

HEADQUARTERS First Marine Division (Rein), FMF FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

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Commanding General, First Marine Division (Rein), FMF From:

Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A030) To:

Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Via:

First Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-31

December 1966

Ref:

(a) MCO 5750.2 (b) FMFPACO 5750.8

(1) First Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for Encl: 1-31 December 1966

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

VICKERSON

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W. TABS "A"- "G"

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEARS INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

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(Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, lstMarDiv (Rein) ltr 3:HIST:tlc over 5750 Ser: 0016-67 dtd 30 January 1967

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Subj: First Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology

for period 1-31 December 1966

l. Forwarded.

M. C. DALBY

By direction

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HEADQUARTERS
First Marine Division (Rein) TMF
FPC, San Francisco, Calif. 96602

CCHIAND CHRONOLOGY

1 Dec to 31 Dec 1966

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PART I

GEGANIZATIONAL DATA

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DESIGNATION

First Marine Division (Rein)

Margen H. NICKERSON JR.

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Task Force X-Ray
5th Marines (-)

7th Marines(-) (Rein)
lst FAG
Chu Lai Defense Command
lst Engr Bn (-)
lst SP Bn (-)
lst MT Bn (-)

3d Amtrac Bn (-) 7th Comm Bn (-) lst Hospital Co Headquarters En lst Marines (Rein) llth Marines (-) (Rein) 2d Bn, 5th Marines 9th Marines (-) (Rein)* 4th Bn (Rein), 503d Abn Inf, 173d Bde, USA (To opcon 173d Bde, USA 4 Dec 1966)* lst Recon Bn (-) (Rein) lst AT Bn (-) lst Med En (-) lst Tank Bn 3d Tank Bn (-)*
3d AT Bn (-)*
3d MT Bn (-) (Rein)* 7th MT Bn (-) (Rein)
1st Amtrac Bn (-) (Rein)* 3d Dental Co (-) (Rein)* lst MP Bn 7th Engr Bn \$ 9th Engr Bn

Det, Hq Bn, 3d MarDiv*

BGen W. A. STILES BGen C. F. WIDDECKE (To 26 Dec 66) Col F. E. HAYNES (Fr 27 Dec 66) Col L. F. SNODDY JR. LtCol J. B. STRIBLING Col W. W. CURTIS Maj C. O. NEWTON LtCol E. H. JONES LtCol R. E. JOHNSON (To 4 Dec 66) Maj J. T. ELKINS (Fr 5 Dec 66) Maj J. D. ROWLEY LtCol W. M. CLELLAND Cdr F. M. ROBERTS USN Col W. A. LEITNER Col D. L. MALLORY Col G. E. NORRIS LtCol W. C. AIRHEART Col R. M. RICHARDS LtCol D. M. HEALY, USA

LtCol D. N. McKEON
Maj J. J. KEEFE
Cmdr R. H. MITCHELL, USN
LtCol J. W. CLAYBORNE
LtCol W. R. CORSON
Maj C. R. STIFFLER
Maj R. F. ARMSTRONG
Maj S. H. BATCHELDER JR.
Maj W. W. DAMEWOOD
Capt L. H. CORDONIER USN
LtCol P. G. STAVRIDIS
LtCol F. W. HARRIS III
LtCol R. W. CRISPEN
Col G. C. SCHMIDT, JR.

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ATTACHED UNITS (cont.)

Det, 3d Engr Bn*
Det, 3d SP Bn*

- * OPCON ONLY \$ ADCON ONLY
- 2. LOCATION

1-31 December: Danang, RVN

3. Staff Officers

Division Commander Assistant Division Commander Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray Chief of Staff Deputy Chief of Staff Staff Secretary Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 Assistant Chief of Staff, Compt Adjutant Air Officer Artillery Officer Band Officer Chaplain Comm-Electronic's Officer Dental Officer Division Clubs Officer Division Exchange Officer Embarkation Officer Engineer Officer Field Historian

Food Services Officer Informational Services Officer Inspector

Legal Officer Motor Transport Officer Naval Gunfire Officer

Ordnance Officer
Photographic Officer
Postal Officer
Provost Marshal
Reproduction Officer
Special Services Officer

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Maj J. A. SHEARMAN, JR. Maj R. L. SCRUGGS

MajGen H. NICKERSON, JR. BGen W. A. STILES BGen W. A. STILES Col S. J. ALTMAN Col F. E. HAYNES, JR. 270ct-25Dec66 Capt H. S. HAUPT Col C. C. CROSSFIELD II Col J. J. O'DONNELL Col H. POGGEMEYER, JR. Col E. L. BALE, JR. Col W. MOORE LtCol J. E. DAUSMAN LtCol E. R. SCHIFFMAN Col F. C. LANG Col G. E. NORRIS CWO F. E. BARTHOLD Capt D. J. CASAZZA, USN Col E. P. CLAUDE Capt P. C. CONGLIS, USN Maj J. H. GEMSKE Maj A. T. FISHER Maj R. L. EFTER LtCol G. A. MERRILL LtCol R. H. USKURAIT (To 4Dec66) Maj H. T. KENNEDY (Fr 5Dec66) Capt V. E. COX Maj G. HUBBARD Col S. DAVIS (To 19Dec66) Col A. L. EMILS (Fr 20Dec66) LtCol T. P. CASEÝ LtCol K. M. BUSS LtCmdr W. S. RILEY (To 15Dec66) LtCmdr R. A. WHITCOMB (Fr 16Dec66) LtCol W. J. DINSE WO H. L. HUNTLEY

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2dLt W. NEW

2dLt D. MARLAND

Maj J. E. FORDE

LtCol J. J. ROOTHOFF

2



Supply Officer
Surgeon
Tank Officer

Col P. J. DUPRE Capt J. J. MCGREEVY, USW LtCol J. W. CLAYBORNE

4. Average Monthly Strength

 USMC
 USM


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 1198
 23,274
 144
 1,212

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Replacement and Rotation of Personnel

a. Total of Marine Replacements received and Marines rotated during December 1966 were:

Replacements:

Officer 72 Enlisted 2848

Rotation:

Officer 41 Enlisted 619

b. There were 5 officers and 181 enlisted personnel medically evacuated. Forty-five enlisted personnel who were previously evacuated were returned to duty. Twenty-seven personnel departed on emergency leave/permanent change of station orders.


- c. A total of 4 officers and 920 enlisted personnel extended their overseas tour in RVN in conjunction with the 30 day free leave policy. 3 officers and 493 enlisted departed on 30 day leave during the period 4-23 December 1966.
- 2. <u>Casualty and Graves Registration</u>. The below casualties were sustained by units ADCON to the 1st Marine Division during December 1966.

,	KIA	WIA	WOŒ**	MIA	CPTR	OTHER		BATTLE	**TOTAL
USMC						}	DEATH	INJURED	,,
OFF		18					ä	4)	16
enl USN	68	478	5				3	30	579
OFF									
ENL	2	26						2	30
TOTAL	70	522 ·	5				3	32	627

* Injuries which result in absence from duty for more than 24 hours.

** DOW figures included in WIA totals and not in vertical total.

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ine, Law and Order. The following oriminal investigations reported. Thirty-one cases are presently under investigation:

Offense Larceny of Government Property Larceny of Private Property Homicide Narcetics Unlawful Discharge of Explosives Blackmarket Assault	Number 6 10 3 5 3 14 14
Total	55

Seventeen traffic violations were reported for the month of December 1966.

Two hundred forty offense reports were issued to violators as follows:

Number
2
46
110
3 0
21
5
2
24
240

4. Morale and Personal Services

a. Chaplain. At the end of December the on board strength of Chaplains assigned to the 1st Marine Division was as follows:

Number	<u>Denomination</u>
17	Protestant
- '	Catholic
i	Eastern Orthodox

Total 25

In addition to the above 4 Protestant and 2 Catholic Chaplains were under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division. Their parent command being the 3rd Marine Division.

The following Services were conducted during the Month:

Service Catholic Protestant Memorial Protestant Lay Leader	Number 337 317 17	Number Attending 8,655 7,067 876
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Division Clubs. The gross income during December was \$138,028.90.

Three officers, nine Staff NCO's and ten enlisted personnel eperated the four clubs and eighteen battalion accounts. Eleven additional clubs

- c. Exchange System. Gross sales during the month of December were \$530,904.61. Three officers and sixty-three enlisted personnel operated fifteen stores within the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's.
- d. Division Band. The Division Band performed at seven military formations. In addition five military concerts were presented and the Band performed at one civic action function.
- e. Informational Services. During December the Informational Services Section produced 164 news releases, 2,225 Fleet Home Town News Center releases, 17 hometown radio tapes and 9 taped radio features.

Writer - Photographer teams covered the following named operations:

Mississippi Sierra

Glenn Sutter Cortes

County Fair 3rd Tank-1

Trinidad

In addition, teams covered all county fair operations, a rough rider, and several company sized operations. Despite a low kill count on Operation Mississippi, the Marine Corps garnered extensive coverage with the exodus of several thousand refugees. Four writer-photographer teams were assigned to the operation.

Writer-photographer teams were active in civic action projects providing coverage to two Elders Day Festivals, several county fair operations and Christmas parties for Vietnamese. Two of the events received extensive media interest. The First Elders Day Festival in the hamlet of Hoa My and the party in Tich Tay hamlet sponsored by the 1st Tank Battalion. The Tank Battalion Party was dubbed Operation Keyerstown by citizens of Waukegan, Illinois who gathered gifts for the party held 22 December at Chu Lai. The Keyerstown Party was photographed, filmed and recorded for media in the Midwest.

The Division was visited by correspondents 126 times during the month. The most notable visitors being Mr. John Steinbeck, well known author, and Mr. William Randolph Hearst, Jr. The majority of the correspondents visited combined action companies and the land mine warfare and booby trap school.

f. Postal

(1) The following figures represent pounds of U. S. Mail this command has received and dispatched during December 1966:

Total Received

957,009

Total Dispatched 332,317

Total Handled

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(2) The following figures represent financial business transacted becember 1966:

Stamps, postage and insurance sales \$27,959.10

- g. Career Advisory. The following statistics represent reenlistment and extension of enlistment percentages for the month of December 1966:
 - (1) Reenlistment Percentages
 - a. First term 18.2%
 - 84.6% Career
 - *c. Total 32.3%
 - (2) Extensions of enlistment executed
 - Career
 - Short term 15
 - Total 21
- * Includes 54 Sgt's and above who were returned to CONUS in accordance with paragraph 4110, Marine Corps Personnel Manual.
- h. Special Services. Personnel of the Division were entertained during the month of December by the appearance of the following shows and/or well known personalities:
 - 23Dec66 Vietnamese Cultural Show
 - 24Dec66 Chris Noel
 - 25Dec66 Bob Hope Show
 - 26Dec66 Australian Show
- i. <u>Distinguished Visitors</u>. Distinguished persons who visited the command during December and the purpose of their visits are listed in Part III.



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ENEMY, WEATHER AND TERRAIN

Over the past month, there have been increasing indications of a re-emphasis of guerrilla and local force activity on the part of the enemy. The lack of contact with main forces and the continuing reports of personnel and logistic shortages are worthy of note. Also to be noted is the increase in activity on the part of the provisional mobile battalions. For instance, in what was nearly a running engagement between the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines and what is believed to have been the R.20 Battalion, the latter expended, according to reports, at least 15,000 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire and 80 rounds of 60/ 81mm mortar fire in five engagements. Such a quantity of fire and the resistance encountered by Marine units in these contacts indicates a logistic capability and a willingness to engage not previously characteristic of provincial mobile battalions. It would appear that the enemy has shifted emphasis from a policy of building up the main force 2d Division in the hope of gaining a quick military victory to a policy of bolstering guerrilla and local forces to conduct protracted guerrilla warfare possibly in the hope of an ultimate political accommodation.

2. WEATHER AND TERRAIN

- a. General. The weather for the month within the tri-province area was generally cloudy with rain and/or scattered showers. The average maximum and minimum temperatures ranged from 79 degrees to 72 degrees respectively, while humidity averaged a mild 85 percent. Visibility averaged 6 miles. Precipitation for the month was 22.62 inches. Winds were from a northerly direction with a velocity of 8-13 knots and gusting to 20.
- b. Effects of the Weather. For the early part of the month, there was little or no effect from the weather on ground and air operations as the days remained partly cloudy with only slight scattered showers. However, this condition deteriorated during the last 10 days of the month when approximately 16 inches of rain fell resulting in reduced activity. Air activity was also limited due to the low cloud cover caused by the "crachin" phenomenon which is characterized by low cloud cover with scattered rain showers often lasting from 2-5 days.
- c. Effect of the Weather on the Terrain. During the past month, weather had little or no effect on the terrain, although during the latter part of the month, the majority of the main roads and rice paddies were semi-inundated. This condition did not remain long enough to hamper travel, however, because of the small amount of rainfall during the early part of the reporting period.

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INTELLIGENCE SECTION ACTIVITY

- 1. GENERAL. During the period the G-2 Section continued its assigned function of collecting, processing and disseminating intelligence to the Commanding General, his staff, and the subordinate units.
- 2. ACQUISITION AND PRODUCTION UNIT. Requests were initiated for the procurement of photo coverage to support the Division's Operation Plan 311-66. A program was initiated to determine the areas of intelligence coverage. This highlighted certain gaps and steps were taken to cover these areas. An Intelligence Library Index File was established in December and, although new, it has already proven its value in giving quick reference on such subjects as last known locations of enemy units, and what units are operating in certain areas, etc.
- 3. PHOTO IMAGERY INTERPRETATION UNIT. A total of nine (9) missions were requested during the month with six (6) received. Bad weather plagued the photographic effort and twenty-six (26) missions for the Division are currently pending.
- 4. AIR OBSERVATION UNIT. During December 183 sorties were flown for a total of 341.9 hours. Sixteen (16) photo, thirty-one (31) artillery, and ninety-four (94) CAS/TAC(A) were conducted in conjunction with normal VR flights.
- 5. 3d ITT. A total of 407 detainees were interrogated at the III MAF Gollection Point during the month. Of these, 155 had Viet Cong association.
- 6. <u>CCUNTERINFELLIGENCE</u>. The Staff Counterintelligence Unit was provided support by the 3d CIT. A total of fourteen (14) investigations of various categories were completed with nineteen (19) more still pending.





OFGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

The major change in organization during December occurred with the departure of the 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry to rejoin its parent unit. This departure resulted in a shift of infantry battalions and a series of phased reliefs with the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines relieving the 4th Battalion, 503d and the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines relieving the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. Upon completion of the moves, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines was placed under the operational control of the Division.

2. Division units concluded eight major operations during the month of December. The operations and their controlling headquarters are as follows:


OPERATION	CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS
Sutter	lst Bn, 5th Marines
Trinidad I & II	lst Bn, 1st Marines
Nississi ppi	9th Marines
Cortez	3d Bn, 5th Marines
Sterling	3d Bn, 9th Marines
Glenn	3d Bn, 9th Merines
Shasta II	lst Bn, 1st Marines

These operations, coupled with the increase of small unit activities within the TAORs, continued to keep the VC off balance and inflicted severe casualties upon his ranks. During the month the enemy suffered a total of 305 KIA, 312 KIA (Prob), 43 WIA, 91 WIA (Prob), 126 VCC, 557 VCS, and 13 Relliers. In addition, numerous items of equipment and supplies were captured including 45 weapons and 103 hand grenades. Of significance was the estimated 45 tons of rice captured by the 2d Bn, 5th Marines during Operation MISSISSIPTI.

Development Program by conducting five County Fairs in the DA NANG TACR. The 1st Marines conducted County Fairs 1-26 and 1-27, and the 3d Tank Battalion, 2d Bn, 5th Marines, and the 9th Marines conducted one each. These operations screened an estimated 6000 Vietnamese civilians, medically treated 1128, provided dental treatment to 117 and distributed several tons of food. During the screening operations, nine VC were identified, 143 Vietnamese were detained for further investigation, and three VC were killed. Although complete results will not be known for some time, these operations have been very successful in restoring the




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authority of the government of RVN and destroying the infrastructure of the VC cadre within the hamlets. Of particular value was the employment of a KIT CARSON Scout during County Fair 3 TK-1. His series of personal speeches gained an immediate response, and on several occassions he received applause from the people. In addition, he ventured into the VCC/VCS compound and spoke to them on various GVN themes. A definite response was observed by the facial expressions of some of the individuals. Attention seemed to follow the KIT CARSON Scout wherever he went, including an apparent interest generated among the ARVN troops who participated in the operation.





PLANS

In December of 1966 the First Marine Division published four new operation plans. Operation Plan 303-66 was published to provide a contingency plan for the relief or reinforcement of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps within the First Marine Division area of responsibility. Operation Plans 316-66 and 317-66 were developed to provide the necessary planning for the introduction of all or portions of the U.S. Army 9th Infantry Division into the CHU LAI TAOR and the subsequent relief of U.S. Marine Corps units. In addition, Operation Plan 318-66 was published to provide for the possible introduction of ROK Army units into the CHU LAI TAOR as a relief for U.S. Marine units.



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TRAINING HIGHLIGHTS

- 1. Formal schools during the month of December provided training for 110 personnel of the division. As the monsoon season exerted increasing influence on mobility and communications, difficulty was experienced in timely delivery of orders to personnel and travel of personnel to attend the formal schools.
- 2. A training conference was conducted at CHU LAI and another was scheduled for DA NANG on 8 Jan 1967. Training officers and noncommissioned officers of regiments and separate battalions attended. The purpose of the conference was to improve coordination of training throughout the division and to use training resources more effectively.
- 3. The 1st Marine Division assumed administrative control of 1st Military Police Battalion and 7th Engineer Battalion and, for the remainder of the 2d Quarter, issued TAD orders for these units based upon quota allocations made by the 3rd Marine Division.
- 4. Contact Instruction Teams conducted instruction on communications equipment, tracked and wheeled vehicle waterproofing, and operations of the five ton wrecker. This instruction was held for 1st Marine Division units in early December, and the comments and evaluation of the instruction were submitted to III MAF.
- 5. Technical Inspections of Regimental and Battalion S-3 Training Sections were concluded during the month. A few discrepancies, resulting primarily from lack of training facilities in the field, were noted and recommendations have been made to overcome them. Overall results were considered satisfactory.
- 6. Requests for 696 school quotes were submitted for in-country and Okinawa based schools being conducted during 3d Quarter FY67. By the end of the month 313 quotes to eleven schools had been approved with an estimated 272 quotes to six schools yet to be approved.
- 7. Scout Sniper indoctrination training for thirty students was completed on 12 December 1966. Included in this training were personnel from all regiments and the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion. The Remington M700 and telescopic sights have not been received as expected, however, the Division Scout Sniper Instruction Team is prepared to conduct ten days of detailed instruction upon the arrival of the equipment. Match ammunition, both 7.62mm and .30-06, has been received to support the platoons when they are formed and trained.
- 8. Twenty-five XM6El rifles were issued along with training ammunition to each infantry battalion and the lst Reconnaissance Battalion for familiarization training. The instructional cadres of each unit have begun orientation training of all personnel. The full transition is dependent upon the arrivel of weapons and ammunition; currently, the target date is March 1967.








- 9. Twenty-five Manpack PersonnelDetectors are on hand for an evaluation period of approximately ninety days. Six battalions are participating, with each battalion receiving four detectors for evaluation. An instruction contact team was formed and has commenced training operations in each battalion. Maintenance problems have occurred during the initial instruction, indicating possible problems in the future.
- 10. Evaluation of the Starlight Scope was completed and the final report submitted to III MAF on 25 December 1966. It was found to be an excellent device and was highly recommended for use in Vietnam.
- 11. The Stoner 63A Weapons system field evaluation program was organized and the following units were selected to participate:
 - a. Co L, 3d Bn, 1st Marines
 - b. 1st Plat, Co B, 1st Recon En
 - c. 3d Plat, 1st Force Recon Co
- 12. The Land Mine, Demolition and Boobytrap School syllabus has been changed to a three day course to meet with III MAF standards and criteria. In order to meet the personnel training goals set by III MAF, schools have been established at both DA NANG and CHU LAI.
- 13. In order to improve tank gunnery, all tank units under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division were directed to conduct tank gunnery training culminating in live firing. This training commenced on 15 December and will end in February.









Combined Action Company (CAC) Program

- 1. Four new CAC platoons were activated in the DA NANG TAOR for a total of eighteen, and four in the CHU LAI TAOR for a total of fourteen. Currently 353 Marines, 20 Navy personnel and approximately 811 Popular Forces personnel participate in the program.
- 2. Two Sub-Units of Headquarters Battalion, Sub-Unit #1 at DA NANG and Sub-Unit #2 at CHU LAI, were assigned the responsibility to exercise administrative control of Marine and Navy personnel assigned to the 1st Marine Division CAC program, all of whom will be transferred to these Sub-Units.
- 3. Combined Action patrols and ambushes were conducted on a regular basis by all units for a total of 906 patrols and 689 ambushes conducted during the month in the two TAORs.
- 4. Enemy casualties from CAC contacts for the month were 21 KIA, 16 KIA (P), 7 WIA, 2 VCC and 30 VCS apprehended. Friendly casualties in these actions were 3 USMC KIA, 5 USMC WIA, 1 USN KIA, 1 USN WIA, 7 PF KIA, and 9 PF WIA.
- 5. Training was conducted on a regular basis, with the overall CAC program showing a marked increase in the hours of training accomplished and in attendance of PF's at training periods. Training of the PF element of CAC platoons is adjusted to the particular needs and requirements of the individual unit.
- 6. Recognition of the increasing value and potential of this program has resulted in plans for a continuing increase in CAC platoons in both the DA NANG and CHU LAI TAORs. The accomplishment of reorganization goals and the activation of CAC Sub-Units in Headquarters Battalion should lend a stability to this program which will result in its continued growth and improvement.
- 7. Division Order 049001A was published to provide instructions for the conduct of the Division Combined Action Company Program.



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


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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY

- 1. The major logistic activity during this reporting period was directed toward the support of combat operations and the introduction of the 11th Motor Transport Battalion and the 1st Armored Amphibian Company into the Republic of Vietnam.
- 2. The Division Embarkation Officer conducted Embarkation Readiness Inspections on seven units; the Division Supply Inspection/Instruction Team visited three units; and the Division Ordnance Officer conducted technical inspections of two units during this reporting period. Additionally, the Division Surgeon, Engineer Officer, Motor Transport Officer and Food Services Officer conducted informal staff visits and inspections.
- 3. Quantities of 60mm Illumination and White Phosphorous ammunition became available for issue during December. These cartridges now give the Infantry Company Commander greater selectivity of ammunition for use in his organic 60mm mortars. Heretofore, only the 60mm High Explosive cartridge was available.
- 4. Throughout the month, Division Embarkation coordinated the airlift of 96.4 short tons of 105mm ammunition from Chu Lai to Tien Phouc. The air movement of 25,600 pounds of supplies for Battery E, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines from Danang to An Hoa was also coordinated.
- 5. The 1st Motor Transport Battalion conducted eight tactical convoys outside the Chu Lai TAOR, and the 7th Motor Transport Battalion conducted four tactical convoys outside the TAOR.
- 6. The receipt of 451 General Purpose Tents during this reporting period helped alleviate a critical shortage of tentage assets. Serviceable General Purpose Tents still remain in short supply, however.
- 7. As of 18 December 1966, the following FY 67 R&E equipment has been received by this Division:

Nine M48A3 Gun Tanks
One M53 155mm Gun (SP)
One M55 8" Howitzer (SP)
Two M109 155mm Howitzer (SP)
One LVTR1
Three LVTP5 (Command)







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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION PART II

1. Narrative Summary for the period 1-31 December 1966.

The initial meeting of the Provincial Joint Coordinating Council for Quang Tin Province was conducted at Tam Ky. The meeting was attended by the Chief of Staff and Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 of Task Force X-Ray, the Province Chief, District Chiefs, Provincial Government Officials, Sector Advisor and Representatives of U. S. Civilian Agencies. The meeting covered two main themes: Mission of the Council and Provincial Revolutionary Development achievements for 1966 and plans for 1967.

The first Elders Day Festival sponsored by the 1st Marine Division was conducted. It was hosted jointly by Headquarters Battalion and the 6th AA Platoon, 29th C.A. Company attached to the division. The festival was held at Hoa Minh Village for the people of Hoa My Hamlet. Guest speakers included the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battalion, Hoa Vang District Chief and a Chieu Hoi Rallier. The festival was well received and it is intended to continue these functions throughout the Division TAOR. Operation MISSISSIPPI conducted during the period 29 Nov - 7 Dec generated 2216 refugees. The Assistant G-5 coordinated the efforts of GVN and U. S. agencies to provide for evacuation and temporary care for the refugees pending resettlement.

The Assistant Chief of Staff (-5 conducted a conference with Civic Action Officers in the Danang TAOR. The primary topic of discussion was the necessity for thorough, accurate and timely reporting of contacts with local government officials and other persons commanding respect.

A Flying Tigers Airliner crashed in Binh Thai Hamlet, Hoa Tho Village, Hoa Vang District causing the death of 116 Vietnamese civilians and 4 U.S. civilian crewmen of the airliner; injury to 27 Vietnamese civilians; destruction of 37 houses; damage to 14 houses and a pagoda. Evacuation of the dead and injured and clearing of the area has been completed and was coordinated by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5. Reconstruction and repair is being planned.


Christmas parties were conducted by units of the division primarily for Christian children. Parties were conducted in coordination with local officials in each case. The largest single affair was conducted by the 1st Tank Bn in Tich Tay Hamlet in the Chu Lai TAOR. 1181 pounds of gifts donated by citizens of Waukegan, Illinois were donated. The project was designated "Operation Keysertown" in honor of the 1st Tank Bn Civic Action NCO, SSgt. William F. Keyser, who arranged for receipt of the gifts and affected coordination with local Vietnamese officials to make the affair a success. The affair received extensive news coverage by various U.S. news media representatives.

VIP visits to the G-5 Section included: Ambassador LODGE; Ambassador KOREN; Congresswoman Mrs. John THOMAS; Congressman Mr. J. O. MARSH; Mr. John E. DAVIS, National Commander American Legion; Lieutenant General CHAPMAN; Leutenant General CHAPMAN; Colonel Jose A. MEDRANO El Salver CIASSIFIE



UNCLASSIFIED Receptulation of assistance rendered (Chu Lai & Danang 1-31 December).

SakVICas: Medical treatments (cases)	35,548
Immunizations (Plague & Cholera)	500
Medical evacuations (cases)	72
Dental treatments (cases)	1,129
Vocational training (students)	28
english Language Training (student hrs.)	345
COMMODICIES:	
Food (lbs)	33, 662
Animal feed, garbage (lbs)	11,600
Toothbrushes	307
Soap (bars)	7,215
Clotning (lbs)	688
Cement (bags)	40
Lumber/Dunnage (truck loads)	11
Carpenter kits	1. 1
Paint (gal)	11
Vitamins (each)	508
Sewing kits	63
School kits	250
Shower shoes (pr)	60
Blankets, paper	480
Blankets, wool	79
Bulletin boards (constructed)	2
Mog shelter, built	1
Toys	10,120





NOFORM

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PART II

1. Marrative Summary for the period 1-31 December 1966, London

Psychological Operations Exploitation Team (POET): This team continued to prove its value. They again enabled us to take advantage of exploitable situations, i.e., Ralliers, VC terrorist acts, and Civic Action efforts. Leaflets, tapes, and posters were quickly produced and distributed in the areas the incidents occurred.

Kit Carson Scout Program (KCS): These scouts have really proven their worth and have drawn interest in the Highest Command levels during December. The results attributed directly to the efforts of the KCS this period are as follows: VCS - 7; VCC - 14(includes the 7 VCS later confirmed); VC - KTA 5 (confirmed); mines - 5 (not including a mine field 20x60 meters, unable to be accurately counted); loudspeaker broadcasts - 3; an intangible result but extremely noteworthy was the fact that on one occasion a KCS on patrol with a Company from 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, alerted the CO he was about to be ambushed. The company deployed and was almost immediately taken under fire from a thick hedgerow ahead. The KCS had noted clippings missing from the tree tops and realized that they were being used as camouflage by the VC. No one in the Company had noted this, and the outcome might have been different had not the KCS been so alert. There are seventeen (17) KCS employed with the 1st Marine Division now, and more are being sought, hopefully to reach a total of fifty (50) by April 1967.

Leaflets, Posters, Newspapers: Our efforts to distibute this material have been successful and the rate and numbers distributed have not been greatly effected by the monsoon as was expected. Rewards for information about VC activities, mines, and booby traps were emphasized during December.

Chieu Hoi Program: Cur continuous concentrated Psy Ops effort to produce defectors has started to show some results. Fifteen (15) Hoi Chanh (Ralliers) turned in to 1st Marine Division units during December.



Pledge of Allegiance Cards: To broaden the limited scope of unity and loyalty now focused primarly on and within the Vietnamese family, Major General NICKERSON the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, has launched a drive to unite all the people regardless of their religious, political or cultural views to support their new government.

Pledge of allegiance cards were produced and are distributed at all dedication ceremonies in which 1st Marine Division units participate. The ceremonies are opened by having the entire assembly stand, place their right hand over their hearts, and recite from the printed cards.

CAM_KET TRUNG-THANH

TOI CAM KET TRUNC THANH VOI LA CO VIÊT VA GIV VUNG CHÊ-BO DÂN-CHU, MÔT QUOU-BOAN-KÊT, VÕI TU-DO VA CÔNG BANG, CHO TAT CA.

KHI KÉO CÓ, DÓ NÓN RA, ĐỂ TAY MẶT LÊN. NGỰC VÃ ĐỘC LỚI CAM-KẾT TRUNG-THẦNH.

TRANSLATION

FRONT

I pledge allegiance to the flag of the Republic of Vietnam and to the democracy for which it stands, one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for alle

BACK

When the flag is being raised, take off your hat, put your right hand on your chest and read the pledge of allegiance.







COMPTROLLER FUNCTIONS

Comptroller functions for the month of December continued without any items considered significant enough for comment.







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COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS COMMAND CHRONOLOGY DECEMBER 1966

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Communication operational highlights during December 1966 included activation of additional multichannel voice and teletype circuits, expansion of the Division Danang cable plant, and increase in the employment of the KY-8 secure voice equipment. The first quarter cyclic communication inspection program was completed and test and evaluation were conducted for squad radios AN/PRT-4 and AN/PRR-9 as well as for vehicular mounting kits for radio sets AN/PRC-41 and AN/PRC-47. To overcome operator and technician deficiencies on the teletypewriter set AN/TRC-14A, a one hour course was conducted at each battalion and regimental headquarters. Instruction assistance was provided by the MITE Corporation Technical Representative assigned to the Force Logistics Command. Communication support was provided Senator Stuart SYMINGTON (Dem-MS) Member, Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee, during his visit to 1st Marine Division TAOR. Also during December, the Division CEO attended the CG FMFPAC Communication-Electronics Conference at Camp Smith, Hawaii.





Latin Caradan

PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The following distinguished visitors visited the command during December

DATE	NA E	BILLER	REASON
lDec	Ambs Henry Cabot LODGE		Toured lstMerDiv
6Dec	Mr. John E. DAVIS	NatCmdrAmerLeg	Toured lstMarDiv
7Dec	Sen Strom THURMOND		Toured lstMarDiv
9Dec	LtGen L. F. CHAPMAN	Asst Commandant MGen R. R. MURRAY, AC/S, G-3 HQMC	Toured 1stMarDiv
10Dec	Sen(E) E. F. HOLLINGS		Toured lstMarDiv
13Dec	Col J. A. MEDRANO	Cmdr PresMilStaff	Toured lstMarDiv
14Dec	Amb KOREN	DepAmerAmb to RVN LtGen WALT	Visited AnMy(3) and CAC B2-1
16Dec	LtGen CHAE MYUNG SHIN	CG, ROKFVN	Toured/lunch lstMarDiv
17Dec	Mr. J. W. UNGER	NatCmdr DAV	Toured lstMarDiv
19Dec	BGen G. S. BLANCHARD	USA, ADC, LstCal(Air)	Toured/lunch lstMarDiv
20Dec	LtGen L. W. WALT	CG, III MAF	Toured 1st&9th Marines
24Dec	RAdm J. W. KELLY	CHC, USN	Dedicated new 1st Marine Division chapel
	LtGen Nguyen Huu CO	ARVN, Minister of Def	Visited 3dMedBn
25Dec	Dr. Billy GRAHAM		Preached at III MAF Amp
26Dec	Mrs. Albert THOMAS Francis Cardinal SPELLMAN	(DTex) Archbishop, Military Ordinariate	Toured lstMarDiv Special Christmas Mass III MAF Amp
27 D ec	BGen R. G. OWENS, JR. Mr. J. O. MARSH, JR.	AWC, 1stMAW Member House AppropCom	Toured lstMarDiv Toured lstMarDiv Civic
	Sen STUART SYMINGTON	Member, Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee	Action Projects Toured lstMarDiv
28Dec	Mr. Bob HOPE		Presented annual Christ- mas Show at the III MAF

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DATE 30Dec

BILLET

REASON

Dr. Clark KERR LtGen V. H. KRULAK

NAME

Pres, U of C, Berkeley CG, FMFPAC

Toured/lunch lstMarDiv Toured 3d Tank Bn







ENEMY ACTIVITY

8 December: During the night, 2 VC companies attacked the Ba-Ren Bridge (BT 102510) with 10 rounds of 60mm mortars. The VC force was dispersed with negative friendly casualties and with slight damage to the bridge. (Tab B, Part I, PERIMHER #16).

C December: During the morning an estimated 2 VC platoons attacked one platoon of the 606th Regional Forces (RF) Company (AT 927-867), who were guarding the bridge. The two VC platoons were dispersed with unknown number of casualties. (Tab B, Part I, FERRITREP #16).

17 December: G/2/5 between 0810H and 1100H at (AT 947536) received 24 rounds small arms fire from an estimated 4-5 VC. an AO/OE overhead reported sighting 5 fighting-holes and 1 men dressed in black PJ's running away. Company G then marked the area and called for an air strike. While waiting for the air strike, Company G received 40 additional rounds of small arms fire and 2 rounds of 60mm mortar. Subsequently the enemy fired 2,000 rounds of small arms, 10 rounds of 60mm mortar and about 100 rounds of .50 caliber from the north resulting in 1 USMC KIA and 3 WIA. Company G then swept the area finding a trench line, fighting holes and nortar positions. It was estimated these fortifications were built for a company size unit. Total VC losses were 3 VC KIA confirmed, 17 VC KIA probable. (Tab B, Part II, PERINTREP #17).

19 December:

At 1330H, E/2/5 at (AT 955545) received 1,000 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire and 10 rounds of RPG rockets fire from an estimated VC reinforced company resulting in 4 Marine casualties. Company E returned 500 rounds of small arms, 2 M-79 rounds, 6 LAAWS, 1,000 rounds automatic weapons and assaulted 75 meters through a rice paddy, treeline and bunker positions and overran the VC position. Enemy losses were 5 VC KIA confirmed, 15 WIA probable, 1 rocket launcher with 3 rounds, 1 BaR, 1 AK-47, 1 ChiCom K-44, 7 grenades, 4 packs and 15 pounds of documents. The VC were wearing comouflaged uniforms and helmets. (Tab B, Part II, PERINTREP #17).

