Base	BT 228 208
Storage and Troop Area	BT 113 305
VC Supply and Assembly Area	BT 195 225
Three Food Storage Bunkers	BS 498 894
Training Area	BT 165 222

B-1-K-3

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

VC Hospital	BT 12 29
Training Area	BS 729 893
20 Structures Housing VC Admin	BS 450 914
2 VC Detainee Camps	BT 205 145, BT 215 146
VC Weapons Repair Shop	BS 382 802
Underground Meeting Facilities	BS 452 850
Vinh Yen	AT 97 12
My Son	BT 37 02
Phuoc Lam	BS 47 92
Nui Da Den	BS 44 79
Tan An Training and Assembly Area	BS 61 40
Vinh Loc	BS 55 80
Batangan (Logistics Area)	BS 70 95
Que Son-Viet An	BT 08 26
Phuoc Chau	BT 005 095
Hill 159 (Logistics Area)	BT 277 155
Military Region 5 (CP)	BS 110 920

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of StaffDISTRIBUTION: Annex "J" (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

B-1-K-4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
 010800H Apr 66

Tab L (Infiltration Routes and Way Stations in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-66.  
 Time Zone: H

Infiltration Routes and Way Stations in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces

PRIMARY ROUTES

1. The first primary route is primarily an east-west route paralleling the provincial boundary between Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces and servicing both provinces. The general tract follows: ZC 073227 to ZC 150237 to ZC 170235 to ZC 190224 to AT 790209 to AT 820188 to AT 900141 to AT 946103 to BT 020071 to BT 051050 to BT 110020 to BT 120019 to BS 330933 to BS 385935 to BS 439949.
2. The second primary route is generally a north-south servicing the central highlands area. Most of the east-west feeder routes discussed below originate in this system. The general tract follows: ZB 082988 to ZB 202944 to AS 812912 to AS 899885 to AS 919854 to AS 972796 to BS 030645 to BS 125500 to BS 129470 to BS 140423 to BS 198331 to BS 217303 to BS 233280 to BS 230255.

SECONDARY ROUTES

1. The first route services Dai Loc District in southwest Quang Nam Province. Its general trace is ZC 118415 to BT 037319.
2. The second route services Duy Xuyen and Que Son Districts in southern Quang Nam Province. Its general trace is ZC 168241 to AT 900319 to BT 030335 to BT 115431.
3. The third route services Thang Binh and Tien Phuoc Districts. Its general tract is at BT 942109 to BT 094135.
4. The fourth route services Thang Binh District. Its general trace is AT 942109 to BT 122304.
5. The fifth route services Tra Bong and Binh Son Districts. Its general trace is AS 907878 to BS 177743 to BS 321859.
6. The sixth route services Son Ha and Son Tinh Districts. Its general trace is BS 045632 to BS 232638.
7. The seventh route services Minh Long, Mo Duc, and Duc Pho Districts. Its general trace is BS 146428 to BS 435457 to BS 500551.
8. The eighth route services Minh Long, Mo Duc, and Duc Pho Districts. Its general trace is BS 146428 to BS 435457 to BS 531382.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

B - 1 - L - 1

UNCLASSIFIED



SECRET

9. The ninth route services Ba To, Mo Duc, and Ban Tho. The general trace is RS 223297 to BS 402250 to BS 490249.

(Note: At each location in the secondary routes where there is a set of coordinates the enemy maintains a way station.)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Jordan H. West*  
JORDAN H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex "J" (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

UNCLASSIFIED

B-1-1-2

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr 66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

Appendix 2 (Tactical Study of the Weather and Terrain) to Annex B (Intelligence) to  
Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) Map, AMS 1509, 1:250,000, Sheets ND49-1 and ND49-5  
(b) NIS 43D, Sections 22, 23, 24, and 25  
(c) LOC, South Vietnam (March 1964)

Time Zone: H

1. PURPOSE AND OTHER LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS. The purpose of this study is to determine the effects of weather, terrain and hydrography on military operations in the study area. The study area is centered at BT5605 with a radius of 50 miles. This study was prepared with emphasis on land based operations with minimum detail relating to amphibious operations. Lack of aerial photography precluded detailed study. References used in compiling this study are restricted to those indicated above.

2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA.

a. Climate. The climate of South Vietnam is monsoonal in nature and is characterized by two major seasons - the southwest monsoon from mid-May to early October and the northeast monsoon from early November to mid-March. These two major seasons are separated by two rather short transitional periods - the spring transitional, mid-March to mid-May, and the autumn transitional, early October to early November. The climate of South Vietnam is essentially controlled by the positions of the large semi-permanent high and low pressure centers in the temperate regions of the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, the topography in and around the area and the location with respect to both latitude and warm oceanic waters. The southwest monsoon is characterized by a northeastward flow of very moist air which is unstable in the lower layers and results in fairly homogeneous temperature and humidity conditions over most of the area. The autumn transitional is accompanied by squall lines at some locations. The northeast monsoon is characterized by a southwestern flow of air which is relatively cool and dry in comparison to the southwest monsoon. The spring transitional contains a three or four week lag in which the circulation over South Vietnam is rather weak. (Tab A, Astronomical Data).

(1) Temperature. Located entirely within tropical latitudes, South Vietnam has recorded mean annual temperatures from 63 degrees F minimum to 94 degrees F maximum in Quang Ngai. Absolute minimum of 56 degrees F and maximum of 105 degrees F have been recorded in Quang Ngai. Mean relative humidity ranges from 82 percent to 92 percent with an absolute minimum recorded at 35 percent. The highest humidity usually occurs during November and December averaging 85 percent to 90 percent. Lowest humidities occur generally in July averaging 70 percent to 80 percent.

(2) Winds. Winds in excess of 16 knots are infrequent and rarely exceed 27 knots. It should be borne in mind, however, that speeds exceeding these values may

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

frequently occur but go unrecorded. A wind speed briefly exceeding 50 knots occurring with a violent thunderstorm would not be unusual. Calm conditions occur 10 percent to 31 percent of the time during June thru August and 4 percent to 19 percent during December thru February. There is a large diurnal variation in wind speed, with calm conditions being observed most frequently during the night and early morning and higher wind speeds in mid-afternoon. During the southwest monsoon most winds are below 17 knots and are from the southwest quadrant except where terrain intervenes. During the northeast monsoon the great majority of reported wind speeds are below 17 knots and are from the northeast. During transitional periods winds are somewhat lighter in speed and more variable in direction.


(3) Precipitation. In our area of interest the major portion of the yearly total of about 81 inches occurs around the autumn transitional. The least amounts occur toward the latter part of the northeast or in the spring transitional. The rainiest period is October/November and the driest is February thru April. Approximately 72 percent of rainfall occurs during September thru December. The remainder is spread throughout the other eight months of the year.

(4) Clouds. Throughout South Vietnam the most prevalent sky condition in every season is the partly cloudy sky. The northeast monsoon averages 74 percent cloudiness and the southwest monsoon about 63 percent. During December, cloudiness reaches a maximum as the area becomes subject to crachin spells. Periods of low, overcast skies with drizzle or light rain and poor visibility prevail over much of the coast and occasionally penetrate the river valleys into the interior. Ceilings below 1,000 feet are reported 10 percent to 15 percent of the time at DaNang in this season.

(5) Visibility. In general, visibility is fair over most of South Vietnam during all seasons, the notable exception being the Eastern Coastlands during the autumn transitional and northeast monsoon seasons. Visibilities are probably better in lowlands and away from rivers. Visibility is seldom poor except along larger rivers in the morning hours and in crachin spells over the eastern coastlands. The best slant visibility in the eastern coastlands is reported in the latter part of the spring transitional and early southwest monsoon since cloudiness and precipitation are at or near a minimum. Diurnally, in all seasons, the best air-to-ground visibilities occur between 0800 and 1000 IST, after any ground fog and haze has burned off and prior to the growth of afternoon cumulus clouds. Between 1000 and 1700 IST convective activity leads to low-level cloud formation and a resultant interference in slant visibility. The poorest slant visibilities are found during mid-afternoon in the southwest monsoon. After 1700 IST and until complete darkness slant visibility again improves slightly. Over regions affected by the crachin, evening, night and early morning are the worst times of day, since this type of cloud has a tendency to burn off during the daytime and form again after dark.

(6) Icing. The height of the freezing level remains between 15,000 and 17,500 feet throughout the year. From April through October abundant moisture in cloud form is available for icing. During the northeast monsoon season clouds building to or above the freezing level are rare.

(7) Thunderstorms. Thunderstorms become a prominent climatic feature during the spring transitional when drier air from the northwest over-rides warm air at the surface. Extreme instability results, quite often causing violent thunderstorms in



the afternoon and evening hours. Their direction of movement is from northwest to southeast with reports of winds between 50 and 80 knots, hail stones two inches in diameter and torrential showers. Moderate turbulence can be expected to 12,000 feet during thunderstorms. During the southwest monsoon, thunderstorms of a somewhat less violent nature are a common feature. They last only a few hours in any given locality. They are quite frequent and extensive on the westward slopes of the Chaine Annamitique and generally occur in late afternoon. Clear air turbulence should be expected in areas around thunderstorms. During the northeast monsoon, thunderstorms average less than one day per month at most locations.

(8) Storms and Fronts. Typhoons are noted for their destructive effects. They occur in the western parts of tropical seas primarily from late July through early November, with October and November being the months of maximum intensity. Of 18 storms that were typhoons at some time during their life, only five were reported during the first nine months of the year. The remaining 13 occurred during the final three months of the year. Four of these storms were still of typhoon intensity when they moved onshore.

(a) Grachin is a prolonged period of widespread fog and drizzle or light rain which begins as early as October but does not become common until late November. It is most frequent in December and disappears by late April.


(b) Winds of Laos. These hot, rather dry, sometimes strong winds blow down from the high plateaus of Laos during the southwest monsoon causing extreme evaporation along their path.

(9) Sea and Swell. High sea and swell conditions occur mainly during the height of both monsoons, with secondary periods resulting from typhoons and squalls. Rough surf conditions may be expected along exposed beaches during these periods of high seas or swells. Calm to light sea and swell conditions predominate in almost all months with a maximum frequency in the spring transitional.

(10) Tactical Effects of the Climate.

(a) On Enemy Operations:

1. Generally the monsoonal climate favors guerrilla operations.
2. The heavy rains will cause rivers and tributaries to swell and limit mobility.
3. Low visibility will limit ground observation of the coastal plain from OP's in the mountain area.
4. Typhoons will limit coastal infiltration by small craft and junk and will destroy military stores in temporary structures.
5. Intense flooding in the rainy season will inundate cave and tunnel fortifications in the lowlands.



CONFIDENTIAL

## (b) On Friendly Operations:

1. Low visibility and crachin will limit ground and air observation required to detect the enemy and use our superior fire power.
2. The rainy climate creates many water ways, streams and rivers. These limit cross country movement of wheeled and tracked vehicles. In the case of a motorized force such as ours, bridges become of prime importance.
3. The heat and humidity create maintenance problems for electronic equipment.
4. Typhoons will limit resupply by ship and can create damage to harbor facilities and beach storage areas.
5. Heavy precipitation requires waterproofing and covering of all supplies and ammunition.
6. Heavy precipitation erodes the road and trail networks creating a continual engineer problem.
7. The heat and humidity reduce human efficiency and endurance, particularly for those not acclimated to it.

b. Topography

(1) Relief and Drainage. The flat coastal plains are interspersed with isolated hills and ridges, which have slopes greater than 20 percent. Dikes in the ricefields on the plains are generally .6 to 1.5 meters high and 2.4 to 3 meters wide. Belts of sand dunes, generally 3 to 18.2 meters high but in places as high as 91.4 meters, line the coastal side of many plains. The coastal plains terminate into an extensive range of hills and mountains. To the SSW, although summit elevations are relatively low, mainly from 1,220 to 2,134 meters, the range is severely dissected and extremely rugged. Toward the north and the west the rolling hills range from 15.3 to 610 meters above sea level. Slopes are steep, 30 to 40 percent or more in the mountains and 10 to 30 percent in the hills. The drainage consist of numerous short streams, small irrigation canals and ditches, and a series of lagoons and ponds which parallel parts of the central and northern coasts. The principle streams rise on the steep eastern slopes of the Chaine Annamitique Mountain Range and flow E to the South China Sea.

(2) Vegetation. The vegetation consists principally of rapidly growing rain forest, open forest and cultivated wetland rice. In the coastal plains, wetland rice, the predominant crop of South Vietnam, occupies approximately 90 percent of the cultivated land. The mountains to the west are primarily rain forest. To the north and west the rolling hills are open forest consisting of secondary growth.

(3) Surface Materials

(a) Coarse-grained and fine-grained soils are closely associated on plains and hills along most of the E coast and on the hills and mountains that comprise the Chaine Annamitique.

(b) Along the coast and in a few places in the interior, silty sand, sand, and silty clay, are randomly distributed over layered coarse and fine-grained soils.

UNCLASSIFIED

(c) In the hills and mountains, randomly mixed silty sand, silt, and silty clay are predominant. Hard rocks mainly granite, basalt, and rhyolite are prevalent but most of these rocks are deeply and thoroughly weathered.

(d) Cross country movement is difficult to impassable for wheeled and tracked vehicles. On the coast, movement of all vehicles will be confined to the sand ridges, beaches, and dunes, but on beaches and dunes movement of wheeled vehicles would be precluded by loose sand except for brief periods during and following rains, when the sands are moderately firm. The flat coastal plains are continuously wet nearly all year because of irrigation during periods of little rain, and ponding for water control during rainy periods, therefore flooding is common. Movement of tracked vehicles is precluded most of the year by miry ground. When the ground is firm, vehicles are slowed by earth dikes and in many places stopped by streams and canals too deep or steep sided to ford. The same holds true for wheeled vehicles but they are more severely hindered by earth dikes and smaller irrigation ditches. In the rolling hills and mountains, movement of all vehicles is unsuited, except locally, due to the steep slopes, forests, and dissected terrain. Movement of foot troops is feasible but difficult nearly everywhere.

#### (4) Cultural Features

(a) All ground capable of cultivation is devoted primarily to wetland rice. There are some dry crops and small gardens to be found in and around the hamlets and villages.

(b) The transportation network is scanty consisting basically of a north-south coastal road (National Route #1) and a single track meter-gauge railroad between Saigon and the North Vietnam-South Vietnam demarcation line. In addition there are some provincial routes leading inland from National Route #1 (See ~~Table~~ B, Roads, Railroads, and Airfields Overlay). Major roads are one or two lanes wide with bituminous or bituminous-treated surfaces and some gravel sections. Local or secondary roads are chiefly gravel or earth. Even though roads, as well as railroads, are generally on embankments, traffic is slowed or stopped in many portions because of inundation at times during the rainy season. Bottlenecks to on-road movement include narrow stretches, fords, and low capacity ferries principally on the local or secondary roads. In addition to this, there is the insurgent activity to contend with, ie; numerous road cuts, blown bridges, roadblocks, etc. In the sparsely populated mountain region, overland travel between villages is limited to trails. Although the inland waterways are not primary transportation networks, it is notable that many of the larger streams and rivers are capable of handling small junks, particularly along the coast.

(c) The dense distribution of cultural features characterizing the coastal lowlands consists primarily of rural settlements, urban areas, ricefield dikes, ditches and canals, salt evaporator pans and grave mounds. Rural settlements commonly located less than one mile apart, dot the lowland plains. They range in size from hamlets with just a few dwellings, to large villages. As a defense measure, many of these villages have been enclosed by various types of barricades and fortifications. Typical urban areas in the coastal plain are roughly rectangular in shape and

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

situated along rivers, roads, and in the fertile valleys. The central section of each village is commonly bounded by an area of native huts separated by narrow winding streets and alleys. These dwellings are mainly of bamboo or wood frame and thatch construction, with thatch, tile, or corrugated metal roofs. Some huts are constructed of sun-dried brick and some of clay or mud plastered over a bamboo framework. Many are built on stilts for protection against floods. The largest city in the area is Quang Ngai, (Coord. BS6573), with an estimated population (1963) of 10,000. This city is primarily a river port.

c. Hydrography and Landing Beaches

(1) See TAB C (Beaches).

(2) There are seven major beach areas and one landing area within the study area. Hilly to mountainous islands, fringed by rocks and reefs lie 5 to 14 miles offshore. Closer inshore, rocks, reefs, and islets fringe the mainland headlands. Although there are some rocky patches between the headlands, the approaches are mostly clear. There are protected anchorages at the island of Cu Lao Cham, in a small bay off the southwest coast, a small area in the southeastern part of Baie de Dung Quat and an unprotected temporary anchorage off the mouth of the Song Tra Khuc. Rocky shores backed by hilly terrain prevail at the headlands. Between the headlands, the shore is sandy and backed by sand dunes. Except for some isolated hills, generally level terrain covered by tree or hedge-fringed fields of rice or dry crops extend from 3 to 30 miles inland. Heavily forested hills and mountains back the coastal lowland. Conditions for off-road movement are generally poor because of the sand dunes, ricefields with their attendant drainage ditches and dikes, and the fringes of trees or hedges around most of the cultivated fields. Conditions are more favorable in the central portion than in the northwest and southeast portions because the area is better drained and fewer extensive rivers or lagoons paralleling the shore short distances inland. There is a fairly good network of roads, trails and tracks inland but few lead to the interior except for the central portion where communications are more extensive. National Route #1 parallels the coast from 1 to 12 miles inland with a meter gauge railroad line paralleling this highway. Native boats ply the numerous waterways and lagoons throughout the coastal plain. The Song Cua Dai has a 5-foot deep entrance channel and the Song Tra Bong has a 6-foot deep entrance channel. The largest populated areas in the study area are Hoi An in the north, Tam Ky in the central and Quang Ngai in the south.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA

a. Observation and Fields of Fire

(1) Ground observation will be restricted by cultural features and hedges between fields on the coastal plain. The few isolated hills on the coastal plain will afford good observation when sufficient vegetation has been cleared from the hill tops. Ground observation in the hill and mountain areas will be severely limited due to roughness of the terrain and dense jungle growth. Aerial observation over

B - 2 - 6

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

the coastal plain will be fair to good with the taller trees and the hedges around dwellings and fields restricting the view. Aerial observation in the hill and mountain areas will be severely limited due to the dense jungle growth with a closed canopy in most areas.

(2) Fields of fire for high angle of fire weapons will be good on the coastal plain. In the hill and mountain areas, the fields of fire will be limited due to lack of open areas and the height of the trees in the jungle. For flat trajectory weapons the fields of fire on the coastal plain will be poor to fair due to the hedges between fields, native dwellings, ricefield dikes and scattered areas of heavy vegetation. In the hill and mountain areas fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons will be poor due to steep slopes, dense jungles with their undergrowth and large tree trunks, and the roughness of the terrain.

b. Concealment and Cover

(1) On the coastal lowlands concealment will be fair to good from aerial observation and good from ground observation. The numerous villages, network of streams, rivers and canals, dense pattern of field hedges and scattered areas of dense vegetation, afford good concealment. The hill and mountain areas offer excellent concealment from both ground and air.

(2) Cover on the coastal plain will be good from flat trajectory weapons and fair from high angle of fire weapons. The characteristics of the coastal plains discussed in paragraph 3. b (1), above, afford good cover from flat trajectory but fair cover from mortar and artillery fire. The hill and mountain areas will afford excellent cover from flat trajectory weapons because of the dense jungle and large trees, steep slopes and roughness of the terrain generally. These same features will afford fair to good cover from high angle of fire weapons. However, the probability of air bursts due to the dense tree crowns will reduce the effectiveness of this cover.

c. Obstacles

(1) The soft sand and dunes found in the beach area will restrict wheeled vehicular movement. The inland waterway paralleling the beach in the northern half of the area requires bridging or ferry operations in order to move inland from the beach.

(2) The Song Thu Bon, Son Tra Bong, Song Tra Khuc and Song Ve rivers are all major water barriers and require bridging. The many small tributaries that feed into these rivers become obstacles to foot and vehicular movement during the rainy season when flooding occurs.

(3) The intense paddy cultivation and hedgerow system of the coastal plain restricts movement to the dike and trail areas. This region is heavily populated by small villages with narrow streets between hedges and walls surrounding each dwelling area.



CONFIDENTIAL

(4) Numerous trench line, cave and field fortification systems are found throughout the coastal plains. These systems become an obstacle to vehicular movement. Helicopter operations are limited by the many anti-helicopter poles and stakes that have been placed in likely landing zones.

(5) Cross country movement in the hill and mountain area will be limited to foot movement due to the steep slopes and dense forest vegetation.

d. Critical Terrain Features

(1) National highway #1 running NW - SE through the entire area is the only all weather road connecting the northern and central portion of Vietnam.

(2) The Chu Lai beach area and the peninsula extending to the north. This area contains the airfield, helicopter field, IST harbor area, and the logistics and command units essential to the area.

(3) The ridge line running east-west from BS 5199 to BS 0497. This terrain feature separates and dominates the coastal plain. It leads into the Chu Lai beach area and National Highway #1.

(4) The village of Tam Ky, capitol of Quang Tin province and Quang Ngai city, capitol of Quang Ngai province are designated as critical terrain features due to psychological impact factor if seized and held by the enemy.

e. Avenues of Approach

(1) The coastal plain with its developed road net provides avenues of approach from both the north and the south.

(2) Approaches by water may be made across any of the seven landing beaches on the coast of the study area and inland via the four large rivers which are navigable for small native craft for a considerable distance inland.

(3) The east-west corridors formed by the river valleys of the Son Thu Bong, Song Khuc, Son Tra Bong and the Song Ve constitute major avenues of approach from the highlands to the west.

(4) Approaches by air can be made from any direction. There are ten air strips in the study area. Five of these are capable of handling light liaison type aircraft only and are less than 610 meters long. These five are located at Ton Dung, Tra Bong, Tam Ky, Dinh Dien and Ai Nghia. An unclassified air strip is located at Duong Hoa Thuong. The strips at Chu Lai and Quang Ngai are considered to be all weather while the strips at Gia Vuc and on the off shore island of Cu Leo Re are considered seasonal.

B - 2 - 8

UNCLASSIFIED

f. Helicopter Landing Areas

(1) On the coastal plain there are many areas suitable for helicopter landings. Ricefields are invariably flat and when they are large enough and during dry weather they are excellent helicopter landing areas. On the slightly higher ground throughout the coastal plain are dry crop fields which are generally suitable for helicopter landings. Beaches and portions of the dune areas backing the beaches can also be used as landing areas. Many dry crop fields will contain stakes, similar to anti-helicopter stakes, used in growing crops which will deny the use of these fields as landing areas. Also, the hedges between fields which often contain trees up to 30 feet high will create an obstacle to helicopter operations. During the rainy season, ricefields become flooded for long periods and depending on the depth of the water, some may become unusable as helicopter landing areas. The pilot would have to decide whether a flooded ricefield was suitable for landing unless a ground check could be made. The best landing areas during the rainy season will be the beaches, dune areas and dry crop fields where the ground is usually well drained.

(2) Helicopter landing areas in the hills and mountains are scarce. Steep slopes, elephant grass and forested areas deny the use of much of the area. Landing areas are to be found in the valley bottoms where areas of fairly level ground have been cultivated. Even in the valley bottoms, helicopter landings will be limited to small scale operations.

(3) Detailed studies on selected areas will be published as required.

4. TACTICAL EFFECT OF THE AREA

a. Effect on the Enemy. The characteristics of the area are favorable to enemy operations.

(1) The coastal plains generally favor guerrilla type warfare. The characteristics of the area provide fair concealment and the obstacles encountered will not seriously slow the enemy's movement.

(2) The forested hills and mountains are well suited to this type of operation. The heavy rainforest with closed canopy in many areas enable the enemy to establish base camps without detection and heavy undergrowth favors his ambushes and small unit probing and hit-and-run tactics.

b. Effect on Friendly Forces. The characteristics of the area are generally unfavorable to friendly forces.


(1) The nature of the coastal plain with its ricefields, numerous rivers, streams and canals, man made fortifications, many small villages, narrow trails and tracks and unimproved roads present a continuous obstacle to wheeled vehicles and to a lesser degree, tracked vehicles.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) The forested hills and mountains will preclude all vehicle movement except in rare cases where roads or tracks are available and then the vehicles will be road bound. Cross country movement can be accomplished only by troops on foot.

(3) Helicopter movement is not restricted in either the coastal plain or in the hills and mountains except for the limited landing areas available in the latter area. The coastal plain is fairly well adapted to helicopter operations during the dry months due to numerous ricefields and dry crops throughout the area. Even though the ricefields are flooded during the wet season, some still may be used as helicopter landing areas.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS



GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of StaffTABS:

- A - Astronomical Data
- B - Road, Railroad and Airfield Overlay
- C - Beaches

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein)  
 Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
 010800H Apr66

Tab A (Astronomical Data) to Appendix 2 (Tactical Study of Weather and Terrain)  
 to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) 30th Weather Squadron Special Study 105-11/13  
 (b) 30th Weather Squadron Special Study 105-11/14  
 (c) The American Ephemeris and Nautical Almanac, 1966

Time Zone: H

1. The astronomical data listed below has been compiled from references (a),  
 (b) and (c) and corrected for Chu Lai, RVN (15° 30' N and 108° 45' E)

DATE	BMNT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EENT	MOONRISE	MOONSET	MOONPHASE
Mar 1	0613	0657	1853	1939	1914	0747	
2	0613	0657	1853	1939	2010	0839	
3	0612	0656	1854	1940	2058	0951	
4	0612	0656	1854	1940	2204	1105	
5	0611	0656	1854	1940	2311	1201	
6	0611	0655	1854	1939	-----	1253	
7	0610	0655	1854	1939	0019	1339	Full Moon
8	0609	0655	1854	1939	0124	1423	
9	0609	0655	1855	1940	0227	1504	
10	0609	0654	1855	1940	0328	1545	
11	0608	0654	1855	1940	0429	1626	
12	0608	0654	1855	1940	0547	1709	
13	0608	0653	1855	1940	0605	1755	
14	0607	0653	1855	1940	0703	1843	Last Quarter
15	0607	0652	1856	1941	0835	1934	
16	0606	0651	1856	1942	0927	2026	
17	0606	0651	1856	1942	1024	2120	

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

B-2-A-1

UNCLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

DATE	BMNT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EENT	MOONRISE	MOONSET	MOONPHASE
Mar 18	0605	0650	1856	1942	1100	2212	
19	0604	0649	1856	1942	1144	2304	
20	0604	0650	1856	1942	1217	2354	
21	0603	0649	1856	1941	1251	----	
22	0602	0649	1856	1941	1322	0044	New Moon
23	0601	0648	1856	1941	1347	0133	
24	0601	0647	1856	1941	1430	0202	
25	0601	0646	1856	1941	1504	0312	
26	0600	0645	1855	1941	1540	0404	
27	0600	0644	1855	1941	1623	0459	
28	0559	0644	1855	1941	1709	0556	
29	0559	0643	1855	1941	1802	0640	First Quarter
30	0559	0642	1855	1941	1845	0741	
31	0557	0642	1855	1941	1948	0855	
Apr 1	0555	0640	1855	1941	2053	0951	
2	0555	0639	1855	1941	2159	1027	
3	0554	0638	1854	1940	2303	1129	
4	0553	0638	1854	1940	----	1213	
5	0553	0637	1854	1940	0006	1254	Full Moon
6	0552	0637	1854	1940	0108	1335	
7	0551	0636	1854	1940	0209	1416	
8	0550	0634	1853	1939	0310	1459	
9	0549	0634	1853	1939	0409	1544	
10	0549	0633	1853	1939	0533	1611	
11	0548	0633	1853	1939	0634	1709	

B - 2 - A - 2

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

DATE	BMNT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EENT	MOONRISE	MOONSET	MOONPHASE
Apr 12	0548	0632	1853	1939	0738	1803	Last Quarter
13	0547	0631	1853	1939	0811	1857	
14	0547	0631	1853	1938	0856	2005	
15	0546	0630	1853	1938	0939	2058	
16	0544	0629	1853	1939	1016	2148	
17	0544	0629	1853	1939	1049	2237	
18	0543	0628	1853	1939	1125	2327	
19	0543	0628	1853	1939	1157	----	
20	0542	0627	1853	1939	1230	0016	New Moon
21	0541	0627	1853	1940	1304	0107	
22	0541	0627	1853	1940	1341	0159	
23	0540	0626	1853	1939	1421	0253	
24	0538	0625	1853	1939	• 1506	0351	
25	0538	0624	1853	1939	1558	0450	
26	0537	0624	1853	1939	1655	0550	
27	0537	0624	1853	1939	1741	0650	
28	0536	0623	1853	1939	1844	0746	First Quarter
29	0536	0623	1852	1938	1947	0837	
30	0536	0622	1852	1938	2050	0924	
May 1					2151	1007	
2					2251	1048	
3					2351	1128	
4					----	1208	Full Moon
5					0051	1249	
6					0153	1334	
7					0254	1422	

UNCLASSIFIED

B - 2 - A - 3

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DATE	BENT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EENT	MOONRISE	MOONSET	MOONPHASE
May 8					0354	1512	
9					0504	1606	
10					0601	1701	
11					0650	1756	
12					0739	1849	Last Quarter
13					0815	1941	
14					0851	2031	
15					0925	2120	
16					0957	2209	
17					1029	2258	
18					1102	2349	
19					1128	----	
20					1218	0044	New Moon
21					1312	0141	
22					1352	0241	
23					1448	0343	
24					1534	0444	
25					1715	0542	
26					1741	0635	
27					1844	0724	First Quarter
28					1944	0807	
29					2058	0847	
30					2156	0926	
31					2305	1004	

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

B - 2 - A - 4

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

1st Marine Division(Rein)  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

UNCLASSIFIED

Tab C (Beaches) to Appendix 2 (Tactical Study of the Weather and Terrain) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 301-66

NIS Beach No. 8

1. Location. Centered 16 miles NW of Cap An Hoa between BT2157 and BT5115.
2. Length and Usable Length. The beach is 33.5 miles long, slightly concave. Terminated at NW end at sandbar off mouth of Song Cua Dai and at SE end at reef fringed point (Cap An Hoa). Beach is separated in SE part by mouth of Truong Giang. 32.75 miles is usable.
3. Beach Width. 68.5 to 160 meters at low water and 36.5 to 91 meters wide at high water.
4. Beach Gradients. 1 on 25 to 1 on 50 in low water to high water zone and 1 on 15 in the high water zone.
5. Approach. Nearshore bottom slopes moderate to flat shoreward of the 3 fathom line 137 to 1,070 meters off high water line. The 5 fathom line lies 625 meters to 2.3 miles off high water line. Offshore approach partly obstructed by an island 16.7 miles off high water line of beach center, by islands, shoals and rocks 5.75 to 11.5 miles off NW end of beach, and by wrecks 1.44 miles off NW part of beach and 2.58 miles off SE part of beach. Nearshore approach is partly obstructed by a rock 222 meters and a wreck 914 meters off SE part of beach, and by a shoal area with least depths of one fathom and rocks 1.1 to 2.2 miles NW of SE end of the beach. Nearshore approach is flanked to the NW by shifting sandbars of river mouth and to the SE by a reef fringed point. Bottom is sand. Anchorage in 8 to 10 fathoms 2 miles NE of NW end of beach, bottom unknown, and in 3 to 4 fathoms 5.25 miles SE of SE end of the beach, with sand bottom.
6. Surf and Tidal Range. Surf 2.2 meters or greater can be expected to occur 55 percent of the time in winter, 22 percent in spring, 5 percent in summer and 24 percent in fall. Tidal range is 1.35 meters, tropic.
7. Beach Material. Sand, firm in wetted areas and soft when dry.
8. Terrain Immediately Behind Beach. Beach is on a barrier 930 meters to 4 miles wide. Beach is backed by dunes partly covered with brush, trees and cultivation. The dunes extend inland from 45 to 2,000 meters to low area mostly covered with ricefields and extending to opposite shore of barrier. Barrier is backed by tidal lagoon which is in turn backed by lowland mostly covered with ricefields and extending 5.5 to 18.5 miles inland. The lowland is traversed by numerous streams and canals and flanked on the NW and SE by large rivers. There are some isolated hills on the lowland. The lowland is backed by forested hills and mountains. There are many small hills scattered throughout the barrier and lowlands. The airstrip at Tam Ky lies 6 miles behind SE part of the beach.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

B - 2 - C - 1

UNCLASSIFIED



CONFIDENTIAL

9. Exits and Communications Inland. Exits cross country or laterally along the beach to trails and tracks leading from villages behind the beach. There are no bridges crossing the tidal lagoon backing the barrier. A hard surfaced road (National Route #1) parallels the beach 3 to 7.5 miles inland. A meter gauge railroad parallels the highway 3 to 12 miles inland from the beach.

## NIS Beach No. 10

1. Location. Centered 3.75 miles S of Cap Nam Tram between BT6701 and BT6997.
2. Length and Usable Length. A 2.5 mile long, slightly concave beach. Terminated to the NW at a rocky shore and to the SE at a fringing reef. Entire length is usable.
3. Beach Width. 55 to 365 meters wide at low water and 36 to 264 meters wide at high water.
4. Beach Gradient. 1 on 15 to 1 on 65 in the low water to high water zone and 1 on 10 in the high water zone.
5. Approach. Nearshore bottom slopes moderate to mild shoreward of the three fathom line, 137 to 640 meters offshore. Six fathom line lies 685 to 1,050 meters offshore. The direct offshore approach is clear but flanked to the NE by shoal with least depths of 2.3 meters 15 miles NE of beach center and to the SE by reef fringed islands 21 miles east of the beach. The nearshore approach is clear but flanked by rocks off the NW end and by fringing reefs off the SE end. Bottom is sand. Anchorage in 8.5 fathoms 3.3 miles NW of NW end of the beach with bottom unknown.
6. Surf and Tidal Range. Surf 1.2 meters or greater can be expected to occur 50 percent of the time in winter, 19 percent in spring, 5 percent in summer and 33 percent in the fall. Tidal range is 1.4 meters, tropic.
7. Beach Material. Sand, firm in wetted areas and soft when dry.
8. Terrain Immediately Behind the Beach. The beach is backed by dunes partly covered with brush and extending 55 to 460 meters inland. The dunes are backed by extensive lowlands mostly covered by ricefields and traversed by a river and tributaries. A lagoon and stream is located 410 to 640 meters behind NW part of the beach. There are numerous hills on the lowland and many small villages scattered throughout. The lowland is backed by forested hills and mountains 11.5 to 15 miles inland.
9. Exits and Communications Inland. Exits cross country to trail paralleling the beach 300 to 1,370 meters inland. Other trails lead inland from the villages to a surfaced road 1.5 to 2 miles behind the beach. The surfaced road joins National Route #1 6.5 to 7 miles inland. A meter gauge railroad parallels National Route #1.

UNCLASSIFIED

## NIS Beach No. 11

1. Location. Centered 6 miles SE of Cap Nam Tram between BS7197 and BS7195.
2. Length and Usable Length. The beach is a 1.5 mile long concave beach terminated to the NW by a reef fringed headland and to the SE by a reef fringed shore. Interrupted near SE end by a small stream mouth. Entire beach is considered usable.
3. Beach Width. 21.5 to 110 meters wide at low water and 9 to 64 meters wide at high water.
4. Beach Gradient. 1 on 10 to 1 on 35 in the low to high water zone and 1 on 10 or steeper in the high water zone.
5. Approach. Nearshore bottom slopes moderate to mild shoreward of the three fathom line 183 to 550 meters offshore. Six fathom depths up to 900 meters offshore. The offshore approaches are partly obstructed by reef fringed islands 18.4 miles offshore. The near-shore approach is clear but flanked on the NW and SE by fringing reefs. Bottom is sand. Anchorage in 5.5 fathoms 6 miles SE of SE end of the beach with a bottom of sand and mud.
6. Surf and Tidal Range. Surf 1.2 meters or greater can be expected to occur 26 percent of the time in winter, 11 percent in spring, and 17 percent in the fall and infrequent during the summer. Tidal range is 1.37 meters, tropic.
7. Beach Material. Sand, firm in wetted areas and soft where dry.
8. Terrain Immediately Behind the Beach. The beach is backed by extensive lowlands mostly covered with ricefields and traversed by streams and rivers. There are numerous hills throughout the lowland area as well as numerous small villages. The lowland is backed by forested hills and mountains 17 miles inland.
9. Exits and Communications Inland. Exits cross country to a trail 73 to 150 meters inland. A network of trails lead inland from the villages to a surfaced road 2.5 to 5.5 miles behind the beach which leads to National Route #1, 8 miles inland.

## NIS Beach No. 12

1. Location. Centered 4.5 miles NW of Batangan between BS7192 and BS7786.
2. Length and Usable Length. The beach is a 5.5 mile long slightly concave beach terminated at either end by reef fringed headlands. A part of the shore in the NW part of the beach is reef fringed and unusable. There is a small stream mouth in the NW part of the beach. 4.75 miles of the beach is usable.
3. Beach Width. 46 to 146 meters wide at low water and 37 to 73 meters wide at high water.
4. Beach Gradient. 1 on 5 to 1 on 55 in the low water to high water zone and 1 on 5 to 1 on 10 in the high water zone.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Approach. Nearshore bottom slopes gentle to flat shoreward of the one fathom line 137 to 457 meters offshore of SE half of the beach and gentle to mild shoreward of the three fathom depths 320 to 730 meters offshore of the NW half. The six fathom line lies 685 to 1,190 meters offshore. The offshore approach is partly obstructed by reef fringed islands 18.4 miles NE of the beach. The nearshore approach is partly obstructed by reefs fringing the unusable part of the beach. Bottom is sand. Anchorage in 5.5 fathoms 900 meters off the SE part of the beach with a sand bottom.

6. Surf and Tidal Range. Surf 1.2 meters or greater can be expected to occur 53 percent of the time in winter, 17 percent in spring, 4 percent in summer and 24 percent in the fall. Tidal range is 1.37 meters, tropic.

7. Beach Material. Sand, firm in wetted areas, and soft when dry.

8. Terrain Immediately Behind the Beach. The beach is backed by a partly tree covered dune area extending 90 to 900 meters inland. The dunes are backed by extensive lowlands covered by ricefield and dry crop areas and traversed by numerous streams, some bordered by marshes. The lowland is flanked to the SE by a river (Song Chau Me Dong) with boarding salt pans. In the central part of the beach the dune area is immediately backed by three lagoons. Several hills are scattered throughout the lowlands as well as numerous small villages. The lowlands are backed by hills and mountains 18 miles inland.

9. Exits and Communications Inland. Exits cross country are by trails and unsurfaced roads leading inland from villages to National Route #1 6.5 to 11 miles inland. A meter gauge railroad parallels National Route #1 7.5 to 11.5 miles inland.

NIS Beach No. 13

1. Location. Centered 3.5 miles SW of Cap Batangan between BS7481 and BS7681.

2. Length and Usable Length. The beach is a 1.5 mile long concave beach terminated at NE end by headland and at the SW end where the shore becomes unusable. The entire beach is considered usable.

3. Beach Width. 27 to 64 meters wide at low water and 13.7 to 36 meters wide at high water.

4. Beach Gradient. 1 on 10 to 1 on 20 in the low water to high water zone and 1 on 10 or steeper in the high water zone.

5. Approaches. Nearshore bottom slopes mild to flat shoreward of the 3 fathom line, 730 to 820 meters offshore. The 6 fathom line lies 1.7 to 2 miles offshore. The offshore approach is partly obstructed by rocks 2.9 miles ESE of NE end of the beach. The nearshore approach is partly obstructed by shoal with least depths of 3.2 meters, 1.7 miles offshore and flanked to the NE by rock fringed headland. Bottom is sand. Anchorage in 5.5 to 6 fathoms 4 miles SE of SW end of the beach, bottom unknown.

B - 2 - C - 4

UNCLASSIFIED

6. Surf and Tidal Range. Surf 1.2 meters or greater can be expected to occur infrequently in all seasons. Tidal range is 1.37 meters, tropic.

7. Beach Material. Sand, firm in wetted areas and soft where dry. There are cusps on the beach.

8. Terrain Immediately Behind the Beach. The beach is located on a barrier and is backed by lowlands covered mostly with ricefields and extending 366 to 1,000 meters inland to a river (Song Cho Mai). Fish ponds on barrier behind the ends of the beach. The river is backed by extensive lowlands covered mostly by ricefields and traversed by numerous streams and canals. There are some hills and numerous small villages scattered throughout the lowland area. The lowlands are backed by hills and mountains about 20 miles inland.

