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00530-67

8 JUN 1967

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, 1st MarDiv (Rein) ltr 3:HIST:mtm
over 5750 dtd 4Apr67

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-28Feb67

1. Forwarded.

M. C. Dalby
M. C. DALBY

By direction

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

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5750
Ser:
4 APR 1967

SECRET -- Unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-28 February 1967


Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
 (b) FMFPACO 5750.8

Encl: (1) 1st Marine Division (Rein) Command Chronology for 1-28 February 1967

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b),
enclosure (1) is submitted.


H. NICKERSON JR.Copy to:
CG III MAF**NOFORN**

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HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 Feb to 28 Feb 1967

INDEX

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATION

1st Marine Division (Rein)

MajGen H. NICKERSON, JR.

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Task Force X-Ray	BGen W. A. STILES
5th Marines (-)	Col F. E. HAYNES, JR.
7th Marines (Rein)	Col C. C. CROSSFIELD II
1st FAG	LtCol J. B. STRIBLING
Chu Lai Defense Command	LtCol E. D. ANDERSON
1st Engr Bn (-)	Maj C. C. NEWTON
1st SP Bn (-)	LtCol E. H. JONES
1st MT Bn	Maj J. T. ELKINS
3rd Amtrac Bn (-)	LtCol J. D. ROWLEY (To 26Feb67)
7th Comm Bn (-)	Maj F. N. VANSANT (Fr 27Feb67)
1st Hospital Co	LtCol W. M. CLELLAND
Headquarters Bn	Cdr F. M. ROBERTS, MC, USN
1st Marines (Rein)	Col W. A. LEITNER
9th Marines (Rein)*	Col E. J. RADICS
11th Marines (-) (Rein)	Col R. M. RICHARDS
2d Bn, 5th Marines	Col G. E. NORRIS
1st Recon Bn (-) (Rein)	LtCol M. C. JACKSON
1st AT Bn (-)	LtCol D. N. MCKEON
1st Med Bn (-)	Maj J. J. KEEFE
1st Tank Bn (-)	Cdr J. C. ROBINS, MC, USN
3rd Tank Bn (-)*	LtCol J. W. CLAYBORNE (To 1Feb67)
3rd MT Bn (-) (Rein)*	LtCol R. M. TAYLOR (Fr 2Feb67)
3rd AT Bn {-}* 7th MT Bn (-) (Rein)	LtCol W. R. CORSON (To 14Feb67)
11th MT Bn	LtCol R. J. NORTON (Fr 15Feb67)
1st Amtrac Bn (-) (Rein)*	LtCol R. F. ARMSTRONG
1st Dental Co {-}	LtCol J. P. CASEY
3rd Dental Co {-}* 1st MP Bn#	Maj S. H. BATCHELDER, JR.
7th Engr Bn# 9th Engr Bn#	Maj L. V. BARKLEY (To 11Feb67)
Det, Hq Bn, 3rd Mar Div*	Maj R. C. TASHJIAN (Fr 12Feb67)
Det, 3rd Engr Bn*	LtCol A. R. BOWMAN II
	Capt P. C. CONGLIS, DC, USN
	Capt L. H. CORDONIER, DC, USN
	LtCol P. G. STAVRIDIS
	LtCol F. W. HARRIS III
	LtCol H. W. CRISPEN (To 6Feb67)
	LtCol G. A. BABE (Fr 7Feb67)
	LtCol G. J. JOHNSON
	Maj J. A. SHERMAN, JR (To 16Feb67)
	Maj W. H. LONG (To 17Feb67)

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Det, 3rd SP Bn*

Maj R. L. SCRUGGS

OPCON ONLY

ADCON ONLY

\$ OPCON of 3rd MT Bn (-) (Rein) reverted back to 3rd MarDiv 13Feb67

2. LOCATION

1-28 February 1967: Danang, RVN

3. Staff Officers

Chief of Staff	Col S. J. ALTMAN
Staff Secretary	Capt H. S. HAUPPT
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	Col A. L. EMILS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	Col S. DAVIS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	Col H. POGGEMEYER, JR.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4	Col E. L. BALE, JR.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	Col W. MOORE (To 2Feb67)
Assistant Chief of Staff, Compt	Col D. L. MALLORY (Fr 3Feb67)
Adjutant	LtCol R. S. ROBERTSON
Air Officer	LtCol E. R. SCHIFFMAN
Artillery Officer	Col F. C. LANG
Band Officer	Col G. E. NORRIS
Chaplain	CWO F. E. BARTHOLD
Comm-Electronics Officer	Capt D. J. CASAZZA, CHC, USN
Dental Officer	Col E. P. CLAUDE
Disbursing Officer	Capt P. C. CONGLIS, DC, USN
Division Clubs Officer	Capt J. J. FISCHER
Division Exchange Officer	Maj J. H. GEMSKE (To 2Feb67)
Embarkation Officer	Capt R. J. PLACHY (Fr 3Feb67)
Engineer Officer	Maj A. T. FISHER
Field Historian	Maj J. P. TREHY
Food Services Officer	LtCol G. A. MERRILL
Informational Services Officer	Maj H. T. KENNEDY
Inspector	Capt V. E. COX
Legal Officer	Maj G. HUBBARD
Motor Transport Officer	Col W. W. CURTIS
Naval Gunfire Officer	LtCol T. P. CASEY (To 13Feb67)
Ordnance Officer	LtCol W. T. WESTMORELAND, JR (Fr 14Feb)
Photographic Officer	LtCol K. M. BUSS
Postal Officer	LtCmdr R. A. WHITCOMB, USN
Provost Marshal	Maj H. SOBOL
Reproduction Officer	WO R. L. HUNTLEY
Special Services Officer	2dLt W. NEW
Supply Officer	LtCol J. J. ROOTHOFF
Surgeon	2dLt J. M. WHEATLEY
Tank Officer	Maj J. E. FORDE
	Col P. J. DUPRE
	Capt J. J. MCGREEVY, MC, USN
	LtCol J. W. CLAYBORNE (To 1Feb67)
	LtCol R. M. TAYLOR (Fr 2Feb67)

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4. Average Monthly Strength

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
OFF	25,294	134	5
1257	1116		105

ENL U. S. Army

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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARYPERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION1. Replacement and Rotation of Personnel

a. Total of Marine replacements received and Marines rotated during February 1967 were:

Replacements:

Officer	76
Enlisted	1069

Rotation:

Officer	115
Enlisted	1482

b. There were 12 officers and 439 enlisted personnel medically evacuated. One officer and forty-eight enlisted personnel who were previously evacuated were returned to duty. Forty-seven personnel departed on emergency leave/permanent change of station orders.

c. A total of 10 officers and 371 enlisted personnel extended their overseas tour in RVN in conjunction with the 30 day free leave policy. 3 officers and 262 enlisted departed on 30 day leave during February 1967.

2. Casualty and Graves Registration. The below casualties were sustained by units ADCON to the 1st Marine Division during February 1967.

	KIA	WIA	**DOW	MIA	CPTR	OTHER	*NON-BATTLE DEATH INJURED	**TOTAL
USMC								
OFF		27	1				2	29
ENL	62	646	16			1	38	747
USN								
OFF								
ENL	4	34	1				2	40
TOTAL	66	707	18			1	42	816

* Injuries which result in absence from duty for more than 24 hours.

** DOW figures included in WIA totals and not in horizontal total.

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3. Awards. During the period 1-28 February 1967 158 award recommendations were processed and forwarded to higher headquarters for approval. In addition, 720 Purple Heart Medals were awarded.

4. Discipline, Law and Order. The following criminal investigations were reported. Three cases are presently under investigation:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Larceny of Government Property	3
Larceny of Private Property	3
Narcotics	3
Blackmarket	1
Assault	1
Total	11

Forty-four traffic violations were reported for the month of February 1967.

One hundred & fifty-nine offense reports were issued to violators as follows:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>
Weapons Violation	4
Unauthorized Absence	145
Other	10
Total	159

5. Industrial Relations

a. Current utilization totals:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>On Board</u>
Hq Bn, Danang	42	45
Hq Bn, Chu Lai	32	30
1st Marines	21	0
5th Marines	21	0
7th Marines	21	0
11th Marines	37	37
1st FAG	18	2
1st Tank Bn	18	16
1st Antitank Bn	18	18
1st Engr Bn	57	29
7th Engr Bn	60	60
9th Engr Bn	57	31
1st SP Bn	18	16
3rd Amtrac Bn	18	0
7th Comm Bn	18	17

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1st MT Bn	18	18
7th MT Bn	18	0
11th MT Bn	18	29
1st Recon Bn	11	11
1st MP Bn	10	10
1st Med Bn	18	30
1st Hosp Co	10	10
TOTAL	559	409

b. Division Industrial Relations Office has moved outside the gate near the 1st Antitank Bn. Purpose of this location is to enable Vietnamese to seek employment without having to be escorted by a sentry (as would be the case if the office were inside the gate).

c. Five employees attended the February Basic English Class at the Industrial Relations Training Department, Danang.

d. Approximately 300 security clearance applications have been processed since 1 January 1967.

e. 1st Motor Transport Bn moved to Danang area from Chu Lai and is now utilizing their full ceiling of 18 employees.

6. Morale and Personal Services

a. Chaplain. At the end of February the on board strength of Chaplains assigned to the 1st Marine Division was as follows:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Denomination</u>
17	Protestant
7	Catholic
1	Eastern Orthodox
TOTAL	25

In addition to these, 5 Protestant and 2 Catholic Chaplains were under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division. Their parent command is the 3rd Marine Division.

The following services were conducted during the month:

<u>Service</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Number Attending</u>
Catholic	361	8,139
Protestant	396	8,393
Memorial	27	1,716
Protestant Lay Leader	16	192
Catholic Lay Leader	2	50
Protestant Bible Study	20	164

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b. Division Clubs. The gross income during February was \$160,582.01. Three officers, six SNCO's and seven enlisted personnel operated the sixty-one clubs and eighteen battalion accounts. Two additional clubs are planned.

c. Exchange System. Gross sales during the month of February were \$625,013.48. Four officers and sixty-six enlisted personnel operated seventeen stores and two mobile units within the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's.

d. Division Band. The Division Band performed at five military formations. In addition four military concerts were presented and the Band performed at four civic action functions.

e. Informational Services. During February the informational Services Section produced 240 news releases and 3,624 Fleet Home Town News Center releases.

Writer - Photographer teams covered the following named operations:

Independence	Deckhouse VI
Pulaski	Stone I & II
Rio Grande	Lafayette
De Soto	

1st Marine Division units were visited by civilian correspondents 103 times.

During February the SEA TIGER used 127 items submitted by the 1st Marine Division. This compares to 71 submitted by 3rd Marine Division and 69 submitted by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

ISO covered three civic action projects: a Spring Festival and Elders Day party by the 1st Tank Battalion and a Big Brother party by the 3rd Tank Battalion.

Activities in the Division that received the most attention from the newsmen were Operation Independence and civic action activities of the 3rd Tank Battalion.

f. Postal

(1) The following figures represent pounds of U. S. Mail this command has received and dispatched during February 1967:

Total Received
682,623

Total Dispatched
284,003

Total Handled
966,626

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(2) The following figures represent financial business transacted during February 1967:

U. S. Money Orders and Fees	\$742,013.46
Stamps, postage and insurance sales	\$40,002.00

g. Career Advisory. The following statistics represent reenlistment and extension of enlistment percentages for the month of February 1967:

(1) Reenlistment Percentages

a. First term	20.5%
b. Career	92.6%
c. Total	39.0%

(2) Extensions of enlistment executed

a. Career	7
b. Short Term	13
c. Total	20

h. Special Services. Personnel of the Division were entertained during the month of February by the appearance of the following shows and/or well known personalities:

8Feb67 - Nancy Sintra Show with Jimmy Boyd
 10Feb67 - Ken Noyles, Magician
 15Feb67 - Jayne Mansfield

i. Distinguished Visitors. Distinguished persons who visited the command during February and the purpose of their visit are listed in Part III.

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ENEMY, WEATHER & TERRAIN1. ENEMY

a. Main Force. For the most part, main force units remained in the mountain areas of our zone of responsibility. Enemy disposition within the 1st Division area remains the same with the bulk of NVA/Main Force units located in Quang Ngai Province. During the past month there were three significant actions on the part of main force units. The first, on the morning of 15 February when elements of the 1st VC Regiment, attacked the 11th KMC Company positions at (BS 589838) with 40th and 60th VC Battalions. This attack was abortive in that the VC suffered heavy losses and never succeeded in their goal, which was considered to be a quick victory in an area that has been denied to him lately. This would have had great psychological impact in that he would have demonstrated his ability to strike deep within an area denied him. The second action was the attack on the KMC artillery position (BS 627-859) on the morning of 16 February, when the enemy mortared this position with 120mm and 60/82mm mortar fire. This was the first time since January 1966, when the enemy attacked the Da Nang air field, that the 120mm mortar has been employed within the 1st Marine Division zone of responsibility. The last and most recent action was the use of a new weapon on the morning of 27 February when the VC used 140mm rockets against the Da Nang Air Field. This attack was launched from vicinity of (AT 959655). The enemy fired a total of 54 rounds, impacting over an area of approximately one by two kilometers square in and along the eastern edge of the runway.

b. Local Force and Guerrilla. Especially notable were the last two weeks of February, when guerrilla initiated incidents increased approximately 50 percent over the first half of the month. Provincial forces, on the other hand, were somewhat less aggressive, with most activity limited to harassing mortars and small unit contact. Overall activity was somewhat restricted, due to the increased number of friendly operations within the 1st Marine Division zone of responsibility. These operations accounted for a large number of enemy losses, most of which were credited against local force units. These events, when correlated with interrogation reports, have produced additional evidence that the enemy has, at least temporarily, discontinued the upgrading of local force units, which was thought to be the trend during the previous months. In fact, a reverse trend is indicated, especially since interrogation reports disclose the practice of assigning NVA personnel to provincial forces. This move on the part of the enemy once more emphasizes his need and reliance on local force units to provide for effective support opera-

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tions of the NVA Main Force units. Further, it demonstrates the enemy's persistence to maintain local force strength regardless of heavy losses and dwindling of his manpower recruitment resources.

2. WEATHER AND TERRAIN

a. General. The weather for the month within the 1st Marine Division zone of responsibility was generally cloudy, with light scattered rain showers. The average maximum and minimum temperatures ranged from 78 degrees and 67 degrees respectively, while humidity averaged 77 percent. Visibility averaged 5-6 miles. Precipitation for the month was .78 inches. The winds were generally from a northeasterly direction with velocities of 6 to 8 knots and gusting to 10 knots.

b. Effects of the Weather. The weather during February had little or no effect on ground operations as the days remained partly cloudy with only intermittent, scattered showers. However, the cloudy condition did have some effect on air and ground operations, especially during the morning hours when ground fog was in evidence in the mountain and valley areas.

c. Effects of Weather on Terrain. Weather had little or no effect on terrain. Rainfall was below average, making for few inundated areas to hamper movement.

INTELLIGENCE SECTION ACTIVITY

1. ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT

a. Services. During the month the unit provided general administrative services for the G-2 Section. Primary emphasis was placed on devising an expeditious system for staffing the mass of intelligence/administrative material entering the G-2 Section.

b. Personnel. During the month the G-2 Section operated with an average 80 percent of its assigned manning level of 25 officers and 52 enlisted personnel. The 3d ITT and 3d CIT were assigned ADCON to the 1st Marine Division.

2. ACQUISITION UNIT. The program to establish Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers at District level continued. Construction was commenced on the Intelligence Operations Coordinating Center at Hieu Nhon District Headquarters. In anticipation of future construction, Liaison NCO's have been located at the District Headquarters in Due Duc, Dai Loc and Hieu Duc Districts. The Center

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at Dien Ban continues to provide intelligence information to the tactical units within the District. Construction has started on the Provincial Intelligence Operations Coordination Center. This Center is manned by a Warrant Officer from 3d CIT who maintains liaison with other GVN and US agencies.

a. Photo Imagery/Interpretation Unit. A total of 30 missions were requested during the month. Thirteen are still pending. PIIU made liaison visits in conjunction with Quarterly G-2 Technical Inspections to ensure that units are aware of photography available and request procedures.


b. Command Operations Center (G-2 portion). COC-2 continued to serve as a focal point for the receipt of spot reports from 3d ITT, tactical units, adjacent units and higher headquarters. Immediate intelligence requirements generated or suggested by reports were disseminated to collectors. Current intelligence was spotted to users.

c. Air Observation Unit. During the month 215 sorties were flown in the Da Nang TACR for a total of 514.7 hours of visual reconnaissance. In conjunction with normal VR flights, the following missions were performed: 32 photo, 22 artillery, 2 Naval gunfire and 138 CAS/TAC (A).

c. 3d Interrogation Translation Team. A total of 230 detainees were interrogated at III MAF Collection Point during the month, of these 124 had Viet Cong association. Deployed 3d ITT sub-teams interrogated additional hundreds at the battalion level.

3. PRODUCTION UNIT. In addition to the two daily Intelligence Summaries, two Perintreps (3-67 and 4-67) and an Intelligence Estimate for Operation Stone were produced. Work continued on the Division's Intelligence Estimate of the 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF, zone of responsibility. A new system of intelligence processing for counter-guerrilla and counterinsurgency operations was installed. The new system is more effective than the previous one, however, it will take more manpower to properly operate. Basic reference material was inventoried and a filing system was initiated to facilitate accessibility. Routine issuing of maps was made in addition to constructing maps and charts as required. Processing of captured enemy weapons and equipment was effected.


4. STAFF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNIT. During the month the unit provided routine administrative counterintelligence services to the Division Staff. The unit was supported by the 3d CIT.

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The unit processed 29 requests for personnel security investigations, presented routine security orientation lectures to incoming personnel and administered the Division's rewards fund program. In addition the unit routinely processed administrative correspondence dealing with passwords, security violations, termination of security clearances, and other miscellaneous correspondence of counterintelligence interest.

5. **1ST INTERPRETER TEAM.** During the period the team translated 213 documents, including claims, decorations and documents of intelligence interest. The unit totaled 1,358 hours of interpreter usage, 891 of which were in support of Operation "STONE". Additionally, it administered the Division's Interpreter Program.

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1. The end of the monsoon season and the advent of good weather saw the First Marine Division more than doubling the number of major operations within its area of responsibility during the month of February. Ten major operations were completed and one, Operation Desoto, continued throughout the month. Significant, was the employment of the Special Landing Force, Battalion Landing Team 1/4, on Operation Deckhouse VI in the DUC PHO area. Operation Desoto, being conducted in the same area, continued with close coordination between the two command groups. The increased tempo in operations saw the enemy suffering some of the heaviest casualties to date. During the month the enemy lost 1005 KIA, 1002 KIA (PROB), 620 Detainees, 145 PW, 24 Returnees and 236 Civil Defendants. In addition to this there were 99 individual weapons and one crew served weapon captured by First Marine Division Forces.

2. The operations and their controlling headquarters were as follows:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS</u>
Desoto	Seventh Marines ✓
Shark	Seventh Marines
Searoy	First Marines
Independence	Ninth Marines
Clay	Seventh Marines
Stone	First Marines
Rio Grande	Seventh Marines
Deckhouse VI	SLF (BLT 1/4)
Pulaski	Ninth Marines
Lafayette	First Marines
Lanoke	Second Battalion, Fifth Marines

3. Although considerable effort was spent on combat operations during the month, First Marine Division Units continued to assist the RVN in its Revolutionary Development Program. Seven County Fair Operations were conducted by RVN Officials with USMC assistance. The Ninth Marines conducted County Fairs 9-39, 9-40, 9-41, 9-42 and 9-43. The First Marines Conducted 1-30 and the Fifth Marines 5-13. County Fair 9-38 was the one hundredth County Fair Operation to be conducted by USMC units in Viet Nam since the beginning of the program on 24 February 1966. These operations have been very successful in undermining or eliminating entirely the VC infrastructure in the Hamlets and Villages involved. They have also provided the sound platform from which the GVN Revolutionary Development Program has been successfully based.

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PLANS

1. During February the Plans Section published Division Order 03400.9B (Employment of Riot Control Agents) on 18 February 1967.
2. Operation plan 1-67 (Operation Lewis) was published on 13 February 1967.
3. Studies on "Security of Critical Installations" and "Cover and Deception from an Operational Viewpoint" were completed and progress of the R.P. program in Quang Nam Province was monitored.

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TRAINING HIGHLIGHTS

1. During February, 229 persons from the 1st Marine Division attended fifteen formal schools, setting a new high for school attendance per month.
2. A six day scout sniper school was conducted for all Division scout sniper platoons. Three squads, who were committed to operations, remain to be trained. On 15 February, the M700 sniper rifle was released from administrative deadline and has been in operational use since that date.
3. Contact Instruction Teams presented on-site operational and maintenance training on generators, rough terrain forklifts, XM16E1 rifles and the trace metal detection kit.
4. Evaluation of the Stoner Family of weapons was initiated on 23 February with the issuance of weapons and equipment. Refresher training, zero and familiarization firing as well as selected operational testing will be conducted during the next two months.
5. On 25 February, Phase II of the XM16E1 rifle transition was reported 77% completed by the 1st Marine Division.


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COMBINED ACTION COMPANY PROGRAM

1. The 1st Marine Division has thirty Combined Action Company platoons. There are seventeen organized platoons in the DA NANG TAOR and thirteen platoons in the CHU LAI TAOR.
2. There were 46 enemy contacts in the DA NANG area and 20 in the CHU LAI area. The total VC casualties inflicted by CAC units of both TAOR's were 17 KIA, 3 KIA(P), 22 WIA, 4 PW and 23 detainees. The CAC platoons suffered 5 Marines WIA.
3. CAC units were profitably employed in the DA NANG and CHU LAI areas in COUNTY FAIR operations. The PFs of the platoons, being from the area, provide invaluable services, promote understanding of the situation and attend to spontaneous problems with relative ease.
4. The combined action units have provided security for their respective hamlets. As a result of their training, the PF's of the units have become more proficient in military skills. The presence of CAC platoons has encouraged the resettlement of several hamlets.
5. The rotation of PF personnel through the CAC platoons has been the main problem area. Liaison between operational commanders and district chiefs is helping to stabilize the assignment of PF's.



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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY

1. The major logistic activity during this reporting period was directed toward the support of combat operations.
2. The Division Embarkation Officer conducted Embarkation Readiness Inspections on ten units; the Division Supply Inspection/Instruction Team visited four units; and the Division Ordnance Officer conducted technical inspections of three units during this reporting period. Additionally, the Division Surgeon, Engineer Officer, Motor Transport Officer and Food Services Officer conducted informal staff visits and inspections.
3. III MAF units received an additional quantity of 105mm Beehive ammunition C-513 during this period. The allocation for the 1st Marine Division and OPCON 105mm units was 333 rounds.
4. Throughout the month, Division Embarkation coordinated the airlift of 145,000 pounds of lumber from Danang to Duc Pho in support of Operation DeSoto. Total airlift for the reporting period of 1st Marine Division units was 217 personnel, 10 vehicles, 248,747 pounds and 8225 cubic feet. Total sealift for this reporting period of 1st Marine Division units was 129 personnel, 43 vehicles and 2954 short tons.
5. Logistic Support Ships were first employed this month in support of Operation DeSoto. Division Embarkation coordinated the offloading of three of these ships for a total of 1636 short tons of supplies for the Duc Pho Logistics Supply Activity.
6. Elements of the 1st, 3rd, and 7th Motor Transport Battalions conducted four tactical convoys outside the Danang TAOR. Elements of the 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions conducted 39 tactical convoys outside the Chu Lai TAOR. Headquarters Company and "C" Company of 3rd Motor Transport Battalion as well as "A" Company of the 9th Motor Transport Battalion deployed by tactical convoy (Rough Rider) from the Danang TAOR to Phu Bai TAOR. Operational control of the three companies and the 3rd Motor Transport Battalion was dropped to the Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division.
7. The receipt of the M-51A2 multi-fuel dump truck during this reporting period helped alleviate the high deadline of dump trucks in the Engineer Battalions.
8. Col. E. L. BALE, JR. and Col. P. J. DUPRE attended FMFPac Logistics Conference No. 7 in Honolulu. Captain E. V. COX attended a Department of the Army conference on Food and Food Related Equipment at Fort Mason, California.

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9. Receipt and issue of locally procured produce was started for the Chu Lai area to compensate for the short supply of fresh salad material received from Stateside shipments.

10. As of 28 February 1967, the following FY 67 R & E equipment has been received by this Division:

Thirteen LVTP5A1 Amphibian Vehicles
Four ONTOS M50A1

1. RECEIVED
2. APPROVED
3. APPROVED
4. APPROVED

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2. Recapitulation of assistance rendered (Chu Lai & Danang 1-28 February)

SERVICES:

Medical treatment (cases)	43,964
Operation HARELIP	12
Medical evacuations (cases)	115
Dental treatments (cases)	2,128
Vocational training (students)	188
English Language training (student hours)	1,001

COMMODITIES:

Food (lbs)	16,868
Animal feed garbage (lbs)	32,775
Toothbrushes	78
Soap (bars)	12,189
Bubble bath (boxes)	179
Clothing (lbs)	959
Cement (bags)	97
Lumber/dunnage (truck loads)	48
Sand (truck loads)	30
Gravel (truck loads)	4
Paint (gallons)	30
Nails (lbs)	40
Tin (sheets)	52
Water pipe (feet of)	75
Kit, masonry	2
Pump, water	4
Kit, tool	6
Drum, metal	5
Machine, sewing	2
Kit, sewing	100
Vitamins (each)	1,988
Mouthwash (cases)	24
Brush, scrub	20
Pigs (each)	10
Chickens (each)	2
Seed, vegetable (package)	1,880
Bags, (for rice)	1,100
Transportation (individual)	300
Aid (financial to individual students)	71
Toys (each)	1,575
Pens, writing (each)	25
Kit, school (each)	738
Volleyball (each)	2
Net, volleyball (each)	2
Flag, Republic of Vietnam (each)	150
Chalk, (each)	30
Blackboard (each)	1
Blackboard eraser (each)	2
Tablet, writing (each)	25
Kit, physical education (each)	1

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Board, bulletin (each)	1
Pole, flag, metal (each)	1
Festival, elders, TET (each)	3
Festival, children, TET (each)	4
Festival, spring (each)	3
Festival, elders (each)	1
Rice (lbs)	6,850
Refugee Supplies (lbs)	44,360
Chieu Hoi Supplies (each)	
GP tents	8
Cots	100
Blankets, paper	48
Rice (lbs)	1,000
Wheat, bulgar (lbs)	500

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CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Narrative summary for the period 1-28 February 1967.

Psychological Operation Exploitation Team (POET). The continued availability of this team enabled the exploitation of six (6) incidents this month, five (5) VC atrocities and one (1) exploitation of GVN/USMC refugee assistance.

Kit Carson Scouts (KCS). The KCS continue to guide patrols with excellent results.

Major Accomplishments:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Monthly Total</u>	<u>Total From 1 Nov 66</u>
PW	21	76
Detainee	4	47
Returnee	5	5
Weapons	2	7
Grenades	1	20
Mines	3	15
Boobytraps	2	6
Caves	18	25
Tunnels	1	12
Supply Caches	1	4
Weapons Caches	1	1
Patrol Guides	225	324
Broadcasts	9	58
VC-KIA	0	8

The KCS suffered their first casualties this month, 1 Killed in Action and 1 Wounded in Action.

Present total of KCS: 18 KCS and 8 Trainees.

Leaflets and Posters. An increased number of reports indicative of the positive effect of aerial leaflet drops and aerial broadcasts were received this month. Returnees, questioned at interrogation centers, state the VC/NVA are reading and saving the leaflets, and listening to the aerial/ground broadcasts.

Returnees. A total of forty (40) returnees turned themselves in to Marine units during the month. It is hoped that the momentum of the TET campaign will be maintained, producing even more returnees during March.

Pledge of Allegiance Cards. Pledge of Allegiance cards continue to be passed out at school dedications and festivals sponsored by 1st MarDiv units.

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COMPTROLLER FUNCTIONS

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Comptroller functions for the month of February continued without any items considered significant enough for comment.

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REFERENCES

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COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. During the period 1 Feb 1967 - 28 Feb 1967 communication elements of this command continued the construction of the division cable system to the 1st and 9th Marine Regiments, and prewired the new division administration building for telephone and intercomm service. Site preparation began on the new communication center building which should be completed between 1 and 10 April 1967.
2. The 600 line, 9 position manual switchboard, AN/MTC-9, arrived at Chu Lai. The 37th Signal Battalion of the 1st Signal Brigade, U.S. Army Signal Corps assisted by the 7th Communication Battalion, MIF, will install and maintain the switchboard. A large number of Chu Lai subscribers will receive telephone service through the new board. This will result in the releasing small tactical switchboards for other vital telephone switching requirements.
3. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) Research and Development Unit, Vietnam revisited division units to obtain added information on its Small Unit Communications Data Collection Project.
4. To improve Division telephone communication service, the division ISHERWOOD SWITCH trunks were shifted to the division ISHERWOOD common user switchboard. ISHERWOOD SWITCH was replaced by the Headquarters Battalion AUDITOR Switchboard.
5. C-E Technical Inspections were conducted and communication support was provided to three VIP's. Division Secure Radio Teletype tests terminated with partial success. The program is being rescheduled to insure that all division units of battalion size and higher are able to activate secure Radio Teletype Circuits on short notice.

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PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The following distinguished visitors visited the command during February 1967:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>REASON</u>
6Feb	RAdm T. J. WALKER	USN COMMCARDIV	Toured 1stMarDiv
8Feb	RAdm W. S. MAILLIARD	USNR, Congressman (R-California)	Toured 1stMarDiv
9Feb	Dr. S. POSSONY	Dir, International Studies Prog of Hoover Institute on War, Revolution & Peace	Toured 1stMarDiv
10Feb	Senator J. G. TOWER	R-Texas	Toured 1stMarDiv
11Feb	Right Rev T. H. WRIGHT	Episcopal Bishop, Wilmington, N. C.	Toured 1stMarDiv
	RAdm F. W. VANNOY	USN, COMMPHIBGRU	Toured 1stMarDiv
16Feb	Mr. R. KOMER & Mr. H. KOREN & Mr. HOLBROOK	Spl Presidential Advisor on Vietnam Dir, Region 1. U. S. Off of Civ Op Unknown	Toured 1stMarDiv
18Feb	Dr. H. WOOD	Exec Secretary of the Dept of Chaplains & Serv Pers, United Presbyterian Church	Toured 1stMarDiv
20Feb	Gen P. F. FREEMAN	CG, U. S. Continental Army Command	Toured 1stMarDiv
21Feb	Mr. D. W. SILKWOOD	GS-15, Gen Purpose For Sys Analysis, Off of Asst Secretary of Defense	Toured 1stMarDiv

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ENEMY ACTIVITY

During the reporting period there were 17 significant VC/NVA initiated incidents recorded in the 1st Marine Division's zone of responsibility.

3 February: At 2345H, the highway bridge at Binh Son, vicinity (BS 593932) was destroyed by VC forces when they attacked with mortar and small arms fire followed by demolitions, which were used to blow out one abutment and drop two spans of the bridge. (Tab A)

5 February: At 0930H, Company M, 3dBn, 7thMar (participating in Operation "DESCO") while landing by helicopter received 7 rounds of 57mm RR fire and 30 cal. machine gun fire. An aerial observer directed 50 rounds of artillery and a Naval gunfire mission on the suspected enemy position vicinity (BS 847390). A search of the area was conducted with inconclusive results. (Tab A)

6 February: At 0120H, Combined Action Company unit of 1stBn, 5th Mar located at (BT 325181) received approximately 200 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire and approximately 8 rifle grenades from an estimated 10 to 15 enemy located at (BT 332179, 326183 and 322182). Fire was returned and the enemy fire ceased. The contact lasted for approximately 20 minutes. A search conducted during the morning daylight hours found 6 homemade grenades, 4 ChiCom grenades, 12 M-79 expended grenades, 1 leather belt with a first aid pouch, 3 expended 7.62mm rounds, 1 magazine for a French or ChiCom weapon, 1 M-26 U.S. grenade, 1 ammunition canister, and an unspecified number of bloody clothing, some with bullet holes. (Tab A)

7 February: At 1000H, Company H, 2dBn, 5thMar platoon on a search and destroy mission vicinity (AT 908504) received approximately 1,000 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire from an estimated reinforced VC squad located at (AT 908501). Fire was returned on the enemy position and the enemy fled east. No casualties were inflicted on either friendly or enemy forces. (Tab A)

11 February: At 1150H, a Company F, 2dBn, 1stMar reconnaissance patrol located at (BT 033262) received a heavy volume of small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy located at (BT 034264). Another squad in the vicinity

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received fire while the patrol maneuvered to assault the enemy position. While searching the area, the squad received 4 rounds of mortar, or M-9, and heavy small arms fire from an estimated 25 VC which resulted in 10 Marines wounded. A search of the area was conducted with inconclusive results. (Tab A)

15 February: At 0410H, the 11th Company of the KMC (BS 589838) was attacked by two (2) VC battalions supported by 81/82mm. The VC employed flame throwers in an attempt to destroy the KMC company's ammunition dump during this attack. KMC units returned fire, mortars and RR throughout the attack and assisted by reinforcements, air and artillery, were successful in repelling the VC attack resulting in 243 VC KIA (CONF), 60 VC KIA (PROB), and 2 WIA PW. (Tab B)

15 February: At 2300H, 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion (AT 990-714) command bunker received 1 mortar round (type unk). Command post personnel made visual search of the area with inconclusive results as to origin of fire. (Tab B)

16 February: At 0100H, KMC artillery position (BS 627859) received 60/120mm mortar fire. Total number of rounds unknown. One (1) dud 120mm round was found the following day. KMC units returned fire on suspected position during the attack. (Tab B)

16 February: At 1030H, Company H, 2ndBn, 1stMar bridge defense (AT 998703) observed objects on the bridge piling. Investigation uncovered two (2) 3"XB" mines of tritonal cast with friction type acid fuses. However, the acid fuse had not been crimped properly rendering the mines ineffective. The mines were disarmed and removed by EOD personnel without incident. (Tab B)

17 February: At 0945H, Company H, 2ndBn, 5thMar platoon road sweep (AT 908481) discovered the railroad bridge at this location destroyed at one end and damaged on the other. 25 meters of the bridge span had been dropped into the river. (Tab B)

17 February: At 1630H, 1st ReconBn outpost (BS 786303) engaged an estimated platoon sized VC unit when the patrol received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from vicinity (BS 786300). The VC were wearing khaki uniforms

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with cartridge belts and dark green helmets. The reconnaissance patrol returned fire and directed airstrikes on the VC position resulting in 2 VC KIA (Conf) and 20 VC KIA (Prob). (Tab B)

22 February: At 0245H, Hoi An City (BS 150570) received 10 rounds 81mm mortar fire resulting in 1 civilian KIA, and 11 civilian WIAs. The origin of fire was not pinpointed. Fire came from the general direction of southwest of the city. (Tab B)

22 February: At 1850H, Company F, 2dBn, 1stMar at (BT 022288) received 15 to 25 rounds of 81mm mortar fire. All rounds landed short of their intended target. The fire came from vicinity of (AT 985280). Marine units returned fire with mortars, RR, and airstrikes with inconclusive results. (Tab B)

22 February: At 1910H, Company G, 2dBn, 4thMar perimeter defense at (AT 925690) received 4 rounds of 60mm mortar and 20 rounds of automatic weapons fire from vicinity of (AT 930684). Marines returned fire with small arms, mortars and tanks resulting in 2 VC KIA (Conf). (Tab B)

25 February: At 0730H, Company F, 2dBn, 1stMar squad combat patrol, while sweeping through a hamlet at (BT 041303), observed 10 VC fleeing the area vicinity (BT 051302) and an additional 20 to 25 VC nearby. The patrol took the VC under fire with heavy small arms and supporting arms fire resulting in 4 VC KIA (Conf) and 10 VC KIA (Prob). In addition, they apprehended 8 detainees in the area. Weapons and equipment captured included 4 individual weapons with magazines, 2 grenades, 1 knife, 3 cartridge belts with 1 canteen and miscellaneous clothing. (Tab B)

25 February: At 2310H, 2dBn, 5thMar Command Post, Duc Duo District Headquarters, and the airstrip at (AT 872472) received 35 to 40 rounds of 81/82mm mortar fire resulting in 2 PF KIA, 2 PF WIA and 8 USMC WIA. Countermortar fire was returned on the suspected VC position vicinity (AT 849479) and points of egress with inconclusive results. (Tab B)

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27 February. At 0310H, Da Nang Airfield came under 140mm rocket attack from VC positions vicinity of (AT 959695). The VC fired a total of 54 rounds which impacted over an area of 1 x 2 kilometers square in and along the eastern edge of the airfield. Marine units sweeping the VC positions from which the rocket fire originated discovered 126 rocket firing positions with supporting ammunition pits. Further search of the area resulted in finding 4 rocket launcher tubes and 30 unexpended 140mm rockets. (Tab B)

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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

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1 February - Operation Clay commenced 010715H.
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 010715Z Feb67
 (Tab D)

1 February - Operation Searcy commenced 010730H.
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 011049Z Feb67
 (Tab D)

1 February - Operation Independence commenced 011000H.
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 011413Z Feb67
 (Tab D)

1 February - Operation Shark terminated 011845H.
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 011845Z Feb67
 (Tab D)

3 February - CG 1st MarDiv directed all units to plan and execute within existing capabilities an increased number of County Fair Operations immediately following the TET standdown to block exfiltration of the enemy from populated area.
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 030113Z Feb67

3 February - Operation Clay terminated 031800H.
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 031335 Feb67
 (Tab D)

4 February - CG III MAF notified CG 1st MarDiv that military operations would be curtailed during the period 080700H-120700H February for observance of TET (Lunar New Year).
 Ref: CG III MAF 041150Z Feb67

4 February - CG 3d MarDiv requested CG 1st MarDiv to assist in organization of Rough Riders between DA NANG and PHU BAI during the period 10-12 February. The Rough Riders would move the 3d Motor Transport Bn from DA NANG to PHU BAI.
 Ref: CG 3d MarDiv 041257Z Feb67

5 February - CG 1st MarDiv passed OPCON CO D 1st Bn 26th Marines and 3d Platoon Co B 1st AT Bn to CG TF XRAY for employment within the CHU IAI TAOR. This move was made to better balance 1st MarDiv assets as more forces were provided for Operation DESOTO.
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 050905Z Feb67

7 February - COMUSMACV issued policy guidance to all subordinate commands for the curtailment of military operations during TET,
 Ref: COMUSMACV 031035Z Feb67

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7 February - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 17-67 which directed the 3d Motor Transport Bn to move from DA NANG to PHU BAI by Rough Riders.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 070255Z Feb67

7 February - CG 1st MarDiv passed OPCON 3d Platoon, Co B 1st Recon Bn to CG Task Force Xray effective 1630H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 071439Z Feb67

8 February - CG 1st MarDiv advised CG III MAF of the concept and support requirements in conjunction with the employment of the SLF in the SA HUYNH/DUC PHO area.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 080101Z Feb67

8 February - CG 1st MarDiv published cancellation of FRAG ORDER 17-67. The Rough Riders originally scheduled by this order were to be rescheduled after the TET standdown period.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 080915Z Feb67

8 February - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 18-67 which directed a Rough Rider to be run from DA NANG to CHU LAI and to return during the period 10-12 February 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 080917Z Feb67

9 February - Operation SEARGY terminated effective 091000H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 090137Z Feb67

9 February - Operation Independence terminated effective 090900H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 090139Z Feb67

9 February - CG 1st MarDiv directed CG TF XRAY to provide one platoon of gun tanks and a flame tank to support units operating in the NUI DAU/NUI DAU area.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 091015Z Feb67

9 February - CG 1st MarDiv published the initiating directive for Operation Stone which is scheduled to commence 12 Feb 67.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 091251Z Feb67

10 February - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 20-67 which provided necessary augmentation to 1st Marines for Operation Stone.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 101515Z Feb 67

10 February - CG 1st MarDiv recommended to CG III MAF changes to the allocation of combat support and combat service support units between the 1st MarDiv and 3d MarDiv. These recommended changes were based upon the increase of infantry battalions operating within the 1st MarDiv TAOR.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 101417Z Feb67

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11 February - CG 1st MarDiv passed OPCON 3d Platoon 3d Force Recon Co to CG 3d MarDiv.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 110821Z Feb67

11 February - 1st Tank Bn recommended to CG 1st MarDiv that the 1st Tank Bn be assigned the responsibility of supporting 2d Bn 5th Marines instead of units of the 3d Tank Bn. This change would provide more efficient utilization of Tank assets within the DA NANG TAOR.

Ref: 1st Tank Bn 110925Z Feb67

12 February - CG 1st MarDiv passed OPCON 7th Motor Transport Bn (-) to CG TF XRAY effective 100830H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 120017Z Feb67

12 February - CG III MAF directed CG 1st MarDiv and CG 3d MarDiv to defer any further allocation of forces between the two divisions pending further study by CG III MAF.
Ref: CG III MAF 120910Z Feb67

12 February - Operation Stone commenced 120700H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 121115Z Feb67
(Tab D)

14 February - CG 1st MarDiv passed to all Marines of 1st MarDiv involved in the Scout-Sniper operations a personal thanks and well done from CG III MAF.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 140245Z Feb67

14 February - CG 1st MarDiv received planning guidance for March from CG III MAF.
Ref: CG III MAF 140446Z Feb67

14 February - CG 1st MarDiv published a warning order for CO 1st Tank Bn to be prepared to assume duties as Commander, Southern Sector, Division Rear Area.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 140941Z Feb67

14 February - CG 1st MarDiv published planning guidance for March.
Ref: 1st MarDiv 141215Z Feb67

15 February - CG 1st MarDiv notified 1st Tank Bn no change of allocation of tank assets would be made until complete evaluation could be made of all 1st MarDiv and 3d MarDiv units in the DA NANG TAOR.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 150539Z Feb67

15 February - CG 1st MarDiv passed OPCON 3d MT Bn (-) and Co A 9th MT Bn to CG 3d MarDiv effective 131250H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 151133Z Feb67

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16 February - Operation Deckhouse VI commenced 0930H.
Ref: CTG 76.5 160300Z Feb67

16 February - CG 1st MarDiv assumed OPCON 1st MT Bn (-) effective 141318H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 161401Z Feb67

16 February - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 21-67 which dealt with
Phase II of Operation Stone.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 161517Z Feb67

20 February - CG III MAF passed OPCON of the SLF to CG 1st MarDiv effective
200001H February.
Ref: CG III MAF 200120Z Feb67
CG 1st MarDiv immediately passed OPCON to CG TF XRAY
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 200355Z Feb67

21 February - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 23-67 which directed the
execution of Operation Gulf and provided augmentation to 9th
Marines for the operation.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 210733Z Feb67

22 February - Operation Stone terminated 1300H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 220325Z Feb67

22 February - Operation RIO GRANDE terminated 1800H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 220327Z Feb67

22 February - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 24-67 which directed the
execution of Operation Pulaski.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 220725Z Feb67

22 February - CG III MAF expressed the desireability of company size opera-
tions instead of battalion or larger size operations to CG 1st
MarDiv.
Ref: CG III MAF 222350Z Feb67

23 February - CG 1st MarDiv directed 9th Marines and 11th Marines to provide
support for the Rough Rider to be conducted 24 February to 1
March by 3d MarDiv.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 230355Z Feb67

24 February - In view of recent increased enemy emphasis on interdiction of
LOCs within the TAOR, CG 1st MarDiv directed 2d Bn 5th Marines
to take necessary measures to secure Route 5 within their
sector, to protect engineer personnel working in vicinity
and to prevent destruction or effective interdiction of this
line of communications.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240231Z Feb67

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24 February - Operation Pulaski commenced 240630H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 240655Z Feb67
(Tab D)

26 February - Operation Lenoke commenced 260700H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 260707Z Feb67
(Tab D)

26 February - Operation Lafayette commenced 260700H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 260925Z Feb67
(Tab D)

27 February - Operation Pulaski terminated 271500H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 271255Z Feb67

28 February - Operation Lanoke terminated 281600H.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 281135Z Feb67

28 February - CG 1st MarDiv published FRAG ORDER 26-67 directing 9th Marines to prepare one infantry battalion of three companies for possible deployment to northern ICTZ..
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv 281455Z Feb67

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COMBINED ACTION COMPANY PROGRAM

2 February - CAC 12 (BT 356165) received 25 rounds small arms from an estimated one enemy (BT 356165). Returned 150 rounds small arms, searched and apprehended nine detainees.

3 February - CAC 15 (BT 311173) received ten rounds small arms from unknown number of enemy 50 meters west of their position. Returned 50 rounds small arms and one M26 grenade. The enemy withdrew. A search of the area revealed one VC KIA and one M1 carbine, 70 rounds small arms, five magazines, two uniforms and two M26 grens.

6 February - CAC M1 (BT 515115) apprehended one detainee at SAM HAI hamlet.

7 February - CAC B1-1 (AT 909783) searched the house of a known enemy. They found a cache of rice and documents.

9 February - CAC C1 (AT 923563) acting on information that two enemy told villagers they wanted to surrender, accepted their surrender with assistance of village chief.

20 February - CAC 2-2 (AT 865573) observed a boat with four enemy (AT 865570). They fired 250 rounds automatic weapons fire, seven rounds 81mm illumination, and eight rounds 106mm. The boat was destroyed and four VC KIA (probable).

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LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLY

1 February 1967 1st Medical Battalion (-) opened a 30 bed hospital at Duc Pho in support of Operation DeSoto.

3 February 1967 Division Embarkation coordinated the airlift from Danang to Chu Lai of "D" Company, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines and the sealift from Danang to Dong Ha of 3rd Bridge Company, 7th Engineer Battalion.

4 February 1967 Division Embarkation coordinated the airlift from Danang to Chu Lai of one platoon of 1st Antitank Battalion.

7 February 1967 The Logistic Support Ship LST-1167 reported on station in support of Operation DeSoto at Duc Pho.

8 February 1967 Division Embarkation coordinated the airlift from Danang to Chu Lai of the 1st Reconnaissance Platoon and the airlift from Danang to Kan Sahn of the 1st Reconnaissance Platoon.

9 February 1967 The Logistic Support Ship LST-1122 arrived on station in support of Operation DeSoto at Duc Pho.

10 February 1967 Division Motor Transport coordinated a tactical convoy (Rough Rider) of the 7th Motor Transport Battalion from Danang to Chu Lai.

12 February 1967 Major L. V. BARKLEY replaced LtCol. K. M. BUSS as Division Motor Transport Officer.

13 February 1967 The 3rd Motor Transport Battalion conducted a tactical convoy (Rough Rider) from Danang to Phu Bai and returned the next day.

18 February 1967 The Logistic Support Ship LST-1165 arrived on station in support of Operation DeSoto at Duc Pho.

19 February 1967 Division Motor Transport began the transporting of 1300 tons of airfield matting from Danang to An Hoa. Coal from the An Hoa Industrial Complex was transported to the Danang storage yard on each return trip.

21 February 1967 Division Motor Transport began transporting construction materials, supplies, and consumables from the Danang Storage Yard of the An Hoa Industrial Complex to An Hoa on a daily basis by tactical convoy.

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
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22 February 1967 The Logistic Support Ship LST-1170 arrived on station in support of Operation DeSoto at Duc Pho.

27 February 1967 Division Embarkation coordinated the sealift from Danang to Dong Ha of material for the 1st Armored Amphibian Company.