G/2/5 on the evening of 191815H at (AT 972518) received 1,000 rounds automatic weapons/small arms fire from an estimated company size VC unit resulting in 1 USMC KIA and 5 WIA (3 evacuated). Company G returned 3,000 rounds small arms/ automatic weapons, 20 1-79's, 8 LAAWS, 5 3.5" rockets and 20 grenades and closed with the enemy. The VC withdrew to the east. The initial heavy contact ended at 1910H but Marines continued to receive sporadic fire. About 2020H, as resupply and medical evacuation helicopters were in the area, the enemy







fired 200 rounds of small arms and 8 rounds of 82nm mortar from the north. Fixed wing aircraft conducted an air strike on the suspected mortar position with unknown results. (Tab B. Part II. PERINTREF #17).

20 December: E/2/5 on 1555H at (AT 976531) received 3000-4000 rounds small arms/automatic weapons fire from an estimated 2 VC companies to their north and southeast. Company E returned 6000 rounds small arms/automatic weapons fire, 20 3.5 rockets, 40 LAAWS, 20 60mm mortar and 40 grenades. They were unable to assault due to heavy volume of fire. Company G moved from the west to link up with Company E at 1615H. Both units continued to receive heavy small arms/automatic weapons fire. Company F crossed the river and moved north to join Companies G & E. At 1625H, Company F received heavy fire (AT 983527) but continued to advance north against resistance. An air strike was called by Company G. The volume of enemy fire began to slack off at 1720H and medical evacuation for Company F was able to get in and out at 1830. Medical evacuation and resupply lifts for the other companies were held off by heavy fire at the landing zone. A link up of all companies was finally effected at 1925H. A flare ship provided illumination while the units consolidated their positions. They continued to receive sporadic small arms fire but due to darkness and the tactical situation, could make no assessment of enemy casualties. Friendly casualties were 3 USMC KIA, 16 WIA (evacuated). (Tab B, Part II, PERINTREP #17).

21 December:

AT 1130H, a C/1/1 platoon combat patrol engaged a VC unit, reportedly 2 squads totalling 20 men from the Q-15B Company. These squads had just ambushed a PF unit to the southwest and were fleeing when cut off by the C/1/1 platoon (BT 062-588). C/1/1 took the VC under fire with small arms and M-79's resulting in the killing of 14 VC confirmed and 2 VCC (one captured by USMC, the other by ARVN). They also captured 10 individual weapons. There were no Marine casualties. (Tab B. Part II. PERINTREP #17).

24 December: At 1445H to 241925H, E/2/5 had 2 separate contacts with VC in an estimated battalion size (350-400 men). Elements of Company G at (AT 955547) received 2500 rounds small arms/ automatic weapons fire and 20 rounds 82mm mortar fire from (AT 963541) resulting in 2 USMC KIA and 7 WIA (evacuated). The unit in contact returned 4500 rounds small arms fire and directed a fire mission of 79 rounds 155mm on the VC positions. Nearby elements of Company G directed 300 rounds automatic weapons fire at VC's left flank. Fire ceased at





1630H. Later at 1840H, as Company E was moving to link up with Company G it received 2000 rounds small arms/automatic weapons fire from a VC unit and 15 rounds 82mm mortar at (AT 971536) resulting in 2 USMC WIA (evacuated). The unit returned 2500 rounds small arms/automatic weapons fire and directed 18 rounds 155mm and 41 rounds of 81mm mortar at the VC positions. Company G sent a platoon to link up with Company E. The VC ceased fire at 1925H. Total USMC casualties for the 2 actions were 2 USMC KIA, 9 WIA (evacuated). VC losses were 9 VC KIA confirmed, 14 KIA probable. (Tab B, Part II, PERINTREP #17).







ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

- l December CG III MAF informed CG lst MarDiv that the current artillery allocation for III MAF was appropriate in light of assets available and that additional deployment of artillery units to SVN would not occur during 1967.

 Ref: CG III MAF 010816Z Dec66.
- 1 December Operation SUTTER commenced 010630H Dec66. Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 011817Z Dec66. (Tab D)
- 2 December CG 1st MarDiv published change one to FRAG ORDER 40-66 which directed the 11th Marines to displace Btry F 2d Bn 11th Marines from QUE SON to AN HOA commencing 021200H Dec. CG TF XRAY was directed to return to CHU LAI the rifle company minus which had been providing security for the battery.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 020245Z Dec66.
- 2 December CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 41-66 which directed the 9th Marines to assume responsibility for the 4th Bn, 503d ABN Inf sector effective 021045H Dec66. The change was necessitated by the return of the 4th Bn, 503d ABN Inf to its parent organization.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 021351Z Dec66.
- 2 December Ninth Marines informed CG 1st MarDiv that the 3d Bn 9th Marines had assumed responsibility for the 4th Bn, 503d ABN Inf sector effective 021045H Dec66.

 Ref: Ninth Marines 020820Z Dec66.
- 2 December CG 1st MarDiv directed 3d MT Bn to chop 1st Plat Rein, Co C to CG 3d MarDiv for employment with BLT 1/4 and to be prepared to receive and employ the motor transport platoon which was to arrive RVN with BLT 3/26. The 3d Med Bn was also directed to chop a clearing platoon of Co D to CG 3d MarDiv for employment with BLT 1/4.


 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 022359Z Dec66.
- 3 December CG lst MarDiv published FRAG PLAN 41-66 (HOME RUN) which provided plans and forces to exploit special intelligence reports which would pinpoint the location enemy battalion or higher headquarters.
 Ref: CG lst MarDiv 030715Z Dec66.
- 5 December CG 1st MarDiv notified CG 3d MarDiv that the clearing platoon of Company D 3d Med Bn would report for OPCON 3d MarDiv as a reinforcing element for BLT 1/4.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 050755Z Dec66.



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- 5 December CG 3d MarDiv requested CG lst MarDiv to organize a ROUGH RIDER convoy to bring elements for BLT 1/4 from DA NANG to PHU BAI on 7 Dec 1966.

 Ref: CG 3d MarDiv 051407Z Dec66.
- 6 December CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 28-66 which assigned sectors of responsibility and missions to be conducted within the 1st MarDiv area of responsibility.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 060249Z Dec66.
- 6 December CG 1st MarDiv directed 11th Marines to employ two 105mm howitzers for support of HOME RUN operations. 9th Marines was directed to provide one rifle platoon for security for the howitzers.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 060345Z Dec66.
- 6 December CG 1st MarDiv directed that a ROUGH RIDER convoy be conducted from DA NANG to PHU BAI on 7 Dec 1966.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 060747Z Dec66.
- 6 December Operation SUTTER terminated 061800H Dec66. Ref: CG lst MarDiv 061927Z Dec66. (Tab D)
- 7 December Operation TRINIDAD I commenced 070630H Dec66. Ref: CG lst MarDiv 070755Z Dec66. (Tab D)
- 7 December Operation MISSISSIPPI terminated 071730H Dec66. Ref: lst MarDiv COC 171257Z Dec66 . (Tab D)
- 7 December CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 43-66 which directed that a ROUGH RIDER convoy be conducted from DA NANG to CHU LAI and to return. The convoy was to depart 10 December and to return on or about 11 December.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 071305Z Dec66.
- 7 December Operation CORTEZ commenced 071200H Dec66. Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 071931Z Dec66. (Tab D)
- 7 December CG III MAF reiterated his policy regarding the use of reconnaissance units within the I Corps Tactical Zone.

 Ref: CG III MAF 072314Z Dec66.
- 7 December Operation TRINIDAD I terminated at 071600H Dec66.

 Ref: lst MarDiv COC 071220Z Dec66.

 The forces were moved to a new location to exploit a more lucrative target. This new operation was named TRINIDAD II and commenced 081300H Dec66.

 Ref: CG lst MarDiv 080847Z Dec66.


 (Tab D)

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- 8 December CG 1st MarDiv published his initiating directive for Operation STERLING.
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 080009Z Dec66.
- 10 December- lst Marines requested from CG lst MarDiv that two LVTH-6 be made available for direct support commencing 120800H Dec for an indefinite period. The request was prompted by the extensive water barriers encountered in the western portion of the lst Bn lst Marines sector.

 Ref: First Marines 100335Z Dec66.
- 10 December CG 1st MarDiv initiated Operation HOME RUN at 101735H Dec66.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 101013Z Dec66.
- 10 December -CG lst MarDiv published initiating directive for an operation to be conducted by TF XRAY in the MO DUC area.

 Ref: CG lst MarDiv 101231Z Dec66.
- 11 December- CG lst MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 45-66 which directed the dephoyment of one LVTH platoon (Rein) and one Force Reconnaissance Team for special operations in IV CTZ.

 Ref: CG lst MarDiv 110255Z Dec66.

 (Tab C)
- 11 December- Operation TRINIDAD II terminated 111600H Dec66.
 Ref: CG lst MarDiv 110622Z Dec66.
- 11 December- CG 1st MarDiv directed 2d Bn, 5th Marines to maintain a
 SPARROW HAWK squad as provided by Division Op Order 304-66.
 All units were directed to make maximum use of the squads to exploit enemy contact.
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 110851Z Dec66.
- 11 December- Operation STERLING commenced 111200H Dec66.

 Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 11423Z Dec66.

 (Tab D)
- 12 December CG III MAF published planning guidance for January 1967 to CG 1st MarDiv.
 Ref: CG III MAF 120326Z Dec66.
- 12 December Operation SIERRA commenced 121030H Dec66.

 Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 120915Z Dec66.

 (Tab D)
- 12 December- Operation CORTEZ terminated 121700H Dec66.

 Ref: lst MarDiv COC 120627Z Dec66.

 (Tab D)
- 12 December- CG 1st MarDiv directed 11th Marines to make two LVTH-6's available for direct support of the 1st Marines commencing 131200H Dec for an indefinite period.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 120725Z Dec66

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December - CG 1st MarDiv issued his planning guidance for the month of January 1967.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 130219Z Dec66.

- 16 December Operation STERLING terminated 160800H Dec66.
 Ref: lst MarDiv COC 160841Z Dec66.
 (Tab D)
- 16 December CG lst MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 46-66 which activated BLT 3/9 for planning, issued instructions for the rotation of the BLT out of country, and for the relief of 3d Bn 9th Marines by BLT 2/4.

 Ref: CG lst MarDiv 160917Z Dec66.

 (Tab C)
- 16 December CG lst MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 47-66 which directed that a ROUGH RIDER convoy be conducted from DA NANG to CHU LAI and to return during the period 18-19 December 1966.

 Ref: CG lst MarDiv 160701Z Dec66.
- 17 December CG 1st MarDiv published instructions and guidance to the command for a curtailment of military activities during the Christmas truce period between 240700H Dec 260700H Dec.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 170053Z Dec66.
- 17 December Operation GLENN commenced 170930H Dec66.
 Ref: lst MarDiv COC 170553Z Dec66.
 (Tab D)
- 17 December CG lst MarDiv terminated Operation HOME RUN which was initiated 10Dec66. Artillery units which displaced for the special operation were ordered to return to their original positions.

 Ref: CG lst MarDiv 170605Z Dec66.
- 18 December CG lst MarDiv notified CG III MAF of the planned operations for January 1967.

 Ref: CG lst MarDiv 180001Z Dec66.
- 19 December Operation SHASTA II commenced at 190600H Dec66.

 Ref: CG lst MarDiv 200521Z Dec66.

 (Tab D)
- 21 December Operation GLENN terminated 210600H Dec66.

 Ref: lst MarDiv COC 211251Z Dec66.

 (Tab D)





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- 21 December Operation SHASTA II terminated 211200H Dec66. Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 211343Z Dec66. (Tab D)
- 23 December CG 1st MarDiv published Change One to FRAG ORDER 46-66 which established the Task Organization for BLT 3/9 and issued instructions for the exchange of equipment.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 230825Z Dec66.
- 24 December CG 1st MarDiv directed all units to be especially alert on Christmas Eve as it has been demonstrated that the VC do not intend to honor the truce.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240807Z Dec66.
- 25 December CG lst MarDiv published Change Two to FRAG ORDER 46-66 deleting Det, 3d Dental Co.

 Ref: CGlst MarDiv 250519% Dec66.
- 29 December CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 48-66 which dealt with the relief of ARVN units by Marine units to enable the ARVN units to support the 1967 Revolutionary Development Plan.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 290251Z Dec66.
- 30 December CG 1st MarDiv published Change Three to FRAG ORDER 46-66 which substituted units in the Task Organization of BLT 3/9.

 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 300345Z Dec66.
- 30 December CG lst MarDiv notified CG TF XRAY that the request to extend the CHU LAI TAOR had been approved.

 Ref: CG lst MarDiv 301450Z Dec66.
- 30 December 2d Bn 5th Marines assumed responsibility NONG SON coal mine complex and the proposed extended TAOR extension effective 301800H December.

 Ref: 2d Bn 5th Marines 310215Z Dec66.





PLANS

- 6 December CG 1st MarDiv published OP PLAN 316-66 (GEORGIA I) which provided plans for the reinforcement of the CHU L/I TAOR by a brigade of the 9th Inf Div. CG 1st Mar Div 061031Z Dec 66.
- 10 December- CG 1st MarDiv published OP PLAN 317-66 (GEORGIA II) which provided plans for the assumption of the responsibility of the CHU LAI TAOR by the 9th Inf Div (USA) and the subsequent move of TF XRAY units to the DA NAG TAOR. CG 1st MarDiv 100831Z Dec 66.
- 13 December- CG 1st MarDiv published OP TL N 318-66 which provided for the relief of a portion of the CHU LAI TAOR by a ROK Army regiment and the subsequent move of a Marine infantry regiment (-) from the CHU LAI TAOR to the DA NANG TAOR. CG 1st MarDiv 131011Z Dec 66.
- 16 December CG 1st MarDiv published OP LAN 303-66 which established contingency lans for the relief or reinforcement of CIDG camps in the 1st MarDiv area of responsibility.

(Tab F)









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
COMBINED ACTION COMPANY PROGRAM

- 6 December CAC unit D-2 was formed in the 3d Bn lst Marines sector of the DA NANG TAOR.
- 15 December CAC units D-4 and D-5 were formed in the 1st Bn 1st Marines sector of the DA NANG TAOR.
- 30 December CAC unit D-6 was formed in the 2d Bn 1st Marines sector of the DA NANG TAOR.
- 30 December CAC unit M-2 was formed in the CLDC sector of the CHU LAI TAOR.
- 31 December CAC units I-4, I-5 and I-6 were formed in the 1st Bn 5th Marines sector of the CHU LAI TAOR.









LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY

2-4 December	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	Brigade and Battery B, 3rd Battellon, 517th at 12	— ↓ (- •
	six C-130 aireraft lifts were required for the mo	re.

- 5 December 1966 Division Embarkation coordinated the airlift of 2nd Battalian, 5th Marines from Danang to in Hos. A total of 389,796 pounds was lifted.
- 6 December 1966

 Division Embarkation coordinated the sealift of Headquarters, 11th Marines and elements of 3rd imphibien
 Tractor Battalion from Chu hai to Denang.
- Division Embarkation goordinated the sirlift of 33.5 short tons of 105mm ammanition to resupply elements of 3rd Battalian, 11th Marines at Minh Long.
- 12 December 1966 Division Motor Transport coordinated a Rough Rider convoy from Danang to Chu Lai.
- 14 December 1966 Division Embarkation coordinated the scalift of elements of the 1st Armored Amphibian Company from Danang to Subic Bay.
- 16-17 December 1966 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 and Division Supply Officer attended FMFPac Logistic Conference on Okinawa.
- 21 December 1966 Division Motor Transport occrdinated a Rough Rider convoy from Daning to Chu Lai.
- 23 December 1966 Division Embarkation coordinated the sealift of 3rd Bridge Company elements from Danang to Phu Bai.
- 24 December 1966 Division units were warned about possible accidental firing of 106mm rifles on the M50Al ONTOS due to worn firing mechanism parts.

Ref: CG 1st MerDiv 241115Z Dec 66 (C)

24 December 1966 lst Medical Battalion assumed responsibility for the Danang Medical Facility formerly run by 3rd Medical Battalion.



SECRET

24 December 1966

Division Embarkation coordinated the sealift of 3rd Bridge Company elements from Danang to Dong Ha.

28 December 1966

Road safety regulations were published for both the Chu Lei and Danang TAORs. These regulations are designed to reduce the frequency of sniper and ambush activity by requiring vehicles to travel in pairs with two occupants per vehicle wearing helmets and upper torse body armer. It least one occupant must be armed with a rifle.


Ref: CG lst MarDiv 280909Z Dec 66 (C)

28-29 December 1966 Division Emberkation coordinated the offloading of the 1st Marine Division December Draft from the USS GAFFEY and USS ELTINGE at Danang.

29 December 1966

Elements of the 11th Motor Transport Battalion began entering the Republic of Vietnam at Dansag.

SECRET





COMMAND CHRONOLOGY CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION PART III

- 1. Sequential listing of significant events for the period 1-31 December 1966
- 1 Dec 1966 First Joint Coordinating Council for Quang Tin Province was conducted.
- Dec 1966 First Elder's Day Festival conducted by 1st MarDiv Units.
- 21 Dec 1966 AC/S G-5 conducted conference with Civic Action Officers, Danang TAOR.
- 24 Dec 1966 Airliner crashed in Binh Thai Hamlet causing death, injury and destruction.
- 25 Dec 1966 Christmas parties conducted for Vietnamese children.







COMMAND CHRONOLOGY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PART III

- 1. Sequential listing of significant events for the period 1-31 December 1966.
- 1 Dec 1966 6 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following:
 175,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals
 50,000 Safe Conduct Passes
 25,000 VC use women as shields
 250,000 Showing how a Vietnamese bus hit a VC mine and injured innocent people
- 2 Dec 1966 3 ralliers turned into L/3/9 and leaflets and tapes are being made to use against the VC.

 4 new Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) were assigned. 2 each to the 1st and 9th Marines. Total new 16.

 KCS convinced residents of Hamlet of Phong Le (1) to move to collection point after repeated tries by interpreter had failed. 6 VCS found.

 B/1/26 distributed 75 leaflets at AT927538: theme, "Marines are friends of civilians"
- 3 Dec 1966 9th Mar broadcasts reported to be annoying VC in area, causing them to threaten Vietnamese
- 4 Dec 1966 A broadcast was made in market place at Thanh Quit (2) concerning VC wounding 3 civilians, about 500 people listened and received message well (favorable reaction).
- 5 Dec 1966 9 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following: 335,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals and Safe Conduct Passes
- 6 Dec 1966 Aerial Observers dropped 5,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals and Safe Conduct Passes
- 7 Dec 1966 7 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following: 360,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals 200,000 Rewards for Mines and Boobytraps 60,000 Choice of Peace or Death 30,000 Safe Conduct Passes
- 8 Dec 1966 10 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following:
 693,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals
 145,000 Safe Conduct Passes
 25,000 Refugee comments about treatment
 25,000 Rallier comments about how they were received









8 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following: 300,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals

75,000 Safe Conduct Passes

35,000 Recent rallier comments on how they were treated 2 aerial broadcasts were conducted with no results reported

7 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following:
170,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals
45,000 Safe Conduct Passes
25,000 VC mines kill innocent women and children
40,000 Don't fire at Marines

11 Dec 1966

1 Psy War broadcast at AT963625
4 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following:
140,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals
20,000 Safe Conduct Passes
25,000 VC mines kill innocent people
25,000 VC steal people's rice
60,000 Weapons reward

KCS found 2 mines and identified 10 VCS

12 Dec 1966 3,000 rewards for mines and boobytraps distributed by
2/1 patrols
3 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following:
250,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals
70,000 Safe Conduct Passes

13 Dec 1966 6 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following:
400,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals
65,000 Safe Conduct Passes
30,000 Appeal for VC to return to GVN
An audio/visual team was utilized for 30 minutes today in an aerial broadcast role: theme, Chieu Hoi tapes and announcement of MEDCAP's.

14 Dec 1966 Loudspeaker broadcast by a Chieu Hoi Rallier while observing air strike in distance explaining that VC are the ones who caused it when they are allowed to hide in the hamlets.

15 Dec 1966 6 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following:
20,000 Overwhelming power against VC
20,000 Warning villagers, "Do not run"
40,000 Fear of death by bombing
230,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals
60,000 Safe Conduct Passes
30,000 Showing how a VC bus hit a VC mine injuring innocent
people
50,000 Weapons Rewards
25,000 Boobytraps and mines kill innocent people

KCS confirmed 1 VC 1 new KCS selected and placed with 9th Mar. Total now 17.

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16 Dec 1966 KCS pointed out a mine field for 2/1.

1 aerial leaflet drop today consisting of 110,000 ChienHoi Appeal and Safe Conduct Passes

17 Dec 1966 KCS confirmed 2 VC POW's and participated in patrols

2 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following: 300,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals, Weapons Reward, Cooperate with the Marines and Mines Reward

18 Dec 1966 1 aerial leaflet drop made today comprised of 160,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals and Safe conduct Passes

19 Dec 1966 6 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following: 125,000 GVN gives better life and Chieu Hoi Appeals 170,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals and Weapons Reward 25,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals

20 Dec 1966 KCS, utilized in operation GLENN, broadcast appeals day and night.

2 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following: 20,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals.

Marines distributed following leaflets, in addition to newspapers and magazines:

1,600 Chieu Hoi Appeals

1,000 Don't run from Marines

1,000 Rewards for Weapons

21 Dec 1966 5 aerial leaflet drops comprised of the following were made: 240,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals and Weapons Reward 10,000 Safe Conduct Passes 30,000 VC mines destroy innocent people 50,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals

10,000 Thoughtprovoking eaflets to raise doubt about the VC cause

KCS identified 1 VCC and 2 VCS aduring operation GLENN.
KCS also used for Chieu Hoi Appeals and audio broadcasts.
Marines passed out 1,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals and 1,000 Safe
Conduct Passes.


22 Dec 1966 1 aerial leaflet drop was made today comprised of the following: 20,000 Safe Conduct Passes
30,000 Letters from captured VC stating how they were treated 25,000 Explanation for Allied Forces in Vietnam 35,000 Chieu Appeals

Marines distributed 6,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals and 1,000 Safe Conduct Passes.

23 Dec 1966 Marines distributed 1,000 "Don't run from Marines!" leaflets

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24 Dec 1966 Marines passed out 1,000 Chieu Hoi and 1,000 "Don't run from Marines" leaflets

KCS distributed literature and told of VC life before a County Fair gathering.

25 Dec 1966 1 hour broadcast by KCS. Theme: Chieu Hoi and Life with RVN.

26 Dec 1966 4 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following: 225,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals 250,000 Chieu Hoi Appeals and Allied Power against VC leaflets mixed

1st Mar distributed 4,000 Chieu Hoi appeal leaflets

A Psy War term utilizing KCS, broadcast for about 2 hours after a helocopter received small arms fire, theme: explaining to people that the VC who fired at helocopter would cause artillery and air bombardment and that to protect the innocent they were asked to withdraw their support of the VC.

27 Dec 1966 Marines passed out 4,000 Chieu Hoi Appeal leaflets today while on patrols.

28 Dec 1966 Marines distributed 1,000 Chieu Hoi Appeal and Weapons Reward leaflet today.

29 Dec 1966 10 aerial leaflet drops were made today comprised of the following leaflet mixtures:

520,000 GVN offer better life, Chieu Hoi Appeals, and rewards for weapons and mines

100,000 Don't harbor VC, Don't let VC fire from your village, Chieu Hoi Appeal and Rewards for Weapons and Mines 400,000 Chieu Hoi Appeal and Rewards for Mines and Boobytraps

Marines from 2/1 handed out 24,000 Chieu Hoi Appeal, Don't run from Marines and Safe Conduct Passes in 24 different positions (this is to replace those destroyed by VC collection teams and the elements of nature).

30 Dec 1966 There were 3 aerial leaflet drops today which contained a mixture of 320,000 leaflets: Rewards for Mines and Boobytraps, Safe Conduct Passes and Chieu Hoi Appeals.

KCS utilized to broadcast to people telling of the futility of the VC and Chieu Hoi Appeal







31 Dec 1966 Marines passed out the following leaflets today:

4,000 Chiet Hoi Appeals

2,000 Rewards for Weapons

2,000 Safe Conduct Passes


1,000 Don't run from Marines

4 KCS wrote letters to their friends in the VC ranks explaining how to rally and how happy they were.

A VC Flt Ldr who had defected made a tape for broadcasts explaining treatment and how VC cause was unjust. Also, made statement to be utilized on leaflets.

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COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS SEQUENTIAL MISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

5 Dec 66	•
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Circuit activated between Division Hqs Danang and 2d En, 5th Marines and Artillery Group AN/HOA.

8 Dec 66

12 Dec 66

18 Dec 66

21 Dec 66

25 Dec 66

25 Dec 66

Danang and 2d En, 5th Marines and Artillery Group AN/HOA.

AN/TGC-14A technical and operation school at each En and Regt'l Hqs by Mr. SHERIDAN

AN/MRC-62 and AN/TSC-15 multichannel

Ref: CG III MAF ltr 10B/yas over 2000 dtd 26 Nov 66.

MITE Corporation Technical respresent-

ative with FLC.

Reterminated NAVCOMOPHET from Chu Lai to Danang.

Ref: OG III MAF msg 0902565 Dec 66 (C)

Terminated DCS TT circuit between Division Hq Danang and new Danang DCS relay.

Ref: COMUSMACV 011120Z Dec 66 (C)

Completed 1st Qtr Comm Cyclic Inspections

Ref: 1st MarDiv memo 10/FLB/wha dtd 23 Nov 1966.

CG ltr 10/ADF/wha over 2050 dtd 26 Sep 66

Completed Test and Evaluation of Squad Radios AN/PRT-4 and AN/PRR-9.

Ref: ADMINO FMFPAC 2301128 Nov 66 (C)

CG 1st Markiv ltr 10/FLB/wha 3900 dtd 25 Dec 1966

Comm Support provided Senator Stuart SYMINGTON (DEM-Mo) Member, Senate Armed Forces Committee.

Ref: 09 1st MarDiv 2512112 Dec 66 (C)





27 Dec 66

31 Dec 66



Activated AN/TRC-97 Multichannel Circuit between Division Hq Danang and TF X-RAY Chu Lai.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 180729Z Dec 66 (C)

Completed Test and Evaluation Vehicle Mounting Kits for Radio Sets AN/PRC-41 and AN/PRC-47.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 030515E Jan 67 (UNCLAS EFFO) msg report

CG 1st MarDiw ltr 10/FLE/llg over 3900 dtd 4 Jan 1967 (follow up ltr report)

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
PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND CHRONOLOGIES OF SUBCRDINATE UNITS

	Tab	A ~	Task organization 1st Marine	Division	as of	31 Dec	6 6
	Tab	B -	lst MarDiv Perintereps				
	Tab	C -	Operational Messages				
1	Tab	D-	Situation Reports				
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	Tab	I	Task Force Xray	Command	Chrono	logy	
		J	1st Marines	Command	Chrono	logy	
Ì	Tab		5th Marines	Command	Chrono	logy	
ì	Tab	L	2d Bn, 5th Marines	Command	Chrono	logy	
	Tab	_	7th Marines	Command	Chrono	logy	
	Tab	N	3d Bn, 7th Marines	Command	Chrono	logy	
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	Tab		9th Engr Bn	Command	Chrono	logy	
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






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lst Marine Division (Rein), FMF Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam 151600H December 1966

PERINTREP NO. 16

Period Covered: 301200H November to 141200H December 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam Als Series L701 and L7014

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

A. Adjacent Areas

- (1) After a period of comparative lull, enemy activity increased considerably during the past week. Interdiction along Route # 1 has been stepped up and on 10 December, several ARVN positions between Hue and Quang Tri were hit simultaneously. The scale of the action indicated main force involvement, believed to have been the 6th NVA Regiment. No forces additional to the 804th are believed located along the Thua Thien Quang Nam border.
- (2) Every forces in Binh Dinh province are believed in a defensive and training phase in central and nerthern Binh Dinh province. According to a defector at Ba To, the 2nd Regiment has crossed the border and is presently in southern Quang Ngai province.
- (3) A new division has been accepted as probably in existence in the Kontum Pleiku area. This division, the 10th, is believed composed of previously independent and newly infiltrated regiments. The 24th Regiment which had been reported possibly moving to Quang Ngai province has been located by captive statements in western Montum province.

B. First Marine Division's Area of Responsibility

(1) Quang Now Province. Enemy activity has increased markedly throughout the southern part of the TAOR. Thuong Duc Special Forces camp was nortared twice and a further attempt was made on the Vinh Dinh power plant. 2/5 in particular had significant contacts in the An Hoa area. Reports of enemy intentions to attack the Da Hang air base were unusually rife during the reporting period. Agent reports and defectors report that the T-89 (AKA 402nd) Sapper Battalion moved to the vicinity of (20 1140) after Operation Allegheny destroyed their former base area. The battalion is further reported new to possess 120mm mortars. The battalion as believed possibly to have moved to a position in the mountains south of the TAOR where it has been working with the R.20 and V.25 Battalions reportedly in preparation for some later attack. Elements of

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one or several of these three battalions are believed to be responsible for the increase of comparatively heavy contacts in the 2/5 area.

- (2) Quang Tin Province. The increase in enemy activity noted in mang Nam extended to this province, al though not to the northern portion of the Chu Lai TAOR. Most spectacular in terms of activity was the 13-14 December attack on Tam My during which several points in that area were attacked simultaneously not without some degree of success. A force of regimental size, possibly the 21st NVA Regiment, is believed responsible for the attack. Significant contact was also made out of the Tien Phuoc CIM camp during the past fortnight. The 21st NVA Regiment, presumably the 2nd Division CP and possibly the 3rd NVA Regiment are in this province.
- (3) Quang Ngai Province. Quang Ngai province experienced its share of enemy activity with solid contacts made out of the Tra Bong and Ba To CIDG camps, mortar incidents at Mo Duc and in the southern part of the Chu Lai TAOR and increased road interdiction. A rallier to the MC's, whose identity and unit association have yet to be verified, claims to be from the 3rd NVA Regiment indicating the possible movement of that regiment to Quang Ngai province. A recon member of the 3rd Division rallied at Ba To and indicated that the 2nd Regiment was located in Vuc Lien (BS 6536) with the 22nd NVA Regiment within reinforcing distance in the northern An Lao valley. Light contact has sofar been made in Operation Sierra in the Mo Duc area.
- C. General Statement. The increased incidence of significant contacts indicates, at the least, a new willingness on the part of the enemy to attack on a limited scale and to hazard engagement with friendly forces. The ultimate intent of the increased activity has yet to be clearly discerned. It may be that this represents no more than the resumption of normal operations after a period of unusual quiet. The Tam Ky attack demonstrates that, despite the generally poor personnel and logistic posture: of the enemy, he still is willing to attack comparatively fortified positions in strength. It is uncertain whether this attack was a one-shot affair or part of a more extended campaign of limited offensives against selected targets. The recent increase and the activity that possibly will ensue may be coordinated with the long-expected offensive in the DMZ area. The introduction of additional forces into quang Ngai province, as indicated by recent ralliers, suggests that the objective for the presumed diversionary attack may be in this province. The activity of the past fortnight is largely the result of an intensification of activity on the part of guerrilla, local and sapper elements throughout the coastal lowlands. It is too early to say whether the possible, indeed probable, involvement of main force units in some of the recent contacts indicates a continuing intensification coordinated with guerrilla, local and sapper forces and/or with a major offensive across the DMZ or whether the main force participation is a one-time affair largely unrelated to other activity and usually not followed by further attacks. MASSIFIED .

Past behavior of the 2nd Division would indicate that the latter is the case.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD

A. Strength and Dispositions

- (1) See Annex A.
- (2) A compilation of interrogations reports of captives and ralliers from the 1st VU Regiment taken in Operation Rio Bianco has revealed the following information. The regiment is reported now to consist of 4 rifle battalions (the auth, auth, apper, norter, auti-tack with six separate companies (recon, sugad, sepper, norter, auti-tack and anti-air). The 70th Battalion was reported administrativity absorbed in February 1966 and come under the operational control of the regiment in April or May, and is reported as furtherly a Quang Ngel Provincial Force Battalion. Based on these reports a summary of the 70th Battalion activity have been compiled below for the purpose of a recapitulation analysis.
- (a) The 70c datation was originally organic to the 1st VC Regiment until early 1964 when it was detected to become the Quang Tin Provincial Mobile Battalion. As a provincial force, its normal operation area was northern Quang Tin in the Thang blun Que Son Matriot areas. In early September 1966 low lawer agents began reporting with some consistency that the battalion was operating west of Tan My.
- (b) An NR-V railier of 20 October stated that the 70th Battalion was an independent unit subordinate to the 2nd Division; and, although still operating in Quang Min, would soon join the 1st Regiment in Quang Ngai where the 1st Regiment was to form a rive battalion brigade, although thus far only four battalions, 40th (ARA OCTA), 60th, 70th and 90th, have been reported with the 1st VC Regiment, (see 4dth Battalion below).
- (c) Documents from a USPE contact with VC elements revealed a 307th unit, believed possibly so be the 307th Company of the 70th Battalian. This contact took place on 20 Moreober in the que Son Thang Binh area.
- (i) Parish Operation Rie Blacks, a warrant officer (supply finance) from the 60th Battalion, let Regiment defected to the ROENC on 24 November at Nui Trom OP. Be stated that a Quang Ngai Provincial Battalion was designated 70th Battalion and attached to the 1st Regiment during February 1966. He further stated that on 20 November the OP of the 70th Battalion was located at (BS 498614). Documents with the Warrant Officer defector also mentioned the 70th Battalian along



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with other elements of the 1st VC Regiment, listing secret names of the units, this rallier stated the 70th Battalion was not the 48th Battalion.

- (e) At least two other defectors from the 1st Regiment about 1 December claimed the 70th Battalion was part of the 1st VC Regiment and was in the Operation Rio Blanco area. Another defector from the 90th Battalion, 1st VC Regiment on 3 December reported never having heard of the 70th Battalion and meanwhile low level agent reports continue to locate the 70th Battalion in the area of west Tam Ry, in quang Tim province.
- (f) A related subject: there is very strong evidence that the 48th Battalion assisted the attack on the 90th Company, ROKARC on 20 November, vicinity (BS 565774). Judging from similar instances when the 48th Battalion reportedly crossed the Tra Khuo river and attacked friendly units, the Battalion probably retreated immediately to its normal operating area in Mo Duc district. Agent reports continue to place the 48th Battalion in its normal operating area, while other low level agent reports indicate a 48th Battalion having been redesignated the 50th Battalion and operating with the 1st Regiment. This designation of 50th Battalion would fit into the designation of other battalions in the 1st VC Regiment, and could well have been the 5th Battalion to form the brigade mentioned by the MR-V rallier. However this plan is reported to have been souttled because of insufficient personnel plus logistic problems.
- (g) Conclusion: From the evidence at hand, it cannot be determined at this time whether there are now two units designated the 70th Battalion, or whether the possible 70th Battalion has in fact moved to Quang Ngai and is operating with the lat Regiment in its original capacity. The bulk of evidence favors the latter.
- (3) Tran Thanh, platoon leader of the Sao Vang recon platcon, 3rd NVA Division (AKA 610th Division) who was captured near Ba To USSF camp on 30 November 1966 states that he was in the area for the purpose of conducting an up-to-date recon of that area and further that a recongroup of MR-V Headquarters has been located in the area for nearly a year acquiring detailed information on disposition and activity in and around the Ba To area. The purpose of these recon missions being an impending attack. On the 2-3 of December 1966 a cadre delegation of the 3rd NVA Division Headquarters and 2rd VC Regiment Headquarters were to observe this area and decide on a plan for the date and time of attack.