9. Exits and Communications Inland. Exits cross country to a trail 73 to 146 meters inland. The trail leads SW from the village and connects with a surfaced road 730 meters SW of the SW end of the beach. The surfaced road leads N across the river to a network of unsurfaced roads and SW to National Route #1, 7.5 miles SW of the SW end of the beach. A meter gauge railroad parallels National Route #1, 9 miles inland from the SW end of the beach.

#### NIS Beach No. 14

1. Location. Centered 6 miles SW of Cap Batangan between BS7478 and BS7475.

2. Length and Usable Length. The beach is a 1.75 mile long straight beach terminated to the north where shore becomes unusable and to the south at base of a sandspit. The entire beach is considered usable.

3. Beach Width. 36 to 64 meters wide at low water and 27 to 36 meters wide at high water.

4. Beach Gradients. 1 on 5 to 1 on 20 in the low water to highwater zone and 1 on 5 or steeper in the high water zone.

5. Approach. The nearshore bottom slopes mild shoreward of the 3 fathom line 410 to 775 meters off shore. The 6 fathom line lies 1,690 to 2000 meters offshore. The 6 fathom line lies 1,690 to 2000 meters offshore. The offshore approach is clear but flanked to the north by rocks and shoals. The nearshore approach is clear. Bottom is sand. Anchorage in 5.5 to 6 fathoms 1850 meters off the south end of the beach, bottom unknown.

6. Surf and Tidal Range. Surf 1.2 meters or greater can be expected to occur 36% of the time in winter, 12% in spring, 6% in summer and 13% in the fall. Tidal range is 1.37 meters, tropic.

7. Beach Material. Sand, firm in wetted areas and soft where dry. Cusps are located on this beach.

CONFIDENTIAL

8. Terrain Immediately Behind the Beach. The beach is on a barrier. The beach is backed by dunes partly covered with cultivation and trees extending inland 182 to 915 meters to a stream paralleling the beach. The stream is backed by lowlands mostly covered by ricefields and traversed by several streams and extending 17 miles inland to forested hills and mountains. The lowland is flanked on the south by a river (Song Tra Khuc). There are a few isolated hills and numerous small villages scattered throughout the lowland area.

9. Exits and Communications Inland. Exits cross country across barrier. There are no dry exits from barrier to the mainland. Movement cross country to a trail 780 to 1140 meters behind the beach. A surfaced road leads north from a point 610 meters behind the north end of the beach to National Route #1, 6.5 miles behind the beach. A meter gauge railroad parallels National Route #1 8.5 miles inland from the beach.

NIS Beach No. 15

1. Location. Cap Mia, NW and SE between BS7568 and BS9031.

2. Length and Usable Length. The beach is a 25 mile long nearly straight beach terminated to the NW at the base of a sandspit and to the SE where shore is backed by a lagoon. The beach is separated in the SE part by a stream mouth and a rocky headland. There are 24.25 miles of usable beach.

3. Beach Width. 91 to 275 meters wide at low water and 82 to 228 meters wide at high water.

4. Beach Gradient. 1 on 5 to 1 on 35 in the low water to high water zone and 1 on 5 to 1 on 10 in the high water zone.

5. Approach. Nearshore bottom slopes moderate to mild shoreward of the three fathom line 180 to 595 meters offshore. The six fathom line lies 640 to 1550 meters offshore from the NW three fourths of the beach. The offshore approach is clear. The nearshore approach is partly obstructed by a wreck 550 meters offshore from the NW part of the beach. The nearshore approach is flanked to the NW by shoals and rocks. The bottom is sand. Anchorage in 5.5 to 6 fathoms 4 miles north of NW end of the beach, bottom is unknown.

6. Surf and Tidal Range. Surf 1.2 meters or greater can be expected to occur 53% of the time in winter, 18% in the spring, 6% in summer and 24% in the fall. Tidal range is 1.37 meters, tropic.

7. Beach Material. Sand, firm in wetted areas and soft where dry.

B - 2 - C - 6

UNCLASSIFIED

8. Terrain Immediately Behind the Beach. The beach is backed by barren dunes extending inland 900 meters. The dunes are backed by lowlands covered by ricefields and traversed by numerous streams and extending 1.25 to 15 miles inland to forested hills and mountains. There are several lagoons and isolated hills on the lowland and numerous small villages scattered throughout the lowlands.

9. Exits and Communications Inland. Exits cross country by tracks, trails and unsurfaced roads connecting with National Route #1, 1.25 to 4 miles inland from the beach. A meter gauge railroad parallels National Route #1 1.5 to 7 miles behind the beach.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

UNCLASSIFIED

B - 2 - C - 7

DECLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

1st Marine Division (Rein)  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

UNCLASSIFIED

Appendix 4 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5510.1C  
(b) DivO P5510.1  
(c) DivO P3800.1F  
(d) LFM-3

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

a. This appendix amplifies instructions contained in references (a) through (d) concerning counterintelligence procedures.

b. Security is especially important in a counterinsurgency environment. The enemy can be expected to continue espionage, sabotage, terrorist, and propaganda activities.

2. MILITARY SECURITY

a. Safeguarding Military Information

(1) Classified information will be handled in accordance with references (a) and (c).

(2) Classified material will not be taken forward of Battalion Command Posts except when essential for the conduct of operations. In such cases, only extracts of necessary information from classified documents shall be used.

(3) All paper waste material from unit command posts will be destroyed by burning.

(4) Unclassified maps, training manuals, and similar publications will be given sufficient protection to prevent their seizure by unauthorized personnel. Disposal of such material will be by burning.

(5) Classified material furnished to this Command by a foreign government or international organization will be afforded the same or greater degree of protection as the United States affords to material of a similar classification. Vietnamese defense information is limited to the following categories of classification:

(a) TOI MAT - TOP SECRET

(b) MAT - SECRET

B-4-1

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

## (c) KIN - CONFIDENTIAL

(6) Upon displacement, commands will thoroughly police their areas to ensure that nothing of intelligence value is left behind.

b. Communications Security

(1) Communications security will be in accordance with the provisions of Annex I (Communications-Electronics) and other directives issued by higher authority.

(2) Classified information will not be discussed over telephones or voice radio nets. Numerical and operational codes will be used when appropriate to safeguard friendly information.

(3) Each unit having crypto devices will prepare an Emergency Destruction Plan for crypto material.

c. Challenges and Passwords. See paragraph 505 of reference (c).d. Counterespionage

(1) Commanders will ensure that all personnel are warned of the enemy capability to utilize low level agents (bar girls, vendors, shop keepers, cycle drivers) to gather intelligence information.

(2) The enemy also has the capability to use Caucasian or Negro agents to penetrate friendly installations or units. Any person, regardless of rank or position, who acts suspiciously, expresses undue interest in military routine, location or units, or who is observed in a restricted area, will be approached and identified. If he has improper identification, or if his identification requires verification, he will be detained, and the details will be reported immediately to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

e. Countersabotage

(1) All units will stress countersabotage in security plans. Particular emphasis will be placed on safeguarding command posts, supply installations, communications centers, and water points.

(2) Prior to occupying any existing building or structure, a thorough search for hidden explosives or booby traps will be conducted.

f. Countersubversion

(1) Troop information programs will include the official role of the United States in the Republic of Vietnam in both military and political matters.

B-4-2

UNCLASSIFIED



(2) Any propaganda directed at US policies or US servicemen will be reported to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 with all details possible.

(3) Any literature from civilian agencies soliciting for opinions or money or asserting political views will be reported to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 as soon as possible.

(4) All personnel will be periodically briefed on their responsibilities as a prisoner of war as outlined in the Code of Conduct.

g. Visitor Control

(1) All units will provide escorts for and control the movement of all visitors within their areas of responsibility.

(2) Representatives of the press or other mass communications media will be escorted.

h. Protection of Ranking Officials. Units being visited by ranking government officials or general/flag officers will provide adequate security for such visitors.

i. Target Lists

(1) Personalities. To be issued.

(2) Facilities and installations. To be issued.

3. CIVIL SECURITY

a. Control of Civilians

(1) Civilians will not be permitted access to camps or installations unless cleared and authorized by this Headquarters (G-1/PMO).

(2) All personnel will be discouraged from dealing with vendors operating on the periphery of camps and along MSR's.

b. Employment of Civilians

(1) Civilians will not be employed by any Marine unit unless they are cleared and authorized by this Headquarters (G-1/PMO).

(2) Civilians authorized for employment will be required to wear a pass/badge issued by this Headquarters while working within Division areas.

c. Civil Leaders. Friendly civilian leaders will be accorded due respect as community officials.

d. Civil Unrest. Notify the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 as soon as possible of any incident which may indicate civil unrest or deterioration of relations between US forces and local civilian personnel.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

4. CENSORSHIP. Armed Forces censorship, if imposed, will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section VI of reference (b).

5. MISCELLANEOUS. Marine Corps counterintelligence personnel attached to this command will remain under the operational control of this Headquarters except as required by operational commitments.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

B-4-4

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) MAPS: (Same as on basic order)  
(b) COMUSMACV 010235Z MAR66

Time Zone: H

1. MISSION

1st Marine Division (Rein) defends the base area, airfield and ancillary facilities at CHU LAI and such other bases as may be established in assigned area of responsibility; defends or participates in the defense of other selected U.S. or GVN critical installations as directed; conducts unilateral offensive operations within TAOR; and executes offensive operations with RVNAF in area of responsibility and as directed anywhere in RVN.

2. CONCEPT

- a. General. 1st Marine Division (Rein), occupies and defends the secure vital base area of CHU LAI and from this base area conducts pacification, clearing, and search and destroy operations in assigned area of responsibility, Appendix 1 (Area of Responsibility) to Annex D (Operations Overlays). In consonance with increasing Division maneuver strength, an expanding offensive campaign will be conducted in 1st Marine Division (Rein), area of responsibility, and as directed, against main VC/NVA forces in established bases and known operating areas. Concurrent with the expanding offensive campaign, 1st Marine Division (Rein), will constantly expand the CHU LAI TAOR by selected clearing operations in contiguous areas.
- b. Offensive Operations. In extension of the concept outlined above, the following type offensive operations will be conducted.
  - (1) Aggressive patrols of all sizes and an extensive reconnaissance screen throughout the TAOR and RZ. (Appendix 2 (TAOR and RZ) to Annex D (Operations Overlays)).
  - (2) Search and destroy operations against known and suspected VC/NVA concentrations which constitute a threat to the base area to forestall surprise rear area actions by the VC.
  - (3) Unilateral, combined or coordinated operations designed to find, fix, and destroy VC/NVA forces, making maximum use of the large advantage possessed in mobility and fire power.

C-1

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (4) In all offensive operations, the pursuit policy outlined in reference (b) will be executed. Unit commanders conducting offensive operations will formulate plans for pursuit intentions and will inform the next higher headquarters as soon as possible in order to effect a coordinated plan to trap VC forces.
- c. Pacification Operations. Pacification operations will be conducted in consonance with the GVN capability to fill in behind cleared areas. The priority of effort for the pacification and expansion of the CHU LAI TACR will be north toward DANANG along the heavily populated coastal area and the coastal LOC.
- d. Defensive Operations. Annex F (Alert Postures/Defense).
- e. Assigned Tasks. Commanding General, III MAF has assigned the following tasks to the 1st Marine Division (Rein).
- (1) Establish and maintain a reconnaissance screen in the TACR and RZ. Unilateral reconnaissance operations in RZ will be conducted only after coordination with appropriate sector command (ARVN).
  - (2) Conduct unilateral offensive operations within assigned TACR.
  - (3) Conduct coordinated unilateral and combined offensive operations in assigned area of responsibility.
  - (4) Be prepared to participate in unilateral and/or coordinated offensive operations throughout I CTZ as directed.
  - (5) Defend the U.S. base at CHU LAI, and other bases that may be established in assigned area of responsibility.
  - (6) Defend or participate in the defense of selected U.S. and GVN tactical installations as directed.
  - (7) Maintain one battalion on twelve (12) hour notice as a reserve/ reaction force prepared for operations throughout I CTZ or commitment to COMUSMACV as a general reserve as directed. Upon commitment of this force be prepared to furnish a regimental headquarters with two additional infantry battalions for release to COMUSMACV.
  - (8) Conduct an active civic action program.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- (9) Within capabilities and in coordination with appropriate authorities, assist in the training of and render support to Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CMU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

Annex D (Operations Overlays) to Operation Order 301-66

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:

1. Area of Responsibility
2. TAOR and RZ Part I and Part II

Distribution: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

D-1

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam

C10800H Apr66

Annex E (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) MAPS: Indochina and Thailand, Series L 509, Scale 1:250,000,  
 Sheets NE 4811, NE 4812, ND 4816, ND 4818, NE 4913, NE 484,  
 ND 491, ND 495, ND 499, ND 4913, NC 484, NC 485, NC 486,  
 NC 487, NC 488, NC 4810, NC 4815, AMS Series L 509, Scale  
 1:250,000 and AMS Series L 701, Scale 1:500,000

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

## 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence), current INTELS and Plans.
- b. Friendly Forces. Basic Order

## 2. MISSIONS

- a. Artillery. Division artillery supports the 1st Marine Division (Rein) in the defense of the CHU LAI base area, airfield and ancillary facilities; provide fires in support of offensive operations within and beyond the TAOR and RZ; and supports ARVN operations as directed.
- b. Fire Support Coordination. The fire support coordination center (FSCC) in the CHU LAI TAOR and RZ will exercise overall responsibility for the coordination of all supporting arms in the CHU LAI TAOR and RZ to ensure maximum effective fire support and troop safety to all units within the TAOR and RZ.
- c. Naval Gunfire Support. Naval Gunfire Support Unit (TU-70.8.9) provides naval gunfire support against Viet Cong targets in order to support COMUSMACV/RVNAF operations ashore.
- d. Air Support. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and 2nd Air Division, USAF provide tactical air support to ground forces as required against NVA/Viet Cong targets in order to support COMUSMACV/III MAF/RVNAF operations in RVN.

## 3. EXECUTION

- a. Artillery. Appendix 1 (Artillery).
- b. Fire Support Coordination. Appendix 2 (Fire Support Coordination).

UNCLASSIFIED

E-1

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

- c. Naval Gunfire Support. Appendix 3 (Naval Gunfire Support).
- d. Air Support. Appendix 4 (Air Support).
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Administrative Order 301-66
- 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS. Annex I (Communications-Electronics)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to operation Order 301-66

APPENDIXES:

- 1. Artillery
- 2. Fire Support Coordination
- 3. Naval Gunfire Support
- 4. Air Support

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex E (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) MAPS: Annex E (Supporting Arms)  
(b) Firing Chart: Grid Sheet, Scale 1:25,000  
(c) 11thMarO 3000.2

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION. Basic order.

2. MISSION. Annex E (Supporting Arms).

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Artillery Employment. 11th Marines (-) (Rein) is positioned in the TAOR in a mixture of types and calibers in order to provide fires within and beyond the TAOR and RZ, with the capability of supporting Division offensive operations and ARVN operations as directed.

b. <sup>2d BN</sup>  
~~1st Battalion~~ (-) (Rein), 11th Marines

~~Batteries 8 and 9, 12th Marines and 101mm Mort Btry, 2d BN~~

(1) Direct support - <sup>5th</sup> 1st Marines (-) (Rein).

(2) Zone of fire - <sup>5th</sup> 1st Marines sector of TAOR.

(3) Be prepared to provide support fires, <sup>and</sup> forward observers and liaison personnel to CHU LAI Defense Command for defense of CHU LAI Defense Command Sector.

c. 3d Battalion, 11th Marines

(1) Direct Support - 7th Marines.

(2) Zone of fire - 7th Marines sector of TAOR.

(3) Be prepared to provide support fires, and forward observer and liaison personnel to CHU LAI Defense Command for defense of CHU LAI Defense Command Sector.

d. 4th Battalion ~~(X)~~ (Rein), 11th Marines

~~3d 155mm Gun Battery (-) (SP), FMF~~  
~~3d 8" How Battery (SP), FMF~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

E-1-1

SECRET

- (1) General support/reinforcing 3rd Battalion. Zone of fire - 7th Marines sector of TACR.
- ~~(2) Be prepared to form battery (rein) composed of one 155mm howitzer battery reinforced by two (2) 155mm Guns.~~
- (2)(X) Be prepared to assume direct support mission and/or control of direct support batteries.
- (3)(X) Be prepared to assume responsibility as alternate regimental command post or fire direction center
- (4)(X) Be prepared to provide support fires to CHU LAI Defense Command for defense of CHU LAI Defense Command Sector.

e. ~~3d 8" Battery Group~~ *5<sup>th</sup> 155mm Gun Btry (SP) FME*  
*General Support.*

~~3d 8" Battery (-) (SP), FME  
 Btry K, 11th Marines  
 Plt 3d 155mm Gun Btry (SP), FME~~

- (1) General support/reinforcing 1st Battalion. Zone of fire - 1st Marines sector of TACR.
- (2) Be prepared to provide support fires to CHU LAI Defense Command for defense of CHU LAI Defense Command Sector.

f. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Firing chart. Reference (b).
- (2) Registration. As directed by 11th Marines FDC.
- (3) Position areas and fire capabilities. Report to Division FSCC as soon as possible when changes occur.
- (4) Survey. Trigonometric lists available at 11th Marines Survey Information Center.
- (5) Counterbattery policy. Active.
- (6) Meteorological data. Electronic data to be furnished every four (4) hours or as required.
- (7) Operations in accordance with reference (c).

UNCLASSIFIED

- (8) Establish local security immediately upon occupation and continue to improve position. Primary threats are infiltrators, 120mm mortar fire and air strikes in that order
- (9) Air observation. Submit requests to this Headquarters.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Administrative Order 301-66
- b. Available supply rate (rds/gun/day):

105mm Howitzer	54
107mm Howtar	54
155mm Howitzer	40
155mm Gun	35
8" Howitzer	35

Note: Units will not expend more than eighty percent (80%) of available Supply rate without approval of this Headquarters.

#### 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. Annex I (Communications-Electronics).
- b. Command posts. Report when established.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
 010600H Apr66

Appendix 2 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex E (Supporting Arms) to Operation  
 Order 301-66

Ref: (a) MAPS: Annex E (Supporting Arms).  
 (b) NWIP 22-7  
 (c) LFM 22

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION. Basic order.

2. MISSION. Annex E (Supporting Arms).

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept. Fire support coordination will be in accordance with references  
 (b) and (c).

b. <sup>5th</sup>  
~~1st~~ Marines/7th Marines

(1) Coordinate fires within sector of TAOR.

(2) Recommend restrictive fire plans to 1st Marine Division FSCC.

(3) Be prepared to coordinate fires within reconnaissance Zone contiguous  
 to sector of TAOR.

(4) Be prepared to recommend Fire Coordination Lines, as required, to  
 1st Marine Division FSCC.

(5) Be prepared to establish No Fire Lines, as required, within sector  
 of TAOR and RZ contiguous to sector of TAOR.

c. 11th Marines (-)(Rein)

(1) Coordinate fires, as required, within CHU LAI TAOR and RZ.

(2) Establish No Fire Lines, Fire Coordination Lines and such other  
 control measures as are required within and beyond the CHU LAI TAOR  
 and RZ.

(3) Coordinate fires with local RVNAF commanders.

E-2-1

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Supporting arms will not be fired into any populated area except when the infantry commander on the ground personally determines that the area is hostile, that such action is necessary to save Marine lives, and that there is no alternative to such course of action.
- (2) All supporting arms missions, with the exception of barrages, pre-planned and unobserved fires, will be controlled by an airborne or ground FAC, forward observer, NGF spot team or RVNAF observer. All observed and unobserved fires, except barrages, will be positively approved at the appropriate FSCC prior to the employment of the supporting arm(s).
- (3) Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker system or appropriate means) even though light fire is received therefrom.
- (4) Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, and if in the judgment of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.
- (5) None of the foregoing is intended to deny the application of force against the source of hostile forces. Enemy forces engaging friendly troops will be destroyed by utilization of any available means.

4. TARGET INFORMATIONa. Target List

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) As maintained by the Target Information Officer and G-2 Section.
- (3) Appropriate target information will be disseminated to all units as required for specific operations. Targets of opportunity will be passed immediately to the unit in whose sector the target appears.

b. Restricted Targets

- (1) Every effort will be made to preserve religious, cultural, medical and public utility installations.
- (2) Other restricted targets will be specified by the local RVNAF commander.

UNCLASSIFIED

E-2-2

## 5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY

a. Air Sentries and Lookouts

- (1) Air sentries will be positioned at artillery firing positions who will command check fire when friendly aircraft are observed approaching danger areas.
- (2) Artillery forward observers and naval gunfire spotters will check fire when it appears that the projectile trajectories of artillery and support ships will endanger friendly aircraft.

b. Restrictive Fire Plans

- (1) When massed artillery and/or naval gunfire could endanger a simultaneous air support mission, a restrictive fire plan may be employed. Division FSCC will publish specifics of the plan to be employed.
- (2) Units requesting an air support mission will recommend a restrictive fire plan if it is required. Higher echelons will not impose a restrictive fire plan contrary to the recommendation of the requesting unit unless the need is clearly indicated.
- (3) The ground commander will exercise prudent judgement in the use of restrictive fire plans to permit the maximum use of all supporting arms available to aid in the accomplishment of the ground force mission.

c. Flak Suppression Fires. When required, and when time permits, flak suppression fires will be planned in detail to most effectively protect support aircraft from ground fires.

d. Landing Zone Preparation. Helicopter landing zones will be prepared by artillery and/or air delivered fires, as required, prior to their use by helicopters executing a tactical lift.

6. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES. No supporting arms will be fired without the prior approval of the ground force commander in whose sector/area the fire is required.

7. COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS. Annex I (Communication-Electronics).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

UNCLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
 010600H Apr66

Appendix 3 (Naval Gunfire Support) to Annex E (Supporting Arms) to Operations  
 Order 301-66

Ref: (a) MAPS: Annex E (Supporting Arms)  
 (b) NWIP 22-2  
 (c) FMFM 7-1

Time Zone: H

### Task Organization

#### TU-70.8.9 Naval Gunfire Support Unit

TE-70.8.9.1 NGF Spt Element ALFA

TE-70.8.9.2 NGF Spt Element BRAVO

TE-70.8.9.3 NGF Spt Element CHARLIE

TE-70.8.9.4 NGF Spt Element DELTA

1. SITUATION. Basic order.

2. MISSION

Naval Gunfire Support Unit (TU-70.8.9) provides naval gunfire support against Viet Cong targets in RVN in order to support COMUSMACV/RVNAF operations ashore.

3. EXECUTION

a. General. Naval gunfire coordination responsibilities and procedures will conform to existing doctrine as contained in references (b) and (c) and as modified herein.

- (1) Naval gunfire support availability (ship type and location) is promulgated periodically by CTU-70.8.9.
- (2) All observed U.S. naval gunfire support missions will be observed by either U.S. naval gunfire spotters, airborne naval gunfire liaison officers (ALO), tactical air controller (airborne) (TAC (A)), forward air controller (airborne) (FAC), artillery forward observers (FO) or artillery observers (airborne) (AO). U.S. naval gunfire spotters will be utilized whenever available. In the absence of ~~naval~~ gunfire spotters, ALO, TAC (A), FAC, FO or AO, trained in naval gunfire spotting techniques and procedures may be utilized in all areas except villages and hamlets.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

(3) Spotting and communications will be in accordance with ATP-4.

b. Naval Gunfire Support Request Procedures. Requests for naval gunfire support will follow the established chain of command to the Division FSCC. Division FSCC will forward the requests to III MAF/SA I CTZ.

(1) Non-scheduled Missions. A non-scheduled mission is one requiring quick reaction (less than forty-eight hours notice) by a naval gunfire support ship already assigned in general support of I CTZ.

(a) Requests for non-scheduled missions will be forwarded to Division FSCC. Division FSCC will transmit the request to I Corps Tactical Operations Center for target clearance. When a target is cleared by I CTOC, it may be assumed that all non-USMC supporting arms and interested agencies, both U.S. and Vietnamese, have been coordinated and the mission is cleared for firing. Division FSCC will notify the requesting command via the chain of command that the target is cleared and may be attacked.

(b) Upon clearance of the target by I CTOC and notification by Division FSCC, the mission may be sent to the naval gunfire support ship. The request for fire may be relayed through the DANANG Coastal Surveillance Center (CSC) over the Market Time Coordination/Reporting Net guarded by the CSC or the ship may be requested to come up on the I Corps naval gunfire liaison officer control frequency to receive the mission direct

(c) The FSCC requesting the mission will arrange for a spotter on station and will include the spotter call sign and spot net circuit to exercise fire control.

(2) Pre-planned Missions. A pre-planned mission includes naval gunfire support for a scheduled ground operation or pre-planned targets known at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance.

(a) When a naval gunfire support ship is on station in general support of I CTZ, the same procedures outlined in paragraph 3.b.(1) above may be used.

(b) When a naval gunfire support ship is not on station in general support of I CTZ, or a mission conflict is identified when a naval gunfire support ship is on station, the mission requests will be forwarded by Division FSCC to I CTOC naval gunfire liaison officer at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to mission time. I CTOC will process the mission, resolve any conflicts, effect required coordination and provide Division FSCC with the assignment of fire support ship(s) for the mission. Upon notification by Division FSCC, the FSCC requesting the mission will comply with the procedures listed in paragraph 3.b(2) and (3) above.

E-3-2

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

- (3) Requests for naval gunfire support in direct support of ground operations will be forwarded to Division FSCC who will submit such requests to CG III MAF. The following information will be provided at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance (where possible);

Indicate type of mission (non-scheduled or pre-planned)

- A. Type operation (amphibious, troop support, area fire, etc)
- B. Number ships required.
- C. Coordinates for ship to report to.
- D. Time to be on station.
- E. Expected duration on station.
- F. Type of target.
- G. ANGLICO/FSCC requesting mission.
- H. Frequencies to be used (by circuit number) and spotter call sign.

Note: Division FSCC will inform the requesting unit, CTF-115, CTG-70.8 and CTU-70.8.9.

- c. Rules of Engagement. Annex G (Rules of Engagement).

#### 4. COMMUNICATIONS

- a. There are two circuits on which initial contact may be established with assigned naval gunfire support ships.

- (1) TU-70.8.9 Common ORESTES is a ship-to-shore/inter-ship circuit that is guarded by all naval gunfire support ships assigned to TU-70.8.9. Net control is CTU-70.8.9. or his designated representative. Naval Communications Station, PHILLIPINES designates the frequencies used on this circuit. Frequency shifts are passed on ORESTES or Fleet Broadcast if necessary. The current frequency can be obtained on the Market Time Coordinating/Reporting net or from NAVCOMMSTAPHIL on a CW/ORESTES ship-to-shore circuit. KAK 2667 is the keying material used. CSC maintains guard of the Market Time Coordinating/Reporting Net, circuit designator is C-17.

- (2) Market Time Coordinating/Reporting Net (North)

Day: 8500 KC (USB)

Night: 3635 KC (USB)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET


b. Naval Gunfire Support Circuits in I CTZ.

<u>Circuit</u>	<u>Identifier</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
C-1	I Corps GLO Control (P)	3179 (USB)
C-2	I Corps GLO Control (S)	2324 (USB)
C-3	I Corps NGF Spot (P)	4301 (USB)
C-4	I Corps NGF Spot (S)	2233 (USB)

c. Call Signs

I Corps NGLO	Afterburner 26 Oscar
I Corps NGF Spotter	Afterburner 26 Charlie
I Corps CSC (DANANG)	Grainy Lamb

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS



GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

E-3-4

UNCLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOB DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

Appendix 4 (Air Support) to Annex E (Supporting Arms) to Operation  
Order 301-66

- Ref: (a) Maps: Annex E (Supporting Arms)  
(b) Annex E (Tactical Air Operations) to III MAF LOI 1-66  
(c) FMFM 7-3, Air Support  
(d) FMFM 3-3, Helicopterborne Operations  
(e) MACV Directive 95-4, Aviation Operations in RVN  
(f) MACV Directive 95-2, Aviation Employment of and Operational Restrictions on US Military Air Delivered Firepower in RVN

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence), current INSUMS and FIR's
- b. Friendly Forces
- (1) Annex A (Task Organization)
  - (2) III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) conducts tactical air support operations in RVN in accordance with the doctrine, procedures and responsibilities outlined in references (b) and (c).
  - (3) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) conducts offensive and defensive tactical air operations in support of III MAF ground forces, other US and ARVN forces as directed.
  - (4) <sup>75 Air Force</sup> ~~2nd Air Division~~, USAF conducts offensive and defensive tactical air operations in RVN and supports US and GVN ground forces as directed.
  - (5) US SEVENTH Fleet conducts air operations in support of the GVN military campaign against the NVA/Viet Cong in RVN.
  - (6) Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) conducts air operations in support of ARVN Forces.

2. MISSION. Annex E (Supporting Arms).

3. EXECUTION

a. General

- (1) Tactical air operation coordination responsibilities and procedures will conform to existing doctrine as contained in references (b) through (e) and as set forth herein.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (2) Helicopter assets are adequate for observation, troop lift, medical evacuation and liaison, provided that requests are judiciously screened to ensure that this mode of transportation is essential to the accomplishment of the mission.
- (3) When 1st MAF aircraft are providing close and immediate support for 1st Marine Division forces actively engaged in combat, standard Marine close air support doctrine applies and approval by agencies external to III MAF command channels is not required. All support provided in other than immediate area of 1st Marine Division and/or III MAF operations must receive prior approval by the appropriate RVNAF/GVN agency

b. Operational Control and Sources

- (1) Fixed wing tactical air support may be provided from either the DANANG (MAG-11) or CHU LAI (MAG-12) based air groups depending on the mission to be accomplished and availability of aircraft.
- (2) Overall coordination for the employment of helicopter resources rests with CG, III MAF. For any pre-planned operation involving helicopter support, commanders will submit air support requirements at the earliest in order to ensure the availability of required assets.
- (3) Helicopter support to 1st Marine Division (Rein) in the CHU LAI TAOR/RZ will normally be provided by MAG-36, located at CHU LAI. MAG-16, located at Marble Mountain, represents an alternate source.

c. Procedures

- (1) General procedures and operational restrictions governing the use of U.S. military air delivered firepower in RVN are contained in reference (f).
- (2) Air strikes within TAOR/RZ must be under the positive control of an FAC, TAC (A) or ASRT.
- (3) ASRT controlled air strikes outside the 1st Marine Division TAOR/RZ will be coordinated with I Corps TOC and DASC/FSOC to preclude conflict with RVN/activities and ensure safety of USMC forces.
- (4) Air activities outside the 1st Marine Division TAOR/RZ will be in accordance with Annex G (Rules of Engagement).
- (5) Targets for air strikes will normally be marked with white phosphorus, white smoke or red smoke in that order of desirability and by the most suitable means.

UNCLASSIFIED

- (6) Frontline panels and/or smoke will be displayed prior to calling close air support strikes.
- (7) UTM grid coordinates will be used to designate and locate targets for all air support missions.
- (8) All pre-planned mission requests will be forwarded to the Division Air Officer, who in turn will consolidate such requests and submit to the 1st MAW. Pre-planned helicopter requests in support of company or larger size operations will be submitted to the 1st MAW at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the desired lift. All other pre-planned mission requests will be submitted to the 1st MAW not later than 1100 on the day prior to the day for which requested. Originating units will be notified by the Division Air Officer of the final action on the request.
- (9) Pre-planned helicopter mission requests in support of company or larger size troop lifts of a non-emergency nature must be submitted to the Division Air Officer not later than forty-eight (48) hours prior to the desired lift.
- (10) All pre-planned mission requests other than pre-planned helicopter requests (par 3c(9)) will be submitted to the Division Air Officer not later than 0600 on the day prior to the day for which requested.
- (11) Sensitive information such as coordinates, times, number of aircraft, types of ordnance and number of troops transported which are transmitted by uncovered means will be encrypted using the current KAC-138 or equivalent system.
- (12) On call and emergency tactical air support requests will be passed directly to the DASC using the standard formats contained in TAB A (Tactical Air Request Form). The procedures indicated in reference (c) will be utilized.
- (13) Helicopter support requests will be made in accordance with the previously enumerated procedures and in accordance with reference (d). The format will conform with TAB B (Aircraft Mission Request Form).
- (14) Helicopter medical evacuation requests will be made directly to the DASC using the format contained in TAB C (Helicopter Medical Evacuation Request Form).
- (15) Targets for ASRT strike will be submitted by FSCC's to the DASC utilizing the format contained in TAB D (TPQ-10 On-Call Target Request).

## SECRET

- (16) Alert status of support aircraft. TAB E (Alert Status of Support Aircraft).
- (17) Aircraft armament codes. TAB F (Aircraft Armament Codes)
- (18) Target area weather minimum. TAB G (Target Area Weather Minimums)
- (19) Aerial delivery in accordance with Annex B (Aerial Delivery) to Administrative Order 301-66
- (20) Aircraft accidents or incidents, including existing weather conditions at the time of the accident/incident will be reported to DASC or FSCC by the most expeditious means.
- (21) Fire Support Coordination. Appendix 2 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex E (Supporting Arms).

## 4. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS

a. Communication-Electronics. Annex I (Communication-Electronics).

b. Control Agencies

- (1) DASC. The DASC serving the CHU LAI TACR/RZ is located in the 1st Marine Division CP.
- (2) TACC (TADC). The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing TACC (TADC) is located within the DANANG TACR.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

TABS

- A. Tactical Air Request Form
- B. Aircraft Mission Request Form
- C. Helicopter Medical Evacuation Request Form
- D. TPQ-10 On-Call Target Request
- E. Alert Status of Support Aircraft
- F. Aircraft Armament Codes
- G. Target Area Weather Minimum
- H. *Helicopter Air/Ground Interest Areas*

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

1. *Air Operations During Marginal Weather Conditions*

E-4-4

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(When Completed)

UNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

1st Marine Division (Rein), PMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

TAB A (Tactical Air Request Form) to Appendix 4 (Air Support) to Annex E  
(Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 301-66

Request No. \_\_\_\_\_

## TACTICAL AIR REQUEST

MISSION NO. \_\_\_\_\_

REF 3000/1 (4-65)

ORIG. CALL	1. (TACR)	THIS IS (TACR)		
	2. I HAVE <input type="checkbox"/> EMERGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY <input type="checkbox"/> ORDINARY <input type="checkbox"/> SEARCH/ATTACK	MISSION		
MISSION REQUEST	1. TARGET IS <input type="checkbox"/> AAA POST <input type="checkbox"/> MORTAR POST <input type="checkbox"/> SUPPLIES <input type="checkbox"/> TROOPS <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> GUN POST <input type="checkbox"/> FILL BOX <input type="checkbox"/> TANKS <input type="checkbox"/> VEHICLES <input type="checkbox"/>	SENT		
	2. IF (T.A.)	CHART (No.)		
	3. TARGET BEARS DISTANCE yd/meters TRUE FROM (Location)			
	4. <input type="checkbox"/> STATIONARY <input type="checkbox"/> MOVING (Give Direction) ON/THE	RECD		
	5. <input type="checkbox"/> WILL <input type="checkbox"/> WILL NOT MARK WITH (Color) SMOKE			
	6. REQUEST <input type="checkbox"/> BOMBING <input type="checkbox"/> STRAFING <input type="checkbox"/> ROCKET <input type="checkbox"/> NAVALM <input type="checkbox"/> ATTACK			
	7. READING (Miles) FULL OUT <input type="checkbox"/> RESET <input type="checkbox"/> LEFT <input type="checkbox"/> STRAIGHT MINIMUM ALTITUDE			
	8. REQUEST (If None) (Give W. Arrangement) PER RUN	TIME		
	9. RUN MISSION <input type="checkbox"/> ASAP <input type="checkbox"/> AT <input type="checkbox"/> AFTER <input type="checkbox"/> BEFORE (Time) BETWEEN (Time) AND (Time)			
	10. FRONT LINES FROM (V.A.) TO (T.A.)			
ARTY INFO	11. <input type="checkbox"/> MARKED <input type="checkbox"/> NOT MARKED WITH (Color) <input type="checkbox"/> PANELS <input type="checkbox"/> SMOKE	BY		
	12. <input type="checkbox"/> FRONT LINE <input type="checkbox"/> FAC IS (Give Distance and Direction) FROM TARGET			
	13. <input type="checkbox"/> I CAN OBSERVE <input type="checkbox"/> I WILL CONTROL <input type="checkbox"/> TARGET HIDDEN <input type="checkbox"/> USE OTHER CONTROL			
	14. REMARKS			
ARTY INFO	ARTY INFO (Location)	TARGET LOCATION CHECKED	APPROVED (Signature) (Date)	
	NOV INFO (Location)	FRONT LINES CHECKED	TIME BY	
MISSION APPROVAL	1. (TACR)	THIS IS (TACR)		SENT
	2. MISSION (No.) <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVED <input type="checkbox"/> TADC <input type="checkbox"/> TACA <input type="checkbox"/> TACF <input type="checkbox"/> TACF <input type="checkbox"/> TACF <input type="checkbox"/> TACF WILL CONTROL			
	3. CONTACT (TACR, PM Leader) WITH (No.) <input type="checkbox"/> VF <input type="checkbox"/> VA (Line) SET (No.)	RECD		
	4. RESTRICTED FIRE PLAN IN EFFECT FROM (Time) TO (Time) FROM (Coord) TO (Coord) WIDTH (Yds/Meters) MIN ALT MAX ALT			
	5. REMARKS	BY		
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT	1. (TACR)	THIS IS (TACR)		SENT
	2. TARGET <input type="checkbox"/> NOT <input type="checkbox"/> COMPLETELY <input type="checkbox"/> PARTIALLY <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROYED <input type="checkbox"/> NEUTRALIZED <input type="checkbox"/> COVERED			
	3. REMARKS	RECD		
	4. NO. TYPE NO. TYPE NO. TYPE ROCKETS NAVALM ROCKETS MISC.	TIME		
	5. ACT COMMENTS	BY		

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

E-4-A-1

DECLASSIFIED

(When Completed)

DECLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

TAB B (Aircraft Mission Request Form) to Appendix 4 (Air Support) to Annex E  
(Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 301-66

AIRCRAFT MISSION REQUEST FORM (HELICOPTER - OR - FIXED WING TRANSPORT)		REQUEST NO. _____ MISSION NO. _____
1. ACTION ADDRESSEE (Call Sign) _____ THIS IS (Call Sign) _____		
2. THE MISSION REQUEST FOR <input type="checkbox"/> HELICOPTER <input type="checkbox"/> FIXED WING TRANSPORT <input type="checkbox"/> OR/LIAISON		
3. THE MISSION IS <input type="checkbox"/> EMERGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY <input type="checkbox"/> ASAP <input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE		
4. TYPE OF MISSION <input type="checkbox"/> TROOPS <input type="checkbox"/> SPOT/OBSERV <input type="checkbox"/> VIP CODE _____ <input type="checkbox"/> LOGISTIC <input type="checkbox"/> PHOTO <input type="checkbox"/> EVAC (URGENT OR ASAP) <input type="checkbox"/> ALARM <input type="checkbox"/> UNIT COMER <input type="checkbox"/> SAR <input type="checkbox"/> RECON <input type="checkbox"/> STAFF <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER _____		
5. AIRLIFT DESCRIPTION (Number/Weight) NUMBER OF TROOPS _____ DESCRIPTION AND WEIGHT/CUBE INTERNAL CARGO _____ DESCRIPTION AND WEIGHT EXTERNAL CARGO _____ (Pallets - Bunkers - Type Vehicle - Equipment) REMARKS _____		
6. INSTRUCTIONS (S-B-A-C-K-L-E When Necessary) PICKUP COORDINATES _____ LOCAL DATE/TIME _____ DESTINATION COORDINATES _____ A. _____ B. _____ C. _____ D. _____		
7. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION _____		
8. LZ/SITE WILL BE IDENTIFIED BY <input type="checkbox"/> UNMARKED <input type="checkbox"/> PANELS <input type="checkbox"/> LIGHTS <input type="checkbox"/> MARKED WITH _____ <input type="checkbox"/> SMOKE <input type="checkbox"/> FLARE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Color) _____		
9. COMMUNICATIONS (For Aircraft and LZCP/TACP) CONTACT _____ CHANNEL/CIRCUIT _____ FREQ _____ (Do not give frequency unless no color code or circuit designation.)		
10. LOCAL DATE/TIME _____ AUTHENTICATION _____ FOR LOCAL <input type="checkbox"/> SENT <input type="checkbox"/> PHONE <input type="checkbox"/> RECEIVED <input type="checkbox"/> RADIO NET (Signature) _____		
FOR USE BY TAGC/TAC/HC/DAC/BACC/TECC 11. RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLAN <input type="checkbox"/> Victor <input type="checkbox"/> Harget <input type="checkbox"/> William LOCAL TIME _____ TO _____ TO _____ (UNREACHABLE) COORDINATES (SHACKLE) _____ TO _____ TO _____ COORD (Encode/Decode) _____ TO _____ TO _____ WIDTH FROM CENTERLINE TO EACH SIDE _____ TO _____ (Feet) (Meters) ALTITUDE FROM _____ TO _____		
12. ESCORT <input type="checkbox"/> REQUESTED <input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED NO./TYPE ACFT _____ CALL SIGN _____ COMMUNICATIONS _____ ARMAMENT CODE _____		
13. BASIC MISSION ASSIGNED TO _____ NO./TYPE ACFT _____ COMMUNICATIONS (Use/Call Sign) _____		
14. MISSION CANCELED <input type="checkbox"/> BY WHOM _____ WHY _____		
15. MISSION REQUEST SENT TO _____ RECD BY _____		
16. MISSION RESULTS <input type="checkbox"/> COMPLETED <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER _____ (Include pilot reports. Use back of this form when necessary.)		