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CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

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1. Sequential listing of significant events for the period 1-28 February 1967

1-8 February 1967 Seven pre TET parties hosted by 1st Marine Division units.

3 February 1967 Spring Festival hosted by 1st Tank Battalion at Hoa An. Commanding General, 1st Marine Division in attendance.
Colonel D. L. MALLORY relieved Colonel W. MOORE as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

7 February 1967 Spring Festival hosted by 3rd AntiTank Battalion.

12 February 1967 Spring Festival hosted by 3rd Tank Battalion.

23 February 1967 Elders Festival hosted by 1st Tank Battalion.

27 February 1967 Civic Action Technical Inspections commenced.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Sequential listing of significant events for the period 1-28 February 1967.

1 Feb 67 8 aerial leaflet drops consisting of 795,000 leaflets were made. Themes were: "Chieu Hoi Appeal," "Allied Strength," "GVN Provides Better Life," "Don't Harbor VC," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Marines are Friends of Civilians," and "VC Endanger Lives by Firing at Helicopters."

4 hours of aerial broadcast of "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

KCS utilized as trail guides for patrols and to obtain information from villagers.

2 Feb 67 8 aerial leaflet drops consisting of 1,235,000 leaflets were made. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeal," "Safe Conduct Passes," "VC Destruction," "Don't Harbor VC," "VC take People's Rice," "Exchange of Thoughts Between Mother and Son," "Obey the Curfew," "VC Mines Kill Innocent Vietnamese," "Explanation of VC Cowardice," "Marines are Friends of Civilians," leaflets to promote better health and a mixture of TET leaflets.

120 minutes of aerial broadcast were made. Themes used were: "Die with the VC or Live with your family," and "Chieu Hoi Appeal."

Marine patrols distributed 6,000 leaflets. Themes were: "Mine Rewards," "Safe Conduct Passes," and TET leaflets.

KCS were utilized as trail guides for patrols and for screening civilians at collection points.

3 Feb 67 7 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,080,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeal," "GVN Show of Strength," a mixture of TET leaflets, "Safe Conduct Passes," "Exchange of Thoughts Between Mother and Son," "Offer of Encouragement to the People of South Vietnam," "Letter from a Captured VC," "Don't Harbor VC," "GVN Provides a Better Life," "GVN Civic Action," "Quy Chan," leaflet and "Prediction of Death to Followers of the National Liberation Front."

2 hours of aerial broadcast on TET was conducted.

KCS utilized as trail guides for patrols.

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4 Feb 67 7 aerial leaflet drops were made comprised of 1,875,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Don't Harbor VC," "Death Rains from the Sky," "Chieu Hoi Appeal," "GVN Show of Strength," "Safe Conduct Passes," "What Reward for Brave Fighters?" "Death, Difference Between ARVN and VC Life," "Letters of Ralliers to VC Friends," and a mixture of TET leaflets.

160 minutes of aerial broadcast on TET was conducted.

KCS utilized as trail guides. Results attributed to KCS were: 1 detainee, 1 tunnel, 2 caves, 2 bayonets and asserted documents.

Marine patrols distributed 8,750 leaflets. Asserted TET themes were used.

5 Feb 67 11 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,341,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Allied Strength," "Chieu Hoi Appeal," "VC Use Force Labor," "Don't Harbor VC," a special leaflet "Attack of Chu Lai Base will Bring Death," "Poor Living Conditions of the VC," a mixture of TET leaflets, "Marines are Friends of Civilians," "Curfew," "Letters from Ralliers to VC Friends," "Comparison of ARVN and VC Life," "Evacuating Wounded," and "Safe Conduct Passes."

2 hours and 40 minutes of aerial broadcasts were made. Themes used were: TET greetings from Marines and "Chieu Hoi Appeal."

Marine patrols distributed 4,500 "Safe Conduct Passes."

KCS utilized as trail guides.

6 Feb 67 2 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 190,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Weapons Rewards," "Prediction of Death," "VC Disillusionment in Their Cause," and "Chieu Hoi Appeal."

7 hours and 40 minutes of aerial broadcast on TET was conducted.

KCS utilized as trail guides.

KCS pointed out 8 caves on Operation Searcy.

Three SNCO's left this Headquarters for the Chieu Hoi Centers at Hoi An, Tam Ky and Quang Ngai to screen returnees for KCS trainees.

7 Feb 67 16 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 3,364,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeal," TET, "Rewards for Mines and Boobytraps," "GVN Provides a Better Life," "VC Failure to Keep Their Promises," "Returnees Letter to his VC Friends," "Prediction of Death," "The B-52 Can Search out its Enemy Anywhere," "Obey the Curfew," "VC Destruction," "VC Mines Cause Senseless Deaths," "VC Need for His Family," and leaflets to promote better health.

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7 hours of aerial broadcasts on TET was conducted.

8 Feb 67 6 aerial leaflet drops consisting of 600,000 leaflets were made. Themes used were: "Surrender Appeal," "Comparison of VC and GVN Life," "GVN Provides Better Life," "Inform USMC of VC," "Allied Forces Help People," "Chieu Hoi Appeal," "Letter of a Returnee to his VC Friends," "Blood on the Hands of the VC," and "Marines are Friends of Civilians."

7 hours and 15 minutes of aerial broadcasts were made. Themes used were: TET, "Chieu Hoi Appeal" and "Warning to VC that TET violations would mean death."

Marine patrols hand distributed 9,250 leaflets.

KCS utilized as trail guides.

9 Feb 67 6 aerial leaflet drops were made, consisting of 705,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Don't Harbor VC," "Surrender Appeals," "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Inform the Marine Corps of VC," "VC Use Civilians as Shields," "VC Force Labor," "GVN Provides Better Life," "Blood on the Hands of the VC," "Marines are Friends of Civilians," "Obey the Curfew," and "VC Mines Kill Innocent Vietnamese."

2 hours and 20 minutes of aerial broadcasts were made. Themes used were: TET, "VC Destroy GVN Buildings," and "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

10 Feb 67 6 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 400,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Don't Harbor VC," "Marines Are Your Friends," "CH1COM Influence Over VC," "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "GVN Provides Better Life," "VC Steal from the People," "Allied Show of Strength."

7 hours of aerial broadcast on TET was conducted.

11 Feb 67 6 hours and 45 minutes of aerial broadcasts were made. Themes used were: TET, and "Chieu Hoi Appeals."

12 Feb 67 1 aerial leaflet drop was made consisting of 100,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Don't Harbor VC," "Don't Run from Marines," "VC Disillusionment in Their Cause," and "Safe Conduct Passes."

Marine patrols distributed 380 Chieu Hoi Appeals leaflets.

13 Feb 67 13 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,602,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "VC Steal Your Rice," "VC Use Force Labor," "VC Mines Kill Innocent People," "Don't Harbor VC," "Marines and Civilians Work Together," "Show of Strength," "Uselessness of Dying for the VC Cause," "Inform

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USMC of VC Locations," "Sanitation Leaflets," "Exploitation of VC Atrocities," "Rewards for Mines and Boobytraps," "GVN Provides Better Life," "Letter from a Returnee to His VC Friends," "GVN Civic Action," "Fear of Death by Bombing," "VC Need for His Family."

3 hours of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

A POET team from 244th FSYOP Co was sent to Dai Loc to exploit the refugees that gathered there as a result of Operation Independence. Pictures were taken for Chieu Hoi leaflets and posters.

14 Feb 67 5 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 261,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "GVN Show of Strength," "Death for VC," "Chieu Hoi Appeal," "Don't Harbor VC," "VC Mines Kill Innocent People," and warning to Vietnamese to evacuate their village.

5 hours and 30 minutes of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

15 Feb 67 4 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 396,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "VC Mines Kill Innocent People," "Comparison Between ARVN and VC Life," "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Don't Harbor VC," "Appeals to the VC to Surrender," "Rewards for Mines and Boobytraps," "Show of Strength," "A VC's Need for His Family," and "Fear of Death."

3 hours of aerial broadcasts were made. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals," and "Mine Rewards."

KCS were utilized as trail guides, for hand distribution of leaflets and to make Chieu Hoi appeals to the people.

16 Feb 67 9 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,111,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Rewards for Mines and Boobytraps," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Don't Harbor VC," "Death from the Air," "GVN Show of Strength," "Allied Forces Help the Vietnamese People," "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "VC Endanger Vietnamese Lives by Firing at Helicopters," "U.S. Marines Protect the Harvest," "Comparison of ARVN to VC Life," and "Warning to Evacuate Your Village Prior to an Air Strike."

2 hours and 40 minutes aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

KCS utilized as trail guides, to translate captured documents, to interrogate detainees and to exploit information gathered from ralliers.

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The first KCS-KIA sustained today. A KCS, attached to 3/1, was killed by a grenade while attempting to search a tunnel. The grenade was thrown by a VC concealed inside the tunnel. The incident occurred while the KCS was serving as a guide for a Marine patrol operating in support of Operation Stone.

17 Feb 67 8 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 770,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeal," "Support the GVN," "VC Mines Kill Innocent People," "Right and Might Will Win," "Don't Harbor VC," "Uselessness of Dying for the VC Cause," "Letters from Captured VC," and sanitation leaflets.

80 minutes of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

KCS utilized as trail guides, to assist in leaflet distribution, to interrogate VC and to exploit information gained from returnees.

18 Feb 67 KCS utilized as trail guides, used to interrogate VC, and to translate captured documents.

A POET team from 244th PSYOP Co was sent to the hamlet of Vien Tay to take pictures for leaflets and posters in an effort to exploit VC murder of children.

19 Feb 67 1 aerial leaflet drop comprised of 125,000 leaflets was made. Themes used were: "Don't Harbor VC," "VC Mines Kill Innocent People," and "Flag of Peace vs Flag of Death."

A POET team from 244th PSYOP Co contacted the ROK Marines for details and pictures to exploit ROK defeat of VC.

KCS utilized as trail guides, to make broadcasts and to interrogate returnees.

20 Feb 67 8 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 790,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeal," "GVN Show of Strength," "Don't Harbor VC," "Appeal to the VC to Surrender," "Exploitation of VC Cowardice," "Why the USMC is in Vietnam," "VC Steal From the People" and "Flag of Peace vs Flag of Death."

6 hours of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

21 Feb 67 6 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 570,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeal," "GVN Show of Strength," "Don't Fire at Aircraft," "Don't Harbor VC," "Explanation of U.S. and Allied Forces Being in Vietnam," "Good Treatment of NVA POW's," "Poor Living Conditions of VC" and "Fear of Death by Bombing."

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2 hours and 20 minutes of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

KCS utilized as trail guides on combat patrols and as interrogators.

22 Feb 67 7 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 705,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "This Operation has Brought the GVN Closer to Victory," "Rewards for Mines," "Don't Harbor VC," "VC Endanger Vietnamese Lives by Firing at Helicopters," "Inform the USMC of VC Locations," "VC Steal From the People," "Surrender Appeal," "Good Treatment of NVA POW's," "Curfew" and "GVN Show of Strength."

1 hour 40 minutes of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

Marine patrols distributed leaflets throughout areas of operations. KCS utilized to interpret and lecture at County Fairs, to interrogate PW's, write letters to former associates telling them of his better way of life in an effort to persuade them to surrender.

23 Feb 67 7 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,280,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeal," "Give Information to the Marines," "VC Steal from the People," "Don't Harbor VC," "Rewards for Mines and Boobytraps," "VC Mines Kill Innocent People," "Surrender Appeal," "Marines and the People Work Together," "A Comparison of ARVN to VC Life," "VC are Cowards," and "Safe Conduct Passes."

90 minutes of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

KCS utilized as a trail guide, to interrogate, to lecture at County Fairs and for giving classes on VC tactics.

24 Feb 67 10 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 3,205,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Don't Run From Marines," "Inform the Marines of VC Activities," "When the VC Stop Fighting There Will Be Peace," "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Don't Harbor VC," "Surrender Appeal," "Civilians and Marines Work Together," "Difference Between ARVN and VC Life," "Appeal to VC to Surrender," "Good Life in South Vietnam," "Surrender Instructions," "Rewards for Mines and Boobytraps," "VC are Cowards," "Letters from a Captured VC," "Safe Conduct Passes" and a warning to the people to evacuate their villages prior to an air strike.

1 hour of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

KCS utilized as trail guides, for interrogating VC and for giving classes to Marines on Mines and boobytraps.

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25 Feb 67 8 aerial leaflet drops were made comprised of 1,855,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Chieu Hoi Appeal," "The Marines Have Come in Peace," "VC Kill Innocent People," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Report VC Activity," "Rewards for Mines and Boobytraps," "VC Cowardice," "Letters from Captured VC," "A Comparison of VC to ARVN Life," "Civilians and Marines Work Together," "VC Disillusionment in Their Cause," and "Surrender Appeal."

90 minutes of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

KCS utilized as trail guides for interrogating VC and for translating captured documents. Three new KCS trainees were assigned today.

26 Feb 67 11 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,300,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Exploitation of VC Atrocities," "VC Mines Kill Innocent People," "Instructions to Inform Marines of the Location of VC Mines," "Chieu Hoi Appeal" and TET mixture.

3 hours of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

Marine patrols hand distributed leaflets throughout their areas.

KCS utilized as trail guides, for screening of PW's, translating captured documents and making loudspeaker broadcasts.

At 0930 a Vietnamese truck loaded with civilians hit a mine resulting in 14 killed and 33 wounded. First report reached 1st MarDiv PSYOP at 0945. 244th PSYOP Co was contacted to request exploitation assistance. By 1100 a POET team was at Danang Hospital taking pictures as the victims were brought in. Another POET team and an HB (loudspeaker) team was at the scene of the wreck taking pictures, gathering data and broadcasting denunciation of VC mines that Kill innocent people. At 1250 150,000 leaflets were dropped in the surrounding area, themes were: "VC Mines Kill Innocent Vietnamese," "Blood on the Hands of the VC" and "Instructions to Inform Marines of the Location of VC Mines". At first light on the morning of 27 Feb, 75,000 leaflets, made from pictures and data collected by the POET teams were dropped in the surrounding area, less than 23 hours from the time of the incident.

27 Feb 67 7 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 800,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Don't Harbor VC," assorted "Chieu Hoi Appeals", "Show of Strength," "Rally to the RVN," "Mines and Boobytraps Rewards," "Don't Run from Marines," "VC Disillusionment in Their Cause," and "Safe Conduct Passes."

4 hours and 10 minutes of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" was conducted.

KCS utilized for screening population, making loudspeaker broadcasts and as trail guides.


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28 Feb 67 11 aerial leaflet drops were made consisting of 1,257,000 leaflets. Themes used were: "Surrender Instructions," "Don't Harbor VC," "Rewards for Mines and Boobytraps," "Safe Conduct Passes," "Chieu Hoi Appeals," "Letters to the Citizens and Soldiers" and "Don't Run from Marines."

6 hours and 30 minutes of aerial broadcast on "Chieu Hoi Appeals" were conducted.

A KCS was slightly wounded when he triggered a boobytrap while searching a cave.



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SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1-28 Feb 67

Cable construction completed and telephone and teletype service provided to 1st Marines and to units in Southern Sector. Work continues toward 9th Marines.

5-25 Feb 67

CG Comm-Elect technical inspections completed on Hq 11th Marines and 1st MP Co, Hq Bn, 1st Bn 11th Marines rescheduled to 14 Mar 67.

Ref: DivBul 5041 of 5 Jan 67 (U)

6-24 Feb 67

CG Technical Assistance/Instruction Type 2 inspections conducted to include 1st MP Bn, 1st Med Bn, 1st Recon Bn and 1st MT Bn. Hq Co, 1st Marines and 1st, 2d, and 3d Bns 1st Marines postponed because of tactical operations.

Ref: Div CGO Memo 10/FLB/hmy dtd 21 Jan 1967 (U)

8 Feb 67

Communication Support provided RADM William S. MAILLARD, USNR, (Congressman, R-Calif.)

Ref: CG 1stMarDiv 070547Z Feb67 (C)

10 Feb 67

Communication support provided Senator John G. TOWER, (R-Texas).

Ref: CG 1stMarDiv 090411Z Feb67 (C)

14 Feb 67

Radio Teletype Test Program completed.

Ref: DivBul 2303 of 8 Jan 67 (U)
CG 1stMarDiv 162333Z Feb67 (U)

20 Feb 67

ARPA, R&D Field Unit, representative revisited division units for further information in Small Unit Communication Project.

Ref: MACV JRATA ltr of 10Oct66, Subj: Comm R&D Data Collection (JRATA Project 2F-255.0) (U)

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25 Feb 67

Central Office Telephone Manual, AN/MTC-9 arrived Chu Lai 37th SigBn, 1st Sig Brigade, U.S. Army Signal Corps, RVN and 7th ComBn MMF will install and maintain MTC-9 in Chu Lai

Ref: ADMMNO COMMAVFORV 160925Z Jan67
(C)

25-28 Feb 67

Trunk Lines shifted from Division ISHERWOOD SWITCH to Division ISHERWOOD common user switchboard. ISHERWOOD SWITCH replaced by HqBn AUDITOR Switchboard.

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OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR & DTG</u>
✓ RELIEF OF ARVN UNITS (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 010029Z FEB 67
✓ FRAG O 15-67 (DEPLOYMENT RIFLE CO CHU LAI)	CG FIRST MARDIV 021430Z FEB 67
✓ COUNTY FAIR OPNS (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 030113Z FEB 67
✓ FRAG O 16-67 (DEPLOYMENT ANTI TANK PLAT CHU LAI)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 031021Z FEB 67
✓ FRAG O 10-67 (U)	CG I FFORCEV NHA RVN 031049Z FEB 67
✓ U.S. TET POLICY	CG III MAF/SA I CORPS 041150Z FEB 67
✓ CHANGE OF OPCON (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 050905Z FEB 67
✓ ROUGH RIDER CONVOY - DISPLACEMENT OF 3D MT BN	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 060621Z FEB 67
✓ FRAG O 17-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV 070255Z FEB 67
✓ CHANGE OF OPCON (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 071439Z FEB 67
✓ REVISED CONCEPT AND SUPPORT REQMTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH SIF EMPLOYMENT SA HUYNH/DUC PHU AREA	
✓ REQUEST FOR LCU SUPPORT OPERATION DESOTO	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 080101Z FEB 67
✓ MSG FM LT GEN WALT	CG III MAF 080122Z FEB 67
✓ REQUEST FOR LCU SUPPORT OPERATION DESOTO (C)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 080621Z FEB 67
✓ FRAG O 18-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)	COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG 080704Z FEB 67
✓ ALO/VAC REQUIREMENTS FOR TASK FORCE XRAY (C)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 080917Z FEB 67
✓ TERMINATION OPN SEARCY (U)	CG FMFPAC 082314Z FEB 67
✓ TERMINATION OPN INDEPENDENCE (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 090137Z FEB 67
✓ EMPLOYMENT OF M-55 QUAD FIFTIES (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 090139Z FEB 67
✓ FRAG O 19-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 090237Z FEB 67
✓ ALLOCATION OF FORCES (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 100341Z FEB 67
✓ FRAG O 20-67 (AUGMENTATION OPN STONE)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 101417Z FEB 67
✓ COMBINED ACTION UNITS IN FIRST MARDIV	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 101515Z FEB 67
✓ CHANGE OF OPCON (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 110725Z FEB 67
✓ CHANGE OF OPCON (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 110821Z FEB 67
✓ COMBINED OPN NUI TRON	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 120017Z FEB 67
✓ ALLOCATION OF FORCES	CG FIRST MARDIV 120713Z FEB 67
✓ TANKS AT NUI DAU/NUI DANG	CG III MAF 120910Z FEB 67
✓ MINIMIZING CASUALTIES TO NONCOMBATANTS	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 140247Z FEB 67
✓ PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR MARCH 67 (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 140731Z FEB 67
✓ CHANGE OF OPCON	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 141215Z FEB 67
✓ DECKHOUSE VI (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 151133Z FEB 67
✓ DEFENSIVE POSITIONS	CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE 151840Z FEB 67
✓ CHANGE OF OPCON (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 160235Z FEB 67
✓ FRAG O 21-67 (OPN STONE PHASE II) (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 161401Z FEB 67
✓ OPN STONE	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 161517Z FEB 67
✓ INTENTIONS MARCH 67	FIRST MARINES 171215Z FEB 67
✓ FRAG ORDER 10 (OPN STONE II)	CG TASK FORCE XRAY 171414Z FEB 67
✓ ANDERSON ROAD SECURITY (U)	FIRST MAR (FWD) 171600Z FEB 67
✓ REPORT OF PLANNED OPNS FOR MARCH 67 (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 180319Z FEB 67
✓ OPN FAULKNER (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 180541Z FEB 67
✓ FRAG O 23-67 (OPN GULF) (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV 210511Z FEB 67
✓ OPN STONE (U)	CG FIRST MARDIV 210733Z FEB 67
✓ TERMINATION OPN RIO GRANDE	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 220325Z FEB 67
	CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 220327Z FEB 67

OPNL Docs - 1ST MARDIV

FEB 1967

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OPN LAFAYETTE
FRAG O 24-67 (OPN PULASKI) (U)
TERMINATION OF OPN STONE
ROUGH RIDER (U)
ROAD SECURITY (U)
NGPS IN I CTZ
OPN LANOKE (U)
HELICOPTER SUPPORT OF OPNS (U)
CHOP ADCON 5TH MARINES
OPN PULASKI (U)
OPN LANOKE (U)
FRAG O 26-67 (IN DEPLOYMENT) (U)
FIRST MARDIV FRAG CARRIER 26-67 (IN DEPLOYMENT)
SITUATION OPN PRAIRIE
IN DEPLOYMENT (U)

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 220657Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 220757Z FEB 67
FIRST MARINES 220600Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 220757Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 240651Z FEB 67
OTG SEVEN HERO PT ELEMENT 240700Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 230610Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 230657Z FEB 67
NINH MARINES 201540Z FEB 67
III MAU CO 201520Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 201540Z FEB 67

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PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND

CHRONOLOGIES OF SUBORDINATE UNITS


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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



REF ID: A6212
JUL 1967

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

PERINTREP NO. 3-67

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF
AND RVNAF

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB A

[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED1st Marine Division (Rein), Fwd
Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam
201200H February 1967

PERINTREP NO. 3

Period Covered: 301200H January 1967 to 141200H February 1967

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATIONA. Adjacent Areas

(1) Several incidents on the northern side of Mai Van Pass indicate continuing enemy efforts to interdict and to harass lines of communication between Hue and Da Nang. Two railroad bridges on the western side of Lap An lagoon (AT 8495 and AT 8398) were blown in 2 February. One bridge was totally destroyed, closing the railroad for at least a month. Also on the 2nd, in the afternoon, a RF platoon was ambushed along Route #1 (AT 9094) and later that night a nearby OP (AT 9193) of the same RF company was attacked.

(2) In Binh Dinh Province, a defector from the 9th Battalion of the 22nd NVA Regiment states that his unit is located in the Tam Quan area (BS 9105). His statements as to enemy intentions indicate that the 22nd Regiment will continue operations in northern Binh Dinh Province. Reports from varied sources reveal that the 18th NVA Regiment is in poor shape in the central part of the province. All reports indicate extreme demoralization. One report reflects fear on the part of cadre of mass defections, while another maintains that the remnants of the 18th Regiment have been formed into a provincial unit and are no longer under control of the 3rd Division.

B. First Marine Division's Area of Responsibility

(1) Quang Nam Province. Normal guerrilla and local force activity was the rule for the Da Nang TAOR. The enemy suffered costly losses as a result of Operations Independence and Stone, which were targeted against operating areas of the R-20 and V-25 Provincial Mobile Battalions. Independence, in the peninsular area between the Vu Gia and Thu Bon Rivers, met steady guerrilla resistance for the entire 8 days of its duration. On the 5th, solid contact was made with elements of the R-20 (AT 8354) resulting in enemy losses of 38 confirmed and 29 probable kills. A battalion-size tunnel complex was found (AT 8651) and destroyed on 4 February. The only other significant enemy activity was the mortar harassment experienced by friendly forces in the vicinity of AT 8352, on the 3rd and 5th of February. The same elements of the R-20 Battalion which were contacted nearby on the 5th are the suspected perpetrators. Three days after the conclusion of Independence, Operation Stone began sweeping another

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AND RVNAF

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preserve of the Quang Da provincial forces: Go Noi island, which is located to the south of the Thu Bon River between grid lines AT 93 and BT 08. As of this date, the operation continues to encounter the same persistent guerrilla resistance that characterized Operation Independence. The absence of substantial contact despite promising intelligence reports and the sighting of 179 armed VC leaving the Stone operational area (AT 9750 and AT 9351) towards the southwest on the afternoon preceding D-Day indicate the VC had fore knowledge of the operation. Detainees interrogated on the first day confirmed that enemy units in the area had indeed left the night before. That the direction of evasion was the southwest was corroborated by reconnaissance sightings and contacts on the 13th in the vicinity of AT 9643 and BT 0447.

Recent ralliers and captives from the R-20 Battalion state that the unit has suffered heavy losses and that as a result morale is correspondingly poor. One man stated that two companies of the R-20 were engaged with Marines in Operation Tuscaloosa and 100 men were killed or wounded on that occasion. One captive who was himself a North Vietnamese provided tangible proof that infiltrated soldiers are being used at least partially as replacements in the R-20th. He indicated that there was often ill feeling between the infiltrated and local soldiers of the battalion.

Elsewhere in the province, contacts and sightings by reconnaissance patrols in the Dong Lam mountain area (AT 8264, AT 8257, AT 7959) indicate continued enemy interest in and use of this base area that was partially destroyed last September in Operation Allegheny. The only main force activity was in evidence in the Que Son/Nui Lao Son area. The district headquarters at Que Son (BT 0334) on 3 February received 40 to 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire -- a quantity that would generally be considered beyond the capability of the local force company located in this area. Marine patrols operating out of Nui Lao Son (BT 0228) have made moderate contact on several occasions and received both .50 caliber machine gun fire and mortar fire. The .50 caliber fire is characteristic of main force units, in this case probably elements of the 3rd NVA Regiment whose object is to discourage Marine patrols from venturing far beyond the base of the hill.

(2) Quang Tin Province. Recent defectors, who confirm the presence of the 3rd NVA Regiment in the Thang Binh/Que Son area, reveal that the 3rd has been behind the several mortar incidents and small unit contacts in the Thang Binh area over the past month. A senior NCO from the 21st NVA Regiment, who deserted when his regiment left for Quang Ngai, stated that the 3rd Regiment was to stay in Quang Tin and Quang Nam in order to tie down possible reinforcements, while the rest of the 2nd Division operated in Quang Ngai Province. A corporal who was to become an assistant platoon leader in the 3rd NVA Regiment stated essentially the same and gave the mission as one of harassment and interdiction. He told of being part of 50 men from his company who combined with 20 local guerrillas to destroy a hamlet near Thang Binh for propaganda purposes. Another rallier reports various

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company size operations against bridges and ARVN positions. Activity in the Thang Binh/Que Son plain indicates that the 3rd Regiment is dispersed over the area with the mission, as put by one of the defectors, "to protect the people," which could apply equally well to countering ARVN pacification efforts around Thang Binh and to Marine clearing operations out of Nui Lac Son. The recent pattern of small unit contacts and mortar harassments is probably indicative of what will continue in this area.

The 72nd Provincial Mobile Battalion remains active as indicated by various incidents at Tam Ky, Tien Phuoc and between. The attack of the 6th on Tam Ky, which featured the mortaring of the provincial headquarters and the interdiction of Route #1, was probably coordinated by the 72nd Battalion. The 72nd or district forces could have accounted for the forces extraction of a recon patrol (BT 2414) on the 30th and for the mortar harassment of an outpost (BT 1313) near Tien Phuoc on the 13th.

Within the Chu Lai TAOR, enemy resistance was stiffest in the area of the recent northern extension. The 3-day Operation Clay in the northwestern corner made numerous contacts with squad and platoon-sized formations. Heavy harassing fire, once reportedly of .50 caliber variety, was received on several occasions. The CAC unit at BT 3317 was the focus for a number of small contacts. The pattern of enemy activity in this northern area represents, in all likelihood, enemy efforts to repel friendly forces from an area which has long been a convenient haven for local forces engaged in operations against Marines in the northern half of the TAOR. The 706th provincial independent company and the south Tam Ky district force company have based their operations more or less permanently in this area (BT 3014 and BT 3408, respectively). The river which forms the northern boundary has been the suspected route of access for several attacks against the airfield and installations within Tam Ky city. The CAC unit's location astride this route may well account for the heavier density of incidents experienced there.

(3) Quang Ngai Province. The coordinated pre-TET attack on Ba To and Chu Lai that was reportedly planned by the 409th Sapper Battalion in conjunction with infantry units failed to materialize. The extent of the pre-TET offensive appears to have been a relatively small scale attack against an RF/PF outpost at Thi Pho (BS 7257) on 7 February. Documents captured during the encounter implicate a battalion of the 2nd VC Regiment. As such, this represents the most northern movement of the 2nd Regiment since its arrival in Quang Ngai in late November. Since that time, the regiment appears to have remained in the mountainous mess between Ba To, Duc Pho and Mo Duc. In addition to the Thi Pho attack, elements of the 2nd Regiment are believed responsible for the forced extractions of several reconnaissance patrols, (BS 7237) in the mountains bordering Duc Pho. Appreciable sightings of VC were made in the area of these extractions as well as to the south at BS 8727. CIDG forces from Ba To made contact on the 1st of February with an estimated company possibly also from the 2nd Regiment at BS 6335.

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In the coastal area of Duc Pho district, Marines engaged in Operation De Soto continue to meet determined resistance. On the night of January 31st and the early morning of the 1st, the command post and an out-lying company position came under coordinated mortar attack. The mortar attack on the CP was followed by a small assault that failed to reach the objective. Marine forces on Nui Dau (BS 8732) have encountered strong resistance and well-constructed fortifications in Qua Thien village (BS 8633). To the north, along the Tra Cau River and inlet, Marines on several occasions received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire from well-concealed fortifications in hamlets along these waterways. A rallyer from these hamlets revealed that the 38th Quang Ngai Provincial Mobile Battalion and the C.219 Duc Pho District Force Company are deployed along the northern bank of the river and inlet with the mission of resisting a Marine advance to the north. To date, there are no indications of the main force 2nd VC Regiment becoming involved in Operation De Soto, other than by attempting to prevent our reconnaissance from coming too close. Contacts in the plain appear to be with what have always been vigorous guerrilla forces backed by equally healthy local forces. The 38th Battalion is considered one of the best of the provincial battalions.

The other focal point for enemy activity in Quang Ngai Province has been Son Tinh District, around and in which the 1st VC and 21st NVA Regiments are believed deployed. Marine reconnaissance patrols and CIDG operations have made several contacts indicating the presence of sizeable forces along the piedmont. On the 30th, upon sighting approximately 200 VC moving towards their position (BS 4471), a recon patrol effected a prudent extraction. On the 3rd, a CIDG patrol from Tra Bong encountered an estimated enemy company (BS 4681). On the 6th, a recon patrol (BS 4385) drew heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire which continued through the extraction. To the east, the BUK's were heavily engaged with an unknown enemy force on the first of the month (BS 7683). Proof positive of main force presence was the abortive attack on the KMC company (BS 5883) on the early morning of the 15th. The 40th and 60th Battalions of the 1st VC Regiment can be considered non or marginally combat effective due to losses suffered in the attack. A mortar attack on the airstrip and the 2nd Division headquarters in Quang Ngai was apparently intended as a diversion. For the two nights following the unsuccessful attack, the enemy administered a riposte to nearby positions consisting of mortar attacks, with 120mm mortars included for extra effect. This is the first time that the 120's have been used since January 25th of last year when they appeared for the first time in this area in the attack on Da Nang airfield.

Activity in the southern part of the Chu Lai TAOR was moderate as usual. Noteworthy was the repeat performance on 5 February of the blowing of the Bink Sox bridge (BS 5932). VC demo experts did a similar job on

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September [REDACTED] on the occasion of the national elections, however, this time an extra twist was added by the simultaneous mortar attack against the bridge's defenders.

The focal points of main force activity in Quang Ngai Province have every appearance of continuing to be Son Tinh District and the Mo Due-Du Pho coastal area. In Son Tinh, the bulk of the 2nd Division is believed concentrated possibly with the intention of contesting the sizeable inroads the KMC's have made into VC control of this area. To the south, in Due Pho, although the 2nd VC Regiment has yet to indicate the intention of contesting the Marine presence, such can be expected as the challenge to their control becomes more palpable and as Marines extend their operations.

C. General Enemy Situation.

Several indications have been received during the past fortnight that infiltrated personnel are no longer being used to form new units, but instead are being utilized as replacements for losses suffered by already existing forces. The rallied from the 60th Battalion of the 1st VC Regiment stated that 40% of the personnel in his battalion were NVA and that infiltrated personnel are now being used to replace losses due to battle, sickness and desertion. A similar situation has been reported to exist in the 2nd NVA Regiment of the 3rd Division. In contrast, last August, captives from the 21st NVA Regiment reported that, after suffering heavy losses in the spring campaign in Son Tinh, that NVA regiment had obtained replacements through local conscription and upgrading of guerrillas and local force personnel to the point that South Vietnamese constituted 40% of the strength of some units. These indications imply that for one reason or another the upgrading of personnel to the main forces is no longer taking place, and that the current level of main forces is likely to remain the same. Perhaps the strongest indication of the latter is the absence of any newly-infiltrated regiments since the 3rd NVA entered last May, despite known plans to increase the 2nd Division to five regiments and despite presumably unabated infiltration.

More noteworthy than the use of infiltrators as main force replacements is their use as troopers in local force units. A cell leader in the R.20 Quang Da Provincial Mobile Battalion, who was captured in Operation Independence, turned out to be an NVA draftee who was infiltrated and placed with the R.20th upon his arrival in this area. His interrogation report implies that there are more than a few NVA in the R.20th. The presence of North Vietnamese in local force units is not unusual in and of itself. There are a number of instances of provincial mobile battalions and district force companies having North Vietnamese cadres sprinkled among the locals. What is unusual about this captive is that as a regular NVA conscript in a replacement draft, he went, not to a main force unit as would be expected, but to a provincial mobile battalion that normally would be manned by local youths. This instance may indicate nothing more than that the R.20th was

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hurting for people, even before the recent losses. If this phenomenon is found to exist in other local force units, a real shortage of locally procured replacements is indicated. This circumstance alone, if true, may well be the reason behind the seeming reversal of the policy of upgrading local force and guerrilla personnel into main force ranks. If the enemy does not have the locally-available manpower to sustain his former plans, he can be expected to resort to NVA replacements for main force units before he would draw down guerrillas and local forces to unacceptably low levels. Since the local forces and the guerrillas form the essential support for the main forces, should the enemy be really short of people, so that he cannot maintain even his local forces, he can be expected to introduce infiltrated personnel into the local forces before he would let them disappear for want of personnel. Should this be the case, the NVA conscripts probably would appear in the provincial mobile battalions before the district force companies. Although not conclusive at this time, the presence of NVA conscripts in the R.20th may indicate that the enemy is not able to provide local force replacements out of locally available resources.

The current disposition and apparent mission of the 3rd NVA Regiment indicates a very different utilization for main forces than what is prescribed by the enemy's doctrine of revolutionary warfare and from what has been the case in the past. A knowledgeable defector states that the 3rd Regiment has the unusual mission, for a main force regiment, "to destroy roads, to protect the people and to attack allied forces if feasible." The same defector speaks of being part of a fifty man group from his company that joined with twenty local guerrillas of Thang Binh to attack a hamlet for propaganda purposes. Another defector from the 3rd Regiment relates that a company from the regiment attacked troops guarding a bridge near Thang Binh and that another shelled an ARVN outpost. The reported mission and those recent activities, which do fit the pattern of activity in this area over the past month or two, are more typical of local force units than of a main force regiment. The full implications of this unorthodox use of a main force unit are not clear at this time. At the very least, a concerted effort to bolster local forces is indicated. This is a particularly significant development for those who subscribe to the view that the local forces are the key element in the Viet Cong force structure, in that they constitute the backbone of the guerrilla structure which is the principal means of controlling the people and of marshalling resources in support of the main forces.

The situation in Quang Ngai Province appears rather different from that in Quang Tin and Quang Nam. The attack on the KMC positions is unique as a determined attack and infantry assault on a fortified position. The intent probably was to annihilate a company that was relatively close in and thus to demonstrate the ability to strike when and where the VC will. Such a victory would have had considerable local impact in an area which has been steadily slipping out of VC control; and it would have boosted morale within VC ranks. As it was, events proved a cruel mockery of plans.

This attack is more along the lines of what would be expected from

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main force units; but the sad results of what was probably a well-planned and well-executed attack were such as most likely to encourage those in the enemy camp who advocate greater emphasis on guerrilla warfare and political organization. Last year at this season, the newly-formed 2nd Division undertook a campaign in this same area and persisted in the campaign despite some heavy drubbings, but the division consisted then of a fresh, newly-infiltrated 21st NVA Regiment and the prestigious 1st VC Regiment whose reputation had been sullied only once by Operation Starlight. Given the present state of demoralization in main force ranks, one can legitimately question whether many such defeats could be sustained. At the least, it appears the 2nd Division intends to get some use out of their 120mm mortars.

Further south in Quang Ngai Province, the presumably refurbished 2nd VC Regiment has yet to make a significant move against the Marines at Duc Pho. It will be surprising if nothing more than the 38th Battalion contests the Marine presence in that area; yet, not being inclined to precipitous action, the enemy will very likely bide his time waiting for the opportune moment when success is deemed certain. The attack against Thi Pho outpost in Mo Duc is characteristic of what the main forces could be expected to do in a situation where local force and guerrilla activity is reemphasized. In such a situation, the main forces provide the concentrated force which, at all times, threatens and which, at any given time, can mass and overrun relatively isolated and weak positions. Thus, the enemy would hope steadily to discourage the continuing dispersion which becomes necessary as the pacification program expands.

2. ENEMY OPERATION DURING THE PERIOD

A. Strength and Disposition

(1) See Annex A, Order of Battle.

(2) See Annex B, Significant Agent, VC PW/Returnees, and Document Translation Reports on returnees Le Van Lum, 5th Company, 60th Battalion, 1st VC Regiment and Dao Xuan Hoa, 8th Company, 7th Battalion, 3rd NVA Regiment, 320th Division.

(3) The following information was provided by returnee Nguyen Quang Nam, former member of 1st Company, R-20th Battalion. Information follows as obtained from spot interrogation report of 10 February 1967.

R-20th Battalion

Strength: 200 men

Weapons: Each company has the following armament: 3-60mm mortars, 1 heavy machine gun, 1 light machine gun, 1 B-40 rocket launcher and 12 automatic rifles.

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Location and Disposition: The guerrilla platoon and the C-219th Company are presently located vicinity BS 812411 to BS 816404 to BS 819408.

Others: Du further stated that in Du Quang #1 (H) BS 828412 there is an unknown province force battalion with three infantry companies designated 801, 802 and 803 and 1 attached sapper platoon. Each company has 3 infantry platoons and 1 weapons/support platoon armed with 1-82mm mortar, 5-60mm mortars and 2-US 30 caliber machine guns.

G-2 Comment: F/3. The C-219th Company is the confirmed district force company of Duo Pho District. Unknown battalion mentioned above is the 38th Quang Ngai Provincial Mobile Battalion with existing companies 801st, 802nd, 803rd infantry and 804th Combat Support Companies.

B. Order of Battle.

(1) See Annex A, Order of Battle.

(2) The following information was derived from captive Nguyen Van Cam, captured by F/2/26 on 4 February 1967.

Information Obtained: Captive joined the 2nd Company of the R-20th Battalion in May 1966.

R-20th Battalion

Strengths: Bn-200 men; 2nd Co-90 men; each platoon-27 men; each squad-9 men; each team-3 men.

Weapons: Bn-2-82mm mortars with 200 rounds; 2nd Co-30 AK's, 20 C80's, 1-MG and 180 Chicom grenades.

Organization: The 2nd Company consist of 3 platoons of 3 squads per platoon and 3 teams per squad.

Morale: Very poor due to the recent heavy losses and the dissension between the NVA soldiers and the local guerrillas. The cause for this dissension was attributed to resentment felt by the NVA's because they had left their families behind, while the local soldiers were able to continue living with theirs.

Supply: Food is often bad and insufficient. It is procured from the local population. Ammunition is often insufficient. It comes from North Vietnam every three months; last resupply was two months ago. Each man has 200 rounds, the machine guns has 500 rounds.

Replacements: Conscripted through the local populace who

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receive a short training in Quang Tin Province. Replacements are received every two or three months.

Tactics: Ambush, frontal assault, and fire and maneuver.

Unit History: Captive further stated that approximately 3 months ago, the R-20th Battalion attacked Hoa Thanh village vicinity (AT 913 790). Approximately 1 month ago, they attacked Marines in Go Noi island vicinity (AT 9353 and BT 0654). Three days ago the battalion came in contact with the Marines again on Operation Independence. Since joining, the battalion has suffered many losses in these sporadic contacts because of the troops poor showing. They have had over 50 killed, a large number wounded and lost 20 AK's and 10 CCK's.

C. Reserves and Reinforcements. No change.

D. New Enemy Tactics. First Field Forces Vietnam PERINTREP 2-67 reported that a confidential source of II Corps reported the VC are now marking trails with eight inch pieces of banana tree bark placed 3 to 4 feet apart along trails. The bark is alleged to have a slight luminescent quality which allows a traveler to find his way along trails. This luminescent quality comes from the inner side of the bark. This bark is also reported as being used by the VC/NVA to mark underwater bridges, by placing them on the ends of stakes.

E. Administrative and Political Units. Negative

F. Anti-Air Activity. No unusual anti-aircraft activity occurred during the reporting period.

G. Anti-Personnel/Anti-Tank Mine Activity. During the reporting period, there were 22 mine/booby trap incidents within the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAOR's. Da Nang recorded 12 anti-personnel mine/booby trap incidents, 6 anti-vehicle mine/booby trap incidents; while Chu Lai recorded 3 anti-personnel mine/booby trap incidents and 1 anti-vehicle mine/booby trap incident.

H. Artillery/Mortar/RR Activity. Activity in this category dropped notably with a recorded two incidents for both Da Nang and Chu Lai TAOR's.

(1) At 050930H, M/3/7 on Operation De Soto during helicopter landing received 7 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle fire and 30 caliber machine gun fire. An aerial observer directed 50 rounds of artillery supported by a naval gun fire mission on the suspected enemy position vicinity (BS 847390). A search of the area was conducted with inconclusive results.

(2) At 111150H, F/2/1 squad reconnaissance patrol located at (BT 033262) received a heavy volume of small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy located at (BT 034264). Another squad in the vicinity received fire

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while the patrol maneuvered to assault the enemy position. While searching the area, the squad received 4 rounds of mortar or M-79 and heavy small arms fire from an estimated 25 VC which resulted in 10 Marines wounded. A search of the area was conducted with inconclusive results.

I. Interdiction Activities. At 032345H, the highway bridge at Binh Son vicinity (BS 593932) was destroyed by VC forces when they attacked with mortar and small arms fire followed by demolitions being used to blow one abutment out and dropping the spans of the bridge.

J. Guerrilla Activity. As usual, the VC guerrillas maintained their level of incidents within the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAOR's with a reported 154 incidents. Da Nang again received the bulk of the incidents with a recorded 107 broken down as follows: 81 harassing small arms fire, 2 grenades, 1 terrorism, 1 M-79 fire, 1 propaganda, 3 punji pits, 12 booby traps and 6 mining incidents. Chu Lai recorded a total of 48 incidents categorized as follows: 33 harassing small arms fire, 7 grenades, 1 punji pit, 1 wire cutting, 3 rifle grenades, 3 booby traps and 1 mining incidents.

K. Guided Missiles. Negative

L. Infantry. Within both TAOR's, 5 significant infantry contacts were recorded.

(1) At 301800H, 1st Platoon, Company "D", 1st Reconnaissance Battalion located at (BT 258142) received an estimated 800 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated 25-30 VC, 50-200 meters northeast and west. The platoon returned fire resulting in 11 VC KIA confirmed, while Marines suffered 6 wounded. Shortly after the firefight, the Marines were extracted from the vicinity.

(2) At 311000H, D/1/26 squad combat patrol located at (AT 979601) while enroute to vicinity (AT 978609) to assist C/1/26 in blocking position received heavy enemy fire from vicinity (AT 980600 and AT 982602) resulting in 2 Marines killed and 11 wounded. A heavy concentration of artillery was then called on the enemy position. A search of the area revealed 4 VC confirmed killed and an estimated 5 probably killed.

(3) At 311820H, C/2/1 on a search-and-destroy mission located at (BT 045598) received 50 rounds of small arms fire from an estimated 16 VC located at (BT 033598). Fire was returned and an artillery mission called on the enemy position. A search of the area revealed 13 VC bodies.

(4) At 060120H, a CAC unit from 1/5 located at (BT 325181) received approximately 200 rounds of small arms/automatic weapons fire and approximately 10 rifle grenades from an estimated 10-15 enemy located at (BT 332179, 326183 and 322182). Fire was returned and the enemy fire ceased. The contact lasted for approximately 20 minutes. A search conducted during

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the morning daylight hours found 6 home-made grenades, 4 Chicom grenades, 12 M-79 expended grenades, 1 leather belt with a first-aid pouch, 3 expended 7.62 rounds, 1 magazine for a French or Chicom weapon, 1 M-26 US grenade, 1 ammunition cannister, and an unspecified number of bloody clothing, some with bullet holes in them.

(5) At 071000H, H/2/5 platoon in a search-and-destroy mission at (AT 908504) received approximately 1000 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated reinforced VC squad located at (AT 908501). Fire was returned to the enemy position. The enemy then fled east. No casualties was inflicted on either friendly or enemy forces.

M. Reconnaissance. Negative

N. Infiltration. Negative

O. Other Elements.

(1) II Corps reported that the attacks on Camp Holloway from 6 through 9 January (main attack on morning of 7 January) produced evidence that the VC had used telephone deception prior to and during the attacks. During the primary attack, an unidentified person, speaking fluent English, free of any Vietnamese accent, made numerous telephone calls in the Holloway complex which were designed to create confusion and indecision. On one occasion, a call was made to a guard bunker requesting information on the number of personnel on duty in the bunker. A check with the CP showed that no such call had been made from the CP. A check of the field wire showed that unknown persons had tapped into the line near the perimeter fence. At approximately 062400H, an unidentified person, speaking fluent English, called the Holloway control tower and asked "Is this 138? Keep a sharp eye on the runway, you are about to be assaulted. You'll be outflanked in two minutes. Widerschn" (German for "Goodbye"). This incident points out a probable VC attempt to monitor friendly command and control circuits in order to determine the reaction of friendly elements to the attack. These incidents point out quite forcefully the VC capability of monitoring our telephone network to determine our reaction and to gain intelligence information. It also points out his willingness and ability to confuse and deceive our operators. This incident vividly demonstrates that insecure communications means are susceptible to monitoring and/or jamming, and should never be considered secure.

(2) Within our area, at 301900H, H/2/4 CP at (AT 878577) had a bogey station on "H" Company's TAC net, using an unidentified call sign.

(3) At 112335H, 2/4 CP perimeter defense located at (AT 915585) received jamming on the battalion TAC net. Jamming started from 112315H.