The 2nd Regiment will be used for the main attack while the 22nd NVA Regiment will be used to attack any reinforcements coming from the direction of Highway #1 (East). Thanh believes that the 2nd VC Regiment at present was moved to the vicinity of Vuc Lien (BS 640370) and the 22nd NVA Regiment is located vicinity (BS 760160).



Thunh further mentioned that on 25 November another recom group from the 3rd NVA Division were to reconnecter the area of Gia Vuc VSSF camp. Detailed information of this reconnaissance were unknown. Comment: RF Forces of 300 men from Ba To USSF Camp made contact at 180918H with an estimated VC battalion vicinity of (BS 600402) and recent agent reports of elements of the 3rd NVA Division moving into southern Quang Ngai province further substantiate this information as probably true. Rallier interrogation of Dieu, squad leader, lst Squad, lst Platoon, lst Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 3rd (NVA) Division who defected to Thack Tru outpost on 29 November located his unit vicinity (BS 748280). (See paragraph G (1) below, Reserves and Reinforcements)

B. Order of Battle

- (1) See Annex &
- (2) See Annex B (History and Organization of the 402nd Sapper Battalion).
- G. Reserves and Reinforcements. Mguyen Van Dieu, Squad Leader, 1st Squad, lst Platoon, 1st Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd HVA Regiment, 3rd HVA Division who defected to Thach Tru outpost on 29 November gave the following information on his unit which reads in substance that Dieu left his unit on er about 22 November when his unit was located vicinity (BS 748280). Other elements of the regiment were generally located: Regimental CP (BS 759278), 1st Battalion (BS 765273) and the 2nd Battalion (BS 765290). Dieu stated that the regiment left Binh Dink province on or about 10 November for the purpose of recuperating and the collection of rice location some place east of the regiment's present position. Comment: Elements of the 3rd BVA Division have been reported several times within the last few mouths located vicinity of the Binh Dinh/Quang Ngai province boundary and have been reported crossing into Quang Mgai prevince (see paragraph A.(3) above). Based on this infernation and passed reports, it is considered probable that this regiment may now be moving or have moved into southern Quang Ngmi to reinforce and support the 1st VC Regiment and those elements of the 2nd VC Regiment reported preparing to launch attacks on Ba Te and possible Gis Vuc USSF camps.
 - D. New Knemy Tactics. Negative
 - E. Administrative and Political Units. Negative
- Fo. Anti-Air Activity. There were a total of thirteen incidents of intense small arms/automatic weapons fire being received by aircraft/helicepters during the subject period. These occurred on 4 December at (BT 1345) and (BS 9322); 7 December at (BT 0551) and (BT 296101); 8 December at (BS 789415), (BT 026605), (AT 992591), (AT 924515) and (BS 323868); 10 December at (ZC 1755) and (AT 966520); 12 December at (BT 1617); and on 13 December at (BS 600448). Tracers were in evidence on incidents of 7 and 8 December. There were no reports of .50 caliber machine gun fire.

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- G. Anti-Personnel/Anti-Tank Mine Activity. During the subject period there were a total of 44 mine and booby trap incidents within the TACR's. There was one mine incident of significance when a truck from 1/5/11 hit a command detonated type mine which destroyed both the truck and bridge that it was crossing.
- H. Artillery/Mortar/RR Activity. There were a total of seven mortar attacks during the subject period within the TAON's. On 2 December, Coastal Group 16 base received unknown number of 57mm RR's and 60mm mortars from an estimated VC company located 500 meters weat of the base. Sporadio small arms fire was also received. The VC dispersed when ARVN artillery support was received. On 8 December, R/2/3 macefived six rounds comm mortars and approximately 1000 rounds small arms fire. There were two mortar incidents on the 9th December. In one case, G/2/5 received what was believed to be one round 57mm RR and 30 rounds small arms fire, and in the other E/2/5 received eight rounds 82mm mortar and beavy small arms fire. On 10 December, 9/2/5 received two rounds 60mm mortar rounds and approximately 200 rounds of small arms. On 12 December, again two mortar incidents took place, I/3/A received three rounds 60mm nortar and approximately 920 rounds of small arms fire. On the other incident, F/2/7 received two rounds 60mm marter followed by one grenade and 8 rounds small sams fire. On 13 December, E/2/5 S&D received 250 rounds small erms/automatic weapons fire resulting in one USFG KTA and one USIC WIA (svat). While waiting for the nelicopter, to E received 5-6 rounds 60mm mortar. Air strike was requested and the VO dispersed. During search. Co "E" found 15 rounds 57mm rounds and 50 pounds of plastic explosive in a dugout. Also 2 VC bodies dressed in black and grey uniforws. On 7 December, Thuong Luc District Headquarters received mortar and small arms fire. Again on the 9th December, the Thurng Duc Mistrict Readquarters received 20 rounds of 32mm mortar rounds.
- I. Interdiction Activities. On 5 December, an unknown number of VC ambushed a train at (AT 947898). The train received heavy small arms and automatic fire and struck a mine while in a bunnel resulting in four care derailed. On 10 December, the bridge at (AT 332891) was 30% destroyed and made impassable along with the oridge at (AI 933521) which was 50% destroyed on the same day. VC forces in both of these incidents were unknown.
- J. Guerrilla Activity. During the period there were a total of 202 incidents of harassing small arms fire, 23 granade incidents, 4 acts of sabotage and 3 M-79 incidents in the ThOR's. There were 3 incidents where the enemy used machine guns against harines. On two occasions on 4 Terember, M/7/1 received .50 caliber machine gun fire. Marines returned fire and the VC withdrew.
 - K. Guided Mastles. Regetive
 - L. <u>Infuntry</u>.



- (1) On the morning of the 8th, an estimated VC platoon launched a coordinated attack on A/1/7 CAC L=4 position. Prior to the attack, 10-15 VC infiltrated the combat base from the northeast; entrance was gained through a hole in the fence and a gate opened by a VC sympathiser. The VC inside the position used approximately 20 grenades while an unknown number of VC outside the position fired approximately 1000 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire, then withdrew northwest. Marines and PF's pursued by fire resulting in one VC KIA confirmed.
- (2) On the night of 8 December, 2 VC companies attacked the Ba-Ren Bridge (BT 102510) with 10 rounds 60mm mortars. The VC force was dispersed with megative friendly casualties with slight damage to the bridge. The identity of the VC unit engaged is as yet unknown.
- (3) On the morning of the 9th, an estimated 2 VC platoons attacked one platoon of the 606th RF Company (AT 927867), who were guarding the bridge. The two VC platoons were dispersed with unknown number casualties.
 - M. Reconnaisance. Negative
 - N. Infiltration. Negative
 - O. Other Elements. Negative

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

An Enemy Organization and Combat Efficiency. Enemy organization and combat efficiency within the tri-province area remains the same for all units. Reports still tend to indicate that most units are still having a leadership problem at company level due to the loss of officers and the recruitment of replacements from the ranks of personnel with insufficient combat experience and training. One notable report is that of the 402nd Sapper Battalion which had been in the past accepted as having five to six companies of \$00 men each. Recent reports indicate that this unit may have split forces to form 2 sapper units, the T-89 (AKA for the 402) with three companies and the reported T.87 with three companies (see Amex.B). If this information is true, it may be their intent to establish a more flexible task organization for greater support to VCMF units located in and around the Da Hang Combat Base.

B. New Unit Identification. Negative

C. New Energy Weapons and Equipment. MACV report (C): Grenades similar to US type MK 3 have been found in Phong Dinh Province. They are equipped with a time delay fuze feature of up to six hours. These grenades have been placed near US compounds to apparently lure souvenir collectors.





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D. Personalities. Negative

- E. Brew Losses. During the subject period, VC losses within the Da Hang and Chu Lai TAOR a totalled 91 VC KIA confirmed, 119 VC KIA probable, 23 VCC and 230 VCS. VC casualties on Operation Mississippi, which commenced at 291030H Nevember 1966 and terminated 071730H December, totalled 8 VC KIA confirmed. 9 KIA probable, 19 VCC, 13 Ralliers and 15 VCS. Enemy losses for Operation Sutter, which commenced on 010630H and terminated 081800H December 1966 totalled 13 VC KIA confirmed, 1 VCC and 6 VCS. Operation Trinidad Phase I, which commenced at 070730H and terminated 071600H December, were 1 KIA probable and 13 VCS. Operation Cortes, which commenced at 071300H and terminated 121850H December, were 1 VCC and 14 VCS. Enemy losses for Operation Trinidad Phase II, which commenced at 081300H and terminated at 111600H December, totalled 33 KIA confirmed, 10 WC KIA probable, 27 WCC and 6 WCS. Other operations are Operation Sterling, which commenced at 111200H December and is still in progress, are 16 VCS; and Operation Sierra, which commenced at 120600H Becember and is still in progress, with 8 VC KIA confirmed, 10 VC probable and 11 VCS.
- F. Merele. During the subject period, several defector reports indicate VC merele within the tri-province area still remains in a low state for the usual reasons such as air and artillery attacks, shortage of food, high incidence of disease and general lack of medicine, supplemented by a general lack of faith in officers and NCO's for their shortcomings in leadership and training.
- Go Details of Administrative Installations and Support. Due Due district VC runner captured on 1 December gave information on the location of administrative and locations of installations in that area. He stated that when Marines were seen on current operations (Mississippi), a VCMF plateon (50 men) fled to the Hon Tau mountains vicinity (AT 9738). In October of this year all the people of the captive's hamlet carried rice in large amount (exact amount unknown) to the base of the Hon Tau mountains and left it there. Also on 4 September 1966, approximately 200 wounded NVA soldiers came to the captive's hamlet overnight and were carried/taken to the mountains, possibly Hon Tau mountains (exact legation unknown), but captive thinks it's the same area where the rice was taken because the people were gone only one day.
- (2) A squad leader from Quang Ngai Provincial Headquarters who defected on 9 December gave some information on the location of pertain administrative and logistic installations. He stated that there is a cache located at (BS 616456), supply depot serving the headquarters lecated (BS 645642), large provincial hospital with 1 dector, 60 marses and 100 patients at (BS 625464).



- (3) ITT interrogation report obtained from 4 captives and 3 ralliers on Operation Mississippi that a central rice collection point is located at Tu Tan (AT 932371).
 - H. Terrain. Negative
- I. Weather. The weather in the TAOR's from 301200H November to 141200H December 1966 was generally cloudy with rain and/or scattered showers. The average maximum and minimum temperatures were 79 degrees and 71 degrees respectively. Mean humidity was 82%. Visibility averaged 7 miles. There was 1.98 inches of rainfall during the subject period. The wind tended to blow in a northernly direction with a velocity of 8-10 knots during the first part of the period and in a north-easterly direction with a velocity of 5 knots during the latter part of the period.
 - J. Intelligence Operations. Negative
- 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Megative
- 5. CAPABILITIES AND VUINERABILITIES

A. Capabilities

- (1) With a redisposition of force, the enemy can attack the Da Nang Combat Base with a division minus consisting of two less than combat efficient regiments (3rd NVA and 21st NVA), supported by combat support and combat service support battalions. The enemy can deploy in his attack, or reinforce, with two battalions from Quang Nam (R.20 and V.25), the 804th Battalion from Thua Thien, and the 402nd Sapper Battalion in Quang Nam province.
- (2) With a redisposition of force, the enemy can attack the Chu Lai Combat Base with a division consisting of three infantry regiments, (lst VC, 3rd NVA and 2lst NVA), two less than combat efficient, supported by combat support and combat service support battalions. The enemy can deploy in his attack, or reinforce, with one battalion from Quang Tin (72nd), two battalions (38th and 48th) and the 409th Sapper Battalion from Quang Ngai.
- (3) Attack CIDG camps, district towns, provincial capitals and vulnerable ARVN outposts, singly or several, simultaneously, in strength of one or more reinforced regiments.
- (4) Covertly infiltrate and attack friendly positions with sapper elements in platoon or company strongth, particularly those proximate to or guarding villages, bridges, artillery positions, fuel and ammo dumps and airfields.





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- (5) Introduce into the 1st Marine Division Area of Responsibility the 6th NVA Regiment from Thua Thien province within 5 days after rovement commences, the 3rd Division from Binh Dinh province within 1 day after movement commences and the 1st Division from Pleiku province within 10 days after movement commences.
- (6) Harass friendly forces and installations with small arms, grenades, mortars, booby traps and small ambushes at a time and place of the enemy's choice utilizing his guerrilla and local forces.
- (7) Interdict lines of communication throughout Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces, particularly National Route # 1, Liberty Road and the railroad lines in Hai Van Pass area at a time and place of the enemy's choice, using trained demolitions personnel working in conjunction with guerrilla and local forces.
- (8) Conduct political agitation and propaganda, combined with a selective use of politically-inspired violence, including assassination, terrorism and sabotage in an effort to thwart the Revolutionary Development Program.
- (9) Evade significant contact with friendly forces to protect the integrity of his force while awaiting more favorable circumstances for offensive operations or repeated harassment, to include at least periods of reduced visibility.
- (10) Continue to improve his force structure by introducing personnel and material resources from North Viet Nam into the 1st Marine Division Area of Responsibility.

B. Probable Enemy Course of Action

- (1) Continue to utilize local and guerrilla forces for harassment and political violence throughout the three provinces, interspersed with raids on selected key installations and positions within the Combat Bases and infrequent reinforced battalion size attacks on isolated outposts elsewhere. Continue interdiction of lines of communication with emphasis on National Route #1, Liberty Road and the Hai Van Pass area. Concurrently, continue to improve his force structure and to evade significant contact with friendly forces whenever possible.
- (2) Attack district towns, CIDC camps and isolated ARVN outposts, singly or several, simultaneously, in up to reinforced regimental strength probably with the further objective of ambushing relief/reaction forces.
- (3) Attack friendly forces within the southern half of the Da Nang Combat Base in up to reinforced battalion strength.

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- (4) Attack installations and forces in the Chu Lai Combat Base, Tam By or Quang Ngai city in up to reinforced regimental strength.
- (5) Attack the An Hoa industrial complex in reinforced regimental strength.
- (6) Attack the Chu Lai Combat Base with the forces enumerated in capability (2) above.
- (7) Attack the Da Nang Combat Base with the forces enumerated in capability (1) above.
- (8) Introduce elements of the 6th NVA Regiment or 1st Division into the three province area.
 - C. Vulnerabilities. The enemy has four major vulnerabilities.
- (1) The enemy is vulnerable to air attack at all times. His logistic system and supply bases are always vulnerable to interdiction and destruction by air. Unless properly concealed, his movements and bivouac sites are constantly in danger of air strikes.
- (2) The enemy is vulnerable to psychological warfare operations. Life for the Viet Cong is hard at best and filled with deprivation and danger. This constant difficulty and peril, the lack of dedication on the part of the rank and file, as well as some of the cadre, plus the proffered leniency of the Chieu Hoi Program, combine to make the enemy unusually susceptible to exploitation by psychological warfare techniques.
- (3) The enemy is vulnerable to rapid, bold and unexpected maneuvers in the developing tactical situation. His insistence on minutely planned and carefully rehearsed operations precludes a quick and flexible reaction to friendly maneuvers, unless in keeping with his preconceived battle plan.
- (4) The enemy is vulnerable to sustained combat operations and aggressive pursuit. The inherent weakness of the enemy's logistic system and its continuing susceptibility to interdiction by air deny the enemy the capability of supporting sustained combat operations. The enemy's rigidity of tactical doctrine induces him to avoid and/or quickly disengage from contact whenever the tactical situation does not develop according to plan.

E. B. S. M. M.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Acting)

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ANNEXES.

- A Order of Battle Annex
- B Significant Agents, VCC/Returnees, and Document Reports
- C Paragraph 1) Entries
- D Astronomical Data
- E MACV Directive nr 361-29 (Military Intelligence Graphic Depiction of Enery Forces) 4 November 1966

DISTRIBUTION: "A" less 7, 12, 17-21, 37-67
"C" less 72, 76, 84, 98, 100

Сору	to:	III MAF	(5)
		3rd MarDiv	(2)
		1st MAW	(8)
		2nd ROK	(1)
		SA, 2nd ARVN Div	(1)
		SA, Quang Tin Sector	(1)
		SA, Quang Ngai Sector	(1)
		SA, QNSS Adv Grp, Hoi An	(1)
		FLC	(1)
		MCB 9	(1)
		MCB 10	(1)
		MCB 58	(1)
		CICV	$\langle 1 \rangle$
		let Air Cav Div	(1)
		Task Force X-Rey	(10)
		9th Marines	(9)
		3rd Tk Bn	(4)
		2 Bn/5th Marines	(4)

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
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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO 1ST	MARDT	PER TRIPE	REP NO. 16	
NIT	CAT	STR	LOCATION AND DATE	SUBORDINATION
A. MAIN FORCE	<u> </u>			
2ND DIV (620TH, NONG TRUONG 2)	C	7,050	Q'TIN (BT 009 224) 1 NOV	161-Y
FWD HQ	C	100	Q'NGAI (BS 540710) 1 NOV	2ND DIV
IST VC REGT (CONG TRUONG 1)	C	2,000	Q'NGAI (BS 430830) 1 DEC	SNA DÍA
hq & SPT units	C	800	Q'NGAI (BS 430810) 1 DEC	1ST REGT
40TH VC EN (80TH BN)	C	500	Q'NGAI (BS 443869) 2 DEC	1ST REGT
60TH VC EN (THANH HA)	C	200	Q'NGAI (BS 470830) 7 DEC	1ST RET
90TH VC BN (THANH TRUC)	C	500	Q'NGAI (BS 437810) 1 DEC	1ST RECT
21ST NVA REGT (2D REGT)	C	1,800	Q'TIN (BT 208338) 26 NOV	SMD DIA
HQ & SPT UNIT	C	600	Q'TIN (BT 205243) 22 NOV	21ST RECT
19T NVA BN (11TH BN)	C	400	Q'TIN (BT 165221) 22 NOV	21ST REGT
2ND NVA EN (22ND EN)	C	400	Q'TIN (BS 745862) 16 SEP	21ST REGT
3RD NVA BN (33RD BN)	C	400	Q'TIN (BT 060280) 2 SEP	21ST REGT
SED NVA REGT (31ST REGT)	C	1,800	Q'HAM/Q'TIN (BT 205161) 5 DEC	2ND DIV
HQ & SPT UNIT	C	600	Q'NAM/Q'TIN (BS 535828) 24 SEP	3RD REGT
1ST NVA BN (BINH MINH X-1)	C	700	Q'NAM/Q'TIN (BT 255 158) 18 OCT	3RD REGT

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


	UNIT	CAT	STR	LAST ACCEPTED/MEPORTED LOCATION AND DATE	SUCCEMENTION
	2ND NVA BN (BINH DA X-2)	С	*,700	Q'NAM/Q'TIN (BS 787330) 4 DEC	3RD REGT
	3RD NVA BN (BINE THIEN X-3)	C	700	Q'NAN/Q'TIN (BT 118266) 24 SEP	3RD REGT
	RQ 20 NVA SIG BN (GK-30)	С	300	Q'TIN/Q'NGAI (UNLOC) 1 NOV	2ND DIV
	33RD ARTY REGT	U	UNK	Q'TIN/Q'NGAI (UNLOC) 1 NOV	ord and
	RQ 21 NVA AA BN (GK-31)	C	280	Q'TIN/Q'NGAI (BT 132 466) 8 NOV	35RD REGT
)	RQ 22 NVA RH EN (GK-32)	C	300	Q'TIN/Q'NGAI (UNIOC) 1 NOV	35RD REGT
	RQ 23 HVA MORT EN (120MM)(GK-33) C	300	Q'TIN/Q'NGAI (UNLOC) 1 NOV	33RD REGT
	RQ 24 NVA ENGR BN (GK-40)	C	150	Q'TIN/Q'NGAI (UNLOC) 1 NOV	SND DIA
	409TH VC BN (SAPPER)(CONG TY)	C	400	Q'NGAI (BS 492853) 7 DEC	WK-V
	1506TH ENGR BN	P	32 5	Q'NGAI (BS 340780) 10 DEC	PR_V
	U/I MEDICAL BN	P	UNK	Q'NAM/Q'TIN (UNLOC) 1 NOV	2ND DIV
	36TH SECURITY BN	C	UNK	Q'TIN (BT 009224) 1 NOV	OIO DIV
	U/I TRANSPORTATION BN	P	UNK	Q'NAM/Q'TIN (UNLOC) 1 NOV	SND DIA
_	B. LOCAL FORCE		- ·		
	70TH VC BN (108TH BN)	C	5 0 0	Q'TIN (BT 157250) 5 DEC	Q'TIN PROV
	72ND VC BN (X-72)	C	450	Q'TIN (BT 211215) 5 DEC	Q'TIN PROV
	38TH VC BN (83RD BN)	C	400	Q'NGAI (BS 667572) 7 DEC	Q'TIN PROV



			LAST ACCEPTED/REPORTED	
TINU	CAT	STR	LOCATION AND DATE	SUFFERDINAPION
48TH VC BN (CONG TY 84)	C	400	Q'NGAI (BS 800482) 5 DEC	Q'IIN PROV
R-20TH IN	C	390	Q*NAM (AT 985535) 7 DEC	Q'NAK PROV
V-25 TH EN	C	500	Q'NAM (AT 865515) 7 DEC	QURAM PROV
T-89TH B	C	600	Q'NAM (AT 8062) 7 DEC	M-V as
			And the second second	
QUANG NAM PROVINCE	•	: :-		The Star
Q.12 CO (HOT AN CC)		80	(BT 180538) 5 DEC	DISTRICT
Q.13 CO (DUY XUYEN CO)		60	(BT 009500) 7 DEC	DISTRICT
Q-14 CO (DAI LOC CO)		70	(AT 7955) 13 NOV	, DIŞT RU T
Qel5 co (DIEM BAN CO)		80	(BT 023635) 9 NOV	DISTRICT
Q. 16 00 (HOA VARG CO)		80	(at 953650) 22 Nov	District
1-59 00		100	(AT 835830) 30 SEP	distri ce
			eng growth (A	
QUANC TIN PROVINCE		t _e .	the second	The second section is a second section of the second section of the second section is a second section of the second section of the second section section is a second section of the second section s
K.50 60 (QUE SON CO)(105)		70	(BS 650965) 15 AUG	District
K-51 CO (THANG BINH CO)		70	(BS 570705) 17 SEP	DISTRICT
K-52 CO (TIEN PHUOC CO)		80	(BT 1017) 1 JUN	DISTRICT
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UNIT	. STR	LAST ACCEPTED/REPORTITION AND DATE	SUMMERATION
K.53 CO (S. TAN KY CO)	70	(BT 344080) 4 DEC	DISTRICT
K.54 CO (N. TAH NY CO)	80	(BT 348277) 4 DEC	DISTRICT
E.55 CO (A.21 CO)	60		DISTRICT
K.57 CO (TRA M I CO)	50	(BT 0303) 28 MAY	DISTRICT
E.58 CO (TRA H 2 CO)	50	(BS 1499) 12 APR	district
K.59 CO (PHUOC SON CO)	40	(BT 365043) 23 AUG	DISTRICT
75TH SAPPER CG (V.18)	UNK	(PT 265205) 4 DEC	TAM RI CITY
706EH G0	WE	(BT 260120) 1 NCV	PROVINCE
749H CO	UMK	(UNLOC)	PR CV IN CE
Y-16 CO	WK	(UNLOC)	PROVINCE
QUANC NGAI PROVINCE			
T.19 CO (BINH SON CO)	80	(BS 470890) 5 DEC	district
T.20 CO (SON TINH CO)	100	(BS 540830) 6 DEC	DISTRICT
8TH CO (TRA BONG CO)	80.	(BS 690585 1 NOV	DISTRICT
C.17 CO (NO DUC CO)	70	(BS 750637) 2 DEC	DISTRICT
89B CO (NGHIA HANH CO)	80	(UNLOC)	D ISTRICT



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INIT	STR	LCCATION AND DATE	SUBORD IN ATE
206 CO (TU NGHIA CO)	100	(BS 73578C) 1 NOV	DISTRICT
0.212 00 (BA TO 00)	80	(BS 575380) 26 SEP	DISTRICT
C. 219 CO (DUC PHC CO)	80	(BS 793467) 30 NOV	District
614 (SON HA CO)	60	(BS 842420) 1 NOV	DISTRICT
20TA BE. (Q. 20)	400	(BS 363653) 2 DEC	DISTRICT
T.18 CO (DONG SON)	60	(BS 678857) 6 DEC	DISTRICT
96TH CC	100	(BS 530560) 1 NOV	DISTRICT
C-19 CO (POSS)	UNK	(BS 747596) 4 DEC	DISTRICT
195TH CO (P-38) (POSS)	UNK	(BS 673586) 6 DEC	DISTRICT
C-21 CO	UNK	(BS 698544) 30 AUG	DISTRICT
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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENTS, VCC/RETURNEES, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO LST MARDIV PERINTREF NO. 16

1. History and OOB of 402nd Sapper Bettalion

The following attached report was compiled from the below listed sources:

SOURCE # (1)

Defector: Bui Quang Hoi, Set, Squad Leader
Unit: MG Sqd, 307th Co, 402nd Sapper En
Date & Place: 100600H Jun 66, Post 60, Dai Loc Dist, Quang Nam Frov.

SOURCE # (2)

Defector: Huynh Dang AKA Phan Dao, Sgt, Squad Leader Unit: 3rd Sqd, 2nd Plt, 4C2nd Sapper Bn Dete & Place: 14 Sep 66, Dai Loo Dist, Quang Nam Prov.

SOURCE # (3)
Defector: Phan Van Dong AKA Phan Kim Tuan, Sgt, Coun-Lisison Sqd Lor Unit: Comm-Lisison Sqd, Dameng City Unit
Date & Place: 19 Nov 66, Xuyen Hiep (V) (BT 010477), Day Xuyen Tist.

Source # (4)

Captured Documents - "Ruster of V-3, T.89"

Date & Place: 20 Aug 66, (AT 813613)

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are keyed to the sources listed above. These numbers appear periodically on charts and at endings of paragraph to denote the source that provided the information. In instances where two or more source number appear together, this indicates that both sources have provided the same information.

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I. TRAINING

The 5th Battalion of the 219th Engineer Regiment was trained in Villages of Chi Linh District, Hai Duong Province, North Vietnam. Training took place for two months from 1 May 1965 to 30 June 1965 and was composed of political and military subjects. All of these subjects were taught by the company and battalion cadres. (1)

Types of training were: Squad-Company attack and defense. Sapper training was: individual and squad road, fence, wall, airfield creasing. Escape from search light, flare, dag barks, leaves and branches, sandy field, mud, rice paddy, plowed fields, and river crossing. Engineer training were: lecture and practical application on AT mine, strip mine, percussion mine, anti-personnel mine, stick grande and hand granule, formula and capacity of explosive to detonate bridge and road highway, locemetive and vehicle etc...(1)

II UNIT HISTORY

20 August 1965: Companies 16th and 17th of the 5th Battalien, subsubinate to the 219th Engineer Regiment infiltrated South Vietnam. The 16th Company led the group and was commanded by a Salt Gueng, the CO of the 16th Company. Infiltration started from Mai Bueng, then by train to Minh Binh. The two companies then marched through the areas of Mam Bong Bridge in Thanh Hos, then by Nghe An and Guang Binh, then to Mill 1001 in lower lases. Fore the 17th Company separated from the 16th Company and headed south. Recommendation letter of the 16th Company indicated that the 17th Company's destinationwas Bac Do or Kentum. Company 16th kept on moving in the direction of Nong Thong. On 16 October 1965 it arrived in the meuntaineus area of Dai Loc District (AT 797 629) previously abandened by another unknown engineer unit. (1)

13 October 1965: At (AT 797 625) the 16th Company was pursued by enemy forces and was forced to withdraw to the vicinity of (ZC 170 654). (1)

27 October 1965: The T.89th Sapper Battalian of Danang City activated with 4 companies designated V.1 through V.4. (1)(2)(3)

December 1965: The battalien moved to the plains area of Lec Tan (AT 835 535) and Loc Quang (AT 860 562) to undergo a menths training in sapper techniques. (1)

January 1966: Battalien moved back to its former location in the forest area of vicinity (ZC 170 654) for more retraining in AA and sapper techniques. Here it was reinforced by another company that had just infiltrated South Vietnam. This company consisted of artillery personnel but did not infiltrate with any artillery pieces. Its mission was to



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overrun an enemy artillery position and deploy it for its own use. (1) (G-2 Comment: Probably the 6th 81rm Mortar Company).

21 January 1966: The 81mm Mortar Platoon of the 4th Company (now the 6th Company) coordinated an attack with a Main Force unit of Quang Nam and shelled the Daneng Airfield. (1). This attack on Danang East, resulted in 4 KIA and 8 WJA. (2)

Late January 1966 through April 1966: Bettalion in training and production mission. (1). March 1966: Attack on Phu My (E), Phu Tan (V), Dien Ban (D), the 2nd Company lost 4 KIA and 6 WIA.

April 1966: The 2nd Company coordinated an attack on a US artillary position at Son Cha. Friendly losses (VC) were 8 killed or esptured. As a result of the possible capture of the above VC, the T.89th was redesignated the 402nd and its companies redesignated from 301st through 309th in old number sequence. (1)(2)

Early May 1965: The lat Company with a Quang Nam Main Force unit attacked a US artillery position at Thanh Vinh, Hoa Vang District. In this action, the company lost 26 killed. (1). In this abtack, the lat Company lost 14 killed and the 4th Company had 22 wounded. (2)

15 May 1966: The battalion moved back to its former location and had food stocked for 4 months because of a fear that the ARVA forces would soon reoccupy Nui To (AT 880572) to Thuong Due in the coming rainy seement. (1)

June 1966: Battalion located (AT 305605). (1)

27-28 August 1966: Battalion returned to its former area vicinity (AT 8060) and began rebuilding its base area, previously destroyed by USMC on Operation Allegheny. (2)

The Danang City Unit was previously located in the sountainous area of Dai Loc District since September 1966. As a result of Operation Aliegheny, it moved to the Diemne Mountains vicinity (ZC 119403). (3)

T.89th and unconfirmed T.87th battalions deployed in the general area of (AT 790340).

15 September 1966: T.89 moved from An Dinh Mountain to Ban Co Mountain area. (3)


T.89th is presently having a recruiting drive which source believes is for the upgrading of the Remang City Units to a regimental-size unit and the formation of a new battalion designated T.87th. (3). (G-2)



Comment: It should be noted that the present T.89th Battalien may refer to a more flexible task organization for the former unit. However, it could easily form another battalion, as stated by source #3 with its existing strength of 600 men. G-2 I Corps comments that the T.87th is probably a cover designation for the Danang City Unit Headquarters).



or Specification




PERSONALITIES:

DECLASSIFIED

Pham Nhu Hieu, Maj, Danang City Unit Ldr Ban, Capt, Political Officer Ha AKA Tuan, Capt, Asst Political Officer Van, Capt, Chief of Staff Hat, 1stLt, Asst Chief of Staff





Letter Box	Numbers (LEN) as provided by Sou	rce #2
21395 GM	Dong Hai Bn	Hos
21391 GM	Dong Hai 1st	. Ca
21392 GM	Dong Hai 2nd	Ca
21.393 GM	Dong Hai 3rd	Co
21.394 CM	Dong Hai 4th	Co
21396 GM	Dong Hai 6th	Co

(2) 16-81mm Mort (9 in V-6Co, 7 in reserve)
2-12.7mm AAMG (V-4 CmbtSptCo)
6-60mm Mort (V-4 CmbtSptCo)
B.40 Rkt Lohr (3-4 in each Co.)
4-PRC-10 Rde
1-SRC-300 Chicom Rdo

(3) 1-120mm Mort 2-81mm Mort 3-unk cal MG 1-unk cal HMG 18-8-40 Ekt Lehr

Source #1: 1 Recon & 1 Signal Sqd also subordinate to Bn Hqs.

Source #2: 1 Recon, 1 Signal & 1 Liaison Platoon subordinate to Bn Hqs.

Source #5: Each company consists of 3 sapper platoons of about 32 men each. Platoons is broken down into 3 squads. Each squad consists of 3-4 men cells.