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

UNCLASSIFIED

E-4-B-1

(When Completed)

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

(When completed)

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

TAB C (Helicopter Medical Evacuation Request Form) to Appendix 4 (Air Support) to  
Annex E (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 301-66

HELICOPTER MED EVAC REQUEST

REQUEST NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
MISSION NO. \_\_\_\_\_

EMERGENCY  
(Critical)

PRIORITY  
(Serious)

ROUTINE

1. REQUESTOR \_\_\_\_\_ RELAYED BY \_\_\_\_\_ NET \_\_\_\_\_
2. DTG REQUEST REC'D \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_
3. PICKUP AREA (name &/or coords) \_\_\_\_\_
4. TACAN RADIAL/DISTANCE \_\_\_\_\_
5. NUMBER OF: WIA \_\_\_\_\_ KIA \_\_\_\_\_ ILL \_\_\_\_\_ US \_\_\_\_\_ ARVN \_\_\_\_\_ CIV \_\_\_\_\_
6. AIRBORNE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE REQUIRED? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_
7. PICKUP LOCATION FOR DOCTOR OR CORPSMAN \_\_\_\_\_ US \_\_\_\_\_ ARVN \_\_\_\_\_
8. LANDING ZONE: SECURE \_\_\_\_\_ NOT SECURE \_\_\_\_\_
  - a. best approach direction \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. panels \_\_\_\_\_ letters \_\_\_\_\_ color \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. smoke \_\_\_\_\_ color \_\_\_\_\_ lights \_\_\_\_\_
  - d. other \_\_\_\_\_
9. CONTACT (call sign) \_\_\_\_\_ ON (freq) \_\_\_\_\_
10. REMARKS/SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS \_\_\_\_\_

-----  
TIME REQUEST RECEIVED \_\_\_\_\_ MISSION NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
TIME RECEIVED BY HMM/ODO \_\_\_\_\_  
TIME HELOS AIRBORNE \_\_\_\_\_  
TIME HELOS RETURNED \_\_\_\_\_

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

(When completed)

E-4-C-1

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(When Completed)

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

TAB D (TPQ-10 On-Call Target Request) to Appendix 4 (Air Support) to Annex E  
(Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 301-66

TPQ-10 ON CALL  
TARGET BEARING

DATE \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_

FREQUENCY \_\_\_\_\_  
PRIORITY \_\_\_\_\_  
ROUTINE \_\_\_\_\_

TGT#	COORDINATES	COVERAGE DESIRED	RESTRICTIONS	RUN IN HEADING	FRIENDLY COORDINATES

REMARKS:

TARGETS CLEARED FROM \_\_\_\_\_ UNTIL \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED AND  
VERIFIED BY \_\_\_\_\_

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

E-4-D-1  
UNCLASSIFIED

(When Completed)

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

TAB E (Alert Status of Support Aircraft) to Appendix 4 (Air Support) to  
Annex E (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

- a. CG 1st MAF requires aircraft and crew be maintained in such a state of readiness so as to be airborne from time of call within the time limits prescribed below. The alert status condition will be as specified in the aircraft schedule and will be in accordance with the following codes.
- b. Aircraft will be loaded as indicated by the aircraft schedule.

2. ALERT STATUS CONDITION CODES

<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>ALERT STATUS</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT STATUS</u>
a. Condition I	2 Minutes	Cockpit manned engine running
b. Condition II	5 Minutes	Cockpit unmanned
c. Condition III	15 Minutes	Cockpit unmanned
d. Condition IV	30 Minutes	Cockpit unmanned
e. Condition V	Secured or as Specified Released	

3. RECONSTITUTING INSTRUCTIONS

- a. Aircraft on lesser alert condition will automatically assume higher condition vacated by scramble.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

E-4-E-1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010600H Apr66

TAB F (Aircraft Armament Codes) to Appendix 4 (Air Support) to Annex E  
(Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

- a. Aircraft will be loaded as indicated by the aircraft schedule.  
All loads include full internal ammunition for automatic weapons.
- b. Flight leaders are directed to report flight ordnance status using  
the following codes to the controlling agency after each CAS mission.

2. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AIRCRAFT ORDNANCE CODES

<u>CODE</u>	<u>TYPE WEAPON</u>
a. D1	MK-81 250# Low Drag GP Bomb
D1A	MK-81 Snakeye
b. D2	MK-82 500# Low Drag GP Bomb
D2A	MK-82 Snakeye
c. D3	MK-83 1000# Low Drag GP Bomb
d. D4	MK-84 2000# Low Drag GP Bomb
e. D5	Aero 7D Rocket Pod 2.75" FFAR
f. D7	LAU 10A Rocket Pod 5" ZUNI FFAR
g. D8	AN/M-64 500# GP Bomb
h. D9	MK-77 Fire Bomb 500# Napalm
i. D10	MK-79 Fire Bomb 1000# Napalm
j. D11	AN-M57A1 Banded Lug 250# GP Bomb
k. D12	M-81 Banded Lug 260# Frag Bomb
l. D13	M-88 Banded Lug 220# Frag Bomb
m. D14	CBU-1 A/A
n. D15	CBU-2 A/A
p. D16	AIM 7E Sparrow Missile

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

E-4-F-1

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET


q. D17 AIM 9B Sidewinder Missile  
 r. D18 AGM 12B Bullpup  
 s. D19 AGM 45 Shrike  
 t. D20 20MM Ammunition  
 u. D21 FS Smoke Tank  
 v. D22 Parachute Flare  
 w. D23/D23A MK-44/Aero 7E Lazy Dog

## 3. FUZES:

<u>CODE</u>	<u>DELAY</u>
V	VT (Proximity)
W	0.1 sec
X	0.025 sec
Y	Instantaneous
Z	Point Detonating

4. NWIP 20-1, Naval Weapons Selection-Aircraft, contains the conditional kill probability, lethal area, and effective miss distance for each type of ordnance against a wide variety of targets.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS



GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

E-4-F-2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

TAB G (Target Weather Minimums) to Appendix 4 (Air Support) to Annex E  
(Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

- a. The following weather minimums have been prescribed for air support within the target area. Weather minimums must meet, or exceed, the following criteria. A cloud condition of broken to overcast constitutes a ceiling.
- b. Cancellation or delay of scheduled, on-call, and unscheduled air support missions will occur at any time the weather minimums are not met.

2. TARGET AREA WEATHER MINIMUMS

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Ceiling-Visibility</u>
a. Helicopter (day)	500' - 1 mile
b. Helicopter (Night)	500' - 2 miles
c. Day Visual Close Air Support (prop)	1500' - 3 miles
d. Day Visual Close Air Support (jet)	2500' - 3 miles
e. Visual Air Delivery	1000' - 3 miles
f. Fixed Wing Observation	1000' - 3 miles
g. ASRT Missions	None in target area

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

E-4-G-1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
CHU LAI, Republic of VietnamTAB H (Helicopter Air/Ground Interest Areas) to Appendix 4 (Air Support) to  
Annex E (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. In the interest of safety as well as operating efficiency, the following general comments pertain to the use of helicopters:
  - a. Medical evacuation aircraft are normally accompanied by armed helicopter escort. This escort can perform his mission of suppressing fires around the LZ more effectively if he is aware of the LZ situation and enemy positions prior to his arrival. Since the escort helicopter monitors the same UHF and FM frequencies as the Medical Evacuation aircraft, it is recommended that the supported unit furnish target information to the aircraft while enroute, that the target be marked when feasible and that any other information be provided which will assist in the successful completion of the MedEvac pickup. The escort will engage targets around the LZ prior to and during the casualty pickup by the evacuation aircraft. It is mandatory that the escort disengage when the pickup is completed and continue its escort mission to the casualty collection point.
  - b. Supported ground units may advise the aircraft commander conducting the medical evacuation in selecting a suitable landing site for the pickup casualties; however, the ultimate selection must be made by the aircraft commander who considers not only the ground and air tactical situation, but the approach/landing direction, anticipated take-off direction, and obstructions in the area. In some cases landings have been made a short distance from the site selected by the supported unit. The longer the helicopter remains on the ground at the pickup site, the more intense the enemy fire usually becomes. It is therefore mutually advantageous to both air and ground units to effect the pickup as rapidly as possible. In most cases, this can be facilitated by moving the casualty quickly to the aircraft.
  - c. There have been instances in the past where helicopter crews were exposed to unnecessary risk and helicopters damaged during attempted MedEvacs which were not bonafide emergencies. Medical evacuation mission pickups are normally made only from secure zones and priorities are normally assigned on the following basis:
    - (1) Emergency MedEvac: Helicopter evacuation of critically wounded, injured or ill personnel whose immediate evacuation is a matter of life or death.


DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10E-4-H-1  
CH7

UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

- (2) Priority MedEvac. Helicopter evacuation of seriously wounded, injured or ill personnel who require early hospitalization but whose immediate evacuation is not a matter of life or death.
  - (3) Routine MedEvac. Helicopter evacuations of patients with minor illness, of deceased personnel, or patients requiring routine transfer to another medical facility.
- d. The determination as to whether the situation is to be classified routine, priority, or emergency remains with the ground commander. However, the ground commander must assure himself that there is in fact an emergency. He must then weigh the risk involved to helicopter and crewmen against the urgency of evacuating the casualty. Ground units requesting emergency MedEvac at night must have the capability of marking the pickup zone with lights or at the time of requesting the MedEvac must state that flares are required.
  - e. Utilization of helicopters to evacuate wounded from the battlefield has materially reduced the casualty rate. Continued command attention to their proper employment in the role of medical evacuation will be of benefit to everyone.
  - f. Occasionally small units encounter situations where emergency need for close air support arises. In addition to fixed wing support, requests for armed UH-1E's should be made via the TAR net. If armed UH-1E's are on station and can be diverted, the emergency needs of the ground unit may be met immediately. The ground unit should be prepared to mark the target with pyrotechnics and/or control fire of the aircraft through its TACP.
  - g. Escort aircraft are assigned to VIP flights in a SAR role. The purpose of these aircraft is to provide immediate pickup of passengers and crew in the event the VIP helicopter is forced down in unfriendly terrain. Many agencies regard the escort helo as another passenger aircraft and use it to carry additional people. Passengers on these flights should be controlled by the requesting agency to prevent this practice and preserve the rescue capability of the escort helicopter.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS



GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

E-4-H-2  
CH7

UNCLASSIFIED



1st Marine Division (Rein), FIF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam

1.B I (Air Operations During Marginal Weather Conditions) to Appendix 4 (Air Support) to Annex E (Supporting Arms) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL. To preclude degradation of our dominant role in the air in Vietnam, it is necessary to conduct maximum flight operations in marginal weather conditions consistent with safe operating procedures. Detailed SOP's and thorough flight briefings are a prerequisite to safe, efficient flight operations under these conditions.

2. PRICETIES. Priorities, with the exception of MANDATORY priority, will be assigned each mission by the requesting agency and will be monitored and confirmed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and/or the Division Air Officer, as appropriate. Commanders will consider priorities assigned to missions in making their decision to conduct flights in marginal weather. The following priorities are established:

a. ROUTINE. Administrative or tactical transport of personnel, material or equipment, where time is not a critical factor and delay will not endanger lives or loss of material. Applied to air targets, this category includes missions against targets that are not time sensitive, for example, bridges and buildings.

b. PRIORITY. Tactical movement of personnel, material or equipment where excessive delay will jeopardize successful accomplishment of the mission. This category includes air strikes on targets that are time sensitive, i.e., of a fleeting nature such as enemy troops, vehicles, and vessels. It also includes cargo operations where delays will result in excessive material loss through spoilage or seizure by the enemy.

c. EMERGENCY. Mission involves safety of human lives or requires immediate transport of vital supplies or equipment. Medical evacuation of wounded personnel and air support of units under attack, including resupply of ammunition or medical supplies are examples of emergency missions.

d. MANDATORY. Mission is emergency in nature and involves safety of human life or national prestige to the extent that normally unacceptable risks will be accepted to accomplish mission. This priority will only be assigned to a mission by CG III MAF or CG 1ST MAW. Mandatory missions will not be cancelled because of weather.

E-4-I-1

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

### 3. CONDUCT OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS

#### a. Fixed Wing Operations

(1) Weather is a critical factor in determining the capability of fixed wing aircraft to provide air support. With the exception of TPQ-10 radar bombing, an all weather air-ground close support system is not currently available. Limited operations can be conducted in marginal weather conditions and units engaged in providing air support must be prepared to operate under these conditions. For normal operations, the recommended minimum operating altitude in the target area is 1000 feet and 5 miles for the F-4, and 1000 feet and 3 miles for the A-4. These minimums are dependent on the ordnance used however, and the respective group commander will make the final decision for his assigned aircraft after all factors, including priority of mission, are considered. To improve air support capabilities in marginal weather, fixed wing Marine Aircraft Groups will be fraggged to maintain two aircraft on "SCUD ALERT" in addition to the normal ground alert. The term "SCUD ALERT" is used to differentiate from the standard alert and will normally only be scrambled in marginal weather. Aircraft on "SCUD ALERT" will be armed with specific ordnance which can be released safely at low altitude, i.e., napalm and 20mm. The most qualified pilots should be assigned to this mission. It is anticipated that "SCUD ALERT" aircraft will operate below minimums recommended for normal operations. Weather minimums for landing and takeoff will be in accordance with current OPNAV instructions and established field minimums.

(2) Aircraft operating under marginal conditions will maintain a close check on terminal weather at both Chu Lai and Danang by contacting the appropriate DASC or the TADC. KC-130 tanker aircraft are available 24 hours a day on Condition 3 (15 minute alert) for emergency air refueling. Pertinent Marine Aircraft Group SOP's will delineate procedures to be followed in the event terminal weather conditions require diversion to airfields outside the Danang - Chu Lai areas.

#### b. Helicopter Operations

(1) Minimum weather conditions for operation of helicopters are normally 500 foot ceiling and 1 mile visibility. Under the combat environment in Vietnam, however, minimum ceilings of 1500 feet and 2 miles visibility are recommended for flight over areas where hostile ground fire can be expected. It will be the helicopter unit commander's prerogative to make the final decision as to whether a mission will be held for weather after he has considered all factors involved, including mission priority.

E-4-I-2

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) To preclude undue exposure to hostile ground fire or disorientation, helicopter flights confronted with below minimum weather conditions in the operating area or enroute to base will:

(a) Either proceed VFR at safe altitude to a secure landing zone to await improvement in the weather, or

(b) Climb in flights of not more than two aircraft to safe enroute altitude, after contacting the appropriate control agency, and proceed to base under tactical instrument flight conditions.

(c) Contact PANAMA or COFFERDAM radar for assistance.

(3) Helicopter units will spell out in detailed SOP's the procedures to be followed for inadvertent IFR flight.

(4) Thorough and detailed planning will be effected prior to scheduled helicopter flights through known or anticipated instrument conditions.

c. Heliborne Assault Operations

(1) Air support operations involving two or more air units, as in a heliborne assault operation, require careful coordination, particularly in marginal weather. All aspects of heliborne assault and fixed wing operations must be carefully considered. Current 1st MAW heliborne assault doctrine requires escort of helicopter waves by attack aircraft, landing zone preparatory fires, fire suppression around the LZ by armed helicopters or attack aircraft during landing of troops, and attack aircraft airborne on call over the LZ to provide close air support as needed under control of an FAC or TAC(A). In marginal weather conditions some of this support may not be available.

(2) To avoid confusion as to the status of the mission when the weather is questionable, the following procedure will be followed. At least one hour prior to the earliest scheduled time on station of any air unit involved in the operation, the helicopter unit involved will launch a weather plane to check on target area weather. Target weather information will be passed to the DASC. The DASC will relay all available weather information to participating units. The TADC will keep the DASC informed of all weather information received from PANAMA and COFFERDAM. If any participating unit decides that it cannot meet the assigned time on station for weather or for any other reason, it will immediately notify the DASC. The DASC will pass this information

E-4-I-3


UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

to the TADC and all participating units. The TADC will put a hold on the operation with all units involved assuming a Condition 3 alert. If the hold is caused by nonavailability of fixed wing support, the helicopter commander has the option of proceeding with the mission after careful consideration of all the factors involved, i.e., priority of mission, target area intelligence, availability of armed helicopters, etc. He will inform the TADC through the DASC of this decision. If he elects to hold until the weather improves, he will have a check made of the weather in the target area at least every hour until the mission is launched or cancelled. A new L-hour will be set by the ground unit commander. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units will not cancel air support missions supporting heliborne operations, but will maintain a Condition 3 alert status until the ground unit commander cancels the operation or until they are scrambled.

(3) Situations will continue to occur where last minute delays by the helicopter or fixed wing unit will result in one being launched without notification that the other is delayed. Timely passing of information by the DASC and all participating units will keep this to a minimum. The ground alert may be scrambled by the DASC through TADC to provide cover for the helicopters in such cases.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

  
SIDNEY J. ALTMAN  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

E-4-I-4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
141700 July 1966

Annex F (Alert/Defense Postures) to Operation Order 301-66

- Ref: (a) I Corps Coordinator Instruction 3121.1  
(b) CLICO 3121.1 of 5Apr66  
(c) I Corps Coordinator Instruction 5500.1 of 4Nov65  
(d) USMACV Directive No 525-2 of 24Sep65  
(e) CLIC Order 1050.1  
(f) 1st MarDiv (Rein) Order 3000.1D Ch#1 (SOP For Operations)  
(g) CG 1st MarDiv (Rein), FMF LOI 3:Op:gnl 3120 Ser: 0145-66 of 4Jun66  
(h) 1st MarDiv (Rein) Op Order 305-66

Time Zone: H

# 1. ALERT/DEFENSE POSTURE

- a. General. Reference (a) designated CG 1st MarDiv (Rein) Installation Coordinator of CHU LAI TAOR. Reference (b) defines responsibility and authority of CHU LAI Installation Coordinator. 1st Marine Division (Rein) defends base area, airfield and ancillary facilities at CHU LAI and such other bases as may be established in assigned area of responsibility; defends or participates in defense of other selected U. S. or GVN critical installations as directed. In order to maintain an adequate Alert/Defense Posture, vital areas have been designated and sectors of defense have been established. Purpose of this annex is to establish standard Alert/Defense postures applicable to all of various sectors and sub-sectors as prescribed by references (c) through (h).
- b. Concept of Ground Defense Operations
- (1) Concept for defense of CHU LAI TAOR is based upon three defense sectors set forth in Appendix 2 (TAOR and RZ Overlay) to Annex D (Operation Overlays). Defense Sectors are contiguous within TAOR and are:
- (a) 5th Marines Defense Sector
  - (b) 7th Marines Defense Sector
  - (c) CHU LAI Defense Command Defense Sector
- (2) Commanding Officer of each Defense Sector is responsible for coordination of all ground defense measures within assigned Defense Sector. Commanding Officers of organizations and units located in each sector are responsible for local security of their installations.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOWNGRADED 200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

c. 5th Mar/7th Mar

- (1) Assigned operational control of all organizations and units within defense sector for ground defense planning and during the execution of ground defense operations with the exceptions provided in reference (g).
- (2) Organize Defense Sector into Sub-Sectors.
- (3) Designate Senior Division Unit Commander in each Sub-Sector as Sub-Sector Commander with the exceptions provided in reference (g)
  - (a) Sub-Sector Commanders are responsible for coordination of all organizations and units in Sub-Sector.
  - (b) Sub-Sector Commanders will exercise operational control for ground defense of forces within their sub-Sector.
- (4) Ensure Sub-Sector Commanders:
  - (a) Organize battle positions within each Sub-Sector.
  - (b) Are aware of conditions under which battle positions will be occupied.
  - (c) Coordinate with other Sub-Sectors and forces.
- (5) Issue such orders as necessary to accomplish assigned defense mission.

d. CHU LAI DEFENSE COMMAND/DIV RESERVE

(1) Ref (g).

(2) Forces for Provisional Companies are as set forth in ref (h).

(3) *Maintain coastal surveillance, when assigned sector and establish ground recon and observe when operating in other coastal areas to detect preparations for infiltration of contraband.*2. SECURITY CONDITIONS AND ACTIONS REQUIRED (MACV)

- a. Security Condition WHITE: Will exist whenever information indicates need for unusual precautions to be exercised on part of all MACV personnel throughout Vietnam unless specifically localized by direction of COMUSMACV. Such conditions will be announced for specified period of time and may be expected during holidays or events having special significance in Republic of Vietnam. Sensitive periods or dates which require special precautions are announced periodically by Embassy or MACV Memorandum.

Action required

F-2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (1) Avoid large crowds.
  - (2) Do not remain in area of civil disturbance.
  - (3) Insure compliance with provisions of reference (c) for personnel in liberty status.
  - (4) Enter villages only as necessary in performance of duties.
  - (5) Inspect vehicles for booby traps.
  - (6) Adhere to curfews as established by this & higher Hq.
- b. Security Condition GRAY: Will exist in an area upon receipt of warning of a disorder where safety of American personnel, property, of installations is likely to be threatened.

Action required

- (1) Intensify provisions of Condition WHITE.
  - (2) Curtail visits to villages to maximum extent.
  - (3) Minimize use of government vehicles.
- c. Security Condition YELLOW: Will exist in a specific area or all of Vietnam when disorders of significance occur which threaten MACV or other American personnel, property, or installations, or when an attack has occurred against any of the above.

Action required

- (1) Intensification of provisions of a. and b. above.
  - (2) Terminate all liberty.
- d. Security Condition RED: Will exist through out Vietnam when a significant deterioration of internal security within Republic of Vietnam has occurred, or external aggression against Republic of Vietnam has taken place or is imminent.

Action required

- (2) In addition to security measures specified for security condition YELLOW, personnel will review classified Document Removal Destruction Plans.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

3. DEFENSE READINESS CONDITIONS (MACV)

- a. There are five Defense Readiness Conditions, with DEFCON 5 being peacetime normal and DEFCON 1 condition of maximum readiness. Normal Defense Readiness Condition for MACV is DEFCON 3. Each of these DEFCONS has associated with it a universally applied exercise term, which is used only during conduct of defense readiness condition tests or exercises. Actual readiness terms, short definitions, and exercise terms are set forth below:

<u>ACTUAL READINESS TERM</u>	<u>SHORT DEFINITION</u>	<u>EXERCISE TERM</u>
DEFCON 5	Normal readiness	FADE OUT
DEFCON 4	Increased intelligence watch and strengthened security measures	DOUBLE TAKE
DEFCON 3	Increase in force readiness above that required for normal readiness	ROUND HOUSE
DEFCON 2	Further increase in force readiness but less than maximum readiness	FAST PAGE
DEFCON 1	Maximum force readiness	COCKED PISTOL

- (1) Further definitions, situations under which each might be declared, and command readiness actions pertinent to each DEFCON are included in Appendixes (1) through (5).
- (2) Defense Readiness Conditions need not necessarily be declared in sequence. Any condition, 5 to 1, may be declared as situation requires. On declaration of DEFCON of greater readiness, action required of lesser readiness conditions whether declared or not, are automatically required.
- (3) In event Defense or Air Defense Emergency is declared, prior to declaration of DEFCON 1, forces will immediately assume posture of maximum readiness.

b. Classification

- (1) To enable rapid dissemination of readiness status, terms DEFCON 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1, together with DTG and declaring command, may be transmitted in clear over nonsecure circuits.
- (2) Fact that force is actually increasing its posture of readiness is classified information.
- (3) Fact that tests, exercise or drills are being conducted is not classified.



- (4) Association of DEFCON with its related exercise term is not classified.
- (5) Short definitions, as set forth in paragraph 3.a. above, may be related to their appropriate DEFCON "For Official Use Only" basis.
- (6) Association of DEFCONS and exercise terms with verbatim definitions or situations listed for each DEFCON in Appendices 1 through 5 is CONFIDENTIAL.
- c. Press Queries. When assuming DEFCON requiring greater degree of force readiness, precautions will be taken to minimize public speculation. However, should queries be received from news media concerning readiness action being taken, following reply will be given: "We do not comment publicly on state of readiness or alert status of forces of this command."
- d. Exercises
- (1) Test or exercise directives, designed to simulate declaration of increased readiness conditions, will only use designated exercise terms.
- (2) Term DEFCON will not be used for exercises. Press queries concerning readiness exercises will be handled as in paragraph 3,c. above.
- (3) Term ALERT will not be used in connection with readiness test and exercises.
- (4) Foregoing instructions are applicable to all component and subordinate commands within MACV.

#### 4. ANTI-AIR WARFARE

- a. Primary active air defense system in support of 1st Marine Division (Rein) will be supplied by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing or task organized elements of Wing supporting Division operations.
- b. Active air defense measures within Division are limited to employment of organic weapons against hostile aircraft. Division units will take under fire only those aircraft which are recognized as unfriendly and which are attacking friendly units or installations. Commanding Officers will control employment of individual weapons against hostile aircraft attacking within range of such weapons.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- c. Passive Measures. Passive measures are designed to reduce effects of hostile action. Passive measures to be taken within CHU LAI TAO include:

- (1) Dispersion. Dispersion of headquarters, supply installations, personnel and vehicles will be effected in order to minimize losses from any single air attack. Vehicles in convoy will maintain intervehicular distance of fifty yards minimum (unless there are overriding considerations) and employ air sentries. Provisional command groups will be prepared to operate from alternate command posts in the event normal command channels are rendered inoperative.
- (2) Shielding. Specific measures to be implemented will include construction of shelter, fighting holes, revetments, trench and employment of covered personnel carriers. As feasible, command centers will be constructed for commanders and key staff members which will provide protection from all but conventional weapon direct hit.
- (3) Damage Control. Damage control measures will be preplanned and ready for application immediately following air attack in order to prevent increased secondary effects. Specific measures include:
  - (a) Designation and training of secondary fire fighting teams, damage control teams and damage assessment teams.
  - (b) Preparations for early evacuation and medical aid.
  - (c) Provisions for lateral communications between units and plans to ensure restoration of communications as may be required.
- (4) Deception. Concealment, including camouflage, smoke, electromagnetic emission control and illumination control are all measures designed to obscure or conceal location or identity from hostile visual, photographic and electronic observation. As situation dictates, construction of dummy installations may be directed in order to cause enemy to expend his air potential on fake targets. Within 1st Marine Division (Rein), active and continuous camouflage measures will be practiced. Following provides guidance in regard to blackout discipline:
  - (a) Blackout line may be designated on all main supply routes within Division area.
  - (b) Division Provost Marshal will post signs when established to indicate line and will ensure its enforcement.
  - (c) Complete blackout to include only lights required for conduct of essential operations, will be practiced forward of this line.


d. Warning

- (1) Signals. Attack and alert warning signals set forth below are effective.

<u>SIGNAL/CONDITION</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>HOW PUBLISHED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Air Defense Warning "RED"	Air attack imminent or taking place (this includes aircraft and missiles)	FLASH message, short repeated sounding of sirens, word of mouth	Sirens will not be used for any other signals within objective area.
"YELLOW"	Air attack possible	Message, word of mouth	
"WHITE"	Air attack improbable	Message, telephone, word of mouth	May be declared before or after Air Defense Warning "YELLOW" or "RED"

(2) Procedures

- (a) Warning from higher authority. Upon receipt of warning from higher authority, or when local conditions dictate, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 will determine alert condition to be set and will disseminate appropriate warning signal/alert condition as follows:



- (b) Transmission of warning signals/alert conditions will be transmitted to all units on Division Broadcast Alert Net (VOICE) AFRS and all other available circuits as rapidly as possible.
- (c) Subordinate commanders will assess situation and in turn transmit warning signal/alert condition to their subordinate units by most reliable and rapid means possible.
- (d) Only those warning signals which prescribe an alert condition within 1st Marine Division TAOR will be transmitted to subordinate Division units. Alert condition "RED" will be set when received by higher authority or when units in 1st Marine Division TAOR/RAOR are under actual air attack.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (3) Warning to Road Vehicles. Military police on traffic duty and personnel operating traffic check points will disseminate warning "RED". Vehicles continue moving and increase normal interval to seventy-five yards. When warning "RED" occurs at night, blackout lights will be used and speed reduced to five miles per hour.

- (4) Aircraft Flash Reports. Subordinate units sighting enemy or suspected enemy aircraft or who are being attacked by an aircraft will:

(a) Make an AIRCRAFT FLASH REPORT to Division HQ by most expeditious means available. This report will include originator's identification, time of sighting, location (grid coordinates), nature of attack, number and type of aircraft, direction of flight and altitude.

(b) Notify subordinate and adjacent units.

- (5) Air Raid Warning Message

(a) Warning messages will be issued in following form:

1 Originator

2 "FLASH"

2 "FLASH"

4 Air Raid Alert Condition, Warning "RED".

5 Local time group

6 Area affected

7 Number of aircraft (One A/C; two A/C) Few A/C (3 to 8 A/C); many A/C (over 8).

8 Acknowledge.

(b) Example: THIS IS (ISHERWOOD) SWITCHBOARD CHIEF OPERATOR, FLASH, FLASH, WARNING RED, (LOCAL TIME). CLDC, MANY, ACKNOWLEDGE.

(c) Each warning message will be repeated at least three times.

Air Raid Alarm Siren

(a) Air raid alarm siren in Division CP will be sounded by Headquarters Commandant upon receipt of designated condition as indicated in paragraph 4.d.(2)(b).

(b) Subordinate units employ air alarms to supplement other warning transmission means as circumstances warrant.

Damage Reports. Immediately following attack, Sector Commanders will report number of casualties, extent of damage, actions required to prevent further injury and damage and actions required to restore combat effectiveness.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5. ANTIMECHANIZED WARNING AND ALERT CONDITIONS

- a. General. An antimechanized warning contains intelligence of significant hostile activity. As situation changes, Commander issues orders and sets alert conditions as necessary to counter threat.
- b. Reporting and Warning Procedures.
  - (1) Commanding Officers at all echelons are responsible for immediate dissemination of antimechanized contact reports and warning over any communications system in operation to lower, higher, and adjacent units.
  - (2) Initial reports of sightings of hostile mechanized forces will be transmitted by most expeditious means to next higher command.
  - (3) Initial reports will employ FLASH precedence (IMMEDIATE during training exercises) and will contain following information:
    - (a) WHAT - What has been sighted? (Approximate number, type and formation to include accompanying infantry, if any)
    - (b) WHERE - Location of hostile unit(s).
    - (c) WHITHER - Direction of movement.
    - (d) SPEED - Estimated speed of unit.
    - (e) WHEN - Time sighted.

Example of the "Initial contact message."

FLASH      FLASH      FLASH  
THIS IS (CALL SIGN OR CODE NAME), TWO ZERO MEDIUM TANKS, ROUTE BLUE. NORTH OF CONCENTRATION ONE ZERO, MOVING SOUTH WEST, ONE FIVE MILES PER HOUR, TIME ONE THREE FIVE ZERO, OVER.

- (4) Amplifying reports following initial reports will contain as much of information specified for contact reports as may be required at time amplifying message is prepared. Normally, IMMEDIATE precedence should be used if in opinion of originator development of attack makes such precedence necessary.

Example of "Amplifying Report".

THIS IS (CALL SIGN OR CODE NAME). IMMEDIATE, MY ONE THREE FIVE ZERO, NOW TWO FIVE TKS, ROUTE BLUE. NORTH CONCENTRATION ONE ZERO, MOVING SOUTHWEST, TWO ZERO MILES PER HOUR, SIGHTED ONE FOUR ZERO FIVE, TIME ONE FOUR ZERO EIGHT, OVER.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (5) Antimechanized warning messages will be sent by FLASH precedence to highest headquarters. Immediately upon receipt of a contact amplifying report (Or alert condition from Headquarters) Division Headquarters (G-3) will announce the alert condition to be set. Subordinate units will take action as set forth below. Warning message will contain the following:

- (a) Phrase "Antimechanized Warning."
- (b) A designator number to indicate antimechanized warning condition which is put into effect by the originator of warning message.
- (c) Voice call(s) or code name(s) of unit(s) apparently threatened.
- (d) Size and strength of mechanized force.
- (e) Location of mechanized force.
- (f) Time it is anticipated attack will strike.

EXAMPLE of the "Antimechanized Warning."

THIS IS (CALL SIGN OR CODE NAME), ANTIMECHANIZED WARNING CONDITION ONE, (CALL SIGN OR CODE(S), TWO J53 TANKS, ROUTE BLUE NORTH CONCENTRATION ONE ZERO, ONE FOUR TWO ZERO, OVER.

- (6) When enemy armor is destroyed or is withdrawing and immediate danger no longer exists, a message will be sent notifying all units which have been alerted.

- (a) Normally IMMEDIATE precedence will be used in "TANKS CLEAR" message.
- (b) This message will contain the phrase "TANKS CLEAR."
- (c) All "TANKS CLEAR" messages will be authenticated using challenge and reply procedures. The called station will initiate the authentication.

- c. Antimechanized Defense Alert Conditions. Upon detection of armor following alert conditions will be set by Division Headquarters (or higher headquarters):

- (1) CONDITION FOUR - Hostile armored force is detected, but contact is not imminent. Control and action to be taken:

- (a) Normal control and coordination continue.

F-10

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- (b) Efforts to detect enemy armor will be intensified by all agencies.
  - (c) Aircraft will be requested for search and attack missions.
  - (d) Long range artillery and naval gunfire prepare to attack enemy antimechanized forces at maximum range.
  - (e) Division Headquarters will alert reserve and general support elements.
- (2) CONDITION THREE - Hostile armored force is approaching our forces and contact is imminent. Time and general area of contact can be predicted with reasonable accuracy, and hostile armor will be within range of weapons assigned to the Division. Control and action to be taken:
- (a) Control of Division Artillery and Naval Gunfire will remain with Division Commander.
  - (b) All antimechanized crews and observers will be alerted.
  - (c) Designated artillery, naval gunfire and air units will mass fires on critical avenues of approach.
  - (d) Tank units in direct support will continue their assigned mission.
  - (e) Combat support units, liaison and/or reconnaissance teams should report to commanders designated by Division Headquarters by fastest means available.
  - (f) Maximum available air and ground transportation will be directed to support movement of barrier equipment and material to obstacle sites.
- (3) CONDITION TWO - Hostile armored forces are in position to immediately attack front line elements, or friendly units are under attack. Control and action to be taken:
- (a) Division Headquarters will pass control of sufficient Division supporting arms and combat support units to the regiments under attack. Control and action to be taken.
    - 1 Division Headquarters will pass control of sufficient Division supporting arms and combat support units to regiments under attack.
    - 2 Tank units, other than those committed in threatened area, will prepare to reinforce or to counterattack.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

2 Remaining antimechanized means will be prepared to defend in depth threatened area.

4 Complete barrier installation in threatened area. (See reference (f)).

(4) CONDITION ONE - Hostile armored forces have advanced to a point where designated lower echelon commander can no longer contain attack in progress. Control and action to be taken: Division Commander assumes direct control of all antimechanized means.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - MACV DEFCON 5 (EXERCISE TERM: FADE OUT)
- 2 - MACV DEFCON 4 (EXERCISE TERM: DOUBLE TAKE)
- 3 - MACV DEFCON 3 (EXERCISE TERM: ROUND HOUSE)
- 4 - MACV DEFCON 2 (EXERCISE TERM: FAST PACE)
- 5 - MACV DEFCON 1 (EXERCISE TERM: COCKED PISTOL)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

F-12

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
141700H July 1966

Appendix 1 (MACV DEFCON 5 (Exercise Term: FADE OUT)) to Annex F (Alert/  
Defense Postures) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL. Normal readiness posture which can be sustained indefinitely and which represents an optimum balance between the requirements of readiness and the routine training and equipping of forces for their primary mission.
2. SITUATION. Cold War Normal
3. DECLARATION AUTHORITY. COMUSMACV or higher authority.
4. COMMAND READINESS ACTIONS
  - a. All elements conduct operations in accordance with assigned missions.
  - b. Training will emphasize combat readiness and development of mission capability.
  - c. Air defense forces maintain adequate alert conditions to guard against sneak attack and to perform the identification function.
  - d. Submit reports as directed by MACV.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

F-1-1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
141700H July 1966

Appendix 2 (MACV DEFCON 4 (Exercise Term: DOUBLE TAKE)) to Annex F (Alert/  
Defense Postures) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL. Readiness posture requiring increased intelligence watch and a continuing analysis of politico/military situation in area of tension. Offensive and defensive alert forces and unit combat readiness normally will not be increased over that required for DEFCON 5. During this condition no measure will be taken which could be considered provocative or which might disclose operational plans. Every effort should be made to insure that measures taken do not cause public speculation.
2. SITUATION. Regional tensions requiring greater military vigilance by U. S. forces.
3. DECLARATION AUTHORITY. COMSUMACV or higher authority.
4. COMMAND READINESS ACTIONS.
  - a. Review contingency plans and make modifications or formulate new plans as required.
  - b. Take actions to increase security and anti-sabotage measures.
  - c. Keep appropriate commanders informed of developing situation.
  - d. Alerting procedures will be reviewed and discreet preparations will be made to assume DEFCON 3, if directed, in minimum time and without generating public speculation.
  - e. Submit reports as directed by MACV.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

F-2-1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
141700H July 1966

Appendix 3 (MACV DEFCON 3 (Exercise Term: ROUND HOUSE)) to Annex F (Alert/  
Defense Postures) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL. State of readiness that requires certain portions of assigned forces to assume an increased readiness posture above that of normal readiness.
2. SITUATION. Regional tensions increasingly susceptible to communist exploitation or other regional tensions which may have serious adverse effect on U. S. national interests. Possible U. S. force involvement. DEFCON 3 will be considered normal readiness condition for MACV.
3. DECLARATION AUTHORITY. COMUSMACV or higher authority.
4. COMMAND READINESS ACTIONS
  - a. Plans of next higher condition are reviewed and readied.
  - b. Commanders will time phase actions in a manner to avoid public speculation.
  - c. Personnel will be alerted without public announcement of action which might unduly alarm civilian populace.
  - d. Personnel on leave and TDY will not be recalled.
  - e. Combat readiness posture established will be one which can be maintained over a prolonged period of time.
  - f. Operational and support force requirements and capabilities will be reviewed and appropriate action will be initiated to fill personnel and logistic deficiencies.
  - g. Communications requirements will be reviewed and appropriate action will be initiated to remedy serious deficiencies.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

F-3-1

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
141700H July 1966

Appendix 4 (MACV DEFCON 2 (Exercise Term: FAST PACE)) to Annex F (Alert/  
Defense Postures) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL. Further increase in military force readiness over that of DEFCON 3 but which remains less than maximum readiness. Certain military deployments and selected civil actions may be necessary in consonance with command's mission.
2. SITUATION. Situations exist that are directly susceptible to communist exploitation by hostile action, or other situations, susceptible to hostile exploitation, exist which could seriously threaten U. S. forces overseas, U. S. allies or areas vital to U. S. national interests.
3. DECLARATION AUTHORITY. COMUSMACV or higher authority.
4. COMMAND READINESS ACTIONS
  - a. Necessary measures will be taken to minimize reaction time.
  - b. Noncombatant evacuation plan (MACV OPLAN 6066) will be executed, if directed by Chief of Mission.
  - c. Commanders and staff division chiefs will review personnel requirements and recall from leave and TDY those personnel essential to current operation.
  - d. All elements of MACV prepare to commence 24-hour operation on direction of COMUSMACV.
  - e. All personnel will be placed on telephone alert.
  - f. Submit reports as directed by MACV.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

F-4-1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
141700H July 1966

Appendix 5 (MACV DEFCON 1 (Exercise Term: COCKED PISTOL)) to Annex F (Alert/  
Defense Postures) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL. Maximum readiness posture requiring highest state of preparedness to execute war plans.
2. SITUATION. Southeast Asia or other major international politico/military situation has deteriorated to such a degree that measures must be taken to achieve maximum readiness. There exist strategic and/or tactical indication of hostilities against U. S. forces in Southeast Asia or elsewhere, U. S. allies and/or Continental United States or its possessions. Overt aggression or general or limited war is imminent and may occur momentarily.
3. DECLARATION AUTHORITY. COMSUMACV or higher authority.
4. COMMAND READINESS ACTIONS
  - a. Noncombatant evacuation will be completed as directed by Chief of Mission.
  - b. Commanders and staff division chiefs will review personnel requirements and recall from leave and TDY those personnel essential to current operation.
  - c. All elements of MACV will operate on 24-hour basis.
  - d. MINIMIZE will be implemented throughout MACV.
  - e. Submit reports as directed by MACV.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

F-5-1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam

180800

MAY 1966

Annex G (Rules of Engagement) to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) 1st MarDiv Bulletin 03400 dtd 8May66

## 1. GENERAL

- a. The rules of engagement set forth herein are prescribed to minimize non-combatant personnel and property losses which may occur in the execution of military operations against enemies of the Republic of Vietnam.
- b. The use of unnecessary force leading to non-combatant battle casualties in areas temporarily controlled by the enemy will embitter the population, drive them into the arms of the enemy, and make the long range goal of pacification more difficult and costly. Accordingly, these circumstances call for the exercise of restraints not normally required on the battlefield. All unit commanders will apply only that force necessary to accomplish their mission, giving due regard to the safety of their command and the importance of preventing injury to the non-combatant populace.
- c. Incidents of non-combatant casualties and destruction of property by RVNAF and US combat forces are exploited by the enemy to the fullest extent to enhance their objectives to foster resentment against the GVN and the United States and to effect the permanent alienation of the people from the government.
- d. The 1st Marine Division (Rein) will establish the reputation of being able to move at will throughout assigned areas of responsibility and to defeat any enemy force encountered. Concurrently, the 1st Marine Division (Rein) will constantly demonstrate its concern for the safety of non-combatants, compassion for the injured and willingness to aid and assist the sick, hungry and dispossessed.