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(4) The following is the Tet standdown wrap-up:

(a) During the 4 day period of the Tet truce, a total of 141 enemy violations were reported in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Of these, 113 were ground incidents. Twenty five involved small arms fire directed at friendly aircraft.

(b) Total casualties incurred/inflicted as a result of these violations follows: 5 friendly KIA, 42 friendly WIA (2 KIA and 37 WIA were Marines), 34 VC KIA confirmed, 29 VC KIA probable, 1 VC WIA probable and 1 VC PW.

(c) A breakdown of these incidents by geographic location follows: Operation Prairie/Khe Sanh/northern Quang Tri Province-14 (11 ground, 3 anti-aircraft); Operation Chinook/northern Thua Thien Province-20 (18 ground, 2 anti-aircraft); Phu Bai and vicinity-10 (all ground); Da Nang and vicinity-65 (50 ground, 15 anti-aircraft); Chu Lai and vicinity-23 (16 ground, 7 anti-aircraft) and Operation De Soto/Ba To in southern Quang Ngai Province-9 (8 ground 1 anti-aircraft).

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

A. Enemy Organization and Combat Efficiency. No change. Refer 1st Marine Division PERINTREP NO. 17.

B. New Unit Identification. Negative

C. New Weapons and Equipment. Negative

D. Personalities. Negative

E. Enemy Losses. Enemy losses during the period 301200H January 1967 to 141200H February 1967 in the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAOR's were 236 confirmed killed, 362 probably killed, 193 detainees classified as follows: 29 PW VC, 7 VC returnees, 1 civil defendant and 3 innocent civilians plus 14 individual weapons. Additionally, Operation Trinity commenced at 300815H January and terminated at 012000H February 1967 resulted in 3 VC confirmed KIA, 2 KIA probable, 4 detainees classified as 4 VC PW and 1 individual weapon. Operation Independence commenced at 011000H and terminated at 090900H February 1967 resulted in 139 confirmed killed, 184 probably killed, 86 detainees classified as 20 VC PW's and 12 individual weapons. Operation Saaray commenced at 010730H, terminated at 091000H February 1967 resulted in 7 KIA confirmed, 1 probably killed, 44 detainees categorized as 18 VC PW, 8 civil defendants, and 10 innocent civilians and 3 individual weapons. Operation Clay commenced at 010815H and terminated at 031800H February resulted in 1 KIA confirmed, 2 KIA probable and 2 detainees. Operation De Soto commenced at 262300H January 1967 and still continuing have thus far

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netted 103 confirmed killed, 208 probably killed, 7 detainees classified as 7 innocent civilians. Operation Stone commenced at 120700H February 1967 and still continuing have thus far resulted in 35 VC killed, 44 probably killed, 40 detainees classified as 5 civil defendants and 4 VC PW's. Total VC losses during the reporting period is 524 confirmed killed, 903 probably killed, 376 detainees classified as 74 VC PW, 7 VC returnees, 14 civil defendants, 20 innocent civilians and 30 individual weapons.

F. Morale. During the subject period, defector/returnee reports still indicate VC morale within the tri-province area remains low for the usual reasons of air/artillery harassment, food/medical shortages, etc. Noteworthy are the recent reports that Vietnamese personnel in VC-controlled areas are beginning to criticize the VC for causing shelling and bombing of their hamlets and villages by their presence, and for being unable to prevent this or to protect the civilians from the shellings. This criticism has further lowered morale within VC ranks.

G. Details of Administrative Installation and Support.

(1) A 7th Counterintelligence Team confidential source reported on 29 January 1967 that presently there exist three major VC fording areas along the Song Tra Bong at coordinates (BS 453882), (BS 438879) and (BS 414879). These locations are reportedly fordable by foot traffic. Further, the fording area at (BS 438879) is a well-utilized infiltration route.

(2) A 3rd Counterintelligence Team report from a confidential source revealed on 28 January 1967 the location of a VC secret area at (AT 793473), with the following facilities: 1 weapons depot, 1 communication station, 1 cache of salted fish (10,000 cans), 53 rice stores, 1 raw rice store (approx. 15,000 tons), 4 Chinese rice threshing machines, 1 weapons repair and grenade making factory, 1 military hospital with rooms for 400 patients, 1 civilian hospital with rooms for 400 patients, 1 farm with cows and fowl to support the hospital, 4 prisons for cadre and ARVN captives, 1 training school for guerrillas and regular forces.

(3) The following reports were received from the 149th Military Intelligence Group:

(a) On 14 January 1967, a VC rice storage area vicinity Nuoc Lay (BS 333648). This area consists of 10 houses containing 3,000 kilo's of rice.

(b) On 12 January 1967, the VC inaugurated a new hospital vicinity Nam Phuoc (H) (AT 825520). This hospital consists of 25 thatched huts placed at random to appear as civilian houses. There are reportedly 160 patients located at this hospital at present. The hospital is guarded by a VC company with an unknown designation.

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(c) As of 18 January 1967, the VC have established a textile shop at Nuoc Dinh (BS 675274). The shop consists of 3 buildings, each measuring 20x10 meters. The shop has 4 textile machines and employs an estimated 120 workers. Also at this location is a rice depot with a capacity of over 120 metric tons of rice. This area is guarded by 40 armed VC.

(d) On 16 January 1967 a paddy storage area was located at Suoi Due (BT 182012). This area consists of 5 shelters containing approximately 18 tons of paddy.

H. Terrain.

I. Weather. The weather in both TAOR's from 301200H January 1967 to 141200H February 1967 was again characterized by generally cloudy skies with light scattered rainshowers. The average maximum and minimum temperatures were 77 degrees and 68 degrees respectively while humidity averaged 75 percent. Visibility averaged 5 to 7 miles while winds were predominantly from a northwesterly direction with an average velocity of 5 knots with gusts to 10 knots. Recorded rainfall for the period was .47 inches.

J. Intelligence Operations. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES.

A. Capabilities

(1) Utilizing his main forces, the enemy can:

(a) Attack the An Hoa, Nong Son or Nui Lao Son with up to one regiment reinforced by local forces up to battalion size.

(b) Attack the Chu Lai Combat Base with the 2nd Division reinforced by division support battalions and nearby local forces.

(c) Attack Marine forces in Duc Pho with the 3rd Division's 2nd VC and 22nd NVA Regiments augmented by divisional support battalions and nearby provincial mobile battalions.

(d) Attack any or several of the CIDG camps in force of one or more regiments.

(e) Conduct combinations of the above.

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(f) Should he so elect, defend various installations and base areas, most notably in the Do Xa in up to division strength utilizing regular security forces augmented by elements of the 2nd Division.

(g) Reinforce his position in the southern 1 Corps area by the infiltration of additional forces from North Vietnam or by the introduction of the 22nd NVA Regiment from Binh Dinh Province within one day after movement commences, the 1st and 10th Divisions from the Central Highlands, 15 to 20 days after movement commences and the 6th NVA Regiment from Thua Thien Province within 10 days after movement commences.

(h) Employ his main forces in an essentially non-aggressive role - engaged primarily in political indoctrination, retraining, re-equipping and conducting small attacks against isolated outposts in no more than battalion size - but positioned so as always to pose threat to certain vital points thus forcing a note of more than usual caution into the conduct of friendly operations.

(2) Utilizing his local and guerrilla forces, the enemy can:

(a) Attack, preferably by fire, ambush, or sapper raid, friendly forces and positions in up to reinforced battalion strength at a time and place of the enemy's choosing.

(b) Harass friendly forces and installations with small arms, grenades, mortars, booby traps and small ambushes at a time and place of the enemy's choosing.

(c) Interdict lines of communications throughout the tri-province area, particularly National Route #1; Routes 1C, 1D, 14 and 5; and the railroad lines in Hai Van Pass area at a time and place of the enemy's choice, often using trained demolitions personnel working in conjunction with guerrilla and local forces.

(d) Conduct political agitation and propaganda, combined with a selective use of politically-inspired violence, including assassination, terrorism and sabotage in an effort to thwart the Revolutionary Development Program.

B. Probable Enemy Courses of Action

(1) For the main forces:

(a) Attack by fire and/or physical assault relatively close-in friendly positions in the Chu Lai and Duc Pho areas in regimental strength at a time of the enemy's choice for the purpose of, not only of annihilating manpower, but also of demonstrating the ability to strike in

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strength within the combat bases.

(b) Conduct a coordinated attack of any or several of the CIDG camps at a time of the enemy's choosing with the main objective of ambushing reinforcements, utilizing a force of one or more reinforced regiments.

(c) Continue political indoctrination, reequipping and replenishing ranks, and small-scale attacks on isolated outposts for the primary purpose of gaining combat experience; while also, by these attacks and the real or imagined potential threat to friendly forces in the vicinity of these mobile forces, hoping to inhibit our freedom of action.

(d) Attack the Nui Lao Son, Nong Son or An Hoa complexes at a time of the enemy's choosing with one reinforced regiment.

(e) Defend vital installations and important base areas, notably the Do Xap, in up to divisional strength.

(f) Infiltrate additional forces from North Vietnam into southern I Corps and/or introduce enemy forces from the Central Highlands or northern I Corps into the tri-province area.

(g) Attack the Duc Pho area in multi-regimental strength using the 2nd VG Regiment reinforced by the 22nd NVA Regiment from Binh Dinh Province, possibly in conjunction with a secondary attack in northern Quang Ngai Province using elements of the 2nd Division.

(h) Attack the Chu Lai Combat Base with the 2nd Division consisting of three infantry regiments reinforced and assisted by divisional support battalions and adjacent provincial mobile battalions.

(2) For local and guerrilla forces:

(a) To continue to exercise the related capabilities listed in paragraph 5.A.(2) above throughout the three provinces.

C. Vulnerabilities.

(1) The enemy is vulnerable to attack by massed support fires from air, artillery and naval gunfire. Even his deepest base areas and lines of communication are vulnerable to attack by air. When closer to the coast or to friendly positions, any massed formation is subject to detection and subsequent attack by artillery and naval gunfire in addition to air. Being unable to effectively to counter this firepower, the enemy must rely heavily on camouflage and circumspection in his activities in order to minimize this vulnerability.

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(2) The enemy is vulnerable to psychological warfare operations. Life for the Viet Cong is hard at best and filled with deprivation and danger. This constant difficulty and peril, the lack of dedication on the part of the rank and file, as well as some of the cadre, plus the preferred leniency of the Chieu Hoi program, combine to make the enemy unusually susceptible to exploitation by psychological warfare technique.

(3) The enemy is vulnerable to rapid, bold and unexpected maneuvers in the developing tactical situation. His insistence on minutely planned and carefully rehearsed operations precludes a quick and flexible reaction to friendly maneuvers, unless in keeping with his preconceived battle plan.

(4) The enemy is vulnerable to sustained operations and aggressive pursuit. The inherent weakness of the enemy's logistic system and its continuing susceptibility to interdiction by air deny the enemy the capability of supporting sustained combat operations. The enemy's rigidity of tactical doctrine induces him to avoid and/or quickly disengage from contact whenever the tactical situation does not develop according to plan.




S. DAVIS
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ANNEXES:

- A - Order of Battle
- B - Significant Agents, VC PW/Returnees, and Document Reports
- C - Paragraph 13 Entries
- D - Astronomical Data

Distribution: "A" less 7, 12, 17-21, 37-67
"C" less 72, 76, 84, 98, 100

Copy to:	III MAF	(5)
	3rd MarDiv	(2)
	1st MAW	(8)
	2nd ROKMC Bds	(1)
	SA, 2nd ARVN Div	(1)
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	SA, Quang Ngai Sector	(1)
	SA, QNNS Adv Grp, Hoi An	(1)
	FLC	(1)
	MCB 9	(1)
	MCB 10	(1)
	MCB 58	(1)
	CICV	(1)
	7th Engr	(1)



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1st AirCavDiv	(1)
Task Force X-Ray	(50)
9th Marines	(9)
3rd TkBn	(4)
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ANNEX A (ORDER OF BATTLE) TO 1ST FAR DIV PERINTREP NO. 3

NAME	TYPE	CAT	STRENGTH	LOCATION	REPORTING LOCATION/DATE		SUBORDINATION
					EST	ACCEPTED	
<u>QUANG NAM PROVINCE</u>							
3RD NVA REGT	NVA	C	1800	BT 205 161	BT 155 255	25 JAN 67	2D NVA DIV
111 & SPT UNIT	NVA	C	600	BT 205 161	BT 105 255	25 JAN 67	3RD NVA REGT
1st BN	NVA	C	500	BT 255 158	BS 435 794	17 JAN 67	3RD NVA REGT
2nd BN	NVA	C	300	BT 205 161	BT 192 284	27 JAN 67	3RD NVA REGT
3rd BN	NVA	C	400	BT 118 266	BT 118 266	24 SEP 66	3RD NVA REGT
4-20 BN	LF	C	390	AT 985 535	AT 982 553	1 FEB 67	PROVINCE
V-25 BN	LF	C	500	AT 829 483	BT 030 420	7 FEB 67	PROVINCE
402ND SAPPER BN	LF	C	600	ZC 135 250	AT 840 780	7 FEB 67	DAKANG CITY
4-12 CO	LF	C	80	BT 165 544	BT 190 540	7 FEB 67	DISTRICT
4-13 CO	LF	C	60	BT 009 500	BT 070 480	7 FEB 67	DISTRICT
4-14 CO	LF	C	70	AT 79 55	AT 805 550	11 FEB 67	DISTRICT
4-15 CO	LF	C	80	BT 023 635	BT 070 630	7 FEB 67	DISTRICT
4-16 CO	LF	C	80	AT 953 650	AT 953 650	22 NOV 66	DISTRICT
<u>QUANG BIN PROVINCE</u>							
2ND NVA DIVISION	NVA	C	7460	BT 009 224	BT 009 224	1 NOV 66	MR V
53RD ARMY REGT	NVA	PR	1000	UNLOCATED			2ND NVA DIV
4-01 AA BN	NVA	C	400	BT 140 180	BT 024 198	17 NOV 66	53RD ARMY REGT
4-22 RR BN	NVA	C	300	AT 940 020	BT 024 198	17 NOV 66	53RD ARMY REGT

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	ACCEPTED LOCATION	REPORTED LOCATION/DATE	SUBORDINATION	
R4-23 HQ& BN	NVA	C	300	AT 790 230	BT 024 198	17 NOV 66	33RD ARTY REGT
R4-20 SIG BN	NVA	C	300	AT 990 200	AT 995 258	17 JAN 67	2ND NVA DIV
R4-24 ENGR BN	NVA	C	150	AT 790 230	BT 024 198	17 NOV 66	2ND NVA DIV
72ND BN	LF	C	300	BT 380 170	BT 180 253	1 FEB 67	PROVINCE
K-50 CO	LF	C	70	BT 227 446	BT 227 246	23 DEC 66	DISTRICT
K-51 CO	LF	C	70	BT 240 390	BT 242 453	28 JAN 67	DISTRICT
K-52 CO	LF	C	80	BT 160 110	BT 160 110	9 DEC 66	DISTRICT
K-54 CO	LF	C	80	BT 230 220	BT 217 173	2 FEB 67	DISTRICT
K-55 CO	LF	C	60	BT 330 150	BT 330 150	1 JUN 66	DISTRICT
706TH CO	LF	C	100	BT 370 100	BS 430 248	27 JAN 67	PROVINCE
74TH CO	LF	C	60	BT 280 100	BT 185 248	27 JAN 67	PROVINCE
14TH CO	LF	C	70	BT 810 119	BT 354 138	31 JAN 67	DISTRICT

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

1ST VC REGT (2ND DIV)	MF	C	2140	BS 365 727	BS 295 515	1 FEB 67	2ND NVA DIV
HQ & SPT UNIT	MF	C	800	BS 365 727	BS 290 520	20 JAN 67	1ST REGT
40TH BN	MF	C	500	BS 555 812	BS 545 801	27 JAN 67	1ST REGT
60TH BN	MF	C	280	BS 555 812	BS 335 520	1 FEB 67	1ST REGT
70TH BN	MF	C	300	BS 450 860	BS 508 805	27 JAN 67	1ST REGT
90TH BN	MF	C	500	BS 405 800	BS 545 801	27 JAN 67	1ST REGT

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	ACCEPTED LOCATION	REP	ED LOCATION/DATE	SUBORDINATION
21ST NVA REGT (2ND DIV)	NVA	C	2,000	BS 350 830	BS 440 815	2FEB67	2ND NVA DIV
HQ & SPT UNIT	NVA	C	200	BS 350 830	BS 502 825	3FEB67	21ST REGT
1ST BN	NVA	C	600	BS 420 760	BS 345 860	15JAN67	21ST REGT
2ND BN	NVA	C	600	BS 420 760	BS 560 820	1FEB67	21ST REGT
3RD BN	NVA	C	600	BS 370 810	BS 449 914	1FEB67	21ST REGT
2ND VC REGT (3RD DIV)	MF	C	2,000	BS 655 315	BS 655 315	28DEC66	3RD NVA DIV
HQ & SPT UNIT	MF	C	500	BS 650 310	BS 650 310	28DEC66	2ND REGT
93RD BN	MF	C	500	BS 640 310	BS 640 310	28DEC66	2ND REGT
95TH BN	MF	C	500	BS 650 320	BS 650 320	28DEC66	2ND REGT
97TH BN	MF	C	500	BS 660 310	BS 660 310	28DEC66	2ND REGT
20TH BN	LF	C	400	BS 280 640	BS 401 759	21JAN67	MR V
409TH SAPPER BN	LF	C	400	BS 640 360	BT 212 236	1FEB67	MR V
1506TH ENGR BN	MF	C	325	BS 340 780	BS 212 652	4JAN67	MR V
38TH BN	LF	C	400	BS 640 565	BS 670 570	2FEB67	PROVINCE
48TH BN	LF	C	400	BS 780 500	BS 620 540	1FEB67	PROVINCE
307TH BN	LF	PO	400	BS 540 640	BS 920 260	30JAN67	PROVINCE
T-19 CO	LF	C	80	BS 500 880	BS 495 895	2FEB67	DISTRICT
T-20 CO	LF	C	100	BS 540 830	BS 530 810	10JAN67	DISTRICT
8TH CO	LF	C	80	BS 690 585	BS 712 428	8JAN67	DISTRICT
C-17 CO	LF	C	70	BS 740 570	BS 735 485	27JAN67	DISTRICT

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UNIT	TYPE	CAT	EST STRENGTH	ACCEPTED LOCATION	REPORTED LOCATION/DATE	SUBORDINATION	
206TH CO	LF	C	100	BS 735 780	BS 750 637	24JAN67	DISTRICT
C-212 CO	LF	C	80	BS 590 330	BS 590 330	14NOV66	DISTRICT
C-219 CO	LF	C	80	BS 795 415	BS 800 415	27JAN67	DISTRICT
614TH CO	LF	C	80	BS 842 420	BS 736 787	9JAN67	DISTRICT
T-18 CO	LF	C	80	BS 635 780	BS 715 825	18JAN67	DISTRICT
96TH CO	LF	C	100	BS 500 492	BS 500 492	29NOV66	DISTRICT

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS	ID EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
3RD NVA REGT	64TH REGT; BAC HA; WORKSITE-3; FACTORY 10; 31ST REGT; 46TH REGT; 51ST REGT; 323RD REGT (?)				CO - LTCOL VIET SON XO - MAJ TRANH ANH KIEN PO - TRUNG THANH
1ST BN	X1; CT3; BINH MINH	20825			CO - CAPT THAO
2ND BN	BINH DA; X2				CO - CAPT THAU
3RD BN	BINH THIEN; MAO CHU; NGUYEN TRAI		5-82MM MORT 6-60MM MORT		CO - NGUYEN TIEP
R-20 BN	QUANG NAM INDP BN; DOC LAP BN; HAI CANG 20		1-81MM MORT 1-60MM MORT 1-57mm RR 2-MG 54-AR		CO - NGUYEN VAN LAM
V-25 BN	LAM BN; 5TH BN		1-81MM MORT 2-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR		CO - QUANG LAM (AKA LUG) XO - THEU PO - TOAN
402ND SAPPER BN	T-89TH SPECIAL ENGR BN 21395 GM DONG HAI		3-81MM MORT 1-120MM MORT		CO - NGUYEN VAN TRAN XO - SRLT THANH
Q-12 CO	X-62 CO; HOI AN CO	2102	1-60MM MORT 2- SMG		CO - LE HIEN XO - NGUYEN NGOC
Q-13 CO	DUY XUYEN CO; H-52; TAN LAP CO; 103RD CO		1-60MM MORT 1-30CAL MG 2-AR		CO - TRAN VAN CAM XO - NGUYEN CHI THIEN PO - VO CA SON
Q-14 CO	DAI LOC CO; H-42 CO		1-60MM MORT 1-30CAL MG 4-M 79		CO - LE THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	AIRMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
Q-15 CO	DIEN BAN CO; H-40; H-35; H-55; 104TH; Q-15B; X-65	2105	2-60MM MORT 1-81MM MORT 1-57MM RR 3-LMG	CO - NGUYEN HY XO - TRAN TU PO - NGUYEN BA
Q-16 CO	HOA VANG CO; H-41; HOA HIEU CO; H-56; 100 CO; Q-16B	2106	2-60MM MORT 1-81MM MORT 1-LMG 6-AR	CO - NGUYEN DOA XO - NGUYEN NHUONG

QUANG TIN PROVINCE

2ND DIV (HQ)	HAM TU 2; 620TH DIV: AGRICULTURAL SITE #2; CHI LANG	20,601GM 20,925GM TAY AN	CG - BG VIET XO - BG DAO. PO - BG DO.
33RD ARTY REGT (HQ) RQ-21 BN (AA)	195AA BN; 519AA BN; 38AA BN; XUONG 111; 19th BN	18-12.7MM MG	CO - CAPT NGUYEN VAN TUYEN XO - TRAN VAN QUANG
RQ-22 BN	GK-32	12-75MM RR	
RQ-23 BN	RQ-33 BN; RQ 330 BN; 7th BN; GK-33	6-120MM MORT	CO - NGUYEN VAN HUYEN
RQ-20 BN (SIG)	RQ-20/A BN; GK-30; RQ-20/B BN; HAM TU 2/C	1803/CH HAI CANG 20	
RQ-24 BN (ENGR)	GK-40		CO - NGUYEN NGOC DONG
72ND BN	H-65; H-68	21,443GM BA HANH	CO - TRANH CAN CAO XO - DANH. PO - THANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
K-50 CO	QUE SON CO; 105 UNIT; A-7		1-60MM MORT 1-AA MG 1-57MM RR 2-30CAL MG	CO - NGUYEN THANH TUNG
K-51 CO	A-10; 107; F-14; D-21; THANG BINH		2-60MM MORT 1-57MM MORT 5-MG	CO - KHOA XO - NGUYEN THAN PO - ANH VU
K-52 CO	A-13 CO; D-22; V-13		1-60MM MORT 2-57MM MORT 2-SMG	CO - NGO XO - KHANH PO - VAN
K-54 CO	A-16; C-73; V-12 N. TAM KY		1-60MM MORT 2-57MM RR 2-MG	CO - CONG XO - TOAN PO - TICH
K-55 CO	A-21; C-75; V-15; PHI PO A-21 BN; FLYING TIGER A-21		1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-LMG	CO - NGUYEN LIEN
706TH CO	106TH;	2440GM BA HANH	1-60MM MORT 1-AA MG 2-30 CAL MG	CO - NGUYEN DUY NGHIA XO - HOANH PO - QUANG
74th Co	V-74; V-20; 74th DIST FORCE CO		1-60MM MORT 1-30CAL MG 1-57MM RR (?)	CO - THANH XO - TRAN TIEN PO - PHUONG
14th Co	K-53; A-19; V-14		1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1-HMG	CO - PHAM CONG XO - HA DONG PO - KHANH

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UNIT	AKA	LBM	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
<u>QUANG NGAI PROVINCE</u>				
1st VC REGT (HQ)	CONG TRUONG 1; PS/40; 108th REGT; H-800			CO - COL CHAN KHOI DICH XO - LTCOL CHU AN TAN
40th Bn	THANH MAI; 3RD BN; BACH DONG BN; PHI DOI 2007	5645	4-60MM MORT 2-81MM MORT 3-HMG 6-LMG	CO - LUAN XO - PHAM THANH PO - DUY DUO TUNG
60th Bn	THANH HA; T-112; 1STBN; AP BAC; 2006 PHONG HAI		3-60MM MORT 4-57MM RR 3-81MM MORT 4-MG	CO - SRCAPT LE LOUNG XO - HOANG XUAN VINH PO - LICH
70TH BN	35TH BN; PHI DOI 2009; CHU SONG; TROUNG SON 70; F-07; INTER-MT WHITE TIGER BN; 103		3-81MM MORT 4-60MM MORT 5-MG 4-57MM RR	CO - NGUYEN DUC CONG XO - SRCAPT THUA PO - DUAN CONG THANH
90th	THANH TRUC; XUYEN SON; 51ST BN; 33RD BN; PHI DOI 2008		2-60MM MORT 2-81MM MORT 1-57MM RR 3-30CAL MG	CO - LE TRUOC DO XO - PHONG PO - NGO DANH TAN
21ST REGT (HQ)	BACH MA; WORKSITE 21; 36TH; A-21; CONG TRUONG 21; 2ND REGT; 36TH REGT; CONG TRUONG 7 (?)		17-81MM MORT UNK-75MM RR UNK-60MM MORT	CO - PHAM KIET XO - DANG CONG KIEH PO - TIEN
1ST BN	11TH WORKSHOP; 11TH BN; AN CHAU		6-60MM MORT 6-81MM MORT 3-MG	CO - TINH XO - NA PO - KHOI

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS & AD EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
2ND BN	135TH BN; 22ND BN; LONG THANH		3-60MM MORT 2-81MM MORT 3-57MM RR 1-75MM RR	CO - LA XO - QAN PO - THA
3RD BN	33RD BN; 75TH BN (?) LONG THANH		3-60MM MORT 5-81MM MORT 4-57MM RR 4-30 CAL MG	CO - DANG HUNG PO - NGUYEN CO
20TH BN	Q-20; X-20; T-20; 120TH BN	20.135GM 20.139GM BAC HIEN	3-60MM MORT 3-81MM MORT 3-57MM RR 4-30 CAL MG	CO - CAPT DINH QUYEN XO - DINH PHO NIA
409TH SAPPER BN	CONG TY; D-68; X-409; BACH SON WORKSITE; X-20	20.141GM 20.144GM BAC HIEN	3-81MM MORT 7-60MM MORT 3-57MM RR 7-30 CAL MG	CO - NGUYEN TAM XO - NGUYEN XUAN BINH PO - QUYET
38TH BN	CONG TY 38; 803RD BN; 83RD BN; THI XA 38	2048; NQ BA HAO	2-60MM MORT 2-81MM MORT 3-57MM RR 5-30 CAL MG	CO - MAI KIM PO - MAI BEN
46TH BN	408TH BN; 84TH BN; CONG TY 84; SONG BA; NGHIEP DOAN 4; CONG TY 48	HT 2416; BA BAO	2-81MM MORT 2-57MM RR 3-60MM MORT 3 MG	CO - CAPT KY XO - CAPT TRINH PO - SRCAPT DU
1506TH ENGR BN	506TH BN (?); 571 UNIT	1289		CO - NGUYEN HUY KINH XO - SRIT DAO PO - SRIT THANH
T-19 CO	P.31 CO; C-10TH CO		1-60MM MORT 1-30 CAL MG	CO - LONG XO - MINH PO - NINH

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UNIT	AKA	LBN	ARMS AND EQUIPMENT	PERSONALITIES
T-20 CO	C-20 CO; SON TINH DONG CO		2-60MM MORT 1-81MM MORT 5 MG	CO - TRAN
8TH CO	TRA BONG CO; P-8 CO			CO - DINH HUY
C-17 CO	MO DUC CO; C-217 CO		1-60MM MORT 1-57MM RR 1 LMG	CO - NGUYEN DIEP
206TH CO	TU NGHIA CO; 75TH CO		5 AR 8 SMG	CO - TIEN XO - SUNG PO - MIEU
C-212 CO	BA TO CO			CO - THIN
C-219 CO	DUC PHO CO; POSS C-19		1-60MM MORT 2 MG 4 AR	CO - MAU
614TH CO	SON HA CO		1-57MM RR 4-30 CAL MG	CO - DIEN MIEU XO - NHANH PO - CHANH
T-18 CO	SON TINH DONG (WEST)		1-60MM MORT 2-30 CAL MG	CO - PHAM TRAN
96TH CO	MINH LONG CO		1-81MM MORT 2-30 CAL MG	CO - LU TRI

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENTS, VC PW/RETURNEES, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO 1ST MARDIV
PERINTREP NO. 3

I. INTERROGATION REPORT OF VC RETURNEE LE VAN LUM

AGE: 19

UNIT: 1st Squad, 5th Platoon, 5th Company, 60th Battalion, 1st Regiment

CIRCUMSTANCE: Rallied with 2 grenades to Quang Ngai Chieu Hoi Center

INFORMATION OBTAINED

A. Strength and Composition of the 1st VC Regiment

40th Infantry Battalion

70th Infantry Battalion

90th Infantry Battalion

60th Infantry Battalion

1st Infantry Co, strength - 90

2nd Infantry Co, strength - 90

3rd Infantry Co, strength - 90

4th Combat Support Co, strength - 50

5th Support and Headquarters Co, strength - 95

1st Transportation Platoon, strength - 30

2nd Signal Platoon, strength - 30

3rd Reconnaissance Platoon

4th Medical Platoon, strength - 1 doctor, 7 nurses

5th Rear Headquarters Platoon (Battalion Staff)

U/I Anti-Aircraft Battery

B. Weapons and Equipment

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1-30cal MG with 500 rounds	(each infantry co of the 60th Bn)
1-60mm mortar with 1-15 rounds	-do-
1-B-40 RL with 10 rounds	-do-
1-M-79 Grenade Launcher with 8-10 rounds	-do-
5-BAR's, 200 rounds per weapon	-do-
Unknown number assorted individual weapons	-do-
2-12.8 and 2-12.7 AA MG's	U/I AA Battery
1-82mm mortar	4th Company, 60th Battalion
1-DK-57 (57mm RR)	-do-
5-Field Phones	2nd Signal Platoon, 5th Co, 60th Bn
4-PRC-10 Radios	-do-
1-15-watt generator	-do-

C. Replacements: At present, 40% of the members of the 60th Battalion are North Vietnamese. Most replacements due to losses and desertions have been North Vietnamese. The last group to arrive was a 100 men group in January 1967. These men were all armed with either AK's or CCK's. Approximately 20 of these replacements had malaria so serious upon arrival, that they couldn't work and required immediate medical attention. These 100 North Vietnamese stated they were bombed on their trek south, but without effect.

D. Locations: Prior to the helicopter overflight, the returnee map-tracked his Battalion CP as located in vicinity BS 335520. However during the overflight, the returnee immediately pointed out the area as vicinity BS 338533. During repeated flights over the area at different angles, he repeatedly pointed out the latter location. This was the Battalion CP position as of 31 January 1967, the date of his defection. From conversations with his friends prior to his defection, he believes all the Battalions of the Regiment are surrounding the Regimental CP. Prior to the overflight, the 1st Regimental CP was map-tracked to the vicinity of BS 290530. During the first fly-over and on repeated fly overs, the returnee consistently pointed out a draw which is bordered by the coordinates BS 304552 to BS 300540 to BS 308533. He appeared very definite of this location.

E. Relationship and Morale: Low because of the lack of quinine for those ill with malaria. In the VC controlled areas, dissension persists as a result of the VC inability to quell the shellings and bombings. Too, the presence of VC in their villages is often followed by bombs and artillery. The people have asked the defector, "What is the use of feeding you, if you can't defeat the enemy? You are only capable of drawing bombs". At command level, the relationship between VC Main Force and local guerrillas are extremely cordial. On the individual level, there are bad feelings and often hatred.

F. Past Activities: Returnee stated that during an operation late November 1966 against the Korean Marine Corps, the 60th Battalion suffered approximately 100 casualties as a result of bombing and artillery shelling at Son Mot (V) (location unknown).

G. Personalities of the 60th Battalion

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Phung, about 50, Battalion C.O.
 Lich, about 40, Political Cadre
 Bui Ngoc Bac, about 40, Assistant C.O.
 Nguyen Ngoc Nhuan, about 30, Assistant Political Cadre
 Nhien, about 40, 1st Company C.O.
 Suyet, about 30, 2nd Company C.O.
 Kiet, about 45, 3rd Company C.O.
 Thuat, about 40, 4th Company C.O.
 Tau, about 30, 5th Company acting C.O. in actuality the Battalion Political Officer

H. Other Information Obtained: The Provincial Hospital may be reached from the 1st Regiment Headquarters by following a trail which changes direction often under thick jungle canopy. During the overflight, the returnee couldn't point out the location but pointed to an area approximately 10 miles north of the 1st Regiment CP. He further stated that the hospital consists of 15-20 well camouflaged buildings, presently housing 500-600 wounded and staffed by a 20 man team of medical personnel.

II. INTERROGATION REPORT OF RETURNEE DAO XUAN HOA

AGE: 22

UNIT: 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon, 8th Company, 7th Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 320th Division

CIRCUMSTANCES: Rallied to government at Thang Binh (D) Headquarters on 052000H February 1967 with a CKC

INFORMATION OBTAINED

Hoa was drafted into the NVA on 15 September 1965 at Luong Son (D), NVN. Hoa reported to a "recruit school" in Dinh (H), Luong Son (D) for 2 months of infantry training. In December of 1965, Hoa joined an infantry company in the newly formed 700th Battalion at Luong Son (D). Hoa claimed that this Battalion was a sniper battalion, and during the month that he spent with the battalion he learned how to fire a Soviet 7.62mm rifle M1891/30 equipped with a sniper scope. At the end of January 1966, Hoa was transferred to the 8th Company, 74th Battalion, 3rd Regiment which was then located in Hoa Binh (P). In February of 1966 the entire 3rd Regiment began rotating to SVN. The Regiment was divided into 3 major groups (line battalions plus regimental support companies).

Group Designator

K-1
 K-2
 K-3

Unit

64th (AKA 1st) Battalion
 74th (AKA 2nd) Battalion
 84th (AKA 3rd) Battalion

In addition the following companies were dispersed somewhere in these three groups for rotation purposes:

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Regimental Headquarters

13
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
3/5

"94"
 Recon Company
 Supply & Transport Company
 75mm RR Company
 82mm Mortar Battery
 Comm Company
 Regimental Reserve Company
 Medical Company
 Regimental Security Company
 Regimental Staff Group (AKA "Bac Ha" in NVN)

The groups left at 5 day intervals from Thanh Hoa (P). They travelled through Laos and the trip took 3 months. Through Laos the groups travelled on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But when they reached CVN they marched on the sides of the highways.

On the trip south, Hoa took 4 uniforms, 1 hammock, 1 mosquito net, 1 blanket, 1 can of fish, 1 kilogram of salt and $\frac{1}{2}$ kilogram of sugar. While on the way south, the groups passed 51 "stations", 20 in NVN, 23 in Laos and 8 in CVN. From Thanh Hoa (P) to the 20th station the men ate food supplied by the station. From Laos to CVN they ate food which they carried with them.

Enroute 8 men died from sickness and 300 (500 men in each group) men were seriously ill. Hoa stated that many men deserted but he doesn't know the exact number.

In May of 1966, the 3rd Regiment reached "Quang Da" (an area between Quang Ngai and Danang). The regiment rested and trained for 1 month in Quang Da and then moved to Tien Phuoc (D) for 2 weeks and then to Que Son (D) for 1 month. They engaged with Arvn troops and lost 30 KIA's and 32 weapons.

Hoa stated that during June or July of 1966 the Allies engaged the 18th Company (Comm Company) at Son Thach (V), Que Son (D). The 18th Company lost 2 radios in this engagement (1-12 watt and 1-15 watt).

After the above mentioned engagement the regiment moved back to Hiep Duc (D) and remained there for 2 months. While in Hiep Duc (D) the regiment had from 30 percent to 50 percent of the men ill with malaria.

In September to October 1966, the entire regiment engaged ARVN troops at the battle of "Nong Son" in Hiep Duc (D). The 3rd Regiment suffered 150 KIA's and 250 WIA's. Hoa didn't know if Americans fought at this battle or not. Hoa said that the regiment took some Arvn prisoners but he didn't know how many or what happened to them.

After the battle of "Nong Son" the regiment roamed all over Que Son (D) and in October of 1966 reached Binh Kieu #1 (H) vicinity at (854237).

From October of 1966 until Hoa left his battalion on 18 January 1967 the 74th Battalion was located in Binh Dinh (V), vicinity (BT 115347).

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In January of 1967 the 7th Company, 74th Battalion fought ARVN troops at a bridge near Thang Binh city, casualties unknown.

Also in January of 1967 the 5th Company and 1 platoon from the 8th Company, 74th Battalion attacked Tuan Duong (G), Phu Qui (V). They shelled the hamlet with 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, but suffered 1 KIA and 2 MIA's.

Hoa stated that sometime prior to TET and during the TET festival, VC forces are planning to attack an area where Americans, Aircraft and "chemical workers" are concentrated. Although he doesn't know the location of this area he guesses that it will be Viet An Op vicinity (BT 022 279) and the charcoal mine adjacent to Viet An. The 16th Company (with 4 - 75mm rifles), the 8th Company with (2) 82mm mortars are the support units from the 320th Division. Hoa claimed that this attack will be primarily by local and Province force VC. The entire attack is to be planned and coordinated by local forces.

The elements of the 320th Division as stated before are to act as support and "back-up" forces.

The only details Hoa knew of supply was that his battalion was supplied by province forces. By supply, Hoa meant shortage of ammo after a battle.

He stated that moral in his battalion is low because the men are tired and afraid. Thirty percent of the men in Hoa's battalion have malaria but remain on duty.

Hoa was equivalent of a PFC (Mortar Ammo-Bearer) in the 8th Company, 74th Battalion.

In the 3rd Regiment (AKA 32nd) there are 3 infantry battalions (64th, 74th, 84th). There are 4 companies in each battalion, 3 of which are infantry, with 1 weapons company.

The 8th Company, of which Hoa is a member, is the weapons Company in the 74th Battalion. There are presently 60-70 men in the 8th Company. The 8th Company has (4) 82mm mortars, (4) 75mm RR's and (4) ChiCom MG's.

Hoa defected because his family is rich and therefore had trouble with VC policy. He found that the VC cheated the people, and also he had a relative who moved to SVN in 1954 and liked it.

Hoa stated that propaganda leaflets are very effective, understood by the men and for the most part believed.

A leaflet from Le Xuan Chuyen a VC LtCol from the 5th VC Regiment affected Hoa the most. The leaflets had a positive influence on Hoa helping him decide to defect. Many other men heard and believed these leaflets or broadcasts but as yet haven't had a chance to defect.

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Hoa stated that the most effective line for the allies to use in preparing leaflets is:

1. Hardships under the VC
2. Bright future and happiness if and when they return to the government

PERSONALITIES:

Viет Son,- about 45, Regimental CO NVN

Toan,- about 45, XO NVN

Luoc,- about 40, Political XO NVN

Thanh,- about 40, 74th Battalion CO NVN

Nhu,- about 40, 74th Battalion XO NVN

Ho,- about 38, 8th Company CO NVN

Thi,- about 38, 8th Company XO NVN

Thuoc,- about 38, Company Political CO (SVN - trained in NVN)

Luong,- about 30, 3rd Platoon, 8th Company NVN

Thi,- about 25, 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon, 8th Company

INTERROGATOR'S COMMENT:

This man is most cooperative & helpful

DISPOSITION:

None

Date & time interrogation completed: 081145H February 1967

G-2 Comment: F/3 - on location of 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, Nong Son attack and past history of the Regiment. All personalities corroborate previous reports by defectors. The designations 64, 74, & 84, for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions are new. The 3rd Regiment was the 64th Regiment in SVN. 32nd as an AKA is new. An Hoa complex is the possible location for planned attack.

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 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
 DOD DIR 5200.10

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ANNEX C (PARAGRAPH 13 ENTRIES) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO. 3

1. Total cases of Vietnamese Nationals volunteering information to U.S. Forces are as follows.

1st Marines.....2

1/1.....1

2/1.....1

5th Marines.....5

Hq.....3

1/5.....2

7th Marines.....3

2/7.....2

1/7.....1

9th Marines.....7

Hq.....1

2/4.....2

1/26.....3

2/26.....1

7th Comm Bn.....1

TOTAL: 18

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

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ANNEX D (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO. 3

<u>DATE</u>	<u>BMCT</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>EECT</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>	<u>MOONPHASE</u>	<u>%ILLUM</u>
FEB 14	0650	0713	1850	1913	1010	2243		18
15	0650	0713	1850	1913	1043	2330		26
16	0649	0712	1850	1913	1119	---		34
17	0648	0711	1850	1913	1157	0019	FIRST	44
18	0648	0711	1851	1914	1240	0111		53
19	0648	0711	1851	1914	1328	0206		63
20	0647	0710	1852	1915	1422	0303		73
21	0647	0710	1852	1915	1522	0402		82
22	0646	0709	1853	1916	1625	0500		90
23	0646	0709	1853	1916	1730	0545		95
24	0645	0708	1853	1916	1834	0646		99
25	0644	0707	1854	1917	1936	0733	FULL	100
26	0643	0706	1854	1917	2037	0818		98
27	0643	0706	1854	1917	2137	0901		92
28	0642	0705	1854	1917	2237	0944		85
MAR 1	0642	0705	1855	1918	2337	1028		76
2	0641	0704	1855	1918	---	1114		65
3	0641	0704	1855	1918	0038	1204	LAST	54
4	0640	0703	1855	1918	0139	1257		43
5	0639	0702	1855	1918	0237	1353		33

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1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF



PERINTREP 4-67

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PERINTREP NO. 4-67

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TAB B

1 MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF
DA NANG, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
081200H March 1967

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PERINTREP 4-67

Period Covered: 141200H February 1967 to 011200H March 1967

Ref: (a) Maps Vietnam AMS series L701 and L7014.

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

A. Adjacent Areas

(1) In Operation Pushing in northeastern Binh Dinh province, the 1st Air Cavalry have contacted elements of the 22nd NVA Regiment in the area of Tam Quan (BS 9015). Contacts have been small-scale and isolated generally, giving evidence of the enemy's desire to evade significant contact with friendly forces.

B. First Marine Division's Zone of Responsibility

(1) Quang Nam Province. Attacks by fire characterized the latter part of February in Quang Nam province. There were four mortar attacks at various points; however, these were over-shadowed by the use of 140mm rockets against the Da Nang airfield early on the morning of the 27th. On the night of the 14th and 15th, the Thanh Quit bridge (BT 041620) on Route #1 received light mortar fire without result. An enemy force of unknown size that attacked by fire the 2/4 field CP (AT 947536) on Operation Stone on 16 February utilized 60mm mortars. On the early morning of the 18th, the provincial capital at Hoi An and some surrounding installations came under mortar attack. The same occurred on the night of the 25th and 26th at An Hoi (AT 875475) when the battalion CP, the airfield and Duc Duc district headquarters received approximately 40 rounds of 81/82mm mortar rounds. As yet, there is no apparent relation between the mortar attacks and the rocket attack on Da Nang airfield. The firing positions for the rockets (AT 9669) were some eight kilometers distant from the center of impact. The attack confirms reports received last summer from at least two defectors concerning a new type of ground-to-ground rocket that was being brought into country. The defectors reported the purpose to be the attack by fire of Da Nang and Chu Lai. The attacking element is estimated to have been a rocket battalion, probably subordinate directly to MR-V, which was guided and assisted in accomplishing the task by local force elements. The effort implied by the survey required for the tolerable accuracy of the fire, by the number of firing positions and presumed rocket launchers and by the size of the projectile and launcher indicates meticulous preparation for the attack.

Phase II of Operation Stone concluded during the latter part of the month. Phase II proved to be more successful than Phase I when it crossed the river to the north and trapped an estimated one hundred or more enemy in the area of (AT 9959). For five days the cordon was constricted against increasingly feeble enemy resistance. Most of the kills and captives were obtained in flushing out tunnels and underground shelters or among those attempting to exfiltrate usually by stealth. Among the number of captives and defectors was one from the R.20th Battalion who stated that the remaining 150 men in the battalion had left Go Noi island during Phase I and retired to the area in which they were surprised and encircled by Phase II.

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At the time of the man's defection he stated that half of these 150 were casualties and that the remainder had been told to disperse. He also reported the Q.15 Company was with the R.20th within the cordon and that it was nearly annihilated. The man reported that the battalion commander and two company commanders had been killed in the recent reverses suffered by the R/20th in Operations Tuscaloosa, Independence and Stone. As a result of these losses, the R.20th is considered at best marginally combat effective and in need of one to two months to replace losses and to train replacements.

An almost successful attempt to blow the key bridge across the Song Cau Do on Route #1 just south of Da Nang was foiled when the charges attached to the pilings were discovered and disarmed.

The 3rd NVA Regiment appears still to be in the area south of the Da Nang TAOR. On the 17th, a reconnaissance patrol (AT 935325) ambushed a small group of enemy and found on one of the bodies documents identifying the man as an assistant squad leader in the 1st Battalion of the 3rd NVA Regiment.

Activity around Nui Lac Son continues without appreciable change. Fifteen to twenty rounds of 81/82mm mortar fire were received by a patrol on the 22nd to the west of the base camp (AT 985280).

(2) Quang Tin Province. Enemy activity in this province continues at a very low level. Two light mortar attacks on the 20th constitute the only major enemy actions. Those two attacks were against the Ky Tra outpost (BT 3109) and an ARVN platoon on patrol west of Tam Ky (BT 2418). In both instances 60mm mortars were used indicating action by local force companies. Within the TAOR, harassment in the northern sector concentrated in the vicinity of the artillery positions adjacent to the CP of the 5th Marines. The 3rd NVA Regiment is believed to be located in the Thang Binh-Que Son plain. A defector from the staff of the 2nd Division reports that an alternate or rear headquarters exists in Quang Tin along with the 3rd Regiment.

(3) Quang Ngai Province. Son Tinh district was the scene of some heavy engagements between the enemy's 2nd Division and various allied forces during the latter half of February. The enemy initiated the series of contacts in the early morning hours of 15 February with a multi-battalion attack by the 1st VC Regiment against a ROKMC company position. Several other attacks in the vicinity appear to have been diversionary attacks conducted either by other elements of the 2nd Division or local forces.

In the Quang Ngai city area, the airfield and 2nd ARVN Division headquarters were subject to mortar attacks a few hours before the assault on the ROK positions. At approximately the same time as the attack against the ROK's, two outposts in the vicinity of Quang Ngai (BS 693796 and BS 5876) also came under attack. For the following two nights, the 175mm guns and ROK artillery position (BS 6258) came under mortar attack in which the enemy used, without serious consequence, several 120mm mortars. Operation Rio Grande commenced soon thereafter with USMC, ROKMC and ARVN forces involved. The ARVN were the only force to make solid contact with main force troops. On the 19th, an ARVN airborne battalion was attacked by an

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emy force of unknown size. The attack drew three battalions in reaction and heavy contact ensued with what was determined to be two battalions of the 21st NVA Regiment. Again the enemy suffered heavy casualties as the ARVN inflicted from 500 to 800 kills. Enemy initiatives and activities have abated noticeably since the conclusion of Operation Rio Grande/Giant Dragon/Lien Ket 81 and the 2nd Division, with four of its seven infantry battalions is thought in Quang Ngai and believed marginally combat effective, to have repaired to the hills for a respite. One of the areas to which some elements of the 2nd Division may have gone is the middle Song Ve valley as evidenced by the unusual enemy activity observed near (BS 6556 6557) a reconnaissance patrol on the 25th. A large number of VC were sighted and subsequent airstrikes not only brought in forty kills but drew heavy ground fire and produced eighteen secondary explosions.