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PERSONALITIES OF THE T.89TH BN

NAME	RANK	POSITION	SOURCE
			(1)
Nguyen Van Thuan	Capt	Bn CO	(1)
Y	Capt	Bn CO	\2\\\2\\
Kim Hung	Capt	Bn PO	%±ζ(~),
Lu Hung		Bn PO	>2(2)
Nguyen Van Than	latLt	Bn XO	(3) (2)(3) (3)
Bi	0 . 37/4	Bn Asst PO	(2)
Pham Nho Hien	2ndlit	En Recon O	(2)
Ва	2ndLt	Bn Training O	(3)
Pham Duy Dai		Chief of Staff	(5)
Dan	SrLt	listCo CO	(1)
Ngon.	2ndLt	lstCo: CO	(2)(3)
Nhu	WO	LatCo XO	(2)
Nam	2ndLt	lstCo PO	(2)
Xuyen & Ban	2ndLt	2ndCo CO	(2) (3)
Du	lstLt	2ndCo CO	(3)
Hoang Han	Lt	2ndCo XO	(1) (2) (2)
Dang Ngoc Qua	WQ	2ndCo XO	(2)
quy & Ly	WO	2ndCo XO	(2)
Tha nh	2ndLt	3rdCo CO	(2)
Khuan	WO	3rdCo XO	(2)
Dinh Van Guorn		5rdCo CO	(4)
Phem Dinh Can		3rdCo CO/PO	(4)
Tren Ban		3rdCo Asst PO	(4)
Vu Van Toai		3rdCo PO	(4)
Nguyen Van Xiem		3rdCo Adj	(4)
Vu Van Toan		3rdCo CO/PO	(4)
Nguyen Van Xuan	Aspt	4thCo CO	(1)
Toan	2ndLt	4thGo CO	(2)
Vu Van Toan	SrLt	4thCo PO	(1)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10 RELEASABLE TO FWMAF
AND RVNAF



ANNEX C (PARAGRAPH 13 ENTRIES) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO. 16

1.	Total	08.8 68	of	Vietnamese	Nationals	volunterring	information	to	v.s.
For	ces are	as fo	110	3 GWC					

lst	Marines 1	1
5th	Marines 1 1/5 1 3/5 1	2
7th	Marines	2
9th	Marines 5 3/7 1	6
11 ti	h Marines 1	1
12t	h Marines	1

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10 RELEASABLE TO FWMAF AND RVNAF



ANNEX D (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIY PERINTREP NR. 16						\$		
DATE	BMCT	SUNRISE	Sunset	EECT	MOONRISE	MOONSET	MOONPHASE	ITTOW
DEC 35	0644	0707	1818	1841	0956	2116	NEW	9
16	0644	0707	1818	1841	1041	2210	NEW	16
17	0645	0708	1819	1842	11.22	2303	NEA	24
18	0645	0708	1819	1842	1200	2351	NEW	32
19	0646	0709	1820	1843	1234		NEW	42
20	0646	0709	1820	1843	1307	0038	lst	51
21	0647	0710	1821	1844	1340	0122	lst	60
22	0647	0710	1821	1844	1413	0209	18T	69
23	0648	0711	1822	1845	1455	0257	1ST	78
24	0648	0711	1822	1845	1527	0347	lst	85
25	0649	0712	1823	1846	1611	0440	lst	92
26	0649	0712	1823	1846	1700	0537	1ST	96
27	0.650	0713	1824	1847	1756	0637	1ST	99
28	0650	0713	1824	1847	1857	0737	FULL	100
29	0651	0714	1825	1848	2000	0836	FULL	98
30	0651	0714	1825	1848	2104	0931	FULL	93
31	0652	0715	1825	1849	2205	1020	FULL	87

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


TION OF ENEM FORCES) 4 NOV 66

- 1. PURPOSE. This directive announces policy and prescribes responsibilities and procedures for the use of standard graphic symbols of enemy forces to be used by all US military forces subordinate to this headquarters.
- 2. GENERAL. To prevent misunderstanding and confusion in the graphic depiction of various enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), this headquarters and JGS, RVNAF have agreed on the use of a set of standard map symbols.

3. GRAPHIC PORTRAYALS

- 8. Maps and Publications in Black and White. The following symbols will be used for NVA and VC units in the acceptance criteria of Confirmed, Probable and Possible:
 - (1) Example (Infantry Battalion).




let Infantry Battelion, 3rd Regiment NVA, CONFIRMED.

(2) Example (Sapper Battalion).



76 Sapper Battalion VC Local Force, PROBABLE.

(3) Example (Infantry Battalion).



81st Infantry Battalion, VC Local Force, POSSIBLE.

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
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RELEASABLE TO FWMAP




b. Maps and Publication in Color. The following symbols will be used for NVA and VC units in the acceptance criteria of Possible, Probable and Confirmed:


(1) Example (NVA Signal Battalion) POSSIBLE.



(2) Example (NVA AA Battalion) PROBABLE.




(3) Example (NVA Infantry Battalion) CONFIRMED.



- (4) <u>VC MAIN FORCE</u> Units will follow the same criteria prescribed in paragraph 3b(1), (2), and (3), above, except that the color will be GREEN.
- (5) <u>VC LOCAL FORCE</u> Units will follow the dame criteria prescribed in paragraph 3b(1), (2), and (3), above, except that the color will be <u>YELLOW</u>.

distance in the language




DECLASSIFIED

5. RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Use of symbols established herein is mandatory for all staff offices of this headquarters.

b. Subordinate commands of USMACV will insure that symbols established herein are used for all operations plans, orders, map overprints, map substitutes and overlays where applicable.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10 RELEASABLE TO FWMAF AND RVNAF



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lst Marin (Vision (Bein), FHF Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam 317200H December 1966

Period Covered: 141200H to 281200H December 1966

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam AMS Series L701 and L7014

L. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

A. Adjacent Areas

- (1) Heavy contact was established by 3/26 with elements of the 6th NVA Regiment in Operation Chinock in the area between Hue and Quang Tricities. No unusual activity was notelalong the Quang Nam Thua Thien border area during the period of this report.
- (2) The 3rd (AKA 610th) Division is believed in an essentially defensive posture in central and northern Binh Dinh province with at least one regiment, almost certainly the 2nd VC, reported across the border in Quang Ngai province.

B. First Marine Division's Area of Responsibility

(1) Quang Nam Province. The bulk of significant activity in this province continues to center on the area where the 2/5, 1/26 and 1/1 mectors converge. 2/5 was heavily engaged with enemy forces of company size on the 16th, 17th, 19th, 20th and 24th of December. In several instances, in excess of 1,000 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire were received, often combined with 60mm on 61mm mortar fire. In addition to the quartity and types of fire received, the camouflaged uniforms, helmste and bunkers used by the enemy indicate that the force encountered was probably units of the R. 20 and/or V. 25 Provincial Mobile Battalions. On the 21st and the 27th December, 1/1 had beavier contacts than weral. The contact on the 21st is believed to have been with the same elements that were engaged by 2/5 on the two preceding days. A captive identified the unit in contact on the 27th as the Q.15B Local Force Company. Enemy activity occurred in a normally quiet part of the Those when are 1/3/9 position at the Hem O Bridge was haressed by mortar fire on the 25th of December. Overall, a general increase in enemy solivity has been moted within the TAOR. No significant artivity took place in those parts of the province outside of the TAOR.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10 RELEASABLE TO FWMAF
AND RVNAF



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- (2) Quang Tin Province. Interrogation of a captive from the 14 Becomber attack against Tam Ky reveal that two local force companies and elements of the 72nd Provincial Mobile Battalion participated. It would appear that the 72nd Battalion coordinated and directed the execution of the attack. Elementer in the province, activity was sparse. ARVN positions at Phu Tra, west of Tam Ky, came under moderate mortar fire on 19 December. On 18 December, a PF patrol out of Thang Binh was ambushed by an unknown force and suffered heavy losses. According to a defector from the 21st Regiment, both the 21st and 3rd NVA Regiments are in Quang Tin province generally northwest of Tien Phuoc. The headquarters of the 2nd Division is assumed to be in the same general area, although no recent reports of its location have been received.
- (3) Quang Ngai Province. No significant enemy activity has taken place in this province during the reporting period. A defector from the 70th Battalion states that his unit forms the fourth battalion of the lat VC Regiment, instead of being an independent battalion in southern Quang Nam province, as had been believed. Other defectors and captives from the 1st Regiment had stated that the 70th was a part of the 1st Regiment, but this man is the first actually from the 70th Battalion and able to give an account of its activity over the past six months. The case of this battalion, which agents consistently averred to be located in southern Quang Nam province when it actually was in Quang Ngai province, is not dissimilar to that of the 52nd Battalion which was reported by agenta, and believed by nearly all, to have been in eastern Son Tinh district for more than six months after it changed designations and moved to No Duc district as the 48th Battalion. As for the 48th now, it is reported by a recent defector to be engaged chiefly in production activities to be reported in the province from the Tra Khuc river south. According to the latest defector from the 3rd Division, the 2nd VC Regiment is located in the mountainous area between Ba To and Duo Pho. It is considered doubtful that elements of the 3rd Division are north of the Thach Tru - Ba To road.
- c. General Statement. Over the past month, there have been increasing indications of a re-emphasis of guerrilla and local force activity on the part of the enemy. The lack of contact with main forces and the continuing reports of personnel and logistic shortages are worthy of note. Also to be noted is the increase in activity on the part of the provincial mobile battalions. For instance in the nearly running engagement between 2/5 and what is believed to have been the R.20 Battalion, the latter expended, according to reports, at least 15,000 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire and 80 rounds of 60/81mm mortar fire in five engagements. Such a quantity of fire and the resistance encountered by Marine units in these contacts indicates a logistic capability and a willingness to engage not previously characteristic of provincial mobile battalions. It would appear that

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the enemy has shifted emphasis from a policy of building-up the main force 2nd Division in the hope of gaining a quick military victory to a policy of bolstering guerrilla and local forces to conduct protracted guerrilla warfare possibly in hope of an ultimate political accomodation. It is believed that, in the face of the Revolutionary Development Program which challenges the basis of the enemy's power - his control of the people -and in view of the lark of success, and of any prospects for the same, on the part of the main forces, the enemy will find it imperative to stress the guerrilla and local forces if ever he is to be successful in gaining his ultimate goal. If this policy has been, or is to be adopted, greater activity can be expected throughout the tri-province area from guerrillas, district-concentrated compenies and provincial motile battalions, in that their ranks will no longer be drawn down to replace main force losses and ammunition and other supplies will become more available as these items are increasingly diverted from main to local and guerrilla forces. While the 2nd Division is not remaining replacements for battle losses and is also suffering from shortages of ammunition, food and madicine, there are no indications that the disbanding of the main force maits is to be expected. Although not fully combat effective, nor likely to become so in the near future, it would appear that the main force 2nd Division will continue to pose a limited, but no less real, threat to isolated outposts and to other forces whenever overextended and when the circumstances are feworable emough wirtually to ensure the success of the enemy attack.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD

A. Strength and Dispositions

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- (1) See Auner A., lat Marbiv FERINTREP No. 16.
- (2) Recent how havel agent reports, ralkier/captured document reports have revealed, over the period that the V.25 and R.20 Battalions are still presently located in and adjacent to the southern boundary of the Danner TAGR.
- (a) Due Due district rallier revealed on 15 December that the V.25 Rettalion is new operating mostly within the 2/5 TAOR, with its CP located vicinity (AT 8/25/VO) and had been for a period of 30 days prior to interrogation. Further reports received plus captured documents indicate the B.20 Battalion now operating astride the AT/BT north south grid line vicinity (AT 9955 and BT 0654). Recent beavy contacts in this area by 2/5 and documents captured by 1/26 on 17 December with letter box number 2111 (R.21 Company) and 2113 (R.23 Company) corroborate agent reports that the R.20 Battalion is now operating this area, and not the 2/5 area as suspected by early low level agent reports.



- (3) Captive Vo Thanh Troug, captured by 1/3/7 on 22 December 1966, revealed that he was a rifleman for the 3rd Cell, 1st Platoon, 2nd Company, Q-14 unit. Dai Loc district force and that his unit has a strength of 270 men. Troug stated that the Q-14 unit has 3 companies, each consisting of 3 platoons, with 3 squads with 3 cells. His company, the 2nd, has 90 men with 30 men per platoon, 12 men per squad and 3 men per cell. The weapons for the unit are 1-60mm mortar, 1-30 caliber machine gun, 2 M-79, 3 BAR's, 10 M-14's, 10 AK-47's, 5 K-50's, an unknown number of MAS 36, M-1's and carbines. The Q-la unit command post locations used are in the vicinity of (AT 850550, AT 805555, ZC 195545, ZC 105565). Troug further stated that the Q-14 sometimes has 30 village guerrillas from Loc Quang (V) (AT 805555) operating with it. The mission of the Q-14 unit is to defend against US/ARVN operations within the Q-14 area. Troug states that morale is low due to the constant artillery and air attacks, insufficient food/ medical supplies. Comment: The reported location for the Q-14 unit is accepted based on current Order of Battle holdings showing this area to be the normal operating area of the Q-14 Company. Previous interrogation reports also located the Q-14 Company in this area but each differs in size and organization. Rallier statement of 12 November shows the Q-14 Company having only 3 platoons for a total strength of 115 men and a captive's statement of 17 December put the strength at 100 men, while another rallier's statement of 15 December shows the Q-14 unit broken down into 2 companies of 40 men each. Based on these reports, it is felt that the captive may be exaggerating and/or just trying to please the interrogator. This captive was only 18 years old and a rifleman who had been with this unit for only 2 months and may be confused on unit strength and organization. What may appear as 3 companies may only be the Q-14 company broken down into operating platoons utilizing the A and B suffix to denote units within a company (Refer Rallier's statement, 1st MarDiv PERINTREP NO. 14. Paragraph 2.b. (2)). Also a Q-14B unit has been reported by low level agent reports of late, indicating this system in use. The strength differences may be the augmentation of local village guerrillas supporting this company as stated by captive.
- (4) Disposition and strength of K-16 Company (2nd Company), Bing Trang Battalion (70th Battalion), Cuu Long Regiment (1st VC Regiment), 2nd NVA Division, Refer Annex B (Operational Interrogation Report Nguyen Van Mao).

B. Order of Battle

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- (1) See Annex A. 1st MarDiv PERINTREP NO. 16.
- (2) See Annex P (History and OOB of the 3rd NVA Regiment, 2nd Division).
- (3) Hoa Vang District (Quang Nam) agent report of 24 November, 1966, rated B-2, reports the Quang Da province Committee has decided to



dissolve the Hoa Vang District Company (AKA Q-16) and to assign the personnel of this company into the V-25 and R-20 Battalions which are suffering shortages of strength caused by many recent battles. Comment: This report is evaluated as possibly true based on recent agent reports and interrogation reports that the Q-16 Company normally operates with these units and if the need for personnel to bolster their strength is required, this would be the normal procedure of procuring additional strength from the district company.

- (4) Evidence available to this headquarters indicates the 1506th Engineer (MF) Battalion sub-unit to MR-V meets the criteria established by COMUSMACV Dir 381-12 dtd 15 November 1965, for confirmation and has been requested in accordance with said directive. Although not confirmed to date, the following information available on this unit was compiled for your records in anticipation of confirmation.
- (a) Sources: VCC, Nguyen Van Minh, member of Signal and Liaison unit, Platoon C, 1506th Engineer Battalion; Rallier, Trinh Thanh Ba, Lieutenant, Field Reconnaissance Officer, MR-V; Rallier, Nguyen Dang Hong, metal worker, 1st Squad, D-HQ platoon, 1506th Engineer Battalion.

(b) Structure

1. 1506th Engineer Battalion, strength, 330.

Capt Nguyen Huy Kinh Bn CO

SrLt Dao Bn XO

SrLt Thanh Bn PO

Asst Bn PO SrLt Xa

The Battalion is composed of three companies (9th, 10th, and 11th) and one Headquarters Platoon (D-HQ Platoon).

2. 9th Company (AKA 1st Company), strength, 100

SrLt TOAN Co CO

Co XO Lt Duc

Co PO SrLt Sau

3. 10th Company (AKA 2nd Company), strength, 100

SrLt Sauo Co CO

Co XO Lt Nhi

Lt Lai Co PO

Asst Co PO Lt Dan

4. 11th Company (AKA 3rd Company), strength, 100

SrLt Long Co CO

Co XO Lt Chi

Francisco Companie

Co PO SrLt De

Asst Co PO Lt Toan

(c) Weapons and Equipment. Each company has the following:



- 1 AR, 9 AK-47 assault rifles (1 per squad) and approximately 14 SKS rifles. In addition, each man carries 1 grenade. The battalion is equipped with shovels, hammers, rakes and hoes. The Signal Squad has no signal equipment.
- (d) Unit History. In October 1965 the 1506th Engineer Battalion was in Trung Ha (V), Quang Dai (D), Son Tay (P), NVN. In late October or early November the 1506th Engineer Battalion left NVN for RVN. It traveled through Thanh Hoa, Nohe An, An Thinh, Quang Sinh and Laos. It arrived in Chi Lang (H), Ha Thanh (V), Son Ha (D), Quang Ngai (P), SVN in March 1966. Here the battalion set up defensive positions and began agricultural work to support themselves and to store food for future use. During this time, the unit participated in no battles, however, I squad was sent to blow up a bridge (location unknown).
- C. Reserves and Reinforcements. Recent reports and indications show no overt or covert change in VC units disposition and organization outside the tri-province area. Elements of the 3rd NVA Division are still reported located adjacent to and within the Quang Ngai province boundary. Interrogation report of captive Private Dang Van Dong, 4th Squad, 2nd Platoon, 2nd Company, 802nd Battalion (AKA K-2), 6th NVA Division gave information on that unit's present disposition and reported planned activities (See Annex B (Interrogation Report, PVT Dang Van Dong, Captive, 2nd Co, 802nd Battalion, 6th NVA Division).
 - D. New Enemy Tactics. Negative
 - E. Administrative and Political Units. Negative
- F. Anti-Air Activity. There were a total of two incidents of intense small arms/automatic weapons fire being received by aircraft/helicopters during the reporting period. These occurred on 13 December at (BS 600448) and on 20 December at (AT 976533), where tracers were in evidence. Also there has been a noticeable increase in anti-aircraft fire over the past month, however, this increase has been in light small arms and automatic weapons fire characteristic of the guerrillas and local forces rather than in the .50 caliber fire typical of main force units. (The total number of AA incidents for subject period were 198).
- G. Anti-Personnel/Anti-Tank Mine Activity. From 141200H to 281200H December there were a total of 44 mine/booby trap incidents within the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR s. There was nothing unusual in the type of mines/booby traps utilized by the VC or in the manner they were employed except for one incident when a 2½ ton truck belonging to the ARVN, 37th Ranger Battalion, travelling on Highway #1, was blown off the Highway by a command detonated mine. The truck was thrown approximately 50 meters off the road and was completely destroyed. The road crater was 8-10 feet deep. Casualties were: 16 KIA and 7 WIA.



- H. Artillery/Mortar/RR Activity. There were a total of seven mortar attacks during the subject period within the TAOR's. These incidents were as follows:
- (1) Between 170810H and 171100H, G/2/5 at (AT 947536) received 12 rounds 60mm mortar fire (See paragraph 2.L.(1) this PERINTREP).
- (2) At 181500H, I/3/l perimeter defense (BT 044661) received 2 rounds 60mm mortar fire from (BT 045657). Returned fire with inconclusive results.
- (3) At 192020H, G/2/5 received 8 rounds 82mm mortar fire from a northern direction. No casualties were inflicted. Air strikes were run on suspected enemy position with inconclusive results. (See paragraph 2.L.(3) this PERINTREP).
- (4) At 192045H, E/2/5 Company S&D (AT 960550) received 10 rounds 82mm mortar and automatic weapons fire from vicinity of (AT 962550) resulting in 2 USMC WIA (non evac). Unit returned fire and searched area with inconclusive results.
- (5) Between 211130H and 211230H, C/1/l at (AT 997595) made contact with 20 VC with small arms and 60mm mortars at (BT 007596). On contact the VC broke into two groups with elements moving northeast and east. Company C pursued the VC and established blocking positions vicinity (BT 005595 004584). Air/artillery missions were run at which time Company C received 14 rounds 60mm mortar resulting in 4 USMC KIA and 2 USMC WIA (evac). Fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA confirmed, 6 VC KIA probable and capturing 1 sub machine-gun and 1 M-14 rifle.
- (6) Between 241445H and 242000H, E/2/5 and G/2/5 received 35 rounds 82mm mortar fire. (See paragraph 2.L.(4) this PERINTREP).
- (7) At 251955H, I/3/9 platoon defense position (AT 929841) received 300 rounds small arms and 2 rounds 60mm mortar from estimated VC squad (AT 925835). Fire was returned and a search of the area was made at first light with inconclusive results. No casualties inflicted.

I. Interdiction Activities. Negative

J. Guerrilla Activity. Throughout the period the VC conducted 179 harassing small arms, 14 grenades, 4 rifle grenades, 2 M-79, 1 propaganda and 1 terrorism incidents in the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's. There was one incident of significance: On 15 December, a 3rd A/T Battalion Ontos in support of C/1/26 was ambushed vicinity (AT 968598) by an estimated 25-30 VC who delivered heavy automatic weapons fire wounding 3 USMC. The infantry and Ontos returned 17 rounds of 106 RR and over 2200 rounds of small arms resulting in 3 VC KIA confirmed and 2 VC KIA prob.

· Vincential Control



M.

- K. Guided Missiles. Negative
- L. Infantry. There were 6 significant contacts within the TAOR's during the reporting period:
- (1) G/2/5 between 170810H and 171100H at (AT 947536) received 24 rounds small arms fire from an estimated 4-5 VC. An AO/OE overhead reported sighting 5 fighting-holes and 1 man dressed in black PJ's running away. G Company then marked the area and called for an airstrike. While waiting for the airstrike, G Company received 40 additional rounds small arms and 2 rounds 60mm mortar. Subsequently the enemy fired 2000 rounds small arms, 10 rounds 60mm mortar and about 100 rounds .50 caliber from the north resulting in 1 USMC KIA and 3 WIA. Company G then swept the area finding a trench line, fighting holes and mortar positions. It was estimated these fortifications were built for a company size unit. Total VC losses were 3 VC KIA confirmed, 17 VC KIA probable.
- (2) At 191330H, E/2/5 at (AT 955545) received 1000 rounds small arms/automatic weapons fire and 10 rounds RPG rockets fire from an estimated VC reinforced company resulting in 4 Marine casualties. E Company returned 500 rounds small arms, 2 M-79 rounds, 6 LAAWS, 1000 rounds automatic weapons and assaulted 75 meters through a rice paddy, treeline and bunker positions and overran the VC position. Enemy losses were 5 VC KIA confirmed, 15 WIA probable, 1 rocket launcher with 3 rounds, 1 BAR, 1 AK 47, 1 Chicom K-44, 7 grenades, 4 packs and 15 pounds of documents. The VC were wearing camouflaged uniforms and helmets.
- (3) G/2/5 on the evening of 191815H at (AT 972518) received 1000 rounds automatic weapons/small arms fire from an estimated company size VC unit resulting in 1 USMC KIA and 5 WIA (3 evac). G Company returned 3000 rounds small arms/automatic weapons, 20 M-79°s, 8 LAAWS, 5 3.5 rockets and 20 grenades and closed with the enemy. The VC withdrew to the east. The initial heavy contact ended at 1910H but Marines continued to receive sporadic fire. About 2020H, as resupply and med evac helos were in the area, the enemy fired 200 rounds small arms and 8 rounds of 82mm mortar from the north. Fixed wing conducted an airstrike on the suspected mortar position with unknown results.
- (4) E/2/5 on 201555H at (AT 976531) received 3000-4000 rounds small arms/automatic weapons fire from an estimated 2 VC companies to their north and southeast. E Company returned 6000 rounds small arms/automatic weapons fire, 20 3.5 rockets, 40 LAAWS, 20-60mm mortar and 40 grenades. They were unable to assault due to heavy volume of fire. G Company moved from the west to link up with Company E at 1615H. Both units continued to receive heavy small arms/automatic weapons fire. Co F crossed the river and moved north to join Co s G & E. At 1625H, Co F received heavy fire (AT 983527) but continued to advance north against resistance. An airstrike was called by Co G. The volume of enemy fire



began to slack off at 1720H and med evac for Co F was able to get in and out at 1830. Med evac and resupply lifts for the other companies were held off by heavy fire at the landing zone. A link up of all companies was finally effected at 1925H. A flare ship provided illumination while the units consolidated their positions. They continued to receive sporadic small arms fire but due to darkness and the tactical situation, could make no assessment of enemy casualties. Friendly casualties were 3 USMC KIA, 16 WIA (evac).

- (5) At 211130H, a C/1/1 platoon combat patrol engaged a VC unit, reportedly 2 squads totalling 20 men from the Q-15B Company. These squads had just ambushed a PF unit to the southwest and were fleeing when cut off by the C/1/1 platoon (BT 062588). C/1/1 took the VC under fire with small arms and M-79's resulting in the killing of 14 VC confirmed and 2 VCC (one captured by USMC, the other by ARVN). They also captured 10 individual weapons. There were no Marine casualties.
- (6) At 241445H to 241925H, E/2/5 had 2 separate contacts with VC in an estimated battalion size (350-400 men). Elements of G/2/5 at (AT 955547) received 2500 rounds small arms/automatic weapons fire and 20 rounds 82mm mortar fire from (AT 963541) resulting in 2 USMC KIA and 7 WIA (evac). The unit in contact returned 4500 rounds small arms fire and directed a fire mission of 79 rounds 155mm on the VC positions. Nearby elements of G/2/5 directed 300 rounds automatic weapons fire at VC's left flank. Fire ceased at 1630H. Later at 1840H, as E/2/5 was moving to link up with G/2/5, it received 2000 rounds small arms/automatic weapons fire from a VC unit and 15 rounds 82mm mortar at (AT 971536) resulting in 2 USMC WIA (evac). The unit returned 2500 rounds small arms/automatic weapons fire and directed 18 rounds 155mm and 41 rounds of 81mm mortar at the VC positions. G/2/5 sent a platoon to link up with Co E. The VC ceased fire at 241925H. Total USMC casualties for the 2 actions were 2 USMC KIA, 9 WIA (evac). VC losses were 9 VC KIA confirmed, 14 KIA prob.
 - M. Reconnaissance. Negative
 - N. Infiltration. Negative
 - O. Other Elements. Negative

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

A. Enemy Organization and Combat Efficiency. Enemy organization and combat efficiency within the tri-province area remains the same for all units. Reports still tend to indicate that most units are still having a leadership problem at small unit level due to personnel losses and recruitment of replacements from the ranks of personnel with insufficient combat experience and training. One notable agent report is that which



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states the Q.16 Company being dissolved and personnel from that unit augmenting the V.25 and R.20 Battalium ranks due to recent llosses by these units (See Para 2.B.(3) This Perintrep).

B. New Unit Identification. Negative

Co New Enemy Weapons and Equipment. Two reports received this head-quarters during the subject period gave information on the introduction of a new type sniper rifle being utilized by the VC forces. The first report came from a returnee interrogation report conducted by the Combined Military Interrogation Center, report # (Log # 08-061-66, Translated 15 December 1966). In this report the subject returnee, Nguyen Van Sinh, Platoon Leader, 2nd Platoon, ColOO Sniper Company, 32nd Group, MR-III, described this scope-equipped rifle as similar to the K-44 rifle, 7.62mm, but differs in characteristics described below:

Size and caliber are the same as the K-44 except that the barrel is long er (approx 18.3 cm) and a scope is affixed to the weapon.

The scope magnifies an image approximately 3 times, for examples at 1050 meters, the scope magnifies the target to appear to be only 300 meters away. Maximum range of the weapons is reportedly 5000 meters with an effective range of 1,500 meters. Weight, including scope, approximately 5.7 kilos. Rate of fire is single shot, six rounds per minute.

The acope is 12 cm long and 4 cm in diameter. It has two knobs for adjusting range and windage. The range knob is computed from zero to twelve with each graduation equaling 100 meters. The windage scale (source didn't remember the numerical designation (but he described the scale to have a zero center with one direction plus and the other minus scale. Inside the scape there is a level and fixed blade type direction finder.

The second report received came from a Quang Ngai National Police Report of a defector in the Khanh Hoa sub-sector. On 22 October 1966, a VC battalian was seen vicinity of Mo Buc District, Quang Ngai province. This battalian was armed with Hungarian weapons with telescopic sights. The weapons had been issued to a squad whose activities were primarily in remote regions. Based on these reports, it is felt that the VC may have introduced a new and different type sniper rifle in SVN, Other than the normally reported and captured weapon, the Soviet 7.62mm sniper rifle M891/30.

D. Personalities. Negative

E. Enemy Leases. VC losses during the period in the Danang and Chu Lai TAGR's totaled 146 KDA confirmed, 187 KDA probable, 31 VCC, 2 ralliers, and 217 VCS. In addition, enemy losses on Operation STERLING, which commenced at 1111120H and terminated 170830H December, were 16 VCS. Operation STERLING, which commenced at 1111120H and terminated 170830H December, were 16 VCS.

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ation GLENN which commenced at 170930H and terminated at 211200H December were: 3 KIA confirmed, 2 KIA probable, 3 VCC, and 12 VCS. Operation SHASTA II which commenced at 200600H and terminated at 211200H December were: 11 KIA confirmed, 1 KIA probable, 1 VCC, and 9 VCS. VC losses on Operation SIERRA, which began at 120600H December and is still in progress, are 61 KIA confirmed, 53 KIA probable, 11 VCC, 1 RALLIER, and 24 VCS. These losses are assessed against the enemys guerrilla and local forces.

- Fo Morale. During the subject period, defector/rallier reports still indicate VC morals within the Trio-Province Area remains low for the usual reasons of air and arty harassment, shortage of food/medical supplies causing disease and lack of physical stamina. These factors supplemented by a general lack of faith in officers and NCO for their shortcomings in leadership and training add to and compound the state of low morals.
- G. Details of Administrative Installation and Support. A Hieu Nhon District Rallier, Bui Gici, 15, Corpsman, C-2 Unit, B-2 Company, 21st VC Madical/Gombat Battalion revealed that there are two aid stations vicinity of Ngoc Lung Mountain, exact location unknown. The journey to these aid stations lasted 3 nights, and went north around the hamlets of Ha My Tay #1 vicinity (BT 120625) and Ha My Dong; vicinity (BT 125632), then south through the villages of Cam An; vicinity (BT 154607) and Cam Chau vicinity (BT 162584) then into the village of Cam Thanh vicinity (BT 174576). The aid stations are on Ngoc Long Mountain approximately one mountain apart. Each aid station is composed of two buildings which are wards and are approx 32° X 32° and made of bamboo. Each building can accommodate approximately 20 patients. On 23 November there were approximately 40 patients in these wards. Also at these aid stations there are two buildings 16° X 16° in which one doctor, five corpsmen, and 3 nurses live.
- (2) The following information was obtained on 5 December from interrogation of refugee from the Opn Mississippi area.
 - (A) Two rice warehouses vicinity (AT 955378)
 - (B) One medical warehouse vicinity (AT 951382)
 - (C)) Twelve rice warehouses vicinity (AT 915350)
 - (D)) Ninty-four tens of rice vicinity (AT 922405)
- (E) Vicinity of grid square (AT 7850) the following supplies are stored in unknown amounts; salt, salted fish, clothing, sugar, and rice.
- (3) Preliminary interrogation report of detaines Opn SIERRA, captured 12 December 1966, reported the followings Rice storage site of 2 ton capacity located (BS 615581). Also subject reported that there is a VC hospital located (BS 585587) capable of treating 40 patients. Captive was at the above locations on 2nd and 9 December 1966.



Total Market

(4) Quang Ngai province agent reports as of 30 November 1966, a VC arms repair factory was located in the vicinity of (BS 286810). This factory is protected by a lumber bunker. The factory contains 10-81mm mortars, an unknown number of 57mm RR, and more than 300 small arms. The factory has approximately 50 VC engineers working there.

H. Terrain. Negative

- I. Weather. The weather in the TAOR's from 141200H to 281200H December was cloudy and wet. The average maximum and minimum temperatures were 77 degrees and 72 degrees respectively, average humidity was 87%, visibility 4 miles, and winds were variable with light velocity the first part of the subject period and toward the latter, at a north-easterly direction with an average velocity of 8-15 knots with gusts up to 20 knots. There was approximately 16.61 inches of rainfall during the subject period, most of it occurring on 23-28 December.
 - J. Intelligence Operations. Negative
- 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative
- 5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES

A. Capabilities

- (1) With a redisposition of force, the enemy can attack the Da Nang Combat Base with a division minus consisting of two less than combat efficient regiments (3rd NVA and 21st NVA), supported by combat support and combat service support battalions. The enemy can deploy in his attack, or reinforce, with two battalions from Quang Nam (R.20 and V.25), the 804th Battalion from Thua Thien, and the 402nd Sapper Battalion in Quang Nam province.
- (2) With a redisposition of force, the enemy can attack the Chu Lai Combat Base with a division consisting of three infantry regiments, (lst VC, 3rd NVA and 2lst NVA), two less than combat efficient, supported by combat support and combat service support battalions. The enemy can deploy in his attack, or reinforce, with one battalion from Quang Tin (72nd), two battalions (38th and 48th) and the 409th Sapper Battalion from Quang Ngai.
- (3) Attack CIEG camps, district towns, provincial capitals and vulnerable ARVN outposts, singly or several, simultaneously, in strength of one or more reinforced regiments.
- (4) Covertly infiltrate and attack friendly positions with sapper elements in platoon or company strength, particularly those proximate to



or guarding villages, bridges, artillery positions, fuel and ammo dumps and airfields.

- (5) Introduce into the 1st Marine Division area of responsibility the 6th NVA Regiment from Thua Thien province within 5 days after movement commences, the 3rd Division from Binh Dinh province within 1 day after movement commences and the 1st Division from Pleiku province within 10 days after movement commences.
- (6) Harass friendly forces and installations with small arms, granades, mortars, booby traps and small ambushes at a time and place of the enemy's choice utilizing his guerrilla and local forces.
- (7) Interdict lines of communication throughout Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces, particularly National Route #1, Liberty Road and the railroad lines in Hai Van Pass area at a time and place of the enemy's choice, using trained demolitions personnel working in conjunction with guerrilla and local forces.
- (8) Conduct political agitation and propaganda, combined with a selective use of politically-inspired violence, including assassination, terrorism and sabotage in an effort to thwart the Revolutionary Development Program.
- (9) Evade significant contact with friendly forces to protect the integrity of his force while awaiting more favorable circumstances for offensive operations or repeated harassment, to include at least periods of reduced visibility.
- (10) Continue to improve his force structure by introducing personnel and material resources from North Viet Nam into the 1st Marine Division area of responsibility.

B. Probable Enemy Course of Action

- (1) Continue to emphasize local and guerrilla forces for harassment and political violence throughout the three provinces, interspersed with raids on selected key installations and positions within the combat bases and infrequent reinforced battalion size attacks on isolated outposts elsewhere. Continue interdiction of lines of communication with emphasis on National Route #1, Liberty Road and the Hai Van Pass area. Concurrently, continue to improve his force structure at the provincial, district and hamlet levels.
- (2) Attack friendly forces within the southern half of the Da Nang combat Base in up to multi-battalion strength, (R. 20 and V. 25).



- (3) Attack district towns, CIDG camps and isolated ARVN outposts, singly or several, simultaneously, in up to reinforced regimental strength probably with the further objective of ambushing relief/reaction forces.
- (4) Attack installations and forces in the Chu Lai Combat Base, Tam My or Quang Ngai city in up to reinforced regimental strength.
- (5) Attack the An Hos industrial complex in reinforced regimental strength.
- (6) Attack the Chu Lai Combat Base with the forces enumerated in capability (3) above.
- (7) Attack the Da Nang Combat Base with the forces enumerated in capability (1) above.
- (8) Introduce elements of the 6th NVA Regiment or 1st Division into the three province area.
 - C. Vulnerabilities. The enemy has four major vulnerabilities.
- (1) The enemy is vulnerable to air attack at all times. His logistic system and supply bases are always vulnerable to interdiction and destruction by sir. Unless properly concealed, his movements and bivuous sites are constantly in danger of air strikes.
- (2) The enemy is vulnerable to psychological warfare operations. Idfe for the Viet Cong is hard at best and filled with deprivation and danger. This constant difficulty and paril, the lack of dedication on the part of the rank and file, as well as some of the cadre, plus the proferred leniency of the Chieu Hoi program, combine to make the enemy unusually susceptible to exploitation by psychological warfare techniques.
- (3) The enemy is vulnerable to rapid, bold and unexpected maneuwers in the developing tactical situation. His insistence on minutely planned and carefully rehearsed operations precludes a quick and flexible reaction to friendly maneuvers, unless in keeping with his preconceived battle plan.
- (4) The enemy is vulnerable to sustained combat operations and aggressive pursuit. The inherent weakness of the enemy's logistic system and its continuing susceptibility to interdiction by air deny the enemy the capability of supporting sustained combat operations. The enemy's rigidity of tactical doctrine induces him to avoid and/or quickly disengage from contact whenever the tactical situation does not develop according to plan.