2. APPLICATION. All commanders are directed to plan and conduct operations in accordance with the following guide lines:

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

G-1

UNCLASSIFIED

## CONFIDENTIAL

- a. Both the military and psychological objectives of each operation will be considered. Pre-strikes in populated areas, reconnaissance by fire into hamlets, and poorly selected harassing and interdiction fires are examples of military measures which will be counterproductive in the long run.
- b. Troop indoctrination briefings will be held before each operation to emphasize both the short and long range importance of minimizing non-combatant battle casualties.
- c. Concurrent air/ground/ planning to ensure the proper selection of helicopter landing zones and the proper employment and integration of artillery, naval gunfire and air strikes will avoid unnecessary damage to lives and property of non-combatants.
- d. Forward air controllers will be briefed on areas to be avoided due to the presence of friendly or potentially friendly populace. Such information must be sought from local officials at province and district level.
- e. Free strike zones should be configured to eliminate populated areas except those in accepted enemy bases.
- f. Operations should be planned in coordination with province and district chiefs with due regard to security of plans. A liaison officer from Marine forces conducting operations in a particular province should be positioned at the district headquarters for coordination. The district advisors will perform this function in the absence of a liaison officer.
- g. With due regard to security and success of the mission, the people will be warned of impending air strikes or operations by leaflets and broadcasts whenever possible. This warning should emphasize that the enemy by his presence makes the action necessary. Further, that the enemy is directly responsible for damages incurred resulting from combat in populated areas.
- h. Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, and if, in the judgment of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.
- i. Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker systems or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.
- j. The participation of Vietnamese forces in operations will be encouraged so that the war does not appear to be a US action

UNCLASSIFIED

against the Vietnamese people. Regional and Popular Force participation will be sought at Marine battalion or company level so that they may assist in the search of private dwellings, obtain information and contribute to the desired effect of the cooperative war effort.

- k. In carrying out search and destroy operations, take all practicable measures to minimize the destruction of indigenous private property and to ensure proper control, disposition, and safeguarding thereof. Plans will include procedures for the protection of private property and reporting, security and disposition of excess supplies.
- l. A civic action plan will support each operation even if the area has been controlled by the enemy. As the situation dictates, operation plans will provide for utilization of all available assets to include a program for dispensing of medical supplies; transportation and distribution of emergency rations; medical evacuation of injured or sick regardless of suspected or known political affiliation; and light engineering work within the capabilities of tactical units.
- m. Whenever possible, utilize appropriate leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, ground loudspeakers and/or face-to-face teams to separate non-combatants from the enemy. Annex H (Psychological Warfare).
- n. Established rules of good military conduct and discipline will be enforced.

### 3. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

#### a. General

- (1) During hours of darkness the sequence of engagement will be:
  - (a) Challenge.
  - (b) If the person challenged makes an overt attempt to avoid apprehension, opens fire or commits any other hostile act and thereby endangers the life of the challenger, the challenger may fire.
  - (c) Unit commanders may prescribe illumination prior to firing if local circumstances allow.
  - (d) The requirement for challenge may be waived by the local commander if required by the tactical situation and no friendly forces are known to be operating in the area.
- (2) Magazines will not be inserted in weapons in a camp area during daylight hours unless under attack.
- (3) Warning shots will not be employed on contact with the enemy with the exception of daytime control of waterborne traffic. Craft failing to respond to challenge may be warned by fire.



## CONFIDENTIAL

- (4) Rounds will not be chambered in individual weapons unless contact with the enemy is imminent. The senior Marine present will determine if, in his judgement, the measure must be taken to preserve the lives of 1st Marine Division (Rein) personnel. Initiation of any offensive or defensive formation implies imminent contact with the enemy.
- (5) Within the TAOR and RAOR, and during operations in areas external thereto, the establishment of a curfew is the responsibility of GVN officials. Assistance in enforcing the curfew will normally devolve upon 1st Marine Division organizations and units. In such instances, indigenous personnel will be informed of the time limits involved and the requirement for strict adherence. It will be further explained that the purpose of the curfew is to ensure that innocent civilians are not mistaken for the enemy and shot.

b. Destruction of VN Property

- (1) Civilian dwellings will not be burned, nor will private property, including livestock, be destroyed except as an unavoidable consequence of combat actions.
- (2) Destruction of Vietnamese dwellings and livestock as a measure of denying their use to the enemy is left to RVNAF units. Requests from Vietnamese authorities for employment of 1st Marine Division (Rein) forces to perform such destruction will be referred to this Headquarters.

c. Artillery/Naval Gunfire

- (1) Artillery and naval gunfire against known or suspected enemy targets in hamlets and villages occupied by non-combatants are governed by the following criteria:
  - (a) All attacks will be controlled by airborne or ground observers or RVNAF observers and will be executed only after US-GVN-RVNAF approval, as appropriate.
  - (b) Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker systems or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.
- (2) In areas exclusive of villages and hamlets, artillery fire and naval gunfire may be directed against enemy forces in contact in accordance with normal procedures. However, unobserved fire will be directed only at targets or target areas declared hostile by GVN, VN liaison personnel, or air and/or ground observers. Further, unobserved naval gunfire will be employed only under exceptional circumstances and in cases where:

UNCLASSIFIED

- (a) The requested naval gunfire support missions cannot be observed due to geography, weather or other factors.
- (b) No US ALO's, FAC's or airborne artillery spotters trained in naval gunfire spotting are available. (Conduct of naval gunfire support missions under this provision must be undertaken as an acknowledged deviation from standard procedures).
- (3) All supporting arms missions with the exception of barrages and preplanned unobserved fires will be controlled by an airborne or ground FAC, forward observer, NGF Spot Team or RVNAF observer. All observed and unobserved fires, except barrages, will be executed only after US/GVN/RVNAF approval, as appropriate.
- (4) *Following measures are effective - - SEE Basic Order, ICh 27, page 25, for text.*
- d. Air
- (1) When possible, coordination with the unit ground commander and the appropriate Direct Air Support Center will be obtained prior to initiating an air strike. In the case of fire suppression in an approved target area where all friendly locations are known, the strike may be accomplished immediately at the FAC's discretion.
- (2) Strike Aircraft in Close Air Support Role.
- (a) USAF, USMC and USN strike aircraft will normally be controlled by the following in the order of preference as listed:
1. US FAC/TAC(A)/ALO
  2. VNAF FAC/FAO
  3. USMC ASRT (TPQ-10)
  4. MSQ-35 Ground Directed Bombing
- (b) Under emergency conditions when none of the above means of controlling strike aircraft are available, the following personnel may designate the target for an aircraft except as otherwise restricted herein:
1. The commander of a ground unit engaged with the enemy.
  2. US Advisor to a ground unit engaged with the enemy.
  3. US pilot of an airplane or helicopter supporting 1. or 2. above, who has radio contact with the ground unit involved and/or can identify all friendly positions in relation to enemy positions.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) ALO/FAC or other controller on close air support missions will ensure that the positions of friendly troops ~~are known~~ known and the information passed to the strike aircraft. When friendly troop positions are uncertain, the ground commander will be required to mark or otherwise identify his position prior to the strike. If time permits, the controller will be briefed on the ground scheme of maneuver, and friendly troops will be made aware of the time and place of the impending air strike.

(d) Close air support missions that involve strikes on hamlets or villages always must be controlled by an FAC. Such an attack will be executed only after US/GVN/RVNAF approval, as appropriate. Obtaining this approval is the responsibility of the unit requesting the strike. Hamlets or villages may be attacked by air without prior warning to the inhabitants if the attack is in conjunction with ground operations involving the movement of ground forces through the area and if, in the judgment of the ~~ground commander~~ ground commander, the mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

(3) US Armed Helicopters. If the target involves non-combatants, such as in a hamlet or village, and if the attack on the village or hamlet is deemed necessary and is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, the attack may be made without warning; however, appropriate US/GVN/RVNAF approval is required. If the attack is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operations, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets and/or loudspeaker systems prior to the attack and must be given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

4. CONTROLLED ITEMS. Control measures will be established in order to limit enemy access to the following specific items - rice, money, medicine, contraband and food caches consistent with the guidelines below:

a. Rice

(1) The rice which fills enemy caches is the product of an increasingly burdensome enemy tax program imposed on the peasantry in areas which the enemy control or to which they have access. The discovery of this rice and its return to villagers in the immediate area constitutes an opportunity for generation of major psychological impact in support of US/Republic of Vietnam objectives. Use of recovered rice for civic action purposes also reduces the drain on government rice supplies and transportation. It is desired, therefore, that Marine commanders be alert to exploit enemy rice stocks for civic action purposes.

(2) Rice harvests will be controlled on a planned basis within the capability of available forces. Requests to destroy rice or ~~rice~~ rice fields which cannot be controlled will be referred to this

UNCLASSIFIED

Headquarters. Approval for such destruction will be granted only when assurances that the legitimate food needs of the local populace can be anticipated and provided for by GVN provincial authorities, monitored and assisted by the US members of the Provincial Team.

(3) Procedures to be followed in the protection of rice crops are:

- (a) Determine the areas which produce large quantities of rice. Establish priorities for protecting these areas.
- (b) Conduct joint and combined military and police operations to protect the people during rice harvesting.
- (c) Protect convoys transporting rice harvests to agricultural cooperatives and farmers associations.
- (d) Initiate propaganda activities, using PsyWar and Rural Construction Cadre, urging the people to sell their rice only to GVN authorities or legal rice traders.
- (e) Deny to the enemy rice from paddies farmed or controlled by enemy. If the enemy rice paddies are not accessible, consideration will be given to the use of herbicides to destroy the crop. Final decision to use herbicides always rests with the GVN and always requires complete coordination of US and GVN agencies involved.

b. Money. The enemy relies heavily on extortion of money from the RVN populace to finance their aggression. The best estimate of the effort indicates that they have extorted from 2 to 4 billion piasters during the past twelve months. About 75% of this money was extorted from the people in the form of an alleged tax on agricultural produce and industrial goods; the balance was extorted from the commercial civilian traffic on the roads, trails and waterways of RVN. Many of the "tax collection" points are in areas which are accessible within the 1st Marine Division area of responsibility and can be successfully interdicted. Within the assigned sector of the TAOR and during operations outside the TAOR, organizations will coordinate with ARVN, PF and RF those activities aimed at neutralizing enemy sources of money and money instruments. These activities are primarily the attack of enemy "tax collection" points on roads and waterways and providing assistance to the local populace in evading so-called enemy taxes and bond-selling efforts.

c. Medicines. The enemy obtains medicines from Communist countries and by direct or indirect purchase in RVN from commercial establishments. Army of North Vietnam units bring a basic supply of medicine with them from North Vietnam and thereafter depend primarily on local purchase. Medicines are transported from the cities and towns by every means of transportation using roads, trails, and waterways to enemy distribution points. Some medicines are also obtained by selective hijacking

## CONFIDENTIAL

of civilian traffic. Local enemy sources of medicine must be identified and neutralized. Captured stocks of medicines will be reported and turned into this Headquarters for disposition.

- d. Contraband. All contraband seized by units will be turned in to this Headquarters for appropriate disposal.
- e. Food Caches. Large food caches, obviously over and above the needs of the local population as determined by local GVN officials, will be reported to this Headquarters for appropriate disposal. For extractions, a receipt system will be utilized where private ownership is claimed. General security for extraction operations and the furnishing of packaging materials and transportation may be provided upon request from GVN officials. Plans should provide for the availability of these resources. The following measures, as a minimum, should be coordinated with local GVN officials:
  - (1) Procedures for informing GVN officials of locations and amounts of food supplies discovered.
  - (2) Procedures for provision of necessary labor, packaging materials, and transportation to permit extraction.
  - (3) Provision for GVN to furnish receipts for supplies extracted when private ownership is claimed.
  - (4) Procedures for use of 1st Marine Division (Rein) personnel to furnish security elements during extraction operations.

## 5. POST OPERATIONS

- a. Where feasible, follow each operation with a PsyWar/CA team to explain to the population what happened and how to avoid future non-combatant casualties.
- b. Following each operation wherein non-combatant casualties and/or property damage have occurred, coordinate with the province/district chief concerned on prompt identification of those affected. Consideration should also be given at this time to appropriate civic action measures.

## 6. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. USMC units do not have the authority to exercise police powers over the Vietnamese people; hence the majority of controls will have to be established by the National Police, Army of Vietnam Military Police, or other ARVN military units and Regional and Popular Force units as appropriate. In the event of civil disturbance, the nearest Vietnamese National Police establishment will be notified. 1st Marine Division units will take no action other than to defend themselves and property of the U.S.

UNCLASSIFIED

b. Use of RCA. Reference (a).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

G-9

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

Annex H (Psychological Warfare) to Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

- a. Psychological operations are an integral part of the present conflict in Vietnam. Each word and deed has psychological ramifications that may either create a psychological advantage, or provide the enemy with a propaganda weapon. It is important that units and individuals create and maintain a favorable impression of the U. S. Forces.
- b. III MAF has established psychological warfare programs which require the conduct of psychological operations on a formal scale. Whenever possible, face-to-face communication is used to disseminate and reinforce propaganda themes. Mass-communication media either internal or external to III MAF ground units is employed in the implementation of the above programs.

2. OBJECTIVES. The basic objectives of the III MAF psychological warfare programs are:

- a. To gain the loyalty and support of the Vietnamese people for the legally constituted government through military civic action and allied programs.
- b. To explain to villagers the presence of U. S. Forces in the Republic of Vietnam.
- c. To reduce the fighting effectiveness of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Forces by conducting psychological operations in conjunction with tactical operations.
- d. To encourage Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Forces to rally to the Government of Vietnam through the Chien Hoi (Open Arms) Program. The Chien Hoi program is the policy whereby the Government of Vietnam welcomes any Viet Cong or North Vietnamese soldier who rallies back to the government.

3. III MAF RESOURCES

- a. Leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts can be made from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing aircraft. One UH1E with a voice loudspeaker system is located in the CHU LAI TAOR. The system does not possess a capability for broadcasting tape recorded messages but is excellent for live broadcasts. This aircraft can also be used for leaflet drops.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

A second UH1E, similarly equipped, is maintained at DANANG. Leaflet drops may also be conducted from UH-34 helicopters.

b. Instructions for requesting helicopters are included below.

4. I CORPS JOINT PSYWAR/CA CENTER RESOURCES

a. Leaflet Production. Presses available at Headquarters, I Corps Joint Psychological Warfare/Civic Action Center in DANANG and the QUANG NGAI Detachment, 244th Psychological Operations Company, USA, are capable of producing approximately 2.5 million leaflets per month. Standard leaflets which are applicable over a long period of time can be obtained from SAIGON. Reaction time on such requests has normally been in excess of two months.

b. Audio/Visual PsyWar Teams.

(1) The 244th Psychological Operations Company, USA has detachments at DANANG and QUANG NGAI. The DANANG Detachment normally provides support for Marine and RVN organizations in QUANG TRI, THUA THIEN and QUANG NAM (includes DANANG) Provinces. The QUANG NGAI Detachment normally provides support in QUANG NGAI and QUANG TRI (includes CHU LAI) Provinces.

(2) DANANG Detachment, 244th Psychological Operations Company, USA currently has two (2) complete Audio/Visual PsyWar units. Each unit includes equipment necessary to make live and tape recorded messages. A team normally contains a team leader, an audio/visual technician and driver/leaflet disseminator. These teams are normally used to present general programs. The QUANG NGAI Detachment does not presently possess this capability, however, equipment is on order.

c. Development of Propaganda Material. A Research and Analysis Section is located at both the DANANG and QUANG NGAI Detachments. These sections are capable of developing basic ideas and raw materials into the form of usable propaganda. This applies to both printed material and tape recorded messages.

d. Intelligence Analysis. A Joint Vietnamese-American intelligence section is located at the Joint PsyWar/CA Center. This section maintains files on intelligence data applicable to psychological operations. This information is used both for the development of general propaganda by the Research and Analysis Section and to check material submitted for development by outside units.

e. Aircraft Support.

(1) Detachment 1, 5th Air Commando Squadron has available four (4) U-10 aircraft specifically designed for psychological warfare. These aircraft are capable of carrying up to three hundred (300) pounds of leaflets, can remain on station for approximately two (2) hours for loudspeaker missions and possess both live broadcast and tape recorded message capabilities.

UNCLASSIFIED



- (2) One (1) C-117 aircraft is on call from Headquarters, 5th Air Commando Squadron in NHA TRANG for large missions. This aircraft can carry substantially more leaflets than the U-10 and can remain on station approximately six (6) hours. Instructions for requesting U-10 or C-117 aircraft are included below.

#### 5. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUPPORT REQUESTS

a. General. Appendix 1 (III MAF Psychological Warfare Support Request Request Form) will be used by organizations/units requesting psychological warfare support external to 1st Marine Division. Request forms will be completed in detail and submitted to the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Attn: G-5). Request forms are used for routine and short notice requests and are normally submitted as far in advance as possible in writing. However, emergency requests may be submitted by telephone using the format contained in the request form.

b. Specific Instructions

- (1) Leaflets. Most leaflets can be ordered by catalogue number using the 1st Psychological Operations File Support Detachment Leaflet Catalogue as a reference. If the material desired is not included in the catalogue, a brief clear description of the printed matter should be provided, for example: "Houng Que Magazine, issue # 25". Quantity desired should be based on whether leaflets are to be hand delivered or dropped from psychological warfare aircraft and the size of the target. A due date should be included in all cases. The term "ASAP" will not be used.
- (2) Audio/Visual PsyWar Teams. The request for a psychological warfare team will include the following details:
- (a) Date/Time desired. Write as a date time group, e.g. 161234H Aug66.
  - (b) Name and rank of contact officer.
  - (c) Location to which team is to report will contain unit designation of the command post or name of the hamlet. Coordinates of the locations are essential.
  - (d) A general description of the program can be indicated by checking the appropriate blocks under paragraph II.C. of the request form.
  - (e) Additional information on particular themes to be stressed or avoided will be included in the remarks section.

H-3

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

(3) Aircraft Support. Type aircraft requested should depend on the specific mission and may be altered depending on availability. U-10 aircraft schedules are made up one (1) week in advance; accordingly requests should be submitted as far in advance as possible. Emergency situations can be handled, if required. Date/time is submitted as a date time group. The target area will be designated by the coordinates of the four corner points.

(4) Remarks. Information which amplifies the data contained in paragraph I, II and III will be entered in paragraph IV.

#### 6. FIRST MARINE DIVISION ACTION

a. Concept. Psychological operations will support III MAF psychological warfare objectives. Psychological operations will be conducted during all operations made throughout QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces, as well as within the Division TAOR.

#### b. Tasks

- (1) The 1st Marine Division psychological warfare program will be oriented to ensure that all personnel are indoctrinated with the objective of displaying a favorable image of the U. S. Marine Corps to the indigenous population of RVN.
- (2) Execute psychological warfare programs through the media of leaflets, aerial broadcasts and ground audio teams.
- (3) During the planning and execution of all tactical operations and civic action programs, include psychological operations, as appropriate.
- (4) Develop and recommend themes and material to support the overall psychological warfare program. All such themes and materials will be submitted to this Headquarters for review and/or approval.
- (5) Counteract incidents which may tend to place U. S. Forces in an unfavorable position by means of appropriate psychological operations.

c. Limitations. The following propaganda themes will not be used.

- (1) Any commitment regarding territorial boundaries.
- (2) Promises other than those attainable within the purview of policies of this command.
- (3) Promises regarding ultimate disposition of POW's.
- (4) Promises/statements regarding specific time periods for withdrawal of allied forces.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- (5) Promises to any specific groups regarding autonomy or political power.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

APPENDIX:

1. Psychological Warfare Support Request Form.

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

H-5

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam

Appendix 1 (Psychological Warfare Request Form) to Annex H (Psychological Warfare) to Operation Order 301-66

From:

To: I Corps Joint Psychological Warfare Center

Via: (1) CG, 1st Marine Division (Rein)  
(2) CG, III MAF (Attn: G-5)

PsyWar Support Request Form

I. Leaflets

A. Catalogue No. \* B. Quantity Desired C. Due Date

- (1)
- (2)
- (3)
- (4)
- (5)
- (6)
- (7)
- (8)
- (9)
- (10)

\* If not standard leaflet, describe printed material desired.

II. Audio/Visual PsyWar Team.

A. Date/Time Desired.

B. Report to (1) \_\_\_\_\_ at

(2) \_\_\_\_\_  
(Name of CP/Hamlet and coordinates)

C. Program to include:

(1) Films ☐ (2) Other ☐

(3) Speech by local official ☐

(4) Leaflet distribution ☐

H-1-1

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

III. Aircraft Support

- A. UH1F
- B. U-10
- C. C-117
- D. (1) Leaflet drop ☐ (2) Other ☐
- E. Target area (4 coordinates to enclosed area)

- (1) \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) \_\_\_\_\_
- (4) \_\_\_\_\_

IV. Remarks

Copy to:

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
 GORDON H. WEST  
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

H-1-2

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DO NOT GRADE AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800Z Apr 66

Annex I (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) DivO P2000.1  
(b) DivO 02000.2  
(c) DivO 2302.1

Time Zones: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence), current ISUMs and PIRs.
- (2) The enemy has employed and will continue to employ monitoring, imitative deception and makeshift jamming (any noise locally generated) of friendly radio and wire circuits. His capabilities will improve if he is provided assistance by CHICOM, NVA and other communist block nations.
- (3) The enemy will continue to harass communications systems by destroying or damaging communications facilities and by disrupting metallic lines.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) III MAF through CG, FMFPac, USMACV, I Corps, DCS and NAVCOMMSTA Philippines states communication-electronics requirements and provides material support.
- (2) USMACV provides voice and teletype channels over SEASIA long haul microwave and tropospheric scatter systems to include channels to 2d ARVN Division in QUANG NGAI and Headquarters 5th and 6th ARVN Regiments in TAM KY.
- (3) Defense Communication Agency provides entry into world-wide communications system through manual relay station NHA TRANG.
- (4) U.S. Navy provides entry into world-wide communications system through NavCommSta, Philippines.
- (5) Force Logistics Command provides electronics supply and maintenance support through Force Logistics Support Group-B. *FLSg-B provides counter message service to 7th M.T. Bn.*
- (6) RPIO Honolulu provides cryptographic support.

UNCLASSIFIED

## CONFIDENTIAL

- (7) Detachment, 1st Radio Battalion provides signal intelligence and communication security support.
- (8) 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing through lateral circuits with 1st Marine Division provide alternate means of communications to III MAF and other external commands.
- (9) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing establishes communications for the conduct of air defense and close air support.
- (10) Command Posts. Paragraph 5, basic order.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization).

## 2. MISSION

Communications elements plan for and install, operate and maintain continuous and reliable communications systems and facilities to support 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF, concept(s) of operation.

## 3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. Annex C (Concept of Operations)

b. Communication-Electronics Concepts

- (1) Communication-Electronics elements have a dual mission.
  - (a) To provide communications for base operations in the CHU LAI TAOR.
  - (b) To support amphibious and/or ground operations extending from or away from the CHU LAI TAOR.
- (2) The base communication-electronics systems are installed with fixed and semi-fixed plant equipment and facilities. Wire is the primary means of communication reinforced in depth by radio, radio relay, messenger and visual means. The facilities systems include:
  - (a) Division Communication Center.
  - (b) Division Telephone System.
  - (c) COC, Command Center, FSCC, and DASC Circuits.
  - (d) Base Defense Circuits.
  - (e) Liaison and coordination circuits with 2d ARVN Division and 5th and 6th ARVN Regiments.
  - (f) CRITICOM Circuits (SSO)

UNCLASSIFIED

- (3) The communication-electronic support for amphibious and/or ground operations extending from or away from the CHU LAI base is provided by packaged tactical equipment resources which are not employed for base operations.

c. 7th Communication Battalion, FMF

- (1) Operate and maintain CHU LAI Combat Base systems and facilities to include:
  - (a) Torn Tape Relay and Division Communication Center.
  - (b) Cable System, expansion and rehabilitation.
  - (c) Telephone Exchange augmentation.
  - (d) CHU LAI Defense Command Communications.
  - (e) Multichannel radio back-up to the cable system for emergency service to 5th, 7th and 11th Marines and the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion.
  - (f) Intercommunication systems.
  - (g) Area communication centers.
- (2) Augment the 1st Marine Division as required to support tactical operations.
- (3) Operate and maintain AN/MRC-62 multichannel circuits to III MAF, 3d MarDiv, and 1st MAW.
- (4) Provide relay guard for 1st MarDiv, 5th, 7th, and 11th Marines, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, FLSG-B, and 7th Communication Battalion.
- (5) Establish system and technical control agencies and procedures to restore systems and to maintain circuit quality.
- (6) Be prepared to activate AN/TSC-15 circuit(s) with III MAF.
- (7) Maintain circuit interconnections between AN/TRC-90/AN/TRC-24 site and 1st MarDiv frame.
- (8) Provide 1st Marine Division Communication Center with teletype and cryptographic equipment repair support.

L-3  
CH 3

UNCLASSIFIED



- (9) Coordinate communication matters of mutual interest with the Division Communication Company and other Division organizations as appropriate.
- (10) Perform other communication services as directed by this Headquarters.
- (11) Provide CG, III MAF with reinforced communication support company to support DA NANG FMF communication requirements.
- (12) Operate Division Communication Schools.
- (13) Provide over-the-counter message service for the 1st Shore Party Battalion, 1st Medical Battalion, Detachment, MASS-2, MCB-3 and 4, FLSG-B, American Red Cross, 1st Hospital Company, Naval Support Facility, and other CHU LAI organizations as directed.

d. Headquarters Battalion

- (1) Install, maintain and operate the following Division systems and facilities in accordance with references (a) and (b):
  - (a) Division Communication Center Augmentation.
  - (b) COC, FSCC, wire, radio and radio relay circuits. Activate Division Tactical, TAR, TAD, Division NGF Support, Division Reconnaissance, Division Air Observation and other COC, FSCC circuits as directed.
- (2) Establish system and technical control facilities and procedures as appropriate to restore internal Division systems and to maintain circuit quality.
- (3) Establish personnel and equipment packages to support other than base type operations by the 1st Marine Division (Rein).
- (4) Install, maintain, and operate 1st Marine Division CHU LAI MARS Station. See reference (c).
- (5) Coordinate matters of mutual interest with 7th Communication Battalion and where possible to conserve manpower and equipment, co-operate communication facilities which service the 1st Marine Division.

I-4  
CH 3

UNCLASSIFIED

e. 7th Marines

- (1) Provide communications guard and counter service for the 1st Engineer Battalion and 1st Motor Transport Battalion.
- (2) Provide communications to support sector assigned and be prepared to provide communications in support of tactical operations.

f. 11th Marines

- (1) Provide communications guard and counter service for the 1st Antitank Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 9th Engineer Battalion and Raymond Morrison Knudsen Co.
- (2) Provide FSCG with personnel and equipment to activate Artillery Regiment Command/Fire Direction and Artillery Air Spot circuits.
- (3) Be prepared to provide communications in support of tactical operations.

g. 1st Reconnaissance Battalion. Provide communications guard and counter service for the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion.h. 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Provide 1st Reconnaissance Battalion with personnel and equipment augmentation support, if, and as necessary, to operate 1st Reconnaissance Battalion Communication Center.i. 1st Shore Party Battalion. Establish and/or coordinate beach support communications with CHU LAI Naval Support Facility.j. Division Reserve. Be prepared to guard Division Tactical Net Number One (FM-VHF-V).k. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Ensure that all CHU LAI base communication systems are mutually supporting.
- (2) Communication procedures in accordance with references (a) and (b) and effective ACP's, JANAP's, III MAF and USMACV directives.

I-5  
CH 3

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (3) Operating instructions and procedures pertaining to radio, ~~whenever~~ and radio relay, frequency and call sign allocation, communications center operations, cryptography, visual communications, pyrotechnics, alert systems, messenger service and communication reports are contained in references (a) and (b).
- (4) Provide communication attachments and detachments with security, health and comfort, and installation support.
- (5) Be prepared to provide ARVN units with low level cryptographic support (operations, numeral and recognition codes, and authentication tables) during combined operations.
- (6) Provide press service with communication support only when such support does not interfere with military operations.
- (7) Lateral communications right to left and as coordinated between adjacent organizations.
- (8) Communications security in accordance with ACP 122.
- (9) Trouble shooting teams must be constantly alert to prevent equipment damage and personal injury due to mines, booby traps and ambushes.
- (10) In the event of landline and radio relay failures, all units (combat, combat support and combat service) be prepared to enter Division Command One (HF-SSB-V) or Division Tactical One (FM-VHF-V).

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Administrative Order 301-66.
- b. Supply and Maintenance. Every effort will be taken to maintain equipment off deadline and ready for immediate use. Maintenance float items must support all circuits, particularly those of lower echelons which are far removed from maintenance float assets. Contact teams will be positioned at regimental level and lower, if necessary, to provide third echelon and overflow second echelon repair. Helicopter evacuation to FLSG-B of equipment damaged during tactical or base defense operations will provide quick repair and replacement.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

I-6  
CH 3

UNCLASSIFIED

- 54
- d. 1st Marines. Provide communications to support sector assigned and be prepared to provide communications in support of tactical operations. ~~Provide message counter service for MCB 4.~~
  - e. 7th Marines
    - (1) Provide communications guard and counter-service for the 1st Engineer Battalion and 1st Motor Transport Battalion.
    - (2) Provide communications to support sector assigned and be prepared to provide communications in support of tactical operations.
  - f. 11th Marines
    - (1) Provide communications guard and counter-service for the 1st Anti-Tank Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, and Raymond-Morrison, Knudsen Co. *1st Engineer Bn*
    - (2) Provide FSCC with personnel and equipment to activate Artillery Regiment Command/Fire Direction and Artillery Air Spot circuits.
    - (3) Be prepared to provide communications in support of tactical operations.
  - g. 1st Reconnaissance Battalion. Provide communications guard and counter-service for the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion.
  - h. 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Provide 1st Reconnaissance Battalion with personnel and equipment augmentation support, if, and as necessary, to operate 1st Reconnaissance Battalion Communication Center.
  - i. 1st Shore Party Battalion. Establish and/or coordinate beach support communications with CHU LAI Naval Support ~~Activity~~ *Facility*.
  - j. Division Reserve. Be prepared to guard Division Tactical Net Number One (FM-VHF-V).
  - k. Coordinating Instructions
    - (1) Ensure that all CHU LAI base communication systems are mutually supporting.
    - (2) Communication procedures in accordance with references (a) and (b) and effective ACP's, JANAP's, III MAF and USMACV directives.
    - (3) Operating instructions and procedures pertaining to radio, wire and radio relay, frequency and call sign allocation, communications center operations, cryptography, visual communications, pyrotechnics, alert systems, messenger service and communication reports are contained in references (a) and (b).
    - (4) Provide communication attachments and detachments with security, health and comfort, and installation support.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

- (3) The communication-electronic support for amphibious and/or ground operations extending from or away from the CHU LAI base is provided by package tactical equipment resources which are not employed for base operations.

c. Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division

- (1) Install, operate and maintain in accordance with references (a) and (b), the following base systems and facilities:
- (a) Division Communication Center
  - (b) Division Telephone System
  - (c) COC, Command Center and FSCC wire, radio and radio relay circuits. Activate TAR, TAD, Division NGF Support, Division Reconnaissance, Division Observation and other COC, FSCC circuits as directed.
  - (d) CHU LAI Defense Command Circuits
  - (e) Division Voice Inter-communication System
- (2) Establish system and technical control agencies and procedures to restore systems and to maintain circuit quality.
- (3) Provide communication guard as follows:
- (a) Relay guard for 1st Marines, 7th Marines, 11th Marines and 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and FLSG-B.
  - (b) Communication guard and counter-service for 1st Shore Party Battalion, 1st Medical Battalion, Detachment, MASS-2 (DASC), MCB, American Red Cross, 1st Hospital Company, 7th Comm Bn and other CHU LAI organizations as directed.
- (4) Activate ~~AN/TRC-15 station on III MAF Command Net~~, two AN/MRC-62 terminals for multichannel communications with III MAF. Be prepared to activate AN/TRC-15 terminal on III MAF Command Net.
- (5) Activate lateral AN/MRC-62 circuits with 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
- (6) Activate AN/TRC-27 radio relay circuits with the 1st, 7th and 11th Marines.
- (7) Establish personnel and equipment packages to support other than base type combat operations of the 1st Marine Division (Rein). ~~WMP Provide Task Force~~ with comm equipment and personnel support; further support regimental and battalion size tactical operations as directed.
- (8) Install, maintain and operate 1st Marine Division CHU LAI MARS Station. See reference (c).
- (9) Install and maintain circuit connections between 1st Marine Division (Rein) communications facilities and AN/TRC-90 and AN/TRC-24 at CHU LAI.
- (10) Be prepared to activate radio and radio relay circuits as directed to support other internal CHU LAI Combat Base operations.

UNCLASSIFIED

- (5) Be prepared to provide ARVN units with low level cryptographic support (operations, numeral and recognition codes, and authentication tables) during combined operations.
- (6) Provide press service with communication support only when such support does not interfere with military operations.
- (7) Lateral communications right to left and as coordinated between adjacent organizations.
- (8) Communications security in accordance with ACP 122.
- (9) Trouble shooting teams must be constantly alert to prevent equipment damage and personal injury due to mines, booby traps and ambushes.
- (10) In the event of landline and radio relay failures, all units (combat, combat support and combat service) be prepared to enter Division Command one (HF-SSB-V) or Division Tactical one (FM-VHF-V).

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Administrative Order 301-66.
- b. Supply and Maintenance. Every effort will be taken to maintain equipment off deadline and ready for immediate use. Maintenance float items must support all circuits, particularly those of lower echelons which are far removed from maintenance float assets. Contact teams will be positioned at regimental level and lower, if necessary, to provide third echelon and overflow second echelon repair. Helicopter evacuation to FLSG-B of equipment damaged during tactical or base defense operations will provide quick repair and replacement.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

UNCLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
300800H Aug66

Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) 1st MarDivO 5605.1

Time Zone: H

1. Distribution for this order is as follows:

<u>Organization</u>	<u>No Copies</u>	<u>Organization</u>	<u>No Copies</u>
CMC (Code AO3H)	2	G-1	1
CMCS	2	G-2	1
CINCPAC	2	G-3	1
<del>CINCPACFLT</del>	2	G-4	1
CG FMFPAC	2	S&C	1
CG FMFPAC/IMAC (Fwd)	1	Ord	1
COMUSMACV	5	CEO	1
COMSEVENTHFLT	2	Compt	1
CG III MAF	10	Air	1
CG 3rd MarDiv	3	Engr	1
CG 1st MAW	3	Supply	1
CG FLC	3	PMO	1
NCC	2	Insp	1
CTF 79	2	MTO	1
CTF 70.8	1	Embark	1
CO I Corps AdvGrp	3	Hq 1st Mar	9
SA 1st ARVN Div	1	Hq 5th Mar	9
SA 2nd ARVN Div	1	Hq 7th Mar	9
FLSG-A	3	Hq 11th Mar	11
FLSG-B	3	Hq Bn	6
MAG-12	2	1st SP Bn	2
MAG-36	2	1st Engr Bn	2
MCB-3	1	1st Recon Bn	2
MCB-40	1	1st AT Bn	2
NAVSPTACT (CHU LAI)	1	1st MT Bn	2
MASS-2	1	1st Med Bn	2
2d LAMM Bn	1	3d AmTrac Bn	2
MACS-7	1	1st Tank Bn	2
1stMarDiv (Internal Distribution)		7th MT Bn	2
CG	1	1st Hospital Co	1
C/S	1	1st Dental Co	1
ADC	1	TOTAL	145
CLSC _____ 2			
FSCC _____ 1			
COC _____ 2			
9th Engr _____ 1			

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL STILES

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800H Apr66

Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

Ref: (a) 1st MarDivO 5605.1

Time Zone: H

1. Distribution for this order is as follows:

<u>Organization</u>	<u>No. Copies</u>
CMC (Code AO3H)	2
CMCS	2
CINCPAC	2
CINCPACFLT	2
CG FMFPAC	2
CG FMFPAC/I MAC (Fwd)	1
COMUSMACV	5
COMSEVENTHFLT	2
CG III MAF	10
CG 3rd MarDiv	3
CG 1st MAW	3
CG FLC	3
NCC	2
CTF-79	2
CTG 70.8	1
CO I Corps Adv Grp	3
S.A. 1st ARVN Div	1
S.A. 2d ARVN Div	1
FLSG-B FLSG-A	1
MAG-12	3
MAG-36	2
MCB-4	2
NavSptAct (CHU LAI)	1
MASS-2	1
2nd LAAM Bn	1
MACS-7	1
<del>2nd Bn, 4th Mar</del>	<del>1</del>
1st Hosp Co	1
"D" (Ref (a) refers)	30
"F" (Ref (a) refers)	25
mc 8-3	1

*Supervised, CHIO.*

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DECLASSIFIED



SECRET

Copy no. \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ copies  
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam

17 APR 1966

Operation Plan 302-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS Series L701  
 (b) DIV OP ORDER 301-66

Time Zone: Hotel

S & C FILES  
 HEADQUARTERS  
 1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

660851

Copy 2 of 85 copies

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces

- (1) See ISUMS and special intelligence reports as issued.
- (2) Previous experience indicates the VC will initiate terrorist mining against rice paddies which they have been denied.
- (3) Last harvest season the VC attempted to move confiscated rice by boat to avoid land patrols and check points.

b. Friendly Forces: Reference (b).c. Assumptions

- (1) That the requirement will exist to provide protection to rice harvesters during the harvesting seasons.
- (2) That VC will attempt to terrorize harvesters, gain access to ripened rice paddies and confiscate all available rice from which they have been denied.

