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1 MAY 1967

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 1stMarDiv FPO San Francisco  
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From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: 1stMarDiv Command Chronology for 1-31 January 1967

1. Forwarded.

*MHStevens*  
M. H. STEVENS  
By direction

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67 288

HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

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3:HIST:jgr  
5750  
Ser: 0031-67  
3 MAR 1967

██████████ -- Unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed

From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A030)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
  
Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-31 January 1967  
  
Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
      (b) FMFPacO 5750.8  
  
Encl: (1) 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-31 January  
1967

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b),  
enclosure (1) is submitted.

*H. Nickerson, Jr.*  
H. NICKERSON, JR.

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CG III MAF

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF  
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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 Jan to 31 Jan 1967

INDEX

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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1st Marine Division (Rein)

MajGen H. NICKERSON, JR.

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Task Force X-Ray	BGen W. A. STILES
5th Marines (-)	Col F. E. HAYNES, JR.
7th Marines (Rein)	Col L. F. SNODDY, JR. (To 20Jan67)
1st FAG	Col C. C. CROSSFIELD II (Fr 21Jan67)
Chu Lai Defense Command	LtCol J. B. STRIBLING
1st Engr Bn (-)	Col W. W. CURTIS (To 8Jan67)
1st SP Bn (-)	LtCol E. D. ANDERSON (Fr 9Jan67)
1st MT Bn	Maj C. O. NEWTON
3rd Amtrac Bn (-)	LtCol E. H. JONES
7th Comm Bn (-)	Maj J. T. ELKINS
1st Hospital Co	LtCol J. D. ROWLEY
Headquarters Bn	LtCol W. M. CLELLAND
1st Marines (Rein)	Cdr F. M. ROBERTS, MC, USN
9th Marines (Rein)*	Col W. A. LEITNER
11th Marines (-) (Rein)	Col D. L. MALLORY (To 28Jan67)
2d Bn, 5th Marines	Col E. J. RADICS (Fr 29Jan67)
1st Recon Bn (-) (Rein)	Col R. M. RICHARDS
1st AT Bn (-)	Col G. E. NORRIS
1st Med Bn (-)	LtCol W. C. AIRHEART
1st Tank Bn (-)	LtCol D. N. MCKEON
3rd Tank Bn (-)*	Maj J. J. KEEFE
3rd MT Bn {-} (Rein)*	Cdr R. H. MITCHELL, MC, USN
3rd AT Bn {-}*	LtCol J. W. CLAYBORNE
7th MT Bn (-) (Rein)	LtCol W. R. CORSON
11th MT Bn	Maj R. F. ARMSTRONG
1st Amtrac Bn (-) (Rein)*	Maj C. R. STIFFLER
1st Dental Co (-)	Maj S. H. BATCHELDER, JR.
3rd Dental Co (-)*	Maj L. V. BARKLEY
1st MP Bn#	LtCol A. R. BOWMAN II
7th Engr Bn#	Capt P. C. CONGLIS, DC, USN
9th Engr Bn#	Capt L. H. CORDONIER, DC, USN
Det, Hq Bn, 3rd Mar Div*	LtCol P. G. STAVRIDIS
Det, 3rd Engr Bn*	LtCol F. W. HARRIS III
Det, 3rd SP Bn*	LtCol R. W. CRISPEN
	Col G. C. SCHMIDT, JR.
	Maj J. A. SHERMAN, JR.
	Maj R. L. SCRUGGS

\* OPCON ONLY

# ADCON ONLY

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2. LOCATION

1-31 January 1967: Danang, RVN

3. Staff Officers

Chief of Staff  
 Deputy Chief of Staff  
 Staff Secretary  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Compt  
 Adjutant  
 Air Officer  
 Artillery Officer  
 Band Officer  
 Chaplain  
 Comm-Electronics Officer  
 Dental Officer  
 Division Clubs Officer  
 Division Exchange Officer  
 Embarkation Officer  
 Engineer Officer  
 Field Historian  
 Food Services Officer  
 Informational Services Officer  
 Inspector  
 Legal Officer  
 Motor Transport Officer  
 Naval Gunfire Officer  
 Ordnance Officer  
 Photographic Officer  
 Postal Officer  
 Provost Marshal  
 Reproduction Officer  
 Special Services Officer  
 Supply Officer  
 Surgeon  
 Tank Officer

Col S. J. ALTMAN  
 Col J. J. O'DONNELL (15-31Jan67)  
 Capt H. S. HAUPT  
 Col C. C. CROSFIELD II (To 18Jan67)  
 Col A. L. EMILS (Fr 19Jan67)  
 Col J. J. O'DONNELL (To 14Jan67)  
 Col S. DAVIS (Fr 15Jan67)  
 Col H. POGGEMEYER, JR.  
 Col E. L. BALE, JR.  
 Col W. MOORE  
 LtCol J. E. DAUSMAN (To 27Jan67)  
 LtCol R. S. ROBERTSON (Fr 28Jan67)  
 LtCol E. R. SCHIFFMAN  
 Col F. C. LANG  
 Col G. E. NORRIS  
 CWO F. E. BARTHOLD  
 Capt D. J. CASAZZA, CHC, USN  
 Col E. P. CLAUDE  
 Capt P. C. CONGLIS, DC, USN  
 Maj J. H. GEMSKE  
 Maj A. T. FISHER  
 Maj R. L. ETTER (To 15Jan67)  
 Maj J. P. TREHY (Fr 16Jan67)  
 LtCol G. A. MERRILL  
 Maj H. T. KENNEDY  
 Capt V. E. COX  
 Maj G. HUBBARD  
 Col A. L. EMILS (To 10Jan67)  
 Col W. W. CURTIS (Fr 11Jan67)  
 LtCol T. P. CASEY  
 LtCol K. M. BUSS  
 LtCmdr R. A. WHITCOMB, USN  
 LtCol W. J. DINSE (To 15Jan67)  
 Maj H. SOBOL (Fr 16Jan67)  
 WO R. L. HUNTLEY  
 2dLt W. NEW  
 LtCol J. J. ROOTHOFF  
 2dLt D. MARLAND  
 Maj J. E. FORDE  
 Col P. J. DUPRE  
 Capt J. J. MCGREEVY, MC, USN  
 LtCol J. W. CLAYBORNE

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4. Average Monthly Strength

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>OTHER</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>1260</u>		<u>ENL</u>	<u>25,429</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u> U. S. Army
				148		102
					5	

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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARYPERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION1. Replacement and Rotation of Personnel

a. Total of Marine replacements received and Marines rotated during January 1967 were:

## Replacements:

Officer	143
Enlisted	1888

## Rotation:

Officer	28
Enlisted	411

b. There were 11 officers and 380 enlisted personnel medically evacuated. One officer and forty-eight enlisted personnel who were previously evacuated were returned to duty. Forty-seven personnel departed on emergency leave/permanent change of station orders.

c. A total of 4 officers and 441 enlisted personnel extended their overseas tour in RVN in conjunction with the 30 day free leave policy. 2 officers and 316 enlisted departed on 30 day leave during January 1967.

2. Casualty and Graves Registration. The below casualties were sustained by units ADCON to the 1st Marine Division during January 1967.

	KIA	WIA	**DOW	MIA	CPTR	OTHER	*NON-BATTLE DEATH	**TOTAL INJURED
USMC								
OFF	4	26						30
ENL	85	718	6			13	28	844
USN								
OFF		1						1
ENL	8	31						39
TOTAL	97	776	6			13	28	914

\* Injuries which result in absence from duty for more than 24 hours.

\*\* DOW figures included in WIA totals and not in vertical total.

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3. Awards. During the period 1-31 January 1967 112 award recommendations were processed and forwarded to higher headquarters for approval. In addition, 905 Purple Heart Medals were awarded. A total of 12 Commanding General Certificates of Commendation were also awarded during the period.

4. Discipline, Law and Order. The following criminal investigations were reported. Three cases are presently under investigation:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Larceny of Government Property	3
Larceny of Private Property	5
Homicide	1
Narcotics	2
Blackmarket	1
Assault	2
 Total	14

Fifteen traffic violations were reported for the month of January 1967.

Ninety-seven offense reports were issued to violators as follows:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Curfew	16
Off Limits	28
Weapons Violation	9
Uniform Violation	5
Unauthorized Absence	13
Property Damage	1
Other	25
 Total	97

5. Industrial Relations

a. Current utilization totals:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>On Hand</u>
Hq Bn	39	39
11th Marines	37	37
7th Engr Bn	60	60
1st Recon Bn	11	11
1st MP Bn	10	10
1st Tank Bn	20	20
1st Antitank Bn	20	20
1st Med Bn	15	30*
1st Marines	23	0*
11th MT Bn	15	23*
 TOTAL	250	250

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Daily totals vary slightly from the above figures due to the normal turn-over rate of employees.

\* 1st Marines are waiting for completion of security clearances on neighboring villagers desiring jobs before hiring. Their ceiling is currently being utilized by 1st Medical Battalion and 11th Motor Transport Battalion.

b. 7th Motor Transport Battalion has moved to Chu Lai and their former employees have been transferred to other organizations. It is anticipated that 7th Motor Transport Battalion will utilize their ceiling of 20 LNC's at Chu Lai.

c. One "cattle car" truck is being provided by NSA at the request of the Industrial Relations Department, Danang. It transports approximately 100 employees from Danang to 1st Division Headquarters area. Other employees are picked up by tactical trucks of using organizations. The exception is the 7th Engineer Battalion where all employees live within easy walking distance of the base.

d. LNC's received a pay raise varying from 2 to 4 piasters per hour effective 23 January 1967. A special "Tet Bonus" has been paid to each LNC employed during 1966.

e. The Division IRO now attends a "Manpower Coordinating Committee" meeting twice each month. This committee discusses labor problems and notes progress of unionization attempts in the Danang area.

f. The Division IRO has been designated as paying agent for Danang area LNC's. All organizations in the Danang area are paid every two weeks. Payment is made directly to the employee by the Division IRO.

g. A meeting of Danang area Battalion IRO's was held at the Division IRO office for the purpose of discussing current requirements and procedures of the industrial relations program.

h. Two employees attended the January Basic English Class given by IRD. Five employees are scheduled for the February Basic English Class.

#### 6. Morale and Personal Services

a. Chaplain. At the end of January the on board strength of Chaplains assigned to the 1st Marine Division was as follows:

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Denomination</u>
	17	Protestant
	7	Catholic
	1	Eastern Orthodox
TOTAL	25	

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In addition to the above, 5 Protestant and 2 Catholic Chaplains were under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division. Their parent command being the 3rd Marine Division.

The following Services were conducted during the Month:

Service	Number	Number Attending
Catholic	325	7,199
Protestant	370	8,579
Memorial	22	1,833
Protestant Lay Leader	22	61
Catholic Lay Leader	5	194
Catholic Bible Study	1	14
Protestant Bible Study	30	288

b. Division Clubs. The gross income during January was \$155,955.67. Three officers, eight SNCO's and eleven enlisted personnel operated the fifty-eight clubs and twenty battalion accounts. No additional clubs are planned.

c. Exchange System. Gross sales during the month of January were \$650,913.06. Four officers and sixty-six enlisted personnel operated seventeen stores and two mobile units within the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's.

d. Division Band. The Division Band performed at seven military formations. In addition eight military concerts were presented and the Band performed at three civic action functions.

e. Informational Services. During January the Informational Services Section produced 216 news releases, 4,582 Fleet Home Town News Center releases, 89 hometown radio tapes.

Writer - Photographer teams covered the following named operations:

Lincoln	Shark
Tuscaloosa	Cleveland
Sierra	De Soto

Writer/photographer teams also covered change of command ceremonies at the 1st, 5th and 7th Marine Regiments; award ceremonies; numerous company-sized operations; the 49th anniversary of the 11th Marine Regiment; dedications of new Vietnamese schools and other G-5 projects; an Elders Day Festival and other routine civic action activities.

Of all the events in the month the raid by "C" Company, 1st Battalion 1st Marines at Ban Lanh (2), January 14, attracted the most attention. The company commander, Captain Marshall CARTER, was interviewed by most of the major U. S. news services after the raid at the Combat Information Bureau in Danang.

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LtCol W. R. CORSON, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Tank Battalion, was interviewed by representatives of the major media on the civic action activities of his battalion several different times during the month.

Again, measured by an unofficial check of publications available to the ISO, the 1st Marine Division had more copy printed than any other unit in I Corps.

f. Postal

(1) The following figures represent pounds of U. S. Mail this command has received and dispatched during January 1967:

<u>Total Received</u>	<u>Total Dispatched</u>	<u>Total Handled</u>
641,291	268,323	909,614

(2) The following figures represent financial business transacted during January 1967:

U. S. Money Orders and Fees	\$702,339.97
Stamps, postage and insurance sales	\$35,180.00

g. Career Advisory. The following statistics represent reenlistment and extension of enlistment percentages for the month of January 1967:

(1) Reenlistment Percentages

- a. First term 25.3%
- b. Career 83.3%
- \*c. Total 39.2%

(2) Extensions of enlistment executed

- a. Career 11
- b. Short Term 11
- c. Total 22

\* Includes 36 Sgts and above who were returned to CONUS in accordance with paragraph 4110, Marine Corps Personnel Manual.

h. Special Services. Personnel of the Division were entertained during the month of January by the appearance of the following shows and/or well known personalities:

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65Jan67 - Martha Raye Show  
30Jan67 - Gary Ellison Show  
30Jan67 - Dick Bass  
30Jan67 - Larry Wilson

i. Distinguished Visitors. Distinguished persons who visited the command during January and the purpose of their visit are listed in Part III.

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ENEMY, WEATHER AND TERRAIN1. ENEMY

a. Local Force. Over the past month the enemy emphasis on guerrilla and local force activity has remained much the same as for December 1966. Provincial forces, on the other hand were active. Especially notable was the encounter on 26 January 1967 when Company "F", 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment on Operation Tuscaloosa located at (AT 976532) received 2000 rounds of small arms fire/automatic weapons fire plus 82mm mortar fire from an estimated two VC companies of the R-20th Local Force Provincial Battalion. During this encounter heavy small arms fire was returned and airstrikes were called on enemy positions by marking them with white phosphorous mortar fire. At this time, however, the VC also employed white phosphorous mortar fire on 2/5's position in an attempt to divert friendly air on Marine positions. The final result of this engagement was 78 VC KIA confirmed, 66 VC KIA probable and 17 individual weapons captured. This action like that of other recent contacts indicates a willingness on the part of the enemy to engage Marine units, not previously characteristic of province force units.

b. Main Force. The enemy's main force and NVA units, on the other hand, were not employed in an aggressive manner usually attributed to them. This apparent passivity can be attributed to the previous poor combat display, a reluctance to expose his forces to massed fires, and logistic and personnel problems. Enemy documents, captives, and returnees have consistently maintained that the destruction of RVNAF/FWMAF manpower is the essential objective. On this basis, it is believed that the VC are pursuing plans to concentrate forces and move to the offensive against important strategic points. However, the recent lack of activity could be just a period of revitalizing his force for the coming spring-summer campaign while local forces keep the war of liberation moving at a constant pace. From intelligence received, it appears that the enemy has over the last two months moved two regiments into Quang Ngai Province (the 21st NVA from Quang Tin and the 2nd VC from Binh Dinh), indicating a certain massing of forces. The 1st VC and the 22nd NVA Regiments were already located or in close proximity to Quang Ngai Province. The presence of these four regiments is out of the ordinary and gives the enemy the capability to conduct attacks on several vital points which he may figure to be lucrative targets for offensive type action in southern Quang Ngai Province.

2. WEATHER AND TERRAIN

a. General. The weather for the month within the tri-province area was generally cloudy with light and scattered rainshowers. The average maximum and minimum temperatures ranged from 73 degrees to 63 degrees respectively, while humidity averaged 84 percent. Visibility averaged 5 miles. Precipitation for the month was 10.84 inches. The winds were generally from a northerly direction with a velocity of 6 knots and gusting to 15 knots. These winds along with scattered rains and overcast brought with them unseasonably cool weather throughout the month.

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b. Effects of the Weather. The weather for January had little or no effect on ground operations as the days remained partly cloudy with only intermittent scattered showers, however this cloudy condition did have some effect on air operations, especially in the morning hours when ground fog was in evidence in the mountains and valley areas.

c. Effect of the Weather on Terrain. During the past month, weather had little or no effect on terrain. Rainfall, even though above average had only temporary effect, with some areas becoming semi-inundated but draining quickly when the precipitation ceased.

#### INTELLIGENCE SECTION ACTIVITY

1. GENERAL. During the period the G-2 Section continued its assigned function of collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence to the Commanding General, his staff, and the subordinate units.

2. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE. In an effort to collect intelligence at the lowest level on VC militia and Infrastructure the first of a series of Intelligence Collection Centers has been established at the DIEN BAN District Headquarters, with the aid of the Census Grievance Committee the Center is staffed with a number of Vietnamese agencies. One Gunnery Sergeant from the 3d CIT is currently assigned as the Division representative. Though new and still getting established, the results have been encouraging; it is hoped to establish similar centers at all District Headquarters within the 1st Marine Division's TAOR. Intelligence estimates were prepared for the West GORDON area (located between VU GIA and THU BON Rivers), the NUI DONG LAM area (located north of the THU BON River) and the NUI LAC SON area (located south of the QUE SON District). Work also commenced on an intelligence estimate of the three provinces that are in the Division's ACR. Interrogation - translation sub-teams were deployed to each Infantry Battalion in the Danang TAOR. This action was taken to expedite the flow of information of immediate tactical value to operational units.

3. PHOTO IMAGERY INTERPRETATION UNIT. Cloudy and rainy weather again had an adverse effect on the photographic effort with a total of eight (8) missions being requested during the month and five (5) missions being received. Thirteen (13) missions were cancelled and thirty (30) missions for the Division are still pending.

4. AIR OBSERVATION UNIT. During January 189 sorties were flown in the Danang TAOR for 451.0 hours of visual reconnaissance. 24 photo, 27 artillery and 155 CAS/TAC(A) were conducted in conjunction with normal VR flights.

5. 3d IIT. A total of 191 detainees were interrogated at the III MAF collection point during the month. Of these 96 had Viet Cong association.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. The Staff Counterintelligence Unit was provided support by the 3d CIT. A total of fifteen (15) investigations were completed and twenty-three (23) more are still pending.

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1. During January, the First Marine Division increased it's area of operation by relieving ARVN units at outposts located in the NUI DAU/NUI DANG and NUI LAC SON/VIET AN areas. These moves coupled with the planned rotations of infantry battalions in and out of country necessitated several major operational changes. On 7 January, 2d Bn, 4th Marines rotated in country and assumed responsibility of the sector formerly held by 3d Bn, 9th Marines which in turn rotated out of country. The 3d Bn, 7th Marines was directed to displace from the DA NANG TAOR to the NUI DAU/NUI DANG area, south of the CHU LAI TAOR. In order to facilitate this movement, the 2d Bn, 4th Marines and the 3d Bn, 7th Marines exchanged sectors of responsibility. An additional battalion, the 2d Bn, 26th Marines was assigned OPCON of the Division to compensate for the additional areas of responsibility. It relieved the 3d Bn, 7th Marines on 22 January and 3d Bn, 7th Marines displaced to the CHU LAI TAOR for further operations in southern QUANG NGAI province. The First Marines displaced a company to the NUI LAC SON/VIET AN area and an adjustment of the regimental boundaries between the First Marines and Ninth Marines was made to balance responsibilities.

2. Five major operations were completed by First Marine Division units during the month of January. The operations and their controlling Headquarters were as follows:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS</u>
Sierra	7th Marines
Shark	7th Marines
Lincoln	2d Bn, 5th Marines
Tuscaloosa	2d Bn, 5th Marines
Cleveland	2d Bn, 4th Marines

In addition to these operations, small unit contacts within the TAOR's were marked by sharp contacts with VC units. Several of these contacts were initiated by First Marine Division units in response to highly reliable intelligence reports. An increase in the utilization of Sparrowhawk forces to respond to these reports proved quite fruitful and VC casualties rose considerably. During the month the enemy lost 721 KIA, 592 KIA (Prob), 93 WIA, 130 WIA (Prob), 93 PW(VC), 719 Detainees and eight Returnees. Considerable items of equipment were captured including 125 Weapons, 274 grenades and 650 pounds of explosive. One of the more significant contacts was the abortive attack conducted by an estimated 350 VC on two platoons of 3d Bn, 1st Marines at 150115 January. The VC attack was turned back and in the action the VC suffered 60 KIA and 35 KIA (Prob). Captured equipment included 12 individual weapons, three B-40 rocket launchers, 47 grenades and 71 satchel charges (five pounds explosive each).

3. County Fair Operations continued to play an important part of the First Marine Division's activities during January. A total of twelve County Fairs were conducted during the month. The First Marines completed six, the Ninth

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Marines three, the 7th Marines one, and two were completed by units of the Fifth Marines. These operations have proven to be a valuable springboard for future Civic Action programs and serve to reestablish the authority of the Government of Viet Nam (GVN). Of particular importance is the cooperation which exists between USMC forces and GVN authorities during both the planning and operational phases. By limiting the participation of USMC forces to a role of isolating the objective hamlet and of providing assistance to the GVN officials, no feelings of resentment are developed by the villagers. As a result a definite feeling of rapport is established between the local villagers and the Marines. This feeling of rapport coupled with the strong showing of the GVN has undermined and in many instances completely destroyed the VC infrastructure within the hamlet.

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PLANS

1. During the month of January, the Plans section of First Mar Div G-3 section functioned as the section coordinator for Revolutionary Development. Frag order 11-67 (Revolutionary Development Program) was published on Jan 26, 1967.
2. The plans section continued its efforts to complete Division Operation Order 301-67 and initiated work on the First Mar Div Force Levels Estimate and a Commander's Estimate for III MAF Campaign Plan 1-67 and LOI 6-66.
3. Division Op Plan 305-67 (Provisional Infantry Units) was published on 31 January.

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TRAINING HIGHLIGHTS

1. During the month of January, 185 personnel from the Division attended formal schools at OKINAWA and DA NANG.
2. Mobile Training Teams from Landing Force Training Center, Pacific conducted in country operations and maintenance instruction on the 6,000 pound rough terrain forklift, and on generators organic to the Division.
3. Personnel from the 1st Marines attended an informal, three-day school on the operation and maintenance of the AN/TPS 21, conducted by Maintenance Company, FISG-A.
4. A Division training conference for units at DA NANG was conducted on 8 January. Areas discussed included use of training aids, present in country requirements for NBCD training and equipment, formal schools and agenda items for the FMFPac training conference scheduled for January on OKINAWA.
5. Four officers represented the 1st Marine Division at the FMFPac training conference conducted on OKINAWA during the period 10-12 January. The discussions and exchange of ideas proved productive. In addition, orientation of incoming Marines, development of proper attitudes towards indigenous personnel and individual responsibilities were emphasized.
6. The 1st Tank Bn conducted a live firing exercise at Hill 41 range with excellent results. Because of the turnover of personnel and lack of firing by some of the personnel, the battalion will continue to conduct firing exercises in order to maintain tank gunners at a satisfactory level of proficiency.
7. Initial training on the Stener weapons was completed on 14 January. The testing and evaluation phase was postponed from 1 February to about 1 March.
8. The M700 Remington sniper rifles were received and training was commenced for regimental scout sniper platoons. A scout sniper school was also conducted for selected teams from the RVN Provincial Reconnaissance Unit.

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COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM

1. The seventeen Combined Action platoons in the DA NANG TAOR had 23 enemy contacts and inflicted enemy casualties of 10 KIA, 4 KIA (P), 3 WIA, 28 PW and 25 Detainees. The 13 platoons in the CHU LAI TAOR had 11 contacts and inflicted 2 KIA, 2 WIA, 10 PW and 26 Detainees.
2. The success of the CAC program can be observed by the intelligence information being received by the units. On three occasions, contact was made as a direct result of information received by PF's through Vietnamese sources. The platoons continue to increase aggressive activities. There were a total of 1249 patrols and 822 ambushes conducted during the month in the two TAORs.
3. The transfer of Marine and Navy personnel assigned to the 1st Marine Division CAC program to Sub-Unit #1 in the DA NANG TAOR and Sub-Unit #2 in the CHU LAI TAOR has centralized all functions of administration.
4. Sgt DU SIHN, a PF soldier with CAC B 1-5, became the first known Vietnamese enlisted man to receive an American combat decoration. He received the Bronze Star for action with CAC 1-5 during a village sweep. LtGen Victor H. KRULAK pinned the medal on Sgt SIHN.
5. CAC C-1 and K-4 were passed messages for jobs well done from MGen NICKERSCH. Both units had demonstrated professional competence in action.

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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY

1. The major logistic activity during this reporting period was directed toward the support of combat operations.
2. The Division Embarkation Officer conducted Embarkation Readiness Inspections on eight units; the Division Supply Inspection/Instruction Team visited seven units; and the Division Ordnance Officer conducted technical inspections of three units during this reporting period. Additionally, the Division Surgeon, Engineer Officer, Motor Transport Officer, and Food Services Officer conducted informal staff visits and inspections.
3. A quantity of 105mm Beehive ammunition C-513 became available to III Marine Amphibious Force units during the month of January. The allocation for the Division and OPCON 105mm Units was 74 rounds. These rounds should greatly aid the defense of battery positions within the Division.
4. Division Embarkation coordinated for the month of January a total airlift of 1,724 personnel, 5 vehicles, 617,372 pounds of supplies. Embarkation coordinated the rotation of BLT 2/4 and 3/9 from 6 January to 9 January on the following ships: USS Bexar (APA-237), USS Union (AKA-107), and USS Point Defiance (LSD-31).
5. Elements of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion and 7th Motor Transport Battalion conducted a total of twenty eight convoys outside the Chu Lai TAOR. Elements of the 3rd Motor Transport Battalion and "A" Company, 9th Motor Transport Battalion conducted a total of three Rough Rider convoys to Phu Bai and returned with personnel of the 2nd Battalion, 26th Marines. Elements of the 7th Motor Transport Battalion conducted one (1) Rough Rider convoy to Chu Lai.
6. The Division Food Services Section opened an office at Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division (Rein) and is now maintaining two offices.
7. As of 31 January 1967, the following FY67 R&E equipment has been received by this Division:

One 8" How, (SP) M-55  
 Two 155mm How, (SP) M-109  
 Two LVTEL  
 Thirteen LVTP5A1  
 One LVTR1A1  
 Seven Ontos M50A1  
 Thirteen Tanks M-48 A3  
 One 155mm Gun, (SP) M-53  
 Three LVTP5 Command

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION  
PART II

1. Narrative Summary for the period 1-31 January 1967.

An Elder's Festival was held in Phong Bac Hamlet by the 3d Tank Battalion. The festival started at approximately 1100 hours and continued until 1430 hours. General Wallace M. GREENE, Jr. and Major General Herman NICKERSON, Jr. arrived in the morning and visited the various activities that were operating such as, MEDCAP which treated 50 people and Bao Chi Games.

USMC lifted 82,000 pounds of food, medical supplies and construction materials together with 11 VN and American Refugee assistants from Hoi An to Thuong Duc. On the return trip, 61 ralliers and their families from Thuong Duc and 18 from Duc Duc were transported to Quang Nam Province Headquarters at Hoi An.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 and Civic Action Officer, 1st Marine Division attended a conference in Hoi An composed of the following members: Senior Advisor, Quang Da Special Zone and S-5 Advisor; MILPHAP Representatives; 1st Marine Division Liaison Officer to Quang Da, USAID Province Representatives; assistant province representatives for Agriculture, Refugees, and Public Safety. Topics discussed included: RD Cadre Program, refugee support, agricultural and medical assistance and self-help projects.

Houses constructed to provide shelters for survivors of airliner crash of 24 December were dedicated. Persons present included: CG, 1st MarDiv, Hoa Vang Sub-sector advisor, Quang Nam Province USAID Representatives and assistants, Hoa Vang District Chief and staff, Hoa Tho and Hoa Cuong Village chiefs and representatives of the press. The dedication was very well conducted and all attending were well pleased. Survivors and those working on the construction projects were honored by being presented plaques and/or certificates. Appropriate remarks were made by the CG, 1st MarDiv and Hoa Vang District Chief.

The Civic Action/Psychological Operations seminar was conducted by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5. Members present included the incoming Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 III MAF; Civic Action and Psychological Operations Officer from the Danang TAOR, 1st Marine Air Wing, 1st MP Battalion, Force Logistic Command; Quang Nam Sector and sub-sector advisors and USAID representatives.

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2. Recapitulation of assistance rendered (Quy Nhon &amp; Da Nang 1-31 January).

**SERVICES:**

Medical treatments (cases)	42,370
Medical evacuations (cases)	273
Dental treatments (cases)	2,386
Vocational training (students)	131
English Language Training (student hrs.)	324

**COMMODITIES:**

Food (lbs)	24,950
Animal Feed, garbage (lbs)	20,621
Toothbrushes	12
Soap (bars)	6,324
Clothing (lbs)	200
Cement (bags)	70
Lumber/Dunnage (truck loads)	12
Carpenter kits	1
Paint (gal)	9
Vitamins (each)	338
Sewing kits	74
School kits	700
Shower shoes (pr)	32
Tin (sheet)	1,990
Physical Education Kit	1
School Kit (supplement)	200
Cooking utensils	71
Toys	515
School books (Vietnamese)	125
Hand Bags	210

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
 CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION  
 PART II

1. Narrative summary for the period 1-31 January 1967.

Psychological Operations Exploitation Team (POET). Availability of this team enabled the exploitation of nine (9) incidents (six (6) VC atrocities and three (3) returnees), on-the-spot interviews, pictures and tape recordings were made.

Kit Carson Scouts (KCS). The KCS continue to lead patrols with excellent results. They are also teaching VC tactics and VC warning signs to our Marine Units.

To accelerate the selection of KCS without loss of quality, three (3) SNCO's have been selected to be placed in the Chieu Hoi Centers (Hoi An, Tam Ky, and Quang Ngai). They will interview, screen and select prospective KCS (trainees). The trainees will be assigned to Marine units and after proving their value they will become KCS's.

Present total number of KCS is nineteen (19) with four (4) trainees receiving on-the-job training.

Leaflets and Posters. With the increase in hand-to-hand dissemination of propaganda material, the attitude of the civilian populace in tactical areas is changing from one of acquiescence to that of friendliness.

Returnees. A total of fourteen (14) returnees turned themselves in to Marine units during the month.

Pledge of Allegiance Cards: Pledge of Allegiance cards continued to be passed out prior to all school dedications and flag raising ceremonies this month, additionally, they were passed out at County Fairs and festivals. On every occasion the Pledge of Allegiance was said with enthusiasm.

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COMPTROLLER FUNCTIONS

Comptroller functions for the month of December continued without any items considered significant enough for comment.

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## COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

## NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. During the month of January 1967 considerable progress was made in telephone pole construction to outlying regiments, internal rewiring of the Division CP, expansion and rehabilitation of the division cable system, completion of a single main distribution frame, and removal of ISHERWOOD SWITCH from the manual switchboard system. Isherwood Switch was replaced by an AUDITOR board which primarily services Headquarters Battalion.

2. Two C-E surveys were conducted. A team from the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), Research and Development Field Unit, Vietnam visited Danang and Chu Lai and compiled information for use in the development of a radio to be especially designed for patrols and other small units. Another team from HQMC and FMFPAC disseminated questionnaires in search of statistical data which will be utilized in the development and design of a Tactical Electronic Automatic Dial Telephone Switching Facility. The team interviewed key wire personnel in their pursuit of more personal data which can assist them in their survey. It also provided the CEO section with information on the cordless switchboard which will replace the SB-22/PT and the SB-86/P.

3. Communication support was provided numerous VIPs included among whom were the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Commanding General, FMFPAC.

4. C-E inspections were conducted by the CEO staff and selected members from the Division Communication Company. These included the Command General Technical Staff and C-E Technical Assistance/Instruction Inspections.

5. In the field of radio communications, increased employment of KY-8 secure voice radio and secure radio teletype tests were initiated during January 1967.

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PART III  
SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The following distinguished visitors visited the command during January 1967:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>REASON</u>
1Jan	LtGen V. H. KRULAK Mr. Joseph RESNICK	CG, FRPPAC (D-NY)	Toured 1stMarDiv Toured 1stMarDiv
4Jan	BGen KIM Yun Sang	CG, 2d ROKMC Bde	Visited 3d Engr Bn Mine Warfare School
6Jan	Gen W. M. GREENE, JR.	CMC	Visited 3d Tk & 3d AT Bns
7Jan	Gen W. M. GREENE, JR.	CMC	Attended a social/dinner/ staff briefing at CG, 1st MarDiv Mess
8Jan	Gen W. M. GREENE, JR.	CMC	Toured 1stMarDiv
9Jan	Rev R. K. YOUNGDAHL	Lutheran dignitary	Toured 1stMarDiv Civic Action Projects
10Jan	Rev R. K. YOUNGDAHL	Lutheran dignitary	Visited 1st Med Bn
12Jan	Robert H. B. BALDWIN	Under Secretary of the Navy	Toured 1stMarDiv
14Jan	BGen W. PEARSON, USA	CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	Toured 1stMarDiv
15Jan	Stanley R. RESOR	Sec of the Army	Toured 1stMarDiv
16Jan	Miss Martha RAYE	Performer	Toured 1stMarDiv
17Jan	MGen A. L. WEST, USA	Head, Dept of the Army Eval of USA Mechanized & Armor Combat Op	Toured 1stMarDiv
17Jan	BGen W. A. KNOLTON, USA	MACV	Toured CAC BL-5
18Jan	MGen Barry GOLDWATER	USAF Reserve	Toured 1stMarDiv
19Jan	Gen W. C. WESTMORELAND & LtGen L. W. WALT	COMUSMACV CG, III MAF	Toured Throng Duc & An Hoa

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20Jan	Mr. Henry L. T. MORIN & Mr. UNGER	Doy Amb to Vietnam Asst Secretary of State for Foreign Relations	Toured 1stMarDiv
24Jan	BGen R. G. OWENS, JR. & Mr. MCMILLAN & Mr. SULLIVAN	ACG, 1st MAW GS-18, DOD Research and Engr GS-18, MACV Scientific Advisor	Toured 1stMarDiv
26Jan	Gen D. E. BEACH, USA	CINCUSARPAC	Toured 1stMarDiv
27Jan	RAdm J. S. COWAN (MC), USN, CINCPACFLT	Visited 1st Med Bn Med Off	
30Jan	Dr. V. K. HEYMAN	GS-16, SE Asia Programs Div, Off Asst Secretary of Def, Sys Analysis	Toured 1stMarDiv

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ENEMY ACTIVITY

During the period there were 12 significant incidents recorded in the Da Nang TAOR.

7 January: AT 1945H, Company K, 3dBn, 1stMar perimeter position at (BT081696, 086699 and 086696) received 500 rounds of small arms fire and four rounds M-79 from an estimated 15 VC located in vicinity (BT086695). Marines returned fire and directed mortar and artillery mission against the enemy position. The enemy broke contact. Visual surveillance indicated one VC KIA probable. (Paragraph 2 of PERINTREP No. 1 - see TAB A)

11 January: AT 1130H, Company L, 3dBn, 9thMar fire team OP located at (AT953665) was attacked by an estimated VC squad utilizing small arms, grenades and possibly satchel charges. A reaction force of two platoons searched the area and found 3 USMC KIA and 1 wounded. The OP had returned fire with rifles, and grenades prior to being overrun. A reaction force later swept the area with inconclusive results. (Paragraph 2 of PERINTREP No. 1 - see TAB A)

12 January: At 1325H, Company H, 2dBn, 5thMar located at (AT861525) received 1500 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire from approximately one VC squad at (AT869525). Marines returned 600 rounds of small arms fire and called an artillery mission. The VC firing ceased. No search was conducted due to the river barrier. (Paragraph 2 of PERINTREP No. 1 - see TAB A)

13 January: At 1445H, Company E, 2dBn, 4thMar perimeter position at (AT 898817) was attacked by an unknown number of VC utilizing 60mm mortars with small arms/automatic weapons. Approximately 10 minutes later, a dispatched patrol sighted 25-40 VC moving east to northwest. The patrol fired at the escaping VC. No assessment was made. (Paragraph 2 of PERINTREP No. 1 - see TAB A)

14 January: At 1200H, Company C, 1stBn, 1stMar landed in the landing zone at (BT015547) to conduct a raid on a suspected enemy village meeting place. Helicopters received small arms fire during the approach despite preparatory fire conducted by fixed wing aircraft. Fifteen rounds of 60mm mortar fire were received in the landing zone. No casualties were sustained. The company then deployed around the hamlet. Shortly thereafter, heavy resistance was encountered from a large number of enemy troops. Marines returned small arms, mortars, grenades and were supported by an artillery mission. Total VC losses were 61 confirmed KIA's and 75 KIA probable for this action. Marine losses were 5 KIA and 23 WIA. Extraction of the company was completed at 1835H in face of increasing enemy activity. (Paragraph 2 of PERINTREP No. 1 - see TAB A)

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15 JANUARY

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At 0115H, one platoon from Company M, 3dBn, 1stMar and one platoon from Company K, were assaulted by an estimated VC company. The assault came in conjunction with mortar preparatory fire. In the ensuing fire fight, Marines suffered 13 KIA and 22 WIA. Ten VC bodies were found inside the perimeter. Fifteen to twenty VC bodies were observed being carried out. A relief force of tanks, LVT's and infantry arrived at approximately 0300H. Medical evacuation began at 0335H. A fire team security patrol discovered the VC and caused the enemy to attack prematurely. Final enemy losses were 57 confirmed KIA's and 60 KIA probable. (Paragraph 2 of PERINTREP No. 1 - see TAB A)

17 January:

At 1200H, Company H, 2dBn, 5thMar search-and-destroy located at (AT937502) received 500 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire from an estimated two squads of VC with three automatic weapons from vicinity (AT937511). Marines returned 600 rounds of small arms fire, 20 rounds of 60mm mortar, 23 rounds of 82mm mortar and 8 rounds of 155 howitzer. The VC firing ceased. The area was later searched with inconclusive results. (Paragraph 2 of PERINTREP No. 2 - see TAB B)

19 January:

At 1115H, Company G, 2dBn, 5thMar search-and-destroy operation located at (AT953545) received 800-1000 rounds of automatic weapons fire and 5 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from an estimated VC platoon located at (AT955546). Five Marines were wounded. Marines returned 1500 rounds of small/arms/automatic weapons fire and 15 rounds of 60mm mortar and were supported by an artillery mission. A search of the area found 1 VC wounded with a U.S. Grease Gun, cartridge belt and ammunition. (Paragraph 2 of PERINTREP No. 2 - see TAB B)

22 January:

At 2045H, Company H, 2dBn, 5thMar platoon observation post located at (AT913515) received 500 rounds of small/arms/automatic weapons fire from a ridgeline vicinity (AT915508). The platoon returned fire and the enemy firing ceased. A search of the area was conducted at first light with inconclusive results. (Paragraph 2 of PERINTREP No. 2 - see TAB B)

22 January:

At 1115H, Company H, 2dBn, 4thMar sweep force located at (AT833554) made immediate contact with an unknown size VC force at (AT833553). Third platoon was blocking for the sweep force. Contact and small arms fire was continuous. Artillery fired 9 rounds of 105 howitzer WP, and 82 rounds of HE. Marine infantry men fired 1500 rounds of small arms, 80 rounds of 60mm mortar, 19 rounds of 3.5 rockets and 25 rounds of M-79. A search of the area found 15 VC confirmed kills, 1 wounded PW, 1 detainee, two K-44 Chicom rifles, one

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U.S. Thompson sub-machine gun, one U.S. M-1 Carbine, three Chicom grenades and miscellaneous documents. Additionally estimated 5 VC KIA probable. (Paragraph 2 of PERINTREP No. 2 - see TAB B)

23 January: At 0930H, Company D, 1stBn, 1stMar platoon combat patrol moving north at vicinity of (BT080588) received a large volume of automatic weapons fire from an estimated three VC located at (BT078588). While the point maneuvered under support from the base of fire, the base of fire received a heavy volume of fire from an estimated six VC located at (BT080590) resulting in 2 Marines KIA and 4 WIA. A reaction force with support from tanks and LVT'S was sent and a search was conducted with inconclusive results. (Paragraph 2 of PERINTREP No. 2 - see TAB B)

26 January: At 0900H, Company F, 2dBn, 5thMar on a search-and-destroy mission while on Operation Tuscaloosa located at (AT976523) received 2000 rounds of small/arms/automatic weapons fire, 18 rounds of 82mm mortar from an estimated VC company located at (AT9852) resulting in 7 Marines WIA. Marines returned 3000 rounds of small arms fire, a heavy volume of M-79 rounds and 3.5 rockets. Air strike was called. VC then fired approximately 5 more rounds of 82mm mortar WP on the Marines in an attempt to divert the air strike on the Marines. Company H, 2dBn, 5thMar crossed a river and maneuvered to vicinity (AT972518) while receiving heavy small arms fire and 82mm mortar fire. After the engagement, VC losses were listed as 78 confirmed KIA, 66 KIA probable, 2 detainees, and 17 individual weapons captured. (G-2 Comment: Documents captured in this engagement showed that VC units in contact were the R-21st and the R-23rd Companies of the R-20th Provincial Mobile Battalion of Quang Nam Province. Due to the heavy losses suffered by the R-21st and the R-23rd Companies, the R-20th Battalion is not considered to be combat effective). (Paragraph 2 of PERINTREP No. 2 - see TAB B)

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ORGANIZATION & OPERATIONS

3 January - CG TF XRAY proposed an expansion of the CHU LAI TACR to CG 1st MarDiv.  
Ref: CG TF XRAY 030417Z Jan67

3 January - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG O 2-67 which directed CG TF XRAY to deploy two 107mm mortars towed with crews and fire direction equipment to AN HOA for further employment in the NONG SON area.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 030749Z Jan67

3 January - CG III MAF informed CG 1st MarDiv that BIL 2/4 would be assigned OPCON CG 1st MarDiv upon completion of debarkation on or about 7 January. BIL 2/4 would relieve 3d Bn 9th Marines which would rotate out of country.  
Ref: CG III MAF 031138Z Jan67

4 January - CG 1st MarDiv reiterated to CG III MAF his requirements for direct and general fire support artillery. The immediate need for M50 mortars to support isolated combat bases which would occur as the relief of ARVN outpost was effected was most pressing.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 040557Z Jan67

4 January - CG 1st MarDiv published the concept of operations for Operation LINCOLN.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 041317Z Jan67

5 January - CG 1st MarDiv informed CG III MAF of the lessons learned during the past holiday trace periods.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 051021Z Jan67

5 January - Operation LINCOLN commenced 050530Z.  
Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 052001Z Jan67  
(TAB D)

5 January - CG 1st MarDiv activated BIL 3/9 for operations effective 060800 January.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 051321Z Jan67

7 January - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 3-67 which dealt with the relocation of infantry battalions within the BA NANG TACR. These changes made the 3d Bn 7th Marines available for subsequent employment in Southern QUANG NGAI Province.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 070915Z Jan67  
(TAB C)

7 January - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 4-67 which deactivated BIL 2/4 and reassigned the units within the BIL.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 071033Z Jan67

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7 January - BLT 2/4 informed CG 1st MarDiv that it had assumed responsibility of the sector formerly assigned 3d Bn 9th Marines effective 071505.  
 Ref: BLT 2/4 071144Z Jan67.

8 January - CG 3d MarDiv informed CG 1st MarDiv that 2d Bn 26th Marines would commence deployment to DA NANG on or about 23 January for employment within the DA NANG TACR.  
 Ref: CG 3d MARDIV 080317Z Jan67.

8 January - CG 1st MarDiv requested CG III MAF assign one Displaced Person Team and one Interpreter Translator Sub-Team to the infantry battalion being prepared for deployment HUI DAU/HUI DANG area.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 081035Z Jan67.

9 January - BLT 3/9 reported to OPCON CTF 79 as directed by CG 1st MarDiv message 160917Z Dec66.  
 Ref: BLT 3/9 091645Z Jan67.

9 January - Operation LINCOLN terminated 091200H.  
 Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 092001Z Jan67  
 (TAB D)

10 January - CG 1st MarDiv directed the 1st Med Bn to dispatch, on order, one clearing platoon in support of BLT 3/7.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 100441Z Jan67

13 January - 2d Bn 5th Marines requested that a CAC unit be formed to operate in the NONG SON coal mine area.  
 Ref: 2d Bn 5th Marines 131115Z Jan67.

13 January - CG 1st MarDiv published a ROUGH RIDER schedule for the deployment of the 2d Bn, 26th Marines from PHU BAI to DA NANG and the return of cargo to PHU BAI.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 131531Z Jan67.

14 January - CG 1st MarDiv published instructions for the movement of the 3d Bn 7th Marines from DA NANG to CHU LAI.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 140941Z Jan67.

15 January - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 6-67 which provided instructions for the ROUGH RIDER to be conducted 18-23 January.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 150745Z Jan67  
 (TAB C)

15 January - 9th Marines notified CG 1st MarDiv that 2d Bn 4th Marines and 3d Bn 7th Marines had exchanged OPCON of their respective sectors effective 151600H January.  
 Ref: 9th Marines 150905Z Jan67.

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16 January - CG 1st MarDiv published planning guidance for the month of February.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 161047Z Jan67  
 (TAB C)

16 January - CG 1st MarDiv recommended to CG III MAF that in country recent assets be increased as soon as possible to relieve the critical shortage now existing.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 160449Z Jan67

16 January - CG 1st MarDiv granted approval for 2d Bn 5th Marines to form a new CAC unit in the HONG SON coal mine area.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 162355Z Jan67.