J. J. O'DONNELL

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Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A Order of Battle Annex (to be issued)
- B Significant Agents, VCC/Returnees, and Document Reports C Paragraph 13 Entries
- D Astronomical Data

Distribution: "A" less 7, 12, 17-21, 37-67 "C" less 72, 76, 84, 98, 100

Copy	to:	III NAF	(5)
		3rd MarDiv	(2)
		lst MAW	(8)
		2nd ROK	(1)
		SA, 2nd ARVN Div	(1)
		SA, Quang Tin Sector	(1)
		SA, Quang Ngai Sector	(1)
		SA, CNSS Adv Grp, Hoi An	(1)
		FLC	(1)
		MCB 9	(1)
		NCB 10	(1)
		MCB 56	(1)
		CICA	(1)
		7th Engr	(1)
		let Air Cav Div	(1)
		Task Force X-Ray	(50)
		9th Marines	(9)
		3rd Tk Bn	(4)
		2nd bn/5th Mar	(4)

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENTS, VCC/RETURNERS, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO 1ST MARDIA PERINTREP NO. 17

I. HISTORY AND OOB OF THE 3RD NVA REGIMENT

The following attached report is a compilation of the below listed captives and defectors.

Source #1

Defector: Do Nhu Phuong, PFC Unit: 11th Sqd, 4th Plt, 10th Co, 3rd Bn, 3rd Regt Date & Place: 8 Jun 66, Que Son Dist

Source #2

Captive: Le Chi Vien, Cpl, Co Aidman Unit: 3rd Co, lst Bn, 3rd Regt Date & Place: 17 Jun 66, (BT 105160)

Source #3

Captive: Nguyen Van Ngoo, Cpl, Asst Sqd Ldr Unit: 3rd Plt, 3rd Co, lst Bn, 3rd Regt Date & Place: 17 Jun, (BT 100180)

Source #4

Defectors: Dinh Long Truong, SrLt, Plans Officer Unit: Rear Service Staff, 3rd Regt, 620th Div Date & Place: 6 Jul 66, Thang Binh Dist Hqs

Source #5

Captives: Ta Van Dan, Sgt Unit: Telephone Plt, 18th Signal Co, 3rd Regt Date & Places: 6 Aug 66, (AT 985325)

Source #6

Captive: Dang Van Ho, Cpl, Sqd Asst Unit: 2nd Telephone Plt, 18th Signal Co, 3rd Regt Date & Place: 6 Aug 66, (AT 985325)

Source #7

Captive: Dang Duc Manh
Unit: 18th Signal Co, 3rd Regt
Date & Place: 6 Aug 66, (AT 985325)


Source #8

Captive: Kieu Van Vi, Cpl, Asst Sqd Ldr Unit: 2nd Telephone Plt, 18th Signal Co, 3rd Regt Date & Place: 6 Aug 66, (AT 985325)

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Source #9

Captive: Do Minh Hien, Pvt Unit: 18th Signal Co, 3rd Regt Date & Place: 6 Aug 66, (AT 985325)

Source #10

Captive: Le Van Dong, Cpl Unit: 18th Signal Co, 3rd Regt Date & Place: 6 Aug 66, (AT 985325)

Source #11

Captive: Nguyen Van Tien, PFC Unit: 18th Signal Co, 3rd Regt Date & Place: 6 Aug 66, (AT 985325)

Source #12

Captive: Nguyen Ba Trung, Pvt Unit: 18th Signal Co, 3rd Regt Date & Place: 6 Aug 66, (AT 985325)

Source #13

Captive: Nguyen Huu Taa, Pvt Unit: 18th Signal Co, 3rd Regt Date & Place: 6 Aug 66, (AT 985325)

Source #14

Defector: Le Xuat Ngoai, Pvt
Unit: B-1 Staff, 3rd Regt, 2nd Div
Date & Place: 22 Aug 66, Lac Son, (BT 0228)

Source #15

Captives Than Duc Dua, Rifleman Unit: 1st Co, 1st Bn, 31st Regt, 2nd Div Date & Places 18 Oct 66, (AT 8439)

HISTORY OF THE 3RD NVA REGIMENT

This regiment was activated during the French Indochina War as the 64th Capital Defense Regiment subordinate to the 320th NVA Division. It maintained the responsibility as the home guard for Hanoi until August 1965 when it moved to Hoa Binh province for infiltration training. During this time, the regiment was composed of 70% veterans while the remainder were new draftees.

Miller

In December 1965, the unit moved to Winh Binh province from whence the unit began to infiltrate South Vietnam in 4 groups beginning in January 1966. Group 1 consisted of the list Battalion, Group 2 consisted of the Support Companies, Group 3 consisted of the 2nd Battalion and Group 4 consisted of the 3rd Battalion. All groups were spaced approximately 24 hours apart.

On or about 20 January, the entire regiment in groups began its infiltration. During infiltration the regiment passed Hill 1001, Hill 1800, Sepone River and then entered South Vietnam in Quang Tri province. From Quang Tri province approximately 40 kilometers west of Hue, it continued its trek southward passing through Thua Thien, and stopping for approximately, 1 month in the mountainous regions of Quang Nam province, for retraining and rest. It then continued its movement southward, arriving in the Hiep Duc basin in late May or early June 1966.

Cover Designations:

While in North Vietnam, this regiment was known as the 64th Regiment subordinate to the 320th MVA Division. During its infiltration the regiment had the cover designation Bac Ha or Group 306. Entering South Viet Nam in Quang Tri province it received the designation 31st Regiment and later upon arrival in the Hiep Duc area, redesignated to 3rd Regiment and subordinated to the 620th NVA Division AKA 2nd Division.

Past Activities:


Source #2 and 3 states that the unit that participated in the attack on USMC positions on a hill in Tien Phuoc District was the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, 3rd NVA Regiment. Casualties for that operation were stated at approximately 20 KIA and 50 WIA, majority of which were caused by airstikes. They (VC) estimated at the time of the attack, that the USMC unit on the hill to be at least 50. (NOTES This was the attack on a hill occupied at the time by a platoon from 1st Recon Battalion numbering approximately 18 men).

Source #15 provided the following informations 3rd NVA Regiment was the unit involved in Neng Son OP attacks of 17 and 19 October 1966.

Source participated in the attack and knew the attack plans. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were the attacking force, while the 3rd Battalion acted as the reserve unit with the regimental CP. The 2nd Battalion conducted the main attack against what the source described as the main outpost. Only the list Company of the 1st Battalion attacked. One plateon assaulted the PF positions while the remaining 2 plateons assaulted BF positions.

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COMPOSITION OF THE 3RD NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY REGIMENT. 620TH DIVISION




Source #6 states: 21st is a Security Plt for the Regimental Mas.

Source #8 states: 21st is a Security Co for the Regimental Mgs.

Source #14 states: Each Bn composed of 3 Co's and 4 attached plts: 81 Mort, 75 RR. Comm & MC Plt's.

Possibly this is not attached elements, but the Hvy Wons Supt Co in each Bn).



WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT

TYPE	No.	Source #	REMARKS	_
82 Morters 12.7 AA MG 75mm RR	4 4 2	4 4 4	Each Rifle Bn Each Rifle Bn Each Rifle Bn	
12.7 AA NG 75mm RR 82mm Mort	4 6 6	4 4 4	14th AA Co 16th RR Co 17th Mort Co	


COVER DESIGNATIONS/AKA

SOURCE #	COVER DESIGNATIONS/ARA	REMARKS
4.	LBN: 20803 GM An Binh	Rear Serv Sect of Regt
À	LBN: 20802 GM An Binh	Polit Sect of Regt
4	LBN: 20801 GM An Binh	Staff Sect of Regt
14	B-1	Opns of Regt
14	B-2	Polit of Regt
14	B-3	Supply of Regt
14	B-4	Guard of Regt
14	B-5	Population control & Givil relations



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COMPOSITION OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 3RD WORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY REGIMENT




Source #1: CmbtSptCo composed of 1-75 RR Plt, 1-82 Mort Plt & 1 HMG Plt.
Source #14: Each Bn composed of 3 Co's and 4 attached Plts, 81 Mort, 75 RR, Comm & MG Plt's. (G-2 Cmt; Poss

this is the CmbtSptCo).

Source #4: En supported by a Signal Plt and a Recom Sqd.

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CmbtSptCo composed of 1-75 RR Plt, 1-82 Mort Plt, 1 HMG Plt Source #1:


Source #14: Each Bn composed of 3 Co's and 4 attached Plts: 81 Mort: 75 RR, Comm & MG Plts. (G-2 Cmt: Poss

this is the CmbtSptCo)

Bn supported by Signal Plt and a Recon Sqd Source #4:



COMPOSITION OF THE 3RD BATTALION, 3RD NORTH VIETNAMESE ARM REGIMENT



Source #1: CmbtSptCo composed of 1-75 RR Plt, 1-82 Mort Plt & 1 HMC Plt.

Source #14: Each Bn composed of 3 Co's and 4 attached Plts: 81 Mort: 75RR, Comm & MG Plts. (G-2 Cmt:

Possibly this is the CmbtSptCo)

Source #4: En supported by a Signal Plt and a Recon Sqd.



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II. OPERATIONAL INTERROGATION REPORT ON EGUYEN VAN MAO

The following is a report from Nguyen Van MAO, 16 years, 2nd Company, 70th Battalion, 1st VC Regiment who defected at NUI TRON Outpost vicinity (BS 515778) the morning of 13 December 1966. He is a member of the 4-1 Squad, B-6 Platoon, E-16 Company (2d Company), Bing Trang Battalion (70th Battalion), CUU LONG Regiment (1st VC Regiment), 2d Division.

Mao stated that he was drafted into the Duc Duc district Training Cen-Eter which trains people from Dai Loc District, Hoa Vang District, Dien Ban District and Duy Duyen District. This training center is located 15 days march west of LOC SON Village but still in Duc Duc district. At the training center he studied the following subjects during the 3 month training period:

- 1. Bayonet training
- 2. Grenade throwing, offensive grenades and defensive grenades. The long handled Chicom grenade is a defensive grenade and the short handled Chicom grenades is an offensive grenade.
 - 3. Digging trenches and defenses
- 4. Demolitions THT and THB (unknown type of explosives). They studied how to place charges on bamboo fences and barb wire fences, and how to place block charges in outposts or tunnels.
 - 5. Tactics: how to attack houses, underground tunnels, ambushes,
- and attack outposts.
- 6. Mobile tactics: if they see the enemy they attack head on and engage the enemy.
 - 7. Swimming
 - 8. How to walk silently on leaves or mud or gravel
- 9. Marksmanship: CKC and AK. He fired 3 rounds with each weapon at a target from 200 meters. They also had dry fire practice on fixed and mobile targets. In addition they studied assembly and disassembly of these two weapons.

The hours of study in the training center were 0700-1100 and 1400-1600 for military training and also 1800-2100 for military training. MAO stated that he had very little political training while in the training center.

In March of 1966 MAO joined the 2d Company; 70th Battalion in Tien Phuoc district, Quang Tin province. The 2nd Company remained in Tien Phuoc only 6 or 7 days and then the 70th Battalion moved to Quang Ngai to join the rest of the 1st VC Regiment.

Note: At this point MAO stated he joined the 70th Battalion as such but that at some time in the past it had been redesignated from the 7/2 Battalion of the Quang Tin Provincial Force. He explained that this 7/2

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was only the provincial force and not part of any unit. He could not explain the designation $^{n}7/2^{n}$.

At this time all the list VC Regiment was located in Quang Ngai province and the 70th Battalion joined them there. The 1st VC Regiment remained in this position 4 or 5 months. During this time the 1st VC Regiment participated in no engagements. One time they were bombed by what he called B-57's and 3 men were killed but no one was wounded. This area where they stayed for 5 months was about 2 hours walk west of the Song Tra Khuc river but further south than the lst VC Regiment present location. During the afore mentioned 5 months the 2nd Company studied and practiced all the things Man had studied previously in the training center. In approximately August of 1966 the let Regiment moved to Ba To (D), Ba Dong (V). The lst VC Regiment remained in Ba Dong approximately 15 days and studied how to infiltrate enemy lines. After this 15 days training the 1st Regiment moved back to Son Ha in the mountains and lived with Montagnards. They stayed there for 7 days. During this 7 days the 1st VC Regiment sent some sappers to attack an outpost in Son Ha. The 70th and 90th Battalions were on stand-by but were never committed to the engagement. This engagement lasted less than 5 minutes and the results are unknown. At this time, late August or early September, the 1st VC Regiment moved to its present location in the mountainous area (BS 4178, BS 4278, BS 4378, BS 4379 and BS 4479). The lat VC Regiment was in this location as of 10 December 1966.

In these positions are headquarters for the lst VC Regiment, 40th Battalion, 60th Battalion, 70th Battalion and 90th Battalion. Mac claimed that the 40th, 60th, 70th and 90th Battalions are all Infantry Battalions.

Mao listed the 70th Battalion as follows:

Headquarters Company	"Bong Trang"
1st Company - Infantry	K-1 5
2nd Company - Infantry	K-1 6
3rd Company - Infantry	K-17
4th Company - Artillery	K- 18

At this point Mao claimed he wasn't sure but he thought other companies in the battalion and other platoons in the other companies were divided and equipped like his company and platoon which is given as follows:

2nd Company

Headquarters Group: CO, XO, Political Officer, Assistant Political Officer, Male Nurse, 2 Messengers, an administrative NCO and his assistant. There are others but he does not know what their jobs were.



6th Platoon - (the infantry platoens of the 2nd Company are numbered 4, 5 and 6): Platoon Leader, Assistant Platoon Leader and an aid man. 3 squads per platoon. Each squad has 4 (3 man) cells. 1 cell is the automatic weapons cell and it has 1 RBD automatic rifle, 1 CKC, and 1 AK. The other 3 cells have 2 CKC's and 1 AK.

Each platoon has one machine gun (ChiCom Type 53) and one mortar that Hao stated he believed was a 45mm mortar. This mortar is the same size as a 60 in height and the base plate is the same but it is operated by one man and Mao was adament in the fact it was not a 60mm mortar.

In addition to the 3 infantry platoons each company has an artillery battery which has the following weapons:

- 2 60mm mortars
- 2 MATTS machine guns
- 4 Flame throwers Mao did not know the nomemclature but stated these flame throwers have a 300 meter maximum range. He had seen one fire one time.
- 4 B-40 bazockas. Again he did not know the full nomemclature but he stated it has a maximum range of 200 meters and will stop an APC, 113 type.

This battery has over 30 men with a battery chief and assistant battery chief and the following gum crews:

- 1 mortar 5 men
- 1 machine gun 4 men
- 1 flame thrower 2 men
- 1 B-40 Bazzoka 2 men
- All of this battery in the 2nd Company are North Vietnamese soldiers.

The K-18 Company or 4th Company Artillery of the 70th Battalion has the following weapons:

- 4 57mm Recoilless Rifles
- 4 82mm mortars
- 4 MATTS machine guns
- 5 Flame throwers
- 5 B-40 Bazookas

Mac stated that he did not know how many men were in K-18. Mac further stated that over $\frac{1}{2}$ of the 2nd Company or K-16 are draftees from Central Vietnam.

Mao claimed that since joining the 1st Regiment he has participated in no battles.

In the 2nd or K-16 Company several months ago almost half of the people had malaria but recently they have gotten a new medicine which



is in the pill form, red sugar coated, taken 3 times a day and after 2 or 3 days the ill person can perform normal duties. Note: After talking with a Chief Corpsman U.S.N. it is believed that this medicine could be CHLOROQUIN, also known as ARALEN. Mao stated that now there is only an average of one man per squad who has malaria very bad. He did not know where this medicine came from.

Mac denied any knowledge of ammo dumps or supply dumps. He stated that the normal amount of ammo for a man armed with a CKC was 50 rounds and for a man with an AK 100 rounds. Mac stated all future plans for the lst VC Regiment and subordinate units are secret and therefore he knew of none. He further stated that he did not think the regiment would move just because he defected and that he knew of no future plans to move. He claimed he did not know of the morale of others in the 2nd Company but he claimed he was the first defector from the 2nd Company since he joined it in March of 1966.

He stated that his reasons for defection were, he has had malaria, he is homesick, and it is cold in the mountains.

PERSONALITIES:

PARTITION OF STREET

CO, 2nd Company: LY, about 25, CVN

XO, 2nd Company: SON, about 25, CVN

Political Officer, 2nd Company: DUNG, about 25, CVN

Assistant Political Officer, 2nd Company: NGOC, about 25, CVN

Platocn Leader, 6th Platocn: Unknown

Assistant Platoon Leader, 6th Platocn: NHIEU, about 25, CVN

lst Squad Leader, 6th Platocn: NCHIA, about 25, NVN

Battery Chief, 2nd Company: TUAN, about 28, NVN

Battery XO, 2nd Company: HAI, about 24, NVN

G-2 Comment: F/2, a returnee from MR-V of 20 October stated that the 70th Battalion was an independent unit subordinate to the 2nd Division, which could account for the "7/2" designation. All thought many lev-level agent reports indicate presence of the 70th Battalion in Quang Tin province. This is probably the 70th Battalion that at one time the provincial mobile force of Quang Tin and has since March or April moved to Quang Ngai and been operating as a battalion of the lst VC Regiment. Other statements by Mao on location of the lst VC Regiment in Son Ha district and its attacks on outposts in Son Ha corroborate reports from other returnees thus far evaluate the information obtained probably true.

III. INTERROGATION REPORT - PVT DANG VAN DONG - CAPTIVE - 2ND CO. 802ND BN' 6TH NVA DIV

A captive taken by I/3/26 on 21 December vicinity (YD 544313) has revealed under interrogation that he was a member of the 2nd Company, K-2 Battalion (AKA 802nd Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment). He is a native of NVN and infiltrated SVN, via Laos, in August 1966. His Battalion operates generally out of the area indicated at vicinity (YD 5717). The strength of the K-2 Battalion is 480 men and is one of the four battalions now under the Cong Truong Sau Regiment (probably AKA 6th NVA Regiment). This regiment is supported by one mortar company and 3 anti-air companies, and has an overall strength of 2000. According to the captive, the regiment has been operating in Thua Thien and Quang Tri provinces. The captive said the other battalions, also believed to have strength of 480, are the K-1, K-4, and K-6. K-1 is AKA for 800th Battalion, K-4 is AKA for 804th and K-6 is AKA for 806th. In addition he said that 2 other battalions, the K-8 and K-10 are operating in Quang Tri and Thus Thien provinces respectively and are highly mobile. There is also a battalion of unknown designation operating in Hue City.

The mission of the K-2 Battalion is to attack outposts and positions along Highway #1 in the northern province in order to weaken the enemy and make way for a major operation in mid 1967.

Three months ago, high ranking officers gathered at the 12th Committee meeting and received the following information which was later handed down to the soldiers through the chain of command and by political cadres:

In the dry season of 1967, the NVA will move to SVN concentrating on the provinces south of and including Quang Nam. North Vietnam itself will be guarded by Chinese Communists troops with SAM sites along the coast and key avenues of approach. The units presently operating in Quang Tri province and Thua Thien province will not be reinforced but will operate as follows: 1 division plus (designation unknown) will attempt to lure the enemy in the vicinity of Highway #9 (west Quang Tri) and destroy it. After which, this division-plus will move to Thua Thien province to join forces with all the local units including the Cong Truong Sau Regiment where they intend to overrun Phu Bai and Hue City. When this is accomplished, all of these forces will be formed in two groups with 1 group holding ground at the Thua Thien province and Quang Nam province border and the other group sweeping morth to the DMZ to destroy the remaining enemy units. To facilitate this operation, it was pointed out that presently all of the ARVN bases and outposts in Quang Tri province and Thua Thien province are infiltrated by the VC and that the VC operate in all hamlets, villages and cities. With stepped up activity all over the country, the ARVN and allied forces will be too busy to defend everywhere and the people will be too busy protecting their own hamlet, villages and cities to provide reinforcement to the military. Victory is insured.



G-2 Comment: F/2. K-2 is AKA for 802nd Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment. K-1 is AKA for 800th Battalion. K-4 is AKA for 804th Battalion and K-6 is AKA for 806th Battalion. Cong Truong Sau is probably AKA of 6th NVA Regiment. K-8 is AKA for 808th Battalion and K-10 is AKA for the 810th Battalion. This is the first indication of four battalions subordinate to the 6th NVA Regiment. Current OCB carries 800, 802, and 806 battalions subordinate to the 6th Regiment. All units mentioned by the captive in the same general area except the 804th Battalion which normally operates in Phu Loc district, Thua Thien province. F/5 as to plans of NVA activity for I Corps.

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
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ANNEX C (PARAGRAPH 13 ENTRIES) TO 1ST MARDIN PERINTREP

1. Total cases of Vietnamese Nationals volumteering information to U.S. Forces are as follows:

2/1 1	1
5th Marines 2	2
7th Marines 2 2/7 1	3
9th Marines 3 3/9 4	7
lith Marines	

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ANNEX I	NNEX D (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIV PER INTREP NO. 17					*		
DATE	BMCT	Sunr ise	Sunser	FEOT	MOMRISE	HOCHSET	MOCEPHASE	ILLIM
DEC30	0651	0714	1825	1848	2104	0931	FULL	93
31	0652	0715	1825	1849	2205	1020	FULL	87
JAN 1	0652	0715	1826	1849	2304	1105	LAST	70
2	0652	0715	1826	1849	****	1148	LAST	68
3	0652	0715	1827	1850	0001	1228	last	57
4	0653	0716	1828	1851	0057	1308	Last	45
5	0653	07 16	1828	1851	0154	1349	LAST	34 4
6	0653	0716	1829	1852	0251	1433	LAST	224
7	0 654	0717	1830	1853	0350	1521	Last	15
8	0 654	0717	1830	1853	0451	1613	Last	8
9	0654	07/17	1831	1854	0551	17/08	Last	3
10	0654	0717	1832	1855	0649	1805	Last	1
11	0654	07.17	1832	1855	07.43	1903	NEW	0
12	0655	07:18	1833	1856	0835	1959	157	2
13	0655	0718	1834	1857	0917	2052	lst	5
14	0 655	0718	1834	1857	0956	2142	lst	10
115	0655	0718	1834	1857	1032	2230	lst	17

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OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS


SUBJET

- #/- PLAINED RAJOR OPERATION DECEMBER 1966
 - 2- TERREINATION OPN DOVER
 - 3- HO BTRY FIRST FAG ASSIGNMENT (U)
 - 4-THIRD MARDIV REQUEST FOR FORCES (U)
 - 5. COMBINED ACTIO COMPANIES
 - 4- FRAG O 40-66 (ADDL) ARTY DEFLOYMENT OH 1 OG FIRST MARDIV REIN 0202452 DEC 66
 - 7- RIVER PATROL
 - P OFN MISSISSIPPI
 - 9-REPORT OF INF BN OFNS 27 NOV-3 DEC 66
 - /O-O'N HATE RUN (U)
 - //- OPN LISSISSIPPI
 - 12 CHOPPING OFCON OF UNITS AS RESULT OF TERMINATION OF OPN MISSISSIPPI
 - /3-FRAG O 45-66 (UNIT DEPLOYMENTS)
 - #-POSTIBLE VC ATTACK ON AIR FIELDS
 - 15-ALERT POSTURE
 - ... FRAG O 46-66 (BLT ROTATION)
 - / TASK ORGANIZATION CHANGE (U)
 - / ROUGH RIDER OPNS REFORT (U)

OPIGINATOR & DTG

- CG III MAF 200840Z NOV 66
- III Not COC 300259Z OCT 66
- OG FIRST HARDIV REIN 0107232 DEC 66
- CG FIRST MAR DIV 010951Z DEC 66
- CG III MAF 011356Z DEC 66
- OG III NAF 0215002 DEC 66
- CG III MAF COC 040203Z DEC 66
- CG FIRST MAR DIV 040933Z DEC 66
- CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 060345Z DEC 66
- FIRST MARDIV COC 071002Z DEC 66 NINTH MARINES 071510Z DEC 66
- CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 1102552 DEC 66 COC FIRST MARDIN 111257Z DEC 66
- III MAF COC 110759Z DEC 66
- CG FIRST MARDIV 160917Z DEC 66
- CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 211217Z DEC 66
- CF FIRST MARDIV REIN 040845E JAN 67








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PAGE TWO RUMNMF 1633
 (4) SEARCH AND DESTROY
 (5) AREA BOUNDED BY NORTH SOUTH GRID LINES BT 17 AND BT 21
AND EAST WEST GRID LINES BT 56 TO BT 59.
 (6) LAST HALF DEC
 (7) NONE
C. (1) IDAHO
 (2) IST MARDIV
 (3) ONE BN MINUS
(4) SEARCH AND DESTROY
(5) AREA BOUNDED BY NORTH SOUTH GRID LINES BT Ø1 TO BT Ø6
AND EAST WEST GRID LINES BT 60 TO BT 56
(6) FIRST HALF DEC
(7) NONE
D. (1) GLENN
(2) IST MARDIV
(3) BN MINUS
(4) SEARCH AND DESTROY
(5) KHAI TAY (1), (2), AND (3) GRID SQ BT 0568, BT 0467, AND
BT 04.66.
(6) FIRST HALF DEC.
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PAGE THREE RUMNMF 1633
( TO NONE
E (1) MISSISSIPPI
(2) IST MARDIV
(3) BN MINUS COORDINATED WITH ARVN FORCES
(4) SEARCH AND DESTROY
(5) NONG SON AREA SOUTH OF AN HOA.
(6) LAST HALF DEC
(7) NONE
F. (1) PAWNEE III
(2) 3D MARDIV
(3) ONE INF BN (-) MINUS ONE COMPANY)
(4) SEARCH AND DESTROY
(5) PHU LOC DISTRICT. SOUTHEASTERN THUA THIEN PROVINCE
(6) COMMENCED 29 OCT 66
(7) NONE
G. (1) COMANCHE
(2) THIRD MARDIV
    ONE INF BN CREINF)
SEARCH AND DESTROY
(5) NAM DONG, VIC (YD 9188)
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PAGE FOUR RUMNMF 1633

(6) DATE: TO BE ANNOUNCED

(7) NONE

(A) PRAIRIE

(2) THIRD MARDIV

(3) FIVE INF BN

(4) SEARCH AND DESTROY

(5) NORHTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE


(6) COMMENCED 3 AUG 66

(7) NONE

6P-4


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OO RUAEGL
DE RUMNLA 039E 3350723
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O P 010723Z DEC 66
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/CG TF XRAY
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST FIELD ARTY GP
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB
ET

HO BIRY FIRST FAG ASSIGNMENT (U)

A. FIRST MARDIV COC 301330Z NOV66 (NOTAL)

- B. CS NINTH MAB 150834Z NOV66 (NOTAL)
- C. CG III NAF 301502Z NOV66 (NOTAL)
- D. CG FIRST MARDIV 270621Z NOV66
- E. CG FIRST MARDIV 282949Z NOV66 (NOTAL)
- 1. AT 301636H NOVG6 HQ ATRY FIRST FAG ARRIVED CHU LAI REPORTED OPCON III MAF AND ADON FIRST MARDIV, AS INDICATED REFA. IAW REF B. BY REF C OPCON FIRST FAG ASSIGNED FIRST MARDIV 300836Z HOVGS
- 2. IAW REF D, AT 301636H NOV66:

PAGE TWO RUMNLA 59E

A. COCON HO BIRY FIRST FAG FURTHER PASSED TO CG IF XHAY FOR EMPLOYMENT OF GROUP TAW REF E.


B. ELEVERTH MAR ASSUME ADOON HO BIRY FIRST FAG.

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BURN HOLD G-1/G-4 G-2 LNO PER SUM WK SUM EMD CHR BRIEF POST

DE RUMNLA 075E 3350951 ZNY SSSSS O P Ø 10951Z DEC 66 FM CG FIRST MARDIV TO CG THIRD MARDIV INFO CG III MAF THIRD MED BN. THIRD MT BN

THIRD MARDIV REQUEST FOR FORCES (U)


R. THIRD MARDIV 300815Z NOV 66

III MAF Ø9Ø924Z OCT 66

1. REQUEST FOR OPCON OF CLEARING PLAT, CO 3, THIRD MED AN AND FIRST PLAT (REIN) CO C, THIRD MT BN CONTAINED IN REF A NOT IAW WITH REF B. CLEARING PLAT CO D, THIRD MED BN SCHEDULED FOR EVENTUAL MVMT TO THIRD MARDIV AREA AVAILABLE FOR ALT ROTATION. MT PLAT NOT AVAILABLE WITHOUT REPL IN KIND FROM INCOMING BLT. 2. ROST CONCURRENCE SUBSTITUTION CLEARING PLAT CO D VICE CO B THIRD MED BN AND IN KIND REPLACEMENT OF FIRST PLAT (REIN) GO C

THIRD MT BN. GP-4

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"" DE RUMNLA 117E 3360245 ZNY SSSSS Z O @20245Z DEC 66 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN TO CG TF XRAY

ELEVENTH MAR INFO NINTH MAR FIRST RECON BN

FRAG 0 48-66 (ADDAL ARTY DEPLOYMENT) CHANGE ONE (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 300611Z NOV66

1. ELEVENTH MAR: MOVE BIRY E SECOND BN ELEVENTH MAR FROM QUE

SON TO AN HOA COMMENCING 021200H DEC66

2. CG IF SRAY: RETURN RIFLE CO MINUS FROM QUE SON TO CHU LAI


ON DEPARTURE BIRY E SECOND BN ELEVENTH MAR FROM QUE SON.

3. REF A MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY. GP-4


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




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	BRIEF
	POST



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O P 040933Z DEC 66

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO CG III MAF INFO CG TF XRAY

FIRST MAR

NINTH MAR


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
REPORT OF INF BN OPNS 27 NOV-3DEC66

A.CG III MAF 220702Z

- 1. FOLLOWING RPT SUBMITTED IAW REF A:
 - A. MANUEVER BNS AVAILABLE: 12US
 - B. DAYS ON:
 - (1) S&D: 18
 - (2) SECURITY: 64
 - (3) RESERVE : TWO
 - (4) TOTAL: 84

BT





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MAF DE NLA NR 314 314

ZNY SSSSS
Z P 060345Z DEC 66
FM CG FIRST MARDIV RELN
TO NINTH MAR
ELEVENTH MAR
INFO CG III MAF
CG FIRST MAW
FIRST RECON ON

OF CALL OF ICE.

OPN HOME RUN (U)

A. TELECON BETWEEN FIRST MARDIV, G-3; CO ELEVENTH MAR AND XC NINTH MAR 5 DEC 66
B. CG FIRST MAR DIV 030715Z DEC 66
1. THIS MSG CONFIRMATION REF A. FOL DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
DIRECTED IN PREPARATION SPI REF B.
A. ELEVENTH MAR: COMMENCING AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE DEPLOY TWO 105MM HOW W/PERS AND EQUIP TO HILL IN GRID SQUARE TO 8138.
B. NINTH MAR: COMMENCING AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE DEPLOY REIN RIFE.
PLAT TO HILL IN GRID SQUARE BT 8138 PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ARTY.

GP-4
BT





HAS BEEN SENT

Cm Cho

DE DIV COC NR 173 *[[]]]]]]]]*

ZNY SSSSS

FM FIRST MARDIV COC

O III MAF COC INFO FMAW OPNS

OPN MISSISSIPPI


1. OPN MISSISSIPPI TERM 071730H

GP-4


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
NNNN FIRST MARDIV COC DE III MAF COC QSL FOR NR 173 AT 07/1015Z DEC 66 KKKK 1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

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Batum Mass

Tor. R R

TT

OXIU DE BIAR NA 14

-T- SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES FIRST MARINES

7.87 SSSSS

271512Z DEC 66

er NINTH MARINES

TO SECOND 3N FIFTH MARINES

INFO CG FIRST MARDIV ---

FIRST MARINES

ZEN/FIRST BN THENTY SIXTH MARIBUS

~ 7

(347)

G-3 AduRT-COC

CHOPPING OPCON OF UNITS AS A RECULT OF TERMINATION OF OPN MISS.

1. CO I, 3D BN, 1ST MARINES CHOPPED UPCON FROM CO, 2D BN, 5TH MAR

EFFECTIVE DS13ECH TO CO, 1ST MARINES.


2. CO D, 1ST BN, 26TH MARINES CHOPPED OPCON FROM CO, 2D BN,


5TH MAR EFFECTIVE DS15ECH TO CO, 1ST FN 26TH MARINES.

6P-4

OT







HB


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RIVERE

Pers!

OO RUABQL DE RUMNLA 1052E 3450255 ZNY SSSSS

OP 110255Z DEC 66
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR
ZEN/FIRST RECON BN
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
RUABGL/CG NINTH MAB



A. CG III MAF Ø 71548Z DE C66 NOTAL

B. CG NINTH MAB 0302 00Z DE C66 PASEP

C. FIRST MARDIV ADMIN 0 301-66

D. FOR 0 P4000.5

1. TERRAIN ANALYSIS, EN SIT AND MINT REIMIS DICTATE NEED FOR ONE LYTH PLAT REIN AND ONE FORCE RECONIM FOR JAN SPECIAL OPN IN IV CTZ. PLANS CALL FOR AUGMENTATION TO ARR SUBIC BY 15 DEC FOR RIVERINE TRING AND RETURN TO DIV ON COMPLETION SPEC OPNS. REF A APPLIES.

2. ELEVENTH MAR: WHEN DIRECTED DEFLOY ONE LVIH FLAT REIN BY SEA TO SUBIC BAY. COMPOSITION AS FOLS:

PAGE 2 RUMNLA 1052E

A. E QUI PME NT

- (1) SIX LVTH 6
- (2) ONE LVIP 5
- (3) ONE LVIC
- (4) OTHER ITEMS TO BE PROVIDED BY NINTH MAB AS INDICATED REF B. B. PERS REIN
- (1) MAINT PERS: ONE SGT 2142, ONE CPL 2142, TWO LCFL 2142, ONE CPL 2151.
 - (2) COMM PERS: ONE CPL 2841
 - (3) SPT PERS: ONE CPL 3371, ONE FVT 3371, ONE HM-3 8404.
- (4) OTHER REIN PERS TO BE FROVIDED BY NINTH MAB AS INDICATED REF B.
- 3. FIRST RECON BN: DEFLOY ONE FORCE RECON TEAM BY AIR TO SUBIC BAY ON OR ABOUT 12DEC66.
- 4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:
- A. UPON DEPARTURE DA NA NG. FOR CE RECON TEAM OPCON FIRST MARD IV. CHOP IF SEVEN NINE POINT FIVE ON ARRIVAL SUBIC BAY.
- B. UPON DEPARTURE DA NA NG LVT H FLAT CHOPS COM SEVENTH FLT FURTHER CHOPS IF SEVEN NINE POINT FIVE ON ARRIVAL SUBIC BYA.