2. MISSION. 1st Marine Division conducts operations to protect Vietnamese Nationals and the rice crop during the main harvest seasons to deny the VC valuable foodstuffs, stifle his control over the local populace and increase the VC logistical problems.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. The most effective echelon to coordinate rice harvesting procedures is at the Infantry Battalion and Village Chief level thereby proving to the populace that the local Marine Force is there to protect them against VC encroachment. No set pattern is applicable to all rice harvesting areas, however the following methods, tactics and procedures will prevail:

- (1) Patrols operating near the periphery of the TAOR coordinate activities with the local villagers to protect them while harvesting and transporting rice.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (2) Marine and ARVN/RF/PF forces coordinate in search and clear operations. Upon conclusion of search and clear operations, the Marine units establish outposts and ambushes to safeguard the rice harvesting area while ARVN/RF/PF forces escort the local populace to and from the rice fields to harvest crops.
- (3) Aggressive patrolling around the periphery of rice fields provides a screen of protection for local villagers, while RF/PF guard rice storage areas.
- (4) Marine and ARVN units coordinate activities to patrol and ambush as appropriate to protect the local populace and rice storage areas.
- (5) Extended search and clear operations outside of the TAOR allows sufficient time for helicopters to transport local villagers to the area of operations, harvest the rice crop and then transport the rice back to a safe area.
- (6) Village Chiefs make arrangements to transport rice to safe areas by bus or sampan.
- (7) Marine units make arrangements to transport rice to safe areas by tracked or wheeled vehicles, water craft and aircraft.

b. 1st Marines

- (1) Conduct operations for rice harvest protection in assigned sector of TAOR during period appropriate to locality.
- (2) Make recommendations to this headquarters for rice protection operations in the RZ and be prepared to execute such operations on order.
- (3) Be prepared on order to execute rice protection operations outside the RZ in the areas indicated in subparagraphs 3g(2)(a) and 3g(2)(b) below.

c. 7th Marines

- (1) Conduct operations for rice harvest protection in assigned sector of TAOR during period appropriate to locality.
- (2) Make recommendations to this headquarters for rice protection operations in the RZ and be prepared to execute such operations on order.
- (3) Be prepared on order to execute rice protection operations outside the RZ in the areas indicated in subparagraph 3g(2)(c) thru 3g(2)(f) below.

d. 11th Marines

Be prepared to support operations for rice harvest protection as required.

UNCLASSIFIED

e. 1st Recon Bn

- (1) Conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ along major avenues of approach to rice harvest areas to detect approach of VC forces and/or indications of VC attempts to harvest, collect, and store rice.
- (2) Be prepared to provide reconnaissance support for rice protection operations outside RZ as indicated in subparagraph 3.g.(2) below.

f. 1st Tank Bn1st Antitank Bn1st Engineer Bn3d AmTrac Bn1st Motor Transport Bn7th Motor Transport Bn

Be prepared to support operations for rice harvest protection as required to include, as applicable, combat support, mine sweeps and transportation of troops, harvesters, and harvested rice.

g. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Principal harvest seasons for rice in CHU LAI area are from 15 March to 15 April for early crop and from 15 September to 1 November for late crop. Fluctuation in times may occur based on seasonal rainfall and temperature in local area.
- (2) Based on availability of 1st MarDiv forces and tactical situation at the time, rice protection operations may be conducted in areas indicated below outside RZ:
  - (a) THANG BINH area bounded by BT 1539, 2023, 0530. Harvest times: March and April, September and October, November and January.
  - (b) TAM KY area bounded by BT 1630, 1622, 2322, 2624, 2230. Harvest times: Same as 3.g.(2)(a) above.

3  
Ch 1

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (c) BINH SON and SON TINH area bounded by BS 6491, 7292, 7784, 7282, 6362. Harvest times: March and April, August and September, October, and January.
- (d) SON TINH area bounded by BS 5088, 4788, 5377, 5389. Harvest times: Same as 3.g.(2)(c) above.
- (e) TU NGHIA area bounded by BS 6074, 5476, 5174, 5270, 6070. Harvest times: Same as 3.g.(2)(c) above.
- (f) NGHIA HANH area bounded by BS 5563, 5561, 6760, 6763. Harvest times: Same as 3.g. (2)(c) above.

- (3) Direct liaison between participating units authorized.
- (4) Report commencement and termination of harvest protection operations.
- (5) This plan effective for planning on receipt, and execution at beginning of rice harvest seasons.
- (6) Operations conducted in support of this Plan will be code named GOLDEN FLEECE, and will be sequentially numbered by regiment, e.g., 5th Mar operations will be numbered GOLDEN FLEECE 5-1, 5-2, etc. This numbering system effective commencing 1 Sep 1966.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Admin Ord 301-66.

5. COMMAND & COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

- a. Comm-Elect: DivO P2000.1D and DivO P02000.2B.
- b. Request additional communication support from this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL STILES

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES

A - Psychological Operations

DISTRIBUTION: "E" 1,2,3,4,7A,8,10,12,14,15,21,27,32,35,39,68,72,76,80,85,  
87,88,89,90,91,92,93,95,98,100

Copy to: CMC (Code AO3H) 2  
CMCS 2  
CG FMFPAC 2  
COMUSMACV 5  
CG III MAF 10  
CG 3d MarDiv 3  
CG 1st MAF 3  
SA I Corps Adv Grp 3  
SA 2d ARVN Div 1

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

e. 1st Recon Bn.

- (1) Conduct reconnaissance operations in the RZ along the major avenues of approach to the rice harvest areas to detect the approach of VC forces and/or indications of VC attempts to harvest, collect and store rice.
- (2) Be prepared to provide reconnaissance support for rice protection operations outside the RZ as indicated in subparagraph 3g(2) below.

f. 1st Tank Bn.1st Antitank Bn.1st Engineer Bn.3rd Am Trac Bn.1st Motor Transport Bn.7th Motor Transport Bn.

Be prepared to support operations for rice harvest protection as required to include, as applicable, combat support, mine sweeps and transportation of troops, harvesters and harvested rice.

g. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) The principal harvest seasons for rice in the Chu Lai area are from 15 March to 15 April for the early crop and from 15 September to 1 November for the late crop. There may be considerable fluctuation in these times based on the seasonal rainfall and temperature in the local area.
- (2) Based on the availability of 1st Marine Division forces and the tactical situation at the time, rice protection operations may be conducted in the areas indicated below outside the RZ:
  - (a) THANG BINH area bounded by BT 1539, 2023, 0530. Rice harvested in this area in March and April, September and October, November, and January.
  - (b) TAM KY area bounded by BT 1630, 1622, 2322, 2624, 2230. Harvest times are the same as (2)(a) above.
  - (c) BINH SON and SON TINH area bounded by BS 6491, 7292, 7784, 7282, 6362. Harvest times are March and April, August and September, October, and January.
  - (d) SON TINH area bounded by BS 5088, 4788, 5377, 5389. Harvest times same as (2)(c) above.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

(e) TU NGHIA area bounded by BS 5034, 5476, 5174, 5270, 6070.  
Harvest times same as (2)(c) above.

(f) NGHIA HANH area bounded by BS 5563, 5561, 6760, 6763. Harvest  
times same as (2)(c) above.

(3) Direct liaison between participating units is authorized.

(4) Report commencement and termination of harvest protection operations.

(5) This plan effective for planning on receipt, and execution at the beginning of the rice harvest seasons.

(6) Unclassified code name is Golden Fleece

4. ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS. In accordance with AdminO 301-66

5. COMMAND & COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

a. Communications in accordance with Division Order P2000.1D and Division Order P02000.2B.

b. Request additional communications support from this headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

A--Psychological Operations

DISTRIBUTION:

CMC (Code AO3H)	2
CMCS	2
CG FMFPAC	2
COMUSMACV	5
CG III MAF	10
CG 3rd MarDiv	3
CG 1st MAW	3
CO I Corps Adv Grp	3
SA 1st ARVN Div	1
SA 2nd ARVN Div	1
1st MarDiv (internal) "D" and "F"	

UNCLASSIFIED

291 <sup>FILE</sup> 486 #  
 Copy no. \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ copies  
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam

Change No. 1 to OPPLAN 302-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. Make the following pen changes to OPPLAN 302-66:

*Revised* a. Basic Plan. Paragraph 3.b. Change "1st Marines" to read "5th Marines".

*Revised* b. Annex A. Page A-1.

(1) *Revised* Paragraph 1.a.: Delete second sentence.

(2) *Revised* Paragraph 1.c.(4): Delete this subparagraph.

(3) *Revised* Paragraph 1.c.(5): Renumber this subparagraph to read "(4)" vice "(5)" and change to read "JUSPAO: Provides drama teams, films, projectors, and printed media to include magazines of propaganda value."

2. Substitute following new pages, attached hereto, for original pages, destroying replaced pages without reporting destruction to this Hqs:

a. Basic Plan. Pages 3 and 4.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL STILES

*Gordon H. West*  
 GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "E" 1, 2, 3, 4, 7A, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 21, 27, 32, 35, 39, 68, 72, 76, 80, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 98, 100

Copy to: CMC (Code AO3H)	2
CMCS	2
CG FMFPAC	2
COMUSMACV	5
CG III MAF	10
CG 3d MarDiv	3
CG 1st MAW	3
SA I Corps AdvGrp	3
SA 2d ARVN Div	1

S & C FILES  
 HEADQUARTERS  
 1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

660851 *ch*  
 Copy 3 of 85 copies

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam

Annex A (Psychological Operations) to Operation Plan 302-66

Ref: (a) Division Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. General. In order for the VC to supply their troops with rations, they have had to prey on the local populace with a heavy rice tax. ~~If this practice can be seriously hampered.~~ The confiscation of rice is one of the most prominent grievances that the people have against the VC. Thorough exploitation of this grievance can potentially produce a valuable psychological advantage.

b. Enemy. See current ISUM's and SIR's as issued.

c. Friendly Forces

(1) 244th Psy Ops Company: Provides leaflet and poster reproduction, tape recording, ground loudspeaker teams and propaganda research and analysis.

(2) 5th Air Commando Squadron: Provides U-10 and C47 aircraft for leaflet drops and aerial broadcasts.

(3) USMACV Advisory Team #2: Provides liaison with province and district headquarters, and with units of the 2nd ARVN Division.

~~(4) Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Province Headquarters: Provides drama teams and intelligence concerning the local population.~~

~~(5) JUSPAO: Provides <sup>DRAMA TEAMS</sup> films, projectors and printed media to include magazines of propaganda value.~~

2. MISSION. The psychological operations mission in Operation Golden Fleece is to accomplish the following psychological objectives:

a. To convince local rice farmers that the Government of Vietnam, assisted by the U.S. Marines, is interested in their welfare.

b. To prove to local rice farmers that the Government of Vietnam, assisted by U.S. Marines, can effectively help the people pursue their desired way of life.

c. To encourage the cooperation of the local populace in providing information for intelligence.

d. To expose the Viet Cong to the local populace as an enemy of the people, desirous of exploiting them by heavy rice taxes enforced by terror.

e. To create disaffection among the enemy with the VC cause.

A-1

UNCLASSIFIED



SECRET

3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Operations

- (1) Phase I: In weeks prior to the operation, through various media, inform the populace of the impending operation and its purpose; and emphasize the injustice of VC confiscation of rice. The purpose of this phase is to begin developing the confidence which will eventually result from fulfilled promises; and to create an awareness of the benefits to be derived from curtailing VC confiscation of rice. This should not reveal the exact area of operations or the time frame, but should be presented in very general terms.
- (2) Phase II:
  - (a) During the operation, through various media and face to face persuasion, encourage the local populace to cooperate with friendly forces by providing information and warnings to friendly troops. Keep the people aware that by cooperating with Marines they are benefiting themselves by helping to protect the harvest.
  - (b) During the operation, posters, leaflets and audio broadcasts will be directed at local VC and VC sympathizers to present the picture of a better life with GVN, the folly and eventual failure of the Viet Cong movement, and the means by which the VC may surrender and enjoy the better life of a free Vietnamese.
  - (c) During the operation, be alert for VC atrocities and acts of terror and expose these by immediate reaction mass communication media.
- (3) Phase III: During the last two weeks of the operation and the weeks following, remind the people of the success of the operation and show how their cooperation contributed to its success and the accomplishment of a peaceful, productive, and oppression-free harvest. Assure the people that during future harvest periods, they will enjoy the same peace and security because of the strength and consideration of their government, supported by the United States.

b. Tasks of participating units:

- (1) Indoctrinate participating troops in current psychological themes and objectives, and means to be employed in their accomplishment, including good people to people relations.
- (2) Inform the local population of the purpose and scope of the operation, thereby exploiting its psychological effect.
- (3) Demonstrate the capability of the ARVN, USMC, and local authorities to provide continued security for the population.

A-2

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (4) Conduct psychological operations, to include leaflet drops, audio broadcasts and ground audio teams.
- (5) Develop and recommend themes and material to support the overall program as favorable opportunities develop. Submit this material to this headquarters for review and approval, prior to dissemination.


## c. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) New themes and material will be coordinated and approved by this headquarters prior to promulgation.
- (2) Themes to be stressed:
  - (a) The people will no longer be oppressed, taxed and preyed upon by the Viet Cong if they cooperate with ARVN, USMC, and local authorities.
  - (b) The GVN and the United States have a sincere interest in the welfare and happiness of the Vietnamese people.
  - (c) The military power of the GVN, supported by the United States, will result in the defeat of the VC and continued security for the people of RVN.

4. ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS: Requests for Psy Ops support will be submitted to this headquarters using the current psy ops request form, in accordance with reference (a).

5. COMMAND and COMMUNICATIONS: In accordance with Division Order P2000.1D and Division Order P02000.2B.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS



GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

## DISTRIBUTION:

GMC (Code AO3H)	2
CMCS	2
CG FMFPAC	2
COMUSMACV	5
CG III MAF	10
CG 3rd MarDiv	3
CG 1st MAW	3
CO I Corps Adv Grp	3
SA 1st ARVN Div	1
SA 2nd ARVN Div	1
1st MarDiv (internal) "D" and "F"	

A-3

UNCLASSIFIED

Copy #77 of 90 Copies

Headquarters, Chu Lai Defense Command  
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
 180800H April 1966

UNCLASSIFIED

## OPERATION ORDER 1-66

Ref: (a) Map: Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheet 6739 IV Series L7014  
 (b) 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-66  
 (c) 1st Marine Division Order 003330.1  
 (d) I Corps Coordinator Instruction 3121.1

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces

- (1) Current ISUMS
- (2) Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b)

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) 1st and 7th Marines defend on FEBA and conduct offensive operations within assigned TAOR.
- (2) Division Reserve (Bn), prepared for employment on six hour alert.
- (3) 1st Tank Battalion and 1st Anti-Tank Battalion provide direct support.
- (4) 11th Marines provide direct and general artillery support.
- (5) MAG-36 provides helicopters in support of ground operations.
- (6) MAG-12 provides attack aircraft in support of ground operations.
- (7) Naval Support Activity provides water-borne patrols in harbor between KY HA and KY HOA.
- (8) Coastal Patrol Fleet 15, RVN Navy conducts counter-infiltration and anti-smuggling operations off the coast and in the waters of TROUNG GIANG.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

2. MISSION The Chu Lai Defense Command coordinates and exercises operational control of forces assigned and coordinates III MAF forces employed in ground defense of the assigned Defense Sector, and during an emergency, will exercise operational control of all forces assigned perimeter defense positions and provisional units made available by the Installation Coordinator, to: repulse or disorganize all forms of ground attack, to contain enemy forces which have established a lodgement in the Defense sector, and to eject or destroy the enemy by counter-attack.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations (Annex B).

b. Marine Air Group-36

(1) Designated as Commander, Sub-Sector I (Annex C Operations Overlay and Annex L Command Relationships).

(2) Assume operational control, for ground defense, of forces assigned within Sub-Sector I.

(3) Construct, maintain, and man fighting positions along barrier in assigned sub-sector, to ensure barrier is under complete observation and covered by fire.

(4) Maintain two platoons on the helicopter pads during the hours of darkness.

(5) Be prepared to man close-in defensive positions around service and operating areas.

(6) Coordinate and supervise defensive and local security measures of all forces assigned within Sub-Sector I.

(7) Submit consolidated reports for Sub-Sector I. (Annex J-Reports)

c. Force Logistics Support Group-5

(1) Designated as Commander, Sub-Sector II (Annex C Operations Overlay and Annex L Command Relationships).

(2) Assume operational control, for ground defense, of forces assigned within Sub-Sector II.

(3) Construct, maintain, and man fighting positions, along barrier in assigned Sub-Sector II, to ensure barrier is under complete observation and covered by fire.

(4) Coordinate, and supervise defensive and local security measure of all assigned forces within Sub-Sector II.

(5) Be prepared to man close-in defensive positions around storage and service areas.

UNCLASSIFIED

(6) Submit consolidated reports for Sub-Sector II. (Annex J-Reports)

d. Headquarters Battalion

(1) Designated as Commander, Sub-Sector III (Annex C Operations Overlay and Annex L Command Relationships).

(2) Assume operational control, for ground defense, of assigned forces within Sub-Sector III.

(3) Construct, maintain, and man fighting positions, along barrier in assigned sub-sector, to ensure barrier is under complete observation and covered by fire.

(4) Construct barrier along sea face and southwest edge of sub-sector as designated in Annex D (Barrier Plan).

(5) Be prepared to man close-in defensive positions around the Division Command Post.

(6) Coordinate and supervise defensive and local security measures of assigned forces within Sub-Sector III.

(7) Institute positive civilian control measures, permitting only authorized, properly identified civilian personnel to enter the Chu Lai Defense Sector.

(8) Establish Military Police check points in vicinity of coordinates BT-521041 and BT-541059, to be manned 24 hours per day. Annex I (Population Control).

(9) Establish Military Police check point in vicinity of BT-531082, to check fishermen in and out of area. Check point to be manned from sunrise to sunset. Annex I (Population Control).

(10) Submit consolidated reports for Sub-Sector III. (Annex J-Reports)

e. Assigned Infantry Unit

(1) Designated as Commander, Sub-Sector IV; responsible only for that portion of the sub-sector designated in Annex C (Operations Overlay) and the RMK Compound.

(2) Coordinate defense of the airfield with the Commanding Officer Marine Air Group-12.

(3) Occupy and maintain positions south, west and north of the airfield, along the barrier to defend airfield. Ensure barrier is under complete observation and covered by fire.

(4) Provide one rifle platoon to Commander, Sub-Sector V.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

- (5) Provide one rifle platoon for security of RMK Compound.
- (6) Provide fire support in accordance with Annex E (Fire Plan).
- (7) Submit consolidated report for Sub-Sector IV. (Annex J-Reports)
- (8) See Annex K (Airfield Defense Unit).

f. Marine Air Group-12

- (1) Coordinate defense of airfield with Commander, Sub-Sector IV.
- (2) Assume operation control, for ground defense, of assigned tenant forces within assigned portion of Sub-Sector IV, for defense of flight line, beach area and Class III, III(A) dump. (Annex C-Operations Overlay and Annex L Command Relationships).
- (3) Construct, maintain, and man positions to ensure complete observation and coverage by fire of assigned portion of Sub-Sector IV.
- (4) Provide a Reaction Force of two companies, upon request, for training and on order during an emergency, to Commander, Sub-Sector IV to reinforce airfield defense.

g. 1st Reconnaissance Battalion

- (1) Designated Commander, Sub-Sector V (Annex C Operations Overlay)
- (2) Assume operational control, for ground defense, of assigned forces with Sub-Sector V (Annex C Operations Overlay and Annex K Command Relationships).
- (3) Construct barrier in accordance with Annex D (Barrier Plan).
- (4) Construct, maintain, and man positions along barrier, in assigned sub-sector to ensure barrier is under complete observation and covered by fire.
- (5) Coordinate and supervise defensive and local security measures of forces assigned for defense of the Class V, V(A) dump.
- (6) Submit consolidated reports for Sub-Sector V (Annex J-Reports).

h. Defense Command Operations Center.

- (1) Coordinate the defense of the Chu Lai Defense Sector. See Annex C (Operations Overlay).
- (2) Establish and maintain radio and wire communications for conduct of defense of the Defense Sector in accordance with Annex H (Communications-Electronics).

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) Direct and coordinate the clearing of fields of fire, construction of a barrier, positions and obstacles along the defensive perimeter.

(4) Man the Defense Command Operations Center (DCOC) 24 hours per day.

i. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Rules of Engagement

(a) Insert magazine in individual weapons and linked ammunition in machine guns:

1. Daylight. In defensive positions and camp ONLY when under attack.

2. At night or during periods of extremely limited visibility (100 yards or less), on any defensive positions, at the discretion of the senior Marine.

(b) Insert rounds in chambers of individual weapons, machine guns, and grenades in launchers:

1. General: ONLY when an encounter with enemy is obvious and, in the judgement of the senior Marine present, rounds must be chambered to preserve Marine lives or to accomplish the mission.

2. By sentries and men in perimeter defensive positions, the general rule applies day and night.

(c) Firing Weapons.

1 Day: If target commits hostile act, shoot to kill.

2. NIGHT:

a On the perimeter, if illumination is adequate to distinguish beyond doubt that the target is hostile, shoot to kill.

b On the perimeter, if illumination is inadequate to distinguish whether or not the target is hostile, follow sequence of night engagement.

c Sentries, follow sequence of night engagement.

3 Sequence of Night engagement:

a Challenge (In English and Vietnamese-Halt, Dung Lie).

b If challenged person makes overt attempt to avoid apprehension, or commits any hostile act which endangers the challenger, the challenger (and assistants) may fire.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

c If the challenged person makes no response, or gives an incorrect response, makes no hostile move or flight, illuminate to make positive identification, then proceed in 2 a above.

(2) Submit overlay of fighting positions, and sub-sector Command Post to DCOC.

(3) Conduct no patrol/ambush activity outside of the Defense Sector without prior approval of this Headquarters.

(4) Conduct alert drills within sub-sector to ensure readiness of all units in each condition of alert. All alert drill to be coordinated with this Headquarters and adjacent units.

(5) Conduct daily inspection of wire barrier and positions (Annex J Reports).

(6) Organize a Reaction Force in each sub-sector for employment within sub-sector only.

(7) Emplace SID's, trip flares and claymore weapons at dark; retrieve at first light.

(8) For use of a Claymore weapon in a given location the following conditions must be met:

(a) Claymore is within vision of Marine controlling its detonation.

(b) Detonation effected only by hand generator.

(c) Individuals handling or controlling Claymores have been thoroughly schooled in capabilities, limitations and safety precautions of the weapon.

(d) The precise location of each Claymore MUST be altered nightly.

(9) Insure all security forces are instructed on rules of engagement, and, for each position, sectors of fire, primary direction of fire, and location of adjacent friendly units.

(10) Instruct Marines, whose sector of fire is such that their fire may fall in friendly areas, to use fragmentation grenades whenever possible. If they must fire, deliberately fire LOW when a target appears inline with adjacent friendly forces.

(11) Provide each manned position with a minimum of four (4) fragmentation grenades and four (4) hand-held illumination devices (grenades or flares). All grenades are to be kept in containers until

UNCLASSIFIED



ready for use. Secure all fragmentation grenades and illumination devices when position is not manned.

(12) Insure proper storage and accountability of ordnance and pyrotechnics.

(13) Barrier Plan, Annex D (Barrier Plan).

(14) Fire Plan, Annex E (Fire Plan).

(15) Annex F (Tank/Ontos Employment).

(16) Pyrotechnic Code, Annex H (Communications-Electronics).

(17) Manning levels for barrier positions, Annex G (Alert Conditions).

(18) Reports, Annex J (Reports).

(19) Assist in construction and maintenance of barrier as directed.

(20) Establish a sub-sector operations center, manned 24 hours per day.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

##### a. Supply

(1) Submit "SLIT" documents (NAVMC-10493) for fortification materials through this Headquarters for coordination with division.

(2) All other; normal.

##### b. Evacuation and Hospitalization

(1) Evacuate casualties to perimeter forces through normal channels.

(2) Aid stations are located at the CP's of the following units:

(a) Sub-Sector I

1 MAG-36

2 MACS-7

(b) Sub-Sector II

1 FLSG-B

2 1st SPBn

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

(c) Sub-Sector III

1 HqBn

(d) Sub-Sector IV

1 1st Marines2 MAG-123 MCB-4

(e) Sub-Sector V

1 1st Recon Bn2 3rd AMTRAC Bn. (-)

c. Transportation. Normal

d. Service. Normal

e. Personnel. Normal

5. Command and Communications.

a. Annex H (Communication-Electronics)

b. Command Posts

(1) DCOG	BT-533089
(2) Sub-Sector I	BT-525113
(3) Sub-Sector II	BT-532104
(4) Sub-Sector III	BT-531092
(5) Sub-Sector IV	BT-533077
(6) Sub-Sector V	BT-561046

*J. P. Trendwell*  
 J. P. TRENDWELL  
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEXES:

UNCLASSIFIED

- A - Task Organization
- B - Concept of Operations
- C - Operations Overlay
- D - Barrier Plan
- E - Fire Plan
- F - Tank/Ontos Employment
- G - Alert Conditions
- H - Communications-Electronics
- I - Population Control
- J - Reports
- K - Special Instructions, Airfield Defense Unit (To be issued)
- L - Command Relationships
- M - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

UNCLASSIFIED

292 072 #1

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
Chu Lai Defense Command  
~~1st Marine Division (Reinforced)~~, FME  
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/REW/hro  
3000  
6 August 1966

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Change One to Chu Lai Defense Command Operation Order 1-66

Encl: (1) New Annex E (Artillery Fire Plan) to Operation Order 1-66

1. Purpose. To promulgate a pen change and transmit enclosure (1) to the basic order.

2. Action.

- posted* →
- (a) On page H-1-1, Appendix 1 (Radio Call Sign and Frequency Plan) to Annex H (Communication-Electronics), change Defense Command Tactical Net (Secondary) to read, 44.4 Freq and M413 Desig vice 38.6 Freq and M356 Desig.
  - ✓(b) Substitute the new attached Annex E. Destroy superseded Annex E without report to this Headquarters.
  - ✓(c) File this Change No. 1 as page 10 of Chu Lai Defense Command Operation Order 1-66.

*D. L. Mallory*  
D. L. MALLORY  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

S &amp; C FILES

CI DC

0063-66

Copy 17 of 100 copies

10

UNCLASSIFIED

Headquarters Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
180800H April 1966

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 1-66

Ref: (a) 1st Marine Division Order 003330.1  
(b) 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

Chu Lai Defense Command

Col TREADWELL

Headquarters Defense Command  
Det. 1st Tank Bn  
Det. 1st Anti-Tank Bn

Sub-Sector I

Col. JOHNSON  
(Maj. MERRITT)

MAG-36  
MACS-7  
MCB-3  
NAVSPTACTY  
1st Force Hosp Co  
Plt 3rd AMTRAC Bn  
Det. MASS-2

Sub-Sector II

Col. SADLER  
(Capt. KING)

FLSG-B  
1stMedBn  
1stSPBn  
7thMTBn  
Btry"B"2ndLAAMBn

Sub-Sector III

LtCol. DIMOND  
(HqBn S-3)

HqBn1stMarDiv  
Tenant Inf Bn (-)  
1st Plt. Sub-Unit 1, 1st Radio Bn.

Sub-Sector IV

Maj. \_\_\_\_\_

Assigned Inf Unit  
MAG-12  
Bulk Fuel Co  
MCB-4

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Sub-Sector V

LtCol. SULLIVAN  
(Capt. GERAGHTY)

1stReconBn  
3rdAMTRACBn  
2ndLAAMBn, (-)  
Rifle Plt  
Det. Ammo Co

Defense Command Operations Center

Maj. HUBBARD

*J. P. Treadwell*  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters, Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
180800H April 1966

Annex B (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 1-66

Ref: (a) 1st Marine Division Order 003330.1  
(b) I Corps Coordinator Instruction 3121.1

Time Zone: H

1. MISSION. The Chu Lai Defense Command coordinates and exercises operational control of forces assigned and coordinates III MAF forces employed in the ground defense of the assigned Defense Sector, and during an emergency, will exercise operational control of all forces assigned perimeter defense positions and provisional units made available by the Installation Coordinator, to: repulse or disorganize all forms of ground attack, to contain enemy forces which have established a lodgement in the Defense Sector, and to eject or destroy the enemy by counterattack.

2. CONCEPT.

a. A defensive barrier, consisting of wire, Claymore mines, electric illumination, SIDS, watch towers, and manned fighting positions is to be constructed around the vital areas of the Defense Sector, augmented by tanks and Ontos, utilizing their lighting and direct fire support capabilities.

b. Forward of the defensive barrier, continuous patrol and ambush activity by infantry units contributes to the defense against indirect fire, infiltration, and build-ups for formal attacks. Listening posts, observation posts, curfew checks, and operations of Popular Forces and Self Defense Corps units also contribute to this effort.

c. The Commanding Officer, Chu Lai Defense Command has organized the Defense Sector into five sub-sectors for maximum coordination, control and utilization of forces.

d. Tenant units will contribute proportionate forces to maintain the defensive posture around the vital areas of the Defense Sector. This requires minimum forces to man the barrier under normal conditions, with strong, well-organized reaction forces available to each sub-sector to meet an immediate threat. Further reinforcement is provided by designated reserve forces within each sub-sector, and a rifle company of the division reserve available for employment within the Defense Sector.


UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

e. The Division reserve, normally one infantry battalion, will be located in or near the Chu Lai Defense Command Sector. The Commanding Officer, Chu Lai Defense Command, exercises operational control, for ground defense, of this battalion, with the exception of one company which will remain in a reserve status until released by the Commanding General. The remainder of the Battalion will be employed for normal ground defense missions within the Defense Sector.

f. The Commanding Officer, Chu Lai Defense Command has established an operations center at coordinates BT-533089, from which the conduct of the defense will be coordinated. Fire support coordination will be effected by Division FSCC.

g. It is expected that any action resulting from enemy attempts to infiltrate or attack will occur without warning and will be brief and violent. Consequently, it is imperative that all tenant units maintain a constantly high degree of readiness.

  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

UNCLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

50

14

ANNEX C OPERATIONS OVERLAY  
TO OPERATIONS ORDER 1-66

REF: MAP, VIETNAM  
SCALE: 1:50,000  
SHEET: 6739 IV  
SERIES: L7011

SUB-SECTOR I  
MAG-36

SUB-SECTOR II  
FLSG-B

SUB-SECTOR III  
HQBN

SUB-SECTOR IV  
ASSIGNED  
INF UNIT

MAG-22

SUB-SECTOR V  
1ST RECON BN

*J. P. Treadwell*  
J. P. TREADWELL  
COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS  
COMMANDING

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

03  
08  
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Headquarters, Chu Lai Defense Command  
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
 180800H April 1966

Annex D (Barrier Plan) to Operation Order 1-66

Ref: (a) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000 Sheet 6739 IV Series L7014

Time Zone: H

# 1. Situation.

## a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) Current ISUMS
- (2) Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b).

## b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) FLSG-B provides barrier materials and maintenance of electric generators for barrier illumination.
- (2) 1st Engineer Battalion provides:
  - (a) Technical assistance and heavy equipment for construction of barrier.
  - (b) Construction of illumination towers and installation of electric power cables.
  - (c) Instruction of Marines in care, handling and operation of Claymore weapons and other mines which may be authorized for use on the perimeter.

# 2. MISSION.

Defense Command constructs and maintains a wire barrier with accompanying obstacles, watch towers, floodlight illumination, and mines to deny access to the vital areas of the Chu Lai Defense Sector by infiltrators and to impede formal attack.


# 3. EXECUTION.

## a. Commander, Sub-Sector I

- (1) Implace barrier to protect Coastal Patrol Fleet 15, RVN Navy from land attack.
- (2) Remove all bunkers presently utilized as fighting positions.
- (3) Relocate existing barrier and fighting positions to ensure barrier is not at a higher elevation than fighting positions.

## b. Commander, Sub-Sector II

- (1) Clear swath west of present barrier; relocate barrier.
- (2) Prepare and maintain supplementary positions.



c. Commander, Sub-Sector III

- (1) Clear swath and emplace barrier vicinity BT-529086 to vicinity BT-531081.
- (2) Remove present barrier from northern sub-sector boundary; relocate along sea-face. Coordinate with Commander, Sub-Sector II.

d. Commander, Sub-Sector IV

Improve and maintain positions in assigned position of sub-sector.

e. Commander, Sub-Sector V

- (1) Clear of vegetation, a 50 meter wide swath on the North, West and South faces of assigned sub-sector.
- (2) Construct and maintain barrier in Sub-Sector V.

f. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Clear, improve and maintain fields of fire beyond the outer barrier to achieve maximum fire coverage.
- (2) Fighting positions along barrier not to be bunkers.
- (3) Prepare fighting holes for barrier forces and reinforcing units.
- (4) Erect watch towers for daylight observation posts, as materials become available.
- (5) Install and maintain electric illumination along near edge of barrier, as materials are made available.
- (6) Barrier Description
  - (a) Trace of barrier - See Appendix 1 (Barrier Trace).
  - (b) On the North, West and South faces, the barrier shall consist of:
    - (1) Two, 5 roll minimum concertina fences, one on either edge of the swath.
    - (2) Area between fences covered with tanglefoot or crazy wire.
    - (3) Claymore weapons emplaced so as to cover the tanglefoot and outer fence.
    - (4) Electric illumination of the barrier by floodlights, emplaced on towers to illuminate the outer barrier fence.
  - (c) On the East (Sea) face, the barrier shall consist of:
    - (1) One double-apron fence augmented with concertina, or one 5 roll concertina fence, emplaced, where it can be kept under observation.
    - (2) Claymore weapons emplaced to cover the fence.
    - (3) Electric illumination of the fence by floodlights, on towers, to illuminate the entire fence.
- (7) ~~Priority~~ Priority of Construction
  - (a) Clear swath

SECRET

REF: MAP, VIETNAM  
SCALE: 1:50,000  
SHEET: 6739 IV  
SERIES: L7104

SECRET

ANNEX E (Artillery Fire Plan) to Operation Order 1-66

1. The Chu Lai Defense Command (CLDC) coordinates the defense of the assigned Defense Sector.
2. Primary reliance is placed on direct fire weapons and organic means (Hand flares, 81mm mortars etc) for illumination.
3. In the event of an emergency, artillery HE and illumination might be required to repulse and destroy large scale attacks. Artillery's use, except in case of emergency is discouraged because of the high population and material density in the vital areas.
4. Requests for artillery fire within and outside of the CLDC Defense Sector, will be submitted to the Defense Command Operations Center (DCOC) for passage to 1st Marine Division FSCC. Fires may be preplanned or called by coordinates and, nature of the target. Preplanned concentrations may be called by indicating concentration number and any amplifying information not previously submitted in the initial request for the preplanned concentration.
5. Requests for 81mm fire, for those units not possessing the organic means, will be submitted to the DCOC, to be passed to the FSCC of the assigned infantry unit.
6. Sub-Sector Commanders are requested to continually review their artillery fire support requirements and request additions or deletions to the target list (if of illumination) as they occur. Remarks should include type of shell desired and amplifying information concerning the area within which the fire is desired.

*J.P. Henderson*  
J. P. HENDERSON  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex N (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

TARGET LIST

CONC #	COORDINATES	ALT	TYPE OF FIRE	COORD. OF IMPACT	BTRY ASSD
CL1	53451365	0	Illum on shell	52511442	C
CL2	53621263	0	-do-	53071357	C
CL3	54111141	0	-do-	54511765	C
CL4	54501000	0	-do-	54901864	C
CL5	54360850	0	-do-	55100852	M
CL6	55460147	0	-do-	55500873	I
CL7	57470542	0	-do-	58470321	I
CL8	56050346	10	-do-	56340362	I
CL9	55560374	10	-do-	55760385	I
CL10	55060430	10	-do-	55060554	I
CL11	53810506	0	-do-	53540616	I
CL12	53000550	0	-do-	52650628	I
CL13	52660664	0	-do-	52560655	E
CL14	52190740	0	-do-	52720749	E
CL15	52320828	10	-do-	52600895	E
CL16	52040879	0	-do-	52410920	E
CL17	52050936	0	-do-	52320988	E
CL18	52350970	10	-do-	52451020	E
CL19	52331612	10	-do-	52351110	C
CL20	52351061	20	-do-	52441140	C
CL21	52001065	0	-do-	52001267	C
CL22	52131125	0	-do-	52331287	C
CL23	51061215	0	-do-	51071339	C
CL24	53650400	0	-do-		Not Yet Assigned
CL25	53460448	0	-do-		Not Yet Assigned
CL26	53210428	0	-do-		Not Yet Assigned
CL27	52400516	0	-do-		Not Yet Assigned
CL28	52240528	0	-do-		Not Yet Assigned

All concentrations will be one gun-one point illumination  
The numbered dot indicates the probable point of cannister impact  
for their respective concentrations with batteries currently assigned

SECRET


DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

REF: MAP: Vietnam  
SCALE: 1:50,000  
SHEET: 6739 IV  
SERIES: L7104



SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET


ANNEX E (Artillery Fire Plan) to Operation Order 1-66 (Change #1)

1. The Chu Lai Defense Command (CLDC) coordinates the defense of the assigned Defense Sector.
2. Primary reliance is placed on direct fire weapons and organic means (Hand Flares, 81mm mortars etc) for illumination.
3. In the event of an emergency, artillery HE and Illumination might be required to repulse and destroy large scale attacks. Artillery's use, except in case of emergency is discouraged because of the high population and material density in the vital areas.
4. Requests for artillery fire within and outside of the CLDC Defense Sector, will be submitted to the Defense Command Operations Center (DCOC) for passage to 1st Marine Division FSCC. Fires may be pre-planned or called by coordinates and, nature of the target. Pre-planned concentrations may be called by indicating concentration number and may amplyfing information not previously submitted in the initial request for the pre-planned concentrations.
5. Requests for 81mm fire, for those units not possessing the organic means, will be submitted to the DCOC, to be passed to the FSCC of the assigned infantry unit.
6. Sub-Sector Commanders are requested to continually review their artillery fire support requirements and request additions or deletions to the target list (HE or Illumination) as they occur. Remarks should include type of shell desired and amplyfing information concerning the area within which the fire is desired.

*D. L. Mallory*  
D. L. MALLORY  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

(Enclosure 1)  
Change #1 to Operation  
Order 1-66.



## DECLASSIFIED

SECRETTARGET LIST

<u>CONC #</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>ALT</u>	<u>TYPE OF FIRE</u>
CL 1	534136	0	Illum on call
CL 2	536126	0	-do-
CL 3	540114	0	-do-
CL 4	545100	0	-do-
CL 5	543085	0	-do-
CL 6	554074	0	-do-
CL 7	574054	0	-do-
CL 8	569039	0	-do-
CL 9	573033	0	-do-
CL 10	570026	0	-do-
CL 11	565029	0	-do-
CL 12	560034	10	-do-
CL 13	555037	10	-do-
CL 14	550043	10	-do-
CL 15	545046	0	-do-
CL 16	536040	0	-do-
CL 17	532042	0	-do-
CL 18	530050	0	-do-
CL 19	538050	0	-do-
CL 20	530057	0	-do-
CL 21	522052	0	-do-
CL 22	526066	0	-do-
CL 23	545055	10	-do-
CL 24	541059	0	-do-
CL 25	536064	0	-do-
CL 26	531069	0	-do-
CL 27	528078	0	-do-
CL 28	518077	0	-do-
CL 29	524083	0	-do-
CL 30	520089	10	-do-
CL 31	520095	10	-do-
CL 32	523101	20	-do-
CL 33	520108	0	-do-
CL 34	517113	0	-do-
CL 35	518121	0	-do-
CL 36	556022	0	-do-
CL 37	547029	0	-do-
CL 38	542035	0	-do-

All concentrations will be one gun-one point illumination.

(Enclosure 1)  
Change #1 to Operation  
Order 1-66.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

REF: MAP, VIETNAM  
SCALE: 1:50,000  
SHEET: 6739 IV  
SERIES: L7014

J. P. TREADWELL  
COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS  
COMMANDING

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

**SECRET**



UNCLASSIFIED

- (h) Clear fields of fire.
- (c) Construct outer fence/seaward fence.
- (d) Prepare fighting positions, to include alternate and supplementary positions.
- (e) Construct inner fence.
- (f) Install watch towers and illumination (as available)
- (g) Emplace tanglefoot/crazy wire.

(8) Engineer assistance available through Headquarters, Ground Defense Command.