17 January - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 7-67 which dealt with the deployment of a motor transport company to CHU LAI.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 170553Z Jan67  
 (TAB C)

18 January - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 5-67 which dealt with the relief of ARVN units in the NUI LAC SON/VIET AN area.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 180115Z Jan67  
 (TAB C)

18 January - CG 1st MarDiv informed CG III MAF of planned operations for February.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 181109Z Jan67  
 (TAB C)

19 January - 9th Marines assumed OPCON 2d Bn 26th Marines effective 190700 January.  
 Ref: 9th Marines 220225Z Jan67

19 January - CG 1st MarDiv directed a change in the regimental boundary between 9th Marines and 1st Marines. This change was necessitated by the planned movement of elements of the 1st Marines to the NUI LAC SON/VIET AN area.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 190355Z Jan67  
 (TAB C)

19 January - CG 1st MarDiv directed CG TF XRAY to execute 1st MarDiv FRAG ORDER 3-67 which dealt with the relief of ARVN units in Southern QUANG NAI area.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 191137Z Jan67

19 January - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 8-67 which directed Headquarters Battalion to deploy the 6th Platoon 29th CA Company (USA) and a Dental Team 1st Dental Company to CHU LAI for further employment with TF XRAY units in the NUI DAU/NUI DANG area.  
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 191139Z Jan67  
 (TAB C)

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20 January - 11th Marines recommended to CG 1st MarDiv artillery displacement to support 1st MarDiv FRAG ORDER 3-67  
Ref: 11th Marines 201230Z Jan67

20 January - CG 3d MarDiv informed CG 1st MarDiv of intention to displace the 3d MT Bn and one company from the 9th MT Bn from DA NANG to PHU BAI about 10 February.  
Ref: CG 3d MarDiv 201255Z Jan67

21 January - Operation SIERRA terminated 211200H.  
Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 201405Z Jan67  
(TAB D)

21 January - CG 1st MarDiv assumed OPCON 2d Platoon 1st Armored Amphibian Company and a Force Recon Team effective 191500H January. OPCON of the units was immediately reassigned to 11th Marines and 1st Recon Battalion respectively.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 210115Z Jan67  
(TAB C)

21 January - CG III MAF directed CG 1st MarDiv to chop a platoon 3d Force Recon Company to CG 3d MarDiv effective not later than 6 February.  
Ref: CG III MAF 210800Z Jan67

22 January - CG 1st MarDiv assigned OPCON 3d Bn 7th Marines to CG TF XRAY effective 220001Z January.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 232211Z Jan67  
(TAB C)

22 January - 2d Bn 26th Marines assumed responsibility for sector formerly assigned 3d Bn 7th Marines effective 220800H January.  
Ref: 2d Bn 26th Marines 220030Z Jan67

22 January - CG 1st MarDiv published concept of operations for Operation TUSCALOOSA  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 220901Z Jan67

23 January - CG 1st MarDiv directed all units to utilize Sparrow Hawk forces to prevent the enemy from breaking contact when water barriers prevented pursuit.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 230721Z Jan67

24 January - CG 1st MarDiv reemphasized the importance of County Fair Operations and directed that all County Fairs will extend through a minimum of two days duration.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240531Z Jan67  
(TAB C)

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24 January - CG 1st MarDiv directed all units to increase the number of night time listening posts, ambushes, and security patrols in order to ensure that the enemy is denied access to areas at night as well as during the day.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240933Z Jan67  
(TAB C)

24 January - Operation CLEVELAND commenced 240940H and Operation TUSCALOOSA commenced 240730H  
Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 242001Z Jan67  
(TAB D)

24 January - CG 1st MarDiv directed commanders to limit the use of daylight platoon and larger size patrols to specific situations where smaller elements cannot be employed since smaller units cover greater area, move faster, and experience a lower casualty rate. Greater utilization of supporting arms and Sparrow Hawks was directed to compensate for the reduced sizes of patrols.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240855Z Jan67  
(TAB C)

25 January - Operation CLEVELAND terminated 251800H.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 250715Z Jan67  
(TAB D)

25 January - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 19-67 which provided for augmentation of the infantry company that is scheduled to relieve ARVN units in the NUI LAC SON/VIET AN area.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 251111Z Jan67  
(TAB C)

25 January - CG 1st MarDiv assumed OPCON Battery B, 1st Bn 13th Marines from CG 3d MarDiv effective 250800H and immediately passed OPCON to 11th Marines.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 270745Z Jan67  
(TAB C)

26 January - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 9-67 which dealt with the redistribution of reconnaissance assets.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 260051Z Jan67  
(TAB C)

26 January - CG 1st MarDiv directed all commanders to intensify the level of operations and to maintain continuous pressure on the VC during the period prior to TET (Lunar New Year).

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 260520Z Jan67  
(TAB C)

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26 January

- CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG PLAN 13-67 which provided plans to prevent the VC from strengthening their posture during any cessation of offensive operations during TET.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 261051Z Jan67  
(TAB C)
- 26 January - CG 1st MarDiv reviewed the criteria for establishment of precedence for helicopter support requests to insure proper utilization of helicopters.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 260817Z Jan67
- 26 January - Operation DE SOTO commenced 262000H.  
Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 272045Z Jan67  
(TAB D)
- 27 January - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 12-67 which directed that an administrative convoy be run from DA NANG to CHU LAI and back during the period 29-30 January.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 270757Z Jan67
- 28 January - Operation TUSCALOOSA terminated 281700H.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 281027Z Jan67  
(TAB D)
- 28 January - CG 1st MarDiv published the initiating directive for Operation INDEPENDENCE  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 281327Z Jan67
- 29 January - CG 1st MarDiv requested CG III MAF to provide four additional Scout Dog Teams to allow maximum support for forces being introduced into the DUC PHO area.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 291439Z Jan67
- 30 January - Operation SHARK commenced 300815H.  
Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 301309Z Jan67  
(TAB D)
- 30 January - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 14-67 which provided additional forces to the 9th Marines for Operation INDEPENDENCE.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 301401Z Jan67  
(TAB C)
- 31 January - CG 1st MarDiv assumed responsibility for the NUI DAU/NUI DANG area effective 291800H January and the NUI LAC SON/VIET AN outpost effective 031000H January.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 310931Z Jan67
- 31 January - CG 1st MarDiv directed that CG TF X-Ray, 1st Marines and 9th Marines provide additional alert forces during TET to insure an increased readiness posture during this period.  
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 311607Z Jan67  
(TAB C)

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COMBINED ACTION COMPANY PROGRAM

9 January - CAC B 2-2 received 88 Vietnamese refugees from the LOC QUANG and LOC MY villages. Upon screening five detainees were forwarded IFT.

Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 092991Z Jan67  
(TAB D)

13 January - CAC K-4 engaged approximately twenty enemy which attacked their perimeter position. An exchange of small arms fire and grenades resulted in four VC KIA (Prob) and one USMC WIA.  
Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 132001Z Jan67  
(TAB D)

15 January - CAC D-5 Squad combat patrol acting upon intelligence received by a PF engaged an estimated seven VC. After an exchange of small arms two detainees were apprehended and forwarded for interrogation.  
Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 162001Z Jan67  
(TAB D)

17 January - CAC B 2-2 sent a squad to investigate a report of a road block being established on Route #14 by the enemy. Upon approaching the area the squad surprised five VC coming up a trail. The squad fired small arms and threw grenades resulting in two VC KIA and two VC KIA (Prob). Four Chi-com grenades and several documents were found and forwarded.  
Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 172001Z Jan67.  
(TAB D)

27 January - A CAC D-1 squad activated a mine and received 300 rounds small arms fire and three M-79 rounds from an estimated ten enemy. They returned small arms fire, and with the assistance of three tanks dispatched from 3d Bn 1st Marines C.P., searched the area finding indications of four VC KIA (Prob). Friendly casualties were one USMC KIA, one USN KIA, two PF KIA, one USMC WIA and two PF WIA.  
Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 272001Z Jan67.  
(TAB D)

29 January - CAC L-4 observed four VC crossing a river. The squad pursued and sighted three armed enemy. They fired small arms at the fleeing VC resulting in one VC KIA. Three detainees were apprehended in the area.  
Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 292001Z Jan67.  
(TAB D)

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30 January - A CAC D-5 squad combat patrol acting on intelligence received from the CAM AM village chief apprehended four VC who were plotting to assassinate him. Two of the VC attempted to escape but the patrol fired 20 rounds small arms fire killing one and wounding the other.

Ref: 1st MarDiv COC 302001Z Jan67.  
(TAB D)

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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY

2 January 1967      Division Embarkation coordinated the airlift of Battery E, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines from Chu Lai to An Hoa.

6 January 1967      Division Embarkation coordinated the offloading of BLT 2/4.

7 January 1967      Division Embarkation coordinated the onloading of BLT 3/9 to complete rotation within the TAOR.

9 January 1967      Division Embarkation coordinated the sealift of 1st AmTrac Battalion and "B" Company, 1st Medical Battalion from Chu Lai to Danang.

12 January 1967      Division Food Services held a Mess Chief's meeting to discuss milk delivery, milk dispensers, preventive maintenance, and supply matters within the Division.

16 January 1967      Division Motor Transport coordinated the movement of a Rough Rider Convoy from Danang to Phu Bai. Major TREAHY relieved Major ETTER as Division Embarkation Officer. Commenced buildup of supplies, by motor convoy, in Quang Ngai LSA in preparation for Operation DeSoto.

19 January 1967      Division Embarkation coordinated the airlift of the advance party of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines from Danang to Chu Lai.

20 January 1967      Division Embarkation Coordinated the sealift of "A" Company, 7th Motor Transport Battalion from Danang to Chu Lai aboard LST-901.

22-24 January 1967      Division Embarkation coordinated the airlift of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines from Danang to Chu Lai.

25 January 1967      Division Embarkation coordinated the offloading of 1st Marine Division January Draft from USNS Walker.

26 January 1967      Division Embarkation coordinated the sealift of 116 personnel and 79 vehicles of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines from Danang to Chu Lai aboard LST-601.

27 January 1967      Opened supply dump at Nui Loc Son for support of Company F, Second Battalion, First Marines. Supplies staged and helilifted from First Marines CP.

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28 January 1967

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LSA in Duc Pho opened. Commenced helilift of supplies from Quang Ngai LSA to LSA at Duc Pho in support of Operation DeSoto.

29 January 1967

Division Motor Transport coordinated the movement of a Rough Rider convoy from Danang to Chu Lai.

31 January 1967

Division Embarkation coordinated the "Mix Master" Program for the 1st Marine Division.

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION  
PART III

1. Sequential listing of significant events for the period 1-31 January 1967
- 8 Jan 1967 3d Tank Bn held an Elder's Festival for the first time in Phong Bac Hamlet.
- 14 Jan 1967 Eighty-two thousand pounds of food, medical supplies and construction material was lifted by USMC helicopters from Hoi An to Thuong Duc.
- 22 Jan 1967 The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 attended a conference in Hoi An on the KCS Cadre Program, refugee support, agricultural and medical assistance.
- 24 Jan 1967 The dedication of houses constructed for the survivors of the 24 December crash.
- 25 Jan 1967 A briefing was conducted by Col HINH, Quang Da Special Zone Commander, on Phase I and II of Operation HUNG QUANG.
- 28 Jan 1967 The Civic Action/Psychological Operations Seminar was conducted by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS  
PART III

## 1. Sequential listing of significant events for the period 1-31 January 1967.

1 Jan 67 Marine patrols distributed the following leaflets. Themes:  
1,000 "Safe Conduct Passes"  
4,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals"  
2,000 "Rewards for Mines"

2 Jan 67 2 hours of ground broadcasts by 244th PSYOP Co. Themes:  
"Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Return to GVN."

Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) are assisting a search and destroy mission for next 6 days by acting as trail guides and screening VN personnel.

Marine patrols distributed 500 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," 200 "GVN Support," and 200 "Safe Conduct Passes."

3 Jan 67 Marines distributed 100 "Chieu Hoi Appeals" leaflets.

4 Jan 67 Pledge of Allegiance Cards were passed out to the Phuoc Tuong School. The Pledge of Allegiance was then led by the teachers. All Vietnamese present were very receptive to the new Pledge of Allegiance.

KCS utilized with patrols and interrogation. Marines distributed 1,200 "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

5 Jan 67 3 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes:

400,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals"  
90,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "GVN Offers Better Life."

Marine patrols distributed 2,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," 1,000 "Don't Run from Marines," 2,000 "Rewards for Weapons" leaflets and 1,000 "Safe Conduct Passes."

KCS were utilized as patrol scouts.

6 Jan 67 6 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes:  
200,000 "Show of Allied Strength" and "Chieu Hoi Appeals"  
560,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and TET leaflets  
140,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals"  
30,000 "Rewards for Weapons"  
20,000 "Safe Conduct Passes"

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Marine patrols distributed 1,000 "Mine Rewards," 3,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," 2,000 "Weapons Reward," 2,000 "Don't Run from Marines," and 1,000 "Safe Conduct Passes."

KCS utilized as trail guide for patrol.

7 Jan 67 2 aerial leaflet drops comprised of 200,000 leaflets. Themes: "GVN Provides Better Life" and "Chieu Hoi Appeals." Marines distributed 2,000 "Weapons Rewards" and 4,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

Pledge of Allegiance cards were passed out at the new school dedication.

8 Jan 67 3 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes: 165,000 leaflets on "TET," 50,000 "Rallier Appeal," 50,000 "Refugee Information," and 50,000 "VC take the People's Rice."

Marine patrols distributed 2,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," 2,000 "Don't Run from Marines," and 2,000 "Weapons Rewards" leaflets.

An Elder's Festival was conducted; although weather was very poor, it was apparent that it achieved the desired results. Pledge of Allegiance cards were distributed to those present and all Vietnamese read the Pledge with enthusiasm.

9 Jan 67 4 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes: 50,000 "Mine Rewards" and "Chieu Hoi Appeals," 56,000 leaflets on "TET" 165,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," 20,000 "Safe Conduct Passes," and 50,000 "Refugee Information" leaflets.

Marine patrols distributed 3,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," 3,000 "Mine Reward" and 3,000 "Weapons Reward" leaflets.

KCS utilized as trail guides for patrols.

10 Jan 67 7 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes used were: 300,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "TET" and "Safe Conduct Passes" 50,000 "Refugee Information Leaflet" 165,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals" 20,000 "Safe Conduct Passes" 100,000 "Exploitation of VC Miseries," "Report VC Activity," and "TET" leaflets.

1 hour TET aerial broadcast made.

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11 Jan 67

3 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes used were:  
 75,000 "Show of Allied Strength," "Chieu Hoi Appeals,"  
 and "TET"  
 75,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "VC Misery" and "TET"  
 300,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Poem by NVN to his Mother"  
 672,000 "TET" leaflets

1 hour 30 minutes of aerial broadcast of "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Refugee Information" was made.

Marine patrols distributed 10,000 leaflets. Themes were:  
 "Marine Corps Overwhelming Fire Power," "Chieu Hoi Appeals,"  
 "Safe Conduct Passes," and "Weapons Rewards."

KCS identified 4 VC and 2 detainees.

12 Jan 67

5 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes used were:  
 250,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," 100,000 "VC Disillusionment in Their Cause," 110,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

1 hour of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

KCS were utilized as trail guides for patrols.  
 KCS identified 2 Vietnamese females as detainees.

13 Jan 67

4 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes were:  
 150,000 "Don't Harbor VC" and "Safe Conduct Passes"  
 100,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Life With VC is Misery"  
 150,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals"  
 20,000 "Safe Conduct Passes"

Marine patrols distributed 9,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," 2,000 "Weapon and Mine Rewards" leaflets.

KCS talked with villagers on life and hardships with the VC vs good life with the GVN.

POET took photographs of the VC attempt to overrun 2/11 showing VC losses. A poster and leaflet were made to be dropped over the area.

14 Jan 67

2 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes used were:  
 125,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals"  
 75,000 "VC Fear of Death"  
 25,000 "Safe Conduct Passes"

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Marine patrols distributed 11,000 leaflets. Themes used:  
 "VC Failures to Make Good Their Promises," "Chieu Hoi Appeals,"  
 "Mine and Weapon Rewards" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

Pledge of Allegiance cards were passed out at County Fair.

15 Jan 67      Marine patrols distributed 7,000 leaflets. Themes used were:  
 "Weapons Rewards," "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "VC Failure to Keep  
 Promises" and "Don't Run from Marines."

16 Jan 67      1 aerial leaflet drop was made. Themes used were:  
 30,000 "VC Disillusionment in Their Cause" and 60,000 leaflets  
 on "TET."

Marine patrols distributed 14,000 leaflets. Themes were:  
 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Mines and Weapons Rewards," "VC Futility,"  
 "Don't Run from Marines" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

17 Jan 67      4 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes used were:  
 60,000 "VC Take the People's Rice"  
 30,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals"  
 40,000 "Show of Allied Strength"  
 50,000 "Safe Conduct Passes"  
 150,000 leaflets on "TET"

Marine patrols distributed 24,000 leaflets. Themes were:  
 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "VC Futility," "Weapons and Mines  
 Rewards," "Appeals to VC Families," "Don't Run from Marines"  
 and "Safe Conduct Passes."

18 Jan 67      5 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes used were:  
 135,000 "TET" leaflets  
 50,000 "GVN and Marines Help the People Protect Themselves  
 From the VC"  
 75,000 "Don't Harber the VC"  
 50,000 "Safe Conduct Passes"

45 minutes of "TET" and 40 minutes of "Chieu Hoi Appeals"  
 aerial broadcast.

Marines distributed 7,000 leaflets. Themes were:  
 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Mines and Weapons Reward" and "Safe  
 Conduct Passes"

19 Jan 67      5 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes used were:  
 380,000 mixed leaflets on "TET," "Comparison of ARVN Life  
 to That of the VC," "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Safe Conduct  
 Passes."

90 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "TET" played.

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20 Jan 67

10 aerial leaflet drops consisting of 830,000 leaflets were made. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "TET" "Safe Conduct Passes," "VC Misery," "GVN Provides Better Life," "VC Kill Innocent Civilians," "Show of Allied Strength" and leaflet exploiting "VC Defeat in Their Attack on 2/11."

Marine patrols distributed 25,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Mines and Weapons Rewards" and "VC Futility."

21 Jan 67

4 aerial leaflet drops consisting of 350,000 leaflets were made. Themes were: "Don't Run from Marines," "Obey the Curfew," "TET" leaflets, "GVN and Allies Show of Strength," "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

2 more Kit Carson Scouts were assigned to units making a total of 19.

22 Jan 67

3 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 250,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Don't Run from Marines," "GVN Provides a Better Life," "Mines Rewards," "Curfew" leaflets, "Uselessness of VC Cause" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

45 minutes of aerial broadcast of TET themes was conducted.

23 Jan 67

6 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes used were: 606,000 leaflets on "TET," "Chieu Hoi Appeal," "Flag of Death vs Flag of Peace," and "Safe Conduct Passes."

Marine patrols distributed 12,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Appeals to Citizens to Back the GVN and Allied Forces," and "Safe Conduct Passes."

24 Jan 67

4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 405,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Don't Harbor the VC," "Obey the Curfew," "Marines are Friends of Civilians," "The Good Life with the GVN," "TET" leaflets, "Flag of Death vs Flag of Peace," "VC Take the People's Rice" and exploitation of "VC Shortage of Good Food and Medical Supplies."

Marine patrols distributed 4,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals" and "Weapons Rewards."

25 Jan 67

3 aerial leaflet drops were made. Themes used were: 30,000 "Don't Harbor the VC," 40,000 "Chieu Hoi Appeals," 50,000 "Obey the Curfew," 25,000 "VC Need For His Family vs His Fear of Death," 100,000 leaflets on TET.

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60 minutes of aerial broadcast on "TET" was played. Marine patrols distributed 4,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Weapons Rewards and Don't Harbor the VC."

26 Jan 67 7 aerial leaflet drops consisting of 472,000 leaflets were made, Themes were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals," leaflets on "TET," "Allied Power," "Don't Harbor VC," "Don't Run from Marines," "Marines are Friends of Civilians," "NVA Rallier's Letter to His Friends," "VC Take the People's Rice," "VC need for his family vs his Fear of Death," "Obey the Curfew," and "Safe Conduct Passes."

Marine patrols distributed 5,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Weapons Rewards" and "Don't Harbor the VC."

60 minute aerial broadcast on "TET" was made.

27 Jan 67 6 aerial leaflet drops consisting of 530,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Don't Harbor the VC," "Comparison Between VC Misery and Good Life With GVN," "Explanation of Marine Presence in Vietnam," "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Uselessness of VC Cause," leaflets on "TET" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

60 minute aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was played.

28 Jan 67 5 aerial leaflet drops consisting of 323,000 leaflets was made. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Poor Living Conditions of VC vs Good Conditions With GVN," "Warning to Vietnamese to evacuate their Homes," "Curfew leaflets," "VC Loneliness for his Family" "Don't Harbor the VC," "Rewards for Mines and Boobytraps," "Don't Fire at Aircraft," "Give Information About the VC," "Marines are Here to Help" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

60 minute aerial broadcast on "Curfew" and "Don't Fire at Aircraft" was played.

Marine patrols distributed 3,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi Appeal" and "Weapons Rewards."

29 Jan 67 6 aerial leaflet drops consisting of 680,000 leaflets were made. Themes were: "Don't Harbor the VC," "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Reward for Information," "Flag of Death vs Flag of Peace," "VC Need for His Family," "The Good Life With the Gvn," "VC Mines Kill Innocent Civilians," "Mines Rewards" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

120 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "VC Mines Kill Innocent Civilians," messages on "TET," "Don't Fire at Aircraft" and "Chieu Hoi Appeal" were played.

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30 Jan 67 6 aerial leaflet drops consisting of 545,000 leaflets were made. Themes used: "VC Take the People's Rice," "Don't Harber the VC," "The Difference Between GVN and VC Life," "Rewards for Mines and Boobytraps," "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Show of Strength," "Don't Fire at Aircraft," and "Safe Conduct Passes."

90 minutes of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeal" and "Don't Fire at Aircraft" were played.

31 Jan 67 8 aerial leaflet drops consisting of 745,000 leaflets were made. Themes used were: "Don't Harber the VC," "Flag of Death vs Flag of Peace," "Show of Strength," "GVN Civic Action," "VC Use Women and Children as Shields," "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Mines and Weapons Rewards" and "Safe Conduct Passes."

180 minutes of aerial broadcasts on "TET" and "Chieu Hoi Appeal" were played.

Marine patrols distributed 2,000 leaflets. Themes were "Chieu Hoi Appeal."

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## COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

## SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1-31 Jan 67

Main Distribution Frame completed. Telephone pole line construction near completion from 1st MarDiv to 3d TkBn (AT 989708), 1st Marines (BT 435078) and 9th Marines (AT 969620). Auditor HqBn swbd replaced ISHERWOOD switch.

1 Jan 67

Comm support for CG FMFPAC.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 290311Z Dec 66 (C)

5 Jan 67

Increased employment of KY-8 secure voice radio throughout Division.

Ref: DivO 02220.1

5-6 Jan 67

ARPA Research and Development Field Unit Vietnam conducted patrol and other small unit communication survey.

Ref: CG III MAF 311006Z Dec 66 (U)

6-8 Jan 67

Comm Support for CMC.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 041405Z Jan 67 (C)

8-21 Jan 67

CG CE Technical Inspection 1st AT Bn and 1st Tank Bn.

Ref: DivBul 5041 10/LR/1jc dtd 5Jan67 (U)

10-23 Jan 67

CE Type #1 Inspection of 1st Recon Bn, 1st MP Bn; HqCo, 1st Marines; 1st Bn, 1st Marines; 2d Bn, 1st Marines; 3d Bn, 1st Marines; 1st Med Bn; CommCo, HqBn.

Ref: DivCEO Memo 10/FLB/1jc dtd 22Dec66 (U)

12 Jan 67

Comm support for Under Secretary of the Navy Hon. Robert H. B. Baldwin.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 101245Z Jan 67 (C)

15 Jan 67

Comm Support Secretary of the Army, Hon. Stanley R. Resor.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 131203Z Jan 67 (C)

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18 Jan 67

Comm Support MGEN Barry GOLDWATER, USAF,  
Reserve.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 170725Z Jan 67 (C)

23 Jan 67

Secure Radio Teletype tests initiated.

Ref: DivBul 2303 10/ROR/1jc dtd 8Jan67 (U)

26 Jan 67

Comm Support General Dwight BEACH  
CINCUSARPAC.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 241333Z Jan 67 (C)

31 Jan 67

HQMC, CG FMFPAC Team conducted survey for  
proposed Tactical Electronic Automatic  
Dial Telephone Switching Facilities.

Ref: ADMINNO FMFPAC 312152Z Dec66 (UNCLAS  
EFTO)

CMC 100823Z Jan 67 (U)

CG III MAF 260146Z Jan 67 (C)

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PART IVSUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND  
CHRONOLOGIES OF SUBORDINATE UNITS

✓ Tab A  
 ✓ Tab B  
 ✓ Tab C  
 ✓ Tab D  
 ✓ Tab E  
 ✓ Tab F  
 ✓ Tab G  
 ✓ Tab H  
 ✓ Tab I  
 ✓ Tab J  
 ✓ Tab K  
 ✓ Tab L  
 ✓ Tab M  
 ✓ Tab N  
 ✓ Tab O  
 ✓ Tab P  
 ✓ Tab Q  
 ✓ Tab R  
 ✓ Tab S  
 ✓ Tab T  
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 ✓ Tab M  
 ✓ Tab N  
 ✓ Tab O  
 ✓ Tab P  
 ✓ Tab Q  
 ✓ Tab R  
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 ✓ Tab T  
 ✓ Tab U  
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 ✓ Tab W  
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 ✓ Tab Y  
 ✓ Tab Z  
 ✓ Tab AA  
 ✓ Tab BB  
 ✓ Tab CC

Photographs and News Releases  
 1st MarDiv Perintreps 1-67 - 2-67

Operational Messages 1-50

Situation Reports

G-3 Journal for January

Division Bulletin 5080 - The Story of Fort Page

Command Directory

Hq Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
Task Force Xray	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1st Marines	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
5th Marines	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
7th Marines	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
11th Marines	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1st Recce Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1st MP Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1st Tank Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1st AT Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1st Engr Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1st SP Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1st MT Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1st Med Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1st Hosp Co	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
3d Amtrac Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
7th MT Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
7th Comm Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
7th Engr Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
11th MT Bn	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
CLDC	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
2d Bn, 5th Marines	COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

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## SUBJECT

## OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS

## ORIGINATOR &amp; DTG

NINETH MARINES 070810Z JAN 67

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 070915Z JAN 67  
 ELEVENTH MARINES 140624Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 150745Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 150939Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 161047Z JAN 67  
 CG ELEVENTH MARINES LTR 17 JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 170553Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 180115Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 181109Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 190355Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 190959Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 191139Z JAN 67

CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 210115Z JAN 67  
 CG III MAF 200544Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 210115Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 210741Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 230133Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 230933Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 231401Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 232211Z JAN 67  
 CG TASK FORCE XRAY 240255Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 240531Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 240855Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 240933Z JAN 67  
 FIRST MARINES 250050Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 250715Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 251111Z JAN 67  
 CG THIRD MAR DIV 251417Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 260051Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 260521Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 260645Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 261051Z JAN 67  
 CG III MAF 261558Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 270047Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 270745Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 271433Z JAN 67  
 CG TASK FO CG XRAY 271715Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 280531Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 281331Z JAN 67  
 CG TASK FORCE XRAY 281502Z JAN 67  
 NINETH MARINES 290502Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 290905Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 290931Z JAN 67

CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 300925Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 301401Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 311425Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 311607Z JAN 67  
 CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN 051545Z FEB 67

End. ✓ RELIEF OF THIRTY BN NINTH MAR BY SECOND BN  
 ✓ FOURTH MARINES  
 ✓ FRAG O 3-67 (REPOSITIONING OF BNS)  
 ✓ OPERATIONAL CONTROL BTRY E, 2dBN, 11TH MARINES  
 ✓ FRAG O 6-67 MUGH RIDER (U)  
 ✓ RESPONSIBILITY SECTORS, 2/4 & 3/7  
 ✓ PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR FEBRUARY 67  
 ✓ RELOCATION OF ARTILLERY  
 ✓ FRAG O 7-67 (DEPLOYMENT OF ASSETS)  
 ✓ FRAG O 5-67 (RELIEF OF ARVN UNITS)  
 ✓ REPORT OF HANDED O NS FOR FEB 67 (U)  
 ✓ FIRST MAR/NINETH MAR BDRY CHANGE (U)  
 ✓ FIRST MAR/NINETH MAR BDRY CHANGE (U)  
 ✓ FRAG O 8-67 (DEPLOYMENT CIV AFFS UNITS AND  
 ✓ DENTAL TB)  
 ✓ CHANGE OF OPCON  
 ✓ PET CHASE FIRE AND STANDDOWN OF OFFENSIVE OPNS  
 ✓ CHANGE OF OPCON  
 ✓ RELIEF OF ARVN UNITS  
 ✓ ARTILLERY DISPLACEMENTS  
 ✓ CHANGE OF SECTOR RESPONSIBILITY (U)  
 ✓ AUGMENTATION FOR NUI DAU/NUI DANG FORCE  
 ✓ CHANGE OF OPCON  
 ✓ OPCON OF 3/7, COR EDITION TO MSG  
 ✓ COUNTY FAIRS (U)  
 ✓ CONDUCT OF PATROLS  
 ✓ LISTENING POSTS (U)  
 ✓ NUI LAC SON SPECIAL OPERATIONS 1  
 ✓ IDENTIFICATION OF CIV CLEVELAND  
 ✓ FRAG O 10-67 (NUI LAC SON: VIET ARN AUGMENTATION)  
 ✓ REASSIGNMENT OF ARTILLERY BATTERY  
 ✓ FRAG O 9-67 (REDISTRIBUTION OF RECONASSETS)  
 ✓ INCREASED ACTIVITY PRIOR TO TET  
 ✓ FRAG O 11-67 (REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM)  
 ✓ FRAG PLAN 13-67 (CNS IN CONNECTION WITH TET)  
 ✓ NAVY SUP CNT REQUIREMENTS DUE TO AREA  
 ✓ SEISMIC INTRUSION DEVICE (SIC) (U)  
 ✓ REASSIGNMENT ARTY BTRY  
 ✓ EXPANSION OF CAC PROGRAM DURING CY 67  
 ✓ CIVIL DEFENSE  
 ✓ IDENTIFICATION OF CIV TUSCALOOSA  
 ✓ KAC-PAPA CODE 3 RIES  
 ✓ CIV DEFENSE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES  
 ✓ CONCEPT OF CIV (CIV INDEPENDENCE)  
 ✓ 40 OBS SUPPORT FIRS MAR DIV  
 ✓ DETAILED PLANS FOR INCREASED OFFENSIVE  
 ✓ REPORT "NICK TO", DURING AND AFTER TET STANDDOWN  
 ✓ SWIFT BOAT SUPPORT CIV TRINITY  
 ✓ FRAG O 14-67 (AUGMENTATION OF INDEPENDENCE)  
 ✓ READINESS POSTURE  
 ✓ READINESS POSTURE  
 ✓ TASK ORGANIZATION

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Da Namg, Republic of Vietnam  
 181200 January 1967

PERINTREP NO. 1

Period Covered: 281200H December 1966 to 151200H January 1967

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam AMS Series L701 and L7014

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATIONA. Adjacent Areas

(1) Recent interrogations indicate that the 22nd NVA Regiment was the enemy unit which attacked the artillery positions of the 1st Air Cavalry Division southwest of Bong Son on 24 December. According to a staff officer of the regiment who was wounded and captured, the 22nd Regiment was to return to the An Lao valley after the attack. The unit was to report to the headquarters of the 3rd Division in the An Lao valley and then move to the Quang Ngai border where it would receive replacements and re-equip its forces. If correct, this information would indicate that the bulk of the 3rd Division is in the general area of the Quang Ngai-Binh Dinh border with the division CP and the 22nd Regiment in northern Binh Dinh Province and the 2nd VC Regiment in southern Quang Ngai Province possibly in the Vuoc Liem area (BS 6637) as stated by two recent captives from that regiment.

B. First Marine Division's Area of Responsibility

(1) Quang Nam Province. Enemy activity was comparatively light for the first part of this reporting period. Starting 5 January, there was an increase in activity. On 5 January, an ARVN position at (BT 096528) was attacked by mortars and overrun. On 6 and 7 January, CIDG forces out of the Thuong Duc camp were in contact with an estimated two platoons in the vicinity of ZC 1853. No identification of the enemy force is possible. USASF states the equipment and tactics used indicate local force, possibly the Q.14, or main force elements being escorted between the base areas in the mountains to the north and south of the point of contact. A CIDG reaction force was dispatched from Da Nang. Two days later a Marine operation on the north side of the river met sporadic resistance from evading guerrillas and local forces. On the 11th of January, a fire team OP at AT 954666 was overrun by an estimated squad. A company raid in response to intelligence reports of a meeting of provincial and district cadre in the vicinity of BT 0254 on 14 January met determined resistance from the time the force

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descended into the landing zone until they were extracted later in the day. In the early morning of the 15th, a two-platoon position at BT 0568 was attacked by a unit that was identified by a captive as the V.75 Mortar Battalion. The statements of two reported defectors from the 3rd NVA Regiment indicate that that regiment remains in northern Quang Tin and southern Quang Nam Provinces. Enemy activity in Quang Nam Province and especially within the Da Nang Combat Base continues to indicate intensified local force and guerrilla activity combined with occasional sapper attacks.

(2) Quang Tin Province. As usual enemy activity within this province has been light. On 10 January, a PF platoon that was on a road-clearing mission near Thang Binh was ambushed by an estimated VC company with fairly heavy losses suffered by the friendly force. This action is typical of a long string of harassments in the vicinity of Thang Binh that is believed possibly to reflect enemy sensitivity to friendly operations which could hamper the flow of supplies from coastal infiltration points in Thang Binh District to caches and depots in near-by mountainous regions. On Friday, the 13th, the 70th Company of the 409th Sapper Battalion conducted a very unsuccessful attack against 2/11's positions within the Chu Lai TAOR. The sappers were detected while in the process of breaching the wire with the result that they were caught between wire obstacles with little room for maneuver. Seven of the attackers were captured and identified the unit. They also revealed that the 70th Company had conducted the more successful attack against M/3/5 in December. A defector from the 21st NVA Regiment states that his unit moved through Quang Tin Province into Quang Ngai during early December. With two regiments in Quang Ngai, it is assumed that the headquarters of the 2nd Division also moved to Quang Ngai Province at about the same time as the 21st. Main forces remaining in Quang Tin consist of the 3rd NVA Regiment which has been operating in northern Quang Tin since its infiltration in May of 1966.

(3) Quang Ngai Province. As compared with the previous reporting period, enemy activity within this province has increased. Defectors report both the 1st VC and 21st NVA Regiments in the area west of Quang Ngai City. The 21st is reported in the area between Vinh Tuy and the Tra Bong CIDG camp while the 1st is said to be in the vicinity of the Ha Thanh CIDG camp. The defector from the 1st Regiment stated that an attack against Ha Thanh is or was planned. In keeping with this statement, patrol contacts out of Ha Thanh increased during the past fortnight and then, on the morning of the 15th, one of the outlying posts manned by RF/PF personnel was assaulted and overrun. This attack is not dissimilar from the pattern of enemy activity witnessed at Ha Thanh during September. At that time, a number of the camp's outposts were overrun and the main camp itself was harassed on several occasions. Defectors later revealed that these attacks and harassments constituted an attack by the 1st VC Regiment against Ha Thanh. Since none of the attacks were serious enough to occasion

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the dispatch of a sizeable reaction force, it is assumed that the objectives was at least in part to make a strong local impression through his limited show of force, as well as to gain a certain degree of combat experience. The impression on the local population was made and for a time, when many of the overrun outposts were not reoccupied, the effective area of GRVN control extended little more than a kilometer beyond the camp. Further to the south, two NVA's captured in Binh Dinh Province state that their parent unit, the 2nd VC Regiment, is located in the Vuc Liem area (BS 6436) of southern Quang Ngai Province. Various captives and defectors have reported the 2nd Regiment in southern Quang Ngai Province for the past month or more. According to reports, the regiment is receiving personnel replacements, some of which have been infiltrated from North Vietnam. In view of the lapse of time since last contact and the number of reported replacements, the 2nd VC Regiment is considered combat effective. The purpose of the 2nd Regiment's presence in Quang Ngai Province is uncertain. All defectors have generally indicated that the 3rd Division will operate in northern Binh Dinh Province and southern Quang Ngai Province (some have stated reconnaissance activities have been conducted even as far north as Quang Ngai city); however nearly all report the objective of the 3rd Division to be the holding of northern Binh Dinh Province and the defeat of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The recent attack against a 1st Air Cavalry artillery position by the 22nd NVA Regiment would seem to be in keeping with this policy. It is not known whether, by staying in Quang Ngai Province, the 2nd VC Regiment is being refitted and trained in a relatively safe area in preparation for further engagements with the 1st AirCav in Binh Dinh Province; or whether the 2nd Regiment is to concern itself with southern Quang Ngai Province. The fertile plain of Ho Duc and Duc Pho is of enough importance to the VC in terms of people, rice and salt to merit the deployment of a regiment to this area to maintain VC control, particularly when friendly operations, such as SIERRA, could be considered to be challenging this control. Other defectors have reported that plans exist for the 2nd and 3rd Divisions to join in southern Quang Ngai Province for a combined attack possibly against Ba To, Gia Vuc or Minh Long. Contact around these camps continues to be very light, while in the southern coastal plain friendly forces have met with some resistance. ARVN and RF positions in Duc Pho were subjected to mortar attacks on 30 December and 7 January. Elsewhere in Quang Ngai Province, on 8 January, an RF/PF outpost at BS 692776 was overrun by an undetermined enemy force. ROKMC forces at BS 544886 made a contact on the afternoon of the 10th that persisted into the night. The sapper captured at Chu Lai on the 13th stated that only the 40th company, the battalion headquarters and some support elements of the 409th Sapper Battalion are in Quang Ngai Province; the 30th and 50th companies having moved to Binh Dinh Province and the 70th company having remained in Quang Tin last June when the rest of the battalion went to Quang Ngai Province. The existence of main force units other than the 1st VC and 2nd VC Regiments is not confirmed; however, considering the increase of activity in this province, the lack of activity in Quang Tin and the uncertain location of the rest of the 2nd Division, it is possible that elements of the 2nd Division, in

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addition to the 1st VC Regiment, have infiltrated the province.

C. General Statement. No significant change from 1st Marine Division PERINTREP NO. 17.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD

A. Strength and Disposition

(1) See Annex A, (Order of Battle).

(2) See Annex B, (Special Intelligence Report of Pham Ngoc Chong).

(3) The following information was provided by Ho Ninh, Private, 2nd Company, T.89 Battalion (AKA 402) who defected on 25 December 1966 to Quang Nam Special Sector. The interrogation report reads in substance that the T.89 Battalion (Code Name: Ham Ty 21392) is commanded by Tran Bao, a native of North Vietnam. The battalion has a strength of 350 men, with weapons consisting of 12 82mm Mortars, 12 B.40 Rocket launchers, 4 BAR's and a number of Chinese Communist sub-machine guns, small arms, mines and explosives. The battalion has 4 companies (302, 303, 304, 305 plus a battalion headquarters). The battalion was located in Dai Loc mountains area in the vicinity of (AT 830615) about mid-September 1966 at which time, after being discovered by USMC forces, it moved to vicinity Tra Linh (ZC 135250).

(a) Located in this area there are 11 paddy depots (estimated 10,000 aangs), 7 rice warehouses (estimated 14,000 aangs), 2 ammo depots with 82mm mortar ammo and sub-machine guns. They also have 28 billets made of conic leaves for troop use.

(b) The subject further went on to state that on 24 December 1966, 2 companies moved to vicinity Hoa Lam (V) (BT 040675), Hoa Phung (V) (BT 055700), and Thanh Thuy (V) (BT 050650), for the purpose of seizing the opportunity of the truce to recon the area for future planned attacks on the Nuoc Nam airstrip and Bo Bo outpost. (G-2 Comment: This information as related by the defector is probably true, based on other reports by agents in the Quang Nam Special Sector, and the VC repeated planning to strike at vital installations within the Danang TAOR. Current order of battle this headquarters places the 402nd Battalion as moved to the area stated by the captive and other low level agent reports.

(4) Preliminary interrogation report of Ha Long, rifleman, 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, 4.15B Local Force Company captured on 27 December 1966 revealed the following information:

(a) On 26 December 1966 the 1st platoon moved from Giang

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to (H) (AT 980594) to Thanh Minh (V) (BT 079635) for one night, then to Tam Ky (H) (BT 053592) where they engaged in a fire fight with the PF's in that area (date not given). The captive stated that only two squads moved to this last area and that the other squad had stayed in Giang La (H), but he didn't know what their mission was. Also he stated he did not have knowledge of the 2nd or 3rd platoons other then elements being located vicinity Ky Minh (V), Chua Lau (H) (AT 995597), Giang La (H) (AT 980595) and Chua Son (H) (AT 957604).

Organization: Q.15B Company consists of 3 platoons, with 3 squads per platoon.

Strength: Approximately 100 men; 1stPlt-32 men; 2ndPlt-approx 32 men; 3rdPlt-approx 32 men; 1stSqd, 1stPlt-10 men; 2ndSqd, 1stPlt-10 men; 3rdSqd, 1stPlt-10 men.

<u>Weapons:</u>	60mm Mortars	2
	30cal MG	2
	BAR's	3 (1stPlt)
	M-14 U.S. Rifles	6 (-do-)
	45cal Thompson SMG's	12 (-do-)
	Carbines	3 (-do-)
	K-44 Rifles	3 (-do-)
	M-1 Rifles	3 (-do-)

<u>Personalities:</u>	Company Cadre Leader	Hy
	Assistant Leader	To
	Political Cadre	Ba
	1stPlt Leader	Hoang
	Asst Leader	Lien
	1stSqd Leader	Ngoc
	Asst Leader	San
	2ndSqd Leader	Trinh
	Asst Leader	(unknown)
	3rdSqd Leader	Nhi
	Asst Leader	Dien

(5) The following information was obtained from rallier Huynh Canh who rallied to the Chieu Hoi center, Danang on 25 December 1966. Canh was a village proselyting cadre for 3 months in Hang Ba (H), Nghia Than (V), Nghia Hanh (D), Quang Ngai Province, and knew of two VC battalions operating in Quang Ngai - the 48th Battalion in eastern Quang Ngai Province and the 83rd Battalion (AKA: 38th) in western Quang Ngai. Canh stated he didn't know anything about the 48th Battalion but thought they were organized in the same manner as the 38th Battalion. The 38th Battalion consists of 4 infantry companies, each company having 4 platoons of 32-40 men further broken down into 3 squads. The battalion is equipped

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with an unknown amount of 60mm and 82mm mortars. Each company is equipped with three 30 caliber machine guns (M1919A4). Each platoon is equipped with three BAR's, 2 or 3 SKS's and M-1's and carbines. The 38th Battalion is commanded by Trinh and the executive officer is Kim. Previously the executive officer was Pho who was killed in action.

(a) Canh further stated that there are also two VC regiments, the 1st and the 2nd, who operate on a moving basis between Quang Tri Province and Phu Yen Province. He stated that their mission is to seek out ARVN and U.S. forces in support of the 83rd Battalion and the 48th Battalion, when these two battalions cannot locate the ARVN or US forces. He stated that the 1st VC Regiment fought the ARVN at Thieu An mountain, Quang Ngai (P).

(b) The rallier further stated that Marines had an operation in his area about 10-12 days ago. While there, the VC stayed on Lon Mountain, Mo Duc (D), Quang Ngai (P). He said that the Marines missed a VC aid station and warehouse on Long mountain and tunnels in Duc Son (V), Mo Duc (D).

(6) The following information was obtained from Private Le Van Giao, member of 1stSqd, 1stPlt, 62ndCo, V-25Bn, captured on a County Fair operation in vicinity of AT 972645.

(a) Composition: The V-25 Battalion consists of 4 companies, the 51st, 62nd, 73rd infantry companies and the 84th artillery company. The 62nd company consists of 3 platoons, with 3 squads per platoon.

(b) Weapons: Each infantry company has two 60mm mortars and one 30 caliber MG. Each platoon of each infantry company has two B-40 rocket launchers. Each squad of each platoon of each company (including the arty company) has two AK-47's, two carbines, one SKS, one K-50, four K-44's one BAR and one pistol. The 84th company, has three 82mm mortars, two 30 caliber MG's and two 12.7mm MG's.

(c) Disposition: As of 27 December 1966, the 62nd company was located in hamlet #6, Loc Song (V), Duc Duc (D), (AT 8248). The 2nd platoon, 62nd company was located 500 meters south of the 62nd company. The 1st platoon, 62nd company was located in Loc Chanh (V) (AT 9361). The 3rd platoon 62nd company was located 500 meters east of the 62nd company.

(d) Supply: Each man is issued three cans of rice, salt, and either pork or beef every day. The fish was issued every 2 to 4 days. Food was of poor quality. Ammunition was difficult to replenish after being expended. Generally, it was 3 to 4 days before the men were resupplied. The captive did not know where the ammunition came from. Each man who carried a carbine had 61 rounds, a man with an AK-47 had 210 rounds, an SKS had 10 rounds, a K-50 had 300 rounds, a K-44 had 50 rounds, a BAR had 450 rounds and each mortar was supported with 20 rounds. Every platoon had a corpsman and these men carried quinine, headache pills, and medicine for all around use.

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(e) Morale: The captive stated that morale was very poor due to the constant threat of death from bombings and further they felt they had no future.

(f) Losses and Replacements: The captive stated that the company lost 27 KIA in October in action at Dien Ban District Headquarters area. Replacements were received by the 62nd Company on 7 December 1966 to replace those lost in October and that at present, the 62nd Company is at full strength.

#### B. Order of Battle

(1) See Annex A, (Order of Battle)

(2) In accordance with MACV Directive 381-12 (NOTAL), the following district force companies are accepted as confirmed units.

(a) 74th District Force Company

1. Sources: Mai Dau, 1stSqd, 1stPlt, 74thCo, defected to Ly Tim District Hqs on 20Oct66; Tran Van Chung, SqdLdr, 2ndSqd, 1stPlt 74thCo, defected to ARVN OP on Hill 159 on 22Nov66; Dinh Cao Sang, leader of economics section, Tam Ky District, defected to Tam Ky District Headquarters on 22Nov66.

2. Cover Designation: V-74th, 74th Dist Force Co, V.20

3. Structure:

74thCo CO:	Thanh	Strength: 50
XO:	Tranh Tien	
XO:	Nam	
XO:	Ngos	
PO:	Phuong	
1stPltLdr:	Nguyen Sa	
2ndPltLdr:	Chung	

4. Weapons: Two BAR's, two AK-47's, Carbines, M-79's, two M-14's, K-50 SMG's, K-44's, two grenades per man.

5. Unit History: Battle against two platoons of ARVN at Khuong Hung Hamlet, Ky Khuong Village (BT 435105), assisted by the 76th Company (AKA 706). Late April 1966: Mortared USMC unit in Ky Khuong Village, with 60mm mortars belonging to the 76th Company. June 1966: Hit by artillery vicinity (BT 348083). June or July 1966: Attacked USMC platoon at Nui Dan mountain near Khuong Nhon Hamlet, Ky Khuong Village (BT 4208). Late September 1966: Attacked USMC/ARVN force at school in Ly Loc near Highway #1. October 1966: Company attacked USMC at Nui Da mountain supported by 15 men of 70th Company with two B-40 rocket launchers.

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6. The 74th Company is currently carried as operating in Tam Ky District vicinity (BT 283084) to (BT 285078).

(b) 14th District Force Company

1. Sources: Dinh Cao Sang, leader of VC economic section, Tam Ky District, defected to Tam Ky District Headquarters on 22Nov66; Le Doan, Ky Chanh Village Guerrilla, rallied to Ly Tin District Headquarters on 22Nov66; Nguyen Quang Vinh, member of 3rdPlt, 1stCo, captured by B/1/5 on 30Jun66 vicinity (BT 328110); Pham Cong Phi, member 2ndPlt, 14thCo, rallied to Tam Ky Chieu Hoi center on 14Dec66; Bui Van Tran, member 2ndPlt, 14thCo, rallied to Tam Ky Chieu Hoi center on 14Dec66; Bui Bhuan, member 1stPlt, 14thCo, captured by national police on 19Dec66.

2. Cover Designations: V-14th Company, A-14th Company.

3. Structure: 14thCo CO: Nguyen Huu & Strength: 90  
 Le Hong Kong  
 XO: Dien  
 XO: Dong  
 XO: Tuyen  
 PO: Khanh  
 1stPlt (B-1) Ldr: Vo Ba (poss. AKA Manh)  
 2ndPlt (B-2) Ldr: Nguyen Hong Linh (poss.  
 AKA Nanh)  
 3rdPlt (B-3) Ldr: Sa (poss. AKA Toan)

4. Weapons: One 60mm mortar, one 30 caliber machine gun, BAR's, SMG's, K-44's, K-50's, Carbines, AK's, and nine M-1 rifles.