The enemy response to the Marine offensive in the Duc Pho area continues to be characterized by dogged guerrilla and local force resistance in the lowlands and by suspected main force involvement with reconnaissance patrols on the mountainous fringes. Large sightings and appreciable contacts were made at a number of points in an arc extending from (BS 8428) in the south to (BS 7238) in the north. One patrol in the southern part of the arc reported that their contact was with NVA troops. The 22nd NVA Regiment is believed to be on the other side of the mountains in Binh Dinh province and elements of that regiment, conceivably evading Operation Pershing, may have been contacted by this patrol. The 2nd VC and 22nd NVA Regiments of the 3rd Division are carried in the area generally west and south of Duc Pho and they are probably the force behind the persistent opposition to Marine reconnaissance in this area. The reason for such persistence is not presently known. It is to be noted that main force units will frequently ignore recon patrols probably in order not to draw undue attention to their own location. The now month-old pattern of activity in response to reconnaissance efforts indicates uncommon sensitivity to our presence in the mountains.

Guerrilla and local force resistance in the coastal lowlands of Duc Pho continues to be heaviest to the north generally along the trace of the Song Tra Cau. Enemy resistance has spread apace with the friendly extension of operations across the highway and to the south in the vicinity of Sa Huynh with Operation Deckhouse VI. There continue to be no indications of main force presence in the lowlands.

Elsewhere in the province, a CIDG patrol out of Gia Vuc made contact with an estimated enemy platoon (BS 3634) on the 19th. This area is generally noted for an absence of enemy activity. The contact may represent more enemy forces in the area north of Gia Vuc than has been true of the past.

Enemy resistance in the southern side of the Chu Lai TAOR continued without significant incident.

C. General Enemy Situation

Enemy initiatives within the past month indicate that the enemy is increasing his main force activity. The attack against the ROKMC position is the first attack of any significance conducted by the 2nd Division since the attack on the

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Nong Son outposts in mid-October conducted by the 3rd NVA Regiment. The attack on the ROK's is unique in the determination evidenced by the attacking force and the relatively hard nature of the target. With the exception of that one infantry assault, the increase in main force activity has been chiefly evidenced in attacks by fire. Again in the ROK area, the 2nd Division's 120mm mortars were used for the first time since January, 1966; and in Da Nang, 140mm rockets were used for the first time ever in the Vietnamese conflict. The type and quantity of fire received in the mortar attacks on An Hoa and Hoi An indicate main force involvement in these actions as well. Attacks by fire have been employed regularly in the past as a means of harassing friendly bases and installations and as a means of inflicting some damage to those bases and installations with attendant psychological results. In the present situation in which there are strong indications that the enemy lacks the manpower to conduct mobile warfare, and is therefore in a position of increasing his reliance upon guerrilla warfare in order to preserve and to increase his main forces, attacks by fire constitute a reasonable economy of force move.

The enemy's ultimate intent in Quang Ngai province has yet to be revealed. Only two of the four regiments in or immediately adjacent to the province have made attempts at engaging friendly forces. As a result of those attempts on the part of the 1st VC and 21st NVA Regiments in northern Quang Ngai, four of the seven infantry battalions in the 2nd Division are considered marginally combat effective. These losses have hurt the enemy, but it does not as yet appear that his plans for a possible campaign in this province have been either revealed or thwarted by recent encounters, if such a plan does in fact exist. For the time being, the 2nd Division has evaded further contact; while the 3rd Division has yet to make a move, other than countering Marine reconnaissance efforts around Duc Pho.

One of the requisite preconditions for a proposed campaign in Quang Ngai province would be some degree of coordination between the 2nd and 3rd Divisions. Indications of coordination between the divisions in the northern and southern parts of the province have been signally lacking to date. The 2nd Division's major initiative to date, the ROKMC attack, was undertaken without the benefit of diversionary attacks conducted by the 3rd Division to the south or by the 409th Sapper Battalion. Such diversionary moves as were accomplished comprised only some mortar incidents around Quang Ngai city and the attack of some ARVN/HF/PF positions between the ROK area and Quang Ngai city. In this particular instance, a coordinated sapper/mortar attack against the Chu Lai airfield or another major initiative against Duc Pho or one of the CIDG camps would at least have lessened the air support which proved devastating to the attackers. The planned attack against Chu Lai and Ba To, reported by a defector from the 409th Sapper Battalion, and which did not take place when indicated by the ralier, prior to TET, may also have been called due to problems of coordination between forces in the north and the south of the province will require correction before the joint campaign by the 2nd and 3rd Divisions reported by some can be undertaken against the CIDG camps, Duc Pho or elsewhere.

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No significant intelligence concerning the general situation of local and guerrilla forces in the tri-province area was developed during the latter part of the month. The previously noted reemphasis of local force and guerrilla activity with a corresponding diversion of a greater proportion of resources, chiefly ammunition and personnel, to these forces continues. The local force and guerrilla structure would appear to be in critical condition in Quang Nam province; however, in view of the amazing resilience demonstrated by these same forces over at least the past year, it would be premature to make any predictions of their imminent demise.

2. ENEMY OPERATION DURING THE PERIOD

A. Strength and Disposition

(1) See Annex A, Order of Battle, to 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF PERINTREP NO. 3-67.

(2) The following information on the R-20 Battalion and 4-15 Company was revealed by Bui Duc Huan, cook/soldier of the R-20 Battalion, who surrendered to C/1/1 vicinity (AT 983594) on 21 February 1967 during Operation Stone.

(a) Huan states that prior to the commencement of Operation Stone he was receiving recruit training with the 3rd Company, R-20 Battalion on Go Noi Island. At this time he placed the battalion strength at approximately 300 men. During Phase 1 of the operation, he states that the battalion suffered 100 KIA and 35 WIA, among these were the battalion commander and the companies of the 1st and 2nd Companies. The battalion after 3 or 4 days of commencement of our operation, moved across the Song Ky Lam (River) with about 150 men, using 7 boats. The battalion at this time moved into the area of Phase II of Stone, and as the subject states they were completely surprised by this second phase of our operation. At the time of his surrender Huan, states the battalion suffered an additional 50 KIA and 20 WIA, "all WIA's were left behind". The subjects unit (the 3rd Company) had only 70 men left at the time of his surrender and his platoon was down to 28 men. He further states that the 4-15 company was annihilated. Huan, says that when he surrendered he was attempting to escape the operation area. The units had been ordered to disperse and hide until after the operation, and then reassemble at Chau Lan Dien (coordinates unknown).

(b) G-2 Comment: This information as stated by the subject is considered possibly true. The battalion strength given by Huan is approximately the same as held by this Headquarters. However, the losses the subject says his unit lost and the location of the R-20 Battalion leave much to be desired in that it now seems evident that not all of the R-20 Battalion was in the Operation Stone area at the time of our operation. (See Special Interrogation Report of Nguyen Dinh Trong, member 4th Platoon, R-21 Company, R-20 Battalion. Annex B (Significant Agents, VC PW/Returnees, and Document Reports)). Tuong states his unit and other elements of the R-20 Battalion were located in

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the Independence area to the west vicinity (AT 8654) and that they further took part in the 140mm rocket attack on 26 February 1967, when, as he reports, the R-21, R-22 and R-23 Companies were used as ammunition bearers for an NVA unit who launched the attack.

(c) With these two conflicting reports it is now considered possible, that just prior to Operation Stone some units of the R-20 Battalion moved from the Stone area in a southwesterly direction on the day before D-Day. This action is possible since on that day elements of the 1st Marine Division recon observed heavy troop movement leaving the Stone area.

(d) However, we still feel that units of the R-20 Battalion were in the Stone area along with local force company units, and possibly elements of the V-25 Battalion which would well account for the large kill number on this operation, with most losses credited against the R-20 Battalion and Q-15 Company. Based on this and earlier losses for the R-20 Battalion in recent weeks, it can still be reasonably accepted that the R-20 and Q-15 at present are most likely down to 50% normal operating strength, and that overall battalion and company organization and combat efficiency is disrupted and marginal. These losses, however, can be replaced within one to two months, since this capability or rapid replacements has been demonstrated in the past.

(3) The following information was obtained from a consolidated interrogation report on five captives claiming to be from the 3rd Platoon, 1st Company, GK-33 (Mortar) Battalion. All captives were captured on 18 February vicinity (BS 472779) by ARVN forces.

(a) The captives state that the GK-33 Battalion is an artillery support battalion, consisting of three companies and armed with three 81 or 82mm mortars each.

(b) The 1st Company is reported armed with two 82mm, one 81mm and as one captive states, one 120mm mortar, that he had seen two months ago in the mountains of Hiep Duc (D).

(c) Three captives state that their unit (the 3rd platoon) arrived in the area of their capture on 17 February 1967 armed with one 82mm mortar, with the mission of supporting a 9th Battalion of the 21st Regiment. This regiment was reported seen located along the northern edge of the Song Tra Khuc vicinity the eastern edge of Son Dong (V) (BS 4876) by these captives.

(d) One captive also reported that the battalion headquarters designated 512th, (note, this captive was the only one of the five captives who gave this designation, explaining it as the unit's designation when in NVN and that it was later changed to GK-33 on entering SVN, all other captives gave the designation GK-33), was located on top of Nui Da Ne mount.

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ain (BS 443788) with the 1st company (150 men) located in the Song Giang valley (BS 4378). However all other captives report their company headquarters is located in the Tre Bong river area, approximately 3 hours south of Tre Bong in the mountains. One of these captives states that the battalion CP is located in Son Binh (V) (coordinates unknown) and prior to moving into this area it was located in Hiep Duc (D) for a period of 6 months with no contact made with free world military forces.

(e) The captives claims that 70% of their unit are North Vietnamese, and that all officers are North Vietnamese. The captives further report that there is no conflict between North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese within their unit.

(f) In the line of supply the captives state that medicine is the only item in demand at present and that many of the personnel have malaria.

(g) The only recent operations mentioned by the captives was from one of the ammo carriers who claims he took part in the mortaring of Nui Vo (KMC outpost) on 15 February 1967.

(h) G-2 Comment: The GK-33 is an AKA for the RQ-23 (mortar) Battalion (C), a subordinate support battalion of the 2nd NVA Division. The statement by one captive of a 512th Battalion designation for this unit is possible. The 500 series designation is used by other battalions with a support role. Weapons reported are acceptable, to include 120mm mortars, one holding this headquarters lists the RQ-23 as having six 120mm mortars. Further, on the 16th, 120mm mortars were employed against a KMC artillery position (BS 627859). This fact now indicates the addition of this support battalion taking part in the attack in support of the 1st VC Regiment. The report of a 9th battalion, 21st Regiment is probably the 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment. The 9th is a known AKA for this unit. This report of the 21st Regiment being located in this area has been additionally supported by an interrogation report of a 2dLt Thung, training officer, 22nd Battalion, 21st Regiment, who reported that on 17 February the 21st Regiment and 17th Battalion were located vicinity (BS 480773) with the 22nd Battalion located vicinity (BS 500770) and the 33rd Battalion located vicinity (BS 555815). All within the general area the captives reported sighting a unit of this regiment.

(4) The information was obtained on the strength and disposition of the C-219 Company from one (female) Huynh Thi Le (AKA "Jan") captured on 17 February, vicinity (BS 804382) by PRU and USMC elements. Information obtained is as follows:

(a) The captive stated that on or about 10 February 1967 she became afraid of artillery and airstrikes and deserted the C-219th Company, attempting to enter the Duc Pho District headquarters area

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where she felt she would not be captured.

(b) The captive further claimed, that in August of 1966 while a cell leader of the guerrilla unit in Tan Tu #2 (H) vicinity (BS 820393), she was told by the hamlet autonomous chairmen that she must attend a one month medical course given by one North Vietnamese and two Central Vietnamese interns. She then had to join the C-219th Company as a nurse/entertainment cadre. There were 4 other nurse/entertainment cadre who attended the one month course, on the use of vitamins, first aid to wounded, administration of drugs and a short course in being a mid-wife. She claimed that two of these females are among the 30 to 50 members of the C-219th Company who have been KIA since the US forces arrived in Duc Pho District.

(c) The (3) 30 man platoons were infantry platoons which had in addition to M-1 rifles, carbines, thompsons, K-44's, MAS-36's, (2) BAR's and (1) US 30 caliber machine gun per platoon. The captive claimed that when she deserted, remnants of the company were in and around Thuy Trieu #1 (H) vicinity (BS 816403).

(d) The captive stated that of the 10 females in the C-219th Company, 6 were cooks/entertainment cadres and 4 were nurses/entertainment cadres. She claimed that when the C-219th Company moved around the females were usually left in Thuy Trieu (H) and that while she heard many stories of battles the C-219th Company fought in and how many ARVN/US forces they had killed. She further stated that she heard many such stories while working in her job as entertainment cadre/prostitute.

(e) The captive stated that while morale was low in the C-219th Company before September 1966, when the company got the 10 entertainment cadre/prostitutes morale was very high.

(f) The captive stated that every 8 days she went to Du Quang #1 (H) vicinity (BS 829412) to the Pho Xuan market (vicinity unknown) and purchased whatever medical supplies the company needed. Food for the company came from the local people of the area the company was located, but ammo re-supply came from an unknown area the captive stated. The captive claimed she knew of no other MF VC units in Duc Pho (D) or where the C-219th Company is presently located.

(g) Personalities:

Nguyen Hieu, about 30, CO of 219th Company
 Ngo Vac, about 34, XO of 219th Company
 Phuoc, about 28, Political Cadre
 Nguyen Be, about 36, 1st Platoon leader
 Ngo Lanh, about 28, 2nd Platoon Leader
 Nguyen Thi Cuc, about 22, nurse/entertainment cadre

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Huynh Thi Ngoc, about 19, nurse/entertainment cadre
 Huynh Thi Thung, about 20, cook/entertainment cadre
 Huynh Thi Nu, about 25, cook/entertainment cadre
 Huynh Thi Sau, about 23, cook/entertainment cadre

(h) Interrogators Comments: The captive was very evasive, lied freely, refused to answer questions, and claimed not to understand the interpreter. She is married to either a district force cadre or a MF VC platoon leader according to the national police of Duc Pho District but she claims her husband is a nurse in the mountains. She refused to even give her name for several hours after her capture. The information she did give was only after repeated interrogation. She changed her story several times but would usually come back to the above information. The national police requested to interrogate her. They stated that she had shouted anti-government slogans to the other captives in their compound and had tried to sing national liberation front songs several times during the night. However, she refused to answer any questions at all and was violent toward them upon several occasions.

(i) G-2 Comment: F/3 on the strength, composition and arms of the C-219th Local Force Company (confirmed). However, the personalities given by the captive do not check out. Two of the names she gave are listed with the C-219th Company. But not in the billets described.

B. Order of Battle

(1) See paragraph 1.A, Other Information of returnee interrogation report of Tran Minh Tam, member Q-14B Company, (Annex "B" this PERINTREP).

(2) The following reports were received from COMUSMACV 149th Military Intelligence Group:

(a) A VC telephone communications system was located in Mo Duc/Duc Pho Districts. The system consisted of three relay sites. The first site, located at Ban An (BS 833428), Duc Pho District, relayed to the second site at Am Tho (BS 813457), Duc Pho District. The second site relayed to the third site at Thach Thang Hamlet (BS 788500) Mo Duc District. The telephones were hidden in holes in the ground about five meters from the road. The natural cover of trees and graves helped to hide them. The holes measured approximately 5.2 meters and were covered with leaves. The sites were guarded at all times by VC guardsman.

(b) The VC planned to remain within two to three miles of the road network during the coming years to preclude bombings. The VC believed that when they were in the deep jungle, the American would not hesitate to send airstrikes against them. However, the proximity of the road network would not allow massive air attacks.

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(3) A confidential Vietnamese source reported the following: the VC are attempting to organize an infiltrations attempt against FWMF installations by utilizing captured Americans. Captured Americans will be dressed as advisors and will be closely guarded by VC dressed in Vietnamese military uniforms. They will approach the guard posts of the FWMF installation deceiving the sentries until it is too late to resist. According to the source, a larger body of guerrillas, concealed nearby will then mount a surprise attack and overwhelm the security force. G-2 Comment:~ F/6,

(4) Task Force X-RAY reports: On 20 February, a MAG-36 helicopter in the vicinity at (BS 507742) observed 10 VC, who attempted to get the helicopter to land by throwing a green smoke grenade as the aircraft passed over their position.

E. Administrative and Political Units. Negative

F. Anti-Air Activity.

(1) See Annex B (Significant Agents, VC PW/Returnees and Document Reports), report of VC Tactics against Aircraft as revealed by returnee Tran Minh Tam, member Q-14B Company.

(2) There was no unusual anti-aircraft activity during the reporting period.

G. Anti-Personnel/Anti-Tank Mine Activity. During the reporting period there were 52 mine/booby trap incidents within the Danang and Chu Lai TAOR's. This number is significant in that this is an approximate 50% increase over the last reporting period. These incidents took place and are classified as follows: Danang - 20 anti-personnel mine/booby trap incidents, and 17 anti-vehicular/booby trap incidents. Chu Lai - 9 anti-personnel mine/booby trap incidents and 4 anti-vehicular mine/booby trap incidents.

H. Artillery/Mortar/RR/Rocket Activity. Activity in this category increased slightly over this reporting period, with 2 incidents in which the VC employed the seldom-used 120mm mortar and a new weapon, the 140mm rocket.

(1) At 150410H, the 11th Company of the KMC (BS 589838) was attacked by two VC battalions supported by 81/82mm mortars. The VC also employed flame throwers in an attempt to destroy the KMC company's ammunition dump during this attack. KMC units returned fire, mortars and recoilless rifle fire throughout the attack and assisted by reinforcements, air and artillery, were successful in repelling the VC attack resulting in 243 VC KIA confirmed, 60 VC KIA probable and 2 WIA PW.

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(2) At 152300H, 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion (AT 990714) command bunker received one mortar round (type unknown). Command post personnel made visual search of the area with inconclusive results as to origin of fire.

(3) At 160100H KMC artillery position (BS 627859) received 60 and 120mm mortar fire. Total number of rounds received unknown. One dud 120mm mortar round was found the following day. KMC units returned fire on the suspected position during the attack.

(4) At 220245H, 1st Marines reports Hoi An (BS 150570) received 10 rounds of 81mm mortar fire resulting in 1 civilian KIA, and 11 civilian WIA. The origin of fire was not pin-pointed. Fire came from the general direction of southwest of the city.

(5) At 221850H, F/2/1 (BT 022288) received 15-25 rounds 81mm mortar fire. All rounds landed short of the intended target. The fire came from vicinity (AT 985280). Marine units returned fire with mortars, recoilless rifles and airstrikes with inconclusive results.

(6) At 221910H, G/2/4 perimeter defense (AT 925690) received 4 rounds 60mm mortar and 20 rounds automatic weapons fire from vicinity (AT 930684). Marines returned fire with small arms, mortars, and tank fire resulting in 2 VC KIA confirmed.

(7) At 252310H, 2/5 command post, Duc Duc District headquarters, and airstrip (AT 872472) received 35-40 rounds 81 and 82mm mortar fire resulting in 2 PF KIA, 2 PF WIA and 8 USMC WIA. Counter mortar fire was returned on the VC position (AT 849479) and points of egress with inconclusive results.

(8) At 270310H, Danang airfield came under 140mm rocket attack from VC position vicinity (AT 959695). The VC fired a total of 51 rounds that impacted over an area one by two kilometers in and along the eastern edge of the airfield. Marine units sweeping the area from which rocket fire originated, discovered 126 rocket launching positions with supporting ammunition pits. Further search of the area resulted in the finding of 3 rocket launcher tubes and 30 unexpended 140mm rockets. For detail description of weapon and firing positions, see Annex E (New VC Equipment and Method of Employment, 140mm Rocket).

I. Interdiction Activities.

(1) At 170945H, H/2/5 platoon road sweep (AT 908481) discovered the railroad bridge at this location destroyed at one end and damaged on the other. Twenty five meters of the bridge span had been dropped into the river.

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(2) At 161030H, H/2/1 bridge defense (BT 998703) observed objects on the bridge piling. Investigation discovered two 3"x8"x8" mines of tritonal cast with friction type acid fuses. However the acid detonator failed to activate due to improper crimping by the VC. The mines were disarmed and removed by EOD personnel without incident.

J. Guerrilla Activity. VC activity increased markedly over the last reporting period. The total incidents within the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAOR's numbered 222. Da Nang, as usual, received the greater percentage of these incidents with a reported 159, broken down as follows: 98 harassing small arms fire, 29 mines, 5 booby traps, 6 grenades, 4 small arms/grenades, 1 small arms/M-79, 1 ambush, 3 sabotage, 1 terrorism, 2 small arms/booby traps, 1 small arms/mine, 1 small arms/punji pit, 6 punji pit, and 1 possible RPG rocket.

Chu Lai area recorded 63 incidents, broken down as follows: 36 harassing small arms fire, 14 mines, 1 booby trap, 9 grenades, 1 illumination grenade, 1 possible terrorism and 1 attempted helicopter interception.

K. Guided Missiles. Negative

L. Infantry. During the reporting period there were only 3 significant contacts with VC forces. These incidents are other then those incurred on separate operations.

(1) See paragraph 2.H.(1) this PERINTREP.

(2) At 171630H, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion outpost (BS 786303) engaged an estimated platoon-sized VC unit when the patrol received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from vicinity (BS 786300). The VC personnel were wearing khaki uniforms with cartridge belts and dark green helmets. The recon patrol returned fire and directed airstrikes on the VC position resulting in 2 VC KIA confirmed and 20 VC KIA probable.

(3) At 250730H, F/2/1 squad combat patrol while sweeping through a hamlet (BT 041303) observed 10 VC fleeing the area and an additional 20-25 VC nearby. The patrol took the VC under fire with heavy small arms and supporting arms fire resulting in 4 VC KIA confirmed and 10 VC KIA probable. In addition, they apprehended 8 detainees in the area. Weapons and equipment captured were 4 individual weapons with magazines, 2 grenades, 1 bayonet, 1 knife, 3 cartridge belts with 1 canteen and miscellaneous clothing.

M. Reconnaissance. Negative

N. Infiltration. Negative

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U. ~~Other~~ Elements. See Annex "F", this PERINTREP (change to Annex "E" to 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF, PERINTREP 16-66.)

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE

A. Enemy Organization and Combat Efficiency. The enemy's general organization and combat efficiency, within the tri-province area remained generally the same, except for the enemy's introduction of the 140mm rocket into his inventory of arms. The weapon now gives the enemy the added means of interdiction by fire, free world military forces installations from a range of 8,800 meters (maximum range) with the weapon, as was evident by the rocket attack on DaNang airfield on 27 February. See paragraph 2.H.(7) this PERINTREP and Annex E (New VC Equipment and Method of Employment, 140mm Rocket).

B. New Unit Identification. Negative

C. New Weapons and Equipment. See Annex E this PERINTREP (New VC Equipment and Method of Employment, 140mm Rocket)

D. Personalities. Negative

E. Enemy Losses.

(1) TAOR's: Enemy losses during the period 141200H February 1967 to 011200H March 1967 in the DaNang and Chu Lai TAOR's were 282 confirmed killed, 242 probably killed and 224 detainees. To date 12 of these have been classified as PW (VC), 11 as returnees (VC), and 13 as innocent civilian. Additionally, there were 27 individual weapons captured.

(2) Operations: Enemy losses on operations were as follows:

(a) Operation Stone, commenced at 120700H February 1967 and terminated at 221300H February 1967 resulted in 291 KIA confirmed, 112 KIA probable and 125 detainees. To date 65 of these have been classified as PW (VC), and 43 as civil defendants. Additionally there were 23 individual weapons captured.

(b) Operation Rio Grande, commenced at 170900H February 1967 and terminated at 221800H February 1967 resulted in 7 KIA confirmed, 7 KIA probable and 9 detainees. To date 2 of these have been classified as innocent civilians.

(c) Operation Lenoke, commenced at 260700H February 1967 and terminated at 281600H February 1967 resulted in 2 detainees.

(d) Operation Pulaski, commenced at 240800H February 1967 and

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terminated 271500H February 1967, resulted in 1 KIA confirmed, 1 KIA probable and 4 detainees. To date, one of these has been classified as a returnee and 1 as a civil defendant.

(e) Operation Lafayette, commenced at 260700H February 1967 and is still continuing has thus far resulted in 37 KIA confirmed, 1 KIA probable and 43 detainees. To date, 5 of these have been classified as PW (VC), and 3 as innocent civilians.

(f) Operation Deckhouse VI, commenced OPCON Task Force X-Ray at 200600H February 1967 and is still continuing has thus far resulted in 185 KIA confirmed, 79 KIA probable and 20 detainees. To date, 1 of these has been classified as a PW. Additionally there has been 1 individual weapon captured.

(g) Operation De Soto commenced at 262000H January 1967 and is still continuing has thus far resulted in 218 KIA confirmed, 495 KIA probable and 43 detainees. To date, 26 of these have been classified as civil defendants and 2 as innocent civilians. Additionally there has been 2 individual weapons captured.

F. Morale. During the reporting period, interrogation and agent reports still indicate VC morale within the tri-province area remains low for the usual reasons of air/artillery harassments and food/medical supplies shortage, etc.

G. Details of Administrative Installation and Support.

(1) The following information was obtained from COMUSMACV 149th Military Intelligence Group and reads in text:

(a) On 4 February 1967 a VC district level prison camp designated "Thu 1002H" was located on a slope of the Con Doc hill (BS 681292) in Duc Pho District, Quang Ngai (P). The camp commander was identified as Bao. There were an estimated 500 prisoners at the camp, including Vietnamese civilians, ARVN soldiers and cadre men.

A wooden fence surrounded the camp. There was only one gate in the fence. The prisoners were detained in three thatched buildings with wooden walls. Each building measured 20 meters by 4 meters. There were two thatched houses with wooden walls located opposite the other buildings. Each measured 10 meters by 4 meters. One house served as quarters for the camp commander. The other housed the security platoon.

The security platoon with an estimated strength of 20 men was subordinate to the VC regional force. The platoon was armed with two automatic rifles and an adequate number of individual weapons.

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During the day, prisoners who had committed lesser crimes worked in the camp or were sent on labor details outside the camp accompanied by the security guards. The prisoners who had committed serious crimes were bound by the hands and kept in the buildings.

(b) On 25 January 1967, a labor party of 10 prisoners and 30 guards left the camp and crossed the Song Nuoc Dinh River to a group of houses near the foot of a mountain at (BS 853205) in the An Do area. They remained there for one day. During the night of 26 January 1967, they left the An Do area and proceeded through Thanh Son (BS 874117), Han Son (BS 871100), An Quoi (BS 885095), across National Highway #1, along the foot of "Doi 10" hill in Tam Queng (BS 910096) to Cuu Loi (BS 022082) to gather salt. Upon arriving at "Doi 10" hill they removed their rubber sandals and proceeded barefoot. They hid bamboo baskets they were carrying in An Quoi, because there was an ARVN unit located on the above mentioned hill. The baskets measured 30 centimeters in diameter and 80 centimeters in height.

The laborers received salt from the houses of local VC underground cadre men in Cuu Loi and put the salt in "Lac" bars. Each man carried approximately 45 kilograms of salt. Groups of three or four laborers carried the salt to An Quoi where it was placed in baskets for further transporting to An Son. During the daylight hours the salt was transported to Con Doc.

(2) The following information was obtained from a confidential 3rd Counterintelligence Team source: As of 15 February 1967, there is a guerrilla training camp located in the vicinity of (AT 814594) near a small stream. This camp is referred to as the "lower camp" by the VC and accepts approximately 100 young men a month for a 2 month training cycle. Subjects taught at the camp are political indoctrination and basic military. Upon completion of the 2 months training, volunteers are sent to the "high camp" for more extensive training before joining a VC main force battalion. The "high camp" is located somewhere within the grid squares (AT 8159) and (AT 8160).

The T-89 Battalion supplies security and training cadre for both camps. Lookouts are stationed high in trees and give the alarm if planes fly near. At this alarm all personnel take cover in camouflaged positions.

H. Terrain. Negative

I. Weather. The weather in both TAOR's from 141200H February 1967 to 011200H March 1967 was again characterized by generally cloudy skies with light scattered rainshowers. The average maximum and minimum temperatures were 79 degrees and 66 degrees respectively while humidity averaged 80 percent. Visibility averaged 7 to 8 miles. Winds were pre-

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dominantly from a north-northwesterly direction with an average velocity of 8 knots and gusts up to 10 knots. Recorded rainfall for the period was .81 inches.

J. Intelligence Operations. Negative

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

A. On 2 March 1967, a 3rd Counterintelligence Team confidential source reported the VC plan to blow the bridge located at (AT 946699). The VC plan to accomplish this by floating mines down the river. G-2 Comment: F/3. This tactic has been employed by VC forces in the past for interdiction of LOC's elsewhere in Vietnam, and must be considered possible in our area.

5. CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES.

A. Capabilities

- (1) Utilizing his main forces, the enemy can:
 - (a) Attack the An Hoa, Nong Son or Nui Lac Son with up to one regiment reinforced by local forces up to battalion size.
 - (b) Attack the Chu Lai Combat Base with the 2nd Division reinforced by division support battalions and nearby local forces.
 - (c) Attack Marine forces in Duc Pho with the 3rd Division's 2nd VC and 22nd NVA Regiments augmented by divisional support battalions and near-by provincial mobile battalions.
 - (d) Attack any or several of the CIDG camps in force of one or more regiments.
 - (e) Attack by fire facilities within any of the combat bases utilizing 120mm mortars and/or 140mm rockets.
 - (f) Conduct combinations of the above.
 - (g) Should he so elect, defend various installations and base areas, most notably in the Do Xa in up to division strength utilizing regular security forces augmented by elements of the 2nd Division.
 - (h) Reinforce his position in the southern I Corps area by the infiltration of additional forces from North Vietnam or by the introduction of the 22nd NVA Regiment from Binh Dinh Province within one day after movement commences, the 1st and 10th Divisions from the Central Highlands, 15 to 20 days after movement commences and the 6th NVA Regi-

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ment from the Thien Province within 10 days after movement commences

(i) Employ his main forces in an essentially non-aggressive role - engaged primarily in political indoctrination, retraining, re-equipping and conducting small attacks against isolated outposts in no more than battalion size - but positioned so as always to pose threat to certain vital points thus forcing a note of more than usual caution into the conduct of friendly operations.

(2) Utilizing his local and guerrilla forces, the enemy can:

(a) Attack, preferably by fire, ambush, or sapper raid, friendly forces and positions in up to reinforced battalion strength at a time and place of the enemy's choosing.

(b) Harass friendly forces and installations with small arms, grenades, mortars, booby traps and small ambushes at a time and place of the enemy's choosing.

(c) Interdict lines of communications throughout the tri-province area, particularly National Route #1; Routes 10, 1D, 14 and 5; and the railroad lines in Hai Van Pass area at a time and place of the enemy's choice, often using trained demolitions personnel working in conjunction with guerrilla and local forces.

(d) Conduct political agitation and propaganda, combined with a selective use of politically-inspired violence, including assassination, terrorism and sabotage in an effort to thwart the Revolutionary Development Program.

B. Probable Enemy Courses of Action

(1) For the main forces:

(a) Attack by fire and/or physical assault relatively close-in friendly positions and installations within any of the combat bases in up to regimental strength.

(b) Conduct a coordinated attack of any or several of the CIDG camps at a time of the enemy's choosing with the main objective of ambushing reinforcements, utilizing a force of one or more reinforced regiments.

(c) Continue political indoctrination, reequipping and replenishing ranks, and small-scale attacks on isolated outposts for the primary purpose of gaining combat experience; while also, by these attacks

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and the real or imagined potential threat to friendly forces in the vicinity of these main forces, hoping to inhibit our freedom of action.

(d) Attack the Nui Lec Son, Nong Son or An Hoa complexes at a time of the enemy's choosing with one reinforced regiment.

(e) Defend vital installations and important base areas, notably the Do Xa, in up to divisional strength.

(f) Infiltrate additional forces from North Vietnam into southern I Corps and/or introduce enemy forces from the Central Highlands or northern I Corps into the tri-province area.

(g) Attack the Duc Pho area in multi-regimental strength, possibly in conjunction with a secondary attack in northern Quang Ngai Province using elements of the 2nd Division.

(h) Attack the Chu Lai Combat Base with the 2nd Division consisting of three infantry regiments reinforced and assisted by divisional support battalions and adjacent provincial mobile battalions.

(2) For local and guerrilla forces:

(a) To continue to exercise the related capabilities listed in paragraph 5.A.(2) above throughout the three provinces.

C. Vulnerabilities

(1) The enemy is vulnerable to attack by massed fires from air, artillery and naval gunfire. Even his deepest base areas and lines of communication are vulnerable to attack by air. When closer to the coast or to friendly positions, any massed formation is subject to detection and subsequent attack by artillery and naval gunfire in addition to air. Being unable to effectively counter this firepower, the enemy must rely heavily on camouflage and circumspection in his activities in order to minimize this vulnerability.

(2) The enemy is vulnerable to psychological warfare operations. Life for the Viet Cong is hard at best and filled with deprivation and danger. This constant difficulty and peril, the lack of dedication on the part of the rank and file, as well as some of the cadre, plus the preferred leniency of the Chieu Hoi program, combine to make the enemy unusually susceptible to exploitation by psychological warfare technique.

(3) The enemy is vulnerable to rapid, bold and unexpected maneuvers in the developing tactical situation. His insistence on minutely planned and carefully rehearsed operations precludes a quick and flexible reaction to friendly maneuvers, unless in keeping with his preconceived battle plan.

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(4) The enemy is vulnerable to sustained operations and aggressive pursuit. The inherent weakness of the enemy's logistic system and its continuing susceptibility to interdiction by air deny the enemy the capability of supporting sustained combat operations. The enemy's rigidity of tactical doctrine induces him to avoid and/or quickly disengage from contact whenever the tactical situation does not develop according to plan.



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ANNEXES:

- A - Order of Battle (Refer 1stMarDiv (Rein), FMF PERINTREP NO 3-67)
- B - Significant Agent, VC PW/Returnee, and Document Reports
- C - Paragraph 13 Entries
- D - Astronomical Data
- E - New VC Equipment and Method of Employment, 140mm Rocket
- F - Changes and Corrections to 1stMarDiv (Rein), FMF PERINTREPS

Distribution: "A" less 7, 12, 17-21, 37-67
"C" less 72, 76, 84, 98, 100

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ANNEX B (SIGNIFICANT AGENTS, VC PW/RETURNEES, AND DOCUMENT REPORTS) TO 1ST MARDIV
PERINTREP NO. 4-67

I. SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT OF VC RETURNEE (NGUYEN DINH TUONG)

AGE: 24
UNIT: 1st Squad, 4th Platoon, R-21 Company, R-20 Battalion
CIRCUMSTANCE: Rallied to G/2/4 on 1 March 1967 (AT 935664)

INFORMATION OBTAINED

A. Strength:

R-20 Battalion, strength - 480

R-21 Company, strength - 120

4th Platoon, strength - (Sapper 16 men)

1st Squad, strength - (Sapper 5 men)

1st Platoon, strength - 32 men

2nd Platoon, strength - 32 men

3rd Platoon, strength - 32 men

B. Organization:

R-20 Battalion - is composed of R-21, R-22, R-23, R-24 Companies

R-21 Company - is composed of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Platoons

*4th Platoon - is composed of 1st, 2nd, 3rd Squads

1st, 2nd, 3rd Platoons - are composed of 1st, 2nd, 3rd Squads

*Sapper Unit

C. Weapons:

R-20 Battalion - 3 x 81mm mortars

6 x 60mm mortars

2 x 57mm RR

1 x RPG-2 (B-40 rocket launcher) per squad

7 x .30 caliber machine guns

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2 x M-60 7.62 machine guns

D. Disposition: R-20 Battalion was located in Loc Qui Village in the Phu Binh hamlet area (AT 866526) on 26 February 1967. All companies were located in the Loc Qui Village area after returning from the attack on Danang.

E. Mission:

Captives: Carry ammunition for the Sapper machine gun squad.

Units: Training in the Loc Qui area.

F. Other Enemy Forces: Unknown to Rallier, the Rallier heard that the V-25 Battalion was operating near Hoi An.

G. Supply:

Food: They have sufficient quantity and good quality which is resupplied from villagers.

Ammunition: They have sufficient ammunition for all weapons which is resupplied from mountains which are about a 15 days march.

Medical: They have sufficient medicine with the Battalion. Their resupply comes from NVN.

H. Replacements: All replacements come from village guerrilla ranks. Rallier claims no North Vietnamese are in the R-20 Battalion.

I. Morale: Poor. The troops are afraid of the bombing and artillery and are having numerous casualties.

J. Tactics: Are unknown to Rallier.

K. Obstacles: Are unknown to Rallier.

L. Communications: From Battalion to Company, AN/PRC-10 and field telephone ER-8. One radio and one telephone per Company.

M. Personalities: R-20 Battalion commander is Nguyen Lam, age 40

N. Other Information: The Rallier stated that the R-20 Battalion was operating in Loc Qui Village vicinity (AT 8652) training in general military subjects. On about 26 February 1967, the R-21, R-22 and R-23 Companies were sent to help transport equipment in the attack on Danang air field.

The 3 Companies left Loc Qui Village, crossed the river at Ha Nha vicinity (AT 866545) and moved north into the mountains. After arrival at the "O RAY Mountain" rest station vicinity (AT 7970), the R-21, R-22 and R-23 Companies were joined by a 130 man NVA force, wearing khaki uniforms, carrying AK-47 rifles, SKS rifles, RPD light machine guns and RPG-2 (B-40) rocket launchers.

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This NVA unit is known by the Rallier only as a Main Force Combat Infantry Unit responsible for the Danang coastal area. The Rallier was told that this NVA unit had attacked Danang on other occasions, but was not told the unit designation. This NVA unit is located about 12 kilometers south from the "O RAY Mountain" rest station in the Dai Loc District.

The NVA unit had the 140mm rocket launchers, identified by the Rallier, when they joined the R-20 personnel. After joining the R-20 personnel, the combined force of about 520 men left the rest station and proceeded down the mountains to the storage site where the unit picked up 135 140mm rockets. The storage area is located vicinity (AT 8867). The Rallier stated that there was no permanent storage area and that the rockets were just stacked ready for pickup. After picking up the rockets the unit proceeded to the launching site (AT 9669). Upon arrival at the launching site the R-20 personnel placed their rockets on the ground and left the area immediately. The Rallier stated that the firing pits and firing equipment were all set up by the NVA personnel who were responsible for the actual rocket firing. After leaving the firing site the R-20 personnel moved over the same route by which they had moved into the area. The R-20 personnel arrived at the firing site at about 2330 hours and departed about 2400 hours. After leaving the firing site the R-20 personnel halted at a village in the valley near the foot of the mountains about 2 hours march from the firing site, vicinity (AT 8865). At this village they waited for the NVA personnel to join them. At about 0230 to 0300 hours, the Rallier stated he heard the rockets being fired. About 1½ hours after they moved over the route to "O RAY Mountain". After arrival at the "O Ray Mountain" rest station the NVA troops departed and the R-21, R-22 and R-23 Companies returned to their operating area in Loc Qui Village.

Interrogator's Comment: The Rallier is in good physical condition of average intellect. He is easily confused and has little or no concept of time or distance. He answers questions readily in a sincere manner but continually beats around the bush, so to speak, while arriving at his answers.

G-2 Comment: Tuong has not yet been interrogated in depth concerning the R-20 Battalion. However, the information which he has provided indicates that he is from that unit but there are certain inconsistencies in Tuong's story. This added to the conflicting report of Huan, also a member of the R-20 Battalion (See Para 2.A.(2) this Perintrep) have left a great deal of questions unanswered. Further interrogation is proposed for these Returnees for the purpose of defining unit strength and movements. Until this time, however, no final judgement can be made on the full validity of these reports and the information is presented herein for your interest and information at this date.

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II. INTERROGATION REPORT OF RALLIER (TRAN MINH TAM)

AGE: 17
UNIT: 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon, Q-14-B Company (X-64)

INFORMATION OBTAINEDA. Strength:

Q-14 A Company, strength - 30

Q-14 B Company, strength - 132

3rd Platoon, strength - 32

1st Squad, strength - 12

B. Organization:

Q-14 A Company - Political Branch

Q-14 B Company - Military Branch

Q-14 B Company - 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Platoons

3rd Platoon - 1st, 2nd, 3rd Squads

C. Weapons:

1 x 60mm mortar

1 M-60 machine gun (3 per Platoon)

7 BAK's (3 per Platoon)

2 RPD light machine guns (3 per Platoon)

17 M-14 rifles

4 M-79 grenade launchers

8 M-1 Garands

12 carbines

24 K-50's (1 per squad leader and 1 per assistant squad leader)

Unknown numbers K-44 rifles

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D. Disposition:

Q-14 B Company - From (AT 828491) to (AT 834490)

Q-14 A Company - Sometimes in Minh Tan (AT 828542), although they are mobile.

V-25 Battalion - One Company is located at Loc Qui village Quang Hue hamlet, vicinity (AT 865537).

E. Mission:

Captive's: To cut off and defeat Marine units moving through area.

Unit's: Same as captive's.

F. Other Enemy Forces: One Company of the V-25 Battalion is operating in the Q-14's general area.G. Supply:

Food: Rice and salt supplied by local villagers. Nine ounces a day is sufficient.

Ammunition: Resupply comes from NVN and captured and policed up U.S. ammunition.

Medical: There are no medical supplies available.

Other: Clothing, uniforms, packs and hammocks are manufactured in the mountains west of Loc Tan village.

H. Losses:

"Operation Independence" - 1st Squad had 10 KIA, none WIA.

3rd Squad had 24 KIA, unknown WIA

Q-14 overall casualties are unknown.

I. Replacements: Drawn from guerrilla forces in Dai Loc, Duc Duc and Thuong Duc Districts.

J. Morale: Very poor. Men are afraid and the villagers are turning against the Viet Cong movement due to air strikes and artillery causing casualties when the Viet Cong stay in an area.

K. Tactics:

Defend and ambush when possible all units, ARVN and Marine, that comes into Q-14 operating area.

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L. Communications: No radios or wire; messengers only.

M. Personalities of Q-14:

Nguyen Vang, age 37, Q-14 A Commander

Nguyen Moi, age 40, Q-14 B Commander

Nguyen Hue, age 20, Q-14 B, 1st Platoon Commander, (WIA)

Le Co, age 18, 2nd Platoon Commander

Le Vien Luyen, age 22, 3rd Platoon Commander

Doan Tan, age 23, 4th Platoon Commander

Nguyen Triet, age 17, 3rd Platoon, 1st Squad leader

Nguyen Hue, age 23, 2nd Squad leader, (WIA)

Nguyen Lai, age 23, 3rd Squad leader, (KIA)

N. Other Information:

1. Methods of evasion used by Q-14 B during Operation Independence: On the first day of the operation, the Q-14 B Company broke up into platoon sized units and then into squad sized units. The squads moved into secret tunnels and waited for Marine forces to pass. Some of the tunnels are large enough to accommodate an entire squad, while others can only sustain three or four men. The tunnels are about 50cm below ground level and are about one meter wide by one meter, 30cm high, reinforced with bamboo. The tunnels are constructed in open areas in lieu of built up or bushy areas. The reason for this is that the Viet Cong know that the Americans will use thorough search methods and demolitions on suspected areas. The tunnels have bamboo tubes sticking up for air vents. One air vent faces east and one west. The reason being that the people hiding can estimate the time of day by the light from the vents. To avoid detection by sentry dogs, chicken or buffalo manure or pepper is smeared on the air vents. When the Viet Cong go into the tunnels, loyal, selected guerrillas or cadre reset and camouflage the cap entrance. The local villagers are not permitted to know where the tunnel complexes are located. When the Marines pass through, the soldiers come out and attack from the rear. The selected guerrillas that camouflage the tunnel entrances leave the area so that there is no possibility of their being captured and forced to reveal the locations.

2. Camouflage: A bamboo woven crown with fresh foliage inserted to give the impression of small bushes.

3. Night Illumination: The Viet Cong move only when flares have burned out and freeze in a crouched position when illumination is overhead.

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4. Regrouping after evasive tactics are employed: Special recon troops follow U.S. forces closely and when the Marines pass out of the hiding area, these recon troops send runners to the tunnels to recall the soldiers.

5. Routes of movement throughout the Q-14 B operating area depend on the mission and tactical situation at that particular time. The Q-14 B Company uses different routes whenever possible to avoid setting a pattern.

6. NVA with the Q-14 B Company: There are none that stay with the company, although they are assigned for specific missions. All NVA troops operating in the Quang Nam Province area are assigned to the Province Local Forces.

7. The Q-14 B Company has worked with the V-25 Battalion only during Operation Independence, so far as the rallier knows.

Interrogator's Comments: The rallier was co-operative, of above average intellect and answered questions readily. However, this interrogator feels that he rallied more from fear of eventual destruction than from a desire to serve the RVN.

G-2 Comments: Attention is brought to Para B, Organization, of this report. This report should clarify many of the questions of there being more than one Infantry unit using the Q-14 designation. As the Returnee states that the difference between the A and B Suffixs is not two separate infantry Companies but two branches under one unit. Q-14 A being the Political Subunit of the Q-14 unit, while on the other hand the Q-14B is the Infantry/Combat type, maneuvering elements of the unit. This suffix designation also probably applies to other Local Force units so reported in the past.

III. SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT OF (TRAN NHAN TAN)

AGE: 17

UNIT: Assistant Squad Leader, Q-14 B Company, Dai Loc District Force Company.

QA: This report contains primarily answers to a Special Intelligence Requirement on anti-air tactics.

1. Helicopter Anti-Air: For every 100 meters altitude, a lead of two lengths of the aircraft must be used. Speed is not considered as helos are fired upon only when passing overhead.

2. Fixed-Wing Jet Aircraft: Jet aircraft are only fired on when they are making their delivery run; at this time they are at their slowest speed and they present a less difficult target. Jet aircraft are not fired upon from the flanks or when they are going away from the shooter due to their increased speed and they present a more difficult target.

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3. Decision to Fire at Aircraft: The Q-14 B Company has a standing order issued by the commander that states all attacking aircraft will be fired upon as well as all aircraft presenting an acceptable target, i.e. flying low, flying slow. All aircraft approaching directly or almost directly overhead will be taken under mass small arms fire by all available weapons. If an aircraft is low enough to read the numbers on the fuselage, the altitude is gauged to be 100 meters. If the numbers are legible but difficult to read, the altitude is gauged to be 200 to 300 meters. If aircraft numbers are unable to be seen, the aircraft is gauged to be over 500 meters high and is an unacceptable target. The most acceptable part of the aircraft is to hit the large vents where the engines and cockpits are located.

4. Method of Employing Small Arms for Anti-Aircraft Fire:

(a) Weapons: The preferred weapons are M-1 rifles and BAR's due to the availability of armor piercing ammunition. However, all weapons are fired when possible. None of the weapons are equipped with special equipment, i.e. sights, mounts, etc.

5. Fire Control: All fire is controlled by squad leaders. The commands to open fire and cease fire are the only commands given. Commands are not given such as increase lead or decrease lead.