(9) Emplacement of mines, except Claymores, and/or booby traps must have prior approval of Commanding Officer, Ground Defense Command.

(10) Construction/Maintenance Reports in accordance with Annex J (Reports).

4. Administration & Logistics.

Normal.

5. Command & Communication.

Annex H (Communication Electronics)

*J. P. Treadwell*  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

Appendix

1 - Barrier Trace

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66


UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters, Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
180800H April 1966

Appendix 1 (Artillery Adjustment) to Annex E (Fire Plan) to Operation Order 1-66

1. In the absence of trained forward observers it is anticipated that the adjustment of fires will pose special problems. Sub-Sector Commanders are encouraged to utilize any trained personnel available to the maximum extent possible for training personnel in the adjustment of fire.
2. One method of adjustment is for the individual calling for the fire to adjust it by utilizing North-South and/or East-West shifts from the point of last illumination or burst. It must be emphasized that when adjusting illumination, bold corrections should be made with corrections of at least 200-400 meters. For example: An outpost calls for a particular illumination concentration, then, when the illumination appears it does not illuminate the appropriate area. The observer's correction would be "East 200, South 400; the correction being passed through the same channels utilized for the initial fire request. To use this system the observer must be thoroughly oriented as to the relationship of key terrain features in his area of observation.
3. Sub-Sector Commanders desiring forward observer training beyond their means for Key personnel in their ground defense organization should address requests for such assistance to this command.

  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters, Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
180800H April 1966

Annex F (Tank-Ontos Employment) to Operation Order 1-66


Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. Detachments of 1st Tank and 1st Anti-Tank Battalions will be placed in support of the Chu Lai Defense Command.
2. The Commanding Officer, Chu Lai Defense Command will further allocate these units to support missions within the various sub-sectors.
3. Sub-Sector Commanders be prepared to fully integrate elements of these supporting arms into Sub-Sector defensive alignment.
4. Concept of Employment.

a. Tanks Primarily employed to exploit their capabilities of infra-red and "white" lights to search out and destroy infiltrators. To exploit the fire power of the tank in limited attacks by utilizing its heavy machine gun and cannister capability. Finally, in the event of a major enemy attack, to utilize the tank's cannister/high explosive direct fire capability to disrupt and destroy the attackers.

b. Ontos Current plans envision an increased capability for this weapon, with the addition of a searchlight and heavy machine guns. Until this capability can be realized, primary employment of the Ontos will be to disrupt and destroy major attacks along the barrier.

  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to Operations Order 1-66

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters, Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FME  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
180800H April 1966

ANNEX G (Alert Conditions) to Operation Order 1-66

Ref: CG III MAF MSG 240655Z Nov 65

Time Zone: H

1. This annex establishes the various alert conditions and measures to be taken by units under each condition of alert.
2. The Defense Command Operations Center (DCOC) will announce the alert condition in effect for the entire Defense Sector. Individual units may, at the discretion of the Commanding Officer, set a condition of higher alert than the one specified by the DCOC, which will be effective only within that unit. However, all units must meet the requirements of the conditions set by the DCOC.
3. The measures to be taken are cumulative and additive; that is, in the description which follows, all measures specified for a higher condition are in addition to those specified for the lower.
4. The alert conditions, in ascending order of defense posture, are entitled WHITE, GREEN, YELLOW, YELLOW BRIGHT, and RED. A description of them, their meanings and actions to be taken are:
  - a. WHITE A daylight only condition, automatically set at sunrise and terminated at 30 minutes past sunset, unless during daylight the DCOC specified a higher alert condition.
 

MEANING No known enemy threat. Conduct normal operations.

ACTION Units on the perimeter man specified daylight observation and defensive positions from where entire barrier is kept under continuous observation.
  - b. GREEN The condition assumed automatically from 30 minutes after sundown to sunrise unless specified during daylight by the DCOC.
 

MEANING No known enemy threat. Units conduct normal operations.

ACTION Units man specified perimeter defensive position. 50% (at least one man in each position) on watch and alert keeping assigned sector under continuous observation.
  - c. YELLOW The condition of highest alert for units on the defense perimeter and the condition when passive defense measures should be commenced by tenant units.
 

MEANING There are indications that the enemy may attack or attempt infiltration within one to 180 minutes. Units continue normal work.

ACTION (1) Activate Defense Command Tactical net; all Sub-Sector Operation Centers check in.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- (2) Perimeter position 100% awake and on watch, keeping assigned sectors under continuous observation.
- (3) Muster, brief and equip sub-sector reaction forces.

d. YELLOW BRIGHT The condition in which augmented perimeter forces move to prepared positions, reaction forces assume instant readiness, nonessential work ceases, and individuals take shelter.

MEANING Contact has been made with the enemy on the perimeter or explosive fires are falling in the vital area.

- ACTION
- (1) Complete all actions specified for condition YELLOW.
  - (2) All hands not engaged in defense or essential work, take cover, or man assigned rear area positions.
  - (3) Reaction forces respond to orders of Sub-Sector Commanders.

e. RED The condition in which maximum effort is devoted to defense and all but emergency work ceases.

MEANING Infiltrators of enemy personnel have penetrated the defense and are within the perimeter.

- ACTION
- (1) Cease work except that of an emergency nature.
  - (2) All hands not engaged in emergency work or defensive tasks take positions around equipment, billeting and working areas for close-in protection of same. These personnel may fire at targets ONLY to protect lives and property. Extreme care must be taken to prevent shooting friendly forces.
  - (3) Reaction Forces maneuver as directed to seek out and destroy the enemy.

f. MISCELLANEOUS

(1) DCOC will notify units that condition YELLOW is in effect by telephone radio and then by firing appropriate pyrotechnic signals, in order listed. Thereafter, DCOC will notify units of a change of condition by radio and pyrotechnic signal until condition WHITE or GREEN has been set. See Annex H (Communication-Electronics)

- (2) Minimize night movement within unit areas.
- (3) At night, during movement conditions YELLOW BRIGHT and RED, walk - DO NOT RUN to assigned positions.
- (4) Report all casualties to DCOC by most expeditious means.

*J. P. Treadwell*  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters, Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
180900H April 1966

Annex H (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 1-66

Ref: (a) 1st MarDiv Operation Order 301-66  
(b) 1st MarDiv O 003330.1  
(c) 1st MarDiv O P2000.1 (COMMSOP)  
(d) 1st MarDiv O P02000.2 (CEOI)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (a).
- (2) The enemy has the capability to:
  - (a) Conduct electronic countermeasures and electronic counter-countermeasures.
  - (b) Conduct extensive wire tapping and disrupt landline circuits.
  - (c) Insert deceptive traffic on any communication channel.
- (3) Abandoned enemy communication-electronics equipment may be booby-trapped.

b. Friendly forces.

- (1) See Operation Order 1-66
- (2) Communication Company, Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division provides communication-electronic material and maintenance support for Defense Command Headquarters as directed.
- (3) Command posts
  - (a) Headquarters, Defense Command BT-533089
  - (b) Sub-Sector I (MAG-36) BT-525113
  - (c) Sub-Sector II (FLSG-B) BT-532104
  - (d) Sub-Sector III (HqBn) BT-531092
  - (e) Sub-Sector IV (Assigned Infantry Unit) BT-533077

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

(f) Sub-Sector V (1st Recon Bn)

BT-561048

2. MISSION: Defense Command communications-electronic elements provide communications and electronics support for operations of the Chu Lai Defense Command in support of reference (b).

a. Communication Company, Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division

(1) Provides the following communication-electronics equipment in support of Defense Command Headquarters:

- (a) Two Radio Sets, AN/PRC-10
- (b) One Radio Set, AN/MRC-38
- (c) Two Antennas, RC-292
- (d) One Control Group, AN/GRA-6
- (e) Two Switchboards, SB-22/PT
- (f) Six Telephones, TA-312/PT

(2) Installs and maintains the following landline circuits and terminates each in the Defense Command Operation Center switchboard.

- (a) One trunk circuit to 1st Marine Division CP
- (b) One trunk circuit to 1st Marine Division (Chu Lai switch.)
- (c) One hot-line to the operations centers of each of the following:
  - (1) Sub-Sector I (MAG-36)
  - (2) Sub-Sector II (FLSG-B)
  - (3) Sub-Sector III (HqBn)
  - (4) Sub-Sector IV (Assigned Infantry Unit)
  - (5) Sub-Sector V (1st Recon Bn)
- (d) Hot-line to 1st Marines S-3
- (e) Hot-line to 7th Marines S-3
- (f) Hot-line to 1st Marine Division FSCC
- (g) Hot-line to 1st Marine Division COC
- (h) Four locals within the Defense Command Operation Center with lines paralleled in the Defense Command Bunker.
- (i) One local to the Commanding Officer's quarters.
- (j) Others as directed.

b. Communication Section, Defense Command Headquarters.

(1) Activate Defense Command Tactical Net, employing AN/PRC-10 and RC-292, daily, 1800 until 0645.

(2) Maintain an AN/MRC-38 in readiness for mobile operations on the Defense Command Tactical Net.

(3) On order, operate station on 1st Marine Division Tactical Net #1, employing AN/PRC-10.

UNCLASSIFIED

(4) Install remote lines for operation of two FM radio nets in the Defense Command bunker.

c. Commander, Sub-Sector I.

Establish and maintain radio and wire communications to forces assigned, in designated sub-sector.

d. Commander, Sub-Sector II.

Establish and maintain radio and wire communications to forces assigned, in designated sub-sector.

e. Commander, Sub-Sector III.

(1) Establish and maintain radio and wire communications to forces assigned, in designated sub-sector.

(2) Be prepared to assume net control on Defense Command Tactical Net on order.

f. Commander, Sub-Sector IV.

Establish radio and wire communications to subordinate units and to MAG-12 Ground Defense Operations Center.

g. Marine Air Group-12.

Establish radio and wire communications to forces assigned, in designated portions of sub-sector.

h. Commander, Sub-Sector V.

Establish and maintain radio and wire communications to forces assigned, in designated sub-sector.

i. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) See references (c) and (d).

(2) Messenger service. As required.

(3) Radio

(a) Appendix 1 (Radio Call Sign and Frequency Plan)

(b) Radio is the alternate to landline means of communications.

(c) Sub-Sector Operations Centers make radio check with this Headquarters at 1830 daily and every two hours thereafter until 0630.

(d) Immediately activate station on Division Tactical Net.

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

1. On order of Commanding Officer, Defense Command.
2. When landline system is under attack, until system restored.
3. When sector is under attack, until secured by Net Control Station.
4. When prescribed by Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.


(f) Call Signs. In accordance with reference (d) and Appendix 1 (Radio Call Sign and Frequency Plan).

(4) Wire.

- (a) Appendix 2 (Telephone Traffic Diagram).
- (b) Wire is the primary means of communication.
- (c) Telephone code names in accordance with reference (d) and Appendix 2 (Telephone Traffic Diagram).
- (d) Sub-Sector Operations Centers report to this Headquarters by telephone, hourly, between 1800 and 0600.

(5) Cryptographic. Reference (d).

(6) Visual and Sound. Reference (d).

  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

APPENDIXES:

1. Radio Call Sign and Frequency Plan
2. Telephone Traffic Diagram
3. Pyrotechnic Code

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to  
Operation Order 1-66

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters, Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
180800H April 1966

Appendix 1 (Radio Call Sign and Frequency Plan) to Annex H (Communication Electronics) to Operation Order 1-66

Time Zone: H

LEGEND:

- C - Net Control Station
- X - Guard
- W - When Required

NOTES:

- 1 - Daily 1800-0645; When landline system fails; When under attack, until secured by NCS.
- 2 - On order of CO, Defense Command; When landline system fails; When sector under attack; When prescribed by CG, 1st Marine Division.

Call Sign	Net Name	Frequency	Device	Notes
D20	DefCmddNet	46.3	M432	1
D21		38.6	M356	
D5	D1vTracNet #1	38.7	M357	2
D6		45.9	M428	

STATION	CALL SIGN		
CG 1st MarDiv	CORSAIR	C	
Chu Lai Def Cmd	EVENING STAR	X	C
Sub-Sector I (MAG-36)	NAIL FILE		X
Sub-Sector II (FLSG-B)	FUMIGATE		X
Sub-Sector III (HqBn)	DATE LINE		X
Sub-Sector IV (Asgd Inf Unit)	CHOW DOWN		X
Sub-Sector V (1st Recon Bn)	CRANK CASE		X

*J. P. Treadwell*  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to  
Operation Order 1-66

H-1-1


UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters, Chu Lai Defense Command  
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
 180800H April 1966

APPENDIX 2 (Telephone Traffic Diagram) to Annex H (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 1-66

Time Zone: H



*J. P. Treadwell*  
 J. P. TREADWELL  
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution)  
 To Operation Order 1-66

H-2-1

UNCLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters, Chu Lai Defense Command  
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
 080028 April 1966

Appendix 3 (Pyrotechnic Code) to Annex H (Communication-Electronics)  
 to Operation Order 1-66

Ref: (a) CG III MAF Msg 191105Z November 1965  
 (b) 1st Marine Division Order P02000.2

Time Zone: H

1. The following pyrotechnic code is prescribed by reference (a) to indicate the various conditions of alert.

<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>DODAC No.</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
SIGNAL, AIRCRAFT, AN-M39A1 DOUBLE STAR, GREEN GREEN,	L-227	CONDITION GREEN (Normal watch conditions 50% of men in positions alert)
SIGNAL, AIRCRAFT, AN-M39A1 DOUBLE STAR, YELLOW YELLOW,	L-226	CONDITION YELLOW (100% alert in positions attack probable within 180 minutes)
SIGNAL, AIRCRAFT, AN-M39A1 DOUBLE STAR, RED YELLOW,	L-228	CONDITION YELLOW BRIGHT (Enemy on perimeter or incoming explosive rounds)
SIGNAL, AIRCRAFT, AN-M39A1 DOUBLE STAR, RED RED,	L-225	CONDITION RED (Infiltrators or enemy personnel have penetrat- ed the defense and are within the perimeter)

2. The below listed illumination and smoke signals are extracted from reference (b) to provide a ready reference. Asterisked items are available for immediate issue.

a. Illumination Signals.

<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>DODAC No.</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
Red Star Cluster M52A1 (One signal is fired).	L-315	Encircled or attacked by enemy. Request for support. Type of support must be affirmed by radio.

H-3-1

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**DECLASSIFIED**

<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>DODAC No.</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
Red Star Cluster M52A1 (Cont fire of 3 or more signals).	L-315	Request for emergency illumination. (Radio liaison must be estab.)
White Star Cluster M18A1 (Cont fire of 3 or more)	L-316	Request for ceasing of illuminating, firing and shelling.
*Red Star Parachute M126 (Hand held) (Fire 1 signal)	L-311	We are withdrawing from this position.
*Red Star Parachute M126 (Fire 2 Signals)	L-311	Area not secure. Do not land/drop supplies.
Green Star Parachute M19A1 (Fire 2 Signals)	L-310	Area secure. Safe to land/drop supplies.
*Green Star Cluster M125 (Hand held)(Cont fire of 3 or more signals).	L-314	Request to wait. We are withdrawing from this position.
Green Star Parachute M19A1 (Fire 1 Signal)	L-310	Request for Ammunition.
*Green Star Cluster M125 (Hand held)(Fire 1 Signal)	L-314	Request for medical evacuation.
White Star Cluster M18A1 (Fire 1 Signal)	L-316	Request for radio comm on the air/ground frequency.
*White Star Parachute M127 (Hand held)(Fire 1 Signal)	L-312	Radio breakdown.
Green Star Cluster M125 (One *and White Star Cluster M18A1 (One)(Fired at same time)	L-314 L-316	Fire final protective fires. (e.g. in case prior to assault, advance of observation teams.)
Green Star Cluster M125 (One) *and Red Star Cluster M52A1 (One)(Fired at same time)	L-314 L-315	Patrol returning to friendly lines.

H-3-2

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**DECLASSIFIED**

b. Smoke Signals.


<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>DCDAC No.</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
*Yellow Smoke M64 or *Yellow Smoke M22A2, or *Yellow Smoke M18	G-950	Marking of Friendly Units position.
Violet Smoke, M23 or Violet Smoke, M18		Objective taken.
*Green Smoke, M65 or *Green Smoke, M18, or *Green Smoke, M15	G-940	Inform us of the enemy direction or position.
*Red Smoke, M2202, M18	G-950	Marking of the enemy position
Signal, Ground, Yellow Smoke M64 or Grenade, Rifle, Yellow Smoke or Grenade, Hand, Yellow Smoke M18 or Signal, Ground, Green Smoke M65 or Grenade, Rifle, Green Smoke M18 or Grenade, Rifle, Green Smoke or Grenade, Rifle, Red Smoke	H-040  G-945  H-000  H-015	Marking of the friendly unit's position or of a secured area for an urgent or normal aircraft landing.  Please inform us of the enemy direction or position.  Marking of the enemy position.
The following are used by aircraft for liaison with ground units.		
HC White Smoke ANMS, or White Star Cluster M18A1 (Fire 1 Signal	L-316	Request for radio comm on the air/ ground frequency.
Grenade, Hand, Green Smoke M18	G-940	Please inform us of the enemy direction.
Grenade, Hand, Red Smoke M18	G-950	Marking the enemy position.

H-3-3

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>DODAC No.</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC (White ANM 8	G-930	Request for radio communications on the air-ground frequency.
or		
Signal, Air-Ground, White Star Cluster (Fire of one signal)	L-316	

  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

H-3-4

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
180800H April 1966

Appendix 4 (Special Instructions for Tanks/Ontos) to Annex H (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 1-66

Time Zone: H

1. Wire will be the primary means of communications between tanks/ontos and elements of the Defense Command.


a. Immediately upon arriving at their predetermined positions, along the barrier, tanks/ontos will utilize the nearest land-line and check in with the sub-sector operations center.

b. Tanks/ontos, utilizing this land-line, will inform the sub-sector operations center of their position and the nearest infantry position where they can be contacted by land-line.

2. Radio will be the alternate means of communication between tanks/ontos and elements of the Defense Command.

a. To contact tanks/ontos along the barrier, the DCOE will contact the appropriate Company Commander via the Defense Command Tactical Net. The Company Commander will then utilize his company net to contact the desired vehicles.

b. Tanks/ontos will enter the Defense Command Tactical Net when ordered by the appropriate Company Commander, and/or in case of emergency when a vehicle desires immediate information on the particular situation.

  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex H (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED




Headquarters Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
180800H April 1966

Annex I (Population Control) to Operations Order 1-66

Ref: 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H


1. This annex sets forth the basic policy concerning the admission of indigenous personnel into the vital areas of the Chu Lai Defense Sector.
2. Generally, only properly identified and authorized indigenous personnel will be permitted access into the vital areas of the Chu Lai Defense Sector.
3. Military Police Company will establish two checkpoints in the vicinity of coordinates BT-521042 and BT-541059 on the MSR, leading into the vital areas. These checkpoints will stop all indigenous personnel and turn back those who are not authorized entry.
4. Military Police Company will also establish a checkpoint in the vicinity of coordinates BT-531082. This post is provided to check all fishermen from KY HA Village into and out of the beach area. See Appendix 1 to this annex, KY HA Village Fishing Instructions. These instructions are as coordinated and agreed upon by Civil Affairs representatives and the KY HA Village chiefs.
5. Sub-Sector Commanders will ensure that the following are complied with:
  - a. Permit no loitering along the barrier by indigenous personnel.
  - b. Permit no business to be conducted along the barrier by indigenous personnel.
  - c. Do not permit wood cutters and/or cattle herders to work closer than fifty meters of the barrier.

  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

APPENDIX:

1 - Fishing Instructions, KY HA Village

DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distributions) to Operation Order 1-66



Appendix 1 (Fishing Instructions for KY HA Village) to Annex I (Population Control) to Operation Order 1-66.

1. The fishermen of KY HA Village will pass through Checkpoint #5 for fishing and will obey the following instructions.
2. Only fishermen living in KY HA Village are authorized to enter (through checkpoint #5) to fish.
3. Fishermen must pass through the gate at checkpoint #5, either going out or coming back from fishing.
4. Each fisherman must carry the following official papers and present them to the sentry:
  - a. ID card, issued by RVN
  - b. Fishing license
  - c. Signed copy of this instruction
5. Anyone who passes the checkpoint without the above papers will be arrested.
6. Every fisherman must let the sentry search the body and personal belongings when passing through the gate.
7. Positively no fisherman can leave the village before sunrise.
8. The fishermen must be out of the area before sunset.
9. Positively no fishermen can use their "basket-boat" to stay on the water overnight.
10. Fishermen owning Sampans are authorized to stay overnight at sea, but must report back to the sentry at checkpoint #5 the following morning.
11. Fishing Sampans must be parked (fish) 5,000 meters away from the beach during the night.
12. Fishing Sampans must sail straight out, from the beach or coming back to the beach.
13. Positively no fishing less than 1,000 meters from checkpoint #5 beach and no fishing in the open area less than 200 meters. (Please see map attached.)
14. Any fishing sampan fishing or parking less than 100 meters from checkpoint #5 beach, or less than 200 meters from open area, shall have his boat confiscated and the fisherman will be arrested.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

15. Any fishermen violating the above instructions shall have his license cancelled forever.

16. Each fisherman must sign this instruction.

SIGNATURE \_\_\_\_\_

ID CARD # \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
180800H April 1966

Annex J (Reports) to Operation Order 1-66

Ref: 1st Marine Division Order 3480.1

Time Zone: H

1. This annex prescribes the consolidated sub-sector reports, and their format, that are to be submitted by each Sub-Sector Commander.

2. CONTACT ACTION REPORT.

- a. Reporting Period 2400 to 2400
- b. Submit daily, by phone, as of 2200, prior to 2400
- c. Read in ten (10) columns:
  - (1) Coordinates
  - (2) Local DTG
  - (3) Size of Action
  - (4) Type of Action
  - (5) Friendly Losses
  - (6) Enemy Losses
  - (7) Action Initiated by
  - (8) Individual weapons captured
  - (9) Crew-served weapons captured
  - (10) Other captured material

3. SPOT REPORT

- a. Submit by phone as soon as possible after incident occurs.
- b. Report by lettered item as follows:
  - A - Reporting Unit
  - B - Local DTG
  - C - Coordinates (6 digits)
    - (1) Friendly Location
    - (2) Enemy Location

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

- D - Brief Narrative
- E - Action Taken
- F - Friendly KIA
- G - Friendly WIA
- H - Friendly MIA
- I - VC KIA
- J - VC MIA
- K - VCC
- L - VCS
- M - Weapons captured
- N - Equipment captured

4. STRENGTH REPORT

- a. Submit upon receipt of this order initially, then as significant changes occur.
- b. This is a written report, to include following:
  - (1) List each organization within sub-sector.
  - (2) List each organization's present strength.
  - (3) Indicate, by organization, number of personnel allocated to defense in a over-all status.
  - (4) Indicate, by organization, number of personnel allocated to defense in a reserve status.

5. ALERT CONDITION DRILLS

- a. Notify this Headquarters of intention to conduct alert condition drills at least 24 hours in advance of drill
- b. Indicate:
  - (1) Date, approximate time of drill.
  - (2) Expected duration of drill.

6. BARRIER STATUS REPORT - Telephonic report, submitted daily by 1200. Negative reports required.

- a. Brief description of damage/suspected tampering with barrier.
- b. Coordinates
- c. Estimated time to complete repairs.

7. BARRIER CONSTRUCTION REPORT - Telephonic report, submitted daily as of 1700. For those sub-sectors constructing and/or relocating barrier.

- a. Number, rolls of concertina emplaced.
- b. Percentage of project completed.
- c. Number of positions under construction.
- d. Number of positions completed.

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX M (Distribution) to Operations Order 1-66

*J. P. Treadwell*  
 J. P. TREADWELL  
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters, Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
080028 April 1966

Annex K (Special Instructions, Airfield Defense Unit) to Operation  
Order 1-66

Ref: (a) 1st Marine Division Order 003330.1

Time Zone: H


1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), designated infantry elements will be assigned to operational control of the Chu Lai Defense Command for airfield defense. While under the operational control of this command no infantry elements will be relieved unless specifically ordered by this Headquarters.
2. The Airfield Defense Unit will normally consist of a Command Group and two rifle companies. The Command Group will report with one section of 81mm mortars and FDC personnel. The two rifle companies will report with all organic weapons, basic allowance of all types ammunition and pyrotechnics, two forward observers and cooks to operate two company galleys.
3. The two rifle companies will be emplaced, along the barrier, covering the North, West and South portions of the airfield.
  - a. The northern most company will provide one rifle platoon to the Commander, Sub-Sector V for defense of the Class V, V(A) dump.
  - b. The southern company will provide one rifle platoon and forward observer for security of the RMK Compound. In addition, one platoon from this company will be designated as a reinforcing element for the RMK Compound.
  - c. Two trucks, provided by this Headquarters, will be pre-positioned in the southern company's area, prior to dark, to provide necessary transportation for the reinforcing platoon.
5. Land-line communications are permanently installed within the positions, however, the Command Group and rifle companies must provide the necessary telephones and radios for both internal and external communications.
6. This Headquarters provides limited equipment for the Airfield Defense Unit, such as: billeting tents, water cans, water buckets, mess trays, lantern sets and two trucks on a daily basis. At the present time, units must provide their own mess equipment, water trailers, gloves and wire cutters for barrier maintenance.

K-1

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

7. The Commander, Airfield Defense Unit is also designated as Commander, Sub-Sector IV and is responsible for sub-sector security forward of the flight line. Commanding Officer, Marine Air Group-12 will provide security from the flight line to the beach; also Marine Air Group-12 is prepared to provide reinforcing elements to the Airfield Defense Unit on order. As Commander, Sub-Sector IV, the Airfield Defense Commander must effect early and continuous liaison with Marine Air Group-12.

  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex L (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

K-2




Headquarters Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
180800H April 1966

ANNEX L (Command Relationships) to Operation Order 1-66

Ref: (a) DivC 003330.1

Time Zone: H

1. The Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), exercises control, for ground defense, of all assigned provisional forces located within the CHU LAI TAOR.
2. The Commanding Officer, Chu Lai Defense Sector is assigned operational control of all divisional organizations located within the sector. Elements of those organizations not under operational control of the 1st Marine Division, will participate in ground defense planning, and when requested, for operations during the execution of ground defense.
3. The sub-sector Commander is responsible for coordination of local security and barrier defense of all organizations and units in the sub-sector. He will exercise operational control, for ground defense, of assigned forces within the sub-sector.

  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding


APPENDIX:

1 - Command Relationships Diagram

DISTRIBUTION:

Annex M (Distribution) to Operation  
Order 1-66

L-1


  
**UNCLASSIFIED**



Appendix 1 to Annex L (Command Relationships) to Operation Order 1-66

Headquarters Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
180800H April 1966

UNCLASSIFIED



DISTRIBUTION: Annex M (Distribution)

*J. P. Treadwell*  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters Chu Lai Defense Command  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam  
180800H April 1966

ANNEX M (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-66

Time Zone: H

CMC (Code A03H)	2
CMCS	2
CG, FMFPAC	2
CG, III MAF	2
CG, 1ST MARDIV	10
CG, 3RD MARDIV	2
CG, 1ST MAW	2
CG, FLC	2
CO, 7th Mar	2
CO, 1st Mar	2
CO, 11th Mar	2
CO, MAG-12	5
CO, MAG-36	5
CO, FLSG-B	5
CO, 1st Recon Bn	5
CO, HQBN	5
CO, 1st Tank Bn	3
CO, 1st Anti Tank Bn	3
CO, 3rd AMTRAC Bn	1
CO, 2nd LAAM Bn	1
CO, Air Field Defense Unit	2
CO, 1st Med Bn	1
CO, 1st SP Bn	1
CO, 7th MT Bn	1
CO, MCB-3	1
CO, MCB-4	1
CO, 1st For Hosp Co	1
CO, NAVSPTACTY (Chu Lai)	1
CO, 1st Plt. Sub-Unit 1, 1st Radio Bn	1
CO, Bulk Fuel Co	1
CO, MASS-2	1
CO, MACS-7	1
CO, Det. Ammo Co	1
Command Chronology	2
File	10

*J. P. Treadwell*  
J. P. TREADWELL  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

LOGISTICS  
AND  
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE  
DOCUMENTS

*Tab 4*

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
APO San Francisco, California 96601

L/TCP/with  
4000  
Sec#: 079-66  
7 APR 1966

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: G-4)  
Subj: Logistic Summary (LOGSUM) Report  
Ref: (a) For/MSG C 4000.1C  
Encl: (1) 1st Marine Division LOGSUM Report for the period 291500H March to  
050800H April  
1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF  
660708  
Copy 4 of 6 copies

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division LOGSUM Report for the Period  
291500H March to 051000H April

1. Logistical Situation. The overall logistical situation is adequate to support this Division in carrying out its assigned mission. Since the majority of this Division's reporting units have only recently arrived in country, definite trends in supply and requisitioning problems have not yet been established. Limited technical inspections on major end-items of ordnance equipment are underway, and a more accurate picture of the material readiness of this Division will be provided upon the completion of these ITI's.

2. Supply and Distribution.

a. Through g. Not applicable to this Division

b. Significant Problem Areas. Items in short supply throughout the Division are typewriters, water cans, and various items of 762 gear. All items are on priority O2 or O5 requisition, with tracer action taken where appropriate. If the typewriters do not soon become available, they will be eligible for the Red Ball Program.

3. Maintenance.

a. General Status. The overall maintenance status within this Division is considered to be satisfactory. A large amount of material has recently arrived in country from Okinawa, and is in excellent condition. Specific deadline rates are unavailable at this time because of the temporary suspension by MACV of this Division's Deadlined Combat-Essential Equipment Report, and the limited technical inspections in progress. Accurate figures will be available for subsequent LOGSUM Reports.

b. Not applicable to this Division

c. Significant Problem Areas. Although specific figures are not available, the deadline rate for rough terrain forklift RF-060 is high. This is due primarily to their use on a continuing 24-hour basis to unload ships. Regular preventive maintenance checks are held, but the high usage rate accelerates breakdown. Repair parts are generally available. It is anticipated that, as 24-hour use becomes less critical, the deadline rate for this equipment will drop.

d. Not applicable to this Division.

5. Other Services. A shortage of tentage and strong backing for tents housing troops has resulted in over crowded living conditions throughout the Division. This shortage is a result of the recent influx of personnel in country, and is being solved with all available assets. As assets are redistributed and strong back construction progresses, this problem will become less critical.

Enclosure (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

Due to the recent arrival of many Division units in country, some units are having difficulty obtaining potable water and water useable for shower/laundry purposes. Water points are being established as rapidly as possible. Units are continuing to improvise shower and laundry facilities, and conditions are steadily improving due to this "self-help" type program.

6. Not applicable to this Division

7. Not applicable to this Division

8. Advanced Planning. Standard operational procedures for the logistical support of operations outside the Chu Lai Combat Base are being developed. The following logistical functions are being studied with a view toward developing optimum standard techniques and procedures.

- a. Composition of LSC and NST's.
- b. Helicopter resupply
- c. Motor convoy resupply
- d. Casualty evacuation
- e. Maintenance in the operating area
- f. Pre-positioning of supplies.

All units are planning redistribution of supply assets due to the re-attachment or detachment of subordinate units. The large amount of equipment brought from Okinawa by headquarters elements of most units will appreciably enhance the combat effectiveness of this Division.

UNCLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (AMPHIB),  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

4/JCP/cag  
10110

29 APR 1966

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (ATTN: G-4)

Subj: Disposable Mess Gear; Test of

Ref: (a) CG III MAF/HCC Ltr 21/and over 10110 dtd 31 March 1966

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

2. Five thousand sets of disposable mess gear were utilized by Second Battalion, Fifth Marines in a field mess where there is a shortage of water for washing standard mess gear. This Battalion is geographically located in such a manner that the nearest potable water point is more than eight miles distant.

3. Test results as required by enclosure (1) of reference (a) are indicated below.

a. Testing Organization. Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division (Rein), FMP

b. Number of Personnel Involved. 650 personnel utilized the disposable mess gear for seven meals.

c. Dates of Testing. 21 to 23 April 1966

d. Acceptance by Using Personnel. 122 personnel were questioned concerning their opinion of the mess gear. All comments were highly favorable, and troops appeared to be totally satisfied with the equipment.

e. Suitability of Design for Field Use. The sectionalized plates make the disposable mess gear completely suitable for field use.

f. Suitability of Materials for Field Use. The materials are very satisfactory for field use. Both meat dishes of a liquid nature and fruits were served on the plates. No softening or deterioration of the plates or cups was apparent, and all materials proved to be adequately sturdy.

g. Disposal Problems. Disposal of trash and garbage was no greater problem than that encountered using standard mess kits. The problem of

used, dirty wash water and garbage ordinarily accompanying the use of immersion burners is as great, or greater, a problem than disposal of the disposable mess gear.

b. Sanitary Conditions Enhanced. The use of disposable mess gear eliminates one probable cause of dysentery, improperly cleaned mess kits, and sanitary conditions are therefore greatly enhanced.

c. Quantities to be Furnished. Approximately 6% of Infantry Battalions personnel eat in one Battalion field mess. Enough disposable mess gear should be furnished to furnish three meals a day to 6% of the personnel in Infantry Battalions, and 9% of the personnel in supporting units.

d. The following observations are of interest, in addition to the test results mentioned above.

a. Second Battalion, Fifth Marines use of disposable mess gear eliminated the requirement for eleven immersion burners, and reduced their water requirement by 930 gallons a day.

b. The elimination of the immersion burners saved fourteen gallons of gas and two gallons of liquid soap daily.

c. The number of messmen required was appreciably reduced because the immersion burners and cans were not required to be set up, cleaned or maintained.

d. The time required for each Marine to eat in the field is reduced by approximately 2% due to the fact that no time is lost in washing mess kits before and after meals.

5. In summary, this Division finds the disposable mess gear a very desirable item. The reduction in water consumed, messmen required, and time required to feed units are significant factors. When these reductions discovered in one Battalion are considered on a Division level, they become especially significant. The man hours saved by this disposable mess gear would more than offset the cost of obtaining this mess gear for Division-wide use.

W. R. BENNETT  
By direction

Copy to:  
[illegible]



DECLASSIFIED

FOOD SERVICES COORDINATOR  
CHU LAI INSTALLATION

55/JWH/cgs  
6 April 1966

INFORMATION SHEET #1

From: Chu Lai Installation Food Services Coordinator  
To: Unit Mess Officers, Chu Lai Installation

Subj: Information Sheets issued by the III MAF Food Services Officer

Encl: (1) Extract of III MAF Food Services Officer's Information Sheets

1. The III MAF Food Services Officer has issued several information sheets concerning the operation of the Food Services Program within the III MAF. Review of these sheets and discussions with various mess chiefs indicate that some of the information has been incorporated into III MAF orders, some of the sheets have been voided and some messes do not have an up-to-date file of these sheets. In order to provide a complete file of the currently applicable sheets for messes within the Chu Lai Installation an extract has been prepared; it is contained in enclosure (1).

2. Enclosure (1) is provided for the information of all unit mess officers within the Chu Lai Installation.

*Jerry W. Harris*  
JERRY W. HARRIS

Copy to:  
III MAF Food Services Officer

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

EXTRACT OF III MAF FOOD SERVICES OFFICER'S INFORMATION SHEETS

WET:ljb  
15 October 1966

INFORMATION SHEET #1

To: All Unit Mess Officers

From: Force Food Services Officer

Subj: "B" Rations, Emergency Stock of

1. It is requested that all unit Mess Officers initiate action to insure that a minimum of three (3) days of supply of "B" Rations are on hand in Unit Messes at all times.

2. Assistance in requisitioning the necessary items is available from the Food Service Representative in the Ration Dumps.

/s/ H. G. Roberts

H. G. ROBERTS

NOTE: This Information Sheet was published as an unnumbered memorandum.

WET:ljb  
21 October 1966

INFORMATION SHEET #2

From: Force Food Services Officer

To: All Mess Unit Officers

Subj: Chlorine, Food Service

1. The majority of the fresh fruits and vegetables available to units in Vietnam are procured from local sources. All locally procured produce is to be considered as contaminated and should not be consumed unless sanitized as indicated below. The one exception to this rule is hard skinned fruits and vegetables, (oranges, grapefruit, pineapple, bananas) which can be used after peeling.

a. Wash thoroughly in a chlorine solution made by dissolving one package of Disinfectant, Chlorine, Food Service (FSN 684-270-8172) in 25 gallons of water. "Purex" or "Chlorox" may be used in lieu of the above at the rate of 10 oz to 25 gal of water (2 $\frac{1}{2}$  graduations on a #56 dipper).

Enclosure (1)

EXTRACT OF III MAF FOOD SERVICES OFFICER'S INFORMATION SHEETS (CONTINUED)

b. Completely immerse the vegetables for 30 minutes, stirring periodically.

c. Remove after 30 minutes and rinse thoroughly in potable water. Do not use chlorine solutions more than once.

2. Disinfectant, Food Service, Chlorine is a versatile product and may be used in many areas throughout the mess. Examples are final dip for mess gear, pots and pans, serving utensils and silverware. Solutions for these suggested uses are the same as for fruits and vegetables. Do not place chlorine in boiling water as this renders it useless. In no case should the chlorine solution be used as a replacement for the final boiling water rinse. It is merely an added safety precaution to be exercised by all food services personnel.

3. If your supply of Chlorine is limited it is strongly recommended that efforts be made by the supply officer to procure "Chlorox" or "Purex" from the Exchange. The Chlorine used for water purification may also be used if available.

/s/ H. G. Roberts

H. G. ROBERTS

NOTE: This Information Sheet was published as an unnumbered letter.

23/HGR/ljb  
28 October 1965

INFORMATION SHEET #3

From: Force Food Services Officer  
To: All Unit Mess Officer

Subj: Subsistence Stores Requisition Receipts

1. Information received at this office indicates that a number of Mess Management Chief's are discarding the receipts for the issue of dry and fresh provisions.

2. This office maintains copies of these receipts for a period of six months. It is strongly recommended that the Unit Messes keep a like file. These documents will be used to substantiate issues and receipt for all subsistence items.

/s/ H. G. Roberts

H. G. ROBERTS

Enclosure (1)

DECLASSIFIED

EXTRACT OF III MAF FOOD SERVICES OFFICER'S INFORMATION SHEETS (CONTINUED)

INFORMATION SHEET #4

Subj: Ration Accounting for RVN Personnel

NOTE: The contents of Information Sheet #4 have been incorporated into III MAF Order 10110.3. See paragraph 13, enclosure (2) of that order.

---

INFORMATION SHEET #5

Subj: Prices for Special Holiday Meals

NOTE: The contents of this Information Sheet have been incorporated into Information Sheet #18.

---

INFORMATION SHEET #6

Subj: Non-perishable Subsistence Items; issue of

NOTE: The contents of this Information Sheet applies only to the DaNang Area; therefore, it is not reproduced.

---

INFORMATION SHEET #7

Subj: Deduction of MCI's from Daily Ration Memorandum

NOTE: The contents of this Information Sheet have been superceded by III MAF Order 10110.3 and need not be retained.

---

33:HGR:1jb  
25 November 1965

INFORMATION SHEET #8

From: Force Food Services Officer  
To: Unit Mess Officers

Subj: Separation of Damaged and Spoiled Rations

1. When food is received at the mess it must be inspected for visible defects abnormal shape, color, and odor to determine whether it is fit for human consumption. If condition inspection indicates that some items are damaged or spoiled they should be segregated and disposal made in accordance with current instructions.

Enclosure (1)

EXTRACT OF III MAF FOOD SERVICES OFFICER'S INFORMATION SHEETS (CONTINUED)

2. The following is a guide to assist the Mess Officer in the condition inspection of subsistence stores.

a. Nonperishables

(1) Dry Stores. Dry Stores such as cereals or sugar should be inspected for signs of having been exposed to greasy substances or excessive moisture. If the container is discolored, it should be opened for verification of condition.

(2) Canned Goods. Condition inspection of canned goods on receipt is usually limited to visual inspection of containers in which the cans are packed. If the containers are crushed or torn open, inspectors should open them and inspect the contents for punctures or excessive rust. Punctured or excessively rusted cans should be immediately segregated. Disposal should be in accordance with current instructions.

b. Perishables

(1) Frozen Foods. When frozen foods are received at the mess, they should be inspected for firmness and signs of having been thawed and refrozen. If the food package is hard on one side and yields easily to pressure applied to the opposite side, refreezing is indicated. If the package is firm on both sides, good condition is indicated. After inspection, store frozen foods in refrigerator immediately. Items that show signs of having been refrozen should be checked by the Medical Officer for suitability.