5. Unit History: Prior to March 1966-unknown. March 1966: Engaged PF/RF forces at My Son (H), Ky Sanh (V) (BT 361034). June 1966: Engaged PF's at Ky Huong (V). Jun 30 66: Attempted to ambush USMC vicinity (BT 3211). July through Nov66: Probably made joint operations with 706th Company, 75th Company and 74th Company for battles at Ba Bau (BT 380140). Dec 14 66: Attacked USMC outpost (BT 434059).

6. The 14th Company is presently carried as an independent district force company operating in the vicinity of (BT 310119) and (BT 314120).

C. Reserves and Reinforcements. See Annex B, Special Interrogation Report of Pham Ngoc Chong.

D. New Enemy Tactics.

(1) At 130745H, 5th Marines located at (BT 439085) while moving VC bodies, detonated a Bangalore torpedo booby trapped under a VC body. (G-2 Comment: There was one similar incident reported in Pleiku Province in II Corps, however, this is the first incident of the "Japanese")

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technique of booby trapping their own dead. This could possibly be an indication by the VC to adopt this method to further inflict casualties.)

(2) On 14 January 1967, an Aerial Observer in an OE Aircraft, picked up a "beeper signal" on his UHF guard while orbiting a village located at (ZC 213317). Earlier, Division Air Support Center reported that a UH-34 Helo had also picked up the same beeper signal while over the above village. Further, the UH-34 pilot reported a voice calling him into the beeper signal, the transmission being in broken english with strong Viet accent. When the helicopter reached the village, it received a heavy volume of small arms fire. The AO did not receive any ground fire nor was he able to pinpoint the beeper. Nothing unusual was noted in the village. Three weeks ago, another AO reported hearing this same signal as did the USAF Bird-Dog while in the above vicinity. (G-2 Comment: Throughout Vietnam, scattered reports have been received of the VC attempt to lure unarmed or lightly armed aircraft into a trap by means of electronic signalling device. However, this is the first instance within our area of the VC attempt to employ this type method of luring aircraft).

E. Administrative and Political Units: Negative

F. Anti-Air Activity. During the reporting period, anti-air activity throughout the tri-province area remained about the same as the last two weeks, with a report of 182 anti-air incidents. There was only one significant incident when at 141445H, H/2/5 security patrol located at (AT 898482) observed an A-4 jet aircraft from VMA 121 pass over the airfield at 2/5, losing fuel and one wing on fire. The pilot ejected at (AT 897470) and was picked up by helicopters immediately. The aircraft continued on and crashed at (AT 898482) and burned in the rice paddy away from a Vietnamese structure. At 141500H, a platoon from Company "H" was dispatched to the scene of the crash. The aircraft was determined a total loss and was still burning when the platoon left the area.

G. Anti-Personnel/Anti-Tank Mine Activity. During the period 281200H December 1966 to 151200H January 1967, there were a total of 45 mine/booby trap incidents within the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's. Danang received the bulk of the incidents with a total of 39 while Chu Lai recorded only 6. The VC continues to heavily employ US and ChiCom manufactured grenades and anti-personnel mines and booby traps with effective results. Also there is a definite increase of mines directed against heavy wheel and tracked vehicles.

(1) At 051010H, a 7th Engineer Battalion mine sweep team at (AT 943679) with a M-51 6x6 dump truck detonated a mine on Route # 5, resulting in the total loss of the truck. Two USMC were WIA.

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(2) At 060730H, a 2/7 fire team road sweep located at (BS 552956) found a mine emplaced in the road. The home-made mine consisted of 25 pounds of C-3 with a gunpowder mixture wrapped in plastic with a pressure type detonator. The mine was blown by an attached engineer team. On the way back to the CP, a 6x6 truck carrying the engineer team passed over another mine. Shortly thereafter a personnel carrier 4x4 truck detonated a mine believed to have been implaced after the road sweep. The PC was heavily damaged with extensive motor and body damage. There were 5 USMC wounded all of which were non-evacs.

(3) At 081300H, a C/1/1 platoon combat patrol located at (BT 095 615) with a tank in direct support detonated another unknown type mine consisting of approximately 60 pounds of TNT. The left track was blown off, and 2 USMC WIA (evac) was sustained.

(4) The following day at 090845H, I/3/7 mine sweep team with a tank in support at (AT 968591) detonated a mine consisting of approximately 40 pounds of TNT which was electrically detonated. The tank's left track and two rollers were blown off with slight damage to the fender. No casualties was sustained.

H. Artillery/Mortar/RR Activity. During the subject period Danang received a total of 7 mortar incidents and Chi Lai recorded 4.

(1) In Danang at 291600H, I/3/1 platoon patrol located at (BT 038672) received three rounds of 60mm mortar fire and small arms from (BT 037662). The patrol returned fire and directed an artillery mission at the suspected enemy position. A search was conducted with inconclusive results.

(2) At 121700H, H/2/5 company on a search-and-destroy mission at (AT 910531) with five amphibious tractors while crossing the river, received 6 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and 500 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire. The company returned 10 rounds of 106mm recoilless rifle fire with good coverage noted. The company did not search the area due to its primary mission.

(3) At 131445H, E/2/4 perimeter was attacked by an unknown number of VC utilizing 60mm mortars with small arms/automatic weapons. (See Para 2.L.(4) this PERINTREP)

(4) At 132205H, H/3/11 battery perimeter located at (AT 920792) received 2 rounds of 60mm mortar fire, 50 rounds of small arms fire and one grenade from an unknown number of VC located at (AT 920793). The area was illuminated and 200 rounds of small arms and two rounds of 105mm howitzer rounds was returned. Search of the area was conducted with inconclusive results.

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(5) At 141200H, C/1/1 while conducting a raid on an enemy village meeting place received 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire in the landing zone. (See Para 2.L.(8) this PERINTREP).

(6) At 142214H, A/1/11 located at (BT 105582) received three rounds of mortar fire from the southeast, vicinity (BT 106566, 109566 and 118564). The rounds landed outside the perimeter. Marines returned fire at the flashes. A search was conducted with inconclusive results.

(7) At 150115H, one platoon from N/3/1 and one platoon from K/3/1 received preparatory mortar fire during an attack. (See Para 2.L.(9) this PERINTREP).

(8) In the Chu Lai TAOR, on 282150H, C/1/7 fire team ambush located at (BS 600976) received three rounds of 60mm mortar fire from the southwest. Two rounds were duds and landed in the rice paddies. The area was searched with inconclusive results.

(9) At 021700H, A/1/7 platoon patrol located at (BT 658027) while searching for a river crossing site received approximately 75 rounds of small arms fire and two rounds of 60mm mortar fire from the north side of the river vicinity (BT 658029). The platoon returned 10 rounds of M-79, and 40 rounds of small arms fire at the VC. The VC broke contact and fled northeast. No search was conducted due to the patrol's assigned mission. No friendly casualties.

(10) At 062020H, A/1/5 at (BT 319135) patrol base received approximately 60 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire and one round of 60mm mortar fire from (BT 317132). Marines returned six rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Also an artillery mission was called. A search of the area was conducted with inconclusive results.

(11) At 130210H, 2/11 received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. (See Para 2.L.(5) this PERINTREP)

I. Interdiction Activities. Negative.

J. Guerrilla Activity. During the period the VC initiated a total of 271 incidents throughout the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's. In Danang, there was 144 harassing small arms/automatic weapons fire incidents, 5 small arms/grenades, 9 small arms/rifle grenades and 10 grenade incidents. In the Chu Lai TAOR, there were 86 harassing small arms incidents, 15 grenades, and 2 small arms/grenade incidents.

K. Guided Missiles. Negative

L. Infantry. There were 9 significant contacts within the TAOR's during the reporting period.

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(1) At 071945H, K/3/1 platoon perimeter position at (BT 081696, 086699 and 086696) received 500 rounds of small arms fire and four rounds M-79 from an estimated 15 VC located in vicinity (BT 086695). Marines returned fire and directed mortar and artillery mission against the enemy position. The enemy broke contact. Visual surveillance indicated one VC KIA probable.

(2) At 111130H, L/3/9 fire team OP located at (AT 953665) was attacked by an estimated VC squad utilizing small arms, grenades and possibly satchel charges. A reaction force of two platoons searched the area and found 3 USMC KIA and 1 USMC WIA. The OP had returned fire with small arms and grenades prior to being overrun. The VC captured 4 M-14 rifles, 1 PRC-25 radio, 5 bandoleers of 7.62 ammunition, 8 M-26 frag grenades. The AO's previously conducted a fire mission on 8-10 VC and observed 1 VC hit at (AT 957679). The reaction force later swept the area with inconclusive results.

(3) At 121325H, H/2/5 located at (AT 881525) received 1500 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire from approximately one VC squad at (AT 869525). Marines returned 600 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire and called an artillery mission. The VC firing ceased. No search was conducted due to the river barrier.

(4) At 131445H, E/2/4 perimeter position at (AT 898817) was attacked by an unknown number of VC utilizing 60mm mortars with small arms/automatic weapons. Approximately 10 minutes later, a dispatched patrol sighted 25-40 VC moving west to northwest. The patrol fired at the escaping VC. No assessment was made.

(5) At 130210H, 2/11 at (BT 440085) received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 4 rifle grenades. The VC attempted to breach the wires and attack within the perimeter. The perimeter defense returned small arms fire and grenades until 130700H. No VC penetrated the inner wire. At last count, the VC lost 17 KIA confirmed, 4 KIA probable, 7 VC PW, 1 detainee, 8 AK-47 Chicom Assault Rifles, 2 NVN 7.62 sub-machine guns, Type 50, 1 French rocket launcher, 37 loaded magazines for sub-machine guns, 1 Chicom rocket launcher with 3 rockets plus propelling charges, 67 assorted frag grenades, 5 concussion grenades, 57 assorted explosive charges, 1 Chicom rifle grenade, 12 rounds of M-79, and 250 loose small arms ammunition.

(6) At 131200H, B/1/7 fire team ambush at (BS 721941) engaged 20 VC in a fire fight at (BS 725939). Two VC were killed. The remaining VC fled with bodies and weapons to vicinity (BS 725935) where they entered two boats attempting to escape to the north. An aerial observer arrived and unsuccessfully attempted to force the boat to shore while receiving automatic weapons fire from the boat. Company "B" squad combat patrol was sent to the vicinity of the boats along the shore.

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The aerial observer then directed a fixed wing air strike resulting in both boats sunk. The 6 VC WIA swam to shore and was apprehended by the squad from Company "B". The remaining VC were killed by air and drowning. Also, weapons aboard the boats estimated at 2 BAR's, 4 M-1 Rifles, 6 M-1 Carbines and 8 Chicom Carbines.

(7) At 141200H, B/1/5 company on a search-and-destroy mission at (BT 307126) while approaching their objective at (BT 310124) received an estimated 100 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire from (BT 307124, 304127, and 309125) from an estimated 30 VC in a well-concealed and fortified position. The rear platoon moved to the right flank to envelop and received 700 rounds of small arms fire from (BT 308122). Air strike was conducted which temporarily halted the enemy fire. A platoon advancing towards the objective again received 500 rounds of small arms fire. An artillery strike was then conducted. The enemy fire ceased and the VC withdrew to the southeast and north. At 1630H to 1720H, B/1/5 searched the suspected enemy positions and found extensive damage to trench lines and fighting holes. No enemy bodies were found.

(8) At 141200H, C/1/1 landed in the landing zone at (BT 015547) to conduct a raid on a suspected enemy village meeting place. Helicopters received small arms fire during the approach despite preparatory fire conducted by fixed wing aircraft. Fifteen rounds of 60mm mortar fire was received in the landing zone. No casualties was sustained. The company then deployed around the hamlet. Shortly thereafter, heavy resistance was encountered from a large number of enemy troops. Marines returned small arms, mortars, grenades and backed up by an artillery mission. Total VC losses for this action were 61 confirmed KIA's, and 75 KIA probable. Marine losses were 5 KIA and 23 WIA. Extraction of the company was completed at 141835H in face of increasing enemy activity.

(9) At 150115H, one platoon from K/3/1 and one platoon from K/3/1 were assaulted by an estimated VC company. The assault came in conjunction with mortar preparatory fire. In the ensuing fire fight, Marines suffered 13 killed and 22 wounded. Ten VC bodies were found inside the perimeter. Fifteen to twenty VC bodies were observed being carried out. A relief force of tanks, LVT's and infantry arrived at approximately 150300H. Medevac began at 150335H. A fire team security patrol discovered the VC and caused the attack to be sprung prematurely. Final enemy losses were 57 confirmed KIA's and 60 KIA probables.

- a. Reconnaissance. Negative
- b. Infiltration. Negative
- c. Other Elements.

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(1) See Annex B, Document Translation Report on Guerrilla Warfare and Extent.

(2) New Years Stand Down Wrap-up:

(a) During the period 310700H December 1966 to 020700H January 1967, 61 violations of the new years stand down were committed by the VC in I Corps Tactical Zone. Forty three incidents occurred against units/personnel on the ground. Eighteen incidents involved anti-aircraft fire.

(b) Of the 43 ground incidents, friendly units returned fire in 37. Of the 18 anti-aircraft incidents fire was not returned in a majority of the incidents.

(c) Of the 43 ground incidents, 2 occurred in the Prairie area, 5 in Operation Chinook area, 3 in Phu Bai area, 26 in Danang TAOR, 1 west of Danang TAOR, 3 in Chu Lai TAOR, 1 west of Chu Lai TAOR, and 2 in the Operation Sierra area.

(d) Of the 18 anti-aircraft incidents, 1 occurred in the Prairie area, 3 in the Danang TAOR, 1 in Chu Lai TAOR and 13 in the Operation Sierra area.

(e) Total friendly casualties were: 2 USMC WIA, 1 PF KIA, and 1 civilian WIA.

(f) Total enemy casualties were: 12 VC KIA confirmed, 3 VC KIA probable, 3 VC WIA probable, 4 PW's and 1 detainee.

### 3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

A. Enemy Organization and Combat Efficiency. No change. Refer 1st Marine Division PERINTREP NO. 17.

B. New Unit Identification. Negative

C. New Weapons and Equipment. Negative

D. Personalities. Negative

E. Enemy Losses: Enemy losses during the period in the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's jumped markedly with a total of 293 confirmed KIA, 251 KIA probable, 44 VC PW, 7 civil defendants, and 72 individual weapons captured, as opposed to the last reporting period of 146 KIA confirmed, 187 KIA probable, 31 VC PW, 2 ralliers, and 217 detainees. In addition, enemy losses on Operation Lincoln which commenced at 050530H January 1967 and terminated at 091200H January 1967 were 8 KIA confirmed, 1 KIA probable

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and 1 VC PW. VC losses on Operation Sierra which commenced at 120600H December 1966 and still in progress have thus far netted 75 VC KIA confirmed, and 71 VC KIA probable, bringing the total combined enemy losses for the reporting period to 312 VC KIA confirmed, 270 VC KIA probable, 53 VC PW, 5 VC ralliers, 36 civil defendants and 79 individual weapons captured.

F. Morale. No change. Refer 1st Marine Division PERINTREP NO 17.

G. Details of Administrative Installation and Support.

(1) COMUSMACV 149th Military Intelligence Group reported locating a VC rice storage area on 10 December 1966 at La Vi (BS 781337). In this area there are seven barns that hold a total of 35 tons of rice and 12 rice plant warehouses that hold a total of 50 tons of rice. All these warehouses are protected by large trees, and are guarded by 20 armed VC guerrillas. The rice is transported from Duc Pho District to La Vi via an unknown route.

(2) Third MAF intelligence spot report of 2 January 1967 reported the following location: 24 December 1966 Quang Ngai- Landing site at (BS 832427), clothing factory at (BS 832427), landing site at (BS 843417), weapons cache at (BS 854407), landing site at (BS 835390), import agency at (BS 856638). Aerial reconnaissance of this general area indicates that the enemy is well fortified with bunkers and foxholes.

(3) The following information was extracted from an initial interrogation report of a defector Doan Thanh Tam, a soldier of the GK-30 Battalion (Information and Transportation Battalion of the 2nd Division) who defected on 20 December 1966 to GVN: Subject states the following information: The information and transportation battalion, cover number GK-30 has a strength of 300 men, commanded by Nguyen Bai Thung with Pham Nha a deputy battalion commander. This battalion has 3 companies consisting of 1 transportation company and 2 information company. These units are armed with SMG's and K-44 rifles. They also are equipped with telephones and wire. The battalion was located at Son Trach (unconfirmed) (AT 970320) and Son Long (AT 975310) on 15 December 1966, but are reported to have moved to Nghi Son Hamlet (BT 020398) for the purpose of studying the transportation of food such as rice, fish sauce and salt from the Phu Dien area (BT 095475) to temporary depots in the Son Trung mountain area (BT 025410). This food is reportedly being stored in this area for the feeding of troops.

H. Terrain. Negative

I. Weather. The weather in the TAOR's from 281200H December 1966 to 191200H January 1967 was generally cloudy with scattered rainshowers. The average maximum and minimum temperatures were 75 degrees and 67 degrees respectively while average humidity was in the 90's. Visibility averaged

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6 miles while winds were predominately from the northwesterly direction with a velocity of 7 knots, gusting to 20 knots. Recorded rainfall during the period totaled 13.26 inches, the majority of which fell in the latter days of December.

(1) The Northeast Monsoon (the cool season) is in full swing from mid-November through February. For most of Southeast Asia the northeast monsoon is a cool, dry wind which has travelled down from Siberia and across China and quite naturally imparts a cool, dry climate. The northeast winds that strike the coastal lowlands of the two Vietnams and I Corps have an opportunity, however, of crossing a few hundred miles of the warm and humid South China Sea. By the time the wind reaches the coastline of our area, it is no longer dry but is instead saturated with moisture, thus bringing rain.

(2) Another special condition occurs known as the "Crachin". The crachin is a prolonged period of widespread fog and drizzle or light rain which primarily affects the northern part of the eastern coastlands, although on occasion it may penetrate into the northern part of the interior highlands. It is a persistent low-level stratus phenomenon accompanied by prolonged precipitation and therefore greatly affects aircraft operations. The top of the stratus layer rarely extends above 6,000 feet, and clear dry air is usually found above this. The clouds are generally 3,000 to 5,000 feet thick, with ceiling under 1,000 feet and frequently below 500 feet. In most cases, visibility is quickly and greatly reduced at the onset of the crachin, generally below 2 miles and frequently below  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile. The crachin may first appear as early as October in this area but usually does not become common until late November. It is most frequent in December through early January and disappears by late April. Although it has been known to last 2 consecutive days, this phenomenon generally occurs in recurring periods of 2 to 5 days each. Over a 5 year study period of this phenomenon, the crachin was reported on an average of 53 days per year at Hue, 41 days per year at Danang, and only 10 days per year at Nha Trang.

J. Intelligence Operations. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Third Marine Division Intsum #004 of January 1967 reported the following information of counterintelligence interest pertaining to the evasion of capture utilized by the VC. The report reads as follows: VC military personnel posing as civilians have had success evading capture by utilizing a technique which involves the creation of a secret room between the walls of Vietnamese civilian huts. The mud and bamboo walls can be constructed as thin as 1 inch and this wall material is then boxed

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together to give the appearance of a wall, five to seven inches thick. In some huts these hollow walls can contain between five and seven Viet Cong. Further, VC seeking to evade military operations have frequently taken up residence in the rural homes of families of ARVN personnel and if the VC are discovered during sweep operations, the family of these ARVN soldiers are subject to later reprisal. As a result of this, ARVN personnel may be reluctant to participate in any thorough search of their native hamlets and their reluctance is communicated to other personnel who may not wish to bring about the death of a soldier's family.

B. The following information was received by the 3rd Counter-intelligence Team on 7 January 1967 and reads in its entirety as follows:

(1) On 6 January 1967, a reliable confidential source furnished the following information considered probably true concerning VC activities. Information was provided to source by his sub-source who is a penetration-agent, currently serving with the VC as a tax collector.

(2) Commencing 5 January 1967, the VC guerrillas operating within the northern sector of the Danang TAOR are to initiate a "self-sufficient campaign". They have been instructed to carry on this campaign for a period of four months, and their duties are to collect food and supplies, to be provided to VC Main Force troops that will move into their area in approximately 15 days.

(3) On 3 January 1967, Tran Dang Chau, a VC Province Committee Cadre, visited the home of Do Thi Ke in sub-hamlet #6, Quang Nam Hamlet (AT 902824). According to sub-source, Chau is a very important and dangerous man and "where-ever he shows up, something is about to happen".

(4) In the very near future, the VC will come to Van Duong #1 (H), Hoa Vinh (V), (AT 956785) to destroy the new-life hamlet and assassinate a VC rallier who they suspect of providing information resulting in the death of a VC District Chief and three guerrillas on 8 December 1966. Approximately one week ago, a Vietnamese Government cadre-man was assassinated by the VC for the part he played in furnishing information that resulted in the death of the above-mentioned VC district chief.

(5) CI Comment: On 8 December 1966, Sub-Team #4, 3rd CIT, conducted a combat-response to information developed, which resulted in the death of a VC District Chief and three guerrillas. Original source of information was in fact a Vietnamese Government Cadre-man from Nam O Hamlet (AT 935835). VC rallier who is to be assassinated in Hoa Vinh (V) did provide information concerning identification of the dead VC Chief. Entire contents of this report is considered highly probable by reporting

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unit.

(6) Reporting unit has instructed source to immediately report the arrival of Main Force units in his area, and to attempt to establish the exact location of Chau to allow for capture or reduction.

(7) Constant monitor of target area after the death of the aforementioned VC District Chief has indicated mass confusion within the ranks of lower ranking VC Cadre members. Reporting unit highly recommends maximum effort by the Marine units concerned, in the apprehension of Chau.

## 5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES

### A. Capabilities

(1) With a redisposition of force, the enemy can attack the Da Nang Combat Base with one less than combat efficient regiment (3rd NVA). The enemy can deploy in his attack, or reinforce, with two battalions from Quang Nam (R.20 and V.25), the 804th Battalion from Thua Thien, and the 402nd Sapper Battalion in Quang Nam Province.

(2) With a redisposition of force, the enemy can attack the Chu Lai Combat Base with a division consisting of three infantry regiments, (1st VC, 3rd NVA and 21st NVA), two less than combat efficient, supported by combat support and combat service support battalions. The enemy can deploy in his attack, or reinforce, with one battalion from Quang Tin (72nd), two battalions (38th and 48th) and the 409th Sapper Battalion from Quang Ngai.

(3) Attack CIDG camps, district towns, provincial capitals and vulnerable ARVN outposts, singly or several, simultaneously, in strength of one or more reinforced regiments.

(4) Covertly infiltrate and attack friendly positions with sapper elements in platoon or company strength, particularly those proximate to or guarding villages, bridges, artillery positions, fuel and ammo dumps and airfields.

(5) Introduce into the 1st Marine Division area of responsibility the 6th NVA Regiment from Thua Thien Province within 5 days after movement commences, the 3rd Division from Binh Dinh Province within 1 day after movement commences and the 1st Division from Pleiku Province within 10 days after movement commences.

(6) Harass friendly forces and installations with small arms, grenades, mortars, booby traps and small ambushes at a time and place of the enemy's choice utilizing his guerrilla and local forces.

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(7) Interdict lines of communication throughout Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces, particularly National Route #1, Liberty Road and the railroad lines in Hai Van Pass area at a time and place of the enemy's choice, using trained demolitions personnel working in conjunction with guerrilla and local forces.

(8) Conduct political agitation and propaganda, combined with a selective use of politically-inspired violence, including assassination, terrorism and sabotage in an effort to thwart the Revolutionary Development Program.

(9) Evade significant contact with friendly forces to protect the integrity of his force while awaiting more favorable circumstances for offensive operations or repeated harassment, to include at least periods of reduced visibility.

(10) Continue to improve his force structure by introducing personnel and material resources from North Viet Nam into the 1st Marine Division area of responsibility.

**B. Probable Enemy Course of Action**

(1) Continue to emphasize local and guerrilla forces for harassment and political violence throughout the three provinces, interspersed with raids on selected key installations and positions within the combat bases and infrequent reinforced battalion size attacks on isolated outposts elsewhere. Continue interdiction of lines of communications with emphasis on National Route #1, Liberty Road and the Hai Van Pass area. Concurrently, continue to improve his force structure at the provincial, district and hamlet levels.

(2) Attack friendly forces within the southern half of the Da Nang Combat Base in up to multi-battalion strength, (R.20 and V.25).

(3) Attack district towns, CIDG camps and isolated ARVN outposts, singly or several, simultaneously, in up to reinforced regimental strength probably with the further objective of ambushing relief/reaction forces.

(4) Attack installations and forces in the Chu Lai Combat Base, Tam Ky or Quang Ngai city in up to reinforced regimental strength.

(5) Attack the An Hoa industrial complex in reinforced regimental strength.

(6) Attack the Chu Lai Combat Base with the forces enumerated in capability (3) above.

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(7) Attack the Da Nang Combat Base with the forces enumerated in capability (1) above.

(8) Introduce elements of the 6th NVA Regiment or 1st Division into the three province area.

C. Vulnerabilities. The enemy has four major vulnerabilities.

(1) The enemy is vulnerable to air attack at all times. His logistic system and supply bases are always vulnerable to interdiction and destruction by air. Unless properly concealed, his movements and bivouac sites are constantly in danger of air strikes.

(2) The enemy is vulnerable to psychological warfare operations. Life for the Viet Cong is hard at best and filled with deprivation and danger. This constant difficulty and peril, the lack of dedication on the part of the rank and file, as well as some of the cadre, plus the preferred leniency of the Chieu Hoi program, combine to make the enemy unusually susceptible to exploitation by psychological warfare techniques.

(3) The enemy is vulnerable to rapid, bold and unexpected maneuvers in the developing tactical situation. His insistence on minutely planned and carefully rehearsed operations precludes a quick and flexible reaction to friendly maneuvers, unless in keeping with his preconceived battle plan.

(4) The enemy is vulnerable to sustained combat operations and aggressive pursuit. The inherent weakness of the enemy's logistic system and its continuing susceptibility to interdiction by air deny the enemy the capability of supporting sustained combat operations. The enemy's rigidity of tactical doctrine induces him to avoid and/or quickly disengage from contact whenever the tactical situation does not develop according to plan.



S. DAVIS

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2



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## ANNEXES:

- A - Order of Battle Annex
- B - Significant Agents, VCC/Returnees, and Document Reports
- C - Paragraph 13 Entries
- D - Astronomical Data

Distribution: "A" less 7, 12, 17-21, 37-67  
 "C" less 72, 76, 84, 98, 100

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	SA, Quang Ngai Sector	(1)
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	MCB 10	(1)
	MCB 58	(1)
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UNIT	CAT	STR	LAST ACCEPTED REPORTED	SUBORDINATION		
			LOCATION AND DATE			
<b>A. MAIN FORCE</b>						
2ND DIV (620TH, NONG TRUONG 2)	C	7,050	Q'TIN (BT 009 224)	1 NOV	MR-V	
1ST VC REGT (CONG TRUONG 1)	C	2,000	Q'NGAI (BS 365 727)	2 JAN	2ND DIV	
HQ & SPT UNITS	C	800	Q'NGAI (BS 365 727)	2 JAN	1ST REGT	
40TH VC BN (80TH BN)	C	500	Q'NGAI (BS 555 812)	2 JAN	1ST REGT	
60TH VC BN (THANH HA)	C	200	Q'NGAI (BS 555 812)	2 JAN	1ST REGT	
70TH VC BN (THANH VAN)	C	300	Q'NGAI (BS 450 860)	2 JAN	1ST REGT	
90TH VC BN (THANH TRUC)	C	500	Q'NGAI (BS 405 800)	23 DEC	1ST REGT	
21ST NVA REGT (2D REGT)	C	1,800	Q'TIN (BT 208 338)	26 NOV	2ND DIV	
HQ & SPT UNIT	C	600	Q'TIN (BT 205 243)	26 NOV	21ST REGT	
1ST NVA BN (11TH BN)	C	400	Q'TIN (BT 165 221)	22 NOV	21ST REGT	
2ND NVA BN (22ND BN)	C	400	Q'TIN (BS 745 862)	16 SEP	21ST REGT	
3RD NVA BN (33RD BN)	C	400	Q'TIN (BT 060 280)	2 SEP	21ST REGT	
3RD NVA REGT (31ST REGT)	C	1,800	Q'NAM/TIN (BT 205 161)	5 DEC	2ND DIV	
HQ & SPT UNIT	C	600	Q'NAM/Q'TIN (BS 535 828)	24 SEP	3RD REGT	
1ST NVA BN (BINH MINH X-1)	C	700	Q'NAM/Q'TIN (BT 255 158)	18 OCT	3RD REGT	

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UNIT	CAT	STR	LAST ACCEPTED/REPORTED LOCATION A	DATE	SUBORDINATION
2ND NVA BN (BINH DA X-2)	C	700	Q'NAM/Q'TIN (BS 787 330)	4 DEC	3RD REGT
3RD NVA BN (BINH THIEN X-3)	C	700	Q'NAM/Q'TIN (BT 118 266)	24 SEP	3RD REGT
RQ 20 NVA SIG BN (GK-30)	C	300	Q'TIN/Q'NGAI (UNLOC)	1 NOV	2ND DIV
33RD ARTY REGT	U	UNK	Q'TIN/Q'NGAI (UNLOC)	1NOV	2ND DIV
RQ 21 NVA AA BN (GK-31)	C	280	Q'TIN/Q'NGAI (BT 024 198)	17NOV	33RD REGT
RQ 22 NVA RR BN (GK-32)	C	300	Q'TIN/Q'NGAI (UNLOC)	1 NOV	33RD REGT
RQ 23 NVA MORT BN (120MM) (GK-33)	C	300	Q'TIN/Q'NGAI (UNLOC)	1 NOV	33RD REGT
RQ 24 NVA ENGR BN (GK-40)	C	150	Q'TIN/Q'NGAI (UNLOC)	1 NOV	2ND DIV
409TH VC BN (SAPPER) (CONG TY)	C	400	Q'NGAI (BS 535 800)	3 JAN	MR-V
1506TH ENGR BN	P	325	Q'NGAI (BS 340 780)	10 DEC	MR-V
U/I MEDICAL BN	P	UNK	Q'NAM/Q'TIN (UNLOC)	1 NOV	2ND DIV
36TH SECURITY BN	C	UNK	Q'TIN (BT 009 224)	1 NOV	2ND DIV
U/I TRANSPORTATION BN	P	UNK	Q'NAM/Q'TIN (UNLOC)	1 NOV	2ND DIV
<b>B. LOCAL FORCE</b>					
72ND VC BN (X-72)	C	450	Q'TIN (BT 211 215)	5 DEC	Q'TIN PROV
38TH VC BN (83RD BN)	C	400	Q'NGAI (BS 640 565)	3 JAN	Q'TIN PROV

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UNIT	CAT	STR	LAST ACCEPTED/REPORTED LOCATION AND DATE	SUBORDINATION	
48TH VC BN (CONG TY 84)	C	400	Q'NGAI (BS 780500)	28 DEC	Q'TIN PROV
R-20TH BN	C	390	Q'NAM (AT 985 535)	11 DEC	Q'NAM PROV
V-25TH BN	C	500	Q'NAM (AT 829 483)	28 DEC	Q'NAM PROV
402ND BN	C	600	Q'NAM (ZC 135 250)	25 DEC	MR-V
307TH BN (72NC, 37TH, 705TH)	PO	400	Q'NGAI (BS 540 640)	4 JAN	Q'NGAI PROV
<u>QUANG NAM PROVINCE</u>					
Q-12 CO (HOI AN CO)		80	(BT 165 544)	28 DEC	DISTRICT
Q-13 CO (DUY XUYEN CO)		60	(BT 009 500)	19 DEC	DISTRICT
Q-14 CO (DAI LOC CO*)		70	(AT 79 55)	13 DEC	DISTRICT
Q-15 CO (DIEN BAN CO)		80	(BT 023 635)	9 NOV	DISTRICT
Q-16 CO (HOA VANG CO)		80	(AT 953 650)	22 NOV	DISTRICT
775					
<u>QUANG TIN PROVINCE</u>					
K.50 CO (QUE SON CO) (105)		70	(BT 227 446)	23 DEC	DISTRICT
K.51 CO (THANG BINH CO)		70	(BT 240 390)	4 JAN	DISTRICT
K.52 CO (TIEN PHUOC CO)		80	(BT 160 110)	9 DEC	DISTRICT

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UNIT	STR	LAST ACCEPTED/REPORT LOCATION AND DATE	SUBORDINATE
K.54 CO (N. TAM KY CO)	80	(BT 230 220) 26 DEC	DISTRICT
K.55 CO (A.21 CO)	60	(BT 330 150) 1 JUN	DISTRICT
75TH CO (V.18)	125	(BT 210 220) 1 JAN	TAM KY CITY
706TH CO (V-76)	100	(BT 370 100) 1 JAN	PROVINCE
74TH CO (V-74)	60	(BT 280 100) 29 NOV	PROVINCE
14TH CO (K-53)	70	(BT 810 119) 5 JAN	DISTRICT

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

T.19 CO (BINH SON CO)	80	(BS 500 880) 29 DEC	DISTRICT
T.20 CO (SON TINH CO)	100	(BS 540 830) 6 DEC	DISTRICT
8TH CO (TRA BONG CO)	80	(BS 690 585) 1 NOV	DISTRICT
C.17 CO (MO DUC CO)	70	(BS 740 570) 29 DEC	DISTRICT
206 CO (TU NGHIA CO)	100	(BS 735 780) 1 NOV	DISTRICT
C.212 CO (BA TO CO)	80	(BS 590 330) 14 NOV	DISTRICT
C.219 CO (DUC PHO CO)	80	(BS 795 415) 1 JAN	DISTRICT
614 (SON HA CO)	80	(BS 842 420) 1 NOV	DISTRICT
20TH BN (Q.20)	400	(BS 453 621) 28 DEC	DISTRICT

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UNIT	STR	LAST ACCEPTED/REPORTED LOCATION AND DATE	SUBORDINATE
T.18 CO (DONG SON)	80	(BS 635 780) 2 JAN	DISTRICT
96TH CO	100	(BS 500 492) 29 NOV	DISTRICT

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**UNCLASSIFIED**~~ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENTS, VC PW/RETURNEES, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO 1ST  
MACV PERINTREP NO. 1~~**I. SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT (OPERATION SIERRA) OF M/SGT PHAM NGOC CUONG**

NAME: Pham Ngoc Cuong  
 AGE: 22  
 RANK: M/Sgt Platoon Leader  
 UNIT: 2nd Platoon, 3rd Company, 95th Battalion, 2nd  
 VC Regiment, Yellow Star Division, Inter  
 Zone V Forces

Cuong defected at approximately 281800H December 1966 to the S-2 Section, Mo Duc District Headquarters. After initial interrogation a helicopter overflight was arranged and by 291000H Dec66, the defector had pointed out the 93rd Battalion, 2nd VC Regiment as being located at vicinity: Grid Square BS 6144, the 95th Battalion, 2nd VC Regiment as being located at vicinity: Grid Square BS 5641, and the 97th Battalion, 2nd VC Regiment as being located at vicinity: Grid Square BS 5444.

Cuong stated that the 2nd VC Regiment is composed of three infantry battalions listed as follows: 93rd Battalion, code name H-21, 95th Battalion, code name H-22, and 97th Battalion, code name H-23.

The code name of the 2nd VC Regiment is Quyet Chien, he stated that he knew the code names of two more regiments but not what regiments the are. The code names are Quyet Thang and Quyet Tam.

The code names of the companies of the 95th Battalion are as follows: 1st Company, code number 261, 2nd Company, code number 262, 3rd Company, code number 265, 4th Company/Support Weapons, code number 264. (NOTE: according to Cuong, there is no letter prefix to these code numbers).

Cuong gave the following breakdown of personnel and weapons for his platoon and stated that all infantry platoons within the 2nd VC Regiment are the same to his knowledge:

Platoon Leader - Armed with M-1 Carbine  
 Asst Platoon Leader - Armed with M-1 Carbine  
 3 (9 man) squads, each squad having 3 cells, the 1st cell leader being the squad leader and the 3rd cell leader being the assistant squad leader. Each squad has a squad leader armed with an AK and an assistant squad leader, also armed with an AK. Automatic Rifleman armed with a U.S BAR. Six Rifleman armed with CCK's. Also organic to the platoons are B-40 Rocket Launchers with 4 rounds of ammo carried by the 1st Squad of each platoon. Cuong stated that the 2nd VC Regiment has just been re-equipped and has the following ammo per weapon:

DEGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
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AK's	300 rounds
CKC's	150 rounds
BAR's	500 rounds

Each company has one 60mm Mortar with 30 rounds of ammo and one German machine gun MG-34 with 1000 rounds of ammo (German 7.92 Machine Gun MG-34 is shown on page 89 of the DOA Pamphlet 381-10, Weapons and Equipment Recognition Guide).

Cuong further stated that the 4th Company Support/Weapons - 264 had 3 platoons, an 81mm Mortar platoon with 81mm Mortars, a machine gun platoon with 4 German 7.92 machine guns, and a recoilless rifle platoon with 4 57mm Recoiless rifles. Cuong stated he did not know how much ammo the company has for these weapons but that the basic load of an ammo bearer with the 81mm Mortar Platoon is 4 rounds per man.

Cuong further stated that even though the Headquarters Group of the 95th Battalion has over 100 men and is divided into 3 platoons it is not called a company, simply Headquarters Group H-22.

The 3 platoons are Headquarters Group Platoon, Recon and Messenger Platoon (not sappers) and a Communications Platoon. The only equipment Cuong claimed to have knowledge of was within the Comm Platoon. They have one AN/PRC-10, one 15 watt radio for C.W. and 4 telephones with an unknown amount of wire. Cuong knew no radio operating frequencies. During secondary interrogation, Cuong stated that during the re-supply in November each company in the 95th Battalion was given 3 bangalore torpedoes, one for each infantry platoon. These bangalore have a 20 second delay fuse activated by pulling a string at the base like a ChiCom stick grenade. Cuong stated that these would be used to breach barbed wire if the 95th were to attack an outpost, but he stated he knew of no future plans to attack anywhere.

Cuong further stated that in April of 1964 he was captured in his home in Phuoc An (H), Duc Thach (V), Mo Duc (D), Quang Ngai (P) vicinity (BS 709 545) and taken to Nhon Loc (H) vicinity (BS 608 503) by the Mo Duc District Force Company. At Nhon Loc he was turned over to the 3rd Company, 95th Battalion, 2nd VC Regiment and has been with them ever since except for 6 months when he attended a division school run by the Yellow Star Division, from March to August 1966.

From April 1964 until October 1964, the 95th Battalion was stationed in Mo Duc District and trained how to attack New Rural Life Hamlets but they participated in no engagements. In October of 1964 the 95th Battalion moved to Binh Dinh Province where they moved from An Lac (H) to Hau Phu (D) to Phu My (D). In February of 1965 the 95th Battalion engaged ARVN forces in Phu My (D). Cuong stated they suffered heavy losses in this engagement. After this battle in February of 1965 the 95th moved to Pleiku Province and moved around and trained until July



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of 1965 when they attacked a convoy on Highway #7. Cuong stated in this attack his company was in reserve and he did not know the results of the engagement. In July of 1965 the 95th Battalion moved back to Bong Son (D), Binh Dinh Province and remained there until October of 1966. In October of 1966 the 95th was engaged by U. S. Forces at an area known as Suci Tuong in Hoai An (D) and suffered, according to Cuong, heavy casualties. After this engagement the 95th Battalion moved to its present location.

Cuong stated that by March of 1966 all the old timers in his platoon had either been killed, wounded or deserted so he was picked to attend a Division Schools run by the Yellow Star Division to become a platoon leader. Cuong stated that this school was located in Hoai An (D) but was not sure of the exact location. His class consisted of 140 trainees and 4 instructors, 2 NVN first lieutenant's and 2 SVN second lieutenants. The trainees lived in 2-man shelter tents during the school. The hours of study were 0600 to 1100, 1300 to 1630, and 1900 to 2100. Training was seven days a week.

The course was divided as follows:

March and April - Basic training, i.e.: bayonet training, grenade throwing, use of demolitions, infiltration tactics, and marksmanship (dry fire with K-44 only).

May and June - Mobile tactics, i.e.: ambushes, attack by fire and maneuver over open terrain and attacking relief columns. Raiding, i.e.: how to raid outposts or built-up areas.

July and August - Attacking outposts in force, the use of building mock-ups or sand tables for the purpose of training troops or preparing for an attack. The use of a compass and finding direction without a compass, and map reading (all maps were hand drawn).

When Cuong graduated from this school he was about in the middle of his class and was promoted to his present rank. He then returned to his company in the 95th Battalion and assumed command of the 2nd Platoon.

Although Cuong stated he knew of no future plans for either the 95th Battalion or the 2nd Regiment, he stated they are now in a training phase and one part of the regimental training is anti-helicopter training. The regiment has studied that to shoot a helicopter down they must wait until it is about 200 meters off the deck and then on order of the platoon leader everyone would open fire on it.

Medically, Cuong stated, that everyone in his platoon has some stage of malaria but that there is a large supply of Quinine shots available and that when a man is very ill, he is given a shot and within 24 to 48 hours he can carry on. He further stated that this Quinine comes from North Vietnam into Quang Nam Province and is further transported to the regiment but he knows of no supply points, routes, etc. He further stated that this is also the way they receive their ammo.

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[REDACTED]

Cuong stated he heard that the 95th Battalion originally came from North Vietnam in 1959 but that presently most of its men are Central Vietnamese.

Cuong gave his reason for defecting as follows: Originally he was captured and in 1965 he tried to go home but was caught and returned to Binh Dinh Province. He stated he has seen many of the old timers being killed or wounded and he wants to return to see his family and possibly join the ARVN if they would trust him after being a Main Force VC. He further stated that the men of his platoon are very tired of the hard life they lead and he felt that if his men heard his voice telling them he had been well treated, that they too would defect.

Personalities:

Major KHANH, about 40, CVN, 2nd VC Regiment  
 Major KIM, about 38, CVN, X0, 2nd VC Regiment  
 Captain LUC, about 40, CVN, CofS, 2nd VC Regiment  
 HA, about 38, CVN, Polit. O, 2nd VC Regiment  
 Captain NHUE, about 40, CVN, 95th Bn CO, now training at 2nd VC  
 Regimental Headquarters.  
 1stLt CHAU, about 40, CVN, 95th Bn X0, presently acting CO  
 1stLt LUONG, about 30, CVN, Bn CofS, 95th Bn  
 Capt SY, about 30, NVN, Bn Polit. O, 95th Bn  
 1stLt THAI, about 30, CVN, CO, 1stCo, 95th Bn  
 1stLt CHUONG, about 30, CVN, CO, 2nd Co, 95th Bn  
 2ndLt TIN, about 25, CVN, X0, 2nd Co, 95th Bn  
 1stLt PHUONG, about 30, CVN, CO, 3rd Co, 95th Bn  
 2ndLt QUAN, about 27, CVN, X0, 3rd Co, 95th Bn  
 2ndLt TAM, about 25, Asst Polit. O, 3rd Co, 95th Bn

G-2 Comment: The Yellow Star Division as mentioned in above report is the confirmed 3rd Division AKA 610th Division. Subordinate regiments are the confirmed 2nd VC Regiment AKA Qyet Chien, 12th NVA Regiment AKA 18th, and Qyet Thang, and the 22nd NVA Regiment AKA Qyet Tam.

II. DOCUMENT TRANSLATION REPORT, "GUERRILLA WARFARE AND EXTENT", CAPTURED  
10 DECEMBER 1966 AT (BT 146 595)

- - - - - FULL TRANSLATION - - - - -

Strive to step up the guerrilla warfare to the fullest extent in order to foil the American Imperialists' and their Henchmen's schemes and achieve more brilliant and decisive successes.

This document, prepared by the political officer of Military Region 5 in September 1966, consists of 3 parts:

PART I: The place of guerrilla warfare in the strategy of M.R.5 and the requirements thereof.

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PART II: Basic problems concerning the guidance of the present guerrilla warfare in the lowlands of M.R. 5.

PART III: Strengthening of the Party leadership, and the guidance and command of local military agencies as regards the guerrilla warfare movement.

A. The place of guerrilla warfare in the strategy of M.R. 5 and the requirements thereof.

1. The development of guerrilla warfare and its place in the strategy in the South Vietnam Theater of Operations, in general and in Military Region 5, in particular.

I. The struggle of our people and troops against the US imperialists and their henchmen is the most violent class struggle in the world, designed to do away with all the contradictions between our people and the US imperialists and their henchmen and the contradictions between socialism and imperialism.

- It is now fully developed from what was nothing before.

- The political struggle lasted from 1954 to 1959 - Ngo Dinh Diem's administration represented savagery. The 10/59 law and the guillotine were used to annihilate our revolutionary forces in the rural areas.

- Under the leadership of the Party, our people have clearly, realized that violence is the only thing which can be used to meet violence.

- The South Vietnamese people activated the armed and para-military forces, which in a very short time, broke the enemy's grip and crushed the Ngo Dinh Diem administration. They made it possible for the armed and para-military forces to develop both in quality and quantity.

- From 1960 to 1964, to cope with the Revolutionary Movement in South Vietnam, the US Imperialists increased their aid in money, equipment and personnel for the South Vietnam puppet government. They trained puppet troops with the objective of annihilating our forces. They used the "eagle flight" tactics, armored personnel carrier tactics, spear and net tactics etc... in order to destroy our forces and regain the areas lost to our control.

- The political struggle and military activities went hand in hand. The ever developing political struggle and armed and para-military forces not only supported the movement but also crushed large scale enemy sweep operations and helped defend liberated areas. The Ap Bac battle (NOTE: The VC were credited with downing 4 US helicopters in this battle)

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marked that new development - Military Region 5, from mid 1964 on, liberated two thirds of the land and more than two million people.

- Since 1964 the movement, armed and para-military forces developed rapidly - Main Force units took shape and made their appearance in Binh Gia, An Lao and so on. Guerrilla warfare developed into mobile warfare. In the summer of 1965, the striking victories in Leo Nhong, Viet An, Bien Hoa, Pleiku, Qui Nhon, Dong Xoai etc. . . basically set back the US imperialist's special war.

-The US brought its troops to South Vietnam when the special war was doomed to defeat. We were on the offensive. Our armed forces had secured combat positions in the battle areas of the mountain regions, of the lowlands, and surrounding cities. The US forces were encircled and split. Over 35,000 US troops and 50,000 puppet troops could not change the situation in Plei Me, Danang, Chu Lai, Bau Bang, Dat Xuot, Nha Do and Bong Trang. Repeated brilliant successes in Van Tuong, Mui Thanh etc...constituted concrete evidence of this. It was, in particular our people and troops who foiled the enemy's five -pronged dry season plan.

2. This development proves that the guerrilla warfare of our people has an important position both in the revolutionary and the strategic fields.