C. MOVREPS IAW SUPPLEMENT TO NWIP 10-1(A).

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

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PAGE 3 RUM NLA 1052E D. OPSTAT CHANGES IAW FM FPAC O 03001.5 A. 5. ADM IN A ND L OG

A. ADMINISTRATION

(1) IAW PROVISIONS OF ATTNEX D REFERENCE C.

(2) INITIAL CASUALTY REPORTING WILL BE MADE BY UNIT TO WHICH ATTA CHED. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTS TO WE SUBMITTED BY PARENT OR GANIZATION.

B. LOGISTICS

(1) PRESCRIBED LOADS.

(A) LVIH-6 PLAT

CLASS I - 15 DAYS MCI

CLASS I - T/E ALLOWANCES, ON HAND OP STOCKS: 30 DAY
REQUIREMENTS AT COMBAT ACTIVE RATES OF CLASS II ITEMS INCLUDING
INDIVIDUAL CLOTHING AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES (ONLY 15 DAYS OF DRY
CELL BATTERIES REQUIRED). AND 30 DAYS REQUIREMENTS NON T/A ITEMS.

CELL BATTERIES REQUIRED), AND 30 DAYS REQUIREMENTS NON T/A ITEMS.

OLASS III - 2 DAYS MOGAS, 4 DAYS DIESEL AND 15 DAYS OF
SPECIAL OILS, LUBRICANTS AND PACKAGED PRODUCTS.

CLASS V - BASIC ALLOWANCE

(B) RECON TM

ALL CLASSES AS FRESCRIBED BY CO FIRST RECON BN.

PAGE 4 RUMNLA 1052E


(2) TRANSPORTATION. SUBMIT REQUIREMENTS TO THIS HQ (ATTN MTO).

(3) EMBARKATION - SUBMIT LIFT REQUIREMENTS TO THIS HQS (ATTN DIV EMBO) IAW REFERENCE D.

GP-4

H

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PAGE TWO RUMSEA 573

FROW THE NATIONAL POLICE AT HOW AN:
ONE VC BN DESIG A40 MOVED FROM QUANG NGA! TO THANH THIN (BT 070650)
AND THEM TO HO! A! (BT 055675) APPROX 10 KM SE OF DANANG EAST A!R
BASE. IT IS BELIEVED THIS BN INTENDS TO USE BOATS TO APPROACH D.
DANANG EAST A!R BASE DURING THE NIGHT 10 DEC 66. DURING NIGHT 11-14
DEC VC BN INTENDS TO MORTAR DANANG MAN BASE CEESE (11-14 DEC 15 TIME
FRAME-ONE NIGHT WILL BE CHOSEN). IT IS VERY PROBABLE THAT VC WILL ATTEMP
ATK ON MAJOR BASES OR OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO 20 DEC 66. 20 DEC IS THE
ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDATION OF NATIONAL LIVERATION FRONT.
2. G-2 COMMENT F-3-SEVERAL AGENT REPORTS AND INTERROGATION OF
FORMER MENBERS TO BN (SAPPER) INDICATES ATTACK ON DANANG AIR BASE
IS PLANNED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
GP-4
BT



DE RUMNLA 114ØE 3451257

INY SSSSS

O 111257Z DEC 66

FM COC FIRST MARDIV

TO FIRST MARINES COC

NINTH MARINES COC

THIRD TANKS

ELEVENTH MARINES

Z 1Ø1359Z DEC 66=

FM III MAF COC

TO 1ST MAF COC



BURN		
HOLD		
G-1/G-4		
G-2		
LNO		
PER SUM		
WK SUM		
CMD CHR		
BRIEF		
POST		

THIRD TANKS
ELEVENTH MARINES
Z 101359Z DEC 66=
FM III MAF GOG
TO 1ST MAW GOG
TO 366TH TFW

J FLC
1ST COASTAL VUV EILLANGE GP
I CORPS (DSA)
DET C-1 5TH SFG (A)
1ST MP BN
NSA
INFO MACV GOC
1ST MARDIV GOC
3RD MARDIV GOC
2ND BDE ROKMC
5TH COMM BN
BT

1. 1ST MARDIV RPT FOLLOWS:
SUBJ: POSSIBLE VC ATTACK ON AIR FIELDS
1. THE HOI AN LNO REC'D THE FOLLOWING REPORT

FROM THE NATIONAL POLICE AT HOW AN:

ONE VC BN DESIG A4Ø MOVED FROM QUANG NGA! TO THANH THIN (BT Ø7Ø65Ø)

AND THEM TO HO! A! (BT Ø55675) APPROX 1Ø KM SE OF DANANG EAST A!R

BASE. IT IS BELIEVED THIS BN INTENDS TO USE BOATS TO APPROACH D.


DANANG EAST A!R BASE DURING THE NIGHT 1Ø DEC 66. DURING NIGHT 11-14

DEC VC BN INTENDS TO MORTAR DANANG MAW BASE (EEBE (11-14 DEC IS TIME FRAME-ONE NIGHT WILL BE CHOSEN). IT IS VERY PROBABLE THAT VC WILL ATTEMP ATK ON MAJOR BASES OR OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO 2Ø DEC 66. 2Ø DEC IS THE ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDATION OF NATIONAL LIVERATION FROMT.

2. G-2 COMMENT F-3-SEVERAL AGENT REPORTS AND INTERROGATION OF FORMER MENBERS TØ9 BN (SAPPER) INDICATES ATTACK ON DANANG A!R BASE IS PLANNED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.


GP-4

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OPY OF WAS





PAGE THREE RUMNLA 1666E
PASSES TO NINTH MAR, OPCON FORMER ATTACHMENTS PASS TO
PARENT OR GN EXCEPT ETRY H THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR OPCON ELEVENTH MAR,
FIRST PLT (REIN) CO B THIRD ENG BN OPCON DET THIRD ENGR BN AND,
PENDING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS, DET HQ CO FOURTH MAR OPCON NINTH MAR.

- (3) CONCURRENT WITH SECOND BN FOURTH MAR DEBARKATION, ELEMENTS SECOND BN FOURTH MAR COMMENCE RELIEF IN PLACE OF THIRD BN NINTH MAR AND BLT THREE SLASH NINE ELEMENTS COMMENCE EMBARKATION. DEBARKATION BLT TWO SLASH FOUR, RELIEF IN PLACE AND EMBARKATION OF BLT THREE NINE ELEMENTS TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN NINTY-SIX HR TIME FRAME.
- (4) BLT THREE MINE TO BE TASK ORGANIZED IAW ENCL (4) OF REF A. ON COMPLETION OF RELIEF AND EMBARKATION O/A SJANS7. BLT THREE NINE ROTATES TO OKI.
 - B. NINTH MAR.
- (1) PREPARE THIRD BN NINTH MARINES FOR ROTATION TO OKA
- (2) ASSUME OPCON SECOND BN FOURTH MAR ON ARRIVAL AND DEACTIVATION BLT TWO FOUR O/A 6JAN67 AND EFFECT IMMEDIATE IN PLACE RELIEF THIRD BN NINTH MAR.
 - (3) DESIGNATE DET HQ CO (RADIO RELAY) FOR ATTACHMENT TO

PAGE FOUR RUMNLA 1666E
ELT THREE SLASH NINE ON ACTIVATION FOR OPNS.

C. THIRD BN NINTH MAR.

- (1) BLT THREE NINE ACTIVATED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES 161800H DE C66 FOR OPERATIONS ON ORDER O/A 6JAN67
- (2) DESIGNATE ADVANCE PARTY TO PROCEED BY AIR TO OKI O/A 20DECGS TO EFFECT LIAISON WITH NINTH MAB REGARDING LOGISTIC AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS.
- (3) ON DEPARTURE DANANG, OPCON PASSES OFF SEVEN NINE, ADOON TO CG NINTH MAB. ON ARR OKI CHOP NINTH MAB.
- (4) PERSONNEL ASSIGNED CAC PROGRAM REMAIN IN SECTOR.

 OPCON AS DIRECTED BY CO NINTH MAR, ADCON SUB-UNIT HQ BN.
 D. DET, HQ BN, THIRD MARDIV.
- DETACHED: DET (POSTAL, DISBURSING, PHOTO, RADIO RELAY).

E. ELEVENTH MAR MINUS REIN.

DETACHED: 185MM HOW BIRY, 12TH MAR.

F. FIRST AMTRAC BN MINUS REIN.

DETACHED: AMTRAC PLAT (REIN), FIRST AMTRAC BN. G. DET THIRD ENGR BN.

DETACHED: ENGR PLAT (REIN), THIRD ENGR BN.
No THIRD TK BN MINUS:

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FLSG-"B" 2100/2 (4-66)



PM GE FIVE RUMNLA 1668E

DETACHED: IX PLAT (REIN):

I. THIRD AT BN MINUS.

DETACHED: AT PLAT (REIN).

J. THIRD MED BN MINUS REIN.

DETACHED: COLL PLAT MINUS (REIN), THIRD MED BN.

K. THIRD DENTAL CO MINUS.

DETACHED: DET, DENTAL CO.

L. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) DETACHMENTS EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING 161800H DEC66 FOR OPNS ON ORDER OZA GJAN67.

(2) ROST CG THIRD MARDIV PROVIDE DESIGNATION RECON PLAT SCHEDULED FOR ATCHMI BLT THREE SLASH NINE IAW REF B. RECOMMEND MYMT OF BLAT TO DANANG AND CHOP FIRST MARDIV 5JAN67.

(3) ROST CG FLC PROVIDE DESIGNATION AND COMPOSITION LSU.

(4) ALL UNITS PROVIDING ATTACHMENTS TO BLT THREE NINE PROVIDE THIS HQ WITH UNIT DESIGNATIONS ASAP.

(5) MOVREPS IAW SUPPLEMENT TO NVIP 10-1(A):

(6) OPSIATS IAW FMFPAC O P03000.5.

(7) SAILING REPORTS IAW FMFPAC O P4600.1F.

(8) DIRLAUTH ALL UNITS.

PAGE SIX RUMNLA 1666E
3. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A . PERSONNEL . INSTRUCTIONS AS ISSUED BY CG 3D MARDIV .

8. SUPPLY.

(1) PRESCRIBED LOADS/SUPPLIES AND EQUIP TO BE EMBARKED (ELT 3/9).

(A) CLASS I, IV, AND V. NONE.

(B) CLASS II, FULL T/E CLASS II ALLOWANCE, INCLUDING ENCAMPMENT GARRISION TYPE ITEMS INDICATED AS REGULAR T/E ALLOWANCE IN US ON HAND OPERATING STOCKS. NO MOUT OUT, NO LITEMS REPEAT NO ITEMS EQUIPMENT WILL BE LEFT IN THIRD ECHELON REPAIR SHOPS IN VIETNAM.

(C) CLASS III. VEHICLE FUEL TANKS 3X4 FULL. NO OTHER

CLASS III.

(2) SUPPLIES AVAILABLE ON BOARD SHIP FOR BLT THREE SLASH NINE FOL
ITEMS WILL BE BROUGHT FROM OKINAWA BY BLT TWO SLASH FOUR AND WILL
REMAIN ON BOARD SHIPS FOR CONTINGENCY USE BY BLT THREE SLASH NINE
ENROUTE OKINAWA.

(A) CLASS I. 3 DAYS MCI.

(B) CLASS III. 2 DAYS MOGAS AND 4 DAYS DIESEL.

(C) CLASS IV. FIELD FORTIFICATION MATERIAL: 5000
SANDBAGS, 60 COLLS OF CONCERTINA, 600 STAKES (200 EACH 5 FT AND

FLSG-"B" 2100/2 (4-66)

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O P 160917Z DEC 66 FM CG FIRST MARDIV TO ZENICG THIRD MARDIV ZEN/CG FLC ZEN/NINTH MAR ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR ZEN/THIRD BN, NINTH MAR ZEN/DET HO BN THIRD MARDIV ZEN/FIRST AMTRAC BN ZEN/THIRD AT BN ZEN/THIRD TANK BN ZEN/DET THIRD ENGR BN ZEN/THIRD MED BN ZEN/THIRD DENTAL CO INFO RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC (KØ12) ZEN/CG III MAF RUABOLICTF SEVEN NINE RUABQL/CG NINTH MAR TZEN/CG TF XRAY BT

FAGE TWO RUMNLA 1667E

SECRETFINAL SECTION OF I

460 EACH 2 FT), AND 180 ROLLS OF BARBED WIRE.

Y (D) CLASS V. BASIC ALLOWANCE. H (3) Supplies and Equipment to be

H (3) SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO BE LEFT IN VIETNAM BY BLT THREE SLASH NINE. ALL GARRISON AND PLANT PROPERTY TYPE ITEMS OBTAINED AS SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR RVN PLUS ALL CLASS I, III, V, AND CLASS IV (FORTIFICATION MATERIALS) WILL BE LEFT IN PLACE AND TURNED OVER TO RELIEVING UNIT.

(4) EXCHANGE OF EQUIPMENT PROHIBITED. CHANGES OF EQUIPMENT BY ANY ORGANIZATION WITH A BLT DEPARTING VIETNAM FOR OKINAWA IS SPECIFICALLY FORBIDDEN. REF (D) APPEIES.

(5) ADDITIONAL SUPPLY INSTRUCTIONS FOR BLT THREE SLASH NINE AS ISSUED BY CG 3RD MARDIV.

C. TRANSPORSTION.

(1) ADVANCE PARTY FOR BLT THREE SLASH NINE:

9TH MAR PROVIDE REQUEST FOR TRANSPORTATION TO THIS HQ (ATTN G-4).

(2) REQUIREMENTS FOR MOTOR TRANSPORT TO SUPPORT EMBARKATION/ DEBARATION OF BLT THREE SLASH NINE AND BLT TWO SLASH FOUR:

SUBMITREQUESTS TO THIS (ATTN MTO)

FLSG-"B" 2100/2 (4-66)

PAGE THREE RUMNLA 1667E SECRET De Embarka Tion/Debarka Tion ...

NINTH MARE 'PROVIDE THIS HO (ATTN EMBO) WITH CONSO-

THE SUBARATION DATA FOR BLT THREE SLASH NINE. HENE SUBSECT EMBARK DATA AND REQUIRED LOGISTIC DATA TO BLT THREE SLASH

(3) DEBARKATION OF BLT TWO SLASH FOUR. SECOND BN FOURTH MAR COORDINATES DEBARKATION FOR ALL ELEMENTS OF BLT TWO SLASH FOUR

- K (4) ASSIGNMENT TO SHIPPING. FOLLOWING SHIPS ARE ASSIGNED TO BLT THREE SLASH NINE: BEXAR APA 237, UNION AKA 187 AND POINT -DEFIANCE LSD 31.
 - E. LTI SZINVENTORY OF BLT THREE SLASH NINE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

(1) IAW REFERENCE A.

- (2) NINTH MAR
 - (A) ENSURE INSPECTIONS COMMENCE IMMEDIATELY.
- (B) ENSURE THAT REPORT OF ITEMS AND QUANTITIES REQUIRING REPLACEMENT OR REPAIR TOGETHER WITH REQUISITIONS FOR PARTS NCECESSARY TO EFFEC REPAIRS IS SUBMITTED TO THIRD FOR 15 DAYS PRIOR TO EMBARK OF BT THREE SLASH WINE.

(C) REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM FLC, ELEVENTH MAR AND

PAGE FOUR RUMNLA 1667ET

SEPARATE BUS AS REQUIRED FOR CONDUCT OF LTS. FOR BLT THREE SLASH TIME. (D) ADVISE THIS HO (ATIN G-4) STATE OF LTIFS EVERY FIVE DAYS. FIRST REPORT DE FIFTH DAYS ERIOR TO EMBARK. CONTINUE REPORTING UNTIL ALL LTI'S AND REQUISTIONS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO

- 11 (3) ELEVENTH MAR, SEPARATE BUS, AND DEF PROVIDING UNITS TO BLE THREE SLASH NIRES RENDER ASSISTANCE TO BLT THREE SLASH NINE IN ACCOMPLISSING LIR /INVENTORIES.
- (4) REUEST FLC PROVIDE TECHNICAL PRSONNEL TO ASSIST BLT THREE SLASH NINE IN CONDUCTING LTI'S EQUIPMENT IAW PARA 5.C.(4) OF REF A.
- to COMMAND AND COMM-ELEC
 - A. COMMAND: REPORT CP OPENING AND CLOSING TIVMES AND LOCS. B. COMM-ELEC
 - (1) REF E.
 - (2) VOICE CALL SIGNS OF RELIEVING UNITS IAW REF F.
 - (3) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
- (A) UNITS TO BE RELIEVED PREPARE TO PASS COMMUNICATIONS RESPONSIBILITIES TO RELIEVING UNITS TO ENSURE CONTINUOUS COMMNICA-TIONS DURING RELIEF IN PLACE.

PAGE FIVE RUMNLA 1667E

(B) RADIO FREQUENCIES ASSIGNED UNITS BEING RELIEVED, IN SUPPLEMENT THREE REF E, REASSIGNED TO RELIEVING UNITS UPON RELIEF


(C) RADIO FREQUENCIES ASSIGNED BY REF F NOT AUTHORIZED FOR USE IN DANANG TAOR.

GP-4 BT

FLSG-"B" 2100/2 (4-66)

<u>ariensin</u>





TO SECOND BN FIFTH MAR FIRST AT BN THIRD AT BN DET THIRD ENG BN IFIRST AMTRAC BN INFO NINTH MAR

TASK OR GN CHANGE (U)

1. IN PREPARATION BLT THREE SLASH NINE ROTATION FOL CHANGES

TASK OR GN EFFECTIVE 2608 20H DEC 66.

A. SECOND BN REIN FIFTH MAR: CHOP FOL UNITS TO PARENT

OR GANIZATIONS:

KI) 2ND PLAT CO C THIRD AT BN

(2) 3D PLAT CO C DET THIRD ENGR BN

(3) 1ST PLAT CO A FIRST AMTRAC BN

B. FIRST AT EN: CHOP 2D PLAT CO B TO SE CONE BN FIFTH MAR.

C. DET THIRD ENGR BN: CHOP 2ND PLAT CO B DET FIRST ENGR BN TO

PAGE TWO DX 1 2 184E
SECOND EN FIFT H MAR.


D. FIRST AMTRAC EN MINUS REIN: CHOP 4T HEPLAT CO A THIRD AMTRAC EN TO SECONE BN FIFTH MAR.

GRE-4
ET

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

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= (BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/ G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 040845Z JAN 67 EM CG FIRST MARDIV (REIN) TO-CG III MAF BT

ROUGH RIDER OPNS REPORT (U)

A. YR 011204Z AUG 66

	HOG GO			
1. IAW REF	A FOLLOWI	NO DEPOST CHOMESON		
NO OF OPN	CONTACTO	NG REPORT SUBMITTED	FOR NAU-DE	e HB.
WO OF OF W	CONTACTS	DIST ROAD TRAVERCES	ED OM 4TIC	
1-320	Ø	DIST ROAD TRAVERSED	PRUM/TO GR	ID COORD
1-321	•	86	BT 505060	
1-521	1	180		BS 614719
1-322	à		AT 984726	BT 505060
	Ø	86	BT 505060	
1-323	Ø			BS 614719
1-324		86	BT 505060	BS 614719
_ ·	Ø	86		
<u>~ 3</u> 25	Ø	· -	BT 505060	BS 614719
7-326 m	-	86	BT 505060	PC CLASIA
1-020	Ø	53	77 507 508	BS 614719
1-327	Ø		BT 505060	BT 309227
1-328		86	BT 505060	
	Ø	86		BS 614719
1-329	•		BT 505060	BS 614719
	Ø	180		
1-330	Ø	· ~ ~		BT 505060
	~	86	BT 505060	
			202300	BS 614719

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 337E 1-331 72 BT 505060 1-332 BS 661757 86 2. ONE CONTACT. NO ENEMY KIA, ENEMY CAPTURED, DETAINEES OR WEAPONS CAPTURED. NO OBSTACLES REMOVED/REPAIRED. BS 614719 BT



Operation Plan 303-66

XTRA

lst Marine Division (Rein), FAZA-DA NANG, Republic of Vietner 160800H Dec 1966

S & C FILES

HEAL QUARTERS

IST MARINE DIVISION, FM

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETMAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014. TRA BONG: Sheets 6639 I, II; 6739 III, IV. TIEN PHUOC: Sheets 6640 II, III; 6639 I, IV. BA TO: Sheets 6738 L-IV. HA THANH: Sheets 6739 III; 6738 IV; 6638 I; 6639 II. KHAM DUC: Sheets 6540 II; III; 6639 I, IV. GIA VUC: Sheets 6738 III, IV; 6638 I, II. MINH LONG: Sheets 6739 II, III; 6738 I, IV. THUONG DUC: 6540 I, II; 6640 III, IV.

(b) THE MAF LOI 5-66 W/Ch #1

(c) 1st MarDiv Op Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. STRUATION

a. Enemy forces.

- (1) Anx A (Intelligence).
 - (2) Current INTSUMS and PERINTREPS.
- b. Friendly forces. Ref (b).
 - (1) I ARVN Corps conducts operations against VC and NVA forces throughout ICTZ. Major subordinate commands I Corps include 1st ARVN Div. (11th Division Tactical Area (DFA), QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces), 2d ARVN Div (12th DTA, QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces), QUANG DA Spec Zone (QUANG NAM Province), Inc Long Dac Biet (LLDB, VM Special Forces) and Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG).
 - (2) CG III MAF/SA I Corps exercises OPCON of U. S. Army Special Forces (USASF) A Detachments at CIDG Camps in ICTZ through Deputy Senior Advisor, I Corps and G-1 Detachment 5th USASF Gp. USASF Detachment Commanders serve as advisors to corresponding echelons of LLDB.
 - (3) 7th Air Force operates MSQ-77 "Sky Spot" rader controlled bombing systems at FLEIKU (AR 7850) and DONG HA (YD2461) in support of all-weather air opns in ICTZ. I Corps DASC provides for delivery of air support to CIDG Camps and provides FAC (Abn) to support camps under atk.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

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Ch 2



SECRET

- (4) FMAW provides air support to include TPQ-10 systems at DA NANG (AT 9574), CHU LAI (BT 5211) and QUANG NGAI (BS 6172) in support of all-weather air opns in 1st MarDiv area of responsibility.
- (5) LLDB, in coordination with Det C-1 5th USASF Gp, maintains nine CIDG Camps in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ), eight in 1st MarDiv area of responsibility.

2. MISSION

When directed by III MAF, in coordination with I Corps forces and U. S. advisory personnel, lst MarDiv provides supporting arms fire in defense of designated CIDG Camps; conducts spoiling atks in vic of camps threatened with atk; conducts opns to rein or relieve camps under atk; in the stablishes camps if seized, and pursues and destroys en forces involved.

3. EXECUTION

- concept of Opns. Relative inaccessibility CIDG Camps allows en to prepare detailed atk plans and marshal substantial forces over period of time in attempt to overwhelm particular camp before relief forces can respond effectively. Experience indicates en atks on camps most likely during extended periods reduced visibility when friendly capabilities to relieve or support camps are minimized, en will establish ambushes along major avenues of approach likely to be used by ground relief forces, and en will interdict likely introopter zones within their capability. Survival of camp under attack will be dependent largely upon speed with which friendly air, artillery, and/or ground support can be rendered.
 - (1) Primary responsibility for support of specific CDG Camps is assigned to specific subordinate units to ensure continuity of planning and minimum response time in execution. See Annex B (Responsibility/Location CDG Camps). Secondary responsibility assigned to ensure flexibility in readiness to execute plans and provide additional forces if required in support of camps concerned. Through frequent liaison with A Detachments of assigned CDG Camps, subordinate units keep continually abreast of friendly and en situation.
 - (2) Three successive phases of support and anvisioned in execution this plan. Sequence of phases depends on speed with which they can be brought to bear. Normal sequence is tac air support, arty support, and commitment of ground forces. Extent of USMC participation determined by III MAF.



Cla 2







- (a) All weather tac air support is provided by TPQ-10 and MSQ-77 radar systems located to enable radar controlled bombing in vic all CIDG camps. Camps are equipped with UHF radios to control air strikes under emergency conditions, to allow conduct of UHF/automatic DF homing and to provide emergency comm via any U. S. aircraft to higher Hos.
- (b) Arty support may be provided by arty within camps, ARVN or US arty within supporting range of camps or USMC arty deployed to within supporting range of camps. Through preplanning and liaison, preplanned concentrations are prepared for each camp, coordinated plans are developed for US arty in support of ARVN ground forces moving to assist camps, and primary and alternate landing sites and firing positions are preselected where possible to ensure rapid deployment. Initial USMC arty deployment envisioned one htry reins with soty element deployed either prior to or in conjunction with ground forces. In phasing of support, USMC arty and associated soty element deployed in support of camp pass to OPCON USMC ground force on its commitment.
- (c) Relief forces may be ARVN, ARVN supported by US arty, coordinated ARVN/USMC, or unilateral USMC. Initial USMC ground force envisioned one inf bn reine. When USMC ground force committed, CPCCN of USASF A Detachment passes to senior USMC infantry commander in area of opn.

b. Task Force XRAY.

- (1) Anx B (Responsibility/Location CIDG Camps).
- (2) When directed, deploy ASAP arty units, rein with soty elements, to provide fires unilaterally or in coordination with ARVN arty in DS besieged CIDG Camps. Anx C (Arty Support).
- (3) Be prepared deliver fires ASAP in support besieged CIDG Camps from arty located within supporting range of camps. AMAN Contact Support).
- (4) When directed, conduct unilateral or coordinated oping to rein or relieve CIDG Camps under atk, reestablish camps if seized, and pursue and destroy en forces involved.
- (5) Maintain liaison with USASF A Detachments, at CIDG Camps assigned, to coordinate planning and maintain current intel of threat to camps.
- (6) Submit recommendations this He for offensive opns in vic CIDG Camps do exploit intel developed concerning camps.
- o. lst Mar (Rein). 9th Mar (-) (Rein).
 - (1) Anx B (Responsibility/Location CIDG Camps).





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- (2) iden directed, conduct unlateral or coordinated opns to relieve primary responsibility CIDG Camp under atk, recetablish camp if seized, and pursus and destroy on forces involved.
- (3) Be prepared conduct unilateral or coordinated opens to rein or relieve secondary responsibility CIDG Camp under atk, reestablish camp if seized, and pursue and destroy en forces involved.
- (4) Maintain liaison with USASF A Detachments, at CIDG Camps assigned, to coordinate planning and maintain current intel of threat to camps.
- (5) Submit recommendations this Hq for opns in vic CIDG Camps to exploit intel developed concerning camps.
- (6) then directed, provide soty elements when artillery units are deployed to support besieged CIDG Camps.

d. 11th Man (-) (Rein)

- (1) Anx B (Responsibility/Location CIDG Camps).
- (2) When directed, deploy ASAP arty units, rein with scty elements to provide fires unilaterally or in coordination with ARWN arty in DS besieged CIDG Camps. Anx C (Arty Support).
- (3) Be prepared deliver fires ASAP in support besieged CIDG Camps from arty located within supporting range of camps. Anx C (Arty Support).
- (4) Assist in prep and maint of plans as requested by 1st Mar and 9th dar.
- (5) When directed, provide forces IAW 1st Mar and 9th Mar plans.
- (6) Maintain liaison with USASF A Detachments at designated CIDG Camps to ensure preplanned concentrations are valid and fire support coordination procedures are established.

lst Recon En (-) (Rein).

lst AT En (-).

Det, 3d AT En.

Det, 3d Engr En.

Det, 3d SP En.

3d En (-) (Rein).

3d En (-) (Rein).

1st TK En (-).

3d En (-) (Rein).

7th MT En (-) (Rein).

(1) Assist in prep and maint of plans as requested by 1st Mar. Other Mar.

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UNCLASSIFIED (2) When directed, provide forces and support IAW 1st have and 9th war

dinating instructions.

(1) In event information received that CIDG Camp is threatened or has come under attack, immediately notify lst MarDivacoc id-5 Watch Officer.

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- (2) On notification of attack, this Hq will execute procedures of Anx D (CCC/FSCC Immediate Action).
- (3) Notify this Hq immediately when current or planned opn would prevent execution of this plan.
- (4) Consider normal combat support and combat service support elements aveilable. A STATE OF
- (5) Submit requests for external support to this Hq.
- (6) Direct In authorized between all 1st MarDiv units and with FLSG-A: and the state of the state of the state of the state of and FIGG-B.
- (7) Arty support: Anx C (Arty support).
- (8) Air support ref (c). Preplanned air tgts: Ans. D. Preplanned a making the state of the contract of the Air Targets).
- (9) No change in rules of engagement: Ref (c).
- Application of continues on the state of the (10) Direct ln authorized with Senior Advisor QUANG NAM Sector and 2d ANV Div as appropriate in discussing coordinated plans.
- (11) Code name for specific operations will be assigned by Frag Order implementing this plan.
- (12) Provide this Hq with ten copies of all plans.
- (13) This plan effective for planning on receipt, execution on order.
- ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISFICS. Administrative Plan 303-66.
- COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS
 - Communication-Electronics: Anx F (Communication-Electronics).
 - ъ. Command.
 - (1) As matter of U. S. policy, U. S. forcess will not be placed under command or OPCON of allied commanders. However, this restriction does not preclude temporary tactical direction of U. S. Forces by ARVN commanders under exceptional circumstances and by mutual agreement, or temporary direction of ARVN Forces by U. S. commenders under certain circumstances. Matters of this nature will be referred to this Hq.

SECRET

- (2) Command Relationships. Amx G (Command Relationships).
- (3) Command Posts. Ref (1)

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> Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

ANNEXES :

A - Intelligence

B - Responsibility/Location CIDG Camps

C - Arty Support D - COC/FSCC Immediate Action


E - Preplanned Air Targets

F - Communication-Electronics

G - Command Relationships

H - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Armex H (Distribution) to Operation Plan 303-66





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Change No. 2 to Operation Plan 303-66

Time Zone: H

- 1. Substitute attached change 2 to Operation Plan 303-66 for Operation Plan 303-66 in its entirety. Destroy superseded order without report to this Headquarters.
- 2. This sheet will be filed as page 7 of new basic Operation Plan.

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Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

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CG 3d MarDiv	100	3	Det 3d SP Bn	1
		ź	3d Med Bn	1 -
CG 1st MAW		í	3d MT En	1
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FLSG-A	5	2	and the tell in the second transfer and transfer an	
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Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014.

- (5) III MAF's Special Photographic Intelligence Study of Special Forces Camps (NOTAL)
- (c) DivO P3800.1F
- (d) Force0 3820.2

Time Zone: H

- 1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION
 - a. See ref (b) for Special Photographic Intelligence Studies of each CIDG Camp in 1st MarDiv area.
 - b. See current 1st MarDiv SPOTREPs, INTSUMs and PERINTREPs.
- 2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION. Within 15 kilometers of each CIDG Camp.
 - a. Determine if enemy will attack any of CIDG Camps herein enumerated. If so, when? Where? In what strength? With what units?
 - b. Determine if enemy will use reinfercements in attack on any of CIDG Camps, If so, when? Where Proposition with what units?
 - c. Determine if enemy will employ artillery, heavy mortars and/or recoilless rifles in support of ditack against any of CIDG Camps. If so, what type and caliber of waspon? Where will firing posttion be located? What methods of fire control will be employed?
 - d. Determine current combat effectiveness of enemy units that could be employed in attacks against CIDS Camps.
 - e. Determine what avenues of approach areay will use to reach CIDG Camps.
 - f. Determine if enemy will attempt to infiltrate CIDG Camp prior to conduct of attack.
 - g. Determine if enemy will attempt saletage within any of GIDG Camps.
 - h. Determine what tactics enemy will employ during conduct of attack.
 - 1. Determine what means of tactical comminications wheny will employ.

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SECTION

- 3. RECONNATUS OF AND CESSERVALTION MISSIONS
 - u. Orders to Subordinate Unite, Task Force XRAY, lat Marines, 9th harines and 11th Marines. crapare detailed intelligence annexes in support of this Operation Plan utilizing ref (b) studies, current INTSUMs and other studies and estimates provided by this Hq.
 - b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent and Supporting Units. III MAF is requested to supplement and revise special photographic studies as required and provide other studies and/or information bearing on conduct of intelligence planning for enumerated CIDG Camps.
 - c. Coordinating instructions.
 - (1) Any belsaguered JIDG Camp will receive first priority of recommassance available to this Hq.
 - (2) All will report as obtained:
 - (a) Information concerning significant enemy movement and activity which, if true, could threaten any CIDG Camp in 1st MarDiv area.
 - (b) Condition of land lines of communication which could be utilized as approach routes for friendly reaction forces.
- 4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURES, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND CAPTURED MATERIAL. See Sect VIII of ref (c).
- 5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS
 - a. Ber (1) consists of Special Photographic Intelligence Studies as
 - (1) TRA BONG, Serial 065966 of 6 June 66 (8)
 - (2) TEEN PHUCC, Serial 077266 of 1 July 66 (0)
 - (3) BA TO, (not serialised) of 25 April 66 (C)
 - (4) HA TRANE, (not serialized) of 10 May 66 (0)
 - (5) MRAN DUG, Serial 069366 of 13 Jun 66 (C)
 - (6) GIA VUC, Serial 070666 of 16 Jun 66 (C)
 - (7) MINH LONG, Serial 096666 of 4 Aug 66 (C)
 - (8) THUONG DUC, Serial 063366 of 31 May 66 (C)

A-2

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standard tectical map for operations under this plan is VIETNAM, 150,000, ANS Series 17014.

- c. Requisition and distribution will be IAW ref (c).
- d. Map connections. All units will maintain record of map corrections. Corrections will be reported to this Eq (G-2) as encountered. Units will pass on map corrections and any additional geographic information to relieving units.
- e. Thotographs. See para 402 of ref (c).
- 6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. See Sect V of ref (c).
- 7. RUPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

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- a. Submit standard intelligence reports as prescribed in Sect XII of ref (c), and as applified below.
- 5. Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). Reporting period for daily INTSUMs submitted to this Eq (G-2) will be 080° to 080°. INTSUMs will arrive at this Eq (G-2) by 120° and will adhere to format specified by ref (d).
- s. Special Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICRs). SICRs will be promulgated by this Hq to direct collection effort of specific tactical and technical intelligence requirements. Pertiont SICRs will be forwarded to subordinate units for inclusion in their collection effort. Collection of information responsive to SICRs must be made in timely fashion.

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SIDNEY JALTMAN

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A-3





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Annex B (Responsibility/Location CIDG Camps) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series 17014

Time Zone: H

1. CIDG Camps are listed below with their locations, organization with primary and secondary responsibility for planning and execution, and plan number.