(2) Fresh Fruits and Vegetables. Fresh fruits and vegetables must be inspected for mold, rot, or other defects. The good must be separated from the bad and refrigerated immediately where necessary.

(3) Meat, Fish, and Poultry. Meat, fish, and poultry must be inspected for odor, color, and presence of slime. Odor should be mild, color should be normal and there should be no slime. If adverse odor, color or slime are evident the Medical Officer should be summoned for final inspection prior to serving.

3. A conscientious inspection program by the Mess Officer, Mess Chief and other Mess Personnel will greatly limit the chances of food contamination, food sickness and epidemic spoilage of subsistence stores.

/s/ H. G. Roberts

H. G. ROBERTS

Enclosure (1)

EXTRACT OF III MAF FOOD SERVICES OFFICER'S INFORMATION SHEETS (CONTINUED)

INFORMATION SHEET #9

Subj: Excess Subsistence items; use of

NOTE: This Information Sheet has been voided; therefore it is not reproduced.

-----

INFORMATION SHEET #10

NOTE: The contents of Information Sheet #10 has been superseded by Information Sheet #15.

-----

33:HGR:ljb  
11 December 1965

INFORMATION SHEET #11

From: Force Food Services Officer  
To: Unit Mess Officers

Subj: Responsible individuals drawing Class I Supplies

1. During recent weeks there have been many cases reported, of messes drawing supplies from the Ration Dumps that were unfit for consumption due to various causes. In other cases complaints have been received that messes are not picking up all the stores they are signing requisitions for. In order to correct these faults, the following recommendations are offered.

a. That a responsible individual, preferable the Mess Sergeant, Assistant Mess Sergeant or a Mature NCO, be designated to draw subsistence stores for the unit mess.

b. That the individual so designated be required to perform a reasonable check, to determine suitability and proper amounts.

c. That no requisition be signed, certifying receipt of stores listed, until the aforementioned check is made.

2. If the above recommendations are followed the necessity of hauling spoiled rations to the mess will be averted and the consolidated mess system will not have to pay ration dollars for unsuitable stores.

/s/ H. G. Roberts

H. G. ROBERTS

-----

Enclosure (1)

EXTRACT OF III MAF FOOD SERVICES OFFICER'S INFORMATION SHEETS (CONTINUED)

33:HGR:1jb  
1 January 1966

INFORMATION SHEET #12

From: Force Food Services Officer  
To: Unit Mess Officers

Subj: Local Vegetable Baskets; return of

1. The cost of baskets, used to deliver locally procured vegetables and fruits, is 45 piastres each. These baskets reflect on the high cost of locally procured produce, if they are not returned to the contractor. Recently the Unit Ration Value was reduced from 1.85 to 1.35. Savings in all areas of mess management must be given consideration. It is requested that all baskets in which local produce is delivered be salvage and returned to the delivery truck, each time produce is delivered. Failure to return baskets could result in the curtailment of the small amount of local produce now available.

/s/ H. G. Roberts

H. G. ROBERTS

---

INFORMATION SHEET #13

NOTE: Contents of Information Sheet #13 has been superseded by Information Sheet #18

---

33:HGR:1jb  
13 January 1966

INFORMATION SHEET #14

From: Force Food Services Officer  
To: Unit Mess Officers

Subj: Ice, Handling and Transportation

1. Recent investigations indicate that many units are exposing ice to secondary contamination that could cause food sickness. In order to prevent this contamination and preserve the health and welfare of III MAF personnel the following recommendations are submitted.

a. That all units construct a bin suitable for transporting ice from the supply point to the using unit. In the event that this construction is impractical, insure that truck beds are clean and ice is covered prior to transportation.

Enclosure (1)

EXTRACT OF III MESS FOOD SERVICES OFFICER'S INFORMATION SHEETS (CONTINUED)

- b. Insure that ice storage facilities are cleaned and sanitized daily.
  - c. Insure that ice is washed thoroughly prior to use.
2. Strict adherence to the above recommendations will eliminate many of the hazards of secondary contamination. However, primary contamination, contamination during manufacture, will not be prevented. In order for the unit to be safe from primary contamination periodic checks by the Medical Officer of ice received must be made.

/s/ H. G. Roberts

H. G. ROBERTS

33:HGR:ljb  
19 February 1966

INFORMATION SHEET #15

From: Force Food Services Officer  
To: Unit Mess Officers

Subj: Recommended Requisitioning and Issuing Factor for Perishable Items per 100 men

Encl: (1) Meat and Dairy Requisitioning Guide  
(2) Fruit and Vegetable Requisitioning Guide  
(3) Fresh Frozen & Dehydrated Vegetable Requisitioning Guide

1. It is recommended that enclosure (1), (2) and (3) be utilized in the requisitioning of perishable food items for utilization in Force Messes.
2. This information sheet supersedes all data contained in Information Sheet Number 10.

/s/ H. G. Roberts

H. G. ROBERTS

Enclosure (1): MEAT & DAIRY REQUISITIONING GUIDE

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>FACTOR PER 100 MEN</u>
BEEF DRIED	7#
BACON SLAB	20#
BACON SLICED	17#
BEEF BRAISED	34#
BEEF FRICASSEE	32#
BEEF POT PIE	29#
BEEF STEW	31#
BEEF ALA MODE (DICED)	39#



DECLASSIFIED

EXTRACT OF III MAF FOOD SERVICES OFFICER'S INFORMATION SHEETS (CONTINUED)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>FACTOR PER 100 MEN</u>
BEEF CHOP SUEY (DICED)	29#
BEEF CORNED	45#
BEEF CROQUETTES	24#
BEEF GRILL STEAK	49#
BEEF SWISS STEAK	44#
BEEF STRIP LOIN	57#
BEEF COUNTRY FRIED STEAK (SWISS)	45#
BEEF SPANISH STYLE STEAK (SWISS)	45#
BEEF CHICKEN FRIED STEAK (SWISS)	45#
BEEF GROUND	
1. MEAT LOAF & VEGETABLE MEAT LOAF	33#
2. CHOPPED SIRLOIN STEAK & SALISBURY SK.	33#
3. CHILI, CREAM BEEF AND MEAT SAUCE	20#
4. HAMBURGERS, CHEESEBURGERS	35#
5. MEAT BALLS	32#
BEEF ROAST SANDWICHES HOT	38#
BEEF OVEN ROAST	44#
BEEF POT ROAST	44#
BEEF TENDERLOIN FOR	
1. STEAK	60#
2. ROAST	50#
BEEF RIBS	100#
BEEF HASH	20#
BUTTER PATTIES	4# PER MEAL
BUTTER PRINTS	AS NEEDED
BEEF LIVER	32#

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>FACTOR PER 100 MEN</u>
<u>COLD CUTS</u>	
1. BOLOGNA	9#
2. SALAMI	9#
3. LIVER SAUSAGE	7#
4. P & P LOAF	8#
5. SAUSAGE NEW ENGLAND	8#
CHEESE AMERICAN SLICED	9#
CHEESE CHEDDAR	9#
CHEESE NATURAL SWISS	9#
CHICKEN, BROILER ROASTER	71#
CHICKEN, FRYER CUT UP	66#
CHICKEN FRICCASSEE	60#
CHICKEN ALA KING (CAN)	9 CANS
DUCK ROASTER	100#
EGGS, FRESH	18#
<u>FISH</u>	
1. FILLETS OF HADDOCK	30#
2. FILLETS OF SOLE	30#
3. FILLETS, PERCH	30#
4. HALIBUT STEAK	37#
5. SCALLOPS	20# WITH PLATTER

Enclosure (1)

EXTRACT OF III MA FOOD SERVICES OFFICER'S INFORMATION SHEETS (CONTINUED)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>FACTOR PER 100 MEN</u>
6. SHRIMP RAW-BREADED	49#
7. OYSTERS CANNED FOR	
1. STEW	18#
2. FRIED	23#
FRANKFURTERS	27#
FRANKFURTERS SPANISH STYLE	25#
HAM VIRGINIA BAKED	
1. SMOKED	57#
2. CANNED	34#
HAM SLICED GRILLED (CAN)	34#
1. SMOKED	34#
LUNCHEON MEAT	
1. MEAL	4 CANS
2. COLD CUTS	12#
PORK ROAST	
1. BOSTON BUTTS	55#
2. FRESH HAM	57#
PORK STEAK FRESH	60#
PORK CHOPS $\frac{1}{2}$ " THICK CUT	60#
PORK SPAPERIBS	60#
PORK LOINS PART, BONED	55#
RABBIT	52#
TURKEY, BNLS W/O PC/PK	47#
TURKEY, WHOLE	88#
TURKEY, ALA KING (BNLS)	25#
TURKEY SANDWICHES HOT (BNLS)	40#
VEAL BRAISED	40#
VEAL CUBES	37#
VEAL STEW	30#
VEAL FRICASSEE	31#
VEAL CHOPS	50#
VEAL STEAK	44#
VEAL CROQUETTS	23#
VEAL ROAST	45#
PORK SAUSAGE	25#
SHRIMP RAW BEHEADED UNPEELED	27#

Enclosure (2):

VEGETABLE REQUISITIONING GUIDE

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>100 MAN FACTOR</u>
LETTUCE & TOMATO SALAD	8 lbs lettuce, 4 lbs tomatoes
TOSSED VEGETABLE SALAD	12 lbs assorted vegetables
SLICED TOMATOES	20 lbs
CABBAGE RELISH	14 lbs of cabbage, $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs green peppers, chopped pimentos, as needed, $2\frac{1}{2}$ lb chopped onions
LETTUCE SALAD	15 lbs lettuce
COLE SLAW	15 lbs of cabbage, $\frac{1}{2}$ lb onions, 1 lb green peppers
STUFFED CELERY	10 lbs of celery, 4 lbs of cheese, 2 cans pimentos #2 (peppers, green, $\frac{1}{2}$ lb and pickle relish sweet, optional

DECLASSIFIED

EXTRACT OF III MAF FOOD SERVICES OFFICER'S INFORMATION SHEETS (CONTINUED)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>100 MAN FACTOR</u>
WALDORF SALAD	15 lbs, apples, 5 lbs lettuce, 5 lbs celery, nuts, chopped (optional)
SLICED CUCUMBER & ONION SALAD	15 lbs cucumbers 4 lbs onions, green or dry
TOMATO WEDGES	20 lbs tomatoes
MIXED VEGETABLE SALAD	7 lbs lettuce, 1 lb peppers, 6 lbs tomatoes 1 lb onions
CARROT/RAISIN SALAD	14 lbs of carrots, 2 lbs raisins
CABBAGE WEDGES	22 lbs
CARROTS, GLAZED	16 lbs
CARROTS, BUTTERED	15 lbs
CABBAGE FRIED	25 lbs
EGG PLANT, FRIED	18 lbs
SQUASH	11 lbs
CORN ON THE COB	55 lbs

FRUIT REQUISITIONING GUIDE

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>100 MAN FACTOR</u>	<u>APPROX COUNT PER CASE</u>	<u>CASE WEIGHT</u>	<u>SIZE PORT</u>
JUICES, F.F.	3 CN			
APPLES	30 lbs	138	40#	1 MED
BANANAS	34 lbs	100	40#	1 MED
CANTALOUPE	75 lbs	23-36	70#	$\frac{1}{4}$ MED
GRAPEFRUITS	30 lbs	64-80	30-32#	$\frac{1}{2}$ MED
GRAPES	25 lbs		27#	40Z (APPRO)
HONEYDEW	75 lbs			1/8 MED
LEMONS	DETERMINED BY USE			
ORANGES	35 lbs	165-200	35#	1 MED
PEACHES	25 lbs	200	50#	1 MED
PEARS	34 lbs	100-130	44#	1 MED
PLUMS	25 lbs		25#	1 MED
TANGERINES	28 lbs	150-175	35#	1 MED
WATERMELON*	150 lbs		28-30 lbs	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ slice, each
STRAWBERRIES, F.F.	3#10 CN			
PEACHES, F.F.	3#10 CN			
RASPBERRIES, F.F.	3#10 CN			

\*1 Watermelon 25 average weight will yield 13 to 17-1 $\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 lb servings.

Enclosure (1)

DECLASSIFIED

EXTRACT OF III M FOOD SERVICES OFFICER'S INFORMATION SHEETS (CONTINUED)

Enclosure (3): FRESH FROZED & DEHYDRATED VEGETABLE REQUISITIONING GUIDE

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>FACTOR PER 100 MEAL</u>
ASPARAGUS, F.F.	12#
BEANS, GREEN F.F.	15#
BEANS, LIMA, F.F.	15#
BEANS, WAX, F.F.	12#
BROCCOLI, F.F.	15#
BRUSSEL SPROUTS, F.F.	12#
CABBAGE FRESH, WHITE	33#
CABBAGE DEHYDRATED	3 NO-10 (CN)
CARROTS FRESH	24#
CAULIFLOWER, F.F.	15#
CORN, (WHOLE GRAIN), F.F.	18#
EGGPLANT, FRESH	17#
KALE OR OTHER LEAFY GREENS, F.F.	12#
ONIONS DRY, FRESH	24#
PEAS, F.F.	18#
POTATOES, FRESH, WHITE	45#
POTATOES (DEHYDRATED, SLICED)	5#
POTATOES (DEHYDRATED, GRANULES)	1 NO-10 (CN)
POTATOES, FRESH, SWEET	25#
RUTABAGAS (YELLOW TURNIPS) FRESH	22#
SPINACH, F.F.	12#
SQUASH, F.F.	12#
TURNIPS, FRESH, WHITE	24#
VEGETABLES, MIXED, F.F.	15#

INFORMATION SHEET #16

Subj: Charges and Surcharges for meals sold by the general mess

NOTE: Contents of this Information Sheet have been superseded by Information Sheet #18.

INFORMATION SHEET #17

Subj: Overstocked items, cornbeef and margarine

NOTE: The contents of this Information Sheet applies only to the DaNang Area; therefore, it is not reproduced.

060948Z  
 CG FIRST MARDIV  
 FIRST MARDIV  
 CG FMFPAC  
 CG FMFPAC/ I MAC (FWD)  
 CG III MAF  
 FLC  
 FLSG BRAVO

UNCLAS

CLASS II MOUNT OUT MATERIAL

- A. CG FIRST MARDIV LTR 4000 DTD 29MAR66 (NOTAL)
1. ALL UNITS ARE DIRECTED TO TURN IN ALL CLASS II TYPE ONE SUBJ MATERIAL (LESS INDIVIDUAL EQUIP) TO FLSG BRAVO BY 20APR66.
  2. ENSURE ALL SETS AND KITS CONTAIN UP TO DATE LISTINGS OF COMPONENTS AND ALL OEM ACCOMPANIES MAJOR END ITEMS WHEN TURNED IN.
  3. DIRLANTH W/FLSG BRAVO (VALVE 3). TURN IN OF SUBJ MATERIAL WILL BE BY INVOICE (SLIT NAVMC 10493-SD) W/ITI ATTACHED. UPON COMPLETION OF TURN-IN REPORT BY MSG THIS HQ (ATTN G-4) IN FOLLOWING FORMAT:

FSN

ITEM

QTY

4. REF A APPLIES FOR ACCOUNTING, STORAGE AND CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR SUBJ FIRST/SECOND ECHELON REPAIR PARTS, CLASS II TYPE II ITEMS AND INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT.
5. FOR 3RD AMTRAC BN AND FIRST TANK BN SUBJ TANKS AND LVTS W/OEM WILL BE RETAINED WITHIN YR RESPECTIVE UNITS FOR REQUIRED FIRST AND SECOND ECHELON MAINTENANCE. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THESE ITEMS REMAIN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF FLSG BRAVO. THESE ITEMS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE UTILIZED NOR ROTATED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THIS HQ AND FLSG BRAVO.

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

DivO 4400.17  
21/LGB/ja  
8 April 1966

DIVISION ORDER 4400.17

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Supply Support of Ground Delivered Nuclear Weapons

Ref: (a) C1100 Series Stock List  
(b) Navy Stock List Vol 8  
(c) OP 2508, Vol I  
(d) OPNAV INSTR. 5510.83  
(e) MCO P4235.17  
(f) CMC/ChBuSandA Joint Ltr CSY-7, S14 of 29Jun61  
(g) Applicable 95000 Series Cosal  
(h) NUWPNANX INSTR. P8110.6  
(i) NUWPNANX INSTR. 008110.10  
(j) OPNAV INSTR. 5510.1C  
(k) BuSandA Manual Vol III, Appendix 11  
(l) Ships Parts Control Center Field Instruction 08110.1A  
(m) OPNAV INSTR. 5510.45  
(n) NWSA OAK P8110.6  
(o) Ships Instr. 6480.1A  
(p) DivO P7000.3\_

1. Purpose. The purpose of this directive is to promulgate procedures incident to supply support for Marine Corps ground delivered nuclear weapons.

2. Background. Supply support for Division units having a special weapons capability via the normal supply channels has proved unsatisfactory; consequently the Commandant of the Marine Corps and other interested Commanders have established a direct line of support between the using unit and the nuclear supply source.

3. Authorization. The Commanding General will designate, in writing, the Commanding Officers of the using units of this Division who are authorized to operate this program and to deal directly with the nuclear supply sources as prescribed in this order. Those designated Commanding Officers will be responsible for requisitioning, receipt, storage, issue, transfer, and inventory control of those materials allowed by and in support of the 95000 series COSALS produced by the Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC), Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.

4. Initial Outfitting. Marine Corps ground units receiving nuclear capabilities will be outfitted on a "force fed" basis. The following sequence of events will normally transpire.

DECLASSIFIED

DivO 4400.17

8 April 1966

a. Based on the NAPSAC (Pg 6-7 of applicable 95000 series COSAL) a letter of "Intent to Outfit" will be initiated by the SPCC, Code 0870, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.

b. Upon establishment of a firm date for outfitting by the SPCC, CG FMFPac and CG, First Marine Division, and the unit being outfitted, the designated Nuclear Weapons Supply Annex (NWSA) will assemble and ship material to the unit concerned. Since these items are "force fed", all initial supply action (preparation of requisitions) will be accomplished by the SPCC. The unit being outfitted will receive either the material or MILSTRIP status (information) cards. It should be emphasized at this point that certain of the aforementioned items will bear a physical security classification. References (a), (b), and (c) may be used to determine the physical security and characteristics of shipments when the part number, stock number or nomenclature (reference (c)) is known. References (c) and (d) provide detailed information relative to the handling of classified matter. If material is not received according to the outfitting plan, the unit being outfitted will consider itself the requisitioner and institute tracer action in accordance with reference (e).

## 5. Subsequent Action

### a. Requisitioning

(1) As indicated in reference (g), the Naval Supply Center (NSC), Oakland, California, is the source of supply for Marine Corps units with nuclear capability located in CONUS west of the Mississippi River and in WESTPAC for the complete range of items covered in reference (g).

(2) References (h) and (i) provide detailed procedures to be followed in obtaining supply support of items identified by cognizance symbols OA and 8A. Further, this publication provides information incident to other services performed by the NWSA, Oakland. Those items identified by cognizance symbols other than OA and 8A will be requisitioned from the NSC, Oakland, California (228), utilizing MILSTRIP procedures outlined in reference (e). The using unit is authorized to submit requisitions directly to this source of supply. It is mandatory that a copy of each requisition falling into the latter category be transmitted to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller, in order that obligations be recorded in a timely manner. Organic units of this division will be furnished appropriate accounting data by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller, in accordance with reference (p), for the purpose of funding these special weapons requirements. Items identified by cognizance symbols OA and 8A are excluded from this requirement since financial accounting is not required.

### b. Receipt, Stowage and Issue

(1) Receipt, stowage and issue procedures are the same as for other Marine Corps items; however, all items authorized by reference (g) will be maintained separately from all other items on the organic property account and will be in a protected status.

DivO 4400.17  
8 April 1966

c. Transfers

(1) Material being transferred back to NWSA, Oakland, will be transferred utilizing the DD Form 1348-1 as prescribed in references (h) and (i). References (a), (b), (c), and (j) provide information and instructions relative to assigning security classifications. All material that is not designated to be returned to NWSA, Oakland, by references (h) and (i) may be disposed of, when appropriate, in accordance with current directives.

d. Stock Records and Inventory Control

(1) Stock Record Cards (NAVMC 708 SD) will be maintained for all items listed in the applicable 95000 series COSAL.

(2) The Equipment Custody Card (NAVMC 10359 SD) will be utilized to obtain custody receipts for those items that are custodial or controlled in accordance with reference (k). Specifically, the items to appear on Equipment Custody Card are all items in sections B1 and B2 and other such items in sections B3 and B4 that are \$25.00 or more in unit price.

e. Inventories and Audits

(1) A complete physical inventory of all custodial type items will be held during the first week of each quarter, and upon relief of the Responsible Officer, and recorded upon the Equipment Custody Cards and Stock Record Cards of the unit.

(2) An inventory of all operating stocks will be held at least every six months and recorded upon the NAVMC 708 cards.

f. Stock Levels and Allowances

(1) Reference (g) prescribes the allowances for equipment and related repair parts authorized each unit and should be cited as such when appropriate.

g. Responsible Officers

(1) Each Commanding Officer will designate an officer in writing to be responsible for COSAL equipment. This officer should be familiar with the material involved and with the current security regulations applicable. Paragraph 5.o. lists a reading requirement for Responsible Officers.

h. Courier Procedures

(1) References (g) and (j) provide detailed instructions to be followed when receiving, stowing, and transmitting classified matter by courier.



DivO 4400.17  
8 April 1966

i. Source and Special Nuclear Materials

(1) Reference (1) provides detailed instructions to be followed when receiving, transferring and status reporting of source and special nuclear materials.

j. Supply Schools

(1) Supply training programs available to members of this Division will be published by separate directives.

k. Field Installations and Facilities

(1) Instructions concerning Field Installations and Facilities are contained in reference (e).

l. Personnel Reliability

(1) Much of the equipment and written matter associated with this program is of a critical security nature; therefore, operational and supporting personnel must meet the security requirements of reference (m).

m. Retrofits or Modification Instructions

(1) Reference (h) applies to "Training Weapons". (See para 2-7)

n. Air Samplers

(1) Units authorized air samplers will follow the instructions contained in references (n) and (o).

o. Required Reading for Responsible/Supply Officers

1. SWOP 0-1
2. SWOP 5-7
3. SWOP 40-13
4. SWOP 35-51
5. SWOP 100-1
6. SWOP 100-3
7. SWOP 100-5
8. SWOP 150-1
9. SPCC Instr 4720.3 (Modifications)
10. NAD, McAlester Nuclear Weapons Bulletins
11. OP 2508, Vols I and II
12. NWSA Oakland Instruction P8110.6
13. NWSA Oakland Instruction P8110.10
14. ComServPac Instruction 008110.6C (Held by Division)
15. SPCC Field Instruction 08110.1A
16. OPNAVINST 08110.3 (Current Revision)
17. OPNAVINST 5510.1C (Security Manual)

DECLASSIFIED

DivO 4400.17  
8 April 1966

- 18. ComTraPac Instruction P1500.2n Training
- 19. Introduction to 95000 COSAL
- 20. CG-W-1, U. S. United Kingdom Atomic Classification Guide

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "B" & "C"

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

DivO 4400.17 Ch 1  
21/FJR/ja  
12 May 1966

DIVISION ORDER 4400.17 Ch 1

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Supply Support of Ground Delivered Nuclear Weapons

1. Purpose. To direct pen change to the basic order.


2. Action

a. On page 1 add new reference.

"q. COMSERVPAC Instruction 008110.13D"

b. On page 3 add new sub-paragraph to paragraph 5.e.

"(3) Division units having custody of reportable items listed in reference (q) will submit required reports as indicated in that reference."

  
GORDON H. WEST  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "B" & "C"

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

DivO 11010.1  
4/BBD/lts  
18 Apr 1966

DIVISION ORDER 11010.1

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Division Base Development Board

Ref: (a) CG, 1st MarDiv ltr 4/BBD/lve over 4000 of 29 Mar 1966

1. Purpose. To establish a Division Base Development Board and provide information on its tasks and functions.

2. Establishment of Board. A Division Base Development Board is hereby established. The Board will be composed of the following members:

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (Chairman)  
Representative, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Representative, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1  
Division Engineer, (Recorder)  
Representatives from each regiment, separate battalion and separate company.

3. Function. The Division Base Development Board will perform the following functions:

a. Establish Division requirements for facilities and real estate to support 1st Marine Division units within Chu Lai Combat Base.

b. Establish priorities for and the adequacy and location of Division facilities which are being programmed for construction through the MILCON program.

c. Allocate and determine priority of construction of Division construction projects for which MILCON funds have been appropriated.

d. Submit a report of board proceedings, to include recommendations, to the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, or referral to higher headquarters as appropriate.

4. Procedures

a. Planning and coordination of base development and real estate matters

DECLASSIFIED

DivO 11010.1  
18 April 1966

is a continuous process which cannot be restricted to board meetings. Base development, allocation of facilities, and real estate matters can and should be discussed by organization commanders or members of their staffs and appropriate staff officers of this Headquarters at anytime. Specific requests, requirements, problems, or recommendations should be the subject of official correspondence. For example, reference (a) provides instructions for submitting requests for real estate.

b. The Base Development Board will meet on call of the chairman.

c. An agenda will be published in advance for each board meeting. Items for the agenda will be requested prior to each meeting. In addition, appropriate matters which have been the subject of official correspondence may be placed on the agenda.

d. Division staff members and other persons, who are not members of the board, but who have special knowledge of, or interests in, an item on the board agenda, may be invited to attend board meetings.

e. A report of board meetings with appropriate recommendations will be made to the Commanding General.

5. Action. Commanding Officers of organizations listed in paragraph 2 will notify this Headquarters by letter of the name of their Base Development Board representative.

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "B" & "C"

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800 April 1966

Administrative Order 301-66 to accompany Operation Order 301-66

- Ref: (a) Maps: RVN AMS Series L-701 Scale 1:50,000 Sheets 6460, 6550, 6559, 6659, 6658, 6657, 6756  
(b) III MAF LOI 1-66  
(c) 1st MarDiv ltr 4/BBD/lve over 4000 dtd 29 Mar66  
(Logistic Instructions)  
(d) FMFM 4-4  
(e) DivO P7000.3A

Time Zone: H

1. SUPPLY

- a. General. Reference (b) sets forth logistic instructions applicable to 1st Marine Division operations within the Chu Lai TAOR. Reference (c) and this order details logistic and personnel instructions in support of the 1st Marine Division during the conduct of operations outlined in Operation Order 301-66. CG, 1st Marine Division is responsible for the logistic support for all 1st Marine Division units and attachments. Organizational commanders are responsible for logistical combat readiness of subordinate units within their commands, and execution of supply, evacuation and hospitalization, transportation, maintenance and services in accordance with directives from this and higher Headquarters.
- (1) Supply Source. The Force Logistic Command is the principal subordinate logistic command of Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force and is tasked to provide sustained logistical support to all III MAF forces. Support for the 1st Marine Division and attached units will be provided through Force Logistic Support Group Bravo (FLSG-B).
- b. Control and Distribution
- (1) FLSG-B acts as control agency for all classes of supply except Class II(A), IV(A), and V(A).

UNCLASSIFIED

## CONFIDENTIAL

- (2) Distribution of supplies to Chu Lai will be primarily by sea lift augmented by Marine Logistic flights, military and commercial motor transport.
- (3) Unit distribution from FLSG-B for infantry units. Supply point distribution for all others.

c. Levels of Supply(1) Class I

	<u>FLSG-B</u>	<u>1stMarDiv</u>
MCI	45 days	2 days
"B"	15 days	3 days
"A"	7 days	2 days *

\* Note: Available storage capacity will determine level of "A" rations.

(2) Class II

<u>Type 1</u>	<u>FLSG-B</u>	<u>1stMarDiv</u>
Operating level	30 days	T/E Allowances plus 30 days *
Safety level	15 days	0
Lead time	45 days	0

\* Note: For expendable property only, based on usage data.

<u>Type 2</u>	<u>FLSG-B</u>	<u>1stMarDiv</u>
Operating level	30 days	30 days
Safety level	15 days	0
Lead time		15 days

(3) Class III

	<u>FLSG-B</u>	<u>1stMarDiv</u>
Packaged	5 days	2 days
Bulk	15 days	0
Oil & Greases	30 days	5 days

UNCLASSIFIED

(4) Class IV

	<u>FLSG-B</u>	<u>1stMarDiv</u>
Operating level	30 days	0
Safety level	30 days	0
Lead time	45 days	0

Construction materials as required, minimum policy.

(5) Class V

	<u>FLSG-B</u>	<u>1stMarDiv</u>
Operating level (Usage rate)	15 days	B/A plus - 4 DOA 81mm 10 DOA 105 Illum 4 DOA 107 Illum 4 DOA 155 Illum 4 DOA 3.5 Rocket 4 DOA 106 RR
Safety level (C/A rate)	30 days	0

(6) Medical

	<u>FLSG-B</u>	<u>1stMarDiv</u>
	90 days	Units - Basic outfit, plus 14 days sick call supplies. Main- tain a 10 and 30 day medical re- supply block for each Medical Co.

- d. Specially Prepared Supplies. FLSG-B will maintain two 5 day supply blocks of Class I, III and V for two reinforced battalions (one supply block for each) to provide for logistic support of 1st Marine Division contingency operations. Contents of supply blocks will be specified by this Headquarters.

UNCLASSIFIED



e. Prescribed Load. In execution of offensive operations.

(1) Class I

(a) One (1) day MCI w/fuel, Trioxane.

(b) One (1) gallon per man in water trailers and/or water cans.

(c) Two (2) full canteens per man.

(2) Class II. Essential T/A and T/E items, including three (3) days salt tablets.

(3) Class III

(a) Vehicle tanks  $3/4$  full plus fuel for 6 hours operation.

(b) Packaged lubricants as required.

(4) Class IV. None except as deemed absolutely essential by organizational commander.

(5) Class V. Basic Allowance.

f. Resupply


(1) Except as provided in this plan, FLSG-B is the supply source for all classes of supply for units within the 1st Marine Division.

(2) Class I requisitions will be submitted by 1st Marine Division to FLSG-B. Units will submit ration memorandums to Division Food Services Officer for review and consolidation. The daily consolidated ration memorandum will be forwarded to the III MAF Food Services Officer.

(3) Class II and IV. Submit requisitions to FLSG-B.

(4) Class III. Submit requisitions to FLSG-B.

(5) Class V. 1st MarDiv units will submit requisitions to FLSG-B via Division Ordnance Officer.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- (6) Water. Water points will be established by engineer units. Present locations - Annex A (Administrative Overlay).
- (7) Replenishment of all classes of supply will be phased to maintain the levels prescribed in paragraph c. above.
- (8) FLSG-B will be responsible for the supply, maintenance, and resupply of all types of Marine Corps provided equipment.

g. Air Resupply. On request to FLSG-B. Annex B (Aerial Delivery).

h. Captured Materials

- (1) Items of captured enemy material having technical intelligence significance will be evacuated through technical intelligence channels. This Headquarters will be advised of captured items of unusual significance.
- (2) Material of intelligence value will be reported and evacuated through intelligence channels.
  - (a) Report location to this Headquarters.
  - (b) Use of materials by our troops is prohibited, except in emergency.
- (3) Whenever possible, items released by this Headquarters will be turned over to in-country forces and/or civil affairs agencies.

i. Excess Equipment. All excess equipment and supplies not required will be returned to FLSG-B.

j. Supply Instructions. Formal property accountability will prevail unless otherwise directed.

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION. Annex C (Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization).

3. TRANSPORTATION

a. Surface

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(1) Highway


- (a) Control will be exercised by CG, 1st Marine Division in assigned tactical operational areas.
  - (b) Motor vehicle augmentation above organic capability will be allocated by this Headquarters.
  - (c) During hours of darkness, all vehicles traveling through CP's and troop bivouac areas will be preceded by a ground guide when blackout is in effect.
  - (d) Speed limits as prescribed by senior/major subordinate commander.
  - (e) Vehicles will utilize only those roads indicated on Annex A (Administrative Overlay), except for operations or in cases of emergency.
- (2) Tracked Vehicles. Travel on paved or hard surface roads is forbidden except in emergency.
- (3) Railroads. To be used when the tactical situation permits and with permission from this Headquarters.

b. Air

- (1) Units submit requests for air transportation in accordance with 1st MAW Order 4631.7A.
- (2) Units mark and report helicopter LZ's to this Headquarters.

4. SERVICEa. Maintenance

- (1) Units are responsible for organizational maintenance as authorized in appropriate T/O's.
- (2) FLSG-B provides the following echelons of maintenance.
  - (a) Third and limited fourth echelon maintenance on those items of Marine Corps equipment for which the units do not possess their own organic capability.



UNCLASSIFIED

- (b) Total third and fourth echelon maintenance for Communications-Electronics equipment, including test equipment for those items of Marine Corps equipment for which the units do not possess their own organic capability.
- (c) Second echelon maintenance for those units not possessing their own organic capability, as well as overflow second echelon maintenance for units requiring additional support.
- (3) Units utilize organic maintenance capability to maximum extent prior to requesting support.
- (4) Maintenance contact teams will be utilized to the maximum. Identify specific malfunctions of equipment and include such information with request for contact teams from FLSG-B.

b. Engineer

- (1) Engineer units of the 1st MarDiv will provide the following services.
  - (a) Essential combat engineer support to units of the Division and other III MAF units in the Chu Lai TAOR as directed by this Headquarters.
  - (b) Construction of essential facilities. Priorities will be assigned by this, or higher Headquarters.
    - 1 Construction requirements to implement the people to people program will be forwarded to this Headquarters.
  - (c) Removal of mines, minefields and booby traps.
  - (d) Provide facilities for handling POW's.
  - (e) Other engineer tasks as contained in reference (d).

c. Salvage

- (1) Units using supply point distribution deliver salvage and excess material to collection points as announced by FLSG-B.

UNCLASSIFIED

## CONFIDENTIAL

- (2) Units on unit distribution advise FLSG-B of [REDACTED] location, nature and amount of salvage for collection.
- (3) All units salvage fuel and diesel drums and bungs and return for re-issue to FLSG-B.
- d. Explosive Ordnance Disposal. EOD assistance available from FLSG-B on request.

## 5. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- a. Units report location of supply, maintenance, medical and dental support facilities to this Headquarters when established.
- b. When directed by this Headquarters and within capabilities, assist indigenous and other allied forces in accomplishing logistic tasks.

## 6. PERSONNEL. Annex D (Personnel).

## 7. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. All units maintain current embarkation data.
- b. Roads and logistical organizations and facilities as shown on Annex A (Administrative Overlay).
- c. Rear Area Defense
- (1) Disperse all installations and use revetments where terrain offers no protection.
- (2) Special attention to defense against guerrilla attacks and acts of sabotage.
- d. Civil Affairs. Annex E (Civil Affairs/Civic Action).
- e. Public Information. Annex F (Public Information).
- f. Fiscal Instructions. In accordance with paragraph 507, reference (e). Units are cautioned to continue to cite Major Command Code (MCC) "A", on all requisitions submitted while in RVN.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEXES:

- A - Administrative Overlay
- B - Aerial Delivery (to be issued)
- C - Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization
- D - Personnel
- E - Civil Affairs/Civic Action
- F - Public Information
- G - *MILITARY CONVOY MOVEMENT*

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800 April 1966

Annex C (Medical) to Administrative Order 301-66

Ref: (a) FMFM 4-5  
(b) BuMedInst 6230.1D  
(c) BuMedInst 6230.13  
(d) BuMedInst 6230.11C  
(e) NAVMED P5052.11  
(f) BuMedInst 6700.19B  
(g) MCO 3040.1  
(h) FMFPacO P3040.2A

Time Zone: H

1. ORGANIZATION. All medical elements attached to the 1st Marine Division (Rein).
2. MISSION
  - a. To provide emergency treatment, casualty evacuation, and maintain the health of troops in the field.
  - b. Be prepared to furnish emergency treatment, on order, to the civilian populace, and to engage in medical civil affairs.
  - c. 1st Medical Battalion. Be prepared to provide one Collecting and Clearing Company with a surgical team, on order, to designated area.
  - d. Coordinating Instructions
    - (1) All medical units provide markers on evacuation routes to indicate locations of medical units. Insure that markers are current to indicate changes of location. Notify Division Surgeon of location and opening and closing times.
    - (2) All medical units be prepared to continue medical services during displacement by establishing two separate echelons. Notify Division Surgeon of location and opening and closing times.

UNCLASSIFIED

## CONFIDENTIAL

- (3) Medical personnel are required for treating casualties and are not to be utilized as litter bearers. Reference (a) refers.
- (4) All medical personnel will be familiar with the proper preparation of Combat Casualty Cards (NAVMC 10453-PD), and with Combat Casualty reporting requirements.

## 3. SANITATION

- a. Due to overcrowded conditions and poverty, the country containing the objective area has a severe handicap in health and sanitation measures. Many diseases are widespread and sanitary measures are practically nonexistent.
- b. Maximum sanitary discipline commensurate with combat conditions will be assured by troop commanders at all echelons.
  - (1) Medical and Hospital Corps personnel attached to troop units are responsible for inspecting facilities and practices, and will advise troop commanders of unsanitary conditions and make recommendations for corrections. Particular attention is directed to facilities, or lack of them, for disposal of human waste.
  - (2) Untreated water is not potable. Food and beverages will be consumed from approved military sources only. All local water, regardless of source will be considered unsafe. Purification will be accomplished by use of water purification tablets or by boiling.
  - (3) All personnel are restricted from towns and villages except as essential military requirements dictate. Exclude indigenous persons from bivouac areas to the greatest extent practicable.
- c. Preventive Medicine
  - (1) All immunizations required in the area will be accomplished on a continuing basis. See reference (b).

UNCLASSIFIED



- [REDACTED]
- (2) Gamma Globulin (Hepatitis) every 5 months while in the objective area. See reference (c).
  - (3) All streams are considered contaminated. Swimming is not permitted in streams.
  - (4) Diseases of special military importance.
    - (a) Malaria - greatest mortality cause - widespread.
    - (b) Dysenteries - next in importance - widespread.
    - (c) Cholera - occasional epidemics - widespread.
    - (d) Venereal diseases - prevalent.
    - (e) Typhus fever - occurs in the hill country.
    - (f) Dengue fever - yearly epidemics - southern and central portions.
    - (g) Plague - sporadic outbreaks but control measures may keep incidence low - reported in the civil population.
    - (h) Scrub Typhus - reported occurrences.
  - (5) Miscellaneous disease.
    - (a) Typhoid fever - common among civilian population due to contaminated water supply.
    - (b) Smallpox - controlled by vaccines.
    - (c) Relapsing fever - occasional - carried by lice.
  - (6) Vectors of disease.
    - (a) Flies - many varieties the year around.
    - (b) Fleas - tropical fleas most prevalent.
    - (c) Mosquitoes - Anopheles common.
    - (d) Rodents - many varieties of rats and rat like animals.

UNCLASSIFIED


## CONFIDENTIAL

## (7) Anti-malaria measures.

- (a) Indoctrination in accordance with reference (d).
  - (b) Maximum anti-malaria measures including mosquito netting to be used by troops.
  - (c) Insect repellents will be used as needed.
  - (d) Chloroquine and Primaquine Phosphate prophylaxis is required and must be continued six weeks after leaving country. See reference (d).
- (8) Anti-rabies vaccine and serum, and snake-bite anti-venom will be carried by the Collecting and Clearing Companies.
- (9) Handling of indigenous tame animals is prohibited. Persons bitten by animals will be considered as having been exposed to rabies and will receive the routine course of anti-rabies vaccine.
- (10) Excessive perspiration will be of significance due to the extreme heat and humidity. Water discipline should be a matter for command attention. All units will carry sufficient quantity of salt tablets for issue of four tablets daily per individual attached.

d. Venereal Disease Prevention and Treatment

- (1) Venereal disease prevention is a command responsibility. The medical department shall provide all possible assistance to the unit commander in conducting an effective VD prevention program. Such programs shall include, but are not limited to; thorough indoctrination of all personnel in signs and symptoms of VD; methods of prevention; effects of VD, both long and short term; means to ensure contact interviewing; proper health record entries in case of infection; and personnel inspections to detect unreported venereal disease.
- (2) Punitive measures solely on the basis of venereal infection are positively forbidden. Care should



be taken to ensure that punitive measures are not imposed under the guise of other restrictions such as quarantine. Quarantine, if used, shall be for the sole purpose of ensuring proper treatment and prevention of contagion and shall be terminated at the earliest practicable time permitted by purely medical considerations.