-Regarding its militarily strategic position, from 1959 to this date, guerrilla warfare has been playing a political role and has shifted to mobile warfare to pave the way for a general offensive and uprising.

#### II. The four combat principles applied on the South Vietnam Theater of Operations and the Position of Guerrilla Warfare at the present time.

- Combat activities of main force units are conducted under the form of offensive and counter-offensive campaigns.

-Guerrilla warfare activities are wide spread and strongly developed in the areas and towns controlled by the presence of US troops.

-Attack and destroy enemy rear strategic installations, equipment depots and strategic roads. Fire at aircraft and mechanized vehicles.

-Conduct appropriate armed activities around or inside cities in conjunction with the political struggle of the people.

-In reference to the above 4 principles, guerrilla warfare has a highly important position. If main force units known to coordinate

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closely with local and guerrilla units, they will assuredly achieve greater successes.

III. The present strategic role of guerrilla warfare in M.R. 5 is to:

-Intensify combat activities of armed and para-military forces in order to destroy as many puppet and US troops as possible.

-Counter all sweep operations in liberated areas.

-Step up military and political activities, tighten the encirclement of enemy military bases.

-Rapidly strengthen armed forces, with emphasis placed on main force elements.

-Strengthen and expand liberated areas and build solid mountain bases.

-Protect movement corridors.

2. The present role of guerrilla warfare in Military Region 5.

a. Step up combat activities of local units, village and hamlet militia and guerrilla forces, continuously attack the enemy and actively counter-attack in coordination with main force units.

b. Resolutely protect the people's lives and property, crops and (farm) production in liberated and urban areas.

c. On the basis of the "3 principles of staying close" (NOTE: Possibly, stay close to the enemy, the people and fortifications) step up military, political and the troop-proselyting activities.

d. Support the people's struggle and continue to destroy the remaining strategic hamlets.

e. Attack enemy supply store houses and rear bases in conjunction with sappers.

f. Widely develop the movement of firing at enemy aircraft.

g. Strive to defend transportation corridors.

h. Be continuously prepared for all contingencies, offensive and defensive. Establish records of enemy strongholds and properly organize military intelligence networks.

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i. Develop guerrilla warfare movement in hamlets and villages.

j. Properly perform missions assigned by higher echelons to meet the following 3 requirements.

-Frustate all enemy clear-and-hold plans; steadily maintain and extend our control.

-Steadily maintain and expand our liberated areas

-Wear down and destroy puppet enemy and US forces and maintain liberated areas.

k. Properly perform missions assigned by higher echelons. Improve and intensify the guerrilla warfare in order to submerge the enemy in the flames of the people's war.

In summary: Guerrilla warfare plays a highly important role in the War of Liberation in South Vietnam. This must be brought to the attention of the entire Party, Army and population, so that guerrilla warfare can be developed to the fullest extent in order to achieve greater successes.

B. Basic problems concerning the guidance for guerrilla warfare in the Lowlands of Military Region 5.

I. Evaluation of the characteristics of enemy and friendly troops, of the terrain in the Lowlands of M.R.5 according to the principles of guerrilla warfare.

a. The M.R. 5 has a very important strategic position with regard to the entire liberation war in South Vietnam.

b. Military Region 5 can be divided into 3 areas: The jungle-covered mountainous regions, the Plateau, and the coastal lowlands.

II. Fully understand combat guidelines and guerrilla warfare principles.

1. It is necessary to fully understand combat ideology, to actively attack and counter-attack the enemy.

-Having basically failed in the special war, the US imperialists are confused in the application of a suitable strategy. They have initiated an unsuccessful 5 pronged dry season counter offensive campaign in M.R.5 in which a large, highly mobile enemy force participated. Friendly forces destroyed a large part of the enemy forces, and continued to counter attack and beat off the enemy's 5 pronged attack.

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Attack and counter-attack are closely related in defeating the enemy. The counter-attack reflects our determination to resist the enemy attack upon our liberated areas.

-The counter clear-and-hold operations campaign, the offensive campaign and the counter-offensive campaign are characteristic of guerrilla warfare.

-Widely disseminate combat guidelines to the local armed and para-military forces and to the party and troops to ensure the successful accomplishment of the mission.

**2. Fully understand guerrilla warfare principles.**

-Guerrilla warfare tactics constitute the main combat guideline. Efforts should be made to step up mobile warfare.

-Basically use guerrilla forces to conduct guerrilla warfare on a large scale to wear down and destroy the enemy.

-Basically use local forces in guerrilla warfare and in small scale mobile warfare. The logical force will serve as the backbone for the guerrilla warfare movement. Concentrate and disperse skillfully.

-In the areas controlled by US troops, skillfully conduct guerrilla activities. Attack with a concentrated force when conditions permit and at the same time grasp the principles of using sappers in the attacks.

**3. Fully understand combat guidelines of guerrilla warfare.**

-Promote the political superiority, and gallantry and aggressively attack the well-equipped enemy force with a numerically smaller and poorly equipped force.

-Actively wear down and annihilate enemy forces, preserve and strengthen our forces.

-Attack with sure success and adequate preparation and win the first battle.

-Fight as independent units and fight with coordinated efforts and use mutual support.

-Develop the skills of fighting at close quarters, fighting at night, fighting continuously and attacking the poorly defended enemy areas.

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-Emphasize an all-out attack, and close coordination of military, political and troop proselytizing activities.

-Take the initiative, exercise flexibility and use the element of surprise.

-Resolutely comply with the "3 principles of staying close" and motivate the people to fight the enemy continuously.

These 8 principles constitute the art of guerrilla warfare and are easy to apply.

III. Resolutely fight the enemy, steadily maintain the control in the US areas.

1. Enemy schemes, ruses, operating procedures, strong and weak points.

The enemy is planning to build and hold military installations and step up their military operations in an attempt to pacify the countryside situated in proximity to his installation, set up security belts for the defense of major military installations, from which he will carry on the war of aggression in SVN and further expand his war of destruction against North Vietnam.

To this end the enemy is resorting to such tactics as intensified military action, the subversive and deceptive "Chieu Hoi" policy, and the economic blockade.

His strong points are well equipped strong points supported by artillery, armor, air power, and a highly mobile and superior force.


His vulnerabilities are low morale, lack of a political motivation, disruption of his puppet government, and his being subjected to our 3 prong attacks.

2. Friendly guidelines drawn from experience.

Be fully familiar with the protracted war principles and patiently try to adhere to the "3 hold policy".

Constantly motivate cadres, Party members, guerrillas and the people into harboring an intense hatred for the enemy, upholding a high sense of patriotism, class struggle, fighting spirit and revolutionary tradition.

Properly motivate the popular organizations as required by the situation.



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Employ to the fullest extent the "Close Three-Prong Attack" tactics in the mountain and lowland areas.

Energetically get rid of all GVN administrative personnel, spies, and "tyrants" with a view to "purifying" the population.

Bolster the (Party) Chapter's guidance and enhance the avant garde and exemplary role of the party and group members.

3. Flexibly adhere to the 8 foregoing lessons:

**IV. CONSTRUCTION OF COMBAT HAMLETS**

The construction of combat hamlets has become a major strategy in that it constitutes the miniaturized picture of the militant and anti-US South Vietnam.

1. Instill in the cadre, party members, guerrillas and public at large a high fighting spirit and make them familiar with the tactics of destroying the enemy while preserving our own forces.

2. Motivate the people and rely on them in the construction of combat hamlets.

3. Study and master all enemy routines and patterns of operation; realign and consolidate the combat plans as the basis on which to deploy our forces and build the combat hamlets.

4. Maintain secrecy: Observe a high sense of determination for combat hamlet construction. Provide technical guidance in order to avoid waste of labor and money.

5. Master the tactics of "3 prong attack in the mountains and lowlands," and warfare. Rely on the combat hamlets and villages in order to wear the enemy down.

6. Effect close coordination between combat and combat hamlet construction; improve our forces in every aspect - Party, Labor Youth Group, overt and covert guerrilla, and other organizations.

7. Place added emphasis on the maintenance of secrecy.

8. Pay more attention to the maintenance of equipment and continually improve the combat hamlets.

9. Devote every effort to raise farm production and to improve

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the people's economic condition.

10. Refine the Party Chapter's over-all guidance; grasp the right time to concentrate on the right task. Uphold the avant garde and exemplary role of the party member and the underlying role of the group member and guerrilla.

V. Counter Sweep Action : Sweep and counter-sweep operations are the activities common to a revolutionary war in which the enemy is better equipped and technically advanced. What matters most is the strategic guidance required in this guerrilla war.

#### 1. Some experience concerning the Enemy.

- A specific preparatory period for reconnaissance and spying purposes is required by the enemy in anticipation of an attack to be launched into our liberated areas.

- Heliborne tactics are preferred. In such operations, the enemy's most likely maneuver, to block our rear while using foot troops to hit our front and to encircle us in a relatively short period of time.

- Combined military operations involving US and puppet (GVN) troops are often conducted (these operations are for the most part poorly coordinated). In such cases, the puppet troops move at the flanks, while the US troops move in the middle, or vice-versa.

- While conducting the attack, the enemy dare not move out unless air and artillery support is available.

- The US troops are very frightened of our close and night attacks.

- The enemy often lands his troops in the high grounds that dot the lowlands of the M.R.5 area.

- The US is waging an aggressive war in the neo-colonialist form, which is characterized by furious attacks coupled with delusive and demagogic tactics.

## 2. Some Experience on the Friendly side:

- Elaborate preparations-tactical and ideological are crucial in countering the enemy sweep operations.

- It is imperative that the commanders exercise judicious leadership, be well aware of the enemy situation and be capable of solving different situations.

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- In a case where the main force is committed to action, it is necessary that close coordination be effected among the three forces (main, local and guerrilla forces).

- Bring into play the most flexible and effective tactics.

- The high anti-American spirit resulting from proper motivation was instrumental in bringing about military success despite the numerically superior US forces who were supported by air and artillery.

- Last but not least, it behooves us to play up the on-to-the-victory propaganda, stabilize the situation, improve leadership, and proper commendations and awards.

#### VI. Missions of the local Forces

1. The fundamental mission of the district and province forces is to serve as the core for the guerrilla warfare conducted in their own local areas. These specific missions are:

- Wear down the enemy strength

- Provide guidance to the guerrilla in combat and in combat hamlet construction.

- Maintain coordination and cooperation with the main and guerrilla force.

- Make the necessary combat preparations for their own forces and in support of the main force.

- Provide security protection for the population and farm production.

- Conduct proselyting and propaganda activities with a view to regimenting the people in the implementation of the Party policies; provide assistance to the population in their own farm work.

- Provide replacements to the main force when needed.

#### 2. Principles of Operation for the Local Force

- Be flexible in troop concentration or dispersion.

- Place emphasis on troop (local force and also some elements of the main force) dispersion when the enemy is stronger, and when the local force meets with difficulties, the area of operation is restricted, the masses are not fully regimented, or the guerrillas are quantitively and qualitatively inferior.

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- When the enemy grows weaker and is driven to the defensive, we will expand our activities, refine the popular organizations, step up the guerrilla movement. Then will the local force gain a solid foothold and be able to concentrate its troops for military operations.

- It is to be remembered that concentration or dispersion should be very flexible and that no gradual transition from dispersion into concentration is required.

- Under no circumstance will dispersion or concentration be employed over extended periods of time.

#### VII. Emphasis on the Manufacturing and Employment of Rudimentary Weapons.

The underlying principle on this popular war are the development of "political superiority", gallantry, by attack by a smaller force on a larger force, the employment of rudimentary equipment versus the enemy's modern equipment. This by no means constitutes a shortage of materials but is closely connected with political factors, the viewpoints of a popular warfare, ideological outlooks, tactical and strategic guidance, guerrilla and mobile warfare.

- The effects exerted by rudimentary weapons are immense in that they can inflict major damage and destruction.

- Rudimentary weapons can be manufactured and used by every citizen thus constitute an "invincible army".

#### VIII. Building up the Local and Guerrilla Force.

At this juncture when guerrilla warfare assumes a crucial strategic importance, it is imperative that the military operations be conducted continuously as our forces become stronger and more seasoned through combat. In this way are we able to achieve far greater success.

When building up the local force and guerrilla force we should pay attention to the following considerations: close coordination between building up the forces and waging combat.

Emphasis on bolstering the guerrilla force and hamlet guerrilla units.

Main Link: Guidance agencies, and command cadre must develop the political ideology as a basis. To develop village guerrillas, pay attention to hamlet guerrillas.

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- Enhance the political awareness.
- Improve combat tactical and technical skills.
- Improve the leadership and unit administration ability of military agencies and cadre at various echelons.
- Improve the procedures for assessing the enemy situation and draft sketches of enemy locations and strongholds.
- Establish combat operating procedures.
- Conduct political activities on a permanent basis.
- The guidance for development and training of units must be properly provided through combat leadership.

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----

### III. INTERROGATION OF AN UNNAMED CAPTAIN, COMMANDER OF THE 93RD BN.

Background: National Interrogation Center interrogation of a South Vietnamese national who was born in 1929 in Thua Thiem Province. He has served with the Communist Armed Forces in Vietnam since 1949 and has been a member of the Lao Dong Party since 1953. In 1954 he was transferred to NVN with a Regiment 95 and reinfiltated SVN in 1962 with Group 100; in SVN he operated in Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces. His last rank and position with the NVA forces was Captain, Commander of Battalion 93 stationed at An Tuong Village, Hoai An District, Binh Dinh Province. He was captured in Binh Dinh Province on 14 February 1966.

Summary: There was a definite NVA/VC policy toward the treatment of defectors, as well as SVN and Allied POW's, which distinguished between those who defected to a VC "liberated" area, those who defected in a battle situation, those who surrendered voluntarily during battle and those who were taken prisoner involuntarily during battle. Defectors to "liberated" areas were to be welcomed, but carefully watched to establish their bona fides, and defectors in battle were to be given similar treatment. Those who surrendered during battle were classified according to the circumstances under which they surrendered and were treated accordingly, but in no case were prisoners supposed to be ill-treated or have their personal possessions confiscated. This policy

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was not, however, adhered to, and prisoners were often tortured by platoon and company cadres who also took their personal effects. Since combat units were forced to move frequently, POW's were turned over to local authorities who adhered more strictly to the official policy regarding treatment of prisoners. All captured U.S. pilots were imprisoned in one compound in Hanoi where they received good food, in comparison to NVA troops, adequate clothing, medicines, and recreational materials.

#### 1. General Policy

The NVA and VC forces have always regarded the South Vietnamese forces as mercenaries whose cadres and soldiers were fighting without ideological motivation and who therefore became weary and retreated in a battle situation. A policy was formulated by the NVA/VC forces which was considered to be highly important, and each cadre and soldier had to be familiar with it and comply with its regulations in order to exert a psychological influence on the SVN Armed Forces to create dissidence among their troops.

#### 2. Policy Toward Defectors in "Liberated" Areas.

SVN military defectors were to be welcomed by the local VC organization and the people. Those defectors having families in the "liberated" areas were to be sent home to see them; every effort was to be made to contact families of defectors in "non-liberated" areas so that they could visit them. A defector who requested to return home to earn a living was to be given assistance, but if he wanted to participate in "revolutionary work" he was to be assigned a mission suitable to his capabilities. All defectors were carefully scrutinized and investigated to establish their bona fides and ascertain that they had not been sent by the SVN forces to penetrate the NVA/VC.

#### 3. Policy Toward Defectors in Battle

Defectors during battle were to be regarded as being under duress to bear arms or as having been bribed; therefore, they were to be treated as well as other defectors. However, if they surrendered because they found themselves in a hopeless position militarily, they were to be treated as prisoners of war.

#### 4. Policy Toward SVN Prisoners of War

It was recognized that the battlefield was a situation of "kill or be killed"; however, if one of the Allied troops surrendered voluntarily, he was to be considered as having "repented" and given kind treatment. Prisoners taken in battle were to be temporarily tied up for security.

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reasons, but the NVA/VC troops were under orders not to insult or mistreat prisoners. After capture, the prisoners were taken to a specified location, which was different from the withdrawal point of the unit. Later the policy of the NVA/VC toward prisoners was to be explained to them in order to reassure them. The families of POW's from "liberated" areas were to be notified of their whereabouts so that they could visit them. Money and belongings of prisoners were not supposed to be confiscated, but simply held after issuing a receipt for all items. Only military equipment was to be taken from dead prisoners, but their personal possessions were not to be touched. Wounded prisoners were to be given field treatment, if possible, and then evacuated to the nearest hospital; their belongings were not to be taken. Every effort was to be made to give prisoners adequate rations and necessary medicines. Prisoners were lodged and ate together; they were permitted to move about freely within the prison compound. Daily rations consisted of two cans of rice and three piasters for salt and fish sauce. Cooks were supposed to gather wild vegetables or obtain them from the local populace to supplement the prisoners diet. Prisoners could be liberated only by the Military Region.

#### 6. Living Conditions of Prisoners of War.

When a POW was captured on the battlefield he was immediately interrogated by operations and training cadres on tactical information relative to the battle. The prisoner was also asked about his rank, position, unit and operational assignment. The POW's were classified by rank (officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and recruits and volunteers), but they all received equal treatment. They were tied up and moved to a prearranged point whence they were transferred to regimental headquarters. Since a combat regiment moved very frequently, it was difficult for them to handle POW's; therefore, the regiment turned them over to the local authorities after they had been interrogated by regiment operations and training cadres on their biographical data. The NVN Government's policy toward prisoners of war was also explained to them but in fact the NVA/VC cadres rarely observed this policy. For example, prisoners captured during the Dec Ngang battle in Phu My District (Feb65) and the Goi Rieng battle in Ba To District, Quang Ngai Province (Dec65) were tortured by platoon and company cadres who also confiscated their belongings, such as wrist-watches, pens, radios and money. Once they were transferred to the local authorities, the POWs were reportedly well treated and seldom tortured, although they were held prisoner in jungle areas.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**ANNEX C (PARAGRAPH 13 ENTRIES) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NR 1

1. Total cases of Vietnamese Nationals volunteering information to U.S. Forces are as follows:

1st Marines .....6

Hq .....3  
1/1 .....1  
2/1 .....1  
3/1 .....1

5th Marines .....1

2/5 .....1

7th Marines .....2

1/7 .....1  
2/7 .....1

9th Marines .....11

Hq .....3  
1/26 .....5  
3/7 .....1  
3/9 .....2

11th Marines .....2

Hq .....1  
4/11 .....1

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ANNEX D (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIV OERINTREP NO. 1

DATE	BMCT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	EECT	MOONRISE	MOONSET	MOONPHASE	ILLUM
JAN 15	0655	0718	1834	1857	1032	2230	NEW	17
16	0655	0718	1835	1858	1106	2316	NEW	25
17	0655	0718	1836	1859	1138	—	FIRST	33
18	0655	0718	1836	1859	1221	0002	FIRST	42
19	0655	0718	1837	1900	1246	0049	FIRST	52
20	0655	0718	1837	1900	1322	0138	FIRST	61
21	0655	0718	1838	1901	1404	0229	FIRST	70
22	0656	0719	1838	1901	1449	0323	FIRST	79
23	0656	0719	1839	1902	1542	0420	FIRST	87
24	0655	0718	1839	1902	1642	0520	FIRST	93
25	0655	0718	1840	1903	1743	0620	FULL	98
26	0655	0718	1841	1904	1848	0717	FULL	100
27	0655	0718	1842	1905	1951	0810	FULL	99
28	0655	0718	1842	1905	2053	0859	FULL	96
29	0655	0718	1843	1906	2153	0943	FULL	90
30	0655	0718	1844	1907	2251	1026	FULL	81
31	0655	0718	1844	1907	2348	1107	FULL	72
FEB 1	0654	0717	1845	1908	—	1149	FULL	61
2	0653	0716	1845	1908	0046	1232	FULL	50
3	0653	0716	1845	1908	0145	1318	LAST	39
4	0653	0716	1846	1909	0244	1408	LAST	28
5	0653	0716	1846	1909	0344	1501	LAST	19

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PERINTREP NO. 2

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam  
 031200H February 1967

Period Covered: 151200H to 301200H January 1967

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam AMS Series L701 and L7014

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

A. Adjacent Areas

(1) The 3rd Division continues to pose a threat to southern Quang Ngai Province. A threat which is somewhat more real now that Marine forces are deployed in the vicinity of Duc Pho. The 3rd Division consists of three regiments; two of which are combat-effective, the 2nd VC in southern Quang Ngai Province, and the 22nd NVA in northern Binh Dinh Province, and one, the 18th (AKA: 12th) NVA, which has been so badly mauled that it is no longer combat effective, and is believed to be dispersed in central Binh Dinh Province. The division CP is thought probably to be in the An Lao valley area. In terms of reinforcing capability, the 22nd NVA Regiment is of principle concern. Nevertheless, in contrast to the 2nd VC Regiment further to the north, the 22nd remains in its normal operating area-the Tam Quan and An Lao areas-and furthermore is believed principally concerned with maintaining enemy control in northern Binh Dinh Province and with countering initiatives by FWMAF in that area.

B. First Marine Division's Area of Responsibility

(1) Quang Nam Province. Enemy activity in this province and especially within the Da Nang TAOR continues to reflect a healthy guerilla and local force structure. Harassing small arms incidents, mines and anti-personnel devices constitute the bulk of contacts. As has become characteristic within the past two months, the continuing low-level activity has been interspersed with some intense contacts. The most significant of these occurred on 26 January in Operation TUSCALOOSA when 2/5 made solid contact with several companies of the R.20 Battalion, as indicated later by documents captured from the dead. The valley between Thuong Duc and Dai Loc district towns was the scene of substantial contacts on the 21st and the 22nd by CIDG forces out of Thuong Duc and elements of 2/4. Recon sightings and contacts in the vicinity of (ZC 2333) on the 18th and (ZC 2050) on the 28th are indicative

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TAB A  
 TAB B

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chiefly of the extent to which the mountainous areas to the west and the south are used as base areas by the enemy. Main force and sapper activity was non-existent during the reporting period. The two Quang Da Provincial Mobile Battalions, the R.20 and the V.25, continue to base their operations in the area to the south of the Thu Bon and Vu Gia rivers.

(2) Quang Tin Province. This province continues to evince the least enemy activity of the main force, local force or guerrilla variety. One of the two notable incidents occurred on the early morning of 18 January when the Thang Binh District headquarters and an RF position at (BT 208375) received harassing mortar fire. For the other, on the 26th elements of 1/5 located at (BT 327107) came under mortar and small arms attack. The continued interdiction of Route #1 between Tam Ky and Dien Ban remains a primary activity of enemy forces along this road. The statement of several recent captives and defectors from the 3rd NVA Regiment indicate that that unit remains in the northern half of Quang Tin Province. Local and guerrilla forces can be expected to account for activity in this province with the main areas of enemy activity being the coastlands of Thang Binh district, reflecting the enemy's sensitivity to supply lines passing from the sea to the mountains through this district, and the northern sector of the Chu Lai TAOR, reflecting his sensitivity to pacification operations. The 72nd Battalion has not been noted active during this reporting period and is thought to be probably dispersed into company formations along the mountainous fringes of Tam Ky and Thang Binh districts.

(3) Quang Ngai Province. With the presence of three main force regiments and a fourth in close reinforcing distance, Quang Ngai has come to the forefront as a possible theatre for an enemy attack. The 21st NVA Regiment is reported by agents and defectors to be in the Tra Bong-Vinh Tuy-Tan An area, while the 1st VC Regiment, which formerly stayed in this area, appears to have moved back into the mountains north and south of the Ha Thanh CIDG camp. The remaining main force regiment, the 2nd VC of the 3rd Division, is believed located in the area of Vuc Liem between Ba To and Duc Pho. A defector from the 409th Sapper Battalion reports that the battalion headquarters, two sapper companies and the support company are also in Vuc Liem and that an attack against Ba To is intended for the period immediately preceding Tet. According to the same defector, a coordinated attack will be conducted against installations on the southern side of Chu Lai. The district headquarters and CIDG camp at Ba To were mortared in the early morning hours of January 17th, with no further action to this time. Considerably more enemy activity is in evidence in the Duc Pho area. The district headquarters came under small arms attack on the 16th. Marine forces have encountered fire ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> the area from the time of the first survey element. The present larger force has met determined opposition to all attempts to move northwards. The CP area came under mortar

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attack on the ~~1st~~ ~~2nd~~ The several helicopters that have been hit in the area report .50 caliber fire, normally a sign of main force involvement. The enemy's decided response to the introduction of Marine forces into Duc Pho is attributable to several factors. The salt flats at near-by Sa Huynh and the rice and people of the fertile Duc Pho/Mo Duc coastal plain have been a vital source of supply for the VC war effort. These resources have been under virtually complete enemy control up to this time; and, considering the importance of these assets, it is not surprising that the enemy is inclined to contest at an early stage what he fears will be an effective challenge to his control. Furthermore the Tra Cau inlet and the coast immediately to the north have long been suspected as an infiltration point for supplies. Viewing the unseemingly propinquity of Marine forces to this infiltration point, the enemy is probably prepared to resist further encroachment. Although all reports indicate that Ba To is a target for future attacks, current activity at Duc Pho indicates that the latter is equally a candidate. Indeed the greater importance of Duc Pho to the enemy and the prospect of a more substantial challenge than in the past to enemy control of the area's important resources give cause to anticipate an enemy response to our deployment. Elsewhere in the province a greater than usual number of sightings in the area between Ha Thanh and Nui Tron probably reflects the presence of major elements of the 2nd Division in this area. The only other attack of significance was against a ROKMC artillery position at (BS 626860) on 19 January consisting of mortar and small arms fire.

C. General Enemy Situation. Although the enemy in the past has not employed his main forces in an aggressive manner for a number of reasons, among which previous poor showings in combat, a reluctance to expose forces to massed fires and logistic and personnel problems, this apparent passivity must be interpreted in accordance with one of the enemy's fundamental maxims "to strike to win, strike only when success is certain; if it is not, then don't strike." The enemy in his writings has consistently maintained that the destruction of the enemy's (our) manpower is the essential objective; and on this basis, he has pursued plans of action described in the following terms: "to concentrate our forces to move to the offensive against important strategic points where the enemy's forces were relatively weak in order to wipe out a part of his manpower, at the same time compelling him to scatter his forces to cope with us at vital points which he had to defend at all costs." The movement of two main force regiments into Quang Ngai Province (the 21st NVA from Quang Tin and the 2nd VC from Binh Dinh) in the past two months indicates a certain massing of forces since two regiments (the 1st VC and the 22nd NVA) were already inside or in close proximity to Quang Ngai Province. The presence of four main force regiments, a presumably two divisional headquarters, in or immediately adjacent to Quang Ngai Province is out-of-the-ordinary and gives to the enemy the capability to conduct coordinated attacks on several vital points which he may figure are Duc Pho, any or

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several of the CIDG camps, Quang Ngai city and various ROKMC and USMC positions and installations within the southern part of the Chu Lai Combat Base. Duc Pho, in particular may be received by the enemy as a relatively belated position where the chances of successfully destroying manpower are better than usual. If the statement of the recent defector from the 409th Sapper Battalion is to be given credence, then there are plans to conduct coordinated attacks-in the instance cited by the defector, against Chu Lai and Ba To before the beginning of Tet.

The enemy's often demonstrated willingness to call or to postpone projected attacks when all does not go according to plan makes the prediction of times or proposed attacks a chancy proposition. In a more general sense, it should be noted that the several months following Tet have in the past been the occasion for an offensive by the 2nd Division. Notably, from early February to April of 1966, the 1st VC and then newly-infiltrated 21st NVA Regiments joined in Son Tinh district for the 2nd Division's first campaign. The 2nd Division was bettered in the campaign but not without some pitched encounters in the ensuing operations known to us as Utah, Indiana, Nevada and Hot Springs.

The 2nd Division's presence in Quang Ngai Province in early 1966 was preceded by that of the 3rd Division with the 2nd VC and 18th NVA Regiments. They operated to the south of the Tra Khuc river and succeeded in overrunning the Minh Long district seat in addition to attacking the Thach Tru outpost at the same time that the 1st VC Regiment was overrunning the Hiep Duc district headquarters in Quang Tin Province.

The current deployment of major elements of both the 2nd and 3rd Divisions into Quang Ngai Province differs from that of the past year, in that then the two moved in tandem, the 3rd in southern Quang Ngai when the 2nd was in Quang Tin and the 3rd moving to Binh Dinh when the 2nd moved to northern Quang Ngai; whereas now over the past two months both have moved the bulk of their forces into or adjacent to Quang Ngai at roughly the same time.

The apparent massing of forces in Quang Ngai Province lends considerable credence to the alleged plans to conduct a two division operation in southern Quang Ngai Province which, according to rallier Ba from the MR-V headquarters staff section, were under consideration this past autumn. The times and targets for this attack were not set according to Ba; but he allowed that the CIDG camps at Ba To, Gia Vuc and Minh Long would be possible targets and that the campaign would take place during the dry season since the swollen rivers and general poor trafficability of the terrain during the monsoon seasons precluded the logistic support required for an operation of this magnitude.

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Although recent movements and reported intentions indicate that attacks are intended in Quang Ngai in the future, the enemy's logistic posture and to a lesser extent his personnel readiness posture will indicate against prolonged attacks. Rather, relatively fast raids and set-piece attack-ambush tactics can be expected.

While the main force situation in Quang Ngai Province has changed considerably over the past two months, the overall picture in the other provinces and for guerrilla and local forces throughout the three provinces remains appreciably the same. An increase and strengthening of guerrilla and local forces is indicated across the board in order more effectively to counter the challenge at the hamlet and village level of the Revolutionary Development program and to marshall the resources of the three provinces in support of the Viet Cong cause. The intensification of guerrilla and local force activity is not inconsistent with a shift to the offensive on the part of the main forces. Although not closely coordinated, the enemy has been known to call for a intensification of guerrilla/local force activity to coincide generally with planned main force campaigns for the avowed purpose of tying down reserves.

## 2. ENEMY OPERATION DURING THE PERIOD

### A. Strength and Disposition

(1) See Annex A, (Order of Battle) 1st MarDiv PERINTREP NO. 1 January 1967.

(2) The following information was provided by a captive Tran Dong, Private (sniper), 1st Squad, 2nd Platoon, 1st Company, 32nd Group. Dong was captured on 5 January 1967 by the ROKMC vicinity (BS 530822). At the time of capture Tran had in his possession a rifle with scope (French 8mm Carbine w/sniper scope).

(a) Dong joined the NVA in September 1965 at Tien Hai (D) Thai Binh (P), NVN. He reported to the 1st Company, 32nd Group (AKA 32nd Battalion) at Hoa Binh (P), NVN. His training lasted four months and included firing Communist automatic weapons, tactics to use on operations, and firing a sniper rifle. The balance of the time was spent on political subjects.

(b) With 15 days notice and leave, the 32nd Group with 300 men in 3 companies departed North Vietnam in March of 1966, traveling by train to Thanh Hoa (P), then on foot southward through Laos. During this walk south many men became sick with malaria to a point that Dong stated he could not count them and the morale was low due to fear of the Americans.

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 (c) The 2nd and 3rd companies of the group were last seen in the jungle when moving south (date/place unknown).

(d) The 1st company, a sniper company as are the other two companies has three platoons, numbered 1st, 2nd and 3rd. The 1st platoon is presently operating in Quang Nam Province. The 3rd platoon's location is unknown. Dong's platoon CP and the 2nd platoon is currently in Bgn' Ch'eu (V) vicinity (BS 545815). In mid-September the platoon was in Nghia Hanh (D) but at that time they had no specific mission.

(e) In October 1966, the platoon moved to Mo Duc (D) where they received treatment for malaria. On 15 October the entire 2nd platoon was resting in Tu Nghia (D) until 31 December when at this time the unit dispersed.

(f) The 2nd platoon is subordinate to the village chief and is organized into 9 (3-men) cells (all NVN). Each cell was assigned to a specific village when dispersed with three local guerrillas assigned to each cell. When Dong was captured, he stated five out of the nine cells of his platoon were inoperative because of malaria. Dong's cell was assigned to Binh Bac (H), vicinity (BS 530822) on 31 December and is thought to be still operating for the hamlet. Each man in his cell has a sniper rifle. The cell members live with their assigned guerrillas and patrol during the day using the guerrillas as guides. The mission of these sniper cells is to snipe at the Koreans.

(g) G-2 Comment: F/3. There have been various reports of a 32nd Battalion as being subordinate to the 21st NVA Regiment, but this is the first report of the captive's unit. However it could be possibly true in light of increased sniper activity over the last three months.

(3) The following information was revealed by a defector Nguyen Phuong, Private, 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, Q-4 Company (AKA K-4) Anti-Aircraft Company, 1st VC Regiment, who defected on 13 January 1967 to Son Tinh District Headquarters.

(a) Phuong, stated the Q-4 Company is the 12.7mm Anti-Aircraft Company attached directly to the 1st VC Regiment. The company is composed of three (15-20 men) platoons with one 12.7mm anti-aircraft machine gun and 100 rounds of ammunition per platoon. Eight of the men in each of the platoons carry the wheel less the gun, while the remaining carry the ammunition. The company currently has only 50 men, making the company approximately 50% under strength.

(b) When Phuong defected on 13 January 1967, his company was located in vicinity of (BS 379618), along with the 40th, 60th, 70th and 90th Battalions were also located in this area, but he was not sure where. The regimental CP and its support companies was last known to be

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located in vicinity (BS 375597). The regiment along with its subordinate units is currently retraining.

(c) The current mission of the Q-4 Company is anti-aircraft defense. In addition to the Q-4 Company, there are the following additional support companies under the 1st VC Regiment headquarters. These are the Q-2 (AKA K-2) Communication/Information Company, Q-5 (AKA K-5) 57mm Recoilless Rifle Company, Q-6 (AKA K-6) 81/82mm Mortar Battery (with three tubes), a medical company called "Phau" Company and a sapper company of unknown designation.

(d) His company is training at present in nomenclature of the 12.7 machine gun consisting of dry-firing and anti-helicopter training at a wooden model of a helicopter. To date Phuong claims the Q-4 Company has not fired its guns nor shot down any planes. Phuong further claims the training he received was very poor.

(e) Phuong went on to state the 1st VC Regiment has participated in two battles since he joined the regiment in September. The first battle was in November at Son Chau (V) vicinity (BS 554813) with the Koreans. The second battle was in December at Tu Nghia (D) when the 60th Battalion engaged ARVN forces. Although Phuong didn't know the number of casualties, he admitted his compatriots fought very poorly.

(f) G-2 Comment: Agent reports and interrogation reports indicate that the 1st VC Regiment is located in this vicinity after being relieved in the Vinh Tuy area by the 21st NVA Regiment. See interrogation report of Phien, member of 21st NVA Regiment below.

(4) The following information was revealed by defector Tran Phien, age 22, Private (rifleman), 1st Squad, 2nd Platoon, 12th Company, 33rd Battalion, 21st Regiment when he defected to Tra Bong (D) headquarters on 13 January 1967.

(a) Phien stated that when he left his unit on 11 January 1967, it was located two days march southwest of Tra Bong (D) (coordinates unknown). He claims that the entire regiment (11th, 22nd, 33rd, and a sapper battalion) is located somewhere in Quang Ngai Province.

(b) Phien joined the VC in 1965 at Tien Phuoc (D) and was assigned to the 60th Battalion, 1st Regiment as a cook. While with the 1st Regiment, Phien claims they engaged in many battles, but could only remember two because his job kept him in the rear areas. These battles were in July 1966(?), vicinity (BS 721952) and vicinity Tam Ky. (G-2 comment: Dates captives give may be confused, no contacts were made these areas. It is possible Phien is referring to battles fought in 1965 in these areas.)

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(c) After July, Phien deserted from the 60th Battalion being he was discontented with his job and claims that in early August 1966 he was allegedly forced to join the 33rd Battalion, 21st Regiment at Son Tay (V), Hiep Duc (D). Since joining, Phien can recall two battles both in September 1966 when the 33rd Battalion fought Americans at Ky Bich (V), Tam Ky (D). The second battle was (also in September) when the 33rd Battalion engaged the ARVN forces at Thang Binh (D).

(d) In November 1966, the regiment moved to Que Son (D), Quang Nam Province with the mission to attack an unknown OP; however the attack was called off because of a compromise of the plan, after which in late December 1966 the regiment moved to Tien Phuoc, Quang Tin Province and 6 days later to Quang Ngai Province where Phien defected from 6 days afterwards.

(e) The 12th Company, 33rd Battalion at present has 60 men, with the battalion having over 200. The companies of the 33rd Battalion are the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th. Each company of the battalion has one communication platoon, two runners and one corpsman. Company weapons are in addition to small arms, two 50 caliber machine guns (mounted on wheels), two 60mm mortars, one 30 caliber machine gun, one B-40 (rocket launcher) and one M-79.

(f) Each battalion of the 21st Regiment has at least one recon section and one medical intern. The companies of the battalions are three infantry and one combat support companies with three 25-30 men platoons per company. The support companies have such weapons as one 75mm recoilless rifle, one 57mm recoilless rifle, one 82mm mortar and two Soviet heavy machine gun, type DSHK 38.

(g) G-2 Comment: F/3 on location of the 21st Regiment. Recent agent reports indicate it is now located in Quang Ngai Province possibly filling in for the 1st Regiment reported located vicinity Son Ha in a retraining phase. Contact dates and organizational information given by captive concurs with OOB data held by this command. Those dates and battles reported for the 1st Regiment possibly confused by captive as stated in text above.

(5) The following information was obtained from a defector Nguyen Hong Trong, age 24, assistant platoon leader, 3rd Platoon, 40th Company, 409th Sapper Battalion who defected on 23 January 1967 vicinity (BS 577973).

(a) Trong states that in December 1966 the battalion executive officer went to a staff meeting in I.R-5 headquarters someplace deep within Son Ha District and returned about 31 December 1966 at which time the 409th Battalion split up to the following locations: 40th Company and aid station vicinity of the entire 1st Regiment area (BS 3377, 3477, 3378, 3478). The X-20 Company (AKA Headquarters Battalion Company), 30th, 50th and 60th

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Companies moved to vicinity (BS 6135, 6136, 6235, 6236). The 70th Company is reportedly operating as a separate company in Tam Ky District at an unknown location.

(b) Trong further states that he was in the area of defection because at the time he was a member of a seven man recon team from the 40th Company consisting of the company executive officer, platoon leader, four privates and himself, on a mission of reconnaissance of the south end of the Chu Lai airfield for a possible mortar sapper attack within the area, to include the fastest jets, the division CP (note: when asked to locate the division CP on a map, the subject pointed out the 7th Marine Regimental CP) and LAAM Battalion.

(c) After completion of the mission the recon team was supposedly to meet on 25 January vicinity (BS 633955) and then return to the battalion area together for planning their attack. The plan as the defector knew it was as follows: between 3 and 5 February, three groups of 12-16 men suicide teams will attack the south end of the larger strip with the mission of destroying as many planes as possible, and at the same time another group of 12-16 men with two or three 82mm mortar will attack the division CP. Trong further claims that when this attack is underway, the X-20 Company (HqCo), 30th, 50th and 60th Companies along with two regiments, one of which is the 2nd Regiment will attack Ba To District headquarters. Trong states the VC will go through with this plan, even though he has defected because of the importance of it. They are ready to stand and fight as they expect the U.S. forces will reinforce Ba To. As for the Chu Lai attack he feels they may not go through with it because of his defection.

(d) Trong gave the following AKA's (also known as) and letter box numbers for the 409th Battalion.

AKA's

X-20.....Bn Hq, 409th Battalion  
 Co #1.....30th Co (infantry company)  
 Co #2.....40th Co (infantry company)  
 Co #3.....50th Co (infantry company)  
 Co #4.....60th Co (Wpns/support company)  
 Co #5.....70th Co (Infantry/support company)

Letter Box Numbers

20142 AGM Bac Hien.....X-20/409th Bn  
 20142 BGM Bac Hien.....30th Co  
 20142 CGM Bac Hien.....40th Co

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20142 DGM Bac Hien.....50th Co  
 20142 EGM Bac Hien.....60th Co  
 20142 FGM Bac Hien.....70th Co

(e) Trong states the 60th Company (weapons/support) has the following crew-served weapons: Three 57mm recoilless rifles with seven rounds per gun, three 82mm mortars with eight rounds per tube, three 30 caliber machine guns with 750 rounds per gun.

(f) The 40th Company has three infantry/sapper platoons with the following number of troops in each: 1st Platoon-25 men, 2nd Platoon-27 men and 3rd Platoon with 28 men. The 3rd Platoon has the following weapons: in three squads. Three BAR's, one per squad with 300 rounds per gun, three B-40 rocket launchers, one per squad with four rounds each, six K-50's, two per squad with 150 rounds each, six AK's, two per squad with 150 rounds each, six K.44's, two per squad with what is known as AT's grenade launchers on them and six rounds per weapon.

(g) Communication equipment. The 409th Battalion has one 15 watt radio used to talk with MR.5. Also four PRC-10's used to monitor FWMF radios, eight field phones for communication within the battalion, and if distance is to great, runners are used.

(h) G-2 Comment: F/3. This plan is within the enemy capability and is a primary choice of course of action. The 2nd Regiment is believed in the Vuc Lien area (BS 6337). A defector from the 551st Sniper Battalion, 3rd Division states a battalion of the Quyet Tam Regiment (22nd Regiment, 3rd Division) is located in southern Quang Ngai Province. Also the information given by Trong tends to corroborate that given by a captive from the 70th Company, 409th Battalion, who stated the 30th and 50th Companies were in the Binh Dinh area, and possibly these companies have moved into southern Quang Ngai with the 60th Company (Weapons/Support) split between the 40th and 70th Companies.

B. Order of Battle.

(1) See Annex A, (Order of Battle) 1st MarDiv PERINTREP NO. 1 January 1967.

(2) A NVA returnee, Corporal Luu Xuan Nga, age 27, member of 803rd Company, 551st Battalion, 325th Division who defected at Sa Huynh OP on 30 December 1966 revealed the following information:

(a) On 25 November 1964, he joined the NVA and became a member of the D-16 Communication Battalion located in Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam. Training lasted one year and subjects were on

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telephones, switchboards and repair techniques. On 12 March 1965, he was assigned to the C-16 Communication Company subordinate to the D-16 Battalion. While in this company, his job was to maintain communication between the 325th Division and its subordinate units.

(b) In the latter part of March 1965, the 2nd Group was organized and was comprised of the C-16 Communication Company, a transportation company and a recon company for the purpose of infiltrating South Vietnam. In May 1965, the 2nd Group departed Quang Binh, passed through Laos and arrived in Pleiku Province, South Vietnam in late May 1965. The entire trip took two months and 25 days. Arriving in Pleiku, he found that part of the 325th Division was already waiting but had changed its designation to the 35th Division. Subsequent division designation changes were as follows: In August 1965 to the Seo Veng or Golden Star Division, late 1965 to Nam Hai and in July 1966 to the 3rd Division. In early 1965, C-16 was redesignated 803rd Company and the D-16 to the 551st Battalion.

(c) Composition of the 551st Battalion

801st Radio Company

802nd Runner/Liaison Company

803rd Telephone Company (breakdown: 3 platoons, 30 men per platoon, 3 squads per platoon, 10 men per squad)

(d) Disposition: Half of each company is located with the Quang Ngai group while the other half remains with the Binh Dinh group.

(e) Weapons and Equipment

801st Company: 8 15-watt USSR or Chicom radios. Weapons unknown.

802nd Company: Equipment and weapons unknown

803rd Company: Unknown number of B-60 Chicom telephones and switchboards, some of which are captured U.S. type.

Weapons- one AK per platoon and two carbines per squad.

(f) Strength and Replacement

803rd Company: Present strength is 120-130 men. Largest number of replacements received by this company was 20 men, many of them who were poorly trained.

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(g) Health, Food and Supplies. The entire 803rd Company has malaria but the majority still remains on duty. Only the seriously ill receive Quinine as it is a priceless commodity. Nga receives a daily ration of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  cans of rice plus 5 piasters per day. Once every two years, Nga receives new clothing and equipment which comes from both North and South Vietnam.

(h) Other Information Obtained. During its stay in Pleiku Province, one regiment of the 325th Division attacked Thaun Man OP. Casualties were unknown to Nga. Also during this period they often harassed Pleiku City with mortar fire. In August 1965, the division moved to Binh Dinh Province and has remained there until Nga's time of defection. In Binh Dinh two battles were fought, one of which was at Nui Mot in which the 3rd Division engaged ARVN and US forces. The division suffered heavy casualties, but Nga does not know the number lost. In 1966 the entire division engaged US troops at Binh Khe District. Nga stated that the division losses amounted to an entire battalion who were killed. As of 10 December 1966, the entire Quyet Chien Regiment plus one battalion from the Quyet Tam Regiment were operating in southern Quang Ngai Province with the mission to attack somewhere in northern Quang Ngai during the dry season. The chief of staff and the political officer of the division make up the command group for the units in Quang Ngai. The Quyet Thang Regiment and the remainder of the Quyet Tam Regiment are located in An Lao District, Binh Dinh Province with an unknown mission. There are also four companies directly subordinate to the division headquarters. They are: one recon company, one sapper company, one transportation company and one security company. Locations of these units are unknown.

(i) G-2 Comment: The returnee's statement of the Sao Vang being redesignated as the 3rd Division is true. Quyet Chien Regiment was previously confirmed as the cover name of the 2nd Regiment of the 3rd Division. Cover names for the 12th Regiment (AKA 18th) and 22nd Regiment are Quyet Thang and Quyet Tam respectively. All information in regards to unit designation has been previously confirmed.

C. Reserves and Reinforcements. No change.

D. New Enemy Tactics.

(1) In the past four months there have been a total of 247 sniper incidents in the 1st Marine Regiment TAOR. A cross section of company commanders and platoon commanders that have been in the field for 5 months or more have been interviewed for their comments about sniper fire.

(a) Characteristics of sniper fire.

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1. Usually a burst of 3-5 rounds.
2. Does not appear to be any pattern for target, such as radio OP or platoon commanders.

3. VC always fire from inside tree line so that muzzle flashes cannot be observed.

4. Normally fire from across water barrier, river or rice paddy.

5. Trails and channelized avenues of approach are sometimes barricaded by barbed wire or fallen bamboo trees. These barricades are often mined and/or covered by fire.

6. There are subtle changes in the attitude of the population that sometimes indicate an impending sniper attack. The people do not talk or ignore the Marines, and there are few people in the fields. Warning drums are a good indication that there are VC in the area and that they know Marines are approaching.

(2) The following is a study conducted by the 1st Marine Regiment on the raid tactics of the VC:

(a) Characteristics of a VC raid.

1. Usually 50-100 men.

2. Normally dark of the moon period/new moon phase.

3. Attack between 2400H and 0300H.

4. Usually employ mortars against any unit that is able to fire artillery or mortars in support of the attacked unit.

5. Try to immediately disrupt communications with parent unit. Results of attacks indicate that the VC plan and rehearse attacks and raids in detail. Captured documents and prisoners indicate that usually the 402nd Sapper Battalion operates inside the 1st Marines TAOR.

6. Men are usually stripped to the waist wearing only shorts.

7. Use satchel charges.

8. Use automatic weapons.

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9. Try to infiltrate the perimeter.

10. Possibly use the same route in and out of target area.

11. VC always try to recover their own bodies. The VC definitely reconnoiter many targets. They wait until the Marines relax and then strike with a large concentration and lightning execution. They destroy as much as possible then exit as quickly as possible.