6. Helo Landing Zones: All possible landing zones in the Q-14 B Company's area of responsibility are either covered by fire or have anti-helo punji stakes and mines in the zone. The punji stakes are from two to four meters high and are placed two to three meters apart. Mines are employed when the landing zone to be used is known. Trip wire type booby traps are also used as well as the mines. When possible on known landing zones, the zones that have no obstacles are covered by automatic weapons fire, preferably machine gun fire.

7. Other Information: The Q-14 B Company was responsible for the destruction of one US Jet Attack Aircraft during January 1967 at Ngoc Kinh hamlet, vicinity (ZC 205542). The Company fired in mass with small arms while the aircraft was making an ordnance delivery. Each squad fired as the aircraft passed over their positions.

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ANNEX C (PARAGRAPH 13 ENTRIES) TO 1ST LAR DIV PERINTREP NO. 4-67

1. Total cases of Vietnamese Nationals volunteering information to U.S. Forces are as follows:

1st Marines.....1
3/1.....1

7th Marines.....1
1/7.....1

9th Marines.....2
1/26.....1
2/26.....1

11th Marines.....3
4/11.....1
2/12.....2

3d Tank Battalion.....2

11th Mt Battalion.....1

Total: 10

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF
AND RVNAF

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C-1

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX D (ASTRONOMICAL DATA) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO. 4-67

DATE	BMCT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	ECT	MOONRISE	MOONSET	MCONPHASE	%ILLUM
MAR 6	0638	0701	1856	1919	0224	1449	LAST	24
7	0638	0701	1856	1919	0425	1545		16
8	0637	0700	1856	1919	0511	1639		9
9	0637	0700	1856	1919	0553	1731		5
10	0636	0659	1856	1919	0635	1820		1
11	0636	0659	1857	1920	0708	1907	NEW	0
12	0635	0658	1857	1920	0838	1953		1
13	0634	0657	1857	1920	0811	2039		3
14	0633	0656	1857	1920	0843	2126		7
15	0632	0655	1858	1921	0917	2214		12
16	0632	0655	1858	1921	0955	2305		19
17	0631	0654	1858	1921	1035	2357		27
18	0630	0653	1858	1921	1120	----		37
19	0629	0652	1858	1921	1211	0052	FIRST	46
20	0629	0652	1858	1921	1307	0149		57

UNCLASSIFIED

D-1

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ANNEX "E" (NEW VC WEAPONS AND METHOD OF EMPLOYMENT: THE 140MM HIGH EXPLOSIVE ROCKET) TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREP NO. 4-67

A. NOMENCLATURE: The 140MM, high explosive type rocket is normally fired from a 8, 16, or 17 round launcher on either a truck or trailer type vehicle mount.

However, the rocket employed by the VC forces in the RVN on 27 February 1967, at Danang Air Base was a (1) one tube, sheet metal, front loaded, electrically fired launcher. The launcher measuring 4'X5.51" and mounted on a 3/4"X8"X47" plank by a comparatively simple elevating and deflection mechanism (see enclosure #1 to annex "E"). The rocket for this launcher is an electrically fired, spin stabilized, 140MM high explosive rocket, designed for use in area-saturation (barrage) fire. (See enclosure #2 annex E). Characteristics of the 140MM high explosive rocket are as follows:

(1) COMPLETE ROUND

- (A) Caliber..... 140MM
- (B) Type..... Ground to ground
- (C) Weight..... 84 LBS
- (D) Length overall..... 42 5/8 Inches
- (E) Type of stabilization... Spin
- (F) Color..... Olive drab & silver steel

(2) WARHEAD

- (A) Type..... High explosive
- (B) Weight..... 39.5 LBS
- (C) Length w/fuze..... 18 1/8 Inches
- (D) Maximum diameter..... 5.51 Inches
- (E) Body material..... Steel
- (F) Filler-weight..... 9½ LBS
- (G) Filler material..... TNT
- (H) Fuze type..... Point detonating, instantaneous & delay (See enclosure #3 To annex E.)
- (I) Color..... Olive drab

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(3) MOTOR ASSEMBLY

- (A) Weight..... 43 Pounds
- (B) Length..... 24.5 Inches
- (C) Maximum diameter..... 5.51 Inches
- (D) Propellant type..... Double base ballistite
- (E) Body color..... Silver steel

(4) PERFORMANCE

- (A) Maximum range..... 8800 Meters
- (B) Maximum velocity..... 1280 Ft Per Second
- (C) Penetration..... Does not apply

B. METHOD OF EMPLOYMENT: The 140mm high explosive rocket can be employed in battery type firing positions as was the case in the Danang Air Base attack on 27 February 1967. Or it can be fired individually (see enclosure #4 annex E).

For this attack the VC constructed 126 rocket launching positions at 2 locations. The first row of launch sites were located at (AT 966697) consisting of 10 battery positions of 6 launchers each. The individual launcher position was a relatively simple one constructed by digging a blast pit 8 inches deep, 18 to 20 inches wide and 3 to 4 feet long. The dirt from this pit was used as a forward parapet (12 inches high) for basic elevation, and weapon stabilization. An aiming stake of 12 inches was placed to the rear of the pit for basic alignment and azimuth of fire. Any other finer adjustment could be made with use of the inherent elevation and deflection mechanism. The loading of this launcher could have been either prior to or after the tube was emplaced. This was accomplished by attaching the fuze with selected setting (instantaneous or delay). Then inserting the round from the front of the tube and attaching the electrical firing wires from the rear of the tube and to the base of the rocket round. This wiring series would be possible in any combination and numbers dependent on the type of electrical source.


Firing was accomplished by activation of the electrical source from a safe position to the rear.

ENCLOSURES:

- (1) (140mm high explosive rocket launcher)
- (2) (140mm high explosive rocket and packing cannister)
- (3) (140mm high explosive rocket fuze)
- (4) (140mm high explosive rocket position, (battery layout, and individual weapons position.))

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
DECLASSIFIED



ENCL: (1) (140 MM HE RKT LAUNCHER)

DECLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIED



ENCL:(2) (140 MM HE RKT AND PACKING CANNISTER)

DECLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIED



ENCL: (3)(140 MM HE RKT FUZE)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



ENCL: (4) (140 MM HE RKT POSN.) (BTRY LAYOUT, AND INDIVIDUAL WPNS POSN.)

DECLASSIFIED

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ANNEX F (CHANGES AND CORRECTIONS TO 1ST MARDIV PERINTREPS) TO 1ST MARDIV
PERINTREP 4-67

1. The following change to 1st MarDiv (Rein) FMF, Perintrep No 16-66, annex E (MACV Directive No 381029). (Military Intelligence Graphic Depiction of Enemy Forces) 4 November 1966, Para 3a. (2) is forwarded.


CHANGE

* * * * *

3. GRAPHIC PORTRAYALS

a.

(2) (Superseded) Example (Sapper Battalion)



K76 VC MF

K76 Sapper Battalion VC
Main Force, PROBABLE

* * * * *

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

RELEASABLE TO FWMAF
AND RVNAF

CONFIDENTIAL

F-1



DECLASSIFIED

5 ✓ OPN LAFAYETTE
46 ✓ FRAG O 24-67 (OPN PULASKI) (U)
47 ✓ TERMINATION OF OPN STONE
48 ✓ ROUGH RIDER (U)
49 ✓ ROAD SECURITY (U)
50 ✓ NGTS IN I CTZ
51 ✓ OPN LANOKE (U)
52 ✓ HELICOPTER SUPPORT OF OPNS (U)
53 ✓ CHOP ADCON 5TH MARINES
54 ✓ OPN PULASKI (U)
55 ✓ OPN LANOKE (U)
56 ✓ FRAG O 26-67 (BN DEPLOYMENT) (U)
57 ✓ FIRST MARDIV FRAG ORDER 26-67 (BN DEPLOYMENT)
58 ✓ SITUATION OPN PRAIRIE
59 ✓ BN DEPLOYMENT (U)

CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 220557Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 220725Z FEB 67
FIRST MARINES 220820Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 230355Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 240231Z FEB 67
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT 240706Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 250619Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 252355Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 270025Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 271255Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 281135Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 281415Z FEB 67
NINTH MARINES 281510Z FEB 67
III MAF COC 281525Z FEB 67
CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 281549Z FEB 67

NOTE: Adm Plan 303-66, 281600 14 Feb 67, file w/ 1st mardiv Plan 303-66, See 1966
LSC 308 1947

SECRET



0100Z FEB 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN A1R0

INFO FIRST MAW

OP 310931Z JAN 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO CG III MAF

INFO CG TF XRAY

DSA I CORPS

FIRST MAR

ET

SECRET

RELIEF OF ARVN UNITS (U)

A. CG III MAF 171416Z JAN 67

1. IAW REF A FIRST MARDIV ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY NUI DAU/NUI DANG
AREA 291800H JAN 67 AND NUI LAC SON/VIET AN OUTPOST 301000H JAN 67


GP-4

ET

5
SECRET
Encl (1)

SECRET

R



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WAR SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

0021430Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV *CCC*

TO CG TF XRAY
 NINTH MAR
 INFO CG III MAF
 CG FMAW

BT
 SE C R E T

IRAG O 15-67 (DEPLOYMENT RIFLE CO CHU LAI)

1. SITUATION. RECENT INTELLIGENCE INDICATES NEED FOR REPOSITIONING OF FIRST MARDIV ASSETS TO COUNTER EN THREAT IN SOUTHERN I CTZ.

2. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. ONE RIFLE CO OF NINTH MAR IS DEPLOYED BY AIR TO CHU LAI FOR EMPLOYMENT W/I TAOR

B. CG TF XRAY. PREPARE TO RECEIVE AND EMPLOY ONE RIFLE CO IN CHU LAI TAOR

C. NINTH MAR

(1) DESIGNATE, PREPARE AND DEPLOY ONE RIFLE CO FOR HELILIFT TO DA NANG AIRFIELD FOR DEPARTURE 031145H BY FIXED WING AIRLIFT TO CHU LAI.

(2) COMPANY DEPLOYING CHU LAI CARRY COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIP


PAGE TWO RUMHLA 0232E S E C R E T
 ONLY, ORGANIC COMM EQUIP, 2 DOA AND 2 DAYS MCI
 (3) EST DURATION OF DEPLOYMENT: TWO WEEKS.
 (4) OPCON PASSES TF XRAY ON ARRIVAL CHU LAI

GP-4
 ET

SECRET

Encd (2)

SECRET



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

K

P 030113Z FEB 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO CG TF XRAY

G-3

FIRST MAR

NINTH MAR

ELEVENTH MAR

SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

THIRD TK BN

INFO CG III MAF

BT

S E C R E T

COUNTY FAIR OPNS (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 010551Z FEB 67 (PASEP)

B. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 311431Z JAN 67

C. FIRST MARDIV OP 0 307-66

1. REF A CITES CUMULATIVE SUCCESS OF HUNDRED COUNTY FAIR OPNS IN I CTZ SINCE FIRST OPN IN FEB66.

2. REF B EMPHASIZES NEED FOR CONTY FAIRS AGAINST SELECTED TARGETS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TET STANDDOWN PERIOD TO BLOCK EXFILTRATION OF EN FROM POPULATED AREAS.

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 254E S E C R E T

3. REPOSITIONING OF ARVN FORCES AND NATIONWIDE EMPHASIS ON 1967 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM NOW INDICATE INCREASING

AVAILABILITY GVN AND ARVN ASSETS TO SPT FUTURE COUNTY FAIR OPNS.

4. CMDRS WILL PLAN AND EXECUTE INCREASED NUMBER COUNTY FAIR OPNS WITHIN CAPABILITY. REPORT COUNTY FAIR DESIGNATION, DTG COMMENCEMENT, LOCATION (COMMUNITY NAME AND COORDINATES), AND PARICIPATING UNIT(S) AS SOON AS DETERMINED. REF C APPLIES. MINIMUM DURATION:

48 HOURS


GP-4

BT

SECRET

Encl (3)

SECRET



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LIO
	PER SUM
	WX SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

00 000Z 031021Z FEB 67
 FM 00 FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO 06 TF XRAY

FIRST AT BN

BT

SECRET

FRAG C 16-67 (DEPLOYMENT ANTI TANK PLAT CHU LAI)

1. TACTICAL SITUATION DUC PHO DICTATES DEPLOYMENT OF ANTITANK ASSETS TO THAT AREA.

2. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. ONE ANTITANK PLAT FIRST AT BN IS DEPLOYED BY FIXED WING FM DA NANG TO CHU LAI, SURFACE MOVE TO QUANG NGAI AND HELILIFT DUC PHO AREA.

B. 06 TF XRAY. PREPARE TO RECEIVE AND DEPLOY ONE AT PLAT TO VIC DUC PHO.

C. FIRST AT BN.

1. DESIGNATE, PREPARE AND DEPLOY ONE PLAT OF FIVE ONTOS TO CHU LAI FOR FURTHER DEPLOYMENT.

2. ADMIN AND LOG INSTRNS PASEP.

D. COORD INSTRNS

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 0347E S E C R E T

1. OPCON PASSES TF XRAY ON ARRIVAL CHU LAI.

2. DIRLAUTH ALCON.


GP=4

BT

SECRET

Encl(4)

SECRET



P 050702Z FEB 67
 FM CG III MAF
 INFO CG FIRST MARDIV
 CG FIRST MAW
 CG THIRD MARDIV
 CG FORLOGCMD
Z 0 031049Z FEB 67
 FM CG I FFORCEV NHA RVN
 TO CG FIRST CAV DIV AM AKE RVN
 CG FOURTH INF DIV PKU RVN
 CO THIRD BDE TWENTY FIFTH INF DIV KMD RVN
 CO SEVENTEENTH AVN GP NHA RVN
 CO FIFTY FOURTH SIG BN NHA RVN
 INFO COMUSMACV SGN RVN
 COMUSMACV COC SGN RVN
 CG III MAF/SA I CORPS DNG RVN
 CMDR SEVENTH USAF TSN RVN
 CG FIRST LOG COMD TSN RVN
 CG USASC QNH RVN
 DSA II CORPS PKU RVN
 CO FIRST BDE FOURTH INF DIV THA RVN
 CO THIRD BDE TWENTY FIFTH INF DIV PKU RVN
 SA TWENTY SECOND INF DIV QNH RVN
 CO FORTY FOURTH MED BDE SGN RVN
 I FFORCEV LNO TO MACV SGN RVN

K

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	-2
26	LNO
92	PER SUM
20	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

Watch Off
 Read for Info

24. Bure *ff*
 25. Andy *a*
 Lt. Sunda *ff*

PAGE 2 RUMNVF 1175 S E C R E T
 I FFORCEV LNO TO USARV TSN RVN
 OIC DTMO TMA PKU
 OIC DTMO COA QNH RVN

BT
 S E C R E T AVFA-GC-PL A-0435 SECT I OF II
 SUBJECT: FRAG ORDER 10-67 (U)

REFS: A. COMUSMACV MSG (S) CITE 03921 DTG 020034Z FEB, WHICH
 IS WARNING ORDER FOR I FFORCEV TO PREPARE TO REINFORCE III MAF WITH
 ONE BDE (NOTAL) (C).

B. ARBABU WARNING ORDER BY PHONECON 2 FEB BY MAJ
 GANNON HQ I FFORCEV TO MAJ DRUDIK, 3D BDE, 25TH INF; CPT MCRAE,
 4TH INF DIV; AND MAJ STOTSER, HQ 1ST CAV DIV.

TASK ORGANIZATION: 3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV

1/14 INF

1/35 INF

2/35 INF

2/9 ARTY (105)

D CO 65 ENGR BN

SPT BN (-)

ONE ASSAULT HELICOPTER CO (GS)

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

SECRET

Enc 15

SECRET

PAGE 3 RUMNVF 1175 S E C R E T

1. (S) SITUATION:

A. ENEMY FORCES: RECENT ENEMY ACTIVITIES WITHIN I CTZ INDICATE THAT ENEMY FORCES MAY LAUNCH A CONCERTED ATTACK AGAINST FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS IN THAT CORPS AREA EITHER PRIOR TO, DURING, OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER, THE TET HOLIDAY PERIOD.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES:

(1) 7TH US AIR FORCE MAINTAINS AIR SUPERIORITY AND PROVIDES AIRLIFT.

(2) 1ST LOG COMD PROVIDES LOGISTICAL SPT.

(3) (S) MISSION: I FFORCEV DEPLOYS ONE BDE TASK FORCE WITH THREE MANEUVER BNS, APPROPRIATE COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SPT ELEMENTS BY AIR TO I CTZ TO CONDUCT OPN FOR A PERIOD OF APPROX TWO WEEKS UNDER OPCON CG III MAF.

3. (S) EXECUTION:

A. CONCEPT OF OPN: THIS DEPLOYMENT WILL BE A THREE PHASED OPN UTILIZING TWO DEPARTURE AIRFIELDS (PLEIKU AND QUI NHON): PHASE I (H-12 HOURS TO H-HOUR): EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT OF NOTIFICATION, ONE BN TASK FORCE COMMENCES ASSEMBLY AND PREPARATION FOR DEPLOYMENT BY AIR FROM PLEIKU AIRFIELD. BN TASK FORCE MUST BE READY TO DEPLOY AT H-HOUR. BDE TF (-) BEGINS ASSEMBLY

PAGE 4 RUMNVF 1175 S E C R E T

AND MOVEMENT TO QUI NHON.

PHASE II (H-HOUR TO APPROX H PLUS 16):

(A) (1-) BN TASK FORCE DEPLOYS BY AIR FROM PLEIKU TO I CTZ.

(B) BDE TASK FORCE (-) CONTINUES ASSEMBLY AT QUI NHON AND PREPARES FOR AIR MOVEMENT TO I CTZ.

(C) BDE TASK FORCE SPT ELEMENTS AT PLEIKU PREPARE FOR AIR MOVEMENT TO I CTZ.

PHASE III (APPROX H PLUS 16 TO APPROX H PLUS 60):

(A) BDE TASK FORCE (-) MOVES BY AIR FROM QUI NHON TO I CTZ.

(B) BDE SPT ELEMENTS AT PLEIKU MOVE BY AIR TO I CTZ.

B. 1ST CAV DIV (AM): PHASE I AND II PARTICIPATION ONLY:

(1) COMMENCING H-12 HOURS ASSEMBLE AND MOVE TF 3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV (-) TO QUI NHON AIRFIELD.

(2) RELEASE OPCON TF 3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV (-) TO THIS HQ UPON CLOSURE QUI NHON AIRFIELD.

C. 4TH INF DIV: PHASE I PARTICIPATION ONLY:

(1) COMMENCING H-12 HOURS ASSEMBLE AND MOVE TF 2/35TH

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMNVF 1175 S E C R E T
 TO PLEIKU AIRFIELD.

(2) RELEASE OPCON TF 2/35TH UPON CLOSURE PLEIKU
 AIRFIELD TO CO, 3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV.
 (3) ASSUME OPCON B BTRY, 5TH BN, 16TH ARTY, IN PLACE,
 EFFECTIVE H-12 HOURS.

D. 3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV:

(1) SUBMIT AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS FOR DEPLOYMENTS FROM
 PLEIKU AND QUI NHON AIRFIELDS TO CG, I FFORCEV NLT 051700H FEB.

(2) PHASE I:

(A) ESTABLISH DEPARTURE AIRFIELD CONTROL GROUPS
 AT PLEIKU AND QUI NHON AIRFIELDS.

(B) CO, 3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV ASSUME OPCON TF
 2/35TH UPON CLOSURE PLEIKU AIRFIELD.

(C) AT H-12 HOURS RELEASE OPCON B BTRY, 5TH BN,
 16TH ARTY TO CG, 4TH INF DIV.

(3) PHASE II:

(A) DEPLOY TF 2/35TH FROM PLEIKU BY AIR, TO I CTZ.

(B) COMMENCE MOVEMENT OF BDE SPT ELEMENTS FROM
 BDE BASE CAMP TO PLEIKU AIRFIELD.

(4) PHASE III:

PAGE 6 RUMNVF 1175 S E C R E T

(A) DEPLOY BDE (-) BY AIR FROM QUI NHON AND PLEIKU
 AIRFIELDS TO I CTZ UNDER OPCON THIS HQ.

(B) UPON CLOSURE OF LAST ELEMENTS IN I CTZ OPCON
 III MAF.

E. 17TH AVN GP: AT H-HOUR COMMENCE MOVEMENT OF ONE
 ASSAULT HELICOPTER CO, APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF GUNSHIPS AND TWO
 CH-47 HELICOPTERS TO I CTZ. OPCON CO 3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV UPON
 CLOSURE.

F. 54TH SIG BN: PHASE II AND III ONLY: SUPPORT DEPLOY-
 MENT OF 3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV FROM DEPARTURE AIRFIELDS AT PLEIKU
 AND QUI NHON AS NECESSARY.

G. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

(1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT, FOR
 EXECUTION ON ORDER CG, I FFORCEV.

(2) CG, III MAF WILL ASSUME OPCON OF 3D BDE, 25TH
 INF DIV UPON CLOSURE OF TF 3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV AT DESTINATION
 AIRFIELD.

(3) H-HOUR: LAUNCH OF 1ST AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT FROM ON-
 LOAD AIRBASE, TBA.

(4) D DAY: TBA.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 7 RUMNVF 1175 S E C R E T

(5) DESTINATION AIRFIELD: TBA.
(6) HQ I FFORCEV WILL EFFECT NECESSARY COORDINATION
WITH HQ III MAF.

4. (S) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

A. ADMINISTRATION: ANNEX M, I FFORCEV SOP.

B. LOGISTICS:

1) MATERIAL SERVICES.

A) SUPPLY.

1. BRIGADE DEPLOYS WITH BASIC LOAD OF CLASS
V, CLASS I, III, IIIA, II AND IV AS REQUIRED.

2. SUPPLY POINT DISTRIBUTION FROM CHU LAI AND/
OR DA NANG.

3. RESUPPLY BY SEA AND AIR LOC FROM QUI NHON
TO CHU LAI AND/OR DA NANG. CLASS II, IV AND V ONLY.

4. STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE: RECOMMEND ONE DAY
AT FSE OR AS DIRECTED BY CO, 3/25TH INF DIV.

5. SERVICES: AS REQUESTED FROM CG, 1ST LOG
COMD.

(B) TRANSPORTATION: 3/25TH INF DIV MOVES INTO
AO BY AIR. 1BN TF AND SPT ELEMENTS STAGE OUT OF PLEIKU, REMAINDER
BT

SECRET

SECRET

P 050702Z FEB 67

FM CG III MAF

INFO CG FIRST MARDIV *G-3*

CG FIRST MAW

CG THIRD MARDIV

CG FORLOGCMD

Z 0 031049Z FEB 67

FM CG I FFORCEV NHA RVN

TO CG FIRST CAV DIV AM AKE RVN

CG FOURTH INF DIV PKU RVN

CO THIRD BDE TWENTY FIFTH INF DIV HMD RVN

CO SEVENTEENTH AVN GP NHA RVN

CO FIFTY FOURTH SIG BN NHA RVN

INFO COMUSMACV SGN RVN

COMUSMACV COC SGN RVN

CG III MAF/SA I CORPS DNG RVN

CMDR SEVENTH USAF TSN RVN

CG FIRST LOG COMD TSN RVN

CG USASC QNH RVN

DSA II CORPS PKU RVN

CO FIRST BDE FOURTH INF DIV THA RVN

CO THIRD BDE TWENTY FIFTH INF DIV PKU RVN

SA TWENTY SECOND INF DIV QNH RVN

CO FORTY FOURTH MED BDE SGN RVN

I FFORCEV LNO TO MACV SGN RVN

2670

PAGE 2 RUMNVF 1176 S E C R E T

I FFORCEV LNO TO USARV TSN RVN

OIC DTMO TMA PKU

OIC DTMO TMA QNH RVN

BT

S E C R E T AVFA-CG-PL A0435 FINAL SEC OF II

OF 3/25TH INF DIV STAGE OUT OF QUI NHON.

(2) EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION. AS DIRECTED BY

CO, 44TH MED BDE.

5. (S) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

A. COMMAND: AS INDICATED HEREIN.

B. SIGNAL: CURRENT SOI - SSI REMAINS IN EFFECT UNTIL
CLOSURE IN II CTZ.

6. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE TYPHOON TOC.


GP-4

BT

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

SECRET

SECRET



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	PRINT

1969

Z 041150Z FEB 67
 FM CG III MAU/SA I CORPS
 TO ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FORLOGCMD
 ZEN/CG SECOND BDE ROKMC
 ZEN/NINTH ENGR BN
 ZEN/ELEVENTH ENGR BN
 ZEN/FIRST MP BN
 ZEN/FIFTH COMM BN
 ZEN/SEVENTH ENG BN
 RUMNVH/I CORPS AVN SEC (PROV)
 RUMNVH/I CORPS ADV GRP
 RUMSBB/FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISOR

BT
 SECRET
 U.S. TET POLICY

1. MILITARY OPERATIONS WILL BE CURTAILED IN VIETNAM DURING THE
 PERIOD 080700H FEB 67 - 120700H FEB 67 REPEAT 080700H FEB 67 - 120700H

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 271 S E C R E T
 FEB 67.
 2. DETAILED INSTR WILL FOLLOW.
 GP-4
 BT

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
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1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

SECRET

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

K



COC

P 050905Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO CG TASK FORCE XRAY G-3
 INFO CG III MAF
 NINTH MAR
 FIRST AT BN
 BT
 S E C R E T
CHANGE OF OPCON (II)


1. OPCON CO D FIRST BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR PASSED TASK FORCE XRAY
 AT 031300H FEB 67.
2. OPCON THIRD PLAT CO B FIRST AT BN PASSED TASK FORCE XRAY
 AT 040800H FEB 67.

GP-4
 BT

II

SECRET

Encl 2 (7)

~~SECRET~~

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

13 Feb
Burn

060621Z
 P 060621Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN G-3
 INFO HQ BN
 NINETH MAR
 ELEVENTH MAR
 DET THIRD ENGR BN
 THIRD AT BN
 P 041257X FEB 67
 FM CG THIRD MARDIV
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV
 THIRD AT BN
 FIRST BN, NINETH MAR
 FOURTH BN, TWELFTH MAR
 HQ BN THIRD MARDIV
 INFO CG III MAF
 CG FIRST MAR
 CG FORLOGCMD
 TWELFTH MAR
 FL SU-2
 SA FIRE INF DIV (ARVN)
 BT
 S E C R E T

ROUGH RIDER CONVOY - DISPLACEMENT OF 3D AT 20
 A. CG THIRD MARDIV 201255Z JAN 67 TOTAL
 B. THIRD MARDIV OP 0 416-66
 1. REF A REFERS
 2. ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS WILL BE SCHEDULED 11 - 12 FEB 67 TO MOVE 3D

~~SECRET~~*Oneill (8)*

SECRET

PAGE TWO RUMNVP 2617D S E C R E T
 MT BN (-) FROM DANANG TO PHU BAI.

DATE/TIME FROM TO
 040000H FEB DANANG PHU BAI
 090000H FEB PHU BAI DANANG
 120900H FEB DANANG PHU BAI

3. FIRST MARDIV

- a. REQUEST YOU ORGANIZE ROUGH RIDERS ON 10, 11 & 12 FEB 67 AND PROVIDE SUPPORT LESS INF SECURITY ELEMENT IAW REF B. ENGR SUPT REQUIRE 10FEB ONLY. TO BE RETURNED 11 FEB. THIS HQ PROVIDE ENGR SUPT 11 AND 12 FEB.
- b. THIRD HQ TO PROVIDE RIFLE PLT (REIN) WITH ARTY FO, FAC, NCF SPOT TM WITH NECESSARY COMM VEHICLES.
- c. REQ YOU PROVIDE RIFLE CO (REIN) AS CONVOY RESERVE WHILE ROUGH RIDER IN YOUR AOR ALL DATES.
- d. CHOP POINT IS 1ST MARDIV/3D MARDIV BOUNDARY.
- e. NOTIFY THIS HQ IF CANCELLED DUE TO WEATHER OR ROAD CONDITIONS.
- f. 3D MT BN, EXECUTE ROUGH RIDERS IAW REF. E
- 5. 1ST BN, 9TH MARINES
- g. PROVIDE RIFLE PLT (REIN) WITH ARTY FO, FAC NCF SPOT TM WITH NECESSARY COMM VEHICLES TO 3MT BN ON 9 FEB 67 TO ACT AS CONVOY

PAGE THREE RUMNVP 0617D S E C R E T
 SECURITY FORCE ON 10, 11 AND 12 FEB 67.
 b. PROVIDE RIFLE CO (REIN) AS CONVOY RESERVE ON 15 MINUTE ALERT 10-12 FEB 67 FROM 0800H UNTIL SECURED BY THIS HQ.

MISSION: CONVOY RESERVE, REF B REFERS.


- 6. 4TH BN (-) (REIN), 12TH MARINES
 - a. PROVIDE ARTY SUPPORT AND LN TMS IAW REF B.
 - b. PROVIDE FO TEAM TO 1/9.
- 7. HQ BN, PROVIDE MIL POLICE ESCORT IAW REF 3 FOR ROUGH RIDER CONVOY 10-12 FEB.
- 8. IN EVENT WEATHER OR ROAD CONDITIONS REQUIRE CANCELLATION RESCHEDULE FOLLOWING DAY.
- 9. DIRLAUTH ALCON.
- 10. COMMAND COMMUNICATION. IAW REF B.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

SECRET

	BURN
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	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WR SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
C	POST



OP 070255Z FEB67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV

HQ BN
 NINTH MAR
 ELEVENTH MAR
 DET THIRD ENGR BN
 THIRTEENTH MT BN
 INFO CG III MAF
 CG FIRST MAW
 CG FLC
 SEVENTH ENGR BN

BT
 S E C R E T

FRAG O 17-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)

- A. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMIN O 301-66
- B. CG THIRD MARDIV 041257Z FEB67 (NOTAL)
- C. THIRD MARDIV O P 416-66 (NOTLA)
- D. FIRST MARDIV 190916Z JAN67 (NOTAL)
- E. FIRST MARDIV O P 020000.2C (NOTD)

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 793E S E C R E T

F. THIRD MARDIV O P 0200.2E (NOTD)

1. MISSION. FIRST MARDIV DIRECTS MOVEMENT THIRD MT BN(-) BY ADMIN MILITRAY CONVOYS FROM DA NANG TO PHU BAI DURING PERIOD 10-12 FEB67 IAW REF A AND AS REQUESTED REF B.

2. EXECUTION.

A. NINTH MAR. PROVIDE CONVOY RESERVE ON 10, 11 AND 12 FEB67 IAW PARA 3.D. (1) (B) REF A. CONVOY SECURITY TO BE FURNISHED BY THIRD MARDIV AS STATED REF B.

B. ELEVENTH MAR. REF A AS APPLICABLE.

C. DET THIRD ENGR BN. ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED IN PARA 3.G. REF A FOR ROUGH RIDER OF 10 FEB67 ONLY.

D. THIRD MT BN. EXECUTE ROUGH RIDER IAW REFS A AND B.

E. CORD INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) REF A MODIFIED FOR CONVOYS DA NANG TO PHU BAI.

(2) CHK PTS. REFS C AND D.

(3) D DAYS H HOURS:

(1) FM DA NANG 100900H FEB 67 AND 120900H FEB67.

(2) FM PHU BAI: IAW REF B.

(4) IN EVENT WEATHER OR ROAD CONDITIONS REQUIRE POSTPONEMENT CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOL DAY.

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
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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 798E S E C R E T
(5) THIRD MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON NORTHBOUND CONVOYS ON
CROSSING FIRST MARDIV/THIRD MARDIV BOUNDARY VIC CHK PT 49. FIRST
MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON SOUTHBOUND CONVOYS SAME LOCATION.
4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. REF A.
5. COMM -ELECT . REFS E AND F.
BT

SECRET

SECRET



	BURN
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	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

Col

P 071439Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO CG TF XRAY
 FIRST RECON BN
 INFO CG III MAF
 BT

SECRET
 CHANGE OF OPCON (U)


A. CG FIRST MARDIV 260005Z JAN 67 (FRAG 09-67)
 1. IAW REF A, OPCON THIRD PLAT CO B FIRST RECON BN PASSED
 TF XRAY 071630H FEB 67.
 GP-4
 BT

SECRET

Index (10)

SECRET

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	C-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	W/R SUM
	ONE CIR
	REF
	POST

008010Z FEB 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN G-3

TO CG III MAF

INFO CG FIRST MAW

CG IF XRAY

CG FLC

BT

SECRET

REVISED CONCEPT AND SUPPORT REQMTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH SLF

EMPLOYMENT SA HUYNH/DUC PHU AREA

- A. CG III MAF CONFERENCE 070900H FEB 67
- B. CG I CORPS CONFERENCE 070700H FEB 67
- C. G-3 III MAF CONFERENCE 071330H FEB 67
- D. FIRST MARDIV COC MSG 171110Z JAN 67

1. GENERAL GUIDANCE DEVELOPED DURING REFS A AND B AND INFORMATION EXCHANGED IN REF C INDICATE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TO MSN AND OPNL PHASING OF CONCEPT CONTAINED REF D ARE REQUIRED.
2. OVERALL MSNS DERIVED FROM REFS A, B AND C INITIALLY INVOLVE COORDINATED PARTICIPATION BY THREE DISTINCT FORCES INCREASING TO FOUR FOLLOWING TERMINATION ARVN/2D ROK BDE/FIRST MARDIV OPN VIC

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 915E SECRET

HOOK OF SONG TRA KHUC (BS 4577) AGREED TO DURING REF B. APPROPRIATE MISSIONS FOR THESE FORCES FOLLOWS:

A. ARG/SLF: CONDUCTS AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT COMMENCING H-HOUR ON D-DAY TO DESTROY LOCAL GUERILLA FORCE AND MAIN FORCE UNITS IN SA HUYNH AREA; PREPARES ON ORDER TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY (S&D) OPNS TO NORTH ASTRIDE AND TO EAST OF NATL HIWAY ONE PREPARED TO LINK UP WITH AND SUPPORT FIRST MARDIV OPNS IN NUI DANG, NUI CUA NUI DAU AREA.

B. FIRST MARDIV: DIV ELEMENTS VIC DUC PHO CONTINUE S&D OPNS IN NUI DANG/NUI DAU AREA; PREPARED FOR LINK UP WITH SLF FROM SOUTH AND ARVN/FIRST MARDIV XROKMC FORCE FROM NORTH SUBSEQUENT TO OPN VIC HOOK OF SON TRA KHUC.

MY ELEMENTS: US ARMY BDE CONDUCTS CONCURRENT COORDINATED S&D OPN NORTH AND NORTHEAST INTO QUANG NGAI PROVINCE ON AXIS SONG AN LAO VALLEY A NUI DAU TO SEAL OFF EN ESCAPE ROUTES TO SOUTH AND WEST OF AOA AND CAPTURE OR DESTROY EN PERS SUPS AND EQPT; PREPARES TO PASS TO OPCON III MAF, RELIEVE SLF IN DAM AN KHE-SA HUYNH COMPLEX AND CONTINUE OPNS IN SPT ESTABLISHMENT OF CIDG CAMP, AIR FIELD AND PORT CONSTRUCTION THAT AREA.

3. PHASING OF OPNS TO ACCOMPLISH OVERALL OF MSN AS FOL'S:

ID
SECRET

(incl 11)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 915E S E C R E T

A. CONCEPT

(1) PHASE 1 (DURATIONS-8 DAYS)

(A) SLF CONDUCTS AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT COMMENCING H-HOUR ON D-DAY TO CONDUCT S&D OPNS IN SA HUYNH AREA TO DESTROY EN GUERRILLA, LOCAL FORCE AND MAIN FORCE UNITS; PREPARES ON ORDER TO CONDUCT S&D OPNS NORTH ALONG NATURAL LITTORAL APPROACH TO VIC NUI DAU.

(B) 1ST MARDIV ELEMENTS CONDUCT DELIBERATE S&D OPNS EAST OF HIGHWAY I IN AREA FORMED BY NUI DANG, NUI CUA, LAM BINH AND HILL 107 (BS 825350).

(2) PHASE 2 (DURATION 1AQP DAYS). SEE NOTE ONE.

(A) ON ORDER, SLF CONDUCTS DELIBERATE S&D OPNS NORTH ALONG MAIN AVENUE OF APPROACH INTO NUI DAU AREA; PREPARES ON ORDER TO LINK UP WITH 1ST MARDIV UNITS VIC NUI DAU AND CONTINUE OPNS.

(B) ON ORDER, 1ST MARDIV ELEMENTS ADVANCE SOUTH FROM VICINITY NUI DANG, NUI CAU, LAM BINH AND HILL 107 (BS 825350) TO CONDUCT DELIBERATE S&D OPNS BETWEEN HIGHWAY I AND THE SEA; PREPARE ON ORDER TO LINK UP WITH SLF VIC NUI DAU AND CONTINUE OPNS.

(C) ARMY BRIGADE PASSES TO OPCON III MAF AND RELIEVES SLF IN VIC DAN AN KHE- SA HUYNH; PREPARES TO CONTROL ACCESS TO SA

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 915E S E C R E T
HUYNH, PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF CIDG CAMP AND AIRFIELD AND PORT CONSTRUCTION.

(3) PHASE 3 (DURATION 8-10 DAYS)

(A) SLF AND 1ST MARDIV ELMS CONTINUE S&D OPNS DUC PHO AREA TO DESTROY ORGANIZED VC UNITS, REDUCE VC INFLUENCE, AND WEAKEN VC INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGHOUT DUC PHO AREA.

(4) PHASE 4 (DURATION 1-2 DAYS). AMPHIB WITHDRAWAL OF SLF.

NOTE ONE: WHILE DETAILS CONCERNING ANTICIPATED TERMINATION ARVN/USMC/ROKMC OPN IN VIC SONG TRA KHUC ARE NOT AVAILABLE, IT IS CONSIDERED COMPLEMENTARY OPERATION BY THIS FORCE SOUTH OF MODUC AND INTO THE DUC PHO AREA ARE FEASIBLE WITHIN THIS PHASE.

B. D-DAY TENTATIVELY 15FEB67

4. SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES

A. OFF SHORE LOG SHIPS AND LSA QUANG NGAI ARE PROGRAMMED TO SUPPORT FORCES CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN OPN DESOTO AND TO BUILD DUC PHO STOCKS TO ACCEPTABLE LEVELS. ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR EARLY LOG SPT SLF BEYOND CURRENT AND PROGRAMMED CAPABILITIES. MAINTENANCE OF PRESENT SUPPORT CONTINGENT ON RETENTION PRESENTLY ASSIGNED SHIPS OR LPD OR LSD WITH FULL FLIGHT DECK. ACCORDINGLY

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
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PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 915E S E C R E T
REQUEST ARG BE PREPARED SUPPORT SLF UNTIL D PLUS FIFTEEN.
B. ADDITIONALLY, REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR RETURN USS REPOSE
NLT D DAY. ALTERNATIVE IS SUITABLY CONFIGURED SHIP WITH APPRO-
PRIATE MEDICAL ELEMENTS EMBARKED.
C. NGF SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IN SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE
FOR SPT OPNS FOL:
(1) THROUGHOUT OPN DUC PHO/SA HUYNH COMPLEX
(A) ONE LSMR CONTINUOUSLY ON STATION
(B) ONE DESTROYER
(C) ONE CRUISER WHEN AVAILABLE FOR HEAVY TARGETS
(2) DURING MOVEMENT ARVN/FIRST MARDIV FORCE QUANG NGAI/
MODUC/DUC PHO ONE DESTROYER. 5 IN/54.
5. ON TERMINATION OF OPN AND WITHDRAWAL OF SLF, A DETAILED ASSESS-
MENT OF FINAL POSTURE IN AREA IS NECESSARY. AS INDICATED IN MISSIONS
AND PHASING OF OPN, US ARMY ELEMENTS RELIEVE SLF IN SA HUYNH
AREA AND CONTINUE OPNS IN SUPPORT OF CIDG CAMP ESTABLISHMENT AND
AIRFIELD AND PORT CONSTRUCTION. USMC ELEMENTS FROM CHU LAI COMBAT
BASE RETURN TO ASSIGNED SECTORS THEREIN. ARVN PLANS FOR DUC PHO AREA
ARE YET TO BE DETERMINED. POSSIBILITY EXISTS FROM REF B THAT ARMF
ELMS MAY AGAIN ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY DUC PHO AREA. EARLY RESOLUTION
ARVN INTENTIONS THIS MATTER REQUIRED.

GP-4
BT

SECRET

SECRET



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	W/ SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

0 080122Z FEB 67

FM CG III MAE
 TO ZEN/COMNAVSUPPACT
 ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 ZEN/CG IF XRAY
 RUMFCR/WESTCHESTER COUNTY

6-3

4617

BT

S E C R E T

REQUEST FOR LCU SUPPORT OPERATION DESOTO

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 060939Z (TOTAL)

1. FOR CG FIRST MAR DIV. THIS REPLIES REF A.

2. FOR COMNAVSUPPACT:

A. REQUEST ASSIGNMENT LCU AS REQUESTED IN REF A.

B. LCU TO REPORT ASAP CG IF X-RAY REP AI CUS HO RAMP, CHU LAI. TWO 5,000 GAL REFUELER AND OPERATORS, PROCEED TO OPERATION DESOTO AREA, RENDEZVOUS WITH WESTCHESTER COUNTY HELO REFUELING OPERATIONS.

C. REQUEST ASSIGN RADIO FREQUENCIES UPON WHICH LCU CAN CONTACT WESTCHESTER COUNTY AND ADVISE ETA LCU AT CHU LAI. INFO ALCON.

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 5065 S E C R E T

3. FOR WESTCHESTER COUNTY:

A. REQUEST YOU ADVISE FEASIBILITY INSTALLATION TAFDS SYSTEM WITH ONE TEN THOUSAND GAS BAG ON MAIN DECK FOR HELO REFUELING. FUEL BAG DIMENSIONS ARE 42 FT LONG, 12 FT WIDE, AND 4 FT HIGH. IF FEASIBLE REQUEST ADVISE IF PRESENT MAIN DECK CARGO MUST BE TOTALLY OR PARTIALLY REMOVED PRIOR TO TAFDS INSTALLATION
NHW FOND

SOONEST PRACTICAL TIME OF INSTALLATION. REQUEST ADVISE CRIBBING/ANCHORING REQUIREMENT BEYOND YOUR CAPABILITY.

B. REQUEST ADVISE ALCON GRID COORDINATES YOUR OPERATING AREA ALL. RELEASE OF ASSIGNED LCU EARLIEST MANDATORY DECJSRG0
OPERATIONS NORTHERN IOTZ. DESOTO

GP-4


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(Incl 12)

CONFIDENTIAL



	BURN
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	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WT SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

R

R 080621Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN *S/S*
 TO FIRST MARDIV ADCON/OPCON
 R 070956Z FEB 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO III MAF
 INFO CG FMFPAC

MSG FM LT GEN WALT

BT

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
AS III MAF EMERGES FROM THE MUD AND DIRTY WEATHER OF THE ~~WET~~ MONSOON I DESIRE TO CONVEY TO ALL OF YOU MY WARM APPRECIATION FOR YOUR SPLENDID PERFORMANCE DURING THE PAST TRYING MONTHS. I HAVE WITNESSED THE HARDSHIPS OF THE TROOPS IN THE FIELD. I AM MINDFUL OF THE FLYING HAZARDS TO WHICH OUR PILOTS WERE EXPOSED. I HAVE SEEN THE PROBLEMS OF SUPPLY MULTIPLIED MANY FOLD BY THE RAIN, THE MUD, AND THE GALE WINDS. IT HAS NOT BEEN EASY. DESPITE THESE OBSTACLES YOU HAVE DONE YOUR JOBS WITH SUCH VALOR, DEVOTION AND PROFESSIONALISM THAT YOU HAVE STOLEN FROM THE ENEMY HIS BEST CHANCE TO MEET US ON IS TERMS. I SHARE WITH YOU THE WELL-FOUNDED PRIDE WHICH YOU MAY FEEL IN THIS ACCOMPLISHMENT. WELL DONE. LT GEN WALT SENDS.

GP-4

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CONFIDENTIAL

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	WK SUM
	ONE PER
	DATA
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COO

0 080704Z FEB 67

FM COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG

TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF

INFO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV - 6-3

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHLA/CG TASK FORCE XRAY

ZEN/NAVSUPPDET CHU LAI

RUMFCR/USST WESTCHESTER COUNTY

BT

S E C R E T

REQUEST FOR LCU SUPPORT OPERATION DESOTO (C)

A. CG III MAF 080122Z FEB 67 PASEP

1. REF A REQUESTS ASSIGNMENT LCU FOR SUPPORT HELO REFUELING FROM WESTCHESTER COUNTY IN SOUTHERN I CORPS DURING OPERATION DESOTO.
2. LCU 1624 DEPARTED DANANG 080530Z. ETA CHU LAI 081130Z. WILL DEPART CHU LAI UPON COMPLETION OF LOADING AT FIRST LIGHT 9 FEB. ETA DESOTO OPERATION 090400Z. GUARDING 277.8 KCS(V) AND 2716 KCS(V). VOICE CALL MESH 1624. NAVSUPPDET CHU LAI GUARDS 2716 KCS(V) AND 3844 KCS(V). VOICE CALL CHU LAI CONTROL.
3. OFFICER-IN-CHARGE LCU 1624 HAS BEEN DIRECTED REPORT TO CO WEST-


PAGE 2 RUMNNA 068 S E C R E T
CHESTER COUNTY FOR DUTY IN CONNECTION WITH HELO REFUELING OPERATIONS.
GP-4

BT

SECRET

(Incl 14)

SECRET



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	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

0 080917Z FEB 67
TM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN S-3

T2 CG TF XRAY

HQ BN

FIRST MAR

ELEVENTH MAR

FIRST AT BN

DET THIRD ENGR BN

FIRST MT BN

SEVENTH MT BN

INFO CG III MAF

CG FIRST MAW

SEVENTH ENGR BN

NINTH ENGR BN

BT

S E C R E T

FRAG O 18-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)

A. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMIN O 301-66

B. FIRST MARDIV O P02000.2C (CEOI)

C. CG FIRST MARDIV 120917Z JAN 67 (NOTAL)

CD

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 982E S E C R E T

D. PHONECON ASST G-4 1ST MARDIV WITH G-4 TF XRAY OF 8FEB 67

1. MISSION: FIRST MARDIV DIRECTS MOVEMENTS BY ADMIN MILITARY CONVOY AS FOL:

A. FROM DANANG TO CHU LAI: SEVENTH MT BN(-) IAW REF C AND D.

B. FROM CHU LAI TO DANANG: FIRST MT BN (-) IAW REF C AND D.

2. EXECUTION:

A. TF XRAY

(1) ASSUMEOPCON CONVOYS WHILE CONVOYS ARE SOUTH OF CHECK PT 21.

(2) PROVIDE BILLETING AND MESSING FACILITIES FOR CONVOY PERSONNEL.

(3) MOVE FIRST MT BN (-) CHU LAI TO DANANG IAW SCHEDULE PARA 3.G. (3) (B) THIS MSG.