CAMP	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SECONDARY RESPONSIBILITY	LOCATION	PLAN#
TRA BONG	TF XRAY	N/A	BS 345882	303A-66
TIEN PHUOC	TF XRAY	N/A	BT 108142	303B-66
BA TO	TF XRAY	N/A	BS 558327	303C-66
HA THANH	XY XRAY	N/A	BS 386704	303D-66
KHAM DUC	1st Mar	9th Mar	zc 004078	303E-66
GIA VUC	TF XRAY	N/A	BS 379270	303F-66
MINH LONG	TF XRAY	A\M	BS 541525	303G-66
THUONG DUC	9th Mar	lst Mar	70 142533	303н-66

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Annex C (Arty Support) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy forces. Annex A (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly forces.
 - (1) ARVN arty provides support when available.
 - (2) FMAW provides air support.
 - (3) 7th USAF provides air support.
 - (4) TU 70. provides NGF support where appropriate.

2. MISSION


When directed, 1st MarDiv provides arty support for relief of beleaguered CIDG Camps.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of arty employment.
 - (1) Provide arty support for beleaguered CIDC Camps from arty within camps and/or arty within supporting range of camp. Arty available to CIDC camps without displacement is shown in Appendix 9 (Arty Support Available to CIDC Camps).
 - (2) On order, arty command and control unit together with one or more firing units will displace to positions from which arty fires can be delivered in support friendly forces defending or reestablishing beleaguered CIDG Camps.
 - (3) Surface movement to selected firing positions will be utilized where possible. For remote positions inaccessible by surface movement, arty elements will move by either helicopter or fixed wing aircraft.

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- b. Arty Command and Control Group.
 - (1) Provide sufficient administrative and logistical personnel to effect OPCON over one or more batteries of field arty ranging from 4.2" mortars to 155mm howitzers.
 - (2) Determine required local security augmentation upon assignment of a special mission and report this requirement to appropriate force commander.
 - (3) Be prepared to exercise technical fire direction for one or more batteries described above.
- c. Firing battery(ies).
 - (1) Be prepared to helilift organic weapons by external means on order, to include providing slings for each weapon.
 - (2) On order prepare basic load of amminition in fiber containers to reduce weight of packing for initial ammunition lift.
 - (3) Be prepared to conduct firing from observed firing charts.
- d. Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) Report position area and fire capabilities to Regimental FDC when established.
 - (2) Available survey data will be furnished to units concerned by Regimental Survey Section.
 - (3) Air observation will be provided when available.
 - (4) Coordination of supporting arms will be exercised by A Detachment Commander at camp under attack until such time as USMC relief forces are committed. At that time, fire support coordination will be exercised by senior USMC tactical commander in area.
 - (5) Assumption of supporting arms coordination by USMC commander will coincide with assumption of OPCON of A Detachment on order of III MAF.
 - (6) ARVN arty available to support CIDG camps is described in Appendix 9 (Arty Support Available to CIDG Camps).
 - (7) Firing chart: Grid Sheet 1:25,000.
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
 - a. Administration of units attached to arty command and control group remains with parent organisation.
 - b. Admin Plan 303-66.





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Appendix 1 (Arty Concentrations, TRA BONG) to Annex C (Arty Support) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014. Sheets 6639 I,II; 6739 III,IV

Time Zone: H

1. TRA BONG CIDG Camp is located at BS 345882, elevation 60 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-107, 5th SFGA.

2. Target list:

TGT NR 1 2 3 4 5 6	TGT LOCATION BS 40678858 BS 41238814 BS 42498847	ELEVATION 10 meters 25 20	TGT DESCRIPTION Military crest Trail on military crest Military crest
4	BS 44568852 BS 45248889	10 10	Trail approach/Exit Trail function
. 6	BS 45508827	5	River proach
7	BS_44708776	10	Military crest
8	BS 43818764	10	Trail junction
9	BS 43338764	20	Military crest
10	BS 42538735	10	Trail junction
11	33 41578706	20	Trail
12	ES 40658656	. 35 - K. C. W. W. W.	Trail metion
13	BS 41078512	95	Milita crest
14	BS 40548565	55	Trail junction
15	BS 42928640	60	Milita_y crest
16	BS 43508740	10	Village, VC controlled
17	BS 44118710	15	Trail function
18	BS 44168646	35	Key ternali.
19	BS 43248527	250	Hill
20	BS 41858527	100	Military crest
21	BS 44338473	50	Military crest and road
22	BS 44888567	10	Trail junction
23	BS 46038612	10	Trail junction
24	BS 46358558	10	Stream/trail junction
25	BS 40048744	10	Village, VC controlled
26	BS 39668693	60	Military crest
27	BS 39628835	3 5	Military crest
28	BS 38878745	15	Bridge
29	BS 38478669	20	Military crest
30	BS 38008767	10	Trail junction

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31	E 38208835	10 meters	Trail
32	B\$ 37408 81 3	40	Key terrain
33	BS 37658738	20	Bridge
34	BS 37388663	. 8 0	Avenue of approach to key terrain
35	BS 37078770	20	Key terrain
36	BS 36678855	3 0	Avenue of approach to key terrain
37	BS 36288889	40	Key terrain
38	BS 35888837	70	Key terrain (Hill 71)
39	BS 35848783	45	Trail junction
40	BS 36608732	5 0	Military crest
41	BS 36258675	140	Military crest
42	BS 36058626	210	Military crest
43	BS 35628700	6 0	Trafficable terrain for
		*,	maneuver element
44	BS 36358735	4 0	Outpost, PF
45	BS 35438731	40	Outpost, PF
46	BS 33598750	60	Outpost, PF
47	BS 33438757	50	Outpost, PF
48	BS 33878792	3 0	Outpost, PF
49	BS 33738837	60	Outpost, PF
50	BS 33168853	60	Outpost, PF
51	BS 34448794	40	Outpost, PF
52	BS 34658820	40	USSF compound
フル	DO JANJOOKO	40	orest. confrontin

3. The following are registration points to be used for registration fires in the vicinity of TRA BONG.

RP NR	RP LOCATION	ELEVATION	RP DESCRIPTION
RP NR #1	BS 35888837	40 meters	Hilltop
#2	BS 36608732	50	Crest
#3	BS 36258675	140	Crest
#4	BS 36058626	210	Crest

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SIDNEY J. ATMAN Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

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Appendix 2 (Arty Concentrations, TIEN PHUOC) to Annex C (Arty Support) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014. Sheets 6640 II,III; 6639 I,IV.

Time Zone: H

- 1. TIEN PHUOC CIDG Camp is located at FT 108142, elevation 60 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-102, 5th SFGA.
- 2. Target list-

TOT NR	LOCATION	ELEVATION	TGT DESCRIPTION
1	BT 10131450	50 meters	Route of approach
2	BT 10101480	60	Route of approach
3 .	BT 10101525	55	Route of approach
3 4 5 6	BT 10091565	60	Route of approach
5	BT 09801586	60	Route of approach
6	BT 10111420	5 5	Support weapons position
7	BT 09901442	60	AW position
8	BT 09801475	55	Trail junction
9	BT 09721517	55	Route of approach
10	BT 09651560	55	Route of approach
11	BT 10801470	60	Attack position
12	BT 10401470	60	Attack position
13	BT 10621510	60	Route of approach
14	BT 11051385	50	River crossing
15	BT 10951335	60	Route of approach
16	BT 10701285	80	Route of approach
17	BT 10051300	50	Possible mortar position
18	BT 09701315	80	Possible mortar position
19	BT 08861365	260	Trail junction
20	BT 08451470	200	Route of approach
21	BT 11651255	70	Possible mortar position
22	BT 10201220	100	Route of approach
23	BT 12301325	55	Route of approach
24	BT 12551475	80	Route of approach
25	BT 12801525	55	Trail junction
26	BT 12701615	70	Trail junction
27	BT 12051680	75	Trail junction
28	BT 11101675	80	Route of approach
29	BT 09301645	60	Trail junction
30	BT 09001582	55	Trail junction

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31	BT 10451435	55 meters	Camp position overrun
32	BT 10751445	60	Camp position overrun
33	BT 10501401	50	Camp position overrun
34	BT 10901420	55	Camp position overrun
35	BT 11101430	60	Assault position
36	BT 09101250	340	RR position
37	BT 08451315	300	RR position
38	BT 08101395	400	RR position
39	BT 07801450	360	RR position
40	BT 07801565	60	Mortar position
41	BT 08461640	60	Route of approach
42·	BT 08781693	55	Route of approach
46	22 00 10 20 7	77	5 · A

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BT 09901746

BT 10331752

BT 11401780

BT 13621617

BT 14441405

BT 13491250

BT 12601187

BT 09651115

3. The following are registration points to be used for registration fires in the vicinity of TIEN PHUOC.

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RP MR	RP LOCATION	<u>elevation</u>	RE DESCRIPTION
//1	BT 09801475	55 meters	Trail junction
<i>1</i> ₽2	BT 10801470	60	Attack position
<i>#</i> 3	ET 11051385	50	dver crossing
# 4.	BT 08861365	260	Trail junction

DI COMMAND OF ALAJOR GENERAL NICKERSON

Route of approach

Route of approach

Route of approach

Possible mortar position

Possible mortar position

Trail junction

River crossing

Trail junction

SIDNEY ALTMAN
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

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- lst MarDiv CEOI.
- Annex F (Communication-Electronics).
- Command relationships. Annex G (Command Relationships).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL NICKERSON

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES:

- Arty Concentrations, TRA BONG
- Arty Concentrations, TIEN PHUOC Arty Concentrations, BA TO
- Arty Concentrations, HA THANH Arty Concentrations, KHAM DUC
- Arty Concentrations, GIA VUC
- Arty Concentrations, MINH LONG 7.
- Arty Concentrations, THUONG DUC
- Arty Support Available to CIDG Camps

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Appendix 3 (Arty Concentrations, BA TO) to Annex C (Arty Support) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014. Sheets 6738 I-IV:

Time Zone: H

1. BA TO CIDG Camp is located at 35 550327, elevation 60 meters.
Special Poster annual Camp is Determined in Statement in

Z. Target list:

TGT NR	TGT LOCATION	ELEVATION	TGT DESCRIPTION
1	BS 57283190	60 meters	Possible avenue of approach
2	BS 56303184	60	Possible outpost
3	BS 55883200	50	Ford
3 4	BS 57003310	65	Possible avenue of approach
Ś	BS 55303340	55	Possible avenue of approach
6	BS 54903285	60	Possible avenue of approach
5 6 7	BS 56503100	140	Possible weapons position
8	BS 55353080	50	Possible assembly area
9	BS 55853060	60	Ford
10	BS 54953110	55	Trail junction
11	BS 55623005	55	Trail junction
12	BS 56752995	100	Possible assembly area
13	BS 60103150	280	Possible avenue of approach
14	BS 61853115	582	Trail junction
15	BS 61203370	360	Trail junction
16	BS 62153425	370	Trail junction
17	BS 63653440	390	Possible assembly area
18	BS 59803510	80	Possible avenue of approach
19	BS 59153510	70	Possible avenue of approach
20	BS 60403570	200	Trail junction
21	BS 61003590	60	Trail junction
22	BS 63343630	100	Trail junction
23	BS 61303715	330	Trail junction
24	BS 59603660	60	Trail junction
25	BS 57903640	70	Possible avenue of approach
26	BS 57253610	40	Possible avenue of approach
27	BS 56693640	40	Possible assembly area
28	BS 58473740	40	Possible avenue of approach
29	BS 56903740	160	Possible avenue of approach
30	BS 56203785	100	Possible assembly area

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31	BS 56453840	20 meters	Ford
32	BS 57103925	50	Ford
33	BS 62153860	40	Trail junction
34	BS 61303975	10	Trail junction
35	BS 62503870	90	Possible avenue of approach
36	BS 49303285	80	Possible avenue of approach
37	BS 51653260	100	Possible avenue of approach
38	BS 49753200	7 0	Possible avenue of approach
39	BS 53103065	250	Possible outpost
40	BS 53843065	100	Possible avenue of approach
41	BS 58502787	140	Possible assembly area
42	BS 56302775	70	Possible avenue of approach
43	BS 55902735	70	Trail junction
44	BS 54602675	70	Ford
45	BS 56802600	8.0	Ford
46	BS 48703085	70	Trail junction
47	BS 57953120	100	Possible avenue of approach
48	BS 5.7 403180	100	Possible avenue of approach
49	BS 57053435	30	Possible avenue of approach
50	BS 57203550	3 0	Ford

3. The following are registration points to be used for registration fires in the vicinity of BA TO.

RP NR	RP LOCATION	ELEVATION	RP DESCRIPTION
#1	BS 57473455	185 meters	"Fail Junction
#2	BS 55663400	125	Telegra
#3	BS 56103255	110	CWII
#4	BS 58103255	300	Hilltop

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Appendix 4 (Arty Concentrations, HA THANH) to Annex C (Arty Support) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014. Sheets 6739 III; 6738 IV; 6638 I; 6639 II.

Time Zone: H

- 1. HA THANH CIDG Camp is located at BS 386702, elevation 60 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-104, 5th SFGA.
- 2. Target list:

TGT NR	TGT LOCATION	ELEVATION	TOT DESCRIPTION
1	BS 43557510	100 meters	Hilltop
2	BS 42827435	140	Hilltop
	BS 42357435	139	Hilltop
4	BS 40427540	$2\overline{0}$	Well used trail
5	BS 30707446	40	Well used trail
3 4 5 6	BS 41507385	20	Village
7	BS 41857392	20	Road junction
. 8 .	BS 37057255	221	Hilltop
9	BS 39787260	60	Well used trail
10	BS 38107350	40	Assembly area
11	BS 37657148	40	Village
12	BS 37007375	100	Infiltration route
13	BS 44397090	20	Trail
14	BS 45757035	20	Possible staging area
15	BS 43926903	146	Abandoned OP
16	BS 44726935	20	Possible staging area
17	BS 41356866	20	River crossing site
18	BS 41456760	60	Infiltration route
19	BS 41007010	100	Possible AW psns
20	BS 40757093	80	Possible AW psn
21	BS 32726480	100	Assembly area
22	BS 34186559	60	Avenue of approach
23	BS 34906692	60	Assembly area
24	BS 32706717	80	Avenue of approach
25	BS 34556770	60	Assembly area
26	BS 35406818	60	Stream crossing
27	BS 32756834	100	Avenue of approach
28	BS 33087038	160	Avenue of approach
29	BS 35357045	240	Avenue of approach
30	BS 36757059	80	Assembly area

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31	BS 36207250	60 meters	Assembly area
32	BS 35007174	80	Avenue of approach
33	BS 34557110	260	Avenue of approach
34	BS 38506970	100	Stream bed
35	BS 39306955	40	AW position
36	BS 39956990	60	Avenue of approach
37	BS 39007120	<u> </u>	Avenue of approach
38	BS 36607020	90	Friendly OP
39	BS 37807050	186	Friendly OP
40	BS 39656940	176	Friendly OP
41	BS 38006920	90	Friendly OP
42	BS 40704330	190	Friendly OP
43	BS 39106920	170	Friendly OP
44	BS 38306770	123	Friendly OP
45	BS 37506690	230	Friendly OP
46	BS 38806640	90	Friendly OP
47	BS 38206480	80	Friendly OP
4ė	BS 38206320	195	Friendly OP
49	BS 37806180	195	Friendly OP
50	BS 37356575	40	Friendly OP

3. The following are registration points to be used for registration fires in the vicinity of HA THANH.

RP NR	RP LOCATION	ELEVATION	RP DESCRIPTION
RP NR #1	BS 37057255	221 meters	Hilltop
#2	BS 39787260	60	Well used trail
#3	BS 41007010	100	Possible AW pan
#2 #3 #4	BS 40757093	100	Possible AW psn

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Appendix 5 (Arty Concentrations, KHAM DUC) to Annex C (Arty Support) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014. Sheets 6540 II, III; 6539 I, IV.

Time Zone: H

1. KHAM DUC CIDG Camp is located at ZC 004078, elevation 360 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-105, 5th SFGA.

2. Target list:

		1.7	
TGT NR	TGT LOCATION	ELEVATION	TGT DESCRIPTION
1	YC 98171015	849 meters	OP
2	YC 97950655	350	Trail junction
.3	YC 98250676	390	Old village
4	YC 99260605	430	Bivouac area
5	YC 98480760	410	Avenue of approach
5	YC 98850705	450	OP
7	YC 98800779	390	Trail junction
8	YC 99380695	390	Avenue of approach
9	YC 99690655	210	River junction
10	YC 99350812	380	Avenue of approach
11	YC 99500901	390	Bridge
12	ZC 00110645	370	Mortar site
13	ZC 00150772	360	Trail
14	ZC 00450760	310	Avenue of approach
13	zc 00660779	330	Trail
16	ZC 00910785	340	Trail
17	ZC 00860825	360	Avenue of approach
18	ZC 00210855	370	Bridge
19	ZC 01000985	450	OP C
20 🐃	ZC 00851029	390	Bridge
21	Z C 01151096	31 0	Bridge
22	20 01400945	450	OP
23	ZC 02600755	350	Bivouac area
24	ZC 02600813	390	Bivouac area
25	ZC 01220694	370	Mortar position
26	ZC 02720647	372	Bivouac area
27	20 01320755	190	Ford
28	ZC 03000767	170	River junction
29	ZC 01100610	390	Bivouac area
30	20 02670961	470	Mortar site
-		• •	

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	* .		
31	YE 95569986	. 440	Bridge
32	YC 96170376	410	Bridge
33	YC 96600780	360	Abandoned village
34	ZC 04551394	360	Ford
35	ZC 03601054	300	Old OP
36	ZC 02821005	320	Bridge
37	ZC 04350967	170	Bridge
3 8	ZC 03800854	170	River junction
39	ZC 03630548	200	Ford
40	ZC 05080324	210	Ford
41	ZC 02530420	676	Old OP
42	ZC 03000320	430	Trail
43	YC 93950765	549	Bivouac area
44	YC 97731350	1028	OP
45	ZC 00240260	550	Bivouac area
46	ZC 01200380	550	Mortar position
47	ZC 07860852	240	Stream cressing
48	YC 95371120	450	Mortar position
49	YC 97800535	490	Bivouac area
50	ZC 00901280	500	Trail
-			

3. The following are registration points to be used for registration fires in the vicinity of KHAN DUC.

RP NR	RP LOCATION	ELEVATION	RP DESCRIPTION
#1	ZC 02550430	676 meters	010
#2	ZC 02160857	457	CHALLEST
<i>#</i> 3	YC 99361010	630	Hilltop .
#4	YC 98420782	510	Hilltop

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Appendix 6 (Arty Concentrations, GIA VUC) to Annex C. (Arty Support) to Operation Plan 303-66

That

Ref: (a) Maps: VINTNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014. Sheets 6738 III,IV: 6638 I, WII.

Time Zone: H

- 1. GIA VUC CIDG Comp is located at BS 377640, elevation 130 meters.
 Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-103, 5th SFGA.
 - 2. Target list

TGT NR	TGT LOCATION	RIFYATION	MIT DESCRIPTION
1	BS 37752985	140 meter	
2	BS 37502960	130	Trail and open area
3	BS 57102945	140	Jungle area & likely assy area
4	BS 37252910	140	ingle area & likely assy area
5	BS 36352890	145	Ravine
	BS 39402920	130	Villege
7	BS 39102885	135	Two buts and trail
8	B6 38402855	320	Hiltop overlooking camp
9		140	Trail junction
10		220	2rell
11	BS 35902795	200	Trail & stream jct
12	BS 57652765	140	Trail junction
13	36 39152630	250	Trail
14	BS 39852800	180	Three buts & trail
15	BS 40252770	130	Trail
1.76	36 39102745	185	Trail junction
	BS 35702740	175	Trail crossing a stream
18 - 3.		130	Trail
19	BS 39702700	270	Hilltop
20	BS 35602595	240	Streen
21	BS 36452595	130	Village Two huts and trail
22	BS 37252605	130	Trail
23	BS 37602615	140 190	Trail
24	BS 38802610 BS 39802 58 0	200	Village
25 26	BS 40552640	340	Trail junction
20 27	BS 36552540	130	Village and trail
28	BS 39302555	200	frail
29	BS 37552485	145	Village and trail junction
3 0	BS 38552465	140	Village
<i>-</i>		•	사람들은 그 그 그 그 그 가는 그 그 가는 그 가는 그 그 그 그 그 그 그

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31	BS	35052415	340	meters	Stream	junction	- Control of Control	
32	BS	36252325	180		Trail	junction	1	
33		37752355	170			junc tion		
34		39852565	566		Hillto			
35	BS	42402465	920		Trail		Fig. 1	
36	39	41802715	180		Trail		time out	
37	BS	433 528 25	130		Trail.	junction	Martin	
38	BS	42452860	130		Trail		and the same	
39		43902955	160	ng inggreen stag.	Tures	hute and	trail	
40	BS	41752940	210		Stream			
41	B8	38853130	210		Stream			
42	BS	38555260	210	8.1	Villeg	• Proposition of the Company of the Comp	4k##	
45		37603295	230		Hillto			
44	BS	37603145	210		Trail:	junc tion		
45		36953080	165	34.4	Jungle	eres, 1:	hily acc	y area
46		34652955	560		Trail			The state of the s
47	BS	32703080	970		Stream			
48		32852935	1100		Villag	0.		
49		33302820	≥860		Treil			4
50	BS	33852705	490		Villag	•		

3. The following are registration points to be used for registration the fires in the vicinity of GIA VUC.

RP NR		LOCATION	111	ELEV	ATION	RP DESC	RIPTION
#1	BS	37252865		140	meters	Trail :	juno tion
#2	39	36952675		190		Hillton	•
#3		36902445		130		River	junction
#4		38902675		130		Trail	junction

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Appendix 7 (Arty Concentrations, FINH LONG) to Annex C (Arty Support) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014. Sheets 6739 II, III; 6738 I, IV.

Time Zone: H

- 1. MING LONG CIDG Camp is located at BS 541525, elevation 80 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-108, 5th SFGA.
- 2. Target List:

TOT NR	TGT LOCATION	ELEVATION	TOT DESCRIPTION
1	BS 54135065	90 meters	Hilltop with positions
2	BS 53275192	65	Registration point #1
	BS 53005060	70	Avenue of approach
4	BS 53404983	ėo	Trail entering trees
5	BS 54755096	125	Hilltop with positions
Ś	BS 54505071	85	Trail junction
3 4 5 5 7	BS 54064998	120	Assembly area
8	BS 52924937	80	Assembly area
8 9	BS 52834945	80	Assembly area
10	BS 52484928	80	Assembly area with wons position
11	BS 52054934	80	Assembly area w/tree line wpns psn
12	BS 51945031	75	Assy area w/auto wpns psns
13	BS 52375046	70	Bridge
14	BS 52955008	175	Hill 175, friendly position
15	BS 53075030	145	Hilltop with possible wpns pos
16	BS 50805270	540	Assembly area, bunkers and houses
17	BS 51605208	100	Assy area/avenue of approach
18	BS 52215195	105	Recaller rifle/mortar psn
19	BS 52095254	120	Trail junction
20	BS 52075275	172	Hilltop with position
2 1	BS 51265266	160	Trail in woods
22	BS 52325287	100	Draw, avenue of approach
23	BS 52305269	100	Trail
24	B\$ 52855236	85	Trail junction
25	BS 53305280	60	Trail junction
2 6	BS 53355185	60	Road junction
27	BS 53375294	8 0	Village, assy area
28	BS 54075387	75	Road in village
29	BS 53905296	55	Road/trail junction
30	BS 54275274	100	Friendly OP

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31	BS 54265252	115 meters	Friendly OP
32	BS 54065241	85	Friendly OP
	BS 54685220	185	Friendly OP
33 34	BS 54455234	75	Trail
35	BS 54785244	80	Trail, assy area
36	BS 56245182	520	Mtn top poss RR psn
37	BS 56135514	35	Trail/road junction
38	35 57685495	15	Village, assy area
-	BS 56805400	25	Trail approach
39	BS 49004455	95	Trail junction, ford
	BS 51704884	70	Trail junction
41	BS 52204849	234	Possible RR position
42		300	Possible RR position
43	BS 50004879		Possible RR position
44	BS 40265299	449	Assembly area
45	BS 51455015	80	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
46	BS 49864966	120	Assembly area
47	BS 50624890	100	Avenue of approach, assy area
48	BS 54965412	60	Assy area, avenue of approach
49	BS 53705516	55	Trail junction
50	BS 51245411	300	Trail

3. The following are registration points to be used for registration fires in the vicinity of MINH LONG.


RP NR	RP LOCATION	ELEVATION	RP DESCRIPTION
#1	BS 53275192	65 meters	Old dist has
#2	BS 54005217	65	Mound in rice paddies
#3	BS 54775094	125	Hilltop
#4	BS 54215120	65	House
#5	BS ₃ 52385097	75	House

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Appendix & (Arty Concentrations, THUONG DUC), to Annex C (Arty Support) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series 17014. Sheets 65/0 I,II; 6640 III,IV.

Time Zone: H

- 1. THUONG DUC CIDG Camp is located at ZC 142533, elevation 60 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-109, 5th SFGA.
- 2. Target list:

TOT NR	TGT LOCATION	ELEVATION	TOT DESCRIPTION
1	ZC 15005246	0	Village
2	ZC 15705296	0	Village
3	ZC 17185325	0 '	Village
4	ZC 16145365	0	Village
5	20 16545384	٥	Village
6	ZC 17105381	Ü	Village
4 5 6 7 8	ZC 17185325	0	Village
	ZC 15875412	0	Village
9	ZC 15105433	. 0	Village
10	ZC 16395433	" O	Village
11	ZC 17285469	0	Village
12	ZC 15715470	0	woulding
13	ZC 15875488	20	##1ltop
14	2C 15555593	20	Friendly OP
15	ZC 11455441	70	Knoll
16	ZC 159255 46	10	Ridge finger
17	ZC 11415374	150	Ridge finger, poss RR position
18	ZC 11265261	140	Draw, staging area
19	ZC 11465229	410	Ridge finger, OP
20	2C 15185531	0	East foot knoll
21	ZC 15125570	0	Bottom of ridge
22	ZC 11785340	250	Knoll, poss RR position
23	ZC 14725599	0	Bottom of ridge
24	ZC 14575620	20	Ridge finger
25	ZC 14185640	0 ,	Stream bed
26	2C 13985570	0	Village
27	ZC 13855595	20	Ridge finger
28	ZC 13355535	0	Village
29	2C 13575383	10	Cresk entering valley
30	ZC 13745325	50	Top of draw

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33	ZC 13805353	# C	Bottom of Association
	20 13785274	90	Top of 3raw William
3 3		20	Sido ridge a selib edi.
33	ZC 14185342	in No.	
34	20 14515340	T T	Skale
35	zc 14135186		Villege Villege
36	ZC 14355225	Q	V11/1920
37	ZC 18325375	Ç	Village
38	20 11855291	1 /2	Merter position
39	ZC 12145238	430	Ridge f inge r
40.	ZC 12725376	50	Infil route staging area
41	2 12985331	90	Montar position
42	20 13205300	70	Mortar position
43	20 13005260	110	Possible RR position
44	ZC 12185570	٥.	Village
45	ZC 11085595		Village
46	20 10645653	0	Village
47	20 13385315	110	Fossible RR position
48	ZC 12315119	C	South end of bridge
49	ZC 13485273	130	Possible RR position
50	zc 11295055	Ü	Village

3. The following are registration points to be used for registration fires in the vicinity of THUONG DUC.


RP NR	RP LOCATION	ELEVATION	RP DESCRIPTION
#1	ZC 14245285	10 meters	Warrow valley
#2	ZC 14555345	0	refre Rigae
#3	ZC 13295358	7 0	Kno11
#4	ZC 14895317	10	Road junction

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Appendix 9 (Arty Support Available to CIDG Camps) to Annex C (Arty Support) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETRAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014.

Time Zone: H

1. Following CIDG Camps have arty emplaced within camp or on OP related to camp complex:

CAMP	ARTY	ARTY COORDINATES
THUONG DUC	2 - 105mm how	ZC 144532
TIEN PHUOC	2 - 105mm how	BT 1 15157

2. Following camp is within supporting range of arty emplaced at other GVN outpost as indicated:

CAIP	SUPPORTING LOCATION	<u>ARTY</u>	A. TT COURDS
M I NH]	LONG WINTA HEAVEN (PH. VINH)	2-155mm how (only capable northeast of	BS 614643 of supporting outposts MINH LONG)

3. Following camps have US arty available for support:

CAMP	US ARTY	ARTY COORDINATES
TRA BONG	2-155mm gun	BS 540994
TIEN PHOUC	4-175mm gun 4-105mm how	BS 635848 BT 106142
на тначн	4-1 75pm gun	BS 6 35848 or
MINH LONG	4-175mm gun	BS 637759(alt. pos.) BS 637759(alt. pos.)
THUONG DUC	2-8" how 2-155mm gun	AT 877474

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4. Other CIDG Camps may be within range of USMC arty depending on tactical deployments dictated by other considerations. USMC arty may also be placed within selected CIDG Camps to support subsequent Marine perations in vicinity of camps.

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Annex D (COC/FSCC Immediate Action) to Operation Plan 303-66

Time Zone: H

- Upon notification that one of the camps listed in Anx B (Responsibility/ Location CIDG Camps) is threatened by or has comegunder enemy attack, Division G-3 COC Watch Officer will:
 - a. Contact Detachment C-1, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) to determine seriousness of threat or attack, action taken to counter threat or attack, and weather conditions in vic of camp.
 - b. Alert ACofS, G-3 of situation at beleaguered camp.
 - c. If initial information concerning camp received from sources other than III MAF, notify III MAF: G-3 COC Watch Officer.
 - d. Contact Advisory Gp Watch Officer at QUANG DA Spec Zone or 2d ARVN Div as appropriate to obtain additional information.
 - e. Alert FSCC, air and artillery Watch Officers.
 - f. Start an immediate plot of situation.
 - g. Monitor appropriate tactical radio net of camp concerned. See Anx G (Command Relationships).
 - h. When directed:
 - (1) Alert organization with responsibility for camp that has been threatened or attacked. See Anx B (Responsibility/Location CIDG Camps).
 - (2) During daylight hours, or at night if flare plane has been requested, describing for AO to make assessment of situation.
- 2. FSCC Watch Officers will:
 - a. Alert Fire Support Coordinator.
 - b. Alert (as mequired):
 - (1) DASC.

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- (2) From Openations.
- (3) 11th Ham/lat PAG as appropriate.
- c. Be respond to phase beloagued compiledized contact with aguantes responding to:
 - (1) Air Support Requests
- (2) Artillery Fire Requests.
 - (3) Nevel Gunfire Support Requests.

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Annex E (Preplanned Air Targets) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS Series L701 and L7014

Time Zone: H

- 1. Appendixes 1 through 8 are preplanted air targets primarily intended to be used for TPQ-10/MSQ-77 controlled air strikes during periods of reduced visibility in vicinity of CIDG Camps under attack. Targets represent likely evenues of approach, choke points, assembly areas, OP's, and weapons positions.
- 2. Promulgation of target lists is directed to fire support coordination elements likely to be committed in support of CIDG Camps under attack.
- 3. All appropriate TPQ-10 computer data for each of these targets will be prepared by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and appropriate appendixes will be promulgated to each ASRT and DASC capable of supporting a given CIDG Camp under attack.

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Chief of Staff

APPENDIXES

1. Preplanned Air Targets, TRA BONG

2. Preplanned Air Targets, TIEN PHUCC 3. Preplanned Air Targets, BA TO

4. Preplanned Air Targets, HA THANH

5. Preplanned Air Tergets, KHAM DUC

6. Preplanned Air Targets, GIA VUC 7. Preplanned Air Targets, MINH LONG

8. Preplenned Air Targets, THUONG DUC

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Appendix 1 (Preplanned Air Targets, TRA BONG) to Annex E (Preplanned Air Targets) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS L7014. Sheets 6640 II, III; 6639 I, IV.

Time Zone: H

- 1. TRA BONG CIDG Camp is located at BS 345882, elevation 60 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-107, 5th SFGA.
- 2. Target list:

TOT NR	TGT LOCATION	ELEVATION	TGT DESCRIPTION
G 1	BS 341887	40 meters	Poss direct fire pan
G 2	BS 335875	60	Poss direct fire pan
	BS 323879	60	RF OP direct fire pan
0 3	BS 347886	60	Direct fire per
G 4	BS 345861	320	Fire pen
G 5 G 6	BS 345895	270	Indirect fire pen
	BS 345885	60	Direct fire pan
G 7	BS 360867	150	RF/OP/dir/ind@rect fire pan
G 8	BS 359884	70	Indirect fire pan
G 9		40	RF/OP fire pen
G 10	BS 355873 BS 363878	60	Indirect fire pen
G 11		120	Indirect fire pan
G 12	BS 325870	40	Direct fire pen
G 13	BS 357878	60	RF/OP fire pan
G 14	BS 345874 BS 345859	400	Hilltop OP
G 15		280	Trail
G 16	BS 323927	260	Trail
G 17	BS 330920	240	Trail
G 18	BS 338911	200	Trail
G 19	BS 342900	40	Trail
G 20	BS 340890	400	Trail
G 21	BS 363850	200	Trail
G 22	BS 360860		Trail
G 23	BS 360858	230 60	Trail
G 24	BS 357871	560	Trail
G 25	BS 355845		Trail
G 26	BS 349860	300	
G 27	BS 344871	80	Trail
G 28	BS 323840	360 200	Trail junction
G 29	BS 319854	280	Trail
G 30	BS 322868	180	Trail

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G	31	•	328872	60	meters	Trail	
G	32.	1	35 587 5	200		Trail	
Ġ	33		35 31 38 80	90		Trail	
G	34		35 240898	70		River/t.ai.	
G	35.		38 238899	80		River/Coail	
	36		35 260897	80		River/t ai	
G			35 274895	80		River, Frai:	
-	38		3S 294890	50		River/ trail	
Ğ	39		35 304886				
G				50		River, trai.	
<u>.</u>	40		35 310915	490		Trail	and the second of the second
G	41		33 315896	100	•	Trail	•
G	42	I	35 410888	20		Trail	, n 1
G	43	E	3 393883	40		Trail	
G	44		3 374843	420		Trail	
G	45		35 368892	100	أمساء الماس	Trail	
Ġ	46		3 333934	420	10,75,87		ea/supply point
G	47		3 320930	380		Choosing are	a/supply point
_						Susming are	es/supply point
G	48		3 318910	600			ea (thistick canopy)
G	49	E	IS 413897	40		Staging are	es (moderate canopy)
G	50	E	3S 405895	160		apply area	

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Appendix 2 (Preplanned Air Targets, TIEN PHUOC) to Annex E (Preplanned Air Targets) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS L7014. Sheets 6640 II, III; 6639 I, IV.

Time Zone: H

1. TIEN PHUCC CIDG Camp is located at BF 108142, elevation 60 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-102, 5th SFGA.