(3) The following report was received from the national police as reported by Quang Da Special Zone Intsum No. 27: The VC have just developed a new tactic to be used against scout dogs, by using dry pepper (hot) and spreading around cave entrances and routes of withdrawal, thus neutralizing their effectiveness. (G-2 Comment: F/6, first report)

E. Administrative and Political Units. Negative

F. Anti-Air Activity. No unusual anti-air activity occurred during the reporting period.

G. Anti-Personnel/Anti-Tank Mine Activity.

(1) During the reporting period, there were a total of 49 anti-tank/anti-personnel mines and booby traps incidents within the Chu Lai and Da Nang TAOR's. Da Nang again received the bulk of the incidents. There were a total of 14 anti-tank mining/booby trap incidents resulting in 58 Marines wounded, 23 anti-personnel mining/booby trap incidents resulting in 48 wounded and one killed.

(2) In the Chu Lai TAOR there were no recorded anti-tank incidents. Fourteen anti-personnel incidents were recorded however, resulting in 17 Marines wounded and one killed.

(3) Once again the VC have utilized their dead as booby traps. At 241850H, a D/1/5 platoon combat patrol while picking up a dead VC detonated a grenade rigged as a booby trap under the body resulting in one Marine wounded. Thus far within the last month, this is the second reported incident of this nature to be recorded in the Chu Lai area. This is another indication of the VC determination to employ this type technique.

H. Artillery/Mortar/RR Activity. During the subject period Danang received a total of 5 mortar incidents and Chu Lai recorded 1.

(1) At 191115H, G/2/5 received 800-900 rounds of automatic

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weapons fire and 5 rounds of 60mm mortar fire during a search-and-destroy mission. (See Para 2.L.(2) this PERINTREP)

(2) At 192030H, G/2/5 perimeter defense position at (AT 928528) called for a med-evac helicopter for a sick Marine. Upon arrival of the helicopter in the landing zone, one round of 60mm mortar fire and 200 rounds of small arms fire were received from vicinity (AT 927523). Marines returned 600 rounds of automatic weapons fire. A search of the area was conducted with inconclusive results.

(3) At 222330H, H/2/5 platoon observation post located at (AT 915515) received 3 rounds of 60mm mortar resulting in one Marine wounded. Also received 25 rounds of small arms fire from a ridgeline south of the OP position. Marines returned 150 rounds of small arms fire. A search conducted at first light showed inconclusive results.

(4) At 222110H, E/2/11 battery perimeter located at (AT 911515) received one unknown caliber mortar round and one rifle grenade and numerous small arms fire from an unknown number of VC located at (AT 910505). Marines returned 12 rounds of 105 howitzer. VC firing ceased. A search of the area was conducted with inconclusive results.

(5) At 260900H, F/2/5 and H/2/5 while on Operation Tuscaloosa received a heavy volume of 82mm mortar fire. (See Para 2.L.(G) this PERINTREP)

(6) At 262145H, B/1/5 company combat base at (BT 327107) received approximately 12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and 1000 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of VC at (BT 325109). Marines returned 500 rounds of small arms fire, 25 rounds of M-79 and H and I missions fired on the possible mortar positions. Search of the area conducted at first light with inconclusive results.

**I. Interdiction Activities. Negative**

**J. Guerrilla Activity.** The reporting period showed a marked decrease in guerrilla activity in both the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's, possibly because of the fair weather favorable to ground small-scale operations.

(1) In the Danang TAOR, guerrillas initiated the following incidents: 92 harassing small arms fire, 3 grenades, 6 punji pits, 2 small arms/M-79, and 1 punji pit/grenade incidents. This is a decrease of 40 incidents of various types from the last reporting period which was 144.

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(2) In the Chu Lai TAOR, total incidents recorded were 77 broken down as follows: 66 harassing small arms fire, 10 grenades, and 1 small arms/grenade incidents for a decrease of 9 incidents over the last reporting period of 86.

K. Guided Missiles. Negative

L. Infantry. There were 8 significant contacts within the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's during the reporting period. Six were in the Danang sector and two were in the Chu Lai sector.

(1) At 171200H, H/2/5 search-and-destroy located at (AT 937502) received 500 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire from an estimated two squads of VC with three automatic weapons located at (AT 937511). Marines returned 600 rounds of small arms fire, 20 rounds of 60mm mortar, 23 rounds of 81mm mortar and 8 rounds of 155 howitzer. The VC firing ceased. The area was later searched with inconclusive results.

(2) At 191115H, G/2/5 search-and-destroy operation located at (AT 953545) received 800-1000 rounds of automatic weapons fire and 5 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from an estimated VC platoon located at (AT 955546). Five Marines were wounded. Marines returned 1500 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire and 15 rounds of 60mm mortar backed by an artillery mission. A search of the area found 1 VC wounded with a U.S. Grease Gun, cartridge belt and ammunition.

(3) At 222045H, H/2/5 platoon observation post located at (AT 913 515) received 500 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire from a ridgeline vicinity (AT 915508). Platoon returned fire and the enemy firing ceased. A search of the area conducted at first light with inconclusive results.

(4) At 221115H, H/2/4 sweep force located at (AT 833554) made immediate contact with an unknown size VC force at (AT 833553). Third platoon was blocking for the sweep force. Contact and small arms fire was continuous. Artillery fired 9 rounds of 105 howitzer WP, and 82 rounds of HE. Marine infantrymen fired 1500 rounds of small arms, 80 rounds of 60mm mortar, 19 rounds of 3.5 rockets, 25 rounds of M-79. A search of the area found 15 VC confirmed kills, 1 wounded PW, 1 detainee, two K.44 Chicom rifles, one U.S. Thompson sub-machine gun, one U.S. M-1 Carbine, three Chicom grenades and miscellaneous documents. Also estimated 5 VC KIA probable.

(5) At 230930H, D/1/1 platoon combat patrol located at (BT 080 588) while moving north received a large volume of automatic weapons fire from an estimated three VC located at (BT 078588). While the point maneuvered under support from the base of fire, the base of fire received a heavy volume of fire from an estimated six VC located at (BT 080590)

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resulting in two Marines killed and four wounded. A reaction force with support from tanks and LVT's was sent in and a search was conducted with inconclusive results.

(6) At 260900H, F/2/5 on a search-and-destroy mission while on Operation Tuscaloosa located at (AT 976523) received 2000 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire, 18 rounds of 82mm mortar from an estimated VC company located at (AT 9852) resulting in 7 Marines wounded. Marines returned 3000 rounds of small arms fire, a heavy volume of M-79 rounds and 3.5 rockets. Air strike was called. VC then fired approximately 5 more rounds of 82mm mortar WP on the Marines in an attempt to divert the air strike on the Marines. Company H/2/5 crossed a river and maneuvered to vicinity (AT 972518) while receiving heavy small arms fire and 82mm mortar fire. After the engagement, VC losses were listed as 78 VC confirmed KIA, 66 KIA probable, 2 detainees, and 17 individual weapons captured. (G-2 Comment: Documents captured in this engagement showed that VC units in contact were the R-21st and the R-23rd Companies of the R-20th Provincial Mobile Battalion of Quang Nam Province. Due to the heavy losses suffered by the R-21st and the R-23rd Companies, the R-20th Battalion is not considered to be combat effective.

(7) At 271000H to 271500H, B/1/7 platoon combat patrol at (BS 645948) received 100 rounds of small arms fire from vicinity (BS 649945). A patrol searched the area with inconclusive results. The patrol then received 3000-4000 rounds of small arms fire from an unknown number of VC. Marines then observed 4 VC wearing camouflage uniforms attempting to crawl to a better firing position. Patrol fired approximately 5000 rounds of small arms, 2 LAAW's, 20 rounds of M-79 and 14 rounds of 60mm mortar. A search conducted found 2 U.S. Thompson SMG's, 1 57mm recoilless rifle round, 3 Chicom grenades, 5 VC confirmed killed and an estimated 2 probably killed.

(8) At 301400H, I/3/7 search-and-destroy mission at (BS 829 399 and 827396) while attempting to enter a hamlet at vicinity (BS 831 395) from the northeast, met an unknown size enemy force that was dug in. Marines received approximately 800 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire from well-concealed positions at (BS 831398 to 829392). Artillery mission called with naval gun fire firing preparatory fire on the enemy. Fixed wing strike using napalm was also conducted. One HU-1-E gunship was temporarily forced down by sniper fire earlier. VC casualties for this encounter were 4 VC confirmed KIA.

M. Reconnaissance. Negative

N. Infiltration. Negative

O. Other Elements. See Annex B, (Significant Agent, VCC/Returnee and Document Reports) Paragraph 2.

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### 3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

A. Enemy Organization and Combat Efficiency. No change. Refer 1st Marine Division PERINTREP NO. 17.

B. New Unit Identification. V-75 Mortar Battalion. (See Annex B, Paragraph III, interrogation report of captive Nguyen Van Bao, member of C-75 Company, V-75 Mortar Battalion.)

C. New Weapons and Equipment. Negative

D. Personalities. Negative

E. Enemy Losses: Enemy losses during the reporting period in the Danang and Chu Lei TAOR's were a total of 269 confirmed VC KIA, 225 probable VC KIA, 368 detainees apprehended during the period of which there were 28 VC and 1 civil defendant. In addition, the enemy lost the following personnel and weapons on the following operations: Operation Sierra which commenced at 120600H December 1966 and terminated at 211200H January 1967 totaled 75 confirmed VC KIA, 71 probable VC KIA and 66 detainees picked up of which 9 were found to be VC, 30 civil defendants, and the remainder, innocent civilians. Armaments captured were 36 individual weapons of various types. Enemy losses on Operation Tuscaloosa which commenced at 240730H January 1967 and terminated at 281700H were 79 VC KIA confirmed, 64 VC KIA probable, 2 detainees of which 1 was a civil defendant and 17 individual weapons. Operation De Soto which commenced at 262000H January 1967 and is still continuing with light contact has thus far netted 37 confirmed VC KIA and 40 probable VC KIA. Operation Trinity which commenced at 300815H January 1967 and still continuing with light contact has thus far resulted in 1 confirmed VC KIA, and 1 probable KIA, 1 detainee who is a VC PW and 1 individual weapon. This brings the total combined enemy losses for the reporting period to 461 KIA confirmed, 401 KIA probable, 38 PW (VC), 6 VC returnees, 1 NVA returnee, and 32 civil defendants. Weapons total were 89 individual type.

F. Morale. No change. Refer 1st Marine Division PERINTREP NO 17.

G. Details of Administrative Installation and Support.

(1) An agent report indicated that on 20 December 1966, a VC arms and explosives factory, identified as Cang Hai Nam 09, was located in Nuoc Lac Hamlet (BS 390450). He Thi Phu, an explosive engineer, commanded the installation. The camp consisted of three buildings, each measuring 40 by 50 meters. Approximately 1000 personnel worked at the factory. The factory produced all types of arms and explosives for Military Region 5. The following facilities were contained in one of the buildings: 7 generators, 3 shelters, one bunker used as a testing laboratory. (G-2 Comment: Report forwarded by 1st Field Forces in

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II Corps area. A 14 October 1966 photography reveals buildings larger than normal for such remote area, but none as large as described above).

(2) The following report was received from the 149th Military Intelligence Group dated 10 January 1967: As of 25 October 1966, a VC munitions workshop known as the H-60 workshop, previously designated T-60, was located from (BT 195044) to (BT 200050) on both sides of Can stream. The workshop consisted of five thatch shelters, each measuring 10 by 5 meters, and spaced at 100 meter intervals. At the site were 4 engines operated by dynamos and 60 drums, the contents of which were unknown. The workshop was operated by a director and 250 workers, of whom 40 were females. The director was Pham Huu Dien, who was responsible for the receiving and distribution of weapons. The workshop operated only at night from 2100 to 0400 hours. It repaired and manufactured weapons, mines, bottle grenades, stick hand grenades, concrete grenades and other explosive devices that the local people had not seen before. Every night about 50 weapons were manufactured and repaired. The weapons were supplied to the areas of Tien Phuoc, Hau Duc and Tam Ky Districts. Every day, a 40-man labor group went to Bong Mieu to purchase iron and cast iron for the workshop. Equipment such as saws, hammers, pliers, etc., were brought to Ky Que from the Tam Ky district seat. From Ky Que, the equipment was transported by a 30-man pedicab group through Bong Mieu to the workshop. The pedicab group was divided into five teams. The female workers cooked for the personnel and went daily to sub-districts in the area to purchase short bottles and to cut banana leaves. The workshop was protected by a well armed regular company. Members of the company were divided into three-man cells that patrolled day and night throughout the workshop except at the entrances and exit, where two guides were posted at all times. Around the perimeter of the workshop, there were numerous mines, traps and spikes, although there were no barbed-wire fences.

(3) Also received from the 149th Military Intelligence Group and dated 20 January 1967, is the following: A VC base camp was located at Tra Gia (BS 268870). The camp was commanded by Pham Miet, a native of Tra Bong. The assistant camp commander was Dinh Cui. The camp consisted of seven thatch covered buildings, each capable of housing 20 people. Approximately 200 Vietnamese Montagnard Communists lived in or near the camp. They were armed with an undetermined number of weapons. A VC radio/telephone repair factory was also located in the camp. The factory contained approximately 30 AN/PRC-10 transceivers and an undetermined number of AN/PRC-9 telephones. The camp's administration office was equipped with two typewriters, two telephone sets, and one unidentified radio with an antenna.

H. Terrain. Negative

I. Weather. The weather in both TAOR's from 151200H to 311200H

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January 1967 was characterized by generally cloudy skies with light scattered rainshowers. The average maximum and minimum temperatures were 73 degrees and 63 degrees respectively while humidity averaged 84 percent. Visibility averaged 3 to 7 miles while winds were again predominately from the northwesterly direction with an average velocity of 6 knots, gusting to 15 knots. Recorded rainfall during the reporting period totalled a low 1.35 inches.

J. Intelligence Operations, Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

A. The following report was received from the 3rd Marine Division of counterintelligence interest and reads as follows:

(1) At approximately 1800H on 2 January 1967, the national police stopped a truck at the south checkpoint (YD 895134) and apprehended Cao Coi (AKA Duong; Van Minh) for lack of proper identification. Intensive CIT interrogation revealed that this individual was a member of an 11-men sabotage team who were issued munition by the VC in Hai Van pass area and instructed to carry out sabotage activities on roads and bridges. The captured individual related that his partner was to set up a claymore mine 100 to 200 yards south of the south checkpoint on Highway #1. The detainee was to set up a claymore mine somewhere in the Gia Le area. When this individual was apprehended, the truck was not searched, and the vehicle passed on through the base carrying a claymore mine and a U.S. caliber 45 pistol. The saboteur provided a list of seven personalities, and a description of vehicles and license numbers that were carrying Chicom grenades, U.S. M-26 grenades and U.S. claymore mines for the purpose of sabotage.

B. Also received from the Quang Da Special Zone of counterintelligence interest is the following:

(1) A 9 January 1967 report from a U.S. Intelligence Agency related that the VC are using a new sabotage device which is approximately 3 inches long, one quarter of an inch in diameter, and made to look like an ordinary cigarette. In addition to containing tobacco to make this device appear as a normal cigarette, the interior contains red phosphorous and potassium chlorate which "eats" through a soft piece of wood and ignites an explosive powder. Reportedly, the "cigarette" does not contain enough power to be used as an assassination device and it appears to be a "delay element" when used to detonate a larger type explosive charge.

C. The following is a counterintelligence report on the sequence of events leading up to the operation launched by the 1st Battalion 1st Marines at (DT 005545) on 14 January 1967.

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(1) On 10 January 1967, personnel of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines killed a VC soldier in the area known as the Horseshoe (BT 0963).

(2) Numerous documents were found on the body of the dead VC. These documents were turned over to the S-2, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. The S-2 Chief caused the documents to be screened by one of the Battalion's interpreters. After the screening, one of the documents was found to be a notice to VC Village and Hamlet Cadre of a meeting to be held in a church at (BT 005545). The meeting was to be held on 14 January 1967, and was being held to stimulate the art and technique of combat and sapper tactics.

(3) The S-2 Chief, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, delivered the document and the original translation to the 3rd CIT on 10 January.

(4) Personnel of the 3rd Counterintelligence Team had the translation of the document checked with the original for accuracy. The translation was found to be accurate.

(5) On 11 January 1967, a Sub-Team of the 3rd Counterintelligence Team was dispatched to Hoi An, to the Census Grievance Study Center to determine the location of the village, as the name of the village was written as a Viet Cong name on the original document. The Census Grievance Study Center was able to furnish an eight digit coordinate on the location of the church and the Government name of the village.

(6) The Sub-Team then contacted the Sub-Team Commander, of the 3rd Counterintelligence Team, that is billeted with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, to ascertain if any of the Team's Sources could verify the location. One of the Sources came from the village given by the Census Grievance Study Center and verified the location of the church.

(7) The Sub-Team proceeded to the 1st Marines' Command Post, where they contacted the Regimental S-2. The information was passed to the S-2 as well as the original document and a copy of the translation.

(8) On 13 January 1967, the Team Commander contacted the S-2, 1st Marines, and an operation was planned to capture or kill the Cadre that attended the meeting.

(9) On 14 January 1967, an operation was launched by "C" Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. The 1st Marine Regiment's count of Viet Cong casualties was sixty-one (61) KIA, and seventy-five (75) KIA probable.

##### 5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES

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A. Capabilities

(1) Utilizing his main forces, the enemy can:

(a) Attack the An Hoa, Nong Son or Nui Lac Son with up to one regiment reinforced by local forces up to battalion size.

(b) Attack the Chu Lai Combat Base with the 2nd Division reinforced by divisional support battalions and nearby local forces.

(c) Attack the Duc Pho with the 3rd Division's 2nd VC and 22nd NVA Regiments augmented by divisional support battalions and near-by provincial mobile battalions.

(d) Attack any or several of the CIDG camps in force of one or more regiments.

(e) Conduct combinations of the above.

(f) Should he so elect, defend various installations and base areas, most notably in the Do Xa, up to division strength utilizing regular security forces augmented by elements of the 2nd Division.

(g) Reinforce his position in the southern I Corps area by the infiltration of additional forces from North Vietnam or by the introduction of the 22nd NVA Regiment from Binh Dinh Province within one day after movement commences, the 1st and 10th Divisions from the Central Highlands, 15 to 20 days after movement commences and the 6th NVA Regiment from Thua Thien Province within 10 days after movement commences.

(h) Employ his main forces in an essentially non-aggressive role - engaged primarily in political indoctrination, retraining, reequipping and conducting small attacks against isolated outposts in no more than battalion size - but positioned so as always to pose a threat to certain vital points thus forcing a note of more than usual caution into the conduct of friendly operations.

(2) Utilizing his local and guerrilla forces, the enemy can:

(a) Attack, preferably by fire, ambush, or sepper raid, friendly forces and positions in up to reinforced battalion strength at a time and place of the enemy's choosing.

(b) Harass friendly forces and installations with small arms, grenades, mortars, booby traps and small ambushes at a time and place of the enemy's choosing.

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(c) Interdict lines of communication throughout the tri-province area, particularly National Route #1, Liberty Road and the railroad lines in Hoi Van Pass area at a time and place of the enemy's choice, often using trained demolitions personnel working in conjunction with guerrilla and local forces.

(d) Conduct political agitation and propaganda, combined with a selective use of politically-inspired violence, including assassination, terrorism and sabotage in an effort to thwart the Revolutionary Development Program.

**B. Probable Enemy Course of Action**

(1) For the main forces:

(a) Conduct a coordinated of any or several of the CIDG camps at a time of the enemy's choosing with the main objective of ambushing reinforcements, utilizing a force of one or more reinforced regiments.

(b) Continue political indoctrination, reequipping, and replenishing ranks and small-scale attacks on isolated outposts for the primary purpose of gaining combat experience; while also by these attacks and the real or imagined potential threat to friendly forces in the vicinity of these main forces, hoping to inhibit our freedom of action.

(c) Attack Duc Pho in multi-regimental strength using the 2nd VC reinforced by the 22nd NVA from Binh Dinh Province, after suitable battlefield preparations have been made, and possibly in conjunction with a secondary attack using elements of the 2nd Division against Quang Ngai city or positions within the Chu Lai Combat Base.

(d) Attack the Nui Lac Son, Nong Son or An Hoa complexes at a time of the enemy's choosing with one reinforced regiment.

(e) Defend vital installations and important base areas, notably the Do Xa, in up to divisional strength.

(f) Infiltrate additional forces from North Vietnam into southern I Corps and/or introduce enemy forces from the Central Highlands or northern I Corps into the tri-province area.

(g) Attack the Chu Lai Combat Base with the 2nd Division consisting of three infantry regiments reinforced and assisted by divisional support battalions and adjacent provincial mobile battalions.

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(2) For local and guerrilla forces:

(a) To continue to exercise the related capabilities listed in paragraphs 5.A.(9) to (12) above throughout the three provinces.

C. Vulnerabilities.

(1) The enemy is vulnerable to attack by massed support fires from air, artillery and naval gunfire. Even his deepest base areas and lines of communication are vulnerable to attack by air. When closer to the coast or to friendly positions, any massed formation is subject to detection and subsequent attack by artillery and naval gunfire in addition to air. Being unable effectively to counter this firepower, the enemy must rely heavily on camouflage and circumspection in his activities in order to minimize this vulnerability.

(2) The enemy is vulnerable to psychological warfare operations. Life for the Viet Cong is hard at best and filled with deprivation and danger. This constant difficulty and peril, the lack of dedication on the part of the rank and file, as well as some of the cadre, plus the preferred leniency of the Chieu Hoi program, combine to make the enemy unusually susceptible to exploitation by psychological warfare technique.

(3) The enemy is vulnerable to rapid, bold and unexpected maneuvers in the developing tactical situation. His insistence on minutely planned and carefully rehearsed operations precludes a quick and flexible reaction to friendly maneuvers, unless in keeping with his preconceived battle plan.

(4) The enemy is vulnerable to sustained operations and aggressive pursuit. The inherent weakness of the enemy's logistic system and its continuing susceptibility to interdiction by air deny the enemy the capability of supporting sustained combat operations. The enemy's rigidity of tactical doctrine induces him to avoid and/or quickly disengage from contact whenever the tactical situation does not develop according to plan.

  
S. DAVIS  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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ANNEXES:

- A - Order of Battle. (See 1st MarDiv PERINTREP NO. 1 January 1967,  
Annex A, Order of Battle)
- B - Significant Agents, VCC/Returnees, and Document Reports
- C - Paragraph 13 Entries
- D - Astronomical Data

Distribution: "A" less 7, 12, 17-21, 37-67  
"C" less 72, 76, 84, 98, 100

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	2nd ROKMC Bde	(1)
	SA, 2nd ARVN Div	(1)
	SA, Quang Tin Sector	(1)
	SA, Quang Ngai Sector	(1)
	SA, QNNS Adv Grp, Hoi An	(1)
	FLC	(1)
	MCB 9	(1)
	MCB 10	(1)
	MCB 58	(1)
	CICV	(1)
	7th Engr	(1)
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**UNCLASSIFIED**ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENTS, VC PW/RETURNES, AND DOCUMENTS REPORTS) TO 1ST  
MARDIV PERINTREP NO. 2**I. INTERROGATION REPORT OF VC RETURNEE MAI VAN KHOI**

NAME: Mai Van Khoi  
 AGE: unknown  
 UNIT: 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon, 3rd Company, 72nd Province Mobile Bn.

Khoi defected on 3 December 1966 at the Thang Binh District Headquarters and interrogated by the National Police.

a. Organization of the 72nd Battalion: Composed of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Infantry Companies and the 4th Headquarters Company. The 4th Company consisted of the communication section, recon section, weapons section, medical section, manager section and the liaison section. Each section is further divided into cells and commanded directly by battalion headquarters. Each company has 3 platoons, 3 squads per platoon and 2 women to buy food.

**b. Weapons and Equipment**

1. 1st and 2nd Co's: unknown
2. 3rd Co: AR's, M-1's, Carbines and K-44 rifles
3. 4th Co: 3-57mm recoilless rifles, 2-81mm mortars, 2-60mm mortars, 2-30cal machine-guns and 3 AN/PRC-10 radios.

**c. Personalities**

Bn CO: Tran Can Cao  
 3rd Co CO: Khanh  
 3rd Co XO: Phuoc

d. Strength: Over 400, more than  $\frac{1}{2}$  were natives of Binh Giang (V) and Binh Duong (V) of Thang Binh District. One-third are natives of Ky Anh (V) of Tam Ky District while the remainder were from Tien Phuoc District.

e. Operational Areas: Its normal operational areas were Tien Phuoc, and Tam Ky Districts of Quang Tin Province and Phu Tho (V) of Que Son (D) Quang Nam Province. Its base locations were in #4 and #8 hamlets of Phuoc Tan (V), Tien Phuoc District.

**f. Past Activities:**

1965: Battalion engaged with ARVN forces at Cam Khe market, Ky An (V), Tam Ky District.

1966: Battalion engaged with ARVN at #8 hamlet, Ky An (V), Tam

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

RELEASABLE TO FWMF  
AND RVNAF


B-1

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Ky District. In both of these battles, VC losses were heavy.

g. Morale: Very low because of a general lack of food, medical supplies and the reluctance of the people to aid them, mostly because of the people's fear of being attacked by airplanes. In the VC controlled areas, the people's life was also bad because of the taxes levied on them and the use of them as coolie laborers.

h. Organizational Chart of the 72nd Quang Tin Provincial Mobile Battalion.



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## II. SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT OF NGHIEM THI QUOC

Name: Nghiem Thi Quoc  
 Age: 26  
 Present Address: Hanoi, North Vietnam  
 Rank: Corporal  
 Unit: 3rd Squad, 1st Platoon, 5th Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 2nd Division.  
 Date of Capture: 21 January 1967  
 Place of Capture: Binh Que (V), Thang Binh (D)

a. Information Obtained

1. Quoc joined the NVA in August of 1964 at Hanoi, because he was of military age. He reported to the 2nd Battalion, 64th Regiment, 320th Division for two months training in Hanoi. Quoc fired U.S. made Johnson and Chicom made AR's. During this time the 2nd Battalion was responsible for the security of Hanoi. From March of 1965 when the battalion moved from Hanoi until February of 1966 the battalion roamed all over North Vietnam, evading bombers.

2. Quoc first heard that he was going to SVN in January of 1966. The four battalions of the 64th Regiment rotated to SVN in 4 groups, one battalion for each group. The group took the same name as the battalion which made it up. The entire trip lasted 2 months and 20 days. Quoc brought 3 sets of clothes, 1 Soviet 7.62 light machine-gun and 200 rounds, 1 blanket, hammock and 1 mosquito net. The men of these groups were fed by the local people. Quoc stated that 6 men in his group died due to malaria and lack of medicine.

3. On 20 April 1966, Quoc's group arrived at Que Son (D), Quang Nam Province. It was necessary to wait one month for the rest of the regiment to arrive. They rested for another month and a half. On 1 June 1966 the entire regiment moved to Hiep Duc (D). Upon arrival in Que Son (D) the 64th Regiment was redesignated as the 3rd Regiment. The 1st and 2nd regiments were in SVN. The 320th Division was redesignated the 2nd Division. After one week in Hiep Duc (D) the 3rd Regiment moved to Tien Phuoc (D) where it remained for 10 days. Also in June of 1966 the 2nd Battalion moved to Phu Tho (V), Que Son (D) and stayed for 4 days. After 4 days the battalion moved to Son Trung (V), Que Son (D). From June of 1966 to present the 3rd Regiment has been located in Que Son (D).

4. In October of 1966 the 3rd Regiment attacked an OP in Trung Phuoc (V), Que Son (D). This OP belonged to the 51st ARVN Regiment. Quoc stated that his regiment killed 760 men and captured 50 ARVN prisoners. He only heard about these prisoners and doesn't know what their fate was.

5. Quoc claimed that the above battle is the only major engage-

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ment that his battalion participated in. He said that there were many platoon-size skirmishes but nothing major.

6. On 21 January 1967 in a hamlet in Binh Que (V), Thang Binh (D), 50 men from Quoc's company and 20 local guerrillas tried to destroy the hamlet for propaganda purposes thinking that ARVN reinforcements would be too slow. The 5th Company suffered 1 KIA and some WIA's. Quoc was the only one captured.

7. The current mission of the 3rd Regiment is to destroy roads, protect the people and prepare to attack allied forces if feasible.

8. On June of 1966, one company from the 2nd Battalion engaged an American company at Nui Vu mountain in Tien Phuoc (D). Quoc's company suffered 35 KIA's and 30 WIA's. Morale in the 2nd Battalion is presently low due to recent losses. So far 5 men from the 5th Company have defected. Quoc stated that many men in the 5th Company want to desert, but know nothing of the geography of SVN. On December of 1966, the 2nd Battalion received 50 men, all of whom were already trained.

9. Supplies are received from NVN, but Quoc denied knowledge of any details. Quoc wasn't sure about supply shortages, because he hasn't noticed any. Two interns are allotted each battalion and two corpsmen for each company. Each day Quoc received 3 cans of rice and 5 piasters.

10. Quoc stated that he has no idea where the division or regimental CP's are. As of 20 January 1967 the 2nd Battalion CP was located somewhere in Thang Binh (D), as were the other 3 companies. Quoc's company was located in Binh Phu (V), Thang Binh (D).

11. Quoc stated that the 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment is also known as Binh Minh, the 2nd Battalion as Binh Da, the 3rd Battalion as Binh Thien. There are 8 separate companies which are subordinate directly to division headquarters and are messed in a security group.

<u>Code Number</u>	<u>Type</u>
13	Recon Company, 40 men (No infra-red)
14	12.7 AA Defense Battery (3 guns)
15	Transport Company, 80 men
16	75mm Recoilless Rifle Company, (6 guns)
17	82mm Mortar Battery, (6 tubes)
18	Communication Company, (12-15 watt radios)
19	Engineer Company, 80 men w/mission of destroying obstacles
20	Medical Company, 3 doctors, 20 corpsmen

12. There are 400 men in the 2nd Battalion divided into 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Companies. There are 3 infantry companies and a weapons

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REF ID: A6500000000000000000000000000000

(8th) company in the battalion. There are three platoons with (3) 5 men squads. In the weapons company the breakdown is the same. In the weapons company there are 4-82mm mortars, 2-75mm recoilless rifles and 2-30 caliber machine-guns. Quoc is an infantry squad leader. He was armed with a Soviet 7.62mm AK-47 sub-machine gun. Each man in the 5th company has a rifle and 20 Chinese grenades.

13. Personalities:

CO, 3rd Regt:	Viet Son, LtCol, about 45
XO, 3rd Regt:	Kiem, Maj, about 40
PO, 3rd Regt:	Than, LtCol, about 45
CO, 2nd Bn:	Thanh, Capt, about 45
Asst PO, 2nd Bn:	Ung, Capt, about 45
Asst PO, 2nd Bn:	Deu, Lt, about 38
CO, 5th Co:	Phuc, 2dLt, about 35
XO, 5th Co:	Than, 2dLt, about 35
Asst PO, 5th Co:	Truoc, 2dLt, about 25

14. Interrogator comments that this man seemed very intelligent and helpful.

15. G-2 Comment: F/2, the history of the 3rd Regiment as stated by the captive corroborate with previous reports. The OP of the 51st ARVN Regiment was attacked in October of 1966 by the 3rd Regiment in the Nong Son OP at vicinity (AT 8439) on 17 October 1966. It should be noted, the casualties are only hear-say. The attack in June of 1966 at Nui Vu was the 18-man recon team from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion. This has been confirmed by more than 5 previous captives and returnees statements. Regiment and battalion personalities as stated by this captive corroborate with previous reports. It is possible the entire 3rd Regiment is in the Que Son/Thang Binh border area.

III. The following information was obtained from a captive who participated in the attack on K/3/1 on 15 January 1967. The reported unit is new and to date, no additional corroborating information has been received to confirm or deny this report.

Interrogation report of Nguyen Van Bao, age 23, PFC Grenadier, 9th Cell, 6th Squad, 2nd Platoon, 2nd Company (AKA: C-75 Company), V-75 Mortar Battalion.

a. Information Obtained:

1. Strength: V-75 Bn-360 men  
C-75 Co-120 men  
2nd Plt-30 men  
6th Sqd-6 men  
9th Cell-3 men

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2. Organization: Battalion - 3 companies  
Companies - 4 platoons  
Platoons - 4 squads  
Squads - 2 cells

3. Weapons: Battalion - 10-81mm mortars, 5-60mm mortars,  
3-B-40 rocket launchers, one sniper rifle.

Companies - 20 AK-47's, 32 SKS rifles, 2 K-50  
SMG's, 2 K-44 rifles, 2 M-2 Carbines, pistols, satchel charges, banga-  
lore torpedoes, grenades, TNT.

4. Disposition: Unknown

5. Mission: Captive-To infiltrate perimeter and employ two  
grenades and one satchel charge against positions.  
Units-To over-run positions and destroy equipment.

6. Supply: Food-Insufficient, rice and fish sauce only.  
Ammo-Insufficient, 120 rounds small arms per man,  
five rounds 81mm mortar, three rounds B-40 per launcher.

7. Losses: Prior to attack, there had been no losses in the  
V-75 Battalion.

8. Medical: Insufficient malaria pills and pain killers only.  
No antibiotics.

9. Replacements: None

10. Morale: Fair, although many were homesick and wanted to  
return to the north.

11. Tactics: Assault, over-run, withdraw.

12. Communications: 1 AN/PRC-10 Radio for communications out-  
side V-75 Battalion and runners are used from the battalion to the companies.

13. Personalities: Cong, 45, V-75 Commander, Major  
Nguyen Van Mau, 35, C-75 Commander, 1stLt  
Pham Van Dong, C-75 XO, CWO  
Tran Van Dong, PltLdr, 1stPlt, Sgt  
Than Dang Dao, PltLdr, 3rdPlt, Sgt

14. Other Information:

(a) The captive was drafted in May 1965 at Hoa Binh Pro-  
vince, North Vietnam. He left home for training in August 1965. Upon  
reporting for duty, he underwent three months of basic infantry training

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and was then assigned to the Q-80 Company of the S-90 Battalion. The captive was transferred to the C-75 Company, V-75 Battalion in June 1966. The V-75 Battalion began infiltration to South Vietnam in June 1966 arriving in Dai Loc District, Quang Nam Province in October 1966. Upon arrival in South Vietnam, the battalion set up a base camp in the mountains of Canh Bac on the Dai Loc slope. From the V-75 base camp, he could see the lights of Da Nang to the northeast.

(b) On 11 January 1967, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd companies of the V-75 Mortar Battalion left their base camp and proceeded generally east. The first days march was conducted during the daylight hours of 11 January 1967. During the first days march, the battalion crossed one large river (possibly the Song Ai Nghia). The second day of march was conducted during the hours of daylight. During the second days march, the V-75 crossed one large river. After crossing the river, they crossed a paved highway, possibly Highway #1. Then they travelled parallel to the highway for about one hour. After marching north for about one hour, the battalion arrived in Dien Thang Village. The highway runs through the center of Dien Thang Village. At Dien Thang the battalion rested for about 24 hours. On the night of 14 January 1967, the battalion moved easterly from Dien Thang for about two or three hours until arriving at Hoa Len Village. After leaving Dien Thang and prior to arriving at Hoa Len, the battalion swam a large river (possibly the Song Can Sien). Weapons and equipment were floated across on banana tree logs. Upon arrival in Hoa Len Village, the battalion rested for about 20 minutes prior to beginning the attack.

(c) The plan of attack was to get on line and storm the gate to the post. After completion of attack, the battalion was to withdraw in small groups to the riverbank where the villagers would be waiting to transport the wounded and dead. The battalion was to return to Canh Bac jungle by the same route.

(d) The V-75 Battalion gets the majority of its supplies from Ban Tan Hamlet, Dai Loc District in the vicinity of (AT 818556). The hamlet is about 500 meters north of the river. The captive gave the letter box number of the battalion as Dong Hai 105.

(f) The captive stated that he was sure that the battalion did not cross any railroad tracks during the march to Hoa Len.

(g) The captive stated that he has heard of two units operating near his unit's base camp. They were the T-89 and the Q-15 unit. The captive saw three soldiers from the Dai Loc District force unit in Ban Tan Hamlet during the last supply mission he participated in. The supplies picked up in Ban Tan consist of rice, salt and fish sauce. The supplies are taken from the villagers. The captive stated that he was told that after this attack, the V-75 would rest up and enjoy the Tet holi-

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[REDACTED]  
days. He denies any knowledge of future missions.

(h) The V-75 used six guerrillas from Dien Ngoc village for guides from their base camp to Dien Thang village where other guerrillas met and guided them to Hoa Lan Village.

(i) About 50 percent of the V-75 personnel suffer from malaria. One percent are incapacitated.

15. During the subsequent interrogation, the following information was obtained.

(a) The captive entered the military in June 1965 at Than Lien Village and travelled from there by truck for one day. At Lang Doi was a small base camp for basic training. The captive spent five months at this camp studying basic infantry training consisting of marksmanship, assault techniques, methods of movement, fortifications, such as fox holes, trenches and bunkers. Marksmanship training was in small arms, all armed with Chicom AK's, with only six rounds total firing. His company (Q-80) strength was 120 men, all armed with Chicom AK's, K-44's, and CKC's. Grenade throwing techniques were also taught.

(b) The recruits received much political indoctrination from the Ho Chi Minh government who told them they should be eager to go to South Vietnam to fight the Americans. When basic training was completed, about half of the Q-80 Company was transferred to the C-75 Company of the V-75 Battalion. The C-75 Company was the last company of the V-75 Battalion to form up. The entire battalion was new. The battalion was together for about two weeks prior to the start of their infiltration to South Vietnam. The battalion moved from 0600 to 1700 each day while infiltrating. The initial direction was due west into Laos. They traveled through Laos on small jungle trails for ten days. The battalion did not make any significantly long stops on their journey to South Vietnam. He neither saw nor heard of any bombing while on this infiltration. He knows of no other village names along the route and saw only the guards who guided his battalion. The battalion came directly from Lang Doi village in North Vietnam to the Canh Bac jungle in Quang Nam Province. The only places that he knows of in Quang Nam Province are Ban Tan Hamlet where the battalion gets its rice and Dien Thang Village where the battalion spent the night prior to the attack.

(c) The captive stated that the number of his infiltration group was 54 but that the number was the battalion designation for use while infiltrating only. He denies knowledge of any other unit designations. Occasionally, the battalion would receive rice from guerrillas who would bring it to them.

[REDACTED]  
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(d) The only women in the base camp were two nurses that were attached to his battalion. The nurses also came from North Vietnam with the battalion and are North Vietnamese. They brought all the supplies. In addition, there were two corpsmen per company (total of 6 in the battalion). Approximately half of the battalion has malaria and they get pills from these corpsmen for their sickness.

(e) The captive states that he received word of the attack of 15 January 1967 about two days prior to the attack. His commanding officer, Nguyen Van Mao told his company on 13 January to "prepare your equipment because we are going to attack the Americans." The captive states that his company was not too enthusiastic about attacking the Americans but went because of the order. About 50 percent of the men did not want to attack. The captive maintains that the better soldiers in the battalion were picked to go inside the post, while the others were to provide fire support. To the best of his knowledge, no other unit other than the six guerrillas from Dien Ngoc (VC name for That Thuy Village) participated in the attack.

(f) The captive also stated that all of the people in Hanoi were forced to move out of the city, except the workers of the factories. The only people now in Hanoi are the working people of the factories and one person per household to watch over the house. The captive states that all of the women and children have been evacuated from Hanoi to save them from the bombings.

16. Interrogators Comments: The captive was extremely evasive and lied constantly during the initial interrogation. After the captive was removed to a location more conducive to interrogation and a more direct approach was employed, the captive began to respond.

17. G-2 Comment: This is the first report of the V-75 Mortar Battalion. Accordingly, this captive has been intensively interrogated for three days to include polygraph test. Only suspected areas of deception at this time pertain to unit to which V-75 Battalion may be subordinated and previous combat in which it may have participated.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF  
AND RVNAF

B-9

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ANNEX C (PARAGRAPH 13 ENTRIES) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO. 2

1. Total case of Vietnamese Nationals volunteering information to U.S. Forces are as follows:

1st Marines .....1  
1/1.....1

5th Marines .....3  
2/5.....3

9th Marines .....2  
1/26.....1  
2/4.....1

11th Marines .....2  
4/11.....2

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

C-1

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF  
AND RVNAF

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ANNEX D (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO. 2

<u>DATE</u>	<u>BMCT</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>EECT</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>	<u>MOONPHASE</u>	<u>% ILLUM</u>
FEB 1	0654	0717	1845	1908	----	1149	Full	61
2	0653	0716	1845	1908	0046	1232	Full	50
3	0653	0716	1845	1908	0145	1318	Last	39
4	0653	0716	1846	1909	0244	1408	Last	28
5	0653	0716	1846	1909	0344	1501	Last	19
6	0652	0715	1846	1909	0442	1557	Last	12
7	0652	0715	1847	1910	0537	1654	Last	6
8	0652	0715	1847	1910	0627	1750	Last	2
9	0652	0715	1848	1911	0712	1843	New	0
10	0651	0714	1848	1911	0753	1935	New	0
11	0651	0714	1848	1911	0830	2024	New	2
12	0651	0714	1849	1912	0905	2110	New	6
13	0651	0714	1849	1912	0938	2157	New	11
14	0650	0713	1850	1913	1010	2243	New	18
15	0650	0713	1850	1913	1043	2330	New	26
16	0649	0712	1850	1913	1119	----	New	34
17	0648	0711	1850	1913	1157	0019	First	44
18	0648	0711	1851	1913	1240	0111	First	53
19	0648	0711	1851	1913	1328	0206	First	63
20	0647	0710	1852	1914	1422	0303	First	73

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

RELEASABLE TO FWMF  
 AND RVNAF


D-1

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DECLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

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	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	RELIEF
	POST

00 070810Z JAN 67  
 FM NINTH MARINES

CG FIRST MARDIV **G-3**  
 INFO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ZEN/SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES  
 ZEN/THIRD BN NINTH MARINES  
 BT

RELIEF OF THIRD BN NINTH MARINES BY SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES.  
 A. 1ST MARDIV FRAG 0 46-66.

1. SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES ASSUME OPCON ASSIGNED SECTOR  
 TAOR EFFECTIVE 071505H

2. THIRD BN NINTH MARINES CHOP PED OPCON FROM NINTH MARINES  
 TO 1ST MARDIV EFFECTIVE 071505H.

GP-4

BT

3947

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O 070915Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO CG IF XRAY  
 NINTH MAR  
 ELEVENTH MAR  
 DET THIRD ENGR BN  
 INFO CG III MAF  
 CG THIRD MARDIV  
 FMAW  
 CG FLC  
 BT

FRAG O 3-67 (REPOSITIONING OF BNS)

- A. CG III MAF 182334Z DEC66
- B. CG FIRST MARDIV 260911Z DEC66
- C. FIRST MARDIV FRAG O 44-66
- D. FIRST MARDIV ADMINO 301-66
- E. CG 1ST MARDIV LTR 1/DBG/RRT 5000 OF 19 NOV 66
- F. FORCE O 4000.5
- G. FIRST MARDIV O P02000.2C

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 645B

THIRD MARDIV O P02000.2E

MISSION. FIRST MARDIV RELOCATES SELECTED INFANTRY BNS IN PREPARATION FOR RELIEF ARVN UNITS INDICATED REF A.

## 2. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. FIRST MARDIV EFFECTS SEQUENTIAL RELIEF OF INF BNS TO MAKE THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, IN LIEU OF BN FROM THIRD MARDIV INDICATED REF B, AND TO EMPLOY SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR IN NORTHERN SECTOR DA NANG TAOR. TIME PHASING AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) SECOND BN FOURTH MAR COMPLETES RELIEF THIRD BN NINTH MAR O/A 8 JAN.
- (2) THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR AND SECOND BN FOURTH MAR INTER-CHANGE LOCATIONS WITHIN NINTH MAR SECTOR OF TAOR ON COMPANY FOR COMPANY BASIS DURING PERIOD 12-18 JAN.
- (3) SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR RELIEVES THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR IN NORTHERN SECTOR TAOR SUBSEQUENT 20 JAN 67.
- (4) RELIEVED ELEMENTS THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR MOVE TO CHU LAI FOR FURTHER EMPLOYMENT OPCON IF XRAY SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE.
- B. IF XRAY

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PAGE 3 RUMHLA 645E

ATTACHED: THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR FROM NINTH MAR SUBSEQUENT 20JAN67.

RECEIVE AND EMPLOY WHEN DIRECTED THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR IN EXECUTION PLANS DEVELOPED IAW REF B AS MODIFIED BY THIS FRAG O.

C. NINTH MAR

ATTACHED: SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR ON ARRIVAL DA NANG SUBSEQUENT 20JAN67.

DETACHED: THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR TO TF XRAY ON RELIEF BY SECOND BN TWENTY - SIXTH MAR

(1) EFFECT INTERCHANGE SECOND BN FOURTH MAR THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR DURING PERIOD COMMENCING 12JAN67, INTERCHANGE TO BE COMPLETE NLT 18JAN67.

(2) EFFECT RELIEF THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR WITH SECOND BN TWENTY-SIXTH MAR COMMENCING SUBSEQUENT 20JAN67.

(3) DIRECT RELIEVED ELMS THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR MOVE CHU LAI IAW DIV EMB SCHED TBA.

D. ELEVENTH MAR

ATTACHED: DS ARTY BTRY, TO BE DESIGNATED, ON ARRIVAL DA NANG FROM THIRD MARDIV

E. DET THIRD ENGR BN

PAGE 4 RUMHLA 645E

ATTACHED: ENGR PLAT, TO BE DESIGNATED, ON ARRIVAL DA NANG FROM THIRD MARDIV

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) SECOND BN TWENTY-SIXTH MAR AND REINF ELMS CHOP FIRST MARDIV ON ARRIVAL DA NANG.

(2) THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR CHOPS TF XRAY ON ARRIVAL CHU LAI.

(3) DIRLATUM ALCON.

(4) REF C AS MODIFIED REMAINS IN EFFECT

4. ADMIN AND LOG

A. ADMIN. IAW REF D AND E

B. LOG

(1) SUPPLY

(A) PRESCRIBED LOAD. AS DIR BY PARENT UNIT. CARRY MIN CLASS V SUFFICIENT FOR IN-TRANSIT SECURITY PLUS LOCAD CONSISTENT WITH ASSIGNED MSN. MINIMIZE PALLETIZED SUPPLIES AND EQUIP BY ELIMINATION EXCESS ITEMS, BOTH ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONAL.

1. TRANSFER/EXCHANGE OF EQUIP AND SUPPLIES.

1. /EXCHANGE / EXCHANGE OF EQUIP AND SUPPLIES.

1. ITEMS TO BE LEFT IN PLACE. GARRISON AND PLANT PROPERTY TYPE ITEMS, FIELD FORTIFICATIONS AND CANTONMENT FACILITIES WITH FIXTURES.