B. FIRST MAR. REF A.

C. ELEVENTH MAR. REF A AS APPLICABLE.

D. FIRST AT BN. REF A.

E. DET THIRD ENGR BN. ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED IN PARA 3.G. REF A.

F. SEVENTH MT BN. REF A.



G. COORD INSTRUCTIONS

24

SECRET

Enc (15)

SECRET



R 10011Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV *AIR*
 TO CG TASK FORCE XRAY

R 082314Z FEB 67

FM CG FMFPAC
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV (W025)
 CG FIRST MAW

BT

S E C R E T

ALO/VAC REQUIREMENTS FOR TASK FORCE XRAY (C)

A. CG FIRST MAW 310343Z JAN (C) (NOTAL)

B. CG FMFPAC 201925Z JAN (U)

1. REDD

CE AA REQUESTED ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL N/A'S
 TO FIRST MARDIV TO MEET TASK FORCE XRAY REQUIREMENT.
 REFERENCE B PROVIDES GUIDANCE ON ALO/FAC ASSIGNMENT.
 2. FOR CG FIRST MARDIV: CONCUR WITH COMMENTS CONTAINED
 IN REFERENCE A PERTAINING TO INCREASE TOTAL N/A'S;
 HOWEVER CONSIDER

CREASE OF 2 VICE 3 N/A'S SUFFICIENT
 IN VIEW OF SIMILAR REQUIREMENTS IN THIRD MARDIV. ACCORD-
 INGLY THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL INITIATE ACTION TO INCREASE
 AT H QUARTER M/L BY 2 COMPANY GRADE N/A'S THERE BY INCREAS-
 ING TOTAL ALLOWANCE TO 29 VICE 27. INTERIM ASSIGNMENT
 OF ADDITIONAL COMPANY GRADE N/A'S WILL BE DRJCED AAT

PAGE TWO YYNAA 1529 SE C R E T
 EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

3. FOR CG FIRST MAW: REQUEST YOU SUBMIT NOMINATIONS
 TO THIS HEADQUARTERS NLT 10 FEBRUARY FOR 2 CAPT/LT N/A'S
 TO BE TRANSFERRED TO FIRST MARDIV SUPPORT IN SUPPORT OF TF XRAY
 PREQUISITES FOR NOMINATIONS WILL ACCORDANCEWATT
 REFERENCE B.

GP-4

BT

10

SECRET

Enc 16

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 982E S E C R E T

(1) REF A

(2) CHECK POINTS. REF A

(3) D DAY H HOUR

(A) DANANG TO CHU LAI: 100000H FEB 67

(B) CHU LAI TO DANANG: 12 FEB 67 AS DIRECTED BY
CG TF XRAY(C) IN EVENT WEATHER OR ROAD CONDITIONS REQUIRE
CANCELLATION, CONVOY TO BE RESCHEDULED FOL DAY.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. REF A.

5. COMM-ELECTE. REF B.


GP-4

BT

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	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

COC

Z O 090137Z FEB 67
 TM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO FIRST MAR

INFO CG FMAW

BT

SECRET

TERMINATION OPN SEARCY (U)

1. AUTHORITY GRANTED TO TERMINATE OPN SEARCY 091000H FEB 67.

GP=4

BT


G-3

SECRET

Encel (17)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET



K

	BURN
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	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

COC

Z O 090139Z FEB 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO NINTH MAR
 INFO CG FMAW
 HQ BN
 FIRST MAR
 NINTH MAR
 SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
 FIRST RECON BN
 DET THIRD ENGR BN
 DET THIRD SP BN
 FIRST MED BN
 BT

G. 3

SECRET

TERMINATION OPN INDEPENDENCE (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 301401Z JAN 67

1. AUTHORITY GRANTED TO TERMINATE OPN INDEPENDENCE 090900H
 FEB 67.

2. PARA 2.1. (2) REF A APPLIES.

GP-4


BT

SECRET

Emell(18)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET



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	BURN
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	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 090237Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO CG III MAF
 INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
 CG TF XRAY

G-3

BT

SECRET

EMPLOYMENT OF M-55 QUAD FIFTIES (U)

A. CG III MAF 160206Z NOV 66

1. 1/44TH ADA AV (SP) BN, USA, PRESENTLY EMPLOYED WITH THIRD MARDIV AS STATED REF A.

2. REQUEST APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIVE THAT ORGN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO FIRST MARDIV TO DETERMINE FEASIBILITY OF EMPLOYMENT M-55 QUAD FIFTY CALIBER WPN IN GROUND SUPPORT/GROUND BASE DEFENSE ROLE NUI DAU/NUI DANG AREA.

GP-4

ST

8
SECRET

(mell 19)

SECRET

0 100341Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV

HQ BN
 NINTH MAR
 ELEVENTH MAR
 DET THIRD ENGR BN
 THIRD MT BN
 INFO CG III MAF

CG FIRST MAW
 CG FLC
 SEVENTH ENGR BN
 BT

S E C R E T

EPAG O 19-67 (ROUGH RIDER) (U)

- A. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMIN O 301-66
- B. PHONECON LCOL HESS-LCOL BUSS OF 09FEB67
- C. THIRD MARDIV O P 416-66 (NOTAL)
- D. FIRST MARDIV 190916Z JAN 67 (NOTAL)
- E. FIRST MARDIV O P 0200G.2C (CGO)
- F. THIRD MARDIV O P 0200G.2E (CGI)

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1190E S E C R E T

1. MISSION. FIRST MARDIV DIRECTS MOVEMENT THIRD MT BN (-) BY ADMIN MILITARY CONVOYS FROM DANANG TO PHU BAI DURING PERIOD 13-15 FEB 67 IAW REF A AND AS DISCUSSED REF B.

2. EXECUTION

A. NINTH MAR PROVIDE CONVOY RESERVE ON 13-15FEB 67 IAW PARA 3D (1) (3) REF A. CONVOY SECURITY TO BE FURNISHED BY THIRD MARDIV AS AGREED REF B.

B. ELEVENTH MAR REF A AS APPLICABLE

C. DET THIRD ENGR BN. ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED IN PARA 3.G REF A FOR ROUGH RIDER OF 13 FEB 67 ONLY.

D. THIRD MT BN. EXECUTE ROUGH RIDER IAW REFS A AND B.

E. COORD INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) REF A MODIFIED FOR CONVOYS DANANG TO PHU BAI

(2) CHK PTS. REFS C AND D.

(3) D DAYS H HOURS:

(A) FM DANANG 130900H FEB 67 AND 150900H FEB 67

(B) FM PHU BAI: AS DIRECTED BY CG THIRD MARDIV O/A

14 FEB AS AGREED REF B.

(4) IN EVENT WEATHER OR ROAD CONDITIONS REQUIRE POSTPONE-

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1190E S E C R E T

MENT CONVOY TO BE RESCHED FOL DAY.


(5) THIRD MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON NORTHBOUND CONVOYS ON CROSSING FIRST MARDIV/THIRD MARDIV BOUNDARY VIC CHK PT 49. FIRST MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON SOUTHBOUND CONVOYS SAME LOCATION

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. REF A.

5. COMM-ELECT. REFS E AND F.


GP-4

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SECRET

Encl (20)

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	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	Wk SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

COC

0 101417Z FEB 67
 TO CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 CO CG III MAF
 CG THIRD MARDIV
 INFO THIRD TANK BN
 THIRD AT BN
 DET THIRD ENGR BN
 DET THIRD SP BN
 DET HQ BN THIRD MARDIV
 BY

G-3

SECRET
 ALLOCATION OF FORCES (U)

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 071516Z OCT 66
 B. CG THIRD MARDIV 080700Z OCT 66
 C. CG III MAF 090924Z OCT 66
 D. CG III MAF 141206Z JAN 67
 E. CG III MAF 120008Z DEC 66
 F. CG III MAF 210802Z JAN 67
 G. CG FIRST MARDIV 270217Z NOV 66
 H. CG FIRST MARDIV 050659Z NOV 66

9

SECRET

(Enc 21)

SECRET

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 1263E S E C R E T

I. CG III MAF 231230Z NOV 66
 J. CG FIRST MARDIV 133229Z DEC 66
 K. CG THIRD MARDIV 191419Z DEC 66
 L. CG THIRD MARDIV 090737Z FEB 67
 M. CG III MAF 250638Z JAN 67

I. REF A AS MODIFIED BY REF B AND AS AJUDICATED BY REF C ESTABLISHED THIRD MARDIV UNITS TO REMAIN DA NANG TAOR OPCON THIS COMMAND BASED ON THEN EXISTION SITUATION. SINCE EARLY OCTOBER, DEPARTURE OF FOURTH BN 503D INF AND RELIEF OF AND ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARVN OUTPOSTS AT NONG SON, NUI LAC SON/VIET AN AND NUI DANG/NUI DAU HAS RESULTED IN AN INCREASE FROM TEN TO TWELVE USMC AF BNS.

B. INCREASE IN FIRST MARDIV FORCE LEVELS AND COMMITMENTS HAVE REQUIRED CONTINUING REVIEW OF COMBAT SPT AND COMBAT SVC SPT ELEMENTS. ADJUSTMENTS IN MOTOR TRANSPORT, MEDICAL AND RECONNAIS- SANCE ASSETS, FROM INITIAL LEVELS, HAVE BEEN OR ARE BEING EFFECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFS D, E, AND F.

J. ARTILLERY ASSETS, AS INDICATED IN REF G, CONTINUE TO BE MARGINAL TO ACCOMPLISH ASSIGNED MSEN.

I. DIVISION ENGR ASSETS WERE ESTABLISHED BY REF C. REF H PRO-

PAGE 3 RUMHLA 1263E S E C R E T

POSED A TIME PHASED REALIGNMENT OF ENGR ASSETS. REF I CONCURRED IN THAT PORTION OF DIV ENGR BNS ADDRESSED IN REF H. REF J PRO- POSED SHIFT OF ENGR ASSETS FIRST TO THIRD MARDIV. REF K CONCURRED, SUBJECT TO COMPLETION OF CANTONMENT. REF L INCLUDES THIRD MARDIV PLANS, UNMODIRE TO COMMENCE MOVEMENT OF DET THIRD ENGR BN, COMPOSED OF DET M&S CO AND ENGR SPT CO MINUS, ON 16FEB67. CHANGING SITUATION BUILINED PARA ONE MITIGATES AGAINST RELEASE THESE ASSETS TO THIRD MARDIV. ASSETS ESTABLISHED BY REF C IN CONCERT WITH TASKS DIRECTED REF M CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ENGR SPT. ACCORDINGLY, NOW CONCUR WITH REF L AS IT RELATES TO MOVEMENT OF DET THIRD ENGR BN. NO DRAWDOWN OF ELMS, EQPT OR PERS OF DET THIRD ENGR BN OPCON FIRST MARDIV IS ACCEPTABLE.

J. BY REF C, BOTH THIRD AT BN MINUS AND THIRD TANK BN MINUS ASSETS WERE PLANNED FOR RETURN TO COMMAND THIRD MARDIV. REF L INDICATES THIRD MARDIV INTENT TO LEAVE CO C REIN THIRD AT BN AND CO B REIN THIRD TANK BN OPCON FIRST MARDIV. IN VIEW CURRENT RATIO OF FORCES BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD MARDIV, CONCUR REF L AS IT RELATE S.

TO AT AND TANK ASSETS. RECOMMEND REF C BE MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY. ADDITIONALLY, WITH REF TO M&S CO MINUS THIRD TANK BN, SELECTED PERS SHOULD REMAIN DANANG TO MAINTAIN CONTINUITY IN ACTIVE

SECRET

Enclosure C-1

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PAGE 4 RUMHLA 1263E S E C R E T
AND PROGRESSIVE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM NOW IN BEING (IN SAME MANNER
AS PERS ASSIGNED TO CAC PROGRAM REMAIN AS UNITS COME AND GO).
PERS INVOLVED WILL BE SUBJ SEPARATE MSG.

6. INCREASE IN SHORE PARTY ASSETS OF ONE SHORE PARTY CO CON-
SIDERED NECESSARY. AT PRESENT, FIRST SHORE PARTY BN, LESS ONE
CO AT DANANG, IS BASED AT CHU LAI. DET THIRD SHORE PARTY BN
COMPOSED OF ELMs OF H&S CO SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO THIRD MARDIV
IAW REF C. CURRENT RATIO OF FORCES BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD
MARDIV COUPLED WITH DISPOSITION FIRST MARDIV REIN FORCES,
INDICATES NEED FOR REEVALUATION DISTRIBUTION SHORE PARTY ASSETS.
RECOMMEND:

A. DET H&S CO THIRD SHORE PARTY BN REMAIN DANANG AS
COMMAND, HVY EQPT AND COMM SPT ELM FOR SHORE PARTY ASSETS
DANANG.

B. AN ADDNL SHORE PARTY CO BE PASSED OPCON FIRST MARDIV
EARLIER FOR EMPLOYMENT DANANG AREA.

7. INTEND RELOCATE FIRST MED BN FROM UNTEENABLE LOCATION ADJACENT
QUARRY TO CANTONMENT PRESENTLY OCCUPIED DETS 3D SHORE PARTY AND
HQ BN THIRD MARDIV. RELOCATION THESE DET TO BE DETERMINED AFTER
EXAMINATION TROOP DENSITY AND AVAILABLE CONTONMENTS FOLLOWING
FOREGOING MOVES.

GP-4



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SECRET

SECRET

0 101515Z FEB 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO CG FMAW
FIRST MAR
NINTH MAR
SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
ELEVENTH MAR
DET THIRD ENGR BN
DET THIRD SP BN
FIRST TK BN
ELEVENTH MT BN
INFO CG FLC
FLSG A
BT

S E C R E T
FRAG 0 20-67 (AUGMENTATION OPN STONE)

A. FIRST MAR 091230Z FEB 67 (NOTAL)
B. SECURE RADIO CON DIV OPS 0 - FIRST MAR 0A OF 101345H FEB 67
C. COMMENCING 12FEB67 FIRST MAR CONDUCTS OPN STONE, UNILATERAL OR COORDINATED SEARCH AND DESTROY OPM, IN SOUTHEAST PORTION OF SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES SECTOR OF TAOR AND THAT PORTION RZ ADJACENT

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 1264E S E C R E T
TO EAST. REF A AS MODIFIED BY REF B CITES NEED FOR AUGMENTATION.
2. EXECUTION

A. FIRST MAR: ASSUME OPCON BY CMD GRP, THREE RIFLE COS, NINTH MAR EFFECTIVE 112400; ONE RIFLE CO, SECOND BN FIFTH MAR, EFFECTIVE 111300H FEB 67.

B. NINTH MAR: CHOP BN CMD GRP, THREE RIFLE COS, TO FIRST MAR 112400H FEB 67.

C. SECOND BN FIFTH MAR: CHOP ONE RIFLE CO TO FIRST MAR 111300H FEB 67.

D. ELEVENTH MAR: PROVIDE ONE PLAT ARMD AMPH DIRECT SUPPORT FIRST MAR 111200H FEB 67.

E. DET THIRD ENGR BN: PROVIDE TWO PLATS IN SPT FIRST MAR EFFECTIVE 11FEB 67.

F. DET THIRD SP BN: PROVIDE HST SPT FIRST MAR
COMMENCING 11FEB 67.

G. FIRST TK BN: PROVIDED ONE HEAVY SEC TMS D/S FIRST MAR EFFECTIVE 111200H FEB 67 IN ADDITION TO CO C REIN

H. ELEVENTH MT BN: PROVIDE MOTOR TRANSPORT AS RQRD IN SPT FIRST MAR COMMENCING 111200H FEB 67 THROUGH D DAY, SUCH SUPPORT TO TERMINATE 0600H D PLUS 1.

1. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

PAGE 3 RUMHLA 1264E S E C R E T

(1) DIRLAUTH ALCON

(2) ON TERMINATION OPN ALL UNITS RETURN PARENT COMMAND,
EXCEPT AS STATED PARA 2 H ABOVE.

3. REQUEST FMAW PROVIDE FIXED WING AND HELO SUPPORT.

GP=4

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
(4)

1DIV 2100/3 (1-65)

SECRET

Encl (22)

CONFIDENTIAL



0 110725Z FEB 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REINS -3
TO CG III MAF

BT

CONFIDENTIAL
COMBINED ACTION UNITS IN FIRST MARDIV

A. CG III MAF 080833Z FEB 67

1. IAW REF A FOLLOWING INFORMATION SUBMITTED:

A. ACCOMPLISHMENT BY AREA:

(1) SINCE FIRST CAC UNIT ESTABLISHED CHU LAI AREA APPROXIMATELY 500 PF'S HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN BASIC MILITARY SUBJECTS. THIS TRAINING COUPLED WITH MARINE AND NAVY PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES TO ORGANIZE, ADVISE AND PROVIDE SKILLED LEADERSHIP HAS ENGENDERED GREATER SENSE OF PRIDE, SELF-CONFIDENCE AND DETERMINATION TO DESTROY THE VC THAN PREVIOUSLY PRESENT IN PF PERSONNEL. TO LOCAL HAMLET RESIDENT PRESENCE OF CAC PLAT PROVIDES TANGIBLE BUFFER TO TAXATION AND OVERT TERRORISM OF VC. CAC UNITS HAVE CONDUCTED MED CAPS AND ASSISTED HAMLETS IN BUILDING DISPENSARIES. VC NO LONGER HAS SIGNIFICANT CONTROL IN ANY OF CAC AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. PEOPLE IN THESE AREAS TRUST AND RESPECT PF'S.

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
<i>CAC</i>	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1345E C O N F I D E N T I A L
MARINES AND NAVY. INTELLIGENCE, SUPPLIES AND PROTECTION HAVE
BEEN DENIED THE VC, AND VC INFRASTRUCTURE HAS BEEN DESTROYED.
DENIAL OF VC TAXATION AND PROTECTING RICE HARVEST HAS ENCOURAGED
POPULACE TO REMAIN IN AREA.

(2) IN DANANG AREA ALL CAC PLATS HAVE PROVIDED FOR LOCAL DEFENSE OF RESPECTIVE HAMLET AND HAVE ASSISTED PF'S OF UNITS BECOME MORE PROFICIENT IN MILITARY SKILLS. PRESENCE OF PLAT HAS ENCOURAGED RESETTLEMENT OF VN AND PROTECTED REFUGEE CENTERS. AT AI DONG, CIVIL GOVERNMENT REESTABLISHED DUE TO PRESENCE OF CAC UNIT. CAC PLAT AT HOA PHU AIDED AND PROTECTED RICE HARVEST WHICH HAD BEEN TAXED FOR 5 YEARS BY VC. CAC B 1-5 RELOCATED NORTH SECTOR OF HOA LAC VILLAGE, ACROSS RIVER AND AFFORDED PROTECTION FOR RELOCATED PEOPLE. CAC UNITS, BY PROVIDING SECURITY FOR LOCAL HAMLETS, HAVE ENCOURAGED FARMING AND TRADE.

B. (1) DATES OF ORGANIZATION OF CAC PLATS:

B 1-1 JUN66, B 1-2 JUN66, B 1-3 JUN66, B 1-4 JUL66,
B 1-5 AUG66, B 2-1 JUL66, B 2-2 JUL66, B 3-1 SEP66, B 3-2 MAY66,
B 3-3 JUL66, B 3-4 JUL66, C 1 SEP66, D 1 OCT66, D 2 DEC66,
D 3 AUG66, D 4 DEC66, D 5 DEC66, D 6 DEC66, E 1 JUN66, I 1 APR66,
I 2 APR66, I 3 APR66, I 4 DEC66, I 5 DEC66, I 6 DEC66, K 4 JUN66,

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PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1345E C O N F I D E N T I A L
 L 1 JUN66, L 2 AUG66, L 3 AUG66, L 4 OCT66, L 5 OCT66, M 1 SEPS6.
 (2) CAC B 1-1, 1-2 AND 1-3 AT HOA THANH HAVE ASSISTED IN BUILDING MARKET PLACE, REFUGEE HAMLET AND BULLETIN BOARDS FOR HAMLET. CAC B 1-4 AT HOA VINH HAVE ASSISTED IN BUILDING FOOTBRIDGE ACROSS RIVER TO CONNECT HAMLET TO VILLAGE AND ASSISTED IN HAVING DAM BUILT TO HALT FLOODING OF RICE PADDIES. CAC B 1-5 AT HOA LAC HAS BUILT FOOTBRIDGE TO CONNECT HAMLET TO VILLAGE, ASSISTED IN DRAINING TWO WELLS CLEANED, BUILT MARKET PLACE AND ASSISTED IN MOVING HOA LAC ACROSS RIVER TO LOCALIZE POPULATION. CAC B 2-1 HAS FURNISHED SECURITY FOR HIGHWAY 5 AND FOR LOCAL AREA THROUGH AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING. CAC B 3-1 HAS PROVIDED SECURITY FOR RESETTLEMENT OF 104 FAMILIES. CAC B 3-2 AT HOA PHU HAS PAINTED SCHOOL, CLEANED WELL IN VILLAGE, BUILT DISPENSARY, AND FURNISHED RICE HARVEST MACHINE AND DRYING AREA. CAC C-1 AT IA DONG (4) HAS AIDED RECONSTRUCTION AI DONG HAMLET FROM ZERO STRUCTURES TO EIGHT FAMILY DWELLINGS AND RELIGIOUS SHRINES, AIDED IN CLEAING TWO LOCAL WELLS. CONSTANT PATROLLING HAS ALLOWED PEOPLE TO TILL THEIR FIELDS WHICH WERE FALLOW AND PERMITTED RESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AT AI DONG. CAC D-5 HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN DESTROYING VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROVIDING SAFE HAVEN. 2800 PEOPLE HAVE

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1345E C O N F I D E N T I A L
 SETTLED IN PHUOC TRACH SINCE UNIT ESTABLISHED. ON 30JAN67 DESTROYED 4 MAN VC ASSASSINATION CELL. CAC D-6 HAS REDUCED SNIPER INCIDENTS ALONG ROUTE 1 WITHIN VICINITY OF UNIT. CAC I-4, I-5 AND I-6 IN KY BICH HAVE REDUCED VC THREAT TO EXTENT THAT LOCAL POPULACE ARE LIVING IN AREA. PRIOR TO CAC PLATS BEING ESTABLISHED PEOPLE DID NOT STAY IN AREA AT NIGHT BUT MOVED TWO OR THREE MILES TO ESCAPE VC HARRASSMENT AND SUBVERSION. CAC K-4 HAS ESTABLISHED COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH VILLAGE AND HAMLET CHIEFS ENABLING UNIT TO ACQUIRE INTELLIGENCE ON VC ACTIVITIES. CAC L-1 AT BINH SON HAS GAINED SUPPORT OF POPULACE AND DESTROYED VC INFRASTRUCTURE. NOW SUPPORTING TWO RD CADRES IN AREA.

(3) CAC PROGRAM WILL ASSIST RD PLANS BY PROVIDING SECURITY AND DESTROYING VC INFRASTRUCTURE IN AREAS WHERE EMPLOYED ALLOWING ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT CIVIL GOVT. PRESENCE OF CAC UNITS RELEASE MARINE UNITS TO SUPPORT EXPANSION OF TAOR. ONCE AREA CLEARED.

(4) NOTEWORTHY EVENTS:

(A) CAC C-1. CONTACT RESULTED IN 5 VC KIA. NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES

(B) CAC B 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, BUILDING REFUGEE CAMP FROM STRAW STRUCTURES TO CEMENT BUILDINGS.

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PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 1345E C O N F I D E N T I A L

(C) CAC D-1. ASSISTANCE TO WOUNDED VN AFTER TERRORIST GRENADE EXPLODED ON BUS. REPORTED IN STARS AND STRIPES 9JAN67.

(5) CAC UNITS HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED BY US AND GVN MILITARY COMMANDS. MESSAGES COMMENDING ACTION OF UNITS ARE SENT BY CG FIRST MARDIV. PF MEMBERS OF CAC UNITS HAVE BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR AND RECEIVED BOTH VIETNAMESE AND US AWARDS. MARINE PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN MERITORIOUSLY PROMOTED FOR PERFORMANCE IN UNIT. THE PEOPLE STOP AND THANK THE CAC PLAT FOR PROTECTION AND ACCEPT THEM IN THEIR HOMES.

C. (1) DE-ACTIVATION OF A CAC UNIT WILL TAKE PLACE WHEN PF'S DEVELOP INTO SELF-SUFFICIENT LOCAL DEFENSE GROUPS THAT IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AS COMPLETELY LOYAL AND RESPONSIVE TO LOCAL AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND REDUCTION OF HOSTILE FORCES AND DESTRUCTION OF VC INFRASTRUCTURE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

(2) DISTRICT CHIEF IS DECIDING FACTOR WHETHER PF'S REMAIN IN AREA. OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS REPORT THAT PF'S WILL REMAIN NEAR OWN HAMLET.

(3) DECISION TO FORM NEW CAC UNIT BASED ON REQUEST BY GVN OFFICIALS AT DISTRICT LEVEL FOR USMC FORCES OR REQUEST BY MARINE REPRESENTATIVE AT REGT L OR BN LEVEL TO FORM UNIT.

PAGE SIX RUMHLA 1345E C O N F I D E N T I A L

REGARDLESS OF ORIGIN OF REQUEST MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN COMMAND REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARINE REGIMENT WHOSE AREA VILLAGE/HAMLET CAC IS DESIRED, AND VILLAGE/HAMLET CHIEF AND THE DISTRICT CHIEF IS NECESSARY.

(4) COORDINATION EFFECTED AS TO LOCATION OF CAC UNIT, MISSION, AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIP OF UNIT.

D. ESTIMATE IN TERMS OF REGULAR MARINE UNITS TO PROVIDE SAME SECURITY AS THAT PROVIDED BY CAC UNITS

(1) DANANG: FIFTEEN REINFORCED RIFLE PLATOONS.


(2) CHU LAI: ELEVEN REINFORCED RIFLE PLATOONS AND ONE CO. HQ.

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET



CO

P 110821Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG TF XRAY
 ZEN/FIRST RECON BN
 BT

SECRET
 CHANGE OF OPCON (U)


A. III MAF 210808Z JAN67
 1. IAW REF A OPCON THIRD PLAT, THIRD FOR RECON CO PASSED THIRD
 MARDIV 080656Z FEB67.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

Encl (24)

SECRET



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

COC

P 120017Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO CG TF XRAY

INFO CG FLC

SEVENTH MT BN

BT

S E C R E T

CHANGE OF OPCON (U)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 120917Z JAN 67

1. IAW PLAN REF A OPCON SEVENTH MT BN MINUS PASSED TF XRAY
 100830Z FEB 67.

GP-4

BT


6-3

14

SECRET

Enc C (25)

SECRET



COC C

O P 120713Z FEB 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO CG FIRST MAW

INFO CG TF XRAY

BT

S E C R E T

Combined Opp Nui Iron

1. OPERATION TO BE CONDUCTED IN NUI IRON AREA ON OR ABOUT 15 FEB 67
FOR A PERIOD OF ABOUT 5 DAYS WILL CONSIST OF COMBINED USMC, ARVN
AND ROK BN SIZED UNITS.

2. REQUEST PROVIDE DACS SUPPORT SIMILAR OPERATION RIO BLANCO. FURTHER
REQUEST DIRLAUTH MASS-3 TF XRAY FOR PLANNING

GP-4

BT

5

SECRET

Enc C (26)

SECRET



C C

0 120910Z FEB 67

FM CG III MAF

TO CG FIRST MARDIV *G-3*
 CG THIRD MARDIV
 INFO CG THIRD MARDIV (FWD)
 CG FLC
 THIRD AT BN
 THIRD ENGR BN
 THIRD TK BN
 FLSG "A"
 FLSU TWO
 FLSU ONE
 BT

S E C R E T

ALLOCATION OF FORCES

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 090737Z FEB 67
 B. CG FIRST MARDIV 101417Z FEB 67 (NOTAL)
 1. REF A STATED THEA UNDERR CG THIRD MARDIV PLANS TO COMMENCE MOVEMENT ON 16FEB OF UNITS SPECIFIED PARA 2A AND B OF REF A. THE REF FURTHER REQ CG FIRST MARDIV CONCURRENCE WITH PROPOSED

COE

6988

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 829 S E C R E T
 MOVES.

2. BY REF B CG FIRST MARDIV CONCURS ONLY WITH THAT PORTION OF THE PLAN PERTAINING CO C (REINF), THIRD AT BN. REF B CONTAINS NON-CONCURRENCES IN PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO OTHER UNITS INVOLVED IN THE PLANNED MOVES.

3. IN VIEW OF THE OPPOSING VIEWS STATED IN THE REFS, CG THIRD MARDIV IS REQUESTED TO DEFER MOVEMENTS OF THE UNITS DESCRIBED IN REF A WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MOVE OF CO C (REINF), THIRD AT BN. ALL OTHER ACTIONS PROPOSED IN REFS A AND B SHOULD BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING REVIEW BY THIS HQS.

GP-4

BT


SECRET

End (27)

SECRET

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	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST



COOC

P R 140247Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 9-3
 TO CG TF XRAY
 INFO CG III MAF/GD MIAL
 FIRST TK BN/GD MAIL
 THIRD TK BN/GD MAIL
 BT

SECRET

TANKS AT NUI DAU/NUI DANG

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 091015Z FEB 67 (NOTAL)

B. CG TF XRAY 111010Z FEB 67 (NOTAL)

C. CG FIRST MARDIV 120755Z FEB 67

1. REF A PROVIDES BASIS FOR TANK PLAT REING WITH FLAME TANK FOR USE NU DAU/NUI DANG AREA. REF B INFORMED THAT M-3 COMPRESSOR REQUIRED FOR NAPALM RECHARGE NOT ON HAND TF XRAY.

2. IN RESPONSE TO REF B, REF C DIRECTS SHIPMENT OF M-3 COMPRESSOR TO ENSURE CAPABILITY EXISTS TO MEET REQUIRMENT REF A.

GP-4


BT

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SECRET

(Encell 28)

DECLASSIFIED



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1/G-4	
2	
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PER SUM	
WEEKLY SUM	
CMD CHR	
BRIEF	
POST	

606

P 140731Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN *S-3*
 TO FIRST MARDIV OPCON/ADCON
 INFO CG III MAF
 BT
 UNCLAS E F T O
MINIMIZING CASUALTIES TO NONCOMBATANTS
 A. FORCE/SA I CORPS ORDER 3040.2
 B. ANNEX G (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO FIRST MARDIV OP O 301-66
 1. CONTINUE EFFORTS TO ENSURE UNDERSTANDING AND COMPLIANCE REFS
 A AND B BY MARINES AT ALL LEVELS AND TO ACT DISCRIMINATELY IN
 APPLICATION OF FIRE.

BT

End(29)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET


0 141215Z FEB67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO CG 17 ARAY

FIRST MAR
 NINTH MAR
 SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
 INFO FIRST RECON BN
 BT

SECRET

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR MARCH 67 (U)

A. III MAF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 16-66 (I CIZ)
 B. CG FIRST MARDIV 260645Z JANG67 (REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT)
 1. PROVIDE THIS HQ WITH PLANNED BN MINUS OR LARGER OPNS
 COUNTY FAIRS FOR MARG67 MLT 171200H FEB67. FORMAT FOR EACH BN
 MINUS OR LARGER OPN:
 A. COMMAND GROUP
 B. SIZE OF UNIT (S) PARTICIPATING
 C. TYPE OPERATION
 D. AREA OF OPN
 E. TIME DURING WHICH OPN TO BE CONDUCTED (FIRST OR LAST HALF
 OF MONTH).
 2. INTELLIGENCE. REF A AND CURRENT FIRST MARDIV ISUMS AND
 PERINTREPS.



	BURN
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	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	Wk SUM
	OPNSH RND
	FORMAT FOR EACH BN
	BRIEF
	POST

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1762E SECRET

3. GENERAL GUIDANCE.

A. EXPAND GENERAL OFFENSIVE WITH CONCURRENT MAXIMUM PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO AREA AND POPULATION SECURITY IN THE FURTHERANCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) PROGRAM IAW REF B.
 B. INCREASED USE OF LOC'S, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THOSE THAT CONTRIBUTE TO EXPANSION OF AREAS UNDERGOING RD.
 C. INCREASE EMPHASIS ON PROVISION OF SECURITY FOR RD CADRES WHEREVER EMPLOYED.
 D. HARASS ENEMY LOC'S BY RAIDS AND AMBUSHES TO PREVENT HIM FROM REPOSITIONING FORCES AND TO DENY HIM FOOD.
 E. RETAIN INITIATIVE AGAINST VC/NVA FORCES BY INTERDICTING AND INVADING HIS BASE AREAS. CONCURRENTLY, PREVENT ENEMY ACCESS TO POPULATION CENTERS.
 F. EXPLOIT GROWING DISSATISFACTION OF NVA, VC AND CIVILIANS BY INCREASED PSYWAR.
 G. CONTINUE EMPHASIS ON COUNTY FAIR OPNS TO EXPAND CONTROL AND INFLUENCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND ASSIST IN IDENTIFICATION AND DISRUPTION OF VC INFRASTRUCTURE.
 H. CONTINUE EMPHASIS ON CAC PROGRAM TO IMPROVE UNIT LEADERSHIP, TRAINING AND CAPABILITIES.
 I. INCREASE EMPLOYMENT OF NIGHT PATROLS, AMBUSHES, LISTENING POSTS.
 J. ENSURE MAXIMUM SECURITY FOR HELICOPTERS WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO SECURE LZ'S AND/OR ENSURING ADEQUATE SUPPORT AND SUPPRESSION FIRES IF ZONES ARE NOT SECURE.

SECRET

Encl (30)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 1760E S E C R E T

K. ASSURE THAT LETTER AND SPIRIT OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
ARE KNOWN TO EACH ORGN AND INDIVIDUALL. CONTINUE USE OF SPARROW HAWK AND BALD EAGLES FOR RAPID
EXPLOITATION OF SURPRISE CONTACT, INTELLIGENCE, AND TACTICAL
SITUATION AS REQUIRED.

M. CONTINUE RECON OPNS WITH EMPHASIS FOL AREAS:

(1) SONG TRA BONG AND SONG TRA KHUC VALLEYS
(2) WEST OF DUC PHO AND INLAND FM SA HUYNH
(3) HIEP DUC/TIEN PHUOC/QUE SON/NUI LAC SON AREAS.

(4) WEATERN APPROACHES TO DA NANG TAOR.

(5) WEST AND SOUTH AND HOA/NONG SON INDUCTRIAL COMPLEX

4. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

A. CG TF XRAY

(1) WITHIN CAPABILITY, CONDUCT RECON IN FORCE OPNS IN
VC/NVA BASE AREA 117 (NUI GO) AS DEFINED REF A.(2) CONTINUE SEARCH AND DESTROY, CLEAR AND HOLD OPNS
IN NUI DAU/ NUI DANG AREA.(3) ACCELERATE NUMBER OF COUNTY FAIRS EMPHASIZING THOSE
IN NEWLY EXPANDED TAOR VIC TAM KY..

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 1760E S E C R E T

B. FIRST MAR

(1) RENDER MAXIMUM PRACTICAL SPT TO FIFTY FIRST ARVN
REGT IN CONDUCT OF REVILUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IAW FEF B.(2) INCREASE AREA OF INFLUENCE IN NUI LAC SON AREA BY
ACCELERATING PATROL AND SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES.(3) EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE BY RAPID REACTION OPNS IN AREA
SOUTH OF SECTOR OF TAOR.

C. NINTH MAR.

(1) RENDER MAXIMUM PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO FIFTY FIRST ARVN REGT IN
CONDUCT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IAW REF B.(2) CONDUCT APPROPRIATE OPERATIONS TO INCREASE INFLUENCE
SOUTHWEST PORTION DAI LOC DISTRICT NINTH MAR SECTOR OF TAOR.

AND ALLEGHENY AREA.

(3) BE PREP TO EXECUTE OPNS PROPOSED ADDITIONAL SECTOR
TAOR VIC HAI VAN PASS.(4) CONDUCT RECON IN FORCE OPNS AS FEASIBLE IN VC/NVA
BASE AREA 116 (NUI MAI RANG).

D. SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

(1) INCREASE AREA OF INFLUENCE IN NONG SON AND ANTENNA

PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 1760 E S D E C R E T

VALLEY AREAS BY ACCELERATING PATROL AND SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES
THAT AREA.(2) CONDUCT RECON IN FORCE OPNS AS FEASIBLE IN VC/NVA
BASE AREA 116 (NUI KAT RANG).(4) CONDUCT APPROPRIATE LEVEL SEARCH AND DESTROY OPNS
GORDON AND TUSCALOOSA AREAS.


GP-4

BT

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET



	BURN
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	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	PER SUM
	CMDLCHR
	REF

(oc)

P 151133Z FEB67
 FW CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 9-3
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV REIN

INFO CG III MAF

BT

S E C R E T

CHANGE OF OPCON

A. CG III MAF 291312Z DEC66

1. IAW REF A OPCON THIRD MT BN(-) AND CO A, NINTH MT BN PASSED
 CG THIRD MARDIV 131250H FEB67.

GP-4


BT

11
SECRET

Cncl (31)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET



CO C
a C

ILZ 0 151848Z FEB 67

FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUMHAW/TG CG FICPT MAW

RUMFKM/CG FIRST MARDIMH

RUMHLA/CG IF X-RAY

RUMHLACWADC, DANANG ~~DA36~~

RUMHLA/DASC, CHU LAI

RUMHLA/DASC, DUE PHO

INFO RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIXU SAN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

ZEN/TG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUMFHWWJGGOTU SEVEN SIX PT ZERO PT TWO

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~DECODE USE VI (UD)~~

1. DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS L-HOUR IS NOW 160930H VICE 160800H

A W H-HOUR IS 161130H VICE 160830H.

2. ALL SCHEDULED AIR EVENTS REFLECTIVE ONE HOUR 30 MIN DELAY.


GP-4 (C) 10 MAR 67

BT

6860

~~SECRET~~

(Enc 32)



COC

5 RN
HOLD
G-1/G-4
G-2
LNO
PER SUM
WR SUM
CMD CHR
BRIEF
POST

O F 150235Z FEB 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

S-3

TO FIRST MARDIV OPCON

INFO CG III MAF

CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

1. ON MORNING 15 FEB 11TH CO KMC CAME UNDER ATTACK BY STRONG EN FORCE. PSN RECD 150 RDS 81/82MM MORTAR FIRE, 200 RDS 60MM, 40 RDS 75 RR, 200 RDS 57RR, 200 RDS ROCKETS AND 200 RIFLE GRENADES. KMC CO SURVIVED THIS INTENSE PREPARATION, THEN MET DETERMINED ASSAULT OF TWO VC BNS WITH EVEN GREATER DETERMINATION AND HIGHLY EFFECTIVE SMALL ARMS AND SUPPORTING ARMS. LATEST TALLY INDICATES OVER 243 VC KIA CONFIRMED AND LARGE QUANTITIES OF MATERIAL CAPTURED INCLUDING MORTAR, FLAMETHROWERS AND AUTOMATIC WPNS.
2. THIS FINE ACTION STRESSES OLD LESSONS THAT WELL-SITED WPNS, GOOD OBSTACLES AND EFFECTIVE USE OF PICK AND SHOVEL CAN OFFSET EN EMPLOYMENT OF SURPRISE, PREPARATION FIRES AND CONCENTRATION OF FORCES. IN OUR EMPHASIS ON OFFENSIVE ACTION IT IS EASY TO SLIGHT DEFENSIVE

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 1927E UNCLAS E F T O

MEASURES WHICH MUST BE AUTOMATIC TO ANY EFFECTIVE MILITARY FORCE REGARDLESS OF ITS ROLE.


3. COMMANDING OFFICERS AT ALL LEVELS WILL ENSURE MORE THAN LIP SERVICE TO NEED FOR ALL USMC FORCES TO DIG IN AND DIG DOWN ANY TIME SITUATION PERMITS. WHEN WE STOP MOVING WE BEGIN TO IMPROVE OUR POSITION, TO INCLUDE OBSTACLES, INTRENCHMENTS AND CONTINUING ATTN TO CAMOUFLAGE. DEGREE OF FORTIFICATION LIMITED ONLY BY TIME AVAILABLE, AND BEARS DIRECT RELATION TO UNIT'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND STRONGEST ENEMY EFFORT AND ADMINISTER PUNISHMENT IN RETURN.

MAJGEN NICKERSON SENDS.

BT

End (33)

SECRET



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	Wk SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

Coc

P 161401Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO FIRST MT BN
 INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG TF XRAY
 BT

SECRET
CHANGE OF OPCON (U)


1. CG FIRST MARDIV 120917Z JAN 67
2. IAW REF A OPCON FIRST MT BN(-) ASSUMED BY FIRST MARDIV 141318H FEB 67.
3. OPCON TRANSPORT CO, NINTH MT BN ASSIGNED FIRST MT BN (-) 141318H FEB 67.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET
 Encl (34) 4

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

COC



0 161517Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO FIRST MAR
 NINTH MAR
 INFO CG III MAF
 CG FMAW
 SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
 BT

G-3

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WR SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

FRAG 0 21-67 (OPN STONE PHASE II) (U)

A. FIRST MAR 150745Z FEB 67 (NOTAL)

1. MISSION. FIRST MARDIV FORCES CONTINUE OPN STONE COMMENCING PHASE II 130700H.

2. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPNS. PHASE II TO CONSIST OF CONTINUED OPNS SOUTH OF SONG KY LAM BY THIRD BN MINUS FIRST MAR (THREE COMPANIES) AND OPNS NORTH OF SONG KY LAM BY FIRST BN MINUS REIN FIRST MAR. FIRST BN MINUS REIN COMPOSED OF COS B, C, D AND CO F SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR, CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN IN AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY SONG LA THO, ON EAST BY TRACE OF LINE FM VIC BY

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 1921

025549 TO BT 047579, ON SOUTH BY SONG KY LAM, AND ON WEST BY RIVER FOLLOWING TRACE OF N-S GRID LINE 98. EST DURATION: TWO DAYS, TENTATIVE H-HOUR, D-DAY: 150700H FEB 67.

B. FIRST MAR:

(1) CONTINUE OPN STONE COMMENCING PHASE II IAW REF A.

(2) CHOP BN COHD GP, CO E AND CO F SECOND BN FOURTH MAR TO NINTH MAR 171200H FEB.

(3) CHOP CO G SECOND BN FIFTH MAR TO SECOND BN FIFTH MAR 171200H FEB.

(4) COORDINATE WITH NINTH MAR FOR USE OF STONE PHASE II AO LYING IN NINTH MAR SECTOR TAOR.

C. NINTH MAR: COORDINATE WITH FIRST MAR ON USE OF AREA OF OPNS WITHIN YOUR SECTOR.

D. DIRLAUTH ALCON.


GP-A

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

One (35)

SECRET



Stone
CO

PER SUM
WK SUM
CMD CHR
BRIEF
NOTE

0 171215Z KEBI17

KV FIRST MARINE

TO CG FIRST MARDIV

BT

ECR E T
ON STONE

6-3

*COMM ABOVE; 0917
SUC HAS BEEN
INITIATED*

a. CG FIRST MARDIV MUG 161715Z FEB

b. DETAILED SEARCHES OF THE LAUTIPMITIONIOF OPNIUTONE OPERATING IN AREA UOUTP OF UONG KQ LAM HAU UNCOVERED LITTLE OK VALUE IN LAUT 24 HOURS. IT IS CONCENSUSOK COMMANDERU OF THE GROUP THAT KUROHER QEARVH WOULD BEIUNPRODUCTIVE. THIS COMCLUSION VERIFIED BY NO PERUONAL REVONNIAIUSANCE.

c. MATTERIOF IMMEDIATE COCCERN IU PROLONGATIONIOF REDUCED GROUP DENSITY AND ACTIVITIYHIN FIRST MARINES TAOR. M

d. IN WIEW OK DEVELOPMENT OM OPN STONEIAND WIHIN TAORIIT IU RECOMMENDED THAT PRIORITY OK EKORT BE SHIFTED BACK TO INTENUIVE FORICGIWIHIN THE TAOR. HTHERE RECOMMEND THAT; NO

e. OPN STONE II COVTINUE AU DESCRIBED BELOW:

- (i) FIRUT BN KIRST VARINES WITH CO'S B, C, AND D, AND CO'S E, SECOMD BM TWECTY-SI MARINES WI, CONDUCTS U&D OPC IN THWIAREA ONORHII OKHUNG KY LAMHAU INICATEDIIN REF A.
- (ii) THIRD BN IFIRUTHMAGINESION 18 FEBIRETURNU OMEI

PAGEITWO IPBQ C SIE C R E T
COMPANQ DIREVILQHTO THIRD BN CP. IREMAINING 2COMPACYS WIH CMD IGROUP RETURN TO FIRST BNVPHKGOV WPICH A U&D OPC IN PHOMG HO AREA VICO00 00 0110 W
ULDIBE CONDUCTED COMMENCING IN AKTERCOOM 18IKE3;0 ESTIMATED DURATION ONE IDAQ.

ELHUPON COMPLETION OK THIRD BN U&D OPNIPHONG HO AREA. THIRD BN RETURNS TO ASUIGMED TAOR AND RESUMES NORMALIRESPOCSIBILITIEU. KIRUT BN CONTINUES S&D OPNS IN AREAIDEFINED REF A AMDHASUUMEU KOLE OKHCONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS. OV ORDER THIS HEADQUARTERS.

b. ABOVE WILL RAPDLY PERMITITHCKENING OF KORCES IN TAOR AND EERT MAXIMUV PRÉSQUAREIOV VC WITVIM OAOR IN FURTHERANCE OK RD OPNS. 8
c. RECONIZEIABOVEIIIS ACCELERATION OKHMOVEMENT OK FORCES BACK TO TAOR AVDIIS DEPARTURE. KROMHPLANIICDICATED REF A. PHOWER CONSIDER THIS COURUE OKIACTION TO BEIMOUO KAVORABLE ATIPIS TIME ;0

SP-4

SECRET

Enc 136

SECRET

PAGE THREE SW NU 0869D S E C R E T

a. SEVENTH MARINES.

b. BN (-) (3/7).

c. SEARCH, DESTROY AND CLEARING.
NORTHERN BOUNDARY SONG TRA CAU FROM BS 760406 TO NATIONAL HIGHWAY 1, EASTERN BOUNDARY, NATIONAL HIGHWAY 1 FROM SONG TRA CAU TO BS 818350, SOUTHERN BOUNDARY BS 818350 TO DUC PHO/HA LU DISTRICT BOUNDARY BS 780350, AND NORTHWEST FROM BS 760350 TO SONG BAU NAM LONG DISTRICT BOUNDARY. WESTERN BOUNDARY SONG HAC FROM BS 754355 TO SONG TRA CAU BS 760405.

d. LAST OF MARCH 3-5 DAYS.

e. CONCENTRATE SURVEILLANCE AND RECON EFFORTS AS FOLLOWS:

a. CONTINUED OBSERVATION OF ALL LOCS, AVENUES OF APPROACH AND RELATED ASSEMBLY AREAS INTO CHU LAI AND DUC PHO RZ'S WITH

EMPHASIS ON SOU I THUNG/SONG BA KY (BT 2709),

SONG LO BO (BS 8005) AND SONG NGA MAN (BS 8327) VALLEYS.

b. CONTINUED OBSERVATION AND GROUND RECON IN BASE AREAS 117, 118, 120, 121 AND 124.

c. CONDUCT GROUND RECON/OBSERVATION IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTY PLACEMENT AT MINH LONG, HA THANH, BATC AND GIA VUC CIDG CAMPS.

d. CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OVER THE SONG VE EAST OF MINH LONG.