2. Target list:

TGT NR	TGT LOCATION	ELEVATION	TGT DESCRIPTION
7 1	BT 136163	60 meters	Trail junction
3 2	BT 120169	80	Trail junction
B 3	BT 090162	55	Ford
	BT 082156	60	Trail and possible troop conc
3 4 9 5 B 6	BT 090143	80	Possible mortar position
в 6	BT 099147	55	Ford
B 7	BT 098144	55	Possible mortar position
B 8	BT 101139	80	Possible mortar position
в 9	BT 096132	80	Possible troop concentration :
B 10	BT 105126	90	Possible mortar position
B 11	BT 102117	90	Possible mortar position
B 12	BT 095115	85	Possible mortar position
B 13	BT 082124	185	Possible mortar position
3 14	BT 07613)	180	Possible mortar position
B 15	BT 06 61 57	170	Possible troop concentration
B 16	BT 05 315 3	30 0	Possible troop concentration
B 17	EL 083144	340	Possible RR position
B 18	BT 089137	≠ 50	Possible RR position
B 19	BT 089139	1 60	Possible RR position
B 20	BF 108138	50	Approach
B 21	BT 103147	40	Assault position
B 22	BT 089167	60	Approach
B 23	BT 104154	50	Approach
B 24	BT 091168	120	AA Gun position
B 25	BT 102178	60	Possible mortar position
В 26	BT 126162	60	Trail junction
B 27	BI 087125	370	Possible AA gun position
B 28	Br 079141	410	Possible AA gun position
В 29	BT 120122	80	Possible mortar position
B 30	BT 136131	125	Possible An gun position

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	31	BN 128152	75 meters	Trail junction
		Br 159152	269	Possible Ad gun position
		Br 134174	310	Possible AA gun position
	33	31 073152	160	Possible mortar position
	34	BT 060125	560	Possible mortar position
	3 5	Br 116115	20	Possible morter position
	36		237	Possible An gun position
	37	31 1.24109	29 (# 1.00	Possible mortar position
	33	BP 066176	,00 ,0	Route of approach
	39	B1.095 1 55	3 0	Route of suprosch
	40	BT 110168	60	Possible asscult position
	41	BF 112149	50 50	Possible assault position
	42	3r 107147		Village (V)
3	43	Br 114179	70	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
В	44	BT 150168	80	Route of approach
В	45	BT 142135	70	Route of approach
В	46	31 135125	60	Route of approach,
	47	BT 099165	60	Support Site
	18	Br 102162	6 0	Route of approach
	49	Br 157129	60	Support site
	50	BT 173138	60	Bridge

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Appendix 3 (Preplanned Air Targets, BA TO) to Annex E (Preplanned Air Targets) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50:000, AMS L7014 Masheet 6738 I-IV

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Time Zone: H

- 1. BA TO CIDG Camp is located at BS 558327, elevation 60 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detackment A-106, 5th SFGA.
- 2. Target list: And The property

2.	Target	ilst:		
TG	T NR	TGT LOCATIO	N ELEVATION	TGT DESCRIPTION
F	1	BS 562316	100 meters	Direct fire wpns psns
F	2	BS 563313	100	Direct fire wpns psns
F	3	BS 567315	160	Direct fire wons pans
F	4	BS 565310	160	Avenues of approach
		BS 572314	160	Possible mortar position
f	5 ACLUM	BS 448310	** *** *** 80 ******	Avenue of approach
F	7	BS 574329	80	Direct fire wpns psns
F	8	BS 550310	50	Fording site
F	9	BS 563297	50	Assembly point
F	10	BS 577319	75	Trail junction
F	11 '	BS 580311	100	Trail and stream junction
F	12	BS 580305	bs 120	Assembly area
F	13	BS 548329	70	Trail junction
F	14	BS 553334 *		Trail and stream junction
F	15	BS 581320	160	Assembly point
F	16	BS 582319	200	Assembly point
	17	BS 583329	1 60	Direct fire wpns psns
	18	BS 5923 26		Trail junction
F	19	33 590 335	180	Assembly point
	20	BS 590337	10 0	Assembly point
	21	BS 568355	110	Blocking positions
	2 2	BS 577363	60	Enemy control point
	23	BS 585375	50	Enemy trade site
F	24	BS 590365	120	Trail junction
	25	BS 602359	210	Enemy OP
F	26	BS 616360	150	Assembly area
	27	BS 620360	140	Assembly area
	28	BS 560379	140	Enery OP
	29	BS 522357	2 50	Assembly area
F	30	BS 534342	440	Avenue of approach

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F 31	BS 549340	80 meters	Avenue of approach
F 32	BS 535325	60	Trail junction
F 33	BS 506314	70	Control point
F 34	BS 635362	80	Assembly area
F 35	BS 646364	50	Assembly area
F 36	BS 619387	50	Assembly area
F 37	BS 620338	290	Assembly area
	BS 617301	660	Trail junction
F 38	BS 610285	290	Assembly area
F 39	BS 573255	90	Assembly area
F 40	BS 555273	100	Assembly area
F 41	BS 548268	90	Assembly area
F 42 F 43	BS 520322	70	Assembly area
- 12	BS 484354	360	Trail junction
F 44	BS 541391	70*	Assembly area
F 45		290	OF
F 46	BS 581330	264	OP .
F 47	BS 534310		OP
F 48	BS 582236	305 305	OP
F 49	BS 579345	105	
F 50	BS 586351	230	OP


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Appendix a (Inclined Air Targets, HA THANH) to Annex E (Preplanmed Air Targets) to Operation Plan 305-66

Ref: (a) Mags: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS L7014. Sheets 6739 III; 6738 IV; 6638 I; 6639 II.

Time Zone: H

1. HA THANH CIDG Camp is located at BS 386704, elevation 60 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-104, 5th SFGA.

2. Target list:

TGT IR	TGT LOCATION	EIEVATION	TGT I ISCRIPTION
D 1	BS 435750	45 meters	OP #6
		60	Commanding terrain
D 2	BS 422741	30	Bridge approach
D 3	BS 415737	2 2 7	Hilltop
D 4	BS 370727		Trail approach
D 5	BS 373717	40	Trail approach
D 6	BS 383714	30	Trail approach
D 7	BS 388710	15	
D 8	BS 393710	• 40	Possible assembly area
D 9	BS 393708	20	River grossing
D 10	B\$ 408708	. 80	Hilltol
D 11	BS 403703	30	Trail approach
D 12	BS 410710	75	Hilltop
D 13	BS 402700	30	Trail approach
D 14	BS 441701	90	Possible assembly area
D 15	BS 45 5 698	40	Possible assembly area
D 16	BS 353704	80	Village
D 17	35 3546 9 9	100	Hilltop
D 18	BS 355697	100	Hilltop
D 19	BS 352693	100	Hilltop
D 20	BS 384697	40	Hilltop
D 21	BS 382697	30	Road junction
D 22	BS 397694	120	Hilltop
D 23	BS 387692	120	Hilltop
D 24	BS 392689	170	Hilltop
D 25	BS 387682	30	Trail approach
D 26	35 355685	50	Trail junction
	BS 359681	90	Hilltop
•	BS 367685	113	Hilltop
_	BS 332649	100	Village assembly made
D 29		90	Village assembly ones
D 30	BS 338650	フン	ATTTORG GOSGMATA TOUCK

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D 31	BS 325645	90 meters	Village assembly area
0 32	BS 441761	30	Bridge
D 33	B\$ 442761	40	Village assembly area
D 34	BS 452711	60.	Cache point
D 35	BS 475704	120	Cache point
D 36	BS 465698	40	Cache point
37	BS 415680	30	Assembly area
D 36	BS 377608	40	Assembly area
D 39	BS 390712	90	Friendly OP
D 40	BS 36702	186	Friendly OP
D /1	BS 378705	176	Friendly OP
D 42	BS 380692	90	Friendly OP
D 43	BS 407733	190	Friendly OP
D 44	BS 391692	170	Friendly OP
D 45	BS 383677	123	Friendly OP
D 46	BS 375669	230	Friendly OP
D 47	BS 388664	90	Friendly OP
D 48	BS 382648	80	Friendly OP
D 49	BS 382632	193	Friendly OP
D 50	BS 378618	195	Friendly OP
	• •		

Many of the above are currently under friendly control, Coordination would be necessary in the event targets were selected.


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
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Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, ANS 17014. Sheets 6540 TI, III; 6539 I, IV.

Time Zone: H

1. KHAM DUC CIDG Camp is located at ZC 004078; elevation 360 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-105, 5th SFGA Ballet Lead on to Taken The

2. Target list:

	# ⁸ / ₂	
TGT NR	TGT LOCATION PEREVATION	TGT DESCRIPTION
E 1	2C 004077 340 meters	Perimeter
E 2	zc 005078 340	Perimeter
E 2 E 3	20 006080 © 360	Perimeter (April 1984)
E 4	ZC 008083 5360	Perimeter hall to be
E 5	20 007088 2:370	Perimeter Intropy Y
E 5 E 6	ZC 004088 370	Perimeter
E 7	ZC 002085 12/5 370% 244	Perimeter
E 8	ZC 001083	Perimeter
E 9	YC. 999081 370	Perimeter
E 10	YC 997078 370	Perimeter
E 11	YC 999975 14 1 376	Perimeter
E 12	20 004075 A 330 010	Perime ter
E 13	ZC 008078 # 109 10 350	OP #6
E 14	ZC 012092 380	Trail junction
E 15		VISITED TO THE THEORY OF THE STANFORM OF THE S
E 16	2C 014094 450	OP #7
E 17	ZC 010099 450	OP #5
E 18	2C 013109 460	Highway #14
E 19	YC 997093 370	Highway #14
E 20	YC 995090 390	Highway #14
E 21	YC 994086 370	Highway trail junction
E 22	YU 993071 370	Trail
E 23	YC 998079 340	Trail
E 24	YC 988093 750	OP #1
E 25	YC 988071 450	OP #3
E 26	YC 981067 370	Trail
E 27	YC 977066 390	Highway #14
E 28	YC 961084 350	Trail
E 29	YC 972095 730	Trail
E 30	YC 993112 340	Trail

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
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E 31	YC 993165	180 meters	Trail
E 32	YC 960036	470	Highway #14
E 33	YC 972045	410	Highway #14
E 34	YC 963018	450	Highway #14
E 35	YC 964009	470	Possible OP
E 36	YC 968015	450	Amb site for react force
E 37	YC 971014	440	Amb site for react force
E 38	YC 925024	720	Main trail
E 39	YC 952076	400	Trail
H 40	ZC 021167	150	Highway #14
- 41	2C 034145	180	Highway #14
42	ZC 046112	210	Highway #14
E 43	ZC 058087	250	
E 44	ZC 078085	250	Trail
E 45	ZC 028009	380	Trail
E 46	ZC 001039	3 90	Trail
E 47	ZC 025082	420	Possible OP
E 48	ZC 042 09 8	190	Trail
	20 042035 20 081133	200	
E 49			Trail
E 50	YC 997161	180	Trail

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Appendix 6 Creplanned Air Targets, GIA VUC) to Annex E (Preplanned Air Targets) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VININAM 1:50,000, AMS L7014, Sheets 6738 III, IV; 6638 I, II.

Time Zone: H

1. GIA VUC CIDG Camp is located at BS 379270, elevation 130 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-103, 5th SFGA.

2. Target list:

TGT NR	TOT LOCATION BS 372281	ELEVATION 180 meters	TGT DESCRIPTION Trail around base vil to E 350M
C 2	BS 384273	310	Cmd approach to east of camp
C 3	BS 374259	300	Cmc approach to south of camp
C 4	BS 387257	338	Cmd approach to south of camp
C 5	BS 352275	220	Village
C 6	BS 364269	200	Likely assembly area
C 7	BS 379259	150	South edge of village
C B	BS 396259	200	Trail and stream jct, small village
c 9	B= 396268	170	Operation area
C 10	BS 392274	1 60	Rice fields; small village
C 11	BS 384277	180	Ravine and stream
C 12 ·	BS 391281	150	Trail north east of OP 2
C 13	BS 382289	270	Likely assembly area
C 14	BS 390293	140	Stream and trail
C 15	BS 370307	140	Jungle area used by VC
C 16	BS 377307	20 0	Sml vil surrounding area is VC
C 17	3S 383307	110	Likely assembly area
C 18	BS 381318	120	Small village
C 19	BS 394326	210	Jungle area rptd used by VC
C 20	BS 403321	260	Small valley used VC
C 21	35 402312	270	Assembly area
C 22	BS 398293	150	Small village
C 23	35 4042 7 4	180	Small village
C 24	BS 419278	150	Trail and stream
C 25	5 8 41 5291	300	Jungle area
C 26	BS 434295	100	Stream and small village
C 27	3S 434281	150	Trail jot; huts in area
C 28	35 452 273	380	Trail junction
C 29	BS 447288	100	Trail and open area
-9-30	BS 441298	120	Small vil rptd to be used by VC

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			\
C 31	BS 443313	180 meters	Stream junction
32	BS 457297	70	Stream junction Street Street
•	BS 456291	70	Trail junction who was
G 33		•	Stream junction
3 34	BS 4 7 8307	70	
0 35	BS 463322	3 50	Stream in VC area
0 36	35 477337	90	Trail junction and stream
G 37	BS 369316	1.60	Trail and stream junction; sml vil
		150	Village
C 38	3S 369324	- :	•
0.39	BS 376323	110	Trail junction
J 40	3\$ 386326	120	Village
C 41	BS 395336	270	Stream and open area
G 42	BS 376342	110	Trail and possibly ford
	BS 364344	110	Village
C 43			Known VC positions
G 44.	B\$ 378347	140	
C 45	BS 368349	130	Prail jot and likely assembly area
3 46	3 5,363 362	1.80	Village and rice fields
C 47	BS 387363	90	Trail junction and village
C 48	BS 378372	100	Village
•		120	Village
C 49	35 426283		
3 50	35 42428 7	334	Rice fields
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

MOTE: Many of the above are currently under friendly control. Coordination would be necessary in the event targets were selected.

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CLASSIFIED Preplanned Air Targets, MINH LONG) to Annex E (Preplanned Air Targets) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS L7014. Sheets 6739 II, III; 6738 I, IV.

Time Zone: H

1. MINH LONG CIDG Camp is located at BS 541525, elevation 80 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-108, 5th SFGA.

2. Target list:

TGT NR H 1 H 2 H 3 H 4 H 5 H 6 H 7 H 8 H 9 H 10	TGT LOCATION BS 490552 BS 490537 BS 490520 BS 480516 BS 490515 BS 481502 BS 490550 BS 529507 BS 500520 BS 615512 BS 500504	ELEVATION 800 meters 200 200 250 140 700 540 110 200 100 300	TOT DESCRIPTION Possible staging area Avenue of approach Possible staging area Avenue of approach Possible staging area Avenue of approach Possible staging area Possible staging area Heavy Wpns Position Avenue of approach Avenue of approach
ĦQ			
and the second s			Avenue of approach
H 11	BS 500504	300	Avenue of approach
H 12	BS 507491	100	Avenue of approach
H 13	BS 510542	320	Avenue of approach
H 14	BS 510530	200	Avenue of approach
H 15	BS 512517	^\ 1 86	Possible weapons position
H 16	BS 514502	80	Possible staging area
H 17	BS 515478	100	Possible staging area
H 18	BS 525564	180	Possible staging area
H 19	BS 529498	150	Possible hwy wpns pan
H 20	3S 521529	100	Possible weapons position
H 21	BS 525515	70	Avenue of approach
H 22	BS 524490	80	Possible gun position
H 23	BS 529501	175	OP
H 24	BS 530551	100	Gun position
H 25	BS 539541	100	Avenue of approach
H 26	BS 531530	70	Avenue of approach
H 27	35 532493	160	OP
F 28	BS 537480	1 60	OP
H 29	BS 544571	60	Avenue of approach
H 30	BS 549561	240	OP

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1	31	33	546551	100	maters	Avanne	of	approtch
			549543	୍ଦିତ				approach
			543 526	110		OF	U	with the company
			54 7 532	180	•	OF		,
								•
			546512	80			CI.	approa ch
	36	33	546 5 02	120		OP		
٠.	77	33	541489	120		verme	of	approach
17	na -	B 3	553571	50		avenue	of	approach
7-1	39 -	35	5575 5 0	40				approach
H	40	35	556554	220		OP .		
H	41	35	5 57 522	320		OP		
\mathbf{H}	42	38	559517	500		OP		
H	43	38	557500	300		Avenue	of	app roach
	**		557487	420		OP:		
	• •		555480	560		OP		
		38	565537	30		Avenue	of	approach
			562519	529		OP		
			560512	380		OP.		
			560495	570		OP		*
			562502			OP		
п	50	DO	704706	540		√ ₽		

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Appendix • (Preplanned Air Targets, THUCNG DUC) to Annex E (Preplanned Air Targets) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETRAM I:50,000, AMS L7014. Misses 6340 I, II; 6640 III, IV.

Time Zone: H

1. THUONG DUC CIDG Camp is located ZC 142533, elevation 60 meters. Special Forces contingent is Detachment A-109, 5th SFGA.

2. Target list:

TGT NR	TGT LOCATION	ELEVATION	TOT DESCRIPTION
I 1	ZC 114539	110 meters	Defensive positions
I 2	ZC 099504	10	Supply route
I 2 I 3	zc 112 926	190	Draw
I 4	20 148549	10	Approach route
I 5 I 6	20 195551	10	Way station
I 6	20 169529	3 0	Poss cache area
I 7	ZC 198542	10	Defensive positions
I 8	ZC 148563	90	Approach route
I 9	zc 139561	10	Poss mortar position
I 10	ZC 181561	70	Infiltration route
Į 11	ZC 114522	30	Ridge finger
I 12	86 165559 86 156566	#10 70	Poss cache area
I 13	98 139399	78	?068 688 % 0 620 6
I 14 11 16	80 117534	296 296	
I 15	20 118529	29 6	Mell
I 16	88 128570	10	infiltration routo
	80 145573	170	infiltration route
I 18	20 173555	10	infiltration poute
I 19 I 20 I 21 I 22	80 153504	670	DAI HIMP (3) (Poss cache area)
I 20	20 155516	330	Ridge finger Hillside
I 21	BG 148914	230	
I 22	20 19 0521	570	Migo of platem
I 23	80 195549	30	Twiendly OP
I 24	90 165554	10	HOANG PHUGG (1) (Pess VG staging
•			area)
I 25	EC 096565 EC 121523	63 430	Hill 6] (Pess VO OP)
I 26		430	Ridge finger
I 97 I 98 I 30	80 133563	10	Rice paddy (Pess cache area)
I 🕮	80 125564	10	Jotion of hill
I 29	30 104576	70 10	Middle of draw
I 29 I 30	80 169555	10	Bottom of hill

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~*	CONTRACT.	וווואיניו	TAT

1 31	2C 169560 30 meters	Streem bank
I 32	zc 166567 10	Stream tank
I 33	zc 160526 10	Trail/simean oreasing
I 34	zc 165537 10	DOW: PHUOC (1) (Pess cante on
I 35	2C 161536 10) 14 PHUOJ (1) (Poss V) s.orta:
1 93	20 101))0 10	
		्रह्म ः)
I 36	ZC 127237 50	$D\mathbf{r}_{i}$ as
I 37	2C 113498 10	T i tāge
I 38	ZC 189556 05	River burn
I 39	2C 191559 10	ax ingo
I 40	ZC 132530 70	Draw
I 41	20 130260 110	Ridge finger
I 42	2G 133531 110	Ridge finger
I 43	ZC 155580 310	Trail og sa hill (Foss 7)
.,		bas. cráa)
I 44	ZG 134527 130	Ridge finger
		TAI SON Village (Poss VC
I 45	zc 137557 10	
_		wort. ren)
I 46	ZC 144520 10	Village (Posa staging area)
I 47	2C 104551 10	Rouse (Poss staging eros)
I 48	2C 127562 10	River bank
	ZC 152554 10	Houses (Poss staging area)
I 49		
I 50	20 084556 10	Bridge
	and the control of th	_

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Annex F (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref:

(a) 1st MarDiv Op Order 301-66

(b) 1st MarDiv O PO2000.2_ (CEOI)

(c) Det C-1, 5th SFG (Abn) SOI (NOTAL)

(d) I Corps Advisory Team SOI (NOTAL)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy forces.
 - (1) Annex A (Intelligence).
 - (2) Current ISUMs and PIRs.
 - (3) Enemy has employed and will continue to employ monitoring, instative deception, and makeshift jamming (any noise locally generated) of friendly radio and wire circuits.
 - (4) Enemy will continue to harass comm systems by destroying or damaging comm facilities and by disrupting metallic lines.
- b. Friendly forces.
 - (1) CG III MAF.
 - (a) Coordinates comm requirements between 1st MarDiv and C-1 Det, 5th SF Group which cannot be supported locally.
 - (b) Relays C-1 Let a SUMs and SPOTREPs/SITREPs to this Hq via existing covered teletype circuits.
 - (c) Provides C-1 Det commander with sufficient comm security aids for immediate authentication, numeral, and brief tactical message encryption/decryption.
 - (d) Provides comm personnel and equipment augmentation as necessary to support requirements beyond capability of this Hq.

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SUCRET

- Walter Control
- (2) C-1 Det, 5th SF Group, suthonized 1st MarDiv and referenced subordinate units to exter existing SF radio nets.
- (3) FMAW provides and occidences, close air support communications and on-call helicopter and/or transport A/O for airborne radio retransmission packages and teams.
- (4) FLC provides emergency comm logistic support.

2. MISSION


When directed, is t MarDiv comm-elec elements install, operate and maintain continuous and reliable comm systems to support this plan.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Comm Co, HqBn.
 - (1) Maintain normal command control communications for this Hq while located in DA NANG Combat Base.
 - (2) Be prepared to enter radio nets which enable this Hq to communicate with QUANG DA Spec Z 'dy'sors and with designated U. S. Army' No Dates / enay or CIDS cause.
 - (3) Be prepared to provide commelec support to augment forces committed to execution of this plan.
 - (4) Coordinate comm planning as directed by this Hq with TF XRAY, lst Man and the War as required.
 - (5) Be prepared to furnish AN/GRC-125 radio retransmission package and teams for installation in transport A/C to provide round-the-clock retransmission capability.

b. TF XRAY

- (1) Plan for and be proposed to install, operate and maintain continuously actions to support assigned mission.
- (2) Be prepared to enter radio nots to communicate with 2d ANVI Div Advicers and designated U. S. Army SF Det(s) and/or CIDS camps.
- (3) Maintain existing comm-elec installations in CHU LAI Combat Base.
- (4) Determine comm requirements which cannot be organically supported and submit appropriate requests to this Hq.



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Appendix 1 (Radio Call Signs) to Annex F (Communication Page tronics) to Operation Plan 303-66

Time Zone: H

- 1. 1st MarDiv Units. Ref (b).
- 2. U. S. Army Special Forces Units and CIDG Camps. Ref (c) and will be published in Frag Order implementing this plan.
- 3. QUANG DA Spec Z. ARVN Misory Teams. Ref (d) and will be published as required.
- 4. 2d ARVN Div Advisory Teams. Ref (d) and will be published as required.

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
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Chief of Staff

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Appendix 2 (Radio Frequencies) to Annex F (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Plan 303-66

Time Zone: H

- 1. lst MarDiv Frequency Assignments: Ref (b) or as modified by Frag Order implementing this plan.
- 2. U. S. Army Special Forces Frequency Assignments.
 - a. Ref (c). To be published that the Pries implementing this plan.
 - b. Initial contact between relieving unit and CIDG camps should be accomplished on VHF Air Movement Frequency. Thereafter, combination of CIDG VHF and HF nets, and relieving units organic appmand, factical, and Supporting Arms Nets would be used. Airborne radio retransmission will be amployed, as required, between parent regiment and relieving unit.
- 3. QUANG DA Spect Z. ARVN Advisory Team Frequency Assignments: Ref (d). To be published as required.
- 4. 2d ARYN Div Advisory Team Frequency Assignments. Ref (d). To be published as required.

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
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F-2-1



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1st Mar (Rein)
9th Mar (-) (Rein)

- (1) Plan for and be prepared to install, operate and maintain continuously reliable communications to support assigned missions.
- (2) Maintain existing comm-elec installations in DA NANG Combat Base.
- (3) Determine comm requirements which cannot be organically supported and submit appropriate requests to this Hq, to include requests for retransmission A/C.
- d. 11th Mar.

 1st Recon Bn (-) (Rein).

 1st AT Bn (-).

 Det, 3d AT Bn.

 Det, 3d Fngr Bn.

 Det, 3d SP En.

 3d MT Bn (-) (Rein).

 3d Med Bn (-) (Rein).

 1st Tk Bn (-).

 3d Tk En (-).

 1st AmTrac Bn (-) (Rein).

 7th MT Bn (-) (Rein).
 - (1) Be prepared to install, operate and maintain communications in support of mission specifically assigned in execution of this plan.
 - (2) Provide comm-elec planning support as required by 1st and 9th Mar.
- e. Air Support Communications. Ref (a).
- f. Arty Communications. Normal. Call signs and frequencies to be published.
- g. Coordinating instructions.
 - (1) Ref (b).

- (2) Annex D (COC/FSCC Immediate Action) for initial comm action requirements.
- (3) Comm Center. Phrase "PASS TO COC" will be included in passing instructions of operational messages transmitted to this High via common user circuits.
- (4) Comm Security Aids.

APPENDIXES:

- (a) Operations Code. KAC-181. Ref (b). significations of the Action in the content of the conten
- (b) Numeral Code. KAC-Q. Ref (b).

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- Tagge (c) Authentication Code. KAC-Q. Ref (b).



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- (5) Radio.
 - (a) Gril Signs. Refs (b), (c), (d) and Appendix 1 (Radio Sall Signs).
 - (b) Frequencies. Refs (b), (c), (d) and Appendix 2 (Radio Frequencies.).
- (6) Radio Relay. Activated on order as tactical situation requires and develops.
- (7) Wire.
 - (a) Limited in objective area(s) until developing tactical situation requires installation of trunks and internal CP wire system(s).
 - (b) Switchboard Code Names. 1st MerDiv Telephone Directory.
 - (c) Be alert for booby traps when trouble-shooting wire lines.
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
 - a. Admin Plan 303-66.
 - b. Charged batteries, BB-451, available on call from LSA when established. Units return discharged batteries to LSA for exchange on one-for-one basis. Mark battery cases with unit designations.
 - c. Limited third and overflow second echelon maintenance and exchange/float service available at LSA when established.
 - d. Limited stock of high usage comm-elec equipment accessory items available at LSA when established.
 - e. Resupply of wire and dry cell batteries available at LSA when established.
 - (1) All expended dry cell batteries will be completely demolished or returned to LSA for destruction.
 - (2) All units retrieve comm wire upon displacement from any position within objective area.

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APPENDIXES:

- Francisco

- 1 Radio Call Signs
- 2 Radio Frequencies

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Annex G (Command Relationships) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) III MAF LOI 5-66 w/Ch #1

Time Zone: H

- 1. Appendix 1 depicts relationships between ARVN units, province and district officials, III MAF command and operational control echelons, 7th Air Force, and USASF 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).
- 2. Only CG, I ARVN Corps is in LLDB command and control structure. No command relationship exists between ARVN divs and LLDB dets at any level.
- 3. Senior LLDB officer at each camp is camp commander.
- 4. USASF A Det commander is advisor to LLDB in each camp and has additional mission as advisor to local sector/sub sector commander. CG III MAF/SA I Corps exercises OPCON USASF A Dets in ICTZ through Commander, I Corps Advisory Group and Commanding Officer, Det C-1, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).
- 5. Special Forces liaison team is stationed QUANG NGAI City, QUANG NGAI Province for purposes of establishing contact with US and Free World Forces, and 2d ARVN Div, and informing them of Special Forces activities in 12th DMA. Viaison team represents Detachment C-1 but has no command or operational authority.

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Chief of Staff

Appendix:

1. Command Relationships Diagram

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G-1




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Appendix I (Command Relationships Diagram) to Annex G (Command Relationships) to Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) III MAF LOI 5-66 w/Ch #1

Time Zone: H



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G-1-2



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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF DaNang, Republic of Vietnam 281600H Feb 67

Administrative Man 303-66 to accompany Operation Plan 303-66

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, AMSSeries L7014. Tra Bong: Sheets 6639 I, II; 6739 III, IV. Tien Phouc: Sheets 6640 II, III; 6639, I, IV. Barbe: Sheets 6738 I, IV. Ha Thanh: Sheets 6739 III; 6730 IV; 6638 I; 6639 II. Kham Duc: Sheets 6540 II, III; 6639 I, IV. Gia Vuc: Sheets 6738 III, IV; 6638 I, II. Minh Long: Sheets 6739 II, III; 6738 I, IV. Thuong Duc: 6540 I, II; 6640 III, IV.

(b) III MAF LOI 5-66 w/ch#1

(c) 1st MarDiv Admin Order 301-66

S&CFILES HEADQUARTERS

Lat MARINE DIVISION, FM

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Time Zone: H

1 .. SUPPLY

a. <u>General</u>. Reference (b) sets forth basic instructions concerning supply support of combat operations in 1st Marine Division's areas of operation. Support for the two phases of 1st Marine Division's participation in the defense of the CIDG camps will be as follows:

(1) Phase I. Artillery Support

- (a) Artillery employed from normal positions. Support provided from appropriate ASP/LSA.
- (b) Artillery w/security units employed from CIDG camps.
 Unit distribution from presently established ASP/LSA's using USAF aircraft or FMAW aircraft.
- (2) Phase II. Commitment of ground forces. Support will be provided in one or more of the following ways:
 - (4) Unit distribution from present supply points using USAF aircraft, FMAW helicopters/fixed wing or Motor Transport convoys as appropriate.
 - (b) Unit distribution by aerial delivery. Annex B (Aerial Delivery) to reference (c).
 - (c) Establishment of new LSA's by 1st Marine Division in area of operation as required.

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(4) Prescribed load

- (a) Classes I through V as prescribed by Battalion Commander.
- (b) Water 2 full canteens per individual and one gallon per individual in water cans.

b. Supplies and Equipment Available

- (1) Prescribed loads from unit held supplies; reference (c) applies.
- (2) Additional required supplies from appropriate supply point or LSA.

c. Control and Distribution

- (1) Unit distribution from appropriate LSA's.
- (2) Distribution of supplies from LSA's will be accomplished by fixed wing/helicopters and vehicles when possible.
 - (3) Supply point distribution where situation permits.
 - (4) LSA's will act as control agency for all classes of supply.

d. Resupply

- (1) Resupply will be from nearest LSA. Requests will be made through HST furnishing direct support.
- (2) Emergency resupply by air. See Annex B (Aerial Delivery) to reference (c).
 - (3) By fixed wing/helicopter or vehicle as appropriate.
- (4) Helicopters will be assigned in support of this operation on a continuing basis for resupply.
 - e. Captured Material. In accordance with reference (c).

f. Salvage

- (1) Units on unit distribution advise appropriate LSA of location, nature and amount of salvage for collection.
- (2) Every effort will be made to recover worn out batteries to insure they do not fall into hostile control.



g. Excess Material

- (1) Movement by fixed wing/helicopter will be mandatory for most units throughout this operation. Excess T/E and T/A equipment will impose an overload on limited helicopter/fixed wing assets; therefore units will embark only essential equipment to accomplish their mission.
- (2) Any material in area of operation, determined to be in excess of unit's needs, will be returned to appropriate LSA on departing resupply aircraft.

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

- a. Evacuation of casualties will be by air to nearest medical facility.
- b. Reinforcing battalion provide initial emergency treatment, evacuate to nearest medical facility.
- c. 1st Medical Battalion (Rein) be prepared to receive casualties on short notice, provide initial surgical care and further evacuation as required. See Annex C (Medical) to reference (c) for additional details.

3. TRANSPORTATION

a. Surface - none except for resupply to LSA's if feasible, or if required to embark areas. Inform this Headquarters (Attn: MTO) when known.

b. Air


- (1) Helicopter and fixed wing will be provided by 1st MAW.
- (2) Helicopters/fixed wing will be available for initial deployment and resupply.

4. SERVICE

a. Functions

- (1) Maintenance
 - (a) 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance by units.
 - (b) Backup 2nd and limited 3rd echelon motor transport, ordnance and electronics maintenance to be provided by the appropriate LSA on request.
 - (c) Contact teams provided by FLC will be utilized when feasible.





- (1) 1st Shore Party Battalion
 - (a) Be prepared to establish LSA's when directed.
 - (c) Be prepared to provide HST support.
- (2) 1st, 7th and 11th Motor Transport Battalions. Be prepared to provide transportation as required.
- (3) 1st Medical Battalion. Be prepared on order to deploy appropriate medical assistance to Special Forces Camps.

c. Request to Supporting Commands

- (1) Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
 - (a) Provide helicopters and/or fixed wing aircraft for resupply, medical evacuation, evacuation and tactical troop lifts.
 - (b) Provide landing zone control unit personnel to support HST 's.
- (2) Commanding General, Force Logistic Command.
 - (a) Provide logistic support as required for LSA/LSU operations.
 - (b) Provide overflow 2nd and limited 3rd echelon electronics, ordnance and motor transport repair capability at appropriate LSA.
 - (c) Provide limited float of comm-elect end items and accessories for emergency resupply.
 - (d) Provide recharging capability of BB 451 batteries at appropriate LSA.
 - (e) FLC/FSR. Be prepared to rapidly assemble one day supply of Class I, V and medical supplies for aerial delivery to Special Forces Camps, if required. Data to be used in computing necessary quantities will be issued separately.
 - (f) Be prepared to provide supplies for airdrop as required.
 - (g) In event a new LSA is established be prepared to assume control from Shore Party upon request and provide this Headquarters (G-4) with a daily dump status.



d. Coordinating Instructions. Units will, upon establishment and change of medical facilities and supply locations, report locations to this Headquarters.

5. PERSONNEL

- See Annex (Personnel) to reference (c). Personnel Procedures.
- b. Civil Affairs/Civic Action. All units be prepared to initiate civic action program when tactical situation permits. See Annex E (Civil Affairs/Civic Action) to reference (c).

6. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. Units will recover individual equipment from evacuated casualties.
- b. All materials provided Special Forces Camps will be on a reimbursable basis.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL NICKERSON

Colonel, U. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

ANNEXES: NONE

DISTRIBUTION:	CMC	(2)
	CMCS A	(2)
	CG, EMPT ad	(5)
	COMUSMACV	(5)
	CG, III MAF	(10)
	CG, 3d MarDiv	(3)'
	CG, 1st MAW	(5)
	CG, FLC	(2) (2)
	FLSG-A	(2)
	FLSG-B	(2)
	SA 23 ARVN Div	(2)
	SA Quang Da Spec, Z	(2)
	co. Task Force X-Ray	(20)
	CO 9th Mar	(5)
	*CO lst Mar	(5)
	Det 3d Engr Bn	(2)
	CO, 1st SP Bn	(T)
	CO, 1st Med Bn	(1)
	CO, 1st MT Bn	(1)
	CO, 7th MT Bn	(1)
	GO, 11th MT Bn	(1)
	CO, 1st AmTrac Bn	(1)

 E_{-1} , 4,5,8,15,16,21,22,26,35,85,88,89,93,95 (1); 2,3,10,14 (2); 68,80 (5) 7A (25)