- (3) The disclosure of names of persons having VD exposure or infection or the publication of quarantine lists is forbidden except on an official "need to know" basis. Information obtained in contact interviewing is "privileged information" and shall not be made available to civil authorities except as shall be specifically authorized by this Headquarters.
- (4) Contact interviewing will be conducted under the supervision of the Preventive Medicine Section, 1st Medical Battalion.

#### 4. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

- a. Reference (a).
  - b. Due care shall be exercised to clear weapons or to disarm casualties before they are taken into treatment facilities.
  - c. Evacuation policy will be directed by the Commanding Officer, 1st Medical Battalion.
- (1) Evacuation will be from BAS and/or dispensary to C&C Company or hospital as appropriate. Seriously injured may be evacuated directly to C&C Company or hospital when circumstances make this route most expeditious. All BAS and dispensaries will make every effort to retain minor short term illness and injury cases for early return to duty. Chu Lai Hospital, when established, will be operated by the 1st Force Hospital Company.
  - (2) Upon decision of the CO, 1st Medical Battalion, based upon the evacuation policy directed by the Force Surgeon and patient load, patients will be

C-5

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

hospitalized at C&C Companies, for early return to duty or transferred to NAVSUPPACT Station Hospital, Danang. The CO, 1st Medical Battalion at Chu Lai will transfer patients as directed by the Division Surgeon to either Chu Lai Medical facilities or NAVSUPPACT Station Hospital, Danang. When available, transfer may be direct to designated hospital ship in the area.

- (3) Indigenous civilian casualties will be rendered emergency medical care as practicable and within the concept of life saving and humanitarian treatment, in keeping with the rules of the Geneva Convention. Persons suffering from disease or injury not considered to be acute or emergency after screening will be referred to Civil Affairs medical treatment facilities for treatment.

- (4) Medical service for indigenous civilians is operated and controlled by the Civil Affairs Group.

d. POW. Hospitalization as dictated by patients' condition.

e. Casualty Overload

- (1) Units experiencing casualty overload shall address requests for assistance to the Regimental Surgeon in the case of Battalion Aid Stations. In the case of separate battalions and C&C Companies, requests shall be addressed to the Commanding Officer, 1st Medical Battalion.
- (2) Mass casualty situations occurring as a result of chemical or nuclear attack will be responded to by Emergency Medical Detachments of one Medical Officer and ten Hospital Corpsmen as directed by this Headquarters.
- (3) Battalion Aid Stations will be prepared to dispatch one Emergency Medical Detachment and the Collecting and Clearing Companies two Emergency Medical Detachments when directed. Transportation will be provided by organic motor transport if available or requested from Division Air. Each detachment will carry a minimum of ten litters and as much medical supplies as can be spared, retaining a minimum reserve for

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

definitive treatment of casualties when they are evacuated to the C&C Companies.

- (4) Emergency Medical Detachments shall report on arrival at the emergency scene to the Recovery Measures Control Officer.
- (5) Collecting and Clearing Companies shall be prepared to dispatch all available vehicles not involved in collection and evacuation of other casualties for the evacuation of mass casualties. Vehicles will be accompanied by the assigned drivers and two additional men per vehicle, when practicable, to act as working parties.
- (6) The medical officer in charge at the scene of the triage station will be designated by the Division Surgeon, or if no medical officer is so designated, the senior medical officer present shall assume this responsibility. The medical officer in charge will report to the Recovery Measures Control Officer for orders.
- (7) Transportation requirements shall be expressed in terms of numbers of litter and ambulatory patients.
- (8) Casualties will be classified as follows.
  - (a) Minimal - Those requiring minimal treatment to be rendered fit for duty and will include psychiatric casualties.
  - (b) Immediate - Those casualties requiring immediate treatment to save life or limb.
  - (c) Delayed - Those casualties capable of having treatment delayed for a period of up to twelve hours without undue hazard to life or limb, but requiring more than minimal treatment.
  - (d) Expectant - Those casualties in a mass casualty situation which are moribund or who cannot reasonably be expected to survive with immediate treatment or for whom strenuous efforts will be required with slight chance of survival even with treatment. Examples of this are: those

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

with over 50% 2nd and 3rd degree thermal burns; extensive head injuries. These casualties are not to be abandoned, but will be made as comfortable as possible under the circumstances and will be given last priority in evacuation.

- (9) Casualties will be reclassified as indicated by a change in conditions at any time.
- (10) Casualties classified as "minimal" shall be used to the maximum extent practicable for the collection and evacuation of other casualties or may be returned to duty as soon as practicable.
- (11) Casualties will be evacuated in the following order of priority.
  - (a) Immediate.
  - (b) Delayed.
  - (c) Minimal.
  - (d) Expectant.
- (12) Chemical warfare casualties must be decontaminated unless no liquid agent remains. Precautions must be taken not to contaminate other individuals or materials in the course of treatment or decontamination.
- (13) As triage and evacuation progress, Emergency Medical Detachments will return to parent organizations as practicable and directed by the Recovery Measures Control Officer.
- (14) Dental personnel will be utilized as practicable to assist in the treatment of casualties.
- (15) Evacuation of casualties will not be delayed solely because of lack of records or other administrative requirements.

c-8

UNCLASSIFIED

f. Air Evacuation

(1) Request for evacuation will be made direct to the Direct Air Support Center (DASC). Requests shall include:

- (a) Number of casualties.
- (b) Grid coordinates.
- (c) Seriousness and type of injury.
- (d) Destination.

g. Evacuation Policy

- (1) The evacuation policy at medical facilities ashore will be five days.
- (2) POW casualties will be evacuated under guard via normal medical channels to the POW compound.
- (3) Civilian indigenous casualties will be retained in the objective area and transferred after initial treatment to locations as directed by the Civil Affairs Officer.

h. Civil Affairs Medical Teams. All medical units will be prepared to dispatch medical teams for assistance in civil affairs. Such teams will consist of one Medical Officer and three Hospital Corpsmen. The Collecting and Clearing Companies will be prepared to furnish two teams. All other units will be prepared to furnish one medical team. See Appendix 1 for conduct of Civil Affairs Medical Teams.

## 5. MEDICAL SUPPLY

a. See reference (g).

b. All medical units.

- (1) Carry sufficient sick call supplies to support parent organization and attachments for fourteen days field operation.
- (2) Carry complete Basic Outfits.

UNCLASSIFIED

## CONFIDENTIAL

- (3) Each Collecting and Clearing Company will carry one Initial Supply Block.
- (4) Obtain routine resupply from next higher echelon in evacuation chain, while engaged in operations in areas outside the TAOR. Otherwise Battalion Aid Stations and Collecting and Clearing Companies will obtain resupply from FLSG-B. Medical supplies will be requisitioned on NAVMC 10493 (Marine Corps Slit Document), and submitted to Division Medical Supply Office for pricing, and forwarded to FLSG-B for supply action.
- (5) FLSG-B will carry Initial Supply Blocks and Mount-out Supply Blocks in sufficient quantity to provide for ninety days operation in the objective area.

c. Resupply

- (1) Emergency resupply by air on request to FLSG-B.
- (2) All levels of evacuation are enjoined to exchange stretchers, stretcher straps, blankets, Thomas splints, etc.

d. Captured medical supplies will be salvaged for use in the case of POW's and indigenous civilians.

e. Whole Blood. Collecting and Clearing Companies will stock whole blood as determined by expected casualties.

## 6. MEDICAL ADMINISTRATION

a. Division Surgeon

- (1) Ashore - Division CP.

b. Evacuation and Casualty Reports

- (1) See reference (g) and (h).
- (2) Casualty reports. See Annex D (Personnel).
- (3) Reports by all medical units will be submitted to the Division Surgeon by 1000 daily to cover the preceding day; 0000 to 2400.
  - (a) ALPHA - Total casualties received.
  - (b) BRAVO - Total casualties to duty.

C-10

UNCLASSIFIED



- (c) CHARLIE - Total casualties evacuated.
- (d) DELTA - Total casualties died of wounds.
- (e) ECHO - Total casualties remaining.
- (f) FOXTROT - Any special requirements in medical personnel, supplies, whole blood, and other matters of medical significance.
- (4) The above reports will be submitted via the Regimental Surgeon in the case of Battalion Aid Stations and via the Commanding Officer, 1st Medical Battalion in the case of Collecting and Clearing Companies. The Regimental Surgeons and Commander, 1st Medical Battalion will be responsible for collecting and forwarding of these reports by the most expeditious means available. Separate Battalions shall report direct. Due consideration must be given to security of the information contained in the reports.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:

1 - Civil Affairs Medical Teams

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

C-11

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800 April 1966

Appendix 1 (Civil Affairs Medical Teams) to Annex C (Medical)  
to Administrative Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. All Medical units shall be prepared to dispatch medical teams for assistance in civil affairs. Such teams shall consist of one medical officer and three hospital corpsmen. Teams shall be prepared to assist civil affairs teams in the conduct of emergency or humanitarian treatment of individuals, to conduct public health improvement projects, or to conduct village clinics as may be appropriate or directed by the commander of the area.
2. The team leader (the medical officer of each team), shall establish liaison with the civilian medical officials of the local area and subject to the orders of the military commander, shall not interfere with or substitute for existing civilian medical programs. The role of the medical assistance team shall be one of assistance, not replacement.
3. Local customs and practices shall be respected and not violated except as may be necessary, with the consent of the military commander, for the institution of proper medical care and public health management, or with the consent of the patient or local populace as may be appropriate.
4. Treatment shall not be used as social bribery and shall be given on a basis of need and availability without regard to the political convictions of the patient or the community. Needed available treatment shall not be withheld as punishment for any case.
5. Medical teams shall report to and be responsible to the military commander or the U. S. official having responsibility for the area.
6. C&C Companies shall be prepared to supply two medical teams. All other units shall be prepared to supply one medical team.

C-1-1

UNCLASSIFIED

## CONFIDENTIAL

7. Medical teams shall be prepared to carry such medical supplies and equipment as may be practicable for care of sick and injured without seriously depleting unit supplies for care of U. S. Forces. Organic medical materials expended will not be replaced with AID supplies. AID supplies shall be utilized to the maximum extent possible.
8. Medical teams shall, when practicable, use their own vehicles. When necessary, vehicles for the transport of teams or use by teams shall be requested from appropriate military authority.
9. Security of vehicles, personnel, supplies and equipment shall be a matter for constant consideration. Provision for adequate security shall be made and shall be the responsibility of the U. S. Forces commander in the area.
10. Requests for additional medical assistance shall be addressed via the local U. S. commander to this Headquarters (Attn: Division Surgeon).
11. Reports of important medical matters shall be made via the local U. S. commander to this Headquarters (Attn: Division Surgeon).
12. Medical teams will furnish such reports as required by the Civil Affairs Officer.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

C-1-2

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800 April 1966

Annex D (Personnel) to Administrative Order 301-66

Ref: (a) MCO P5000.3  
(b) DivO P5000.1  
(c) DivO 3000.3  
(d) DivO P5800.1  
(e) DivO 5800.2  
(f) DivO P3500.1  
(g) DivO 3040.1  
(h) DivO 1050.1  
(i) DivO 2700.4  
(j) DivO P1730.3  
(k) FMFPacO P1650.1  
(l) DivO 1650.4

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

- a. Personnel and Administrative Procedures will be in accordance with references (a) and (b), and the provisions of this Order.
- b. Command Relationship. All administrative matters will be conducted via the normal chain of command, i.e. Battalion to Regiment to Division in the case of a Battalion subordinate to a Regiment.

2. STRENGTH, RECORDS, AND REPORTS

- a. Strengths. Based on T/C as Task Organized pending receipt of Manning Levels from Higher Headquarters.
- b. Records
  - (1) Maintain in accordance with current directives.
  - (2) The importance of maintaining personnel records in an accurate and current status at all times cannot be overemphasized.

D-1

UNCLASSIFIED

- (3) Organizational Commanders will establish procedures deemed necessary to insure prompt submission of Unit Diaries and PAR's. In this respect, it is imperative that appropriate and prompt action be taken upon receipt of Monthly Personnel Rosters and required audits.

c. Reports

- (1) Personnel Daily Summary (PDS). Daily as of 2359 by 1200 the following day. First report due 1200H, 2 April 1966 for the period 2400H, 31 March to 2359, 1 April 1966. Report will be submitted in format shown in Appendix 1.
- (2) Weekly-In-Country Strength Report. In addition to the information required by 2c(1) above, the PDS report as of 2359 Thursday of each week will include a listing of unit arrivals and departures to the lowest reporting unit level occurring during the period 0001, Friday to 2359 Thursday. Show unit title, date of event and strength breakdown. Detachments and or advance parties will also be listed.
- (3) Personnel Status Report. To be submitted semi-monthly in accordance with reference (c).
- (4) Naval Personnel Daily Strength Report. The Division Surgeon's Office will submit a daily strength report of naval personnel by organization as of 2359H by 1200 the following day. First report due 1200, 2 April 1966 for period ending 2359, 1 April 1966.
- (5) Weekly Report of Personnel TAD. The Division Adjutant will submit a weekly report of personnel TAD to this Command by 1200 each Friday as of 2359 each Thursday.
- (6) Reports listed above will be submitted to this Headquarters (Attn: AC/S G-1). Written reports are required, original and one copy. Each action addressee will report on all units under his administrative control.

3. REPLACEMENTS. Provided by this Headquarters as required and when available.
4. DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER
  - a. In accordance with references (d) and (e).
  - b. Personnel will conduct themselves in an exemplary manner at all times as to reflect credit upon the U. S. Marine Corps and the United States.
  - c. Special incident reports will be submitted in accordance with reference (e).
  - d. Stragglers
    - (1) Organizations will be responsible for stragglers within their zone of responsibility.
    - (2) Military Police Company, Headquarters Battalion will conduct straggler control operations as required.
  - e. A Division Detention Facility will be operated by the Division Provost Marshal. Designed as a field expedient it will be used solely for emergency situations.
  - f. Captives
    - (1) Captives will be handled in accordance with Section VIII, reference (f).
    - (2) The Division Collecting Point will be operated under the supervision of the Division Provost Marshal. Capturing units will deliver captives who are not seriously injured to the Collecting Point. Seriously injured captives will be evacuated through medical channels.
5. CASUALTY REPORTING AND GRAVES REGISTRATION
  - a. Casualty Reporting will be in accordance with reference (g).
  - b. Graves Registration. Disposition of remains and personal effects will be in accordance with reference (a) and other current applicable instructions.

## 6. MORALE AND PERSONAL SERVICES

a. Leave

- (1) Annual. Provisions for annual leave contained in paragraph 5, reference (h) are suspended.
- (2) Emergency. In accordance with reference (h). Reference to On-Island in the order will also apply to In-Country. Reference to Off-Island will also apply to Out-of-Country.

b. Liberty. To be promulgated by separate directive.c. Postal Service

- (1) General Instruction. Postal Services and handling of U. S. Mail will be conducted in accordance with reference (i) and supplementary instructions contained herein.
- (2) Mailing Address. All mailing addresses will remain the same. Personnel are reminded that use of the simplified mailing address and the ZIP code number "96602" by their correspondents will insure more timely receipt of their mail.
- (3) Free Mailing Privilege
  - (a) Upon departure from Okinawa to Vietnam the Free Mailing Privilege may be utilized, providing the below requirements are met.
    - 1 That the mailer has his complete military address, including Rank, Name and Service number in the upper left hand corner.
    - 2 That the mailer writes the word "Free" in the upper right hand corner.
    - 3 That the privilege be used only on letters, in their usual and accepted form, and post cards.

DECLASSIFIED

- 4 That the letters or post cards be mailed to the U. S., possessions of the U. S., Puerto Rico, FPO and APO post offices and Canada.
- 5 That the letters and post cards are not registered or certified. They may be sent Special Delivery providing the additional postage (\$.30) is affixed adjacent to the word "Free".
- (b) Parcels mailed from Vietnam at the 4th class rate of postage, weighing less than 5 pounds will be flown to the U. S. on a space available basis.
- (4) Casualty, KIA, MIA, Deserter Mail. Under no circumstances will mail for casualties, KIA, MIA, or deserters be forwarded "Returned to Sender". This mail will be sent by official cover to the Division Postal Officer for appropriate disposition in accordance with current regulations. No notations will be written on the mail. Attach a separate piece of paper and indicate on this the desired notation, i.e., KIA-15Mar66-A-3-1.
- (5) Mobile Post Offices. Three mobile post offices are available for use by unit commanders when financial postal service is desired and no U. S. post offices are available. Arrangements will be made directly with the Division Postal Officer. The requesting unit will:
  - (a) Indicate what type of services desired, i.e., money order sales, stamp sales, parcel mailing, etc.
  - (b) Furnish transportation to and from their area.
  - (c) Provide adequate security and shelter area to set up the mobile office, i.e., tent, lean-to, rear of covered truck.
- d. Exchange Services. Exchange services will be available within the Chu Lai Combat Base. Information regarding mobile exchanges will be published at a later date.

D-5

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

- e. Informational Services. Instructions and procedures regarding Informational Services are contained in Annex F (Public Information) to this Order.
- f. Special Services. In accordance with current directives, Organizational/Unit Commanders will, to the extent possible, develop recreational facilities within their respective areas.
- g. Religious Activities. Will be in accordance with reference (j).
- h. Decorations and Awards. In accordance with references (k) and (l).
- 7. CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT. Annex E (Civil Affairs/Civic Action).
- 8. PERSONNEL PROCEDURES
  - a. Rotation. Procedures for rotation of personnel will be promulgated as necessary and in sufficient time to permit orderly rotation of personnel.
  - b. TAD. Paragraph 207 of reference (b) applies. Requests for TAD will be submitted at least four working days prior to the date of commencement of travel with full justification and applicable references attached if unclassified. Use Division form 1320/4 (Rev 10-65) when requesting TAD.
- 9. MISCELLANEOUS. Courier service and guard mail instructions will be issued separately.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Personnel Daily Summary Format

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800 April 1966

Appendix 1 (Personnel Daily Summary Format) to Annex D (Personnel) to Administrative Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

SAMPLE

HEADQUARTERS

SAMPLE1st Battalion, 7th Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: AC/S G-1)  
 Subj: Personnel Daily Summary No. 7-66  
 Ref: (a) DivAdminOrd 301-66

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following personnel data as of 2359 7 April 1966 is submitted:

a. Organization/ Unit	Chargeable Strength				Availability*				Location	Remarks
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN			
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl		
H&SCo 1/7	14	320	3	49	14	311	3	47	Chu Lai	
"A"Co 1/7	4	168	0	0	4	164	0	0	Chu Lai	
"B"Co 1/7	5	163	0	0	5	161	0	0	Chu Lai	
"D"Co 1/7	4	169	0	0	4	169	0	0	Chu Lai	
TOTAL 1/7 (-)	27	820	3	49	27	805	3	47		
b. Attachments										
1stPlt, "A"Co,										
1stATBn	1	19	0	0	1	19	0	0	Chu Lai	Att to "A"Co
"C"Co, 1stReconBn	5	83	0	2	5	83	0	2	Chu Lai	
"H"Btry, 3/11	9	120	0	2	9	120	0	2	Chu Lai	
TOTAL ATTACHMENTS	15	222	0	4	15	222	0	4		
c. Detachments										
"C"Co 1/7	4	165	0	4	4	157	0	4	Danang	Att to 9thMar
TOTAL DETACHMENTS	4	165	0	4	4	157	0	4		

DECLASSIFIED

T-1-D

DECLASSIFIED

d. Additional Information. Required only with report ending 2359 each Thursday.

(1) Arrivals	Date	Strength			
		USMC	USN	Off	Enl
		Off	Enl	Off	Enl
1stPlt,"A"Co,1stATBn	3Apr66	1	19	0	0


(2) Departures

1stPlt,"B"Co,3dATBn	5Apr66	1	19	0	0
---------------------	--------	---	----	---	---

\*Includes only those personnel physically present for duty. Personnel hospitalized, TAD, UA, on leave, R&R, etc. will not be included.

/s/ JOE DOAKES  
JOE DOAKES

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

  
GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800 April 1966

Annex : (Civil Affairs/Civic Action) to Administrative Order 301-66

Ref: (a) MARCORPERSMAN (MCO P5500.3)  
(b) For/NCCO 5081.2 (U)  
(c) MACV Directive: 525-3 (C)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION. (See Operation Order 301-66)
2. MISSION. 1st Marine Division will conduct Civil Affairs to control the populace in the objective area and give aid to the civilian populace within the availability of local resources and U. S. supplies as necessary.
3. EXECUTION
  - a. Concept of Operation. Primary effort will be directed toward providing essential assistance to the populace to maintain order and to meet the minimum needs for survival of civilians left homeless or injured in the course of this operation.
  - b. 1st Marine Division
    - (1) Establish Civil Affairs control in combat areas.
    - (2) Be prepared on order to execute or assist with the following:
      - (a) Population control.
      - (b) Psychological Warfare indoctrination (Annex H to Operation Order 301-66).
      - (c) Medical assistance to civilians. Civilians will be medically evacuated to the Province Hospital for emergency lifesaving only.
      - (d) Operation of assembly areas for displaced persons.
      - (e) Phase in of U. S. Army Civil Affairs Teams including ARVN Civil Affairs Teams, if required. Teams will be on call to be phased in by message request to III Marine Amphibious Force.

E-1

UNCLASSIFIED

## CONFIDENTIAL

- (f) Employment and organization of indigenous personnel for labor in connection with rice recovery and other support to the operation.

c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Report locations and primary points of contact with civil authorities.
- (2) Captured VC rice that is not contaminated will be evacuated for return to RVN control. Unit commanders will not destroy this rice unless it is considered totally impractical to evacuate it. In these circumstances permission to destroy the rice must be obtained from the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division prior to destruction. Evacuation will be accomplished as follows:
  - (a) Rice bags will be provided unit commanders from FLSG-B on request.
  - (b) Ground evacuation to FLSG-B will be arranged by 1st Marine Division Headquarters when feasible; aero evacuation in other cases.
  - (c) Return to RVN authorities will be arranged by 1st Marine Division Headquarters.
- (3) Civic Action Situation Reports will be submitted daily and in accordance with instructions contained in reference (b)
- (4) Damage assessment to local structures, rice paddies, and other property will be reported to this Headquarters (G-5) to facilitate subsequent settlement of claims through Government of Vietnam channels. The populace should not be in any way given indication that combat claims will be processed through U. S. channels.

## 4. LOGISTICS

a. Civilian Assistance

- (1) Civic Action commodities shall be requested through normal command/logistical channels.

E-2

UNCLASSIFIED

- [REDACTED]
- (2) Sufficient MedCap supplies and other commodities to effectively carry out the Civil Affairs program will be held in the FLSG-B for requisition by units. Minimum MedCap supplies for use during operations outside the TAOR will be carried by units to provide required civic medical assistance.
  - (3) Units in static situations will be prepared to conduct civic action through Unit Civic Action Officers and Teams.

b. Sociological

- (1) Public Health. Commanders will assist in providing essential medical treatment to civilian personnel as operations, supplies, and personnel permits (i.e. static situation).
  - (2) Displaced Persons
    - (a) Displaced persons shall not be evacuated from the area of operations.
    - (b) Commanders will direct the handling of non-combatant persons in accordance with reference (c) and set standards of care to prevent disease and unrest.
    - (c) Care and support of displaced persons will be provided from supplies contained in paragraph 4a(2) above, and other commodities provided from local ARVN sources.
  - (3) Arts, Monuments and Archives
    - (a) Commanders will ensure that troops are especially careful not to damage or violate the premises of property, live-stock, religious structures, and other property, such as graves, which hold particular significance to the people.
    - (b) Troops will refrain from needless damage or wanton destruction of property consistent with the over-all military mission.
  - (4) Cultural Relations
    - (a) Within the requirements of the military situation, maximum respect for customs, traditions, and desires of the people will be enforced.
    - (b) Use of churches, temples, and other religious institutions for military purposes is prohibited.
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

(5) Command and Signal

- (a) See Annex I (Communications) to Operation Order 301-66.
- (b) G-5 will be located in the Division Command Post.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*

GORDON H. WEST  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

E-4

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
010800 April 1966

Annex F (Public Information) to Administrative Order 301-66

Ref: (a) MCO P5720.44  
(b) FMFPacO P5700.1C  
(c) III MAFO P5700.1  
(d) DivO P5000.1D  
(e) Annex V to COMSEVENTHFLT OPOORDER 201-64  
(f) OPNAVINST 5530.10

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

- a. The rules and guidelines for public information matters are contained in references (a) through (e).
- b. Public information planning must be concurrent with operational planning, and conducted on a continuous basis. Additional guidance as deemed necessary, will be issued to subordinate commands to ensure uniformity in public information matters.
- c. To ensure accurate and expeditious coverage of news material, Informational Services Officers (ISO's) and Technical Information Officers (TIO's) will be assigned, and provided necessary essentials to perform their duties in accordance with the provisions of reference (c).

2. MISSION. Plan, coordinate and implement informational services activities for the purpose of keeping the general public and military informed on the nature, scope and significance of 1st Marine Division operations.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations

- (1) The emphasis of public information releases will be directed towards the operational news which results from direct contact with the enemy. When practicable, ISO's and TIO's will be informed of all significant matters and attend briefings of

UNCLASSIFIED



## CONFIDENTIAL

impending operations, in order that they may intelligently plan their work and coordinate the activities of news correspondents.

- (2) News material will be gathered and forwarded by the fastest available means to the Force CIB, via the chain of command. Timely and accurate reporting is mandatory, especially for operational actions.
- (3) Community relations responsibilities are now a function of the Civil Affairs Officer. At all echelons, coordination in areas of mutual interest is mandatory between Civil Affairs and ISO personnel, in order to establish effective relationship with the local populace.
- (4) Both writers and photographers will be constantly on the alert to obtain photographic coverage and news material which could be utilized for film and narrative releases to the public. Actual combat situations and civic action projects are considered to be the two most important newsworthy subjects.

b. Release of Information

- (1) The responsibility for release of public information rests with COMSEVENTHFLT until troops are landed in the Republic of South Vietnam, at which time the responsibility comes under the cognizance of COMUSMACV.
- (2) By agreement with COMUSMACV, the Commanding General, III MAF has release authority over the information programs of all U. S. Armed Forces elements in the Army of Vietnam I Corps Area. This release authority has been delegated to the Officer in Charge, Combat Information Bureau (CIB) established at III MAF Headquarters.
- (3) The handling, clearance and release of news material by military personnel will be in accordance with reference (c).
- (4) Civilian correspondents will have full access to unclassified areas and activities provided they hold current accreditation by COMUSMACV.

UNCLASSIFIED

- (5) Upon notification by a correspondent that he desires to visit a particular unit or area of operations in the 1st Marine Division, the III MAF CIB will relay the information to the Division ISO the day prior to the visit, if possible. The Division ISO will inform the appropriate commander of the impending visit and the name of the correspondent, the unit or area he desires to visit and the nature of the visit. Commanding Officers will cooperate with and assist newsmen wherever possible. As the tactical situation dictates, escorts may be provided and use of operational communications will be permitted. Briefings by experienced staff officers or the unit commander is considered a desirable means of providing accurate coverage of an operation. It may be necessary, however, to request certain information not be released for publication until completion of an operation.
- (6) The Division ISO will make every effort to avoid having newsmen arrive in a unit's area unannounced or unescorted. Should this occur, the unit should check the correspondent's credentials and report his presence to this Headquarters.

c. Speeches and Public Statements

- (1) The making of speeches does not require prior clearance, except when they pertain to foreign and military policy, new weapons and tactics or matters considered controversial.
- (2) Security of classified information has precedence over public information releases and information made available to news media.

5. MISCELLANEOUS


a. Censorship

- (1) Field press censorship may be established as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense under certain conditions of grave national emergency.
- (2) Commanders may expect a requirement to establish a news censorship program or security program in accordance with reference (f).

## CONFIDENTIAL

- b. Adverse Incidents. Commanding Officers will ensure that the Division ISO is informed of all incidents which might result in unfavorable public reaction. Such incidents may include, but are not limited to, vehicular and aircraft accidents, short rounds, civilian casualties, escape from custody, crimes of a felonious nature and non-battle casualties of a violent nature.
- c. Fleet Home Town News
- (1) Fleet Home Town News releases originating in the Republic of Vietnam are presently more salable than any such material since the end of the war in Korea. Therefore, commanders are encouraged to pursue a vigorous home town news program.
  - (2) All forms will be screened by the originating organization to eliminate careless or undignified entries, and to ensure legibility. All FHTNC releases will be submitted via the Division ISO.
  - (3) Fleet Home Town News forms (NAVEXOS 4365) are available through normal supply channels.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

  
GORDON H. WESTColonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

F-4

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

L/WEB/lve  
Ser: 087-66

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Change One to Administrative Order 301-66

Encl: (1) Annex G (Military Convoy Movement)

1. Purpose. To direct a pen change and transmit Annex G to the basic Order.

2. Action:

a. Make the following pen addition to page 9 under ANNEXES:  
"G - Military Convoy Movement".

b. Insert enclosure (1) to the basic Order.

3. This change is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST  
Chief of Staff

Distribution: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

S & C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

66069021

Copy 2 of 207 copies

UNCLASSIFIED

291-263

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
 010800 April 1966

Annex G (Military Convoy Movement) to Administrative Order 301-66

- Ref: (a) Maps: Indochina and Thailand, Series L 509, Scale 1:250,000 Sheets NE 4811, NE 4812, ND 4816, ND 4818, NE 4913, NE 484, ND 491, ND 495, ND 499, ND 4913, NC 484, NC 485, NC 486, NC 487, NC 488, ND 4810, NC 4815; AMS Series L 509, Scale 1:250,000 and AMS Series L 701, Scale 1:500,000  
 (b) 1st MarDiv OP O 301-66  
 (c) 1st MarDiv O P3000.1D (SOP for Operations)  
 (d) 1st MarDiv O P3040.2A  
 (e) 1st MarDiv O P2000.1D  
 (f) 1st MarDiv O P02000.2B

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. See current ISUM's.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Reference (b).

(2) ARVN Forces provide traffic control assistance at bridge sites, crossings and village/hamlet complexes; provide military assistance in event of enemy attack; provide artillery support.

(3) 1st MAW provides aerial observation aircraft and convoy cover; provides the air support aircraft on Condition THREE ground alert; provides emergency resupply and evacuation aircraft as required.

(4) FLSG-B provides EOD Team.

2. MISSION. 1st Marine Division conducts military convoy movements between designated areas within the 1st Marine Division area of responsibility; conducts visual reconnaissance of highways and surrounding areas enroute to destination; demonstrates capability to use highways and protect military convoys from VC attack.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. Elements of the 1st Marine Division conduct military convoy movements between Chu Lai Combat Base, Republic of Vietnam, and designated areas within the 1st Marine Division area of responsibility. Convoys will consist of 2½ ton, 5 ton or equivalent vehicles with necessary support and control vehicles. Security escort will be provided as well as supporting arms for cover throughout the route to the destination and return. All protective measures will be taken to insure safe arrival of convoys.

G-1

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

b. --- Marines

- (1) On order, assign an infantry unit of appropriate strength and composition as convoy escort. Provide FAC's as required.
- (2) On order, assign an infantry unit as convoy reserve for helicopter-borne movement to convoy location in the event of attack.
- (3) Provide medical personnel with convoy escort.
- (4) Coordinate planning and execution of assigned convoy. Direct liaison with supporting units authorized.

c. 11th Marines

- (1) Provide artillery support.
- (2) Authorized to displace artillery outside the TACR in friendly (ARVN) area to facilitate artillery support as required.
- (3) Provide one Forward Observer Team per convoy.
- (4) Provide liaison personnel with communication equipment to ARVN artillery units supporting operation.

d. ---Motor Transport Battalion

- (1) Provide cab hardened  $2\frac{1}{2}$ /5 ton 6x6 cargo trucks as required.
- (2) Provide one .50 caliber machine gun with ring mount for every five trucks.
- (3) Assign one officer to accompany each convoy.

e. 1st Engineer Battalion

- (1) Provide Engineer Convoy Support Team to each convoy for engineer support.
- (2) Conduct aerial engineer reconnaissance of highways and secondary roads over which convoy will travel from Chu Lai Combat Base to destination prior to departure of each convoy. Report findings to this Headquarters.
- (3) Be prepared to destroy vehicles and equipment to prevent capture.

f. 1st AntiTank Battalion. Provide convoy security as required.g. Convoy Reserve, --- Marines. Convoy reserve be prepared to assume missions as assigned by the convoy commander.h. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Convoys will be conducted on order of this Headquarters. The

UNCLASSIFIED

infantry regiment assigned convoy responsibility will be the coordinating agency for convoy control.

- (2) Instructions on personnel and/or material to be transported, size of convoy and destination will be provided to the coordinating infantry regiment by this Headquarters.
- (3) Check points as indicated in Appendix 1 (Check Points). Convoy locations will be reported on  $\frac{1}{2}$  hour intervals using check points as reference points.
- (4) Reference (c) provides guidance for the conduct of motor transport operations in guerrilla warfare environment; adherence to this reference is mandatory.
- (5) Infantry regiment is responsible for hardening beds of vehicles. Motor Transport Battalion is responsible for hardening cabs of vehicles.
- (6) Destruction of vehicles and equipment will be on authority of this Headquarters except in extreme emergency when the Convoy Commander is authorized to execute destructive measures to prevent capture of vehicles and equipment.
- (7) Direct liaison between participating units is authorized.
- (8) Rules of engagement; reference (b).

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

##### a. Supply Source

- (1) Units draw from normal source of supply, those amounts of Class I, III, IV and V necessary to meet prescribed load.
- (2) Convoy Commander is authorized to draw from FISC-A, those supplies necessary to replenish the prescribed load for a return trip when convoy's destination is Danang.

##### b. Prescribed Load

###### (1) Class I

- (a) Three MCI's with fuel bar per individual.
- (b) Water - two canteens per individual plus  $\frac{1}{2}$  gallon/man in 5 gallon water cans.

###### (2) Class III. Vehicle tanks full; 5 gallon fuel cans mounted on vehicles.

###### (3) Class IV. Sufficient sandbags to properly harden vehicles.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

- (4) Class V. BA per weapon plus 1 DOA of selected items, as prescribed by Convoy Commander, computed at D plus 60 to succession rate.
- c. Service. Maintenance service provided by FLSG-B. Requests will identify specific malfunctions and include pertinent information.
- d. Casualties. Evacuation by most expeditious means to nearest 1st Marine Division medical facility. Casualty reporting in accordance with reference (d).
- e. Personnel Reports. Normal.
- f. Transportation. A driver and assistant driver will be assigned to each vehicle.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICSa. General

- (1) Infantry unit commander will be designated convoy commander and will assume operational control of entire operation.
- (2) An officer from the designated Motor Transport Battalion will be designated the assistant convoy commander. The assistant convoy commander is responsible for advising the convoy commander on the technical operation of the convoy.

b. Communication-Electronics

- (1) Communications in accordance with references (e) and (f) and as prescribed herein.
- (2) Each convoy leaving the 1st Marine Division TACR will maintain communications with this Headquarters on an appropriate Division Tactical Net. This Headquarters guards the following nets continuously:
  - (a) Division Tactical Net #1 authorized when Convoy Commander is equipped with VHF-FM radio equipment capable of maintaining satisfactory communications over the distance and terrain which the convoy is to traverse.
  - (b) Division Tactical Net #2 prescribed when convoy route will exceed the capabilities of VHF-FM radios.
- (3) Internal convoy communications as prescribed by the Convoy Commander. Communications must be adequate to maintain positive control of all elements of the convoy. Convoy Commander's communication equipment and operating personnel to be provided by the infantry regiment providing the Convoy Commander and escort.

G-4

UNCLASSIFIED



- [REDACTED]
- (4) Forward Air Controllers (FAC's) accompanying the convoy will maintain positive communications with the Convoy Commander (VHF-FM Radio) and with escorting helicopters and Combat Air Patrol (CAP) (UHF Radio on an assigned TAD/HD frequency).
  - (5) Forward Observers (FO's) accompanying the convoy will be equipped to maintain communications with the supporting artillery unit(s). Additionally, FO's will maintain communications with the Convoy Commander for coordination of supporting fires.
  - (6) Other attached units (i.e. AT's, Engrs) will maintain communications as prescribed by the Convoy Commander. Liaison Officers, with radio equipment, will be positioned at the Convoy Headquarters as necessary.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS

*Gordon H. West*  
GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:

1 - Check Points

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam  
 010800 April 1966

Appendix 1 (Check Points) to Annex G (Military Convoy Movement) to Administrative Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series

1. Check Points: Chu Lai Combat Base to Quang Ngai Airfield

<u>CP #</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DISTANCE (MILES)</u>	<u>MAP SHEET</u>
1	550019	2.25 (from coordinates 539026)	6756 IV
2	565996	1.75	6756 IV
3	576965	3.0	6756 IV
4	596927	2.75	6756 II
5	623866	4.25	6756 II
6	635802	4.0	6756 II
7	642746	3.5	6756 II
8	614719	3.5	6756 II

2. Check Points: CHU LAI to DANANG

<u>CP #</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DISTANCE (MILES)</u>	<u>MAP SHEET</u>
33	497067	5.0	BT 6757 III
29	430109	5.25	BT 6757 III
32	379175	4.0	BT 6757 IV
25	330209	1.5	BT 6757 IV
22	314224	3.0	BT 6657 I
28	279255	2.5	BT 6657 I
34	259289	3.75	BT 6657 I

G-1-1


UNCLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>GP #</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DISTANCE (MILES)</u>	<u>MAP SHEET</u>
37	231337	2.75	BT 6658 II
35	207377	3.25	BT 6658 II
31	176418	3.0	BT 6658 II
21	145457	4.75	BT 6658 II
27	102512	2.75	BT 6658 II
36	093552	3.5	BT 6658 I
30	055588	2.25	BT 6658 I
29	042621	3.75	AT 6658 IV
26	017675	2.25	AT 6658 IV
23	998707	2.0	AT 6658 IV
10	988720		AT 6659 III

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL FIELDS



GORDON H. WEST

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of StaffDISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-66

R 280200Z  
FM CG FIRST MARINE BRIG  
TO RUMSMP/CG 111 MAF  
INFO RUMSMP/PLC  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/PLSC BRAVO  
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF UNUSUAL TUBE WEAR 155MM GUN M58

1.1. TWO TUBES BELONGING TO GUNS NUMBERED FORTY (40) AND SIXTY (60) OF THE THIRD 155MM GUN BATTERY HAVE EXHIBITED UNUSUAL WEAR.

A. TUBE ON GUN NUMBER 212340, INSTALLED ON FOUR APRIL 1966, HAS FIRED TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY (260) RDS. ON EIGHT-SEVEN APRIL 1966 FULL OVER GAGE READING INDICATES ONLY THIRTY (30) PERCENT LIFE REMAINING.

B. TUBE NUMBER 212340, INSTALLED ON TWENTY-FOUR MARCH

212340, HAS FIRED ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY (160) RDS. ON EIGHT-SEVEN APRIL 1966 FULL OVER GAGE READING INDICATES ONLY THIRTY (30) PERCENT LIFE REMAINING.

C. DURING THE INSPECTION OF THE BATTERY THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS WERE MADE. THE BATTERY HAS BEEN HEAVILY DAMAGED BY A WEAPONS AREA WITH EXCESSIVE WEAR AND CHARACTERISTICS OF A WEAPONS AREA. THE WEAR OF THE TUBE WILL BE MONITORED BY THE BATTERY.

BT  
BT  
BT

CG FIRST MARINE BRIG

200520Z APR 66

DECLASSIFIED

LEAFLET ANNOUNCING BAND CONCERT

Side One

In Hoa An Hamlet, Nguyen Ngoc Chau, the village chief of Ky Xuan, spoke of the very evident improvements brought about by the progress of pacification.

Side Two

In Hoa An Hamlet the people enjoyed the music.

Music for the Villagers

U. S. Marines came to Ky Hoa and Ky Xuan, Saturday, 16 April. Their purpose in coming was to entertain the villagers with music by the Marine Band and to say thank you for the fine cooperation that the villagers have given to the village chiefs and the Popular Forces. The band played some American music and some Vietnamese music too. Everyone enjoyed the day.

DECLASSIFIED