CONCLASS

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PAGE 5 RUMHLA 645E

2. TRANSFER OF CLASS I, III, IV AND V SUPPLIES  
IN POSIT IN TAOR AND EXCHANGE OF LIKE ASSETS, 3.G. PUMPS AND  
TENTAGE, IS AUTH.

(C) STORAGE. SUBMIT REQUIREMENTS THIS HQ (ATIN G-4).

(2) TRANSPORTATION

(A) TRK TRANSPORTATION. SUBMIT REQUIREMENTS FOR MVMNT  
W/I DA NANG TAOR THIS HQ (ATIN MTO).

(B) EMBARK. THIRDBN SEVENTH MAR SUBMIT TOTAL LIFT  
REQUIREMENTS ASAP THIS HQ (ATIN EMBO) IAW REF F.

(C) REQUEST TO SPTG CMDS.

1. CG FMAW. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE FIXED WING/  
HELO TRANSPORTATION FOR UNIT MVMNTS.

2. CG FLC.

A. BE PREPARED TO MEET SUGR DEMANDS GENERATED  
BY UNIT MVMNTS.

B. EXPEDITE RETURN OF T/E ITEMS UNDERGOING  
REPAIR FOR THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR PRIOR TO DEPARTURE DA NANG TAOR.

3. INSTRNS FOR MVMNT, SPEC EQUIP AND ADDNL SPT FOR THIRD  
BN SEVENTH MAR TO BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY.

5. COMM-ELEC

PAGE 6. RUMHLA 645E

A. THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR

(1) UPON SHIFT AOR RETAIN PRESENTLY ASSIGNED FREQS.

(2) PRIOR CHOP IF XRAY NEW FREQ ASSIGNMENT BY SEP MSG.

B. SECOND BN FOURTH MAR. UPON SHIFT AOR RETAIN PRESENTLY  
ASSIGNED FREQS.

C. SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR. UPON CHOP FIRST MARDIV AND  
RELIEF INPLACE THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR ASSUME FM FREWS CURRENTLY  
ASSIGNED THAT UNIT IN REF G.

D. COORD INSTRNS.

(1) COMM IAW REF G.

(2) CALL SIGNGS IAW REFS G AND H.


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P 140624Z JAN 67  
FM ELEVENTH MAR  
TO SECOND BN TWELFTH MAR  
INFO CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
CG TASK FORCE XRAY  
ELEVENTH MAR

BT

G-3

7541

OPERATIONAL CONTROL BTRY E, 2D BN, 11TH MARINES  
A. CG FIRST MARDIV 300611Z NOV66  
B. VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS OF CO, 11TH MAR OF 8DEC66  
1. REF A CHOPPED BTRY E, 2/11 TO OPCON 2/12  
2. IAW REF B, BTRY E, 2/11 CHOPPED OPCON CO 11TH MARINES EFFECTIVE  
8DEC66

GP-4

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Catch off

0 150100Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN G-3  
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV

HQ BN  
 NINTH MAR  
 ELEVENTH MAR  
 THIRD MT BN  
 THIRD AT BN  
 DET THIRD ENG BN DA NANG  
 INFO CG III MAF  
 CG FMAW  
 SEVENTH ENGR BN

FRAG O 6-67 ROUGH RIDER (U)  
 A. CG FIRST MARDIV 131531Z JAN 67 (PASEP)  
 B. CG THIRD MARDIV 141307Z JAN 67  
 C. FIRST MARDIV OP O 304-66  
 D. ANNEX G TO DIV ADMIN O 301-66  
 E. FIRST MARDIV O P02000.2C (CEOI)



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PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1478E  
 F. THIRD MARDIV O P02000.2E (COI)

1. ROUGHT RIDERS ARE PLANNED IAW REFS A AND B FOR ADMIN MOVEMENT SECOND BY TWENTY SIXTH MAR PHU BAI TO DANANG.
2. EXECUTE NORTHBOUND ADMINISTRATIVE ROUGH RIDERS IAW SCHEDULE SPECIFIED REF A. IN EVENT WEATHER OR ROAD CONDITIONS REQUIRE CANCELLATIONS CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOR DAY AND PARA 2 REF A APPLIES. OPCON PASSES THIRD MARDIV ON CORSSING FIRST MARDIV/THIRD MARDIV BOUNDARY VIC CHK PT 49. FIRST MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON SOUTHBOUND ROUGH RIDERS SAME POINT.
3. SECURITY ELEMENTS PROVIDED BY THIRD MARDIV AS SPECIFIED REF B  
 (A) NINTH MAR. PROVIDE BALD EAGLE IAW REF B.  
 (B) ELEVENTH MAR. REF C.
4. THIRD MT BN. REFS AND AND C.
5. THIRD AT BN. PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY AS REQUIRED.
6. DET THIRD ENG BN.
  - (A) PROVIDE ENGR SPT AS REQUIRED BASED ON KNOWN OR ANTICIPATED NEEDS.
  - (B) CONDUCT AERIAL RECON OF ROADS OVER WHICH CONVOY WILL TRAVEL FROM DANANG COMBAT BASE TO DESTINATION PRIOR TO DEPARTURE

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1478E  
 OF EACH CONVOY. REPORT FINDINGS THIS HQ (ACOFS, G-4)

7. COMM
  - A. IAW REF D AND E
  - B. COMM CO, HQ BN
    - (1) ACTIVATE STA ON THIRD MARDIV TAC NR ONE AT 180800Z JAN. GUARD NET UNTIL COMPLETION OF ROUGH RIDER Q/A 242330Z JAN. REMOTE TO COC.
    - (2) MONITOR CONVOY CONTROL NET IN COC SAME PERIOD.

GP-4


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	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

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P 150939Z JAN 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO FIRST MARDIV OFCON ADCON  
INFO CG III MAF  
CG THIRD MARDIV  
CG FMAW  
CG FLC  
BT

G-3

RESPONSIBILITY Sectors, 2/4 + 1/2

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 070915Z JAN67 NOTAL  
1. IAW REF A RESPONSIBILITY SECTORS OF SECOND BN FOURTH MAR AND  
THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR EXCHANGED 151600H JAN67. THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR  
NOW OCCUPIES NW SECTOR DANANG TAOR.

GP-4

BT


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0 161047Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO CG IF XRAY  
 FIRST MAR  
 NINTH MAR  
 SECOND BN FIFTH  
 INFO FIRST RECON BN  
 BT

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	BRIEF
	POST

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR FEBRUARY 67 (UD)  
 A. III MAF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 16-66 (I CTZ)  
 B. FIRST MARDIV ISUMS  
 C. FIRST MARDIV PERINTREPS  
 1. PROVIDE THIS HQ WITH PLANNED BN MINUS OR LARGER OPNS, COUNTRY  
 FAIRS FOR FEB67 MLI 141200H JAN67. FORMAT FOR EACH BN MINUS  
 OR LARGER OPN:  
 A. COMMAND GROUP  
 B. SIZE OF UNIT(S) PARTICIPATING  
 C. TYPE OPERATION  
 D. AREA OF OPN.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1662Z

1. TIME FRAME IN WHICH OPN TO BE CONDUCTED (FIRST OR LAST  
 HALF OF MONTH).

2. INTELLIGENCE. REF A, B, AND C APPLY.

3. TO ASSIST IN PREPARATION OF INTENTIONS FOR GUIDANCE  
 PROVIDED.

A. GENERAL GUIDANCE. PLANNING TO SUPPORT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF  
 FOR MISSIONS:

(1) CONTINUE TO PLACE EMPHASIS ON PLANNING FOR MOST EF-  
 FECTIVE USE OF HELICOPTERS.

(2) CONTINUE TO CONDUCT MAXIMUM SURVEILLANCE/STRIKE  
 OPERATIONS.

(3) INCREASE MILITARY USE OF LOC'S (ROUGH RIDER) IN ORDER  
 TO LESSEN LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS ON AIRCRAFT.

(4) CONTINUE TO CONDUCT VIGOROUS AIR, ARTY, AND NGF IN-  
 TERDICTION PROGRAM AGAINST VC/NVA BASE AREAS DEFINED IN REF A.

(5) ACCELERATE RECON OPERATION, PARTICULARLY RECON SUP-  
 PORTED BY ALL SUPPORTING ARMS AVAIL, TO DETECT VC/NVN MOVEMENT AND  
 TO PREVENT MASSING OF FORCES.

(6) MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS LIAISON AND INTEGRATED EFFORT WITH  
 ARVN IN SUPPORTING REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. BE ALERT  
 TO OPPORTUNITIES TO ASSIST AND SUPPORT GVN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOP-  
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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1662E [REDACTED]  
MENT ACTIVITIES.

- (7) INCREASE EMPHASIS ON EXPANSION CAC PROGRAM.
- (8) EXPLOIT EMPLOYMENT KIT CARSON SCOUTS ON INCREASING SCALE.
- (9) CONDUCT OPNS TO INCREASE CONTROL OF LOC'S, PARTICULARLY NATIONAL HIGHWAY ONE.
- (10) BE ALERT TO OPPORTUNITIES TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS AND EXPLOIT IMPROVING TRAFFICABILITY DURING TRANSITIONAL WEATHER PERIOD.

B. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE. PLANNING TO SUPPORT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF FCL MISSION:

- (1) CONTINUE CLEAR AND HOLD OPERATIONS IN DA NANG AND CHU LAI TAORS.
- (2) CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE OF AVENUES OF APPROACH TO DA NANG AND CHU LAI TAORS THROUGH A VIGOROUS AND CONTINUING RECON EFFORT SUPPORTED BY ALL AVAILABLE SUPPORTING ARMS.
- (3) WITHIN CAPABILITY CONDUCT RECON IN FORCE OPNS INTO VC/NVA BASE AREAS 116 (NUI MAT RANG), AND 117 (NUI GO) AS DEFINED IN REFERENCE A.
- (4) CONTINUE TO ACCELERATE OPERATIONS IN AREA BOUNDED BY LINE FROM AN HOA/NONG SON, TO TIEN PHUOC, TO TAM KY, TO HOI AN,

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1662E [REDACTED]  
TO AN HOA WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING THE VC/NVA INFLUENCE IN THE AREA PRIOR TO THE 1967 HARVEST.

- (5) CONDUCT OPERATIONS ASTRIDE TAM KY-TIEN PHUOC ROAD TO CLEAR ROUTE OF LF/MF/NVA ORGANIZED UNITS.
- (6) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY AND CLEAR AND HOLD OPERATIONS IN NUI DAU/NUI DANG AREA.
- (7) INCREASE NUMBER OF COUNTY FAIRS WITHIN THE DA NANG AND CHU LAI TAORS WITH EMPHASIS ON NEWLY EXPANDED AREA OF TAOR VIC TAM KY.

GP-4

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HEADQUARTERS, 11TH MARINES  
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/67/Jee  
003000  
Series: 002-67  
17 January 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
Subj: Relocation of Artillery

1. It is requested that this regiment be granted permission to displace two (2) 155mm howitzers from coordinates AT 965619 to coordinates AT 106582. Control of the howitzers would be transferred from Battery A, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines to Battery A, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines concurrently with the displacement.
2. This deployment would enhance our artillery posture in the southeastern area of the TAOR by providing a larger caliber weapon with a greater range capability than the 105mm howitzers presently in that area. Additionally, the fires of the 105mm howitzer battery, presently located in the southeastern area, could be reinforced resulting in much greater damage to the many lucrative targets in that area of operations.
3. The area presently covered by these two weapons is also covered by Battery L, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines.

G. R. MORRIS


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HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF  
**67 0226**  
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P 170553Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARD IV REIN  
 TO SEVENTH MT BN K  
 INFO CG TF XRAY

G-3

K

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	PER SUM
	WK SUM
X	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

FRAG 0 7-67 (DEPLOYMENT MT ASSETS)

A. CG FIRST MARD IV 120917Z JAN 67

1. AS PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION REF A, DEPLOY CO A SEVENTH MT BN ASAP  
 CHU LAI. CHOP TF XRAY ON ARRIVAL.

2. ADM AND LOGISTICS

A. ADCON REMAINING WITH PARENT ORGANIZATION.

B. LOGISTICS

(1) PREScribed LOADS FOR DEPLOYMENT AS DIRECTED BY BN CDR.

(2) ALL ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL BAGGAGE WILL BE  
 CARRIED. NO EQUIPT TO REMAIN BEHIND.

(3) SUPPLY: CLASSI - D OS

CLASS V - B/A

(4) RESUPPLY: UPON ARRIVAL TF XRAY.

(5) FACILITIES. ALL CANTONMENT REMAINS IN PLACE. FIXED

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 1717E  
 FACILITIES SUCH AS COMM AND ELECT WIRE, HARDWARE, PLUMBING, BUNKERS  
 AND TACTICAL WIRE LEFT UNDISTURBED.C. EMBARKATION: SUBMIT REQUIREMENTS THIS HQS (ATIN DIV  
 EMBOD ASAP.

GP-4


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C-2(G)

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0100115Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN G-3  
 TOCG FMAW  
 CG IF XRAY  
 CG FLC  
 FIRST MAR  
 ELEVENTH MAR  
 INFO CG III MAF  
 CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMNVH/DSA I CORPS ADV GRP  
 NINTH MAR  
 SECOND BN REIN FIFTH MAR  
 BT

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	WK SUM
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	BRIEF
	POST

K

FRAG O 5-67 (RELIEF OF ARVN UNITS)

- A. CG III MAF 182334Z DEC 66
- B. CG III MAF 171416Z JAN 67
- C. FIRST MARDIV FRAG O 44-66
- D. FIRST MARDIV O P02000.2C
- E. AS OUTLINED REF A, AND ORDERED EXECUTED BY REF B, FIRST MARDIV

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1793E

EFFECTS RELIEF CERTAIN ARVN OUTPOSTS IN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY TO FREE ARVN FORCES FOR SPT OF 1967 REVOLUNTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) PLAN. THIRD BN FIFTH REGT SECOND ARVN DIV LOCATED NUI LAC SON AND VIET AN VIC BT 02223 SCHEDULED FOR WITHDRAWAL AND ASSIGNMENT RD DUTIES NLT 30 JAN 67. 873D RF CO PRESENTLY LOCATED VIC TAM KY DESIG TO PARTICIPATE RELIEF.

2. EXECUTION

A. FIRST MAR

- (1) EFFECT RELIEF OF NUI LAC SON/VIET AN OUTPOSTS NLT 30 JAN 67.
- (2) ON WITHDRAWAL THIRD BN FIFTH ARVN REGT ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR NUI LAC SON/VIET AN AREA. THIS IN ADDITION TO ASSIGNED SECTOR TOAR REF C.

(3) DURLAURH WITH CMDR SECOND ARVN DIV AND MILITARY SECTOR QUANG TIN PROV TO COORDINATE WITHDRAWAL ARVN FORCES AND ASSUMPTION RESPONSIBILITIES FOR AREA.

(4) ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE LN WITH PF COS IN AREA OF OPNS TO ENSURE COORDINATED EFFORT IN EXECUTION OF MSN. COMPANY LOCATIONS:

- (A) 743RD CO VIC BT 038343
- (B) 321ST CO VIC BT 038348
- (C) 924TH CO VIC BT 044348

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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1793E S E C R E T

(5) SUBMIT RECOMMENDATION TAOR IN NEW AREA. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES CLEARANCE TENTATIVELY GRANTED FOR AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY EW GRIDLINE 37, ON EAST BY NS GRIDLINE BT 09, ON SOUTH BY EW GRIDLINE 23, AND ON WEST BY NS GRIDLINE AT 94. CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW

(6) COORDINATE EMPLOYMENT RF CO ON OUTPOSTS

B. ELEVENTH MAR

(1) PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN PLANNING ARTY SPT AS REQUESTED BY FIRST MAR.

(2) PROVIDE ARTY ASSETS AS REQUIRED IN SPT REPOSITIONED FORCE.

C. COORD INSTRNS.

(1) DIRLAUTH DIV UNITS.

(2) REF C IN EFFECT.

(3) RQSIS FOR CBT SPT AND CBT SVC SPT UNITS TO THIS HQS ASAP.

(4) CG IF XRAY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE FIRST MAR IN COORD MATTERS WITH 2D ARVN DIV AND QUANG TIN MIL AND PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES.

(5) REDUCTION FIRST MAR SECTOR OF TAOR AND INCREASE NINTH MAR SECTOR OF TAOR TO BE ISSUES SEPARATELY.

3. LOGISTICS

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1693E [REDACTED]

A. RESUPPLY. PRIMARY RESUPPLY BY HELO FROM AN HOA. BACKUP BY AIRDROP FROM DA NANG. ALTERNATE METHOD OF RESUPPLY BY HELO FROM CHU LAI OF DANANG.

B. FIRST MAR. SUBMIT BY MSG TO THIS HQ (ATTN G-4) FOL INFO:

(1) NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND DENSITIES OF WPN/MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIP TO BE PLACED IN NUI LAC SON/VIET AN.

(2) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STOCK LEVELS CLASS I, III, IV, V AND SELECTED ITEMS CLASS II TO BE MAINTAINED NUI LAC SON/VIET AN. DETERMINATION TO BE MADE THIS HQ.

(3) REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS IV FIELD FORIFICATION MATERIALS.

(4) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FREQ OF RESUPPLY TO NUI LAC SON/ VIET AN.

(5) REQUIREMENTS FOR HST (INCLUDING SIZE AND COMPOSITION).

C. CG FMAW. REQUEST BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE HELO/FIXED WING SUPPORT FOR RESUPPLY IAW PARA 3.A.

D. CG FLC. REQUEST BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE FOR RESUPPLY IAW PARA 3.A.

4. COMM AND COMM-ELEC

A. COMM-ELEC

(1) IAW REF D.

PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 1793E [REDACTED]

(2) SUBMIT ADDL EQUIP/FREQ REQUIREMENTS THIS HQ.

B. COMMAND. RF CO DIRECT SUPPORT USMC RIFLE CO NUI LAC SON/VIET AN OUTPOSTS.

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1954 A.M.

OP 1300Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MAR DIV REIN S-3  
 TO CG II MAF  
 INFO CG FMAW  
 CG TF XRAY  
 FIRST MAR  
 NINTH MAR  
 SECOND BN FIFTH MAR  
 BT

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	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
X	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

COC

## REPORT OF PLANNED OPNS FOR FEB 67 (U)

CG III MAF 130840Z JAN 67

1. BASED ON PLANNING GUIDANCE FURNISHED BY REF A THE FOL REPORT OF PLANNED MAJOR OPNS FOR FEB 67 IS SUBMITTED:

A. (1) DE SOTO  
 (2) TF XRAY  
 (3) BN OR LARGER  
 (4) SEARCH AND DESTROY, SUBSEQUENTLY CLEARING  
 (5) DUC PHO/NUI DANG/NUI DAU  
 (6) FIRST HALF FEB 67

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1846E

B. (1) RIO GRANDE  
 (2) SEVENTH MAR  
 (3) BN MINUS  
 (4) SEARCH & DESTROY  
 (5) BI 275115 NW TO TAM-KY-TIEN PHUOC RD  
 (6) LAST HALF FEB 67

C. (1) PUEBLO  
 (2) SEVENTH MAR  
 (3) BN MINUS  
 (4) SEARCH & DESTROY  
 (5) ASTRIDE SONG TRA BONG APPROACH TO ENEMY BASE AREA 118  
 (6) LAST HALF FEB 67

D. (1) FAULKNER  
 (2) SECOND BN FIFTH MAR  
 (3) BN MINUS REIN  
 (4) SEARCH & DESTROY  
 (5) ANTENNA VALLEY AREA  
 (6) FIRST HALF FEB 67

E. (1) LOGAN  
 (2) SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1346E [REDACTED]

- (3) BN MINUS REIN
- (4) SEARCH AND DESTROY
- (5) AREA BOUNDED BY AT 8355, 8855, 8751, 8350
- (6) LAST HALF FEB67
- F. (1) LANCKE
- (2) SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
- (3) BN MINUS REIN
- (4) SEARCH & DESTROY
- (5) AREA BOUNDED BY AT 9655, BT 0055, BT 0052, AT 9652
- (6) LAST HALF FEB67
- G. (1) GULF
- (2) NINTH MAR
- (3) BN MINUS
- (4) SEARCH AND DESTROY
- (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY THUA THIEN-QUANG NAM PROVINCE BOUNDARY ON EAST BY SEA, ON SOUTH BY EW GRID LINE AT 84, AND ON WEST BY NS GRID LINE AT 92
- (6) LAST HALF FEB67
- H. (1) INDEPENDENCE
- (2) NINTH MAR

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1346E [REDACTED]

- (3) TWO BN MINUS
- (4) SEARCH AND DESTROY
- (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY SONG VU GIA, ON EAST BY SONG HU BON, ON SOUTH BY EW GRID LINE AT 45, AND ON WEST BY NS GRID LINE AT 79
- (6) LAST HALF FEB67
- I. (1) PULASKI
- (2) NINTH MAR
- (3) BN MINUS
- (4) SEARCH AND DESTROY
- (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY EW GRIDLINE AT 60, ON EAST BY NS GRIDLINE AT 83, ON SOUTH BY SOUTH BANK OF SONG VU GIA, AND ON WEST BY GRIDLINE ZC 26.
- (6) FIRST HALF FEB67
- J. (1) LAFAYETTE
- (2) FIRST MAR
- (3) BN MINUS
- (4) SEARCH AND DESTROY
- (5) AREA BOUNDED BY SOUTH CHINA SEA, ON SOUTH BY EW GRIDLINE BT 59, AND ON WEST BY NS GRIDLINE BT 12.

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PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 1846E [REDACTED]

(6) LAST HALF FEB67

K. (1) SEARCY  
(2) FIRST MAR  
(3) BN MINUS

(4) SEARCH AND DESTROY

(5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY EW GRIDLINE BT 70, ON  
EAST BY SOUTH CHINA SEA, ON SOUTH BY EW GRIDLINE BT 65, ON  
AND ON WEST BY NS GRIDLINE BT 27.

(6) LAST HALF FEB67

2. RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS WILL BE ACCELERATED  
AND ADDITIONAL OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED TO EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE.

3. CAC PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE TO BE EXPAND AND KIT CARSON SCOUTS  
EMPLOYED ON INCREASING SCALE.

4. ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT WILL BE EXTENDED TO REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT  
PROGRAM.

5. MAX POSSIBLE COUNTY FAIRS TO TAKE PLACE.

6. OPNS PLANNED FOR MIN USE HELOS.

GP-4

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G-3

0 190355Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 ZEN/FIRST MAR  
 ZEN/NINTH MAR  
 ZEN/THIRD TANK BN  
 ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR REIN  
 INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
 ZEN/CG FLC  
 RUMNVH/DSA 1 CORPS  
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON  
 BT

## FIRST MAR/NINTH MAR BDRY CHANGE (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 180115Z JAN 67

1. TO MAINTAIN BALANCE OF FORCES WITHIN TAOR IN PREP EXECUTION  
 REF A, REGTL BDRY BTWN FIRST AND NINTH MAR TO BE SHIFTED EASTWARD  
 EFFECTIVE 200800H JAN 67 TO NEW BDRY AS INDICATED HEREIN:A. NINTH MAR NORTHER BDRY COMMON WITH THIRD TANK BN: FROM  
 BRIDGE COORD AT 947700 ALONG SONG TUY LOAN -- SONG CAU DO, RIVER

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 1901E [REDACTED]  
 INCLUSIVE NINTH MAR, TO POINT 500 N WEST BRIDGE COORD AT 998708.  
 B. NINTH MAR EASTERN BDRY COMMON WITH FIRST MAR: SOUTH  
 FROM BRIDGE COORD AT 998708 TO WEST OF AND PARALLELING BRIDGE  
 AND ROUTE 1C, RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY, AT DISTANCE OF 500 M TO INTER-  
 SECTION E-W ROAD COORD AT 982663; EAST ALONG SOUTH SIDE OF RD TO  
 PT 500 METERS EAST OF ROUTE 1C COORD AT 992664; SOUTH 500 METERS  
 TO EAST OF RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY TO PT ON SOUTH BANK OF SONG KY  
 LAM COORD BT 021551,500 METERS EAST OF SONG KY LAM RAILROAD  
 BRIDGE COORD AT 998547.

C. NINTH MAR SOUTHERN BOUNDARY COMMON WITH SECOND BN REIN  
 FIFTH MAR: WEST ALONG SONG KY LAM, RIVER INCLUSIVE NINTH MAR.

GP-4

BT


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	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
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Z 0 190959Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV (REIN)  
 TO FIRST MAR  
 NINTH MAR  
 THIRD TANK BN  
 SECOND BN REIN FIFTH MAR  
 INFO CG III MAF  
 CG FIRST MAW  
 CG FLC  
 DSA I CORPS  
 FIRST MARDIV OPCON  
 ST

G-3

FIRST MAR/NINTH MAR BDRY CHANGE (6)  
 A. CG FIRST MARDIV 190355Z JAN 67  
 I. CHANGE EFFECTIVE DATE TIME FOR BDRY CHANGE REF A FROM 200800H  
 JAN 67 TO 210800H JAN 67. RPT TO 210800H JAN 67.

GP-4  
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X

P 191139Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN S-3  
 TO HQ BN  
 INFO CG III MAF  
 CG TF XRAY  
 BT

FRAG O 8-67 (DEPLOYMENT CIV AFFS UNIT AND DENTAL TM)

A. CG TF XRAY 053052Z JAN 67 (NOTAL)

1. TF XRAY EFFECTS RELIEF ARVN OUTPOSTS AT NUI DAU AND NUI DANG EMPLOYING THIRD BN REIN SEVENTH MAR. REF A CITES NEED FOR ONE CIV AFFS UNIT (AA). DENTAL TM SPT ALSO CONSIDERED NEC.

2. HQ BN: DEPLOY 6TH AA PLAT 29TH CA CO, USA AND DENTAL TM, 1ST DENTAL CO ASAP CHU LAI. CHOP TF XRAY ON ARRIVAL FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH THIRD BN REIN SEVENTH MAR.

3. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS

A. ADCON REMAINS WITH PARENT ORGANIZATION.

B. LOGISTICS

(1) PRESCRIBED LOADS:

(A) 6TH AA PLAT, 29TH CA CO, AS DIRECTED BY PLAT CMDR

(B) DENTAL TM, 1ST DENTAL CO AS DIRECTED CO CMDR.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1950E


(2) ALL ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL BAGGAGE WILL BE CARRIED.

(3) RESUPPLY: UPON ARRIVAL TF XRAY.

C. EMBARKATION: SUBMIT REQUIREMENTS THIS HQS (ATTN DIV EMBO) ASAP.

GP-4

BT



UNCLASSIFIED

Ends (15)

DECLASSIFIED

C.C.

OO FIRST MARDIV

ELEVENTH MAR  
FIRST RECON BN

3:09:00Z  
HAWAII

OO III MAR

UNCLASSIFIED

PPP  
PPP

SECRET

CHARGE OF OPCON

A. OO III MAR 171600Z JAN67

1. IAW RSP A ASSIGNED OPCON 2D PLAT 1ST ARMD AMPH CO AT 201500Z JAN67 AND FORCE RECON BN AT 192500Z JAN67.
2. OPCON 2D PLAT 1ST ARMD AMPH CO ASSIGNED ELEVENTH MAR AT 201500Z JAN67.
3. OPCON FORCE RECON BN ASSIGNED 1ST RECON BN AT 191500Z JAN67.


GP-4

2 10 1152

Encel (14)

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	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	MIN. SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRUFR
	POST

K

P 200544Z JAN 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
 CG THIRD MARCCV  
 CG SECOND BDE ROKMC  
 INFO CG FIRST MAW  
 CG FORLOGCMD  
 CG TASK FORCE X-RAY  
 THIRD MARDIV (FWD)  
 BT

G-3

11338

## TET CEASE FIRE AND STANDOWN OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. DURING THE RECENT CHRISTMAS AND OCCIDENTAL NEW YEAR PERIODS, THE ENEMY DEMONSTRATED HIS INTENTION OF TAKING EVERY ADVANTAGE OF THE TEMPORARY CESSION OF OPERATIONS BY US/FW/RVNAF FORCES TO REPOSITION FORCES, RESUPPLY, AND PREPARE FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THESE PERIODS OF CEASE FIRE AND STAND DOWN OF MILITARY OPERATIONS PROVIDE ADVANTAGES TO THE ENEMY BUT ARE DETRIMENTAL TO FRIENDLY FORCES.

2. BY BROADCAST OVER LIBERATION RADIO ON 1 JAN 67, THE CENTRAL

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Final Draft

INCLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 1404 [REDACTED]

COMMITTEE PRESIDIUM OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSVN) ANNOUNCED THAT IT WILL ORDER A CESSATION OF MILITARY ATTACKS ON US/FW/RVNAF FORCES DURING THE PERIOD FROM 080700H FEB 67 TO 150700H FEB 67, A PERIOD OF SEVEN DAYS. SHOULD THE US/FW/RVNAF FORCES BE REQUIRED FOR POLITICAL REASONS TO CEASE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS DURING THIS PERIOD, WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO LESSEN THE IMPACT OF THE STANDOWN AND PREVENT ANY STRENGTHENING OF THE ENEMY'S POSTURE.

3. FORCES MUST BE DEPLOYED PRIOR TO THE CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO POSITIONS WHICH WILL RESTRICT ENEMY MOVEMENT, RESUPPLY ACTIVITIES, AND PROPAGANDA EFFORTS. DEPLOYMENTS MUST LIMIT EN FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT INTO, OUT OF, AND BETWEEN BASE AREAS. AS A MINIMUM, SUCH POSITIONING WILL REQUIRE ENEMY USE OF MORE ARDUOUS AND CIRCUITOUS ROUTES AND DIMINISH HIS RESUPPLY AND REPOSITIONING ACCOMPLISHMENTS. PLANS WILL BE DESIGNED TO PERMIT LAST MINUTE MOVEMENT OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE INTEREST OF ACHIEVING SURPRISE. IT MAY BE ASSUMED THAT CEASE FIRE RESTRICTIONS, IF CEASE FIRE IS ORDERED, WILL BE ESSENTIALLY SAME AS XMAS/NEW YEAR STANDDOWNS.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES PREPARE PLANS TO ACCOMPLISH THE OPTIMUM

PAGE THREE RUMHMF 1404 [REDACTED]

POSITIONING OF FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING CONCEPT TO INCLUDE, BUT NOT LIMITED TO: MAXIMUM AIR/GROUND RECONNAISSANCE, ALERT REACTION FORCES FOR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO A VC/NVA ATTACK, AND READINESS TO DELIVER SURVEILLANCE STRIKES AGAINST THREATENING GROUPINGS OF VC/NVA. PLANS SHOULD EMPHASIZE LONG RANGE RECON PATROLS IN R7'S TO MAXIMUM EXTENT COMPATIBLE WITH AVAILABLE RESOURCES.

5. PLANS TO ACCOMPLISH THE ABOVE WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS TO ARR NO LATER THAN 26JAN67.

GP-4

BT

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P 210115Z JAN 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO 11TH MAR  
FIRST RECON BN  
INFO CG III MAF  
BT

f-3

CHANGE OF OPCON  
1. CG III MAF 171620Z JAN 67  
2. IAW REF ASSUMED OPCON 2D PLAT 1ST ARMD AMPH CO AT 201530H  
JAN 67 AND FORCE RECON TM AT 191500H JAN 67.  
2. OPCON 2D PLAT 1ST ARMD AMPH CO ASSIGNED 11TH MAR AT 201530H  
JAN 67.  
3. OPCON FORCE RECOND TM ASSIGNED 1ST RECOND BN AT 191500H JAN 67.  
BT


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Concl (16)

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K

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 210741Z JAN67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN S-3  
TO ZEN/FIRST MARINES  
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
RUMSBJ/DSA I CORPS ADV GRP  
ZEN/CG TF XRAY  
ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MAR  
BT

RELIEF OF ARVN UNITS

- A. FIRST MARDIV FRAG 0 5-67
1. REF A DIRECTED FIRST MAR EFFECT RELIEF NUI LAC SON/VIET AN OUTPOSTS NLT 30JAN67.
2. ON COMPLETION OF RELIEF OF OUTPOSTS FOL TASKS ASSGN OUTPOST FORCES IN ADDN THOSE CONTAINED REF A.
  - A. CONDUCT OPNS TO EXPAND GVN INFLUENCE AND CONTROL VIC OUTPOST AREA, PRIMARY EMPHASIS TO EAST, NORTHEAST AND NORTH TOWARDS QUE SON.
  - B. BEFEND NUI LAC SON/VIET AN OUTPOST COMPLEX.

GP-4

BT

10  
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Jan 2012

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	BURN
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	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

K

COC

P 230133Z JAN 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 5-3  
TO ELEVENTH MAR  
INFO CG TF XRAY

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

ARTILLERY DISPLACEMENTS

A. ELEVENTH MAR 201230Z JAN 67  
B. CO ELEVENTH MAR LTR SER NO 002-67 OF 17JAN67  
1. CONCUR WITH REFS A AND B

GP-4

BT


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COC



P R 230933Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO FIRST MARDIV OPCON/ADCON  
 INFO CG III MAF  
 CG THIRD MARDIV  
 CG FIRST MAW  
 CG FLC  
 BT

G-3

## CHANGE OF SECTOR RESPONSIBILITY (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 070915Z JAN67 NOTAL  
 1. IAW REF A SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY  
 FOR NW SECTOR DANANG TAOR FM THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR EFFECTIVE  
 220800H JAN67.

GP-4  
 BT

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Encl (19)

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	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WR SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

O P 231401Z JAN 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO CG TASK FORCE XRAY  
INFO ELEVENTH MAR  
FIRST MED BN  
HQ BN  
BT

G-3

AUGMENTATION FOR NUI DAU/NUI DANG FORCE  
A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 191137Z JAN 67  
B. TF XRAY OPLAN 1-67  
C. FIRST MARDIV FRAG O 8-67  
D. CG III MAF 101402Z JAN 67  
1. IAW REF A TF XRAY RELIEVES ARVN FORCES VIC NUI DAU/NUI DANG  
MLT 30JAN67 EMPLOYING THIRD BN REIN SEVENTH MAR.  
2. REINFORCING ELMS SHOWN IN ANNEX B (TASK ORG) OF REF B  
TO BE PROVIDED FM TF XRAY ASSETS. EXCEPTION: DET CIV AFFS UNIT  
(AA) DEPLOYED IAW REF C.  
3. DENTAL TM, FIRST DENTAL CO DEPLOYED IAW REF C.  
4. PROVIDE ENGR NEEDS FM TF XRAY ASSETS TO  
BE REPLACED IN TAOR FROM MAF ASSETS.

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 2383E  
5. DIRLAUTH IAW REF D TO OBTAIN SPT OF VA TMS IF DESIRED.  
GP-4  
BT

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16  
Encl (20)

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DECLASSIFIED

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	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER-SUM
	Wkly-SUM
	CMD. CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

COC

P 232211Z JAN 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV (REIN)  
TO CG TASK FORCE X-RAY  
INFO TO III MAF  
SEVENTH MAR  
NINJA MAR  
THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR

G-3

ORCON  
CON T THIRD BN SEVENTH MAR ASSIGNED TASK FORCE X-RAY AT 2200Z  
0000Z 67.  
GP-4  
ST

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CONFIDENTIAL



HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WK SUM
CMD CHR
BRIEF
POST

K

P 240255Z JAN67  
FM CG TASK FORCE XRAY  
TO CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
INFO ZEN/TASK FORCE XRAY  
BT

OPCON OF 3/7, CORRECTION TO MSG  
A. MY 230345Z JAN67

1. CHANGE PARA 1 REF A TO READ "OPCON 3/7 ASSUMED 220001Z JAN67"  
VICE "210001Z JAN67."

GP-4  
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 240531Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN G-3  
 TO CG TF XRAY  
 FIRST MAR  
 NINTH MAR  
 SECOND BN FIFTH MAR  
 ELEVENTH MAR  
 THIRD TK BN  
 BT

## COUNTY FAIRS (U)

1. THOROUGHLY PLANNED, ENERGETICALLY CONDUCTED COUNTRY FAIRS HAVE MAJOR IMPACT DURING SECURING PHASE OF PACIFICATION EFFORT. BY DEFINITION, COUNTY FAIR IS DETAILED PAINSTAKING OPERATION, OF SUFFICIENT DURATION TO SCREEN ALL INHABITANTS OF AREA AND ROOT OUT VC. THIS CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED BY RAPID SWEEP. EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT EFFECT ON EN INFRASTRUCTURE IS IN DIRECT PROPORTION TO LENGTH OF OPN. ADDITIONALLY, VC IN AREA ATTEMPT TO LEAVE HIDING PLACES AFTER TWO OR THREE DAYS IN EFFORT TO MINGLE WITH POPULATION OR ESCAPE AREA.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2420E  
 2. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COUNTY FAIRS CONDUCTED BY FIRST MARDIV UNITS WILL BE MINIMUM TWO DAY DURATION. IF TARGET AREA NOT WORTHY OF THE EFFORT, PICK ONE THAT IS. COUNTY FAIRS WILL BE TERMINATED IN LESS THAN TWO DAYS ONLY WITH PERMISSION OF CG.

GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WASH
	CMD CRR
	REF
	POST

P 240855Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 6-3  
 TO CG IF XRAY  
 FIRST MAR  
 NINTH MAR  
 SECOND BN FIFTH MAR  
 BT

## CONDUCT OF PATROLS

1. EXPERIENCE INDICATES UNDESIRABILITY OF DAYLIGHT PATROLS BY PLATOON SIZE OR LARGER ELMS. REPEATED CONTACTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED HIGH COST IN TERMS OF MAN-HOURS AND CASUALTIES WITH NO COMPENSATING RESULTS. SAME NUMBER OF MEN IN SMALLER GROUPS COVER GREATER AREA, MOVE FASTER, AND EXPERIENCE LOWER CASUALTY RATE. LACK OF NUMBERS CAN BE COMPENSATED FOR BY AGGRESSIVE USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS AND SPARROWHAWKS.
2. CMDRS WILL LIMIT USE OF DAYLIGHT PLATOON AND LARGER SIZE PATROLS TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS WHERE SMALLER ELMS CANNOT BE EMPLOYED.

GP-4


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0 240938Z JAN 67  
FM COM FIRST MARDIV REIN-3  
TO FIRST MARDIV REIN (OPCOND)  
BT



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD C

10

## LISTENING POSTS (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 121003Z NOV 66  
B. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 241417Z NOV 66 (NOTAL)  
C. CG FIRST MRARDIV REIN 280719Z NOV 66 (NOTAL)  
D. CG III MAF 170706Z JAN 67

EXCERPTS REFS FOLLOW

A. REF A: AGGRESSIVE PATROLING COMBINED WITH MAXIMUM USE OF LISTENING POSTS, SID'S AND TRIP FLARES AROUND THE PERIMETERS DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS IS MANDATORY. BRIEF

B. REF B: I DESIRE THAT EACH COMMANDER EXAMINE HIS PATROL ACTIVITIES AND COMMENSURATE WITH REQUIREMENTS, EFFECT AN IMMEDIATE INCREASE IN NUMBER OF NIGHTIME LISTENING POSTS, AMBUSHES AND SECURITY PATROLS.

C. REF C: INCREASE IN NIGHT PATROL ACTIVITY, LPS, AM-BUSHES, SCRY PATROLS WILL OCCUR. WE WILL CONTROL OUR AREAS AT NIGHT AS WELL AS DAY.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2440E

D. REF D: THIS LESSON IS TOO OLD FOR MARINES TO HAVE TO  
LEARN IT AGAIN AND LEARN IT THE HARD WAY. THE ONLY SECURITY FOR  
ANY INSTALLATION IS CONSTANT AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING, AMBUSHES AND  
LISTENING POSTS AT A DISTANCE SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE WARNING OF ANY  
IMPENDING ATTACK.

2. REPEATED INCIDENTS IN PAST MONTHS HAVE INDICATED CONTINUING AND INTOLERABLE DISREGARD OF ABOVE PRINCIPLES. IN ADDITION, MARINES HAVE DIED BECAUSE THEY AND/OR THEIR LEADERS HAVE IGNORED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES:

A. PATTERNS. ONE LP AND ONE OP WIPE OUT THIS MONTH WERE OCCUPYING POSITIONS USED OVER AND OVER AGAIN. EN SUCCESSES HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN TRACED TO HIS OBSERVATION OF OUR ROUTINE. VARY PATTERNS

B. COMMUNICATIONS. LPS ARE TO PROVIDE WARNING. WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS THEY CAN NEITHER WARN NOR SUMMON SUPPORT IF REQUIRED.

C. ALERTNESS. THE ENEMY IS ALERT. NOTHING CAN SAVE AN INDIVIDUAL OR A UNIT THAT IS NOT.

3. CMDRS WILL BE HELD STRICTLY TO ACCOUNT FOR FAILURE TO GRASP AND APPLY CONTENTS THIS MSG. NO DEPARTURES FROM THESE PRINCIPLES WILL BE TOLERATED.

TR 14  
GP-4

BT

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25

George

PRESENTED JAN 27  
 FM FIRST MARINES  
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV  
 INFO SECOND BN FIRST MARINES  
 ELEVENTH MARINES  
 FIRST BN ELEVENTH MARINES

BT

HUI LAC SON SPECIAL SITREP NO. 1

A. FIRST MARDIV FRAS 0 5-67

1. REF A DIRECTED FIRST MARINES TO EFFECT RELIEF ARVN UNITS AT HUI LAC SON AND ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT OUTPOST. THIS MESSAGE REPORTS PROGRESS TO DATE AND PLANS FOR FULFILLMENT OF ASSIGNED TASKS.

## 2. SUMMARY

A. CO FIRST MARINES AND STAFF MEMBERS HAVE VISITED HUI LAC SON AND HAVE CONDUCTED INITIAL COURTESY/LIAISON VISIT TO ARVN AND QUANG TIN SEC-TOR OFFICIALS AT TAM KY.

B. HUI LAC SON PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY 300 MEMBERS OF 3RD BN 3RD ARVN REGT. DEFENSIVE POSITIONS CLUSTERED ON HIGHEST PART OF BOULDER-STREWN RIDGELINE. ANOTHER 150 MEMBERS OF 3 RD BN 3RD ARVN REGT OCCUPY VIET AN OUTPOST. TWO PLATOONS PF'S OCCUPY SUPPORTING POSITIONS.

PAGE TWO. 8823

C. ADVANCE PARTY FROM CO F, 2ND BN, 1ST MARINES AND SUPPORTING UNITS NOW AT HUI LAC SON. TOTAL 28 MARINES WITH EXECUTIVE OFFICER CO F IN CHARGE. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS ON REGT TAC NET.

## D. ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR OBSTACLES TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

(1) WEATHER: LOW CLOUD COVER HAS PREVENTED HELICOPTERS FROM REACHING HUI LAC SON ON THREE OUT OF LAST FOUR DAYS. CONTINUED BAD WEATHER WILL DELAY RELIEF.

(2) ONLY TWO LANDING POINTS EXIST AT HUI LAC SON. THIS RESTRICTS OFF LOADING OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.

(3) EXTENSIVE RELOCATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRESENT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS REQUIRED.

(4) PROTECTIVE MINEFIELDS OF UNKNOWN DIMENSIONS AND DENSITIES HAVE BEEN INSTALLED BY PREVIOUS OCCUPANTS. CLEARING REQUIRED.

## 3. PLANS

A. TO INSTALL CO F (GREEN) AND INITIAL FIVE DAY LEVEL OF SUPPLY AS FOLLOWS, WEATHER PERMITTING:

DATE	PERSONNEL	LOGISTIC SUPPORT
25	17	5000
26		14,000
27	105	12000

PAGE THREE 8823

28 1000P

B. A 15 DAY RESUPPLY LEVEL WILL BE ESTABLISHED AS STORAGE FACILITIES ARE DEVELOPED. DAILY RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS WILL TOTAL APPROXIMATELY 15,000 POUNDS.


C. EMPHASIS TO BE PLACED INITIALLY ON DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

D. PSY WAR EFFORT WILL EXPLAIN ROLE OF MARINES TO LOCAL POPULATION OF EST 6000 PERSONS.

E. MAXIMUM COORDINATION CONTINUED WITH ARVN AND RVN OFFICIALS IN UTILIZATION OF RF AND PF FORCES.

GP-4

BT



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	HR

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
G-002

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CO C

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST



O 090712Z JAN 67  
FM C8 FIRST RADAR REIN COC  
TO SIXTH RADAR

BT

TERMINATION OPS CLEVELAND

A. III MAP COC 090651Z JAN67

1. REF A APPLIES. AUTHORITY GRANTED TERMINATE OPS CLEVELAND  
291000Z JAN67.

OP-4

BT


6-3

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1/2

DECLASSIFIED

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO FIRS MAR  
11TH MAR  
1ST RECON BN  
DET 3RD ENGR BN  
DET 3RD SP BN  
INFO CG III MAR  
CG FMAW  
CG FLC  
FM



K

	BURN
1	HOUD
2	G-1
3	G-2
4	LNO
5	PER SUM
6	WK SUM
7	CMD CHR
8	X SUM AND VIET BRIEF
9	POST

FRAG O 15-67 (HUI LAC SON: VIET AN AUGMENTATION)  
A. FIRST MAR 232340Z JAN 67 (NOTAL)

B. FIRST MARDIV OPH O 319-66

1. FIRST MAR EFFECTS RELIEF ARVN OUTPOSTS AT HUI LAC SON AND VIET AN MLT 30JAN67. REF A CITES NEED FOR AUGMENTATION.

2. EXECUTION

A. FIRST MAR

ATTACHED: ONE BTRY MINUS REIN (4 M-30 MORTARS W/FDC

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 2544E  
AND ONE FO TM), 11TH MAR  
ONE ENGR SQUAD REIN, DT 3RD ENGR BN  
2 HSTS, DT THIRD SP BN

ALL ATTACHMENTS EFFECTIVE 260500H JAN 67

(1) AUTHORITY EMPLOY ELEMENTS THIRD ITT CURRENTLY SUPPORTING FIRST MAR GRANTED PENDING AUGMENTATION.

(2) KIT CARSON SCOUTS EMPLOYED ONLY IN AREA WITH WHICH THEY ARE FAMILIAR. EFFORT BEING MADE TO RECRUDE SCOUTS FROM HIEP DUC/QUE SON/SONG LY LY VALLEY AREA. NONE PRESENTLY AVAILABLE.

(3) FAC TO BE PROVIDED. PENDING AUGMENTATION PROVIDE FROM REGT ASSETS.

(4) SUBMIT REQUESTS ADDITIONAL ENGR SPT THIS WKS

(5) SUBMIT REQUESTS AIR SUPPORT IAW REF 3

C. 11TH MAR

DETACHED: ONE BTRY MINUS REIN (4 M-30 MORTARS W/FDC AND ONE FO TM) TO FIRST MAR 260500H JAN 67

D. FIRST RECON BN, ENSURE HUI LAC SON AREA INCLUDED WITHIN RECON SURVEILLANCE CONDUCTED

E. DET THIRD ENGR BN

DETACHED: ONE ENGR SQUAD REIN TO FIRST MAR 260500H JAN 67

PAGE 3 RUMHLA 2544E

PROVIDE ENGR PLANNING SPT AS REQUESTED BY FIRST MAR

F. DET THIRD SP BN

DETACHED: TWO HSTS TO FIRST MAR 260500H JAN 67

G. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. DIRLAUTH ALCON

H. REQUEST FMAW PROVIDE FIXED WING AND HELO SUPPORT

GP-4

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UNCLASSIFIED

16

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WR SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST



P 251417Z JAN 67  
FM CG THIRD MARDIV  
TO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
RUMHMF/CG FLC  
ZEN/THIRD MARDIV FWD  
ZEN/TWELFTH MARINES  
RUMHLA/NINETH MARINES  
RUABOL/SECOND BN, TWENTY SIXTH MARINES  
BT

REASSIGNMENT OF ARTILLERY BATTERY  
A. CG III MAF 182334Z DEC 66  
1. IAW REF A, CHANGE OPCON B BTRY, 1ST BN, 13TH MARINES FROM  
3D MARDIV TO FIRST MARDIV EFF 250000H JAN 67.