PAGE FOUR SW NU 0869D S E C R E T

THE SONG TRA BONG AND SON TRA KHUC VALLEYS.

a. CONTINUE AGGRESSIVE AMBUSH AND PATROLLING WITH EMPHASIS ON AN INCREASE IN EMPLOYMENT OF NIGHT PATROLS, AMBUSHES AND LISTENING POSTS.

b. RAPID EXPLOITATION OF CONTACTS AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION GAINED.

c. STRENGTHEN AND ENHANCE CAC FR

WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS

IN UNIT LEADERSHIP, TRAINING AND CAPABILITIES.

d. CONDUCT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TO EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE, THE DISSATISFACTION OF NVA, VC AND CIVILIANS AND TO SUPPORT TACTICAL OPERATION.

e. CONTINUE CLEARING OPERATIONS IN CHU LAI AND DUC PHO AO.

f. SUPPORT ARVN FORCES IN PRIORITY AREAS FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT BY INSURING MAXIMUM FREEDOM MOVEMENT AND INCREASING USE OF LOCS BETWEEN TAM KY AND QUANG NGAI. MAINTAIN CLOSE LIAISON WITH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS TO PROTECT NATIONAL RESOURCES WITHIN, AND AS REQUIRED.

g. SABOTAGE TAQR.

h. ATTENDING UPON VN APPROVAL AND SUPPORT, CONDUCT COUNTY FAIR OPERATIONS AS FOLLOWS:

a. BINH NGU (5), BI 8417, BINH TIN DISTRICT (1/7).

b. BINH UYEN, BI 8402, BINH SON DISTRICT (1/7).

c. HANH TRA (1), BS 5293, BINH SON DISTRICT (2/7).

SECRET

SECRET

P

GE FIVE 9VNU 0869D S E C R E T

D. TAN PHUOC (4), BS 5590, BINH SON DISTRICT (2/7).


11. EXPLOIT AND/OR ASSESS ARC LIGHT STRIKES WHENEVER POSSIBLE.
12. BASED UPON CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, INTERDICT ENEMY INFILTRATION ROUTES, HARBOURING SITES AND BASE AREAS WITH AIR, ARTILLERY OR NGF AS APPROPRIATE.
13. CONTINUE TO EMPLOY KIT CARSON SCOUTS ON AN EXPANDING SCALE.
14. CONDUCT AND SUPPORT "ROUGH RIDERS" AS DIRECTED.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

SECRET



COC
Stone

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

G-3 171600Z FEB 67

FM FIRST MAR (FWDO)

TO: ZEN/FIRST BN FIRST MAR

DEATH MAR

100D OG FIRST MARDIV (RETN)

ZEN/SECOND BN FIRST MAR

ZEN/THIRD BN FIRST MAR

ZEN/FIRST BN ELEVENTH MAR

BT

SECRET

FRAG ORDER TO OPEN STONE 171

1. ZEELON G-3 FIRST MARDIV & CO FIRST MAR 17 FEB 67

1. CO F. SECOND BN: TWENTY-SIXTH MAR. CHOP FMM FIRST BN FIRST MAR TO FIRST MAR 180700H FEB 67. 2. HELD LIFT LZEEEEEHFM LZ 100 GS 0055. TO LZ TURKEY. UPON ARRIVAL LZ TURKEY CHOP TO PARENT ORGANIZATION.

2. FTH ST BN FIRST MAR ENSURE SECURE LZ FOR PICK-UP.

3. CO F. SECOND BN TWENTY-SIXTH MAR ENTER FIRST MAR REGT TAC NET, M-653, QIEEE 180700H FEB 67.


GP-A

BT

SECRET

Encl (58)

CONFIDENTIAL



1. PAY	2. BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	1. NO
	PER SUM
	WEEK SUM
	MD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 180319Z FEB 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/FIRST MAR
 ZEN/NINTH MAR
 ZEN/SEVENTH ENGR BN
 INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
 BT

S C C
 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 ANDERSON ROAD SECURITY (UD)

1. SEVENTH ENGR BN HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO IMPROVE LOC KNOWN AS ANDERSON ROAD FM VIC AT 990642 TO AT 995633, THENCE EAST TO JCT RTE ONE VIC BT 032643. RECENT SNIPING AND MINING INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN AN UNACCEPTABLY HIGH TOLL IN ENGR PERSONNEL.

2. FIRST MAR

 NINTH MAR

TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES TO SECURE ABOVE AREA, PROTECT ENGR PERS WORKING IN VIC, AND PREVENT DESTRUCTION OR EFFECTIVE INTERDICTION OF LOC FOLLOWING COMPLETION.


3. SEVENTH ENGR BN. COORD ENGR EFFORT IN SUBJ AREA WITH APPROP REGT, AND PROVIDE ENGR ASSISTANCE AS REQUIRED.

4. DIRLAUTH ALCON.

GP=4

CONFIDENTIAL
 DECLASSIFIED

SECRET



P 180541Z FEB 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO CG III MAF

INFO CG FIRST MAW

CG IF XRAY

FIRST MAR

NINTH MAR

SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

BT

SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
 REPORT OF PLANNED OPNS FOR MARCH 67 (U)

A. CG III MAF 140446Z FEB 67

1. BASED ON PLANNING GUIDANCE REF A FOL REPORT
 OF PLANNED MAJOR OPNS FOR MARCH 67 SUBMITTED:

- A. (1) DECKHOUSE VI - DESOTC
- (2) IF XRAY
- (3) MULTIPLE BN
- (4) CLEARING
- (5) DUC PHO OPERATING AREA
- (6) FIRST HALF MARCH

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2198E SECRET

- B. (1) ALLEN
- (2) IF XRAY
- (3) BN MINUS
- (4) SEARCH AND DESTROY
- (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GRIDLINE BS97, ON EAST

BY TAOR, ON SOUTH BY E-W GRIDLINE S3, AND ON WEST BY N-S GRIDLINE
 BS 37.

- (6) LAST HALF MARCH
- C. (1) PERRY
- (2) IF XRAY
- (3) BN MINUS
- (4) COORDINATED SEARCH AND DESTROY
- (5) BS455865 WEST TO TRA BONGCIDG CAMP
- (6) LAST HALF MARCH

- D. (1) TIPPECANOE
- (2) IF XRAY
- (3) BATTALION MINUS
- (4) SEARCH AND DESTROY
- (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GRIDLINE BT32, ON EAST
 BY SEA, ON SOUTH BY TAOR BOUNDARY, AND ON WEST BY N-S GRIDLINE

8

SECRET

(mild)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2188E S E C R E T
 BT 32.

- (6) FIRST HALF MARCH
- E. (1) PLYMOUTH
- (2) TF XRAY
- (3) BN MINUS
- (4) SEARCH AND DESTROY
- (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY RZ, ON EAST BY TAOR, ON SOUTH BY E-W GRIDLINE BT07, AND ON WEST BY N-S GRIDLINE ST 26.
- (6) LAST HALF MARCH
- F. (1) PUEBLO
- (2) TF XRAY
- (3) BN MINUS
- (4) CLEARING
- (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY SONG TRA CAU, ON EAST BY NATIONAL RTE ONE, ON SOUTH BY E-W GRIDLINE BS35, AND ON WEST BY DISTRICT BOUNDARY DUC PHO/BA TO NORTHWEST TO SONG BAC TO SONG TRA CAU.
- (6) LAST HALF MARCH
- G. (1) YELL
- (2) FIRST MAR
- (3) BN MINUS

PAGE FOUR RUMHLA 2198E S E C R E T

- (4) CLEARING
- (5) AREA BOUNDED BY BT0160, ET0158, AT9958, AT9960.
- (6) LAST HALF MARCH
- H. (1) HUMBOLDT
- (2) FIRST MAR
- (3) BN MINUS
- (4) CLEARING
- (5) AREA BOUNDED BY BT0667, BT0664, BT0364, ST0367.
- (6) FIRST HALF OF MONTH
- I. (1) RIVERSIDE
- (2) NINTH MAR
- (3) BN MINUS
- (4) CLEARING
- (5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY SONG AI NCHIA EXTENDING FROM COORD AT970607 NORTHEAST TO COORD AT99639, ON EAST BY REGIMENTAL BOUNDARY, ON SOUTH BY REGIMENTAL BOUNDARY AND ON WEST BY N-S GRIDLINE AT97.
- (6) FIRST HALF MARCH
- J. (1) YUBA
- (2) NINTH MAR

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FIVE RUMHLA 2198E S E C R E T

(3) BN MINUS

(4) CLEARING

(5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GRIDLINE AT70, ON EAST BY N-S GRIDLINE AT94, ON SOUTH BY E-W GRIDLINE AT66, AND ON WEST BY N-S GRIDLINE AT90.

(6) FIRST HALF MARCH

K. (1) GRAND

(2) NINTH MAR

(3) BN REIN

(4) SEARCH AND DESTROY

(5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GRIDLINE AT63, ON EAST BY N-S GRIDLINE AT85, ON SOUTH BY E-W GRIDLINE AT59, AND ON WEST BY N-S GRIDLINE AT79.

(6) LAST HALF MARCH

L. (1) MONTEZUMA

(2) NINTH MAR

(3) BN MINUS

(4) SEARCH AND DESTROY

(5) AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY SONG VU GIA, ON EAST BY SONG THU BON, ON SOUTH BY E-W GRIDLINE AT44, AND ON WEST BY N-S

PAGE SIX RUMHLA 2198E S E C R E T

GRIDLINE ZC21.

(6) LAST HALF MARCH

M. (1) NEW CASTLE

(2) SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

(3) BN MINUS REIN

(4) SEARCH AND DESTROY

(5) THAT PORTION GORDON AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY E-W GRIDLINE AT50, ON THE EAST BY THE SONG THU BON, ON THE SOUTH BY E-W GRIDLINE AT 45, AND ON THE WEST BY N-S GRIDLINE AT80.

(6) FIRST HALF MARCH

N. (1) DIXIE

(2) SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

(3) BN MINUS REIN

(4) CLEARING

(5) THAT PORTION OF TUSCALOOSA AREA BOUNDED ON NORTH BY SONG THU BON, ON EAST BY RR TRACKS, ON SOUTH BY RR TRACKS, AND ON WEST BY N-S GRIDLINE AT92.

(6) LAST HALF MARCH

O. (1) HERNANDO

(2) SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

BT

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

P 180541Z FEB 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO CG III MAF
INFO CG FIRST MAW
CG TASK FORCE XRAY
FIRST MAR
NINTH MAR
SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
BT

SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO

(3) BN MINUS REIN

(4) RECON IN FORCE

(5) VIC EN BASE AREA 116 (NUJI MAT RANG) COORD AT9843.

(6) LAST HALF MARCH

2. GENERAL OFFENSIVE WILL BE EXPANDED WITH MAXIMUM PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO AREA AND POPULATION SECURITY IN FURTHERANCE OF RD PROGRAM.

3. CONTINUED EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS, AND ADDITIONAL OPNS TO EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE.

PAGE TWO RUWHLA 2199E 5 E C B E T

4. CONTINUED EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON EXPANSION OF CAC PROGRAM AND USE OF KIT CARSON SCOUTS.

5. MAX POSSIBLE COUNTY FAIRS TO BE EXECUTED.

6. CONTINUED EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON NIGHT PATROLS, AMBUSHES, AND LISTENING POSTS.


684

81

SECRET

SECRET

COC



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PFR SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CLK
	BRIEF
	POST

P 210511Z FEB 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV (REIN) G-3

TO III MAF COC

INFO FIRST MAW OPNS
SECOND BN FIFTH MAR

BT

S E C R E T

OPN FAULKNER (U)

- A. FIRST MARDIV COC 200630Z FEB 67
1. DELETE PARA TWO REF A.
2. INSERT NEW PARA TWO AS FOL:

D-DAY L HOUR: 030900H MAR 67.


GP-4

BT

4
SECRET

(mail 44)

SECRET



P 212733Z FEB 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO CG III MAF

CG FMAW

NINTH MAR

ELEVENTH MAR

DET THIRD ENGR BN

DET THIRD SP BN

INFO CG FLC

FIRST MP BN

BT

S E C R E T

FRAG O 23-67 (OPN GULF) (U)

A. FIRST MARDIV COC 200640Z FEB 67 (NOTAL)

B. NINTH MAR 180710Z FEB 67 (NOTAL)

C. DIV O 5312.3

D. FORCE O 5312.10

1. COMMENCING O/A 27FEB67 NINTH MAR CONDUCTS OPN GULF,
 SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN VIC SONG CU ĐÉ VALLEY, IAW CONCEPT
 REF A. REF B CITES NEED FOR AUGMENTATION.

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WT SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

COC

F-3

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 2582E S E C R E T

2. EXECUTION

A. NINTH MAR

(1) REF B APPROVED. EXECUTE OPN GULF.

(2) SUBMIT REQUEST SCOUT DOG TMS IAW REF C.

DIRLAUTH FIRST MP BN TO ARRANGE PICK UP SCOUT DOG TMS.

B. ELEVENTH MAR:

PROVIDE ARMD AMPH PLT DS NINTH MAR

C. DET THIRD ENGR BN: PROVIDE ENGR SPT NINTH MAR

D. DET THIRD SP BN: PROVIDE ONE HST IN SPT NINTH MAR

E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

(2) ON TERMINATION OPN ALL UNITS AND DET RETURN

PARENT COMMAND.

3. REQUEST CG III MAF PROVIDE FOUR SCOUT DOG TMS IN SPT
 COMMENCING 26FEB67 FOR ABOUT FIVE DAYS. WRITTEN REQUEST
 FOLLOWS IAW REF D.

4. REQUEST FMAW PROVIDE FIXED WING AND HELO SPT.

GP-4


BT

8
SECRET

(Enclosure 42)

SECRET

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WIC SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST



0 220325Z FEB 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 6-3

TO FIRST MAR

INFO CG III MAF

CG FMAW

NINTH MAR

BT

S E C R E T

OPN STONE (U)

1. AUTH GRANTED TERM OPN STONE 221300H FEB 67

GP-4



BT

)2

SECRET

(incl 145)

SECRET



0 220327Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO CG TFXRAY
 INFO CG III MAF
 CG FMAW
 SECOND ROK MAR BDE
 BY

SECRET

TERMINATION OPN RIO GRANDE

1. AUTHORITY GRANTED TO TERMINATE OPN RIO GRANDE 221800H FEB 67

GP-4
 BT


12

SECRET

Encl (44)

SECRET

COC



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	1
	LND
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

P 220557Z FEB 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

TO FIRST MAR

BT

SECRET

OPN LAFAYETTE

A. FIRST MAR 200255Z FEB 67

1. CONCEPT REF A APPROVED. EXECUTE OPN LAFAYETTE.

GP-4


BT

13

SECRET

(Enc 45)

SECRET



0 220725Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV RE
 TO CG III MAF
 CG FIRST MAW
 NINTH MAR
 DET THIRD ENGR BN
 FIRST AMTRAC BN
 BT

SECRET

FRAG O 24-67 (OPN PULASKI) (U)

- A. FIRST MARDIV COC 212345Z FEB 67 (NOTAL)
- B. NINTH MAR 201120Z FEB67
- C. DIV O 5312.3
- D. CG FIRST MARDIV 060249Z FEC66 (FRAG O 44-66)
- E. FORCE O 5312.10

1. COMMENCING O/A 24FEB67 NINTH MAR CONDUCTS OPN PULASKI, SEARCH AND DESTROY OPN SOUTHWEST PORTION NINTH MAR SECTOR TAIR, IAW CONCEPT REF A. REF B CITES NEED FOR FORCES BEYOND NINTH MAR ASSETS.

2. EXECUTION

COC

	BURN
	HOLD
	1A/6-4
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

PAGE 2 RUMHLA 2703E SECRET

- A. NINTH MAR:
 - (1) CONCEPT REF B APPROVED. EXECUTE OPN PULASKE.
 - (2) SUBMIT REQUEST SCOUT DOG TMS IAW REF C DIRLAUTH FIRST MP BN TO ARRANGE PICK UP SCOUT DOG TMS.
 - (3) PROVIDE RIFLE COS FROM ORGANIC ASSETS.
 - (4) REF D FOR DS TANK AND AMTRAC UNITS.
- B. DET THIRD ENGR BN: PROVIDE ENGR SPT NINTH MAR.
- C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
 - (1) DIRLAUTH
 - (2) ON TERMINATION ALL UNITS AND DET RETURN PARENT CMD.
 - (2) REQUEST CG III MAF PROVIDE FOUR SCOUT DOG TMS IN SPT COMMENCING 23FEB67. WRITTEN REQUEST FOLLOWS IAW REF E.
 - (3) REQUEST FMAW PROVIDE FIXED WING AND HELO SPT.

GP-4

BT


SECRET

Initial (46)

SECRET

Stone

Coc



	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

090802Z FEB 67

FM FIRST MARINES

TO CG FIRST MARDIV (RRIN)

ZEN/FIRST BN FIRST MARINES

ZEN/SECOND BN FIRST MARINES

ZEN/THIRD BN FIRST MARINES

ELEVENTH MARINES

FIRST AT BN

FIRST AMTRAC BN

FIRST TANK BN

ZEN/FIRST BN ELEVENTH MARINES

THIRD ENGR BN

FIRST RECON BN

BT

SECRET

TERMINATION OF POPN STONE.

A. CG FIRST MARDIV MSG 220325Z FEB 67

1. IAW REF (A), OPERATION STONE TERMINATED AT 221300H FEB 67.

GP=4

BT


C3 12480
 1ST AT
 1ST RECON
 3D ENGR

14

SECRET

Encl (47)

SECRET

*Watch off**Then*

	BURN
	HOLD
	G-1/G-4
	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

0 230355Z FEB67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN *G-3*
 TO ZEN/NINTH MAR
 ZEN/ELEVENTH MAR *one*
 ZEN/DET THIRD ENGR BN *one*
 INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
 RUMNVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FMAW
 ZEN/CG FOR LOG CMD
 BT

S E C R E T
ROUGH RIDER (U)

- A. CG THIRD MARDIV 220327Z FEB67 (NOTAL)
- B. ANNEX G TO FIRST MARDIV ADMIN 0 301-66 (NOTAL)
- C. THIRD MARDIV 0 P416-66 (NOTAL)
- D. FIRST MARDIV 190916Z JAN67 (NOTAL)
- E. FIRST MARDIV 0 P02000.2C (CEO1)
- F. THIRD MARDIV 0 P02000.2E (CO1)
- 1. REF A SCHEDULES ROUGH RIDER CONVOYS 24 FEB67 PHU BAI TO DA NANG AND 25 FEB67 DANANG TO PHU BAI, REQUESTS FIRST MARDIV

PAGE TWO RUMHLA 2808E S E C R E T

PROVIDE CERTAIN CONVOY SPT. CONVOY 25FEB67 STAGED, ORGANIZED, AND DISPATCHED BY CG FOR LOG COMD FM FOR LOG CMD AREA.

2. EXECUTION

A. NINTH MAR: PROVIDE CONVOY RESERVE ON 24 AND 25FEB67 IAW PARA 3.D(1) (B) REF B. CONVOY SECURITY TO BE FURNISHED BY THIRDMARDIV AS STATED REF A.

B. ELEVENTH MAR: REF B AS APPLICABLE.

C. DET THIRD ENGR BN: ASSUME MISSION ASSIGNED IN PARA 3.G. REF B FOR ROUGH RIDER 25FEB67.

D. COORD INSTRUCTIONS

(1) REF B MODIFIED FOR CONVOYS DA NANG TO PHU BAI.

(2) CHK PTS: REF C AND D.

(3) D DAYS H HOURS:

(A) FM PHU BAI: SCHEDULED BY REF A TO DEPART 240900 FEB67.

(B) FM DA NANG: AS DIRECTED BY CG FOR LOG CMD. SCHEDULED BY REF A TO DEPART 250900H FEB 67.

(4) IN EVENT WEATHER OR ROAD CONDITIONS REQUIRE POSTPONEMENT CONVOYS TO BE RESCHED FOL DAY.

3. COMM-ELECT:

(b)

SECRET

(Enc 48)

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUMHLA 2808E S E C R E T

A. REF E AND F.
B. NINTH MAR: MONITOR THIRD MARDIV TAC NR ONE
(M-15, 2244 KC) COMMENCING 240900H FEB 67 UNTIL CONVOY TERMINATES
DANAG. MONITOR SAME NET COMMENCING 250830H UNTIL CONVOY PASSES
NORTH OF FIRST-THIRD MARDIV BOUNDARY.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

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COC

P R 240231Z FEB 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
SEVENTH ENGR BN
INFO CG III MAF
BT

ROAD SECURITY (u)

1. RECENT MONTHS HAVE SEEN INCREASED ENEMY EMPHASIS ON INTERDICTION OF LOCS WITHIN TAOR. RECENT SNIPING, MINING AND AMBUSHING INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN AN UNACCEPTABLY HIGH TOLL OF MARINE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. IN VIEW INCREASED USE OF RTE 5 FOR MOVEMENT OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES, ADDL EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO REDUCE INCIDENTS ON LOC.
2. SECOND BN FIFTH MAR. TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES TO SECURE RTE 5 WITHIN SECTOR, PROTECT ENGR PERS WORKING IN VIC, AND PREVENT DESTRUCTION OR EFFECTIVE INTERDICTION OF LOC.
3. SEVENTH ENGR BN. COORD ENGR EFFORT IN SUBJ AREA WITH SECOND BN FIFTH MAR, AND PROVIDE ENGR ASSISTANCE AS REQUIRED.
4. DIRLAUTH.

GP-4


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UNCLASSIFIED

(II MAF 2100-1 (9-66)


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	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

CONFIDENTIAL



	BURN
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	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	W/L SUM
	CMD CHR
	URGEE
	POST

COC

R 240706Z FEB 67
 FM CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 TO RUMGCR XCG III MAF
 RUMGCR/SA I CORPS
 INFO RUMGUL XCOMSEVENTHFLT
 RUMGCR/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMGCR/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMGCR/SECOND BDE ROKMC
 RUMGCR/I CORPS ADV GRU
 RUMGCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PP EIGHT PT NYFE
 RUMGCR/SUB UNIT ONE FIRST ANGLICO

BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 NGFS IN I CTZ

14174

A M YOUR 230006Z FEB 67

QM COMMENTS REF A GREATLY APPRECIATED.
 2. NO MATTER HOW MUCH HELP CUR GUYS PROVIDE IN TAKING A HURL OR
 ROUTING "CHARLIE" OUT OF HIS ENCLAVES THE DIRTY WORK IS STILL UP
 TO YOUM THO E HARD CHARGERS OF YOURS DESERVE EVERY BIT OF SUPPORT
 WE CAN PROVIDE.

PAGE TWO RUMGUAY 100 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 EM NO BETTER ANAMPLE OF I M NAO
 -MARINE CORPS TEAM EXISTS TODAY THAN
 THE ONE IN THE I CTZ. BE ASSURED THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT YMU
 TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY.

GP-4
 BT

SECRET

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	WK SUM
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COC



02506197 FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
 INFO CG III MAF

G-3

BT

S E C R E T

OPN LANOKA (U)

A. SECOND BN FIFTH MAR 230535Z FEB 67 (NOTAL)

1. REF A APPLIES. OPN NAME LANOKA.
2. EXECUTE.

GP-4

BT



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P 270025Z FEB 67
FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
INFO RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC (K001)
ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG TASK FORCE X-RAY
ZEN/FIFTH MARINES

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

1. CHOP ADCON 5TH MARINES) EFFECTIVE 010001H MAR 67.

GP-4

BT

G-1

III MAF 2100-1 (9-66)

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
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	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

Gulf file
COC



0252355Z FEB 67
 FM OG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO OG III MAF
 INFO CG FMAW
 CG TLC
 FIRST MP BN
 NINTH MAR
 ELEVENTH MAR
 DET THIRD ENGR
 DET THIRD SP BN
 BT

SECRET

HELICOPTER SUPPORT OF OPNS (U)

- A. OG III MAF 241350Z FEB 67 (NOTAL)
- B. FIRST MARDIV COC 200640Z FEB 67 (NOTAL)
- C. OG FIRST MARDIV 210733Z FEB 67

- 1. REF A CITES DIFFICULTY OF PROVIDING HELICOPTER SPT FOR OPNS SCHED 25-28 FEB 67 AND SUGGESTS DELAYING D-DAY OPN GULF UNTIL 4MAR67.
- 2. CONCUR DELAY OPN GULF UNTIL 4MAR67. ADDDEES ARE REQUESTED TO REFLECT CHANGE OF D-DAY IN REFS A AND B.


GP-4

BT

12
SECRET
(mc52)

SECRET

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	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST



P 271255Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV (REIN)
 TO NINH MAR
 INFO CG III MAF
 CG FIRST MAW
 BT
 S E C R E T
 OPN PULASKI (U)


G-3
 1. AUTHORITY GRANTED TERMINATE OPN PULASKI AS OF 271500H FEB 67.
 GP-4
 BT

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SECRET

(Incl 15-4)

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL



	BURN
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	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WT. SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

Coc

O P 281135Z FEB 67
FM CEF FIRST MARDIV REIN
TO SECOND BN FIFTH MAR
INFO CG III MAF

G-3

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
OPN LANOKE (U)

1. AUTHORITY GRANTED TERMINATE OPN LANOKE 281600H FEB 67.

GP-4


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	G-2
	LNO
	PER SUM
	WK SUM
	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST



***** ZZ 281415Z FEB 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO ZEN/NINTH MAR
 INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 ZEN/CG FLC/FIRST FSR
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV (OPCON)

BT

S E C R E T

FRAG O 26-67 (BN DEPLOYMENT) (U)

- A. FIRST MARDIV O P02000.2C (DIV CLOI)
- B. THIRD MARDIV O P020002E (DIV CGID)
- 1. ENEMY SITUATION NORTHERN ICTZ REQUIRES POSSIBLE REINFORCEMENT
 VIC CAM LO.
- 2. NINTH MAR
 - A. PREPARE ONE BN OF THREE COMPANIES FOR DEPLOYMENT ON FOUR HOUR NOTICE TO NORTHERN ICTZ AS AIRCRAFT BECOME AVAILABLE. UPON ARRIVAL NORTHERN ICTZ BN (-) CHOPS CG. THIRD MARDIV. REPORT THIS HQ UNIT DESIGNATED FOR ALERT STATUS AND TIME STATUS ATTAINED.

PAGE 2 RUMNLA 3447E S E C R E T

- B. MISSION REMAINS SAME.
- C. AUTHORITY GRANTED TO TERMINATE PRESENT OPNS AND CANCEL SCHED OPNS AS REQUIRED.
- 3. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS
 - A. REQUEST FMAW PROVIDE A/C AS REQUIRED.
 - B. PERSONNEL. AS DIR BY THIRD MARDIV.
 - C. ADMIN AS DIR BY THIRD MARDIV.
 - D. LOGISTICS
 - (1) PRESCRIBED LOADS. AS DIR BY NINTH MAR.
 - (2) RESUPPLY. AS DIR BY THIRD MARDIV.
 - (3) TRANSPORTATION. SUBMIT REQUIREMENTS THIS HQ (ATTN MTO).
- 4. COMM-ELEC
 - A. CALL SIGNS AND FREQS IAW REF A.
 - B. THIRD MARDIV CALL SIGNS AND FREQS IAW REF B.
 - C. COMM SECURITY AIDS.
 - (1) AUTHENTICATION-KAA-60 KAC-QX.
 - (2) NUMERAL CDE-KAC-138, KAC-QX
 - (3) OPERATIONS CDE-KAC-PX.
 - D. REQUEST THIRD MARDIV PROVIDE ADDNL COMM INSTR AS REQUIRED.

GP-4


BT

14
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(mell 56)

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	BURN
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	CMD CHR
	BRIEF
	POST

Z 281510Z FEB 67

FM NINTH MARINES

TO CG FIRST MARDIV REIN

INFO CG THIRD MARDIV

ZEN/ SECOND BN TWO SIX MARINES

ZEN/ SECOND BN FOURTH MARINES

G-3

15558

BT

SECRET

FIRST MARDIV FRAG ORDER 26-67 (BN DEPLOYMENT)

A. CG FIRST MARDIV 2

1415Z FEB 67

L IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (A), THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED:

A. UNIT SECOND BN TWENTY SIX MARINES (5).

CMD GROUP, 2/26

CO F, 2/26

CO H, 2/26

CO E, 2/4

B. STATUS ATTAINED AT 282130H FEB 67.

GP-4

BT

6
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Encl (57)

NNNN
DEDIV-PI INT QSL INT

L INQSL K K K K K
FOLLOW

***** ZNY SSSSS
Z 281525Z FEB 67
FM-11 MAF COC
FM-11 FIRST MARDIV COC
FM-AW COC
INFO THIRD MARDIV COC
BT


SITUATION OPN PRAIRIE

SECRET

1. SITUATION PRAIRIE AREA DICTATES IMMEDIATE ACTION TO PLACE REINFORCING ELEMENTS IN AN ALERT STATUS IN CASE OF NEED.
2. FOR CG 1ST MARDIV: PLACE ON BN COMD GPP WITH THREE KIPL COMPANIES ON FOUR HOUR ALERT FOR AIR MOVEMENT TO DONG HA. PROVIDE EMBARKATION DATA TO FORCE EMBARK OFF. TROOPS TO BE STAGED AND READY TO BOARD AIRCRAFT WITHIN FOUR HOURS OF EXECUTE.
3. FOR CG FMAW: PROVIDE FOUR C-130 AIRCRAFT PREPARED FOR ABOVE LIFT WITHIN FOUR HOURS OF EXECUTE. IN ADDITION, PROVIDE ONE 200 MAN HELO LIFT FROM 2D BN 4TH MARINES AREA TO MARINE AIR FREIGHT AREA, DANANG ON 3 HOUR ALERT FROM EXECUTE.
4. THIS CONFIRMS VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS ALREADY ISSUED.

GP-4

BT



Command & Services

	BURN
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	WK SUM
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	BRIEF

Return to CoC

ACTION CO

Encd (a)

NNNNF REAETPVDXNLDZEFYBHXTUJ

281549Z
CG FIRST MARDET

CG III MAF

BRIEF OFFICER

CG THIRD MARDIV
CG FMAW
CG FLC/FIRST FSR
FIRST MARDIV (OPCON)

Poggemeyer

SECRET

SECRET

IN DEPLOYMENT (U)000
000

A. NINETH MAR 281510Z (NOTAL)

B. CG FIRST MARDIV REIN 281415Z FEB67 (PRAG 0 26-67)

1. IF A PROVIES FOL INFO AS REQUIRED BY PARA 2A REF B.

A. UNITS DESIGNATED: IN CMD GRP, COS F AND 2/26; CO E,

2/4.

B. TIME READINESS STATUS ATTAINED: 282130Z FEB67

GP-1

281549Z

Feb 67

Encell(67)

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at RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	LtCol D. N. MCKEEON	Aug 67	Ironhand 6
Executive Officer	Maj F. RINEY	Mar 67	Ironhand 5
Adjutant	2dLt D. J. COLLINS	Aug 67	Ironhand 1
1st MEDICAL BN, "D" CO DET			
Commanding Officer	Cdr C. R. ASHWORTH USN	May 67	Calhoun 6
Admin Asst	Lt C. L. HENSLEY MSC/USN	Jan 68	Calhoun 1
Patient Affairs	Lt J. L. ROBERTSON MSC/USN	Jan 68	Calhoun Delta
1st HOSPITAL COMPANY			
Commanding Officer	Cdr F. M. ROBERTS, USN	Oct 67	Syringe
Admin Asst	LtJG N. G. OGLESBY	Jan 68	Syringe
3d AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	LtCol D. ROWLEY	Oct 67	Sleek 6
Executive Officer	Maj F. M. VAN SANT	Jun 67	Sleek 5
Adjutant	2dLt F. A. LAMBERT	Oct 67	Sleek 1
7th COMMUNICATION BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	LtCol W. M. CLELLAND	Dec 67	Mouth 6
Executive Officer	Maj E. A. HUERLIMANN	Jul 67	Mouth 5
Adjutant	2dLt T. L. DANIELS	Jul 67	Mouth 1
1st MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	Maj J. T. ELKINS	Apr 67	Quench 6
Executive Officer	Maj K. H. REAGAN	Oct 67	Quench 5
Adjutant	2dLt B. V. BRANSON	Sep 67	Quench 1
7th MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION			
Commanding Officer	Maj S. H. BATHELDER	Sep 67	Faster 6
Executive Officer	Maj F. R. SMITH	Jun 67	Faster 5
Adjutant	1stLt J. SOMMERHAUSER	Jul 67	Faster 1
"C" COMPANY, 1st ANTI TANKS BN			
Commanding Officer	Capt R. J. ESPOSITO	May 67	Dance Card Charlie
TMA MAC V OIC			
	2dLt C. B. TORRES	Dec 67	Devote 439/539

PLEASE REPORT TO THE TASK FORCE ADJUTANT ANY ERRORS, AND/OR OMISSIONS - TELEPHONE
DEVOTE 7.

J. A. DeBBS
2dLt., U. S. Marine Corps
Task Force Adjutant

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMMAND DIRECTORY

HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN)
FLIGHT MARINE FORCE
DA NANG, VIETNAM
1 FEBRUARY 1967

	RTD	OFFICE PHONE	QTRS
MajGen H. NICKERSON JR.	Oct67	Isherwood 13	113
1stLt L. H. ANDERSON	Apr67	Isherwood 105	
SgtMaj J. H. JOHNSON	Nov67	Isherwood 407	
Col S. J. ALTMAN	Jul67	Isherwood 5	905
Capt H. S. HAUPT	Apr67	Isherwood 38	113
Col A. L. EMILS	May67	Isherwood 1	593
LtCol P. A. LORENTZEN	Sep67	Isherwood 101	A-1
Maj M. P. MANNING	Aug67	Isherwood 1	C-1
Maj J. A. POLAND	Nov67	Isherwood 1	C-1
1stLt F. A. WATERS	Nov67	Isherwood 1	
2dLt D. B. GREENLAW	Apr67	Isherwood 1	
Col S. DAVIS	Nov67	Isherwood 2	938
LtCol L. W. T. WALLER II	Feb67	Isherwood 2	A-1
LtCol E. B. SIGMON	Oct67	Isherwood 202	
WO J. C. ENDERLE	Mar67	Isherwood 502	
Maj R. A. MONFORT	Jul67	Isherwood Bailey	
2dLt J. N. CORCORAN	Sep67	Isherwood Auditor	98
CWO L. V. SHERIDAN	May67	Iron Hand	
1stLt A. D. ELLERMAN	May67	Isherwood 602	
Capt D. M. KENWORTHY	Apr67	Isherwood Lusty	
Capt C. M. ISBELL	Sep67	Isherwood 502	
Col H. POGGEMEYER JR.	Jul67	Isherwood 3	909
Col R. L. DOMINICK	Mar67	Isherwood 103	933
LtCol E. A. WALKER	Mar67	Isherwood 203	952-B-3
Maj F. H. HARPER JR.	Jul67	Isherwood 403	910
Maj R. J. HEMLET	Aug67	Isherwood 403	
Maj H. T. KENNEDY	Aug67	Isherwood 600	COC
LtCol E. R. WATSON	Oct67	Isherwood 303	A-1
Maj D. E. WIGET	Aug67	Isherwood 303	
LtCol R. W. SMITH	Oct67	Isherwood 303	
Maj C. H. BLACK	Nov67	Isherwood 303	
1stLt A. S. HILL	May67	QUANG NGAI TOC	
Capt T. J. DALzell	Jun67	HOT AN 103	
2dLt W. C. SHIPLE	Oct67	Puma 126	
Col E. L. BALE	Oct67	Isherwood 4	909
LtCol K. M. BUSS	Nov67	Isherwood 4	902
Maj F. J. BALLEK	Mar67	Isherwood 304	
Capt T. B. FULLILOVE	Sep67	Isherwood 304	
Maj V. B. PAGANO	Nov67	Isherwood 104	
Capt R. W. LAYER	Dec67	Isherwood 104	
Col D. L. MALLORY	Jun67	Isherwood 46	
LtCol R. F. PETERSON	Nov67	Isherwood 46	
Maj J. P. MCGILL	Jul67	Isherwood 46	946
Maj H. D. JACKSON	Mar67	Isherwood 146	
Maj W. J. KRAUSS JR.	Oct67	Isherwood 146	946
LtCol R. S. ROBERTSON	Oct67	Isherwood 50	
WO M. P. TIERNEY	Apr67	Isherwood 50	

FEB 1967

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ADJUTANT	LtCol E. R. SCHIFFMAN	Sep67	Isherwood 7	A-1	USO - CHU LAI	Mr. T. HEBERT	Auditor Rear 337
Asst Adjutant	Capt G. F. KUSTINER JR.	Cot67	Isherwood 7		Executive Director		
EnclPers0	CWO E. J. McNAGLE	Apr67	Isherwood 47		AMERICAN RED CROSS	Mr. W. J. BURTSCHER	Devote 119/219
OffPers0/TADO	2dLt J. E. TYLER	Aug67	Isherwood 147		HEADQUARTERS 5th MARINES	Col F. E. HAYNES JR	Nov 67 Select 6
RPS GUARDIAN	2dLt W. J. KANE	Oct67	Isherwood 507		Commanding Officer	LtCol W. H. DRAPER	Oct 67 Select 5
Casualty0	2dLt J. D. CARMAN	Sep67	Isherwood 107		Executive Officer	2dLt J. W. HORTON	Dec 67 Select 1
Awards0	2dLt J. M. STOOPS	Mar67	Isherwood 607		Adjutant		
SAC Files	CWO H. A. ZIMMERMAN	Nov67	Isherwood 507		1st BATTALION 5th MARINES	Maj P. L. HILGARDNER	Oct 67 Chime 6
AIR OFFICER	Col F. C. LANG	Aug67	Isherwood 14		Commanding Officer	Maj R. J. ALGER	Sep 67 Chime 5
AsstAir0	Maj P. L. MOREAU	Apr67	Isherwood 14		Executive Officer	2dLt G. S. LIDBACK JR	Aug 67 Chime 1
AsstAir0	Capt T. L. ELSER	May67	Isherwood 14		Adjutant		
AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR OFFICER	LtCol J. D. ROWLEY	Oct67	Sleek 6		3d BATTALION 5th MARINES	LtCol D. E. ESSLINGER	Sep 67 Glove 6
ARTILLERY OFFICER	Col G. E. NORRIS	Sep67	Amigo 6		Commanding Officer	Maj J. P. WHITE	Aug 67 Glove 5
BAND OFFICER	CWO F. E. BARTHOLD	Mar67	Auditor 55		Executive Officer	2dLt B. F. BEZGGS	Mar 67 Glove 1
CLUBS OFFICER	Maj J. R. GRIMSKIE	Jun67	Auditor Rear 60		Adjutant		
COMM ELEC OFFICER	Col E. P. CLAUDE	Oct67	Isherwood 10		4th BATTALION 7th MARINES	Col C. C. CROSSFIELD III	Aug 67 Bonnie Hero 6
Asst CEO	Maj F. DI CILLO JR.	Mar67	Isherwood 10		Commanding Officer	LtCol R. E. JOHNSON	Sep 67 Bonnie Hero 5
Asst CEO/Electronics	Maj F. L. BIROU	Aug67	Isherwood 210		Executive Officer	Capt D. R. MUNCIE	Dec 67 Bonnie Hero 1
Asst CEO/Operations	Maj R. O. RITTS	Nov67	Isherwood 110		Adjutant		
Asst CEO/Plans	Maj J. H. BIRD JR.	Jul67	Isherwood 210		1st BATTALION 7th MARINES	LtCol B. LUBKA	Aug 67 Booth 6
Div Comm Center Off	Capt L. J. KELLY	Mar67	Isherwood 110		Commanding Officer	Maj K. D. HYSLOP	May 67 Booth 5
Div Systems Control Off	2dLt R. L. ROBILLARD	Jul67	Isherwood 69		Executive Officer	2dLt J. F. CURRAN	Aug 67 Booth 1
DENTAL OFFICER	Capt P. C. CONKLIS, USN	May67	Isherwood 40		Adjutant		
Admin Officer	Ens J. H. BRUHN, USN	Mar67	Isherwood 40		2d BATTALION 7th MARINES	Maj W. P. KITTERMAN	Aug 67 Dixie Diner 6
DISBURSING OFFICER	Capt J. J. FISCHER JR.	Jun67	Isherwood 418		Commanding Officer	Maj D. L. DIAMOND	Jul 67 Dixie Diner 5
AsstDisbursing0	Capt T. J. KENNEDY	Mar67	Isherwood 318		Executive Officer	2dLt J. C. ALVAREZ	Jul 67 Dixie Diner 1
DIVISION CHAPLAIN	Capt D. J. CASAZZA, USN	Aug67	Isherwood 19		3d BATTALION 7th MARINES	LtCol R. J. OLEARY	Aug 67 False 6
Asst Chaplain	Cir H. W. HOLLAND, USN	Feb67	Devote 19		Commanding Officer	Maj R. C. RICE	Sep 67 False 1
EMBARKATION OFFICER	Maj J. P. TREHY	Apr67	Isherwood 39		Executive Officer	2dLt W. E. KELLER	Jul 67 False 1
ENGINEER OFFICER	LtCol G. A. MERRILL	Aug67	Isherwood 15		2d BATTALION 11th MARINES	LtCol I. L. CARVER	Aug 67 Prowl 6
Asst Engr0	Capt G. E. LANE	Jun67	Isherwood 115		Commanding Officer	Maj J. J. MARRON	Oct 67 Prowl 5
Engr Equipment0	Capt C. WILLIAMS	Jun67	Isherwood 115		Executive Officer	2dLt A. A. BOROWICKI	Oct 67 Prowl 1
Base Development0	Maj E. E. SCHILHAB	Jun67	Isherwood 15		Adjutant		
DIVISION SUPPLY OFFICER	Col P. J. DUPRE	Oct67	Isherwood 21		3d BATTALION 11th MARINES	LtCol A. S. RUGGIERO	Jul 67 Laugh 6
EXCHANGE OFFICER	Maj A. T. FISHER	Oct67	Auditor 44		Commanding Officer	Maj H. R. ANKER	Apr 67 Laugh 5
INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER	Maj G. HUBBARD	Mar67	Isherwood 141		Executive Officer	WO J. D. CURLEE	Oct 67 Laugh 1
INSPECTOR	Col W. W. CURTIS	Sep67	Isherwood 32		4th BATTALION 11th MARINES	LtCol G. R. LAMB	Mar 67 Plaid 6
AsstInspector	Maj E. H. HOLTHUS	Mar67	Isherwood 32		Commanding Officer	Maj C. F. BURAN	Jul 67 Plaid 5
DIVISION CAREER ADVISOR	2dLt M. E. CARSON (CHU LAI)	Oct67	Devote 447		Executive Officer	2dLt J. W. WELLS	Nov 67 Plaid 1
DIVISION LEGAL OFFICER	LtCol T. P. CASEY	Feb67	Isherwood 217		Adjutant		
AdminLaw0	Maj W. B. DRAPER	Oct67	Isherwood 217		1st ENGINEER BATTALION	Maj C. O. NEWTON	Aug 67 Big Buddy 6
Law Specialist	Lt W. J. LANDEN, USN	Jul67	Isherwood 217		Commanding Officer	Maj J. C. FLOYD	Jun 67 Big Buddy 5
PROTOCOL OFFICER	Capt R. T. TANNER	Mar67	Isherwood 138		Executive Officer	2dLt J. MOUTON	Dec 67 Big Buddy 1
MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER	LtCol K. M. BUSS	Nov67	Isherwood 55		Adjutant		
NAVAL GUNFIRE OFFICER	LtCol R. A. WHITCOMB, USN	Jan68	Isherwood 26		9th ENGINEER BATTALION	LtCol R. W. CRISPEN	Jun 67 Earthworm 6
ORDNANCE OFFICER	Maj H. SOBOL	Feb67	Isherwood 8		Commanding Officer	Maj W. R. FLOYD	Jun 67 Earthworm 5
PHOTO OFFICER	WO H. L. HUNTLEY	Aug67	Isherwood 4341		Executive Officer	CWO F. L. HALL	Dec 67 Earthworm 1
					Adjutant		
					1st SHORE PARTY BATTALION	LtCol E. H. JONES	Sep 67 Consequence 6
					Commanding Officer	Maj T. J. GIPSON JR	Sep 67 Consequence 5
					Executive Officer	2dLt J. J. KOLIHA	Sep 67 Consequence 1

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ASST DIV CAREER ADVISORY O	2dLt M. E. CARSON	Oct 67	Devote 447	INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFFICER	Capt R. A. PATTERSON (DAMANG) Oct 67	Boherwood 446
CHU LAI DEFENSE COMMAND Commanding Officer Executive Officer/S-3	LtCol E. B. ANDERSON Maj J. C. HERCET	Aug 67 Aug 67	Anchor Watch 6 Anchor Watch 5	POSTAL OFFICER	2dLt C. M. HENDRICKS (CHU LAI) Aug 67	Boherwood 7
COMM ELECT OFFICER Asst CEO Asst CEO/Maintenance Systems Control O Comm Chief	LtCol A. G. ZIEGLER 2dLt D. L. NELSON 2dLt J. J. LEE 2dLt T. C. SHEPHERD MSgt J. DARE	Nov 67 Jul 67 Sep 67 Jul 67 Mar 67	Devote 10 Devote 110 Devote 210 Devote 69 Devote 110	PROVOST MARSHAL	2dLt W. NEW	Aug 67
EMBARKATION OFFICER	1stLt G. J. DESTEFANO	Jan 67	Devote 39	REPRODUCTION OFFICER	LtCol J. J. HOOHOFF	Month 120 or Devote 20
ENGINEER OFFICER Asst Engineer Officer	Maj H. I. FREY 1stLt P. J. ZOHLER	Jun 67 Jun 67	Devote 15 Devote 15	SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER Custodian Recreation Fund	Mar 67	Lipfurn 6
EXCHANGE OFFICER	2dLt E. T. KENDRICK	Feb 67	Devote 44	TANK OFFICER	2dLt J. M. WHEATLEY	Feb 68
CLUBS OFFICER	Maj J. R. GEMSKY	Jun 67	Auditor Rear 60	SURGEON AdminO	Maj J. E. FORRE 2dLt W. E. MUNN (CHU LAI)	Oct 67
DIV FOOD SERVICES OFFICER Div Mess Administrator	Capt E. V. COX WO E. G. DAHLGREN	Apr 67 Feb 67	Devote 56 Devote 56	HEADQUARTERS BATTALION (REIN) Commanding Officer Executive Officer OIC, Sub Unit #2 Executive Officer	LtCol M. R. TAYLOR	Oct 67
INFORMATIONAL SERVICES O	2dLt C. B. TYLER	Sep 67	Devote 141	1ST MILITARY POLICE BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Capt J. J. MCGREEVY, USN Lodir M. SLOAN, USN	Feb 68
SURGEON	HM1 R. W. STOLLER	Feb 67	Devote 16	HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Col W. A. LEITNER Maj R. E. EGGER LtCol R. B. MOLESKY Maj R. A. FREEMAN	Aug 67
1st DENTAL DET COMDR	Lt D. M. BARE USN	Jun 67	Devote 40	1ST BATTALION, 1ST MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol P. G. STAVRIDIS Capt J. W. BEACH 2dLt R. G. GARDNER	Aug 67
ASST DIVISION CHAPLAIN	Cdr H. W. HOLLAND	Feb 67	Devote 19	2D BATTALION, 1ST MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Col E. J. RADICS LtCol G. E. PETRO Capt R. V. OLSON	Aug 67
IRO	Capt J. C. GREENE JR	Feb 67	Earthworm IRO	3RD BATTALION, 1ST MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol V. D. BELL JR. Maj J. A. SCOTT 2dLt B. R. FREEMAN	Aug 67
DEPUTY DISBURSING O	Capt R. R. REUSCHLING	Jun 67	Devote 18/118	4TH BATTALION, 5TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol H. DONABEDIAN Maj W. P. HOHMANN WO J. L. THOMPSON	Aug 67
LEGAL OFFICER Trial Section/MJO Legal Asst O Trial Counsel Trial Counsel Gen CM Section	LtCol J. L. ZORACK Maj C. W. OLSON Capt D. M. COSTANTINO Capt F. T. COLEMAN Capt D. M. HANLON GySgt R. A. BINGHAM	Aug 67 May 67 Sep 67 Apr 67 Feb 67 Dec 67	Devote 17 Devote 217 Devote 117 Devote 217 Devote 217 Devote 317	5TH BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol H. F. DEATLEY Maj A. S. LOUGHRY 2dLt V. B. BUNNELL	Aug 67
MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER	Maj F. B. OKONSKY	Jun 67	Devote 35	6TH BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol M. C. JACKSON Maj J. L. COOPER 1stLt J. J. GOWART	Aug 67
NAVAL GUNFIRE OFFICER	Lt H. C. DRAUGHON USN	Apr 67	Devote 26	7TH BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol G. E. NORRIS LtCol R. B. METCALFE Capt R. M. HUSTON	Aug 67
ORDNANCE	MgSgt A. O. BRINK	Oct 67	Devote 108	8TH BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	LtCol M. P. FENNESSY Maj J. A. BYRD 2dLt R. A. HARDIE	Aug 67
POSTAL OFFICER Postal Locator	2dLt W. NEW	Aug 67	Devote 20 Devote 120	9TH BATTALION, 11TH MARINES Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj L. V. BARKLEY Maj J. M. SHAY 2dLt R. O. BLANCHETTE	Aug 67
PROVOST MARSHAL	Capt W. A. BARNER	Jun 67	Devote 27	10TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj L. V. BARKLEY Maj J. M. SHAY 2dLt R. O. BLANCHETTE	Aug 67
DIV SPEC SERV C Recreation Fund Custodian MARS Radio Station	2dLt R. A. CORNELL 2dLt W. E. MUNN GySgt R. P. ROTELLA	Dec 67 Oct 67 Jul 67	Auditor Rear 37 Auditor Rear 237 Devote 237	11TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj L. V. BARKLEY Maj J. M. SHAY 2dLt R. O. BLANCHETTE	Aug 67
DIV SUPPLY OFFICE Asst Supply O	LtCol J. N. DILLARD	Sep 67	Devote 21	12TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj L. V. BARKLEY Maj J. M. SHAY 2dLt R. O. BLANCHETTE	Aug 67
SUB UNIT #2 OIC Sub Unit #2 Executive Officer Adjutant/S-1	LtCol R. V. MOLESKY Maj R. A. FREEMAN 2dLt S. A. LADA	Sept 67 Mar 67 Dec 67	Devote 34 Auditor Rear 5 Auditor Rear 7	13TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj L. V. BARKLEY Maj J. M. SHAY 2dLt R. O. BLANCHETTE	Aug 67
S-3/S-4	Capt E. M. LITZ	Jun 67	Auditor Rear 3/4	14TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj L. V. BARKLEY Maj J. M. SHAY 2dLt R. O. BLANCHETTE	Aug 67
HEADQUARTERS BN AID STATION	HM1 L. C. WALKER	Feb 67	Auditor Rear 16	15TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION Commanding Officer Executive Officer Adjutant	Maj L. V. BARKLEY Maj J. M. SHAY 2dLt R. O. BLANCHETTE	Aug 67

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FEBRUARY
1967



1st MARINE DIVISION
DANANG



TELEPHONE DIRECTORY



YOUR TELEPHONE IS
NOT SECURE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Tab F

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TIME CONVERSION TABLE

This time conversion table is used to convert local time in one zone to local time in any other zone. The vertical columns indicate specific time zones (A-Z). When the time is known in any of the time zones, the corresponding time in any other zone can be determined by using the horizontal columns. Time in the shaded area to the left of the table is one day (24 hours) earlier; to the right is one day (24 hours) later. To use this table, proceed as follows: Assume that the local time in RVN (H time zone) is 1700 hours on the 15th day of the month, and you wish to know

the time in Washington, D. C. Find 1700 hours in column H and proceed horizontally to the same line in column R. Read the local time in Washington, D. C., as 0400 hours on the 15th day. If you wish to know the time in Honolulu rather than Washington, D. C., proceed to column W and read 2300 hours, the 14th day. All times shown are standard time. To convert to daylight time, add one hour to the time shown. Thus, in the first example, daylight time in Washington, D. C., would be 0500 hours on the 15th day.