GP-4

BT


UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

	BURN
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	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

COC



P 260051Z JAN 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN S-3  
 TO CG TF XRAY  
 FIRST RECON BN  
 INFO CG III MAF  
 CG THIRD MARDIV  
 BT

FRAG C S-67 (REDISTRIBUTION OF RECON ASSETS)

- A. CG III MAF 210808Z JAN 67
- B. CO FIRST RECON BN LTR 1/DNM/JJH OVER 3000 OF 23JAN67 (NOTAL)
1. REF A DIR REDISTRIBUTION OF IN-CNTRY RECON ASSETS IN VIEW CURRENT TACTICAL SITUATION.
2. REF B RECOMMENDS REDISTRIBUTION RECON ASSETS W/I FIRST MARDIV.
3. TF XRAY. MOVE THIRD PLAT THIRD FORCE RECON CO TO PHU BAI NLT 6FEB67. CHOP THIRD MARDIV ON ARRIVAL.
4. FIRST RECON BN. MOVE THIRD PLAT COMPANY B FIRST RECON BN TO CHU LAI NLT 6 FEB67. CHOP TF XRAY ON ARRIVAL.

GP-4


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	G-2
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	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRB
	POST

OP 260521Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO FIRST MARDIV OPCON G-3  
 INFO CG III MAF  
 CG FIRST MAW  
 CG FLC  
 BT

2617

INCREASED ACTIVITY PRIOR TO TET  
 1. BY RADIO BROADCAST 1 JAN NATIONAL FRONT FOR LIBERATION OF  
 SOUTH VIETNAM ANNOUNCED IT WILL ORDER CESSATION OF MILITARY  
 ATTACKS US/FW/RVN ARMED FORCES DURING PERIOD FM 080700H FEB 67 TO  
 150700H FEB 67 IN OBSERVANCE LUNAR NEW YEAR.  
 2. US/FW/GVN PLANS UNDETERMINED AT THIS TIME. REGARDLESS OF  
 DECISION, MARKED INCREASE IN OFFENSIVE PRESSURE ON EN FORCES WILL  
 PEAP BENEFITS BY DISRUPTING HIS DISPOSITIONS AND HIS PLANS TO  
 EXPLOIT ANY STAND DOWN, FORMAL OR INFORMAL. ADDITIONALLY LARGE  
 NUMBERS OF VC ARE EXPEDITED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES DURING TET  
 PERIOD. CONTINUOUS PRESSURE ON EN DURING NEXT TEN DAYS WILL  
 INCREASE NUMBER OF THOSE WHO RALLY OR SIMPLY DECIDE NOT TO GO BACK.

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 2617E  
 3. ALL CMDRS WILL INTENSIFY LEVEL OF OPERATIONS INCLUDING EMPLOY-  
 MENT OF SUPPORTING ARMS FOR PERIOD BETWEEN NOT AND TET.

GP-4  
 BT


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	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST



0 260645Z JAN 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
TO RUMNVH/DSA I CORPS  
ZEN/FIRST MAR  
ZEN/NINH MAR  
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF  
ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR  
ZEN/THIRD TK BN  
RUMNVH/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL  
BT

G-3

FRAG 0 11-67 (REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (RD))

A. DIV 0 P02000.2C

B. I CORPS ADV GP SOI

1. MISSION. 1ST MARDIV SUPPORTS GVN RD THROUGH CONDUCT OF UNILATERAL AND COORDINATED OPNS, CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

2. EXECUTION

A. 1ST MAR/9TH MAR

(1) EFFECT AND MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH MACV ADVISOR IN SECT-

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PAGE 2 RUMHLA 2639E  
OR.

(2) CONDUCT UNILATERAL AND COORDINATED OPNS IN SUPPORT OF RD AS REQUIRED.

(3) PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT WITHIN SECTOR FOR RD OPNS AS REQUESTED.

(4) COORDINATE WITH ARVN FORCES ON MOVEMENT OF TROOPS FOR RD OPNS AS REQUIRED.

B. COORDINATING INST:

(1) 1ST MARDIV AND SUBORDINATE UNITS, AS DIRECTED, CONDUCT CONCURRENT COORDINATED PLANNING WITH CORRESPONDING ARVN ECHELONS AND ADVISORY STAFFS TO DEVELOP COORDINATED PLANS FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF RD GOALS IN SELECTED AREAS WITHIN ASSIGNED AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND SECTORS.

(2) OPNS WILL BE CHARACTERIZED BY SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND COORDINATION, FREE EXCHANGE OF ASSISTANCE, SUPPORT, ADVICE AND INFO AMONG ARVN AND USMC FORCES AND MACV ADVISORS.

(3) APPROPRIATE LEVEL MACV ADVISOR WILL BE INITIAL POINT OF CONTACT ON ALL MATTERS OF COORDINATION, COOPERATION AND LIAISON WITH ARVN.

(4) DIRLAUTH BETWEEN UNITS FOR SUPPORT OF RD OPNS.

PAGE 3 RUMHLA 2639E

(5) EXCHANGE OF LIAISON PERSONNEL, WHERE APPROPRIATE, ENCOURAGED.

(6) SUBMIT REGTL INITIATING PLANS THIS HQS FOR APPROVAL OR REVIEW AS APPROPRIATE.

3. RQST DSA I CORPS DIRECT SA QUANG DA SPEC ZONE TO:

(1) EFFECT AND MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH APPROPRIATE 1ST MARDIV UNITS.

(2) PROVIDE INFORMATION ON RD OPNS TO THIS HQ AND FIRST MAR AND NINTH MAR HQ.

(3) CONDUCT CONCURRENT COORDINATED PLANNING WITH APPROPRIATE 1ST MARDIV UNITS.

4. CA/PSY OPS  
1ST MAR/9TH MAR BE PREPARED PROVIDE CA/PSY OPS ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORT RD OPNS CONSISTENT WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES AVAILABLE.


5. COMM-ELECT IAW REF A AND B. 1ST MARDIV UNITS ESTABLISH LIAISON COMMUNICATIONS WITH ARVN FORCES ADVISORS AND NECESSARY TO INSURE COORDINATION OF EFFORT AND COORDINATION OF SPTG ARMS.

GP-4

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026105 IZ JAN 67  
 EX CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO FIRST MARDIV (OPCON) *G-3*  
 INFO CG III MAF  
 CG THIRD MARDIV  
 CG FMAW  
 CG FLC  
 BT

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	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

## FRAG PLAN 13-67 (OPERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH TET) (U)

A. CG III MAF 200544Z JAN 67  
 B. FIRST MARDIV OP ORD304-66

## 1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY. BY RADIO BROADCAST 1 JAN 67 NATIONAL FRONT FOR LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM ANNOUNCED IT WILL ORDER CESSATION OF MILITARY ATTACKS ON US/FW/RVN ARMED FORCES DURING PERIOD FM 080700H FEB 67 TO 150700H FEB 67 IN OBSERVANCE LUNAR NEW YEAR. EXPERIENCE INDICATES EN WILL ATTEMPT TO TAKE EVERY ADVANTAGE OF ANY CESSATION OF OPNS TO REPOSITION FORCES, RESUPPLY, AND PREPARE FOR OFFENSIVE OPNS.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2700Z

B. FRIENDLY. US/FW/GVN PLANS UNDETERMINED AT THIS TIME. IF DECISION IS MADE FOR POLITICAL REASONS TO CEASE OFFENSIVE OPNS DURING THIS PERIOD, EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO LESSEN IMPACT OF STANDDOWN AND PREVENT ANY STRENGTHENING OF ENEMY'S POSTURE.

## 2. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. FIRST MARDIV DEPLOYS FORCES PRIOR TO CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPNS TO POSITIONS WHICH WILL RESTRICT ENEMY MOVEMENT, RESUPPLY ACTIVITIES AND PROPAGANDA EFFORTS. DEPLOYMENTS DESIGNED TO LIMIT EN FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT INTO, OUT OF AND BETWEEN BASE AREAS.

## B. DA NANG TAOR/RAOR.

(1) GROUND RECON. RECON BN CONDUCTS OBSERVATION AND SURVEILLANCE OF AVENUES OF APPROACH WITH PRIMARY EMPHASIS AREAS THUONG DUC, NONG SON, AN HOA, ANTENNA VALLEY (SOUTHEAST NONG SON) AND NUI LAC SON AREA.

## (2) AERIAL SURVEILLANCE.

(A) VISUAL RECON. DIV AO'S CONDUCT CONTINUOUS VR OF TAOR/RAOR 0700-1800 DAILY W/PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO HAI VAN PASS, ELEPHANT VALLEY, HAPPY VALLEY, VALLEYS NORTHWEST AND SOUTHWEST FROM THUONG DUC CIDG CAMP, AN HOA VALLEY, NONG SON AND QUE SON. NIGHT RECON WILL BE FLOWN UTILIZING STARLITE SCOPE. PLAN 2 AO'S

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Encl (33)

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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2700E [REDACTED]  
AIRBORNE DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS DEPENDENT ON AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY  
AND WEATHER.

(2) IMAGERY RECON. VERTICAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND RED HAZE  
MISSION REQUESTED, SELECTED TO COVER PRIMARY AVENUES OF APPROACH.  
TO BE FLOWN THROUGHOUT PERIOD.

(3) INFANTRY UNITS.

(A) CONDUCT EXTENSIVE PATROLLING OF SECTORS THROUGHOUT  
PERIOD WITH EMPHASIS ON INTERDICTION OF ENEMY MOVEMENT AND EARLY  
DETECTION OF THREATENING GROUPINGS.

(B) CONDUCT INTENSIFIED SURVEILLANCE OF WATERWAYS.

(C) MAINTAIN ALERT FORCES IAW REF B. BE PREPARED TO  
RECONSTITUTE FORCES WHEN COMMITTED.

C. CHU LAI TAOR/RAOR.

(1) GROUND RECON. RECON BN CONDUCTS OBSERVATION AND SUR-  
VEILLANCE OF AVENUES OF APPROACH WITH PRIMARY EMPHASIS VIC  
BT 0722, BT 0709, BT 2308, BT 3007, BS 4681, BS 4077, AND IN  
MO DUC, DUC PHO AREA.

(2) AERIAL RECON. DIV AO'S CONDUCT CONTINUOUS VR OF  
AO/R AOR 0700-1800 DAILY. PLAN 2 AO'S AIRBORNE DURING DAYLIGHT  
HOURS DEPENT ON AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY AND WEATHER.

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 2700E [REDACTED]

(3) INFANTRY UNITS.

(A) CONDUCT EXTENSIVE PATROLLING OF SECTORS THROUGH-  
OUT PERIOD WITH EMPHASIS ON INTERDICTION OF ENEMY MOVEMENT AND  
EARLY DETECTION OF THREATENING GROUPINGS.

(B) CONDUCT INTENSIFIED SURVEILLANCE OF WATERWAYS.

(C) MAINTAIN ALERT FORCES IAW REF B. BE PREPARED  
TO RECONSTITUTE FORCES WHEN COMMITTED.

D. COORD INSTRNS.

(1) DISPOSITIONS WILL BE DESIGNED TO PERMIT LAST MINUTE  
MOVEMENT OF FRIENDLY FORCES TO ACHIEVE SURPRISE.

(2) IT MAY BE ASSUMED THAT CEASE FIRE RESTRICTIONS, IF  
CEASE FIRE ORDERED, WILL BE ESSENTIALLY SAME AS CHRISTMAS/NEW  
YEARS STANDDOWNS.


GP-4

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	BRIEF
	POST

UUC

O 261558Z JAN 67

FM CG III MAF

TO RUMSBB/CTG 115.1/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR

INFO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV

ZEN/COMNAVSUPPACT, DANANG

ZEN/CG TASK FORCE X-RAY

RUMSBB/COMMANDER FIRST COASTAL ZONE

RUMSBB/COASTAL DIV 12

BT

14787

NAVY SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS DUC PHO AREA

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 250625Z (S) PASEP

1. REF A DEFINED SUBJECT ANTICIPATED REQUIREMENT FOR 2 COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CRAFT AND 2 VNB JUNKS ASSIGNED IN SUPPORT OF FIRST MARDIV OPERATIONS FOR A PERIOD OF TEN DAYS COMMENCING 27JAN.

2. IT IS REQUESTED THE SUBJECT SUPPORTING CRAFT BE PROVIDED ADN ASSIGNED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF TASK FORCE X-RAY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT DESCRIBED PARA 3 REF A, WITHIN EXISTING AVAILABLE RESOURCES.

3. DIRLAUTH IS ALSO DESIRED AS REQUESTED PARA 4 REF A.

GP-4

BT


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C O U L D	BURN
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	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 270047Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO FIRST MARDIV (OPCON), (ADCON)  
 BI

G3

## SEISMIC INTRUSION DEVICE (SID) (U)

1. MAXIMUM BENEFITS NOT BEING OBTAINED IN USE OF SEISMIC INTRUSION DEVICES (SID) BY SOME UNIT THIS COMMAND. SID PROVIDES SIMPLE MEANS FOR WARNING OF EN ACTIVITY IN AREA. SUCCESSFUL USE BASE ON TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED OPERATORS, AND ON CMDRS KNOWLEDGE OF HOW TO INTEGRATE SIDS INTO AMBUSH AND DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.
2. FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES APPLY:
  - A. EFFECTIVENESS OF SID DEPENDENT ON SOIL COMPACTNESS AND MOISTURE CONTENT.
  - B. SEIS IDEALLY EMPLACED OUT FROM PERIMETER OF STATIC INSTALLATION, ALONG MOST LIKELY AVENUES OF APPROACH, TO PROVIDE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WARNING
  - C. TRAINING OF OPERATORS BEST ACHIEVED THROUGH PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE PERSONNEL UNFAMILIAR WITH EQUIPMENT CAN EXPERIMENT DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS.
  - D. EXPERIENCED OPERATORS CAN SCREEN OUT BACKGROUND INTERFERENCE

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 2744E

FROM PUMPS, GENERATORS, MOVING VEHICLES AND RAINFALL.

- E. SETTING OF VOLUME AND SELECTIVITY SWITCHES IS KEY TO EFFECTIVE USE OF SID.
- F. WHEN SEISOMETER DETECTS INTRUDER, AREA OF INTRUSION CAN BE QUICKLY DETERMINED BY REFERENCE TO PLOT OR CHART.
3. FULL REALIZATION OF SID VALUE REQUIRES COMMAND FAMILIARITY AND IMAGINATIVE EMPLOYMENT. CONTACT TEAM AVAILABLE THIS HQ (ATTN CEO) TO ASSIST IN INITIAL INSTRUCTION
4. ENSURE PROMPT EVACUATION TO APPROPRIATE FLSG WHEN REPAIRS REQUIRED.

DP-4


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coC

P R 270745Z JAN67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN S-3  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
ELEVENTH MARINES  
INFO CG III MAF  
CG FLC  
BT


REASSIGNMENT ARTY BTRY (U)  
A. CG III MAF 182334Z JAN67  
B. CG THIRD MARDIV 251417Z JAN67 (P4SEP)  
1. IAW REFS A AND B, ASSUMED OPCON BTRY B FIRST BN THIRTEENTH MAR  
250800H JAN67. OPCON PASSED ELEVENTH MAR SAME DTG.

GP-4  
BT

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Canal (36)

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	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
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O 271433Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN S-3  
 TO CG I F XRAY  
 FIRST MAR  
 NINTH MAR  
 ELEVENTH MAR  
 SECOND BN FIFTH MAR  
 THIRD TANK BN  
 BT

EXPANSION OF COMBINED ACTION COMPANY PROGRAM DURING CY67

A. DIV O 07980.1A

1. PEF A REQUIRES CG, I F XRAY AND SECTOR COMMANDERS IN DA NAM: TAOR TO CONTINUALLY EVALUATE COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM TO DETERMINE WHERE NEW CAC PLATOONS ARE REQUIRED. AT PRESENT FIRST MARDIV HAS 34 CAC PLATOONS WITH ESTABLISHED GOAL OF 50 PLATOONS WITHIN TAORS BY 1 JULY 1967

2. NOW INTENDED TO EXPAND BOTH SCOPE AND SIZE OF CAC PROGRAM TO INCLUDE AREAS OUTSIDE TAORS IN I CORPS PRIORITY AREAS IN QUANG:

PAGE TWO RUMHILA 2845

DA SPECIAL ZONE, QUANG NAI AND VIC TAN KY. EXPANSION TO BE COORDINATED AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARVN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ACTIONS:

4. BASED ON ABOVE AND ASSUMPTION THAT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT PROGRAM FULLY, REQUEST YOU PROVIDE FOLLOWING:

A. ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF CAC CO HQ'S/CAC PLATS BY PROVINCE AND/OR AREA THAT CAN BE ESTABLISHED DURING CY67.

B. COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO T/O AND T/E OF CAC HQ AND CAC PLAT AND OTHER CONCEPTS IN LINE WITH MISSION OF CAC PROGRAM WHICH WILL INCREASE PROGRAMS EFFECTIVENESS.

5. REPLIES DUE MLT 30JAN67.

GP-4


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OC

1557

14 37  
 FORCE X-RAY  
 1ST MARDIV  
 1ST X-RAY  
 1ST SEVENTH MARINE  
 1ST FIRST MARINE AIR WING

OPEN DESOTO

MISSION TO ENGINEER SURVEY CONDUCTED BY TASK FORCE X-RAY  
 BY ROADWAY 1 BETWEEN DUC PHO AND MO LUC ON 26-27 JANUARY  
 WAS INCREASED AND NECESSITATED CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL  
 ROAD. 3D BN, 5TH MAR CMD GP UNDER OPCON 7TH MARS  
 AT 2600Z0H; ASSUMED OPCON OF 4 CO, 3D BN, 5TH MARS AND  
 1B, 1ST MARS. ELEMENTS 3D BN 7TH MARS AND X-RAY IN 2600Z  
 UNDER OPCON TASK FORCE X-RAY. RESULTING OPERATIONS WERE  
 PLANNED PHASE-1A OF 3D BN, 7TH MARS, INTO DUC PHO AREA  
 FOR ARVN FORCES.

COINCIDE WITH PLANNED CONCEPT FOR OPERATION DESOTO,  
 TO COMMENCE AT OR ABOUT 31 JANUARY. AS A CONSEQUENCE,

PHL 10210

FRIENDLY FORCES IN DUC PHO AREA ON 26 JANUARY HAS BEEN  
 PART OF OPERATION DESOTO WHICH, TOP REPORT FOR PURPOSE,  
 AT 2600Z0H.

DESOTO WILL BE CONDUCTED IN SEVERAL CLEARLY DEFINED


1. (PREPARATORY PHASE) OPERATIONS IN PREPARATION FOR  
 RELEASE OF ARVN FORCES COMMENCED 2600Z27 JAN; ESTIMATED  
 DURATION 2 DAYS.
2. (OCUPATION PHASE) RELIEF OF ARVN FORCES AND  
 ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMAND IN IMMEDIATE AREA (ESTIMATED  
 DURATION 2 DAYS).
3. (DEVELOPMENT PHASE) DILIGENT SEARCH AND SECURITY  
 OPERATIONS IN SELECTED PRIORITY AREAS (ESTIMATED DURATION  
 1 DAY).
4. (DECOM IV) STANDBY PHASE) MAINTENANCE OF DILIGENT OVER  
 AND DILIGENT AREA (ESTIMATED DURATION 4-5 DAYS).
5. (DECOM V) CONSOLIDATION PHASE) DILIGENT SEARCH AND SECURITY  
 OPERATIONS OVER PROGRESSIVELY EXPANDING AREA (ESTIMATED  
 DURATION 1-2 DAYS).

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PER SUM	
WX SUM	
CMD CLR	
BRIEF	
POST	

Add

OP 090051Z JAN 67  
 FM OP FIRST BARDIV  
 TO OP III HAP  
 INFO 09 TMW OPNS

G-3

TERMINATION OPN TUSCALOOSA GUD  
 1. SUBJECT yr CONCURRENCE INTEND TO TERMINATE OPN TUSCALOOSA  
 281700H JAN 67.

OP-4  
 PT

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G-3 (39)

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	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

COO

F 281331Z JAN 67  
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN C 60  
TO FIRST MARDIV OPCON/ADCON  
BT

KAC-PAPA CODE SERIES (U)

- A. CG III MAF 200518Z JAN 67
- B. CG III MAF 200522Z JAN 67
- C. CNO 181352Z OCT 66

- 1. REF A PROVIDES IMPLEMENTING INSTNS FOR KAC-P SERIES OPNS CODE WHICH REPLACES KAC-181 EFF 010001H FEB 67.
- 2. REF B GIVES EFF DATES FOR EDITIONS ONE AND TWO OF KAC-PX. SPARE GROUP. ASSIGNMENT SHEETS HAVE BEEN DIST BY S & C
- 3. REF A AND C GIVE AUTH FOR DROP ACCOUNTABILITY WHEN ISSUED TO ULTIMATE USER.
- 4. ENSURE CODES ON HAND AND USERS FAMILIARIZED PRIOR EFF DATE.
- 5. ENSURE NO MORE THAN FOUR DAYS EXTRACTS (TWO SETS) CARRIED BY ONE PERSON.
- 6. REPORT LOSS OR COMPROMISE BY PRIORITY MSG TO THIS HQ IAW DIVO P5510.1.

GP-4

BT

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
(C) MAF 2100-1 (9-66)

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P 281502Z JAN 67  
 FM CG TASK FORCE X-RAY  
 TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 ZEN/TASK FORCE XRAY  
 INFO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MARAIRWING  
 ZEN/FL SG-BRAVO  
 BT

G-3



1615

	BURN
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	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
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## OPERATION DESOTO AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

A. CG-TF X-RAY 271715Z JAN 67  
 1. REF A ANNOUNCED COMMENCEMENT OPERATION DESOTO AND ESTIMATED DURATION OF FIVE DISTINCT PHASES.  
 2. ENEMY ACTIVITY HAS NOTICEABLY INCREASED IN AND AROUND THE CHU LAI TAOR. TASKFORCE X-RAY UNITS HAVE HAD MODERATE CONTACT WITH ORGANIZED UNITS ALONG NORTHWESTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN PORTIONS OF TOAR BOUNDARY. ON 26 AND 27 JAN HELICOPTERS REPORTED RECEIVING 5 CL FIRE FROM EN POSITIONS LOCATED ALONG S. PORTION USMC/R MC  
 BOUNDARY. INTERROGATION OF CAPTURED ENRECON PERSONNLF CONFIRMS OTHER INTL REPORTS F EN INTENTION TO ATTACK USMC INSTALLATIONS IN CHU LAI TAOR.

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 1289D  
 APPARENT BUILD-UP OF EN FORCES AROUND CHU LAI TAOR AND CONTINUING INDICATIONS OF EN INTENTION TO ATTACK CRITICAL CHU LAI INSTALLATIONS PRECLUDES DEPLOYMENT OF ANY OF PRESENT FORCES WITHIN CHU LAI TAOR TO DUC PHO. UNITS N CHU LAI TAOR WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT COMPANY AND BATTALION-SIZE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS AGAINST SELECTED TARGETS AND MAINTAIN POSTURE NECESSARY TO PERMIT RAPID REACTION TO EN MOVEMENT TOWARD CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS.

4. ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS AFFECT ONLY SIZE OF FRIENDLY FORCE PARTICIPATING IN PHASE III OF OPERATION DESOTO. PHASE III WILL BE CONDUCTED BY 3D BN (REIN), 7TH MAR AND RF/PF FORCES CURRENTLY PRESENT IN DUC PHO AREA. FOLLOWING INFORMATION AMPLIFIES INTENTIONS CONCERNING OPERATION DESOTO:

A. PHASE II (28-31 JAN): FORCES: 3D BN REIN), 7TH MAR SUB-SECTOR  
 F/PF FORCES. TASK FORCE X-RAY RETAINS DIRECT OPCON.  
 B. P AE IIIKI FEB TO BEGINNING TET TRUCE): NO CHANGE IN FORCES OR OPCON.  
 C. PHASE IV (TET TRUCE): NO CHANGE IN FORCES OR OPCON.  
 D. PHASE V (ON OR ABOUT 12 FEB FOR PERIOD OF 32-60 DAYS  
 (1) WITH SLF PARTICIPATION  
 (a) OPCON: TASK FORCE X-RAY

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Encl (4)

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PAGE 3 RUMHLA 1289D

(B) FORCES: SLF; TOTAL OF TWO TASK FORCE X-RAY BNS (REIN):  
SUB-SECTOR RF/PF FORCES.

(2) WITHOUT SLF PARTICIPATION

(A) OPCON: 7TH MAR

(B) FORCES: TOTAL OF TWO TASK FORCE X-RAY BNS (REIN) SURF  
SECTOR RF/PF FORCES.


5. IF SURF AND WEATHER CONDITIONS PERMIT, PLANNED HYDROGRAPHIC  
SURVEYS IN THE MO DUC/DUC PHO AREA WILL BE CONDUCTED ON 2 AND  
3 FEB.

GP-4

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	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BR/EF

COC

16401

O 290850Z JAN 67  
 FM NINTH MARINES  
 TO CG, FIRST MARIDV  
 BT

G-3

## CONCEPT OF OPERATION(OPERATION INDEPENDENCE)

A. CG 1ST MARDIV 281323Z JAN 67

1. MISSION. NINTH MARINES CONDUCTS COORDINATED SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN GODON AREA BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY SONG VU GIA, ON THE EAST BY SONG THU BON, AND ON THE WEST BY TAOR BOUNDARY TO LOCATE AND CAPTURE OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT THEREIN.

2. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. COMMENCING AT L-HOUR, D-DAY, 2D BN (-) (REIND), 4TH MARINES LANDS BY HELICOPTER IN DESIGNATED HLZ' AND ATTACKS NORTHEAST IN ASSIGNES ZOA; SIMULTANEOUSLY 2D BN (-) (REIND), 5TH MARINES LANDS IN DESIGNATED HLZ'S AND ATTACKS EAST AND NORTHEAST IN ASSIGNED ZOA. DECEPTION WILL BE EMPLOYED BY A FEINT TOWARD ANTENNA VALLEY AREA AND A FALSE HLZ PREP IN THAT AREA. COORDINATION WITH THUONG DUC CIDG FORCES WOULD PROVIDE A BLOCKING FORCE TO THE WEST VIC N-S GRID LINE (ZC 200) TO PREVENT MOVEMENT OUT OF THE GORDON AREA IN THAT DIRECTION.

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Coral (42)

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PAGE TWO B14R

ON D-W RECON ELEMENTS WILL BE INSERTED BY HELICOPTER INTO RECON ZONES LOCATED NORTH, WEST AND SOUTH OF OBJECTIVE AREA TO INITIALLY PROVIDE SURVEILLANCE OF OBJECTIVE AREA AND ON ORDER, ESTABLISH AMBUSHES ON AVENUES OF ENTRANCE TO AND EGRESS FROM OBJECTIVE AREA. LATE ON D-1, OR AS DIRECTED, BLOCKING FORCES ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN BLOCKING POSITIONS ALONG SONG VU GIA AND SONG THU BON AND ON ORDER SHIFT BLOCKS AS REQUIRED TO INSURE SEALING OF

OBJECTIVE ARE. CAS CONSISTING OF FIXED WING AND HELO GUNSHIPS WILL BE EMPLOYED AS FEASIBLE. FIRE SUPPORT WILL BE PROVIDED BY DIRECT SUPPORT BATTERIES, REINFORCING ARTILLERY FIRES AND 81MM MORTARS (LOCATED WITH BLOCK FORCE UNITS). CONCENTRATIONS WILL BE PREPLANNED ON AVENUES OF ENTRANCE TO AND EGRESS FROM OBJECTIVE AREA IN SUPPORT OF RECON ELEMENTS AND MAJOR OPERATING ELEMENTS. ADDITIONAL DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT WILL BE PROVIDED BY TANK AND ANTI-TANK UNITS LOCATED WITH BLOCK FORCES. CASUALTIES WILL BE EVACUATED INITIALLY TO DET, CLEARING PLATOON LOCATED AT BAS, AN HOA. AN LSA WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT A LOCATION TO BE COORDINATED WITH FLSG(A).

3. ADDITIONAL FIRCES REQUIRED ABOVE THOSE PROVIDED BY REFERENCE (A) AND ORGANIC ASSETS.

PAGE THREE B14R

- (A) DET, 1ST RECON BN (DIRECT SUPPORT)
- (B) DET, SCOUT DOG PLAT (6 TEAMS) (DIRECT SUPPORT)
- (C) DET, ITT (8) (DIRECT SUPPORT)
- (D) INTERPRETERS (8) (DIRECT SUPPORT)
- (E) ARTY FORCES, AN HOA (DIRECT SUPPORT)
- (F) HE TEAM, 244TH PSYWAR CO (DIRECT SUPPORT)
- (G) PLT, 29TH CA CO (DIRECT SUPPORT)
- (H) THUONG DUC CIDG FORCES (COORDINATION)
- (I) DET, COLL AND CLR CO, 1ST MED BN (DIRECT SUPPORT)

4. ESTIMATED DURATION OF OPERATION: 5-7 DAYS.

5. TENTATIVE D-DAY: 1 FEB 67

6. TENTATIVE L-HOUR: 1000H

GP-4

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	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	REF
	337

COL

P 290905Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TO CG III MAF  
 INFO CG FIRST MAW  
 BT

AIR O  
 AO OBS SUPPORT 1st MAR DIV

A. CG, III MAF 201404Z JAN 67

1. PRESENT AERIAL OBSERVATION (AO) SUPPORT FOR FIRST MARDIV TAOR/ RAOR PROVIDED IAW REF A INADEQUATE TO ENSURE PROPER COVERAGE.
2. FACTORS RELATING TO INADEQUACY OF AO COVERAGE ARE:
  - A. FRAGMENTATION OF LIMITED ASSETS AVAILABLE. NINE (9) AIRCRAFT PRESENTLY ASSIGNED FMAW ARE DISPERSED DONG HA, PHU BAI, DANANG AND CHU LAI.
  - B. MULTI SOURCE DEMANDS FOR UH-1E IN OTHER THAN OBSERVATION MISSION.
  - C. DIVERSION OF FRAGGED AO MISSIONS FOR USE AS TAC(A) FORGED BLAZERS BOTH AT DANANG AND CHU LAI.
  - D. PRESENT POLICY THAT REQUIRES 01 TO FLY IN PAIRS WHEN OUTSIDE OF TAOR.
  - E. DIVERSION OF AERIAL OBSERVER ASSETS, PRESENTLY NINE (9), FOR

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 3035E  
 DANANG AND CHU LAI. INCREASE IN MANNING LEVEL OF AERIAL OBSERVERS TO EIGHTEEN (18) TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DANANG AND CHU LAI IN PROCESS

F. LIMITED ARMY 01 AIRCRAFT SORTIES AVAILABLE

3. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AO COVERAGE COMMENSURATE AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ABOVE FACTORS RECOMMEND:

- A. INCREASE PRESENT ALLOCATION FIRST MARDIV FOR DANANG AND CHU LAI IN REF A BY ADDITIONAL ONE USMC AND ONE ARMY SORTIE.
- B. PERIODIC REVIEW BE CONDUCTED AND AS PROGRAMMED ASSETS, BOTH AIRCRAFT AND AERIAL OBSERVERS, BECOME AVAILABLE INCREASE TEMPO OF AERIAL SURVEILLANCE TO FULL TIME 24 HOUR COVERAGE.

GP-4  
 BT

UNCLASSIFIED  
 UNCLASSIFIED  
 (Conf 43)

UNCLASSIFIED



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF

1-57

CC

G-3

O 290931Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TO CG IF XRAY  
 FIRST MAR  
 NINTH MAR  
 SECOND BN FIFTH MAR  
 FIRST RECON BN  
 ELEVENTH MAR  
 BT

DETAILED PLANS FOR INCREASED OFFENSIVE EFFORT PRIOR TO, DURING AND AFTER TET STANDDOWN

- A. CG III MAF 262348Z JAN 67 (PASEP)
- B. CG III MAF 281336Z JAN 67 (NOTAL)
- C. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 281323Z JAN 67 (NOTAL)

1. REF A PROVIDED PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR INCREASED OFFENSIVE EFFORT PRIOR TO, DURING AND AFTER TET STANDDOWN.
2. REF B REQUESTED THIS HQ SUBMIT PLANS TO IMPLEMENT REQUIREMENTS REF A TO CG III MAF NLT 31JAN67.
3. REQUEST SUBMISSION YR INTENTIONS SUBJ INCREASED OFFENSIVE

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3036E  
 EFFORT THIS HQ NLT 30JAN67.  
 4. OMIT INFORMATION RELATED REF C.


GP-4  
 BT

6.

Conf (44)

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CO.C

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

K

P 300925Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REING-3  
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF  
 INFO RUMNNA/NAVSUPPACT DANANG  
 RUMFCR/CTF 115  
 RUMNNA/CTG 115.1/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR  
 RUMFCR/DET COASTAL DIV 12, CHU LAI  
 ZEN/CG IP XRAY  
 BT

SWIFT BOAT SUPPORT OPN TRINITY

1. REQUEST ONE SWIFT BOAT BE PLACED IN SUPPORT OF FIRST BN SEVENTH MAR FOR OPN TRINITY BEGINNING 300815H JAN 67 FOR PERIOD OF ABOUT THREE DAYS TO RENDER SERVICES SIMILAR TO THOSE PROVIDED ON OPN FRANKLIN, TO INCLUDE SCREENING/BLOCKING, BEACH RECON AND ATTACK OF SUCH SHORE TARGETS IN FIRST BN SEVENTH MAR SECTOR S CO, FIRST BN SEVENTH MAR MAY REQUEST. PATROL AND INTERDICTION OF COASTAL TRAFFIC OFF OPERATIONS AREA BOUNDED BY E-W GRID LINES BS 96 AND BS 98.  
 2. CONTACT CONSTRUE ON 53.20 (FM) M-789. DIRLAUTH.

GP-4

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl (45)


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O 301401Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 5-3  
 TO CG III MAF  
 CG FMAW  
 HQ BN  
 FIRST MAR  
 NINTH MAR  
 SECOND BN FIFTH MAR  
 FIRST RECON BN  
 DET THIRD ENGR BN  
 DET THIRD SP BN  
 FIRST MED BN  
 BT

*K*

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	Wk SUM
	CMD CHR
	DRIFT

*Coc*



FRAG O 14-67 (AUGMENTATION OPN INDEPENDENCE) (U)  
 A. FIRST MARDIV COC 300253Z JAN 67 (NOTAL).  
 B. NINTH MAR 290850Z JAN 67 (NOTAL).  
 C. FORCE O 5312, 10  
 1. COMMENCING O/A 1FEB67 NINTH MAR CONDUCTS OPN INDEPENDENCE.

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 3196 E  
 COORDINATED SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN IN DANANG TAOR IAW CONCEPT  
 CONTAINED REF A. REF B CITES NEED FOR AUGMENTATION.

2. EXECUTION

A. NINTH MAR:

(1) ASSUME OPCON BN CMD GRP, TWO RIFLE COS, FIRST MAR  
 AND BN CMD GRP, TWO RIFLE COS, SECOND BN FIFTH MAR EFFECTIVE  
 010600H FEB 67

(2) DIRLAUTH FIRST MP BN TO ARRANGE PICKUP OF SCOUT DOG TMS.

(3) AUTHORITY GRANTED EMPLOY ITT SUB TM CURRENTLY SUPPORTING NINTH MAR IN OPN INDEPENDENCE.

(4) HB TM AND DISPL PERS TM REQUESTED III MAF IN SPT, IF  
 AVAILABLE.

B. HQ BN. PROVIDE AERIAL OBS PERS AS LN TO NINTH MAR FV  
 31JAN 67 TO TERMINATION OPN.

C. FIRST MAR

(1) CHOP BN CMD GRP, TWO RIFLE COS TO NINTH MAR 010600H FEB 67  
 (INCL 3 INTERPRETERS).

(2) AUTHORITY GRANTED EMPLOY ITT SUB TM CURRENTLY SUPPORTING FIRST MAR IN OPN INDEPENDENCE.

D. SECOND BN FIFTH MAR CHOP BN CMD GRP, TWO RIFLE COS TO

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(cont'd 46)

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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 3196 [REDACTED]

NINTH MAR 010600H FEB 67 (INCL ONE INTERPRETER.

E. FIRST RECON BN. PROVIDE LN DET NINTH MAR 010600H FEB 67.

F. DET THIRD ENGR BN. PROVIDE TWO ENGR SQUADS IN SPT NINTH MAR COMMENCING 31JAN 67

G. DET THIRD SP BN. PROVIDE MINE HST'S IN SPT NINTH MAR COMMENCING 31JAN67.

H. FIRST MED BN. PROVIDE DET COLL AND CLR CO IN SPT NINTH MAR ET TO TAKE POSITION VIC AN HOA AIRFIELD PRIOR 011000H FEB 67.

I. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

(2) ON TERMINATION OPN ALL UNITS AND DETS RETURN PARENT COMMAND.

3. REQUEST CG III MAF PROVIDE FOL SPT COMMENCING 31JAN67 FOR PERIOD ABOUT SEVEN DAYS:

A. ONE HB TM, PSYOPS CO

B. DISPL PERS TM

C. SIX SCOUT DOG TMS. WRITTEN REQUEST FOLLOWS IAW REF C.


4. REQUEST FMAW PROVIDE FIXED WING AND HELO SPT.

GP-4


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031142Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN *CC*  
 INFO FIRST MARDIV COOPCOM  
 031070Z JAN 67  
 FM III MAF COC  
 TO FIRST MARDIV COC  
 BT



## READINESS POSTURE

- A. CG III MAF 301340Z JAN 67
1. INDICATIONS ARE THAT ENEMY FORCES MAY SEEK TO ATTACK IN FORCE IN SEVERAL SECTORS OF IOTZ DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND TET WHICH COMMENCES 8 FEBRUARY, OR PERHAPS DURING THE TET PERIOD ITSELF. NEITHER THE EXACT FORM OR LOCUS OF SUCH AN ATTACK CAN BE PREDICTED, BUT WHATEVER IT SHOULD OCCUR AN IMMEDIATE REACTION BY III MAF FORCES WILL BE MANDATORY. REF A REFERS.
2. FOR CG 1ST MARDIV: WITH FORBODING IN MIND, IMMEDIATE ACTION IS DIRECTED TO:
  - A. DESIGNATE AND READY THREE INFANTRY BATTALIONS CONSISTING OF TWO COMPANIES EACH. UNITS SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF AIR OR SURFACE MOVEMENT AS DETERMINED AT THE TIME OF EXECUTION. TASK ORGANIZATION OF UNITS DEPLOYED WILL BE SPECIFIED IN THE EXECUTING DIRECTIVE, BUT SHOULD INCLUDE AS A MINIMUM ARTY, ENGR AND

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 331GE  
 LOGISTIC SUPPORT ELEMENTS.

- B. OF THE THREE ELEMENTS ALERTED, DEPILE ONE ON 12 HOUR ALERT, WITH THE REMAINING TWO IN A TWENTY-FOUR HOUR POSTURE.
3. FOR CG 3D MARDIV:
  - A. DESIGNATE AND READY TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS CONSISTING OF TWO COMPANIES EACH, CAPABILITIES AND ORGANIZATION AS INDICATED IN PARA 2, ABOVE.
  - B. DEPILE ONE BN ON 12 HOUR ALERT AND ONE IN TWENTY-FOUR HOUR POSTURE.
  - C. FOR ALL 3 PROVIDE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED, BOTH IN PLANNING AND IN EXECUTION. DIRECT LIAISON IS DIRECTED. KEEP THIS MD INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.


GP-4  
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2  
*GP-4*

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031160Z JAN 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO FIRST MARDIV OPCON  
 INFO CG III MAF  
 ET



COC

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
X	CMD CHR
X	BRIEF
	POST

K

## READINESS POSTURE (U)

- A. CG III MAF 301340Z JAN 67 (PASEP)
- B. III MAF COC 310701Z JAN 67 (PASEP)
- C. FIRST MARDIV OP O 301-66
- D. THIRD MARDIV OP O 277-66

1. REF A CITES INDICATIONS OF EN ATTACK IN FORCE IN I CTZ PRIOR TO TET WHICH COMMENCES 8 FEBRUARY. REF B DIRECTS FIRST MARDIV TO PREPARE FORCES FOR IMMEDIATE REACTION PRIOR TO AND DURING TET.

## 2. EXECUTION

A. CG TFXRAY. IN EXTENSION REF C, DESIGNATE AND BE PREP PROVIDED ONE BN OF TWO COMPANIES WITH COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SPT ELMS ON TWELVE HOUR NOTICE.

B. FIRST MAR. IN EXTENSION REF D, DESIGNATE AND BE PREP PROVIDED ONE BN OF TWO COMPANIES WITH COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SPT

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 333IE

ELMS ON TWELVE HOUR NOTICE.

C. NINTH MAR. IN EXTENSION REF D, DESIGNATE AND BE PREP PROVIDED ONE BN OF TWO COMPANIES WITH COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SPT ELMS ON TWENTY FOUR HOUR NOTICE.

## D. ELEVENTH MAR

DET THIRD ENGR BN

DET THIRD SP BN

THIRD MT BN

ELEVENTH MT BN

SEVENTH MT BN

FIRST MED BN

PREPARE TO PROVIDE AUGMENTATION AND/OR SPT AS REQUIRED.

## E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) UNITS MUST BE CAPABLE OF AIR OR SURFACE MOVEMENT WITHIN PERIOD INDICATED.

(2) TASK ORG OF UNITS DEPLOYED WILL BE SPECIFIED IN EXECUTING DIRECTIVE.

(3) STANDDOWN AND REVERSION PROVISIONS REFS C AND D ON ORDER THIS HQ.

(4) REPORT UNITS DESIGNATED IAW PROVISIONS THIS MSG THIS HQ.

(5) DIRLAUTH ALCON.


GP-4

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16

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12 FEB 1968  
1ST MARDIV REIN  
1ST MARDIV OPCON/GUARD MAIL  
G-3

SECTION 1 OF 2

SECTION

SECTION 10

1. TASK ORGANIZATION AS OF 11 JAN

1.1. 1ST MARDIV REIN

1.1.1. (-) REIN

1.1.1.1. (-)

1.1.1.2. (-) REIN

1.1.1.3. (-)

1.1.1.4. 1ST FA CO, (USA)

1.1.1.5. 1ST PLAT, 2914 FA CO, (USA)

1.1.1.6. EST 17, INF

1.1.1.7. CO SGT 14, FWD

PAGE 2 UNCLASSIFIED

1.1.2. 1ST FA CO

1.1.3. 1ST PLAT

1.1.4. 1ST FA CO

1.1.5. 1ST FA CO (USA)

1.1.6. 1.1.1. (-) REIN, 1ST BN 1111

1.1.7. CO A, 1ST SP BN

1.1.8. CO A, 1ST BN 111

1.1.9. (-) REIN

1.1.10. 1ST MAR

1.1.11. 1ST MAR

1.1.12. 28TH MAR

1.1.13. 111, 57TH MAR

1.1.14. BN

1.1.15. CO S, 1ST AT BN

1.1.16. CO S, 1ST ENGR BN

1.1.17. CO S, 11 2K BN

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	Wk SUM
	CMD CRR
	BRK
	POST
	POSITION

DAMANG

DO  
DO  
DO  
DO  
DO  
DO  
DO  
DO  
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DO

DO  
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DO  
DO  
DO  
DO  
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DO  
DO

YORIARU DO



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PAGE 3 RUMHLA 0639E

3D PLAT, CO A, 3D AMIRAC BN	DO
DET COMM CO, HQ BN	DO
DET MORTAR BTRY, 2D BN, 11TH MAR (2 107MM MORTAR)	DO
11TH MAR (-) REIN	DO
HQ BTRY	DO
1ST BN REIN	DO
HQ BTRY	DO
BTRY A (6 105MM HOW TD)	DO
BTRY B (-) (6 105MM HOW TD)	DO
BTRY C (6 105MM HOW TD)	DO
DET MORTAR BTRY (6 107MM MORTAR TD)	DO
3D PLAT, 1ST ARMD AMPH CO, FMF (6 LVT-6)	DO
2D BN (-) REIN, 12TH MAR	DO
HQ BTRY (2 155MM HOW TD)	DO
BTRY H, 3D BN (6 105MM HOW TD)	DO
BTRY A, 1ST BN, 13TH MAR (6 105MM HOW TD)	DO
BTRY B, 1ST BN, 13TH MAR (6 105MM HOW TD)	DO
BTRY L, 4TH BN (6 155MM HOW SP)	DO
1ST 8" HOW BTRY (-) (REIN) (1 8" HOW SP, 1 155MM GUNSP, DO 2 155MM HOW TD)	DO

PAGE 4 RUMHLA 03639E

1ST ARMD AMPHI CO (-), FMF	DO
HQ CO	DO
SERV PLAT	DO
2D PLAT (6 LVT-6)	DO
ARTY GP AN HOA	DO
BTRY E (REIN), 2D BN, 11TH MAR (6 105MM HOW TD, 2 155MM HOW TP)	DO
1ST PLAT, 1ST 8" HOW BTRY (1 8IN HOW S, 1 155MM GUNSP DO	DO
3D PLAT, 1ST 8" HOW BTRY (1 8IN HOW SP, 1 155MM GUN SP) DO	DO
1ST RECON BN (-) REIN	DO
H&S CO (-)	DO
CO B	DO
CO C	DO
1ST FORCE RECON CO (-), FMF	DO
1ST AT BN (-) (24-M50)	DO
H&S CO	DO
CO A	DO
CO B (-)	DO
3D AT BN (-) (13 M50 ONTOS)	DO
H&S CO (-)	DO

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PAGE 5 RUMHLA 93639E

CO C	DO
DET, 3D ENGR BN REIN	DO
DET H&S CO	DO
ENGR SUPPT CO (-)	DO
CO C	DO
CO A (-) REIN, 1ST ENGR BN	DO
DET, 3D SP BN REIN	DO
DET H&S CO	DO
CO A (-), 1ST SP BN	DO
3D MT BN (-) REIN	DO
CO C (-)	DO
CO A, 1ST MT BN	DO
1ST MED BN (-) REIN	DO
H&S CO	DO
CO A	DO
CO C, 3D MED BN	DO
1ST TK BN (-) (36 M-48, 6 M67, 3 M51 TVR)	DO
H&S CO (-)	DO
CO B REIN	DO

PAGE 6 RUMHLA 93639E

CO C REIN	DO
3D TX BN (-) (19 M-48, 4 M-67, 2 M51 TVR)	DO
H&S CO (-)	DO
CO B (-)	DO
1ST AMTRAC BN (-) REIN (6 LVTP-5 CMD, 69 LVTP-5 3LVTR, 7 LVTE-1)	DO
H&S CO	DO
CO A (-) REIN	DO
CO A (-), 3D AMTRAC BN	DO
7TH MT BN (-) REIN, FMF	DO
H&S CO	DO
CO C	DO
CO A, 9TH MT BN, FMF	DO
TRANS CO, 9TH MT BN, FMF	DO
11TH MT BN, FMF	DO
1ST DENTAL CO (-), FMF	DO
3D DENTAL CO (-), FMF	DO
TASK FORCE XRAY	DO
HQ & HQ CO REIN	DO
DET HQ BN	DO

CHU LAI

BT

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FINAL SECTION OF 2  
DET 1ST DENTAL CO, FMF  
7TH CIT (-), FMF  
9TH IIT (-), FMF  
4TH PLAT, 29TH CA CO, (USA)  
6TH PLAT (-), 29TH CA CO, (USA)  
DET, HQ CO, 5TH MAR  
5TH MAR (-)  
HQ CO (-)  
7TH MAR (-) REIN  
HQ CO  
1ST BN  
2D BN (-)  
M&S CO  
CO E

DO DO

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 646E

CO F  
CO G  
1ST BN(-) 5TH MAR  
H&S CO  
CO B  
CO C  
CO D  
3D BN, 5TH MAR  
3D BN REIN, 5TH MAR  
3D BN  
DET, BIRY I (-), 3D BN, 11TH MAR  
DET, HQ BN  
DET, 9TH ITI, FMF  
DET, 6TH PLAT, 29TH CA CO USA  
DET, 7TH CIT, FMF  
DET, RR/CONST CO, 7TH COMM BN  
DET, COC, 1ST SP BN  
CLEARING PLAT REIN, COD, 1ST MED  
PLAT REIN, CO C, 1ST ENGR BN  
CO A (-), DET 1ST RECON BN

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 3 RUMHLA 646E

1ST FAG	DO
HQ BTRY REIN	DO
DET HQ BTRY 11TH MAR	DO
2D BN (-), 11TH MAR	DO
HQ BTRY	DO
BTRY D (6 105MM HOW TD)	DO
BTRY F (6 105 MM HOW TD)	DO
MORTAR BTRY (-) (4 107MM MORTORS)	DO
3D BN, 11TH MAR (18 105MM HOW TD, 6 107MM MORTARS)	DO
4TH BN, 11TH (18 105MM HOW SP, 6 107MM HOW TD)	DO
3D 155MM GUN BTRY SP, FMF (6 155MM GUN SP)	DO
3D 8IN HOW BTRY SP, FMF (6 8IN HOW SP)	DO
BTRY A REIN, 2D BN, 24TH FA, USA (4 175MM GUN SP)	DO
CHU LAI DEFENSE COMD	DO
DET, H&S CO, 1ST BN, 7TH MAR	DO
CO A, 1ST BN, 5TH MAR	DO
CO H, 2D BN, 7TH MAR	DO
PROVISIONAL CO	DO
DET, 1ST RECON BN	DO
DET H&S CO	DO

PAGE 4 RUMHLA 646E

DET CO A	DO
CO D	DO
DET 1ST FORCE RECON CO	DO
3D PLAT, 3D FORCE RECON BN	DO
CO C REIN, 1ST AT BN (19 M-50 ONTOS)	DO
1ST ENGR BN(-)	DO
H&S CO	DO
ENGR SUPPORT CO	DO
CO B (-)	DO
CO C (-)	DO
1ST SP BN (-)	DO
H&S CO	DO
CO B	DO
CO C (-)	DO
1ST NT BN (-)	DO
H&S CO	DO
CO B	DO
CO C	DO
CO A REIN, 1ST TK BN, FMF (17 M48 TKS, 3 M-67 FLM TKS)	DO
3D AMTRAC BN (-) FMF (7 LVTP-5 CVD 60 LVTP-5, 7 LVTP-5)	DO

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

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K.  
HB

HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

Div Bul 5080  
46/WM/cws  
30 January 1967

DIVISION BULLETIN 5080

From: Commanding General  
To: Distribution List

Subj: The Story of Fort Page

Enclos: (1) "Something of Significance"

1. Purpose. To familiarize personnel of this Command with the achievements of a Combined Action Company.

2. Information. Enclosure (1) is a factual, well written success story of what has been and can be accomplished by the CAC Program.

3. Action. The lessons learned in this narrative can be applied by all unit commanders, in their personal and working relationship with the Vietnamese people and Military Forces.

4. Self-Cancellation. 31 July 1967.

*Sidney J. Altman*  
SIDNEY J. ALTMAN  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "A" AND "B"

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Tab F

Div Bul 5080  
30 January 1967SOMETHING OF SIGNIFICANCE

Captain F. J. WEST, Jr.

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## INTRODUCTION

The author, recalled to active duty at his own request while on leave from Princeton University, has been conducting a study and writing narratives concerning small-unit combat for seven months. During that time, he spent several weeks operating with Combined Action Company L-1, located at Fort Page, near the Song Tra Bong River, some 8 miles southwest of the Chu Lai airfield. He stayed at the fort in July and August, and again in December and January, participating in the patrols and watching the Marines and PFs work together. In some cases, inductive reasoning is more meaningful than statistical analysis. It is for that reason that the first-hand narrative tracing the development of one Combined Action Company is presented. Fort Page was singled out for attention not because it was a "show" CAC singular in a spectacular way; rather, the author selected it for his study over half a year ago precisely because it was ordinary and untouched by any fame or unusual attention. Its story could be that of a score of other CACs.

## I

## The Beginnings

No one was sure at first, not in the early summer of 1966. Binh Nghia village was a battleground, hardly a pacified area. The district chief at Binh Son (in Quang Ngai Province) estimated 750 young men from that village had joined the main-force VC units during the past several years. Two independent VC companies and one full battalion were roaming the district. Of the 4,575 persons in the village, 122 families were known VC sympathizers. So the decision by the Marine regiment to establish a Combined Action Company in Binh Nghia was not made without an acknowledgement of the hazards involved, still, something had to be done. The morale of the local PF platoon was low and ebbing fast. They had been hit by the VC so often that their confidence was shattered. The enemy held the offensive and controlled the actions of the people. Marine patrols and ambushes made contact often, killing enemy soldiers and disrupting the movements of large forces; but that alone was not

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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30 January 1967

enough. Still the villagers scurried about with averted eyes and the PPs clung to the shallow safety of their fort.

Twelve Marines from Charlie Company were selected to go to the fort and work with the PPs. The Marines chosen had compassion and understanding as well as sound tactical sense. Their primary mission was to raise the fighting spirit and ability of the 28 PPs who stayed at the fort. Originally, the Marines commanded by a Corporal BEEBE, who took things nice and easy, getting his feet on the ground and allowing the PPs to be accustomed to sharing watches and making short patrols with the Marines. When Corporal BEEBE rotated home in late June, Staff Sergeant Joseph SULLIVAN replaced him and the presence of Marines had been generally accepted by the villagers and the PPs. SULLIVAN thought the time had come to remove the fear the PPs had of night contact with the VC and to show the villagers that darkness did not have to be a time of dread.

## II

### Night Skirmishes


The village was a two mile long complex of six hamlets, bordered to the south by a wide river and to the north by a large expanse of sand dunes. At night the VC from main-force units moved in and out freely, either crossing the river or infiltrating in across the dunes to collect taxes, take out rice, or just to visit their families. Over a platoon of guerrillas never left the local area. The enemy groups varied in size from two to 200. SULLIVAN set out to stalk them.

His technique was simple and relied upon total integration. Using only his own men and the PPs at the fort, he would send out three, and sometimes four patrols and ambushes at night. The Company was willing to send him more Marines any time he wanted, but he never asked. He wanted to show the PPs that his men needed and relied on them.

The patrols were small, generally not more than three Marines and three or four PPs. They were extremely well armed. Each Marine carried an M-14 modified with bipods, four to six grenades, three or four hundred rounds with a liberal mix of tracers, and one or two LAWs. The patrols never knew whether they would hit a VC courier or a company.

At first, the PPs were badly frightened at the idea of hunting the VC in the dark, but the Marines taught and trained them by example, taking the point, setting the pace, demanding night discipline and throwing out sharp full volumes of fire when engaged. The enemy, not used to encountering such tactics,

ENCLOSURE (1)



Div Bul 5080  
30 January 1967

was thrown off balance. The PFs on the other hand were showing marked improvement. Their attitude and spirit of cooperation were improving. Confidence, like fear, is infectious, especially when it derives from success, and the PFs were beginning to succeed.

Determined to check this new, aggressive unit, the enemy gathered a sizeable force. They struck at the fort in strength in early July, only to be ambushed from behind as they crossed a paddy. In the ensuing fight, the Marines lost their first KIA, for whom the fort was subsequently named. The VC however, were routed and lost face. The PFs became more confident.

In mid-July, the VC tried again, determination reflecting the effectiveness of the CAC units. This time they attacked a force of five Marines and three PFs who were lying in ambush along the northern bank of the Song Tra Bong River. The VC attempted to hit the force from the rear, crawling close in along the paddy dikes which stretched for 200 meters to the rear of the ambush party. A PF posted on rear lookout saw the enemy and alerted SULLIVAN who was patrol leader that night. SULLIVAN had his force wriggle about to face the enemy. They then held fire until the VC were within 50 meters. When he did give the order to cut loose the effect was devastating. The VC were trapped with nowhere to go. By using bipods, the friendly fire was delivered in grazing arcs which not only cut down the enemy on the dikes but also raked clean the treeline on the far side of the paddies. At the edge of that treeline the VC leaders had clustered to watch and direct the attack. The sudden concentrated fire of the Marines and PFs caught them standing erect and the final tally of the night action, (which lasted less than eight minutes), stood at 31 enemy dead, including a Company Commander and a platoon commander. The Marines and PFs took no casualties.

The villagers were dumbfounded and the PFs could hardly believe it themselves. The enemy force had passed through the hamlets of My Hue (1) and (3) before the attack. They said they would destroy the Marines and PFs. The bodies brought back to the various hamlets and moved across the river for burial did not include one PF.

The fight was, of course, exceptional because of its size. Throughout the summer, however, firefights in the dark were the rule. The fort averaged 11 kills a week. If a night went by without a contact, SULLIVAN and his PF counterpart, Mr. PHUC, would kid their troops for taking it easy.

"What were you people doing - picking daisies?", SULLIVAN would say.  
"I didn't hear a round fired all night long."

3  
ENCLOSURE (1)

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30 January 1967

The PFs became more aggressive. Trails where they would balk previously, they now traveled freely. They watched the Marines care for their weapons, and followed suit. They began to conduct night patrols alone. Being familiar with the habits of their enemy and buoyed by their growing prestige among their families and relatives and friends in the village, they sought out members of the local VC infrastructure. By late July, the number of VC captured within the village rose markedly, so that it was a rare day when a prisoner was not brought in by the PFs. Marines had become great favorites in the village, and knew literally hundreds of the villagers and children by name. The CAC did not bring peace to Binh Nghia in 90 days, however.

## III

## The Battle for Binh Nghia

There had been many warnings but little solid information. Supposedly there was an informer in the fort and the VC planned to attack in overwhelming strength. These rumors were common throughout the late summer. With no facts or real clues to work on, SULLIVAN continued his patrolling as usual, although he and Mr. PHUC said they were ~~surprised~~ but harbored an enemy within.

The blow fell shortly after midnight on 15 September. Six of the 12 Marines and 16 of the 28 PFs were put on ambush or village patrol. A squad of VC gained entrance to the fort through a post whose guard mysteriously disappeared. Outside, the 21st VC Company attacked from two different directions. PFC THEITAPAPE, the Marine on radio watch in the machinegun bunker, sprayed the area with automatic fire, preventing the enemy from overrunning the fort. At the same time, he called for illumination and reinforcements. The battle raged at close range for 15 minutes before the enemy were driven from the fort. The Marine relief column pushed them back across the river. Before the firing ended, the six Marines in the fort were casualties, and it was the PFs who had held firm on their own, throwing rocks and using fists and rifle butts when they ran out of ammunition. SSgt SULLIVAN and Mr. PHUC died that night but the idea and the cooperation they had fostered didn't. The six CAC Marines who reached the fort after the fight set out with the PFs to fight again the next night. They refused flatly the offer of relief or the temporary emplacement of a Marine platoon in Binh Nghia. It was their village and they would protect it, and they preferred to do so by working with each other. "The way I figured it, I had a score to settle", Corporal Larry WINGROVE said, "The PFs felt the same way, Hell, this is our village, it's why we're here."

They split up and started out to patrol the hamlets early on the night of 16 September. That same night, the Viet Cong company came back, only this time they too entered the village. Thinking they would receive no interference from the PFs and Marines at the fort, they boldly walked straight down the street

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30 January 1967

leading to the market place in the main hamlet of Binh Yen Noi (3).

Walking up the street from the fort were Corporal WINGROVE, LCpl FLEMING and three PFs. It was barely dusk. The PF in the lead almost collided with a VC standing in the shadow of a house. The VC broke and ran for cover. The PF yelled "VC-VC" then shot and killed him. The PF had time to snatch a French machinegun from the body before the VC recovered from their surprise and opened fire. Bullets snapped toward the CAC patrol from all directions. The five men flopped down in a rough star formation and the duel began. The fight would rage until dawn. FLEMING carrying a PRC-25, called for reinforcements from the fort, and for illumination from the 81's. The PFs, with excellent sense for movement in the shadows, identified targets for WINGROVE, who popped his M-79 as fast as he could load.

Another combined squad from the fort reached the patrol in less than 10 minutes and flares began bursting regularly overhead. The VC tried to work their way back to the river and get across under cover of the rear guard; but an old lady at whose house WINGROVE had eaten a few times ran from her house and pointed out to the Corporal the spot where the VC rear guard was lurking. Some Marines and PFs crawled around the flank while the rest laid down a base of fire and the rear guard position was blasted away in a hail of grenades.

The Marines and PFs now numbering almost a platoon, gained the bank of the river as the VC neared mid-stream. The CACs swept the river with streams of tracers and fired over a dozen LAAWS. From everywhere the people came; even while the firing was still going on, they gathered to watch and talk in amazement.

"You would have thought it was daytime out there", a Marine said, "It was incredible":

That night the VC lost 10 in the village itself and an undetermined number on the waterway. There were no CAC casualties.

Two nights later (September 18th) the enemy tried again. This time a VC squad made the tactical blunder of attempting to ambush a CAC patrol head on. Their own flank was turned and two who had climbed trees for better vantage points were toppled to the ground while their comrades fled.

IV

Acceptance

In the past four months there have been no VC initiated incidents in

5  
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ENCLOSURE (1)

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## DECLASSIFIED

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30 January 1967

Binh Nghia village. As a result, the combat actions have slowed considerably. The CACs have struck at the enemy only three times since on land, although there have been several shoot-outs against targets on the river. From a variety of sources and reports, the district chief and his subsector advisor estimate that there are less than 12 active guerrillas left in the six hamlets.

But, (although it might be tautological even to mention it), force of arms can control the actions of a people while their inclinations and beliefs lay elsewhere. The rapport between the people of Binh Nghia and the CAC Marines have been building, slowly and steadily. Each Marine has three or four close friends among the families of the PFs or of other villagers and many meals are taken within the hamlets at the insistence of these friends. On six occasions in the past two months Marines on night patrols passing by certain houses have received information about VC activities whispered through a window in broken English. In addition, the PFs and village leaders supply much intelligence.

Living with the Marines at the fort is a 10 year old orphan, (naturally nicknamed Joe). WINGROVE found him in a state of miserable existence and promptly adopted in an ad-hoc fashion, quipping to his fellow Marines: "What else could I do? He followed me home, Honest". Joe now attends school regularly and the CAC unit plans to send him to Binh Son to continue his education next year. In his present status, he is the envy of all his friends. "He only has one problem-", laughed one Marine, "with 12 pappasans he has to do his homework and fly right and the PFs check with his teacher so he can't pull a fast one on us."

The CAC acts as a clearing-house for all military movements within the village complex. The Marines and Vietnamese plan their patrols and plot their on-call illumination missions together. No Marine forces enter the area without checking with the CAC first. Medevacs and fire support are available. The Marines are convinced these are very important factors contributing to the high morale of the PFs. Any villager requiring swift aid is also transported by helicopter.

More and more the CAC at Fort Page is filling the role of a catalytic agent around and through which many various agencies may plan, coordinate and control their programs. Marine Civic Action tools and kits are given to the village chief with the cognizance of the CAC. The subsector advisor brings planned USAID projects to the attention of the Marines and he also includes their Sergeant in any meetings he has with the village officials.

During the fall, two 59-man Revolutionary Development Cadres moved into two of the village's six hamlets. Their arrival in no way impeded the work of the CAC. The Cadre leaders took to checking in with the CAC Commander, Sgt James WHITE, to settle military matters as if it were the most natural procedure to follow. For certain checks and visits, the village Police Chief

ENCLOSURE (1)

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30 January 1967

got into the habit of requesting a combined PF/Marine escort where before he could only take national police.

How solidly established the CAC at Fort Page had become in Binh Nghia was graphically demonstrated at a village fair held during the last week of December. The Village Chief and the Police Chief planned the fair in order to draw the villagers together, holding their attention by games and songs while working to inspire a solidarity of feeling against the Viet Cong. The village chief invited the CAC Marines to come, not as guests, but as participants.

In the market place of the hamlet of Binh Yen Noi (3), a wooden stage had been erected. There were two benches set in front of the stage and behind them sat thousands of villagers, packed in tight to watch the entertainment. The PF who was acting as Master of Ceremonies began by introducing the Village Chief, the Police Chief and the two Cadre leaders, each of whom gave a short, impassioned speech. Then a fifth leader was called, and it was Sgt WHITE's turn to get up and talk, with everyone applauding his presence if not his oration, which was very short indeed. After a number of villagers had sung songs or acted out skits before a most appreciative audience, Cplis Larry MELTON and WINGROVE and a brave PF named MUY mounted the stage to moan and mimick some of the latest rock-and-roll records, to the accompaniment of much hooting and laughter. When the fair quieted toward midnight, those Marines in attendance gathered some PFs and RDC militia and faded into the darkness to relieve others on watch or patrol.

V

Conclusion

There is no real conclusion to this story, not yet anyway. The Marines, and the PFs and the RDC militia, will be going on patrol in Binh Nghia village tonight, and tomorrow night and the night after that. The task is not finished, but it is well started and gaining momentum. Sgt WHITE and his men believe they will work themselves right out of their job within a year.

In answer to a pointed question, Cpl WINGROVE replied, "I stay here because I feel I'm doing something".

That "something" has taken various forms at Fort Page. Primarily the CAC has provided security for the village. Not the Marines alone - the PFs and the Marines together. The actions on 15 and 16 September conclusively proved the fighting mettle of the PFs. The Marines have established a rapport with the villagers which, slicing through apathy and fear, is fresh and positive on both sides. By easy natural stages, the CAC at Fort Page has grown into a coordina-

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30 January 1967

ting channel for various agencies to check relating to the specific projects and programs in Binh Nghia.

Note:

If the author believed the struggle and achievements described herein were aberrations, he would have hesitated to write this narrative. So before he did, he traveled to ten other CACs, selected at random throughout I Corps. He spent some time at each, questioning the men closely on a series of points relating to tactics, cooperation with and from the Vietnamese and coordination with other agencies and Marine units. The striking similarity of the responses convinced him that the story of Fort Page was a fitting subject for an inductive study of a Combined Action Company.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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CMC

REF ID: A617942

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam

310800H Jan 1967

**Operation Plan 305-67 (Provisional Infantry Units)**

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014. DA NANG Sheets 6640 I, IV; 6641 II, III. CHU LAI. Sheets 6739 I-IV; 6740 III

(b) First MarDiv Op O 301-67

(c) First MarDiv Op Plan 305-66

(d) DivO P02000.2

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Anx A (Task Organization) to ref (b)

**1. SITUATION**

## a. Enemy forces.

(1) Anx B (Intelligence) to ref (b).

**S & C FILES****HEADQUARTERS****1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF**

## b. Friendly forces. Ref (b).

## c. Assumption. Situation may arise which requires use of provisional inf units within TAORs for special tasks or to relieve or augment other forces.

**2. MISSION.** First MarDiv rapidly forms provisional inf units, as situation requires, for employment within TAOR on special tasks or to relieve or augment other forces.**3. EXECUTION**

## a. Concept of operation.

(1) Standard organization, equipment and supplies prescribed for provisional inf units throughout Division. Subordinate commands when tasked by this Bq to provide provisional rifle company or elements thereof organize, equip and supply unit IAW Anx A (Organization of Provisional Rifle Company) and Anx B (Equipment and Supplies).

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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f/w

1st MarDiv

Jan 1967

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(2) Typical tasks for provisional inf unit:

(a) Special security mission.

(b) Relieve organized unit within TAOR for employment on another mission.

(c) Augment organized unit within TAOR.

b. TF XRAY. Be prepared to form such provisional inf units as may be required for employment within CHU LAI TAOR.

c. Separate battalions DA NANG TAOR:

(1) When directed provide provisional inf units as specified in execution frag order.

(2) Anx A (Organization for Provisional Rifle Company).

(3) Task orgn provisional inf units to be published in execution frag order.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Ref (c), Op Plan 305-66, superseded by this plan and may be destroyed by burning without reference to this Hq.

(2) This plan effective for planning on receipt, execution on order.

(3) DIRLAUTH ALCON on receipt of execution frag order.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. TF XRAY. As directed by CG TF XRAY.

b. Separate battalions DA NANG TAOR:

(1) Supply.

(a) Initial source. Parent organization of provisional units to provide initial issue for prescribed load.

(b) Prescribed load.

1. Class I. MCI w/fuel trioxane - 1 day.

2. Class II.

a. Normal arms and equipment including body armor (upper torso) in accordance with assigned job.

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b. Crew served weapons, comm equip and vehicles.  
Annex B (Equipment and Supplies).

c. Dry cell batteries. Minimum of 2 days supply each item of equip.

3. Class III. Vehicle fuel tanks full.

4. Class IV. None

5. Class V. Basic allowance for small arms plus items listed in Annex B (Equipment and Supplies).

6. Water. Two full canteens per ind plus water cans listed in Annex B (Equipment and Supplies).

(c) Resupply. By org having OPCON of provisional inf units.

(2) Gas evac. Evac by most expeditious means to nearest 1st MarDiv med facility unless directed otherwise by competent medical authority.

(3) Transportation. Parent organization of provisional units to coordinate transportation to move units to initial employment location.

(4) Personnel. Admin Order 301-67.

## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS


### a. Communication-Electronics.

(1) IAW Ref (d).

(2) Frequencies, call signs and other Comm instructions to be promulgated in execution frag order.

### b. Command. Instructions to be published in execution frag order.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL NICKERSON

  
SIDNEY J. ALTMAN  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

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ANNEXES:

A - Organization of Provisional Rifle Company

B - Equipment and Supplies

DISTRIBUTION:

CG III MAF	5	3d Dental Co	1
CG 3d MarDiv	3	G-1	1
CG TF XRAY	30	G-2	1
Hq Bn	5	G-3	1
1st Mar	6	G-4	1
9th Mar	6	G-5	1
2d Bn, 5th Mar	3	Compt	1
11th Marines	3	Air	1
1st Recon Bn	5	Eng	1
1st AT Bn	5	Ord	1
3d AT Bn	5	CEO	1
Det, 3d Engr Bn	5	Supply	1
Det, 3d SP Bn	5	Insp	1
3d MT Bn	5	PMO	1
7th MT Bn	5	MTO	1
11th MT Bn	5	Emb	1
1st Med Bn	2	S&C	50
1st Tank Bn	5	COC	1
3d Tank Bn	5	FSOC	1
1st AmTrac Bn	5	Surg	1

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
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1st Marine Division (Rein), FIF  
DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
310300H Jan 1967

Annex A (Organization of Provisional Rifle Company) to Operation Plan 305-67

Time Zone: H

1. The following organization is prescribed for provisional inf units activated IAW provisions of basic order.



BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL NICKERSON

*Sidney J. Altman*  
SIDNEY J. ALTMAN  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Op Plan 305-67

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A-1

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam  
 310700Z Jul 1967

## Annex B (Equipment and Supplies) to Operation Plan 305-67

## 1. Required equipment.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Prov Co</u>	<u>Prov PLAT</u>
Radio Set AN/PRC-25	2	1
Telephone Set TA-312/PR (or EE-8)	2	2
Cable Tele MX-3064/G-WD-1/TT (Comm Wire)	2	1
Machine Gun (Cal 7.62mm M60 or Cal 30/1919 A-4)	0	3

## 2. Recommended equipment and supplies.

<u>ITEM</u>		
Truck utility 4 T 4X4 M422A1	1	0
Trlr utility 4 M-100	1	0
Launcher Grenade 40mm M-79 w/B4 ammo	1	0
Can Water, 5 gal (full)	1	8
Grenade, hand frag M26	0	4 cases
Grenade, hand, illum MK1	1 case	0
Grenade, hand smoke, colored, assorted (red, green, yellow)	1 case	0
Flare, surface, trip M49	1 case	0

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL NICKERSON

*Sidney J. Altman*  
 SIDNEY J. ALTMAN  
 Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
 Chief of Staff

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ASST DIV CAREER ADVISORY O	2dLt M. E. CARSON	Oct 67	Devote 447 -	INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFFICER	Capt R. A. PATTERSON (DANANG) Oct 67 2dLt C. M. HENDRICKS (CHU LAI) Aug 67	Isharwood 446 Cavwood 7	
CHU LAI DEFENSE COMMAND Commanding Officer Executive Officer/S-3	LtCol E. B. ANDERSON Maj J. C. HERCET	Aug 67 Aug 67	Anchor Watch 6 Anchor Watch 5	POSTAL OFFICER PROVOST MARSHAL REPRODUCTION OFFICER SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER Custodian Recreation Fund	2dLt W. NEW LtCol J. J. HOOHOFF 2dLt J. M. WHEATLEY Maj J. E. FORRE 2dLt W. E. MUNN (CHU LAI)	Aug 67 Mar 67 Feb 68 Oct 67 Oct 67	Mount 120 or Devote 20 Isharwood 6 Isharwood 307 Auditor 37 Devote-Auditor 37
COMM ELECT OFFICER Asst CBO Asst CBO/Maintenance Systems Control O Comm Chief	LtCol A. G. ZIEGLER 2dLt D. L. NELSON 2dLt J. J. LEE 2dLt T. C. SHEPHERD Maj J. DARE	Nov 67 Jul 67 Sep 67 Jul 67 Mar 67	Devote 10 Devote 110 Devote 210 Devote 69 Devote 110	TANK OFFICER SURGEON AdminO	LtCol M. R. TAYLOR Capt J. J. MCGREGORY, USM Ldr M. SLOAN, USM	Feb 68 Jun 67 Sep 67	Happy Age 6 Isharwood 116 Isharwood 116
EMBARKATION OFFICER	1stLt C. J. DESTEPANO	Jan 67	Devote 39	HEADQUARTERS BATTALION (REIN)	Col W. A. LEITNER Maj E. E. BOGERS LtCol R. B. MOLESKY Maj R. A. FREEMAN	Aug 67 Sep 67 Sep 67 Mar 67	Auditor 6 Auditor 5 Devote 34 Devote-Auditor 5
ENGINEER OFFICER Asst Engineer Officer	Maj H. I. FREY 1stLt P. J. ZOHLIN	Jun 67 Jun 67	Devote 15 Devote 15	MILITARY POLICE BATTALION	LtCol P. G. STAVRIDIS Capt J. W. REACH 2dLt H. G. GARDNER	Jun 67 Jun 67 Nov 67	Boardinghouse 6 Boardinghouse 5 Boardinghouse 1
EXCHANGE OFFICER	2dLt E. T. KENDRICK	Feb 67	Devote 44	HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MARINES	Col E. J. RADICS LtCol G. E. PISTRO Capt R. V. OLSON	Aug 67 Jan 68 Mar 67	Blade 6 Blade 5 Blade 1
CLUBS OFFICER	Maj J. R. GEMSKY	Jun 67	Auditor Rear 60	1ST BATTALION, 1ST MARINES	LtCol V. D. BELL JR. Maj J. A. SCOTT 2dLt B. R. FREEMAN	Jun 67 Jul 67 Oct 67	Bound 6 Bound 5 Bound 1
DIV FOOD SERVICES OFFICER Div Mess Administrator	Capt E. V. COX WO E. G. DAHLGREN	Apr 67 Feb 67	Devote 56 Devote 56	2D BATTALION, 1ST MARINES	LtCol H. DONABEDIAN Maj W. F. HORNHAN WO J. L. THOMPSON	Aug 67 Apr 67 Sep 67	Cedar Bird 6 Cedar Bird 5 Cedar Bird 1
INFORMATIONAL SERVICES O	2dLt C. B. TYLER	Sep 67	Devote 141	3RD BATTALION, 1ST MARINES	LtCol H. F. DEATLEY Maj A. S. LOUGHRY 2dLt V. B. BUNNELL	Jul 67 Oct 67 Oct 67	Chuck 6 Chuck 5 Chuck 1
SURGEON	HMr R. W. STOLLER	Feb 67	Devote 16	2D BATTALION 5TH MARINES	LtCol M. C. JACKSON Maj J. L. COOPER 1stLt J. J. COWART	Aug 67 Apr 67 Mar 67	Grasshopper 6 Grasshopper 5 Grasshopper 1
1st DENTAL DET COMDR	Lt D. M. BARE USN	Jun 67	Devote 40	HEADQUARTERS, 11TH MARINES	Col G. E. MORRIS LtCol R. B. METCALFE Capt R. M. HUSTON	Oct 67 Jan 68 Jun 67	Amigo 6 Amigo 5 Amigo 1
ASST DIVISION CHAPLAIN	Cdr H. W. HOLLAND	Feb 67	Devote 19	1ST BATTALION, 11TH MARINES	LtCol M. P. FENNESSY Maj J. A. BYRD 2dLt R. A. HARDIE	Jun 67 Jul 67 Oct 67	Month 6 Month 5 Month 1
IRO	Capt J. C. GREENE JR	Feb 67	Earthworm IRO	11TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION	Maj L. V. BARKLEY Maj J. M. SHAY 2dLt R. O. BLANCHETTE	Jan 68 Jan 68 Jan 68	Happy Age - Bravo 6 Happy Age - Bravo 5 Happy Age - Bravo 1
DEPUTY DISBURSING O	Capt R. R. REUSCHLING	Jun 67	Devote 18/118	Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Adjutant
LEGAL OFFICER Trial Section/MJO Legal Asst O Trial Counsel Trial Counsel Gen CM Section	LtCol J. L. ZORACK Maj C. W. OLSON Capt D. M. COSTANTINO Capt F. T. COLEMAN Capt D. M. HANLOW GySgt R. A. BINGHAM	Aug 67 May 67 Sep 67 Apr 67 Feb 67 Dec 67	Devote 17 Devote 217 Devote 117 Devote 217 Devote 217 Devote 317	Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Adjutant
MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER	Maj F. B. OKONSKY	Jun 67	Devote 35	2D BATTALION, 5TH MARINES	LtCol H. DONABEDIAN Maj W. F. HORNHAN WO J. L. THOMPSON	Aug 67 Apr 67 Sep 67	Cedar Bird 6 Cedar Bird 5 Cedar Bird 1
NAVAL GUNFIRE OFFICER	Lt H. C. DRAUCHON USN	Aug 67	Devote 26	3RD BATTALION, 11TH MARINES	LtCol H. F. DEATLEY Maj A. S. LOUGHRY 2dLt V. B. BUNNELL	Jul 67 Oct 67 Oct 67	Chuck 6 Chuck 5 Chuck 1
ORDNANCE	MgSgt A. O. BRINK	Oct 67	Devote 108	2D BATTALION 5TH MARINES	LtCol M. C. JACKSON Maj J. L. COOPER 1stLt J. J. COWART	Aug 67 Apr 67 Mar 67	Grasshopper 6 Grasshopper 5 Grasshopper 1
POSTAL OFFICER Postal Locator	2dLt W. NEW	Aug 67	Devote 20 Devote 120	HEADQUARTERS, 11TH MARINES	Col G. E. MORRIS LtCol R. B. METCALFE Capt R. M. HUSTON	Oct 67 Jan 68 Jun 67	Amigo 6 Amigo 5 Amigo 1
PROVOST MARSHAL	Capt W. A. BARNER	Jun 67	Devote 27	1ST BATTALION, 11TH MARINES	LtCol M. P. FENNESSY Maj J. A. BYRD 2dLt R. A. HARDIE	Jun 67 Jul 67 Oct 67	Month 6 Month 5 Month 1
DIV SPEC SERV C Recreation Fund Custodian MARS Radio Station	2dLt R. A. CORNELL 2dLt W. E. MUNN GySgt R. P. ROTELLA	Dec 67 Oct 67 Jul 67	Auditor Rear 37 Auditor Rear 237 Devote 237	11TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION	Maj L. V. BARKLEY Maj J. M. SHAY 2dLt R. O. BLANCHETTE	Jan 68 Jan 68 Jan 68	Happy Age - Bravo 6 Happy Age - Bravo 5 Happy Age - Bravo 1
DIV SUPPLY OFFICE Asst Supply O	LtCol J. N. DILLARD	Sep 67	Devote 21	Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Adjutant
SUB UNIT #2 OIC Sub Unit #2 Executive Officer Adjutant/S-1	LtCol R. V. MOLESKY Maj R. A. FREEMAN 2dLt S. A. LADA	Sept 67 Mar 67 Dec 67	Devote 34 Auditor Rear 5 Auditor Rear 7	11TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION	Maj L. V. BARKLEY Maj J. M. SHAY 2dLt R. O. BLANCHETTE	Jan 68 Jan 68 Jan 68	Happy Age - Bravo 6 Happy Age - Bravo 5 Happy Age - Bravo 1
S-3/S-4	Capt E. M. LITZ	Jun 67	Auditor Rear 3/4	3			
HEADQUARTERS BN AID STATION	HMr L. C. WALKER	Feb 67	Auditor Rear 16				

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ADJUTANT Asst Adjutant EnlPerso OffPerso/TADO RPS CUSTODIAN CasualtyO AwardsO SAC Files	LtCol E. R. SCHIFFMAN Capt G. F. KUEHTNER JR. CWO E. J. MCNAUL 2dLt J. E. TYLER 2dLt W. J. KANE 2dLt J. D. CARMAN 2dLt J. M. SHOOPS CWO N. A. ZIMMERMAN	Sep67 Oct67 Apr67 Aug67 Oct67 Sep67 Mar67 Nov67	Isherwood 7 Isherwood 7 Isherwood 47 Isherwood 147 Isherwood 507 Isherwood 107 Isherwood 607 Isherwood 507	A-1	USO - CHU LAI Executive Director AMERICAN RED CROSS	Mr. T. HEBERT Mr. W. J. BURTSCHER	Auditor Rear 337 Devote 119/219	
AIR OFFICER AsstAirO AsstAirO	Col F. C. LANG Maj P. L. MOREAU Capt T. L. ELSER	Aug67 Apr67 May67	Isherwood 14 Isherwood 14 Isherwood 14		HEADQUARTERS 5th MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Col F. E. HAYNES JR LtCol W. H. DRAPER 2dLt J. W. HORTON	Nov 67 Oct 67 Dec 67	Select 6 Select 5 Select 1
AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR OFFICER	LtCol J. D. ROWLEY	Oct67	Sleek 6		1st BATTALION 5th MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj P. L. HILGARTNER Maj R. J. ALGER 2dLt C. S. LIDBACK JR	Oct 67 Sep 67 Aug 67	Chime 6 Chime 5 Chime 1
ARTILLERY OFFICER	Col G. E. NORRIS	Sep67	Amigo 6		3d BATTALION 5th MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol D. E. ESSLINGER Maj J. P. WHITE 2dLt B. F. BEGGS	Sep 67 Aug 67 Mar 67	Glove 6 Glove 5 Glove 1
BAND OFFICER	CWO F. E. BARTHOLD	Mar67	Auditor 55		HEADQUARTERS 7th MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Col C. C. CROSSFIELD III LtCol R. E. JOHNSON Capt D. R. MUNCIE	Aug 67 Sep 67 Dec 67	Bonnie Hero 6 Bonnie Hero 5 Bonnie Hero 1
CLUBS OFFICER	Maj J. R. GEMSEK	Jun67	Auditor Rear 60	D-2	1st BATTALION 7th MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtColB. LUBKA Maj K. D. HYSLOP 2dLt J. F. CURRAN	Aug 67 May 67 Aug 67	Booth 6 Booth 5 Booth 1
COMM ELEC OFFICER Asst CEO Asst CEO/Electronics Asst CEO/Operations Asst CEO/Plans Div Comm Center Off Div Systems Control Off	Col E. P. CLAUDE Maj F. DI CILLO JR. Maj F. L. BIROU Maj R. O. RITTS Maj J. H. BIRD JR. Capt L. J. KELLY 2dLt R. L. ROBILLARD	Oct67 Mar67 Aug67 Nov67 Jul67 Mar67 Jul67	Isherwood 10 Isherwood 10 Isherwood 210 Isherwood 110 Isherwood 210 Isherwood 110 Isherwood 59		2d BATTALION 7th MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj W. P. KITTERMAN Maj D. L. DIAMOND 2dLt J. C. ALVAREZ	Aug 67 Jul 67 Jul 67	Dixie Diner 6 Dixie Diner 5 Dixie Diner 1
DENTAL OFFICER Admin Officer	Capt P. C. CONGLIS, USN Ens J. M. BRUHN, USN	May67 Mar67	Isherwood 40 Isherwood 40		3d BATTALION 7th MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol R. J. OLEARY Maj R. C. RICE 2dLt W. E. KELLER	Aug 67 Sep 67 Jul 67	False 6 False 1 False 1
DISBURSING OFFICER AsstDisbursingO	Capt J. J. FISCHER JR. Capt T. J. KENNEDY	Jun67 Mar67	Isherwood 418 Isherwood 318		2d BATTALION 11th MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol I. L. CARVER Maj J. J. MARION 2dLt A. A. BOROWICKI	Aug 67 Oct 67 Oct 67	Prowl 6 Prowl 5 Prowl 1
DIVISION CHAPLAIN Asst Chaplain	Capt D. J. CASAZZA, USN Cdr H. W. HOLLAND, USN	Aug67 Feb67	Isherwood 19 Devote 19		3d BATTALION 11th MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol A. S. RUGGIERO Maj H. R. ANKER WO J. D. CURLEE	Jul 67 Apr 67 Oct 67	Laugh 6 Laugh 5 Laugh 1
EMBARKATION OFFICER	Maj J. P. TREHY	Apr67	Isherwood 39		4th BATTALION 11th MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol G. R. LAMB Maj C. F. BURAN 2dLt J. W. WELLS	Mar 67 Jul 67 Nov 67	Plaid 6 Plaid 5 Plaid 1
ENGINEER OFFICER Asst EngrO Engr EquipmentO Base DevelopmentO	LtCol G. A. MERRILL Capt C. E. LANE Capt C. WILLIAMS Maj E. E. SCHILHAB	Aug67 Jun67 Jun67 Jun67	Isherwood 15 Isherwood 115 Isherwood 115 Isherwood 15		1st ENGINEER BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj C. O. NEWTON Maj J. C. FLOYD 2dLt J. MOUTON	Aug 67 Jun 67 Dec 67	Big Buddy 6 Big Buddy 5 Big Buddy 1
DIVISION SUPPLY OFFICER	Col P. J. DUPRE	Oct67	Isherwood 21		9th ENGINEER BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol R. W. CRISPEN Maj W. R. FLOYD CWO F. L. HALL	Jun 67 Jun 67 Dec 67	Earthworm 6 Earthworm 5 Earthworm 1
EXCHANGE OFFICER	Maj A. T. FISHER	Oct67	Amriter 44		1st SHORE PARTY BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol E. H. JONES Maj T. J. GIPSON JR 2dLt J. J. KOLTHA	Sep 67 Sep 67 Sep 67	Consequence 6 Consequence 5 Consequence 1
INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER	Maj G. HUBBARD	Mar67	Isherwood 141					
INSPECTOR Asst Inspector	Col W. W. CURTIS Maj E. H. HOLTHUS	Sep67 Mar67	Isherwood 32 Isherwood 32					
DIVISION CAREER ADVISOR	2dLt M. E. CARSON (CHU LAI)	Oct67	Devote 447					
DIVISION LEGAL OFFICER AdminlawO Law Specialist	LtCol T. P. CASEY Maj W. B. DRAPER Lt W. J. LANDEN, USN	Feb67 Oct67 Jul67	Isherwood 217 Isherwood 217 Isherwood 217					
PROTOCOL OFFICER	Capt R. T. TANNER	Mar67	Isherwood 138					
MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER	LtCol K. M. BUSS	Nov67	Isherwood 35					
NAVAL GUNFIRE OFFICER	LGdr R. A. WHITCOMB, USN	Jan68	Isherwood 26					
ORDNANCE OFFICER	Maj H. SOBOL	Feb67	Isherwood 8					
PHOTO OFFICER	WO H. L. HUNTLEY	Aug67	Isherwood 314					

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1st RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	LtCol D. N. MCKEEON	Aug 67	Ironhand 6
Executive Officer	Maj F. RIMSY	Mar 67	Ironhand 5
Adjutant	2dLt D. J. COLLINS	Aug 67	Ironhand 1
1st MEDICAL BN, "D" CO DET			
Commanding Officer	Cdr C. R. ASHWORTH USN	May 67	Calhoun 6
Admin Asst	Lt C. L. HENSLEY MSC/USN	Jan 68	Calhoun 1
Patient Affairs	Lt J. L. ROBERTSON MSC/USN	Jan 68	Calhoun Delta
1st HOSPITAL COMPANY			
Commanding Officer	Cdr F. M. ROBERTS, USN	Oct 67	Syringe
Admin Asst	LtJG N. G. OGLESBY	Jan 68	Syringe
3d AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	LtCol D. ROWLEY	Oct 67	Sleek 6
Executive Officer	Maj F. N. VAN SANT	Jun 67	Sleek 5
Adjutant	2dLt F. A. LAMBERT	Oct 67	Sleek 1
7th COMMUNICATION BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	LtCol W. M. CLELLAND	Dec 67	Mouth 6
Executive Officer	Maj E. A. HUERLIMANN	Jul 67	Mouth 5
Adjutant	2dLt T. L. DANIELS	Jul 67	Mouth 1
1st MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	Maj J. T. ELKINS	Apr 67	Quench 6
Executive Officer	Maj K. H. REAGAN	Oct 67	Quench 5
Adjutant	2dLt B. V. BRANSON	Sep 67	Quench 1
7th MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	Maj S. H. BATCHELDER	Sep 67	Faster 6
Executive Officer	Maj F. R. SMITH	Jun 67	Faster 5
Adjutant	1stLt J. SOMMERHAUSER	Jul 67	Faster 1
"C" COMPANY, 1st ANTI TANKS BN			
Commanding Officer	Capt R. J. ESPOSITO	May 67	Dance Card Charlie
TMA MAC V OIC	2dLt C. B. TORRES	Dec 67	Devote 439/539

PLEASE REPORT TO THIS TASK FORCE ADJUTANT ANY ERRORS, AND/OR OMISSIONS - TELEPHONE  
DEVOTE 7.

J. A. JONES  
U. S. Marine Corps  
Task Force Adjutant

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COMMAND DIRECTORY

HEADQUARTERS

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

FLAME MARINE FORCE

DAMANG, VIETNAM

1 FEBRUARY 1967

	RTD	OFFICE PHONE	QRS
DIVISION COMMANDER	Maj Gen H. NICKERSON JR.	Oct 67	
Aide-de-Camp	1stLt L. H. ANDERSON	Apr 67	113
Sergeant Major	SgtMaj J. H. JOHNSON	Mar 67	
CHIEF OF STAFF	Col S. J. ALTMAN	Jul 67	905
Day C/S	Capt H. S. HAUPP	Apr 67	113
Staff Secretary			
ASST Cofs, G-1	Col A. L. EMILS	May 67	593
Asst G-1	LtCol P. A. LORENZEN	Sep 67	A-1
Asst G-1	Maj M. F. MANNING	Aug 67	C-1
Asst G-1	Maj J. A. POLAND	Nov 67	C-1
Asst G-1	1stLt F. A. WATERS	Nov 67	
Official ProjectsO	2dLt D. B. GREENLAW	Apr 67	
ASST Cofs, G-2	Col S. DAVIS	Nov 67	938
Asst G-2	LtCol L. W. T. WALLER II	Feb 67	A-1
Asst G-2	LtCol E. B. SIGMON	Oct 67	
Imagery InterpO	WO J. C. ENDERLE	Mar 67	502
ChiefAirObserver	Maj R. A. MONFORT	Jul 67	
OIC SSCT-2	2dLt J. N. CORCORAN	Sep 67	
OIC 1st INT	CWO L. V. SHERIDAN	May 67	
OIC 2nd INT	1stLt A. D. ELLERMAN	May 67	
OIC 3rd INT	Capt D. M. KENWORTHY	Apr 67	
OIC Officer	Capt C. M. ISBELL	Sep 67	
ASST Cofs, G-3	Col H. POGGEMEYER JR.	Jul 67	909
Asst G-3	Col H. L. DOMINICK	Mar 67	933
Ops/WEBO	LtCol E. A. WALKER	Mar 67	952
Asst OpsO	Maj J. R. HARPER JR.	Jul 67	910
Asst Ops/Rpts/PFO	Maj R. J. HENLEY	Aug 67	
OIC COC	Maj H. T. KENNEDY	Aug 67	COC
Trng Off	LtCol E. R. WATSON	Oct 67	A-1
Asst Trng Off	Maj E. E. WIGHT	Aug 67	
PlansO/NBCDO	LtCol R. W. SMITH	Oct 67	
Asst PlansO	Maj C. H. BLACK	Nov 67	503
LnO to 2d ARVN Div	1stLt A. S. HILL	May 67	
LnO to QUANG DA Spec Z	Capt T. J. DALZELL	Jun 67	
LnO to DA NANG Spec Sec	2dLt W. C. SHIPLE	Oct 67	
ASST Cofs, G-4	Col E. L. RALE	Oct 67	909
Asst G-4	LtCol K. M. BUSS	Nov 67	902
Asst OpsO	Maj F. J. BALLEK	Mar 67	
PlansO	Capt T. E. FULLILOVE	Sep 67	
Asst PlansO	Maj V. B. PAGANO	Nov 67	
Asst PlansO	Capt R. W. LAYER	Dec 67	
ASST Cofs, G-5	Col D. L. MALLORY	Jun 67	
Asst G-5	LtCol R. F. PETERSON	Nov 67	
QAO	Maj J. P. MCCELL	Jul 67	
Asst QAO	Maj H. D. JACKSON	Mar 67	146
PayOpsO	Maj W. J. KRAUSS JR.	Oct 67	146
ASST Cofs, COMPTROLLER	LtCol R. S. ROBERTSON	Oct 67	
Asst Comptroller	WO M. F. TIERNEY	Apr 67	

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