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TELEPHONE TRANSMISSION SECURITY

The increased use of non-secure telephone circuits provides enemy intelligence agents with lucrative sources of U. S. classified information. The Danang Combat Base Cable System is unpatrolled and extends to many distant terminals within the DMZ. Wire lines, therefore, are highly susceptible to intercept. Additionally, telephone communications throughout RVN pass through multichannel systems which are not secure. The increasing disclosure of classified information over telephone circuits has necessitated tasking U.S. Communication Security Agencies to monitor telephone conversations and to report by name and instance security breaches.

EMERGENCY and Division Headquarters KEY Telephone Numbers

Combat Operations Center	ISHERWOOD COC
Fire Support Coordination Center	ISHERWOOD BAILEY
Dispensary	AUDITOR 16
Chaplain	ISHERWOOD 19
American Red Cross	ISHERWOOD 62/162
Protocol Officer	ISHERWOOD 138
Provost Marshal	WEAVE 6
Telephone Trouble Reports Desk	ISHERWOOD 31
Comm Systems Control Desk	ISHERWOOD 69
FIRE:	MOTLEY 933

FREQUENTLY CALLED NUMBERS

**SUBMIT DIRECTORY CHANGES
TO ISHERWOOD 110**

INDEX

	<u>Page</u>
Telephone Transmission Security	1
EMERGENCY and Division Headquarters	
Key Telephone Numbers	1
Space for listing Frequently Called Numbers	1
Index	2
Distribution	3
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE OF YOUR TELEPHONE	4-5
OVERSEAS AND SOUTHEAST AREA TELEPHONE SERVICE	6-7
JOINT UNIFORM TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION PRECEDENCE SYSTEM	8-9
TELEPHONE SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS	10-11
SWITCHBOARD CODE NAMES LIST	
Encode	12-14
Decode and Routing	15-17
1st Marine Division	
Telephone Traffic Diagram	18
Division Headquarters Telephone Listings	19-24
Officers Quarters	25-26
Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC)	
Telephone Traffic Diagram	27
Combat Operations Center (COC)	
Telephone Traffic Diagram	28
Headquarters Battalion	
Telephone Traffic Diagram and Listing	29-31
1st Marines Telephone Traffic Diagram	32
9th Marines Telephone Traffic Diagram	33
11th Marines Telephone Traffic Diagram	34
1st Recon Bn Telephone Traffic Diagram	35
1st Tank Bn Telephone Traffic Diagram	36
1st Anti Tank Bn Telephone Traffic Diagram	37
1st Medical Bn Telephone Traffic Diagram	38
Task Force Xray Headquarters	39-42
Telephone Listings	
Task Force Xray Telephone Traffic Diagram	43

**FOR TELEPHONE TROUBLE
CALL ISHERWOOD 31**

DISTRIBUTION

CG Task Force Xray (100)	Division Hqs	CMC (3)
Hq Bn (30)	S/Secty (10)	CG FMFPac (5)
CommCo (20)	G-1 (5)	CG FMFPacFwd (25)
Hq Co (10)	G-2 (5)	CG 9thMAB/CTF 79 (10)
MP Co (10)	G-3 (5)	Camp Butler (5)
ServCo (10)	G-4 (5)	3d FSR (5)
1st Mar (30)	G-5 (5)	CG III MAF (100)
1/1 (30)	Compt (2)	CG 3d MarDiv (50)
2/1 (30)	CEO (5)	CG 1st MAW (50)
3/1 (30)	Adj (5)	CG FLC (50)
5th Mar (30)	S&C (2)	Comdr,NSA (25)
1/5 (30)	Ord (2)	CO, 30th NCR (25)
2/5 (30)	Air (2)	COMUSMACV (5)
3/5 (30)	Eng (2)	COMNAVFORV (5)
7th Mar (30)	Surg (2)	COMNAVFORV Rep Dng (5)
1/7 (30)	Legal (5)	SA, 2d ARVN Div (10)
2/7 (30)	Disb (5)	CG 1st CavDiv(Air) (10)
3/7 (30)	Chap (2)	Det C-1, 5th SFG (5)
9th Mar (100)	Supply (2)	American Red Cross (2)
11th Mar (30)	NGFO (2)	
1st FAG (30)	PMO (5)	
1/11 (30)	Insp (2)	
2/11 (30)	MTO (2)	
2/12 (30)	ISO (2)	
3/11 (30)	SplServ (4)	
4/11 (30)	Emb (2)	
1st 8" HowBtry (20)	FoodDir (2)	
3d 8" HowBtry (20)	CRCC (2)	
3d 155MMGunBtry (20)	Band (2)	
1st ArmdAmphibCo (20)	Exchange (2)	
1st Recon Bn (30)	Clubs (2)	
1st AT Bn (30)	DASC (2)	
1st Tank Bn (30)	FSCC (2)	
1st MT Bn (30)	COG (5)	
7th MT Bn (30)	MARS (2)	
11th MT Bn (30)	Postal (5)	
1st Engr Bn (30)	Dent (2)	
7th Engr Bn (30)	Officers Qtrs (1 ea)	
9th Engr Bn (30)		
1st Med Bn (30)		
1st SP Bn (30)		
1st Amtrac Bn (30)		
3d Amtrac Bn (30)		
1st Hosp Co (10)		
1st DentCo (10)		
7th CommBn (30)		
1st MP Bn (30)		
Det 3d Engr Bn (10)		

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE OF YOUR TELEPHONEPLACING A CALL

- ... Refer to the telephone directory if at all in doubt about the correct exchange or extension number.
- ... Have an alternate person or extension number handy in case the person you are calling is out or the desired extension is busy.

IF CALLED EXTENSION IS BUSY

- ... Refer to the telephone directory for an alternate extension.
- ... Do not ask the operator to "hold" the line open for you.
- ... Do not ask the operator to call you back when the line is open.

IF CALLED PERSON IS NOT AVAILABLE

- ... Talk to alternate person if possible.
- ... Give answering person necessary information.
- ... Determine when desired party will be available.
- ... Notify answering party that you will call back or,
- ... Request that your call be returned. Leave your name and number.

TO TRANSFER A CALLTO SIGNAL THE OPERATORFROM A "COMMON BATTERY" TELEPHONE

- ... TP-6 (Commercial model phone) SLOWLY depress and release either of the plungers in the handset cradle.
- ... TP-9 (French cradle type phone) SLOWLY depress and release the plunger.
- ... TA-312 (Field telephone with battery selector at "CB") SLOWLY depress and release the chromed button.
- ... EE-8 (Field telephone with battery selector at "CB") SLOWLY depress and release the bar which cradles handset.

FROM A "LOCAL BATTERY" TELEPHONE (TA-312 or EE-8 with battery selector on "LB"), briskly turn the signalling crank.

WHEN THE OPERATOR ANSWERS

- ... Identify your switchboard name and extension. Do this anytime you desire additional service from the operator before your call is broken down.
- ... Ask the operator to transfer the incoming call from (identify) to the desired extension.

TO COMPLETE YOUR CALL

- ... From COMMON BATTERY telephones, merely replace the handset securely on the cradle or bar.
- ... From LOCAL BATTERY telephones, "ring-off" by briskly turning the signalling crank twice. On local battery systems, this is the only means whereby the operator knows you have completed your call. If you do not "ring-off", your extension will be "BUSY" to all callers until the operator has an opportunity to individually "challenge" your extension and release the line for further calls.

IF YOU REQUIRE ASSISTANCE to place a call, ask the operator for the switch-board supervisor.

IF YOU WISH TO REPORT TROUBLE WITH YOUR TELEPHONE, ask the operator for ISHERWOOD 31.

IF YOU HAVE A COMPLAINT

- ... DO NOT discuss complaints regarding service with the operator.
- ... Division Headquarters subscribers please register complaints with Communication Company Operations Officer (NOTICE 3). Other units notify the appropriate unit communication officer.

WHEN ANSWERING YOUR TELEPHONE

... Identify yourself by Switchboard Code Name, Extension Number, and, where appropriate, your title, i.e., Clerk, Chief, etc.

EXAMPLES: ACoF S, G-3, 1st MarDiv ISHERWOOD 3
Clerk, G-1 Office, 1st ISHERWOOD 1 CLER
MarDiv BONNIE HERO 4 AL
Asst S-4, 7th Marines

USE OF PRECEDENCE ON TACTICAL SWITCHBOARD SYSTEMS

... Normally, all telephone calls placed over Tactical Switchboard systems are handled as "routine" calls. Since the ISHERWOOD Switchboard primarily serves the Division Headquarters, PRIORITY calls are not authorized except by:

Commanding General
Assistant Division Commander
Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Communication Systems Controllers

- ... Anyone reporting a real emergency or other urgent situation, or otherwise requires assistance to complete an important call, should request to be connected to the switchboard supervisor.
- ... These directions in no way restrict the use of appropriate precedence on overseas and Southeast Asia telephone calls as discussed on pages 6 through 9.

OVERSEAS AND SOUTHEAST ASIA TELEPHONE SERVICE

The Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) system in CONUS provides the Department of Defense, Service Commands and other government agencies with rapid telephone service throughout the United States and to distant parts of the world. AUTOVON currently has extended to Okinawa (Joint Switch). The SEASIA Wideband System (SEAWBS) which provides telephone and teletype service throughout RVN also provides overseas telephone service. The 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF interconnects into SEAWBS through the Danang Long Distance Switchboard. Routing to the U. S. is accomplished through Danang to Clark AFB, Philippines, to the U. S. AUTOVON entry in Hawaii. Routing to other locations in PACOM is accomplished through many interchanges at such sites as Guam, Okinawa, Japan, etc. Information pertaining to the SEAWBS is contained in the COMUSMACV CEI. A diagram depicting selected terminals and trunks in the SEAWBS follows these instructions.


INSTRUCTIONS

1. Subscribers may place official calls to almost any distant location (e.g., Saigon, Bangkok, Okinawa, Philippines, Hawaii, San Francisco, Washington D. C.) by contacting Danang Switchboard. Danang Switchboard direct long distance connections include Saigon, Bangkok, Clark AFB and Okinawa.
2. When placing official calls:
 - a. Ask ISHERWOOD Operator for MOMENT then ask MOMENT Operator for DANANG. (From a dial telephone, dial 0 and DANANG Operator will answer.)
 - b. If ISHERWOOD's lines to MOMENT are busy, ask operator to route you through PARCHMENT.
 - c. Give DANANG destination of call, i.e., Saigon, Bangkok, Hawaii, Washington, etc.
 - d. Give precedence of call in accordance with Joint Uniform Telephone Communications Precedence System. All calls will be processed as ROUTINE unless higher precedence is given.
 - e. Give name, rank and organization.
 - f. Give the desired party's rank, name and telephone number (and alternate) if known. If not known, give place of work and location if appropriate, e.g., CINCPAC, FMFPAC, etc.
 - g. State any special instructions.
 - h. Limit call to five minutes.

PLAN YOUR CALL IN ADVANCE

3. Since the system is predicated upon service in accordance with precedence, subscribers are forewarned that higher precedence calls automatically preempt lower precedence calls. Additionally, manual switching through several switchboards necessitates waiting for the call to be rung through to the final switchboard.

4. Selected terminals and trunks in the I Corps area:



JOINT UNIFORM TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION PRECEDENCE SYSTEM

1. The precedence indicators listed in the following chart are directed for joint use and specify, by military precedence designator, the relative order in which telephone calls should be handled based on the importance (content) of the call.
2. The precedence system is directed for use by all authorized users of the voice communication facilities of the Department of Defense. Since the effectiveness of the system depends upon cooperation on the part of persons authorized to employ it, users must be familiar with the purpose to be served by precedence category and the types of calls which may be assigned the respective precedences. Each authorized user should consider whether a call requires special precedence and exercise care not to request or utilize one higher than the circumstances require.
3. The AUTOVON system does not make specific provisions for the conduct of test and exercise calls. Those activities or individuals authorized or required to conduct such tests or exercise, and upon contacting the called party will identify the call as a FLASH test call, IMMEDIATE test call, or PRIORITY test call.
4. Calls of a given precedence will not normally preempt calls of an equal precedence. However, calls originated by the President of the United States, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff can preempt FLASH calls in progress by application of their FLASH OVERRIDE capability. In addition, commanders of unified and specified commands when declaring either Defense Condition ONE or Defense Emergency and CINCNORAD when declaring either Defense Condition ONE or Air Defense Emergency may also preempt FLASH calls in progress by application of the FLASH OVERRIDE capability.

MILITARY PRECEDENCE DESIGNATORSFLASH

The military precedence designator "FLASH" is used to denote the highest precedence that may be assigned telephonic communications, and is reserved for alerts, warnings, or other emergency actions having immediate bearing on national, command or area security. Flash precedence calls may be preempted by the application of the "FLASH OVERRIDE" capability available to:

(1) President of the United States, Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (2) Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands when declaring either Defense Condition One or Defense Emergency; (3) CINCNORAD when declaring either Defense Condition One or Air Defense Emergency.

IMMEDIATE	Preempts all lower precedence calls, and is reserved for vital communications: (1) having immediate operational effect on tactical operations; (2) which directly concern safety or rescue operations; (3) which affect the intelligence community operational role.
PRIORITY	Preempts all lower precedence calls, and is reserved for calls which require prompt completion for national defense and security, the successful conduct of war, or to safeguard life or property, which do not require higher precedence. "Normally, PRIORITY will be the highest precedence which may be assigned to administrative matters for which speed of handling is of paramount importance."
ROUTINE	Has no preemption rights, and is reserved for all other official communications. All routine calls are handled sequentially as placed by the calling party.

**DID YOU KNOW THAT THE
AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL CAN SAY
330 WORDS IN 3 MINUTES**

TELEPHONE SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS

1. General. The telephone system is operated to provide the commander with a means of exercising command and control over his units and activities.

2. Maintenance

a. Communication personnel will periodically perform preventive maintenance checks on your telephone, including general inspection of instrument, batteries, cords and general operating condition. Telephone users can assist in this program by preventing abuse to the instrument, preventing tangling or tension of cords, and by frequently dusting or wiping instruments to remove dirt and dust.

b. If your telephone is inadvertently damaged, DO NOT attempt to repair it yourself -- use another instrument to report trouble to Telephone Number 31. If you have any difficulty with your telephone -- do not tamper with it -- call 31.

3. Requests for Telephone Service. Requests for additional numbers, extensions, relocations or removal of telephone service by subscribers to Division Headquarters or Headquarters Battalion Switchboards will be prepared in the format as illustrated on reverse side.

a. Other subscribers will request such service in accordance with instructions promulgated by their organization.

b. Refer to next page for service request authorization format.

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TELEPHONE SERVICE REQUEST/AUTHORIZATION

FROM: TO:	DATE		
COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONIC OFFICER, 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMF			
IT IS REQUESTED THE FOLLOWING SERVICE BE PROVIDED:			
LOCATION (BLDG NO)	PHONE NO	SPECIAL EQUIPMENT	DATE DESIRED
INSTALL		REMOVAL	
DIRECTORY LISTING		ADDITIONAL LISTING	
LOCATION (BLDG NO)	PHONE NO.	SPECIAL EQUIPMENT	DATE DESIRED
REMOVE		INSTALL	
DIRECTORY LISTING		ADDITIONAL LISTING	
REMARKS (SPECIFY ADDITIONAL DETAIL DIAGRAM OR OTHER SERVICES DESIRED TO FULLY EXPLAIN REQUEST)			
PERSON FAMILIAR WITH REQUEST:		TEL NO.	
REQUESTED BY (SIGNATURE)		APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE)	
FOR TELEPHONE OFFICE USE ONLY			
— APPROVED		— DISAPPROVED	
		(SIGNATURE)	(DATE)
DATE RECEIVED	REMARKS	SERVICE ORDER NO.	

1 Div 2600/1 (4-66)

SWITCHBOARD CODE NAMES (ENCODE)

III MAF	PARCHMENT	1/4 2/4 3/4	IMPRESSIVE BENDIX BEARMAT
<u>DIVISIONS</u>			
1st MarDiv	IISHERWOOD	1/5	CHIME
HqBn	AUDITOR	2/5	GRASSHOPPER
Hq Co	AUDITOR YANKEE	3/5	GLOVE
MP Co	WEAVE		
CommCo	NOTICE	1/7	BOOTH
SvcCo	AUDITOR ZULU	2/7 3/7	DIXIE DINER FALSE
3d MarDiv	SHOVE		
HqBn	SHAPE	1/9	IRON TREE
Hq Co	SHAPE 206	2/9	BLACK BOX
MP Co	LIPFERN	3/9	FERTILIZE
CommCo	BOGART		
SvcCo	SHAPE ZULU	1/26 2/26	BELGRADE ARLINGTON MILLS
<u>TASK FORCE</u>			
Task Force Xray	DEVOTE	3/26	DRIVING TEST

<u>ARTILLERY BATTALIONS</u>			
<u>REGIMENTS</u>			
1st Marines	BLADE	1/11 2/11	MONTH
3d Marines	CROWD	3/11	PROWL
4th Marines	AFTERGLOW	4/11	LAUGH
5th Marines	SELECT	1/12	PLAID
7th Marines	BONNIE HERO	2/12	GOOSE
9th Marines	SENATOR	3/12	WAGON MASTER
11th Marines	AMIGO	4/12	TINGE
12th Marines	CLICK		BRACE
26th Marines	INTRIGUE	1/13	JACKSONVILLE

FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP

1st Field Arty Gp IRONSIDES

INFANTRY BATTALIONS

1/1	BOUND
2/1	CEDAR BIRD
3/1	CHUCK
1/3	BURKE
2/3	SQUIRE
3/3	SWAIN

DECLASSIFIED

AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR BATTALIONS

1st	DREAM
3d	SLEEK
1st AA Co	COVETOUS

ANTITANK BATTALIONS

1st	DANCE CARD
3d	HEAVY FIST

COMMUNICATION BATTALIONS

5th	MUTINY
7th	MOUTh

ENGINEER BATTALIONS

1st	BIG BUDDY
3d	AXE HANDLE
7th	BROGUE
9th	EARTHWORM
11th	ANDREW

LAAM BATTALIONS

1st	WINGMAN
2d	PANZER

MEDICAL BATTALIONS

1st	CALHOUN
3d	WHALE

MILITARY POLICE BATTALIONS

1st	BOARDINGHOUSE
-----	---------------

MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALIONS

1st	QUENCH
3d	YACHT
7th	FASTER
9th	DENOte
11th	CHESTERWHITE

RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS

1st	IRON HAND
3d	SAINT JOE

SHORE PARTY BATTALIONS

1st	CONSEQUENCE
3d	PAN HANDLE

TANK BATTALIONS

1st	HAPPY AGE
3d	SMOKE ROOM

ARTILLERY BATTERIES

8" Howitzer Batteries:

1st	IVAN
2d	BEECHNUT

155mm Gun Batteries (SP):

1st	LADYSHIP
3d	MARGARINE

COMMUNICATION BATTALION COMPANIES

Communication Co,	
7th Comm Bn	BLUE SUGAR
Communication Supt	
Co, 7th Comm Bn	EYE PIECE
Radio Relay and	
Construction Co,	
7th Comm Bn	SUNDAY MOVIE

SEPARATE COMPANIES

Dental Companies:	
1st	CHAIN WORK
3d	ROLAND

MISCELLANEOUS

Chu Lai Def Cmd	ANCHOR WATCH
Chu Lai Airfield	
Def Opn Center	CHOW DOWN
37th Signal Bn	PUMA
1972 Comm Sq	FLAMINGO
(Serves C-Det	
5th SFG, Dng Sta	
Hosp plus numerous	
other subscribers	
Danang area)	

LOGISTICS COMMAND

Force Logistics Command/1st FSR	PITCHBLENDE
H&S Bn, 1st FSR	KIT CARSON
Supply Bn, 1st FSR	KIT CARSON SIERRA
Maintenance Bn, 1st FSR	KIT CARSON MIKE
Force Logistic Support Group ALFA/	PERFORMANCE
3d Service Bn	
Force Logistic Support Group BRAVO/	VALVE
1st Service Bn	ZIPPER LIP
Bulk Fuel Company	

NAVAL ACTIVITIES

Commander, Naval Support Activity, Danang	MOTLEY
Naval Support Facility, Chu Lai	SHELLBACK
30th Naval Construction Regiment	PROFILE
Naval Mobile Construction Battalions:	
MCB-1	SPRUCE
MCB-2	PROUD
MCB-3	STORM
MCB-4	TRENCH
MCB-5	VOCAL
MCB-6	DRIFT
MCB-7	STEEP
MCB-8	ROCKFISH
MCB-9	ORDERLY
MCB-10	SHAVETAIL
MCB-11	LEGEND
MCB-40	GLADSTONE BAG
MCB-58	FORESTALL
MCB-62	CARTRIDGE

**PATIENCE WILL HELP THE
OPERATOR TO HELP YOU**

DECLASSIFIED

SWITCHBOARD CODE NAMES (DECODE)


<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ROUTING</u>
AFTERGLOW	4th Marines	ISH - SHOVE - SHOVE FWD-
AMIGO	11th Marines	ISH -
ANCHOR WATCH	Chu Lai Defense Command	ISH - DEVOTE-
ANDREW	11th Engineer Battalion	ISH - SHOVE-
AUDITOR	HqBn, 1st MarDiv	ISH -
AUDITOR YANKEE	HqCo, HqBn, 1st MarDiv	ISH - AUDITOR
AUDITOR ZULU	SvcCo, HqBn, 1st MarDiv	ISH - AUDITOR
AXE HANDLE	3d Engineer Battalion	ISH - SHOVE - SHOVE FWD-
BEARMAT	3d Bn, 4th Marines	ISH - SHOVE-
BEECHNUT	3d 8" How Btry	ISH - DEVOTE - PLAID-
BENDIX	2d Bn, 4th Marines	ISH - SENATOR-
BELGRADE	1st Bn, 26th Marines	ISH - SENATOR-
BIG BUDDY	1st Engineer Battalion	ISH - DEVOTE-
BLACK BOX	2d Bn, 9th Marines	ISH - SHOVE - SHOVE FWD-
BLADE	1st Marines	ISH -
BLUE SUGAR	CommCo, 7th Comm Battalion	ISH - DEVOTE - MOUTH-
BOGART	CommCo, HqBn, 3d MarDiv	ISH - SHOVE-
BONNIE HERO	7th Marines	ISH - DEVOTE-
BOOTH	1st Bn, 7th Marines	ISH - DEVOTE - BONNIE HERO-
BOUND	1st Bn, 1st Marines	ISH - BLADE-
BRACE	4th Bn, 12th Marines	ISH - SHOVE-
BROGUE	7th Engineer Battalion	ISH -
BURKE	1st Bn, 3d Marines	ISH - SHOVE-
CALHOUN	1st Medical Battalion	ISH -
CARTRIDGE	MCB-62	ISH - SHOVE-
CEDAR BIRD	2d Bn, 1st Marines	ISH - BLADE-
CHAIN WORK	1st Dental Co	ISH - AUDITOR - 40
CHIME	1st Bn, 5th Marines	ISH - DEVOTE - SELECT-
CHOWDOWN	Chu Lai Airfield Defense Cmd	ISH - DEVOTE-
CHESTERWHITE	11th Motor Transport Bn	ISH -
CHUCK	3d Bn, 1st Marines	ISH - BLADE-
CLICK	12th Marines	ISH - SHOVE-
CONSEQUENCE	1st Shore Party Battalion	ISH - DEVOTE-
COVETOUS	1st Armored Amphibian Co	ISH - AMIGO-
CROWD	3d Marines	ISH - SHOVE - SHOVE FWD-
DANCE CARD	1st Antitank Battalion	ISH -
DENOTE	9th Motor Transport Bn	ISH - SHOVE-
DEVASTATE	MASS-2	ISH -
DEVOTE	Task Force Xray	ISH -
DIXIE DINER	2d Bn, 7th Marines	ISH - DEVOTE - BONNIE HERO-
DREAM	1st AmTrac Bn	ISH -
DRIFT	MCB 6	ISH - PARCHMENT- DANANG- FLAMINGO-
DRIVING TEST	3d Bn, 26th Marines	ISH - SHOVE - SHOVE FWD-

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EARTHWORM	9th Engineer Battalion	ISH - DEVOTE-
EYE PIECE	Comm Supt Co, 7th Comm Bn	ISH - PARCHMENT- MUTINY-
FALSE	3d Bn, 7th Marines	ISH - DEVOTE -
FASTER	7th Motor Transport Bn	ISH - DEVOTE-
FERTILIZE	3d Bn, 9th Marines	
FORESTALL	MCB-58	
GLADSTONE BAG	MCB-40	ISH - DEVOTE-
GLOVE	3d Bn, 5th Marines	ISH - DEVOTE - SELECT-
GOOSE	1st Bn, 12th Marines	ISH - AMIGO
GRASSHOPPER	2d Bn, 5th Marines	ISH -
HAPPY AGE	1st Tank Bn	ISH -
HEAVY FIST	3d Antitank Bn	ISH - SHOVE-
IMPRESSIVE	1st Bn, 4th Marines	ISH - SHOVE FWD- AFTERGLOW-
IRON HAND	1st Reconnaissance Bn	ISH -
IRON SIDES	1st Field Artillery Group	ISH - DEVOTE-
IRON TREE	1st Bn, 9th Marines	
ISHERWOOD	1st Marine Division	ISH -
IVAN	1st 8" How Battery	ISH - AMIGO-
KIT CARSON	H&S Bn, 1st FSR	ISH -
LADYSHIP	1st 155mm Gun Btry (SP)	ISH - SHOVE - CLICK-
LAUGH	3d Bn, 11th Marines	ISH - DEVOTE- IRONSIDES-
LEGEND	MCB-11	
LIPFERE	MP CO, HqBn, 3d MarDiv	ISH - SHOVE- SHAPE-
MARGARINE	3d 155mm Gun Btry (SP)	ISH - DEVOTE- IRONSIDES-PLAID-
MOMENT	1st MAW	
MONTH	1st Bn, 11th Marines	ISH - AMIGO-
MOTLEY	NavSuppAct, Danang	ISH - PARCHMENT-
MOUTH	7th Comm Bn, FMF	ISH - DEVOTE-
MUTINY	5th Comm Bn, FMF	ISH - PARCHMENT-
NOTICE	CommCo, HqBn, 1st MarDiv	ISH - AUDITOR-
ORDERLY	MCB-9	ISH - KIT CARSON-

DECLASSIFIED

PANHANDLE REAR	DET 3d Shore Party Battalion	ISH-
PANZER	2d LAAM Battalion	ISH - MOMENT-
PARCHMENT	III MAF	ISH -
PERFORMANCE	FLSG ALFA/3d Svc Bn	ISH - SHOVE
PITCHBLENDE	Force Logistic Command	ISH -
PLAID	4th Bn, 11th Marines	ISH - DEVOTE - IRONSIDES-
PROFILE	30th NCR	ISH - PARCHMENT
PROUD	MCB-2	
PROWL	2d Bn, 11th Marines	ISH - DEVOTE - IRONSIDES-
QUENCH	1st Motor Transport Bn	ISH -
ROCKFISH	MCB-8	ISH - DEVOTE-
ROLAND	3d Dental Co	ISH - SHOVE-
SAINST JOE	3d Reconnaissance Bn	ISH - SHOVE-
SELECT	5th Marines	ISH - DEVOTE-
SENATOR	9th Marines	ISH -
SHAPE	HqBn, 3d MarDiv	ISH - SHOVE-
SHAPE 206	HqCo, HqBn, 3d MarDiv	ISH - SHOVE-
SHAPE ZULU	SvcCo, HqBn, 3d MarDiv	ISH - SHOVE-
SHAVETAIL	MCB-10	ISH -
SHELL BACK	NavSuppFac, Chu Lai	ISH - DEVOTE-
SHOVE	3d Marine Division	ISH -
SLEEK	3d AmTrac Bn	ISH - DEVOTE-
SMOKE ROON	3d Tank Battalion	ISH - SHOVE-
SPRUCE	MCB-1	ISH - KIT CARSON-
SQUIRE	2d Bn, 3d Marines	ISH - SHOVE- SHOVE FWD-CROWD-
STEEP	MCB-7	ISH - SHOVE-
STORM	MCB-3	ISH - DEVOTE-
SUNDAY MOVIE	Radio Relay ConstrCo, 7th Comm Battalion	ISH - DEVOTE- MOUTH-
SWAIN	3d Bn, 3d Marines	ISH - SHOVE- SHOVE FWD-CROWD-
SYRINGE	1st Hospital Co	ISH - DEVOTE-
TINGE	3d Bn, 12th Marines	ISH - SHOVE-
TRENCH	MCB-4	ISH - DEVOTE-
VALVE	FLSG BRAVO/1st Svc Bn	ISH - DEVOTE-
VOCAL	MCB-5	ISH - PARCHMENT-DANANG-FLAMINGO
WAGON MASTER	2d Bn, 12th Marines	ISH - AMIGO-
WEAVE	MP Co, HqBn, 1st MarDiv	ISH - AUDITOR-
WHALE	3d Medical Battalion	ISH - SHOVE-
WINGMAN	1st LAAM Battalion	ISH - MOMENT-
YACHT	3d Motor Transport Bn	ISH - SHOVE-



DECLASSIFIED

	<u>MANUAL</u>	<u>DIAL</u>
COMMANDING GENERAL	6	6290
COMMANDING GENERAL'S QTRS	106	EX 6290
COMMANDING GENERAL'S MESS	206	
GUEST QUARTERS	306	
AIDES-DE-CAMP	13	EX 6290
AIDES-DE-CAMP /STAFF SECRETARY QTRS	113	
SERGEANT MAJOR	406	
CHIEF OF STAFF	5	6465
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF	105	
CHIEF OF STAFF QUARTERS	905	EX 6465
STAFF SECRETARY	38	EX 6465
PROTOCOL OFFICER	138	
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1	1	6218
ASST G-1	1	
ASST G-1	101	
ASST G-1	201	
SPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICER	201	
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2	2	6262
ASST G-2	2	
PRODUCTION OFFICER	202	
ACQUISITION OFFICER	302	
IMAGERY INTERP OFFICER	502	

**DON'T TELL-A- PHONE OUR
SECRETS**

DECLASSIFIED

OIC SSCT-2	AUDITOR 98
OIC 1ST IT	IRON HAND-1ST IT
SIO	602
OIC 3d ITT	LUSTY
OIC 3d CIT	LUSTY
CI OFFICER	502
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3	3 6307
ASST G-3	103 EX 6307
OPNS/NWEO	203
ASST OPNS OFFICER	403
ASST OPNS/RPTS/PFO	403
OIC COC	000
TRNG OFFICER	303
PLANS O/NBCDO	503
ASST PLANS OFFICER	503
INO TO 2D ARVN DIV	(QUANG NGAI TOC)
INO TO QUANG DA SPEC ZONE	HOI AN 103
INO TO DA NANG SPEC SEC	PUMA 126
INO FROM I CORPS	24
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4	4 6359
ASST G-4	104
OPNS OFFICER	304
ASST OPNS OFFICER	304

DECLASSIFIED

PLANS OFFICER	204	
ASST PLANS OFFICER	204	
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5	46	6287
ASST G-5	46	
CIVIL AFFAIRS OFF	46	
PSY OPS OFFICER	146	
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, COMPTROLLER	50	6287
ASST COMPTROLLER	50	
ADJUTANT	7/207	6218
PERS OFFICER	47	
OFFICERS O/TAD	147	
ENL PERS SEC /DIV LOCATOR	247	
CASUALTY OFFICER	107	
AWARDS OFFICER	107	
RPS CUSTODIAN	507	
S&G FILES	507	
AIR OFFICER	14	6115
ASST AIR O	14	
AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR OFFICER	SLEEK 6	
ARTILLERY OFFICER	AMIGO 6	
BAND OFFICER	AUDITOR 55	
CAREER ADVISOR	AUDITOR 46	
CHAPLAIN	19/19	
ASST CHAPLAIN	DEVOTE 19	

**CONSULT YOUR DIRECTORY
BEFORE CALLING**

COMBAT OPERATION CENTER (COC)	COO	6115
COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS OFFICER	10	6275
ASST CEO	10	EX 6275
ASST CEO/OPERATIONS	110	
ASST CEO/ELECTRONICS	210	
ASST CEO/PLANS	210	
DIV COMM CENTER OFFICER	111	
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER	11 (IN)	
	12 (OUT)	
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS CONTROL	69	
DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER	DEVASTATE	
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER	BAILEY	6115
DENTAL OFFICER	40	
ADMIN ASST	40	
DISBURSING OFFICER (3D MARDIV)	18	
ASST DISBURSING OFFICER	118/218	
DISBURSING OFFICER (1ST MARDIV)	418	
ASST DISBURSING OFFICER	318	
EMBARKATION OFFICER	39/139	

NO CLASSIFIED CONVERSATIONS
NO UNAUTHORIZED CODES
NO DOUBLE TALK

ENGINEER OFFICER	15	6359
ASST ENGINEER OFFICER	115	
EXCHANGE OFFICER	44	
FOOD SERVICES OFFICER	56	
HISTORICAL OFFICER	56	
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFFICER	446	
INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFF	41/141	
HELICOPTER PAD (CG)	54	
INSPECTOR	32	
LEGAL OFFICER	17	6275
ASST LEGAL OFFICER	117	
ADMIN SEC	117	
MIL JUSTICE	117	
TRIAL COUNSEL	117	
LAW SPECIALIST	217	
DEFENSE COUNSEL	317	
MARS STATION (3D MARDIV)	228	
MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER	35/135	
NAVAL GUNFIRE OFFICER	26	6115
ORDNANCE OFFICER	8	
AMMUNITION OFFICER	8	
OFFICER BILLETING	AUDITOR 260	
OFFICERS CLUB	160	
PHOTOGRAPHIC SECTION	341	

USE PROPER PROCEDURE

DECLASSIFIED

POSTAL OFFICER	20
PROVOST MARSHAL	WEAVE 6
RED CROSS	62/162
REPRODUCTION OFFICER	307
SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER	37
CUSTODIAN RECREATION FUND	REAR 37
SUPPLY OFFICER	21/121
SURGEON	16
ADMIN OFFICER	116
TANK OFFICER	HAPPY AGE 6
WIRE OFFICER	31/131

ALWAYS IDENTIFY YOURSELF

OFFICERS QUARTERS
COLONELS (ISHERWOOD)

	MANUAL	DIAL	QTRS
COL. S. J. ALTMAN	905	6465	C/S QTRS
COL. H. POGGEMEYER JR.	909		G-3 QTRS
COL. E. L. BALE	909		G-4 QTRS
CAPT. P. C. CONGLIS, (DC) USN	931		1
	931		1
COL. E. P. CLAUDE	932		2
COL. W. W. CURTIS	932		2
	933		3
	933		3
COL. F. C. LANG	934		4
COL. W. A. LEITNER	934		4
COL. D. L. MALLORY	935		5
	935		5
LT.COL. R. S. ROBERTSON	936		6
	936		6
COL. A. L. EMILS	937		7
COL. P. J. DUPRE	937		7
CAPT. D. J. CASAZZA, (CHC) USN	938		8
COL. S. DAVIS	938		8
CAPT. J. J. MCGREEVY, (MC) USN	939		9
LT.COL. G. A. MERRILL	939		9

HANG UP THE RECEIVER GENTLY


LT COLS AND MAJORS (AUDITOR)

QTRS NO.	PHONE NO.
A-1	ALFA 1
A-2	ALFA 2
A-3	ALFA 3
A-6	ALFA 6
A-7	ALFA 7
B-1	BRAVO 1
B-2	BRAVO 2
B-3	BRAVO 3
B-4	BRAVO 4
C-1	CHARLIE 1
C-2	CHARLIE 2
C-3	CHARLIE 3
C-4	CHARLIE 4
D-2	DELTA 2


For information on which hut an officer lives in, ask Auditor operator
for 260-OFFICER BILLETING

NOTE: Telephones are not installed in company grade officers huts.


**IF YOU HAVE A TELEPHONE
SERVICE COMPLAINT
CALL NOTICE 3**

LOCAL TELEPHONES

Air Off	Opsn Chief
Watch Off	Recon AO
Opsn Off	Flight Tower
	OIC Qtrs



CG	C/S
CG Qtrs	C/S Qtrs
OIC COC	COC 3 Ops Chief
G-2	Journal Clerk
G-3	TT Operator
G-3 Watch Off	OIC Qtrs
G-2 Watch Off	G-2 Qtrs
G-3 Ops Off	G-3 Qtrs



HEADQUARTERS BN (AUDITOR SWBD)

COMMANDING OFFICER	1/ISH 34
EXECUTIVE OFFICER	5/ISH 134
S-1	1
S-3	3
S-4	4
ADJUTANT	7
BATTALION AID STATION	16
LEGAL OFFICER	17
SUPPLY OFFICER	21/121
MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER	35
BAND OFFICER	55
BN GUARD	27
DENTAL CLINIC	40
ENLISTED CLUB	70
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFFICE	46
MESS HALL	58
SECURITY PLATOON	127
STAFF NCO CLUB	71
WATER POINT (7TH ENGR ROCK CRUSHER)	215
GENERATOR SITE (HILLTOP)	415
GENERATOR POINT (MAIN CP AREA)	515
GENERATOR POINT (SVC CO)	615
WATER POINT (Hq Co)	715
TRANSIENT OFFICERS QUARTERS	ALFA 4

**DON T TELL-A-PHONE OUR
SECRETS**

DECLASSIFIED

COMMUNICATION COMPANY (NOTICE-AUDITOR SWBD)

COMMANDING OFFICER	6
EXECUTIVE OFFICER	5
OPERATIONS	3
1ST SERGEANT	7
ADMIN CHIEF	7
SUPPLY	21
RADIO PLATOON	28
RADIO RELAY	52
AIR/NAVAL GUNFIRE PLATOON COMMANDER	14/26
WIRE OFFICER/CHIEF	31/131
ELECTRONICS MAINTENANCE	49
MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER	35


HEADQUARTERS COMPANY (AUDITOR YANKEE)


COMMANDING OFFICER	6
COMPANY OFFICE	7


SERVICE COMPANY (AUDITOR ZULU)


COMMANDING OFFICER	6
COMPANY OFFICE	7
SUB UNIT ONE	SUB UNIT ONE


**FOR TELEPHONE TROUBLE
CALL ISHERWOOD 31**




















DECLASSIFIED

TASK FORCE XRAY (CHU LAI)TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS (DEVOTE)

COMMANDING GENERAL	6
QUARTERS	106
GENERAL'S MESS	156
AIDE-DE-CAMP	13
CHIEF OF STAFF	5
QUARTERS	105
STAFF SECRETARY	38
QUARTERS	113
SERGEANT MAJOR	38
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1	1
ASSISTANT G-1	101
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2	2
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER	102
ORDER OF BATTLE OFFICER	202
AIR OBSERVER	402
PHOTO IMAGERY INTERPRETATION UNIT	502
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER	702
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3	3
PLANS/TRAINING OFFICER	103
OPERATIONS OFFICER	203
OIC COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER	803
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4	4
ASSISTANT G-4	104
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5	46
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OFFICER	146
PLT CMDR USA 4TH AA, PLT 29TH CACO	146
ADJUTANT	7
MAIL AND FILES SECTION	207
S AND C FILES SECTION	407
AIR FREIGHT	
MARINE AIR GROUP 13	SWISS AIR FREIGHT
MARINE AIR GROUP 36	607
AMERICAN RED CROSS	119/219
AREA AUDITOR	150
ASSISTANT DIVISION CHAPLAIN	19

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS OFFICER	10
QUARTERS	310
ASSISTANT CEO/COMM CHIEF	110
ASSISTANT CEO ELECTRONICS	210
CEO CHU LAI INSTALLATION	210
SYSTEMS CONTROL	69
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER OFFICER	111
INCOMING	11
OUTGOING	12
COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER	COC
COMMANDING GENERAL	6
CHIEF OF STAFF	5
G-2 WATCH OFFICER	
G-3 WATCH OFFICER	
G-3 OPERATIONS	
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER	
DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER	
REPORT SECTION	
1ST DENTAL DET COMMANDER	40
DEPUTY DISBURSING OFFICER	18
DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER	LANDSHARK ALFA
EMBARKATION OFFICER	39
ENGINEER OFFICER	15
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER	BAILEY
COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER	
DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER	
AIR OFFICER	14
	114
ARTILLERY OFFICER	22
NAVAL GUNFIRE OFFICER	26
RECONNAISSANCE BN REPRESENTATIVE	29
OPERATIONS CHIEF	
TARGET INFORMATION	
FOOD SERVICE OFFICER	56
HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT	34
HELICOPTER PADS	
VIP PAD	54
ADMIN PAD	154
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFFICER	EARTHWORM IRO
INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER	141

DECLASSIFIED

INSPECTOR	32
LEGAL OFFICER	17
DEFENSE SECTION	117
TRIAL SECTION/MJD	217
C-CM SECTION	317
MARINE EXCHANGE OFFICE	44
MILITARY AFFILIATE RADIO STATION	237
MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER	35
ASSISTANT MTO	135
ORDNANCE OFFICER	404
POSTAL OFFICER	20
LOCATOR	120
PROVOST MARSHAL	27
RAYMOND, MORRISON, KNUDSON CORP	RMK
TASK FORCE SUPPLY OFFICER	21
SUPPLY CHIEF	121
TASK FORCE SURGEON	16
US ARMY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT OFFICE	439/539
US ARMY 362 SIGNAL CO, DET 4	362
USO	337
WIRE OFFICER	31
TELEPHONE TROUBLE DESK	99

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, HEADQUARTERS
BATTALION, SUB UNIT 2 (AUDITOR REAR)

OFFICER IN CHARGE	6
EXECUTIVE OFFICER	5
ADJUTANT	7
S-1	1
S-3	3
S-4	4
 BATTALION AID STATION	 16
 BASE DEVELOPMENT	 504
BASE MAINTENANCE	404
 CLUBS OFFICER	 60
OFFICERS CLUB	160
STAFF CLUB	260
ENLISTED CLUB	360
WAREHOUSE	460
 ENGINEER OFFICER	 15
 MAINTENANCE COORDINATOR	 104
 MESS HALL	 MOUTH 256
 QUARTERS	 205/206
QUEST	910/915/921
LIEUTENANT COLONELS	914
MAJORS	911
CAPTAINS	917
LIEUTENANTS	920
MASTER SERGEANTS	909
STAFF SERGEANTS	
 SERVICE COMPANY	 AUDITOR ZULU
 SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER	 37
EDUCATION OFFICE	137
RECREATION CUSTODIAN/WAREHOUSE	237
 US ARMY, DET TASK FORCE (OPERATION BURGESS)	 228
 WATER POINT	 204
 WIRE OFFICER	 31